T43n1830_成唯識論述記

大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

No. 1830 [cf. No. 1585]

成唯識論述記卷第一(本)

沙門基撰

竊以。六位精微。資象翼而筌理。二篇玄妙。藉蒙．列以探機。況乎非有非空。息詮辨于言蹄之外。不生不滅。絕名相於常寂之津。至覺迥照其宗。將聖獨甄其宰。無言之言風驚。韜邃彩而月玄。非有之有。波騰。湛[泳-永+幽]章而海𤀹匪屬具體鄰智渲賾釣深。則空性了義幾乎息矣。唯識三十頌者。十支中之一支。天親菩薩之所制也。白虹飛祲。素豪銷景。線華奧旨舛鳳訛風。貝葉靈篇乖魚謬日。顧惟法寶斯文行墜。誕茲融識秀跡傳燈。晦孤明於俱舍。示同塵而說有。解惠縛于攝論。表縱聖而談空。鑒洽智周。窮神盡睿。研精此頌用標玄極。釋文未就歸真上遷。義繁文約。泉源重秘。爰有護法等十大菩薩。澄情七囀。激河辨而贊微言。游神八藏。振金聲而流妙釋。凈彼真識成斯雅論。名曰成唯識論。或名凈唯識論。義苞權．實。陵鷲巘而飛高。理洞希夷。掩龍宮而騰彩。總諸經之綱領索隱涵宗。括眾論之菁華掇奇提異。風飛三量而外道靡旗。泉涌二因則小乘亂轍。故以。儀天地而齊載。孕日月而融明。豈只與潢河爭流。雷霆競響而

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 竊以為，六位的精微之處，需要藉助象和翼來闡明其道理；二篇的玄妙之處，需要憑藉蒙和列來探索其奧秘。更何況，非有非空的道理，超越了言語詮釋的範圍；不生不滅的境界，斷絕了名相的束縛，到達了常寂的彼岸。至高的覺悟獨自照亮其宗旨，聖人的智慧獨特地甄別其主宰。無言之言如同風的驚動，隱藏著深邃的光彩，如同月亮的玄妙。非有之有，如同波濤的翻騰，在深邃的道理中顯現出大海的廣闊。如果不是具體地接近智者，闡明深奧的道理，探求深邃的意義，那麼空性的究竟意義幾乎就要消失了。 《唯識三十頌》是十大論支中的一支，是天親菩薩所著。白虹貫日，象徵著不祥之兆；素豪消失，預示著聖人的逝去。經文的奧旨出現偏差，如同鳳凰的錯誤鳴叫；貝葉經的靈篇出現謬誤，如同魚的錯誤形狀。考慮到佛法的珍貴經文將要衰落，因此出現了融通識見的傑出人物來傳承佛法。他們隱藏了《俱舍論》的孤立見解，用世俗的方式來闡述有；他們解開了《攝大乘論》的束縛，用超越聖人的方式來談論空。他們的智慧廣博，窮盡了神妙和智慧，精研此頌，用以標明玄妙的極致。釋文尚未完成，作者就歸真圓寂了。義理繁多，文字簡略，如同泉源一樣被重重隱藏。 於是有護法等十大菩薩，以清凈的心情七次演說，激揚如河流般的辯才，讚美這精微的語言；他們遊歷於八藏之中，發出金石般的聲音，流傳著精妙的解釋。他們凈化了真實的意識，成就了這部優雅的論著，名為《成唯識論》，又名《凈唯識論》。義理包含權巧和真實，超越了靈鷲山的高峰；道理洞徹希夷之境，掩蓋了龍宮的光彩。它總括了諸經的綱領，探索了隱秘的宗旨；它囊括了眾論的精華，選取了奇異的觀點。它的三量如同風一樣飛揚，使外道偃旗息鼓；它的二因如同泉水一樣涌出，使小乘迷失方向。因此，它與天地一樣承載萬物，與日月一樣融合光明。豈止是與黃河爭流，如同雷霆一樣競相轟鳴！

【English Translation】 English version: I humbly believe that the subtle intricacies of the six positions require the aid of '象' (symbols) and '翼' (wings) to elucidate their principles; the profound mysteries of the two treatises rely on '蒙' (ignorance) and '列' (arrangement) to explore their secrets. Moreover, the principle of neither existence nor non-existence transcends the scope of verbal interpretation; the state of neither birth nor death severs the bonds of names and forms, reaching the shore of eternal tranquility. The supreme enlightenment alone illuminates its purpose, and the wisdom of the sages uniquely distinguishes its master. The wordless words are like the startling of the wind, concealing profound splendor, like the mystery of the moon. The existence of non-existence is like the surging of waves, revealing the vastness of the sea in profound principles. If one does not specifically approach the wise, elucidate the profound principles, and explore the deep meanings, then the ultimate meaning of emptiness will almost disappear. The 'Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only' (唯識三十頌) is one of the ten branches, composed by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu (天親菩薩). A white rainbow piercing the sun symbolizes an ominous sign; the disappearance of the white hair foretells the passing of a sage. The profound meaning of the scriptures appears to be deviating, like the erroneous cry of a phoenix; the spiritual chapters of the palm-leaf scriptures appear to be flawed, like the erroneous shape of a fish. Considering that the precious scriptures of the Dharma are about to decline, therefore, outstanding figures who integrate knowledge appear to transmit the Dharma. They conceal the isolated views of the 'Abhidharmakośa' (俱舍論), using worldly ways to explain existence; they untie the bonds of the 'Mahāyānasaṃgraha' (攝大乘論), discussing emptiness in a way that transcends the sages. Their wisdom is broad, exhausting the divine and wisdom, and they meticulously study this verse to mark the ultimate of the profound. Before the commentary was completed, the author passed away. The meaning is abundant, and the text is concise, like a spring that is heavily hidden. Therefore, there are ten great Bodhisattvas, such as Dharmapāla (護法), who expound with pure minds seven times, stirring up river-like eloquence, praising these subtle words; they travel through the eight treasuries, emitting sounds like gold and stone, spreading wonderful explanations. They purify the true consciousness and accomplish this elegant treatise, named 'Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi' (成唯識論), also known as 'Pure Consciousness-Only Treatise' (凈唯識論). The meaning encompasses expediency and truth, surpassing the peaks of Vulture Peak (靈鷲山); the principle penetrates the realm of the subtle and the imperceptible, covering the splendor of the Dragon Palace (龍宮). It summarizes the outlines of all the sutras, exploring the hidden purpose; it encompasses the essence of all the treatises, selecting strange viewpoints. Its three proofs fly like the wind, causing the heretics to lower their flags and cease their drums; its two causes gush out like springs, causing the Hinayana to lose their way. Therefore, it carries all things like heaven and earth, and integrates light like the sun and moon. It is not only competing with the Yellow River, but also competing with thunder!

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已。在昔周星閟色至道郁而未揚。漢日通暉像教宣而遐被。譯經．律義繼武聯蹤。多覿蔥右之英罕聞天竺之秀。音韻壤隔。混宮宇于華．戎。文字天懸。昧形聲于胡．晉。雖則彷彿糟粕。未能曲盡幽玄。大義或乖微辭致爽。鴻疑碩滯霧擁云凝。幽絢屢彰其詳可略。惟我親教三藏法師　玄奘。含章拔萃。燭榑景于靈臺。蓄德居宗。涌談漪于智沼。騖三輪之寶躅。迥晉金沙。澄八解之真波。遼清玉井。忘軀殉法委運祈通。冥契天真微假資習。匪摛靈而顯異。固蘊福而延祥。備踐神蹤窮探秘府。先賢未覿咸貫情樞。曩哲所遺幷包心極。誓志弘撫言旋舊邦。德簡帝心道延天藻。遂此寶偈南贊。金牒東流。暢翳理于玄津。蕩疑氛于縟思。穎標三藏殫駕一人。擢秀五天陵掩千古。詎與夫家依驤譽空擅美於聲明。童壽流芳徒見稱于中觀。云爾而已矣。斯本匯聚十釋群分。今總詳譯糅為一部。商搉華．梵。徴詮輕．重。陶甄諸義之差。有葉一師之制。成唯識者。舉宏綱旌一部之都目。復言論者。提藻鏡簡二藏之殊號。成乃能成之稱。以成立為功。唯識所成之名。以簡了為義。唯有識大覺之旨隆。本頌成中道之義著。唯謂簡別遮無外境。識謂能了詮有內心。識體即唯持業釋也。識性識相皆不離心。心所心王以識為主。歸心泯相總言唯識。

唯遮境有。執有者喪其真。識簡心空。滯空者乖其實。所以。晦斯空有長溺二邊。悟彼有空高履中道。三十本論名為唯識。藉此成彼名成唯識。唯識之成以彰論旨。三摩娑釋依士立名。蘇漫多聲屬主為目。論則賓主云烈旗鼓載揚。幽關洞開妙義斯賾。以教成教。資教成理。即成是論持業釋也。以理成理因理成教。是成之論依士釋也。基。學慚融．愷。忝倍譯以操觚。業謝顏．游。謬廁資于函杖。屬諸雅吹誠事濫竽。顧異良工叨暉蘊玉。凡斯纂敘備受指麾。庶玄鑒來英鏡詳幽致爾(其此廣釋題目。及下所有別義。並如樞要一一別解)。

論云。稽首唯識性。滿分清凈者我今釋彼說利樂諸有情。

述曰。初發論端略以五門解釋。一辨教時．機。二明論宗．體。三藏．乘所攝。四說教年．主。五判釋本文。

第一辨教時．機。于中有二。初辨說教時會。后辨教所被機　辨說教時會者。如來設教隨機所宜。機有三品不同。教遂三時亦異。諸異生類無明所盲。起造惑．業。迷執有我。于生死海淪沒無依。故大悲尊初成佛已。仙人鹿苑轉四諦輪。說阿笈摩除我有執。令小根等漸登聖位。彼聞四諦雖斷我愚。而於諸法迷執實有。世尊為除彼法有執。次於鷲嶺說諸法空。所謂摩訶般若經等。令中根品舍小趣大。彼聞

世尊密義意趣說無破有。便撥二諦性相。皆空為無上理。由斯二聖互執有．空。迷謬競興未契中道。如來為除此空．有執。于第三時演了義教。解深密等會說一切法唯有識等。心外法無破初有執。非無內識遣執皆空。離有．無邊正處中道。于真諦理悟證有方。于俗諦中妙能留舍。又今此論爰引六經。所謂華嚴．深密．如來出現功德莊嚴．阿毗達磨．楞迦．厚嚴。十一部論。瑜伽．顯揚．莊嚴．集量．攝論．十地．分別瑜伽．觀所緣緣．二十唯識．辨中邊．集論等為證。理明唯識三性十地因果行位了相大乘。故知第三時中道之教也。如瑜伽論第七十六。解深密經廣說其相。此約機．理漸教法門以辨三時。若大由小起。即有三時年月前後。解深密經說唯識是也。若頓教門。大不由小起。即無三時前後次第。即花嚴中說唯心是。初成道竟最第一說。此約多分。今論所明二種皆是。若對不定姓大由小起。即第三時教。若唯被菩薩大不由小起。即頓教也。此顯頓．漸無別定教。入法界品五百聲聞亦在坐故。如樞要說　辨教所被機者。依瑜伽等有五種姓。一菩薩。二獨覺。三聲聞。四不定。五無姓。此論第三云。入見菩薩皆名勝者。證阿賴耶故正為說。又見道前。已能信解求彼轉依故亦為說　又云。無姓有情不能窮底。故說甚深。

趣寂種姓不能通達。故名甚細。由此論旨。唯被大乘。及不定姓趣菩薩者。非被獨覺．聲聞．無姓三種機也。故所被機必唯上品。所顯幽旨亦離二邊。浩污包括難可詳矣。依楞迦經被五種姓。依大般若被四種姓。莊嚴論等與此稍異。如樞要說。

二明論宗體。于中有二。初明論宗。后彰論體。皆如樞要說　明論宗者。諸愚夫類。從無始來。虛妄分別因緣力故。執離心外定有真實能取．所取　如來大悲以甘露法。授彼令服。斷妄狂心棄執空．有證真了義。華嚴等中說一切法皆唯有識　天親菩薩。為利有情令法久住。依如上教制三十頌明唯識理。文義周圓離於廣略　后護法等。依上經論采撮精要廣釋頌文。名成唯識。故此即以唯識為宗。識有非空。境無非有。以為宗也。雖具明諸法。皆不離識也　明論體者。依瑜伽論攝釋分初第八十一說。經體有二。一文。二義。文是所依義即能依。由能詮文義得顯故。龍軍論師．無性等云。謂佛慈悲本願緣力。其可聞者自意識上文義相生似如來說。此文義相。雖自親依善根力起。而就本緣名為佛說。佛實無言。此若依本乃無文義。唯有無漏大定．智．悲。若依自識。有漏心現。即似無漏文義為體。無漏心現。即真無漏文義為體。此即如來實不說法。故大般若四百二十五．文殊問經

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：趣寂種姓（qu ji zhong xing，指具有涅槃傾向的種姓）無法通達此理，因此稱之為『甚細』。根據此論的宗旨，它只針對大乘（da cheng，佛教的一個主要分支）和不確定種姓的菩薩（pu sa，指追求覺悟的眾生），而不針對獨覺（du jue，獨自覺悟者）、聲聞（sheng wen，通過聽聞佛法而證悟者）和無姓這三種根器的人。因此，所針對的根器必定是上品，所闡明的深奧旨意也遠離二邊（er bian，指極端觀點）。其浩瀚深邃難以詳盡瞭解。依據《楞伽經》（Leng qie jing），此論針對五種姓；依據《大般若經》（Da ban ruo jing），此論針對四種姓。《莊嚴論》（Zhuang yan lun）等與此稍有不同，如《樞要》（Shu yao）所說。

二、闡明論的宗體。其中分為兩部分：首先闡明論的宗旨，然後彰顯論的本體，都如《樞要》所說。闡明論的宗旨：那些愚昧之人，從無始以來，由於虛妄分別（xu wang fen bie，錯誤的認知）的因緣力量，執著於心外有真實的能取（neng qu，能認知的主體）和所取（suo qu，被認知的客體）。如來（Ru lai，佛的稱號之一）以大慈悲心，用甘露法（gan lu fa，能帶來解脫的佛法）來教導他們，讓他們服用，斷除虛妄狂亂之心，捨棄對空（kong，空性）和有（you，存在）的執著，證悟真實的了義（liao yi，究竟的意義）。《華嚴經》（Hua yan jing）等經典中說一切法都只是識（shi，意識）的顯現。天親菩薩（Tian qin pu sa），爲了利益有情眾生（you qing zhong sheng，一切有情識的生命），使佛法長久住世，依據上述教義，撰寫了三十頌來闡明唯識（wei shi，一切唯心所現）的道理。其文辭和意義周全圓滿，既不廣博也不簡略。後來的護法（Hu fa）等人，依據上述經論，採摘精要，廣泛地解釋頌文，名為《成唯識論》（Cheng wei shi lun）。因此，此論就是以唯識為宗旨，認為識是存在的，境是不存在的。雖然全面闡明諸法，但都離不開識。

闡明論的本體：依據《瑜伽師地論·攝釋分》（Yu qie shi di lun · She shi fen）初第八十一卷所說，經的本體有二：一是文（wen，文字），二是義（yi，意義）。文是所依，義是能依，因為通過能詮釋的文字，意義才能顯現。龍軍論師（Long jun lun shi）、無性（Wu xing）等人說，憑藉佛的慈悲本願（ci bei ben yuan，慈悲的根本誓願）的力量，那些可以聽聞佛法的人，在自己的意識上產生文義的相，看起來像是佛所說。這文義的相，雖然是依靠自己親身的善根力量而生起，但就其根本因緣來說，被稱為佛說。佛實際上並沒有說話。如果依據其根本來說，就沒有文義，只有無漏（wu lou，沒有煩惱）的大定（da ding，甚深的禪定）、智慧和慈悲。如果依據自己的意識，有漏（you lou，有煩惱）的心顯現，就好像以無漏的文義為本體。無漏的心顯現，就以真正的無漏文義為本體。這就是如來實際上沒有說法的原因。所以《大般若經》第四百二十五卷、《文殊問經》（Wen shu wen jing）。

【English Translation】 English version: Those of the Gotra (zhong xing, lineage or nature) of Quiescence and Solitude cannot comprehend this. Therefore, it is called 'extremely subtle.' According to the purport of this treatise, it is only directed towards the Mahayana (da cheng, the Great Vehicle) and Bodhisattvas (pu sa, beings striving for enlightenment) of uncertain Gotra, not towards the three types of beings: Pratyekabuddhas (du jue, solitary Buddhas), Sravakas (sheng wen, disciples who attain enlightenment by hearing the teachings), and those without Gotra. Therefore, the beings it addresses must be of the highest caliber, and the profound meaning it reveals is far from the two extremes (er bian, extreme views). Its vastness and depth are difficult to fathom. According to the Lankavatara Sutra (Leng qie jing), it addresses five Gotras; according to the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra (Da ban ruo jing), it addresses four Gotras. The Ornament of the Mahayana Sutras (Zhuang yan lun) and others differ slightly from this, as stated in the Essentials (Shu yao).

Secondly, to clarify the doctrine and essence of the treatise. This is divided into two parts: first, clarifying the doctrine of the treatise, and then revealing the essence of the treatise, both as stated in the Essentials. Clarifying the doctrine of the treatise: Those foolish beings, from beginningless time, due to the power of the causes and conditions of false discrimination (xu wang fen bie, erroneous perception), cling to the belief that there are real perceivers (neng qu, the subject that perceives) and perceived objects (suo qu, the object that is perceived) outside of the mind. The Tathagata (Ru lai, one of the titles of the Buddha), with great compassion, teaches them with the nectar of Dharma (gan lu fa, the Dharma that brings liberation), allowing them to take it, cutting off the false and deluded mind, abandoning attachment to emptiness (kong, emptiness) and existence (you, existence), and realizing the true and ultimate meaning (liao yi, ultimate meaning). The Avatamsaka Sutra (Hua yan jing) and other scriptures say that all dharmas are only manifestations of consciousness (shi, consciousness). Vasubandhu Bodhisattva (Tian qin pu sa), in order to benefit sentient beings (you qing zhong sheng, all beings with consciousness) and to make the Dharma abide for a long time, based on the above teachings, composed thirty verses to clarify the principle of Vijnanavada (wei shi, the doctrine of consciousness-only). Its wording and meaning are comprehensive and complete, neither extensive nor concise. Later, Dharmapala (Hu fa) and others, based on the above sutras and treatises, extracted the essence and extensively explained the verses, naming it the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only (Cheng wei shi lun). Therefore, this treatise takes Vijnanavada as its doctrine, believing that consciousness exists and that objects do not exist. Although it comprehensively explains all dharmas, they are all inseparable from consciousness.

Clarifying the essence of the treatise: According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Section on Interpretation (Yu qie shi di lun · She shi fen), the essence of a sutra has two aspects: first, the words (wen, words), and second, the meaning (yi, meaning). The words are what is relied upon, and the meaning is what relies on them, because the meaning can be revealed through the words that explain it. The Master Nagarjuna (Long jun lun shi), Asanga (Wu xing), and others say that by the power of the Buddha's compassionate original vow (ci bei ben yuan, the fundamental vow of compassion), those who can hear the Dharma generate the appearance of words and meaning in their own consciousness, which seems like what the Buddha said. Although this appearance of words and meaning arises from the power of one's own good roots, it is called the Buddha's teaching in terms of its fundamental cause. The Buddha actually did not speak. If based on its fundamental nature, there are no words or meaning, only unconditioned (wu lou, without defilements) great samadhi (da ding, deep meditation), wisdom, and compassion. If based on one's own consciousness, the conditioned (you lou, with defilements) mind manifests, it seems to take the unconditioned words and meaning as its essence. When the unconditioned mind manifests, it takes the true unconditioned words and meaning as its essence. This is why the Tathagata actually does not teach the Dharma. Therefore, the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra, volume 425, the Manjushri Questions Sutra (Wen shu wen jing).

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等。佛皆自說我成佛來。不說一字。汝亦不聞。論說聚集顯現為體。此即無性。佛地一師。作如此解　護法．親光等云。或宜聞者本願緣力。如來識上文義相生。實能所詮文義為體。若依本說。即真無漏文義為體。故瑜伽論六十四卷。引叔攝波葉喻經云我未所說乃有爾所　二十論說。展轉增上力。二識成決定。是故世尊實有說法。言不說者是密意說。此論根本既是佛經。故出體者應如經說。此釋雖二。然此論主無不說法。取后解也　總論出體略有四重。一攝相歸性。皆如為體。故經說言。一切法亦如也。至於彌勒亦如也。二攝境從心。一切唯識。如經中說三界唯心。三攝假隨實。如不相應色．心分位。對法論說是假立故也。四性用別論。色心假實各別處收　瑜伽論說色蘊攝彼十處全等　上來第二．第四體訖。自識所變。則是第二攝境從心。並言佛說。乃是第四性用別論。聞者似法．說者真教。俱凈法界平等所流。約本為言。此教亦以真如為體。此即第一攝相歸性。能說．能聽所有名等。聲上屈曲。離聲無體。故假從實體即是聲。此即第三攝假隨實。對法論云成所引聲謂諸聖說。雖出四體所望不同。以理而言不相違背。今此論體。若從所聞有漏心變。或從能說有漏文義。唯屬依他相．名等攝。無漏心變。或無漏說。正智

所攝通圓成實。無漏有為通二性故。此所詮體。謂唯識境．正行．及果。若能詮體。即聲．名等。經體雖二。今取能詮聲．名．句等。正教體故　問十八界中十五有漏。如何聲等亦無漏攝。名．句．文三自性無記。如何可說通無漏善　答依隨轉門．二乘等身。說十五唯有漏。名等唯無記。依今大乘。若唯如來后得說法聲．名．句文。真善無漏。十地論說說者．聽者俱以二事。一者聲。二善字　能斷金剛般若論說我法唯善。汝唯無記　此論第二云法．辭二無礙解。境有差別。法緣名等。辭緣于聲　又解深密經．及瑜伽七十八說。第九地斷二種愚。一于無量所說無量名．句．字。陀羅尼自在愚　下此論第九云無量名．句．字。是法無礙解　又此論。及佛地。云十八界通無漏善。故為教體于理無違　問若明教體一切唯識。如何乃言佛菩薩說　答無性釋云。彼增上生故作是說　二十唯識天親解云。展轉增上力。二識成決定。謂余相續識差別故。令余相續差別識生　展轉互為增上緣故　問過去．未來既非實有。非有為法生已便住。如何聽教聚集解生　答無性釋云。隨墮八時聞者識上。直．非直說聚集顯現。以為體性　謂八時中聞者識上。有直．非直二種言說聚集現故。如瑜伽論八十一說。諸行無常。有起盡法。生必滅故。彼寂為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：所攝持的通於圓成實性（Parinispanna，指事物最真實、完美的狀態）。因為無漏的有為法通於兩種自性（指遍計所執性Parikalpita、依他起性Paratantra）。這所詮釋的本體，指的是唯識的境界、正確的修行以及最終的果報。如果說是能詮釋的本體，那就是指聲音、名稱等等。經的本體雖然有二種，現在取能詮釋的聲音、名稱、語句等等，因為它們是真正的教法的本體。 問：十八界（Ashtadasha Dhatu，眼界、耳界、鼻界、舌界、身界、意界，色界、聲界、香界、味界、觸界、法界，眼識界、耳識界、鼻識界、舌識界、身識界、意識界）中，有十五界是有漏的（Sasrava，指有煩惱，會產生輪迴的），為什麼聲音等等也屬於無漏的（Anasrava，指沒有煩惱，不會產生輪迴的）範疇？名稱、語句、文字這三種自性是無記的（Avyakrta，指非善非惡，不能確定其性質的），怎麼能說它們通於無漏的善法呢？ 答：依據隨轉門（Anuloma，順應世俗的方便之門）和二乘（Sravaka-yana和Pratyekabuddha-yana，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的觀點，說十五界只有有漏，名稱等等只有無記。依據現在的大乘（Mahayana，佛教的主要流派之一）觀點，如果只有如來（Tathagata，佛的稱號之一）在獲得根本智后所說的聲音、名稱、語句、文字，才是真正的善且無漏的。十地論（Dasabhumika Sutra，大乘佛教經典）中說，說法者和聽法者都具備兩種要素：一是聲音，二是善字。 《能斷金剛般若論》（Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra，又名《金剛經》）中說，『我的法是唯一的善，你的法是唯一的無記』。此論的第二部分說，法無礙解（Dharma-pratisamvid，對佛法的通達無礙）和辭無礙解（Nirukti-pratisamvid，對語言文字的通達無礙）在境界上有差別。法無礙解所緣的是名稱等等，辭無礙解所緣的是聲音。 另外，《解深密經》（Samdhinirmocana Sutra，大乘佛教經典）和《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra，瑜伽行派的根本論書）第七十八卷中說，第九地（Acintya-buddhabhumi，菩薩修行的第九個階段）斷除了兩種愚癡：一是對無量所說的無量名稱、語句、文字，在陀羅尼（Dharani，總持，記憶之法）上的自在愚。下文此論的第九卷說，無量的名稱、語句、文字，是法無礙解。 此外，此論和《佛地經》（Buddhabhumi Sutra，大乘佛教經典）中說，十八界通於無漏的善法，因此作為教法的本體在道理上沒有違背。 問：如果說教法的本體一切都是唯識（Vijnanavada，佛教哲學流派，認為一切皆是心的顯現），為什麼又說是佛菩薩說的呢？ 答：無性（Asanga，印度佛教瑜伽行派的創始人之一）解釋說，因為他們是增上生（Adhipati-phala，增上果）的緣故，所以這樣說。《二十唯識論》（Vimsatika，唯識宗的論書）中天親（Vasubandhu，印度佛教瑜伽行派的代表人物）解釋說，『輾轉增上力，二識成決定。』意思是說，因為其餘相續識的差別，使得其餘相續識產生。輾轉互相作為增上緣的緣故。 問：過去、未來既然不是真實存在的，有為法（Samskrta，由因緣和合而成的法）生起后便會停止，如何通過聽聞教法來聚集併產生理解呢？ 答：無性解釋說，隨著墮入八時（Ashta-ksana，沒有機會修行的八種狀態）的聽聞者，在意識上，直接或非直接的言說聚集顯現，作為其體性。意思是說，在八時中，聽聞者的意識上，有直接或非直接兩種言說聚集顯現的緣故。如同《瑜伽師地論》第八十一卷所說，諸行無常（Anitya，一切事物都是變化無常的），有生起和消亡的規律，生起后必然會滅亡，因此寂滅才是最終的歸宿。

【English Translation】 English version: That which is encompassed is universally complete and truly real (Parinispanna, referring to the most real and perfect state of things). This is because undefiled conditioned phenomena are connected to two natures (referring to the imagined nature Parikalpita and the dependent nature Paratantra). This object being explained refers to the realm of consciousness-only, correct practice, and the ultimate fruition. If we speak of the object that explains, it refers to sounds, names, and so on. Although there are two aspects to the essence of the sutra, we now take the sounds, names, phrases, etc., that explain, because they are the essence of the true teaching. Question: Among the eighteen realms (Ashtadasha Dhatu, the realms of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, form, sound, smell, taste, touch, dharma, eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness), fifteen are defiled (Sasrava, referring to having afflictions and generating samsara). How can sounds, etc., also be included in the undefiled (Anasrava, referring to being without afflictions and not generating samsara) category? Names, phrases, and words, these three natures are neutral (Avyakrta, referring to neither good nor evil, and whose nature cannot be determined). How can it be said that they are connected to undefiled good dharmas? Answer: According to the perspective of the conforming gate (Anuloma, the gate of expedient means that conforms to the world) and the Two Vehicles (Sravaka-yana and Pratyekabuddha-yana, the Hearer Vehicle and the Solitary Realizer Vehicle), it is said that the fifteen realms are only defiled, and names, etc., are only neutral. According to the current Mahayana (Mahayana, one of the main schools of Buddhism) perspective, if only the sounds, names, phrases, and words spoken by the Tathagata (Tathagata, one of the titles of the Buddha) after attaining fundamental wisdom are truly good and undefiled. The Dasabhumika Sutra (Dasabhumika Sutra, a Mahayana Buddhist scripture) states that both the speaker and the listener possess two elements: one is sound, and the other is good words. The Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra (Vajracchedika Prajnaparamita Sutra, also known as the Diamond Sutra) states, 'My dharma is uniquely good, and your dharma is uniquely neutral.' The second part of this treatise states that the unobstructed understanding of dharma (Dharma-pratisamvid, unobstructed understanding of the Buddha's teachings) and the unobstructed understanding of language (Nirukti-pratisamvid, unobstructed understanding of language and words) differ in their realms. The unobstructed understanding of dharma is related to names, etc., while the unobstructed understanding of language is related to sounds. Furthermore, the Samdhinirmocana Sutra (Samdhinirmocana Sutra, a Mahayana Buddhist scripture) and the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the fundamental treatise of the Yogacara school) in its seventy-eighth fascicle state that the ninth ground (Acintya-buddhabhumi, the ninth stage of a Bodhisattva's practice) cuts off two kinds of ignorance: one is ignorance regarding the freedom in dharani (Dharani, retention, the method of memory) concerning the immeasurable names, phrases, and words that are spoken. The ninth fascicle of this treatise below states that immeasurable names, phrases, and words are the unobstructed understanding of dharma. Moreover, this treatise and the Buddhabhumi Sutra (Buddhabhumi Sutra, a Mahayana Buddhist scripture) state that the eighteen realms are connected to undefiled good dharmas, therefore, as the essence of the teaching, there is no contradiction in principle. Question: If it is said that the essence of the teaching is all consciousness-only (Vijnanavada, a school of Buddhist philosophy that believes everything is a manifestation of the mind), why is it said to be spoken by Buddhas and Bodhisattvas? Answer: Asanga (Asanga, one of the founders of the Indian Buddhist Yogacara school) explains that it is said so because they are the cause of the dominant result (Adhipati-phala, the dominant result). Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu, a representative figure of the Indian Buddhist Yogacara school) explains in the Vimsatika (Vimsatika, a treatise of the Consciousness-Only school), 'Through the power of mutual enhancement, the two consciousnesses become definite.' This means that because of the difference in the remaining continuous consciousnesses, the remaining continuous consciousnesses are generated. They mutually act as enhancing conditions. Question: Since the past and future are not truly existent, and conditioned phenomena (Samskrta, phenomena that arise from the combination of causes and conditions) cease after arising, how can understanding be generated by gathering and listening to the teachings? Answer: Asanga explains that for the listener who has fallen into the eight unfavorable conditions (Ashta-ksana, eight states where there is no opportunity for practice), the direct or indirect speech gathers and manifests on their consciousness as its essence. This means that in the eight unfavorable conditions, the listener's consciousness has the gathering and manifestation of both direct and indirect speech. As the eighty-first fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra states, all phenomena are impermanent (Anitya, all things are subject to change), have the law of arising and ceasing, and are bound to perish after arising, therefore, quiescence is the ultimate refuge.

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樂　如言諸字。率爾心已必起尋求。續初心起。雖多剎那。行解唯一總名尋求。未決定知諸所目故。如瑜伽論第三卷說。又一剎那五識生已。從此無間必意識生故　復言行時。由先熏習連帶解生。有三心現。謂率爾．尋求．及次決定。決定知諸目一切行。故瑜伽說。尋求無間。若不散亂決定心生。若散亂時生即不定　雖知自性然未知義。為令知故復說無字。於此時中有先三心。于無字上但有其二。謂率爾．尋求。未決定知無所無故。即從決定后卻起尋求。論但定說率爾．尋求定無間生。尋求以後許亂起故　復言常時五心並具。其義可解。由前字力展轉熏習連后字生。于最後時方能解義。染凈等心方乃得轉。故雖無過．未。而教體亦成　若新新解皆有率爾。四字之上皆定有二心。謂率爾．尋求。即于末後。有十二心一時聚集。第一有二。第二有三。第三有二。第四有五。故有十二。既于初字有率爾心。於後后字有尋求．決定。末後乃有染凈等生。五心方具名為聚集。故唯識教其理成立。更有別義。如樞要說　此中出體雖有四門。佛地論中唯有二種。一攝境從心。二性用別質。無性意取攝境從心。護法意說性用別質。教體即是能說聲等。不爾教體便成有漏或染無記。三寶．真如亦應如是。故護法釋善順論宗不違唯識。能說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 樂，如言說諸字。率爾（突然）之心必然生起尋求。接續最初生起的心。即使經過多個剎那，行為和理解只有一個總稱，即尋求。因為尚未決定知道所指向的目標。如《瑜伽師地論》第三卷所說。又，一個剎那五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）生起之後，從此無間斷必然生起意識。所以又說在行動時，由於先前的熏習，連帶產生理解，有三種心顯現，即率爾、尋求、以及隨後的決定。決定知道所指向的一切行為。所以《瑜伽師地論》說，尋求之後，如果不散亂，決定心就會生起。如果散亂，生起就不一定。 雖然知道自性，但還不知道意義。爲了讓人知道，所以又說無字。此時心中有先前的三種心。在無字之上，只有其中的兩種，即率爾、尋求。因為尚未決定知道沒有什麼是沒有的。即從決定之後，反而生起尋求。《瑜伽師地論》只確定地說率爾、尋求必定無間斷地生起。尋求之後，允許散亂生起。 又說常時五心（作意、觸、受、想、思）並存。其意義可以理解。由於先前的字的力量，輾轉熏習，連線後來的字生起。在最後的時候，才能理解意義。染污或清凈等心才能得以轉變。所以即使沒有過去、未來，教法體系也能成立。 如果新的理解不斷產生，那麼每個字之上都必定有率爾。四個字之上都必定有兩種心，即率爾、尋求。即在最後，有十二種心一時聚集。第一個字有二種心，第二個字有三種心，第三個字有二種心，第四個字有五種心。所以共有十二種心。既然在第一個字有率爾心，在後面的字有尋求、決定。最後才會有染污或清凈等心生起。五種心全部具備，稱為聚集。所以唯識宗的教義在理上是成立的。還有其他的意義，如《樞要》所說。 此中教體雖然有四種說法，但在《佛地經論》中只有兩種。一是攝境從心（將境界歸攝於心），二是性用別質（自性和作用是不同的實體）。無性認為應該採取攝境從心。護法認為應該說性用別質。教體就是能說的聲音等。否則教體就會成為有漏或染污無記。三寶（佛、法、僧）、真如也應該如此。所以護法的解釋符合善順論宗，不違背唯識宗。能說。

【English Translation】 English version 'Le', like uttering words. The 'surer' (sudden) mind inevitably arises seeking. Continuing from the initial arising of the mind. Even if many 'kshanas' (moments) pass, the action and understanding have only one general name, which is seeking. Because one has not yet decisively known the target being pointed to. As stated in the third volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice). Furthermore, after the five 'vijnanas' (consciousnesses) (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) arise in one 'kshana' (moment), the 'manovijnana' (mind-consciousness) inevitably arises without interruption. Therefore, it is also said that when acting, due to prior 'vasana' (habitual tendencies), understanding arises in connection, and three minds appear, namely 'surer' (sudden), seeking, and subsequent determination. Determination knows all the actions being pointed to. Therefore, the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) says that after seeking, if there is no distraction, the determining mind will arise. If there is distraction, the arising is uncertain. Although one knows the 'svabhava' (self-nature), one does not yet know the meaning. In order to make people know, it is said again that there is no word. At this time, there are the previous three minds in the mind. Above the word 'no', there are only two of them, namely 'surer' (sudden), seeking. Because one has not yet decisively known that there is nothing that is not. That is, after determination, seeking arises instead. The 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) only definitively says that 'surer' (sudden) and seeking inevitably arise without interruption. After seeking, it is permissible for distraction to arise. It is also said that at all times, the five 'cittas' (mental functions) (attention, contact, sensation, perception, volition) are all present. The meaning can be understood. Due to the power of the previous word, through repeated 'vasana' (habitual tendencies), the subsequent word arises in connection. Only at the last time can the meaning be understood. Defiled or pure minds can then be transformed. Therefore, even if there is no past or future, the 'dharma' (teaching) system can be established. If new understandings continue to arise, then there must be 'surer' (sudden) above each word. Above the four words, there must be two minds, namely 'surer' (sudden), seeking. That is, in the end, twelve minds gather at once. The first word has two minds, the second word has three minds, the third word has two minds, and the fourth word has five minds. Therefore, there are a total of twelve minds. Since there is a 'surer' (sudden) mind in the first word, there is seeking and determination in the subsequent words. Only in the end will defiled or pure minds arise. When all five minds are present, it is called gathering. Therefore, the doctrine of the 'Vijnanavada' (Yogacara) school is established in principle. There are other meanings, as stated in the 'Essential Points'. Although there are four kinds of statements about the 'shastratanu' (essence of the teaching) in this, there are only two kinds in the 'Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra' (Treatise on the Buddha-land Sutra). One is 'she jing cong xin' (gathering the realm from the mind), and the other is 'xing yong bie zhi' (nature and function are different entities). 'Wuxing' (Asanga) believes that 'she jing cong xin' (gathering the realm from the mind) should be adopted. 'Huofa' (Dharmapala) believes that 'xing yong bie zhi' (nature and function are different entities) should be said. The 'shastratanu' (essence of the teaching) is the sound that can be spoken, etc. Otherwise, the 'shastratanu' (essence of the teaching) will become 'samskrta' (conditioned) or defiled and 'avyakrta' (unspecified). The 'Triratna' (Three Jewels) (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha) and 'Tathata' (Suchness) should also be like this. Therefore, 'Huofa's' (Dharmapala) explanation is in accordance with the 'Shunshun' school and does not violate the 'Vijnanavada' (Yogacara) school. Able to speak.

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法者識上現故。至下第十論自當解。

三藏．乘所攝。于中有二。初藏所攝。后乘所攝。藏所攝者。依瑜伽等說有二藏。一菩薩藏。二聲聞藏。然獨覺教少於聲聞。從多為藏。名聲聞藏。或說三藏。一素呾覽。二毗奈耶。三阿毗達磨。或說六藏。菩薩．聲聞各有三故。獨覺更無別戒律等。故無三藏可得成九。此於二藏菩薩藏收。上乘攝故。三藏之中對法藏攝。研核推尋諸法相故。六藏之內菩薩藏中對法藏攝　乘所攝者。或說一乘。妙法花等。或說三乘。一菩薩。二獨覺。三聲聞。處處經論皆同說故。無唯說二乘一者大乘二者小乘之教。或說五乘。三乘如前。第四人乘。第五天乘。前三攝定．不定種姓。后二唯攝第五無性。此論正是一乘所攝。三乘之中菩薩乘攝。五乘之內第一乘收。此對諸部。十二分教相攝分齊。如樞要說。

四教興年．主。于中有二。一教興年。二教興主　教興年者。慧愷法師俱舍序云。佛滅已后千一百年。天親菩薩出生造論依今所傳諸部說異　今依大乘。九百年間天親菩薩出世造此頌本。真諦法師中邊疏。亦云凡百年中天親生也。同時唯有親勝．火辨二大論師造此頌釋。千一百年後。餘八論師方造斯釋。教興主者。三十頌本。天親菩薩之所作也。其別神德具如別記　釋此本頌有十論師

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

『法』是指在意識上顯現的事物。至於更詳細的解釋，將在第十論中自然會闡明。 此論（《成唯識論》）所包含的內容，可以從『藏』和『乘』兩個方面來理解。首先是『藏』所包含的內容，其次是『乘』所包含的內容。關於『藏』，根據《瑜伽師地論》等論典的說法，有二藏：一是菩薩藏（Mahāyāna Piṭaka），二是聲聞藏（Śrāvakapiṭaka）。然而，獨覺（Pratyekabuddha）的教法少於聲聞，因此從多數的角度將其歸入聲聞藏，稱為聲聞藏。或者說有三藏：一是素呾覽（Sūtrānta，經藏），二是毗奈耶（Vinaya，律藏），三是阿毗達磨（Abhidharma，論藏）。或者說有六藏，因為菩薩和聲聞各有三藏。獨覺沒有特別的戒律等，因此無法形成三藏，所以不能構成九藏。此論在二藏中屬於菩薩藏，因為它屬於上乘。在三藏中，屬於對法藏（論藏），因為它研核推尋諸法的體相。在六藏中，屬於菩薩藏中的對法藏。 關於『乘』，或者說有一乘（Ekayāna），如《妙法蓮華經》等所說。或者說有三乘：一是菩薩乘（Bodhisattvayāna），二是獨覺乘（Pratyekabuddhayāna），三是聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna）。各處經論都這樣說，沒有隻說二乘（大乘和小乘）的教法。或者說有五乘：三乘如前所述，第四是人乘（Manuṣyayāna），第五是天乘（Devayāna）。前三乘包含決定和不決定的種姓（gotra），后二乘只包含第五種無性（agotra）。此論正是屬於一乘所攝，在三乘之中屬於菩薩乘，在五乘之內屬於第一乘。此論對於各部派的十二分教（dvādaśāṅga-buddhavacana）的相攝關係，如《樞要》所說。 關於四教（指佛陀的教法）興起的年代和教主，分為兩個方面：一是教法興起的年代，二是教法的教主。關於教法興起的年代，慧愷法師在《俱舍論》的序文中說，佛陀滅度后一千一百年，天親菩薩（Vasubandhu）出生並造論。根據現在流傳的各部派的說法，年代有所不同。現在根據大乘的說法，天親菩薩在佛滅后九百年間出世並造了此頌本。真諦法師在《中邊分別論疏》中也說，天親菩薩大約在佛滅后一百年出生。同時只有親勝（Viśeṣamitra）和火辨（Agnivarman）兩位大論師造了此頌的註釋。一千一百年後，其餘八位論師才造了此頌的註釋。關於教法的教主，這三十頌的頌本是天親菩薩所作。他的特別神德記載在其他傳記中。註釋此頌本的有十位論師。

【English Translation】 English version:

'Dharma' refers to what appears in consciousness. A more detailed explanation will naturally be given in the tenth treatise. The content of this treatise (Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi) can be understood from the perspectives of 'Piṭaka' and 'Yāna'. First, what is included in the 'Piṭaka', and second, what is included in the 'Yāna'. Regarding 'Piṭaka', according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other treatises, there are two Piṭakas: the Bodhisattva Piṭaka (Mahāyāna Piṭaka) and the Śrāvaka Piṭaka (Śrāvakapiṭaka). However, the teachings of the Pratyekabuddha (Pratyekabuddhayāna) are fewer than those of the Śrāvakas, so from the perspective of the majority, they are included in the Śrāvaka Piṭaka, called the Śrāvaka Piṭaka. Alternatively, there are three Piṭakas: the Sūtrānta (Sūtra Piṭaka), the Vinaya (Vinaya Piṭaka), and the Abhidharma (Abhidharma Piṭaka). Or there are six Piṭakas, because the Bodhisattvas and Śrāvakas each have three Piṭakas. The Pratyekabuddhas do not have special precepts, etc., so they cannot form three Piṭakas, and therefore cannot constitute nine Piṭakas. This treatise belongs to the Bodhisattva Piṭaka among the two Piṭakas, because it belongs to the Mahāyāna. Among the three Piṭakas, it belongs to the Abhidharma Piṭaka, because it examines and investigates the characteristics of all dharmas. Among the six Piṭakas, it belongs to the Abhidharma Piṭaka within the Bodhisattva Piṭaka. Regarding 'Yāna', it is said that there is one Yāna (Ekayāna), as stated in the Lotus Sūtra and others. Or there are three Yānas: the Bodhisattva Yāna (Bodhisattvayāna), the Pratyekabuddha Yāna (Pratyekabuddhayāna), and the Śrāvaka Yāna (Śrāvakayāna). This is stated in various sūtras and treatises, and there is no teaching that only speaks of two Yānas (Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna). Or there are five Yānas: the three Yānas are as mentioned before, the fourth is the Human Yāna (Manuṣyayāna), and the fifth is the Deva Yāna (Devayāna). The first three Yānas include definite and indefinite gotras (lineages), and the latter two Yānas only include the fifth, those without nature (agotra). This treatise precisely belongs to the one Yāna, and among the three Yānas, it belongs to the Bodhisattva Yāna, and within the five Yānas, it belongs to the first Yāna. Regarding the relationship between this treatise and the twelve divisions of the teachings (dvādaśāṅga-buddhavacana) of various schools, it is as stated in the Key Essentials. Regarding the years of the rise and the masters of the four teachings (referring to the Buddha's teachings), there are two aspects: the years of the rise of the teachings and the masters of the teachings. Regarding the years of the rise of the teachings, Dharma Master Huikai said in the preface to the Abhidharmakośa that Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu) was born and composed the treatise 1,100 years after the Buddha's Parinirvana. According to the statements of various schools that are currently transmitted, the years differ. Now, according to the Mahāyāna, Vasubandhu appeared and composed this verse text 900 years after the Buddha's Parinirvana. Dharma Master Paramārtha also said in the commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga that Vasubandhu was born approximately 100 years after the Buddha's Parinirvana. At the same time, only two great masters, Viśeṣamitra (Viśeṣamitra) and Agnivarman (Agnivarman), composed commentaries on this verse. After 1,100 years, the remaining eight masters composed commentaries on this verse. Regarding the masters of the teachings, this verse text of thirty verses was composed by Vasubandhu. His special spiritual virtues are recorded in other biographies. There are ten masters who commented on this verse text.

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。一梵云達磨波羅。唐言護法。此大論師。南印度境達羅毗荼國建至城中帝王之子。學乃泉于海𤀹。解又朗于曦明。內教窮於大小。聲論光于真俗。外道．小乘咸議之曰。大乘有此人也。既猶日月之麗天皎皎而垂彩。亦如溟渤之紀地浩浩而無竭。天親以後一人而已。製作破斥具如別傳。年三十二而卒于大菩提寺。臨終之日天樂霄迎。悲聲慟城。空中響報婆羅門曰。此是賢劫之一佛也。故諸神異難以備言　二梵云寠(瞿字上聲)拏末底。唐言德慧。安慧之師。業冠前英道光時彥。芳聲流於四主雅韻驤於五天。聖德神奇未易詳舉　三梵云悉恥羅末底。唐言安慧。即糅雜集。救俱舍論破正理師。護法論師同時先德。南印度境羅羅國人也。妙解因明善窮內論。扇徽猷于小運。飛蘭蕙于大乘。神彩至高固難提議　四梵云畔徒室利。唐言親勝。天親菩薩同時人也。本頌初行先為略釋。妙得作者之意。后德因而釋焉　五梵云難陀。唐言歡喜。勝軍祖習。故於后卷新熏種子此師所說。造瑜伽釋等大有製作　六梵云戍陀戰達羅。唐言凈月。安慧同時。造勝義七十釋。及集論釋之論師也　七梵云質呾羅婆拏。唐言火辨。亦世親同時也。尤善文辭深閑注述。形雖隱俗而道高真侶　八梵云毗世沙蜜多羅。唐言勝友　九梵云辰那弗多羅。唐言勝子

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 一、達磨波羅（Dharmapala），意為護法。這位偉大的論師是南印度達羅毗荼國建至城中帝王的兒子。他的學識如海般深邃，見解如陽光般明朗。精通大小乘佛教，聲論方面也光耀真俗。外道和小乘都議論說：『大乘有這樣的人啊！』他就像日月懸掛在天空，皎潔而光彩照人；又像大海一樣，浩瀚無盡。他是繼天親（Vasubandhu）之後唯一的一人。他的著作和破斥異端的文章都記載在別的傳記中。三十二歲時在大菩提寺圓寂。臨終之日，天樂在空中迎接，全城都為之悲慟。空中傳來婆羅門的聲音說：『這是賢劫中的一尊佛啊！』所以他的種種神異難以一一述說。 二、寠拏末底（Gunamati），意為德慧。他是安慧（Sthiramati）的老師。他的事業超越前人，道德光耀當世。美名傳遍四方，高雅的聲譽響徹五天竺。他的聖德和神奇難以詳細列舉。 三、悉恥羅末底（Sthiramati），意為安慧。他糅合了《雜集論》，救護《俱舍論》，駁斥正理師。與護法（Dharmapala）論師是同一時代的先德。他是南印度羅羅國人。精妙地理解因明，深入研究內論。在小乘佛教中發揚光大，在大乘佛教中如蘭蕙般芬芳。他的神采至高無上，難以評價。 四、畔徒室利（Bandhusri），意為親勝。他是與天親菩薩（Vasubandhu）同時代的人。他最初對本頌的第一行做了簡略的解釋，巧妙地領會了作者的意圖，後來的學者因此而加以解釋。 五、難陀（Nanda），意為歡喜。他是勝軍的祖師。因此在後來的章節中，新熏種子是這位論師所說的。他創作了《瑜伽師地論釋》等大量著作。 六、戍陀戰達羅（Suddhacandra），意為凈月。他是與安慧（Sthiramati）同時代的人。他創作了《勝義七十論釋》以及《集論釋》的論師。 七、質呾羅婆拏（Citrabhanu），意為火辨。他也是與世親（Vasubandhu）同時代的人。他尤其擅長文辭，精通註釋和著述。雖然形跡隱於世俗，但他的道行卻高於真正的修行者。 八、毗世沙蜜多羅（Visesamitra），意為勝友。 九、辰那弗多羅（Jinaputra），意為勝子。

【English Translation】 English version: 1. Dharmapala (達磨波羅), meaning 'Protector of the Dharma'. This great master was the son of a king in Kanchipuram (建至城), in the Dravida (達羅毗荼) country of South India. His learning was as deep as the ocean, and his understanding as bright as the sun. He was proficient in both Mahayana and Hinayana Buddhism, and his knowledge of grammar shone brightly in both the true and conventional senses. The non-Buddhists and Hinayanists all said, 'Mahayana has such a person!' He was like the sun and moon hanging in the sky, shining brightly and radiantly; and like the vast ocean, boundless and inexhaustible. He was the only one after Vasubandhu (天親). His works and refutations are recorded in separate biographies. He passed away at the age of thirty-two at the Mahabodhi Temple (大菩提寺). On the day of his death, heavenly music welcomed him in the sky, and the whole city mourned. A voice from the sky announced to the Brahmins, 'This is a Buddha of the Bhadrakalpa (賢劫)!' Therefore, his various miraculous events are difficult to describe in detail. 2. Gunamati (寠拏末底), meaning 'Virtue and Wisdom'. He was the teacher of Sthiramati (安慧). His achievements surpassed his predecessors, and his virtue illuminated his contemporaries. His fame spread throughout the four directions, and his elegant reputation resounded throughout the five regions of India. His saintly virtue and miraculous powers are difficult to fully enumerate. 3. Sthiramati (悉恥羅末底), meaning 'Stable Wisdom'. He harmonized the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論), rescued the Abhidharmakosa (俱舍論), and refuted the logicians. He was a virtuous predecessor contemporary with the master Dharmapala (護法). He was a native of the Rara country in South India. He had a profound understanding of Hetuvidya (因明) and thoroughly studied the inner treatises. He promoted the subtle teachings in the Hinayana and spread the fragrance of orchids in the Mahayana. His spiritual brilliance was supreme and difficult to evaluate. 4. Bandhusri (畔徒室利), meaning 'Auspicious Friend'. He was a contemporary of Vasubandhu (天親) Bodhisattva. He initially provided a brief explanation of the first line of the original verse, skillfully grasping the author's intention, and later scholars expanded upon his explanation. 5. Nanda (難陀), meaning 'Joy'. He was the ancestral teacher of Sengjun (勝軍). Therefore, in later chapters, the new seeds were discussed by this master. He created extensive works such as the Yogacarabhumi-sastra-vyakhya (瑜伽師地論釋). 6. Suddhacandra (戍陀戰達羅), meaning 'Pure Moon'. He was a contemporary of Sthiramati (安慧). He was the master who created the Tattvartha-saptati-vrtti (勝義七十論釋) and the commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya (集論釋). 7. Citrabhanu (質呾羅婆拏), meaning 'Fire Discrimination'. He was also a contemporary of Vasubandhu (世親). He was particularly skilled in rhetoric and deeply versed in commentary and writing. Although his form was hidden in the mundane world, his path was higher than that of true practitioners. 8. Visamitra (毗世沙蜜多羅), meaning 'Superior Friend'. 9. Jinaputra (辰那弗多羅), meaning 'Son of the Conqueror'.

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十梵云若那戰達羅。唐言智月。此後三論師。並護法菩薩之門人也。或釋瑜伽。或別注述。道名俱遠。辭旨咸奧。神德既高難盡言也　制此釋者雖十論師。于中護法聲德獨振。故此論題特以標首。此師所說最有研尋。于諸義中多為南指。邪徒失趣正理得方。迥拔眾師穎超群聖者。其惟一人乎。

五判釋本文。于中有二。一判本文。二釋本文。判本文者。此論本頌唯有正說。世親菩薩臨終時造。未為長行廣釋便卒。故無初．后二分文也。論其釋文具有三分。初歸敬頌。及次長行。是宗前敬敘分。云何世間及諸聖教下。正釋本文。名依教廣成分。此論三分成立唯識下。是即第三釋結施愿分。此乃判彼釋文有斯三分　就初分中。此初一頌。彼護法等。歸敬福田憑力求護。投誠述己彰釋論因。次諸長行。即安慧等。明論本師為令含識得勝果等。制論本頌造論之由。此即分別不同科也　然準釋論之意。可知本師亦爾。不爾本師豈不令法久住。利樂諸有情也　就初頌中。上之兩句歸敬福田。下之二句敘釋論意　釋本文者。稽首二字顯能敬相。次下八字彰所敬體　若依俗釋。稽者至也。首者頭也。以首至地故名稽首。此唯身業。敬相不盡。今但舉身義顯意．語二業亦敬　又依理解。起殷凈心策殊勝業申誠歸仰。敬禮之異名也

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：十梵云若那戰達羅（Dhyanachandra，意為智月）。他是三論宗的論師，也是護法菩薩的門人。他們或者解釋《瑜伽師地論》，或者另行著述，他們的道行和名聲都很高遠，文辭和旨意都深奧。他們的神異功德很高，難以用言語來表達。製作這個註釋的有十位論師，其中護法論師的聲望和德行最為突出，所以這個論的題目特別以他為首。這位論師所說的最有研究價值，在各種義理中多有指南的作用，使邪見之人失去方向，正理得以確立。他遠遠超越了眾多的論師，卓越超群，堪稱聖者中的佼佼者。

五、判釋本文。其中有二：一、判本文；二、釋本文。判本文是指，此論的根本頌文只有正說部分。世親菩薩臨終時所造，沒有寫出長行廣釋就去世了，所以沒有初、后二分文。論其釋文，則具有三分：最初的歸敬頌，以及接下來的長行，是宗前的敬敘分。『云何世間及諸聖教下』，是正式解釋本文，名為依教廣成分。『此論三分成立唯識下』，是第三釋結施愿分。這是判別其釋文有這三個部分。就最初的敬敘分中，最初的一頌，護法等人歸敬福田，憑藉力量求得護佑，以誠懇的態度陳述自己，彰顯解釋論的原因。接下來的長行，是安慧等人說明論的本師，爲了使一切眾生得到殊勝的果報等等，而製作論的根本頌文，闡述造論的緣由。這是分別不同的科判。然而根據釋論的意義，可知本師也是如此。否則，本師怎麼能使佛法長久住世，利益安樂一切有情眾生呢？就最初的頌文中，上面的兩句是歸敬福田，下面的兩句是敘述解釋論的意圖。解釋本文是指，『稽首』二字顯示能敬的相狀，接下來的八個字彰顯所敬的本體。如果按照世俗的解釋，『稽』是至的意思，『首』是頭的意思，用頭至地，所以叫做稽首。這只是身業，敬意不完全。現在只是舉出身業，來顯示意業和語業也同樣恭敬。又根據義理來理解，發起殷重清凈的心，策發殊勝的行業，表達真誠的歸仰，這是敬禮的不同名稱。

【English Translation】 English version: Dhyanachandra (智月, meaning 'Wisdom Moon'), also known as Shi Fan Yun Ruo Na Zhan Da Luo, was a master of the Three Treatise School and a disciple of Bodhisattva Dharmapala (護法). They either explained the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) or wrote separate commentaries. Their virtue and fame were far-reaching, and their words and meanings were profound. Their divine merits were so high that they are difficult to express in words. Although there were ten masters who made this commentary, Dharmapala's reputation and virtue were the most prominent, so the title of this treatise specifically places him at the forefront. What this master said is most worthy of study, and in various meanings, it often serves as a guide, causing those with wrong views to lose their way, and establishing correct principles. He far surpasses the many masters and is outstanding among the sages.

1. Dividing and Explaining the Text. There are two parts: 1. Dividing the Main Text; 2. Explaining the Main Text. Dividing the Main Text means that the fundamental verses of this treatise only have the part of the correct teaching. Bodhisattva Vasubandhu (世親) composed it when he was about to die, and he passed away before writing a lengthy commentary, so there are no initial and final divisions. As for its commentary, it has three parts: the initial verses of homage, and the following long passages, are the part of reverent introduction before the main subject. 'How the world and all the sacred teachings...' is the formal explanation of the main text, called the part of expanding the teaching. 'This treatise establishes the Three Natures of Consciousness Only...' is the third part of explanation, conclusion, and aspiration. This is to distinguish that its commentary has these three parts. Regarding the initial part of reverent introduction, the initial verse is where Dharmapala and others pay homage to the field of merit, relying on strength to seek protection, and sincerely state themselves, highlighting the reason for explaining the treatise. The following long passages are where Ananda (阿難) and others explain the original master of the treatise, in order to enable all sentient beings to obtain supreme rewards, etc., and to create the fundamental verses of the treatise, elaborating on the reasons for writing the treatise. This is to distinguish the different divisions. However, according to the meaning of the commentary, it can be known that the original master is also like this. Otherwise, how could the original master enable the Dharma to abide in the world for a long time, benefiting and bringing happiness to all sentient beings? Regarding the initial verse, the first two lines are paying homage to the field of merit, and the last two lines are narrating the intention of explaining the treatise. Explaining the main text means that the two words 'Kīrtana' (稽首, paying homage) show the aspect of being able to pay homage, and the following eight words highlight the essence of what is being revered. If according to the secular explanation, 'Kīrtana' (稽) means 'to reach', and 'sirah' (首) means 'head', using the head to reach the ground, so it is called 'Kīrtana'. This is only physical action, and the respect is not complete. Now, only the physical action is mentioned to show that mental and verbal actions are also respectful. Also, according to the meaning, to arouse a sincere and pure mind, to encourage superior actions, and to express sincere devotion, these are different names for paying homage.

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。此通三業敬相乃周。瞿波論師云。三業禮者。欲顯大師有天眼故以身業禮。有天耳故以語業禮。有他心故以意業禮　又生三業圓滿善故。以三業禮。如僧祇律中說。在明去遠須以身禮。以可見故。在闇去近須以語禮。以可聞故。在闇復遠須以意禮。不可見聞故　又顯敬禮三輪因故須三業禮。天親攝論歸敬頌。云故我至誠身．語．思。頻修無倒歸命禮。故知稽首理通三業。

次言唯識性滿分清凈者。顯所敬體。言唯識性略有二種。一者虛妄。即遍計所執。二者真實。即圓成實。於前唯識性所遣清凈。於後唯識性所證清凈　又有二種。一者世俗。即依他起。二者勝義。即圓成實。於前所斷清凈。於後所得清凈。此釋準下第九卷初唯識性解　又言唯識相．性不同。相即依他。唯是有為。通有．無漏。唯識即相名唯識相。持業釋也。性即是識圓成自體。唯是真如。無為無漏。唯識之性名唯識性。依士釋也。唯內證凈。為簡依他故說識性。何故須簡。有漏依他不可敬故。無漏依他亦俗諦故。非最勝故。非諸聖法真實性故。非所證故。非迷悟依故。或彼即是滿分凈故。略不敬也。又有別解如樞要說。若於識性。滿凈即者是持業釋。凈屬人故。滿凈之者是依士釋。凈屬智故。今取后釋。此即如來智周德圓窮真如性。故稱為滿

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這是通過身、語、意三業表達敬意的方式，是普遍適用的。瞿波論師（Guṇaprabha，一位佛教論師）說：『以三業禮敬，是爲了顯示大師具有天眼，所以用身業禮敬；具有天耳，所以用語業禮敬；具有他心通，所以用意業禮敬。』

又因為三業圓滿皆是善，所以用三業禮敬。如《僧祇律》（Mahāsaṃghika Vinaya）中所說：『在明亮處且距離遠時，需要用身禮敬，因為可以看見；在黑暗處且距離近時，需要用語禮敬，因為可以聽見；在黑暗處且距離遠時，需要用意禮敬，因為既不可見也不可聞。』

又爲了顯示敬禮三輪（施者、受者、施物）的因，所以需要三業禮敬。天親（Vasubandhu，一位佛教論師）在《攝論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）的歸敬頌中說：『所以我至誠地以身、語、意，頻繁地修習無倒的歸命禮。』由此可知，稽首的道理貫通三業。 其次說『唯識性滿分清凈』，是爲了顯示所敬對象的本體。『唯識性』略有二種：一是虛妄，即遍計所執性（parikalpita-lakṣaṇa，完全是虛構的性質）；二是真實，即圓成實性（pariniṣpanna，事物最圓滿真實的狀態）。對於前者，是唯識性所遣除的清凈；對於後者，是唯識性所證得的清凈。

又有二種：一是世俗，即依他起性（paratantra，事物由其他條件而生起的狀態）；二是勝義，即圓成實性。對於前者，是所斷除的清凈；對於後者，是所獲得的清凈。這個解釋參照下文第九卷初的唯識性解釋。

又說唯識的『相』（lakṣaṇa，表相）和『性』（svabhāva，自性）不同。『相』即依他起性，唯是有為法（saṃskṛta，由因緣和合而成的現象），通於有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱的）和無漏（anāsrava，沒有煩惱的）。『唯識』即『相』，名為『唯識相』，是持業釋（karmadhāraya，一種複合詞的構成方式）。『性』即是識的圓成自體，唯是真如（tathatā，事物的真實本性），無為（asaṃskṛta，不依賴因緣的）無漏。『唯識之性』名為『唯識性』，是依士釋（tatpuruṣa，一種複合詞的構成方式）。唯有內證清凈，爲了簡別依他起性，所以說『識性』。為什麼需要簡別？因為有漏的依他起性不可敬，無漏的依他起性也是俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦），不是最殊勝的，不是諸聖法的真實性，不是所證得的，不是迷悟的依據。或者因為彼即是滿分清凈，所以略而不敬。又有其他解釋，如《樞要》所說。如果『識性』和『滿凈』是同一事物，就是持業釋，因為清凈屬於人；『滿凈之性』就是依士釋，因為清凈屬於智慧。現在採用后一種解釋。這即是如來的智慧周遍，功德圓滿，窮盡真如之性，所以稱為『滿』。

【English Translation】 English version: This thorough reverence through the three karmas (body, speech, and mind) is universal. Guṇaprabha (a Buddhist commentator) said: 'Revering with the three karmas is to show that the master has the divine eye, so he is revered with the body karma; has the divine ear, so he is revered with the speech karma; and has the knowledge of others' minds, so he is revered with the mind karma.' Moreover, because the three karmas are perfectly good, they are used for reverence. As stated in the Mahāsaṃghika Vinaya: 'In a bright place and at a distance, one should revere with the body, because it can be seen; in a dark place and nearby, one should revere with speech, because it can be heard; in a dark place and at a distance, one should revere with the mind, because it cannot be seen or heard.' Furthermore, to show the cause of the three wheels of reverence (giver, receiver, and gift), reverence with the three karmas is necessary. Vasubandhu (a Buddhist commentator) said in the verse of homage in the Abhidharmasamuccaya: 'Therefore, with utmost sincerity, I frequently practice the flawless prostration with body, speech, and mind.' From this, it is known that the principle of prostration pervades the three karmas. Next, saying 'the perfectly pure nature of consciousness-only' is to reveal the essence of the object of reverence. The 'nature of consciousness-only' is roughly of two types: first, the illusory, which is the parikalpita-lakṣaṇa (the completely fabricated nature); second, the real, which is the pariniṣpanna (the most perfect and real state of things). For the former, it is the purity that is eliminated by the nature of consciousness-only; for the latter, it is the purity that is attained by the nature of consciousness-only. There are also two types: first, the conventional, which is the paratantra (the state of things arising from other conditions); second, the ultimate, which is the pariniṣpanna. For the former, it is the purity that is severed; for the latter, it is the purity that is obtained. This explanation refers to the explanation of the nature of consciousness-only in the beginning of the ninth volume below. It is also said that the 'appearance' (lakṣaṇa) and 'nature' (svabhāva) of consciousness-only are different. 'Appearance' is the paratantra, which is only conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta), encompassing both defiled (sāsrava) and undefiled (anāsrava). 'Consciousness-only' is 'appearance', named 'the appearance of consciousness-only', which is a karmadhāraya (a type of compound word formation). 'Nature' is the perfect self-nature of consciousness, which is only suchness (tathatā), unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) and undefiled. 'The nature of consciousness-only' is named 'the nature of consciousness-only', which is a tatpuruṣa (a type of compound word formation). Only the inner realization is pure; to distinguish the paratantra, 'the nature of consciousness' is mentioned. Why is it necessary to distinguish? Because the defiled paratantra is not worthy of reverence, and the undefiled paratantra is also conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), not the most supreme, not the true nature of all holy dharmas, not what is attained, and not the basis of delusion and enlightenment. Or because that is perfectly pure, it is briefly not revered. There are other explanations, as stated in the 'Essentials'. If 'the nature of consciousness' and 'perfect purity' are the same thing, it is a karmadhāraya, because purity belongs to the person; 'the nature of perfect purity' is a tatpuruṣa, because purity belongs to wisdom. Now, the latter explanation is adopted. This is that the wisdom of the Tathagata is pervasive, the merits are complete, and the nature of suchness is exhausted, so it is called 'perfect'.

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。澄鑒無垢二障都盡說名清凈。澄鑒曰清。無垢名凈。者即假者。意顯如來證唯識理究竟圓極。名滿凈者　于唯識性分清凈者。分謂少分。凈者同前。即諸菩薩分證唯識真如自性。覺未圓明名分凈者。欲顯師弟悟證不同。故於唯識說滿．分凈。于所歸敬合有七釋。三如樞要。今以理準四義不同。一者唯敬法而非人。法有二種。一教。二理。佛證唯識說一心經令依修學。既涅槃已教便散滅。由論本師造三十頌顯唯識理。散滅之法令其集顯。論文雖舉滿．分二人。意取二人所證所說識性教．理。滿清凈者于教為勝。本教主故。分清凈者于理為勝。顯理勝故。由於識性滿．分凈故。如來能說教。弟子能顯理。故今歸敬唯法非人　何故但敬法而非人　諸佛所師所謂法故。佛及弟子從此生故　二者但敬人而非法。即是唯識本．釋二師。本謂如來。于唯識性滿清凈者。釋謂頌主。于唯識性分清凈者。唯識性聲境第七攝。是能差別。滿分凈者第四囀攝。是所差別。此梵本音。一切所敬皆第四囀故。此頌所舉唯識性言顯是所證。而意歸敬能證彼人滿．分凈者。辨中邊論天親頌云。稽首造此論。善逝體所生。及教我等師。當勤顯斯義。唯敬二師　何故但敬本．釋二師。如來是作者。論所依故。弟子是述者。起此論故。瑜伽論中六十四說。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：澄澈明鑑，沒有污垢，兩種障礙都已斷盡，這被稱為清凈。澄澈明鑑稱為『清』，沒有污垢稱為『凈』。『者』字是假設的說法，意在顯示如來證悟唯識之理達到究竟圓滿的境界，所以稱為『滿凈者』。在唯識的體性上達到部分清凈，『分』是指少分，『凈』的含義同前。這是指諸位菩薩分證唯識真如自性，覺悟尚未圓滿明瞭，所以稱為『分凈者』。這是爲了顯示師父和弟子在悟證上的不同，所以在唯識上說『滿凈』、『分凈』。對於所歸依和尊敬的對象，總共有七種解釋，其中三種最為重要。現在以理來衡量，有四種不同的含義。第一種是隻尊敬法而不尊敬人。法有兩種：一是教法，二是理法。佛陀證悟唯識，宣說《一心經》，讓人依此修學。佛陀涅槃后，教法便會散滅。由論的本師造《三十頌》，闡明唯識之理，使散滅的教法得以重新顯現。論文雖然舉出『滿凈』、『分凈』二人，但意在取二人所證悟、所說的識性教法和理法。『滿清凈者』在教法上更為殊勝，因為是本教的教主。『分清凈者』在理法上更為殊勝，因為闡明了理法。因為在識性上有『滿凈』、『分凈』，所以如來能夠宣說教法，弟子能夠闡明理法，因此現在歸依和尊敬的是法而不是人。 為什麼只尊敬法而不尊敬人呢？因為諸佛所尊崇的是法。佛和弟子都是從法中產生的。 第二種是隻尊敬人而不尊敬法，即是唯識的本師和釋師。本師是指如來（Tathagata），在唯識的體性上達到『滿清凈者』。釋師是指《三十頌》的作者，在唯識的體性上達到『分清凈者』。『唯識性』這個聲音，屬於境的第七種攝法，是能差別。『滿分凈者』屬於第四囀攝，是所差別。這是梵文字的讀音。一切所尊敬的都是第四囀。這首頌所舉的『唯識性』，顯示的是所證悟的境界，而意在歸敬能夠證悟此境界的人，即『滿凈者』和『分凈者』。《辨中邊論》（Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya）中，天親（Vasubandhu）的頌文說：『稽首造此論，善逝（Sugata）體所生，及教我等師，當勤顯斯義。』只尊敬本師和釋師。 為什麼只尊敬本師和釋師呢？因為如來是作者，是論所依據的。弟子是述者，是發起此論的。在《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第六十四卷中說。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Clear discernment without defilement, with both veils completely exhausted, is called purity.' 'Clear discernment' is called 'clear,' and 'without defilement' is called 'pure.' The word '者' (者) is a hypothetical term, intended to show that the Tathagata's (如來) realization of the principle of Vijnaptimatrata (唯識) has reached the ultimate and perfect state, hence called 'perfectly pure one' (滿凈者). Achieving partial purity in the nature of Vijnaptimatrata, 'partial' (分) refers to a small part, and 'pure' (凈) has the same meaning as before. This refers to the Bodhisattvas (菩薩) who partially realize the self-nature of Vijnaptimatrata-tathata (唯識真如自性), whose enlightenment is not yet complete and clear, hence called 'partially pure one' (分凈者). This is to show the difference in enlightenment and realization between the teacher and the disciple, so 'perfect purity' (滿凈) and 'partial purity' (分凈) are mentioned in relation to Vijnaptimatrata. Regarding the objects of refuge and reverence, there are a total of seven explanations, of which three are the most important. Now, measured by reason, there are four different meanings. The first is to respect only the Dharma (法) and not the person. There are two types of Dharma: one is the teaching (教), and the other is the principle (理). The Buddha (佛) realized Vijnaptimatrata and expounded the Ekacitta Sutra (一心經), instructing people to cultivate accordingly. After the Buddha's Nirvana (涅槃), the teaching will dissipate. The original teacher of the treatise composed the Thirty Verses (三十頌), elucidating the principle of Vijnaptimatrata, so that the dissipated teaching could be revealed again. Although the treatise mentions the two individuals, 'perfectly pure' (滿凈) and 'partially pure' (分凈), it intends to take the teaching and principle of the nature of consciousness that the two have realized and spoken. The 'perfectly pure one' (滿清凈者) is superior in teaching, because he is the original teacher of the teaching. The 'partially pure one' (分清凈者) is superior in principle, because he elucidates the principle. Because there is 'perfect purity' (滿凈) and 'partial purity' (分凈) in the nature of consciousness, the Tathagata (如來) is able to expound the teaching, and the disciple is able to elucidate the principle, therefore now we take refuge in and respect the Dharma (法) and not the person. Why respect only the Dharma (法) and not the person? Because what all Buddhas (諸佛) revere is the Dharma (法). The Buddha (佛) and the disciple are both born from the Dharma (法). The second is to respect only the person and not the Dharma (法), that is, the original teacher and the expositor of Vijnaptimatrata (唯識). The original teacher refers to the Tathagata (如來), who achieved 'perfect purity' (滿清凈者) in the nature of Vijnaptimatrata (唯識). The expositor refers to the author of the Thirty Verses (三十頌), who achieved 'partial purity' (分清凈者) in the nature of Vijnaptimatrata (唯識). The sound 'Vijnaptimatrata-nature' (唯識性) belongs to the seventh category of objects, which is the differentiator. 'Perfectly pure and partially pure' (滿分凈者) belongs to the fourth case ending, which is the differentiated. This is the pronunciation of the Sanskrit text. Everything that is revered is in the fourth case ending. The 'Vijnaptimatrata-nature' (唯識性) mentioned in this verse shows the state of realization, and the intention is to revere the person who can realize this state, that is, the 'perfectly pure one' (滿凈者) and the 'partially pure one' (分凈者). In the Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya (辨中邊論), Vasubandhu's (天親) verse says: 'I bow to the one who composed this treatise, born from the body of the Sugata (善逝), and the teacher who taught us, we should diligently reveal this meaning.' Only respect the original teacher and the expositor. Why respect only the original teacher and the expositor? Because the Tathagata (如來) is the author, on whom the treatise is based. The disciple is the narrator, who initiated this treatise. It is said in the sixty-fourth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論).

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若欲造論先敬二師。恭敬法故敬論本師。恭敬義故禮開闡師。安惠雜集論初序云。此論所依。及能起故。佛薄伽梵諸法所依。一切教起所依處故。佛聖弟子依法隨學。無倒依止而造論故。世親雖是地前菩薩于唯識性決定信解。雖未證真亦隨修學。分有所得名分凈者　三者雙敬法之與人。法謂真如。諸法自性。即是此中唯識性是。人即此中滿．分凈者。能證唯識真如性故。何故雙敬法之與人　法可軌持。人弘道故　四者歸敬佛．法．僧寶。初唯識性即是法寶。以是佛師故先歸敬。理．教．行．果四法不同。常恒軌則真如為本。要證真如余方有故。教．行．果三真實性故。三乘聖者之根本故。或說彼本即兼末故。不說餘三但說理法。或唯識效能詮．所詮．能成．所成。如其次第。教．理．行．果四種法寶。言唯識性即攝一切四種法也。滿清凈者即是佛寶。證法正說唯如來故。次法后說。分清凈者即是僧寶。能隨佛教是佛之資。故次佛說　一問何故論初三寶不次　答師．資相因法先佛后。顯．說相因佛先法后。故與常說三寶次第義各不同。所望異故。雖報恩經不許法在佛先所說。今以師．資之義亦無過失　二問何故論初須敬三寶　答有四義。一最吉祥故。故成實論說。言三寶最吉祥故。我經初說。二真福田故。論又說言堪受

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果想要造論，首先要恭敬二位老師。因為恭敬佛法，所以恭敬論的根本老師（論主）。因為恭敬佛法的義理，所以禮敬開闡義理的老師（講師）。安慧的《雜集論》的最初的序言中說：『這部論所依據的，以及能夠發起這部論的原因，是因為佛薄伽梵（Bhagavan，世尊）是諸法的所依，是一切教法的發起之處。佛的聖弟子們依法隨學，沒有顛倒地依止佛法而造論。』世親（Vasubandhu）菩薩雖然是地前菩薩，但對於唯識的體性有決定的信解。雖然沒有證得真如，但也隨順修學，分證所得，名為分凈者。這三者是同時恭敬佛法和人。佛法指的是真如（Tathata），諸法的自性，也就是此中的唯識性。人指的是此中的滿凈者和分凈者，因為他們能夠證得唯識真如的體性。為什麼同時恭敬佛法和人呢？因為佛法可以作為軌範持守，人可以弘揚佛道。第四是歸敬佛、法、僧三寶。最初的唯識性就是法寶，因為是佛的老師，所以首先歸敬。理、教、行、果四法不同，常恒的軌則以真如為根本，要證得真如，其他方面才能有所成就。教、行、果三種是真實的體性，是三乘聖者的根本。或者說，把握了根本就兼顧了末節，所以不提其他三種，只說理法。或者說，唯識效能夠詮釋、被詮釋、能夠成就、被成就，依次對應教、理、行、果四種法寶。說唯識性就涵蓋了一切四種佛法。滿清凈者就是佛寶，因為只有如來才能正確地宣說佛法。其次是法，然後是分清凈者，也就是僧寶，能夠隨順佛教，是佛的助資，所以放在佛之後說。第一個問題是：為什麼論的開頭三寶的順序不是按照通常的順序？回答是：因為師資相因，所以佛法在佛之前；因為顯說相因，所以佛在佛法之前。因此，與通常所說的三寶的順序意義各不相同，所期望的不同。雖然《報恩經》不允許佛法在佛之前宣說，但現在以師資的意義來說，也沒有過失。第二個問題是：為什麼論的開頭需要恭敬三寶？回答是有四個原因：一是最為吉祥。所以《成實論》說：『因為三寶最為吉祥，所以我的經文一開始就說。』二是真正的福田。論中又說：『堪受供養。』

【English Translation】 English version: If one wishes to compose a treatise, one must first revere the two teachers. Because of revering the Dharma, one reveres the root teacher (the author of the treatise). Because of revering the meaning of the Dharma, one pays homage to the teacher who elucidates the meaning (the lecturer). In the initial preface of Anhui's Compendium of Abhidharma it says: 'This treatise relies on, and is able to arise because, the Buddha Bhagavan (Bhagavan, the World-Honored One) is the basis of all Dharmas, the place where all teachings originate. The Buddha's holy disciples follow and study the Dharma, and compose treatises without inverted reliance on the Dharma.' Although Bodhisattva Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu) is a Bodhisattva before the Bhumis (stages), he has a firm understanding and belief in the nature of Vijnaptimatrata (Consciousness-only). Although he has not attained Suchness (Tathata), he also follows and studies, partially attaining, and is called the 'partially purified one'. These three are simultaneously revering the Dharma and the person. The Dharma refers to Suchness (Tathata), the self-nature of all Dharmas, which is the nature of Vijnaptimatrata in this context. The person refers to the fully purified one and the partially purified one in this context, because they are able to realize the nature of Vijnaptimatrata Suchness. Why simultaneously revere the Dharma and the person? Because the Dharma can be a standard to uphold, and the person can propagate the Dharma. The fourth is taking refuge in the Three Jewels: Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha. The initial nature of Vijnaptimatrata is the Dharma Jewel, because it is the teacher of the Buddha, so it is revered first. The four Dharmas of principle, teaching, practice, and result are different, but the constant and unchanging standard is rooted in Suchness. To realize Suchness, other aspects can be achieved. The three of teaching, practice, and result are the true nature, the root of the Holy Ones of the Three Vehicles. Or, grasping the root encompasses the branches, so the other three are not mentioned, only the principle of Dharma is spoken of. Or, the nature of Vijnaptimatrata can explain, be explained, can accomplish, and be accomplished, corresponding in order to the four Dharma Jewels of teaching, principle, practice, and result. Saying the nature of Vijnaptimatrata encompasses all four types of Dharma. The fully purified one is the Buddha Jewel, because only the Tathagata (Tathagata) can correctly proclaim the Dharma. Next is the Dharma, then the partially purified one, which is the Sangha Jewel, able to follow the Buddha's teachings, and is the Buddha's aid, so it is placed after the Buddha. The first question is: Why is the order of the Three Jewels at the beginning of the treatise not in the usual order? The answer is: Because of the teacher-student relationship, the Dharma is before the Buddha; because of the manifest explanation relationship, the Buddha is before the Dharma. Therefore, the meaning of the order of the Three Jewels as commonly spoken of is different, the expectations are different. Although the Sutra of Gratitude does not allow the Dharma to be spoken of before the Buddha, there is no fault in speaking of it in terms of the teacher-student relationship. The second question is: Why is it necessary to revere the Three Jewels at the beginning of the treatise? The answer is that there are four reasons: First, it is most auspicious. Therefore, the Tattvasiddhi Shastra says: 'Because the Three Jewels are most auspicious, my sutra begins by saying this.' Second, it is a true field of merit. The treatise also says: 'Worthy of receiving offerings.'

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世間妙供養故。三有大力故。福德．智惠二種莊嚴。功德神通實難對故。四起希求故。說法之首先說三寶。令聞法者發勝心故。憑力請加方能造釋　三問三寶有二。一乘．三乘。此中所敬何者三寶　答此中唯敬一乘三寶。說唯識性滿．分凈故。二乘不修唯識觀故。顯揚頌云。善逝善說妙三身。無畏無流證教法。上乘真實牟尼子。我今至誠先贊禮　佛地論頌云。稽首無上良福田。三身．二諦．一乘眾　攝大乘等處處皆同。故此唯敬一乘三寶。證．解圓滿。福．慧具足。有大力故。

或此通敬三乘聖者。二乘亦於人無我門。觀見真如唯識性故。分凈所攝。對法說云。諸會真凈究竟理。乃至敬禮如是大覺尊．無等妙法．真聖眾。通敬一切三乘三寶　四問此中所敬三寶如何　答法如前說。此中佛寶通攝三身。僧寶通攝除佛余聖　問麟角獨覺諸部不同。此於三寶何寶所攝　答麟角善根僧種類故。許彼種類有多獨覺同時出故。故麟角者亦僧寶攝　五問三寶有二。同相．別相。此中所敬何者三寶　答此中但敬別相三寶。何故但敬別相三寶。顯敬有為．無為功德皆周盡故。又亦通敬同相三寶。唯識性中義兼說故。故涅槃云。若能見三寶常住同真諦。此則是諸佛最上之誓願。論文雖舉滿．分二凈。意取所證。同相三寶。皆常住故　

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為世間殊勝的供養，因為三有（指欲有、色有、無色有）具有強大的力量，因為福德和智慧兩種莊嚴，因為功德和神通實在難以匹敵，因為發起希求之心，所以在說法之初首先宣說三寶（佛寶、法寶、僧寶），令聽聞佛法的人發起殊勝之心，憑藉力量祈請加持才能造作解釋。 關於三問三寶，有二乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘）和一乘（菩薩乘）之分。這裡所敬奉的是哪一種三寶？ 答：這裡只敬奉一乘三寶，因為宣說唯識之性是圓滿和分凈的。二乘不修唯識觀。 《顯揚聖教論》的偈頌說：『善逝（如來）善說微妙三身（法身、報身、應身），無畏無漏證得教法。上乘真實的牟尼子（佛陀），我今至誠首先贊禮。』 《佛地經論》的偈頌說：『稽首無上良福田，三身、二諦（真諦、俗諦）、一乘眾。』 《攝大乘論》等經論處處都相同。因此，這裡只敬奉一乘三寶，證悟和理解都是圓滿的，福德和智慧都具備，具有強大的力量。 或者，這裡可以通指敬奉三乘聖者。二乘也在人無我之門中，觀見真如唯識之性，屬於分凈所攝。《對法論》說：『諸會真凈究竟理，乃至敬禮如是大覺尊、無等妙法、真聖眾。』通指敬奉一切三乘三寶。 四問：這裡所敬奉的三寶是怎樣的？ 答：法寶如前所說。這裡佛寶通攝三身。僧寶通攝除了佛以外的其餘聖者。 問：麟角喻獨覺（Pratyekabuddha）在各個部派中有不同的說法，這裡屬於三寶中的哪一寶所攝？ 答：麟角喻獨覺屬於僧寶的種類，因為允許這種種類有多個獨覺同時出現。所以麟角喻獨覺也屬於僧寶所攝。 五問：三寶有兩種，同相三寶和別相三寶。這裡所敬奉的是哪一種三寶？ 答：這裡只敬奉別相三寶。為什麼只敬奉別相三寶？因為顯示敬奉有為和無為的功德都周遍窮盡。又可以通指敬奉同相三寶，因為在唯識性中兼顧了這種意義。所以《涅槃經》說：『若能見三寶常住同真諦，此則是諸佛最上之誓願。』論文雖然舉出滿凈和分凈兩種，意在選取所證悟的，同相三寶，都是常住的。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the wonderful offerings in the world, because the Three Realms (desire realm, form realm, formless realm) possess great power, because of the adornment of both merit and wisdom, because merit and supernatural powers are truly difficult to match, because of arising the mind of aspiration, therefore, at the beginning of teaching the Dharma, first proclaim the Three Jewels (Buddha Jewel, Dharma Jewel, Sangha Jewel), so that those who hear the Dharma may generate a supreme mind, and only by relying on strength and requesting blessings can one create explanations. Regarding the three questions about the Three Jewels, there are the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna) and the One Vehicle (Bodhisattvayāna). Which of the Three Jewels is revered here? Answer: Here, only the One Vehicle Three Jewels are revered, because the nature of Consciousness-Only is said to be complete and partially pure. The Two Vehicles do not cultivate the Consciousness-Only view. The verse in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'The Well-Gone (Tathāgata) well speaks of the subtle Three Bodies (Dharmakāya, Sambhogakāya, Nirmāṇakāya), fearless and without outflows, attaining the teaching and the Dharma. The true Muni's son (Buddha) of the Supreme Vehicle, I now sincerely first praise and pay homage.' The verse in the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra says: 'I bow to the supreme field of good fortune, the Three Bodies, the Two Truths (conventional truth, ultimate truth), and the assembly of the One Vehicle.' The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other scriptures are the same everywhere. Therefore, here only the One Vehicle Three Jewels are revered, with complete realization and understanding, possessing both merit and wisdom, and having great power. Alternatively, here it can generally refer to revering the saints of the Three Vehicles. The Two Vehicles also, in the gate of no-self of persons, see the Suchness of the Consciousness-Only nature, belonging to the partially pure. The Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'All gather the true pure ultimate principle, and even pay homage to the Great Awakened One, the unequaled wonderful Dharma, and the true Holy Assembly.' Generally referring to revering all the Three Vehicles Three Jewels. Fourth question: What are the Three Jewels revered here like? Answer: The Dharma Jewel is as previously stated. Here, the Buddha Jewel generally encompasses the Three Bodies. The Sangha Jewel generally encompasses the remaining saints other than the Buddha. Question: The solitary realizer (Pratyekabuddha) is different in various schools. Which of the Three Jewels does this belong to? Answer: The solitary realizer belongs to the Sangha Jewel, because it is permissible for multiple solitary realizers of this kind to appear simultaneously. Therefore, the solitary realizer is also included in the Sangha Jewel. Fifth question: There are two kinds of Three Jewels, the Three Jewels of the same characteristics and the Three Jewels of different characteristics. Which of the Three Jewels is revered here? Answer: Here, only the Three Jewels of different characteristics are revered. Why only revere the Three Jewels of different characteristics? Because it shows that the merit of both conditioned and unconditioned is universally and completely exhausted. It can also generally refer to revering the Three Jewels of the same characteristics, because this meaning is also included in the Consciousness-Only nature. Therefore, the Nirvana Sutra says: 'If one can see that the Three Jewels are permanent and abide in the same ultimate truth, this is the supreme vow of all Buddhas.' Although the text mentions both complete purity and partial purity, it intends to select what is realized, the Three Jewels of the same characteristics, which are all permanent and abiding.

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六問何故但敬三寶非余。答四緣勝故。一由如來性調善故。二所調．能調善方便故。三由如來具大悲故。四財供養時未以為喜。正行供時方歡喜故。由此如來．所說正法．及聖弟子。皆可歸依。非余天等　三寶．歸敬．及二體性．並諸門義。三寶可敬。余不可敬。並如瑜伽第六十四．七十四卷．顯揚第六．第十三卷．及勝鬘經．別章等說。此中第四亦得說敬非人．非法。法寶即非人。佛．僧非法故。雖有四義釋上二句。正取歸敬本．釋二師。于境第七說唯識性故。第四聲中說滿．分凈故。如樞要說。總是第一歸敬福田凡造論者總有二緣。一令法久住。二為濟含識。一自利。二利他。一由智德。二由恩德。一為生大智。二為生大悲。第三句云我今釋彼說者。正顯釋論令法久住自利。由有智德生大智也。第四句云利樂諸有情者。述意所為濟諸含識。利他由有恩德生大悲也。又有別解如樞要說　我。即安惠自指己身。即是隨俗五蘊假者　今者。正顯隨其爾所釋論之時。即事究竟時分今也　釋。謂解釋開演之義。幽隱未顯今說名開。先略難知廣談為演　又約機說。為初機曰開。為久機曰演　又釋者。成立之義。安教立理名曰釋也　彼。謂世親　說。即本頌三十伽陀世親所造。名為彼說。此即唯取彼所說教　又說。即是能詮所詮

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 六問：為何只尊敬三寶（佛、法、僧），而不尊敬其他的呢？ 答：因為有四種殊勝的緣故。 一、由於如來（Tathagata，佛的稱號）的本性調柔善良。 二、所調伏的對象和能調伏的善巧方便都殊勝。 三、由於如來具有廣大的慈悲。 四、在以財物供養時，如來並不以此為喜悅，只有以如法修行供養時，才感到歡喜。 因此，如來、如來說的正法、以及聖弟子（僧伽）都是可以歸依的，而不是其他的神祇等。 關於三寶、歸敬、以及二者的體性、以及各種門義，三寶是值得尊敬的，其他的則不值得尊敬。這些內容在《瑜伽師地論》第六十四卷、第七十四卷，《顯揚聖教論》第六品、第十三品，以及《勝鬘經》、別章等處都有說明。 這裡，第四點也可以說是尊敬非人、非法。法寶（Dharma Jewel）即是非人，佛（Buddha）、僧（Sangha）非法。 雖然有四種解釋來解釋上面兩句話，但主要取歸敬的根本，解釋二位論師。在《瑜伽師地論》第七境中說唯識性。 在第四聲中說圓滿、清凈的功德。如《樞要》所說。總之，第一是歸敬福田，凡是造論的人總是有兩種因緣：一是令佛法長久住世，二是為救濟一切眾生。一是自利，二是利他。一是由於智慧的功德，二是由於恩德。一是為生起大智慧，二是為生起大慈悲。 第三句說『我今釋彼說』，正是顯示解釋論典是爲了令佛法長久住世，是自利，因為有智慧的功德，能生起大智慧。 第四句說『利樂諸有情者』，是陳述意圖，爲了救濟一切眾生，是利他，因為有恩德，能生起大慈悲。 另外還有其他的解釋，如《樞要》所說。『我』，即安慧（Anhui，論師的名字）自指自身，即是隨順世俗的五蘊假合之身。『今』，正是顯示隨其所釋論典之時，即是事情究竟的時分。『釋』，是解釋、開演的意思。幽深隱晦未顯明的，現在說出來叫做『開』。先前簡略難以理解的，現在廣為談論叫做『演』。又可以約根機來說，為初學者說是『開』，為久學者說是『演』。又，『釋』是成立的意思，安立教義、建立真理叫做『釋』。『彼』，指世親（Vasubandhu，論師的名字）。『說』，即是本頌三十頌，是世親所造，叫做『彼說』。這裡只是取他所說的教義。又，『說』即是能詮和所詮。

【English Translation】 English version Question 6: Why only revere the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha) and not others? Answer: Because of four superior reasons. 1. Because the nature of the Tathagata (title of the Buddha) is harmonious and virtuous. 2. Both the object to be tamed and the skillful means to tame are superior. 3. Because the Tathagata possesses great compassion. 4. When offering material possessions, the Tathagata does not rejoice in this, but only rejoices when offering through righteous practice. Therefore, the Tathagata, the Dharma spoken by the Tathagata, and the noble disciples (Sangha) are all worthy of refuge, and not other deities, etc. Regarding the Three Jewels, reverence, and the nature of the two, as well as various meanings, the Three Jewels are worthy of reverence, while others are not. These contents are explained in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) Volumes 64 and 74, the Asanga's Exposition of the Sutras Volumes 6 and 13, and the Srimala Sutra, special chapters, etc. Here, the fourth point can also be said to be reverence for non-humans and non-Dharma. The Dharma Jewel is non-human, while the Buddha and Sangha are non-Dharma. Although there are four explanations to explain the above two sentences, the main point is to take the root of reverence and explain the two teachers. In the seventh realm of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the nature of consciousness-only is discussed. In the fourth sound, the merits of completeness and purity are discussed. As the Key Essentials says. In short, the first is to revere the field of merit. All those who create treatises have two causes: one is to make the Dharma last long in the world, and the other is to save all sentient beings. One is for self-benefit, and the other is for the benefit of others. One is due to the merit of wisdom, and the other is due to the merit of kindness. One is to generate great wisdom, and the other is to generate great compassion. The third sentence, 'I now explain his saying,' precisely shows that explaining the treatise is to make the Dharma last long in the world, which is self-benefit, because there is the merit of wisdom, which can generate great wisdom. The fourth sentence, 'To benefit and bring joy to all sentient beings,' is stating the intention, to save all sentient beings, which is benefiting others, because there is kindness, which can generate great compassion. There are also other explanations, as the Key Essentials says. 'I' refers to Anhui (name of a commentator) referring to himself, which is the aggregation of the five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) in accordance with worldly conventions. 'Now' precisely shows the time when the treatise is being explained, which is the time when the matter is completed. 'Explain' means to interpret and expound. What is deep and hidden and not yet clear is now spoken of as 'opening'. What was previously brief and difficult to understand is now discussed extensively as 'expounding'. It can also be said in terms of the capacity of the audience: for beginners, it is 'opening', and for advanced learners, it is 'expounding'. Also, 'explain' means to establish. Establishing teachings and establishing truth is called 'explain'. 'He' refers to Vasubandhu (name of a commentator). 'Saying' refers to the thirty verses of the original treatise, which were created by Vasubandhu, and is called 'his saying'. Here, only the teachings he spoke are taken. Also, 'saying' refers to both the expressing and the expressed.

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若教若理。世親所述總名彼說。如樞要中釋論名義。此中意顯我今釋彼世親所說三十唯識令法久住令法久住。略有六因。一欲令法義當廣流佈。二欲令有情隨入正法。三令失沒義重開顯故。四為欲略攝廣散義故。五為欲顯發甚深義故。六以巧文辭莊嚴法義。令起愛樂生凈信故。如瑜伽論六十四說　令法久住。即自利也　利樂有情。乃有多義。梵云薩埵此言有情。有情識故。今談眾生有此情識故名有情。無別能有。或假者能有此情識故亦名有情。又情者性也。有此性故。又情者愛也。能有愛生故。下第三云。若無本識復依何法建立有情。有情之體即是本識。言眾生者不善理也。卉木眾生。亦應利樂　有情不同有六十二。如瑜伽論第二卷說。五趣。四姓。女．男．俱三。劣．中．妙三。在家等四。律儀等三。離欲等二。邪定等三。苾芻等七。習斷等十九。異生等四。聲聞等四。輪王為一。故今此論言諸有情。又教所被菩薩種姓。不定姓人。此類非一故言諸也。一利謂利益即是后濟。樂謂安樂即是現濟。二或現益名利。后益名樂。三或攝善名利。離惡名樂。四或翻此。五或出苦名利。與樂名樂。六或與智名利。與福名樂。七或與出世勝善名利與世勝善說名為樂。八或與小果名利。與大果名樂。九或利與樂一體異名。如佛地第

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『若教若理』（『若教』指教義，『若理』指理則）。世親（Vasubandhu）所述，總稱為『彼說』。如同《樞要》（Shūyào）中解釋論的名義。此中意在表明，我今解釋世親所說的《三十唯識》（Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā），爲了使佛法長久住世，使佛法長久住世。略有六個原因：一，想要使佛法的義理能夠廣泛流佈；二，想要使有情眾生隨順進入正法；三，爲了使已經失沒的義理重新開顯；四，爲了將廣博散漫的義理進行概括攝取；五，爲了顯發甚深的義理；六，用巧妙的文辭來莊嚴佛法的義理，使人生起喜愛和清凈的信心。如同《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第六十四卷所說，使佛法長久住世，就是自利；利益安樂有情眾生，有很多意義。梵語『薩埵』（Sattva），這裡譯為『有情』，因為具有情識的緣故。現在談論眾生，因為有這種情識，所以稱為有情。沒有其他能夠擁有，或者假設者能夠擁有這種情識，所以也稱為有情。另外，『情』是本性，因為具有這種本性的緣故。另外，『情』是愛，能夠產生愛的緣故。下文第三頌說：『若無本識，復依何法建立有情？』有情的本體就是本識。說『眾生』是不善的道理。草木眾生，也應該利益安樂嗎？有情有六十二種不同，如同《瑜伽師地論》第二卷所說：五趣（五道輪迴）。四姓（婆羅門、剎帝利、吠舍、首陀羅）。女、男、俱三（三種性別）。劣、中、妙三（三種根器）。在家等四（在家、出家等）。律儀等三（三種戒律）。離欲等二（兩種離欲者）。邪定等三（三種邪定）。苾芻等七（七種比丘）。習斷等十九（十九種修行斷除者）。異生等四（四種異生）。聲聞等四（四種聲聞）。輪王為一（一位轉輪聖王）。所以現在這部論典說『諸有情』。另外，教法所覆蓋的菩薩種姓，不定種姓的人，這類並非只有一種，所以說是『諸』。 一，『利』是指利益，也就是後來的救濟。『樂』是指安樂，也就是現在的救濟。二，或者現在的利益稱為『利』，將來的利益稱為『樂』。三，或者攝取善法稱為『利』，遠離惡法稱為『樂』。四，或者與此相反。五，或者脫離痛苦稱為『利』，給予快樂稱為『樂』。六，或者給予智慧稱為『利』，給予福報稱為『樂』。七，或者給予出世間的殊勝善法稱為『利』，給予世間的殊勝善法稱為『樂』。八，或者給予小的果報稱為『利』，給予大的果報稱為『樂』。九，或者『利』與『樂』是一體異名，如同《佛地經》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra）所說。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Ruò jiào ruò lǐ' ('Ruò jiào' refers to teachings, 'ruò lǐ' refers to principles). What was stated by Vasubandhu is collectively called 'his teachings.' Just like the explanation of the meaning of terms in 'Shūyào.' The intention here is to show that I am now explaining Vasubandhu's 'Triṃśikā-vijñaptimātratā' (Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only) in order to make the Dharma long-lasting, to make the Dharma long-lasting. There are roughly six reasons: First, to make the meaning of the Dharma widely spread; second, to make sentient beings follow and enter the right Dharma; third, to re-reveal the meaning that has been lost; fourth, to summarize and gather the broad and scattered meanings; fifth, to reveal the profound meaning; sixth, to adorn the meaning of the Dharma with skillful words, so that people will develop love and pure faith. As stated in the sixty-fourth volume of 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra,' making the Dharma long-lasting is benefiting oneself; benefiting and bringing happiness to sentient beings has many meanings. The Sanskrit word 'Sattva' is translated here as 'sentient being' because they have consciousness. Now we are talking about beings, because they have this consciousness, they are called sentient beings. There is no other that can have, or the assumed one can have this consciousness, so they are also called sentient beings. In addition, 'feeling' is nature, because they have this nature. In addition, 'feeling' is love, because they can generate love. The third verse below says: 'If there is no fundamental consciousness, what Dharma is relied upon to establish sentient beings?' The substance of sentient beings is the fundamental consciousness. Saying 'beings' is not a good principle. Should plants and trees also be benefited and made happy? There are sixty-two different kinds of sentient beings, as stated in the second volume of 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra': Five destinies (five paths of reincarnation). Four castes (Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, Shudra). Female, male, and both three (three genders). Inferior, medium, and superior three (three capacities). Layperson, etc. four (layperson, monastic, etc.). Precepts, etc. three (three kinds of precepts). Detachment, etc. two (two kinds of those detached from desire). Wrong determination, etc. three (three kinds of wrong determination). Bhikshu, etc. seven (seven kinds of monks). Practice and severance, etc. nineteen (nineteen kinds of practitioners who sever afflictions). Different beings, etc. four (four kinds of different beings). Śrāvaka, etc. four (four kinds of Śrāvakas). Wheel-turning king as one (one Chakravartin). Therefore, this treatise now says 'all sentient beings.' In addition, the Bodhisattva lineage covered by the teachings, people of uncertain lineage, this kind is not only one, so it is said 'all'. First, 'benefit' refers to advantage, which is later relief. 'Happiness' refers to peace and joy, which is present relief. Second, or present benefit is called 'benefit,' and future benefit is called 'happiness.' Third, or gathering good Dharma is called 'benefit,' and staying away from evil Dharma is called 'happiness.' Fourth, or the opposite of this. Fifth, or escaping from suffering is called 'benefit,' and giving happiness is called 'happiness.' Sixth, or giving wisdom is called 'benefit,' and giving blessings is called 'happiness.' Seventh, or giving transcendent excellent Dharma is called 'benefit,' and giving worldly excellent Dharma is called 'happiness.' Eighth, or giving small results is called 'benefit,' and giving great results is called 'happiness.' Ninth, or 'benefit' and 'happiness' are one entity with different names, as stated in the 'Buddhabhūmi-sūtra'.

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一．顯揚十三．諸論等說。十或利。謂十利。一純利。二共利。三利益種類利。四安樂種類利。五因攝利。六果攝利。七此世利。八他世利。九畢竟利。十不畢竟利　樂謂五樂。一者因樂。即順樂受諸根境界。樂相應法。樂所發業。皆名因樂能有樂故。二者受樂。即是樂受。通有．無漏。有漏樂者。三界所繫調暢身心皆名為樂。非唯遍行受數中樂。無漏樂者。通學．無學。是樂自性。三苦對治樂。謂因寒熱飢渴等事暫息滅時。生起樂覺名苦對治樂。非必自性。四受斷樂。謂滅受想定。粗動受滅故說為樂。五無惱害樂。此有四種。一出離樂。謂出家者。二遠離樂。謂生上者。三寂靜樂。謂即涅槃。四覺法樂。謂菩提。婆沙二十六有此四樂。最後二種是勝義樂。此十利五樂。如瑜伽論三十五說　上之十種解利樂者。應說頌言。世．性．及苦樂。智福．出世世。小大．與名異。十利並五樂　今釋此論令法不滅。為與有情此利．樂故。即以二緣釋彼論也　或此頌中下之兩句。明釋彼說者但為諸有情。有情信學法便住故。菩薩所為本利他故　依所具緣前解為本。約大悲說后解無妨　然造論者名莊嚴經。略有五喻名莊嚴也。一者如蓮未開。見雖生喜。不如已剖香氣芬馥。二者如金未用。見雖生喜。不如用之為莊嚴具。三者如膳未食

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一.《顯揚聖教論》第十三品，關於各種論述等所說的十種利益，稱為『十利』：一、純利（完全的利益）；二、共利（共同的利益）；三、利益種類利（屬於利益範疇的利益）；四、安樂種類利（屬於安樂範疇的利益）；五、因攝利（由因所包含的利益）；六、果攝利（由果所包含的利益）；七、此世利（現世的利益）；八、他世利（來世的利益）；九、畢竟利（最終的利益）；十、不畢竟利（非最終的利益）。 安樂，指五種安樂：一、因樂（由因產生的安樂），即順應令人感到快樂的諸根境界，與快樂相應的法，以及由快樂所引發的行為，都稱為『因樂』，因為它們能帶來快樂。二、受樂（感受到的安樂），即是樂受，包括有漏和無漏。有漏樂是指三界所繫縛，能調和身心的快樂，不只是遍行受中的快樂。無漏樂包括有學和無學，是安樂的自性。三、苦對治樂（通過對治痛苦而獲得的安樂），指因寒冷、炎熱、飢餓、乾渴等情況暫時平息時，產生的快樂感覺，稱為『苦對治樂』，並非安樂的自性。四、受斷樂（斷滅感受而獲得的安樂），指滅受想定，因為粗重的感受滅除，所以說是安樂。五、無惱害樂（沒有煩惱和傷害的安樂），這有四種：一、出離樂（從世俗中解脫的安樂），指那些出家修行的人。二、遠離樂（遠離煩惱的安樂），指那些生於上界的人。三、寂靜樂（寂靜涅槃的安樂），指涅槃的境界。四、覺法樂（覺悟佛法的安樂），指菩提。在《大毗婆沙論》第二十六卷中有這四種安樂，最後兩種是勝義樂（殊勝的安樂）。這十種利益和五種安樂，如《瑜伽師地論》第三十五卷所說。 上面這十種解釋利益和安樂的方法，可以用一首偈頌來概括：『世、性、及苦樂，智福、出世世，小大、與名異，十利並五樂』。 現在解釋這部論典，是爲了讓佛法不至於斷滅，爲了給予眾生這些利益和安樂，所以用這兩種緣起來解釋這部論典。 或者這首偈頌中下面的兩句，說明解釋這些內容只是爲了眾生，因為眾生相信並學習佛法才能安住。菩薩所做的事情本來就是爲了利益他人。 依據所具備的因緣，前面的解釋是根本。從大悲的角度來說，後面的解釋也沒有妨礙。 然而，這部論典的作者名為『莊嚴經』，略有五種比喻稱為『莊嚴』。一、就像未開放的蓮花，看到雖然令人歡喜，但不如已經綻放、香氣芬芳的蓮花。二、就像未使用的黃金，看到雖然令人歡喜，但不如用它來製作成莊嚴的飾品。三、就像未食用的美食。

【English Translation】 English version I. Śūraṅgama Sūtra 13. Discussions and other statements. Ten or benefits. Called the 'Ten Benefits': 1. Pure benefit; 2. Shared benefit; 3. Benefit of the category of benefits; 4. Benefit of the category of peace and happiness; 5. Benefit included in the cause; 6. Benefit included in the result; 7. Benefit in this life; 8. Benefit in the next life; 9. Ultimate benefit; 10. Non-ultimate benefit. Happiness refers to five kinds of happiness: 1. Happiness of cause, which is the realm of the senses that accords with pleasant feelings, the dharma corresponding to happiness, and the actions arising from happiness, all called 'happiness of cause' because they can bring happiness. 2. Happiness of feeling, which is the feeling of happiness, including both with outflows (sāsrava) and without outflows (anāsrava). Happiness with outflows refers to the happiness that is bound by the Three Realms, which can harmonize body and mind, not just the happiness in the pervasive feeling. Happiness without outflows includes both those in training (śaikṣa) and those beyond training (aśaikṣa), and is the nature of happiness itself. 3. Happiness of counteracting suffering, which refers to the feeling of happiness that arises when things like cold, heat, hunger, and thirst are temporarily relieved, called 'happiness of counteracting suffering,' which is not necessarily the nature of happiness. 4. Happiness of cessation of feeling, which refers to the cessation of feeling and perception, because coarse feelings are extinguished, so it is said to be happiness. 5. Happiness without affliction, which has four types: 1. Happiness of renunciation, referring to those who have left home. 2. Happiness of detachment, referring to those born in higher realms. 3. Happiness of tranquility, referring to Nirvana. 4. Happiness of awakening to the Dharma, referring to Bodhi. In Mahāvibhāṣā 26, there are these four kinds of happiness, the last two being ultimate happiness. These ten benefits and five kinds of happiness are as described in Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra 35. The above ten ways of explaining benefits and happiness can be summarized in a verse: 'World, nature, and suffering and happiness, wisdom and merit, with outflows and without outflows, small and large, and different in name, the ten benefits and five kinds of happiness.' Now, explaining this treatise is to prevent the Dharma from being extinguished, and to give sentient beings these benefits and happiness, so these two conditions are used to explain this treatise. Or the last two lines of this verse explain that these contents are only for sentient beings, because sentient beings can abide by believing in and learning the Dharma. What Bodhisattvas do is originally for the benefit of others. According to the conditions that are possessed, the previous explanation is fundamental. From the perspective of great compassion, the latter explanation is not an obstacle. However, the author of this treatise is named 'Ornament Scripture,' and there are briefly five metaphors called 'ornament.' 1. Like an unopened lotus flower, seeing it is pleasing, but not as pleasing as a lotus that has already bloomed and is fragrant. 2. Like unused gold, seeing it is pleasing, but not as pleasing as using it to make ornate ornaments. 3. Like uneaten delicacies.

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。見雖生喜。不如食已知其美味。四者如慶書未開。見雖生喜。不如披已知其慶事。五者如珍寶未得。見雖生喜。不如得已攝為己財。故今造論名莊嚴經　又要具四緣方應造論。如瑜伽論六十四說。

次長行中明本論主造論之意。文勢有三。一安惠等。欲顯論主為令生解斷障得果。所以造論二火辨等意。明論主令達二空悟唯識性。所以造論。三護法等。明造本論。破諸邪執顯唯識理。然此三師併爲人．法。雖三義別二意造論。

論。今造此論為於二空有迷謬者生正解故。

述曰。下顯造論悟．斷．得果。于中有三。初顯悟。次顯斷。后得果。此即初也　論言今者。正顯論主造論之時　造者。製作之義。敘理名述先來有故。作論名造今新起故。此上即是發端標舉。簡持。指斥　于者即是境上第七。非依第七。所迷謬故一切異生諸外道等。此愚癡類彼於二空全不解了名為迷者。聲聞．獨覺．及惡取空。邪解空理分有智故名為謬者。不解。邪解。合名迷謬或但不解無明名迷。若不正解邪見名謬。癡．邪見人名迷．謬者為令于彼二空真如。有迷謬者生正解故。制斯論也。正解體通無漏真智。及有漏智不迷謬者。即令迷者解生。謬者正解為者所為。濟益之義何謂二空。謂即生．法。先云人我今說為生。但說于

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：四者，就像慶賀的信件還沒打開，看見了雖然高興，不如打開後知道是慶賀的事情。五者，就像珍寶還沒得到，看見了雖然高興，不如得到后收為自己的財產。所以現在造論，名為《莊嚴經論》。又要具備四種因緣，才應該造論，如《瑜伽師地論》第六十四卷所說。

接下來長行文中說明本論主造論的意圖。文勢有三種：一是安慧等人，想要顯示論主爲了使眾生生起理解、斷除障礙、獲得果位，所以造論；二是火辨等人，說明論主爲了使眾生通達二空、領悟唯識的體性，所以造論；三是護法等人，說明造本論是爲了破除各種邪見，彰顯唯識的道理。然而這三位論師都是爲了人、法二空，雖然三種意義不同，但都是爲了這兩種意圖而造論。

論：現在造這部論，是爲了對於二空有迷惑顛倒的人，使他們產生正確的理解。

述記：下面顯示造論是爲了領悟、斷除、獲得果位。其中有三個方面：首先是領悟，其次是斷除，最後是獲得果位。這裡是第一個方面。論中說『現在』，正是顯示論主造論的時候。『造』是製作的意思。敘述道理叫做『述』，因為先來就有的緣故；作論叫做『造』，因為是現在新產生的緣故。以上就是發端標舉、簡別持擇、指明陳述。『于』是處所，即是境上第七，不是依處第七，因為是所迷惑顛倒的緣故。一切凡夫、各種外道等，這些愚癡之輩，他們對於二空完全不瞭解，叫做『迷者』。聲聞、獨覺，以及錯誤執取空性的人，邪曲地理解空性的道理，一部分有智慧，所以叫做『謬者』。不瞭解、邪曲地理解，合起來叫做『迷惑顛倒』。或者只是不瞭解，無明叫做『迷』；如果是不正確的理解，邪見叫做『謬』。愚癡、邪見的人叫做『迷惑顛倒者』。爲了使他們對於二空真如，有迷惑顛倒的人產生正確的理解，所以製作這部論。正確的理解，本體通於無漏的真智，以及有漏的智慧，不迷惑顛倒的人。就是使迷惑的人產生理解，使顛倒的人產生正確的理解。『為』是所為，濟助利益的意思。什麼是二空？就是眾生空、法空。先前說人我，現在說眾生，只是在說法上有所不同。

【English Translation】 English version: Fourth, like a congratulatory letter that hasn't been opened yet, seeing it brings joy, but it's not as good as opening it and knowing it's a congratulatory matter. Fifth, like a treasure that hasn't been obtained yet, seeing it brings joy, but it's not as good as obtaining it and taking it as one's own property. Therefore, this treatise is now being composed, and it is named 'Treatise on Adornment of the Scriptures'. Moreover, one must possess four conditions in order to be qualified to compose a treatise, as stated in the sixty-fourth fascicle of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice).

Next, the prose section explains the intention of the author of this treatise. The structure of the text has three aspects: First, Ānanda (Anhui) and others, wish to show that the author composed the treatise in order to enable sentient beings to generate understanding, sever obstacles, and attain fruition; Second, Agnidatta (Huobian) and others, explain that the author composed the treatise in order to enable sentient beings to comprehend the two emptinesses and realize the nature of Vijñaptimātratā (Consciousness-only); Third, Dharmapāla (Hufa) and others, explain that the composition of this treatise is to refute various heretical views and reveal the principle of Vijñaptimātratā. However, these three masters are all for the emptiness of persons and dharmas, although the three meanings are different, they all compose the treatise for these two intentions.

Treatise: Now, this treatise is composed in order to generate correct understanding for those who are confused and deluded about the two emptinesses.

Commentary: Below, it shows that composing the treatise is for the sake of enlightenment, severance, and attainment of fruition. There are three aspects to this: first is enlightenment, second is severance, and third is attainment of fruition. This is the first aspect. The treatise says 'now', which precisely shows the time when the author is composing the treatise. 'Composing' means making. Narrating principles is called 'narrating', because it has existed before; making a treatise is called 'composing', because it is newly arising now. The above is the beginning, pointing out, distinguishing and selecting, and specifying. 'In' is the location, which is the seventh on the object, not the seventh on the basis, because it is what is confused and deluded. All ordinary beings, various heretics, etc., these ignorant beings, they do not understand the two emptinesses at all, and are called 'confused ones'. Śrāvakas (Hearers), Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas), and those who wrongly grasp emptiness, understand the principle of emptiness perversely, and some have wisdom, so they are called 'deluded ones'. Not understanding and understanding perversely are collectively called 'confused and deluded'. Or simply not understanding, ignorance is called 'confusion'; if it is an incorrect understanding, wrong view is called 'delusion'. Ignorant and wrong-viewed people are called 'confused and deluded ones'. In order to generate correct understanding for those who are confused and deluded about the two emptinesses and Suchness (Tathata), this treatise is made. Correct understanding, the substance connects to the unconditioned true wisdom, as well as the conditioned wisdom, those who are not confused and deluded. It is to enable the confused to generate understanding, and to enable the deluded to generate correct understanding. 'For' is what is done, the meaning of aiding and benefiting. What are the two emptinesses? They are the emptiness of sentient beings and the emptiness of dharmas. Previously it was said 'self of person', now it is said 'sentient beings', it is only a difference in the way of speaking.

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人我不該余趣故。彼皆執有。此說為空。空即彼無。無別體也。智緣空起為所由門。顯二真如名二空理。理體雖有離有離空非性是空。說為二空從能顯說。梵言瞬若可說如空。名舜若多。如是空性。即是二空所顯實性。故言空者從能顯說。二空之性名二空性。依士釋名。言真如空未善理故。

問證二空性生解為何。

論。生解為斷二重障故。

述曰。此顯證空生解所由。下即第二顯其斷也　障言重者。毀責名也。由煩惱障障大涅槃流轉生死。由所知障障大菩提不悟大覺。一者猶如金剛。難可斷故。二者擔此難越生死流故。三者押溺有情處四生故。四者墮墜有情沒三界故。此上四義毀責過失故名為重。通二障解。五者或二障中我法二執。為障根本生余障類。但說二執名為重障。我法執之餘末障皆輕故。此解正顯二空所斷。前四通取斷諸二障。即根本沉下名之為重　障謂覆礙。覆所知境令智不生。礙大涅槃令不顯證。故名為障　二障體．義。如下第九．佛地第七．別章等解。

問初四解重障義者。何故障理。但說二空空唯二執。生解。乃言斷二重障即兼余法　問第五解重唯二執。二障體斷亦通貪等。何故但說我．法二空。

論。由我法執二障具生若證二空彼障隨斷。

述曰。此釋但

說二執所由。答解初問云。且煩惱障品類眾多。我執為根生諸煩惱。若不執我無煩惱故。證無我理我見便除。由根斷故枝條亦盡。此依見道．乃究竟位斷煩惱說。餘位不然。先離八品煩惱。第九品時方斷我見故。第四地中我見亦爾。如第九卷資糧位中有其二解　所知障中類亦非一。法執為本余障得生。證法空時法執便斷。以根斷故莖葉亦除　正障二空謂我．法執。余障余惑是此等流。故於真理但說二空　又總解之不須別說。以執為根生余煩惱。故由二執具生二障。無有少障不依執生。說具生言意在於此。本既盡已末隨滅故。若證二空餘障皆隨斷。障如從本但說二空。生解斷除兼余煩惱。非余障惑證空不斷。言執通取心心所法。隨義答上二問所徴。今此總四句答第二問。若初二句但釋言二空。若后二句但釋斷重障。答第一問　問煩惱障中品類非一。可言本斷余惑不生。所知障中唯有法執殊無品類。何法為流。言根斷時莖葉亦盡　答六識執外五識等中法愛恚等。異熟生攝定下劣效能障定者。法執等流。所知障攝。故說根斷莖葉亦除　問定障是何　答據實通取染污心．心所能障定者。隨勝但取異熟生受　以何為證　雜集論說由受盡故得二無為。即其證也。此約離煩惱外異熟受。說得其無為。若煩惱俱者。與彼同斷　問既爾應

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於二執（兩種執著）的由來。回答第一個問題說：『且煩惱障（Klesha-avarana，煩惱的障礙）種類繁多，我執（Atma-graha，對自我的執著）是產生各種煩惱的根源。如果不執著于自我，就不會有煩惱。』因此，證悟無我（Anatma，非我）的道理，我見（Atma-drishti，對自我的錯誤見解）就會消除。由於根源斷除，枝條也隨之枯竭。這是依據見道（Darshana-marga，見真理之道）、乃至究竟位（最終的果位）斷除煩惱而說的，其餘的階段並非如此。先要離開八品煩惱，到第九品時才斷除我見。第四地（Fourth Bhumi，菩薩修行的第四個階段）中的我見也是如此。如同第九卷《資糧位》（Sambhara-marga，積累資糧之道）中有兩種解釋。 所知障（Jnana-avarana，對所知事物的障礙）中的種類也並非單一，法執（Dharma-graha，對法的執著）是其餘障礙產生的根本。證悟法空（Dharma-shunyata，諸法皆空）時，法執便會斷除。因為根源斷除，莖葉也隨之消失。 真正障礙二空（Dvi-shunyata，我空和法空）的是我執和法執，其餘的障礙和迷惑是這些執著的等流（Nisyanda，餘勢、流溢）。因此，對於真理，只說二空。 又可以總括地解釋，不需要分別說明。因為執著是產生其餘煩惱的根源，所以由於兩種執著，就產生了兩種障礙。沒有哪一種障礙不是依賴執著而產生的。說『具生』（共同產生）的意思就在於此。根本既然已經斷盡，末梢也隨之滅亡。如果證悟了二空，其餘的障礙都會隨之斷除。障礙如同從根本生出，所以只說二空。生起理解，斷除二執，兼帶斷除其餘的煩惱。並非其餘的障礙和迷惑，證悟空性就不能斷除。所說的『執』，包括心和心所法（Citta-caitta，心理活動和心理作用）。根據意義回答了上面兩個問題所提出的疑問。現在用這四句總括地回答第二個問題。如果前兩句只是解釋『二空』，那麼后兩句只是解釋斷除重大的障礙。回答第一個問題。 問：煩惱障中的品類並非單一，可以說根本斷除，其餘的迷惑就不會產生。所知障中只有法執，並沒有其他的品類，什麼法是等流？說什麼根斷時莖葉也隨之枯竭？ 答：六識（第六意識）執著外境，五識（前五識）等中產生法愛（Dharma-tanha，對法的愛著）、法恚（Dharma-dvesha，對法的嗔恨）等，這些是異熟生（Vipaka-ja，由業力成熟而生）所攝，具有低下劣弱的效能，能夠障礙禪定。這些是法執的等流，屬於所知障所攝。所以說根斷時莖葉也隨之消失。 問：什麼是定障（Samadhi-avarana，禪定障礙）？ 答：根據實際情況，可以總括地理解為染污的心和心所法能夠障礙禪定。但從殊勝的角度來說，只取異熟生受（Vipaka-ja vedana，由業力成熟而生的感受）。 以什麼為證據？《雜集論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）說：『由於感受滅盡，所以能得到兩種無為（Dvi-asamskrita，兩種無為法）。』這就是證據。這是指離開煩惱之外的異熟生受，說能得到無為。如果是與煩惱一起產生的感受，就與煩惱一同斷除。 問：既然如此，應該……

【English Translation】 English version Regarding the origin of the two attachments (Dvi-graha): Answering the first question, it says: 'Moreover, the Klesha-avarana (afflictive obscurations) are numerous, and Atma-graha (self-attachment) is the root from which all afflictions arise. If there is no attachment to self, there will be no afflictions.' Therefore, realizing the truth of Anatma (non-self), Atma-drishti (self-view) will be eliminated. Because the root is severed, the branches also wither away. This is said based on the Darshana-marga (path of seeing), up to the ultimate stage, of severing afflictions; it is not so in other stages. First, one must abandon the eight categories of afflictions, and only in the ninth category is self-view severed. Self-view in the Fourth Bhumi (fourth bodhisattva ground) is also like this, as in the two explanations in the ninth volume of the Sambhara-marga (path of accumulation). The types within the Jnana-avarana (cognitive obscurations) are also not singular; Dharma-graha (attachment to phenomena) is the basis for the arising of other obscurations. When Dharma-shunyata (emptiness of phenomena) is realized, Dharma-graha will be severed. Because the root is severed, the stems and leaves also disappear. What truly obstructs the Dvi-shunyata (two emptinesses) are Atma-graha and Dharma-graha; the remaining obscurations and delusions are Nisyanda (outflow, emanation) of these attachments. Therefore, regarding the truth, only the two emptinesses are spoken of. Furthermore, it can be explained comprehensively, without needing to explain separately. Because attachment is the root from which other afflictions arise, therefore, due to the two attachments, the two obscurations arise. There is no obscuration that does not arise dependent on attachment. The meaning of saying 'arise together' lies in this. Since the root has been exhausted, the branches also perish along with it. If the two emptinesses are realized, the remaining obscurations will all be severed along with them. Obscurations are like arising from the root, so only the two emptinesses are spoken of. Generating understanding, severing the two attachments, also severs the remaining afflictions. It is not that the remaining obscurations and delusions cannot be severed by realizing emptiness. The 'attachment' spoken of includes Citta-caitta (mind and mental factors). According to the meaning, it answers the questions raised above. Now, these four lines comprehensively answer the second question. If the first two lines only explain 'two emptinesses,' then the latter two lines only explain severing major obscurations. Answering the first question. Question: The categories within the Klesha-avarana are not singular; it can be said that if the root is severed, the remaining delusions will not arise. Within the Jnana-avarana, there is only Dharma-graha, without any other categories; what Dharma is the Nisyanda? What is meant by saying that when the root is severed, the stems and leaves also wither away? Answer: The sixth consciousness clinging to external objects, Dharma-tanha (craving for phenomena), Dharma-dvesha (aversion to phenomena), etc., arising from the five consciousnesses, etc., are included in Vipaka-ja (born from karmic maturation), possessing inferior and weak qualities, capable of obstructing Samadhi (meditative concentration). These are the Nisyanda of Dharma-graha, included within the Jnana-avarana. Therefore, it is said that when the root is severed, the stems and leaves also disappear. Question: What is Samadhi-avarana (obstruction to meditative concentration)? Answer: According to the actual situation, it can be comprehensively understood as defiled mind and mental factors capable of obstructing Samadhi. But from the perspective of excellence, only Vipaka-ja vedana (feeling born from karmic maturation) is taken. What is the evidence? The Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) says: 'Because feeling is exhausted, one can attain the Dvi-asamskrita (two unconditioned states).' This is the evidence. This refers to Vipaka-ja vedana apart from afflictions, saying that one can attain the unconditioned. If it is feeling arising together with afflictions, it will be severed together with the afflictions. Question: Since that is the case, it should...

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斷所知障品亦得無為　下二障中自當解釋。此受俱品雖亦定障受為本故但說于受。修禪定時受為勝障。領受下劣生愛味故更不進修下二障中皆當廣說。

問為何斷障。

論。斷障為得二勝果故。

述曰。下顯得果。

勝謂殊勝。果謂果利。即順益於因。三劫修因所得順益故。二乘二果非極圓滿。果而非勝　十地二法非已圓滿。勝而非果。

究竟二果過出于彼。立勝果名。斷二種障為得此果。

問雖言斷障得二勝果。而未分別斷彼二障得二果時。為總為別。故應分別。

論。由斷續生煩惱障故證真解脫。由斷礙解所知障故得大菩提。

述曰。即顯障．果別斷。

別證。如瑜伽論五十九。說一切煩惱皆能續生。即是發業潤生煩惱。今此論中並皆名續　煩是擾義惱是亂義。擾亂有情故名煩惱。唯煩惱障發業潤生。體是縛法。其所知障義即不然。故續生言但在煩惱　言解脫者。體即圓寂。西域梵音云波利匿縛(去聲呼之)𠲸(奴緘一反)波利者圓也。匿縛𠲸言寂。即是圓滿體寂滅義。舊云涅槃音訛略也。今或順古亦云涅槃。此有多名。如佛地第五。下轉依中說。由煩惱障縛諸有情恒處生死。證圓寂已能離彼縛立解脫名。非解脫體即勝解數。解謂離縛。脫謂自在。障即

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『斷所知障品亦得無為』，下面兩障（煩惱障和所知障）中會自行解釋。此『受俱品』雖然也必定會障礙以受為根本，但只說『于受』。修禪定時，受是最大的障礙。因為領受下劣之境會產生愛戀和執著，所以不再進一步修行，下面兩障中都會詳細說明。

問：為什麼要斷除障礙？

論：斷除障礙是爲了獲得兩種殊勝的果實。

述曰：下面會顯現所得的果實。

『勝』是指殊勝，『果』是指果利，也就是順益於因。三劫修因所得的順益。二乘的二果並非極其圓滿，所以只是果而非勝。十地的二法並非已經圓滿，所以只是勝而非果。

究竟的二果超過了以上所說，所以立名為『勝果』。斷除兩種障礙是爲了獲得這種果實。

問：雖然說斷除障礙可以獲得兩種殊勝的果實，但是沒有分別斷除這兩種障礙獲得兩種果實的時候，是總的還是別的，所以應該分別說明。

論：由於斷除能延續生死的煩惱障，所以證得真解脫（波利匿縛𠲸，圓寂）。由於斷除障礙理解的所知障，所以獲得大菩提（Mahābodhi，大智慧）。

述曰：這顯示了障礙和果實是分別斷除、分別證得的。

分別證得。如《瑜伽師地論》第五十九卷所說，一切煩惱都能延續生死，也就是發起業和滋潤生死的煩惱。現在這部論中都稱為『續』。『煩』是擾亂的意思，『惱』是擾亂的意思，擾亂有情眾生所以叫做煩惱。只有煩惱障才能發起業和滋潤生死，本體是束縛之法。而所知障的意義就不是這樣，所以『續生』這個詞只用在煩惱障上。『解脫』的本體就是圓寂（Parinirvana）。西域梵音叫做波利匿縛𠲸（Parinirvana），波利（Pari）是圓滿的意思，匿縛𠲸（nirvana）是寂靜的意思，也就是圓滿體寂滅的意思。舊譯為涅槃（Nirvana）是音譯的省略。現在或者順應古音也說涅槃。這有很多名稱，如《佛地經論》第五卷，在下轉依中說，由於煩惱障束縛著有情眾生，使他們恒常處於生死輪迴之中，證得圓寂之後就能脫離這種束縛，所以立名為解脫。解脫的本體不是勝解數，解是脫離束縛，脫是自在。障礙就是

【English Translation】 English version: 『The chapter on eliminating the obstacle of knowledge also attains non-action.』 The following two obstacles (the afflictive obstacle and the cognitive obstacle) will be explained later. Although this 『Chapter on Feeling』 also definitely obstructs, with feeling as its root, it only speaks 『of feeling.』 During meditative concentration, feeling is the greatest obstacle. Because experiencing inferior states generates attachment and craving, one does not progress further in cultivation; the following two obstacles will be explained in detail.

Question: Why eliminate obstacles?

Treatise: Eliminating obstacles is for attaining two supreme fruits.

Commentary: The fruits obtained will be revealed below.

『Supreme』 means excellent, and 『fruit』 means beneficial result, which is conducive to the cause. The beneficial results obtained from cultivating the cause for three kalpas. The two fruits of the two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) are not perfectly complete, so they are only fruits and not supreme. The two dharmas of the ten grounds (Daśa-bhūmi) are not yet complete, so they are supreme but not fruits.

The ultimate two fruits surpass those mentioned above, so they are named 『supreme fruits.』 Eliminating the two types of obstacles is for attaining these fruits.

Question: Although it is said that eliminating obstacles can attain two supreme fruits, it has not been distinguished whether the attainment of the two fruits upon eliminating these two obstacles is general or specific, so it should be explained separately.

Treatise: By eliminating the afflictive obstacle (Kleśa-āvaraṇa), which continues rebirth, one attains true liberation (Parinirvana). By eliminating the cognitive obstacle (Jñeya-āvaraṇa), which hinders understanding, one attains great enlightenment (Mahābodhi).

Commentary: This shows that the obstacles and fruits are eliminated and attained separately.

Separate attainment. As stated in the fifty-ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, all afflictions can continue rebirth, which are the afflictions that initiate karma and nourish rebirth. In this treatise, they are all called 『continuing.』 『Affliction』 means disturbance, and 『annoyance』 means disruption, disturbing sentient beings, hence called afflictions. Only the afflictive obstacle can initiate karma and nourish rebirth, and its essence is a binding dharma. The meaning of the cognitive obstacle is not like this, so the term 『continuing rebirth』 is only used for the afflictive obstacle. The essence of 『liberation』 is perfect tranquility (Parinirvana). In the Western Regions, the Sanskrit sound is called Parinirvana, where Pari means complete, and nirvana means tranquility, which is the meaning of complete and tranquil essence. The old translation as Nirvana is an abbreviated transliteration. Now, or in accordance with the ancient sound, it is also called Nirvana. This has many names, as stated in the fifth volume of the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra, in the lower transformation of the basis, because the afflictive obstacle binds sentient beings, causing them to constantly be in the cycle of birth and death, after attaining perfect tranquility, one can be free from this bondage, hence it is named liberation. The essence of liberation is not the number of supreme understanding; liberation means freedom from bondage, and freedom means being at ease. Obstacle means

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煩惱名煩惱障。此持業釋。障蔽涅槃令不趣證。凡夫所修諸行暫滅。外道苦行計證涅槃。乃至有頂諸惑暫斷。所顯之理執為圓寂。今說。彼是彼分涅槃。雖理名真。種不斷故非真解脫。又二乘等雖得二滅。住此二中。非為不住。解脫非真以是假故。十地證如真非解脫。為簡于彼言真解脫。假體擇滅。實即真如。有．無餘依滅所顯故。又總別於外道．二乘所得解脫。言真解脫。彼唯是假。非不住故。即斷煩惱別得涅槃　言所知者。即一切法若有若無皆所知故。了所知智說之為解　礙是障義。由法執類覆所知境。障礙正解令不得生　言正解者。正覺異號。梵云菩提此翻為覺。覺法性故。末伽言道。游履義故。古云菩提道者非也　由法執類覆所知境令智不生名所知障。此從所障以立障名。所知之障。依主釋也　二所障體即四智品。及四涅槃。下轉依中自當廣釋　異生雖作二種無我真如觀等。大非菩提　二乘之慧菩提非大　又異生外道雖有少智。非大菩提。二乘．菩薩有無漏惠。菩提非大。今簡于彼名大菩提。又但簡彼二乘之智菩提非大。菩薩之智大非菩提。凡夫之智俱非二種故　問此言二障各障一果。為定別障。為亦互通　答此不定或別．或通。此中且說定勝障故。說各別障。至下當知　又解為於二空有迷謬者者。是未入法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『煩惱』名為煩惱障（Klesha-avarana），這是持業釋（Karma-dharaya）。它障蔽涅槃（Nirvana），使人不能趨向證得。凡夫所修的諸種行持只是暫時的止滅，外道的苦行則錯誤地認為證得了涅槃，乃至有頂天（Bhavagra）的各種迷惑也只是暫時斷除，他們所顯現的道理執著為圓寂。現在說，那些只是部分涅槃，雖然道理上名為真，但因為種子沒有斷絕，所以不是真正的解脫。此外，二乘（Sravaka-yana and Pratyeka-buddha-yana）等雖然得到了兩種滅（二滅：煩惱滅和蘊滅），但安住在這兩種滅中，並非不住于生死，所以解脫不是真實的，因為它是虛假的。十地菩薩所證得的如（Tathata）雖然真實，但並非解脫，爲了簡別於此，所以說是『真解脫』。虛假的體性是擇滅（Pratisankhya-nirodha），實際上就是真如（Tathata），因為有餘依涅槃（Sa-upadhishesha-nirvana）和無餘依涅槃（Nirupadhishesha-nirvana）所顯現的緣故。又總的來說，是爲了區別于外道和二乘所得到的解脫，所以說『真解脫』，他們的解脫只是虛假的，因為並非不住于生死。斷除煩惱而另外得到的涅槃。 所知，指的是一切法，無論是有還是無，都是所知。了知所知的智慧，稱之為解。『礙』是障礙的意思，由於法執（Dharma-graha）覆蓋了所知的境界，障礙了正確的理解，使之不能產生。『正解』是正覺（Sammasambuddha）的別稱，梵語是菩提（Bodhi），翻譯成漢語是覺，覺悟法性的緣故。末伽（Marga）意思是道，是遊歷行走的含義，古人說的菩提道不是這個意思。 由於法執覆蓋了所知的境界，使智慧不能產生，這叫做所知障（Jneya-avarana）。這是從所障礙的事物來建立障礙的名稱，是所知之障，屬於依主釋（Tat-purusha）。 兩種所障礙的體性，就是四智品（四智：成所作智、妙觀察智、平等性智、大圓鏡智）和四種涅槃（四種涅槃：自性清凈涅槃、有餘依涅槃、無餘依涅槃、無住處涅槃），在下文的轉依（Ashraya-paravrtti）中會詳細解釋。 異生（Prthag-jana）雖然修作兩種無我（二無我：人無我和法無我）、真如觀等，但不是大菩提（Maha-bodhi）。二乘的智慧，是菩提，但不是大菩提。 此外，異生外道雖然有少許智慧，但不是大菩提。二乘和菩薩有無漏的智慧，是菩提，但不是大菩提。現在爲了簡別於他們，所以稱為『大菩提』。又只是簡別於二乘的智慧，是菩提，但不是大菩提。菩薩的智慧是大，但不是菩提。凡夫的智慧，兩種都不是。 問：這裡說二障各自障礙一個果，是確定分別障礙，還是也會互相共通障礙？ 答：這不確定，或者分別障礙，或者互相共通障礙。這裡且說是確定地主要障礙，所以說各自障礙。到下文就會知道。 又解釋為對於二空（人空和法空）有迷惑的人，是未入法位的人。

【English Translation】 English version 'Affliction' is named Klesha-avarana (affliction-obscuration), which is Karma-dharaya (descriptive determinative compound). It obscures Nirvana, preventing one from approaching and realizing it. The various practices cultivated by ordinary beings are only temporary cessations. Heretics' ascetic practices mistakenly consider themselves to have realized Nirvana. Even the various delusions of Bhavagra (the peak of existence) are only temporarily severed, and the principles they manifest are clung to as perfect tranquility. Now it is said that those are only partial Nirvana. Although they are nominally true in principle, they are not true liberation because the seeds have not been cut off. Furthermore, although the Two Vehicles (Sravaka-yana and Pratyeka-buddha-yana) attain two cessations (two cessations: cessation of afflictions and cessation of aggregates), they abide in these two cessations and are not free from samsara. Therefore, their liberation is not true because it is false. The Suchness (Tathata) realized by the Ten Bhumi Bodhisattvas, although true, is not liberation. To distinguish it from that, it is called 'True Liberation'. The false entity is Pratisankhya-nirodha (cessation through discrimination), which is actually Suchness (Tathata), because it is manifested by Sa-upadhishesha-nirvana (Nirvana with remainder) and Nirupadhishesha-nirvana (Nirvana without remainder). Generally speaking, it is to distinguish it from the liberation attained by heretics and the Two Vehicles, so it is called 'True Liberation'. Their liberation is only false because it is not free from samsara. The Nirvana obtained separately by cutting off afflictions. What is knowable refers to all dharmas, whether existent or non-existent, are knowable. The wisdom that knows what is knowable is called understanding. 'Avarana' means obstruction. Because Dharma-graha (attachment to dharmas) covers the knowable realm, it obstructs correct understanding, preventing it from arising. 'Correct Understanding' is another name for Sammasambuddha (perfect enlightenment), which in Sanskrit is Bodhi, translated into Chinese as '覺' (awakening), because it awakens to the nature of dharmas. Marga means the path, which is the meaning of traveling and walking. The ancient saying of the Bodhi path is not this meaning. Because Dharma-graha covers the knowable realm, preventing wisdom from arising, this is called Jneya-avarana (knowledge-obscuration). This is establishing the name of the obstruction from what is obstructed, which is Tat-purusha (dependent determinative compound). The nature of the two obstructions are the Four Wisdoms (Four Wisdoms: Accomplishing Wisdom, Discriminating Wisdom, Equality Wisdom, Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom) and the Four Nirvanas (Four Nirvanas: Self-Nature Purity Nirvana, Nirvana with Remainder, Nirvana without Remainder, Non-Abiding Nirvana), which will be explained in detail in the following Ashraya-paravrtti (transformation of the basis). Although ordinary beings (Prthag-jana) cultivate the two non-selves (two non-selves: non-self of person and non-self of dharma), Suchness contemplation, etc., it is not Maha-bodhi (Great Enlightenment). The wisdom of the Two Vehicles is Bodhi, but not Maha-bodhi. Furthermore, although heretics have a little wisdom, it is not Maha-bodhi. The Two Vehicles and Bodhisattvas have undefiled wisdom, which is Bodhi, but not Maha-bodhi. Now, to distinguish it from them, it is called 'Maha-bodhi'. Also, it only distinguishes the wisdom of the Two Vehicles, which is Bodhi, but not Maha-bodhi. The wisdom of Bodhisattvas is great, but not Bodhi. The wisdom of ordinary beings is neither. Question: Here it says that the two obstructions each obstruct one result. Is it a definite separate obstruction, or is it also mutually common obstruction? Answer: It is not certain, either separate obstruction or mutually common obstruction. Here it is said that it is a definite main obstruction, so it is said that each obstructs separately. It will be known below. Also, it is explained that those who are confused about the two emptinesses (emptiness of person and emptiness of dharma) are those who have not entered the Dharma position.

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時。有癡．邪見故　生正解故者。入見道前資糧．加行二位之時。雖未能證。深信觀心亦生解故。此即第一加行位也。所有資糧皆加行故。攝大乘中但說四位。勝解行地一向隨聞生勝解故　生解為斷二重障者。顯入見道。分別粗惑名為重障。此即第二通達位也　由我法執至彼障隨斷。顯於十地修道位中。所有二障二執為本。十地之中證空斷障至究竟位。此即第三修習位也　斷障為得二勝果故者。顯金剛心斷煩惱障證真解脫。斷所知障得菩提故。此即第四究竟位也　前文字解。上來第一生解斷障得二勝果。又有諸解。如樞要說。

論。又為開示謬執我法迷唯識者令達二空。

述曰。自下第二令達二空證唯識性。此即先敘所為外執　開為初開。示為久示　諸內外道俱起邪智不正知故。謬執我法於二空門。真俗二法唯識真理不能了達。無明所盲殊不正解名迷唯識。為令達空方乃造論　者即假者。迷謬人也。

論。于唯識理如實知故。

述曰。此即正述達空所以。為外道等開顯此文。為內道等演示此義。令于唯識如實了知。不生邪智謬執我法。或內外道我法邪知。示令正知故名為示。于唯識理全未能知。開曉令知故名開也　智稱正理名如實知。此約小乘．及外道解。若大乘中諸空見師。唯識亦名謬。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 當時，因為愚癡和邪見，所以產生正確的理解嗎？這是指進入見道（見道，指佛教修行中證悟真理的階段）之前的資糧位（資糧位，指積累功德和智慧的階段）和加行位（加行位，指為證悟真理而進行的努力階段）。雖然尚未證悟，但深信觀心也能產生理解。這便是第一加行位。所有的資糧都是加行，所以在《攝大乘論》（《攝大乘論》，佛教論著）中只說了四個階段。勝解行地（勝解行地，指通過聞思對佛法產生深刻理解的階段）一向是隨著聽聞而產生深刻理解，所以說產生理解是爲了斷除兩種重障。這是爲了顯示進入見道。分別粗顯的迷惑稱為重障。這便是第二通達位（通達位，指對真理產生初步認識的階段）。 由於我法執（我法執，指對自我和事物存在的執著）直到那些障礙隨之斷除，顯示在十地（十地，指菩薩修行的十個階段）的修道位（修道位，指通過修行逐步斷除煩惱的階段）中，所有的兩種障礙都以兩種執著為根本。在十地之中，證悟空性，斷除障礙，直至究竟位（究竟位，指修行達到圓滿的階段）。這便是第三修習位（修習位，指通過反覆修行鞏固證悟的階段）。斷除障礙是爲了獲得兩種殊勝的果報嗎？這是爲了顯示金剛心（金剛心，指堅不可摧的智慧）斷除煩惱障（煩惱障，指由貪嗔癡等煩惱引起的障礙）而證得真正的解脫，斷除所知障（所知障，指由對事物錯誤的認知引起的障礙）而獲得菩提（菩提，指覺悟）。這便是第四究竟位。以上是文字的解釋。上面第一點是產生理解，斷除障礙，獲得兩種殊勝的果報。還有其他的解釋，如《樞要》（《樞要》，佛教著作名）所說。 論：又爲了開示那些錯誤執著於我法，迷惑于唯識（唯識，佛教哲學，認為一切現象都是心的顯現）的人，使他們通達二空（二空，指人空和法空）。 述曰：下面第二點是使他們通達二空，證得唯識的本性。這首先敘述了所針對的外在執著。開是最初的開示，示是長久的開示。諸內外道（內外道，指佛教內外的各種學說）都產生邪惡的智慧和不正當的認知，錯誤地執著於我法，對於二空之門，真俗二法（真俗二法，指真諦和俗諦，佛教中對真理和世俗的兩種不同理解），以及唯識的真理都不能夠理解通達。被無明（無明，指對事物真相的迷惑）所矇蔽，特別是不正確的理解，叫做迷惑于唯識。爲了使他們通達空性，才撰寫這部論著。者，就是指那些迷惑的人。 論：對於唯識的道理，如實地瞭解。 述曰：這便是正確地敘述了通達空性的原因。爲了外道等開顯這段文字，爲了內道等演示這個意義，使他們對於唯識如實地瞭解，不產生邪惡的智慧，錯誤地執著於我法。或者內外道對我法的邪惡認知，開示使他們正確地認知，所以叫做示。對於唯識的道理完全不能夠了解，開導曉喻使他們瞭解，所以叫做開。智慧稱之為正理，叫做如實地瞭解。這是從小乘（小乘，佛教的一個主要流派）以及外道的角度來解釋。如果在大乘（大乘，佛教的一個主要流派）中，那些持空見的法師，也認為唯識是錯誤的。

【English Translation】 English version: At that time, is it because of ignorance and wrong views that correct understanding arises? This refers to the stages of accumulation (資糧位, zī liáng wèi, the stage of accumulating merit and wisdom) and preparation (加行位, jiā xíng wèi, the stage of effort towards enlightenment) before entering the Path of Seeing (見道, jiàn dào, the stage of realizing the truth in Buddhist practice). Although not yet enlightened, deep faith in contemplating the mind can also generate understanding. This is the first stage of preparation. All accumulations are preparations, so in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (《攝大乘論》, Shè Dà Chéng Lùn, a Buddhist treatise), only four stages are mentioned. The stage of understanding through faith (勝解行地, shèng jiě xíng dì, the stage of developing deep understanding of the Dharma through hearing and contemplation) always arises from hearing and generating deep understanding, so it is said that generating understanding is to eliminate the two heavy obstacles. This is to show entering the Path of Seeing. Differentiating gross delusions is called heavy obstacles. This is the second stage of penetration (通達位, tōng dá wèi, the stage of initial understanding of the truth). Because of the attachment to self and phenomena (我法執, wǒ fǎ zhí, the attachment to the existence of self and things) until those obstacles are eliminated accordingly, it shows that in the ten stages (十地, shí dì, the ten stages of a Bodhisattva's practice) of the Path of Cultivation (修道位, xiū dào wèi, the stage of gradually eliminating afflictions through practice), all two obstacles are rooted in the two attachments. Among the ten stages, realizing emptiness and eliminating obstacles until the ultimate stage (究竟位, jiū jìng wèi, the stage of reaching perfection in practice). This is the third stage of cultivation (修習位, xiū xí wèi, the stage of consolidating enlightenment through repeated practice). Is eliminating obstacles to obtain the two supreme fruits? This is to show that the Vajra Mind (金剛心, jīn gāng xīn, indestructible wisdom) eliminates the obstacle of afflictions (煩惱障, fán nǎo zhàng, obstacles caused by afflictions such as greed, anger, and ignorance) and attains true liberation, and eliminates the obstacle of knowledge (所知障, suǒ zhī zhàng, obstacles caused by incorrect cognition of things) and attains Bodhi (菩提, pú tí, enlightenment). This is the fourth ultimate stage. The above is the explanation of the text. The first point above is generating understanding, eliminating obstacles, and obtaining the two supreme fruits. There are other explanations, as mentioned in the Essentials (《樞要》, Shū Yào, a Buddhist text). Treatise: Furthermore, in order to enlighten those who wrongly cling to self and phenomena and are deluded about Consciousness-Only (唯識, wéi shí, a Buddhist philosophy that believes all phenomena are manifestations of the mind), to enable them to understand the two emptinesses (二空, èr kōng, the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena). Commentary: The second point below is to enable them to understand the two emptinesses and realize the nature of Consciousness-Only. This first narrates the external attachments that are being addressed. 'Opening' is the initial opening, 'showing' is the long-term showing. All internal and external paths (內外道, nèi wài dào, various doctrines within and outside of Buddhism) generate evil wisdom and incorrect cognition, wrongly clinging to self and phenomena, and are unable to understand and penetrate the gate of the two emptinesses, the two truths (真俗二法, zhēn sú èr fǎ, the two different understandings of truth and the mundane in Buddhism), and the truth of Consciousness-Only. Being blinded by ignorance (無明, wú míng, delusion about the true nature of things), especially incorrect understanding, is called being deluded about Consciousness-Only. In order to enable them to understand emptiness, this treatise is written. 'Those' refers to those who are deluded. Treatise: Because they truly understand the principle of Consciousness-Only. Commentary: This is the correct narration of the reason for understanding emptiness. To reveal this text for external paths, and to demonstrate this meaning for internal paths, to enable them to truly understand Consciousness-Only, and not generate evil wisdom and wrongly cling to self and phenomena. Or, the evil cognition of self and phenomena by internal and external paths, showing and enabling them to correctly cognize, so it is called 'showing'. Being completely unable to understand the principle of Consciousness-Only, guiding and enlightening them to understand, so it is called 'opening'. Wisdom is called correct principle, called truly understanding. This is explained from the perspective of the Hinayana (小乘, xiǎo shèng, a major school of Buddhism) and external paths. If in the Mahayana (大乘, dà shèng, a major school of Buddhism), those Dharma masters who hold the view of emptiness also consider Consciousness-Only to be wrong.

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影互顯也。此中說有謬執我法。令謬不生。意在了空證唯識性。故與第一所說有殊　又以真如名迷悟依。迷真如故謬執我法。除迷令悟故與前殊。又如樞要說。

論。復有迷謬唯識理者。

述曰。自下第三為破邪執造斯論也　于中有三。初總舉迷謬。次別敘邪執。第三總結。此即初也　此四計中第一第四名迷唯識。全不解故。第二第三名謬唯識。邪分別故　清辨計言。若論世諦心．境俱有。若依勝義心．境俱空。經中所言唯心等者。識最勝故。由心集生一切法故。非無心外實有境也　德光論師先小乘學。造十地疏。釋一心言。如言王來非無臣從舉勝者故。非謂唯心便無境等。

小乘．外道雖多異執。總略勝者不過四種。

論。或執外境如識非無。

述曰。自下別敘邪執有二。初別敘四計。后例破余。此第一計。薩婆多等。依說十二處密意言教。諸部同執離心之境如識非無　彼立量云。其我所說離心之境。決定實有。許除畢竟無心．境二法隨一攝故。如心．心所。此皆依經說有色等。不能繁引。

論。或執內識如境非有。

述曰。此第二計。即學中．百清辨等師。依密意教說諸法空。便亦撥心體非實有　彼立量云。汝之內識。如境非有。許所知故。如汝心外境。清辨俗諦外

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『影互顯也』，意思是影像相互顯現。這裡說的是有人錯誤地執著于『我』（ātman）和『法』（dharma）。爲了使這種錯誤觀念不再產生，其意在於證悟空性，從而證明唯識的性質。因此，這與第一種說法有所不同。此外，『真如』（tathatā）被稱為迷悟的依據。因為迷惑于真如，所以錯誤地執著于『我』和『法』。去除迷惑，使人覺悟，因此與之前的說法不同。又如《樞要》所說。

論：還有迷惑于唯識道理的人。

述記：下面第三部分是爲了破除錯誤的執著而造此論。其中有三部分。首先總的列舉迷惑，其次分別敘述錯誤的執著，第三總結。這裡是第一部分。這四種計較中，第一和第四種稱為迷惑唯識，因為完全不理解。第二和第三種稱為謬解唯識，因為邪惡地分別。清辨（Bhāviveka）認為，如果從世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）來說，心和境都是存在的。如果依據勝義諦（paramārtha-satya），心和境都是空性的。經中所說的『唯心』等，是因為識是最殊勝的，因為心能集合產生一切法，並非沒有心外實有的境。德光（Guṇaprabha）論師先學習小乘，造《十地疏》，解釋『一心』說，如同說國王來了，並非沒有臣子跟隨，這是舉出最殊勝的。並非說只有心而沒有境等。

小乘（Hīnayāna）和外道（Tīrthika）雖然有很多不同的執著，但總的來說，最主要的不過四種。

論：或者執著外境如同識一樣並非沒有。

述記：下面分別敘述錯誤的執著，分為兩部分。首先分別敘述四種計較，然後舉例破除其餘的。這是第一種計較。說一切有部（Sarvāstivāda）等，依據宣說十二處（dvādaśa āyatana）的密意言教，各部共同執著離開心的境如同識一樣並非沒有。他們立論說：我所說的離開心的境，一定是真實存在的，因為允許被包含在畢竟沒有心和境這兩種法中的任何一種，如同心和心所（citta-caitta）。這些都是依據經文說有色等，不能一一引用。

論：或者執著內在的識如同境一樣並非實有。

述記：這是第二種計較。就是學中的清辨等論師，依據密意教說諸法空，就也否定了心的本體並非真實存在。他們立論說：你的內在的識，如同境一樣並非實有，因為是所知，如同你心外的境。清辨認為世俗諦外境是存在的。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Shadows appear mutually,' meaning images manifest each other. This refers to those who mistakenly cling to 'ātman' (self) and 'dharma' (phenomena). The intention is to prevent such erroneous views from arising, aiming to realize emptiness and thereby prove the nature of Vijñaptimātratā (consciousness-only). Therefore, this differs from the first statement. Furthermore, 'Tathatā' (suchness) is called the basis of delusion and enlightenment. Because of delusion regarding Tathatā, there is a mistaken clinging to 'ātman' and 'dharma.' Removing delusion and enabling enlightenment, therefore, it differs from the previous statement. It is also as stated in the 'Essentials'.

Treatise: Furthermore, there are those who are deluded regarding the principles of Vijñaptimātratā.

Commentary: The third section below is to refute erroneous attachments and create this treatise. There are three parts within it. First, a general listing of delusions; second, a separate narration of erroneous attachments; and third, a conclusion. This is the first part. Among these four views, the first and fourth are called delusions of Vijñaptimātratā because they do not understand it at all. The second and third are called misinterpretations of Vijñaptimātratā because of their perverse discriminations. Bhāviveka (清辨) argues that, according to saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth), both mind and objects exist. According to paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth), both mind and objects are empty. The 'mind-only' mentioned in the scriptures is because consciousness is the most excellent, and because the mind gathers and produces all dharmas; it does not mean that there are no real objects outside the mind. Guṇaprabha (德光), a teacher who initially studied Hīnayāna, composed the 'Commentary on the Ten Stages,' explaining 'one mind' by saying, 'Like saying the king has come, it does not mean there are no ministers following; this is to cite the most excellent.' It does not mean that there is only mind and no objects, etc.

Although Hīnayāna (小乘) and Tīrthika (外道) have many different attachments, in general, the most important are no more than four kinds.

Treatise: Or they cling to external objects as if they are not non-existent like consciousness.

Commentary: Below, the erroneous attachments are narrated separately in two parts. First, the four views are narrated separately; then, the rest are refuted by example. This is the first view. The Sarvāstivāda (說一切有部), etc., rely on the secret meaning teachings that explain the dvādaśa āyatana (十二處, twelve sense bases), and the various schools commonly cling to the idea that objects apart from the mind are not non-existent like consciousness. They establish the argument: 'The objects apart from the mind that I speak of must be truly existent, because they are allowed to be included in either of the two dharmas that are ultimately without mind and objects, like citta (心, mind) and caitta (心所, mental factors).' These are all based on scriptures that speak of the existence of rūpa (色, form), etc., and cannot be cited one by one.

Treatise: Or they cling to the inner consciousness as if it is not real like objects.

Commentary: This is the second view. It is the teachers like Bhāviveka (清辨) in the school, who, based on the secret meaning teachings that say all dharmas are empty, also deny that the substance of the mind is not truly existent. They establish the argument: 'Your inner consciousness is not real like objects, because it is knowable, like the objects outside your mind.' Bhāviveka believes that external objects exist in conventional truth.

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境許有。今就中道無自違失。又掌珍中依勝義諦。說有為．無為並是空等。皆如彼說。

論。或執諸識用別體同。

述曰。此第三計。即大乘中一類菩薩。依相似教說識體一。攝論第四說一意識菩薩計。一依遠行．及獨行教。遊歷諸境故說遠行。復言獨行無第二故。二依五根所行境界。意各能受教。三依六識身皆名意處教。四又解深密．瑜伽等。說如依一鏡上有多影像教。五如依一水中有多波喻教。此恐違至教故說有一識　有云。一意識。但說前六識為一意識　理必不然。此說八識體是一故。

論。或執離心無別心所。

述曰。此第四計。即是經部．覺天等執。經部師說。佛說五蘊。故離心外唯有三心所。一受。二想。三思。更不說余心所名蘊。故離三外更無餘所　覺天所執亦依經故。經說三法和合名觸。乃至廣說。又說土夫六界。染凈由心。故無心所。彼說唯有受．及想．行信思等心更無餘法。隨心功用立心所名。亦恐違至教。故說無心所　如上所說四種計執。初之二種小大二乘。執境執心非無非有。后之二種大小二乘。執心執所非多非異　然清辨計總撥法空。為違中道強立唯境。諸心所現即是唯境。有何心也　順世外道。亦立唯有四大種色　若依此義四句分別。清辨．順世有境無心　中

道大乘有心無境　小乘多部有境有心　邪見．一說都無心境。總是第一別敘計也　又四句分別。有見無相。謂正量部師。不作相分而緣境也　有相無見。謂清辨師　相見俱有。餘部及大乘等　相見俱無。即安惠等　又有別解如樞要說。

論。為遮此等種種異執。

述曰。第二例破余小乘外道等也。小乘．外道。不知唯識境離心無妄計便起。且外道中。于能所緣皆執我法。迷唯識故。如僧佉等。計思是我心有實體。即計能緣為我法也。如吠世等。別有我體。非即是思實有諸法。即于所緣計我法也　其小乘中犢子等計。我為能知者。亦執有法。法藏部計心緣相應。化地部執緣俱有法。法救說心所體即是思。此等種類非唯是一。故今論言種種異計　破境實有。在此卷末。及后卷初。下第四卷。第七卷中唯識處說。破心是無。諸識用別體唯是一。及執離心無別心所。皆如第七卷說。例破余計在此卷中．及后卷說。讀者知之不能繁敘。此中皆應敘比量破。尋下敘之。

論。令于唯識至故作斯論。

述曰。此即第三結作論也　深妙理者。唯識道理　如實解者。正智生也。有漏．無漏解唯識智名如實解。如其境實正解生也。

上來長行及與初頌。合是第一文前敬敘。自下第二依教廣成。科此本教有三

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 大乘佛法認為心是存在的，而外境是虛幻的；小乘的許多部派則認為外境和心都是存在的；邪見則認為心和外境都不存在。這些都是第一種不同的敘述和計度。另外，還可以用四句話來分別：有見無相，指的是正量部，他們不設立相分而緣取外境；有相無見，指的是清辨論師；相見俱有，指的是其他部派和大乘等；相見俱無，指的是安慧等人。另外，樞要對此還有其他的解釋。

論：爲了破斥這些種種不同的執著。

述記：這是第二個例子，用來破斥其他小乘和外道等的觀點。小乘和外道不了解唯識的道理，錯誤地認為外境是獨立於心而存在的，因此產生了錯誤的計度。例如，外道中的僧佉派等，認為思就是我的心，具有實體，也就是認為能緣的心是我法。又如吠世史迦派等，認為存在一個獨立的我體，並非就是思，並且認為諸法是真實存在的，也就是認為所緣的外境是我法。小乘中的犢子部等，認為我是能知者，也執著於法的存在。法藏部認為心緣取相應的法，化地部執著于緣取俱有的法，法救認為心所的體性就是思。這些種類並非只有一種，所以論中說『種種異計』。破斥外境真實存在的內容，在本卷末尾以及後面的卷首，還有第四卷和第七卷中唯識的部分都有說明。破斥心是虛無的內容，諸識的作用不同，但體性只有一個，以及執著于離開心就沒有其他心所的內容，都在第七卷中說明。破斥其他計度的例子，在本卷中以及後面的卷中都有說明。讀者應該瞭解這些內容，這裡就不再詳細敘述了。這裡都應該敘述比量來破斥，請在下文中尋找。

論：爲了讓人們對於唯識的道理能夠深入理解，如實地瞭解，所以才寫作這部論。

述記：這是第三個總結寫作此論的原因。深妙的道理，指的是唯識的道理。如實地瞭解，指的是產生正智。有漏和無漏的瞭解唯識的智慧，都叫做如實瞭解。就像對外境的真實情況正確地瞭解而產生智慧一樣。

上面的長行以及最初的頌文，合起來是第一部分，文前的敬敘。從下面開始是第二部分，依據教義廣泛地闡述。科判這本教義分為三個部分。

【English Translation】 English version: The Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) asserts that the mind exists, while external reality (境, jing) is illusory. Many schools of the Śrāvakayāna (Small Vehicle) hold that both external reality and the mind exist. Heretical views (邪見, xiéjiàn) claim that neither the mind nor external reality exists. These are all fundamentally different accounts and conceptualizations. Furthermore, there are four ways to distinguish them: 'Having perception (見, jiàn) but no form (相, xiàng),' referring to the Sautrāntika (正量部, Zhèngliàng bù), who do not posit a form-aspect (相分, xiàngfēn) when cognizing objects. 'Having form but no perception,' referring to Bhāviveka (清辨, Qīngbiàn). 'Having both form and perception,' referring to other schools and the Mahāyāna, etc. 'Having neither form nor perception,' referring to Ānanda (安慧, Ānhuì) and others. Additionally, there are other explanations, as stated in the 'Essential Commentary' (樞要, Shūyào).

Treatise: To refute these various differing attachments.

Commentary: This is the second example, used to refute the views of other Śrāvakayāna and non-Buddhist schools. The Śrāvakayāna and non-Buddhist schools do not understand the principle of Vijñāptimātratā (唯識, Wéishí, Consciousness-only), mistakenly believing that external reality exists independently of the mind, thus giving rise to erroneous conceptualizations. For example, the Sāṃkhya (僧佉, Sēngqié) school among the non-Buddhists believes that thought (思, sī) is the 'I' (我, wǒ) or mind, possessing substance, thus considering the cognizing mind as 'I' and 'dharma' (法, fǎ). Similarly, the Vaiśeṣika (吠世, Fèishì) school believes in an independent 'I' entity, which is not identical to thought, and that dharmas are truly existent, thus considering the cognized external reality as 'I' and 'dharma.' The Vātsīputrīya (犢子, Dúzǐ) school among the Śrāvakayāna, believing that 'I' is the knower, also clings to the existence of dharmas. The Dharmaguptaka (法藏部, Fǎzàng bù) school believes that the mind cognizes corresponding dharmas, the Mahīśāsaka (化地部, Huàdì bù) school clings to the cognition of co-existent dharmas, and Dharmatrāta (法救, Fǎjiù) says that the nature of mental factors (心所, xīnsuǒ) is identical to thought. These types are not just one, hence the treatise speaks of 'various differing attachments.' The refutation of the real existence of external reality is discussed at the end of this volume and the beginning of the next, as well as in the sections on Vijñāptimātratā in the fourth and seventh volumes. The refutation of the mind being non-existent, the different functions of the various consciousnesses but with a single nature, and the clinging to the absence of other mental factors apart from the mind, are all explained in the seventh volume. Examples of refuting other conceptualizations are found in this volume and the subsequent volumes. The reader should understand these contents, and I will not elaborate further here. Here, one should present reasoning (比量, bǐliàng) to refute them; look for it in the following text.

Treatise: To enable people to deeply understand and truly comprehend Vijñāptimātratā, therefore this treatise is written.

Commentary: This is the third part, summarizing the reason for writing this treatise. The profound and subtle principle refers to the principle of Vijñāptimātratā. 'Truly comprehend' refers to the arising of correct wisdom (正智, zhèngzhì). The wisdom of understanding Vijñāptimātratā, whether with outflows (有漏, yǒulòu) or without outflows (無漏, wúlòu), is called 'truly comprehending,' just as correctly understanding the true nature of external reality gives rise to wisdom.

The above prose and the initial verse together constitute the first part, the respectful introduction before the text. From below begins the second part, extensively elaborating based on the teachings. This teaching is divided into three parts.

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種三。且一三云。前二十四頌宗明識相。即是依他。第二十五頌明唯識性。即圓成實。后之五頌明唯識位。即十三住。諸異生等無始時來。不能了知心虛妄性。執離心外有別實境。執離彼境有別實心。妄計二取為真為實。故頌說言唯識無境界。以無塵妄見。如人目有翳。見毛月等事。執我執法具生二障。冀諸智者授法妙藥令障斷除。小聖邪師智尚微闕解生迷謬。菩薩大悲為欲除彼我法執故。顯離妄心無別二取說唯有識。是故最初種種方便。廣分別說識相令知。遣生厭斷。即依他起令除二取。雖知此心虛妄顯現。而未了達真性是何。若未知真不了妄故。是故經言非不見真如。而能了諸行皆如幻事等。雖有而非真。是故次初明唯識性即圓成實。顯如一味故一頌明。前世俗諦。后勝義諦。為除二取廣說諦也。意令有情斷妄成佛。如來功德殊妙無邊。非少修行可能圓證。故次第三明唯識位。彼修行時經三大劫。總十三住。略為五位。謂資糧等。要無邊因得無邊果。故時長遠修行斷障。方能證得菩提．涅槃。今論所明意在於此。勸諸智者應勤修學。故為三分科釋本文。下第九卷五位初。云如是所成唯識相．性。誰于幾位如何悟入。即依彼文判頌意也　第二三云。此三十頌分初中后。初一頌半。略標離心無別我法。以彰論旨辨唯識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有三種（分類）。第一種是三（頌）。前面的二十四頌闡明了識相（vijñāna-lakṣana，心的各種表象），也就是依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva，緣起性）。第二十五頌闡明了唯識性（vijñapti-mātratā，唯識的真實性質），也就是圓成實性（pariniṣpanna-svabhāva，圓滿成就的性質）。後面的五頌闡明了唯識的位階（vijñapti-sthiti，唯識修行的階段），也就是十三住（trayodaśa-vihāra，菩薩修行的十三個階段）。 諸如異生（pṛthag-jana，凡夫）等，從無始以來，不能了知心的虛妄性，執著于離開心之外有別的真實境界，執著于離開那境界有別的真實心，錯誤地認為能取和所取（grāhaka-grāhya，能認知的主體和被認知的客體）是真實存在的。所以頌文說『唯識無境界』，因為沒有塵（rajas，煩惱）的虛妄見（mithyā-darśana，錯誤的見解）。就像人眼睛有翳病，看到毛髮、月亮等事物一樣。執著於我（ātman，自我）和法（dharma，事物）而產生兩種障礙（dvi-āvaraṇa，兩種障礙：煩惱障和所知障）。希望有智慧的人授予佛法的妙藥，使障礙斷除。小乘聖者和邪師的智慧尚且微弱欠缺，理解產生迷惑錯誤。菩薩以大悲心，爲了去除他們對我和法的執著，闡明離開虛妄心沒有別的能取和所取，說唯有識。 因此，最初用種種方便，廣泛地分別解說識相，使人知道，從而產生厭離和斷除（煩惱）。也就是依他起性，使人去除能取和所取。雖然知道這心是虛妄顯現，而未了達真性是什麼。如果不知道真性，就不能了知虛妄，所以經上說，『並非沒有見到真如（tathatā，事物的真實本性），而能了知諸行都如幻事』等。雖然有，但不是真實的。因此，接著最初闡明唯識性，也就是圓成實性。顯示如一味（eka-rasa，單一的本質），所以用一頌來闡明。前面是世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理），後面是勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，絕對真理）。爲了去除能取和所取而廣泛地解說真諦。意思是使有情斷除虛妄而成就佛果。如來的功德殊勝微妙無邊無際，不是稍微修行就能圓滿證得的。所以接著第三闡明唯識的位階。他們修行時經過三大阿僧祇劫（asankhyeya-kalpa，極長的時間），總共有十三住，概括為五個階段，即資糧位等。要無邊的因才能得到無邊的果，所以時間長遠，修行斷除障礙，才能證得菩提（bodhi，覺悟）和涅槃（nirvāṇa，解脫）。現在論所闡明的意義就在於此。勸勉各位智者應該勤奮修學。所以分為三部分來解釋本文。下面第九卷的五位之初說，『像這樣所成就的唯識相和性，誰在幾個位階上如何悟入？』就是依據那段文字來判斷頌文的意義。 第二十三（頌）說，這三十頌分為初、中、后。最初一頌半，簡略地標明離開心沒有別的我和法，以此來彰顯論的宗旨，辨明唯識。

【English Translation】 English version: There are three (classifications). The first is three (verses). The preceding twenty-four verses elucidate the characteristics of consciousness (vijñāna-lakṣana, the various appearances of the mind), which is the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva, the nature of dependent origination). The twenty-fifth verse elucidates the nature of consciousness-only (vijñapti-mātratā, the true nature of consciousness-only), which is the perfectly accomplished nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva, the nature of perfect accomplishment). The following five verses elucidate the stages of consciousness-only (vijñapti-sthiti, the stages of practice in consciousness-only), which are the thirteen abodes (trayodaśa-vihāra, the thirteen stages of a Bodhisattva's practice). Beings such as ordinary beings (pṛthag-jana, common people), from beginningless time, have been unable to understand the illusory nature of the mind, clinging to the belief that there is a separate real realm outside the mind, clinging to the belief that there is a separate real mind apart from that realm, falsely believing that the grasper and the grasped (grāhaka-grāhya, the subject that cognizes and the object that is cognized) are real. Therefore, the verse says 'Consciousness-only has no realm,' because there is no deluded view (mithyā-darśana, false view) of dust (rajas, defilements). It is like a person with cataracts in their eyes seeing hairs, moons, and other things. Clinging to the self (ātman, ego) and phenomena (dharma, things) gives rise to two obscurations (dvi-āvaraṇa, two obscurations: afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations). It is hoped that wise people will administer the wonderful medicine of the Dharma to eliminate these obscurations. The wisdom of lesser saints and heretical teachers is still weak and deficient, leading to confusion and error in understanding. Bodhisattvas, with great compassion, in order to remove their clinging to self and phenomena, explain that apart from the deluded mind, there are no separate grasper and grasped, saying that there is only consciousness. Therefore, initially, using various skillful means, they extensively and separately explain the characteristics of consciousness, enabling people to understand and thereby generate aversion and cessation (of afflictions). This is the dependent nature, enabling people to remove the grasper and the grasped. Although they know that this mind is an illusory appearance, they have not yet understood what the true nature is. If they do not know the true nature, they cannot understand illusion, so the sutra says, 'It is not that they have not seen Suchness (tathatā, the true nature of things), but they can understand that all phenomena are like illusions.' Although they exist, they are not real. Therefore, following the initial explanation, they elucidate the nature of consciousness-only, which is the perfectly accomplished nature. It reveals a single essence (eka-rasa, a single essence), so it is explained in one verse. The former is the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, relative truth), and the latter is the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, absolute truth). The truths are extensively explained in order to remove the grasper and the grasped. The intention is to enable sentient beings to eliminate delusion and attain Buddhahood. The merits and virtues of the Tathagata are supremely wonderful and boundless, and cannot be fully realized through a little practice. Therefore, thirdly, the stages of consciousness-only are elucidated. When they practice, they go through three great asamkhyeya kalpas (asankhyeya-kalpa, extremely long period of time), totaling thirteen abodes, which are summarized into five stages, namely the stage of accumulation, etc. Limitless causes are needed to obtain limitless results, so the time is long, and practice eliminates obscurations, enabling one to attain Bodhi (bodhi, enlightenment) and Nirvana (nirvāṇa, liberation). The meaning of the treatise now lies in this. It exhorts all wise people to diligently study and practice. Therefore, the text is divided into three parts for explanation. At the beginning of the fifth section of the ninth chapter below, it says, 'Who, in how many stages, and how, enters into the thus accomplished characteristics and nature of consciousness-only?' It is based on that passage that the meaning of the verses is judged. The twenty-third (verse) says that these thirty verses are divided into beginning, middle, and end. The first one and a half verses briefly indicate that apart from the mind, there are no separate self and phenomena, thereby highlighting the purpose of the treatise and distinguishing consciousness-only.

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相。次有二十三行頌半。廣明唯識若相若性。釋諸妨難。后之五頌。明唯識行位大意同前。故第十卷論末說云如是三分成立唯識。即依彼文釋為三也　第三三者。雖無文說。準諸經論判此有三。初二十五頌。明唯識境。次有四頌。明唯識行。末後一頌。明唯識果。先觀所知方起勝行。因行既備果德乃圓故為三也。此皆準釋瑜伽．攝論故有此判。然初境中。有世俗諦有勝義諦。一切所知唯此二故　且依第一判頌三分。初二十四頌明識相者。于中有二。初一頌半略釋外難略標識相。餘二十二頌半廣明識相　第二三分判其頌者。此一頌半即初分也。依境．行果科二諦者同初性相。判文可知。余如樞要　然解第一一頌半中文分為二。初將發論端寄問徴起第二舉頌依義正答。

論。若唯有識至說有我法。

述曰。此即第一寄問徴起。此意難云。論宗所明一切唯識。若唯有識無心外境。云何諸世間說有我法。此則世間相違。違理之失。及諸聖教中亦說有我法。此則聖教相違。違教之失。非彼兔角等可說為青等。以本性無不可說故。我法本無雲何起說。夫立義宗要無九過。既有二失。唯識不成。此依因明世間．聖教二種相違故為難也　言世間者。可毀壞故。有對治故。隱真理故。名之為世。墮世中故名為世間。由此滅．

【現代漢語翻譯】 相。接下來有二十三行半的頌文，廣泛闡明了唯識的相和性，解釋了各種妨礙和疑問。最後的五頌，闡明唯識的修行位次，大意與前文相同。因此，第十卷論末說：『如是三分成立唯識』，即是依據那段文字解釋為三分。第三，雖然沒有文字說明，但根據各種經論判斷，這裡有三分。最初的二十五頌，闡明唯識的境；接下來有四頌，闡明唯識的行；最後的一頌，闡明唯識的果。先觀察所知境，才能發起殊勝的修行；因地的修行完備，果地的功德才能圓滿，所以分為三分。這些都是根據解釋《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）和《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）而作出的判斷。然而，最初的境中，有世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）和勝義諦（paramārtha-satya），一切所知都包含在這二者之中。暫且依據第一種判分頌文為三分。最初的二十四頌闡明識相，其中又分為二：最初的一頌半，簡略地解釋外來的詰難，簡略地標明識相；其餘的二十二頌半，廣泛地闡明識相。第二種三分法判分頌文，這一頌半即是最初的部分。依據境、行、果來劃分二諦，與最初的性相相同，判分文章可以知曉。其餘的如同樞要所說。然而，解釋第一頌半中的文字，分為二：最初是發起論端的寄問，引出問題；第二是舉出頌文，依據義理正面回答。 論：若唯有識至說有我法。 述曰：這即是第一種寄問，引出問題。這裡的意思是詰難說：論宗所闡明的一切唯識，如果只有識而沒有心外的境，為什麼世間上都說有我（ātman）和法（dharma）呢？這與世間的說法相違背，是違背道理的過失。而且，各種聖教中也說有我法，這與聖教相違背，是違背教義的過失。不能像說兔角等是青色一樣，因為兔角等在本性上是不存在的，所以不能說。我法本來不存在，怎麼會產生這種說法呢？建立義理宗派，要沒有九種過失。既然有這兩種過失，唯識就不能成立。這是依據因明（hetuvidyā），世間和聖教兩種相違背而提出的詰難。所說的世間，因為可以被毀壞，因為有對治，因為遮蔽真理，所以稱為世。墮落在世間中，所以稱為世間。因此，滅...

【English Translation】 Section on Aspects. Next, there are twenty-three and a half verses, extensively clarifying the aspects and nature of Vijñaptimātratā (唯識, Consciousness-only), and explaining various obstacles and difficulties. The last five verses clarify the stages of practice in Vijñaptimātratā, with the general meaning being the same as before. Therefore, at the end of the tenth fascicle, it is said: 'Thus, the establishment of Vijñaptimātratā is accomplished in three parts,' which is based on that text and explained as three parts. Third, although there is no textual explanation, based on various sutras and treatises, it is judged that there are three parts here. The initial twenty-five verses clarify the object of Vijñaptimātratā; next, there are four verses clarifying the practice of Vijñaptimātratā; and finally, one verse clarifying the result of Vijñaptimātratā. First, one observes the knowable object, then one can initiate superior practice; when the practice of the cause is complete, the merits of the result will be perfected, so it is divided into three parts. These are all judgments made based on the interpretation of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Compendium of the Mahayana). However, in the initial object, there are conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya, 世俗諦) and ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, 勝義諦), as all knowable things are contained within these two. For now, based on the first method, divide the verses into three parts. The initial twenty-four verses clarify the aspects of consciousness, which are further divided into two: the initial one and a half verses briefly explain external challenges and briefly identify the aspects; the remaining twenty-two and a half verses extensively clarify the aspects of consciousness. In the second method of dividing the verses into three parts, this one and a half verses is the initial part. Dividing the two truths based on object, practice, and result is the same as the initial division of aspects and nature; the division of the text can be understood. The rest is as stated in the essentials. However, the explanation of the text in the first one and a half verses is divided into two: initially, the question is raised to initiate the discussion; secondly, the verses are cited to answer directly based on the meaning. Treatise: 'If there is only consciousness... to say there is self and dharma.' Commentary: This is the first question raised to initiate the discussion. The meaning here is to challenge by saying: If, as the doctrine of the treatise explains, everything is only consciousness, and there is no external object outside of the mind, then why do all worldly people say there is self (ātman, 我) and dharma (法)? This contradicts worldly sayings, which is the fault of contradicting reason. Moreover, various sacred teachings also say there is self and dharma, which contradicts the sacred teachings, which is the fault of contradicting doctrine. It cannot be said that rabbit horns are blue, because rabbit horns do not exist in their nature, so it cannot be said. If self and dharma do not exist originally, how can such a saying arise? To establish a doctrine, there must be no nine faults. Since there are these two faults, Vijñaptimātratā cannot be established. This is a challenge based on the two contradictions of worldly and sacred teachings according to Hetuvidya (因明, logic). The so-called 'worldly' is called 'world' because it can be destroyed, because there is a countermeasure, and because it obscures the truth. It is called 'worldly' because it falls into the world. Therefore, extinction...

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道或非世間。無對治故　言聖教者。聖者正也。與理相應。於事無擁目之為聖。又契理通神目之為聖。又聖者正也。心與境冥。智與神會。名之為聖。此所說教名為聖教。世間．聖教皆依士釋。所餘文義下自當知　然大般若第五百卷。以八囀聲釋世間等。今略敘之。是世間出故名世間。造世間故。由世間故。為世間故。因世間故。屬世間故依世間故。名為世間。廣如彼說。釋問起因如樞要說。

從此頌曰。即是第二依義正答。然此一行半頌之內。依長行釋。上之三句答難破執略標論宗。下之三句略辨識相彰能變體。三種科文釋一頌半皆同無別(余如樞要)。

論。由假說我法至彼依識所變。

述曰。上之二句答難破執。下之一句意標論宗結歸唯識。此中所說由者故也。因由之義　假有二種。一者無體隨情假。多分世間．外道所執。雖無如彼所執我法。隨執心緣亦名我法。故說為假。二者有體施設假。聖教所說。雖有法體而非我法。本體無名強名我法。不稱法體隨緣施設。故說為假。因二起言稱之為說。我法之相如論自釋　相謂相狀　轉是起義　相起非一故名種種。二句意言。汝所問云我法若無。世間及聖教云何說有者。非離識外有實我法自體性故。世間．聖教說有我法。但由二種假名言故。說有我

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：道是否等同於世間？ 答：並非如此，因為道沒有需要對治的事物。 問：什麼是『聖教』？ 答：『聖』意味著正，與真理相應，對事物沒有阻礙。或者說，契合真理，通達神妙，就稱為『聖』。因此，這裡所說的教法稱為『聖教』。世間和聖教都依據士夫（補特伽羅）來解釋。其餘的文義將在下文中解釋。然而，《大般若經》第五百卷用八囀聲來解釋『世間』等概念，現在簡要敘述如下：因為從世間而出，所以名為世間；因為創造世間，因為由世間而來，爲了世間，因為世間，屬於世間，依靠世間，所以名為世間。詳細的解釋可以參考《大般若經》。解釋提問的起因可以參考《樞要》。

從這首偈頌開始，就是第二次依據意義進行正式回答。然而，在這短短的一行半偈頌中，依據長行進行解釋。上面的三句回答了提問，破除了執著，簡要地標明了論宗。下面的三句簡要地辨別了識相，彰顯了能變之體。三種科文解釋這一頌半偈頌都相同，沒有區別（其餘的可以參考《樞要》）。

論：由假說我法，乃至彼依識所變。

述：上面的兩句回答了提問，破除了執著。下面的一句意在標明論宗，最終歸結于唯識。這裡所說的『由』，是『因為』的意思。『假』有兩種：一種是沒有實體的隨情假，多為世間和外道所執著。雖然沒有像他們所執著的那樣的我法，但隨著執著的心緣，也稱為我法，所以說是『假』。另一種是有實體的施設假，是聖教所說的。雖然有法體，但並非我法，本體沒有名稱，強行命名為我法，不符合法體，隨著因緣施設，所以說是『假』。因為這兩種原因，才會有言說，稱之為『說』。我法的相狀，如論中所解釋的。『相』指的是相狀。『轉』是生起的意思。相的生起不是單一的，所以稱為『種種』。這兩句的意思是說，你所問的『如果我法不存在，那麼世間和聖教為什麼說有我法呢？』，那是因為沒有離開識之外的真實的我法自體性，世間和聖教所說的有我法，只是因為兩種假名言的緣故，才說有的。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: Is the Dao equivalent to the world (世間, shìjiān)? Answer: It is not, because the Dao has nothing to be counteracted. Question: What is 'Sacred Teaching' (聖教, shèngjiào)? Answer: 'Sacred' (聖, shèng) means correct, corresponding to truth, and without obstruction to things. Or, being in accordance with truth and understanding the divine is called 'Sacred'. Therefore, the teachings spoken here are called 'Sacred Teaching'. Both the world (世間, shìjiān) and the Sacred Teaching are explained based on the individual (補特伽羅, bǔ tè qié luó). The remaining meanings of the text will be explained below. However, the five hundredth volume of the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra explains concepts like 'world' (世間, shìjiān) using the eight inflections. Now, a brief account is given: Because it comes out of the world (世間, shìjiān), it is called the world (世間, shìjiān); because it creates the world (世間, shìjiān), because it comes from the world (世間, shìjiān), for the sake of the world (世間, shìjiān), because of the world (世間, shìjiān), belonging to the world (世間, shìjiān), relying on the world (世間, shìjiān), it is called the world (世間, shìjiān). Detailed explanations can be found in the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra. The explanation of the cause of the question can be found in the Essentials.

Starting from this verse, it is the second time to formally answer according to the meaning. However, in this short one and a half verses, the explanation is based on the long prose. The above three sentences answer the question, break the attachment, and briefly mark the tenets of the treatise. The following three sentences briefly distinguish the characteristics of consciousness and highlight the nature of the transformation. The three types of divisions explain this one and a half verses in the same way, without distinction (the rest can be found in the Essentials).

Treatise: 'Due to the provisional speaking of self and dharma (我法, wǒfǎ), up to that which is transformed by consciousness.'

Commentary: The above two sentences answer the question and break the attachment. The following sentence intends to mark the tenets of the treatise, ultimately concluding in the doctrine of Consciousness-Only (唯識, wéishí). The 'due to' mentioned here means 'because of'. 'Provisional' (假, jiǎ) has two types: one is the provisional that has no substance and follows emotions, mostly adhered to by the world (世間, shìjiān) and external paths. Although there is no self and dharma (我法, wǒfǎ) as they adhere to, it is also called self and dharma (我法, wǒfǎ) following the clinging mind, so it is said to be 'provisional'. The other is the provisional that has substance and is established, which is what the Sacred Teaching (聖教, shèngjiào) speaks of. Although there is a dharma body, it is not self and dharma (我法, wǒfǎ). The essence has no name, and it is forcibly named self and dharma (我法, wǒfǎ), which does not conform to the dharma body and is established according to conditions, so it is said to be 'provisional'. Because of these two reasons, there is speech, which is called 'speaking'. The characteristics of self and dharma (我法, wǒfǎ) are as explained in the treatise. 'Characteristic' (相, xiāng) refers to the appearance. 'Transformation' (轉, zhuǎn) means arising. The arising of characteristics is not singular, so it is called 'various'. The meaning of these two sentences is that you asked, 'If self and dharma (我法, wǒfǎ) do not exist, then why do the world (世間, shìjiān) and the Sacred Teaching (聖教, shèngjiào) say that self and dharma (我法, wǒfǎ) exist?', that is because there is no real self and dharma (我法, wǒfǎ) nature outside of consciousness. The world (世間, shìjiān) and the Sacred Teaching (聖教, shèngjiào) say that there is self and dharma (我法, wǒfǎ) only because of the two provisional names.

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法種種相轉。應釋頌言。世間聖教所言我法。由假說故。有此種種諸相轉起。非實有體說為我法。此釋順下長行論文　外復問言。有實我法可依假說。我法實無假依何立。第三句云。彼我法相。依內識等所變現相而起假說。我法諸相。非依離識實有我法。而起假說。但依內識所變相見而假說故。此但說識。義兼心所。若爾真如應非唯識。不離識故真如名唯識。非識所變故。不說為我法。若說為真如。亦心所變故。此中總顯。由無始來橫計我法分別心故。熏習本識。後後遂有相．見分生。愚夫不了此唯內識。依之妄計有實我法。我法實無。隨彼妄情所執之相名為我法。故知世間所說我法是假非實。故經頌言。如愚所分別。外境實皆無。習氣擾濁心故似彼而轉。聖者依此內識所變若相若見。為起言論。斷染取凈引生真見。假為立名說為我法。法體實非若我若法。故知聖教所說我法。亦假說也。是故經言。為對遣愚夫所執實我法。故於識所變。假說我法名。此解二種我法之名。依識變立　又第二解。世間所執我法體無。依識所變妄情為緣而起于執。妄情所執是世我法。然體無故以無依有。依內妄情說為我法。聖教所說我法二種。依識體上有我法義。義依于體別依于總。依有體法說為我法。即說所執能計之情。及所詮之法。皆

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『法種種相轉。應釋頌言。世間聖教所言我法（世俗和聖教所說的「我」和「法」），由假說故（因為是假設的說法），有此種種諸相轉起（才會有各種各樣的現象產生）。非實有體說為我法（並非真實存在本體，而是被說成「我」和「法」）。』 這解釋順應了下面長篇論文的論述。

『外復問言。有實我法可依假說（是否存在真實的「我」和「法」可以作為假設的基礎）？我法實無假依何立（如果「我」和「法」實際上不存在，那麼假設的基礎又是什麼）？』 第三句說：『彼我法相（那些「我」和「法」的現象），依內識等所變現相而起假說（是依賴於內在意識等等所變現的現象而產生的假設）。我法諸相（「我」和「法」的各種現象），非依離識實有我法（不是依賴於脫離意識而真實存在的「我」和「法」），而起假說（而產生的假設）。但依內識所變相見而假說故（只是依賴於內在意識所變的現象和見解而假設的）。』 這只是在說意識，但意義也包含了心所（心理活動）。

『若爾真如應非唯識（如果這樣，那麼真如（事物的真實本性）就不應該只是唯識（只有意識）了）？』 因為不離識故，真如才名為唯識（因為真如不離意識，所以才被稱為唯識）。非識所變故（因為它不是意識所變現的），所以不說為我法（所以不說它是「我」和「法」）。如果說為真如（如果說是真如），也是心所變故（也是心理活動所變現的）。

這裡總的顯示：由於無始以來橫生計較「我」和「法」的分別心，熏習本識（根本意識），後來就有了相分（現象）和見分（認知）產生。愚昧的人不瞭解這只是內在意識，因此妄加計較，認為有真實的「我」和「法」。「我」和「法」實際上並不存在，只是隨著他們妄想執著的現象，才有了「我」和「法」的名稱。所以要知道世間所說的「我」和「法」是虛假的，不是真實的。所以經文說：『如愚所分別（就像愚昧的人所分別的那樣），外境實皆無（外在的境界實際上都是不存在的）。習氣擾濁心故似彼而轉（因為習氣擾亂了清凈的心，所以（意識）才好像外境那樣運轉）。』 聖者依據這內在意識所變的現象和見解，爲了發起言論，斷除染污，獲取清凈，引導產生真實的見解，才假設立名，說為「我」和「法」。「法」的本體實際上不是「我」，也不是「法」，所以要知道聖教所說的「我」和「法」，也是假設的說法。

因此經文說：『為對遣愚夫所執實我法（爲了對治愚昧的人所執著的真實「我」和「法」），故於識所變（所以在意識所變現的基礎上），假說我法名（假設說「我」和「法」的名稱）。』 這解釋了兩種「我」和「法」的名稱，是依據意識的變現而建立的。

另外第二種解釋：世間所執著的「我」和「法」本體並不存在，是依據意識所變的妄想為緣而產生的執著。妄想所執著的就是世俗的「我」和「法」。然而本體並不存在，所以用「無」來依賴「有」，依據內在的妄想說為「我」和「法」。聖教所說的「我」和「法」兩種，是依據意識的本體上有「我」和「法」的意義。意義依賴於本體，個別依賴於總體，依據有本體的法說為「我」和「法」，也就是說了所執著的能計較的情感，以及所詮釋的法，都是...

【English Translation】 English version: 'The transformations of various aspects of Dharma (法). It should be explained in verse: The 'I' (我) and 'Dharma' (法) mentioned in worldly and sacred teachings arise from hypothetical statements, hence the transformations of these various aspects. They are not real entities but are spoken of as 'I' and 'Dharma.' This explanation aligns with the following lengthy treatise.

'Furthermore, it is asked: Is there a real 'I' and 'Dharma' upon which to base hypothetical statements? If 'I' and 'Dharma' are actually non-existent, upon what is the hypothesis established?' The third sentence states: 'Those aspects of 'I' and 'Dharma' arise as hypothetical statements based on the appearances transformed by inner consciousness (內識) and so on. The various aspects of 'I' and 'Dharma' do not arise as hypothetical statements based on a real 'I' and 'Dharma' existing apart from consciousness. They are merely hypothetical statements based on the appearances and perceptions transformed by inner consciousness.' This only speaks of consciousness, but the meaning also includes mental activities (心所).

'If so, should True Suchness (真如) not be solely consciousness (唯識)?' Because it is inseparable from consciousness, True Suchness is named only consciousness. Because it is not transformed by consciousness, it is not spoken of as 'I' and 'Dharma.' If it is spoken of as True Suchness, it is also transformed by mental activities.

Here, it is generally revealed that due to the beginningless, falsely conceived discriminating mind of 'I' and 'Dharma,' the fundamental consciousness (本識) is perfumed, and later, the appearance aspect (相分) and the perception aspect (見分) arise. Ignorant people do not understand that this is only inner consciousness, and therefore, they falsely conceive that there is a real 'I' and 'Dharma.' 'I' and 'Dharma' are actually non-existent; they are merely named 'I' and 'Dharma' according to the appearances to which they are attached by their deluded emotions. Therefore, know that the 'I' and 'Dharma' spoken of in the world are false, not real. Thus, the scripture says: 'As the ignorant discriminate, external realms are actually all non-existent. Because habitual tendencies disturb and cloud the mind, it seems to turn like them.' Sages rely on the appearances and perceptions transformed by this inner consciousness to initiate discourse, cut off defilements, obtain purity, and guide the arising of true views, and they hypothetically establish names, speaking of them as 'I' and 'Dharma.' The essence of Dharma is actually neither 'I' nor 'Dharma,' so know that the 'I' and 'Dharma' spoken of in sacred teachings are also hypothetical statements.

Therefore, the scripture says: 'To counter the real 'I' and 'Dharma' clung to by ignorant people, the names of 'I' and 'Dharma' are hypothetically spoken based on what is transformed by consciousness.' This explains that the names of the two kinds of 'I' and 'Dharma' are established based on the transformations of consciousness.

Another second explanation: The essence of 'I' and 'Dharma' clung to by the world does not exist; it is the attachment that arises based on the deluded thoughts transformed by consciousness as a condition. What is clung to by deluded thoughts is the worldly 'I' and 'Dharma.' However, the essence does not exist, so 'non-existence' is used to rely on 'existence,' and it is spoken of as 'I' and 'Dharma' based on inner delusion. The two kinds of 'I' and 'Dharma' spoken of in sacred teachings are based on the meaning of 'I' and 'Dharma' in the essence of consciousness. Meaning relies on essence, the individual relies on the whole, and it is spoken of as 'I' and 'Dharma' based on the Dharma with essence, which is to say that the clinging emotions that can calculate and the Dharma that is explained are all...

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識所變以為我法。此上二解。第一解云。說為我法而體是無隨情說假。設體雖有不稱名假。我法二假乃屬於說。唯假言說以為我法。彼體都非　第二解云。以無依有。世間說情以為我法。以義依體。聖教說體以為我法。假我及法不在於言。以所說為若我法故。此上二解皆護法釋若安惠解。二種我法皆是別無。依于總無見．相二分施設假說。性非有故。自證離言非我法故。唯佛所證難陀復別。唯以所變相分。與護法解別。又解如樞要說既言我法依識所變。識有幾種。

論。此能變唯三至及了別境識。

述曰。略辨識相出能變體。初句總舉能變識數。因前所標今略舉也。下之二句列能變名。乘前舉數次列名也　謂有難言。雖我法相皆依識變。而未了達能變一多。故答三種　此者。即識之所變也。彼我法相依識所變　此識所變之能變有三種。三法轉相依也。一謂異熟識。即第八識。名有多義。一變異而熟。要因變異之時果方熟故。此義通余。種生果時皆變異故。二異時而熟。與因異時果方熟故。今者大乘。約造之時非約種體。許同世故。三異類而熟。與因異性果酬因故。然初二解無別論文。今依論文但取后解。若異屬因即異之熟。若異屬果異即是熟。異熟即識熟屬現行。異熟之識熟屬種子。故余能變不得此名　

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 將所變的境界誤認為是我和法。以上有兩種解釋。第一種解釋說：雖然說是『我』和『法』，但其本體是空無，只是隨順世俗的感情而假立的。即使本體存在，也不符合『名』的假立。『我』和『法』這兩種假立都屬於言說，只是假借言語來說『我』和『法』，它們的本體根本不存在。第二種解釋說：憑藉無而說有，世間的說法是隨順情感而認為有『我』和『法』；依據義理的本體，聖教的說法是認為本體有『我』和『法』。虛假的『我』和『法』不在於言語，因為所說的是『我』和『法』。以上兩種解釋都是護法（Dharmapāla）的解釋。若安慧（Sthiramati）的解釋是，兩種『我』和『法』都是另外沒有的，是依靠普遍不存在的見分（darśana-bhāga）和相分（ākāra-bhāga）而施設的假說，因為它們的自性並非真實存在。自證分（svasaṃvedana）遠離言語，所以不是『我』和『法』。只有佛陀所證悟的境界才是真實的。難陀（Nanda）的解釋又有所不同，他只認為所變的相分是『我』和『法』，這與護法的解釋不同。還有一種解釋，如《樞要》（樞要）所說，既然說『我』和『法』是依靠識所變現的，那麼識有幾種呢？

論：此能變唯三至及了別境識。

述曰：簡略地辨別識的體相，說明能變的本體。第一句總括了能變識的數量，因為前面已經標出，所以這裡簡略地舉出。下面的兩句列出了能變識的名稱，承接前面的數量，依次列出名稱。有人會問：雖然『我』和『法』的相都是依靠識變現的，但還不清楚能變的是一種還是多種。所以回答說有三種。『此』指的是識所變現的境界。那些『我』和『法』的相是依靠識變現的。這識所變現的能變有三種，三種法相互轉變。一是異熟識（vipāka-vijñāna），即第八識（ālayavijñāna）。這個名稱有多種含義：一是變異而成熟，因為要經過變異的時候，果才能成熟，這個含義也適用於其他情況，種子生果的時候都會變異。二是異時而成熟，與因不同的時間，果才能成熟，現在大乘的觀點是，就造作的時候來說，不是就種子的本體來說，允許是同一世的。三是異類而成熟，與因不同的性質，果才能酬報因。然而，前兩種解釋沒有明確的論證，現在依據論文只取后一種解釋。如果『異』屬於因，就是『異』的成熟；如果『異』屬於果，『異』就是成熟。異熟即是識，成熟屬於現行；異熟的識，成熟屬於種子。所以其他的能變識不能用這個名稱。

【English Translation】 English version: Taking what is transformed by consciousness to be 'self' and 'dharma' (dharma). There are two explanations above. The first explanation says: Although it is said to be 'self' and 'dharma', its essence is emptiness; it is merely a provisional establishment following worldly emotions. Even if the essence exists, it does not conform to the provisional establishment of 'name'. These two provisional establishments of 'self' and 'dharma' belong to speech; they merely borrow language to speak of 'self' and 'dharma', but their essence does not exist at all. The second explanation says: Relying on non-existence to speak of existence, worldly views consider 'self' and 'dharma' to exist according to emotions; based on the essence of meaning, the teachings of the sages consider 'self' and 'dharma' to exist in essence. The false 'self' and 'dharma' are not in language, because what is spoken of is 'self' and 'dharma'. The above two explanations are both interpretations of Dharmapāla (護法). According to Sthiramati (安慧), both kinds of 'self' and 'dharma' are non-existent separately; they are provisionally established based on the universally non-existent darśana-bhāga (見分) and ākāra-bhāga (相分), because their nature is not truly existent. The svasaṃvedana (自證分) is apart from language, so it is not 'self' and 'dharma'. Only the realm realized by the Buddha is real. Nanda's (難陀) interpretation is different again; he only considers the transformed ākāra-bhāga to be 'self' and 'dharma', which is different from Dharmapāla's interpretation. There is another explanation, as stated in the Essentials (樞要): Since it is said that 'self' and 'dharma' rely on what is transformed by consciousness, how many kinds of consciousness are there?

Treatise: These transformations are only three, up to and including the vijñāna (識) that discerns the objective realm.

Commentary: Briefly distinguishing the characteristics of consciousness, explaining the essence of the transformation. The first sentence summarizes the number of transforming consciousnesses. Because it was indicated earlier, it is briefly mentioned here. The following two sentences list the names of the transforming consciousnesses, following the number mentioned earlier, listing the names in order. Someone might ask: Although the characteristics of 'self' and 'dharma' are all transformed by consciousness, it is not yet clear whether the transformer is one or many. Therefore, the answer is that there are three kinds. 'This' refers to the realm transformed by consciousness. Those characteristics of 'self' and 'dharma' rely on the transformation of consciousness. These transformations of consciousness are of three kinds, the three dharmas transform each other. One is the vipāka-vijñāna (異熟識), which is the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna 阿賴耶識). This name has multiple meanings: One is transformation and maturation, because the fruit can only mature after the time of transformation. This meaning also applies to other situations; the seed transforms when it produces the fruit. Two is maturation at a different time; the fruit can only mature at a different time from the cause. Now, the view of Mahayana is that, in terms of the time of creation, not in terms of the essence of the seed, it is allowed to be in the same lifetime. Three is maturation of a different kind; the fruit of a different nature from the cause can repay the cause. However, the first two explanations do not have clear arguments. Now, according to the treatise, only the last explanation is taken. If 'different' belongs to the cause, it is the maturation of 'different'; if 'different' belongs to the fruit, 'different' is maturation. Vipāka is consciousness, maturation belongs to the present activity; the consciousness of vipāka, maturation belongs to the seed. Therefore, other transforming consciousnesses cannot use this name.

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二謂思量識。即第七識。思謂思慮。量謂量度。思量第八度為我故。又恒．審思量余識無故。余之二識不名思量。至下當悉。思量即識準前釋也　三了別境識。即餘六識。二十論說。心．意．識．了名之差別。了是諸識之通名也。了別別境及粗顯境唯前六故。對此六塵說六識故。然濫第七。應言此六了別粗境名了別境識。以了別相粗。簡於七．八故。了別境即識。亦同前解　此依勝義勝義。心．言俱絕。依第二．第三勝義。不可言一．多。真故相無別。依世間中可言八別。今以類同故有三種　頌中唯言顯其二義。一簡別義。遮虛妄執。顯但有識無心外境。二決定義。離增減數。略唯決定有此三故。廣決定有八種識故。一類菩薩說識唯一。諸小乘等。執心．意．識義一文異。又復彼執識唯有六。則是減數。楞迦經說八九種種識如水中諸波。說有九識即是增數。顯依他識略有三種廣唯有八。離於增減故說唯言。楞迦經中兼說識性。或以第八染．凈別開故言九識。非是依他識體有九。亦非體類別有九識。小乘根淺不知心．意．識三種體別。又未除所知障。不了依他故唯說六。然依根境別體相故。說十二處。十八界等。非唯六識。經部雖立有細意識。即是第六別位起故。如樞要說　及亦二義。一合集義。六識合名了境識故。如

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：第二種是思量識，也就是第七識（末那識）。『思』指的是思慮，『量』指的是量度。第七識恒常思量第八識（阿賴耶識）為『我』的緣故。而且，第七識是恒常且審慎地思量，其他識沒有這個特性。其餘的兩個識（指前六識和第八識）不稱為思量識，這一點在後面會詳細解釋。思量即是識，解釋與前面相同。 第三種是了別境識，也就是其餘的六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）。《二十唯識論》中說，『心』、『意』、『識』、『了』，這些名稱各有差別。『了』是各種識的通稱。因為只有前六識才能了別別境和粗顯境。針對六塵才說有六識。然而，爲了避免與第七識混淆，應該說這六識了別粗境，稱爲了別境識。因爲了別的相狀比較粗顯，可以區別于第七識和第八識。了別境即是識，解釋也與前面相同。 以上是依據勝義勝義諦（最究竟的真理）來說的，在這種情況下，語言和思維都無法觸及。依據第二勝義諦（相對的真理）和第三勝義諦（世俗的真理），不能說是一或多，因為真如的體相沒有差別。依據世間俗諦，可以說有八種識的差別。現在因為類別相同，所以歸納為三種。 頌文中只說了『唯』，是爲了彰顯兩種含義：一是簡別義，遮止虛妄的執著，顯示只有識而沒有心外的境界。二是決定義，遠離增減的數量。簡略地說，決定只有這三種識。廣義地說，決定有八種識。有些菩薩說識只有一種。一些小乘行者等，執著于『心』、『意』、『識』的意義相同，只是用詞不同。而且，他們執著于識只有六種，這是減數。 《楞伽經》中說八識、九識種種識，就像水中的波浪一樣，說有九識就是增數。這表明依他識（第八識）簡略地說有三種，廣義地說只有八種，遠離增減，所以說『唯』。 《楞伽經》中也說了識的自性，或者因為第八識有染污和清凈的差別，所以說有九識，但這不是說依他識的本體有九種，也不是說本體的類別有九種識。小乘根基淺薄，不知道心、意、識三種的本體差別，又沒有去除所知障，不瞭解依他起性，所以只說六識。然而，依據根、境的差別，本體和相狀不同，所以說有十二處、十八界等，不是隻有六識。經部雖然立有細意識，但這是第六識在不同階段的顯現，就像《樞要》中所說的那樣。 『及』和『亦』這兩個字也有兩種含義：一是合集義，六識合起來稱爲了境識，比如...

【English Translation】 English version: Secondly, there is the Thinking Consciousness, which is the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana). 'Thinking' refers to contemplation, and 'Measuring' refers to assessment. The seventh consciousness constantly contemplates the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) as 'I'. Moreover, the seventh consciousness is constant and deliberate in its thinking, which other consciousnesses do not possess. The remaining two consciousnesses (referring to the first six consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness) are not called Thinking Consciousness; this will be explained in detail later. Thinking is consciousness, and the explanation is the same as before. Thirdly, there is the Discriminating Consciousness, which is the remaining six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness). The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only states that 'mind' (citta), 'thought' (manas), 'consciousness' (vijnana), and 'discrimination' (vijnapti) have different meanings. 'Discrimination' is a general term for all consciousnesses. Because only the first six consciousnesses can discriminate specific objects and coarse, manifest objects. The six consciousnesses are spoken of in relation to the six sense objects. However, to avoid confusion with the seventh consciousness, it should be said that these six consciousnesses discriminate coarse objects and are called Discriminating Consciousness. Because the aspect of discrimination is relatively coarse, it can be distinguished from the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. Discriminating objects is consciousness, and the explanation is the same as before. The above is based on the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), in which language and thought cannot reach. According to the second ultimate truth (relative truth) and the third ultimate truth (conventional truth), it cannot be said to be one or many, because the nature of Suchness (tathata) has no difference. According to worldly truth (samvriti-satya), it can be said that there are eight kinds of consciousnesses. Now, because the categories are the same, they are summarized into three types. The verse only mentions 'only' (唯), in order to highlight two meanings: First, the meaning of distinction, preventing false attachments, showing that there is only consciousness and no external realm outside the mind. Second, the meaning of determination, away from increasing or decreasing numbers. Briefly speaking, it is determined that there are only these three types of consciousnesses. Broadly speaking, it is determined that there are eight types of consciousnesses. Some Bodhisattvas say that there is only one type of consciousness. Some Hinayana practitioners, etc., are attached to the meaning of 'mind' (citta), 'thought' (manas), and 'consciousness' (vijnana) being the same, only the words are different. Moreover, they are attached to the idea that there are only six types of consciousnesses, which is a reduction in number. The Lankavatara Sutra says that the eight and nine consciousnesses are like waves in the water, saying that there are nine consciousnesses is an increase in number. This shows that the dependent consciousness (eighth consciousness) can be briefly said to have three types, and broadly speaking, there are only eight types, away from increasing or decreasing, so it says 'only'. The Lankavatara Sutra also speaks of the nature of consciousness, or because the eighth consciousness has the difference between defilement and purity, it is said that there are nine consciousnesses, but this does not mean that the essence of the dependent consciousness has nine types, nor does it mean that the categories of essence have nine consciousnesses. Hinayana practitioners have shallow roots, do not know the difference between the essence of mind, thought, and consciousness, and have not removed the obstacles to knowledge, and do not understand dependent origination, so they only say six consciousnesses. However, according to the difference between the root and the object, the essence and characteristics are different, so it is said that there are twelve entrances (ayatana), eighteen realms (dhatu), etc., not only six consciousnesses. Although the Sautrantika school establishes a subtle consciousness, this is the manifestation of the sixth consciousness at different stages, as stated in the Essential Meaning. The words 'and' (及) and 'also' (亦) also have two meanings: First, the meaning of aggregation, the six consciousnesses are collectively called the Discriminating Consciousness, such as...

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后卷說。二相違義。即相違釋。顯三能變體各別故。即一及字貫通上下。謂應言異熟。及思量。及了境識。若不爾者。即有濫于余釋之過。所以者何。但言異熟思量了別境識。不言及思量等者。一濫持業。恐言異熟即是思量了別境故。二濫依土。不言及者。恐言異熟之思量了別境故。三濫有財。不言及者。恐言以彼異熟而為思量了別境故。四濫鄰近。不言及者。恐言異熟俱時思量了別境故。今顯異彼故說及言。顯三能變體各異故　既爾何故頌中不言異熟及思量等。而頌乃言及了別境識　顯得二義故。若於異熟下方置及言。唯得相違不得合集。今合六識總名了境故。于思量下方置及字　下一識字通三能變。欲顯又略而義廣故　此三能變。初之一名唯未轉位。后之二號亦通凈名。何故爾耶。下自當悉。又諸識皆通異熟等名。何故第八獨得名也。皆如下辨。恐厭繁文故不先述。

此舉本頌答難標宗。次長行中依頌正答。二段如頌。何故本頌先首答難標論宗者。如樞要說　然釋本頌上三句中。文意有二。初略釋頌答外所徴。次云何應知實無外境下。廣破外執顯前頌義　初略解中有二判文。第一合作二文科。初別解三句。后愚夫所計實我實法下。總解三句　別解三句中。初別解第一句。彼二俱有種種相轉下。別解第二句。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《后卷》說，『二相違義』，即相違的解釋，是爲了顯示三種能變的自體是各不相同的。這裡的『及』字貫通上下，意思是應該說『異熟識』（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識），『及思量識』（Manas-vijñāna，末那識），『及了境識』（Viṣaya-vijñāna，了別境識）。如果不是這樣，就會有混淆其他解釋的過失。為什麼這樣說呢？如果只說『異熟、思量、了別境識』，而不說『及思量』等，就會產生以下幾種混淆： 一、混淆持業釋：恐怕會認為『異熟』就是『思量了別境』。 二、混淆依主釋：如果不說『及』，恐怕會認為『異熟』的『思量了別境』。 三、混淆有財釋：如果不說『及』，恐怕會認為是以『異熟』作為『思量了別境』。 四、混淆鄰近釋：如果不說『及』，恐怕會認為『異熟』與『思量了別境』同時存在。 現在爲了顯示它們之間的不同，所以說『及』字，顯示三種能變的自體是各不相同的。 既然如此，為什麼頌文中不說『異熟及思量』等，而頌文卻說『及了別境識』呢？ 這是爲了顯示兩種含義。如果在『異熟』的下方放置『及』字，就只能得到相違的含義，而不能得到合集的含義。現在將六識總稱為『了境』，所以在『思量』的下方放置『及』字。 下一個『識』字貫通三種能變。這是爲了顯示既簡略而意義又廣博。 這三種能變，第一個名稱只用于未轉位時，后兩個名稱也通用於清凈的名稱。為什麼會這樣呢？下面自然會詳細說明。而且，各種識都通用於『異熟』等名稱，為什麼只有第八識獨得這個名稱呢？這些都將在下面辨析。因為害怕繁瑣，所以不先說明。 這裡舉出本頌來回答疑問，標明宗義。接下來的長行中，依據頌文正式回答。分為兩段，與頌文對應。為什麼本頌首先回答疑問，標明論宗呢？就像《樞要》所說的那樣。 然而，解釋本頌上面三句時，文意有兩種。首先是簡略地解釋頌文，回答外來的質疑；其次是『云何應知實無外境』（如何才能知道實際上沒有外境）以下，廣泛地破斥外道執著，顯示前面頌文的含義。 最初的簡略解釋中，有兩種判文。第一種是合作二文科，首先分別解釋三句，然後是『愚夫所計實我實法』（愚夫所計度的真實我、真實法）以下，總括地解釋三句。 在分別解釋三句中，首先分別解釋第一句，『彼二俱有種種相轉』（彼二者都有種種相的轉變）；以下，分別解釋第二句。

【English Translation】 English version: The latter volume says, 'The meaning of two contradictions,' that is, the explanation of contradictions, is to show that the three kinds of transformations have their own distinct entities. The word 'and' here connects above and below, meaning that it should be said 'Vipāka-vijñāna' (resultant consciousness), 'and Manas-vijñāna' (thinking consciousness), 'and Viṣaya-vijñāna' (object-cognizing consciousness). If it is not like this, there will be the fault of confusing other explanations. Why is this so? If only 'Vipāka, thinking, object-cognizing consciousness' is said, without saying 'and thinking' etc., the following confusions will arise: 1. Confusion of Karmadhāraya compound: There is a fear that 'Vipāka' will be considered as 'thinking object-cognizing'. 2. Confusion of Tatpuruṣa compound: If 'and' is not said, there is a fear that it will be considered as 'thinking object-cognizing' of 'Vipāka'. 3. Confusion of Bahuvrīhi compound: If 'and' is not said, there is a fear that it will be considered as 'Vipāka' being the 'thinking object-cognizing'. 4. Confusion of Avyayībhāva compound: If 'and' is not said, there is a fear that 'Vipāka' and 'thinking object-cognizing' exist simultaneously. Now, in order to show the difference between them, the word 'and' is said, showing that the three kinds of transformations have their own distinct entities. Since this is the case, why does the verse not say 'Vipāka and thinking' etc., but the verse says 'and object-cognizing consciousness'? This is to show two meanings. If the word 'and' is placed below 'Vipāka', only the meaning of contradiction can be obtained, and not the meaning of aggregation. Now, the six consciousnesses are collectively called 'object-cognizing', so the word 'and' is placed below 'thinking'. The next word 'consciousness' connects the three kinds of transformations. This is to show that it is both concise and broad in meaning. These three kinds of transformations, the first name is only used when it is not transformed, and the latter two names are also commonly used for pure names. Why is this so? It will be explained in detail below. Moreover, all consciousnesses are commonly used for names such as 'Vipāka', why does only the eighth consciousness exclusively get this name? These will be analyzed below. Because of the fear of being verbose, it will not be explained first. Here, the original verse is cited to answer questions and mark the doctrine. In the following long passage, the verse is formally answered according to the verse. It is divided into two sections, corresponding to the verse. Why does this verse first answer questions and mark the doctrine? It is like what is said in the 'Essentials'. However, when explaining the above three sentences of this verse, there are two meanings in the text. The first is to briefly explain the verse and answer external questions; the second is from 'How should one know that there is actually no external object' onwards, widely refuting external attachments and showing the meaning of the previous verse. In the initial brief explanation, there are two kinds of judgments. The first is to cooperate with the two texts, first separately explaining the three sentences, and then from 'The real self and real dharma measured by fools' onwards, comprehensively explaining the three sentences. In the separate explanation of the three sentences, first separately explain the first sentence, 'Those two both have various transformations of appearances'; below, separately explain the second sentence.

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如是諸相若由假說下。別解第三句。第二總作三文科。別解三句故。若由假說下。乃至亦勝義有。皆解第三句。

論。世間聖教至非實有性。

述曰。略釋本頌答外徴也。此釋初句。別釋其字如論易詳。故不別舉。雙舉世間。及諸聖教。皆說有我。及有法者。但由假立。非實有性。性者體也。

仍未了知我法二義。

論。我謂主宰法謂軌持。

述曰。我如主宰者。如國之主有自在故。及如輔宰能割斷故。有自在力。及割斷力義同我故　或主是我體。宰是我所　或主如我體。宰如我用　法謂軌持。軌謂軌範可生物解。持謂住持不捨自相。一體有無對。二自性差別對。三有為無為對。四先陳后說對。前唯有體。后亦通無。瑜伽論五十二。說意不壞法現前。無亦名法。今者相分必有。似無名無。前是共相。后是自相。前唯有為。后通無為。前唱者名持。后唱者名軌。合有四對名為軌持。

論。彼二俱有種種相轉。

述曰。釋第二句頌。然彼我法二種。俱有種種差別。若名若義諸相轉也。相謂相狀。言種種者顯非一義。

何謂種種。

論。我種種相謂有情命者等。

述曰。世間我種種相。謂我亦名有情．意生．摩納縛迦．養育者．數取趣．命者．生者。此中但

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果像這樣對諸相進行假說，以下是第三句的分別解釋。第二部分總共分為三個科，分別是分別解釋這三句。『若由假說下』，乃至『亦勝義有』，都是解釋第三句。

論：世間聖教至非實有性。

述記：簡略地解釋本頌，回答外來的提問。這裡解釋第一句。分別解釋其中的字，如論中容易詳細理解的部分，所以不特別舉出。同時舉出世間和諸聖教，都說有『我』（Atman，靈魂）和『法』（Dharma，佛法），但都是由假立而有，並非真實存在的體性。『性』指的是體。

仍然不瞭解『我』和『法』的兩種含義。

論：我謂主宰法謂軌持。

述記：『我』就像主宰者，比如國家的主有自在的權力，又像輔佐的大臣能夠決斷事務，具有自在的力量和決斷的力量，意義與『我』相同。或者『主』是『我』的本體，『宰』是『我』的所有。或者『主』像『我』的本體，『宰』像『我』的作用。『法』指的是軌持，『軌』指的是軌範，可以產生對事物的理解。『持』指的是住持，不捨棄自身的相狀。一體有有無的對立，二自性有差別的對立，三有為和無為的對立，四先陳述后解說的對立。前者只有體，後者也通於無。瑜伽論第五十二卷說，意不壞法現前，無也稱為法。現在相分必定有，好像沒有的稱為無。前者是共相，後者是自相。前者只有有為，後者通於無為。前者唱的名為『持』，後者唱的名為『軌』。合起來有四種對立，稱為軌持。

論：彼二俱有種種相轉。

述記：解釋第二句頌。然而『我』和『法』這兩種，都具有種種差別，無論是名稱還是意義，都有諸相的轉變。『相』指的是相狀，說『種種』是爲了顯示並非單一的意義。

什麼叫做種種？

論：我種種相謂有情命者等。

述記：世間的『我』有種種相，說『我』也叫做有情（Sattva，有感覺的生物）、意生（Manomaya，意念所生）、摩納縛迦（Manavaka，人）、養育者（Poshaka，養育者）、數取趣（Pudgala，補特伽羅，輪迴者）、命者（Jiva，有生命者）、生者。這裡只

【English Translation】 English version: If these characteristics are hypothetically described in this way, the following is a separate explanation of the third line. The second part is divided into three sections, which are separate explanations of these three lines. 'If by hypothetical description,' up to 'also existentially true,' all explain the third line.

Treatise: Worldly and sacred teachings up to non-substantial nature.

Commentary: Briefly explain the verse to answer external questions. This explains the first line. Separately explain the words in it, as the treatise is easy to understand in detail, so it is not specifically mentioned. Simultaneously mentioning the worldly and all sacred teachings, both say there is 'Atman' (soul) and 'Dharma' (teachings), but they are all hypothetically established and not truly existing natures. 'Nature' refers to substance.

Still do not understand the two meanings of 'self' and 'dharma'.

Treatise: 'Self' means master, 'dharma' means standard.

Commentary: 'Self' is like a master, such as the ruler of a country who has the power of freedom, and like an assistant minister who can make decisions, having the power of freedom and the power of decision, the meaning is the same as 'self'. Or 'master' is the substance of 'self', 'minister' is what 'self' possesses. Or 'master' is like the substance of 'self', 'minister' is like the function of 'self'. 'Dharma' refers to standard, 'standard' refers to norms that can generate understanding of things. 'Hold' refers to maintaining, not abandoning its own characteristics. One body has the opposition of existence and non-existence, two natures have the opposition of difference, three have the opposition of conditioned and unconditioned, four have the opposition of first statement and later explanation. The former only has substance, the latter also includes non-existence. Yoga Treatise Volume 52 says that when the mind does not destroy the dharma, non-existence is also called dharma. Now the aspect division must exist, what seems to be non-existent is called non-existence. The former is the common aspect, the latter is the self-aspect. The former only has conditioned, the latter includes unconditioned. The former chanting is called 'hold', the latter chanting is called 'standard'. Combined, there are four oppositions, called standard.

Treatise: Those two both have various aspect transformations.

Commentary: Explain the second verse. However, both 'self' and 'dharma' have various differences, whether in name or meaning, there are transformations of aspects. 'Aspect' refers to appearance, saying 'various' is to show that it is not a single meaning.

What is called various?

Treatise: The various aspects of 'self' are called sentient beings, life-possessors, etc.

Commentary: The worldly 'self' has various aspects, saying 'self' is also called Sattva (sentient being), Manomaya (mind-made), Manavaka (human), Poshaka (nourisher), Pudgala (one who transmigrates), Jiva (life-possessor), and one who is born. Here only

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舉三種。等后所說意生等五。合有八種。若依大般若說合有十三士夫．作者．受者．知者．見者等。若依世親金剛般若論但有四種。約三世總別故。此即第一世間說有我種種相。

言有情者。謂諸賢聖。如實了知唯有此法更無餘故。顯有法性更無餘物。情是性義。或復于彼有愛著故。愛是情義。能生愛故名為有情。乃至言生者者。謂具出現．起等諸法故名生者。此依瑜伽釋。若依世間釋。情謂情識。我有情識名為有情。色．心相續名之為命。者是主義。我有此命故名命者。準論釋者。命謂第八現行。者謂假者。總者有別命名為命者。今取世間解。或有情即是第八現行。壽體即是第八種子。有壽和合故名命者。或命通是六識名命。有此命者名為命者今取世間不取正義。薩婆多等所說各異。宜應敘之。愚者不了謂實有情及實命者。釋此名等。如瑜伽論八十三卷。及樞要說。

論。預流一來等。

述曰。聖教我種種相。預流．一來．不還．無學．二十七賢．十三住聖．三乘．十地。皆聖教中我種種相。此舉二果等余賢聖。前預流向亦此所攝。不別簡別向及果故　預者言入。流謂流類。入聖之類故名預流。舊云流謂生死。此逆生死說名逆流。義乃非也。一於人．天往來。便得極果名為一來。決定已斷三界見

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 舉三種，即等持者（Samāhita，指專注的人）、后所說意生者（Manōmayakāya，指意生身）等五種。合起來共有八種。如果依照《大般若經》所說，合起來共有十三種，包括士夫（Pudgala，補特伽羅，指人）、作者（Kāraka，指作者）、受者（Bhoktṛ，指領受者）、知者（Jñātṛ，指知者）、見者（Draṣṭṛ，指見者）等。如果依照世親（Vasubandhu）的《金剛般若論》，則只有四種，這是根據三世（過去、現在、未來）的總別來劃分的。這便是第一種世間所說的我（Ātman）的種種相。

說到有情（Sattva，指眾生），指的是諸位賢聖，他們如實了知只有此法（Dharma，指佛法），更無其他，這顯示了有法性，更無其他事物。情是性的意思，或者因為對於彼（指眾生）有愛著，愛是情的意思。能夠生起愛，所以名為有情。乃至說到生者，指的是具有出現、起始等諸法的，所以名為生者。這是依照《瑜伽師地論》的解釋。如果依照世間的解釋，情指的是情識，我有情識，名為有。、心相續，名之為命。者是主義，我有此命，所以名為命者。按照論的解釋，命指的是第八識（Ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）的現行，者指的是假者。總的來說，有別命名為命者。現在採用世間的解釋。或者有情就是第八識的現行，壽體就是第八識的種子，有壽和合，所以名為命者。或者命通於六識，名為命，有此命者，名為命者。現在採用世間的解釋，不採用正義。薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）等所說各有不同，應該敘述出來。愚者不瞭解，認為實有有情及實有命者。解釋這些名稱等，可以參考《瑜伽師地論》第八十三卷及《樞要》。

論：預流（Srotaāpanna，須陀洹）一來（Sakṛdāgāmin，斯陀含）等。

述曰：聖教中我的種種相，包括預流、一來、不還（Anāgāmin，阿那含）、無學（Arhat，阿羅漢）、二十七賢、十三住聖、三乘（Triyāna，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）、十地（Daśabhūmi，菩薩十地）。這些都是聖教中我的種種相。這裡列舉了二果等其餘賢聖，前面的預流向也包含在此處，不特別區分向和果。預的意思是進入，流指的是流類，進入聖人之類，所以名為預流。舊的說法認為流指的是生死，這種逆生死說名為逆流的說法是不對的。一於人、天往來，便得極果，名為一來。決定已斷三界見惑。

【English Translation】 English version: To cite three: namely, the Samāhita (one who is concentrated), and the five including the Manōmayakāya (mind-made body) mentioned later. Combined, there are eight types. If according to the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, there are thirteen types in total, including Pudgala (person), Kāraka (agent), Bhoktṛ (experiencer), Jñātṛ (knower), Draṣṭṛ (seer), etc. If according to Vasubandhu's Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Śāstra, there are only four types, based on the general and specific divisions of the three times (past, present, and future). This is the first type of worldly saying about the various aspects of 'I' (Ātman).

Speaking of Sattva (sentient being), it refers to the noble ones and sages who truly understand that there is only this Dharma (teaching), and nothing else. This reveals that there is Dharma-nature, and nothing else. 'Sentiment' (情) means 'nature' (性), or because there is attachment to them (sentient beings), 'love' (愛) means 'sentiment'. Being able to generate love, therefore it is called 'sentient being'. Even to say 'one who is born' (生者), it refers to one who possesses the Dharmas of appearance, arising, etc., therefore it is called 'one who is born'. This is according to the explanation in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. If according to the worldly explanation, 'sentiment' refers to emotional consciousness. 'I have emotional consciousness' is called 'having *'. * and the continuity of mind are called 'life' (命). 'One' (者) means 'master' (主義). 'I have this life' is called 'one who has life'. According to the commentary, 'life' refers to the current manifestation of the eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna), and 'one' refers to the provisional. Generally speaking, having a separate name is called 'one who has life'. Now we adopt the worldly explanation. Or 'sentient being' is the current manifestation of the eighth consciousness, and the 'life-entity' is the seed of the eighth consciousness. Having the combination of life, therefore it is called 'one who has life'. Or 'life' generally refers to the six consciousnesses, called 'life', and 'one who has this life' is called 'one who has life'. Now we adopt the worldly explanation, not the correct meaning. The Sarvāstivāda school and others have different explanations, which should be narrated. The ignorant do not understand and think that there are real sentient beings and real 'ones who have life'. To explain these names, refer to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 83, and the 'Key Essentials'.

Treatise: Srotaāpanna (stream-enterer), Sakṛdāgāmin (once-returner), etc.

Commentary: The various aspects of 'I' in the holy teachings include Srotaāpanna, Sakṛdāgāmin, Anāgāmin (non-returner), Arhat (one who has nothing more to learn), the twenty-seven worthy ones, the thirteen who abide in holiness, the three vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna), and the ten grounds (Daśabhūmi). These are all the various aspects of 'I' in the holy teachings. Here, the second fruit and other worthy ones are listed. The path of the Srotaāpanna is also included here, without specifically distinguishing between the path and the fruit. 'Pre' (預) means 'entering', and 'stream' (流) refers to the category of stream. Entering the category of the holy ones is called Srotaāpanna. The old saying that 'stream' refers to birth and death, and that reversing birth and death is called 'reversing the stream', is not correct. One who comes and goes between humans and gods once, and then attains the ultimate fruit, is called Sakṛdāgāmin. Having definitively cut off the delusions of view in the three realms.

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所斷惑。或修至五品立預流果。決定已斷三界見惑。修道六品或七．八品。立一來果。二向不定。如瑜伽論第二十六．對法十三顯揚第三等廣說彼相。此即聖教我種種相。世間聖教俱有我相。此二雖殊。而皆是我種種相也。

論。法種種相謂實德業等。

述曰。此即世間法種種相。如有外道名吠世史迦。立六句義。一實。二德。三業。四有。五同異。六和合。或立十句。如下當知。實者諸法體實德．業所依名之為實。德．業不依有性等故。德者道德業是作用。動作義也　有數論者。立二十五諦。我是前門。法中但有二十四諦。此舉吠世前三句義。等餘三句。及諸師法。至下當知。

論。蘊處界等。

述曰。即諸聖教法種種相崇聚．生．因。是蘊．處．界義。等者等取緣起．根．諦．並處非處．餘三善巧．或四善巧．及別別法。若依中邊．菩薩藏經第十七卷。有十善巧頌曰蘊．界．處．緣起。處非處．根．世。諦．乘．有無為。是名十善巧　皆聖教中法種種相。此蘊等相。如對法第一疏解。此上顯示世間．聖教皆說我法。有種種相。若依他起。遍計所執。雖有．非有二性相別。今於此中總名我法。以假說故。

論。轉謂隨緣施設有異。

述曰。釋第二句中我．法二種諸相轉言　言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所斷之惑。或者修行至五品位，證得預流果（Srota-apanna，入流果，小乘四果的第一果）。這表示已經斷除了三界之內的見惑（錯誤的見解）。如果繼續修行至六品或七、八品，便能證得一來果（Sakrdagamin，一來果，小乘四果的第二果）。至於二向，則不確定。這些在《瑜伽師地論》第二十六卷、《阿毗達磨集論》第十三卷、《顯揚聖教論》第三卷等處有詳細說明。這些都是聖教中關於『我』的種種相狀。世間的聖教也有關於『我』的相狀。雖然這兩者有所不同，但都屬於『我』的種種相狀。

論：法的種種相狀，指的是實體、德行、作用等等。

述記：這指的是世間法（非佛教的哲學體系）的種種相狀。例如，有一種外道叫做吠世史迦（Vaisheshika，勝論派），他們建立了六句義：一、實體（實）；二、德行（德）；三、作用（業）；四、有；五、同異；六、和合。或者建立十句義，如下文將要說明。實體指的是諸法的體性真實，是德行和作用所依賴的基礎。德行和作用不依賴於『有性』等等。德行指的是道德，作用指的是動作。有數論者（Samkhya，數論派）建立了二十五諦，『我』是前門。在『法』中只有二十四諦。這裡列舉了吠世史迦的前三句義，『等』字包括了其餘三句義，以及其他學派的理論，將在下文說明。

論：蘊、處、界等等。

述記：這是指聖教中法的種種相狀，崇聚、生、因，是蘊（Skandha，五蘊）、處（Ayatana，十二處）、界（Dhatu，十八界）的含義。『等』字包括了緣起（Pratītyasamutpāda，十二因緣）、根（Indriya，根，如眼根、耳根等）、諦（Satya，四聖諦），以及處非處智（知道什麼是合理的，什麼是不合理的智慧）、其餘三種善巧（瞭解蘊、界、處）、或者四種善巧，以及種種不同的法。如果依據《中邊分別論》、《菩薩藏經》第十七卷，有十種善巧的偈頌說：蘊、界、處、緣起，處非處、根、世（世間法），諦、乘（乘，道）、有無為（有為法和無為法）。這被稱為十種善巧。這些都是聖教中法的種種相狀。這些蘊等等的相狀，如同《阿毗達磨》第一的疏解。以上顯示了世間和聖教都說有『我』和『法』，並且有種種相狀。如果依據依他起性（Paratantra，依他起性）和遍計所執性（Parikalpita，遍計所執性），雖然有『有』和『非有』兩種不同的自性，但現在在這裡總稱為『我』和『法』，因為是假說的緣故。

論：轉，指的是隨著因緣施設而有所不同。

述記：解釋第二句中『我』和『法』兩種諸相的『轉』字。

【English Translation】 English version The afflictions that are severed. Or, by cultivating up to the fifth stage, one establishes the fruit of Srota-apanna (stream-enterer). This definitively means that one has severed the afflictions of view within the Three Realms. By cultivating the sixth, seventh, or eighth stages of the path, one establishes the fruit of Sakrdagamin (once-returner). As for the 'two towards,' it is uncertain. These aspects are extensively explained in texts such as the twenty-sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the thirteenth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and the third chapter of the Mahayanasamgraha. These are all the various aspects of 'self' according to the sacred teachings. Worldly sacred teachings also have aspects of 'self.' Although these two differ, they are both various aspects of 'self.'

Treatise: The various aspects of 'dharma' refer to reality, virtue, action, and so on.

Commentary: This refers to the various aspects of worldly dharmas (non-Buddhist philosophical systems). For example, there is an externalist school called Vaisheshika (atomism), which establishes six categories: 1. Reality (substance); 2. Virtue (quality); 3. Action (activity); 4. Generality; 5. Particularity; 6. Inherence. Or they establish ten categories, as will be known below. 'Reality' refers to the real substance of all dharmas, which is the basis upon which virtue and action depend. Virtue and action do not depend on 'generality,' and so on. 'Virtue' refers to morality, and 'action' refers to activity. The Samkhya (enumerationist) school establishes twenty-five Tattvas (principles), with 'self' as the initial entry. Within 'dharma,' there are only twenty-four Tattvas. Here, the first three categories of the Vaisheshika are listed, and 'so on' includes the remaining three categories, as well as the doctrines of other schools, which will be explained below.

Treatise: Skandhas (aggregates), Ayatanas (sense bases), Dhatus (elements), and so on.

Commentary: This refers to the various aspects of dharma in the sacred teachings. Accumulation, arising, and cause are the meanings of Skandhas (five aggregates), Ayatanas (twelve sense bases), and Dhatus (eighteen elements). 'And so on' includes Pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), Indriyas (faculties, such as the eye faculty, ear faculty, etc.), Satyas (Four Noble Truths), as well as knowledge of what is appropriate and inappropriate, the remaining three skillful means (understanding the aggregates, elements, and sense bases), or the four skillful means, and various different dharmas. According to the Madhyantavibhaga and the seventeenth volume of the Bodhisattvapiṭaka Sutra, there is a verse on the ten skillful means: aggregates, elements, sense bases, dependent origination, appropriate and inappropriate, faculties, world (worldly dharmas), truths, vehicle (path), existence and non-existence (conditioned and unconditioned dharmas). These are called the ten skillful means. These are all the various aspects of dharma in the sacred teachings. These aspects of the aggregates, etc., are explained in the commentary on the first chapter of the Abhidharma. The above shows that both worldly and sacred teachings speak of 'self' and 'dharma,' and that they have various aspects. According to Paratantra (dependent nature) and Parikalpita (imputed nature), although there are two different natures of 'existence' and 'non-existence,' they are now collectively called 'self' and 'dharma' here, because they are provisionally designated.

Treatise: Transformation refers to differences arising from provisional designations based on conditions.

Commentary: Explaining the word 'transformation' in the second sentence regarding the various aspects of 'self' and 'dharma.'

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隨緣者。隨諸世間種種分別橫計等緣。隨諸聖教施設安立證得等緣。即施設為世間．聖教我法別相　異者別也　言施設者。安立異名即假說義。此意顯示隨諸世間橫計種種我法等緣施設我法。隨諸聖教證得種種無為等緣即施設為聖教我法　轉者起義。隨彼彼緣起彼種種我法相故　問世說我法率己妄情。聖說我法有何益用　答由四緣故。一言說易故。二順世間故。三者能除無我怖故。四有自他染凈．信解．事業等故。如瑜伽第六．顯揚第十說。

此上即解頌上二句。將釋第三句寄問徴起。

論。如是諸相至依何得成。

述曰。如是諸相。牒前我法種種相義。下二句難也。謂諸外道．二乘。世間聞說我法性相非有便作是難。若彼我法性相非有。假我法相。若計所執若依他者。二種我法依何得成。由彼識外二真無故。內識上二假依何立。要依彼真可說假故。

論。彼相皆依至而假施設。

述曰。釋第三句頌。此中答意。彼世間．聖教所說我法相。雖無于真方可假說。然依內識之所轉變。謂種子識變為現行。現行識變為種子。及見．相分。故名為變。依此所變而假施設為我法相。心變真如亦名為法。若實真如不可說為法與非法。非識所變故非彼依。后得變似皆名為法。故此但說近依他依。此即

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 隨緣者。隨順世間種種分別和橫加臆測的因緣，隨順聖教所施設、安立和證得的因緣。因此，就施設為世間和聖教中我（ātman）法（dharma）的差別相。（異者，就是差別。）所說的施設，就是安立不同的名稱，也就是假說的意思。這表明隨順世間橫加臆測的種種我法等因緣來施設我法，隨順聖教證得種種無為等因緣就施設為聖教的我法。（轉，是生起的意思。）隨順那些因緣生起那些種種我法之相的緣故。 問：世間所說的我法是按照自己的妄情，聖教所說的我法有什麼益處和作用呢？答：由於四種因緣的緣故。一是容易用言語表達的緣故；二是順應世間的緣故；三是能夠去除對無我的怖畏的緣故；四是有自身和他人的染污和清凈、信解、事業等的緣故。如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第六卷、《顯揚聖教論》（Abhisamayālaṃkāra）第十卷所說。 以上是解釋頌文的前兩句。將要解釋第三句，先用提問來引發。 論：像這樣諸多的相，到頭來是依靠什麼才能成立的呢？ 述曰：像這樣諸多的相，是承接前面所說的我法種種相的意義。下面兩句是責難。意思是說，那些外道（tīrthika）、二乘（Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyekabuddha-yāna），世間人聽到說我法的自性和相不是真實存在的，就作這樣的責難：如果那些我法的自性和相不是真實存在的，那麼假立的我法相，無論是遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhāva）還是依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva），這兩種我法依靠什麼才能成立呢？由於在識之外沒有兩種真實存在的緣故，在內在的識上，這兩種虛假的我法依靠什麼才能成立呢？一定要依靠真實存在的，才能說虛假的。 論：那些相都是依靠內心識的變現而假施設的。 述曰：解釋頌文的第三句。這裡回答的意思是：世間和聖教所說的我法相，即使沒有真實的，才可以假說。然而，是依靠內心識的轉變。也就是種子識（bīja-vijñāna）轉變為現行識（pravṛtti-vijñāna），現行識轉變為種子識，以及見分（darśana-bhāga）和相分（nimitta-bhāga）。所以叫做變。依靠這種轉變而假施設為我法相。心變現的真如（tathatā）也叫做做法。如果真實的真如，不能說成是法與非法，因為它不是識所變現的，所以不是它的所依。后得智（prsthalabdha-jnana）所變現的相似之相，都叫做做法。所以這裡只說接近的依他起性。這就是

【English Translation】 English version Those who accord with conditions accord with all kinds of discriminations and arbitrary calculations in the world. They accord with the conditions of establishment, arrangement, realization, etc., of the holy teachings. Therefore, they are established as the distinct characteristics of 'self' (ātman) and 'dharma' in the world and in the holy teachings. ('Different' means distinction.) The so-called establishment is the setting up of different names, which is the meaning of provisional designation. This shows that according to the various conditions of arbitrary calculations of 'self' and 'dharma' in the world, 'self' and 'dharma' are established. According to the conditions of realizing various unconditioned states in the holy teachings, 'self' and 'dharma' of the holy teachings are established. ('Transformation' means arising.) Because according to those conditions, various characteristics of 'self' and 'dharma' arise. Question: The 'self' and 'dharma' spoken of in the world are based on one's own deluded feelings. What benefit and function do the 'self' and 'dharma' spoken of in the holy teachings have? Answer: Because of four conditions. First, it is easy to express in words. Second, it accords with the world. Third, it can remove the fear of no-'self'. Fourth, there are defilements and purifications, faith and understanding, activities, etc., of oneself and others. As stated in the sixth volume of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' and the tenth volume of the 'Abhisamayālaṃkāra'. The above explains the first two lines of the verse. To explain the third line, a question is raised to initiate it. Treatise: These many characteristics, in the end, rely on what to be established? Commentary: These many characteristics refer to the meaning of the various characteristics of 'self' and 'dharma' mentioned earlier. The following two lines are a refutation. It means that those non-Buddhists (tīrthika), followers of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyekabuddha-yāna), and worldly people, upon hearing that the nature and characteristics of 'self' and 'dharma' are not truly existent, make this refutation: If the nature and characteristics of those 'self' and 'dharma' are not truly existent, then the falsely established characteristics of 'self' and 'dharma', whether they are the 'completely imagined nature' (parikalpita-svabhāva) or the 'dependent nature' (paratantra-svabhāva), what do these two kinds of 'self' and 'dharma' rely on to be established? Since there are no two truly existent things outside of consciousness, on what can these two false 'self' and 'dharma' rely on within the inner consciousness to be established? It must rely on what is truly existent to be able to speak of what is false. Treatise: Those characteristics are all provisionally established based on the transformations of the inner consciousness. Commentary: Explaining the third line of the verse. The meaning of the answer here is: The characteristics of 'self' and 'dharma' spoken of in the world and in the holy teachings, even if they are not truly existent, can be provisionally spoken of. However, they rely on the transformations of the inner consciousness. That is, the 'seed consciousness' (bīja-vijñāna) transforms into the 'manifesting consciousness' (pravṛtti-vijñāna), and the 'manifesting consciousness' transforms into the 'seed consciousness', as well as the 'seeing aspect' (darśana-bhāga) and the 'image aspect' (nimitta-bhāga). Therefore, it is called transformation. Based on this transformation, the characteristics of 'self' and 'dharma' are provisionally established. The 'suchness' (tathatā) transformed by the mind is also called 'dharma'. If the true 'suchness' cannot be said to be 'dharma' or 'non-dharma', because it is not transformed by consciousness, so it is not its basis. The similar appearances transformed by 'subsequent wisdom' (prsthalabdha-jnana) are all called 'dharma'. Therefore, here it only speaks of the 'dependent nature' that is close. This is

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顯示識所變者實非我法。而諸世間及諸聖教假說我法。言假設也。

釋總句已。下別解識。及變二字。

論。識謂了別。

述曰。釋識名義。今舉行相顯識自體。心．意．識了名之差別。故以了別釋識之義。

問我法所依內能變相豈無心所。

論。此中識言亦攝心所定相應故。

述曰。隱劣顯勝故。謂所與心非定俱起。如貪．信等時不現行。不可說所義兼於心。故說識言亦攝心所　問遍行五所。心定相應。何不說彼而但說識　答識為主故。能生彼故。彼五種類非定俱行。故但說識即攝心所　問真如與識非如心所。何故此中亦不說有　答識實性故。識俱有故。不離識故。非我法依。故但說識不說真如。

問前言識變。變義如何。

論。變謂識體轉似二分。

述曰。此釋變義。此論一宗總有二釋。此即初釋　護法等云。謂諸識體即自證分。轉似相．見二分而生。此說識體是依他性。轉似相．見。二分非無亦依他起。依此二分執實二取。聖說為無。非依他中無此二分。論說唯二依他性故。此除真智緣于真如。無相分故。不爾如何名他心智。后得智等不外取故。此二廣釋。至下第七．及第十末。並二十唯識述記中說。

許有相．見二體性者。說相．見種或同或

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 顯示識所變現的，實際上並非真實的我與法。而世間以及聖教所說的『我』(ātman)與『法』(dharma)，都是假立的名稱，是假設性的說法。

總括性地解釋了前句之後，下面分別解釋『識』(vijñāna)以及『變』(pariṇāma)這兩個字。

論：『識』(vijñāna)指的是了別作用。

述記：解釋『識』(vijñāna)這個名稱的含義。現在用它的行相來顯明『識』(vijñāna)的自體。心(citta)、意(manas)、識(vijñāna)在名稱上了別有差別，因此用『了別』來解釋『識』(vijñāna)的含義。

問：作為『我』(ātman)與『法』(dharma)所依的內在能變現的相，難道沒有心所(caitta)嗎？

論：這裡所說的『識』(vijñāna)，也包括了與它相應的心所(caitta)，因為它們是決定的相應關係。

述記：因為隱沒次要的，而彰顯主要的。所與『識』(vijñāna)相應的心所(caitta)並非總是同時生起，比如貪(rāga)、信(śraddhā)等有時不現行。不能說『所』的含義兼顧到心(citta)。所以說『識』(vijñāna)也包括了心所(caitta)。問：遍行五心所(pañca sarvatraga citta-caittas)，心(citta)是決定的相應。為什麼不說它們，而只說『識』(vijñāna)？答：因為『識』(vijñāna)是主要的，能夠產生它們。這五種心所(caitta)並非總是同時生起，所以只說『識』(vijñāna)就包括了心所(caitta)。問：真如(tathatā)與『識』(vijñāna)的關係不像心所(caitta)那樣，為什麼這裡也不說有真如(tathatā)？答：因為真如(tathatā)是『識』(vijñāna)的實性，與『識』(vijñāna)俱有，不離『識』(vijñāna)，不是『我』(ātman)與『法』(dharma)所依，所以只說『識』(vijñāna)而不說真如(tathatā)。

問：前面說『識變』(vijñāna-pariṇāma)，『變』(pariṇāma)的含義是什麼？

論：『變』(pariṇāma)指的是『識』(vijñāna)的體性轉變，顯現出相分(nimitta-bhāga)和見分(darśana-bhāga)這二分。

述記：這是解釋『變』(pariṇāma)的含義。這個論典的一個宗派總共有兩種解釋。這是第一種解釋。護法(Dharmapāla)等人說，所謂的諸『識』(vijñāna)的體性，就是自證分(sva-saṃvedana-bhāga)，轉變顯現出相分(nimitta-bhāga)和見分(darśana-bhāga)這二分而生起。這說明『識』(vijñāna)的體性是依他性(paratantra-svabhāva)。轉變顯現出的相分(nimitta-bhāga)和見分(darśana-bhāga)並非沒有，也是依他而起。依據這二分執著為真實的二取。聖人說這是沒有的，並非在依他性(paratantra-svabhāva)中沒有這二分。論典說只有二分是依他性(paratantra-svabhāva)的緣故。這排除了真智緣于真如(tathatā)，因為沒有相分(nimitta-bhāga)的緣故。否則如何稱為他心智(paracitta-jñāna)？后得智(pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna)等不向外取。這兩種廣泛的解釋，在下面的第七識(saptama-vijñāna)以及第十識(daśama-vijñāna)末尾，以及《二十唯識述記》中都有說明。

如果承認有相分(nimitta-bhāga)和見分(darśana-bhāga)的體性，那麼說相分(nimitta-bhāga)和見分(darśana-bhāga)的種子或者相同或者

【English Translation】 English version What is manifested by consciousness is in reality not 'self' (ātman) or 'dharma'. The 'self' (ātman) and 'dharma' spoken of in the world and in sacred teachings are merely provisional designations, hypothetical constructs.

Having explained the general statement, the following separately explains the words 'consciousness' (vijñāna) and 'transformation' (pariṇāma).

Treatise: 'Consciousness' (vijñāna) refers to the function of discernment.

Commentary: Explains the meaning of the term 'consciousness' (vijñāna). Now, its characteristics are used to reveal the essence of 'consciousness' (vijñāna). Mind (citta), thought (manas), and consciousness (vijñāna) are distinct in name, hence 'discernment' is used to explain the meaning of 'consciousness' (vijñāna).

Question: As the internal transforming aspect on which 'self' (ātman) and 'dharma' rely, are there no mental factors (caitta)?

Treatise: Here, the term 'consciousness' (vijñāna) also includes mental factors (caitta) because they are determinately corresponding.

Commentary: Because the subtle is concealed and the prominent is revealed. The mental factors (caitta) that correspond with 'consciousness' (vijñāna) do not always arise simultaneously, such as greed (rāga), faith (śraddhā), etc., which sometimes do not manifest. It cannot be said that the meaning of 'that which' includes mind (citta). Therefore, it is said that 'consciousness' (vijñāna) also includes mental factors (caitta). Question: The five omnipresent mental factors (pañca sarvatraga citta-caittas) are determinately corresponding with mind (citta). Why are they not mentioned, but only 'consciousness' (vijñāna)? Answer: Because 'consciousness' (vijñāna) is primary and can produce them. These five types of mental factors (caitta) do not always arise simultaneously, so only 'consciousness' (vijñāna) is mentioned, which includes mental factors (caitta). Question: True Thusness (tathatā) is not related to 'consciousness' (vijñāna) like mental factors (caitta), so why is True Thusness (tathatā) not mentioned here either? Answer: Because True Thusness (tathatā) is the true nature of 'consciousness' (vijñāna), co-exists with 'consciousness' (vijñāna), is inseparable from 'consciousness' (vijñāna), and is not what 'self' (ātman) and 'dharma' rely on, so only 'consciousness' (vijñāna) is mentioned and not True Thusness (tathatā).

Question: Earlier, 'transformation of consciousness' (vijñāna-pariṇāma) was mentioned. What is the meaning of 'transformation' (pariṇāma)?

Treatise: 'Transformation' (pariṇāma) refers to the essence of 'consciousness' (vijñāna) changing and appearing as the image-component (nimitta-bhāga) and the seeing-component (darśana-bhāga).

Commentary: This explains the meaning of 'transformation' (pariṇāma). This treatise has two interpretations in total according to one school. This is the first interpretation. Dharmapāla and others say that the essence of all 'consciousnesses' (vijñāna) is the self-cognition component (sva-saṃvedana-bhāga), which transforms and appears as the image-component (nimitta-bhāga) and the seeing-component (darśana-bhāga) that arise. This explains that the essence of 'consciousness' (vijñāna) is dependently arisen (paratantra-svabhāva). The image-component (nimitta-bhāga) and the seeing-component (darśana-bhāga) that are transformed and appear are not non-existent, but also dependently arisen. Based on these two components, there is attachment to the two graspers as real. The sages say that this is non-existent, not that these two components do not exist in the dependently arisen (paratantra-svabhāva). The treatise says that only the two components are dependently arisen (paratantra-svabhāva). This excludes true wisdom that is conditioned by True Thusness (tathatā), because there is no image-component (nimitta-bhāga). Otherwise, how could it be called the mind-reading wisdom (paracitta-jñāna)? Subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna) and others do not grasp externally. These two extensive explanations are given in the following seventh consciousness (saptama-vijñāna) and the end of the tenth consciousness (daśama-vijñāna), as well as in the Commentary on the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only.

If the essence of the image-component (nimitta-bhāga) and the seeing-component (darśana-bhāga) is acknowledged, then it is said that the seeds of the image-component (nimitta-bhāga) and the seeing-component (darśana-bhāga) are either the same or

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異　若同種者。即一識體轉似二分相用而生。如一蝸牛變生二角。此說影像相．見。離體更無別性。是識用故　若言相．見各別種者。見是自體義用分之。故離識體更無別種。即一識體轉似見分別用而生。識為所依轉相分種似相而起。以作用別性各不同。故相別種。于理為勝。故言識體轉似二分　此依他起非有似有。實非二分似計所執二分見．相故立似名　相別有種何名識變　不離識故。由識變時相方生故。如大造色。由分別心相境生故。非境分別心方得生。故非唯境但言唯識。

此顯能變．相見二分。用．體別有。何故說識似二分生。

論。相見俱依自證起故。

述曰。若無自證二定不生。如無頭時角定非有。及無鏡時面影不起。皆于識上現相貌故。故說二分依識體生。

此總顯示依他起性。此上顯示識之所變。問此依他起。如何說為我法二相。

論。依斯二分至無所依故。

述曰。依止依他相．見二分。施設遍計所執我法二實分也。依起執故。若離於此依他二分。彼無所依。故說依他為執依止。染分依故。此世間我法　聖教我法。義依于體亦復如是。此顯我法假說所由。上來總是護法解訖　安惠解云。變謂識體轉似二分。二分體無。遍計所執。除佛以外菩薩已還。諸識自體

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 異：如果相和見是同一種子，那就是一個識體（vijñāna-kāya，意識的本體）轉變，看起來像是兩種不同的部分（相分和見分）而產生。就像一隻蝸牛變化出兩隻角一樣。這種說法認為影像（相分）和見（見分）離開識體就沒有其他的自性，因為它們是識的作用。如果說相和見是不同的種子，那麼見是自體（svātmā，自身）的義用分，所以離開識體就沒有其他的種子。就是一個識體轉變，看起來像是見的分別作用而產生。識是所依，轉變出相分，種子看起來像是相而生起。因為作用和自性各自不同，所以相是不同的種子，在道理上是更勝一籌的。所以說識體轉變，看起來像是兩種部分。 這屬於依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva，依賴於其他條件而生起的性質），並非真實存在卻看起來像是存在，實際上並非兩種部分，只是看起來像是遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhāva，虛妄分別的性質）所執著的見和相，所以才建立『似』這個名稱。 如果相是別有的種子，那為什麼還叫作識變（vijñāna-pariṇāma，意識的轉變）呢？ 因為不離開識的緣故。由於識變的時候相才產生，就像大造色（mahābhūta-rūpa，四大元素所形成的色法）一樣，由於分別心的緣故，相境才產生。並非是由於境，分別心才得以產生。所以不是唯有境，而是說唯識。 這裡顯示了能變（pariṇāma，轉變）、相見二分，作用和本體是分別存在的。為什麼說識看起來像是兩種部分而產生呢？ 論：相和見都依賴於自證分（svasaṃvedana-bhāga，自我證知的成分）而生起。 述曰：如果沒有自證分，相和見就一定不會產生。就像沒有頭的時候角一定不會存在，以及沒有鏡子的時候面部的影像不會生起一樣。相和見都是在識上顯現相貌，所以說兩種部分依賴於識體而生起。 這裡總的顯示了依他起性。上面顯示了識所轉變的內容。問：這個依他起性，如何說是『我』和『法』兩種相呢？ 論：依賴於這兩種部分，直到沒有所依為止。 述曰：依賴於依他的相和見兩種部分，施設遍計所執的我法兩種虛妄分別。因為依賴於依他起而執著。如果離開了這依他的兩種部分，遍計所執就沒有所依賴的，所以說依他起是執著的依止，是染污的所依。這個世間的我和法，聖教中的我和法，意義上依賴於本體也是如此。這裡顯示了我和法是假說所由來的。以上全部是護法（Dharmapāla）的解釋完畢。安慧（Sthiramati）解釋說：變，就是識體轉變看起來像是兩種部分，兩種部分的本體是不存在的，是遍計所執。除了佛以外，菩薩以及以下的眾生的識的自體。

【English Translation】 English version Objection: If the appearance-aspect (lakṣaṇa-bhāga) and the perception-aspect (darśana-bhāga) are of the same seed, then it is one consciousness-entity (vijñāna-kāya) transforming to appear as two distinct parts, and then arising. It is like a snail transforming and producing two horns. This explanation asserts that the image (appearance-aspect) and the perception (perception-aspect) have no separate nature apart from the entity of consciousness, because they are functions of consciousness. If it is said that the appearance-aspect and the perception-aspect are of different seeds, then the perception is a functional division of the self-nature (svātmā), so there is no separate seed apart from the entity of consciousness. It is one consciousness-entity transforming to appear as the discriminating function of perception and then arising. Consciousness is the basis upon which the appearance-aspect transforms, and the seed appears to arise like the appearance-aspect. Because the functions and natures are each different, the appearance-aspect is a different seed, which is superior in reason. Therefore, it is said that the consciousness-entity transforms to appear as two parts. This belongs to the dependently arisen nature (paratantra-svabhāva), which is not truly existent but appears to be existent. In reality, they are not two parts, but merely appear to be the perceived and the appearance-aspects that are clung to by the completely conceptualized nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), hence the establishment of the name 'appearance'. If the appearance-aspect has a separate seed, then why is it called consciousness-transformation (vijñāna-pariṇāma)? Because it does not depart from consciousness. It is because the appearance-aspect arises when consciousness transforms, just like the great created matter (mahābhūta-rūpa). Due to the discriminating mind, the object of the appearance-aspect arises. It is not that the discriminating mind arises because of the object. Therefore, it is not only the object, but it is said to be only consciousness. Here, the transformer (pariṇāma), the appearance-aspect, and the perception-aspect are revealed, and the function and entity are separately existent. Why is it said that consciousness appears to arise as two parts? Treatise: Both the appearance-aspect and the perception-aspect arise relying on the self-awareness aspect (svasaṃvedana-bhāga). Commentary: If there is no self-awareness aspect, the appearance-aspect and the perception-aspect will definitely not arise. Just like horns definitely do not exist when there is no head, and the image of the face does not arise when there is no mirror. Both the appearance-aspect and the perception-aspect manifest appearances on consciousness, so it is said that the two parts arise relying on the entity of consciousness. Here, the dependently arisen nature is generally revealed. Above, what is transformed by consciousness is revealed. Question: How is this dependently arisen nature said to be the two aspects of 'self' and 'dharma'? Treatise: Relying on these two parts, until there is no basis. Commentary: Relying on the two parts of the dependently arisen, the appearance-aspect and the perception-aspect, the completely conceptualized false discriminations of self and dharma are established. Because clinging arises relying on the dependently arisen. If one departs from these two parts of the dependently arisen, the completely conceptualized has nothing to rely on, so it is said that the dependently arisen is the basis of clinging, and is the basis of defilement. The self and dharma of this world, and the self and dharma in the holy teachings, are also like this in meaning, relying on the entity. Here, it is revealed that the self and dharma are derived from provisional speech. The above is the complete explanation of Dharmapāla. Sthiramati explains: Transformation means that the entity of consciousness transforms to appear as two parts, and the entity of the two parts does not exist, but is completely conceptualized. Except for the Buddha, the self-nature of the consciousness of Bodhisattvas and beings below.

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即自證分。由不證實有法執故。似二分起即計所執。似依他有。二分體無。如自證分相貌亦有。以無似有。即三性心皆有法執。八識自體皆似二分。如依手巾變似於兔幻生二耳。二耳體無。依手巾起。彼引世親所造緣起論中末後抉擇。說無明支許通三性。故除如來皆有二分是計所執　問此二體無。識體如何轉似二分　答相．見俱依自證起故。由識自體虛妄習故。不如實故。或有執故。無明俱故。轉似二分。二分即是相及見分。依識體起。由體妄故變似二分。二分說依自證而起　若無識體二分亦無。故二分起由識體有　既有自體及此二分。依何分上假說我法　答依斯二分施設我法。依此相．見計所執上。世間．聖教說為我法。此相．見之中皆說為我法。彼我法二離此相．見無所依故。故依所執相．見二分施設我法。世尊能知識自證分及真如等。法性離言非我非法。為除愚夫所執實我法。于彼識所變二分之上。假說為我法。方便誘引令知假說。非謂實有　問前護法解。后安惠解。何故我法但依二分。不計自體以為我法　答若護法說。據實亦計。且舉所變二分為依。非無依于自體計也。略有三義所以不說。一二執遍。我執不依自證起故。二共許遍。今古大小皆不許有自證分故。三義已說。若計自體即能取攝。見分中收。但言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 即自證分（指第八識的自我認知部分）。因為不證實存在對法的執著，所以當出現類似能取和所取二分時，就產生了遍計所執性（指虛妄分別）。這類似於依他起性（指因緣和合而生），但能取和所取二分的體性是空無的。如同自證分的相貌也是存在的，但實際上並不存在，只是看起來存在。因此，三性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）的心識都存在對法的執著。八識的自體都類似於能取和所取二分。就像依靠手帕變出像兔子的幻象，生出兩隻耳朵，這兩隻耳朵的體性是空無的，只是依靠手帕而生起。世親菩薩所造的《緣起論》中最後的抉擇部分說，無明這一支可以通於三性。因此，除了如來之外，所有眾生都有能取和所取二分，這就是遍計所執性。 問：如果能取和所取二分的體性是空無的，那麼識的自體是如何轉變成類似能取和所取二分的呢？ 答：相分（所取）和見分（能取）都依賴於自證分而生起。由於識的自體具有虛妄的習氣，不如實，或者存在執著，以及與無明相應，所以會轉變成類似能取和所取二分。能取和所取二分就是相分和見分，它們依賴於識的自體而生起。由於識的自體是虛妄的，所以會變現出類似能取和所取二分。能取和所取二分是依賴於自證分而生起的。如果不存在識的自體，那麼能取和所取二分也不會存在。因此，能取和所取二分的生起是由於識的自體存在。 既然存在自體以及能取和所取二分，那麼在哪個部分上假立我法（對自我和事物的執著）呢？ 答：在能取和所取二分上施設我法。在相分和見分這些遍計所執性的基礎上，世間和聖教都說為我法。在相分和見分中都說為我法。因為我法二者離開了相分和見分就沒有所依賴之處。因此，依賴於遍計所執的相分和見分來施設我法。世尊能夠認識自證分以及真如等法性，這些法性是超越言語的，既不是我，也不是非我。爲了去除愚夫對真實我法的執著，所以在識所變現的能取和所取二分之上，假立為我法，方便誘導他們瞭解這只是假說，並非真實存在。 問：前護法（Dharmapala）的解釋和后安慧（Sthiramati）的解釋，為什麼我法只是依賴於能取和所取二分，而不認為自體也是我法呢？ 答：如果按照護法的說法，實際上也認為自體是我法，只是著重指出能取和所取二分是所依賴的基礎，並非不依賴於自體。略有三個原因所以沒有說明。一是二執（我執和法執）普遍存在，而我執不是依賴於自證分而生起的。二是共同認可的普遍性，古今大小乘都不認可存在自證分。三是以上已經說明。如果認為自體也是我法，那麼就包含在能取之中，可以歸入見分。

【English Translation】 English version: This refers to the Svasamvedana (self-cognition) aspect. Because there is no confirmation of the existence of the clinging to dharma (objects of mind), the appearance of two aspects, like the subject and object, gives rise to Parikalpita (the fully conceptualized nature, imputation). This is similar to Paratantra (the dependent nature, arising from conditions), but the substance of the two aspects is empty. Just as the appearance of Svasamvedana exists, but it does not actually exist, it only appears to exist. Therefore, the minds of the three natures (Parikalpita, Paratantra, and Parinispanna) all have clinging to dharma. The self-nature of the eight consciousnesses all resembles the two aspects. It's like relying on a handkerchief to transform into an illusion of a rabbit, giving rise to two ears. The substance of these two ears is empty, arising from the handkerchief. The final determination in Vasubandhu's Treatise on Dependent Arising states that the branch of ignorance is allowed to pervade the three natures. Therefore, except for the Tathagata (Buddha), all beings have two aspects, which is Parikalpita. Question: If the substance of these two aspects is empty, how does the substance of consciousness transform to resemble the two aspects? Answer: The Nimitta (objective appearance) and Darsana (subjective perception) aspects both arise dependent on Svasamvedana. Because the self-nature of consciousness has false habits, is not in accordance with reality, or has clinging, and is associated with ignorance, it transforms to resemble the two aspects. The two aspects are the Nimitta and Darsana aspects, which arise dependent on the substance of consciousness. Because the substance is false, it transforms to resemble the two aspects. The two aspects are said to arise dependent on Svasamvedana. If the substance of consciousness does not exist, then the two aspects will not exist either. Therefore, the arising of the two aspects is due to the existence of the substance of consciousness. Since there is self-nature and these two aspects, on which aspect is the false establishment of 'I' and 'dharma' (clinging to self and phenomena) based? Answer: The establishment of 'I' and 'dharma' is based on these two aspects. On the basis of the Nimitta and Darsana aspects, which are Parikalpita, both worldly and sacred teachings speak of 'I' and 'dharma'. 'I' and 'dharma' are spoken of within these Nimitta and Darsana aspects. Because these 'I' and 'dharma' have no basis to rely on apart from these Nimitta and Darsana aspects, the establishment of 'I' and 'dharma' is based on the Parikalpita Nimitta and Darsana aspects. The World-Honored One is able to recognize Svasamvedana and suchness (Tathata), whose dharma-nature is beyond words, neither 'I' nor 'not-I'. In order to remove the clinging of foolish beings to a real 'I' and 'dharma', the false establishment of 'I' and 'dharma' is based on the two aspects transformed by consciousness, conveniently guiding them to understand that this is just a false designation, not actually existing. Question: In Dharmapala's explanation and Sthiramati's explanation, why are 'I' and 'dharma' only dependent on the two aspects, and not considered to be based on the self-nature as well? Answer: According to Dharmapala's explanation, the self-nature is also actually considered to be 'I' and 'dharma', but the emphasis is on the two transformed aspects as the basis of dependence, not that it does not depend on the self-nature. There are three reasons why it is not explicitly stated. First, the two clingings (clinging to self and clinging to dharma) are pervasive, while clinging to self does not arise dependent on Svasamvedana. Second, it is universally acknowledged that neither ancient nor modern, Hinayana nor Mahayana, acknowledge the existence of Svasamvedana. Third, the above has already been explained. If the self-nature is considered to be 'I' and 'dharma', then it is included within the subject, and can be categorized under the Darsana aspect.

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二分攝能所取。非不依于自體分計。今顯自證離見體無。故但說二見分中攝。顯能所取攝法盡故　若安惠解。凡是所執體皆是無。若執自體即說能取不異見分。故更不說為我法依。以自證分體是有故。或離言故。不可依說　問護法雲。相．見識所變。相．見名唯識。自證不言變。應非是唯識　解若立三分。種所變故名為唯識。若說四分。三．四更互變名唯識。又即識體何故非唯　問何故二師所說三分。義各有異今合為文　答譯者欲以文同義別文約義繁。所以合二師總為一文也。又如因明宗等多言名為能立陳那所說宗非能立。今舉其宗意不違古文辭遣同。義取所等因一喻二以為能立。理即別也。此文亦然。文不相違所以合譯義有乖返故為二釋　問真如非識之所變現。何成唯識。亦依真如執為實法。寧非染分之所依止　答雖非識變。識實性故亦名唯識。真如離言。與能計識非一非異。非如色等可依起執。故非執依。此中不說　又解深密經說亦為執依。然與依他稍不相似。依他之法與所計執。有少作用相狀可同。隨能計心新新而起。心上所現即是依他。是能計心之所親取。真如不爾。故此不說。遠望疏言亦可依執。諸末學者依起執故。解深密說亦不相違。真如既非識所轉變。應非唯識。不以變故名為唯識。不離識故亦名唯識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『能取』（grāhaka，能執取者）和『所取』（grāhya，所執取者）二分，並非不依賴於『自體分計』（ātma-parikalpa，對自我的虛妄分別）。現在是爲了顯示『自證分』（svasaṃvedana-bhāga，自我認知的部分）離開了能見之『體』（本質）而無，所以才只說在『二見分』（dvi-darśana-bhāga，兩種見的部分，即能取和所取）中攝取。這顯示了能取和所取涵蓋了一切法。 如果安慧（Sthiramati）的解釋是，凡是所執著的『體』（本質）都是無，如果執著于『自體』（ātman，自我），那就說『能取』（grāhaka）與『見分』（darśana-bhāga，見的部分）沒有差別。所以不再說它是『我法』（ātma-dharma，自我和法）的所依。因為『自證分』（svasaṃvedana-bhāga）的『體』（本質）是有，或者因為離開了言語，所以不可作為所依來說。 問：護法（Dharmapāla）說，『相』（nimitta，表象）和『見』（darśana，見）是識所變現的，『相』和『見』被稱為『唯識』（vijñapti-mātra，唯有識）。『自證』（svasaṃvedana，自我認知）不說是變現的，那應該不是『唯識』吧？ 答：如果建立三分，因為是種子所變現的，所以稱為『唯識』。如果說四分，第三分和第四分互相變現，稱為『唯識』。而且，『識體』（vijñāna-kāya，識的本質）本身為什麼不是『唯識』呢？ 問：為什麼兩位論師所說的三分，意義各有不同，現在卻合在一起成為一篇文章？ 答：譯者想要用相同的文字表達不同的意義，用簡略的文字表達繁多的意義。所以把兩位論師的觀點合為一篇文章。又比如因明學中，宗等多言被稱為『能立』（sādhana，能成立者），陳那（Dignāga）所說的宗不是『能立』。現在舉出宗的意義，不違背古文的措辭，意義上取『所』等，因一喻二作為『能立』。道理上是不同的。這篇文章也是這樣，文字上不相違背，所以合在一起翻譯，意義上有乖離，所以分為兩種解釋。 問：真如（tathatā，事物的真實本性）不是識所變現的，怎麼能成為『唯識』？而且，如果依據真如執著為真實之法，難道不是染污分的所依止嗎？ 答：雖然不是識所變現的，但因為是識的真實本性，所以也稱為『唯識』。真如離開了言語，與能計度的識非一非異，不像色等可以作為所依而生起執著，所以不是執著的所依。這裡沒有說。 又，《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra）說，真如也可以作為執著的所依。然而，它與『依他起』（paratantra-utpāda，依他而起）稍微有些不同。『依他起』之法與『所計執』（parikalpita，虛妄分別）有少許作用和相狀可以相同，隨著能計度的心不斷生起，心上所顯現的就是『依他起』，是能計度的心所親近執取的。真如不是這樣，所以這裡沒有說。從遠處來看，疏文說也可以依據真如而生起執著，因為末學之人依據真如而生起執著。《解深密經》所說也不相違背。真如既然不是識所轉變的，那應該不是『唯識』。不因為變現的緣故稱為『唯識』，不離開識的緣故也稱為『唯識』。

【English Translation】 English version The division into 'grāhaka' (the grasper, the one who apprehends) and 'grāhya' (the grasped, the one who is apprehended) is not independent of 'ātma-parikalpa' (the imputation of self). Now, it is to show that 'svasaṃvedana-bhāga' (the self-awareness portion) is devoid of the nature of seeing, that it is only said to be included in the 'dvi-darśana-bhāga' (two seeing portions, i.e., grāhaka and grāhya). This shows that grāhaka and grāhya encompass all dharmas. If Sthiramati's explanation is that all 'nature' (essence) that is grasped is non-existent, and if one grasps at 'ātman' (self), then it is said that 'grāhaka' (the grasper) is not different from 'darśana-bhāga' (the seeing portion). Therefore, it is no longer said to be the basis of 'ātma-dharma' (self and dharma). Because the 'nature' (essence) of 'svasaṃvedana-bhāga' (self-awareness portion) exists, or because it is beyond words, it cannot be spoken of as a basis. Question: Dharmapāla says that 'nimitta' (appearance) and 'darśana' (seeing) are transformations of consciousness, and 'nimitta' and 'darśana' are called 'vijñapti-mātra' (consciousness-only). 'Svasaṃvedana' (self-awareness) is not said to be a transformation, so shouldn't it not be 'consciousness-only'? Answer: If three portions are established, it is called 'consciousness-only' because it is a transformation of seeds. If four portions are spoken of, the third and fourth portions transform each other, which is called 'consciousness-only'. Moreover, why isn't the 'vijñāna-kāya' (essence of consciousness) itself 'consciousness-only'? Question: Why are the meanings of the three portions spoken of by the two masters different, but now combined into one article? Answer: The translator wants to use the same words to express different meanings, and use concise words to express abundant meanings. Therefore, the views of the two masters are combined into one article. Also, for example, in Hetuvidyā (logic), multiple words such as proposition are called 'sādhana' (means of proof), but the proposition spoken of by Dignāga is not 'sādhana'. Now, the meaning of the proposition is cited, without violating the wording of the ancient text, and the meaning takes 'what' etc., with one reason and two examples as 'sādhana'. The principles are different. This article is also like this. The words do not contradict each other, so they are translated together, but the meanings are different, so there are two explanations. Question: Since 'tathatā' (suchness, the true nature of things) is not a transformation of consciousness, how can it become 'consciousness-only'? Moreover, if one grasps at 'tathatā' as a real dharma, isn't it the basis of the defiled portion? Answer: Although it is not a transformation of consciousness, it is also called 'consciousness-only' because it is the true nature of consciousness. 'Tathatā' is beyond words, and is neither one nor different from the consciousness that can be measured. It is not like form, etc., which can be relied upon to give rise to grasping, so it is not the basis of grasping. This is not mentioned here. Also, the 'Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra' (解深密經) says that 'tathatā' can also be the basis of grasping. However, it is slightly different from 'paratantra-utpāda' (dependent origination). The dharma of 'paratantra-utpāda' and 'parikalpita' (conceptual construction) have a few functions and characteristics that can be the same. As the consciousness that can be measured constantly arises, what appears on the mind is 'paratantra-utpāda', which is what the consciousness that can be measured closely grasps. 'Tathatā' is not like this, so it is not mentioned here. From a distance, the commentary says that grasping can also arise based on 'tathatā', because later learners give rise to grasping based on 'tathatā'. What the 'Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra' says does not contradict this. Since 'tathatā' is not transformed by consciousness, it should not be 'consciousness-only'. It is not called 'consciousness-only' because of transformation, but it is also called 'consciousness-only' because it does not depart from consciousness.

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。此中且說依他唯識　問依所變相執為我法。內道外道皆可了知。依所變見執法可爾。如何依見亦執我耶　答如外僧佉執思為我。犢子部等我名能見。故依二分皆執我法。前敘計中已略敘說　安惠已前諸古德等。皆說二分是計所執。護法已後方計三四依他分也。實有四分。今說三者隱而不說。以對他故。義準知故。順陳那故。略敘宗故。非極研尋故且不說。第二卷中自當建立。

論。或復內識轉似外境。

述曰。即是難陀。親勝等義。依攝論說唯二義也。但立見．相以為依他。不說第三．第四分也。相分體性雖依他有。由見變為故名唯識。此相分體實在於內不離於識妄情執為似外境現。實在內也。即以依他似計所執。依此似外相分之上。世間聖教執說我法。見變似能取亦相分攝　文雖有二。義即有三。或實說一分如安慧。或二分親勝等。或三分陳那等。或四分護法等。此中護法但說三分。以證自證分別義建立義相猶隱。所以不說。

製作此論知見不同。或有一師假敘異執。種種研尋方于最後申了義說。于假施設中咸言有義。非多有義便謂多師。即護法等多為此釋。如敘本有種子是也。以護月與同時故敘之此中破斥。或復諸師各說異理。故此論下多言有義。勿皆謂一師假設研究致多有義。然多釋中為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於依他起識的討論：問：如果將依他起識所變現的相，執著為我（ātman，靈魂）和法（dharma，事物），內道（佛教）和外道（非佛教）都能理解。依據所變現的相而執著於法，這可以理解。但如何依據能見的見分（識的活動部分）也執著於我呢？答：例如，外道僧佉派（Sāṃkhya）認為思（buddhi，理智）就是我。犢子部（Vātsīputrīya）等部派認為我的名稱就是能見。因此，依據見分和相分都會執著於我和法。前面敘述各種計度時已經略微敘述過。安慧（Sthiramati）以前的古德等，都說見分和相分是遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhāva，虛妄分別性）。護法（Dharmapāla）以後才計度出依他起性有三分或四分。實際上有四分，現在說三分是隱而不說，爲了對治某些觀點。因為義理上可以推知，爲了順應陳那（Dignāga），爲了簡略地敘述宗義，並非要極盡研尋，所以暫且不說。第二卷中自然會建立。

論：或者內在的識，轉變而好像外在的境。

述記：這就是難陀（Nanda）、親勝（Vasubandhu）等的觀點。依據《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）的說法，只有見分和相分兩種意義。只建立見分和相分作為依他起性，不說第三分和第四分。相分的體性雖然是依他起有，但由於見分的變化，所以名為唯識。這相分的體性實在於內在，不離於識，只是由於虛妄的情感執著，才好像外在的境顯現。實在於內在。即以依他起性好像遍計所執性。依據這好像外在的相分之上，世間和聖教執著說我和法。見分變化而好像能取，也屬於相分所攝。文句雖然有二，義理上卻有三種。或者確實只說一分，如安慧。或者二分，如親勝等。或者三分，如陳那等。或者四分，如護法等。這裡護法只說三分，因為證自證分（sva-saṃvedana）和分別義（nirvikalpa-jñāna）的建立意義仍然隱而不說，所以不說。

製作此論的知見不同。或者有一位論師，假設敘述不同的執著，通過種種研尋，才在最後闡明了義的說法。在假設施設中都說有義理，不能因為有很多義理就認為是很多論師。即護法等大多如此解釋。如敘述本有種子就是這樣。因為護月（Devachandra）與護法是同時代的人，所以敘述他的觀點並在此中破斥。或者各位論師各自說不同的道理，所以此論下面多說『有義』。不要都認為是一位論師假設研究而導致有很多義理。然而在多種解釋中，爲了...

【English Translation】 English version: Here, let's discuss dependent arising consciousness (依他唯識, yī tā wéishì). Question: If one clings to the appearances transformed by dependent arising consciousness (依所變相, yī suǒ biàn xiàng) as 'self' (我, wǒ, ātman) and 'dharma' (法, fǎ, things), both insiders (內道, nèi dào, Buddhists) and outsiders (外道, wài dào, non-Buddhists) can understand this. Clinging to 'dharma' based on the appearances transformed is understandable. But how can one also cling to 'self' based on the seeing aspect (見分, jiàn fēn, the active part of consciousness) of consciousness?

Answer: For example, the external Sāṃkhya (僧佉, Sēngqié) school clings to intellect (思, sī, buddhi) as 'self'. The Vātsīputrīya (犢子部, Dúzǐ bù) school and others consider the name of 'self' as the 'seer'. Therefore, based on both the seeing aspect and the appearance aspect, one clings to 'self' and 'dharma'. The previous description of various conceptualizations has already briefly mentioned this. Ancient masters before Sthiramati (安慧, Ānhuì) all said that the seeing aspect and the appearance aspect are the nature of what is conceptually imputed (計所執性, jì suǒ zhí xìng, parikalpita-svabhāva). Only after Dharmapāla (護法, Hùfǎ) did they conceive of dependent arising nature as having three or four aspects. In reality, there are four aspects, but now speaking of three is to conceal it, in order to counter certain views. Because it can be inferred from the meaning, to accord with Dignāga (陳那, Chénnà), to briefly describe the doctrine, and not to exhaustively investigate, it is not mentioned for now. It will be established in the second chapter.

Treatise: Or, the inner consciousness transforms to resemble external objects.

Commentary: This is the view of Nanda (難陀, Nánduó), Vasubandhu (親勝, Qīnshèng), etc. According to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Shè Dàchéng Lùn), there are only two aspects: the seeing aspect and the appearance aspect. Only the seeing aspect and the appearance aspect are established as dependent arising nature, without mentioning the third or fourth aspects. Although the nature of the appearance aspect is dependently arisen, it is called 'consciousness-only' because of the transformation of the seeing aspect. The nature of this appearance aspect is actually internal, not separate from consciousness, but due to deluded emotional clinging, it appears as if it were an external object. It is actually internal. That is, dependent arising nature resembles the nature of what is conceptually imputed. Based on this appearance aspect that resembles an external object, the world and the sacred teachings cling to 'self' and 'dharma'. The seeing aspect transforms to resemble the grasper, and is also included in the appearance aspect. Although the text has two aspects, in terms of meaning, there are three. Or, one aspect is truly spoken of, like Sthiramati. Or two aspects, like Vasubandhu, etc. Or three aspects, like Dignāga, etc. Or four aspects, like Dharmapāla, etc. Here, Dharmapāla only speaks of three aspects, because the meaning of establishing self-awareness (證自證分, zhèng zì zhèng fēn) and non-conceptual wisdom (分別義, fēnbié yì, nirvikalpa-jñāna) is still concealed, so it is not mentioned.

The views on composing this treatise differ. Or, there is one teacher who hypothetically describes different clingings, and through various investigations, finally clarifies the definitive meaning. In the hypothetical establishments, they all say there is meaning, but one cannot assume there are many teachers simply because there are many meanings. Dharmapāla and others mostly explain it this way. For example, the description of the inherently existing seeds is like this. Because Devachandra (護月, Hùyuè) was a contemporary of Dharmapāla, his views are described and refuted here. Or, various teachers each speak of different principles, so this treatise often says 'there is meaning' below. Do not assume that it is all one teacher's hypothetical research that leads to many meanings. However, among the various explanations, in order to...

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例非一。或初無有義後方言有義勝者在初。或於初后皆言有義勝者多后。或彼初后皆言有義。理等教齊任情取捨。此大文例非獨此論。余新翻者皆準此知。謂前但解后說理徴。此即一師所假說也。或前理廣后理教略。初無有義此為勝也。或前理略后理教廣。皆言有義而後勝也。或初後有義理教皆均。取捨難知。無偏勝也。今此亦爾。無偏勝故。

論。我法分別至變似我法。

述曰。依第二釋三文科者。已別釋字。后廣分別。此中有三。初以法喻別解依他．遍計所執。或有．或無。二說所執及與依他。皆假所由。遮增減執。三依二諦攝彼二假。至下當知。此即初也。于中有二。初法后喻　若護法．難陀等解。由無始來第六．七識橫計我法。種種分別熏習力故　若安惠解。七識相應諸心．心所皆名分別。能熏習故。即由分別熏習種生。熏者擊發義。習者數數義。由數熏發有此種故　后諸識起變似我法。護法釋云。識自證分所變相．見依他二分。非我非法。無主宰故。無作用故。性離言故。聖教名我法者是強目彼。如世說火口不被燒。所說火言明非目火。世間凡夫。依識所變相．見二分依他性上。執為我法。此所變者似彼妄情名似我法。彼妄所執我法實無。非可說牛毛似彼龜毛。故不說似彼但說似情　難陀等言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：例子不止一個。或者最初沒有意義，後來才說有意義的，以最初的為勝。或者在最初和後來都說有意義的，多數以後來的為勝。或者他們最初和後來都說有意義，道理相等，教義齊備，可以隨意取捨。這種大的文例不只在這部論著中出現，其餘新翻譯的論著都可以參照這個來理解。意思是前面只是解釋，後面才說理並加以論證，這也就是一個老師所假託的說法。或者前面的道理廣博，後面的道理和教義簡略，最初沒有意義的，這種為勝。或者前面的道理簡略，後面的道理和教義廣博，都說有意義的，以後面的為勝。或者最初和後來都有意義，道理和教義都相同，取捨難以確定，沒有偏頗的勝負。現在這裡也是這樣，沒有偏頗的勝負。

論：我法分別至變似我法。

述記：依照第二種解釋，將文章分為三部分。已經分別解釋了字義，後面再廣泛地分別說明。這其中有三部分。第一部分用『法』和『喻』分別解釋依他起性（paratantra-svabhava，事物相互依存的性質）和遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhava，虛妄分別所執著的性質），或者說『有』，或者說『無』。第二部分說明所執著的以及依他起性，都是假借所產生的，以此來遮止增益和損減的執著。第三部分依靠二諦（satya-dvaya，真諦和俗諦）來攝取那兩種虛假的性質，到後面自然會明白。這裡是第一部分。在第一部分中，先說『法』，后說『喻』。如果按照護法（Dharmapala）和難陀（Nanda）等人的解釋，由於無始以來第六識（末那識，manas）和第七識（阿賴耶識，ālayavijñāna）橫加計度我法，種種分別熏習的力量，如果按照安慧（Sthiramati）的解釋，與第七識相應的各種心和心所都叫做分別，因為能夠熏習。也就是由分別熏習產生種子。『熏』是擊發的意思，『習』是多次的意思。由於多次熏發有這種種子，所以後來的各種識生起時，變現出好像是我和法的樣子。護法解釋說，識的自證分所變現的相分和見分是依他起性的兩種分，不是我和法，因為沒有主宰，沒有作用，性質離於言說。聖教中稱為『我法』，是勉強稱呼它們。就像世俗所說的『火口不被燒』，所說的『火』字，明顯不是指真正的火。世間的凡夫，依靠識所變現的相分和見分，在依他起性上，執著為我和法。這種所變現的好像是他們的虛妄情識，所以叫做『似我法』。他們虛妄執著的我和法實際上並不存在，不能說牛毛像龜毛，所以不說像他們，只說像情識。難陀等人說

【English Translation】 English version: Examples are not unique. Sometimes, there is no meaning initially, but later it is said to have meaning, and the initial one is considered superior. Sometimes, both initially and later, it is said to have meaning, and the later one is often considered superior. Sometimes, both initially and later, they are said to have meaning, the principles are equal, and the teachings are complete, so one can choose according to their preference. This kind of large textual example is not unique to this treatise; other newly translated treatises can be understood in the same way. It means that the former only explains, while the latter explains the principles and provides evidence. This is just a saying attributed to one teacher. Or the former principles are broad, while the latter principles and teachings are concise, and the initial one without meaning is considered superior. Or the former principles are concise, while the latter principles and teachings are broad, and both are said to have meaning, and the latter is considered superior. Or both initially and later have meaning, and the principles and teachings are the same, making it difficult to determine which to choose, and there is no biased superiority. It is the same here now, with no biased superiority.

Treatise: 'The differentiation of self and dharma leads to transformations resembling self and dharma.'

Commentary: According to the second interpretation, the text is divided into three parts. The meanings of the words have already been explained separately, and later they will be explained extensively. There are three parts to this. The first part uses 'dharma' (law, principle) and 'simile' to separately explain the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava) and the completely imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava), or 'existence' or 'non-existence.' The second part explains that what is clung to and the dependent nature are both produced by borrowing, in order to prevent clinging to increase or decrease. The third part relies on the two truths (satya-dvaya, conventional and ultimate truth) to encompass those two false natures, which will become clear later. This is the first part. In the first part, 'dharma' is discussed first, followed by 'simile.' If according to the interpretation of Dharmapala and Nanda, due to the power of the beginningless sixth consciousness (manas) and seventh consciousness (ālayavijñāna) arbitrarily calculating self and dharma, and the force of various differentiations and熏習(xunxi, influence), if according to the interpretation of Sthiramati, all the minds and mental factors corresponding to the seventh consciousness are called differentiations, because they can 熏習(xunxi, influence). That is, the seeds are produced by differentiation and 熏習(xunxi, influence). '熏(xun)' means to strike and activate, and '習(xi)' means repeatedly. Because there are such seeds due to repeated 熏發(xunfa, influence and activation), the later consciousnesses arise and manifest as if they are self and dharma. Dharmapala explains that the appearance-aspect and the seeing-aspect transformed by the self-cognition aspect of consciousness are two aspects of the dependent nature, not self and dharma, because they have no master, no function, and their nature is beyond words. The term 'self and dharma' in the sacred teachings is a forced designation for them. Just like the worldly saying 'the mouth of fire is not burned,' the word 'fire' clearly does not refer to real fire. Worldly ordinary people, relying on the appearance-aspect and the seeing-aspect transformed by consciousness, cling to them as self and dharma on the dependent nature. This transformation resembles their false emotions, so it is called 'resembling self and dharma.' The self and dharma that they falsely cling to do not actually exist, and one cannot say that cow hair resembles tortoise hair, so it is not said to resemble them, but only to resemble emotions. Nanda and others say

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。于識所變依他相分。諸聖者等愍諸凡類不知自識。方便假說我法二言。便於識變強名我法。令彼斷除我法實執。方便解了離言法性。凡夫依此依他相分執為我法故說識變似我法言　安惠解云。變似我法總有二解。一若世間聖教皆是計所執。世間依八識所變總無之上。第六．七識起執於我。除第七識余之七識起執於法。不許末那有法執故。如是總說。執為我法種種別相熏習力故。八識生時變似我法。六．七似我。聖教愍諸有情。說凡愚所計為假我法。亦依總無假說為別我法。由聞此熏習。八識生時變似我法　又解諸識生時變似我法者。即自證分上。有似我法之相。體變為相但依他性。依此堅執為我法者方是二分。其似我法不名二分。以下約喻依他性有故。識所變似我似法是識自體。雖有二解后解難知。前解為勝　然護法等云。第六．七識妄熏習故。八識生時變似我法。安慧釋云。由七識熏習分別力故。八識生時變似我法。八識之中皆有執故。

論。此我法相至似外境現。

述曰。顯法在內似外境現。此說所變似我法相雖在內識。而由六．七。或總八識。虛妄分別之力。實非在外似外境現準前諸解。即依他起緣所生法。名似我法二種相也。

論。諸有情類至實我實法。

述曰。諸有情類由無明

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：在由識所變的依他起相分上，諸位聖者爲了憐憫那些不瞭解自身心識的凡夫俗子，方便地假說『我』（ātman，靈魂）和『法』（dharma，事物）這兩個概念，就在識的變現上勉強安立『我』和『法』的名稱，使他們斷除對於『我』和『法』的真實執著，從而方便地理解遠離言說的法性真理。凡夫俗子依據這依他起相分，執著為『我』和『法』，所以說識的變現類似於『我』和『法』的顯現。 安慧的解釋是：『變似我法』總共有兩種解釋。第一種，如果世間的聖教都是由遍計所執性所產生的，那麼世間所依據的八識變現，總是在『無』的基礎上。第六識和第七識生起對『我』的執著，除了第七識之外，其餘七個識生起對『法』的執著（因為不承認末那識有法執）。像這樣總的來說，執著為『我』和『法』的種種不同相狀的熏習力量，導致第八識生起時變現出類似於『我』和『法』的形象。第六識和第七識類似於『我』。聖教憐憫一切有情眾生，說凡夫愚昧所執著的都是虛假的『我』和『法』，也依據總體的『無』，假說為個別的『我』和『法』。由於聽聞這些熏習，第八識生起時變現出類似於『我』和『法』的形象。 另一種解釋是，各種識生起時變現出類似於『我』和『法』的形象，這指的是在自證分上，有類似於『我』和『法』的相狀。本體的變現成為相狀，僅僅是依他起性。依據這個而堅固執著為『我』和『法』的，才是二分（能取、所取）。那些類似於『我』和『法』的，不能稱為二分。以下用比喻來說明依他起性的存在。識所變現的類似於『我』和類似於『法』的，是識的自體。雖然有兩種解釋，但后一種解釋難以理解，前一種解釋更好。 然而，護法等人認為，由於第六識和第七識的虛妄熏習，第八識生起時變現出類似於『我』和『法』的形象。安慧解釋說，由於第七識的熏習分別力量，第八識生起時變現出類似於『我』和『法』的形象。第八識中都有執著。 論：這種『我』和『法』的相狀，類似於外境的顯現。 述記：說明法存在於內在，卻類似於外境的顯現。這裡說所變現的類似於『我』和『法』的相狀雖然存在於內在的識中，但是由於第六識、第七識，或者總體的八識的虛妄分別力量，實際上並不在外，卻類似於外境的顯現，參照前面的各種解釋，就是依他起緣所生的法，名為類似於『我』和『法』的兩種相狀。 論：各種有情眾生由於無明…… 述記：各種有情眾生由於無明……

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva) aspect transformed by consciousness (vijñāna), the noble ones, out of compassion for ordinary beings who do not understand their own consciousness, expediently postulate the terms 'self' (ātman) and 'dharma' (things). They provisionally establish the names 'self' and 'dharma' upon the transformations of consciousness, enabling them to sever their real attachment to 'self' and 'dharma', and thus expediently understand the truth of the nature of reality (dharmatā) that is beyond words. Ordinary beings, relying on this dependent nature aspect, cling to it as 'self' and 'dharma', hence it is said that the transformations of consciousness resemble the appearance of 'self' and 'dharma'. Ānanda's explanation is: 'Transformation resembling self and dharma' has two general interpretations. First, if the teachings of the world are all produced by the completely imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva), then the transformations of the eight consciousnesses upon which the world relies are all based on 'non-existence'. The sixth and seventh consciousnesses give rise to attachment to 'self', and the other seven consciousnesses, except for the seventh, give rise to attachment to 'dharma' (because the manas-consciousness is not considered to have attachment to dharma). Generally speaking, the power of the habitual tendencies of clinging to various different aspects of 'self' and 'dharma' causes the eighth consciousness to manifest images resembling 'self' and 'dharma' when it arises. The sixth and seventh consciousnesses resemble 'self'. The holy teachings, out of compassion for all sentient beings, say that what ordinary, ignorant people cling to are false 'self' and 'dharma', and also provisionally postulate individual 'self' and 'dharma' based on the overall 'non-existence'. Due to hearing these habitual tendencies, the eighth consciousness manifests images resembling 'self' and 'dharma' when it arises. Another explanation is that when the various consciousnesses arise, they manifest images resembling 'self' and 'dharma', which refers to the fact that on the self-cognition aspect (svasaṃvedana-bhāga), there are appearances resembling 'self' and 'dharma'. The transformation of the substance into appearance is merely of dependent nature. Those who firmly cling to this as 'self' and 'dharma' are the two aspects (grāhaka and grāhya, subject and object). Those resembling 'self' and 'dharma' cannot be called the two aspects. The following uses a metaphor to illustrate the existence of dependent nature. The 'self'-like and 'dharma'-like appearances transformed by consciousness are the self-nature of consciousness. Although there are two explanations, the latter is difficult to understand, and the former is better. However, Dharmapāla and others believe that due to the false habitual tendencies of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, the eighth consciousness manifests images resembling 'self' and 'dharma' when it arises. Ānanda explains that due to the power of the habitual tendencies of discrimination of the seventh consciousness, the eighth consciousness manifests images resembling 'self' and 'dharma' when it arises. There is attachment in all of the eight consciousnesses. Treatise: This appearance of 'self' and 'dharma' resembles the appearance of external objects. Commentary: Explains that the dharma exists internally, but resembles the appearance of external objects. This says that although the transformed appearance resembling 'self' and 'dharma' exists in the internal consciousness, due to the power of the false discrimination of the sixth, seventh, or all eight consciousnesses, it is not actually external, but resembles the appearance of external objects. Referring to the previous explanations, it is the dharma produced by dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), called the two aspects resembling 'self' and 'dharma'. Treatise: All sentient beings, due to ignorance... Commentary: All sentient beings, due to ignorance...

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力。無始時來緣此所變似我似法。執為實我實法自體。即依依他起遍計所執。不說依于圓成起計所執。親不得故。如前已說。若安惠初解。以無依無。別依于總。

論。如患夢者至外境相現。

述曰。此意喻上我法分別以下論文。此對經部等。若對薩婆多此喻不成。夢等所見皆真實故。此上總顯道理二性。自下重顯二性有無　如患熱病損眼根力。所見青色皆以為黃。故覺愛論云。唯識無境界。以無塵妄見。如人目有翳。見毛．月等事。及如夢者顛倒緣力。所夢諸事皆謂真實。如大迦多衍那意願勢力。令婆剌拏王夢見異事。不應見境。彼境便生即患．夢緣。心似種種外境相現。體實自心。

論。緣此執為實有外境。

述曰。由患．夢力不了真虛。遂執所見以為實有。此喻喻上諸有情類以下論文。護法解云。如依他起。愚夫不了此是自心。緣之執為實有外境。外境即是遍計所執。前所變者依他起性。可說非無。若執為實體性非有。即解二性一有一無。此對經部。三釋如前。

論。愚夫所計至都無所有。

述曰。依初二科。自下第二總解三句。下有三文。一顯我法皆假所由。二遮增減執。三二諦攝。準義可知依第二三科。自下第二解其二性皆假所由遮增減執。此即先敘法體非有。以下

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：力量。從無始以來，由於這種力量，變現出類似『我』（ātman）和『法』（dharma）的現象。執著這些現象為真實的『我』和真實的『法』的自體。這就是依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva）上的遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhāva）。不說依于圓成實性（parinispanna-svabhāva）而生起遍計所執性，因為無法直接認知圓成實性。正如前面已經說過的。如果安慧（Sthiramati）最初的理解是，以『無』為依據，區別于總體。

論：就像患病做夢的人，外境的景象顯現出來。

述記：這個意思是用比喻來說明上面關於『我』和『法』的分別的論文。這是針對經量部（Sautrāntika）等宗派的觀點。如果針對薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda），這個比喻就不成立，因為夢中所見都是真實的。上面總的顯示了道理的二性。從下面開始，重新顯示二性的有無。就像患熱病損害了眼根的力量，所見到的青色都以為是黃色。所以覺愛論說：『唯識沒有境界，因為沒有塵境的虛妄見。』就像人眼睛有翳障，見到毛髮、月亮等事物。以及像做夢的人，由於顛倒的因緣力量，所夢到的各種事物都認為是真實的。就像大迦多衍那（Mahākātyāyana）的意願勢力，讓婆剌拏王（Vāraṇāsī）夢見奇異的事情，不應該見到的境界，那個境界便產生了，即患病、做夢的因緣，心識顯現出種種外境的景象，體性實際上是自己的心識。

論：緣于這些景象，執著為真實存在的外境。

述記：由於患病、做夢的力量，不能明瞭什麼是真什麼是假，於是執著所見到的事物為真實存在。這個比喻是比喻上面所有有情眾生。護法（Dharmapāla）解釋說：『就像依他起性，愚夫不能明瞭這是自己的心識，緣於它而執著為真實存在的外境。』外境就是遍計所執性。前面所變現的，是依他起性，可以說不是沒有。如果執著為實體性，那就不是真實存在。這就是解釋二性，一個有，一個無。這是針對經量部的觀點。三種解釋如前所述。

論：愚夫所計執，乃至完全不存在。

述記：依據最初的兩個部分。從下面開始，第二部分總的解釋三句話。下面有三段文字：一是顯示『我』和『法』都是虛假的所由；二是遮止增益和損減的執著；三是二諦所攝。根據意義可以知道，依據第二和第三部分。從下面開始，第二部分解釋二性都是虛假的所由，遮止增益和損減的執著。這首先敘述法體不是真實存在的。

【English Translation】 English version: Power. From beginningless time, due to this power, phenomena resembling 'self' (ātman) and 'dharma' arise. Grasping these phenomena as the real self and the real self-nature of dharmas. This is the parikalpita-svabhāva (imputational nature) on the paratantra-svabhāva (dependent nature). It is not said that the parikalpita-svabhāva arises based on the parinispanna-svabhāva (perfected nature), because the parinispanna-svabhāva cannot be directly cognized. As has been said before. If Sthiramati's initial understanding was to rely on 'non-existence', distinguishing it from the whole.

Treatise: Like a sick person dreaming, the appearance of external objects manifests.

Commentary: This meaning uses a metaphor to explain the above treatise on the distinction between 'self' and 'dharma'. This is directed at the Sautrāntika school and others. If directed at the Sarvāstivāda school, this metaphor would not hold, because what is seen in dreams is all real. The above generally shows the two natures of the principle. From below, it re-emphasizes the existence or non-existence of the two natures. Like having a fever that damages the power of the eye faculty, all the blue colors seen are mistaken for yellow. Therefore, the Jue Ai Lun (Awakening of Love Treatise) says: 'Consciousness-only has no realm, because there is no false view of dust objects.' Just as a person's eyes have cataracts, seeing hair, the moon, and other things. And like a dreamer, due to the power of inverted conditions, all the things dreamed of are considered real. Just like Mahākātyāyana's power of intention, causing King Vāraṇāsī to dream of strange things, realms that should not be seen, that realm then arises, that is, the conditions of illness and dreams, the mind appears to have various external object appearances, but the substance is actually one's own mind.

Treatise: Based on these appearances, grasping them as real external objects.

Commentary: Due to the power of illness and dreams, one cannot understand what is true and what is false, and thus grasps what is seen as real. This metaphor is a metaphor for all sentient beings above. Dharmapāla explains: 'Like the paratantra-svabhāva, foolish people cannot understand that this is their own mind, and based on it, they grasp it as a real external object.' The external object is the parikalpita-svabhāva. What was transformed earlier is the paratantra-svabhāva, which can be said not to be non-existent. If it is grasped as a substantial nature, then it is not real. This is explaining the two natures, one exists, one does not exist. This is directed at the Sautrāntika school. The three explanations are as mentioned before.

Treatise: What foolish people grasp, even to the point of complete non-existence.

Commentary: Based on the first two sections. From below, the second part generally explains the three sentences. There are three paragraphs below: one is to show that both 'self' and 'dharma' are falsely established; two is to prevent the clinging to augmentation and diminution; three is encompassed by the two truths. According to the meaning, it can be known that it is based on the second and third parts. From below, the second part explains that the two natures are falsely established, preventing the clinging to augmentation and diminution. This first narrates that the nature of dharmas is not real.

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之文唯是難陀．護法二說。無安惠解。以無內識所變我法故。護法．難陀二義準解。謂諸愚夫虛妄所執。實我實法都無所有。此但情有理皆無故若爾如何前說為假。

論。但隨妄情至說之為假。

述曰。此顯所執但隨妄情而施設彼為我為法。故說所執。亦名為假。非彼體有可說我法二種假言。無體隨情。無依于有。二假皆得。準前以釋。此顯世間假我假法。非必有體方說為假。但隨妄情說為假故。

論。內識所變至實我法性。

述曰。此顯依他我法名假。先顯其體實非我法。內識所變似我似法。雖體依他緣起是有。而非是彼妄情所執實我法性。此緣起法。無主宰故。無作用故。

若爾如何諸聖教等說為我法。

論。然似彼現故說為假。

述曰。此正解假。即顯聖教假我假法。有體施設．義依于體。二假皆得。由似我法能執妄情有主宰用現。說此依他為假我法。

論。外境隨情至非有如識。

述曰。自下先敘心境有無。方言遮執。遍計所執心外實境。由隨妄情施設為假。體實都無。非與依他內識相似。

論。內識必依至非無如境。

述曰。由內識體是依他故。必依種子因緣所生。非體是無如遍計境。彼實我法猶如龜毛。識依他有故非彼類。即顯內

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於『我』和『法』的討論，只有難陀（Nanda）和護法（Dharmapala）的兩種說法。無安惠（Asvabhāva）的解釋是，因為沒有內在的識所變現的『我』和『法』。護法和難陀的兩種觀點可以參照理解。也就是說，那些愚昧的人虛妄地執著，認為有真實的『我』和真實的『法』，但實際上它們根本不存在。這只是情識上的存在，從理上來說都是沒有的。如果這樣，那麼之前所說的『假』又該如何解釋呢？

論：只是隨著虛妄的情識才說它是『假』。

述曰：這表明所執著的『我』和『法』，只是隨著虛妄的情識而施設的。所以說所執著的，也叫做『假』。不是說它本身就具有可以稱為『我』和『法』的兩種『假』的體性。沒有實體，只是隨著情識，沒有依靠于『有』，兩種『假』都可以成立。參照前面的解釋。這表明世俗的『假我』和『假法』，不一定有實體才能說是『假』，只是隨著虛妄的情識才說是『假』。

論：內在的識所變現的，並非真實的『我』和『法』的體性。

述曰：這表明依他起性的『我』和『法』，名為『假』。首先說明它的體性並非真實的『我』和『法』。內在的識所變現的，類似『我』和『法』。雖然體性是依他起性，是緣起而有的，但並非是那些虛妄情識所執著的真實的『我』和『法』的體性。這種緣起法，沒有主宰，沒有作用。

如果這樣，那麼諸如聖教等所說的『我』和『法』又該如何解釋呢？

論：然而因為它們看起來像『我』和『法』，所以才說是『假』。

述曰：這是正確地解釋『假』。也就是表明聖教中的『假我』和『假法』，有實體可以施設，意義依靠于實體，兩種『假』都可以成立。由於它類似『我』和『法』，能夠讓執著虛妄情識的人產生有主宰作用的錯覺，所以說這種依他起性的『我』和『法』是『假』的。

論：外境隨著情識而存在，並非像識一樣真實存在。

述曰：下面首先敘述心和境的有無，然後說明遮止執著。遍計所執性的心外實境，由於隨著虛妄的情識而施設為『假』，體性實際上完全沒有，不像依他起性的內在的識一樣真實存在。

論：內在的識必定依靠種子因緣而生，並非像外境一樣不存在。

述曰：由於內在的識的體性是依他起性，必定依靠種子因緣所生，體性並非像遍計所執性的外境一樣不存在。那些真實的『我』和『法』就像龜毛一樣虛無。識是依他起性而有的，所以不是同一類。

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the discussion of 'self' (ātman) and 'dharma', there are only two views: those of Nanda and Dharmapala. Asvabhāva's explanation is that because there is no 'self' or 'dharma' transformed by inner consciousness. The two views of Dharmapala and Nanda can be understood by analogy. That is to say, those ignorant people falsely cling to the belief that there is a real 'self' and a real 'dharma', but in reality, they do not exist at all. This is only an existence in terms of emotions and consciousness; logically speaking, they are all non-existent. If so, how should the previously mentioned 'false' (kalpita) be explained?

Treatise: It is only according to deluded emotions that it is said to be 'false'.

Commentary: This shows that the 'self' and 'dharma' that are clung to are merely established according to deluded emotions. Therefore, what is clung to is also called 'false'. It is not that it inherently possesses the nature of two kinds of 'falsehood' that can be called 'self' and 'dharma'. Without substance, it is merely according to emotions, without relying on 'existence'; both kinds of 'falsehood' can be established. Refer to the previous explanation. This shows that worldly 'false self' and 'false dharma' do not necessarily need to have substance to be called 'false'; they are merely called 'false' according to deluded emotions.

Treatise: What is transformed by inner consciousness is not the true nature of 'self' and 'dharma'.

Commentary: This shows that the dependently originated (paratantra) 'self' and 'dharma' are called 'false'. First, it is explained that its nature is not the true 'self' and 'dharma'. What is transformed by inner consciousness is similar to 'self' and 'dharma'. Although the nature is dependently originated, arising from conditions, it is not the true nature of 'self' and 'dharma' clung to by those deluded emotions. This dependently originated dharma has no master and no function.

If so, how should the 'self' and 'dharma' mentioned in the sacred teachings and so on be explained?

Treatise: However, because they appear like 'self' and 'dharma', they are said to be 'false'.

Commentary: This is the correct explanation of 'false'. That is, it shows that the 'false self' and 'false dharma' in the sacred teachings have substance that can be established, and the meaning relies on the substance; both kinds of 'falsehood' can be established. Because it is similar to 'self' and 'dharma', it can cause those who cling to deluded emotions to have the illusion of having a master function, so this dependently originated 'self' and 'dharma' is said to be 'false'.

Treatise: External objects exist according to emotions, but they are not as real as consciousness.

Commentary: Below, first, the existence and non-existence of mind and objects are described, and then it is explained to prevent clinging. The external objects of the completely conceptualized (parikalpita) nature are established as 'false' due to deluded emotions. The nature is actually completely non-existent, unlike the dependently originated inner consciousness, which is real.

Treatise: Inner consciousness must rely on the seeds and conditions to arise, and it is not non-existent like external objects.

Commentary: Because the nature of inner consciousness is dependently originated, it must rely on the seeds and conditions to arise. The nature is not non-existent like the external objects of the completely conceptualized nature. Those real 'self' and 'dharma' are as non-existent as turtle hair. Consciousness is dependently originated, so it is not of the same kind.

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識是依他有。心外實境體性都無。此中色等相．見二分內識所變。不離識故總名內識。由此真如是識性故。亦非非有。

論。由此便遮增減二執。

述曰。由此內識體性非無。心外我法體性非有。便遮外計離心之境實有增執。及遮邪見惡取空者撥識亦無損減空執。即離空有說唯識教。有心外法輪迴生死。覺知一心生死永棄。可謂無上處中道理。此即第二皆假所由遮增減執。

問內境是有外境都無。皆依內識而說為假。彼及內識。為世俗有。亦勝義耶。

論。境依內識至亦勝義有。

述曰。此即第三依諦攝假。謂心外境其體都無。依內妄情假名我法。唯世俗者執有。勝義者說無。內因緣識相．見分等。假境所依依他性事。其世俗者說為非無。亦勝義者之所說有。此中色等內識相分。因緣所生從本名識。此約內境如識有義。即下第十三分俱實　或緣過未。龜毛等法。雖識內變影像虛疏。如瓶．衣等唯世俗有。非如內識體少實故亦勝義有。下第十云。然相分等依識變現。非如識性依他中實。一切相分並非實故。雖有二解前解為勝。后解不依四勝義說。但殊勝義名為勝義。此即說有三分之義。若第二師唯有二分。釋此少別。大意亦同。此第二釋至下當知。此前初解依人二諦。已下問答依法二諦

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『識』是依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava，事物依賴於其他事物而存在的性質）。心外沒有實在的境，其體性完全不存在。這裡所說的色等現象，以及能見和所見二分，都是內在意識所變現的。因為它們不離意識，所以總稱為『內識』。由此可知，真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）是意識的本性，因此也不是不存在的。

論：由此便能遮止增益和損減兩種執著。

述記：由此可知，內識的體性並非不存在，而心外的我法體性並非真實存在。這樣就能遮止外道認為離開心識之外，存在實在的境的增益執著；也能遮止邪見者錯誤地執著于空性，認為連意識也不存在的損減執著。這就是離開空和有，宣說唯識的教義。認為心外有法，就會輪迴生死；覺悟到一切唯心，就能永遠擺脫生死。這可以說是無上的中道真理。這就是第二重『一切皆假』所要達到的目的，即遮止增益和損減兩種執著。

問：內在的境是存在的，而外在的境完全不存在，這一切都依賴於內在意識而說是假立的。那麼，這些境以及內在意識，是世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理）所承認的存在，還是勝義諦（Paramartha-satya，絕對真理）所承認的存在呢？

論：境依賴於內識……乃至也是勝義諦所承認的存在。

述記：這即是第三重『依諦攝假』。意思是說，心外的境，其體性完全不存在，是依賴於內在的虛妄情識而假立的我法。只有執著於世俗諦的人才會認為它們存在，而勝義諦則認為它們不存在。內在的因緣識，包括相分（Nimitta-bhaga，客體部分）和見分（Darsana-bhaga，主體部分）等，是假立的境所依賴的依他起性事物。在世俗諦中，人們認為它們並非不存在；在勝義諦中，人們也認為它們是存在的。這裡所說的色等內在意識的相分，是因緣所生，從根本上來說就是識。這是從內在的境如同意識一樣存在的意義上來說的。即下文第十三分所說的『俱實』。或者緣於過去、未來，以及龜毛等法，雖然是意識內變現的影像，虛幻而稀疏，如同瓶子、衣服等，僅僅是世俗諦所承認的存在，不像內在意識那樣具有少許真實體性，因此也是勝義諦所承認的存在。下文第十中說：『然而相分等依賴於意識而變現，不像意識的本性那樣在依他起性中是真實的。』因為一切相分都不是真實的。雖然有兩種解釋，但前一種解釋更為殊勝。后一種解釋不依賴於四種勝義諦的說法，只是將殊勝的意義稱為勝義。這即是說有三分的意義。如果第二位論師認為只有二分，那麼對這裡的解釋就略有不同，但大意是相同的。這第二種解釋在下文將會提到。以上是最初的解釋，是依據人二諦（指凡夫和聖人所理解的兩種真理）。以下的問答是依據法二諦（指世俗諦和勝義諦兩種真理）。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Vijnana' (consciousness) is dependent on Paratantra-svabhava (the nature of things existing dependently on other things). There is no real object outside the mind, and its essence does not exist at all. The phenomena such as form mentioned here, as well as the two divisions of seeing and being seen, are all transformations of the inner consciousness. Because they are inseparable from consciousness, they are collectively called 'inner consciousness'. From this, it can be known that Tathata (the true nature of things) is the nature of consciousness, so it is also not non-existent.

Treatise: From this, both the attachment to increase and decrease can be prevented.

Commentary: From this, it can be known that the essence of inner consciousness is not non-existent, while the essence of self and dharma outside the mind is not truly existent. In this way, it can prevent the heretical view that there is a real object apart from consciousness, which is an attachment to increase; it can also prevent the perverse view of those who wrongly cling to emptiness, thinking that even consciousness does not exist, which is an attachment to decrease. This is the doctrine of Vijnanavada (consciousness-only) that departs from both emptiness and existence. Believing that there are dharmas outside the mind will lead to samsara (cycle of rebirth); realizing that everything is only mind can lead to the eternal abandonment of samsara. This can be said to be the supreme Middle Way truth. This is the purpose of the second layer of 'everything is provisional', which is to prevent the attachment to increase and decrease.

Question: The inner object exists, while the outer object does not exist at all. All of this is said to be provisionally established based on the inner consciousness. Then, are these objects and the inner consciousness recognized as existing by Samvriti-satya (conventional truth), or by Paramartha-satya (ultimate truth)?

Treatise: Objects depend on inner consciousness... and are also recognized as existing by Paramartha-satya.

Commentary: This is the third layer of 'including the provisional based on the truth'. It means that the object outside the mind does not exist at all in its essence, and it is the self and dharma that are provisionally established based on the inner deluded consciousness. Only those who cling to Samvriti-satya will think that they exist, while Paramartha-satya thinks that they do not exist. The inner causal consciousness, including the Nimitta-bhaga (objective aspect) and Darsana-bhaga (subjective aspect), etc., are Paratantra-svabhava things on which the provisional object depends. In Samvriti-satya, people think that they are not non-existent; in Paramartha-satya, people also think that they exist. The phenomena such as form mentioned here, which are the objective aspects of inner consciousness, are born from causes and conditions, and are fundamentally consciousness. This is from the meaning that the inner object exists like consciousness. That is, the 'both real' mentioned in the thirteenth section below. Or, things that are related to the past, future, and things like turtle hair, although they are images transformed by the inner consciousness, illusory and sparse, like bottles, clothes, etc., are only recognized as existing by Samvriti-satya, and do not have a little real essence like inner consciousness, so they are also recognized as existing by Paramartha-satya. The tenth section below says: 'However, the objective aspects, etc., are transformed and manifested depending on consciousness, and are not real in Paratantra-svabhava like the nature of consciousness.' Because all objective aspects are not real. Although there are two explanations, the former explanation is more superior. The latter explanation does not depend on the four Paramartha-satya statements, but only calls the superior meaning Paramartha. This is to say that there is the meaning of three aspects. If the second teacher thinks that there are only two aspects, then the explanation here is slightly different, but the general meaning is the same. This second explanation will be mentioned below. The above is the initial explanation, which is based on the two truths of people (referring to the two truths understood by ordinary people and sages). The following questions and answers are based on the two truths of dharma (referring to the two truths of Samvriti-satya and Paramartha-satya).

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問此中二諦體別如何。所攝假境如何差別　答如別章說。言二諦者道理難思。今於此中略示綱要。世俗諦者。世謂覆障可毀壞義。俗謂顯現隨世流義。諦者理也。或世即俗是持業釋。勝義三種如第八卷。然則蘊．處．界名勝義者。勝之義故。如涅槃等。唯依士釋　真俗二諦各有四重。俗諦四者。一假名無實諦。謂瓶．盆等。但有假名而無實體。從能詮說故名為諦。或體實無亦名為諦。二隨事差別諦。謂蘊．界等。隨彼彼事立蘊等法。三證得安立諦。謂苦．集等。由證得理而安立故。四假名非安立諦。謂二空理。依假空門說為真性。由彼真性內證智境。不可言說名二空如。但假設故。此前三種法可擬宜。其第四諦假名施設　勝義四者。一體用顯現諦。謂蘊界等有實體性。過初世俗故名勝義。隨事差別說名蘊等故名顯現。二因果差別諦。謂苦．集等。知．斷．證．修因果差別。過俗道理故名勝義。三依門顯實諦。謂二空理。過俗證得故名勝義。依空能證以顯于實故名依門。四廢詮談旨諦。謂一實如。體妙離言已名勝義。過俗勝義複名勝義　俗諦中初都無實體假名安立。無可勝過故不名真。但名為俗。第四勝義不可施設。不可名俗但名為真。由斯二諦四句料簡。有俗非真。謂最初俗。有真非俗。謂最後真。有亦真亦俗。謂

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：這其中的二諦（satya-dvaya，佛教中的真諦和俗諦）的本體區別是什麼？所包含的假境又有什麼差別？ 答：如同在其他章節所說。說到二諦，其道理難以思議。現在在這裡簡略地揭示其綱要。世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya）是指，『世』意味著覆蓋、遮蔽、可以毀壞；『俗』意味著顯現、隨順世間流轉；『諦』是真理的意思。或者說，『世』即是『俗』，這是持業釋（ कर्मधारय samāsa，一種梵文複合詞的構成方式）。勝義諦（paramārtha-satya）的三種含義如同第八卷所說。然而，蘊（skandha，構成要素）、處（āyatana，感覺器官和對像）、界（dhātu，元素）被稱為勝義，是因為它們具有『勝』的意義，如同涅槃（nirvāṇa，解脫）等。這僅僅是依士釋（梵文複合詞的構成方式）。 真諦和俗諦各有四重含義。俗諦的四重含義是：一、假名無實諦，指的是瓶、盆等，只有假的名字而沒有實體。從能詮釋的角度來說，所以稱為諦。或者說，本體實際上不存在，也稱為諦。二、隨事差別諦，指的是蘊、界等，隨著不同的事物而建立蘊等法。三、證得安立諦，指的是苦（duḥkha，痛苦）、集（samudaya，痛苦的根源）等，由於通過證悟的道理而安立。四、假名非安立諦，指的是二空（dvisūnyatā，人空和法空）之理，依據假有的空性之門來說明真性，由於那真性是內在證悟智慧的境界，不可言說，所以稱為二空如。但只是假設而已。前面三種法可以比擬適宜，而第四種諦只是假名施設。 勝義諦的四重含義是：一、體用顯現諦，指的是蘊、界等具有實體性，超過了最初的世俗諦，所以稱為勝義。隨著事物的差別而說為蘊等，所以稱為顯現。二、因果差別諦，指的是苦、集等，知、斷、證、修的因果差別，超過了世俗的道理，所以稱為勝義。三、依門顯實諦，指的是二空之理，超過了世俗的證得，所以稱為勝義。依靠空性之門來顯現真實，所以稱為依門。四、廢詮談旨諦，指的是一實如（ekatathatā，唯一的真實），本體微妙，遠離言語，已經稱為勝義，超過了世俗的勝義，又稱為勝義。 俗諦中最初的都無實體，只是假名安立，無可勝過，所以不稱為真，只稱為俗。第四種勝義不可施設，不可稱為俗，只稱為真。由此，二諦可以用四句來料簡：有俗非真，指的是最初的俗諦；有真非俗，指的是最後的真諦；有既真又俗，指的是……

【English Translation】 English version Question: What are the differences in the essence of the two truths (satya-dvaya, the conventional and ultimate truths in Buddhism)? What are the differences in the illusory realms they encompass? Answer: As explained in other chapters. The two truths are difficult to comprehend. Here, I will briefly outline the key points. Conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) means that 'conventional' implies covering, obscuring, and being subject to destruction; 'conventional' also means appearing and flowing with the world. 'Truth' means principle. Alternatively, 'conventional' is 'worldly,' which is a कर्मधारय (karmadhāraya) compound (a type of Sanskrit compound). The three meanings of ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) are as described in the eighth chapter. However, the aggregates (skandha, components), sense bases (āyatana, sense organs and objects), and elements (dhātu, elements) are called ultimate because they have the meaning of 'ultimate,' like nirvāṇa (liberation). This is solely based on a तत्पुरुष (tatpuruṣa) compound (a type of Sanskrit compound). Both conventional and ultimate truths have four levels of meaning. The four levels of conventional truth are: First, the truth of nominal existence without substance, referring to things like bottles and pots, which have only nominal names but no substance. From the perspective of what can be expressed, it is called truth. Or, even if the substance does not actually exist, it is still called truth. Second, the truth of differentiation according to phenomena, referring to aggregates, sense bases, etc., which establish the dharmas of aggregates, etc., according to different phenomena. Third, the truth of establishment through realization, referring to suffering (duḥkha, suffering), the origin (samudaya, the cause of suffering), etc., which are established through the principle of realization. Fourth, the truth of nominal non-establishment, referring to the principle of the two emptinesses (dvisūnyatā, emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena), which explains true nature based on the gate of illusory emptiness. Because that true nature is the realm of inner realized wisdom and cannot be expressed, it is called the 'suchness of two emptinesses.' It is merely a hypothesis. The first three types of dharmas can be compared appropriately, while the fourth truth is merely a nominal designation. The four levels of ultimate truth are: First, the truth of the manifestation of essence and function, referring to aggregates, sense bases, etc., which have substantial nature. It surpasses the initial conventional truth, so it is called ultimate. It is called manifestation because it is spoken of as aggregates, etc., according to the differentiation of phenomena. Second, the truth of the differentiation of cause and effect, referring to suffering, the origin, etc., and the causal differences of knowing, abandoning, realizing, and cultivating. It surpasses conventional reasoning, so it is called ultimate. Third, the truth of revealing reality through the gate, referring to the principle of the two emptinesses. It surpasses conventional realization, so it is called ultimate. It relies on the gate of emptiness to reveal reality, so it is called 'relying on the gate.' Fourth, the truth of abandoning expression and discussing the essence, referring to the one suchness (ekatathatā, the single reality), whose essence is subtle and beyond words. It is already called ultimate, and it surpasses the ultimate of the conventional, so it is again called ultimate. In the conventional truth, the initial ones have no substance, only nominal establishment. There is nothing to surpass, so it is not called true, only conventional. The fourth ultimate truth cannot be designated, cannot be called conventional, only true. Therefore, the two truths can be analyzed using four categories: There is conventional but not true, referring to the initial conventional truth; there is true but not conventional, referring to the final ultimate truth; there is both true and conventional, referring to...

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真前三。俗后三諦。其第四句翻上應知。前四世俗如瑜伽論六十四中。顯揚六說。名字雖別諸論亦有。其四真諦。若義若名非諸論有。唯此論釋。如第九卷　外境隨情唯世俗者。即是假名無實諦攝。故說唯言。決定義故。實我法名如瓶盆等。唯初俗攝。體非實諦。以無法故。識境所依亦勝義者。是俗隨事差別諦攝。復是體用顯現真諦。故論言亦。不定義故　真俗二諦今古所明。各為四重曾未聞有可謂理高百代義光千載者歟。真不自真待俗故真。即前三真亦說為俗。俗不自俗待真故俗。即后三俗亦名為真。至理沖玄彌驗於此。廣此二諦如別章說。

以上略明頌上三句。通護法．難陀二師所釋然本唯是二分家義但難陀釋。自下廣釋如是三句。于中有二。初廣破外執成此三句。后第二卷有作是難下。略釋外難重凈此三句初復有四。第一總問。第二略答。第三別問別答。第四至第二卷如是外道下。別徴總結　或分為三。初總問答。次別問答。后別徴結。至下當知。不繁預述。

論。云何應知至似外境生。

述曰。即初問也。多護法文。外道．小乘聞說唯識　外道等曰。有作有受我體寧無。有礙有緣寧無法體　小乘等曰。士夫用有。何為我無。依．緣積聚色等是有。得等成就行蘊非無。聖說無為。寧撥無法。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『真前三』指的是前三個真諦。『俗后三諦』指的是后三個世俗諦。第四句的翻譯應該參考上文來理解。前四個世俗諦，如同《瑜伽師地論》第六十四卷和《顯揚聖教論》六說中所述。雖然名字不同，但其他論著中也有提及。而四個真諦，無論是其意義還是名稱，都不是其他論著所擁有的，只有這部論著解釋了它們，如第九卷所說：『外境隨情唯世俗者』，這指的是假名安立，不屬於真實的諦理範疇，所以用『唯』字來強調，以示決定義。而『實我法名如瓶盆等』，僅僅屬於最初的世俗諦，其體性並非真實諦，因為它們沒有真實的自性。『識境所依亦勝義者』，指的是世俗諦中隨事差別的諦，同時也屬於體用顯現的真諦，所以論中用『亦』字，表示不確定性。 真諦和俗諦的闡釋，無論古今，各有四重含義，前所未聞，可謂是理論高度超越時代，義理光輝照耀千年的創見。真諦不是自身為真，而是依賴於俗諦才顯得真實，所以前三個真諦也可以說是俗諦。俗諦不是自身為俗，而是依賴於真諦才顯得虛妄，所以後三個俗諦也可以說是真諦。這種至高的道理深奧玄妙，在這裡得到了驗證。關於這二諦的詳細闡述，將在其他章節中說明。 以上簡要地說明了頌文的前三句，這是護法（Dharmapala）和難陀（Nanda）兩位論師共同的解釋。然而，根本上來說，這只是二分家的觀點。接下來，從難陀論師的解釋開始，詳細地解釋這三句頌文。其中分為兩個部分：首先，廣泛地破斥外道的執著，從而成立這三句頌文；其次，在第二卷中，從『有作是難』開始，簡要地解釋外道的詰難，重新澄清這三句頌文。第一部分又分為四個部分：第一，總的提問；第二，簡要的回答；第三，分別提問和分別回答；第四，到第二卷的『如是外道』開始，分別徵引並總結。或者可以分為三個部分：首先，總的提問和回答；其次，分別提問和回答；最後，分別徵引並總結。這些內容將在下文中詳細說明，這裡不再贅述。 論：『云何應知至似外境生。』 述曰：這是最初的提問。在護法的文章中，外道（Tirthika）和小乘（Hinayana）聽聞了唯識的教義后，外道等說：『有作者和受者，我的實體怎麼會不存在？有障礙和因緣，法的實體怎麼會不存在？』小乘等說：『士夫的作用是存在的，為什麼說我不存在？依賴於因緣積聚的色等是存在的，得等成就的行蘊不是沒有的。聖人所說的無為法，怎麼能否定它不存在呢？』

【English Translation】 English version: 'True first three' refers to the first three truths. 'Mundane last three truths' refers to the last three mundane truths. The translation of the fourth sentence should be understood by referring to the previous text. The first four mundane truths are as described in the sixty-fourth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and the six explanations in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma). Although the names are different, other treatises also mention them. However, the four true truths, whether in their meaning or name, are not found in other treatises; only this treatise explains them, as stated in the ninth volume: 'External objects following emotions are only mundane,' which refers to provisional designations and does not belong to the category of real truths, so the word 'only' is used to emphasize this, indicating a definitive meaning. 'Real self and dharma names such as bottles and pots,' only belong to the initial mundane truth, and their nature is not a real truth because they do not have a real self-nature. 'The basis of consciousness's objects is also ultimate,' refers to the truth of differentiation according to things in the mundane truth, and also belongs to the true truth of manifestation of substance and function, so the treatise uses the word 'also,' indicating uncertainty. The explanation of the two truths, true and mundane, whether ancient or modern, each has fourfold meanings, which is unprecedented and can be said to be a theoretical height surpassing the times and a brilliant insight illuminating thousands of years. The true truth is not true by itself, but appears true because of its dependence on the mundane truth, so the first three true truths can also be said to be mundane truths. The mundane truth is not mundane by itself, but appears illusory because of its dependence on the true truth, so the last three mundane truths can also be called true truths. This supreme principle is profound and mysterious, and it is verified here. A detailed explanation of these two truths will be given in other chapters. The above briefly explains the first three sentences of the verse, which is the common explanation of Dharmapala (護法) and Nanda (難陀). However, fundamentally, this is only the view of the two-division school. Next, starting from Nanda's explanation, the three sentences of the verse are explained in detail. This is divided into two parts: first, widely refuting the attachments of externalists, thereby establishing these three sentences; second, in the second volume, starting from 'There is a difficulty,' briefly explaining the externalists' challenges and re-clarifying these three sentences. The first part is further divided into four parts: first, a general question; second, a brief answer; third, separate questions and separate answers; fourth, starting from 'Thus externalists' in the second volume, separately citing and summarizing. Alternatively, it can be divided into three parts: first, a general question and answer; second, separate questions and answers; and third, separate citations and summaries. These contents will be explained in detail below, and will not be repeated here. Treatise: 'How should it be known to the arising of external objects?' Commentary: This is the initial question. In Dharmapala's text, externalists (Tirthika) and Hinayana (小乘) practitioners, upon hearing the doctrine of Consciousness-Only, the externalists and others say: 'There are actors and recipients, how can my substance not exist? There are obstacles and conditions, how can the substance of dharma not exist?' The Hinayana practitioners and others say: 'The function of a person exists, why say that I do not exist? The form, etc., accumulated depending on conditions exist, and the aggregates of action, etc., achieved are not non-existent. The unconditioned dharma spoken of by the sages, how can it be denied that it does not exist?'

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豈離識時便無外境。云何知識似外境生。

論。實我實法不可得故。

述曰。此即第二略答外徴。謂實我．法。現．比二量所不能成。名不可得。至下一一別破應知。法體實無然立五蘊。我體非實何法攝耶。法依作用故可立蘊。我無一常故不別立。又心變似法有多差別隨五蘊攝。心變似我無多差別眾同分攝。

自下第三別問別答。于中有二。初問答我。后問答法。我中有二。初問。次答。

論。如何實我不可得耶。

述曰。此即初問。犢子部師。及正量部。本經量部等。及外道等。咸作問言。大乘所說我法無者。且置於法。如何實我不可得耶。假我共成。非此所問　自下答中文勢有五。初敘三類計正破外道。二復敘三類計兼破小乘。三總破上二差別執我。四解釋彼執分別．俱生伏．斷位次五假設外徴釋諸妨難　或分為四。初別敘兩三破。二總敘諸執破。三解彼執分別俱生等。四假外徴釋外妨難　或分為三。初破外我。次釋彼執分別俱生。伏斷位次。后假設外徴釋諸妨難　初中有三。如前可解。或分為二。初破計我。次總解執。

論。諸所執我略有三種。

述曰。此即第一敘三類計正破彼執。此中有二。初敘三計。二別破三。外道雖多計執各異。種類而說莫過三種。

{ "translations": [ "豈離識時便無外境。云何知識似外境生？", "難道離開了能認識的心識，就沒有外在的境界了嗎？為什麼心識的生起好像是外在境界所導致的呢？", "", "論。實我實法不可得故。", "論：因為真實的『我』（Atman）和真實的『法』（Dharma）是不可獲得的。", "", "述曰。此即第二略答外徴。謂實我．法。現．比二量所不能成。名不可得。至下一一別破應知。法體實無然立五蘊。我體非實何法攝耶。法依作用故可立蘊。我無一常故不別立。又心變似法有多差別隨五蘊攝。心變似我無多差別眾同分攝。", "解釋：這是第二次簡略地回答外來的質疑。所謂的真實的『我』和『法』，是現量（Pratyaksha，直接感知）和比量（Anumana，推理）這兩種認知方式都無法證成的，所以說是不可獲得的。到後面會一一分別破斥，應該瞭解。『法』的本體實際上是不存在的，但爲了方便說明而設立了五蘊（Skandha）。『我』的本體不是真實的，那麼應該歸屬於哪一種『法』呢？『法』是依據其作用而可以設立為蘊的，而『我』沒有恒常不變的性質，所以不單獨設立。而且，心識變化所顯現的『法』有多種差別，可以歸屬於五蘊。心識變化所顯現的『我』沒有多種差別，可以歸屬於眾同分（Sattvabhaga，眾生共業所感）。", "", "自下第三別問別答。于中有二。初問答我。后問答法。我中有二。初問。次答。", "下面是第三部分，分別提問和回答。其中分為兩部分：首先是提問和回答關於『我』的問題，然後是提問和回答關於『法』的問題。關於『我』的部分又分為兩部分：首先是提問，然後是回答。", "", "論。如何實我不可得耶。", "論：為什麼真實的『我』是不可獲得的呢？", "", "述曰。此即初問。犢子部師。及正量部。本經量部等。及外道等。咸作問言。大乘所說我法無者。且置於法。如何實我不可得耶。假我共成。非此所問　自下答中文勢有五。初敘三類計正破外道。二復敘三類計兼破小乘。三總破上二差別執我。四解釋彼執分別．俱生伏．斷位次五假設外徴釋諸妨難　或分為四。初別敘兩三破。二總敘諸執破。三解彼執分別俱生等。四假外徴釋外妨難　或分為三。初破外我。次釋彼執分別俱生。伏斷位次。后假設外徴釋諸妨難　初中有三。如前可解。或分為二。初破計我。次總解執。", "解釋：這是最初的提問。犢子部（Vatsiputriya）的論師，以及正量部（Sammitiya）、本經量部等，還有外道等等，都這樣提問說：大乘所說的『我』和『法』都是空無的，暫且先不談『法』，為什麼真實的『我』是不可獲得的呢？假立的『我』是共業所成的，這不是這裡所要問的。下面回答的內容有五種結構：首先敘述三種不同的觀點，主要爲了破斥外道；其次再次敘述三種不同的觀點，兼顧破斥小乘；然後總括破斥以上兩種對『我』的執著；第四解釋他們所執著的分別我（Parikalpita-atman）和俱生我（Sahaja-atman）的伏斷位次；第五假設外來的質疑，解釋各種妨難。或者可以分為四種結構：首先分別敘述兩種或三種觀點並加以破斥；其次總括敘述各種執著並加以破斥；第三解釋他們所執著的分別我和俱生我等；第四假設外來的質疑，解釋外來的妨難。或者可以分為三種結構：首先破斥外道所執著的『我』；其次解釋他們所執著的分別我和俱生我，以及伏斷的位次；最後假設外來的質疑，解釋各種妨難。第一種結構中包含三種內容，如前所述可以理解。或者可以分為兩種結構：首先破斥計度出來的『我』；其次總括解釋各種執著。", "", "論。諸所執我略有三種。", "論：各種所執著的『我』，概括起來有三種。", "", "述曰。此即第一敘三類計正破彼執。此中有二。初敘三計。二別破三。外道雖多計執各異。種類而說莫過三種。", "解釋：這是第一部分，敘述三種不同的觀點，主要爲了破斥他們的執著。這部分包含兩方面：首先敘述三種觀點；其次分別破斥這三種觀點。外道雖然眾多，他們的計度和執著也各不相同，但從種類上來說，不超過這三種。" ], "english_translations": [ "『If one departs from consciousness, then there would be no external world. How can knowledge arise as if from an external world?』", "『Does it mean that if we separate from the perceiving consciousness, there would be no external reality? How is it that knowledge seems to arise as if caused by external objects?』", "", "Treatise: 『Because a real self (Atman) and real dharmas (Dharma) are unattainable.』", "Treatise: 『Because a real 『self』 (Atman) and real 『dharmas』 (Dharma) are unattainable.』", "", "Commentary: This is the second brief response to an external challenge. It means that a real 『self』 and 『dharmas』 cannot be established by either direct perception (Pratyaksha) or inference (Anumana), hence they are called unattainable. The individual refutations will be given later. Although the substance of 『dharmas』 is actually non-existent, the five aggregates (Skandha) are established for convenience. If the substance of 『self』 is not real, then to which 『dharma』 should it belong? 『Dharmas』 can be established as aggregates based on their functions, but 『self』 does not have a constant nature, so it is not separately established. Moreover, the transformations of consciousness that resemble 『dharmas』 have many differences and are included within the five aggregates. The transformations of consciousness that resemble 『self』 do not have many differences and are included within the commonality of beings (Sattvabhaga).』", "Commentary: This is the second brief response to an external challenge. It means that a real 『self』 and 『dharmas』 cannot be established by either direct perception (Pratyaksha) or inference (Anumana), hence they are called unattainable. The individual refutations will be given later. Although the substance of 『dharmas』 is actually non-existent, the five aggregates (Skandha) are established for convenience. If the substance of 『self』 is not real, then to which 『dharma』 should it belong? 『Dharmas』 can be established as aggregates based on their functions, but 『self』 does not have a constant nature, so it is not separately established. Moreover, the transformations of consciousness that resemble 『dharmas』 have many differences and are included within the five aggregates. The transformations of consciousness that resemble 『self』 do not have many differences and are included within the commonality of beings (Sattvabhaga).』", "", "『The third part is a separate question and answer section, divided into two parts: first, questions and answers about the 『self』; second, questions and answers about 『dharmas』. The section on the 『self』 is further divided into two parts: first, the question; second, the answer.』", "『The third part is a separate question and answer section, divided into two parts: first, questions and answers about the 『self』; second, questions and answers about 『dharmas』. The section on the 『self』 is further divided into two parts: first, the question; second, the answer.』", "", "Treatise: 『How is it that a real 『self』 is unattainable?』", "Treatise: 『How is it that a real 『self』 is unattainable?』", "", "Commentary: This is the initial question. Teachers of the Vatsiputriya school, as well as the Sammitiya school, the Mulasarvastivada school, and other non-Buddhist schools, all ask: 『The Mahayana school says that both 『self』 and 『dharmas』 are empty. Let』s put aside the discussion of 『dharmas』 for now. How is it that a real 『self』 is unattainable? The conventionally established 『self』 is formed by common karma, which is not what we are asking about.』 The following answer has five structures: first, it describes three types of views to directly refute non-Buddhists; second, it describes three types of views again to also refute the Hinayana; third, it generally refutes the above two different attachments to the 『self』; fourth, it explains their attachment to the positions of subduing and cutting off the discriminated self (Parikalpita-atman) and the innate self (Sahaja-atman); fifth, it assumes external challenges and explains various obstacles. Alternatively, it can be divided into four structures: first, it separately describes two or three views and refutes them; second, it generally describes all attachments and refutes them; third, it explains their attachment to the discriminated self and the innate self, etc.; fourth, it assumes external challenges and explains external obstacles. Alternatively, it can be divided into three structures: first, it refutes the 『self』 held by non-Buddhists; second, it explains their attachment to the discriminated self and the innate self, as well as the positions of subduing and cutting off; finally, it assumes external challenges and explains various obstacles. The first structure contains three aspects, which can be understood as explained earlier. Alternatively, it can be divided into two structures: first, it refutes the 『self』 that is conceptually constructed; second, it generally explains all attachments.", "Commentary: This is the initial question. Teachers of the Vatsiputriya school (Vatsiputriya), as well as the Sammitiya school (Sammitiya), the Mulasarvastivada school, and other non-Buddhist schools, all ask: 『The Mahayana school says that both 『self』 and 『dharmas』 are empty. Let』s put aside the discussion of 『dharmas』 for now. How is it that a real 『self』 is unattainable? The conventionally established 『self』 is formed by common karma, which is not what we are asking about.』 The following answer has five structures: first, it describes three types of views to directly refute non-Buddhists; second, it describes three types of views again to also refute the Hinayana; third, it generally refutes the above two different attachments to the 『self』; fourth, it explains their attachment to the positions of subduing and cutting off the discriminated self (Parikalpita-atman) and the innate self (Sahaja-atman); fifth, it assumes external challenges and explains various obstacles. Alternatively, it can be divided into four structures: first, it separately describes two or three views and refutes them; second, it generally describes all attachments and refutes them; third, it explains their attachment to the discriminated self and the innate self, etc.; fourth, it assumes external challenges and explains external obstacles. Alternatively, it can be divided into three structures: first, it refutes the 『self』 held by non-Buddhists; second, it explains their attachment to the discriminated self and the innate self, as well as the positions of subduing and cutting off; finally, it assumes external challenges and explains various obstacles. The first structure contains three aspects, which can be understood as explained earlier. Alternatively, it can be divided into two structures: first, it refutes the 『self』 that is conceptually constructed; second, it generally explains all attachments.", "", "Treatise: 『The various conceptions of 『self』 can be summarized into three types.』", "Treatise: 『The various conceptions of 『self』 can be summarized into three types.』", "", "Commentary: This is the first part, describing three types of views, mainly to directly refute their attachments. This part contains two aspects: first, it describes three views; second, it separately refutes these three views. Although there are many non-Buddhist schools, and their conceptions and attachments are different, in terms of categories, they do not exceed these three." "Commentary: This is the first part, describing three types of views, mainly to directly refute their attachments. This part contains two aspects: first, it describes three views; second, it separately refutes these three views. Although there are many non-Buddhist schools, and their conceptions and attachments are different, in terms of categories, they do not exceed these three." ] }

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論。一者執我至量同虛空。

述曰。此謂數論．勝論等計。即是僧佉．吠世史迦義。如下廣敘。我有三義。一者常。我體常住。無初后故。從過去來未來不斷。現在相續。二週遍。五趣之中體周遍故。趣趣有身非定恒居一趣中故。三量同虛空。遍十方故。

論。隨處造業受苦樂故。

述曰。此成遍因。何以同空。隨處即能造種種業。受苦．樂故。即釋第三執我同空遍十方界。欲破作．受但說造業受苦樂言。彼常遍義遂不開顯。又此為二。一常。二遍。同空以下釋前遍義。同空是喻。若準破中此解為勝　數論執我體是受者。三德能作。轉作法已我受用之。名受苦樂　勝論執我實句義攝。體能作．受。故名造業受苦樂等。下破法中一一別敘。

論。二者執我至而量不定。

述曰。立不定宗。我體雖常大小不定。

論。隨身大小有卷舒故。

述曰。顯不定因。謂身若大我量便舒。身若小時我量便卷。如一牛皮日干水漬。日炙便卷。水濕便舒。此即無慚之類計也。謂尼虔子。今言昵楗陀弗咀羅。翻為離系子。苦行修勝因名為離系。露形少羞恥亦名無慚。本師稱離系。是彼門徒名之為子。

論。三者執我至如一極微。

述曰。此立小宗。顯我量小。至者極義。極小如

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：第一種觀點認為，『我』（Atman）的體積廣大，等同於虛空。

述記：這是數論（Samkhya）、勝論（Vaisheshika）等學派的觀點。也就是僧佉（Samkhya）、吠世史迦（Vaisheshika）的意義，下文會詳細敘述。『我』有三種含義：一是常，『我』的本體是常住不變的，沒有初始和終結，從過去到現在未來都不會斷絕，現在仍然相續存在。二是周遍，在五趣（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）之中，『我』的本體是周遍存在的，因為在不同的趣中會有不同的身體，並非恒常居住在一個趣中。三是體積等同於虛空，因為遍佈十方。

論：因為在任何地方造業，都會承受苦樂的果報。

述記：這是爲了成立『我』是周遍的原因。為什麼說『我』等同於虛空呢？因為在任何地方都能造作各種各樣的業，並承受苦和樂的果報。這是解釋第三種觀點，認為『我』等同於虛空，遍佈十方世界。爲了破斥『我』的造作和承受，只說了造業和承受苦樂。他們常和遍的意義沒有完全顯現。這裡可以分為兩點：一是常，二是遍。『同空』以下是解釋前面的『遍』的意義。『同空』是一種比喻。如果按照破斥的觀點來看，這種解釋更好。數論認為『我』的本體是受者，三德（ सत्त्व sattva, रजस् rajas, तमस् tamas）能夠造作，轉化成法之後，『我』就受用它，這就叫做承受苦樂。勝論認為『我』被包含在實句義中，本體能夠造作和承受，所以叫做造業和承受苦樂等等。在下面的破法中，會一一分別敘述。

論：第二種觀點認為，『我』的體積是不確定的。

述記：這是立不定宗，『我』的本體雖然是常的，但是大小是不確定的。

論：因為『我』會隨著身體的大小而伸縮。

述記：這是爲了顯示不確定的原因。意思是說，身體如果大，『我』的體積就伸展；身體如果小，『我』的體積就收縮。就像一塊牛皮，曬乾了或者浸水了，被太陽曬就會收卷，被水浸濕就會伸展。這就像無慚之類的人的觀點。也就是尼虔子（Nigantha），現在叫做尼楗陀弗咀羅（Nigantha Putta），翻譯過來就是離系子（freed from bonds）。苦行能夠修得殊勝的因，所以叫做離系。裸露身體，很少羞恥，也叫做無慚。本師被稱為離系，他的門徒就被稱為離系子。

論：第三種觀點認為，『我』的體積小到像一個極微（paramāṇu）。

述記：這是立小宗，顯示『我』的體積很小。『至』是極的意思，極小就像...

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: The first view holds that the 'Self' (Atman) is as vast as space.

Commentary: This refers to the views of schools like Samkhya and Vaisheshika. That is, the meaning of Samkhya and Vaisheshika, which will be described in detail below. 'Self' has three meanings: First, permanence. The substance of the 'Self' is permanent and unchanging, without beginning or end, not ceasing from the past to the present and future, but continuing in the present. Second, pervasiveness. Within the five realms (hell, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods), the substance of the 'Self' is pervasive, because there are different bodies in different realms, and it does not constantly reside in one realm. Third, its size is equal to space, because it pervades the ten directions.

Treatise: Because wherever one creates karma, one experiences the results of suffering and happiness.

Commentary: This is to establish the reason why the 'Self' is pervasive. Why is it said that the 'Self' is equal to space? Because one can create all kinds of karma anywhere and experience the results of suffering and happiness. This explains the third view, which holds that the 'Self' is equal to space and pervades the ten directions. In order to refute the 'Self's' creation and experience, it only speaks of creating karma and experiencing suffering and happiness. Their meanings of permanence and pervasiveness are not fully revealed. This can be divided into two points: first, permanence; second, pervasiveness. What follows 'equal to space' explains the meaning of 'pervasiveness' mentioned earlier. 'Equal to space' is a metaphor. If viewed from the perspective of refutation, this explanation is better. The Samkhya school believes that the substance of the 'Self' is the experiencer, and the three Gunas ( सत्त्व sattva, रजस् rajas, तमस् tamas) are capable of creation. After transforming into Dharma, the 'Self' enjoys it, which is called experiencing suffering and happiness. The Vaisheshika school believes that the 'Self' is included in the meaning of reality, and its substance is capable of creating and experiencing, so it is called creating karma and experiencing suffering and happiness, etc. In the following refutation of Dharma, each will be described separately.

Treatise: The second view holds that the size of the 'Self' is uncertain.

Commentary: This establishes the uncertain thesis. Although the substance of the 'Self' is constant, its size is uncertain.

Treatise: Because the 'Self' expands and contracts according to the size of the body.

Commentary: This is to show the uncertain reason. It means that if the body is large, the size of the 'Self' expands; if the body is small, the size of the 'Self' contracts. It's like a piece of cowhide that shrinks when dried and expands when soaked in water. This is like the view of shameless people, namely the Niganthas (Nigantha), now called Nigantha Putta, which translates to 'freed from bonds'. Austere practices can cultivate excellent causes, so it is called 'freed from bonds'. Exposing the body with little shame is also called 'shameless'. The original teacher is called 'freed from bonds', and his disciples are called 'sons of the freed from bonds'.

Treatise: The third view holds that the size of the 'Self' is as small as a paramāṇu (atom).

Commentary: This establishes the small thesis, showing that the size of the 'Self' is very small. 'To' means extreme, extremely small like...

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極微量。

論。潛轉身中作事業故。

述曰。顯我小因。以我量小如一極微有自在用。小輕利故　潛轉身中。顯勝自在所棲隱處　作諸事業。顯我勝用能為作者。此即獸主。遍出等計。謂有外道名播輸缽多。翻為獸主。如一瞿聲別目于牛。通名于獸。但言牛主未善方言。非但與牛而為主故。如伏犧等　復有外道名波利呾羅拘迦翻為遍出。遍能出離諸俗世間。即是出家外道之類。今此總敘三計。五師所執之義。餘九十種所計我等。不異三故。

即是第一敘三師計。自下次第一一別徴。

論。初且非理。

述曰。下別破也。文三易解更不判之。且者。偏舉未盡之義。非破初也。

論。所以者何。

述曰。既總非已。外人卻徴所言非理之所以者何者。是也。

下文有二。初破作．受。后難同異。

論。執我常遍至受苦樂等。

述曰。此破數論。此中第一破初。量云。汝所執我。是宗有法。應不隨身受苦樂者。是宗之法。此二和合互相差別不相離性總名為宗也。一許常故。二許遍故。因也。如汝虛空喻也。有二比量。此破僧佉我為受者。文言執我意道汝執。文言常遍意亦有許。若不爾者。有法之我非自極成。常遍之因亦犯隨一。或若大乘許我是有。即違自宗。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 極微量。

論：因為能在潛轉身中進行活動。

述記：爲了彰顯我（ātman）的微小原因。因為我的量小如一個極微，具有自在的作用，小而輕便。『潛轉身中』，顯示了殊勝自在所棲息的隱秘之處，進行各種活動，顯示了我殊勝的作用，能夠成為作者。這就是獸主（Paśupati）。遍出（Parivrājaka）等外道的計論。所謂有外道名為播輸缽多（Paśupati），翻譯為獸主，就像用『瞿聲』這個特別的名稱來稱呼牛，而通稱則為獸。只說『牛主』並不善於表達，因為它不僅僅是牛的主人。如同伏羲等。又有外道名為波利呾羅拘迦（Parivrājaka），翻譯為遍出，普遍能夠出離各種世俗，就是出家外道之類。現在這裡總共敘述三種計論，五位老師所執持的意義。其餘九十種所計的我等，與這三種沒有差異。

這就是首先敘述三位老師的計論。從下次開始，逐一分別征問。

論：最初且不合理。

述記：下面分別破斥。文中的三個部分容易理解，不再進行判別。『且』，是偏舉未盡的意思，並非破斥最初的觀點。

論：原因是什麼？

述記：已經總的否定之後，外人反過來征問所說不合理的原因是什麼。

下文分為兩部分。首先破斥『作』和『受』，然後辯難『同』和『異』。

論：執著我（ātman）常恒遍在，以至於感受苦樂等。

述記：這是破斥數論派（Sāṃkhya）。這裡首先破斥最初的觀點。量式如下：你所執著的我（ātman），是宗有法。不應該隨身感受苦樂，這是宗之法。這兩者結合在一起，互相差別而不相離的性質，總稱為宗。因為一是許常，二是許遍，這是因。如同你的虛空，這是喻。有兩個比量。這是破斥僧佉派的我（ātman）是受者。文中的『執我』，意思是說你所執著的。文中的『常遍』，意思是也有承認。如果不是這樣，有法之我（ātman）就不是自己所極力主張的。常遍的原因也犯了隨一的過失。或者如果大乘承認我是有的，就違背了自己的宗義。

【English Translation】 English version Extremely minute quantity.

Treatise: Because it performs activities in a subtle transformation.

Commentary: To reveal the small cause of the self (ātman). Because my quantity is as small as an extremely minute particle, possessing independent function, small, light, and beneficial. 'Subtle transformation' reveals the hidden place where the supreme independence resides, performing various activities, revealing my supreme function, capable of being the agent. This is Paśupati (Lord of Beasts). The doctrines of Parivrājaka (Wandering Ascetic), etc. It is said that there is an externalist named Paśupati, translated as Lord of Beasts, just as the special name 'Go-svara' is used to refer to a cow, while the general term is beast. Simply saying 'Lord of Cows' is not a skillful expression, because it is not only the lord of cows. Like Fu Xi, etc. There is also an externalist named Parivrājaka, translated as 'Completely Departing,' universally capable of departing from various worldly affairs, which is the category of renunciate externalists. Now, here is a general description of three doctrines, the meanings upheld by five teachers. The remaining ninety types of selves (ātman) accounted for are not different from these three.

This is first a narration of the doctrines of three teachers. From the next section onwards, each will be individually questioned.

Treatise: Initially, it is unreasonable.

Commentary: Below, each is refuted separately. The three parts of the text are easy to understand, so no further distinction will be made. 'Initially' means a partial and incomplete statement, not a refutation of the initial view.

Treatise: What is the reason?

Commentary: After a general negation, the externalist conversely questions what the reason is for saying it is unreasonable.

The following text is divided into two parts. First, refuting 'action' and 'reception,' then debating 'sameness' and 'difference.'

Treatise: Holding that the self (ātman) is constant and pervasive, to the point of experiencing suffering and pleasure, etc.

Commentary: This is a refutation of Sāṃkhya (Enumeration School). Here, the initial view is refuted first. The logical formula is as follows: The self (ātman) that you hold, is the subject-property. It should not experience suffering and pleasure along with the body, this is the property of the subject. The combination of these two, the nature of being mutually different and inseparable, is generally called the subject. Because one is the assertion of constancy, and two is the assertion of pervasiveness, this is the reason. Like your space, this is the example. There are two inferences. This is a refutation of the Sāṃkhya's self (ātman) as the experiencer. The phrase 'holding the self' means what you hold. The phrase 'constant and pervasive' means there is also an admission. If this were not the case, the self (ātman) as the subject-property would not be what one strongly asserts. The reason of constancy and pervasiveness would also commit the fault of one-sidedness. Or if the Mahāyāna school admits that the self exists, it would contradict its own doctrine.

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若無即犯自所別過。因中亦有所依不成。大乘虛空雖無實體。就他宗說亦得為喻。故無喻中俱不成過。故說汝言。初一執字義通因．喻。許義同故。又于因中應加故字。義定順故。又因．喻自許。此則不成。若唯他許非必是過。他比量故。文中有法在初。法居最後。中間因．喻。隨文可知。性相為文故無次第。下文體例或有非次。皆準此知。解因明者許是事故。應審思準。

論。又常遍故至能造諸業。

述曰。此破衛世我作者也。此師之我雖亦受者。對彼僧佉但破作者。不爾前文兼破亦得。若立量云。汝所執我。應無動轉。許常遍故。如虛空等。即有相符極成之失。勝論之我無動轉故。不爾便與十句論違。彼說我實無動作故。由此應言。汝所執我。應不隨身能造諸業。許常故許遍故。說喻如前文云汝我應不隨身能造諸業。無動轉故。如虛空等。此釋即順十句論我無動作也。今隨文便於因之上置其應字。下皆準知此文但有其法。而無同喻。及與有法。以同前故不別出之。其應之字於法中置。文準前解。此中總有三比量因。

上來別破二師作受訖。次下雙破作．受同異。

論。又所執我至為同爲異。

述曰。此審定也。唯有異計。同是設遮。

論。若言同者至便成大過。

述

曰。此破有情共同一我。執諸有情同一我故。若一有情作業之時。余諸有情亦應作業。即此一我作諸業故。受果解脫亦準此例。應立量云。且如余祠授等。于天授作諸業時亦應作業。我是一故。如天授等。然內真如既非是我。又無系屬。亦不作受。故無不定返詰過失。受果．解脫二量亦然。總於此中有三比量。別破外道準義可知。又若一解脫一切解脫。便成大過。此三若爾便違世間。亦違教故。

論。若言異者至體應相雜。

述曰。下破有情我體各異。諸有情我既更相遍。體應相雜。由彼計執諸有情我。體是實有各各調然自相別故。量云。諸有情我。與天授我體應是一。許常．遍故。如天授我。論言相雜。意令相入成一物故。雖言更遍意言常遍。不爾更雜。便無同喻外返難言。且如同處不相離色。許多種色更互相遍。體非相雜諸根得時各各異故。其我亦然雖體相遍。然非相雜各有屬故。斯有何失。此亦不然。彼執我體是真是實。有相雜失。然我色等是虛幻法。又同類業招非實之法。體相虛疏。設令相雜亦無過失。一切有情共果亦爾。其山河等同一處故　又今以彼更相遍言。遂令相雜以成一物。未必須量。

論。又一作業至所作所受。

述曰。復以作業受果為難。作業受果者。與一切我處無別

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 曰：這是爲了破斥有情共同擁有一個『我』（ātman，靈魂）。因為他們執著于所有有情擁有同一個『我』。如果一個有情在造業的時候，其餘的有情也應該同時在造業，因為這個『我』是同一個，它在做所有的業。接受果報和解脫也應該遵循這個例子。應該建立論證：比如，其他的祭祀者等，在天授（Devadatta，人名）造業的時候，也應該同時在造業，因為『我』是同一個，就像天授等。然而，內在的真如（tathatā，如實）既不是『我』，又沒有系屬關係，也不造作或承受，所以沒有不確定的反駁和過失。接受果報和解脫的兩個論證也是如此。總的來說，這裡有三個比量（anumāna，推理），分別破斥外道（tīrthika，佛教以外的宗教）的觀點，可以根據意義類推得知。而且，如果一個解脫，一切都解脫，就會造成很大的過失。這三種情況如果成立，就違背了世間的常理，也違背了佛教的教義。

論：如果說『我』是不同的，那麼『我』的本體應該相互混雜。

述曰：下面破斥有情的『我』的本體各自不同的觀點。如果所有有情的『我』相互遍佈，那麼『我』的本體應該相互混雜。因為他們執著于所有有情的『我』，本體是真實存在的，各自截然不同，具有各自的自相。論證：所有有情的『我』，與天授的『我』的本體應該是一樣的，因為它們被認為是常恒和遍在的，就像天授的『我』一樣。論中說的『相雜』，意思是相互進入而成為一個物體。雖然說的是相互遍佈，但意思是常恒遍佈。否則，如果只是相互混雜，就沒有相同的比喻，外道可以反駁說：比如，在同一個地方，不互相分離的顏色，有很多種顏色相互遍佈，但本體並沒有相互混雜，因為諸根在得到的時候各有不同。『我』也是如此，雖然本體相互遍佈，但並沒有相互混雜，因為各有歸屬。這有什麼過失呢？這種說法也是不對的。他們執著于『我』的本體是真實存在的，就會有相互混雜的過失。然而，『我』和色等是虛幻的法，而且同類的業招感的是非真實的法，本體虛假疏鬆，即使相互混雜也沒有過失。一切有情共同的果報也是如此。山河等也是在同一個地方。而且，現在用他們說的相互遍佈，導致相互混雜而成為一個物體，不一定需要論證。

論：如果一個造業，那麼一切都造業，那麼一切都接受所造的果報。

述曰：再次用造業和接受果報來作為難點。造業和接受果報，與一切『我』所處的位置沒有區別。

【English Translation】 English version: It is said: This is to refute the common possession of a single 'ātman' (self, soul) by sentient beings. Because they are attached to the idea that all sentient beings share the same 'ātman'. If one sentient being is creating karma, then all other sentient beings should also be creating karma simultaneously, because this 'ātman' is the same, and it is doing all the karma. Receiving the results and liberation should also follow this example. An argument should be established: for example, other sacrificers, etc., when Devadatta (a person's name) is creating karma, they should also be creating karma simultaneously, because the 'ātman' is the same, just like Devadatta, etc. However, the inner tathatā (suchness, reality) is neither 'ātman' nor has any affiliation, nor does it create or receive, so there is no uncertain refutation or fault. The two arguments for receiving results and liberation are also the same. In general, there are three anumānas (inferences) here, respectively refuting the views of tīrthikas (non-Buddhists, religious practitioners outside of Buddhism), which can be known by analogy according to the meaning. Moreover, if one is liberated, all are liberated, which would cause a great fault. If these three situations are established, it would violate worldly common sense and also violate Buddhist teachings.

Treatise: If it is said that 'ātman' are different, then the substance of 'ātman' should be mixed together.

Commentary: Below, the view that the substance of sentient beings' 'ātman' are each different is refuted. If all sentient beings' 'ātman' are mutually pervasive, then the substance of 'ātman' should be mixed together. Because they are attached to the idea that all sentient beings' 'ātman' are truly existent, each distinctly different, with their own self-characteristics. Argument: All sentient beings' 'ātman' should be the same in substance as Devadatta's 'ātman', because they are considered to be constant and pervasive, just like Devadatta's 'ātman'. The 'mixing' mentioned in the treatise means entering each other and becoming one object. Although it says mutually pervasive, it means constantly pervasive. Otherwise, if it is just mutual mixing, there would be no same metaphor, and non-Buddhists could refute by saying: for example, in the same place, colors that do not separate from each other, there are many kinds of colors that are mutually pervasive, but the substance is not mixed together, because the senses are different when they are obtained. 'Ātman' is also like this, although the substance is mutually pervasive, it is not mixed together, because each has its own affiliation. What fault is there in this? This statement is also incorrect. They are attached to the idea that the substance of 'ātman' is truly existent, and there will be the fault of mutual mixing. However, 'ātman' and form, etc., are illusory dharmas, and similar karma attracts non-real dharmas, the substance is falsely sparse, and even if they are mixed together, there is no fault. The common result of all sentient beings is also the same. Mountains and rivers, etc., are also in the same place. Moreover, now using their saying of mutual pervasiveness, leading to mutual mixing and becoming one object, does not necessarily require argument.

Treatise: If one creates karma, then all create karma, then all receive the results of what is created.

Commentary: Again, using the creation of karma and receiving the results as a difficult point. The creation of karma and receiving the results are no different from the location where all 'ātman' are.

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故。處謂處所。我之住處。量云。彼祠授等。于天授作業時。亦應作。以一切我處無別故。如提婆達多。受果比量亦準此知。不爾直責。如諸燈光。處無別故。一照一切照。我亦應爾。處無別故。一作一切作。有情共果雖處無別。然非一受即一切受。非一切我處無別故。又我一受即一切受。處無別故。非共果故。

論。若謂作受至理亦不然。

述曰。此即敘救總非之。彼意救言。如天授我但屬天授。如眾燈光各有所屬。無有一作一切作失。論總非之。理不然也。

論。業果及身至不應理故。

述曰。敘其非理。一一諸業．及果．身三。皆與一一諸我和合。以諸我體相雜糅住。至於作．受唯屬此我不屬彼我不應正理。提婆達多作．受。亦應屬他耶若達多我。許此業．果．身。與彼我合故。如耶若達多作．受。

論。一解脫時至一切我合故。

述曰。此又重責。如天授解脫余亦應爾。作業．受果．並各別身。與諸我合故。所修證法。彼此我合故。不可但說唯屬此我非彼我故。一人解脫余不解脫。量云。且如天授一解脫時。余未解脫者一切應解脫。所修所證法一切我合故。猶如天授已解脫者　所修者行。所證者理。此破初計。文各有十三比量。又以業．果．身為因。難解脫宗。亦得為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 故（因此）。處謂處所（處所指的是地方，這裡指我的住處）。量云（量部中說）：『彼祠授等（他們的祠堂授予等等），于天授作業時（在天授進行工作時），亦應作（也應該這樣做）。以一切我處無別故（因為所有我的處所沒有區別）。如提婆達多（例如提婆達多）。受果比量亦準此知（接受果報的比量也應該按照這個來理解）。不爾直責（否則就直接責難）。如諸燈光（例如許多燈的光芒），處無別故（因為處所沒有區別）。一照一切照（一盞燈照亮，所有的燈都照亮）。我亦應爾（我也應該這樣），處無別故（因為處所沒有區別）。一作一切作（我做了一件事，就等於所有我都做了這件事）。有情共果雖處無別（有情共同的果報雖然處所沒有區別），然非一受即一切受（但不是一個人接受就等於所有人都接受）。非一切我處無別故（不是因為所有我的處所沒有區別）。又我一受即一切受（而且我一個人接受就等於所有人都接受），處無別故（因為處所沒有區別）。非共果故（不是共同的果報的緣故）。 論（正理論）：若謂作受至理亦不然（如果說作業和接受的道理是這樣，那也是不對的）。 述曰（述記中說）：此即敘救總非之（這是敘述對方的辯解並總體的否定它）。彼意救言（對方辯解說）：如天授我但屬天授（例如天授的我只屬於天授）。如眾燈光各有所屬（例如許多燈的光芒各有歸屬）。無有一作一切作失（沒有一個人做就等於所有人都做的過失）。論總非之（正理論總體否定它）：理不然也（道理不是這樣的）。 論（正理論）：業果及身至不應理故（業、果報以及身體，這樣說是不合道理的）。 述曰（述記中說）：敘其非理（敘述它不合道理的地方）。一一諸業（每一個個的業）、及果（以及果報）、身三（身體這三者），皆與一一諸我和合（都與每一個個的我結合在一起）。以諸我體相雜糅住（因為所有我的本體相互混雜居住）。至於作（至於作業）、受（接受果報）唯屬此我不屬彼我（只屬於這個我不屬於那個我），不應正理（是不合道理的）。提婆達多作（提婆達多作業）、受（接受果報），亦應屬他耶若達多我（也應該屬於其他的耶若達多我嗎）？許此業（允許這個業）、果（果報）、身（身體），與彼我合故（與那個我結合的緣故）。如耶若達多作（例如耶若達多作業）、受（接受果報）。 論（正理論）：一解脫時至一切我合故（一個人解脫的時候，就等於所有我都解脫的緣故）。 述曰（述記中說）：此又重責（這是又一次的責難）。如天授解脫余亦應爾（例如天授解脫了，其餘的也應該這樣）。作業（作業）、受果（接受果報）、並各別身（以及各自不同的身體），與諸我合故（與所有的我結合的緣故）。所修證法（所修習和證悟的法），彼此我合故（彼此的我結合的緣故）。不可但說唯屬此我非彼我故（不可以只說只屬於這個我而不屬於那個我的緣故）。一人解脫余不解脫（一個人解脫了，其餘的人沒有解脫）。量云（量部中說）：且如天授一解脫時（例如天授一個人解脫的時候），余未解脫者一切應解脫（其餘沒有解脫的人都應該解脫）。所修所證法一切我合故（所修習和證悟的法，所有我都結合的緣故）。猶如天授已解脫者（猶如天授已經解脫的人）所修者行（所修習的行為），所證者理（所證悟的道理）。此破初計（這是破斥最初的計較）。文各有十三比量（文中各有十三個比量）。又以業（又以業）、果（果報）、身為因（身體作為原因），難解脫宗（責難解脫宗）。亦得為（也可以作為）。

【English Translation】 English version Therefore. 'Place' refers to a location, my dwelling place. The Pramana (means of knowledge) says: 'Their offerings, grants, etc., when Deva Datta (name of a person) is working, should also be done, because there is no difference in the location of all 'I's.' Like Deva Datta. The inference regarding the reception of consequences should also be understood accordingly. Otherwise, there is direct blame. Like the lights of many lamps, because there is no difference in location, one illuminates, all illuminate. I should also be like that, because there is no difference in location, one acts, all act. Although the shared consequences of sentient beings have no difference in location, it is not that one receiving means all receive, not because there is no difference in the location of all 'I's. Moreover, one 'I' receiving means all receive, because there is no difference in location, not because it is a shared consequence. Treatise: If it is said that the principle of action and reception is thus, it is also not right. Commentary: This is to narrate the defense and generally negate it. Their intention is to defend by saying: 'Like Deva Datta's 'I', it belongs only to Deva Datta. Like the lights of many lamps, each has its own belonging. There is no fault of one acting and all acting.' The treatise generally negates it: 'The principle is not so.' Treatise: Action, consequence, and body are not reasonable. Commentary: Narrating its unreasonableness. Each and every action, consequence, and body are all combined with each and every 'I'. Because the entities of all 'I's reside intermingled. As for acting and receiving, it belongs only to this 'I' and not to that 'I', which is not reasonable. Deva Datta's acting and receiving should also belong to another Yajna Datta's 'I', if it is admitted that this action, consequence, and body are combined with that 'I'. Like Yajna Datta's acting and receiving. Treatise: When one is liberated, all 'I's are combined. Commentary: This is another repeated rebuke. Like Deva Datta's liberation, the rest should also be like that. Acting, receiving consequences, and each separate body are combined with all 'I's. The Dharma (teachings) cultivated and realized are combined with each other's 'I's. It cannot be said that it belongs only to this 'I' and not to that 'I'. When one person is liberated, the rest are not liberated. The Pramana says: 'For example, when Deva Datta is liberated, all the rest who are not liberated should be liberated, because the Dharma cultivated and realized is combined with all 'I's.' Like the conduct cultivated and the principle realized by Deva Datta who is already liberated. This refutes the initial calculation. Each text has thirteen inferences. Moreover, using action, consequence, and body as the cause, it is difficult to challenge the liberation school. It can also be used as.

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量。

論。中亦非理所以者何。

述曰。此總非破離系子計。彼復徴已。

論。我體常住至而有舒捲。

述曰。此以常住難非舒捲。舒捲者盈縮不定之義。量云。汝所執我。應無舒捲。計常住故。如太虛空。

論。既有舒捲至應非常住。

述曰。此以卷舒難非常住。量云。汝所執我。應非常住。許卷舒故。如橐籥風。橐謂囊橐。排袋之類。以內含風起作用故。籥謂管籥簫笛之屬。以內有風起聲等故。此二中風。既隨囊．管。有其大小卷舒之事。而非常住。我亦應然。

論。又我隨身至我體一耶。

述曰。初之二句以隨身故難可分析。后之二句以可析故難體非一。初比量云。汝我應可分析。許卷舒故。如橐風等。言隨身者。有卷舒義。今以隨身顯事為難。不說同喻義準應知。若以隨身為因。影為同喻故。后比量云。汝我非實一。以可析故。如瓶．盆等。以前難破令其可析。故得為因。或以隨身為非一因。汝我非定一。許卷舒故。如牛等皮。此破第二有五比量。

論。故彼所言如童豎戲。

述曰。結非調之。童者小也。豎者奴也。如小奴等戲于沙土。雖甚劬勞無實可錄。汝等所計實我亦爾。

論。后亦非理所以者何。

述曰。此破獸主。遍出

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：在『中』（指先前辯論的中間部分）中，這種說法也是不合理的，原因是什麼呢？ 述曰：這是總括性地駁斥離系子（Samkhya）的觀點。他們又提出了質疑。 論：『我』的本體是常住不變的，但卻有舒捲（伸展和收縮）的特性。 述曰：這是用常住不變的特性來反駁舒捲的說法。舒捲指的是盈縮不定。量（論證）說：你所執著的『我』，應該沒有舒捲的特性，因為它被認為是常住不變的，就像太虛空一樣。 論：既然有舒捲的特性，就應該不是常住不變的。 述曰：這是用卷舒的特性來反駁非常住的說法。量（論證）說：你所執著的『我』，應該不是常住不變的，因為它被認為是具有卷舒的特性，就像橐籥（tuó yuè）中的風一樣。橐指的是囊橐，類似於排袋之類的東西，因為內部含有風而起作用。籥指的是管籥，如簫笛之類，因為內部有風而發出聲音等。這兩種情況下的風，都隨著囊和管的大小而有卷舒的變化，因此不是常住不變的。『我』也應該是這樣。 論：此外，『我』隨著身體而變化，那麼『我』的本體是一體的嗎？ 述曰：最初的兩句是用『隨著身體』這個特性來反駁『我』不可分析的說法。後面的兩句是用『可分析』這個特性來反駁『我』的本體不是一體的說法。最初的比量（論證）說：你的『我』應該是可以分析的，因為它被認為是具有卷舒的特性，就像橐中的風一樣。說『隨著身體』，就具有卷舒的含義。現在用『隨著身體』這個明顯的現象來作為反駁的理由。雖然沒有說出同喻（相似的例子），但其含義應該可以理解。如果用『隨著身體』作為因，以影（影子）作為同喻，也是可以的。後面的比量（論證）說：你的『我』不是真實的單一實體，因為它被認為是可分析的，就像瓶子和盆子等。因為先前的反駁已經使其可以被分析，所以可以作為因。或者可以用『隨著身體』作為非一體的因，你的『我』不是確定的單一實體，因為它被認為是具有卷舒的特性，就像牛等動物的皮一樣。這是爲了駁斥第二種觀點而提出的五個比量。 論：所以他們所說的話就像小孩子在玩遊戲一樣。 述曰：這是總結性的否定和嘲諷。童指的是小孩，豎指的是奴僕。就像小奴僕等在沙土上玩遊戲一樣，雖然非常努力，但實際上沒有什麼可以記錄的。你們所計度的實我（真實的我）也是如此。 論：後面的說法也是不合理的，原因是什麼呢？ 述曰：這是爲了駁斥獸主（Pashupati）的觀點，普遍地提出。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: In the 'middle' (referring to the middle part of the previous debate), this statement is also unreasonable. What is the reason? Commentary: This is a comprehensive refutation of the Samkhya's (離系子) view. They have raised questions again. Treatise: The substance of 'I' (我) is permanent, but it has the characteristic of expansion and contraction (舒捲). Commentary: This uses the characteristic of permanence to refute the statement of expansion and contraction. Expansion and contraction refer to indefinite waxing and waning. The argument (量) says: The 'I' that you adhere to should not have the characteristic of expansion and contraction, because it is considered permanent, like the great void. Treatise: Since it has the characteristic of expansion and contraction, it should not be permanent. Commentary: This uses the characteristic of expansion and contraction to refute the statement of non-permanence. The argument (量) says: The 'I' that you adhere to should not be permanent, because it is considered to have the characteristic of expansion and contraction, like the wind in a bellows (橐籥 - tuó yuè). 橐 refers to a bag, similar to a bellows, because it contains wind and functions. 籥 refers to a pipe, such as a flute, because it has wind inside and produces sound. In both of these cases, the wind changes in size with the bag and pipe, so it is not permanent. The 'I' should also be like this. Treatise: Furthermore, the 'I' changes with the body, so is the substance of 'I' one? Commentary: The first two sentences use the characteristic of 'changing with the body' to refute the statement that 'I' cannot be analyzed. The last two sentences use the characteristic of 'analyzable' to refute the statement that the substance of 'I' is not one. The initial argument (比量) says: Your 'I' should be analyzable, because it is considered to have the characteristic of expansion and contraction, like the wind in a bellows. Saying 'changing with the body' implies the meaning of expansion and contraction. Now, the obvious phenomenon of 'changing with the body' is used as a reason for refutation. Although the similar example (同喻) is not stated, its meaning should be understood. If 'changing with the body' is used as the cause, and the shadow (影) is used as the similar example, it is also acceptable. The subsequent argument (比量) says: Your 'I' is not a real single entity, because it is considered analyzable, like bottles and pots. Because the previous refutation has made it analyzable, it can be used as a cause. Or, 'changing with the body' can be used as the cause of non-oneness, your 'I' is not a definite single entity, because it is considered to have the characteristic of expansion and contraction, like the skin of cows and other animals. These are the five arguments put forward to refute the second view. Treatise: Therefore, what they say is like children playing games. Commentary: This is a concluding negation and mockery. 童 refers to children, and 豎 refers to servants. Just like young servants playing in the sand, although they work very hard, there is nothing real to record. Your conceived real self (實我) is also like this. Treatise: The latter statement is also unreasonable. What is the reason? Commentary: This is to refute the view of Pashupati (獸主), presenting it universally.

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等計。彼卻徴已。

論。我量至小至大身遍動。

述曰。第一量云。汝所執我。於一剎那應不能令大身遍動。以極小故。如極微等。此中難意如何小我。一剎那中能令色究竟天萬六千由旬大身動轉。

論。若謂雖小至似遍動者。

述曰。敘彼救云。此我不能一剎那頃即遍動身。然次第而動。以迅速故。如旋火輪者。

論。則所執我至非常一故。

述曰。汝所執我。應非常一。有往來故。如火輪等。諸有往來皆非常一故。此有二量。一難非常。二難非一。合有三量破第三計。都合二十一比量破三類執。此中破三種我。並同廣百論第二．第三卷說。

論。又所執我復有三種。

述曰。即是第二別敘三計。兼破小乘。于中有二。初敘計。后破斥。

論。一者即蘊。

述曰。此如瑜伽等四種計中。此即第一。有計我體體即是蘊二十句等。世間異生皆為此計。

論。二者離蘊。

述曰。即體非蘊。前說三計皆是此攝。離者異義。體異名離。不爾攝計便為不盡。瑜伽四計。即彼后三。雖住蘊中。或住蘊外。或不住蘊。亦非蘊外。並離蘊計。

論。三者與蘊不即不離。

述曰。筏蹉氏外道名犢子外道。男聲中呼。歸佛出家名犢子部。皤雌子

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 等計（諸如此類的計算）。他們卻反過來責問。

論：我認為，無論多麼微小，我的身體都能遍及並活動。

述曰：第一種量（推理）說：你所執著的『我』，在一剎那間應該不能使巨大的身體遍及並活動，因為它極其微小，就像極微（最小的物質單位）一樣。這裡的問題是，如此微小的『我』，如何在一剎那間能使色究竟天（最高的天界）一萬六千由旬（長度單位）的巨大身體動轉？

論：如果說雖然小，但看起來像是遍及並活動呢？

述曰：這是敘述他們的辯解：這個『我』不能在一剎那間就遍及全身並活動，而是次第地活動，因為速度極快，就像旋轉的火輪一樣。

論：那麼，你所執著的『我』，應該是無常且非單一的。

述曰：你所執著的『我』，應該不是恒常唯一的，因為它有往來（運動），就像火輪一樣。凡是有往來的事物，都不是恒常唯一的。這裡有兩個量（推理）：一是難（詰難）其非常，二是難其非一。合起來有三個量，用來破斥第三種計（觀點）。總共有二十一個比量，用來破斥三類執著。這裡破斥三種『我』的觀點，與《廣百論》第二、第三卷所說相同。

論：此外，你所執著的『我』還有三種。

述曰：這就是第二部分，分別敘述三種計（觀點），同時也破斥小乘佛教的觀點。其中分為兩部分：首先敘述計（觀點），然後破斥。

論：第一種是『我』即是蘊（五蘊，構成個體經驗的要素）。

述曰：這就像《瑜伽師地論》等所說的四種計（觀點）中的第一種。有人認為『我』的本體就是蘊，例如二十句等。世間的凡夫俗子大多持有這種觀點。

論：第二種是『我』離於蘊。

述曰：即『我』的本體不是蘊。前面所說的三種計（觀點）都屬於這一類。『離』的意思是不同。本體不同才稱為『離』，否則，如果不能涵蓋所有計（觀點），就不能說是窮盡了。《瑜伽師地論》中的四種計（觀點），就是指後面的三種。雖然『我』住在蘊中，或者住在蘊外，或者不住在蘊中，也不是蘊外，都屬於離蘊的計（觀點）。

論：第三種是『我』與蘊不即不離。

述曰：筏蹉氏外道，又名犢子外道。在男聲中稱呼。歸佛出家后稱為犢子部。皤雌子（姓名）。

【English Translation】 English version: Etc. They in turn questioned him.

Treatise: I believe that, no matter how small, my body can be pervasive and active.

Commentary: The first inference states: The 'self' that you cling to should not be able to make the large body pervasive and active in an instant, because it is extremely small, like atoms (the smallest units of matter). The question here is, how can such a tiny 'self' cause the huge body of the Form Realm Heaven (the highest heaven), which is 16,000 yojanas (units of length), to move in an instant?

Treatise: What if it is said that although small, it appears to be pervasive and active?

Commentary: This narrates their defense: This 'self' cannot pervade and activate the entire body in an instant, but rather activates it sequentially, because it is extremely fast, like a spinning fire wheel.

Treatise: Then, the 'self' that you cling to should be impermanent and non-singular.

Commentary: The 'self' that you cling to should not be constant and unique, because it has coming and going (movement), like a fire wheel. Anything that has coming and going is not constant and unique. Here are two inferences: one challenges its impermanence, and the other challenges its non-singularity. Together, there are three inferences used to refute the third view. In total, there are twenty-one inferences used to refute the three types of attachments. Here, the three views of 'self' are refuted, which is the same as what is said in the second and third volumes of the Hundred Treatises.

Treatise: Furthermore, there are three types of 'self' that you cling to.

Commentary: This is the second part, separately narrating the three views, while also refuting the views of the Hinayana Buddhism. It is divided into two parts: first narrating the views, and then refuting them.

Treatise: The first is that the 'self' is identical to the skandhas (the five aggregates, the elements that constitute individual experience).

Commentary: This is like the first of the four views mentioned in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and others. Some believe that the essence of the 'self' is the skandhas, such as the twenty statements, etc. Most ordinary people in the world hold this view.

Treatise: The second is that the 'self' is separate from the skandhas.

Commentary: That is, the essence of the 'self' is not the skandhas. The three views mentioned earlier all belong to this category. 'Separate' means different. The essence is different, so it is called 'separate'. Otherwise, if it cannot cover all views, it cannot be said to be exhaustive. The four views in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra refer to the latter three. Although the 'self' dwells in the skandhas, or dwells outside the skandhas, or does not dwell in the skandhas, nor is it outside the skandhas, all belong to the view of being separate from the skandhas.

Treatise: The third is that the 'self' is neither identical to nor separate from the skandhas.

Commentary: The Vatsa clan of heretics, also known as the Vatsiputriya heretics. Addressed in male voice. After joining the Buddhist order, they were called the Vatsiputriya school. Pāṃsucīra (name).

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部。女聲中呼。即是一也。上古有仙居山寂處。貪心不已。遂染母牛。因遂生男流諸苗裔。此後種類皆言犢子。即婆羅門之一姓也。涅槃經說犢子外道歸佛出家。此後門徒相傳不絕。今時此部是彼苗裔。遠襲為名名犢子部。正量部等亦作此計。然廣百論第二．三卷唯有三種。對法第一。瑜伽第六．及六十四．顯揚第十並有四種。然今此文列有三種。義寬於瑜伽。彼無第三非即離計。經部本計。我亦非離蘊。偏破犢子如俱舍論第二十九並三十說。然薩婆多等。敘外道計無離蘊者。以二十句等我見等中。唯即蘊故。如毗婆沙第八卷。問為有離蘊計為我耶。彼答言無。諸所執我一切皆緣五取蘊故。緣蘊外無不生心故。今者大乘。說有離蘊計為我者。如瑜伽等說。然亦釋經一切皆緣五取蘊起。至下當知。此據影像相分為論。必須有故。所緣緣體非無法故。非據本質。本質諸蘊或復無故。然今大乘影像而言。緣無心不生。本質而說。緣無心亦起。薩婆多說緣有心生。無即不起。經部師說緣無心得生。不要于有。大乘一念即俱得緣。獨無不生。俱無得起。故三宗別。

論。初即蘊我至非常一故。

述曰。破我體即蘊我應非我相。量云。我應非常。以即蘊故。猶如蘊性。彼宗所計我體即蘊。然體仍常。故為此破。破一比

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 部。女聲中呼。這（犢子部）就是其中之一。上古時代有仙人居住在寂靜的山中，但貪心沒有止境，竟然與母牛交合，因此生下男子，成為諸多少數民族的祖先。此後，這些民族都自稱為『犢子』，也就是婆羅門的一個姓氏。《涅槃經》中說，犢子外道皈依佛門出家。此後，他們的門徒世代相傳，沒有斷絕。現在這個犢子部就是他們的後裔，沿用古老的名稱，稱為犢子部。正量部等也持有類似的觀點。然而，《廣百論》第二、三卷中只提到三種（我），《對法》第一，《瑜伽師地論》第六及六十四，《顯揚聖教論》第十中都有四種（我）。但現在這篇文章列出了三種（我），其含義比《瑜伽師地論》更寬泛，因為《瑜伽師地論》沒有將『離蘊計』作為一種（我），而經部本來就認為，『我』並非與『蘊』分離的。對犢子部的批判，可以參考《俱舍論》第二十九和第三十卷。然而，薩婆多等宗派敘述外道的觀點時，認為沒有『離蘊』的說法，因為在二十句等我見中，『我』只是『即蘊』。如《毗婆沙論》第八卷中問：『是否有離開五蘊而計為我的情況？』回答是：『沒有。』因為他們所執著的『我』，一切都是緣於五取蘊，離開五蘊就不會產生心識。現在大乘佛教說有離開五蘊而計為我的情況，如《瑜伽師地論》等所說。然而，也解釋說一切經文都是緣於五取蘊而生起，這一點將在後面說明。這指的是影像相分而說的，因為必須要有影像相分。所緣緣的本體不是沒有法的，不是指本質。本質的諸蘊有時可能不存在。然而，現在大乘佛教就影像而言，緣于無心則不生；就本質而言，緣于無心也會生起。薩婆多宗認為緣于有心則生，無則不起。經部師認為緣于無心也能生，不一定要有心。大乘佛教認為一念之間可以同時緣于有和無，只有獨一無二的『無』才不會生起。同時俱無也能生起。所以這三個宗派的觀點不同。

論：最初的『即蘊我』，導致『非常一』的結論。

述記：如果『我』的本體就是『蘊』，那麼『我』就不應該是『我』的相狀。可以這樣論證：『我』應該是無常的，因為它就是『蘊』，就像『蘊』的性質一樣。他們宗派所認為的『我』的本體就是『蘊』，但本體仍然是常的，所以用這個來破斥。破斥『一』的比量。

【English Translation】 English version: The 'Pudgalavada' (Pudgalavada: a Buddhist school that posited the existence of a 'person' or 'pudgala' as neither identical to nor different from the skandhas) is one of them. In ancient times, there was an immortal dwelling in a secluded mountain, but his greed was insatiable. He even had intercourse with a cow, resulting in the birth of a son who became the ancestor of various ethnic groups. Thereafter, these groups all referred to themselves as 'calf-born,' which is a surname of the Brahmins. The Nirvana Sutra states that the heretical 'calf-born' converted to Buddhism and became monks. Subsequently, their disciples continued to transmit their teachings without interruption. The current Pudgalavada is their descendant, inheriting the ancient name. The Sautrantika (Sautrantika: a school of Buddhist philosophy that emphasizes the importance of the sutras) and other schools also hold similar views. However, the Hundred Verses only mentions three types of 'self,' while the Abhidharma, Yogacarabhumi, and Xianyang Shengjiao Lun all mention four types. But this text lists three types, and its meaning is broader than that of the Yogacarabhumi, because the Yogacarabhumi does not include 'separate-skandha conception' as a type of 'self,' while the Sautrantika originally believed that the 'self' is not separate from the skandhas. The criticism of the Pudgalavada can be found in the Abhidharmakosa . However, when the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins: an early Buddhist school that believed in the existence of all things in the past, present, and future) describe the views of heretics, they believe that there is no 'separate-skandha' view, because in the twenty sentences and other views of self, the 'self' is only 'identical to the skandhas.' As the Vibhasa asks: 'Is there a case of conceiving of a self separate from the skandhas?' The answer is: 'No.' Because all the 'self' they cling to is based on the five aggregates of clinging, and without the skandhas, no consciousness arises. Now, Mahayana Buddhism says that there is a case of conceiving of a self separate from the skandhas, as stated in the Yogacarabhumi. However, it also explains that all sutras arise from the five aggregates of clinging, which will be explained later. This refers to the image-aspect division, because there must be an image-aspect division. The object-condition's substance is not without dharma, not referring to the essence. The essence of the skandhas may sometimes not exist. However, now Mahayana Buddhism says that in terms of the image, it does not arise from the absence of mind; in terms of the essence, it arises even from the absence of mind. The Sarvastivadins say that it arises from the presence of mind, and does not arise from the absence of mind. The Sautrantikas say that it can arise from the absence of mind, not necessarily from the presence of mind. Mahayana Buddhism believes that in one thought, it can simultaneously arise from both presence and absence, and only the unique 'absence' does not arise. It can also arise from simultaneous absence. Therefore, the views of these three schools are different.

Treatise: The initial 'self-identical-to-skandhas' leads to the conclusion of 'impermanent and non-one.'

Commentary: If the substance of the 'self' is the 'skandhas,' then the 'self' should not be the appearance of 'self.' It can be argued that the 'self' should be impermanent, because it is the 'skandhas,' just like the nature of the 'skandhas.' Their school believes that the substance of the 'self' is the 'skandhas,' but the substance is still permanent, so this is used to refute it. The refutation of the 'one' is a comparison.

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量亦準此知。然瑜伽等更有別破。此既無文不能具引。此總緣蘊而起我見。得為破也。

論。又內諸色至有質礙故。

述曰。自下別破二十句中五別計我。且破色我量云。內諸色處。定非實我。有質礙故。如外諸色。根及屬色皆名內色。唯破內色我非計外我者。以外色無作．受用故。

論。心心所法至待眾緣故。

述曰。自下破餘四蘊　不恒相續。是間斷義待眾緣者。籍緣起義。量云。心心所法。亦非實我。不恒相續故。待眾緣故。喻如燈聲　此既二因。比量亦二。四蘊非色體類是同。合為量破。並如色蘊別破亦得。此破于蘊計為實我。說假我者亦不遮之。

前破心所即行蘊少分。行蘊少分中不相應行。既與心所別。故應別破之。

成唯識論述記卷第一

成唯識論述記卷第一(末)

沙門基撰

論。余行余色至非覺性故。

述曰。覺者覺察。心心所總名。心所法外余行．外處．及無表色。亦非實我。非覺性故。如虛空等。此中但合總為一量。行與色等各別為量。理亦不遮。因明之法遮他為論。言非覺性。不是翻顯心．心所性是覺性故許為實我。此兼遮計。非必有執。合七比量破初計也。

論。中離蘊我至無作受故。

述曰。破僧佉等計也

【現代漢語翻譯】 量的大小也應依此來理解。然而，《瑜伽師地論》等論著中有更詳細的破斥，這裡因為沒有原文，無法一一引用。總而言之，這是針對緣於五蘊而生起的我見進行破斥，是可以成立的。

論：又，內部的各種色法，因為具有質礙的緣故……

述記：以下分別破斥二十句中的五種不同的計我。首先破斥色我的量是：內部的各種色處，必定不是真實的我，因為具有質礙的緣故，就像外部的各種色法一樣。根和屬於根的色法都稱為內部的色法。這裡只破斥計執內部色法為我的觀點，而不是破斥計執外部色法為我的觀點，因為外部的色法沒有作用和受用。

論：心和心所法，因為不恒常相續，依賴眾多因緣的緣故……

述記：以下破斥其餘四蘊。『不恒常相續』，是間斷的意思。『待眾緣者』，是憑藉因緣生起的意思。量是：心和心所法，也不是真實的我，因為不恒常相續的緣故，依賴眾多因緣的緣故，比如燈光和聲音。這裡有兩個因，所以比量也有兩個。四蘊和色蘊的體類相同，可以合為一個量來破斥，也可以像色蘊一樣分別破斥。這裡破斥的是將五蘊計為真實我的觀點，對於說假我的觀點，並不遮止。

前面破斥的心所，是行蘊（saṃskāra-skandha）的少部分。行蘊的少部分中，不相應行（citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra）既然與心所不同，所以應該分別破斥。

《成唯識論述記》卷第一

《成唯識論述記》卷第一（末）

沙門基 撰

論：其餘的行蘊、其餘的色法，因為不是覺性的緣故……

述記：『覺』是覺察的意思，心和心所總稱為覺。心所法之外的其餘行蘊、外處以及無表色（avijñapti-rūpa），也不是真實的我，因為不是覺性的緣故，比如虛空等。這裡只是合併總為一個量，行蘊和色等各自作為一個量，道理上也不禁止。因明（hetu-vidyā）的方法是以遮止他人為論。說『非覺性』，不是反過來顯示心和心所的性質是覺性，所以允許它們是真實的我。這兼帶遮止這種觀點，不一定有人執著。合併七個比量來破斥最初的計我。

論：中間離開五蘊的我，因為沒有作用和受用的緣故……

述記：破斥僧佉（Sāṃkhya）等外道的計我。

【English Translation】 The extent should also be understood accordingly. However, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other treatises have more detailed refutations, which cannot be fully cited here due to the lack of the original text. In summary, this is a refutation of the self-view that arises from the aggregates, and it is valid.

Treatise: Furthermore, the internal forms, because they have material obstruction...

Commentary: Below, among the twenty sentences of separate refutations, there are five separate conceptions of self. First, the measure for refuting the self of form is: the internal form-places are definitely not the real self, because they have material obstruction, like the external forms. The roots and the forms belonging to the roots are all called internal forms. Here, only the view of considering internal forms as the self is refuted, not the view of considering external forms as the self, because external forms have no function or enjoyment.

Treatise: Mental functions and mental events, because they are not constant and continuous, and depend on many conditions...

Commentary: Below, the remaining four aggregates are refuted. 'Not constant and continuous' means intermittent. 'Depending on many conditions' means arising by means of conditions. The measure is: mental functions and mental events are also not the real self, because they are not constant and continuous, and depend on many conditions, like the light of a lamp and sound. Here there are two reasons, so there are also two analogies. The nature of the four aggregates is the same as that of the form aggregate, so they can be combined into one measure for refutation, or they can be refuted separately like the form aggregate. This refutes the view of considering the aggregates as the real self, and does not prevent the view of speaking of a provisional self.

The mental events refuted earlier are a small part of the volitional aggregate (saṃskāra-skandha). Among the small part of the volitional aggregate, the non-associated formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra) are different from the mental events, so they should be refuted separately.

Commentary on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, Volume 1

Commentary on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, Volume 1 (End)

Composed by Śramaṇa Kuiji

Treatise: The remaining volitional formations, the remaining forms, because they are not of the nature of awareness...

Commentary: 'Awareness' means discernment. Mental functions and mental events are collectively called awareness. The remaining volitional formations outside of mental events, the external sense bases, and the non-manifesting forms (avijñapti-rūpa) are also not the real self, because they are not of the nature of awareness, like space, etc. Here, they are only combined into one general measure. It is not forbidden in principle to have the volitional formations and forms, etc., as separate measures. The method of epistemology (hetu-vidyā) is to refute others as the argument. Saying 'not of the nature of awareness' does not mean to conversely show that the nature of mental functions and mental events is awareness, so they are allowed to be the real self. This also refutes this view, but it is not necessarily that someone holds it. Combining seven analogies to refute the initial conception of self.

Treatise: The self that is separate from the aggregates, because it has no function or enjoyment...

Commentary: Refuting the conception of self of the Sāṃkhya school, etc.

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。量云。所計之我。應無作．受。蘊不攝故。如虛空等。文中但有宗及同喻。因如所標。故略不敘。文以一量破中計也。今助破云。所計之我。應非實我。蘊不攝故。如虛空等。此下準作一一應思。

論。后俱非我至非實我故。

述曰。破犢子等也。彼宗計我與所依蘊不即不離。然別有體。非常無常。如俱舍論二十九卷敘難依義。今解。依者依止。蘊上施設。不即離故。恐繁不述。量云。汝所執我。應非實我。因云。許依蘊立非即離蘊故。如瓶．盆等。

此中法言應非實我。簡別真如。真如依蘊亦不即離。然非實我故無不定。因中言許無隨一過。宗等次第準義釋文。彼計瓶等依於四塵蘊等而立。然與四塵不即不離。故以為喻。

論。又既不可說至是我非我。

述曰。彼立五法藏。三世．無為．及不可說。彼計此我非常無常。不可說是有為無為也。今者論主直以我非我而為例也。應立量云。汝所執我。應不可說是我。許不可說是有為無為故。如龜毛等　以二比量破第三計。若破俱句。他宗亦說我非俱句。不可說是我非我故犯相符過。又無同喻。今破是我兼說非我。應定說是蘊。不應說非蘊。又量云。汝所執我。於我非我聚義亦應不可說。許不可說故。如有為無為義　今者文意不令隨入我

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：量云：你們所設想的『我』（Ātman，靈魂），應該沒有作用和感受，因為它不被五蘊（Skandha，構成個體存在的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）所包含，就像虛空一樣。文中只有宗（命題）和同喻（相同的例子），因為因（理由）如前面所標示，所以省略不敘述。這段文字用一個量式來破斥中觀派的觀點。現在輔助破斥說：你們所設想的『我』，應該不是真實的『我』，因為它不被五蘊所包含，就像虛空一樣。以下可以類推，一一進行思考。 論：后俱非我至非實我故。 述曰：這是爲了破斥犢子部等。他們的宗義認為『我』與所依的五蘊不即不離，但另外有自體，非常也非無常。如《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa，佛教論書）第二十九卷敘述『難依』的意義。現在解釋，『依』是指依止，在五蘊上施設，不即不離，恐怕繁瑣所以不詳細敘述。量云：你所執著的『我』，應該不是真實的『我』，因為許可是依蘊而立，並非與蘊不即不離，就像瓶子、盆子等。 此中法言『應非實我』，是爲了簡別真如（Tathātā，事物的真實本性）。真如依蘊，也不即不離，但並非實我，所以沒有不定。因中說『許』沒有隨一過。宗等次第按照意義解釋文字。他們認為瓶子等依靠四塵蘊等而立，然而與四塵不即不離，所以用作比喻。 論：又既不可說至是我非我。 述曰：他們立五法藏，即三世（過去、現在、未來）、無為（Nirvana，不生不滅的境界）以及不可說。他們認為這個『我』非常也非無常，不可說是有為（Saṃskṛta，由因緣和合而成的）或無為。現在論主直接以『我』和『非我』作為例子。應該立量云：你所執著的『我』，應該不可說是『我』，因為許可是不可說是有為或無為，就像龜毛等。用兩個比量來破斥第三種觀點。如果破斥『俱句』，其他宗派也說『我』不是『俱句』，不可說是『我非我』，所以犯了相符的過失。又沒有同喻。現在破斥『是我』兼說『非我』，應該定說是蘊，不應該說非蘊。又量云：你所執著的『我』，在我非我的聚義中也應該不可說，因為許可是不可說，如有為無為義。現在的文意是不讓隨入『我』。

【English Translation】 English version: Quantifier: The 'self' (Ātman, soul) that you conceive should be without action and sensation, because it is not included in the five Skandhas (the five aggregates that constitute individual existence: form, sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness), just like empty space. The text only contains the proposition (thesis) and the example (homologous example), because the reason (hetu) is as indicated earlier, so it is omitted. This text uses a quantifier to refute the views of the Madhyamaka school. Now, to assist in the refutation, it says: The 'self' that you conceive should not be a real 'self' because it is not included in the five Skandhas, just like empty space. The following can be inferred and considered one by one. Treatise: Later, both are not self, to not being a real self. Commentary: This is to refute the Vātsīputrīyas and others. Their doctrine holds that the 'self' is neither identical nor different from the Skandhas on which it depends, but has a separate entity, which is neither permanent nor impermanent. As the Abhidharmakośa (Buddhist treatise) Volume 29 describes the meaning of 'difficult to rely on'. Now explain, 'rely on' means to depend on, established on the Skandhas, neither identical nor different, fearing complexity, so it is not described in detail. Quantifier: The 'self' that you cling to should not be a real 'self' because it is permitted to be established based on the Skandhas, not being neither identical nor different from the Skandhas, just like bottles, pots, etc. Here, the statement 'should not be a real self' is to distinguish it from Suchness (Tathātā, the true nature of things). Suchness depends on the Skandhas, and is also neither identical nor different, but it is not a real self, so there is no uncertainty. In the reason, saying 'permit' does not have the fault of following one. The order of proposition, etc., explains the text according to the meaning. They believe that bottles, etc., are established based on the four material elements, etc., but they are neither identical nor different from the four material elements, so they are used as metaphors. Treatise: Also, since it cannot be said to be self or not self. Commentary: They establish the five Dharma treasuries, namely the three times (past, present, future), the unconditioned (Nirvana, the state of non-birth and non-death), and the unspeakable. They believe that this 'self' is neither permanent nor impermanent, and it cannot be said to be conditioned (Saṃskṛta, formed by the combination of causes and conditions) or unconditioned. Now the treatise master directly uses 'self' and 'not self' as examples. It should be established as a quantifier: The 'self' that you cling to should not be said to be 'self' because it is permitted to be unspeakable as conditioned or unconditioned, just like turtle hair, etc. Use two quantifiers to refute the third view. If refuting 'both sentences', other schools also say that 'self' is not 'both sentences', and it cannot be said to be 'self and not self', so it commits the fault of conformity. Also, there is no homologous example. Now refuting 'is self' also says 'not self', it should be definitely said to be Skandhas, and should not be said to be not Skandhas. Also, quantifier: The 'self' that you cling to should also be unspeakable in the meaning of the collection of self and not self, because it is permitted to be unspeakable, like the meaning of conditioned and unconditioned. The current meaning of the text is not to let it follow into 'self'.

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非我俱句。故無過失。

論。故彼所執實我不成。

述曰。此總結也。合十比量破此三計。

論。又諸所執至為無思慮。

述曰。自下第三總破上二差別執我。于中有四。初有思慮。無思慮破。二有作用。無作用破。三我見境。非我見境破。四我非我見境。我見不緣破。今總問前所執諸我故言諸也　有思慮者。意問僧佉。彼說神我體是思故　無思慮者。問吠世等。然僧佉計。神我體性常住。除自性外二十三諦體性雖常。仍有轉變無常之相。今難彼我亦應同彼二十三諦。體性俱應轉變無常。

論。若有思慮至有思慮故。

述曰。汝我體。應是轉變無常。作用或有不起時故。如許大等。若不約用難令體亦轉變。即無同喻。彼不許有滅無常故。若直難用。彼思慮用有時不起故犯相符過。雖自性體常。用是無常。無不定失。非共許故。又以體例用亦應無常。相即亦得。

論。若無思慮至亦不受果。

述曰。即破吠世等。文易可知。量云。汝等實我。應不能作業亦不能受果。許無思慮故。猶如虛空。作業受果二比量也。即除僧佉余計神我皆同此破。

論。故所執我理俱不成。

述曰。雙結二也。

論。又諸所執至為無作用。

述曰。更重第二雙破前

【現代漢語翻譯】 非我俱句。故無過失。 現代漢語譯本：如果『我』和構成要素（俱句）不是同一的，那麼就沒有過失。

論。故彼所執實我不成。 現代漢語譯本：因此，他們所執著的『真我』是不成立的。

述曰。此總結也。合十比量破此三計。 現代漢語譯本：這是總結。結合十個比量來破斥這三種計度。

論。又諸所執至為無思慮。 現代漢語譯本：此外，所有執著的『我』，要麼是有思慮的，要麼是無思慮的。

述曰。自下第三總破上二差別執我。于中有四。初有思慮。無思慮破。二有作用。無作用破。三我見境。非我見境破。四我非我見境。我見不緣破。今總問前所執諸我故言諸也　有思慮者。意問僧佉（Samkhya）。彼說神我體是思故　無思慮者。問吠世（Vaisheshika）等。然僧佉計。神我體性常住。除自性外二十三諦體性雖常。仍有轉變無常之相。今難彼我亦應同彼二十三諦。體性俱應轉變無常。 現代漢語譯本：下面第三部分總破斥前面兩種不同的執『我』。其中有四點：第一，破斥有思慮和無思慮的『我』；第二，破斥有作用和無作用的『我』；第三，破斥『我』是見境和『我』不是見境；第四，破斥『我』和非『我』是見境，『我』見不緣。現在總的提問前面所執著的各種『我』，所以用『諸』字。所謂『有思慮者』，意在問僧佉（Samkhya），他們說神我的本體是思慮。所謂『無思慮者』，是問吠世（Vaisheshika）等。然而僧佉認為，神我的體性是常住的，除了自性之外，二十三種諦的體性雖然也是常的，但仍有轉變無常的相。現在責難他們的『我』也應該和那二十三種諦一樣，本體都應該轉變無常。

論。若有思慮至有思慮故。 現代漢語譯本：如果『我』有思慮，那麼『我』就應該像思慮一樣是無常的。

述曰。汝我體。應是轉變無常。作用或有不起時故。如許大等。若不約用難令體亦轉變。即無同喻。彼不許有滅無常故。若直難用。彼思慮用有時不起故犯相符過。雖自性體常。用是無常。無不定失。非共許故。又以體例用亦應無常。相即亦得。 現代漢語譯本：你的『我』的本體，應該是轉變無常的，因為作用有時不生起。比如許大等。如果不從作用方面入手，很難讓本體也轉變。那就沒有同喻了，因為他們不承認有滅和無常。如果直接責難作用，他們會說思慮的作用有時不生起，所以犯了相符過失。雖然自性的本體是常的，但作用是無常的，沒有不定的過失，因為這不是共同認可的。又以本體為例，作用也應該是無常的，相即也可以。

論。若無思慮至亦不受果。 現代漢語譯本：如果『我』沒有思慮，那麼『我』就不能造業，也不能受果報。

述曰。即破吠世等。文易可知。量云。汝等實我。應不能作業亦不能受果。許無思慮故。猶如虛空。作業受果二比量也。即除僧佉余計神我皆同此破。 現代漢語譯本：這是破斥吠世（Vaisheshika）等。文義容易理解。比量說：你們的真我，應該不能造業，也不能受果報，因為你們承認它是沒有思慮的，就像虛空一樣。這是作業和受果的兩個比量。除了僧佉（Samkhya）之外，其餘計度神我的都同樣被這樣破斥。

論。故所執我理俱不成。 現代漢語譯本：因此，所執著的『我』在道理上都不成立。

述曰。雙結二也。 現代漢語譯本：這是雙重結論。

論。又諸所執至為無作用。 現代漢語譯本：此外，所有執著的『我』，要麼是有作用的，要麼是無作用的。

述曰。更重第二雙破前 現代漢語譯本：更進一步，第二次雙重破斥前面。

【English Translation】 非我俱句。故無過失。 English version: If the 'self' and the aggregates (skandhas) are not the same, then there is no fault.

論。故彼所執實我不成。 English version: Therefore, their adherence to a 'true self' is not established.

述曰。此總結也。合十比量破此三計。 English version: This is a summary. Combining ten analogies to refute these three views.

論。又諸所執至為無思慮。 English version: Furthermore, all the 'selves' that are adhered to are either with thought or without thought.

述曰。自下第三總破上二差別執我。于中有四。初有思慮。無思慮破。二有作用。無作用破。三我見境。非我見境破。四我非我見境。我見不緣破。今總問前所執諸我故言諸也　有思慮者。意問僧佉（Samkhya）。彼說神我體是思故　無思慮者。問吠世（Vaisheshika）等。然僧佉計。神我體性常住。除自性外二十三諦體性雖常。仍有轉變無常之相。今難彼我亦應同彼二十三諦。體性俱應轉變無常。 English version: The third part below generally refutes the two different attachments to 'self' mentioned earlier. There are four points: First, refuting the 'self' with thought and without thought; second, refuting the 'self' with action and without action; third, refuting 'self' as an object of perception and 'self' as not an object of perception; fourth, refuting 'self' and non-'self' as objects of perception, and 'self'-perception not arising. Now, a general question is posed regarding the various 'selves' adhered to earlier, hence the use of the word 'various'. The 'with thought' refers to questioning the Samkhya (僧佉), who say that the essence of the divine self is thought. The 'without thought' refers to questioning the Vaisheshika (吠世) and others. However, the Samkhya believe that the nature of the divine self is permanent. Apart from the self-nature, the nature of the twenty-three principles, although also permanent, still have the aspect of change and impermanence. Now, it is argued that their 'self' should also be like those twenty-three principles, with the essence also changing and impermanent.

論。若有思慮至有思慮故。 English version: If the 'self' has thought, then the 'self' should be impermanent like thought.

述曰。汝我體。應是轉變無常。作用或有不起時故。如許大等。若不約用難令體亦轉變。即無同喻。彼不許有滅無常故。若直難用。彼思慮用有時不起故犯相符過。雖自性體常。用是無常。無不定失。非共許故。又以體例用亦應無常。相即亦得。 English version: Your 'self's' essence should be changing and impermanent, because its function sometimes does not arise, like the permitted great elements, etc. If one does not start from the aspect of function, it is difficult to make the essence also change. Then there is no similar example, because they do not admit destruction and impermanence. If one directly challenges the function, they will say that the function of thought sometimes does not arise, so it commits the fault of correspondence. Although the essence of self-nature is permanent, the function is impermanent, and there is no indefinite fault, because this is not commonly accepted. Also, taking the essence as an example, the function should also be impermanent; identity is also possible.

論。若無思慮至亦不受果。 English version: If the 'self' has no thought, then the 'self' cannot create karma and cannot receive karmic retribution.

述曰。即破吠世等。文易可知。量云。汝等實我。應不能作業亦不能受果。許無思慮故。猶如虛空。作業受果二比量也。即除僧佉余計神我皆同此破。 English version: This refutes the Vaisheshika (吠世) and others. The meaning of the text is easy to understand. The analogy says: Your true self should not be able to create karma, nor be able to receive karmic retribution, because you admit that it has no thought, just like empty space. These are two analogies for creating karma and receiving retribution. Except for the Samkhya (僧佉), all other views that conceive of a divine self are refuted in the same way.

論。故所執我理俱不成。 English version: Therefore, the adhered-to 'self' is not established in terms of reason.

述曰。雙結二也。 English version: This is a double conclusion.

論。又諸所執至為無作用。 English version: Furthermore, all the 'selves' that are adhered to are either with action or without action.

述曰。更重第二雙破前 English version: Further, a second double refutation of the previous.

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說。此即問定也。

論。若有作用至應是無常。

述曰。諸師作．受計各不同。作用而言。作受作用並計是有。有用量云。我應無常。有作用故。如手．足等。若對數論。轉變如手等。若對吠世等。滅壞如足等。文勢雖合義意不同。虛空．真如此無作用。故無不定。

論。若無作用至二俱不成。

述曰。無有一我無作．受用。若數論師無作者用亦名無用。若動轉作用勢用作用。勝．數俱無。十句說故。離系子等我有動轉。故是前門。余是後門。又諸所計得解脫時。我並無用無用。量云。所執之我。應非實我。無作用故。如兔角等。虛空亦得。無作用故。文言非實我。不言非實有。故彼真如非不定失。若爾寧言常樂我凈。此非定實我。性離言故。言我者是假說也。此無用計諸執並非。無有一師計我無用。然破無動作．勢用之用。故得為難　或綺互破作．受之用。謂應量云。僧佉等我。應非實我。無唯作者用故。如虛空等　吠世等我。應非實我。無唯受者用故。如兔角等　此中遮無唯受者用。非許唯有受者用性便為實我。不爾本識及僧佉我應是實我。但言兔角無唯受者用。不言兔角有作．受用。故此非失。以因明者遮詮門故。文結易知。故不別釋。

論。又諸所執至所緣境不。

述

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 說：這就是問定的意思。

論：如果『我』有作用，那麼它就應該是無常的。

述曰：各個學派對於『作』（karma, 業）和『受』（experiencing, 感受）的看法各不相同。就作用而言，『作』和『受』都被認為是存在的。可以用量式來論證：我應該是無常的，因為它有作用，就像手和腳一樣。如果針對數論派（Samkhya），『我』的轉變就像手一樣；如果針對吠世史迦派（Vaisheshika），『我』的滅壞就像腳一樣。雖然文字上可以勉強符合，但實際意義卻不同。虛空（Akasha）和真如（Tathata）沒有作用，所以不是不定的。

論：如果『我』沒有作用，那麼『作』和『受』兩者都不能成立。

述曰：沒有一個『我』是沒有『作』和『受』的。如果數論師認為沒有作者和受者，那也叫做無用。無論是動轉的作用還是勢用的作用，勝論派（Vaisheshika）和數論派都沒有，因為他們說了十句義。離系子（Ajivikas）等認為『我』有動轉，所以屬於前一種情況。其餘的屬於后一種情況。此外，各個學派所認為的解脫之時，『我』都是無用的。可以用量式來論證：你們所執著的『我』，應該不是真實的『我』，因為它沒有作用，就像兔角一樣。虛空也可以這樣說，因為它沒有作用。文中的意思是說『非實我』，而不是說『非實有』，所以他們的真如不是不定的過失。如果這樣，那還說什麼常、樂、我、凈呢？這並非是定實之『我』，因為它的自性是離言的。說『我』，只是假說而已。這種無用的說法，各個執著都不是這樣認為的。沒有一個學派認為『我』是沒有用的。然而，這裡破斥的是沒有動作和勢用的作用，所以可以作為一種責難。或者可以互相破斥『作』和『受』的作用。可以用量式來論證：僧佉派（Samkhya）的『我』，應該不是真實的『我』，因為它沒有唯獨作者的作用，就像虛空一樣。吠世史迦派（Vaisheshika）的『我』，應該不是真實的『我』，因為它沒有唯獨受者的作用，就像兔角一樣。這裡遮止的是沒有唯獨受者的作用，並不是說允許唯有受者的作用的自性就是真實的『我』。如果那樣，本識（alaya-vijñana）和僧佉派的『我』就應該是真實的『我』了。只是說兔角沒有唯獨受者的作用，並不是說兔角有『作』和『受』的作用。所以這不是過失。因為因明（hetu-vidya）是通過遮詮的方式來表達的。文義容易理解，所以不另外解釋。

論：此外，各個學派所執著的『我』，是否是所緣境呢？

述

【English Translation】 English version: Said: This is what is meant by 'asking to determine'.

Treatise: If 'self' has function, then it should be impermanent.

Commentary: The various schools have different views on 'karma' (action) and 'experiencing' (feeling). In terms of function, both 'karma' and 'experiencing' are considered to exist. It can be argued using a logical statement: 'Self' should be impermanent because it has function, like hands and feet. If addressing the Samkhya school, the transformation of 'self' is like a hand; if addressing the Vaisheshika school, the destruction of 'self' is like a foot. Although the wording can be勉強 fit, the actual meaning is different. Akasha (space) and Tathata (suchness) have no function, so it is not indefinite.

Treatise: If 'self' has no function, then both 'karma' and 'experiencing' cannot be established.

Commentary: There is no 'self' without 'karma' and 'experiencing'. If the Samkhya masters believe that there is no actor and no experiencer, that is also called useless. Whether it is the function of movement or the function of potential, neither the Vaisheshika nor the Samkhya have it, because they said ten meanings. The Ajivikas, etc., believe that 'self' has movement, so it belongs to the former case. The rest belong to the latter case. In addition, at the time of liberation that various schools believe in, 'self' is useless. It can be argued using a logical statement: The 'self' that you cling to should not be the real 'self' because it has no function, like a rabbit's horn. The same can be said of space because it has no function. The text means 'not a real self', not 'not really existing', so their suchness is not an indefinite fault. If so, then what about saying permanence, bliss, self, and purity? This is not a fixed and real 'self' because its nature is beyond words. Saying 'self' is just a false statement. This kind of useless statement is not what various attachments think. No school believes that 'self' is useless. However, what is refuted here is the function without action and potential, so it can be used as a difficulty. Or, the functions of 'karma' and 'experiencing' can be refuted each other. It can be argued using a logical statement: The 'self' of the Samkhya school should not be the real 'self' because it does not have the function of only the actor, like space. The 'self' of the Vaisheshika school should not be the real 'self' because it does not have the function of only the experiencer, like a rabbit's horn. What is prevented here is the function of only the experiencer, not that allowing the nature of only the experiencer is the real 'self'. If so, the alaya-vijñana (store consciousness) and the 'self' of the Samkhya school should be the real 'self'. It is only said that the rabbit's horn does not have the function of only the experiencer, not that the rabbit's horn has the function of 'karma' and 'experiencing'. So this is not a fault. Because hetu-vidya (logic) is expressed through the method of exclusion. The meaning of the text is easy to understand, so it will not be explained separately.

Treatise: Furthermore, is the 'self' that various schools cling to the object of perception?

Commentary:

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曰。此即第三亦總徴前內外道也。

論。若非我見至知實有我。

述曰。破本計非我見所緣　量云。汝所執我。應非是我。許非我見之所緣故。如色．聲等　又此量意云。汝能緣我心．心所法。應不知我。非我見故。如緣余心　文雖無救。以理為之。如緣真如心．心所法。雖不定作真如之解。得成緣如。緣我之心亦同于彼。雖不作我解。何妨得緣我。緣如之心雖不作如解。真如仍名如心緣。我見雖不作我解。其我應名我見緣。故為此解助破彼失。

論。若是我見至如實知故。

述曰。破彼我是我見所緣。量云。緣我我見。應非倒見。如實知故。順所緣故。如緣色等心　外道小乘執有我者所信之教。皆許我見雖順所緣是顛倒體。斷之成聖。無我之心雖不稱境。違于染故名非顛倒。如緣真心作有如解即是法執。若作無解。雖不稱如仍因成聖。

論。若爾如何至稱讚無我。

述曰。言至教者。至實教也。如二十抄。汝若言爾亦有我見非顛倒者。何故汝教中。我見染故斷之成聖。要無我見能得涅槃。故毀我見贊無我也。此就他宗相違為難。

論。言無我見至沉淪生死。

述曰。汝宗自言。起我見者沉淪生死。以是染故。起無我見能證涅槃。以是凈故。今就彼宗故得成難。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：這第三個問題實際上是總括地駁斥了前述的內外道觀點。

論：如果不是因為我見（ātma-dṛṣṭi，認為有我的錯誤見解）而認為真實存在『我』（ātman，一種恒常不變的實體）。

述曰：這是爲了破斥他們原本認為『我見』所緣取的對象不是『我』的觀點。可以這樣論證：你所執著的『我』，應該不是真正的『我』，因為它不是『非我見』所緣取的對象，就像色、聲等一樣。此外，這個論證的意圖是說：你能夠緣取『我』的心和心所法（caitta，心理活動），應該是不瞭解『我』的，因為它不是『我見』，就像緣取其他人的心一樣。經文雖然沒有明確的辯護，但可以從道理上進行解釋。就像緣取真如（tathātā，事物的真實本性）的心和心所法，即使不一定理解為真如，也能成立為緣取真如。緣取『我』的心也與此類似，即使不理解為『我』，又有什麼妨礙它緣取『我』呢？緣取真如的心即使不理解為真如，真如仍然被稱為『如心』所緣取。『我見』即使不理解為『我』，它所緣取的對象也應該被稱為『我見』所緣取。因此，這樣的解釋有助於駁斥他們的錯誤。

論：如果是『我見』，那麼就應該像如實地瞭解事物一樣。

述曰：這是爲了破斥他們認為『我』是『我見』所緣取的對象。可以這樣論證：緣取『我』的『我見』，應該不是顛倒見（viparyāsa，錯誤的見解），因為它如實地瞭解事物，順應了所緣取的對象，就像緣取色等的心一樣。外道（tīrthika，佛教以外的宗教）和小乘（Hīnayāna，佛教的一個早期流派）執著于有『我』的人所信仰的教義，都認為『我見』雖然順應了所緣取的對象，但其本質是顛倒的，斷除它才能成聖。而無我的心雖然不符合實情，但因為它違背了染污，所以被稱為不是顛倒。就像緣取真心（真實的心）卻理解為有『如』（tathātā）的見解，那就是法執（dharma-graha，對法的執著）。如果理解為沒有『如』，即使不符合『如』，仍然可以因此成聖。

論：如果這樣，為什麼（你們的經典）稱讚無我（anātman，沒有『我』）呢？

述曰：這裡所說的『至教』，是指真實的教義。就像《二十抄》所說：如果你說也有『我見』不是顛倒的，那麼為什麼你們的教義中，『我見』因為是染污的，所以要斷除它才能成聖？一定要有『無我見』才能證得涅槃（nirvāṇa，解脫），所以才要毀壞『我見』，讚歎『無我』。這是就其他宗派的自相矛盾之處進行詰難。

論：說『無我見』會導致沉淪生死（saṃsāra，輪迴）。

述曰：你們宗派自己說，生起『我見』的人會沉淪生死，因為它是染污的。生起『無我見』的人能夠證得涅槃，因為它是清凈的。現在就是根據他們的宗派來提出詰難。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: This third point is actually a general refutation of the aforementioned views of both internal and external paths (schools of thought).

Treatise: If it were not for the 'view of self' (ātma-dṛṣṭi, the erroneous view of believing in a self) that one knows there truly exists a 'self' (ātman, a permanent and unchanging entity).

Commentary: This is to refute their original view that the object of the 'view of self' is not the 'self'. It can be argued as follows: The 'self' that you cling to should not be the real 'self', because it is not the object of the 'non-self view', just like form, sound, etc. Furthermore, the intention of this argument is to say: The mind and mental functions (caitta, mental activities) that you can apprehend as 'self' should not understand the 'self', because it is not the 'view of self', just like apprehending the minds of others. Although the text does not have an explicit defense, it can be explained logically. Just like the mind and mental functions that apprehend Suchness (tathātā, the true nature of things), even if it is not necessarily understood as Suchness, it can still be established as apprehending Suchness. The mind that apprehends the 'self' is similar to this; even if it is not understood as 'self', what prevents it from apprehending the 'self'? Even if the mind that apprehends Suchness does not understand it as Suchness, Suchness is still called what is apprehended by the 'Suchness-mind'. Even if the 'view of self' does not understand it as 'self', the object it apprehends should be called what is apprehended by the 'view of self'. Therefore, this explanation helps to refute their error.

Treatise: If it is the 'view of self', then it should be like knowing things as they truly are.

Commentary: This is to refute their view that the 'self' is the object of the 'view of self'. It can be argued as follows: The 'view of self' that apprehends the 'self' should not be a distorted view (viparyāsa, a mistaken view), because it knows things as they truly are, conforming to the object it apprehends, just like the mind that apprehends form, etc. The doctrines believed by those of the external paths (tīrthika, religions other than Buddhism) and the Hinayana (an early school of Buddhism) who cling to the existence of a 'self' all hold that although the 'view of self' conforms to the object it apprehends, its essence is distorted, and only by cutting it off can one become a saint. The mind of non-self, although it does not conform to reality, is called non-distorted because it goes against defilement. Just like apprehending the true mind (the real mind) but understanding it as having 'Suchness' (tathātā), that is attachment to dharma (dharma-graha, attachment to the teachings). If it is understood as not having 'Suchness', even if it does not conform to 'Suchness', one can still become a saint because of it.

Treatise: If that is the case, why do (your scriptures) praise non-self (anātman, the absence of a 'self')?

Commentary: The 'ultimate teaching' mentioned here refers to the true teaching. As stated in the 'Twenty Copies': If you say that there is also a 'view of self' that is not distorted, then why in your teachings is the 'view of self' defiled, so it must be cut off to become a saint? One must have the 'view of non-self' to attain Nirvana (nirvāṇa, liberation), so one must destroy the 'view of self' and praise 'non-self'. This is a challenge based on the self-contradiction of other schools.

Treatise: Saying that the 'view of non-self' leads to sinking into samsara (saṃsāra, the cycle of rebirth).

Commentary: Your own school says that those who give rise to the 'view of self' will sink into samsara because it is defiled. Those who give rise to the 'view of non-self' can attain Nirvana because it is pure. Now, the challenge is based on their own school.

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論。豈有邪見至沉淪生死。

述曰。此總結難。無我見是邪能證涅槃。不順所緣故。我見是正翻沉生死。能順境故。廣百論中亦作此難。

論。又諸我見至如緣余心。

述曰。此下第四總破前師。不須別說染凈之惠。但汝所說緣我之見。今皆破之。無相符過。應為量云。汝緣我之見。不緣于實我。宗也。有所緣故。因也。如緣我外色等之心。喻也。文有次第如是應知。然就彼計皆有我見不緣我生。如僧佉說吠世史迦作者我見。不緣實我生。是橫計故。余計相望準知亦爾。故今此宗。應有分別汝等各別言非橫計緣我之見方成有法。今大乘意。欲顯但是緣我之見。皆不緣于實我生故。不須分別。此破能緣不緣我起。

次破所緣定非實我。

論。我見所緣至如所餘法。

述曰。此中量云。我見所緣定非實我。宗也。是所緣故。因也。猶如所餘色等諸法。喻也。宗中如前亦應分別。彼等各計有我見境非實我故。

論。是故我見至種種計度。

述曰。此曲結也。如瑜伽。顯揚。十六大論。皆緣影像自心相分為所緣緣。無有一我是相分者故。是但緣識所變蘊。蘊各別故。故言諸蘊。即計此蘊種種計度。故與小乘所說有異。

論。然諸我執略有二種。

述曰。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：難道有邪見會讓人沉淪於生死輪迴之中？

述曰：這是總結性的詰難。無我見是邪見，卻能證得涅槃，因為它不順應所緣境的緣故。而我見是正見，反而會讓人沉淪於生死輪迴，因為它能夠順應所緣境的緣故。《廣百論》中也作過類似的詰難。

論：此外，各種我見，就像緣於他人之心一樣。

述曰：以下是第四個方面，總的破斥前人的觀點，不需要分別說明染污和清凈的恩惠。只是你們所說的緣於我的見解，現在都要破斥它，沒有不相符的過失。應該這樣立量：你們緣於我的見解，不是緣于真實的我，這是宗。因為有所緣的緣故，這是因。就像緣於我之外的色等法的心一樣，這是喻。文句的次第應當這樣理解。然而就他們的計度而言，都有我見不是緣於我而生起的，例如僧佉派和吠世史迦派所說的作者我見，不是緣于真實的我而生起的，這是橫加計度的緣故。其餘各派的計度，可以參照類推。所以現在這個宗，應該有所分別，你們各自所說的不是橫加計度的緣於我的見解，才能成立有法。現在大乘的意圖，是想表明只是緣於我的見解，都不是緣于真實的我而生起的緣故，不需要分別。這是破斥能緣不是緣於我而生起。

接下來破斥所緣必定不是真實的我。

論：我見所緣的，就像其餘的法一樣。

述曰：這裡可以這樣立量：我見所緣的必定不是真實的我，這是宗。因為是所緣的緣故，這是因。就像其餘的色等諸法一樣，這是喻。宗中像前面一樣也應該分別，他們各自計度的有我見之境不是真實的我。

論：因此，我見會產生種種計度。

述曰：這是總結性的陳述。如《瑜伽師地論》、《顯揚聖教論》等十六大論，都緣于影像自心相分為所緣緣，沒有一個是我是相分的緣故。這只是緣于識所變現的蘊，蘊是各不相同的緣故，所以說諸蘊。就是計度這些蘊，產生種種計度，所以與小乘所說的有所不同。

論：然而，各種我執，大致有兩種。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: How could a wrong view lead to sinking into the cycle of birth and death?

Commentary: This is a concluding refutation. The view of no-self is a wrong view, yet it can lead to the attainment of Nirvana, because it does not accord with the object it apprehends. Conversely, the view of self is a correct view, yet it causes one to sink into the cycle of birth and death, because it can accord with the object it apprehends. The Comprehensive Treatise also raises a similar refutation.

Treatise: Furthermore, all views of self are like those that apprehend the minds of others.

Commentary: The following is the fourth aspect, a general refutation of the previous teachers. There is no need to separately explain the benefits of defilement and purity. It's just that the views of self that you speak of, I will now refute them all, without any inconsistencies. It should be established as follows: Your views of self do not apprehend a real self, this is the thesis. Because there is an object apprehended, this is the reason. Like the mind that apprehends external phenomena such as form, this is the example. The order of the sentences should be understood in this way. However, according to their calculations, there are views of self that do not arise from the self, such as the agent-self view spoken of by the Samkhya (a school of Indian philosophy) and Vaisheshika (a school of Indian philosophy), which does not arise from a real self, because it is a fabricated calculation. The calculations of the other schools can be inferred by analogy. Therefore, this thesis should be distinguished, and your respective statements that are not fabricated calculations of the view of self can establish the subject. Now, the intention of Mahayana (the Great Vehicle) is to show that only the views of self do not arise from a real self, so there is no need to distinguish. This refutes that the apprehender does not arise from the self.

Next, refute that the apprehended object is definitely not a real self.

Treatise: The object apprehended by the view of self is like other dharmas (phenomena).

Commentary: Here, it can be established as follows: The object apprehended by the view of self is definitely not a real self, this is the thesis. Because it is an object apprehended, this is the reason. Like other dharmas such as form, this is the example. In the thesis, it should also be distinguished as before, because the object of their respective calculations of the view of self is not a real self.

Treatise: Therefore, the view of self gives rise to various calculations.

Commentary: This is a concluding statement. As in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), Asanga's Compendium of Determinations and the sixteen great treatises, they all apprehend the image of one's own mind as the object apprehended, and none of them is a self that is a part of the image. This only apprehends the skandhas (aggregates) transformed by consciousness, and the skandhas are all different, so it is said that the skandhas. It is the calculation of these skandhas that gives rise to various calculations, so it is different from what the Hinayana (the Lesser Vehicle) says.

Treatise: However, there are roughly two types of self-grasping.

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破我之中。自下第四。解釋彼執分別俱生。若作三科此即第二也。于中有二。初別解二執。第二如是所說一切我執下。總解二執。初中有三。第一標執舉數。二列執名。三別解釋。此即初也　總舉有其二種。此中諸門如別章說。謂迷諦總別。諸識有無。伏斷位次。九品所攝。伏與不伏。人法二執斷位粗細。分別俱生二十句等。一一分別如下當知。雖一有情無二十句等。然說法界亦得有之。

言我執者。顯非唯見。心心所法皆名執故論。一者俱生二者分別。

述曰。此列。差別與身俱起名曰俱生。后橫計生名分別起。下別釋之。

論。俱生我執至故名俱生。

述曰。自下別釋。先釋俱生。后釋分別　初中有三。初釋俱生義。二顯其差別。三明斷位。唯藉內種起。與分別緣別　恒身俱者。解其俱義　而言轉者。解其生義。余文易知。

論。此復二種至執為實我。

述曰。上總釋俱生。下別解差別　常相續者。顯恒起義　在第七者。顯執所依　緣第八者。顯所緣境　起自心相者。顯緣第八不親著也　執為實我者。不稱境知故執生也。未得無漏。第七識中我執恒起。名常相續。緣恒具故。非如第六意識中執。何故相續唯在第七。略有二義。一緣少故。謂眼．耳．鼻等。意．八．七識。或

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 破除我執的內容。這是第四部分，解釋了分別生起和我執俱生的情況。如果分為三個部分，這部分就是第二部分。這部分內容分為兩部分。第一部分是分別解釋兩種我執，第二部分是'如是所說一切我執'以下的內容，總的解釋兩種我執。第一部分又分為三部分。第一部分是標明我執並列舉數量，第二部分是列出我執的名稱，第三部分是分別解釋。這裡是第一部分，總的列舉了兩種我執。這裡面的各種門類，就像其他章節所說的那樣，比如迷惑于真諦的總相和別相，各種識的有和無，降伏和斷除的位次，屬於九品中的哪一品，是降伏還是不降伏，人我和法我的斷除位次和粗細程度，分別生起和我執俱生的二十句等等。這些內容將在下面一一分別解釋。雖然一個有情沒有二十句等等，但是就說法界來說，也可以有這些。

說到'我執'（認為有一個真實不變的'我'的執著），這表明不僅僅是見解，心和心所法都可以稱為執著。論中說，我執有兩種：一種是俱生我執，一種是分別我執。

述記中說，這裡列出了差別。與生俱來的稱為俱生我執，後來橫加計度產生的稱為分別我執。下面分別解釋它們。

論中說，'俱生我執'到'故名俱生'。

述記中說，下面分別解釋。先解釋俱生我執，后解釋分別我執。首先解釋俱生我執的含義，其次顯示它的差別，再次說明斷除的位次。俱生我執僅僅依靠內在的種子生起，與分別我執的因緣不同。'恒身俱者'，解釋了'俱'的含義。'而言轉者'，解釋了'生'的含義。其餘的文字容易理解。

論中說，'此復二種'到'執為實我'。

述記中說，上面總的解釋了俱生我執，下面分別解釋差別。'常相續者'，顯示了恒常生起的含義。'在第七者'，顯示了執著所依賴的識。'緣第八者'，顯示了所緣的境界。'起自心相者'，顯示了緣第八識不是親身的執著。'執為實我者'，因為不符合真實的境界而產生執著。在沒有得到無漏智慧之前，第七識中我執恒常生起，稱為常相續，因為所緣的境界恒常具備。不像第六意識中的執著。為什麼相續不斷的我執只在第七識中產生？大概有兩個原因。一是所緣的境界少。比如眼、耳、鼻等，意、第八識、第七識，或者

【English Translation】 English version: Breaking Through the Attachment to Self. This is the fourth section, explaining both the innate and acquired attachments to self. If divided into three sections, this is the second. This section is divided into two parts. The first part separately explains the two attachments to self, and the second part, from 'As all the aforementioned attachments to self' onwards, provides a general explanation of the two attachments. The first part is further divided into three parts. The first part labels the attachments to self and lists their number, the second part lists their names, and the third part provides separate explanations. This is the first part, generally listing the two attachments to self. The various aspects within this, as mentioned in other chapters, include confusion regarding the general and specific characteristics of truth (諦, Dì), the existence or non-existence of various consciousnesses (識, Shì), the stages of subduing and eliminating attachments, which of the nine categories (九品, Jiǔ pǐn) they belong to, whether they are subdued or not, the stages and degrees of subtlety in eliminating the attachments to self and to phenomena (人我, Rén wǒ and 法我, Fǎ wǒ), the twenty phrases related to innate and acquired attachments, and so on. These will be explained separately below. Although a single sentient being may not have all twenty phrases, the realm of Dharma (法界, Fǎ jiè) can have them.

Speaking of 'attachment to self' (我執, Wǒ zhí) (the clinging to a real and unchanging 'self'), this indicates that it is not merely a view. Both mind (心, Xīn) and mental factors (心所法, Xīn suǒ fǎ) can be called attachments. The treatise states that there are two types of attachment to self: innate attachment and acquired attachment.

The commentary states that this lists the differences. That which arises with birth is called innate attachment, and that which is later conceptually constructed is called acquired attachment. These will be explained separately below.

The treatise states, 'Innate attachment to self' to 'therefore it is called innate'.

The commentary states that below, they are explained separately. First, the innate attachment is explained, then the acquired attachment. First, the meaning of innate attachment is explained, second, its differences are shown, and third, the stages of elimination are clarified. Innate attachment arises solely from internal seeds, differing from the conditions for acquired attachment. 'Always with the body' explains the meaning of 'with'. 'And arises' explains the meaning of 'arises'. The remaining text is easy to understand.

The treatise states, 'This again has two types' to 'clinging to a real self'.

The commentary states that above, innate attachment was generally explained, and below, the differences are explained separately. 'Constantly continuous' shows the meaning of constant arising. 'In the seventh' shows the consciousness on which the attachment relies. 'Relies on the eighth' shows the object relied upon. 'Arising from the mind's own appearance' shows that relying on the eighth consciousness is not a direct clinging. 'Clinging to a real self' arises because it does not accord with the true reality. Before obtaining non-outflow wisdom (無漏, Wú lòu), attachment to self constantly arises in the seventh consciousness, called constantly continuous, because the object relied upon is constantly present. It is not like the attachment in the sixth consciousness. Why does the constantly continuous attachment only arise in the seventh consciousness? There are roughly two reasons. First, the objects relied upon are few. For example, the eyes, ears, nose, etc., the mind, the eighth consciousness, the seventh consciousness, or

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九．八．七．五．四．三緣少故。若加等無間。及俱有增上即更增之。所藉緣少故。第七恒續我執非余。如第七卷緣多少說。二由行相深。及相續故。第八續而不深。第六深而不續。五識不深不續。第七具有。故唯第七非余。此第七識本質。即以第八為境。由似一常。似實我相。故緣第八七我恒行。影像相中亦無實我。唯似第八。是第七識自心之相。若從見說名染無記。若從本說名凈無記。以許染凈故雜種所生。執此自心所變之相以為常一。不稱境故名為執也　不稱本質名為執者。五識亦應名為有執。此約影像。依他為相。若約所執。當情顯現亦名為相。緣第八者。即是本質。下準此知相亦有二。

論。二有間斷至執為實我。

述曰。在第六識。顯執所在。第六行相深遠亦復間斷。第七深而不斷。五識斷而不深。第八不深不斷。故此我執唯六識中。

五取蘊者。彰此俱生我見之境不緣無漏　薩婆多中一切煩惱皆名為取。蘊從取生。或能生取。故名取蘊　今者大乘如對法說。欲貪名取。唯貪為體。染希五蘊。蘊能生取。蘊從取生。蘊立取名。緣蘊總別顯執行相。總緣五蘊為我名總。別緣五蘊為我名別。非二十句等別我見也。二十句見唯分別故。第七識中唯緣別識蘊。行相常定我見一類。不可論其此總

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 九．八．七．五．四．三，因為所依賴的緣較少。如果加上等無間緣，以及俱有緣和增上緣，那麼緣就會增加。因為所憑藉的緣較少，所以只有第七識（末那識）是恒常持續的我執，而不是其他識。如同第七卷所說的緣的多少。二是因為行相深刻，以及相續不斷。第八識（阿賴耶識）是相續的但不深刻，第六識（意識）是深刻的但不相續，前五識是不深刻也不相續。第七識兩者都具備。所以只有第七識是這樣，而不是其他識。這個第七識的本質，就是以第八識為所緣境。因為它看起來像一個常一的、像真實我的相狀，所以緣著第八識，第七識的我執恒常執行。在影像相中也沒有真實的我，只是像第八識。這是第七識自心的相。如果從見分（能見）來說，叫做染污無記（既非善也非惡），如果從本識（阿賴耶識）來說，叫做清凈無記。因為它允許染污和清凈，所以是由雜染種子所生。執著這個自心所變的相，認為是常一的，不符合真實的境界，所以叫做執著。不符合本質而稱為執著，那麼前五識也應該稱為有執著。這裡說的是影像，以依他起性為相。如果就所執著的來說，當下的情境顯現也叫做相。緣著第八識，就是本質。下面可以參照這個來理解相也有兩種。

論：二，有間斷，乃至執為實我。

述記說：在第六識（意識）中，顯示執著所在。第六識的行相深刻而長遠，但也間斷。第七識（末那識）深刻而不間斷。前五識間斷而不深刻。第八識（阿賴耶識）不深刻也不間斷。所以這種我執只在第六識中。

五取蘊，彰顯這種俱生我見的所緣境不緣無漏法。薩婆多部（一切有部）中，一切煩惱都叫做取。蘊從取產生，或者能夠產生取，所以叫做取蘊。現在大乘佛教如同《對法論》所說，欲貪叫做取，只有貪是它的本體。染污的希求五蘊，蘊能夠產生取，蘊從取產生，蘊就立名為取蘊。緣著五蘊的總體和個別，來顯示執著的行相。總體上緣著五蘊認為是『我』，叫做總。個別地緣著五蘊認為是『我』，叫做別。不是二十句見等個別的我見。二十句見只是分別產生的。第七識中只緣著個別的識蘊，行相恒常不變，我見只有一種，不能說它是總還是別。

【English Translation】 English version Nine. Eight. Seven. Five. Four. Three, because the conditions it relies on are few. If the immediately preceding condition (等無間緣, deng wu jian yuan), the co-existent condition (俱有緣, ju you yuan), and the dominant condition (增上緣, zeng shang yuan) are added, then the conditions will increase. Because the conditions it relies on are few, only the seventh consciousness (末那識, monashishi, Manas-vijnana) is the constant and continuous ego-grasping, not the other consciousnesses. As stated in the seventh volume regarding the number of conditions. Two, it is because of the profound nature of its activities and its continuous succession. The eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, alayeshishi, Alaya-vijnana) is continuous but not profound, the sixth consciousness (意識, yishi, Mano-vijnana) is profound but not continuous, the first five consciousnesses are neither profound nor continuous. The seventh consciousness possesses both. Therefore, only the seventh consciousness is like this, not the others. The essence of this seventh consciousness is to take the eighth consciousness as its object. Because it appears to be a constant, singular, and real 'self' aspect, the seventh consciousness's ego-grasping constantly operates by clinging to the eighth consciousness. In the image aspect, there is also no real 'self', it only resembles the eighth consciousness. This is the aspect of the seventh consciousness's own mind. If speaking from the perspective of the seeing aspect (見分, jian fen), it is called defiled non-definitive (染污無記, ranwu wuji, neither good nor evil); if speaking from the perspective of the fundamental consciousness (阿賴耶識, alayeshishi, Alaya-vijnana), it is called pure non-definitive. Because it allows for both defilement and purity, it is born from defiled seeds. Clinging to this aspect transformed by one's own mind, considering it to be constant and singular, does not accord with the true state of reality, therefore it is called clinging. If not according with the essence is called clinging, then the first five consciousnesses should also be called having clinging. Here, it refers to the image, taking the dependent nature (依他起性, yitaqixing) as its aspect. If speaking of what is clung to, the present situation that appears is also called an aspect. Clinging to the eighth consciousness is the essence. The following can be understood in accordance with this, that aspects also have two types.

Treatise: Two, there is interruption, up to clinging to a real self.

Commentary says: In the sixth consciousness (意識, yishi, Mano-vijnana), it shows where the clinging is located. The activities of the sixth consciousness are profound and far-reaching, but also interrupted. The seventh consciousness (末那識, monashishi, Manas-vijnana) is profound and uninterrupted. The first five consciousnesses are interrupted but not profound. The eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, alayeshishi, Alaya-vijnana) is neither profound nor interrupted. Therefore, this ego-grasping is only in the sixth consciousness.

The five aggregates of grasping (五取蘊, wu qu yun), manifest that the object of this innate ego-view does not cling to unconditioned dharmas. In the Sarvastivada school (薩婆多部, savaduo bu, Everything Exists school), all afflictions are called grasping. The aggregates arise from grasping, or can give rise to grasping, therefore they are called aggregates of grasping. Now, in Mahayana Buddhism, as the Abhidharma (對法論, duifa lun) says, desire and greed are called grasping, only greed is its substance. Defiled craving for the five aggregates, the aggregates can give rise to grasping, the aggregates arise from grasping, the aggregates are named aggregates of grasping. Clinging to the totality and individuality of the five aggregates manifests the activities of clinging. Generally clinging to the five aggregates as 'self' is called general. Individually clinging to the five aggregates as 'self' is called individual. It is not the individual ego-views such as the twenty groups of views. The twenty groups of views are only produced by discrimination. In the seventh consciousness, it only clings to the individual aggregate of consciousness, its activities are constant and unchanging, the ego-view is only of one kind, it cannot be said to be general or individual.

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此別。故與此殊。第七唯托第八為相。舉其本質言起自心相。此中所言五取蘊相或總或別者。是第六本質。起自心相者。是影像相。顯緣不著妄生我解。

又第六本質。非定一法故不別言。其實亦有非無本質。是俱生故。故此所言五取蘊等皆起影像。

論。此二我執至方能除滅。

述曰。第三文也。顯執細微斷之所在。無始串習體相微隱。故十地云。遠隨現行故。不作意緣故　是俱生義。故名為細。一非世道伏。二非初道斷。初道斷者即見道斷。三非地未滿修道能斷。要第九勝道方斷故言難斷。初簡修道不相應惑。第二簡見道一切。第三顯自行相細。勝道方除故唯修斷。一識分別。第六數斷非第七。二乘分別。第六識者二乘數斷。非菩薩於六識中。三習分別。若菩薩數斷習非種子。若二乘種數斷非習。不數斷者道數數修。若數斷者斷道俱數。於二乘中漸次行者。故唯修斷。若頓悟者亦通見斷。先世間道伴已伏故。菩薩不然。不障地故。無超越故。然初二果不能斷之。有覆無記第九品故。斷有二種。一斷種。二伏滅。今論斷種。第六識中。二乘入聖道暫伏滅。要離自地欲盡方斷。于金剛心方究竟盡。菩薩初地暫能伏滅。四地永不行。金剛心位方究竟盡。第七識中。二乘入無漏心方暫伏滅。金剛心方斷

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 此處的『別』（差別）與彼處的『殊』（不同）是有區別的。第七識唯有依託第八識才能顯現其『相』（現象）。從本質上來說，第七識的生起源於第八識的『心相』（心的影像）。這裡所說的『五取蘊相』（色、受、想、行、識五種構成苦的原因的集合）或者總的或者別的，指的是第六識的『本質』（根本）。『起自心相者』（生起於心之影像的），指的是『影像相』（虛幻的現象）。這表明，由於攀緣而不執著，才會錯誤地產生『我』的理解。 此外，第六識的『本質』並非固定不變的，因此不單獨說明。實際上，它也有非本質的部分，因為它是俱生的。因此，這裡所說的『五取蘊』等，都是由影像產生的。 論：這兩種『我執』（對自我的執著）必須到一定程度才能被消除。 述曰：這是第三段文字，闡明了執著的細微之處以及斷除執著的地方。無始以來串習的『體相』（本體和現象）非常微隱，所以《十地經》說：『因為遠離而隨順現行，因為不作意攀緣』，這就是俱生的含義，所以稱為『細』（微細）。一是不能用世俗的方法來降伏，二不是初道（見道）所能斷除的。『初道斷者』（初道斷除的）就是見道斷除的。三不是未滿十地修道所能斷除的，必須用第九勝道才能斷除，所以說『難斷』（難以斷除）。首先簡別了與修道不相應的迷惑，其次簡別了見道的一切迷惑，第三顯示了自行相的微細，只有勝道才能斷除，所以唯有修道才能斷除。一是識的分別，第六識多次斷除，但第七識不能。二是二乘的分別，第六識是二乘多次斷除的，菩薩不是在六識中斷除的。三是習氣的分別，如果是菩薩多次斷除，那麼習氣就不是種子；如果是二乘種子多次斷除，那麼就不是習氣。不多次斷除的，用道多次修習；多次斷除的，斷道都是多次的。在二乘中漸次修行的人，所以唯有修道才能斷除。如果是頓悟的人，也通達見斷，因為先前的世間道已經降伏了。菩薩不是這樣，因為不障礙地，沒有超越。然而，初果和二果不能斷除它，因為有覆無記是第九品。斷除有兩種，一是斷除種子，二是伏滅。現在討論的是斷除種子，在第六識中，二乘進入聖道暫時伏滅，要離開自地欲盡才能斷除，在金剛心才能究竟斷盡。菩薩初地暫時能夠伏滅，四地永遠不行，金剛心位才能究竟斷盡。在第七識中，二乘進入無漏心才能暫時伏滅，金剛心才能斷除。

【English Translation】 English version: The 'difference' here is distinct from the 'distinction' there. The seventh consciousness only manifests its 'aspect' (phenomenon) by relying on the eighth consciousness. In essence, the arising of the seventh consciousness originates from the 'mind-image' (image of the mind) of the eighth consciousness. The 'aggregate of clinging' (the collection of the five aggregates of form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness, which are the cause of suffering) mentioned here, whether general or specific, refers to the 'essence' (fundamental nature) of the sixth consciousness. 'That which arises from the mind-image' refers to the 'image-aspect' (illusory phenomenon). This shows that due to clinging without attachment, the understanding of 'self' is falsely produced. Furthermore, the 'essence' of the sixth consciousness is not fixed, so it is not explained separately. In reality, it also has non-essential parts because it is co-arisen. Therefore, the 'aggregates of clinging' mentioned here are all produced from images. Treatise: These two types of 'self-grasping' (attachment to self) must be eliminated to a certain degree. Commentary: This is the third passage, clarifying the subtlety of attachment and where to eliminate it. The 'substance and characteristics' (essence and phenomena) of habitual tendencies from beginningless time are very subtle and hidden. Therefore, the Ten Stages Sutra says: 'Because of being distant and following present actions, because of not intentionally clinging,' this is the meaning of co-arisen, so it is called 'subtle.' First, it cannot be subdued by worldly methods. Second, it cannot be cut off by the initial path (the path of seeing). 'Those who cut off with the initial path' are those who cut off with the path of seeing. Third, it cannot be cut off by cultivating the path before fulfilling the ten stages; it must be cut off with the ninth supreme path, so it is said to be 'difficult to cut off.' First, it distinguishes the afflictions that are not in accordance with the cultivation path. Second, it distinguishes all the delusions of the path of seeing. Third, it shows the subtlety of the self-acting characteristics; only the supreme path can eliminate it, so only the cultivation path can eliminate it. First, the discrimination of consciousness; the sixth consciousness is cut off many times, but the seventh consciousness cannot be. Second, the discrimination of the two vehicles; the sixth consciousness is cut off many times by the two vehicles, but the Bodhisattva does not cut it off in the six consciousnesses. Third, the discrimination of habits; if it is a Bodhisattva who cuts it off many times, then the habits are not seeds; if it is a seed of the two vehicles that is cut off many times, then it is not a habit. Those who do not cut it off many times cultivate the path many times; those who cut it off many times, both the cutting off and the path are many times. Those who practice gradually in the two vehicles, so only the cultivation path can cut it off. If it is a sudden enlightenment, it also penetrates the cutting off of seeing, because the previous worldly path has already subdued it. The Bodhisattva is not like this, because it does not obstruct the stages, and there is no transcendence. However, the first and second fruits cannot cut it off, because the covered and unrecordable is the ninth grade. There are two types of cutting off: one is cutting off the seed, and the other is subduing and extinguishing. Now we are discussing cutting off the seed. In the sixth consciousness, the two vehicles temporarily subdue and extinguish upon entering the holy path; they must leave their own desire realm completely before they can cut it off, and they can completely cut it off in the diamond mind. The Bodhisattva can temporarily subdue and extinguish it in the first stage, and it will never act in the fourth stage, and it can completely cut it off in the diamond mind position. In the seventh consciousness, the two vehicles temporarily subdue and extinguish upon entering the unconditioned mind, and they can cut it off in the diamond mind.

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盡。菩薩七地已前入無漏心能伏。八地以上方永不行。金剛心方斷頓盡。故言數數修道方能除斷　又總而論六．七。道數數修。斷有數數．不數數義。二乘斷彼第六識執種子。非習能數數斷。菩薩數數斷其粗重名數數斷。其種子等道數數修。非斷數數。以十地中皆不斷故。第七識執要金剛心方能頓斷。三乘修道道數數修方能除滅。非數數斷　此中二執行微名細。何故三心初斷名細　若言品類粗細。初斷為粗。難易粗細。先斷名細。此中言品類。修道下品名細。三心約難易故。初斷名細。亦不相違。以界第九品斷名細。品類細故。有難斷不名細。即三心中第二三品。有名細非難斷。即三心中初．中品等。有名細亦難斷。如九品中下下品等。此中所說二我執故。三心約難易以分粗細。九品約行相。以分粗細理不相違。此顯所斷以作二解又能治所治以分粗細。九品中從所治行相名細。三品中從能治行相名細。亦不相違。唯言生空斷者。一通三乘。二以行相而說。其實菩薩亦法空斷。勝生空者。簡異有漏。及遊觀生空心。斷彼不能故。此說無間非解脫道。

論。分別我執至故名分別。

述曰。此釋分別。文亦有三。內緣必藉。兼藉外緣。故於外緣說于亦字　非與身俱以來。顯異俱生　要待以下。顯分別義　言分別

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：菩薩在七地之前，進入無漏心時能夠降伏（煩惱）。八地以上才能永遠不再生起（煩惱）。只有金剛心才能徹底斷除（煩惱）。所以說，只有通過不斷地修道，才能除斷（煩惱）。 又總的來說，第六識和第七識的修道，有數數修和斷有數數斷與不數數斷的含義。二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）斷除的是第六識的執著種子，這不是通過習氣能夠多次斷除的。菩薩多次斷除的是其粗重的名言習氣，這叫做數數斷。而其種子等，是通過修道來多次修習，而不是多次斷除，因為在十地中都沒有斷除。第七識的執著，必須要用金剛心才能一下子斷除。三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）修道，通過多次修道才能除滅（煩惱），而不是多次斷除。 這裡面，二執（俱生我執和分別我執）的行相微細。為什麼說三心（下品心、中品心和上品心）初斷時叫做細呢？如果從品類粗細來說，初斷是粗的。從難易粗細來說，先斷的叫做細的。這裡說的是品類。修道下品叫做細。三心是從難易的角度來說的，所以初斷叫做細，這也不矛盾。因為在界第九品斷的時候叫做細，是因為品類細的緣故。有難斷的，不叫做細，就像三心中的第二品和第三品。有名叫做細，但不難斷的，就像三心中的初品和中品等。有名叫做細，也難斷的，就像九品中的下下品等。這裡所說的是二我執（俱生我執和分別我執），所以三心是從難易的角度來區分粗細的，九品是從行相的角度來區分粗細的，道理上不矛盾。這顯示了所斷（煩惱）可以有兩種解釋，又能從能治（智慧）和所治（煩惱）的角度來區分粗細。九品中是從所治的行相來說的細。三品中是從能治的行相來說的細，這也不矛盾。只說斷生空（人無我），一是通用於三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘），二是從行相上來說的。實際上菩薩也斷法空（法無我），勝過斷生空，是爲了區別于有漏（煩惱）以及遊觀生空心。斷除這些是不能做到的。這裡說的是無間道，而不是解脫道。 論：分別我執，是因為通過分別而產生的，所以叫做分別。 述曰：這是解釋分別（我執）。文義也有三個方面。內緣必須憑藉，也憑藉外緣，所以對外緣用『亦』字。『非與身俱以來』，是爲了顯示與俱生（我執）的不同。『要待以下』，是爲了顯示分別（我執）的含義。說分別（我執）。

【English Translation】 English version: Before the seventh Bhumi (stage of Bodhisattva), when entering the Anāsrava-citta (non-outflow mind), a Bodhisattva can subdue (afflictions). Only from the eighth Bhumi onwards can they never arise again (afflictions). Only the Vajra-citta (diamond mind) can completely cut off (afflictions). Therefore, it is said that only through constantly cultivating the path can one eliminate and cut off (afflictions). Generally speaking, the cultivation of the path for the sixth and seventh consciousnesses has the meaning of repeated cultivation and cutting off, with both repeated and non-repeated aspects. The Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) cut off the seeds of attachment in the sixth consciousness, which cannot be repeatedly cut off through habit. Bodhisattvas repeatedly cut off their gross verbal habits, which is called repeated cutting off. As for their seeds, etc., they are repeatedly cultivated through the path, rather than repeatedly cut off, because they are not cut off in the Ten Bhumis. The attachment of the seventh consciousness can only be completely cut off by the Vajra-citta. The Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) cultivate the path, and only through repeated cultivation can they eliminate (afflictions), rather than repeatedly cutting them off. Here, the characteristics of the two attachments (Sahaja-ātmagraha (innate self-attachment) and Vikalpa-ātmagraha (conceptual self-attachment)) are subtle. Why is it said that the initial cutting off of the three minds (inferior mind, intermediate mind, and superior mind) is called subtle? If we speak in terms of the grossness and subtlety of categories, the initial cutting off is gross. In terms of the difficulty and ease, what is cut off first is called subtle. Here, we are speaking of categories. The inferior level of cultivation is called subtle. The three minds are spoken of from the perspective of difficulty and ease, so the initial cutting off is called subtle, which is not contradictory. Because when cutting off at the ninth level of the realm, it is called subtle because the category is subtle. There are things that are difficult to cut off that are not called subtle, like the second and third levels of the three minds. There are things called subtle that are not difficult to cut off, like the first and middle levels of the three minds. There are things called subtle that are also difficult to cut off, like the lowest of the nine levels. What is said here is about the two self-attachments (Sahaja-ātmagraha and Vikalpa-ātmagraha), so the three minds are distinguished in terms of difficulty and ease, while the nine levels are distinguished in terms of characteristics, which is not contradictory in principle. This shows that what is to be cut off (afflictions) can have two interpretations, and the grossness and subtlety can be distinguished from the perspective of the healer (wisdom) and the healed (afflictions). Among the nine levels, subtlety is spoken of from the perspective of the characteristics of what is to be healed. Among the three levels, subtlety is spoken of from the perspective of the characteristics of the healer, which is also not contradictory. Saying only that one cuts off the Śūnyatā of self (emptiness of self) applies to all three vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna), and is spoken of from the perspective of characteristics. In reality, Bodhisattvas also cut off the Śūnyatā of dharma (emptiness of phenomena), which is superior to cutting off the Śūnyatā of self, in order to distinguish it from contaminated (afflicted) states and the mind that contemplates the Śūnyatā of self. Cutting off these cannot be done. Here, we are speaking of the path of immediate cessation, not the path of liberation. Treatise: Vikalpa-ātmagraha (conceptual self-attachment) is called Vikalpa (conceptual) because it arises through conceptualization. Commentary: This explains Vikalpa (self-attachment). The meaning also has three aspects. The internal condition must rely on, and also relies on external conditions, so the word 'also' is used for external conditions. 'Not together with the body since...' is to show the difference from Sahaja (innate self-attachment). 'Must wait below...' is to show the meaning of Vikalpa (conceptual). Saying Vikalpa (conceptual).

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者。謂邪教分別。及邪思分別。一分別言通二處也　自下別解分別之執。余文可知。

論。唯在第六意識中有。

述曰。顯執所在。間斷粗猛故有此執。余識淺細。及相續故。不能橫計起邪分別。邪分別者必有間斷。及粗猛故。以第八識淺而不間。五間而又淺。七二俱無故唯在六。

論。此亦二種至執為實我。

述曰。第一即是即蘊計我。二十句等。自心相等如前二解。

論。二緣邪教至執為實我。

述曰。離蘊計我。余義如前。心所變相眾同分攝。隨其所應依何法變。或以名教而為本質起自心相。二重如前。不說二境總別之相如樞要說。

論。此二我執至即能除滅。

述曰。顯執相粗斷之所在。違見道故道生便滅。相見道中不斷之故。故論言初　又真見中有無間．解脫。無間道斷。異解脫名初。此依種子　又解脫道能斷粗重亦名為初。此約一心　若三心者。準法執說。雖有三品斷。望俱生者總名為粗。行相猛名為粗。初聖道除名為易斷。此依二乘．及行相說言生空斷。菩薩亦通以法空斷。

論。如是所說至或有或無。

述曰。此下第二總釋二執。合說本質之有無也。于中有二。初解所依有無。后然諸蘊相下。解蘊我有無合有三解。一七．六有無。二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這些是指對邪教的分別，以及對邪思的分別。『分別』一詞在這裡通用指代這兩種情況。以下分別解釋對『分別』的執著，其餘文句可以自行理解。

論：唯獨在第六意識中存在。

述曰：這顯示了執著存在的位置。因為第六意識具有間斷性和粗猛性，所以會產生這種執著。其他意識則因為淺薄細微，以及相續不斷，所以不能橫生邪惡的分別。邪惡的分別必然伴隨著間斷性和粗猛性。第八識淺薄而不間斷，前五識間斷卻又淺薄，第七識則兩者都不具備，所以只有第六意識才會產生這種執著。

論：這種執著也有兩種，乃至執著為真實的我。

述曰：第一種就是即蘊計我，如同之前的二十句等，以及自心相等，如同之前的兩種解釋。

論：第二種是緣于邪教，乃至執著為真實的我。

述曰：這是離蘊計我，其餘含義如同之前所說。心所變現的相屬於眾同分所攝，根據情況依何種法變現，或者以名教作為本質，生起自心之相。二重的情況如同之前所說。關於二境的總別之相，可以參考《樞要》中的說法。

論：這兩種我執，乃至能夠立即消除。

述曰：這顯示了執著之相的粗細以及斷除的位置。因為與見道相違背，所以見道產生時便會滅除。在相見道中，因為沒有斷除，所以《論》中說『初』。另外，真見中存在無間道和解脫道。無間道斷除，異於解脫道，稱為『初』。這是依據種子而言。另外，解脫道能夠斷除粗重的煩惱，也可以稱為『初』。這是就一心而言。如果是三心，可以參照法執的說法。雖然有三種品級的斷除，但相對於俱生我執而言，都可總稱為粗。行相猛烈稱為粗。初聖道能夠去除，稱為易斷。這是依據二乘以及行相而言，說生空斷。菩薩也通用法空來斷除。

論：如上所說，乃至或有或無。

述曰：以下第二部分總括解釋兩種執著，合併說明本質的有無。其中分為兩部分。首先解釋所依的有無，然後『然諸蘊相』以下，解釋蘊我的有無，總共有三種解釋。一是第七識和第六識的有無，二是...

【English Translation】 English version: These refer to the discriminations of false teachings and the discriminations of false thoughts. The term 'discrimination' here generally refers to both situations. The following separately explains the attachment to 'discrimination,' and the remaining sentences can be understood on their own.

Treatise: It exists only in the sixth consciousness.

Commentary: This shows the location where attachment exists. Because the sixth consciousness has intermittence and coarseness, this attachment arises. Other consciousnesses, because they are shallow and subtle, and continuous, cannot give rise to perverse discriminations. Perverse discriminations are necessarily accompanied by intermittence and coarseness. The eighth consciousness is shallow and uninterrupted, the first five consciousnesses are intermittent but also shallow, and the seventh consciousness possesses neither, so only the sixth consciousness gives rise to this attachment.

Treatise: This attachment also has two types, even to the point of clinging to a real self.

Commentary: The first is the clinging to self in the aggregates, like the previous twenty sentences, and the self-mind aspect, like the previous two explanations.

Treatise: The second is based on false teachings, even to the point of clinging to a real self.

Commentary: This is the clinging to self apart from the aggregates, and the remaining meanings are as previously stated. The aspect transformed by the mental functions belongs to the collectively shared aspect, and according to the situation, it transforms based on what dharma, or it takes nominal teachings as its essence, giving rise to the aspect of one's own mind. The double aspect is as previously stated. Regarding the general and specific aspects of the two objects, refer to the explanation in the 'Essentials'.

Treatise: These two attachments to self, even to the point of being able to be immediately eliminated.

Commentary: This shows the coarseness of the aspect of attachment and the location of its elimination. Because it contradicts the path of seeing (Darshana-marga), it is eliminated when the path of seeing arises. Because it is not eliminated in the aspect of the path of seeing, the 'Treatise' says 'initial'. In addition, in true seeing, there exists the path of no gap (Anantarya-marga) and the path of liberation (Vimukti-marga). The path of no gap eliminates, different from the path of liberation, and is called 'initial'. This is based on the seeds. In addition, the path of liberation can eliminate coarse and heavy afflictions, and can also be called 'initial'. This is in terms of one mind. If there are three minds, refer to the explanation of the attachment to dharma. Although there are three levels of elimination, relative to the co-arisen attachment to self, they can all be generally called coarse. The fierce aspect is called coarse. The initial holy path can remove it, and is called easy to eliminate. This is based on the Two Vehicles and the aspect, saying the elimination of the emptiness of self. Bodhisattvas also generally use the emptiness of dharma to eliminate.

Treatise: As stated above, even to the point of sometimes existing and sometimes not existing.

Commentary: The second part below summarizes and explains the two attachments, combining the explanation of the existence or non-existence of the essence. It is divided into two parts. First, it explains the existence or non-existence of the basis, and then from 'However, the aspects of the aggregates' below, it explains the existence or non-existence of the self in the aggregates, with a total of three explanations. One is the existence or non-existence of the seventh and sixth consciousnesses, and two is...

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修．見有無。三即．離有無。隨義應說。從粗至細展轉推故。即是他人及於己身以為本質。並是此攝。能緣緣不著。皆名心外故。第七計我心外唯有。第六計我心外之蘊。或是于無。如吠世等。我無所依蘊故說為無。俱生定有。分別或無。即蘊計我本質是有。離蘊計我本質是無。

論。自心內蘊一切皆有。

述曰。親所緣也。不問即．離計為我者。影像必有故無少法能取少法。唯有自心還取自心故皆緣蘊。此上總辨我所依也。

論。是故我執至妄執為我。

述曰。結成前義。影像相分必是蘊故。緣此為我。義顯大乘親緣。于無心不生也。成所緣緣必有法故。

論。然諸蘊相至決定非有。

述曰。自下第二解內心相對我有無。內相依他緣生故有。外境橫計故定是無。

論。故契經至說五取蘊起。

述曰。恐義無由故。引經證內心相有　言沙門者。息惡之義　婆羅門者。凈行種也。四姓之中一姓　等餘三姓。或等所餘若天若魔若梵等也。此等總是能起計人　所有我見。是能執惠　五取蘊起。所計境也。余文易解。

論。實我若無至恩怨等事。

述曰。自下第五假設外徴釋諸妨難。若三段科第三文也。此中難云。若無實我誰能記憶曾所更事。亦能了知一切境

界。誦持經書。溫習文史。恩濟于彼。怨害於此。貪愛是財嗔怒個物。種種事業。犢子部我亦能記憶。與外合問。應立量云。一切有情。應無憶識等事。以無我故。如太虛空　下辨外救有三問答。初文有五。文相可知。答中論主初皆卻質。

論。所執實我至是事非有。

述曰。且如冥性未變為大等時。我未受用境。后大等生我方受用。前無是事無受境用。後有是事有受境用。若是常者破之。量云。汝之實我。後起受用時亦應不起用。以前與后體無別故。猶如前時。即難我體有變易也。

論。前應如后至體無別故。

述曰。此中敘計準前可知　量云。汝之實我。前無受用事時應有受用事。即后體故。如后位時。以後與前體無別故者。通前及后二難之因　次外人救。

論。若謂我用至理亦不然。

述曰。此牒計非次顯非理。

論。用不離體至應非常故。

述曰。此中二難。體用相例。量云。用應常有。許不離體故。如體。體應非常有。許不離用故。如用。外人計體不離於用故為此因。

論。然諸有情至非於我宗。

述曰。由第八識與一切法更互為緣宿熏習力。有憶識等事故無失也　更互為因等。能所攝藏也。義顯前作已熏種本識中。后從本識生諸識等起憶

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『界』（Dhatu，指構成世界的元素）。誦讀並持有經書。溫習文史典籍。給予他人恩惠，卻對某些人造成怨恨和傷害。貪愛錢財，嗔怒於事物。從事各種各樣的事務。即使是犢子部（Vatsiputriya，佛教部派之一）的教義，我也能記住。與外道辯論時，應該這樣立論：一切有情眾生，都不應該有憶念和識別等作用，因為沒有『我』（Atman，靈魂、真我）的緣故，就像虛空一樣。下面辨析外道的辯護，有三個問答。最初的文段有五句，文句的表述方式可以理解。在回答中，論主首先駁斥對方的質問。 論：所執著的實我，到頭來，這些事情是不存在的。 述曰：例如，冥性（Prakrti，自性）尚未轉變為『大』（Mahat，宇宙理性）等狀態時，『我』沒有受用境界。後來，『大』等產生后，『我』才開始受用。之前沒有這些事情，沒有受用境界的作用；之後有這些事情，有受用境界的作用。如果『我』是常恒不變的，就用下面的論證來破斥：你所執著的實我，在後來產生受用作用時，也應該不產生作用，因為之前和之後本體沒有差別，就像之前一樣。這就反過來詰難『我』的本體是有變易的。 論：之前應該像之後一樣，因為本體沒有差別。 述曰：這裡敘述的計較，參照前面就可以理解。論證如下：你所執著的實我，在之前沒有受用作用的時候，也應該有受用作用，因為它和後來的本體一樣，就像後來的狀態一樣。因為之後和之前的本體沒有差別。這可以用來反駁前面和後面的兩種詰難的原因。接下來是外道的辯護。 論：如果認為『我』的作用不離開『我』的本體，那麼這個道理也是不成立的。 述曰：這裡先簡要地駁斥對方的觀點，然後闡明其不合理之處。 論：作用不離開本體，那麼『我』的本體就應該不是常恒的。 述曰：這裡有兩種詰難，本體和作用可以互相類比。論證如下：作用應該常恒存在，因為它被認為是和本體不分離的，就像本體一樣。本體應該不是常恒的，因為它被認為是和作用不分離的，就像作用一樣。外道認為本體不離開作用，所以用這個作為原因。 論：然而，諸位有情眾生之所以有憶念和識別等作用，並不是因為『我』。 述曰：由於第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）與一切法互相作為因緣，通過宿世的熏習力，才會有憶念和識別等作用，所以沒有過失。互相作為因等，是能攝和所藏的關係。意思是說，之前的行為已經在根本識中薰染了種子，之後從根本識產生各種識，從而產生憶念。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Dhatu' (element, referring to the elements that constitute the world). Reciting and upholding scriptures. Reviewing literature and history. Bestowing kindness on some, while causing resentment and harm to others. Greedily loving wealth, being angry at things. Engaging in various kinds of affairs. Even the doctrines of the Vatsiputriya (a Buddhist school) I can remember. When debating with outsiders, one should establish the following argument: All sentient beings should not have functions such as memory and recognition, because there is no 'Atman' (soul, true self), just like empty space. Below, we analyze the defenses of outsiders, with three questions and answers. The initial passage has five sentences, and the expression of the sentences can be understood. In the answers, the debater first refutes the opponent's questions. Treatise: The real self that is clung to, in the end, these things do not exist. Commentary: For example, when Prakrti (primordial nature) has not yet transformed into 'Mahat' (cosmic intellect) and other states, the 'self' has not experienced the realm. Later, after 'Mahat' and others arise, the 'self' begins to experience. Before, there were no such things, no function of experiencing the realm; after, there are these things, there is the function of experiencing the realm. If the 'self' is constant and unchanging, then use the following argument to refute it: The real self that you cling to should also not produce function when it later produces the function of experiencing, because the essence is no different before and after, just like before. This in turn questions that the essence of the 'self' is changeable. Treatise: The former should be like the latter, because the essence is no different. Commentary: The calculations described here can be understood by referring to the previous one. The argument is as follows: The real self that you cling to should also have the function of experiencing when it does not have the function of experiencing before, because it is the same as the later essence, just like the later state. Because the essence is no different after and before. This can be used to refute the reasons for the two questions before and after. Next is the defense of the outsider. Treatise: If it is thought that the function of the 'self' does not leave the essence of the 'self', then this principle is also not established. Commentary: Here, the opponent's point of view is briefly refuted first, and then its unreasonableness is explained. Treatise: The function does not leave the essence, then the essence of the 'self' should not be constant. Commentary: Here are two kinds of questions, the essence and function can be compared to each other. The argument is as follows: The function should always exist, because it is considered inseparable from the essence, just like the essence. The essence should not be constant, because it is considered inseparable from the function, just like the function. The outsider believes that the essence does not leave the function, so use this as a reason. Treatise: However, the reason why sentient beings have functions such as memory and recognition is not because of the 'self'. Commentary: Because the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) mutually acts as a cause and condition with all dharmas, through the force of past karmic imprints, there will be functions such as memory and recognition, so there is no fault. Mutually acting as a cause, etc., is the relationship between the able to collect and the collected. It means that previous actions have already imprinted seeds in the root consciousness, and later various consciousnesses arise from the root consciousness, thereby producing memory.

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念等。下廣當辨。

論。若無實我至誰受果耶。

述曰。此第二段。文有其三。敘外人難。若無實我無實作．受。既無作．受法體應空。應立量云。一切有情。應無作．受以無我故。如龜毛等。

次論主質。

論。所執實我至應是無常。

述曰。此有二量。我既常有誰能作．受。言變易者。是體改轉無常之義。量云。汝我。應不能作業受果。許無變易故。許體常故。如虛空等。諸執我常皆無變易。今設遮計亦得。若用轉變令體無常亦得。若用有變易。汝所執我應體無常。許用變易故。如色聲等　若破僧佉。令體亦轉變。或隨卷舒名為變易故應無常。或是設遮。

論。然諸有情至於理無違。

述曰。此敘正義。文易可知　心心所法因緣力等者。謂由七識熏習種子因緣力故。阿賴耶識生於諸趣相續無斷。六識造業。此並第八亦能受果。于理無違　又心心所。即第八識。自許種子因緣力故。其現行識相續無斷。即此六識有時造業。並與第八亦能受果。于理無違。又八識等心．心所法。各自種子因緣力故。諸趣五蘊相續無斷。即此假者。六識作業。六．八受果。于理無違。除第七識。

外人又難。

論。我若實無至求趣涅槃。

述曰。第三段。文有其四。外人

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：念等，下文將詳細辨析。

論：如果沒有真實的『我』（ātman），那麼誰來承受果報呢？

述曰：這是第二段，內容分為三部分。首先是外人的詰難：如果沒有真實的『我』，就沒有真實的作者和受者。既然沒有作者和受者，那麼法的本體就應該是空無。應該建立論式：一切有情，都應該沒有作者和受者，因為沒有『我』的緣故，就像龜毛一樣。

其次是論主的質問：

論：如果所執著的『我』是常恒不變的，那麼它應該是無常的。

述曰：這裡有兩個論式。如果『我』是常恒存在的，那麼誰能作為作者和受者呢？所謂變易，是指本體的改變和轉化，是無常的含義。論式如下：你所說的『我』，應該不能作業和承受果報，因為它被認為是無變易的，被認為是本體常恒的，就像虛空一樣。所有執著『我』是常恒不變的，都沒有變易。現在假設遮止的計較也是可以的。如果用轉變使本體成為無常也是可以的。如果用有變易，你所執著的『我』應該是本體無常的，因為它被認為是會變易的，就像色聲等。如果破斥僧佉派，使本體也轉變，或者隨著卷舒而名為變易，因此應該是無常的。或者這是假設的遮止。

論：然而，對於諸有情來說，心、心所法（citta-caitta）的因緣力等，在道理上沒有違背。

述曰：這是敘述正義，文義容易理解。所謂心、心所法的因緣力等，是指由於第七識（末那識，manas）熏習種子（bīja）的因緣力，阿賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna）在諸趣中生起，相續不斷。第六識（意識，mano-vijñāna）造業，這和第八識（阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna）都能承受果報，在道理上沒有違背。又心、心所，即第八識，自己承認種子因緣力的緣故，它的現行識相續不斷。即此第六識有時造業，並與第八識也能承受果報，在道理上沒有違背。又八識等心、心所法，各自種子因緣力的緣故，諸趣五蘊（pañca-skandha）相續不斷。即此假者，第六識作業，第六識和第八識受果，在道理上沒有違背。除了第七識。

外人又提出詰難：

論：如果『我』確實不存在，那麼誰會爲了求取涅槃（nirvāṇa）而努力呢？

述曰：這是第三段，內容分為四個部分。首先是外人的詰難。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Nian' (念, mindfulness) and others will be discussed in detail below.

Treatise: If there is no real 'self' (ātman), then who receives the consequences?

Commentary: This is the second section, with three parts. First, the outsider's challenge: If there is no real 'self', there is no real actor or receiver. Since there is no actor or receiver, the essence of the Dharma should be empty. A proposition should be established: All sentient beings should have no actor or receiver because there is no 'self', like turtle hair.

Next, the treatise master's questioning:

Treatise: If the 'self' that is clung to is constant and unchanging, then it should be impermanent.

Commentary: Here are two propositions. If the 'self' is constantly existing, then who can act as the actor and receiver? The so-called change refers to the alteration and transformation of the essence, which is the meaning of impermanence. The proposition is as follows: Your 'self' should not be able to perform actions and receive consequences, because it is considered to be without change, and it is considered to be a constant essence, like empty space. All those who cling to the 'self' as constant and unchanging have no change. Now, assuming a defensive calculation is also possible. If using transformation to make the essence impermanent is also possible. If using change, the 'self' that you cling to should be impermanent in essence, because it is considered to be changeable, like form and sound. If refuting the Samkhya school, making the essence also transform, or being called change along with contraction and expansion, therefore it should be impermanent. Or this is a hypothetical defense.

Treatise: However, for sentient beings, the causal power of mind and mental factors (citta-caitta) and so on, there is no contradiction in principle.

Commentary: This is a description of the correct meaning, and the meaning of the text is easy to understand. The so-called causal power of mind and mental factors, etc., refers to the fact that due to the causal power of the seventh consciousness (manas) perfuming seeds (bīja), the alaya-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) arises in the various realms of existence, continuously. The sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna) creates karma, and this and the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) can both receive the consequences, and there is no contradiction in principle. Also, mind and mental factors, that is, the eighth consciousness, itself admits the reason for the causal power of seeds, its manifest consciousness continues uninterruptedly. That is, this sixth consciousness sometimes creates karma, and together with the eighth consciousness can also receive the consequences, and there is no contradiction in principle. Also, the eight consciousnesses and other mind and mental factors, due to the causal power of their respective seeds, the five aggregates (pañca-skandha) of the various realms of existence continue uninterruptedly. That is, this false one, the sixth consciousness creates karma, the sixth consciousness and the eighth consciousness receive the consequences, and there is no contradiction in principle. Except for the seventh consciousness.

The outsider raises another challenge:

Treatise: If the 'self' truly does not exist, then who would strive to seek nirvana (nirvāṇa)?

Commentary: This is the third section, with four parts. First, the outsider's challenge.

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難。若有我者可有厭舍。我既實無。誰生生死及得涅槃。既無此事便為大失。無厭舍故。此中二問。應立量云。一切有情。應無生死亦不求涅槃。以無我故。如虛空等。

論。所執實我至常為自害。

述曰。論主質云。我性既常。何能生死。量云。汝我。不能輪迴生死。計無生滅故。如虛空等　既非苦惱。應不能厭苦樂求涅槃。以是常故。如空無為。既執我常復沉生死求趣涅槃。故彼所言常為自害。總結彼非。

論。然有情類至求趣涅槃。

述曰。敘正義也。然有似我唯蘊所攝和合假者。身心相續諸生不斷。起煩惱已復生諸趣。深厭此苦便求涅槃。故無實我。

論。由此故知至妄執為我。

述曰。總結前非述正義也。其文易解。

就破外計文總有四。其第三段別問答中。上來第一已破我訖。自下第二次破執法。于中有二。初破計。后解執　或有三。初總問答。次廣別破。后解法執　或分為四。第一總問答。第二別問答破。第三合破小乘．外道。第四解彼二執　或分為五。初外道．小乘略共為問。徴法非有。第二略答法體是無。第三外道．小乘別問別破所取非有。第四合破小乘．外道所能取無。第五解彼法執分別俱生伏斷位次。

論。如何識外至不可得耶。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 難。如果存在『我』（ātman），就可以有厭惡和捨棄。既然『我』（ātman）實際上不存在，那麼誰會經歷生死輪迴，又如何證得涅槃（nirvāṇa）呢？如果根本沒有『我』（ātman）這件事，那就大錯特錯了，因為沒有『我』（ātman）就無法產生厭惡和捨棄。這裡包含兩個問題。應該這樣立論：一切有情眾生，都不應該有生死輪迴，也不應該尋求涅槃（nirvāṇa），因為沒有『我』（ātman）的緣故，就像虛空一樣。

論：所執著的真實的『我』（ātman），如果恒常不變，反而會自我傷害。

述曰：論主質問說，如果『我』（ātman）的體性是恒常的，怎麼會經歷生死輪迴呢？可以這樣立論：你所說的『我』（ātman），不能輪迴生死，因為你認為它沒有生滅變化，就像虛空一樣。既然不是苦惱，就不應該厭惡痛苦，喜好快樂，並尋求涅槃（nirvāṇa），因為它恒常不變，就像虛空無為一樣。既然執著『我』（ātman）是恒常的，又沉溺於生死輪迴，尋求涅槃（nirvāṇa），所以他們所說的話，常常會自相矛盾。總結他們的觀點是錯誤的。

論：然而，有情眾生會經歷生死，並尋求涅槃（nirvāṇa）。

述曰：這是在闡述正確的道理。然而，有類似『我』（ātman）的東西，只是由五蘊（skandha）所包含的，和合而成的假象。身心相續，諸法生滅不斷。產生煩惱后，又會流轉于各個趣向。深深厭惡這些痛苦，便尋求涅槃（nirvāṇa）。所以，並沒有真實的『我』（ātman）。

論：由此可知，都是因為愚昧無知，才錯誤地執著為『我』（ātman）。

述曰：這是總結之前的錯誤觀點，並闡述正確的道理。文句容易理解。

關於破斥外道計度的文章，總共有四段。在第三段的個別問答中，上面第一部分已經破斥了『我』（ātman）。從下面開始，第二次破斥對法的執著。其中又分為兩種：首先破斥計度，然後解釋執著。或者分為三種：首先是總體的問答，其次是廣泛而分別地破斥，最後解釋對法的執著。或者分為四種：第一是總體的問答，第二是分別問答破斥，第三是合併破斥小乘和外道，第四是解釋他們二者的執著。或者分為五種：首先是外道和小乘略微共同地提出問題，質疑法不是實有。第二是簡略地回答法的體性是空無。第三是外道和小乘分別提出問題，分別破斥他們所執著的不是實有。第四是合併破斥小乘和外道所能執著的不是實有。第五是解釋他們對法的執著，分別說明俱生和分別的伏斷位次。

論：如何認識外境，以至於認為外境是不可得的呢？

【English Translation】 English version: Objection: If there were an 'I' (ātman), there could be aversion and abandonment. Since the 'I' (ātman) is actually non-existent, who would undergo birth and death, and how would one attain nirvāṇa? If there is no such thing as an 'I' (ātman), then it would be a great mistake, because without an 'I' (ātman), there would be no aversion or abandonment. This contains two questions. One should establish the following proposition: All sentient beings should not have birth and death, nor should they seek nirvāṇa, because there is no 'I' (ātman), just like empty space.

Treatise: The real 'I' (ātman) that is clung to, if it is permanent, will harm itself.

Commentary: The treatise master questions, saying, 'If the nature of the 'I' (ātman) is permanent, how can it undergo birth and death?' One can establish the following proposition: Your 'I' (ātman) cannot transmigrate through birth and death, because you consider it to be without arising or ceasing, like empty space. Since it is not suffering, it should not be averse to suffering, fond of pleasure, and seek nirvāṇa, because it is permanent, like unconditioned space. Since they cling to the 'I' (ātman) as permanent, yet are immersed in birth and death, seeking nirvāṇa, therefore, what they say often contradicts itself. In conclusion, their views are wrong.

Treatise: However, sentient beings experience birth and death and seek nirvāṇa.

Commentary: This is explaining the correct principle. However, there is something similar to an 'I' (ātman), which is merely an illusion composed of the aggregates (skandha). The body and mind continue, and phenomena arise and cease continuously. After generating afflictions, they transmigrate through various destinies. Deeply disgusted with these sufferings, they seek nirvāṇa. Therefore, there is no real 'I' (ātman).

Treatise: From this, it can be known that it is all due to ignorance that one mistakenly clings to an 'I' (ātman).

Commentary: This is summarizing the previous wrong views and explaining the correct principle. The text is easy to understand.

Regarding the texts refuting externalist views, there are a total of four sections. In the individual questions and answers of the third section, the first part above has already refuted the 'I' (ātman). From below, the second time refutes the clinging to dharmas. Among them, there are two types: first, refuting the conceptualization; then, explaining the clinging. Or, there are three types: first, the general questions and answers; second, the extensive and separate refutations; and finally, explaining the clinging to dharmas. Or, there are four types: first, the general questions and answers; second, the separate questions and answers refuting; third, the combined refutation of the Hīnayāna and externalists; and fourth, explaining the clinging of the two. Or, there are five types: first, the externalists and Hīnayāna briefly raise a common question, questioning that dharmas are not real. Second, briefly answering that the nature of dharmas is empty. Third, the externalists and Hīnayāna separately raise questions, separately refuting that what they cling to is not real. Fourth, the combined refutation of the Hīnayāna and externalists that what can be clung to is not real. Fifth, explaining their clinging to dharmas, separately explaining the stages of suppression and eradication of the co-arisen and conceptual.

Treatise: How does one recognize external objects, to the extent that one considers external objects to be unattainable?

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述曰。此即第一外道．小乘略共為問。徴法非有。前所計我識內識外皆體是無。但應總問云何實我不可得耶。今者彼法識內可有。有似法故。但識外無。為簡他宗計識外有故今問曰。如何識外實有諸法不可得耶。

論。外道余乘至理非有故。

述曰。此即第二略答彼問。法體無也。亦答識外不答識中。

論。外道所執云何非有。

述曰。為五段中。自下第三外道．小乘別問別破所取非有。于中有二。初是外道別問別破。第二小乘別問別破。就初外道別問破中。初問次破。此即問也。

論。且數論者至二十三法。

述曰。自下破也。于中有二。初別破一十三種大外道計。第二總束九十五種為四句破。于初別破十三計中合為六破。至下當知。此即第一破數論也。文勢有三。初敘計。次破執。后結非。其間子細至文方科　謂有外道名劫比羅。古云迦毗羅訛也。此云黃赤。鬢髮面色並黃赤故。今西方貴波羅門種。皆黃赤色也。時世號為黃赤色仙人。其後弟子之中上首。如十八部中部主者名伐里沙。此翻為雨。雨時生故即以為名。其雨徒黨名雨眾外道　梵云僧佉。此翻為數。即智惠數。數度諸法根本立名從數起論。名為數論。論能生數亦名數論。其造數論及學數論名數論者。此師所造金七

【現代漢語翻譯】 述曰：這是第一類外道和小乘略微共同提出的問題，質疑法的存在。之前所計度的我、識內、識外，其本體都是不存在的。但應該總的提問：『為什麼真實的我不可得呢？』現在，彼法在識內可能是存在的，因為它有類似法的形態。但識外則不存在。爲了區分其他宗派計度識外存在的觀點，現在提問：『為什麼識外真實存在的諸法是不可得的呢？』

論：外道和其他乘所執著的理，是不存在的。

述曰：這是第二部分，簡略地回答了他們的問題，即法的本體是不存在的。這裡只回答了識外的問題，沒有回答識內的問題。

論：外道所執著的主張，為什麼是不存在的呢？

述曰：在五段內容中，從下面開始是第三部分，外道和小乘分別提問，分別破斥他們所執著的不存在。其中分為兩部分：第一部分是外道分別提問，分別破斥；第二部分是小乘分別提問，分別破斥。在第一部分外道分別提問破斥中，先提問，后破斥。這裡是提問。

論：且數論者，認為有二十三種法。

述曰：從下面開始是破斥。其中分為兩部分：第一部分是分別破斥十三種大的外道的計度；第二部分是總括九十五種計度，用四句來破斥。在第一部分分別破斥十三種計度中，總共有六種破斥，到後面會知道。這裡是第一種破斥數論。文章的結構分為三部分：首先敘述他們的計度，其次破斥他們的執著，最後總結其非理性。其中的細節在後面的文章中會詳細說明。所謂的外道，名叫劫比羅（Kapila），古代翻譯為迦毗羅，是訛誤。劫比羅的意思是『黃赤』，因為他的鬢髮和麵色都是黃赤色的。現在西方尊貴的婆羅門種姓，都是黃赤色的。當時世人稱他為黃赤色仙人。他的弟子中，地位最高，如同十八部中的部主的人，名叫伐里沙（Varsha），翻譯為『雨』，因為在下雨的時候出生，所以就用這個作為名字。他的徒黨被稱為雨眾外道。梵文僧佉（Samkhya），翻譯為『數』，也就是智慧之數。他們通過計數諸法的根本來立名，從數開始立論，所以叫做數論。這種理論能夠產生數，所以也叫做數論。創造數論和學習數論的人，被稱為數論者。這位老師所造的金七十論...

【English Translation】 Commentary: This is the first type of heretics and the slightly common question posed by the Lesser Vehicle, questioning the existence of dharmas. The self, internal consciousness, and external consciousness previously conceived are all non-existent in their essence. But the general question should be: 'Why is the real self unattainable?' Now, that dharma may exist within consciousness because it has a form similar to dharma. But it does not exist outside of consciousness. In order to distinguish the views of other schools that conceive of existence outside of consciousness, the question is now asked: 'Why are the real dharmas that exist outside of consciousness unattainable?'

Treatise: The principles adhered to by heretics and other vehicles do not exist.

Commentary: This is the second part, briefly answering their question, that is, the essence of dharmas does not exist. It only answers the question of what is outside of consciousness, not what is inside of consciousness.

Treatise: Why do the assertions adhered to by heretics not exist?

Commentary: In the five sections, from below begins the third section, where heretics and the Lesser Vehicle separately ask questions and separately refute what they adhere to as non-existent. It is divided into two parts: the first part is where heretics separately ask questions and separately refute; the second part is where the Lesser Vehicle separately asks questions and separately refutes. In the first part, where heretics separately ask questions and refute, first the question is asked, then the refutation. This is the question.

Treatise: Moreover, the Samkhya (enumeration) school believes in twenty-three dharmas.

Commentary: From below begins the refutation. It is divided into two parts: the first part is to separately refute the conceptions of thirteen major heretical schools; the second part is to summarize the ninety-five conceptions and refute them with four statements. In the first part, separately refuting the thirteen conceptions, there are a total of six refutations, which will be known later. This is the first refutation of the Samkhya school. The structure of the text is divided into three parts: first, narrating their conceptions; second, refuting their attachments; and third, summarizing their irrationality. The details will be explained in detail in the following text. The so-called heretic is named Kapila (Kapila), which was mistakenly translated as '迦毗羅' in ancient times. Kapila means 'yellow-red' because his hair and complexion are yellow-red. Now the noble Brahmin caste in the West is all yellow-red. At that time, people called him the Yellow-Red Immortal. Among his disciples, the highest in status, like the head of the eighteen schools, is named Varsha (Varsha), which translates to 'rain', because he was born during the rain, so he used this as his name. His followers are called the Rain Assembly Heretics. The Sanskrit term Samkhya (Samkhya) translates to 'number', which is the number of wisdom. They establish names by counting the roots of all dharmas, and start the theory from numbers, so it is called Samkhya. This theory can generate numbers, so it is also called Samkhya. Those who create and study Samkhya are called Samkhyas. The Golden Seventy Treatise created by this teacher...

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十論。謂有外道入金耳國。以鐵鍱腹。頂戴火盆。擊王論鼓求僧論議。因諍世界初有後無。謗僧不如外道。遂造七十行頌申數論宗。王意朋彼以金賜之。外道欲彰己令譽。遂以所造名金七十論。彼論長行天親菩薩之所造也。下第四卷更當廣述。依金七十論立二十五諦。總略為三。次中為四。廣為二十五。彼論云略為三者。謂變易。自性．我知。變易者。謂中間二十三諦。自性所作名為變易　自性者冥性也。今名自性。古名冥性今亦名勝性未生大等但住自分名為自性。若生大等便名勝性用增勝故　我知者神我也　中為四者。一本而非變易。謂即自效能生大等故名為本。不從他生故非變易。二變易而非本。一說謂十六諦。即十一根。及五大。總十六諦。又說但十一根。唯從他生名為變易。不能生他是故非本。三亦本亦變易。一說謂七諦。即大．我慢．及五唯量。又說並五大合十二法。謂從他生復生他故。四非本非變易。謂神我　諦廣為二十五諦者。一自性。二大。三我慢。四五唯。五五大．六五知根。七五作業根．八心平等根．九我知者。於此九位開為二十五諦　問自性云何能與諸法為生因也。

答三德合故能生諸諦。三德者。梵云薩埵此云有情。亦言勇健。今取勇義。梵云剌阇此名為微。牛毛塵等皆名剌阇。亦名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《十論》中記載，有外道進入金耳國（Jīn'ěr guó）。他們用鐵片包裹腹部，頭頂戴著火盆，敲擊著王論鼓，尋求與僧侶辯論。他們爭論世界是先有還是後有，誹謗僧侶不如外道。於是，他們創作了七十行頌，來闡述數論宗（Shùlùn zōng）。國王傾向於他們，並用黃金賞賜他們。外道爲了彰顯自己的名譽，就將所造的論著命名為《金七十論》。這部論著的長行部分是天親菩薩（Tiānqīn Púsà）所著。在第四卷中會更詳細地闡述。依據《金七十論》，建立了二十五諦（èrshíwǔ dì）。總的來說，可以概括為三種，其次為四種，廣義上為二十五種。該論著說，概括為三種，即變易（biànyì）、自性（zìxìng）、我知（wǒzhī）。變易，指的是中間的二十三諦，自性所產生的稱為變易。自性，指的是冥性（míngxìng），現在稱為自性，古代稱為冥性，現在也稱為勝性（shèngxìng），未產生大等，只是安住于自身的部分，稱為自性。如果產生了大的等等，就稱為勝性，因為作用增強了。我知，指的是神我（shénwǒ）。 中為四種，一是本而非變易，指的是自性，能夠產生大等，所以稱為本，不從其他產生，所以不是變易。二是變易而非本，一種說法是十六諦，即十一根（shíyīgēn）和五大（wǔdà），總共十六諦。另一種說法是隻有十一根，只從其他產生，稱為變易，不能產生其他，所以不是本。三是亦本亦變易，一種說法是七諦，即大、我慢（wǒmàn）和五唯量（wǔwéiliàng）。另一種說法是加上五大，共十二法，因為從其他產生，又產生其他。四是非本非變易，指的是神我。 諦廣義上為二十五諦，一是自性，二是大，三是我慢，四是五唯，五是五大，六是五知根（wǔzhīgēn），七是五作業根（wǔzuòyègēn），八是心平等根（xīnpíngděnggēn），九是我知者。在這九個位置上，展開為二十五諦。問：自性如何能夠作為諸法產生的因呢？ 答：因為三德（sāndé）和合，所以能夠產生諸諦。三德，梵語是薩埵（Sàduǒ），這裡翻譯為有情（yǒuqíng），也說是勇健，現在取勇義。梵語是剌阇（Làzhā），這裡翻譯為微（wēi），牛毛塵等都稱為剌阇，也稱為。

【English Translation】 English version: The 'Ten Treatises' record that some heretics entered the country of Jin'er (Jīn'ěr guó). They wrapped their abdomens with iron plates, wore fire basins on their heads, and beat the King's Debate Drum, seeking debate with the monks. They argued whether the world was first existent or later existent, slandering the monks as inferior to the heretics. Therefore, they composed seventy lines of verses to expound the Samkhya (Shùlùn zōng) school. The king favored them and rewarded them with gold. The heretics, in order to highlight their reputation, named their creation the 'Golden Seventy Verses'. The prose commentary of this treatise was written by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu (Tiānqīn Púsà). It will be elaborated further in the fourth volume. Based on the 'Golden Seventy Verses', twenty-five Tattvas (èrshíwǔ dì) are established. Generally speaking, they can be summarized into three types, secondly into four types, and broadly into twenty-five types. The treatise says that summarizing into three types means transformation (biànyì), nature (zìxìng), and the knower (wǒzhī). Transformation refers to the middle twenty-three Tattvas; what is produced by nature is called transformation. Nature refers to Prakriti (míngxìng), now called nature, anciently called Prakriti, and now also called Pradhana (shèngxìng), not yet producing Mahat etc., but just abiding in its own part, is called nature. If it produces Mahat etc., it is called Pradhana because its function is enhanced. The knower refers to Atman (shénwǒ). The four types are: first, the source but not transformation, referring to nature, which can produce Mahat etc., so it is called the source, not produced from others, so it is not transformation. Second, transformation but not the source, one explanation is the sixteen Tattvas, namely the eleven organs (shíyīgēn) and the five great elements (wǔdà), totaling sixteen Tattvas. Another explanation is only the eleven organs, only produced from others, called transformation, unable to produce others, so it is not the source. Third, both the source and transformation, one explanation is the seven Tattvas, namely Mahat, Ahamkara (wǒmàn), and the five Tanmatras (wǔwéiliàng). Another explanation is adding the five great elements, totaling twelve dharmas, because they are produced from others and produce others. Fourth, neither the source nor transformation, referring to Atman. The Tattvas broadly are twenty-five Tattvas: first is nature, second is Mahat, third is Ahamkara, fourth is the five Tanmatras, fifth is the five great elements, sixth is the five cognitive organs (wǔzhīgēn), seventh is the five conative organs (wǔzuòyègēn), eighth is the mind-organ (xīnpíngděnggēn), ninth is the knower. In these nine positions, they are expanded into twenty-five Tattvas. Question: How can nature be the cause for the production of all dharmas? Answer: Because the three Gunas (sāndé) are combined, they can produce all Tattvas. The Sanskrit word for the three Gunas is Sattva (Sàduǒ), which is translated here as sentient being (yǒuqíng), also said to be courageous, now taking the meaning of courage. The Sanskrit word is Rajas (Làzhā), which is translated here as subtle (wēi), cow hair dust etc. are all called Rajas, also called.

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塵坌。今取塵義。梵云答摩此名為闇。鈍闇之闇。三德應名勇．塵．闇也。若傍義翻。舊名染．粗．黑。今云黃．赤．黑。舊名喜．憂．闇。今名貪嗔癡。舊名樂．苦．癡。今言樂．苦．舍　外人問曰。此我知者作受者耶。答是受者。三德作故。問既非作者用我何為。答曰為領義故。義之言境。證於境也。我是知者。余不能知。又從冥性既轉變已我受用故。次第生者。自性本有無為常住。唯能生他非從他生。由我起思受用境界。從自性先生大。大者增長之義。自性相增故名為大。或名覺。亦名想。名遍滿。名智。名惠。從大生我執我執者自性起用觀察於我。知我須境故名我執。初亦名轉異。亦名脂膩。有說我慢生五大．五唯十法。五大者謂地．水．火．風．空。別有一物名之為空。非空無為。空界色等。五唯者謂聲．觸．色．味．香。有說慢但生五唯。五唯生五大。五大生十一根。為我受用先作五唯。量者定義。唯定用此成大．根等。若約此說。色成於火大。火大成眼根。眼不見火而見於色。聲成於空。空成於耳。耳不聞空而聞于聲。香成於地。地成於鼻。鼻不聞地而聞于香。味成於水。水成於舌。舌不得水而嘗于味。觸成於風。風成於身。身不得風而得於觸。此中所說約別成義。有說五唯總成五大。五大總成五根者

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 塵坌（dūn bèn）。現在取『塵』的含義。梵語『答摩』（tā mó），這裡的意思是『闇』（àn），鈍闇的『闇』。三德（sān dé）應該名為勇、塵、闇。如果從旁義翻譯，舊譯名為染、粗、黑，現在譯為黃、赤、黑。舊譯名為喜、憂、闇，現在譯為貪、嗔、癡。舊譯名為樂、苦、癡，現在譯為樂、苦、舍。 外道（wài dào）之人問道：『這個我（wǒ），是知者（zhī zhě）、作者（zuò zhě）和受者（shòu zhě）嗎？』回答說：『是受者，因為三德在起作用。』問道：『既然不是作者，用我做什麼呢？』回答說：『爲了領受的緣故。』『義』的意思是境界（jìng jiè），證悟于境界。我是知者，其他不能知。又因為從冥性（míng xìng）轉變之後，我才受用，次第產生。自性（zì xìng）本來就有，是無為（wú wéi）常住的，只能生他，不能從他而生。由於我（wǒ）生起思（sī），受用境界。從自性先生出大（dà）。大，是增長的意思。自性相互增長，所以名為大。或者名為覺（jué），也名為想（xiǎng），名為遍滿（biàn mǎn），名為智（zhì），名為惠（huì）。從大生我執（wǒ zhí），我執是自性起作用，觀察於我，知道我需要境界，所以名為我執。最初也名為轉異（zhuǎn yì），也名為脂膩（zhī nì）。 有人說，我慢（wǒ màn）產生五大（wǔ dà）、五唯（wǔ wéi）這十法（shí fǎ）。五大是指地、水、火、風、空。另外有一種東西，稱之為空，不是空無為。空界（kōng jiè）是色等。五唯是指聲、觸、色、味、香。有人說，我慢只產生五唯，五唯產生五大，五大產生十一根（shí yī gēn），爲了我受用，先產生五唯。量（liàng）是定義。唯（wéi）定義用這個，成就大、根等。如果按照這個來說，色（sè）成就於火大（huǒ dà），火大成就眼根（yǎn gēn）。眼睛看不見火，而看見色。聲（shēng）成就於空（kōng），空成就耳（ěr）。耳朵聽不見空，而聽見聲。香（xiāng）成就於地（dì），地成就鼻（bí）。鼻子聞不見地，而聞見香。味（wèi）成就於水（shuǐ），水成就舌（shé）。舌頭嘗不到水，而嚐到味。觸（chù）成就於風（fēng），風成就身（shēn）。身體感覺不到風，而感覺到觸。這裡所說的是按照分別成就的意義。有人說，五唯總成就五大，五大總成就五根。

【English Translation】 English version: Dust and dirt. Now taking the meaning of 'dust'. In Sanskrit, it's 'Tamas', which means 'darkness', the darkness of dullness. The three Gunas (qualities) should be named Energy, Rajas (passion), and Tamas (darkness). If translated from a side meaning, the old names are stained, coarse, and black; now translated as yellow, red, and black. The old names are joy, sorrow, and darkness; now named greed, hatred, and delusion. The old names are pleasure, pain, and ignorance; now said to be pleasure, pain, and equanimity. An outsider asks: 'Is this 'I' (Atman) the knower (Jnata), the doer (Karta), and the enjoyer (Bhokta)?' The answer is: 'It is the enjoyer, because the three Gunas are acting.' The question is: 'Since it is not the doer, what is the use of the 'I'?' The answer is: 'For the sake of experiencing.' 'Artha' (meaning) means the object of sense, realization in the object. 'I' am the knower, others cannot know. Also, because after transformation from Prakriti (primordial nature), 'I' experience, and things arise in sequence. Prakriti is inherently existent, uncaused, and eternal, only able to produce others, not produced by others. Because of 'I', thoughts arise, and experiences are enjoyed. From Prakriti, Mahat (the Great One) arises first. Mahat means growth. Prakriti increases mutually, so it is called Mahat. Or it is called Buddhi (intellect), also called thought (Samkalpa), called all-pervading (Vibhu), called wisdom (Jnana), called intelligence (Prajna). From Mahat arises Ahamkara (ego), Ahamkara is the function of Prakriti, observing 'I', knowing that 'I' needs objects, so it is called Ahamkara. Initially, it is also called transformation (Vikara), also called unctuous (Snigdha). Some say that ego produces the five great elements (Pancha Mahabhuta) and the five subtle elements (Pancha Tanmatra), these ten dharmas (ten principles). The five great elements are earth, water, fire, wind, and space. There is another thing called space, not empty non-action. The space realm is form, etc. The five subtle elements are sound, touch, form, taste, and smell. Some say that ego only produces the five subtle elements, the five subtle elements produce the five great elements, and the five great elements produce the eleven organs (eleven senses), for 'I' to enjoy, first producing the five subtle elements. 'Quantity' (Parimana) is definition. The subtle elements define the use of this, accomplishing the great elements, organs, etc. If according to this, form is accomplished by the fire element, the fire element accomplishes the eye organ. The eye does not see fire, but sees form. Sound is accomplished by space, space accomplishes the ear. The ear does not hear space, but hears sound. Smell is accomplished by earth, earth accomplishes the nose. The nose does not smell earth, but smells fragrance. Taste is accomplished by water, water accomplishes the tongue. The tongue does not taste water, but tastes flavor. Touch is accomplished by wind, wind accomplishes the body. The body does not feel wind, but feels touch. What is said here is according to the meaning of separate accomplishment. Some say that the five subtle elements collectively accomplish the five great elements, and the five great elements collectively accomplish the five organs.

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也。五作業根．心平等根亦皆總成。為用五唯須十一根。十一根不能自有。藉五大成。佛法所造是彼能造。故十一法變易非本。順此後解。即今西方猶有二諍　次生十一根。初生五知根。五知根者。謂眼．耳．鼻．舌．皮。次生五作業根。五作業根者。一語具．二手．三足．四小便處．五大便處。此中語具。謂語所須口舌等是。此中手足。即分皮根少分為之。前取總皮。今取支故。又此男女大遺根等。有別作用故別立也。次生心根。金七十論分別為體。有說。此是肉心為體。神我以思為體。故因明說執我是思。三德是生死因。由所轉變擾亂我故不得解脫。知二十三諦轉變無常生厭修道。自性隱跡不生諸諦。我便解脫。今破彼法顯三德體非是能成。二十三諦非是所成。不破彼我前已破故。故言三德所成二十三法。

論。然大等法至現量所得。

述曰。二十三諦由薩埵等三事和合以成自體。皆是實有。無滅壞法。但是轉變。稱為無常。初從自性轉變而生。后變壞時還歸自性。但是隱顯。非后無體滅名無常。體皆自性。更無別體。是實非假。此等皆是現量所得。我所受用。此顯二義。一實。二現量得。

論。彼執非理。

述曰。自下破也。破中有三。初總非。次返問。后別破。此總非也。

論。所以者何。

述曰。此返問也。

論。大等諸法至應假非實。

述曰。自下別破破中有三。初總破所成二十三諦。第二薩埵等三下。別破本事三法能成。第三又三是別下。合破能所成二十四諦。初破有三。此即初也　大等者等中間二十二法。第一量云。大等諸法。應假非實。因云。許多事成故。喻云。如軍林等　然彼宗中許軍林等是假非實以多法成不同瓶等。瓶等雖亦多法所成。能成多法皆不相離。如大等諦。故皆實有。軍林相離多法而成。故假非實。然體非是滅壞無常。分析之時還歸自性。即是彼許世間有假。故得為喻。然彼所計大等諸法。一一皆依三德所成。三事和合能成大等。此言所成不言所生。不違彼宗。然余處中假說言生者。成生之生。非生起生。此生起生後有滅故。故大等因言多事成。若言三德所成為因。無同喻過。今但總言多事成故。因無過也　若爾五唯自宗亦說為多事成。豈不違宗　若據三假等說。相續假中所收。故無違教。亦非多事所共成故。以皆生故。

又彼宗計大等諸法多事所成。是現量得。以得色等時亦得於大等。軍等多事成。然非現量得。

論。如何可說現量得耶。

述曰。難非現量得大等法。第二量云。汝之大等。亦非現量所得。多事成故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：為什麼這麼說呢？

述曰：這是反問。

論：『大』（Mahat，宇宙理性）等諸法，應該是假有而非實有。

述曰：下面分別破斥，破斥中有三個部分。第一部分是總破所成立的二十三個諦（Tattva，真實）。第二部分是『薩埵』（Sattva，悅性）等三種屬性，分別破斥作為根本的三法能成。第三部分是『又三是別』，合併破斥能成和所成的二十四個諦。首先破斥，有三個部分。這是第一個部分。『大』等，是指中間的二十二法。第一個論證是：『大』等諸法，應該是假有而非實有。原因是：由許多事物構成。例如軍隊、森林等。他們宗派認為軍隊、森林等是假有而非實有，因為由多種事物構成，這與瓶子等不同。瓶子等雖然也是由多種事物構成，但構成它們的多種事物都不互相分離，例如『大』等諦，所以都是實有。軍隊、森林是互相分離的多種事物構成，所以是假有而非實有。然而，它們的本體並非滅壞無常，分析的時候還會迴歸自性。這就是他們所承認的世間假有，所以可以作為比喻。然而，他們所認為的『大』等諸法，每一個都是依靠三種屬性構成。三種事物和合才能構成『大』等。這裡說的是構成，而不是產生，不違揹他們的宗派。然而，在其他地方假說『生』的時候，指的是成就之『生』，而不是生起之『生』。因為這種生起之『生』之後會有滅亡。所以『大』等的原因是『由許多事物構成』。如果說『由三種屬性構成』作為原因，就沒有同喻的過失。現在只是總說『由許多事物構成』，原因沒有過失。如果這樣，五唯自宗也說是多種事物構成，難道不違背宗義嗎？如果根據三假等來說，包含在相續假中，所以不違背教義。也不是多種事物共同構成，因為都是生起的。

而且，他們宗派認為『大』等諸法是由多種事物構成，是現量所得。因為得到色等的時候也得到『大』等。軍隊等多種事物構成，卻不是現量所得。

論：怎麼能說是現量所得呢？

述曰：反駁不是現量所得『大』等法。第二個論證是：你的『大』等，也不是現量所得，因為是由多種事物構成。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: Why is it said so?

Commentary: This is a counter-question.

Treatise: 『Mahat』 (the Great, cosmic intellect) and other dharmas should be considered as provisional (false) rather than real.

Commentary: The following is a separate refutation, which consists of three parts. The first part is a general refutation of the twenty-three Tattvas (realities) that are established. The second part, starting with 『Sattva』 (goodness) and the other three attributes, separately refutes the three fundamental dharmas that are capable of constituting. The third part, starting with 『also three are separate』, combines the refutation of the twenty-four Tattvas that are both constitutive and constituted. The first refutation has three parts. This is the first part. 『Mahat』 and others refer to the twenty-two dharmas in between. The first argument is: 『Mahat』 and other dharmas should be considered as provisional rather than real. The reason is: because they are composed of many things. For example, an army, a forest, etc. Their school considers an army, a forest, etc., to be provisional rather than real because they are composed of many things, which is different from pots, etc. Although pots, etc., are also composed of many things, the many things that constitute them are not separate from each other, such as 『Mahat』 and other Tattvas, so they are all real. An army and a forest are composed of many things that are separate from each other, so they are provisional rather than real. However, their substance is not destructible or impermanent; when analyzed, they still return to their own nature. This is what they acknowledge as the provisional existence in the world, so it can be used as a metaphor. However, the 『Mahat』 and other dharmas that they posit are each composed of the three attributes. The combination of the three things can constitute 『Mahat』 and others. Here, it is said to be constituted, not produced, which does not contradict their school. However, when 『birth』 is hypothetically mentioned elsewhere, it refers to the 『birth』 of accomplishment, not the 『birth』 of arising. Because this 『birth』 of arising will be followed by destruction. Therefore, the reason for 『Mahat』 and others is 『composed of many things』. If 『composed of the three attributes』 is used as the reason, there would be no fault of a non-exemplary example. Now, it is simply said 『composed of many things』, so there is no fault in the reason. If so, the Five Uniques (five subtle elements) are also said by our own school to be composed of many things. Wouldn't that contradict the tenets of our school? If based on the Three Provisionals, etc., they are included in the provisional of continuity, so there is no contradiction with the teachings. Also, they are not jointly composed of many things, because they are all arising.

Moreover, their school believes that 『Mahat』 and other dharmas are composed of many things and are obtained through direct perception. Because when color, etc., are obtained, 『Mahat』 and others are also obtained. An army, etc., are composed of many things, but are not obtained through direct perception.

Treatise: How can it be said that they are obtained through direct perception?

Commentary: Refuting that 『Mahat』 and other dharmas are not obtained through direct perception. The second argument is: Your 『Mahat』 and others are also not obtained through direct perception, because they are composed of many things.

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或是假故。如軍林等。前已破假。故得為因　若爾即有一分違自宗失。此許五大中四大並五唯量。皆多事成。現量所得　此亦不然。彼執是常。宗言汝執故無過失。又文中少。應改前宗。云大等非實有境之現量所得。即簡自宗四大五唯非實有境現量所得。彼宗軍林等。亦非實有境現量所得故。故得為喻。彼宗現量。即五知根。心平等根。然非彼宗軍林等物是實有境現量所得故。今但遮實有現量之所得故。真如離言故無有失。

論。又大等法至非三合成。

述曰。第三總破二十三諦。量云。大等二十三諦。應非三事合成。許實有故。如本自性。此中論文。宗有前後。因不簡略。準前應知。文言略故。

上來三量總破所成二十三諦。此下第二總破本事能成自性。

論。薩埵等三至亦三合成。

述曰。于中文有其八。量有其十。此中量云。薩埵等三。應三合成。許即大等故。猶如大等。彼宗大等即是薩埵等三。薩埵等三即是大等。薩埵等三是本法故。不從他成。大等不爾。故以三德例從大等多法而成。

自下第二。

論。轉變非常為例亦爾。

述曰。又破自性。由此三事即大等故。應如大等轉變非常。故立量云。薩埵等三法。應轉變無常。即大等故。如大等法。恐有能別

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 或者說是虛假的顯現。例如軍林（Junlin，軍隊的幻象）等。之前已經破斥了這些虛假顯現，所以可以作為因（hetu，理由）。如果這樣說，那麼就有一部分違背了你自己的宗義的過失。因為你承認五大（wuda，地、水、火、風、空）中的四大（sida，地、水、火、風）以及五唯（wuwei，色、聲、香、味、觸）都是由多事（duoshi，多種因素）所成就，並且是通過現量（xianliang，直接感知）所獲得的。但這種說法是不對的。因為他們認為這些是常（chang，永恒不變）的。我們可以用宗義反駁：『因為你執著它們是常的，所以沒有過失。』而且原文的語句較少，應該修改之前的宗義，改為『五大等不是由實有境的現量所獲得的。』這樣就排除了我們自己宗義的四大五唯不是由實有境的現量所獲得的。他們的宗義中的軍林等，也不是由實有境的現量所獲得的，所以可以作為比喻。他們的宗義中的現量，就是五知根（wuzhigen，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）和心平等根（xinpingdenggen，意識）。然而，他們的宗義中的軍林等事物不是由實有境的現量所獲得的。現在只是遮止由實有的現量所獲得，所以真如（zhenru，事物的真實本性）是離言的，因此沒有過失。

論：又五大等法，不是由三種事物合成。

述曰：第三，總破斥二十三諦（ershisan di，數論的二十三種基本實體）。量云：五大等二十三諦，不應由三種事物合成，因為你們許可是實有的，如同本自性（benzixing，根本自性）。這裡論文中，宗義有前後顛倒，因不簡略。應該參照前面的內容來理解。因為文句簡略。

以上三個量，總破斥了所成立的二十三諦。下面第二部分，總破斥能成立自性（zixing，自性）的本事（benshi，根本原因）。

論：薩埵（Sattva，悅性）、剌阇（Rajas，變性）、答磨（Tamas，惰性）這三種自性，也不是由三種事物合成。

述曰：原文中有八個部分，量有十個。這裡的量云：薩埵等三種自性，應該由三種事物合成，因為你們許可它們就是五大等。如同五大等。他們的宗義中，五大等就是薩埵等三種自性，薩埵等三種自性就是五大等。薩埵等三種自性是根本法，所以不是由其他事物所成就。五大等不是這樣，所以用三種德性來比喻，它們是由五大等多種法所成就的。

自下第二。

論：轉變和無常，也可以作為例子。

述曰：又破斥自性。因為這三種事物就是五大等，所以應該像五大等一樣轉變和無常。所以立量云：薩埵等三種法，應該轉變無常，因為它們就是五大等。如同五大等法。恐怕有能區別的因素。

【English Translation】 English version Or it is a false appearance. Such as Junlin (army illusion) etc. These false appearances have already been refuted, so they can be taken as hetu (reason). If so, then there is a fault of contradicting your own tenet. Because you admit that the four great elements (sida, earth, water, fire, wind) among the five great elements (wuda, earth, water, fire, wind, space) and the five tanmatras (wuwei, color, sound, smell, taste, touch) are all accomplished by many factors (duoshi, multiple factors), and are obtained through direct perception (xianliang). But this statement is not correct. Because they believe that these are permanent (chang, eternal). We can refute with the tenet: 'Because you are attached to them as permanent, there is no fault.' Moreover, the original text has few sentences, and the previous tenet should be modified to 'The five great elements etc. are not obtained by direct perception of real objects.' This excludes that our own tenet's four great elements and five tanmatras are not obtained by direct perception of real objects. Their tenet's Junlin etc. are also not obtained by direct perception of real objects, so they can be used as a metaphor. The direct perception in their tenet is the five sense organs (wuzhigen, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) and the mind-equal root (xinpingdenggen, consciousness). However, the things like Junlin etc. in their tenet are not obtained by direct perception of real objects. Now it is only to prevent the attainment by direct perception of real existence, so Suchness (zhenru, the true nature of things) is beyond words, so there is no fault.

Treatise: Furthermore, the dharmas such as the five great elements are not composed of three things.

Commentary: Thirdly, generally refuting the twenty-three tattvas (ershisan di, twenty-three basic entities of Samkhya). The inference is: The twenty-three tattvas such as the five great elements should not be composed of three things, because you allow them to be real, like the fundamental nature (benzixing, fundamental nature). Here in the thesis, the tenet is reversed, and the reason is not concise. It should be understood with reference to the previous content. Because the sentences are concise.

The above three inferences generally refute the established twenty-three tattvas. The second part below generally refutes the fundamental cause (benshi, fundamental cause) that can establish nature (zixing, self-nature).

Treatise: The three gunas of Sattva (Sattva, goodness), Rajas (Rajas, passion), and Tamas (Tamas, ignorance) are also not composed of three things.

Commentary: There are eight parts in the original text, and ten inferences. The inference here is: The three gunas such as Sattva should be composed of three things, because you allow them to be the five great elements etc. Like the five great elements etc. In their tenet, the five great elements etc. are the three gunas such as Sattva, and the three gunas such as Sattva are the five great elements etc. The three gunas such as Sattva are the fundamental dharma, so they are not accomplished by other things. The five great elements etc. are not like this, so use the three qualities as a metaphor, they are accomplished by many dharmas such as the five great elements.

From below, the second.

Treatise: Transformation and impermanence can also be taken as examples.

Commentary: Again refuting self-nature. Because these three things are the five great elements etc., they should transform and be impermanent like the five great elements etc. Therefore, the inference is established: The three dharmas such as Sattva should transform and be impermanent, because they are the five great elements etc. Like the dharmas of the five great elements etc. Perhaps there are distinguishing factors.

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不極成過。及無同喻過。故以轉變之言簡也。

論。又三本事至能體一故。

述曰。自下第三以體例功能。量云。薩埵等三事體。應各有多。即是功能故。如彼功能功能多者。一一上有多功能故。即生大等諸功能也。體唯各一。例能亦多。以能為量亦爾。就彼所執故以為喻。

論。三體既遍至體無別故。

述曰。自下第四第五以體一分例餘一分。量云。薩埵等三。一分轉變成法之時余之一分亦應轉變。此體即是彼薩埵等體無別故。或云。許體遍一切故。如一分轉變者　此二比量。一體無別因。二遍一切因。若許一分變餘一分亦變。即此三事無不變時。便違宗失。彼計此處變為山水。彼處即不變。自性之體仍遍一切故。

自下第六彼計三種體相各別。仍說和合共成一相。以彼三體例成一相。

論。許此三事至共成一相。

述曰。此中遮總合成一相。彼宗自許三體相別故。立量云。三事和合所成之相。亦應有三。許即三體故。如體。

論。不應合時至體無別故。

述曰。第七比量也。汝言此三事和合共成一相之時。應不能成一。三體各別故。或前與后體無別故。如不合時　相實有三變合成一。彼計三事有不和合。即是未成大等法時。故得為喻　返為量云。汝之三

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不極成過（不成極成之過失）。以及無同喻過（沒有相同的比喻的過失）。所以用轉變的言論來簡別。

論：又，三種自性（三本事，即薩埵(Sattva，悅性)、剌阇(Rajas，憂性)、答摩(Tamas，暗性)）的自體，達到能成為一體的緣故。

述曰：從下面第三點開始，以自體、作用、功能為例。立量說：薩埵等三種事物的自體，應該各自有很多（自體）。因為它們就是功能。就像那些功能一樣，功能多者，每一個上面都有很多功能。即產生大等各種功能。自體唯有各一。例證功能也很多。以功能為量也是這樣。就他們所執著的觀點，所以用功能作為比喻。

論：三種自體既然周遍一切，達到自體沒有差別的緣故。

述曰：從下面第四、第五點開始，以自體的一部分為例證其餘一部分。立量說：薩埵等三種事物，一部分轉變成為法的時候，其餘的一部分也應該轉變。因為這個自體就是那個薩埵等的自體，沒有差別。或者說，允許自體周遍一切的緣故。就像一部分轉變一樣。這兩個比量，一是自體沒有差別的原因，二是周遍一切的原因。如果允許一部分轉變，其餘一部分也轉變，那麼這三種事物就沒有不變的時候。就違背了宗義的失誤。他們認為此處變為山水，彼處即沒有改變。自性的自體仍然周遍一切的緣故。

從下面第六點開始，他們認為三種自體的體相各自不同，仍然說和合共同形成一個相。以那三種自體為例證形成一個相。

論：允許這三種事物，達到共同形成一個相。

述曰：這裡遮止總合成為一個相。因為他們的宗義自己允許三種自體的體相不同。立量說：三種事物和合所成的相，也應該有三個。允許就是三個自體。就像自體一樣。

論：不應該在和合的時候，達到自體沒有差別的緣故。

述曰：第七個比量。你們說這三種事物和合共同形成一個相的時候，應該不能成為一個相。因為三種自體各自不同。或者前與后的自體沒有差別。就像不和合的時候。相實際上有三種，轉變合成一個。他們認為三種事物有不和合的時候，就是沒有成為大等法的時候。所以可以作為比喻。反過來立量說：你們的三個

【English Translation】 English version: There is no 'not conclusively established' fallacy (an instance where the probandum is not conclusively established). And there is no 'lack of a similar example' fallacy (an instance where there is no similar example). Therefore, the statement of transformation is used to distinguish it.

Treatise: Furthermore, the three essential natures (three fundamental elements, namely Sattva (goodness), Rajas (passion), and Tamas (ignorance)) reach the point where they can become one entity.

Commentary: Starting from the third point below, examples are given based on essence, function, and capability. The argument is stated: The essence of the three things, Sattva, etc., should each have many (essences). Because they are functions. Just like those functions, those with many functions, each has many functions above it. That is, producing various functions such as greatness. The essence is only one each. The example of function is also many. Using function as a measure is also like this. Based on their adhered-to viewpoint, function is used as a metaphor.

Treatise: Since the three essences pervade everything, reaching the point where the essences are not different.

Commentary: Starting from the fourth and fifth points below, one part of the essence is used as an example for the remaining part. The argument is stated: When one part of the three things, Sattva, etc., transforms into a dharma, the remaining part should also transform. Because this essence is the same as that essence of Sattva, etc., without difference. Or, it is allowed that the essence pervades everything. Just like one part transforms. These two arguments, one is the reason that the essence is not different, and the other is the reason that it pervades everything. If it is allowed that one part transforms and the remaining part also transforms, then these three things would have no time when they do not change. This would violate the error of the tenet. They believe that this place transforms into mountains and rivers, but that place does not change. The essence of self-nature still pervades everything.

Starting from the sixth point below, they believe that the forms of the three essences are different from each other, but they still say that they combine to form one form. The three essences are used as an example to form one form.

Treatise: Allowing these three things to reach the point of jointly forming one form.

Commentary: Here, the combination into one form is prevented. Because their tenet itself allows the forms of the three essences to be different. The argument is stated: The form formed by the combination of the three things should also have three. It is allowed that it is the three essences. Just like the essence.

Treatise: It should not be at the time of combination, reaching the point where the essences are not different.

Commentary: The seventh argument. When you say that these three things combine to jointly form one form, it should not be able to become one form. Because the three essences are different from each other. Or the essence before and after is not different. Just like when they are not combined. The form actually has three, transforming and combining into one. They believe that there are times when the three things are not combined, that is, when they have not become great dharmas. Therefore, it can be used as a metaphor. Conversely, the argument is stated: Your three

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事未成大等時。應亦能成大等。前與后體無差別故。如后成時。

第八彼言三體有異其相是一。即救前難故為此計。

論。若謂三事至體相是一。

述曰。此違自宗。體即相故。以體與相同異。量云。汝本三事。體應無別。說體與相無差別故。如所成相　或相。應三別。與體無別故。如三本體。以許相一而事有三。故違自宗。自宗三體即是相故。不應三一。由違自宗故為一難。

自下第九．第十量云。

論。體應如相至三合成一。

述曰。此乃體用更互相即難量有二。文有兩宗。因云體即相故。相即體故。更互為喻其理可知。

第三合難二十四諦。唯除我體。前已破故。于中文有其五。第一難其總別。

論。又三是別至應非一三。

述曰。又三是別。各別體故。大等是總。是一法故。非謂三成其大遂異。此即乘前一相為難。三事和合成一大等。大等名總。雖總別不同。而性定是一。如金轉為環。非離環外別有金故。以本三事從大等難。量云。汝許別三事。應是一非三。因云。性即總故。如總大等。以總大等從三難云。大等總法。應是三非一。因云。體即別三故。如三別性。此中論文更互相非。謂總非一。別非是三。彼若轉計言誰言所成大等諸法各是一耶。三

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 事未成大等（Mahat，宇宙理性）時，也應能成就大等，因為前與后的本體沒有差別，就像後來成就時一樣。

第八，他們的說法是三體（三種自性）有異，其相（特徵）是一，這是爲了補救前面的難點而提出的。

論：如果說三事（三種事物）的本體和相是一。

述曰：這違反了他們自己的宗義，因為本體就是相。因為本體與相相同還是相異？可以這樣論證：你們本來的三事，本體應該沒有差別，因為說本體與相沒有差別，就像所成就的相一樣。或者說，相應該是三別，因為它與本體沒有差別，就像三個本體一樣。因為他們承認相是一個，而事有三個，所以違反了他們自己的宗義。他們自己的宗義是三體就是相，不應該是三一。因為違反了他們自己的宗義，所以這是一個難點。

下面是第九、第十個論證：

論：本體應該像相一樣，三者合成為一。

述曰：這是本體和作用互相即是的難點，有兩個論證。文中有兩種宗義。因為本體就是相，相就是本體，互相作為比喻，道理可以理解。

第三個是總合起來駁難二十四諦（二十四種真實），唯獨排除我（Atman，真我）的本體，因為前面已經破斥過了。在文中，有五個方面。第一個是駁難其總別。

論：又，三是別，大等是總，應該不是一三。

述曰：又，三是別，因為各有各的本體。大等是總，因為是一法。不是說三者和合而成的大等就不同了。這是乘著前面一個相來駁難。三事和合而成一大等，大等名為總。雖然總別不同，而性質一定是一。就像金子轉變為環，不是離開環之外另有金子。用本來的三事從大等來駁難。論證：你們承認別三事，應該是一而不是三，因為性質就是總，就像總的大等。用總的大等從三來駁難說：大等總法，應該是三而不是一，因為本體就是別三，就像三別性。這其中的論文互相否定，說總不是一，別不是三。他們如果轉而辯解說，誰說所成的大等諸法各自是一呢？三

【English Translation】 English version When the Mahat (cosmic intellect) is not yet formed, it should also be able to form the Mahat, because there is no difference between the former and the latter in terms of essence, just like when it is formed later.

Eighth, their statement is that the three Gunas (three qualities) are different in essence but the same in characteristic, which is proposed to remedy the previous difficulty.

Treatise: If it is said that the essence and characteristic of the three entities (three objects) are the same.

Commentary: This violates their own doctrine, because essence is characteristic. Because are essence and characteristic the same or different? It can be argued that: your original three entities should have no difference in essence, because it is said that there is no difference between essence and characteristic, just like the characteristic that has been formed. Or, the characteristic should be three different, because it has no difference with the essence, just like the three essences. Because they admit that the characteristic is one, but there are three entities, so it violates their own doctrine. Their own doctrine is that the three Gunas are the characteristic, and should not be three-in-one. Because it violates their own doctrine, this is a difficulty.

Below are the ninth and tenth arguments:

Treatise: The essence should be like the characteristic, the three combine into one.

Commentary: This is the difficulty of essence and function being mutually identical, there are two arguments. There are two doctrines in the text. Because essence is characteristic, and characteristic is essence, using each other as metaphors, the principle can be understood.

The third is to collectively refute the twenty-four Tattvas (twenty-four truths), except for the essence of Atman (true self), because it has been refuted before. In the text, there are five aspects. The first is to refute its totality and difference.

Treatise: Also, three is different, Mahat etc. is total, it should not be one and three.

Commentary: Also, three is different, because each has its own essence. Mahat etc. is total, because it is one dharma. It is not to say that the Mahat etc. formed by the combination of the three is different. This is taking advantage of the previous one characteristic to refute. The three entities combine to form a Mahat etc., Mahat etc. is called total. Although the total and the different are different, the nature must be one. Just like gold is transformed into a ring, it is not that there is gold outside the ring. Using the original three entities to refute from Mahat etc. Argument: You admit the three different entities, it should be one and not three, because the nature is total, just like the total Mahat etc. Using the total Mahat etc. to refute from three, saying: Mahat etc. total dharma, it should be three and not one, because the essence is the three different, just like the three different natures. The papers in this mutually negate, saying that the total is not one, and the different is not three. If they turn to argue, who said that the Mahat etc. dharmas formed are each one? Three

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合成故非是一相。其中諸相實各各別。合故似一。

論。此三變時至是一色等。

述曰。第二破轉計非成一相　此三變時者。謂三事轉變成大等時　若不和合成一相者。意說三體各變一相。即大等法體亦有三非一相故　此上牒計。下正申難。應如未變三事本體。即應見三。如何見一。量云。三事和合所成之相。應見三別。許有三故。如見三相體未變時又若不和合但成一相。相中有三者。何故現見是一色等。世間現見色唯是一。而言但由三法成故色等三別者。即違現量及世間過。量云。色等諸法應各見三。體有三故。如汝三事。

此難三體成三相義。次下更難成一相義。前第一翻難相應三。或應非一。雖似同此難。此難若成一相失本三相及與本體。故與前失體性各別。

論。若三和合至體亦應隨失。

述曰。此第三破三事和合共成一相。一相即大等。量云。汝根本三相共成一相時。根本三相應無三相。即一相故。猶如一相。相既失本。體亦應然。相體一故。量云。成相之時根本三體。應無有三。以相即體故。如所成相。

論。不可說三至如何見一。

述曰。此第四文。由彼復計根本三事各有二相。一總。二別。成相之時所成大等但見總一。根本三事即見三別。今破於此。第

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：合成的緣故並非是一個相。其中各個相實際上是各自不同的，因為是組合在一起，所以看起來像一個。

論：這三種事物轉變時，最終成為一種顏色等等。

述記：第二重破斥認為轉變並非成為一個相。『這三種事物轉變時』，是指三種事物轉變成為大地等等的時候。如果不和合成為一個相，意思是說三種本體各自轉變成為一個相，那麼大地等等的法體也應該有三種，而不是一個相。上面是重複對方的觀點，下面是正式提出詰難。應該像沒有轉變的三種事物本體一樣，就應該看到三種不同的相，怎麼會只看到一個相呢？可以這樣論證：三種事物和合所成的相，應該看到三種不同的部分，因為你承認有三種。就像看到三種相的本體沒有轉變的時候一樣。又如果不是和合，只是成為一個相，相中有三種成分，那麼為什麼現在看到的是一種顏色等等呢？世間現在看到顏色只有一種，而你說只是由三種法組成的，所以顏色等等有三種不同的成分，這就違背了現量和世間的常識。可以這樣論證：顏色等等諸法應該各自看到三種不同的成分，因為本體有三種。就像你說的三種事物一樣。

這是難點在於三種本體形成三種相的觀點。接下來進一步詰難形成一個相的觀點。前面第一次翻過來詰難，相應該是三種，或者應該不是一個。雖然看起來和這個詰難相似，但是這個詰難在於如果形成一個相，就會失去原本的三種相以及本體，所以和前面失去本體的性質是不同的。

論：如果三種事物和合，那麼本體也應該隨之消失。

述記：這是第三重破斥三種事物和合共同形成一個相的觀點。一個相就是大地等等。可以這樣論證：你的根本三種相共同形成一個相的時候，根本三種相應該沒有三種相，因為是一個相的緣故。就像一個相一樣。相既然失去了原本的性質，本體也應該如此。因為相和本體是一體的。可以這樣論證：在形成相的時候，根本三種本體，應該沒有三種不同的性質。因為相就是本體的緣故。就像所形成的相一樣。

論：不能說三種事物各自有兩種相，怎麼會只看到一個相呢？

述記：這是第四段文字。因為對方又認為根本三種事物各自有兩種相，一種是總相，一種是別相。在形成相的時候，所形成的大地等等只能看到總相，根本三種事物就能看到三種別相。現在破斥這種觀點。'

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the combination, it is not a single aspect. Among them, the various aspects are actually different from each other. Because they are combined, they appear to be one.

Treatise: When these three things transform, they ultimately become one color, etc.

Commentary: The second refutation argues that the transformation does not result in a single aspect. 'When these three things transform' refers to when the three things transform into earth, etc. If they do not combine to form a single aspect, it means that the three entities each transform into one aspect, then the dharma-body of earth, etc., should also have three aspects, not one. The above is a repetition of the opponent's view, and the following is a formal challenge. It should be like the original three things that have not transformed, one should see three different aspects, how can one only see one aspect? It can be argued that the aspect formed by the combination of the three things should be seen as three different parts, because you admit that there are three. Just like seeing the bodies of the three aspects when they have not transformed. Also, if it is not a combination, but only becomes one aspect, and there are three components in the aspect, then why do we now see one color, etc.? The world now sees only one color, and you say that it is only composed of three dharmas, so color, etc., have three different components, which violates direct perception and worldly common sense. It can be argued that color, etc., all dharmas should each see three different components, because the body has three. Just like the three things you mentioned.

This is a difficult point in that the three entities form three aspects. Next, further challenge the view of forming one aspect. The first time I turned around to challenge, the aspects should be three, or should not be one. Although it seems similar to this challenge, this challenge is that if one aspect is formed, the original three aspects and the body will be lost, so it is different from the previous loss of the nature of the body.

Treatise: If the three things combine, then the body should also disappear with it.

Commentary: This is the third refutation of the view that three things combine to form one aspect. One aspect is earth, etc. It can be argued that when your fundamental three aspects combine to form one aspect, the fundamental three aspects should not have three aspects, because it is one aspect. Just like one aspect. Since the aspect has lost its original nature, the body should also be the same. Because the aspect and the body are one. It can be argued that when forming the aspect, the fundamental three bodies should not have three different natures. Because the aspect is the body. Just like the aspect formed.

Treatise: It cannot be said that the three things each have two aspects, how can one only see one aspect?

Commentary: This is the fourth paragraph. Because the other party also believes that the fundamental three things each have two aspects, one is the general aspect and the other is the specific aspect. When forming the aspect, the earth, etc., formed can only see the general aspect, and the fundamental three things can see the three specific aspects. Now refute this view.'

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一量云。大等總法。應非是總。即三體故。如三別相。以別從總為難亦爾　又徴。三事所有總相。若不是一亦應見三。相即體故。如三事體　體應見一。即總相故。猶如總相　三事總相。若有三種不應見一。有三種故。如本三事　三事別相。不應見三。即三相故。如大等相。

自下第五彼復計言。三事之上各有三相。謂初薩埵有一自相。及剌阇．答摩二事之相。余之二法展轉相望各有三相。相雜共成大等諸法。九相難了遂見一相。其實于中各有三相相雜而住。

論。若謂三體至故見一者。

述曰。此牒彼執。

論。既有三相寧見為一。

述曰。下有五難。第一既云各有三相。還應見三。如何見一。大等法中應見三相。相即體故。猶如三體　大等諸相或應見九。即本相故。如三體上所有九相。各三相故不應見一。如前見色。此中一一更互為量準為之也。

論。復如何知三事有異。

述曰。第二比量。又此三中各有三相共成大等。如何知三事各有異也。三事比量各有一種。且為一量云。汝薩埵。剌阇二法。應非薩埵．剌阇。具三相故。如答摩　或應此二。即是答摩。有三相故。如答摩。既爾如何知三事別。

論。若彼一一至待三和合。

述曰。自下第三更難三德

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一量云：『大』（Mahat，宇宙理性）等總法，應非是總，即三體故，如三別相。以別從總為難亦爾。又徴：三事所有總相，若不是一亦應見三，相即體故，如三事體。體應見一，即總相故，猶如總相。三事總相，若有三種不應見一，有三種故，如本三事。三事別相，不應見三，即三相故，如大等相。 自下第五，彼復計言：三事之上各有三相，謂初薩埵（Sattva，純粹），有一自相，及剌阇（Rajas，激變）、答摩（Tamas，惰性）二事之相。余之二法展轉相望各有三相，相雜共成大等諸法。九相難了遂見一相，其實于中各有三相相雜而住。 論：若謂三體至故見一者。 述曰：此牒彼執。 論：既有三相寧見為一？ 述曰：下有五難。第一，既云各有三相，還應見三，如何見一？大等法中應見三相，相即體故，猶如三體。大等諸相或應見九，即本相故，如三體上所有九相。各三相故不應見一，如前見色。此中一一更互為量準為之也。 論：復如何知三事有異？ 述曰：第二比量。又此三中各有三相共成大等，如何知三事各有異也？三事比量各有一種。且為一量云：汝薩埵（Sattva，純粹）、剌阇（Rajas，激變）二法，應非薩埵（Sattva，純粹）、剌阇（Rajas，激變），具三相故，如答摩（Tamas，惰性）。或應此二，即是答摩（Tamas，惰性），有三相故，如答摩（Tamas，惰性）。既爾如何知三事別？ 論：若彼一一至待三和合。 述曰：自下第三更難三德

【English Translation】 English version One argument states: 'Mahat' (the Great, cosmic intellect) and other general dharmas should not be considered as a whole, because they are composed of three entities, just like the three distinct characteristics. The difficulty of deriving the distinct from the general applies here as well. Furthermore, if the general characteristic of the three entities is not one, then three should be seen, because the characteristics are identical to the entities, just like the three entities themselves. The entity should be seen as one, because it is the general characteristic, just like the general characteristic itself. If the general characteristic of the three entities has three types, then one should not be seen, because there are three types, just like the original three entities. The distinct characteristics of the three entities should not be seen as three, because they are three characteristics, just like 'Mahat' and other characteristics. From the fifth point onwards, they further argue that each of the three entities has three characteristics. The first, Sattva (purity), has its own characteristic, as well as the characteristics of Rajas (passion) and Tamas (inertia). The remaining two dharmas, in relation to each other, each have three characteristics, which mix together to form 'Mahat' and other dharmas. The nine characteristics are difficult to discern, so one characteristic is seen, but in reality, each has three characteristics that reside intermingled. Treatise: If it is said that seeing one is due to the three entities... Commentary: This quotes their assertion. Treatise: Since there are three characteristics, how can one be seen as one? Commentary: There are five difficulties below. First, since it is said that each has three characteristics, three should be seen. How can one be seen? Three characteristics should be seen in 'Mahat' and other dharmas, because the characteristics are identical to the entities, just like the three entities. The various characteristics of 'Mahat' should perhaps be seen as nine, because they are the original characteristics, just like the nine characteristics on the three entities. Because each has three characteristics, one should not be seen, just like seeing color before. Here, each is used as a measure for the other. Treatise: Furthermore, how is it known that the three entities are different? Commentary: Second, a syllogism. Also, how is it known that each of the three entities is different, since each of these three has three characteristics that together form 'Mahat' and others? Each of the three entities has its own syllogism. Let's take one syllogism: Your Sattva (purity) and Rajas (passion) dharmas should not be Sattva (purity) and Rajas (passion), because they possess three characteristics, just like Tamas (inertia). Or perhaps these two are Tamas (inertia), because they have three characteristics, just like Tamas (inertia). If so, how is it known that the three entities are distinct? Treatise: If each of them waits for the three to combine... Commentary: From below, the third difficulty further challenges the three qualities.

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一一應然。謂此三事一應能成諸法大等。何假須三。具三相故。如三事合。量云。薩埵一法。應成大等。具三相故。如答摩等合時。若言緣闕一不成者。何所闕少而待三耶。

若言要由三三相合能成大等。故一本事不能成大等。

論。體亦應各三以體即相故。

述曰。此下第四量云。又彼一一。應有三體。體即相故。猶如本相。一一為量。或總為量。

自下第五總難大等應無差別。

論。又大等法至應無差別。

述曰。量云。除大諦外余慢等法。應與大無別。三合成故。如大。以大望慢等無別既爾。以慢望大等無別亦然。二十三法展轉合有二十三量。

汝若說言皆無別者。

論。是則因果至皆不得成。

述曰。總結違宗。是則大為因。慢為果。五唯量．五大．十一根無差別故。皆不成也。

論。若爾一根至一切根所得。

述曰。此顯無別不成所由。違現量過。即無差別。一根應得一切境。或應一境一切根所得。無差別故。以互為喻宗亦復爾。此有二量。且以一根望非所得一切境界。應亦得之。以體無別故。如自所對境。境望于根亦有是責。然佛性論亦有此難。

論。世間現見至便為大失。

述曰。前違現量。此違世間。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 一一應是如此。意思是說這三件事各自都能夠成就諸法的大等（Mahat，宇宙自性），為什麼還需要三個呢？因為它們各自都具備三種相。就像這三件事合在一起一樣。可以這樣論證：薩埵（Sattva，悅性）這一法，應當能夠成就大等，因為它具備三種相，就像答摩（Tamas，惰性）等合在一起的時候一樣。如果說缺少一個緣就不能成就，那麼缺少什麼才需要三個呢？ 如果說一定要由三個相合在一起才能成就大等，所以一個本身不能成就大等。 論：體也應該各自有三個，因為體就是相。 述記：下面是第四個論證，說：而且那每一個，都應該有三個體，因為體就是相。就像本相一樣。可以一個一個地作為論證的依據，或者總的作為論證的依據。 下面是第五個，總的責難，說大等應該沒有差別。 論：而且大等法，應該沒有差別。 述記：論證說：除了大諦（Mahat，宇宙自性）之外，其餘的慢（Ahamkara，我慢）等法，應該和大諦沒有區別，因為它們是三種相合成的，就像大諦一樣。既然以大諦來看慢等沒有區別，那麼以慢等來看大等也應該沒有區別。二十三種法輾轉相合，就有二十三個論證。 如果你們說都沒有區別。 論：那麼因果等都不能成立。 述記：總結，這是違背宗義。那麼大諦是因，慢是果，五唯量（Tanmatra，五唯），五大（Mahabhuta，五大元素），十一根（Ekadasendriya，十一根）沒有差別，都不能成立。 論：如果這樣，一個根就能得到一切根所得到的。 述記：這顯示了沒有差別導致不能成立的原因。這是違背現量（Pratyaksha，現量）的過失。如果沒有差別，一個根就應該能得到一切境界，或者一個境界應該被一切根所得到。因為沒有差別。以互相作為比喻，宗義也是這樣。這裡有兩個論證。先以一個根來看，對於不是它所能得到的境界，也應該能得到，因為體沒有差別，就像它自己所對應的境界一樣。境界對於根也有這樣的責難。然而《佛性論》中也有這樣的責難。 論：世間現在所見，就成了很大的過失。 述記：前面是違背現量，這裡是違背世間常識。 論

【English Translation】 English version: 'It should be so in each case.' This means that each of these three things is capable of accomplishing the 'great' (Mahat, cosmic principle) and so on of all dharmas. Why then are three needed? Because each possesses the three aspects. It is like the combination of these three things. The argument can be stated: 'Sattva (quality of goodness), as a single dharma, should be able to accomplish the 'great' and so on, because it possesses the three aspects, just like the combination of Tamas (quality of darkness) and so on.' If you say that the lack of one condition prevents accomplishment, then what is lacking that requires three? If you say that it is necessary for the three aspects to combine in order to accomplish the 'great' and so on, therefore one alone cannot accomplish the 'great' and so on. Treatise: The essence (體) should also each have three, because the essence is the aspect. Commentary: Below is the fourth argument, stating: 'Moreover, each of those should have three essences, because the essence is the aspect, just like the original aspect.' Each can be taken as the basis for the argument, or the whole can be taken as the basis. Below is the fifth, a general criticism, stating that the 'great' and so on should have no difference. Treatise: Moreover, the dharmas of the 'great' and so on should have no difference. Commentary: The argument states: 'Except for the 'great' (Mahat, cosmic principle), the remaining dharmas such as 'ego' (Ahamkara, ego-consciousness) and so on, should have no difference from the 'great', because they are composed of the three aspects, just like the 'great'.' Since there is no difference from the perspective of the 'great' looking at 'ego' and so on, then from the perspective of 'ego' looking at the 'great' and so on, there should also be no difference. The twenty-three dharmas combining in turn result in twenty-three arguments. If you say that all are without difference. Treatise: Then cause and effect and so on cannot be established. Commentary: In conclusion, this contradicts the established doctrine. Then the 'great' is the cause, 'ego' is the effect, the five 'tanmatras' (Tanmatra, subtle elements), the five 'mahābhūtas' (Mahabhuta, gross elements), and the eleven 'indriyas' (Ekadasendriya, eleven sense faculties) have no difference, and none can be established. Treatise: If so, one 'indriya' should obtain what all 'indriyas' obtain. Commentary: This shows the reason why the lack of difference leads to non-establishment. This is the fault of contradicting 'pratyaksha' (Pratyaksha, direct perception). If there is no difference, one 'indriya' should be able to obtain all objects, or one object should be obtainable by all 'indriyas', because there is no difference. Using each other as metaphors, the doctrine is also like this. There are two arguments here. First, looking at one 'indriya', it should also be able to obtain the objects that it cannot obtain, because the essence is not different, just like the objects it corresponds to. The objects also have this criticism towards the 'indriyas'. However, the 'Buddha-nature Treatise' also has this criticism. Treatise: What is seen in the world now becomes a great fault. Commentary: The previous contradicts 'pratyaksha', this contradicts worldly common sense. Treatise:

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。故彼所執至計度為有。

述曰。總結彼非。如文可解。第三文也。此中數論。及與勝論。各有十八部異執競興。如別抄記。

自下第二破勝論義。成劫之末人壽無量外道出世。名嗢露迦。此云鵂鹠。晝避色聲匿跡山藪。夜絕視聽方行乞食。時人謂似鵂鹠因以名也。謂即獯猴之異名焉。舊云優婁佉訛也。或名羯拏仆。羯拏雲米濟。仆翻為食。先為夜遊驚他稚婦。遂收場碾糠秕之中米濟食之。故以名也。時人號曰食米濟仙人。舊云蹇尼陀訛也　亦云吠世史迦。此翻為勝。造六句論。諸論罕匹故云勝也。或勝人所造故名勝論。舊云衛世師。或云鞞世師。皆訛略也。勝論之師造勝論者名勝論師。多年修道遂獲五通。謂證菩提便欣入滅。但嗟所悟未有傳人。愍世有情癡無惠目。乃觀七德授法令傳。一生中國。二父母俱是婆羅門姓。三有般涅槃性。四身相具足。五聰明辨捷。六性．行柔和。七有大悲心。經無量時無具七者。后住多劫。婆羅痆斯國有婆羅門。名摩納縛迦。此云儒童。其儒童子名般遮尸棄。此言五頂。頂發五旋。頭有五角。其人七德雖具。根熟稍遲。既染妻孥卒難化導。經無量歲伺其根熟。后三千歲因入戲園。與其妻室競花相忿。鵂鹠因此乘通化之。五頂不從。仙人且返。又三千歲化又不得。更三千年

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，他們所執著的觀點最終都只是計度為有（kalpita-sat，假有，通過概念構造而成的存在）。

《述記》中說：總結了他們的錯誤之處，如文字表面所表達的含義一樣容易理解。這是第三段文字。這裡面，數論派（Samkhya）以及勝論派（Vaisheshika）各自有十八個不同的派別，爭相興起，詳細情況可以參考其他記錄。

下面第二部分是破斥勝論派的觀點。在成劫（vivartakalpa，宇宙形成的時期）的末期，人類壽命極長的時候，有一位外道出世，名叫嗢露迦（Uluka），這個名字的意思是『鵂鹠』（貓頭鷹）。他白天躲避聲色，隱藏在山林之中，夜晚斷絕視覺和聽覺，才出來乞食。當時的人覺得他像鵂鹠，因此用這個名字稱呼他。有人說他就是獯猴（一種猴子）的別名。舊譯為優婁佉（Uluka）是錯誤的。或者名叫羯拏仆（Kanabhuk）。羯拏（Kana）的意思是『米濟』，仆（bhuk）翻譯為『食』。他先前因為夜遊驚嚇了別人的年輕妻子，於是被關在碾米的場所，吃糠秕中的米粒，因此得名。當時的人稱他為食米濟仙人。舊譯為蹇尼陀（Kanada）是錯誤的。也叫做吠世史迦（Vaisheshika），翻譯為『勝』，因為他創造了六句論，其他理論很少能與之匹敵，所以稱為『勝』。或者因為是殊勝的人所創造，所以叫做勝論。舊譯為衛世師（Vaisheshika），或者鞞世師（Vaisheshika），都是訛略的說法。勝論派的老師，也就是創造勝論的人，被稱為勝論師。他多年修道，最終獲得了五神通。他認為自己已經證得菩提（bodhi，覺悟），於是欣然準備入滅（parinirvana，圓寂）。但他感嘆自己所領悟的道理還沒有傳人，憐憫世間眾生愚癡沒有智慧。於是觀察具備七種德行的人，以便傳授法令。這七種德行是：一、生在中國；二、父母都是婆羅門（Brahmana）姓氏；三、具有般涅槃（parinirvana）的本性；四、身相具足；五、聰明敏捷；六、性格行為柔和；七、具有大悲心。經過漫長的時間，都沒有找到具備這七種德行的人。後來經過多劫，在婆羅痆斯國（Varanasi）有一個婆羅門，名叫摩納縛迦（Manavaka），翻譯為『儒童』。這個儒童的兒子名叫般遮尸棄（Pancashikha），意思是『五頂』，因為他頭頂的頭髮有五個旋，頭上有五個角。這個人雖然具備七種德行，但是根器成熟得比較晚。因為已經娶妻生子，最終難以教化引導。經過漫長的歲月，等待他的根器成熟。後來三千年，因為進入戲園，和他的妻子因為爭花而發生爭吵。鵂鹠因此憑藉神通來教化他。五頂不聽從，仙人就回去了。又過了三千年，再次教化仍然沒有成功。又過了三千年

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, their adhered views are ultimately just conceptualized as existent (kalpita-sat, imagined existence, existence constructed through concepts).

The Commentary states: Summarizing their errors, as easily understood as the surface meaning of the text. This is the third passage. Within this, the Samkhya and Vaisheshika schools each have eighteen different sects, competing to rise, details of which can be found in other records.

The second part below refutes the views of the Vaisheshika school. At the end of the formation kalpa (vivartakalpa, the period of the universe's formation), when human lifespan was extremely long, an ascetic of other paths appeared, named Uluka, which means 'owl'. During the day, he avoided sights and sounds, hiding in the mountains and forests, and only came out to beg for food at night, cutting off sight and hearing. People at the time thought he resembled an owl, hence the name. Some say he is another name for the langur (a type of monkey). The old translation as Uluka is incorrect. Or he was named Kanabhuk. Kana means 'rice grains', and bhuk translates as 'eater'. He had previously startled someone's young wife while wandering at night, and was confined to a rice-milling place, eating rice grains from the chaff, hence the name. People at the time called him the Rice-Grain-Eating Immortal. The old translation as Kanada is incorrect. He is also called Vaisheshika, which translates as 'superior', because he created the six-category theory, and other theories rarely matched it, so it is called 'superior'. Or because it was created by a superior person, it is called the Vaisheshika school. The old translations as Vaisheshika, or Bhaisheshika, are all abbreviated corruptions. The teacher of the Vaisheshika school, that is, the creator of the Vaisheshika theory, is called the Vaisheshika teacher. He cultivated the path for many years and finally obtained the five supernormal powers. He thought he had attained bodhi (bodhi, enlightenment), so he happily prepared to enter parinirvana (parinirvana, complete nirvana). But he lamented that the principles he had realized had not been passed on, and he pitied sentient beings for being ignorant and lacking wisdom. So he observed people with seven virtues in order to pass on the Dharma. These seven virtues are: first, being born in China; second, both parents being of the Brahmin (Brahmana) caste; third, having the nature of parinirvana; fourth, having complete physical characteristics; fifth, being intelligent and quick-witted; sixth, having a gentle character and behavior; seventh, having great compassion. After a long time, no one was found with these seven virtues. Later, after many kalpas, in the country of Varanasi, there was a Brahmin named Manavaka, which translates as 'young scholar'. This young scholar's son was named Pancashikha, meaning 'five peaks', because the hair on the top of his head had five whorls, and he had five horns on his head. Although this person had seven virtues, his faculties matured relatively late. Because he had already married and had children, it was ultimately difficult to teach and guide him. After many years, waiting for his faculties to mature. Later, three thousand years, because he entered the theater garden, and quarreled with his wife over flowers. Uluka therefore used his supernormal powers to teach him. Pancashikha did not listen, and the immortal returned. After another three thousand years, he tried to teach again but was still unsuccessful. After another three thousand years

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兩競尤甚。相厭既切。仰念空仙。仙人應時神力化引。騰虛迎往所住山中。徐說所悟六句義法。一實。二德．三業．四有．五同異．六和合。此依百論。及此本破。唯有六句義法　后其苗裔名為惠月。立十句義。于中略以三門分別。一列總別名。二出體性。三諸門辨釋。列總名者。一實．二德．三業．四同．五異．六和合．七有能．八無能．九俱分．十無說　列別名者。實有九種。一地．二水．三火．四風．五空．六時．七方．八我．九意。德有二十四種。一色．二味．三香．四觸．五數．六量．七別性．八合．九離．十彼性．十一此性．十二覺．十三樂．十四苦．十五欲．十六嗔．十七勤勇．十八重性．十九液性．二十閏．二十一行．二十二法．二十三非法．二十四聲。業有五種。一取．二舍．三屈．四申．五行。同體是。一實．德．業三同一有故。異體許多。依九實故。而數不定。或總實異。或別實異。九實一一有細分故。和合是一。有能．無能體許有多。實．德．業三得果之時。或共不共故。俱分亦多。實．德．業三各別性故。無說有五。一未生無．二已滅無三更互無．四不會無．五畢竟無　第二齣其體性。九實體者。若有色．味．香．觸名地。以德顯地也。若有色．味．觸．及液．潤名水。若有色．觸名火。

若有觸名風。唯有聲名空。別有空大。非空無為。亦非空界色。若是彼此．俱不俱．遲速。能詮之因。及此能緣之因名時。若是東南等能詮之因。及能緣因名方。若是覺．樂．苦等九德。和合因緣能起智相名我。若是覺．樂．苦等九德。不和合因緣能起智相名意　此中以德顯其實體　諸德體者　眼所取一依名色　舌所取一依名味。鼻所取一依名香　皮所取一依名觸　一實非一實詮緣之因名數。非一實者。二以上數　量有五種　一微性。唯二微果上有。如薩婆多輕不可稱。若可稱者但重相形。非是輕也。此微性亦爾。唯最微名微。下短性亦爾　二大性。三微果等以上方有　三短性。唯二微果上有　四長性。三微果等以上方有　五圓性有二種。一極微。謂不和合父母真實極微上有。二極大。空．時．方．我四實上有。以此四體遍周圓故　一非一實等差別詮緣因。名別性　二先不至物今至時名合。此意但取初合名合。此別有三。一隨一業生。以手打鼓。手有動作所生之合。業是動作也。二俱業生。兩手相合皆動作故。三三合生。如芽等生無有動作。與空等實合時所生之合也　先二至物不至時名離。此亦有三。初二翻合如前可解。三是離生。先造實果由有他緣來離別之果實便壞與空等離。所生之離名為離生　依一二等數時方等

實。遠覺所待名為彼性。此物是一彼物是二等故屬於數。此時彼時故屬於時。此方彼方故屬方等　此性翻彼應知其相　覺有二種。一現。二比。謂至實色等根等合時。有了相生名為現量　此宗意說。眼根舒光至於色境方始取之。如燈照物。聲．香．味．觸四境來至於根方始取之。故遠見打鐘久方聞聲。聲來入耳方可聞也。根與至境鄰合之時。有了相生。此了相者是現量體。

比有二種。一見同故比。見不相違法。而比于宗果。如見煙時比有火等。二不見同故比。見相違法而比宗果。如見雹時比禾稼損。見禾稼損比有風雹　適悅名樂　逼惱名苦　希求色等名欲　損害色等名瞋　欲作事時先生策勵。此名勤勇。發動勢是也　墜墮之因名為重性　地．水．火三流注之因名為液性　地等攝因名潤　行有二種。一念因。二作因。現比智行所生數習差別名念因。即智種子。𥎞擲等業所生勢用名作因。行是勢用。十句多說作因名勢用。念因名行　法有二種。一能轉。謂得可愛身因。即得生死勝身之因。二能還。謂離染緣正智喜因。即出世間之因。正智正因也　能得生死不可愛身。苦邪智因名為非法　耳所取一依名聲　五業體者。若於上下虛空等處。極微等先合後離之因名為取業　舍業翻此　遠處先離近處今合之因名屈　申業翻

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『實』（Sat）：遠距離感知所依賴的性質稱為『彼性』（paratva）。此物是一，彼物是二等等，因此屬於數（samkhya）。此時彼時，因此屬於時（kala）。此方彼方，因此屬於方（disa）等等。

此『性』（paratva）的反面，應當知道它的相（lakshana）。

覺（buddhi）有兩種：一是現量（pratyaksha），二是比量（anumana）。當至實（vastu）、色（rupa）等與根（indriya）等聚合時，產生了一種了別相，這稱為現量。

此宗（vaisheshika）的意思是說，眼根（chakshurindriya）放出光芒到達色境（rupadhatu）時，才開始獲取它，就像燈照亮物體一樣。聲（shabda）、香（gandha）、味（rasa）、觸（sparsha）這四種境（vishaya）來到根（indriya）前，才開始獲取它們。所以遠距離敲鐘，很久才能聽到聲音。聲音傳入耳朵才能聽到。

根（indriya）與所至之境（vishaya）鄰近結合時，產生了一種了別相，這種了別相就是現量（pratyaksha）的本體。

比量（anumana）有兩種：一是見同故比，即所見不相違背，從而比量宗（paksha）和果（phala），例如見到煙時，比量有火等。二是不見同故比，即所見相互違背，從而比量宗（paksha）和果（phala），例如見到冰雹時，比量禾稼受損，見到禾稼受損，比量有風雹。

適悅稱為樂（sukha）。

逼惱稱為苦（duhkha）。

希求色（rupa）等稱為欲（iccha）。

損害色（rupa）等稱為瞋（dvesha）。

想要做事時，首先產生策勵，這稱為勤勇（prayatna），是發動的勢頭。

墜落的原因稱為重性（gurutva）。

地（prthivi）、水（ap）、火（tejas）三種流注的原因稱為液性（dravatva）。

地（prthivi）等攝取的原因稱為潤（sneha）。

行（karman）有兩種：一是念因（samskara-hetu），二是作因（kriya-hetu）。現量（pratyaksha）、比量（anumana）智行所產生的數習差別稱爲念因，也就是智的種子。拋擲等業所產生的勢用稱為作因。行（karman）就是勢用。在十句義中，多說作因名為勢用，念因名為行。

法（dharma）有兩種：一是能轉，即獲得可愛身體的原因，也就是獲得生死輪迴中殊勝身體的原因。二是能還，即脫離染污的因緣，是正智（samyag-jnana）喜悅的原因，也就是出世間的原因，正智（samyag-jnana）是正因。

能夠獲得生死輪迴中不可愛身體，以及苦和邪智（mithya-jnana）的原因稱為非法（adharma）。

耳朵所獲取的唯一所依稱為聲（shabda）。

五業（panca-karmani）的本體是：如果在上下虛空等處，極微（paramanu）等先聚合後分離的原因稱為取業（utkshepana）。

舍業（avaksepana）與此相反。

遠處先分離，近處現在聚合的原因稱為屈（akunchana）。

申業（prasaran）與此相反。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Sat' (Reality): The property on which distant perception depends is called 'paratva' (remoteness). This object is one, that object is two, and so on, therefore it belongs to number (samkhya). This time, that time, therefore it belongs to time (kala). This direction, that direction, therefore it belongs to direction (disa), and so on.

The opposite of this 'paratva' (remoteness), one should know its characteristic (lakshana).

Cognition (buddhi) is of two kinds: direct perception (pratyaksha) and inference (anumana). When reality (vastu), form (rupa), etc., combine with the senses (indriya), etc., a distinct awareness arises, which is called direct perception.

The meaning of this school (vaisheshika) is that the eye sense (chakshurindriya) emits light reaching the object of form (rupadhatu), only then does it begin to grasp it, just as a lamp illuminates an object. Sound (shabda), smell (gandha), taste (rasa), touch (sparsha), these four objects (vishaya) come to the senses (indriya), only then does it begin to grasp them. Therefore, when a bell is struck at a distance, it takes a long time to hear the sound. Only when the sound enters the ear can it be heard.

When the sense (indriya) and the object (vishaya) it reaches are in close proximity, a distinct awareness arises. This distinct awareness is the essence of direct perception (pratyaksha).

Inference (anumana) is of two kinds: one is inference based on similarity, where what is seen does not contradict, thus inferring the subject (paksha) and the result (phala), such as when seeing smoke, inferring the presence of fire, etc. The second is inference based on dissimilarity, where what is seen contradicts each other, thus inferring the subject (paksha) and the result (phala), such as when seeing hail, inferring damage to crops; seeing damage to crops, inferring the presence of wind and hail.

Pleasantness is called happiness (sukha).

Oppression is called suffering (duhkha).

Desiring form (rupa), etc., is called desire (iccha).

Harming form (rupa), etc., is called aversion (dvesha).

When wanting to do something, first arises incitement, this is called effort (prayatna), which is the momentum of initiation.

The cause of falling is called gravity (gurutva).

The cause of the flow of earth (prthivi), water (ap), and fire (tejas) is called fluidity (dravatva).

The cause of cohesion of earth (prthivi), etc., is called cohesion (sneha).

Action (karman) is of two kinds: one is the cause of memory (samskara-hetu), and the other is the cause of action (kriya-hetu). The difference in numerical habits produced by direct perception (pratyaksha), inference (anumana), and cognitive action is called the cause of memory, which is the seed of wisdom. The momentum produced by actions such as throwing is called the cause of action. Action (karman) is momentum. In the ten categories, the cause of action is often referred to as momentum, and the cause of memory is referred to as action.

Dharma (dharma) is of two kinds: one is that which enables transformation, which is the cause of obtaining a desirable body, that is, the cause of obtaining a superior body in the cycle of birth and death. The second is that which enables return, which is the condition for detachment, the cause of joy of right knowledge (samyag-jnana), that is, the cause of transcendence, right knowledge (samyag-jnana) is the right cause.

That which enables obtaining an undesirable body in the cycle of birth and death, and the cause of suffering and false knowledge (mithya-jnana) is called adharma (adharma).

The unique substrate grasped by the ear is called sound (shabda).

The essence of the five actions (panca-karmani) is: if in places such as the upper and lower space, the cause of the initial combination and subsequent separation of atoms (paramanu), etc., is called throwing upward (utkshepana).

Throwing downward (avaksepana) is the opposite of this.

The cause of initial separation at a distance and present combination at a close distance is called contraction (akunchana).

Extension (prasaran) is the opposite of this.

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此　有質礙實先合後離之因名行業　同句體者。謂實．德．業體性非無。能詮能緣之因名同。此體即是舊大有性。諸法同有故名為同。俱舍論云總同句義也　異句體者。常于實轉。是遮德等心．心所因。是表實性心．心所因。但于實轉。異實之物。實由有此異於德等。故名為異　和合體者。能令實等不相離而相屬。此能詮緣因名和合　有能體者。實．德．業三或時共一。或時各別。造各自果。因定所須。因若無此者。應不能造果　無能體者。實．德．業三或時共一。或時各別。不造余果。決定所須。因若無此者。一法應能造一切果。因由有此唯造自果。不造余果　俱分體者。即實．德．業三種體性。此三之上總俱分性。地等色等別俱分性。互於彼不轉。一切根所取。當舊所說同異性也。亦同亦異。故名俱分　無說體者。初未生無。以實．德．業因緣不會而未得生之無為體。二已滅無。以實．德．業或因勢盡。或違緣生雖生。而壞之無為體。三更互無。以實．德等彼此互無為其體性。四不會無。以大有性及實．德等。隨於是處不和不合。如彼處人不於此合無為體性。五畢竟無。以無因故。三時不生無為體性。此五既無體不可說名無說也。

自下第三諸門辨釋。于中有五。一十句相望一多分別。大同．和合二唯一物

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『此』（指代前文討論的範疇）中，『有質礙實先合後離之因』被稱為『行業』（karma，指行為及其結果）。 『同句體』指的是：實體（dravya）、德（guna）、業（karma）的體性並非不存在。能夠詮釋和緣起的因被稱為『同』。這種體性就是舊有的『大有性』（mahāsattā）。因為諸法都共同具有這種性質，所以稱為『同』。《俱舍論》中說，這是總括『同』的含義。 『異句體』指的是：常在實體上發生變化，是遮止德等現象的心和心所的因；是表示實體的心和心所的因。只在實體上發生變化，不同於實體的其他事物。實體因為具有這種『異』而不同於德等。因此稱為『異』。 『和合體』指的是：能夠使實體等不分離而相互關聯。這種能夠詮釋和緣起的因被稱為『和合』。 『有能體』指的是：實體、德、業三者有時共同作用，有時各自獨立，產生各自的結果。這是因果關係中必須具備的。如果缺少這種『有能體』，就無法產生結果。 『無能體』指的是：實體、德、業三者有時共同作用，有時各自獨立，但不產生額外的結果。這是決定性的必要條件。如果缺少這種『無能體』，那麼一個法就可能產生一切結果。因為有了這種『無能體』，所以只能產生自身的結果，而不能產生其他結果。 『俱分體』指的是：實體、德、業三種體性。在這三種體性之上，有總體的『俱分性』；在地等、色等之上，有分別的『俱分性』。它們之間互不轉化，是一切根所能取到的。這相當於舊說中的『同異性』。既相同又相異，所以稱為『俱分』。 『無說體』指的是：第一種是『初未生無』，以實體、德、業的因緣沒有聚合而未能產生的『無』為體性。第二種是『已滅無』，以實體、德、業或者因為因緣勢力耗盡，或者因為違逆的因緣產生而壞滅的『無』為體性。第三種是『更互無』，以實體、德等彼此互相不存在作為其體性。第四種是『不會無』，以『大有性』以及實體、德等，在任何地方不和諧不聚合，比如那裡的人不在這裡聚合的『無』作為體性。第五種是『畢竟無』，因為沒有因，所以過去、現在、未來都不產生的『無』作為體性。這五種『無』因為沒有實體，所以不可說，稱為『無說』。 接下來是第三部分，辨析各種門類。其中有五點：一是十句相互比較的一多分別，『大同』（mahāsattā）和『和合』（samavāya）二者都是唯一的實體。

【English Translation】 English version: Here, the cause of 'having obstructive reality, first combining and then separating' is called 'karma' (action and its consequences). 'Sameness-entity' refers to: the nature of substance (dravya), quality (guna), and action (karma) is not non-existent. The cause that can express and cognize is called 'sameness'. This entity is the old 'great existence' (mahāsattā). Because all dharmas share this nature, it is called 'sameness'. The Abhidharmakośa states that it encompasses the meaning of 'sameness'. 'Difference-entity' refers to: constantly changing in substance, it is the cause of mind and mental factors that prevent qualities, etc.; it is the cause of mind and mental factors that express substance. It only changes in substance, different from other things that are substance. Substance is different from qualities, etc., because of this 'difference'. Therefore, it is called 'difference'. 'Combination-entity' refers to: that which can cause substances, etc., not to separate but to be related to each other. This cause that can express and cognize is called 'combination'. 'Capable-entity' refers to: substance, quality, and action, sometimes acting together, sometimes independently, producing their respective results. This is necessary for the causal relationship. If this 'capable-entity' is lacking, the result cannot be produced. 'Incapable-entity' refers to: substance, quality, and action, sometimes acting together, sometimes independently, but not producing additional results. This is a decisive necessity. If this 'incapable-entity' is lacking, one dharma could produce all results. Because of this 'incapable-entity', it can only produce its own result and not other results. 'Both-part-entity' refers to: the nature of substance, quality, and action. Above these three natures, there is the overall 'both-part-ness'; above earth, etc., and color, etc., there is the separate 'both-part-ness'. They do not transform into each other, and they can be apprehended by all senses. This is equivalent to the 'sameness-difference-ness' in the old teachings. Being both the same and different, it is called 'both-part'. 'Unspeakable-entity' refers to: the first is 'non-arisen-yet-non-existence', taking the 'non-existence' that has not arisen because the causes and conditions of substance, quality, and action have not come together as its nature. The second is 'already-ceased-non-existence', taking the 'non-existence' of substance, quality, and action that has been destroyed either because the power of the causes and conditions has been exhausted or because opposing causes and conditions have arisen as its nature. The third is 'mutual-non-existence', taking the mutual non-existence of substance, quality, etc., as its nature. The fourth is 'non-assembly-non-existence', taking the 'non-existence' of 'great existence' and substance, quality, etc., not being harmonious or assembled in any place, such as people there not assembling here, as its nature. The fifth is 'ultimate-non-existence', taking the 'non-existence' that does not arise in the past, present, or future because there is no cause as its nature. These five 'non-existences' are called 'unspeakable' because they have no entity. Next is the third part, analyzing various categories. Among them, there are five points: one is the comparison of sameness and difference among the ten categories, 'great existence' (mahāsattā) and 'combination' (samavāya) are both unique entities.

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。德．業．及異．有能．無能．俱分．無說七唯多物。實句一種亦一亦多。空．時．方．我．意五是一物。地．水．火．風四是多物　第二十句相望常無常分別。大同．及異．和合．有能．無能．俱分六句是常。非所作故。業唯無常。說是能作．所作事故。實．德．無說亦常無常。九種實中五是常。四分別。地．水．火．風非所作者常。父母極微非所作故。所作者無常。子微以去皆無常故。餘五是常。二十四德中覺．樂．苦．欲．嗔．勤勇．法．非法．行．離．彼性．此性．聲．香十四德是無常。其香唯地上有。設是極微上有亦是無常。如下引文。故十四德唯無常也。餘十或常。或無常。色．味．香．觸若地所有唯是無常。因門中言。火合為因。若地所有色．味．香．觸等。同類為因。從前同類為因生故。由此準知。香唯無常。唯地有故。液性地．火所有一切是無常。數中二性等數。別性中二別性等。量中大性．微性．短性．長性唯是無常。圓性定唯是常。並余色．味．觸．一數．一別性．液性．潤．重性．及合。隨所依實若常無常此等亦爾。總有十法通常無常。五無說中。三常一無常。一亦常亦無常。初未生無一向無常。與實．德．業生相違故。此若生時。無便滅故。已滅無．更互無．畢竟無三。唯是常性。不違實

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 德（Dravya，實體）、業（Karma，活動）、及異（Vaisheshika，特殊性）、有能（Samanya，普遍性）、無能（Abhava，不存在）、俱分（Samavaya，內在關係）、無說（Anupalabdhi，不可知覺性）七者，唯多物。實句一種，亦一亦多。空（Akasha，空間）、時（Kala，時間）、方（Dik，方向）、我（Atman，靈魂）、意（Manas，心）五者是一物。地（Prithvi，地）、水（Apas，水）、火（Tejas，火）、風（Vayu，風）四者是多物。 第二十句：相望常無常分別。大同（Mahasamanya，最大普遍性）、及異（Vaisheshika，特殊性）、和合（Samyoga，結合）、有能（Samanya，普遍性）、無能（Abhava，不存在）、俱分（Samavaya，內在關係）六句是常。非所作故。業（Karma，活動）唯無常。說是能作、所作事故。實（Dravya，實體）、德（Guna，屬性）、無說（Anupalabdhi，不可知覺性）亦常無常。九種實中五是常，四分別。地（Prithvi，地）、水（Apas，水）、火（Tejas，火）、風（Vayu，風）非所作者常。父母極微非所作故。所作者無常。子微以去皆無常故。餘五是常。二十四德中覺（Buddhi，知性）、樂（Sukha，快樂）、苦（Dukha，痛苦）、欲（Iccha，慾望）、嗔（Dvesha，嗔恨）、勤勇（Prayatna，努力）、法（Dharma，正法）、非法（Adharma，非法）、行（Gati，運動）、離（Prithaktva，分離）、彼性（Paratva，遠）、此性（Aparatva，近）、聲（Shabda，聲音）、香（Gandha，氣味）十四德是無常。其香唯地上有。設是極微上有亦是無常。如下引文。故十四德唯無常也。餘十或常，或無常。色（Rupa，顏色）、味（Rasa，味道）、香（Gandha，氣味）、觸（Sparsha，觸覺）若地所有唯是無常。因門中言，火合為因。若地所有色、味、香、觸等，同類為因。從前同類為因生故。由此準知，香唯無常，唯地有故。液性地、火所有一切是無常。數中二性等數。別性中二別性等。量中大性、微性、短性、長性唯是無常。圓性定唯是常。並余色、味、觸、一數、一別性、液性、潤、重性、及合。隨所依實若常無常此等亦爾。總有十法通常無常。五無說中，三常一無常，一亦常亦無常。初未生無一向無常。與實、德、業生相違故。此若生時，無便滅故。已滅無、更互無、畢竟無三，唯是常性。不違實

【English Translation】 English version Dravya (substance), Karma (activity), Vaisheshika (particularity), Samanya (generality), Abhava (non-existence), Samavaya (inherence), and Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) are seven, only multiple objects. The 'real' category is one kind, both one and many. Akasha (space), Kala (time), Dik (direction), Atman (soul), and Manas (mind) are five, being one object. Prithvi (earth), Apas (water), Tejas (fire), and Vayu (air) are four, being multiple objects. The twentieth sentence: distinguishing between permanence and impermanence in relation. Mahasamanya (greatest generality), Vaisheshika (particularity), Samyoga (conjunction), Samanya (generality), Abhava (non-existence), and Samavaya (inherence) are six sentences that are permanent, because they are not created. Karma (activity) alone is impermanent, because it is said to be the cause of action and the object of action. Dravya (substance), Guna (quality), and Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) are both permanent and impermanent. Among the nine types of substances, five are permanent, and four are distinct. Prithvi (earth), Apas (water), Tejas (fire), and Vayu (air) are permanent because they are not created. The ultimate atoms of parents are permanent because they are not created. What is created is impermanent. The atoms of offspring and beyond are all impermanent. The remaining five are permanent. Among the twenty-four qualities, Buddhi (intellect), Sukha (pleasure), Dukha (pain), Iccha (desire), Dvesha (aversion), Prayatna (effort), Dharma (righteousness), Adharma (unrighteousness), Gati (motion), Prithaktva (separateness), Paratva (remoteness), Aparatva (nearness), Shabda (sound), and Gandha (odor) are fourteen qualities that are impermanent. Their odor exists only on earth. Even if it exists on the ultimate atoms, it is also impermanent, as quoted below. Therefore, the fourteen qualities are only impermanent. The remaining ten are either permanent or impermanent. Rupa (color), Rasa (taste), Gandha (odor), and Sparsha (touch) are only impermanent if they belong to earth. In the section on causes, it is said that fire is the cause of combination. If color, taste, odor, touch, etc., belong to earth, they are caused by similar things. Because they are produced from similar causes in the past. From this, it can be inferred that odor is only impermanent because it exists only on earth. Liquidity belonging to earth and fire is all impermanent. In number, the two natures are equal in number. In distinctness, the two distinct natures are equal. In magnitude, largeness, smallness, shortness, and length are only impermanent. Roundness is definitely only permanent. And the remaining color, taste, touch, one number, one distinctness, liquidity, fluidity, heaviness, and combination. Depending on the substance they rely on, if it is permanent or impermanent, these are also the same. In total, there are ten dharmas that are usually impermanent. Among the five non-apprehensions, three are permanent, one is impermanent, and one is both permanent and impermanent. The initial non-existence before birth is always impermanent because it contradicts the origination of substance, quality, and action. If this arises, non-existence will immediately cease. Non-existence after destruction, mutual non-existence, and absolute non-existence are three that are only permanent in nature and do not contradict reality.

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等故。不會無有常無常如地等實。覺樂等德。不相應故一向是常。若自許德與自許實雖未相應。當必相應。一向無常。如常無常所作．非所作亦爾。三有質礙．無質礙分別。德．業．和合．有能．無能．俱分．無說七句唯無質礙。實句九中四無質礙。謂空．時．方．我。餘五有礙。說意是微如二微果許大而亦有礙。有性及異雖文不說。亦是無礙。合九句無礙也　四現量境非現量境分別。此宗現量德句中覺。故彼論言。覺有二種。一現二比。其業．有性．並俱分。皆現量得。論自說為諸根得故。無說句義。非現量得。論亦自說唯比境故。和合句義。唯識說為非現量得。實句之中地．水．火．風．父母極微。非現量得。子微以上是現量得。下破順世及勝論中雲。極微聚集足成根．境。何用果為。故知耳也。余空．方．時．我．意。亦無文說。今解非現量得。德句之中聲唯現境。其覺．樂．苦．欲．嗔．勤勇。是我現境。文不說重今解亦唯現境。重具德中水火德故。總有八德唯是現境。法非法全行少分二德半。唯非現境。此行即是行中念因。非全取行故是半也。色．味．香．觸．數．量．別性．合．離．彼性．此性．液性．潤．及勢用十三德半。並通二種。此中勢用即行作因。非全取行故是半也。其異句義。有能．無能。雖

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為相同的原因。不會沒有常與無常，就像地等實體一樣。覺（覺知）、樂（快樂）等德（屬性），因為不相應，所以一向是常（恒常不變）。如果自許的德與自許的實（實體）雖然尚未相應，但必定會相應，則一向是無常（變化無常）。如同常與無常，所作與非所作也是如此。三有質礙（有形）與無質礙（無形）的分別。德、業（行為）、和合（結合）、有能（有能力）、無能（無能力）、俱分（可分割）、無說（不可說）這七句，只有無質礙。實句九中，四是無質礙，即空（空間）、時（時間）、方（方向）、我（自我）。其餘五是有礙。這裡說的意思是，即使像二微（兩個極微）組成的果（果實）那樣小，許可是大的，但仍然是有礙的。有性（存在）及異（不同），雖然文中沒有說，也是無礙的。總共九句都是無礙的。 四、現量境（可直接感知的）與非現量境（不可直接感知的）的分別。此宗（指勝論派）認為，現量在德句中是覺。所以他們的論典說，覺有兩種，一是現（現量），二是比（比量）。其業、有性、並俱分，都是現量所得。論典自己說，這是諸根（感官）所得。無說句的意義，是非現量所得。論典也自己說，這只是比量的境界。和合句的意義，唯識宗認為是不可直接感知的。實句之中，地、水、火、風、父母極微（最小的粒子），是非現量所得。子微（比極微大的粒子）以上，是現量所得。下面破斥順世派和勝論派時說，極微聚集就足以形成根和境，何必需要果呢？由此可知耳（耳根）。其餘空、方、時、我、意，也沒有文獻說明。現在解釋為非現量所得。德句之中，聲（聲音）只是現境。其覺、樂、苦（痛苦）、欲（慾望）、嗔（嗔恨）、勤勇（努力），是我的現境。文獻沒有說，現在解釋也只是現境。重具德（具有多種屬性）中，水火德（水和火的屬性），總共有八德只是現境。法（正法）非法（非法）全行（全部行為）少分（少部分）二德半，只是非現境。這個行就是行中的念因（念頭的起因）。因為不是全部取行，所以是半。色（顏色）、味（味道）、香（氣味）、觸（觸感）、數（數量）、量（大小）、別性（獨特性）、合（結合）、離（分離）、彼性（它的屬性）、此性（這個屬性）、液性（液體性）、潤（濕潤）、及勢用（作用）這十三德半，都通二種（既可以是現量境，也可以是非現量境）。這其中勢用就是行作因（行為的原因）。因為不是全部取行，所以是半。其異句義（不同的意義）。有能、無能，雖然

【English Translation】 English version: For the same reason. It will not be without permanence and impermanence, like earth and other substances. Qualities such as 覺 (jué) [awareness] and 樂 (lè) [happiness], because they are not corresponding, are always permanent. If a self-admitted quality and a self-admitted substance, although not yet corresponding, are bound to correspond, then they are always impermanent. Just like permanence and impermanence, what is made and what is not made are also the same. The distinction between the three: with obstruction (tangible) and without obstruction (intangible). These seven categories of quality, action (業 (yè)), combination (和合 (héhé)), capable (有能 (yǒunéng)), incapable (無能 (wúnéng)), divisible (俱分 (jùfēn)), and unspeakable (無說 (wúshuō)), only the 'without obstruction' applies. Among the nine categories of substance, four are without obstruction, namely 空 (kōng) [space], 時 (shí) [time], 方 (fāng) [direction], and 我 (wǒ) [self]. The remaining five are with obstruction. What is meant here is that even something as small as a fruit composed of two 微 (wēi) [atoms], although considered large, still has obstruction. Existence (有性 (yǒuxìng)) and difference (異 (yì)), although not mentioned in the text, are also without obstruction. In total, nine categories are without obstruction. Four, the distinction between 現量境 (xiànliàngjìng) [objects of direct perception] and 非現量境 (fēixiànliàngjìng) [objects of non-direct perception]. According to this school (Vaisheshika), direct perception in the category of quality is 覺 (jué) [awareness]. Therefore, their scriptures say that there are two types of 覺 (jué) [awareness]: one is direct (現 (xiàn)), and the other is inference (比 (bǐ)). Its action, existence, and divisibility are all obtained through direct perception. The scriptures themselves say that this is obtained through the senses. The meaning of the 'unspeakable' category is not obtained through direct perception. The scriptures also say that this is only the realm of inference. The meaning of the 'combination' category is considered by the Yogacara school to be not directly perceptible. Among the categories of substance, earth, water, fire, wind, and the ultimate atoms of parents are not obtained through direct perception. Particles larger than 子微 (zǐwēi) [sub-atoms] are obtained through direct perception. Below, when refuting the Charvaka and Vaisheshika schools, it is said that the aggregation of ultimate atoms is sufficient to form the senses and objects, so why is a fruit needed? From this, we know the ear. The remaining space, direction, time, self, and mind are also not mentioned in the text. Now, it is explained as not obtained through direct perception. Among the categories of quality, sound is only an object of direct perception. Its awareness, happiness, suffering (苦 (kǔ)), desire (欲 (yù)), anger (嗔 (chēn)), and effort (勤勇 (qínyǒng)) are objects of my direct perception. The text does not say, but now it is explained as only objects of direct perception. Among the qualities with multiple attributes, the qualities of water and fire, in total, eight qualities are only objects of direct perception. 法 (fǎ) [Dharma], 非法 (fēifǎ) [non-Dharma], the entirety of action, and a small portion of two and a half qualities are only objects of non-direct perception. This action is the cause of thought within action. Because it is not the entirety of action that is taken, it is half. Color (色 (sè)), taste (味 (wèi)), smell (香 (xiāng)), touch (觸 (chù)), number (數 (shù)), size (量 (liàng)), distinctiveness (別性 (biéxìng)), combination (合 (hé)), separation (離 (lí)), its nature (彼性 (bǐxìng)), this nature (此性 (cǐxìng)), liquidity (液性 (yèxìng)), moisture (潤 (rùn)), and function (勢用 (shìyòng)), these thirteen and a half qualities, all pass through both (can be objects of both direct and non-direct perception). Among these, function is the cause of action. Because it is not the entirety of action that is taken, it is half. Its different meanings. Capable and incapable, although

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無文辨並非現得。異但是差別實因。非如俱分是實性故。有能無能因之所須。亦非現得。總言業．有．俱分三唯現得。異．及和合．有能．無能．無說五非現得。餘二通二　五常無常中生果不生果分別。唯識唯難常生果故。雖有六句一向是常。三通常無常。一唯無常。實中四種地．水．火．風父母極微。常能生果。有能是常。亦能生果。是作果時定所須故。餘五句全．空．時．方．我．意五實。雖常不能生果。論自誠說。德句準有能中說有得果所須。十通常德亦能生果。隨其所應。業雖生果而體無常。非此所說。無說雖亦有常。不能生果。非根本故。此中所辨唯識所須。其餘諸門實。由幾德名為有德。乃至廣說。幾是所知。非此所要。略不繁述。如十句說。

論。勝論所執至現量所得。

述曰。破中有三。第一敘宗。第二正破。第三結非。此即初也。今敘有二。一敘是實有。二敘現量得。若敘實有破其六句。六句皆實。今言多者顯非一法。三法以上皆名多故。若破十句九句實有。第十是無。多分實有故實言多。現量得中若破六句。準下論文五現量得。說實等五現量所得。唯言和合非現量得。故說多言。若破十句總句而言。異．及和合．有能．無能．無說非現量得。餘五現得。然多實有中。五現得四非現得

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『無文辨』（Avikalpavijñāna，無分別智）並非現量所得。『異』（Pṛthaktva，異性）等只是差別的實在原因。不像『俱分』（Ubhayathā，兩俱分）那樣是實在的自性。『有能』（Śakti，能力）和『無能』（Aśakti，無能力）是生果的必要條件，但也不是現量所得。總的來說，『業』（Karma，業）、『有』（Bhāva，有）、『俱分』三種是現量所得。『異』、『和合』（Samavāya，和合）、『有能』、『無能』、『無說』（Abhāva，無）五種不是現量所得。其餘兩種（『實』Dravya，實體；『德』Guṇa，屬性）則兩者皆有可能。在『五常』（Nitya，常）和『無常』（Anitya，無常）中，對生果和不生果進行分別。唯識宗認為，只有常才能生果。雖然有六種情況是一向是常，三種通常是無常，一種唯獨是無常。『實』中的四種——地（Pṛthivī，地）、水（Āpas，水）、火（Tejas，火）、風（Vāyu，風）的父母極微，是常且能生果的。『有能』是常，也能生果，因為在產生果時是必須的。其餘五句——全（Sarva，全）、空（Śūnya，空）、時（Kāla，時）、方（Dik，方）、我（Ātman，我）、意（Manas，意）五種『實』，雖然是常，但不能生果。這是論著自己誠實地說的。『德』句可以參照『有能』中的說法，即獲得果所必需的。十種通常的『德』也能生果，視情況而定。『業』雖然能生果，但其體性是無常，不在此處討論。『無說』雖然也有常，但不能生果，因為它不是根本的。這裡所辨析的只是唯識宗所需要的。至於其他方面，比如『實』，由幾種『德』才能稱為『有德』，乃至廣說，以及有多少是『所知』（Prameya，量知），這些都不是這裡所要討論的，所以略去不詳細敘述，可以參考《十句義論》。

論：勝論所執至現量所得。

述曰：破斥中有三個部分。第一是敘述宗義，第二是正式破斥，第三是總結否定。這裡是第一部分。敘述分為兩點：一是敘述是實有，二是敘述是現量所得。如果敘述是實有，那麼破斥的就是六句，因為六句都是實在的。這裡說『多』，是爲了表明不是一種法，三種以上的法都可以稱為『多』。如果破斥十句，那麼就是九句是實有，第十句是『無』。因為大部分是實有，所以說『實言多』。在現量所得中，如果破斥六句，那麼按照下面的論文，五種（『實』、『德』、『業』、『有』、『俱分』）是現量所得，只有『和合』不是現量所得，所以說『多』。如果破斥十句，那麼總的來說，『異』、『和合』、『有能』、『無能』、『無說』不是現量所得，其餘五種是現量所得。然而，在『多實有』中，五種是現量所得，四種不是現量所得。

【English Translation】 English version 'Avikalpavijñāna' (Non-conceptual cognition) is not obtained through direct perception. 'Pṛthaktva' (Distinctness) and others are merely the real causes of difference. They are not like 'Ubhayathā' (Both ways) which is a real nature. 'Śakti' (Potency) and 'Aśakti' (Impotency) are necessary conditions for the production of effects, but they are also not obtained through direct perception. In general, 'Karma' (Action), 'Bhāva' (Being), and 'Ubhayathā' are the only three obtained through direct perception. 'Pṛthaktva', 'Samavāya' (Inherence), 'Śakti', 'Aśakti', and 'Abhāva' (Non-existence) are five that are not obtained through direct perception. The remaining two ('Dravya' (Substance), 'Guṇa' (Quality)) are possible in both ways. Among the 'five permanent' (Nitya) and 'impermanent' (Anitya), there is a distinction between producing effects and not producing effects. According to the Vijñānavāda school, only the permanent can produce effects. Although there are six cases that are always permanent, three are usually impermanent, and one is solely impermanent. Among the 'Dravya', the four—the ultimate particles of earth (Pṛthivī), water (Āpas), fire (Tejas), and wind (Vāyu)—are permanent and can produce effects. 'Śakti' is permanent and can also produce effects because it is necessary when producing effects. The remaining five categories—totality (Sarva), emptiness (Śūnya), time (Kāla), space (Dik), self (Ātman), and mind (Manas)—although permanent, cannot produce effects. This is what the treatise itself honestly states. The 'Guṇa' category can be referred to in the statement about 'Śakti', which is necessary for obtaining effects. The ten common 'Guṇa' can also produce effects, depending on the situation. Although 'Karma' can produce effects, its nature is impermanent and is not discussed here. Although 'Abhāva' also has permanence, it cannot produce effects because it is not fundamental. What is being analyzed here is only what is needed by the Vijñānavāda school. As for other aspects, such as how many 'Guṇa' are needed for a 'Dravya' to be called 'possessing Guṇa', and how many are 'Prameya' (Object of knowledge), these are not discussed here, so they are omitted and not described in detail. Refer to the Ten Categories.

Treatise: The Vaiśeṣika's doctrine extends to what is obtained through direct perception.

Commentary: There are three parts to the refutation. The first is to state the doctrine, the second is to formally refute it, and the third is to conclude with a negation. This is the first part. The statement is divided into two points: one is to state that it is real, and the other is to state that it is obtained through direct perception. If the statement is about reality, then what is being refuted are the six categories, because all six are real. The word 'many' is used here to indicate that it is not one dharma; three or more dharmas can be called 'many'. If the ten categories are refuted, then nine are real, and the tenth is 'non-existence'. Because most are real, it is said 'many real'. In what is obtained through direct perception, if the six categories are refuted, then according to the following treatise, five ('Dravya', 'Guṇa', 'Karma', 'Bhāva', 'Ubhayathā') are obtained through direct perception, and only 'Samavāya' is not obtained through direct perception, so it is said 'many'. If the ten categories are refuted, then in general, 'Pṛthaktva', 'Samavāya', 'Śakti', 'Aśakti', and 'Abhāva' are not obtained through direct perception, and the remaining five are obtained through direct perception. However, in 'many real', five are obtained through direct perception, and four are not obtained through direct perception.

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。故言多是現量所得。即一多言通實現得。然說六句既是本計。故百論等不破十句。此論亦爾。然兼破十句。于理亦無違。

論。彼執非理。

述曰。自下第二正破他非。于中有三。初且總非。次外返問。三為別破。此即初也。

論。所以者何。

述曰。外返問也。

論。諸句義中至如所生果。

述曰。此別破也。于中有五。一總破諸句。二別破實．德。三又總破諸句。四者別破大有等三。五者總結破諸句義　或分為三。初總破諸句。二別破有等。三結破諸句。初中有三。一總破。二破實．德。三複合破　若準五段科。初中有二破。一破常諸句。二破無常諸句。破常中有二。一難生果。二難不生。此即初也。體是常住能生果者。父母地．水．火．風。及德中十種通常者。並有能句常能生果。破此量云。此等亦應體是無常。許能生果故。如所生果　子微已去皆能生果。體無常故。又宗如前。許有生果之作用故。如所生果。

或總相言。諸句義中能生果常者應是無常。有作用故。如所生果。

論。若不生果至如兔角等。

述曰。此難不生果諸常住者。謂大有．同異．和合．無能．俱分五全是常。空等五實常者。皆不能生果。除無說句。以為喻故。又體是無非所破

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，他們所說的很多都是現量所得（直接感知獲得的知識）。即『一』和『多』的說法都能夠通過現量獲得。然而，因為他們所說的六句是他們自己的根本主張，所以《百論》等論著不破斥他們的十句。這部論著也是如此。然而，兼破斥十句，在道理上也沒有什麼違背。

論：他們的主張不合道理。

述曰：下面第二部分正式破斥他們的錯誤觀點。其中有三個部分：首先是總的破斥，其次是從對方的角度反問，第三是分別破斥。這裡是第一部分，總的破斥。

論：為什麼這麼說呢？

述曰：這是從對方的角度反問。

論：在各種句義中，直到像所生的果一樣。

述曰：這是分別破斥。其中有五個部分：一是總破斥各種句，二是分別破斥『實』（Dravya）和『德』（Guna），三是再次總破斥各種句，四是分別破斥『大有』（Mahāsāmānya）等三種，五是總結破斥各種句義。或者可以分為三個部分：一是總破斥各種句，二是分別破斥『有』（Bhāva）等，三是總結破斥各種句。在第一部分中，又有兩個破斥：一是破斥常的各種句，二是破斥無常的各種句。在破斥常的各種句中，又有兩個部分：一是難於生果，二是難於不生果。這裡是第一部分，難於生果。如果是常住的本體能夠生果，那麼父母、地、水、火、風，以及『德』（Guna）中的十種通常者，都具有『能』（Śakti）句，常能生果。破斥這種觀點的論證是：這些也應該是無常的本體，因為它們被認為是能夠生果的。就像所生的果一樣。子微等已經能夠生果，本體是無常的。又，宗（Paksha，論題）如前，因為它們被認為具有生果的作用。就像所生的果一樣。

或者總的來說，各種句義中能夠生果的常者應該是無常的，因為它們有作用。就像所生的果一樣。

論：如果不生果，就像兔角等。

述曰：這是難於不生果的各種常住者。所謂『大有』（Mahāsāmānya）、『同異』（Sāmānya-viśeṣa）、『和合』（Samavāya）、『無能』（Aśakti）、『俱分』（Ubhayathā）這五種全是常的。空等五種『實』（Dravya）是常的，都不能生果。除了『無說』句，因為它是作為比喻的。而且本體是『無』，不是被破斥的對象。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, much of what they say is derived from direct perception (Pratyaksha). That is, the statements of 'one' and 'many' can both be realized through direct perception. However, because the six categories they speak of are their own fundamental tenets, treatises like the Śataśāstra (Hundred Treatise) do not refute their ten categories. This treatise is also like that. However, refuting the ten categories as well does not violate reason.

Treatise: Their assertions are unreasonable.

Commentary: The second part below formally refutes their incorrect views. There are three parts to it: first, a general refutation; second, a counter-question from their perspective; and third, a separate refutation. This is the first part, the general refutation.

Treatise: Why is that?

Commentary: This is a counter-question from their perspective.

Treatise: Among the meanings of the various categories, up to like the produced fruit.

Commentary: This is a separate refutation. There are five parts to it: first, a general refutation of all categories; second, a separate refutation of 'substance' (Dravya) and 'quality' (Guna); third, another general refutation of all categories; fourth, a separate refutation of the three, 'great generality' (Mahāsāmānya) etc.; and fifth, a concluding refutation of the meanings of all categories. Or it can be divided into three parts: first, a general refutation of all categories; second, a separate refutation of 'existence' (Bhāva) etc.; and third, a concluding refutation of all categories. In the first part, there are two refutations: first, a refutation of the permanent categories; and second, a refutation of the impermanent categories. In the refutation of the permanent categories, there are two parts: first, difficulty in producing fruit; and second, difficulty in not producing fruit. This is the first part, difficulty in producing fruit. If the permanent entity is capable of producing fruit, then parents, earth, water, fire, wind, and the ten common ones among the 'qualities' (Guna), all possess the category of 'potency' (Śakti), and are constantly able to produce fruit. The argument refuting this view is: these should also be impermanent entities, because they are considered capable of producing fruit. Like the produced fruit. The subtle particles etc. are already capable of producing fruit, and their entity is impermanent. Also, the thesis (Paksha) is as before, because they are considered to have the function of producing fruit. Like the produced fruit.

Or, generally speaking, the permanent entities among the meanings of the various categories that are capable of producing fruit should be impermanent, because they have a function. Like the produced fruit.

Treatise: If they do not produce fruit, like rabbit horns etc.

Commentary: This is difficulty in the various permanent entities that do not produce fruit. The five, 'great generality' (Mahāsāmānya), 'similarity and difference' (Sāmānya-viśeṣa), 'inherence' (Samavāya), 'impotency' (Aśakti), 'both ways' (Ubhayathā), are all permanent. The five 'substances' (Dravya) such as space are permanent, and none of them can produce fruit. Except for the category of 'indescribable', because it is used as a metaphor. And the entity is 'non-being', not the object of refutation.

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故。今以唯識難之。不可以無作用難。真如虛空為不定過。無作用故。量云。此等實常不生果者。應非離識實有自性。許是常住不生果故。如兔角等　彼宗畢竟無是常住故。以為同喻。因不言常有不定失　或余句無常者雖不生果。大乘不許有實體故。設許有體亦非離識故無不定。然彼覺等既不離識。應犯相符。今言常住即除覺等。覺等攝在異喻中故。又不言常除覺等。以為同品亦得。文中宗等準理應知。又兔角等亦非離識。彼此共成。真如空等亦不離識。無不定過。

論。諸無常者至非實有性。

述曰。下破諸句體無常者。于中二破。一難有質礙者。二難無質礙者。此難有質。實句中五地．水．火．風．意皆有礙。意全四本父母極微是常。非此中破。今破四子微等。此中二量。一云汝此四種無常有礙者。應可分折。有方分故。如軍林等　唯得有質礙為宗。簡別他句無礙無常者無方分故。彼許軍林體有方分然可分折多虛疏法成軍林故。子實等不然。以體實有堅密一處不可折故。軍謂四軍。林謂竹樹等。二云此等諸法。應非實有。有方分故。如軍林等。父母極微有圓量德合故無方分。其子微等上有方分。意雖有礙量如子微。然無方分。體是常住非此所破。無不定失　又以可分折故為因難非實有。為第三量。已

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，現在用唯識的觀點來駁斥對方的觀點。不能用『沒有作用』來反駁，因為真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）和虛空（Akasa，沒有阻礙的空間）是不確定的過失，因為它們也沒有作用。論證如下：這些真實恒常且不產生結果的事物，應該不是獨立於識（Vijnana，意識）而真實存在的自性（Svabhava，自身本性），因為它們被認為是恒常存在且不產生結果的，就像兔角等不存在的事物一樣。對方宗派畢竟沒有什麼是恒常存在的，所以用作同喻（Samanya，正面的例子）。如果原因（Hetu，論證的理由）沒有說『恒常』，就會有不確定的過失。或者，如果其他句子中的『無常』事物雖然不產生結果，但大乘佛教不承認它們有實體（Dravya，實在的本體），即使承認有實體，也不是獨立於識的，所以沒有不確定的過失。然而，對方所說的『覺』等既然不離識，就應該犯『相符』的錯誤。現在說『恒常存在』，就是爲了排除『覺』等。『覺』等被包含在異喻（Vaidharmya，反面的例子）中。如果不說『恒常』，而用『覺』等作為同品（Sapaksha，與宗法相似的事物），也是可以的。文中的宗（Paksha，論題）等應該根據道理來理解。而且，兔角等也不是獨立於識的，這是彼此共同承認的。真如、虛空等也不離識，所以沒有不確定的過失。 論：諸無常者，至非實有性。 述記：下面破斥諸句中本體是無常的事物。其中分為兩部分來破斥：一是駁斥有質礙的事物，二是駁斥沒有質礙的事物。這裡是駁斥有質礙的事物。在『實』句中，五地（Prthivi，地）、水（Apas，水）、火（Tejas，火）、風（Vayu，風）、意（Manas，意）都有阻礙。『意』的全部、四本（四大種）、父母極微（Paramanu，最小的粒子）是常，不是這裡要破斥的。現在破斥四子微等。這裡有兩個論證：一是說，你們這四種無常且有阻礙的事物，應該是可以分割的，因為它們有方分（Avayava，組成部分），就像軍隊和森林等。這裡只用『有質礙』作為宗，是爲了區分其他句子中沒有阻礙的無常事物，因為它們沒有方分。對方承認軍隊和森林的本體有方分，但可以分割，因為它們是由許多虛疏的法組成的。但子實等不是這樣，因為它們的本體是真實存在且堅密一體的，不可分割。『軍』指的是四種軍隊，『林』指的是竹子和樹木等。二是說，這些法，應該不是真實存在的，因為它們有方分，就像軍隊和森林等。父母極微有圓量德合，所以沒有方分。而子微等有方分。『意』雖然有阻礙，但論證方式像子微一樣，而且它的本體是常住的，不是這裡要破斥的，所以沒有不確定的過失。又用『可以分割』作為原因來駁斥『不是真實存在』，這是第三個論證。已

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, now I refute the opponent's view using the Vijnanavada (Yogacara) perspective. It is not permissible to refute with 'having no function,' because Tathata (the suchness, the true nature of things) and Akasa (space, unobstructed space) are uncertain faults, as they also have no function. The argument is as follows: These real, constant, and non-productive things should not be independent of Vijnana (consciousness) and have a real Svabhava (self-nature), because they are considered to be constant and non-productive, like the horns of a rabbit and other non-existent things. After all, the opponent's school has nothing that is constant, so it is used as a Samanya (positive example). If the Hetu (reason, the basis of the argument) does not say 'constant,' there will be an uncertain fault. Or, if the 'impermanent' things in other sentences, although they do not produce results, Mahayana Buddhism does not admit that they have Dravya (substance, real entity). Even if it is admitted that they have substance, they are not independent of Vijnana, so there is no uncertain fault. However, since the 'awareness' and so on mentioned by the opponent are not separate from Vijnana, they should commit the error of 'agreement.' Now, saying 'constant existence' is to exclude 'awareness' and so on. 'Awareness' and so on are included in Vaidharmya (negative example). If 'constant' is not said, and 'awareness' and so on are used as Sapaksha (similar to the subject), it is also possible. The Paksha (thesis, the subject of the argument) and so on in the text should be understood according to reason. Moreover, rabbit horns and so on are not independent of Vijnana, which is mutually acknowledged. Tathata, Akasa, and so on are also not separate from Vijnana, so there is no uncertain fault. Treatise: All impermanent things, to not having real nature. Commentary: Below, refute the things whose essence is impermanent in all sentences. Among them, there are two parts to refute: one is to refute things with obstruction, and the other is to refute things without obstruction. Here, things with obstruction are refuted. In the 'real' sentence, the five elements of Prthivi (earth), Apas (water), Tejas (fire), Vayu (wind), and Manas (mind) all have obstruction. All of 'mind,' the four primary elements, and the Paramāṇu (smallest particles) of parents are constant and are not to be refuted here. Now refute the four derived particles and so on. Here are two arguments: one is to say that these four kinds of impermanent and obstructive things of yours should be divisible, because they have Avayava (components), like armies and forests and so on. Here, only 'having obstruction' is used as the Paksha, in order to distinguish the impermanent things without obstruction in other sentences, because they have no Avayava. The opponent admits that the essence of armies and forests has Avayava, but they can be divided because they are composed of many sparse Dharmas. But derived realities and so on are not like this, because their essence is real and solid, and cannot be divided. 'Army' refers to the four kinds of armies, and 'forest' refers to bamboo and trees and so on. The second is to say that these Dharmas should not be real, because they have Avayava, like armies and forests and so on. The Paramāṇu of parents have roundness and virtue combined, so they have no Avayava. But derived particles and so on have Avayava. Although 'mind' has obstruction, the argument is like that of derived particles, and its essence is constant and is not to be refuted here, so there is no uncertain fault. Also, using 'divisible' as the reason to refute 'not being real' is the third argument. End

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破之宗得成因故　然以理觀唯此非實一句為宗。方分可折是二別因。彼宗理許可分折。故如斧等斷成多分故。便．應二字文便故來。非則宗法　或有質礙為因亦得。

論。若無質礙至有實自性。

述曰。此難無礙量。后之九句全是無礙。實句之中空．時．方．我四是無礙。今破無常無質礙者。即德句十四全．十少分．及五業全。除無說句中一全．一少分。謂未生無全．不會無少分。非離識故。今破彼云。汝宗此等無常無礙法。除覺等外應不離心．心所有實自性。無質礙故。如覺．樂等諸心．心所　彼心．心所即德句中覺．樂等攝。無常無礙。故得為喻。然無相符極成之失。簡覺等故。彼宗說為非離心等故。彼說。意實是有礙攝。亦非是心。形如芥子。我所須具。非謂心也。設若是心。其喻即有能立不成。無質礙因此不轉故。同品亦非定是有性。以非心故。無過失也。然此文略。故無簡別。

論。又彼所執至如堅濕暖動。

述曰。自下第二別破實．德。初總相對以破實．德。后總結非堅．濕等別。此即初也　初中有二。初以德例實。實非實攝。地．水．火．風實句所攝。性是有礙。堅．濕等法是德句中觸德所攝。而是無礙。俱身根所得故。今翻覆為量破之。以實地等即德堅等。量云。地．水．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 破宗得成的原因，是因為以理性的觀察來看，只有『此非實』這一句可以作為宗（pakṣa，論題）。『方分可折』是兩個不同的因（hetu，理由）。他們的宗在理上是可以被分割和拆解的。因此，就像斧頭等工具可以把物體斷成很多部分一樣。『便』和『應』這兩個字，是因為文句的需要而使用的。如果不是這樣，就不能成為宗法（pakṣadharmatva，宗依性）。或者，以有質礙作為因也可以。

論：如果無質礙，就能得到真實的自性。

述曰：這是爲了駁斥無礙量（nirāvaraṇa-pramāṇa，無障礙量）。後面的九句全部都是關於無礙的。在『實』句中，空、時、方、我這四者是無礙的。現在駁斥無常且無質礙的事物。也就是『德』句中的十四個全部，十個少部分，以及五個『業』全部。除了『無說』句中的一個全部，一個少部分。所謂『未生』是全部，『不會』是少部分。因為不是脫離識（vijñāna，意識）的緣故。現在駁斥他們說：你們宗派的這些無常且無礙的法，除了覺等之外，應該不離心（citta，心）和心所（caitta，心所）的真實自性。因為沒有質礙的緣故。就像覺、樂等各種心和心所。他們的心和心所，就是『德』句中的覺、樂等所包含的。無常且無礙，所以可以作為比喻。然而沒有不相符和極成（prasiddha，已成立）的過失，因為簡別了覺等。他們的宗派說這些不是脫離心等的。他們說，意（manas，意）實際上是有礙的，也不是心，形狀像芥子。我所需要的是工具，而不是心。假設如果是心，那麼這個比喻就有了能立不成（sādhyāprasiddhi，所立不成）的過失，因為無質礙的因不能成立。同品（sapakṣa，同品）也並非一定是具有自性的，因為不是心的緣故，所以沒有過失。然而這段文字比較簡略，所以沒有簡別。

論：還有他們所執著的，就像堅、濕、暖、動。

述曰：從下面開始，第二個部分是分別駁斥實（dravya，實）和德（guṇa，德）。開始是總體相對地駁斥實和德，後面總結不是堅、濕等分別的特性。這裡是第一個部分。第一個部分中有兩個方面。首先是用德來類比實。實不是實所包含的。地、水、火、風是『實』句所包含的，性質是有礙的。堅、濕等法是『德』句中觸德所包含的，而是無礙的。都是身根所能感受到的。現在翻過來用量（pramāṇa，量）來駁斥他們。用地等實來類比堅等德。量是：地、水、

【English Translation】 English version The reason for establishing the refutation's thesis is that, from a rational perspective, only the phrase 'this is not real' can serve as the pakṣa (thesis). 'Divisible into parts' are two distinct hetus (reasons). Their thesis is rationally divisible and dissectible. Therefore, just as tools like axes can break objects into many parts. The words '便' (biàn, then) and '應' (yīng, should) are used for the sake of the sentence's structure. Otherwise, it cannot become a pakṣadharmatva (property of the thesis). Alternatively, having obstruction can also be used as a reason.

Treatise: If there is no obstruction, then one can attain a real self-nature.

Commentary: This is to refute the nirāvaraṇa-pramāṇa (unobstructed valid cognition). The following nine sentences are all about unobstructedness. In the 'real' sentence, space, time, direction, and self are the four that are unobstructed. Now refuting things that are impermanent and unobstructed. That is, all fourteen of the 'quality' sentence, ten partial ones, and all five 'actions'. Except for one whole and one partial in the 'non-speaking' sentence. The so-called 'unborn' is the whole, and 'un-meeting' is the partial. Because it is not separate from vijñāna (consciousness). Now refuting them by saying: These impermanent and unobstructed dharmas (phenomena) of your school, except for awareness and the like, should not be separate from the real self-nature of citta (mind) and caitta (mental factors). Because there is no obstruction. Like awareness, pleasure, and other various minds and mental factors. Their minds and mental factors are included in awareness, pleasure, and the like in the 'quality' sentence. Impermanent and unobstructed, so they can be used as metaphors. However, there is no fault of incompatibility or prasiddha (established), because awareness and the like are distinguished. Their school says that these are not separate from the mind and so on. They say that manas (mind) is actually obstructed and is not the mind, shaped like a mustard seed. What I need is a tool, not the mind. Assuming that it is the mind, then this metaphor has the fault of sādhyāprasiddhi (unproven probandum), because the reason of unobstructedness cannot be established. The sapakṣa (similar instances) are not necessarily having self-nature, because they are not the mind, so there is no fault. However, this text is brief, so there is no distinction.

Treatise: Also, what they adhere to, like hardness, wetness, warmth, and motion.

Commentary: From below, the second part is to separately refute dravya (substance) and guṇa (quality). The beginning is to refute substance and quality in a generally relative way, and the back summarizes the distinct characteristics that are not hardness, wetness, and so on. This is the first part. There are two aspects in the first part. First, using quality to analogize substance. Substance is not included in substance. Earth, water, fire, and wind are included in the 'substance' sentence, and their nature is obstructed. Hardness, wetness, and other dharmas are included in the tactile quality in the 'quality' sentence, but they are unobstructed. They can all be perceived by the body sense. Now, turning it over, using pramāṇa (valid cognition) to refute them. Using real substances like earth to analogize qualities like hardness. The pramāṇa is: earth, water,

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火．風。非有質礙實句所攝。身根取故。如堅濕等。

此中身根亦得大有．同異。並在喻中。若但言非有礙。不言非是實句所攝。即有違宗失。有礙之言簡無礙實句所攝。彼不說為無礙實故　又對無礙堅．濕等故。故舉有礙。下德句等無礙等言亦準此釋。

論。即彼所執至如地水火風。

述曰。此以堅等例于地等。如文可知。宗等如次。此暖言等。等取動．觸．數．量．別性等十一法。彼說身根得十一德。一觸．二數．三量．四別性．五合．六離．七彼性．八此性．九液性．十潤．十一勢用。即行作因。其地等四皆身根得。皆有觸故。色德但在地．水．火三。風中無色。彼以假實地等俱名地等。故眼所見。

論。地水火三至準此應責。

述曰。即以地等例于青等。眼見為因返覆為量。然不可言地非地攝。違自宗故。應言汝所執地非有質礙實地所攝。非如所執實有自性實句所攝。故不違宗。彼眼亦見十一種德除觸取色。為量可知。

論。故知無實至實地水火。

述曰。此總結非彼地．水等與堅等異。大乘之地即堅等故。會申正義。然不可言色即是地。今只可以彼此相例非實非德地等非見。又言地等非別堅等地等非見。不可說色離地等無。文言雖總意顯別也。又應言地等。非

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 火、風，並非屬於有質礙的實句所包含的範疇，因為它們是被身根所取知的，就像堅硬、潮濕等觸感一樣。

這裡，身根所取的大種（四大元素）也存在同異之處，這些都體現在比喻之中。如果僅僅說『非有礙』，而不說『非是實句所攝』，就會出現違背宗義的過失。『有礙』一詞是爲了簡別無礙的實句所包含的事物，因為對方沒有說那些是無礙的實法。另外，也是爲了對應無礙的堅硬、潮濕等觸感，所以才舉出『有礙』。下面的『德句』等詞語中的『無礙』等，也按照這個原則來解釋。

論：就是他們所執著的……如同地、水、火、風。

述記：這裡是用堅硬等觸感來比喻地等四大元素，如同文中所說的那樣可以理解。宗義等也依次類推。這裡的『暖』等，『等』字包括了動、觸、數、量、別性等十一種法。他們認為身根可以獲得十一種德：一、觸；二、數；三、量；四、別性；五、合；六、離；七、彼性；八、此性；九、液性；十、潤；十一、勢用，也就是作為行為的原因。地等四種元素都是身根可以獲得的，因為它們都有觸感。色德只存在於地、水、火三種元素中，風中沒有顏色。他們將假有的和實有的地等都稱為地等，所以眼睛可以看見。

論：地、水、火三種元素……按照這個原則應該進行責難。

述記：這裡是用地等四大元素來比喻青色等，以眼睛所見作為原因，反覆推論作為衡量。然而，不能說地不是地所包含的，因為這違背了自己的宗義。應該說：『你所執著的地，不是有質礙的實地所包含的，不像你所執著的實有自性的實句所包含的。』這樣才不違背宗義。對方的眼睛也可以看見十一種德，除了觸覺之外，還可以取色，作為衡量的標準是可以理解的。

論：所以要知道沒有真實的……真實的地、水、火。

述記：這裡總結了對方的地、水等與堅硬等觸感是不同的，因為大乘所說的地就是堅硬等。這是爲了闡明正確的意義。然而，不能說色就是地。現在只能用彼此相比例的方式來說，非實非德的地等是不可見的。又說地等不是別的，堅硬的地等是不可見的。不能說色離開了地等就不存在。文句雖然總括，但意思卻顯示出差別。又應該說地等不是……

【English Translation】 English version Fire and wind are not included in the category of 'real sentences with material obstruction' (非有質礙實句所攝), because they are perceived by the body faculty (身根), like hardness and wetness.

Here, the great elements (大有, the four great elements) perceived by the body faculty also have similarities and differences, which are all reflected in the metaphors. If one only says 'not obstructed' (非有礙), without saying 'not included in the real sentences' (非是實句所攝), then there will be a fault of contradicting the doctrine (違宗失). The term 'obstructed' (有礙) is to distinguish things included in the unobstructed real sentences, because the other party did not say those are unobstructed real dharmas. In addition, it is also to correspond to unobstructed hardness, wetness, and other tactile sensations, so 'obstructed' is mentioned. The 'unobstructed' (無礙) in the following 'quality sentences' (德句) and other terms should also be interpreted according to this principle.

Treatise: That is, what they adhere to... like earth, water, fire, and wind.

Commentary: Here, hardness and other tactile sensations are used to exemplify the four great elements such as earth, as can be understood from the text. The doctrines and so on are inferred accordingly. Here, 'warmth' (暖) and so on, 'and so on' includes eleven dharmas such as motion, touch, number, quantity, distinctiveness. They believe that the body faculty can obtain eleven qualities: one, touch; two, number; three, quantity; four, distinctiveness; five, combination; six, separation; seven, that-ness; eight, this-ness; nine, liquidity; ten, moistness; eleven, potential, which is the cause of action. The four elements of earth and so on can all be obtained by the body faculty, because they all have touch. The quality of color only exists in the three elements of earth, water, and fire; there is no color in wind. They call both the hypothetical and real earth and so on as earth and so on, so the eyes can see.

Treatise: The three elements of earth, water, and fire... according to this principle, one should question.

Commentary: Here, the four great elements such as earth are used to exemplify blue and so on, using what the eyes see as the cause, and repeated reasoning as the measure. However, it cannot be said that earth is not included in earth, because this contradicts one's own doctrine. It should be said: 'The earth you adhere to is not included in the real earth with material obstruction, unlike what you adhere to as the real sentences with real self-nature.' This does not contradict the doctrine. The other party's eyes can also see eleven qualities, except for touch, they can also take color, as the standard of measurement can be understood.

Treatise: Therefore, know that there is no real... real earth, water, fire.

Commentary: This summarizes that the other party's earth, water, and so on are different from hardness and other tactile sensations, because the earth spoken of in Mahayana is hardness and so on. This is to clarify the correct meaning. However, it cannot be said that color is earth. Now, one can only use the method of comparing each other to say that the non-real and non-quality earth and so on are invisible. It is also said that earth and so on are not different, the hard earth and so on are invisible. It cannot be said that color does not exist apart from earth and so on. Although the sentences are general, the meaning shows the difference. It should also be said that earth and so on are not...

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眼所見。實句攝故。猶如風等。此中文略。亦非地等。是此意也。彼不說地等耳等三根所取。故於此中但破見．觸。

此下第三重破實等。

論。又彼所執至應是無常。

述曰。實句義中有礙常者。即地．水．火．風父母極微及意。彼為礙故。此等五法應是無常。皆有礙故。如粗地等。粗地等法彼自計執為無常故。宗因喻等如文可知。

論。諸句義中至如地水火風。

述曰。下破諸句無質礙法色根所取者。即德句中色．味．香．觸．聲五。及數等十種。業．及大有．俱分三。色等性故。皆色根取。此無礙法。應皆有礙。許色根取故。如地等四　此中許言。明大有等我宗不許體性是有。及色根取。彼論說。根有五。鼻根即地。舌根即水。眼根即火。皮根即風。耳根即空　此于諸句何法攝耶　由此正解。即實句空取聲之時。于身起作用名空耳根也。且十一德對其自根一一簡略皆有一量。若二二合。若三三合。乃至總對諸根說量。其義其多。此中文總無簡略故。

論。又彼所執至如石女兒。

述曰。此十句中除實句外餘八句。義皆是非實。然此唯取有體句者。意明唯識。翻返為量。且欲除實破餘八句　量云。非實及覺樂等余德等八有體句。應非離識有別自性。汝許除心等非實句

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 眼所見之物，是因為它們被真實的實體所攝持，就像風等等一樣。這裡文句有所省略，但並非指地等。這就是此處的含義。他們沒有說地等以及耳等三種根所取之物，因此在這裡只破斥見和觸。

接下來是第三重，破斥真實等。

論：此外，他們所執著的……應該是無常的。

述曰：在真實句的含義中，凡是有障礙且是常住的，例如地、水、火、風的父母極微以及意。因為它們有障礙，所以這五種法應該是無常的，因為它們都有障礙，就像粗糙的地等一樣。粗糙的地等法，他們自己認為是無常的。宗、因、喻等，如文中所述，可以理解。

論：在各種句子的含義中……就像地水火風一樣。

述曰：下面破斥各種句子中沒有實質障礙的法，也就是色根所取之物。即德句中的色、味、香、觸、聲五種，以及數等十種，業以及大有、俱分三種。因為它們具有色等性質，都是色根所取。這些無障礙的法，應該都是有障礙的，因為它們被認為是色根所取，就像地等四種一樣。這裡說的『認為』，表明大有等在我宗不認為是體性是有，以及色根所取。他們的論述是：根有五種，鼻根即地，舌根即水，眼根即火，皮根即風，耳根即空。這些在各種句子中被什麼法所攝持呢？由此可以正確理解，即真實句中空取聲的時候，在身上起作用，名為空耳根。而且十一種德對其各自的根一一簡略地都有一種量。如果兩兩結合，如果三三結合，乃至總的對各種根說量，其中的含義非常多。這裡文中總的來說，沒有簡略。

論：此外，他們所執著的……就像石女兒一樣。

述曰：這十句中，除了真實句之外，其餘八句的含義都是非真實的。然而這裡只取有體句，意在表明唯識，翻轉過來作為量。且想要除去真實句，破斥其餘八句。量云：非真實以及覺、樂等其餘德等八種有體句，應該不是離開識而有別的自性。你認為除了心等非真實句

【English Translation】 English version What is seen by the eye is because they are grasped by real entities, just like wind and so on. Here the sentence is abbreviated, but it does not refer to earth and so on. This is the meaning here. They do not say that earth and so on, as well as the three roots taken by the ear and so on, are taken, so here only seeing and touching are refuted.

Next is the third refutation, refuting reality and so on.

Treatise: Moreover, what they cling to... should be impermanent.

Commentary: In the meaning of the real sentence, whatever is obstructive and permanent, such as the ultimate particles of the parents of earth, water, fire, and wind, and the mind. Because they are obstructive, these five dharmas should be impermanent, because they are all obstructive, just like coarse earth and so on. Coarse earth and other dharmas, they themselves consider to be impermanent. The proposition, reason, analogy, etc., can be understood as stated in the text.

Treatise: In the meaning of various sentences... just like earth, water, fire, and wind.

Commentary: Below, refute the dharmas in various sentences that have no substantial obstacles, that is, what is taken by the color root. That is, the five of color, taste, smell, touch, and sound in the quality sentence, as well as the ten kinds such as number, karma, and the three of great existence and conjunction. Because they have the nature of color and so on, they are all taken by the color root. These unobstructed dharmas should all be obstructed, because they are considered to be taken by the color root, just like the four of earth and so on. The 'consider' here indicates that great existence and so on are not considered to be substantial existence in my school, and that they are taken by the color root. Their argument is: there are five roots, the nose root is earth, the tongue root is water, the eye root is fire, the skin root is wind, and the ear root is space. What dharma in these various sentences is grasped by? From this, it can be correctly understood that when space takes sound in the real sentence, it acts on the body and is called the space ear root. Moreover, the eleven qualities each have a measure in relation to their respective roots in a simplified manner. If two are combined, if three are combined, and even if the measure is generally spoken of in relation to various roots, the meaning is very much. Here in the text, in general, there is no simplification.

Treatise: Moreover, what they cling to... just like the son of a barren woman.

Commentary: Among these ten sentences, except for the real sentence, the meaning of the remaining eight sentences is unreal. However, here only the sentence with substance is taken, intending to indicate only consciousness, turning it over as a measure. And wanting to remove the real sentence and refute the remaining eight sentences. The measure says: the unreal and the remaining qualities such as sensation and pleasure, etc., the eight kinds of sentences with substance, should not have a separate nature apart from consciousness. You think that except for the unreal sentences such as mind, etc.

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攝故。如石女兒　石女兒無法。彼此不許識外有性。除心等言。簡覺等者。恐犯一分相符過故。文略不簡也　然佛法真如即識性故。亦非離識。無不定過。虛空．擇滅等理。非心外然假為喻。就他宗比量。又此中宗應云汝執。為簡所別不極成過。又因雖有他隨一過。謂實中火等非異德中觸。而就他宗為論。故無此過。故因簡略。應云汝許非實攝故。明自不許也。即是非實為因。破餘八句。一一別除為八比量。

次以非有為因破餘八句。

論。非有實等至如空花等。

述曰。不以非德等為因。以非有為因　此中示方隅令知多法一法不離於識。又有等是實等自性。故便舉之也。量云。非有性及覺樂等外余實等句。應非離識有別自性。許非有性之所攝故。如空花等。文略不簡覺．樂等也。此中簡略如前應知。此但除一有八比量。若二二除。若三三除。乃至除八句比量可知。前實等等多體法。今有等等一體法。又應別破九句。然多體法中以實為首。一體法中以有為初。例示余也。

次下第四別破有等性。

論。彼所執有至如實德等。

述曰。于中有三。一破大有。二難同異。三破和合　初中有四。此即初也。彼計實等有法之外。別計有一大有之效能有諸法。法若無此即體非有。如龜毛等

。故今破之。彼宗所執大有性者。應離實等八句之外無別自性。汝宗許是非無法故。如實．德等。等取業等。不言八句有不定過。或但言離三句亦得。其異句等非兩共成。無不定失。或遮決定相違。說八句勝。非無之因唯彼許于有性上有故。許言簡自隨一過。實等許非無離實等外無別有。有性許非無。應實等外無別有。難令實外無別有性。

又逐令離實等外即非有性。

論。若離實等至如畢竟等。

述曰。此中總因。若異二異三異四五乃至異八皆得。若異八一一有八比量。其二三等隨自計取。量云。若離實等八句之外。應非有性。汝許異實等故。如畢竟無等。等未生無等。彼宗除實以外。德等八句。及龜毛等。皆名異實。且以畢竟無為喻也。又今以八句義為有法。唯但以無為同法喻。

更復難令有性之上更應立有性。

論。如有非無至有別有性。

述曰。如有性非是無法有性無別有性有。實等亦非無如何別有有。立量云。汝有性。應別有有性。許非無故。如實．德等　此中因有不定。同異亦許體非無。不許有有故。彼非極成故無不定　又總取所難之中。此中簡過如前應知。已下所有比量簡過皆準可知。更不繁指。

次更逐令無法之上別有無性。

論。若離有法至有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此現在破斥它。對方宗派所執著的大有性（Maha Sattva，指普遍存在的有），應該在實體（Dravya）、屬性（Guna）等八句之外沒有其他的自性（Svalaksana，自身獨有的特性）。你們宗派承認非有是無法的，就像實體、屬性等一樣。（'等'字包括業等）。不說八句有不定的過失，或者只說離開三句也可以。因為異句等不是雙方共同承認的，所以沒有不定的過失。或者遮止決定相違，說八句殊勝。非有的原因只是他們承認在有性之上存在。承認的說法簡化了各自的過失。實體等承認非有，離開實體等之外沒有其他的有。有性承認非有，應該在實體等之外沒有其他的有。難以使實體之外沒有有性。 又進一步追問，離開實體等之外就不是有性。 論：如果離開實體等，就像畢竟無等。 述記：這裡是總的因。如果不同於二、不同於三、不同於四、五，乃至不同於八都可以。如果不同於八，一一都有八個比量。其中的二、三等，根據各自的計算選取。比量說：如果離開實體等八句之外，應該不是有性。你們承認不同於實體等，就像畢竟無等一樣。（'等'字包括未生無等）。對方宗派除了實體以外，屬性等八句，以及龜毛等，都叫做不同於實體。姑且以畢竟無作為比喻。現在以八句的意義作為有法，只以無作為同法喻。 更進一步追問，在有性之上更應該建立有性。 論：如有性不是無法，有性沒有其他的有性有。實體等也不是無，如何有其他的有。立量說：你的有性，應該有其他的有性。承認不是無的緣故，就像實體、屬性等。這裡的原因有不定。共同和不同的也承認體不是無，不承認有有性的緣故。他們不是極成，所以沒有不定。又總的選取所難之處。這裡的簡要說明過失如前所述應該知道。以下所有的比量的簡要說明過失都應該準此可知。不再繁瑣地指出了。 接下來進一步追問，在無法之上另外存在無性。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, now we refute it. The opponent's school holds that the great 'being-ness' (Maha Sattva, referring to universal existence) that they posit should have no other self-nature (Svalaksana, its own unique characteristic) apart from the eight categories of substance (Dravya), quality (Guna), etc. Your school admits that non-existence is non-entity, just like substance, quality, etc. (The 'etc.' includes action, etc.). It is not said that the eight categories have the fault of being indefinite, or it can be said that only departing from three categories is sufficient. Because different categories, etc., are not jointly established by both sides, there is no fault of indefiniteness. Or, refuting the definite contradiction, it is said that the eight categories are superior. The reason for non-existence is only that they admit it exists on 'being-ness'. Admitting the statement simplifies each other's faults. Substance, etc., admit non-existence, that apart from substance, etc., there is no other existence. 'Being-ness' admits non-existence, that apart from substance, etc., there should be no other existence. It is difficult to make it so that there is no 'being-ness' apart from substance. Furthermore, it is further questioned whether apart from substance, etc., it is not 'being-ness'. Treatise: If apart from substance, etc., like absolute non-existence, etc. Commentary: Here is the general cause. If it is different from two, different from three, different from four, five, up to different from eight, all are possible. If it is different from eight, each one has eight inferences. The two, three, etc., among them are selected according to their own calculations. The inference says: If apart from the eight categories of substance, etc., it should not be 'being-ness'. You admit that it is different from substance, etc., like absolute non-existence, etc. (The 'etc.' includes unborn non-existence, etc.). The opponent's school, apart from substance, the eight categories of quality, etc., and turtle hair, etc., are all called different from substance. Let's take absolute non-existence as a metaphor. Now, taking the meaning of the eight categories as the subject, only taking non-existence as the example of the same. It is further questioned whether 'being-ness' should be established on top of 'being-ness'. Treatise: If 'being-ness' is not non-entity, 'being-ness' has no other 'being-ness'. Substance, etc., are also not non-existence, how can there be other existence. Establishing the inference says: Your 'being-ness' should have other 'being-ness'. Because it is admitted that it is not non-existence, like substance, quality, etc. The reason here is indefinite. The common and different also admit that the substance is not non-existence, and do not admit that there is 'being-ness'. They are not fully established, so there is no indefiniteness. Also, generally selecting the difficult points. The brief explanation of the faults here should be known as mentioned before. All the brief explanations of the faults of the inferences below should be known accordingly. No longer pointing out in detail. Next, it is further questioned whether there is another non-being-ness on top of non-entity.

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別無性。

述曰。無性體非有。無上不立無。有法體非無。何須別立有。彼若言有法雖非無。不自有故須有有。亦應無法不自無。無法之外別立無。此責恒齊何方遣難。量云。汝第十句無法之外應別立性。因云。除大有．同異．和合等六句之外有無二法互相違故。如實．德業。

因中不言除大有等者。即有不定過。為如實．德等。與無互違故。無法之外更別立性。為如大有等。無法互違故。無法之外不別立性。故今簡言除有等六。

論。彼既不然至唯妄計度。

述曰。總結非之。彼無既更不別立性。然者有性應不爾。故彼有性唯妄計度。

子段第二難同異性。彼執同異是諸實．德等體性。非即實等此是多法故今破之。

論。又彼所執至如德業等。

述曰。實．德．業之性即是同異性。離實．德．業理定不然。勿者莫也。莫此同異性亦非同異性。總立量云。汝所執實．德．業性。應非實．德．業性。異實．德．業故。如和合等。

此中無有自言相違。以宗中言汝執簡故。非我許有實等之性。而今復言非實等性。今欲違此故無此過　然今宗中實．德．業三。其舉喻中復以德．業等而為喻者。此中應別簡云。汝之實性。應非實性。異實句故。如德業。汝德性。應非德性。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 別無自性。

述曰：『無自性』的本體並非『有』，至高無上的真理不建立在『無』上。『有法』的本體並非『無』，又何須另外建立一個『有』呢？如果他們說，『有法』雖然不是『無』，但因為不具有自性，所以需要一個『有』。那麼也應該說，『無法』不是自己就是『無』，在『無法』之外另外建立一個『無』。這種責難始終存在，如何消除疑問？可以這樣論證：你們的第十句『無法之外應別立性』。原因是：除了『大有』（Mahābhāva，指最大的存在）、『同異』（Sāmānya-viśeṣa，指共性和個性）、『和合』（Samavāya，指結合關係）等六句之外，『有』和『無』兩種法互相違背，就像『實』（Dravya，指實體）、『德』（Guṇa，指性質）、『業』（Karma，指活動）。

原因中沒有排除『大有』等，就有了『不定過』。因為像『實』、『德』等，與『無』互相違背，所以在『無法』之外另外建立自性。又像『大有』等，與『無法』互相違背，所以在『無法』之外不另外建立自性。所以現在簡要地說，排除『有』等六種情況。

論：他們既然不這樣認為，那麼就只是虛妄的計度。

述曰：總結並否定他們的觀點。既然他們不另外建立『無』的自性，那麼『有』的自性就不應該是那樣。所以他們的『有』的自性只是虛妄的計度。

子段第二，駁斥『同異』的自性。他們認為『同異』是諸如『實』、『德』等的本體自性，並非就是『實』等本身，因為這是多種法。所以現在駁斥它。

論：他們所執著的……就像『德』、『業』等。

述曰：『實』、『德』、『業』的自性就是『同異』的自性。離開『實』、『德』、『業』，道理上一定不成立。『勿』就是『不要』的意思。不要認為這個『同異』的自性也是『同異』的自性。總的來說，可以這樣論證：你們所執著的『實』、『德』、『業』的自性，應該不是『實』、『德』、『業』的自性，因為它與『實』、『德』、『業』相異，就像『和合』等。

這裡沒有自相矛盾的情況，因為宗中說了『你們所執著的』，進行了限定。不是我承認有『實』等的自性，而現在又說不是『實』等的自性。現在想要反駁這種觀點，所以沒有這種過失。然而現在宗中說了『實』、『德』、『業』三種，而舉例中又用『德』、『業』等作為比喻，這裡應該另外簡要地說：你們的『實』的自性，應該不是『實』的自性，因為它與『實』相異，就像『德』、『業』。你們的『德』的自性，應該不是『德』的自性。

【English Translation】 English version There is no separate self-nature.

Commentary: The essence of 'no self-nature' is not 'existence' (bhāva). The supreme truth is not established on 'non-existence' (abhāva). The essence of 'existent things' (bhāva-dharma) is not 'non-existence'. Why then is it necessary to separately establish 'existence'? If they say that although 'existent things' are not 'non-existence', because they do not have self-nature, they need an 'existence'. Then it should also be said that 'non-existent things' are not themselves 'non-existence', and a 'non-existence' is separately established outside of 'non-existent things'. This criticism is always present, how to eliminate the doubt? It can be argued as follows: Your tenth statement, 'a nature should be separately established outside of non-existence'. The reason is: Apart from the six statements of 'great existence' (Mahābhāva, referring to the greatest existence), 'similarity and difference' (Sāmānya-viśeṣa, referring to generality and particularity), 'inherence' (Samavāya, referring to the relationship of combination), etc., the two dharmas of 'existence' and 'non-existence' contradict each other, like 'substance' (Dravya, referring to entity), 'quality' (Guṇa, referring to property), 'activity' (Karma, referring to action).

Not excluding 'great existence' etc. in the reason leads to the fallacy of 'uncertainty'. Because like 'substance', 'quality', etc., contradict 'non-existence', so a self-nature is separately established outside of 'non-existence'. Also like 'great existence' etc., contradict 'non-existence', so a self-nature is not separately established outside of 'non-existence'. Therefore, now it is briefly said, excluding the six cases of 'existence' etc.

Treatise: Since they do not think so, then it is only false speculation.

Commentary: Summarizing and negating their view. Since they do not separately establish the self-nature of 'non-existence', then the self-nature of 'existence' should not be like that. Therefore, their self-nature of 'existence' is only false speculation.

Second sub-section, refuting the self-nature of 'similarity and difference'. They believe that 'similarity and difference' is the essential self-nature of things like 'substance', 'quality', etc., not the 'substance' etc. themselves, because this is multiple dharmas. So now refute it.

Treatise: What they adhere to... is like 'quality', 'activity', etc.

Commentary: The self-nature of 'substance', 'quality', 'activity' is the self-nature of 'similarity and difference'. Apart from 'substance', 'quality', 'activity', it is certainly not established in principle. 'Do not' means 'do not'. Do not think that this self-nature of 'similarity and difference' is also the self-nature of 'similarity and difference'. In general, it can be argued as follows: The self-nature of 'substance', 'quality', 'activity' that you adhere to should not be the self-nature of 'substance', 'quality', 'activity', because it is different from 'substance', 'quality', 'activity', like 'inherence' etc.

There is no self-contradiction here, because the subject says 'what you adhere to', which is limited. It is not that I admit that there is a self-nature of 'substance' etc., and now say that it is not the self-nature of 'substance' etc. Now I want to refute this view, so there is no such fault. However, now the subject says the three of 'substance', 'quality', 'activity', and in the example, 'quality', 'activity', etc. are used as metaphors, here it should be briefly said separately: Your self-nature of 'substance' should not be the self-nature of 'substance', because it is different from 'substance', like 'quality', 'activity'. Your self-nature of 'quality' should not be the self-nature of 'quality'.

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異德故。如實業。業亦應然。準可知也。更互為喻。然此有別而無總量。二合有三。三合有一。為量可知。此中所言實．德．業者。即是各別當句為宗。言實等性者。即是同異性故別也。文言如德．業。但舉實句之喻等取德喻。謂實．業等取業喻。謂實．德。

次又令實非實。德非德。業非業。

論。又應實等至如德業實等。

述曰。便破實等。非正所明。量云。實應非實。異實性故。如德．業。德．業更互相望為量如實可知。文言如德．業．實等者。舉實喻。謂德業于德喻中但舉于實等取業句。及等業喻。謂實．德也。文中宗等言皆簡略。但言實等應非實等。異實等性故。二三等合準前可解。

論。地等諸性至準此應知。

述曰。汝言地性。應非地性。異地故。如火等。火等一一相望亦爾。實中九種各各相望有九比量。德有二十四。業有五種。合三十八。返覆有七十六。各二二合三三合者乃有無量。第二準量云。地應非地。異地等性故。如火等。然豈不有違自宗失。何乃言地非地等耶。今者不然。此則應言汝所計地應非實地言簡別之。我宗之地。非實地故。是假立故。又非實句之中地故。彼計火等亦非實句地。無不定過。前量應簡別。文言略故也。

論。如實性等至無別實性

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為異於實（Sat，存在）的緣故。如實業（Satkarya，實在的果）一樣。業（Karma，行為）也應如此。可以類推得知。互相作為比喻。然而這有區別而沒有總量。二者結合有三種情況。三者結合有一種情況。作為量可以得知。這裡所說的實、德（Guna， गुण，性質）、業，就是各自作為當句的宗（Paksha， पक्ष，論題）。說實等性，就是因為同異的性質而有所區別。文中的措辭如德、業。只是舉出實句的比喻等，取德的比喻。說實、業等，取業的比喻。說實、德。 接下來又說，令實（Sat，存在）非實，德（Guna， गुण，性質）非德，業（Karma，行為）非業。 論：又應實等至如德業實等。 述曰：這是爲了破斥實等，並非真正要闡明的。量（Pramana， प्रमाण，量）說：實應非實，因為異於實性。如德、業。德、業更互相望作為量，如實可以得知。文中的措辭如德、業、實等，是舉實的比喻。說德業，在德的比喻中，只是舉出實等，取業句。以及等業的比喻，說實、德。文中宗等的言辭都比較簡略。只是說實等應非實等，因為異於實等性。二三等結合，可以參照前面來理解。 論：地等諸性至準此應知。 述曰：你說地性，應非地性，因為異於地。如火等。火等一一互相望也是如此。在實中，九種事物各自互相望，有九個比量。德有二十四種，業有五種，合起來有三十八種。正反過來有七十六種。各自二二結合、三三結合，乃至於有無量種情況。第二個準量說：地應非地，因為異於地等性。如火等。然而難道沒有違背自己宗派的過失嗎？為什麼說地非地等呢？現在不是這樣。這應該說，你所認為的地，應非真實的地，用簡略的言辭來區別它。我宗派的地，並非真實的地，是假立的緣故。又因為不是實句中的地。他們所認為的火等，也不是實句中的地。沒有不定的過失。前面的量應該加以簡別。因為文辭簡略的緣故。 論：如實性等至無別實性。

【English Translation】 English version: Because it is different from Sat (existence). Like Satkarya (real effect). Karma (action) should also be like that. It can be known by analogy. They serve as metaphors for each other. However, there is a distinction here and no total quantity. The combination of two has three situations. The combination of three has one situation. It can be known as a measure. What is said here about Sat, Guna (quality), and Karma, each serves as the Paksha (thesis) of the respective sentence. Saying 'Sat-ness, etc.' is different because of the nature of sameness and difference. The wording in the text is like 'Guna, Karma'. It only cites the metaphor of the Sat sentence, taking the metaphor of Guna. Saying 'Sat, Karma, etc.' takes the metaphor of Karma. Saying 'Sat, Guna'. Next, it is said again, let Sat (existence) be non-Sat, Guna (quality) be non-Guna, and Karma (action) be non-Karma. Treatise: Again, it should be Sat, etc. to like Guna Karma Sat, etc. Commentary: This is to refute Sat, etc., not what is truly to be clarified. The Pramana (means of valid cognition) says: Sat should be non-Sat, because it is different from Sat-ness. Like Guna, Karma. Guna, Karma, looking at each other as a measure, can be known as Sat. The wording in the text is like 'Guna, Karma, Sat, etc.', citing the metaphor of Sat. Saying Guna Karma, in the metaphor of Guna, it only cites Sat, etc., taking the Karma sentence. And the metaphor of equal Karma, saying Sat, Guna. The words of Paksha, etc. in the text are all abbreviated. It only says that Sat, etc. should be non-Sat, etc., because it is different from Sat-ness, etc. The combination of two, three, etc. can be understood by referring to the previous. Treatise: The nature of earth, etc. should be known according to this. Commentary: You say earth-ness, it should be non-earth-ness, because it is different from earth. Like fire, etc. Fire, etc., looking at each other one by one, is also like that. In Sat, the nine kinds of things, looking at each other, have nine inferences. Guna has twenty-four kinds, Karma has five kinds, totaling thirty-eight kinds. Reversing them has seventy-six kinds. The combination of two and two, the combination of three and three, even have countless situations. The second quasi-measure says: Earth should be non-earth, because it is different from earth-ness, etc. Like fire, etc. However, isn't there a fault of violating one's own tenet? Why say earth is non-earth, etc.? Now it is not like that. This should say, the earth that you consider should be non-real earth, using concise words to distinguish it. The earth of my tenet is not real earth, because it is hypothetically established. Also, because it is not earth in a real sentence. The fire, etc. that they consider is also not earth in a real sentence. There is no indefinite fault. The previous measure should be distinguished. Because the wording is abbreviated. Treatise: Like Sat-ness, etc. to no separate Sat-ness.

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等。

述曰。難令離實等無同異性。量云。實等之外。應無同異性。非唯一故。如同異性。如實性等無別實等性。實等亦應無別實性等。等德等性遮令同異有同異性。其實等性應更有實等性。非一法故。如實等法　實性者同異性也。然實等各異。義相似實等之外別立實等性。實等之性相似亦非一。應更別立實等性。相似之言簡不相似。此即以性同實等例。若總．若別皆有比量。此中但有總而無別。別數如前。然文唯有以性同實例。無以實同性例。若破六句義即無違。若破十句有不定失。異．有能等非一相似。無別性故。今者亦以為所立中。應令別有性。例同於實等亦無過也。又非極成法。無不定失。

論。若離實等至有非實等性。

述曰。自下又以非實例實等難。謂離實等外別有實等性。應離非實等外立有非實等性。且如除實．德．業以外併名非實．非德．非業。即餘六句．及無法是。有體法者唯六句是。今言七句應有非實性。異實性故。如德．業。德．業相望亦爾。又雖知德等皆名非實。其性即是非實性攝。然合八句皆非實性及與無法。無別有一大非實性總該九法故為量也。量云。除實餘九。應別有一總性。實非實中隨一攝故。如實句　此量雖成。然可直例不令立實性。何須令立非實性也。便違

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

述曰：難以使『實』（Dravya，實體）等離開其同異性。量式如下：在『實』等之外，應該沒有同異性，因為它們不是唯一的，如同同異性本身一樣。如果『實性』（Dravyatva，實體性）等沒有與『實』等不同的『實性』，那麼『實』等也應該沒有與『實性』等不同的性質。用『等德』（Guna，屬性）的『等性』（性質）來遮止『同異』具有『同異性』。那麼，『實』等的『實性』應該還有其他的『實性』，因為它們不是單一的法（Dharma，事物），如同『實』等法一樣。『實性』就是『同異性』。然而，『實』等各自不同，意義相似，所以在『實』等之外另立『實等性』。『實』等的性質相似，也不是單一的，應該另外建立『實等性』。『相似』一詞也涵蓋了不相似的情況。這就像用性質與『實』等相同來舉例。無論是總的還是別的，都有比量（Anumana，推論）。這裡只有總的比量而沒有別的比量，別的數量如前所述。然而，文中只有用性質與『實』等相同來舉例，沒有用『實』與『性』相同來舉例。如果破斥六句義，就沒有違背；如果破斥十句義，就會有不定過失。『異』（Bheda，差異）、『有能』（Samarthya，能力）等不是單一的相似，因為沒有別的性質。現在也認為在所立中，應該另外有性質，例如與『實』等相同，也沒有過錯。又因為不是極成法（絕對成立的法），所以沒有不定過失。

論：如果離開『實』等，直到有『非實等性』。

述曰：下面又用『非實』的實例來反駁『實』等。意思是說，如果離開『實』等之外另有『實等性』，那麼應該離開『非實』等之外，建立『非實等性』。例如，除了『實』、『德』、『業』（Karma，活動）以外，都稱為『非實』、『非德』、『非業』，也就是其餘的六句以及『無法』（Abhava，不存在）。有體法只有六句。現在說七句應該有『非實性』，因為它與『實性』不同，如同『德』、『業』一樣。『德』、『業』相互比較也是如此。又雖然知道『德』等都稱為『非實』，但它們的性質就是『非實性』所包含的。然而，總共八句都是『非實性』以及『無法』，沒有另外一個大的『非實性』總括這九法，所以作為量式。量式如下：除了『實』以外的其餘九句，應該另外有一個總的性質，因為它包含在『實』或『非實』中的一個，如同『實句』。雖然這個量式成立，但可以直接舉例而不必建立『實性』，何必建立『非實性』呢？這就違背了。

【English Translation】 English version:

Statement: It is difficult to make 'Dravya' (substance) etc. separate from their identity and difference. The logical formula (Anumana) is as follows: Outside of 'Dravya' etc., there should be no identity and difference, because they are not unique, just like identity and difference themselves. If 'Dravyatva' (substantiality) etc. do not have 'Dravyatva' different from 'Dravya' etc., then 'Dravya' etc. should also not have properties different from 'Dravyatva' etc. Using the 'sameness' (nature) of 'Guna' (quality) etc. to prevent 'identity and difference' from having 'identity and difference'. Then, the 'Dravyatva' of 'Dravya' etc. should have other 'Dravyatva', because they are not a single Dharma (entity), just like 'Dravya' etc. Dharma. 'Dravyatva' is 'identity and difference'. However, 'Dravya' etc. are different from each other, and their meanings are similar, so 'Dravyatva' is established separately outside of 'Dravya' etc. The nature of 'Dravya' etc. is similar, and it is not unique, so 'Dravyatva' should be established separately. The word 'similar' also covers dissimilar situations. This is like using the example of the nature being the same as 'Dravya' etc. Whether it is general or specific, there is inference (Anumana). Here, there is only general inference and no specific inference, and the number of specific inferences is as mentioned before. However, the text only uses the example of the nature being the same as 'Dravya' etc., and does not use the example of 'Dravya' being the same as 'nature'. If the meaning of the six categories is refuted, there is no contradiction; if the meaning of the ten categories is refuted, there will be an uncertain fault. 'Bheda' (difference), 'Samarthya' (capability), etc. are not uniquely similar because there is no other nature. Now, it is also considered that in what is to be established, there should be another nature, for example, being the same as 'Dravya' etc., and there is no fault. Also, because it is not an absolutely established Dharma, there is no uncertain fault.

Treatise: If separated from 'Dravya' etc., until there is 'non-Dravya-ness' etc.

Statement: Below, the example of 'non-Dravya' is used to refute 'Dravya' etc. The meaning is that if there is 'Dravyatva' separately from 'Dravya' etc., then 'non-Dravyatva' should be established separately from 'non-Dravya' etc. For example, everything other than 'Dravya', 'Guna', and 'Karma' (action) is called 'non-Dravya', 'non-Guna', and 'non-Karma', which are the remaining six categories and 'Abhava' (non-existence). Only the six categories are entities with substance. Now, it is said that the seven categories should have 'non-Dravyatva' because it is different from 'Dravyatva', just like 'Guna' and 'Karma'. The comparison between 'Guna' and 'Karma' is also the same. Also, although it is known that 'Guna' etc. are all called 'non-Dravya', their nature is included in 'non-Dravyatva'. However, all eight categories are 'non-Dravyatva' and 'Abhava', and there is no other large 'non-Dravyatva' that encompasses these nine Dharmas, so it is used as a logical formula. The logical formula is as follows: The remaining nine categories other than 'Dravya' should have another general nature, because it is included in either 'Dravya' or 'non-Dravya', just like the 'Dravya category'. Although this logical formula is established, it can be directly exemplified without establishing 'Dravyatva'. Why establish 'non-Dravyatva'? This contradicts.

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自宗。若不爾者。即一德上他說亦有非實性。故犯相符過。非德等性例亦應然。故論言等。

論。彼既不爾至唯假施設。

述曰。總結非也。彼非實既不爾。更無非實性。實等云何然。更有實等性。故同異性。唯假施設。

論。又彼所執至如畢竟無。

述曰。自下子段第三破和合句義。我佛法中法不相違假立和合。然彼所執別有一法。是實。是常。能和合法。能令實等不離相屬。相離不相屬。即不和合故破之。量云。如彼所執和合句義。定非實有。許非是有性及非實等八句諸法攝故。如畢竟無。即兔角等。體是一法舉非有為因。體是多法舉非實為首。故因中言非有實等。又性體別故。此中宗因皆有所簡如前可知。

有彼本許六句義者。前之五句現量所得。十句義中實．德．業．有．俱分現量所得。其此和合非現量得。故今破之。

論。彼許實等至而可實有。

述曰。彼計實等現量所得。分明證故。如前徴詰。尚非實有。牒前所非。況彼自許和合句義非現量得。不分明證。可是實有。

雖復非有遭此難已若復說言。

論。設執和合至亦非實有。

述曰。若執和合亦現量得。如前實等道理破之亦非實有。量云。和合性。非實有。實等十句隨一攝故。如實．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 自宗（Sva-tantra）。如果不是這樣，那麼在一個『德』（guna）上說其他『德』也具有非真實性，因此會犯『相符過』（samānādhikaraṇatā-doṣa）。非『德』等『性』（dharma）的例子也應該如此。所以論中說『等』。

論：既然他們不這樣認為，那麼就只是假施設。

述記：總結說不是這樣。既然那個非實有不是這樣，就沒有非真實性。真實等怎麼會是這樣呢？哪裡還有真實等『性』（dharma）呢？所以同異『性』（dharma）只是假施設。

論：此外，他們所執著的，就像畢竟沒有一樣。

述記：從下面開始，子段第三，破斥和合句義。我佛法中，諸法不相違背，假立和合。然而他們所執著的，是另外一個法，是真實的，是常恒的，能夠和合法，能夠使真實等不離相屬，相離就不相屬，即不和合，所以破斥它。量式是：就像他們所執著的和合句義，必定不是實有，因為它被允許包含在非有性以及非實等八句諸法中。就像畢竟沒有一樣，即兔角等。體是一個法，舉非有作為因；體是多個法，舉非實作為首。所以因中說非有實等。又因為『性』（dharma）和『體』（svabhāva）不同，所以此中宗和因都有所簡別，如前可知。

有人本來允許六句義，之前的五句是現量所得。十句義中，實（sat）、德（guna）、業（karma）、有（bhāva）、俱分（avayava）是現量所得。而這個和合不是現量所得，所以現在破斥它。

論：他們認為真實等是現量所得，因為有分明的證據，所以是真實有。

述記：他們認為真實等是現量所得，因為有分明的證據。就像前面征詰的那樣，尚且不是實有，重複前面所否定的。何況他們自己認為和合句義不是現量所得，沒有分明的證據，怎麼可能是實有呢？

即使非有遭到這樣的詰難，如果又說：

論：假設執著和合也是現量所得，那麼也不是實有。

述記：如果執著和合也是現量所得，那麼就像前面真實等那樣，用同樣的道理破斥它，也不是實有。量式是：和合『性』（dharma），不是實有，因為它被包含在真實等十句中的一個，就像真實一樣。

【English Translation】 English version Sva-tantra (Self-sufficient). If it were not so, then saying that other 'gunas' (qualities) also have non-reality on one 'guna' (quality) would commit the fault of 'samānādhikaraṇatā-doṣa' (the fallacy of co-referentiality). The example of non-'guna' (quality) like 'dharmas' (properties) should also be the same. Therefore, the treatise says 'etc.'

Treatise: Since they do not think so, then it is only a provisional designation.

Commentary: Concluding that it is not so. Since that non-real is not so, there is no non-reality. How can reality etc. be so? Where else is there reality etc. 'dharma' (property)? Therefore, sameness and difference 'dharma' (property) are only provisional designations.

Treatise: Moreover, what they hold is like utter non-existence.

Commentary: From below, the third sub-section, refuting the meaning of the aggregate phrase. In my Buddha-dharma, dharmas do not contradict each other, and aggregation is provisionally established. However, what they hold is another dharma, which is real, permanent, able to aggregate dharmas, and able to make reality etc. inseparably related; separation means non-relation, which means non-aggregation, so it is refuted. The inference is: like the meaning of the aggregate phrase they hold, it is certainly not real, because it is allowed to be included in the dharmas of non-existence and the eight phrases such as non-reality. Like utter non-existence, i.e., rabbit horns etc. The entity is one dharma, citing non-existence as the cause; the entity is multiple dharmas, citing non-reality as the head. Therefore, in the cause, it is said non-existence, reality etc. Also, because 'dharma' (property) and 'svabhāva' (essence) are different, the subject and cause in this are both simplified, as can be known before.

Some originally allow six phrase meanings, the previous five phrases are obtained by direct perception. Among the ten phrase meanings, sat (reality), guna (quality), karma (action), bhāva (existence), avayava (parts) are obtained by direct perception. But this aggregation is not obtained by direct perception, so now it is refuted.

Treatise: They think that reality etc. are obtained by direct perception, because there is clear evidence, so they are real.

Commentary: They think that reality etc. are obtained by direct perception, because there is clear evidence. Just like the previous questioning, it is not even real, repeating the previous negation. Moreover, they themselves think that the meaning of the aggregate phrase is not obtained by direct perception, there is no clear evidence, how can it be real?

Even if non-existence encounters such difficulties, if it is said again:

Treatise: Suppose holding that aggregation is also obtained by direct perception, then it is also not real.

Commentary: If holding that aggregation is also obtained by direct perception, then like the previous reality etc., using the same reasoning to refute it, it is also not real. The inference is: aggregation 'dharma' (property), is not real, because it is included in one of the ten phrases such as reality, just like reality.

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德等。實德等前已破故。故得為量。此破轉計亦現量得。

上來總別破訖。自下結歸唯識之門而復總破。

論。然彼實等至如龜毛等。

述曰。自下第五總破六句。然彼計無非離識有。故但破九。初破實等離識自體竟不可得。次破緣實等智。非是緣實等現量智。初比量云。彼計實等。是有法也。非是緣離識實有自體之現量所得。是法也。合名為宗。汝許是所知故。如龜毛等　此無異喻。彼宗計此實．德等句。是緣識外實有自體現量所得。故今非之。現量者能緣也。此中遮非是緣離識外境自體現量智之所得。非是緣不離識境假有自體現量所得。義雖是緣不離識境心等所得。非必現量所得故。其實等句義。彼宗說是離識有體。能緣彼心是名現量。彼實等句是此現量所得。謂實等句義。是離識實有自體之現量所得。今者非之。復言緣者恐濫持業釋。言其離識實有自體。即是現量。若以離識實有自體。屬其能緣現量者。即彼此二宗一切心．心所法。亦非離識實有自體。覺等即是心．心所故。犯違宗過。為簡此過故說緣言顯依士釋。緣顯能緣。非離識有體實等句義之現量得。又若不言緣即無所簡。其覺．樂等亦入法中。即有一分相符之失。彼亦說為不離識現量得故。由此應合實等句義總為二分。謂彼覺等心．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本德等。（實德等之前已經被破斥，所以可以作為量。）這種破斥轉計也是現量所得。

上來總的、分別的破斥完畢。下面總結歸於唯識之門，再次總的破斥。

論：然而他們所說的實等，就像龜毛等一樣。

述曰：下面第五個總的破斥六句。然而他們所計的無不是離開識而有的，所以只破斥九句。首先破斥實等離開識的自體最終不可得。其次破斥緣實等的智慧，不是緣實等的現量智。最初的比量是：他們所計的實等，是有法（dharmin）也。不是緣離開識的實有自體的現量所得，是法（dharma）也。合起來名為宗（paksha）。你許可是所知（prameya）的緣故，就像龜毛等。這沒有異喻（vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta）。他們宗派認為這個實、德等句，是緣識外實有自體的現量所得，所以現在否定它。現量是能緣（ālambana）也。這裡遮止的不是緣不離識外境自體現量智的所得，不是緣不離識境假有自體現量所得。意義上雖然是緣不離識境心等所得，但並非一定是現量所得。其實等句的意義，他們宗派說是離開識有體。能緣彼心名為現量。彼實等句是此現量所得。說實等句義，是離開識實有自體的現量所得。現在否定它。再說『緣』是爲了避免持業釋（karmadhāraya-samāsa）的混淆，說其離開識實有自體，就是現量。如果把離開識實有自體，歸屬於能緣現量，那麼彼此二宗一切心、心所法，也不是離開識實有自體，覺等就是心、心所的緣故，犯了違宗過（svasiddhānta-virodha）。爲了避免這個過失，所以說『緣』字，顯示依士釋（tad-dhita）。緣顯示能緣，不是離開識有體實等句義的現量得。又如果不說『緣』，就沒有所簡別，其覺、樂等也進入法中，就有一部分相符的失誤。他們也說是為不離識現量得的緣故。由此應該把實等句義總分為二分，說彼覺等心。

【English Translation】 English version Qualities, etc. (Since realities, qualities, etc., have already been refuted, they can be taken as the subject of the inference.) This refutation of the transferred thesis is also known through direct perception.

Having completed the general and specific refutations above, we now summarize and return to the Yogācāra school, and again offer a general refutation.

Treatise: However, their asserted realities, etc., are like turtle hair, etc.

Commentary: Below, the fifth section offers a general refutation of the six categories. However, their assertions are all based on things existing apart from consciousness, so only nine are refuted. First, the reality, etc., as self-existent entities apart from consciousness, are ultimately unattainable. Second, the wisdom that cognizes realities, etc., is not a direct perception of realities, etc. The initial inference is: Their asserted realities, etc., are the subject (dharmin). It is not obtained through direct perception of a self-existent entity apart from consciousness; this is the property (dharma). The combination is called the thesis (paksha). You accept that it is knowable (prameya), like turtle hair, etc. This has no counter-example (vaidharmya-dṛṣṭānta). Their school asserts that these categories of reality, quality, etc., are obtained through direct perception of a self-existent entity existing outside of consciousness. Therefore, we now negate it. Direct perception is the object (ālambana). Here, what is being refuted is not the direct perception of a self-existent entity existing apart from consciousness, nor is it the direct perception of a conditionally existent entity not apart from consciousness. Although in meaning it is obtained through the mind, etc., of a realm not apart from consciousness, it is not necessarily obtained through direct perception. The meaning of the categories of reality, etc., is said by their school to be entities existing apart from consciousness. The mind that cognizes them is called direct perception. These categories of reality, etc., are obtained through this direct perception. Saying that the meaning of the categories of reality, etc., is obtained through direct perception of a self-existent entity existing apart from consciousness. Now we negate it. Saying 'cognition' is to avoid confusion with the karmadhāraya-samāsa (appositional compound), saying that its self-existent entity existing apart from consciousness is direct perception. If the self-existent entity existing apart from consciousness is attributed to the cognizing direct perception, then all minds and mental factors of both schools would also not be self-existent entities existing apart from consciousness, because awareness, etc., are minds and mental factors, thus committing the fault of self-contradiction (svasiddhānta-virodha). To avoid this fault, the word 'cognition' is used, showing the tad-dhita (possessive compound). Cognition shows the cognizer, not the direct perception of the meaning of the categories of reality, etc., as entities existing apart from consciousness. Also, if 'cognition' is not said, there would be nothing to distinguish, and awareness, pleasure, etc., would also enter into the property, resulting in a partial agreement. They also say that it is obtained through direct perception not apart from consciousness. Therefore, the meaning of the categories of reality, etc., should be divided into two parts, saying that their awareness, etc., are minds.

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心所法總為一分。除此以外法為一分。其能緣法總為三分。一唯緣實等非心心所法。二唯緣覺等心心所法。三合二為境。若論說言然彼實等非唯緣離識實有自體現量所得。為簡德中覺等不離心故。恐犯違宗及相符故。說唯字者。簡別緣實等。可置唯字通緣二者。即簡不盡。以覺．樂等亦從實等。是離識實有自體。現量所得。實等亦從覺等。是不離識。實有自體。現量得故。今為簡盡但應總言非緣離識等。其總緣者亦所簡故。為簡如是種種過失。故但說緣不言唯等。此中總為但有一量。準能緣智各別有九比量。若二二．三三合義準應知。

論。又緣實智至如德智等。

述曰。第二量云。緣實之智。非緣離識實句自體現量智攝。假合生故。如德智等。彼計緣實智生之時。假合生者。謂緣九實．及大有。及異隨所有德。同異等實性。發生此智。然德智等皆假合生。亦緣多法假合生故。即非緣實現量智攝。緣實之智亦假合生。應非緣實現量之智。若作此解。無獨緣德等智可以為喻。必合緣故。有及和合等必有所有及所合故。不作此解。緣大有和合之智非假合生。由是理故今更解。先假合生者顯藉多法。藉因托緣智方生故。謂如意緣實時。藉我及合德法非法行等因緣。方生緣于實句。其德智亦爾。有及和合亦爾。許

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 心所法總共分為一部分。除此之外的法分為另一部分。能夠作為所緣的法總共分為三部分：第一種只緣實等非心心所法（dharma that are not mental events or mental factors, such as matter），第二種只緣覺等心心所法（mental events and mental factors, such as feelings），第三種則兼緣二者。如果按照（經文）所說，那麼那些實等（reality etc.）並非僅僅是緣于離開識而真實存在的自體的現量所得（direct perception）。爲了區分德（qualities）中的覺等（feelings etc.）不離心（mind）的特性，避免犯下違背宗義和與宗義相符的過失，所以才說『唯』字。這個『唯』字是爲了區分緣實等（reality etc.）的情況。可以把『唯』字放在能普遍緣二者的（情況）中，這樣就不能完全區分，因為覺（feelings）、樂（pleasure）等也來自於實等（reality etc.），是離開識而真實存在的自體，通過現量所得。實等（reality etc.）也來自於覺等（feelings etc.），是不離識的，是真實存在的自體，通過現量所得。現在爲了完全區分，應該總的說『非緣離識等』。因為總緣的情況也被區分了。爲了避免像這樣的種種過失，所以只說『緣』，而不說『唯』等。這裡總的來說只有一種量（pramana, valid cognition）。按照能緣的智慧各自有九種比量（anumana, inference）來算，如果二二、三三結合，其中的含義應該知道。 論：又緣實智至如德智等。 述曰：第二量云：緣實之智，非緣離識實句自體現量智攝。假合生故，如德智等。彼計緣實智生之時，假合生者。謂緣九實．及大有。及異隨所有德。同異等實性。發生此智。然德智等皆假合生。亦緣多法假合生故。即非緣實現量智攝。緣實之智亦假合生。應非緣實現量之智。若作此解。無獨緣德等智可以為喻。必合緣故。有及和合等必有所有及所合故。不作此解。緣大有和合之智非假合生。由是理故今更解。先假合生者顯藉多法。藉因托緣智方生故。謂如意緣實時。藉我及合德法非法行等因緣。方生緣于實句。其德智亦爾。有及和合亦爾。許

【English Translation】 English version Mental factors (citta-caitta) are generally one category. Dharmas other than these are another category. Dharmas that can be objects of cognition are generally divided into three categories: The first only cognizes realities (satya) etc., which are not mental events or mental factors (non-citta-caitta dharmas). The second only cognizes feelings (vedana) etc., which are mental events and mental factors (citta-caitta dharmas). The third cognizes both. If we follow the statement, then those realities (satya) etc. are not merely obtained through direct perception (pratyaksha) of their own self-nature that exists independently of consciousness (vijnana). To distinguish the feelings (vedana) etc. within qualities (guna) as not separate from the mind, and to avoid the faults of contradicting or conforming to the doctrine, the word 'only' (eva) is used. This 'only' distinguishes the cognition of realities (satya) etc. The 'only' could be placed in the case of universally cognizing both, but this would not be a complete distinction, because feelings (vedana), pleasure (sukha), etc., also originate from realities (satya) etc., and are self-existent entities apart from consciousness, obtained through direct perception. Realities (satya) etc. also originate from feelings (vedana) etc., and are not separate from consciousness, being self-existent entities obtained through direct perception. Now, for the sake of complete distinction, it should be generally stated as 'not cognizing entities separate from consciousness, etc.' Because the case of universally cognizing is also being distinguished. To avoid such various faults, only 'cognizing' is stated, without saying 'only' etc. Here, in general, there is only one valid cognition (pramana). According to the nine types of inference (anumana) for each cognizing wisdom, the meaning of combining two-two or three-three should be understood. Treatise: Furthermore, the wisdom cognizing reality extends to the wisdom of qualities, etc. Commentary: The second valid cognition states: The wisdom cognizing reality is not included in the direct perception of the self-nature of the real entity separate from consciousness, because it arises from a composite. For example, the wisdom of qualities, etc. They consider that when the wisdom cognizing reality arises, it arises from a composite. That is, this wisdom arises by cognizing the nine realities, the great existence, and the qualities that differ according to their properties, such as similarity and difference. However, the wisdom of qualities, etc., all arise from composites, because they also cognize many dharmas arising from composites. Therefore, they are not included in the direct perception of reality. The wisdom cognizing reality also arises from a composite, and therefore should not be the wisdom of direct perception of reality. If this explanation is made, there is no wisdom that solely cognizes qualities, etc., that can be used as an example, because it necessarily cognizes composites. Existence and combination, etc., necessarily have what exists and what is combined. If this explanation is not made, the wisdom cognizing the combination of great existence does not arise from a composite. Therefore, for this reason, we now explain further. The former 'arising from a composite' indicates relying on many dharmas. Because wisdom arises by relying on causes and conditions. For example, when the mind cognizes reality, it relies on the causes and conditions of self, the dharma of combined qualities, non-dharma actions, etc., to arise the cognition of the real entity. The wisdom of qualities is also like this. Existence and combination are also like this. It is permitted.

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有別緣有及和合以為境者。然不要與實．德等境合方能緣之。以能緣智藉多法起。名假合生無過失也。前解境必有多方能生智。后解境可唯一。藉多緣生。名假合生。彼家所計。緣實之智。即是緣于離識之外實之現量。今正非之。此智非是緣離識之實現量智義也。

論。廣說乃至至如實智等。

述曰。此為例破。如文可知。此破六句故至和合。義及九句一一為之。並前有九。若二合等準前應思。前破境實非緣離識現量所得。今意正破緣離識實等智非現量智。意明前實是非緣離識境之現量所得。后實智非是緣離識境之現量智攝。其眼識等雖緣多色假合而生。非緣實智。無不定失。前說和合非現量得。今遮現量者意。故不相違。準此知。境六皆現量得　又解境據本計破五非現量所得。智據末計破六非現量智。影互顯也。

論。故勝論者至妄所施設。

述曰。此即第三總結非也。意明唯識心所變作故。是妄情之所施設。

自下第三破事大自在天等執。即不平等因計也。若言莫醯伊濕伐羅。是大自在天。若長言摩醯伊濕伐羅。是事大自在天者。如言佛陀是覺者。若言抱徒憨是事佛者。今破事大自在天者執。彼計此天法身遍常。身如空量。無別居處。其變化身別有住處。

論。有執有一至

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 對於以別緣、有及和合作為所緣境的情況，並非一定要與實、德等境結合才能緣取。因為能緣的智慧是憑藉多種法產生的，稱為假合生起並沒有過失。之前的解釋是，境必須具備多種條件才能產生智慧；之後的解釋是，境可以只有一個，憑藉多種因緣生起，稱為假合生起。他們所認為的緣實之智，就是緣于離開識之外的真實的現量。現在正是要否定這一點，這種智慧並非是緣離識之實的現量智的含義。 論：廣泛地說，乃至如實智等。 述記：這是用例子來破斥，如文中所說的那樣可以理解。這裡破斥了六句，所以說到和合。義以及九句，一一都這樣破斥。加上前面的，共有九種情況。如果兩種事物結合等情況，可以參照前面的思路來思考。前面破斥的是境的真實性並非緣離識的現量所得。現在的意思是著重破斥緣離識的實等智並非現量智。意思是說明前面的實並非緣離識境的現量所得，後面的實智並非是緣離識境的現量智所攝。眼識等雖然緣取多種色法假合而生，但並非緣取實智，沒有不確定的過失。前面說和合不是現量所得，現在遮止現量，意思是不相違背。根據這個可以知道，境的六種情況都是現量所得。又一種解釋是，境根據他們原本的計度，破斥五種情況不是現量所得；智根據他們最終的計度，破斥六種情況不是現量智。相互映襯。 論：所以勝論者乃至妄所施設。 述記：這是第三個總結，表示否定。意思是說明唯識心所變現出來的，所以是虛妄情識所施設的。 從下面開始，第三個部分是破斥事大自在天（Maheśvara，印度教神祇）等的執著，也就是不平等因的計度。如果說莫醯伊濕伐羅（Maheśvara）是大自在天，如果長音說是摩醯伊濕伐羅（Maheśvara），是事大自在天，就像說佛陀（Buddha，覺悟者）是覺者，如果說抱徒憨是事佛一樣。現在破斥事大自在天的執著。他們認為此天的法身遍佈常恒，身體像虛空一樣廣大，沒有特定的居處，他的變化身另外有住處。 論：有人執著有一個...

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding situations where separate causes, existence, and combination are taken as objects, it is not necessary to combine with objects like substance and quality to apprehend them. This is because the cognizing wisdom arises through multiple dharmas, and calling it a 'hypothetical arising' is not a fault. The previous explanation is that the object must have multiple aspects to generate wisdom; the later explanation is that the object can be singular, arising through multiple conditions, called 'hypothetical arising.' What they consider the wisdom that cognizes reality is the direct perception of reality apart from consciousness. Now, this is precisely what is being negated; this wisdom is not the meaning of direct perception of reality apart from consciousness. Treatise: Broadly speaking, even up to true wisdom, etc. Commentary: This is an example of refutation, which can be understood as stated in the text. Here, six statements are refuted, hence the mention of combination. Meaning and the nine statements, each is refuted in this way. Adding the previous ones, there are nine situations in total. If two things combine, etc., one should think according to the previous line of reasoning. Previously, it was refuted that the reality of the object is not obtained through direct perception apart from consciousness. The current intention is to emphatically refute that the wisdom that cognizes reality, etc., apart from consciousness is not direct perception. The intention is to clarify that the previous reality is not obtained through direct perception of an object apart from consciousness, and the later true wisdom is not included in the direct perception of an object apart from consciousness. Although eye consciousness, etc., arise from the hypothetical combination of multiple colors, they do not cognize true wisdom, without the fault of uncertainty. The previous statement that combination is not obtained through direct perception, and the current prevention of direct perception, are not contradictory. According to this, it can be known that all six aspects of the object are obtained through direct perception. Another explanation is that the object, according to their original calculation, refutes that five aspects are not obtained through direct perception; wisdom, according to their final calculation, refutes that six aspects are not direct perception. They mutually highlight each other. Treatise: Therefore, the Vaiseṣika (a school of Indian philosophy) and even what is falsely constructed. Commentary: This is the third summary, indicating negation. The intention is to clarify that what is transformed by the mind-only is falsely constructed by emotional consciousness. From below, the third part is refuting the attachment to Maheśvara (a Hindu deity) and others, which is the calculation of unequal causes. If one says Maheśvara is the Great自在天 (Great自在天), if one says Mahéśvara with a long vowel, it is the 事大自在天 (Supreme Great自在天), just as saying Buddha (the awakened one) is the awakened one, if one says 'Bao Tu Han' is a follower of Buddha. Now refuting the attachment to 事大自在天 (Supreme Great自在天). They believe that this deity's Dharmakaya (body of essence) is pervasive and eternal, the body is as vast as space, without a specific dwelling place, and his transformation body has a separate dwelling place. Treatise: Some are attached to one...

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能生諸法。

述曰。此中有二。初敘。后非。大自在天。一體實有。二遍一切。三是常住。四能生一切法。如此類計西方極多。初敘計也。

論。彼執非理所以者何。

述曰。論主總非。他返徴已。

論。若法能生至非真實故。

述曰。自下別破有二。初破本宗。后難救義。初有五量。第一立量破其常住。從下向上為因為宗。或以義取。如理應思。量云。大自在天。決定非常。是能生故。如地．水等。余能生他者必從他生故。此中所說能生他因。得下貫通遍．實二宗。然下即以所破訖法。而為因故。相乘為論。不然即有隨一不成。以彼不許大自在天非常等故。大自在天決定非遍。以非常故。如瓶等物。又非真實。以不遍故。如盆等物。今此既以非真實為法。即簡心．心所等法。是虛幻有。非真有故。真如等不爾故許遍也。

論。體既常遍至頓生一切法。

述曰。更重破也。體既遍而且是常。遍故何不於一切處。常故何不於一切時能生諸法。如彼現生處及時等。遍故。常故。即二因也。此中二量前三為五。

論。待欲及緣至違一因論。

述曰。此違自宗。汝復若謂體雖遍常。以待樂欲並及緣故。諸法不一切處。及一切時生者。今汝宗言唯大自在一法為因。復言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 能產生一切諸法。 窺基法師註疏說：這裡面包含兩種觀點。首先是敘述，然後是否定。大自在天（Maheśvara，印度教中的主神），一、本體是真實存在的；二、遍及一切處；三、是永恒常住的；四、能產生一切諸法。像這樣的觀點，在西方非常多。首先是敘述他們的計度。 論：他們所執持的道理不合邏輯，原因是什麼呢？ 窺基法師註疏說：論主總體的否定他們的觀點，他們反過來進行詰問。 論：如果法能夠產生…以至於不是真實存在的緣故。 窺基法師註疏說：從下面開始分別破斥，分為兩部分。首先破斥他們的根本宗義，然後駁斥他們爲了自救而提出的觀點。首先有五個量式。第一，建立量式破斥他們的常住觀點。從下向上，以能生作為理由，以常住作為宗。或者從意義上理解，應該這樣思考。量式是：大自在天，必定不是常住的，因為是能生的緣故，就像地、水等。其餘能生其他事物的，必定是從其他事物產生的緣故。這裡所說的能生他因，可以向下貫通遍一切處、本體真實這兩個宗義。然而下面就用所破斥的法，作為理由，相互乘合作為論證。不然就會有隨一不成的問題，因為他們不承認大自在天不是常住等等。大自在天必定不是遍一切處的，因為不是常住的緣故，就像瓶子等物。又不是真實的，因為不是遍一切處的緣故，就像盆子等物。現在這裡既然以不是真實作為法，就簡別了心、心所等法，是虛幻的存在，不是真實的存在。真如等不是這樣，所以允許是遍一切處的。 論：本體既然是常住且遍一切處的…以至於頓時產生一切法。 窺基法師註疏說：更進一步的破斥。本體既然是遍一切處而且是常住的，因為遍一切處的緣故，為什麼不在一切處，因為是常住的緣故，為什麼不在一切時能夠產生諸法呢？就像他們現在產生的地方和時間等。因為遍一切處的緣故，因為是常住的緣故，就是兩個理由。這其中兩個量式，前面三個成為五個。 論：等待慾望以及因緣…以至於違背唯一因的理論。 窺基法師註疏說：這是違揹他們自己的宗義。你們又說本體雖然遍一切處且常住，因為等待樂欲並且有因緣的緣故，諸法不是在一切處以及一切時產生，現在你們宗義說只有大自在天這一法作為原因，又說…

【English Translation】 English version: Capable of producing all dharmas (phenomena). Shu (Commentary) says: There are two views here. First, a narration, then a refutation. Maheśvara (the Great自在天, a major deity in Hinduism), one, its substance is truly existent; two, it pervades everything; three, it is eternally abiding; four, it can produce all dharmas. Views like this are very common in the West. First, it narrates their calculations. Treatise: Their adherence is illogical, what is the reason? Shu says: The treatise master generally refutes their views, and they in turn question. Treatise: If a dharma is capable of producing... to the extent that it is not truly existent. Shu says: Starting from below, there are separate refutations, divided into two parts. First, refuting their fundamental doctrine, then refuting the views they put forward to save themselves. First, there are five logical arguments. First, establish a logical argument to refute their view of permanence. From bottom to top, use the ability to produce as the reason, and permanence as the thesis. Or understand it in terms of meaning, one should think like this. The logical argument is: Maheśvara, is definitely not permanent, because it is capable of producing, like earth, water, etc. The rest that can produce other things, must be produced from other things. The cause of being able to produce others mentioned here can penetrate downwards to connect the two doctrines of pervading everything and the reality of the substance. However, below, the dharma that has been refuted is used as the reason, and they are multiplied together as an argument. Otherwise, there will be a problem of one of them not being established, because they do not admit that Maheśvara is not permanent, etc. Maheśvara is definitely not all-pervading, because it is not permanent, like bottles and other objects. Also, it is not real, because it is not all-pervading, like basins and other objects. Now that it takes not being real as the dharma, it distinguishes the mind, mental states, etc., which are illusory existences, not real existences. True Thusness (真如) etc. are not like this, so it is allowed to be all-pervading. Treatise: Since the substance is permanent and all-pervading... to the extent that it instantly produces all dharmas. Shu says: Further refutation. Since the substance is all-pervading and permanent, because it is all-pervading, why not in all places, because it is permanent, why not at all times can it produce all dharmas? Like the places and times they are now produced. Because it is all-pervading, because it is permanent, these are the two reasons. Among these two logical arguments, the first three become five. Treatise: Waiting for desire and conditions... to the extent that it violates the theory of a single cause. Shu says: This violates their own doctrine. You also say that although the substance is all-pervading and permanent, because it waits for desire and has conditions, dharmas are not produced in all places and at all times, now your doctrine says that only Maheśvara is the cause, and also says...

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更待諸眾生欲及諸法緣。即多法為因。豈不便違一因生論。

論。或欲及緣至因常有故。

述曰。大自在因一切時有。以是常故。何不眾生欲。及緣一切時頓生。量云。汝言無慾及緣起時欲．緣應起。許自在天體恒有故。如余起時。此同瑜伽第六．七說。不能繁引。

自下第四合破七外道計。準上應知。

論。余執有一至虛空我等。

述曰。梵即梵王。此事梵王者計。此下皆從所執所事以立其名。乃至事我者亦爾。有外計此是常是一。能生一切法。或計有一時是常是一。能生諸法。有計方亦爾。是一是常能生萬法。此破能生別有一計。上破實有勝論等計故不同也。本際者即過去之初首。此時一切有情。從此本際一法而生。此際是實是常。能生諸法。古人云。諸部有計。時頭眾生。與此同也　自然者。別有一法。是實是常。號曰自然。能生萬法。如此方外道。亦計有自然是一是常能生萬法。虛通之理名不可道之常道也。稍與彼同。虛空亦然。別有一法一切有情皆因而有。其我亦然。別有一我能生萬法。前破實有。今破能生。故前後別。宿作因等非一故論言等。

論。常住實有至皆同此破。

述曰。以上諸法皆是一物。是實常住法。具諸功能生一切法。與大自在義相似故。合

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：更何況還要等待眾生的慾望以及諸法的因緣呢？如果說多種法作為原因，豈不是就違背了『一因生』的理論了嗎？

論：或者說慾望和因緣作為原因，是常有的。

述曰：大自在天（Maheśvara，印度教神祇，被一些佛教派別認為是世界的創造者）作為原因，在一切時候都存在。因為它是常有的，為什麼眾生的慾望和因緣不能在一切時候同時產生呢？可以這樣推論：如果你們說沒有慾望和因緣產生的時候，慾望和因緣就應該產生。因為你們承認自在天的本體是恒常存在的，就像其他產生的時候一樣。這與《瑜伽師地論》第六、七卷所說相同，這裡就不詳細引用了。

從下面開始，第四部分是總破七種外道的計度，可以參照上面的內容來理解。

論：其餘外道執著有一個梵（Brahma，印度教的創造神）、虛空、我（Atman，印度教哲學中的「真我」）等等。

述曰：梵，就是梵天王。這是梵天王信徒的計度。下面都是根據他們所執著和崇拜的對象來命名的，乃至崇拜『我』的也是這樣。有些外道認為這個『梵』是常有的、唯一的，能夠產生一切法。或者認為有一個『時』是常有的、唯一的，能夠產生諸法。有些認為『方』也是這樣，是唯一的、常有的，能夠產生萬法。這裡是破斥能生的別有一個『梵』的計度。上面破斥的是實有的，比如勝論派（Vaiśeṣika）等的計度，所以不同。『本際』就是過去最初的開端。在那個時候，一切有情都是從這個『本際』一法而生。這個『本際』是真實的、常有的，能夠產生諸法。古人說，有些部派認為『時頭眾生』與此相同。『自然』，是另外一種法，是真實的、常有的，叫做『自然』，能夠產生萬法。就像一些地方的外道，也認為有『自然』，是唯一的、常有的，能夠產生萬法。虛通的道理，是不可言說的常道。稍微與他們相同。『虛空』也是這樣，另外有一種法，一切有情都因為『虛空』而有。『我』也是這樣，另外有一個『我』能夠產生萬法。前面是破斥實有的，現在是破斥能生的，所以前後不同。『宿作因』等等不是唯一的，所以論中說『等』。

論：常住實有，乃至都用同樣的方法破斥。

述曰：以上這些法都是一個東西，是真實常住的法，具有各種功能，能夠產生一切法。與大自在天的意義相似，所以放在一起破斥。

【English Translation】 English version: Moreover, [do we] have to wait for the desires of all sentient beings and the conditions of all dharmas? If multiple dharmas are taken as causes, wouldn't that contradict the theory of 'one cause producing [everything]'?

Treatise: Or [we can say that] desires and conditions, as causes, are always present.

Commentary: Maheśvara (a Hindu deity, considered by some Buddhist schools as the creator of the world) as a cause, exists at all times. Because it is permanent, why can't the desires and conditions of sentient beings arise simultaneously at all times? It can be inferred as follows: If you say there is no time when desires and conditions arise, then desires and conditions should arise. Because you admit that the essence of Maheśvara is eternally existent, just like other times when things arise. This is the same as what is said in the sixth and seventh volumes of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, so I won't quote it in detail here.

From below, the fourth part is a general refutation of the seven types of heretical views. It can be understood by referring to the above content.

Treatise: Other heretics cling to one Brahma (the Hindu god of creation), space, self (Atman, the 'true self' in Hindu philosophy), etc.

Commentary: Brahma is Brahma King. This is the calculation of the Brahma King's followers. Below, all are named according to what they cling to and worship, and the same is true for those who worship the 'self'. Some heretics believe that this 'Brahma' is permanent and unique, capable of producing all dharmas. Or they believe that there is a 'time' that is permanent and unique, capable of producing all dharmas. Some believe that 'direction' is also like this, unique and permanent, capable of producing all dharmas. Here, the refutation is directed at the calculation that there is a separate 'Brahma' that can produce [everything]. The above refutation is directed at the real existence, such as the calculation of the Vaiśeṣika school, so it is different. 'Original limit' is the very beginning of the past. At that time, all sentient beings were born from this one dharma of 'original limit'. This 'original limit' is real and permanent, capable of producing all dharmas. The ancients said that some schools believe that 'sentient beings at the beginning of time' are the same as this. 'Nature' is another kind of dharma, real and permanent, called 'nature', capable of producing all dharmas. Just like some local heretics, they also believe that there is 'nature', unique and permanent, capable of producing all dharmas. The principle of empty communication is the ineffable eternal way. Slightly similar to them. 'Space' is also like this, another kind of dharma, all sentient beings exist because of 'space'. The 'self' is also like this, another 'self' capable of producing all dharmas. The previous refutation was directed at the real existence, and now the refutation is directed at the ability to produce, so the front and back are different. 'Past actions as causes' etc. are not unique, so the treatise says 'etc.'

Treatise: Permanent and real existence, and so on, are all refuted in the same way.

Commentary: All the above dharmas are one thing, a real and permanent dharma, possessing various functions, capable of producing all dharmas. Similar in meaning to Maheśvara, so they are refuted together.

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例為破。然以不如數．勝論等。別有熾盛多部類故。不標其名各各別破。然勘瑜伽第六．七卷．顯揚十一．十二．十六．大論中．及廣百論。方知此等外道名計。

自下第五二聲論師合一處破。初敘二計。后正非之。

論。有餘偏執至表詮諸法。

述曰。明論聲常。是婆羅門等計。明論者先云韋陀論。今云吠陀論。吠陀者明也。明諸實事故。彼計此論聲為能詮定量表詮諸法。諸法揩量。故是常住。所說是非。皆決定故。余非揩量。故不是常。設有少言稱可於法。多不實故亦名非常。梵王誦者。而本性有。然聲性非能詮。下破之中彼無同喻為不定過。

論。有執一切至方有詮表。

述曰。待緣顯者。聲顯也　待緣發者。聲生也　發是生義。聲皆是常。然有時聞及不聞者。待緣詮故。方乃顯發。此有二類。一計常聲如薩婆多無為。於一一物上有一常聲。由尋．伺等所發音顯。此音響是無常。二計一切物上。共一常聲。由尋．伺等所發音。顯音亦無常。如大乘真如萬法共故。唯此常者是能詮聲。其音但是顯聲之緣。非能詮體。此通破聲顯．聲生計內計外全分一分。如因明疏敘。今不繁述。今破計一切。少分亦自破。或少分一切攝諸計盡。

論。彼俱非理所以者何。

述曰。總非

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

這裡舉例說明了破斥。然而，由於勝論（Vaisheshika，印度哲學流派，主張實在論和原子論）等其他流派非常興盛，因此沒有逐一標明其名稱並分別破斥。然而，通過研究《瑜伽師地論》第六、七卷，《顯揚聖教論》第十一、十二、十六卷，《大乘阿毗達磨集論》以及《廣百論》，才能瞭解這些外道的各種主張。 接下來第五個部分，將二聲論師的觀點放在一起破斥。首先敘述兩種觀點，然後正式進行駁斥。 論：有些外道偏執地認為聲音能夠詮釋一切法。 述記：這裡說明了明論（Mimamsa，印度哲學流派，注重吠陀經的解釋）認為聲音是常住不變的觀點。明論，先前稱為韋陀論，現在稱為吠陀論。吠陀的意思是『明』，能夠闡明各種真實的事物。他們認為這種論的聲音是能夠詮釋的定量，能夠表達一切法。一切法都可以通過它來衡量，因此它是常住不變的。它所說的是非都是確定的。其他的聲音不能衡量，因此不是常住的。即使有少數言語符合法，但大多數是不真實的，因此也被認為是非常住的。梵天所誦讀的聲音，其本性就是如此。然而，聲音的性質並不能詮釋，在下面的破斥中，他們沒有共同的比喻，這是一個不確定的過失。 論：有些外道認為一切聲音都依賴於因緣才能顯現，這樣才能進行詮釋。 述記：『待緣顯者』，指的是聲音的顯現。『待緣發者』，指的是聲音的產生。『發』就是產生的意思。所有的聲音都是常住的，然而有時能聽到，有時聽不到，這是因為要依賴於因緣才能進行詮釋，這樣才能顯現出來。這其中有兩種觀點：一種認為常聲就像薩婆多（Sarvastivada，說一切有部，佛教部派之一）的無為法一樣，在每一個事物上都存在一個常住的聲音，通過尋（vitarka，粗略的思考）、伺（vicara，精細的思考）等所發出的聲音來顯現。這種音響是無常的。另一種認為在一切事物上，共同存在一個常住的聲音，通過尋、伺等所發出的聲音來顯現，這種聲音也是無常的。就像大乘佛教的真如一樣，萬法是共同的。只有這種常住的聲音才是能夠詮釋的聲音，其他的音響只是顯現聲音的因緣，而不是能夠詮釋的本體。這裡總共破斥了聲顯、聲生兩種觀點，包括內道和外道的全部或部分觀點。正如因明疏中所敘述的那樣，這裡不再贅述。現在破斥認為一切聲音都能詮釋的觀點，少部分觀點也自然被破斥。或者說，少部分和一切聲音都能詮釋的觀點已經包含了所有的觀點。 論：這兩種觀點都不合理。為什麼呢？ 述記：總的來說，這兩種觀點都是不合理的。

【English Translation】 English version:

This exemplifies refutation. However, because other schools, such as Vaisheshika (an Indian philosophical school advocating realism and atomism), are very prosperous, their names are not individually listed and refuted separately. However, by studying the sixth and seventh volumes of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the eleventh, twelfth, and sixteenth volumes of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the Mahayana-samgraha, and the Vimsatika, one can understand the various claims of these non-Buddhist schools. Next, in the fifth section, the views of the two sound theorists are refuted together. First, the two views are described, and then they are formally refuted. Treatise: Some heretics stubbornly believe that sound can express all dharmas (phenomena). Commentary: This explains that the Mimamsa (an Indian philosophical school focusing on the interpretation of the Vedas) believes that sound is permanent. Mimamsa, previously called Veda-vada, is now called Veda-vada. Veda means 'clear', capable of clarifying various real things. They believe that the sound of this treatise is a quantifiable expression that can express all dharmas. All dharmas can be measured by it, so it is permanent. What it says is definitely right or wrong. Other sounds cannot measure, so they are not permanent. Even if a few words conform to the dharma, most are untrue, so they are also considered impermanent. The sound recited by Brahma is inherently so. However, the nature of sound cannot express, and in the following refutation, they have no common analogy, which is an uncertain fault. Treatise: Some heretics believe that all sounds depend on conditions to manifest, so that they can be interpreted. Commentary: 'Depending on conditions to manifest' refers to the manifestation of sound. 'Depending on conditions to arise' refers to the generation of sound. 'Arise' means generation. All sounds are permanent, but sometimes they can be heard and sometimes they cannot. This is because they depend on conditions to be interpreted, so that they can manifest. There are two views: one believes that permanent sound is like the unconditioned dharma of the Sarvastivada (a Buddhist school), and there is a permanent sound on every thing, which is manifested by the sounds emitted by vitarka (rough thinking) and vicara (fine thinking). This sound is impermanent. The other believes that there is a common permanent sound on all things, which is manifested by the sounds emitted by vitarka and vicara. This sound is also impermanent. Just like the tathata (suchness) of Mahayana Buddhism, all dharmas are common. Only this permanent sound is the sound that can be interpreted, and other sounds are only the conditions for manifesting sound, not the entity that can be interpreted. Here, the views of sound manifestation and sound generation are refuted in total, including all or part of the views of internal and external paths. As described in the Hetuvidya-sastra, it will not be repeated here. Now, refuting the view that all sounds can be interpreted, the view of a small part is naturally refuted. Or, the view that a small part and all sounds can be interpreted already includes all views. Treatise: Both of these views are unreasonable. Why? Commentary: In general, both of these views are unreasonable.

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他失。他還返徴。

論。且明論聲至如所餘聲。

述曰。破初婆羅門等計。量云。汝明論聲應非常住。許能詮故。如所餘聲　餘聲即是非明論外餘一切聲。以彼聲性非是能詮故無不定。

論。餘聲亦應至待眾緣故。

述曰。破第二師也。此言餘者有二義。一計余。是前明論者計之餘也。二聲余。前計少分。今計全故。又前破明論聲計。今破彼聲外之常聲。故云餘聲亦應非常聲體。待眾緣故。如瓶盆等　然彼所計聲性與聲別。聲性即是所發音響聲之體。故今總言非常聲體。若破所發音聲。言非常聲。若破聲性言非常聲體。聲及聲性合名聲體。若但言非常聲。他以聲性例所發音為不定過。若言非聲。即違自宗。故但總言非常聲體。又簡真如。雖待緣顯。非常聲體故。因云。待眾緣者。若言待緣顯。即聲顯成自生俱不成。若言待緣生。即自產生顯不成。為對二宗自無有過。故但總言待眾緣故。若言待眾緣生顯故。文繁無用故不具述。

自下第六破第十三外道計也。

論。有外道執至而體實有。

述曰。于中有二。初敘計。后破之。此初也。即是順世外道所計。此唯執有實常四大生一切有情。一切有情稟此而有。更無餘物。后死滅時還歸四大。其勝論所計父母極微。此亦兼破。然

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 他失（指辯論中的失敗）。他還返徴（他仍然反過來進行辯駁）。

論（正方觀點）。且明論聲至如所餘聲（而且，如果明確『論』的聲音，就像其餘的聲音一樣）。

述曰（註釋）：破初婆羅門等計（駁斥最初婆羅門等的觀點）。量云（論證說）：汝明論聲應非常住（你所說的『論』的聲音應該不是恒常不變的）。許能詮故（因為它具有表達意義的功能）。如所餘聲（就像其餘的聲音一樣）。餘聲即是非明論外餘一切聲（其餘的聲音，就是指除了『明論』之外的一切聲音）。以彼聲性非是能詮故無不定（因為那些聲音的性質不是用來表達意義的，所以沒有不確定的問題）。

論（正方觀點）。餘聲亦應至待眾緣故（其餘的聲音也應該不是恒常的，因為它依賴於各種因緣條件）。

述曰（註釋）：破第二師也（駁斥第二種觀點）。此言餘者有二義（這裡說『其餘』有兩種含義）。一計余（一種是觀點的『其餘』），是前明論者計之餘也（是先前主張『明論』的人的觀點的剩餘）。二聲余（二是聲音的『其餘』），前計少分（先前的觀點只涉及少部分），今計全故（現在的觀點涉及全部）。又前破明論聲計（先前駁斥了關於『明論』聲音的觀點），今破彼聲外之常聲（現在駁斥那種聲音之外的常住不變的聲音）。故云餘聲亦應非常聲體（所以說其餘的聲音也應該不是恒常不變的聲音的本體）。待眾緣故（因為它依賴於各種因緣條件）。如瓶盆等（就像瓶子、盆子等一樣）。然彼所計聲性與聲別（然而，他們所主張的聲音的性質與聲音本身是不同的）。聲性即是所發音響聲之體（聲音的性質就是所發出的音響的聲音的本體）。故今總言非常聲體（所以現在總的說不是恒常不變的聲音的本體）。若破所發音聲（如果駁斥所發出的聲音），言非常聲（就說是非常住的聲音）。若破聲性言非常聲體（如果駁斥聲音的性質，就說是非常住的聲音的本體）。聲及聲性合名聲體（聲音和聲音的性質合起來叫做聲音的本體）。若但言非常聲（如果只說非常住的聲音），他以聲性例所發音為不定過（對方會用聲音的性質來類比所發出的聲音，認為是不確定的過失）。若言非聲（如果說不是聲音），即違自宗（就違背了自己的宗派）。故但總言非常聲體（所以只總的說不是恒常不變的聲音的本體）。又簡真如（又爲了區別于真如），雖待緣顯（雖然真如也依賴於因緣而顯現），非常聲體故（但它不是聲音的本體）。因云（原因在於）：待眾緣者（依賴於各種因緣條件）。若言待緣顯（如果說是依賴於因緣而顯現），即聲顯成自生俱不成（那麼聲音的顯現、成就、自生、同時產生，都不能成立）。若言待緣生（如果說是依賴於因緣而產生），即自產生顯不成（那麼自生、成就、顯現都不能成立）。為對二宗自無有過（爲了應對這兩種宗派，自己沒有過失）。故但總言待眾緣故（所以只總的說依賴於各種因緣條件）。若言待眾緣生顯故（如果說依賴於各種因緣條件而產生和顯現），文繁無用故不具述（文字繁瑣沒有用處，所以不詳細敘述）。

自下第六破第十三外道計也（下面第六部分，駁斥第十三種外道的觀點）。

論（正方觀點）。有外道執至而體實有（有一種外道認為，四大元素是真實存在的本體）。

述曰（註釋）：于中有二（其中有兩部分）。初敘計（首先敘述他們的觀點），后破之（然後駁斥它）。此初也（這是第一部分）。即是順世外道所計（就是順世外道所主張的）。此唯執有實常四大生一切有情（他們只認為有真實恒常的四大元素產生一切有情眾生）。一切有情稟此而有（一切有情眾生都稟賦于這四大元素而存在）。更無餘物（再沒有其他的東西）。后死滅時還歸四大（死後消滅時，就回歸到四大元素中）。其勝論所計父母極微（勝論派所主張的父母極微）。此亦兼破（這裡也一併駁斥）。然

【English Translation】 English version He lost (referring to losing in debate). He also returned to challenge (He still turned around to argue).

Treatise (the proponent's view). Moreover, clarifying the sound of 'treatise' is like the remaining sounds.

Commentary: Refuting the views of the initial Brahmins, etc. Reasoning states: Your sound of 'treatise' should not be permanent (nitya). Because it is capable of expressing meaning. Like the remaining sounds. The remaining sounds are all sounds other than the 'clarifying treatise'. Because the nature of those sounds is not capable of expressing meaning, there is no uncertainty.

Treatise: The remaining sounds should also not be permanent, because they depend on various conditions.

Commentary: Refuting the second teacher. There are two meanings to 'remaining' here. One is the 'remaining' of views, which is the remainder of the views of the previous proponents of 'clarifying treatise'. The second is the 'remaining' of sounds. The previous view involved only a small part, while the current view involves the whole. Also, previously the view about the sound of 'clarifying treatise' was refuted, and now the permanent sound outside of that sound is refuted. Therefore, it is said that the remaining sounds should also not be a permanent sound entity. Because it depends on various conditions. Like pots, basins, etc. However, their asserted nature of sound is different from sound itself. The nature of sound is the entity of the sound emitted. Therefore, now it is generally said that it is not a permanent sound entity. If the emitted sound is refuted, it is said to be a non-permanent sound. If the nature of sound is refuted, it is said to be a non-permanent sound entity. Sound and the nature of sound together are called the sound entity. If only non-permanent sound is mentioned, the opponent will use the nature of sound to exemplify the emitted sound as an uncertain fault. If it is said to be not sound, it contradicts one's own doctrine. Therefore, it is only generally said to be a non-permanent sound entity. Also, to distinguish it from Suchness (Tathata), although Suchness also manifests depending on conditions, it is not a sound entity. The reason is: depending on various conditions. If it is said to manifest depending on conditions, then the manifestation, accomplishment, self-arising, and simultaneous arising of sound are all not established. If it is said to arise depending on conditions, then self-arising, accomplishment, and manifestation are not established. To counter these two schools, one has no fault. Therefore, it is only generally said to depend on various conditions. If it is said to arise and manifest depending on various conditions, the text is verbose and useless, so it is not described in detail.

From here, the sixth part refutes the views of the thirteenth non-Buddhist.

Treatise: There are non-Buddhists who hold that the four great elements are real entities.

Commentary: There are two parts to this. First, describing their views, and then refuting them. This is the first part. This is the view held by the Lokayata (materialist) non-Buddhists. They only hold that the real and permanent four great elements produce all sentient beings. All sentient beings are endowed with these elements. There is nothing else. When they die, they return to the four great elements. The atoms of parents asserted by the Vaisheshika school are also refuted here. However,

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此勝論更許有餘物。順世不然。執實執常。執能生粗色此是因也。又勝論師及此順世。執所生之色不越因量。量只與所依父母本許大。如第三子微。如一父母許大。乃至大地與所依一本父母許大。本極微是常。子等無常。亦是實有。色是德句。極微非色。今言色者。以自宗義說彼法體。然只地．水．火．風四有極微。余無極微。謂色．聲等。

論。彼執非理所以者何。

述曰。初論非云彼非應理。彼次返詰所以者何。

論。所執極微至體應非實。

述曰。下破有三。一破能生四大。二破所生粗色。三合破二。初有三量。一有方非實難。順世極微及與衛世。皆無方分。唯有圓德。然今設破。若有方分。即立量云。所執極微體應非實。有方分故。如蟻行等。彼許蟻行有方分非實有。故以為喻。文中非次。準量應知。又以佛法義徴可有擬宜之方分故。如蟻行等。此即破實。

次第二無分不生難。

論。若無方分至生粗果色。

述曰。又汝根本執無方分者。量云。所執極微應不共聚生粗果色。無方分故。如心．心所。心．心所法亦不共聚生粗果色。故以為喻。此即有分。及無分難。

次第三能生非常難。

論。既能生果至極微常住。

述曰。汝之極微應非常住

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 勝論派（Vaisheshika）更進一步地承認有『余物』（余物：除了實體、屬性、活動、普遍性、特殊性和內在性之外的第七種範疇）。而順世派（Lokāyata）則不這樣認為。他們堅持實體是真實的、恒常的，並且堅持實體能夠產生粗色，這就是原因。此外，勝論派和順世派都認為，所產生的顏色不會超過其原因的量。這個量只與所依賴的父母的本體一樣大。例如，第三個孩子很小，就像一個父母那麼大。乃至大地也與所依賴的一個父母的本體一樣大。最初的極微（paramāṇu）是恒常的，而孩子等則是無常的，但也是真實存在的。顏色是屬性的範疇。極微不是顏色。現在所說的顏色，是用他們自己的宗義來說明那個法的本體。然而，只有地、水、火、風這四種有極微，其餘的沒有極微，比如顏色、聲音等。

論：他們的這種堅持是不合理的，為什麼呢？

述曰：最初的論點不是說他們的觀點不合理，而是反過來詰問為什麼。

論：如果所堅持的極微的本體不是真實的，那會怎麼樣呢？

述曰：下面有三個駁斥。第一是駁斥能產生四大（四大：地、水、火、風）的觀點，第二是駁斥所產生的粗色的觀點，第三是結合前兩者進行駁斥。首先，有三個量。第一是有方分（有方分：有空間上的部分）就不是真實的難題。順世派的極微和衛世派（Vaisheshika）的極微都沒有方分，只有圓德（圓德：圓形的屬性）。然而，現在假設進行駁斥，如果存在方分，那麼就可以立論說：所堅持的極微的本體應該不是真實的，因為它有方分，就像螞蟻的行走等。他們承認螞蟻的行走有方分，但不是真實存在的，所以用它來做比喻。文中的順序不對，應該按照量來理解。又可以用佛法的意義來徵詢，因為可能有類似的方分，就像螞蟻的行走等。這實際上是駁斥真實性。

其次，第二個是沒有部分就不能產生的難題。

論：如果根本上堅持沒有方分，那麼會怎麼樣呢？

述曰：又如果你們根本上堅持沒有方分，那麼可以立論說：所堅持的極微應該不能共同聚集產生粗果色，因為它沒有方分，就像心和心所（心所：心理活動）一樣。心和心所法也不能共同聚集產生粗果色，所以用它來做比喻。這實際上是有部分和沒有部分的難題。

其次，第三個是能產生果就不是恒常的難題。

論：既然能夠產生果，那麼會怎麼樣呢？

述曰：你們的極微應該不是恒常的。

【English Translation】 English version The Vaisheshika further admits the existence of '余物' (aviśeṣa: a seventh category besides substance, quality, activity, generality, particularity, and inherence). The Lokāyata does not think so. They insist that substance is real and permanent, and they insist that substance can produce gross color, which is the reason. In addition, both the Vaisheshika and the Lokāyata believe that the color produced does not exceed the amount of its cause. This amount is only as large as the original body of the parents on which it depends. For example, the third child is small, just like one parent. Even the earth is as large as the original body of one parent on which it depends. The original paramāṇu (atom) is constant, while children, etc., are impermanent, but also really exist. Color is a category of attribute. The paramāṇu is not color. The color now spoken of is to explain the essence of that dharma with their own sectarian meaning. However, only earth, water, fire, and wind have paramāṇu, and the rest do not have paramāṇu, such as color, sound, etc.

Argument: Their insistence is unreasonable, why?

Commentary: The initial argument is not that their view is unreasonable, but rather to ask why in return.

Argument: What if the essence of the paramāṇu that is insisted upon is not real?

Commentary: Below are three refutations. The first is to refute the view that can produce the Four Great Elements (mahābhūta: earth, water, fire, and wind), the second is to refute the view of the gross color produced, and the third is to refute by combining the first two. First, there are three measures. The first is that having spatial parts (spatial parts: having spatial parts) is not a real problem. The paramāṇu of the Lokāyata and the paramāṇu of the Vaisheshika do not have spatial parts, only round qualities (round qualities: circular attributes). However, now suppose to refute, if there are spatial parts, then it can be argued that: the essence of the paramāṇu that is insisted upon should not be real, because it has spatial parts, like the walking of ants, etc. They admit that the walking of ants has spatial parts, but it is not real, so it is used as a metaphor. The order in the text is incorrect, it should be understood according to the measure. Also, the meaning of the Buddha-dharma can be used to inquire, because there may be similar spatial parts, like the walking of ants, etc. This is actually refuting reality.

Secondly, the second is the difficulty that cannot be produced without parts.

Argument: What if you fundamentally insist on having no spatial parts?

Commentary: Also, if you fundamentally insist on having no spatial parts, then it can be argued that: the paramāṇu that is insisted upon should not be able to gather together to produce gross fruit color, because it has no spatial parts, like the mind and mental factors (citta-caitta: mental activities). The mind and mental factors cannot gather together to produce gross fruit color, so it is used as a metaphor. This is actually the difficulty of having parts and not having parts.

Secondly, the third is the difficulty that being able to produce fruit is not constant.

Argument: Since it can produce fruit, then what?

Commentary: Your paramāṇu should not be constant.

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。許能生果故。如所生果　果即子微等。

上來初有方分難父母實有。次無方分難能生粗色。后能生果難父母常。總破能生父母本極微竟　下破所生果。于中有二。無常極成。故不須破。次下第一難所生之果。不粗于因量。至下文言既多分成應非實有。第二方是難果實有。初中有四。一合破順世．勝論本計果量同一因微。第二量德合下。唯破衛世粗德合救。第三合破順世．衛世遍在自因之救義執。第四合破順世．衛世果多分合故成粗救。

論。又所生果至不名粗色。

述曰。此中量云。所生之果色應不名粗。與本極微等故。猶如本極微。又應返難極微應是粗。量云。所執極微應不名細。與粗量等故。如粗果色　又彼執。地等所生粗果。眼根等色根所取。父母極微非色根取。以極微細。非色根取故。

論。則此果色至便違自執。

述曰。自下破粗果色應非色根取。量云。所執實粗果色應非色根所得。與極微量等故。猶如極微。若不言實色根所得。即違自執。自執許色根得諸粗色果故。

論。若謂果色至色根能取。

述曰。此下第二唯勝論師計。彼轉計言。所生果色與量德合。即德句中量德有五。即微量大量也。有量德合。故雖與極微量等非粗。似粗色根能取。然本極微非粗

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：能產生結果的原因。例如所產生的結果，結果就是指子微等。

上面首先用有方分的理由來質疑父母實有的觀點。其次用無方分的理由來質疑能產生粗色的觀點。最後用能產生結果的理由來質疑父母是常有的觀點。總而言之，破斥了能產生結果的父母本極微的觀點。下面破斥所產生的結果。其中有兩種情況。無常是已經成立的，所以不需要破斥。接下來是第一種情況，質疑所產生的結果，不比原因的量大。直到下文說，既然多分結合，就不應該是實有的。第二種情況才是質疑結果是實有的。第一種情況中有四點。第一，共同破斥順世派和勝論派的根本觀點，即結果的量和原因的極微相同。第二，量德結合，只破斥衛世派粗德結合的辯解。第三，共同破斥順世派和衛世派遍在自因的辯解。第四，共同破斥順世派和衛世派果多分結合所以成為粗大的辯解。

論：又所產生的結果，以至於不稱為粗色。

述曰：這裡用量來論證：所產生的結果色，應該不稱為粗色，因為它和本極微相等。就像本極微一樣。又應該反過來質疑極微應該是粗的。用量來論證：你們所執著的極微應該不稱為細，因為它和粗的量相等。就像粗果色一樣。而且他們認為，地等所產生的粗果，是眼根等色根所取的。父母極微不是色根所取的，因為極微細小，不是色根所取的。

論：那麼這個果色，就違背了自己的執著。

述曰：下面破斥粗果色應該不是色根所取的。用量來論證：你們所執著的真實粗果色，應該不是色根所能得到的，因為它和極微的量相等。就像極微一樣。如果不說真實色根所得到的，就違背了自己的執著。自己的執著是允許色根得到各種粗色果的。

論：如果說果色和量德結合，色根就能取到。

述曰：下面第二種情況，只有勝論師這樣認為。他們轉變觀點說，所產生的結果色和量德結合。量德這個詞中有五種，就是微量和大量。因為有量德結合，所以即使和極微的量相等，也不是粗的，但看起來是粗的，所以色根能夠取到。然而本極微不是粗的。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Because it can produce a result.' For example, the result that is produced, the result refers to the ultimate particles, etc. (果即子微等).

Above, first, the argument of having spatial dimensions (有方分) is used to question the view that parents are truly existent. Second, the argument of not having spatial dimensions (無方分) is used to question the view that it can produce coarse matter. Finally, the argument of being able to produce a result is used to question the view that parents are permanent. In summary, it refutes the view that the fundamental ultimate particles of parents can produce a result. Below, it refutes the result that is produced. Among them, there are two situations. Impermanence (無常) is already established, so there is no need to refute it. Next is the first situation, questioning the result that is produced, which is not larger in quantity than the cause. Until the following text says that since many parts are combined, it should not be truly existent. The second situation is questioning whether the result is truly existent. In the first situation, there are four points. First, jointly refuting the fundamental view of the Lokayata (順世) and Vaisheshika (勝論) schools, that the quantity of the result is the same as the ultimate particle of the cause. Second, the combination of quantity and quality (量德合), only refuting the defense of the Vaibhashika (衛世) school's combination of coarse qualities. Third, jointly refuting the defense of the Lokayata and Vaibhashika schools that pervades its own cause. Fourth, jointly refuting the defense of the Lokayata and Vaibhashika schools that the combination of many parts of the result makes it coarse.

Treatise: 'Moreover, the result that is produced, to the extent that it is not called coarse matter.'

Commentary: Here, an argument is used: the color of the result that is produced should not be called coarse, because it is equal to the fundamental ultimate particle. Just like the fundamental ultimate particle. Moreover, it should be questioned in reverse that the ultimate particle should be coarse. An argument is used: the ultimate particle that you adhere to should not be called fine, because it is equal to the quantity of coarse matter. Just like coarse matter. Moreover, they believe that the coarse result produced by earth, etc., is taken by the eye sense organ (眼根) and other color sense organs (色根). The ultimate particles of parents are not taken by the color sense organs, because the ultimate particles are fine and not taken by the color sense organs.

Treatise: 'Then this color of the result violates its own adherence.'

Commentary: Below, it refutes that the coarse color of the result should not be taken by the color sense organs. An argument is used: the real coarse color of the result that you adhere to should not be obtainable by the color sense organs, because it is equal to the quantity of the ultimate particle. Just like the ultimate particle. If it is not said that it is obtained by the real color sense organs, it violates its own adherence. Its own adherence is to allow the color sense organs to obtain various coarse color results.

Treatise: 'If it is said that the color of the result combines with quantity and quality, the color sense organs can take it.'

Commentary: Below is the second situation, only the Vaisheshika school thinks this way. They change their view and say that the color of the result that is produced combines with quantity and quality. There are five kinds of quantity and quality in the term 'quantity and quality', which are small quantity and large quantity. Because there is a combination of quantity and quality, even if it is equal to the quantity of the ultimate particle, it is not coarse, but it looks coarse, so the color sense organs can take it. However, the fundamental ultimate particle is not coarse.

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德合故。

論。所執果色至無粗德合。

述曰。今為量云。此所生果色。應無粗德合。與本極微體量等故。如本極微。

更返難之。

論。或應極微至處無別故。

述曰。此中量云。或應本極微有粗量德合。與粗果色處無別故。如粗色果　以量既等即一處住體相涉入。名處無別。文無別因。意說相入。相入即是量等子微之義。子微今以量無別為因。顯父母亦得。父母以處無別為因。顯子微亦得。互影顯也。

論。若謂果色至可名粗者。

述曰。此下第三子段。合破勝論．順世二師。謂彼救言。前言果色等於因量。誰謂所生一色之果。唯與一個極微量等。今云等者。等如二個父母極微。遍在二因之中。因既有二。果等於彼。故可名粗。

論。則此果色至處各別故。

述曰。此正述難。極微所生一果色體應非是一。如所在因父母極微。處各別故。如父母極微　此但應言如二極微量。以三微果等因非極微故。但可總相相即言如因量。又文中少。此意欲顯一子微居父母二極微之中。即在此者非彼。在彼者非此。云如所在因處各別故。量云。所生色果。體應非一。在此東者非西。處各別故。如所在因父母極微。

論。既爾此果至色根所取。

述曰。既子微

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 德合故。

論：所執果色至無粗德合。

述曰：今為量云。此所生果色，應無粗德合。與本極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）體量等故。如本極微。

更返難之。

論：或應極微至處無別故。

述曰：此中量云。或應本極微有粗量德合。與粗果色處無別故。如粗色果。以量既等即一處住體相涉入。名處無別。文無別因。意說相入。相入即是量等子微之義。子微今以量無別為因。顯父母亦得。父母以處無別為因。顯子微亦得。互影顯也。

論：若謂果色至可名粗者。

述曰：此下第三子段。合破勝論（Vaiśeṣika，印度哲學流派之一）。順世二師。謂彼救言。前言果色等於因量。誰謂所生一色之果。唯與一個極微量等。今云等者。等如二個父母極微。遍在二因之中。因既有二。果等於彼。故可名粗。

論：則此果色至處各別故。

述曰：此正述難。極微所生一果色體應非是一。如所在因父母極微。處各別故。如父母極微。此但應言如二極微量。以三微果等因非極微故。但可總相相即言如因量。又文中少。此意欲顯一子微居父母二極微之中。即在此者非彼。在彼者非此。云如所在因處各別故。量云。所生色果。體應非一。在此東者非西。處各別故。如所在因父母極微。

論：既爾此果至色根所取。

述曰：既子微

【English Translation】 English version: De he gu.

Treatise: The perceived color of the effect does not possess a coarse quality.

Commentary: Now, to establish a proposition: This color of the effect produced should not possess a coarse quality, because it is equal in size to the original paramāṇu (atom, the smallest unit of matter). Like the original paramāṇu.

Further refutation.

Treatise: Or the paramāṇu should have no difference in location.

Commentary: Here, the proposition states: Or the original paramāṇu should possess a coarse quality, because it has no difference in location from the coarse color of the effect. Like the coarse color of the effect. Because the size is equal, they reside in the same place, and their substance interpenetrates. This is called 'no difference in location.' The text has no separate cause. The intention is to say they interpenetrate. Interpenetration means the size is equal to the meaning of the child-paramāṇu. The child-paramāṇu now uses the non-difference in size as the cause. It shows that the parents are also possible. The parents use the non-difference in location as the cause. It shows that the child-paramāṇu is also possible. They mutually illuminate each other.

Treatise: If it is said that the color of the effect can be called coarse.

Commentary: This is the third sub-section below. It jointly refutes the Vaiśeṣika (one of the schools of Indian philosophy) and the Lokāyata (materialist) teachers. They say in their defense: The previous statement that the color of the effect is equal to the size of the cause. Who said that the color of the effect produced is only equal in size to one paramāṇu? Now, when we say 'equal,' it is equal to two parent paramāṇus. It pervades within the two causes. Since there are two causes, the effect is equal to them. Therefore, it can be called coarse.

Treatise: Then this color of the effect should have different locations.

Commentary: This is a direct statement of the difficulty. The single color-substance of the effect produced by the paramāṇu should not be one, like the parent paramāṇus in their respective causes, because they have different locations. Like the parent paramāṇus. This should only say 'like the size of two paramāṇus,' because the cause of the three-paramāṇu effect is not a single paramāṇu. It can only be said in general terms that it is like the size of the cause. Also, the text is lacking. The intention here is to show that one child-paramāṇu resides within the two parent paramāṇus. That which is here is not there, and that which is there is not here. It says 'like the different locations in their respective causes.' The proposition states: The color-effect produced should not be one. That which is here in the east is not in the west, because they have different locations. Like the parent paramāṇus in their respective causes.

Treatise: Since this effect is perceived by the color-sense.

Commentary: Since the child-paramāṇu

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為二。如父母極微還不成粗。由此粗色如父母極微。亦非色根所取。此中二量如次前說。

論。若果多分至何用果為。

述曰。下子段第四合破救義。若彼遭難復設救言果色一一細分之時即非是粗。多果色合故成粗者。今難之云。即多父母因極微合時。足得成粗。及足成與色根為境。更用子果粗色何為。彼執父母極微眾多雖合。仍不成粗。果色不然。合即粗故。今立量云。多父母極微合應不成細。量等粗果故。如粗果色　果色多合應不成粗。量等極微故。如父母極微　彼說父母極微設和合時。亦非根之境。粗色相合即成根之境。今令父母極微合成根之境故。言足成根境　又立量云。多極微合亦應成粗。許多合故。如粗果色　彼許多極微雖合不成粗故也　多極微合應成根境。許多合故。如粗果色。

論。既多分成至前後相違。

述曰。此下第二破所生果體是實有。果既多分成粗應非實有。多分成故。如軍林等　又汝所執前後相違。前言果色子微一物雖粗。仍量等彼一因之微。既被難已雲量德合。又復轉言量等二因微。乃至今言。多分所成粗元非一物。又多分成複稱實有。故是前後相違轉執。

論。又果與因至如二極微。

述曰。自下大文第三。合破父母及子。又粗果色與因極微俱

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：分為兩種。例如，父母的極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）結合也無法形成粗色（sthūla-rūpa，粗顯的色法）。因此，這種粗色就像父母的極微一樣，也不是色根（rūpa-indriya，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五根）所能感知的。這裡所說的兩種量，就像前面所說的那樣。

論：如果已經有很多果（phala，結果）的細分，那還要果做什麼呢？

述曰：下面是子段的第四部分，結合破斥和辯護的意義。如果對方遇到詰難，又提出辯護說，果色一一細分的時候就不是粗色了，是多個果色合在一起才成為粗色的。現在反駁說，即使是多個父母的因極微合在一起，也足以形成粗色，足以成為色根的對境，又何必需要子果的粗色呢？對方認為父母的極微即使眾多結合，仍然不能成為粗色，而果色則不然，一結合就是粗色。現在立量說：多個父母的極微結合，應該不能成為細色，因為其量等於粗果色。就像粗果色一樣。果色多個結合，應該不能成為粗色，因為其量等於極微。就像父母的極微一樣。對方說父母的極微即使和合，也不是根的對境，粗色相合才能成為根的對境。現在要讓父母的極微合成根的對境，所以說足以成為根的對境。又立量說：多個極微結合也應該成為粗色，因為是許多結合。就像粗果色一樣。對方認為許多極微即使結合也不能成為粗色。多個極微結合應該成為根的對境，因為是許多結合。就像粗果色一樣。

論：既然已經多分，成為粗色，那前後就自相矛盾了。

述曰：下面是第二部分，破斥所生的果體是實有。果既然已經多分，成為粗色，那就不應該是實有，因為是多分而成。就像軍隊、森林等一樣。而且你所執持的觀點前後自相矛盾。前面說果色的子微和一物雖然粗，但其量仍然等於那一因的極微。已經被詰難之後，又說是量和德的結合。又轉而說其量等於二因的極微。直到現在又說，多分所成的粗色根本不是一物。又已經多分，還稱之為實有，所以是前後自相矛盾，反覆執著。

論：而且果與因……就像兩個極微一樣。

述曰：從下面開始是第三大段，合併破斥父母和子。而且粗果色與因極微都是……

【English Translation】 English version: are of two kinds. For example, even the combination of the paramāṇu (ultimate particles) of parents does not form a sthūla-rūpa (gross form). Therefore, this gross form, like the paramāṇu of parents, is not perceived by the rūpa-indriya (sense organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch). The two kinds of measure mentioned here are as previously described.

Treatise: If there are already many subdivisions of the fruit (phala, result), what is the use of the fruit?

Commentary: The following is the fourth part of the sub-section, combining the meanings of refutation and defense. If the opponent encounters a challenge and then offers a defense, saying that when the fruit-color is subdivided one by one, it is not a gross color; it is the combination of multiple fruit-colors that forms a gross color. Now, the refutation is that even the combination of multiple causal paramāṇu of parents is sufficient to form a gross color, sufficient to become the object of the sense organs of color. What need is there for the gross color of the child-fruit? The opponent believes that even if the paramāṇu of parents combine in large numbers, they still cannot become a gross color, whereas the fruit-color is different; once combined, it is a gross color. Now, a proposition is established: the combination of multiple paramāṇu of parents should not become a subtle color, because its measure is equal to the gross fruit-color, just like the gross fruit-color. The combination of multiple fruit-colors should not become a gross color, because its measure is equal to the paramāṇu, just like the paramāṇu of parents. The opponent says that even if the paramāṇu of parents combine, they are not the object of the sense organs; the combination of gross colors becomes the object of the sense organs. Now, to make the paramāṇu of parents combine to become the object of the sense organs, it is said that it is sufficient to become the object of the sense organs. Another proposition is established: the combination of multiple paramāṇu should also become a gross color, because it is a combination of many, just like the gross fruit-color. The opponent believes that even if many paramāṇu combine, they cannot become a gross color. The combination of multiple paramāṇu should become the object of the sense organs, because it is a combination of many, just like the gross fruit-color.

Treatise: Since it has already been divided into many parts, becoming a gross color, then there is a contradiction between the beginning and the end.

Commentary: The following is the second part, refuting that the produced fruit-body is real. Since the fruit has already been divided into many parts, becoming a gross color, then it should not be real, because it is formed from many parts, just like an army, a forest, etc. Moreover, your held view is self-contradictory. Earlier, it was said that although the child-particle of the fruit-color and one thing are gross, their measure is still equal to the paramāṇu of that one cause. After being challenged, it was said that it is a combination of measure and quality. Then it was said that its measure is equal to the paramāṇu of the two causes. Until now, it is said that the gross color formed from many parts is not one thing at all. Having already been divided into many parts, it is still called real, so it is a self-contradictory and repeatedly held view.

Treatise: Moreover, the fruit and the cause... are like two paramāṇu.

Commentary: From below begins the third major section, combining the refutation of parents and child. Moreover, the gross fruit-color and the causal paramāṇu are both...

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有質礙。亦應不得同一處住。如二極微。二極微有礙。即不得同處。如何因果二色俱有礙遂得同處。同處者即相涉入義。謂所生果色涉入因極微中。故為此破。上來意爾。此中比量雖非次第。如文具有。量云。粗果。與因父母極微。應不同處。許有礙故。如二極微。

論。若謂果因至藥入镕銅。

述曰。若彼救言因果相受入。如一沙受水。鍮石之藥入于镕銅。沙得水而不增。銅得藥而不長。即水入沙腹中。藥入銅里。因極微得果色因不增大。如沙受水等。故無違者。牒彼計也。

論。誰許沙銅至非一非常。

述曰。今破之云。誰許沙．銅體受水．藥。此即不許沙體受水。但入二沙中間空處。不入一沙體之中也。亦應果色入二極微中間空處。不入一極微之體中。謂藥入銅亦復如是。即是造金鍮石是也。謂藥于銅中安。變成金時。藥但入銅之空隙處。非入極微之中。是此宗義。此顯不入義　下就宗難。若果色入因極微中。應如沙受水而離。謂水入沙中。二沙即相離遠。不是水微入沙之中。一量云。汝宗水入沙。應離非一。許水入中故。如二沙中間　二或子微入父母極微腹中亦應離非一。許入中故。如水入沙　三又二微相觸。如粗物相擊體不相受遂即離散。汝何言果色入因極微之中。因極微體應離

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果存在阻礙，那麼它們就不應該在同一個地方。例如，兩個極微（paramāṇu，物質的最小單位），如果它們之間存在阻礙，就不能在同一個地方。如果因和果兩種色法都存在阻礙，那麼它們怎麼可能在同一個地方呢？在同一個地方意味著相互涉入，也就是說，所產生的果色涉入了作為原因的極微之中。因此，這裡是爲了駁斥這種觀點。以上就是這個意思。雖然這裡的比量（anumāna，推理）不是按照順序排列的，但文中的確包含了這些內容。比量如下：粗大的果，與作為父母的因極微，應該不在同一個地方。因為它們被認為是存在阻礙的，就像兩個極微一樣。

論：如果說果因就像藥進入熔化的銅一樣。

述曰：如果對方辯解說，因和果是相互容納的，就像沙子容納水，鍮石（tuttha，一種礦物）的藥進入熔化的銅中一樣。沙子得到水不會增加，銅得到藥也不會增長。也就是說，水進入沙子的腹中，藥進入銅的裡面。因極微得到果色，因也不會增大，就像沙子容納水一樣，所以沒有矛盾之處。這是重複對方的觀點。

論：誰允許沙子和銅的本體接受水和藥？

述曰：現在駁斥這種觀點。誰允許沙子和銅的本體接受水和藥？這裡並不允許沙子的本體接受水，水只是進入兩粒沙子中間的空隙處，而不是進入一粒沙子的本體之中。果色也應該進入兩個極微中間的空隙處，而不是進入一個極微的本體之中。所謂藥進入銅中也是如此，也就是製造金鍮石的過程。當藥在銅中，變成金的時候，藥只是進入銅的空隙處，而不是進入極微之中。這是這個宗派的觀點。這表明不進入的含義。下面就宗派進行詰難。如果果色進入因極微之中，應該像沙子容納水一樣分離。也就是說，水進入沙子中，兩粒沙子就會相互遠離。不是水微粒進入沙子之中。一個比量是：你們宗派的水進入沙子，應該分離而不是一體。因為你們承認水進入沙子的中間，就像兩粒沙子中間一樣。第二個比量是：或者子極微進入父母極微的腹中，也應該分離而不是一體。因為你們承認進入其中，就像水進入沙子一樣。第三個比量是：另外，兩個極微相互接觸，就像粗大的物體相互撞擊，本體不能相互容納，就會離散。你們怎麼說果色進入因極微之中呢？因極微的本體應該分離。

【English Translation】 English version: If there is obstruction, then they should not reside in the same place. For example, two paramāṇu (ultimate particles, the smallest unit of matter), if there is obstruction between them, cannot be in the same place. If both the cause and effect rūpa (form, matter) have obstruction, how can they be in the same place? Being in the same place means mutual interpenetration, that is, the produced effect rūpa interpenetrates the cause paramāṇu. Therefore, this is to refute this view. The above is the meaning. Although the anumāna (inference) here is not in order, the text does contain these contents. The anumāna is as follows: The gross effect, and the cause paramāṇu that are like parents, should not be in the same place. Because they are considered to have obstruction, just like two paramāṇu.

Treatise: If it is said that the effect and cause are like medicine entering molten copper.

Commentary: If the opponent argues that the cause and effect are mutually accommodating, like sand accommodating water, and tuttha (a type of mineral) medicine entering molten copper. Sand getting water does not increase, and copper getting medicine does not grow. That is, water enters the belly of the sand, and medicine enters the inside of the copper. The cause paramāṇu getting the effect rūpa does not increase the cause, just like sand accommodating water, so there is no contradiction. This is repeating the opponent's view.

Treatise: Who allows the substance of sand and copper to receive water and medicine?

Commentary: Now refute this view. Who allows the substance of sand and copper to receive water and medicine? Here it is not allowed that the substance of sand receives water, but water only enters the empty space between two grains of sand, not into the substance of one grain of sand. The effect rūpa should also enter the empty space between two paramāṇu, not into the substance of one paramāṇu. The so-called medicine entering copper is also like this, which is the process of making gold tuttha. When the medicine is in the copper, and it becomes gold, the medicine only enters the empty space of the copper, not into the paramāṇu. This is the view of this school. This shows the meaning of not entering. Below, the school is challenged. If the effect rūpa enters the cause paramāṇu, it should separate like sand accommodating water. That is, when water enters the sand, the two grains of sand will move away from each other. It is not that the water particles enter the sand. One anumāna is: Your school's water entering the sand should separate and not be one. Because you admit that water enters the middle of the sand, just like between two grains of sand. The second anumāna is: Or the child paramāṇu entering the belly of the parent paramāṇu should also separate and not be one. Because you admit that it enters it, just like water entering the sand. The third anumāna is: Also, two paramāṇu touching each other, like coarse objects colliding with each other, the substance cannot accommodate each other, and they will disperse. How do you say that the effect rūpa enters the cause paramāṇu? The substance of the cause paramāṇu should separate.

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散。為果微所觸故。如粗物相擊。又藥入镕銅。入其間隙。二極微不相入。雖居間隙。藥令銅極微變為金者。量云。果色設許入因極微之間。亦應變彼因極微異本。許入極微腹中故。如藥變銅也　故論言應離變者是也。水入沙而離。或相擊而離。藥入銅而變也。沙離故非一。藥變故非常。汝極微亦應爾。非一非常。如銅．沙等。

論。又粗果色至彼應如此。

述曰。此中二十論言。一應無次行。俱時至未至。及多有間事。並難見細物。破衛世計。今亦同之。果色是一。如得此一處一分時。一切處一切分亦應得。以彼此一故。彼應如此。論雖為比量但舉一邊。亦應言此應如彼。大乘以理。無實一物。乃至一極微亦無實一。是假立故。無不定失。今破實一也。

論。不許違理至虛妄計度。

述曰。不許違理者。謂若不許得此即得彼。即違彼此是一體之比量理也。若許便違世間之事。進隨自宗得。違事不成。退隨他不得。違理不成。此即近結。若遠結者。進從於他。便違自教。退隨自教。有違理失。故是所執進退不成。但是妄情所計度也。結歸唯識。

論。然諸外道至不過四種。

述曰。就破外道中。上來別破十三外道法訖。已下第二總攝為四種。于中有二。初總后別。此總舉訖。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：散壞。這是因為果實的微細部分接觸到了極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）的緣故，就像粗糙的物體相互撞擊一樣。又像藥物進入熔化的銅中，進入其間的縫隙。兩個極微不能相互進入。即使處於間隙之中，藥物能使銅的極微轉變為金，可以這樣推論：如果果實的顏色被允許進入作為原因的極微之間，也應該改變那個作為原因的極微的原本性質。因為允許進入極微的內部，就像藥物改變銅一樣。因此，《論》中說應該分離變化就是這個意思。水進入沙子會分離，或者相互撞擊而分離，藥物進入銅中會發生變化。沙子分離所以不是一體的，藥物使銅變化所以不是恒常的。你們的極微也應該這樣，不是一體的，不是恒常的，就像銅和沙子等一樣。

論：又粗大的果實的顏色到達那裡也應該如此。

述記：這裡，《二十唯識論》中說，一應該沒有次第行進，同時到達未到達，以及多有間隔的事情，並且難以見到細微的物體，破斥衛世師（Vaiśeṣika）的計度。現在也同樣如此。果實的顏色是一體的，如果得到這一處的一個部分時，一切處的一切部分也應該得到，因為彼此是一體的緣故。那裡應該如此。論雖然是比量，但只舉了一邊，也應該說這裡應該像那裡一樣。大乘依據道理，沒有真實的一體之物，乃至一個極微也沒有真實的單一性，是假立的緣故，沒有不確定的過失。現在破斥真實的一體性。

論：不承認就違背道理，只是虛妄的計度。

述記：不承認違背道理，是指如果不承認得到這裡就得到那裡，就違背了彼此是一體的比量道理。如果承認就違背了世間的事情。前進隨順自己的宗派，違背事情不能成立；後退隨順他人，違背道理不能成立。這是近處的結論。如果遠處的結論，前進順從他人，就違背了自己的教義；後退隨順自己的教義，有違背道理的過失。所以這是所執著的進退兩難，只是虛妄的情感所計度的。結論歸於唯識。

論：然而各種外道，總括起來不過四種。

述記：就破斥外道中，上面分別破斥了十三種外道法完畢。以下第二部分總括為四種。其中有二，先總后別。這裡是總的舉出完畢。

【English Translation】 English version: Dissolution. This is because the subtle parts of the fruit come into contact with the paramāṇu (the smallest unit of matter), just like rough objects colliding with each other. It is also like medicine entering molten copper, entering the gaps between them. Two paramāṇus cannot penetrate each other. Even if they are in the gaps, if the medicine can transform the paramāṇu of copper into gold, it can be inferred that if the color of the fruit is allowed to enter between the paramāṇus that are the cause, it should also change the original nature of that paramāṇu that is the cause. Because it is allowed to enter the inside of the paramāṇu, just like medicine changes copper. Therefore, the statement in the Treatise that there should be separation and change means this. Water entering sand will separate, or separate by colliding with each other, and medicine entering copper will change. Sand separates, so it is not one entity; medicine changes copper, so it is not constant. Your paramāṇus should also be like this, not one entity, not constant, just like copper and sand, etc.

Treatise: Furthermore, the color of a coarse fruit reaching there should also be like this.

Commentary: Here, in the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only, it is said that one should not have sequential movement, arriving simultaneously or not arriving, as well as things with many intervals, and it is difficult to see subtle objects, refuting the calculations of the Vaiśeṣika. Now it is the same. The color of the fruit is one entity; if one part of it is obtained in this one place, then all parts in all places should also be obtained, because they are one entity with each other. It should be like that there. Although the Treatise is an inference, it only mentions one side; it should also be said that this should be like that. Mahayana relies on reason; there is no real single entity, and even a single paramāṇu does not have real singularity; it is falsely established, so there is no uncertain fault. Now we refute the real singularity.

Treatise: Not admitting it violates reason, it is just a false calculation.

Commentary: Not admitting violates reason means that if one does not admit that obtaining here means obtaining there, then it violates the reasoning of the inference that they are one entity with each other. If one admits it, then it violates worldly affairs. Advancing in accordance with one's own school, violating affairs cannot be established; retreating in accordance with others, violating reason cannot be established. This is the near conclusion. If it is a distant conclusion, advancing in accordance with others violates one's own teachings; retreating in accordance with one's own teachings has the fault of violating reason. Therefore, this is a dilemma of what is adhered to, and it is just a calculation of false emotions. The conclusion returns to Consciousness-Only.

Treatise: However, the various non-Buddhist paths are summarized into no more than four types.

Commentary: Regarding the refutation of non-Buddhist paths, the above separately refuted the thirteen types of non-Buddhist dharmas. The second part below summarizes them into four types. There are two parts to it, first general and then specific. Here is the completion of the general enumeration.

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論。一執有法至如數論等。

述曰。此即僧佉自部之中分為十八部。故今言數論等。或他外道等非一。彼說。勝論所執大有同異。我自宗中不離有體法外別有此二性。二性即法體。法體與此一故　有等性者。等同異性也。不言同異言等性者。顯有等是彼性故。又等同異顯類別故。以是法性。故別破之。

論。彼執非理至體無差別。

述曰。此非之也。第一違比量。勿一切法即有性故。皆如有性是一無差。汝既執有體法即是有性。但是有體法有義不殊。皆是有故。故有體法應無差別。今立量云。汝唯量等。應無差別。即有性故。如諸法非無　諸法非無。即是有性。有性皆無別。其有性既無差。法亦應爾。故以為喻。

論。便違三德至諸法差別。

述曰。此違自教及違世間。汝宗二十三諦。自望雖無別。以體即自性故。而許三德及我四法有別。故論中言三德及我。又汝三德及我四法。皆應無差。即有性故。如二十三諦。二十三諦體無別故。若言一切悉皆無差。豈不自違宗意　又我等者。等二十三諦差別體相。又違世間現見可知。此破大有即有三違。一比量。二自宗。三世間。

次難同異性。

論。又若色等至青黃等異。

述曰。但言色性。即一切色無有差別。一

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論。一執有法至如數論等。

述曰。此即僧佉（Samkhya，數論）自部之中分為十八部。故今言數論等。或他外道等非一。彼說。勝論（Vaisheshika）所執大有同異。我自宗中不離有體法外別有此二性。二性即法體。法體與此一故　有等性者。等同異性也。不言同異言等性者。顯有等是彼性故。又等同異顯類別故。以是法性。故別破之。

論。彼執非理至體無差別。

述曰。此非之也。第一違比量。勿一切法即有性故。皆如有性是一無差。汝既執有體法即是有性。但是有體法有義不殊。皆是有故。故有體法應無差別。今立量云。汝唯量等。應無差別。即有性故。如諸法非無　諸法非無。即是有性。有性皆無別。其有性既無差。法亦應爾。故以為喻。

論。便違三德至諸法差別。

述曰。此違自教及違世間。汝宗二十三諦。自望雖無別。以體即自性故。而許三德及我四法有別。故論中言三德及我。又汝三德及我四法。皆應無差。即有性故。如二十三諦。二十三諦體無別故。若言一切悉皆無差。豈不自違宗意　又我等者。等二十三諦差別體相。又違世間現見可知。此破大有即有三違。一比量。二自宗。三世間。

次難同異性。

論。又若色等至青黃等異。

述曰。但言色性。即一切色無有差別。一

【English Translation】 English version Treatise. One adheres to the existence of dharma, such as the Samkhya school, etc.

Commentary: This refers to the Samkhya (enumeration) school itself, which is divided into eighteen sub-schools. Hence the mention of 'Samkhya, etc.' Or other non-Buddhist schools, etc., are not singular. They say that the Vaisheshika (particularist) school holds that the great self has both similarities and differences. In our own school, apart from the dharma of existence, there are these two natures. These two natures are the essence of dharma. The essence of dharma is one with this. 'Having equality of nature' means having equality of similarities and differences. Not speaking of similarities and differences but speaking of 'equality of nature' shows that having equality is their nature. Moreover, equality of similarities and differences reveals categories. Because it is the nature of dharma, it is refuted separately.

Treatise: Their adherence is unreasonable, leading to no difference in essence.

Commentary: This refutes them. Firstly, it contradicts inference. Do not all dharmas have the nature of existence? All are like the nature of existence, being one without difference. Since you hold that the dharma of existence is the nature of existence, but the meaning of the dharma of existence is not different, all are existence. Therefore, the dharma of existence should have no difference. Now, establishing a measure, it is said: Your only measure, etc., should have no difference, because it is the nature of existence. Like all dharmas are not non-existent. All dharmas are not non-existent, which is the nature of existence. The nature of existence has no difference. If the nature of existence has no difference, then the dharmas should also be the same. Therefore, it is used as a metaphor.

Treatise: It then contradicts the three qualities, leading to differences in all dharmas.

Commentary: This contradicts their own teachings and contradicts the world. Your school's twenty-three principles, although having no difference in themselves, because their essence is their own nature, admit that the three qualities and the four aspects of the self are different. Therefore, the treatise speaks of the three qualities and the self. Moreover, your three qualities and four aspects of the self should all have no difference, because they are the nature of existence. Like the twenty-three principles, the essence of the twenty-three principles has no difference. If you say that everything is without difference, would it not contradict your own school's intention? Moreover, 'self, etc.' equals the different characteristics of the twenty-three principles. It also contradicts what is seen and known in the world. This refutes the great self having three contradictions: one, inference; two, their own school; three, the world.

Next, it is difficult to distinguish between similarity and difference.

Treatise: Moreover, if color, etc., leads to differences such as blue and yellow, etc.

Commentary: Simply speaking of the nature of color means that all colors have no difference. One

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切色法皆有變礙為色性故。諸人共許。今立量云。此青．黃等色應無差別。即色性故。如色性　色性一切色是一。諸色皆色性。故以為喻　問破一切法即大有同異。今佛法豈離法外別有大有等耶　答曰。我但破汝之非。非我即為定也。

論。二執有法至如勝論等。

述曰。勝論自部亦有十八。故復言等。計前已敘。

論。彼執非理至體不可得。

述曰。此總破也。汝大有外一切法體應不可得。非有性故。如已滅無。即舉五無之中一也。

論。便違實等至現見有物。

述曰。若體不可得。便違自執實等是有。違自宗也。亦違世間現見有物。三失如前。此破大有。

次難同異。

論。又若色等至非眼等境。

述曰。難色若非色性。應如聲非眼境。量云。汝色應非眼境。非色性故。如彼聲等。此中色等言。即等取自所依三大。及余眼境者。恐有不定過故。又更互作法。等一切法。故後言等　問若難色非眼境。豈不違宗．世間．現量等過　答彼所執色通常無常。是無礙德句收者。佛法不許。有法既言汝所執色。以別其宗。故無違教．現量等過。

論。三執有法至如無慚等。

述曰。即是尼揵子。今正翻云離系。亦云無慚。即無羞也。離三界繫縛也。以其

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 一切有形之法，都具有變化和阻礙的性質，這是大家公認的。現在我提出一個論證：這些青色、黃色等顏色應該沒有差別，因為它們都具有有形之法的性質。就像有形之法的性質一樣，一切顏色都是一種有形之法的性質，所有顏色都具有有形之法的性質，所以可以用作比喻。有人問：破斥一切法，就等於承認『大有』（Maha Sattva，一種實體概念）的同一性和差異性。那麼，佛法難道不是在一切法之外，另立一個『大有』之類的概念嗎？回答是：我只是破斥你的錯誤觀點，並非我堅持某種固定的觀點。

論：二、執著『有法』（Sattvavada，存在論）的，如勝論派等。

述：勝論派（Vaisheshika）自身也有十八個分支，所以說『等』。他們的觀點前面已經敘述過了。

論：他們所執著的道理不合理，以至於本體都無法獲得。

述：這是總體的破斥。你所認為的『大有』之外的一切法的本體，應該都無法獲得，因為它們不具有『有』的性質。就像已經滅亡的事物一樣。這裡舉了五種『無』（Abhava）中的一種。

論：這樣就違背了他們自己所執著的『實』（Dravya，實體）等是『有』的觀點，也違背了世間現量所見到的事物。

述：如果本體無法獲得，就違背了他們自己所執著的『實』等是存在的觀點，這是違背自己的宗派。也違背了世間現量所見到的事物。這三種過失和前面一樣。這是破斥『大有』。

接下來是駁斥『同一』和『差異』。

論：又如果顏色等不是有形之法的性質，就應該像聲音不是眼睛的對境一樣。

述：駁斥說，如果顏色不是有形之法的性質，就應該像聲音不是眼睛的對境一樣。論證如下：你所說的顏色應該不是眼睛的對境，因為它不是有形之法的性質，就像聲音等一樣。這裡說『顏色等』，就包括了它所依賴的三大（地、水、火），以及其他的眼睛的對境。恐怕有不確定的過失，所以又互相作為法。包括一切法，所以後面說『等』。有人問：如果駁斥顏色不是眼睛的對境，豈不是違背了宗派、世間、現量等過失？回答是：他們所執著的顏色通常是無常的，是被『無礙德句』（Anavarana-guna-vakya）所包含的，而佛法是不承認的。既然說『你所執著的顏色』，就是爲了區別於他們的宗派，所以沒有違背教義、現量等過失。

論：三、執著『有法』的，如尼揵子等。

述：就是尼揵子（Nigantha，耆那教）。現在正確的翻譯是『離系』，也叫『無慚』，就是沒有羞恥。意思是脫離三界的繫縛。因為他們...

【English Translation】 English version: All conditioned dharmas (phenomena) have the nature of change and obstruction, which is universally acknowledged. Now, I propose an argument: these colors such as blue and yellow should have no difference, because they all possess the nature of conditioned dharmas. Just like the nature of conditioned dharmas, all colors are a kind of nature of conditioned dharmas, and all colors possess the nature of conditioned dharmas, so it can be used as a metaphor. Someone asks: Refuting all dharmas is equivalent to acknowledging the sameness and difference of 'Maha Sattva' (Great Being, a concept of entity). Then, doesn't Buddhism establish a concept like 'Maha Sattva' outside of all dharmas? The answer is: I am only refuting your wrong views, not that I insist on a certain fixed view.

Treatise: Second, those who cling to 'Sattvavada' (the doctrine of existence), such as the Vaisheshika school, etc.

Commentary: The Vaisheshika school itself has eighteen branches, so it says 'etc.' Their views have been described earlier.

Treatise: The principles they cling to are unreasonable, to the extent that the substance cannot be obtained.

Commentary: This is a general refutation. The substance of all dharmas outside of what you consider 'Maha Sattva' should not be obtainable, because they do not possess the nature of 'existence'. Just like things that have already perished. Here, one of the five 'Abhava' (non-existences) is cited.

Treatise: This would contradict their own clinging to 'Dravya' (substance) etc. as 'existent', and also contradict the things seen by direct perception in the world.

Commentary: If the substance cannot be obtained, it would contradict their own clinging to 'Dravya' etc. as existent, which is contradicting their own school. It also contradicts the things seen by direct perception in the world. These three faults are the same as before. This is refuting 'Maha Sattva'.

Next is refuting 'sameness' and 'difference'.

Treatise: Also, if color etc. is not the nature of conditioned dharmas, it should be like sound not being an object of the eye.

Commentary: Refuting that if color is not the nature of conditioned dharmas, it should be like sound not being an object of the eye. The argument is as follows: The color you speak of should not be an object of the eye, because it is not the nature of conditioned dharmas, just like sound etc. Here, 'color etc.' includes the three great elements (earth, water, fire) on which it depends, as well as other objects of the eye. Fearing that there might be an uncertain fault, they are also mutually regarded as dharmas. Including all dharmas, so it says 'etc.' later. Someone asks: If refuting that color is not an object of the eye, wouldn't it violate the faults of school, world, direct perception, etc.? The answer is: The color they cling to is usually impermanent, and is included in 'Anavarana-guna-vakya' (unobstructed virtue sentence), which Buddhism does not acknowledge. Since it says 'the color you cling to', it is to distinguish it from their school, so there is no violation of doctrine, direct perception, etc.

Treatise: Third, those who cling to 'Sattvavada', such as the Niganthas, etc.

Commentary: That is the Niganthas (Jainas). The correct translation now is 'detached', also called 'ashamedless', which means without shame. It means being detached from the bonds of the three realms. Because they...

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露形佛法毀之曰無慚。即無慚羞也。言等者。種類非一故。其有等如共相一切法體不無。體皆同故。法如別相。相狀異故。如共故非一。即別法體故非異。不是別計有大有等。而說亦言。同異性亦爾。一切色同一同異故。此表成俱。其第四師遮即違此說。義亦同故。

論。彼執非理至一異過故。

述曰。一同初過。異同第二過故。

論。二相相違至俱不成故。

述曰。一異既相違。如苦樂體異。一異體應別。二相違故。如苦樂等　一異體同俱不成者。一異不應同體。相相違故。如苦樂等　一即非一。體即異故。如異　異即非異。體即一故。如一　言俱不成。一異二法俱不成故也。

論。勿一切法皆同一體。

述曰。汝一切法應皆同體。許相違法得同體故。如一異相違。一異相違許同體故。一切法成一體也。

論。或應一異至理定不然。

述曰。一故一切法同體。異故諸法體不同。如杌似人牛說為人牛。是假非實。而義說故。此中量云。汝一異應假非實。二相違法一處說故。如似人牛。

論。四執有法至如邪命等。

述曰。如邪命等者。即是阿時縛迦外道。應云正命。佛法毀之。故云邪命。邪活命也。此執非一故亦言等。

論。彼執非理至同異一

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『露形佛法毀之曰無慚』，意為如果顯露出佛法卻加以詆譭，這就是『無慚』（Ashram，沒有羞恥）。『即無慚羞也』，就是說沒有慚愧和羞恥之心。『言等者，種類非一故』，這裡說『等』，是因為種類不止一種。『其有等如共相一切法體不無，體皆同故』，其中有些『等』，比如共相（common characteristics），一切法的本體並非不存在，因為它們的本體是相同的。『法如別相，相狀異故』，法就像別相（distinct characteristics），因為它們的相狀是不同的。『如共故非一，即別法體故非異』，如果像共相那樣，就不是單一的；如果像別相那樣，本體就是不同的。『不是別計有大有等，而說亦言』，不是特別地去計算有大有小等等，而是泛泛地說。『同異性亦爾，一切色同一同異故』，同性和異性也是如此，一切色（form）既有相同之處，也有不同之處。『此表成俱』，這表明它們是共同存在的。『其第四師遮即違此說，義亦同故』，第四種師的遮破就違背了這種說法，因為他們的意義也是相同的。

論：彼執非理至一異過故。

述曰：一同初過，異同第二過故。

論：二相相違至俱不成故。

述曰：一異既相違，如苦樂體異，一異體應別，二相違故，如苦樂等。一異體同俱不成者，一異不應同體，相相違故，如苦樂等。一即非一，體即異故，如異。異即非異，體即一故，如一。言俱不成，一異二法俱不成故也。

論：勿一切法皆同一體。

述曰：汝一切法應皆同體，許相違法得同體故，如一異相違，一異相違許同體故，一切法成一體也。

論：或應一異至理定不然。

述曰：一故一切法同體，異故諸法體不同，如杌似人牛說為人牛，是假非實，而義說故。此中量云：汝一異應假非實，二相違法一處說故，如似人牛。

論：四執有法至如邪命等。

述曰：如邪命等者，即是阿時縛迦外道（Ajivikas，一種古印度的苦行僧團體）。應云正命，佛法毀之，故云邪命，邪活命也。此執非一故亦言等。

論：彼執非理至同異一

【English Translation】 English version: 'Revealing the Dharma and then denigrating it is called 'Ashram' (without shame). 'That is, without shame and embarrassment,' meaning without a sense of shame or embarrassment. 'Speaking of 'etc.' because there is more than one type,' here 'etc.' is mentioned because there are multiple types. 'Some 'etc.' such as the common characteristics, the essence of all dharmas is not non-existent, because their essence is the same,' among them, some 'etc.,' such as common characteristics, the essence of all dharmas is not non-existent because their essence is the same. 'Dharma is like distinct characteristics, because their appearances are different,' dharma is like distinct characteristics because their appearances are different. 'If it is like the common, then it is not singular; if it is like the distinct, then the essence is different,' if it is like the common characteristics, then it is not singular; if it is like the distinct characteristics, then the essence is different. 'It is not specifically calculating whether there is large or small, etc., but speaking generally,' it is not specifically calculating whether there is large or small, etc., but speaking generally. 'The nature of sameness and difference is also like this, all forms have both sameness and difference,' the nature of sameness and difference is also like this, all forms have both sameness and difference. 'This shows that they exist together,' this shows that they exist together. 'The fourth teacher's refutation contradicts this statement because their meaning is also the same,' the fourth teacher's refutation contradicts this statement because their meaning is also the same.

Treatise: Their attachment is unreasonable, leading to the fault of oneness and otherness.

Commentary: Oneness is the first fault, otherness and sameness are the second fault.

Treatise: Two opposing characteristics lead to mutual non-establishment.

Commentary: Since oneness and otherness are contradictory, like the difference between the essence of suffering and joy, the essence of oneness and otherness should be separate because the two are contradictory, like suffering and joy, etc. The essence of oneness and otherness being the same leads to mutual non-establishment, oneness and otherness should not have the same essence because they are contradictory, like suffering and joy, etc. One is not one, the essence is different, like otherness. Otherness is not otherness, the essence is the same, like oneness. Saying 'mutual non-establishment' means that the two dharmas of oneness and otherness are not established.

Treatise: Do not let all dharmas be of the same essence.

Commentary: All your dharmas should be of the same essence, allowing contradictory things to have the same essence, like the contradiction between oneness and otherness, allowing the contradiction between oneness and otherness to have the same essence, all dharmas become one essence.

Treatise: Or oneness and otherness should definitely not be true.

Commentary: Because of oneness, all dharmas have the same essence; because of otherness, the essence of all dharmas is different, like a stump resembling a person or a cow being called a person or a cow, which is false and not real, but spoken of in meaning. Here, the measure says: Your oneness and otherness should be false and not real, because two contradictory things are spoken of in one place, like resembling a person or a cow.

Treatise: The four attachments to existing dharmas are like the wrong livelihood, etc.

Commentary: Like the wrong livelihood, etc., refers to the Ajivikas (a group of ancient Indian ascetics). It should be called right livelihood, but the Buddha Dharma denigrates it, so it is called wrong livelihood, a wrong way of living. This attachment is not singular, so 'etc.' is also mentioned.

Treatise: Their attachment is unreasonable, leading to sameness and otherness being one.

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故。

述曰。謂若言非一。同前異過。若言非異同前一過也。彼若復言不須別言若非一同前異破。別言若非異。同前一破。應一時言非一非異。

論。非一異言為遮為表。

述曰。此問定也。

論。若唯是表應不雙非。

述曰。雙非非表。故如雲石女無兒無女。雙無之言無所表故。

論。若但是遮應無所執。

述曰。量云。汝應無所執。但遮他故。如言石女無兒女等。

汝所執法即是所表。云何言遮都無所表。無所表故應無所執。以無執故何所競耶。

論。亦遮亦表應互相違。

述曰。若遮時無表故。若表時無遮故。此二相違如何言一。汝之表．遮應非體一。相相違故。如水火等。

又此言表即同第一。若言遮者即同第二。

論。非表非遮應成戲論。

述曰。何所名目。但是戲論。俱無所成。

論。又非一異至決定實有。

述曰。即違世間有一異物。謂青是一。與黃為異故。以雙非故。即無有法。便違自宗色等有法決定實有。一異相違非實有故。如何非一異。豈色與色非一。與聲等非異。

論。是故彼言至勿謬許之。

述曰。總結非也。此唯矯詐復茍避過。諸有智者勿謬許之謂為中理。

成唯識論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此。

解釋說：如果說『非一』，就和前面一樣犯了『異』的過失。如果說『非異』，就和前面一樣犯了『一』的過失。如果對方又說不需要分別說『非一』，就和前面一樣用『異』來破斥。如果分別說『非異』，就和前面一樣用『一』來破斥。應該同時說『非一非異』。

論：『非一異』的說法是爲了遮遣還是爲了表述？

解釋說：這是爲了確定對方的觀點。

論：如果僅僅是表述，就不應該雙重否定。

解釋說：雙重否定不是表述。就像說『石女沒有兒子也沒有女兒』，這種雙重否定的說法沒有任何表述。

論：如果僅僅是遮遣，就應該沒有任何執著。

解釋說：可以這樣論證：你應該沒有任何執著，因為你只是遮遣他人。就像說『石女沒有兒子女兒』等等。

你所執著的法就是你所表述的，怎麼能說遮遣而沒有任何表述呢？因為沒有表述，所以應該沒有執著。因為沒有執著，還爭論什麼呢？

論：既遮遣又表述，應該互相矛盾。

解釋說：遮遣的時候就沒有表述，表述的時候就沒有遮遣。這兩種狀態是矛盾的，怎麼能說是一個呢？你的表述和遮遣應該不是同一個本體，因為它們互相矛盾，就像水和火一樣。

而且，這種說法如果說是表述，就和第一種說法一樣；如果說是遮遣，就和第二種說法一樣。

論：非表述非遮遣，應該成為戲論。

解釋說：那還叫什麼呢？這只是戲論，沒有任何成就。

論：又說非一非異，就違背了決定實有。

解釋說：這就違背了世間存在『一』和『異』的事物。比如青色是一個，和黃色是不同的。因為雙重否定，就沒有法存在，就違背了自己宗派所說的色等法決定實有。『一』和『異』是相互矛盾的，不是真實存在的，怎麼能說非一非異呢？難道色和色不是一嗎？和聲等不是異嗎？

論：所以，那種說法只是狡辯，不要錯誤地認可它。

解釋說：總結說，那種說法是不對的。這只是狡辯和茍且逃避過失。有智慧的人不要錯誤地認可它，認為這是中正的道理。

《成唯識論》

【English Translation】 English version Therefore.

Explanation: If one says 'not one', it commits the same fault as 'different' mentioned earlier. If one says 'not different', it commits the same fault as 'one' mentioned earlier. If the opponent further says that there is no need to separately say 'not one', it can be refuted with 'different' as before. If one separately says 'not different', it can be refuted with 'one' as before. One should simultaneously say 'neither one nor different'.

Treatise: Is the statement 'neither one nor different' for negation or for affirmation?

Explanation: This is to ascertain the opponent's view.

Treatise: If it is only affirmation, it should not be a double negation.

Explanation: Double negation is not affirmation. It is like saying 'a barren woman has no son and no daughter'; such a double negative statement does not affirm anything.

Treatise: If it is only negation, there should be no attachment.

Explanation: One can argue: You should have no attachment, because you are only negating others. It is like saying 'a barren woman has no son or daughter', etc.

The dharma you are attached to is what you are affirming. How can you say you are negating and not affirming anything? Because there is no affirmation, there should be no attachment. Because there is no attachment, what is there to argue about?

Treatise: Both negation and affirmation should be mutually contradictory.

Explanation: When there is negation, there is no affirmation; when there is affirmation, there is no negation. These two states are contradictory, how can they be said to be one? Your affirmation and negation should not be the same entity, because they are mutually contradictory, like water and fire.

Moreover, if this statement is said to be affirmation, it is the same as the first statement; if it is said to be negation, it is the same as the second statement.

Treatise: Neither affirmation nor negation should become a frivolous argument.

Explanation: What is it then called? It is just a frivolous argument, achieving nothing.

Treatise: Furthermore, saying neither one nor different contradicts the established reality.

Explanation: This contradicts the worldly existence of things that are 'one' and 'different'. For example, blue is one, and it is different from yellow. Because of double negation, no dharma exists, which contradicts the tenet of our school that dharmas such as color are definitely real. 'One' and 'different' are mutually contradictory and not truly existent, so how can one say neither one nor different? Is color not one with color? Is it not different from sound, etc.?

Treatise: Therefore, that statement is merely sophistry; do not mistakenly accept it.

Explanation: In conclusion, that statement is incorrect. This is merely sophistry and a cowardly attempt to evade faults. Wise people should not mistakenly accept it, thinking it is a balanced view.

'Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi' (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only)

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述記卷第一 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

成唯識論述記卷第二(本)

沙門基撰

自下第二別破小乘。于中有三。初總問。次略答。后廣破。

論。余乘所執至如何非有。

述曰。即總問也。大乘之餘即小乘也。若言異識大乘亦成。色異心故。今言離識簡違宗過。

論。彼所執色至理非有故。

述曰。即略答也。心心所等稍同大乘。故且未破。

論。且所執色至非極微成。

述曰。下廣破也。于中有三。初破色。次破不相應。后破無為。以心．心所是能取故。體即識故。稍相近故。后總破內方始破之　破法之中總有十一部。顯義別破。謂薩婆多．經量部．正量部．大眾．一說．說出世．雞胤．上座．化地．飲光．法藏等計。自餘九部宗類皆破　就破色中有三。初總敘外執色之類別。次別牒破之。后總結非有。此即初也　對有三種。謂即所緣．障礙．境界。初所緣有對。謂心．心所于自所緣。次障礙有對。謂十色界自於他處被礙不生。如手礙手等。后境界有對。謂十二界法界一分諸有境法於色等境　初后別者。心．心所法執彼而起。彼於心等名有所緣。若於彼法此有功能。即說彼為此法境界。如俱舍第二等廣說其相。然此中說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 述記卷第一 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

成唯識論述記卷第二(本)

沙門基撰

自下第二，分別破斥小乘的觀點。其中有三個部分：首先是總體的提問，其次是簡略的回答，最後是詳細的破斥。

論：其他乘所執著的，到如何證明它不是真實存在的？

述曰：這就是總體的提問。『大乘之餘』，指的就是小乘。如果說是『異識』，那麼大乘也會變成『色異心』的狀況。現在說『離識』，是爲了避免違背本宗的過失。

論：他們所執著的色，到如何證明在理上是不存在的？

述曰：這是簡略的回答。心和心所等，與大乘有相似之處，所以暫且不破斥。

論：且說他們所執著的色，到如何證明不是由極微組成的？

述曰：下面是詳細的破斥。其中有三個部分：首先破斥色，其次破斥不相應行法，最後破斥無為法。因為心和心所是能取，其體性就是識，所以比較相近，放在後面總的破斥，然後才開始破斥。在破斥法之中，總共有十一個部派（的觀點）。爲了顯明意義，分別破斥，包括薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，一切有部），經量部（Sautrantika，又稱說轉部），正量部（Sammitiya，又稱正量部、犢子部），大眾部（Mahasanghika），一說部（Ekavyavaharika），說出世部（Lokottaravada），雞胤部（Kasyapiya），上座部（Theravada），化地部（Mahisasaka），飲光部（Kasyapiya），法藏部（Dharmaguptaka）等的觀點。其餘九個部派的宗義，都可以用類似的方法破斥。就破斥色法而言，有三個部分：首先總的敘述外道執著的色的類別，其次分別列舉並破斥，最後總結色法不是真實存在的。這裡是第一個部分。對有三種：即所緣對、障礙對、境界對。首先是所緣對，指心和心所對於它們所緣的對象。其次是障礙對，指十色入自身在其他地方受到阻礙而不能產生，比如手阻礙手等。最後是境界對，指十二界和法界的一部分有境法對於色等境界。第一個和最後一個的區別在於，心和心所法執著于某個對像而生起，那個對像對於心等來說，就叫做所緣。如果某個法對於另一個法有作用，就說那個法是這個法的境界。就像《俱舍論》第二卷等詳細地說明了它們的相狀。然而這裡說的是...

【English Translation】 English version Shuji Volume 1 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 43 No. 1830 Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only

Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 2 (Original)

Composed by Shramana Ji

From here onwards, the second section separately refutes the Hinayana (Small Vehicle). Within this section, there are three parts: first, a general question; second, a brief answer; and third, a detailed refutation.

Treatise: What the other vehicles adhere to, how can it be proven that it is not real?

Commentary: This is the general question. 『Other than the Mahayana (Great Vehicle)』 refers to the Hinayana. If it were said to be 『different consciousnesses,』 then the Mahayana would also become a state of 『form differing from mind.』 Now, saying 『apart from consciousness』 avoids the fault of contradicting the sect's principles.

Treatise: The form they adhere to, how can it be proven that it is not real in principle?

Commentary: This is the brief answer. Mental functions (citta) and mental factors (cetasika) are somewhat similar to the Mahayana, so they are not refuted for the time being.

Treatise: Furthermore, the form they adhere to, how can it be proven that it is not composed of ultimate particles?

Commentary: The following is the detailed refutation. Within this, there are three parts: first, refuting form; second, refuting non-associated formations; and third, refuting unconditioned dharmas. Because mental functions and mental factors are the 'graspers' (subject), and their essence is consciousness, they are relatively close, so they are refuted later in general, and then the refutation begins. Among the refutations of dharmas, there are a total of eleven schools (whose views are addressed). To clarify the meaning, separate refutations are made, including the views of the Sarvastivada (the 'All Exists' school), Sautrantika (the 'Sutra Followers' school), Sammitiya, Mahasanghika, Ekavyavaharika, Lokottaravada, Kasyapiya, Theravada, Mahisasaka, Kasyapiya (again, possibly a variant or related school), and Dharmaguptaka. The doctrines of the remaining nine schools can be refuted in a similar way. Regarding the refutation of form, there are three parts: first, a general description of the types of form adhered to by externalists; second, separate enumeration and refutation; and third, a conclusion that form is not real. This is the first part. 'Opposition' (pratigha) is of three types: object-opposition, obstruction-opposition, and realm-opposition. First, object-opposition refers to the relationship between mental functions and mental factors and their objects. Second, obstruction-opposition refers to the ten sense bases themselves being obstructed in other places and unable to arise, such as a hand obstructing a hand. Third, realm-opposition refers to the twelve sense bases and a portion of the dharma-realm, which are object-possessing dharmas in relation to form and other objects. The difference between the first and last is that mental functions and mental factors arise clinging to an object, and that object is called the 'object of apprehension' (alambana) for the mental functions, etc. If a certain dharma has a function in relation to another dharma, then that dharma is said to be the 'realm' (visaya) of this dharma. This is explained in detail in the second volume of the Abhidharmakosa, etc. However, what is being said here is...

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。對謂對礙。取障礙有對。十處名有對。法處名無對。彼此共成。除勝定果。余宗無故。

論。彼有對色至非實有故。

述曰。牒有對破也。于中有三。初破有對。次破無對。后雙破之　初中有二。先破諸部有對不成。后結有對不成　破有對中有三。初破能成有對極微不成。次破所成有對眼等不成。后申正義　破能成中。初總非。次別破。后總結。此總非也　能成所成根微等義。至文當知　然經部等極微隨眼．色等十處所攝。然非是假。非眼識等得。成和合色為眼等境故。以理而論唯意識得。應法處收。以實從假色等處攝。以假攬此實法成故。正理論中與經部諍。法處不許別有色故。非法處攝也　薩婆多極微隨色等處攝。即和．集色等。細從粗攝故　大乘極微法處假色。不能成眼等積集色故　由此應作四句分別。經部十處粗假細實。大乘世俗粗實細假。薩婆多等粗細俱實。一說部等粗細俱假。以經部師．薩婆多等所計極微各疏遠故。今破之也　然諸部計全疏遠者。因言敘之。近者不述。彼有對色定非實有者。總立宗非。正對薩婆多。若對經部非彼所許。欲難不極成所成有對故。不作此解言對經部者。犯相符極成。彼說所成有對非實有故　能成極微非實有故者。總立因非。然此因有隨一不成。

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【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『對』是指『有對』還是『礙』？如果取『障礙』的意思，那麼『有對』是指十個處（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、色、聲、香、味、觸），『法處』則稱為『無對』。這些處彼此共同構成，但排除勝定（殊勝的禪定）之果，因為其他宗派沒有這種說法。

論：他們所說的『有對色』，最終都不是真實存在的。

述記：這裡是對『有對』進行駁斥。其中分為三個部分：首先駁斥『有對』不成立，其次駁斥『無對』，最後同時駁斥兩者。在駁斥『有對』中，又分為三個部分：首先駁斥能成立『有對』的極微不成立，其次駁斥所成立的『有對』，如眼等不成立，最後闡述正確的觀點。在駁斥能成立『有對』的極微中，首先總的否定，其次分別駁斥，最後總結。能成立和所成立的根、微等含義，到後面的經文自然會明白。然而，經部等宗派認為極微包含在眼、色等十個處所攝，但並非是假立的，也不是眼識等能夠得到的。因為它們能夠形成和合的色法，作為眼等的境界。從道理上來說，只有意識才能得到，應該歸於法處所攝。從實在的角度來說，是從假立的色等處所攝，因為假立的色等處包含著實在的法。正理論中與經部爭論，認為法處不允許有其他的色法，因此不屬於法處所攝。薩婆多部認為極微包含在色等處所攝，也就是和合色等，細微的包含在粗大的之中。大乘認為極微是法處中的假色，不能形成眼等積聚的色法。由此應該作四句分別：經部認為粗的是假立的，細的是實在的；大乘認為世俗中粗的是實在的，細的是假立的；薩婆多等認為粗細都是實在的；一說部等認為粗細都是假立的。因為經部、薩婆多等所說的極微都非常疏遠，所以現在要駁斥他們。然而，對於那些宗派的說法過於疏遠的，就簡單敘述一下，比較接近的就不再贅述。他們所說的『有對色』，肯定不是真實存在的。這是總的立宗否定，主要是針對薩婆多部。如果針對經部，則不符合他們的觀點。想要用不極成的東西來駁斥所成立的『有對』，所以不這樣解釋，說針對經部，就犯了相符極成的錯誤，因為他們認為所成立的『有對』不是真實存在的。能成立『有對』的極微不是真實存在的，這是總的立因否定。然而，這個因中有一個不成立。

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【English Translation】 English version: Is 'to be an object' ('dui') referring to 'having resistance' ('youdui') or 'being an obstacle' ('ai')? If it means 'being an obstacle', then 'having resistance' refers to the ten sense bases (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, form, sound, smell, taste, touch), while the 'dharma base' ('fachu') is called 'without resistance' ('wudui'). These bases mutually constitute each other, but excluding the fruit of superior samadhi (supreme meditative concentration), because other schools do not have this concept.

Treatise: Their so-called 'resistant form' ('youdui se') is ultimately not truly existent.

Commentary: This is a refutation of 'having resistance'. It is divided into three parts: first, refuting that 'having resistance' is not established; second, refuting 'without resistance'; and third, simultaneously refuting both. In refuting 'having resistance', it is further divided into three parts: first, refuting that the ultimate particles that establish 'having resistance' are not established; second, refuting that what is established as 'having resistance', such as the eye, etc., is not established; and third, elaborating the correct view. In refuting the ultimate particles that establish 'having resistance', first, there is a general negation; second, a separate refutation; and third, a summary. The meanings of the root, subtle particles, etc., that establish and are established will naturally become clear in the subsequent text. However, the Sarvastivadins, etc., believe that ultimate particles are included within the ten sense bases such as eye, form, etc., but they are not nominally existent, nor can they be obtained by eye consciousness, etc. Because they can form compounded form as the object of the eye, etc. Logically speaking, only consciousness can obtain them, and they should be included in the dharma base. From a real perspective, they are included in the nominally existent form, etc., because the nominally existent form, etc., contains the real dharma. The Zhengli Lun (Abhidharmakosha-bhasya) argues with the Sautrantikas, believing that the dharma base does not allow for other forms, therefore it is not included in the dharma base. The Sarvastivada school believes that ultimate particles are included in form, etc., that is, compounded form, etc., the subtle being included in the coarse. The Mahayana school believes that ultimate particles are nominally existent form in the dharma base, and cannot form accumulated form such as the eye, etc. Therefore, four possibilities should be distinguished: the Sautrantikas believe that the coarse is nominally existent and the subtle is really existent; the Mahayana believes that the coarse is really existent in the mundane world and the subtle is nominally existent; the Sarvastivada, etc., believe that both the coarse and the subtle are really existent; the Ekavyavaharika, etc., believe that both the coarse and the subtle are nominally existent. Because the ultimate particles spoken of by the Sautrantikas, Sarvastivada, etc., are very distant, they are now being refuted. However, for those schools whose views are too distant, they will be briefly described, and those that are closer will not be elaborated. Their so-called 'resistant form' is definitely not truly existent. This is a general statement of negation, mainly aimed at the Sarvastivada school. If it is aimed at the Sautrantikas, it does not conform to their views. Wanting to use something that is not established to refute the established 'having resistance' is why it is not explained in this way, saying that it is aimed at the Sautrantikas, which would commit the error of conforming to what is already established, because they believe that the established 'having resistance' is not truly existent. The ultimate particles that establish 'having resistance' are not truly existent, this is a general statement of the cause of negation. However, one of the causes in this is not established.

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有二。初破有礙無礙。后破有方分無方分。

論。謂諸極微至是假非實。

述曰。自下別破薩婆多師．經部等計。皆說極微是實有故。皆是礙性。三有對中障礙有對。有對名礙。薩婆多極微是礙　若有方分名礙。薩婆多非礙。唯經部有。已下隨應。量云。此應是假。許質礙故。如瓶等物。

五根．五境亦攝在中。無不定過。此是經部方分質礙。及薩婆多本計。

自下設遮。

論。若無質礙至成瓶衣等。

述曰。恐有異計亦說極微無礙。故今設破。又無方分名為無礙。薩婆多等亦名無礙　量云。汝之極微。不能整合瓶等。以無礙故。如非色法　無為．不相應．心心所等。皆攝在喻中。亦無不定。若對薩婆多。因應改云無方分質礙故。不能一一。可尋比量。正彼論文子細分段亦準可知。

論。又諸極微至便非實有。

述曰。此中量云。所執極微。應可分析應非實有。有方分故。如粗色等。此二比量破經部師諸計極微有方分者。然方即分。更無有分故。二十唯識云。極微有方分。理不應成一。

論。若無方分至承光發影。

述曰。下難無方分。略有五難。此第一極微無方分應無光影難。無方分者是薩婆多計。彼以極微等即是和合色。和合色外無別極微。極微

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有兩種。第一種是破斥有礙和無礙的觀點，第二種是破斥有方分和無方分的觀點。

論：認為所有極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）都是假立的，不是真實的。

述記：以下分別破斥薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）和經部（Sautrāntika）等的觀點。他們都認為極微是實有的，因此都具有阻礙的性質。在三種『有對』中，阻礙屬於『有對』。『有對』被稱為『礙』。薩婆多部所說的極微就是『礙』。如果具有方分（空間分割）就稱為『礙』，薩婆多部不認為極微是『礙』，只有經部這樣認為。以下內容可以根據具體情況進行調整。可以這樣論證：這應該是虛假的，因為它具有物質阻礙的性質，就像瓶子等物體一樣。

五根（indriya，感覺器官）和五境（viṣaya，感覺對像）也包含在其中，沒有不確定的過失。這是經部所說的具有方分的物質阻礙，以及薩婆多部的基本觀點。

以下進行反駁。

論：如果極微沒有物質阻礙，那麼它們就無法形成瓶子、衣服等物體。

述記：恐怕有其他學派也認為極微沒有阻礙，所以現在進行破斥。另外，沒有方分也被稱為『無礙』，薩婆多部等也認為極微是『無礙』。可以這樣論證：你們所說的極微，不能夠聚集形成瓶子等物體，因為它沒有阻礙，就像非色法（arūpa-dharma，非物質的法）一樣。無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma，未生之法）、不相應行法（citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra，不與心相應的行法）、心和心所法（citta-caitta，心和心所）等，都可以包含在比喻中，也沒有不確定的過失。如果針對薩婆多部，論證的理由應該改為『沒有方分的物質阻礙』。這裡不能一一列舉，可以參考其他的論證。仔細分析他們的論文，分段理解也是可以的。

論：而且，如果所有極微都可以被分割，那麼它們就不是真實存在的。

述記：這裡可以這樣論證：你們所執著的極微，應該是可以被分析的，因此應該不是真實存在的，因為它具有方分，就像粗色（sthūla-rūpa，粗顯的色法）等一樣。這兩種論證是用來破斥經部師認為極微具有方分的觀點。方就是分，沒有其他的『分』。因此，《二十唯識論》（Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi）中說，極微具有方分，在道理上不能形成一個整體。

論：如果沒有方分，那麼極微就無法承載光線，也無法產生陰影。

述記：下面是針對沒有方分的觀點的駁斥，略有五種。這是第一個難題，即極微如果沒有方分，就無法產生光影。認為極微沒有方分的是薩婆多部。他們認為極微等同於和合色（saṃghāta-rūpa，組合的色法），在和合色之外沒有其他的極微。極微

【English Translation】 English version There are two aspects. The first is to refute the views of having obstruction and non-obstruction. The second is to refute the views of having spatial parts and not having spatial parts.

Treatise: States that all atoms (paramāṇu, the smallest unit of matter) are provisional and not real.

Commentary: From here onwards, there is a separate refutation of the views of the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika schools, etc. They all say that atoms are real, therefore they all have the nature of obstruction. Among the three 'with-opposition' (sa-pratigha), obstruction belongs to 'with-opposition'. 'With-opposition' is called 'obstruction'. The atoms of the Sarvāstivāda are 'obstruction'. If it has spatial parts, it is called 'obstruction'. The Sarvāstivāda does not consider atoms to be 'obstruction', only the Sautrāntika does. The following content can be adjusted according to the specific situation. It can be argued: This should be false, because it has the nature of material obstruction, like bottles and other objects.

The five roots (indriya, sense organs) and five objects (viṣaya, sense objects) are also included in this, without the fault of uncertainty. This is the material obstruction with spatial parts according to the Sautrāntika, and the basic view of the Sarvāstivāda.

The following is a rebuttal.

Treatise: If atoms have no material obstruction, then they cannot form bottles, clothes, and other objects.

Commentary: Fearing that other schools also believe that atoms have no obstruction, we now refute this. Furthermore, not having spatial parts is also called 'non-obstruction', and the Sarvāstivāda, etc., also consider atoms to be 'non-obstruction'. It can be argued: The atoms you speak of cannot gather to form bottles and other objects, because they have no obstruction, like non-form dharmas (arūpa-dharma, non-material dharmas). Unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta-dharma, unproduced dharmas), non-associated formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra, formations not associated with the mind), mind and mental factors (citta-caitta, mind and mental factors), etc., can all be included in the analogy, without the fault of uncertainty. If targeting the Sarvāstivāda, the reason for the argument should be changed to 'not having material obstruction with spatial parts'. It is not possible to list them all here, you can refer to other arguments. Carefully analyze their papers, and understanding them in sections is also possible.

Treatise: Moreover, if all atoms can be divided, then they are not truly existent.

Commentary: Here it can be argued: The atoms you adhere to should be able to be analyzed, therefore they should not be truly existent, because they have spatial parts, like coarse form (sthūla-rūpa, gross form), etc. These two arguments are used to refute the view of the Sautrāntika masters who believe that atoms have spatial parts. A part is a division, there is no other 'division'. Therefore, the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi) states that atoms having spatial parts cannot logically form a whole.

Treatise: If there are no spatial parts, then atoms cannot receive light and cannot produce shadows.

Commentary: The following is a refutation of the view of not having spatial parts, with five difficulties. This is the first difficulty, that if atoms have no spatial parts, they cannot produce light and shadows. The Sarvāstivāda believes that atoms have no spatial parts. They believe that atoms are the same as aggregate form (saṃghāta-rūpa, composite form), and there are no other atoms outside of aggregate form. Atoms

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外無和合色。以理難云。汝和合色。應無方分。體即極微故。如汝極微　成和合色無方分已　遂立量云。汝和合色等。不能承光發影。無方分故。如非色等。

論。日輪才舉至光影各現。

述曰。此敘理也。如日輪舉照柱等時。東處承光。西邊發影。故言各現。

論。承光發影至定有方分。

述曰。此正難也。承光發影東西不同。故知極微定有方分。如日照一柱。其中極微無方分者。應日照東處西邊有光。無方分故。應無所隔。汝之極微。應有方分。即和合色故。如和合色。東處非西。明有方分。

論。又若見觸至必有方分。

述曰。此第二極微無方分見觸無差難也。即事申理。若執極微都無方分。眼見壁等。及手觸時。唯得所見．觸之此邊。不得所不見．觸之彼分。此和合物即諸極微。極微無方分。見觸此邊之時。應亦得於彼分。此即彼故。彼如於此。為量同前。粗色方分既即極微。故知極微定有方分。

論。又諸極微至共和集義。

述曰。此第三極微有中表。一應成六分難。又若無方分。即不能或和或集。和對古薩婆多師。集對新薩婆多順正理師。極微。應不和．整合粗大物。以無方分故。如虛空等　然經部師說有方分。今難無方分便非和者。故知唯古薩婆多

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『外無和合色。以理難云。汝和合色。應無方分。體即極微故。如汝極微』：外在沒有由多個部分組合而成的顏色（和合色）。用道理來詰難說：你所說的和合色，應該沒有方位分際（方分），因為它的本體就是最小的微粒（極微）的緣故。就像你所說的極微一樣。 『成和合色無方分已。遂立量云。汝和合色等。不能承光發影。無方分故。如非色等』：如果組成和合色的極微沒有方位分際，那麼就可以建立論證說：你所說的和合色等等，不能夠承受光照而產生陰影，因為沒有方位分際的緣故，就像非顏色（非色）等等一樣。

『論。日輪才舉至光影各現』：正理論師說：太陽剛剛升起，光照和陰影就各自顯現。

『述曰。此敘理也。如日輪舉照柱等時。東處承光。西邊發影。故言各現』：窺基法師解釋說：這是敘述道理。例如太陽升起照耀柱子等物體時，東邊承受光照，西邊產生陰影，所以說各自顯現。

『論。承光發影至定有方分』：正理論師說：承受光照和產生陰影的現象，必定有方位分際。

『述曰。此正難也。承光發影東西不同。故知極微定有方分。如日照一柱。其中極微無方分者。應日照東處西邊有光。無方分故。應無所隔。汝之極微。應有方分。即和合色故。如和合色。東處非西。明有方分』：窺基法師解釋說：這是正式的詰難。承受光照和產生陰影，東西兩邊不同，所以可知極微必定有方位分際。例如太陽照耀一根柱子，如果其中的極微沒有方位分際，那麼太陽照耀東邊，西邊也應該有光，因為沒有方位分際，應該沒有阻隔。你所說的極微，應該有方位分際，因為它就是和合色。就像和合色，東邊不是西邊，明顯有方位分際。

『論。又若見觸至必有方分』：正理論師說：又如果視覺和觸覺接觸到物體，必定有方位分際。

『述曰。此第二極微無方分見觸無差難也。即事申理。若執極微都無方分。眼見壁等。及手觸時。唯得所見．觸之此邊。不得所不見．觸之彼分。此和合物即諸極微。極微無方分。見觸此邊之時。應亦得於彼分。此即彼故。彼如於此。為量同前。粗色方分既即極微。故知極微定有方分』：窺基法師解釋說：這是第二個詰難，如果極微沒有方位分際，那麼視覺和觸覺的接觸就沒有差別。這是從事物本身來闡述道理。如果堅持極微完全沒有方位分際，那麼眼睛看到墻壁等物體，以及手觸控時，只能看到或觸控到這一邊，不能看到或觸控到沒有看到或觸控到的那一邊。這個和合物就是由許多極微組成的。如果極微沒有方位分際，那麼看到或觸控到這一邊的時候，也應該能看到或觸控到那一邊，因為此即是彼，彼如於此。論證方式與前面相同。粗色的方位分際既然就是極微的方位分際，所以可知極微必定有方位分際。

『論。又諸極微至共和集義』：正理論師說：又如果各個極微不能和合或聚集，那麼就失去了共同組合和聚集的意義。

『述曰。此第三極微有中表。一應成六分難。又若無方分。即不能或和或集。和對古薩婆多師。集對新薩婆多順正理師。極微。應不和．整合粗大物。以無方分故。如虛空等　然經部師說有方分。今難無方分便非和者。故知唯古薩婆多』：窺基法師解釋說：這是第三個詰難，如果極微有中間和表面，那麼一個極微就應該可以分成六個部分。又如果極微沒有方位分際，那麼就不能和合或聚集。『和』是針對古代一切有部（古薩婆多）的觀點，『集』是針對新一切有部（新薩婆多）順正理論師的觀點。極微，應該不能和合或聚整合粗大的物體，因為沒有方位分際的緣故，就像虛空一樣。然而經部師認為極微有方位分際。現在詰難極微沒有方位分際就不能和合的觀點。所以可知只有古代一切有部才持此觀點。

【English Translation】 English version 'Outer [things] do not have combined colors (he se) [i.e., colors formed by the combination of multiple parts]. It is difficult to explain this logically. Your combined colors should have no directional divisions (fang fen), because their substance is the ultimate particle (ji wei). Like your ultimate particle': Externally, there are no colors formed by the combination of multiple parts. Using logic to challenge: The combined colors you speak of should have no directional divisions, because their substance is the ultimate particle. 'Having formed combined colors without directional divisions, one then establishes the argument: Your combined colors, etc., cannot receive light and emit shadows, because they have no directional divisions, like non-colors (fei se), etc.': If the ultimate particles that make up combined colors have no directional divisions, then one can establish the argument: The combined colors you speak of, etc., cannot receive light and emit shadows, because they have no directional divisions, like non-colors, etc.

'Treatise: As soon as the sun rises, light and shadow each appear': The author of the Nyāyānusāra states: As soon as the sun rises, light and shadow each appear.

'Commentary: This narrates the principle. For example, when the sun rises and shines on pillars, etc., the east side receives light and the west side emits shadows, hence the statement 'each appear'': Kuiji explains: This narrates the principle. For example, when the sun rises and shines on pillars, etc., the east side receives light and the west side emits shadows, hence the statement 'each appear'.

'Treatise: Receiving light and emitting shadows necessarily have directional divisions': The author of the Nyāyānusāra states: Receiving light and emitting shadows necessarily have directional divisions.

'Commentary: This is the direct challenge. Receiving light and emitting shadows are different in the east and west. Therefore, it is known that the ultimate particle definitely has directional divisions. For example, when the sun shines on a pillar, if the ultimate particles within it have no directional divisions, then the sun shining on the east side should also produce light on the west side, because there are no directional divisions, and there should be no obstruction. Your ultimate particle should have directional divisions, because it is a combined color. Like combined colors, the east side is not the west side, clearly having directional divisions': Kuiji explains: This is the direct challenge. Receiving light and emitting shadows are different in the east and west. Therefore, it is known that the ultimate particle definitely has directional divisions. For example, when the sun shines on a pillar, if the ultimate particles within it have no directional divisions, then the sun shining on the east side should also produce light on the west side, because there are no directional divisions, and there should be no obstruction. Your ultimate particle should have directional divisions, because it is a combined color. Like combined colors, the east side is not the west side, clearly having directional divisions.

'Treatise: Moreover, if seeing and touching necessarily have directional divisions': The author of the Nyāyānusāra states: Moreover, if seeing and touching necessarily have directional divisions.

'Commentary: This is the second challenge, that if the ultimate particle has no directional divisions, there is no difference in seeing and touching. This explains the principle from the event itself. If one insists that the ultimate particle has no directional divisions at all, then when the eyes see walls, etc., and the hand touches them, one can only see or touch this side, and cannot see or touch the other side that is not seen or touched. This combined object is composed of many ultimate particles. If the ultimate particle has no directional divisions, then when seeing or touching this side, one should also be able to see or touch the other side, because this is that, and that is like this. The argument is the same as before. Since the directional divisions of coarse colors are the same as the ultimate particle, it is known that the ultimate particle definitely has directional divisions': Kuiji explains: This is the second challenge, that if the ultimate particle has no directional divisions, there is no difference in seeing and touching. This explains the principle from the event itself. If one insists that the ultimate particle has no directional divisions at all, then when the eyes see walls, etc., and the hand touches them, one can only see or touch this side, and cannot see or touch the other side that is not seen or touched. This combined object is composed of many ultimate particles. If the ultimate particle has no directional divisions, then when seeing or touching this side, one should also be able to see or touch the other side, because this is that, and that is like this. The argument is the same as before. Since the directional divisions of coarse colors are the same as the ultimate particle, it is known that the ultimate particle definitely has directional divisions.

'Treatise: Moreover, if the various ultimate particles cannot combine or gather, then they lose the meaning of common combination and gathering': The author of the Nyāyānusāra states: Moreover, if the various ultimate particles cannot combine or gather, then they lose the meaning of common combination and gathering.

'Commentary: This is the third challenge, that if the ultimate particle has a middle and a surface, then one ultimate particle should be able to be divided into six parts. Moreover, if there are no directional divisions, then they cannot combine or gather. 'Combine' is directed at the views of the ancient Sarvāstivādins (gu Sa Po Duo shi), and 'gather' is directed at the new Sarvāstivādins (xin Sa Po Duo) and the Nyāyānusāra masters. The ultimate particle should not be able to combine or gather into coarse objects, because it has no directional divisions, like space, etc. However, the Sautrāntikas (Jing Bu Shi) say that there are directional divisions. Now, the view that there are no directional divisions is challenged because it is not combinable. Therefore, it is known that only the ancient Sarvāstivādins hold this view': Kuiji explains: This is the third challenge, that if the ultimate particle has a middle and a surface, then one ultimate particle should be able to be divided into six parts. Moreover, if there are no directional divisions, then they cannot combine or gather. 'Combine' is directed at the views of the ancient Sarvāstivādins, and 'gather' is directed at the new Sarvāstivādins and the Nyāyānusāra masters. The ultimate particle should not be able to combine or gather into coarse objects, because it has no directional divisions, like space, etc. However, the Sautrāntikas say that there are directional divisions. Now, the view that there are no directional divisions is challenged because it is not combinable. Therefore, it is known that only the ancient Sarvāstivādins hold this view.

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師義。不然因有隨一不成。隨所住處。設許汝不相觸著。相擬宜時必有上下及四方差別。所擬東邊既非西邊。明有方分。東若非東。西應非西。便為非色非謂極微。

論。或相涉入至定有方分。

述曰。此第四極微無中表微聚不異難。若無所擬東西等方。所有極微應相涉入合為一體便不成粗。二十頌云。極微與六合。一應成六分。若與六同處。聚應如極微。初半是前。後半是此。由此極微定有方分。故俱舍云。觸與不觸皆應有分。

論。執有對色至應無障隔。

述曰。此第五極微即粗色。應無障隔難。汝有對粗色應無障隔。即極微故。猶如極微　汝執有對色即是極微。極微之外無有對色。極微若無方分。粗色應亦無方分。無方分故亦無障隔。如非色等。為量同前。二十頌云。無應影障無　此障無也。

論。若爾便非障礙有對。

述曰。若無障隔。便非障礙有對所攝。量云。汝之十處。非障礙有對。無障隔故。如心．心所。

論。是故汝等至定非實有。

述曰。由此汝極微必有方分。有方分故便可分折。可分折故定非實有。二十頌云。聚不異無二。

論。故有對色實有不成。

述曰。此結非也。能成極微既非實有故。所成有對之色實有不成。

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【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 師義（老師的觀點）。不然，因為有隨一不成（如果極微沒有方分，那麼由極微組成的粗色也無法成立）。隨所住處（無論在什麼地方）。設許汝不相觸著（假設你允許極微之間不相互接觸）。相擬宜時必有上下及四方差別（當相互比較時，必然存在上下和四方的差別）。所擬東邊既非西邊（所比較的東邊既然不是西邊）。明有方分（明顯有方位）。東若非東（如果東不是東）。西應非西（西也應該不是西）。便為非色非謂極微（那就不是色法，也不是所謂的極微）。

論（論主的反駁）。或相涉入至定有方分（或者極微相互涉入，最終必定有方分）。

述曰（註釋）。此第四極微無中表微聚不異難（這是第四個難點，即極微沒有內部和外部，微聚和極微沒有差別）。若無所擬東西等方（如果沒有所比較的東、西等方位）。所有極微應相涉入合為一體便不成粗（所有的極微應該相互涉入，合為一體，便不能形成粗色）。二十頌云（《俱舍論》二十頌說）。極微與六合（極微與六個方向的極微結合）。一應成六分（一個極微應該分成六份）。若與六同處（如果與六個方向的極微在同一位置）。聚應如極微（微聚應該像極微一樣）。初半是前（前半部分是前面的觀點）。後半是此（後半部分是這個觀點）。由此極微定有方分（由此可見，極微一定有方分）。故俱舍云（所以《俱舍論》說）。觸與不觸皆應有分（接觸和不接觸都應該有部分）。

論（論主的反駁）。執有對色至應無障隔（如果認為有對色是實有的，那麼應該沒有障礙和間隔）。

述曰（註釋）。此第五極微即粗色（這是第五個難點，即極微就是粗色）。應無障隔難（應該沒有障礙和間隔的難點）。汝有對粗色應無障隔（你認為有對的粗色應該沒有障礙和間隔）。即極微故（因為它是極微）。猶如極微（就像極微一樣）。汝執有對色即是極微（你認為有對的色法就是極微）。極微之外無有對色（極微之外沒有有對的色法）。極微若無方分（如果極微沒有方分）。粗色應亦無方分（粗色也應該沒有方分）。無方分故亦無障隔（沒有方分，所以也沒有障礙和間隔）。如非色等（就像非色法等）。為量同前（推理方式與前面相同）。二十頌云（《俱舍論》二十頌說）。無應影障無（不應該有影子和障礙）。此障無也（這裡指沒有障礙）。

論（論主的反駁）。若爾便非障礙有對（如果這樣，那就不是障礙有對）。

述曰（註釋）。若無障隔（如果沒有障礙和間隔）。便非障礙有對所攝（那就不是障礙有對所包含的）。量云（推理如下）。汝之十處（你的十處）。非障礙有對（不是障礙有對）。無障隔故（因為沒有障礙和間隔）。如心．心所（就像心和心所）。

論（論主的反駁）。是故汝等至定非實有（因此，你們的極微必定不是實有的）。

述曰（註釋）。由此汝極微必有方分（由此可見，你們的極微必定有方分）。有方分故便可分折（有方分，所以就可以分割）。可分折故定非實有（可以分割，所以一定不是實有的）。二十頌云（《俱舍論》二十頌說）。聚不異無二（微聚和極微沒有差別，也不是兩個）。

論（論主的反駁）。故有對色實有不成（所以，有對的色法是實有的觀點不能成立）。

述曰（註釋）。此結非也（這是結論，否定了對方的觀點）。能成極微既非實有故（因為能形成粗色的極微不是實有的）。所成有對之色實有不成（所以，所形成的粗色是實有的觀點也不能成立）。

上

English version: Teacher's opinion. Otherwise, because having one (aspect) is not established (if the ultimate particles do not have spatial dimensions, then the gross matter composed of ultimate particles cannot be established). Wherever it is located. Suppose you allow them not to touch each other. When comparing each other, there must be differences in up and down, and the four directions. Since the east side being compared is not the west side. It is clear that there are spatial dimensions. If east is not east. West should not be west either. Then it is neither form nor what is called an ultimate particle.

Treatise (the author's rebuttal). Or they interpenetrate until they definitely have spatial dimensions.

Commentary. This is the fourth difficulty: the ultimate particle has no inside or outside, and the aggregation of particles is no different from the ultimate particle. If there are no east, west, etc. directions to compare. All ultimate particles should interpenetrate and merge into one, and cannot form gross matter. The Twenty Verses say. The ultimate particle combines with six (directions). One should be divided into six parts. If it is in the same place as the six (directions). The aggregation should be like the ultimate particle. The first half is the previous view. The second half is this view. Therefore, the ultimate particle definitely has spatial dimensions. Therefore, the Kosha says. Touching and not touching should both have parts.

Treatise (the author's rebuttal). Holding that tangible matter is real, there should be no obstruction or separation.

Commentary. This is the fifth difficulty: the ultimate particle is gross matter. There should be no obstruction or separation. You believe that tangible gross matter should have no obstruction or separation. Because it is an ultimate particle. Just like an ultimate particle. You hold that tangible matter is an ultimate particle. There is no tangible matter outside of the ultimate particle. If the ultimate particle has no spatial dimensions. Gross matter should also have no spatial dimensions. Because it has no spatial dimensions, it also has no obstruction or separation. Like non-form, etc. The reasoning is the same as before. The Twenty Verses say. There should be no shadow or obstruction. This means no obstruction.

Treatise (the author's rebuttal). If so, then it is not an obstructing tangible object.

Commentary. If there is no obstruction or separation. Then it is not included in the category of obstructing tangible objects. The reasoning is as follows. Your ten places. Are not obstructing tangible objects. Because there is no obstruction or separation. Like mind and mental factors.

Treatise (the author's rebuttal). Therefore, your ultimate particles are definitely not real.

Commentary. Therefore, your ultimate particles must have spatial dimensions. Because they have spatial dimensions, they can be divided. Because they can be divided, they are definitely not real. The Twenty Verses say. The aggregation is no different and not two.

Treatise (the author's rebuttal). Therefore, the view that tangible matter is real cannot be established.

Commentary. This is the conclusion, negating the opponent's view. Because the ultimate particles that form gross matter are not real. Therefore, the view that the formed gross matter is real cannot be established.

Above

【English Translation】 English version: Teacher's opinion. Otherwise, because having one (aspect) is not established (if the paramāṇu (ultimate particles) do not have spatial dimensions, then the gross matter composed of ultimate particles cannot be established). Wherever it is located. Suppose you allow them not to touch each other. When comparing each other, there must be differences in up and down, and the four directions. Since the east side being compared is not the west side. It is clear that there are spatial dimensions. If east is not east. West should not be west either. Then it is neither rūpa (form) nor what is called an ultimate particle.

Treatise (the author's rebuttal). Or they interpenetrate until they definitely have spatial dimensions.

Commentary. This is the fourth difficulty: the ultimate particle has no inside or outside, and the aggregation of particles is no different from the ultimate particle. If there are no east, west, etc. directions to compare. All ultimate particles should interpenetrate and merge into one, and cannot form gross matter. The Twenty Verses say. The ultimate particle combines with six (directions). One should be divided into six parts. If it is in the same place as the six (directions). The aggregation should be like the ultimate particle. The first half is the previous view. The second half is this view. Therefore, the ultimate particle definitely has spatial dimensions. Therefore, the Abhidharmakośa says. Touching and not touching should both have parts.

Treatise (the author's rebuttal). Holding that sa-pratigha-rūpa (tangible matter) is real, there should be no obstruction or separation.

Commentary. This is the fifth difficulty: the ultimate particle is gross matter. There should be no obstruction or separation. You believe that tangible gross matter should have no obstruction or separation. Because it is an ultimate particle. Just like an ultimate particle. You hold that tangible matter is an ultimate particle. There is no tangible matter outside of the ultimate particle. If the ultimate particle has no spatial dimensions. Gross matter should also have no spatial dimensions. Because it has no spatial dimensions, it also has no obstruction or separation. Like non-form, etc. The reasoning is the same as before. The Twenty Verses say. There should be no shadow or obstruction. This means no obstruction.

Treatise (the author's rebuttal). If so, then it is not an obstructing tangible object.

Commentary. If there is no obstruction or separation. Then it is not included in the category of obstructing tangible objects. The reasoning is as follows. Your ten places. Are not obstructing tangible objects. Because there is no obstruction or separation. Like citta (mind) and caitasika (mental factors).

Treatise (the author's rebuttal). Therefore, your ultimate particles are definitely not real.

Commentary. Therefore, your ultimate particles must have spatial dimensions. Because they have spatial dimensions, they can be divided. Because they can be divided, they are definitely not real. The Twenty Verses say. The aggregation is no different and not two.

Treatise (the author's rebuttal). Therefore, the view that tangible matter is real cannot be established.

Commentary. This is the conclusion, negating the opponent's view. Because the ultimate particles that form gross matter are not real. Therefore, the view that the formed gross matter is real cannot be established.

Above

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來破能成極微不成訖。下破根．境所成有對不成。

論。五識豈無所依緣色。

述曰。自下第二明所成有對不成之中有二。一問。二答。此問也。小乘問曰。若無能成實極微故。無所成有對色。汝大乘五識。豈無所依．所緣之色。

下答有三。初申正義。第二破眼等內處不成。第三別破外處不成。

論。雖非無色而是識變。

述曰。即申正義。此中雖言義兼德失。色義片同。意顯識變不同他色。即論主答。雖有所依．所緣之色。而是識所變現。非是心外別有極微以成根．境。

論。謂識生時至為所依緣。

述曰。此解識變。謂八識生時內因緣種子等力。第八識變似五根．五塵。眼等五識依彼所變根。緣彼本質塵。雖親不得。要托彼生。實于本識色塵之上。變作五塵相現。即以彼五根為所依。以彼及此二種五塵為所緣。五識若不託第八所變。便無所緣。所緣之中有親疏故。以上是總初申正義。

論。然眼等根至非外所造。

述曰。自下第二別破五根。色等五塵世間共見現量所得。眼等五根非現量得。雖第八識緣。及如來等緣是現量得。世不共信。余散心中無現量得。以但能有發識之用。比知是有。此非他心及凡六識現量所得。唯除如來。如來小乘計亦為現量得

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 來破斥『能成極微』（可以組成物質的最小單位）不成，下面破斥根、境所成的『有對』（有阻礙、有對立的物質）不成。

論：五識難道沒有所依和所緣的色法嗎？

述曰：下面第二部分說明所成的『有對』不成，其中分為兩部分：一是提問，二是回答。這是提問。小乘問道：如果沒有能成立的真實極微，那麼就沒有所成的『有對』色法。你們大乘的五識，難道沒有所依和所緣的色法嗎？

下面回答分為三部分：首先闡述正義，第二破斥眼等內處不成，第三分別破斥外處不成。

論：雖然不是沒有色法，但那是識所變現的。

述曰：這是闡述正義。這裡雖然說了『義』，但兼顧了『德』和『失』。『色義』只是部分相同，意在表明識所變現的色法不同於其他的色法。這是論主的回答：雖然有所依和所緣的色法，但那是識所變現的，不是心外別有極微來組成根和境。

論：所謂的識生起時，才成為所依和所緣。

述曰：這是解釋識變。所謂的第八識生起時，依靠內因緣種子等的力量，第八識變現出類似於五根（眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根）和五塵（色塵、聲塵、香塵、味塵、觸塵）的相。眼等五識依靠第八識所變現的五根，緣取第八識所變現的本質塵。雖然五識不能直接緣取本質塵，但需要依託它們才能生起。實際上，是在本識的色塵之上，變現出五塵的相。因此，以第八識所變現的五根為所依，以第八識所變現的五塵以及五識自己變現的五塵為所緣。五識如果不依託第八識所變現的根和塵，就沒有所緣。所緣之中有親疏遠近的差別。以上是總的闡述正義。

論：然而眼等根，不是外物所造。

述曰：下面第二部分分別破斥五根。色等五塵是世間共同見到的，是現量所得。眼等五根不是現量所得。雖然第八識緣取五根，以及如來等緣取五根是現量所得，但世間不普遍相信。其餘散亂心中沒有現量所得。只能通過它們具有引發五識的作用，來比量得知它們的存在。這不是他心通以及凡夫六識現量所得，只有如來才能現量得知。小乘也認為如來可以現量得知五根。

【English Translation】 English version Here, we refute the idea that 'constituent atoms' (the smallest units that can form matter) can be established. Below, we refute the idea that 'obstructive entities' (matter that obstructs and opposes) are formed by the sense organs and their objects.

Treatise: Do the five consciousnesses not have colors that they rely on and perceive?

Commentary: The second part below explains why the 'obstructive entities' that are formed cannot be established, and it is divided into two parts: first, a question; second, an answer. This is the question. The Hinayana asks: If there are no real constituent atoms that can be established, then there are no 'obstructive' colors that can be formed. Do your Mahayana's five consciousnesses not have colors that they rely on and perceive?

The answer below is divided into three parts: first, stating the correct meaning; second, refuting the idea that the internal sense bases such as the eye can be established; and third, refuting the idea that the external sense bases can be established.

Treatise: Although there are colors, they are transformations of consciousness.

Commentary: This is stating the correct meaning. Although the word 'meaning' is used here, it encompasses both 'virtue' and 'fault'. 'Color-meaning' is only partially the same, and it is intended to show that the colors transformed by consciousness are different from other colors. This is the treatise master's answer: Although there are colors that are relied on and perceived, they are transformations of consciousness, and there are no separate constituent atoms outside of the mind that form the sense organs and their objects.

Treatise: What is called consciousness arising is when it becomes the basis for reliance and perception.

Commentary: This explains the transformation of consciousness. When the eighth consciousness arises, relying on the power of internal causal seeds, the eighth consciousness transforms into appearances similar to the five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) and the five sense objects (form, sound, smell, taste, and touch). The five consciousnesses, such as the eye consciousness, rely on the five sense organs transformed by the eighth consciousness and perceive the essential objects transformed by the eighth consciousness. Although the five consciousnesses cannot directly perceive the essential objects, they need to rely on them to arise. In reality, it is on top of the color-objects of the fundamental consciousness that the appearances of the five sense objects are transformed. Therefore, the five sense organs transformed by the eighth consciousness are the basis for reliance, and the five sense objects transformed by the eighth consciousness and the five sense objects transformed by the five consciousnesses themselves are what is perceived. If the five consciousnesses do not rely on the sense organs and objects transformed by the eighth consciousness, they will have nothing to perceive. Among what is perceived, there are differences in closeness and distance. The above is a general statement of the correct meaning.

Treatise: However, the sense organs such as the eye are not created by external things.

Commentary: The second part below refutes the five sense organs separately. The five sense objects such as color are commonly seen in the world and are obtained through direct perception. The five sense organs such as the eye are not obtained through direct perception. Although the eighth consciousness perceives the five sense organs, and the Tathagatas perceive the five sense organs through direct perception, the world does not universally believe this. There is no direct perception in other distracted minds. It can only be inferred that they exist through their function of causing the five consciousnesses to arise. This is not obtained through the direct perception of others' minds or the six consciousnesses of ordinary people, only the Tathagatas can directly perceive them. The Hinayana also believes that the Tathagatas can directly perceive the five sense organs.

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。非世共許故不為證。此但有功能。非是心外別有大種所造之色。此功能言即是發生五識作用。觀用知體。如觀生芽用比知體是有。觀所緣論亦作是言。識上色功能名五根應理　以用比知體性是有。由此說根唯是種子。二十頌云。識從自種生。似境相而轉　觀所緣論不言現色。言功能故　然今此義諸說不同。大眾部等說。五種色根肉團為體。眼不見色。乃至身不覺觸。以經說言根謂四大種所造各別堅性等故是肉團。肉團不凈故不見色。稍勝餘色故名清凈　薩婆多師別有四大生等五因。為其因緣造根．塵等。大唯身觸。根雖積集。離心之法。仍實有體　成實論師名師子胄。本于數論法中出家。因立彼義云。由色．香．味．觸四塵以造四大。是無常法。此中四大總得成根。為五根體　經部五色根．境。雖體並假。實極微成　說假部通假實。蘊．處門中攝各別故　一說部說。唯有其名都無體性　順世外道計即四大　吠世史迦。四大俱是實句所攝。堅．濕．暖．動德句所攝。眼唯得三。但除風大。身根得四。亦得堅等。然彼宗說。眼根即火。耳根即空。鼻根即地。味根即水。皮根即風　數論師自性生大。大生我執。我執生五唯。即色．聲．香．味．觸。此五是我所受用物。受用物時必有用。根謂十一根。不能自起。必待五大。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為這些不是世俗普遍認可的，所以不能作為證據。這裡只有功能，而不是心外獨立存在、由四大種所造的色。這裡說的『功能』，指的是發生五識的作用。通過觀察作用來了解本體。就像觀察到生芽的作用，從而推知本體是存在的。《觀所緣論》也這樣說：『識上的色功能，名為五根』，這是合理的，因為通過作用來推知體性是存在的。因此說根只是種子。《二十頌》說：『識從自己的種子生起，呈現出類似境的相狀而運轉。』《觀所緣論》沒有說『現色』，而是說『功能』。 然而，現在對於這個意義，各種說法不同。大眾部等認為，五種色根以肉團為體。眼不能看見色，乃至身不能感覺到觸。因為經中說，根是指四大種所造的各自具有堅硬等性質的東西，所以是肉團。肉團是不清凈的，所以不能看見色，稍微勝過其他色，所以稱為清凈。 薩婆多部的老師認為，另外有四大生等五種原因，作為因緣來製造根、塵等。四大唯有身觸。根雖然是積聚的，但作為獨立於心之外的法，仍然是真實存在的。 成實論的論師，名叫師子胄（Śīhahanāda，獅子吼），原本在數論法的學派中出家。因此立下這樣的觀點：由色、香、味、觸四塵來製造四大，這是無常的法。這其中的四大總合起來成為根，作為五根的本體。 經部的觀點是，五色根和五境，雖然本體都是假有的，但實際上是由極微組成的。 說假部認為，根和境既可以是假有的，也可以是實有的，因為它們在蘊、處、界中各自被攝屬。 一說部認為，五根只有名稱，完全沒有體性。 順世外道認為，五根就是四大。 吠世史迦派認為，四大都是實句所攝，堅、濕、暖、動德句所攝。眼根只能得到三種，除了風大。身根可以得到四種，也可以得到堅等。然而，他們的宗派認為，眼根就是火，耳根就是空，鼻根就是地，味根就是水，皮根就是風。 數論師認為，自性（Prakṛti）產生大（Mahat），大產生我執（Ahaṃkāra），我執產生五唯（Tanmātra），即色、聲、香、味、觸。這五唯是我所受用的東西。受用東西的時候，必然有作用。根指的是十一根，不能自己生起，必須依賴五大。

【English Translation】 English version: Because these are not universally acknowledged, they cannot be taken as proof. There is only function here, not a separate, externally existing color (rūpa) created by the four great elements (mahābhūta). The 'function' referred to here is the operation of the five consciousnesses (vijñāna). Understanding the substance (dravya) by observing the function (kārya). Just as observing the function of a sprout arising leads to inferring that the substance exists. The Ālambanaparīkṣā also states: 'The color function on consciousness is called the five sense organs (indriya),' which is reasonable because the existence of the substance is inferred through the function. Therefore, it is said that the sense organs are merely seeds. The Twenty Verses states: 'Consciousness arises from its own seed, appearing and functioning in a manner similar to the object.' The Ālambanaparīkṣā does not say 'manifest color' but 'function'. However, there are various views on this meaning. The Mahāsāṃghika and others believe that the five sense organs of color have a fleshy mass (māṃsa-piṇḍa) as their substance. The eye cannot see color, and the body cannot feel touch. Because the sutras say that the sense organs are made of the four great elements, each having distinct properties such as solidity, they are fleshy masses. Fleshy masses are impure, so they cannot see color, but they are slightly superior to other colors, so they are called pure. The Sarvāstivāda teachers believe that there are five causes, including the four great elements, as conditions for creating the sense organs, objects, etc. The four great elements are only the body's touch. Although the sense organs are accumulated, as dharmas independent of the mind, they still exist in reality. The teacher of the Satyasiddhi school, named Śīhahanāda (獅子吼, Lion's Roar), originally renounced the world in the Sāṃkhya school. Therefore, he established the view that the four great elements are created from the four objects of color, smell, taste, and touch, which are impermanent dharmas. The four great elements together become the sense organs, serving as the substance of the five sense organs. The Sautrāntika school believes that although the substance of the five sense organs and objects is nominally existent, they are actually composed of extremely small particles (paramāṇu). The Bhadra school believes that the sense organs and objects can be either nominally existent or really existent because they are each included in the aggregates (skandha), bases (āyatana), and realms (dhātu). The Ekavyāvahārika school believes that the five sense organs only have names and no substance at all. The Lokāyata (Cārvāka) school believes that the five sense organs are the four great elements. The Vaiśeṣika school believes that the four great elements are all included in the category of substance (dravya), and the categories of qualities (guṇa) such as solidity, liquidity, heat, and motion. The eye organ can only obtain three, except for the wind element. The body organ can obtain four, including solidity, etc. However, their school believes that the eye organ is fire, the ear organ is space, the nose organ is earth, the taste organ is water, and the skin organ is wind. The Sāṃkhya school believes that Prakṛti (自性, Primordial Nature) produces Mahat (大, Intellect), Mahat produces Ahaṃkāra (我執, Ego), and Ahaṃkāra produces the five Tanmātras (五唯, Subtle Elements), namely color, sound, smell, taste, and touch. These five are the objects that I experience. When experiencing objects, there must be a function. The sense organs refer to the eleven sense organs, which cannot arise on their own and must rely on the five great elements.

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待五大故從五唯復生五大。五大生已方成十一根。是能受用具故。有說色造火。火成眼。聲造空。空成耳。耳無礙。聲亦無礙。香造地。地成鼻。味造水。水成舌。觸造風。風成皮。心根有二說。一說是肉團。一說非色。非色者不說造。是色者說造。或說唯地造。或說五大皆能造余根。亦有說五大通能造之　然今大乘一解。內自種子為其因緣。心內所變現行相分四大為增上緣。造根．境．色。故此論說。非是心外實大所造　二解云。根即種子。名功能故。名種子故。引教如前。于中三說。至下當知。體既非色。非是外處四大所造　三解云。五根據實皆通現．種。然論多據現色名根。此中造義諸門分別。如對法疏。

論。外有對色至內識變現。

述曰。且薩婆多五塵離識皆有實體雖緣積聚仍體實有。經部師說。實極微成。五塵體假。說假部計。若在處門以緣積集說之為假。若在蘊門五塵體實。故五塵體總通假實。若成實論師體是實有。仍是能造一說部說。唯有假名無實塵體。數論師說。五塵體常。仍是礙性。能造所攝。勝論師說。聲．香唯無常。色．味．觸通常無常。五皆無礙。順世外道計即四大。

大乘之中有以過去五識相分為五塵。有以現在大種。及所造為五塵。然有假實。如色中二十五種。四

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：待五大（地、水、火、風、空）壞滅后，又從五唯（色、聲、香、味、觸）重新產生五大。五大產生后，才形成十一根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意，以及色、聲、香、味、觸五境）。這些是能感受和使用的工具。有人說色造火，火形成眼；聲造空，空形成耳，耳沒有阻礙，聲也沒有阻礙；香造地，地形成鼻；味造水，水形成舌；觸造風，風形成皮。對於心根，有兩種說法：一種說是肉團心，一種說心根非色。如果心根非色，就不說是造；如果心根是色，就說是造。或者說唯有地能造心根，或者說五大都能造其餘的根。也有說五大共同能造一切根的。然而現在大乘佛教有一種解釋，認為內在的種子是根的因緣，心內所變現的行相分的四大是增上緣，從而造出根和境色。所以此論說，根不是心外真實的五大所造。第二種解釋說，根就是種子，因為根具有功能，所以也稱為種子。可以引用之前的教義來證明。其中有三種說法，到下文會知道。根的體性既然非色，就不是外在的四大所造。第三種解釋說，五根根據實相來說，都通於現行和種子。然而論典大多根據現行的色法來稱之為根。此中關於『造』的含義，有各種不同的解釋，如同《對法疏》中所說。 論：外有對色至內識變現。 述曰：且薩婆多（一切有部，佛教部派之一）認為五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）離開識都有實體，即使因緣積聚，其體性仍然是真實的。經部師說，五塵由真實的極微組成，其體性是假有的。說假部認為，如果在處門中，五塵是因緣積集而成的假有；如果在蘊門中，五塵的體性是真實的。所以五塵的體性總體來說是假實並存。若成實論師認為五塵的體性是實有的。仍然是能造的一種說法，一部派說，五塵唯有假名，沒有真實的塵體。數論師說，五塵的體性是常恒的，仍然具有阻礙性，屬於能造的範疇。勝論師說，聲和香是無常的，色、味、觸通常是無常的。五塵都沒有阻礙。順世外道認為五塵就是四大。 大乘佛教中，有人認為過去的五識相分就是五塵。有人認為現在的大種以及所造之物就是五塵。然而有假有實，如色法中有二十五種。

【English Translation】 English version: After the five great elements (earth, water, fire, wind, and space) disintegrate, the five subtle elements (form, sound, smell, taste, and touch) give rise to the five great elements again. Once the five great elements are produced, the eleven sense bases (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, and the five corresponding objects: form, sound, smell, taste, and touch) are formed. These are the instruments for experiencing and utilizing. Some say that form creates fire, and fire forms the eye; sound creates space, and space forms the ear. The ear is unobstructed, and sound is also unobstructed; smell creates earth, and earth forms the nose; taste creates water, and water forms the tongue; touch creates wind, and wind forms the skin. Regarding the mind-base, there are two views: one says it is the physical heart, and the other says it is non-material. If the mind-base is non-material, it is not said to be created; if it is material, it is said to be created. Or it is said that only earth can create the mind-base, or that all five great elements can create the other sense bases. There is also the view that all five great elements can jointly create all the sense bases. However, the Mahayana (Great Vehicle Buddhism) now has one explanation: the internal seed is the cause and condition for the sense bases, and the four great elements of the appearance-aspect transformed within the mind are the supporting condition, thereby creating the sense bases and sense objects. Therefore, this treatise says that the sense bases are not created by the real five great elements external to the mind. The second explanation says that the sense bases are the seeds, because they have functions, so they are also called seeds. Previous teachings can be cited to prove this. Among these, there are three views, which will be known later. Since the nature of the sense bases is non-material, they are not created by the external four great elements. The third explanation says that, according to reality, the five sense bases all pervade both manifestation and seed. However, the treatises mostly refer to the manifested form as the sense base. Regarding the meaning of 'creation' here, there are various different explanations, as stated in the Commentary on the Abhidharma. Treatise: External objects of sense up to the transformations of internal consciousness. Commentary: Furthermore, the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivada, one of the early Buddhist schools) believe that the five sense objects (form, sound, smell, taste, and touch) have substance apart from consciousness, and even if they are accumulated by conditions, their nature is still real. The Sautrantikas (Sautrantika school) say that the five sense objects are composed of real atoms, and their nature is provisional. The Bahusrutiya (Bahusrutiya school) believes that if in the sphere of sense bases, the five sense objects are provisional, being accumulated by conditions; if in the sphere of aggregates, the nature of the five sense objects is real. Therefore, the nature of the five sense objects is generally both provisional and real. The Tattvasiddhi (Tattvasiddhi school) masters believe that the nature of the five sense objects is real. It is still one view of what can be created, one school says that the five sense objects only have provisional names, and there are no real sense objects. The Samkhya (Samkhya school) says that the nature of the five sense objects is constant, still having obstructive nature, belonging to the category of what can be created. The Vaisheshika (Vaisheshika school) says that sound and smell are impermanent, while form, taste, and touch are usually impermanent. The five sense objects are all unobstructed. The Lokayata (Lokayata school) believes that the five sense objects are the four great elements. In Mahayana Buddhism, some believe that the past aspects of the five consciousnesses are the five sense objects. Some believe that the present great elements and what is created are the five sense objects. However, there are provisional and real aspects, such as the twenty-five kinds in form.

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顯色實。余色皆假。響聲假。餘聲實。觸中所造假。四大實。不見香．味通假之言。心外有對前已遮破。故此諸根但是內識之所變現所緣論云。內色如外現。為識所緣緣。許彼相在識。及能生識故。

論。發眼等識至生眼等識。

述曰。然雖識變作用有別。發眼等識名眼等根。此為依故生眼等識。勿謂識變但是色者皆無差別。此即結根及解根義。

然且依常徒義釋此文者。以現行清凈色為五根。諸處但言四大所造凈色名根。若約觀所緣論。陳那即以五識．種子名為五根。或以五塵種子名根。第四卷中護法救義。五識業種名為五根。對法第一云眼界者謂曾現見色及此種子。又瑜伽抉擇分等。皆以現行．種子二法為眼根等　然唯種家。釋對法等者。由本熏時心變似色。從熏時為名　又即識之種子現有生識用　故假說為現行色根。若唯說現行為根。釋唯種子文者。如下第四卷．及觀所緣論。釋通現．種文者。實唯現行是根。以大所造說凈色故。對所生之果識。假說現行為功能。實唯現色。功能生識之義。大小共成。舉之以顯。體實有無。彼此競故不說。以聖教言根謂凈色故。其實種子非五根性　俱用之家如下第四自當廣釋。不能預述　唯種子者。陳那等義。以二十唯識說五色根皆是種子。如第四卷引。唯

【現代漢語翻譯】 顯現的顏色是真實的（顯色實），其餘的顏色都是虛假的（余色皆假）。響聲是虛假的（響聲假），其餘的聲音是真實的（餘聲實）。觸覺中所產生的感受是虛假的（觸中所造假），地、水、火、風四大元素是真實的（四大實）。這裡沒有提到關於香和味道是相通且虛假的說法（不見香．味通假之言）。心外有對境的說法，之前已經被遮破了（心外有對前已遮破）。因此，這些根識都只是內在意識所變現出來的（故此諸根但是內識之所變現）。《所緣論》中說，內在的色法如同外在顯現一樣，是意識所緣的條件（所緣論云。內色如外現。為識所緣緣）。允許它們以相的形式存在於意識中，並且能夠產生意識（許彼相在識。及能生識故）。

論：從生起眼識等（發眼等識）到產生眼識等（生眼等識）。

述記：雖然意識的變現作用有所不同，但生起眼識等被稱為眼等根（發眼等識名眼等根），因為它們是產生眼識等的所依（此為依故生眼等識）。不要認為意識的變現只是色法，而沒有差別（勿謂識變但是色者皆無差別）。這實際上是關於建立根和解除根的意義（此即結根及解根義）。

然而，暫且依據常人的理解來解釋這段文字，認為現行的清凈色法是五根（以現行清凈色為五根）。在各個論典中，只是說由四大元素所造的清凈色法被稱為根（諸處但言四大所造凈色名根）。如果按照《觀所緣論》的觀點，陳那（Dignāga）認為五識的種子就是五根（若約觀所緣論。陳那即以五識．種子名為五根），或者認為五塵的種子是根（或以五塵種子名根）。在第四卷中，護法（Dharmapāla）的解釋是，五識的業種子是五根（第四卷中護法救義。五識業種名為五根）。《對法論》第一卷說，眼界是指曾經顯現的色法以及它的種子（對法第一云眼界者謂曾現見色及此種子）。此外，《瑜伽師地論·抉擇分》等都認為現行和種子兩種法是眼根等（又瑜伽抉擇分等。皆以現行．種子二法為眼根等）。然而，只有種子派解釋《對法論》等，認為最初熏習時，心識變現得像色法（然唯種家。釋對法等者。由本熏時心變似色），從熏習時開始命名（從熏時為名）。此外，就是意識的種子現在具有產生意識的作用（又即識之種子現有生識用），所以假說為現行的色根（故假說為現行色根）。如果只說現行是根，那麼如何解釋只有種子的經文呢（若唯說現行為根。釋唯種子文者）？如下面的第四卷以及《觀所緣論》會解釋。解釋貫通現行和種子的經文，實際上只有現行才是根（釋通現．種文者。實唯現行是根），因為是由四大所造的清凈色法（以大所造說凈色故）。對於所產生的果識，假說現行具有功能（對所生之果識。假說現行為功能）。實際上只有現行的色法，具有功能產生意識的意義（實唯現色。功能生識之義）。大小乘共同認可這一點（大小共成）。舉出這些是爲了顯明（舉之以顯）。本體實際上是有還是無（體實有無），彼此爭論，所以不說（彼此競故不說）。因為聖教說根是指清凈的色法（以聖教言根謂凈色故）。實際上種子不是五根的性質（其實種子非五根性）。俱用派的觀點如下面的第四卷會詳細解釋（俱用之家如下第四自當廣釋），不能預先敘述（不能預述）。只有種子派，如陳那等的觀點，認為《二十唯識論》說五色根都是種子（唯種子者。陳那等義。以二十唯識說五色根皆是種子），如第四卷所引用（如第四卷引）。

【English Translation】 Manifested colors are real (Śyāma-varṇa sat). Other colors are false (Śeṣa-varṇa mithyā). Echoes are false (Śabda-pratiśrutkā mithyā). Other sounds are real (Śeṣa-śabda sat). What is created in touch is false (Sparśa-ja mithyā). The four great elements (mahābhūta) are real (Catur-mahābhūta sat). There is no mention here of fragrance and taste being interconnected and false (Na dṛṣṭa gandha-rasa-samānādhikaraṇa-mithyā-vacana). The existence of objects outside the mind has already been refuted (Citta-bāhya-artha pūrvam nirākṛta). Therefore, these sense faculties are only transformations of the inner consciousness (Ataḥ ete indriya kevala antar-vijñāna-pariṇāma). The Ālambana-parīkṣā states: 'Internal form appears as external, as the object-condition for consciousness' (Ālambana-parīkṣā āha: Antar-rūpa yathā bāhya pratibhāsa vijñāna-ālambana-pratyaya). It is accepted that they exist as aspects in consciousness and can generate consciousness (Anujñāta te ākāra vijñāne santi vijñāna-janaka ca).

Treatise: From the arising of eye-consciousness, etc. (utpāda cakṣur-vijñāna-ādi) to the production of eye-consciousness, etc. (janma cakṣur-vijñāna-ādi).

Commentary: Although the functions of consciousness transformation are different, the arising of eye-consciousness, etc., are called eye-faculty, etc. (utpāda cakṣur-vijñāna-ādi nāma cakṣur-indriya-ādi). Because they are the basis for the production of eye-consciousness, etc. (idam āśraya janma cakṣur-vijñāna-ādi). Do not think that the transformations of consciousness are only form and have no difference (Mā smṛti vijñāna-pariṇāma kevala rūpa asti na viśeṣa). This is actually about establishing the meaning of the faculties and dissolving the faculties (idam eva bandha-indriya vimokṣa-indriya artha).

However, let's temporarily explain this text according to the common understanding, considering the currently manifest pure form as the five faculties (atha api āśraya sāmānya artha vyākhyāna idam vacana, vartamāna viśuddha-rūpa pañca-indriya). In various treatises, it is only said that the pure form created by the four great elements is called faculty (sarvatra vacana catur-mahābhūta-ja viśuddha-rūpa nāma indriya). If according to the viewpoint of the Ālambana-parīkṣā, Dignāga (陳那) considers the seeds of the five consciousnesses as the five faculties (yadi āśraya Ālambana-parīkṣā, Dignāga eva pañca-vijñāna-bīja nāma pañca-indriya), or considers the seeds of the five objects as faculties (vā pañca-viṣaya-bīja nāma indriya). In the fourth fascicle, Dharmapāla's (護法) explanation is that the karma-seeds of the five consciousnesses are the five faculties (caturtha skandha Dharmapāla vyākhyāna, pañca-vijñāna-karma-bīja nāma pañca-indriya). The first volume of the Abhidharmakośa says that the eye-sphere refers to the form that has been manifested and its seed (Abhidharmakośa prathama āha cakṣur-dhātu nāma pūrvam dṛṣṭa-rūpa tathā bīja). Furthermore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī etc., all consider the manifest and seed two dharmas as the eye-faculty, etc. (tathā Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī sarva eva vartamāna tathā bīja dvaya dharma cakṣur-indriya-ādi). However, only the seed school explains the Abhidharmakośa, etc., considering that when initially perfuming, the consciousness transforms to resemble form (atha api kevala bīja-vāda vyākhyāna Abhidharmakośa-ādi, yadā prathama vāsanā, citta pariṇāma rūpa-sadṛśa), naming it from the time of perfuming (nāma vāsanā-kāla). Furthermore, the seed of consciousness now has the function of producing consciousness (tathā api vijñāna-bīja adhunā asti vijñāna-janaka-kārya), so it is falsely said to be the currently manifest form-faculty (ataḥ mithyā vacana vartamāna rūpa-indriya). If only the currently manifest is said to be the faculty, then how to explain the sutras that only mention the seed (yadi kevala vartamāna vacana indriya, katham vyākhyāna sūtra kevala bīja)? The fourth fascicle below and the Ālambana-parīkṣā will explain. Explaining the sutras that connect the currently manifest and the seed, in reality, only the currently manifest is the faculty (vyākhyāna sūtra sambandha vartamāna tathā bīja, vastutaḥ kevala vartamāna eva indriya), because it is the pure form created by the four great elements (yasmāt catur-mahābhūta-ja viśuddha-rūpa). Regarding the resulting consciousness, it is falsely said that the currently manifest has the function (viṣaya janita vijñāna, mithyā vacana vartamāna asti kārya). In reality, only the currently manifest form has the meaning of the function producing consciousness (vastutaḥ kevala vartamāna rūpa asti artha kārya janaka vijñāna). The Greater and Lesser Vehicles both acknowledge this (Mahāyāna Hīnayāna ubhaya eva svīkāra idam). These are mentioned to clarify (idam uktam spaṣṭa). Whether the substance actually exists or not (vastu vastutaḥ asti vā na asti), they argue with each other, so it is not said (paraspara vivāda, ataḥ na vacana). Because the sacred teachings say that the faculty refers to pure form (yasmāt śāstra vacana indriya nāma viśuddha-rūpa). In reality, the seed is not the nature of the five faculties (vastutaḥ bīja na pañca-indriya-svabhāva). The view of the school that uses both will be explained in detail in the fourth fascicle below (ubhayavāda vyākhyāna vistara caturtha skandha adhah), it cannot be described in advance (na śaknoti pūrvam varṇana). Only the seed school, such as Dignāga's (陳那) view, considers that the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only says that the five form-faculties are all seeds (kevala bīja-vāda, yathā Dignāga vicāra, Vimsatikā āha pañca-rūpa-indriya sarva eva bīja), as quoted in the fourth fascicle (yathā caturtha skandha udāhṛta).

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現行者無別師說。此中但約諸處教文顯相義說。即護法等通用現．種為根。根既然境亦爾。且助陳那故言業種亦是根體。可尋下第四．及觀所緣．二十唯識．對法第一等。不能繁引。

上來第二別破根訖。自下第三破所緣緣。

論。此眼等識至為所緣緣。

述曰。下破所緣緣。大文有三。初標識變定所緣緣義。次正破執。后歸正義。此標識變也。內識所緣不離心之境我亦許有。然心外所緣緣決定非有。外人執他身心聚等一切外境能生心者皆所緣緣體。故今非之。即總非十八部。然大眾部．一說部．說出世部．雞胤部。亦緣自心。亦緣心外法。今非一分故無過也。故宗輪云諸預流者心．心所法能了自性。至第二卷當知。

論。諸能引生至此所緣緣。

述曰。以上總文。謂色．心等能為引生。緣似自色．心之識者。汝執彼是此所緣緣耶。此即總牒共許所緣緣義。下欲別破。此對除正量部以外夫識緣法。法必有體能生識故是緣義。無法即非緣。識上必有似境之相。是所緣義。若無此相名所緣者。即眼根等應眼識所緣　若爾即鏡所照亦具二義。面等望鏡應是所緣緣　此亦不然。此鏡非為能慮託故。至下第七卷四緣中廣解。然此大小二乘共許。非唯自宗。其似境之相即是行相。大小乘別。如第二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

現行的觀點與已故大師的說法沒有區別。這裡只是根據各處經文所顯現的意義來解釋。也就是說，護法（Dharmapāla）等人普遍認為現行和種子是根本。既然根是這樣，那麼境也是這樣。而且爲了幫助陳那（Dignāga），所以說業種也是根的本體。可以參考下面的第四卷、以及《觀所緣緣論》（Ālambanaparīkṣā）、《二十唯識論》（Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi）、《對法論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第一卷等。不能一一列舉。

上面第二部分已經破斥了根。下面第三部分破斥所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya）。

論：這眼識等以...作為所緣緣。

述曰：下面破斥所緣緣。大的方面有三點。首先是標明和確定所緣緣的意義，其次是正式破斥執著，最後是歸於正確的意義。這裡是標明和確定。內在的識所緣的境不離心，我也允許有。然而，心外的所緣緣絕對沒有。外道認為他人的身心聚合等一切外境能夠產生心，都是所緣緣的本體。所以現在要破斥它。這是總的破斥十八部。然而，大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）、一說部（Ekavyāvahārika）、說出世部（Lokottaravāda）、雞胤部（Kukkuṭika），也緣自心，也緣心外法。現在破斥的是一部分，所以沒有過失。所以《宗輪論》（Samayabhedoparacanacakra）說，諸預流者（srota-āpanna）的心和心所法能夠了解自性。到第二卷時就會明白。

論：諸能引生...此所緣緣。

述曰：以上是總的說明。意思是說，色（rūpa）、心（citta）等能夠作為引生，緣于相似於自身色、心的識。你認為它們是此識的所緣緣嗎？這是總的列出共同認可的所緣緣的意義。下面想要分別破斥。這是針對除了正量部（Saṃmitīya）以外的，識緣法。法必定有本體，能夠產生識，所以是緣的意義。沒有法就不是緣。識上必定有相似於境的相。這是所緣的意義。如果沒有這個相而稱為所緣，那麼眼根等就應該是眼識的所緣了。如果這樣，那麼鏡子所照的也具備兩種意義。面等對著鏡子應該是所緣緣。這樣也是不對的。這個鏡子不是作為能夠思慮的依託。到下面第七卷四緣中會詳細解釋。然而，這是大小乘共同認可的，不是隻有自宗才認可。那相似於境的相就是行相（ākāra）。大小乘對此有區別，如第二卷所說。

【English Translation】 English version:

The current practitioners have no different teachings from those of deceased masters. Here, we are only explaining based on the apparent meanings of the teachings in various scriptures. That is to say, Dharmapāla and others generally consider the present activity and the seed to be the root. Since the root is like this, so is the object. Moreover, to assist Dignāga, it is said that the karma-seed is also the essence of the root. Refer to the fourth volume below, as well as the Ālambanaparīkṣā (Examination of the Object of Cognition), the Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Twenty Verses on Representation-Only), and the first volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma). It is impossible to list them all.

Above, the second part has refuted the root. Below, the third part refutes the ālambana-pratyaya (object-condition).

Treatise: These eye-consciousnesses, etc., take... as their object-condition.

Commentary: Below, we refute the object-condition. There are three major points. First, to identify and define the meaning of object-condition; second, to formally refute the attachment; and third, to return to the correct meaning. This is identification and definition. The object that the internal consciousness cognizes does not depart from the mind, and I also allow that. However, the object-condition outside the mind definitely does not exist. Externalists believe that all external objects, such as the aggregates of others' bodies and minds, which can generate consciousness, are the essence of the object-condition. Therefore, we now refute it. This is a general refutation of the eighteen schools. However, the Mahāsāṃghika (Great Assembly School), the Ekavyāvahārika (One-Word School), the Lokottaravāda (Transcendent Word School), and the Kukkuṭika (Cock School) also cognize their own minds and external dharmas. Now we are refuting a portion of them, so there is no fault. Therefore, the Samayabhedoparacanacakra (The Wheel of the Divisions of Doctrines) says that the minds and mental factors of the srota-āpanna (stream-enterers) can understand their own nature. This will be understood by the second volume.

Treatise: All that can lead to the arising... this object-condition.

Commentary: The above is a general explanation. It means that rūpa (form), citta (mind), etc., can serve as the cause, cognizing consciousness similar to one's own form and mind. Do you think they are the object-condition of this consciousness? This is a general listing of the commonly accepted meaning of object-condition. Below, we want to refute them separately. This is aimed at the fact that, except for the Saṃmitīya (Popular School), consciousness cognizes dharmas. Dharmas must have a substance that can generate consciousness, so it is the meaning of condition. Without dharmas, it is not a condition. Consciousness must have an appearance similar to the object. This is the meaning of object. If it is called an object without this appearance, then the eye-sense-organ, etc., should be the object of eye-consciousness. If so, then what is reflected in a mirror also has two meanings. The face, etc., facing the mirror should be the object-condition. This is also not correct. This mirror is not relied upon as something that can think. This will be explained in detail in the four conditions in the seventh volume below. However, this is commonly accepted by both the Mahayana and Hinayana, not only by our own school. That appearance similar to the object is the ākāra (appearance). The Mahayana and Hinayana differ on this, as mentioned in the second volume.

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卷末．及觀所緣論。不能煩引。如色為緣發生眼識。眼識緣色時。有似色之相。即是行相名似自識。

論。非但能生至所緣緣故。

述曰。下正破執。于中有四。一破正量。二破經部。三破古薩婆多。四破新薩婆多。此中唯破正量部。正量部識不立似相。直取前境即名為緣。吠世史迦眼舒光至境緣。余塵至根方緣。下既別破薩婆多故。此初破正量部也。正量不許具二義名緣。但能生識即是所緣。何假似自者。今難之云。以能生識故是所緣緣者。其因緣等應是所緣緣。等者等取等無間．增上緣等。對立量云。且汝眼識現緣色時。眼識所有因緣等應是眼識所緣緣。宗也。但能生眼識故。因也。如現色等。喻也　或翻遮色等非所緣緣。如眼根等但能發生無似相故。經部師等。因緣等者。種子等也。薩婆多等。因緣等者。同類因等也。彼並非眼識所緣緣。故今非地。又與能生識是所緣緣。為不定過。且望一色處作法。汝此色處為如聲等能生五識故。是五識中隨一所緣緣攝。為如眼等增上緣同類因等。能生五識故非是所緣緣。因緣等法既非所緣緣。心外色等應知亦爾。此破親所緣緣。然小乘等共計。他心等法為自識親所緣緣。即是心外取法。故今破也。此等親疏所緣緣義。分行相事等。如第七卷說。若不遮心外法為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 卷末，《及觀所緣論》。不再繁瑣地引用。例如，以色為緣而生起眼識。眼識緣於色時，會有類似於色的行相（ākāra），這被稱為行相，也叫做『似自識』。

論：不僅能生起（眼識），而且是所緣緣的緣故。

述曰：下面正式破斥各種執著。其中有四種：一、破斥正量部（Sammitīya）；二、破斥經部（Sautrāntika）；三、破斥古薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）；四、破斥新薩婆多部。這裡只破斥正量部。正量部的識不建立似相，直接取前面的境作為緣。吠世史迦（Vaiśeṣika）認為眼根舒放光明到達境才能作為緣，其餘的塵埃到達根才能作為緣。下面既然分別破斥薩婆多部，這裡首先破斥正量部。正量部不承認具備兩種含義才能稱為緣，只要能生起識就是所緣。為何要假設『似自』呢？現在用以下方式進行詰難：因為能生起識就是所緣緣嗎？那麼因緣等也應該是所緣緣。『等』字包括等無間緣、增上緣等。可以建立論式如下：當你的眼識現前緣於色時，眼識所有的因緣等應該是眼識的所緣緣（宗），因為它們能生起眼識（因），就像現前的色等（喻）。或者反過來說，遮色等不是所緣緣，就像眼根等只能生起眼識而沒有似相的緣故。經部師等認為，因緣等指的是種子等。薩婆多部等認為，因緣等指的是同類因等。它們並非眼識的所緣緣，所以現在這個論點不成立。而且，以『能生識就是所緣緣』作為標準，會犯不定過的錯誤。例如，對於一個色處（rūpāyatana）的法，這個色處像聲音等一樣能生起五識，所以是五識中任何一個的所緣緣嗎？還是像眼根等增上緣、同類因等一樣，雖然能生起五識但不是所緣緣？因緣等法既然不是所緣緣，那麼心外的色等也應該知道也是如此。這裡破斥的是親所緣緣。然而，小乘等共同認為，他心等法是自識的親所緣緣，也就是從心外取法，所以現在要破斥它。這些親疏所緣緣的含義，以及分行相事等，如第七卷所說。如果不遮止心外法作為

【English Translation】 English version End of the volume, Adhyālambanaparīkṣā (Analysis of the object of observation). It is not necessary to quote extensively. For example, with color (rūpa) as a condition, eye-consciousness (cakṣur-vijñāna) arises. When eye-consciousness cognizes color, there is an appearance similar to color (ākāra), which is called an appearance, also known as 'similar to self-consciousness'.

Treatise: Not only because it can generate (eye-consciousness), but also because it is the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya).

Commentary: Below, we formally refute various attachments. There are four types: 1. Refuting the Sammitīya school; 2. Refuting the Sautrāntika school; 3. Refuting the old Sarvāstivāda school; 4. Refuting the new Sarvāstivāda school. Here, only the Sammitīya school is refuted. The consciousness of the Sammitīya school does not establish a similar appearance; it directly takes the preceding object as the condition. The Vaiśeṣika school believes that the eye-organ emits light to reach the object to be a condition, and the remaining dust reaches the root to be a condition. Since the Sarvāstivāda school is refuted separately below, here we first refute the Sammitīya school. The Sammitīya school does not acknowledge that possessing two meanings is necessary to be called a condition; as long as it can generate consciousness, it is the object. Why assume 'similar to self'? Now, we challenge it in the following way: Because it can generate consciousness, is it the object-condition? Then the causal condition (hetu-pratyaya) etc. should also be the object-condition. 'Etc.' includes the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya), the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya), etc. A logical argument can be established as follows: When your eye-consciousness presently cognizes color, all the causal conditions etc. of the eye-consciousness should be the object-condition of the eye-consciousness (thesis), because they can generate eye-consciousness (reason), just like the present color etc. (example). Or conversely, the obstructing color etc. are not object-conditions, just like the eye-organ etc. can only generate eye-consciousness without a similar appearance. The Sautrāntika masters etc. believe that causal conditions etc. refer to seeds etc. The Sarvāstivāda school etc. believe that causal conditions etc. refer to homogeneous causes etc. They are not the object-condition of eye-consciousness, so this argument does not hold. Moreover, using 'being able to generate consciousness is the object-condition' as a criterion commits the fallacy of being inconclusive. For example, for a phenomenon of a color-sphere (rūpāyatana), does this color-sphere, like sound etc., generate the five consciousnesses, so is it the object-condition of any one of the five consciousnesses? Or is it like the dominant condition of the eye-organ etc., the homogeneous cause etc., although it can generate the five consciousnesses, it is not the object-condition? Since causal conditions etc. are not object-conditions, then external colors etc. should also be known to be the same. Here, the immediate object-condition is refuted. However, the Hīnayāna schools commonly believe that the minds of others etc. are the immediate object-condition of self-consciousness, which means taking phenomena from outside the mind, so now we refute it. The meanings of these immediate and remote object-conditions, as well as the division of appearance-aspects etc., are as described in the seventh volume. If external phenomena are not prevented from being

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疏所緣緣。即是第八為質。余識托之而變。觀所緣緣論說。過去色識是現五識所緣緣。二十唯識等。並如下第四卷。不能別敘。

上來第一破正量訖。自下第二破經部師。

論。眼等五識至似彼相故。

述曰。此牒經部師計。自下並同觀所緣緣論。彼說實有極微非五識境。五識上無極微相故隨彼彼處所攝眾多極微共和合時。總成一物名為和合。如阿拏色等以上方為五識境。和合是假。依實微立。即五識上有和合相故。名五識似彼相也。

論。非和合相至定不生故。

述曰。此下正破。量云。其和合相。非異極微有實體。即極微故。如極微此犯相符。經部不說和合有體。故今牒定也。說和合相既非實有。方顯非是五識緣故。非汝經部師其和合相。異本真實極微有實自體。分折彼和合時。能緣假和合相識定不生故。

論。彼和合相至是五識緣。

述曰。和合既假說許是所緣識上有相。不許是緣。以假無體故。

論。勿第二月等能生五識故。

述曰。舉月為難。應立量云。汝和合色處。設許是眼識之所緣非是緣。以彼都無實體性故。如第二月。第二月彼計亦是假不生五識。唯意識所緣。觀所緣緣論頌云。和合於五識。設所緣非緣。彼體實無故。猶如第二月　經部第

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：疏所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya）：即是第八識（阿賴耶識，ālayavijñāna）作為本質，其餘的識依附於它而生起變化。《觀所緣緣論》中說，過去的色識是現在的五識的所緣緣。《二十唯識論》等，以及如下第四卷的內容，不能在此分別敘述。

上面第一部分已經破斥了正量派（Sautrāntika）的觀點。下面第二部分開始破斥經部師（Vaibhāṣika）的觀點。

論：眼等五識乃至相似於那些相的緣故。

述曰：這是引述經部師的觀點。下面內容與《觀所緣緣論》相同。他們認為真實存在極微（paramāṇu），但極微不是五識的境界。因為五識上沒有極微的相。當各個地方所攝的眾多極微共同聚合時，總合成為一個事物，名為和合（samghāta），如阿拏色等以上才成為五識的境界。和合是假立的，依附於真實的極微而建立。因此五識上有和合的相，所以說五識相似於那些相。

論：非和合相乃至必定不生起的緣故。

述曰：這是正式破斥。可以立量說：『那和合相，不是異於極微而有實體，即是極微。』如同極微一樣，這犯了『相符』的過失。經部不說和合有實體。所以現在確定這一點。說和合相既然不是實有的，才顯示它不是五識的緣故。不是你們經部師所說的，那和合相，異於原本真實的極微而有真實的自體。當分析那和合時，能緣假和合相的識必定不會生起。

論：彼和合相乃至是五識的緣。

述曰：和合既然是假立的，就只允許它是所緣，識上有它的相，不允許它是緣，因為假立的事物沒有實體。

論：不要像第二個月亮等能生起五識的緣故。

述曰：舉第二個月亮為例來反駁。應該立量說：『你們的和合色處，即使允許它是眼識的所緣，也不是緣。因為它根本沒有實體性。』如同第二個月亮。他們認為第二個月亮也是虛假的，不能生起五識，只是意識的所緣。《觀所緣緣論》的頌文說：『和合對於五識，即使是所緣也不是緣，它的體性是虛假的緣故，猶如第二個月亮。』經部（Vaibhāṣika）的觀點。

【English Translation】 English version: Concerning the 'condition of object' (ālambana-pratyaya), it is the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness) that serves as the substance, and the other consciousnesses rely on it to transform. The Treatise on the Examination of the Conditions of Cognition states that past color-consciousness is the object-condition for the present five consciousnesses. The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only, and the content of the fourth fascicle below, cannot be described separately here.

The first part above has refuted the Sautrāntika's view. The second part below begins to refute the Vaibhāṣika's view.

Treatise: The five consciousnesses of the eye, etc., even because they resemble those appearances.

Commentary: This quotes the Vaibhāṣika's view. The following content is the same as the Treatise on the Examination of the Conditions of Cognition. They believe that real atoms (paramāṇu) exist, but atoms are not the realm of the five consciousnesses. Because there is no appearance of atoms on the five consciousnesses. When many atoms gathered from various places are combined together, they form a single thing called 'combination' (samghāta), such as the color of aṇa, etc., which are the realm of the five consciousnesses. Combination is provisional, established based on real atoms. Therefore, the five consciousnesses have the appearance of combination, so it is said that the five consciousnesses resemble those appearances.

Treatise: The non-combination appearance, even because it certainly does not arise.

Commentary: This is the formal refutation. A proposition can be established: 'That combination appearance is not a real entity different from atoms, it is atoms.' Like atoms, this commits the fault of 'agreement'. The Vaibhāṣika does not say that combination has a real entity. So now this is confirmed. Saying that the combination appearance is not real shows that it is not a condition of the five consciousnesses. It is not as your Vaibhāṣika says, that combination appearance is different from the original real atoms and has a real self-nature. When that combination is analyzed, the consciousness that cognizes the false combination appearance will certainly not arise.

Treatise: That combination appearance, even is the condition of the five consciousnesses.

Commentary: Since combination is provisional, it is only allowed to be the object, and the consciousness has its appearance, but it is not allowed to be a condition, because provisional things have no substance.

Treatise: Do not let the second moon, etc., be able to produce the conditions of the five consciousnesses.

Commentary: Use the second moon as an example to refute. A proposition should be established: 'Your combination color-location, even if it is allowed to be the object of eye-consciousness, is not a condition. Because it has no substantial nature at all.' Like the second moon. They believe that the second moon is also false and cannot produce the five consciousnesses, it is only the object of consciousness. The verse in the Treatise on the Examination of the Conditions of Cognition says: 'Combination for the five consciousnesses, even if it is the object, is not a condition, because its nature is false, like the second moon.' The Vaibhāṣika's view.

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二月亦非五所緣。今以為喻者意取少分。謂和合於五識是有法。非緣是法也。彼體實無故。猶如第二月。但以義縱和合設為所緣故。文中雲設。非第二月亦許所緣。此中但遮有其緣義。不說彼為五所緣故。又第二月依瞿波論師略有二解。一解云。唯意識得。此中為五識喻。非緣義等故無過失。以五識是有法所收。同喻無有無所立失。又以義減文。于有法之中須除五字直言和合于識設所緣非緣為宗。是意所緣故。或除設所緣字。但言和合于識非是緣。為宗亦得　二解云。第二月空花等相。即眼識等所緣。于中執實等方是意識。若依此義。空花等色便無本質。亦非法性故前解勝。護法同前。又所緣是境義。有無俱成。彼文既正。不須減加。其經部師。亦不說五識緣第二月故。論文之中宗．因．及喻準量應知。今不許彼實是所緣故言設也。五識緣長等假法。應有不定過。今釋之言。唯取五識一向緣實故無違也。然觸處中澀等。即四大分位差別名之為假。身根所得。不同長等聚集假攝非眼識等得。說為色處以明瞭取依眼為門故。若說五識亦緣假者。此是識內。不同他宗。如緣命根等亦是所緣緣。別變為相。依他攝故。或兼實緣。汝之和合識外無法不可為例。如對法抄。

論。非諸極微至各作所緣。

述曰。此第三

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：二月的現象也不是五種所緣（pañcavijñāna-gocara，五種感官意識的對象）。現在用它來作比喻，只是取其少部分意義。意思是說，與五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺意識）和合是有法（dharmin，論題），但它並非五識所緣之法。因為第二月（dvitiya-candra，幻覺中的第二個月亮）的體性實際上並不存在。就像幻覺中的第二個月亮一樣，只是爲了方便起見，假設它與五識和合，才被設定為所緣。所以文中說『假設』。並非說第二月也被允許作為所緣。這裡只是遮止了它具有作為五識之緣的意義，而不是說它不是五種所緣。另外，關於第二月，依瞿波（Gopa）論師的觀點，略有兩種解釋。一種解釋認為，只有意識（manovijñāna，心理意識）才能感知到它。這裡把它作為五識的比喻，因為它不具備緣的意義等等，所以沒有過失。因為五識是被有法所包含的，所以這個比喻沒有不成立的過失。或者可以通過減少文字的方式，在有法中去掉『五』字，直接說『與識和合，設定為所緣，但不是緣』作為宗（paksa，論題）。這是意識所緣的緣故。或者去掉『設定為所緣』這幾個字，只說『與識和合，但不是緣』，作為宗也可以。第二種解釋認為，第二月、空花（khyāti，虛幻的花朵）等現象，就是眼識等所緣。在這些現象中執著為真實等，才是意識的作用。如果按照這種解釋，空花等色就沒有本質，也不是法性（dharmatā，事物的真實本性），所以前一種解釋更好。護法（Dharmapāla）的觀點與前一種相同。另外，所緣是境（visaya，對像）的意思，無論有無都可以成立。這段文字既然正確，就不需要增減。經部師（Sautrāntika）也沒有說五識緣第二月。論文中的宗、因（hetu，理由）和喻（dṛṣṭānta，例子）應該按照量（pramāṇa，有效的認知手段）來理解。現在不承認第二月實際上是所緣，所以才說是『假設』。如果說五識緣長等假法（prajñapti-sat，概念性的存在），就應該有不定的過失。現在解釋說，只取五識一向緣實法（dravya-sat，實體性的存在），所以沒有違背。然而，觸處（spraṣṭavya-āyatana，觸覺的領域）中的澀等，就是四大（mahābhūta，地、水、火、風四大元素）分位差別的名稱，稱之為假。這是身根（kāya-indriya，身體感官）所獲得的。不同於長等聚集的假法，不是眼識等所能獲得的。說為色處（rūpa-āyatana，視覺的領域），是爲了清楚地說明依靠眼為門戶的緣故。如果說五識也緣假法，這是識內所緣，不同於其他宗派。如緣命根（jīvita-indriya，生命力）等也是所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya，對像緣），別變為相（ākāra，形象），依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva，依他存在的性質）所攝故。或者兼緣實法。你的和合識外無法，不可作為例子。如《對法抄》（Abhidharmakośa）所說。 論：並非諸極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）各自作為所緣。 述曰：這是第三。

【English Translation】 English version: The phenomenon of the second moon is also not one of the five objects of sense consciousness (pañcavijñāna-gocara). The reason for using it as a metaphor now is to take only a small part of its meaning. It means that being in conjunction with the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna, the five sense consciousnesses of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) is a subject of discussion (dharmin), but it is not a dharma that is the object of the five consciousnesses. This is because the nature of the second moon (dvitiya-candra, the illusory second moon) does not actually exist. Just like the illusory second moon, it is only for the sake of convenience that it is assumed to be in conjunction with the five consciousnesses and is thus designated as an object. Therefore, the text says 'assumed.' It is not that the second moon is also allowed to be an object. Here, it is only denying that it has the meaning of being a condition for the five consciousnesses, not saying that it is not one of the five objects. Furthermore, regarding the second moon, according to the view of the teacher Gopa, there are roughly two explanations. One explanation is that only mental consciousness (manovijñāna, mental consciousness) can perceive it. Here, it is used as a metaphor for the five consciousnesses because it does not have the meaning of being a condition, etc., so there is no fault. Because the five consciousnesses are included in the subject of discussion, this metaphor does not have the fault of being unestablished. Alternatively, by reducing the text, one can remove the word 'five' from the subject of discussion and directly say 'being in conjunction with consciousness, designated as an object, but not a condition' as the thesis (paksa). This is because it is an object of mental consciousness. Or, one can remove the words 'designated as an object' and simply say 'being in conjunction with consciousness, but not a condition' as the thesis. The second explanation is that phenomena such as the second moon and illusory flowers (khyāti, illusory flowers) are the objects of eye consciousness, etc. It is only when one clings to these phenomena as real that it becomes the function of mental consciousness. If one follows this explanation, then colors such as illusory flowers have no essence and are not the true nature of things (dharmatā), so the former explanation is better. Dharmapāla's view is the same as the former one. Furthermore, an object is the meaning of a domain (visaya), which can be established whether it exists or not. Since this passage is correct, there is no need to add or subtract. The Sautrāntika teacher also does not say that the five consciousnesses perceive the second moon. The thesis, reason (hetu), and example (dṛṣṭānta) in the treatise should be understood according to valid cognition (pramāṇa). Now, it is not acknowledged that the second moon is actually an object, so it is said to be 'assumed.' If one says that the five consciousnesses perceive conceptual existences (prajñapti-sat) such as length, there should be the fault of being indefinite. Now, it is explained that only the five consciousnesses invariably perceive substantial existences (dravya-sat), so there is no contradiction. However, roughness, etc., in the tactile sphere (spraṣṭavya-āyatana) are the names for the differences in the positions of the four great elements (mahābhūta, the four great elements of earth, water, fire, and wind), and are called conceptual. This is what the body sense (kāya-indriya, the body sense organ) obtains. It is different from the conceptual existences gathered from length, etc., which cannot be obtained by eye consciousness, etc. It is said to be the visual sphere (rūpa-āyatana) in order to clearly explain that it relies on the eye as a gateway. If one says that the five consciousnesses also perceive conceptual existences, this is an object within consciousness, which is different from other schools. For example, perceiving the life force (jīvita-indriya, the faculty of life) is also an object condition (ālambana-pratyaya), which transforms into an appearance (ākāra), and is included in the dependently originated nature (paratantra-svabhāva). Or it also perceives substantial existences. Your consciousness in conjunction with something outside of consciousness cannot be taken as an example. As the Abhidharmakośa says. Treatise: It is not that each individual atom (paramāṇu, the smallest unit of matter) acts as an object. Commentary: This is the third.

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牒本薩婆多毗婆沙師義。如經部師。極微和合所成是假。不能為緣發生五識。今和合時一一極微有和合粗相。各能為緣發生五識。以有實體能為緣故。然別極微相五識不得故非之也。

論。此識上無極微相故。

述曰。此中量云。色等極微設許是五識緣。非是所緣。五識上無彼極微相故如眼根等。眼根等為緣發生五識。五識不緣故以為喻。二十唯識亦作是說。極微各別不可取故。觀所緣緣論頌云。極微於五識。設緣非所緣。彼相識無故。猶如眼根等。

論。非諸極微至無此相故。

述曰。彼設救言極微各別之上有和合相為五識所緣。和合相者即似一相。此相是用大於本極微。用不離體。體既實有。成所緣緣。或為本計義亦無妨。今亦非之。量云。極微和合時。應無別和合相。體即本極微故。如未和合時。此中意云。非諸極微上別有和合相。不和合時無此相故。故此亦非是所緣也。

論。非和合位至體相有異。

述曰。此重成破。非是和合位與不和合位此諸極微。若體若相二俱有異。和合之位可作所緣。

論。故和合位至非五識境。

述曰。由如是理。極微和合位。亦非五識境。量云。汝不和合時極微。應是五識所緣。體即和合極微故。如和合極微。又返例和合之相

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《薩婆多毗婆沙》（Sarvastivada Vibhasa）師的觀點是：如同經部師（Sautrantika）所說，由極微（paramanu，最小的物質單位）和合而成的物質是虛假的，不能作為緣（pratyaya，條件）生起五識（five consciousnesses）。但現在認為，在極微和合時，每一個極微都具有和合的粗相（gross aspect of aggregation），各自能夠作為緣生起五識，因為它們具有實體，能夠作為緣。然而，由於五識無法識別單個極微的相狀，所以這種觀點是不正確的。

論：因為這種識上沒有極微的相狀。

述記：這裡可以用量（inference）來論證：如果色等極微被認為是五識的緣，那麼它們不是所緣（alambana，對像），因為五識上沒有這些極微的相狀，就像眼根等一樣。眼根等作為緣生起五識，但五識並不緣取眼根等，所以可以作為比喻。《二十唯識論》（Vimsatika）也這樣說，極微各自獨立，無法被認知。觀所緣緣論（Alambanapariksa）的頌文說：『極微對於五識，如果是緣而不是所緣，因為在識中沒有它們的相狀，就像眼根等一樣。』

論：不是所有的極微……因為沒有這種相狀。

述記：對方如果辯解說，在各個極微之上存在和合相，作為五識的所緣。和合相就像一個整體的相狀。這個相狀的作用大於原本的極微。作用不離本體。本體既然是實有的，就能成為所緣緣（alambanapratyaya，對像緣）。或者按照他們原本的觀點，也沒有妨礙。現在也否定這種觀點。可以用量來論證：極微在和合時，應該沒有另外的和合相，因為它的本體就是原本的極微，就像未和合時一樣。這裡的意思是說，不是在所有的極微上都有另外的和合相，因為在未和合時沒有這種相狀。所以，這也不是所緣。

論：不是在和合的位置……本體和相狀有差異。

述記：這裡再次進行破斥。不是在和合的位置和未和合的位置，這些極微的本體和相狀都有差異。在和合的位置可以作為所緣。

論：所以，在和合的位置……不是五識的境界。

述記：由於這樣的道理，極微在和合的位置，也不是五識的境界。可以用量來論證：你們認為未和合時的極微，應該是五識的所緣，因為它的本體就是和合的極微，就像和合的極微一樣。又反過來舉例說明和合的相狀。

【English Translation】 English version The view of the Sarvastivada Vibhasa masters is as follows: Like the Sautrantikas, they say that matter formed by the aggregation of atoms (paramanu, the smallest unit of matter) is false and cannot serve as a condition (pratyaya) for the arising of the five consciousnesses (five vijnanas). However, they now argue that when atoms aggregate, each atom has a gross aspect of aggregation and can individually serve as a condition for the arising of the five consciousnesses because they have substance and can serve as a condition. Nevertheless, since the five consciousnesses cannot perceive the individual aspects of atoms, this view is incorrect.

Treatise: Because there is no aspect of atoms on this consciousness.

Commentary: Here, an inference (anumana) can be used to argue: If atoms such as color are considered conditions for the five consciousnesses, then they are not objects (alambana) because there is no aspect of these atoms on the five consciousnesses, just like the sense organs (eye, etc.). The sense organs serve as conditions for the arising of the five consciousnesses, but the five consciousnesses do not perceive the sense organs, so they can be used as an analogy. The Vimsatika also says this, that individual atoms cannot be cognized. The Alambanapariksa states: 'Atoms, for the five consciousnesses, if they are conditions but not objects, because there is no aspect of them in consciousness, just like the sense organs.'

Treatise: Not all atoms... because there is no such aspect.

Commentary: If the opponent argues that there is an aggregate aspect above the individual atoms, which serves as the object of the five consciousnesses. The aggregate aspect is like a single, unified aspect. The function of this aspect is greater than the original atoms. The function is inseparable from the substance. Since the substance is real, it can become the object-condition (alambanapratyaya). Or, according to their original view, there is no obstacle. Now, this view is also negated. An inference can be used to argue: When atoms aggregate, there should be no separate aggregate aspect because its substance is the original atom, just like when they are not aggregated. The meaning here is that there is no separate aggregate aspect on all the atoms because there is no such aspect when they are not aggregated. Therefore, this is also not an object.

Treatise: Not in the position of aggregation... the substance and aspect are different.

Commentary: Here, the refutation is repeated. It is not that in the position of aggregation and the position of non-aggregation, the substance and aspect of these atoms are different. In the position of aggregation, it can serve as an object.

Treatise: Therefore, in the position of aggregation... it is not the realm of the five consciousnesses.

Commentary: Because of this reason, atoms in the position of aggregation are also not the realm of the five consciousnesses. An inference can be used to argue: You believe that atoms when not aggregated should be the object of the five consciousnesses because its substance is the aggregated atom, just like the aggregated atom. And conversely, give an example to illustrate the aspect of aggregation.

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非五識所緣體即不和合時極微故。如不和合時極微。此論文中有二意也。思準可知。若彼救言不和合時。亦有和合之相。以微隱故相難知者。又應破云。不和合時極微。應生和合覺。體即和合極微故。如和合時。返難和合如不合時。準量亦爾。非五識境總結之也。

論。有執色等至為此所緣。

述曰。此第四敘眾賢論師新薩婆多義。為前非破色等法極微是緣非所緣。以五識上無彼相故。便救之言。其五識上亦有極微相。色等雖有多相。一分是現量境。此諸極微共和集時。展轉相資各有粗相生。如阿拏色七極微相資。皆有阿拏色許大微相。如經部師阿拏色是假法。薩婆多雲。彼和合故非五識境。五識必依實法生故。今者所說此相相資。各別極微能生五識。一處相近名和。不為一體名集。即是相近。體各別故。是實法故有力生識。以相粗故識有此相。故所緣緣理具足有。

今者非之云。設許有體不諍緣義。不許彼有相資相故。故論但言為此所緣。今所緣義是所諍故。彼執不然下破之也。如觀所緣有六義破。皆有比量。不能具述。

論。彼執不然至體相一故。

述曰。下難有五。一二位無差難。極微和集相資之時與不和集不相資時其體是一。如何相資能為大故發生五識。立量云。汝相資極微

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 非五識所緣的實體，就是不和合狀態下的極微（smallest indivisible particle）。例如不和合狀態下的極微。這段論文中有兩種含義。可以思考推斷得知。如果他們辯解說不和合時，也有和合的表相，因為極其微小隱蔽所以難以察覺。那麼就應該反駁說，不和合狀態下的極微，應該產生和合的覺知，因為它的實體就是和合的極微。如同和合狀態時一樣。反過來詰難和合狀態如同不和合狀態，按照這個標準衡量也是一樣。以上是對非五識境界的總結。 論：有人認為色等是五識所緣。 述評：這是第四個部分，敘述眾賢論師（Samghabhadra）關於新一切有部（new Sarvastivada）的觀點。爲了反駁前面所說的色等法的極微是緣而不是所緣，因為五識上沒有那些表相。他們就辯解說，五識上也有極微的表相。色等雖然有很多表相，但一部分是現量（perception）的境界。這些極微共同聚集時，互相資助，各自產生粗大的表相。例如阿拏色（anu-varna，微細顏色）的七個極微互相資助，都有阿拏色所允許的粗大表相。如同經部師（Sautrantika）認為阿拏色是假法。一切有部說，因為它們和合所以不是五識的境界，五識必定依靠實法產生。現在所說的是這些表相互相資助，各個極微能夠產生五識。在同一個地方相近叫做『和』，不成為一體叫做『集』。也就是相近，實體各自獨立。因為是實法所以有力量產生識。因為表相粗大所以識有這些表相。所以所緣緣（object-condition）的道理完全具備。 現在反駁他們說，假設承認有實體，不爭論作為緣的意義。但不承認它們有互相資助的表相。所以論文只說『為此所緣』。現在所緣的意義是爭論的焦點。他們在『彼執不然』下面進行反駁。如同觀察所緣有六種方式進行反駁。都有比量（inference）。不能全部敘述。 論：他們的主張不對，直到『體相一故』。 述評：下面有五個難點。第一，二位無差別難。極微和集互相資助的時候，與不和集不互相資助的時候，它們的實體是一樣的。為什麼互相資助就能因為變大而發生五識？立量說：你的互相資助的極微

【English Translation】 English version: That which is not an object of the five consciousnesses is the ultimate particle (paramāṇu) in a state of non-combination. For example, the ultimate particle in a state of non-combination. There are two meanings in this treatise. They can be understood through contemplation and inference. If they argue that even in a state of non-combination, there is an appearance of combination, but it is difficult to perceive because it is extremely subtle and hidden, then it should be refuted by saying that the ultimate particle in a state of non-combination should produce a cognition of combination, because its entity is the combined ultimate particle, just as in the state of combination. Reversely challenging that the state of combination is like the state of non-combination, the standard of measurement is also the same. The above is a summary of what is not the realm of the five consciousnesses. Treatise: Some hold that form, etc., are the objects of these [five consciousnesses]. Commentary: This is the fourth part, narrating the views of Master Samghabhadra regarding the new Sarvastivada. In order to refute the previous statement that the ultimate particles of form, etc., are conditions (hetu) but not objects (alambana), because those appearances are not present on the five consciousnesses, they argue that the appearances of ultimate particles are also present on the five consciousnesses. Although form, etc., have many appearances, a portion of them is the realm of direct perception (pratyakṣa). When these ultimate particles gather together, they mutually assist each other, and each produces a coarse appearance. For example, when the seven ultimate particles of anu-varna (subtle color) mutually assist each other, they all have the coarse appearance allowed by anu-varna. Just as the Sautrantikas (Sūtra School) believe that anu-varna is a conceptual entity (prajñapti-sat), the Sarvastivadins say that because they are combined, they are not the realm of the five consciousnesses, as the five consciousnesses must arise based on real entities (dravya-sat). What is now being said is that these appearances mutually assist each other, and each ultimate particle can produce the five consciousnesses. Being close together in the same place is called 'combination' (samāhāra), and not becoming one entity is called 'aggregation' (samuccaya). That is, being close together, the entities are each independent. Because they are real entities, they have the power to produce consciousness. Because the appearances are coarse, the consciousness has these appearances. Therefore, the principle of the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya) is fully present. Now, refuting them, it is said that assuming the existence of entities is acknowledged, the meaning of being a condition is not disputed. However, it is not acknowledged that they have mutually assisting appearances. Therefore, the treatise only says 'the object of these'. Now, the meaning of 'object' is the focus of the dispute. They refute it below in 'Their assertion is not so'. It is like observing the object with six methods of refutation. All have inferences (anumāna). It is not possible to describe them all. Treatise: Their assertion is not so, up to 'because the entity and appearance are one'. Commentary: Below are five difficulties. First, the difficulty of no difference in the two states. The entities of the ultimate particles when combined and mutually assisting each other are the same as when not combined and not mutually assisting each other. Why can mutual assistance cause the five consciousnesses to arise because of becoming larger? Establishing an inference: Your mutually assisting ultimate particles

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。應不與五識為其所緣。即極微相故。如不相資集時　所緣論頌云。和集如堅等。設於眼等識。是緣非所緣。許極微相故。

論。瓶甌等物至應無別故。

述曰。二量等相齊難。所緣論云瓶．甌等質覺相彼應無別故等。今云瓶．甌二物極微之量等者。緣彼相識應無差別。瓶．甌等者。等取盆等。極微等者。是相似義。且如俱以一俱胝極微作瓶．甌。瓶．甌應無別。以極微頭數相資等故。今既瓶．甌二相各別。故知不是相資量等為五識緣。量云。彼一俱胝極微為瓶等者。與此一俱胝極微所成甌應無差別。有一俱胝極微相資相故。如此一俱胝極微所成之甌　境量既爾。心量準知。論文但有緣心無別。

彼若救言此瓶．甌等微量既齊相資相應等。但由行位不同遂令見別。

論。共和集位至微圓相故。

述曰。三微相失本難。所緣論頌云。非形別故別形別非實故。乃至廣說。更有一頌。今難之云。共和集位一一極微。應舍根本極微圓相。行烈既別相資亦殊。即是極微失本圓相　量云。瓶等相資之極微。應非圓相。體即相資相故。如相資相　極微本是團圓之相。今既不爾故失本相。由此又解。既無方分如何行位令其相別。相別唯在假瓶等上非極微故。此亦非由行位異令見異也。

論。非粗

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不應該讓五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）以極微（物質的最小單位）作為它們所緣的對象，因為極微是無分相的。就像不互相資助聚集的時候一樣。《所緣論》的頌文說：『和合聚集如堅硬等，假設對於眼等識，是緣而不是所緣，因為許可是極微相的緣故。』

論：瓶子、甌（小盆）等物，如果極微的量相等，那麼所緣的相識應該沒有差別。

述記：二量等相齊難。《所緣論》說：『瓶、甌等物質，感覺的相彼應該沒有差別。』現在說瓶、甌二物，如果極微的量相等，那麼緣彼相的識應該沒有差別。瓶、甌等，『等』字包括盆等。極微等，是相似的意思。比如都用一俱胝（一種很大的數量單位）的極微做成瓶、甌，瓶、甌應該沒有區別，因為極微的數量互相資助相等。現在既然瓶、甌二相各別，所以知道不是互相資助量等作為五識的所緣。量云：那一俱胝極微做成瓶等，與這一俱胝極微所成的甌應該沒有差別，因為有一俱胝極微互相資助相的緣故。如此一俱胝極微所成的甌，境的量既然如此，心的量也應該類推得知。論文只有緣心沒有差別。

他們如果辯解說，這瓶、甌等微量既然齊等，互相資助相應等，只是由於排列位置不同，才使得所見不同。

論：共同和合的位置，每一個極微，應該捨棄根本極微的圓形相。

述記：三微相失本難。《所緣論》的頌文說：『不是因為形狀差別而有差別，形狀差別不是因為真實的緣故。』乃至廣說。還有一頌。現在用它來反駁說：共同和合的位置，每一個極微，應該捨棄根本極微的圓形相，排列位置既然不同，互相資助也不同，這就是極微失去原本的圓形相。量云：瓶等互相資助的極微，應該不是圓形相，本體就是互相資助相的緣故，就像互相資助相一樣。極微原本是團圓的相，現在既然不是這樣，所以失去了原本的相。由此又可以解釋，既然沒有方分，如何排列位置使得它們相別？相別只在假瓶等上，不是在極微上。這也不是由於排列位置不同而使得所見不同。

【English Translation】 English version: The five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) should not have 'paramāṇu' (smallest unit of matter) as their object, because 'paramāṇu' are without parts. It's like when they are not mutually supportive and assembled. The verse in the 'Treatise on Objects' says: 'Aggregation is like hardness, etc. If for eye, etc. consciousnesses, it is a condition but not an object, because it is admitted to be the nature of 'paramāṇu'.'

Treatise: If the amount of 'paramāṇu' in objects like bottles and 'ou' (small basins) is equal, then the perceived appearance should be no different.

Commentary: The difficulty lies in the equality of the two amounts. The 'Treatise on Objects' says: 'The perceived appearance of substances like bottles and 'ou' should be no different.' Now it is said that if the amount of 'paramāṇu' in the two objects, bottles and 'ou', is equal, then the consciousnesses perceiving their appearance should be no different. 'Etc.' after bottles and 'ou' includes basins, etc. 'Equal 'paramāṇu'' means similar. For example, if both a bottle and an 'ou' are made with one 'koṭi' (a large unit of measurement) of 'paramāṇu', the bottle and 'ou' should be no different, because the number of 'paramāṇu' mutually supporting each other is equal. Since the appearances of the bottle and 'ou' are now distinct, it is known that mutually supportive equal amounts are not the objects of the five consciousnesses. It is argued: If one 'koṭi' of 'paramāṇu' makes a bottle, etc., it should be no different from an 'ou' made of one 'koṭi' of 'paramāṇu', because there is one 'koṭi' of 'paramāṇu' mutually supporting each other. Since the object's amount of an 'ou' made of one 'koṭi' of 'paramāṇu' is like this, the mind's amount should be inferred accordingly. The text only says that the mind's condition is no different.

If they argue that since the amounts of 'paramāṇu' in the bottle and 'ou' are equal, mutually supportive, and corresponding, the difference in what is seen is only due to the different arrangement of positions.

Treatise: In the position of common aggregation, each 'paramāṇu' should abandon the fundamental round shape of 'paramāṇu'.

Commentary: The original difficulty is the loss of the three 'paramāṇu'. The verse in the 'Treatise on Objects' says: 'The difference is not because of the difference in shape, the difference in shape is not because of reality,' and so on. There is another verse. Now it is used to refute: In the position of common aggregation, each 'paramāṇu' should abandon the fundamental round shape of 'paramāṇu'. Since the arrangement of positions is different, the mutual support is also different, which means that the 'paramāṇu' loses its original round shape. It is argued: The mutually supportive 'paramāṇu' of bottles, etc., should not be round, because the substance is the mutually supportive aspect, like the mutually supportive aspect. 'Paramāṇu' originally has a round shape, but since it is not like this now, it loses its original shape. From this, it can also be explained that since there are no directions, how can the arrangement of positions make them different? The difference is only in the false bottles, etc., not in the 'paramāṇu'. This is also not because the difference in what is seen is due to the different arrangement of positions.

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相識至緣余境故。

述曰。四識行相互通難。此中量云。緣大瓶等識。應即緣極微之心。彼執所緣即極微故。如緣極微心　何故緣瓶等。但作瓶等解不作極微解。若言見微。微雖細相。瓶雖相粗。以體一故。彼緣瓶粗相之識。即是緣微細相之識。若許爾者。汝餘聲等境。其緣色境之識應亦得緣。許相違法得俱緣故。如粗細境。

若許即有世間相違。

又若許爾。

論。一識應緣一切境故。

述曰。五一心緣遍難。相相違法許俱緣故。緣此之識應亦緣余。應耳亦得緣於色等。比量應知。

論。許有極微至真實極微。

述曰。總結之。如觀所緣廣為徴逐不能煩引。

論。由此定知至為所緣緣。

述曰。自下第三結歸正義。于中有三。一顯識變所緣緣義。二顯頓變非積小義。三顯極微非有實義。此顯識變也。以自內識所變之色為所緣緣是依他性有體法故。不緣心外所執無法。所緣頌云。內色如外現。為識所緣緣。許彼相在識。及能生識故。

此如何成。

論。見托彼生帶彼相故。

述曰。顯具所緣．緣義。若緣本質有法．無法。心內影像定必須有。此既有體見托彼生。即是緣義。然心起時帶彼相起名為所緣。帶是挾帶逼附之義。由具二義與小乘

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『相識至緣余境故』。

窺基法師疏解說：四識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識）的行相相互通達是困難的。這裡可以用比量來論證：緣于大瓶子等事物的識，應該也同時緣于組成瓶子的極微之心，因為他們認為所緣的本質就是極微。如同緣于極微之心一樣。為什麼緣于瓶子等事物時，只是理解為瓶子等，而不理解為極微呢？如果說能見到極微，雖然極微的相狀很細微，瓶子的相狀很粗大，但因為本體是一樣的，那麼緣于瓶子粗大相狀的識，也就是緣于極微細微相狀的識。如果允許這樣，那麼你們其餘的聲音等境，緣于顏色境的識也應該能夠緣于聲音等境，因為允許相違背的事物可以同時被緣，就像粗細的境一樣。

如果允許這樣，就會有世俗間的相違背。

又如果允許這樣。

論：一個識應該緣於一切境。

窺基法師疏解說：五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）一心緣於一切境是困難的，因為允許相狀相違背的事物可以同時被緣。緣於此境的識，也應該緣于其他境。應該耳識也能緣于顏色等。可以通過比量來理解。

論：允許有極微，乃至真實極微。

窺基法師疏解說：總結一下。就像觀察所緣的廣度一樣，如果進行詳細的追究，就會變得繁瑣。

論：由此必定知道，乃至作為所緣緣。

窺基法師疏解說：下面第三部分總結歸納到正確的意義。其中有三點：一是顯示識所變現的所緣緣的意義，二是顯示頓現，而不是積累微小的意義，三是顯示極微不是實有的意義。這裡顯示的是識的變現。因為由自身內在的識所變現的色，作為所緣緣，是依他起性（Paratantra）的有體法，不緣於心外所執著的沒有實體的法。所緣頌說：『內在的色，如外在顯現，作為識的所緣緣。允許它與識相互依存，並且能夠產生識。』

這是如何成立的呢？

論：因為見分依託它而生起，並且帶有它的相狀。

窺基法師疏解說：顯示具備所緣緣的意義。如果緣于本質（本質有法或本質無法），那麼心內的影像必定存在。既然這影像是有體的，見分依託它而生起，這就是緣的意義。然而心生起時，帶有那個相狀生起，稱為所緣。『帶』是挾帶、逼附的意思。由於具備這兩種意義，才與小乘（Hinayana）不同。

【English Translation】 English version 『Because mutual cognition arises from conditions and remaining realms.』

Commentary: It is difficult for the characteristics of the four consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness) to mutually interpenetrate. Here, an inference can be used to argue: The consciousness that cognizes a large pot, etc., should also simultaneously cognize the mind of the ultimate particles that constitute the pot, because they believe that the essence of what is cognized is the ultimate particle. Just like cognizing the mind of the ultimate particle. Why, when cognizing pots, etc., is it only understood as pots, etc., and not as ultimate particles? If it is said that one can see the ultimate particles, although the characteristics of the ultimate particles are very subtle, and the characteristics of the pot are very coarse, because the substance is the same, then the consciousness that cognizes the coarse characteristics of the pot is also the consciousness that cognizes the subtle characteristics of the ultimate particles. If this is allowed, then your remaining sound, etc., realms, the consciousness that cognizes the color realm should also be able to cognize the sound, etc., realms, because it is allowed that contradictory things can be cognized simultaneously, just like coarse and subtle realms.

If this is allowed, there will be worldly contradictions.

Furthermore, if this is allowed.

Treatise: One consciousness should cognize all realms.

Commentary: It is difficult for the five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) to cognize all realms with one mind, because it is allowed that contradictory characteristics can be cognized simultaneously. The consciousness that cognizes this realm should also cognize other realms. The ear-consciousness should also be able to cognize color, etc. This should be understood through inference.

Treatise: Allowing the existence of ultimate particles, even real ultimate particles.

Commentary: To summarize. Just like observing the breadth of what is cognized, if one pursues it in detail, it will become cumbersome.

Treatise: From this, it is definitely known, even as the objective condition (所緣緣, alambana-pratyaya).

Commentary: The third part below summarizes and returns to the correct meaning. There are three points: First, it shows the meaning of the objective condition transformed by consciousness; second, it shows the meaning of sudden manifestation, not the accumulation of small things; third, it shows that ultimate particles are not real. Here, it shows the transformation of consciousness. Because the color transformed by one's own inner consciousness, as the objective condition, is a dependent nature (依他起性, Paratantra) existing entity, it does not cognize the non-existent dharma clung to outside the mind. The verse on the objective condition says: 『The inner color, appearing as external, serves as the objective condition of consciousness. It is allowed that it is interdependent with consciousness and can generate consciousness.』

How is this established?

Treatise: Because the seeing-aspect arises relying on it and carries its characteristics.

Commentary: It shows the meaning of possessing the objective condition. If one cognizes the essence (whether the essence is an existing entity or a non-existing entity), then the image within the mind must exist. Since this image is an existing entity, the seeing-aspect arises relying on it, and this is the meaning of cognition. However, when the mind arises, it arises carrying that characteristic, which is called the objective condition. 『Carrying』 means to hold and attach. Because it possesses these two meanings, it is different from the Hinayana (小乘).

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別雖無分別緣真如時無有似境相。而亦挾帶真如體起名所緣緣。如自證分。至下第七自當體解。相者是何。所謂體相。真如無遍計所執相名無相。仍有體相。故經言一切諸相共同一相。所謂無相　問眼緣心上所變之色。有別影像不。若有者即應無窮。此是所緣故。若無者正量部心．薩婆多極微亦爾。何理不齊。我色近識可名挾帶。定相隨故。汝色不然。何得為難。識皆具不。如緣我等豈有相耶。五識亦緣過去識等。如此問答皆至下釋。

問既無極微。大乘識等緣色等時如何緣也。

論。然識變時至合成一物。

述曰。自下第二顯色頓變非積小義。自申正義。述能成所成根．塵等義。隨其相分形量大小。其能變識頓現此相。非別變作眾多極微。如薩婆多從小至大合成一物。如瑜伽第三．及．五十四．顯揚第五．第十六．第十八皆廣解之　此中意說順世．衛世極微本是常法。所生子微與因量等。仍名為粗。是無常法。子微聚集與量德合方成大量。薩婆多微隨何色者。即彼處攝。七極微成微。乃至展轉積小成大皆是實有。經部極微體是實有。積成大物。大物是假。實隨於假十處所攝。大乘極微法處所攝。然是假法。其色處等形量大者。體是實有。折大成小極微故假。由此識變但隨形量若大若小。不從於小

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：雖然在證悟真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）時沒有分別，也沒有類似外境的相狀，但它也包含著真如的本體而生起，這被稱為所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya，生起心識的條件之一）。就像自證分（Svasamvedana，心識的自我認知）。到後面的第七識會自然理解。什麼是相？就是所謂的體相。真如沒有遍計所執相（Parikalpita-lakshana，虛妄分別的相）所以名為無相。但仍然有體相。所以經中說一切諸相共同一相，這個一相就是所謂的無相。問：眼識所緣的心上所變的顏色，有不同的影像嗎？如果有，那就應該無窮無盡。因為這是所緣的緣故。如果沒有，那麼正量部（Sammitiya，佛教部派之一）的心識和薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，佛教部派之一）的極微（Paramanu，物質的最小單位）也是一樣。有什麼道理不同？我的顏色接近於意識，可以稱為包含。因為有確定的相隨附。你的顏色不是這樣。怎麼能用來責難？意識都具備嗎？比如緣於我等，難道有相嗎？五識也緣於過去的意識等等。這些問答都到後面解釋。 問：既然沒有極微，大乘的識等緣於色等時，如何緣呢？ 論：然而意識變現時，直到合成一個物體。 述曰：從下面第二點開始，闡明顏色是頓然變現，而不是逐漸積累的意義。自己陳述正確的觀點。敘述能成所成（成就者和被成就者）的根、塵等意義。隨著相分（Nimitta-bhaga，心識所呈現的外部對像）的形狀大小，能變識（Vijnana，能進行變現的意識）頓然顯現這個相，而不是分別變現出眾多的極微。就像薩婆多部從小到大合成一個物體。如《瑜伽師地論》第三卷、第五十四卷，《顯揚聖教論》第五卷、第十六卷、第十八卷都廣泛地解釋了這一點。這裡的意思是說，順世外道（Lokayatika，古印度哲學流派）和衛世師（Vaisheshika，古印度哲學流派）的極微本來是常法。所生的子微與因的量相等，仍然稱為粗。是無常法。子微聚集，與量和德結合，才成為大量。薩婆多部的極微隨屬於什麼顏色，就在那個處所攝持。七個極微成為微，乃至輾轉積累從小成大，都是實有。經量部（Sautrantika，佛教部派之一）的極微體是實有。積累成大物。大物是假。實隨從於假，被十處所攝。大乘的極微被法處所攝。然而是假法。它的色處等形狀大的，體是實有。折大成小成為極微，所以是假。因此，意識的變現只是隨著形狀的大小，無論是大是小。不從小開始。

【English Translation】 English version: Although there is no distinction when realizing Suchness (Tathata, the true nature of things), and there is no appearance like an external object, it also contains the essence of Suchness and arises, which is called Alambana-pratyaya (one of the conditions for the arising of consciousness). Just like Svasamvedana (self-cognition of consciousness). The seventh consciousness will naturally understand this later. What is 'appearance'? It is the so-called 'essence-appearance'. Suchness has no Parikalpita-lakshana (imaginary nature) and is therefore called 'no-appearance'. But it still has 'essence-appearance'. Therefore, the sutra says that all appearances share one appearance, and this one appearance is called 'no-appearance'. Question: Does the color transformed on the mind by the eye-consciousness have different images? If it does, then it should be infinite. Because this is the object of cognition. If it doesn't, then the mind of the Sammitiya (a Buddhist school) and the Paramāṇu (the smallest unit of matter) of the Sarvastivada (a Buddhist school) are the same. What is the difference in reasoning? My color is close to consciousness and can be called 'containing'. Because there is a definite appearance attached. Your color is not like this. How can it be used to criticize? Does consciousness possess all? For example, when cognizing 'I', etc., is there an appearance? The five consciousnesses also cognize past consciousnesses, etc. These questions and answers will be explained later. Question: Since there are no Paramāṇu, how does the consciousness of Mahayana cognize color, etc.? Treatise: However, when consciousness transforms, it continues until it synthesizes into one object. Commentary: From the second point below, it clarifies that color is manifested instantaneously, not gradually accumulated. It states its own correct view. It describes the meaning of the roots, objects, etc. of the accomplisher and the accomplished. According to the size of the Nimitta-bhaga (the external object presented by consciousness), the transforming consciousness (Vijnana, the consciousness that can transform) instantly manifests this appearance, rather than separately transforming into many Paramāṇu. Just like the Sarvastivada synthesizes an object from small to large. As explained extensively in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Volume 3, Volume 54, and the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations, Volume 5, Volume 16, and Volume 18. The meaning here is that the Paramāṇu of the Lokayatika (an ancient Indian philosophical school) and the Vaisheshika (an ancient Indian philosophical school) are originally permanent dharmas. The produced child-Paramāṇu is equal in quantity to the cause, and is still called 'coarse'. It is an impermanent dharma. The child-Paramāṇu gather together and combine with quantity and quality to become a large quantity. The Paramāṇu of the Sarvastivada, whichever color it belongs to, is contained in that place. Seven Paramāṇu become a subtle particle, and gradually accumulate from small to large, all of which are real. The Paramāṇu of the Sautrantika (a Buddhist school) is real in essence. It accumulates into a large object. The large object is false. The real follows the false and is contained in the ten places. The Paramāṇu of Mahayana is contained in the dharma-place. However, it is a false dharma. Its color-place, etc., which are large in shape, are real in essence. Breaking the large into small to become Paramāṇu is therefore false. Therefore, the transformation of consciousness only follows the size of the shape, whether it is large or small. It does not start from small.

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以成大也。所言一相是假一相。形假似一。實非是一。不同衛世　間如色等法形表等假。五識緣時為緣假實。若緣長等。即同經部應無緣義。若不緣者如何此中言隨大小。

又如何說長等假色色處所收　答由此義故西方二釋。一云五唯緣實。五識唯現量。明瞭緣自相故。如色處中唯青等實眼識緣之。五識同時意識明瞭取得長短等故。長等假色色處所攝。若以別根．境相對。長等法處收。唯意緣故。此中所言隨大小者。隨其顯色大小頓變。眼識緣之無大小解。今談之為大小等也。意識緣之作大小相。非五識能緣作大小解。即是假形。色處既爾。乃至觸處亦不緣假。唯緣本實四大為境。不同經部　第二師云。五亦緣假。以能明瞭照其自相。是處自相。非事自相。亦非自相自相。處者十二處。事者謂青．黃等各各別事。自相自相者。於一青中復有多微一一各別。或多分段各各有別。由如是理故名現量。非言現量皆是實法。無漏亦緣諸假法故。然假有二。一無體假。二相待假。前如忿等。后如悔等。以癡相說。長等但是相待假收。非如青等相待仍實。名之為假。體是有法。無如經部緣假之失。長等有體。依他法故。長等但是青等分位。其實五識得多青等名緣長等。無別緣也。唯意得之。名緣假者。五識亦緣青分位故。故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 以成就大事。所說的一相是虛假的一相。形狀虛假地相似於一，實際上並非是一個。這不同於世俗間的顏色等法，其形狀、表象等是虛假的。五識在緣取時，是緣取真實的。如果緣取長等，就如同經部一樣，應該沒有緣取的意義。如果不緣取，那麼如何在此處說隨大小呢？ 又如何說長等虛假之法為法處所攝？回答是，由於這個意義，西方有兩種解釋。一種說法是，五識只緣取真實的，五識唯是現量，因為明瞭地緣取自相。例如，在色處中，只有青等是真實的，眼識緣取它們。五識同時，意識明瞭地取得長短等，所以長等虛假之法為法處所攝。如果以不同的根、境相對，長等法為法處所收，因為唯有意識緣取。此處所說的隨大小，是隨著顯色的大小而頓然變化，眼識緣取它，沒有大小的理解。現在談論它為大小等。意識緣取它，產生大小的相狀，不是五識能夠緣取併產生大小的理解，這就是虛假的形狀。色處既然如此，乃至觸處也不緣取虛假的，只緣取根本真實的四大作為境。這不同於經部。第二種說法是，五識也緣取虛假的，因為它能夠明瞭地照見它的自相，是處（ayatana）的自相，不是事（dharma）的自相，也不是自相的自相。處指的是十二處（dvadasayatana），事指的是青、黃等各個不同的事物，自相的自相指的是在一個青色中還有很多微小的、各個不同的部分，或者很多分段，各個各有區別。由於這樣的道理，所以稱為現量（pratyaksa）。並非說現量都是實法，無漏（anasrava）也緣取諸虛假之法。然而虛假有兩種：一種是無體的虛假，一種是相待的虛假。前者如忿等，後者如悔等，以癡相來說。長等只是相待的虛假所攝，不像青等相待仍然是真實的，名為虛假，體是有法。沒有像經部那樣緣取虛假的過失。長等有體，因為是依他法。長等只是青等的分位，實際上五識得到很多青等，名為緣取長等，沒有別的緣取。唯有意識得到它，名為緣取虛假，五識也緣取青的分位，所以。

【English Translation】 English version: To accomplish great things. The 'one aspect' spoken of is a false 'one aspect'. The shape falsely resembles one, but in reality, it is not one. This is different from worldly phenomena such as color, whose shapes and appearances are false. When the five consciousnesses perceive, they perceive the real. If they perceive length, etc., then, like the Sautrantikas, there should be no meaning of perception. If they do not perceive, then how can it be said here that they follow size? Furthermore, how can it be said that false phenomena such as length are included in the 'dharma-ayatana' (sphere of mind-objects)? The answer is that due to this meaning, there are two Western interpretations. One says that the five consciousnesses only perceive the real; the five consciousnesses are only 'pratyaksa' (direct perception), because they clearly perceive their own-nature (svalaksana). For example, in the 'rupa-ayatana' (sphere of forms), only blue, etc., are real, and the eye-consciousness perceives them. Simultaneously with the five consciousnesses, the mind-consciousness clearly grasps length, shortness, etc., so false phenomena such as length are included in the 'dharma-ayatana'. If different faculties and objects are opposed, then length, etc., are included in the 'dharma-ayatana', because only the mind perceives them. What is said here about following size is that it changes suddenly according to the size of the visible form; the eye-consciousness perceives it without understanding size. Now we discuss it as size, etc. The mind-consciousness perceives it and produces the appearance of size, which the five consciousnesses cannot perceive and produce an understanding of size; this is a false shape. Since the 'rupa-ayatana' is like this, even the 'sprasta-ayatana' (sphere of touch) does not perceive the false, but only perceives the fundamental real four great elements (mahabhuta) as objects. This is different from the Sautrantikas. The second interpretation says that the five consciousnesses also perceive the false, because they can clearly illuminate their own-nature, which is the own-nature of the 'ayatana' (sphere), not the own-nature of the 'dharma' (phenomenon), nor the own-nature of the own-nature. 'Ayatana' refers to the twelve 'ayatanas' (dvadasayatana), 'dharma' refers to the various different things such as blue and yellow, and the own-nature of the own-nature refers to the many subtle, individual parts within one blue color, or many segments, each with its own distinction. Because of this reason, it is called 'pratyaksa' (direct perception). It is not to say that all 'pratyaksa' are real phenomena; the 'anasrava' (untainted) also perceives false phenomena. However, there are two types of false: one is the false without substance, and the other is the false dependent on relation. The former is like anger, etc., and the latter is like regret, etc., speaking in terms of delusion. Length, etc., are only included in the false dependent on relation, unlike blue, etc., which are still real even when dependent on relation, and are called false, but the substance is a real phenomenon. There is no fault of perceiving the false like the Sautrantikas. Length, etc., have substance, because they are dependent on other phenomena. Length, etc., are only divisions of blue, etc.; in reality, the five consciousnesses obtain many blue, etc., and are called perceiving length, etc., without any other perception. Only the mind obtains it, and it is called perceiving the false, because the five consciousnesses also perceive the divisions of blue.

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瑜伽論第三卷說。識變色時隨小大中　由此長等本識亦變。此甚難解。前解為勝。如對法第一疏。

問若無極微佛何故說。

論。為執粗色至實有極微。

述曰。下第三顯極微非有實義。即是為執實法實我是一是常故。佛說極微令其除執。而分折色。非謂有實極微體故佛說之也。然依他故。可說為實成所緣緣故。依所折色說故。然瑜伽論第五十四。由五緣故佛說極微　問如何除折。

論。諸瑜伽師至假說極微。

述曰。言瑜伽者名為相應。此有五義故不別翻。一與境相應。不違一切法自性故。二與行相應。謂定惠等行相應也。三與理相應。安非安立二諦理也。四與果相應。能得無上菩提果也。五得果既圓利生救物。赴機應感藥病相應。此言瑜伽。法相應稱。取與理相應。多說唯以禪定為相應。瑜伽之師即依士釋。師有瑜伽名瑜伽師。即有財釋。若言瑜祇即觀行者。是師之稱。以假想惠。非謂實以刀等折之。于粗色相即是所折之色相也。半半破之漸次而折。除粗至細至不可折假說極微。不同小乘體無方分而不可折。

論。雖此極微至是色邊際。

述曰。以此極微體即是分而體有方。故言極微猶有方分。

或復分者謂有二義。一方之分。二方即分。粗具二種。細唯后一

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《瑜伽師地論》第三卷說：『當意識轉變去認知顏色時，會隨著小、大、中而變化，因此，作為根本識的阿賴耶識也會隨之變化。』 這句話非常難以理解，之前的解釋更為妥當，正如《對法論》第一疏所說。

問：如果根本沒有極微（kalāpa，不可再分的最小物質單位），佛陀為何還要說有極微呢？

論：爲了讓人們不再執著于粗色，認為粗色是真實存在的，並執著于實有的極微。

述曰：下面第三點闡明極微並非真實存在的意義。因為人們執著于實法、實我，認為它們是單一的、永恒的，所以佛陀才說極微，爲了消除他們的執著，從而分析色法。 並非說存在真實的極微實體，所以佛陀才說極微。然而，由於極微是依他起性（paratantra，依賴其他條件而生起），所以可以說它是真實的，因為它構成了所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya，生起意識的客觀條件）。 它是根據被分析的色法而說的。然而，《瑜伽師地論》第五十四卷說，由於五個原因，佛陀才說極微。 問：如何進行分析呢？

論：諸位瑜伽師……（通過假想）說有極微。

述曰：『瑜伽』的意思是『相應』（yoga，結合，聯繫）。這裡有五種含義，所以不單獨翻譯。一是與境相應，不違背一切法的自性。二是與行相應，指與禪定、智慧等修行相應。三是與理相應，安立世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）和勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，絕對真理）這二諦之理。四是與果相應，能夠獲得無上菩提（anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi，無上正等正覺）之果。五是獲得果位后，圓滿地利益眾生、救助萬物，應機施教，如藥對癥。這裡說的『瑜伽』，是指法相應。取其與理相應的含義。通常只以禪定作為相應。『瑜伽師』（yogācāra，瑜伽行者）是依士釋（指根據主語來解釋複合詞）。師有瑜伽，名為瑜伽師，即有財釋（指根據所有者來解釋複合詞）。如果說『瑜祇』，就是觀行者，是對老師的稱呼。通過假想的智慧，並非真的用刀等工具去分析它。對於粗大的色相，就是所要分析的色相。一半一半地破除它，逐漸地分析，去除粗大的部分，直到細微到無法再分析，假想地說有極微。這不同於小乘佛教所說的極微，小乘認為極微沒有方分，是不可分割的。

論：雖然這極微……是色的邊際。

述曰：這個極微的本體，實際上是有分，並且本體有方位的。所以說極微仍然有方位。

或者說『分』，有兩種含義：一是方位的分，二是方位即是分。粗大的事物具有這兩種含義，細微的事物只有后一種含義。

【English Translation】 English version The third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'When consciousness transforms to cognize color, it changes according to small, large, and medium; therefore, the ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness), as the fundamental consciousness, also changes accordingly.' This is very difficult to understand; the previous explanation is better, as stated in the first commentary of the Abhidharmakośa.

Question: If there are no kalāpas (indivisible particles), why did the Buddha speak of them?

Treatise: To prevent attachment to gross matter, thinking it is real, and to attachment to truly existing kalāpas.

Commentary: The third point below clarifies that kalāpas do not have real existence. Because people are attached to real dharmas and a real self, thinking they are singular and eternal, the Buddha spoke of kalāpas to eliminate their attachment, thereby analyzing form. It is not that there is a real kalāpa entity, so the Buddha spoke of it. However, because kalāpas are paratantra (dependent origination), it can be said that they are real, because they constitute the ālambana-pratyaya (objective condition for the arising of consciousness). It is spoken of according to the analyzed form. However, the fifty-fourth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the Buddha spoke of kalāpas for five reasons. Question: How is the analysis done?

Treatise: The yogācāras (through imagination) speak of kalāpas.

Commentary: 'Yoga' means 'correspondence'. There are five meanings here, so it is not translated separately. First, it corresponds to the object, not violating the self-nature of all dharmas. Second, it corresponds to practice, referring to correspondence with practices such as dhyāna (meditation) and prajñā (wisdom). Third, it corresponds to reason, establishing the two truths of saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth) and paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth). Fourth, it corresponds to the result, being able to obtain the fruit of anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi (unexcelled perfect enlightenment). Fifth, after obtaining the fruit, perfectly benefiting beings and saving all things, teaching according to their capacity, like medicine matching the illness. The 'yoga' mentioned here refers to correspondence with the Dharma. It takes the meaning of correspondence with reason. Usually, only dhyāna is taken as correspondence. 'Yogācāra' is interpreted based on the subject. A teacher has yoga, called a yogācāra, which is interpreted based on possession. If it is said 'yogī', it is the practitioner of contemplation, which is a title for the teacher. Through imagined wisdom, it is not really analyzed with knives or other tools. For the gross form, it is the form to be analyzed. Breaking it in half, gradually analyzing it, removing the gross parts until it is subtle and cannot be analyzed further, hypothetically speaking of kalāpas. This is different from the kalāpas spoken of in Hīnayāna Buddhism, which are considered to have no spatial dimensions and are indivisible.

Treatise: Although this kalāpa is the boundary of form.

Commentary: The substance of this kalāpa actually has parts, and the substance has direction. Therefore, it is said that the kalāpa still has direction.

Or 'part' has two meanings: one is the part of direction, and the other is that direction is the part. Gross things have both meanings, while subtle things have only the latter meaning.

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。方即是分故無有失。若更折之便心相變似虛空現。不作色相現。所折之物即非極微。極微細故。故不可折。非如心等故有方分。方即分故非更有分。瑜伽說云極微有方無分者。更無細分故不相違。以此微相與空相鄰故。諸經論皆說極微是色邊際。邊際者是窮盡義。過此更折便為非色。然此分別如對法第一瑜伽第三．五十四等說。五十四說。非肉天眼境。唯餘三眼境。唯惠折之。非實有故。

論。由此應知至非極微成。

述曰。破有對中。此為第二結上明非。

論。余無對色至定非實色。

述曰。自下第二破無對色。即法處色。生起下文。此中二量。謂無對色。定非實有。許色所攝故。色種類故。如有對色。前已破訖故得為喻　又量云。或此定非實色。以無對故。如心．心所。心．心所法非實色故。

論。諸有對色至真實色法。

述曰。牒有對非結無對非。此五外境或現在。或過去。或現行。或唯種。或通二。如下第三．第八。觀所緣論等說。

論。表無表色豈非實有。

述曰。自下第三雙破有對。及無對也。于中有二。初問。次破。此即初也。此外人問。有對．無對既說為無。表．無表色豈非實有。世尊說有業及戒故下初總非。

論。此非實有。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

'方'即是分割，所以沒有缺失。如果再分割它，那麼心的相狀就會改變，類似虛空顯現，不再顯現色相。被分割的物體就不是極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）了。因為極微非常微細，所以不可分割，不像心等有方位和部分。'方'即是部分，所以不再有更小的部分。《瑜伽師地論》說極微有方位但沒有更小的部分，這是因為沒有更細微的部分，所以不矛盾。因為這種微小的相狀與空相鄰，所以諸經論都說極微是色的邊際。邊際就是窮盡的意思，超過這個界限再分割就不是色了。然而這種分別如同《對法論》第一和《瑜伽師地論》第三、第五十四等所說。第五十四說，不是肉眼所能見的境界，只有其餘三種眼（天眼、慧眼、法眼）才能見。只有智慧才能分割它，因為它不是真實存在的。

論：由此應該知道，乃至不是極微構成。

述記：在破斥有對色中，這是第二部分，總結上面所說的，說明不是極微構成。

論：其餘無對色，乃至必定不是真實色。

述記：下面第二部分破斥無對色，也就是法處色。引出下文。這裡有兩個量（推理）：所謂的無對色，必定不是真實存在的，因為它被認為是色所包含的，是色的一種。就像有對色一樣。前面已經破斥完畢，所以可以作為比喻。又一個量是：或者這個必定不是真實色，因為它沒有對礙。就像心和心所（citta-caitta，心理活動和心理因素）一樣。心和心所法不是真實色。

論：諸所有對色，乃至真實色法。

述記：引用有對色的說法，總結無對色的非真實性。這五種外境，或者存在於現在，或者存在於過去，或者正在發生，或者只是種子，或者兩者都有。如下文第三和第八，《觀所緣論》等所說。

論：表色和無表色難道不是真實存在的嗎？

述記：下面第三部分同時破斥有對色和無對色。其中分為兩部分，首先是提問，然後是破斥。這裡是提問。這是外人的提問：有對色和無對色既然都說是沒有的，那麼表色（vijñapti-rūpa，表業色）和無表色（avijñapti-rūpa，無表業色）難道不是真實存在的嗎？世尊說過有業和戒律，所以下面首先總的否定。

論：這些不是真實存在的。

【English Translation】 English version:

'Direction' is division, therefore there is no loss. If you further divide it, then the appearance of the mind will change, similar to the appearance of emptiness, no longer manifesting form. The object being divided is not a paramāṇu (the smallest unit of matter). Because the paramāṇu is extremely subtle, it cannot be divided, unlike the mind, which has direction and parts. 'Direction' is part, so there are no smaller parts. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the paramāṇu has direction but no smaller parts, which is not contradictory because there are no finer parts. Because this subtle appearance is adjacent to emptiness, all sutras and treatises say that the paramāṇu is the boundary of form. Boundary means exhaustion; beyond this limit, further division is no longer form. However, this distinction is as described in the first chapter of the Abhidharma and the third and fifty-fourth chapters of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The fifty-fourth chapter says that it is not an object of the physical eye, but only of the other three eyes (divine eye, wisdom eye, dharma eye). Only wisdom can divide it, because it is not truly existent.

Treatise: From this, it should be known that it is not composed of paramāṇus.

Commentary: In refuting the colors with resistance, this is the second part, summarizing the above and explaining that it is not composed of paramāṇus.

Treatise: The remaining colors without resistance are definitely not real colors.

Commentary: The second part below refutes colors without resistance, which are dharma-sphere colors. It introduces the following text. Here are two inferences: The so-called colors without resistance are definitely not truly existent, because they are considered to be included in color, a type of color, just like colors with resistance. The previous refutation is complete, so it can be used as a metaphor. Another inference is: Or this is definitely not a real color, because it has no resistance. Like the mind and mental factors (citta-caitta). The mind and mental factors are not real colors.

Treatise: All colors with resistance are real colors.

Commentary: Quoting the statement about colors with resistance, it concludes the non-reality of colors without resistance. These five external objects either exist in the present, or exist in the past, or are happening, or are just seeds, or both. As stated in the third and eighth chapters below, the Ālambanaparīkṣā and other texts.

Treatise: Are manifest and non-manifest colors not truly existent?

Commentary: The third part below simultaneously refutes colors with and without resistance. It is divided into two parts, first the question, then the refutation. This is the question. This is an outsider's question: Since colors with and without resistance are said to be non-existent, are manifest color (vijñapti-rūpa) and non-manifest color (avijñapti-rūpa) not truly existent? The World-Honored One said that there are karma and precepts, so the following first gives a general negation.

Treatise: These are not truly existent.

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述曰。下別破也。于中有二。初破外計。后外人引經為難。初中有三。一總非。二卻詰。三別破。此即初也。

論。所以者何。

述曰。次卻詰也。

論。且身表色至以何為性。

述曰。此下第三別破諸部。于中有二。一破錶。二例破無表　初中有二。先破身。后破語　先中復二。初破外計。次申正義。破外計中有二。第一總問諸部。言身者積聚義。謂諸根大造色和合差別為體。積聚多色以成身故。或依止義。為眾多法所依止故。此義雖通。然唯身根別得總名。表謂表示。色處表色。以表依身故名身表。依身之表。依士釋也。此唯假業。若思實身業。動身之業。能動身故。成業論中廣釋諸部業體。不能煩引。

論。若言是形至不可得故。

述曰。下第二別破諸部。于中有二。初破薩婆多實有形。故言非實有。可分析故。如瓶等物。前已破錶色處無故。今更破無表。故非實有。以彼長等以相形故成於形色。豈長等是實。相待之時便失相故　外人救曰。此實有性。有別長等極微性故。積集長性微即成長等。短等亦爾。故非表是假。若爾應失微本圓相。或應極微有別長形者。微本圓相。性雖是長而微不長。后此便變為其長等。豈非捨本微圓之相而成長等。若謂不然。應量破云。汝長極

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：窺基法師解釋說：下面分別進行破斥。其中分為兩部分：首先破斥外道計度，然後外道引用經文進行詰難。在第一部分中又有三點：一是總的否定，二是反過來詰問，三是分別破斥。這裡是第一點，總的否定。

論：為什麼呢？

窺基法師解釋說：這是反過來詰問。

論：且說身表色，究竟以什麼為體性呢？

窺基法師解釋說：下面第三部分是分別破斥各個部派的觀點。其中分為兩部分：一是破斥表色，二是類比破斥無表色。在破斥表色中又分為兩部分：先破斥身表，后破斥語表。在破斥身表中又分為兩部分：首先破斥外道計度，然後闡述正確的義理。在破斥外道計度中又有兩部分：第一是總的詢問各個部派。所說的『身』，是積聚的意思，指的是諸根、四大種所造的色法和合差別而成的體性。因為積聚多種色法才形成身。或者有依止的意思，因為是眾多法所依止的地方。這個意義雖然普遍，但只有身根才能特別得到總的名稱。『表』是表示的意思，色處中的表色，因為表色依身而存在，所以稱為身表。『依身之表』，是依士釋。這只是假業，如果是思實身業，就是動身之業，因為能動身。在《成業論》中廣泛解釋了各個部派的業體，這裡就不詳細引用了。

論：如果說是形色，那麼形色是假有，因為可以分析。

窺基法師解釋說：下面第二部分是分別破斥各個部派的觀點。其中分為兩部分：首先破斥薩婆多部的實有形色，所以說不是實有，因為可以分析，就像瓶子等物一樣。前面已經破斥了表色處不存在，現在進一步破斥無表色，所以說不是實有。因為它們的長度等是相互比較而形成的形色。難道長度等是實有的嗎？相互對待的時候，長度等就失去了自身原有的性質。外人辯解說：這是實有的體性，因為有不同的長度等極微的體性。積聚長度的極微就形成了長度等，短度等也是這樣。所以表色不是假有的。如果這樣，那麼應該失去極微原本的圓形相。或者應該極微有不同的長度形狀。極微原本的圓形相，體性雖然是長度，但是極微本身並不長。後來這就會變成長度等。這難道不是捨棄了原本極微的圓形相而變成了長度等嗎？如果說不是這樣，那麼應該用量來破斥：你的長度極微

【English Translation】 English version: Kuiji comments: The following separately refutes. It is divided into two parts: first, refuting external calculations; then, outsiders cite scriptures to challenge. In the first part, there are three points: first, a general negation; second, a counter-questioning; and third, separate refutations. This is the first point, a general negation.

Treatise: Why is that?

Kuiji comments: This is a counter-questioning.

Treatise: Furthermore, what is the nature of bodily expression (身表色, shēn biǎo sè)?

Kuiji comments: The third part below separately refutes the views of various schools. It is divided into two parts: first, refuting expression (表, biǎo); second, analogously refuting non-expression (無表, wú biǎo). The refutation of expression is further divided into two parts: first, refuting bodily expression; second, refuting verbal expression. The refutation of bodily expression is further divided into two parts: first, refuting external calculations; second, expounding the correct meaning. The refutation of external calculations is further divided into two parts: first, a general inquiry to various schools. The so-called 'body' (身, shēn) means accumulation, referring to the nature of the aggregation and differentiation of the roots, the four great elements (四大, sì dà), and the produced form (造色, zào sè). Because the accumulation of various forms constitutes the body. Or it has the meaning of reliance, because it is the place where many dharmas rely. Although this meaning is universal, only the body root can specifically obtain the general name. 'Expression' (表, biǎo) means indication. Expression in the form realm (色處, sè chù), because expression relies on the body, it is called bodily expression. 'Expression relying on the body' is an appositional compound (依士釋, yī shì shì). This is only a provisional karma (假業, jiǎ yè). If it is a real bodily karma, it is the karma of moving the body, because it can move the body. The Cheng Ye Lun extensively explains the nature of karma of various schools, so I will not quote it in detail here.

Treatise: If it is said to be shape (形, xíng), then shape is provisionally existent because it can be analyzed.

Kuiji comments: The second part below separately refutes the views of various schools. It is divided into two parts: first, refuting the Sarvastivada's (薩婆多, Sà pó duō) real existence of shape, so it is said that it is not really existent because it can be analyzed, like bottles and other things. The expression in the form realm has already been refuted as non-existent before, and now non-expression is further refuted, so it is said that it is not really existent. Because their length, etc., are formed by comparing each other. Are length, etc., really existent? When they are treated relatively, length, etc., lose their original nature. An outsider argues: This is a real nature because there are different extremely small particles (極微, jí wēi) of length, etc. Accumulating extremely small particles of length forms length, etc., and shortness, etc., are also like this. Therefore, expression is not provisional. If so, then the original round appearance of the extremely small particle should be lost. Or the extremely small particle should have different length shapes. The original round appearance of the extremely small particle, although its nature is length, the extremely small particle itself is not long. Later, this will become length, etc. Isn't this abandoning the original round appearance of the extremely small particle and becoming length, etc.? If it is said that it is not like this, then it should be refuted by measure: Your length extremely small particle

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微。應無圓相。說是長故。如粗長等色　或積長等微。應不成長等。微圓相故。如顯色微　長等極微不可得故。故表是假。寧為實有。

論。若言是動至無動義故。

述曰。次破正量部。彼計身業以動為體。如成業論．俱舍十三。別有一物。色等動時能動名身業。今言亦非實有。才生即滅無動義故。非謂才生即滅證非實法。心．心所法亦實有故。彼言動者是長時滅法。如有人行從初發至住。一期之間有此動故。初行名生。中間名住。乃至終盡位時名滅。今言生已即滅無有動義。非生即滅謂一切假。應云汝動生已應滅。有生法故。如心．心所。依論量云。諸法無實動義。才生即滅故。如心．心所。彼心．心所剎那即滅然無動義。

彼若救云誰言生已即滅。若如即滅可無動義。然此因有隨一不成。今為成此即滅因故。

論。有為法滅不待因故。

述曰。量云。此動應生已即滅。因云滅不待因故。如心．心所。故知生已即滅　或云。動應剎那滅。有為法故。如鈴聲等。彼說鈴聲等是念念滅法故。雖彼自宗色等是有為非唸唸滅。非極成故無不定過。彼復救言如薩婆多法滅待滅相不待外緣。我部色等滅待外緣及內相因。故不可以不待因為證。有隨一故　今覆成之。汝滅應不待因。許是滅故。如無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 微塵不應具有圓形相狀。如果說是由於長（dīrgha）的緣故，就像粗長等顏色一樣。或者是由積累的長等微塵組成，那麼就不應具有長等形狀，因為微塵是圓形相狀的，就像顯色微塵一樣。由於長等極微是不可得的，所以表明這是虛假的，怎麼能說是真實存在呢？

論：如果說是動，那麼就沒有動的意義。

述記：接下來駁斥正量部（Saṃmitīya）。他們認為身業以動為體，就像《成業論》、《俱舍論》第十三卷所說，有一種特別的事物，在色等運動時能夠運動，稱為身業。現在說它也不是真實存在的，因為才產生就滅亡，沒有動的意義。這並不是說才產生就滅亡就證明不是實法，因為心、心所法也是真實存在的。他們所說的動，是長時間滅亡的法，就像有人行走，從最初出發到停止，一個時期內有這個動。最初行走稱為生，中間稱為住，乃至最終結束時稱為滅。現在說產生后立即滅亡，沒有動的意義。不是說產生后立即滅亡就是一切虛假，應該說你的動產生后就應該滅亡，因為有生法，就像心、心所一樣。依據論證：諸法沒有真實的動義，因為才產生就滅亡，就像心、心所一樣。他們的心、心所剎那間就滅亡，然而沒有動義。

他們如果辯解說：誰說產生后立即滅亡？如果像立即滅亡那樣，就沒有動的意義。然而這個因有隨一不成。現在爲了成就這個立即滅亡的因。

論：有為法的滅亡不依賴於因。

述記：論證：這個動應該產生后立即滅亡，因為滅亡不依賴於因，就像心、心所一樣。所以知道產生后立即滅亡。或者說：動應該剎那間滅亡，因為是有為法，就像虛空（ākāśa）等。他們說虛空等是念念滅亡的法。雖然他們自己的宗派認為色等是有為法，不是念念滅亡，但因為不是極成，所以沒有不定過失。他們又辯解說：就像薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）的法滅亡依賴於滅相，不依賴於外緣。我們部的色等滅亡依賴於外緣和內相因，所以不可以用不依賴於因來證明，因為有隨一。現在再次成就它：你的滅亡應該不依賴於因，因為許可是滅亡，就像虛空一樣。

【English Translation】 English version: A particle should not have a round shape. If it is said to be due to length (dīrgha), like coarse and long colors, or composed of accumulated long particles, then it should not have a long shape, because the particles are round, like manifest color particles. Since extremely small long particles are unattainable, it indicates that it is false, how can it be said to be truly existent?

Treatise: If it is said to be movement, then there is no meaning of movement.

Commentary: Next, refuting the Saṃmitīya school. They believe that bodily karma has movement as its essence, as stated in the Treatise on the Accomplishment of Karma and the thirteenth volume of the Abhidharmakośa. There is a special entity that, when colors and other things move, is capable of movement, called bodily karma. Now it is said that it is also not truly existent, because it arises and immediately ceases, having no meaning of movement. This does not mean that arising and immediately ceasing proves that it is not a real dharma, because mental states and mental events are also truly existent. What they call movement is a dharma that ceases over a long period, like someone walking, from the initial start to the stop, there is this movement during a period. The initial walk is called arising, the middle is called abiding, and the final end is called ceasing. Now it is said that arising and immediately ceasing has no meaning of movement. It is not that arising and immediately ceasing is all false; it should be said that your movement should cease after arising, because there is the dharma of arising, like mental states and mental events. According to the argument: dharmas have no real meaning of movement, because they arise and immediately cease, like mental states and mental events. Their mental states and mental events cease in an instant, yet there is no meaning of movement.

If they argue: Who says that it arises and immediately ceases? If it were like immediately ceasing, there would be no meaning of movement. However, this reason has one aspect that is not established. Now, in order to establish this reason of immediately ceasing.

Treatise: The cessation of conditioned dharmas does not depend on a cause.

Commentary: Argument: This movement should arise and immediately cease, because cessation does not depend on a cause, like mental states and mental events. Therefore, it is known that it arises and immediately ceases. Or: Movement should cease in an instant, because it is a conditioned dharma, like space (ākāśa) etc. They say that space etc. are dharmas that cease moment by moment. Although their own school believes that colors etc. are conditioned dharmas and do not cease moment by moment, because it is not extremely established, there is no fault of uncertainty. They further argue: Like the Sarvāstivāda school, the cessation of dharmas depends on the characteristic of cessation, not on external conditions. The cessation of colors etc. in our school depends on external conditions and internal co-causes, so it cannot be proven by not depending on a cause, because there is one aspect. Now, establishing it again: Your cessation should not depend on a cause, because it is admitted to be cessation, like space.

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為滅　但總言滅不須分別體之與相。若體若相皆應不待。此中總破相及非相。故有法之中須言有為。不然即有少分相符極成之失。

論。滅若待因應非滅故。

述曰。汝所執待因之滅應非是滅。以待因故。如生住等　生違于滅滅待因而方滅。滅違于生生應無因而自生。返覆成之。生違于滅生待因而方生。滅違于生不待因而自滅。此破正量。以彼部計展轉為救。故論連環展轉破之。不爾從下向上成立亦得。先成滅不待因。既成已成有為法剎那滅。既成已成無動。菩薩地中四十六云。滅若有因應更生故。此如生難。謂滅應更生。以待因故。如生。

彼住等雖待因。然非是滅。又不極成。故非同喻。無不定失。

論。若言有色至理亦不然。

述曰。別有一物不是動等。心所引生能動手等說名身業。心等引生。簡唇．口等。非心引故。此破日出論者。即經部本師。佛去世后一百年中。北天竺怛叉翅羅國有鳩摩邏多。此言童首。造九百論。時五天竺有五大論師。喻如日出明導世間名日出者。以似於日。亦名譬喻師。或為此師造喻鬘論集諸奇事。名譬喻師。經部之種族。經部以此所說為宗。當時猶未有經部。經部四百年中方出世故如成業論。彼云。有色非顯非形。心所引生能動手等。是身業性。然

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了破除『滅』，但總是說『滅』不需要區分體和相。無論是體還是相，都應該是不依賴於因緣的。這裡總的破斥了『相』和『非相』。所以在『有法』之中，必須說『有為法』是存在的。不然，就會有少部分與極成見解相符的過失。

論：如果『滅』依賴於因緣，那就不應該是『滅』。

述曰：你所執著的依賴於因緣的『滅』，應該不是『滅』。因為它是依賴於因緣的，就像『生』、『住』等一樣。『生』違背『滅』，『滅』依賴於因緣才能滅。『滅』違背『生』，『生』應該沒有原因而自己產生。反過來推論也是一樣。『生』違背『滅』，『生』依賴於因緣才能生。『滅』違背『生』，不依賴於因緣而自己滅。這是爲了破斥正量部（Sammitīya）。因為他們爲了補救，會用展轉相生的方式。所以論中用連環的方式展轉破斥。不然的話，也可以從下向上成立。先成立『滅』不依賴於因緣。既然成立了，就成立了『有為法』是剎那滅的。既然成立了，就成立了『無動』。菩薩地中的第四十六卷說：『滅』如果有原因，就應該再生。這就像『生』一樣難成立。意思是說，『滅』應該再生，因為它依賴於因緣，就像『生』一樣。

他們所說的『住』等雖然依賴於因緣，但不是『滅』。而且也不是極成，所以不是相同的比喻。沒有不定的過失。

論：如果說有一種顏色，這種說法在道理上也是不成立的。

述曰：另外有一種東西，不是動等，而是心所引發，能夠使手等動作，這叫做身業。心等引發，這裡簡別了唇、口等，因為它們不是心所引發的。這是爲了破斥日出論者。也就是經部（Sautrāntika）的本師。佛陀去世后一百年中，北天竺（North India）的怛叉翅羅國（Takshashila）有一個人叫鳩摩邏多（Kumāralāta），意思是童首。他造了九百部論。當時五天竺（Pañca-Sindhava）有五大論師，比喻他們像日出一樣照亮世間，所以叫做日出者。因為他們像太陽一樣。也叫做譬喻師，或者說這位老師造了《譬喻鬘論》，收集各種奇特的事情，所以叫做譬喻師。是經部的種族。經部以他所說的話作為宗義。當時還沒有經部，經部在佛陀去世后四百年才出世，就像《成業論》所說的那樣。他們說：有一種顏色，既不是顯色也不是形色，而是心所引發，能夠使手等動作，這就是身業的性質。然而

【English Translation】 English version: To refute 'cessation', but it is always said that 'cessation' does not need to distinguish between substance and characteristics. Whether it is substance or characteristics, both should be independent of conditions. Here, it generally refutes 'characteristics' and 'non-characteristics'. Therefore, within 'existent dharmas', it must be said that 'conditioned dharmas' exist. Otherwise, there would be the fault of partially conforming to extremely established views.

Treatise: If 'cessation' depends on causes, then it should not be 'cessation'.

Commentary: The 'cessation' that you hold, which depends on causes, should not be 'cessation'. Because it depends on causes, like 'birth', 'duration', etc. 'Birth' contradicts 'cessation'; 'cessation' depends on causes to cease. 'Cessation' contradicts 'birth'; 'birth' should arise without a cause on its own. The reverse reasoning is also valid. 'Birth' contradicts 'cessation'; 'birth' depends on causes to arise. 'Cessation' contradicts 'birth'; it ceases on its own without depending on causes. This is to refute the Sammitīya school. Because they would use interdependent origination as a remedy. Therefore, the treatise uses a chain-like method to refute it in a circular manner. Otherwise, it could also be established from bottom to top. First, establish that 'cessation' does not depend on causes. Once that is established, it is established that 'conditioned dharmas' cease in an instant. Once that is established, it is established that there is 'immobility'. The forty-sixth chapter of the Bodhisattva-bhūmi states: 'If 'cessation' has a cause, it should be reborn.' This is as difficult to establish as 'birth'. It means that 'cessation' should be reborn because it depends on causes, just like 'birth'.

Although their 'duration' etc. depend on causes, they are not 'cessation'. Moreover, they are not extremely established, so they are not the same analogy. There is no fault of uncertainty.

Treatise: If it is said that there is a color, this statement is also not logically valid.

Commentary: There is another thing that is not movement, etc., but is generated by mental factors, which can cause the hands, etc., to move, and this is called body karma. Generated by mind, etc., this distinguishes the lips, mouth, etc., because they are not generated by the mind. This is to refute the 'Rising Sun' proponents. That is, the root teacher of the Sautrāntika school. One hundred years after the Buddha's passing, in the country of Takshashila (Takṣaśilā) in North India (Uttara Bharata), there was a person named Kumāralāta (Kumāralāta), which means 'Child Chief'. He composed nine hundred treatises. At that time, there were five great teachers in the Five Indias (Pañca-Sindhava), who were likened to the rising sun illuminating the world, so they were called 'Rising Sun' proponents. Because they were like the sun. They were also called 'Exemplification Teachers', or it is said that this teacher composed the 'Garland of Examples Treatise', collecting various strange events, so they were called 'Exemplification Teachers'. They are the lineage of the Sautrāntika school. The Sautrāntika school takes what he said as its doctrine. At that time, there was no Sautrāntika school yet; the Sautrāntika school emerged four hundred years after the Buddha's passing, as stated in the 'Treatise on the Establishment of Karma'. They say: There is a color that is neither visible nor shape, but is generated by mental factors, which can cause the hands, etc., to move; this is the nature of body karma. However,

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不是動。理亦不然。總敘計非。

論。此若是動義如前破。

述曰。此非彼計。今設徴云。能動手等。體應是動。同正量義。已如前破。

論。若是動因至不應名錶。

述曰。若非是動是動因者。即應是風大。風大能動故。量云。汝身業。應即風界。許體是色能動因故。如風大等　設許是風不應名錶無表示故。如水火等。

論。又觸不應通善惡性。

述曰。汝執此風設許有表。即通善惡。觸法不應通善惡故。風非表業。觸處攝故。如火．水等　若無此物手等不能動。外草木等無此動因。云何能動。風定非此。非善惡故。如水等。若許風有善惡者。不然。觸入攝故。如水等。

論。非顯香味至定非實有。

述曰。汝此表色。亦非是顯．及與香．味。無表示故。如觸應知。復有香積世界之香雖有表示。即非此土。亦非彼許。此以音聲為佛事故。然彼不許香是表故　第二解云。又彼非表。但聞香時而自悟道。豈是由香表有善惡。此如見佛顯色即唸佛等。觸物知善惡。豈以顯等為表也。第三結云。故身表業定非實有。然今後解雖違下論破名等文。設為此解答外無爽。

外人問曰。何名身表。

論。然心為因至假名身表。

述曰。此述正義。大乘五塵皆無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不是動。道理也不是這樣。總的來說，這種計算是不對的。

論：如果這（身表）是動，那麼它的意義就如前面所破斥的那樣。

述記：這不是他們的計算。現在假設提問說，能夠動手等等，其體性應該是動，如同正量派的觀點。但已經如前面所破斥的那樣。

論：如果是動的因，就不應該叫做『表』（表示）。

述記：如果不是動，而是動的因，那就應該是風大（四大之一，指風的元素）。因為風大能夠使事物運動。可以這樣推論：你的身體的業，應該就是風界。因為你承認它的體性是色，並且是能動的因，就像風大一樣。如果承認是風，就不應該叫做『表』，因為它沒有表示作用，就像水、火等。

論：而且，觸覺不應該同時具有善惡的性質。

述記：你所執著的這個風，假設它有『表』的作用，那麼它就同時具有善惡的性質。但觸法不應該同時具有善惡的性質。所以風不是表業，因為它屬於觸處所攝，就像火、水等。如果沒有這個東西（指身表），手等就不能動。外面的草木等沒有這個動的因，怎麼能夠動呢？風肯定不是這個（身表），因為它不是善惡的，就像水等。如果承認風有善惡的性質，那是不對的，因為它屬於觸入所攝，就像水等。

論：它不是顯色、香味，所以肯定不是真實存在的。

述記：你所說的這個表色，也不是顯色，也不是香味，因為它沒有表示作用，就像觸覺一樣，應該知道。還有香積世界的香，雖然有表示作用，但不是我們這個世界的，也不是他們（指外道）所承認的。因為那個世界以音聲作為佛事。然而他們不承認香是表。第二種解釋是，它不是表，只是聞到香味時自己領悟了道理，難道是因為香表示了善惡嗎？這就像見到佛的顯色就念佛一樣。接觸事物知道善惡，難道是因為顯色等是表嗎？第三總結說，所以身表業肯定不是真實存在的。然而現在和後面的解釋雖然違背了下面論述中破斥名等文字的含義，但如果這樣解答對外道來說是沒有問題的。

外人問道：什麼叫做身表？

論：然而，心為因，所以假名為身表。

述記：這是闡述正義。大乘認為五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）都是沒有的。

【English Translation】 English version: It is not movement. The principle is also not so. Overall, this calculation is incorrect.

Treatise: If this (bodily expression) is movement, then its meaning is as refuted before.

Commentary: This is not their calculation. Now, suppose we ask, being able to move hands, etc., its nature should be movement, like the view of the Samkhya school. But it has already been refuted as before.

Treatise: If it is the cause of movement, it should not be called 'expression' (representation).

Commentary: If it is not movement, but the cause of movement, then it should be the wind element (one of the four elements, referring to the element of wind). Because the wind element can make things move. It can be inferred: your body's karma should be the wind realm. Because you admit that its nature is form and is the cause of movement, like the wind element. If you admit it is wind, it should not be called 'expression' because it has no representational function, like water, fire, etc.

Treatise: Moreover, tactile sensation should not simultaneously have the nature of good and evil.

Commentary: This wind that you cling to, assuming it has the function of 'expression,' then it simultaneously has the nature of good and evil. But tactile sensation should not simultaneously have the nature of good and evil. Therefore, wind is not bodily karma, because it is included in the tactile sphere, like fire, water, etc. If there is no this thing (referring to bodily expression), hands, etc., cannot move. External grass and trees, etc., do not have this cause of movement, how can they move? Wind is definitely not this (bodily expression), because it is not good or evil, like water, etc. If you admit that wind has the nature of good and evil, that is not correct, because it is included in the tactile entry, like water, etc.

Treatise: It is not visible form, fragrance, or taste, so it is certainly not truly existent.

Commentary: This expressive form that you speak of is neither visible form, nor fragrance, nor taste, because it has no representational function, just like tactile sensation, you should know. Also, the fragrance of the Fragrant Accumulation World, although it has a representational function, is not of our world, nor is it admitted by them (referring to the heretics). Because that world uses sound as the Buddha's work. However, they do not admit that fragrance is expression. The second explanation is that it is not expression, but one realizes the truth when smelling the fragrance, is it because the fragrance represents good and evil? This is like reciting the Buddha's name upon seeing the visible form of the Buddha. Knowing good and evil by touching things, is it because visible form, etc., are expressions? The third conclusion is that bodily karma is certainly not truly existent. However, the current and subsequent explanations, although they violate the meaning of refuting the words of name, etc., in the following discussion, it is okay to answer the heretics in this way.

The heretic asks: What is called bodily expression?

Treatise: However, the mind is the cause, so it is nominally called bodily expression.

Commentary: This is explaining the correct meaning. Mahayana believes that the five dusts (form, sound, smell, taste, touch) are all non-existent.

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記性。然余處言色．聲二處通善．惡者。一為隨順小乘等說。二為表示內心等說。實非善．惡。由加行心為等起因。顯隨心之善惡。簡餘香等扶根諸塵故。令內唸唸識之所變生滅之身。往趣余處表示心故。假名善惡說為身業　言識變者。簡薩婆多等。生滅相續。簡正量部等　似有動作。簡譬喻師等　表示心故。顯其表義。此非業體表示其心。故名錶業。香等無表示。不可名錶。此上總破實身業已。

論。語表亦非實有聲性。

述曰。此下第二破語業也。初破外執。次述正義。此即總非。大乘解云。假語業者。語謂語言。音聲為性。語體即業。名為語業。持業釋也。此能表了所欲說義故名為語表。故名語也　或復語者字等所依。由帶字等能詮表故名之為語。實業即思。發語之業。亦依士釋。

論。一剎那聲無詮表故。

述曰。此破一切有部。就彼宗除佛餘一剎那聲不能詮故。又以理徴。設汝說佛一剎那聲。亦不能實詮。如汝說極微大。于大乘者以粗心故緣之不著。如我極細一剎那聲。汝宗不能有所詮表。故今總非。設就量云。語中汝除佛一剎那聲。應許有實表業。以是有情語聲攝故。如佛一念語　今既說除佛一切聲一念無表明非實表。一念實聲不能詮故。又佛一念聲言實能詮表。但汝自言。余

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於記憶。至於其他地方所說的色（Rūpa，物質、形態）、聲（Śabda，聲音）二處通於善與惡，一是為隨順小乘等的說法，二是為表示內心等說法。實際上並非是善或惡，而是由加行心（指有目的、有意識的行為）作為等起因（主要原因），顯示隨心而起的善惡。這裡簡略了其餘的香（Gandha，氣味）等扶根諸塵，因此，令內心念念識所變生滅之身，前往其他地方，表示心意。因此，假名為善惡，說為身業。說到識變，是爲了區別薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）等；說到生滅相續，是爲了區別正量部（Saṃmitīya，正量部）等；說到似有動作，是爲了區別譬喻師（Dārṣṭāntika，譬喻師）等；說到表示心意，是爲了顯示其表義。這並非業的本體，而是表示其心意，所以名為表業。香等沒有表示，不可名為表。以上總破斥了真實的身業。 論：語表（Vāgvijñapti，語言的表達）也並非實有的聲音性質。 述曰：以下第二部分破斥語業。首先破斥外道執著，其次闡述正義。這裡是總體的否定。大乘解釋說，假語業，語是指語言，以音聲為性質。語體即是業，名為語業，是持業釋。這能表達所想要說的意義，所以名為語表，故名為語。或者說，語是字等所依，由於帶有字等能詮釋表達，所以稱之為語。實際的業是思，是發出語言的業，也是依士釋。 論：一剎那的聲音沒有詮釋表達的功能。 述曰：這是破斥一切有部（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）。就他們的宗義來說，除了佛陀以外，其餘一剎那的聲音不能詮釋。又以理來徵詢，假設你說佛陀一剎那的聲音，也不能真實地詮釋。就像你們所說的極微大，對於大乘行者來說，因為心粗，所以緣取它並不執著。就像我所說的極細的一剎那聲音，你們的宗義不能有所詮釋表達。所以現在總體的否定。假設就量來說，在語言中，你們除了佛陀一剎那的聲音，應該允許有真實的表業，因為這是有情語聲所攝，就像佛陀一念的語言。現在既然說除了佛陀一切聲音一念沒有表明，並非真實的表業，一念真實的聲音不能詮釋。又佛陀一念的聲音確實能夠詮釋表達，但是你們自己說，其餘的

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding memory. As for the places mentioned elsewhere, 'form' (Rūpa, matter, shape) and 'sound' (Śabda, sound) both pertain to good and evil, one is to accord with the teachings of the Śrāvakayāna (small vehicle), and the other is to express the mind, etc. In reality, they are neither good nor evil, but rather the volitional mind (referring to purposeful, conscious action) serves as the primary cause, revealing the good and evil arising from the mind. Here, the remaining sense objects such as 'smell' (Gandha, odor) that support the roots are omitted. Therefore, the body transformed by the mind's continuous consciousness, which is subject to arising and ceasing, goes to other places, expressing the intention of the mind. Thus, it is nominally called good or evil and referred to as body karma. Speaking of the transformation of consciousness is to distinguish it from the Sarvāstivāda (all exists school); speaking of continuous arising and ceasing is to distinguish it from the Saṃmitīya (personalist school); speaking of seeming movement is to distinguish it from the Dārṣṭāntika (exemplification school); speaking of expressing intention is to reveal its expressive meaning. This is not the substance of karma, but rather expresses the intention of the mind, so it is called expressive karma. Smell, etc., have no expression and cannot be called expressive. The above is a general refutation of real body karma. Treatise: 'Speech expression' (Vāgvijñapti, expression of language) is also not a real sound nature. Commentary: The following is the second part refuting speech karma. First, refuting external attachments, and then elaborating on the correct meaning. This is a general negation. The Mahāyāna explanation says that false speech karma, 'speech' refers to language, with sound as its nature. The substance of speech is karma, called speech karma, which is a possessive compound. This can express the meaning one wants to say, so it is called speech expression, hence it is called speech. Or, speech is what words, etc., rely on. Because it carries words, etc., that can explain and express, it is called speech. The actual karma is thought, the karma of uttering speech, which is also a subjective compound. Treatise: A sound of one kṣaṇa (instant) has no function of explanation and expression. Commentary: This is refuting the Sarvāstivāda (all exists school). According to their doctrine, except for the Buddha, the sound of one kṣaṇa cannot explain. Moreover, it is questioned with reason. Suppose you say that the sound of one kṣaṇa of the Buddha also cannot truly explain. Just like what you say about the extremely small being large, for Mahāyāna practitioners, because the mind is coarse, they grasp it without attachment. Just like the extremely subtle sound of one kṣaṇa that I speak of, your doctrine cannot explain and express anything. So now it is a general negation. Suppose in terms of measure, in language, you exclude the sound of one kṣaṇa of the Buddha, you should allow that there is real expressive karma, because it is included in the speech sound of sentient beings, just like the language of one thought of the Buddha. Now that it is said that except for the Buddha, all sounds of one thought have no indication, it is not real expressive karma, the real sound of one thought cannot explain. Moreover, the sound of one thought of the Buddha can indeed explain and express, but you yourselves say that the rest

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人不了。故不能詮　此違自義。大乘之中豈不許佛一念能詮。今諍是假。故宗法言有實表業。以簡過失。乃不違宗。若說假時我亦許故。又言。汝佛一剎那聲。無實詮表。許聲性故。如所餘聲　此遮實詮。無違宗失。

論。多念相續便非實故。

述曰。第二因破。或應此語多剎那聲是實能詮者。理亦不然。多念相續便非實故。量云。多念語聲。應不實能詮表。多念相續聲故。如風鈴等　或因云。語聲性故。如一念聲。一念聲詮。前已破故。得為喻也。

論。外有對色前已破故。

述曰。此中約前破有對色故今破之。量云。汝多念身表語聲。應是假法。合多成故。如瓶衣等。又外有對色前已破訖。明聲表業亦非實有。為量如前。

論。然因心故至於理無違。

述曰。此述正義。文相易知　言因心者。簡唇．口等。此時雖動然非語業。非因心故。心本不欲發於此故　識變者。簡經部。似聲者。簡薩婆多等。生滅相續。簡聲論者。彼計常故。

似有表示。簡一切宗。彼皆實表故。

論。表既實無無表寧實。

述曰。第二例破無表亦無。于中有二。初破外執。次申正義。此破執也。汝無表色。亦非實有。色所攝故。如有對色　前已破得為喻　又汝無對色。應非實色。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：人不能理解。因此不能詮釋，這違反了你自己的觀點。大乘佛教中難道不允許佛陀一念之間就能詮釋嗎？現在爭論的是假說。所以宗派的說法是有真實的表達作用，以此來避免過失，這樣才不違反宗義。如果說是假說，我也是允許的。又說，你的佛陀一剎那的聲音，沒有真實的詮釋表達，因為允許聲音的性質，就像其餘的聲音一樣。這是爲了遮止真實詮釋，沒有違反宗義的過失。

論：多個念頭相續，就不是真實的。

述曰：這是第二個因來破斥。或者應該說這多個剎那的聲音是真實能詮釋的，道理也不成立。多個念頭相續就不是真實的。量式是：多個念頭的語聲，應該不是真實能詮釋表達的，因為是多個念頭相續的聲音，就像風鈴等。或者因為說是語聲的性質，就像一個念頭的聲音。一個念頭的聲音的詮釋，前面已經破斥過了，可以作為比喻。

論：外在的有對色，前面已經破斥過了。

述曰：這裡是根據前面破斥有對色的緣故，現在破斥它。量式是：你的多個念頭的身表語聲，應該是假法，由多個組合而成，就像瓶子、衣服等。又外在的有對色，前面已經破斥完畢。說明聲表業也不是真實存在的。作為量式如前。

論：然而因為心的緣故，在道理上沒有違背。

述曰：這是闡述正義。文句的表相容易理解。說因為心的緣故，是爲了區分唇、口等。這個時候雖然動了，但不是語業，因為不是因為心的緣故。心本來不想要引發這個。識變，是爲了區分經量部。相似於聲音，是爲了區分薩婆多部等。生滅相續，是爲了區分聲論者，他們認為是常的。

相似於有表示，是爲了區分一切宗派。他們都是真實表達的緣故。

論：表達既然是真實不存在的，無表怎麼會是真實的呢？

述曰：這是第二個例子來破斥無表也是不存在的。其中有兩個部分。首先破斥外道的執著，其次闡述正義。這是破斥執著。你的無表色，也不是真實存在的，因為是被色所包含的，就像有對色。前面已經破斥過，可以作為比喻。又你的無對色，應該不是真實存在的色。

【English Translation】 English version: People cannot understand it. Therefore, it cannot be explained, which contradicts your own view. In Mahayana Buddhism, isn't it permissible for the Buddha to explain in a single thought? What is being argued now is a hypothesis. So the tenet of the school is that there is a real expressive function, in order to avoid faults, so that it does not violate the doctrine. If it is said to be a hypothesis, I also allow it. Also, your Buddha's sound in an instant does not have a real expressive function, because it allows the nature of sound, just like the rest of the sounds. This is to prevent real expression, and there is no fault of violating the doctrine.

Treatise: Multiple thoughts in succession are not real.

Commentary: This is the second reason to refute. Or it should be said that these multiple moments of sound are real and can be explained, but the reasoning is not valid. Multiple thoughts in succession are not real. The quantification is: the sound of multiple thoughts should not be a real expression, because it is the sound of multiple thoughts in succession, like wind chimes, etc. Or because it is said to be the nature of speech sounds, like the sound of a single thought. The explanation of the sound of a single thought has been refuted earlier and can be used as a metaphor.

Treatise: External tangible matter has already been refuted.

Commentary: Here, it is based on the previous refutation of tangible matter, so it is now refuted. The quantification is: your bodily expression of speech sounds in multiple moments should be false phenomena, composed of multiple combinations, like bottles, clothes, etc. Also, external tangible matter has been refuted. It shows that the karma of sound expression is not real either. As a quantification as before.

Treatise: However, because of the mind, there is no contradiction in principle.

Commentary: This is to explain the correct meaning. The appearance of the sentences is easy to understand. Saying because of the mind is to distinguish between lips, mouth, etc. Although it moves at this time, it is not verbal karma, because it is not because of the mind. The mind did not originally want to initiate this. Transformation of consciousness is to distinguish between Sautrantika. Similar to sound is to distinguish between Sarvastivada, etc. The succession of arising and ceasing is to distinguish between the sound theorists, who consider it to be constant.

Similar to having expression is to distinguish between all schools. They are all real expressions.

Treatise: Since expression is really non-existent, how can non-expression be real?

Commentary: This is the second example to refute that non-expression is also non-existent. There are two parts in it. First, refute the externalist's attachment, and second, explain the correct meaning. This is to refute attachment. Your non-manifested form is also not real, because it is included in form, like tangible form. It has been refuted before and can be used as a metaphor. Also, your intangible form should not be a real form.

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許無對故。如心．心所。若大眾．法密部。別立無表色。謂身勇。身精進。若心勇等心所攝。上座胸中色物亦法處攝。今例破之。

論。然依思愿至理亦無違。

述曰。第二申正義也。此解無表如成業論末。已下大精稍有差別。謂依思是定道戒。愿謂散無表。或思起愿作善惡多小時節分限。或由異思。或由異緣未起已來。所造善惡時節分限。於此思上假立無表。此即總言。然中有別。

論。謂此或依至增長位立。

述曰。此無表色略有二種。一散無表。即是依發殊勝身．語善惡思種子增長之位名為無表。依謂所依。顯假依實。殊勝思者。簡下中思不發無表。身語者。顯色義。發善惡者。顯性非無記。惡者。不律儀業　增長位者。簡前及后。謂加行時種未增長。及后舍已種不增長。今有善惡戒時。種子增長剎那剎那七支倍倍即是種子唸唸體多。由現無依諸福業事。施主遠處心雖不緣。受者用時。施主要期緣今具故。種子增長增長福業。故受戒時。第三羯磨雖住無心。由前邀期緣今時具。種子雖無現行熏習。亦得唸唸體性倍增。即作白前從僧乞戒時心所發故。阇梨作白以後。其受戒者或無心故。猶如遣使作殺生等。若新熏種唸唸種子體新倍生上立無表。若本有種。體雖不增而功能倍。若新舊合用

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 許：沒有對立的緣故。例如心、心所。如果大眾部、法密部另外建立無表色（Rūpa avijñapti，不可知色），說是身體的勇猛、身體的精進，如果是心勇猛等心所（Caitasika，心所法）所攝。上座部的胸中所說的色法也屬於法處所攝。現在用同樣的例子來破斥它。

論：然而依靠思和愿，從道理上來說也沒有違背。

述曰：第二段是闡述正義。這裡解釋無表色如同《成業論》的末尾。以下大致有些差別。所謂依靠思，指的是定道戒（Śīla，戒）。愿，指的是散無表。或者思發起愿，作善惡多小時節分限。或者由於不同的思，或者由於不同的緣，在未發起之前，所造的善惡時節分限，於此思上假立無表。這只是總的來說，然而其中有區別。

論：所謂這或者依靠增長位而建立。

述曰：這種無表色大概有兩種。一是散無表，就是依靠發起殊勝的身、語善惡思的種子增長的階段，名為無表。依靠，指的是所依。顯示是假依于實。殊勝思，是簡別下等和中等的思，不能發起無表。身語，是顯示色法的意義。發起善惡，是顯示性質不是無記。惡，指的是不律儀業（Asaṃvara，非律儀）。增長位，是簡別之前和之後。所謂加行的時候，種子沒有增長。以及之後捨棄之後，種子不增長。現在有善惡戒的時候，種子增長，剎那剎那七支倍倍，就是種子唸唸體多。由於現在沒有依靠諸福業事，施主在遠處，心雖然不緣，受者用的時候，施主要期緣現在具足的緣故，種子增長，增長福業。所以受戒的時候，第三羯磨（Karma，業）雖然住在無心，由於之前邀期緣現在時間具足，種子雖然沒有現行熏習，也能夠唸唸體性倍增。就是作白前從僧乞戒的時候，心所發起的緣故。阇梨作白以後，其受戒者或者沒有心。猶如派遣使者作殺生等。如果是新熏的種子，唸唸種子體新倍生上立無表。如果是本有的種子，體雖然不增而功能倍。如果是新舊合用。

【English Translation】 English version: Xu: There is no opposition. For example, mind and mental factors (Caitasikas). If the Mahāsaṃghika and Dharmagupta schools separately establish Rūpa avijñapti (unmanifested form), saying it is the body's courage and the body's diligence, if it is governed by mental factors such as mental courage. The form objects spoken of in the chest of the Theravada school also belong to the Dharma realm. Now, we refute it with the same example.

Treatise: However, relying on thought (Cetanā) and aspiration (Pranidhāna), there is no contradiction in principle.

Commentary: The second paragraph explains the correct meaning. This explains the unmanifested form as in the end of the Treatise on the Completion of Karma. The following is roughly somewhat different. The so-called relying on thought refers to the Śīla (precepts) of the path of meditation. Aspiration refers to the scattered unmanifested form. Or thought arises from aspiration, creating good and evil for many hours and limited periods. Or due to different thoughts, or due to different conditions, before it arises, the good and evil time limits created are provisionally established as unmanifested form on this thought. This is just a general statement, but there are differences within it.

Treatise: So-called this is established by relying on the stage of growth.

Commentary: This unmanifested form roughly has two types. One is the scattered unmanifested form, which is the stage of growth relying on the seeds of superior good and evil thoughts of body and speech, called unmanifested form. Relying on refers to what is relied upon. It shows that it is provisionally relying on reality. Superior thought distinguishes between inferior and middle thoughts, which cannot initiate unmanifested form. Body and speech show the meaning of form. Initiating good and evil shows that the nature is not neutral. Evil refers to Asaṃvara (non-restraint). The stage of growth distinguishes between before and after. The so-called time of application, the seed has not grown. And after abandoning it, the seed does not grow. Now, when there are good and evil precepts, the seed grows, and the seven limbs multiply moment by moment, which means that the seed's substance is numerous in every moment. Because there is no reliance on meritorious deeds now, the donor is far away, and although the mind does not connect, when the recipient uses it, the donor must expect the present conditions to be complete, so the seed grows and increases meritorious deeds. Therefore, when receiving the precepts, although the third Karma (action) dwells in no-mind, because of the previous invitation, the present time is complete, and although the seed does not have present practice and fumigation, it can also increase its nature moment by moment. That is, when asking the Sangha for precepts before the announcement, it is because of the mind that arises. After the Acharya makes the announcement, the receiver of the precepts may not have a mind. It is like sending a messenger to commit killing. If it is a newly fumigated seed, the new seed body is multiplied and established as unmanifested form. If it is an original seed, although the body does not increase, the function is doubled. If it is a combination of new and old.

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者。唯取新熏種倍倍生時用增上說。不用本有。力不及新故。初熏種時舊亦生種。今所立無表。唯依新熏上立也　然此新熏亦唯用增。而體不增為勝。既無現行如何種起。又定道戒體不增用增。此何故爾。此解為勝。約此祈願思種子上。假立散無表色也　又思種子者。顯所依體而非現行。發身語者。簡意業。不發身．語者是意業故。又遠近二思名為意業。非第三思正發業者。今言正發簡初二思。又簡遠近及與剎那。第三思是近因等起。故說發言　又解此思為色所以發身．語善色故。或止身．語惡色故。顯揚論說。諸律儀色依不現行法建立色性。此中善戒言發身．語者。彼說決定得色名因。定．道合說。此顯差別。定．道不發業故。

論。或依定中至故是假有。

述曰。此中二無表。謂依定中止身．語惡現行思上立定．道戒。不約種子。此名隨心轉。故現行思可爾種子不爾。故止身語惡者。解名為色所由　問定戒可爾。道共戒若現思者。即八道支正語．業．命以何為體　彼皆表故以現思為體　豈一現思亦表無表　彼非是表但名無表　又雖發身．語。而非表無表。如發身．語思　又望不同。通於二義通表無表不爾八地已上菩薩。及如來身。應無表業等。又此唯用唸唸增長而體不增。非一剎那有二思並故。故知

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這些觀點只採納新熏習的種子，並以其倍增生起時的作用增上來解釋，不採用原本就有的種子。因為原本種子的力量不如新熏習的種子。最初熏習種子時，舊種子也會生起。現在所建立的無表色，僅僅依據新熏習的種子而建立。然而，這種新熏習也僅僅是用增，而體不增，這樣才是殊勝的。既然沒有現行，種子如何生起？又，定共戒體和道共戒體不增體而只增用，這是什麼緣故呢？對此的解釋是殊勝的，是依于祈願思種子上，假立散無表色。又，思種子，是顯示所依之體，而非現行。『發身語者』，是簡別意業，不發身語的才是意業。又，遠思和近思名為意業，不是第三思正能引發業。現在說的『正發』，是簡別最初的兩個思。又簡別遠思、近思以及剎那思，第三思是近因等起，所以說是發言。又解釋說，此思是色，所以能引發身語善色，或者止息身語惡色。顯揚論說，諸律儀色是依不現行法建立色性。此中善戒說『發身語者』，是說決定得色名之因。定共戒和道共戒合起來說，這是顯示差別，因為定共戒和道共戒不發業。 論：或者依定中乃至故是假有。 述曰：此中二無表，是指依定中止息身語惡現行思上，建立定共戒和道共戒，不涉及種子。這叫做隨心轉。所以現行思可以這樣，種子不可以這樣。所以止息身語惡者，解釋為色所由。問：定共戒可以這樣，道共戒如果是現思，那麼八道支中的正語、正業、正命以什麼為體？答：它們都是表色，以現思為體。問：難道一個現思既是表色又是無表色嗎？答：它們不是表色，但名為無表色。又，即使發身語，也不是表無表，如發身語思。又，望不同。通於二義，通表無表，不然八地以上的菩薩以及如來身，應該沒有無表業等。又，此唯用唸唸增長而體不增，非一剎那有二思並故。所以知道。

【English Translation】 English version: These views only adopt newly perfumed seeds and explain them based on the increase in their function when they multiply, not using the original seeds. This is because the power of the original seeds is not as strong as that of the newly perfumed seeds. When initially perfuming the seeds, the old seeds also arise. The unmanifested form (wu biao se) now established is based solely on the newly perfumed seeds. However, this new perfuming only increases the function, not the substance, which is superior. Since there is no present action, how do the seeds arise? Furthermore, the substance of the Samadhi-born precepts (ding gong jie ti) and the Path-born precepts (dao gong jie ti) does not increase in substance but only in function. What is the reason for this? The explanation for this is superior, relying on the seeds of aspirational thought (qi yuan si zhong zi) to provisionally establish scattered unmanifested form. Moreover, the seeds of thought (si zhong zi) manifest the substance on which they rely, not the present action. 'Those who produce bodily and verbal actions' distinguish mental karma (yi ye); those who do not produce bodily and verbal actions are mental karma. Furthermore, distant thought and near thought are called mental karma, not the third thought that directly initiates karma. The 'directly initiates' now mentioned distinguishes the first two thoughts. It also distinguishes distant thought, near thought, and momentary thought; the third thought is the proximate cause that arises together, so it is said to be speech. It is also explained that this thought is form (se), so it can initiate good bodily and verbal form, or stop bad bodily and verbal form. The Xianyang Lun (Compendium of Determinations) states that all precepts-forms (lü yi se) are established based on non-present action dharmas (bu xian xing fa). Here, the good precepts say 'those who produce bodily and verbal actions' to mean the cause of definitely obtaining the name of form. The Samadhi-born precepts and the Path-born precepts are spoken of together to show the difference, because the Samadhi-born precepts and the Path-born precepts do not initiate karma. Treatise: 'Or relying on Samadhi, hence it is provisionally existent.' Commentary: The two unmanifested forms here refer to establishing the Samadhi-born precepts and the Path-born precepts based on the thought of stopping bad bodily and verbal present actions in Samadhi, not involving seeds. This is called following the mind's transformation. Therefore, present action thought can be like this, but seeds cannot. So, those who stop bad bodily and verbal actions are explained as the reason for form. Question: The Samadhi-born precepts can be like this, but if the Path-born precepts are present thought, then what is the substance of Right Speech (zheng yu), Right Action (zheng ye), and Right Livelihood (zheng ming) among the Eightfold Path (ba dao zhi)? Answer: They are all manifested forms (biao se), with present thought as their substance. Question: Could a present thought be both a manifested form and an unmanifested form? Answer: They are not manifested forms, but are named unmanifested forms. Furthermore, even if bodily and verbal actions are produced, they are not manifested unmanifested forms, such as the thought of producing bodily and verbal actions. Moreover, the perspective is different. It encompasses two meanings, encompassing manifested and unmanifested forms; otherwise, Bodhisattvas above the Eighth Ground (ba di) and the bodies of Tathagatas (ru lai), should not have unmanifested karma, etc. Furthermore, this only increases in function moment by moment, but does not increase in substance, because two thoughts do not occur simultaneously in one moment. Therefore, it is known.

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別脫用此解勝　問曰別解脫種上立無表可爾。以無表示他故。何故定道戒。遂現行上立仍名無表耶。此應是意表　答曰不然。此亦不能表示他故　問曰若爾即散意識現行思應名無表。此亦不能表示他故　答曰此定等中別有殊勝止身．語惡。先有祈願別脫類故。不發善身語。于現思上假名定道無表。隨心轉故。散意不然。既非殊勝止身．語惡。及無祈願等故不名無表。散意殊勝祈願。即是別脫表戒。從他受得。緣外身．語與此不同。此大乘一支二支乃至多支皆發無表。祈願勝故。盡形祈故。此意表業現行者名錶。然無無表。如瑜伽第五十三．並樞要．及別抄等　然今應說二種無表何大種造等。如五十四．及六十六等解。及如下第七卷抄解。三業無表皆假所以。如佛地第四．成業等解。定共戒與道共戒應明寬狹。此中言定中通明道者。明無漏戒亦名定戒。

論。世尊經中至豈不違經。

述曰。即第二段外引經難。初問。次答。此初問也。

論。不撥為無但言非色。

述曰。此總答。下別顯。

若爾何者名身．語業。

論。能動身思至說名意業。

述曰。下文有二。一出體。二釋名。近意之業。意相應業。名意業。鄰近釋。依意之業。依士釋。此言三種思中第三思正發身．語者

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：『別解脫』（Pratimoksha，一種戒律）的種子之上可以建立『無表』（Avijñapti，一種不可見的業力），這是可以理解的，因為它不向他人顯示。那麼，為什麼『定道戒』（Dhyana-marga-sila，禪定之道所生的戒律）在現行之上建立，仍然被稱為『無表』呢？這應該是一種『意表』（Manovijñapti，通過意識表達的業力）吧？ 答：不是的。因為它也不能向他人顯示。 問：如果這樣，那麼散亂意識的現行思也應該被稱為『無表』，因為它也不能向他人顯示。 答：不是的，因為在禪定等之中，有一種殊勝的力量可以阻止身、語的惡行。先前有祈願別解脫的種類。不發起善的身語，在現行的思之上，假名為『定道無表』，因為它隨心而轉。散亂的意識則不然，因為它既沒有殊勝的力量來阻止身語的惡行，也沒有祈願等，所以不被稱為『無表』。散亂意識的殊勝祈願，就是別解脫的『表戒』（Vijñapti-sila，可見的戒律），是從他人那裡獲得的，緣于外在的身語，與此不同。大乘的一支、二支乃至多支，都能發起『無表』，因為祈願殊勝，盡形壽祈願。這種意表業的現行，被稱為『表』，然而沒有『無表』。如《瑜伽師地論》第五十三卷、樞要以及別抄等所說。 然而現在應該說兩種『無表』是由什麼大種（Mahabhuta，四大元素）所造等，如第五十四卷和第六十六卷等所解釋的，以及如下第七卷抄解。三業的『無表』都是假立的，如《佛地經論》第四卷、成業等所解釋的。『定共戒』（Dhyana-samvara-sila，由禪定產生的戒律）與『道共戒』（Marga-samvara-sila，由道產生的戒律）應該明確其寬狹。這裡說禪定中通明道，是說明無漏戒也名為定戒。 論：世尊經中所說……豈不是違背了經典？ 述曰：這是第二段，從外部引用經典來提出疑問。先是提問，然後是回答。這是最初的提問。 論：不是否定它為無，只是說它不是色法。 述曰：這是總體的回答，下面分別顯示。 如果這樣，那麼什麼叫做身業、語業呢？ 論：能夠動身思……說名意業。 述曰：下面有兩點：一是指出體性，二是解釋名稱。接近意之業，與意相應的業，名為意業。這是鄰近的解釋。依于意的業，這是依士的解釋。這裡說三種思中，第三種思正是發起身業、語業者。

【English Translation】 English version Question: It is understandable that 'Avijñapti' (unmanifested karma, a type of invisible force) can be established upon the seed of 'Pratimoksha' (individual liberation vows, a kind of discipline), because it does not manifest to others. Why is it that 'Dhyana-marga-sila' (precepts arising from the path of meditation) is established upon present actions and still called 'Avijñapti'? Shouldn't this be a kind of 'Manovijñapti' (manifestation through consciousness, karma expressed through consciousness)? Answer: No. Because it also cannot manifest to others. Question: If that's the case, then the present thought of a scattered consciousness should also be called 'Avijñapti', because it also cannot manifest to others. Answer: No, because within Dhyana (meditation) and such, there is a special power to prevent evil actions of body and speech. Previously, there was the category of Pratimoksha vows. Not initiating good actions of body and speech, it is nominally called 'Dhyana-marga-avijñapti' upon present thought, because it follows the mind. Scattered consciousness is not like this, because it neither has the special power to prevent evil actions of body and speech, nor does it have vows, etc., so it is not called 'Avijñapti'. The special vow of scattered consciousness is the 'Vijñapti-sila' (manifested precepts, visible precepts) of Pratimoksha, which is obtained from others, arising from external body and speech, which is different from this. One branch, two branches, or even many branches of Mahayana can initiate 'Avijñapti', because the vow is special, and the vow lasts for a lifetime. The present action of this Manovijñapti karma is called 'Vijñapti', but there is no 'Avijñapti'. As stated in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 53, and the essential summaries and separate notes. However, now it should be said what great elements (Mahabhuta, the four great elements) the two types of 'Avijñapti' are made of, as explained in volumes 54 and 66, and the notes in volume 7 below. The 'Avijñapti' of the three karmas are all nominally established, as explained in the Buddhabhumi-sastra, volume 4, and the establishment of karma. The scope of 'Dhyana-samvara-sila' (precepts arising from meditation) and 'Marga-samvara-sila' (precepts arising from the path) should be clarified. Here, it is said that Dhyana universally illuminates the path, indicating that the undefiled precepts are also called Dhyana precepts. Treatise: What the World Honored One said in the sutras... Doesn't this contradict the sutras? Commentary: This is the second section, raising a question by quoting scriptures from the outside. First a question, then an answer. This is the initial question. Treatise: It is not denying it as non-existent, but only saying that it is not form. Commentary: This is the overall answer, and the following will show it separately. If that's the case, then what is called bodily karma and verbal karma? Treatise: The thought that can move the body... is called mental karma. Commentary: There are two points below: first, to point out the substance; second, to explain the name. Karma close to the mind, karma corresponding to the mind, is called mental karma. This is a proximate explanation. Karma based on the mind, this is an explanation based on agency. Here it is said that among the three types of thought, the third type of thought is precisely the one that initiates bodily and verbal karma.

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。是身．語業體也。前二審慮．決定思。與意俱故。作動意故。名意業。五十三云。不發身．語思名意表業。自有表知故。此二種思是發身．語遠近加行。動發勝思正發身．語。是三差別　問曰若發身．語思是身．語業。表無表中何者所攝。如言色．聲假名錶業。思種假名無表。此現行思名為何法　答曰此正業體。而非表無表。不示他故非表。自表知故非無表。又不恒續故。以色例表假實相徴如理思擇　由此應作四句分別。有唯名無表非表。謂別脫無表。有唯表非無表。謂散身．語。有亦表亦無表。謂定．道思。瑜伽說。意思自表知故亦名為表。即八地以去觀中意俱思通二義故。有是業非表無表。謂身．語業思。

問曰何故名業及道。

論。起身語思至亦名為道。

述曰。此第三發身．語思有所造作。謂于境轉造作於心。復能發身．語故名為業。道有二義。一者是前審．決二思所游履故。謂第三思。為前二思所游履故。即是所緣所引發義。如身．語是思所游等。二者或通生當來苦樂異熟故亦名道。思道名亦亦于業也。非唯名業。亦名道故　又亦身．語二。非唯身．語名道。思但名業。即是身．語亦得名業。思亦名道。道者依止義。依之進趣生當果故。十業道中前七之思。為后三種業所履故。意業能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是身語業的本體。前面的審慮思和決定思，因為與意念同時產生，並且是產生行動的意念，所以稱為意業。《瑜伽師地論》第五十三卷說：『不引發身語的思，稱為意表業，因為它能讓自身知曉。』這兩種思是引發身語的遠近加行。動發勝思是真正引發身語的思，這是三者的差別。 問：如果引發身語的思是身語業，那麼表無表業又屬於哪一類呢？比如，顏色、聲音可以假名為表業，思的種子可以假名為無表業。那麼，這種現行的思又屬於什麼法呢？ 答：這是真正的業的本體，但不是表業也不是無表業。因為它不向他人顯示，所以不是表業；因為它能讓自身知曉，所以不是無表業；而且它不是恒常相續的。用顏色來比喻表業的假實相，應該如理思擇。 由此應該作四句分別：有的只是名無表而非表業，比如別解脫無表（Pratimoksha-asamvrti）。有的只是表業而非無表業，比如散亂的身語。有的是表業也是無表業，比如禪定和道中的思。瑜伽師地論說，意思能讓自身知曉，所以也稱為表業，即八地以上的觀中，意念相關的思同時具有兩種含義。有的是業，但不是表業也不是無表業，比如身語業的思。 問：為什麼稱為業和道？ 論：起身語思，乃至也稱為道。 述：這第三種引發身語的思，有所造作，即在境界上進行轉變，造作於心，又能引發身語，所以稱為業。道有兩種含義：一是前審慮思和決定思所遊歷的路徑，即第三種思，是前兩種思所遊歷的，也就是所緣和所引發的含義。比如身語是思所遊歷的等等。二是或者能通往未來苦樂的異熟果報，所以也稱為道。思道這個名稱也適用於業。不僅僅是稱為業，也稱為道。另外，也適用於身語二業。不僅僅是身語稱為道，思只是稱為業，即是身語也可以稱為業，思也可以稱為道。道是依止的意思，依靠它前進，產生未來的果報。十業道中，前七種業的思，是后三種業所履行的路徑，意業能夠……

【English Translation】 English version: It is the substance of body and speech karma. The preceding deliberative thought and decisive thought, because they arise simultaneously with intention and are the intention that produces action, are called mental karma. The fifty-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Thought that does not initiate body and speech is called non-revealing mental karma, because it allows oneself to know.' These two kinds of thought are the near and far preparatory actions for initiating body and speech. The thought that initiates action is the thought that truly initiates body and speech; these are the three differences. Question: If the thought that initiates body and speech is body and speech karma, then to which category do revealing and non-revealing karma belong? For example, color and sound can be nominally called revealing karma, and the seed of thought can be nominally called non-revealing karma. Then, to what dharma does this present thought belong? Answer: This is the true substance of karma, but it is neither revealing nor non-revealing. Because it does not show itself to others, it is not revealing karma; because it allows oneself to know, it is not non-revealing karma; and it is not constantly continuous. Using color as an analogy for the hypothetical and real aspects of revealing karma, one should contemplate and discern according to reason. Therefore, one should make a fourfold distinction: Some are only nominally non-revealing but not revealing karma, such as Pratimoksha-asamvrti (別解脫無表). Some are only revealing but not non-revealing karma, such as scattered body and speech. Some are both revealing and non-revealing karma, such as thought in meditation and the path. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that intention allows oneself to know, so it is also called revealing karma, that is, in the contemplation of the eighth ground and beyond, thought related to intention simultaneously has two meanings. Some are karma but neither revealing nor non-revealing karma, such as the thought of body and speech karma. Question: Why are they called karma and path? Treatise: The thought that initiates body and speech, and even is also called the path. Commentary: This third kind of thought that initiates body and speech creates something, that is, it transforms on the object, creates in the mind, and can initiate body and speech, so it is called karma. Path has two meanings: First, it is the path traversed by the preceding deliberative thought and decisive thought, that is, the third kind of thought, which is traversed by the preceding two kinds of thought, that is, the meaning of what is cognized and what is initiated. For example, body and speech are what thought traverses, and so on. Second, it can lead to the different ripening of future suffering and happiness, so it is also called the path. The name thought-path also applies to karma. It is not only called karma, but also called the path. Furthermore, it also applies to body and speech karma. It is not only body and speech that are called the path, thought is only called karma, that is, body and speech can also be called karma, and thought can also be called the path. Path means reliance, relying on it to advance and produce future results. Among the ten paths of karma, the thought of the first seven is the path traversed by the last three kinds of karma, mental karma can...

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生當異熟故。是其道義。

論。故前七業道亦思為自性。

述曰。非但意業以思為體。身．語二業體復是思。故論言亦　又業道實體唯思是也。假名業道通身．語二。以實思業亦二假道。故論言亦。

論。或身語表至說名業道。

述曰。前解思業名為業道。此下第二正解身．語名業道義。思所造作。非能造作故。如文可知。

論。由此應知至變似色生。

述曰。自下第三此總結非。申正義也。

論。不相應行亦非實有。

述曰。自下第二破不相應。于中有二。初總破諸部。后別破異計。初中復三。一總非。二卻詰。三量斥。此即初也。不相應者。簡非色．心．及諸心所。不相似故。行簡無為。

論。所以者何。

述曰。外返詰也。

論。得非得等至體相可得。

述曰。下以量斥于中有三。初難實有。別舉體相及作用因。二合難體用。三別難實有　初中有三。一舉有法及難體因。二舉難用因。三顯其宗法以結于假。此即初也　得非得等。是有法。下文云定非實有。法也。此初量云。得非得等。定非實有。非如色．心．及心所等現比二量有體可得故。如畢竟無　俱舍云。非如色等現量可得。非如眼根等比量所得。既不如色等。故異色等無別體

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『生當異熟故』（因為產生不同的異熟果），這就是它的道理。

論：所以，前面的七支業道也以思為自性。

述曰：不只是意業以思為體，身業和語業的體也是思。所以論中說『亦』。而且業道的實體只有思。假名業道通於身業和語業，因為真實的思業也是兩種假道，所以論中說『亦』。

論：或者說，身語的表業才被稱作業道。

述曰：前面的解釋是思業名為業道，這裡開始第二種解釋，身語名為業道的意義。思所造作，不是能造作，如文可知。

論：由此應該知道，變似色生。

述曰：下面第三部分，總結前面的否定，闡明正確的意義。

論：不相應行也並非實有。

述曰：下面第二部分，破斥不相應行。其中分為兩部分，首先總破各部派的觀點，然後分別破斥不同的見解。在總破中又分為三部分：一、總的否定；二、反詰；三、以量來駁斥。這裡是第一部分，總的否定。『不相應』，是簡別於色、心以及各種心所法，因為它們不相似。『行』，是簡別于無為法。

論：為什麼呢？

述曰：這是外人的反詰。

論：得、非得等，體相不可得。

述曰：下面用量來駁斥，其中分為三部分：首先，難實有；分別舉出體相和作用的原因；二、合起來難體和用；三、分別難實有。第一部分中又分為三部分：一、舉出有法和難體的原因；二、舉出難用的原因；三、顯明其宗法，以結論為假。這裡是第一部分。『得、非得等』，是有法。下文說『定非實有』，是法。這裡最初的量是說：得、非得等，必定不是實有，因為不像色、心以及心所等，現量和比量都不能得到它的體。如同畢竟無。俱舍論說：不像色等現量可以得到，也不像眼根等比量可以得到。既然不像色等，所以和色等沒有別的體。

【English Translation】 English version 『Because it produces different Vipāka (異熟)』 (different results of maturation), that is its meaning.

Treatise: Therefore, the previous seven paths of action (業道) also have thought (思) as their nature.

Commentary: It is not only mental action (意業) that has thought as its essence, but also bodily action (身業) and verbal action (語業). Therefore, the treatise says 『also』. Moreover, the substance of the paths of action is only thought. The nominal paths of action extend to bodily and verbal actions, because the real thought action is also two nominal paths, so the treatise says 『also』.

Treatise: Or, the expressions (表) of body and speech are called paths of action.

Commentary: The previous explanation was that mental action is called the path of action. Here begins the second explanation, the meaning of body and speech being called the path of action. Thought creates, but it is not capable of creating, as the text shows.

Treatise: From this, it should be known that it transforms and appears to be produced from form (色).

Commentary: The third part below summarizes the previous negations and clarifies the correct meaning.

Treatise: Non-associated formations (不相應行) are also not truly existent.

Commentary: The second part below refutes non-associated formations. It is divided into two parts: first, a general refutation of the views of various schools; then, a separate refutation of different views. The general refutation is further divided into three parts: 1. General negation; 2. Counter-questioning; 3. Refutation by inference. This is the first part, the general negation. 『Non-associated』 distinguishes it from form (色), mind (心), and various mental functions (心所), because they are not similar. 『Formations』 distinguishes it from unconditioned dharmas (無為法).

Treatise: Why is that?

Commentary: This is an external counter-question.

Treatise: Attainment (得), Non-attainment (非得), etc., their substance and characteristics cannot be obtained.

Commentary: Below, inference is used to refute, which is divided into three parts: First, it is difficult to have real existence; the causes of substance and characteristics are listed separately; second, it is difficult to combine substance and function; third, it is difficult to have real existence separately. The first part is divided into three parts: 1. List the subject (有法) and the reason for the difficulty of substance; 2. List the reason for the difficulty of function; 3. Clarify its doctrine (宗法) to conclude that it is false. This is the first part. 『Attainment, Non-attainment, etc.』 are the subject. The following text says 『definitely not truly existent』, which is the predicate (法). The initial inference here is: Attainment, Non-attainment, etc., are definitely not truly existent, because, unlike form, mind, and mental functions, neither direct perception (現量) nor inference (比量) can obtain its substance. It is like something that is completely non-existent. The Abhidharmakośa (俱舍論) says: It cannot be obtained by direct perception like form, nor can it be obtained by inference like the eye faculty. Since it is not like form, it has no separate substance from form, etc.

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用。其無為等即色等性。舉色．心等。以顯無為如色．心等現可得故。無不定失。又擇滅等非此所許。亦無不定。

論。非異色心至作用可得。

述曰。此難作用。其因有別。謂非異色．心．及心所等。現比二量作用可得故。宗．喻同前。真如與心等非一向異。亦無過失。

論。由此定知至分位假立。

述曰。舉其宗法結歸假也。至下當知。

論。此定非異至許蘊攝故。

述曰。即第二段合難體．用。此者即不相應法也。量云。此不相應。定非異於色．心．心所有實體用。許蘊攝故。如色．心等　其真如等與色等不一不異。不同彼宗不相應行一向有異。無不定失。又非蘊攝。即成異品。況非一向異於色．心等也。許言簡過準上應知。

論。或心心所至定非實有。

述曰。下第三段別難實有。有二比量。此第一也。有法同前。故文不說。謂不相應行。定非實有。或心．心所．及色．無為所不攝故。如畢竟無　畢竟無者。即龜毛等。瑜伽思惠地有四種無。此即彼一。前言異等。真如與心等不一不異。故因不舉無為。今言實有。為宗法。故舉無為也。簡不定失。

論。或余實法至非實有體。

述曰。有法如前。此中假法。共許瓶等。不共許忿等。今但總言。

汝不相應行。定非實有。除假以外許余實法所不攝故。如余假法　此中余言。顯色心等所不攝也。不言許者隨一不成。文外量云。汝不相應行名。非有此實體。此余心等所不攝故。如瓶．忿等。顯揚十八具廣破此。不繁廣引。

論。且彼如何至有實體用。

述曰。下別破異計。于中有三。初破本薩婆多等說十四不相應者。第二破大眾部．一說部．說出世部．雞胤部．化地部計。第三例破成實論師無表戒等。正量部等所說不失增長。正理論師所立和合性等　初破本薩婆多十四不相應中有六段。一破得．非得。二破同分。三破命根。四破二無心定．及無想異熟。五破四相。六破名．句．文身　于中一一皆有四文。一問外人說有之由。二外人引有之教理。三以理教難。四申成正義。此即初也。雜心等說異生性狹。退不成就等無處攝故。俱舍立非得不說異生性。即非得攝故。以成不成相返而立故對問也　文言且者。顯簡持義　又言異者。顯不離義。彼宗亦說不離色等別住有體色等俱故。

論。契經說故至十無學法。

述曰。外人引有之教理也。此顯異生聖者俱有得經。

補特伽羅。數取趣也。即諸異生　十無學法者。一無學正見。二正思惟。三正語。四正業。五正命。六正精進。七正念。八正

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 你們（指薩婆多部）所說的不相應行，實際上並不存在。因為除了假法以外，它不被任何真實存在的法所包含，就像其他的假法一樣。這裡的『余』字，表明它不被色法、心法等所包含。如果不說『許』字，那麼隨便哪一個條件不成立，這個論證就無法成立。用量式來表達就是：你們所說的不相應行，實際上並不存在，因為它不被心法等所包含，就像瓶子、憤怒等一樣。《顯揚聖教論》第十八卷對此有詳細的破斥，這裡就不詳細引用了。

論：且彼如何至有實體用？

述曰：下面分別破斥不同的觀點。其中有三個部分：第一部分破斥本薩婆多部等所說的十四種不相應行；第二部分破斥大眾部、一說部、說出世部、雞胤部、化地部的主張；第三部分類比破斥成實論師所說的無表戒等，以及正量部等所說的『不失』、『增長』等，還有正理論師所立的『和合性』等。首先破斥本薩婆多部的十四種不相應行，這部分又分為六段：一、破『得』、『非得』；二、破『同分』；三、破『命根』；四、破兩種無心定以及無想異熟；五、破『四相』；六、破『名身』、『句身』、『文身』。每一段都有四個部分：一、提問外人（指薩婆多部）說『有』的理由；二、外人引用經典作為『有』的教理依據；三、用道理和教理進行反駁；四、闡明正確的觀點。這裡是第一部分。雜心論等認為『異生性』的範圍太窄，『退』、『不成就』等沒有地方可以歸屬。因此，《俱舍論》立『非得』，而不說『異生性』，因為『非得』包含了『異生性』。這是因為『成』和『不成』是相對而立的，所以進行對問。文中的『且』字，表示簡別和持守的意思。又說『異』字，表示不離的意思。他們的宗派也說不離色法等，單獨存在實體，因為和色法等同時存在。

論：契經說故至十無學法。

述曰：外人引用經典作為『有』的教理依據。這表明異生和聖者都有『得』的經典。

補特伽羅（Pudgala，數取趣也）：指眾生，也就是指所有的異生。十無學法：一、無學正見；二、正思惟；三、正語；四、正業；五、正命；六、正精進；七、正念；八、正定。

【English Translation】 English version Your (referring to the Sarvastivadins) non-associated formations do not actually exist. Because, apart from the nominal existences, they are not encompassed by any truly existing dharma, just like other nominal existences. Here, the word 'other' indicates that it is not encompassed by form, mind, etc. If the word 'allow' is not used, then if any one condition is not met, this argument cannot stand. Expressed in a logical formula: Your so-called non-associated formations do not actually exist, because they are not encompassed by mind, etc., just like a bottle, anger, etc. The Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (Treatise on Manifesting the Correct Teaching) volume 18 refutes this in detail, so I will not quote it extensively here.

Treatise: Moreover, how does it reach the point of having a substantial function?

Commentary: Below, different views are refuted separately. There are three parts: The first part refutes the fourteen non-associated formations asserted by the original Sarvastivadins, etc.; the second part refutes the assertions of the Mahasamghika, Ekavyavaharika, Lokottaravada, Kukkutika, and Dharmaguptaka schools; the third part analogously refutes the non-manifest precepts, etc., asserted by the Satyasiddhi school, as well as the 'non-loss,' 'growth,' etc., asserted by the Sammitiya school, and the 'cohesive nature,' etc., established by the Master of the Nyaya Sutras. First, refuting the fourteen non-associated formations of the original Sarvastivadins, this part is further divided into six sections: 1. Refuting 'attainment' and 'non-attainment'; 2. Refuting 'commonality of class'; 3. Refuting 'life-force'; 4. Refuting the two mindless samadhis and the fruition of non-perception; 5. Refuting the 'four characteristics'; 6. Refuting 'name-body,' 'phrase-body,' and 'letter-body.' Each section has four parts: 1. Questioning the reason why the outsider (referring to the Sarvastivadins) says 'it exists'; 2. The outsider cites scriptures as the doctrinal basis for 'it exists'; 3. Refuting with reason and doctrine; 4. Clarifying the correct view. This is the first part. The Zaxin Lun (Treatise on the Collection of Categories) etc., considers the scope of 'ordinary being nature' to be too narrow, and there is nowhere to categorize 'decline,' 'non-accomplishment,' etc. Therefore, the Abhidharmakosa establishes 'non-attainment' instead of speaking of 'ordinary being nature,' because 'non-attainment' includes 'ordinary being nature.' This is because 'accomplishment' and 'non-accomplishment' are established in opposition to each other, so a counter-question is posed. The word 'moreover' in the text indicates the meaning of distinguishing and upholding. The word 'different' also indicates the meaning of non-separation. Their school also says that it does not separate from form, etc., and that a substance exists independently, because it exists simultaneously with form, etc.

Treatise: Because the sutra says, up to the ten non-learning dharmas.

Commentary: The outsider cites scriptures as the doctrinal basis for 'it exists.' This shows that there are sutras where both ordinary beings and sages have 'attainment'.

Pudgala (補特伽羅, person): refers to sentient beings, that is, all ordinary beings. The ten non-learning dharmas are: 1. Non-learning right view; 2. Right thought; 3. Right speech; 4. Right action; 5. Right livelihood; 6. Right effort; 7. Right mindfulness; 8. Right concentration.

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定。九正解脫。十正智。此十法義如別章說。

論。又說異生至不成就煩惱。

述曰。此顯異生聖者俱有。不成就異生等言。至下當釋。此且引經證得等有。

論。成不成言顯得非得。

述曰。結經證有。

論。經不說此至為證不成。

述曰。以教理難也。先皆總非。次方申難。此總非也。經說成不成。不別說言異色等有。故非成證。

論。亦說輪王至他身非情。

述曰。下文有二。先難得已。后例非得　破得中有二。初以教為齊責。后教外別生徴　初中有四。第一以教為齊責　七寶者。一象寶。二馬寶。三主兵臣。四主藏臣。五女寶。六珠。七輪。此中前五他身有情。后二非情。此七寶義如別章說。既言輪王成就此七寶。豈成他身及非情也。彼宗不許成他．非情故。

論。若謂于寶至假說成就。

述曰。第二難寶假成。謂彼救言。輪王于寶有自在用。隨欲轉故假名成就。非謂有得同善惡等。

論。于善惡法至而執實得。

述曰。何故於寶即假說成非實有得。異產生就善惡諸法言有實得。量云。汝宗七寶。應有實得得。契經說有成就言故。如善惡等　汝善惡法。應無實得得。契經說有成就言故。如七寶等　又量云。善惡等法。應自在故名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 定。九正解脫（第九種正確的解脫）。十正智（第十種正確的智慧）。這十種法義如同在其他章節所說的那樣。

論：又說異生（指凡夫）乃至不成就煩惱。

述曰：這顯示了凡夫和聖者都具有不成就。不成就異生等言論，將在下文解釋。這裡暫且引用經文來證明等有。

論：『成不成』的說法，顯示了並非是獲得。

述曰：總結經文以證明存在。

論：經文沒有說這些，因此不能作為證明不成就的依據。

述曰：用教義和道理來辯難。先總的否定，然後進一步申述辯難。這是總的否定。經文說了『成不成』，但沒有分別說異色等有，所以不能作為成就的證據。

論：也說了輪王乃至他身非情。

述曰：下文有兩部分。先辯難『得』，后舉例說明『非得』。破斥『得』中有兩點：首先以經教為標準進行責難，然後從經教之外另外提出質疑。首先以經教為標準進行責難，其中有四點。第一點是以經教為標準進行責難。七寶是：一象寶，二馬寶，三主兵臣，四主藏臣，五女寶，六珠，七輪。這其中，前五種是他身有情，后兩種是非情。這七寶的含義如同在其他章節所說的那樣。既然說輪王成就這七寶，難道是成就了他身和非情嗎？他們的宗派不承認成就他身和非情。

論：如果說對於寶物乃至假說成就。

述曰：第二點是辯難寶物是假成就。他們辯解說，輪王對於寶物有自在的使用權，可以隨意轉化，所以假名為成就，不是說有獲得，如同善惡等。

論：對於善惡法乃至執著于真實獲得。

述曰：為什麼對於寶物就說是假說成就而不是真實獲得，而異產生就善惡諸法就說是真實獲得呢？可以這樣推論：你們宗派的七寶，應該有真實的獲得，因為契經說了有成就。如同善惡等。你們的善惡法，應該沒有真實的獲得，因為契經說了有成就。如同七寶等。又可以這樣推論：善惡等法，應該是自在的，所以才被稱為

【English Translation】 English version Fixed. Nine Right Liberations (the ninth kind of correct liberation). Ten Right Knowledges (the tenth kind of correct wisdom). These ten Dharma meanings are as explained in other chapters.

Treatise: It also speaks of ordinary beings (referring to common people) up to the non-accomplishment of afflictions.

Commentary: This shows that both ordinary beings and sages possess non-accomplishment. The statements about non-accomplishment of ordinary beings, etc., will be explained below. Here, we temporarily cite scriptures to prove the existence of 'equal possession'.

Treatise: The term 'accomplishment or non-accomplishment' indicates that it is not attainment.

Commentary: Concluding the scriptures to prove existence.

Treatise: The scriptures do not speak of these, therefore they cannot be used as evidence for non-accomplishment.

Commentary: Using doctrine and reason to argue. First, a general negation, then a further elaboration of the argument. This is a general negation. The scriptures speak of 'accomplishment or non-accomplishment', but do not separately speak of the existence of different forms, etc., so it cannot be used as evidence of accomplishment.

Treatise: It also speaks of the Wheel-Turning King up to other bodies and non-sentient beings.

Commentary: There are two parts below. First, arguing against 'attainment', then giving examples to illustrate 'non-attainment'. There are two points in refuting 'attainment': first, using scriptures as a standard for criticism, then raising questions separately from outside the scriptures. First, using scriptures as a standard for criticism, which has four points. The first point is to criticize using scriptures as a standard. The Seven Treasures are: one, elephant treasure; two, horse treasure; three, chief military minister; four, chief treasurer; five, female treasure; six, pearl; seven, wheel. Among these, the first five are other sentient beings, and the latter two are non-sentient beings. The meaning of these Seven Treasures is as explained in other chapters. Since it is said that the Wheel-Turning King accomplishes these Seven Treasures, does that mean he accomplishes other bodies and non-sentient beings? Their sect does not acknowledge the accomplishment of other bodies and non-sentient beings.

Treatise: If it is said that with regard to treasures, it is merely nominal accomplishment.

Commentary: The second point is arguing that treasures are nominally accomplished. They argue that the Wheel-Turning King has the power to freely use treasures and transform them at will, so it is nominally called accomplishment, not that there is attainment, like good and evil, etc.

Treatise: With regard to good and evil dharmas, they cling to real attainment.

Commentary: Why is it said that with regard to treasures, it is merely nominal accomplishment and not real attainment, while the ordinary being's accomplishment of good and evil dharmas is said to be real attainment? It can be inferred as follows: Your sect's Seven Treasures should have real attainment, because the scriptures say there is accomplishment. Like good and evil, etc. Your good and evil dharmas should not have real attainment, because the scriptures say there is accomplishment. Like the Seven Treasures, etc. It can also be inferred as follows: Good and evil dharmas, etc., should be free, so they are called

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成就。經有成就言故。如七寶等　此就他說。

第三例寶唯現。彼復救言。

論。若謂七寶至可假說成。

述曰。此牒彼計。七寶現在。可說自在名為成就。善惡之法理則不然。非必皆唯現在有故。

次論主難。

論。寧知所成至理非有故。

述曰。寧知善惡離現在有。離現之法非我許有。故今言現者。無為亦是現。今即有故。又現者現在。現在外皆非有。擇滅等亦爾。而我真如與現在法不即不離。不可離現而說有故。故知唯有現在之法。即可自在故名成就。離現實法理非有故。故知決定不成過．未。而我真如不說實得得。而智證之故假說無妨。擇．非擇滅我無別體。亦非此證。

第四破外伏難。外人問曰。若無得者。未得．者未得已失。及無為法應永不成。

論。現在必有善種等故。

述曰。未得．已失現行之法。現在必有善．惡．無記諸法種子。后得生故。于現種子假名成就。已得真如者。有無漏種。須即緣故。

善種等言。攝惡．無記。及真如智。更無過失。

論。又得於法有何勝用。

述曰。自下第二教外別生徴。于中有二。初總。后別。今總問彼。又此得等於所得法有何勝用。

論。若言能起。

述曰。毗婆沙中

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：成就。經典中有成就的說法，例如七寶（指金、銀、琉璃、硨磲、瑪瑙、珍珠、琥珀等七種珍寶）。這是就他人的觀點來說的。 第三種情況是，寶物只在現在顯現。對方又辯解說： 論：如果說七寶等可以假說為成就。 述曰：這是引述對方的觀點。七寶是現在存在的，可以說自在地存在，所以稱為成就。善惡之法理則不然，並非必定都是現在存在的。 接下來是論主的駁難。 論：怎麼知道所成就的道理不是存在的呢？ 述曰：怎麼知道善惡可以離開現在而存在呢？離開現在之法，我並不承認它存在。所以現在所說的『現』，無為法也是現，因為現在就有。而且，『現』就是現在，現在之外都沒有。擇滅（通過智慧選擇而達到的滅盡狀態）等也是如此。而我的真如（事物本來的真實如是的狀態）與現在之法不即不離，不可離開現在而說有。所以知道只有現在之法，才可以自在，所以名為成就。離開現實之法，道理上是不存在的。所以知道決定不能成就過去、未來之法。而我的真如，不說實際得到了，而是通過智慧證得，所以假說也沒有妨礙。擇滅、非擇滅（非通過智慧選擇而達到的滅盡狀態）我沒有別的本體，也不是通過這個來證明的。 第四，駁斥外道的反駁。外人問道：如果沒有『得』，那麼未得、已失，以及無為法應該永遠不能成就。 論：現在必定有善的種子等。 述曰：未得、已失的現行之法，現在必定有善、惡、無記（非善非惡）諸法的種子，以後才能產生。對於現在種子假名為成就。已得真如者，有無漏種（沒有煩惱的種子），必須立即產生作用。 『善種等』，包括惡、無記，以及真如智。再沒有過失。 論：得到法有什麼殊勝的作用？ 述曰：從下面開始，第二部分是教外別生徴（佛教以外的人提出的不同問題）。其中有二，先是總的，后是別的。現在是總的問對方，這個『得』對於所得的法有什麼殊勝的作用？ 論：如果說能生起…… 述曰：在《毗婆沙論》中……

【English Translation】 English version: Accomplishment. Because the scriptures speak of accomplishment, such as the Seven Treasures (gold, silver, lapis lazuli, tridacna, agate, pearl, and amber). This is according to another's view. The third case is that treasures only appear in the present. The opponent further argues: Treatise: If it is said that the Seven Treasures, etc., can be hypothetically said to be accomplished. Commentary: This quotes the opponent's view. The Seven Treasures are present now, and it can be said that they exist freely, so they are called accomplishment. The principles of good and evil are not like this, and they are not necessarily all present. Next is the refutation by the treatise master. Treatise: How do you know that the principle of what is accomplished does not exist? Commentary: How do you know that good and evil can exist apart from the present? I do not admit that there is a dharma apart from the present. So the 'present' that is now spoken of, unconditioned dharmas are also present, because they exist now. Moreover, 'present' is the present moment, and there is nothing outside the present. Cessation by choice (Nirvana attained through wisdom) etc. are also like this. And my Suchness (the true nature of things as they are) is neither identical nor different from the present dharma, and it cannot be said to exist apart from the present. So I know that only the present dharma can be free, so it is called accomplishment. The principle of dharma apart from reality does not exist. So I know that it is definitely impossible to accomplish past and future dharmas. And my Suchness is not said to be actually obtained, but is realized through wisdom, so hypothetical speech is not a problem. Cessation by choice and cessation without choice (Nirvana not attained through wisdom) I have no other entity, nor is it proven through this. Fourth, refute the objections of externalists. An outsider asks: If there is no 'attainment', then what has not been attained, what has been lost, and unconditioned dharmas should never be accomplished. Treatise: There must be good seeds, etc., in the present. Commentary: The present dharmas that have not been attained and have been lost must have seeds of good, evil, and neutral (neither good nor evil) dharmas in the present, so that they can be produced later. The present seed is hypothetically called accomplishment. Those who have attained Suchness have unconditioned seeds (seeds without afflictions), which must take effect immediately. 'Good seeds, etc.' include evil, neutral, and Suchness wisdom. There is no further fault. Treatise: What is the special function of attaining dharma? Commentary: From below, the second part is the different questions raised by those outside the teachings (different questions raised by people outside of Buddhism). There are two parts, first general, then specific. Now, generally ask the other party, what is the special function of this 'attainment' for the dharma that is attained? Treatise: If you say it can arise... Commentary: In the Vibhasha Shastra...

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雖有二說。得於所得能起不失。婆沙本意取不失因。生能起法。非得能故。下難有二。此外人言能起諸法。起者生也。即生彼法義。

論。應起無為。

述曰。論主難云。應起無為。以有得故。如有為等。

論。一切非情應永不起。

述曰。一切非情即外具等。應永不起。以無得起故。如龜毛等　彼宗不許外法非情有得得故。過去．未來已成就法應恒常起。以有得故。如現得法。

論。未得已失應永不生。

述曰。一切未得應永不生。已失之法更不應生。此中通說。未得之法及易界地等已舍之法。應永不生。無能生得故。如龜毛等。

論。若俱生得為因起者。

述曰。此設彼救。未得已失之法現雖無得。彼皆許有俱生得故后時能起。以俱生得為能起因故。今牒之云若爾者。

次論主難。

論。所執二生便為無用。

述曰。諸有為相應無用故。有俱生因及前後得故。此中所說大小二生更何所用。汝宗有情數法二生。應無用。許有能得故。如無為法。

論。又具善惡至應頓現前。

述曰。若法由有前後得等皆能生者。應一切時頓生三性。得恒有故。量云。汝善心起時余所未起善惡等法現有得者。並應亦起。以有能生得故。如現起善法　

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：雖然有兩種說法，但如果認為『得』（prāpti，獲得）和『所得』（prāptalābha，已獲得）能夠引發事物而不喪失，那麼《婆沙論》（Vibhāṣā）的本意是取『不失因』（avipraṇāśa-hetu，不失壞之因），即生起能夠引發諸法的能力，而不是『得』本身的能力。下面會有兩個難點。此外，外人說能夠引發諸法，『起』就是『生』，也就是生起那個法的意義。

論：應該生起無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma，未被造作之法）。

述曰：論主反駁說，應該生起無為法，因為它有『得』，就像有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma，被造作之法）一樣。

論：一切非情（acitta，無情識）之物應該永遠不生起。

述曰：一切非情之物，比如外在的器具等，應該永遠不生起，因為它沒有引發它們的『得』，就像龜毛等。他們的宗派不承認外在的非情之物有『得』。過去、未來已經成就的法應該恒常生起，因為它有『得』，就像現在已經獲得的法一樣。

論：未得和已失之物應該永遠不生。

述曰：一切未得之物應該永遠不生，已經失去的法更不應該生起。這裡是通俗的說法，未得之法以及易界地等已經捨棄的法，應該永遠不生，因為它沒有能夠生起的『得』，就像龜毛等。

論：如果俱生得（sahajā-prāpti，與生俱來的獲得）是生起的因。

述曰：這是假設他們的辯解。未得和已失的法現在雖然沒有『得』，但他們都承認有俱生得，所以之後能夠生起，因為俱生得是能夠生起的因。現在引用他們的觀點說，如果是這樣的話。

接下來論主進行反駁。

論：所執著的兩種生（jāti，生）就變得沒有用了。

述曰：因為與有為法相應的『無用』，有俱生因以及前後的『得』。這裡所說的大小兩種『生』還有什麼用呢？你們宗派認為有情數法有兩種『生』，應該沒有用，因為承認有能夠獲得的『得』，就像無為法一樣。

論：又具備善惡等法，應該同時顯現。

述曰：如果法由於有前後的『得』等都能夠生起，那麼應該一切時都同時生起三性（tri-svabhāva，三種自性）。因為『得』是恒常存在的。可以這樣論證：當你的善心生起時，其餘尚未生起的善惡等法，如果現在有『得』，那麼也應該同時生起，因為它有能夠生起的『得』，就像現在生起的善法一樣。

【English Translation】 English version: Although there are two views, if it is considered that 'prāpti' (得, attainment) and 'prāptalābha' (所得, obtained attainment) can cause things to arise without loss, then the original intention of the Vibhāṣā (婆沙論) is to take 'avipraṇāśa-hetu' (不失因, the cause of non-loss), that is, the ability to generate dharmas, not the ability of 'attainment' itself. There will be two difficulties below. In addition, outsiders say that they can cause dharmas to arise, and 'arising' is 'birth', which is the meaning of giving rise to that dharma.

Treatise: Asaṃskṛta-dharmas (無為法, unconditioned dharmas) should arise.

Commentary: The treatise master refutes, saying that asaṃskṛta-dharmas should arise because they have 'attainment', just like saṃskṛta-dharmas (有為法, conditioned dharmas).

Treatise: All acitta (非情, non-sentient) things should never arise.

Commentary: All non-sentient things, such as external instruments, should never arise because they do not have the 'attainment' to cause them to arise, just like turtle hair. Their sect does not admit that external non-sentient things have 'attainment'. Past and future accomplished dharmas should always arise because they have 'attainment', just like dharmas that have already been obtained.

Treatise: What has not been attained and what has been lost should never arise.

Commentary: Everything that has not been attained should never arise, and dharmas that have been lost should not arise again. This is a common saying that dharmas that have not been attained and dharmas that have been abandoned, such as the easy realm and land, should never arise because they do not have the 'attainment' to cause them to arise, just like turtle hair.

Treatise: If sahajā-prāpti (俱生得, innate attainment) is the cause of arising.

Commentary: This is assuming their defense. Although dharmas that have not been attained and have been lost do not have 'attainment' now, they all admit that there is innate attainment, so they can arise later because innate attainment is the cause that can cause them to arise. Now, quoting their point of view, if that is the case.

Next, the treatise master refutes.

Treatise: The two kinds of jāti (生, birth) that are adhered to become useless.

Commentary: Because of the 'uselessness' corresponding to saṃskṛta-dharmas, there is an innate cause and previous and subsequent 'attainment'. What is the use of the two kinds of 'birth', large and small, mentioned here? Your sect believes that sentient number dharmas have two kinds of 'birth', which should be useless because it admits that there is 'attainment' that can be obtained, just like asaṃskṛta-dharmas.

Treatise: Moreover, dharmas such as good and evil should appear simultaneously.

Commentary: If dharmas can arise at all times because they have previous and subsequent 'attainment', then the three svabhāvas (三性, three natures) should arise simultaneously at all times. Because 'attainment' is constant. It can be argued that when your good mind arises, if the remaining good and evil dharmas that have not yet arisen now have 'attainment', then they should also arise simultaneously because they have 'attainment' that can cause them to arise, just like the good dharmas that are now arising.

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更互為量準此應知　彼復救云若雖有得。無所餘因可和合故不俱起者。

論。若待余因得便無用。

述曰。所待之餘自能生故。以前破文俱舍等有。

彼復救云。

論。若待於法至成就彼故。

述曰。此牒彼計。若無得者不成就彼。正理師救。

次論主難。

論。諸可成法至實不可得。

述曰。即是現在及真如等。皆不離有情。何須得成就。過．未無法。前已論故更不須成。離有情者實不可得。

論。故得於法俱為無用。

述曰。不離有情法。若離有情法。俱為無用。前何須故。后即無故。又得於法為因能起。或不失因。以理推徴。俱無用也　此中離言有二。一內有情數法名不離法。外無情法名離有情法。初可說有得。后不可說有得。二云識所變不離有情法。即非情法亦不離有情。無法名離有情法。初說有得后即無得。亦通非情說有得也。既說輪王成就七寶。亦得說成他身非情。故通取得他非情勝。又現行成就即一切法。非情現行寧即非也。故后解勝。

論。得實無故非得亦無。

述曰。以得無實故非得亦無。得有用而尚無。非得無用如何有。非得非有。得與非得相返立故。如得。

論。然依有情至三種成就。

述曰。申正

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 更互相作為衡量標準，應該知道這一點。對方再次辯解說，即使有所獲得，如果沒有其他原因可以調和聚合，也不會同時產生。

論：如果依賴其他原因才能獲得，那麼『得』就沒有用處了。

述曰：因為所依賴的其他原因自己就能產生結果。以前破斥《俱舍論》等時已經說過。

對方再次辯解說：

論：如果依賴於法，是爲了成就那個法。

述曰：這是重複對方的觀點。如果沒有『得』，就不能成就那個法。這是正理師的辯解。

接下來是論主的駁難：

論：所有可以成就的法，最終都是無法獲得的。

述曰：這裡指的是現在和真如等，都不離開有情眾生，何須通過『得』來成就？過去和未來的法不存在，之前已經討論過，所以不需要成就。離開有情眾生的法，實際上是無法獲得的。

論：所以，對於法來說，『得』都是沒有用處的。

述曰：不離開有情眾生的法，或者離開有情眾生的法，『得』都是沒有用處的。前者不需要，後者不存在。而且，『得』對於法來說，無論是作為原因能夠產生結果，還是不失去原因，從道理上推斷，都是沒有用處的。這裡說的『離開』有兩種含義：一是內在有情眾生的法，稱為『不離法』；外在無情眾生的法，稱為『離有情法』。前者可以說有『得』，後者不可以說有『得』。二是意識所變現的法，稱為『不離有情法』，即使是非情之法也不離開有情；無法，稱為『離有情法』。前者說有『得』，後者就沒有『得』。也可以說非情之法有『得』。既然說轉輪王成就七寶，也可以說成就他身非情之物。所以，普遍認為取得他身非情之物是殊勝的。而且，現行成就即是一切法，非情現行怎麼能說不是呢？所以，後面的解釋更勝一籌。

論：因為『得』實際上不存在，所以『非得』也不存在。

述曰：因為『得』沒有實體，所以『非得』也不存在。『得』有用尚且不存在，『非得』沒有用處怎麼會存在呢？『非得』不是有，因為『得』和『非得』是相互對立的。如同『得』一樣。

論：然而，依靠有情眾生，有三種成就。

述曰：申明正義。

【English Translation】 English version This should be understood as mutually serving as a standard of measurement. The opponent further argues that even if there is 'attainment' (得), if there are no other causes that can harmonize and combine, they will not arise simultaneously.

Treatise: If it depends on other causes to be attained, then 'attainment' is useless.

Commentary: Because the other causes it depends on can produce the result themselves. This was previously discussed when refuting the Abhidharmakośa (俱舍) and other texts.

The opponent further argues:

Treatise: If it depends on a dharma (法), it is to accomplish that dharma.

Commentary: This is repeating the opponent's view. If there is no 'attainment', that dharma cannot be accomplished. This is the argument of the Vaibhashikas (正理師).

Next, the treatise master refutes:

Treatise: All dharmas that can be accomplished are ultimately unattainable.

Commentary: This refers to the present and tathata (真如) etc., which do not leave sentient beings (有情). Why is it necessary to accomplish them through 'attainment'? The past and future dharmas do not exist, and this has already been discussed, so there is no need to accomplish them. Dharmas that are separate from sentient beings are actually unattainable.

Treatise: Therefore, 'attainment' is useless for dharmas.

Commentary: Whether it is a dharma that does not leave sentient beings, or a dharma that leaves sentient beings, 'attainment' is useless. The former is unnecessary, and the latter does not exist. Moreover, whether 'attainment' is a cause that can produce a result for a dharma, or it does not lose the cause, based on logical reasoning, it is useless. There are two meanings of 'separate' here: first, the dharmas of internal sentient beings are called 'dharmas that do not leave'; the dharmas of external non-sentient beings are called 'dharmas that leave sentient beings'. The former can be said to have 'attainment', while the latter cannot be said to have 'attainment'. Second, the dharmas transformed by consciousness are called 'dharmas that do not leave sentient beings', even non-sentient dharmas do not leave sentient beings; non-existent dharmas are called 'dharmas that leave sentient beings'. The former is said to have 'attainment', while the latter has no 'attainment'. It can also be said that non-sentient beings have 'attainment'. Since it is said that a Chakravartin (轉輪王) achieves the seven treasures (七寶), it can also be said to achieve non-sentient objects in other bodies. Therefore, it is generally considered superior to attain non-sentient objects in other bodies. Moreover, present manifestation is all dharmas, how can non-sentient present manifestation not be? Therefore, the latter explanation is superior.

Treatise: Because 'attainment' does not actually exist, 'non-attainment' also does not exist.

Commentary: Because 'attainment' has no substance, 'non-attainment' also does not exist. If 'attainment' is useful and still does not exist, how can 'non-attainment', which is useless, exist? 'Non-attainment' is not existent, because 'attainment' and 'non-attainment' are mutually opposed. It is like 'attainment'.

Treatise: However, relying on sentient beings, there are three kinds of accomplishment.

Commentary: Declaring the correct meaning.

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義有二。初明得。后明非得也。然外非情。他身。過．未。皆非可成。然以輪王成七寶故亦許。大乘於他．非情許建立得。可有受用者許成就故。準下第二成他根不成以為二說。此言可成。謂五種姓互所無者名不可成。即自身中所有種子。及現行中可受用者。他身．非情名可成法。依此等上立成就．得。然今大乘都無文解得．成就別。準理及教。實體無別。如瑜伽論五十二說。云何得．獲．成就。謂若略說生緣．攝受．增盛之因說名為得。彼復說言。當知此得略有三種一種子成就等　故得．成就二無差別。

依何分位立成就也。

論。一種子成就至三現行成就。

述曰。五十二說。若所有染污法。諸無記法生得善法。不由功用而現行者。染法未為奢摩他伏。無記未為聖道永害。生得未為邪見損伏。如是名為種子成就。此等未損。行與不行皆名成就。故瑜伽言。于引發緣勢力自在假立為得。即是一切見．修煩惱。三無記法任運起者。及生得善所有種子。皆此成就。從無始來此等種子數修習故。然五十六。對法第五。說種子成。如生欲界未離欲染。此諸煩惱及隨煩惱名為成就。若離此地欲亦名不成就。彼依有體及與損害能生現行作用力故名成不成就。瑜伽唯約未為損伏能生用說。無不成就。亦不相違。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：意義有二。首先闡明『得』（Prapti，獲得），然後闡明『非得』（Aprapti，未獲得）。然而，外物、其他眾生、過去和未來，都不是可以成就的。但是，因為轉輪王可以成就七寶，所以也允許這種說法。大乘佛教允許在他者和非情之物上建立『得』，因為可以被受用的事物被允許成就。根據下文第二部分關於『成就他根』和『不成就』的兩種說法，這裡所說的『可成』，指的是五種姓（五種不同的根性）之間彼此所沒有的，這被稱為『不可成』。也就是自身中所有的種子，以及現行中可以受用的事物，他者和非情之物被稱為『可成法』。依據這些來建立『成就』和『得』。然而，現在大乘佛教中沒有文獻解釋『得』和『成就』的區別。根據道理和教義，實體上沒有區別。如《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷所說：什麼是『得』、『獲』、『成就』？簡略地說，產生、攝受、增長的原因被稱為『得』。其中又說：應當知道，這種『得』略有三種，一種子成就等。因此，『得』和『成就』二者沒有差別。

依據什麼分位來建立『成就』呢？

論：一種子成就，乃至三種現行成就。

述曰：《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說：如果所有染污法、諸無記法、生得善法，不由功用而現行者，染法未被奢摩他（Samatha，止）所降伏，無記法未被聖道永遠斷除，生得善法未被邪見損害降伏，像這樣就稱為種子成就。這些沒有被損害，行與不行都稱為成就。所以《瑜伽師地論》說：對於引發緣的勢力自在，假立為『得』。也就是一切見煩惱、修煩惱、三種無記法任運而起者，以及生得善的所有種子，都是這種成就。從無始以來，這些種子數數修習的緣故。然而，《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷，《對法論》第五卷，說種子成就，如生於欲界未離欲染，這些煩惱以及隨煩惱稱為成就。如果離開此地欲也稱為不成就。那裡依據有體以及損害，能夠產生現行作用力的緣故，稱為成就不成就。《瑜伽師地論》只就未被損害降伏，能夠產生作用來說，沒有不成就，也不相違背。

【English Translation】 English version: There are two meanings. First, to clarify 'Prapti' (得, attainment), and then to clarify 'Aprapti' (非得, non-attainment). However, external objects, other beings, the past, and the future are not things that can be accomplished. However, because a Chakravartin (輪王, wheel-turning king) can accomplish the seven treasures, this is also permitted. Mahayana Buddhism allows the establishment of 'Prapti' on others and non-sentient things because things that can be enjoyed are allowed to be accomplished. According to the second part below regarding the two statements of 'accomplishing other roots' and 'non-accomplishment', what is meant here by 'can be accomplished' refers to what is not possessed by each other among the five gotras (五種姓, five lineages), which is called 'non-accomplishment'. That is, all the seeds within oneself, and things that can be enjoyed in the present activity, others and non-sentient things are called 'Dharmas that can be accomplished'. Based on these, 'accomplishment' and 'Prapti' are established. However, there is currently no literature in Mahayana Buddhism that explains the difference between 'Prapti' and 'accomplishment'. According to reason and doctrine, there is no difference in substance. As the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) says in the fifty-second fascicle: What is 'Prapti', 'acquisition', 'accomplishment'? Briefly speaking, the causes of production, reception, and increase are called 'Prapti'. It also says: It should be known that this 'Prapti' is roughly of three types, one being seed accomplishment, etc. Therefore, there is no difference between 'Prapti' and 'accomplishment'.

Based on what divisions is 'accomplishment' established?

Treatise: One is seed accomplishment, up to three are present activity accomplishments.

Commentary: The fifty-second fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: If all defiled dharmas, all neutral dharmas, and innate virtuous dharmas arise without effort, the defiled dharmas have not been subdued by Samatha (奢摩他, calming meditation), the neutral dharmas have not been permanently destroyed by the noble path, and the innate virtuous dharmas have not been harmed and subdued by wrong views, this is called seed accomplishment. These have not been harmed, and whether they are practiced or not, they are called accomplishment. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Prapti' is provisionally established for the power and freedom of the causes of arising. That is, all afflictions of view, afflictions of cultivation, the three types of neutral dharmas that arise spontaneously, and all the seeds of innate virtue are this accomplishment. From beginningless time, these seeds have been repeatedly cultivated. However, the fifty-sixth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the fifth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論) say that seed accomplishment is like being born in the desire realm without being separated from the desire defilements, these afflictions and secondary afflictions are called accomplishment. If one leaves this realm of desire, it is also called non-accomplishment. There, based on having substance and harm, being able to produce the power of present activity, it is called accomplishment and non-accomplishment. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra only speaks of being able to produce activity without being harmed and subdued, there is no non-accomplishment, and it is not contradictory.

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對法論等。不說任運一分無記是種子成。生得善中文亦略也。然準彼論。自在成就言一分無記。其種子成就。理亦攝餘一分無記。其生得善與瑜伽同。然準對法。亦應如彼煩惱。理說通成不成。以在他界不起他界生得善故。唯說成就同於瑜伽。以瑜伽中但依染法能生用說。其能治道說奢摩他。不說無漏道。以對法中。通說染體及用未滅名為成就。通無漏道名為能治。對法文盡。瑜伽少分。故知二論各據一義。此種成就唯取種子。如瑜伽說。對法論中但約染法。有體無體有用無用。名成．不成。生得有用名為成就。亦不說現行名種子成就。今依對法依體用有名成。約體用無名不成者。且依用說。如欲界染法為奢摩他伏。第七識中一向成。六識中名成不成。六識之中見道一向成。修道名成不成。修道中我見等不伏名成。貪．嗔等伏名不成。已伏者作用無名不成。未伏作用有名成。若無漏道。依染種體名成不成。義亦有別。離欲界染見道門者。一向不成。已斷故。修道通成不成。修道中第七識一向成。金剛心方斷故。六識一向不成。此依我見等離欲斷說。不爾即通成及不成。其無記法。若有聖道望斷縛。名成不成亦得。望體成佛名不成。不爾名成。若生得善法。有依用名成不成。未為邪見伏。生在此地名成。若邪見伏不生之

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於《對法論》等。不說任運（自然而然）的一分無記（非善非惡）是種子成就。『生得善』（與生俱來的善）在文中也略有提及。然而，根據《彼論》，『自在成就』指的是一分無記，其種子成就的道理也涵蓋了其餘一分無記。其『生得善』與《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）相同。然而，根據《對法論》，也應如彼煩惱一樣，從道理上來說，成就與不成就都包括在內，因為在他界（其他世界）不會生起他界的『生得善』。因此，只說成就與《瑜伽師地論》相同，因為《瑜伽師地論》中只是依據染法（不凈之法）的生起作用來說明。其中能對治（對抗）染法的道，只說了奢摩他（Śamatha，止），沒有說無漏道（沒有煩惱的道）。因為在《對法論》中，通說染法的本體和作用未滅，名為成就，通說無漏道名為能對治。《對法論》的文義詳盡，《瑜伽師地論》的文義簡略，因此可知二論各自依據一個角度。這種成就只取種子。如《瑜伽師地論》所說，《對法論》中只是就染法而言，有體無體，有用無用，名為成就或不成就。『生得』的有用之法名為成就，也沒有說現行（當下發生）名為種子成就。現在依據《對法論》，依據體用（本體和作用）有名成就，依據體用無名不成就。且依據作用來說，如欲界（Kāmadhātu， 慾望界）的染法被奢摩他所降伏，在第七識（末那識，Manas）中一向是成就的，在第六識（意識，Vijñāna）中名為成就或不成就。在第六識中，見道（Darśanamārga， 見道位）一向是成就的，修道（Bhāvanāmārga， 修道位）名為成就或不成就。修道中，我見（對自我的執著）等沒有被降伏，名為成就，貪、嗔（憤怒）等被降伏，名為不成就。已經被降伏的，作用消失，名為不成就，未被降伏的，作用存在，名為成就。如果是無漏道，依據染法的種子本體，名為成就或不成就，意義也有區別。離開欲界染法的見道門，一向是不成就的，因為已經被斷除。修道則包括成就與不成就。修道中，第七識一向是成就的，因為要到金剛心（Vajracitta， 比喻堅不可摧的智慧）才能斷除。第六識一向是不成就的。這是依據我見等離開欲界斷除來說的，否則就包括成就與不成就。其無記法，如果有聖道（Āryamārga， 聖者的道）希望斷除束縛，名為成就或不成就也可以。希望本體成佛，名為不成就，否則名為成就。如果是生得善法，有依據作用名為成就或不成就。未被邪見（錯誤的見解）所降伏，生在此地名為成就，如果被邪見降伏不生在此地。

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the Abhidharma treatises, etc., it is not said that a portion of indeterminate (avyākṛta) activity that arises spontaneously is seed-accomplishment. 'Innate virtue' (janmasiddha-kuśala) is also briefly mentioned in the text. However, according to that treatise, 'self-attained accomplishment' refers to a portion of indeterminate activity, and the principle of its seed-accomplishment also encompasses the remaining portion of indeterminate activity. Its 'innate virtue' is the same as in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra). However, according to the Abhidharma, it should also be like those afflictions (kleśa), and in principle, both accomplishment and non-accomplishment are included, because the 'innate virtue' of another realm does not arise in another realm. Therefore, it is only said that accomplishment is the same as in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, because in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, it is only explained based on the arising function of defiled dharmas (saṃkliṣṭa-dharma). Among them, the path that counteracts defiled dharmas, only Śamatha (Śamatha, calming the mind) is mentioned, not the unconditioned path (anāsrava-mārga). Because in the Abhidharma, it is generally said that the substance and function of defiled dharmas that have not been extinguished are called accomplishment, and the unconditioned path is generally called the counteracting force. The meaning of the Abhidharma is detailed, and the meaning of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is brief, so it can be known that the two treatises each rely on one perspective. This accomplishment only takes the seed. As the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, in the Abhidharma, it is only in terms of defiled dharmas, whether there is substance or no substance, whether there is function or no function, that it is called accomplishment or non-accomplishment. 'Innate' useful dharmas are called accomplishment, and it is not said that present activity is called seed-accomplishment. Now, according to the Abhidharma, based on substance and function, there is the name accomplishment, and based on substance and function, there is no name non-accomplishment. And based on function, such as the defiled dharmas of the desire realm (Kāmadhātu), being subdued by Śamatha, in the seventh consciousness (Manas, mind), it is always accomplishment, and in the sixth consciousness (Vijñāna, consciousness), it is called accomplishment or non-accomplishment. In the sixth consciousness, the path of seeing (Darśanamārga) is always accomplishment, and the path of cultivation (Bhāvanāmārga) is called accomplishment or non-accomplishment. In the path of cultivation, self-view (attachment to self) etc. are not subdued, it is called accomplishment, greed, anger, etc. are subdued, it is called non-accomplishment. Those that have been subdued, the function disappears, it is called non-accomplishment, those that have not been subdued, the function exists, it is called accomplishment. If it is the unconditioned path, based on the seed substance of defiled dharmas, it is called accomplishment or non-accomplishment, and the meaning is also different. Leaving the path of seeing of the defiled dharmas of the desire realm, it is always non-accomplishment, because it has already been cut off. Cultivation includes accomplishment and non-accomplishment. In cultivation, the seventh consciousness is always accomplishment, because it is not until the diamond mind (Vajracitta, diamond-like mind) that it can be cut off. The sixth consciousness is always non-accomplishment. This is based on the cutting off of self-view etc. leaving the desire realm, otherwise it includes accomplishment and non-accomplishment. If it is indeterminate dharmas, if there is a holy path (Āryamārga) hoping to cut off bondage, it can also be called accomplishment or non-accomplishment. Hoping for the substance to become a Buddha, it is called non-accomplishment, otherwise it is called accomplishment. If it is innate virtuous dharmas, there is reliance on function called accomplishment or non-accomplishment. Not being subdued by wrong views, being born in this land is called accomplishment, if being subdued by wrong views, not being born in this land.

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地名不成。若依體說。若已成佛名不成。已舍故。若未成佛恒名成。對法中染法。有體及用名成不成。說有無漏對治道故。瑜伽唯有作用名成不成。以增盛種子方名得故。無記．生得善。唯瑜伽有約損用名成不成。無記體者。應互相準作成不成　自在成就者。瑜伽論說。若加行所生善法。及一分無記。增盛種子名自在成。由加行力方得自在。又成此時名自在者。故說此等名自在成。對法論說。加行善法。謂世出世一切功德一分無記。謂工巧處變化心等。等言為顯攝威儀心極串習者。唯除生得無記之法。若準對法染污等法說。其加行善等。若體若用。亦有成不成者。如斷善根用不成。成佛之時體不成。有漏者已舍故。無記亦有用成及不成。離縛等故。若望成佛亦有體不成者。其無漏種亦爾。用有成不成。謂得勝舍劣。及退失現法樂住等名不成。已生現行者名成。有未起無漏現行位名不成。後起現位名成。其體亦有成不成。無種姓名不成。有者名成。有三乘決定所有姓名成。互所無名不成　現行成就者。對法等說。諸蘊處界。若善．不善．無記現行。名現行成就。種若斷損。現行亦不成就。現起時必名成。不起位名不成。前二唯種。此唯現行。三種成就皆通有漏。若無漏法唯后二種。若大乘位伏斷有異。如樞要說　問何故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 地名是否成立？如果按照『體』（本質）來說，如果已經成佛，『名』（名稱）就不成立，因為已經捨棄了（原有的名稱）。如果尚未成佛，則『恒名』（常名）成立。在《阿毗達磨對法論》中，染污法，其『體』（本質）和『用』（作用）的『名』（名稱）成立嗎？因為說有無漏的對治道（解脫之道）的緣故，所以成立。 《瑜伽師地論》中，只有『作用』（功能）的『名』（名稱）成立嗎？因為增盛種子（潛在能力）才能獲得『名』（名稱）的緣故，所以成立。無記（非善非惡）、生得善（與生俱來的善），只有《瑜伽師地論》中有，如果按照損減『用』（作用）來說，『名』（名稱）成立嗎？無記的『體』（本質），應該互相參照來判斷『成』（成立）與『不成』（不成立）。 自在成就者，《瑜伽師地論》說，如果加行（努力修行）所生的善法，以及一部分無記法，增盛種子，名為自在成（自然成就）。由於加行之力才能獲得自在。又成就此時名為自在者，所以說這些名為自在成。《阿毗達磨對法論》說，加行善法，指世間和出世間的一切功德，一部分無記法，指工巧處（精巧的技藝）、變化心等。『等』字是爲了顯示包含威儀心（莊嚴的儀態）和極串習者（極其熟練的人）。唯獨不包括生得的無記法。如果參照《阿毗達磨對法論》中染污等法來說，其加行善等，無論是『體』（本質）還是『用』（作用），也有『成』（成立）與『不成』（不成立）的。例如斷善根，『用』（作用）不成立；成佛之時，『體』（本質）不成立，因為有漏法已經捨棄了。無記法也有『用』（作用）的『成』（成立）與『不成』（不成立），因為離縛（脫離束縛）等緣故。如果期望成佛，也有『體』（本質）不成立的，其無漏種子也是如此。『用』（作用）有『成』（成立）與『不成』（不成立），指獲得殊勝的，捨棄低劣的，以及退失現法樂住（現世安樂的境界）等，名為『不成』（不成立）。已經生起現行（已經發生作用）的，名為『成』（成立）。有尚未生起無漏現行的階段，名為『不成』（不成立）。後起現行位，名為『成』（成立）。其『體』（本質）也有『成』（成立）與『不成』（不成立）。沒有種子，姓名不成立；有種子，姓名成立。有三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）決定所有的姓名成立，互相之間所沒有的，名不成立。 現行成就者，《阿毗達磨對法論》等說，諸蘊（五蘊）、處（十二處）、界（十八界），如果是善、不善、無記的現行，名為現行成就。種子如果斷損，現行也不成就。現起時必定名為『成』（成立），不起位名為『不成』（不成立）。前兩種（種子成就、自在成就）唯獨是種子，這種（現行成就）唯獨是現行。三種成就都通於有漏法。如果是無漏法，只有后兩種（自在成就、現行成就）。如果是大乘的地位，伏斷（降伏和斷除）有所不同，如《樞要》所說。 問：為什麼……

【English Translation】 English version Is the name of a place established? If according to 'essence' (體, ti) it is said, if one has already become a Buddha, the 'name' (名, ming) is not established, because it has been abandoned (the original name). If one has not yet become a Buddha, then the 'constant name' (恒名, heng ming) is established. In the Abhidharma-samuccaya (對法, duifa), for defiled dharmas, are the 'names' (名, ming) of their 'essence' (體, ti) and 'function' (用, yong) established? Because it is said that there is an un-leaking antidote path (the path of liberation), therefore it is established. In the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽, yuqie), is only the 'name' (名, ming) of 'function' (作用, zuoyong) established? Because the increasing of seeds (potential abilities) is how one obtains a 'name' (名, ming), therefore it is established. Undetermined (neither good nor bad) and innate good (善, shan), only the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra has them. If according to the diminishing of 'function' (用, yong), is the 'name' (名, ming) established? The 'essence' (體, ti) of the undetermined should be judged by mutual reference to determine 'established' (成, cheng) or 'not established' (不成, bu cheng). Those who have achieved self-mastery, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, if the good dharmas produced by effort (加行, jiaxing) and a portion of undetermined dharmas increase the seeds, it is called self-mastery achieved (自在成, zizai cheng). One can only obtain self-mastery through the power of effort. Also, achieving this state is called self-mastery, so these are said to be self-mastery achieved. The Abhidharma-samuccaya says that effort-based good dharmas refer to all merits of the mundane and supramundane realms, and a portion of undetermined dharmas refers to skillful arts (工巧處, gongqiao chu), transformation minds, etc. The word 'etc.' (等, deng) is to show that it includes dignified minds (威儀心, wei yi xin) and those who are extremely practiced (極串習者, ji chuanxi zhe). Only innate undetermined dharmas are excluded. If referring to the defiled dharmas in the Abhidharma-samuccaya, their effort-based good, whether 'essence' (體, ti) or 'function' (用, yong), also have 'established' (成, cheng) and 'not established' (不成, bu cheng). For example, cutting off the roots of good, the 'function' (用, yong) is not established; at the time of becoming a Buddha, the 'essence' (體, ti) is not established, because leaking dharmas have been abandoned. Undetermined dharmas also have 'established' (成, cheng) and 'not established' (不成, bu cheng) in terms of 'function' (用, yong), because of liberation from bondage, etc. If hoping to become a Buddha, there is also 'essence' (體, ti) that is not established, and the same is true for un-leaking seeds. 'Function' (用, yong) has 'established' (成, cheng) and 'not established' (不成, bu cheng), referring to obtaining the superior, abandoning the inferior, and losing the pleasant abiding in the present dharma (現法樂住, xian fa le zhu), etc., which are called 'not established' (不成, bu cheng). That which has already arisen and is currently functioning is called 'established' (成, cheng). The stage where un-leaking current functioning has not yet arisen is called 'not established' (不成, bu cheng). The later arising current functioning stage is called 'established' (成, cheng). Its 'essence' (體, ti) also has 'established' (成, cheng) and 'not established' (不成, bu cheng). If there is no seed, the name is not established; if there is a seed, the name is established. The names of all those who are determined for the Three Vehicles (聲聞乘, shengwen cheng; 緣覺乘, yuanjue cheng; 菩薩乘, pusa cheng) are established; that which is not present in each other is not established. Those who have achieved current functioning, the Abhidharma-samuccaya, etc., say that the aggregates (五蘊, wu yun), bases (十二處, shier chu), and realms (十八界, shiba jie), if they are good, unwholesome, or undetermined current functioning, are called current functioning achieved. If the seed is cut off or damaged, current functioning is also not achieved. When it arises, it is definitely called 'established' (成, cheng), and when it does not arise, it is called 'not established' (不成, bu cheng). The first two (seed achievement, self-mastery achievement) are only seeds, and this (current functioning achievement) is only current functioning. All three achievements are common to leaking dharmas. If it is an un-leaking dharma, there are only the latter two (self-mastery achievement, current functioning achievement). If it is the position of the Mahayana, the subduing and cutting off are different, as the Essential Instructions (樞要, shiyao) says. Question: Why...

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種分為二。現唯立一　答以種隱而難知離之為二。現行顯而易了合而爲一　又影顯故。

論。翻此假立不成就名。

述曰。此顯非得翻得而立非別有體。斷體斷善不成等皆此中攝。然今辨得聊以義門。一辨依處。今者通說依他．非情。自心變似皆自種子之所生起。通成他身。及非情法。不同小乘心外取法故。二辨差別直申正義。恐理不明。聊相對辨。薩婆多得依三種別。一屬所得謂有為得。二屬能得道。謂擇滅得。通有無漏。三屬所依。謂非擇得。屬所依眾同分也　今者大乘有為法得定屬所得。擇滅之得亦定屬道。然唯無漏　非擇滅得略有三種。一屬道。謂六行伏惑所得無為。非是擇滅。不斷種故。不屬所依。世道得故。二屬所依。所依謂第八識。如畢竟得非擇滅法。及佛身中邪理不生等。三屬種子。暫緣闕法。有種子在不屬所依故　或即屬所依。種子即本識故。非心緣證。亦不屬道。故但屬種。然通有漏及無漏法。三性別等如對法說　所非得法亦通一切。即前一切種子緣闕不生名非得故。非得唯有屬於所依。通有無漏。或屬種子。暫非得故。種猶有故。亦有義門。與小乘別。如余記說。不能繁述　所成就有三。所不成就亦爾。前說不成即三非得。

論。此類雖多至名異生性。

述曰。五十

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：種（bīja，種子，此處指事物生長的可能性）分為兩種。現在只說一種。 答：因為種是隱藏的，難以知道，所以分為兩種。現在所行的（事物）是顯現的，容易瞭解，所以合為一種。而且影（事物）是顯現的緣故。

論：翻譯這個假立（kalpita，虛構的）不成就（asiddha，未完成的）之名。

述曰：這表明並非通過翻譯才能獲得，並非通過建立而存在，並非是獨立存在的實體。斷體（dharma-kāya，法身）斷善（kuśala，善行）不成等都包含在這裡面。然而，現在辨別獲得，姑且用義門（artha-dvāra，意義之門）來解釋。 一、辨別所依之處。現在普遍來說，依他（paratantra，依他起性）、非情（無情）。自心變現的都像是自身種子所生起。普遍成就他身（para-kāya，其他眾生的身體）以及非情之法。不同於小乘（Hinayana），在心外取法。 二、辨別差別，直接闡述正義。恐怕道理不明白，姑且相對辨別。薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）的得（prāpti，獲得）依據三種差別：一是屬於所得，指有為得（saṃskṛta-prāpti，有為法的獲得）；二是屬於能得之道，指擇滅得（pratisamkhyā-nirodha-prāpti，通過智慧選擇而獲得的滅）；普遍具有有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱的）和無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱的）。三是屬於所依，指非擇滅得（apratisamkhyā-nirodha-prāpti，非通過智慧選擇而獲得的滅），屬於所依的眾同分（nikāya-sabhāgatā，同類眾生的共性）。 現在大乘（Mahāyāna）有為法得一定屬於所得。擇滅的獲得也一定屬於道，然而唯有無漏。 非擇滅得略有三種：一是屬於道，指通過六行（ṣaḍ-ākāra，六種行相）伏惑（kleśa，煩惱）所獲得的無為（asaṃskṛta，無為法），不是擇滅，因為沒有斷除種子，不屬於所依，因為是世間道所獲得的。二是屬於所依，所依指的是第八識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識），例如畢竟得（atyanta-prāpti，究竟獲得）非擇滅法，以及佛身中邪理不生等。三是屬於種子，暫時缺少因緣的法，有種子存在，不屬於所依的緣故。 或者就屬於所依，因為種子就是本識（mūla-vijñāna，根本識）。不是心緣證，也不屬於道，所以只屬於種。然而普遍具有有漏和無漏法，三性別等如同《對法》（Abhidharma）中所說。所非得法（aprāpti，未獲得）也普遍包括一切，就是之前一切種子缺少因緣而不生，名為非得的緣故。非得唯有屬於所依，普遍具有有漏和無漏，或者屬於種子，因為暫時沒有獲得，種子仍然存在。也有義門，與小乘不同，如同其他記錄所說，不能繁瑣地敘述。所成就（siddha，已完成的）有三種，所不成就也是如此。前面說的不成就是三種非得。

論：此類雖然很多，直到名為異生性（pṛthag-jana-tva，凡夫性）。

述曰：五十

【English Translation】 English version: Question: 'Seed' (bīja, meaning seed, here referring to the potential for things to grow) is divided into two types. Now, only one is discussed. Answer: Because the 'seed' is hidden and difficult to know, it is divided into two. What is currently being practiced (things) is manifest and easy to understand, so it is combined into one. Moreover, the 'shadow' (things) is manifest, hence.

Treatise: Translating this name of falsely established (kalpita, fabricated) non-accomplishment (asiddha, unaccomplished).

Commentary: This shows that it is not obtained through translation, nor does it exist through establishment, nor is it a separate entity. The severance of the 'Dharma-kāya' (dharma-kāya, body of the Dharma), the severance of 'wholesome deeds' (kuśala, virtuous actions), non-accomplishment, etc., are all included here. However, now distinguishing 'attainment', let's tentatively explain it using the 'gate of meaning' (artha-dvāra, gate of meaning). First, distinguishing the place of reliance. Now, generally speaking, it relies on 'other-dependent' (paratantra, other-powered nature), and 'non-sentient' (inanimate). The transformations of one's own mind all seem to arise from one's own seeds. It universally accomplishes the 'bodies of others' (para-kāya, bodies of other beings) as well as non-sentient dharmas. This is different from the 'Hinayana' (Hinayana), which takes dharmas outside the mind. Second, distinguishing the differences, directly expounding the correct meaning. Fearing that the principle is not clear, let's tentatively distinguish them relatively. The 'Sarvāstivāda' (Sarvāstivāda, the 'Everything Exists' school) 'attainment' (prāpti, attainment) is based on three distinctions: First, it belongs to what is attained, referring to 'conditioned attainment' (saṃskṛta-prāpti, attainment of conditioned dharmas); second, it belongs to the path of what can be attained, referring to 'cessation through discrimination' (pratisamkhyā-nirodha-prāpti, cessation attained through wisdom); it universally possesses 'defiled' (sāsrava, with afflictions) and 'undefiled' (anāsrava, without afflictions). Third, it belongs to what is relied upon, referring to 'cessation not through discrimination' (apratisamkhyā-nirodha-prāpti, cessation not attained through wisdom), belonging to the 'commonality of kind' (nikāya-sabhāgatā, commonality of kind) of what is relied upon. Now, in 'Mahāyāna' (Mahāyāna), the 'conditioned attainment' of conditioned dharmas certainly belongs to what is attained. The attainment of 'cessation through discrimination' also certainly belongs to the path, but only the undefiled. 'Cessation not through discrimination' has roughly three types: First, it belongs to the path, referring to the 'unconditioned' (asaṃskṛta, unconditioned dharma) attained through subduing afflictions (kleśa, afflictions) by the 'six aspects' (ṣaḍ-ākāra, six aspects), it is not 'cessation through discrimination' because it does not sever the seeds, it does not belong to what is relied upon because it is attained through worldly paths. Second, it belongs to what is relied upon, what is relied upon refers to the 'eighth consciousness' (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness), such as 'ultimate attainment' (atyanta-prāpti, ultimate attainment) of 'cessation not through discrimination', and the non-arising of wrong views in the Buddha's body, etc. Third, it belongs to the seeds, dharmas that temporarily lack conditions, the seeds exist, therefore it does not belong to what is relied upon. Or it belongs to what is relied upon, because the seeds are the 'fundamental consciousness' (mūla-vijñāna, root consciousness). It is not verified by the mind, nor does it belong to the path, so it only belongs to the seeds. However, it universally possesses defiled and undefiled dharmas, the three natures, etc., as described in the 'Abhidharma' (Abhidharma). 'Non-attainment' (aprāpti, non-attainment) also universally includes everything, that is, all the previous seeds lack conditions and do not arise, hence it is called non-attainment. Non-attainment only belongs to what is relied upon, universally possessing defiled and undefiled, or it belongs to the seeds, because it is temporarily not attained, the seeds still exist. There is also a gate of meaning, different from the 'Hinayana', as described in other records, which cannot be elaborately narrated. 'Accomplishment' (siddha, accomplished) has three types, and non-accomplishment is also the same. The previously mentioned non-accomplishment is the three types of non-attainment.

Treatise: Although there are many of this kind, up to the name 'nature of an ordinary being' (pṛthag-jana-tva, nature of an ordinary being).

Commentary: Fifty

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二說三界見所斷種子。唯未永害量名異生性。即通二障不善．無記二法之上假施設之。異生性者。或五四蘊成有情法。性唯染污。異生之性名異生性故。異有二義。一別異名異。謂聖唯生人天趣。此通五趣故。又變異名異。此轉變為邪見等故。生謂生類。異聖人之生類名為異生。生者是總。性者是別。異生之性。並依主釋。以變異名異。聖非異生。又如婆沙廣解名字。

論。于諸聖法未成就故。

述曰。釋其所以。唯依見斷種子上立。此有四種。一無種姓。乃至第四如來種姓之所隨逐。隨所有姓二障種子即建立之。不唯約能障上立。無種姓人無別障故。應言未得見道二障上立。二乘斷一分。名一分聖。俱句攝故。此等諸門及釋難。如下第九十障中解。

論。復如何知至有實同分。

述曰。初問有由。次彼部答。

論。契經說故至乃至廣說。

述曰。外人引經。

次論主非。

論。此經不說至為證不成。

述曰。經明不說別有自體。即依色．心之上說天人同分。故證不成。

論。若同智言至知實有者。

述曰。下有三難。初內外相同難。此牒外救。若無別實眾同分者。即緣界．趣。及四生等。同言同智應不得生。以無能同相似法故。無不生心。要

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 其次，關於三界（Trailokya）見所斷的種子（seed）。只有尚未完全斷除的，才被稱作『異生性』（prthag-janatva），這個『異生性』實際上是安立在不善和無記這兩種法之上的一種假名施設，並且貫通煩惱障（klesavarana）和所知障（jneyavarana）這二障。所謂的『異生性』，或者說是五蘊（panca-skandha）、四蘊（catur-skandha）所成就的有情法，其性質唯是染污的。因為是『異生』的性質，所以名為『異生性』。『異』有二個含義：一是差別不同，名為『異』，聖者只生於人天趣（manusya-devaloka），而異生則通於五趣（panca-gati）；二是變異，名為『異』，因為異生會轉變為邪見等。『生』是指生類，不同於聖人的生類，就叫做『異生』。『生』是總稱，『性』是別稱，『異生之性』是依主釋（tatpurusa）。以變異為『異』，聖者不是異生。又如《婆沙論》（Vibhasa）中廣泛解釋這個名字。

論：因為對於諸聖法（arya-dharma）尚未成就的緣故。

述曰：解釋其原因。唯獨依據見所斷的種子上安立。這有四種情況：一、無種姓（agotrika）；乃至第四、如來種姓（tathagata-gotra）之所隨逐。隨其所有的種姓，二障的種子就依之建立。不是僅僅在能障礙之上安立，因為無種姓的人沒有別的障礙。應該說是在未得見道（darshana-marga）的二障上安立。二乘（sravaka-yana, pratyeka-buddha-yana）斷一分，名為一分聖。俱句所攝故。這些門類以及解釋疑難，在下文第九十障中解釋。

論：又如何得知眾同分（nikayasabhaga）真實存在？

述曰：首先提出疑問，其次是彼部回答。

論：因為契經（sutra）這樣說……乃至廣說。

述曰：外人引用經典。

接下來是論主破斥。

論：此經沒有說……所以不能作為證據。

述曰：經文表明沒有單獨的自體，而是依據色（rupa）、心（citta）之上說天人同分，所以不能作為證據。

論：如果相同的智（jnana）……知道真實存在？

述曰：下面有三個難點。首先是內外相同的難點。這裡是外人的辯解。如果沒有別的真實的眾同分，那麼緣于界（dhatu）、趣（gati）以及四生（catasro yonayah）等，相同的語言和相同的智慧應該不能產生。因為沒有能夠相同相似的法，就不會產生心。

【English Translation】 English version Secondly, regarding the seeds (bija) of what is severed by seeing (darshana-heya) in the Three Realms (Trailokya). Only what has not been completely eradicated is called 'the nature of an ordinary being' (prthag-janatva), which is actually a provisional designation established upon the two types of phenomena, unwholesome (akushala) and indeterminate (avyakrita), and it pervades both the afflictive obscuration (klesavarana) and the cognitive obscuration (jneyavarana). The so-called 'nature of an ordinary being' is either the aggregates of five (panca-skandha) or the aggregates of four (catur-skandha) that constitute sentient beings (sattva), and its nature is solely defiled (samklista). Because it is the nature of an 'ordinary being', it is called 'the nature of an ordinary being'. 'Different' (prthag) has two meanings: first, difference, called 'different', as the noble ones (arya) are only born in the realms of humans and gods (manusya-devaloka), while ordinary beings pervade the five realms (panca-gati); second, change, called 'different', because ordinary beings transform into wrong views (mithya-drsti) and so on. 'Being' (jana) refers to the class of beings, and what is different from the class of beings of the noble ones is called 'ordinary being'. 'Being' is the general term, and 'nature' is the specific term. 'The nature of an ordinary being' is a possessive compound (tatpurusa). 'Different' means change, and the noble ones are not ordinary beings. Furthermore, as in the Vibhasa, the name is extensively explained.

Treatise: Because they have not achieved the noble dharmas (arya-dharma).

Commentary: Explains the reason. It is established solely based on the seeds severed by seeing. There are four cases: first, those without the potential (agotrika); up to the fourth, those who are followed by the Tathagata-nature (tathagata-gotra). According to the potential they possess, the seeds of the two obscurations are established accordingly. It is not established solely on what can obstruct, because those without the potential have no other obstructions. It should be said that it is established on the two obscurations before attaining the path of seeing (darshana-marga). The two vehicles (sravaka-yana, pratyeka-buddha-yana) sever a portion, and are called a portion of noble ones. Because it is included in the conjunctive phrase. These categories and explanations of difficulties are explained in the ninetieth obscuration below.

Treatise: Furthermore, how do we know that the commonality of beings (nikayasabhaga) truly exists?

Commentary: First, the question is raised, and then the other school answers.

Treatise: Because the sutra (sutra) says... and so on, extensively.

Commentary: Outsiders quote the sutra.

Next, the treatise master refutes it.

Treatise: This sutra does not say... therefore, it cannot be used as evidence.

Commentary: The sutra clarifies that there is no separate self-nature, but rather it speaks of the commonality of gods and humans based on form (rupa) and mind (citta), so it cannot be used as evidence.

Treatise: If the same wisdom (jnana)... knows that it truly exists?

Commentary: Below are three difficulties. First, the difficulty of internal and external sameness. Here is the outsider's defense. If there is no separate real commonality of beings, then the same language and the same wisdom should not arise from the realms (dhatu), destinies (gati), and the four births (catasro yonayah). Because there is no similar dharma that can be the same, the mind will not arise.

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緣有故。

論。則草木等應有同分。

述曰。論主難云。則草木緣之。亦起同言同智。應別有同分。草等既無。人等應不有。量云。汝宗草等。應有別同分。起同言．智故。許如人天等　又應天人等。無別實同分。起同言智故。如草木等　有何所以不許彼有耶　彼若救言。如趣生體唯內有情有。而外無情無。同分類應爾。非外皆應有。若六足．對法文無法同分。唯俱舍．順正理師立　今難俱舍等曰。趣等唯業果。外法可言無。同分許非唯業果。何妨外法有同分。如異熟色外法可無。若等流色外非不有。若言外法無樂欲故即無同分。無樂欲故應無生等。若言有為法故有生等者。即相似法故應有同分。若言同分樂欲之因。同分無故亦無樂欲。樂欲無故亦無同分。應唯說有有情同分。應不與一切相似法為因。又趣是趣向。外法可非趣。不以趣向解同分。何得如趣外法無。相似法上有同分故。此難古薩婆多師。更有餘難準生為之　又汝自言起言．智故有此同分。即外法非無。前後雖欲分疏。實為難解也。故此同分應亦非情有。此設外救出自論文。復為徴逐文外意也。請審詳之。

論。又于同分至有別同分。

述曰。此下第二能所無差難。若以於法起同言．智。便別有體者。同分亦起同言．智。應別有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 緣有故。

論：如果這樣，那麼草木等也應該有同分（sabhāga, 類別相同）。

述曰：論主提出疑問說，如果草木也因為緣而生起相同的語言和智慧，那麼應該另外有同分。草木等既然沒有同分，那麼人等就不應該有同分。可以這樣推論：按照你們的宗義，草木等應該有另外的同分，因為它們生起相同的語言和智慧。如果你們承認這一點，就如同承認人天等有同分一樣。又，應該說天人等沒有另外真實的同分，因為他們生起相同的語言和智慧，如同草木等一樣。有什麼理由不允許草木等有同分呢？如果他們辯解說，如同趣生（gati-utpāda, 投生）的自體只有內在的有情才有，而外在的無情沒有，同分也應該如此，並非外在的一切都應該有。如果按照《六足論》和《對法論》的說法，沒有法的同分，只有《俱舍論》和《順正理論》的論師才立同分。現在反駁《俱舍論》等：趣等只是業果，外在的法可以說沒有，但同分並非僅僅是業果，為什麼妨礙外在的法有同分呢？如同異熟色（vipāka-rūpa, 異熟所生的色法）外在的法可以沒有，但等流色（niṣyanda-rūpa, 等流所生的色法）外在並非沒有。如果說外在的法沒有樂欲（chandas, 意欲），所以就沒有同分，那麼沒有樂欲就應該沒有生等。如果說因為是有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma, 有生滅變化的法），所以有生等，那麼因為是相似的法，就應該有同分。如果說同分是樂欲的原因，因為沒有同分，所以也沒有樂欲，因為沒有樂欲，所以也沒有同分，那麼應該只說有有情的同分，不應該與一切相似的法作為原因。而且，趣是趣向，外在的法可以不是趣向，不以趣向來解釋同分，怎麼能像趣一樣外在的法就沒有呢？因為相似的法上有同分。這是對古薩婆多（古老的說一切有部）師的駁難。還有其他的駁難，可以類推。又，你們自己說因為生起語言和智慧，所以有這個同分，那麼外在的法並非沒有。前後雖然想要區分，實際上難以理解。所以這個同分也應該並非有情才有。這裡假設外在的救護出自論文，又爲了徵求追逐文外的意思，請仔細審察。

論：又，對於同分，乃至有另外的同分。

述曰：這以下是第二個能所（能取和所取）沒有差別的駁難。如果因為對於法生起相同的語言和智慧，就另外有自體，那麼同分也生起相同的語言和智慧，應該另外有同分。

【English Translation】 English version The reason exists.

Treatise: Then plants and trees, etc., should have a commonality (sabhāga).

Commentary: The treatise master raises the question: If plants and trees also give rise to the same speech and wisdom due to conditions, then there should be a separate commonality. Since plants, etc., do not have a commonality, then humans, etc., should not have it either. It can be inferred as follows: According to your doctrine, plants, etc., should have a separate commonality because they give rise to the same speech and wisdom. If you admit this, it is like admitting that humans, gods, etc., have a commonality. Furthermore, it should be said that gods, humans, etc., do not have a separate real commonality because they give rise to the same speech and wisdom, just like plants and trees, etc. What reason is there for not allowing plants, etc., to have a commonality? If they argue that, like the nature of rebirth (gati-utpāda), only sentient beings have it internally, while external non-sentient beings do not, the commonality should be the same; not everything external should have it. If according to the Jñānaprasthāna and Dharmaskandha, there is no commonality of dharma, only the masters of the Abhidharmakośa and Nyāyānusāra establish commonality. Now, refuting the Kośa, etc.: Rebirth, etc., are merely karmic results; external dharmas can be said to not exist. However, commonality is not merely karmic results; what prevents external dharmas from having commonality? Just as the resultant form (vipāka-rūpa) can be absent in external dharmas, the outflow form (niṣyanda-rūpa) is not absent externally. If it is said that external dharmas lack desire (chandas), so they lack commonality, then lacking desire should mean lacking birth, etc. If it is said that because they are conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta-dharma), they have birth, etc., then because they are similar dharmas, they should have commonality. If it is said that commonality is the cause of desire, and because there is no commonality, there is no desire, and because there is no desire, there is no commonality, then it should only be said that there is commonality of sentient beings, and it should not be the cause of all similar dharmas. Moreover, rebirth is directed; external dharmas may not be directed. Not explaining commonality in terms of direction, how can external dharmas be said to not exist like rebirth? Because there is commonality on similar dharmas. This is a refutation of the ancient Sarvāstivāda masters. There are other refutations that can be inferred analogously. Furthermore, you yourselves say that because speech and wisdom arise, there is this commonality; then external dharmas are not non-existent. Although there is an attempt to distinguish between before and after, it is actually difficult to understand. Therefore, this commonality should not only be for sentient beings. Here, assuming external protection comes from the treatise, it is also to seek and pursue the meaning outside the text; please examine it carefully.

Treatise: Moreover, regarding commonality, even to have a separate commonality.

Commentary: Below is the second refutation that there is no difference between the grasper and the grasped. If because the same speech and wisdom arise regarding a dharma, there is a separate entity, then commonality also gives rise to the same speech and wisdom; there should be a separate commonality.

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同分。彼說同分更無同分。此相似法雲何乃然。量中翻覆皆應準知。然彼救言。如所造是色為四大種所造。大種雖是色。更非他所造。同分亦然。體為能同不假他同。此義失宗。若以造故名為色。四大無能造。故可名非色。但以變礙名為色。何得如同分。相似法上有同分故　又不然。大種有勝功能。稱大而是種。更無大故。不為他所造。同分更無有勝能。然體既非一。復起同言．智。與法既不殊。何為無同分　又體是能同故。更無別同分。亦應體是能生故。更無別物生。生體是能生。更為生所生。同分是同他。更應為他同。汝以大大返徴。我以生生卻逐。設欲翻其勝論尚自難知。何況許有同分實。而自墜耳。

論。彼既不爾此云何然。

述曰。彼同分既無同分不爾。此法何為許然有。

論。若謂為因至知實有者。

述曰。下第三宿因非假難。此牒正理師救。由同分為因。起同事同欲故。

論。理亦不然至有實同分。

述曰。若爾即應唯與事業及欲同爲同分。不與眼等色．聲．觸等相似法為其同分。若許事．欲外亦與為因。但內相似皆有因者。即應外法色等相似應類亦有同分。量云。汝外相似色處法上。應有同分。色處攝故。如內色處　如此徴逐亦順其理。又以理說。無始宿習為

因。於今事業起同事．欲。何要別執有實同分。

論。然依有情至假立同分。

述曰。申正義也。眾者種類義。如婆羅門等。同是一義。同是一婆羅門故。分者相似義。同雖通能所。今屬能同。眾之同分。依士釋也。不同小乘。彼別有體。分是因義。眾同之分故。今則不然。不在外法內外異故　然大論等中。唯趣生上立彼同分。諸論不說外法之上亦立同分。以理而言外有亦好。教中且說勝所依處。非外無也。俱舍．經部然即許之。設立外法有。亦無過失。今且依有情內法上立。如對法抄。及樞要說。

次第三破命根。

論。復如何知至有實命根。

述曰。此問外人。

論。契經說故至說名為壽。

述曰。薩婆多師等引經為證。即諸論云壽．暖及與識。三法捨身時頌。應知命根說名為壽。命根解釋雖多。正義唯在於此。命謂色心不斷。是命之根　或命者第八識。以情為命也。

論。此經不說至為證不成。

述曰。此論主責。非說異色等有實體故。非證實有。

論。又先已成至無別命根。

述曰。此即第一離識無別難。汝說命根。非離於識實有。壽．暖．及識三法攝故。如暖　暖是色法。前破色中說不離識故今為喻。不爾喻中所立不成。此中色不離

【現代漢語翻譯】 因：如果現在事業的興起是共同作用的結果，為什麼還要特別執著于存在一個真實的『同分』（Sabhāgatā，共同性）呢？

論：然而，是根據有情眾生的存在而假立『同分』的。

述曰：這是爲了闡明正義。『眾』指的是種類，例如婆羅門等，他們共同具有一個意義，因為他們同屬於一個婆羅門。『分』指的是相似性。『同』既可以指能同，也可以指所同，這裡指的是能同。『眾之同分』，是依士釋。這與小乘不同，小乘認為『同分』是獨立存在的實體。『分』是原因的意思，是眾生共同的原因。但現在不是這樣，『同分』不在外法，因為內外是不同的。然而，在《大論》等中，只在趣生之上建立『同分』。許多論典沒有說在外法之上也建立『同分』。從道理上講，外法之上建立『同分』也可以。教義中且說殊勝的所依之處，並非說外法沒有『同分』。《俱舍論》、《經部》等認可這一點，設立外法有『同分』也沒有過失。現在且依據有情內法之上建立『同分』，如《對法抄》及《樞要》所說。

其次，依次破斥『命根』（Jīvitindriya，生命力）。

論：又如何知道存在真實的『命根』呢？

述曰：這是詢問外道。

論：因為契經中說：『壽』（Āyus，壽命）、『暖』（Usma，體溫）和『識』（Vijñāna，意識）被稱為『壽』。

述曰：薩婆多師等引用經典作為證據，也就是諸論中所說的『壽、暖及與識，三法捨身時』的偈頌。應該知道『命根』被稱為『壽』。對『命根』的解釋有很多，但正義只在於此：『命』指的是色法和心法的不間斷，這是『命』的根源。或者，『命』指的是第八識（Ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識），因為有情以『識』為生命。

論：這部經並沒有說異於色法等存在實體，因此不能作為證據。

述曰：這是論主的責難，因為經中並沒有說異於色法等存在實體，因此不能證實『命根』的存在。

論：而且，先前已經成立沒有與『識』不同的『命根』。

述曰：這是第一個『離識無別』的難點。你說『命根』不是獨立於『識』而真實存在的，因為『壽、暖、及識』這三種法已經包含了它，就像『暖』一樣。『暖』是色法，前面在破斥色法時已經說過它不離於『識』，所以現在用它來作比喻。否則，比喻中所立的觀點就不能成立。這裡說的色法不離於識。

【English Translation】 Question: If the arising of present activities is the result of joint effort, why insist on a real 'Sabhāgatā' (commonality)?

Treatise: However, 'Sabhāgatā' is provisionally established based on the existence of sentient beings.

Commentary: This is to clarify the correct meaning. 'Group' (眾) refers to categories, such as Brahmins, who share a common meaning because they belong to the same Brahmin. 'Share' (分) refers to similarity. 'Common' (同) can refer to both the agent and the object of commonality, but here it refers to the agent. 'Commonality of the group' (眾之同分) is interpreted according to the agent. This differs from the Hinayana, which considers 'Sabhāgatā' to be an independent entity. 'Share' (分) means cause, the common cause of beings. But this is not the case now; 'Sabhāgatā' is not in external dharmas because internal and external are different. However, in treatises like the 'Great Treatise,' 'Sabhāgatā' is only established on the realm of sentient beings. Many treatises do not say that 'Sabhāgatā' is also established on external dharmas. Logically speaking, it is also good to establish 'Sabhāgatā' on external dharmas. The teachings only mention the superior basis, not that external dharmas lack 'Sabhāgatā.' The 'Abhidharmakośa' and 'Sautrāntika' schools recognize this, and there is no fault in establishing 'Sabhāgatā' on external dharmas. Now, we provisionally establish 'Sabhāgatā' based on the internal dharmas of sentient beings, as stated in the 'Commentary on the Abhidharma' and 'Essentials.'

Next, refute the 'Jīvitindriya' (life faculty) in order.

Treatise: How do we know that a real 'Jīvitindriya' exists?

Commentary: This is asking the non-Buddhists.

Treatise: Because the sutras say: 'Āyus' (lifespan), 'Usma' (warmth), and 'Vijñāna' (consciousness) are called 'lifespan.'

Commentary: The Sarvāstivādins and others cite the sutras as evidence, namely the verse in the treatises: 'Lifespan, warmth, and consciousness, these three dharmas are abandoned when the body is relinquished.' It should be known that 'Jīvitindriya' is called 'lifespan.' There are many explanations of 'Jīvitindriya,' but the correct meaning is only this: 'Life' refers to the uninterrupted continuity of form and mind; this is the root of 'life.' Alternatively, 'life' refers to the eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna), because sentient beings take 'consciousness' as life.

Treatise: This sutra does not say that there is an entity different from form, etc., so it cannot be used as evidence.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's criticism, because the sutra does not say that there is an entity different from form, etc., so it cannot prove the existence of 'Jīvitindriya.'

Treatise: Moreover, it has already been established that there is no 'Jīvitindriya' different from 'consciousness.'

Commentary: This is the first difficulty of 'no difference from consciousness.' You say that 'Jīvitindriya' does not exist independently of 'consciousness,' because the three dharmas of 'lifespan, warmth, and consciousness' already include it, just like 'warmth.' 'Warmth' is a form, and it has been said before in the refutation of form that it is inseparable from 'consciousness,' so it is now used as a metaphor. Otherwise, the view established in the metaphor cannot be established. The form mentioned here is inseparable from consciousness.

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識言。即通總別。總取一切色為喻亦得。別取暖為喻亦得。故不別言暖。恐失總故。

論。又若命根至非實命根。

述曰。此中第二如受非根難。量云。汝所言命根。非實命根。許異識實有故。如受．想等　自命根假無違宗失。薩婆多師以命能持身。唯業能持命　如經部等無命根者。不然。即入無心定無物持身。及無色界生。起不同分心。無漏心等。便非彼趣。無假命根所依等故。薩婆多以命能持故。即無前過者。今立量云。又汝命根。不能持身。以非心故。如色　以眾同分前已破故無不定過。又不爾者並取同分及命根皆不能持。和合名宗。又入無心定時既令無心。如何有命。量云。汝入無心定等時。應無實命根。此中等言等取無想異熟。彼睡眠．悶絕二位並有心故。但等一也。以無心故。如死屍等。或樹木等。故知無心定等中定識不離故是有情數。有情數為比量如下文可知。又命根鬚何法持。即言是業。若爾此業足持果法。何假命根。量云。除命根外余異熟法。應實命根不能持之唯業能持。宗也。業所招故。因如汝命根。喻。若言以暖．識間斷故不然者。更立量云。汝命根。不能持身。以非心故。如色等。又對經部師。眼等不能持種。入無色時舍故。阿賴耶識入無心時不捨。能持種等。不可為例。

【現代漢語翻譯】 識（vijñāna，意識）。即通總別（總相和別相）。總取一切色（rūpa，物質）為喻亦得。別取暖為喻亦得。故不別言暖。恐失總故。 論。又若命根（jīvitindriya，命根）至非實命根。 述曰。此中第二如受非根難。量云。汝所言命根。非實命根。許異識實有故。如受（vedanā，感受）、想（saṃjñā，知覺）等。自命根假無違宗失。薩婆多師（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）以命能持身。唯業（karma，業力）能持命。如經部（Sautrāntika，經量部）等無命根者。不然。即入無心定（asaṃjñā-samāpatti，無想定）無物持身。及無**生。起不同分心。無漏心等。便非彼趣。無假命根所依等故。薩婆多以命能持故。即無前過者。今立量云。又汝命根。不能持身。以非心故。如色。以眾同分前已破故無不定過。又不爾者並取同分及命根皆不能持。和合名宗。又入無心定時既令無心。如何有命。量云。汝入無心定等時。應無實命根。此中等言等取無想異熟。彼睡眠、悶絕二位並有心故。但等一也。以無心故。如死屍等。或樹木等。故知無心定等中定識不離故是有情數。有情數為比量如下文可知。又命根鬚何法持。即言是業。若爾此業足持果法。何假命根。量云。除命根外余異熟法。應實命根不能持之唯業能持。宗也。業所招故。因如汝命根。喻。若言以暖、識間斷故不然者。更立量云。汝命根。不能持身。以非心故。如色等。又對經部師。眼等不能持種。入無色時舍故。阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）入無心時不捨。能持種等。不可為例。

【English Translation】 Modern Chinese version: 識 (shì) (vijñāna, consciousness). It encompasses both general (zǒng) and specific (bié) aspects. Generally, one can use all forms (sè) (rūpa, matter) as an analogy. Specifically, one can use warmth as an analogy. Therefore, warmth is not mentioned separately, lest the general aspect be lost. Treatise: Furthermore, if the life faculty (mìng gēn) (jīvitindriya, life faculty) extends to not being a real life faculty... Commentary: Here, the second point is a difficulty similar to 'feeling is not a faculty'. The argument goes: What you call the life faculty is not a real life faculty, because you admit that distinct consciousnesses exist as real, like feeling (shòu) (vedanā, sensation), perception (xiǎng) (saṃjñā, perception), etc. The assumption that the life faculty is unreal contradicts the established doctrine. The Sarvāstivāda (sà pó duō shī) (Sarvāstivāda, the 'All Exists' school) asserts that life sustains the body, and only karma (yè) (karma, action) sustains life. Those who deny the life faculty, such as the Sautrāntika (jīng bù) (Sautrāntika, the 'Sutra school'), are incorrect. When entering the state of non-perception (rù wú xīn dìng) (asaṃjñā-samāpatti, cessation of perception), there is nothing sustaining the body, and there is no birth. The arising of minds with different functions, such as undefiled minds, would not align with their view, because there is no basis for a false life faculty. The Sarvāstivāda's claim that life sustains, thus avoiding the previous fault, can be countered with the following argument: Your life faculty cannot sustain the body because it is not mind, like form. Since the shared characteristics have been refuted earlier, there is no uncertain fault. If not, then both the shared characteristics and the life faculty cannot sustain. Their combination is the thesis. Furthermore, when entering the state of non-perception, since the mind is absent, how can there be life? The argument goes: When you enter the state of non-perception, there should be no real life faculty. The 'etc.' here includes the fruition of non-perception. The states of sleep and fainting still have mind, so only one is included. Because there is no mind, like a corpse or a tree. Therefore, it is known that in the state of non-perception, the fixed consciousness does not depart, so it is counted among sentient beings. The argument for sentient beings is knowable from the following text. Furthermore, what dharma sustains the life faculty? It is said to be karma. If so, this karma is sufficient to sustain the resultant dharma, so why posit a life faculty? The argument goes: Apart from the life faculty, other resultant dharmas should be sustained only by karma, not by the real life faculty. This is the thesis. Because it is caused by karma. The reason is like your life faculty. The analogy. If it is said that it is not so because warmth and consciousness are intermittent, then another argument is established: Your life faculty cannot sustain the body because it is not mind, like form, etc. Furthermore, against the Sautrāntika teacher, the eye, etc., cannot sustain the seed, because they are abandoned when entering the formless realm. The storehouse consciousness (ā lài yé shí) (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness) is not abandoned when entering the state of non-perception. It can sustain the seed, etc., so it cannot be taken as an example. English version: 識 (Vijñāna, Consciousness). It encompasses both general (totality) and specific (particularity) aspects. Generally, one can use all forms (色) (Rūpa, Matter) as an analogy. Specifically, one can use warmth as an analogy. Therefore, warmth is not mentioned separately, lest the general aspect be lost. Treatise: Furthermore, if the life faculty (命根) (Jīvitindriya, Life Faculty) extends to not being a real life faculty... Commentary: Here, the second point is a difficulty similar to 'feeling is not a faculty'. The argument goes: What you call the life faculty is not a real life faculty, because you admit that distinct consciousnesses exist as real, like feeling (受) (Vedanā, Sensation), perception (想) (Saṃjñā, Perception), etc. The assumption that the life faculty is unreal contradicts the established doctrine. The Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多師) (Sarvāstivāda, the 'All Exists' school) asserts that life sustains the body, and only karma (業) (Karma, Action) sustains life. Those who deny the life faculty, such as the Sautrāntika (經部) (Sautrāntika, the 'Sutra school'), are incorrect. When entering the state of non-perception (入無心定) (Asaṃjñā-samāpatti, Cessation of Perception), there is nothing sustaining the body, and there is no birth. The arising of minds with different functions, such as undefiled minds, would not align with their view, because there is no basis for a false life faculty. The Sarvāstivāda's claim that life sustains, thus avoiding the previous fault, can be countered with the following argument: Your life faculty cannot sustain the body because it is not mind, like form. Since the shared characteristics have been refuted earlier, there is no uncertain fault. If not, then both the shared characteristics and the life faculty cannot sustain. Their combination is the thesis. Furthermore, when entering the state of non-perception, since the mind is absent, how can there be life? The argument goes: When you enter the state of non-perception, there should be no real life faculty. The 'etc.' here includes the fruition of non-perception. The states of sleep and fainting still have mind, so only one is included. Because there is no mind, like a corpse or a tree. Therefore, it is known that in the state of non-perception, the fixed consciousness does not depart, so it is counted among sentient beings. The argument for sentient beings is knowable from the following text. Furthermore, what dharma sustains the life faculty? It is said to be karma. If so, this karma is sufficient to sustain the resultant dharma, so why posit a life faculty? The argument goes: Apart from the life faculty, other resultant dharmas should be sustained only by karma, not by the real life faculty. This is the thesis. Because it is caused by karma. The reason is like your life faculty. The analogy. If it is said that it is not so because warmth and consciousness are intermittent, then another argument is established: Your life faculty cannot sustain the body because it is not mind, like form, etc. Furthermore, against the Sautrāntika teacher, the eye, etc., cannot sustain the seed, because they are abandoned when entering the formless realm. The storehouse consciousness (阿賴耶識) (Ālayavijñāna, Storehouse Consciousness) is not abandoned when entering the state of non-perception. It can sustain the seed, etc., so it cannot be taken as an example.

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論。若爾如何經說三法。

述曰。下文第三假為他詰難。于中有六。外人云。若言壽體即識性故。經言三法。

三法者何。

論。義別說三如四正斷。

述曰。此論主答。但是一識義別說三。謂阿賴耶識相分色法身根所得名暖。此識之種名壽。以能持識故。現行識是識。故言三法義別說之。非謂別有體性。是則身舍暖時。有餘二不捨。如無色界生。餘二舍時暖必隨舍。故言三法捨身時等。然今此三約義別說。但是一體。如四正斷。四正斷約已生未生善惡二法義別說四。體但是一精進數也。

論。住無心位壽暖應無。

述曰。此外人云。若壽．暖體即是識者。入無心位識已舍故壽暖應無。

論。豈不經說識不離身。

述曰。此論主答。識不離身。明亦有餘二。非我宗中許無心定而無有識。

論。既爾如何名無心位。

述曰。此外人問。

論。彼滅轉識非阿賴耶。

述曰。此論主答。言無心者。彼滅或六或七轉識。非阿賴耶。此恒有故。所以有暖．壽。

外人問曰。何知此位有此識也。

論。有此識因后當廣說。

述曰。下第三卷自廣說也。正理師云。若無命根誰為界．趣．生之體。于無色界起不同分心。及無漏心。

于下二界入無心定。誰能持身。識．暖不恒故。入無心位壽．暖有。三是一體亦有識。入無色位色皆無。三體既一應有暖　無色厭暖色。有識即無暖。無心不厭于細心。所以亦有識。其義應思。

論。此識足為至有實命根。

述曰。遍簡色及五識。不遍三界故。恒續簡第六識。異熟簡第七。此阿賴耶識足為界．趣．生體。是遍三界一切位中。及不斷。恒相續。復是引業。真異熟果。余法雖亦屬界．趣．生。非真異熟。故汝無勞別執有實命根。界雖亦通余法。此是真實界體故也。

外人問曰。前言識種即是命根。何義名根。

論。然依親生至假立命根。

述曰。此中義意。但依本識自體分種。今論主言。依者顯體是假依實上立。依謂所依。親者即簡異熟因。雖生此識是增上緣。非親生故。此中據名言種為因緣。親生此識種子者是。言生者簡名言之種身中。極多非業所牽。不能親為因緣生於今識。今取生者簡去不生。言此者簡親生余識種子。言識者簡相應法種。唯取識種故。言種者簡現行。不取第八現行為命根故。彼所簡者皆非命根。今取親生之名言種上。由先世業所引持身之差別功能。令色心等住時決定。依此功能說名命根。非取生現行識義。以此種子為業力故。有持一期之身功能差別

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 于下二界入無心定（指非想非非想處定和無所有處定）。誰能維持身體的存在？識（指阿賴耶識）、暖（指體溫）不是恒常存在的，所以進入無心定的狀態，壽（指壽命）、暖（指體溫）存在。這三者是一體的，也存在識（指阿賴耶識）。進入無色界的狀態，色（指物質）全部消失。三者既然是一體的，應該有暖（指體溫）。無色界厭惡暖（指體溫）和色（指物質）。有識（指阿賴耶識）就沒有暖（指體溫）。無心定不厭惡細微的心識活動，所以也有識（指阿賴耶識）。這個道理應該仔細思考。

論：這個識（指阿賴耶識）足以作為真實存在的命根。

述曰：普遍簡擇色（指物質）和前五識（指眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識），因為它們不遍及三界（指欲界、色界、無色界），恒常相續地簡擇第六識（指意識），異熟簡擇第七識（指末那識）。這個阿賴耶識足以作為界（指三界）、趣（指六道輪迴）、生（指生命體）的本體。它遍及三界的一切狀態中，並且不斷絕，恒常相續。又是引業（指能引發下一期生命的業力）的真實的異熟果（指由業力所產生的果報）。其他法雖然也屬於界、趣、生，但不是真實的異熟果。所以你不需要另外執著存在真實的命根。界雖然也通於其他法，但阿賴耶識是真實的界體。

外人問曰：前面說識種（指阿賴耶識的種子）就是命根，為什麼稱之為根？

論：然而，是依仗親生的種子而假立為命根。

述曰：這裡的意思是，只是依仗本識（指阿賴耶識）的自體分出的種子。現在論主說，『依』是顯示自體是假借依附於真實之上而建立的。『依』是指所依之處。『親』是簡擇異熟因（指能產生異熟果的業力），雖然能產生這個識（指阿賴耶識），但只是增上緣（指輔助性的條件），不是親生的原因。這裡是根據名言種（指語言文字的種子）作為因緣，親生這個識（指阿賴耶識）的種子。說『生』是爲了簡擇名言的種子在身中，極多不是業力所牽引的，不能親自作為因緣產生現在的識（指阿賴耶識）。現在取『生』是爲了簡去不生的種子。說『此』是爲了簡擇親生其他識（指阿賴耶識）的種子。說『識』是爲了簡擇相應的法種。只取識種（指阿賴耶識的種子）。說『種』是爲了簡擇現行，不取第八識（指阿賴耶識）的現行作為命根。那些被簡擇的都不是命根。現在取親生的名言種上，由先世業力所引導的維持身體的差別功能，使色（指物質）、心（指精神）等住留的時間得以決定。依據這個功能說為命根，不是取產生現行識（指阿賴耶識）的意義。因為這個種子是業力所致，具有維持一期身體的功能差別。

【English Translation】 English version Entering the No-Mind Samadhi in the lower two realms (referring to the Neither-Perception-Nor-Non-Perception realm and the Nothingness realm). Who can maintain the existence of the body? Consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness), warmth (referring to body temperature) are not constant, so entering the state of No-Mind Samadhi, life (referring to lifespan), warmth (referring to body temperature) exist. These three are one entity, and consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness) also exists. Entering the state of the Formless realm, form (referring to matter) completely disappears. Since the three are one entity, there should be warmth (referring to body temperature). The Formless realm detests warmth (referring to body temperature) and form (referring to matter). If there is consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness), there is no warmth (referring to body temperature). The No-Mind Samadhi does not detest subtle mental activities, so there is also consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness). This principle should be carefully considered.

Treatise: This consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness) is sufficient to be a truly existing life-root.

Commentary: Universally selecting form (referring to matter) and the first five consciousnesses (referring to eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness), because they do not pervade the three realms (referring to the Desire realm, the Form realm, the Formless realm), constantly and continuously selecting the sixth consciousness (referring to the mind consciousness), the Vipaka (differently matured) selects the seventh consciousness (referring to the Manas consciousness). This Alaya consciousness is sufficient to be the substance of the realm (referring to the three realms), the destiny (referring to the six paths of reincarnation), and the birth (referring to living beings). It pervades all states of the three realms, and is not interrupted, constantly and continuously. It is also the true Vipaka fruit (referring to the result produced by karma) of the karma that draws (referring to the karma that can trigger the next life). Although other dharmas also belong to the realm, destiny, and birth, they are not true Vipaka fruits. Therefore, you do not need to separately cling to the existence of a real life-root. Although the realm also extends to other dharmas, this Alaya consciousness is the true substance of the realm.

Outsider asks: Earlier it was said that the seed of consciousness (referring to the seed of Alaya consciousness) is the life-root, why is it called a root?

Treatise: However, it is based on the directly produced seed that the life-root is provisionally established.

Commentary: The meaning here is that it is only based on the seed differentiated from the self-nature of the fundamental consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness). Now the treatise master says, 'based on' shows that the self-nature is falsely established based on the real. 'Based on' refers to the place of reliance. 'Directly' is to select the Vipaka cause (referring to the karma that can produce the Vipaka fruit), although it can produce this consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness), it is only an enhancing condition (referring to auxiliary conditions), not the direct cause. Here it is based on the seed of name and language (referring to the seed of language and writing) as the cause and condition, the seed that directly produces this consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness). Saying 'produce' is to select the seeds of name and language in the body, most of which are not driven by karma, and cannot personally be the cause and condition for producing the present consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness). Now taking 'produce' is to select the seeds that do not produce. Saying 'this' is to select the seeds that directly produce other consciousnesses (referring to the Alaya consciousness). Saying 'consciousness' is to select the corresponding seeds of dharmas. Only taking the seed of consciousness (referring to the seed of Alaya consciousness). Saying 'seed' is to select the present activity, not taking the present activity of the eighth consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness) as the life-root. Those that are selected are not life-roots. Now taking the directly produced seed of name and language, the differential function of maintaining the body guided by the karma of previous lives, allows the time of dwelling of form (referring to matter), mind (referring to spirit) and so on to be determined. Based on this function, it is called the life-root, not taking the meaning of producing the present activity of consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness). Because this seed is caused by karma, it has the differential function of maintaining the body for a lifetime.

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令得決定。若此種子無此功能。身便爛壞。阿賴耶識現行。由此種故。能緣及住持于眼等法。亦名能持。此種正能持于現行之識。若不爾者。現行之識應不得有。及無能持余根等法　由此功能故識持于身。現行由種力故生。及緣持法。不名命根。非根本故。由種生故。此種不由現行有故。種為諸法之根本故。如抉擇二十二根中命根無所屬　若取現識為根。即定屬意。何故云無屬。先業所引種上別功能為命根故。是此中意　然顯揚第一等。言六處住時決定假立命者。即第六意處是。此本識種子故。如無始法爾六處相續言。唯取第六處　又是現行。識所持故。從所持說能持種業名命根。命根所持。體非命根。令六處住時決定故。故種為命根。余現行色心等非命根。不恒續故。非業所引故。然業正牽時。唯牽此種子。種子方能生現行。非謂現行名命根。故唯種是根　又解云。此識種子者。謂五根是本識之相分。相分不離識故。總名此識種子。然功能雖是一體。是色及心差別故。唯言此識。此中見．相種子同體之義。取六處種子皆命根體　雖知二解。或本識種。或六處種子。六處種子中五處或時中斷。而本識獨在不名為死。取五根種者。即應有死。以于中間無功能故　或命根三界有差別故　或命根應非一。以種子非一故。雖復

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 令得決定。如果這個種子沒有這個功能，身體就會腐爛壞掉。阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijñāna，根本識）的現行，由於這個種子的緣故，能夠緣取和住持眼等法。也叫做能持。這個種子真正能夠持住現行的識。如果不是這樣，現行的識就不應該存在，以及沒有能夠持住其餘根等法。由於這個功能，識才能持住身體。現行由於種子的力量而生起，以及緣取和持住法。不叫做命根（jīvitendriya，生命力），因為不是根本的緣故。由於種子生起的緣故。這個種子不是由現行產生的緣故，種子是諸法的根本的緣故。如《抉擇分》二十二根中，命根沒有所屬。

如果取現識為根，就必定屬於意。為什麼說沒有所屬呢？先業所牽引的種子上的特別功能為命根的緣故。這是此中的意思。然而《顯揚聖教論》第一等，說六處住時決定假立命者，就是第六意處。這是本識的種子。如無始以來法爾如此，六處相續而言，唯取第六處。

又是現行識所持的緣故。從所持來說能持的種業名為命根。命根所持的，體不是命根。令六處住時決定故。所以種子為命根。其餘現行色心等不是命根。因為不恒常相續的緣故，不是業所牽引的緣故。然而業真正牽引時，唯牽引這個種子，種子才能生起現行。不是說現行名為命根。所以唯有種子是根。

又解釋說，這個識種子，是指五根是本識的相分。相分不離識的緣故，總名這個識種子。然而功能雖然是一體，是色及心的差別緣故，唯說這個識。此中見、相種子同體的意義。取六處種子都是命根的體。

雖然知道兩種解釋。或者本識種，或者六處種子。六處種子中五處有時中斷，而本識單獨存在不叫做死。取五根種者，就應該有死。因為在中間沒有功能的緣故。

或者命根在三界有差別緣故。

或者命根應該不是一，因為種子不是一的緣故。雖然

【English Translation】 English version: It allows for determination. If this seed does not have this function, the body will decay and break down. The manifestation of Alaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness), due to this seed, is able to cognize and sustain the sense faculties such as the eye. It is also called the 'sustainer'. This seed is truly able to sustain the manifesting consciousness. If it were not so, the manifesting consciousness should not exist, and there would be nothing to sustain the other sense faculties. Because of this function, consciousness sustains the body. Manifestation arises from the power of the seed, and cognizes and sustains the dharmas. It is not called jīvitendriya (life faculty), because it is not fundamental. Because it arises from the seed. This seed does not arise from manifestation, because the seed is the root of all dharmas. As in the twenty-two faculties in the Discrimination, the life faculty has no specific belonging.

If we take the manifesting consciousness as the root, it would definitely belong to the mind. Why is it said to have no specific belonging? Because the special function on the seed led by prior karma is the life faculty. This is the meaning here. However, in texts such as the first chapter of Asaṅga's Compendium of Abhidharma, when it is said that the determination of the life faculty is provisionally established when the six sense bases are present, it refers to the sixth sense base, the mind. This is the seed of the fundamental consciousness. As it is said that the six sense bases continue from beginningless time, only the sixth sense base is taken.

Moreover, it is sustained by the manifesting consciousness. From the perspective of what is sustained, the karmic activity of the sustaining seed is called the life faculty. What is sustained by the life faculty is not the life faculty itself. It allows for the determination of the presence of the six sense bases. Therefore, the seed is the life faculty. The other manifesting forms and mental states are not the life faculty, because they are not constant and continuous, and are not led by karma. However, when karma truly leads, it only leads this seed, and the seed is then able to generate manifestation. It is not that manifestation is called the life faculty. Therefore, only the seed is the root.

Another explanation is that this seed of consciousness refers to the five sense faculties as the aspect-division of the fundamental consciousness. Because the aspect-division is inseparable from consciousness, it is collectively called this seed of consciousness. However, although the function is one entity, it is the difference between form and mind, so only this consciousness is mentioned. Here, the meaning is that the seeds of seeing and aspect are of the same entity. Taking the seeds of the six sense bases as the substance of the life faculty.

Although there are two explanations. Either the seed of the fundamental consciousness, or the seeds of the six sense bases. Among the seeds of the six sense bases, the five sense faculties sometimes cease, but the fundamental consciousness alone does not cause death. Taking the seeds of the five sense faculties would imply death, because there is no function in between.

Or the life faculty may differ in the three realms.

Or the life faculty should not be one, because the seeds are not one. Although

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釋言見．相同種。既五根種即本識種。與前解何別。俱唯一種子體故。若相．見別種。此如何通。有多過故。前解為勝。亦順正理。如下第八增上緣中。亦唯取本識種子故。此通無漏。佛亦有故。

次第四破無心定等及果。

論。復如何知至有實自性。

述曰。論主問彼實有所由。

論。若無實性至令不現起。

述曰。此外人答出其有理。非但經說。且於三位中心等不起。若無別實法遮心等不生心等。如何能暫不起。

論。若無心位至名無心定。

述曰。下有二難。此為厭色齊心難。論主將難先牒彼義。但言入定唯牒其定。不牒其果。例同破也。若入此二無心之位。有別實法異色．心等能礙於心名無心定者。

次下正難。

論。應無色時至此云何然。

述曰。應入無色之時。亦有別實法。異色．心等能礙於色名無色定。彼既不爾此云何然。厭心之時。有別非色非心來礙心。厭色之位。亦應有別非心非色來礙色。厭色之位入無色。無別非色非心來礙色。厭心之時入無心。寧別非色非心來礙心。無色既唯有心。無心應唯有色　二外人難曰。厭心入無心。不許別法礙。即令厭色入無色亦有別法遮。汝大乘厭色入無色。無色即非是色種。厭心入無心。無心應非

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於『釋言見』（解釋所見）和『相同種』（相同的種子）的問題。既然五根種（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感官的種子）就是本識種（根本意識的種子），這與之前的解釋有什麼區別呢？因為它們都只是一個種子的本體。如果相（現象）和見（認知）是不同的種子，這又該如何解釋呢？因為這樣會有多種過失。所以之前的解釋更好，也更符合正理。如下文第八識的增上緣中，也只是取本識的種子。這可以通於無漏法（超越煩惱的法），因為佛也有。

接下來，依次破斥無心定等以及其果。

論：又如何知道至有真實的自性？

述曰：論主問他們，這個『實有』是由什麼而來。

論：如果沒有實性，以至於令不現起。

述曰：此外人回答，說出他們有道理的地方。不僅僅是經書上說的。而且在三種狀態中心等不起作用。如果沒有別的實法來遮止心等不生，心等怎麼能暫時不起作用呢？

論：若無心位，至名無心定。

述曰：下面有兩個難點。這是用厭離色界來比齊厭離心識的難點。論主將要提出的難點，先複述對方的觀點。只說了入定，沒有說入定的結果。例子和破斥的方法相同。如果進入這兩種無心狀態，有別的實法，不同於色、心等，能夠阻礙心識，這就被稱為無心定。

接下來是正式的詰難。

論：應無色時，至此云何然？

述曰：應該在進入無色界的時候，也有別的實法，不同於色、心等，能夠阻礙色法，這就被稱為無色定。既然事實並非如此，這又該如何解釋呢？在厭離心識的時候，有別的非色非心的東西來阻礙心識。在厭離色法的時候，也應該有別的非心非色的東西來阻礙色法。在厭離色法的階段進入無色界，沒有別的非色非心的東西來阻礙色法。在厭離心識的時候進入無心狀態，怎麼會有別的非色非心的東西來阻礙心識呢？無色界只有心識，無心狀態應該只有色法。二外人的難點在於：厭離心識進入無心狀態，不承認有別的法來阻礙，那麼就應該讓厭離色法進入無色界時也有別的法來遮止。你們大乘說厭離色法進入無色界，無色界就不是色法的種子。厭離心識進入無心狀態，無心狀態應該不是心識的種子。

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the question of 'Shi Yan Jian' (explaining what is seen) and 'Xiang Tong Zhong' (identical seeds). Since the five root seeds (seeds of the five senses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) are the same as the Ben Shi Zhong (seeds of the fundamental consciousness), what is the difference between this and the previous explanation? Because they are all just one seed entity. If Xiang (phenomena) and Jian (cognition) are different seeds, how can this be explained? Because there would be multiple faults. Therefore, the previous explanation is better and more in line with correct reasoning. As in the eighth consciousness's dominant condition below, only the seeds of the fundamental consciousness are taken. This can be applied to the unconditioned Dharma (Dharma beyond afflictions), because the Buddha also has it.

Next, sequentially refute the no-mind samadhi (Wu Xin Ding) and its results.

Treatise: How do we know that it has a real self-nature?

Commentary: The author of the treatise asks them, what is the origin of this 'real existence'?

Treatise: If there is no real nature, to the extent that it does not arise.

Commentary: This outsider answers, stating their reasons. It's not just what the scriptures say. Moreover, in the three states, the mind and so on do not arise. If there is no other real Dharma to prevent the mind and so on from arising, how can the mind and so on temporarily not arise?

Treatise: If there is a no-mind state, it is called no-mind samadhi.

Commentary: There are two difficulties below. This is the difficulty of equating aversion to the realm of form with aversion to consciousness. The author of the treatise, about to raise the difficulty, first restates the other party's view. Only the entering of samadhi is mentioned, not the result of entering samadhi. The example and the method of refutation are the same. If entering these two no-mind states, there is another real Dharma, different from form, mind, etc., that can obstruct the mind, this is called no-mind samadhi.

Next is the formal challenge.

Treatise: When there should be no form, how is this so?

Commentary: There should also be another real Dharma when entering the formless realm, different from form, mind, etc., that can obstruct form. Since this is not the case, how can this be explained? When averse to consciousness, there is something other than form and mind that obstructs consciousness. When averse to form, there should also be something other than mind and form that obstructs form. Entering the formless realm in the stage of aversion to form, there is nothing other than form and mind that obstructs form. Entering the no-mind state when averse to consciousness, how can there be something other than form and mind that obstructs consciousness? The formless realm only has consciousness, the no-mind state should only have form. The difficulty of the two outsiders lies in: entering the no-mind state by being averse to consciousness, not admitting that there is another Dharma to obstruct, then it should be allowed that there is another Dharma to prevent entering the formless realm by being averse to form. Your Mahayana says that entering the formless realm by being averse to form, the formless realm is not the seed of form. Entering the no-mind state by being averse to consciousness, the no-mind state should not be the seed of consciousness.

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是心種。厭心入無心。無心即心種。厭色入無色。無色應色種。然彼無色即非色種。故亦無心即非心種　三論主云。色法唯所厭。無色非色種心法亦能厭。無心故心種。即是色法非能厭。無色非色種。設令色法亦能厭。無色不妨是色種。四外曰。我亦應然。心法通能厭。別有非色非心來礙心。色法唯所厭。無別非心非色來礙色。五論主云。心法亦能厭。別有非色非心來礙心。色法唯所厭。唯應有色來礙色。色法非能厭。不許非色非心來礙色。心法即能厭。唯應心種來礙心。我義心法通能厭。即說心法名無色。色法唯所厭。故說心種名無心。即是心法通能厭。唯有心種名無心。色法唯所厭。唯有心法名無色。此中翻覆子細逐徴。論文雖復不論。講者應須審悉。不爾此文即為自害。

論。又遮礙心至假亦能遮。

述曰。此為第二假遮非實難　堤謂堤堰。塘謂㘭塘。此中意者。謂薩婆多極微是實。和合色是假。如瓶等及堤塘。既是和合假法能遮。極微實法乃不能遮。不和合故。假法遮物此極成法。今引為喻。今明假法亦能礙心不須實法。如堤塘等。然俱舍云如堰江河等者。此引有別法為礙。非謂假實為喻。

次大乘中自出己義。

論。謂修定時至遮心心所。

述曰。此申正義。謂修定時。于

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是心識的種子。厭離有心而入于無心之境，無心即是心識的種子。厭離有色之境而入于無色之境，無色應是色法的種子。然而，那無色之境並非色法的種子，所以，無心之境也並非心識的種子。《三論》的作者說，色法只是被厭離的對象，無色並非色法的種子；心法既能被厭離，無心故而是心識的種子。也就是說，色法並非能厭離的主體，無色並非色法的種子。即使色法也能成為厭離的主體，無色不妨礙其作為色法的種子。四外道說：『我也應該這樣認為，心法普遍能成為厭離的主體，另外有非色非心的事物來阻礙心識。色法只是被厭離的對象，沒有另外的非心非色的事物來阻礙色法。』五論主說：『心法也能成為厭離的主體，另外有非色非心的事物來阻礙心識。色法只是被厭離的對象，只應有色法來阻礙色法。』色法並非能厭離的主體，不允許有非色非心的事物來阻礙色法。心法是能厭離的主體，只應有心識的種子來阻礙心識。我的意思是心法普遍能成為厭離的主體，所以說心法名為無色。色法只是被厭離的對象，所以說色法的種子名為無心。也就是說，心法普遍能成為厭離的主體，只有心識的種子名為無心。色法只是被厭離的對象，只有心法名為無色。』這裡面翻來覆去，仔細地追問細節。論文雖然沒有詳細論述，講解的人應該仔細審察，否則這段文字就會自相矛盾。 論：又，遮礙心識，乃至假法也能遮礙。 述曰：這是第二重，用假法遮礙來反駁非實體的觀點。堤，指的是堤壩；塘，指的是池塘。這裡的意思是說，薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）認為極微是真實的，和合的色法是虛假的，比如瓶子等以及堤壩池塘。既然和合的假法能夠遮礙，極微這種實法反而不能遮礙，因為它不是和合的。假法遮礙物體，這是極其明顯的道理，現在引用這個比喻來說明，假法也能阻礙心識，不需要實法。比如堤壩池塘等。然而，《俱舍論》中說，比如堤堰阻擋江河等，這是引用了另一種法來作為阻礙，不是用假和實來作比喻。 接下來，大乘（Mahayana）中自己闡述自己的觀點。 論：所謂修習禪定時，能遮蔽心和心所。 述曰：這是闡述正義。所謂修習禪定時，對於……

【English Translation】 English version: These are seeds of consciousness. To reject the mind and enter a state of no-mind, that no-mind is itself a seed of consciousness. To reject form and enter a state of formlessness, that formlessness should be a seed of form. However, that formlessness is not a seed of form, therefore, that no-mind is also not a seed of consciousness. The author of the Sanlun (Three Treatise School) says, 'Form is only the object of rejection, formlessness is not a seed of form; consciousness can be rejected, therefore no-mind is a seed of consciousness.' That is to say, form is not the subject that can reject, formlessness is not a seed of form. Even if form can be the subject of rejection, formlessness does not prevent it from being a seed of form.' The four heretics say, 'I should also think so, consciousness can universally be the subject of rejection, and there are other non-form, non-consciousness things that obstruct consciousness. Form is only the object of rejection, there are no other non-consciousness, non-form things that obstruct form.' The five masters say, 'Consciousness can also be the subject of rejection, and there are other non-form, non-consciousness things that obstruct consciousness. Form is only the object of rejection, only form should obstruct form.' Form is not the subject that can reject, it is not allowed to have non-form, non-consciousness things to obstruct form. Consciousness is the subject that can reject, only the seeds of consciousness should obstruct consciousness. My meaning is that consciousness can universally be the subject of rejection, therefore it is said that consciousness is called formlessness. Form is only the object of rejection, therefore it is said that the seeds of form are called no-mind. That is to say, consciousness can universally be the subject of rejection, only the seeds of consciousness are called no-mind. Form is only the object of rejection, only consciousness is called formlessness.' Here, back and forth, carefully pursuing the details. Although the text does not elaborate, the lecturer should carefully examine it, otherwise this passage will be self-contradictory. Treatise: Furthermore, obstructing the mind, even false dharmas can obstruct. Commentary: This is the second layer, using false obstructions to refute the non-substantial view. Di refers to embankments; tang refers to ponds. The meaning here is that the Sarvastivada (everything exists school) believes that the ultimate particles are real, and the combined forms are false, such as bottles and embankments and ponds. Since combined false dharmas can obstruct, the real dharmas of ultimate particles cannot obstruct, because they are not combined. False dharmas obstruct objects, this is an extremely obvious principle, now this metaphor is used to illustrate that false dharmas can also obstruct the mind, without the need for real dharmas, such as embankments and ponds. However, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Treasury of Knowledge) says, such as embankments blocking rivers, this is citing another dharma as an obstruction, not using false and real as a metaphor. Next, the Mahayana (Great Vehicle) school elaborates its own views. Treatise: So-called practicing dhyana (meditative absorption), can obscure the mind and mental factors. Commentary: This is elaborating the correct meaning. So-called practicing dhyana (meditative absorption), regarding...

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定加行厭患有漏無漏粗動心．心所故。無想六。滅定七。無想有漏。滅定無漏。無想厭如病等。滅定止息想。俱為勞慮故厭患。發勝期愿云。我欲或一日。乃至七日。或一劫。或一劫餘無心。遮心．心所。

論。令心心所漸細漸微。

述曰。遂厭此心。令心．心所漸細漸微。此猶遠加行也。

論。微微心時至厭心等種。

述曰。正欲入定至微微心時。即是末後鄰次於定前剎那心。熏異熟識成極增上厭心種子。以前諸位雖熏成種。猶中下品。未名為定。

論。由此損伏至假立二定。

述曰。由是增上厭心種子。余粗動心等。於後念以去暫不現行。依此一期無心分位假立二定。此二定種無想有漏。滅盡無漏　此說因位初入滅定。非久串習。故說滅心定前厭患種為定體。

論。此種善故定亦名善。

述曰。即以厭心功能種子為定體性。故定是善。此則二定加行門別。對法第二。顯揚第一。瑜伽第五十二．五十六等廣說。及彼抄會。又此論第七卷自廣解。

論。無想定前至假立無想。

述曰。下明定果。即是微微心等諸明瞭心。求無想果。將此果以為涅槃。所熏成種。此是增上微微心是　招彼異熟。即招阿賴耶識。依此本識余粗動六轉識想等不行。於此無心分

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 定加行（Dhyana Prayoga）厭患有漏（Sasrava）無漏（Anasrava）的粗動心（ স্থূল চিত্ত ）和心所（Caitasika），是因為無想（Asanjna）有六種，滅定（Nirodha-samapatti）有七種。無想是有漏的，滅定是無漏的。無想厭患如病等，滅定止息想，都因為是勞慮而厭患。發起殊勝的期望說：『我想要或者一日，乃至七日，或者一劫（Kalpa），或者一劫餘無心，遮止心和心所。』

論：令心和心所漸漸細微。

述曰：於是厭患此心，令心和心所漸漸細微。這還是遙遠的加行。

論：在微微心時，至厭心等種子。

述曰：正要入定，至微微心時，就是最後鄰近於定前的剎那心，熏習異熟識（Vipaka-vijnana），成為極增上的厭心種子。以前的各個階段雖然熏習成種子，還是中下品，不能稱為定。

論：由此損伏至假立二定。

述曰：由於這增上的厭心種子，其餘粗動心等，在後念以后暫時不現行。依據這一期無心分位，假立二定。這二定種，無想是有漏的，滅盡是無漏的。這是說因位初入滅定，不是長久串習。所以說滅心定前的厭患種子為定體。

論：此種善故，定亦名善。

述曰：就是以厭心功能種子為定體性，所以定是善的。這是二定加行門別的說法。《對法》（Abhidharma）第二，《顯揚》（Asanga）第一，《瑜伽》（Yoga）第五十二、五十六等廣說，以及它們的抄會。又此論第七卷自己廣為解釋。

論：無想定前至假立無想。

述曰：下面說明定果，就是微微心等諸明瞭心，求無想果，將此果以為涅槃（Nirvana），所熏成種。這是增上的微微心，是招感彼異熟，即招感阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana）。依據此本識，其餘粗動六轉識想等不行，於此無心分位。

【English Translation】 English version: Dhyana Prayoga (preparatory practice for meditation) is the aversion to Sasrava (with outflows) and Anasrava (without outflows) coarse mental activities (sthula citta) and mental factors (Caitasika), because there are six types of Asanjna (non-perception) and seven types of Nirodha-samapatti (cessation attainment). Asanjna is Sasrava, and Nirodha-samapatti is Anasrava. Aversion to Asanjna is like aversion to illness, etc. Nirodha-samapatti stops perception, and both are aversion because they are laborious and worrisome. One generates a superior aspiration, saying: 'I want to be without mind for one day, or even seven days, or one Kalpa (eon), or more than one Kalpa, preventing mind and mental factors.'

Treatise: Cause the mind and mental factors to gradually become subtle and minute.

Commentary: Thereupon, one becomes averse to this mind, causing the mind and mental factors to gradually become subtle and minute. This is still a distant preparatory practice.

Treatise: At the time of the minute mind, up to the seeds of aversion, etc.

Commentary: Just as one is about to enter Samadhi (meditative absorption), at the time of the minute mind, which is the last moment adjacent to the moment before Samadhi, one imprints the Vipaka-vijnana (resultant consciousness), forming an extremely enhanced seed of aversion. Although the previous stages have imprinted seeds, they are still of middle or lower quality and cannot be called Samadhi.

Treatise: From this, subdue and control, up to the provisional establishment of two Samadhis.

Commentary: Due to this enhanced seed of aversion, the other coarse mental activities, etc., temporarily do not manifest after the subsequent moment. Based on this period of mindlessness, two Samadhis are provisionally established. These two types of Samadhi, Asanjna is Sasrava, and Nirodha is Anasrava. This speaks of the initial entry into Nirodha-samapatti in the causal stage, not prolonged practice. Therefore, it is said that the seed of aversion before the cessation of mind Samadhi is the substance of Samadhi.

Treatise: Because this seed is good, the Samadhi is also called good.

Commentary: That is, the seed of the function of aversion is the substance of the nature of Samadhi, so Samadhi is good. This is a different explanation of the preparatory practice for the two Samadhis. The second volume of Abhidharma, the first volume of Asanga, and the fifty-second and fifty-sixth volumes of Yoga, etc., explain it extensively, as well as their summaries. Furthermore, this treatise itself explains it extensively in the seventh volume.

Treatise: Before Asanjna-samapatti, up to the provisional establishment of Asanjna.

Commentary: Below, the result of Samadhi is explained, which is the clear mind, etc., seeking the result of Asanjna, taking this result as Nirvana, and the seeds that are imprinted. This is the enhanced minute mind, which is the cause of attracting that Vipaka, that is, attracting the Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness). Based on this fundamental consciousness, the other coarse six consciousnesses, such as perception, etc., do not function in this state of mindlessness.

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位假立無想異熟　此言雖總。而意欲說明了心時。種子招總異熟。無心以去厭心種子。招別無想異熟。論種子體。是一種子通招總別。若據其位前後有殊。有心無心二果別故　又解微微心以前。明瞭故招總果。微微心細所熏成種感別果。二種種子各招一果。亦不相違。微微心種轉為無想定等故　前解為勝　今解即是彼地六識中善染等心不行位建立此體。如許無心唯依本識。即依本識上立此無心。無心實非異熟。親依異熟立。得異熟名。故論云不恒行心．心所滅。不簡何性心。然瑜伽五十三云唯約生得心心所滅立此異熟者。即善等恒行心。生便即得故名生得。非謂異熟生得無記心。或種依本識。是生得無記性。與本識同性故名生得。此相傳解違下第七。然不順理。又解第六異熟舍受生得無記心滅種子上立。即是依本識。而生得粗動想等滅故。建立此異熟。此師為正。諸論皆說生有初心定無覆故。如下第七　第六識何時滅。此有二義。如下第七卷中廣說自有三師。

論。依異熟立至亦非實有。

述曰。此無想天非真異熟。是異熟生。諸論說名無想異熟者。依真第八異熟識生得種立故名異熟。非是總報真實異熟。如言從異熟所生名異熟生故　無想異熟。及二無心定亦非實有。總結非也。余門分別如下當知　就別

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『位假立無想異熟』（在無想天中假立的無想果報）。這句話雖然是總的來說，但其意圖在於說明，當有『了心』（明瞭的心識）時，種子招感的是總的異熟果報；而當『無心』（沒有心識）時，由於厭離心識的種子，招感的是個別的無想異熟果報。從種子的本體來說，是一種種子可以同時招感總的異熟果報和個別的異熟果報。如果根據其所處的位置，前後有所不同，有心和無心兩種果報就會有所區別。另一種解釋是，在『微微心』（極其微細的心識）之前，心識是明瞭的，因此招感總的果報；而『微微心』因為極其微細，所熏習成的種子感得個別的果報。這兩種種子各自招感一種果報，也不互相違背。『微微心』的種子可以轉變為無想定等狀態。前一種解釋更為合理。現在的這種解釋，就是在彼地的六識中，善、染等心識不行作用時，建立這種本體。如果允許無心唯獨依靠阿賴耶識（本識），那就是依靠本識來建立這種無心。無心實際上並非真正的異熟果報，而是親近依靠異熟果報而建立，因此得到異熟的名稱。所以論中說，不恒常生起的心和心所滅去，沒有簡擇是什麼性質的心。然而，《瑜伽師地論》第五十三卷說，只是就生得的心和心所滅去而建立這種異熟果報，指的是善等恒常生起的心，因為一生下來就得到，所以稱為生得，而不是指異熟所生的無記心。或者說，種子依靠本識，是生得的無記性，與本識的性質相同，所以稱為生得。這種相傳的解釋與下文第七卷的內容相違背，也不合乎道理。還有一種解釋是，在第六意識的異熟舍受生得無記心滅去時，在種子上建立這種異熟果報，也就是依靠本識，因為生得的粗動想等滅去，所以建立這種異熟果報。這種說法是正確的。各種論典都說，在生有（中陰身）的最初一念心中，一定沒有覆無記性，如下文第七卷所說。第六意識在什麼時候滅去？這有兩種含義，如下文第七卷中有詳細說明，有三種不同的說法。 論：依異熟立至亦非實有。 述曰：此無想天非真異熟。是異熟生。諸論說名無想異熟者。依真第八異熟識生得種立故名異熟。非是總報真實異熟。如言從異熟所生名異熟生故。無想異熟。及二無心定亦非實有。總結非也。余門分別如下當知。就別

【English Translation】 English version 'The position is hypothetically established as the fruition of non-perception' (the fruition of non-perception hypothetically established in the Realm of Non-Perception). Although this statement is general, its intention is to explain that when there is a 'clear mind' (a mind with clear consciousness), the seed attracts a general fruition; while when there is 'no mind' (no consciousness), due to the seeds of aversion to consciousness, it attracts a separate fruition of non-perception. In terms of the essence of the seed, one seed can simultaneously attract both general and specific fruitions. If based on its position, there are differences in sequence, the two fruitions of having mind and not having mind will be different. Another explanation is that before the 'subtle mind' (extremely subtle consciousness), the consciousness is clear, thus attracting a general fruition; while the 'subtle mind' is extremely subtle, and the seeds cultivated by it sense a separate fruition. These two types of seeds each attract one fruition, and they do not contradict each other. The seed of the 'subtle mind' can be transformed into states such as the Nirodha-samāpatti (Cessation Attainment). The former explanation is more reasonable. The current explanation is that in the six consciousnesses of that realm, when the good, defiled, and other consciousnesses do not function, this entity is established. If it is allowed that no-mind relies solely on the Ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness), then it is relying on the store consciousness to establish this no-mind. No-mind is actually not a true fruition, but is established closely relying on the fruition, thus obtaining the name of fruition. Therefore, the treatise says that the non-constant arising of mind and mental factors ceases, without distinguishing the nature of the mind. However, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Chapter 53, says that this fruition is established only with respect to the cessation of the innately obtained mind and mental factors, referring to the constantly arising minds such as good, etc., because they are obtained as soon as they are born, so they are called innately obtained, not referring to the indeterminate mind born from fruition. Or, the seed relies on the store consciousness, which is of an innately obtained indeterminate nature, and is of the same nature as the store consciousness, so it is called innately obtained. This traditional explanation contradicts the content of the seventh volume below and is not reasonable. Another explanation is that when the fruition of the sixth consciousness, the feeling of indifference, the innately obtained indeterminate mind ceases, this fruition is established on the seed, that is, relying on the store consciousness, because the innately obtained coarse and moving thoughts cease, so this fruition is established. This statement is correct. Various treatises say that in the initial thought of the bhavaṅga (intermediate state), there is definitely no obscured indeterminate nature, as stated in the seventh volume below. When does the sixth consciousness cease? There are two meanings to this, as explained in detail in the seventh volume below, with three different views. Treatise: Relying on fruition to establish, it is also not truly existent. Commentary: This Realm of Non-Perception is not a true fruition, but is born from fruition. The treatises call it the Fruition of Non-Perception because it is established based on the innately obtained seed of the true eighth fruition consciousness. It is not a true fruition of general retribution. As it is said, 'What is born from fruition is called born from fruition.' The Fruition of Non-Perception and the two no-mind samādhis are also not truly existent. This is a summary conclusion. The distinctions of other aspects will be known below. Regarding the specific

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破中。上來四段合破七種不相應訖。初二定持業釋。無想異熟通持業．依士。下第三．第七卷自當了知。

成唯識論述記卷第二(本)

成唯識論述記卷第二(末)

沙門基撰

論。復如何知至有實自性。

述曰。自下第五破薩婆多等實有四相　于中有四。初問外人。次外人答。第三廣破。第四述正。至下當知。此即初也。

論。契經說故至乃至廣說。

述曰。此即第二外人引經證有實相。此中應言有三有為之相。有為。是所相法。有三之相者。即顯有為有三能相也。重言之有為者。此屬能相。顯法有此。體是有為。是緣生性。非如白鷺。表水非無。亦非如童女相。表法是善．不善。不重言有為。疑表有為有。或表有為通善．惡性。今為簡此重言有為。又此之言即第六轉。是依士釋。故知離法別有相體。非無異法可說之言　問既有四相。何故此經但說三種　俱舍二說。初云除住。若法令行三世遷流。經說為相。生遷未來法。令流入現在。異．滅遷現法。令流入過去。令其衰異．及壞滅故。如三怨敵見怨處林。牽出．衰力。損壞其命。住于彼法攝受．安立。樂不相離。不說相中。又無為法有自相住。住相濫彼故經不說。然經說住異。是此異別名。如生名起。滅名為盡　第二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 破斥（破中）。上面四段合起來破斥了七種不相應法完畢。最初兩個是定持業釋（一種梵文語法結構）。『無想異熟』是通持業釋和依士釋。下面第三卷、第七卷自然會明白。

《成唯識論述記》卷第二（本）

《成唯識論述記》卷第二（末）

沙門基 撰

論：又如何知道四相有真實自性？

述記：從『自下』開始，第五部分破斥薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）等認為四相實有的觀點。其中有四個部分：首先是提問外人（指持不同觀點的人），其次是外人的回答，第三是廣泛破斥，第四是闡述正確的觀點。到後面自然會明白。這裡是第一個部分。

論：因為契經（佛經）這樣說，乃至廣說。

述記：這是第二個部分，外人引用佛經來證明四相是真實存在的。這裡應該說有三種有為相。『有為』是所相法（被標示的法），有三種相，即表明有為法有三種能相（能標示的相）。重複說『有為』，這是屬於能相，表明法具有這種體性，是有為法，是緣生性（dependent origination）。不像白鷺，表明水並非不存在；也不是像童女相，表明法是善或不善。如果不重複說『有為』，會讓人懷疑表明有為法存在，或者表明有為法通於善惡性。現在爲了避免這些誤解，所以重複說『有為』。另外，這裡的『之』字是第六格，是依士釋。因此可知，離開法，另外有相的自體，並非沒有不同的法可以說明。問：既然有四相，為什麼這部經只說了三種？《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakosha，阿毗達摩俱舍論）有兩種說法。第一種說法是除去『住』相。如果法令行於三世遷流，經中就說為相。生相使未來法流入現在，異相、滅相使現在法流入過去，使其衰敗變異及壞滅。就像三個怨敵，看見怨家身處樹林，牽引出來、使其衰弱，損壞其性命。『住』相對於彼法，是攝受、安立，快樂不相分離，所以不在相中說明。另外，無為法有自相住，『住』相容易與無為法混淆，所以經中不說。然而經中所說的『住異』，是此『異』相的別名，就像『生』也叫做『起』，『滅』也叫做『盡』。第二種說法是……

【English Translation】 English version Refutation (Po Zhong). The above four sections together refute the seven kinds of non-corresponding dharmas completely. The first two are determined possessive compound (a type of Sanskrit grammatical structure). 'Non-thinking different ripening' is both a general possessive compound and a dependent compound. The third and seventh volumes below will naturally make it clear.

Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only, Volume 2 (Beginning)

Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only, Volume 2 (End)

Written by Shramana (Buddhist monk) Ji

Treatise: Furthermore, how do we know that the four characteristics have real self-nature?

Commentary: Starting from 'Zi Xia', the fifth part refutes the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins, the 'All Exists' school) and others who believe that the four characteristics are real. There are four parts to this: first, questioning the outsiders (those who hold different views); second, the outsiders' answers; third, extensive refutation; and fourth, stating the correct view. It will become clear later. This is the first part.

Treatise: Because the sutras (Buddhist scriptures) say so, and so on, extensively speaking.

Commentary: This is the second part, where outsiders cite the sutras to prove that the four characteristics are real. Here, it should be said that there are three conditioned characteristics. 'Conditioned' is the characterized dharma (the dharma being marked), and having three characteristics means that conditioned dharmas have three characterizing characteristics (the characteristics that can mark). Repeating 'conditioned' belongs to the characterizing characteristics, indicating that the dharma has this nature, is a conditioned dharma, and is of dependent origination. It is not like a white heron, indicating that water does not not exist; nor is it like the appearance of a virgin, indicating that the dharma is good or bad. If 'conditioned' is not repeated, it would lead people to suspect that it indicates the existence of conditioned dharmas, or that it applies to both good and bad natures. Now, to avoid these misunderstandings, 'conditioned' is repeated. Furthermore, the word 'zhi' here is in the sixth case, which is a dependent compound. Therefore, it can be known that apart from the dharma, there is another self-nature of characteristics, and it is not that there are no different dharmas that can be explained. Question: Since there are four characteristics, why does this sutra only mention three? The Abhidharmakosha (Abhidharmakosha, Treasury of Abhidharma) has two explanations. The first explanation is to remove the 'abiding' characteristic. If the dharma causes movement and change in the three times, it is said to be a characteristic in the sutra. The characteristic of arising causes future dharmas to flow into the present, and the characteristics of change and cessation cause present dharmas to flow into the past, causing them to decay, change, and be destroyed. It is like three enemies, seeing their enemy in the forest, dragging them out, weakening them, and destroying their lives. The 'abiding' characteristic, with respect to that dharma, is to embrace, establish, and be inseparable from happiness, so it is not explained in the characteristics. Furthermore, unconditioned dharmas have their own characteristic of abiding, and the 'abiding' characteristic is easily confused with unconditioned dharmas, so it is not mentioned in the sutra. However, the 'abiding change' mentioned in the sutra is another name for this 'change' characteristic, just as 'arising' is also called 'beginning', and 'cessation' is also called 'ending'. The second explanation is...

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師說。即此經中住．異合說名住異相。住是有情所愛著處。為令生厭與異合說。如示黑耳與吉祥俱　乃至廣說者。謂有為之起亦可了知。如樞要說　然今大乘。釋經說者文各不同。或說一相。謂四嗢柁南中取諸行無常。或說二相。謂璽弟子應觀諸法生滅而住。或八不中不生不滅。或說三相。如此經說三有為相。或說四相。處處皆同有何密意作此說　此說一相者。謂說生滅等總名無常。非常相故。八十一云有起盡故是無常也。即是生．滅等合名無常。如瑜伽論五十二說。若由此相起厭思惟。但說為相。能起厭患離欲。解脫。本無今有生。有已還無滅。名無常相。故經說一謂即無常　何故生．滅等合名無常　以有非恒有。無非恒無故。無非恒無所以言生。有非恒有所以言滅。無為有而恒有。無法無而恒無。以二常相　今此有為。有不恒有不同無為。無不恒無不同兔角。故合名無常。無彼有．無之常相故。此非即是四中滅相。亦兼生故　住異與生。同一世有故合說　說二相者。瑜伽論說。生及住異俱生所顯。故住異二合為一分。建立生品。于第二分建立滅品。此法有時名為生品。若后無常名為滅品。令諸弟子應隨觀住。八不翻此。為除執著故但說二更不說余。又無常相起厭思惟。即是此中說二所以　說三相者。謂一生。二滅

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 經文中提到的『住』（Dwell），與『異』（Change）結合，便被稱作『住異相』（Characteristic of Duration and Change）。『住』是有情眾生所執著和喜愛的狀態。爲了使他們對此生起厭離之心，所以將『住』與『異』結合起來進行闡述。例如，就像經文中展示的黑耳（Black Ear）與吉祥（Auspiciousness）同時存在一樣，乃至更廣闊的闡述。這意味著有為法的生起是可以被認識和理解的，正如《樞要》（Essentials）中所說的那樣。然而，現在大乘佛教對經典的解釋各有不同。有的說一相，即在四句偈（Udana）中選取『諸行無常』（All conditioned things are impermanent）。有的說二相，即教導璽（Seal）的弟子應當觀察諸法的生滅而安住。有的在八不中說『不生不滅』（Neither arising nor ceasing）。有的說三相，就像這部經所說的三種有為相（Three characteristics of conditioned existence）。有的說四相，處處都相同，那麼這樣說有什麼秘密的含義呢？ 這說一相，是指將生滅等總括地稱為『無常』（Impermanence），因為它不是恒常不變的相。如《八十一》（Eighty-One）中所說，因為有生起和消盡，所以是無常的。也就是說，生、滅等合起來稱為無常。正如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十二卷所說，如果由此相生起厭離的思惟，那麼只說一個相。這個相能夠引發厭惡、遠離慾望和解脫。原本沒有現在有了，這是生；有了之後又消失了，這是滅，這被稱為無常相。所以經中說一，指的就是無常。 為什麼生、滅等合起來稱為無常呢？因為有不是恒常的有，無也不是恒常的無。無不是恒常的無，所以說是生；有不是恒常的有，所以說是滅。無為法（Unconditioned Dharma）是有而恒常的有，無法是無而恒常的無，因為它們具有兩種常相。現在這個有為法，有不是恒常的有，這與無為法不同；無不是恒常的無，這與兔角不同。所以合起來稱為無常，因為它沒有有和無的常相。這並非就是四相中的滅相，因為它也包含了生。 住異與生，都是同一世（Lifetime）中存在的，所以合起來說。 說二相，是指《瑜伽師地論》中說，生和住異都是由俱生所顯現的，所以住異二者合為一部分，建立生品（Category of Arising）。在第二部分建立滅品（Category of Ceasing）。此法有時被稱為生品，如果之後是無常，則被稱為滅品。讓弟子們應當隨之觀察安住。八不顛倒了這個說法，爲了去除執著，所以只說二，不再說其他的。又因為無常相能引發厭離的思惟，這就是這裡說二的原因。 說三相，是指一生，二滅。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Dwell', as mentioned in this sutra, when combined with 'Change', is called the 'Characteristic of Duration and Change'. 'Dwell' is the state that sentient beings are attached to and fond of. In order to make them generate a sense of revulsion towards this, 'Dwell' and 'Change' are combined for explanation. For example, just like the Black Ear and Auspiciousness exist simultaneously as shown in the sutra, and even broader elaborations. This means that the arising of conditioned dharmas can be recognized and understood, just as stated in the 'Essentials'. However, now the interpretations of the sutras in Mahayana Buddhism vary. Some say one characteristic, which is selecting 'All conditioned things are impermanent' from the four-line verse (Udana). Some say two characteristics, which is teaching the disciples of the Seal to observe the arising and ceasing of all dharmas and abide accordingly. Some say 'Neither arising nor ceasing' in the Eight Negations. Some say three characteristics, just like the three characteristics of conditioned existence mentioned in this sutra. Some say four characteristics, which are the same everywhere, so what is the secret meaning of saying this? Saying one characteristic refers to collectively calling arising, ceasing, etc., as 'Impermanence', because it is not a constant and unchanging characteristic. As stated in 'Eighty-One', because there is arising and exhaustion, it is impermanent. That is to say, arising, ceasing, etc., are collectively called impermanence. As stated in the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra', Volume 52, if aversion arises from this characteristic, then only one characteristic is mentioned. This characteristic can induce aversion, detachment from desire, and liberation. Originally not existing, now existing, this is arising; after existing, it disappears again, this is called the characteristic of impermanence. So the sutra says one, which refers to impermanence. Why are arising, ceasing, etc., collectively called impermanence? Because existence is not constant existence, and non-existence is not constant non-existence. Non-existence is not constant non-existence, so it is said to be arising; existence is not constant existence, so it is said to be ceasing. Unconditioned Dharma is existence that is constant existence, and the absence of dharma is the absence that is constant absence, because they have two constant characteristics. Now this conditioned dharma, existence is not constant existence, which is different from unconditioned dharma; non-existence is not constant non-existence, which is different from rabbit horns. So it is collectively called impermanence, because it does not have the constant characteristics of existence and non-existence. This is not exactly the characteristic of ceasing among the four characteristics, because it also includes arising. 'Duration and Change' and arising both exist in the same lifetime, so they are spoken of together. Saying two characteristics refers to what is said in the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra', that arising and duration and change are both manifested by co-arising, so duration and change are combined into one part, establishing the Category of Arising. In the second part, the Category of Ceasing is established. This dharma is sometimes called the Category of Arising, and if it is followed by impermanence, it is called the Category of Ceasing. Let the disciples observe and abide accordingly. The Eight Negations reversed this statement, in order to remove attachment, so only two are mentioned, and nothing else is said. Also, because the characteristic of impermanence can induce aversion, this is the reason for saying two here. Saying three characteristics refers to one arising, two ceasing.

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。三住異性。瑜伽論說。由一切行三世所顯。由未來世本無而生。彼既生已落謝過去。現在世法二相所顯。謂住及異唯現在法有住可得。前後變異亦唯現在。總說住異而為一相。似同俱舍第二師說。然世不同　說四相者。義用四故　然今此引三相之經。共許經也。

論。此經不說至為證不成。

述曰。此即總非。大乘四相。與色．心等。非一非異。遮外定異有實自體。故言此經不說異等。

此下別破有七。

論。非第六聲至即色心故。

述曰。第一六轉無差難。破所引第六轉言　彼立量云。之有為相言。別有體。有第六轉言故。如天授之衣。祠授之缽等。今為作不定過。又如世言色．心之體。非離色．心而別有體。返成生等非離於法有體亦然。謂立量言。第六轉言所目諸法。非定別體。第六轉故。如色．心之體。識之了別等。不遮諸法有別體者。然遮生等定別有法決定相違。

外人救云。其能相體。非即所相。說能所相故。如煙表火等。大士相等為例亦爾。即能．所相定各有異。故知生等與法定別　論主破云。

論。非能相體至異地等故。

述曰。第二能所不異難。表火之相能所別。例生等相能所殊。地等堅等能所一。例生等相無別體。地堅為相。乃至風動為相。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：三種住的差異。《瑜伽師地論》中說，由一切行為在過去、現在、未來三世中所顯現。從未來世原本不存在而產生，它產生之後便衰落消逝到過去。現在世的法由兩種相來顯現，即住和異，只有現在的法才能找到『住』。前後變異也只存在於現在。總的來說，『住』和『異』被視為一個相，這似乎與《俱舍論》第二位論師的觀點相同。然而，世間不同，說四相是因為義用有四種。現在這裡引用三相的經典，是大家共同認可的經典。

論：這部經沒有說到，以至於無法證明。

述記：這是總體的否定。大乘的四相，與色、心等，非一非異。遮止外道認為它們是絕對不同的，有實在的自體。所以說這部經沒有說到『異』等。

下面分別破斥，共有七處。

論：不是第六格，以至於就是色心。

述記：第一，用第六格沒有差別來反駁。破斥所引用的第六格的說法。對方立論說：『有為法的相』這句話，說明『相』有單獨的本體，因為有第六格的說法，就像天授的衣服，祠授的缽等。現在給出一個不定過失的例子。又比如世俗所說的色、心的本體，並非脫離色、心而有單獨的本體。反過來證明生等並非脫離於法而有本體也是一樣。也就是說，立論說：第六格所指代的諸法，並非一定是單獨的本體，因為是第六格，就像色、心的本體，識的了別等。這並不是說諸法沒有單獨的本體，而是說生等一定有單獨的法，這是絕對相違的。

外人辯解說：能相的本體，並非就是所相的本體，因為有能相和所相的說法，就像煙表示火等。大士的相等也可以作為例子。即能相和所相一定各有不同。所以知道生等與法是不同的。論主反駁說：

論：不是能相的本體，以至於像地等不同。

述記：第二，用能所不異來反駁。表示火的相，能相和所相不同。類比生等相，能相和所相不同。地等的堅硬等，能相和所相是一樣的。類比生等相，沒有單獨的本體。地以堅硬為相，乃至風以動為相。

【English Translation】 English version: The three differences in abiding. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that they are manifested by all actions in the three times of past, present, and future. They arise from the future, where they originally did not exist, and after arising, they decline and vanish into the past. The phenomena of the present are manifested by two characteristics: abiding and difference. Only present phenomena can have 'abiding' found. Changes before and after also only exist in the present. Generally speaking, 'abiding' and 'difference' are regarded as one characteristic, which seems to be the same as the view of the second teacher in the Abhidharmakosa. However, the world is different, and the four characteristics are spoken of because there are four kinds of meanings and functions. Now, the sutra citing the three characteristics is a sutra that is commonly accepted.

Treatise: This sutra does not say enough to prove it.

Commentary: This is a general negation. The four characteristics of Mahayana, like form (rupa), mind (citta), etc., are neither one nor different. It prevents outsiders from thinking that they are absolutely different and have a real self-nature. Therefore, it is said that this sutra does not mention 'difference' and so on.

The following are separate refutations, with a total of seven points.

Treatise: It is not the sixth case, so that it is form and mind.

Commentary: First, refute with the lack of difference in the sixth case. Refute the statement of the sixth case that was cited. The opponent argues: 'The characteristic of conditioned phenomena' means that 'characteristic' has a separate entity because there is a statement of the sixth case, like the clothes given by Devadatta, the bowl given by Civa etc. Now, give an example of an uncertain fault. Also, for example, the entity of form and mind as commonly said, does not have a separate entity apart from form and mind. Conversely, it proves that arising etc. do not have an entity apart from the Dharma either. That is to say, argue that the dharmas referred to by the sixth case are not necessarily separate entities, because it is the sixth case, like the entity of form and mind, the discernment of consciousness, etc. This does not mean that dharmas do not have separate entities, but that arising etc. must have separate dharmas, which is absolutely contradictory.

The outsider argues: The entity of the able-characteristic is not the entity of the characterized, because there is the saying of able-characteristic and characterized, like smoke indicates fire, etc. The characteristics of the great Bodhisattva can also be used as an example. That is, the able-characteristic and the characterized must each be different. So know that arising etc. are different from the Dharma. The treatise master refutes:

Treatise: It is not the entity of the able-characteristic, so that it is different like earth etc.

Commentary: Second, refute with the non-difference of the able and the characterized. The characteristic of indicating fire, the able-characteristic and the characterized are different. Analogously, the characteristics of arising etc., the able-characteristic and the characterized are different. The hardness etc. of earth etc., the able-characteristic and the characterized are the same. Analogously, the characteristics of arising etc. do not have a separate entity. Earth takes hardness as its characteristic, and even wind takes movement as its characteristic.

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雖有之言。及能所義。然非體別。生等應然　然就極成便無實大士。以眾同分大乘經部皆不許故。若就他義。大士亦成。薩婆多等。今依自宗引大士相有體為例。若依共許。彼例不成。故俱舍中返以為難。云非大士相異於大士等。此中比量返覆可知。然為他因作不定過　此中遮定第六轉言有別自性。非遮一切。

外人復曰。若能所相體是一者。何故經言有為之相。

論。若有為相至應異所相。

述曰。第三二相應齊難。此論主徴。經言無為寂靜為相。又經說言無為之相。故離能相無別所相　量云。汝無為相。應離體有。說之相言故。如有為相。返為有為比量可知　然今論主理亦應然。經說有為相。別立其假相。經說無為相。應別立假相。假相有立．不立。實相亦然。亦有有者。有無者故　有為有變異差別可立假。無為體不異。何須立假相　無為無生。無老。無滅。亦應立此三種能相　體無起盡。又非多法顯分位殊。故無為法不假立相。此義應思　外人復云。無為不墮世。不與能相合。有為既墮世。故與能相合　此亦不然。有為墮世。墮世相合。無為非世。非世相合。大乘應爾。無為非世。非世無假相。有為墮世。墮世無假相　此難不然。為顯差別墮世立相。無為自法無差別。何得立假相。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 雖然這樣說，以及能相和所相的意義，但它們並非本體上有所區別，生等現象也應如此。然而，就極成（paramārtha-satya，勝義諦）而言，便沒有真實的大士（bodhisattva，菩薩），因為大眾部（Mahāsaṃghika）、經部（Sautrāntika）等都不認可。如果就他宗的觀點，大士也可以成立，比如薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）等。現在依據我宗的觀點，引用大士的相有本體作為例子。如果依據共同認可的觀點，這個例子不能成立。所以《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）中反過來以此為難，說非大士的相異於大士等。此中的比量可以反覆推敲得知。然而，作為他宗的因，會造成不定過失。這裡遮止的是第六轉言（ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti）所表示的『有別自性』，並非遮止一切。

外人又說：如果能相和所相本體是一，為什麼經中說有為法的相呢？

論：如果有為法的相，就應該異於所相。

述記：這是用第三能相和第二所相來一起進行詰難。此論主提出質疑：經中說無為法寂靜為相，又經中說無為之相，所以離開能相，沒有別的所相。量式是：你的無為相，應該離開本體而存在，因為說了『相』這個詞，就像有為相一樣。反過來用有為法作比量也可以得知。然而現在論主的道理也應該是這樣：經中說有為相，另外設立它的假相；經中說無為相，應該另外設立假相。假相有設立和不設立兩種情況，實相也是這樣，也有有和沒有兩種情況。

有為法有變異差別，可以設立假相。無為法本體沒有差異，何須設立假相？無為法無生、無老、無滅，也應該設立這三種能相。本體沒有起始和終結，又不是多種法顯現出不同的分位，所以無為法不需要設立假相。這個道理應該仔細思考。外人又說：無為法不屬於世間，不與能相結合；有為法屬於世間，所以與能相結合。這也是不對的。有為法屬於世間，屬於世間就與相結合；無為法不屬於世間，不屬於世間就與相結合，大乘（Mahāyāna）應該也是這樣。無為法不屬於世間，不屬於世間就沒有假相；有為法屬於世間，屬於世間就沒有假相。這個詰難不對。爲了顯示差別，屬於世間才設立相；無為法自身沒有差別，怎麼能設立假相呢？

【English Translation】 English version: Although it is said so, and regarding the meanings of the perceiver-aspect (能相) and the perceived-aspect (所相), they are not different in essence, and phenomena such as birth should be the same. However, in terms of ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), there is no real Bodhisattva (bodhisattva), because the Mahāsaṃghika (Mahāsaṃghika) and Sautrāntika (Sautrāntika) schools do not accept it. If based on the views of other schools, a Bodhisattva can be established, such as the Sarvāstivāda (Sarvāstivāda) school. Now, according to our own school's view, we cite the example of the Bodhisattva's characteristic having substance. If based on a commonly accepted view, this example cannot be established. Therefore, the Abhidharmakośa refutes it by saying that the characteristic of a non-Bodhisattva is different from a Bodhisattva, etc. The inference here can be repeatedly examined and understood. However, as a reason for other schools, it creates the fault of being uncertain. Here, what is negated is the 'having a separate nature' indicated by the sixth case ending (ṣaṣṭhī vibhakti), not negating everything.

The objector further says: If the perceiver-aspect and the perceived-aspect are one in essence, why does the scripture speak of the characteristics of conditioned phenomena?

Treatise: If there is a characteristic of conditioned phenomena, it should be different from the perceived-aspect.

Commentary: This is a simultaneous challenge using the third perceiver-aspect and the second perceived-aspect. The author of this treatise raises the question: The scripture says that the unconditioned is characterized by tranquility, and the scripture also speaks of the characteristic of the unconditioned. Therefore, apart from the perceiver-aspect, there is no separate perceived-aspect. The logical formula is: Your unconditioned characteristic should exist apart from the essence, because the word 'characteristic' is used, just like the conditioned characteristic. Conversely, using conditioned phenomena as an analogy can also be understood. However, the principle of the author of the treatise should also be like this: The scripture speaks of the conditioned characteristic, and separately establishes its provisional characteristic; the scripture speaks of the unconditioned characteristic, and should separately establish a provisional characteristic. There are cases where provisional characteristics are established and not established, and the same is true for real characteristics, there are cases where they exist and do not exist.

Conditioned phenomena have change and difference, so provisional characteristics can be established. The essence of unconditioned phenomena has no difference, so why establish provisional characteristics? The unconditioned has no birth, no aging, no death, so these three perceiver-aspects should also be established. The essence has no beginning and end, and it is not multiple phenomena manifesting different positions, so unconditioned phenomena do not need to establish provisional characteristics. This principle should be carefully considered. The objector further says: The unconditioned does not belong to the world, and does not combine with the perceiver-aspect; the conditioned belongs to the world, so it combines with the perceiver-aspect. This is also incorrect. Conditioned phenomena belong to the world, and belonging to the world combines with the characteristic; the unconditioned does not belong to the world, and not belonging to the world combines with the characteristic, Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna) should be the same. The unconditioned does not belong to the world, and not belonging to the world has no provisional characteristic; the conditioned belongs to the world, and belonging to the world has no provisional characteristic. This challenge is incorrect. In order to show the difference, belonging to the world establishes a characteristic; the unconditioned itself has no difference, how can a provisional characteristic be established?

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更重難云。

論。又生等相至齊興作用。

述曰。第四四相齊興難。有三子段。第一例體應俱難　量云。汝生用時。住等三用亦應即起。體現有故。猶如生相　住等三法若起用時。生用應起。以現有體故。如住等三用。住等三用比量亦然。彼宗計為前後起故。

論。若相違故用不頓興。

述曰。子段第二例用相違難。即此古昔薩婆多。救用前後起。今論主牒用相違故用不頓起。

論。體亦相違如何俱有。

述曰。此論主難。彼若救言體不相違故得俱起。用相違故不得並者。即應難云　以體同用亦應相違。體不離用故。如用　以用從體用應不違。不離體故。如體。

此上。古薩婆多師四相用違。前後別起故為此難。正理論師為救此義。復別解云。三相用俱一時。所望別故。住引等流果。異衰其力令後果弱不及前法。其滅可知　子段第三新宗背古難。論主非之。

論。又住異滅用不應俱。

述曰。以相違故。如苦．樂受　彼若救言。誰謂相違。若爾滅相應不滅。住不相違故。如生相等。

又難此師。

論。能相所相至無別性故。

述曰。第五段有三　第一如體本有難。彼部計用離體外無。故為此難。令用同體亦本來有。

彼若救言。以

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 更重難云：

論：又生等相至齊興作用。

述曰：第四四相齊興難。有三子段。第一例體應俱難。量云：汝生用時，住等三用亦應即起。體現有故，猶如生相。住等三法若起用時，生用應起。以現有體故，如住等三用。住等三用比量亦然。彼宗計為前後起故。

論：若相違故用不頓興。

述曰：子段第二例用相違難。即此古昔薩婆多（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）。救用前後起。今論主牒用相違故用不頓起。

論：體亦相違如何俱有。

述曰：此論主難。彼若救言體不相違故得俱起。用相違故不得並者。即應難云：以體同用亦應相違。體不離用故，如用。以用從體用應不違。不離體故，如體。

此上，古薩婆多師四相用違，前後別起故為此難。正理論師為救此義，復別解云：三相用俱一時，所望別故。住引等流果，異衰其力令後果弱不及前法。其滅可知。子段第三新宗背古難。論主非之。

論：又住異滅用不應俱。

述曰：以相違故。如苦．樂受。彼若救言：誰謂相違。若爾滅相應不滅，住不相違故，如生相等。

又難此師。

論：能相所相至無別性故。

述曰：第五段有三。第一如體本有難。彼部計用離體外無。故為此難。令用同體亦本來有。

彼若救言：以

【English Translation】 English version Further Difficulties Explained:

Treatise: Furthermore, the functions of arising and other characteristics occur simultaneously.

Commentary: The fourth difficulty is that the four characteristics arise simultaneously. There are three sub-sections. The first sub-section presents the difficulty that the substance and function should occur together. Argument: When your function of arising occurs, the three functions of abiding, etc., should also arise immediately, because the substance is present, just like the characteristic of arising. If the three dharmas of abiding, etc., arise in function, the function of arising should also arise, because the substance is present, just like the three functions of abiding, etc. The inference for the three functions of abiding, etc., is similar. Their school considers them to arise sequentially.

Treatise: If they are contradictory, the functions should not arise simultaneously.

Commentary: The second sub-section presents the difficulty that the functions are contradictory. This refers to the ancient Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins, those who believe in the existence of all things). They argue that the functions arise sequentially to avoid this problem. Now, the author of the treatise states that because the functions are contradictory, they do not arise simultaneously.

Treatise: If the substances are also contradictory, how can they exist together?

Commentary: This is a difficulty raised by the author of the treatise. If they argue that the substances are not contradictory, so they can arise together, but the functions are contradictory, so they cannot occur simultaneously, then it should be argued that: Because the substance is the same, the functions should also be contradictory, because the function is inseparable from the substance, like the function. Because the function follows the substance, the function should not be contradictory, because it is inseparable from the substance, like the substance.

Above, the ancient Sarvastivada (Sarvastivadins) masters consider the functions of the four characteristics to be contradictory and arise separately, hence this difficulty. The masters of the Nyāyānusāra-śāstra (正理論師) offer another explanation to resolve this issue: the functions of the three characteristics occur simultaneously, but the focus is different. Abiding leads to the result of outflow, and the force of difference weakens the subsequent results, making them weaker than the previous dharmas. The extinction is knowable. The third sub-section presents the difficulty that the new school contradicts the old. The author of the treatise rejects this.

Treatise: Furthermore, the functions of abiding and ceasing should not occur together.

Commentary: Because they are contradictory, like suffering and pleasure. If they argue: Who says they are contradictory? In that case, the extinction should not extinguish, because abiding is not contradictory, like arising, etc.

Furthermore, a difficulty is raised against this master.

Treatise: Because the acting characteristic and the acted-upon characteristic have no separate nature.

Commentary: The fifth section has three parts. The first presents the difficulty that the function is originally inherent in the substance. That school considers that the function does not exist outside the substance. Hence this difficulty is raised, making the function the same as the substance and originally inherent.

If they argue: Because

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待因．緣用不頓起。因謂同類因等。緣謂餘三緣　次子段第二因非本有難。論主答破。

論。若謂彼用至應非本有。

述曰。此既本有何不頓生。所待因緣若先無者。便違自執。論主亦然。種子體本有。何不用恒生種子體本無。理應無種子。若以假故要待緣。合方生。我亦實故要待實緣方起。汝實緣現有。何不恒合。汝假緣恒有。何不頓生。解云。虛疏之法。緣雖現有種。更無外緣。即不能起。以劣弱故。汝之實法何得例然。此義應思。

正理論師復救之曰。法待因．緣故不頓起。因有親疏。緣法亦爾。親因雖有。無疏緣用。亦不得生。如雖有種。水不合時。芽不生故。次子段第三生等無能難。論主破。

論。又執生等便為無用。

述曰。既有同類親因緣體。余緣亦合。即已得生。故執生等便為無用。既有水．種復待餘生。如是橫執實為無用。

論。所相恒有至亦有生等。

述曰。第六體等相同難。又所相法三世恒有。而言有生等來與法合。汝之無為體恒有。應有生等合。以此返成無為無生等。有為亦應然。此中比量返覆可知。

論。彼此異因不可得故。

述曰。彼若救言三世之法是有為故。與生等合。無為體常住。何得有生等。難云。三世之法體有為。即

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 待因緣和合才能生起作用，不是立即產生的。『因』指的是同類因等等，『緣』指的是其餘三種緣。 接下來是第二子段，『因』不是本來就有的這個難點，論主進行了解釋和駁斥。

論：如果說它們的作用需要等待因緣才能產生，那麼它們應該不是本來就有的。

述曰：如果它們是本來就有的，為什麼不能立即產生呢？如果所等待的因緣先前沒有，就違背了你自己的主張。論主也是這樣認為的。如果種子的體性是本來就有的，為什麼不能恒常產生呢？如果種子的體性本來就沒有，那麼按道理就不應該有種子。如果因為是假有的緣故，必須要等待因緣聚合才能產生，那麼我也是因為是實有的緣故，必須要等待真實的因緣才能生起。你的真實因緣現在已經存在，為什麼不能恒常聚合呢？你的假有因緣恒常存在，為什麼不能立即產生呢？解釋說，虛疏之法，即使因緣現在存在，種子如果沒有其他外緣，也不能生起，因為它們是劣弱的。你的實有之法怎麼能和它們相比呢？這個道理應該仔細思考。

正理論師再次辯解說：法需要等待因緣，所以不能立即產生。因有親疏之分，緣法也是如此。即使有親因，如果沒有疏緣的作用，也不能產生，就像即使有種子，如果沒有水分，芽也不會生長。接下來是第三子段，生等（生、住、異、滅）沒有作用這個難點，論主進行駁斥。

論：如果這樣認為，那麼生等就沒有作用了。

述曰：既然有同類的親因緣體，其餘的緣也聚合了，就已經可以產生，所以認為生等就沒有作用了。既然有水分和種子，又等待其他的生，像這樣橫加執著，實在是無用的。

論：所相恒常存在，卻說有生等來與法聚合。

述曰：第六體等相同難。又所相法三世恒常存在，卻說有生等來與法聚合。你的無為法體恒常存在，應該有生等聚合，用這個來反駁，就成了無為法沒有生等。有為法也應該這樣。這裡面的比量可以反覆推敲。

論：彼此不同的因是不可得的。

述曰：如果他們辯解說，三世之法是有為法，所以與生等聚合，無為法體是常住的，怎麼會有生等呢？反駁說，三世之法的體是有為法，那麼

【English Translation】 English version Effects arise from the combination of causes (hetu) and conditions (pratyaya), not instantaneously. 'Cause' refers to similar causes, etc., and 'condition' refers to the other three conditions. Next is the second subsection, addressing the difficulty that 'cause' is not originally existent, which the author explains and refutes.

Treatise: If it is said that their function arises only by awaiting causes and conditions, then they should not be originally existent.

Commentary: If they are originally existent, why do they not arise instantaneously? If the awaited causes and conditions did not exist previously, it would contradict your own assertion. The author also thinks this way. If the nature of the seed is originally existent, why does it not constantly produce? If the nature of the seed is originally non-existent, then logically there should be no seed. If it is because it is provisionally existent and must await the aggregation of causes and conditions to arise, then I also say that because it is truly existent, it must await true causes and conditions to arise. Your true causes and conditions are now present, why do they not constantly aggregate? Your provisionally existent conditions are constantly present, why do they not arise instantaneously? The explanation is that for empty and sparse phenomena, even if the conditions are present, the seed cannot arise without other external conditions because they are inferior and weak. How can your truly existent phenomena be compared to them? This principle should be carefully considered.

The Sautrāntika (Pravādī) again argues: Phenomena do not arise instantaneously because they await causes and conditions. Causes have close and distant relationships, and so do conditional phenomena. Even if there is a close cause, it cannot arise without the function of a distant condition, just as a sprout does not grow without water even if there is a seed. Next is the third subsection, addressing the difficulty that origination, etc. (birth, abiding, change, cessation) are useless, which the author refutes.

Treatise: If this is the case, then origination, etc., are useless.

Commentary: Since there is a similar cause and condition, and the other conditions are also aggregated, it can already arise, so it is considered that origination, etc., are useless. Since there is water and a seed, and it still awaits other origination, such arbitrary attachment is truly useless.

Treatise: The characterized (lakṣaṇa) is always present, yet it is said that origination, etc., come to combine with the phenomenon.

Commentary: The sixth difficulty is the sameness of essence, etc. Furthermore, the characterized phenomena are always present in the three times, yet it is said that origination, etc., come to combine with the phenomenon. Your unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) dharma is eternally existent, it should have origination, etc., combining with it. Using this to refute, it becomes that the unconditioned dharma has no origination, etc. Conditioned (saṃskṛta) dharmas should also be the same. The inference here can be repeatedly examined.

Treatise: Because different causes for each other are unobtainable.

Commentary: If they argue that the phenomena of the three times are conditioned, so they combine with origination, etc., while the nature of the unconditioned is permanent, how can there be origination, etc.? The refutation is that the nature of the phenomena of the three times is conditioned, then

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有有為之相合。無為體常住。應有無為之相合。又彼救言有為有起可待相合。無為無生不須相合。難云。無為無起不須相合。有為體起何須相合。由如是理徴難不窮。故次論云。彼此異因不可得故。因者所以。

論。又去來世至非實有性。

述曰。第七有．無乖角難。有二。初難后結。難中有四子段。第一定世有無難。欲破生滅無。先破世非有。量云。去．來二世。非實有體。非現在故。及非常故。如空華等。非常之言簡無為法。此定去．來無。

次子段第二生．滅非依難。

論。生名為有至應非現在。

述曰。生法名有。未來既無。如何有生在彼無世。現在既是有。過去名為無。滅體令法無。應非是現在故。應滅相在過去世。薩婆多說在現在故。

彼復救言。誰言滅相其體是無令成過去。

論。滅．若非無生應非有。

述曰。子段第三滅．生相翻難。此論主難。生．滅體相違。生法體是有。滅．生相返故。滅法體成無。滅體若非無。生應非是有。然正理師。未來之世生有功能。及過去有與果功能而非作用。作用唯現在。即是取果用。此亦不然。何不去．來法皆令有功能。生非作用。與果亦非是作用故。即未來一切法應恒時生。過去一切法應恒與果。若言作用說現

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有為之相與無為之相，二者如何相合？無為之體是常住不變的。如果說有為與無為可以相合，那麼有為法生起時，可以等待因緣和合而生。但無為法不生不滅，不需要任何相合。有人反駁說：無為法既然不生起，自然不需要相合；但有為法的生起，又為何需要相合呢？如果按照這樣的邏輯來辯論，那麼爭論將永無止境。因此，接下來的論述是：因為彼此的因不同，所以無法相合。這裡的『因』指的是原因或理由。 論：過去和未來二世，並非真實存在。 述曰：第七個難點是有為和無為的矛盾之處，包含兩個部分。首先是提出問題，然後是總結。在問題中包含四個小部分。第一部分是確定過去和未來二世的『有』和『無』的難題。爲了駁斥『生滅』的觀點，首先要駁斥過去和未來二世的『非有』。可以這樣論證：過去和未來二世，並非真實存在的實體，因為它們不是現在，也不是常住不變的，就像虛空中的花朵一樣。『非常』這個詞是爲了排除無為法。 接下來是第二小部分，關於『生』和『滅』不互相依存的難題。 論：『生』被稱為『有』，既然未來世不存在，那麼『生』又如何在不存在的未來世中產生？現在世被稱為『有』，過去世被稱為『無』，『滅』使法歸於無，那麼『滅』就不應該存在於現在世。『滅相』應該存在於過去世，但薩婆多（Sarvastivada）宗派認為『滅相』存在於現在世。 對方辯解說：誰說『滅相』的本體是『無』，從而導致成為過去世？ 論：如果『滅』不是『無』，那麼『生』就不應該是『有』。 述曰：第三小部分是關於『滅』和『生』相互顛倒的難題。這是論主的提問。『生』和『滅』的本體是相互對立的。『生』的本體是『有』，因為『滅』和『生』是相反的，所以『滅』的本體就應該是『無』。如果『滅』的本體不是『無』，那麼『生』就不應該是『有』。然而，正理師（Nyaya）認為，未來世具有產生的功能，過去世具有給予果報的功能，但這些都不是實際的作用。實際的作用只存在於現在世，也就是獲取果報的作用。這種說法是不對的。為什麼不讓過去和未來世的法都具有功能，而『生』不是作用，給予果報也不是作用呢？如果這樣，那麼未來世的一切法應該恒常生起，過去世的一切法應該恒常給予果報。如果說作用只存在於現在世。

【English Translation】 English version: How can the characteristics of 'being' (有為, Youwei) and 'non-being' (無為, Wuwei) be combined? The essence of 'non-being' is constant and unchanging. If it is said that 'being' and 'non-being' can be combined, then when a conditioned phenomenon arises, it can wait for the combination of causes and conditions to arise. But 'non-being' neither arises nor ceases, and does not require any combination. Someone retorts: Since 'non-being' does not arise, it naturally does not need to be combined; but why does the arising of 'being' need to be combined? If one argues according to this logic, then the debate will never end. Therefore, the following discussion is: because the causes of each are different, they cannot be combined. The 'cause' here refers to the reason or justification. Treatise: The past and future are not truly existent. Commentary: The seventh difficulty is the contradiction between 'being' and 'non-being', which contains two parts. The first is to raise the question, and the second is to summarize. The question contains four subsections. The first part is to determine the difficulty of 'existence' and 'non-existence' in the past and future. In order to refute the view of 'arising and ceasing', one must first refute the 'non-existence' of the past and future. It can be argued that the past and future are not truly existent entities because they are not the present, nor are they constant, like flowers in the sky. The word 'non-constant' is to exclude 'unconditioned dharmas'. The next is the second subsection, concerning the difficulty that 'arising' and 'ceasing' are not interdependent. Treatise: 'Arising' is called 'existence'. Since the future does not exist, how can 'arising' arise in the non-existent future? The present is called 'existence', and the past is called 'non-existence'. 'Cessation' causes the dharma to return to non-existence, so 'cessation' should not exist in the present. The 'characteristic of cessation' should exist in the past, but the Sarvastivada school says that the 'characteristic of cessation' exists in the present. The opponent argues: Who says that the essence of 'cessation' is 'non-existence', thus causing it to become the past? Treatise: If 'cessation' is not 'non-existence', then 'arising' should not be 'existence'. Commentary: The third subsection is about the difficulty of 'cessation' and 'arising' being reversed. This is the question of the treatise master. The essence of 'arising' and 'cessation' are opposed to each other. The essence of 'arising' is 'existence', and because 'cessation' and 'arising' are opposite, the essence of 'cessation' should be 'non-existence'. If the essence of 'cessation' is not 'non-existence', then 'arising' should not be 'existence'. However, the Nyaya school believes that the future has the function of producing, and the past has the function of giving retribution, but these are not actual functions. The actual function only exists in the present, which is the function of obtaining retribution. This statement is incorrect. Why not let the dharmas of the past and future have functions, while 'arising' is not a function, and giving retribution is not a function? If so, then all dharmas of the future should constantly arise, and all dharmas of the past should constantly give retribution. If it is said that the function only exists in the present.

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在。過．未說功能。即現在有功能。應名為過．未。唯住相取果可名作用。異．滅不能取果。即是功能。便非現在。若謂作用不要取果。即顯生相亦非功能。此義應審。諸論無有。婆沙第三說未來三法有作用者。復如何通。

論。又滅違住至何容異世。

述曰。子段第四違同須異難。又滅能滅法。住能住法。體是相違。寧執同世。住既不違生。一種令法有。何容返異世。故應生．住同在現時。滅相體無令成過去。滅應與住世定不同。

論。故彼所執進退非理。

述曰。第二總結非也。進為相違。體不得俱有。退不相返。用何不齊生。又進非理。應滅與住不同時。退非理。生．住例應同世。又進住．滅異世。便違自宗。退住．滅世同。復乖正理。別破異相如俱舍說。即前異不成。異前非一法。廣說如彼。今略不破。

論。然有為法至假立四相。

述曰。下述自義　文有其二。初申自義。后結成假　初述正義。文復有五。初簡他宗說立相意。文意可知。

論。本無今有至無時名滅。

述曰。自下第二說相相狀　言四相者。即本無今有等法。暫停名住。與前後念法別名異。生．滅可知。此並如菩薩地四十六卷說。

論。前三有故至故在過去。

述曰。第三約

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：如果說『過』、『未』（過去和未來）具有功能，也就是現在具有功能，那麼應該稱之為『過』、『未』嗎？只有『住相』（事物保持不變的狀態）才能產生結果，可以稱之為作用。『異』（變化）和『滅』（消滅）不能產生結果，如果它們是功能，那就不是現在。如果說作用不需要產生結果，那就表明『生相』（產生）也不是功能。這個道理應該仔細審查，各種論著中都沒有提到。如果《婆沙論》第三卷說未來三種法具有作用，又該如何解釋？

論：而且『滅』與『住』相違背，怎麼能存在於同一時期？

述曰：這是子段第四部分，通過『違』（相違）和『同』（相同）來提出疑問。『滅』能夠消滅法，『住』能夠使法保持，它們的本體是相違背的，怎麼能堅持它們存在於同一時期？『住』既然不違背『生』，以同一種方式使法存在，怎麼能反而存在於不同的時期？所以，『生』和『住』應該同時存在於現在，『滅相』的本體不存在，從而成為過去。『滅』應該與『住』存在於不同的時期。

論：所以他們所堅持的進退都是沒有道理的。

述曰：這是第二部分，總結說他們的觀點是不對的。『進』（如果認為『滅』和『住』不同時）是因為它們相違背，本體不能同時存在。『退』（如果認為『生』和『住』同時）是因為它們不互相違背，為什麼不能同時產生？而且，『進』是沒有道理的，『滅』應該與『住』不同時。『退』是沒有道理的，『生』和『住』應該像那樣存在於同一時期。而且，『進』認為『住』和『滅』存在於不同的時期，就違背了他們自己的宗派。『退』認為『住』和『滅』存在於同一時期，又違背了正確的道理。分別破斥『異相』（不同的相）就像《俱舍論》所說的那樣，也就是前面的『異』不能成立，與前面的『非一法』不同。詳細的論述就像《俱舍論》所說的那樣，現在簡略地不破斥。

論：然而，有為法（由因緣和合而成的法）是假立的四相。

述曰：下面陳述自己的觀點。文章分為兩個部分，首先闡述自己的觀點，然後總結成假立。首先陳述正確的觀點，文章又分為五個部分，首先簡要說明其他宗派建立『相』的意圖，文章的意思可以理解。

論：本來沒有現在有，直到沒有的時候稱為『滅』。

述曰：從下面開始，第二部分說明『相』的相狀。所說的『四相』，就是本來沒有現在有等等法，暫時停止稱為『住』，與前後唸的法不同稱為『異』，『生』和『滅』可以理解。這些都像《菩薩地》第四十六卷所說的那樣。

論：因為前三個存在，所以在過去。

述曰：第三部分關於

【English Translation】 English version: Question: If we say that 'past' and 'future' have functions, that is, they have functions in the present, should they be called 'past' and 'future'? Only 'sthita-lakṣaṇa' (the state of remaining unchanged) can produce results, which can be called function. 'Anyathātva' (change) and 'nirodha' (cessation) cannot produce results. If they are functions, then they are not present. If it is said that function does not need to produce results, then it shows that 'utpāda-lakṣaṇa' (arising) is also not a function. This principle should be carefully examined, and it is not mentioned in various treatises. If the third volume of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra says that the three future dharmas have functions, how can this be explained?

Treatise: Moreover, 'nirodha' contradicts 'sthiti', how can they exist in the same period?

Commentary: This is the fourth part of the sub-section, raising questions through 'virodha' (contradiction) and 'samatva' (sameness). 'Nirodha' can extinguish dharmas, and 'sthiti' can maintain dharmas. Their essence is contradictory, how can one insist that they exist in the same period? Since 'sthiti' does not contradict 'utpāda', using the same method to make dharmas exist, how can they exist in different periods instead? Therefore, 'utpāda' and 'sthiti' should exist in the present at the same time, and the essence of 'nirodha-lakṣaṇa' does not exist, thus becoming the past. 'Nirodha' should exist in a different period from 'sthiti'.

Treatise: Therefore, their insistence on advancement and retreat is unreasonable.

Commentary: This is the second part, concluding that their views are incorrect. 'Advancement' (if it is thought that 'nirodha' and 'sthiti' are not at the same time) is because they contradict each other, and their essence cannot exist at the same time. 'Retreat' (if it is thought that 'utpāda' and 'sthiti' are at the same time) is because they do not contradict each other, why can't they arise at the same time? Moreover, 'advancement' is unreasonable, 'nirodha' should not be at the same time as 'sthiti'. 'Retreat' is unreasonable, 'utpāda' and 'sthiti' should exist in the same period like that. Moreover, 'advancement' believes that 'sthiti' and 'nirodha' exist in different periods, which violates their own sect. 'Retreat' believes that 'sthiti' and 'nirodha' exist in the same period, which violates the correct principle. Refuting 'anyathātva-lakṣaṇa' (the characteristic of difference) separately is like what the Abhidharmakośa says, that is, the previous 'difference' cannot be established, which is different from the previous 'non-one dharma'. Detailed discussions are like what the Abhidharmakośa says, and now it is briefly not refuted.

Treatise: However, conditioned dharmas (dharmas that arise from causes and conditions) are provisionally established as the four characteristics.

Commentary: Below, state one's own views. The article is divided into two parts. First, explain one's own views, and then summarize them as provisional establishments. First, state the correct view, and the article is divided into five parts. First, briefly explain the intention of other sects to establish 'lakṣaṇa' (characteristics), and the meaning of the article can be understood.

Treatise: Originally non-existent, now existent, until the time of non-existence is called 'nirodha'.

Commentary: Starting from below, the second part explains the characteristics of 'lakṣaṇa'. The so-called 'four characteristics' are dharmas such as originally non-existent and now existent, temporarily stopping is called 'sthiti', being different from the dharmas of the previous and subsequent moments is called 'anyathātva', and 'utpāda' and 'nirodha' can be understood. These are all like what the forty-sixth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says.

Treatise: Because the first three exist, they are in the past.

Commentary: The third part is about

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世辨相。

論。如何無法與有為相。

述曰。第四釋難。此外人問　滅若是無。如何與現在有體法為相。

論。表此後無為相何失。

述曰。此論主答。不表法現在。但表法后無。因明者。說無得為無因故亦無過　若爾即龜毛等應立為相　答此不同彼。非后無故。本無今無故非是相。即現在法於後無時。名之為滅。假言過去。過去體無。實非彼世。

論。生表有法乃至暫有用。

述曰。此文正述說相所由。及相所表。意義可知。

論。故此四相至而表有異。

述曰。雖於一法義別說四。所望既異故表不同。

論。此依剎那至亦得假立。

述曰。第五立一期。此中四表但約剎那。然一期生十時分位。亦得假立。一剎那立同薩婆多。一期等立同正量部。合二立者同經部師。

論。初有名生至轉變名異。

述曰。此則正敘一期四相。菩薩地說剎那四相。餘論等處但約一期。此中通說。彼皆互舉。同顯揚．及瑜伽八十八說。諸論皆說剎那之異。唯望於前。此說于異亦望於後。諸論通說一切有情。無學末心無後法故唯望前作。此論亦說除彼末心。余有情類可有為語。亦不相違。既一期生自望為相。故立異相依轉變立。不同剎那望前後法。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 世間的辨別相。

論：如何使『無法』與『有為』相互關聯？

述曰：這是第四個解釋難題。此外人提問：如果『滅』是『無』，如何與現在的『有』實體法相互關聯？

論：用『后無』來表示，作為相有什麼不妥？

述曰：這是論主的回答。不表示法現在存在，只表示法之後的『無』。因為明者說『無』可以作為『無』的原因，所以沒有過失。如果這樣，那麼像龜毛等不存在的事物也應該被立為相。回答說，這與龜毛等不同，因為龜毛等不是『后無』，而是『本無』，所以不是相。即現在法在之後變為『無』的時候，稱之為『滅』，假名為過去。過去體已經不存在，實際上不是那個時代。

論：『生』表示有法，乃至暫時的作用。

述曰：這段文字正是描述『相』產生的由來，以及『相』所表示的內容，意義可以理解。

論：因此這四相，到來而表示『有』的差異。

述曰：雖然對於一個法，因為意義不同而說了四種相，但所期望的不同，所以表示的也不同。

論：這依據剎那，乃至也可以假立一期。

述曰：第五，建立一期。這其中的四相，只是就剎那而言。然而一期生起，有十個時分位，也可以假立。一個剎那的建立，如同薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）。一期的建立，如同正量部（Sammitiya）。合二者建立的，如同經部師（Sautrantika）。

論：最初名為『生』，乃至轉變名為『異』。

述曰：這正是敘述一期的四相。《菩薩地持經》說剎那四相，其他論等處只說一期。這裡是通說，他們都是互相舉例。如同《顯揚聖教論》以及《瑜伽師地論》第八十八卷所說。諸論都說剎那的差異，只是相對於前面。這裡說差異，也相對於後面。諸論通說一切有情，無學末心沒有後面的法，所以只相對於前面而作。此論也說除了那個末心，其餘有情可以有『有為』的說法，也不相違背。既然一期生起是自身相對為相，所以建立『異相』是依據轉變而建立的，不同於剎那相對於前後法。

論：

【English Translation】 English version Distinguishing characteristics of the world.

Treatise: How can 'non-existence' be related to 'conditioned existence'?

Commentary: This is the fourth explanation of the difficulty. An outsider asks: If 'cessation' (滅, nirodha) is 'non-existence', how can it be related to the present 'existent' (有, bhava) entity-dharma?

Treatise: What is wrong with using 'subsequent non-existence' to represent a characteristic?

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. It does not represent the dharma as presently existing, but only represents the 'non-existence' after the dharma. Because the wise say that 'non-existence' can be the cause of 'non-existence', there is no fault. If so, then things like turtle hair, which do not exist, should also be established as characteristics. The answer is that this is different from turtle hair, etc., because turtle hair is not 'subsequently non-existent' but 'originally non-existent', so it is not a characteristic. That is, when a present dharma becomes 'non-existent' afterward, it is called 'cessation', nominally called the past. The past entity no longer exists; in reality, it is not that time.

Treatise: 'Birth' (生, jāti) represents the existence of a dharma, even if only for a temporary function.

Commentary: This passage precisely describes the origin of the 'characteristics' and what the 'characteristics' represent. The meaning is understandable.

Treatise: Therefore, these four characteristics arrive and represent the differences in 'existence'.

Commentary: Although four characteristics are spoken of for one dharma because of different meanings, what is expected is different, so what is represented is also different.

Treatise: This is based on a kshana (剎那, moment), and even a period (一期, eka-kāla) can be provisionally established.

Commentary: Fifth, establishing a period. The four characteristics here are only in terms of a kshana. However, in the arising of a period, there are ten time divisions, which can also be provisionally established. The establishment of a kshana is like that of the Sarvastivada (薩婆多, 一切有部). The establishment of a period is like that of the Sammitiya (正量部). Combining the two is like that of the Sautrantika (經部師).

Treatise: Initially named 'birth', and the transformation is named 'difference' (異, anyathātva).

Commentary: This is precisely describing the four characteristics of a period. The Bodhisattvabhumi (菩薩地持經) speaks of the four characteristics of a kshana, while other treatises only speak of a period. This is a general explanation; they are all giving examples to each other. As stated in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) chapter eighty-eight and the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations (顯揚聖教論). The treatises all speak of the differences of a kshana, only in relation to what comes before. Here, the difference is also in relation to what comes after. The treatises generally speak of all sentient beings. The final mind of a non-learner (無學末心, asekha-antima-citta) has no subsequent dharma, so it only acts in relation to what comes before. This treatise also says that apart from that final mind, other sentient beings can have the statement of 'conditioned existence', which is not contradictory. Since the arising of a period is in relation to itself as a characteristic, the establishment of 'difference' is based on transformation, unlike a kshana in relation to the preceding and following dharmas.

Treatise:

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。是故四相皆是假立。

述曰。總結相假遮外實法。言四相者。帶數釋名。相者相狀。標印名相。由此標法知是有為。諸門分別如余處說。

論。復如何知至名句文身。

述曰。自下第六破名．句等身。此則論主初問外人。

論。契經說故至名句文身。

述曰。外人第二舉經答有。謂成佛時。得未曾有名身等故。

論。此經不說至為證不成。

述曰。論主第三總非外人引經說有。

論。若名句文至非實能詮。

述曰。此下別破中有五。第一論主別出理非。如色非詮難。色等異聲體是實有非實能詮。名等應爾。量云。如汝所說實名．句等。非實能詮。汝許異聲有實體故。如色．香等。我宗所許名等。異聲實體無故。聲為能詮。汝許異聲有。如色非能詮。

論。謂聲能生至何用名等。

述曰。下第二名等無用難。更責外非。汝計生名等聲定有屈曲。此屈曲聲足能詮義。何用計離聲外別有名等。薩婆多雖有名由聲顯。生二義。今取生破。顯類破之。

正理師救云。聲上屈曲是名．句．文。體異於聲而定實有。

論。若謂聲上至異聲實有。

述曰。此下第三聲．色無差難。論主牒云若謂如此者。

次下正難。

論。所見

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，四相（生相、住相、異相、滅相）都是虛假安立的。

述曰：總結四相是假立，遮遣外道認為實有之法。所說的『四相』，是帶數字的解釋名稱。『相』是指事物的相狀，是標示和印證的名稱。通過這些標示，可以知道法是有為法。各種門類的分別，如同其他地方所說。

論：又如何知道名、句、文身（nama-kaya, pada-kaya, vyanjana-kaya）是實有呢？

述曰：從下面第六段開始，破斥名、句等身。這是論主最初對外人的提問。

論：因為契經（sutra）中這樣說，所以名、句、文身是實有的。

述曰：外人第二次引用經典來回答說有。認為成佛的時候，獲得了前所未有的名身等。

論：這部經並沒有說，所以不能作為證據。

述曰：論主第三次總的否定外人引用經典來說明實有。

論：如果名、句、文身是實有，那麼就不是真實能詮釋意義的。

述曰：下面分別破斥，共有五點。第一點，論主分別提出理證來否定。如同用色法不能詮釋意義來反駁一樣。色等不同於聲音，本體是實有，但不是真實能詮釋意義的。名等也應該是這樣。可以這樣推理：如同你所說的實有的名、句等，不是真實能詮釋意義的，因為你承認它們不同於聲音，有實體，如同色、香等。而我宗所承認的名等，因為不同於聲音，沒有實體，所以聲音才能詮釋意義。你承認不同於聲音是實有的，如同色法不能詮釋意義。

論：如果說聲音能夠產生意義，那麼要名等有什麼用呢？

述曰：下面第二點，用名等無用進行反駁。進一步責難外道。你認為產生名等的音聲一定有屈曲變化。這種屈曲變化的音聲就足以詮釋意義，為什麼還要認為在聲音之外另有名等呢？薩婆多（Sarvastivada）雖然認為名由聲音顯現，產生兩種意義。現在取產生來破斥，用顯現來類比破斥。

正理師（Nyaya）辯解說：聲音上的屈曲就是名、句、文，本體不同於聲音，而且一定是實有的。

論：如果認為聲音上的屈曲就是名、句、文，那麼就應該像所見到的色法一樣，不同於聲音，是實有的。

述曰：下面第三點，用聲音和色法沒有差別來反駁。論主先複述說：如果認為這樣的話。

接下來正式反駁。

論：所見...

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, the four characteristics (birth, duration, change, and extinction) are all falsely established.

Commentary: This summarizes that the four characteristics are falsely established, refuting the externalists' view of real existence. The 'four characteristics' are named with a numerical prefix. 'Characteristic' refers to the appearance of things, which are labels and marks. Through these marks, it can be known that the dharma is conditioned. The distinctions of various categories are as described elsewhere.

Treatise: How do we know that nama-kaya (name-body), pada-kaya (phrase-body), and vyanjana-kaya (letter-body) are real?

Commentary: From the sixth section below, refuting the name-body, phrase-body, etc. This is the treatise master's initial question to the externalist.

Treatise: Because the sutras say so, nama-kaya, pada-kaya, and vyanjana-kaya are real.

Commentary: The externalist responds for the second time by citing scriptures to assert their existence, claiming that at the time of enlightenment, one obtains unprecedented name-body, etc.

Treatise: This sutra does not say that, so it cannot be used as evidence.

Commentary: The treatise master refutes the externalist's citation of scriptures to prove real existence for the third time.

Treatise: If name-body, phrase-body, and letter-body are real, then they are not truly capable of expressing meaning.

Commentary: Below are separate refutations, totaling five points. First, the treatise master presents logical arguments to refute them. It's like refuting with the argument that form cannot express meaning. Form, etc., are different from sound, and their substance is real, but they are not truly capable of expressing meaning. Name-body, etc., should be the same. It can be reasoned as follows: Like the real name-body, phrase-body, etc., that you speak of, they are not truly capable of expressing meaning because you admit that they are different from sound and have substance, like form, smell, etc. And the name-body, etc., that our school admits, because they are different from sound and have no substance, sound can express meaning. You admit that being different from sound is real, just as form cannot express meaning.

Treatise: If sound can produce meaning, then what is the use of name-body, etc.?

Commentary: The second point below uses the uselessness of name-body, etc., to refute. Further questioning the externalist. You believe that the sound that produces name-body, etc., must have inflections. This inflected sound is sufficient to express meaning, so why do you need to think that there are separate name-body, etc., apart from sound? Although the Sarvastivadins believe that name is manifested by sound, producing two meanings. Now, take 'produce' to refute, and use 'manifest' to analogously refute.

The Naiyayikas (Nyaya) defend by saying: The inflections on the sound are the name-body, phrase-body, and letter-body, whose substance is different from sound and must be real.

Treatise: If you think that the inflections on the sound are the name-body, phrase-body, and letter-body, then they should be like the seen form, different from sound, and real.

Commentary: The third point below uses the lack of difference between sound and form to refute. The treatise master first restates: If you think like this.

Next is the formal refutation.

Treatise: What is seen...

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色上至別有實體。

述曰。色等法上形量屈曲。即是長．短．方．圓．表等。或即書上文字。亦是色之屈曲。然色之屈曲。不異於色即色處攝。聲上屈曲。應不異聲聲處所收。量云。聲之屈曲。應非離所依別有實體法處所收。色蘊上屈曲故。或色．聲二色之上隨一屈曲故。如色處長等。若不言法處所收。同喻便有所立不成。又汝色上屈曲。應別有體法處所收。色蘊上屈曲故。如聲上屈曲等。此中外例亦復如是。汝大乘師聲上屈曲。雖體非實。仍法處收。色上屈曲。應體非實法處所攝。若以聲能顯義。有教性故。意識所得故法處收。假立名等我宗亦爾。彼此異因不可得故　此義不然。不唯依聲立名等故。亦依光明等而假立故。既依多法唯意所緣。故法處收。不可難言戒體但依思應別處攝。現同處故。

自下第四例聲生語詮難。

論。若謂聲上至非能詮者。

述曰。下第四段。子段有四。第一隨他不詮難。牒彼救言。語聲上屈曲。非能詮表。聲上屈曲故。如絃管聲。又此屈曲是聲體性故。如色上屈曲。即色體性。此不能詮。由此故知別有名等。

論。此應如彼聲不別生名等。

述曰。此正難云。如彼絃管聲雖有屈曲。不能生名等。此語聲上屈曲。例亦應爾。量云。汝內屈曲聲。不能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於色法（Rūpa，物質現象）之上是否存在獨立的實體：

論述：色法等事物上的形狀、大小、彎曲等，就是長、短、方、圓等表現。或者書本上的文字，也是色法的彎曲。然而，色法的彎曲並不異於色法本身，因此被歸於色處（Rūpāyatana，色界）。聲音上的彎曲，也應該不異於聲音本身，而被歸於聲處（Śabdāyatana，聲界）。有人反駁說：『聲音的彎曲，不應該脫離其所依之物而成為獨立的實體，因此被歸於法處（Dharmāyatana，法界）。』這是因為色蘊（Rūpaskandha，色蘊）上有彎曲的緣故，或者因為色法、聲音這兩種色法之上都有彎曲的緣故，就像色處中的長短等一樣。如果不說法處所包含，那麼類比就無法成立。

此外，你所說的色法上的彎曲，應該是一個獨立的實體，因此被歸於法處，因為色蘊上有彎曲的緣故，就像聲音上的彎曲一樣。這裡的外道例子也是如此。你們大乘的老師認為，聲音上的彎曲，雖然其體性並非真實存在，但仍然被歸於法處；色法上的彎曲，也應該其體性並非真實存在，而被歸於法處。如果因為聲音能夠表達意義，具有教說的性質，並且被意識所感知，所以被歸於法處，那麼我們宗派也可以假立名相等，原因是一樣的，無法區分。』

這種說法是不對的，因為名相等不僅僅依賴於聲音而建立，也依賴於光明等而假立。既然依賴於多種法，並且僅僅是意識所緣，所以被歸於法處。不能以此來反駁說戒體（Śīlaskandha，戒蘊）僅僅依賴於思，應該被歸於其他處，因為它們現在處於同一處。

下面是第四個例子，用聲音產生語言詮釋來反駁。

論：如果認為聲音上的彎曲不能表達意義。

論述：下面是第四段，子段有四個。第一，隨順他人不詮釋的觀點進行反駁。重複對方的觀點：語言的聲音上的彎曲，不能表達意義，因為是聲音上的彎曲，就像絃樂器或管樂器的聲音一樣。此外，這種彎曲是聲音的體性，就像色法上的彎曲是色法的體性一樣。這種彎曲不能表達意義，因此可以知道存在獨立的名相等。

論：這應該像那些聲音一樣，不能獨立產生名相等。

論述：這是直接反駁說：就像絃樂器或管樂器的聲音，雖然有彎曲，但不能產生名相等，這種語言的聲音上的彎曲，也應該如此。論證如下：你內在的彎曲的聲音，不能……

【English Translation】 English version: On whether there is a separate entity on Rūpa (matter or form):

Explanation: The shapes, sizes, and curvatures on things like Rūpa are the expressions of length, shortness, squareness, roundness, etc. Or the characters on a book are also curvatures of Rūpa. However, the curvature of Rūpa is not different from Rūpa itself, so it is included in Rūpāyatana (sphere of form). The curvature of sound should also not be different from sound itself and should be included in Śabdāyatana (sphere of sound). Someone argues: 'The curvature of sound should not be separated from its basis and become an independent entity, so it is included in Dharmāyatana (sphere of phenomena).' This is because there is curvature on Rūpaskandha (aggregate of form), or because there is curvature on both Rūpa and sound, just like length and shortness in Rūpāyatana. If it is not said to be included in Dharmāyatana, then the analogy cannot be established.

Furthermore, the curvature on Rūpa that you mentioned should be an independent entity, so it is included in Dharmāyatana, because there is curvature on Rūpaskandha, just like the curvature on sound. The example of the heretics here is also the same. Your Mahāyāna teachers believe that the curvature on sound, although its nature is not real, is still included in Dharmāyatana; the curvature on Rūpa should also be included in Dharmāyatana, even though its nature is not real. If it is because sound can express meaning, has the nature of teaching, and is perceived by consciousness, so it is included in Dharmāyatana, then our sect can also hypothetically establish name and so on, because the reason is the same and cannot be distinguished.'

This statement is incorrect, because name and so on are not only established based on sound, but also hypothetically established based on light and so on. Since it depends on multiple dharmas and is only perceived by consciousness, it is included in Dharmāyatana. It cannot be refuted by saying that Śīlaskandha (aggregate of morality) only depends on thought and should be included in other places, because they are now in the same place.

The following is the fourth example, refuting with the interpretation of language produced by sound.

Treatise: If it is thought that the curvature on sound cannot express meaning.

Explanation: The following is the fourth section, with four subsections. First, refute by following others' views of non-interpretation. Repeat the other party's point of view: the curvature on the sound of language cannot express meaning, because it is the curvature on sound, just like the sound of stringed instruments or wind instruments. In addition, this curvature is the nature of sound, just like the curvature on Rūpa is the nature of Rūpa. This curvature cannot express meaning, so it can be known that there are independent names and so on.

Treatise: This should be like those sounds, which cannot independently produce names and so on.

Explanation: This is a direct refutation saying: just like the sound of stringed instruments or wind instruments, although there is curvature, it cannot produce names and so on, the curvature on the sound of this language should also be like this. The argument is as follows: your inner curved sound cannot...

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生實名。聲屈曲故。如絃管聲。又若語聲上屈曲。即能生名。絃管屈曲。不能生名。我亦如是。語聲上屈曲能詮表義。弦上屈曲不能詮表。如生名相似故。言此應如彼聲不別生名等。他宗許弦上屈曲不別生名。

此即且就他宗為論且例令齊。此下復出己之正義。

論。又誰說彼定不能詮。

述曰。第二子段。正義詮同難。我亦不說弦上屈曲非不能詮。但如汝化人身．語二業非善．惡性。今大乘因俱故。如林聲說法。亦得有善等。離質化不廢通善。汝若以聲上屈曲。例同於色。不能詮表。我亦以色上屈曲。例同於聲。不生名等。既以生名不等。明知詮表亦異。色屈曲不能詮。聲屈曲許能詮。此有何過。

論。聲若能詮至應有詮用。

述曰。子段第三。例生非詮難。彼復救言若一切聲皆有詮表。如絃管等者。即風鈴等聲應有詮用。我許內聲能生名等故有詮表。非一切聲皆生名等。風鈴等聲故無詮用。汝既以聲即能詮表。風鈴等聲應有詮用。

論。此應如彼至名句文身。

述曰。論主質云。此風鈴等聲。如彼所執不能別生實名．句．文。我宗亦說風鈴等聲亦無詮表。彼計語聲能生名等。風鈴等聲不能生。我許聲體能詮表。何妨風鈴等聲不能詮。以內語聲。有屈曲音韻故能詮表。

風鈴等聲則不如是。不別生實名．句等者。顯二家義。彼此風鈴並不能生實．假名等。內聲即能生實．假名等故。

論。若唯語聲至唯語能詮。

述曰。子段第四。例生能詮難。更成語詮。彼復救言風鈴等聲是外法。不能生名等。語聲是內法。何妨即能別生名者　且就彼計申自義云。語聲是內聲。聲體即能詮。風鈴聲是外。即不能詮表。汝雖內聲能生名。非一切內聲皆能生名。我雖內聲能詮表。非一切內聲皆能詮。正義應言。汝許語聲方能生名。非風鈴等。我許屈曲之聲有詮表。如絃管等。即風鈴等既無屈曲。不能詮表。無能詮用故。內聲生名有能詮定量。內聲詮表何妨亦是能詮定量。外法聲不然。生名之聲有能詮。彼無能詮故。

論。何理定知能詮即語。

述曰。此下第五段。徴機調難有三。一問。二詰。三調。此初。外人問言。何理定知能詮法者。非名身等。體即是語。若聲能生名。名可能詮。聲非能詮。能詮離聲既無別體。初發聲時應即能詮。何為初不能詮後方能詮。故知后時名等生也。由此故知能詮即語。

論。寧知異語別有能詮。

述曰。論主詰云。汝亦寧知異語聲體別有名能詮。汝言能生名等名等能詮故異語者。汝如何生不可一法分分漸生。又諸念聲非聚集起如何

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：風鈴等發出的聲音就不是這樣了。它們不能分別產生實在的名詞、語句等，這顯示了兩個學派的觀點：風鈴等的聲音彼此都不能產生實在的事物、假名等等，而內在的聲音卻能產生實在的事物、假名等等。

論：如果只有語言的聲音才能表達意義。

述曰：子段第四，用產生能詮釋的事物來反駁對方的觀點，進一步論證語言的詮釋作用。對方辯解說，風鈴等的聲音是外在的法，不能產生名稱等；而語言的聲音是內在的法，為什麼不能分別產生名稱呢？且就對方的觀點來闡述自己的觀點：語言的聲音是內在的聲音，聲音的本體就能詮釋；風鈴的聲音是外在的，就不能詮釋表達。你雖然認為內在的聲音能產生名稱，但並非一切內在的聲音都能產生名稱。我雖然認為內在的聲音能詮釋表達，但並非一切內在的聲音都能詮釋。正確的說法應該是：你認為語言的聲音才能產生名稱，而不是風鈴等的聲音。我則認為有曲折變化的聲音才能詮釋表達，比如絃樂、管樂等。風鈴等的聲音沒有曲折變化，所以不能詮釋表達，因為它沒有詮釋的功能。內在的聲音產生名稱，具有能詮釋的定量；內在的聲音詮釋表達，為什麼不能也是能詮釋的定量呢？外在的法發出的聲音就不是這樣，產生名稱的聲音具有能詮釋的功能，而風鈴等的聲音沒有能詮釋的功能。

論：憑什麼道理可以確定能詮釋的就是語言？

述曰：此下是第五段，通過提問來引發辯論，共有三個步驟：一問，二詰，三調。這是第一個步驟，外人提問說：憑什麼道理可以確定能詮釋的法，不是名稱等，它的本體就是語言？如果聲音能產生名稱，名稱可能詮釋，聲音就不是能詮釋的。能詮釋的如果離開了聲音就沒有別的本體，那麼最初發聲的時候就應該能詮釋，為什麼最初不能詮釋，而要到後來才能詮釋？所以知道後來才產生名稱等。由此可知，能詮釋的就是語言。

論：憑什麼知道不同的語言有不同的能詮釋？

述曰：論主反駁說：你又憑什麼知道不同的語言的聲音本體有不同的名稱能詮釋？你說能產生名稱等，名稱等能詮釋，所以是不同的語言。你如何能讓不可分割的法一點點地逐漸產生？而且各種念頭的聲音不是聚集起來產生的，又該如何解釋？

【English Translation】 English version: The sounds of wind chimes, etc., are not like that. They do not separately produce real nouns, sentences, etc. This reveals the views of two schools: the sounds of wind chimes, etc., cannot produce real things, hypothetical names, etc., while inner sounds can produce real things, hypothetical names, etc.

Treatise: If only the sounds of language can express meaning.

Commentary: Sub-section four uses the production of things that can be interpreted to refute the other party's point of view, further demonstrating the interpretive function of language. The other party argues that the sounds of wind chimes, etc., are external dharmas (法, dharma), and cannot produce names, etc.; while the sounds of language are internal dharmas, why can't they separately produce names? Furthermore, let's explain our own point of view based on the other party's point of view: the sounds of language are inner sounds, and the essence of the sound can interpret; the sounds of wind chimes are external, and cannot interpret and express. Although you think that inner sounds can produce names, not all inner sounds can produce names. Although I think that inner sounds can interpret and express, not all inner sounds can interpret. The correct statement should be: you think that the sounds of language can produce names, not the sounds of wind chimes, etc. I think that sounds with twists and turns can interpret and express, such as stringed and wind instruments. The sounds of wind chimes, etc., do not have twists and turns, so they cannot interpret and express, because they do not have the function of interpretation. The inner sound produces a name, which has a quantifiable amount of interpretation; the inner sound interprets and expresses, why can't it also be a quantifiable amount of interpretation? The sounds produced by external dharmas are not like this. The sound that produces the name has the function of interpretation, but the sounds of wind chimes, etc., do not have the function of interpretation.

Treatise: What reason determines that what can interpret is language?

Commentary: The following is the fifth paragraph, which initiates a debate through questioning, with three steps: question, challenge, and adjust. This is the first step. An outsider asks: What reason determines that the dharma (法, dharma) that can interpret is not a name, etc., and its essence is language? If sound can produce a name, and the name can interpret, then the sound cannot interpret. If what can interpret is separated from the sound, there is no other essence, then it should be able to interpret when the sound is first produced. Why can't it interpret at first, but only later? So we know that names, etc., are produced later. From this, we know that what can interpret is language.

Treatise: How do you know that different languages have different interpretations?

Commentary: The treatise master refutes: How do you know that the sound essence of different languages has different names that can interpret? You say that it can produce names, etc., and names, etc., can interpret, so it is a different language. How can you make an indivisible dharma (法, dharma) gradually produce little by little? And how can you explain that the sounds of various thoughts are not produced by gathering together?

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名生。亦應初念聲即能生名等。彼若救言如無表發待前表等最後生故。既爾。即應末聲生名。汝應但聞末後之聲。便能解義。理既不爾。故知但由無始串習。前前諸聲分位力故。後生解時謂聞名等。其實耳等但能取得聲之自性剎那便滅。意識于中詮解究竟名為名等。非別實有。是故汝等寧知異語別有能詮。

論。語不異能詮至天愛非余。

述曰。下論主調。語即能詮。若人．若天皆共了達。共知聲語即能詮故。執能詮是名。體異於語。唯汝天愛。非余智者。以語與名不即不離。然但可言離語無體　言天愛者。以其愚癡無可錄念。唯天所愛方得自存。如言此人天矜故爾故名天愛。又名癡人即是天也。如說奴為郎君等。此調之言。咄天汝甚可矜。故言天愛。天即是愛。如樞要中說此義也。外人問。既聲體即能詮。如何有名等三種差別。

論。然依語聲至名句文身。

述曰。下申正義有四。一顯假差別也。此論主解。依聲假立名．句．文身。如梵音斫芻。但言斫。唯言芻。未有所目。說為字分位。若二連合能詮法體。詮于眼體說為名分位。然未有句位。更添言阿薩和縛。名為眼有漏。說為句位。故依分位以立名等。依一切位。非自在者　外人問。雖言分位差別。何者是也。

論。名詮自性至

為二所依。

述曰。二顯三用殊。名詮法自性。句詮法差別。文體是字。為名．句之所依。不能詮自性．及差別故。文者彰義。與二為依彰表二故。又名為顯。與二為依能顯義故。而體非顯。字者無改轉義。是其字型。文是功能。功能即體故言文即是字等。或字為初首。即多剎那聲整合一字。集多字為所依。次能成名詮諸法體。集多名已后成句身詮法差別。即雜集云自性。差別。及此二言。總攝一切。彼二言者。即是字也。字即語故說之為言。名．句二種所依止之言也。瑜伽言名于自性施設。句於差別施設。名．句所依止性說之為字。又顯揚言句必有名。名不必有句。名必有字。字不必有名。如樞要說　問曰如此卷。言名詮諸法但得共相不得自相。何故今言名詮自性。答曰。此有密意。謂諸法中自相．共相。體非是遍。有是自相非共相。如青色等相。有是共相非自相。如空．無我等。其自性。差別。體即遍通。自相．共相皆有自性。自相．共相皆有差別。何以知者。如因明云有法言自性。法是差別。如五蘊中思數。體是自性。有漏．無漏．我．無我是差別。數論師立我是思。即以我為自性。以是有法故。思為差別。以是法故。是我．非我之共相。亦有自性。思之自相亦有差別。今此中言不同於彼。諸法自相非名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是名和句的兩種所依。

解釋說：名、句、文這三者的作用各不相同。『名』詮釋法的自性，『句』詮釋法的差別，『文』（字）是名和句所依賴的基礎。因為文字本身不能詮釋自性和差別。『文』的作用是彰顯意義，作為名和句的所依，彰顯和表達名和句的意義。另外，『名』也是一種顯現，作為名和句的所依，能夠顯現意義，但文字的本體並非顯現。『字』的含義是不可改變的意義，這是字型的本質。『文』是功能，功能即是本體，所以說『文』就是『字』等等。或者說，『字』是最初的開始，即多個剎那的聲音集合成一個字，集合多個字作為所依，然後才能形成『名』來詮釋諸法的本體。集合多個『名』之後，形成『句』來詮釋法的差別。就像《雜集論》所說，自性、差別以及這兩個詞，總括了一切。這兩個詞就是『字』。『字』就是語言，所以說它是『言』，是名和句兩種所依賴的『言』。《瑜伽師地論》說，『名』是對自性的施設，『句』是對差別的施設，名和句所依賴的性質被稱為『字』。另外，《顯揚聖教論》說，句必然有名，名不一定有句；名必然有字，字不一定有名。就像《樞要》所說。

問：如果像這部經卷所說，『名』詮釋諸法的共相，但不能得到自相，為什麼現在說『名』詮釋自性？ 答：這裡有深意。所謂的諸法中的自相和共相，本體並非普遍存在。有些是自相而非共相，比如青色等相；有些是共相而非自相，比如空、無我等。而自性和差別，本體是普遍存在的。自相和共相都有自性，自相和共相都有差別。為什麼知道呢？就像因明學所說，『有法』是自性，『法』是差別。比如五蘊中的思數，本體是自性，有漏、無漏、我、無我是差別。數論師認為『我』是思，就是以『我』為自性，因為『有法』的緣故；以『思』為差別，因為『法』的緣故。『我』和『非我』的共相，也有自性，『思』的自相也有差別。現在這裡所說的，與他們不同，諸法的自相併非『名』。

【English Translation】 English version: They are the two supports for name and sentence (ming and ju).

Explanation: The functions of name, sentence, and letter (wen) are different. 'Name' (ming) explains the self-nature (svabhava) of dharmas, 'sentence' (ju) explains the distinctions (vishesha) of dharmas, and 'letter' (wen, which refers to the written character) is the basis upon which name and sentence rely. This is because the letter itself cannot explain self-nature and distinctions. The function of 'letter' is to manifest meaning; as the support for name and sentence, it manifests and expresses the meanings of name and sentence. Furthermore, 'name' is also a manifestation; as the support for name and sentence, it can manifest meaning, but the substance of the letter is not a manifestation. The meaning of 'letter' (zi) is an unchangeable meaning; this is the essence of the written character. 'Wen' is the function, and function is substance, so it is said that 'wen' is 'zi,' and so on. Or, 'zi' is the initial beginning, that is, multiple momentary sounds are assembled into one letter, and multiple letters are assembled as a support, and then 'name' can be formed to explain the substance of dharmas. After multiple 'names' are assembled, a 'sentence' (ju) is formed to explain the distinctions of dharmas. As the Abhidharmasamuccaya says, self-nature, distinctions, and these two terms encompass everything. These two terms are 'zi' (letter). 'Zi' is language, so it is said to be 'speech' (yan), the 'speech' upon which name and sentence rely. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that 'name' is a designation for self-nature, 'sentence' is a designation for distinctions, and the nature upon which name and sentence rely is called 'zi' (letter). Furthermore, the Asrayavijnapti-sastra says that a sentence must have a name, but a name does not necessarily have a sentence; a name must have a letter, but a letter does not necessarily have a name. As the Essentials says.

Question: If, as this scripture says, 'name' explains the common characteristics (samanya-lakshana) of dharmas but cannot obtain the self-characteristics (svalakshana), why is it now said that 'name' explains self-nature? Answer: There is a deeper meaning here. The so-called self-characteristics and common characteristics in dharmas are not universally present in substance. Some are self-characteristics but not common characteristics, such as the appearance of blue color; some are common characteristics but not self-characteristics, such as emptiness (sunyata) and no-self (anatman). However, self-nature and distinctions are universally present in substance. Both self-characteristics and common characteristics have self-nature, and both self-characteristics and common characteristics have distinctions. How do we know this? As logic (hetuvidya) says, 'existent dharma' is self-nature, and 'dharma' is distinction. For example, in the five aggregates (skandhas), thought (citta) is self-nature, and defiled (sasrava), undefiled (anasrava), self (atman), and no-self (anatman) are distinctions. The Samkhya school considers 'self' to be thought, that is, taking 'self' as self-nature, because of 'existent dharma'; taking 'thought' as distinction, because of 'dharma'. The common characteristics of 'self' and 'non-self' also have self-nature, and the self-characteristics of 'thought' also have distinctions. What is said here is different from them; the self-characteristics of dharmas are not 'name'.

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等詮。唯現量證。名唯詮共相。今言詮自性者。即是共相之自性。自性者體義。差別者體上差別義。即自相．共相。皆有體性．及差別義故　問曰。何故名自相．共相。答曰。法自體唯證智知。言說不及是自相。若法體性言說所及假智所緣是為共相　問曰。如一切法皆言不及。而復乃云言說及者是為共相。一何乖返。答曰共相是法自體上義。更無別體。且如名詮火等法時。遮非火等。此義即通一切火上。故言共相得其義也。非苦．空等之共相理　若爾即一切法不可言。不可言言亦不稱理。遮可言故言不可言。非不可言即稱法體。法體亦非不可言故。而今乃言名得自性者。共相為自性。故今應解。此非法體其義可然。言名等詮共相。非謂即得共相體。但遮得自相故。言名詮共相　問曰。若爾即名不詮自性。不得共相之自性故。又準五根．五塵。心．心法得。此義應思。然不得共相之別義名得自性。非詮稱共相之自體也　問曰。如色蘊是自相。漏．無漏是共相。色蘊之中色處等是自相。色蘊是共相。色處中青等是自相。色處是共相。又青等是共相。隨一樹等是自相。樹等是共相。枝等是自相。枝等是共相。極微為自相。今言不得自相。為是不得色蘊色總自相。為不得青等色別自相。答曰。俱不得色及青等。皆詮不及故　問

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『等詮』（Equal expression）。只有現量（Pratyaksha，直接認知）才能證明。這被稱為『唯詮共相』（only expressing the universal characteristic）。現在說的『詮自性』（expressing self-nature），就是共相的自性。『自性』指的是本體的意義，『差別』指的是本體上的差別意義。也就是說，自相（Svalaksana，自性）和共相（Samanyalaksana，共相）都有本體和差別意義。 問：為什麼叫做自相、共相？ 答：法的自體只能被證智（valid cognition）所知，言語無法觸及，這就是自相。如果法的體效能被言語觸及，被假智（conceptual thought）所緣，那就是共相。 問：如果一切法都無法用言語表達，卻又說言語可以觸及的是共相，這豈不是矛盾？ 答：共相是法自體上的意義，沒有其他的本體。比如，當用名稱表達『火』等法時，就排除了『非火』等。這個意義可以通用於一切『火』上，所以說共相可以表達其意義。苦、空等並非共相的道理。 如果這樣，那麼一切法都不可言說。說『不可言』的言語也不符合道理，因為遮止了『可言』。『不可言』並不能完全表達法的本體，法的本體也不是『不可言』的。現在說名稱可以表達自性，共相是自性，所以現在應該理解，這並非法的本體，其意義是可以理解的。名稱等表達的是共相，並非直接獲得共相的本體，只是遮止了獲得自相，所以說名稱表達共相。 問：如果這樣，那麼名稱就不能表達自性，因為無法獲得共相的自性。又根據五根（five sense organs）、五塵（five sense objects），心（citta，心）和心法（caitta，心所）可以獲得。這個意義應該思考。然而，無法獲得共相的差別意義，名稱才能獲得自性，而不是完全表達共相的本體。 問：比如色蘊（rupa-skandha，色蘊）是自相，有漏（asrava，有漏）和無漏（anasrava，無漏）是共相。色蘊之中，色處（rupa-ayatana，色處）等是自相，色蘊是共相。色處中，青等是自相，色處是共相。又青等是共相，單獨的一棵樹等是自相，樹等是共相。枝等是自相，枝等是共相。極微（paramanu，極微）是自相。現在說無法獲得自相，是指無法獲得色蘊的總體自相，還是無法獲得青等色的個別自相？ 答：色和青等都無法獲得，因為都無法完全用語言表達。 問：

【English Translation】 English version 『Equaling expression』. Only direct perception (Pratyaksha) can prove it. This is called 『only expressing the universal characteristic』 (Samanyalaksana). Now, saying 『expressing self-nature』 (Svalaksana), is the self-nature of the universal characteristic. 『Self-nature』 refers to the meaning of the entity, 『difference』 refers to the meaning of difference on the entity. That is to say, both self-nature (Svalaksana) and universal characteristic (Samanyalaksana) have entity and difference meanings. Question: Why are they called self-nature and universal characteristic? Answer: The self-entity of the Dharma can only be known by valid cognition, and language cannot reach it, this is self-nature. If the entity of the Dharma can be reached by language and is the object of conceptual thought, that is the universal characteristic. Question: If all Dharmas cannot be expressed in words, but it is said that what can be reached by language is the universal characteristic, isn't this a contradiction? Answer: The universal characteristic is the meaning on the self-entity of the Dharma, and there is no other entity. For example, when using names to express Dharmas such as 'fire', it excludes 'non-fire' and so on. This meaning can be applied to all 'fire', so it is said that the universal characteristic can express its meaning. The principles of suffering, emptiness, etc., are not the reason for the universal characteristic. If so, then all Dharmas are inexpressible. The language of saying 'inexpressible' is also unreasonable, because it prevents 'expressible'. 'Inexpressible' cannot fully express the entity of the Dharma, and the entity of the Dharma is not 'inexpressible'. Now it is said that names can express self-nature, and the universal characteristic is self-nature, so now it should be understood that this is not the entity of the Dharma, and its meaning can be understood. Names, etc., express the universal characteristic, not directly obtaining the entity of the universal characteristic, but only preventing the obtaining of self-nature, so it is said that names express the universal characteristic. Question: If so, then names cannot express self-nature, because they cannot obtain the self-nature of the universal characteristic. Also, according to the five sense organs, the five sense objects, the mind (citta) and mental factors (caitta) can be obtained. This meaning should be considered. However, the difference meaning of the universal characteristic cannot be obtained, and names can obtain self-nature, but not fully express the entity of the universal characteristic. Question: For example, the form aggregate (rupa-skandha) is self-nature, and defiled (asrava) and undefiled (anasrava) are universal characteristics. Among the form aggregate, the form base (rupa-ayatana) etc. are self-nature, and the form aggregate is the universal characteristic. Among the form base, blue etc. are self-nature, and the form base is the universal characteristic. Also, blue etc. are universal characteristics, a single tree etc. is self-nature, and trees etc. are universal characteristics. The ultimate particle (paramanu) is self-nature. Now it is said that self-nature cannot be obtained, does it mean that the overall self-nature of the form aggregate cannot be obtained, or does it mean that the individual self-nature of colors such as blue cannot be obtained? Answer: Neither color nor blue etc. can be obtained, because they cannot be fully expressed in language. Question:

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曰。若爾即漏．無漏等豈詮得及。如佛言有漏。佛言非有漏。凡夫言無漏。凡夫言非無漏。如詮火時亦不燒口。豈得漏．無漏耶。而言名得共相之自性。此義但遮得自相非謂名即得共相。然法體不可說自相共相。以假言詮也。謂有定量且名共相。非謂自．共相者。名言所及。何故不立頌為不相應。以離名．句．文無別用故。詮法體義名．句以周。為二所依文用已足。故頌不立。進不及名等。退不如文故。此雖有多字未了有名如悉曇章等。有多字名未了有句。如雜心云。眼．耳及與鼻等。雖有名字無句。顯義未圓故。若般若燈。集法滿足即說為句。今是名攝故不別說頌。

問曰。上來雖言名等即聲。若名等是不相應行者。色上屈曲非不相應。聲何故爾。

論。此三離聲至亦不即聲。

述曰。三明不即離。論主答云。此三離聲雖無別體。名等是假。聲是實有。假．實異故。故名等三非即是聲。非聲處攝。但是差別之聲義說名等。以詮義故是不相應。無別種子生故言即聲。

論。由此法辭至亦各有異。

述曰。外人問言。若名等即聲。法．辭二無礙解境有何別。答曰。即此緣故二境有異。法無礙解緣假名等。辭無礙解緣實聲等。故說境差別。非二俱緣實。雖二自性互不相離。法對所詮故但取

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果這樣，那麼『有漏』（Sāsrava，指受煩惱影響的狀態）、『無漏』（Anāsrava，指不受煩惱影響的狀態）等概念，又怎麼能夠被言語表達呢？就像佛陀說『有漏』，佛陀也說『非有漏』；凡夫說『無漏』，凡夫也說『非無漏』。就像描述火的時候，並不會燒到嘴巴一樣。怎麼能說能通過言語得到『有漏』、『無漏』的真實含義呢？雖然說名稱可以得到共相（Sāmānyalakṣaṇa，事物共有的普遍性質）的自性（Svabhāva，事物自身獨特的性質），但這個意義只是遮止了得到自相，並不是說名稱就能得到共相。然而法的本體是不可說的，無論是自相還是共相，都只能通過假設的言語來表達。所謂的『有定量』，暫且稱之為共相，並不是說自相和共相是名言所能完全涵蓋的。為什麼不單獨設立一個『頌』（Gāthā，偈頌）作為不相應行法呢？因為離開了名、句、文，頌就沒有其他作用了。詮釋法體意義，名和句已經足夠，依靠名句的文字作用也已經足夠，所以不單獨設立頌。頌在表達上不如名等簡潔，在理解上不如文字清晰。雖然有些字很多但意義不完整的名稱，比如悉曇章等；有些名稱很多字但沒有構成完整的句子，比如《雜心論》中說：『眼、耳及與鼻等』。雖然有這些名稱，但沒有構成句子，顯現的意義不完整。如果像《般若燈論》那樣，集合了完整的法義，就可以說是一個句子。現在這些都屬於名稱的範疇，所以不單獨設立頌。

問：雖然上面說名等同於聲音，如果名等是不相應行法，那麼色上的屈曲變化並非不相應，聲音為什麼也是如此？

論：這三者離開聲音，但也不等同於聲音。

述記：三者表明不即不離的關係。論主回答說：這三者雖然離開了聲音就沒有獨立的本體，但是名等是假立的，聲音是真實存在的。因為假和真不同，所以名等三者不等同於聲音，不屬於聲音的範疇。只是用差別之聲的意義來說明名等，因為它們可以詮釋意義，所以是不相應行法。因為沒有單獨的種子生起，所以說它們等同於聲音。

論：因此，法無礙解（Dharma-pratisaṃvidā，對佛法的通達無礙）和辭無礙解（Nirukti-pratisaṃvidā，對語言文字的通達無礙）各自的境界也有所不同。

述記：外人問道：如果名等同於聲音，那麼法無礙解和辭無礙解的境界有什麼區別呢？回答說：正因為這個緣故，兩者的境界有所不同。法無礙解所緣的是假立的名等，辭無礙解所緣的是真實的聲音等，所以說境界有差別。並非兩者都緣于真實。雖然兩者的自性互相不分離，但法無礙解是對所詮釋的意義而言的，所以只取...

【English Translation】 English version: Question: If that's the case, then how can concepts like 'Sāsrava' (with outflows, referring to a state influenced by afflictions) and 'Anāsrava' (without outflows, referring to a state free from afflictions) be expressed? Just as the Buddha speaks of 'Sāsrava,' the Buddha also speaks of 'non-Sāsrava'; ordinary beings speak of 'Anāsrava,' and ordinary beings also speak of 'non-Anāsrava.' It's like describing fire; it doesn't burn the mouth. How can one obtain the true meaning of 'Sāsrava' and 'Anāsrava' through language? Although it's said that names can obtain the self-nature (Svabhāva, the unique characteristic of a thing) of the common characteristic (Sāmānyalakṣaṇa, the universal nature shared by things), this meaning only prevents obtaining the self-nature; it doesn't mean that names can obtain the common characteristic. However, the essence of Dharma is inexpressible, whether it's the self-nature or the common characteristic; it can only be expressed through hypothetical language. What is called 'having a fixed quantity' is temporarily called the common characteristic; it doesn't mean that the self-nature and the common characteristic are completely covered by names and words. Why not establish a separate 'Gāthā' (verse) as an unassociated formation? Because apart from name, sentence, and phrase, the Gāthā has no other function. To explain the meaning of the Dharma's essence, name and sentence are sufficient, and the function of words relying on name and sentence is also sufficient, so a separate Gāthā is not established. The Gāthā is not as concise as names, etc., in expression, and not as clear as words in understanding. Although there are names with many characters but incomplete meanings, such as the Siddham chapter; there are names with many characters but do not form complete sentences, such as in the Abhidharma-samuccaya: 'Eye, ear, and nose, etc.' Although there are these names, they do not form sentences, and the meaning revealed is incomplete. If, like the Prajñā-dīpa, complete Dharma meanings are gathered, it can be called a sentence. Now these all belong to the category of names, so a separate Gāthā is not established.

Question: Although it was said above that names, etc., are the same as sound, if names, etc., are unassociated formations, then the curvature on form is not unassociated. Why is sound also like this?

Treatise: These three are apart from sound, but they are also not identical to sound.

Commentary: The three indicate a relationship of neither identical nor separate. The treatise master answers: Although these three have no independent entity apart from sound, names, etc., are provisional, and sound is real. Because the provisional and the real are different, the three, names, etc., are not identical to sound and do not belong to the category of sound. They are only explained as the meaning of differentiated sound, because they can explain meaning, so they are unassociated formations. Because there is no separate seed arising, it is said that they are identical to sound.

Treatise: Therefore, the realms of Dharma-pratisaṃvidā (unobstructed understanding of the Dharma) and Nirukti-pratisaṃvidā (unobstructed understanding of language) are also different.

Commentary: An outsider asks: If names, etc., are the same as sound, then what is the difference between the realms of Dharma-pratisaṃvidā and Nirukti-pratisaṃvidā? The answer is: Precisely because of this reason, the realms of the two are different. Dharma-pratisaṃvidā is concerned with provisional names, etc., and Nirukti-pratisaṃvidā is concerned with real sounds, etc., so it is said that there is a difference in realms. It is not that both are concerned with reality. Although the self-natures of the two are not separate from each other, Dharma-pratisaṃvidā is concerned with the meaning being explained, so it only takes...

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名。辭多對機故但說聲。耳聞聲已意了義故。以所對不同說二有異。非體有異也。又此二境．及名等三。與聲別者。蘊．處．界攝亦有異故。色蘊行蘊。聲處法處。聲界法界。如其次第攝聲．名等　問曰。聲上屈曲假。即言不相應。色上屈曲假。應非色處攝答聲上有教名等不相應。色上無教故是色處攝。

問曰。聲上屈曲即以為教。色上屈曲應亦為教。

論。且依此土至非謂一切。

述曰。四會相違。名等依聲者依此土說。諸餘佛土名等依余故。

論。諸餘佛土至假立三故。

述曰。余佛土者。何者是耶。如無垢稱經說。或以光明。妙香。及味。等者等取觸．思數等。此上皆得假立名等三種。亦是不相應攝此三法故　問曰。小乘不信有他方佛。何故以此為證。又如何知有他方佛。證此量云。除此三千界外他方。亦應時有佛出教化眾生。有人天眾生故。猶如此土。證光明等為佛教。量云。光明等上。亦得有名等。眾生機欲待故。如此聲上有名等。由依多法立名故。非聲處攝。依發身．語多法立無表色。依多法立。命根等與六處為根。長等不同。有義無表．命根但依一立。然非教性。故同所依法處所攝。梵云便善那此有四義。一者扇。二相好。三根形。四味。此即是鹽。能顯諸物中味故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：名稱。因為很多詞語都是針對特定情況而設定的，所以只是口頭說說而已。因為耳朵聽到聲音后就能理解其中的含義。因為所針對的對象不同，所以說法上會有差異，但本質上並沒有不同。此外，這兩種境界，以及名稱等三種，與聲音的區別在於，它們在五蘊（skandha，構成個體經驗的五種要素）、十二處（āyatana，感覺的來源和對像）和十八界（dhātu，感官、對像和意識的組合）中的歸屬也不同。聲音屬於色蘊（rūpa-skandha，物質的集合）和行蘊（saṃskāra-skandha，意志和心理活動的集合），聲音處屬於法處（dharma-āyatana，意識的對象），聲音界屬於法界（dharma-dhātu，一切法的領域）。按照這樣的順序，聲音、名稱等分別被包含在其中。 問：聲音上的彎曲變化，如果不是語言文字，那就不應該與言語相應。那麼，顏色上的彎曲變化，是否也不應該被色處（rūpa-āyatana，視覺的對象）所包含呢？答：聲音上有教名等，所以不相應。顏色上沒有教名，所以屬於色處。 問：聲音上的彎曲變化可以被認為是語言文字，那麼顏色上的彎曲變化是否也可以被認為是語言文字呢？ 論：暫且依據我們這個世界的情況來說，並非指所有情況。 述：四種說法相互矛盾。名稱等依附於聲音，這是依據我們這個世界的情況來說的。在其他佛土（buddhakṣetra，佛所教化的世界），名稱等依附於其他事物。 論：在其他佛土，可以通過光明、美妙的香氣和味道等來表達，因此可以假立名稱等三種。 述：其他的佛土是指哪些呢？比如《維摩詰經》（Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra）中說，或者通過光明、美妙的香氣和味道等，這裡的『等』包括觸覺、思緒等。在這些事物上都可以假立名稱等三種，也屬於不相應行蘊（asaṃprayukta-saṃskāra-skandha，不與心識相應的行蘊）所包含的這三種法。 問：小乘（Hinayana，早期佛教的一個主要分支）不相信有他方佛（buddha，覺悟者），為什麼用這個來作為證據？又如何知道有他方佛呢？可以這樣論證：除了這個三千大千世界（trisāhasra-mahāsāhasra-lokadhātu，佛教宇宙觀中的一個宇宙單位）之外的其他地方，也應該有時有佛出現教化眾生，因為那裡也有人和天人等眾生，就像我們這個世界一樣。證明光明等是佛教的論證是：光明等上面也可以有名稱等，因為眾生的根機和慾望需要這些，就像聲音上面有名稱等一樣。因為依賴於多種法（dharma，佛法、事物）來建立名稱，所以不屬於聲處所包含。依賴於身體和語言等多種法來建立無表色（avijñapti-rūpa，一種不可見的色法）。依賴於多種法來建立命根（jīvitendriya，維持生命的能力）等，並以六處（ṣaḍāyatana，六種感覺器官）為根本，這與長等不同。有一種觀點認為，無表色和命根只是依賴於一種法來建立的，但它們不是教的性質，所以和它們所依賴的法一樣，屬於法處所包含。梵語便善那（vyañjana），有四種含義：一是扇子，二是相好（lakṣaṇa，佛的三十二相和八十隨形好），三是根形，四是味道。這裡指的是鹽，因為它能顯現各種事物中的味道。

【English Translation】 English version: Name. Because many words are set for specific situations, they are just spoken. Because the meaning is understood when the ear hears the sound. Because the objects they address are different, there are differences in the way they are expressed, but there is no difference in essence. In addition, the difference between these two realms, and the three types of names, etc., and sound, is that their inclusion in the five skandhas (aggregates of existence), twelve āyatanas (sense bases), and eighteen dhātus (elements of existence) is also different. Sound belongs to the rūpa-skandha (aggregate of form) and saṃskāra-skandha (aggregate of mental formations), the sound āyatana belongs to the dharma-āyatana (sense base of mental objects), and the sound dhātu belongs to the dharma-dhātu (realm of mental objects). In that order, sound, names, etc., are included respectively. Question: If the inflections of sound are not language, then they should not correspond to speech. Then, should the inflections of color also not be included in the rūpa-āyatana (sense base of form)? Answer: Sound has teachings, names, etc., so it does not correspond. Color has no teachings, so it belongs to the rūpa-āyatana. Question: If the inflections of sound can be considered language, then can the inflections of color also be considered language? Treatise: For the time being, based on the situation in this world, it does not refer to all situations. Commentary: The four statements contradict each other. That names, etc., depend on sound is based on the situation in this world. In other buddha-kṣetras (Buddha-fields), names, etc., depend on other things. Treatise: In other Buddha-fields, expression can be achieved through light, wonderful fragrance, and taste, etc., so the three types of names, etc., can be provisionally established. Commentary: What are these other Buddha-fields? For example, the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra says, 『Or through light, wonderful fragrance, and taste, etc.』 Here, 『etc.』 includes touch, thoughts, etc. On these things, the three types of names, etc., can be provisionally established, and they also belong to the asaṃprayukta-saṃskāra-skandha (aggregate of formations not associated with consciousness), which includes these three dharmas (phenomena). Question: The Hinayana (early Buddhist school) does not believe in other Buddhas (enlightened beings), so why use this as evidence? And how do we know there are other Buddhas? It can be argued that outside of this trisāhasra-mahāsāhasra-lokadhātu (great trichiliocosm), there should also be Buddhas appearing from time to time to teach sentient beings, because there are also humans and devas (gods) there, just like in this world. The argument for proving that light, etc., is Buddhism is: names, etc., can also be on light, etc., because the faculties and desires of sentient beings require these, just like there are names, etc., on sound. Because names are established based on multiple dharmas (teachings, phenomena), they are not included in the sound āyatana. Avijñapti-rūpa (non-manifesting form) is established based on multiple dharmas such as body and language. Jīvitendriya (life faculty), etc., is established based on multiple dharmas and has the six āyatanas (sense organs) as its root, which is different from length, etc. One view is that avijñapti-rūpa and jīvitendriya are only established based on one dharma, but they are not of the nature of teaching, so they belong to the dharma-āyatana, like the dharma they depend on. The Sanskrit word vyañjana has four meanings: first, a fan; second, lakṣaṇa (marks of excellence, the 32 major and 80 minor marks of a Buddha); third, the shape of the roots; and fourth, taste. Here it refers to salt, because it can reveal the taste in various things.

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味即文是。如言文義巧妙等目之為便繕那。此中四義總是一顯義。古德說名為味。對法雲。此又名顯。能顯彼義故。為名句所依能顯義故。惡察那是字。無改轉義。如對法說缽陀是跡。如尋象跡以覓象等。此名為句。理應名跡。義之跡故。尋此知義也。順古所翻稱之為句。播陀是足　上來且依俱舍破十四不相應訖。如瑜伽五十二．五十四六等．及顯揚．五蘊．對法第二等說。大乘雖依色．心上立。然與色．心不一不異。如名與聲。無別體．及別種故言不異。假實蘊等攝別故言不一。餘十種法皆應知也。又約界地．漏無漏．現行種子．凡夫內外等諸義。如別抄說。八十一卷亦有說也。

論。有執隨眠至行蘊所攝。

述曰。此是大眾彌沙塞計。一說等同。此如俱舍隨眠品說。

論。彼亦非理至非不相應。

述曰。論主破之。此中量云。貪等隨眠。非不相應攝。名貪等故。如現行貪等。此中貪．嗔．癡一一為之。薩婆多隨眠是纏現行法。諸部之中此義最心粗也。我今大乘隨眠即是心．心所法。第八識中諸染污種。故以破之。非遮彼不相應。我即是相應。此非一．異故。

論。執別有余至皆應遮止。

述曰。有餘部執不失．增長。為不相應。是得異名。皆準此破。此如成業論正量部。舊

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『味』就是『文』。例如，說『文義巧妙』等，就稱之為『便繕那』(Pravacana，言辭)。這裡面的四種含義總的來說都是一種顯義。古代的德行高尚之人說它叫做『味』。對法論中說，這又叫做『顯』，因為它能夠顯現那個意義。因為名句所依賴的能夠顯現意義，所以『惡察那』(Akshara，字)是字，沒有改變和轉化的意義。如同對法論中說『缽陀』(Pada，足跡)是跡，如同尋找象的足跡來尋找像一樣。這叫做『句』，理應叫做『跡』，因為它是意義的足跡。通過尋找它來了解意義。按照古人的翻譯稱之為『句』。『播陀』(Pada，足)是足。以上是依據俱舍論破斥十四種不相應法完畢。如同瑜伽師地論第五十二、五十四、六等，以及顯揚聖教論、五蘊論、對法論第二等所說。大乘雖然依據色、心而建立，然而與色、心不一也不異。如同名與聲。沒有別的自體和別的種類，所以說不異。假立的實蘊等攝取的不同，所以說不一。其餘十種法都應當知道。又依據界地、有漏無漏、現行種子、凡夫內外等各種意義，如同別的抄本所說。第八十一卷也有說到。 論：有人執著隨眠是不相應行蘊所攝。 述記：這是大眾部和彌沙塞部的觀點。一種說法是等同。這如同俱舍論隨眠品所說。 論：他們的觀點也是不合理的，因為隨眠不是不相應法。 述記：論主破斥他們的觀點。這裡可以用量式來論證：貪等隨眠，不是不相應法所攝，因為它們是貪等（煩惱）的名稱。如同現行的貪等（煩惱）。這裡貪、嗔、癡每一種都可以這樣論證。薩婆多部認為隨眠是纏縛現行法。在各個部派之中，這種觀點最為粗糙。我現在大乘的觀點是，隨眠就是心、心所法，是第八識中的各種染污種子。所以用這種方式來破斥他們，並不是遮止他們認為隨眠是不相應法，而是說隨眠是相應法。這並非一也非異，所以不能說隨眠是不相應法。 論：如果有人執著另外存在不失法、增長法等不相應法，都應當制止。 述記：有其餘部派執著不失法、增長法等為不相應法，認為是得的另一種名稱，都可以用這個道理來破斥。這如同成業論和正量部的觀點，舊譯如此。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Taste' is 'word'. For example, saying 'the meaning of the words is ingenious' and so on, is called 'Pravacana' (utterance). The four meanings here are all a kind of manifest meaning. Ancient virtuous people said it was called 'taste'. The Abhidharma says that it is also called 'manifest', because it can manifest that meaning. Because the name and sentence rely on being able to manifest meaning, 'Akshara' (letter) is a word, without the meaning of change and transformation. Just as the Abhidharma says that 'Pada' (footprint) is a trace, just like looking for an elephant's footprint to find an elephant. This is called a 'sentence', and should be called a 'trace', because it is the trace of meaning. Understand the meaning by looking for it. According to the ancient translation, it is called a 'sentence'. 'Pada' (foot) is a foot. The above is based on the Abhidharma-kosa to refute the fourteen non-corresponding dharmas. As stated in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volumes 52, 54, 6, etc., as well as the Exposition of the Holy Teaching, Treatise on the Five Aggregates, and Abhidharma, volume 2, etc. Although Mahayana is established based on form and mind, it is neither identical nor different from form and mind. Like name and sound. There is no other self-nature and other kinds, so it is said to be not different. The difference in the false established real aggregates and other collections, so it is said to be not one. The remaining ten kinds of dharmas should all be known. Also, according to various meanings such as realm, ground, defiled and undefiled, manifest seeds, ordinary people inside and outside, etc., as stated in other copies. Volume 81 also mentions it. Treatise: Some hold that the anusayas (latent tendencies) are included in the non-corresponding formations aggregate. Commentary: This is the view of the Mahasamghika and Mahisasaka schools. One view is that they are the same. This is as stated in the Anusaya chapter of the Abhidharma-kosa. Treatise: Their view is also unreasonable, because the anusayas are not non-corresponding dharmas. Commentary: The author of the treatise refutes their view. Here, a syllogism can be used to argue: The anusayas such as greed are not included in the non-corresponding dharmas, because they are the names of greed and other (afflictions). Like the manifest greed and other (afflictions). Here, each of greed, hatred, and delusion can be argued in this way. The Sarvastivadins believe that the anusayas are entangling manifest dharmas. Among the various schools, this view is the crudest. My current Mahayana view is that the anusayas are mental and mental factors, and are various defiled seeds in the eighth consciousness. Therefore, I refute them in this way, not to prevent them from thinking that the anusayas are non-corresponding dharmas, but to say that the anusayas are corresponding dharmas. This is neither one nor different, so it cannot be said that the anusayas are non-corresponding dharmas. Treatise: If someone insists that there are other non-corresponding dharmas such as non-loss dharma and growth dharma, they should all be stopped. Commentary: Other schools insist that non-loss dharma, growth dharma, etc. are non-corresponding dharmas, and think that they are another name for attainment, and can all be refuted with this reasoning. This is like the view of the Treatise on the Accomplishment of Karma and the Sautrantika school, according to the old translation.

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云不失法如券是也。並破正理師和合性等。及破成實論無表戒等。

次下第三破無為法。于中有三。初破外計。次顯正理。第三結非。就破外中。初總非。后別破。總非中有三。初總非無實。次顯法定無。后為量遮破。

論。諸無為法至理不可得。

述曰。此即最初總非無實。薩婆多等實有無為。此中皆破。然不相應即色．心等。故初遮中皆言不異。此諸無為非即色等。不可言不異。但可言離色等實有。定無。大乘真如望有為法。非即非離不異不一。既殊彼計。故破無失。

論。且定有法略有三種。

述曰。此即第二顯法定無。極成之法不過三種。

論。一現所知法如色心等。

述曰。即是五識身。他心智境。謂色等五塵．及心．心所。此約總聚。不別分別此何識境。現量所知名現所知。

論。二現受用法如瓶衣等。

述曰。此雖現見受用。而非現量所得。是假法故。但是世現所受用物。

論。如是二法至不得因成。

述曰。一切世間皆共知有。更不須待比量成立。問此中緣瓶等心是何量攝。答非量收。不親緣得法自體故。非比度故。非量所收。非量不要唯堅執故。

論。三有作用法至證知是有。

述曰。此五色根非現量得。亦非

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

云不失法（指不會失去其性質的法）就像券（一種憑證）一樣。這也破斥了正理師（Vaisheshika）的和合性等觀點，以及成實論（Satya-siddhi-śāstra）的無表戒等觀點。

接下來是第三部分，破斥無為法。這部分分為三個小部分：首先破斥外道（其他學派）的觀點，然後闡明正確的道理，最後總結並否定無為法。在破斥外道的觀點中，首先總的否定，然後分別破斥。在總的否定中，又分為三個部分：首先總的否定無為法的真實存在，然後說明其在定義上是不存在的，最後通過論證來遮破它。

論：所有的無為法，從道理上來說是無法獲得的。

述曰：這便是最初總的否定無為法的真實存在。薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）等認為無為法是真實存在的，這裡全部破斥。然而，不相應行法（citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra）即色、心等，因此最初的遮破中都說『不異』。這些無為法不是色等，不能說『不異』，只能說離開色等而真實存在。在定義上是不存在的。大乘的真如（Tathātā）相對於有為法來說，非即非離，不異不一。既然與他們的觀點不同，所以破斥沒有過失。

論：而且，可以確定存在的法，大致有三種。

述曰：這是第二部分，說明其在定義上是不存在的。極其確定的法，不超過三種。

論：第一種是現所知法，如色、心等。

述曰：即是五識身（pañca vijñāna kāya），他心智（para-citta-jñāna）的境界。即色等五塵（pañca viṣaya）、以及心、心所（citta-caitta）。這裡說的是總的聚合，不分別這是什麼識的境界。通過現量（pratyakṣa）所知，名為現所知。

論：第二種是現受用法，如瓶、衣等。

述曰：這雖然是現在可見並受用的，但不是現量所得，因為是假法（prajñapti-sat）。只是世俗中現在所受用的事物。

論：像這樣的兩種法，不需要通過因明（hetu-vidyā）來成立。

述曰：一切世間都共同知道存在，更不需要等待比量（anumāna）來成立。問：這裡緣于瓶等的心，屬於什麼量（pramāṇa）的範疇？答：不屬於量。因為它不能直接緣取法的自體，不是比量，所以不是量所包含的。不是量並非不必要，只是因為過於堅固執著。

論：第三種是有作用法，通過作用可以證明其存在。

述曰：這五色根（pañca rūpa indriya）不是現量所得，也不是比量所得。

【English Translation】 English version:

'Cloud not losing its dharma' (meaning a dharma that does not lose its nature) is like a voucher. This also refutes the Vaisheshika's (Nyaya-Vaisheshika) concept of inherence (samavāya), and the Satyasiddhi-śāstra's concept of non-manifested precepts (avijñapti-rūpa) etc.

Next is the third part, refuting the unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta dharma). This part is divided into three sub-parts: first, refuting the views of externalists (other schools); then, clarifying the correct reasoning; and finally, summarizing and negating the unconditioned dharmas. In refuting the views of externalists, first, there is a general refutation, and then separate refutations. In the general refutation, there are three parts: first, a general negation of the real existence of unconditioned dharmas; then, explaining that they are non-existent by definition; and finally, refuting them through argumentation.

Treatise: All unconditioned dharmas, in terms of reason, are unobtainable.

Commentary: This is the initial general negation of the real existence of unconditioned dharmas. The Sarvāstivāda school, etc., believes that unconditioned dharmas are real, and all of that is refuted here. However, non-associated formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra), i.e., form, mind, etc., therefore, in the initial refutation, it is said 'not different'. These unconditioned dharmas are not form, etc., and cannot be said to be 'not different', but can only be said to exist separately from form, etc. They are non-existent by definition. The Tathātā (真如) of Mahayana, relative to conditioned dharmas, is neither identical nor different, neither not different nor one. Since it is different from their views, there is no fault in the refutation.

Treatise: Moreover, dharmas that can be determined to exist are roughly of three types.

Commentary: This is the second part, explaining that they are non-existent by definition. Extremely certain dharmas do not exceed three types.

Treatise: The first type is directly knowable dharmas, such as form, mind, etc.

Commentary: This refers to the five aggregates of consciousness (pañca vijñāna kāya), the realm of telepathy (para-citta-jñāna). That is, the five sense objects (pañca viṣaya) such as form, etc., as well as mind and mental factors (citta-caitta). This refers to the general aggregation, without distinguishing which consciousness's realm this is. What is known through direct perception (pratyakṣa) is called directly knowable.

Treatise: The second type is directly experienced dharmas, such as bottles, clothes, etc.

Commentary: Although this is currently visible and experienced, it is not obtained through direct perception, because it is a provisional dharma (prajñapti-sat). It is merely something currently experienced in the mundane world.

Treatise: These two types of dharmas do not need to be established through logic (hetu-vidyā).

Commentary: All the world commonly knows that they exist, and there is no need to wait for inference (anumāna) to establish them. Question: To what category of valid cognition (pramāṇa) does the mind that cognizes bottles, etc., belong? Answer: It does not belong to valid cognition. Because it cannot directly cognize the self-nature of the dharma, and it is not inference, so it is not included in valid cognition. It is not that valid cognition is unnecessary, but only because it is too firmly adhered to.

Treatise: The third type is dharmas with functions, whose existence can be proven through their functions.

Commentary: These five sense faculties (pañca rūpa indriya) are not obtained through direct perception, nor are they obtained through inference.

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現世人所共知。此眼．耳等。各由彼彼有發識用。比知是有　言證知者。證成道理也。以現見果比有因故。果謂所生心．心所法。比量知有清凈色根。此非現量．他心智知。然今大乘第八識境。亦現量得。佛智緣時亦現量緣。今就他部除佛以外共許為論。非世共悉。是故但言比知是有。

論。無為非世至如眼耳等。

述曰。且三無為。非如前二。世共知有。不同第三。比作用瞭如眼．耳等。故知定無。量云。汝宗所立三種無為。應離色等無別實性。前三法不攝故。或非世共知及無用故。如龜毛等。然我真如。非全離於色．心等有。無不定過。又應簡別。汝等無為。非真實有。以無用故。如兔角等。

論。設許有用至無為定有。

述曰。汝宗無為。應非無為是無常法。許有用故。如眼．耳等。下結句文許通於上。此非彼宗。設義破也。故不可執無為實有。

此下即是第三量破。

論。然諸無為至所顯性故。

述曰。此舉有法及二種因。色心等所顯性者。謂色亦能顯色心等。如燈．日．月照色等法。以色顯色。以聲詮色．心。以身．語業表善．惡色．心等此即以色表色．心也。心顯色．心其理可解。

論。如色心等至實無為性。

述曰。此舉同喻．及與宗法。謂

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 現世之人所普遍知曉的眼、耳等，各自憑藉其特定的條件而產生識別作用。通過比量可以得知它們是存在的。』言證知者『，指的是能夠證明道理的人。因為現量所見的果，可以比量推知有因。果指的是所生的心和心所法。通過比量可以得知有清凈的色根。這並非現量或他心智所能知曉的。然而，現在大乘的第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）的境界，也可以通過現量獲得。佛智在緣取時，也是現量緣取。現在就其他部派（除佛以外）普遍認可的觀點進行討論。因為並非世間普遍知曉，所以只說是通過比量得知它們是存在的。

論：無為法並非世間普遍知曉，如同眼、耳等。

述曰：且說三種無為法（虛空無為、擇滅無為、非擇滅無為），並非像前兩種那樣，為世間普遍知曉其存在，也不同於第三種（真如無為）。通過比量作用，如同眼、耳等，可知其必定不存在。量式如下：你們宗派所立的三種無為法，應當離開色等而沒有其他的實體自性，因為前三種法不包含它，或者因為它不是世間普遍知曉的，也沒有作用，如同龜毛等。然而，我的真如（Tathātā），並非完全離開色、心等而存在，沒有不定的過失。又應當簡別，你們的無為法，並非真實存在，因為它沒有作用，如同兔角等。

論：假設承認有用，則無為法必定存在。

述曰：你們宗派的無為法，應當不是無為法，而是無常法，因為承認它有用，如同眼、耳等。下面的總結句可以適用於上面。這並非他們的宗派，而是假設的破斥。所以不可執著無為法是真實存在的。

下面就是第三個量來破斥。

論：然而，諸無為法是色心等所顯現的性質。

述曰：這裡舉出有法和兩種因。色心等所顯現的性質，指的是色也能顯現色心等，如同燈、日、月照亮色等法。用色來顯現色，用聲音來詮釋色、心，用身、語業來表達善、惡色、心等，這就是用色來表達色、心。心顯現色、心的道理可以理解。

論：如同色心等，並非真實的無為自性。

述曰：這裡舉出同喻以及宗法，即說

【English Translation】 English version The eyes, ears, etc., which are commonly known to people in the present world, each produce their respective functions of cognition by virtue of their specific conditions. It can be inferred through inference that they exist. 'Those who know by proof' refers to those who can prove the truth. Because the effect that is seen by direct perception can be used to infer the cause. The effect refers to the mind and mental factors that are produced. It can be known through inference that there are pure sense faculties (prasāda-rūpa). This cannot be known by direct perception or telepathy. However, now the realm of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) in Mahayana can also be obtained through direct perception. When Buddha's wisdom cognizes, it also cognizes through direct perception. Now we are discussing the views that are commonly accepted by other schools (excluding the Buddha). Because it is not universally known in the world, it is only said that it is known to exist through inference.

Treatise: Non-conditioned phenomena are not universally known in the world, like the eyes, ears, etc.

Commentary: Let's talk about the three unconditioned dharmas (ākāśa-asaṃskṛta, nirodha-asaṃskṛta, anirodha-asaṃskṛta). They are not like the first two, which are universally known to exist in the world, and are also different from the third (Tathātā-asaṃskṛta). Through the function of inference, like the eyes, ears, etc., it can be known that they definitely do not exist. The logical formula is as follows: The three unconditioned dharmas established by your school should be separate from form, etc., and have no other real nature, because the first three dharmas do not include it, or because it is not universally known in the world and has no function, like turtle hair, etc. However, my Suchness (Tathātā) does not exist completely apart from form, mind, etc., and there is no indefinite fault. Furthermore, it should be distinguished that your unconditioned dharmas are not truly existent, because they have no function, like rabbit horns, etc.

Treatise: If it is admitted that it is useful, then the unconditioned dharma must exist.

Commentary: The unconditioned dharma of your school should not be an unconditioned dharma, but an impermanent dharma, because it is admitted that it is useful, like the eyes, ears, etc. The concluding sentence below can be applied to the above. This is not their school, but a hypothetical refutation. Therefore, it is not permissible to cling to the idea that the unconditioned dharma is truly existent.

The following is the third argument to refute.

Treatise: However, all unconditioned dharmas are the nature manifested by form, mind, etc.

Commentary: Here, the subject and two kinds of causes are cited. The nature manifested by form, mind, etc., refers to the fact that form can also manifest form, mind, etc., just as lamps, sun, and moon illuminate form and other dharmas. Form is used to manifest form, sound is used to explain form and mind, and body and speech karma are used to express good and evil form, mind, etc. This is using form to express form and mind. The principle of mind manifesting form and mind can be understood.

Treatise: Like form, mind, etc., it is not the true nature of the unconditioned.

Commentary: Here, the example and the property of the subject are cited, that is to say,

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立量云。汝諸無為。不應執為離色．心等實無為性。所知性故。或色．心等所顯性故。如色．心等然色．心等非離色等實無為性。故以色等為其同喻。此中宗等尋文可知。今此比量破歸唯識。

以下別破空等一多。初破薩婆多等立三無為者計。第二例破餘部。第三總破。言無為者。此非六釋。無二義故。如雲鶻路波雖有三字共目一色。無別體義不可別釋。以無合故。由擇所得滅名為擇滅。由第三囀上依士釋。不唯第六囀有依士釋。非由擇力所得亦爾。苦樂想受之滅。依士釋也。其虛空．不動。既無別體義。不可別解。善法之真如。亦依士釋。真即如者。持業釋也。

論。又虛空等為一為多。

述曰。下文有二。初審。后破。此問定宗。三無為法為體是一。為體是多。薩婆多師此有二說。一云是一。一云是多。故今俱破。如婆沙第十。虛空有二說。

論。若體是一遍一切處。

述曰。此定外人三體各一。

論。虛空容受至體應成多。

述曰。且彼虛空容色等故。隨其一．一色等法合。虛空體應成多。此舉宗已。

論。一所合處余不合故。

述曰。更舉一因。宗如前。一處色合處。余處色不合。故如余處色。余處色合處。彼色不合故體非是一。虛空亦應爾。比量

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：立量云：你們這些無為法，不應該執著地認為它們是離開色（Rūpa，物質、形態）、心（Citta，精神、意識）等而真實存在的無為自性。因為它們是所知之自性，或者說是色、心等所顯現的自性，就像色、心等一樣。然而，色、心等並非離開色等而真實存在的無為自性。所以用色等作為它們的同喻。這裡面的宗（Paksha，論題）、因（Hetu，理由）、喻（ दृष्टाanta，例子）等，尋文可知。現在的這個比量是爲了破斥歸於唯識的觀點。

以下分別破斥空等是一還是多。首先破斥薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）等設立三種無為法的觀點。第二，用類似的例子破斥其他部派。第三，總的破斥。說到『無為』，這不是六離合釋（一種梵文語法結構），因為沒有兩個不同的意義。就像說『鶻路波』（Hūlupa，名稱），雖然有三個字共同指稱一種顏色，但沒有不同的實體意義，不能分別解釋，因為沒有組合。由擇滅所得的滅，叫做擇滅（Pratisamkhyā-nirodha，擇滅無為）。由第三囀（梵文語法格）是依士釋（Tatpurusha，持業釋）。不是隻有第六囀才有依士釋。不是通過選擇的力量所得的滅也是這樣。苦、樂、想、受的滅，是依士釋。而虛空（Ākāśa，空間）、不動（Āniñjya，不動無為），既然沒有不同的實體意義，就不能分別解釋。善法的真如（Tathatā，如如），也是依士釋。真即是如，是持業釋。

論：又，虛空等是一還是多？

述曰：下文有兩部分。首先是審問，然後是破斥。這裡是提問以確定論題。這三種無為法，本體是一個，還是本體是多個？薩婆多部的老師對此有兩種說法。一種說法是一個，一種說法是多個。所以現在一起破斥。如《婆沙論》（Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra）第十卷所說，關於虛空有兩種說法。

論：如果本體是一個，遍一切處。

述曰：這是確定外人認為三種無為法各自是一個。

論：虛空容納乃至本體應該成為多個。

述曰：且說那虛空容納色等，隨著每一個色等法結合，虛空的本體應該成為多個。這是舉出論題之後。

論：一個所結合的地方，其餘地方不結合。

述曰：進一步舉出一個理由。論題如前。一個地方與色結合的地方，其餘地方不與色結合。所以就像其餘地方的色一樣，其餘地方的色結合的地方，這個地方的色不結合，所以本體不是一個。虛空也應該這樣。比量（Anumāṇa，推論）。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Liang Yun: You, all these unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta-dharma), should not be attached to as if they are truly existing unconditioned natures separate from form (Rūpa, matter, shape), mind (Citta, spirit, consciousness), etc. Because they are the nature of what is known, or the nature manifested by form, mind, etc., just like form, mind, etc. However, form, mind, etc., are not truly existing unconditioned natures separate from form, etc. Therefore, form, etc., are used as their similar example. The subject (Paksha), reason (Hetu), example ( दृष्टाanta), etc., in this, can be understood by examining the text. This inference (Anumāṇa) now is to refute the view of returning to only consciousness (Vijñānavāda).'

'The following separately refutes whether emptiness, etc., are one or many. First, refuting the view of the Sarvāstivāda (Everything Exists school), etc., who establish three unconditioned dharmas. Second, refuting other schools with similar examples. Third, a general refutation. When speaking of 'unconditioned,' this is not a sixfold compound (a type of Sanskrit grammatical structure), because there are not two different meanings. Just like saying 'Hūlupa' (name), although there are three characters jointly referring to a color, there is no different substantial meaning, and it cannot be separately explained, because there is no combination. The cessation obtained by selective destruction is called Pratisamkhyā-nirodha (cessation through wisdom). The third case ending (in Sanskrit grammar) is a genitive Tatpurusha compound. It is not only the sixth case ending that has a genitive Tatpurusha compound. That which is not obtained through the power of selection is also like this. The cessation of suffering, pleasure, thought, and sensation is a genitive Tatpurusha compound. As for Ākāśa (space) and Āniñjya (immobility), since there is no different substantial meaning, they cannot be separately explained. The Suchness (Tathatā) of good dharmas is also a genitive Tatpurusha compound. 'True' is 'Suchness' is an appositional compound.'

'Treatise: Furthermore, are space, etc., one or many?'

'Commentary: The following text has two parts. First, examination; then, refutation. This is a question to determine the thesis. Are these three unconditioned dharmas one in essence, or are they many in essence? The teachers of the Sarvāstivāda school have two views on this. One view is that it is one; one view is that it is many. Therefore, now we refute both together. As the tenth volume of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra says, there are two views regarding space.'

'Treatise: If the essence is one, it pervades all places.'

'Commentary: This is to confirm that outsiders believe that the three unconditioned dharmas are each one.'

'Treatise: Space accommodates, and therefore the essence should become many.'

'Commentary: Let's say that space accommodates form, etc., and as it combines with each dharma of form, etc., the essence of space should become many. This is after stating the thesis.'

'Treatise: Where one combines, the rest do not combine.'

'Commentary: Further, an example is given. The thesis is as before. Where one place combines with form, the other places do not combine with form. Therefore, just like the form in other places, where the form in other places combines, the form in this place does not combine, so the essence is not one. Space should also be like this. Inference (Anumāṇa).'

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應思。

下破設救。謂此合處余色亦合。

論。不爾諸法應互相遍。

述曰。比量可知。若非此處色合時。余處色不合。即色等法應互相遍。以此處色合時。余處色亦合。此處色即余處色故。一．一色等應互相遍。隨彼虛空其量遍故。

論。若謂虛空至如余無為。

述曰。彼言虛空不與法合破云。虛空應不能容受。不與法合故。如餘二無為。今言合者謂容受義。故初標宗。虛空容受色等法故。本計容受。今設不容受。故有此過。更非余意。

論。又色等中有虛空不。

述曰。更審外人。

論。有應相雜無應不遍。

述曰。有．無並難。色中有空。色體與空體應相雜。量云。色中虛空。體應即色。處無別故。如此處色體。相雜者。是一義。若此色體中無有虛空。虛空應不遍一切法。不遍一切法故應是有為。如地．水別。

論。一部一品至余品擇滅。

述曰。破空一已。又若擇滅體是一者。且如五部。一部九品。一品結斷時。應得余未斷四部。八品擇滅無為。以體是一故。如彼已得一部。一品所得擇滅。

論。一法緣闕至得非擇滅。

述曰。非擇無為體是一者。一法緣闕得不生時。應於一切法得非擇滅。以非擇體唯是一故。如已所得非

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 應思。

下破設救。謂此合處余色亦合。

論：不然，諸法應該互相遍及。

述曰：這可以通過比量來理解。如果不是此處色法結合時，其他地方的色法不結合，那麼色等法就應該互相遍及。因為此處色法結合時，其他地方的色法也結合，此處的色法即是其他地方的色法，所以每一個色法等都應該互相遍及。就像虛空一樣，它的量是遍及一切的。

論：如果說虛空乃至如同其餘無為法。

述曰：他們說虛空不與法結合，反駁說，虛空應該不能容受。因為它不與法結合，就像其餘兩種無為法一樣。現在說『合』是指容受的意思。所以一開始就標明宗義，虛空能夠容受色等法。他們原本認為虛空能夠容受，現在假設虛空不能容受，所以有這個過失。這並非其他的含義。

論：又，色等之中有虛空嗎？

述曰：進一步審問外道。

論：如果有，應該相互混雜；如果沒有，應該不遍及。

述曰：有和無都有過失。如果色中有虛空，色體和空體應該相互混雜。量云：色中的虛空，其體應該就是色，因為處所沒有區別。就像此處的色體一樣。相互混雜就是一體。如果此色體中沒有虛空，虛空應該不遍及一切法。因為不遍及一切法，所以應該是有為法，就像地、水那樣有區別。

論：一部一品乃至其餘品擇滅（pratisankhya-nirodha，通過智慧抉擇而滅盡煩惱的無為法）。

述曰：破斥虛空是一之後，又如果擇滅的體是一，那麼比如五部（五種煩惱類別），一部有九品（九個等級）。當斷除一部的一品煩惱時，應該得到其餘未斷的四部八品的擇滅無為，因為體是一的緣故。就像已經得到一部一品所得的擇滅一樣。

論：一法緣闕乃至得到非擇滅（apratisankhya-nirodha，不通過智慧抉擇，僅因缺乏生起條件而自然止息的無為法）。

述曰：如果非擇滅的體是一，那麼當一個法缺乏生起條件而不能產生時，應該對一切法都得到非擇滅，因為非擇滅的體只有一個。就像已經得到的非擇滅一樣。

【English Translation】 English version: Should be considered.

The following refutes the establishment and defense, claiming that where this combines, other forms also combine.

Treatise: If not, all dharmas should mutually pervade.

Commentary: This can be understood through inference. If it is not the case that when form combines here, form does not combine elsewhere, then form and other dharmas should mutually pervade. Because when form combines here, form also combines elsewhere; the form here is the form elsewhere, therefore each and every form, etc., should mutually pervade. Just like space, its extent is all-pervasive.

Treatise: If it is said that space is like other unconditioned dharmas.

Commentary: They say that space does not combine with dharmas, refuting that space should not be able to contain. Because it does not combine with dharmas, like the other two unconditioned dharmas. Now, 'combine' means the meaning of containing. Therefore, the proposition is initially stated that space can contain form and other dharmas. They originally thought that space could contain, but now they assume that space cannot contain, so there is this fault. This is not another meaning.

Treatise: Furthermore, is there space within form, etc.?

Commentary: Further questioning the heretics.

Treatise: If there is, they should be mixed; if there is not, it should not be pervasive.

Commentary: Both existence and non-existence have faults. If there is space within form, the substance of form and the substance of space should be mixed. Inference: The space within form, its substance should be identical to form, because there is no difference in location. Just like the substance of form here. Being mixed is the same as being one. If there is no space within this substance of form, space should not pervade all dharmas. Because it does not pervade all dharmas, it should be conditioned, like earth and water being distinct.

Treatise: One category, one grade, up to the remaining grades of pratisankhya-nirodha (滅盡, cessation through discernment).

Commentary: After refuting that space is one, furthermore, if the substance of pratisankhya-nirodha is one, then, for example, with the five categories (of afflictions), one category having nine grades, when one grade of one category is severed, one should obtain the pratisankhya-nirodha of the remaining four categories and eight grades that have not been severed, because the substance is one. Just like obtaining the pratisankhya-nirodha obtained from one grade of one category.

Treatise: When the condition for one dharma is lacking, one obtains apratisankhya-nirodha (非擇滅, cessation without discernment).

Commentary: If the substance of apratisankhya-nirodha is one, then when one dharma lacks the condition for arising and cannot arise, one should obtain apratisankhya-nirodha for all dharmas, because the substance of apratisankhya-nirodha is only one. Just like the apratisankhya-nirodha that has already been obtained.

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擇之法。

問。何故難空令色中有空。次難令亦得餘部品擇滅。后難令亦得余法非擇滅。

論。執彼體一理應爾故。

述曰。汝執此三各體唯一。故理應有如是過失。

論。若體是多至非實無為。

述曰。此等比量義準可知。此三無為體各多者。應是有為。便有品類。此處三品類。非彼品類故。如色等法。非實無為。此即總破三體多訖。

論。虛空又應非遍容受。

述曰。別破空多。汝今既說虛空體多。應非遍。非容受。色等中無故非是遍。無色處有故非容受。此即別破薩婆多等執有實無為者。此三無為雖復各有破其一．多。毗婆沙師取空體一。餘二各多。此難雙關一．多並破。

論。餘部所執至準前應破。

述曰。大眾等四部立九無為。化地部亦執有九。各各不同。此下方破。此等無為。離心．心所體非實有。許無為故。如三無為。如是一切準前應破。

下重總破以上諸部。

論。又諸無為至非異心等有。

述曰。諸無為法。非定實有。無因果故。如兔角等。他部無為無有因果。體是因果。而無因果也。因果即是六因．五果。為離系果時。非六因所得。為能作因等時。不得五果故。自宗無為非異心等。故無過失。

論。然契經說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《擇之法》

問：為什麼難以使『空』在『色』中成為『空』？其次，為什麼難以使『擇滅』也獲得其他品類的『擇滅』？再次，為什麼難以使『非擇滅』也獲得其他法的『非擇滅』？

論：因為你們認為它們的本體是唯一的，所以理應如此。

述曰：你們認為這三者的本體各自是唯一的，所以理應有這樣的過失。

論：如果本體是多的，就會變成非真實的『無為』。

述曰：這些比量的意義可以類推得知。如果這三種『無為』的本體各自是多的，就應該是有為法，便會有品類。這裡的三種品類，不是那些品類，如同『色』等法，不是真實的『無為』。這便是總破三種本體是多的觀點。

論：『虛空』又應該不是普遍容受的。

述曰：這是分別破斥『空』是多的觀點。你們現在既然說『虛空』的本體是多的，就應該不是普遍的，不是容受的。因為在『色』等之中沒有，所以不是普遍的；因為在『無色處』有，所以不是容受的。這便是分別破斥薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）等認為有真實的『無為』的觀點。這三種『無為』雖然各自破斥其一和多，但毗婆沙師（Vaibhashika）認為『空』的本體是唯一的，其餘兩種各自是多的。這個難點同時關聯一和多，並加以破斥。

論：其他部派所執持的，按照前面的方式也應該被破斥。

述曰：大眾部（Mahasamghika）等四個部派立九種『無為』，化地部（Mahisasaka）也執持九種，各自不同。這下面會破斥。這些『無為』，離開心和心所，本體不是真實存在的。因為你們許可是『無為』，如同三種『無為』。像這樣一切按照前面的方式都應該被破斥。

下面再次總破以上各部。

論：又，各種『無為』，不是決定真實存在的，因為沒有因果。如同兔角等。其他部派的『無為』沒有因果，本體是因果，卻沒有因果。因果就是六因和五果。作為離系果時，不是六因所得到的；作為能作因等時，得不到五果。我們自宗的『無為』不是異於心等的，所以沒有過失。

論：然而，契經說……

【English Translation】 English version: The Method of Selection (Zhi Zhi Fa).

Question: Why is it difficult to make 'emptiness' (kong) in 'form' (se) become 'emptiness'? Secondly, why is it difficult to make 'selective cessation' (ze mie) also obtain other categories of 'selective cessation'? Thirdly, why is it difficult to make 'non-selective cessation' (fei ze mie) also obtain other dharmas' 'non-selective cessation'?

Treatise: Because you hold that their substance is one, it should be so.

Commentary: You hold that the substance of these three is each unique, so there should be such faults.

Treatise: If the substance is multiple, it will become unreal 'unconditioned' (wu wei).

Commentary: The meaning of these analogies can be inferred. If the substance of these three 'unconditioned' is each multiple, it should be conditioned dharmas (you wei), and there will be categories. The three categories here are not those categories, like 'form' and other dharmas, which are not real 'unconditioned'. This is a general refutation of the view that the three substances are multiple.

Treatise: 'Space' (xu kong) should also not be universally receptive.

Commentary: This is a separate refutation of the view that 'emptiness' is multiple. Now that you say the substance of 'space' is multiple, it should not be universal, not receptive. Because it is not in 'form' and other things, it is not universal; because it is in the 'formless realms' (wu se chu), it is not receptive. This is a separate refutation of the Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada) and others who hold that there is real 'unconditioned'. Although these three 'unconditioned' each refute their oneness and multiplicity, the Vaibhashika (Vaibhashika) masters take the substance of 'emptiness' as one, and the other two as multiple. This difficulty is related to both one and many, and refutes them together.

Treatise: What other schools hold should also be refuted in the same way as before.

Commentary: The Mahasamghika (Mahasamghika) and other four schools establish nine 'unconditioned', and the Mahisasaka (Mahisasaka) also hold nine, each different. This will be refuted below. These 'unconditioned', apart from mind (xin) and mental factors (xin suo), the substance is not really existent. Because you allow 'unconditioned', like the three 'unconditioned'. In this way, everything should be refuted in the same way as before.

Below, a general refutation of all the above schools is repeated.

Treatise: Also, various 'unconditioned' are not definitely real, because there is no cause and effect. Like rabbit horns and so on. The 'unconditioned' of other schools has no cause and effect, the substance is cause and effect, but there is no cause and effect. Cause and effect are the six causes and five effects. When it is the result of separation from bondage, it is not obtained by the six causes; when it is the efficient cause and so on, the five effects cannot be obtained. Our own school's 'unconditioned' is not different from mind and so on, so there is no fault.

Treatise: However, the sutras say...

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至略有二種。

述曰。下申正義也。

若諸無為非實是有。何故經中。及此宗內。說虛空等以為無為。答此所說略有二種。

論。一依識變假施設有。

述曰。此無本質唯心所變。如極微等。

依何得生。

論。謂曾聞說至虛空等相。

述曰。聞佛．菩薩說有虛空名。隨此名後起分別心。有虛空等相以為緣力。

論。數習力故至無為相現。

述曰。由曾聞說。今時復聞。數習力故。心等生起緣空等時。便似虛空等無為相現。謂變空作無色等礙相。乃至非擇作法闕緣而不生相。此即七地以前有漏加行心等。緣名起分別相。入地入果聖人無漏后得智。緣前無分別智中法性之空等。及遠緣加行智等中。及親聞佛說虛空等故。變似空等相現。此皆變境而緣故也。有漏一識因無漏二識果無漏三智。或說八識。

問曰。此心之相體是有為。何故乃說虛空無為。

論。此所現相至假說為常。

述曰。所現空相前後相似無有改易。唯為一類豁虛空等相。故假說為無為。而理定無實有本質。此如顯揚第十八說。若有漏心所緣現相。多分苦諦所攝。若善．不善心等。亦集諦攝。論據多分但說苦諦。無漏心者道諦所攝。實非是常。即是生滅非生滅門依他性攝。下

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 至略有二種。 述曰：下面申述正義。 如果各種無為法並非真實存在，為何經典中以及本宗之內，說虛空等是無為法？回答是，這裡所說的略有二種。 論：一是依識變假施設有。 述曰：這種無為法沒有本質，只是唯心所變現的，就像極微等。 依什麼而生起呢？ 論：是說曾經聽聞過虛空等的相。 述曰：聽聞佛或菩薩說有虛空這個名稱，隨著這個名稱之後生起分別心，以虛空等的相作為緣的力量。 論：由於數數串習的力量，無為的相便顯現。 述曰：由於曾經聽聞過，現在又聽聞，由於數數串習的力量，心等生起緣于空等的時候，便好像虛空等無為的相顯現。這是說變現空，作為無色等的無礙之相，乃至非擇滅，因為缺少因緣而不生起的相。這指的是七地以前的有漏加行心等，緣于名稱而生起分別相。進入聖位的聖人，其無漏后得智，緣于先前無分別智中的法性之空等，以及遠緣加行智等，以及親自聽聞佛說虛空等，變現出好像空等的相顯現。這些都是變現境界而緣故。有漏的是一識，無漏的是二識，果無漏的是三智，或者說八識。 問：這個心的相，體是有為法，為何卻說虛空是無為法？ 論：這種所顯現的相，前後相似，沒有改變，只是一種豁然空虛的相，所以假說為常。 述曰：所顯現的空相，前後相似，沒有改變，只是一種豁然空虛等的相，所以假說為無為。而理上一定沒有真實存在的本質。這就像《顯揚》第十八所說，如果有漏心所緣的現相，大部分是苦諦所攝。如果是善、不善心等，也是集諦所攝。論據大部分只說苦諦。無漏心是道諦所攝。實際上並非是常，即是生滅，非生滅門，依他性所攝。下面會詳細解釋。

【English Translation】 English version There are two kinds of 'to a slight degree'. Commentary: The following explains the correct meaning. If all unconditioned (asamskrta) dharmas are not truly existent, why do the sutras and this school speak of space (akasa) and so on as unconditioned? The answer is that what is spoken of here is roughly of two kinds. Treatise: First, based on transformations of consciousness (vijnana), there are provisional establishments. Commentary: These unconditioned dharmas have no essence; they are merely transformations of mind, like atoms (paramanu) and so on. What do they depend on to arise? Treatise: It is said that one has heard of the characteristics of space and so on. Commentary: One hears the Buddha or Bodhisattvas say that there is a name 'space'. Following this name, a discriminating mind arises, taking the characteristics of space and so on as the power of a condition. Treatise: Due to the power of repeated practice, the characteristics of the unconditioned appear. Commentary: Because one has heard it before, and now hears it again, due to the power of repeated practice, when the mind and so on arise in relation to space and so on, it seems as if the characteristics of the unconditioned, such as space and so on, appear. This means transforming space into unobstructed characteristics such as formlessness, and even non-selective cessation (apratisamkhya-nirodha), because of the lack of conditions, the characteristics do not arise. This refers to the defiled application minds (prayoga-citta) and so on before the seventh ground (bhumi), which arise with discriminating characteristics in relation to names. The undefiled subsequent wisdom (prsthalabdha-jnana) of the sages who have entered the grounds and attained the fruits, relates to the emptiness (sunyata) of the suchness (dharmata) in the prior non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jnana), and remotely relates to the application wisdom and so on, and because they have personally heard the Buddha speak of space and so on, transformations appear as if they are the characteristics of space and so on. These are all because they transform the object and relate to it. The defiled is one consciousness (vijnana), the undefiled is two consciousnesses, the fruit of the undefiled is three wisdoms (jnana), or it can be said to be eight consciousnesses. Question: The characteristics of this mind are conditioned (samskrta) in nature. Why then is space said to be unconditioned? Treatise: The characteristics that appear are similar before and after, without change, only a kind of vast emptiness, so it is provisionally said to be constant. Commentary: The characteristics of emptiness that appear are similar before and after, without change, only a kind of vast emptiness and so on, so it is provisionally said to be unconditioned. But in principle, there is definitely no real essence. This is as stated in the eighteenth section of the Exposition of the Scriptures ( Xianyang Shengjiao Lun), if the phenomena cognized by defiled minds are mostly included in the truth of suffering (duhkha-satya). If they are good or bad minds, they are also included in the truth of accumulation (samudaya-satya). The treatise mainly speaks of the truth of suffering. Undefiled minds are included in the truth of the path (marga-satya). In reality, they are not constant, that is, they are arising and ceasing, the gate of non-arising and non-ceasing, included in the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava). This will be explained in detail below.

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三性中自有誠證。

論。二依法性假施設有。

述曰。此顯空等依真如立。

何者是法性。

論。謂空無我至非一異等。

述曰。此空無我所顯真如。離有。離無。離俱有無。離俱非有無。心行處滅。言語道斷。與一切法非一非異　等者等取非即離等。此前總顯法性之體。

論。是法真理故名法性。

述曰。釋法性名。性者體也。諸法真理。故名法性。

如何依此假說空等。

論。離諸障礙至故名擇滅。

述曰。即此真如離諸障礙。故名虛空。由無漏惠簡擇力故。滅諸雜染。雜染之言通有漏法。究竟證會。即此真如名為擇滅。即由惠力方證會故。

論。不由擇力至名非擇滅。

述曰。而此本性不由惠能而性清凈。名非擇滅。或有為法緣闕不生。不生之滅顯真理故。名非擇滅。離無漏惠而自滅故。

論。苦樂受滅至名想受滅。

述曰。若離第三靜慮欲時。得於一切苦樂受滅。即此真如說名不動。乃至若離無所有處欲想受不行。即此真如名想受滅。對法第二．及瑜伽第五十三．顯揚第一．第十八等說。然顯揚亦說。苦樂等無為。是暫時離系。此說二性無為。下三性中通計所執有．無合說。

論。此五皆依至假施設名。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 三性（三種自性，即遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）中自有誠實的證據。

論：二依法性（兩種法性，指空性和真如）假施設有。

述曰：這表明空等是依據真如而建立的。

何者是法性？

論：所謂空無我（沒有實體和自我）乃至非一異等。

述曰：這空無我所顯現的真如，遠離有，遠離無，遠離既有又無，遠離既非有也非無。心識的活動止息，言語的道路斷絕。與一切法非一非異。等者，等同於取非即非離等。這之前總的顯示了法性的本體。

論：是法的真理，所以名為法性。

述曰：解釋法性的名稱。性就是體。諸法的真理，所以名為法性。

如何依此假說空等？

論：離諸障礙乃至故名擇滅。

述曰：即此真如遠離一切障礙，所以名為虛空。由於無漏智慧的簡擇力，滅除一切雜染。雜染之言通指有漏法。究竟證悟，即此真如名為擇滅。即由智慧的力量才能證悟。

論：不由擇力乃至名非擇滅。

述曰：而此本性不由智慧的能力而自然清凈，名為非擇滅。或者有為法因緣缺失而不生，不生之滅顯現真理的緣故，名為非擇滅。離開無漏智慧而自然寂滅的緣故。

論：苦樂受滅乃至名想受滅。

述曰：如果離開第三禪的慾望時，得到一切苦樂感受的滅除，即此真如說名不動。乃至如果離開無所有處的慾望，想和受都不起作用，即此真如名想受滅。《對法》第二、《瑜伽師地論》第五十三、《顯揚聖教論》第一、第十八等都有說明。然而《顯揚聖教論》也說，苦樂等無為，是暫時離系。這裡說二性無為，下三性中通計所執的有和無合起來說。

論：此五皆依乃至假施設名。

【English Translation】 English version: There is genuine evidence within the three natures (trisvabhāva, namely parikalpita-svabhāva, paratantra-svabhāva, and pariniṣpanna-svabhāva).

Treatise: The two dharma-natures (two kinds of dharma-nature, referring to emptiness and suchness) are provisionally established.

Commentary: This shows that emptiness and the like are established based on suchness (tathatā).

What is dharma-nature?

Treatise: It refers to emptiness, non-self (anatta), and so on, up to non-oneness and non-difference, etc.

Commentary: The suchness revealed by this emptiness and non-self is apart from existence, apart from non-existence, apart from both existence and non-existence, and apart from neither existence nor non-existence. The activity of the mind ceases, and the path of language is cut off. It is neither one nor different from all dharmas. 'Etc.' includes taking non-identity and non-separation, etc. Before this, the substance of dharma-nature is generally revealed.

Treatise: It is the truth of dharmas, therefore it is called dharma-nature.

Commentary: Explaining the name dharma-nature. 'Nature' means substance. It is the truth of all dharmas, therefore it is called dharma-nature.

How are emptiness and the like provisionally spoken of based on this?

Treatise: Being apart from all obstacles, hence it is called selective cessation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha).

Commentary: This suchness is apart from all obstacles, therefore it is called space (ākāśa). Due to the selective power of non-outflow wisdom (anāsrava-jñāna), all defilements are extinguished. The term 'defilements' generally refers to outflow-bearing dharmas (sāsrava-dharma). Ultimate realization and attainment, this suchness is called selective cessation. That is, it is only through the power of wisdom that one can realize and attain it.

Treatise: Not by the power of selection, hence it is called non-selective cessation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha).

Commentary: This original nature is naturally pure without the ability of wisdom, hence it is called non-selective cessation. Or, conditioned dharmas do not arise due to the lack of conditions, and the cessation of non-arising reveals the truth, hence it is called non-selective cessation. It is naturally extinguished apart from non-outflow wisdom.

Treatise: The cessation of suffering and pleasure, hence it is called the cessation of perception and sensation (saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha).

Commentary: If one departs from the desire of the third dhyana (third meditation), one attains the cessation of all suffering and pleasure, and this suchness is called immobility. Furthermore, if one departs from the desire of the realm of nothingness (ākiṃcanyāyatana), perception and sensation do not function, and this suchness is called the cessation of perception and sensation. This is explained in the second chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the fifty-third chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, and the first and eighteenth chapters of the Śūnyatā-sampatti. However, the Śūnyatā-sampatti also says that the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) such as suffering and pleasure is a temporary separation. Here it says that the two natures are unconditioned, and in the following three natures, the conceptualized nature (parikalpita-svabhāva) is generally discussed with existence and non-existence combined.

Treatise: These five all rely on, hence they are provisionally established names.

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述曰。善等真如約詮而論。體唯是一。此五無為依真如上假名空等。而真如體非如非不如。故真如名亦是假立。如食油蟲等。不稱彼體。唯言顯故。

若真如名所詮非如體。何故說如為有。

論。遮撥為無故說為有。

述曰。遮惡取空．及邪見者撥體全無。故說為有。體實非有非不有。

若爾何故經說為空。

論。遮執為有故說為空。

述曰。遮化地部說。定有執故說為空。非言為空而體即空。非空非不空故。

何故論中說實物有。即瑜伽論五法中說。

論。勿謂虛幻故說為實。

述曰。遮一說部一切皆假。謂如為虛。同依他法。故說為實。又虛簡所執。幻簡依他。此真如體非實。非不實。

若爾何故名為真如。

論。理非妄倒故名真如。

述曰。真以簡妄。如以別倒。初簡所執。后簡依他。或真以簡有漏。非虛妄故。如以別無漏。非有為故。真是實義。如是常義。故名真如。

若爾此與化地部計實有善等真如。有何差別。

論。不同余宗至名曰真如。

述曰。我部所言。與色等法非一異故。亦非是實。非不實故。不同於余化地部。離色．心等定實有法。

論。故諸無為非定實有。

述曰。此即第三

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述：關於善等真如（Tathata，如實、不變的真理）從詮釋的角度來說，其本體是唯一的。這五種無為法（Asamskrta dharmas，不生不滅、無造作的法）是依真如之上假名安立的空等概念。而真如的本體既不是『如』，也不是『不如』，所以真如這個名稱也是假立的，就像稱呼吃油的蟲子等，並不能真正代表它們的本體，只是爲了方便顯說而已。

如果真如這個名稱所詮釋的不是『如』的本體，那麼為什麼說『如』是『有』呢？

論：爲了遮止否認為『無』的觀點，所以說『如』是『有』。

窺基法師述：爲了遮止那些錯誤地執著于空，以及邪見者否定本體完全不存在的觀點，所以說『如』是『有』。但實際上，本體既非『有』，也非『不有』。

如果這樣，那麼為什麼經典中又說『空』呢？

論：爲了遮止執著于『有』的觀點，所以說『空』。

窺基法師述：爲了遮止化地部（Mahisasaka，佛教部派之一）認為一切事物都是實有的執著，所以說『空』。並非說『空』就意味著本體就是空無，因為本體既非『空』，也非『不空』。

為什麼論中又說實物是『有』呢？就像《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）五法中所說的那樣。

論：爲了避免被認為是虛幻的，所以說『實』。

窺基法師述：爲了遮止一切皆假的說法，即認為『如』是虛假的，與依他起性（Paratantra，緣起性）相同，所以說『實』。而且，『虛』是爲了簡別所執著的事物，『幻』是爲了簡別依他起性。這個真如的本體既非『實』，也非『不實』。

如果這樣，那麼為什麼又名為『真如』呢？

論：因為道理不是虛妄顛倒的，所以名為『真如』。

窺基法師述：『真』是爲了簡別虛妄，『如』是爲了簡別顛倒。前者簡別所執著的事物，後者簡別依他起性。或者，『真』是爲了簡別有漏法（Sasrava-dharma，有煩惱的法），因為它不是虛妄的；『如』是爲了簡別無漏法（Anasrava-dharma，無煩惱的法），因為它不是有為法（Samskrta-dharma，有生滅變化的法）。『真』是真實的意思，『如』是常恒的意思，所以名為『真如』。

如果這樣，那麼這與化地部所認為的實有善等真如，有什麼差別呢？

論：與其他的宗派不同，所以名為『真如』。

窺基法師述：我們宗派所說的真如，與色等法（Rupa，物質現象）既非同一，也非相異，所以它既非是實有，也非不是實有。這與化地部不同，他們認為離開色、心等法，存在著一個實在的法。

論：所以，諸無為法並非是實在存在的。

窺基法師述：這是第三點。

English version: Master Kuiji states: Regarding Suchness (Tathata, the true and unchanging reality) from the perspective of interpretation, its essence is singular. These five unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta dharmas, unborn, undying, and uncreated dharmas) are provisionally established upon Suchness as concepts like emptiness. However, the essence of Suchness is neither 'such' nor 'not such,' so the name Suchness is also provisionally established, like calling oil-eating insects, which doesn't truly represent their essence but is merely for convenient expression.

If the meaning of the name Suchness does not interpret the essence of 'such,' then why is 'such' said to be 'existent'?

Treatise: To prevent the denial of 'non-existence,' it is said to be 'existent.'

Master Kuiji states: To prevent those who mistakenly cling to emptiness and those with wrong views who deny the complete non-existence of the essence, it is said to be 'existent.' But in reality, the essence is neither 'existent' nor 'non-existent.'

If so, then why do the scriptures say 'emptiness'?

Treatise: To prevent clinging to the view of 'existence,' it is said to be 'empty.'

Master Kuiji states: To prevent the Mahisasaka (a Buddhist school) from clinging to the view that everything is truly existent, it is said to be 'empty.' It is not that 'empty' means the essence is empty, because the essence is neither 'empty' nor 'not empty.'

Why does the treatise say that real things are 'existent'? As stated in the five dharmas of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice).

Treatise: To avoid being considered illusory, it is said to be 'real.'

Master Kuiji states: To prevent the assertion that everything is false, that 'suchness' is false, like the dependent nature (Paratantra, the nature of dependent origination), it is said to be 'real.' Moreover, 'false' is to distinguish what is clung to, and 'illusory' is to distinguish the dependent nature. The essence of this Suchness is neither 'real' nor 'not real.'

If so, then why is it called 'Suchness'?

Treatise: Because the principle is not false or inverted, it is called 'Suchness.'

Master Kuiji states: 'True' is to distinguish falsehood, and 'such' is to distinguish inversion. The former distinguishes what is clung to, and the latter distinguishes the dependent nature. Alternatively, 'true' is to distinguish defiled dharmas (Sasrava-dharma, dharmas with afflictions), because it is not false; 'such' is to distinguish undefiled dharmas (Anasrava-dharma, dharmas without afflictions), because it is not conditioned dharma (Samskrta-dharma, dharmas subject to birth and death). 'True' means reality, and 'such' means permanence, so it is called 'Suchness.'

If so, then what is the difference between this and the Mahisasaka's view of the truly existent Suchness of goodness, etc.?

Treatise: It is different from other schools, so it is called 'Suchness.'

Master Kuiji states: What our school says about Suchness is neither identical to nor different from form (Rupa, material phenomena), so it is neither truly existent nor not truly existent. This is different from the Mahisasaka, who believes that there is a real dharma apart from form, mind, etc.

Treatise: Therefore, the unconditioned dharmas are not definitely truly existent.

Master Kuiji states: This is the third point.

【English Translation】 English translation line 1 English translation line 2

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總結非也。然此無為四門分別。一諸部增減。二出體性。三釋名。四釋妨難。第一諸部增減者。大眾部．一說部．說出世部．雞胤部立有九種。一釋滅。二非擇滅。三虛空。四空無邊處。五識無邊處。六無所有處。七非想非非想處。八緣起支性。九聖道支性。化地部舊云正地部。亦立有九。一擇滅。二非擇滅。三虛空。四不動。舊云無我謬也。五善法真如。六不善法真如。七無記法真如。八道支真如。九緣起真如。正量．及譬喻師立三無為。無有體性。毗婆阇婆提。說三滅中立無常滅。亦是無為。薩婆多部亦立三種。然是實有。乃至虛空。或說唯一或說為多。然大乘中。此．及百法但唯說六。瑜伽五十三說二。謂空．非擇。五蘊論說有四。不說不動等二。即擇滅故。又瑜伽論．對法．顯揚等論說有八種。於此六中真如為三。約詮約理所望別故。

第二齣體性者。一實體。八無為體皆是真如。由此論中依于真如立虛空等。二假體。即隨有漏．無漏心中所現空等無為之相名虛空等。或依障斷所得滅處。假立擇滅．不動．想受無色之處假說虛空。法緣闕時義名非擇。約詮為論名善等如。即依假體皆可說假。實亦可然。皆可說實。若通三性。體遍有無　三釋名者。無別釋名。虛空之體即是無為乃至真如此即無為。皆持業

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 總結並非如此。這裡對無為四門進行分別闡述：一、諸部增減；二、出體性；三、釋名；四、釋妨難。 第一，諸部增減：大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）、一說部（Ekavyāvahārika）、說出世部（Lokottaravāda）、雞胤部（Kukkuṭika）立有九種無為：一、釋滅（visarga-nirodha）；二、非擇滅（apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）；三、虛空（ākāśa）；四、空無邊處（ākāśānantyāyatana）；五、識無邊處（vijñānānantyāyatana）；六、無所有處（ākiṃcanyāyatana）；七、非想非非想處（naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana）；八、緣起支性（pratītyasamutpāda-aṅga-svabhāva）；九、聖道支性（ārya-mārga-aṅga-svabhāva）。 化地部（Mahīśāsaka），舊稱正地部，也立有九種無為：一、擇滅（pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）；二、非擇滅（apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）；三、虛空（ākāśa）；四、不動（āniñjya），舊譯『無我』是錯誤的；五、善法真如（kuśala-dharma-tathatā）；六、不善法真如（akuśala-dharma-tathatā）；七、無記法真如（avyākṛta-dharma-tathatā）；八、道支真如（mārga-aṅga-tathatā）；九、緣起真如（pratītyasamutpāda-tathatā）。 正量部（Saṃmitīya）以及譬喻師（Dārṣṭāntika）立三種無為，認為沒有體性。毗婆阇婆提（Vibhāṣāvādin）認為在三種滅中，無常滅（anitya-nirodha）也是無為。薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）也立三種無為，但認為是實有，乃至虛空。或者說唯一，或者說為多。然而在大乘（Mahāyāna）中，此以及百法（Śata-dharma）但唯說六種無為。瑜伽五十三說二種，即空和非擇滅。《五蘊論》（Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa）說有四種，不說不動等二種，因為包含在擇滅中。另外，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）、《對法》（Abhidharma）、《顯揚》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）等論說有八種無為，在這六種無為中，真如（tathatā）分為三種，這是根據所詮釋的意義和道理的不同而區分的。 第二，出體性：一、實體：八種無為的體性都是真如（tathatā）。因此，這些論典中依據真如而立虛空等。二、假體：即隨著有漏（sāsrava）、無漏（anāsrava）心中所顯現的空等無為之相，名為虛空等。或者依據斷除障礙所得到的滅處，假立擇滅、不動，以及想受無色之處假說虛空。法緣缺失時的意義名為非擇滅。根據所詮釋的意義來說，名為善等真如。即依據假體都可以說是假，實際上也可以說是真，都可以說是實。如果通達三性（trisvabhāva），體性遍及有和無。 第三，釋名：沒有特別的解釋名稱。虛空的體性就是無為，乃至真如就是無為，都是持業釋。

【English Translation】 English version The summary is not so. Here, the four gates of asaṃskṛta (unconditioned) are distinguished: 1. Increases and decreases in various schools; 2. Elucidating the essence; 3. Explaining the names; 4. Explaining objections and difficulties. First, increases and decreases in various schools: The Mahāsāṃghika (大眾部), Ekavyāvahārika (一說部), Lokottaravāda (說出世部), and Kukkuṭika (雞胤部) establish nine kinds of asaṃskṛta: 1. visarga-nirodha (釋滅); 2. apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (非擇滅); 3. ākāśa (虛空); 4. ākāśānantyāyatana (空無邊處); 5. vijñānānantyāyatana (識無邊處); 6. ākiṃcanyāyatana (無所有處); 7. naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana (非想非非想處); 8. pratītyasamutpāda-aṅga-svabhāva (緣起支性); 9. ārya-mārga-aṅga-svabhāva (聖道支性). The Mahīśāsaka (化地部), formerly known as the Zhengdi Bu, also establishes nine: 1. pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (擇滅); 2. apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (非擇滅); 3. ākāśa (虛空); 4. āniñjya (不動), the old translation 'no-self' is wrong; 5. kuśala-dharma-tathatā (善法真如); 6. akuśala-dharma-tathatā (不善法真如); 7. avyākṛta-dharma-tathatā (無記法真如); 8. mārga-aṅga-tathatā (道支真如); 9. pratītyasamutpāda-tathatā (緣起真如). The Saṃmitīya (正量部) and the Dārṣṭāntika (譬喻師) establish three asaṃskṛta, believing they have no essence. The Vibhāṣāvādin (毗婆阇婆提) believes that among the three nirodha (滅), anitya-nirodha (無常滅) is also asaṃskṛta. The Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多部) also establishes three, but believes they are real, even ākāśa (虛空). Some say it is one, others say it is many. However, in the Mahāyāna (大乘), this and the Śata-dharma (百法) only speak of six asaṃskṛta. The Yogācāra fifty-three speaks of two, namely emptiness and apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. The Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa (五蘊論) speaks of four, not mentioning āniñjya etc., because they are included in pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. In addition, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), Abhidharma (對法), Abhidharma-samuccaya (顯揚) and other treatises speak of eight kinds of asaṃskṛta. Among these six, tathatā (真如) is divided into three, which is distinguished according to the different meanings and principles explained. Second, elucidating the essence: 1. Real essence: The essence of the eight asaṃskṛta is all tathatā (真如). Therefore, in these treatises, ākāśa etc. are established based on tathatā. 2. Provisional essence: That is, the appearance of emptiness and other asaṃskṛta that appear in the minds of sāsrava (有漏) and anāsrava (無漏), are called ākāśa etc. Or, based on the place of cessation obtained by cutting off obstacles, pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha and āniñjya are provisionally established, and emptiness is provisionally spoken of in the place of formlessness of perception and sensation. The meaning of the absence of dharma conditions is called apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha. According to the meaning explained, it is called kuśala etc. tathatā. That is, based on the provisional essence, it can be said to be provisional, and in reality, it can be said to be real, and it can be said to be real. If the three svabhāva (trisvabhāva) are understood, the essence pervades existence and non-existence. Third, explaining the names: There is no special explanation of the names. The essence of ākāśa is asaṃskṛta, and even tathatā is asaṃskṛta, all of which are possessive determinatives.

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釋　四釋妨難者。何故擇滅外別立不動．及想受滅。唯於二受滅立不動無為。舍受滅時立想受滅。非余受滅亦立無為。且依勝定障說。據實。一切染污等法無不障定。今約別行障定者說。不障一法得多無為故。又斷所知障得無為不。及釋諸論相違等妨。皆如此論第十卷說。于中復有內外。善等三性。依他等攝。安立非安立。世俗勝義。苦集滅道。及七真如體相攝等。得非得等體性一多。五果。凡聖得之多少。其擇非擇滅隨有漏事。為隨煩惱類數多少等諸門分別。如別章說。大般若經．辨中邊論。說真如名有十二種。謂真如．法界．法性．不虛妄性．不變異性．平等性．離生性．法定．法住．虛空界．實際．不思議界。對法第二．佛地論等。雖釋此名然少於彼。

上來三別破外道．小乘法非有訖。自下第四合破小乘．外道所．能取無。

論。外道余乘至如心心所。

述曰。言余乘者。顯非此乘。所執諸法通三聚法。除心．心所。為簡自許依他性心．及心所．所變色等諸法。法性真如與心等法不一異等。不同彼執一向異。故無過失也。謂立量云。外道．余乘所執三聚如前諸法。是有法也。異心．心所非實有性。即是法也。合名為宗。因云。是所取故。喻云。如心．心所。若心．心所亦是所立。今此比量

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 釋：第四部分解釋了對妨難的駁斥。為什麼在擇滅之外，還要單獨設立不動（Achala，指一種禪定狀態）以及想受滅（Sanjnavedanirodha，指滅盡定）？為什麼只在兩種受滅時設立不動無為（不動的涅槃狀態），而在舍受滅時設立想受滅？為什麼其餘的受滅不設立無為？這主要是依據殊勝禪定的障礙來說的。實際上，一切染污等法沒有不障礙禪定的。現在是就特別會障礙禪定的法來說的。不障礙一種法，可以獲得多種無為的緣故。此外，斷除所知障（Jnana-avarana）是否能獲得無為？以及解釋各種論典中相互矛盾之處等等的妨難，都如《成唯識論》第十卷所說。其中又包含內外、善等三種性質，依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava）等所攝，安立與非安立，世俗諦（Samvriti-satya）與勝義諦（Paramartha-satya），苦集滅道（Dukkha-samudaya-nirodha-marga）四聖諦，以及七種真如（Tathata）的體相攝等，得與非得等體性的一多，五果（Pancha-phala），凡夫與聖者所得的多少，其擇滅與非擇滅隨著有漏事（Sasrava-dharma）的多少，以及隨著煩惱的種類數量多少等各種門類的分別，如其他章節所說。《大般若經》（Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra）、《辨中邊論》（Madhyantavibhaga-bhashya）說真如的名有十二種，即真如（Tathata）、法界（Dharmadhatu）、法性（Dharmata）、不虛妄性（Avitathata）、不變異性（Ananyathata）、平等性（Samata）、離生性（Viviktata）、法定（Dharmaniyamata）、法住（Dharmasthitata）、虛空界（Akasadhatu）、實際（Bhutakoti）、不思議界（Acintyadhatu）。《對法論》（Abhidharma）第二、《佛地論》（Buddhabhumika-sastra）等，雖然解釋了這些名稱，但少於《大般若經》和《辨中邊論》所說。 上面三個部分破斥了外道（Tirthika）、小乘（Hinayana）的法並非實有。下面第四部分合並破斥小乘、外道所執的能取（Grahaka，能認知的主體）和所取（Grahya，被認知的客體）並非實有。 論：外道和其他乘派，乃至如心和心所（Citta-caitta）。 述曰：所說的『其他乘派』，表明不是唯識宗。他們所執著的諸法，通於三種類別的法（三聚法，指善、惡、無記三類法）。除了心和心所，是爲了簡別自宗所許的依他起性的心和心所，以及心和心所所變現的色等諸法。法性真如與心等法不一不異等，不同於他們所執著的一概是異體的觀點，所以沒有過失。可以立一個量式：外道和其他乘派所執著的三聚法，如前面所說的諸法，是有法（Dharmin，論題）。異於心和心所，不是實有自性，這是法（Sadhya，結論）。合起來稱為宗（Paksha，論題）。因（Hetu，理由）是：『是所取故』。喻（Drishtanta，例證）是：『如心和心所』。如果心和心所也是所要成立的，那麼這個比量（Anumana，推理）就...

【English Translation】 English version: Explanation: The fourth section explains the refutation of objections. Why, in addition to Nirodha-samapatti (cessation attainment), are Achala (immovable state, a type of Samadhi) and Sanjnavedanirodha (cessation of perception and feeling) separately established? Why is Achala-asamskrita (immovable unconditioned state) only established at the cessation of two types of feelings, and Sanjnavedanirodha established at the abandonment of feeling? Why are unconditioned states not established for the cessation of other feelings? This is mainly based on the obstacles to superior Samadhi. In reality, all defiled dharmas obstruct Samadhi. Now, it is discussed in terms of dharmas that specifically obstruct Samadhi. Not obstructing one dharma allows for the attainment of multiple unconditioned states. Furthermore, can the attainment of unconditioned states be achieved by severing the Jnana-avarana (cognitive obscurations)? And how to explain the contradictions in various treatises, etc., are all discussed in the tenth volume of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra. It also includes internal and external aspects, the three natures of good, etc., what is included in Paratantra-svabhava (other-powered nature), established and unestablished, Samvriti-satya (conventional truth) and Paramartha-satya (ultimate truth), the Four Noble Truths of Dukkha-samudaya-nirodha-marga (suffering, origin, cessation, path), and the inclusion of the seven Tathatas (suchness) in terms of their essence and characteristics, the oneness or multiplicity of the nature of attainment and non-attainment, the five results (Pancha-phala), the amount attained by ordinary beings and sages, and the distinctions between Nirodha (cessation) and non-Nirodha based on the amount of Sasrava-dharma (defiled phenomena), and the number of types of afflictions, etc., as discussed in other chapters. The Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra (Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra) and the Madhyantavibhaga-bhashya (Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes) state that there are twelve names for Tathata (suchness), namely Tathata (suchness), Dharmadhatu (dharma realm), Dharmata (dharma nature), Avitathata (non-deceptive nature), Ananyathata (non-different nature), Samata (equality), Viviktata (seclusion), Dharmaniyamata (dharma regularity), Dharmasthitata (dharma abiding), Akasadhatu (space realm), Bhutakoti (limit of reality), and Acintyadhatu (inconceivable realm). Although the Abhidharma (collection of Buddhist teachings) in the second volume and the Buddhabhumika-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Buddhahood), etc., explain these names, they are fewer than those mentioned in the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra and the Madhyantavibhaga-bhashya. The above three sections refuted the non-existence of dharmas according to the Tirthikas (non-Buddhists) and Hinayana (Smaller Vehicle). The fourth section below combines the refutation of the Grahaka (apprehender, the subject that cognizes) and Grahya (apprehended, the object that is cognized) as held by the Hinayana and Tirthikas. Treatise: The Tirthikas and other vehicles, up to Citta (mind) and Caitta (mental factors). Commentary: The term 'other vehicles' indicates that it is not the Vijnanavada (Yogacara) school. The dharmas they adhere to encompass the three categories of dharmas (good, evil, and neutral). Except for Citta and Caitta, it is to distinguish the Paratantra-svabhava (other-powered nature) Citta and Caitta, and the Rupa (form) and other dharmas transformed by Citta and Caitta, as accepted by our school. The Dharmata-Tathata (dharma nature-suchness) is neither one nor different from Citta and other dharmas, which is different from their view that everything is entirely different, so there is no fault. A syllogism can be established: The three categories of dharmas adhered to by the Tirthikas and other vehicles, like the dharmas mentioned earlier, are the Dharmin (subject of the argument). Different from Citta and Caitta, they are not substantially existent, which is the Sadhya (conclusion). Together, they are called the Paksha (thesis). The Hetu (reason) is: 'Because they are apprehended.' The Drishtanta (example) is: 'Like Citta and Caitta.' If Citta and Caitta are also to be established, then this Anumana (inference) would...

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即有一分相符之過。故今除之。此成所取無。

次成能取亦不緣彼。

論。能取彼覺至如緣此覺。

述曰。薩婆多等言。若境無實。云何緣時生心心所　今立量云。汝言能取彼色等覺。亦不緣彼色等諸法。是能取故。如緣此覺之所有覺。覺者是心．心所總名。此者即是心．心所也。緣心等心。即他心智等。然有法中先言如汝所執法能緣之覺。不緣于彼故。無自言相違。又無違自宗等。我不許緣彼心外實法生心故。前我執下亦有此結。

上來難破心外境無。仍恐許心等同外計實有故今應破。

論。諸心心所至非真實有。

述曰。謂立量云。諸心．心所。非實有性。依他起故。如幻事等。諸部皆許幻事非實。

問若爾心．境都無差別。何故乃說唯有識耶。

論。為遣妄執至說唯有識。

述曰。為外道等心．心所外執實有境故。假說唯有識。非唯識言便有實識。

論。若執唯識至亦是法執。

述曰。由是理故但應遣彼心外之境同兔角無。能緣彼心如幻事有。故別不同。非謂即心亦名實有量云。執心所取真實唯識。體非實有。執所取故。如所執色等。執實唯識心等。亦是法執。執實有法故。如執色心等。

論。然諸法執至二者分別。

述曰

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 即便是隻有一分相似之處的過失，現在也要去除。這樣，『成所取』（parinispanna，圓成實性）的缺失就不存在了。 接下來，『能取』（grahaka，能取相）也不會緣于那個『彼』（tat，所取相）。 論：能取彼覺，乃至如緣此覺。 述曰：薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）等人說，如果境不是真實的，那麼緣境時生起的心和心所怎麼可能存在？現在立一個量式：你們所說的能取彼色等的覺，也不會緣于彼色等諸法，因為它是能取。就像緣此覺的所有覺一樣。『覺』是心和心所的總稱。『此』就是心和心所。緣心等的心，比如他心智等。然而，在有法中，先說如你所執法的能緣之覺，不緣于彼，所以沒有自語相違。也沒有違背自宗等。我不允許緣彼心外實法生心。前面我執下也有這個結論。 上面是爲了破斥心外境無，但仍然擔心你們會認為心等同於外境，執為實有，所以現在應該破斥。 論：諸心心所，乃至非真實有。 述曰：就是立一個量式：諸心、心所，不是實有自性，因為是依他起。就像幻事等。各部都承認幻事不是真實的。 問：如果這樣，心和境都沒有差別，為什麼還要說唯有識呢？ 論：為遣妄執，乃至說唯有識。 述曰：爲了外道等在心、心所外執實有境，所以假說唯有識。並非說了唯有識，就有了實識。 論：若執唯識，乃至亦是法執。 述曰：因為這個道理，所以只應該去除他們心外的境，如同兔角一樣不存在。能緣彼心如同幻事一樣存在，所以有所不同。並非說心就是實有。立一個量式：執心所取真實唯識，體不是實有，因為是執所取。如同所執的色等。執實唯識的心等，也是法執。因為執實有法，如同執色心等。 論：然諸法執，乃至二者分別。 述曰：

【English Translation】 English version: Even a fault that has a semblance of correctness should now be removed. Thus, there is no absence of 『parinispanna』 (perfected nature). Next, the 『grahaka』 (apprehender) also does not cognize that 『tat』 (object). Treatise: The apprehension of that, up to the apprehension of this awareness. Commentary: The Sarvastivadins and others say, if the object is not real, how can the mind and mental factors arise when cognizing the object? Now, we establish a syllogism: Your so-called apprehension of that color, etc., also does not cognize those dharmas such as color, etc., because it is an apprehender. It is like all the awarenesses that cognize this awareness. 『Awareness』 is the general term for mind and mental factors. 『This』 refers to mind and mental factors. The mind that cognizes the mind, such as the knowledge of others' minds, etc. However, in the case of the subject, it is first said that the awareness that cognizes the dharma you uphold does not cognize that, so there is no contradiction in terms. There is also no contradiction with one's own doctrine, etc. I do not allow the mind to arise from the external real dharma outside the mind. The previous conclusion under 『I-attachment』 also has this conclusion. The above is to refute the non-existence of external objects outside the mind, but there is still concern that you might consider the mind to be the same as external objects and cling to it as real, so now it should be refuted. Treatise: All minds and mental factors, up to not being truly existent. Commentary: That is, establish a syllogism: All minds and mental factors do not have a real nature because they are dependently arisen. Like illusions, etc. All schools admit that illusions are not real. Question: If so, there is no difference between mind and object, why say only consciousness? Treatise: To eliminate false clinging, hence the saying 『only consciousness』. Commentary: Because externalists and others cling to the existence of real objects outside of mind and mental factors, it is falsely said that there is only consciousness. It is not that by saying only consciousness, there is real consciousness. Treatise: If clinging to only consciousness, it is also a dharma attachment. Commentary: Because of this reason, one should only remove the external objects outside their minds, just like the horns of a rabbit do not exist. The mind that cognizes that exists like an illusion, so it is different. It is not that the mind is said to be real. Establish a syllogism: Clinging to the truly existent only consciousness apprehended by the mind, its substance is not truly existent, because it is what is apprehended. Like the apprehended color, etc. Clinging to the mind, etc., of truly existent only consciousness is also a dharma attachment, because it clings to the existence of real dharmas, like clinging to color, mind, etc. Treatise: However, all dharma attachments, up to the distinction between the two. Commentary:

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。自下第五解上法執分別．俱生伏．斷位次。二障三住通。十地斷位諸門分別。如第九卷。文中有二。初解二執行相．斷位。如是所說下。顯執所緣或無。或有。初中有三。初牒執舉數。次依執別烈。后依烈別釋。準義可知。護法雲。法執寬故。人執俱時必有法執。有法執時可無人執。與前人執不同性起。體寬廣故。有唯法執種子生故。無有唯從人執種起。又俱所變似我法亦爾。故無妨難　問曰何故人執必帶法執。法執亦有不帶人　答能持自體說名為法。即一切法皆持自體。有常一用方名為我。故非一切法皆是我。如計外境為法非我。即顯內法有非一常。

論。俱生法執至恒與身俱。

述曰。下隨別釋。此中顯彼俱生法執。由自種子內因力生。釋其俱義。

論。不待邪教至故名俱生。

述曰。顯非外緣方始得起。釋其生義。

論。此復二種至執為實法。

述曰。此顯相續唯第七識。未得無漏聖道已來。恒相續起要入佛地方永不生。中間亦有間轉位次。未入聖時恒無轉故。名為相續。然第七識亦唯有說。唯我無法。法執亦通第八識有。今此但舉正義所取。此中解釋準我執說。此識執相如下當知。

論。二有間斷至執為實法。

述曰。識既不能取心外法。唯緣所變蘊．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：自下文第五部分開始，解釋了對法的執著的分別，以及俱生法執的伏斷位次。兩種障礙和三種住所是共通的。關於十地斷位的各種門類的分別，詳見第九卷。這段文字包含兩部分。首先解釋兩種執著的行相和斷位，如『如是所說』以下的內容。揭示執著的所緣，有時有，有時無。第一部分包含三點。首先，依照執著列舉數目；其次，根據執著的類別進行詳細劃分；最後，根據劃分的類別進行解釋。根據文義可以理解。護法說：『因為法執範圍寬廣，所以人執必然伴隨法執。有法執的時候，可以沒有人執。』這與之前的人執不同，不是同一性質生起，因為法執的本體更加寬廣。因為只有法執的種子才能生起，沒有僅僅從人執的種子生起的。而且，共同變現的相似的我和法也是如此，所以沒有妨礙和疑問。問：為什麼人執必然伴隨法執，而法執卻可以不伴隨人執？答：能夠保持自身體性的叫做『法』，也就是說一切法都保持自身體性。具有常一作用的才叫做『我』，所以不是一切法都是我。例如，認為外境是法而不是我，這就顯示了內在的法有不是單一和常有的。

論：俱生法執乃至恒常與身體相伴。

述曰：下面隨著類別進行解釋。這裡顯示了俱生法執，由自身種子內在力量所生。解釋其中的『俱』的含義。

論：不依賴邪教乃至所以叫做俱生。

述曰：顯示不是依靠外在因緣才開始生起。解釋其中的『生』的含義。

論：這又分為兩種，乃至執著為真實法。

述曰：這顯示了相續的法執唯有第七識才有。在沒有獲得無漏聖道之前，恒常相續生起，必須要進入佛地才能永遠不生。中間也有間斷和轉變的位次。在沒有進入聖位時，恒常沒有轉變，所以叫做相續。然而，第七識也只是一種說法，只有我執沒有法執。法執也通於第八識。現在這裡只是舉出正義所取。關於這個識的執著相，下面將會知道。

論：第二種是有間斷的，乃至執著為真實法。

述曰：既然識不能取心外的法，只能緣所變現的蘊、界、處。

【English Translation】 English version: From the fifth section onwards, the text explains the distinctions of attachment to Dharma (法, dharma), and the stages of subduing and eliminating innate attachment to Dharma. The two kinds of obstacles and the three abodes are common. The distinctions of the various categories of the ten Bhumis (十地, ten grounds) of severance are detailed in the ninth volume. This passage contains two parts. First, it explains the characteristics and stages of severance of the two attachments, as in the content following 'as it is said'. It reveals that the object of attachment is sometimes present and sometimes absent. The first part contains three points. First, it lists the number of attachments according to the attachments; second, it elaborates in detail according to the categories of attachments; and finally, it explains according to the categories of elaboration. It can be understood according to the meaning of the text. Dharmapala (護法) said: 'Because the scope of attachment to Dharma is broad, attachment to self (人執, attachment to self) is necessarily accompanied by attachment to Dharma. When there is attachment to Dharma, there may be no attachment to self.' This is different from the previous attachment to self, and it does not arise from the same nature, because the substance of attachment to Dharma is broader. Because only the seeds of attachment to Dharma can arise, there is no arising solely from the seeds of attachment to self. Moreover, the similar self and Dharma that are jointly manifested are also like this, so there is no hindrance or question. Question: Why is attachment to self necessarily accompanied by attachment to Dharma, while attachment to Dharma may not be accompanied by attachment to self? Answer: That which can maintain its own essence is called 'Dharma', that is, all Dharmas maintain their own essence. Only that which has a constant and singular function is called 'self', so not all Dharmas are self. For example, considering external objects as Dharma but not self, this shows that internal Dharmas are not singular and constant.

Treatise: Innate attachment to Dharma, even constantly accompanies the body.

Commentary: Below, it explains according to the categories. Here, it reveals the innate attachment to Dharma, which arises from the internal power of its own seeds. It explains the meaning of 'innate'.

Treatise: Not relying on heretical teachings, hence it is called innate.

Commentary: It shows that it does not rely on external conditions to begin to arise. It explains the meaning of 'arising'.

Treatise: This is further divided into two types, even clinging to it as a real Dharma.

Commentary: This shows that continuous attachment to Dharma is only present in the seventh consciousness (第七識, seventh consciousness). Before obtaining the unconditioned holy path, it constantly arises continuously, and it must enter the Buddha ground (佛地, Buddha ground) to never arise again. There are also stages of interruption and transformation in between. When not entering the holy position, there is constantly no transformation, so it is called continuous. However, the seventh consciousness is also just one way of saying it, only having attachment to self and no attachment to Dharma. Attachment to Dharma also extends to the eighth consciousness (第八識, eighth consciousness). Now, this is just citing the meaning taken from the correct view. Regarding the characteristics of attachment of this consciousness, it will be known below.

Treatise: The second type is intermittent, even clinging to it as a real Dharma.

Commentary: Since consciousness cannot grasp Dharmas outside of the mind, it can only be conditioned by the aggregates (蘊, skandha), realms (界, dhatu), and bases (處, ayatana) that it manifests.

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界相等。或總緣蘊。或別緣蘊。界．處亦然。起自心相執為實法。非二十句見．及六十五等。見道斷故。如我見說此執。有說。通五識起。今舉正義故不相違。然我本相即唯言蘊。其法本相言界．處者。我作用義。故說言蘊。無為無用計為我少。故不說處．界。然說我為一．及常者亦說有。于作．受之用其法不然。但計有體即計為法。故計於法亦依處．界。處．界即是真如．擇滅等。不了此界．處而執有法故。下準此知。又緣識所變諸蘊．處．界。起自心相執為實法。同前我中二解。然涅槃經。外道以佛性為我。此不相似。非我相故。無作用故。但名緣蘊。法可與同。佛性不失法自體故。故於我中唯言緣蘊。雖無作用緣有少功能故。法體不然。故通界．處。又依于本質與相分。相似不相似合說。我中應言處．界。故計佛性為我。若但依相似法為論。法中應但言蘊。以親所取。與本質真如不相似故。以前準后前加處界。以後準前應除界．處。以親相分唯有漏故。我執加取字。后依本質有無漏故。故減取字。又我唯總執故緣五蘊。法通總．別故說三科。

論。此二法執至方能除滅。

述曰。第六識中俱生法執。于其十地道數數備。地地別斷。以障地故。第七識者。於十地中道數數備。要至金剛方能除斷。此中

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 界相等。或者總體上執取五蘊（skandha，構成個體經驗的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識），或者分別執取五蘊。界（dhātu，構成經驗的十八界：六根、六塵、六識）和處（āyatana，產生經驗的十二處：六根、六塵）也是如此。這是因為從自己的心相中生起執著，認為它們是真實存在的法（dharma，事物、規律）。這並非二十句見（二十種錯誤的見解）以及六十五種外道見等。因為在見道（darśanamārga，證悟真理的道路）中已經斷除了這些。例如，『我見』就是這樣執著的。有人說，這種執著也可能從前五識（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）中生起。現在爲了說明正確的意義，所以這樣說並不矛盾。然而，『我』的根本相狀只是指五蘊。至於『法』的根本相狀，則指界和處。『我』的作用意義在於五蘊，所以說五蘊。無為法（asaṃskṛta dharma，不生不滅的法）沒有作用，如果計執為『我』，那就太少了，所以不說處和界。然而，如果說『我』是單一的、常恒的，那也說得過去。對於作用和領受的功用，法的情況就不是這樣了。只要計執有實體，就計執為法，所以計執於法，也要依據處和界。處和界就是真如（tathatā，事物的真實本性）、擇滅（pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha，通過智慧選擇而達到的寂滅）等。因為不瞭解這些界和處，而執著于有法，所以下文可以參照這個來理解。此外，緣于識所變現的諸蘊、處、界，生起自己的心相，執著為真實存在的法，這與前面關於『我』的兩種解釋相同。然而，《涅槃經》（Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra）中，外道以佛性（Buddha-dhātu，成佛的可能性）為『我』，這並不相似，因為佛性不是『我相』，也沒有作用。只能說是緣於五蘊，法可以與此相同，因為佛性不會失去法的自體。所以在『我』的執著中，只說緣於五蘊，雖然沒有作用，但緣于少許功能。法的本體則不然，所以通於界和處。此外，依據本質（svabhāva，自性）與相分（nimitta-bhāga，現象）相似或不相似的情況，合起來說。在『我』的執著中，應該說處和界。所以計執佛性為『我』。如果只是依據相似的法來討論，那麼在法的執著中，應該只說五蘊，因為親近所取（upādāna，執取）與本質真如不相似。以前面的情況參照後面的情況，應該加上處和界。以後面的情況參照前面的情況，應該去除界和處，因為親近的相分只有有漏法（sāsrava dharma，有煩惱的法）。『我』的執著加上『取』字，是因為後面依據本質有無漏法（anāsrava dharma，無煩惱的法），所以減去『取』字。而且，『我』只是總體的執著，所以緣於五蘊。法通於總體和分別的執著，所以說三科（五蘊、十二處、十八界）。 論：這兩種法執，要到那個時候才能除滅。 述記：第六識中的俱生法執（sahaja dharma-graha，與生俱來的對法的執著），在十地（bhūmi，菩薩修行的十個階段）的道中，數數具備，每一地分別斷除，因為它障礙了地。第七識的俱生法執，在十地中，道數數具備，要到金剛喻定（vajropama-samādhi，金剛一般的禪定）才能除斷。這裡面...

【English Translation】 English version: The realms are equal. Or one generally grasps at the skandhas (aggregates of existence: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness), or one grasps at them separately. The dhātus (elements of existence: six sense organs, six sense objects, and six consciousnesses) and āyatanas (sense bases: six sense organs and six sense objects) are also the same. This arises from clinging to one's own mind-images as real dharmas (things, phenomena, laws). This is not the twenty kinds of wrong views, nor the sixty-five kinds of heretical views, etc., because these are cut off in the path of seeing (darśanamārga). For example, the 'self-view' is such a clinging. Some say that this clinging can also arise from the first five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses). Now, in order to explain the correct meaning, this is not contradictory. However, the fundamental characteristic of 'self' refers only to the skandhas. As for the fundamental characteristic of 'dharma,' it refers to the dhātus and āyatanas. The meaning of the function of 'self' lies in the skandhas, so we speak of skandhas. Asaṃskṛta dharmas (unconditioned dharmas) have no function; if they were clung to as 'self,' that would be too little, so we do not speak of āyatanas and dhātus. However, if one says that 'self' is singular and permanent, that is also acceptable. The situation is not the same for the function of acting and receiving. As long as one clings to a substance, one clings to it as a dharma, so clinging to dharma also relies on āyatanas and dhātus. Āyatanas and dhātus are suchness (tathatā), selective cessation (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha), etc. Because one does not understand these dhātus and āyatanas, one clings to the existence of dharmas, so the following can be understood by referring to this. Furthermore, clinging to one's own mind-images as real dharmas, which are transformed by consciousness, is the same as the previous two explanations about 'self.' However, in the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra, heretics take Buddha-nature (Buddha-dhātu) as 'self,' which is not similar, because Buddha-nature is not the 'self-image' and has no function. It can only be said to be related to the skandhas. Dharma can be the same as this, because Buddha-nature does not lose the self-nature of dharma. Therefore, in the clinging to 'self,' we only speak of being related to the skandhas, although there is no function, but it is related to a little function. The substance of dharma is not the same, so it is connected to dhātus and āyatanas. Furthermore, based on the similarity or dissimilarity between the essence (svabhāva) and the image-aspect (nimitta-bhāga), they are discussed together. In the clinging to 'self,' one should speak of āyatanas and dhātus. Therefore, one clings to Buddha-nature as 'self.' If one only discusses based on similar dharmas, then in the clinging to dharma, one should only speak of skandhas, because the closely grasped (upādāna) is not similar to the essence of suchness. Referring to the previous situation with the following situation, one should add āyatanas and dhātus. Referring to the following situation with the previous situation, one should remove dhātus and āyatanas, because the closely related image-aspect only has defiled dharmas (sāsrava dharma). The clinging to 'self' adds the word 'grasping' because the essence later has undefiled dharmas (anāsrava dharma), so the word 'grasping' is reduced. Moreover, 'self' is only a general clinging, so it is related to the five skandhas. Dharma is connected to general and separate clinging, so we speak of the three categories (five skandhas, twelve āyatanas, and eighteen dhātus). Treatise: These two kinds of dharma-clinging can only be eliminated at that time. Commentary: The innate dharma-clinging (sahaja dharma-graha) in the sixth consciousness is fully present in the paths of the ten bhūmis (stages of a Bodhisattva's practice), and is cut off separately in each bhūmi, because it obstructs the bhūmi. The innate dharma-clinging of the seventh consciousness is fully present in the paths of the ten bhūmis, and can only be cut off at the vajropama-samādhi (diamond-like samādhi). In this...

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合說若道．若斷。故言數數方能除斷。此唯菩薩。非二乘者。若數數斷。習．種俱然。又除滅有二。一伏。二斷。六識伏亦斷。第七伏不斷故。皆言數數。此中言細以品而論。說為難斷約道而說。勝道方除。非劣道故。若以見道。三心之中。中中名中。第三名上。彼約難易易斷名細。粗品亦名細。下道能除。以品從道初名為細。道下品故。今以道從品難斷名細。亦不相違。準我執說。又我執難斷言修道除。通三乘故。此言十地唯菩薩故。然初地中入．住．出別。故十地中皆有修道。言勝法空。顯法空觀簡遊觀心。唯取無間斷法執道。此中說執不言五識。若所知障五識亦通十地中斷。

論。分別法執至非與身俱。

述曰。顯由外緣。及自內種二因力起故言亦由。

論。要待邪教至故名分別。

述曰。正顯外緣釋分別義。

論。唯在第六意識中有。

述曰。顯執所在。強思計度。間斷非恒。唯第六有。故非余識。下二障中五識所知障亦初地斷。以無分別籌度惠性。不能起執。故此中無。

論。此亦二種至執為實法。

述曰。此文可知。即小乘等併名邪故。不稱正理故。

論。二緣邪教至執為實法。

述曰。自性即是數論勝性。等取勝論實句義等。如是非一

。其數論師本若未變為大等時但名自性故。古名冥性。初小乘等所執。后外道等所執。心相二重準我中解。此二亦有總．別緣者。二十句見．六十二等。許皆有故。

論。此二法執至即能除滅。

述曰。分別相粗。粗觀能斷。行相猛故。下道能除。故入初地即斷除之。一心而論準我中說。若三心者。二心斷名初。第三道除望修道為初故。如樞要說。或頓．或漸。至下當知。

論。如是所說至或有或無。

述曰。下顯所依或有．或無。第七本法定有。第六本法或無。修道本法定有。見道本法或無。計蘊等或容有。計自性等定無。準我見說。

論。自心內法一切皆有。

述曰。心之所變皆因緣生。一切故有。

論。是故法執至執為實有。

述曰。此顯所執親唯內相。故諸法執皆緣內心依他相有。

論。然似法相至是如幻有。

述曰。內心所變種子所生。不同真如。故如幻有。

論。所執實法至決定非有。

述曰。依前依他執為實有。不稱似法。故體定無。此即以理成內相有唯心所現。以外境無。

下以經證。

論。故世尊說至如幻事等。

述曰。此引即是解深密經。如攝大乘第四．五說。下亦引之。至下當悉。由此故知。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這些數論師的『本若』（Prakrti，自性）在沒有轉變為『大』（Mahat，宇宙理性）等狀態時，僅僅被稱為『自性』。古代稱之為『冥性』。這是最初的小乘佛教等以及後來的外道等所執著的。關於『心』（Citta，心識）和『相』（Lakshana，表相）這二者的關係，可以參照關於『我』（Atman，神我）的解釋。這二者也有總相和別相的緣起關係，就像二十種『見』（Dṛṣṭi，邪見）和六十二種『等』（外道見解）一樣，因為他們都承認這些是存在的。

論：這兩種法執一旦達到極致，就能被消除。

述曰：分別相是粗糙的，粗略的觀察就能斷除。因為行相猛烈，所以下品道就能消除它。因此，進入初地（Prathama-bhumi，歡喜地）就能斷除它。如果從一心（Eka-citta，一個心識）的角度來說，可以參照關於『我』的解釋。如果是從三心（Tri-citta，三個心識）的角度來說，二心斷除稱為初，第三道消除，是相對於修道位來說的初。就像《樞要》所說的那樣，或者頓悟，或者漸悟，這些在後面會知道。

論：像這樣所說的，或者有，或者無。

述曰：下面顯示所依據的或者有，或者無。第七識（Manas，末那識）的根本法一定是有的，第六識（Vijnana，意識）的根本法或者沒有。修道位的根本法一定是有的，見道位的根本法或者沒有。計執五蘊（Skandha，構成要素）等或許有，計執自性等一定是無。參照關於『我見』的解釋。

論：自心內的法，一切都是有的。

述曰：心所變現的一切都是因緣所生，所以一切都是有的。

論：因此，法執是執著為真實存在的。

述曰：這顯示了所執著的親近的只有內相。所以諸法執都緣于內心，依他相而有。

論：然而，相似的法相，就像幻象一樣存在。

述曰：內心所變現的，種子所生的，不同於真如（Tathata，如如）。所以就像幻象一樣存在。

論：所執著的真實法，決定不是有的。

述曰：依據前面的依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava，依他起性），執著為真實存在，不符合相似的法相，所以本體一定是無。這就是用道理來證明內相是有，唯心所現，外境是無。

下面用經文來證明。

論：所以世尊說，就像幻事等。

述曰：這裡引用的就是《解深密經》。就像《攝大乘論》第四、五所說的那樣。下面也會引用，到後面就全部知道了。因此可知。

【English Translation】 English version: Those Samkhya (number theorists) 'Prakrti' (primordial nature) when not transformed into 'Mahat' (the Great, cosmic intellect) etc., are merely named 'Prakrti'. In ancient times, it was called 'Pradhana' (the unmanifest). This is what the early Hinayana (Small Vehicle) and later non-Buddhist schools clung to. The relationship between 'Citta' (mind) and 'Lakshana' (characteristics) can be understood by referring to the explanation of 'Atman' (self). These two also have general and specific causal relationships, like the twenty kinds of 'Dṛṣṭi' (views, wrong views) and the sixty-two kinds of 'etc.' (non-Buddhist views), because they all acknowledge these as existing.

Treatise: These two kinds of clinging to Dharma (phenomena), once they reach their extreme, can be eliminated.

Commentary: The aspect of discrimination is coarse, and can be cut off by coarse observation. Because the aspect of practice is intense, the lower path can eliminate it. Therefore, entering the first Bhumi (stage, Joyful Ground) immediately cuts it off. If discussed from the perspective of one mind (Eka-citta), refer to the explanation of 'self'. If from the perspective of three minds (Tri-citta), the cutting off by two minds is called the beginning, and the elimination by the third path is the beginning relative to the path of cultivation. As the 'Essentials' say, either sudden or gradual, this will be known later.

Treatise: As said, either existing or non-existing.

Commentary: Below, it shows that what is relied upon is either existing or non-existing. The fundamental Dharma of the seventh consciousness (Manas, mind) must exist, while the fundamental Dharma of the sixth consciousness (Vijnana, consciousness) may not exist. The fundamental Dharma of the path of cultivation must exist, while the fundamental Dharma of the path of seeing may not exist. Clinging to the Skandhas (aggregates, constituents of existence) etc. may exist, while clinging to self-nature etc. definitely does not exist. Refer to the explanation of 'self-view'.

Treatise: All Dharmas within one's own mind exist.

Commentary: Everything transformed by the mind is born from causes and conditions, therefore everything exists.

Treatise: Therefore, clinging to Dharma is clinging to it as truly existing.

Commentary: This shows that what is clung to closely is only the internal aspect. Therefore, all clinging to Dharmas arises from the mind, depending on the Paratantra-svabhava (other-dependent nature).

Treatise: However, the similar Dharma-aspect exists like an illusion.

Commentary: What is transformed by the mind, born from seeds, is different from Tathata (suchness). Therefore, it exists like an illusion.

Treatise: The real Dharma that is clung to definitely does not exist.

Commentary: Based on the previous other-dependent nature, clinging to it as truly existing does not conform to the similar Dharma-aspect, therefore the substance is definitely non-existent. This is using reason to prove that the internal aspect is existent, manifested only by the mind, and the external realm is non-existent.

Below, it is proven with sutras.

Treatise: Therefore, the World-Honored One said, like illusory things etc.

Commentary: This quote is from the 'Samdhinirmocana Sutra' (解深密經). As said in the 'Mahayanasamgraha' (攝大乘論) fourth and fifth. It will also be quoted below, and everything will be known later. Therefore, it can be known.

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唯緣自心依他幻有。等言等取妄所執無。

論。如是外道至皆非實有。

述曰。此下大文第四別徴總結。于中有三。初牒前所非。次申別破上座等計。後重總結引經證成。此結牒上所非破。外道．小乘離識我法。皆非實有。以無體故。如前理徴。

論。故心心所至為所緣緣。

述曰。此總結也。

論。緣用必依實有體故。

述曰。釋外法無緣義所由。所執既無故非緣也。相當情現。如第二月。不遮所緣。

外道等徴曰。外色實無。可非內識境。他心實有。寧非內識所緣。又佛他心智慧取他心。二十唯識說。除佛他心智。不知如佛所行境故。名不如實。即取心外法。如何言心取不離識境。

論。現在彼聚至他聚攝故。

述曰。比量應云。現在彼聚他心智等所緣之境心．心所法。非此聚識親所緣緣。他聚攝故。如非所緣。若疏所緣我不障故。此因在後。喻在於前。外道．小乘皆在此破。他聚者。謂他身。或自身中八識更相望為他聚識也。護法解云。二十唯識說。佛他心智所變之相。是與本質心相極相似故勝餘之智。非謂親能取得他心。名異余智。不爾便有識非唯故。二十唯識世親自釋。及護法唯識釋。皆不言親取。如二十疏。及下第七自當廣解。然上座部。法藏

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 唯識宗認為，一切事物都只是由自心所緣起的，是依他起性的幻有。而那些被人們執著為真實存在的『等言』、『等取』，實際上都是虛妄的，並不存在。

論：正如外道所認為的，一切都不是真實存在的。

述曰：下面是本文的第四個主要部分，分別進行總結。其中有三個部分：首先，回顧之前所否定的觀點；其次，詳細駁斥上座部等宗派的觀點；最後，再次總結並引用經文來證明。這裡總結並回顧了之前所否定的觀點，即外道和小乘佛教所主張的離開識之外的『我』和『法』，都不是真實存在的，因為它們沒有實體。正如之前的理論所證明的。

論：因此，心和心所（Citta-caitta，心和心的作用）都是作為所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya，認識對像）而存在的。

述曰：這是總結。

論：緣起的作用必然依賴於真實存在的實體。

述曰：解釋了外法沒有緣起意義的原因。因為所執著的事物並不存在，所以它不是緣起。就像在黑暗中看到第二個月亮一樣，只是虛幻的顯現，並不妨礙真實的所緣。

外道等提出質疑：外在的色法（Rupa，物質現象）確實不存在，可以認為不是內在識的境界。但是，他人的心識是真實存在的，怎麼能說不是內在識的所緣呢？而且，佛陀的他心智（Paracitta-jnana，瞭解他人心識的智慧）能夠了解他人的心識。《二十唯識論》中說，除了佛陀的他心智，其他的智慧都不能完全瞭解佛陀所行的境界，所以說『不如實』，即是說能夠取到心外的法。那麼，為什麼說心所取的一切都不離識的境界呢？

論：現在，那些屬於他者的聚合，都屬於他者的範疇。

述曰：可以用比量來論證：現在，那些屬於他者的聚合，即他心智等所緣的境界，心和心所法，不是這個聚合的識所直接緣取的所緣緣，因為它們屬於他者的範疇。就像不是所緣一樣。如果只是間接的所緣，我並不反對。這個『因』在後面，『喻』在前面。外道和小乘都包含在這個駁斥之中。『他聚』指的是他人的身體，或者自身中八識互相視為他聚識。護法（Dharmapala）解釋說，《二十唯識論》中說，佛陀的他心智所變現的相，與本質心非常相似，所以勝過其他的智慧，並不是說它能夠直接取得他人的心識，才被稱為不同於其他智慧。否則，就會有識不是唯識的過失。《二十唯識論》是世親（Vasubandhu）親自解釋的，護法的《唯識釋》也沒有說能夠直接取到。就像《二十唯識疏》和下面的第七識中將要詳細解釋的那樣。然而，上座部（Sthavira）和法藏（Dharmakara）...

【English Translation】 English version The Vijnanavada (Yogacara) school holds that all things arise from one's own mind and are dependently originated illusions (paratantra-svabhava). Those 'terms' and 'grasps' that people cling to as real are actually illusory and do not exist.

Treatise: As the heretics believe, everything is not truly existent.

Commentary: The following is the fourth major section of this text, which summarizes separately. There are three parts: first, reviewing the previously negated views; second, refuting in detail the views of the Sthavira school and others; and finally, summarizing again and citing scriptures to prove it. This summarizes and reviews the previously negated views, namely, the 'self' and 'dharmas' apart from consciousness advocated by the heretics and Hinayana Buddhism, which are not truly existent because they have no substance. As proven by the previous reasoning.

Treatise: Therefore, the mind and mental factors (Citta-caitta) exist as the object-condition (Alambana-pratyaya).

Commentary: This is the summary.

Treatise: The function of dependent origination necessarily relies on a truly existent entity.

Commentary: Explains the reason why external dharmas have no meaning of dependent origination. Because the things clung to do not exist, they are not dependent origination. Like seeing a second moon in the dark, it is just an illusory manifestation and does not hinder the real object.

Heretics and others raise the question: External form (Rupa) does not really exist, so it can be considered not to be the realm of the inner consciousness. However, the minds of others are truly existent, so how can it be said that they are not the object of the inner consciousness? Moreover, the Buddha's mind-reading wisdom (Paracitta-jnana) can understand the minds of others. The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only says that apart from the Buddha's mind-reading wisdom, other wisdoms cannot fully understand the realm of the Buddha's actions, so it is said to be 'not in accordance with reality', which means that it can grasp dharmas outside the mind. So why is it said that everything the mind grasps does not depart from the realm of consciousness?

Treatise: Now, those aggregates that belong to others all belong to the category of others.

Commentary: It can be argued by analogy: Now, those aggregates that belong to others, that is, the objects of mind-reading wisdom and so on, the mind and mental factors, are not the object-condition directly grasped by the consciousness of this aggregate, because they belong to the category of others. Just like not being the object. If it is only an indirect object, I do not object. This 'reason' is in the back, and the 'analogy' is in the front. Heretics and Hinayana are all included in this refutation. 'Other aggregates' refers to the bodies of others, or the eight consciousnesses in one's own body that are regarded as other aggregates. Dharmapala explains that the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only says that the appearance transformed by the Buddha's mind-reading wisdom is very similar to the essential mind, so it surpasses other wisdoms. It is not said that it can directly obtain the minds of others, so it is called different from other wisdoms. Otherwise, there would be the fault that consciousness is not only consciousness. The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only was personally explained by Vasubandhu, and Dharmapala's Commentary on Consciousness-Only did not say that it could be directly obtained. Just like the Commentary on the Twenty Verses and the seventh consciousness below will explain in detail. However, the Sthavira and Dharmakara...

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部等計。同聚心相應之法亦互能緣。化地部說。緣共有法。西方師說。惠俱五蘊名俱有法。五識依色根。俱有身中色等是根種類。故能緣之。意識唯依無間意。所依非色。不能緣俱有身中色等。非根種類故。大眾部說心．心所法能取自體。與大乘同。今此唯破上座部．法藏部計。意兼破余也。

論。同聚心所至如余非所取。

述曰。立比量云。同聚心所。非心親所緣。與心自體異故。如余眼根等非所取法。此有二說。一說。設佛鏡智慧現智影。自相應法亦非所緣。以自證分緣自體盡故。亦成遍智。見分之境心等必同。自證分境許各別故。第二師說。鏡智相應心．心所法。亦許相緣。此但遮親不遮疏也。于見分上佛現彼影名遍智故。然一一自證分。與相應法見分同境。名同所緣。非要皆見分方同所緣故。又遮親所緣。非即許彼為疏所緣。因明法爾。又上座等心等不能自緣唯緣相應法　問曰。心緣受時。受自緣不。若緣者即有緣自性之過。不緣者。即心．心所不同一所緣過。何得共取前境。唯心獨能緣相應法。受等不能自緣也。彼部心等不自緣故。其破緣共有俱生色等法。是共有法體。廣如婆娑第九。不能引之。然大乘．大眾部等。心自緣妨。如次前中第二師釋。

論。由此應知至似外境生。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 部派等宗義認為，同一聚合中的心和心所法也能互相緣取。化地部說，心可以緣取共有的法。西方師說，慧與五蘊合稱為俱有法。五識依賴於色根，俱有身中的色等是根的種類，因此能夠緣取它們。意識只依賴於無間意，所依賴的不是色法，因此不能緣取俱有身中的色等，因為它們不是根的種類。大眾部認為心和心所法能夠取自體，這與大乘的觀點相同。這裡主要駁斥的是上座部和法藏部的觀點，同時也間接駁斥了其他宗派的觀點。

論：同一聚合中的心所法，就像其餘不是心所取之法一樣。

述記：建立比量說：同一聚合中的心所法，不是心直接緣取的對象，因為它與心的自體不同，就像其餘眼根等不是所取之法一樣。對此有兩種說法。一種說法是，即使佛的鏡智慧夠顯現智的影像，自相應法也不是所緣取的對象，因為自證分已經緣取了自體。這也成就了遍智，因為見分的境界與心等必定相同，而自證分的境界則允許各自不同。第二種說法是，鏡智相應的心的心所法，也允許互相緣取，這只是遮止了直接的緣取，而不是遮止了間接的緣取。在見分上，佛顯現彼影像，稱為遍智。然而，每一個自證分都與相應法的見分同境，稱為同所緣，並非一定要見分才同所緣。又遮止了直接的所緣，並非就允許它是間接的所緣，這是因明的法則。另外，上座部等認為心等不能自緣，只能緣取相應的法。問：心緣取受的時候，受自己緣取自己嗎？如果緣取，就有了緣取自性的過失；如果不緣取，就有了心和心所法不同一所緣的過失，怎麼能夠共同取前境呢？只有心能夠緣取相應的法，受等不能自己緣取自己。因為彼部的心等不能自己緣取自己。他們破斥緣取共有、俱生色等法，認為共有法有實體，詳細內容見《婆沙論》第九卷，這裡不再引用。然而，大乘和大眾部等認為心自緣沒有妨礙，如前文中的第二位師父所解釋。

論：由此應該知道，一切法都從自心生起，看起來像是外在的境界。

【English Translation】 English version: The Sarvastivadins and other schools hold that mental factors (citta-samprayukta dharmas) in the same aggregate can also mutually cognize each other. The Mahisasaka school says that the mind can cognize shared dharmas. The Western masters say that wisdom (prajna) together with the five skandhas are called co-existent dharmas (sahabhu-dharmas). The five consciousnesses rely on the sense organs (rupa-ayatana), and the form, etc., in the co-existent body are types of roots, so they can cognize them. The mind-consciousness (mano-vijnana) only relies on the immediately preceding mind (anantara-manas), and what it relies on is not form, so it cannot cognize the form, etc., in the co-existent body, because they are not types of roots. The Mahasanghika school believes that the mind and mental factors can grasp their own nature (svabhava), which is the same as the Mahayana view. Here, the main refutation is against the views of the Sthavira school and the Dharmaguptaka school, and indirectly refutes the views of other schools as well.

Treatise: Mental factors in the same aggregate are like other things that are not grasped by the mind.

Commentary: Establish the analogy: Mental factors in the same aggregate are not directly cognized by the mind, because they are different from the mind's own nature, just like the other eye organs, etc., are not graspable dharmas. There are two views on this. One view is that even if the Buddha's mirror-like wisdom (adarsha-jnana) can manifest the image of wisdom, the self-corresponding dharmas are not the objects of cognition, because the self-cognizing aspect (svasamvedana-bhaga) has already cognized its own nature. This also achieves omniscience (sarvajnatva), because the realm of the perceiving aspect (darshana-bhaga) must be the same as the mind, etc., while the realm of the self-cognizing aspect is allowed to be different. The second view is that the mind and mental factors corresponding to mirror-like wisdom are also allowed to cognize each other, which only prevents direct cognition, but not indirect cognition. On the perceiving aspect, the Buddha manifests that image, which is called omniscience. However, each self-cognizing aspect shares the same realm with the perceiving aspect of the corresponding dharma, which is called the same object of cognition (samana-alambana), and it is not necessary for the perceiving aspect to be the same object of cognition. Furthermore, preventing direct cognition does not mean allowing it to be indirect cognition, which is the rule of logic (hetu-vidya). In addition, the Sthavira school, etc., believes that the mind, etc., cannot cognize itself, but can only cognize the corresponding dharmas. Question: When the mind cognizes feeling (vedana), does feeling cognize itself? If it cognizes, then there is the fault of cognizing its own nature; if it does not cognize, then there is the fault of the mind and mental factors not having the same object of cognition, how can they jointly grasp the previous realm? Only the mind can cognize the corresponding dharmas, and feeling, etc., cannot cognize itself. Because the mind, etc., of that school cannot cognize itself. They refute the cognition of shared, co-existent form, etc., and believe that shared dharmas have substance, the details of which can be found in the ninth volume of the Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra, which will not be quoted here. However, the Mahayana and Mahasanghika schools, etc., believe that there is no obstacle to the mind cognizing itself, as explained by the second teacher in the previous text.

Treatise: From this, it should be known that all dharmas arise from one's own mind and appear to be external realms.

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述曰。下顯世間說我法因。總結上也。

論。是故契經至故似彼而轉。

述曰。如經頌者。厚嚴經頌。是大乘經。證法唯識無心外境。由妄習力似外境現。實但內心。故引之也。

上來已廣破外執。解初頌上三句訖。自下第二釋外妨難。重凈三句。

論。有作是難至假亦應無。

述曰。此吠世師難也。于中有三。初敘難。次破斥。后結正。初中有三。初總申難意。次申理．喻。后結成難。此為初也。如上所言無實我法。世間．聖教仍說有假。依何假說。不可假說牛毛而似龜毛。以其所似都無體故。

論。謂假必依至共法而立。

述曰。下申理．喻中。初申理。后申喻。此申理也。謂立假者必依三法方可說假。一謂真事。二謂似事。者共法。

論。如有真火至此人為火。

述曰。申喻有二。初指后例。此即初也。舉世三事　如有真火。名為真事。有似火人。即是似事　有猛赤法說為共法。火．人之上俱有猛赤故名共法。此中難意。既有所變色等能似之法。有善．惡作用等共法。即於三中有似事．共法。明知。心外有別真法名為真事。如無真火。不可說人似於火故。然似事中有法無我。我但有名無相分故。法則不爾。依他性故。法謂軌持。依他之中有法。我謂主

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述：下面闡明世間宣說『我』（Ātman，靈魂）和『法』（Dharma，佛法）的原因，總結上文。

論：因此，契經（Sūtra，佛經）乃至『故似彼而轉』。

窺基法師述：如經中的頌文，例如《厚嚴經》的頌文，這是一部大乘經典，證明法唯識（Dharmamātra-vijñapti，一切法皆是識）的道理，沒有心外的境界。由於虛妄的習氣力量，顯現出類似外境的現象，實際上只是內心的顯現，所以引用它。

上面已經廣泛地破斥了外道的執著，解釋了第一頌的前三句完畢。下面第二部分解釋外道的妨難，重新澄清這三句。

論：有人這樣發難，乃至『假亦應無』。

窺基法師述：這是吠世師（Vaiśeṣika，勝論派）提出的難題。其中有三個部分：首先敘述難題，其次破斥，最後總結歸正。首先敘述難題，其中有三個部分：首先總括地申明難題的意旨，其次申述理由和比喻，最後總結成難題。這是第一個部分。如果像上面所說，沒有真實的『我』和『法』，那麼世間和聖教（Ārya-śāsana，佛陀的教導）仍然說有假立的『我』和『法』，是依據什麼假立的呢？不能假立牛毛類似於龜毛，因為所要比擬的事物根本沒有實體。

論：所謂假立，必定依據三種法才能成立假說：一是真事，二是似事，三是共法。

窺基法師述：下面申述理由和比喻，先申述理由，后申述比喻。這裡是申述理由。所謂建立假說，必定依據三種法才可以假立。一是真事，二是似事，三是共法。

論：例如有真火，乃至『此人為火』。

窺基法師述：申述比喻有二個部分，先指出，后舉例。這裡是先指出。舉世間的三件事：如有真火，名為真事；有像火的人，就是似事；有猛烈和赤紅的性質，稱為共法。火和人之上都有猛烈和赤紅的性質，所以稱為共法。這裡難題的意旨是：既然有所變動的顏色等能夠相似的法，有善和惡的作用等共法，那麼在這三種法中，有似事和共法，明明知道心外有別的真實法，名為真事。如果沒有真火，就不能說人像火。然而在似事中有法無我，『我』只是有名而沒有相分，而『法』則不是這樣，因為『法』是依他性（paratantra-svabhāva，緣起性）。『法』的意思是軌範和保持，在依他性中有法，『我』的意思是主宰。

【English Translation】 English version: Master Kuiji states: The following clarifies the reasons why the world speaks of 'Ātman' (self, soul) and 'Dharma' (teachings, law), summarizing the above.

Treatise: Therefore, the Sūtras (scriptures) up to 'hence it appears to transform'.

Master Kuiji states: Like the verses in scriptures, such as the verses in the Ghanavyūha Sūtra (Thickly Adorned Sūtra), which is a Mahāyāna scripture, proving the principle of Dharmamātra-vijñapti (consciousness-only), that there are no external objects outside the mind. Due to the power of false habitual tendencies, phenomena resembling external objects appear, but in reality, they are merely manifestations of the mind. Therefore, it is cited.

The above has extensively refuted externalist attachments and completed the explanation of the first three lines of the first verse. The following second part explains the externalist objections, re-clarifying these three lines.

Treatise: Some raise this difficulty, up to 'the false should also not exist'.

Master Kuiji states: This is a difficulty raised by the Vaiśeṣika (atomist school). There are three parts to it: first, stating the difficulty; second, refuting it; and third, concluding with the correct view. First, stating the difficulty, which has three parts: first, generally stating the intention of the difficulty; second, stating the reason and analogy; and third, concluding with the difficulty. This is the first part. If, as stated above, there is no real 'self' and 'dharma', then the world and the Ārya-śāsana (Buddha's teachings) still speak of the falsely established 'self' and 'dharma'. Based on what is this false establishment? One cannot falsely establish that cow hair resembles tortoise hair, because the thing being resembled has no substance at all.

Treatise: The so-called false establishment must rely on three dharmas (elements) to establish a false statement: first, a true thing; second, a similar thing; and third, a common dharma.

Master Kuiji states: Below, stating the reason and analogy, first stating the reason, then stating the analogy. This is stating the reason. The so-called establishing a false statement must rely on three dharmas to establish a false statement. First, a true thing; second, a similar thing; and third, a common dharma.

Treatise: For example, there is real fire, up to 'this person is like fire'.

Master Kuiji states: Stating the analogy has two parts: first, pointing out; second, giving an example. This is pointing out. Giving three examples from the world: if there is real fire, it is called a true thing; if there is a person who resembles fire, it is a similar thing; if there is the quality of being fierce and red, it is called a common dharma. Both fire and the person have the qualities of being fierce and red, so it is called a common dharma. The intention of the difficulty here is: since there are changing colors and other dharmas that can resemble, and there are common dharmas such as good and bad functions, then among these three dharmas, there are similar things and common dharmas. It is clear that there is a separate real dharma outside the mind, called a true thing. If there is no real fire, one cannot say that a person is like fire. However, in the similar thing, there is dharma but no self. 'Self' is only a name without a characteristic aspect, while 'dharma' is not like this, because 'dharma' is of dependent origination (paratantra-svabhāva). 'Dharma' means to regulate and maintain. In dependent origination, there is dharma. 'Self' means to be the master.

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宰。依他之中無我。法無主宰故。若和合時名假主宰。此即是我無別種生。依他假我如瓶．盆等。不同於法有別種生。說雖極微亦名法故。我則不爾。又如婆羅門。其性猛。其色赤。猶如火。如世人說此婆羅門赤急似火。火是真事。人為似事。猛赤是共法。可說婆羅門似火。三法闕一假義不成。若無真事即似於誰。若無似事說誰為似。無猛赤法。如何似也。

論。假說牛等應知亦爾。

述曰。此例指也。即如有人負重。形質猶如於牛。亦復如是。等余㺃等。

論。我法若無至似外境轉。

述曰。此結成難。若有我法名為真事。識所變者名為似事。所變上有不捨色等法之自相名為共法。可說所變名為似法。說之為假。今無心外我法真事。真事既無故。所說假依何得有無所說義假法故。其體似法亦不成。似無依故。即義依體假。又所變之似既無。能說之假既無。所變之似不有。即有體施設假。此似既無。如何說心似外境轉。外境無故。心何所似。誰似於誰。誰為能似。是彼難也。世間我法標宗說無。故今但難聖教我法。

論。彼難非理。

述曰。下破彼計。初破外道。后破小乘。破外道中先破真事無。后破似事．共法亦無。

論。離識我法前已破故。

述曰。此破真事

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 宰（Isha，自在，這裡指獨立主宰者）。在依他起性中沒有我（Atman，靈魂，這裡指獨立主宰的實體）。因為法（Dharma，佛法，這裡指構成世界的要素）沒有主宰。如果因緣和合時，稱為假主宰。這就像我（Atman）並非由其他種類所生。依他起的假我，就像瓶子、盆子等。不同於法有其他種類所生。即使說極微小的東西，也稱為法。而我則不是這樣。又如婆羅門（Brahmin，印度教祭司），其性格剛猛，其顏色赤紅，猶如火焰。如世人說，這個婆羅門赤紅且急躁，像火焰一樣。火焰是真實存在的事物，人是相似的事物。剛猛和赤紅是共同的性質。可以說婆羅門像火焰。如果這三種要素缺少任何一個，假借的比喻就不能成立。如果沒有真實存在的事物，那麼像什麼呢？如果沒有相似的事物，說誰像呢？沒有剛猛和赤紅的性質，又如何能像呢？

論：假說牛等，應當知道也是這樣。

述曰：這是舉例說明。就像有人揹負重物，其形態和性質猶如牛一樣。其他的如㺃等也是如此。

論：如果我和法都沒有，那麼心識如何能像外境一樣運轉？

述曰：這是總結並提出疑問。如果我和法存在，被稱為真實存在的事物。識所變現的，被稱為相似的事物。所變現的事物上有不捨棄色等法的自相，被稱為共同的性質。可以說所變現的事物像法，稱之為假。現在沒有心外我和法的真實存在。真實存在的事物既然沒有，那麼所說的假借依據什麼而存在呢？因為沒有所說的義假法，所以其體（相似之法）也不能成立，因為沒有依據。這就是義依體假。又因為所變現的相似事物不存在，能說的假借也不存在，所變現的相似事物也不存在。這就是有體施設假。既然這個相似的事物不存在，那麼如何說心像外境一樣運轉呢？因為外境不存在，心又像什麼呢？誰像誰呢？誰是能像者呢？這是他們的疑問。世間我和法標榜宗義說沒有，所以現在只針對聖教的我和法提出疑問。

論：他們的疑問不合理。

述曰：下面駁斥他們的觀點。首先駁斥外道，然後駁斥小乘。駁斥外道中，先駁斥真實存在的事物不存在，然後駁斥相似的事物和共同的性質也不存在。

論：離開識的我和法，之前已經駁斥過了。

述曰：這是駁斥真實存在的事物。

【English Translation】 English version: Isha (自在, meaning independent sovereign). There is no Atman (我, soul, here referring to an independent sovereign entity) in Paratantra (依他, dependent origination). Because Dharma (法, the teachings, here referring to the elements that constitute the world) has no sovereign. If causes and conditions come together, it is called a false sovereign. This is like the Atman not being born from other kinds. The falsely established Atman in Paratantra is like a bottle, a pot, etc. It is different from Dharma, which is born from other kinds. Even if one speaks of something extremely subtle, it is called Dharma. But the Atman is not like that. Also, like a Brahmin (婆羅門, Hindu priest), whose nature is fierce and whose color is red, like fire. As people say, this Brahmin is red and impatient, like fire. Fire is a real thing, and the person is a similar thing. Fierceness and redness are common qualities. It can be said that the Brahmin is like fire. If any of these three elements is missing, the false analogy cannot be established. If there is no real thing, then what is it like? If there is no similar thing, who is said to be like it? Without the qualities of fierceness and redness, how can it be like anything?

Treatise: It should be understood that the false designation of 'cow' and so on is also like this.

Commentary: This is an example. Just as someone carries a heavy load, their form and nature are like that of a cow. The same applies to other animals such as 㺃.

Treatise: If neither 'I' nor 'Dharma' exist, how can consciousness function as if resembling external objects?

Commentary: This is a summary and a question. If 'I' and 'Dharma' exist, they are called real things. What is transformed by consciousness is called a similar thing. The transformed thing has its own characteristics, such as not abandoning form, which are called common qualities. It can be said that the transformed thing is like Dharma, and it is called false. Now there is no real existence of 'I' and 'Dharma' outside of the mind. Since real things do not exist, then what does the so-called false depend on? Because there is no falsely established Dharma in meaning, its substance (the similar Dharma) cannot be established either, because there is no basis. This is the false meaning depending on the substance. Also, because the transformed similar thing does not exist, the false designation that can be spoken does not exist, and the transformed similar thing does not exist. This is the false establishment of a substance. Since this similar thing does not exist, how can it be said that the mind functions as if resembling external objects? Because external objects do not exist, what does the mind resemble? Who resembles whom? Who is the one who resembles? This is their question. The worldly 'I' and 'Dharma' proclaim the doctrine of non-existence, so now we only question the 'I' and 'Dharma' of the sacred teachings.

Treatise: Their question is unreasonable.

Commentary: Below, refute their views. First refute the heretics, then refute the Hinayana. In refuting the heretics, first refute the non-existence of real things, then refute the non-existence of similar things and common qualities.

Treatise: The 'I' and 'Dharma' apart from consciousness have already been refuted before.

Commentary: This is refuting the real things.

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無。以說假我法為能似。真我法為所似。前破我法中已總破彼真我法訖。此即不極成之真事。故指如前。

論。依類依實至俱不成故。

述曰。下破似事。及破共法。于中有二。初總非。后別破。此總非也。前舉火喻難中真火論主非之。在於心外實法中破。似事之中。有依類。有依實說似。類者性也。即是同異。其大有句義者。今不取之。何以知者。下破德與類互相離。故知是同異。若大有為類。以是一法決定不相離故。即不成因。類是別義故。實者即是彼實句義。如地．水．火等。汝今所言。依于似事假說為火。所說假火。依同異類。及火等實。皆不成故。此即總非依皆不成。

論。依類假說至非類有故。

述曰。下別破也。于中有二。初破。后結。破中有二。初德非類有破。后德．類相離破。此初也。先破假火依類不成。其猛赤等實火之德。非是同異德。故彼宗計。地有十四德。謂色．味．香．觸．數．量．別性．合．離．彼性．此性．液性．潤．行。水亦十四德。前十四中除香取重。火有十一種。水十四中除味．潤．重性。風有九德。火十一中除色．液性故。色是火等德。而同異類無德。今言猛赤等德非是類有。猛即行中勢用作因。非念因也。亦名為利。即是火上猛利之勢。赤是色德

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以說假我法作為能相似的，以真我法作為所相似的。前面破斥我法時，已經總括地破斥了他們的真我法。這（假我法）是不極成的真實事物，所以像前面所說的那樣指出來。

論：因為依類、依實都不能成立的緣故。

述曰：下面破斥相似的事物，以及破斥共同的法。其中分為兩部分：首先是總的否定，然後是分別破斥。這裡是總的否定。前面舉火的譬喻進行辯難時，真火的論主否定了它，在心外的實法中進行破斥。在相似的事物中，有依類、有依實來說相似。類，指的是性質，也就是同異。那些具有『大有』句義的，現在不採用。為什麼知道呢？因為下面破斥德與類互相分離，所以知道這裡說的類是同異。如果『大有』作為類，因為它是一個法，決定不會互相分離，所以不能成為因。類是不同的意義。實，指的是彼實句義，如地、水、火等。你們現在所說的，依據相似的事物，假說為火，所說的假火，依據同異類，以及火等實，都不能成立的緣故。這也就是總的否定，依據都不能成立。

論：依據類假說，到不是類所具有的緣故。

述曰：下面分別破斥。其中分為兩部分：首先是破斥，然後是結論。破斥中分為兩部分：首先是德不是類所具有的破斥，然後是德、類互相分離的破斥。這是第一部分。先破斥假火依據類不能成立。那些猛烈、赤紅等真實火的德，不是同異德。因為他們的宗派認為，地有十四種德，即色（顏色）、味（味道）、香（氣味）、觸（觸感）、數（數量）、量（體積）、別性（獨特性）、合（結合）、離（分離）、彼性（那邊的性質）、此性（這邊的性質）、液性（液體的性質）、潤（濕潤）、行（運動）。水也有十四種德，前十四種中除去香，取重（重量）。火有十一種，水十四種中除去味、潤、重性。風有九種德，火十一種中除去色、液性。色是火等的德，而同異類沒有德。現在說猛烈、赤紅等德不是類所具有的。猛烈，指的是行中的勢用作為因，不是念因。也叫做利，指的是火上猛烈的勢頭。赤是色德。

【English Translation】 English version: Taking the assertion of a false self-dharma as that which is seemingly similar, and the true self-dharma as that which is similar. In the previous refutation of self-dharma, their true self-dharma has already been refuted in its entirety. This (false self-dharma) is a non-extremely established true thing, so it is pointed out as before.

Treatise: Because relying on class and relying on reality both cannot be established.

Commentary: Below, refuting similar things, as well as refuting common dharmas. Among them, there are two parts: first, a general negation, and then a separate refutation. This is the general negation. In the previous analogy of fire for debate, the proponent of true fire denied it, refuting it within the real dharmas outside the mind. Among similar things, there are those that rely on class and those that rely on reality to speak of similarity. Class refers to nature, which is the same as difference. Those with the meaning of 'great existence' are not taken now. How is it known? Because below, the virtues and classes are refuted as being mutually separate, so it is known that the class spoken of here is sameness and difference. If 'great existence' is taken as a class, because it is one dharma that is definitely not mutually separate, it cannot become a cause. Class is a different meaning. Reality refers to the meaning of 'that reality', such as earth, water, fire, etc. What you are saying now, relying on similar things, falsely asserting it as fire, the false fire that is spoken of, relying on the class of sameness and difference, as well as realities such as fire, all cannot be established. This is the general negation, relying on all that cannot be established.

Treatise: Relying on class to falsely assert, to the reason that it is not possessed by class.

Commentary: Below, refuting separately. Among them, there are two parts: first, refutation, and then conclusion. Within the refutation, there are two parts: first, the refutation that virtues are not possessed by class, and then the refutation that virtues and classes are mutually separate. This is the first part. First, refuting that false fire cannot be established by relying on class. Those virtues of real fire, such as fierceness and redness, are not virtues of sameness and difference. Because their sect believes that earth has fourteen virtues, namely color (色), taste (味), smell (香), touch (觸), number (數), quantity (量), distinctiveness (別性), combination (合), separation (離), that-nature (彼性), this-nature (此性), liquidity (液性), moisture (潤), and movement (行). Water also has fourteen virtues, removing smell from the previous fourteen and taking weight (重). Fire has eleven virtues, removing taste, moisture, and weight from the fourteen of water. Wind has nine virtues, removing color and liquidity from the eleven of fire. Color is a virtue of fire, etc., but the class of sameness and difference does not have virtues. Now it is said that virtues such as fierceness and redness are not possessed by class. Fierceness refers to the potential use in movement as a cause, not a thought-cause. It is also called sharpness, referring to the fierce momentum on fire. Red is a color virtue.

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。此在於火。非是類德。

論。若無共德至假說火等名。

述曰。顯其非理。共德者即猛赤也。雖有同異類而無火德等亦得說為火者。於水等中應得說為火。亦有同異類無火德故。如似火人。以人例水。亦應不得說為似火。如汝所說人似火。似火應不依類。類無共德故。猶如水等。水等返覆可知。

論。若謂猛等至此亦不然。

述曰。下破相離。先牒計非。若彼宗言猛等雖非類德。而不相離故。可假說。以人之類。必與火德猛赤等法。不相離故。可說人為火。水中類離德。何得說為火者。此亦不然。

論。人類猛等至互相離故。

述曰。此出非理。人類及猛德等。現見亦有互相離故。如無猛赤調順之人。但有人類無猛等德。如火及彼似火牛中。雖有猛等。而無人類。豈非類．德有互相離。又見貧人。先無猛赤。后富貴已方有猛赤。或復翻此。豈非相離。故不可說假依類得成。以其人類無猛赤等德。不可說人定似於火。故知假說不依于類。或復亦有有德無人類。故不可以不相離救。

論。類既無德至不依類成。

述曰。今總結之。類既無德。牒初破。又互相離。牒第二破。故知假說不依類成。此總結非。皆有比量。思可知也。

論。依實假說至非共有故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 此在於火，並非是同類所具有的性質（類德）。

論：如果不存在共同的性質（共德），就不能假借而說成是火等名稱。

述曰：這表明了這種說法不合理。共同的性質（共德）指的是猛烈和赤熱。即使有相同或不同的種類，但沒有火的性質（火德）等，也能被說成是火，那麼在水等事物中也應該能被說成是火，因為它們也有相同或不同的種類，但沒有火的性質（火德）。例如，像火一樣的人。用人來類比水，也應該不能被說成是像火一樣，就像你所說的人像火一樣。像火一樣不應該依賴於種類，因為種類沒有共同的性質（共德），就像水等事物一樣。水等事物的反駁可以類推得知。

論：如果說猛烈等性質雖然不是同類所具有的性質（類德），但因為不相分離，所以可以假借而說成是火，這也是不對的。

述曰：下面破斥不相分離的觀點。首先重複對方的錯誤觀點。如果對方宗派說，猛烈等性質雖然不是同類所具有的性質（類德），但因為不相分離，所以可以假借而說成是火。因為人類一定與火的性質（火德），即猛烈和赤熱等法不相分離，所以可以說人像火。水中種類與火的性質（火德）相分離，怎麼能說水像火呢？這種說法也是不對的。

論：人類以及猛烈等性質，實際上也存在互相分離的情況。

述曰：這裡指出這種說法不合理。人類以及猛烈等性質，現在看來也存在互相分離的情況。例如，沒有猛烈和赤熱，性格溫順的人，只有人類的屬性，而沒有猛烈等性質。又如火以及像火的牛，雖然有猛烈等性質，但沒有人類的屬性。難道不是種類和性質（類德）有互相分離的情況嗎？又比如，貧窮的人，先前沒有猛烈和赤熱的性質，後來富貴了才有了猛烈和赤熱的性質，或者反過來，難道不是互相分離嗎？所以不能說假借是依賴於種類而成立的，因為人類沒有猛烈和赤熱等性質，不能說人一定像火。所以知道假借的說法不依賴於種類。或者也有有性質（德）而沒有人屬性的情況，所以不能用不相分離來挽救。

論：既然種類沒有性質（德），又互相分離，所以知道假借的說法不依賴於種類而成立。

述曰：現在總結一下。種類沒有性質（德），這是重複最初的破斥。又互相分離，這是重複第二次的破斥。所以知道假借的說法不依賴於種類而成立。這是總結性的破斥，都有比量可以思考得知。

論：依靠實際存在的性質（實德）進行假借的說法，是因為這些性質不是共同具有的。

【English Translation】 English version This lies in fire; it is not a property of the class (類德, lei de, class property).

Treatise: If there is no common property (共德, gong de, common property), then one cannot hypothetically say it is the name of fire, etc.

Commentary: This shows that this statement is unreasonable. Common properties (共德, gong de) refer to fierceness and redness. Even if there are similar or dissimilar classes but without the properties of fire (火德, huo de, fire property), it can still be said to be fire. Then, in water, etc., it should also be able to be said to be fire because they also have similar or dissimilar classes but without the properties of fire (火德, huo de). For example, a person like fire. Using a person to compare to water, it should also not be able to be said to be like fire, just as you say a person is like fire. Being like fire should not depend on the class because the class has no common properties (共德, gong de), just like water, etc. The refutation of water, etc., can be understood by analogy.

Treatise: If it is said that fierceness, etc., although not a property of the class (類德, lei de), can be hypothetically said because they are inseparable, this is also not correct.

Commentary: Below, refute the inseparability argument. First, repeat the opponent's erroneous view. If the opponent's school says that fierceness, etc., although not a property of the class (類德, lei de), can be hypothetically said because they are inseparable. Because the human class is necessarily inseparable from the properties of fire (火德, huo de), i.e., fierceness and redness, etc., it can be said that a person is like fire. The water class is separate from the properties of fire (火德, huo de), so how can it be said that water is like fire? This statement is also incorrect.

Treatise: The human class and fierceness, etc., actually also exist in a state of mutual separation.

Commentary: Here, point out that this statement is unreasonable. The human class and fierceness, etc., are now seen to exist in a state of mutual separation. For example, a gentle person without fierceness and redness only has the attributes of the human class but does not have fierceness, etc. Also, like fire and a cow that is like fire, although they have fierceness, etc., they do not have the attributes of the human class. Isn't it the case that the class and properties (類德, lei de) are mutually separated? Also, for example, a poor person previously did not have fierceness and redness, but later, after becoming wealthy and noble, they had fierceness and redness, or vice versa. Aren't they mutually separated? Therefore, it cannot be said that hypothetical attribution is established by relying on the class because the human class does not have fierceness and redness, etc. It cannot be said that a person is necessarily like fire. Therefore, it is known that hypothetical attribution does not depend on the class. Or there are cases where there are properties (德, de) but no human attributes, so it cannot be saved by inseparability.

Treatise: Since the class has no properties (德, de) and is mutually separated, it is known that hypothetical attribution is not established by relying on the class.

Commentary: Now, let's summarize. The class has no properties (德, de); this is repeating the initial refutation. Also, they are mutually separated; this is repeating the second refutation. Therefore, it is known that hypothetical attribution is not established by relying on the class. This is a summary refutation, and there are analogies that can be thought about and understood.

Treatise: The statement of hypothetical attribution based on actually existing properties (實德, shi de, real property) is because these properties are not commonly possessed.

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述曰。就破似事．共法之中。上來已破依類不成。自下復破依實不成。于中有二。初破。后結。破中．有二。初無共不成破。后在人非德破。此初也。等者。等取別性．此．彼等。隨其所應猛赤等德非共有故。

此中總非。下顯非共。

論。謂猛赤等至所依異故。

述曰。此顯非共。若猛赤等體是一法。一頭在人。一頭在火。此猛赤等可名共法而是共有。既非共有。所依別故。依實不成。此猛赤德在火所依實火等異。在人所依實火等異。非是一德而在二邊。既無共法。故知假說亦不依實。

論。無共假說有過同前。

述曰。若外救言無共假說亦有何失。今論主非。無共假說。有過同前。同前於水應名火等。以無共故。

論。若謂人火至理亦不然。

述曰。下在人非德破。此牒計非。謂彼救言水無赤德故。與火不相似也。人．火雖復猛赤所依之實各別。以相似故可假說者。理亦不然。

論。說火在人不在德故。

述曰。世間但說人似於火。不說德似火。德似火時。應當猛似猛。赤似赤。德是實家德。可依假說。今不在德。唯在於人。乃言假依實說。此既便依假人說實火故。若說火在德。德是實德。以德相似名火依實。既說火在人。應人相似名為火。不說火

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：就破除『相似法』和『共法』而言，前面已經破斥了『依類不成』的觀點，下面繼續破斥『依實不成』的觀點。其中分為兩部分：首先破斥『無共不成』，然後破斥『在人非德』。這是第一部分。『等』字，是包括『別性』，例如『此』、『彼』等。根據具體情況，猛、赤等性質並非共有。

這裡總的否定，下面顯示並非共有。

論：所謂猛、赤等，是因為所依賴的事物不同。

述曰：這裡顯示並非共有。如果猛、赤等本質上是一種法，一端在人，一端在火，那麼這種猛、赤等可以稱為『共法』，而且是共有。既然不是共有，是因為所依賴的事物不同。這種猛、赤的性質，在火所依賴的實體（火等）中是不同的，在人所依賴的實體（火等）中也是不同的。不是一種性質同時存在於兩邊。既然沒有共法，所以知道假說也不依賴於真實。

論：沒有共法而進行假說，所犯的過失與之前相同。

述曰：如果對方辯解說，沒有共法而進行假說，又有什麼過失呢？現在論主否定這種說法。沒有共法而進行假說，所犯的過失與之前相同，即如同之前所說，水應該被稱為火等，因為沒有共性的緣故。

論：如果認為人像火是因為人有火的性質，這個道理也是不成立的。

述曰：下面破斥『在人非德』的觀點。這裡駁斥對方的錯誤觀點。對方辯解說，水沒有赤色，所以與火不相似。人與火雖然猛、赤所依賴的實體各不相同，但因為相似，所以可以進行假說，這個道理也是不成立的。

論：世間只說人像火，不說性質像火。

述曰：世間只說人像火，不說性質像火。如果說性質像火，那麼應該說猛像猛，赤像赤。性質是實體家的性質，可以依據假說。現在不在性質上，只在於人，卻說假借依據真實。這實際上是依據假的人來說真實的火。如果說火在性質上，性質是真實的性質，因為性質相似而稱為火，這是依據真實。既然說火在人身上，那麼應該是人相似而稱為火，而不是說火。

【English Translation】 English version: Statement: Regarding refuting 'similar dharma' and 'common dharma', the 'dependent on type non-establishment' has already been refuted above. Below, 'dependent on reality non-establishment' is further refuted. There are two parts to this: first, refuting 'no commonality non-establishment', and then refuting 'in person not quality'. This is the first part. 'Etc.' includes 'distinct nature', such as 'this', 'that', etc. Depending on the specific situation, qualities like fierceness and redness are not shared.

Here is a general negation; below it shows non-commonality.

Treatise: The so-called fierceness, redness, etc., are because the things they rely on are different.

Statement: This shows non-commonality. If fierceness, redness, etc., are essentially one dharma, with one end in a person and one end in fire, then this fierceness, redness, etc., can be called 'common dharma' and is shared. Since it is not shared, it is because the things they rely on are different. This quality of fierceness and redness is different in the entity that fire relies on (fire, etc.), and it is also different in the entity that a person relies on (fire, etc.). It is not one quality existing on both sides simultaneously. Since there is no common dharma, it is known that hypothetical statements do not rely on reality either.

Treatise: Making hypothetical statements without commonality has the same fault as before.

Statement: If the opponent argues that making hypothetical statements without commonality, what fault is there? Now the treatise master negates this. Making hypothetical statements without commonality has the same fault as before, that is, as said before, water should be called fire, etc., because there is no commonality.

Treatise: If it is thought that a person is like fire because the person has the qualities of fire, this reasoning is also not valid.

Statement: Below, the view of 'in person not quality' is refuted. Here, the opponent's erroneous view is refuted. The opponent argues that water does not have redness, so it is not similar to fire. Although the entities that fierceness and redness rely on are different in a person and in fire, because they are similar, hypothetical statements can be made. This reasoning is also not valid.

Treatise: The world only says that a person is like fire, not that a quality is like fire.

Statement: The world only says that a person is like fire, not that a quality is like fire. If it is said that a quality is like fire, then it should be said that fierceness is like fierceness, and redness is like redness. A quality is the quality of a real entity, and hypothetical statements can be based on it. Now, it is not based on the quality, but only on the person, yet it is said that the hypothetical is based on the real. This is actually using the hypothetical person to speak of the real fire. If it is said that fire is in the quality, and the quality is a real quality, then it is called fire because the qualities are similar, and this is based on reality. Since it is said that fire is in the person, then it should be said that the person is similar and is called fire, not that fire is said.

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依實。

論。由此假說不依實成。

述曰。即總結也。此中有救。及如前解依類不成亦有救破。不異前也。

論。又假必依至亦不應理。

述曰。上來已破外道真事。次破小乘伏難真事。破前外道。勝論為首。余亦從之。今小乘等自辨真事準前立三法。故今破也。或是外道．佛法共許真事。假亦不依。文有三。一總非。二別顯。三結依。此總非也。

論。真謂自相至俱非境故。

述曰。下別顯有三。初顯不依真。唯依共相轉。即此真事。非謂心外實體名真。但心所取法自體相。言說不及。假智緣不著。說之為真。此唯現量知。性離言說。及智分別。此出真體非智．詮及。

論。謂假智詮至共相而轉。

述曰。如色法等。礙為自性。火以暖為性。水以濕為性。但可證知。言說不及。第六意識隨五識後起緣此智發言語等。但是所緣說法之共相。非彼自相若緣著自相者。如緣張人。即應張人身中諸事皆應了知。緣及張人之自相故。應立量云。如第六意識緣張人時。張人身中餘一切法皆應緣著張人自相故。如所緣形量等。此就他宗而為此量。非謂共許。張人身以眾多法為自性。緣彼之時但得眾法所成之人。非一．一法皆能別知。一．一法皆能別知。是證量故　言共相者。如

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 依實。

論。由此假說不依實成。

述曰。即總結也。此中有救。及如前解依類不成亦有救破。不異前也。

論。又假必依至亦不應理。

述曰。上來已破外道真事。次破小乘伏難真事。破前外道。勝論為首。余亦從之。今小乘等自辨真事準前立三法。故今破也。或是外道．佛法共許真事。假亦不依。文有三。一總非。二別顯。三結依。此總非也。

論。真謂自相至俱非境故。

述曰。下別顯有三。初顯不依真。唯依共相轉。即此真事。非謂心外實體名真。但心所取法自體相。言說不及。假智緣不著。說之為真。此唯現量知。性離言說。及智分別。此出真體非智．詮及。

論。謂假智詮至共相而轉。

述曰。如色法等。礙為自性。火以暖為性。水以濕為性。但可證知。言說不及。第六意識隨五識後起緣此智發言語等。但是所緣說法之共相。非彼自相若緣著自相者。如緣張人（人名）。即應張人身中諸事皆應了知。緣及張人之自相故。應立量云。如第六意識緣張人時。張人身中餘一切法皆應緣著張人自相故。如所緣形量等。此就他宗而為此量。非謂共許。張人身以眾多法為自性。緣彼之時但得眾法所成之人。非一．一法皆能別知。一．一法皆能別知。是證量故　言共相者。如

【English Translation】 English version Ishi.

Treatise: Therefore, this hypothetical proposition does not accord with reality.

Commentary: This is a summary. There is a refutation here, and as in the previous explanation, the failure to accord with categories is also refuted. It is no different from before.

Treatise: Furthermore, the necessity of dependence on the hypothetical is also unreasonable.

Commentary: Above, the 'true reality' of externalist paths has already been refuted. Next, the 'true reality' that the Hinayana (Small Vehicle) attempts to defend is refuted. The previous refutation targeted externalist paths, with the Vaisheshika school at the forefront, and others following. Now, the Hinayana and others defend their 'true reality' by establishing three dharmas (laws/principles) according to the previous model, hence this refutation. Or perhaps it is a 'true reality' commonly accepted by both externalist paths and Buddhist teachings, upon which the hypothetical does not depend. The text has three parts: first, a general negation; second, a specific manifestation; and third, a concluding dependence. This is the general negation.

Treatise: 'True' refers to the self-nature, up to the point that both are not objects.

Commentary: Below, the specific manifestation has three parts. First, it manifests non-dependence on the 'true,' but only revolves around the common characteristic. This is the 'true reality.' It is not that an external entity outside the mind is called 'true,' but rather the self-nature of the dharma taken by the mind, which words cannot reach. The hypothetical wisdom does not cling to it, and it is called 'true.' This is only known by direct perception, its nature is separate from words and intellectual discrimination. This shows that the true essence is beyond wisdom, expression, and...

Treatise: It is said that hypothetical wisdom and expression revolve around the common characteristic.

Commentary: For example, form (rupa) and other dharmas. Obstruction is its self-nature. Fire has warmth as its nature. Water has wetness as its nature. It can only be known through verification, words cannot reach it. The sixth consciousness arises after the five consciousnesses and, based on this wisdom, produces speech and language. However, this is only the common characteristic of the dharma being spoken about, not its self-nature. If one clings to the self-nature, such as when perceiving Zhang Ren (a person's name), then all things within Zhang Ren's body should be fully known, because one is perceiving Zhang Ren's self-nature. One should establish the following inference: When the sixth consciousness perceives Zhang Ren, all other dharmas within Zhang Ren's body should be perceived and clung to as Zhang Ren's self-nature, such as the perceived shape and quantity. This inference is made based on the other's school, not as a common agreement. Zhang Ren's body has numerous dharmas as its self-nature. When perceiving him, one only obtains the person composed of numerous dharmas, and one cannot separately know each and every dharma. Being able to separately know each and every dharma is proof of valid cognition. The term 'common characteristic' refers to...

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言色時遮余非色。一切色法皆在所言。乃至言青遮非青。一切青皆在所言。貫通諸法。不唯在一事體中。故名共相說為假也。遮得自相名得共相。若所變中有共相法是可得者即得自體。應一切法可說．可緣。故共相法亦說．緣不及。然非是執。不堅取故。如五蘊中以五蘊事為自相。空．無我等理為共相。分蘊成處。色成於十。處名自相。蘊名共相。一色蘊該十故。於一處中。青．黃等類別。類名自相。處名共相。於一青等類中。有多事體。果青非華等。以類為共相。事名為自相。一事中有多極微。以事為共相。以極微為自相。如是展轉至不可說為自相。可說極微等為共相。故以理推無自相體。且說不可言法體名自相。可說為共相。以理而論。共既非共。自亦非自。為互遮故。但各別說。說空．無我等是共相者。從假智說。此但有能緣行解。都無所緣真實共體。入真觀時則一一法皆別了知　非作共解。

言說若著自相者。說火之時火應燒口。火以燒物為自相故。緣亦如是。緣火之時火應燒心。今不燒心。及不燒口。明緣．及說。俱得共相。若爾喚火何不得水不得火之自相故如喚於水此理不然。無始串習共呼召故。今緣于青作青解者。此比量知不稱前法。如眼識緣色。稱自相故不作色解。後起意識緣色共相。不著色

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：言語和概念所指代的，並非只是事物的個別特性（自相），而是普遍的共性（共相）。一切關於色法的言論，都包含在所言說的共性之中。乃至說『青色』，就排除了『非青色』，一切青色都包含在所言說的共性之中。這種共性貫通於各種事物，並非只存在於一個事物的本體之中，所以稱為共相，是假立的。通過遮遣個別特性來獲得普遍共性。如果所變現的事物中存在共相之法，那麼就能獲得它的自體（自相），那麼一切法就都可以被言說、可以被緣取了。因此，共相之法也是言說和緣取所不能及的。然而，這並非是執著，因為不是堅固地取著。例如，在五蘊（panchaskandha）中，以五蘊的事物為自相，空（shunyata）、無我（anatman）等道理為共相。將蘊分解為處（ayatana），色蘊分解為十處，處名為自相，蘊名為共相，因為一個色蘊涵蓋了十處。在一個處中，青、黃等類別，類別名為自相，處名為共相。在一個青色等類別中，有多個事物個體，例如果實的青色不同於花朵的青色。以類別為共相，事物個體名為自相。在一個事物中，有多個極微（paramanu），以事物為共相，以極微為自相。像這樣層層遞進，直到不可言說的事物為自相，可說的極微等為共相。所以，從理性的角度推論，沒有自相的實體。暫且說不可言說的法體名為自相，可言說的為共相。以理來論，共性既然不是真正的共性，自性也不是真正的自性，因為它們是互相遮遣的。只是各自區別地說明。說空、無我等是共相，是從假智的角度來說的。這只是有能緣的行解，而沒有所緣的真實共體。進入真觀時，那麼每一個法都能分別了知，而不是作為共性來理解。 如果言說執著于自相，那麼說『火』的時候，火就應該燒傷嘴巴，因為火以燒物為自相。緣取也是如此，緣取火的時候，火就應該燒傷心。現在沒有燒傷心，也沒有燒傷嘴巴，說明緣取和言說，都獲得了共相。如果這樣，叫『火』為什麼得不到水，得不到火的自相呢？就像叫『水』一樣。這個道理不是這樣的，因為無始以來串習共同的稱呼。現在緣取青色，產生青色的理解，這是比量所知，不符合前面的法。就像眼識緣取色法，符合自相，所以不產生色法的理解。後起的意識緣取色法的共相，不執著於色法。

【English Translation】 English version: Speech and concepts refer not only to the individual characteristics (svalaksana) of things, but also to universal commonalities (samanya-laksana). All statements about 'rupa' (form) are included in the commonality that is spoken of. Even saying 'blue' excludes 'non-blue,' and all blue things are included in the commonality that is spoken of. This commonality pervades all things and does not exist only in the essence of one thing, so it is called a commonality and is provisionally established. Gaining a universal commonality is achieved by negating individual characteristics. If there is a commonality-dharma in the manifested things, then its own-nature (svarupa) can be obtained, and then all dharmas can be spoken of and apprehended. Therefore, the commonality-dharma is also beyond speech and apprehension. However, this is not attachment, because it is not firmly grasped. For example, in the five skandhas (panchaskandha), the things of the five skandhas are taken as individual characteristics, and the principles of emptiness (shunyata), non-self (anatman), etc., are taken as commonalities. Dividing the skandhas into ayatanas (sense bases), the rupa-skandha is divided into ten ayatanas. The name of the ayatana is the individual characteristic, and the name of the skandha is the commonality, because one rupa-skandha covers ten ayatanas. In one ayatana, categories such as blue and yellow, the name of the category is the individual characteristic, and the name of the ayatana is the commonality. In one category such as blue, there are multiple individual things, such as the blue of a fruit being different from the blue of a flower. The category is taken as the commonality, and the individual thing is taken as the individual characteristic. In one thing, there are multiple paramanus (ultimate particles), the thing is taken as the commonality, and the paramanu is taken as the individual characteristic. Progressing in this way, until the unspeakable thing is the individual characteristic, and the speakable paramanu, etc., is the commonality. Therefore, from a rational perspective, there is no entity of individual characteristic. For the time being, the unspeakable dharma-essence is called the individual characteristic, and the speakable is called the commonality. In terms of reason, since commonality is not true commonality, self-nature is also not true self-nature, because they mutually negate each other. They are only explained separately. Saying that emptiness, non-self, etc., are commonalities is from the perspective of provisional wisdom. This only has the action and understanding of the apprehender, and there is no real common entity of the apprehended. When entering true contemplation, then each dharma can be known separately, and not understood as a commonality. If speech is attached to individual characteristics, then when saying 'fire,' the fire should burn the mouth, because fire takes burning things as its individual characteristic. Apprehension is also the same, when apprehending fire, the fire should burn the heart. Now, it does not burn the heart, nor does it burn the mouth, indicating that apprehension and speech both obtain the commonality. If so, why does calling 'fire' not obtain water, and not obtain the individual characteristic of fire? It is like calling 'water.' This reasoning is not so, because of the habitual common calling from beginningless time. Now, apprehending blue and producing the understanding of blue, this is inferential knowledge, which does not conform to the previous dharma. Just as eye-consciousness apprehends rupa-dharma, it conforms to the individual characteristic, so it does not produce the understanding of rupa-dharma. The subsequent consciousness apprehends the commonality of rupa-dharma, and is not attached to rupa-dharma.

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故遂作青解。遮余非青之物。遂作青解。非謂青解即稱青事。故二十唯識伽他中言。現覺如夢等。已起現覺時。見．及境已無。寧許有現量。比謂假智唯緣共相而得起故。法之自相離分別故。言說亦爾。不稱本法。亦但只於共相處轉。如說青蓮華等。有所遮故　今大乘宗唯有自相體。都無共相體。假智．及詮。但唯得共不得自相。若說共相唯有觀心。現量通緣自相．共相。若法自相唯現量得。共相亦通比量所得。乃至故言唯于諸法共相而轉。此之自相證量所知。非言說等境。故。

下文第二顯假詮智有勝功能。

論。亦非離此至為假所依。

述曰。方便者。所以義．因義．安立施設義．善巧義。非離假智．及言說。外有別所以。便施設自相。說為假智詮之所依。假智．及詮。依所詮變與彼自相相似之義說為假故。以為疏緣親不得自性。得自性時不作青等解。作青等解即非自性。故知自性非假所依。然緣自性色。及詮故。作青等解。故說自相為假所依。

論。然假智詮必依聲起。

述曰。下第三文總申假說不依真事。謂此假智及詮。必定依聲而起。如聞某甲即便緣之。或起言說。故必依聲。如作色解。及說色言。由聞他聲說之為色方能了故。詮謂名等。有詮辨故。聲謂表業。雖不相離各

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此才會有對於『青』的理解。這種理解是爲了排除其他非『青』的事物。雖然有了對於『青』的理解，但這並不意味著對於『青』的理解就等同於『青』本身。所以在《二十唯識伽他》中說：『（如同）現覺如夢等，已生起現覺時，見者和所見之境都已經不存在，怎麼能允許有現量呢？』比量（anumāna）之所以被稱為假智，是因為它只能通過推論共相（sāmānya-lakṣaṇa）才能生起。法的自相（sva-lakṣaṇa）是遠離分別的。言說也是如此，它並不能完全對應於事物本身，而只是在共相的層面起作用。比如我們說『青蓮花』等等，都是有所遮詮的。現在大乘宗認為只有自相的實體，而沒有共相的實體。假智和詮釋只能把握共相，而不能把握自相。如果說共相只是觀心所現，那麼現量（pratyakṣa）既能緣自相，也能緣共相。如果法的自相只能通過現量獲得，那麼共相也可以通過比量獲得。因此說，（假智和詮釋）只能在諸法的共相層面起作用。而自相只能通過證量（pramāṇa）來認知，不是言說等所能達到的境界。

下面的內容是第二部分，闡述假詮智具有殊勝的功能。

論：也不是離開這些（假智和詮釋）而有，是假所依。

述曰：『方便』的意思是『所以』、『因』、『安立施設』、『善巧』。並不是離開假智和言說之外，還有其他的方法可以施設自相，說自相是假智和詮釋所依賴的對象。假智和詮釋，依據所詮釋的變異，與那個自相相似的意義，被稱為『假』。因為是疏遠的緣，不能直接獲得自性。獲得自性的時候，不會產生『青』等等的理解。產生『青』等等的理解，就不是自性。所以說自性不是假所依。然而，因為緣自性的色，以及詮釋，才產生『青』等等的理解。所以說自相是假所依。

論：然而假智和詮釋必定依聲而起。

述曰：下面第三部分總的闡述假說不依賴真實的事物。這裡說的假智和詮釋，必定依賴聲音而生起。比如聽到某甲的名字，就緣取他，或者產生關於他的言說。所以必定依賴聲音。比如產生對於『色』的理解，以及說『色』這個詞，都是因為聽到別人說『色』這個詞才能理解。詮釋指的是名稱等等，因為有詮釋辨別的作用。聲音指的是表業，雖然不互相分離，但是各自...

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, the understanding of 'blue' arises. This understanding serves to exclude other things that are not 'blue'. Although there is an understanding of 'blue', it does not mean that the understanding of 'blue' is the same as 'blue' itself. Therefore, in the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (Viṃśatikā), it is said: 'Like present awareness being like a dream, when present awareness has arisen, the seer and the seen object are already non-existent. How can we allow for direct perception (pratyakṣa)?' Inference (anumāna) is called false knowledge because it can only arise by inferring the general characteristic (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa). The own-nature (sva-lakṣaṇa) of a dharma is free from conceptualization. Speech is also like this; it cannot fully correspond to the thing itself, but only functions at the level of the general characteristic. For example, when we say 'blue lotus flower', etc., there is always something being excluded. Now, the Mahayana school believes that there is only the entity of the own-nature, and there is no entity of the general characteristic. False knowledge and interpretation can only grasp the general characteristic, but not the own-nature. If it is said that the general characteristic is only what appears to the mind, then direct perception can cognize both the own-nature and the general characteristic. If the own-nature of a dharma can only be obtained through direct perception, then the general characteristic can also be obtained through inference. Therefore, it is said that (false knowledge and interpretation) can only function at the level of the general characteristics of all dharmas. The own-nature can only be known through valid cognition (pramāṇa), and is not an object that can be reached by speech, etc.

The following section is the second part, explaining that false interpretive knowledge has excellent functions.

Treatise: It is not apart from these (false knowledge and interpretation), it is what the false relies on.

Commentary: 'Expedient' means 'reason', 'cause', 'establishment and designation', and 'skillful means'. It is not apart from false knowledge and speech that there are other ways to establish the own-nature, saying that the own-nature is what false knowledge and interpretation rely on. False knowledge and interpretation, based on the variations of what is interpreted, are called 'false' because of the meaning similar to that own-nature. Because it is a distant cause, it cannot directly obtain the self-nature. When obtaining the self-nature, the understanding of 'blue', etc., will not arise. When the understanding of 'blue', etc., arises, it is not the self-nature. Therefore, it is said that the self-nature is not what the false relies on. However, because of the color that is the object of the self-nature, and the interpretation, the understanding of 'blue', etc., arises. Therefore, it is said that the own-nature is what the false relies on.

Treatise: However, false knowledge and interpretation must arise based on sound.

Commentary: The third part below generally explains that false speech does not rely on real things. The false knowledge and interpretation mentioned here must rely on sound to arise. For example, when hearing the name of someone, one grasps him, or produces speech about him. Therefore, it must rely on sound. For example, the understanding of 'color', and saying the word 'color', are both understood because one hears others say the word 'color'. Interpretation refers to names, etc., because there is the function of interpretive discrimination. Sound refers to expression, although they are not separate from each other, they each...

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據一勝。若爾嬰兒等。應無比智。及生無色。比智應無。不聞他聲起假智故。此理不然。如鼠聞貓聲。及或見鴟等即便急走。豈彼生已能起證智耶。此鼠前生曾為貓．鴟之所食啖。今既見已有比智生。定知如前還被彼殺。即便急走。生無色亦爾。無始及地獄曾熏習故。曾聞說有無色界定修生彼故。不爾此中唯說地獄智依聲起。除無色界起故知諸智皆緣共。生假智．及詮。詮謂名等。必依聲起。

論。聲不及處此便不轉。

述曰。如香．味．觸。根合得自相。豈能以聲得彼自體。聲既不及自相之處。故定知此假智及詮。皆不及彼自相而轉。猶如於聲。

論。能詮所詮至不依真事。

述曰。說為能詮之名。所詮之法。俱非自相。聲是耳所得。無所詮表故。今此能詮。是名．句等。意識所緣。緣之起解。故知能．所二詮俱非自相。共相無別體。是假法故　問曰若不著自相。橫為分別。何非是執。即善心等中應有法執。如法執不善心亦不稱境故　今答曰。法執之心非但不稱本質。亦不稱影像親所緣緣共相之法依他性者。故名為執。或堅著此親相分故。說之為執。此善心等緣共相時。雖不稱自相本質。而稱于影像所變。亦不橫計堅著。與法執不同。以彼影像依他性故。或比量等心緣親相分。亦不相稱。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有人主張，如果像嬰兒一樣，應該具有無比的智慧。以及生於無色界（Arupadhatu，佛教三界之一，沒有物質存在的純精神界）的眾生，他們的比智（Anumana-jnana，通過推理獲得的知識）應該不存在。因為他們不聽聞其他聲音而產生假智（Parikalpita-jnana，虛妄分別的知識）。 這個道理是不成立的。例如，老鼠聽到貓的聲音，或者看到老鷹等，就立即逃跑。難道它們一生下來就能產生證智（Pratyaksha-jnana，直接的、真實的知識）嗎？這隻老鼠前世曾經被貓或老鷹吃掉。現在既然看到它們，就產生了比智，確定知道像以前一樣還會被它們殺死，所以立即逃跑。生於無色界的眾生也是如此，因為他們無始以來以及在地獄曾經熏習過，曾經聽說過有無想定（Asanjnasamapatti，一種禪定狀態，在此狀態下意識活動暫時停止）的修行而生於彼處。否則，這裡只說地獄的智慧依賴聲音而生起，除了無想定之外，因此知道諸智都是緣于共相（Samanya-lakshana，事物共有的普遍特徵）。生起假智以及能詮（Abhidhana，表達意義的語言符號）。能詮指的是名稱等，必定依賴聲音而生起。

論：聲音無法觸及的地方，這些（假智和能詮）就無法運作。

述曰：例如香、味、觸，根與境結合才能獲得自相（Svalakshana，事物獨特的、不可分割的特徵）。怎麼能通過聲音獲得它們的自體（Svarupa，事物的本質）呢？聲音既然無法觸及自相的地方，因此可以確定這種假智和能詮，都無法觸及它們的自相而運作，就像聲音一樣。

論：能詮和所詮，最終都不依賴真實的事物。

述曰：被稱為能詮的名稱，和所詮的法，都不是自相。聲音是耳朵所獲得的，沒有所詮表的意義。現在這個能詮，是名、句等，是意識所緣取的，緣取它而產生理解。因此知道能詮和所詮都不是自相。共相沒有獨立的實體，是虛假的法。 問：如果不執著于自相，而橫生分別，為什麼不是執著呢？那麼，在善心等心中，應該有法執（Dharma-graha，對法的執著），就像法執的不善心也不符合真實情況一樣。 現在回答說：法執的心不僅不符合本質，也不符合影像親所緣緣（Upalambana-pratyaya，產生認知的條件）的共相之法，即依他性（Paratantra，依賴其他條件而存在的性質）。所以稱為執著。或者堅固地執著于這個親相分（事物直接呈現的方面），所以說它是執著。這種善心等緣取共相時，雖然不符合自相本質，但是符合影像所變現的，也不橫生計度堅固執著，與法執不同，因為這個影像具有依他性。或者比量等心緣取親相分，也不相符合。

【English Translation】 English version: According to some, if one is like an infant, one should have incomparable wisdom. And those born in the Arupadhatu (the formless realm, one of the three realms in Buddhism, a purely spiritual realm without material existence), their Anumana-jnana (inferential knowledge) should not exist. Because they do not hear other sounds and thus arise Parikalpita-jnana (imaginative knowledge). This reasoning is not valid. For example, when a mouse hears the sound of a cat, or sees a hawk, it immediately runs away. Could it be that it can generate Pratyaksha-jnana (direct knowledge) as soon as it is born? This mouse was eaten by a cat or hawk in a previous life. Now that it sees them, it generates Anumana-jnana, and is certain that it will be killed by them as before, so it immediately runs away. It is the same for those born in the Arupadhatu, because they have been conditioned since beginningless time and in the lower realms, and have heard that there is Asanjnasamapatti (a state of meditation where conscious activity is temporarily suspended) and are born there. Otherwise, it is only said here that the wisdom of the lower realms arises dependent on sound, except for Asanjnasamapatti, therefore it is known that all wisdom arises from Samanya-lakshana (the common characteristics of things). The arising of Parikalpita-jnana and Abhidhana (language symbols expressing meaning). Abhidhana refers to names, etc., and must arise dependent on sound.

Treatise: Where sound cannot reach, these (Parikalpita-jnana and Abhidhana) cannot operate.

Commentary: For example, with smell, taste, and touch, the root and object must combine to obtain Svalakshana (the unique, indivisible characteristics of things). How can one obtain their Svarupa (essence) through sound? Since sound cannot reach the place of Svalakshana, it is certain that this Parikalpita-jnana and Abhidhana cannot operate on their Svalakshana, just like sound.

Treatise: The signifier and the signified ultimately do not rely on real things.

Commentary: The name that is called the signifier, and the Dharma that is signified, are not Svalakshana. Sound is obtained by the ear, and has no signified meaning. Now this signifier, is name, sentence, etc., is what consciousness takes as its object, and understanding arises from taking it as its object. Therefore it is known that both the signifier and the signified are not Svalakshana. Samanya-lakshana has no independent entity, it is a false Dharma. Question: If one does not cling to Svalakshana, but generates arbitrary distinctions, why is it not clinging? Then, in good minds, etc., there should be Dharma-graha (clinging to Dharma), just as the unwholesome mind of Dharma-graha does not conform to reality. Now we answer: The mind of Dharma-graha not only does not conform to the essence, but also does not conform to the Samanya-lakshana of Upalambana-pratyaya (the condition for generating cognition), that is, Paratantra (the nature of existing dependent on other conditions). Therefore it is called clinging. Or one firmly clings to this direct aspect of the object, so it is said to be clinging. When this good mind, etc., takes Samanya-lakshana as its object, although it does not conform to the essence of Svalakshana, it conforms to what the image manifests, and does not arbitrarily generate measurement and firm clinging, which is different from Dharma-graha, because this image has Paratantra. Or the mind of inference, etc., takes the direct aspect of the object as its object, and it also does not conform.

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若相稱者應名得體。由此但非堅著此境。故不名執。若爾色等五境有別能緣故。有緣自相。眼等五根。及種子亦爾。本識境故。心．心所法此是誰緣。若言他心智慧緣此。應非證量。是散心故。如余散心。此理不然。護法釋云。一切凡．聖自證分等為證量故。安惠云。謂即諸佛他心智緣。是通果故。如通是證量修惠所攝。二十唯識伽他中雲。他心智云何。知境不如實。如知自心智。不知如佛境。此證量者。皆不起言說。及有分別智。以證自相故。如五識境。餘二乘．凡夫所得他心智。不稱他心法體自相。橫緣共相故。妄執意識故。故知。假說不依真事。此總結之。

論。由此但依似事而轉。

述曰。此總結也。定知。不依自相說假。依似事說。

論。似謂增益至假必依真。

述曰。此顯似事非真實有。謂于自相之上。增益共相依他有法。謂一色相。通諸色上故名增益。此通三性心。及於此中遍計所執此相是無。自相之上妄增為有。隨情說相非稱本境。勿謂善心亦是有執。不堅取故。執心必違影像相故。共相不違影像相故。能詮之聲。依共相轉不依自相。故說假法不依真起。心變共相外必有體。然與自相必須合緣。如緣色時亦隨自相變為一共遍諸色上故成所緣緣。乃至緣我或空華等。隨作青等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果（認識和對像）相稱，就應該叫做『得體』。由此可見，只要不是堅固地執著于這個境界，就不叫做『執』。如果這樣說，色等五境有分別的能力，能夠緣取自身特有的相狀，眼等五根以及種子也是這樣，因為它們是本識的境界。那麼，心和心所法緣取的是什麼呢？如果說他心智慧夠緣取這些，那就不應該是可靠的證據，因為那是散亂的心，就像其他的散亂心一樣。這個道理是不成立的。護法解釋說，一切凡夫和聖人的自證分等都是可靠的證據。安慧說，是指諸佛的他心智所緣取的，因為那是通果，就像神通是證量，被智慧所攝持一樣。《二十唯識論》的偈頌中說：『他心智如何？知境不如實，如知自心智，不知如佛境。』這些證量，都不起語言表達，以及有分別的智慧，因為它們證得的是自相，就像五識的境界一樣。其餘二乘和凡夫所得到的他心智，不能如實地瞭解他人心法的自體自相，只是橫向地緣取共相，因為那是妄執的意識。所以要知道，假說是不依據真實事物的。這是總結。

論：由此，只是依據相似的事物而運轉。

述記：這是總結。一定知道，不依據自相說假，而是依據相似的事物來說。

論：相似，是指增益，假必依真。

述記：這顯示了相似的事物不是真實存在的。是指在自相之上，增益共相，依據他法而有。比如一個色相，通用於各種顏色之上，所以叫做增益。這包括三性的心，以及於此之中遍計所執的相是無，在自相之上虛妄地增益為有，隨順情意所說的相不符合本來的境界。不要認為善心也是有執著的，因為它不是堅固地取著。執著的心必然違背影像的相，共相不違背影像的相。能夠詮釋的聲音，依據共相運轉，不依據自相。所以說假法不是依據真而生起的。心所變現的共相外一定有本體，然而與自相必須結合起來緣取。比如緣取色的時候，也隨著自相變現為一個共同的、普遍存在於各種顏色之上的相，所以成為所緣緣。乃至緣取我或者空花等，隨著（心）作出青色等（的分別）

【English Translation】 English version: If (the cognition and the object) are in accordance, it should be called 'appropriate'. From this, as long as one is not firmly attached to this realm, it is not called 'attachment'. If that is the case, the five objects such as form (rupa) have the ability to differentiate and can cognize their own unique characteristics (svalaksana), and so do the five roots such as the eye and the seeds (bija), because they are the realm of the fundamental consciousness (alaya-vijnana). Then, what do the mind (citta) and mental factors (caitasika) cognize? If it is said that the mind-reading faculty (paracitta-jnana) can cognize these, then it should not be reliable evidence, because it is a distracted mind, like other distracted minds. This reasoning is not valid. Dharmapala explains that the self-cognition portion (svasamvedana) of all ordinary beings and sages is reliable evidence. Anhui says that it refers to the mind-reading faculty of the Buddhas, because it is a common result (samanya-phala), just as supernormal powers (abhijna) are evidence, being included in wisdom (prajna). The verse in the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (Vimsatika) says: 'How is the mind-reading faculty? It knows the object unrealistically, like knowing one's own mind, not knowing like the Buddha's realm.' These evidences do not give rise to verbal expression or discriminating wisdom, because they prove the self-characteristic (svalaksana), like the realm of the five consciousnesses. The mind-reading faculty obtained by the remaining two vehicles (sravaka and pratyekabuddha) and ordinary beings cannot truly understand the self-characteristic of others' minds, but only horizontally cognizes the common characteristic (samanya-laksana), because it is a falsely attached consciousness. Therefore, know that hypothetical speech does not rely on true facts. This is a summary.

Treatise: Therefore, it only operates based on similar things.

Commentary: This is a summary. It is definitely known that false speech does not rely on the self-characteristic, but is based on similar things.

Treatise: Similarity refers to augmentation; the false must rely on the true.

Commentary: This shows that similar things are not truly existent. It refers to augmenting the common characteristic on top of the self-characteristic, relying on other-dependent existence (paratantra-svabhava). For example, a single form (rupa) is common to all colors, so it is called augmentation. This includes the minds of the three natures (trisvabhava), and the completely conceptualized nature (parikalpita-svabhava) within it is non-existent; falsely augmenting existence on top of the self-characteristic, the characteristics spoken according to sentiment do not match the original realm. Do not think that the wholesome mind also has attachment, because it does not firmly grasp. The attached mind necessarily contradicts the image's characteristic, while the common characteristic does not contradict the image's characteristic. The sound that can express relies on the common characteristic, not on the self-characteristic. Therefore, it is said that false phenomena do not arise based on the true. The common characteristic transformed by the mind must have a substance outside, but it must be combined with the self-characteristic to be cognized. For example, when cognizing form, it also transforms with the self-characteristic into a common characteristic that is universally present in all colors, so it becomes the object-condition (alambana-pratyaya). Even when cognizing self or empty flowers, it follows (the mind) to make distinctions such as blue, etc.

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解。或依于蘊實法。或別緣兔角等。與有體法併合緣之。故無非所緣緣失。一切準知　又解即共相別緣亦依他性。然不稱實仍是有性成所緣緣。今論所說假我法者。但隨妄情。非謂別有真論說于假也。

論。是故彼難不應正理。

述曰。總結前所明釋非道理。謂前所破。初就外宗設許真事等為難。后就小乘等共許真事為難　問曰。若爾世尊如何知共相法苦．無常等。應不能緣二三諦等　答如佛地論第六卷中廣有三解。如薩婆多。五蘊是自相。苦無常等理是共相。因明乃有多重。並如別處廣敘不能煩引。學者應知。

論。然依識變至說假似言。

述曰。下顯正教說我法因。依識所變見．相分法。為遣所執隨情說假我法言。故非真實有。

論。由此契經至假說我法名。

述曰。即厚嚴經。我法無體。但有其名。此非安惠文也。文意易詳。故今不解。

上來雖有略．廣二段。總是解頌上之三句。答頌前問訖。自下釋頌下之三句。

論。識所變相至類別唯三。

述曰。于中有二。初別解三句。后別解能變義。三句不同即分為二。此解初句也　所變相者。釋頌此言。此見．相分相狀各各有無量故。所言唯者。是決定義。此見．相分所依自體能變之識。體類定三。非增減

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：解釋：或者依賴於五蘊（skandha）所包含的真實法，或者特別地緣取兔角等不存在的事物，與真實存在的法合併在一起作為所緣。因此，不會有『無所緣緣』的過失。一切情況都可以依此類推。又解釋說，即使是共相（lakṣaṇa）和別相（vikalpa），也是依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva）。雖然不符合真實，但仍然是有自性的，可以成為所緣緣。現在論中所說的假我法，只是隨順虛妄的情執，並不是說另外存在真實的論述來說明假我。

論：因此，之前的責難是不合理的。

述記：總結前面所說明的解釋是不合道理的。之前所破斥的，最初是以外道宗派假設存在真實事物等作為責難，後來是就小乘等共同承認的真實事物作為責難。問：如果這樣，世尊（Śākyamuni）如何能知共相法，如苦、無常等？應該不能緣取二諦（dve satye）或三諦（tri-satya）等。答：如《佛地論》第六卷中有詳細的三種解釋。如薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）認為，五蘊是自相，苦、無常等是共相。因明學（hetuvidyā）中有很多重釋，這些都在其他地方廣泛敘述，不能在此煩瑣地引用。學者應該瞭解。

論：然而，依據識變（vijñāna-pariṇāma），才說有假似的我法。

述記：下面顯示正教說明我法的原因。依據識所變現的見分（darśana-bhāga）和相分（nimitta-bhāga）之法，爲了遣除所執著的，隨順情執而說假我法，所以並非真實存在。

論：由此契經（sūtra），才假說我法之名。

述記：即《厚嚴經》（Ghanavyūha-sūtra）。我法沒有實體，只有名稱。這並非安慧（Sthiramati）的文句。文意容易理解，所以現在不解釋。

上面雖然有略、廣兩段，總是解釋頌文上面的三句，回答了頌文前面的提問。下面解釋頌文下面的三句。

論：識所變現的相，類別只有三種。

述記：其中有兩部分。首先分別解釋三句，然後分別解釋能變（pariṇāma）的意義。三句不同，所以分為兩部分。這裡解釋第一句。所變現的相，解釋頌文中的這句話。這個見分和相分的相狀各有各的，有無量多種。所說的『唯』字，是決定義。這個見分和相分所依的自體，也就是能變的識，體類決定只有三種，不能增減。

【English Translation】 English version: Explanation: Or it relies on the real dharmas contained within the five skandhas (skandha), or it specifically apprehends non-existent things like rabbit horns, combining them with actually existing dharmas as objects of cognition (ālambana). Therefore, there will be no fault of 'no object condition' (anālambana-pratyaya). All situations can be understood analogously. Another explanation is that even common characteristics (lakṣaṇa) and specific characteristics (vikalpa) are of dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva). Although they do not conform to reality, they still have self-nature and can become object conditions. The imputed self and dharmas (ātma-dharma) mentioned in the treatise now merely follow deluded emotional attachments; it is not that there is a separate, true discourse explaining the imputed self.

Treatise: Therefore, the previous criticism is not reasonable.

Commentary: Summarizing the preceding explanation, it is unreasonable. What was refuted earlier initially used the hypothetical existence of real things, etc., by external schools as a criticism, and later used the real things commonly acknowledged by the Hīnayāna schools, etc., as a criticism. Question: If this is the case, how can the World-Honored One (Śākyamuni) know the common characteristics of dharmas, such as suffering, impermanence, etc.? He should not be able to apprehend the two truths (dve satye) or three truths (tri-satya), etc. Answer: As explained in detail in the sixth fascicle of the Treatise on the Stages of the Buddha Land (Buddhabhūmi-śāstra), there are three explanations. As the Sarvāstivāda school holds, the five skandhas are self-characteristics, while suffering, impermanence, etc., are common characteristics. There are many layers of interpretation in epistemology (hetuvidyā), which are extensively described elsewhere and cannot be laboriously cited here. Scholars should understand.

Treatise: However, based on the transformation of consciousness (vijñāna-pariṇāma), the imputed self and dharmas are spoken of.

Commentary: The following reveals the reason why the correct teaching speaks of self and dharmas. Based on the perception-aspect (darśana-bhāga) and image-aspect (nimitta-bhāga) dharmas transformed by consciousness, in order to eliminate attachments, the imputed self and dharmas are spoken of in accordance with emotional attachments, so they are not truly existent.

Treatise: Therefore, the sutra (sūtra) speaks of the name of the imputed self and dharmas.

Commentary: This refers to the Ghanavyūha-sūtra. Self and dharmas have no substance, only names. This is not a sentence by Sthiramati. The meaning of the text is easy to understand, so I will not explain it now.

Although there are two sections above, brief and extensive, they both explain the first three lines of the verse, answering the previous question in the verse. The following explains the last three lines of the verse.

Treatise: The aspects transformed by consciousness have only three categories.

Commentary: There are two parts to this. First, the three lines are explained separately, and then the meaning of transformation (pariṇāma) is explained separately. The three lines are different, so they are divided into two parts. This explains the first line. The transformed aspects explain this phrase in the verse. The characteristics of the perception-aspect and image-aspect are each different, with countless varieties. The word 'only' is definitive. The self-nature on which the perception-aspect and image-aspect rely, that is, the transforming consciousness, has only three definite categories, which cannot be increased or decreased.

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故。或簡別義。如前已說。

論。一謂異熟至多異熟性故。

述曰。合解下二句。謂初二識。及第三識。如理應知　多異熟者。謂此識體總有三位　一我愛執藏現行位。即唯七地以前菩薩。二乘有學。一切異生。從無始來。謂名阿賴耶。至無人執位。此名執藏　二善惡業果位。謂從無始乃至菩薩金剛心。或解脫道時。乃至二乘無餘依位。謂名毗播迦。此云異熟識。毗者異也。播迦熟義。至無所知障位　三相續執持位。謂從無始乃至如來盡未來際。利樂有情位。謂名阿陀那。此云執持。或名心等。長短分限不過三位。以異熟名亦通初位故。論說言多異熟性故不言初以狹故。不言后以寬故。寬狹何事遮不說也。此中意說熏習位識。若說寬時佛無熏習。說即無用。若說狹時八地以後猶有熏習。便為不足。又但說因有虛妄位。不說于佛。故說異熟識。是多異熟性。寬狹皆得　又為五位。一異生位。二二乘有學位。三二乘無學位。四十地菩薩位。五如來位。異熟一名通前四位故。言多異熟性不說餘名。又十三位通十二故。又七地如樞要說。

論。二謂思量至恒審思量故。

述曰。謂第七識恒審思量。此說恒言簡第六識。意識雖審思而非是恒。有間斷故。次審思言。復簡第八。第八雖恒。非審思故。恒．

【現代漢語翻譯】 故。或者簡別其意義，如前面已經說過的。

論：第一是異熟，乃至具有多種異熟的性質。

述記：合起來解釋下面兩句。指的是前二識，以及第三識，應當如理如實地瞭解。多種異熟，指的是這個識的本體總共有三個階段：第一，我愛執藏現行位，也就是隻有七地以前的菩薩、二乘有學（還在學習的聖者）、一切凡夫，從無始以來，稱為阿賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）。直到沒有對人的執著時，這個名稱是執藏。第二，善惡業果位，也就是從無始以來乃至菩薩的金剛心，或者解脫道時，乃至二乘的無餘依涅槃位，稱為毗播迦（Vipāka），這翻譯為異熟識。毗的意思是『異』，播迦是『成熟』的意思。直到沒有所知障的階段。第三，相續執持位，也就是從無始以來乃至如來直到未來際，利益安樂有情的階段，稱為阿陀那（Ādāna），這翻譯為執持，或者稱為心等。長短的界限不超過這三個階段。因為異熟這個名稱也通用於第一個階段，所以論中說『具有多種異熟的性質』，而不說第一個階段，是因為它太狹窄了；不說最後一個階段，是因為它太寬泛了。寬泛和狹窄有什麼事情阻礙了不說呢？這裡的意思是說熏習位的識。如果說寬泛的時候，佛就沒有熏習了，說了也沒有用。如果說狹窄的時候，八地以後還有熏習，就顯得不足。又只是說因有虛妄位，沒有說到佛。所以說異熟識，是具有多種異熟的性質，寬泛和狹窄都合適。又可以分為五個階段：第一，異生位（凡夫位）。第二，二乘有學位。第三，二乘無學位。第四，十地菩薩位。第五，如來位。異熟這個名稱通用於前四個階段，所以說『具有多種異熟的性質』，而不說其他的名稱。又十三位通用於十二位。又七地如樞要所說。

論：第二是思量，乃至恒常審細地思量。

述記：指的是第七識恒常審細地思量。這裡說『恒常』這個詞，是爲了簡別第六識。意識雖然審細地思量，但不是恒常的，因為有間斷。其次，『審細思量』這個詞，又簡別了第八識。第八識雖然恒常，但不是審細思量。

【English Translation】 Therefore, it is to distinguish the meaning, as previously explained.

Treatise: First, it is Vipāka (異熟, ripening), up to having multiple Vipāka natures.

Commentary: Combining to explain the following two sentences. It refers to the first two consciousnesses, and the third consciousness, which should be understood as they truly are. 『Multiple Vipāka』 refers to the fact that the essence of this consciousness has three stages in total: First, the stage of 『I-love clinging』 (我愛執藏現行位), which is only for Bodhisattvas before the seventh ground, Śrāvakas (聲聞) and Pratyekabuddhas (緣覺) who are still learning, and all ordinary beings, from beginningless time, called Ālaya (阿賴耶, storehouse consciousness). Until there is no clinging to persons, this name is 『clinging-storehouse』 (執藏). Second, the stage of good and evil karmic results, which is from beginningless time until the Vajra-like mind of the Bodhisattva, or the time of the path of liberation, even until the Nirupadhisesa-nirvana (無餘依涅槃) of the Two Vehicles, called Vipāka (毗播迦), which is translated as 『ripening consciousness』 (異熟識). 『Vi』 means 『different,』 and 『Pāka』 means 『ripening.』 Until the stage of no cognitive obscurations. Third, the stage of continuous upholding, which is from beginningless time until the Tathāgata (如來) throughout the future, benefiting and bringing happiness to sentient beings, called Ādāna (阿陀那), which is translated as 『upholding,』 or called 『mind,』 etc. The length of the limits does not exceed these three stages. Because the name Vipāka also applies to the first stage, the treatise says 『having multiple Vipāka natures,』 and does not mention the first stage because it is too narrow; it does not mention the last stage because it is too broad. What prevents mentioning the broad and narrow aspects? The meaning here is to speak of the consciousness of the stage of conditioning. If speaking broadly, the Buddha would have no conditioning, and speaking would be useless. If speaking narrowly, there would still be conditioning after the eighth ground, which would be insufficient. Also, it only speaks of the cause having a false stage, and does not speak of the Buddha. Therefore, it says Vipāka consciousness is of multiple Vipāka natures, which is suitable for both broad and narrow aspects. It can also be divided into five stages: First, the stage of ordinary beings. Second, the stage of the Two Vehicles with learning. Third, the stage of the Two Vehicles without learning. Fourth, the stage of the ten-ground Bodhisattvas. Fifth, the stage of the Tathāgata. The name Vipāka applies to the first four stages, so it says 『having multiple Vipāka natures,』 and does not mention other names. Also, the thirteen stages apply to the twelve stages. Also, the seventh ground is as the essentials say.

Treatise: Second, it is thinking, up to constantly and carefully thinking.

Commentary: It refers to the seventh consciousness constantly and carefully thinking. Here, the word 『constant』 is to distinguish the sixth consciousness. Although the consciousness carefully thinks, it is not constant, because it has interruptions. Secondly, the word 『carefully thinking』 also distinguishes the eighth consciousness. Although the eighth consciousness is constant, it does not carefully think.

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審思量。雙簡五識。彼非恒起。非審思故。若言此識實內思量。何故此中不言內者。通無漏說。佛此亦緣外境相故。此恒等言各有所簡。如樞要說。

論。三謂了境至了境相粗故。

述曰。下解第三句也。以前六識同了粗境異七．八故。合為一名　問此前六識亦緣細境。如佛六識等。何故但名粗　答一多分故。二易知故。三諸有情共可悉故。四內．外道皆許有故。五大小乘所極成故。六不共義故。七．八二識不粗了故。此後二識亦通凈名。非所熏故。又互顯故。以上如樞要說。

論。及言顯六合為一種。

述曰。謂前頌言及了別境識。解彼及字。及者合集義。以了境識六種不同。今合為一名爲了境。故言及也。及字雖通相違及等。今顯合集。故解及言。

上來雖別解后三句出能變體。然未解釋能變之義。故今應說。于中有三。初牒烈數。次依標解。后總料簡。

論。此三皆名至能變有二種。

述曰。初牒能變列其數也。束三能變合為二種。即以二義解能變也。

論。一因能變至二因習氣。

述曰。次依標解為二文也。此言因者。即所由故。謂種子也。辨體生現為現行生之所由也。此名唯望現果為名。據理而言應名果變。種及現行所引生故。今望果說現行因故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 審思量：指第六意識的審慮思量作用。雙簡五識：爲了排除前五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）。彼非恒起：前五識不是恒常生起的。非審思故：因為它們沒有審慮思量的作用。若言此識實內思量：如果說這個第六意識實際上是內在的思量。何故此中不言內者：為什麼在這裡不說是『內』思量呢？通無漏說：這是爲了涵蓋無漏的說法。佛此亦緣外境相故：佛的意識也緣外境的相。此恒等言各有所簡：這裡的『恒』等詞各有其簡擇的含義，如《樞要》所說。

論：三謂了境至了境相粗故。

述曰：下面解釋第三句。因為前六識共同了別粗顯的境界，不同於第七識和第八識，所以合為一個名稱。問：此前六識亦緣細境：如果前六識也能緣細微的境界，比如佛的六識等，何故但名粗？答：一、多分故：因為多數情況下是了別粗境。二、易知故：容易被認知。三、諸有情共可悉故：所有有情眾生都能共同瞭解。四、內．外道皆許有故：內道和外道都承認有。五、大小乘所極成故：大小乘都普遍認可。六、不共義故：因為這是不共的含義。七．八二識不粗了故：第七識和第八識不能粗顯地了別境界。此後二識亦通凈名：後面的兩個識也通於清凈的名稱，非所熏故：因為它們不是被薰染的。又互顯故：又因為互相顯現的緣故。以上如《樞要》所說。

論：及言顯六合為一種。

述曰：謂前頌言及了別境識：指的是前面的頌詞中說的『及了別境識』。解彼及字：解釋那個『及』字。及者合集義：『及』是合集的意思。以了境識六種不同：因爲了別境界的識有六種不同。今合為一名爲了境：現在合為一個名稱，稱為『了境』。故言及也：所以說是『及』。及字雖通相違及等：『及』字雖然可以通於相違等含義。今顯合集：現在顯示的是合集的意思。故解及言：所以解釋『及』字。

上來雖別解后三句出能變體：上面雖然分別解釋了後面的三句，顯現了能變的體性。然未解釋能變之義：但是還沒有解釋能變的含義。故今應說：所以現在應該說明。于中有三：其中有三個方面。初牒烈數：首先是列舉數量。次依標解：其次是依據標示來解釋。后總料簡：最後是總體的概括。

論：此三皆名至能變有二種。

述曰：初牒能變列其數也：首先是列舉能變，列出它的數量。束三能變合為二種：將三種能變歸納為兩種。即以二義解能變也：也就是用兩種含義來解釋能變。

論：一因能變至二因習氣。

述曰：次依標解為二文也：其次是依據標示來解釋，分為兩段文字。此言因者：這裡說的『因』。即所由故：就是所由來的緣故。謂種子也：指的是種子。辨體生現為現行生之所由也：辨別體性生起顯現，是現行生起的所由。此名唯望現果為名：這個名稱只是針對現行的果報而說的。據理而言應名果變：按照道理來說，應該稱為『果變』。種及現行所引生故：因為是由種子和現行所引發產生的。今望果說現行因故：現在是針對果報來說，現行是因的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version: 『審思量 (shěn sī liáng)』: Refers to the deliberative thinking function of the sixth consciousness. 『雙簡五識 (shuāng jiǎn wǔ shí)』: To exclude the first five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness). 『彼非恒起 (bǐ fēi héng qǐ)』: The first five consciousnesses do not arise constantly. 『非審思故 (fēi shěn sī gù)』: Because they do not have the function of deliberative thinking. 『若言此識實內思量 (ruò yán cǐ shí shí nèi sī liáng)』: If it is said that this sixth consciousness is actually internal thinking. 『何故此中不言內者 (hé gù cǐ zhōng bù yán nèi zhě)』: Why is it not said to be 『internal』 thinking here? 『通無漏說 (tōng wú lòu shuō)』: This is to cover the description of the un-leaked (unconditioned). 『佛此亦緣外境相故 (fó cǐ yì yuán wài jìng xiāng gù)』: The Buddha's consciousness also cognizes the appearance of external objects. 『此恒等言各有所簡 (cǐ héng děng yán gè yǒu suǒ jiǎn)』: The words 『constant』 and so on each have their selective meanings, as stated in the 『Essentials』.

Treatise: 『三謂了境至了境相粗故 (sān wèi liǎo jìng zhì liǎo jìng xiāng cū gù).』

Commentary: The following explains the third sentence. Because the first six consciousnesses commonly cognize coarse realms, differing from the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, they are combined into one name. Question: 『此前六識亦緣細境 (cǐ qián liù shí yì yuán xì jìng)』: If the first six consciousnesses can also cognize subtle realms, such as the Buddha's six consciousnesses, why are they only called coarse? Answer: 1. 『多分故 (dà fēn gù)』: Because they mostly cognize coarse realms. 2. 『易知故 (yì zhī gù)』: Because they are easy to be known. 3. 『諸有情共可悉故 (zhū yǒu qíng gòng kě xī gù)』: Because all sentient beings can commonly understand them. 4. 『內．外道皆許有故 (nèi.wài dào jiē xǔ yǒu gù)』: Because both internal and external paths acknowledge their existence. 5. 『大小乘所極成故 (dà xiǎo shèng suǒ jí chéng gù)』: Because both the Great and Small Vehicles universally acknowledge them. 6. 『不共義故 (bù gòng yì gù)』: Because this is a non-common meaning. 7. 『七．八二識不粗了故 (qī.bā èr shí bù cū liǎo gù)』: Because the seventh and eighth consciousnesses cannot coarsely cognize realms. 『此後二識亦通凈名 (cǐ hòu èr shí yì tōng jìng míng)』: The latter two consciousnesses also relate to pure names, 『非所熏故 (fēi suǒ xūn gù)』: because they are not perfumed. 『又互顯故 (yòu hù xiǎn gù)』: Also, because they manifest each other. The above is as stated in the 『Essentials』.

Treatise: 『及言顯六合為一種 (jí yán xiǎn liù hé wèi yī zhǒng).』

Commentary: 『謂前頌言及了別境識 (wèi qián sòng yán jí liǎo bié jìng shí)』: Refers to the previous verse saying 『and the consciousnesses that cognize realms』. 『解彼及字 (jiě bǐ jí zì)』: Explains that word 『及 (jí)』. 『及者合集義 (jí zhě hé jí yì)』: 『及 (jí)』 means to combine and collect. 『以了境識六種不同 (yǐ liǎo jìng shí liù zhǒng bù tóng)』: Because the consciousnesses that cognize realms are six different types. 『今合為一名爲了境 (jīn hé wèi yī míng wèi liǎo jìng)』: Now they are combined into one name, called 『cognizing realms』. 『故言及也 (gù yán jí yě)』: Therefore, it is said 『及 (jí)』. 『及字雖通相違及等 (jí zì suī tōng xiāng wéi jí děng)』: Although the word 『及 (jí)』 can relate to contradictory meanings, etc. 『今顯合集 (jīn xiǎn hé jí)』: Now it shows the meaning of combining and collecting. 『故解及言 (gù jiě jí yán)』: Therefore, it explains the word 『及 (jí)』.

Although the above separately explains the latter three sentences, revealing the nature of the transformer, the meaning of the transformation has not yet been explained. Therefore, it should be explained now. There are three aspects to this: first, listing the numbers; second, explaining according to the labels; and third, providing a general summary.

Treatise: 『此三皆名至能變有二種 (cǐ sān jiē míng zhì néng biàn yǒu èr zhǒng).』

Commentary: 『初牒能變列其數也 (chū dié néng biàn liè qí shù yě)』: First, it lists the transformers, listing their numbers. 『束三能變合為二種 (shù sān néng biàn hé wèi èr zhǒng)』: The three transformers are summarized into two types. 『即以二義解能變也 (jí yǐ èr yì jiě néng biàn yě)』: That is, using two meanings to explain the transformation.

Treatise: 『一因能變至二因習氣 (yī yīn néng biàn zhì èr yīn xí qì).』

Commentary: 『次依標解為二文也 (cì yī biāo jiě wèi èr wén yě)』: Second, it explains according to the labels, dividing it into two sections of text. 『此言因者 (cǐ yán yīn zhě)』: The 『cause』 mentioned here. 『即所由故 (jí suǒ yóu gù)』: Is the reason for something. 『謂種子也 (wèi zhǒng zi yě)』: Refers to the seeds. 『辨體生現為現行生之所由也 (biàn tǐ shēng xiàn wèi xiàn xíng shēng zhī suǒ yóu yě)』: Distinguishing the arising of the nature is the reason for the arising of the present activity. 『此名唯望現果為名 (cǐ míng wéi wàng xiàn guǒ wèi míng)』: This name is only named in relation to the present result. 『據理而言應名果變 (jù lǐ ér yán yīng míng guǒ biàn)』: According to reason, it should be called 『result transformation』. 『種及現行所引生故 (zhǒng jí xiàn xíng suǒ yǐn shēng gù)』: Because it is caused by the seeds and present activities. 『今望果說現行因故 (jīn wàng guǒ shuō xiàn xíng yīn gù)』: Now, in relation to the result, the present activity is said to be the cause.

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變者。是轉變義。在三能變初異熟中。顯所依止能持之識。所有等流．異熟二種習氣是也。言習氣者。是現氣分。熏習所成故名習氣。自性親因名等流種。異性招感名異熟種。一切種子二種攝盡。士用．增上。於此二中假施設立故不說之。謂因即能變名因能變。謂此二因能轉變。生后自類種同類現行。及異熟果故。

論。等流習氣至熏令生長。

述曰。不以等流所變之果顯其自性。但舉等流能變之因以顯自體。義顯所生通諸有漏三性之法。各自種子所引八識。各．各自果名言種子是也。等謂相似。流謂流類。即此種子與果性同。相似名等。果是彼類名之為流。即從等所流。從因為名。故名等流。即等之流。依士釋也。即名言熏習種子。是等流之習氣。名等流習氣。等流非因名。故等流習氣非持業釋。以第八識不能熏故。唯說七生。七唯無記。六通三性。

論。異熟習氣至熏令生長。

述曰。前等流因是因緣種。其所生果即通八識種。此異熟因增上緣種。即是有分熏習種子。不以所生異熟之果顯其因性。但舉此因能變之因以彰自體。義顯所生除第七識。可通余識。及五蘊等無記之法此體唯通善．惡二性。果唯無記。前因因．果皆通三性。第七識唯無記。非異熟因。勢力羸劣不感果也。此非異

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『變』指的是轉變的含義。在三種能變中，初能變（阿賴耶識）的異熟能變中，顯示了作為所依止和能持之識的阿賴耶識所具有的等流習氣和異熟習氣。所謂的『習氣』，是現行氣分熏習所形成的，因此稱為習氣。自性親因稱為等流種，異性招感稱為異熟種。一切種子都被這兩種習氣所涵蓋。士用和增上，在這兩種習氣中只是假立的，所以不單獨說明。也就是說，因即是能變，稱為因能變。這兩種因能夠轉變，產生後來的同類種子和同類現行，以及異熟果報。

論：等流習氣乃至熏習令其生長。

述記：不以等流所變的果來顯示其自性，只是舉出等流能變的因來顯示其自體。意義上顯示了所生之果可以通於各種有漏的三性之法。各自的種子所引生的八識，各自的果，也就是名言種子。等，指的是相似；流，指的是流類。也就是這種種子和果的性質相同，相似稱為『等』，果是它的同類稱為『流』。即從『等』所流出。從因的角度命名，所以稱為等流。也就是『等』的流出，這是依士釋。也就是名言熏習的種子，是等流的習氣，稱為等流習氣。等流不是因的名字，所以等流習氣不是持業釋。因為第八識不能熏習，所以只說七識產生。七識只有無記性，六識可以通於三性。

論：異熟習氣乃至熏習令其生長。

述記：前面的等流因是因緣種，它所產生的果可以通於八識的種子。這裡的異熟因是增上緣種，也就是有分熏習的種子。不以所生的異熟果來顯示它的因性，只是舉出這個因能夠轉變的因來彰顯它的自體。意義上顯示了所生的果除了第七識之外，可以通於其他的識，以及五蘊等無記之法。這個本體只通于善和惡二性，果只有無記性。前面的因，它的因和果都通於三性。第七識只有無記性，不是異熟因，因為它的勢力微弱，不能感果。這並非異熟。

【English Translation】 English version: 『Transformation』 refers to the meaning of change. Among the three kinds of transformation, in the Vipāka (matured result) transformation of the initial transformation (Ālaya-vijñāna), it reveals the two types of habit energies (vāsanā) that the Ālaya-vijñāna, as the supported and sustaining consciousness, possesses: the habit energy of Equable Flow (niṣyanda-vāsanā) and the habit energy of Matured Result (vipāka-vāsanā). The so-called 『habit energy』 refers to that which is formed by the perfuming of the present active elements (vartamāna-dhātu), hence it is called habit energy. The direct cause of self-nature is called the Equable Flow seed, and the dissimilar cause that invites the result is called the Matured Result seed. All seeds are encompassed by these two types of habit energies. Efficient Cause (kāritra) and Augmenting Condition (vardhana) are merely provisionally established within these two, so they are not discussed separately. That is to say, the cause is the transformer, called the cause-transformer. These two causes are capable of transforming and producing later seeds of the same kind and active manifestations of the same kind, as well as the matured result.

Treatise: The habit energy of Equable Flow, up to the point of perfuming and causing growth.

Commentary: It does not reveal its self-nature by the fruit transformed by the Equable Flow, but only cites the cause that the Equable Flow is capable of transforming to reveal its own substance. In meaning, it reveals that the produced fruit can extend to all conditioned dharmas of the three natures (tri-svabhāva). The eight consciousnesses produced by their respective seeds, their respective fruits, are the seeds of verbal expression (nāma-rūpa-bīja). 『Equable』 refers to similarity; 『Flow』 refers to category. That is, this seed and the nature of the fruit are the same; similarity is called 『Equable,』 and the fruit is of its kind, called 『Flow.』 That is, flowing from the 『Equable.』 Named from the perspective of the cause, hence it is called Equable Flow. That is, the flow of the 『Equable,』 which is interpreted based on the agent. That is, the seed of verbal expression perfuming is the habit energy of Equable Flow, called the habit energy of Equable Flow. Equable Flow is not the name of a cause, so the habit energy of Equable Flow is not a possessive compound. Because the eighth consciousness cannot perfume, it is only said that the seven consciousnesses arise. The seven consciousnesses only have the nature of neutral (neither good nor bad), while the six consciousnesses can extend to the three natures.

Treatise: The habit energy of Matured Result, up to the point of perfuming and causing growth.

Commentary: The preceding cause of Equable Flow is the causal seed (hetu-bīja), and the fruit it produces can extend to the seeds of the eight consciousnesses. This cause of Matured Result is the augmenting condition seed (adhipati-pratyaya-bīja), which is the seed of the life continuum (bhavaṅga) perfuming. It does not reveal its causal nature by the matured result it produces, but only cites the cause that this cause is capable of transforming to manifest its own substance. In meaning, it reveals that the produced fruit, except for the seventh consciousness (kliṣṭa-manas), can extend to the other consciousnesses, as well as the neutral dharmas such as the five aggregates (pañca-skandha). This substance only extends to the two natures of good and evil, and the fruit only has the nature of neutral. The preceding cause, its cause and fruit, all extend to the three natures. The seventh consciousness only has the nature of neutral and is not a cause of Matured Result because its power is weak and cannot produce a result. This is not a matured result.

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熟。有覆性故。第八不能熏。此中皆不說。明因能變。即是種子轉變生果。果通種子。及與現行。自類種子亦相生故。瑜伽第五種子七義云。與他性為因。亦與后念自性為因。非即此剎那。舉因能熏。意顯七識等諸現行法。亦名為因。亦名能變。故二習氣各舉能熏。諸因緣體辨體生果者。名因能變故。轉變之義通現．種也。種因變唯在第八。現因變通餘七識。不說我見熏習種子。離此二外無別體故。于名言中別離出故。不能別招後果生故　言異熟者。如前已釋。異熟習氣。唯依士釋。果是異熟。因名習氣。故第八唯果變而非因。種子因變而非果。現七識亦因亦果能變。前六識中異熟無記心等。同第八識唯果能變。非能熏故。至下當知　問既說現行為因能變。種子何故非果能變。對誰名因。答此中果變。謂有緣法能變現義。故種子非。若體是果而能轉變。種子亦是。今論但說有八識生現種種相。故知。但說現行果法名果能變。由以變現名能變故。種子但以轉變名變。三熏習等下自當說。

論。二果能變至現種種相。

述曰。即前二因所生現果。謂有緣法能變現者名果能變。非因所生皆名為果。不爾種子應名果變。自相生故。此果能變即自證分能變現生見．相分果。此言變者與前不同。是有緣變。變現為義。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 熟。因為具有覆蓋性。第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）不能被熏習。這裡都沒有說到。闡明因能變，就是種子轉變產生果。果包括種子，以及現行（現在發生的行為）。因為同類的種子也會相互產生。瑜伽第五卷中關於種子的七個含義說：『與其他自性作為因，也與后唸的自性作為因，並非就是此剎那。』舉出因能熏習，意在表明第七識等各種現行法，也稱為因，也稱為能變。所以兩種習氣各自舉出能熏。各種因緣的本體辨別本體產生果，稱為因能變。所以轉變的意義貫通現行和種子。種子因變只在第八識。現行因變貫通其餘七識。不說我見熏習種子，因為離開這二者之外沒有別的本體。在名言中分別出來，不能分別招感後果的產生。說到異熟，如前面已經解釋。異熟習氣，只依據士（果報的承受者）來解釋。果是異熟，因名為習氣。所以第八識只是果變而不是因。種子是因變而不是果。現在的七識既是因也是果，能夠轉變。前六識中異熟無記心等，與第八識相同，只是果能變，不能熏習。到下面應當知道。問：既然說現行作為因能變，種子為什麼不是果能變？對誰來說是因？答：這裡說的果變，是指有緣法能夠變現的意義。所以種子不是。如果本體是果而能夠轉變，種子也是。現在討論只是說有八識產生現在的種種相。所以知道，只是說現行果法名為果能變。因為以變現稱為能變。三種熏習等下面自然會說。

論：二果能變至現種種相。

述記說：就是前面兩種因所產生的現果。所謂有緣法能夠變現的稱為果能變。不是因所產生的都稱為果。否則種子應該稱為果變，因為自身相互產生。這個果能變就是自證分能夠變現產生見分和相分的果。這裡說的『變』與前面不同。是有緣的變，變現為意義。

【English Translation】 English version Mature. Because it has the nature of covering. The eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) cannot be perfumed. All of this is not discussed here. Clarifying that the cause can transform means that the seed transforms to produce the effect. The effect includes the seed and the present action (current behavior). Because seeds of the same kind also produce each other. The fifth volume of the Yoga Sutra says about the seven meanings of seeds: 'Taking other natures as the cause, and also taking the nature of subsequent thoughts as the cause, not just this moment.' Mentioning that the cause can perfume, the intention is to show that the various present actions of the seventh consciousness, etc., are also called causes and can also be transformed. Therefore, the two kinds of habits each mention the ability to perfume. The body of various causes and conditions distinguishes the body to produce the effect, which is called the cause can transform. Therefore, the meaning of transformation runs through the present action and the seed. The seed cause transformation is only in the eighth consciousness. The present action cause transformation runs through the remaining seven consciousnesses. It is not said that the seed of the perfuming of self-view, because there is no other body apart from these two. Separated in name, it cannot separately attract the production of subsequent effects. Speaking of different ripening, as has been explained before. Different ripening habits are only explained based on the person (the recipient of karmic retribution). The effect is different ripening, and the cause is called habit. Therefore, the eighth consciousness is only the effect transformation but not the cause. The seed is the cause transformation but not the effect. The present seven consciousnesses are both the cause and the effect, and can be transformed. Among the first six consciousnesses, the indifferent and unmarked mind of different ripening, etc., is the same as the eighth consciousness, only the effect can be transformed, and cannot be perfumed. It should be known below. Question: Since it is said that the present action can be transformed as the cause, why is the seed not the effect can be transformed? To whom is it the cause? Answer: The effect transformation mentioned here refers to the meaning that the conditioned dharma can transform. Therefore, the seed is not. If the body is the effect and can be transformed, the seed is also. Now the discussion only says that there are eight consciousnesses that produce the present various appearances. So I know, it only says that the present action effect dharma is called the effect can transform. Because it is called 'can transform' by transforming. The three kinds of perfuming will be said naturally below.

Treatise: The second effect can transform to the present various appearances.

The commentary says: It is the present effect produced by the previous two causes. The so-called conditioned dharma that can transform is called the effect can transform. Not everything produced by the cause is called the effect. Otherwise, the seed should be called the effect transformation, because they produce each other. This effect can transform is the self-proving part that can transform to produce the effect of the seeing part and the appearance part. The 'transformation' mentioned here is different from the previous one. It is the transformation of conditioned, and transformation is the meaning.

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識中種子果之所變。識所緣故。由前等流能變力故。八識三性因緣果生。由前異熟能變力故。除第七識余之七識無記果生。舉因顯果。無記之法體性羸劣。要等流．異熟二因所生名果能變。余則不爾　種種相者。顯相應等見．相分法。五蘊非一言種種也。若種子唯轉變名變。若第八識唯變現名變。若能熏七識得二變名。此前所說並在因位有漏之心。若在因位無漏之種。唯第六．七種及現行。唯有等流因果能變。若佛果位八識現行。唯有等流果能變攝。以在果位不熏習故。其諸種子名因能變。生自類種。及現行故。三界具幾如理應思。

論。等流習氣至差別而生。

述曰。后總料簡。前因能變等流習氣。習氣者種子也。必有其果。未知生何。如何生果。能起何果。即有三義。今顯所生通於八識能為因緣生八識也。體。謂體性。相。謂相狀。自證．見．相俱名為識。

論。名等流果果似因故。

述曰。顯是何果。釋等流義。為因緣生。因緣之法必同性故。

論。異熟習氣至立異熟名。

述曰。前因能變中言異熟習氣。既是種子。未知生何。如何生果。能起何果。今顯增上緣生不親生故。所生真異熟者唯第八識。增上緣生性不同故。唯第八識是總果故。是果之主余果方生。主引生故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『識』（vijñāna）中種子所變現的果。『識』所緣的緣故，由前一刻的等流（niṣyanda-phala）所具有的能變現的力量的緣故，第八識的三種性質（善、惡、無記）由因緣果而生。由前一刻的異熟（vipāka）所具有的能變現的力量的緣故，除了第七識之外，其餘七個識產生無記的果。這是舉因來顯示果。無記的法，其體性羸弱，需要等流和異熟兩種因所生，才能稱為果的能變。其餘情況則不是這樣。種種相，顯示與『識』相應的見分、相分等法。五蘊不是單一的，所以說是種種。如果種子只是轉變，就稱為『變』。如果第八識只是變現，就稱為『變』。如果能熏習的七個識得到兩種『變』的名稱。以上所說都是在因位的有漏之心。如果在因位的無漏種子，只有第六識、第七識的種子和現行，只有等流因果的能變。如果佛果位的八識現行，只有等流果的能變所攝，因為在果位不再熏習的緣故。那些種子稱為因能變，因為它們能生出同類的種子和現行。三界中具備幾種能變，應該如理思維。

論：等流習氣達到差別而生。

述曰：後面總括地簡別。前面說的因能變中的等流習氣，習氣就是種子。必定有它的果。不知道生出什麼。如何生果。能生起什麼果。即有三種含義。現在顯示所生通於八識，能作為因緣生八識的體、相。體，指的是體性。相，指的是相狀。自證分、見分、相分都稱為識。

論：名為等流果，果相似於因的緣故。

述曰：顯示這是什麼果。解釋等流的含義。作為因緣所生，因緣之法必定是同性質的緣故。

論：異熟習氣達到建立異熟之名。

述曰：前面因能變中說的異熟習氣，既然是種子，不知道生出什麼。如何生果。能生起什麼果。現在顯示增上緣所生，不是親生的緣故。所生的真正的異熟果只有第八識。增上緣所生的性質不同。只有第八識是總果的緣故。是果的主體，其餘的果才能產生。因為主體引導產生。

【English Translation】 English version The fruit transformed from the seeds within 『consciousness』 (vijñāna). Because of what 『consciousness』 cognizes, and due to the power of transformation inherent in the preceding 『result of equable flow』 (niṣyanda-phala), the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) of the eighth consciousness arise from cause, condition, and effect. Due to the power of transformation inherent in the preceding 『result of maturation』 (vipāka), the seven consciousnesses, excluding the seventh, produce neutral results. This illustrates the result by mentioning the cause. The nature of neutral dharmas is weak and requires the production of both the 『equable flow』 and 『maturation』 causes to be called the transformative power of the result. Other cases are not like this. 『Various appearances』 manifest the 『seeing division』 (darśana-bhāga), 『appearance division』 (nimitta-bhāga), and other dharmas that correspond to 『consciousness』. The five aggregates are not singular, hence the term 『various』. If a seed only undergoes change, it is called 『transformation』. If the eighth consciousness only manifests, it is called 『transformation』. If the seven consciousnesses that can be perfumed obtain two names of 『transformation』. What has been said above all refers to the defiled mind in the causal stage. If it is a non-defiled seed in the causal stage, only the seeds and present activity of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses have the transformative power of the 『equable flow』 cause and result. If it is the present activity of the eight consciousnesses in the Buddha's fruition stage, it is only encompassed by the transformative power of the 『equable flow』 result because there is no further perfuming in the fruition stage. Those seeds are called the transformative power of the cause because they can produce seeds of the same kind and present activity. One should contemplate how many transformations are present in the three realms according to reason.

Treatise: The habit-energy of equable flow leads to differentiation and arises.

Commentary: The following is a general and concise distinction. The habit-energy of equable flow in the aforementioned causal transformation, habit-energy is the seed. There must be its result. It is not known what it produces. How does it produce the result? What result can it generate? There are three meanings. Now it is shown that what is produced is common to the eight consciousnesses and can serve as the cause and condition for the arising of the eight consciousnesses. 『Substance』 refers to the nature. 『Appearance』 refers to the characteristics. The self-cognition division, seeing division, and appearance division are all called consciousness.

Treatise: It is called the result of equable flow because the result is similar to the cause.

Commentary: This shows what kind of result it is. It explains the meaning of equable flow. As it is produced by cause and condition, the dharmas of cause and condition must be of the same nature.

Treatise: The habit-energy of maturation leads to the establishment of the name 『maturation』.

Commentary: The aforementioned habit-energy of maturation in the causal transformation, since it is a seed, it is not known what it produces. How does it produce the result? What result can it generate? Now it is shown that it is produced by the dominant condition, not directly produced. The true result of maturation that is produced is only the eighth consciousness. The nature of what is produced by the dominant condition is different. Only the eighth consciousness is the total result. It is the master of the result, and other results can then arise because the master leads to their production.

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由強勝業引總果故。余別弱業方能生果。據其勝業名引。引餘業生故。報亦名引。引余果故。業勝名引。果無間故說恒相續。由恒相續。及是引果立果熟名。余法亦爾。

論。感前六識至有間斷故。

述曰。顯異熟因所生未盡。即明亦感前之六識。俱增上緣。此是別果。故業名滿。引如作模。滿如填彩。以此六識從第八識真異熟起名異熟生。以非是主。有間斷故。不名真異熟。成圓果事。具足果事。名之為滿。亦通因果皆有滿義。業勝名滿。

論。即前異熟至果異因故。

述曰。釋生何果。言異熟果。及釋異熟。因是善．惡果無記故。別從總稱二種俱名為異熟果。即由如前所說理故。其第七識非異熟種之所引生。因位唯染。果無漏故　問六識報者非直異熟名異熟生者。善等三性法應名異熟生。並從真實異熟起故　答曰。不然。對法第五說。若法是異熟。從異熟起者名異熟生。善等唯從彼起。不是異熟故不名異熟生　若爾即真異熟從自前念．及種起故。應名異熟生。合具二義故。答曰。可然。如瑜伽六十三有心地。廣說如彼。今應義釋。若法異熟從異熟起。無間斷遍者名為異熟。名異熟生。若法異熟從異熟起。有間不遍者名異熟生。不名異熟。若法非異熟。有間不遍。雖從異熟起。不名異熟。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由於強大的業力能夠引導產生總的果報，其餘較弱的業力才能產生個別的果報。根據其強大的業力，稱之為『引』（能夠引導）。因為它能引導其餘的業力產生果報，所以果報也稱為『引』（能夠引導）。業力強大稱為『引』，因為果報沒有間斷，所以說恒常相續。由於恒常相續，以及這是引導的果報，所以建立『果熟』的名稱。其餘的法也是如此。

論：感受前六識，乃至有間斷的緣故。

述記：顯示異熟因所生的果報尚未窮盡，即是說也感受前六識，都是增上緣。這是個別的果報，所以業力稱為『滿』（圓滿）。『引』就像製作模具，『滿』就像在模具中填塗色彩。這六識從第八識（阿賴耶識）的真實異熟生起，稱為『異熟生』。因為它們不是主要的，有間斷的緣故，所以不稱為真實的異熟。成就圓滿的果報之事，具足果報之事，稱之為『滿』。『滿』也通用於因和果，都有圓滿的含義。業力強大稱為『滿』。

論：即是前述的異熟，乃至果報與因不同之故。

述記：解釋產生什麼果報。說是異熟果，並且解釋異熟，因為因是善、惡，果是無記的緣故。從總的方面來說，兩種都稱為異熟果。即是由於如前所說的道理，第七識（末那識）不是由異熟種子所引導產生的，因位只有染污，果位沒有染污。問：六識的果報，不直接稱為異熟，而稱為異熟生，那麼善等三種性質的法，也應該稱為異熟生，因為它們都是從真實的異熟生起的。答：不是這樣的。《對法論》第五說，如果法是異熟，並且是從異熟生起的，才稱為異熟生。善等只是從異熟生起，不是異熟，所以不稱為異熟生。如果這樣，那麼真實的異熟，從自身前念以及種子生起，應該稱為異熟生，因為它同時具備兩種含義。答：可以這樣認為。如《瑜伽師地論》第六十三卷有心地中，廣泛地說明了這一點。現在應該從義理上解釋，如果法是異熟，並且是從異熟生起，沒有間斷且普遍存在，那麼稱為異熟，不稱為異熟生。如果法是異熟，並且是從異熟生起，有間斷且不普遍存在，那麼稱為異熟生，不稱為異熟。如果法不是異熟，有間斷且不普遍存在，即使是從異熟生起，也不稱為異熟。

【English Translation】 English version: Because a strong karma can lead to the production of a general result, other weaker karmas can then produce individual results. Based on its strong karma, it is called 'hetu' (cause, able to lead). Because it can lead other karmas to produce results, the result is also called 'hetu' (cause, able to lead). Strong karma is called 'hetu' because the result is without interruption, so it is said to be constantly continuous. Because of constant continuity, and because this is the result that is led, the name 'result maturation' is established. Other dharmas are also like this.

Treatise: Experiencing the first six consciousnesses, even to the point of having interruptions.

Commentary: Showing that the result produced by the ripening cause has not yet been exhausted, that is, also experiencing the first six consciousnesses, all of which are supporting conditions. This is an individual result, so the karma is called 'full' (complete). 'Hetu' is like making a mold, 'full' is like filling the mold with colors. These six consciousnesses arise from the true ripening of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), and are called 'ripening-born'. Because they are not primary and have interruptions, they are not called true ripening. Accomplishing the matter of a complete result, possessing the matter of a result, is called 'full'. 'Full' also applies to both cause and result, both having the meaning of completeness. Strong karma is called 'full'.

Treatise: That is, the aforementioned ripening, even to the point that the result is different from the cause.

Commentary: Explaining what result is produced. It is said to be the ripening result, and explaining ripening, because the cause is good or evil, and the result is neutral. From a general perspective, both are called ripening results. That is, due to the reason stated earlier, the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñāna) is not led and produced by a ripening seed; in the causal stage, it is only defiled, and in the result stage, it is not defiled. Question: The result of the six consciousnesses is not directly called ripening, but is called ripening-born, then dharmas of the three natures, such as good, should also be called ripening-born, because they all arise from true ripening. Answer: It is not like that. The fifth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa says that if a dharma is ripening and arises from ripening, it is called ripening-born. Good, etc., only arise from ripening, and are not ripening, so they are not called ripening-born. If that is the case, then true ripening, arising from its own previous moment and seed, should be called ripening-born, because it possesses both meanings. Answer: That is acceptable. As the sixty-third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra has a section on the mind-ground, which explains this extensively. Now it should be explained from the perspective of meaning: if a dharma is ripening and arises from ripening, without interruption and is pervasive, then it is called ripening, not ripening-born. If a dharma is ripening and arises from ripening, with interruption and is not pervasive, then it is called ripening-born, not ripening. If a dharma is not ripening, with interruption and is not pervasive, even if it arises from ripening, it is not called ripening.

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不名異熟生。若法有漏依異熟者。可名異熟生。不名異熟。有漏種子皆名異熟生。由是無漏種子不名異熟生。非有漏不同性故若法有為依異熟有。不名異熟。名異熟生。因中無漏併名異熟生。故五十七云。二十二根一切皆有異熟種子。由是佛果諸無漏法非異熟生。若法緣合與本性別變異。而熟果始能生。名異熟生。即一切有為皆異熟生。故具知根名異熟生。佛果無漏諸有為法。皆名異熟生。今五義中取第一義。唯第八識。不取于余。

論。此中且說至非謂一切。

述曰。雖異熟果通七識有。今初能變唯真異熟。我所藏故。持染種故。名真異熟。非說一切業所感者皆初能變。持雜染種。即顯善．惡業果名識。能變果識者。顯此非是能變之中因能變也。不能熏故。我愛執藏。顯初名也。言異熟者。或異時而熟。或變易而熟。或異類而熟。或異熟因所招名異熟果。前二無文解。第三．第四依士釋。或持業釋。異熟即果故。然下十因得五果處。彼自料簡故今不述。如第八卷。此中所言異熟生者。一切色法非第八品亦異熟生。此但舉心。心為勝故。

論。雖已略說至其相云何。

述曰。初一三判本頌云。前二十四頌。明唯識相。于中有二。初一頌半略釋外難。略標識相。如上說訖。下有二十二行頌半。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不稱為『異熟』（Vipāka，果報）。如果某種法是有染污的，並且依賴於異熟果而生起，可以稱為『異熟生』。但不稱為『異熟』。有染污的種子都稱為『異熟生』。因此，無染污的種子不稱為『異熟生』，因為它們與有染污的種子性質不同。如果某種法是有為法，並且依賴於異熟果而存在，不稱為『異熟』，而稱為『異熟生』。因地中的無漏法都稱為『異熟生』。所以《五十七》中說，二十二根一切都有異熟種子。因此，佛果的各種無漏法不是異熟生。如果某種法因緣和合，與本來的性質發生變異，成熟的果實才能夠產生，就稱為『異熟生』，即一切有為法都是異熟生。所以，完全瞭解根就稱為異熟生。佛果的無漏有為法，都稱為異熟生。現在五種意義中取第一種意義，唯有第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）。不取其他的。

論：這裡只是說到『至非謂一切』。

述記：雖然異熟果通於七識都有，現在最初的能變唯有真實的異熟。因為它是『我所』執藏之處，持有染污的種子，所以稱為『真異熟』。不是說一切業所感得的都是最初的能變。持有雜染的種子，就顯示善業和惡業的果報名為識，能夠變成果識。顯示這並非是能變之中的因能變，因為它不能熏習。『我愛執藏』，顯示最初的名稱。說到『異熟』，或者異時而成熟，或者變易而成熟，或者異類而成熟，或者由異熟因所招感的稱為異熟果。前兩種沒有經文解釋，第三種和第四種依據士釋，或者持業釋。異熟就是果。然而，在下面的十因得五果之處，那裡有詳細的辨析，所以現在不敘述，如第八卷。這裡所說的異熟生，一切色法不是第八識的品類，也是異熟生。這裡只是舉心為例，因為心是殊勝的。

論：雖然已經簡略地說過，但它的相是什麼呢？

述記：最初用一頌半和三頌來判斷本頌說：前面的二十四頌，說明唯識的相。其中有兩部分。最初一頌半簡略地解釋外人的疑問，簡略地標明體相，如上面所說完畢。下面有二十二行頌半。

【English Translation】 English version It is not called 'Vipāka' (異熟, fruition). If a dharma is tainted and arises dependent on Vipāka, it can be called 'Vipākaja' (異熟生, born of fruition). But it is not called 'Vipāka'. Tainted seeds are all called 'Vipākaja'. Therefore, untainted seeds are not called 'Vipākaja' because they are different in nature from tainted seeds. If a dharma is conditioned and exists dependent on Vipāka, it is not called 'Vipāka', but is called 'Vipākaja'. Untainted dharmas in the causal stage are all called 'Vipākaja'. Therefore, it is said in the 'Fifty-Seven' that all twenty-two faculties have Vipāka seeds. Therefore, the various untainted dharmas of the Buddha-fruit are not Vipākaja. If a dharma arises from the combination of conditions, and its original nature changes, and the mature fruit can then arise, it is called 'Vipākaja', that is, all conditioned dharmas are Vipākaja. Therefore, fully understanding the faculties is called Vipākaja. The untainted conditioned dharmas of the Buddha-fruit are all called Vipākaja. Now, among the five meanings, we take the first meaning, only the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness). We do not take the others.

Treatise: Here, it only speaks of 'to not mean everything'.

Commentary: Although Vipāka fruits are common to all seven consciousnesses, now the initial transformation is only true Vipāka. Because it is the place where 'self' is clung to and stored, and it holds tainted seeds, it is called 'true Vipāka'. It is not saying that everything produced by karma is the initial transformation. Holding defiled seeds shows that the result of good and bad karma is called consciousness, which can transform into fruit-consciousness. This shows that this is not the causal transformation among the transformations, because it cannot be perfumed. 'Clinging to and storing self-love' shows the initial name. Speaking of 'Vipāka', it either matures at a different time, or matures through transformation, or matures as a different kind, or what is summoned by the Vipāka cause is called the Vipāka fruit. The first two have no textual explanation, the third and fourth are based on the explanation of the agent, or the explanation of holding the action. Vipāka is the fruit. However, in the place where the ten causes obtain five fruits below, there is a detailed analysis there, so it is not described now, as in the eighth volume. What is said here as Vipākaja, all form dharmas are not of the category of the eighth consciousness, and are also Vipākaja. Here, it is only given as an example of the mind, because the mind is superior.

Treatise: Although it has been briefly said, what is its characteristic?

Commentary: Initially, one verse and a half and three verses are used to judge the original verses, saying: The preceding twenty-four verses explain the characteristics of Vijñāptimātratā (唯識, Consciousness-only). There are two parts in it. The initial one verse and a half briefly explains the questions of outsiders, and briefly indicates the characteristics, as has been said above. Below there are twenty-two lines and a half of verses.

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廣明識相。于中有三。初有十四行頌半。廣前下三句頌。明三種能變識相。次有一頌正辨唯識。廣前彼依識所變。下有七頌。廣前上二句頌。釋諸妨難。

問頌文何故如是次第　答曰。宗明唯識。若不了知能變識體。何以能解法皆識變。雖了能變．及法唯識。義猶未盡。理更須彰。故為三段如是次第。復于能變十四半頌中。初有二行半頌。解異熟識初能變相。次有三行頌。明思量識第二能變。後有九頌。釋了境識第三能變。依境．行．果判文準此。世俗諦中分判之故　又三釋云。論有三分。上一頌半。略標離心無別我法。辨識相訖。次有二十三行頌半。廣明唯識若相．若性。釋諸妨難。此中有三。初有十五頌半。廣解唯識若相．若性等。廣顯下四句。次有七頌。釋諸妨難。廣顯上二句。後有一頌。明唯識性。初一頌半。所明是所執無。依他有。今明圓成性。此廣之中然初二段。宗明依他世俗諦理。后之一段。宗明圓成勝義諦理。就初十五頌半廣明唯識中有二。先以十四頌半辨三能變。次有一頌正解唯識能變之義　辨三能變中。初二頌半解初能變。初中有二。初結前生后以發論端。次依所問舉頌正答。此即初也。準下長行釋即分為二。初釋頌文廣明三能變。第二總為分別八識一．異等義。

論。頌曰初阿賴

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 廣明識相（詳細闡述各種識的體相）。其中分為三部分。首先是十四行半的頌文，詳細解釋了前面三句頌文，闡明三種能變識的體相。其次有一頌，正面辨析唯識（一切法皆是識所變現的道理），詳細解釋了前面『彼依識所變』。最後有七頌，詳細解釋了前面兩句頌文，解釋各種妨難。

問：頌文為何如此安排順序？答：因為宗旨是闡明唯識，如果不瞭解能變識的體性，如何能夠理解一切法都是識的變現？即使瞭解了能變識以及法皆是唯識，其意義仍然沒有窮盡，道理更需要彰顯。所以分為三個段落，如此安排順序。又在能變的十四行半頌文中，最初有兩行半頌文，解釋異熟識（阿賴耶識）最初的能變之相。其次有三行頌文，闡明思量識（末那識）第二能變。最後有九頌，解釋了境識（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意識）第三能變。依據所緣境、行相、結果來判斷文句，依據世俗諦進行分判。又三種解釋說，論有三個部分。前面一頌半，簡略標明離心之外沒有別的我法。辨析識相完畢。其次有二十三行頌半，詳細闡明唯識的體相和性質，解釋各種妨難。這其中分為三部分。首先有十五頌半，詳細解釋唯識的體相和性質等等，詳細闡明下面四句。其次有七頌，解釋各種妨難，詳細闡明上面兩句。最後有一頌，闡明唯識的體性。最初一頌半，所闡明的是所執無（遍計所執性），依他有（依他起性）。現在闡明圓成性（圓成實性）。在這個詳細闡述中，前面的兩個部分，闡明依他世俗諦的道理。後面的一個部分，闡明圓成勝義諦的道理。在最初的十五頌半詳細闡明唯識中，分為兩部分。先用十四頌半辨析三種能變，其次有一頌正面解釋唯識能變的意義。在辨析三種能變中，最初兩頌半解釋最初的能變。最初的部分分為兩部分。首先總結前面，引出後面，以發起討論的開端。其次依據所提出的問題，舉出頌文正面回答。這就是最初的部分。依據下面的長行解釋，就分為兩部分。首先解釋頌文，詳細闡明三種能變。第二總的分別八識的一同、差異等等意義。

論：頌文說：最初阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna）...

【English Translation】 English version: Elucidating the Characteristics of Consciousness (Guang Ming Shi Xiang). It is divided into three parts. First, there are fourteen and a half lines of verses, elaborating on the previous three lines of verses, clarifying the characteristics of the three kinds of consciousness that can transform. Second, there is one verse that directly analyzes Vijñānavāda (the doctrine that all phenomena are manifestations of consciousness), elaborating on the previous 'they depend on consciousness for transformation'. Finally, there are seven verses, elaborating on the previous two lines of verses, explaining various objections.

Question: Why is the order of the verses arranged in this way? Answer: Because the purpose is to elucidate Vijñānavāda, if one does not understand the nature of the consciousness that can transform, how can one understand that all phenomena are transformations of consciousness? Even if one understands the consciousness that can transform and that all phenomena are Vijñānavāda, its meaning is still not exhausted, and the principle needs to be further clarified. Therefore, it is divided into three paragraphs, arranged in this order. Furthermore, in the fourteen and a half verses on the consciousness that can transform, the first two and a half verses explain the initial transformation aspect of the Vipāka-vijñāna (Ālaya-vijñāna). Second, there are three lines of verses, clarifying the second transformation of the Manas-vijñāna. Finally, there are nine verses, explaining the third transformation of the sensory consciousness (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind consciousness). Judging the sentences based on the object, characteristics, and result, and dividing them according to the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). Furthermore, three explanations say that the treatise has three parts. The first one and a half verses briefly indicate that there is no separate self or dharma outside of the mind. The analysis of the characteristics of consciousness is completed. Second, there are twenty-three and a half lines of verses, elaborating on the characteristics and nature of Vijñānavāda, explaining various objections. This is divided into three parts. First, there are fifteen and a half verses, elaborating on the characteristics and nature of Vijñānavāda, etc., elaborating on the following four sentences. Second, there are seven verses, explaining various objections, elaborating on the above two sentences. Finally, there is one verse, clarifying the nature of Vijñānavāda. The first one and a half verses explain the non-existence of what is grasped (parikalpita-svabhāva), and the existence of what is dependent (paratantra-svabhāva). Now clarify the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). In this detailed explanation, the first two parts explain the principle of dependent conventional truth. The last part explains the principle of perfected ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). In the initial fifteen and a half verses elaborating on Vijñānavāda, it is divided into two parts. First, fourteen and a half verses analyze the three kinds of transformation, and second, one verse directly explains the meaning of the transformation of Vijñānavāda. In analyzing the three kinds of transformation, the first two and a half verses explain the initial transformation. The initial part is divided into two parts. First, summarize the previous and introduce the following to initiate the beginning of the discussion. Second, based on the question raised, present the verses to answer directly. This is the initial part. According to the following commentary, it is divided into two parts. First, explain the verses, elaborating on the three kinds of transformation. Second, generally distinguish the meanings of the sameness and difference of the eight consciousnesses.

Treatise: The verse says: Initially, the Ālaya-vijñāna...

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耶識至阿羅漢位舍。

述曰。三師俱云。初二行頌半解初能變中。本頌以十門解釋。一自相。謂初阿賴耶識。二果相。謂異熟。三因相。謂一切種。四所緣。謂執受處。五行相。謂了　不可知者。即于所緣．行相之內差別之義。既無別用。故非別門。若別開者。束五受門相應中攝。俱心所故。六相應。謂常與觸作意。受想思相應。七五受。謂相應唯舍受。一相應言通二處也。八三性。謂是無覆無記。九因果譬喻。謂恒轉如暴流。十伏斷位次。謂阿羅漢位舍　觸等亦如是者。俱時心所例同於王。非是分別第八識也　長行有二。初八段．十義釋此頌文。后以十理．五經證此識有。八段十義者。初之三相合為一門。所緣．行相合一門明。義相順故。余門各別。七門正解十義。一門別解觸等。于初八段等中。文復有二。初以八段別解本識心王．心所。后以有漏．無漏二位。總明本識心王．心所。其前八段若解本識唯七門也。至下當知。頌致初字。即是顯三能變之中第一能變。或別釋頌文復分為三。初別釋頌文。次釋識異名。后以十門對無漏辨。至下當悉。分為二者。于理為勝。

論。初能變識至名阿賴耶。

述曰。第一合解頌上二句。即是自相．因相．果相。于中有二。初略解三。后廣分別。就略解中有二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 耶識（第八識）到阿羅漢果位時捨棄。

述記中說，護法、難陀、親勝三位論師都認為，最初的兩行半頌文解釋了初能變識（阿賴耶識）。本頌以十個方面來解釋：一、自相，指最初的阿賴耶識；二、果相，指異熟果；三、因相，指一切種子；四、所緣，指執受處；五、行相，指了別不可知的事物。這實際上是在所緣和行相之內進行區分，並沒有其他的用途，因此不是單獨的一個方面。如果單獨列出，可以歸入五受門相應之中，因為它們都是心所法。六、相應，指常與觸、作意、受、想、思相應；七、五受，指相應的只有舍受。『一相應』這個詞可以用於兩個地方。八、三性，指是無覆無記性。九、因果譬喻，指阿賴耶識的恒常流轉就像暴流一樣。十、伏斷位次，指在阿羅漢果位時捨棄。觸等心所也像這樣，與心王同時生起，並非是分別第八識。長行分為兩部分，前八段用十個方面來解釋頌文，后一部分用十個道理和五個經證來證明此識的存在。八段十義中，將初能變識的三相合併爲一個方面，所緣和行相合併爲一個方面來闡明，因為它們的意義相順。其餘的方面各自獨立。七個方面正面解釋十義，一個方面單獨解釋觸等心所。在前面的八段中，文義又分為兩部分，先用八段分別解釋本識的心王和心所，然後用有漏和無漏兩種狀態，總括地說明本識的心王和心所。前面的八段如果解釋本識，只有七個方面。到後面就會明白。頌文的第一個字，就顯示了三能變識中的第一能變識。或者可以分別解釋頌文，分為三個部分：先分別解釋頌文，然後解釋識的異名，最後用十個方面對照無漏識進行辨析。到後面就會詳細說明。分為兩個部分，在道理上更為優勝。

論中說，初能變識到名為阿賴耶識。

述記中說，第一部分是合起來解釋頌文的上兩句，也就是自相、因相、果相。其中分為兩個部分，先是簡略地解釋這三個方面，然後是詳細地分別解釋。在簡略解釋中又分為兩個部分。

【English Translation】 English version The Yeshi (eighth consciousness) is abandoned at the Arhat stage.

The commentary states that the three masters, Dharmapala, Nanda, and Sthiramati, all agree that the first two and a half verses explain the first transformation consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna). This verse explains it in ten aspects: 1. Self-nature, referring to the initial Ālaya-vijñāna; 2. Resultant nature, referring to the Vipāka (differently matured result); 3. Causal nature, referring to all seeds; 4. Object, referring to the object of clinging; 5. Characteristics, referring to the discernment of the unknowable. This is actually differentiating within the object and characteristics, and has no other use, so it is not a separate aspect. If listed separately, it can be categorized under the five feeling gates, as they are all mental functions. 6. Association, referring to constant association with Sparśa (contact), Manaskāra (attention), Vedanā (feeling), Samjñā (perception), and Cetana (volition); 7. Five feelings, referring to association only with Upekṣā (equanimity). The term 'one association' can be used in two places. 8. Three natures, referring to being morally neutral and obscured. 9. Cause and effect analogy, referring to the constant flow of Ālaya-vijñāna like a violent torrent. 10. Subjugation and severance stages, referring to abandonment at the Arhat stage. Mental functions like Sparśa are also like this, arising simultaneously with the mind-king, and are not the discriminating eighth consciousness. The commentary is divided into two parts: the first eight sections use ten aspects to explain the verse, and the latter part uses ten reasons and five sutra proofs to prove the existence of this consciousness. Among the eight sections and ten aspects, the three natures of the first transformation consciousness are combined into one aspect, and the object and characteristics are combined into one aspect for explanation, because their meanings are similar. The remaining aspects are independent. Seven aspects positively explain the ten aspects, and one aspect separately explains mental functions like Sparśa. In the preceding eight sections, the meaning is further divided into two parts: first, the mind-king and mental functions of the original consciousness are explained separately in eight sections, and then the mind-king and mental functions of the original consciousness are summarized using the two states of contaminated and uncontaminated. If the preceding eight sections explain the original consciousness, there are only seven aspects. This will become clear later. The first word of the verse reveals the first transformation consciousness among the three transformation consciousnesses. Alternatively, the verse can be explained separately in three parts: first, the verse is explained separately, then the different names of consciousness are explained, and finally, the ten aspects are used to compare and analyze the uncontaminated consciousness. This will be explained in detail later. Dividing it into two parts is superior in terms of reasoning.

The treatise states that the first transformation consciousness is called Ālaya-vijñāna.

The commentary states that the first part is to explain the first two lines of the verse together, which are self-nature, causal nature, and resultant nature. It is divided into two parts, first a brief explanation of these three aspects, and then a detailed separate explanation. The brief explanation is further divided into two parts.

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。初三相。后總結之。解三相中。先解自相。次解果相。后解因相初中有三。一顯藏義。二即頌名。三釋妨難。此即初也。此識總于大．小乘教名阿賴耶。下第三卷。大．小乘經自有證故。非此阿賴耶名大乘獨有。

論。此識具有至執藏義故。

述曰。此釋藏義。通含三種。攝論第二云。謂與染法互為緣故。為染末那所緣義故。此即略標。

論。謂與雜染至自內我故。

述曰。能持染種種名所藏。此識是能藏。是雜染法所熏．所依染法名能藏。此識為所藏。攝論第二等云。非如大等藏最勝等中即能所藏。彼論又言。為染第七等之所執藏。以為內我名執藏義。即此論云。謂與雜染互為緣故。解能．所藏。諸有漏法皆名雜染。非唯染法。梵云僧吉隸爍。此名雜染。若不言僧。即唯染也。有情執為自內我故。解執藏義。唯煩惱障義。非所知障義。不爾無學應有此名。此不別執為其我所．及與他我。名自內我。此即正解阿賴耶義。阿賴耶者。此翻為藏。藏具三義。如論已說。義雖具三。正取唯以執藏為名。不爾二乘．八地菩薩應有此名。三名闕一即不得名。若爾七地已前。二乘有學。入無漏心。我愛不執應舍此名。至下當辨。

論。此即顯示至所有自相。

述曰。此即頌名。故今結言此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 初三相（最初的三個特徵）。後面總結它。解釋三相中，先解釋自相（自身之相），其次解釋果相（結果之相），最後解釋因相（原因之相）。最初的部分有三個方面：一是顯示藏義（隱藏的含義），二是總結名稱，三是解釋妨難（妨礙和困難）。這便是最初的部分。這個識（意識）在大小乘佛教中總稱為阿賴耶（ālaya，藏識）。見下文第三卷。大小乘經典都有證據，因此阿賴耶這個名稱並非大乘佛教獨有。

論：此識具有執藏義故。（這個識具有執持和儲藏的含義。）

述曰：這是解釋藏義，普遍包含三種含義。《攝大乘論》第二卷說：『因為與染法互為因緣，作為染污的末那（末那識，manas）所緣的對象。』這便是簡略的標示。

論：謂與雜染至自內我故。（意思是說，它與各種雜染相互作用，被有情執著為內在的自我。）

述曰：能夠執持染污的種種名稱為所藏。這個識是能藏（能儲藏者）。被雜染法所熏習、所依賴的染法名為能藏。這個識是所藏（被儲藏者）。《攝大乘論》第二卷等說：『不像大自在天等藏最勝等中既是能藏又是所藏。』該論又說：『被染污的第七識等所執持儲藏，作為內在的自我，這叫做執藏義。』也就是本論所說的：『與雜染互為因緣』，解釋能藏和所藏。各種有漏法都叫做雜染，並非只有染法。梵文是Saṃkiliṣṭa（僧吉隸爍），這叫做雜染。如果不說僧，就只有染污的意思。有情執著它為內在的自我，這是解釋執藏義。只是煩惱障的含義，不是所知障的含義。否則，無學（已經證得阿羅漢果位的人）也應該有這個名稱。這個識不特別執著于『我的』或『屬於我的』，以及『其他的我』，叫做自內我。這便是正確地解釋阿賴耶的含義。阿賴耶，翻譯成漢語就是『藏』。藏具有三種含義，如論中所說。含義雖然有三種，但主要以執藏作為名稱。否則，二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）和八地菩薩也應該有這個名稱。三種含義缺少一種就不能稱為阿賴耶。如果這樣，七地之前的菩薩，二乘的有學（還在學習的人），進入無漏心（沒有煩惱的心），我愛不執著，應該捨棄這個名稱嗎？到下文再辨析。

論：此即顯示至所有自相。（這便是顯示阿賴耶識的所有自相。）

述曰：這是總結名稱，所以現在總結說這個。

【English Translation】 English version: The initial three characteristics. Later, summarize them. In explaining the three characteristics, first explain the self-characteristic (svalakṣaṇa), then explain the result-characteristic (phalalakṣaṇa), and finally explain the cause-characteristic (hetulakṣaṇa). The initial part has three aspects: first, to reveal the meaning of 'store' (藏義); second, to summarize the name; and third, to explain obstacles and difficulties. This is the initial part. This consciousness (vijñāna) is generally called Ālaya (ālaya, store consciousness) in both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna Buddhism. See Volume 3 below. Both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna scriptures have evidence, so the name Ālaya is not unique to Mahāyāna Buddhism.

Treatise: This consciousness possesses the meaning of 'holding and storing' (執藏義故).

Commentary: This explains the meaning of 'store,' universally encompassing three meanings. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論), Chapter 2, states: 'Because it mutually conditions defiled dharmas, it is the object of the defiled manas (末那識, manas).' This is a brief indication.

Treatise: Meaning, with defilements to the inner self (謂與雜染至自內我故).

Commentary: That which can hold various defiled names is called 'that which is stored' (所藏). This consciousness is the 'able to store' (能藏). The defiled dharmas that are perfumed and relied upon by defiled dharmas are called 'able to store.' This consciousness is 'that which is stored.' The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Chapter 2, etc., states: 'It is not like the Great自在天 and other stores, which are both 'able to store' and 'that which is stored.' That treatise also states: 'It is held and stored by the defiled seventh consciousness, etc., and is taken as the inner self, which is called the meaning of 'holding and storing'.' That is, this treatise says: 'Mutually conditioning defilements,' explaining 'able to store' and 'that which is stored.' All conditioned dharmas are called defilements, not just defiled dharmas. The Sanskrit is Saṃkiliṣṭa (僧吉隸爍), which is called defilement. If 'Saṃ' is not said, it only means defilement. Sentient beings cling to it as their inner self, which explains the meaning of 'holding and storing.' It is only the meaning of the kleśa-āvaraṇa (煩惱障, affliction obscuration), not the jñeyāvaraṇa (所知障, cognitive obscuration). Otherwise, those who are beyond learning (無學, arhats) should also have this name. This consciousness does not particularly cling to 'mine' or 'belonging to me,' as well as 'other selves,' which is called the inner self. This is the correct explanation of the meaning of Ālaya. Ālaya, translated into Chinese, means 'store' (藏). 'Store' has three meanings, as stated in the treatise. Although there are three meanings, it mainly takes 'holding and storing' as the name. Otherwise, the Two Vehicles (聲聞乘 and 緣覺乘) and the eighth-ground Bodhisattvas should also have this name. Lacking one of the three meanings, it cannot be called Ālaya. If so, before the seventh ground, the Two Vehicles' learners (有學, those still learning), entering the non-outflow mind (無漏心, mind without afflictions), without clinging to self-love, should they abandon this name? This will be discussed below.

Treatise: This shows all self-characteristics (此即顯示至所有自相).

Commentary: This summarizes the name, so now it concludes by saying this.

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即顯示初能變識所有自相。自相者。自體相也。但言藏識即持業釋。藏即識故。

問言與雜染互為緣者。說為能藏即是因義。言為所藏即是果義。因果之外豈更無別自體相耶。

論。攝持因果為自相故。

述曰。自體是總。因果是別。自相攝持因果二相為自體故。攝是包含義。包二為一故。持是依持義。以總為別所依持故。別為總所包。總為別所依。故名攝持。又離二無總。攝二為體。二是總義。總是義之體。體與義為依名之為持。攝二義為體名攝　問若爾自相應是假有　答此亦不然。若有條然因．果兩相合之為自相。自相可成假。既離自相無別因．果相因．果相即自體之上別義說之。故非假也。

問前言第八有三位名。何故於三能變之中。乃舉異熟果相之號。于別釋中遂致染分藏識之名。

論。此識自相至是故偏說。

述曰。此釋妨難。三能變中舉異熟者。如前已解。今由二義說阿賴耶。由此自相雖有三位。以彼藏名三位之中初位所攝。自從無始乃至七地．二乘有學最初舍故。又以是名我執所執。過失重故。雖染分名亦通異熟。異熟之名望此仍輕。以此藏名通二種義。過失之重。故今偏說。

論。此是能引至說名異熟。

述曰。自下解果相。即頌言異熟也。于中

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 即是說，最初顯現時，能夠辨識所有自身的體相。自身的體相，就是指自體之相。這裡只說『藏識』，是持業釋，因為『藏』即是『識』。

有人問：如果說與雜染互為因緣，那麼說為『能藏』就是因的含義，說為『所藏』就是果的含義。那麼在因果之外，難道就沒有別的自體相了嗎？

論：因為攝持因果作為自身的體相。

述記解釋說：自體是總體的概念，因果是分別的概念。自相攝持因果這兩種相，作為自身的體相。『攝』是包含的意思，包含二者合為一體。『持』是依持的意思，以總體作為分別的所依持。分別被總體所包含，總體是分別所依賴的。所以叫做『攝持』。而且離開二者就沒有總體，攝取二者作為本體。二是總體的意義，總是意義的本體。本體與意義相互依存，叫做『持』。攝取二者的意義作為本體，叫做『攝』。有人問：如果這樣，那麼自相應該是假有。回答說：不是這樣的。如果有條理分明地將因、果兩種相合在一起作為自相，那麼自相就可以說是假有。既然離開自相就沒有別的因、果相，因、果相就是在自體之上分別說明的意義，所以不是假有。

有人問：前面說第八識有三個名稱，為什麼在三種能變之中，只舉出異熟果相的名稱？在分別解釋中，卻提到染分藏識的名稱？

論：這個識的自相……所以偏說。

述記解釋說：這是爲了解釋妨難。三種能變中舉出異熟，如前面已經解釋過。現在因為兩個原因說明阿賴耶識。因為這個自相雖然有三個位次，但因為『藏』這個名稱是三個位次中最初的位次所包含的，自從無始以來，直到七地、二乘有學最初捨棄它。而且因為這個名稱是我執所執著的，過失很嚴重。雖然染分的名稱也通於異熟，但異熟的名稱相比之下仍然較輕。因為『藏』這個名稱通於兩種意義，過失很嚴重，所以現在偏重說明。

論：這是能夠引生……所以說名叫異熟。

述記解釋說：下面解釋果相，也就是頌文中所說的『異熟』。其中

【English Translation】 English version: That is, when it initially manifests, it can distinguish all its own characteristics (svalakṣaṇa). 'Own characteristics' refers to the characteristic of its own entity (ātma-lakṣaṇa). The mere mention of 'store consciousness' (ālayavijñāna) is a possessive compound (dhārayati), because 'store' is 'consciousness'.

Someone asks: If it is said that it is mutually conditioned with defilements (saṃkleśa), then saying 'capable of storing' (ādhāna) implies the meaning of cause (hetu), and saying 'that which is stored' (ādhāra) implies the meaning of effect (phala). Besides cause and effect, is there no other characteristic of its own entity?

Treatise: Because it encompasses and maintains cause and effect as its own characteristic.

The commentary explains: The own entity is the general concept, while cause and effect are the specific concepts. The own characteristic encompasses and maintains these two aspects of cause and effect as its own entity. 'Encompass' (saṃgraha) means to include, combining the two into one. 'Maintain' (dhāraṇa) means to support, with the general supporting the specific. The specific is encompassed by the general, and the general supports the specific. Therefore, it is called 'encompass and maintain'. Moreover, without the two, there is no general; taking the two as the essence. The two are the meaning of the general, and the general is the essence of the meaning. The essence and the meaning are interdependent, which is called 'maintain'. Taking the meaning of the two as the essence is called 'encompass'. Someone asks: If that's the case, then the own characteristic should be a hypothetical existence (prajñaptisat). The answer is: That's not the case. If the two aspects of cause and effect are clearly combined as the own characteristic, then the own characteristic could be considered hypothetical. Since there are no separate cause and effect aspects apart from the own characteristic, the cause and effect aspects are simply specific meanings described on top of the own entity. Therefore, it is not hypothetical.

Someone asks: Earlier, it was said that the eighth consciousness has three names. Why, among the three transformations (pariṇāma), is only the name of the result aspect of different maturation (vipāka) mentioned? And in the separate explanation, why is the name of the defiled aspect of store consciousness mentioned?

Treatise: The own characteristic of this consciousness... therefore, it is specifically mentioned.

The commentary explains: This is to address the objection. The reason for mentioning different maturation among the three transformations has been explained earlier. Now, the Ālayavijñāna is explained for two reasons. Although this own characteristic has three stages, the name 'store' is included in the initial stage among the three stages, from beginningless time until the initial abandonment by those in the seventh ground (bhūmi) and the Arhats (arhat) and those still learning (śaikṣa). Moreover, because this name is what is grasped by self-grasping (ātmagrāha), the fault is severe. Although the name of the defiled aspect also applies to different maturation, the name of different maturation is still lighter compared to this. Because the name 'store' applies to two meanings, and the fault is severe, it is now specifically mentioned.

Treatise: This is capable of producing... therefore, it is called different maturation.

The commentary explains: Below, the result aspect is explained, which is the 'different maturation' mentioned in the verse. Among them,

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有四。一顯異熟義。二簡他宗。三即頌名。四釋妨難。此即初也。謂此識是能引諸界．諸趣．諸生。總善．惡業之異熟果說名異熟。此意說是總業之果。明是總報故名異熟。簡別報果。別報果者。但名異熟生。不名異熟故。

論。離此命根至不可得故。

述曰。此簡他宗。顯離本識無別真異熟。謂若離此第八異熟識。有別命根。及眾同分等　等者。等取或執別有窮生死蘊等。恒時不斷。相續生滅。殊勝真實異熟果體。不可得也。即破薩婆多命根．眾同分是真異熟。破化地部等離此別有窮生死蘊。大眾部別有根本識。上座部分別論者。別有有分識等。為勝異熟果。不可得也。返顯不離本識恒時。相續。勝異熟果。可得之義。恒時之言。已顯相續。相續之言。更何所顯。恒時簡間斷。相續簡常。故無失也　勝異熟者。顯真異熟。異熟生法非真異熟故　破命根．同分如前卷末解。然有量云。離我第八識汝命根．同分。能執持身真異熟果定不可得。非第八識故。如外色等　然彼本計六種轉識能執持身。今此亦簡謂真異熟。彼非真異熟。不極成故　破離第八有窮生死蘊等。亦不成者。如下第三卷中廣解　成第八識能執持身者。如下十證。攝論第三末等。皆當解釋。

論。此即顯示至所有果相。

述曰。

【現代漢語翻譯】 有四種含義：一、彰顯異熟的意義；二、簡別其他宗派的觀點；三、即是頌文的名稱；四、解釋妨難。這即是第一種含義。意思是說，這個識能夠牽引諸界（指欲界、色界、無色界）、諸趣（指地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）、諸生（指卵生、胎生、濕生、化生），總合善業和惡業的異熟果報，稱為異熟。此意是說這是總業的果報，表明是總報，所以名為異熟，用以簡別別報的果報。別報的果報，只稱為異熟生，不稱為異熟。

論：離開這個命根，就不可得。

述記：這是爲了簡別其他宗派的觀點，顯示離開本識就沒有其他的真異熟。意思是說，如果離開這個第八異熟識，有其他的命根，以及眾同分等（等，包括那些執著有其他的窮生死蘊等），恒常不斷，相續生滅，殊勝真實的異熟果體，是不可得的。這即是破斥薩婆多部的命根、眾同分是真異熟的觀點，破斥化地部等認為離開此識，另有窮生死蘊的觀點，大眾部認為另有根本識的觀點，上座部中的分別論者認為另有有分識等，作為殊勝的異熟果報，這些都是不可得的。反過來顯示不離開本識，恒常、相續，殊勝的異熟果報，是可以得到的。『恒時』一詞，已經顯示了相續的含義，再說『相續』，還能顯示什麼呢？『恒時』是簡別間斷，『相續』是簡別常一，所以沒有重複的過失。殊勝異熟，是顯示真異熟，異熟生法不是真異熟。破斥命根、同分的觀點，如前卷末的解釋。然而有量部認為：離開我的第八識，你的命根、同分，能夠執持身體的真異熟果，必定是不可得的，因為它不是第八識，就像外色等。然而他們本來認為六種轉識能夠執持身體，現在這裡也簡別說，這是真異熟，他們所說的不是真異熟，因為不極成。破斥離開第八識，另有窮生死蘊等的觀點，也是不成立的，如下第三卷中會詳細解釋。成立第八識能夠執持身體的觀點，如下十種證據，《攝大乘論》第三卷末等，都會解釋。

論：這即是顯示所有果相。

【English Translation】 There are four meanings: First, to manifest the meaning of Vipāka (異熟, resultant effect); second, to distinguish from the views of other schools; third, it is the name of the verse itself; fourth, to explain objections and difficulties. This is the first meaning. It means that this consciousness is capable of leading to all realms (界, dhātu, referring to the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm), all destinies (趣, gati, referring to hell-beings, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods), all births (生, jāti, referring to egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born, and transformation-born beings), and the Vipāka result of combined good and evil karma, which is called Vipāka. The intention here is to say that this is the result of collective karma, indicating that it is a general retribution, hence the name Vipāka, to distinguish it from the result of specific retribution. The result of specific retribution is only called Vipākaja (異熟生, born of Vipāka), not Vipāka.

Treatise: Apart from this life-force, it is unobtainable.

Commentary: This is to distinguish from the views of other schools, showing that apart from the fundamental consciousness, there is no other true Vipāka. It means that if apart from this eighth Vipāka consciousness, there is another life-force (命根, jīvitendriya), as well as the commonality of beings (眾同分, nikāyasabhāga), etc. (The 'etc.' includes those who insist on other aggregates that exhaust life and death, etc.), constantly without interruption, continuously arising and ceasing, a supremely real Vipāka fruit-body, is unobtainable. This is to refute the Sarvāstivāda school's view that the life-force and the commonality of beings are true Vipāka, to refute the view of the Haimavata school, etc., that apart from this consciousness, there are other aggregates that exhaust life and death, the view of the Mahāsāṃghika school that there is another fundamental consciousness, and the view of the Vibhajyavāda school among the Sthavira school that there is another Bhavāṅga-citta (有分識, subconsciousness), etc., as a supreme Vipāka fruit. These are all unobtainable. Conversely, it shows that without departing from the fundamental consciousness, a constant, continuous, supreme Vipāka fruit is obtainable. The term 'constant' already shows the meaning of continuous. What more can 'continuous' show? 'Constant' distinguishes from intermittent, and 'continuous' distinguishes from permanent, so there is no fault of redundancy. Supreme Vipāka shows true Vipāka, as Vipākaja dharmas are not true Vipāka. The refutation of the life-force and commonality of beings is as explained at the end of the previous volume. However, the Sautrāntika school argues: Apart from my eighth consciousness, your life-force and commonality of beings, which can uphold the body, the true Vipāka fruit is definitely unobtainable, because it is not the eighth consciousness, like external objects, etc. However, they originally believed that the six consciousnesses could uphold the body. Now, this also distinguishes by saying that this is true Vipāka. What they speak of is not true Vipāka, because it is not fully established. The refutation of the view that apart from the eighth consciousness, there are other aggregates that exhaust life and death, etc., is also untenable, as will be explained in detail in the third volume below. The establishment of the view that the eighth consciousness can uphold the body, as in the following ten proofs, the end of the third volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, etc., will all be explained.

Treatise: This shows all the aspects of the result.

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此即頌名結上頌中異熟果相。

問阿賴耶．阿他那名亦是果相。獨言異熟有何意耶。

論。此識果相至故偏說之。

述曰。此釋妨難　此識果相雖多位者。如前三位。或復五位。故言多位　言多種者。即五果中。有義具四果。除離系果此可具有。謂前望后為等流果。同時心所望此心王名士用果。種子生時亦名士用。故論下言如俱有因得士用故。亦名增上果。異熟果可知。有義具三。除士用果。五蘊假者所得名士夫果。由此本識具三．四果故言多種。此識果相雖多位．多種。以異熟之名一寬．二不共故偏說之。三位通二位。五位通四位。故說言寬有餘三果。可通余法。唯異熟果不通余法故言不共。此諍真異熟故偏說之。此明有漏第八心品。除相分外取餘三分。並自種子。為果相體。余相分．及餘種。非真業果。以不恒相續故。或此唯說現為果相。種相隱故。據實而言。現．種俱通果．因二相。然種果狹。唯業果故。因相亦通一切種子。然今此文。三相皆唯取現行識。

論。此能執持至名一切種。

述曰。此第三解因相。頌言一切種也。以現行識執持諸法自．他種子令不失故名一切種。釋因相義。此第八識所執諸法。諸法之因。今說亦是此識因相。即種子識。今望能持且說于現。三相皆唯

【現代漢語翻譯】 這解釋了頌詞中總結的關於異熟果相的內容。

問：阿賴耶（ālaya，藏識），阿陀那（ādhāna，執持識）的名字也表示果相，為什麼單單提到異熟呢？

論：因為這個識的果相最為顯著，所以特別說明。

述曰：這是爲了解釋疑問。這個識的果相雖然有很多方面，例如前面提到的三位（種子識、現行識、轉識）或者五位（五蘊）。所以說有很多方面。說到多種，指的是五果（異熟果、等流果、士用果、增上果、離系果）中，有的具有四果，除了離系果之外都可以具有。比如，前一階段對於后一階段來說是等流果。同時，心所對於心王來說是士用果。種子生起時也稱為士用果。所以論中說，如同俱有因（sahabhū-hetu，同時俱起因）得到士用果一樣。也稱為增上果（adhipati-phala，增上果）。異熟果（vipāka-phala，異熟果）是可以理解的。有的具有三果，除了士用果。五蘊假合所得的稱為士夫果（puruṣakāra-phala，士夫果）。因此，本識具有三果或四果，所以說多種。這個識的果相雖然有很多方面，但因為異熟這個名稱既寬泛又不共，所以特別說明。三位可以通用於二位，五位可以通用於四位。所以說寬泛。其餘三種果可以通用於其他法，只有異熟果不能通用於其他法，所以說不共。這是爲了辨明真正的異熟，所以特別說明。這裡說明有漏的第八識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）的體性，除了相分（nimitta-bhāga，影像部分）之外，取其餘三分（見分、自證分、證自證分）以及自己的種子，作為果相的本體。其餘的相分以及其餘的種子，不是真正的業果，因為它們不是恒常相續的。或者這裡只是說現在顯現的作為果相，種子的相狀是隱藏的。實際上來說，顯現和種子都通於果和因兩種相。然而種子的果相是狹隘的，僅僅是業果。因相也通於一切種子。然而現在這篇文章中，三種相都僅僅取現行識。

論：這個能執持一切法，直到被稱為一切種。

述曰：這是第三種解釋因相，頌詞中說的一切種（sarva-bīja，一切種子）。因為現行識執持諸法自身和他人的種子，使它們不丟失，所以稱為一切種。解釋因相的含義。這個第八識所執持的諸法，諸法的因，現在說也是這個識的因相，也就是種子識。現在相對於能執持的現行識來說。三種相都僅僅是現行識。

【English Translation】 This explains the content of the verse summarizing the characteristics of the Vipāka-phala (異熟果, ripening fruit).

Question: The names Ālaya (阿賴耶, storehouse consciousness) and Ādhāna (阿陀那, holding consciousness) also indicate the aspect of fruit. Why is Vipāka (異熟) mentioned specifically?

Treatise: Because the characteristic of this consciousness as fruit is most prominent, it is specifically explained.

Commentary: This is to clarify the doubt. Although this consciousness has many aspects of fruit, such as the three stages (seed consciousness, manifest consciousness, transforming consciousness) mentioned earlier, or the five stages (five aggregates). Therefore, it is said to have many aspects. Speaking of various kinds, it refers to the five fruits (Vipāka-phala, Niṣyanda-phala, Puruṣakāra-phala, Adhipati-phala, Visamyoga-phala). Some have four fruits, except for Visamyoga-phala (離系果, fruit of separation), which can all be possessed. For example, the previous stage is the Niṣyanda-phala (等流果, outflowing fruit) for the later stage. At the same time, the mental functions are the Puruṣakāra-phala (士用果, effort fruit) for the mind-king. When seeds arise, they are also called Puruṣakāra-phala. Therefore, the treatise says, just as the Sahabhū-hetu (俱有因, co-existent cause) obtains the Puruṣakāra-phala. It is also called Adhipati-phala (增上果, dominant fruit). Vipāka-phala (異熟果, ripening fruit) is understandable. Some have three fruits, except for Puruṣakāra-phala. What is obtained by the aggregation of the five aggregates is called Puruṣakāra-phala (士夫果, man-made fruit). Therefore, the basic consciousness has three or four fruits, so it is said to have various kinds. Although this consciousness has many aspects of fruit, the name Vipāka is both broad and unique, so it is specifically explained. The three stages can be applied to two stages, and the five stages can be applied to four stages. Therefore, it is said to be broad. The remaining three fruits can be applied to other dharmas, but only Vipāka-phala cannot be applied to other dharmas, so it is said to be unique. This is to clarify the true Vipāka, so it is specifically explained. This explains the nature of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness) with outflows, taking the remaining three parts (seeing-part, self-awareness part, and self-awareness-witnessing part) and its own seeds, excluding the image-part (Nimitta-bhāga, 影像部分), as the substance of the fruit aspect. The remaining image-part and the remaining seeds are not the true fruit of karma, because they are not constantly continuous. Or it only refers to what is currently manifested as the fruit aspect, and the appearance of the seeds is hidden. In reality, both manifestation and seeds are connected to both the fruit and cause aspects. However, the fruit aspect of the seeds is narrow, only the fruit of karma. The cause aspect also applies to all seeds. However, in this article, all three aspects only take the manifest consciousness.

Treatise: This can hold all dharmas, until it is called Sarva-bīja (一切種, all seeds).

Commentary: This is the third explanation of the cause aspect, the Sarva-bīja (一切種, all seeds) mentioned in the verse. Because the manifest consciousness holds the seeds of all dharmas, both its own and others', so that they are not lost, it is called Sarva-bīja. Explaining the meaning of the cause aspect. The dharmas held by this eighth consciousness, the causes of all dharmas, are now said to be also the cause aspect of this consciousness, which is the seed consciousness. Now, relative to the manifest consciousness that can hold. All three aspects are only the manifest consciousness.

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現行之識。所望義別。實無寬狹。實通現．種。故下論文。一切種相應更分別。即通一切三性種子。其第八識若現．若種。皆是因相。現行為種等依持之因。種子即是諸法因緣。皆因相也　問何故果相唯異熟法。因相通耶。答余法非異熟故。余非果相。諸法皆為因。因無別名。故現．種皆因相。此即通出因相之體。由此三相寬狹有別。自相．因相通一切法。果唯異熟。約互為緣果相亦通。三相一種(如樞要說)。

論。離此余法至不可得故。

述曰。此簡他宗。破經部譬喻師等。如五十一說。彼計。色根中有心．心所等．及四大種種子。心．心所中有色根種子等。以于有色．無色界生時。互能持種故。及假類能持等如下十證自當廣破。今量云。彼不能持一切種子。非第八識故。如外色等。返顯第八能執持義。然執持義。下執受中自當廣說。

論。此即顯示至所有因相。

述曰。即上頌名。

問曰。因相六因．十因皆是因相。此中何故但說持種唯有現行。

論。此識因相至是故偏說。

述曰。下釋妨難　因相多種者。謂為同類因前後自生故。亦為俱有因即是種子故。如下自說。現行雖望種非。種望之是。如四小相望本法等。又亦為相應因望心所法故。今于能作因中辨持種因

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 現行之識（manifest consciousness）。所望義別。實無寬狹。實通現（manifestation）。種（seed）。故下論文。一切種相應更分別。即通一切三性種子。其第八識（eighth consciousness, 阿賴耶識 Alaya-vijnana）若現（manifestation）。若種（seed）。皆是因相（causal aspect）。現行（manifestation）為種（seed）等依持之因。種子（seed）即是諸法因緣。皆因相（causal aspect）也。問何故果相（resultant aspect）唯異熟法（vipaka, different maturation）。因相（causal aspect）通耶。答余法非異熟故。余非果相（resultant aspect）。諸法皆為因。因無別名。故現（manifestation）。種（seed）皆因相（causal aspect）。此即通出因相（causal aspect）之體。由此三相寬狹有別。自相（self-aspect）。因相（causal aspect）通一切法。果（result）唯異熟（vipaka）。約互為緣果相亦通。三相一種(如樞要說)。 論。離此余法至不可得故。 述曰。此簡他宗。破經部譬喻師等。如五十一說。彼計。色根（sense organ）中有心（mind）。心所（mental functions）等。及四大種（four great elements）種子（seed）。心（mind）。心所（mental functions）中有色根（sense organ）種子（seed）等。以于有色（with form）。無**生時。互能持種故。及假類能持等如下十證自當廣破。今量云。彼不能持一切種子（seed）。非第八識（eighth consciousness, 阿賴耶識 Alaya-vijnana）故。如外色等。返顯第八（eighth consciousness, 阿賴耶識 Alaya-vijnana）能執持義。然執持義。下執受中自當廣說。 論。此即顯示至所有因相（causal aspect）。 述曰。即上頌名。 問曰。因相（causal aspect）六因（six causes）。十因（ten causes）皆是因相（causal aspect）。此中何故但說持種唯有現行（manifestation）。 論。此識因相（causal aspect）至是故偏說。 述曰。下釋妨難。因相（causal aspect）多種者。謂為同類因（homogeneous cause）前後自生故。亦為俱有因（co-existent cause）即是種子（seed）故。如下自說。現行（manifestation）雖望種（seed）非。種（seed）望之是。如四小相望本法等。又亦為相應因（associated cause）望心所法（mental functions）故。今于能作因（efficient cause）中辨持種因。

【English Translation】 English version: The consciousness in its present manifestation. The meanings hoped for are different. In reality, there is no broadness or narrowness. It truly encompasses both manifestation and seed. Therefore, the following text discusses: 'All seeds are corresponding and further distinguished,' which means it encompasses all seeds of the three natures. The eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), whether in manifestation or seed form, is the causal aspect. The present manifestation is the cause upon which the seeds and others rely. The seeds are the causes and conditions of all dharmas, and all are causal aspects. Question: Why is the resultant aspect only the vipaka (different maturation) dharma, while the causal aspect is all-encompassing? Answer: Because other dharmas are not vipaka, they are not resultant aspects. All dharmas serve as causes, and a cause has no separate name. Therefore, both manifestation and seed are causal aspects. This generally reveals the substance of the causal aspect. Hence, these three aspects differ in breadth. The self-aspect and causal aspect encompass all dharmas. The result is only vipaka. Considering the mutual relationship as cause and result, the resultant aspect is also all-encompassing. The three aspects are of one kind (as stated in the Essentials). Treatise: 'Apart from this, other dharmas are unattainable.' Commentary: This refutes other schools, such as the Sautrantikas and the Dristantavadins. As stated in the fifty-first [section], they believe that within the sense organs are seeds of mind, mental functions, and the four great elements. Within the mind and mental functions are seeds of the sense organs, etc. Because they can mutually hold seeds during the arising of form and formlessness. And the false categories can hold, etc., as the following ten proofs will extensively refute. Now, the measure states: 'They cannot hold all seeds because they are not the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), like external forms, etc.' This conversely reveals the meaning of the eighth (Alaya-vijnana) being able to hold. However, the meaning of holding will be extensively discussed in the following section on 'grasping'. Treatise: 'This shows all causal aspects.' Commentary: This is the name of the verse above. Question: The causal aspect, the six causes, and the ten causes are all causal aspects. Why is it said here that only the present manifestation holds the seeds? Treatise: 'The causal aspect of this consciousness is why it is specifically mentioned.' Commentary: The following explains the objection. The causal aspect is of many kinds, meaning it is the homogeneous cause where subsequent [dharmas] arise from previous ones. It is also the co-existent cause, which is the seed. As will be explained below, the present manifestation is not the seed from the perspective of the seed, but the seed is from the perspective of the manifestation, like the four minor aspects in relation to the original dharma. It is also the associated cause in relation to mental functions. Now, within the efficient cause, we distinguish the cause that holds the seeds.

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。是不共故。於十因中隨義可解故論說言因相雖多持種不共。又不須於六因．十因為論。但通說因相。謂依持因．生起因等。但持種之能不共余法。余法不能有此功力。非是共故。是故偏說。

下第三結。

論。初能變識至唯有三相。

述曰。謂此識體變為見．相二分相狀。又亦為清凈種依。或為等流果等。或為同類因等。體上所有義相非一。故言雖多。以自證分但有三義。略說三相。

論。一切種相至名為種子。

述曰。下第二廣上三相。于中有三。初發問。次廣釋。后總結之。此即初也。

上來雖言能持法種與法為種。仍未盡理分別種相。故今應說先發論端。自下廣釋。初出體等。以十門分別種子。后第二辨熏習相。

論。謂本識中至功能差別。

述曰。此出體也　言本識者。顯種所在。簡經部師色．心等持種　親生自果。簡異熟因。望所生果非種子故。要望自品能親生故　功能差別。簡現行七轉識等。望所生種雖是因緣亦親生果。是現法故。非名功能。故以功能顯種子相。

第二一．異分別。

論。此與本識至不一不異。

述曰。種望所依及所生果為不一異。此即立宗。

何所以然。

論。體用因果理應爾故。

述曰

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 是不共的緣故。在十因（das hetu，十種原因）中，可以根據意義來解釋，所以論中說因的相狀雖然很多，但『持種』（dharana-bija，保持種子）是不共的。也不需要在六因（sad hetu，六種原因）、十因中進行討論，只需通泛地說明因的相狀，如依持因（asraya-hetu，所依賴的原因）、生起因（utpada-hetu，產生的原因）等。但『持種』的功能不是其他法所共有的，其他法不能有這種功力，不是共同的緣故，所以特別說明。 下面是第三部分，總結。 論：最初的能變識（parinama-vijnana，轉變意識）乃至只有三相（tri-laksana，三種相）。 述記：意思是說，這個識的本體轉變為見分（darsana-bhaga，能見部分）和相分（nimitta-bhaga，所見部分）的相狀，也作為清凈種（visuddha-bija，清凈種子）的所依，或者作為等流果（nisyanda-phala，同類相續之果）等，或者作為同類因（sajatiya-hetu，同類原因）等。本體上所有的義相不止一種，所以說雖然很多，但從自證分（svasamvedana-bhaga，自我認知部分）來說，只有三種意義，簡略地說就是三相。 論：一切種相（sarva-bija-laksana，一切種子的相狀）乃至名為種子（bija-nama，名為種子）。 述記：下面是第二部分，廣泛解釋上面的三相。其中有三部分：首先是提問，其次是廣泛解釋，最後是總結。這裡是第一部分，提問。 上面雖然說了能持法種（dharana-dharma-bija，保持法之種子）與法作為種子，但仍然沒有完全透徹地分別種子的相狀，所以現在應該先提出論點。從下面開始廣泛解釋，首先說明體性等，用十門來分別種子，然後第二部分辨別熏習相（vasana-laksana，熏習的相狀）。 論：所謂本識（mula-vijnana，根本識）中乃至功能差別（karitra-visesa，功能差別）。 述記：這是說明體性。說『本識』，是爲了顯示種子所在之處，區別于經量部（Sautrantika，經量部）的色（rupa，物質）、心（citta，精神）等持種。『親生自果』，是爲了區別于異熟因（vipaka-hetu，異熟因），因為從所生之果來看，它不是種子。要期望它能親生自品（svajatiya，同類）之果。『功能差別』，是爲了區別于現行的七轉識（sapta-pravrtti-vijnana，七種轉識）等，從所生之種來看，雖然是因緣（hetu-pratyaya，原因和條件），也能親生果，但因為是現法（pratyutpanna-dharma，現在的法），所以不稱為功能。因此用『功能』來顯示種子的相狀。 第二，一（ekatva，單一）和異（nanatva，差異）的分別。 論：此與本識（mula-vijnana，根本識）乃至不一不異（na-ekatva-na-nanatva，非一非異）。 述記：種子對於所依（asraya，所依賴者）和所生之果來說，是不一不異的。這是立宗。 為什麼是這樣呢？ 論：體（svabhava，體性）、用（karitra，作用）、因（hetu，原因）、果（phala，結果）的道理應當是這樣的。 述記：

【English Translation】 English version: It is because it is uncommon. Among the ten hetus (das hetu, ten causes), it can be explained according to the meaning, so the treatise says that although the characteristics of causes are many, 'dharana-bija' (dharana-bija, maintaining the seed) is uncommon. It is also not necessary to discuss within the six hetus (sad hetu, six causes) and ten hetus, but only to generally explain the characteristics of causes, such as asraya-hetu (asraya-hetu, dependent cause), utpada-hetu (utpada-hetu, producing cause), etc. However, the function of 'dharana-bija' is not shared by other dharmas (dharma, phenomena); other dharmas cannot have this power, because it is not common, so it is specifically explained. The following is the third part, the conclusion. Treatise: The initial parinama-vijnana (parinama-vijnana, transforming consciousness) even has only three laksanas (tri-laksana, three aspects). Commentary: It means that the substance of this consciousness transforms into the aspects of darsana-bhaga (darsana-bhaga, seeing part) and nimitta-bhaga (nimitta-bhaga, object part), and also serves as the basis of visuddha-bija (visuddha-bija, pure seed), or as nisyanda-phala (nisyanda-phala, result of similar flow), etc., or as sajatiya-hetu (sajatiya-hetu, homogeneous cause), etc. The meanings inherent in the substance are more than one, so it is said that although there are many, from the perspective of svasamvedana-bhaga (svasamvedana-bhaga, self-awareness part), there are only three meanings, briefly speaking, three aspects. Treatise: All sarva-bija-laksana (sarva-bija-laksana, characteristics of all seeds) are named bija-nama (bija-nama, named seed). Commentary: The following is the second part, broadly explaining the above three aspects. There are three parts: first, asking questions; second, broadly explaining; and third, summarizing. This is the first part, asking questions. Although it has been said above that the dharana-dharma-bija (dharana-dharma-bija, seed that maintains dharma) and dharma serve as seeds, the characteristics of seeds have not been completely and thoroughly distinguished. Therefore, we should first raise the argument now. Starting from below, we will broadly explain, first explaining the substance, etc., using ten doors to distinguish seeds, and then the second part will distinguish the vasana-laksana (vasana-laksana, characteristics of habituation). Treatise: So-called mula-vijnana (mula-vijnana, root consciousness) even karitra-visesa (karitra-visesa, functional differences). Commentary: This explains the substance. Saying 'mula-vijnana' is to show where the seed is located, distinguishing it from the rupa (rupa, matter), citta (citta, mind), etc. that the Sautrantika (Sautrantika, Sautrantika school) holds. 'Personally produces its own result' is to distinguish it from vipaka-hetu (vipaka-hetu, maturation cause), because from the perspective of the result produced, it is not a seed. It is expected to personally produce the result of its own kind (svajatiya, homogeneous). 'Functional differences' is to distinguish it from the seven pravrtti-vijnanas (sapta-pravrtti-vijnana, seven active consciousnesses), etc. From the perspective of the seed produced, although it is hetu-pratyaya (hetu-pratyaya, cause and condition), it can also personally produce the result, but because it is pratyutpanna-dharma (pratyutpanna-dharma, present dharma), it is not called function. Therefore, 'function' is used to show the characteristics of the seed. Second, the distinction between ekatva (ekatva, oneness) and nanatva (nanatva, difference). Treatise: This and mula-vijnana (mula-vijnana, root consciousness) are na-ekatva-na-nanatva (na-ekatva-na-nanatva, neither one nor different). Commentary: The seed is neither one nor different from the asraya (asraya, the dependent) and the result produced. This is establishing the proposition. Why is this so? Treatise: The principle of svabhava (svabhava, nature), karitra (karitra, function), hetu (hetu, cause), and phala (phala, result) should be like this. Commentary:

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。本識是體。種子是用。種子是因。所生是果。此之二法理應如是。不一不異。本識望種。四出體中攝相歸性故皆無記。種從現行望于本識。相用別論故通三性。若即是一。不可說為有因．果法有體．用法。若一向異。應穀麥等能生豆等。以許因果一向異故。不爾法滅應方有用。以許體．用一向異故。用．體相似氣勢必同。果．因相似。功能．狀貌可相隨順。非一向異然瑜伽抉擇第五十一末．五十二末廣說。而彼但言種望現法。即是此中因望果義。非唯種子望本識義。彼約因．果門。此亦體．用門。

清辨等宗．譬喻師等。第三問答辨假．實門。如生望法非一異。即說生為假。種望於法非是一異。種子應非實。

論。雖非一異至非因緣故。

述曰。生等假法。如龜毛等體是無法。非因緣故。種子望法即是因緣故體實有　問生等既如無。應非行蘊攝。答依法施設故。故是行蘊收。然法非果。生非是因。即於法上假施設故。亦有唯于現行等法。或種上立。故例不同。種子非現行。因．果差別故。

論。此與諸法至是假非實。

述曰。此安惠等難　問生等與法非因果。不可例同於種子者。此與諸法既非一異有因果故。應如瓶等是假非實。瓶為假果體。色等為因故。

論。若爾真如至真

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，根本識）是本體，種子是作用。種子是因，所生之法是果。這兩種法理應如此，不一亦不異。從阿賴耶識來看種子，因為四種流出之法在本體中攝相歸性，所以都是無記性（中性）。從現行法來看種子，相對於阿賴耶識，相和用是分別討論的，所以通於三性（善、惡、無記）。如果種子和阿賴耶識完全是一，就不能說有因果法，有本體和作用。如果完全是異，就應該像穀麥等能生豆等，因為允許因果完全相異。如果不是這樣，法滅就應該方能有用，因為允許本體和作用完全相異。作用和本體相似，氣勢必定相同。果和因相似，功能和狀貌可以相互隨順，不是完全相異。然而，《瑜伽師地論·抉擇分》第五十一末和第五十二末有廣說。那裡只是說種子相對於現行法，就是這裡因相對於果的意義。不是僅僅種子相對於阿賴耶識的意義。那裡是約因果門說的，這裡也是約本體作用門說的。 清辨（Bhāvaviveka）等宗派、譬喻師等，第三個問答辨別假和實。就像生相對於法不是一也不是異，就說生是假。種子相對於法不是一也不是異，種子應該不是實。 論：雖然不是一異，以至於不是因緣的緣故。 述記：生等假法，就像龜毛等，本體是無法，因為不是因緣的緣故。種子相對於法，就是因緣的緣故，本體是實有的。問：生等既然像沒有一樣，應該不屬於行蘊所攝。答：依法施設的緣故，所以是行蘊所攝。然而法不是果，生不是因，就在法上假施設的緣故。也有僅僅在現行等法，或者種子上建立。所以例子不同。種子不是現行，因為因果有差別。 論：此與諸法，以至於是假非實。 述記：這是安慧（Sthiramati）等人的責難。問：生等與法不是因果，不可以類比于種子。此與諸法既然不是一異，有因果的緣故，應該像瓶等是假非實。瓶是假果，色等是因的緣故。 論：如果這樣，真如（Tathatā）...

【English Translation】 English version: The Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness, fundamental consciousness) is the substance, and the seeds are its function. Seeds are the cause, and what is produced is the effect. These two dharmas should be like this, neither one nor different. From the perspective of the Ālaya-vijñāna looking at the seeds, because the four outflows are gathered back to their nature within the substance, they are all indeterminate (neutral). From the perspective of the manifest phenomena looking at the seeds, in relation to the Ālaya-vijñāna, the characteristics and functions are discussed separately, so they encompass the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate). If the seeds and the Ālaya-vijñāna were completely one, it could not be said that there are causal dharmas, and that there is substance and function. If they were completely different, then things like grains and wheat should be able to produce beans, because it is allowed that cause and effect are completely different. If it were not so, then when the dharma ceases, it should then be useful, because it is allowed that substance and function are completely different. Function and substance are similar, and their momentum must be the same. Effect and cause are similar, and their functions and appearances can follow each other, not being completely different. However, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra's Decision Chapter, the end of the fifty-first and the end of the fifty-second, explains this extensively. There, it only speaks of seeds in relation to manifest phenomena, which is the meaning of cause in relation to effect here. It is not merely the meaning of seeds in relation to the Ālaya-vijñāna. That speaks from the perspective of cause and effect, and this also speaks from the perspective of substance and function. The schools of Bhāvaviveka and the Exemplifiers, etc., in the third question and answer, distinguish between the false and the real. Just as arising in relation to dharma is neither one nor different, arising is said to be false. Seeds in relation to dharma are neither one nor different, so seeds should not be real. Treatise: Although they are neither one nor different, to the extent that it is not because of a causal relationship. Commentary: False dharmas such as arising, like turtle hair, have no substance because they are not due to a causal relationship. Seeds in relation to dharma are due to a causal relationship, so their substance is real. Question: Since arising is like non-existence, it should not be included in the aggregate of formations. Answer: Because it is established according to the dharma, it is included in the aggregate of formations. However, dharma is not an effect, and arising is not a cause, because it is falsely established on the dharma. There are also cases where it is established only on manifest phenomena or on seeds. Therefore, the examples are different. Seeds are not manifest phenomena because there is a difference between cause and effect. Treatise: This in relation to all dharmas, to the extent that it is false and not real. Commentary: This is the criticism of Sthiramati and others. Question: Arising and dharma are not cause and effect, so they cannot be compared to seeds. Since this in relation to all dharmas is neither one nor different, and there is cause and effect, it should be like a vase, which is false and not real. The vase is a false effect, and form etc. are the cause. Treatise: If that is so, the Suchness (Tathatā)...

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勝義諦。

述曰。此論主質。如與諸法既非一異。應是假有。如種子故。真如是法性。與法不一異如前已解。故得為喻。此難清辨．安惠等　設彼救言。真如亦假。不起故。如空華。許則便無真勝義諦。真勝義諦若許無者。約誰說有世俗諦耶。何有涅槃。而有造修求成佛等。蘊．處．界等通真．俗諦。真如唯真名真勝義。

自下第四二諦分別。問真如非假是勝義有。種亦應然。實有體故。

論。然諸種子至不同真如。

述曰。謂此種子唯世俗諦說為實有。不同真如。真如唯是勝義勝義。種子不然。非唯勝義。亦通世俗。道理世俗故。今顯異於勝義。故說唯依世俗。非不通勝義也。又依瑜伽等勝義唯一非安立諦。故種言唯。真唯勝義。據實種子亦通勝義。又于俗諦中可名實有。推入勝義虛妄假法。真如隨在二諦皆實。依詮勝義亦是實故。若非安立唯有一種。此即諦唯。不通真故。若立四勝義。此是實唯。勝義諦中假故。此助瑜伽會於此等。瑜伽並有誠文同此。此則通說一切有漏．無漏種子。義皆同故。

第五有漏種子依本識何分。即是四分分別門也。

論。種子雖依至相分非余。

述曰。此種雖依異熟識體。即是依于自體分也。亦非見分。見分一向緣前境故。是自體分義用

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya，最終真理）。

述曰：此為本論的主要內容。如果它與諸法既非同一也非相異，那麼它應當是假有，就像種子一樣。真如（Tathatā，事物的真實本性）是法性（Dharmatā，法的本性），它與法非一非異，如前已解釋。因此，可以用種子作為比喻。這種詰難，清辨（Śuddhamati）和安慧（Sthiramati）等人可以辨析。

假設他們辯解說：『真如也是假有的，因為它不起作用，就像空中的花朵。』如果承認這一點，那麼就沒有真實的勝義諦了。如果承認沒有真實的勝義諦，那麼依據什麼來說有世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）呢？又怎麼會有涅槃（Nirvāṇa，解脫），以及造作、修行、求成佛等等呢？蘊（Skandha，五蘊）、處（Āyatana，十二處）、界（Dhātu，十八界）等都通於真諦和俗諦。真如唯獨是真，名為真勝義。

下面第四部分是二諦的分別。問：真如不是假有，是勝義有，那麼種子也應當如此，因為它有真實的體性。

論：然而，諸種子與真如不同。

述曰：這裡所說的種子，只是在世俗諦中才說是實有，與真如不同。真如唯獨是勝義勝義，種子則不然，它不僅是勝義，也通於世俗。道理是世俗的緣故。現在是爲了顯示它與勝義的不同，所以說唯依世俗，並非不通勝義。又依據《瑜伽師地論》等，勝義諦是唯一的，不是安立諦。所以說種子是『唯』。真如是『唯』勝義。就實際情況而言，種子也通於勝義。又在俗諦中可以稱為實有，推入勝義則成為虛妄假法。真如無論在哪個二諦中都是真實的，因為它依據詮釋勝義也是真實的。如果是非安立，只有一種，那麼這就只是諦，不通於真。如果安立四種勝義，那麼這就是『實唯』，因為在勝義諦中是假的。這有助於《瑜伽師地論》會通這些內容。《瑜伽師地論》中有誠實的文句與此相同。這裡是通說一切有漏（Sāsrava，有煩惱的）、無漏（Anāsrava，無煩惱的）種子，意義都相同。

第五部分是有漏種子依據本識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）的哪個部分？這就是四分（Catur-bhāga，四部分）分別的門。

論：種子雖然依于異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，異熟識），但依于相分（Nimitta-bhāga，相分），不是其他。

述曰：這種子雖然依于異熟識的體，也就是依于自體分（Sva-bhāga，自體分）。也不是見分（Darśana-bhāga，見分），因為見分一向緣於前境，是自體分的義用。

【English Translation】 English version: Paramārtha-satya (Ultimate Truth).

Commentary: This is the main subject of this treatise. If it is neither identical nor different from all dharmas, then it should be provisionally existent, like a seed. Tathatā (suchness, the true nature of things) is Dharmatā (the nature of dharma), which is neither identical nor different from dharma, as explained earlier. Therefore, a seed can be used as a metaphor. This challenge can be clarified by Śuddhamati (Pure Intelligence) and Sthiramati (Steadfast Intelligence) and others.

Suppose they argue: 'Tathatā is also provisionally existent because it does not arise, like a flower in the sky.' If this is admitted, then there is no real Paramārtha-satya. If it is admitted that there is no real Paramārtha-satya, then based on what is it said that there is Saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth)? How can there be Nirvāṇa (liberation), and the creation, practice, seeking to achieve Buddhahood, etc.? Skandhas (aggregates), Āyatanas (sense bases), Dhātus (elements), etc., all pertain to both ultimate and conventional truths. Tathatā alone is true, and is called true Paramārtha.

The fourth part below is the distinction between the two truths. Question: If Tathatā is not provisionally existent but ultimately existent, then seeds should also be so, because they have a real substance.

Treatise: However, seeds are different from Tathatā.

Commentary: The seeds mentioned here are said to be real only in Saṃvṛti-satya, and are different from Tathatā. Tathatā alone is Paramārtha-satya, but seeds are not, as they pertain not only to Paramārtha but also to Saṃvṛti. The reason is that it is conventional. Now, to show its difference from Paramārtha, it is said to rely only on Saṃvṛti, not that it does not pertain to Paramārtha. Moreover, according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and others, Paramārtha-satya is unique and not an established truth. Therefore, it is said that seeds are 'only'. Tathatā is 'only' Paramārtha. In reality, seeds also pertain to Paramārtha. Also, in Saṃvṛti-satya, it can be called real, but when pushed into Paramārtha, it becomes an illusory and provisional dharma. Tathatā is real in both truths, because it is also real according to the interpretation of Paramārtha. If it is non-established, there is only one kind, then this is only truth, not pertaining to reality. If four kinds of Paramārtha are established, then this is 'real only', because it is false in Paramārtha-satya. This helps the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra to reconcile these contents. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra has sincere statements that are the same as this. This is a general explanation of all Sāsrava (with afflictions) and Anāsrava (without afflictions) seeds, and the meanings are all the same.

The fifth part is, which part of the Ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness) do the Sāsrava seeds rely on? This is the door to the distinction of the four parts (Catur-bhāga).

Treatise: Although seeds rely on the Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness), they rely on the Nimitta-bhāga (objective aspect), not others.

Commentary: Although these seeds rely on the substance of the Vipāka-vijñāna, that is, they rely on the Sva-bhāga (self-aspect). It is not the Darśana-bhāga (subjective aspect), because the Darśana-bhāga always relates to the preceding object, and is the meaning and function of the Sva-bhāga.

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別故。非受熏故。此言種子依識自體。自體即是所受熏處。不可見分初受余熏。種后便依自體分住。此論依附。即依自體。若據別攝。即相分攝。非見等攝。即是見分緣自證分差別功能。以為相分。非是緣于自證分體。若不爾。即無證自證分。又說見分但緣外故。

何故不是自體分攝。

論。見分恒取此為境故。

述曰。此護法釋。見分恒緣故是相分。即是識體功能義分。故成相分。真如亦是識之自證。應為相分。真如是識實性攝故。既稱無相不同種子。種子非是識實性故。故為相分。真如但是識之性攝。體實無相。見分唯不緣識自體　若護月師。今解。無色界以無內身色先厭色故。且說緣種。隱器色不論。瑜伽文非盡理也。若舊相傳。護月師。唯種依識見分而住。自證分緣唯三分故。瑜伽五十一說。生無色者第八唯緣內種子者。依自證分所緣境說。既爾生無色不還聖者等第八見分。緣何為境。必不當生欲．色界故。雖當不生。許通緣故。如下當辨。

自下第六三性分別。

論。諸有漏種至無記性攝。

述曰。此有漏種與本第八體無別故。性類是同。唯是無記。

論。因果俱有至亦名善等。

述曰。能所生法皆通善等。故通三性。謂此種子本能熏習現行之因。及后

所生現行之果。皆通三性。故言因果俱善等性。即是功能差別門說。非依體門性唯無記。如前已說。

問何故爾　答不相違。無記不違善．惡品故。對法三末。及第四初。等起善等即是種子。此三性同。及瑜伽論九十六云。謂十八界各決定有差別種子。廣解種子稍勝餘文。

此辨有漏種。無漏種云何。

論。諸無漏種至唯名為善。

述曰。此無漏種非異熟識性所攝故。故非無記。體性不順本識體故。體既不同。不可相即。又性類別。能治．所治漏．無漏殊。不可相即。故一性言。義乃合通體．類二種。既不從識名無記性。此為何性。因果俱是善性攝故。唯名為善。若法爾種。前念同類因。本性是善。后念等流果。是善亦然。乃至後生現行果。亦爾。既法爾力非第八性之所攝故。因是善性亦無有過。此即種子未熏習位。自類相望有如是義。若后熏習。由見道前聞．思等熏。令其增長。雖有漏因。增上緣中為果增長。然亦名善。見道已去理顯可知。故唯善性非惡．無記。法爾一切無漏之法。順理。違生。無惡．無記。

問曰。無漏與識性類別。不得隨識名無記。無漏與識體不同。應非隨識名異熟。為有此義故次論問。

論。若爾何故至皆異熟生。

述曰。第五十七抉擇分說。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：所產生的現行之果，都通於三種性質（三性：善性、惡性、無記性）。所以說『因果都是善等性質』，這是從功能差別方面說的。如果從本體方面來說，性質就只是無記性，如前面已經說過的。

問：為什麼這樣說？答：不相違背。因為無記性不違背善和惡的品類。對法論第三末，以及第四最初，等起善等就是種子。這三種性質相同。以及瑜伽師地論第九十六卷說：『十八界各自決定有差別種子。』詳細解釋種子比其他文章稍勝一籌。

這裡辨別有漏種子。無漏種子又是什麼樣的呢？

論：諸無漏種子乃至唯名為善。

述曰：這無漏種子不是異熟識（第八識）的性質所包含的，所以不是無記性。體性不順從根本識的本體。本體既然不同，就不可相互即是。又性質類別不同，能調伏和所調伏的，有漏和無漏不同，不可相互即是。所以說『一性』，意義乃是合通本體和類別兩種。既然不從識而名為無記性，那麼這是什麼性質呢？因為因和果都是善性所包含的，所以唯名為善。如果是法爾種子，前念是同類因，本性是善，后念等流果，是善也是這樣。乃至後生現行果，也是這樣。既然是法爾力，不是第八識的性質所包含的，所以因是善性也沒有過失。這指的是種子未熏習的階段，自類相望有這樣的意義。如果後來熏習，由見道前聞、思等熏習，使其增長。雖有漏因，在增上緣中為果增長，然而也名為善。見道以後道理顯而易見。所以唯是善性，不是惡和無記。法爾一切無漏之法，順理，違背生死，沒有惡和無記。

問：無漏和識的性質類別不同，不能隨識而名為無記。無漏和識的本體不同，應該不隨識而名為異熟。爲了有這個意義，所以接著論問：

論：如果這樣，為什麼乃至都是異熟所生？

述曰：第五十七抉擇分說。

【English Translation】 English version: The resulting manifest effects that arise all partake of the three natures (three natures: wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral). Therefore, it is said that 'both cause and effect are of wholesome and similar natures,' which is spoken of from the perspective of functional differences. If considered from the perspective of substance, the nature would only be neutral, as previously stated.

Question: Why is it so? Answer: It is not contradictory. Because the neutral nature does not contradict the categories of wholesome and unwholesome. In the third section of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the beginning of the fourth, the arising of wholesome, etc., are the seeds. These three natures are the same. Also, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, ninety-sixth fascicle, says: 'Each of the eighteen realms definitely has different seeds.' The detailed explanation of seeds is slightly superior to other texts.

Here, the defiled seeds are distinguished. What are the undefiled seeds like?

Treatise: All undefiled seeds are even solely named wholesome.

Commentary: These undefiled seeds are not included in the nature of the Vipāka-consciousness (eighth consciousness), so they are not neutral. The substance does not accord with the substance of the fundamental consciousness. Since the substances are different, they cannot be identical. Moreover, the categories of natures are different; what can be tamed and what is to be tamed, the defiled and the undefiled are different, and cannot be identical. Therefore, the term 'one nature' means that it combines both substance and category. Since it is not named neutral because of the consciousness, what is its nature? Because both cause and effect are included in the wholesome nature, it is solely named wholesome. If it is a naturally occurring seed, the previous thought is a cause of the same kind, and its inherent nature is wholesome; the subsequent thought, the equable flow effect, is also wholesome in the same way. Even the later arising manifest effect is also like this. Since it is the power of natural occurrence and is not included in the nature of the eighth consciousness, there is no fault in the cause being wholesome. This refers to the stage where the seed has not been perfumed. From the perspective of its own kind, it has such a meaning. If it is later perfumed, it is increased by the perfuming of hearing, thinking, etc., before the Path of Seeing. Although there is a defiled cause, it increases as an effect in the condition of the dominant cause, but it is also named wholesome. After the Path of Seeing, the principle is clear and understandable. Therefore, it is solely of a wholesome nature and is not unwholesome or neutral. All undefiled dharmas that occur naturally accord with principle and contradict birth and death, and are without unwholesome and neutral.

Question: The nature and category of the undefiled and consciousness are different, so it cannot be named neutral following the consciousness. The substance of the undefiled and consciousness are different, so it should not be named Vipāka following the consciousness. In order to have this meaning, the treatise then asks:

Treatise: If so, why are all even born of Vipāka?

Commentary: The fifty-seventh section of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says.

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二十二根一切皆有異熟種子。又說一切皆異熟生。此為二問。一異熟種。二異熟生。

論。雖名異熟至名異熟種。

述曰。此諸種子雖名異熟。而非無記。何故爾也。體非異熟。由所依識是異熟故名異熟種。

若爾此等體非無記。依無記故應名無記。

論。異性相依如眼等識。

述曰。如眼等識異性相依。從根為名但名眼識。即依士釋。依眼根識名眼識也。不可說言識依眼故亦名無記。應返質云。無漏依識名異熟。亦令從識名無記。識依于眼名眼識。應亦從眼名無記。此既不爾彼云何然。故無漏種不名無記。此除佛無漏。即齊義解。

又有不齊釋。

論。或無漏種至所攝異熟。

述曰。此無漏種由熏習力轉變成熟。與本種異立異熟名。即轉變已而方成熟能生現行。非如善．惡而為因故。所招無記性所攝之異熟。非是因果性別云異。果起酬因說名為熟之異熟也。此通佛果諸無漏種。又設除佛。此中但言經熏習氣。非未熏時自類變異而成熟位。所以者何。如前已解。如眼識等。即唯自類未熏時義。今此中解即熏已位。又復前解通熏．未熏。此解但據已熏之種。據顯偏說。又前解通熏已．未熏。今解據三家種子無諍義。法爾自類有不許故。若言熏者諸皆許故。前約本有等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二十二、一切皆有異熟種子，又說一切皆是異熟所生。這是兩個問題：一是異熟種子，二是異熟所生。

論：雖然名為異熟，乃至名為異熟種子。

述曰：這些種子雖然名為異熟，但並非無記（既非善，也非惡）。為什麼呢？本體並非異熟，因為所依之識是異熟，所以名為異熟種子。

如果這樣，這些種子的本體並非無記，因為依于無記，應該名為無記。

論：就像眼等識一樣，異性相互依存。

述曰：就像眼等識，異性相互依存，因依于根而得名，只稱為眼識。這是依士釋（一種解釋方法）。依于眼根的識，名為眼識。不能說因為識依于眼，所以也名為無記。應該反駁說，無漏依于識，名為異熟，也應該從識而名為無記。識依于眼，名為眼識，也應該從眼而名為無記。既然這樣不行，那又怎麼能說無漏種子名為無記呢？所以無漏種子不名為無記。這裡排除了佛的無漏，只是齊義解釋。

還有不齊的解釋。

論：或者無漏種子，乃至所攝的異熟。

述曰：這種無漏種子由於熏習的力量，轉變成熟，與本來的種子不同，所以立為異熟之名。即轉變之後才成熟，能夠產生現行（實際的行為）。不像善、惡那樣作為因，所招感的無記性所攝的異熟。不是因果的類別不同，果報的生起是爲了酬償因，所以說名為熟的異熟。這包括佛果的各種無漏種子。又假設排除佛，這裡只說經過熏習的氣息，並非未熏習時，自類變異而成熟。為什麼呢？如前已解釋，如眼識等，只是自類未熏習時的意義。現在這裡解釋的是熏習之後的狀態。而且前面的解釋通於熏習和未熏習，這裡的解釋只是根據已熏習的種子。這是據顯偏說。而且前面的解釋通於熏習和未熏習，現在的解釋是根據三家種子沒有爭議的意義。法爾（自然如此）自類有人不認可，如果說是熏習，大家都認可。前面是約本有等（關於種子本有等問題的討論）。

【English Translation】 English version 22. All have Vipāka (resultant) seeds, and it is said that all are born from Vipāka. These are two questions: one is Vipāka seeds, and the other is born from Vipāka.

Treatise: Although named Vipāka, even named Vipāka seeds.

Commentary: Although these seeds are named Vipāka, they are not indeterminate (neither good nor evil). Why? The substance is not Vipāka, because the consciousness on which it relies is Vipāka, hence it is named Vipāka seeds.

If so, the substance of these is not indeterminate, because it relies on the indeterminate, it should be named indeterminate.

Treatise: Like eye consciousness and so on, different natures rely on each other.

Commentary: Like eye consciousness and so on, different natures rely on each other, named after the root on which it relies, only called eye consciousness. This is an appositional explanation. The consciousness relying on the eye root is called eye consciousness. It cannot be said that because consciousness relies on the eye, it is also called indeterminate. It should be retorted that the unconditioned relies on consciousness, named Vipāka, it should also be named indeterminate from consciousness. Consciousness relies on the eye, named eye consciousness, it should also be named indeterminate from the eye. Since this is not the case, how can it be said that unconditioned seeds are named indeterminate? Therefore, unconditioned seeds are not named indeterminate. This excludes the unconditioned of the Buddha, it is just an explanation of equal meaning.

There is also an unequal explanation.

Treatise: Or unconditioned seeds, even the Vipāka included.

Commentary: This unconditioned seed, due to the power of habituation, transforms and matures, different from the original seed, hence the name Vipāka is established. That is, it matures after transformation and can produce actual behavior. Unlike good and evil, which act as causes, the Vipāka included in the indeterminate nature that is attracted. It is not that the categories of cause and effect are different, the arising of the result is to repay the cause, so it is said to be the Vipāka of maturity. This includes all kinds of unconditioned seeds of the Buddha's fruit. And suppose excluding the Buddha, here it only says the breath after being habituated, not the self-transformation and maturation when not habituated. Why? As explained before, like eye consciousness and so on, it is only the meaning of its own kind when not habituated. Now this explanation is the state after habituation. Moreover, the previous explanation applies to both habituated and unhabituated, this explanation is only based on the habituated seeds. This is based on a partial explanation. And the previous explanation applies to both habituated and unhabituated, the current explanation is based on the undisputed meaning of the three schools of seeds. Naturally, some people do not recognize its own kind, if it is said to be habituation, everyone recognizes it. The previous is about the inherent existence and so on (discussion about the inherent existence of seeds, etc.).

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義。此約新熏等義。故文差別。故瑜伽論二十二根皆名異熟。無處而言皆通無記。不可為難。如此文意諸論未詳。古昔文抄皆須譭棄。

第七新熏．本有分別。于中有三。初唯本有。上古已來多說如此。今護法論師。敘近者護月等義。

論。此中有義至不從熏生。

述曰。于中有四。一標宗。二釋難。三引證。四立理。此即標宗。一切有漏．無漏種子皆法爾有。非是本無今從熏生。

論。由熏習力但可增長。

述曰。此言即是會諸經論第二子段也。諸經論言由熏習有。此謂增長。非新成故。此中本有寧異僧佉彼是常故。此有生滅。

自下第三引有漏．無漏皆本有經等。

論。如契經說至法爾而有。

述曰。自下第三引證有三也。初引有漏．無漏通經。次引唯無漏經。後有漏例同。大莊嚴論亦引此經。名無盡意。此即三乘通訊之經。毗婆沙等前分亦有此文。既言無始時來有種種界。故知。有漏無漏種子。皆是無始法爾而有。其惡叉形。如無食子。落在地時多為聚故。以為喻也。

論。界即種子差別名故。

述曰。此中言界。界即種子差別之名。故知種子皆法爾有。

此下第二是阿毗達磨經。即大乘通用。

論。又契經說至界是因義。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 意義。這指的是新熏習等意義。因此經文有所差別。所以《瑜伽師地論》說二十二根都名為異熟，但沒有地方說它們都通於無記性，所以不能以此來詰難。像這樣的文意，在其他論著中沒有詳細說明，過去古人的文抄都應該譭棄。 第七，新熏和本有之間的分別。其中有三種說法。第一種是唯有本有。從上古以來，多數人都這樣說。現在護法論師敘述了近代的護月等人所持的意義。 論：『此中有義至不從熏生。』 述記：於此有四部分：一、標明宗旨；二、解釋疑問；三、引經作證；四、建立道理。這裡是標明宗旨。一切有漏（sāsrava，指有煩惱的）和無漏（anāsrava，指沒有煩惱的）的種子，都是本來就有的，不是本來沒有，現在才從熏習而生。 論：『由熏習力但可增長。』 述記：這句話就是會通各種經論的第二部分。各種經論說由熏習而有，這裡說是增長，不是新產生的緣故。這裡所說的本有和僧佉（Sāṃkhya，數論派）的本有有什麼不同呢？他們的本有是常恒不變的，而這裡的本有是有生滅變化的。 下面第三部分是引證有漏和無漏都是本有的經文等。 論：『如契經說至法爾而有。』 述記：下面第三部分是引證，有三個方面。首先是引證有漏和無漏共通的經文，其次是引證唯有無漏的經文，最後是有漏的例子與此相同。《大莊嚴論》也引用了這部經，名為《無盡意》。這是三乘（triyāna，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）共通的經典。《毗婆沙論》等的前一部分也有這段文字。既然說從無始時來就有種種界（dhātu，種子），所以知道有漏和無漏的種子，都是從無始以來本來就有的。它的形狀像惡叉（akṣa，印度的一種果實）的形狀，像沒有吃過的果實，落在地上時多會聚集在一起，所以用它來作比喻。 論：『界即種子差別名故。』 述記：這裡說界，界就是種子的差別名稱。所以知道種子都是本來就有的。 下面第二部分是《阿毗達磨經》，這是大乘（mahāyāna）通用的。 論：『又契經說至界是因義。』

【English Translation】 English version: Meaning. This refers to meanings such as newly acquired imprints. Therefore, there are differences in the texts. Hence, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states that the twenty-two faculties are all called vipāka (異熟, resultant), but nowhere does it say that they all pertain to the indeterminate (avyākṛta, 無記). Therefore, it is not valid to use this as an objection. Such textual meanings are not detailed in other treatises, and old transcripts should all be discarded. Seventh, the distinction between newly acquired imprints and innate seeds. There are three views on this. The first is that only innate seeds exist. This has been the prevailing view since ancient times. Now, the Dharmapāla (護法) master narrates the meanings held by Hūramati (護月) and others of recent times. Treatise: 'Here, there is a meaning that [seeds] are not produced from imprints.' Commentary: Here, there are four parts: 1. stating the thesis; 2. explaining the difficulty; 3. citing evidence; 4. establishing the principle. This is stating the thesis. All seeds, whether sāsrava (有漏, with outflows) or anāsrava (無漏, without outflows), exist by nature. They are not originally non-existent and now produced from imprints. Treatise: 'Due to the power of imprints, they can only increase.' Commentary: This statement is the second part of reconciling the various sutras and treatises. The various sutras and treatises say that they exist due to imprints, but this means they increase, not that they are newly formed. How does this innate existence differ from that of the Sāṃkhya (僧佉, Samkhya school)? Their innate existence is permanent, while this existence is subject to arising and ceasing. Below, the third part cites sutras, etc., to prove that both sāsrava and anāsrava are innate. Treatise: 'As the sutra says, [the seeds] exist by nature.' Commentary: Below, the third part is citing evidence, and there are three aspects. First, it cites sutras common to both sāsrava and anāsrava. Second, it cites sutras that only pertain to anāsrava. Finally, the example of sāsrava is the same. The Mahāvyūha-sūtra (大莊嚴論) also cites this sutra, called Anantamatī (無盡意). This is a sutra common to the three vehicles (triyāna, 三乘, Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna). The first part of the Vibhāṣā (毗婆沙論) etc., also has this passage. Since it says that there have been various dhātu (界, elements/seeds) since beginningless time, it is known that the seeds of both sāsrava and anāsrava exist by nature since beginningless time. Its shape is like the shape of an akṣa (惡叉, Indian fruit), like uneaten fruits, when they fall on the ground, they often gather together, so it is used as a metaphor. Treatise: 'Dhātu is just a different name for seeds.' Commentary: Here it says dhātu, dhātu is just a different name for seeds. Therefore, it is known that seeds all exist by nature. Below, the second part is the Abhidharma-sūtra (阿毗達磨經), which is commonly used in Mahāyāna (大乘). Treatise: 'Also, the sutra says that dhātu means cause.'

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述曰。此證種子亦無始有。如下自解。此合二經。

此下所引。如瑜伽論第三卷說。

論。瑜伽亦說至新所熏發。

述曰。由此故知。有漏．無漏種皆本有。然新染凈熏發之中。有漏凈染熏于有漏本有種增。有漏凈及無漏。復發本有無漏種增也。

又第三卷次前上文。

論。諸有情類至菩提種子。

述曰。法者道理義也。有般涅槃之義。名般涅槃法。此中意說。有漏．無漏並有名具。非無法爾種而可言具足．不具足。故即二論證有．無漏種皆是本有。

論。如是等文誠證非一。

述曰。此則曲結有漏無漏合法爾經。

論。又諸有情至不由熏生。

述曰。此第二引經論通證。即是十卷入楞伽第二卷。無上依經上卷。善勇猛般若第一卷。大般若經第五百九十三卷。說前種姓。大莊嚴論第一卷末種姓品。及此瑜伽第二十一聲聞地。皆說有五種姓別。故應定有法爾無漏種子。不由熏生。

論。又瑜伽說至是種非現。

述曰。第二偏引無漏本有。即瑜伽論五十七卷二十二根中。地獄成就三無漏根。種子非現。

論。又從無始至本性住姓。

述曰。此地持．善戒經．菩薩地並是。第一種姓品云。又從無始展轉傳來法爾所得本性住姓。即

是菩薩本性住姓。彼有六處言。取唯第六處。阿賴耶中有此種故。

論。由此等證至不從熏生。

述曰。即結無漏。由此三文。證無漏種法爾本有不新熏生。

下準有漏亦法爾有。

論。有漏亦應至不別熏生。

述曰。無漏種子無始不起。經論誠說有法爾種故。有漏種無始曾起故。無分明別說之教。設無如上通證有漏之經論者。義準亦應有法爾種。

上雖引經。此有何理。

論。如是建立因果不亂。

述曰。第四立理。即諸法種子初但有一物。後生果時可無雜亂。若更有新熏。或唯新熏者。種子便多。後生果時從何種起。新熏．法爾功能既齊。有生．不生因果便亂。若二種子共生一芽。外麥．豆等例亦應爾。若新唯一種理亦不然。不可初熏后不熏故。比量齊故。如我所立因果無亂。然無漏種未增長位名本性住姓。后增長已名習所成姓。有漏亦爾。本有未熏增名本性住種。后熏增已名習所成。若唯新熏說何以為本性住種。若無本有無漏種子者。見道如何生。

自下第二唯新熏。即勝軍祖師難陀尊者義。

論。有義種子皆熏故生。

述曰。于中有四。一立宗。二釋難。三引證。四解違。此第一也。一切有漏無漏種子法爾新生。此第一立宗也。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這是關於菩薩本性住姓（菩薩原本具有的種性）的討論。其中提到了六處，但只取第六處，因為阿賴耶識（第八識，儲存一切種子）中存在這種種子的緣故。

論：由此等證據可以證明，種子並非完全由熏習產生。

述記：這是總結無漏種（超越煩惱的種子）。通過以上三段文字，證明無漏種子是法爾本有（本來就存在），而不是新熏生的。

下面推論有漏種（具有煩惱的種子）也是法爾本有。

論：有漏種子也應該如此，並非完全由熏習產生。

述記：無漏種子無始以來沒有生起（煩惱），經典和論典都明確說明存在法爾的種子。有漏種子無始以來曾經生起（煩惱），沒有明確的教義說明它。假設沒有像上面那樣普遍證明有漏種子的經典和論典，那麼根據道理也應該認為存在法爾的種子。

上面雖然引用了經典，但有什麼道理呢？

論：這樣建立，因果就不會混亂。

述記：第四點是建立道理。即諸法的種子最初只有一種，後來產生果實的時候才不會雜亂。如果還有新熏的種子，或者只有新熏的種子，那麼種子就會很多，後來產生果實的時候從哪一種種子生起呢？新熏的種子和法爾的種子功能既然相同，那麼有生和不生的因果就會混亂。如果兩種種子共同產生一個芽，那麼外面的麥子和豆子等也應該如此。如果只有新熏的種子，道理也不對。不可能最初熏習，後來不熏習，因為比量是相同的。像我所建立的，因果就不會混亂。然而，無漏種子在沒有增長的時候叫做本性住姓，後來增長了以後叫做習所成姓（通過後天熏習形成的種性）。有漏種子也是這樣，本有的種子在沒有熏習增長的時候叫做本性住種，後來熏習增長了以後叫做習所成種。如果只有新熏的種子，那麼說什麼叫做本性住種呢？如果沒有本有的無漏種子，那麼見道（證悟真理）如何產生呢？

下面第二種觀點是唯有新熏，即勝軍祖師（Jitsugun）和難陀尊者（Nanda）的觀點。

論：有觀點認為，一切種子都是通過熏習而產生的。

述記：其中有四個部分：一是立宗，二是解釋疑問，三是引用證據，四是解釋矛盾。這是第一部分。一切有漏和無漏的種子都是法爾新生（通過熏習產生），這是第一點立宗。

【English Translation】 English version: This is a discussion about the Bodhisattva's inherent nature lineage (Bodhisattva's original nature). It mentions the six senses, but only takes the sixth sense because the Alaya consciousness (the eighth consciousness, storing all seeds) contains this seed.

Treatise: From these evidences, it can be proved that seeds are not entirely produced by conditioning.

Commentary: This is a conclusion about the unconditioned seeds (seeds beyond afflictions). Through the above three passages, it proves that unconditioned seeds are inherently existent (originally exist) and not newly conditioned.

The following infers that conditioned seeds (seeds with afflictions) are also inherently existent.

Treatise: Conditioned seeds should also be like this, not entirely produced by conditioning.

Commentary: Unconditioned seeds have not arisen (afflictions) since the beginningless past. The sutras and treatises clearly state that there are inherently existent seeds. Conditioned seeds have arisen (afflictions) since the beginningless past, and there is no clear teaching about it. Assuming that there are no sutras and treatises that universally prove conditioned seeds like the above, then according to reason, it should also be considered that there are inherently existent seeds.

Although the above quoted the sutras, what is the reason?

Treatise: Establishing it in this way, cause and effect will not be confused.

Commentary: The fourth point is to establish the reason. That is, the seeds of all dharmas initially have only one kind, and later when producing fruits, they will not be mixed up. If there are also newly conditioned seeds, or only newly conditioned seeds, then there will be many seeds, and later when producing fruits, from which seed will they arise? Since the functions of newly conditioned seeds and inherently existent seeds are the same, then the cause and effect of arising and not arising will be confused. If two kinds of seeds jointly produce a sprout, then the external wheat and beans, etc., should also be like this. If there are only newly conditioned seeds, the reason is also not right. It is impossible to condition initially and not condition later, because the analogy is the same. Like what I have established, cause and effect will not be confused. However, unconditioned seeds are called inherent nature lineage when they have not grown, and later they are called acquired nature lineage (lineage formed through acquired conditioning) after they have grown. Conditioned seeds are also like this, inherent seeds are called inherent nature seeds when they have not been conditioned and grown, and later they are called acquired nature seeds after they have been conditioned and grown. If there are only newly conditioned seeds, then what is called inherent nature seeds? If there are no inherently existent unconditioned seeds, then how does the path of seeing (realizing the truth) arise?

The following second view is that only newly conditioned, which is the view of Master Jitsugun (勝軍祖師) and Venerable Nanda (難陀尊者).

Treatise: Some views hold that all seeds are produced through conditioning.

Commentary: There are four parts to it: first, establishing the thesis; second, explaining the doubts; third, citing evidence; and fourth, explaining the contradictions. This is the first part. All conditioned and unconditioned seeds are newly produced by conditioning (法爾新生), this is the first point of establishing the thesis.

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自下第二釋難。

論。所熏能熏至無始成就。

述曰。非無漏能熏亦無始有故。有漏種子無始成就。即是難陀會前所引一切無始有漏種文。

論。種子既是至花熏故生。

述曰。此種子者。習氣異名。習氣之法必由熏有。如胡麻中所有香氣華熏故生。西方欲作涂身香油。先以香華和于苣勝。聚之一處令便極爛。后以押油。油遂香馥。故攝論第二說華熏苣勝。非華習氣不熏苣勝。苣勝之氣而是本有。故諸習氣必由熏生。此即理也。

次第三引經證也。

論。如契經說至之所積集。

述曰。由此經中。不言不由染．凈熏習諸種積集。故知諸種皆是新熏。此引即是多界經也。

論。論說內種至或有或無。

述曰。攝論第二無著云。外或無熏習。非內種。應知聞等熏習無果生非道理。故無內種不由熏有。外種之中華熏苣勝香氣是有。從炭．牛糞．毛。生苣勝．青蓮華根．及蒲。非彼俱生．俱滅互相重習。苣勝等生名為外種或無熏習。

論。又名言等至必藉熏生。

述曰。此中即是約教申理。其名言等三種熏習。總攝一切有漏種盡。彼既由熏其種方有。故有漏種必藉熏生。不爾名言等應攝種不盡。以法爾種非此攝故。

上來所引有漏種證。次第二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 下面第二部分是解釋疑問。

論：所熏和能熏，乃至無始成就。

述記：不是無漏法不能熏習，也不是無始就有的。所以有漏的種子是無始成就的。這就是難陀會之前所引用的『一切無始有漏種』的經文。

論：種子既然是，乃至花熏才生。

述記：這個種子，是習氣的另一種說法。習氣的產生必定通過熏習。就像胡麻中所有的香氣，是因為花的薰染才產生的。西方想要製作涂身香油，先用香花和苣勝（胡麻）混合在一起，堆積在一處讓其極度腐爛，然後用來榨油，油就變得香氣濃郁。所以《攝大乘論》第二卷說花熏苣勝。不是花的習氣不能薰染苣勝，苣勝的氣味本來就有的。所以各種習氣必定通過熏習產生，這就是道理。

下面第三部分是引用經文來證明。

論：如契經所說，乃至之所積集。

述記：因為這部經中，沒有說不由染污和清凈熏習，各種種子積集。所以知道各種種子都是新熏習產生的。這裡引用的就是《多界經》。

論：論說內種，乃至或有或無。

述記：《攝大乘論》第二卷，無著菩薩說：外種或者沒有熏習，不是內種。應該知道聽聞等的熏習沒有結果產生是不合道理的。所以沒有內種不是通過熏習產生的。外種之中，花熏苣勝的香氣是有的。從炭、牛糞、毛中，生出苣勝、青蓮花根以及蒲草。不是它們俱生俱滅，互相重複熏習。苣勝等產生，稱為外種，或者沒有熏習。

論：又名言等，乃至必藉熏生。

述記：這裡就是用教理來闡述道理。名言等三種熏習，總攝了一切有漏種子。它們既然通過熏習，種子才產生。所以有漏種子必定依靠熏習產生。否則名言等應該不能完全包含種子，因為法爾種子不被它包含。

【English Translation】 English version: The second part below explains the difficulties.

Treatise: What is perfumed and what can perfume, up to beginningless accomplishment.

Commentary: It is not that the unconditioned (anāsrava) cannot perfume, nor is it beginninglessly existent. Therefore, conditioned (sāsrava) seeds are beginninglessly accomplished. This is the passage 'all beginningless conditioned seeds' quoted before the Nandā assembly.

Treatise: Since the seed is, up to being produced by flower-perfuming.

Commentary: This seed is another name for habit-energy (vāsanā). The nature of habit-energy must arise from perfuming. Just as the fragrance in sesame seeds arises from the perfuming of flowers. In the West, if they want to make fragrant oil for anointing the body, they first mix fragrant flowers with sesame seeds, pile them up in one place and let them rot completely. Then they press the oil, and the oil becomes fragrant. Therefore, the second volume of the Saṃgraha says that flowers perfume sesame seeds. It is not that the habit-energy of flowers does not perfume sesame seeds, but that the scent of sesame seeds is originally present. Therefore, all habit-energies must arise from perfuming. This is the principle.

The third part below cites scriptures to prove it.

Treatise: As the sūtra says, up to what is accumulated.

Commentary: Because in this sūtra, it does not say that various seeds are accumulated without being perfumed by defilement and purity. Therefore, it is known that all seeds are newly perfumed. This citation is from the Bahudhātuka Sūtra.

Treatise: The treatise says that inner seeds, up to sometimes exist and sometimes do not.

Commentary: In the second volume of the Saṃgraha, Asaṅga (Wuzhuo, the author of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) says: Outer seeds may not have perfuming, they are not inner seeds. It should be known that it is unreasonable for the perfuming of hearing and so on not to produce results. Therefore, there are no inner seeds that do not arise from perfuming. Among outer seeds, the fragrance of sesame seeds perfumed by flowers exists. From charcoal, cow dung, and hair, sesame seeds, blue lotus roots, and cattails are produced. It is not that they arise and cease together, mutually repeatedly perfuming each other. The production of sesame seeds and so on is called outer seeds, or there is no perfuming.

Treatise: Also, name and so on, up to must arise from perfuming.

Commentary: Here, the principle is explained using doctrine. The three types of perfuming, namely name (nāman), etc., completely encompass all conditioned seeds. Since they arise from perfuming, the seeds are produced. Therefore, conditioned seeds must rely on perfuming to arise. Otherwise, name and so on should not completely encompass seeds, because the naturally existent seeds are not included in this.

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說無漏種證。

論。無漏種生亦由熏習。

述曰。此即立宗。

何以知者。

論。說聞熏習至而熏起故。

述曰。等流正法。正法從法界平等而流出。從正智等次第生故。攝論第三卷出世凈章中。說聞熏習聞凈法界等流正法。而熏習起故。又瑜伽論五十二說。從真如所緣緣種子生。與此文同。

論。是出世心種子性故。

述曰。又攝論說。聞熏地前既是有漏。為出世法之種子性。故知無有法爾無漏種。唯以有漏為見道因故。

第四大段解眾文違。若唯新熏如何五種種姓差別。

論。有情本來至種子有無。

述曰。本未熏故。如何說有五種姓別。

論。但依有障無障建立。

述曰。即是約煩惱及所知障品有無建立。

何以知者。

論。如瑜伽說至如來種姓。

述曰。五十二說。于真如境二障畢竟不可斷者。立為不般涅槃法性。唯不可斷所知障者。一分立為聲聞種性。一分立為獨覺種性。此如何別。障雖齊等解有利鈍。于煩惱斷中修習差別故。煩惱．所知二障皆可斷。即立此為如來種姓。

論。故知本來至非無漏種。

述曰。以文證理故依障立。非依無漏種子有無。

上來即會前種姓文。若爾成就三無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 討論無漏種子之證成。

論：無漏種子之生起，亦由熏習而來。

述記：此即是立宗（確立論點）。

以何得知呢？

論：經中說，聽聞熏習乃至熏習生起之故。

述記：等流正法（equable outflowing of the true dharma）。正法從法界平等流出，從正智等次第生起之故。《攝大乘論》第三卷出世凈品中說，聽聞熏習聽聞清凈法界等流的正法，而熏習生起之故。又《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說，從真如所緣緣種子生起，與此文義相同。

論：是出世間心之種子自性之故。

述記：又《攝大乘論》說，聽聞熏習于地上之前既是有漏（afflicted），作為出世間法之種子自性。故知沒有法爾（naturally existing）的無漏種子，唯以有漏作為見道之因故。

第四大段解釋眾多經文的矛盾之處。若唯有新熏，如何解釋五種種姓（five kinds of lineages）的差別？

論：有情本來乃至種子有無。

述記：本來未熏習，如何說有五種姓的差別？

論：但依有障無障而建立。

述記：即是依煩惱障及所知障的品類有無而建立。

以何得知呢？

論：如《瑜伽師地論》所說乃至如來種姓。

述記：《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說，于真如境二障畢竟不可斷者，立為不般涅槃法性（those who by nature cannot attain nirvana）。唯不可斷所知障者，一部分立為聲聞種性（Śrāvaka-gotra），一部分立為獨覺種性（Pratyekabuddha-gotra）。此如何區別？障礙雖齊等，但理解有利鈍。于煩惱斷除中修習有差別之故。煩惱障、所知障二障皆可斷，即立此為如來種姓（Tathāgata-gotra）。

論：故知本來乃至非無漏種子。

述記：以經文來證明道理，故依障礙而立，非依無漏種子有無。

上來即會通前文種姓之說。若如此，成就三無性等如何解釋？

【English Translation】 English version: Discussion on the Proof of Anāsrava Seeds.

Treatise: The arising of anāsrava (untainted) seeds also comes from habituation.

Commentary: This is establishing the thesis (establishing the argument).

How is this known?

Treatise: It is said that hearing habituation even causes habituation to arise.

Commentary: Equable outflowing of the true dharma. The true dharma flows out equally from the Dharmadhātu (realm of dharma), arising sequentially from correct wisdom, etc. The 'Pure Chapter of Transcendence' in the third volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that hearing habituation hears the equable outflowing of the true dharma of the pure Dharmadhātu, and thus habituation arises. Furthermore, the fifty-second volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that it arises from the seed of the object-condition of Suchness (Tathātā), which is the same as this text.

Treatise: It is because it is the seed nature of the transcendental mind.

Commentary: Furthermore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that hearing habituation before the ground (bhūmi) is afflicted (sāsrava), serving as the seed nature of transcendental dharma. Therefore, it is known that there are no naturally existing anāsrava seeds, only using afflicted seeds as the cause of the path of seeing.

The fourth major section explains the contradictions in many sutra texts. If there is only new habituation, how can the differences in the five kinds of lineages be explained?

Treatise: Sentient beings originally even to the existence or non-existence of seeds.

Commentary: Originally not habituated, how can it be said that there are differences in the five kinds of lineages?

Treatise: It is only established based on the presence or absence of obstructions.

Commentary: That is, it is established based on the presence or absence of categories of afflictive obstructions (kleśāvaraṇa) and cognitive obstructions (jñeyāvaraṇa).

How is this known?

Treatise: As the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, even to the Tathāgata lineage.

Commentary: The fifty-second volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that those who ultimately cannot sever the two obstructions in the realm of Suchness are established as those who by nature cannot attain nirvāṇa. Those who can only sever the cognitive obstructions are partially established as the Śrāvakagotra (Hearer lineage), and partially established as the Pratyekabuddhagotra (Solitary Buddha lineage). How are these distinguished? Although the obstructions are equal, understanding has sharpness and dullness. There are differences in practice in the severance of afflictions. Those who can sever both afflictive and cognitive obstructions are established as the Tathāgatagotra (Tathāgata lineage).

Treatise: Therefore, it is known that originally even to not being anāsrava seeds.

Commentary: Using the sutra text to prove the principle, it is established based on obstructions, not based on the existence or non-existence of anāsrava seeds.

The above reconciles the previous discussion of lineages. If so, how is the accomplishment of the three non-natures, etc., explained?

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漏根是種非現瑜伽文等如何通。

論。所說成就至非已有體。

述曰。約煩惱等可斷之義。說后無漏種子可生名為成就。非無漏種未熏之時即有體性。

第三師說護法自意。難破前師。

論。有義種子各有二類。

述曰。有漏．無漏各有二類。于中有四。第一立宗。第二引證。三破斥。四總結。此即初也。

論。一。者本有至功能差別。

述曰。此文即是出種子體。

自下引經。

論。世尊依此至廣說如初。

述曰。此引經證同護月也。

論。此即名為本性住種。

述曰。法爾有故。

論。二者始起至熏習而有。

述曰。此出種體。

論。世尊依此至熏習故生。

述曰。此引經證於中不言如前引證。此後自會。由彼亦有非新熏證。故不指也。

論。此即名為習所成種。

述曰。新熏生故。

自下第三破斥。有二。先難本有。后破新熏。難本有中有二。初引經成理難。后結違諸教難。

論。若唯本有至為因緣生。

述曰。引經成理中有五。初總標彰難意也。至下當知。

論。如契經說至亦常為因性。

述曰。第二引教成前理。此引阿毗達磨經也　諸法于識藏。能攝藏

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：如果斷盡了煩惱，沒有了根本，那麼非現行（非正在發生）的瑜伽等如何能夠通達？

答：從理論上說，所說的成就，是指達到了非已有的狀態。

解釋：從煩惱等可以斷除的意義上來說，說後來無漏的種子可以產生，這叫做成就。並不是說無漏的種子在沒有被熏習的時候就具有體性。

第三位論師（護法）闡述了自己的觀點，難以駁倒之前的論師。

論：有理論認為，種子各有兩種型別。

解釋：有漏和無漏各有兩種型別。其中有四點：第一，確立宗義；第二，引用證據；第三，駁斥；第四，總結。這裡是第一點。

論：第一種是本有的，具有功能差別。

解釋：這段文字是闡述種子的本體。

下面引用經文。

論：世尊依據這個道理廣泛地闡述，如同之前所說。

解釋：這裡引用經文來證明與護月（Acharya Huarue）的觀點相同。

論：這就被稱為本性住種（prakriti-stha-bija）。

解釋：因為是法爾本有。

論：第二種是開始產生的，通過熏習而有。

解釋：這裡闡述種子的本體。

論：世尊依據這個道理廣泛地闡述，通過熏習而產生。

解釋：這裡引用經文來證明，其中沒有說「如同之前引用證據」。這之後會自己解釋。因為那裡也有非新熏的證據，所以沒有指明。

論：這就被稱為習所成種（abhyasa-nisyanda-bija）。

解釋：因為是新熏習產生的。

下面第三部分是駁斥，分為兩部分：先是駁斥本有，后是駁斥新熏。駁斥本有又分為兩部分：先是引用經文和道理來駁斥，后是總結違背各種教義的過失。

論：如果只有本有的，那麼如何作為因緣而生？

解釋：引用經文和道理來駁斥，其中有五點。首先總的標明，彰顯駁斥的意圖。到下面就應當知道了。

論：如契經所說，也常常作為因性。

解釋：第二，引用教義來成就前面的道理。這裡引用《阿毗達磨經》（Abhidhamma Sutra）。諸法在識藏（Alaya-vijnana）中，能夠攝藏。

【English Translation】 English version Question: If afflictions are completely eradicated, and there is no root, how can non-manifest (non-occurring) yogas, etc., be attained?

Answer: Theoretically speaking, the so-called 'accomplishment' refers to reaching a state that was not already present.

Explanation: In terms of the meaning that afflictions, etc., can be severed, it is said that the subsequent arising of unconditioned (anāsrava) seeds is called 'accomplishment'. It is not that unconditioned seeds inherently possess a nature even before being perfumed.

The third teacher (Dharmapala) expounds his own view, which is difficult for previous teachers to refute.

Treatise: Some theories hold that seeds each have two types.

Explanation: Conditioned (sāsrava) and unconditioned (anāsrava) seeds each have two types. Among these, there are four points: first, establishing the tenet; second, citing evidence; third, refuting; and fourth, summarizing. This is the first point.

Treatise: The first type is inherently existent, possessing functional differences.

Explanation: This passage explains the substance of the seeds.

Below, scriptures are cited.

Treatise: The World-Honored One extensively expounds according to this principle, as mentioned before.

Explanation: Here, scriptures are cited to prove the same view as Acharya Huarue (護月).

Treatise: This is called the 'inherently abiding seed' (prakriti-stha-bija).

Explanation: Because it is naturally existent.

Treatise: The second type is initially arising, existing through perfuming.

Explanation: This explains the substance of the seeds.

Treatise: The World-Honored One extensively expounds according to this principle, arising through perfuming.

Explanation: Here, scriptures are cited to prove, without saying 'as cited before'. This will be explained later. Because there is also evidence of non-newly perfumed seeds there, it is not specified.

Treatise: This is called the 'habitually formed seed' (abhyasa-nisyanda-bija).

Explanation: Because it is newly perfumed and produced.

Below, the third part is refutation, divided into two parts: first, refuting inherent existence; second, refuting new perfuming. Refuting inherent existence is further divided into two parts: first, refuting by citing scriptures and reasoning; second, summarizing the fault of contradicting various teachings.

Treatise: If only inherently existent, how can it arise as a cause and condition?

Explanation: Refuting by citing scriptures and reasoning, there are five points. First, generally stating and highlighting the intention of refutation. It should be understood below.

Treatise: As the sutra says, it also often serves as the causal nature.

Explanation: Second, citing teachings to establish the preceding reasoning. Here, the Abhidhamma Sutra (阿毗達磨經) is cited. All dharmas in the Alaya-vijnana (識藏) are capable of containing.

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也。謂與諸識作二緣性。一為彼種子。二為彼所依　識於法亦爾所攝藏也。謂諸轉識與阿賴耶亦為二緣。一于現法長養彼種。二於後法攝植彼種。互相生故。所生為果。即顯互亦能為因也　常為因性者。顯此二法更互亦常為因。顯非異此而有因也。故常言亦通果。常為果故。于果說互。于因說常。影略故也。如攝大乘第二卷說。瑜伽師論五十一中廣說其相。

論。此頌意言至互為因果。

述曰。第三釋頌顯前徴。總釋頌言成因緣理。

此由未顯。何以得知互為因緣是此經意。

論。攝大乘說至互為因緣。

述曰。雜染法通三性。即一切有漏法。餘七識品既為能熏．亦所生故。互為因緣。

論。如炷與焰至互相依住。

述曰。舉增上緣喻因緣義。如燈炷與燈焰展轉生燒。由炷生焰。如種生現。由焰燒炷。如現熏種。故名展轉。此顯三法。如蘆相依。為俱有因。二法為喻。喻因緣義。

論。唯依此二至不可得故。

述曰。唯種與現實名因緣。除此所餘因緣無故。不以現行七識望第八現為因也。但取種子望后為因。又此中望體。因緣體盡。若望果別。亦有種子生於種子。豈非因緣。由是此中但約體說。又說不盡。不說無漏故。

論。若諸種子至有因緣義。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 也。這是說阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識）與各個識（vijñāna，意識）之間存在兩種緣性關係：一是作為那些識的種子，二是作為那些識所依賴的基礎。各個識對於法（dharma，佛法）也是如此，被阿賴耶識所攝藏。也就是說，各個轉識（pravṛtti-vijñāna，轉變的意識）與阿賴耶識之間也存在兩種緣性關係：一是在現行法（present dharma，當下的法）中滋養阿賴耶識的種子，二是在未來的法中將那些種子攝藏植入阿賴耶識。因為它們互相產生，所以所產生的果（phala，結果）就顯示出它們互相也能作為因（hetu，原因）。 『常為因性者』，顯示這兩種法互相之間也常常作為因。這表明除了這兩種法之外，沒有其他的因。所以『常』這個詞也適用於果，因為它們常常作為果。對於果來說，是互相作用；對於因來說，是常恒不變。這是省略的說法。正如《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第二卷所說，以及《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第五十一卷中詳細說明了它們的相狀。

論：這首偈頌的意思是說，它們互相作為因果。

述曰：第三是解釋偈頌，以顯明前面的提問。總的解釋偈頌，成就因緣的道理。

這是因為還沒有顯明，如何得知互相作為因緣是這部經的本意？

論：《攝大乘論》說，它們互相作為因緣。

述曰：雜染法（saṃkliṣṭa-dharma，不清凈的法）貫通三性（tri-svabhāva，三種自性），也就是一切有漏法（sāsrava-dharma，有煩惱的法）。其餘七識品（vijñāna-skandha，意識的集合）既是能熏（kāraka，能產生影響的），也是所生（utpanna，被產生的），所以互相作為因緣。

論：比如燈炷與燈焰，互相依賴而存在。

述曰：這是用增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya，增強的條件）來比喻因緣的意義。就像燈炷與燈焰，輾轉相生相燒。由燈炷產生燈焰，就像種子產生現行（vartamāna，當下）。由燈焰燒燈炷，就像現行熏習種子。所以叫做輾轉。這顯示了三種法，就像蘆葦互相依靠一樣，作為俱有因（sahabhū-hetu，共同存在的因）。用兩種法來比喻，比喻因緣的意義。

論：只有依靠這兩種，其餘的因緣是不可得的。

述曰：只有種子與現行才叫做因緣。除了這些之外，其餘的因緣是不存在的。不用現行的七識來期望第八識的現行為因。只是取種子來期望後來的現行為因。而且這裡是就體（svabhāva，自性）來說的，因緣的體就窮盡了。如果就果的差別來說，也有種子產生種子，難道不是因緣嗎？因此，這裡只是就體來說。而且說得不完全，沒有說無漏法（anāsrava-dharma，沒有煩惱的法）。

論：如果各種種子具有因緣的意義。

【English Translation】 English version Also, it refers to the fact that Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) has two kinds of causal relationship with the various vijñānas (consciousnesses): one is as the seed for those vijñānas, and the other is as the basis upon which those vijñānas rely. The vijñānas are also like this with respect to the dharmas (teachings), being contained within the Ālaya-vijñāna. That is to say, the various pravṛtti-vijñānas (evolving consciousnesses) also have two kinds of causal relationship with the Ālaya-vijñāna: one is that in the present dharma (current teachings), they nourish the seeds of the Ālaya-vijñāna, and the other is that in future dharmas, they collect and plant those seeds into the Ālaya-vijñāna. Because they produce each other, the resulting phala (result) shows that they can also act as hetu (cause) for each other. 『Constantly being of a causal nature』 shows that these two dharmas also constantly act as causes for each other. This indicates that there is no other cause apart from these two dharmas. Therefore, the word 『constantly』 also applies to the result, because they constantly act as results. With respect to the result, there is mutual interaction; with respect to the cause, there is constancy. This is an abbreviated way of speaking. As stated in the second volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna), and as detailed in the fifty-first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice).

Treatise: The meaning of this verse is that they are mutually cause and effect.

Commentary: The third is to explain the verse to clarify the previous question. The overall explanation of the verse establishes the principle of cause and condition.

This is because it has not yet been clarified how it is known that mutual causation is the intention of this scripture?

Treatise: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that they are mutually cause and condition.

Commentary: Saṃkliṣṭa-dharma (defiled dharmas) pervades the tri-svabhāva (three natures), which is all sāsrava-dharma (defiled dharmas). The remaining seven vijñāna-skandhas (aggregates of consciousness) are both kāraka (causal agents) and utpanna (produced), so they are mutually cause and condition.

Treatise: For example, the wick and flame of a lamp rely on each other to exist.

Commentary: This uses adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition) to illustrate the meaning of cause and condition. Just like the wick and flame of a lamp, they generate and burn each other in turn. The wick generates the flame, like a seed generates the present. The flame burns the wick, like the present perfuming the seed. Therefore, it is called reciprocal. This shows three dharmas, like reeds leaning on each other, acting as sahabhū-hetu (co-existent cause). Using two dharmas as a metaphor, it illustrates the meaning of cause and condition.

Treatise: Only relying on these two, other causes and conditions are unobtainable.

Commentary: Only the seed and the present are called cause and condition. Apart from these, other causes and conditions do not exist. Do not use the present seven consciousnesses to expect the manifestation of the eighth consciousness as a cause. Only take the seed to expect the later manifestation as a cause. Moreover, this is speaking in terms of svabhāva (self-nature), the nature of cause and condition is exhausted. If speaking in terms of the difference of the result, there are also seeds that generate seeds, is that not a cause and condition? Therefore, this is only speaking in terms of nature. Moreover, it is not fully stated, not mentioning anāsrava-dharma (undefiled dharmas).

Treatise: If various seeds have the meaning of cause and condition.

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述曰。第四結上無因義。由唯本有。即二相望無因緣義。

若彼救言但熏增長名曰因緣。

論。非熏令長至為因緣故。

述曰。第五重破伏難。初之二句牒彼計非。次三句難。勿善惡業與異熟果為因緣故。汝言諸法各但一種。若異熟果．因。但是一種生。善．惡業現行熏果種增時。善．惡業與果應為因緣故。又汝若言善．惡業體是一種生。異熟果體是一種生。各一種者。而異熟果現不自熏。但善．惡業現行熏。令果種增長。其種本有。業于果種能令增長應名因緣。如自業種。但令增長為因緣故。或復業種增名言種。應是因緣。既非因緣故。非增長名曰因緣。果種。如業種亦增長故。故非唯本有。亦有新熏。若爾設俱新熏。豈俱新起俱名因緣。並新生故　此難不齊。如無記心熏無記種。復善．惡業自熏自種。親辨體故。故是因緣。但緣資彼無記種子故非因緣。汝之種子俱不辨體。但資增長。不辨體齊。故應俱是因緣攝也。然觀本意后解是本。今難本意。由是義顯應諸現行望本有種不名因緣。熏增長故。此本有種唯以自類為其因緣。既爾此因應不生現。有新起種生故。此義應思。然以生種類同於新亦因緣攝。不同唯本有故彼非因緣。

論。又諸聖教至理教相違。

述曰。此下第二違

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師疏解說：第四點是總結上文所說的『無因』的含義。因為一切法都唯是本有，所以從兩種法相互觀望的角度來說，它們之間沒有因緣關係。 如果對方辯解說，僅僅是熏習增長，就可以稱作因緣。 論中反駁：不是熏習增長就能成為因緣的。 窺基法師疏解說：第五點是再次破斥對方的詰難。開頭的兩句是重複對方的觀點，認為是不正確的。接下來的三句是進行反駁：難道善惡業與異熟果之間就沒有因緣關係了嗎？你認為諸法各自只有一種。如果異熟果和它的因，都只是一種生起方式，那麼當善惡業現行熏習果報的種子，使之增長時，善惡業與果報之間就應該存在因緣關係。而且，如果你認為善惡業的體性是一種生起方式，異熟果的體性也是一種生起方式，各自都是一種，那麼異熟果的現行並不能自己熏習自己，只能由善惡業的現行來熏習，使果報的種子增長。既然種子是本有的，業對於果報種子能夠使其增長，就應該稱作因緣，就像自己的業種，僅僅是使其增長，就作為因緣一樣。或者說，業種的增長可以稱為言語上的種子，也應該是因緣。既然不是因緣，那麼就不能說增長就可以稱作因緣。果報的種子，就像業的種子一樣，也是會增長的。所以，不能說一切法都唯是本有，也有新熏習的。如果這樣，假設都是新熏習的，難道都是新生的，都可以稱作因緣嗎？因為都是新生的。這個反駁是不恰當的，就像無記心熏習無記種子，或者善惡業自己熏習自己的種子一樣，因為能夠清楚地辨別體性，所以是因緣。只是作為輔助，資助那些無記的種子，所以不是因緣。你們的種子都不能清楚地辨別體性，只是資助增長，不能辨別體性是一樣的，所以應該都屬於因緣。然而，觀察本來的意思，後面的解釋才是根本。現在反駁的是本來的意思。因為這個道理顯示出，應該說諸多的現行對於本有的種子，不能稱作因緣，因為只是熏習增長。這個本有的種子，僅僅以自己的同類作為它的因緣。既然這樣，這個因應該不能生出現行，因為有新生的種子生起。這個道理應該仔細思考。然而，因為生起的種類與新的種類相同，所以也屬於因緣的範疇。不同於僅僅是本有的，所以它不是因緣。 論中說：而且諸多的聖教，與這個道理的教相違背。 窺基法師疏解說：下面是第二點，違背聖教。

【English Translation】 English version: Shu (commentary by Kuiji): The fourth point concludes the meaning of 'no cause' mentioned above. Because all dharmas are only inherently existent, from the perspective of two dharmas observing each other, there is no causal relationship between them. If the opponent argues that merely the act of perfuming and increasing can be called a cause and condition (hetu-pratyaya). The treatise refutes: It is not that perfuming and increasing can become a cause and condition. Shu (commentary by Kuiji): The fifth point is to refute the opponent's challenge again. The first two sentences repeat the opponent's view, considering it incorrect. The next three sentences refute: Is there no causal relationship between wholesome/unwholesome karma and the Vipaka (result of karma)? You believe that each dharma has only one kind. If the Vipaka and its cause are only one kind of arising, then when wholesome/unwholesome karma manifests and perfumes the seed of the result, causing it to increase, there should be a causal relationship between wholesome/unwholesome karma and the result. Moreover, if you believe that the nature of wholesome/unwholesome karma is one kind of arising, and the nature of the Vipaka is also one kind of arising, each being one kind, then the manifestation of the Vipaka cannot perfume itself; it can only be perfumed by the manifestation of wholesome/unwholesome karma, causing the seed of the result to increase. Since the seed is inherently existent, and karma can cause the seed of the result to increase, it should be called a cause and condition, just like one's own karma seed, which merely causes it to increase, is considered a cause and condition. Or, the increase of the karma seed can be called a seed in terms of language, and it should also be a cause and condition. Since it is not a cause and condition, then it cannot be said that increase can be called a cause and condition. The seed of the result, like the seed of karma, also increases. Therefore, it cannot be said that all dharmas are only inherently existent; there is also new perfuming. If so, assuming that all are newly perfumed, can they all be called causes and conditions because they are newly born? This refutation is inappropriate, just like the neutral mind perfumes the neutral seed, or wholesome/unwholesome karma perfumes its own seed, because they can clearly distinguish the nature, so they are causes and conditions. It is only as an aid, assisting those neutral seeds, so it is not a cause and condition. Your seeds cannot clearly distinguish the nature, they only assist in increasing, and the inability to distinguish the nature is the same, so they should all belong to causes and conditions. However, observing the original meaning, the later explanation is fundamental. Now, the refutation is against the original meaning. Because this principle shows that it should be said that the many manifestations cannot be called causes and conditions for the inherently existent seeds, because they only perfume and increase. This inherently existent seed only takes its own kind as its cause and condition. Since this is the case, this cause should not be able to produce manifestation, because there is a newly born seed arising. This principle should be carefully considered. However, because the kind of arising is the same as the new kind, it also belongs to the category of cause and condition. It is different from being only inherently existent, so it is not a cause and condition. The treatise says: Moreover, the many sacred teachings contradict the teachings of this principle. Shu (commentary by Kuiji): Below is the second point, contradicting the sacred teachings.

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多經失。違聖教說種由熏生。故與理教俱相違也。前者違理。后違教故。

自下第二難唯新熏。

論。若唯始起至應不得生。

述曰。此下第二破立新熏。于中有五。一正難本宗。二乘因廣破分別論者。三申正義。四釋相違。五總結。此下即初也。有為無漏即見道等。無本有種。無因緣故。應不得生。量云。汝初無漏應不得生。無因緣故。如兔角等。

若彼救言以世第一法為其因緣。有漏法中此為勝故。此義不然。

論。有漏不應至生有漏故。

述曰。此二相違。如何有漏為對治因。應無漏法為有漏因。今以理徴。若有漏生無漏。應無漏生有漏。許漏．無漏得相生故。如有漏善生於無漏。無漏既不得生於有漏為相違者。如何有漏生於無漏。此初無漏許無因緣亦有何妨。答曰不然。佛說無一法非因緣生故。若無因生便非釋種。立量云。汝初無漏心。應無漏種為因緣生。體是有為無漏法故。如后無漏法。

論。許應諸佛至不善等種。

述曰。若許有漏生無漏。則無漏生有漏。許便諸佛有漏復生。此中亦有有學聖者等對治。生有漏。然以世尊全是無漏故但舉之。非余無也。外曰不然。以勝劣故。劣可為勝因。勝非劣因。若爾不善應為善因。又若相違得為因者。善等應為不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

多種經論都已遺失。如果說種子是由熏習產生的，這違背了聖教的說法。因此，這種觀點既與道理相違背，也與佛教的教義相違背。前者是違背道理，後者是違背教義。

下面第二部分是駁斥唯有新熏的觀點。

論：如果只有最初生起的，那麼就不應該產生。

述記：下面第二部分是破斥建立新熏的觀點。其中有五個部分：一是直接駁斥對方的宗義，二是借用因明廣泛破斥分別論者，三是闡述正確的義理，四是解釋相違之處，五是總結。下面就是第一部分。有為無漏法，比如見道等，沒有本有的種子，因為沒有因緣，所以不應該產生。可以這樣立論：你們最初的無漏法不應該產生，因為它沒有因緣，就像兔角一樣。

如果對方辯解說，以世第一法（lokaikagrachittotpada-dharma，指欲界定中最高位的善法）作為它的因緣，因為在有漏法中，這是最殊勝的。這種說法是不對的。

論：有漏法不應該作為有漏法的生起原因。

述記：這兩種說法是相互矛盾的。怎麼能說有漏法是對治的因，而無漏法是有漏法的因呢？現在用道理來質問。如果說有漏法能生起無漏法，那麼就應該無漏法也能生起有漏法，因為你們承認有漏和無漏可以相互產生。就像有漏的善法能生起無漏的善法一樣。如果無漏法不能生起有漏法，這本身就是一種矛盾。那麼最初的無漏法，即使承認它沒有因緣，又有什麼妨礙呢？回答說：不是這樣的。佛陀說過，沒有一種法不是由因緣產生的。如果沒有因產生，那就不是釋迦牟尼佛的教義。可以這樣立論：你們最初的無漏心，應該以無漏的種子作為因緣而產生，因為它的體是有為的無漏法，就像後來的無漏法一樣。

論：如果承認有漏法能生起無漏法，那麼就應該承認諸佛的有漏法也能再次生起。

述記：如果承認有漏法能生起無漏法，那麼無漏法也能生起有漏法。如果這樣承認，那麼諸佛的有漏法也能再次生起。這裡面也包括有學聖者等對治有漏法，從而生起無漏法的情況。但是因為世尊（Bhagavan，佛的尊稱）完全是無漏的，所以只舉這個例子，並非沒有其他的例子。外人辯駁說：不是這樣的，因為有勝劣之分。劣的可以作為勝的因，勝的不能作為劣的因。如果這樣，那麼不善法就應該能作為善法的因。又如果說相互矛盾的可以作為因，那麼善法等就應該能作為不善法的因。

【English Translation】 English version:

Many sutras have been lost. To say that seeds arise from conditioning contradicts the teachings of the Holy Ones. Therefore, this view contradicts both reason and doctrine. The former contradicts reason, the latter contradicts doctrine.

The second part below refutes the view that only new conditioning exists.

Treatise: If only the initial arising exists, then it should not arise.

Commentary: The second part below refutes and establishes the view of new conditioning. It has five parts: first, directly refuting the opponent's doctrine; second, extensively refuting the proponents of differentiation through reasoning; third, stating the correct meaning; fourth, explaining the contradictions; and fifth, summarizing. The following is the first part. Conditioned unconditioned dharmas, such as the path of seeing (darśanamārga), do not have inherent seeds because they lack causes and conditions, so they should not arise. One can argue: your initial unconditioned dharma should not arise because it lacks causes and conditions, like a rabbit's horn.

If the opponent argues that the 'highest mundane dharma' (lokaikagrachittotpada-dharma, referring to the highest good dharma in the desire realm meditation) is its cause and condition because it is the most excellent among conditioned dharmas, this is not correct.

Treatise: Conditioned dharmas should not be the cause of arising of conditioned dharmas.

Commentary: These two statements are contradictory. How can a conditioned dharma be a counteractive cause, and an unconditioned dharma be the cause of a conditioned dharma? Now, I question this with reason. If a conditioned dharma can give rise to an unconditioned dharma, then an unconditioned dharma should also be able to give rise to a conditioned dharma, because you admit that conditioned and unconditioned dharmas can arise from each other. Just as a conditioned good dharma can give rise to an unconditioned good dharma. If an unconditioned dharma cannot give rise to a conditioned dharma, this is a contradiction in itself. Then, for the initial unconditioned dharma, even if we admit that it has no causes and conditions, what harm is there? The answer is: it is not like that. The Buddha said that there is no dharma that does not arise from causes and conditions. If it arises without a cause, then it is not the teaching of Shakyamuni Buddha. One can argue: your initial unconditioned mind should arise from unconditioned seeds as its cause and condition, because its nature is a conditioned unconditioned dharma, like the later unconditioned dharma.

Treatise: If you admit that conditioned dharmas can give rise to unconditioned dharmas, then you should admit that the conditioned dharmas of the Buddhas can arise again.

Commentary: If you admit that conditioned dharmas can give rise to unconditioned dharmas, then unconditioned dharmas can also give rise to conditioned dharmas. If you admit this, then the conditioned dharmas of the Buddhas (Bhagavan, a title of the Buddha) can arise again. This also includes the case where learners and saints counteract conditioned dharmas, thereby giving rise to unconditioned dharmas. But because the World Honored One is completely unconditioned, only this example is given, not that there are no other examples. The outsider argues: it is not like that, because there is a distinction between superior and inferior. The inferior can be the cause of the superior, but the superior cannot be the cause of the inferior. If that is the case, then unwholesome dharmas should be able to be the cause of wholesome dharmas. Also, if contradictory things can be the cause, then wholesome dharmas, etc., should be able to be the cause of unwholesome dharmas.

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善等種。小乘可爾為同類因。大乘不然故以為難。

自下第二破分別論。諸邪分別皆名毗婆阇婆提。即大眾．一說．說出世．雞胤四部。因諍無漏無因緣故今亦敘破。本即大乘唯說新熏心溷師等。名分別論。亦作是說。

論。分別論者至非無因生。

述曰。于中有三。初敘宗。次破他。后自解。此初也。彼計。無法爾種。心性本凈。離煩惱時既體清凈為無漏因。如乳變為酪。乳中有酪性。木中火亦然。此立宗也。無垢稱經亦有此說。

次論主問。

論。而心性言彼說何義。

述曰。下破他也。于中有二。初問彼經意。后別以理徴。

論。若說空理至諸法種子。

述曰。下別徴。于中有二。初空理非因難。後起心非凈難。此即初也。此中空理。即是真如。空非心因。常非種子故。

彼若救言常為種子于理何妨。

論。以體前後無轉變故。

述曰。即復難言。此真如體既許為因。應有取．與。以體前後無轉變故。無取無與故不為因下六義中第一剎那滅即簡真如。非心因緣。因有生滅有取．與故。一切無為為所緣緣此亦無妨。因緣不然。親能辨體與力生故。

論。若即說心至而體常一。

述曰。下起心非凈難。有八。若言心性即是心體。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 善等種子。小乘認為可以作為同類因。大乘不這樣認為，所以覺得難以接受。

下面第二部分是破斥分別論。各種邪分別都被稱為毗婆阇婆提（Vibhāṣāvadins），即大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）、一說部（Ekavyāvahārika）、說出世部（Lokottaravāda）、雞胤部（Gokulika）四部。因為爭論無漏無因緣的緣故，現在也敘述並破斥。本來就是大乘，只是說新熏的心識混雜了師說等，稱為分別論，也這樣說。

論：分別論者認為乃至不是無因而生。

述曰：其中有三部分。首先敘述宗義，其次破斥他人，最後自我解釋。這是第一部分。他們認為，沒有法爾（法性本然）的種子，心性本來清凈，離開煩惱時，本體清凈，可以作為無漏的因。就像牛奶變為酪，牛奶中有酪的性質，木頭中有火的性質一樣。這是立宗。無垢稱經（Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra）中也有這種說法。

接下來是論主提問。

論：如果說心性，他們說的是什麼意思？

述曰：下面是破斥他人。其中有兩部分。首先詢問對方經文的含義，然後用道理來質問。

論：如果說空理乃至諸法種子。

述曰：下面是分別質問。其中有兩部分。首先用空理不是因來發難，然後用起心不是清凈來發難。這是第一部分。這裡說的空理，就是真如（Tathātā）。空不是心的因，因為它是常，不是種子。

如果對方辯解說，常作為種子在道理上有什麼妨礙？

論：因為本體前後沒有轉變的緣故。

述曰：立即反駁說，既然你承認真如本體是因，就應該有取、與。因為本體前後沒有轉變的緣故。沒有取、沒有與，所以不能作為因。下面六義中的第一剎那滅，就是爲了簡別真如。不是心的因緣，因為因有生滅，有取、與。一切無為作為所緣緣，這也沒有妨礙。因緣就不是這樣，因為它能直接辨別本體，給予力量使其產生。

論：如果說心性就是心體乃至本體常一。

述曰：下面是用起心不是清凈來發難，有八個方面。如果說心性就是心體。

【English Translation】 English version Seeds of goodness, etc. The Hīnayāna school may consider them as homogeneous causes. The Mahāyāna school does not agree, hence the difficulty.

The second part below refutes the Vibhāṣāvadins. All kinds of wrong views are called Vibhāṣāvadins, namely the Mahāsāṃghika, Ekavyāvahārika, Lokottaravāda, and Gokulika schools. Because of the dispute over the causelessness of the unconditioned, it is now narrated and refuted. Originally it was Mahāyāna, but it is said that newly acquired consciousness mixed with teachers' teachings, etc., is called Vibhāṣāvadins, and it is also said in this way.

Treatise: The Vibhāṣāvadins believe that even things are not born without a cause.

Commentary: There are three parts to this. First, state the doctrine; second, refute others; and third, explain oneself. This is the first part. They believe that there are no seeds of Dharma-nature (Dharmatā) by nature, and that the nature of the mind is originally pure. When it is free from afflictions, its essence is pure and can be the cause of the unconditioned. Just as milk turns into cheese, milk has the nature of cheese, and wood has the nature of fire. This is establishing the doctrine. The Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra also has this statement.

Next is the question from the treatise master.

Treatise: If you say 'mind-nature', what do they mean?

Commentary: The following is the refutation of others. There are two parts to it. First, ask the meaning of the other party's scripture, and then question it with reason.

Treatise: If you say emptiness-principle, even the seeds of all dharmas.

Commentary: The following is a separate questioning. There are two parts to it. First, challenge that emptiness-principle is not a cause, and then challenge that arising-mind is not pure. This is the first part. The emptiness-principle mentioned here is Tathātā (真如). Emptiness is not the cause of the mind, because it is permanent and not a seed.

If the other party defends by saying, what is the harm in permanence being a seed in principle?

Treatise: Because the substance does not change before and after.

Commentary: Immediately refute by saying, since you admit that the substance of Tathātā is a cause, there should be taking and giving. Because the substance does not change before and after. There is no taking and no giving, so it cannot be a cause. The first moment of extinction in the following six meanings is to distinguish Tathātā. It is not the cause and condition of the mind, because the cause has arising and ceasing, taking and giving. All unconditioned things are conditions of the object, and this is not a hindrance. The cause and condition are not like this, because it can directly distinguish the substance and give strength to produce it.

Treatise: If you say that mind-nature is mind-essence, even the essence is always one.

Commentary: The following is to challenge that arising-mind is not pure, there are eight aspects. If you say that mind-nature is mind-essence.

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體能緣法此中說心。應同數論謂彼大等相雖轉變。而體常一。此即有漏心相轉為無漏。以無漏心體作無漏故。非前體滅故言性常。失前有漏相得無漏相故名相轉變。

若言前無漏體滅后無漏體生。此亦不然。以有漏為相性是無漏者。難云。

論。惡無記心又應是善。

述曰。以有漏善心性凈故。不善．無記亦應名善。心性凈故。如有漏善。

論。許則應與信等相應。

述曰。若許有漏不善心等體性是善。相應法故。應與善等心所相應。若是無為已如前說。亦無過失。共許法性真如善故。非有為善心。無信等故。以心體是相應善故。此中應敘諸師立善各有幾種。如別抄說。若如色．聲善無信等。此是何法。若是不相應。亦非心性。若是色法。故非心性。若說心．心所。必應與善等心所相應。量云。汝不善等心。應與信等心所相應。許有為心凈類攝故。如余無漏及善心等。

論。不許便應至況是無漏。

述曰。又若不許此有信等者。應非善心。無信等故。如染色等。此不善心等尚不名善。況是無漏。此即成立不善．無記心性非善。

彼若救言有漏善心。信等俱故可生無漏。不善．無記。無信等故非性凈者。

論。有漏善心至無漏為因。

述曰。自下正難。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於體（dhatu，元素）的自性（svabhava，本性）和緣起（pratītyasamutpāda，因緣和合）的法（dharma，法則），這裡說到心（citta，意識）。應該像數論（Samkhya）所說的那樣，認為『大』（mahat，宇宙理性）等相（lakṣaṇa，特徵）雖然轉變，但其體（dhatu，元素）常為一。這就是有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）的心相（cittalakṣaṇa，意識的特徵）轉變為無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱）。因為以無漏的心體（anāsravacittadhatu，無煩惱的意識元素）作為無漏的緣故。不是之前的體（dhatu，元素）滅了，所以說『性常』（nityasvabhava，本性恒常）。失去之前的有漏相（sāsravalakṣaṇa，有煩惱的特徵），得到無漏相（anāsravalakṣaṇa，無煩惱的特徵），所以名叫相轉變（lakṣaṇapariṇāma，特徵轉變）。

如果說之前的無漏體（anāsravadhatu，無煩惱的元素）滅了，之後的無漏體（anāsravadhatu，無煩惱的元素）生了，這也是不對的。因為以有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）作為相（lakṣaṇa，特徵），自性（svabhava，本性）是無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱）的，所以有如下的詰難：

論：惡（akuśala，不善）和無記（avyākṛta，非善非惡）的心（citta，意識）又應該是善（kuśala，善）。

述曰：因為有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）的善心（kuśalacitta，善的意識）自性（svabhava，本性）清凈的緣故，不善（akuśala，不善）和無記（avyākṛta，非善非惡）也應該叫做善（kuśala，善），因為心性（cittasvabhava，意識的本性）清凈的緣故，如有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）的善（kuśala，善）。

論：如果允許這樣，那麼應該與信（śraddhā，信仰）等相應（samprayukta，相應）。

述曰：如果允許有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）的不善心（akuśalacitta，不善的意識）等的體性（dhatu，元素）是善（kuśala，善），因為是相應法（samprayukta dharma，相應的法）的緣故，應該與善（kuśala，善）等心所（caitasika，心理活動）相應（samprayukta，相應）。如果是無為（asaṃskṛta，非造作）的，已經像前面所說的那樣，也沒有過失。共同允許法性（dharmatā，法的本性）真如（tathatā，如實）是善（kuśala，善）的緣故。不是有為（saṃskṛta，造作）的善心（kuśalacitta，善的意識），因為沒有信（śraddhā，信仰）等。因為心體（cittadhatu，意識的元素）是相應（samprayukta，相應）的善（kuśala，善）的緣故。這裡應該敘述諸位論師建立善（kuśala，善）各有幾種，如其他抄本所說。如果像色（rūpa，顏色）、聲（śabda，聲音）那樣，善（kuśala，善）沒有信（śraddhā，信仰）等，這是什麼法（dharma，法則）？如果是不相應（asamprayukta，不相應）的，也不是心性（cittasvabhava，意識的本性）。如果是色法（rūpadharma，色法的法則），所以不是心性（cittasvabhava，意識的本性）。如果說心（citta，意識）和心所（caitasika，心理活動），必定應該與善（kuśala，善）等心所（caitasika，心理活動）相應（samprayukta，相應）。量（pramāṇa，論證）云：你的不善（akuśala，不善）等心（citta，意識），應該與信（śraddhā，信仰）等心所（caitasika，心理活動）相應（samprayukta，相應），因為允許是有為（saṃskṛta，造作）的心（citta，意識）清凈的類別所攝的緣故，如其他的無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱）和善心（kuśalacitta，善的意識）等。

論：如果不允許這樣，那麼應該至於何況是無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱）。

述曰：又如果不允許這有信（śraddhā，信仰）等，應該不是善心（kuśalacitta，善的意識），因為沒有信（śraddhā，信仰）等，如染色等。這不善心（akuśalacitta，不善的意識）等尚且不名叫善（kuśala，善），何況是無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱）。這即是成立不善（akuśala，不善）和無記（avyākṛta，非善非惡）的心性（cittasvabhava，意識的本性）不是善（kuśala，善）。

他們如果辯解說有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）的善心（kuśalacitta，善的意識），因為信（śraddhā，信仰）等俱（sahita，一起）的緣故，可以生無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱），不善（akuśala，不善）和無記（avyākṛta，非善非惡），因為沒有信（śraddhā，信仰）等的緣故，不是自性（svabhava，本性）清凈的。

論：有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）的善心（kuśalacitta，善的意識）至於作為無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱）的因（hetu，原因）。

述曰：自下正式詰難。

【English Translation】 English version Here, the text discusses the nature (svabhava) and dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda) of elements (dhatu), focusing on the mind (citta). It suggests aligning with the Samkhya school's view that while aspects like 'Mahat' (the great principle) undergo transformation, the underlying element remains singular. This implies the transformation of defiled (sāsrava) mental aspects into undefiled (anāsrava) ones, because the undefiled mind-element serves as the basis for the undefiled state. It's not that the previous element ceases; hence, the term 'constant nature' (nityasvabhava). The change in aspects refers to losing the defiled aspect and gaining the undefiled one.

If it's argued that the previous undefiled element ceases and a subsequent undefiled element arises, this is also incorrect. Because if the defiled is taken as an aspect, and the nature is undefiled, then the following objection arises:

Treatise: Evil (akuśala) and neutral (avyākṛta) minds should also be good (kuśala).

Commentary: Because the nature of defiled good minds is pure, evil and neutral minds should also be considered good, as their mind-nature is pure, just like defiled good minds.

Treatise: If this is accepted, then they should be associated with faith (śraddhā) and other factors.

Commentary: If it's accepted that the nature of defiled evil minds is good, then because they are associated dharmas, they should be associated with good mental factors. If it's unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), as previously stated, there's no fault, as it's commonly accepted that the nature of reality (dharmatā), suchness (tathatā), is good. It's not that conditioned (saṃskṛta) good minds lack faith, because the mind-element is associated with goodness. Here, one should describe the various ways different teachers establish goodness, as described in other texts. If, like form (rūpa) and sound (śabda), goodness lacks faith, what kind of dharma is this? If it's unassociated, it's not mind-nature. If it's a form-dharma, it's not mind-nature. If one speaks of mind and mental factors, they must be associated with good mental factors. Argument: Your evil minds should be associated with faith and other mental factors, because they are admitted to be included in the category of pure conditioned minds, like other undefiled and good minds.

Treatise: If this is not accepted, then how much less so for the undefiled?

Commentary: Furthermore, if it's not accepted that these have faith, then they should not be good minds, as they lack faith, like dyed colors. These evil minds are not even called good, how much less so the undefiled. This establishes that the nature of evil and neutral minds is not good.

If they argue that defiled good minds can generate the undefiled because they are accompanied by faith, while evil and neutral minds are not inherently pure because they lack faith:

Treatise: Defiled good minds serve as the cause for the undefiled.

Commentary: The following presents the formal objection.

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有漏善心。性非無漏。名雜染故。如不善等。此雜染言通一切三性有漏法得為因也。言雜染者。為諸煩惱所緣縛義。又此有漏善心。不應與無漏為因。是雜染故。如不善心等。或可總云。有漏善心性非無漏。不應與無漏為因。是雜染故。如噁心等。此有法不極成。誰許有漏善心性非無漏。故應如前所說為善。

何故有漏不得為無漏因。

論。勿善惡等互為因故。

述曰。為因何事。違自宗故。非親生故。性相違故。

論。若有漏心至不可得故。

述曰。又難相違得互為因。若有漏心性是無漏。無漏心性應是有漏。以相違故。如有漏性。若唯有漏性是無漏。非無漏心性是有漏。差別所以不可得故。若勝劣故劣可有勝性。非勝有劣性。以勝劣故劣有勝性。以相違故。劣無勝性。是對治故。應無勝性。

論。又異生心至應名聖者。

述曰。若心性凈即是無漏。諸異生位應無漏現行。許現行有漏心性凈故。如佛等聖。應名聖者。

論。若異生心至無斯過者。

述曰。牒彼救言。由相有染不名無漏者。

論。則心種子至性相同故。

述曰。自下正難。種子亦應由相有染不名無漏。何故彼論說諸異生唯成無漏種。不言成現行。現行。種子性之與相皆類同故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有漏的善心，其自性並非無漏，因為它被稱為『雜染』的緣故，就像不善心等一樣。這裡的『雜染』一詞，可以通用於一切三性（善、惡、無記）的有漏法，作為它們產生的原因。之所以稱為『雜染』，是因為它被各種煩惱所攀緣和束縛。而且，這種有漏的善心，不應該成為無漏心的原因，因為它本身是雜染的，就像不善心等一樣。或者可以總的說，有漏的善心，其自性並非無漏，不應該成為無漏心的原因，因為它本身是雜染的，就像噁心等一樣。這種說法中的『有法』（指有漏善心）並不完全成立，誰會認為有漏的善心其自性不是無漏的呢？所以應該像前面所說的那樣才是正確的。

為什麼有漏法不能成為無漏法的原因呢？

論：因為善與惡等不能互相成為原因。

述曰：作為什麼的原因呢？因為這違背了你自己的宗義。因為它們不是直接產生的。因為它們的自性相互違背。

論：如果認為有漏心最終會變得不可得。

述曰：又一個難題是，如果相違的事物可以互為原因，那麼有漏心的自性如果是無漏的，無漏心的自性就應該是有漏的，因為它們是相互違背的。就像有漏的自性一樣。如果只有有漏的自性是無漏的，而不是無漏心的自性是有漏的，那麼這種差別的原因是不可得的。如果因為勝劣的關係，劣的可以具有勝的自性，而不是勝的具有劣的自性。因為勝劣的關係，劣的可以具有勝的自性，但因為它們是相互對治的，劣的就不應該具有勝的自性，因為它們是對治的關係，勝的也不應該具有劣的自性。

論：如果異生（凡夫）的心是無漏的，那麼他們就應該被稱為聖者。

述曰：如果心的自性是清凈的，那就是無漏的。那麼，在異生（凡夫）的階段，就應該有無漏法現行。如果承認現行的有漏心其自性是清凈的，就像佛等聖者一樣，那麼這些異生就應該被稱為聖者。

論：如果異生（凡夫）的心因為有染污的相，所以不被稱為無漏，那麼就沒有這樣的過失了。

述曰：這是對對方辯解的複述，對方認為因為有染污的相，所以不被稱為無漏。

論：那麼，心的種子也應該因為有染污的相，所以不被稱為無漏，因為種子和現行的自性和相是相同的。

述曰：下面是正面的反駁。心的種子也應該因為有染污的相，所以不被稱為無漏。為什麼對方的論點說，諸異生（凡夫）只有無漏的種子，而不說有無漏的現行呢？因為現行和種子的自性和相都是相同的。

【English Translation】 English version: A wholesome mind with outflows (有漏善心, yǒu lòu shàn xīn), its nature is not without outflows (無漏, wú lòu), because it is called 'contaminated' (雜染, zá rǎn), like unwholesome minds and so on. This term 'contaminated' can be applied to all three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) of phenomena with outflows, as their cause. It is called 'contaminated' because it is clung to and bound by various afflictions (煩惱, fán nǎo). Moreover, this wholesome mind with outflows should not be the cause of a mind without outflows, because it itself is contaminated, like unwholesome minds and so on. Or, it can be generally said that a wholesome mind with outflows, its nature is not without outflows, and it should not be the cause of a mind without outflows, because it itself is contaminated, like evil minds and so on. This 'dharma possessing' (有法, yǒu fǎ) [referring to the wholesome mind with outflows] is not fully established. Who would admit that a wholesome mind with outflows is not without outflows in nature? Therefore, it should be as said before that is correct.

Why can't phenomena with outflows be the cause of phenomena without outflows?

Treatise: Because wholesome and unwholesome, etc., cannot be mutual causes.

Commentary: The cause of what? Because it contradicts your own tenets. Because they are not directly produced. Because their natures are contradictory.

Treatise: If it is thought that minds with outflows will ultimately become unattainable.

Commentary: Another difficulty is that if contradictory things can be mutual causes, then if the nature of a mind with outflows is without outflows, the nature of a mind without outflows should be with outflows, because they are contradictory. Like the nature with outflows. If only the nature with outflows is without outflows, and not the nature of a mind without outflows is with outflows, then the reason for this difference is unattainable. If because of superiority and inferiority, the inferior can have the superior nature, but not the superior have the inferior nature. Because of superiority and inferiority, the inferior can have the superior nature, but because they are mutually antidotal, the inferior should not have the superior nature, because they are antidotal, and the superior should not have the inferior nature.

Treatise: If the minds of ordinary beings (異生, yì shēng) are without outflows, then they should be called sages (聖者, shèng zhě).

Commentary: If the nature of the mind is pure, then it is without outflows. Then, in the stage of ordinary beings, there should be the manifestation of phenomena without outflows. If it is admitted that the nature of the currently manifesting mind with outflows is pure, like Buddhas and other sages, then these ordinary beings should be called sages.

Treatise: If the minds of ordinary beings are not called without outflows because they have contaminated appearances, then there is no such fault.

Commentary: This is a restatement of the other party's defense, who believes that because there are contaminated appearances, they are not called without outflows.

Treatise: Then, the seeds of the mind should also not be called without outflows because they have contaminated appearances, because the nature and appearance of seeds and currently manifesting phenomena are the same.

Commentary: Below is a direct refutation. The seeds of the mind should also not be called without outflows because they have contaminated appearances. Why does the other party's argument say that ordinary beings only have seeds without outflows, and not currently manifesting phenomena without outflows? Because the nature and appearance of currently manifesting phenomena and seeds are the same.

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下申正義。外人問曰。若爾心性凈者。此是何法。

論。然契經說至真實性故。

述曰。下自解也。即心空理真如是心。心性凈者真實性故。勝鬘經中具說此義。其對法論第十卷三轉依中。解心轉依真如說為心本性凈。以起煩惱覆此凈心。今斷染惑證凈心性故。

論。或說心體至名性本凈。

述曰。或依他心體非煩惱名性本凈。以煩惱客相應惑心擾令斷客染心得解脫。如瑜伽五十四說。心所等亦爾。

論。非有漏心至故名本凈。

述曰。心性者。真如也。真如無為非心之因。亦非種子能有果法。如虛空等。故非有漏心性是無漏名本性凈也。

論。由此應信至類此應知。

述曰。自下第三申其正義。應信本有無漏種子。至解脫分善根已去名勝進位。但熏增長。復熏成種。謂入見道。且如無漏既有本有及與新熏。有漏法種類此應悉。已如前說。

第四大段。釋外問經．論等妨難唯新熏難言。論說內種定有熏習。此如何通有本有故。

論。諸聖教中至本有種子。

述曰。自下第四釋相違也。若唯本有此義難通。我兼本有故無有妨。既不定說一切種子皆熏故生。汝寧全撥無本有種。

若爾何須論說內種定有熏習。

論。然本有種至

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 下文申明正義。外人問道：『如果心性是清凈的，那麼這清凈心性又是什麼法呢？』

論：『然而契經中說，這是真實性。』

述記：下面是自解。即心空之理，真如就是心。心性清凈，是因為它是真實性。《勝鬘經》中詳細地闡述了這個意義。瑜伽師地論的《對法論》第十卷三轉依中，解釋心轉依真如時，說它是心本性清凈。因為生起煩惱覆蓋了這清凈的心，現在斷除染污迷惑，證得清凈的心性。』

論：『或者說，依他心體，沒有煩惱，名為性本凈。』

述記：『或者說，依他心體，沒有煩惱，名為性本凈。因為煩惱是客塵，與心相應，擾亂了心，斷除客塵染污，心得解脫。如《瑜伽師地論》第五十四卷所說。心所等也是如此。』

論：『不是有漏心性，所以名為本凈。』

述記：『心性，就是真如。真如是無為法，不是心的因，也不是種子，不能產生果法，如同虛空等。所以不是有漏心性，而是無漏，名為本性清凈。』

論：『由此應當相信，有本有的無漏種子，此類應當知道。』

述記：『下面第三次申明正義。應當相信有本有的無漏種子，到解脫分善根以後，名為勝進位，只是熏習增長，再次熏習成為種子，即進入見道。比如無漏法既有本有，又有新熏。有漏法的種類，也應當像這樣。這些前面已經說過了。』

第四大段。解釋外人提問，經、論等妨難，唯有新熏難以解釋。論中說內在的種子必定有熏習，這如何與有本有相通？

論：『諸聖教中說，有本有種子。』

述記：『下面第四次解釋相違之處。如果只有本有，這個意義難以解釋。我兼有本有，所以沒有妨礙。既然不一定說一切種子都是熏習而生，你難道要完全否定沒有本有的種子嗎？』

『如果這樣，為什麼論中說內在的種子必定有熏習？』

論：『然而本有的種子……』

【English Translation】 English version Hereinafter, clarifying the correct meaning. An outsider asks: 'If the nature of the mind is pure, then what Dharma is this?'

Treatise: 'However, the sutras say that it is the true nature.'

Commentary: The following is a self-explanation. That is, the principle of the emptiness of the mind, suchness (tathata) is the mind. The purity of the mind's nature is because it is the true nature. The Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra fully explains this meaning. In the tenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, in the three transformations, when explaining the transformation of the mind's reliance on suchness, it is said that it is the inherently pure nature of the mind. Because the arising of afflictions covers this pure mind, now, by cutting off defilements and delusions, one attains the pure nature of the mind.'

Treatise: 'Or it is said that the dependent nature of the mind, without afflictions, is called inherently pure.'

Commentary: 'Or it is said that the dependent nature of the mind, without afflictions, is called inherently pure. Because afflictions are adventitious dust, corresponding to the mind, disturbing the mind, cutting off the adventitious dust defilements, the mind attains liberation. As stated in the fifty-fourth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The mental factors (citta-samprayukta) are also like this.'

Treatise: 'It is not the nature of the afflicted mind, therefore it is called inherently pure.'

Commentary: 'The nature of the mind is suchness. Suchness is unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), not the cause of the mind, nor a seed, and cannot produce resultant dharmas, like space. Therefore, it is not the nature of the afflicted mind, but the unconditioned, called inherently pure.'

Treatise: 'Therefore, one should believe that there are inherently existing unconditioned seeds; this kind should be known.'

Commentary: 'The following is the third clarification of the correct meaning. One should believe that there are inherently existing unconditioned seeds, and after the roots of virtue in the liberation division, it is called the stage of superior progress, only perfuming and increasing, and again perfuming to become seeds, that is, entering the path of seeing (darśana-mārga). For example, unconditioned dharmas have both inherent existence and newly perfumed. The types of conditioned dharmas should also be like this. These have been said before.'

The fourth major section. Explaining the questions raised by outsiders, the difficulties in the sutras and treatises, only the newly perfumed is difficult to explain. The treatise says that the internal seeds must have perfuming, how does this connect with having inherent existence?

Treatise: 'In the various holy teachings, it is said that there are inherently existing seeds.'

Commentary: 'The following is the fourth explanation of the contradictions. If there is only inherent existence, this meaning is difficult to explain. I have both inherent existence, so there is no obstacle. Since it is not necessarily said that all seeds are produced by perfuming, do you want to completely deny that there are no inherently existing seeds?'

'If so, why does the treatise say that the internal seeds must have perfuming?'

Treatise: 'However, the inherently existing seeds...'

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定有熏習。

述曰。謂本有種亦由熏習令其增盛方能得果。新熏理然。故說內種定有熏習。

外人復曰。此義可爾如何說聞熏習聞凈法界等流正法。而熏起也。復言是出世心種子性也。

論。其聞熏習非唯有漏。

述曰。顯聞熏習通有．無漏。

論。聞正法時至名聞熏習。

述曰。種解脫分善根已去。聞正法時。由現行有漏．及自因緣所熏有漏種。為增上緣。令其本有無漏種子。亦得增長展轉增勝。即以所增無漏勝種。后時正生出世之心。亦說無漏所增長種名聞熏習。對法第四云。抉擇分善根亦是有漏。亦名無漏。據各別故。

論。聞熏習中至勝增上緣。

述曰。此第一解有漏性者是修所斷。即同對法第四卷抉擇分善修道所斷文感勝異熟為出世法勝增上緣。即如瑜伽第五十一卷說。感總．別果如第九說。

論。無漏性者至正為因緣。

述曰。亦同對法第四卷文　與出世法正為因緣。辨體生故。

論。此正因緣至出世心種。

述曰。又第二解此無漏種望出世心是正因緣微隱難了。未起現行故。相狀難知故。攝大乘諸論等處。但寄粗顯有漏聞熏是無漏勝增上緣者。方便說此為出世心種。此增上緣。非正因緣種。若無有漏聞熏習者。無漏之種不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 必定有熏習。

解釋說：所謂的本有種子，也是通過熏習使其增長，才能得到結果。新熏習的道理也是如此。所以說內在的種子必定有熏習。

外人又問：這個道理可以接受。但如何解釋通過聽聞熏習，聽聞清凈法界等流的正法，而熏習生起呢？又說這是出世之心的種子自性呢？

論：聽聞熏習不僅僅是有漏的。

解釋說：表明聽聞熏習貫通有漏和無漏。

論：聽聞正法時，就叫做聽聞熏習。

解釋說：從種下解脫分善根開始，聽聞正法時，由現行的有漏法，以及自身因緣所熏習的有漏種子，作為增上緣，使得其本有的無漏種子，也得以增長，輾轉增勝。就以所增長的無漏殊勝種子，在之後真正生起出世之心。也說無漏所增長的種子名為聽聞熏習。《對法》第四卷說：抉擇分善根也是有漏的，也名為無漏，根據各自不同的角度來說。

論：在聽聞熏習中，是殊勝的增上緣。

解釋說：這第一種解釋，有漏的性質是修所斷（bhāvanāpahātavya），就如同《對法》第四卷抉擇分善修道所斷的文句，感得殊勝的異熟果，作為出世法的殊勝增上緣。就如《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷所說。感得總果和別果，如第九卷所說。

論：無漏的性質，是作為正因緣。

解釋說：也如同《對法》第四卷的文句，與出世法作為正因緣。因為辨別體性而生起。

論：這個正因緣，是出世之心的種子。

解釋說：又第二種解釋，這個無漏種子，相對於出世之心，是正因緣，但非常微隱難以明瞭，因為還沒有生起現行。因為相狀難以知曉。因此《攝大乘論》等處，只是憑藉粗顯的有漏聽聞熏習，作為無漏的殊勝增上緣，方便地說這是出世之心的種子。這個增上緣，不是正因緣的種子。如果沒有有漏的聽聞熏習，無漏的種子就不會……

【English Translation】 English version: There must be habitual influence (熏習, xūn xí).

Explanation: The inherent seeds also need to be increased through habitual influence to bear fruit. The principle of newly acquired habitual influence is the same. Therefore, it is said that the internal seeds must have habitual influence.

An outsider asks again: This principle is acceptable. But how do you explain that through hearing and habitual influence, hearing the pure Dharma realm's (法界, fǎ jiè) equable flow of the Correct Dharma, habitual influence arises? And it is said that this is the seed nature of the mind that transcends the world (出世心, chū shì xīn)?

Treatise: Hearing and habitual influence is not only with outflows (有漏, yǒu lòu).

Explanation: It shows that hearing and habitual influence pervades with and without outflows.

Treatise: When hearing the Correct Dharma, it is called hearing and habitual influence.

Explanation: Starting from planting the roots of good of the liberation division (解脫分, jiě tuō fēn), when hearing the Correct Dharma, the existing outflows, and the outflow seeds influenced by their own conditions, serve as the dominant condition (增上緣, zēng shàng yuán), so that their inherent seeds without outflows can also grow and gradually become superior. Then, with the increased superior seeds without outflows, the mind that transcends the world truly arises later. It is also said that the seeds increased without outflows are called hearing and habitual influence. The fourth volume of Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法, Duì Fǎ) says: The roots of good of the determination division (抉擇分, jué zé fēn) are also with outflows and are also called without outflows, according to their respective perspectives.

Treatise: In hearing and habitual influence, it is a superior dominant condition.

Explanation: This first explanation, the nature with outflows is what is abandoned by cultivation (修所斷, bhāvanāpahātavya), which is the same as the sentence in the fourth volume of Abhidharmasamuccaya about the roots of good of the determination division abandoned by the path of cultivation, feeling the superior Vipāka (異熟, yì shú) as the superior dominant condition for the Dharma that transcends the world. It is as said in the fifty-first volume of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Yúqiéshī Dìlùn). Feeling the general and specific results is as said in the ninth volume.

Treatise: The nature without outflows is the direct cause.

Explanation: It is also the same as the sentence in the fourth volume of Abhidharmasamuccaya, being the direct cause for the Dharma that transcends the world. Because it distinguishes the essence and arises.

Treatise: This direct cause is the seed of the mind that transcends the world.

Explanation: Also, the second explanation, this seed without outflows, in relation to the mind that transcends the world, is the direct cause, but it is very subtle and difficult to understand, because it has not yet arisen in manifestation. Because the characteristics are difficult to know. Therefore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Shè Dàchéng Lùn) and other treatises only rely on the coarse and obvious hearing and habitual influence with outflows as the superior dominant condition without outflows, conveniently saying that this is the seed of the mind that transcends the world. This dominant condition is not the seed of the direct cause. If there is no hearing and habitual influence with outflows, the seed without outflows will not...

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生現行故寄有漏勝者說也。第一就實正因緣解。第二就勝增上緣解故。攝論文無相違失。由是善得對法等意。問曰。解脫．抉擇二善根中。其無漏種增長何別。答曰。約有漏行有上中下。其無漏種增長有異。解脫分中。下品增故。抉擇耎．頂。中品增故。其增上忍．世第一法。上品增故　問此無漏種本有既多。後生果時何者能生。何者不生　答曰。其同類種隨遇緣合即便能生。不合不生。如三世有未來應生法。何者前生。何者後生。故隨緣合即能生果。如后卷中自釋妨難　問若本有者。為三品種。為一品種　答若據唯本有．及唯新熏。皆唯一品。此是轉滅。轉滅下等作中等故。若本有家。唯一種子。若新熏初時唯一種生故。今第三師有三品種。即轉齊義。有漏亦爾。

既爾如何五十二說有障．無障說種姓別。

論。依障建立至如來種姓。

述曰。意顯無漏種子有無等文可解　有圓寂法者。是有涅槃種姓也。無者。可知。

論。故由無漏至不可斷義。

述曰。由有無漏種子差別故。障有可斷．不可斷義。

若爾既由無漏種故。障有可斷不可斷者。何故彼論但約障立姓耶。

論。然無漏種至不可害者。

述曰。由無漏種微隱難知故。約彼障顯姓差別。若不爾者。因者所

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為生起現行，所以說寄託于有漏的殊勝者。第一是就真實正確的因緣來解釋，第二是就殊勝的增上緣來解釋。因此，《攝論》的論文沒有互相違背的過失。由此才能很好地理解《對法》等的意旨。問：在解脫和抉擇這兩種善根中，無漏種子的增長有什麼區別？答：根據有漏行為的上、中、下品，無漏種子的增長也有不同。在解脫分中，下品增長；在抉擇的耎位和頂位，中品增長；在增上忍和世第一法中，上品增長。問：這些無漏種子本來就很多，後來產生果實的時候，哪些能夠產生，哪些不能產生？答：那些同類的種子，隨著因緣聚合就能產生，不聚合就不能產生。就像三世中未來應該產生的法，哪些先產生，哪些后產生一樣，都是隨著因緣聚合就能產生果實。就像後面章節中自己解釋妨難一樣。問：如果說是本有的，那麼是三種品類，還是一種品類？答：如果根據唯有本有或者唯有新熏，都是唯一品類。這是轉滅，轉滅下等作為中等。如果是本有家，只有一種種子；如果是新熏，最初的時候只有一種產生。現在第三師有三種品類，就是轉齊的意義，有漏也是這樣。

既然這樣，為什麼五十二說有障和無障，說種姓的區別？

論：依據障礙建立，乃至如來種姓（Tathāgata gotra）。

述曰：意思是說，無漏種子有無等的文句可以理解。有圓寂法（parinirvāṇa dharma）的人，是有涅槃種姓（nirvāṇa gotra）的人。沒有的人，可以知道。

論：所以因為有無漏種子的差別，障礙有可以斷和不可斷的意義。

述曰：因為有無漏種子差別，所以障礙有可以斷和不可斷的意義。

如果這樣，既然因為無漏種子的緣故，障礙有可以斷和不可斷，為什麼那部論只根據障礙來建立種姓呢？

論：然而無漏種子微細隱蔽難以知道，所以根據那些障礙來顯示種姓的差別。如果不這樣，因者所

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the arising of present actions, it is said that it relies on the superior among those with outflows (sāsrava). The first explanation is based on true and correct causes and conditions, and the second is based on superior dominant conditions. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the verses of the Compendium of Abhidharma (Abhidharma-samuccaya). From this, one can well understand the meaning of the Treatise on Dharma (Dharma-skandha) and others. Question: In the two roots of good, liberation (moksha) and ascertainment (nirnaya), what is the difference in the growth of the seeds of no-outflow (anāsrava)? Answer: According to the superior, middle, and inferior qualities of actions with outflows, the growth of the seeds of no-outflow is also different. In the part of liberation, the inferior quality increases; in the tenderness (mṛdu) and summit (mūrdhan) of ascertainment, the middle quality increases; in the superior forbearance (adhimukti-kṣānti) and the highest mundane dharma (laukikāgradharma), the superior quality increases. Question: Since these seeds of no-outflow are originally numerous, when the fruit arises later, which ones can arise and which ones cannot? Answer: Those seeds of the same kind can arise as soon as the conditions come together; if they do not come together, they cannot arise. Just like the dharmas that should arise in the future in the three times (past, present, future), which ones arise first and which ones arise later, it is all according to the aggregation of conditions that they can produce fruit. It is like the self-explanation of obstacles and difficulties in the later chapters. Question: If it is said to be originally existent, then are there three kinds or one kind? Answer: If based on only originally existent or only newly perfumed, there is only one kind. This is transformation and extinction (parinama-nirodha), where the transformation and extinction of the inferior, etc., becomes the middle, etc. If it is the family of originally existent, there is only one seed; if it is newly perfumed, only one arises at the beginning. Now the third teacher has three kinds, which is the meaning of transformation and equality; it is the same with outflows.

Since this is the case, why does the fifty-second section speak of obstacles and no obstacles, speaking of the difference in lineage (gotra)?

Treatise: Based on obstacles, the Tathāgata gotra (如來種姓) is established.

Commentary: The meaning is that the sentences about the presence or absence of seeds of no-outflow can be understood. Those who have the dharma of parinirvāṇa (圓寂法) have the nirvana gotra (涅槃種姓). Those who do not have it can be known.

Treatise: Therefore, because of the difference in seeds of no-outflow, obstacles have the meaning of being able to be cut off and not able to be cut off.

Commentary: Because there is a difference in seeds of no-outflow, obstacles have the meaning of being able to be cut off and not able to be cut off.

If this is the case, since obstacles can be cut off and not cut off because of the seeds of no-outflow, why does that treatise only establish lineage based on obstacles?

Treatise: However, the seeds of no-outflow are subtle, hidden, and difficult to know, so the difference in lineage is shown based on those obstacles. If not, the cause is what

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以。有何所以。彼障有可害．不可害別。

論。若謂法爾至寧不許然。

述曰。彼若救言法爾力故障有可害．不可害者。即難彼云。無漏法種寧不許有法爾種子姓各別也。若彼復言有漏曾熏故。法爾障有可害．不可害。無漏未曾熏故。種無法爾。此唯有言都無有理。既言有漏由熏。如何復言法爾。無漏既無法爾應不說言由熏。

論。若本全無至永不得生。

述曰。以無因故永不生也。

論。誰當能害至立種姓別。

述曰。無漏種無誰能害障。汝今乃說依障立姓。

論。既彼聖道至亦定非理。

述曰。聖道無種必無生義。約當可生說地獄等成種非現。亦定非理。無因果不生故。無治障不斷故。若言有漏心等為因。或說心性本凈為因。並如前破。此則以理返徴及會眾經．論意。

自下結此總說違理。

論。然諸聖教至理教相違。

述曰。自下第五曲文總結。處處說有本有種子。皆違新熏所立義故　故唯始起。理教相違諸經．論中無定文言一切種子皆法爾有。無有熏生　無定處言一切種子唯是新熏無法爾種。故二皆取。善順契經。

論。由此應知至始起二類。

述曰。大文第四總結之也。諸法種子有漏無漏各有二類。本有．新熏。理無失

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：有什麼原因導致這種情況？這種障礙有可被摧毀和不可被摧毀的區別嗎？

答：如果你們說這是事物本性如此，那麼難道不應該承認無漏法的種子也有其固有的不同嗎？

解釋：如果對方辯解說，事物本性就是這樣，力量導致障礙有可被摧毀和不可被摧毀的區別。那麼就可以反駁他們說，難道不應該承認無漏法的種子也有其固有的不同嗎？如果他們又說，有漏法是因為曾經被熏習，所以障礙有可被摧毀和不可被摧毀的區別，而無漏法沒有被熏習過，所以種子沒有這種本性。這只是空口無憑，毫無道理。既然說有漏法是由於熏習，怎麼又說是本性如此呢？無漏法既然沒有本性，就不應該說是由熏習產生的。

答：如果原本完全沒有，那麼就永遠不會產生。

解釋：因為沒有原因，所以永遠不會產生。

問：誰能夠摧毀無漏法的障礙呢？你們現在是依據障礙來建立種姓的區別。

解釋：無漏法的種子沒有誰能夠摧毀障礙。你們現在卻說依據障礙來建立種姓。

答：既然聖道沒有種子，那麼也一定是不合理的。

解釋：聖道如果沒有種子，必然沒有產生的道理。如果說地獄等是將來可能產生的種子，而不是現在就存在的，這也是不合理的。因為沒有原因就不會有結果，沒有對治就不會斷除障礙。如果說有漏心等是原因，或者說心性本凈是原因，都和前面破斥的一樣。這是用道理反過來質問，並且符合眾多經典和論著的意義。

下面總結這段話，總的來說是違背道理的。

答：然而，各種聖教都說有本有的種子，這與新熏習的觀點相違背。

解釋：下面第五次曲折地總結。處處都說有本有的種子，這都與新熏習所建立的觀點相違背。所以只承認新熏習的觀點是錯誤的。道理和教義相違背。各種經典和論著中沒有明確的說法，說一切種子都是本性就有的，沒有熏習產生的。也沒有明確的說法，說一切種子都只是新熏習的，沒有本有的種子。所以兩種觀點都應該採納，這樣才符合契經。

答：由此應該知道，各種法的種子有本有和新熏兩種。

解釋：這是第四個大的總結。各種法的種子，有漏的和無漏的，各有兩種：本有的和新熏習的。這樣在道理上沒有過失。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: What is the reason for this? Is there a distinction between these obstructions, whether they can be destroyed or cannot be destroyed?

Answer: If you say that this is the nature of things, then shouldn't it be admitted that the seeds of unconditioned (Asrava-free) dharmas also have their inherent differences?

Explanation: If the opponent argues that it is the nature of things, and the power causes the obstructions to have differences between those that can be destroyed and those that cannot. Then it can be refuted by saying, shouldn't it be admitted that the seeds of unconditioned dharmas also have their inherent differences? If they further say that conditioned (Asrava-laden) dharmas are because they have been previously perfumed (熏習 xūn xí), so the obstructions have differences between those that can be destroyed and those that cannot, while unconditioned dharmas have not been perfumed, so the seeds do not have this nature. This is just empty talk, without any reason. Since it is said that conditioned dharmas are due to perfuming, how can it also be said that it is their nature? Since unconditioned dharmas do not have this nature, it should not be said that they are produced by perfuming.

Answer: If there is absolutely nothing originally, then it will never arise.

Explanation: Because there is no cause, it will never arise.

Question: Who can destroy the obstructions of unconditioned dharmas? You are now establishing the distinction of lineages (種姓 zhǒng xìng) based on obstructions.

Explanation: No one can destroy the seeds of unconditioned dharmas. You are now saying that you establish the lineages based on obstructions.

Answer: Since the Noble Path (聖道 shèng dào) has no seeds, then it must also be unreasonable.

Explanation: If the Noble Path has no seeds, it necessarily has no reason to arise. If it is said that hells, etc., are seeds that may arise in the future, rather than existing now, this is also unreasonable. Because without a cause, there will be no result, and without an antidote, obstructions will not be eliminated. If it is said that conditioned minds, etc., are the cause, or that the nature of mind is inherently pure is the cause, it is the same as the previous refutations. This is using reason to question back, and it is in accordance with the meaning of many sutras and treatises.

Below summarizes this passage, saying that overall it is against reason.

Answer: However, various sacred teachings all say that there are originally existing seeds, which contradicts the view of newly perfumed seeds.

Explanation: Below is the fifth indirect summary. Everywhere it is said that there are originally existing seeds, which all contradict the view established by newly perfumed seeds. Therefore, it is wrong to only acknowledge the view of newly perfumed seeds. Reason and doctrine contradict each other. There is no clear statement in various sutras and treatises saying that all seeds are inherently existing, without being produced by perfuming. Nor is there a clear statement saying that all seeds are only newly perfumed, without originally existing seeds. Therefore, both views should be adopted, so that it is in accordance with the sutras.

Answer: From this, it should be known that the seeds of various dharmas have two types: originally existing and newly perfumed.

Explanation: This is the fourth major summary. The seeds of various dharmas, conditioned and unconditioned, each have two types: originally existing and newly perfumed. In this way, there is no fault in reason.

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故。不違經故。入見道已別熏生種。無漏行故。地前但令舊種增長。有漏現行勢力弱故。不別能令無漏種起　此中但言由聞熏習令本有種漸增盛故。諸法師等皆言護法解脫分等有新種生。護月但令種子增長故有別者。理亦不然。此文為正。以前．及后瑜伽第五．攝論二本第二。勘讀其理方明。

成唯識論述記卷第二 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

成唯識論述記卷第三(本)

基撰

論。然種子義略有六種。

述曰。十義廣種子中。自下第八具義多小。種有六義遮余非種。于中有三。初總標六義。次隨六別釋。后總結簡余非實種子。此即初也。

瑜伽第五說有七種子。今此言六故云略也　法有五聚第一遮無為。第三遮心．心所等。即簡別盡。然簡自處更立余門。第二遮等自處分別更不敘之。不遮色者。色法外種亦具此六義故。假名種子　若爾如何與果俱有。復如何言常恒隨轉　無性攝論不簡差別唯言內種有。世親即通。然彼一一皆自釋。言內法如此．外法如此。至果俱有唯言內種。即不論外。勘彼一一次第明之。今釋外種亦有果俱。如蓮華根生蓮華等。非因滅位其果方生。根．莖同時世極成故。此解稍好。可細尋之。

論。一剎那滅至方成種

【現代漢語翻譯】 故，因為不違背經文的緣故。進入見道位后，通過特別的熏習產生新的種子，這是因為無漏行（沒有煩惱的行為）的緣故。在見道位之前，只能讓原有的種子增長，因為有漏的現行（有煩惱的行為）勢力較弱，不能使無漏的種子生起。這裡只是說通過聽聞熏習，使原本就有的種子逐漸增長。諸位法師等都說護法的解脫分等有新的種子產生。護月只認為種子是增長的，所以有差別。這個說法是不對的，本文的說法是正確的。以前以及後來的《瑜伽師地論》第五卷、《攝大乘論》的兩個版本第二卷，仔細研讀其中的道理才能明白。

《成唯識論述記》卷第二 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 《成唯識論述記》

《成唯識論述記》卷第三(本)

基 撰

論：然而種子的意義大致有六種。

述曰：在十義廣種子中，從下面第八個『具義多小』開始，種子有六種意義，用來排除其他不是種子的東西。其中有三個方面。首先總標出六種意義，其次分別解釋這六種意義，最後總結並簡別出不是真實種子的東西。這裡是第一個方面。

《瑜伽師地論》第五卷說有七種種子，現在這裡說六種，所以說是『略』。法有五聚，第一是遮止無為法，第三是遮止心、心所等。這樣就簡別完畢了。然而，簡別自身之處，另外設立其他門類。第二是遮止等，自身之處的分別不再敘述。不遮止色法的原因是，色法外在的種子也具備這六種意義。假名種子。如果這樣，如何與果同時存在？又如何說是常恒隨轉？無性《攝大乘論》不簡別差別，只說內在的種子有。世親則認為內外種子都通。然而，他們都各自解釋，說內在法如此，外在法如此。至於與果同時存在，只說內在的種子，而不論外在的種子。仔細研讀他們一一的次第就能明白。現在解釋外在的種子也有與果同時存在的，比如蓮花的根生蓮花等，不是因滅的時候果才生，根和莖同時存在是世間普遍認可的。這種解釋稍微好一些，可以仔細研究。

論：一剎那滅，才能成為種子。

【English Translation】 Therefore, it is because it does not contradict the scriptures. After entering the Path of Seeing (見道, Jian Dao), new seeds are produced through special熏習 (xun xi, habitual influence), because of the un-leaked (無漏, wu lou, free from defilements) practice. Before the Path of Seeing, one can only allow the original seeds to grow, because the power of the leaked (有漏, you lou, with defilements) present actions is weak, and it cannot cause the un-leaked seeds to arise. Here it only says that through hearing and熏習 (xun xi, habitual influence), the original seeds gradually increase. All the Dharma masters say that the liberating divisions of Dharmapala (護法, Hu Fa) and others have new seeds produced. Hu Yue (護月) only believes that the seeds are growing, so there is a difference. This statement is incorrect, and the statement in this text is correct. Read carefully the fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論, Yu Jia Shi Di Lun) before and the second volume of the two versions of the Mahayanasamgraha (攝大乘論, She Da Cheng Lun) later, and you will understand the reason.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only, Volume 2 Taisho Tripitaka Volume 43, No. 1830, Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only, Volume 3 (Original)

Composed by Ji (基)

Treatise: However, there are roughly six kinds of meanings of seeds.

Commentary: Among the ten meanings of broadly defining seeds, starting from the eighth 'having meaning, many small', seeds have six meanings to exclude other things that are not seeds. There are three aspects to this. First, it generally marks out the six meanings, second, it explains each of the six meanings separately, and finally, it summarizes and distinguishes things that are not real seeds. This is the first aspect.

The fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論, Yu Jia Shi Di Lun) says that there are seven kinds of seeds, but here it says six, so it is 'roughly'. Dharma has five aggregates, the first is to exclude unconditioned dharmas (無為法, wu wei fa), and the third is to exclude mind, mental factors, etc. This completes the distinction. However, to distinguish its own place, other categories are established. The second is to exclude etc., and the distinctions in its own place are no longer described. The reason for not excluding form is that external seeds of form also have these six meanings. Nominal seeds. If so, how can it exist simultaneously with the result? And how can it be said to be constant and ever-changing? Mahayanasamgraha (攝大乘論, She Da Cheng Lun) by Asanga (無性, Wu Xing) does not distinguish differences, but only says that internal seeds exist. Vasubandhu (世親, Shi Qin) believes that both internal and external seeds are universal. However, they all explain themselves, saying that internal dharma is like this, and external dharma is like that. As for existing simultaneously with the result, only internal seeds are mentioned, and external seeds are not discussed. Carefully study their order one by one to understand. Now explain that external seeds also exist simultaneously with the result, such as lotus roots producing lotuses, etc. It is not that the result is produced when the cause ceases, but the root and stem exist simultaneously, which is universally recognized in the world. This explanation is slightly better and can be studied carefully.

Treatise: One instant of cessation is required to become a seed.

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子。

述曰。顯種子義。謂有為法有生滅故。于轉變位能取與果。有勝功能方成種子。

論。此遮常法至能生用故。

述曰。此簡略也。無為不然。無轉變故。無取．與用非能生也。亦顯大眾等四部．化地部十二緣起非是　無為無取無與．無轉變故。即遮正量部長時四相。非剎那滅故　若謂后時有勝功力。初位無者。初亦應有。體一故。如后時　后應無。體一故。如前位。故體才生無間即滅名為種子。有勝功力。才生即有非要后時　又遮外道自性．神我等常法為因。無轉變故。瑜伽第五云。唯無常法為因。非常法也　舊人云真如是諸法種子者。非也　若爾前種應與后念現行為種。或雖同念他身相望應為種子。

論。二果俱有至方成種子。

述曰。謂此種子要望所生現行果法。俱時現有　現者。顯現．現在．現有三義名現。由此無性人第七識不名種子。果不顯現故。即顯現言簡彼第七。現在簡前後。現有簡假法。體是實有成種子故。顯現唯在果。現有唯在因。現在通因．果　和合簡相離。即簡前法為后法種。

有說。種生現行之時。必前後念非此剎那。如何解此。彼師意說。如上座部心有二時。即因在生果在滅故同在現在。亦不相違。此即勝軍假明上座。非實用之。第三卷中自當

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 子。

述曰。闡明種子的意義。意思是說有為法有生滅變化，在轉變的過程中能夠取得和給予果報，具有殊勝的功能才能成為種子。

論。這段話是爲了遮止常法，因為常法不能產生作用。

述曰。這是簡略的解釋。無為法不是這樣，因為它沒有轉變，沒有取得和給予的作用，所以不能產生作用。這也顯示出大眾部等四部、化地部的十二緣起不是無為法，因為它們沒有取得、給予和轉變。這就遮止了正量部所說的長時四相，因為它們不是剎那滅的。如果說后時有殊勝的功力，而初位沒有，那麼初位也應該有，因為體性是一樣的，就像后時一樣。后時也應該沒有，因為體性是一樣的，就像前位一樣。所以，體性剛產生就立即滅去，這叫做種子，具有殊勝的功力，剛產生就具有，不是一定要到后時才具有。又遮止了外道所說的自性、神我等常法作為原因，因為它們沒有轉變。瑜伽第五卷說，只有無常法才能作為原因，而不是常法。舊人說真如是諸法的種子，這是不對的。如果這樣，那麼前一念的種子應該與后一念的現行作為種子，或者即使是同一念，但不同身體之間也應該作為種子。

論。兩種果報同時具有，才能成為種子。

述曰。意思是說，這種種子要與所產生的現行果法同時存在。『現』，有顯現、現在、現有三種含義，所以無性人的第七識不能稱為種子，因為它所產生的果不顯現。『顯現』這個詞是爲了簡別第七識，『現在』是爲了簡別前後，『現有』是爲了簡別假法，因為它的體性是實有，所以才能成為種子。顯現只在果上，現有隻在因上，現在則通於因和果。和合是爲了簡別相離，也就是簡別前法作為后法的種子。

有人說，種子產生現行的時候，必定是前後念，而不是這一剎那，應該如何解釋呢？那位師父的意思是說，就像上座部所說的心有二時，也就是因在生的時候，果在滅的時候，所以同時存在於現在，也不互相違背。這只是勝軍假借上座部的說法，並不是實際應用。第三卷中自然會說明。

【English Translation】 English version: Son.

Statement: Explains the meaning of 'seed'. It means that conditioned dharmas have arising and ceasing, and in the process of transformation, they can take and give results. Only with superior functions can they become seeds.

Treatise: This is to negate permanent dharmas because they cannot produce effects.

Statement: This is a brief explanation. Unconditioned dharmas are not like this because they do not transform, and they do not have the function of taking and giving, so they cannot produce effects. This also shows that the twelve links of dependent origination of the Mahasamghika and other four schools, and the Dharmaguptaka school, are not unconditioned dharmas because they do not have taking, giving, and transformation. This negates the long-lasting four characteristics of the Sautrantika school because they do not cease in an instant. If it is said that later times have superior power, while the initial state does not, then the initial state should also have it because the nature is the same, just like later times. Later times should also not have it because the nature is the same, just like the initial state. Therefore, the nature arises and immediately ceases, which is called a seed, possessing superior power, which it has as soon as it arises, not necessarily later. It also negates the permanent dharmas of externalists, such as self-nature and the self, as causes because they do not transform. The fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that only impermanent dharmas can be causes, not permanent dharmas. The old people say that Suchness is the seed of all dharmas, which is not correct. If so, then the seed of the previous thought should be the seed for the manifestation of the subsequent thought, or even if it is the same thought, different bodies should be seeds for each other.

Treatise: Two results exist simultaneously for it to become a seed.

Statement: It means that this seed must exist simultaneously with the manifest result that it produces. 'Manifest' has three meanings: manifestation, present, and existing. Therefore, the seventh consciousness of the non-nature person cannot be called a seed because the result it produces does not manifest. The word 'manifestation' is to distinguish the seventh consciousness, 'present' is to distinguish before and after, and 'existing' is to distinguish false dharmas because its nature is real, so it can become a seed. Manifestation is only in the result, existence is only in the cause, and present is common to both cause and result. Combination is to distinguish separation, which is to distinguish the previous dharma as the seed of the subsequent dharma.

Some say that when a seed produces a manifestation, it must be in the previous and subsequent thoughts, not in this instant. How should this be explained? That teacher means that, like the Theravada school says, the mind has two times, which means that when the cause is arising, the result is ceasing, so they both exist in the present, and they do not contradict each other. This is just Shengjun borrowing the Theravada school's statement, not for practical use. It will be explained in the third volume.

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廣述　若爾種望種亦應然。何為料簡　瑜伽云。法與自性為因。非即此剎那　此必異時非果俱有　若因在滅果在生相仍名俱有。即有二趣並生之妨。由此故知。種生現時定必同世。種生于種世不必同。

雖必同世。若與現行和合之位方成種子。簡與他身現行為因。不和合故。

論。此遮前後及定相離。

述曰。此遮經部等因果異時。上座部等亦爾。種望現行定俱。一身不相離故得為因也。外道說大自在天生一切有情。有情因緣者。皆不成也。

問何故種望種因果。即言異時生。望現為因果。乃許同時起。

論。現種異類至有能生用。

述曰。現行與種各異類故互不相違。於一身俱時現在。有能生用故。且如色法。現行有礙。種子無礙。心緣慮等準此應知。因．果體性不相似故名為異類。不相違故得同時有。

論。非如種子至必不俱有。

述曰。種子望種。體性相似名為同類　以相違故不得俱時一身和合。即第五卷瑜伽論云。與他性為因　即種望現　亦與后念自性為因。非即此剎那　此即是種　前後相生　種相生時何故不許有同時義　難曰。見分緣于見自體同時緣。種子生於種自體同時。

有解云。種望于種為因果。若許同時非因緣。見分望見雖同時因果。即

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 廣述：如果種子生種子也應該是這樣（指種子和種子必須異時），為什麼還要進行料簡呢？《瑜伽師地論》說：『法與自性為因，不是即此剎那』，這必定是異時，不是果與因俱有。如果因在滅時，果在生時，表面上仍然可以稱為俱有，但這樣就會有二趣並生的妨礙。由此可知，種子生現行時，必定是同一世；種子生種子時，世不一定相同。

雖然必定是同一世，但如果與現行和合的位置才能成為種子，這是爲了簡別與他身現行為因的情況，因為不和合的緣故。

論：這遮止了前後以及定相離的情況。

述曰：這遮止了經部等認為因果異時的觀點，上座部等也是如此。種子生現行必定是俱有的，因為一身不相離，所以可以作為因。外道說大自在天（Maheśvara，印度教神祇，被認為是宇宙的創造者）生一切有情，有情因緣的說法，都是不成立的。

問：為什麼種子生種子，因果就說是異時生，而種子生現行作為因果，就允許同時生起呢？

論：現行和種子是異類，所以有能生用的作用。

述曰：現行與種子因為各自是異類，所以互相不違背，可以在一身同時存在，並且有能生用的作用。例如色法，現行是有障礙的，種子是無障礙的。心緣慮等情況，可以參照這個道理來理解。因為因和果的體性不相似，所以稱為異類，因為不相違背，所以可以同時存在。

論：不是像種子生種子那樣，必定不能俱有。

述曰：種子生種子，體性相似，稱為同類。因為相違背的緣故，不能在同一身同時和合。就像第五卷《瑜伽師地論》所說：『與他性為因』，就是指種子生現行，『也與后念自性為因，不是即此剎那』，這指的就是種子。前後相生，種子相生時，為什麼不允許有同時的意義呢？難曰：見分緣于見自體是同時緣，種子生於種子自體是同時。

有解釋說：種子生種子作為因果，如果允許同時就不是因緣。見分望見雖然是同時因果，即

【English Translation】 English version: Extensive Explanation: If seed generating seed should also be the same (referring to seed and seed necessarily being at different times), why is it still necessary to make distinctions? The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Dharma and self-nature are the cause, not just this moment,' this must be at different times, not that the effect and cause exist together. If the cause is ceasing and the effect is arising, superficially it can still be called existing together, but this would have the fault of two destinies arising simultaneously. From this, it can be known that when a seed generates a manifestation, it must be in the same lifetime; when a seed generates a seed, the lifetimes do not necessarily have to be the same.

Although it must be in the same lifetime, if it is only when combined with the present manifestation that it can become a seed, this is to distinguish the case where the present manifestation of another body is the cause, because they are not combined.

Treatise: This prevents the situations of before and after, and fixed separation.

Commentary: This prevents the views of the Sautrāntikas (Sautrāntika, a school of early Buddhism) and others who believe that cause and effect are at different times, and the Theravādins (Theravada, the oldest surviving branch of Buddhism) are also like this. Seed generating manifestation must be together, because they are not separated in one body, so it can be the cause. The heretics say that Maheśvara (Maheśvara, a Hindu deity, considered the creator of the universe) generates all sentient beings, and the causes and conditions of sentient beings are all untenable.

Question: Why is it said that seed generating seed, the cause and effect are generated at different times, while seed generating manifestation as cause and effect is allowed to arise simultaneously?

Treatise: Manifestation and seed are different categories, so they have the function of being able to generate.

Commentary: Because manifestation and seed are different categories, they do not contradict each other, and can exist simultaneously in one body, and have the function of being able to generate. For example, with form, the manifestation is obstructed, and the seed is unobstructed. The mind's contemplation and other situations can be understood by analogy. Because the nature of cause and effect are not similar, they are called different categories, and because they do not contradict each other, they can exist simultaneously.

Treatise: It is not like seed generating seed, which necessarily cannot exist together.

Commentary: Seed generating seed, the nature is similar, and is called the same category. Because they contradict each other, they cannot be combined simultaneously in the same body. Just like the fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Taking other nature as the cause,' this refers to seed generating manifestation, 'also taking the self-nature of the subsequent thought as the cause, not just this moment,' this refers to the seed. Generating each other before and after, when seeds generate each other, why is it not allowed to have the meaning of simultaneity? Objection: The seeing-aspect conditions the seeing-self simultaneously, and the seed generates the seed-self simultaneously.

Some explain: Seed generating seed as cause and effect, if simultaneity is allowed, it is not cause and condition. Although the seeing-aspect looking at seeing is simultaneous cause and effect, that is

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非因緣攝　若爾種望現起類亦應然　故應更解。種望于種許同時生。體便無窮。自類許有同時生故。即一剎那有多種生。都無因緣。不許后種更生果故。現行望種名為異類。雖亦熏種。后種未生果故非無窮。於一剎那無二現行自體並故。所生之種由此不可更生現行。種望于種類亦應爾　問若爾如何本有同念得生新熏。體相違故　此不同時。如世第一法無漏。緣增本有種子。牽生后念任運自類法爾之種。復能為因生於后念一新熏種。本．新二種緣力既齊同生一現。故無同念種生種失　此亦難解。若本有種更生種子。便一念中有四法也。謂一本有。二本有所生。三新現行所熏。四是現行。如何可說三法展轉　今釋。不然。即本有種．及現行為因緣。生一新熏種故但三法　又解。本有種望新熏種非其因緣。現行能熏為因緣故。即是本有唯望現行。現行唯望新熏。為因緣故。由此別脫戒。體不增。而用增。與道定戒相似。定．道二戒既是現思。故唯唸唸是用增非體　前解即與別脫戒體用俱增義。

此中雖顯與果俱有望現行說。可現在時說為因義。種望于種既許異時。若入過去何者因義。

論。雖因與果至無自體故。

述曰。其因與果有俱者。謂生現。不俱者。生自類。雖俱．不俱而要現在可有因用。以有體

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 非因緣攝（不受因緣支配）。如果這樣，種子和期望（望）的現起也應該一樣（指不受因緣支配）。所以應該重新解釋。種子和期望對於種子，允許同時產生，這樣本體就會無窮無盡。因為自類允許有同時產生的，即一個剎那有多種子產生，完全沒有因緣。因為不允許後來的種子再生果。現行對於種子，名為異類，雖然也熏習種子，但因為後來的種子沒有生果，所以不是無窮無盡。在一個剎那沒有兩個現行自體並存。所生的種子因此不能再生現行。種子對於種類也應該這樣。 問：如果這樣，如何本有的同念能夠產生新的熏習？因為本體和相狀是相違背的。 答：這不同時。比如世第一法（指修行者在進入見道位之前所修習的最高層次的世間禪定）的無漏，憑藉增上的本有種子，牽引產生后念任運自類的法爾種子（自然而然產生的種子），又能作為因產生后唸的一個新的熏習種子。本有和新的兩種子，緣的力量既然相同，同時產生一個現行，所以沒有同唸的種子產生種子消失的過失。這也很難理解。如果本有的種子再生種子，那麼一念中就有四法了。即一本有，二本有所生，三新現行所熏，四是現行。如何能說三法展轉相生？ 現在解釋，不是這樣。即本有的種子和現行作為因緣，產生一個新的熏習種子，所以只有三法。又解釋，本有的種子對於新的熏習種子不是它的因緣，現行能夠熏習作為因緣。即是本有隻對於現行，現行只對于新的熏習，作為因緣。因此別解脫戒（佛教戒律的一種）的本體不增加，而作用增加，與道共戒（通過修道而自然獲得的戒律）和定共戒（通過禪定而獲得的戒律）相似。定共戒和道共戒既然是現思（當下的思慮），所以只是唸唸作用增加而不是本體增加。前面的解釋即是與別解脫戒本體和作用都增加的意義相符。 這裡雖然顯示了與果同時有期望現行，說可以在現在時說為因的意義。種子對於種子既然允許異時，如果進入過去，哪個是因的意義？ 論：雖然因和果到了沒有自體。 述曰：它的因和果有同時的，指產生現行。不同時的，指產生自類。雖然同時或不同時，但一定要現在可以有因的作用，因為有本體。

【English Translation】 English version Not conditioned by causes (not governed by causes and conditions). If so, the arising of seeds and expectations (wang, anticipation) should also be the same (meaning not governed by causes and conditions). Therefore, it should be re-explained. Seeds and expectations for seeds, allow simultaneous generation, so the substance will be endless. Because self-categories allow simultaneous generation, that is, multiple seeds are generated in one kshana (instant), completely without causes and conditions. Because later seeds are not allowed to produce fruit again. The present action (xianxing, current manifestation) for seeds is called a different category, although it also perfumes seeds, but because later seeds do not produce fruit, it is not endless. There are no two present actions existing simultaneously in one kshana. The generated seeds therefore cannot regenerate present actions. Seeds should also be like this for categories. Question: If so, how can the original same thought produce new perfuming? Because the substance and appearance are contradictory. Answer: This is not simultaneous. For example, the non-outflow of the World's First Dharma (shidi yi fa, the highest level of worldly meditation practiced by practitioners before entering the stage of seeing the Way), relying on the increasing original seed, leads to the natural seed of its own category in the subsequent thought, and can also be used as a cause to produce a new perfuming seed in the subsequent thought. Since the power of the original and new seeds is the same, they simultaneously produce a present action, so there is no fault of the same thought's seed producing and disappearing. This is also difficult to understand. If the original seed regenerates seeds, then there will be four dharmas in one thought. That is, one original, two produced by the original, three perfumed by the new present action, and four is the present action. How can it be said that the three dharmas generate each other? Now explain, it is not like this. That is, the original seed and the present action are the cause and condition, producing a new perfuming seed, so there are only three dharmas. Another explanation, the original seed is not its cause and condition for the new perfuming seed, the present action can perfume as the cause and condition. That is, the original only for the present action, the present action only for the new perfuming, as the cause and condition. Therefore, the substance of Pratimoksha precepts (biejietuo jie, a type of Buddhist precepts) does not increase, but the function increases, similar to the precepts shared with the Way (daogong jie, precepts naturally obtained through cultivation) and the precepts shared with Samadhi (dinggong jie, precepts obtained through meditation). Since the precepts shared with Samadhi and the precepts shared with the Way are present thoughts, only the function increases moment by moment, not the substance. The previous explanation is consistent with the meaning that both the substance and function of Pratimoksha precepts increase. Although it is shown here that there is expectation of present action at the same time as the fruit, it can be said that the meaning of being a cause can be said in the present time. Since seeds are allowed to be at different times for seeds, if they enter the past, which is the meaning of cause? Treatise: Although the cause and effect have reached no self-nature. Commentary: Its cause and effect have simultaneous ones, referring to the generation of present action. Those that are not simultaneous refer to the generation of self-categories. Although simultaneous or not simultaneous, it must be possible to have the function of cause now, because there is substance.

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故。若入過去即無因用。體已滅故。未來亦爾。因用未生體無有故。

問為因既通種與有種。何故此言與果俱有。

論。依生現果至與果俱有。

述曰。依生現行果之種子名為俱有。不依引生自類名種　何故爾耶　能熏生故。望異類故。果現起故。相易知故　種望于種非能熏生。非異類故。非現起故。非易知也。此中不說　故攝論第二云。不生現行名為種類。生現行時名為種子　勝軍如何釋非即此剎那。以彼計執因果同世故　云何復釋無種已生文　如彼抄會。如瑜伽論第五十六。別抄有文。及下第四可披解也。

現行能熏轉識等應名種子。

論。三恒隨轉至方成種子。

述曰。謂要長時其性一類相續無斷。至得對治道。名至究竟位。各各究竟故。

論。此遮轉識至不相應故。

述曰。遮七轉識．及色等法。不得為種子。此但言心。實亦遮色　經部六識等能持種子。亦此中破。以三受轉變。緣境易脫故。

論。此顯種子自類相生。

述曰。即顯前種生后之義。此非俱有。俱種攝故。攝論無此　問第七識亦至金剛心方斷。何不名種　答十地等中以轉變故。緣境易脫故。未對治已即轉變故。種子不然　若爾如何名有受盡相種子．無受盡相種子。名言無記種生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，如果進入過去，就沒有因的作用，因為它的體性已經滅盡。未來也是如此，因為因的作用尚未產生，體性也不存在。

問：既然作為因，既包括種子，也包括有種，為什麼這裡說與果同時存在？

論：依據產生顯現的果，才說與果同時存在。

述曰：依據產生顯現的果的種子，才稱為俱有（sahabhu）。不依據引生自類的，稱為種類。為什麼這樣說呢？因為能夠熏習產生，是針對不同類而言，果已經顯現，容易瞭解。種子相對於種子，不能熏習產生，不是不同類，沒有顯現，不容易瞭解。這裡沒有說這些。所以《攝大乘論》（Śrāvakabhūmi）第二說：『不產生顯現的，稱為種類；產生顯現的時候，稱為種子。』勝軍（Śūrasena）如何解釋『非即此剎那』呢？因為他們認為因果同時存在。又如何解釋『無種已生』的文句呢？如同他們的抄會。如同《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi）第五十六，另有抄寫的文句，以及下文第四可以披閱理解。

現行能夠熏習的轉識等，應該稱為種子。

論：三種恒常隨轉，才能成為種子。

述曰：就是要長時間，其性質同一類，相續不斷，直到獲得對治道，名為達到究竟位。各自究竟的緣故。

論：這遮止轉識等，因為不相應的緣故。

述曰：遮止七轉識以及色等法，不能作為種子。這裡只是說心，實際上也遮止了色。經部（Sautrāntika）認為六識等能夠持有種子，也在此處被破斥，因為三種感受會轉變，緣取的境界容易脫落的緣故。

論：這顯示種子自類相生。

述曰：即顯示前一種子產生后一種子的意義。這並非俱有，因為屬於俱有種所攝。攝論沒有這些。問：第七識也要到金剛心（Vajracitta）才能斷除，為什麼不稱為種子？答：在十地（Daśabhūmi）等中，因為它會轉變的緣故，緣取的境界容易脫落的緣故，在未對治之前就會轉變的緣故。種子不是這樣。如果這樣，如何稱為有受盡相種子、無受盡相種子？名言無記種生。

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, if entering the past, there is no function of the cause, because its substance has already ceased. The future is also like this, because the function of the cause has not yet arisen, and the substance does not exist.

Question: Since as a cause, it includes both seeds and having-seeds, why does this say that it exists simultaneously with the effect?

Treatise: Based on the production of the manifest effect, it is said to exist simultaneously with the effect.

Commentary: The seeds that produce the manifest effect are called 'sahabhu' (co-existent). Those that do not rely on producing their own kind are called 'categories'. Why is this so? Because they can perfuming and producing, are directed towards different kinds, the effect has already manifested, and it is easy to understand. Seeds relative to seeds cannot perfuming and producing, are not of different kinds, have not manifested, and are not easy to understand. These are not mentioned here. Therefore, the second chapter of the Śrāvakabhūmi says: 'What does not produce manifestation is called a category; when it produces manifestation, it is called a seed.' How does Śūrasena explain 'not in this moment'? Because they believe that cause and effect exist simultaneously. How else to explain the sentence 'no seed has already arisen'? Like their copied compilation. Like the fifty-sixth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi, there are other copied sentences, and the fourth chapter below can be read and understood.

The transforming consciousnesses, etc., that can be perfumed by the manifest, should be called seeds.

Treatise: The three constantly transforming ones are needed to become seeds.

Commentary: That is, it must be for a long time, its nature is of the same kind, continuously without interruption, until obtaining the antidote path, it is called reaching the ultimate position. Because each is ultimate.

Treatise: This prevents the transforming consciousnesses, etc., because they are not corresponding.

Commentary: Prevents the seven transforming consciousnesses and phenomena such as form from being seeds. Here it only speaks of mind, but in reality, it also prevents form. The Sautrāntika school believes that the six consciousnesses, etc., can hold seeds, which is also refuted here, because the three kinds of feelings will transform, and the objects they grasp are easy to let go of.

Treatise: This shows that seeds arise from their own kind.

Commentary: That is, it shows the meaning of the previous seed producing the later seed. This is not co-existent, because it belongs to the category of co-existent seeds. The Śrāvakabhūmi does not have these. Question: The seventh consciousness also needs to be cut off until the Vajracitta (diamond mind), why is it not called a seed? Answer: In the ten bhūmis (Daśabhūmi), etc., it is because it will transform, and the objects it grasps are easy to let go of, because it will transform before being antidoted. Seeds are not like this. If so, how are they called seeds with the aspect of cessation of feeling, seeds without the aspect of cessation of feeling? Nominal non-specified seeds arise.

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果無量無盡。可恒隨轉。善．不善等種生果有限。如何恒轉　答曰。彼據生果有分限。名有受盡相。非種子體未得對治。即滅無餘　又有分熏習名有受盡相。名言熏習名恒隨轉。此等種唯有自類生果恒隨轉。即是與果不俱有名種。此闕恒與果俱一義　若闕一義得名種子。其第七識闕恒隨轉。應名種子　此不應爾。今於此中。正以生滅．恒轉二理顯種子義。余但別遮。非正顯故。其第七識為種不成　又說種子具有六義。非顯具六即是種子　又此自類亦非種子。不與果俱故。無性攝論說非種子然名種類　此顯自類至對治位非得種名。生果之時可名種子。但若生果必俱時故。若論其體。自類之時亦名種子。非現行故。此但任運牽生後果。若緣具勝種子勢增。有勝與果用起之時。方名種子　無性顯此二位差別。果俱名種。不爾名為種類　今此約非現行談其體說總名種子。亦不相違　又顯種子具斯六義。非說唸唸皆具六義故皆名種　然應分別。若具六義方名種子𨷂一不成。無性有情第七。闕與現果俱故非是種子　若爾即未生果時恒隨轉種。應不名種　由此應釋。對治道起。謂令不生現行等位。如見道中無想定等。據其體有。修道方除。據果不生種見道斷。以盡已來無與果俱義故。今言與果俱者。至對治道起已來。有與現行果法。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『果』（vipāka）是無量無盡的，可以恒常相隨流轉。而善、不善等『種』（bīja）所生的『果』（vipāka）是有限的，如何能夠恒常流轉呢？ 回答：這是根據所生的『果』（vipāka）有分限，稱為有受盡的相狀。並非『種子』（bīja）的本體在未得到對治（pratipaksa）之前，就會完全滅盡無餘。 又有分熏習（vāsanā）稱為有受盡的相狀，名言熏習（prapañca-vāsanā）稱為恒常相隨流轉。這些『種』（bīja）唯有自類生『果』（vipāka）恒常相隨流轉，這就是與『果』（vipāka）不俱有的名『種』（bīja）。這裡缺少了恒常與『果』（vipāka）俱生這一含義。 如果缺少一個含義就可以稱為『種子』（bīja），那麼第七識（manas），缺少恒常相隨流轉，應該稱為『種子』（bīja）嗎？ 不應該這樣。現在在這裡，正是用生滅、恒轉這兩種道理來顯示『種子』（bīja）的含義，其餘的只是分別遮止，不是正面的顯示，所以第七識（manas）作為『種』（bīja）是不成立的。 又說『種子』（bīja）具有六種含義，並非顯示具有六種含義就是『種子』（bīja）。 又說此自類也不是『種子』（bīja），因為不與『果』（vipāka）俱生。無性《攝論》（Asaṅga, Mahāyānasaṃgraha) 說不是『種子』（bīja），但稱為種類（sabhāga）。 這顯示自類到對治（pratipaksa）位才得到『種』（bīja）的名稱。生『果』（vipāka）的時候可以稱為『種子』（bīja），但如果生『果』（vipāka）必定是同時的。如果論及其本體，自類的時候也稱為『種子』（bīja），因為不是現行（abhisaṃskāra）的緣故。這只是任運牽引產生後來的『果』（vipāka）。如果因緣具足殊勝，『種子』（bīja）的勢力增強，有殊勝的與『果』（vipāka）作用生起的時候，才稱為『種子』（bīja）。 無性（Asaṅga）顯示這兩種位置的差別，與『果』（vipāka）俱生稱為『種』（bīja），否則稱為種類（sabhāga）。 現在這裡是就非現行（abhisaṃskāra）來談論其本體，說總名為『種子』（bīja），也不相違背。 又顯示『種子』（bīja）具有這六種含義，並非說唸唸都具有六種含義，所以都稱為『種』（bīja）。 然而應該分別。如果具有六種含義才稱為『種子』（bīja），缺少一種都不成立。無性有情第七識（manas），缺少與現『果』（vipāka）俱生，所以不是『種子』（bīja）。 如果這樣，那麼未生『果』（vipāka）時恒常相隨流轉的『種』（bīja），應該不稱為『種』（bīja）嗎？ 由此應該解釋，對治道（pratipaksa-mārga）生起，是說令不生現行（abhisaṃskāra）等位置，如見道（darśana-mārga）中的無想定（asaṃjñā-samāpatti）等。根據其本體存在，修道（bhāvanā-mārga）才去除。根據『果』（vipāka）不生，『種』（bīja）在見道（darśana-mārga）中斷。以至於已經窮盡，沒有與『果』（vipāka）俱生的含義。現在說與『果』（vipāka）俱生，是指到對治道（pratipaksa-mārga）生起以來，有與現行『果』（vipāka）法。

【English Translation】 English version The 'results' (vipāka) are immeasurable and endless, and can constantly flow along. However, the 'results' (vipāka) produced by good and non-good 'seeds' (bīja) are limited. How can they constantly flow? Answer: This is based on the fact that the 'results' (vipāka) produced have limitations, and are called having the characteristic of exhaustion. It is not that the substance of the 'seed' (bīja) will be completely extinguished without any remainder before it obtains the antidote (pratipaksa). Furthermore, the habituation (vāsanā) of divisions is called having the characteristic of exhaustion, while the habituation of names and words (prapañca-vāsanā) is called constantly flowing along. These 'seeds' (bīja) only have their own kind of 'results' (vipāka) constantly flowing along, which are 'seeds' (bīja) that do not coexist with the 'results' (vipāka). Here, the meaning of constantly coexisting with the 'results' (vipāka) is missing. If lacking one meaning can be called a 'seed' (bīja), then should the seventh consciousness (manas), which lacks constant flow, be called a 'seed' (bīja)? It should not be so. Now, here, it is precisely using the two principles of arising and ceasing, and constant flow, to reveal the meaning of 'seed' (bīja). The rest are just separate negations, not positive revelations, so the seventh consciousness (manas) as a 'seed' (bīja) is not established. It is also said that a 'seed' (bīja) has six meanings, but it is not to show that having six meanings is a 'seed' (bīja). Also, this own-kind is not a 'seed' (bīja), because it does not coexist with the 'results' (vipāka). Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha says it is not a 'seed' (bīja), but is called a kind (sabhāga). This shows that the own-kind only obtains the name of 'seed' (bīja) when it reaches the position of antidote (pratipaksa). When 'results' (vipāka) are produced, it can be called a 'seed' (bīja), but if 'results' (vipāka) are produced, it must be at the same time. If we talk about its substance, it is also called a 'seed' (bīja) when it is its own kind, because it is not manifest (abhisaṃskāra). This only naturally draws and produces later 'results' (vipāka). If the conditions are complete and excellent, the power of the 'seed' (bīja) increases, and it is called a 'seed' (bīja) when the function of excellent giving of 'results' (vipāka) arises. Asaṅga shows the difference between these two positions, coexisting with 'results' (vipāka) is called a 'seed' (bīja), otherwise it is called a kind (sabhāga). Now, here, we are talking about its substance in terms of non-manifestation (abhisaṃskāra), and saying that the general name is 'seed' (bīja), which is not contradictory. It also shows that the 'seed' (bīja) has these six meanings, but it is not to say that every moment has six meanings, so they are all called 'seeds' (bīja). However, it should be distinguished. If it has six meanings, it is called a 'seed' (bīja), and lacking one is not established. The seventh consciousness (manas) of sentient beings, according to Asaṅga, lacks coexistence with manifest 'results' (vipāka), so it is not a 'seed' (bīja). If so, then should the constantly flowing 'seed' (bīja) when 'results' (vipāka) have not yet arisen not be called a 'seed' (bīja)? From this, it should be explained that the arising of the antidote path (pratipaksa-mārga) means causing the non-arising of manifest (abhisaṃskāra) positions, such as the non-perception samadhi (asaṃjñā-samāpatti) in the path of seeing (darśana-mārga). According to its substance, it exists, and the path of cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga) removes it. According to the non-arising of 'results' (vipāka), the 'seed' (bīja) is interrupted in the path of seeing (darśana-mārga). Since it has been exhausted, there is no meaning of coexisting with 'results' (vipāka). Now, saying that it coexists with 'results' (vipāka) refers to having the law of manifest 'results' (vipāka) since the arising of the antidote path (pratipaksa-mārga).

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俱現和合之義名為種子。非要此念與現和合方名種子。不爾便於一界不成三界諸種子。種子成就義便不成。故知不約剎那而說。約后能有與果俱義以顯自性　無性所言不生果時名種類者。約畢竟不生當果為論。如見道中無想定等。

若恒隨轉得名種子。應善種等生不善等。

論。四性決定至方成種子。

述曰。謂隨前熏時現行因力故生善．惡等。功能決定非雜亂生。

論。此遮餘部至有因緣義。

述曰。遮薩婆多等。善法等與惡．無記等。為同類因。有因緣義　夫因緣者。辨自體生。性相隨順。以善等不辨惡法等自體。又不相隨順。何義是因緣　又異熟因通善．惡性生無記果。遍行因等是異性果。俱有因取異熟．無間士用等果為因亦然。

若要善等種方為善等因。種既恒有。應頓生果。

論。五待眾緣至方成種子。

述曰。謂自種子要待眾緣和合。種子轉變起取現行等諸果作用。功能殊勝方成種子。故種自類非因緣合。不名種子。

論。此遮外道至恒頓生果。

述曰。謂外道執。別有一法名曰自然。不待眾緣恒頓生果。此方外道為計亦然。大梵．時．方等計亦爾。同此所遣。此中且舉一自然義。

論。或遮餘部至非恒頓生。

述曰。三世

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『俱現和合』的意義稱為種子（bīja，事物生長的潛在力量）。並非一定要此念頭與現行和合才稱為種子。否則，在一個界（dhātu，構成要素）內，便不能成立三界（trayo dhātavaḥ，欲界、色界、無色界）的諸多種子。種子成就的意義便不能成立。所以，可知不是就剎那（kṣaṇa，極短的時間單位）而說，而是就後來能夠與果同時存在之義來顯示自性（svabhāva，事物自身不變的性質）。 無性（Asaṅga，印度佛教瑜伽行派創始人之一）所說的『不生果時名為種類』，是就畢竟不生當來之果而說的，如見道（darśanamārga，佛教修行道中的一個階段）中的無想定（asaṃjñāsamāpatti，一種禪定狀態）等。

如果恒常隨轉而得名為種子，那麼善的種子等應該生出不善的果等。

論：四性決定才能成就種子。

述曰：意思是說，隨著先前熏習時現行因的力量，產生善、惡等。功能決定，不是雜亂而生。

論：這遮止其他部派所說的有因緣義。

述曰：遮止薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda，說一切有部）等。善法等與惡、無記（avyākṛta，非善非惡）等，作為同類因，具有因緣義。所謂因緣，是辨別自體而生，性相隨順。因為善等不能辨別惡法等的自體，又不互相隨順，有什麼意義是因緣呢？又異熟因（vipākahetu，導致異熟果的因）通於善、惡性而生無記果，遍行因等是異性果。俱有因（sahabhūhetu，同時存在的因）取異熟、無間士用等果作為因也是這樣。

如果要善等種子才能作為善等因，種子既然恒常存在，應該頓然產生果。

論：五待眾緣才能成就種子。

述曰：意思是說，自身的種子要等待眾多的因緣和合，種子轉變而生起取現行等諸果的作用，功能殊勝才能成就種子。所以種子自身一類，不是因緣和合，不能稱為種子。

論：這遮止外道所說的恒常頓然生果。

述曰：意思是說，外道執著，另外有一法名為自然（Prakṛti，自性），不等待眾多的因緣而恒常頓然生果。此方外道這樣計度也是如此。大梵（Mahābrahmā，佛教中的一位神）、時（Kāla，時間）、方（Diś，空間）等計度也是這樣，與此所遣相同。此中且舉一個自然義。

論：或者遮止其他部派所說的非恒常頓然生果。

述曰：三世

【English Translation】 English version: The meaning of 'co-existence and combination' is called a seed (bīja, the potential force for the growth of things). It is not necessarily the case that this thought must be combined with the present manifestation to be called a seed. Otherwise, within one realm (dhātu, constituent element), the various seeds of the three realms (trayo dhātavaḥ, the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm) cannot be established. The meaning of the accomplishment of a seed would not be established. Therefore, it can be known that it is not spoken of in terms of an instant (kṣaṇa, an extremely short unit of time), but rather in terms of the meaning of being able to co-exist with the result later on, in order to reveal its own nature (svabhāva, the unchanging nature of a thing itself). What Asaṅga (one of the founders of the Yogācāra school of Indian Buddhism) said, 'When it does not produce a result, it is called a category,' is spoken of in terms of ultimately not producing the future result, such as the non-perception samadhi (asaṃjñāsamāpatti, a state of meditation) in the path of seeing (darśanamārga, a stage in the Buddhist path of practice), etc.

If constantly following transformation is called a seed, then good seeds, etc., should produce bad results, etc.

Treatise: The determination of the four natures is necessary for a seed to be accomplished.

Commentary: It means that, following the power of the present cause at the time of previous熏習(xūnxí, influence), good, evil, etc., are produced. The function is determined, not produced in a mixed-up manner.

Treatise: This refutes the meaning of cause and condition as spoken of by other schools.

Commentary: It refutes the Sarvāstivāda (the 'All Exists' school), etc. Good dharmas, etc., together with evil, neutral (avyākṛta, neither good nor evil), etc., as causes of the same kind, have the meaning of cause and condition. What is meant by cause and condition is to distinguish the self-nature and produce it, with nature and characteristics following each other. Because good, etc., cannot distinguish the self-nature of evil dharmas, etc., and do not follow each other, what meaning is there in being a cause and condition? Moreover, the result-maturing cause (vipākahetu, the cause that leads to a result-maturing effect) is common to good and evil natures, producing neutral results, while the pervasive cause, etc., are results of a different nature. The co-existent cause (sahabhūhetu, the cause that exists simultaneously) takes the result-maturing, immediate, and volitional effects, etc., as causes as well.

If good seeds, etc., are required to be the cause of good, etc., since the seeds are constantly present, the result should be produced suddenly.

Treatise: The five conditions must be awaited for a seed to be accomplished.

Commentary: It means that one's own seed must await the combination of many conditions, and the seed transforms to give rise to the function of taking present manifestations, etc., as results. The function must be particularly excellent for a seed to be accomplished. Therefore, the seed itself, of one kind, is not a combination of causes and conditions, and cannot be called a seed.

Treatise: This refutes the externalists' claim of constantly and suddenly producing results.

Commentary: It means that the externalists cling to the view that there is another dharma called nature (Prakṛti, self-nature), which constantly and suddenly produces results without awaiting many conditions. The externalists in this region who hold this view are also like this. The views of Mahābrahmā (a god in Buddhism), time (Kāla), space (Diś), etc., are also like this, and are the same as what is being refuted here. Here, only the meaning of one nature is mentioned.

Treatise: Or it refutes the claim of other schools that results are not constantly and suddenly produced.

Commentary: The three times

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有執。緣體一切時有。即恒非無。今言待緣種方生果故遮彼執　若緣恒有應恒生果。種既不許恒時生果。故緣恒無。

問若設有緣善等性定。應善色等種生善心等果。

論。六引自果至方成種子。

述曰。謂于別色．別心等果。各自引生方名種子。非善等色種。生善等心果可名種子。不相應故。

論。此遮外道至生一切果。

述曰。即大自在為因生一切果等。皆是此計。果應無別。以因一故。果既有異因亦應殊。故非一因生一切果。

論。或遮餘部至互為因緣。

述曰。薩婆多等以善色望四蘊為因。四望色蘊亦得為因　此即不然。唯引自果因果隨順。功能同故名為因緣。若增上緣等。義則可爾。如何色等與心為因。不相隨順功能異故。

問言恒隨轉名為種子。第八識現行既恒隨轉。為名種不　有說亦得。以名一切種子識故　若謂然者。此現行望自種既非因緣。非能熏故如何名種　有說不得。言一切種子識。含藏一切法能生一切法名一切種。非彼現行能生自種。種雖依識現行自體。是識所緣。不同於識。故識現行非名種子　此闕何義也　與果不俱故　其無性人第七識亦具六義。應名種子　此亦不然。論自解言與現行果俱現和合方成種子。種子之法其相沉隱。所生果法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有執著的人認為，作為本體的『緣』（pratyaya，因緣、條件）在任何時候都存在，即是永恒的，不是不存在的。現在說要等待『緣』的『種子』（bīja，能生果的事物）才能產生『果』（phala，結果），是爲了破除他們的執著。如果『緣』是恒常存在的，那麼『果』應該恒常產生。既然『種子』不被允許恒常產生『果』，所以『緣』不是恒常存在的。

問：如果假設『緣』的善等性質是確定的，那麼應該從善的『色』（rūpa，物質）等『種子』產生善的『心』（citta，精神）等『果』。

論：各自引生自己的『果』，才能稱為『種子』。

述曰：對於不同的『色』、不同的『心』等『果』，各自引生自己的『果』才能稱為『種子』。不是說善的『色』『種子』能產生善的『心』『果』，因為它們不相應。

論：這破斥了外道認為『大自在天』（Īśvara，印度教中的主神）是產生一切『果』的原因的觀點。

述曰：即認為『大自在天』是產生一切『果』的原因等，都是這種計較。如果是這樣，『果』應該沒有差別，因為『因』是唯一的。既然『果』有差異，『因』也應該不同。所以不是一個『因』產生一切『果』。

論：或者破斥其他部派認為『色』等與『四蘊』（skandha，五蘊中的受、想、想、行、識）可以互相作為『因緣』（hetupratyaya，因和緣）的觀點。

述曰：『薩婆多部』（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）等認為以善的『色』望向『四蘊』為『因』，『四蘊』望向『色蘊』也可以作為『因』。這是不對的。只有引生自己的『果』，『因果』才能隨順，功能相同才能稱為『因緣』。如果是『增上緣』（adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣），這種說法還可以。怎麼能說『色』等與『心』互為『因』呢？因為它們不相隨順，功能不同。

問：說恒常隨之運轉的稱為『種子』，第八『識』（vijñāna，阿賴耶識）的現行既然恒常隨之運轉，可以稱為『種子』嗎？有人說也可以，因為它被稱為『一切種子識』（sarva-bīja-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）。如果說是這樣，那麼這個現行望向自己的『種子』既然不是『因緣』，不能熏習，怎麼能稱為『種子』？有人說不可以。說『一切種子識』，是含藏一切法，能生一切法，才稱為『一切種子』。不是那個現行能生自己的『種子』。『種子』雖然依于『識』的現行自體，是『識』所緣的對象，不同於『識』，所以『識』的現行不能稱為『種子』。這缺少什麼含義呢？因為與『果』不同時存在。那些沒有自性的人的第七『識』（末那識）也具有六種含義，應該稱為『種子』。這也是不對的。論中自己解釋說，與現行『果』同時出現並和合才能成為『種子』。『種子』的法，它的相狀是沉寂隱藏的，所生的『果』法

【English Translation】 English version Those with attachment hold that 『pratyaya』 (condition, cause), as the entity, exists at all times, that is, it is eternal and not non-existent. Now, saying that one must wait for the 『bīja』 (seed, that which can produce a result) of 『pratyaya』 to produce 『phala』 (fruit, result) is to refute their attachment. If 『pratyaya』 were eternally existent, then 『phala』 should be eternally produced. Since 『bīja』 is not allowed to produce 『phala』 eternally, therefore 『pratyaya』 is not eternally existent.

Question: If we assume that the nature of 『pratyaya』 such as goodness is fixed, then good 『rūpa』 (matter) and other 『bīja』 should produce good 『citta』 (mind) and other 『phala』.

Treatise: Each draws forth its own 『phala』 to be called 『bīja』.

Commentary: For different 『rūpa』, different 『citta』 and other 『phala』, each draws forth its own 『phala』 to be called 『bīja』. It is not that good 『rūpa』 『bīja』 can produce good 『citta』 『phala』, because they are not corresponding.

Treatise: This refutes the view of the heretics that 『Īśvara』 (the supreme god in Hinduism) is the cause of producing all 『phala』.

Commentary: That is, thinking that 『Īśvara』 is the cause of producing all 『phala』, etc., are all this kind of calculation. If this were the case, 『phala』 should have no difference, because the 『hetu』 (cause) is unique. Since 『phala』 has differences, 『hetu』 should also be different. Therefore, it is not that one 『hetu』 produces all 『phala』.

Treatise: Or refute the view of other schools that 『rūpa』 etc. and the 『four skandhas』 (the four aggregates of feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness among the five aggregates) can be 『hetupratyaya』 (cause and condition) to each other.

Commentary: 『Sarvāstivāda』 etc. think that taking good 『rūpa』 towards the 『four skandhas』 as 『hetu』, and the 『four skandhas』 towards 『rūpa skandha』 can also be 『hetu』. This is not right. Only drawing forth its own 『phala』, 『hetu』 and 『phala』 can be in accordance, and only when functions are the same can they be called 『hetupratyaya』. If it is 『adhipati-pratyaya』 (dominant condition), this statement is acceptable. How can it be said that 『rūpa』 etc. and 『citta』 are causes to each other? Because they are not in accordance and their functions are different.

Question: Saying that what constantly follows and revolves is called 『bīja』, since the manifestation of the eighth 『vijñāna』 (Ālaya-vijñāna) constantly follows and revolves, can it be called 『bīja』? Some say it can, because it is called 『sarva-bīja-vijñāna』 (Ālaya-vijñāna). If this is the case, since this manifestation towards its own 『bīja』 is not 『hetupratyaya』 and cannot perfuse, how can it be called 『bīja』? Some say it cannot. Saying 『sarva-bīja-vijñāna』 is that which contains all dharmas and can produce all dharmas, and is called 『sarva-bīja』. It is not that the manifestation can produce its own 『bīja』. Although 『bīja』 relies on the manifestation of 『vijñāna』 itself, it is the object of 『vijñāna』, different from 『vijñāna』, so the manifestation of 『vijñāna』 cannot be called 『bīja』. What meaning is missing here? Because it does not exist at the same time as 『phala』. The seventh 『vijñāna』 (Manas-vijñāna) of those without self-nature also has six meanings, and should be called 『bīja』. This is also not right. The treatise itself explains that only when it appears and combines with the manifested 『phala』 at the same time can it become 『bīja』. The dharma of 『bīja』, its appearance is silent and hidden, and the produced 『phala』 dharma

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其相粗顯。故與現俱方成種子。第七相顯。設所熏種。果乃沉隱。不與現行果法和合。不名種子。第八現識亦然。無所生果故。

第八門中以上明種。自下第三總結聊簡。

論。唯本識中至成種非余。

述曰。簡上轉識等非名種義。

此中別解上六義中。言唯內種具有六義。然世親攝論亦通外種。此中引之解。外穀麥種既能生果。名種子不。

論。外穀麥等至非實種子。

述曰。雖識所變假名種子。非實種子。現行法故　攝大乘雲。作．不作失．得過。故成相違。外種內為緣。由依彼熏習。又引頌云。天．地．風．虛空。波．池．方．大海。皆真內所作。分別不在外　故由內種。外谷等熟彼非實種　問種亦識所變。應非實種子　答曰不然。內種識變已復生麥等。麥等復識變。以重變故。故非種子。如眼根等。故下文云。外麥等克體。非因緣生果。故因緣唯內種。非外種故　此等已上並攝論有。自下第九雙辨內外生．引二因。此內外種皆有生．引二因體不。答有。何者。

論。此種勢力至即名引因。

述曰。其內外種生近果生正果名生因。引遠果引殘果名引因　無性云。如內識種生現識等名近果。是生因。望名色等是遠果。是引因。外種望芽是近果。是生因。望莖等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 其相粗顯，所以與現行法同時才能成為種子。第七識的相狀隱微，即使被熏習成種子，其果報也是深藏不露，不與現行法的果報相和合，因此不能稱為種子。第八現識（阿賴耶識）也是如此，因為它不直接產生果報。

第八門中以上闡明了種子。從下面第三部分開始，進行總結和簡化。

論：只有本識（阿賴耶識）中才有種子，其他識中沒有。

述曰：簡要說明了轉識等不是種子的含義。

這裡特別解釋了前面六義中的內容，說只有內在的種子才具有六種含義。然而，世親菩薩的《攝大乘論》也認為外在的種子也具有這些含義。這裡引用它來解釋：外在的穀物麥子等種子既然能夠產生果實，是否也稱為種子呢？

論：外在的穀物麥子等，不是真實的種子。

述曰：雖然是識所變現的，可以假名為種子，但不是真實的種子，因為它們是現行法。 《攝大乘論》說：『因為有作、不作、失、得的過失，所以成為相違。』外在的種子對於內在的種子來說是增上緣，因為依靠它們進行熏習。又引用頌文說：『天、地、風、虛空，波、池、方、大海，都是真實的內在識所造作，分別心不在外。』所以，由於內在的種子，外在的穀物等成熟，它們不是真實的種子。 問：種子也是識所變現的，應該也不是真實的種子吧？ 答：不是這樣的。內在的種子是識所變現的，然後又產生麥子等，麥子等又被識所變現，因為經過了多次變現，所以不是種子，就像眼根等一樣。所以下文說：外在的麥子等只是克體，不是因緣所生的果。所以因緣只有內在的種子，而不是外在的種子。 這些內容以上都出自《攝大乘論》。從下面第九部分開始，雙重辨析內外種子的生因和引因。這內外兩種種子都有生因和引因嗎？ 答：有。是什麼呢？

論：這種種子的勢力，產生近的果報，稱為生因；引導遠的果報，稱為引因。

述曰：內在和外在的種子，產生近的果報，產生正果，稱為生因；引導遠的果報，引導殘餘的果報，稱為引因。 無性菩薩說：例如內在的識種子產生現識等，是近的果報，是生因；對於名色等來說，是遠的果報，是引因。外在的種子對於芽來說，是近的果報，是生因；對於莖等來說，是引因。

【English Translation】 English version Its appearance is coarse and manifest. Therefore, it can only become a seed when it exists simultaneously with the present phenomena. The seventh consciousness's appearance is subtle. Even if it is熏習 (xunxi) [influenced/perfumed] into a seed, its result remains deeply hidden and does not combine with the results of present phenomena. Therefore, it cannot be called a seed. The eighth consciousness, the 阿賴耶識 (Ālāyavijñāna) [storehouse consciousness], is also the same, because it does not directly produce results.

In the eighth section, the above explains the seeds. From the third part below, we will summarize and simplify.

Treatise: Only in the 本識 (běnshì) [original consciousness, i.e., Ālāyavijñāna] are there seeds; there are none in the other consciousnesses.

Commentary: Briefly explains that the 轉識 (zhuǎnshì) [transforming consciousnesses] and others do not have the meaning of seeds.

Here, a special explanation is given for the content of the previous six meanings, saying that only internal seeds possess the six meanings. However, 世親 (Shìqīn) [Vasubandhu]'s 《攝大乘論》(Shè Dàchéng Lùn) [Compendium on the Mahāyāna] also considers external seeds to have these meanings. Here, it is cited to explain: Since external seeds such as grains and wheat can produce fruits, are they also called seeds?

Treatise: External grains, wheat, etc., are not real seeds.

Commentary: Although they are transformations of consciousness and can be nominally called seeds, they are not real seeds because they are present phenomena. The 《攝大乘論》(Shè Dàchéng Lùn) [Compendium on the Mahāyāna] says: 'Because there are faults of action, non-action, loss, and gain, it becomes contradictory.' External seeds are supporting conditions for internal seeds because they are relied upon for熏習 (xunxi) [influence/perfuming]. It also quotes a verse saying: 'Heaven, earth, wind, and space, waves, ponds, directions, and the great ocean are all truly created by the internal consciousness; discrimination is not external.' Therefore, due to internal seeds, external grains, etc., mature; they are not real seeds. Question: Seeds are also transformations of consciousness; shouldn't they also not be real seeds? Answer: That is not the case. Internal seeds are transformations of consciousness, and then they produce wheat, etc. Wheat, etc., are then transformed by consciousness. Because they have undergone multiple transformations, they are not seeds, just like the eye faculty, etc. Therefore, the following text says: External wheat, etc., are merely the material cause; they are not fruits produced by cause and condition. Therefore, the cause and condition are only internal seeds, not external seeds. All of the above content is from the 《攝大乘論》(Shè Dàchéng Lùn) [Compendium on the Mahāyāna]. From the ninth section below, we will doubly analyze the 生因 (shēngyīn) [productive cause] and 引因 (yǐnyīn) [leading cause] of both internal and external seeds. Do these two types of seeds, internal and external, have both 生因 (shēngyīn) [productive cause] and 引因 (yǐnyīn) [leading cause]? Answer: Yes. What are they?

Treatise: The power of this seed, producing near results, is called 生因 (shēngyīn) [productive cause]; guiding distant results is called 引因 (yǐnyīn) [leading cause].

Commentary: Internal and external seeds, producing near results, producing the correct result, are called 生因 (shēngyīn) [productive cause]; guiding distant results, guiding remaining results, are called 引因 (yǐnyīn) [leading cause]. 無性 (Wúxìng) [Asanga] says: For example, internal consciousness seeds producing present consciousness, etc., are near results and are 生因 (shēngyīn) [productive cause]; in relation to 名色 (míngsè) [name and form], etc., they are distant results and are 引因 (yǐnyīn) [leading cause]. External seeds, in relation to sprouts, are near results and are 生因 (shēngyīn) [productive cause]; in relation to stems, etc., they are 引因 (yǐnyīn) [leading cause].

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是遠果。是引因　天親云。如內種子生正果名生因。生殘果名引因。即現在種生現在身名生因。生六處等皆名生因。引余枯喪屍骸等名引因　雖生他界等。勢分力故余骸尚有。如下自解。外種生芽莖等為生因。是正因。生枯死時草等。是引因。勢分力故。然至此位時。內外種皆無。或生他界等。或種已久滅。然由前生勢分力故引彼猶有。即義說彼生因之種名引因　然今兩說生．引二因俱無別體。一體望別故說二也。若無引因勢分力者。一切死後皆應頓絕如化生死。若遍四生具二因者。無性理勝。以化生死無屍骸故。然世親論意。無著大師為成引因說枯喪等。故說頌言。枯喪由能引。如任運后滅。天親解云。若無引因。應無枯喪果如任運后滅。但是天親解略。無性釋廣。亦不相違。此雖攝論文。然對法第四卷說能引．所引能生．所生。瑜伽第九說能引．所引俱是引因。能生名生因。瑜伽第十云。從無明乃至受是引因。愛．取．有是生因　此意欲顯未潤七支去果猶遠名為引因。引遠果故。能潤二支．及所潤有。去果近故名曰生因。近生果故。亦即此中近．遠所攝。無性但約已潤種中果去因為近．遠。瑜伽約潤．未潤位去果近．遠。亦不相違。

次第十四緣分別辨內外種因．非因緣。熏．不熏別。

論。內種必

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 是遠果，是引因（能引導產生結果的因）。天親菩薩說：『如內在的種子產生正果，名為生因（直接產生結果的因）；產生殘餘的果，名為引因。』即現在的種子產生現在的身，名為生因；產生六處（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）等，都名為生因；引導其餘枯萎喪失的屍骸等，名為引因。雖然生於其他界等，由於勢分力（潛在力量）的緣故，其餘骸骨尚存，如下文的解釋。外在的種子產生芽、莖等為生因，是正因；產生枯死時的草等，是引因，也是由於勢分力的緣故。然而到了這個階段，內外種子都已經沒有了，或者生於其他界等，或者種子已經很久滅亡了，然而由於前一生勢分力的緣故，引導它們仍然存在。即從意義上說，那產生生因的種子名為引因。然而現在兩種說法都認為生因和引因沒有不同的本體，只是從一體的不同方面來說，所以說二。如果沒有引因的勢分力，一切死後都應該立刻斷絕，如變化所生的生死。如果遍及四生（胎生、卵生、濕生、化生）都具備兩種因，就沒有性理上的殊勝之處，因為變化所生的生死沒有屍骸的緣故。然而世親菩薩的論意，無著大師爲了成就引因，說了枯喪等，所以說頌言：『枯喪由能引，如任運后滅。』天親菩薩解釋說：『如果沒有引因，應該沒有枯喪的果，如任運后滅。』但是天親菩薩的解釋簡略，無性菩薩的解釋廣博，也不相違背。這雖然是攝論文，然而對法第四卷說能引、所引，能生、所生。瑜伽第九說能引、所引都是引因，能生名為生因。瑜伽第十說：『從無明乃至受是引因，愛、取、有是生因。』這意思是想顯示未潤澤的七支（無明、行、識、名色、六處、觸、受）離結果還很遠，名為引因，因為引導遙遠的結果的緣故。能潤澤的二支（愛、取）以及所潤澤的有，離結果很近，所以名叫生因，因為接近產生結果的緣故。也即是此中近、遠所攝。無性菩薩只是就已潤澤的種子中果的去因為近、遠。瑜伽師地論約潤澤、未潤澤的位去果的近、遠，也不相違背。

次第十四緣分別辨內外種因、非因緣，熏、不熏別。

論：內種必然

【English Translation】 English version: It is a distant result, it is a 'hetu of leading' (yin yin) (the cause that leads to the production of a result). Vasubandhu (Tianqin) says: 'Like an internal seed producing a direct result, it is called 'hetu of production' (sheng yin); producing a residual result, it is called 'hetu of leading'.' That is, the present seed producing the present body is called 'hetu of production'; producing the six sense bases (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) etc., are all called 'hetu of production'; leading the remaining withered and lost corpses etc., is called 'hetu of leading'. Although born in other realms etc., due to the power of potential (shifen li), the remaining bones still exist, as explained below. External seeds producing sprouts, stems etc. are 'hetu of production', which is the direct cause; producing withered grass etc. at the time of death is 'hetu of leading', also due to the power of potential. However, at this stage, both internal and external seeds are gone, or born in other realms etc., or the seeds have long perished, but due to the power of potential from the previous life, they are led to still exist. That is, in terms of meaning, the seed that produces the 'hetu of production' is called 'hetu of leading'. However, now both views hold that 'hetu of production' and 'hetu of leading' do not have different entities, but are spoken of as two from different aspects of one entity. If there is no power of potential of 'hetu of leading', everything should be completely cut off after death, like transformation birth and death. If all four types of birth (womb-born, egg-born, moisture-born, transformation-born) possess both causes, there is no superiority in terms of nature and principle, because transformation birth and death have no corpses. However, the meaning of Vasubandhu's treatise is that Asanga (Wuzhu) spoke of withered loss etc. in order to establish 'hetu of leading', so he said in a verse: 'Withered loss is led by the ability to lead, like annihilation after spontaneous action.' Vasubandhu explained: 'If there is no 'hetu of leading', there should be no withered loss as a result, like annihilation after spontaneous action.' But Vasubandhu's explanation is brief, while Asanga's explanation is broad, and they are not contradictory. Although this is a summary of the treatise, the fourth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Duifa) says that which can lead, that which is led, that which can produce, and that which is produced. The ninth chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yujia) says that both that which can lead and that which is led are 'hetu of leading', and that which can produce is called 'hetu of production'. The tenth chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'From ignorance (avidya) to feeling (vedana) are 'hetu of leading', craving (trsna), grasping (upadana), and becoming (bhava) are 'hetu of production'.' This means to show that the seven limbs (ignorance, activity, consciousness, name and form, six sense bases, contact, feeling) that have not been moistened are far from the result, and are called 'hetu of leading', because they lead to a distant result. The two limbs that can moisten (craving, grasping) and the becoming that is moistened are close to the result, so they are called 'hetu of production', because they are close to producing the result. That is, they are included in near and far here. Asanga only speaks of the distance of the result in the already moistened seeds as near and far. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra speaks of the distance of the result in the moistened and unmoistened states as near and far, and they are not contradictory.

The fourteenth link in order distinguishes between internal and external seeds, causes and non-causes, whether they are perfumed or not.

Treatise: Internal seeds must

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由至是因緣性。

述曰。內種是因緣。必由熏習方能生果。法爾種子必由熏長方能生果故。新熏熏生方能生果。有情法故。

論。外種熏習至辨所生果。

述曰。無性攝大乘第二卷說。如從其炭．牛糞．毛等。如次生巨勝．青蓮根．及蒲。非巨勝等與炭等。俱生俱滅互相熏習而從彼生。名無熏習。如巨勝等與華等。俱生俱滅由熏習故生香氣等。名有熏習。外種不定。內則定熏　故外種子既唯現行。為增上緣辨所生果。

論。必以內種至所生果故。

述曰。此顯外種非無因緣。從內共相種子生故。如攝大乘自廣分別。

自下第二解熏習義。于中有三。初總問。次略答。后廣辨。

論。依何等義立熏習名。

述曰。初問起也。

論。所熏能熏至故名熏習。

述曰。此標具義。釋熏習名。略答所問　熏者發也。或由致也　習者。生也。近也。數也。即發致果於本識內。令種子生近。令生長故。此略標有三。一所熏四。二能熏四。三令種生長名熏習故。

論。何等名為所熏四義。

述曰。此廣辨也。

于中有三。初辨所熏具緣多．少。二辨能熏具緣少．多。三釋熏習義等　初中有三。初問。次答。后結。此即初也　攝論第二亦有此文。然少

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 由是因緣性。

述曰：內在的種子是因緣，必須通過熏習才能產生結果。種子本性如此，必須通過熏長才能產生結果。新的熏習產生新的結果，因為是有情之法。

論：外在的種子通過熏習來辨別所產生的結果。

述曰：《無性攝大乘》第二卷說，例如從木炭、牛糞、毛髮等，依次產生巨勝（芝麻）、青蓮根和蒲草。並非巨勝等與木炭等同時產生、同時滅亡，互相熏習而從它們產生，這叫做『無熏習』。如同巨勝等與花等同時產生、同時滅亡，由於熏習而產生香氣等，這叫做『有熏習』。外在的種子是不確定的，內在的種子則是確定的熏習。因此，外在的種子僅僅是現行，作為增上緣來辨別所產生的結果。

論：必須以內在的種子才能產生結果。

述曰：這表明外在的種子並非沒有因緣，而是從內在的共相種子產生。如《攝大乘》的自廣分別所說。

從下面開始第二部分，解釋熏習的含義。其中有三部分：首先是總的提問，其次是簡略的回答，最後是詳細的辨析。

論：依據什麼意義來建立熏習這個名稱？

述曰：這是最初的提問。

論：所熏、能熏，因此叫做熏習。

述曰：這表明具備了意義，解釋熏習的名稱，簡略地回答了所問。熏，是發揚的意思，或者是由來的意思。習，是產生的意思，接近的意思，多次的意思。即發揚、導致結果在本識內，使種子產生、接近，使之生長。這裡簡略地標明有三點：一是所熏四義，二是能熏四義，三是使種子生長，因此叫做熏習。

論：什麼叫做所熏的四種意義？

述曰：這是詳細的辨析。

其中有三部分：首先辨別所熏具備的因緣多少，其次辨別能熏具備的因緣多少，第三解釋熏習的意義等。這裡是第一部分，即最初的提問。《攝論》第二卷也有這段文字，但有所省略。

【English Translation】 English version Hence, it is the nature of cause and condition.

Commentary: The internal seed is the cause and condition. It must be through熏習 (xunxi, perfuming or influence) to produce the result. The nature of the seed is such that it must be nurtured to produce the result. New 熏習 (xunxi) produces new results because it is the dharma of sentient beings.

Treatise: External seeds are discerned through 熏習 (xunxi) to distinguish the resulting fruit.

Commentary: The second volume of Wu Xing She Da Cheng (《無性攝大乘》, Asanga's Summary of the Great Vehicle) states that, for example, from charcoal, cow dung, hair, etc., successively arise sesame, blue lotus roots, and cattails. It is not that sesame, etc., arise and perish simultaneously with charcoal, etc., mutually influencing each other and arising from them. This is called 'no 熏習 (xunxi)'. It is like sesame, etc., arising and perishing simultaneously with flowers, etc., and due to 熏習 (xunxi), fragrance, etc., arise. This is called 'having 熏習 (xunxi)'. External seeds are uncertain, while internal seeds are certain 熏習 (xunxi). Therefore, external seeds are merely manifest actions, serving as the dominant condition to discern the resulting fruit.

Treatise: It must be through internal seeds to produce the resulting fruit.

Commentary: This indicates that external seeds are not without cause and condition, but arise from internal common characteristic seeds, as explained in the self-extensive differentiation of She Da Cheng (《攝大乘》, Summary of the Great Vehicle).

From here begins the second part, explaining the meaning of 熏習 (xunxi). There are three parts: first, a general question; second, a brief answer; and third, a detailed analysis.

Treatise: Based on what meaning is the name 熏習 (xunxi) established?

Commentary: This is the initial question.

Treatise: That which is perfumed, that which can perfume, hence it is called 熏習 (xunxi).

Commentary: This indicates the possession of meaning, explaining the name 熏習 (xunxi), and briefly answering the question. 熏 (xun) means to develop or to originate. 習 (xi) means to produce, to be near, or to be frequent. That is, to develop and lead to results within the 本識 (ben shi, root consciousness), causing the seeds to arise, to be near, and to grow. Here, it is briefly indicated that there are three points: first, the four meanings of that which is perfumed; second, the four meanings of that which can perfume; and third, causing the seeds to grow, hence it is called 熏習 (xunxi).

Treatise: What are the four meanings of that which is perfumed?

Commentary: This is a detailed analysis.

There are three parts: first, distinguishing the many or few conditions possessed by that which is perfumed; second, distinguishing the few or many conditions possessed by that which can perfume; and third, explaining the meaning of 熏習 (xunxi), etc. This is the first part, i.e., the initial question. The second volume of She Lun (《攝論》, Summary of the Treatises) also contains this passage, but it is abbreviated.

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不同。隨處應辨　然五聚法。第一簡色法．及七識俱心所法等。第二簡佛果善等法。第三簡無為．及不相應。俱時心所。第四簡別異身同時許可熏義　攝論無者。一一披對方知差別。

論。一堅住性至乃是所熏。

述曰。此第二答也。從無始之始。至究竟之終。一類之性相續不斷。能持習氣乃是所熏。

論。此遮轉識至故非所熏。

述曰。遮七轉識。及彼心所　此中識言攝心所故。即末那等皆名轉識。若許持種。初地見道無漏心時。應失一切有漏種子　聲風等者。即遮根．塵．法處色等。生無色界。色即無故。入滅定等。心亦無故。名性不堅。此中何故但言風．及聲。簡斷相顯故。非謂色等此中不說。此攝論無。

若堅故可熏。佛本識既堅。應是善等性許亦可熏。此簡經部色心可熏。不堅住故。

論。二無記性至乃是所熏。

述曰。若法平等無所違拒善惡習氣。乃可受熏。無記不違善．惡品故。

論。此遮善染至故非所熏。

述曰。如沉麝等。及如蒜薤等皆不受熏。亦如舍行之人體性寬容即能納事。若聰明．惡性皆不能容。且如善性非直唯違不善。亦自違善。如沈不受檀等香故。惡等亦爾。故不可熏。而無記性不違善．惡。如舍行人不違事故　亦遮識類善等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不同之處在於，需要隨時辨別五蘊之法（panchaskandha-dharma）。第一，簡別色法（rupa-dharma），以及與七轉識（sapta-vijnana）相應的心所法（citta-caitta-dharma）等。第二，簡別佛果（buddha-phala）之善法（kusala-dharma）等。第三，簡別無為法（asamskrta-dharma），以及不相應行法（viprayukta-samskara-dharma），和俱時心所法（samprayukta-citta-caitta-dharma）。第四，簡別異身（prthag-jana）同時許可熏習之義。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中沒有這些，一一對比才能知道差別。

論：一、堅住性（dhrva-sthiti-laksana），乃至是所熏。

述曰：這是第二個回答。從無始之始（anadi），至究竟之終（atyanta），一類之自性相續不斷，能持習氣（vasana），才是所熏。

論：此遮轉識（pravrtti-vijnana），乃至故非所熏。

述曰：遮止七轉識，以及它們的心所。此中『識』字包含心所之故，即末那識（manas）等都名為轉識。若允許持種（bija），初地（prthivi）見道（darshana-marga）無漏心（anasrava-citta）生起時，應失去一切有漏種子（sasrava-bija）。聲風等，即遮止根（indriya）、塵（visaya）、法處（dharmayatana）之色等。生無**，色即無故。入滅盡定（nirodha-samapatti）等，心亦無故，名為自性不堅。此中為何只說風和聲？因為簡別斷滅相明顯之故，並非說色等不在此中說。《攝大乘論》中沒有這些。

若因為堅固就可以熏習，佛的本識（mula-vijnana）既然堅固，應是善等自性，允許也可以熏習。此簡別經量部（Sautrantika）的色心（rupa-citta）可以熏習，因為不堅住之故。

論：二、無記性（avyakrta-laksana），乃至是所熏。

述曰：若法平等，無所違拒善惡習氣，才可受熏。無記性不違背善惡品類之故。

論：此遮善染（kusala-klista），乃至故非所熏。

述曰：如沉香、麝香等，以及如蒜、薤等，都不受熏。也如捨棄成見之人，體性寬容就能容納事物。若聰明、惡性，都不能容納。而且善性非但違背不善，也違背自身之善，如沉香不受檀香等香氣之故。惡等也是如此，故不可熏。而無記性不違背善惡，如捨棄成見之人不違背事物一樣。也遮止識類（vijnana-jati）之善等。

【English Translation】 English version: The difference lies in the need to discern the five skandhas (panchaskandha-dharma) everywhere. First, distinguish between form (rupa-dharma), and mental factors (citta-caitta-dharma) associated with the seven consciousnesses (sapta-vijnana), etc. Second, distinguish between the good dharmas (kusala-dharma) of the Buddha-fruit (buddha-phala), etc. Third, distinguish between unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta-dharma), non-associated formations (viprayukta-samskara-dharma), and simultaneous mental factors (samprayukta-citta-caitta-dharma). Fourth, distinguish the meaning of simultaneous permission of熏習(xunxi) by different individuals (prthag-jana). These are not found in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha; only by comparing them one by one can the differences be known.

Treatise: One, the nature of being firm and abiding (dhrva-sthiti-laksana), is what can be perfumed.

Commentary: This is the second answer. From the beginning of beginninglessness (anadi) to the ultimate end (atyanta), the nature of one kind continues without interruption, and that which can hold habit-energy (vasana) is what can be perfumed.

Treatise: This precludes the transforming consciousnesses (pravrtti-vijnana), and therefore they are not what can be perfumed.

Commentary: It precludes the seven transforming consciousnesses and their mental factors. Here, the word 'consciousness' includes mental factors, so manas, etc., are all called transforming consciousnesses. If it is allowed to hold seeds (bija), when the undefiled mind (anasrava-citta) of the first ground (prthivi) of the path of seeing (darshana-marga) arises, all defiled seeds (sasrava-bija) should be lost. Sounds, winds, etc., preclude form, etc., of the sense faculties (indriya), objects (visaya), and the sphere of dharmas (dharmayatana). Since there is no ** when born, form is non-existent. When entering cessation samadhi (nirodha-samapatti), etc., the mind is also non-existent, and this is called the nature of not being firm. Why are only wind and sound mentioned here? Because distinguishing the aspect of annihilation is clear, it is not that form, etc., are not mentioned here. These are not found in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

If it can be perfumed because it is firm, since the Buddha's fundamental consciousness (mula-vijnana) is firm, it should be of the nature of goodness, etc., and it is allowed that it can also be perfumed. This distinguishes that the Sautrantika's form and mind (rupa-citta) can be perfumed, because they are not firm and abiding.

Treatise: Two, the nature of being neutral (avyakrta-laksana), is what can be perfumed.

Commentary: If a dharma is equal and does not resist good or bad habit-energies, then it can be perfumed. Because the neutral nature does not contradict the categories of good and bad.

Treatise: This precludes good and defiled (kusala-klista), and therefore they are not what can be perfumed.

Commentary: Like aloeswood, musk, etc., and like garlic, scallions, etc., they are not perfumed. It is also like a person who has abandoned fixed views, whose nature is tolerant and can accommodate things. If one is clever or has a bad nature, they cannot accommodate things. Moreover, the nature of goodness not only contradicts non-goodness, but also contradicts its own goodness, like aloeswood not accepting the fragrance of sandalwood, etc. The same is true for badness, etc., so it cannot be perfumed. But the neutral nature does not contradict good and bad, just as a person who has abandoned fixed views does not contradict things. It also precludes the goodness, etc., of the class of consciousness (vijnana-jati).

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受熏。第七識內並非所熏。此同於后唯是無覆無記中釋。

論。由此如來至非新受熏。

述曰。由此無記方受熏故。如來第八無漏凈識。唯在因中曾所熏習帶此舊種。非新受熏。以唯善故。違于善等如沉香等故。此攝論無　簡與佛地同　說為不熏。熏時何過　違拒法故。有增減故。善圓滿故。有優劣故。不可受熏。

若無記性。及唯堅故。即是所熏。本識同時想等五數．及虛空等。應是所熏。

論。三可熏性至乃是所熏。

述曰。若法為王而體自在不依他起。性非堅密體是虛疏易可受熏。非如石等是可熏習。若不堅密有虛疏故可容種子。堅密不然。

論。此遮心所至故非所熏。

述曰。本識俱時心所五數。體非自在。依他生起。故非所熏。王雖要有心所方起。不言依他。得名王故。是自在義。此攝論無。受熏何妨。如下觸等亦如是中解。亦遮無為。以堅密故。不受熏習如堅石等。故虛空等不可熏習　若爾識上生等假法。應可受熏　今依他攝。自無實體。依實說假故　又此應言若非堅密。有體。自在。乃可受熏。初簡無為。次簡假法。后簡心所。此遮無為．假法．心所．依他．堅密故非所熏。不是說者擬今說故　又此不言實有體者。假法先無。更何須簡　若爾空等無為如何

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 受熏：指的是接受熏習。第七識（末那識，Manas-vijnana）內部並非接受熏習之處。這與《攝大乘論》中關於『后位』（果位）唯是無覆無記（既非善也非惡，不影響善惡果報）的解釋相同。

論：因此，如來（Tathagata）的第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）並非新接受熏習。

述曰：因為只有無記性的事物才能接受熏習。如來的第八識是無漏清凈識，只在因地（修行階段）時曾被熏習，帶有過去的種子，並非新接受熏習。因為它只有善性，與善等性質相違背，就像沉香等一樣。此處的《攝大乘論》沒有簡別佛地（佛的境界），認為不接受熏習。熏習時會有什麼過失呢？因為違背了拒法（已經圓滿的法），有增減的緣故，善已經圓滿的緣故，有優劣的緣故，所以不可接受熏習。

如果具有無記性，並且是堅固的，那就是所熏習的對象。那麼，與本識同時生起的想等五種心所（五遍行心所，即觸、作意、受、想、思），以及虛空等，也應該是所熏習的對象。

論：三種可熏習的性質，才是可以被熏習的。

述曰：如果一個法是自主的，並且其體性是自在的，不依賴於其他事物而生起，其性質不是堅固緊密的，其體性是虛疏的，容易接受熏習，不像石頭等那樣，才是可以被熏習的。如果不堅固緊密，有虛疏的性質，就可以容納種子；堅固緊密的則不然。

論：這遮止了心所（Caitasika）等，所以不是所熏習的對象。

述曰：與本識同時生起的心所五數，其體性不是自在的，是依他生起的，所以不是所熏習的對象。雖然作為『王』（心王，即第八識）必須要有心所才能生起作用，但不能說它依賴於其他事物，因為它被稱為『王』，具有自在的含義。此處的《攝大乘論》沒有說明，接受熏習有什麼妨礙。如下文關於觸等也是如此解釋。這也遮止了無為法（Asamskrta-dharma），因為它堅固緊密，不接受熏習，就像堅硬的石頭等一樣。所以虛空等不可熏習。如果這樣，識上生等假法，應該可以接受熏習。現在是依他起性所攝，自身沒有實體，是依真實法而假立的。而且這裡應該說，如果不是堅固緊密的，有體性的，自在的，才可以接受熏習。首先簡別無為法，其次簡別假法，最後簡別心所。這遮止了無為法、假法、心所，因為它們是依他的、堅密的，所以不是所熏習的對象。這不是說論者打算現在才說，而是本來就這麼說的。而且這裡沒有說實有體者，因為假法本來就沒有，更何須簡別？如果這樣，虛空等無為法又如何解釋呢？

【English Translation】 English version: 'Being perfumed' refers to the act of receiving熏習 (xunxi, influence or imprinting). The seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana, the mind consciousness) is not the location where perfuming occurs. This is similar to the explanation in the She Da Cheng Lun (Compendium of the Mahayana) regarding 'later stages' (the fruition stage) being only 無覆無記 (wufu-wuji, neither good nor evil, not affecting karmic consequences).

Treatise: Therefore, the Tathagata's (如來, Thus Come One) eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) is not newly perfumed.

Commentary: Because only things that are of an indeterminate nature (無記, neither good nor bad) can be perfumed. The Tathagata's eighth consciousness is a pure, undefiled consciousness, only having been perfumed in the causal stage (the stage of practice), carrying old seeds from that time, and is not newly perfumed. Because it is only of a good nature, it contradicts things that are good, etc., like sandalwood. The She Da Cheng Lun here does not distinguish the Buddha-ground (佛地, the state of Buddhahood), considering it not to be perfumed. What fault would there be in perfuming it? Because it contradicts the rejected dharma (already perfected dharma), because there would be increase or decrease, because goodness is already complete, because there would be superiority or inferiority, it cannot be perfumed.

If it has an indeterminate nature and is solid, then it is what is perfumed. Then, the five mental functions (五遍行心所, five omnipresent mental factors: contact, attention, feeling, perception, volition) such as thought, which arise simultaneously with the fundamental consciousness, and things like space, should also be what is perfumed.

Treatise: The three perfumable natures are what can be perfumed.

Commentary: If a dharma is autonomous, and its nature is free and does not depend on others for arising, and its nature is not solid and dense, and its substance is loose and sparse, easily receiving perfuming, not like stone, etc., then it can be perfumed. If it is not solid and dense, and has a loose and sparse nature, then it can contain seeds; if it is solid and dense, it cannot.

Treatise: This prevents mental functions (Caitasika, mental factors), etc., so they are not what is perfumed.

Commentary: The five mental functions that arise simultaneously with the fundamental consciousness are not autonomous in nature, but arise dependently on others, so they are not what is perfumed. Although the 'king' (心王, mind-king, i.e., the eighth consciousness) must have mental functions in order to function, it cannot be said that it depends on others, because it is called 'king', which has the meaning of autonomy. The She Da Cheng Lun here does not explain what harm there would be in receiving perfuming. The following explanation about contact, etc., is also explained in this way. This also prevents unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta-dharma, unconditioned dharmas), because they are solid and dense, and do not receive perfuming, like hard stones, etc. Therefore, space, etc., cannot be perfumed. If that is the case, then the imputed dharmas such as arising on consciousness should be able to be perfumed. Now it is included in the dependently arisen nature, and does not have its own substance, but is imputed based on real dharmas. Moreover, it should be said here that if it is not solid and dense, has substance, and is autonomous, then it can be perfumed. First, unconditioned dharmas are distinguished, then imputed dharmas are distinguished, and finally mental functions are distinguished. This prevents unconditioned dharmas, imputed dharmas, and mental functions, because they are dependent and solid, so they are not what is perfumed. This is not to say that the treatise writer intends to say this now, but that it was originally said this way. Moreover, it is not said here that those with real substance, because imputed dharmas originally do not exist, so why would there be a need to distinguish them? If that is the case, how are unconditioned dharmas such as space explained?

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。若言真如即非無記。言非擇等假。同生等假法不論。由此故應第一說善。無明簡真如。由此知非也。亦遮熏　于假識類等。

若可熏習即是所熏。亦應異身得成熏習。

論。四與能熏至乃是所熏。

述曰。所．能和合是相應義。若同一時．同一處所。所熏之體非即能熏。亦非全相離在他身上識為能熏等。

論。此遮他身至故非所熏。

述曰。此遮他身許為可熏。及剎那前後。不相應故無和合義故非所熏。異經部師前念之識熏后念類。

論。唯異熟識至非心所等。

述曰。第三結也。唯第八識具此四義可是所熏。非是同時五心所等．及余轉識。言異熟識者。正是熏位故。若言現行生種異時。如何釋此。故知即以此義為正　其無性人此第七識四義具足。何不受熏　以染無記違善．惡品。今言無記唯無覆無記　此所熏中何故堅者乃名受熏　以諸色等生無色界。諸轉識等入無心定等。便無法持諸種子故。若二俱持。即成一種生二芽過。如后當破　何故善等不能受熏　不含容故。如沉香等。如文自解　何故假法．心所．無為不能受熏　以無體故。不自在故。非可熏故。不能持種　問如瓶能持物。假法何不然。　答曰不然。總假不能持。別色等能持。以別成總說瓶能持。瓶體即是實

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說真如就不是無記（既非善也非惡），說『非擇滅』等是假法。同生等假法不討論。因此應該首先說善。無明可以區分真如，由此可知真如不是無明。這也遮止了熏習在假識的類別上等。

如果可以被熏習，那就是所熏。也應該異身（不同個體的身）可以成就熏習。

論：四種條件與能熏和合，才是所熏。

述曰：『所』和『能』和合是相應的意義。如果同一時間、同一處所，所熏的體不是能熏本身，也不是完全分離在他身上的識作為能熏等。

論：這遮止了他身被認為是可熏，因此不是所熏。

述曰：這遮止了他身被認為是可熏，以及剎那前後。因為不相應，沒有和合的意義，所以不是所熏。異經部師認為前唸的識熏習后唸的識。

論：只有異熟識（第八識）才符合這些條件，不是心所等。

述曰：這是第三個結論。只有第八識具足這四種條件，才可以被熏習。不是同時的五種心所等，以及其他的轉識。說異熟識，正是熏習的地位。如果說現行生種是異時，如何解釋這個？所以知道就是以這個意義為正確。無性的人認為第七識四種條件都具足，為什麼不受熏習？因為染污無記違背了善、惡的品類。現在說的無記只是無覆無記。這所熏之中，為什麼堅固的才叫做受熏？因為諸色等產生沒有障礙。諸轉識等進入無心定等，就沒有法來保持這些種子。如果兩者都保持，就成了一種生出兩個芽的過失，如同後面將要破斥的。為什麼善等不能受熏？因為不含容。如同沉香等。如同文中所解釋的。為什麼假法、心所、無為不能受熏？因為沒有實體。不自在。不是可熏的。不能保持種子。問：如同瓶子能保持物體，假法為什麼不能？答：不是這樣的。總假不能保持，別的色等能保持。因為別的色等成就了總假，所以說瓶子能保持。瓶子的體就是真實的。

【English Translation】 English version: If it is said that Suchness (真如, zhen ru, ultimate reality) is not non-defined (無記, wu ji, neither good nor evil), then 'non-selective cessation' (非擇滅, fei ze mie, cessation achieved through wisdom) etc., are considered provisional (假, jia). Provisional dharmas such as co-arising are not discussed. Therefore, it should be said that good is primary. Ignorance (無明, wu ming, lack of knowledge) distinguishes Suchness, hence it is known that Suchness is not ignorance. This also prevents the perfuming on the category of provisional consciousness etc.

If it can be perfumed, then it is what is perfumed. It should also be that different bodies (異身, yi shen, different individuals) can accomplish perfuming.

Treatise: The four conditions together with the perfumer are what is perfumed.

Commentary: 'What' and 'can' together is the meaning of correspondence. If it is the same time, the same place, the substance of what is perfumed is not the perfumer itself, nor is it completely separate from the consciousness on another's body as the perfumer etc.

Treatise: This prevents another's body from being considered perfumable, therefore it is not what is perfumed.

Commentary: This prevents another's body from being considered perfumable, as well as the before and after of a moment. Because they do not correspond, there is no meaning of combination, therefore it is not what is perfumed. The Sautrantika school (經部師, jing bu shi) believes that the consciousness of the previous moment perfumes the consciousness of the subsequent moment.

Treatise: Only the Vipaka consciousness (異熟識, yi shu shi, the eighth consciousness) meets these conditions, not mental factors etc.

Commentary: This is the third conclusion. Only the eighth consciousness possesses these four conditions, so it can be perfumed. It is not the five mental factors etc. at the same time, as well as other transformed consciousnesses. Saying Vipaka consciousness is precisely the position of perfuming. If it is said that the manifestation producing the seed is at a different time, how to explain this? So it is known that this meaning is correct. The one without nature believes that the seventh consciousness possesses all four conditions, why is it not perfumed? Because defiled non-defined opposes the categories of good and evil. Now the non-defined that is spoken of is only non-obstructed non-defined. Among what is perfumed, why is it that what is firm is called perfumed? Because the various forms etc. arise without obstruction. The various transformed consciousnesses etc. enter into unconscious samadhi etc., then there is no method to hold these seeds. If both hold, then it becomes the fault of one producing two sprouts, as will be refuted later. Why can't good etc. be perfumed? Because it does not contain. Like sandalwood etc. As explained in the text itself. Why can't provisional dharmas, mental factors, and unconditioned be perfumed? Because there is no substance. Not self-governing. Not perfumable. Cannot hold seeds. Question: Like a bottle can hold objects, why can't provisional dharmas? Answer: It is not like that. The general provisional cannot hold, other forms etc. can hold. Because other forms etc. accomplish the general provisional, it is said that the bottle can hold. The substance of the bottle is real.

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色等故。諸不相應即色．心等。故如色等不能持種。亦不受熏。若爾本識上假物生等。應能受熏　實已受熏。何須假法。如礙於心。假法亦得。如受于熏假法應得　若假說者亦得受熏。唯自體分能受余熏。如上心所不能受熏。如下觸等亦如是中說　何故不和合　不得為所熏　若爾便許有熏他身　熏他身有何過　即自作罪令他受果。他身中有業等種子。自受果故。或凡夫熏阿羅漢等。故要四義簡持如右。此則攝論雖有。未能有此差別。

唯能熏四義諸論所無。

論。何等名為能熏四義。

述曰。依前標問。

論。一有生滅至乃是能熏。

述曰。即前六義簡無為因。以有作用故方能熏。猶如種子有生滅用故能生果。

論。此遮無為至故非能熏。

述曰。此簡法也。

論。二有勝用至乃是能熏。

述曰。勝用有二　一能緣勢用。即簡諸色。為相分熏。非能緣熏　二強盛勝用。謂不任運起。即簡別類異熟心等。有緣慮用無強盛用。為相分熏。非能緣熏　由斯色等有強盛用。無能緣用　異熟心等有能緣用無強盛用　不相應法二用俱無。皆非能熏　即勝勢用可致熏習。如強健人能致功效　故第八俱五心所等亦非能熏。若為他緣。一切無過　此中總言。意說如此。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 色等（指色法等）的緣故。諸不相應行法即是色法、心法等。因此，如同色法等不能持有種子，也不能接受熏習。如果這樣，本識（根本識）上假立的生等法，應該能夠接受熏習。實際上已經接受熏習，何須假立之法？如同色法障礙於心法，假立之法也能做到。如同接受熏習，假立之法也應該能夠做到。如果說是假說，也能接受熏習。只有自體分（自體的部分）能夠接受其他的熏習，如同上面的心所法不能接受熏習，如下面的觸等也是如此說的。為什麼不和合？不能作為所熏習的對象。如果這樣，就允許有熏習他身的情況。熏習他身有什麼過失？就是自己造罪卻讓他人承受果報。因為他身中有業等種子，自己承受果報的緣故。或者凡夫熏習阿羅漢等。所以需要四種意義來簡別持守，如右邊所說。這在《攝大乘論》中雖然有，但未能有此差別。

唯有能熏的四種意義，是諸論典中所沒有的。

論：什麼叫做能熏的四種意義？

述曰：依照前面的標示提問。

論：一、有生滅的法，才是能熏的。

述曰：這是用前面的六義來簡別無為法作為因。因為有作用才能熏習，猶如種子有生滅的作用才能生果。

論：這遮止了無為法，所以不是能熏的。

述曰：這是簡別法。

論：二、有殊勝作用的法，才是能熏的。

述曰：殊勝作用有兩種：一、能緣的勢用，即簡別諸色法。作為相分（所緣的境）被熏習，而不是能緣的熏習。二、強盛的勢用，指不是任運而起的法，即簡別異類異熟心等。有緣慮的作用，沒有強盛的作用，作為相分被熏習，而不是能緣的熏習。因此，色法等有強盛的作用，沒有能緣的作用；異熟心等有能緣的作用，沒有強盛的作用；不相應行法兩種作用都沒有，都不是能熏的。即殊勝的勢用可以導致熏習，如同強健的人能夠取得功效。所以第八識（阿賴耶識）及其相應的五種心所等也不是能熏的。如果作為他緣，一切沒有過失。這裡總而言之，意思是這樣。

【English Translation】 English version Because of form, etc. (referring to form dharmas, etc.). The non-corresponding formations are form, mind, etc. Therefore, like form, etc., they cannot hold seeds, nor can they be influenced. If so, the phenomena of arising, etc., provisionally established on the fundamental consciousness (alaya-vijnana), should be able to be influenced. In reality, they have already been influenced, so why posit provisional dharmas? Just as form obstructs mind, provisional dharmas can also do so. Just as receiving influence, provisional dharmas should also be able to do so. If it is said to be provisional, it can also receive influence. Only the self-nature division (part of the self-nature) can receive other influences, just as the mental functions above cannot receive influence, and the touches below are also spoken of in this way. Why are they not harmonious? They cannot be the object of influence. If so, it would be permissible to influence another's body. What is the fault of influencing another's body? It is that one creates sin and causes others to receive the consequences. Because there are seeds of karma, etc., in another's body, one receives the consequences oneself. Or ordinary people influence arhats, etc. Therefore, four meanings are needed to distinguish and uphold, as mentioned on the right. Although this is in the Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle (攝大乘論), it does not have this distinction.

Only the four meanings of being able to influence are not found in the various treatises.

Treatise: What are the four meanings of being able to influence?

Commentary: According to the previous indication, ask.

Treatise: First, phenomena that arise and cease are able to influence.

Commentary: This uses the previous six meanings to distinguish unconditioned dharmas as causes. Because only with function can there be influence, just as seeds with the function of arising and ceasing can produce fruit.

Treatise: This prevents unconditioned dharmas, so they are not able to influence.

Commentary: This is distinguishing dharmas.

Treatise: Second, phenomena with superior function are able to influence.

Commentary: There are two kinds of superior function: First, the power of being able to cognize, which distinguishes form dharmas. They are influenced as the object-aspect (the object of cognition), not as the subject-aspect (the cognizer). Second, strong and vigorous power, referring to phenomena that do not arise spontaneously, which distinguishes dissimilar result-consciousness, etc. They have the function of deliberation, but not strong and vigorous function, and are influenced as the object-aspect, not as the subject-aspect. Therefore, form, etc., have strong and vigorous function, but not the function of being able to cognize; result-consciousness, etc., has the function of being able to cognize, but not strong and vigorous function; non-corresponding formations have neither function, and are not able to influence. That is, superior power can lead to influence, just as a strong person can achieve results. Therefore, the eighth consciousness (alaya-vijnana) and its corresponding five mental functions, etc., are also not able to influence. If it is taken as other conditions, there is no fault. Here, in general, the meaning is like this.

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論。此遮異熟至故非能熏。

述曰。心所等者。等彼相分。或六識中異熟生無記　此舉第八異熟心．心所。等六識中業所引者。非謂一切異熟生心法執等類。皆不能熏。唯業所感異熟心等。二種所生。無勝用故。或此法爾。皆非能熏。以無用故。

論。三有增減至乃是能熏。

述曰。第七末那至無漏位亦有增減。因中無漏為例並然。可致上．中．下種子故。要如利根能斷于善得果亦疾。余則不然。或能剛．能柔乃能致果。非余中物．及平等物。

論。此遮佛果至應有勝劣。

述曰。佛四智品非能熏習　若佛能熏有何過失　更增新種便非圓滿。諸佛有勝劣。功德多少故。

論。四與所熏至乃是能熏。

述曰。要同時處方是能熏。如所熏說。

論。此遮他身至故非能熏。

述曰。非前後剎那．及與他身能熏自識。不和合故　和合即是相應異名。如生名起現行生種。若說異時如何釋此　無性有情此第七識。畢竟無有動轉之時。闕無第三有增減故。應非能熏　此有二釋　一云。此亦不然。無始以來我執增長。剎那剎那現．種增長。非是不增。如邪見等雖言一品亦有異故。四義具足。如無分別智入見以去漸漸增長。非謂體大名為增長。但加明利。此亦如是。從無始來。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論：這排除了異熟，因為它們不能熏習。

述記：『心所等』指的是與心所相應的相分，或者六識中的異熟生無記。這裡指的是第八識的異熟心和心所。『等』指的是六識中由業力所引生的。並非所有異熟生心法，如執等，都不能熏習。只有由業力所感的異熟心等，這兩種所生的，因為沒有殊勝的作用。或者這是法爾如是，都不能熏習，因為沒有作用。

論：三界中的增減變化才能熏習。

述記：第七識末那識，乃至無漏位也有增減。因地中的無漏也同樣如此。可以產生上、中、下三種種子。就像利根之人能夠斷除善，得果也快。其餘則不然。或者能剛能柔才能導致結果，不是其餘中等之物，以及平等之物。

論：這排除了佛果，否則應有勝劣之分。

述記：佛的四智品不能熏習。如果佛能熏習會有什麼過失呢？如果再增加新的種子，就不是圓滿了。諸佛有勝劣之分，因為功德有多少的差別。

論：具備四種條件才能熏習。

述記：必須同時同處才能熏習，如所熏說的。

論：這排除了他身，所以不能熏習。

述記：不是前後剎那，以及他身能夠熏習自己的識，因為不和合。和合就是相應的另一種說法。如生名為起現行生種。如果說是異時，如何解釋這個？無性有情的第七識，畢竟沒有動轉的時候，因為缺少第三種增減變化，所以不應該能熏習。這裡有兩種解釋：一種說法是，這也不對。從無始以來，我執增長，剎那剎那現行和種子都在增長，並非不增長。如邪見等，雖然說是一品，也有不同。四義具足。如無分別智入見道以後漸漸增長，不是說體大名為增長，只是更加明利。這個也是如此，從無始以來。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: This excludes the Vipāka (異熟, result of actions), because they are not capable of perfuming.

Commentary: 『Mental factors, etc.』 refers to the corresponding aspect-divisions of the mental factors, or the Vipāka-born (異熟生) indeterminate [states] in the six consciousnesses. This refers to the Vipāka-mind and mental factors of the eighth consciousness. 『Etc.』 refers to those induced by karma in the six consciousnesses. It is not that all Vipāka-born mental dharmas, such as attachments, are incapable of perfuming. Only the Vipāka-mind, etc., induced by karma, these two kinds of births, are incapable because they do not have superior function. Or this is just the nature of things, they are all incapable of perfuming, because they have no function.

Treatise: Only the increases and decreases in the three realms are capable of perfuming.

Commentary: The seventh consciousness, Manas (末那, mind), even up to the stage of non-outflow (無漏位), also has increases and decreases. The non-outflow in the causal stage is also the same. It can produce superior, intermediate, and inferior seeds. Just like a person with sharp faculties can cut off the good and quickly attain the result. Others are not like this. Or being able to be firm and able to be gentle can lead to results, not other intermediate things, and equal things.

Treatise: This excludes the Buddha-fruit, otherwise there should be superior and inferior differences.

Commentary: The four wisdom qualities of the Buddha are not capable of perfuming. If the Buddha could perfume, what fault would there be? If new seeds were added, it would not be complete. The Buddhas have superior and inferior differences, because the merits have differences in quantity.

Treatise: Only when the four conditions are met is it capable of perfuming.

Commentary: It must be at the same time and in the same place to be capable of perfuming, as the perfumed says.

Treatise: This excludes other bodies, so it is not capable of perfuming.

Commentary: It is not that previous and subsequent moments, and other bodies, can perfume one's own consciousness, because they are not in harmony. Harmony is another way of saying correspondence. Like birth is called arising, manifesting, and producing seeds. If it is said to be at different times, how to explain this? The seventh consciousness of sentient beings without nature, after all, has no time of movement, because it lacks the third kind of increase and decrease, so it should not be capable of perfuming. There are two explanations here: one says that this is also not right. Since beginningless time, the attachment to self has been increasing, moment by moment the manifestation and seeds are increasing, it is not that they are not increasing. Like wrong views, although they are said to be of one kind, they also have differences. The four meanings are complete. Like non-discriminating wisdom gradually increases after entering the path of seeing, it is not said that the large body is called increase, but it is just more clear and sharp. This is also like this, from beginningless time.

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行相轉闇堅執不捨。故名為增。然極難也　二云。亦有增減。欲界為粗。乃至非想為細。地系差別粗細不同。生下．上時亦有轉動。有增減故　問曰。既爾何故論說與有頂地下下品道。一時頓斷　答曰。不然。豈以斷同便無九品。如三界中見道煩惱一時頓斷。有九品故　此障見道。彼障非見。何以為證　答曰。若爾如修道中頓超二果。從預流者至阿羅漢。以欲界中初品煩惱。乃至與有頂初品煩惱。一時頓斷。豈品類同耶　問彼由加行故令頓斷。此不然者　答曰。若爾菩薩第十地一時頓斷修道煩惱應無九品。若以煩惱不障地故。唯障無學。作意留故。一時頓斷者。已前頓斷有得義不。今此第七唯障無學不障有學。故金剛心一時頓斷。非無九品　問曰。若爾應離此地即斷第七。以九品故　答曰。不然。如菩薩十地所斷所知障。一．一地通三界所斷。豈無多品。又如菩薩生上。不斷下惑不障彼者。此例應然。不障有學。雖離此地故不能斷。要至無學方卻斷下　問若有九品。何故名一類　答一類有多義。一三受不易。二三性不易。三境界不易。四相續不易。故未轉前名為一類。非無九品名為一類。由此義故。卻成無始乃至今日。今日為增。前解方成　若以無性有情第七。是有性種類故有增減者　不然。佛果七識因七之類。亦應

能熏。若以有漏．無漏為論不可例者。亦可有性．無性為例。不應種類彼可名熏　論言第七與有頂地下下煩惱等者。同障無學名勢力等。金剛心中一時頓斷故。名勢力等。非謂品同名勢力等。又如初地所斷所知障　乃通三界。不妨欲界初品所知障通障十地。十地別斷。豈以多品斷。故障即品多。一品斷故便無品類。故細但初能障此者。證此即斷。不須論品　此中前四準所熏中。一．一皆應寄問徴起然後牒論。

論。唯七轉識至可是能熏。

述曰。總結也。即能緣中七轉識．心所等為能熏。若為相分何法為障。即第八識為六．七識之所緣故為相分熏　何分為能熏　唯自體分。如自體分唯受熏故。見分體故。

論。如是能熏至熏習義成。

述曰。后釋熏習義　于中有三。初解熏習義。次顯法體多少。后明因果。此即初也　要俱生滅熏習義成。非如種生芽許異時生故不俱時有。故知色法無俱有義。

論。令所熏中至故名熏習。

述曰。唯華熏苣勝同生．同滅。故以為喻　攝論喻如內熏習等。

論。能熏識等至因果同時。

述曰。下顯法體。初法。后喻。此舉法也。

論。如炷生焰至更互相依。

述曰。初舉三法喻喻三法體。后舉二法喻喻因果義。種．現二義

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 能熏。如果以有漏（具有煩惱）和無漏（沒有煩惱）來討論，認為不可類比，也可以用有性和無性來類比。不應認為種類不同就不能稱為熏習。論中說第七識與有頂地（色界最高的禪定）和地下下煩惱等，共同障礙無學（不再需要學習）的聖者，稱為勢力等。在金剛心中一時頓斷，所以稱為勢力等，不是說品類相同就稱為勢力等。又如初地（菩薩修行階位的第一個階段）所斷的所知障（對真理的認知障礙），乃通於三界（欲界、色界、無色界）。不妨礙欲界初品所知障通障十地（菩薩修行的十個階段）。十地分別斷除。難道因為多品斷除，障礙就是品多嗎？一品斷除就沒有品類了嗎？所以細微的障礙只有最初才能障礙，證得這個就斷除了，不需要討論品類。這裡的前四句，按照所熏中的內容，一一都應該借用提問來引發，然後再加以論述。

論：唯有第七轉識乃至可以說是能熏。

述曰：這是總結。就是能緣中的第七轉識（末那識）、心所等作為能熏。如果作為相分（被認知的部分），什麼法是障礙呢？就是第八識（阿賴耶識）作為第六識（意識）和第七識所緣的對象，所以作為相分被熏習。什麼分是能熏呢？只有自體分（識的自身部分）。如自體分只接受熏習。因為見分（識的認知功能）是體。

論：如是能熏乃至熏習的意義成立。

述曰：後面解釋熏習的意義。其中有三點。首先解釋熏習的意義，其次顯示法體的多少，最後說明因果。這裡是第一點。要同時俱生俱滅，熏習的意義才能成立。不像種子生芽，允許異時生起，所以不是同時存在。所以知道色法沒有俱有的意義。

論：令所熏中乃至所以名為熏習。

述曰：只有華熏苣勝是同生同滅的，所以用它來比喻。《攝論》用如內熏習等來比喻。

論：能熏識等乃至因果同時。

述曰：下面顯示法體。先是法，后是比喻。這裡是舉法。

論：如燈炷生火焰乃至更互相依。

述曰：首先舉三個法的比喻來比喻三個法體，然後舉兩個法的比喻來比喻因果的意義。種子和現行這兩種意義。

【English Translation】 English version: 'That which can perfume'. If we discuss based on 'with outflows' (having afflictions) and 'without outflows' (without afflictions), considering them incomparable, we can also use 'with nature' and 'without nature' as an analogy. It should not be thought that because the categories are different, they cannot be called perfuming. The treatise says that the seventh consciousness, along with the highest realm (highest meditation in the Form Realm) and the lowest afflictions of the underground, together obstruct the 'no-more-learning' (those who no longer need to learn), and are called 'power-like'. They are instantly and completely cut off in the diamond mind, so they are called 'power-like'. It doesn't mean that being of the same category is called 'power-like'. Also, like the obstructions to knowledge (cognitive obstacles to truth) that are cut off in the first ground (the first stage of a Bodhisattva's practice), they pervade the three realms (Desire Realm, Form Realm, Formless Realm). It does not hinder the initial product of the obstructions to knowledge in the Desire Realm from obstructing the ten grounds (ten stages of a Bodhisattva's practice). The ten grounds are cut off separately. Is it because many products are cut off that the obstruction is of many products? If one product is cut off, then there are no categories? Therefore, subtle obstructions can only obstruct at the beginning, and realizing this cuts them off, without needing to discuss the categories. The first four sentences here, according to the content of what is perfumed, should all be initiated by questioning and then discussed.

Treatise: Only the seventh transformed consciousness can be said to be the perfumer.

Commentary: This is a summary. That is, the seventh transformed consciousness (Manas consciousness), mental factors, etc., in the 'that which can cognize', are the perfumers. If it is taken as the 'image-division' (the part being cognized), what dharma is the obstruction? It is the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness) that is the object of the sixth (consciousness) and seventh consciousnesses, so it is perfumed as the image-division. Which division is the perfumer? Only the self-division (the self-part of consciousness). As the self-division only receives perfuming, because the seeing-division (the cognitive function of consciousness) is the substance.

Treatise: Thus, the perfumer, and so the meaning of perfuming is established.

Commentary: The meaning of perfuming is explained later. There are three points in it. First, explain the meaning of perfuming, second, show the amount of dharma-substances, and finally, explain cause and effect. This is the first point. The meaning of perfuming can only be established if they arise and cease simultaneously. Unlike the seed producing a sprout, which allows for arising at different times, so they do not exist simultaneously. Therefore, it is known that form does not have the meaning of being co-existent.

Treatise: Causing the perfumed to, and therefore it is called perfuming.

Commentary: Only the fragrance of flowers perfuming the bitter lettuce is simultaneous in arising and ceasing, so it is used as a metaphor. The Compendium of Abhidharma uses metaphors such as internal perfuming.

Treatise: The perfuming consciousness, etc., and so cause and effect are simultaneous.

Commentary: The dharma-substance is shown below. First the dharma, then the metaphor. This is citing the dharma.

Treatise: Like a wick producing a flame, and relying on each other.

Commentary: First, three metaphors are given to illustrate the three dharma-substances, and then two metaphors are given to illustrate the meaning of cause and effect. The two meanings of seed and manifestation.

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其文可解　何故無有四法新種生現耶　心等一時不可並故。又生彼緣未和合故。若許生者便無窮故。不可此時遂生現行。

論。因果俱時理不傾動。

述曰。不同經部因果異時。故說俱時理不傾動。

論。能熏生種至得士用果。

述曰。下明因果。能熏生種。種生現時。如小乘俱有因與俱有法為其因。故以種望現能熏心等。更互皆得。即約同時士用果說。本種與現唯作因緣。現行望新種亦唯因緣。偏望為因緣。非說現行與本有種為因緣也。此以大乘俱有因與相似。言如俱有因是因緣攝。非大乘中許彼現行俱有因法是因緣義。顯揚破故　然攝論第三亦說為因緣。即是本識。同此無妨。如彼俱有因。體不成俱時為因故。以彼俱有因義。亦有現行不能熏故。下四緣中自當料簡。

論。種子前後至引等流果。

述曰。種子望種。大乘為同類因。亦如於彼現望于現。非現望現為因緣攝同類因也。以疏遠故非親近故。此等諸文攝論皆有。

論。此二于果至應知假說。

述曰。除此余法。七轉識等名為因緣。彼對法第四。十二緣起皆名因緣。應知假說非實因緣。非辨體故。非親近故。

論。是謂略說一切種相。

述曰。此總結上第三段也。

論。此識行相所緣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果這樣可以解釋，為什麼沒有四法（指種子、現行、因、果）的新種子生起顯現呢？ 答：因為心等（指種子和現行）不能同時並存。而且，生起它們的條件尚未和合。如果允許生起，就會導致無窮的推論。因此，不可能在這個時候就生起顯現的行相。 論：因果同時，在道理上是站得住腳的。 述記：這與經部宗認為因果異時的觀點不同。因此說，因果同時在道理上是站得住腳的。 論：能熏習的現行生起種子，最終獲得士用果（作用的果報）。 述記：下面闡明因果關係。能熏習的現行生起種子，種子生起現行。就像小乘的有部宗認為俱有因（同時存在的因）與俱有法（同時存在的法）互為因。因此，以種子來看現行，能熏習心等，可以互相成立。這是就同時的士用果而言。本有種子與現行只是作為因緣。現行對於新種子也只是因緣。偏重於作為因緣，而不是說現行與本有種子互為因緣。這與大乘的俱有因相似。說如同俱有因是因緣所攝，但大乘中並不承認現行俱有因法是因緣的含義，因為《顯揚論》破斥了這種觀點。然而，《攝大乘論》第三也說其為因緣，指的就是本識，與此處的說法沒有妨礙。如同彼俱有因，其體性不能同時作為因，因為有現行不能熏習的情況。關於四緣，將在後面進行辨析。 論：種子前後相續，最終引生等流果（性質相似的果報）。 述記：種子對於種子，大乘認為是同類因。也如同現行對於現行。但現行對於現行，不是因緣所攝的同類因。因為疏遠，不是親近的緣故。這些內容在《攝大乘論》中都有。 論：除了這兩種情況，其餘的法，如七轉識等，都稱為因緣。在《對法論》第四中，十二緣起都稱為因緣。應該知道這是假說，不是真實的因緣。因為不是辨析體性，也不是親近的緣故。 論：以上是簡略地說明一切種子的相狀。 述記：這是總結上面第三段的內容。 論：此識（阿賴耶識）的行相和所緣

【English Translation】 English version: Question: If it can be explained in this way, why do new seeds of the four dharmas (referring to seeds, manifestations, causes, and effects) not arise and appear? Answer: Because the mind and so on (referring to seeds and manifestations) cannot coexist simultaneously. Moreover, the conditions for their arising have not yet harmonized. If arising were allowed, it would lead to infinite regression. Therefore, it is impossible for the manifest appearance to arise at this time. Treatise: Cause and effect occurring simultaneously is logically sound. Commentary: This differs from the Sautrantika school's view that cause and effect occur at different times. Therefore, it is said that cause and effect occurring simultaneously is logically sound. Treatise: The active manifestation that can perfume and generate seeds ultimately obtains the 'purposive fruit' (the fruit of action). Commentary: The following clarifies the relationship between cause and effect. The active manifestation that can perfume generates seeds, and seeds generate manifestations. Just as the Sarvastivada school of Hinayana believes that co-existent causes (causes that exist simultaneously) and co-existent dharmas (dharmas that exist simultaneously) are causes for each other. Therefore, from the perspective of seeds looking at manifestations, the ability to perfume the mind and so on can be mutually established. This refers to the simultaneous 'purposive fruit'. The original seeds and manifestations only act as conditions. Manifestations for new seeds are also only conditions. Emphasis is placed on acting as conditions, rather than saying that manifestations and original seeds are causes for each other. This is similar to the co-existent cause in Mahayana. It is said that like the co-existent cause, it is included in the conditions, but Mahayana does not acknowledge that the active co-existent cause dharma is the meaning of condition, because the Exposition of the Abhidharma refutes this view. However, the third chapter of the Compendium of Mahayana also says that it is a condition, referring to the Alaya consciousness, which is consistent with this statement. Like that co-existent cause, its nature cannot simultaneously be a cause, because there are cases where manifestations cannot perfume. The four conditions will be analyzed later. Treatise: Seeds continue sequentially, ultimately leading to the 'equiflow fruit' (a fruit with similar qualities). Commentary: Seeds for seeds, Mahayana considers them to be causes of the same type. It is also like manifestations for manifestations. But manifestations for manifestations are not causes of the same type included in the conditions. Because they are distant, not close causes. These contents are all in the Compendium of Mahayana. Treatise: Apart from these two situations, the remaining dharmas, such as the seven consciousnesses, are all called conditions. In the fourth chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, the twelve links of dependent origination are all called conditions. It should be known that this is a provisional statement, not a real condition. Because it is not analyzing the nature, nor is it a close cause. Treatise: The above is a brief explanation of the characteristics of all seeds. Commentary: This is a summary of the third section above. Treatise: The characteristics and objects of this consciousness (Alaya consciousness)

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云何。

述曰。十門分別第八識中上已三門。第一齣體。識自相門。第二真假異熟。五果果相分別。第三諸法因緣。四緣因相分別　自下第四．第五。行相．所緣。分別。于中有二。初問。次答。此問起也　然不可知。粗細分別但無別體。或約所緣。或約行相。明不可知。故於門中略而不舉。后別解中即自疏出。義有別故。

論。謂不可知執受處了。

述曰。答中有二。初舉頌答。后自別解　論問起中依義為問。以不可知無別體故。不為問也。然以唯識轉變次第。先行．后境　次略答中。依頌而牒　下解釋中。從後向前依問而解　所以者何　本頌先後法相求故。心依境因方得起故　長行先後意趣求故。其境要是識所變故　謂本頌中。先不可知之所緣　后不可知之行相。明解法相。頌文穩便故。不可知為初。所緣．行相隨後。一不可知通境．行故　長行之中。一切諸法有心．有境。行相是識之見分故　先明行相。由心變境次說所緣　約見．及相而辨細．粗。后解不可知義。故有別也　解行相．所緣中有二。初解所緣．行相。后解不可知言　初中復二。先略。后廣。略即粗解體義。廣則料簡細解　了謂了別下。此為略解　此中了者下。此為廣解　略中有二。初解行。后解境。

論。了謂了別至為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 云何？（什麼意思？） 述曰：十門分別第八識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識，又稱藏識）中，前面已經討論了三個方面：第一，顯現第八識的自體，即『識自相門』；第二，區分真實的和虛假的異熟果報，即『五果果相分別』；第三，說明諸法的因緣，即『四緣因相分別』。下面第四和第五，分別討論第八識的行相和所緣。其中分為兩部分：首先是提問，然後是回答。這裡是提問的開始。然而，『不可知』的粗細分別，並沒有獨立的自體，或者從所緣，或者從行相的角度來說明其不可知性。因此，在『十門分別』中略去不提，而在後面的詳細解釋中才單獨闡述，因為其意義有所不同。 論：謂不可知執受處了。（所謂的『不可知』，是指第八識執持和領受之處是不可了知的。） 述曰：回答分為兩部分：首先引用頌文回答，然後是詳細解釋。在提問部分，論主根據意義提出問題，因為『不可知』沒有獨立的自體，所以不單獨提問。然而，根據唯識轉變的次第，先有行相，後有所緣。在簡略的回答中，依據頌文進行解釋。在下面的解釋中，從後向前，依據問題進行解釋。為什麼這樣呢？因為本頌是按照法相的先後順序來求證的，心依于境才能生起。長行的先後順序是爲了探求意趣。其境一定是識所變現的。也就是說，在本頌中，先說『不可知』的所緣，后說『不可知』的行相，是爲了闡明法相，使頌文更加穩妥。因此，先說『不可知』，然後是所緣和行相。『不可知』既可以通於境，也可以通於行。在長行中，一切諸法都有心和境，行相是識的見分。因此，先說明行相，由心變現境，然後說明所緣。通過見分和相分來辨別粗細。最後解釋『不可知』的含義，所以有所不同。解釋行相和所緣分為兩部分：首先解釋所緣和行相，然後解釋『不可知』。在第一部分中，又分為兩部分：先簡略解釋，后詳細解釋。簡略解釋就是粗略地解釋體義，詳細解釋就是仔細地分析。『了謂了別』以下是簡略解釋。『此中了者』以下是詳細解釋。在簡略解釋中，又分為兩部分：先解釋行相，后解釋所緣。 論：了謂了別至為

【English Translation】 English version: What does it mean? Śāstra says: Among the ten aspects of distinguishing the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, store consciousness), the previous three aspects have already been discussed: First, revealing the substance of the eighth consciousness itself, which is the 'aspect of self-nature of consciousness'; second, distinguishing between true and false matured retributions, which is the 'distinction of the characteristics of the five fruits'; third, explaining the causes and conditions of all dharmas, which is the 'distinction of the characteristics of the four conditions'. Below, the fourth and fifth aspects will discuss the characteristics and objects of the eighth consciousness, respectively. This is divided into two parts: first, the question, and then the answer. This is the beginning of the question. However, the coarse and subtle distinctions of 'unknowable' do not have an independent substance. Either from the perspective of the object or from the perspective of the characteristics, its unknowability is explained. Therefore, it is omitted in the 'ten aspects of distinction' and only elaborated separately in the detailed explanation later, because its meaning is different. Treatise: 'Unknowable' refers to the place where grasping and reception are not knowable. Śāstra says: The answer is divided into two parts: first, quoting the verse to answer, and then providing a detailed explanation. In the question part, the author raises the question based on meaning, because 'unknowable' does not have an independent substance, so it is not questioned separately. However, according to the order of transformation in Consciousness-only, there is first the characteristic and then the object. In the brief answer, the verse is explained. In the following explanation, from back to front, the question is explained. Why is this so? Because this verse is to seek proof according to the order of the characteristics of dharmas, and the mind can only arise by relying on the object. The order of the prose is to explore the intention. The object must be transformed by consciousness. That is to say, in this verse, the object of the 'unknowable' is mentioned first, and then the characteristic of the 'unknowable' is mentioned, in order to clarify the characteristics of dharmas and make the verse more stable. Therefore, 'unknowable' is mentioned first, followed by the object and the characteristic. 'Unknowable' can be applied to both the object and the characteristic. In the prose, all dharmas have mind and object, and the characteristic is the seeing-aspect of consciousness. Therefore, the characteristic is explained first, and the object is transformed by the mind, and then the object is explained. The coarse and subtle are distinguished through the seeing-aspect and the object-aspect. Finally, the meaning of 'unknowable' is explained, so there is a difference. The explanation of the characteristic and the object is divided into two parts: first, the object and the characteristic are explained, and then the 'unknowable' is explained. In the first part, it is divided into two parts: first, a brief explanation, and then a detailed explanation. The brief explanation is a rough explanation of the substance, and the detailed explanation is a careful analysis. 'Knowing means distinguishing' below is a brief explanation. 'This knowing' below is a detailed explanation. In the brief explanation, it is divided into two parts: first, the characteristic is explained, and then the object is explained. Treatise: 'Knowing means distinguishing' to be

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行相故。

述曰。此解行相。識自體分以了別為行相故。行相見分也。類體亦然　相者體也。即謂境相。行於境相。名為行相　或相謂相狀。行境之相狀名為行相　前解通無分別智。后解除彼　或行境之行解相貌。此解亦非無分別智。以無相故　然本但是行於相義。非是行解義。

論。處謂處所至所依處故。

述曰。下解境。

于中有二。初別解內外所緣。後方總解所緣。初文復二。初外。后內　今此即是識之相分。依名釋義如文可知。此為外相　然下自廣。隨彼處會。

論。執受有二至及有根身。

述曰。下解內境。與外境殊故別開說　總相而言。執受義者。執是攝義。持義　受是領義。覺義　攝為自體。持令不壞。安危共同。而領受之。能生覺受。名為執受。領為境也。如瑜伽論第五十一．五十三．七十六卷同此義釋　對法第五說執受者。但唯五根．四塵一分。不說種子．及與聲處　五十六說。五根全．五塵一分名為執受。二文不同　五十三說。執受有二　一若識依執名有執受。謂識所託安危事同　即顯依持而領受義　領受義者。謂以為境　二以此為依能生諸受。此義即顯執令不壞。能生覺受　若據實理。生覺受者唯是身根。以餘四根。色．香．味觸。不離身根。同聚一處

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『行相故』。

窺基法師註疏：這裡解釋『行相』。識的自體分以了別為『行相』的緣故。『行相』就是見分。類似的，『體』也是如此。『相』就是『體』，指的是境相。『行』于境相，就叫做『行相』。或者，『相』指的是相狀，『行』于境的相狀，就叫做『行相』。前一種解釋也適用於無分別智，后一種解釋則排除了無分別智。或者，『行』是對於境的行解相貌。這種解釋也不適用于無分別智，因為它沒有相。然而，根本上只是『行』于相的意義，而不是『行解』的意義。

『處謂處所至所依處故』。

窺基法師註疏：下面解釋『境』。

其中有二部分。首先分別解釋內外所緣，然後總的解釋所緣。第一部分又分為兩部分，先是外境，然後是內境。現在這裡就是識的相分。按照名稱解釋意義，就像文中所說的那樣可以理解。這是外相。然而，下面會自己擴充套件，隨順那些地方的會合。

『執受有二至及有根身』。

窺基法師註疏：下面解釋內境。因為它與外境不同，所以分開來說。總的來說，『執受』的意義是：『執』是攝取、持有的意思；『受』是領納、覺知的意思。攝取作為自體，持有使之不壞，安危共同，並且領納它，能夠產生覺受，就叫做『執受』。領納是作為境。如《瑜伽師地論》第五十一、五十三、七十六卷相同地解釋了這個意義。《對法論》第五說『執受』，僅僅是五根、四塵的一部分，沒有說種子以及聲處。《五十六》說，五根全部、五塵的一部分叫做『執受』。兩種說法不同。《五十三》說，『執受』有兩種：一是如果識依靠執持，就叫做『有執受』，意思是識所依託，安危與它相同，這顯示了依靠持有而領納的意義。領納的意義，就是作為境。二是以此為依靠能夠產生各種感受。這個意義就顯示了執持使之不壞，能夠產生覺受。如果根據真實的道理，產生覺受的只有身根，因為其餘四根，色、香、味、觸，不離身根，同聚一處。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Because of the characteristic aspect.'

Kuei-chi's commentary: This explains 'characteristic aspect'. The self-nature division of consciousness (識) takes discrimination as its 'characteristic aspect'. 'Characteristic aspect' is the seeing-division (見分). The same applies to 'substance'. 'Aspect' is 'substance', referring to the aspect of the object (境相). 'Acting' upon the aspect of the object is called 'characteristic aspect'. Alternatively, 'aspect' refers to the appearance. 'Acting' upon the appearance of the object is called 'characteristic aspect'. The former explanation applies to non-discriminating wisdom (無分別智), while the latter excludes it. Or, 'acting' is the understanding of the appearance of the object. This explanation also does not apply to non-discriminating wisdom, because it has no appearance. However, fundamentally, it is only the meaning of 'acting' upon the aspect, not the meaning of 'acting understanding'.

'Place refers to the location, the place to which one arrives, the place of reliance.'

Kuei-chi's commentary: Below explains 'object' (境).

There are two parts to this. First, separately explain the internal and external objects of cognition (所緣), then generally explain the objects of cognition. The first part is further divided into two parts, first the external object, then the internal object. What is here is the aspect-division (相分) of consciousness. Explain the meaning according to the name, as can be understood from the text. This is the external aspect. However, it will expand itself below, following the confluence of those places.

'Grasping and reception, up to and including the body with roots.'

Kuei-chi's commentary: Below explains the internal object. Because it is different from the external object, it is explained separately. Generally speaking, the meaning of 'grasping and reception' (執受) is: 'Grasping' (執) means gathering and holding; 'reception' (受) means receiving and perceiving. Gathering as the self-nature, holding it so that it does not decay, sharing safety and danger, and receiving it, being able to produce sensation, is called 'grasping and reception'. Reception is as the object. As the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), volumes 51, 53, and 76, similarly explain this meaning. The fifth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論) says that 'grasping and reception' is only the five roots (五根), a portion of the four dusts (四塵), not mentioning seeds (種子) and the sphere of sound (聲處). Volume 56 says that all five roots and a portion of the five dusts are called 'grasping and reception'. The two statements are different. Volume 53 says that there are two types of 'grasping and reception': First, if consciousness relies on grasping, it is called 'having grasping and reception', meaning that what consciousness relies on shares safety and danger with it, which shows the meaning of relying on holding and receiving. The meaning of receiving is to take it as an object. Second, relying on this can produce various sensations. This meaning shows that grasping holds it so that it does not decay, being able to produce sensation. According to the true principle, only the body-root (身根) produces sensation, because the other four roots, form (色), smell (香), taste (味), and touch (觸), are inseparable from the body-root, gathering in one place.

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亦名覺受。體實非也　薩婆多等亦作此解。對法唯據現行。此義生覺受義　不論其聲。聲體虛疏不可執之而生覺受。故略不說。故外道中說為無礙　五十六中唯據現行。不相離大所發之聲。同處不相離。不異大極微而出。復親領之。故通十界處。不言種子　五十一卷．及此論等。通依現．種二執受義。通於十界種子．現行。文勢雖殊義意同也　問無表色．心．心所。亦依于識安危共同。雖不執令能生覺受。如種子等。何非執受　答非所緣故。如下當說。無領受義　問外器界既以為境。何非執受　答非是相近。不執為自體。故與識相遠不為依故。故非執受　問既唯緣此更無餘者。何故十卷楞伽說。云阿𥠖耶識。緣名．及相猶如毛．輪　答名體即聲。聲是能詮。說緣其名意說緣聲。如言緣相意在根等。不爾心等相應是彼所緣　又相者即色蘊。有相顯故。名謂非色四蘊。第八緣初相現行．及種。但緣名種不緣現行。亦名緣名　又解。相者即執受．處俱名為相。相即相分。見分所取。名者四蘊。即心．心所法。自證分緣。許自緣故　又相者即器．有根身。現可知故。其諸種子總名為名。相難可知。唯以名顯故名為名　問何故彼復說第八識頓分別知一切境界　答說自一切境。皆頓分別知。非如余識境漸次能了故　由是彼經復作是

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 也叫做覺受（Vedana，感受）。它的體性實際上不是實在的。薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，一切有部）等也作此解釋。《對法論》（Abhidharma）只根據現行（Pravrtti，現起）來說明。此義是生起覺受的意義。不論其聲音，聲音的體性虛弱疏散，不可執著它而生起覺受，所以略而不說。因此外道中說為無礙。五十六卷中只根據現行。不相離的大所發出的聲音，在同一處不相分離，不是異於極微（Paramanu，最小的物質單位）而出，並且親自領受它，所以通於十界（Dasabhumi，十個存在領域）。不談種子（Bija，潛在狀態）。 第五十一卷以及此論等，都依據現行和種子兩種執受的意義。通於十界的種子和現行。文句的表達方式雖然不同，但意義相同。問：無表色（Avijnapti-rupa，不可知色）、心（Citta，意識）、心所（Caitasika，心理活動），也依賴於識（Vijnana，認知）而安危與共，雖然不執著它們令其能生起覺受，如同種子等，為什麼不是執受？答：因為不是所緣（Alambana，對像），如下面將要說，沒有領受的意義。問：外在的器世界（Bhajana-loka，物質世界）既然被認為是境（Visaya，對像），為什麼不是執受？答：因為不是相近的，不執著為自體，所以與識相遠，不作為所依，所以不是執受。 問：既然只緣此更無其他，為什麼第十卷《楞伽經》（Lankavatara Sutra）說，阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，藏識）緣名（Nama，名稱）和相（Lakshana，特徵），猶如毛髮和輪子？答：名的體性就是聲音，聲音是能詮釋的，說緣其名，意思是說緣聲音。如同說緣相，意思是在根（Indriya，感官）等。不然的話，心等相應就是彼所緣。又，相就是色蘊（Rupa-skandha，色蘊），因為有相顯現的緣故。名是指非色的四蘊（Skandha，蘊），第八識緣初相的現行和種子，但緣名的種子，不緣現行，也可以說是緣名。又一種解釋，相是指執受和處，都叫做相。相就是相分（Nimitta-bhaga，對像部分），是見分（Darsana-bhaga，主觀部分）所取。名是四蘊，即心和心所法，是自證分（Svasamvedana-bhaga，自我認知部分）所緣，允許自緣的緣故。 又，相是指器世界和有根身（Indriya-sahita-rupa，具有感官的身體），現行可知。那些種子總稱為名，相難以可知，唯有通過名來顯現，所以稱為名。問：為什麼《楞伽經》又說第八識頓分別知一切境界？答：說自的一切境，都頓分別知，不像其他識那樣，境界是漸次才能瞭解的。因此《楞伽經》又作這樣的說明。

【English Translation】 English version It is also called Vedana (feeling). Its essence is actually not real. Sarvastivadins (the 'All Exist' school) also interpret it this way. The Abhidharma only explains based on the present manifestation (Pravrtti). This meaning is the meaning of generating feeling. Regardless of its sound, the essence of sound is weak and sparse, and one cannot cling to it to generate feeling, so it is omitted. Therefore, it is said to be unobstructed in external paths. Volume 56 only explains based on the present manifestation. The sound emitted by the inseparable great element is inseparable in the same place, not different from the ultimate particle (Paramanu), and is personally received, so it pervades the ten realms (Dasabhumi). Seeds (Bija) are not mentioned. Volume 51 and this treatise both rely on the meaning of both present manifestation and seeds being grasped. It pervades the seeds and present manifestations of the ten realms. Although the wording is different, the meaning is the same. Question: Unmanifested form (Avijnapti-rupa), mind (Citta), and mental factors (Caitasika) also rely on consciousness (Vijnana) for safety and danger together. Although they are not grasped to generate feeling, like seeds, why are they not grasped? Answer: Because they are not objects (Alambana), as will be explained below, they do not have the meaning of reception. Question: Since the external world (Bhajana-loka) is considered an object, why is it not grasped? Answer: Because it is not close, and it is not grasped as the self, so it is far from consciousness and does not serve as a basis, so it is not grasped. Question: Since it only cognizes this and nothing else, why does the tenth volume of the Lankavatara Sutra say that the Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness) cognizes names (Nama) and characteristics (Lakshana) like hairs and wheels? Answer: The essence of name is sound, and sound is what can explain. Saying that it cognizes the name means that it cognizes the sound. Just as saying that it cognizes the characteristic means that it is in the sense organs (Indriya) and so on. Otherwise, the mental concomitants are what it cognizes. Also, the characteristic is the form aggregate (Rupa-skandha), because the characteristic is manifested. Name refers to the four non-form aggregates (Skandha). The eighth consciousness cognizes the present manifestation and seeds of the initial characteristic, but it cognizes the seeds of name and not the present manifestation, so it can also be said to cognize the name. Another explanation is that the characteristic refers to both grasping and place, which are both called characteristics. The characteristic is the object-aspect (Nimitta-bhaga), which is taken by the seeing-aspect (Darsana-bhaga). Name is the four aggregates, namely mind and mental factors, which are cognized by the self-awareness aspect (Svasamvedana-bhaga), because self-cognition is allowed. Also, the characteristic refers to the external world and the body with sense organs (Indriya-sahita-rupa), which are knowable in the present manifestation. Those seeds are collectively called names. Characteristics are difficult to know, and they are only manifested through names, so they are called names. Question: Why does the Lankavatara Sutra also say that the eighth consciousness knows all realms instantly? Answer: It says that all its own realms are known instantly, unlike other consciousnesses, whose realms can only be understood gradually. Therefore, the Lankavatara Sutra makes this explanation.

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說。自身．及資具。一時頓分別　與此文同。並不違也　問何故辨中邊云唯緣根．塵　生覺受故。舊論云。根．塵．我．及識。本識生似彼。至卷末當解。

論。諸種子者至分別習氣。

述曰。即是一切有漏善等諸法種子。下解五法中。此三唯有漏。論說非無漏。無漏種子此識既不緣。但為彼依故非執受。與七十六．解深密同。與五十一．顯揚等別。彼言遍計所執自性妄執習氣。有何所以者。此有二說　護法等說。唯染無記心中有法執。善．無記心不能起執。因執心所執。為所遍計熏成於種。此種名妄執習氣。即見．相分而熏種生　又解應分別論文染無記心有遍計所執自性妄執。故此種子名遍計所執自性妄執習氣。善．無記心但是遍計。計是分別心之異名。故此種名遍計習氣。而非所執自性妄執習氣。以有漏心皆名遍計故。非善等心中許有執故　或復此文但約染語。以有漏中多起執故。若不爾者。一切色法非能熏者。皆非能遍計。亦不起執。相分之中既無種子。又此不說本識應不緣。既爾第八應亦能熏。有力能執故。由此故知。此解為勝。下三性中更當分別　安惠等說。有漏八識皆能遍計而起于執。即以此文為證。今此師意有八識種子。唯自體分後生現行。似有能詮．所詮相現說為名．相。名．相現行遍

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 說：自身以及資具，一時全部辨別清楚，與前面的文義相同，並不矛盾。問：為什麼《辨中邊論》中說『唯緣根、塵，生覺受故』？舊論說：『根、塵、我、及識，本識生似彼。』到卷末時會解釋。 論：諸種子者，乃至分別習氣。 述曰：即是一切有漏善等諸法種子。下面解釋五法中，這三種只有有漏。論中說沒有無漏。無漏種子，此識既然不緣，只是作為它們的所依，所以不是執受。與第七十六卷、《解深密經》相同，與第五十一卷、《顯揚聖教論》等不同。他們說遍計所執自性妄執習氣，有什麼原因呢？這裡有兩種說法：護法等人說，只有染污無記心中有法執，善、無記心不能生起執著。因為執著心所執著，被所遍計熏習成為種子，此種名為妄執習氣，即見分、相分而熏習生起種子。又一種解釋應該分別論文，染污無記心有遍計所執自性妄執，所以此種子名為遍計所執自性妄執習氣。善、無記心只是遍計，計是分別心的異名，所以此種名為遍計習氣，而不是所執自性妄執習氣。因為有漏心都名為遍計，所以善等心中不許有執著。或者此文只是就染污來說，因為有漏中多起執著。若不是這樣，一切色法不是能熏習者，都不是能遍計，也不生起執著。相分之中既然沒有種子，又這裡不說本識應該不緣。既然如此，第八識應該也能熏習，因為有力能執著。因此可知，這種解釋為勝。下面三性中再作分別。安慧等人說，有漏八識都能遍計而生起執著，即以此文為證。現在這位師父的意思是有八識種子，只有自體分後生現行，好像有能詮、所詮相現，說為名、相，名、相現行遍。

【English Translation】 English version: It says: The self and its possessions are all clearly distinguished at once, which is the same as the previous meaning and does not contradict it. Question: Why does the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya say 'Only conditioned by the root (indriya) and object (viṣaya), thus feeling (vedanā) arises'? The old treatise says: 'Root (indriya), object (viṣaya), self (ātman), and consciousness (vijñāna), the Ālaya-vijñāna produces what resembles them.' It will be explained at the end of the chapter. Treatise: The various seeds, up to the habit-energy of discrimination (vikalpa-vāsanā). Commentary: These are the seeds of all defiled (sāsrava) wholesome dharmas, etc. In the following explanation of the five dharmas, these three are only defiled. The treatise says there are no undefiled (anāsrava) ones. Since this consciousness (vijñāna) does not condition undefiled seeds, but only serves as their basis, it is not appropriation (upādāna). This is the same as in the seventy-sixth fascicle and the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, and different from the fifty-first fascicle and the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, etc. What is the reason for saying that they are the habit-energy of falsely imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva-vāsanā)? There are two explanations here: Dharmapāla and others say that only in defiled and neutral (avyākṛta) minds is there attachment to dharmas (dharma-graha), and wholesome and neutral minds cannot give rise to attachment. Because the mind is attached to what is grasped, it is conditioned by what is falsely imagined and becomes a seed. This seed is called the habit-energy of false imagination, that is, the seeing-aspect (darśana-bhāga) and the object-aspect (nimitta-bhāga) condition the arising of the seed. Another explanation should distinguish the text of the treatise: defiled and neutral minds have falsely imagined nature and false imagination, so this seed is called the habit-energy of falsely imagined nature and false imagination. Wholesome and neutral minds are only discrimination (vikalpa), and 'imagination' (kalpana) is another name for the discriminating mind, so this seed is called the habit-energy of discrimination, but not the habit-energy of falsely imagined nature and false imagination. Because defiled minds are all called discrimination, wholesome minds, etc., are not allowed to have attachment. Or this text only refers to defilement, because attachment often arises in defilement. If not, all forms (rūpa) that cannot condition are not able to discriminate and do not give rise to attachment. Since there are no seeds in the object-aspect, and it is not said here that the Ālaya-vijñāna should not condition, then the eighth consciousness (vijñāna) should also be able to condition, because it has the power to attach. Therefore, this explanation is known to be superior. Further distinctions will be made in the following three natures (tri-svabhāva). Sthiramati and others say that the defiled eight consciousnesses (vijñāna) can all discriminate and give rise to attachment, and this text is taken as evidence. Now, this teacher's meaning is that there are seeds of the eight consciousnesses (vijñāna), only the self-aspect (sva-bhāga) arises and manifests later, and it seems that there are expressing (vācaka) and expressed (vācya) aspects, which are said to be name (nāma) and form (rūpa), and the name and form manifest everywhere.

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計所執。相似有故。說自證種能生名．相因緣。名為名．相等習氣。非離自證種外別有名．相種　或名與相雖無實體。而別有種亦不相違　此中二解如下自知　然今此文與彼既別。故此文勝。通一切有漏三界．三性。乃至抉擇分等種。皆是執受。阿賴耶識性所攝故　問為緣種子別功能不　答自有種子即是功能。能生現行之功能故。然復有別功能。如心．心所種子。有總能生現行功能。復有厭心差別功能即無想定。然第八識雖緣種子。不緣無想定。此即不緣差別功能　若爾無色界識。即不緣心等廣大功能。如何乃言于無色界。能緣廣大執受境等　此義應思　如善種子本識雖緣。然但緣體。體即識性。唯無記攝。不緣善等余別功能。無想定等唯是善性。故亦不緣無色界中雖有善種差別功能。即是能生廣大之心現行法故。不失無記。不違本識。不如善等．及無想定違本識故。故於無色界緣廣大功能　無想定等是種上假。無色廣大功能不然。故不許緣無想定等　又無色界廣大之用。唯在現行。種是彼因。即是廣大之功能義。彼第八境種子。從現行為名名廣大功能。非緣種上廣大別義。故無有失　又種有三品。此為一類緣。心無三品。任運緣故。心唯一界。種通三界。系．性別故。如第八緣異界色法。見．相別界攝。以親緣故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 計所執：所計執著的事物。 相似有故：因為相似而存在。 說自證種能生名相因緣：說是從自證的種子生出名相的因緣。 名為名相等習氣：名為名相等等的習氣。 非離自證種外別有名相種：不是離開自證的種子之外，另外有名相的種子。 或名與相雖無實體，而別有種亦不相違：或者名相雖然沒有實體，但是另外有種子也不相違背。 此中二解如下自知：這其中的兩種解釋，自己可以瞭解。 然今此文與彼既別，故此文勝：然而現在這段文字和那段文字既然不同，所以這段文字更好。 通一切有漏三界三性，乃至抉擇分等種，皆是執受，阿賴耶識性所攝故：通達一切有煩惱的三界、三種性質，乃至抉擇分等等的種子，都是執受，被阿賴耶識的性質所攝。 問：為緣種子別功能不？（問：阿賴耶識所緣的種子，有不同的功能嗎？） 答：自有種子即是功能，能生現行之功能故。然復有別功能，如心心所種子，有總能生現行功能，復有厭心差別功能即無想定。然第八識雖緣種子，不緣無想定，此即不緣差別功能。（答：種子本身就是功能，因為它能夠產生現行的功能。然而還有另外的功能，比如心和心所的種子，有總的產生現行功能，還有厭惡心的差別功能，也就是無想定。然而第八識雖然緣種子，但不緣無想定，這就是不緣差別功能。） 若爾無色識，即不緣心等廣大功能，如何乃言于無色界，能緣廣大執受境等？此義應思。（如果這樣，無色界的識，就不緣心等等廣大的功能，那麼怎麼說在無色界，能夠緣廣大的執受境等等呢？這個道理應該思考。） 如善種子本識雖緣，然但緣體，體即識性，唯無記攝，不緣善等余別功能。無想定等唯是善性，故亦不緣。無色界中雖有善種差別功能，即是能生廣大之心現行法故，不失無記，不違本識。不如善等及無想定違本識故。故於無色界緣廣大功能。（比如善的種子，本識雖然緣，但只是緣它的本體，本體就是識性，只是無記所攝，不緣善等等其他的差別功能。無想定等等只是善性，所以也不緣。無色界中雖然有善種的差別功能，也就是能夠產生廣大的心現行法，所以不失去無記，不違背本識。不像善等等以及無想定違背本識。所以在無色界緣廣大的功能。） 無想定等是種上假，無色廣大功能不然，故不許緣無想定等。（無想定等等是種子上的假立，無色界廣大的功能不是這樣，所以不允許緣無想定等等。） 又無色界廣大之用，唯在現行，種是彼因，即是廣大之功能義。彼第八境種子，從現行為名名廣大功能，非緣種上廣大別義，故無有失。（而且無色界廣大的作用，只在現行，種子是它的原因，也就是廣大的功能的意思。那個第八識所緣的種子，是從現行而得名，名為廣大的功能，不是緣種子上廣大的另外的意義，所以沒有過失。） 又種有三品，此為一類緣。心無三品，任運緣故。心唯一界，種通三界，系性別故。如第八緣異界色法，見相別界攝，以親緣故。（而且種子有三品，這是作為一類來緣。心沒有三品，因為是任運緣故。心只有一個界，種子通三界，因為有系屬和性別。比如第八識緣異界的色法，見相被其他界所攝，因為是親緣的緣故。）

【English Translation】 English version: Ji Suo Zhi (計所執): The things that are calculated and clung to. Xiang Si You Gu (相似有故): Existing because of similarity. Shuo Zi Zheng Zhong Neng Sheng Ming Xiang Yin Yuan (說自證種能生名相因緣): It is said that the causes and conditions of names and forms arise from the seeds of self-awareness. Ming Wei Ming Xiang Deng Xi Qi (名為名相等習氣): Called habits such as names and forms. Fei Li Zi Zheng Zhong Wai Bie You Ming Xiang Zhong (非離自證種外別有名相種): It is not that there are separate seeds of names and forms apart from the seeds of self-awareness. Huo Ming Yu Xiang Sui Wu Shi Ti, Er Bie You Zhong Yi Bu Xiang Wei (或名與相雖無實體，而別有種亦不相違): Or, although names and forms have no substance, it is not contradictory to have separate seeds. Ci Zhong Er Jie Ru Xia Zi Zhi (此中二解如下自知): The two interpretations herein can be understood by oneself. Ran Jin Ci Wen Yu Bi Ji Bie, Gu Ci Wen Sheng (然今此文與彼既別，故此文勝): However, since this text is different from that text, this text is better. Tong Yi Qie You Lou San Jie San Xing, Nai Zhi Jue Ze Fen Deng Zhong, Jie Shi Zhi Shou, A Lai Ye Shi Xing Suo She Gu (通一切有漏三界三性，乃至抉擇分等種，皆是執受，阿賴耶識性所攝故): Comprehending all afflicted Three Realms and Three Natures, even the seeds of the Determination Division, etc., are all clung to and are encompassed by the nature of the Alaya Consciousness. Question: Wei Yuan Zhong Zi Bie Gong Neng Bu? (問：為緣種子別功能不？) (Question: Do the seeds that Alaya Consciousness cognizes have different functions?) Answer: Zi You Zhong Zi Ji Shi Gong Neng, Neng Sheng Xian Xing Zhi Gong Neng Gu. Ran Fu You Bie Gong Neng, Ru Xin Xin Suo Zhong Zi, You Zong Neng Sheng Xian Xing Gong Neng, Fu You Yan Xin Cha Bie Gong Neng Ji Wu Xiang Ding. Ran Di Ba Shi Sui Yuan Zhong Zi, Bu Yuan Wu Xiang Ding, Ci Ji Bu Yuan Cha Bie Gong Neng. (答：自有種子即是功能，能生現行之功能故。然復有別功能，如心心所種子，有總能生現行功能，復有厭心差別功能即無想定。然第八識雖緣種子，不緣無想定，此即不緣差別功能.) (Answer: The seeds themselves are functions because they can produce the function of manifestation. However, there are other functions, such as the seeds of mind and mental factors, which have the general function of producing manifestation, and also the differential function of aversion, which is the state of No-Thought Concentration (Wu Xiang Ding). However, although the eighth consciousness cognizes seeds, it does not cognize No-Thought Concentration; that is, it does not cognize differential functions.) Ruo Er Wu Se Shi, Ji Bu Yuan Xin Deng Guang Da Gong Neng, Ru He Nai Yan Yu Wu Se Jie, Neng Yuan Guang Da Zhi Shou Jing Deng? Ci Yi Ying Si. (若爾無色識，即不緣心等廣大功能，如何乃言于無色界，能緣廣大執受境等？此義應思.) (If so, the consciousness of the Formless Realm does not cognize the vast functions of mind, etc. How can it be said that in the Formless Realm, it can cognize vast objects of clinging, etc.? This meaning should be considered.) Ru Shan Zhong Zi Ben Shi Sui Yuan, Ran Dan Yuan Ti, Ti Ji Shi Xing, Wei Wu Ji She, Bu Yuan Shan Deng Yu Bie Gong Neng. Wu Xiang Ding Deng Wei Shi Shan Xing, Gu Yi Bu Yuan. Wu Se Jie Zhong Sui You Shan Zhong Cha Bie Gong Neng, Ji Shi Neng Sheng Guang Da Zhi Xin Xian Xing Fa Gu, Bu Shi Wu Ji, Bu Wei Ben Shi. Bu Ru Shan Deng Ji Wu Xiang Ding Wei Ben Shi Gu. Gu Yu Wu Se Jie Yuan Guang Da Gong Neng. (如善種子本識雖緣，然但緣體，體即識性，唯無記攝，不緣善等余別功能。無想定等唯是善性，故亦不緣。無色界中雖有善種差別功能，即是能生廣大之心現行法故，不失無記，不違本識。不如善等及無想定違本識故。故於無色界緣廣大功能.) (For example, although the fundamental consciousness cognizes the seeds of goodness, it only cognizes their substance, which is the nature of consciousness, and is only encompassed by neutral karma; it does not cognize other differential functions such as goodness. No-Thought Concentration, etc., are only of the nature of goodness, so it does not cognize them either. Although there are differential functions of good seeds in the Formless Realm, which are the manifest dharmas that can produce the vast mind, it does not lose its neutral nature and does not contradict the fundamental consciousness, unlike goodness, etc., and No-Thought Concentration, which contradict the fundamental consciousness. Therefore, it cognizes vast functions in the Formless Realm.) Wu Xiang Ding Deng Shi Zhong Shang Jia, Wu Se Guang Da Gong Neng Bu Ran, Gu Bu Xu Yuan Wu Xiang Ding Deng. (無想定等是種上假，無色廣大功能不然，故不許緣無想定等.) (No-Thought Concentration, etc., are hypothetical on the seeds, but the vast functions of the Formless Realm are not like this, so it is not allowed to cognize No-Thought Concentration, etc.) You Wu Se Jie Guang Da Zhi Yong, Wei Zai Xian Xing, Zhong Shi Bi Yin, Ji Shi Guang Da Zhi Gong Neng Yi. Bi Di Ba Shi Jing Zhong Zi, Cong Xian Xing Wei Ming Ming Guang Da Gong Neng, Fei Yuan Zhong Shang Guang Da Bie Yi, Gu Wu You Shi. (又無色界廣大之用，唯在現行，種是彼因，即是廣大之功能義。彼第八識境種子，從現行為名名廣大功能，非緣種上廣大別義，故無有失.) (Moreover, the vast function of the Formless Realm is only in manifestation, and the seed is its cause, which is the meaning of vast function. The seeds of the eighth consciousness's realm are named vast functions from manifestation, not cognizing a separate meaning of vastness on the seeds, so there is no fault.) You Zhong You San Pin, Ci Wei Yi Lei Yuan. Xin Wu San Pin, Ren Yun Yuan Gu. Xin Wei Yi Jie, Zhong Tong San Jie, Xi Xing Bie Gu. Ru Di Ba Yuan Yi Jie Se Fa, Jian Xiang Bie Jie She, Yi Qin Yuan Gu. (又種有三品，此為一類緣。心無三品，任運緣故。心唯一界，種通三界，系性別故。如第八緣異界色法，見相別界攝，以親緣故.) (Moreover, seeds have three categories, and this is cognized as one category. The mind does not have three categories because it cognizes spontaneously. The mind is only in one realm, while seeds pervade the Three Realms because they have affiliation and gender. For example, the eighth consciousness cognizes form dharmas of different realms, and seeing and appearance are encompassed by different realms because of their close relationship.)

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名本識故。不同意識等。彼分別生故。相．見必同界。但得為境。非必有用。此識任運隨因緣變。境有用故。即己體故。若斷．未斷。隨增．減緣。如現行法相分緣故。

論。有根身者至及根依處。

述曰。身者諸大造等合聚名身。或依止名身。即一形之總稱。以根微細不言于根。但言緣身。恐無根色。以別根為首標其總身。即顯本識緣彼五根．扶根色盡。總身之中有別根故名有根身　又成身者以根為主。身是通名。以主標首。為稱于身名有根身　根通五根。唯自身者　依處即是諸扶根。五處不可以聲對法第五說非執受故。唯為外境緣。然實亦內緣。又緣他五境等。即非執受如外境故。此中有量。準作可知。

論。此二皆是至同安危故。

述曰。釋執受義。執受義者。同安危等。如前已說兩義釋之。此中言總。對法．瑜伽．顯揚．俱舍等。皆有執受義。

論。執受及處但是所緣。

述曰。總解上也。

論。阿賴耶識至外變為器。

述曰。顯由親因種．及業緣種。變內．外相。

論。即以所變至而得起故。

述曰。本識行相必杖境生。此唯所變。非心外法。本識必緣實法生故。若無相分見分不生。即解本頌先境後行之所以也　杖謂杖托。此意總顯見托相

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為名為『本識』（根本識，Alaya-vijñana）的緣故，它與意識等不同，因為意識等是分別產生的。『相』（相分，objective aspect of consciousness）和『見』（見分，subjective aspect of consciousness）必定在同一界（界，dhātu）中。它們只能作為所緣境（所緣境，object），不一定有用處。這個識（識，vijñana）隨著因緣（因緣，hetu-pratyaya）的變化而自然而然地改變。境（境，viṣaya）之所以有用處，是因為它就是識的自體。無論是已斷還是未斷，都隨著增減的因緣而變化，就像現行法（現行法，manifest dharma）的相分作為緣（緣，pratyaya）一樣。

論：有根身者乃至及根依處。

述曰：『身』（身，kāya）是指由諸大（四大，mahābhuta）造等聚合而成的，或者是指依止處，即一個形體的總稱。因為根（根，indriya）非常微細，所以不直接說緣根，而是說緣身，以免被認為沒有根色（根色，indriya-rupa）。以各個根為首，標示整個身體，就顯示了本識緣彼五根（五根，pañcendriya）以及扶根色（扶根色，supporting sense organs）。總身之中有各個根，所以稱為『有根身』。又，成就身體是以根為主，身是通名，以主標示，所以稱為『有根身』。根通指五根，唯有自身。依處（依處，āśraya）就是指扶根。五處（五處，five places）不可以用聲對法（聲對法，sound-countering dharma）的第五種說法，因為它們不是執受（執受，upādāna）的，所以只是作為外境（外境，external object）被緣。然而實際上也緣內境（內境，internal object）。又緣其他的五境等，因為它們不是執受，就像外境一樣。這裡面有衡量，可以參照推知。

論：此二皆是乃至同安危故。

述曰：解釋執受的含義。執受的含義是，同安危等。如前已經說了兩種解釋。這裡說的是總的含義。對法（對法，Abhidharma）、瑜伽（瑜伽，Yoga）、顯揚（顯揚，Asanga's Explanation of the Scriptures）、俱舍（俱舍，Abhidharmakośa）等，都有執受的含義。

論：執受及處但是所緣。

述曰：總的解釋上面所說的。

論：阿賴耶識乃至外變為器。

述曰：顯示了由親因種（親因種，direct cause seed）以及業緣種（業緣種，karma-condition seed）變現出內相（內相，internal aspect）和外相（外相，external aspect）。

論：即以所變乃至而得起故。

述曰：本識的行相（行相，ākāra）必定要依靠境（境，viṣaya）才能產生。這裡所說的只是所變現的境，不是心外之法。本識必定要緣實法（實法，real dharma）才能產生。如果沒有相分（相分，objective aspect），見分（見分，subjective aspect）就不會產生。這就是解釋本頌先有境後有行的原因。『杖』（杖，staff）是指依靠。這個意思總的顯示了見分依靠相分。

【English Translation】 English version Because it is called 『Alaya-vijñana』 (storehouse consciousness), it is different from consciousness and so on, because consciousness and so on are produced by discrimination. The 『aspect』 (objective aspect of consciousness) and the 『seeing』 (subjective aspect of consciousness) must be in the same realm (dhātu). They can only be objects (viṣaya), and are not necessarily useful. This consciousness (vijñana) naturally changes according to the conditions (hetu-pratyaya). The reason why the object (viṣaya) is useful is because it is the self-nature of the consciousness. Whether it is severed or not severed, it changes according to the increasing or decreasing conditions, just like the objective aspect of the manifest dharma (manifest dharma) serves as a condition (pratyaya).

Treatise: 『Those with rooted bodies』 up to 『and the place where the roots rely』.

Commentary: 『Body』 (kāya) refers to the aggregation of the great elements (mahābhuta) and so on, or it refers to the place of reliance, which is the general term for a form. Because the roots (indriya) are very subtle, it is not directly said that it conditions the roots, but rather that it conditions the body, lest it be thought that there is no sense-organ-matter (indriya-rupa). By taking each root as the head, indicating the entire body, it shows that the Alaya-vijñana conditions these five roots (pañcendriya) and the supporting sense organs (supporting sense organs). Because there are individual roots within the entire body, it is called 『those with rooted bodies』. Moreover, the accomplishment of the body is based on the roots as the main thing. 『Body』 is a general term, and it is indicated by the main thing, so it is called 『those with rooted bodies』. 『Root』 refers to all five roots, only the self-body. The place of reliance (āśraya) refers to the supporting sense organs. The five places (five places) cannot be explained by the fifth type of sound-countering dharma (sound-countering dharma), because they are not appropriated (upādāna), so they are only conditioned as external objects (external object). However, in reality, they also condition internal objects (internal object). They also condition other five objects and so on, because they are not appropriated, just like external objects. There is a measure here, which can be inferred by analogy.

Treatise: 『These two are all』 up to 『because they share the same safety and danger』.

Commentary: Explaining the meaning of appropriation. The meaning of appropriation is, sharing the same safety and danger, and so on. As mentioned before, there are two explanations. Here, it refers to the general meaning. The Abhidharma (Abhidharma), Yoga (Yoga), Asanga's Explanation of the Scriptures (Asanga's Explanation of the Scriptures), Abhidharmakośa (Abhidharmakośa), and so on, all have the meaning of appropriation.

Treatise: 『Appropriation and place are only objects』.

Commentary: A general explanation of what was said above.

Treatise: 『The Alaya-vijñana』 up to 『outwardly transforms into containers』.

Commentary: It shows that the internal aspect (internal aspect) and external aspect (external aspect) are transformed by the direct cause seed (direct cause seed) and the karma-condition seed (karma-condition seed).

Treatise: 『That is, by what is transformed』 up to 『and thus arises』.

Commentary: The appearance (ākāra) of the Alaya-vijñana must rely on the object (viṣaya) to arise. What is said here is only the transformed object, not a dharma outside the mind. The Alaya-vijñana must condition real dharmas (real dharma) to arise. If there is no objective aspect (objective aspect), the subjective aspect (subjective aspect) will not arise. This is the explanation of why the verse first has the object and then has the activity. 『Staff』 (staff) refers to reliance. This meaning generally shows that the subjective aspect relies on the objective aspect.

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生。大乘影像即是所變。緣有生心。非緣無也　有處說諸識必依緣有本質方生。即以名教等為本質故。如下當辨。此略解訖　變有二種　一者生變。即轉變義。如次前說。變謂因．果生熟差別。等流．異熟二因習氣名因能變。所生八識現種種相。是果能變。故能生因說名能變　二緣名變。即變現義。是果能變。且第八識唯變種子及有根身等。眼等轉識變色等是　此中但言緣故名變。下論言變。準此分別　若生名變。種子第八識生七識等。併名為變。七識生第八。亦名為變。緣無漏生種準此應知　若緣名變。即唯影像。心上現者。有漏諸識等各自相分是。準此應思一切諸法　或復作三。亦有執故名之為變。即根．種等具二變義。外器唯一。七識亦一。言不變者。依此二門．三門可解　大乘緣無不生識心。影像之中必定變為。依他法故。故行相杖之而方得起。非緣本質法名緣有生心。以或無故。如過．未等。若影像心不定有者。即應識起無有緣義。境無體故。此如我見。經部．薩婆多．大乘皆別。

已略解訖。自下廣解。初廣行相。次廣所緣　初中有三。初護法菩薩釋其了言申其正義。二明四分。及對小乘明行相等。三總結。

論。此中了者至有了別用。

述曰。即申正義。解了言也　言此中者。是簡

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 生。大乘的影像（Dacheng Yingxiang）即是所變現之物。因為有緣而生心，不是因為無緣。有些地方說，諸識必須依靠緣起而有本質才能產生，即以名言教導等作為本質。如下文將辨析。以上是簡略的解釋。 變有二種：一是生變，即轉變之義，如前文所說。變是指因、果生熟的差別。等流因（Dengliu Yin）、異熟因（Yishu Yin）這兩種因的習氣名為因能變，所生的第八識（Alaya-vijnana）顯現種種相，是果能變。所以能生的因被稱為能變。二是緣名變，即變現之義，是果能變。且第八識只變現種子（bija）以及有根身等，眼等轉識變現色等。 這裡只說因為有緣故名為變。下文的『變』，可以參照此分別。如果生名為變，那麼種子、第八識生七識等，都名為變。七識生第八識，也名為變。緣無漏生種，準此應知。如果緣名為變，那麼就只有影像，心上顯現的，有漏的諸識等各自的相分是。準此應思一切諸法。 或者可以分為三種，因為有執取故名之為變，即根、種等具有兩種變的含義，外器唯一，七識也唯一。所謂不變，可以依照這二門、三門來理解。大乘認為緣無不會生起識心，影像之中必定會變現。因為是依他法（paratantra）的緣故，所以要依靠行相才能生起。不是緣本質法而名為緣有生心，因為或者沒有本質法，如過去、未來等。如果影像心不一定有，那麼識的生起就應該沒有緣義，因為境沒有實體。這如同我見（Atma-drishti）。經部（Sautrantika）、薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）、大乘對此有不同的看法。 以上是簡略的解釋。下面是詳細的解釋。先詳細解釋行相，再詳細解釋所緣。其中有三部分：首先是護法菩薩（Dharmapala Bodhisattva）解釋『了』字，闡明其正義；二是說明四分，以及針對小乘說明行相等；三是總結。 論：此中了者至有了別用。 述曰：即闡明正義，解釋『了』字。言『此中者』，是簡別。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Birth.' The image of Mahayana (Dacheng Yingxiang) is what is transformed. The mind arises because of conditions, not because of the absence of conditions. Some places say that the consciousnesses (vijnana) must rely on conditioned existence (pratitya-samutpada) and have an essence to arise, that is, taking verbal teachings etc. as the essence. This will be discussed below. This is a brief explanation. There are two types of transformation: first, 'birth transformation,' which means transformation in the sense of change, as mentioned earlier. 'Transformation' refers to the differences in the arising and maturation of causes and effects. The habitual energies of the outflowing cause (Dengliu Yin) and the ripening cause (Yishu Yin) are called the 'cause-capable transformation' (hetu-parinama). The eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) that arises manifests various appearances, which is the 'effect-capable transformation' (phala-parinama). Therefore, the cause that can give rise is called 'capable of transformation.' Second, 'condition-name transformation,' which means transformation in the sense of manifestation, is the 'effect-capable transformation.' Moreover, the eighth consciousness only transforms seeds (bija) and rooted bodies, etc., while the transforming consciousnesses such as the eye consciousness transform forms, etc. Here, it is only said that it is called 'transformation' because of conditions. The 'transformation' mentioned in the following text can be distinguished accordingly. If 'birth' is called 'transformation,' then the seeds, the eighth consciousness giving rise to the seven consciousnesses, etc., are all called 'transformation.' The seven consciousnesses giving rise to the eighth consciousness is also called 'transformation.' The seeds arising from unconditioned (anasrava) should be understood accordingly. If 'condition' is called 'transformation,' then it is only the image, what appears on the mind, the self-cognition aspect (sva-bhaga) of the defiled consciousnesses, etc. All dharmas should be considered accordingly. Or it can be divided into three types, because of attachment it is called 'transformation,' that is, the roots, seeds, etc., have the meaning of two transformations, the external vessel is unique, and the seven consciousnesses are also unique. What is called 'unchanging' can be understood according to these two or three aspects. Mahayana believes that the mind of consciousness will not arise without conditions, and transformation will definitely occur within the image. Because it is dependent on other dharmas (paratantra), it must rely on the appearance to arise. It is not called 'mind arising from conditioned existence' because of the essential dharma, because the essential dharma may not exist, such as the past and future. If the image-mind is not necessarily present, then the arising of consciousness should have no meaning of condition, because the object has no substance. This is like the view of self (Atma-drishti). The Sautrantika (Sautrantika), Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada), and Mahayana have different views on this. The above is a brief explanation. The following is a detailed explanation. First, a detailed explanation of the appearance, and then a detailed explanation of the object. There are three parts: First, Dharmapala Bodhisattva (Dharmapala Bodhisattva) explains the word 'clearly' and clarifies its correct meaning; second, explains the four divisions, and explains the appearance, etc., in relation to the Hinayana; and third, summarizes. Treatise: 'This 'clearly' refers to having the function of discernment.' Commentary: That is, clarifying the correct meaning and explaining the word 'clearly.' The words 'in this' are for distinction.

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持義。此解第八識行相故　言異熟識于自所緣者。即所變影像。是親所緣。相分所攝。於此有了別用。非於心外法等。

論。此了別用見分所攝。

述曰。謂于所緣相分之上有了別有。即行相故。是識見分非是余分　然行相有二　一者見分。如此文說。即一切識等皆有此行相。于所緣上定有　二者影像相分名為行相。其一切識或有。或無。所緣不定故。如此論下所緣緣中。出二所緣緣體。又瑜伽等說同一所緣是也　今此且約諸識定有者說。或與小乘別體者說。以影像相為行相者。小乘同故。

然唯初解無第二者。第八俱時五心所法。如何可說同一所緣不同一行相。故須二解。以影像相為行相者。出集量文。

論。然有漏識至能緣相現。

述曰。大段第二明四分義。即分為四。初立二分　于中有二。初立二分。后引教成　立二分中。初申自義。後方破他。此出自義　謂安惠等古大乘師。多說唯有識自證分無相．見分。護法出已說見．相有。依集量論等方顯發之。故先敘宗　自體生時者。識自體也　皆似所緣能緣相現者。依他二分。似遍計所執情計二分現也　似能緣相者。大乘見分收。當小乘事攝。似彼行相取所緣故。名似能緣　似所緣相者。大乘相分收。當小乘行相。似彼所緣心外相分

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 持義（解釋）：這是解釋第八識的行相的緣故。『異熟識對於自己所緣的』，就是所變現的影像，是親所緣，屬於相分所攝。對於這個（相分）有了別的作用，不是對於心外的法等。

論（原文）：這種了別的作用屬於見分所攝。

述曰（解釋）：就是說在所緣的相分之上有了別的作用，就是行相的緣故，是識的見分，不是其餘的部分。然而行相有兩種：一種是見分，就像本文所說，即一切識等都有這種行相，在所緣之上一定有；另一種是影像相分，名為行相，這種行相一切識或者有，或者沒有，所緣不一定。就像論下文所說的所緣緣中，提出了二所緣緣的體，又如《瑜伽師地論》等所說，同一所緣就是這個意思。現在這裡暫且就諸識一定有的情況來說，或者與小乘的別體來說。以影像相為行相的說法，小乘也是相同的。

然而只有第一種解釋，沒有第二種解釋的原因是：第八識同時具有五種心所法，怎麼能說同一所緣，不同的行相呢？所以需要兩種解釋。以影像相為行相的說法，出自《集量論》的文。

論（原文）：然而有漏識乃至能緣的相顯現。

述曰（解釋）：這是大段的第二部分，闡明四分的意義，即分為四分。首先建立二分，其中有兩層意思：首先建立二分，然後引用教義來證明。建立二分中，首先陳述自己的觀點，然後才駁斥他人的觀點。這裡是陳述自己的觀點。安慧等古代的大乘論師，大多說只有識的自證分，沒有相分、見分。護法出現后，闡述了見分、相分的存在，依據《集量論》等才得以顯發。所以先敘述自己的宗義。『自體生時』，指的是識的自體。『都好像所緣能緣的相顯現』，指的是依他的二分，好像遍計所執的情計二分顯現。『好像能緣的相』，被大乘的見分所攝，相當於小乘的事（作用）所攝，好像小乘的行相取所緣的緣故，所以名為『好像能緣』。『好像所緣的相』，被大乘的相分所攝，相當於小乘的行相，好像小乘所緣的心外相分。

【English Translation】 English version: Holding the meaning (explanation): This explains the characteristics of the eighth consciousness. 'The Ālaya-consciousness (異熟識) [Vipāka-vijñāna, the eighth consciousness] in relation to its own object' refers to the manifested image, which is the directly perceived object and belongs to the aspect of the objective image (相分) [nimitta-bhāga]. It has a distinguishing function in relation to this (objective image), not in relation to external dharmas, etc.

Treatise (original text): This distinguishing function belongs to the aspect of the subjective perception (見分) [darśana-bhāga].

Commentary (explanation): That is to say, there is a distinguishing function on the objective image aspect of the perceived object, which is the characteristic. It is the subjective perception aspect of consciousness, not the other aspects. However, there are two kinds of characteristics: one is the subjective perception aspect, as mentioned in this text, that is, all consciousnesses have this characteristic, which is definitely present on the perceived object; the other is the image aspect, which is called the characteristic. This characteristic may or may not be present in all consciousnesses, and the perceived object is not fixed. As mentioned in the section on the objective condition (所緣緣) [ālambana-pratyaya] below, two kinds of objective conditions are presented, and as mentioned in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) and other texts, the same perceived object is what is meant here. Here, we are temporarily discussing the case where all consciousnesses definitely have it, or in relation to the different entity in the Hinayana. The statement that the image aspect is the characteristic is the same in the Hinayana.

However, the reason why there is only the first explanation and not the second is: the eighth consciousness simultaneously has five mental functions (心所法) [cetasikas], so how can it be said that the same perceived object has different characteristics? Therefore, two explanations are needed. The statement that the image aspect is the characteristic comes from the text of the Compendium of Valid Cognition (集量論) [Hetuvidyā-nyāya-dvāra-saṃgraha-śāstra].

Treatise (original text): However, the defiled consciousness manifests the aspect of the perceiving subject.

Commentary (explanation): This is the second part of the major section, clarifying the meaning of the four aspects, that is, dividing into four aspects. First, establish two aspects, which has two layers of meaning: first, establish two aspects, and then cite teachings to prove it. In establishing two aspects, first state one's own view, and then refute others' views. This is stating one's own view. Ācārya Anhui (安慧) and other ancient Mahayana masters mostly said that there is only the self-awareness aspect (自證分) [sva-saṃvedana-bhāga] of consciousness, and there are no objective image aspect or subjective perception aspect. After Dharmapāla (護法) appeared, he elaborated on the existence of the subjective perception aspect and the objective image aspect, which was revealed based on the Compendium of Valid Cognition and other texts. Therefore, first state one's own doctrine. 'When the self-nature arises' refers to the self-nature of consciousness. 'All seem to manifest the aspects of the perceived object and the perceiving subject' refers to the dependent two aspects, which seem to manifest the conceptualized two aspects of the completely conceptualized. 'Seemingly the aspect of the perceiving subject' is included in the subjective perception aspect of Mahayana, equivalent to the function of Hinayana, seemingly taking the perceived object as the characteristic of Hinayana, hence the name 'seemingly the perceiving subject'. 'Seemingly the aspect of the perceived object' is included in the objective image aspect of Mahayana, equivalent to the characteristic of Hinayana, seemingly the external objective image aspect of the perceived object of Hinayana.

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。為見分所緣故。名似所緣相　是心外法此中無故。

論。彼相應法應知亦爾。

述曰。一如於心。今此正義　不同安惠．及小乘中正量部等。無所緣相得名為緣　不同薩婆多等。許有行相。但取心外所緣。無心．心所自能緣故。

論。似所緣相至說名見分。

述曰。此說能似攝於見．相。

論。若心心所至自所緣境。

述曰。自下第二正破安惠．正量部等　量言。如緣青時若心．心所上無所緣相貌。應不能緣當正起時自心所緣之境。此立宗也。許無所緣相故。因也。如余所不緣境。喻也。或如餘人境　又量。我余時緣聲等心。亦應緣今色。許無所緣相故。如今緣自青等之心。餘人亦爾。

論。或應一一能緣一切。

述曰。謂除所緣色外諸餘法。亦應為此緣色心緣。無所緣相故。如現自所緣色。他人亦爾。

論。自境如余余如自故。

述曰。或自境如余境亦不緣。或余境如自境亦應緣。即此二喻各通前量　或論中二量次第配之。初屬上。后屬下。此義意言。緣此自境時。心上必有帶境之相。如鏡面上似面相生。方名所緣。不爾便有如前說過。除正量等外所餘部共大乘同　而真如無似境之相。如下所緣緣中自會。

此破所緣無訖。次破無能緣見。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為要顯現見分（Dṛṣya-bhāga）所緣的緣故，所以稱為相似所緣相（Sālambana-ākāra）。這所緣相是心外的法，因為心內並沒有。

論：與心相應的法，應當知道也是這樣。

述記：就像心一樣，這是正確的意義。不同於安慧（Sthiramati）以及小乘中的正量部（Saṃmitīya）等，認為沒有所緣相也能名為緣。也不同於薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）等，雖然允許有行相（ākāra），但只取心外的所緣，因為心和心所（Citta-caitta）不能自己緣自己。

論：相似所緣相乃至說名為見分。

述記：這說明了能相似地包含見分和相分（Nimitta-bhāga）。

論：如果心和心所上沒有所緣相，那麼當它生起時，就不能緣自己的所緣境。

述記：下面第二點是正式破斥安慧、正量部等。量式說：如果緣青色時，心和心所上沒有所緣相貌，那麼當它真正生起時，就不應該能夠緣自己心所緣的境。這是立宗。因為他們許諾沒有所緣相，這是因。就像其餘所不緣的境，這是比喻。或者像其餘人的境。又一個量式：我其餘時候緣聲音等的心，也應該能緣現在的顏色。因為他們許諾沒有所緣相，就像現在緣自己青色等的心，其餘人也是這樣。

論：或者應該每一個都能緣一切。

述記：意思是說，除了所緣的顏色之外的其餘諸法，也應該被這個緣顏色的心所緣。因為他們許諾沒有所緣相，就像現在自己所緣的顏色，其他人也能緣。

論：自己的境像其餘的境一樣，其餘的境像自己的境一樣。

述記：或者自己的境像其餘的境一樣也不能緣，或者其餘的境像自己的境一樣也應該能緣。這兩個比喻各自通用前面的量式。或者論中的兩個量式依次對應。第一個屬於上面，第二個屬於下面。這個意思說，緣這個自己的境時，心上必定有帶著境的相貌，就像鏡面上相似的面相產生一樣，才能稱為所緣。不然就會像前面說過的過失。除了正量部等之外，其餘的部派和大乘相同。而真如（Tathātā）沒有相似境的相貌，在下面的所緣緣中自然會明白。

以上是破斥沒有所緣結束。接下來破斥沒有能緣的見分。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the need to manifest the object of perception (Dṛṣya-bhāga), it is called the 'semblance of the perceived object' (Sālambana-ākāra). This perceived object is a dharma external to the mind, because it does not exist within the mind.

Treatise: The associated dharmas should also be understood in the same way.

Commentary: Just like the mind, this is the correct meaning. It differs from Sthiramati and the Saṃmitīya school of Hīnayāna, etc., which hold that something can be called a 'condition' (緣, hetu) even without the semblance of a perceived object. It also differs from the Sarvāstivāda school, etc., which, although they allow for 'aspects' (ākāra), only take external objects of perception, because the mind and mental factors (Citta-caitta) cannot perceive themselves.

Treatise: The semblance of the perceived object, up to being called the 'perceiving aspect' (見分, Darśana-bhāga).

Commentary: This explains that it can similarly encompass both the perceiving aspect and the objective aspect (相分, Nimitta-bhāga).

Treatise: If there is no semblance of the perceived object on the mind and mental factors, then when it arises, it cannot perceive its own object of perception.

Commentary: The second point below is a formal refutation of Sthiramati, the Saṃmitīya school, etc. The logical statement says: If, when perceiving blue, there is no semblance of the perceived object on the mind and mental factors, then when it truly arises, it should not be able to perceive the object perceived by its own mind. This is the proposition. Because they assert that there is no semblance of the perceived object, this is the reason. Like other objects that are not perceived, this is the analogy. Or like the objects of other people. Another logical statement: My mind that perceives sounds, etc., at other times should also be able to perceive the present color. Because they assert that there is no semblance of the perceived object, just like the mind that perceives its own blue, etc., now, other people are also like that.

Treatise: Or each one should be able to perceive everything.

Commentary: The meaning is that, apart from the remaining dharmas other than the perceived color, they should also be perceived by this mind that perceives color. Because they assert that there is no semblance of the perceived object, just like the color that one perceives now, others can also perceive it.

Treatise: One's own object is like another's object, and another's object is like one's own object.

Commentary: Or one's own object cannot be perceived like another's object, or another's object should be able to be perceived like one's own object. These two analogies each apply to the preceding logical statements. Or the two logical statements in the treatise correspond sequentially. The first belongs to the above, and the second belongs to the below. The meaning of this is that when perceiving this own object, there must be an aspect on the mind that carries the appearance of the object, just like the appearance of a face arises on the surface of a mirror, only then can it be called a perceived object. Otherwise, there will be the faults mentioned earlier. Apart from the Saṃmitīya school, etc., the remaining schools are the same as Mahāyāna. But Suchness (Tathātā) does not have the appearance of a similar object, and it will naturally be understood in the section on objective conditions below.

The above is the end of the refutation of the absence of the perceived object. Next, we refute the absence of the perceiving aspect.

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然佛地論第三。四智三諍。但論相分有無不論見分。即與此別。下第九中自當解釋。

論。若心心所至如虛空等。

述曰。心．心所法有能緣相。不爾心等應非能緣。無能緣相故。如虛空等。

論。或虛空亦是能緣。

述曰。此返難云。汝虛空等。應是能緣。無能緣相故。如心．心所　古大乘師即安惠等。既如是立二分俱無。論下自說　清辨亦云。若約勝義諸法皆空。唯有虛偽。如幻化等。若約世俗見．相俱有。許有外境。故非唯識。識離於境有何體用。故知諸法有境無心。若言心等有緣作用許有實作用。便非釋子。亦違聖教。今且違汝一切唯境。故能緣相決定是無。小乘諸師此相皆有　此義意言。心．心所生必有能緣之相。如鏡必有能照之相。不爾便有如前說過。不同外道．小乘有實作用體仍非無。此中比量。準之可解　若爾即鏡應名能緣　如下所緣緣中說。

第一別破正量部等。第二別破清辨。合破安惠下引經證。

論。故心心所必有二相。

述曰。故者因也。因前義說。

論。如契經說至各自然而轉。

述曰。引厚嚴經　上之二句明內心有。外境是無　下之二句明自內心見．相二分有。謂即似能所緣相是　各自然而轉者。謂見．相分各各自然。從其因

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 然《佛地論》第三，關於四智和三諍的討論，只論述了相分（Lakshana-bhaga，認識對象的部分）的有無，而不論述見分（Darshana-bhaga，認識主體部分）。這與此處的觀點不同。下文第九品中會對此進行解釋。

論：如果心和心所（Citta-caitta，心理活動及其伴隨物）像虛空一樣。

述曰：心和心所法具有能緣之相（alambana-lakshana，認識能力）。否則，心等就不應具有認識能力。因為沒有能緣之相，就像虛空一樣。

論：或者虛空也是能緣。

述曰：這是反駁說，你所說的虛空等，也應該是能緣。因為沒有能緣之相，就像心和心所一樣。古大乘師，如安慧（Sthiramati），就是這樣主張二分（見分和相分）皆空的。論中下文會自己說明。清辨（Bhavaviveka）也說，如果從勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，最高真理）的角度來看，諸法皆空，只有虛妄。就像幻化等。如果從世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）的角度來看，見分和相分都是存在的。他承認有外境存在，所以並非唯識（Vijñānavāda，唯識宗）。識（Vijñāna，意識）離開了境（vishaya，對像）有什麼體用呢？所以可知諸法有境而無心。如果說心等有緣的作用，承認有真實的作用，那就不是釋迦牟尼佛的弟子了。也違背了聖教。現在暫且反駁你一切唯境的觀點，所以能緣之相肯定是無有的。小乘諸師認為此相是有的。此義的意思是說，心和心所的生起必定有能緣之相，就像鏡子必定有能照之相。否則就會像前面所說的那樣。不同於外道和小乘，雖然有真實的作用，但體仍然不是沒有。此中的比量，可以參照理解。如果這樣，那麼鏡子就應該被稱為能緣了。如下文所緣緣中會說到。

第一是分別破斥正量部（Sammitīya）等。第二是分別破斥清辨。合併破斥安慧，下文會引用經文來證明。

論：所以心和心所必定有二相。

述曰：故，是原因。因為前面的意義而說。

論：如契經所說，乃至各自自然而轉。

述曰：引用《厚嚴經》。上面的兩句說明內心是有的，外境是沒有的。下面的兩句說明自內心見分和相分是有的。也就是類似於能緣和所緣之相。各自自然而轉，是指見分和相分各自自然，從其因緣而生起。

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, the third chapter of the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Buddha-land), concerning the Four Wisdoms and Three Disputes, only discusses the existence or non-existence of the lakshana-bhaga (aspect of the object), without discussing the darshana-bhaga (aspect of the subject). This differs from the view here. It will be explained in the ninth chapter below.

Treatise: If the mind and mental factors (citta-caitta) are like space.

Commentary: The mind and mental factors have the characteristic of being able to cognize (alambana-lakshana). Otherwise, the mind and so on should not be able to cognize. Because they lack the characteristic of being able to cognize, like space.

Treatise: Or space is also able to cognize.

Commentary: This is a refutation, saying that your space and so on should also be able to cognize. Because they lack the characteristic of being able to cognize, like the mind and mental factors. Ancient Mahayana masters, such as Sthiramati, established that both aspects (subject and object) are empty. The treatise itself will explain this below. Bhavaviveka also said that if viewed from the perspective of ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), all dharmas are empty, only illusion exists, like magical transformations. If viewed from the perspective of conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), both the seeing aspect and the seen aspect exist. He admits the existence of external objects, so it is not only consciousness (Vijñānavāda). What substance or function does consciousness have apart from objects? Therefore, it can be known that all dharmas have objects but no mind. If it is said that the mind and so on have the function of cognizing, admitting that there is a real function, then that is not a disciple of Shakyamuni Buddha. It also contradicts the holy teachings. Now, for the time being, I refute your view that everything is only objects, so the characteristic of being able to cognize is definitely non-existent. The Hinayana masters believe that this characteristic exists. The meaning of this is that the arising of the mind and mental factors must have the characteristic of being able to cognize, just as a mirror must have the characteristic of being able to reflect. Otherwise, it would be as said before. Unlike the heretics and Hinayana, although there is a real function, the substance is still not non-existent. The analogy in this can be understood by referring to it. If so, then the mirror should be called able to cognize. As will be said in the section on the object-condition below.

First, there is a separate refutation of the Sammitīya school and others. Second, there is a separate refutation of Bhavaviveka. Combining the refutation of Sthiramati, the scriptures will be cited below to prove it.

Treatise: Therefore, the mind and mental factors must have two aspects.

Commentary: 'Therefore' means cause. It is said because of the previous meaning.

Treatise: As the sutra says, up to 'each turns naturally'.

Commentary: Quoting the Ghanavyūha Sūtra. The above two sentences explain that the inner mind exists, and the external object does not exist. The following two sentences explain that the seeing aspect and the seen aspect of the self-mind exist. That is, it is similar to the aspect of the cognizer and the cognized. 'Each turns naturally' means that the seeing aspect and the seen aspect are each natural, arising from their causes and conditions.

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緣和合而起。不必須待心外之境　或計大自在天之所作故方乃得轉。

今異於彼說自然言。故緣龜毛心影像起。此證有二分也。

論。執有離識至自體相故。

述曰。下解三分　于中有二。初對十九部辨相差別。后申三分。此等即初　除大眾．正量。外皆是此也。又大眾部心得自緣。見分緣相與此等同。自緣體者則不如是。以緣自體不須別起行相。以能緣見者為行相。所緣見為所緣．及事。此等取境者彼執。心外之境是所緣。心上有似所緣之相名行相。體即見分攝故　以大乘相．見分。即彼宗立名。非是彼定許有見．相分名也　觀所緣云帶彼相故　即是行相。謂行於相見分能緣說名為事　是心．心所自體相故。是釋事義　不言自體事言自體相者。簡大乘事謂自證分。言自體事便濫彼故。

論。心與心所至行相相似。

述曰。心．心所。同所．依所緣。俱依一根。緣一境故　行相相似。俱有似境相。隨是青等行相各別。總相似故。雖受以領納為相。想以取像為相等。一一心．心所。各有青等行相故(名為相似)。

論。事雖數等至相各別故。

述曰。識．受等體各是一故。而相狀別。識．受．想等體性相狀各各別故。行相言似。不言等者。據相似故。相似．等義無有差別。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由各種因緣聚合而生起。不必一定要等待心外之境，或者認為是「大自在天」（Maheśvara，印度教神祇，被認為是世界的創造者）所創造才能轉變。

現在不同於他們所說的自然而然的觀點，而是說緣于「龜毛」（tortoise hair，比喻虛無的事物）的心之影像而生起。這證明了有見分和相分。

論：執著于有離開識的自體相。

述記：下面解釋三分，其中分為兩部分。首先，針對十九部派辨別其相的差別；然後，闡述三分。這些就是第一部分，除了大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）和正量部（Saṃmitīya）之外，其餘都屬於此列。另外，大眾部的心得自緣，見分緣相與此等相同。自緣的體則不是這樣，因為緣自體不需要另外生起行相，以能緣的見分作為行相，所緣的見分作為所緣和事。這些部派取境時，他們認為心外的境是所緣，心上好像有所緣的相，這叫做行相。體就是見分所攝。以大乘的相、見分，就是他們宗派所立的名，並非他們一定承認有見分、相分之名。觀察所緣時，因為帶有那個相，那就是行相。所謂行於相，見分能緣，說名為事，是心、心所的自體相。這是解釋事的含義。不說自體事，而說自體相，是爲了簡別大乘的事，即自證分。說自體事就容易與自證分混淆。

論：心與心所，到行相相似。

述記：心和心所，同所、依所緣，都依於一個根，緣於一個境，所以行相相似。都具有類似境的相，隨著是青色等，行相各自不同，總體上是相似的。雖然受以領納為相，想以取像為相等，每一個心、心所，都各有青色等行相（所以名為相似）。

論：事雖然數量相等，到相各別的緣故。

述記：識、受等體各是一個，所以相狀不同。識、受、想等體性相狀各自不同。行相說相似，不說相等，是根據相似的緣故。相似和相等，意義上沒有差別。

【English Translation】 English version: Arising from the aggregation of various causes and conditions. It is not necessary to wait for an external object outside the mind, or to consider it as created by 'Maheśvara' (a Hindu deity, considered the creator of the world) in order to transform.

Now, differing from their view of natural occurrence, it is said to arise from the mind's image of 'tortoise hair' (something non-existent). This proves the existence of the 'seeing-aspect' (darśana-bhāga) and 'object-aspect' (viṣaya-bhāga).

Treatise: Holding onto the self-nature aspect that is separate from consciousness.

Commentary: The following explains the three aspects, divided into two parts. First, differentiating the characteristics among the nineteen schools; then, elaborating on the three aspects. These are the first part, excluding the Mahāsāṃghika (Great Assembly School) and Saṃmitīya (Popular School), the rest belong to this category. In addition, the Mahāsāṃghika's mind attains self-cognition, the seeing-aspect cognizing the object-aspect is the same as these. The substance of self-cognition is not like this, because cognizing the self does not require the separate arising of a mental image; the cognizing seeing-aspect serves as the mental image, and the cognized seeing-aspect serves as the cognized object and event. When these schools grasp an object, they consider the external object outside the mind as the cognized object, and the appearance on the mind that resembles the cognized object is called the mental image. The substance is included in the seeing-aspect. The terms 'object-aspect' and 'seeing-aspect' in Mahayana are the names established by their school, not that they necessarily acknowledge the names of 'seeing-aspect' and 'object-aspect'. When observing the cognized object, because it carries that appearance, that is the mental image. What is called acting upon the appearance, the seeing-aspect being able to cognize, is called an event, which is the self-nature aspect of the mind and mental factors. This is the explanation of the meaning of 'event'. Not saying 'self-nature event' but saying 'self-nature aspect' is to distinguish it from the 'self-awareness aspect' (sva-saṃvedana) of Mahayana. Saying 'self-nature event' would easily be confused with that.

Treatise: The mind and mental factors, up to the similarity of mental images.

Commentary: The mind and mental factors, sharing the same object and the same basis of cognition, both rely on one root and cognize one object, therefore their mental images are similar. Both possess an appearance similar to the object; depending on whether it is blue, etc., the mental images are different, but overall they are similar. Although sensation has the characteristic of reception, and conception has the characteristic of taking an image, each mind and mental factor has a blue, etc., mental image (therefore it is called similar).

Treatise: Although the events are equal in number, up to the reason why the aspects are distinct.

Commentary: The substance of consciousness, sensation, etc., is each one, therefore the appearances are different. The substance and appearance of consciousness, sensation, conception, etc., are each different. Saying the mental images are similar, not equal, is based on the reason for similarity. Similarity and equality have no difference in meaning.

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論。達無離識至見分名行相。

述曰。是大乘義。則說相分是所緣故。由無心外法。以小乘行相而為所緣。即是相分。彼宗說相分非是所緣。是能緣上所緣之相故。彼之見分自體事者。大乘名行相。能行於相故。所似即相分。

論。相見所依至即自證分。

述曰。此二所依自體名事　言所依者。是依止義。謂相離見無別條然各別自體。此二若無一總所依者。相離見應有。是二法故。如心與所。然無別體。但二功能。故應別有一所依體。起二用時由有此體。故言相．見自體名事。即自證分。然小乘人心外有境。即以為所緣。大乘說無故。以彼小乘行相。為大乘相分。大乘心得自緣。別立自體分即以為事。故以見分名行相。即小乘事體是見分。不立自證分。無返緣故。大．小二乘所說各別。

然彼難云。刀不自割。如何心能自緣。別立自證分。

論云。此若無者至必不能憶故。

述曰。謂無自體分。應不自憶心．心所法。所以者何。如不曾更境必不能憶故。謂若曾未得之境。必不能憶。心昔現在曾不自緣既過去已。如何能憶此已滅心。以不曾為相分緣故。我今雖不令為相分緣。然自證分緣故。如曾相分所更境故。今能憶之　量云。今所思念過去不曾更心等。除宿命．他心智

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：如果認為沒有離開識而存在的見分，就稱之為行相（xingxiang）。

述曰：這是大乘的觀點。因為大乘認為相分是所緣（suoyuan），由於沒有心外的法，所以小乘的行相才成為所緣，也就是相分。小乘宗派認為相分不是所緣，而是能緣（nengyuan）之上所顯現的所緣之相。而小乘的見分自體，在大乘中被稱為行相，因為它能作用於相。所顯現的影像就是相分。

論：相分和見分所依賴的自體，就叫做自證分（zizhengfen）。

述曰：這兩個（相分和見分）所依賴的自體叫做事。所依賴的意思是依止。意思是說，離開見分，相分就沒有單獨存在的自體。如果這兩個沒有一個總體的所依，那麼相分和見分就應該各自獨立存在，因為它們是兩種法。就像心和所緣一樣，雖然沒有不同的自體，但卻有兩種功能。所以應該另外有一個所依的體，在產生兩種作用時，因為有這個體，所以說相分和見分的自體叫做事，也就是自證分。然而小乘認為心外有境，就把它當作所緣。大乘認為沒有心外的境，所以把小乘的行相當作大乘的相分。大乘的心能夠自己緣自己，另外建立一個自體分，就把它當作事。所以用見分來稱呼行相。小乘的事體就是見分，不建立自證分，因為沒有返回來緣的作用。大乘和小乘所說的各有不同。

然而有人反駁說：刀不能自己割自己，心怎麼能自己緣自己，另外建立自證分呢？

論：如果（自證分）不存在，那麼就一定不能回憶。

述曰：意思是說，如果沒有自體分，就不應該能夠回憶心和心所法（xin suofa）。為什麼呢？因為就像不曾經歷過的境界，就一定不能回憶一樣。如果是不曾獲得的境界，就一定不能回憶。心在過去和現在不曾自己緣自己，既然已經過去了，怎麼能夠回憶這個已經滅去的心呢？因為它不曾作為相分被緣過。我現在雖然不讓它作為相分被緣，但是因為自證分緣過它，就像曾經作為相分經歷過的境界一樣，現在就能夠回憶它。可以這樣推論：現在所思念的過去不曾經歷過的心等，除了宿命（suming）、他心智（taxinzhi）之外。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: If it is considered that there is no perception-division (見分, jianfen) existing apart from consciousness, it is called 'appearance' (行相, xingxiang).

Commentary: This is the meaning of Mahayana. Because Mahayana considers the object-division (相分, xiangfen) as the object of cognition (所緣, suoyuan), since there is no dharma outside the mind, the 'appearance' of Hinayana becomes the object of cognition, which is the object-division. The Hinayana schools consider the object-division not as the object of cognition, but as the appearance of the object of cognition manifested on the subject of cognition (能緣, nengyuan). The self-nature of the perception-division in Hinayana is called 'appearance' in Mahayana, because it can act on the appearance. The manifested image is the object-division.

Treatise: The self-nature upon which the object-division and perception-division rely is called the self-awareness-division (自證分, zizhengfen).

Commentary: The self-nature upon which these two (object-division and perception-division) rely is called 'thing'. 'Relying' means dependence. It means that apart from the perception-division, the object-division has no separate self-nature. If these two do not have a general basis of reliance, then the object-division and perception-division should exist independently, because they are two dharmas. Just like the mind and its object, although they do not have different self-natures, they have two functions. Therefore, there should be another relying entity. When two functions arise, because there is this entity, it is said that the self-nature of the object-division and perception-division is called 'thing', which is the self-awareness-division. However, Hinayana considers that there are objects outside the mind, and takes them as the object of cognition. Mahayana considers that there are no objects outside the mind, so it takes the 'appearance' of Hinayana as the object-division of Mahayana. The Mahayana mind can cognize itself, and establishes another self-nature division, which is taken as the 'thing'. Therefore, the perception-division is used to refer to the 'appearance'. The 'thing' of Hinayana is the perception-division, and the self-awareness-division is not established, because there is no function of returning to cognize. The teachings of Mahayana and Hinayana are different.

However, someone refutes: A knife cannot cut itself, how can the mind cognize itself and establish a self-awareness-division?

Treatise: If (the self-awareness-division) does not exist, then one will certainly not be able to recall.

Commentary: It means that if there is no self-nature division, one should not be able to recall the mind and mental functions (心所法, xin suofa). Why? Because just like a state that has never been experienced, one will certainly not be able to recall it. If it is a state that has never been obtained, one will certainly not be able to recall it. The mind in the past and present has never cognized itself, and since it has already passed, how can one recall this extinguished mind? Because it has never been cognized as an object-division. Although I do not allow it to be cognized as an object-division now, it is because the self-awareness-division has cognized it, just like a state that has been experienced as an object-division, so one can now recall it. It can be inferred that the past mind, etc., that is now being thought of has not been experienced, except for past-life knowledge (宿命, suming) and mind-reading knowledge (他心智, taxinzhi).

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等余心一切皆應不能憶。不曾更故。如不曾更色等　卻證故知。曾現在緣。佛地第三云。集量論說。乃至若不爾者。如不曾見不應憶念。

論。心與心所至有差別故。

述曰。然心．心所同所依根。其所緣相各各變別。故但相似。緣青相分皆變青故。事雖數等而相各異。識．受等體有差別故。與小乘別　然瑜伽第一說同一所緣不同一行相。據了別領納各各不同故。相分雖不同然極相似。如青為境。諸相俱青相似名同　見分各異。雖俱是青取像各異。故名不同行相　此中有行相與見分。雖各非一。各據義別。境據總故名之為一。見據別故名為相似。此卷論中據實為言。故與瑜伽說不同也　又彼約疏所緣緣。此約親所緣緣。此心．心所許時．依同。所緣．事等。亦據所緣各相似義。非是相違。

明三分中。次文第二約三分等明心．心所。

論。然心心所至各有三分。

述曰。此即陳那菩薩依經立理。諸論共同。

何須說三。

論。所量能量至所依體故。

述曰。相分．見分．自體三種。即所．能量．量果別也。如次配之　如以尺丈量於物時。物為所量。尺為能量。解數之智名為量果。心等量境類亦應然。故立三種　若無自證分。相．見二分無所依事故。即成別體心外有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 如果我的心對一切都應該不能回憶，不曾改變過去的狀態，就像不曾改變對色（Rupa）等的認知一樣，那麼如何證明它曾經知曉過去、現在和因緣呢？《佛地經論》（Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra）第三卷和《集量論》（Hetuvidya-nyaya-dvara-sangraha）中說，如果不是這樣，就像不曾見過的事物不應該被憶念一樣。

論：心與心所（Citta-caitta）之間存在差別。

述曰：然而，心和心所雖然依賴於相同的根（Indriya），但它們所緣的境相（Alambana-nimitta）各自變化不同，因此只是相似。因為緣于青色的相分（Nimitta-bhaga）都顯現為青色，所以事物雖然數量相等，但境相各不相同。識（Vijnana）、受（Vedana）等自體存在差別，這與小乘（Hinayana）的觀點不同。然而，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第一卷說，雖然所緣相同，但行相（Akara）不同，這是因爲了別（Pariccheda）和領納（Upalabdhi）各有不同。相分雖然不同，但極其相似，例如以青色為境，各種境相都顯現為青色，相似之處稱為『同』。見分（Darsana-bhaga）各異，雖然都是青色，但取像的方式各不相同，因此稱為『不同行相』。這裡所說的行相與見分，雖然各自並非完全相同，但各自根據不同的意義來區分。境根據總體而言，因此稱為『一』，見根據個別而言，因此稱為『相似』。此卷論中根據實際情況而言，因此與《瑜伽師地論》的說法不同。另外，《瑜伽師地論》是就疏所緣緣（Adhipati-pratyaya）而言，而這裡是就親所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya）而言。這裡的心和心所，允許時間、所依相同，所緣、事物等也相同，也是根據所緣各自相似的意義而言，並非是相互矛盾。

在闡明三分（Tri-bhaga）中，接下來的第二段文字是關於根據三分等來闡明心和心所。

論：然而，心和心所各自具有三分。

述曰：這就是陳那菩薩（Dignaga）依據經典建立的道理，是各種論著所共同認可的。

為什麼需要說三分呢？

論：因為所量（Parimana）、能量（Parimiti）乃至所依體（Asraya-kaya）的緣故。

述曰：相分、見分、自體分（Sva-samvedana-bhaga）這三種，分別是所量、能量、量果（Parimiti-phala）。依次對應。就像用尺子測量物體時，物體是所量，尺子是能量，理解數量的智慧稱為量果。心等量度境也應該如此，因此建立三種。如果沒有自證分（Sva-samvedana-bhaga），相分和見分就沒有所依賴的事物，就會成為獨立於心之外的實體。

【English Translation】 English version If my mind should not be able to recall everything, never changing its past state, just as it never changes its cognition of Rupa (form) and so on, then how can it be proven that it once knew the past, present, and conditions? The third volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra (Treatise on the Buddha-land Sutra) and the Hetuvidya-nyaya-dvara-sangraha (Compendium on the Door of Logic) say that if it were not so, it would be like not being able to recall something that had never been seen.

Treatise: There is a difference between Citta (mind) and Caitta (mental factors).

Commentary: However, although the mind and mental factors rely on the same Indriya (root), the Alambana-nimitta (object-aspects) they perceive vary differently, so they are only similar. Because the Nimitta-bhaga (image-division) that is related to blue all appears as blue, although the things are equal in number, the aspects are different. There are differences in the self-nature of Vijnana (consciousness), Vedana (feeling), etc., which is different from the view of Hinayana (Small Vehicle). However, the first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) says that although the object is the same, the Akara (characteristics) are different, because Pariccheda (discernment) and Upalabdhi (reception) are different. Although the image-divisions are different, they are extremely similar. For example, taking blue as the object, all aspects appear blue, and the similarity is called 'same'. The Darsana-bhaga (perception-division) are different; although they are all blue, the way of taking the image is different, so it is called 'different characteristics'. The characteristics and perception-division here, although not completely the same, are distinguished according to different meanings. The object is based on the whole, so it is called 'one', and the perception is based on the individual, so it is called 'similar'. This volume of the treatise speaks according to the actual situation, so it is different from the statement in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. In addition, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra speaks of Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition), while this speaks of Alambana-pratyaya (object-condition). The mind and mental factors here allow the time and basis to be the same, and the object and things to be the same, also according to the meaning that the objects are similar to each other, which is not contradictory.

In clarifying the Tri-bhaga (Three Aspects), the next second passage is about clarifying the mind and mental factors according to the three aspects, etc.

Treatise: However, the mind and mental factors each have three aspects.

Commentary: This is the principle established by Dignaga (Chenna Pusa) based on the scriptures, which is commonly recognized by various treatises.

Why is it necessary to speak of three aspects?

Treatise: Because of Parimana (object to be measured), Parimiti (measuring instrument), and even Asraya-kaya (supportive body).

Commentary: The Nimitta-bhaga (image-division), Darsana-bhaga (perception-division), and Sva-samvedana-bhaga (self-awareness division) are the three, which are respectively Parimana (object to be measured), Parimiti (measuring instrument), and Parimiti-phala (result of measurement). They correspond in order. Just as when measuring an object with a ruler, the object is the object to be measured, the ruler is the measuring instrument, and the wisdom to understand the quantity is called the result of measurement. The mind, etc., that measures the object should also be like this, so three aspects are established. If there is no Sva-samvedana-bhaga (self-awareness division), the image-division and perception-division would have nothing to rely on, and would become entities independent of the mind.

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境。今言有所依故離心無境。即一體也。

論。如集量論至此三體無別。

述曰。相唯所量。見為能量。自證為量果。此頌意言。今此三種體是一識。不離識故說之為唯。功能各別故說言三　果是何義。成滿因義。見分緣相既為能量。能量無果量境何益。如人量物起量解也　小乘量果即是見分。行相為能量。外境為所量。與此稍別　然有六師。及敘陳那以前．以後。量．及量果體性不同。如因明抄說。佛地論中雖說三分。無頌引證。唯有長行。

論。又心心所至證自證分。

述曰。明四分中。自下第三說有四分。于中有四。初立四理。二分別之。三引教成。四釋頌意。下即初也　護法以後方始立之。理極須然。如文可解。然諸經論唯多三分。

論。此若無者至應皆證故。

述曰。此立理也。第三．第二心分既同。應立別有能證自分。量云。第三分心。應有能照之心。心分攝故。猶如見分　見分返此或無能證。

論。又自證分至必有果故。

述曰。見分為能量。第三為量果。若第三能量。立誰為量果。為量如前。

彼若救云第二見分為第三果。

論。不應見分至非量攝故。

述曰。由此見分或時亦有非量攝故。不證第三。

論。由此見分至

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 境。現在說有所依，所以離開心就沒有境。即（心和境）是一體的。 論。《集量論》說到這裡，（能量、所量、量果）這三體沒有差別。 述曰。相分是所量，見分是能量，自證分是量果。這句頌的意思是說，現在這三種體是一個識。因為不離識，所以說是『唯』。功能各自有別，所以說是『三』。果是什麼意思？是成滿因的意思。見分緣相既然是能量，能量沒有果，衡量境有什麼用？就像人衡量物體，產生衡量的理解一樣。小乘的量果就是見分，行相是能量，外境是所量，與此稍有區別。然而有六師，以及敘述陳那以前、以後，量以及量果的體性不同。如《因明抄》所說。《佛地論》中雖然說三分，沒有頌來引證，只有長行。 論。又心和心所都證自證分。 述曰。說明四分中，從下面第三開始說有四分。其中有四個方面：第一，建立四理；第二，分別說明；第三，引用教義來證明；第四，解釋頌的意思。下面就是第一方面。護法以後才開始建立（四分），道理非常必要。如文中所說可以理解。然而各種經論大多隻有三分。 論。如果這個（自證分）沒有，那麼（第二和第三心分）應該都能被證知。 述曰。這是建立道理。第三和第二心分既然相同，應該另外建立一個能夠證知自己的心分。量云：第三分心，應該有能夠照見的心，因為屬於心分，就像見分一樣。見分反過來，或許沒有能夠證知的。 論。又自證分必定有果。 述曰。見分是能量，第三（自證分）是量果。如果第三（自證分）是能量，那麼立誰為量果？衡量如同前面所說。 如果他們辯解說，第二見分是第三（自證分）的果。 論。不應該，因為見分有時不是量所包含的。 述曰。因為這個見分有時也有不是量所包含的情況，所以不能證知第三（自證分）。 論。由此見分……

【English Translation】 English version: Realm. Now it is said that there is something to rely on, so without the mind, there is no realm. That is, (the mind and the realm) are one entity. Treatise. As the Hetuvidyā-nyāya-dvāra-tarka-śāstra (Compendium on the Means of Valid Cognition) says, up to this point, these three entities (the pramana, prameya, and pramana-phala) are not different. Commentary: The appearance aspect (lakṣaṇa) is the object of valid cognition (prameya), the seeing aspect (darśana) is the instrument of valid cognition (pramāṇa), and the self-awareness aspect (svasaṃvedana) is the result of valid cognition (pramāṇa-phala). The meaning of this verse is that these three entities are one consciousness (vijñāna). Because they are not separate from consciousness, it is said to be 'only' (vi). Because their functions are different, it is said to be 'three'. What is the meaning of 'result' (phala)? It means the cause of accomplishment and fulfillment. Since the seeing aspect cognizes the appearance aspect as the instrument of valid cognition, what is the use of measuring the realm if the instrument of valid cognition has no result? It is like a person measuring an object and generating a measuring understanding. The result of valid cognition in the Śrāvakayāna is the seeing aspect, the mode of operation is the instrument of valid cognition, and the external realm is the object of valid cognition, which is slightly different from this. However, there are the six teachers (tirthikas), and before and after Dignāga, the nature of the instrument of valid cognition and the result of valid cognition are different. As the Yinming Chao says. Although the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra speaks of three aspects, there is no verse to cite as evidence, only prose. Treatise. Moreover, both the mind (citta) and mental factors (caitta) cognize the self-cognition aspect (svasaṃvedana-bhāga). Commentary: Explaining the four aspects, from the third part below, it is said that there are four aspects. Among them, there are four aspects: first, establishing the four reasons; second, explaining them separately; third, citing teachings to prove them; fourth, explaining the meaning of the verse. The following is the first aspect. It was only after Dharmapāla that (the four aspects) were established, and the reasoning is very necessary. As the text says, it can be understood. However, most sutras and treatises only have three aspects. Treatise. If this (self-cognition aspect) did not exist, then (the second and third mind aspects) should all be able to be cognized. Commentary: This is establishing the reason. Since the third and second mind aspects are the same, another mind aspect should be established that can cognize itself. The inference is: the third mind aspect should have a mind that can illuminate it, because it belongs to the mind aspect, just like the seeing aspect. Conversely, the seeing aspect may not have anything that can cognize it. Treatise. Moreover, the self-cognition aspect must have a result. Commentary: The seeing aspect is the instrument of valid cognition, and the third (self-cognition aspect) is the result of valid cognition. If the third (self-cognition aspect) is the instrument of valid cognition, then who is established as the result of valid cognition? The measurement is as mentioned before. If they argue that the second seeing aspect is the result of the third (self-cognition aspect). Treatise. It should not be, because the seeing aspect is sometimes not included in the measurement. Commentary: Because this seeing aspect sometimes has situations that are not included in the measurement, it cannot cognize the third (self-cognition aspect). Treatise. Therefore, the seeing aspect...

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必現量故。

述曰。諸體自緣皆證自相。果亦唯現。見緣相分。或量．非量。故不應言見分為果。不可非量法為現量果故。故不可見分或緣于相是比．非量。返緣自證復是現量。難曰。見分緣相或量。或非量。一向現量自證分以為果。何妨自證唯現量能量。亦得比量或非以為果。

解曰。現量心自體。比．非量果可唯現。比．非二種非證體。何得能為現量果　現量為比果。比不為現果。問答亦然　外內難。緣縛難。例亦然。見緣相為縛。自證應亦爾。是縛無失。然唯現量。如五識境縛。仍是現量收。證自體故。為是煩惱染污相故。如末那章　夫證自體必現量攝。故不可說見分緣相。或量．非量。為自證果。不可見分一時之中為量．非量。以相違故。縱許見分或比．非量。為第三果。亦不定故。現量為果義即定故。一心之中相違不可或量．非量。故立第四義亦如前。

論。此四分中至后二是內。

述曰。下分別之。此釋見分若時現量。應為第三果難也。但由見分似外緣外故名為外。非體是外。故此現量亦不緣三。后二名內。體是內緣內故。

論。初唯所緣后三通二。

述曰。其義可知。縱緣於心以心為相。亦唯所緣。相分之心不能緣故　問見分緣外從境名外。見分緣唯所緣。從唯

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為是必然的現量之故。

述曰：各種識體的自緣都能證得自相。果也唯有現量。見緣的相分，有時是量，有時是非量。所以不應該說見分是果，因為非量的法不能作為現量的果。因此，不能說見分緣于相是比量或非量，反過來緣自證分又是現量。難曰：見分緣相，有時是量，有時是非量，一向以現量的自證分為果。為什麼妨礙自證唯有現量能作為量，也能作為比量或非量的果呢？

解曰：現量心是自體，比量和非量的果可以唯有現量。比量和非量這兩種不是證體，怎麼能作為現量的果呢？現量可以作為比量的果，但比量不能作為現量的果。問答也是這樣。外內難，緣縛難，例子也是這樣。見緣相是束縛，自證也應該是這樣。是束縛沒有過失。然而唯有現量。如五識的境是束縛，仍然是現量所攝。因為證自體之故。是爲了煩惱染污的相之故。如末那章所說。凡是證自體必定是現量所攝。所以不能說見分緣相，有時是量，有時是非量，作為自證的果。不能說見分一時之中既是量又是非量，因為是相違的。縱然允許見分有時是比量或非量，作為第三果，也是不定的。現量作為果的意義是確定的。一心之中相違的量和非量是不可能的，所以建立第四義也和前面一樣。

論：這四分中，到後面兩種是內。

述曰：下面分別說明。這是解釋見分如果是現量時，應該作為第三果的難點。只是因為見分好像向外緣外境，所以稱為外，並非體是外。所以這個現量也不緣三。后兩種稱為內，因為體是內，緣也是內。

論：最初一種唯是所緣，后三種通於二者。

述曰：其中的意義可以知道。縱然緣於心，以心為相，也唯是所緣。相分的心不能緣故。問：見分緣外，從境上說是外。見分緣唯是所緣，從唯...

【English Translation】 English version: Because it is necessarily a valid perception (pramana) (bixianliang) (a type of valid cognition) .

Commentary: The self-cognition (ziyuan) of all entities (ti) and their conditions (yuan) can verify their own characteristics (zixiang). The result (guo) is also only present (xian). The characteristic-portion (xiangfen) of the perceptual condition (jianyuan) is sometimes valid (liang) and sometimes invalid (feiliang). Therefore, it should not be said that the seeing-portion (jianfen) is the result, because an invalid (feiliang) dharma cannot be the result of a valid perception (xianliang). Therefore, it cannot be said that the seeing-portion's (jianfen) relation to the characteristic (xiang) is either inference (biliang) or invalid cognition (feiliang), and conversely, its relation to self-cognition (zizhengfen) is valid perception (xianliang). Objection: The seeing-portion's (jianfen) relation to the characteristic (xiang) is sometimes valid (liang) and sometimes invalid (feiliang), and it always takes the self-cognizing portion (zizhengfen) of valid perception (xianliang) as its result. Why does it prevent the self-cognizing portion (zizhengfen), which is only capable of valid perception (xianliang), from also being the result of inference (biliang) or invalid cognition (feiliang)?

Explanation: The mind itself (ziti) of valid perception (xianliang), the results of inference (biliang) and invalid cognition (feiliang) can only be valid perception (xianliang). Inference (biliang) and invalid cognition (feiliang), these two are not verifying entities (zhengtiti), how can they be the result of valid perception (xianliang)? Valid perception (xianliang) can be the result of inference (biliang), but inference (biliang) cannot be the result of valid perception (xianliang). The question and answer are also like this. The difficulty of external and internal, the difficulty of relational bondage, the examples are also like this. The seeing-portion's (jianfen) relation to the characteristic (xiang) is bondage (fu), the self-cognition (zizheng) should also be like this. Being bondage is not a fault. However, it is only valid perception (xianliang). Like the bondage of the objects (jing) of the five consciousnesses (wushi), it is still included in valid perception (xianliang). Because it verifies the self-entity (ziti). It is for the sake of the characteristic (xiang) of defilement (ranwu) by afflictions (fannao). As stated in the chapter on Manas (monaye). All that verifies the self-entity (ziti) must be included in valid perception (xianliang). Therefore, it cannot be said that the seeing-portion's (jianfen) relation to the characteristic (xiang), sometimes valid (liang) and sometimes invalid (feiliang), is the result of self-cognition (zizheng). It cannot be said that the seeing-portion (jianfen) is both valid (liang) and invalid (feiliang) at the same time, because they are contradictory. Even if it is allowed that the seeing-portion (jianfen) is sometimes inference (biliang) or invalid cognition (feiliang), as the third result, it is also uncertain. The meaning of valid perception (xianliang) as the result is definite. Contradictory valid (liang) and invalid (feiliang) are impossible in one mind, so establishing the fourth meaning is also the same as before.

Treatise: Among these four portions (sifen), the latter two are internal.

Commentary: The following explains them separately. This explains the difficulty that if the seeing-portion (jianfen) is valid perception (xianliang), it should be the third result. It is only because the seeing-portion (jianfen) seems to relate to external objects (waijing) that it is called external (wai), not that the entity (ti) is external (wai). Therefore, this valid perception (xianliang) does not relate to the three. The latter two are called internal (nei), because the entity (ti) is internal (nei), and the relation (yuan) is also internal (nei).

Treatise: The first is only the object (suoyuan), the latter three are common to both.

Commentary: The meaning of this can be understood. Even if it relates to the mind, taking the mind as the characteristic (xiang), it is only the object (suoyuan). The characteristic-portion (xiangfen) of the mind cannot relate. Question: The seeing-portion's (jianfen) relation to the external (wai) is called external (wai) from the perspective of the object (jing). The seeing-portion's (jianfen) relation is only to the object (suoyuan), from the perspective of only...

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所緣名所緣　答曰此義亦可然。此文影顯故無有失。為色等難皆應準思　今意欲顯由見緣外不得返緣立第四分。故立外名理實非外　因論生論。自證緣見。應相分心不能緣慮。所緣心故。如相分心　此義不然。自證緣見一能緣上義別分故。若為相分心。必非一能緣體故。或別人心。或前後心。由此必非能緣性故。見分等心故能緣慮。相心不然。謂第二分以第三為果。自為能量。第三緣見。以第四為果。能量可知。緣第四時以誰為果。不可即以第四為果。如緣見分見分非果。此義應思。即以所緣第四為果。第四緣第三為果。例此同故。功能應爾。若更立者過無窮故。唯爾所者分限足故。如無色界本識見分緣種子等。更無餘相。種子搏附識自體分。即以自證為相分緣。緣彼種故。然不緣彼自體分上能緣功能。過如前說。仍以第三自證為果此例應同。

論。謂第二分至或現或比。

述曰。見分外緣。故量不定。

論。第三能緣至以無用故。

述曰。其第三分。前緣第二。卻緣第四。第四前緣第三。何不通緣第二　非第二者以無用故。設許得緣涉重緣過。以無用故　或無緣彼之用不說緣之。如自證分不緣于相。能緣各有分限可得故。然第三分得緣第四。現量等定。復不緣外。佛即不爾。

論。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『所緣』被稱為『所緣』嗎？回答說：這個意義也可以這樣認為。這段文字已經很明顯了，所以沒有錯誤。對於色等困難，都應該按照這個思路來思考。現在的意思是想說明，由於見分緣于外境，不能反過來緣自身，所以設立第四分。因此設立『外』這個名稱，但實際上並非外在。因為辯論而產生辯論。自證分緣見分。應相分的心不能緣慮，因為是所緣的心。就像相分的心一樣。這個意義不對。自證分緣見分，一個能緣，在意義上有所區別。如果作為相分的心，必定不是一個能緣的本體。或者是別人的心，或者是前後的心。因此必定不是能緣的性質。見分等心，所以能夠緣慮。相分的心則不然。意思是第二分以第三分為果，自身作為能量。第三分緣見分，以第四分為果，能量是可以知道的。緣第四分的時候，以誰作為果呢？不能直接以第四分為果。就像緣見分，見分不是果一樣。這個意義應該思考。就以所緣的第四分為果。第四分緣第三分為果，以此類推是相同的。功能也應該是這樣。如果再設立更多，就會有無窮的過失。只有這樣，分際才足夠。就像沒有阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna，根本識）的見分緣種子等，沒有其他的相。種子依附於識的自體分，就以自證分為相分所緣。因為緣彼種子。然而不緣彼自體分上的能緣功能。過失如前面所說。仍然以第三自證分為果，這個例子應該相同。

論：第二分乃至或現或比。

述記說：見分向外緣，所以量不定。

論：第三能緣乃至因為沒有用處。

述記說：這第三分，先前緣第二分，然後緣第四分。第四分先前緣第三分。為什麼不普遍地緣第二分呢？不是第二分，因為沒有用處。假設允許緣，就會有重複緣的過失，因為沒有用處。或者沒有緣彼的作用，所以不說緣之。就像自證分不緣于相分。能緣各有分限可以得到，所以這樣。然而第三分能夠緣第四分，現量等是確定的。又不緣外境。佛就不是這樣。

【English Translation】 English version Is 『that which is cognized』 called 『that which is cognized』? The answer is: This meaning can also be considered so. This text is already clear, so there is no error. For difficulties such as form, etc., one should think according to this line of thought. The present intention is to explain that because the seeing-aspect (darśana-bhāga) cognizes external objects and cannot turn around to cognize itself, therefore the fourth division is established. Therefore, the name 『external』 is established, but in reality, it is not external. Because of debate, debate arises. The self-awareness-aspect (svasaṃvedana-bhāga) cognizes the seeing-aspect. The mind of the appearance-aspect (ākāra-bhāga) cannot cognize and deliberate, because it is the mind that is cognized. Just like the mind of the appearance-aspect. This meaning is not correct. The self-awareness-aspect cognizes the seeing-aspect, one that can cognize, and there is a difference in meaning. If it is taken as the mind of the appearance-aspect, it is certainly not a single entity that can cognize. Or it is the mind of another person, or the mind of before and after. Therefore, it is certainly not the nature of being able to cognize. The mind of the seeing-aspect, etc., therefore can cognize and deliberate. The mind of the appearance-aspect is not like that. It means that the second division takes the third division as its result, and itself serves as the energy. The third division cognizes the seeing-aspect, taking the fourth division as its result, and the energy can be known. When cognizing the fourth division, who is taken as the result? It cannot directly take the fourth division as the result. Just like when cognizing the seeing-aspect, the seeing-aspect is not the result. This meaning should be considered. It takes the fourth division, which is cognized, as the result. The fourth division cognizes the third division as the result, and by analogy, it is the same. The function should also be like this. If more are established, there will be infinite faults. Only in this way is the division sufficient. Just like there is no seeing-aspect of the Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) cognizing seeds, etc., there are no other appearances. The seeds adhere to the self-nature division of consciousness, and the self-awareness-aspect is taken as that which is cognized by the appearance-aspect. Because it cognizes those seeds. However, it does not cognize the function of being able to cognize on that self-nature division. The fault is as mentioned before. It still takes the third self-awareness-aspect as the result, and this example should be the same.

Treatise: The second division, up to either present or comparative.

Commentary says: The seeing-aspect cognizes externally, so the measure is uncertain.

Treatise: The third that can cognize, up to because there is no use.

Commentary says: This third division, previously cognized the second division, and then cognizes the fourth division. The fourth division previously cognized the third division. Why doesn't it universally cognize the second division? It is not the second division, because there is no use. If it is allowed to cognize, there will be the fault of repeated cognition, because there is no use. Or there is no function of cognizing that, so it is not said to cognize it. Just like the self-awareness-aspect does not cognize the appearance-aspect. Each that can cognize has a division limit that can be obtained, so it is like this. However, the third division can cognize the fourth division, and the present measure, etc., are certain. And it does not cognize external objects. The Buddha is not like this.

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第三第四至唯識理成。

述曰。三．四二分由取自體故現量攝。具所能緣。恒但四分不減不增。無無窮過　此中有難。如得及生得得非得生生非生法不立第四得．及生。何妨見分緣相．及自證。不立第四分。

此不應然。此能緣慮有量定故。彼但成就．生長功能。非緣慮法。無量相違。據功能別名為非即。四用一體名為非離　又說四分能．所緣異。不可言即。無別種生。一體用異。故名非離。

論。是故契經至見種種差別。

述曰。下引教成　佛地論有。即厚嚴經。謂即內．外二性。此內外一切分。皆有所取．能取纏繞故有四分。

論。此頌意說至是見分故。

述曰。下釋頌意。此四分中相．見名外。見緣外故　三．四名內。證自體故。唯見分有種種差別。或量．非量。既言見分或非．比故。別立第四　此唯眾生四分故言纏縛。相．及粗重二縛具故。無漏心等雖有四分。而非纏縛　問如諸佛。及因五．八識等唯現量者。應但三分。見分即得為三果故　答此不然。外．內定故。見分緣外用外也。不得復為緣內果故。一心見分用。不得通緣內．外法故。雖緣真如真如非外。以見分用外故亦不得緣　若爾內心應非外果　此義如量。義準可知。

論。如是四分至自證分故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 第三和第四部分是唯識理論成立的關鍵。

《述記》中說：第三和第四部分，因為它們各自具有所取自體（svabhāva-graha，指心識對自身對像和自身的執取）的緣故，屬於現量（pratyakṣa，直接認知）。它們具備能緣（grāhaka，能認知的主體）和所緣（grāhya，被認知的客體）。始終只有四分，不會減少也不會增加，因此不會有無窮倒退的過失。這裡有一個疑問：如果按照『得』（lābha，獲得）、『及生得』（prāpti-lābha，獲得之獲得）、『得非得』（alābha，未獲得）、『生』（jāti，生起）、『生得』（prāpti-jāti，生起之獲得）、『生非生』（ajāti，未生起）的法則，不成立第四『得』和『生』，那麼見分（darśana-bhāga，認知作用）緣相分（nimitta-bhāga，被認知對像）和自證分（sva-saṃvedana-bhāga，自我認知）時，為什麼不能不成立第四分呢？

不應該這樣認為。因為能緣的思慮是有一定限度的。『得』和『生』只是成就和生長的功能，不是緣慮之法，與無量相違背。根據功能的不同，稱之為『非即』（abheda，非一）；四種作用一體，稱之為『非離』（aviyukta，非異）。

又說四分能緣和所緣不同，不能說是『即』（tādātmya，同一）。沒有不同的種子生起，一體而作用不同，所以稱為『非離』。

論：因此，契經（sūtra，佛經）中說，見到種種差別。

《述記》中說：下面引用佛經來證明。在《佛地論》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra）中，引用了《厚嚴經》（Ghanavyūha-sūtra），指的是內、外二性。這內外一切分，都有所取和能取的纏繞，所以有四分。

論：這首偈頌的意思是說，這是見分的作用。

《述記》中說：下面解釋偈頌的意思。這四分中，相分和見分稱為『外』，因為見分緣于外境。第三分和第四分稱為『內』，因為它們證明自體。只有見分有種種差別，或者是有量（pramāṇa，正確的認知），或者是無量（apramāṇa，不正確的認知）。既然說見分或者正確或者不正確，所以特別設立第四分。這只是眾生的四分才說是纏縛，因為相分和粗重（sthūla，粗大的煩惱）兩種束縛都具備。無漏心（anāsrava-citta，沒有煩惱的心）等雖然有四分，但不是纏縛。

問：如果像諸佛以及因位的五、八識等只有現量，那麼應該只有三分。見分就可以作為第三分的結果。

答：不能這樣說。因為內外是確定的。見分緣外境，作用在外。不能再作為緣內境的結果。一心（eka-citta，一個心識）的見分的作用，不能同時緣內、外之法。雖然緣真如（tathatā，真如），但真如不是外境。因為見分的作用在外，所以也不能緣真如。如果這樣，那麼內心應該不是外境的結果。

這個道理就像量（pramāṇa，量度）一樣，可以依此類推。

論：像這樣，四分是爲了自證分而設立的。

【English Translation】 English version: The third and fourth parts are crucial for the establishment of the Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-only) theory.

In the Shuji (Commentary), it is stated: The third and fourth parts are categorized under direct perception (pratyakṣa) because they each possess the self-grasping nature (svabhāva-graha, referring to the mind's grasping of its own object and itself). They possess both the grāhaka (the subject that cognizes) and the grāhya (the object that is cognized). There are always only four parts, neither decreasing nor increasing, thus avoiding the fallacy of infinite regress. Here arises a question: If, according to the principles of 『attainment』 (lābha), 『attainment of attainment』 (prāpti-lābha), 『non-attainment』 (alābha), 『arising』 (jāti), 『attainment of arising』 (prāpti-jāti), and 『non-arising』 (ajāti), the fourth 『attainment』 and 『arising』 are not established, then when the seeing-part (darśana-bhāga, the cognitive function) cognizes the image-part (nimitta-bhāga, the object of cognition) and the self-awareness-part (sva-saṃvedana-bhāga, self-cognition), why can't the fourth part be dispensed with?

This should not be the case. Because the deliberation of the cognizing subject has a definite limit. 『Attainment』 and 『arising』 are merely functions of accomplishment and growth, not the nature of deliberation, which contradicts the unlimited. Based on the difference in function, it is called 『non-identical』 (abheda, non-one); the four functions are one entity, called 『non-separate』 (aviyukta, non-different).

Furthermore, it is said that the cognizing and cognized aspects of the four parts are different, so they cannot be said to be 『identical』 (tādātmya, oneness). There is no arising of different seeds; they are one entity with different functions, hence called 『non-separate』.

Treatise: Therefore, the sūtras (Buddhist scriptures) say that various differences are seen.

The Shuji states: The following quotes the sūtra to prove it. In the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra (Treatise on the Buddha-land Sūtra), the Ghanavyūha-sūtra (Dense Array Sūtra) is quoted, referring to the inner and outer two natures. All these inner and outer parts are entangled with what is grasped and what grasps, hence there are four parts.

Treatise: The meaning of this verse is that it is the function of the seeing-part.

The Shuji states: The following explains the meaning of the verse. Among these four parts, the image-part and the seeing-part are called 『external』 because the seeing-part cognizes external objects. The third and fourth parts are called 『internal』 because they verify the self-nature. Only the seeing-part has various differences, either being valid cognition (pramāṇa, correct cognition) or invalid cognition (apramāṇa, incorrect cognition). Since it is said that the seeing-part is either correct or incorrect, the fourth part is specifically established. Only the four parts of sentient beings are said to be entangled, because both the image-part and the gross (sthūla, coarse afflictions) two bonds are present. Although the undefiled mind (anāsrava-citta, mind without afflictions) and others have four parts, they are not entangled.

Question: If, like the Buddhas and the five and eight consciousnesses in the causal stage, there is only direct perception, then there should only be three parts. The seeing-part can then be taken as the result of the third part.

Answer: This cannot be said. Because the internal and external are definite. The seeing-part cognizes external objects, and its function is external. It cannot then be taken as the result of cognizing internal objects. The function of the seeing-part of one mind (eka-citta, one consciousness) cannot simultaneously cognize internal and external dharmas. Although it cognizes Suchness (tathatā, Suchness), Suchness is not an external object. Because the function of the seeing-part is external, it also cannot cognize Suchness. If so, then the internal mind should not be the result of an external object.

This principle is like measurement (pramāṇa, means of valid cognition), and can be inferred accordingly.

Treatise: Thus, the four parts are established for the sake of the self-awareness-part.

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述曰。解四分中。自下第四解立一分。先以義攝。次引頌成后總指例。如集量頌。或攝為三。果體一故。攝四入三。

論。或攝為二至是能緣義。

述曰。如初所引厚嚴經頌。能緣體一。三攝為見。攝論唯二。亦攝入見　此言見者。能緣境義。通心．心所。非推求義推求義者唯惠能故。

論。或攝為一至是故說唯心。

述曰。如第十卷楞伽經說。此頌意言。外境無故唯有一心。由執著故似外境轉　定無外境許有自心。不離心故總名一識。心所與心相應。色法心之所變。真如識之實性。四分識義用分。此上四類各一別義。又皆不離識。故併名唯　無漏種子但具一義。謂不離識。故說名唯　頌舊云。虛妄取自心。是故心現在。外法無可見。是故說唯心。

論。如是處處說唯一心。

述曰。此指例也。諸師因此執諸有情唯有一識。此義非也。至下當知。今此即是例十地等一心之文。三界唯爾心。離一心外無別法故。

論。此一心言亦攝心所。

述曰。此頌非唯一心。如境更無異物。亦有心所。如言王者亦攝臣故。

論。故識行相至識之見分。

述曰。自下辨行相中。大文第三總結　故識行相即是了別。卻結頌中了一字也。此了別體即是第八識之見分。歸本

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述：解釋四分時，從下面第四個部分開始解釋建立一分。首先用義理來概括，然後引用頌文來完成，最後總括地指出例子。例如《集量論》的頌文，或者可以概括為三種，因為果和體是一體的緣故。將四分概括為三分。

世親菩薩論：或者可以概括為二分，直到『是能緣義』。

窺基法師述：如最初所引用的《厚嚴經》的頌文，能緣的體性是一。將三分概括為見分。《攝大乘論》中只有二分，也概括到見分中。這裡說的『見』，是能緣境的意義，通於心和心所。不是推求的意義，推求的意義只有智慧才能做到。

世親菩薩論：或者可以概括為一分，直到『是故說唯心』。

窺基法師述：如第十卷《楞伽經》所說。這頌文的意思是，因為外境不存在，所以只有一心。由於執著，好像外境在運轉。一定沒有外境，允許有自心。因為不離心，所以總名為一識。心所與心相應，色法是心所變現的，真如是識的真實體性。四分是識的義用分，這四類各有不同的意義，又都不離識，所以都稱為『唯』。無漏種子只具有一個意義，就是不離識，所以說名為『唯』。頌文舊譯為：『虛妄取自心，是故心現在，外法無可見，是故說唯心。』

世親菩薩論：像這樣處處都說唯一心。

窺基法師述：這是指例子。各家法師因此執著認為所有有情都只有一識，這個義理是不對的，到下面自然會明白。現在這裡就是舉例說明《十地經》等經文中的一心之說，三界唯有此心，離開一心之外沒有別的法。

世親菩薩論：這『一心』也包括心所。

窺基法師述：這頌文並非只有一心，好像除了境之外沒有其他事物，也有心所。好像說王者也包括臣子一樣。

世親菩薩論：所以識的行相就是識的見分。

窺基法師述：從下面辨別行相中，第三大段是總結。所以識的行相就是了別，對應總結頌文中的『了』字。這個了別的體性就是第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）的見分，歸於根本。

【English Translation】 English version: Master Kuiji states: Explaining the four divisions, starting from the fourth part below, we explain the establishment of one division. First, we summarize with the meaning, then we cite the verses to complete, and finally, we generally point out the examples. For example, the verses of the Compendium on Valid Cognition (Hetuvidyā-samuccaya), or it can be summarized into three, because the result and the essence are one. The four divisions are summarized into three.

Vasubandhu's Treatise: Or it can be summarized into two divisions, up to 'is the meaning of the perceiver'.

Master Kuiji states: As in the verse of the Ghanavyūha Sūtra initially cited, the nature of the perceiver is one. The three divisions are summarized into the seeing-division. In the Compendium of Mahāyāna (Mahāyānasaṃgraha), there are only two divisions, which are also summarized into the seeing-division. The 'seeing' mentioned here is the meaning of perceiving the object, which applies to both mind and mental factors. It is not the meaning of investigation, as only wisdom can accomplish investigation.

Vasubandhu's Treatise: Or it can be summarized into one division, up to 'therefore it is said only mind'.

Master Kuiji states: As stated in the tenth volume of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. The meaning of this verse is that because external objects do not exist, there is only one mind. Due to attachment, it seems as if external objects are revolving. It is certain that there are no external objects, and it is permissible to have one's own mind. Because it is inseparable from the mind, it is generally called one consciousness. Mental factors are in accordance with the mind, form is transformed by the mind, and Suchness (Tathātā) is the true nature of consciousness. The four divisions are the functional divisions of consciousness. These four categories each have different meanings, and yet they are all inseparable from consciousness, so they are all called 'only'. The unconditioned seeds only have one meaning, which is that they are inseparable from consciousness, so they are called 'only'. The old translation of the verse is: 'Delusionally grasping one's own mind, therefore the mind is present, external dharmas are not visible, therefore it is said only mind.'

Vasubandhu's Treatise: Like this, everywhere it is said only one mind.

Master Kuiji states: This is pointing out examples. Various masters therefore cling to the view that all sentient beings have only one consciousness. This meaning is incorrect, as will be understood below. Now, this is an example of the saying of one mind in texts such as the Ten Stages Sutra (Daśabhūmika Sūtra). The three realms are only this mind; apart from one mind, there are no other dharmas.

Vasubandhu's Treatise: This 'one mind' also includes mental factors.

Master Kuiji states: This verse does not only refer to one mind, as if there were nothing else besides the object, there are also mental factors. It is like saying that a king also includes his ministers.

Vasubandhu's Treatise: Therefore, the appearance of consciousness is the seeing-division of consciousness.

Master Kuiji states: From the following distinction of appearances, the third major section is the conclusion. Therefore, the appearance of consciousness is discernment, corresponding to the word 'discernment' in the concluding verse. The nature of this discernment is the seeing-division of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), returning to the root.

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所明　然安惠立唯一分　難陀立二分　陳那立三分　護法立四分　今此論文護法菩薩依四教理說四差別。俱依他性。非安惠等諸師知見　此四分相望為所緣。各為自證．及行相者。所緣可知。逐難說者。第四名行相。第三名所緣。亦名自體。能緣自體故。不可以見分為自體。不緣第四故　如第三為行相。第二名所緣。第四名自體。能緣第三。以能緣法為自體故　又第三分為行相緣第四時。第四為所緣。所緣即自體。如四緣第三。返覆理齊故　第三為自體見分為行相。相分為所緣。如前已辨。又難云。第二量．非量。余之二分是現量。第二染．非染。余之二分定非染　又量．非量殊。苦．樂．舍應異。又見分解．非解。餘二定皆解。餘一切法準難可知　又心若自緣。即有因果．能所作．能所成．能所引．能所生．能所屬．能所縛．能所相．能所覺無差別過失　亦不應言二緣生識。三和合生識。識亦生識故　亦不應立有邪見心。以邪見心自知邪故　亦不應言噁心遍體皆是不善。以自知心是不善故。此為正智。非邪惡故　其四念住亦應無別。以身等念住。即法念住等故　又四諦智應無差別。以苦智等即成道智等故　又宿住智亦應不成。知現在故。他心智亦爾。以自知故　又若知他如知自者。知他應是邪。謂他為自故。知自如

{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：", "所明：然安慧（Anhui，人名，佛教瑜伽行唯識學派的論師）主張唯識有「一分」，即只有一個部分；難陀（Nanda，人名，佛教論師）主張「二分」；陳那（Dignāga，人名，佛教論師，因明學的集大成者）主張「三分」；護法（Dharmapāla，人名，佛教論師，唯識宗的代表人物之一）主張「四分」。現在這部論文，護法菩薩依據四種教理說明四種差別。都依賴於他性（paratantra-svabhāva，依他起性）。不是安慧等各位論師的知見。", "這四分相互之間，可以互為所緣（ālambana，認識對像）。各自作為自證（sva-saṃvedana，自我認知）和行相（ākāra，心理表象）。所緣是可以理解的。按照提問者的詰難來說，第四分名為行相，第三分名為所緣，也名為自體（ātman，自身）。因為能緣自體，所以不可以用見分（darśana-bhāga，認識的主體部分）作為自體，因為它不緣第四分。", "例如第三分作為行相，第二分名為所緣，第四分名為自體。因為它能緣第三分，以能緣之法作為自體的緣故。", "又，第三分作為行相緣第四分時，第四分作為所緣。所緣即是自體。如同四分緣第三分，反過來也是一樣的道理。", "第三分作為自體，見分作為行相，相分（nimitta-bhāga，認識的客體部分）作為所緣。如同前面已經辨析過的。又有人詰難說，第二分可以是量（pramāṇa，正確的認知）或非量（apramāṇa，錯誤的認知），其餘兩分是現量（pratyakṣa-pramāṇa，直接的認知）。第二分可以是染污（kliṣṭa，不純凈的）或非染污的，其餘兩分必定是非染污的。", "又，量和非量不同，苦、樂、舍（duḥkha, sukha, upekṣā，痛苦、快樂、舍受）也應該不同。又，見分解脫或不解脫，其餘兩分必定都是解脫的。其餘一切法都可以按照這個思路來詰難。", "又，心如果自己緣自己，就會有因果、能所作（kartṛ-karma，能作者和所作者）、能所成（sādhaka-sādhya，能成就者和所成就者）、能所引（āharaka-āhārya，能引導者和所引導者）、能所生（janaka-janya，能生者和所生者）、能所屬（svāmin-bhṛtya，能擁有者和所擁有者）、能所縛（bandhaka-baddha，能束縛者和所束縛者）、能所相（lakṣaṇa-lakṣya，能相者和所相者）、能所覺（bodhaka-bodhya，能覺悟者和所覺悟者）沒有差別的過失。", "也不應該說二緣生識（vijñāna，意識），三和合生識，因為識也能生識。", "也不應該建立有邪見心（mithyā-dṛṣṭi-citta，錯誤的見解），因為邪見心自己知道自己是邪見。", "也不應該說噁心遍佈全身都是不善的，因為自知心是不善的。這是正智（samyag-jñāna，正確的智慧），不是邪惡的。", "四念住（smṛtyupasthāna，四種禪修方法）也應該沒有差別，因為身念住等同於法念住等。", "又，四諦智（catuḥ-satya-jñāna，對四聖諦的認知）應該沒有差別，因為苦智等同於道智等。", "又，宿住智（pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna，回憶過去世的智慧）也應該不能成立，因為它知道現在。他心智（para-citta-jñāna，瞭解他人內心的智慧）也是如此，因為它自己知道。", "又，如果知他人如同知自己，那麼知他人應該是邪見，因為把他人當作自己。知自己如同...", "", "english_translations": [ "English version:", "Statement: However, Anhui (Anhui, a person's name, a Buddhist Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school philosopher) advocates that Vijñāna has 'one part', that is, only one part; Nanda (Nanda, a person's name, a Buddhist philosopher) advocates 'two parts'; Dignāga (Dignāga, a person's name, a Buddhist philosopher, the great master of Hetuvidya) advocates 'three parts'; Dharmapāla (Dharmapāla, a person's name, a Buddhist philosopher, one of the representatives of the Vijñānavāda school) advocates 'four parts'. Now in this treatise, Bodhisattva Dharmapāla explains the four differences based on the four teachings. All depend on paratantra-svabhāva (dependent nature). These are not the views of masters such as Anhui.", "These four parts can be objects of cognition (ālambana, object of cognition) to each other. Each serves as self-cognition (sva-saṃvedana, self-awareness) and appearance (ākāra, mental representation). The object of cognition is understandable. According to the questioner's challenge, the fourth part is called appearance, and the third part is called object of cognition, also called self (ātman, self). Because it can cognize the self, the seeing-part (darśana-bhāga, the subjective part of cognition) cannot be used as the self, because it does not cognize the fourth part.", "For example, when the third part serves as appearance, the second part is called object of cognition, and the fourth part is called self. Because it can cognize the third part, and uses the cognizing dharma as the self.", "Also, when the third part serves as appearance and cognizes the fourth part, the fourth part serves as object of cognition. The object of cognition is the self. Just as the four parts cognize the third part, the reverse is also the same principle.", "The third part serves as the self, the seeing-part serves as appearance, and the object-part (nimitta-bhāga, the objective part of cognition) serves as object of cognition. As has been analyzed before. Someone also challenges that the second part can be valid cognition (pramāṇa, correct cognition) or invalid cognition (apramāṇa, incorrect cognition), and the remaining two parts are direct cognition (pratyakṣa-pramāṇa, direct cognition). The second part can be defiled (kliṣṭa, impure) or undefiled, and the remaining two parts must be undefiled.", "Also, valid and invalid cognition are different, so suffering, happiness, and equanimity (duḥkha, sukha, upekṣā, suffering, happiness, and equanimity) should also be different. Also, whether the seeing-part is liberated or not, the remaining two parts must be liberated. All other dharmas can be challenged according to this line of reasoning.", "Also, if the mind cognizes itself, there will be no difference between cause and effect, agent and object (kartṛ-karma, agent and object), accomplisher and accomplished (sādhaka-sādhya, accomplisher and accomplished), guider and guided (āharaka-āhārya, guider and guided), producer and produced (janaka-janya, producer and produced), owner and owned (svāmin-bhṛtya, owner and owned), binder and bound (bandhaka-baddha, binder and bound), characterizer and characterized (lakṣaṇa-lakṣya, characterizer and characterized), and awakener and awakened (bodhaka-bodhya, awakener and awakened).", "It should also not be said that two conditions produce consciousness (vijñāna, consciousness), or that three conditions combine to produce consciousness, because consciousness can also produce consciousness.", "It should also not be established that there is a mind with wrong views (mithyā-dṛṣṭi-citta, wrong views), because the mind with wrong views knows that it is wrong views.", "It should also not be said that an evil mind throughout the body is unwholesome, because the self-knowing mind is unwholesome. This is right knowledge (samyag-jñāna, correct knowledge), not evil.", "The four foundations of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna, four types of meditation) should also have no difference, because mindfulness of the body is the same as mindfulness of the dharma, etc.", "Also, the wisdom of the four noble truths (catuḥ-satya-jñāna, knowledge of the four noble truths) should have no difference, because the wisdom of suffering is the same as the wisdom of the path, etc.", "Also, the wisdom of past lives (pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna, wisdom of recalling past lives) should also not be established, because it knows the present. The wisdom of others' minds (para-citta-jñāna, wisdom of understanding others' minds) is also the same, because it knows itself.", "Also, if knowing others is like knowing oneself, then knowing others should be wrong views, because it treats others as oneself. Knowing oneself is like..." ] }

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他反難亦爾　又用二故體應非一。如燈自照其喻不成喻。無能緣等心。有能緣等故。即有因法自相相違。喻所立不成過　又燈若性照。更何須照。若非明者。應非能照。體應是闇　諸如是等種種妨難。更應思擇次第解之　然佛地第三。有解燈照難。余難無解。然他界．無為．無漏緣等。依見分說。非自證分。又以堅執名非量。非比非親證名非量。自證於境雖是邪見。親證自體故。不作邪．正等解。故前諸難理皆不成。如五識中貪．嗔等惑。雖染仍現量。由他引故成染。親得故現量攝　於四分中。八識．三惠．三量．因果諸門分別。皆如別章。

上來已廣解行相訖。下廣所緣　于中有三。初外境。次內境。后料簡　初中有二。初總解釋。后諸師說。

論。所言處者至及所造色。

述曰。此義意言。由自種子為因緣故。本識變為器世間相。唯外非情。此即能造．及所造色。在外處故言外大種。非心外法。且諸種子總有二種。一是共相。二不共相。何人為共相。多人所感故。雖知人人所變各別名為唯識。然有相似共受用義說名共相。實非自變他能用之。若能用者。此即名緣心外法故。然我此物為增上緣。令多人可共受用名共相。如山．河等。不共相者。若唯識理。唯自心變名不共物。一切皆是。他變是他

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

他反駁說也是這樣，又因為二故，本體應不是一。比如燈自照，這個比喻不能成立。沒有能緣等心，因為有能緣等故，即有因法自相矛盾。比喻所立的過失不能成立。又如果燈的本性是照亮，又何須照亮？如果不是明亮的，應不能照亮，本體應是黑暗。諸如此類的種種妨難，更應思考選擇次第解釋。

然而佛地第三，有解釋燈照的難題，其餘難題沒有解釋。然而他界、無為、無漏緣等，是依據見分說的，不是自證分。又以堅執名相為非量，非比量、非親證名相為非量。自證對於境雖然是邪見，親證自體，所以不作邪、正等解釋，所以前面諸多的難題在理上都不能成立。如五識中的貪、嗔等煩惱，雖然染污仍然是現量，由於他引的緣故成為染污，親自體得的緣故屬於現量。在四分中，八識、三慧、三量、因果等諸多的門類的分別，都如別的章節所說。

上面已經廣泛地解釋了行相完畢。下面廣泛地解釋所緣。其中有三個方面：首先是外境，其次是內境，最後是料簡。首先外境中有兩個方面：首先是總的解釋，然後是諸位論師的說法。

論：所說的處，乃至所造色。

述記說：這個意思說，由於自身種子的因緣，本識變為器世間相，唯有外在的非情之物。這就是能造作以及所造作的色法。在外處的緣故，說是外大種，不是心外的法。而且諸多的種子總共有兩種：一是共相，二是不共相。什麼是共相呢？因為是多人所感知的緣故。雖然知道人人所變的各不相同，名為唯識，然而有相似共同受用的意義，所以叫做共相。實際上不是自己所變而他人能用。如果他人能用，這就名為緣心外法了。然而我這個事物作為增上緣，使得多人可以共同受用，叫做共相，如山河等。不共相，如果按照唯識的道理，唯有自心所變，名為不共之物，一切都是這樣，他人所變是他人的。

【English Translation】 English version:

He retorts that it is also so, and also because of the two reasons, the substance should not be one. For example, a lamp illuminating itself, this metaphor cannot be established. There is no mind with the ability to cognize, because there is the ability to cognize, thus there is a contradiction in the inherent characteristics of the causal dharma. The fault established by the metaphor cannot be established. Furthermore, if the nature of the lamp is to illuminate, then why is there a need for illumination? If it is not bright, it should not be able to illuminate, and its substance should be darkness. All such kinds of difficulties should be further considered and selectively explained in order.

However, in the third section of the Buddha-bhumi (Buddha-land), there is an explanation of the difficulty of the lamp's illumination, but the other difficulties are not explained. However, other realms, unconditioned (asamkhata), outflows-free (anasrava) conditions, etc., are explained based on the perception-division (darshana-bhaga), not the self-cognition division (svasamvedana-bhaga). Furthermore, clinging to names and forms is considered non-valid cognition (apramana), and non-inferential cognition (anuman), non-direct cognition (pratyaksha) are considered non-valid cognition. Although self-cognition towards objects is a wrong view, it directly cognizes the self-nature, so it is not explained as right or wrong, so the previous difficulties are not logically established. For example, in the five consciousnesses, afflictions such as greed and anger, although defiled, are still present as direct perception (pratyaksha), because they are induced by others, they become defiled, and because they are directly attained, they are included in direct perception. Within the four divisions, the distinctions of the eight consciousnesses, the three wisdoms (prajna), the three valid cognitions (pramana), cause and effect, and other categories are all as explained in separate chapters.

Above, the characteristics (akara) have been extensively explained. Below, the object of cognition (alambana) is extensively explained. There are three aspects to this: first, the external object; second, the internal object; and third, the analysis. First, in the external object, there are two aspects: first, a general explanation; and second, the views of various teachers.

Treatise: The so-called 'place' (ayatana), up to and including the 'produced form' (nirmita-rupa).

Commentary: This means that due to the causal conditions of its own seeds, the fundamental consciousness (alaya-vijnana) transforms into the appearance of the container world (bhajana-loka), only external non-sentient things. This is the form that can be created and the form that is created. Because it is in the external place, it is called the external great elements (maha-bhuta), not a dharma outside the mind. Moreover, there are two types of seeds in total: one is the common characteristic (sadharana-lakshana), and the other is the uncommon characteristic (asadharana-lakshana). What is the common characteristic? Because it is perceived by many people. Although it is known that the transformations of each person are different, called 'consciousness-only' (vijnapti-matra), there is a similar meaning of shared enjoyment, so it is called the common characteristic. In reality, it is not transformed by oneself and used by others. If it can be used by others, this is called conditioning a dharma outside the mind. However, this thing of mine serves as a dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya), allowing many people to share and enjoy it, called the common characteristic, such as mountains and rivers. The uncommon characteristic, according to the principle of consciousness-only, is only transformed by one's own mind, called an uncommon thing, and everything is like this, what is transformed by others belongs to others.

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物。自不能用亦名不共相。然今但約自身能用。他不得用。名為不共。如奴．婢等　然依諸教。共．不共中總分為四。且如瑜伽六十六卷。共中有二　一共中共。如山．河等。非唯一趣用。他趣不能用　二共中不共。如己田．宅。及鬼等所見猛火等物。人見為水。余趣．餘人不能用故。余房．衣等準此可知。如下廣解有根身處　不共相中亦有二種　一不共中不共。如眼等根。唯自識依用。非他依用故　二不共中共。如自扶根塵。他亦受用故。根即不爾。下文難言。雖亦變他根。自識不能依他根故。由此但名不共中不共。今據正義不取五根為不共中共。既有此四。即至下文一一配屬　此中處言共相種者。即共中共。問曰。且如色中形．影假法。第八緣不　答曰。不緣。如所造觸若緣。但緣本實物著。即觸處中第八所變。唯能造非所造。以無體故。但緣著彼俱有四大故。此由四大實不造觸處。以果假故。但有造五根．四塵四大。緣長等時並緣青等。更不別緣離青等外別有長等。非如意識別得緣假。此無別體不可緣故。瓶．盆亦爾。即是若變為大小時。但隨彼青等大小而緣。非別有長等。若從本實說。亦得緣長等。由此準。觸處亦應作是說。然所造觸是四大種分位差別。緣所造時即緣四大。假依實故如長等同。

論。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 物。自身不能使用也叫做不共相（abhāva-svalakṣaṇa，非實體自性）。然而現在只是就自身能使用，他人不能使用而言，稱為不共。例如奴隸、婢女等。然而依據各種教義，共相（sādhāraṇa-lakṣaṇa，共同自性）、不共相中總共分為四種。例如《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷中，共相中有二種：一是共中共，如山、河等，並非只有一類眾生能使用，其他類眾生不能使用；二是共中不共，如自己的田地、住宅，以及鬼等所見的猛火等物，人見為水，其他道的眾生、其他人不能使用。其餘的房屋、衣服等可以依此類推。如下文詳細解釋有根身處。不共相中也有兩種：一是不共中不共，如眼等根，只有自己的識依之而用，不是他人依之而用；二是不共中共，如自己扶持根塵，他人也受用。根的情況並非如此。下文難以說明，雖然也能變他人的根，但自己的識不能依他人的根，因此只能稱為不共中不共。現在根據正義，不取五根為不共中共。既然有這四種情況，就到下文一一對應歸屬。此中『處』所說的共相種類，就是共中共。問：比如色中的形、影這些假法，第八識緣嗎？答：不緣。如所造觸若緣，但緣本來的實體物著，即觸處中第八識所變現的，只能造作而非被造作，因為它沒有實體。但緣著彼俱有的四大種，因此這由四大種實體不造作觸處，因為是果的假法。但有造作五根、四塵的四大種。緣長等時，並緣青等，更不另外緣離青等之外的別的長等，不像意識能分別緣假法，因為這沒有別的實體，不可緣故。瓶、盆也是這樣，即是若變為大小時，只是隨著那些青等的大小而緣，並非另外有長等。若從本來的實體來說，也可以緣長等。由此類推，觸處也應該這樣說。然而所造觸是四大種的分位差別，緣所造觸時，就是緣四大種，假法依于實法，如長等一樣。 論（Abhidharma，阿毗達磨）。

【English Translation】 English version Objects. That which cannot be used by itself is also called abhāva-svalakṣaṇa (non-substantial self-characteristic). However, now it is only with respect to oneself being able to use it, and others not being able to use it, that it is called abhāva (non-common). For example, slaves, servants, etc. However, according to various teachings, sādhāraṇa-lakṣaṇa (common characteristic) and abhāva-lakṣaṇa (non-common characteristic) are generally divided into four types. For example, in the sixty-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, there are two types of sādhāraṇa-lakṣaṇa: first, sādhāraṇa-sādhāraṇa (common among common), such as mountains, rivers, etc., which are not only used by one type of sentient being, but cannot be used by other types of sentient beings; second, sādhāraṇa-abhāva (non-common among common), such as one's own fields, houses, and the fierce fire seen by ghosts, etc., which humans see as water, and sentient beings of other realms and other people cannot use. Other houses, clothes, etc., can be understood by analogy. The following explains in detail the location of the rooted body. There are also two types of abhāva-lakṣaṇa: first, abhāva-abhāva (non-common among non-common), such as the sense organs like the eyes, which are only used by one's own consciousness, not by others; second, abhāva-sādhāraṇa (common among non-common), such as oneself supporting the root-objects, which others also benefit from. The case of the roots is not like this. It is difficult to explain in the following text, although it can also transform the roots of others, one's own consciousness cannot rely on the roots of others, so it can only be called abhāva-abhāva. Now, according to the correct meaning, the five sense organs are not taken as abhāva-sādhāraṇa. Since there are these four situations, they will be assigned to each category in the following text. The type of sādhāraṇa mentioned in the 'location' here is sādhāraṇa-sādhāraṇa. Question: For example, do the illusory dharmas of form and shadow in rūpa (form) get cognized by the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna)? Answer: No. If the created touch (sparśa) is cognized, it only cognizes the original substantial object, that is, what is manifested by the eighth consciousness in the touch-location, which can only create and not be created, because it has no substance. But it cognizes the co-existent four great elements (mahābhūta), therefore, the substantial four great elements do not create the touch-location, because it is an illusory dharma of the result. But there are the four great elements that create the five sense organs and the four objects. When cognizing length, etc., it also cognizes blue, etc., and does not separately cognize other lengths, etc., apart from blue, etc., unlike consciousness, which can separately cognize illusory dharmas, because this has no separate substance and cannot be cognized. The same is true for bottles and basins, that is, if they become large or small, they are only cognized according to the size of those blue, etc., and there are no separate lengths, etc. If speaking from the original substance, length, etc., can also be cognized. By analogy, the touch-location should also be spoken of in this way. However, the created touch is the differentiation of the four great elements, and when cognizing the created touch, it is cognizing the four great elements, the illusory dharma relies on the substantial dharma, just like length, etc. Abhidharma.

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雖諸有情至各遍以一。

述曰。此釋共果同在一處不相障礙。謂外器相。如小宗中。眾多燈明共在一室各各遍。一一自別。而相相似處所無異　此如何知各各別也　一燈去時其光尚遍。若共為一。是則應將一燈去已。餘明不遍。又相涉入不相隔礙故見似一。置多燈已人影多故　問曰。若爾且如一人心上木．石。更互相隔。以是障礙有對法故。何故眾多各變山河．及大地等。不相障隔同在一處　答由業相似．不相似故。亦由自心礙。不礙故。五十四說諸有對法同處一處。而非無對者。由隨順轉相鬚生故。又由如是種類之業增上所感。一切色者一切色根共受用故。乃至廣說。

彼雖說四塵等與此相似。如山．河等業。眾人並相似。及心於上共用無礙。故不相障。一心上木等所感業各別。及心受用自有礙故。遂令相隔　問曰。若爾多人共感木等。何故亦互相礙　答彼不礙他心上者。但礙自者。如心上燈明百千不礙。與明相違。無始於中有礙．不礙故。此義應思。

論。誰異熟識變為此相。

述曰。下諸師說。初問。后答。此為問也。雖知處所本識所緣。誰異熟識變為此相。問能變者。瑜伽等說于外器皆無差別。于上界等為是誰緣。故今問也。為凡為聖。為此趣。為他趣。為自界。為他界。為自地。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：即使眾多的有情眾生，都能各自周遍地以一個（外器世界）。

述記解釋說：這是解釋共同的果報共同存在於一個地方而不互相障礙的情況。指的是外在的器世界景象。就像小乘宗派中，眾多的燈光共同在一個房間里，各自周遍，一一自成區別，而相似之處在於處所沒有差異。這是如何知道它們各自不同的呢？一盞燈熄滅時，它的光芒仍然周遍。如果（眾多燈光）共同成為一個整體，那麼就應該在一盞燈熄滅后，其餘的光芒也不再周遍。又因為它們相互涉入而不互相隔礙，所以看起來像是一個整體。放置多盞燈后，人的影子也會增多。問題是：如果這樣，那麼就像一個人的心上的木頭和石頭，它們會互相隔開，因為它們是障礙性的有對法。為什麼眾多眾生各自變現的山河以及大地等，不會互相障礙，而是共同存在於一個地方呢？回答是：由於業力的相似和不相似，也由於自心的障礙和不障礙。第五十四卷說，諸多的有對法共同存在於一個地方，而不是無對法，這是因為它們隨順運轉，相互依存而產生。又由於像這樣種類的業力增上所感，一切的色法都是一切色根共同受用的，乃至廣說。

他們雖然說四塵等與此相似，就像山河等是眾多人相似的業力所感，並且心在上共同使用而沒有障礙，所以不會互相障礙。而一個人的心上的木頭等，所感的業力各自不同，並且心受用時自有障礙，因此導致互相隔開。問題是：如果這樣，那麼多人共同感得的木頭等，為什麼也會互相障礙呢？回答是：它們不障礙他人心上的木頭等，但會障礙自己心上的木頭等。就像心上的燈光成百上千，也不會互相障礙。與光明相違背的事物，從無始以來在心中就有障礙和不障礙的分別，這個道理應該仔細思考。

論：是誰的異熟識變現出這種景象？

述記解釋說：下面各家師的說法，先提問，后回答。這是提問。雖然知道處所是本識所緣，但究竟是誰的異熟識變現出這種景象？這是在問能變現者。瑜伽師地論等經論中說，對於外在的器世界都沒有差別，那麼對於上界等，又是誰所緣的呢？所以現在提問。是凡夫還是聖人？是此趣（此道）還是他趣（他道）？是自界還是他界？是自地（此地）？

【English Translation】 English version: Even though all sentient beings, each can universally and completely possess one (external world).

The commentary states: This explains how shared retributive results can coexist in one place without obstructing each other. It refers to the appearance of the external world. Like in the Lesser Vehicle schools, many lights can coexist in one room, each being universally present, individually distinct, yet similar in that their location is not different. How do we know they are individually distinct? When one lamp is extinguished, its light still pervades. If (the many lights) were collectively one, then when one lamp is extinguished, the remaining light should no longer pervade. Moreover, because they interpenetrate without obstructing each other, they appear as one. When many lamps are placed, the shadows of people also increase. The question is: If that's the case, then like wood and stones in one's mind, they obstruct each other because they are obstructive entities with opposition. Why don't the mountains, rivers, and great earth, etc., transformed by many beings, obstruct each other, but instead coexist in one place? The answer is: Due to the similarity and dissimilarity of karma, and also due to the obstruction and non-obstruction of one's own mind. The fifty-fourth volume says that many entities with opposition coexist in one place, but not those without opposition, because they arise in accordance with each other, depending on each other. Also, due to the increasing influence of such kinds of karma, all forms are jointly used by all sense faculties, and so on.

Although they say that the four elements (earth, water, fire, wind) are similar to this, like mountains and rivers are the result of similar karma of many people, and the mind uses them together without obstruction, so they do not obstruct each other. But the wood and stones in one's mind are the result of different karma, and the mind's enjoyment of them has its own obstructions, thus causing them to be separated. The question is: If that's the case, then why do the wood and stones, etc., jointly perceived by many people, also obstruct each other? The answer is: They do not obstruct the wood and stones, etc., in others' minds, but only obstruct those in one's own mind. Like hundreds and thousands of lights in one's mind, they do not obstruct each other. Things that are contrary to light have been distinguished as obstructive and non-obstructive in the mind since beginningless time. This principle should be carefully considered.

Treatise: Whose Vipaka-consciousness (Yishushi) transforms into this appearance?

The commentary states: The following are the statements of various masters, first asking a question, then answering it. This is the question. Although we know that the location is what the Root-consciousness (Ben shi) perceives, whose Vipaka-consciousness (Yishushi) transforms into this appearance? This is asking about the transformer. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra and other scriptures say that there is no difference in the external world, so who perceives the upper realms, etc.? Therefore, we ask now. Is it a common person or a sage? Is it this gati (realm) or another gati (realm)? Is it this dhatu (sphere) or another dhatu (sphere)? Is it this bhumi (level)?

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為他地為唯自變。為他亦變。

自下護法菩薩假敘三計。初同月藏。

論。有義一切至共所起故。

述曰。此言一切。即通凡聖．五趣有情．自他界地．己及外身。何以知者。契經說故。即立世經。

第二破云。

論。有義若爾至此雜穢土。

述曰。護法菩薩假為別義難破月藏。無別師說。諸佛菩薩若化變為。我所不諱。若實變為。即違理．教。雜穢種子久已亡故。螺髻梵王等亦是此類。舉佛．菩薩且論勝者。

論。諸異生等至諸凈妙土。

述曰。此中言等等取二乘．諸小菩薩。他方者。三千界外。

此界者此娑訶界。彼應實變為他方．自界諸凈妙土。若佛．菩薩神力所加。變化所作我亦無遮。且論實故　然凈妙土有別他方如極樂等。亦在此界靈鷲山等。有漏凈土。外法異生亦不應變。不能用故。

論。又諸聖者至復何所用。

述曰。諸聖生上必不下生。變為下土亦何所用。以本變土本為身用。定不能用變之何為。此中且舉聖生無色。就顯處說。色界．異地類此亦然。

論。是故現居至變為此界。

述曰。此述正義。由此定應現身所居。及當生者。本識變為現所居界。及當生界　當生界者。一云次生者變。遠者不變。二云。可應生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 為他地則變為唯識所變。為他身亦變為唯識所變。

以下護法（Dharmapāla）菩薩假設敘述三種計度。首先是同於月藏（Chandra-garbha）。

論：有種觀點認為，一切都是由共同的業力所產生的。

述記：這裡所說的『一切』，包括凡夫和聖人、五道眾生、自身和他人的世界和土地、自身和外在的身體。為什麼這麼說呢？因為契經中有這樣的記載，即《立世經》。

第二，反駁這種觀點：

論：有種觀點如果成立，那麼……就會變成這污穢的土地。

述記：護法菩薩假設另一種觀點，以此來反駁月藏的觀點。沒有其他論師這樣說。諸佛菩薩如果爲了教化而變化，我並不反對。如果真的變化，就違背了道理和教義。因為污穢的種子早就消失了。螺髻梵王（Śikhi-brahman）等也是這種情況。這裡舉佛和菩薩，只是討論其中殊勝的。

論：各種異生等……到達各種清凈美妙的國土。

述記：這裡說的『等』，包括二乘（Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyekabuddha-yāna）、各種小菩薩。『他方』指的是三千大千世界之外的地方。

『此界』指的是此娑婆世界（Sahā world）。他們應該真正地變化為他方和自身世界的各種清凈美妙的國土。如果是佛和菩薩以神通力加持，變化所作，我並不反對。這裡討論的是真實的變化。然而，清凈美妙的國土有其他方，如極樂世界（Sukhāvatī）等，也有在此界，如靈鷲山（Gṛdhrakūṭa）等有漏的清凈國土。外道的凡夫也不應該能變化，因為他們沒有這種能力。

論：還有各種聖者……又有什麼用呢？

述記：各種聖者往生到更高的境界，必定不會下生。變化為低下的土地又有什麼用呢？因為原本變化的土地是為自身所用，一定不能用變化后的土地，那變化它做什麼呢？這裡只是舉聖者往生到無色界（Arūpadhātu），就顯而易見的地方來說。**和異地的情況也類似。

論：因此，現在居住的……變化為此界。

述記：這是闡述正確的觀點。因此，一定應該是現在身所居住的，以及將要往生的，由本識（Ālaya-vijñāna）變化為現在所居住的界，以及將要往生的界。『將要往生的界』，一種說法是隻變化下次往生的，遙遠的就不變化。另一種說法是，可以往生的。

【English Translation】 English version For other lands, it is transformed by consciousness-only. For other bodies, it is also transformed by consciousness-only.

Here, Bodhisattva Dharmapāla provisionally narrates three kinds of views. The first is the same as Chandra-garbha (Moon Womb).

Treatise: Some argue that everything arises from shared karma.

Commentary: 'Everything' here includes ordinary beings and sages, beings in the five realms, one's own and others' worlds and lands, one's own and external bodies. How do we know this? Because the scriptures say so, namely the Loka-prajñapti-śāstra (Treatise on the Establishment of the World).

Second, refuting this view:

Treatise: If that view holds, then... it would become this impure land.

Commentary: Bodhisattva Dharmapāla provisionally presents another view to refute Chandra-garbha's view. No other teachers say this. If Buddhas and Bodhisattvas transform for the sake of teaching, I do not object. If they truly transform, it contradicts reason and doctrine, because the seeds of impurity have long been extinguished. Śikhi-brahman (Brahma with a Hair-knot) and others are also like this. Here, we mention Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, only discussing the superior ones.

Treatise: Various different beings... reach various pure and wonderful lands.

Commentary: 'Etc.' here includes the Two Vehicles (Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyekabuddha-yāna), and various lesser Bodhisattvas. 'Other lands' refers to places beyond the three-thousandfold great thousand world.

'This world' refers to this Sahā world. They should truly transform into various pure and wonderful lands of other and their own worlds. If Buddhas and Bodhisattvas bless with their supernatural powers and create transformations, I do not object. Here, we are discussing true transformations. However, pure and wonderful lands exist in other directions, such as Sukhāvatī (Pure Land of Bliss), and also in this world, such as Gṛdhrakūṭa (Vulture Peak) and other pure lands with outflows. Externalist ordinary beings should also not be able to transform, because they do not have this ability.

Treatise: Also, various sages... what use would it be?

Commentary: Various sages are born into higher realms and will certainly not be born into lower realms. What use would it be to transform into a lower land? Because the land originally transformed is for one's own use, one certainly cannot use the transformed land, so what is the point of transforming it? Here, we only mention sages born into the Arūpadhātu (Formless Realm), speaking of what is obvious. ** and different lands are similar.

Treatise: Therefore, the present dwelling... transforms into this world.

Commentary: This explains the correct view. Therefore, it must be that the present body's dwelling, and what one will be born into, are transformed by the Ālaya-vijñāna (Store Consciousness) into the present dwelling and the world one will be born into. 'The world one will be born into,' one explanation is that it only transforms the next birth, not the distant ones. Another explanation is that it transforms what one can be born into.

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者變。隨其凡聖可生者變。由此即無成劫之時先器成過　以上界有情當生者變故　既爾無色當生下時亦變為下。何故瑜伽論五十一。云彼識不緣下外器相　彼約不定境。亦不相違。謂緣種子即是定境。緣外器等此即不定。以無色聖者不緣器故。不生下故　問聖定不生無間之處。應不變為彼所居處。長壽天亦爾　答此問言。即現所居地界故得。

若爾何故說一切言。

論。經依小分至皆共變故。

述曰。此會經文。如言一切人共見此物。非他方界亦能見之。約小分故。業不同者即不變故　若作是說。劫將壞時既無現居．當生者故。是不盡理。此似月藏義。非實月藏計。似為有救。狹于月藏。

第三破之。

論。有義若爾至變為此界。

述曰。若如前言。現所居者變為土者。器將壞時無現．當生。此土誰變。即有壞器不變之過　現他欲界變為故者。何故但言現所居者。而不說言一切欲界同此界變。又成器時他方三禪等有情當生。亦有感得。何故但言此界有情當生者變。此便無用。由汝前說現所居言。一三千界成．壞同者。故我今破。

論。又諸異生至此復何用。

述曰。謂諸異生生無色界預變無用。現無身故。生有頂天壽八萬劫。不妨欲界數度成．壞。變之何用。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 這些（世界）會發生變化。隨著其中凡夫和聖人可能轉生的情況而變化。因此，在成劫（kalpa，宇宙形成時期）之初，就不會出現先有器世界完成的情況，因為上界（指色界和無色界）的有情眾生將要轉生到這裡，所以（世界）會發生變化。既然如此，無色界（arupa-dhatu，沒有物質的禪定界）的眾生將要下生時，也會隨著地獄而變化。為什麼《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十一卷說，他們的識（vijnana，意識）不緣于地獄的外在器世界之相呢？那是指不定的境界。這並不矛盾。所謂緣于種子（bija，潛在的可能性）就是確定的境界。緣于外在的器世界等，這就是不定的。因為無色界的聖者不緣于器世界，也不會下生到地獄。問：聖者的禪定不會生於無間地獄（avici，最底層的地獄），那麼（世界）應該不會爲了他們所居住的地方而發生變化。長壽天（deva，壽命很長的天神）也是如此。答：這個問題可以通過『即現在所居住的地界』來解釋。

如果這樣，為什麼說『一切』呢？

論：經文是依據小部分來說的，因為大家都共同經歷變化。

述曰：這是爲了解釋經文。例如說，『一切人』共同看到這個東西，而不是其他方界也能看到。這是從小部分來說的。業（karma，行為和其結果）不同的人，就不會發生變化。如果這樣說，劫將要壞滅的時候，既然沒有現在居住的或將要出生的眾生，這就不合理了。這類似於月藏義（Chandra-garbha，一種佛教哲學觀點），但不是真正的月藏的觀點。這似乎是爲了補救，但比月藏的觀點更狹隘。

第三，駁斥它。

論：有人認為，如果像前面所說，現在所居住的地方會變成土地，那麼器世界將要壞滅的時候，沒有現在居住的或將要出生的眾生，這片土地由誰來改變呢？就會有壞滅的器世界沒有發生變化的過失。現在其他欲界（kama-dhatu，充滿慾望的界）變成這樣，為什麼只說『現在所居住的地方』，而不說一切欲界都和這個世界一樣發生變化呢？又，在世界形成的時候，其他三禪天（dhyana，禪定）等地的有情眾生將要出生，也會有感受。為什麼只說這個世界的有情眾生將要出生而發生變化呢？這便沒有意義了。因為你前面說『現在所居住的地方』，一個三千大千世界（tri-sahasra-maha-sahasra-loka-dhatu，佛教宇宙觀中的一個大世界）的成住壞空（samvarta-sthayi-vivarta-samvarta，形成、持續、轉變、毀滅）是相同的，所以我現在駁斥你。

論：還有，那些異生（prthag-jana，凡夫）沒有參與變化，這又有什麼用呢？

述曰：那些異生沒有身體，所以參與變化沒有用。生到有頂天（bhavagra，三界中的最高處）的眾生壽命有八萬劫，不妨礙欲界數次成住壞空。改變他們又有什麼用呢？

【English Translation】 English version These (worlds) change. They change according to the possibilities of sentient beings, both ordinary and noble, being born there. Therefore, at the beginning of a kalpa (era of cosmic formation), there is no situation where the container world is completed first, because sentient beings from the upper realms (referring to the Form Realm and Formless Realm) are about to be born here, so (the world) changes. Since this is the case, when sentient beings from the Arupa-dhatu (Formless Realm, the realm of formless meditation) are about to descend, they will also change along with the lower realms. Why does the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) in its fifty-first fascicle say that their vijnana (consciousness) does not cognize the external container world's appearances of the lower realms? That refers to indefinite realms. This is not contradictory. What is meant by cognizing the bija (seed, potentiality) is a definite realm. Cognizing external container worlds, etc., is indefinite. Because the noble ones of the Formless Realm do not cognize the container world, nor do they descend to the lower realms. Question: The noble ones' samadhi (meditative concentration) does not arise in Avici (the lowest hell), so (the world) should not change for the sake of where they reside. The long-lived devas (gods with long lifespans) are also like this. Answer: This question can be explained by 'the present dwelling place'.

If that's the case, why say 'all'?

Treatise: The sutra relies on a small portion, because everyone experiences the change together.

Commentary: This is to explain the sutra. For example, saying 'all people' see this thing together, rather than other realms also being able to see it. This is speaking from a small portion. Those whose karma (actions and their consequences) is different will not change. If it is said that when a kalpa is about to be destroyed, since there are no sentient beings currently residing or about to be born, this is unreasonable. This is similar to the Chandra-garbha (Moon Womb, a Buddhist philosophical view) meaning, but not the actual Chandra-garbha view. This seems to be for remedy, but is narrower than the Chandra-garbha view.

Third, refute it.

Treatise: Some argue that if, as previously stated, the present dwelling place turns into earth, then when the container world is about to be destroyed, there are no sentient beings currently residing or about to be born, who changes this earth? There would be the fault of the destroyed container world not changing. Now that other Kama-dhatu (Desire Realm, the realm full of desires) becomes like this, why only say 'the present dwelling place', and not say that all Kama-dhatu realms change the same as this world? Also, when the world is formed, sentient beings from other Third Dhyana (meditation) heavens, etc., are about to be born, and will also have feelings. Why only say that the sentient beings of this world are about to be born and change? This would be meaningless. Because you previously said 'the present dwelling place', the formation, duration, transformation, and destruction (samvarta-sthayi-vivarta-samvarta) of a tri-sahasra-maha-sahasra-loka-dhatu (great trichiliocosm, a large world system in Buddhist cosmology) are the same, so I now refute you.

Treatise: Also, what is the use of those prthag-jana (ordinary beings) not participating in the change?

Commentary: Those ordinary beings do not have bodies, so participating in the change is useless. Sentient beings born in Bhavagra (the peak of existence, the highest point in the Three Realms) have a lifespan of eighty thousand kalpas, which does not hinder the Kama-dhatu from forming, enduring, transforming, and destroying numerous times. What is the use of changing them?

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論。設有色身至亦何所益。

述曰。設縱汝宗如大眾部無色有色身。及身生有色上地既變無益。粗細懸隔不相依持。如梵王下別變為地。此異地身不能受用。故變無用。

論。然所變土至便變為彼。

述曰。變本為身。身不能用變之無益。故若於身可有持用。便變為彼。

論。由是設生至變為此土。

述曰。下述正義。同現居身他三千界所依之處說名當地。彼當地一切有情皆能變之。非唯是一三千界變。亦非異地當生者變。欲界欲界同。及至上亦爾。

論。故器世間至而亦現有。

述曰。由自地變無過失故。器世壞成而亦現有　若爾聖者于梵宮自地．及地獄自地。若諸異生。他三千界欲界等中自地無用。不能持身變之何益。

今此義言。現雖無用。身若往彼可得持身。故須變作。非謂現身即令得持用。言可持用故。且如聖者設往地獄中。豈亦不得依彼而住。異生設往他方欲界亦得持身。以業同故。以粗細等不是懸隔。

若爾如人見水。鬼見於火。其火外器。人何故不見而名共變耶。答此文言。

論。此說一切至所見異故。

述曰。即當自界一切有情。可共受用說名為共。共中共也。若別受用。隨與多小有情同變說名為共。共中不共。以人．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：假設有色身，又有什麼益處呢？

述記：假設縱然你宗派如同大眾部一樣，認為無色界和有色界都有色身，以及色身所生的有色上地已經變化，也沒有什麼益處。因為粗細差別太大，不能互相依存。如同梵天王地獄別處變化為土地一樣，這種不同地方的身不能受用，所以變化沒有用處。

論：然而所變的土地，就變為那個地方的。

述記：變化根本是爲了身體，身體不能使用變化就沒有益處。所以如果對於身體可以有支援作用，就變為那個地方的。

論：因此，假設生到其他三千世界，就變為這個地方的土地。

述記：下面闡述正義。共同顯現居住的身體，其他三千世界所依靠的地方，就叫做當地。那個當地的一切有情眾生都能變化它，不只是一個三千世界變化，也不是其他地方將要出生的眾生變化。欲界和欲界相同，乃至上界也是這樣。

論：所以器世間壞滅和產生，而也是現在存在的。

述記：因為從自己的地方變化沒有過失的緣故。器世界壞滅和產生，而也是現在存在的。如果這樣，聖者在梵天宮自己的地方，以及地獄自己的地方，如果各種異生，其他三千世界欲界等中自己的地方沒有用處，不能支援身體，變化它有什麼益處？

現在這個意義是說，現在雖然沒有用處，身體如果去到那個地方可以得到支援身體的作用，所以需要變化它。不是說現在的身體就能夠得到支援作用。說是可以支援作用的緣故。暫且比如聖者假設去到地獄中，難道也不能依靠那個地方而住嗎？異生假設去到其他方位的欲界，也可以支援身體，因為業力相同。因為粗細等等不是懸殊隔離。

如果這樣，如同人看見水，鬼看見火。那個火的外器，人為什麼看不見而叫做共同變化呢？回答是這篇論文說：

論：這說明一切有情眾生共同變化，因為所見不同。

述記：就是當自己界的一切有情眾生，可以共同受用的叫做共同。共同中的共同。如果分別受用，隨著與多少有情眾生共同變化，叫做共同。共同中不共同。因為人...

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: Supposing there is a form body, what benefit is there?

Commentary: Suppose, even if your school, like the Mahasanghika (大眾部), holds that the Formless Realm and the Form Realm both have form bodies, and that the form bodies born in the higher realms of the Form Realm have already transformed, there is still no benefit. This is because the difference between coarse and fine is too great, and they cannot depend on each other. Just as the Brahma King transforms the lower realms into land, these bodies from different realms cannot make use of it, so the transformation is useless.

Treatise: However, the transformed land becomes that place.

Commentary: The fundamental transformation is for the sake of the body, but if the body cannot use the transformation, it is useless. Therefore, if it can support the body, it transforms into that place.

Treatise: Therefore, supposing one is born in another chiliocosm (三千世界), it transforms into the land of that place.

Commentary: The following explains the correct meaning. The place where the shared manifested body resides, which is relied upon by other chiliocosms, is called the local place. All sentient beings in that local place can transform it, not just the transformation of one chiliocosm, nor the transformation of beings about to be born in other places. The Desire Realm (欲界) is the same as the Desire Realm, and so on up to the higher realms.

Treatise: Therefore, the receptacle world (器世間) is destroyed and formed, and it also exists now.

Commentary: Because there is no fault in transforming from one's own place. The receptacle world is destroyed and formed, and it also exists now. If so, for sages in their own Brahma palaces, and in their own hells, if various ordinary beings in their own places in other chiliocosms, Desire Realms, etc., are useless, unable to support the body, what is the benefit of transforming it?

The meaning here is that, although it is not useful now, if the body goes to that place, it can be supported, so it needs to be transformed. It is not that the present body can be supported immediately. It is said that it can be supported. For example, if a sage goes to hell, can he not rely on that place to stay? If an ordinary being goes to another Desire Realm, he can also support the body, because the karma is the same. Because coarseness and fineness, etc., are not vastly different.

If so, just as humans see water and ghosts see fire, why can't humans see the outer receptacle of that fire, and it is called a shared transformation? The answer is in this treatise:

Treatise: This explains that all sentient beings transform together, because what is seen is different.

Commentary: That is, all sentient beings in one's own realm, who can use it together, are called shared. Shared within shared. If it is used separately, depending on how many sentient beings transform together, it is called shared. Shared within unshared. Because humans...

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鬼等所見異故。如大梵變．及孤地獄。隨諸有情多小變之。非謂一切　問何故經說一切共變　答對法第五說。此顯生無色有未離欲業種隨故。無現行也　亦非一切一切。

上解處訖。次簡執受。執受有二。先解種子。

論。諸種子者至故是所緣。

述曰。謂即三性有漏種子俱是所緣。此識性攝故　謂性者體也。體即本識。種子是用。如前已說。諸法體用理應爾故。用是體攝　又言性者。謂是性類。其並有漏。以類同故不相違背。得為所緣　又性者性也。若住本識同無記性。故能緣之。然是識之相分所攝。如前已說。若據前緣器中三說。若言緣種是相分者。第三師正義也。無色界本識。唯緣內種故。不緣器等。若據前二師義。無色亦但約緣種說以無身故。實亦緣器。今非彼義。不可用之。無色緣種。亦有解云。即為自體分。見分緣器故。彼據自體分故言唯緣種　前師問。種是識自體。即為相分緣。真如即自證。亦應相分緣。答彼識性故。此非識性。識上功能。為相分緣。不同如也。設佛見分緣于自證。作影像緣。不爾便無四分之義。故下第八唯除見分非相所緣。許見分亦緣自證分等。但不親證。影變亦得。

難此解云。有漏種子依自體分。識即緣之。無漏之種亦依自體。識為緣不。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：鬼和其他眾生所見不同，例如大梵天（Mahābrahmā，色界初禪天的天主）的變化以及孤地獄的情況，都隨著不同有情眾生的大小而變化。這並不是說一切都是如此。問：為什麼經中說一切都是共同變化的呢？答：在《對法論》第五卷中說，這顯示了生於無色界（Arūpadhātu，佛教三界之一，沒有物質存在的境界）的有情，由於還沒有脫離慾望，其業的種子仍然存在，但沒有現行。也不是一切的一切都是如此。 上面解釋了『處』。接下來簡要說明『執受』。執受有兩種，首先解釋種子。 論：各種種子都是所緣（ālambana，心識所緣的對象），因為它們是識的自性所攝持。 述記：這意味著三性（善、惡、無記）的有漏種子都是所緣。這是因為它們被識的自性所攝持。這裡說的『性』是指體性，體性就是本識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識，又稱藏識）。種子是作用。正如前面已經說過的，諸法的體和用都應該是這樣的，作用是被體所攝持的。又說『性』是指性類，它們都是有漏的，因為種類相同，所以不相互違背，可以作為所緣。又，『性』是指自性，如果安住在本識中，就具有相同的無記性，所以能夠緣取它。然而，它是識的相分（nimitta-bhāga，心識的客觀部分）所攝持的，正如前面已經說過的。如果根據前面所說的緣取器世間的三種說法，如果說緣取種子是相分，那麼這是第三位論師的正確觀點。阿賴耶識不緣取器世間等，只緣取內在的種子。如果根據前兩位論師的觀點，無色界也只是就緣取種子而言，因為沒有身體的緣故。實際上也緣取器世間。現在不是他們的觀點，所以不能採用。關於無色界緣取種子，也有解釋說，這是作為自體分（sva-bhāga，心識的自體部分）。見分（darśana-bhāga，心識的能見部分）緣取器世間。他們是根據自體分來說的，所以說只緣取種子。前一位論師問：種子是識的自體，也就是相分所緣取的。真如（tathatā，事物的真實如是的狀態）是自證分（sva-saṃvedana-bhāga，心識的自我覺知部分），也應該是相分所緣取的。回答說：真如是識的自性，而種子不是識的自性，而是識上的功能，所以可以作為相分所緣取的，與真如不同。假設佛的見分緣取自證分，是作為影像緣取，否則就沒有四分（心識的四個部分：見分、相分、自證分、證自證分）的意義了。所以下面說第八識（阿賴耶識）唯獨排除見分不是相分所緣取的，允許見分也緣取自證分等，但不是親自證知，而是通過影像變化來證知。 有人提出疑問說：這樣解釋，有漏種子依附於自體分，識就緣取它。那麼無漏的種子也依附於自體分，識是否緣取它？ 論：

【English Translation】 English version: The perceptions of ghosts and other beings differ. For example, the transformations of Mahābrahmā (the lord of the first Dhyāna heaven in the Realm of Form) and the conditions of solitary hells vary according to the size and nature of different sentient beings. It is not that everything is like this. Question: Why does the scripture say that everything changes together? Answer: The fifth volume of the Abhidharmakośa says that this shows that sentient beings born in the Arūpadhātu (the Formless Realm, one of the three realms in Buddhism, a realm without material existence) still have the seeds of karma because they have not yet detached from desire, but these seeds are not manifest. It is not that everything is everything. The above explains 'place'. Next, briefly explain 'reception'. There are two types of reception. First, explain the seeds. Treatise: All seeds are ālambana (objects of consciousness) because they are contained within the nature of consciousness. Commentary: This means that the tainted seeds of the three natures (good, evil, and neutral) are all ālambana. This is because they are contained within the nature of consciousness. Here, 'nature' refers to essence, and essence is the ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness). Seeds are function. As previously stated, the essence and function of all dharmas should be like this, and function is contained within essence. Also, 'nature' refers to type, and they are all tainted because they are of the same type, so they do not contradict each other and can serve as ālambana. Also, 'nature' refers to self-nature. If residing in the ālayavijñāna, they have the same neutral nature, so they can be apprehended. However, it is contained within the nimitta-bhāga (objective aspect of consciousness) of consciousness, as previously stated. If based on the three explanations of apprehending the vessel world mentioned earlier, if it is said that apprehending seeds is the nimitta-bhāga, then this is the correct view of the third teacher. The ālayavijñāna does not apprehend the vessel world, etc., but only apprehends internal seeds. If based on the views of the first two teachers, the Formless Realm also only refers to apprehending seeds because there is no body. In reality, it also apprehends the vessel world. This is not their view now, so it cannot be adopted. Regarding the Formless Realm apprehending seeds, there is also an explanation that it is as the sva-bhāga (self-aspect of consciousness). The darśana-bhāga (perceiving aspect of consciousness) apprehends the vessel world. They are speaking based on the sva-bhāga, so they say only apprehending seeds. The previous teacher asked: Seeds are the self-nature of consciousness, which is what the nimitta-bhāga apprehends. Tathatā (the true suchness of things) is the sva-saṃvedana-bhāga (self-awareness aspect of consciousness), so it should also be apprehended by the nimitta-bhāga. The answer is: Tathatā is the nature of consciousness, while seeds are not the nature of consciousness, but rather a function on consciousness, so it can be apprehended as the nimitta-bhāga, unlike Tathatā. Suppose the Buddha's darśana-bhāga apprehends the sva-saṃvedana-bhāga as an image, otherwise there would be no meaning to the four aspects (the four parts of consciousness: darśana-bhāga, nimitta-bhāga, sva-saṃvedana-bhāga, and svasaṃvedanasaṃvedana-bhāga). Therefore, it is said below that the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna) exclusively excludes the darśana-bhāga from being apprehended by the nimitta-bhāga, allowing the darśana-bhāga to also apprehend the sva-saṃvedana-bhāga, etc., but not directly knowing it, but knowing it through image transformation. Someone raised a question saying: According to this explanation, tainted seeds rely on the sva-bhāga, and consciousness apprehends it. Then do untainted seeds also rely on the sva-bhāga, and does consciousness apprehend it? Treatise:

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。無漏法種至故非所緣。

述曰。對治識故。體性異故。不相順故。故非所緣。四分之中依自體分。非即是識自體分收。性相乖故　若爾本識既不變緣。何名唯識。

論。雖非所緣至不違唯識。

述曰。由不離識故言唯識。此意即是非離識外別有實物。故名唯識。如真如性識雖不變。離識外無故名唯識。唯識但遮心外法故　若爾心所亦不離識。應名唯識　此亦不然。心所不依識之自體。別有行相。不可例同。然識相應。亦不離識。故並唯識　問有漏種中有三界種。如在欲界。上界善等種。不離於識體。即名無記性。體不離於識。應名欲界系。此義應思　答不然。系據縛義。即法體上差別義故。三界系別。然性即是體類義故。同無記性。仍未了知。此中三性種隨識皆無記。亦應煩惱種隨識非煩惱。如是一切皆如理思　問大乘所緣本是心變。隨心何系地境亦隨之故。如在欲界命終生上。此潤生愛是上界系。依欲界身緣欲界身。仍相分中所變相分是上界系。隨見心說。第七緣第八相分亦然。何故不如此中緣種。境是異界系。心是異界系　答曰。不例。如本識緣異地身。異地器。異地身者。在地獄起他界地天眼．耳等。此豈非是緣異地身。異地器者。如緣于彼無色諸天淚下如雨。此非菩薩生彼化作。聖說菩

{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：無漏的法種因為是至極的，所以不是所緣的境界。", "", "述記中說：因為能對治阿賴耶識，體性和阿賴耶識不同，並且和阿賴耶識不相順應，所以不是阿賴耶識所緣的。在阿賴耶識的四分中，無漏法種依于自體分，但並非就是阿賴耶識的自體分所攝，因為體性和行相相違背。如果這樣，根本識既然不變緣，為什麼還稱為『唯識』呢？", "", "論中說：雖然阿賴耶識不是無漏法種的所緣，但並不違背『唯識』的教義。", "", "述記中說：因為無漏法種不離於識，所以說『唯識』。這個意思是說，並非在識之外別有實物，所以稱為『唯識』。如同真如的體性，識雖然不變緣，但因為在識之外沒有真如，所以稱為『唯識』。『唯識』只是遮遣心外之法。如果這樣，心所也不離識，應該也稱為『唯識』。這也不對。心所不依于識的自體，別有行相，不可類比。然而心所和識相應，也不離識，所以都屬於『唯識』。問：有漏的種子中有三界（欲界，色界，無色界）的種子，比如在欲界，上界的善等種子，不離於識體，就名為無記性。體不離於識，應該名為欲界系。這個道理應該思考。答：不是這樣的。『系』是繫縛的意思，指的是法體上的差別義。三界有繫縛的差別。然而『性』是體類的意思，所以同爲無記性。仍然沒有完全理解。這其中三性的種子隨識都是無記性，也應該像煩惱的種子隨識並非煩惱一樣。像這樣一切都要如理思維。問：大乘所緣的本來是心變現的，隨心而系，地境也隨之。比如在欲界命終而生到上界，這個潤生的愛是上界系，依于欲界身緣欲界身，仍然在相分中所變現的相分是上界系，隨所見的心而說。第七識緣第八識的相分也是這樣。為什麼不這樣類比，而說緣種子，境是異界系，心是異界系？答：不能類比。比如本識緣異地的身，異地的器物。異地的身，比如在地獄生起他界的地天眼、耳等。這難道不是緣異地的身嗎？異地的器物，比如緣于彼無色諸天淚如雨下。這並非菩薩生到那裡化作的，聖者這樣說。", "" ], "english_translations": [ "English version: The undefiled dharma seeds, because they are ultimate, are not objects of cognition (所緣, so yuan).", "", "The commentary states: Because they counteract the Alaya consciousness (阿賴耶識), their nature is different, and they are not in accordance with the Alaya consciousness, therefore they are not objects of its cognition. Among the four parts of the Alaya consciousness, the undefiled dharma seeds rely on the self-nature part, but they are not included in the self-nature part of the Alaya consciousness, because their nature and characteristics are contradictory. If this is the case, since the fundamental consciousness (本識, ben shi) does not change and cognize, why is it called 'Only Consciousness' (唯識, wei shi)?", "", "The treatise states: Although the Alaya consciousness is not the object of cognition of the undefiled dharma seeds, it does not contradict the doctrine of 'Only Consciousness'.", "", "The commentary states: Because the undefiled dharma seeds are not separate from consciousness, it is called 'Only Consciousness'. This means that there are no real objects separate from consciousness, hence the name 'Only Consciousness'. Like the nature of Suchness (真如, zhen ru), although consciousness does not change and cognize it, because there is no Suchness outside of consciousness, it is called 'Only Consciousness'. 'Only Consciousness' only negates dharmas outside of the mind. If this is the case, mental functions (心所, xin suo) are also not separate from consciousness, so they should also be called 'Only Consciousness'. This is not correct. Mental functions do not rely on the self-nature of consciousness and have separate characteristics, so they cannot be compared. However, mental functions are associated with consciousness and are also not separate from consciousness, so they are included in 'Only Consciousness'. Question: Among the defiled seeds, there are seeds of the Three Realms (三界, san jie) [desire realm (欲界, yu jie), form realm (色界, se jie), formless realm (無色界, wu se jie)]. For example, in the desire realm, the seeds of goodness, etc., of the upper realms are not separate from the substance of consciousness and are called neutral (無記性, wu ji xing). Since the substance is not separate from consciousness, it should be called belonging to the desire realm. This meaning should be considered. Answer: It is not like that. 'Belonging' refers to the meaning of bondage, which refers to the difference in the substance of the dharma. The Three Realms have differences in bondage. However, 'nature' refers to the meaning of the category of substance, so they are all neutral. It is still not fully understood. Among these, the seeds of the three natures (三性, san xing) [good, evil, neutral] are all neutral with consciousness, and it should also be like the seeds of afflictions (煩惱, fan nao) are not afflictions with consciousness. Like this, everything should be considered according to reason. Question: What is cognized in Mahayana is originally a transformation of the mind, and it is bound by the mind, and the realm of the earth also follows it. For example, if one dies in the desire realm and is born in the upper realm, this love that moistens birth belongs to the upper realm. Relying on the body of the desire realm and cognizing the body of the desire realm, the appearance-portion (相分, xiang fen) transformed in the appearance-portion is still of the upper realm, according to what the mind sees. The seventh consciousness cognizing the appearance-portion of the eighth consciousness is also like this. Why not make this analogy and say that the object of cognition of the seeds is of a different realm, and the mind is of a different realm? Answer: It cannot be compared. For example, the fundamental consciousness cognizes the body of a different land and the objects of a different land. The body of a different land, for example, in the lower realm, one arises the heavenly eyes and ears of another realm. Isn't this cognizing the body of a different land? The objects of a different land, for example, cognizing the tears of the formless heavens falling like rain. This is not a Bodhisattva born there transforming, the sage said so." "" ] }

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薩不生彼故。乃是信有第八教。生彼入滅定。此是利根。亦緣下地。即利根不還。阿羅漢等。又下菩薩等入彼界定所變生色。此並得緣。故同種子相．見地別。此同前難。何勞為證　此若不爾七識緣境。下文但據由分別心。不是定有實用故變。本識必有實用故變。他界地身．器。見．相得別系。七識不爾故系隨相。若不爾者。本識亦但隨心變境。即天眼．耳無識持故。應名爛壞。應非有情。若一身中起二界身俱是．實有。第八不持非此身攝即眾生界有增減過。第十卷云三性雜生。故相．見分不必同性。如二禪以上起初禪眼．耳．身識緣上地色。此亦相．見別地所繫　問第七識緣但分別有無實用者。即五識色等應無質礙　此中問答不緣識中自當分別　難一師云。若本識所變皆有實用變他根等應為識依。有實用故。如自眼根。應設功勞。他之實根心外法故。所變之根便無實用。若亦為他依。便緣心外法。此緣他法但似彼根。非實有用。若變自法即實有用　問如變他色等。似他色等言有用。變他身根等似他根等。應有實用　答此亦為例。變似他色等。實非他有用。變似他根等。亦非他有用　若爾變似他色等。於己實有用。變似他根時。於己有何用。於己有實用。應為自識依有實用故。如變自根。此應思度　若為自受用變似他

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果『薩』（薩迦耶見，認為五蘊是『我』的錯誤觀念）不生起，他就不會因此而轉生到彼處（指輪迴）。這是因為他已經相信了第八識（阿賴耶識）的教義。如果他轉生到彼處並進入滅盡定，這就是利根之人（具有敏銳智慧的人）。他們也可能緣于下地（較低的境界）。即使是利根的不還果（不再返回欲界的人），阿羅漢等，以及下位菩薩等，進入彼界定（指滅盡定）所變現的色法，這些都可以作為所緣。因此，雖然種子相同，但相分（客觀影像）和見分（主觀認知）的境界是不同的。這與之前的難題相同，何必再作證明呢？ 如果不是這樣，七識緣境（第七識緣取境界），下文只是根據由分別心（分別事物的心理）所產生的。不是說它一定有實際作用才變現。而本識（阿賴耶識）必定有實際作用才變現。他界的地、身、器（指其他世界的環境、身體和器物），見分和相分可以有不同的聯繫。七識不是這樣，所以聯繫是隨相而定的。如果不是這樣，本識也只是隨心變現境界，那麼天眼、天耳等沒有識的維持，應該腐爛損壞，應該不是有情眾生。 如果一個身體中同時出現兩個不同世界的身體，並且都是真實存在的，那麼第八識如果不執持，就不是這個身體所包含的，那麼眾生界就會有增減的過失。《第十卷》說三性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）是混合產生的，所以相分和見分不必是同一性質的。例如，在二禪以上，產生初禪的眼、耳、身識，緣于上地的色法，這也是相分和見分屬於不同的境界。 問：如果第七識緣取只是分別有無實際作用的事物，那麼五識所緣的色等，應該沒有質礙（物質的阻礙）才對。 答：這裡所問的，是不緣于識中的事物，自然應當分別。 難：一位論師說，如果本識所變現的一切都有實際作用，那麼變現其他的根等，應該作為識的所依，因為它有實際作用。就像自己的眼根一樣，應該需要付出努力。因為其他的真實根是心外之法，所以變現出來的根就沒有實際作用。如果也作為他人的所依，那就是緣於心外之法。這種緣於他法，只是像那個根，並非真正有用。如果變現自己的法，那就是真正有用。 問：例如變現其他的色等，說像其他的色等是有用的，那麼變現其他的身根等，說像其他的根等，應該有實際作用才對。 答：這也是一個例子。變現得像其他的色等，實際上對他者沒有用處。變現得像其他的根等，也對他者沒有用處。 問：如果這樣，變現得像其他的色等，對於自己來說是有用的。那麼變現得像其他的根時，對於自己有什麼用處？ 答：對於自己有實際用處，應該作為自己識的所依，因為它有實際作用。就像變現自己的根一樣。這應該仔細思考。 如果爲了自己受用而變現得像其他的...

【English Translation】 English version: If 『Sat』 (Sakkāya-ditthi, the false view that the five aggregates are 『I』) does not arise, then he will not be reborn there (referring to Samsara). This is because he has already believed in the doctrine of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna). If he is reborn there and enters the extinction attainment (Nirodha-samāpatti), this is a person of sharp faculties (possessing keen wisdom). They may also be related to the lower realms (lower states of existence). Even the Anāgāmin (Non-Returner) with sharp faculties, Arhats, and lower Bodhisattvas, etc., when entering that realm of attainment (referring to Nirodha-samāpatti), the form produced by transformation can be taken as an object of cognition. Therefore, although the seeds are the same, the object-aspect (objective image) and the subject-aspect (subjective cognition) have different realms. This is the same as the previous difficulty, why bother to prove it again? If this is not the case, the seventh consciousness cognizes objects, the following text is only based on what is produced by the discriminating mind (the mind that distinguishes things). It is not that it necessarily has a practical function to transform. But the fundamental consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) must have a practical function to transform. The lands, bodies, and vessels (referring to the environment, bodies, and objects of other worlds) of other realms, the subject-aspect and object-aspect can have different connections. The seventh consciousness is not like this, so the connection is determined by the appearance. If this is not the case, the fundamental consciousness also only transforms the realm according to the mind, then the divine eye, divine ear, etc., without the maintenance of consciousness, should decay and be damaged, and should not be sentient beings. If two bodies from different worlds appear simultaneously in one body, and both are real, then if the eighth consciousness does not uphold it, it is not contained in this body, then there will be the fault of increase or decrease in the realm of sentient beings. The 『Tenth Volume』 says that the three natures (Parikalpita-svabhāva, Paratantra-svabhāva, and Parinispanna-svabhāva) are produced in a mixed manner, so the object-aspect and subject-aspect do not necessarily have the same nature. For example, in the second Dhyana and above, the eye, ear, and body consciousness of the first Dhyana arise, cognizing the form of the upper realm, this is also the object-aspect and subject-aspect belonging to different realms. Question: If the seventh consciousness only cognizes things that are distinguished as having or not having practical function, then the form, etc., cognized by the five consciousnesses should not have material obstruction (material hindrance). Answer: What is asked here is that which is not related to things in consciousness, it should naturally be distinguished. Objection: One teacher says, if everything transformed by the fundamental consciousness has a practical function, then transforming other roots, etc., should serve as the basis of consciousness, because it has a practical function. Just like one's own eye-root, it should require effort. Because other real roots are external to the mind, the transformed roots have no practical function. If it also serves as the basis for others, then it is related to things external to the mind. This kind of relation to other things is only like that root, not truly useful. If one transforms one's own things, then it is truly useful. Question: For example, transforming other forms, saying that being like other forms is useful, then transforming other body-roots, saying that being like other roots, should have a practical function. Answer: This is also an example. Transforming to be like other forms, in reality, is not useful to others. Transforming to be like other roots, is also not useful to others. Question: If so, transforming to be like other forms is useful to oneself. Then when transforming to be like other roots, what use is it to oneself? Answer: It has a practical function for oneself, it should serve as the basis of one's own consciousness, because it has a practical function. Just like transforming one's own roots. This should be carefully considered. If it is transformed to be like others for one's own enjoyment...

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根。他根於己亦名有用。此義不然。豈於他根己能受用。以無用故。不變他根。故知下文第二說勝。于不緣心等由此即無妨。

二執受中。上解種子訖。次解有根身。

論。有根身者至及所造色。

述曰。身者總名。身中有根名有根身　此中所言不共相種。若如前說。不共中不共。如即自根。不共中共。如在身色等。今此具二　然依中邊。下一師說亦變他根。即根亦是不共中共。如色等故　今此不然。變根不似他實根故。若變色等似他色故。

論。有共相種至受用他義。

述曰。不共中共名共相種。由受用他故變他身。即前不共今名為共。此即最初總說本識於他亦變。不論根．境。于中差別。

論。此中有義亦變似根。

述曰。非唯似塵。亦似根故。

以何為證。

論。辨中邊說至五根現故。

述曰。既言亦似他根。故許變也。此有何義。若言受用。不用他根。又本識變皆有實用。若許變根。全無實用。非他依故。變何用者。此亦不然。為欲受用他身依處故變他根。由根若無時依處亦無故。如色界系鼻．舌依處。根若無者依處亦無。不爾彼界應無二根。唯有依處莊嚴身故。由為受用亦變似根。又本識變皆有實用。此不能生識故不能變者。理亦不然。色

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 根。如果說根源於自身，也可以說是『有用』。但這種說法是不對的。怎麼能說根源於他物，自身也能受用呢？因為這樣就變得沒有用處了。如果不變為他人的根，那麼就知道下文第二種說法更為正確。對於不緣心等情況，由此也就沒有妨礙。

二、在執受中，上面已經解釋了種子，接下來解釋有根身。

論：有根身，以及所造色。

述記：『身』是一個總稱。身中具有根，就稱為『有根身』。這裡所說的『不共相種』，如果像前面所說的那樣，『不共』中的『不共』，就像是自身的根；『不共』中的『共』，就像是在身體的色等。現在這裡兼具這兩種情況。然而依照《中邊分別論》，下一位論師說也變現他人的根，即根也是『不共』中的『共』，就像色等一樣。現在這裡不這樣認為，變現根不同於他人的真實根。如果變現色等，就類似於他人的色。

論：有共相種，從而受用他人的意義。

述記：『不共』中的『共』，稱為『共相種』。由於受用他人的緣故，變現他人的身體。即前面所說的『不共』，現在稱為『共』。這也就是最初總說阿賴耶識對於他人也進行變現，不論是根還是境，都在其中有所差別。

論：其中有意義也變現得像根一樣。

述記：不僅僅像塵，也像根一樣。

以什麼作為證據呢？

論：在《辨中邊論》中說，五根顯現的緣故。

述記：既然說也像他人的根，所以允許變現。這有什麼意義呢？如果說是爲了受用，卻不用他人的根。而且阿賴耶識的變現都有實際用處。如果允許變現根，卻完全沒有實際用處，因為它不是他所依賴的。變現它有什麼用呢？這種說法也是不對的。爲了想要受用他人身體的依處，所以變現他人的根。因為根如果不存在，那麼依處也就不存在。比如象的鼻子、舌頭是其依處。根如果不存在，依處也就不存在。否則，那個世界應該沒有這兩種根，只有作為依處的莊嚴身體。因為爲了受用，所以也變現得像根一樣。而且阿賴耶識的變現都有實際用處。如果說不能產生識，所以不能變現，這個道理也是不對的。色等

【English Translation】 English version Root. If it is said that the root originates from itself, it can also be called 'useful.' But this statement is not correct. How can it be said that the root originates from others, and oneself can also benefit from it? Because in that case, it becomes useless. If it does not transform into the root of others, then it is known that the second statement below is more correct. Regarding situations such as not being conditioned by mind, there is no obstacle because of this.

1. In the appropriation, the seeds have been explained above, and next the rooted body is explained.

Treatise: The rooted body, as well as the produced form.

Commentary: 'Body' is a general term. A body with roots is called a 'rooted body.' The 'uncommon characteristic seed' mentioned here, if it is as said before, the 'uncommon' within the 'uncommon' is like one's own root; the 'common' within the 'uncommon' is like the form etc. in the body. Now this has both situations. However, according to the Madhyāntavibhāga (Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes), the next teacher says that it also transforms the roots of others, that is, the root is also the 'common' within the 'uncommon,' like form etc. Now this is not considered so; transforming the root is not like the real root of others. If transforming form etc., it is similar to the form of others.

Treatise: The common characteristic seed, thereby benefiting from the meaning of others.

Commentary: The 'common' within the 'uncommon' is called the 'common characteristic seed.' Because of benefiting from others, it transforms the body of others. That is, the 'uncommon' mentioned earlier is now called 'common.' This is the initial general statement that the Ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness) also transforms for others, regardless of whether it is root or object, there are differences within it.

Treatise: Among them, there is meaning that also transforms to be like a root.

Commentary: Not only like dust, but also like a root.

What is the proof?

Treatise: In the Madhyāntavibhāga it is said, because the five roots appear.

Commentary: Since it is said that it is also like the roots of others, it is allowed to transform. What is the meaning of this? If it is said that it is for the sake of benefiting, but the roots of others are not used. Moreover, the transformations of the Ālaya-vijñāna all have practical uses. If it is allowed to transform the root, it has no practical use at all, because it is not what it relies on. What is the use of transforming it? This statement is also incorrect. In order to want to benefit from the place of reliance of the body of others, the roots of others are transformed. Because if the root does not exist, then the place of reliance does not exist either. For example, the elephant's nose and tongue are its places of reliance. If the root does not exist, the place of reliance does not exist either. Otherwise, that world should not have these two roots, only the adorned body as the place of reliance. Because for the sake of benefiting, it also transforms to be like a root. Moreover, the transformations of the Ālaya-vijñāna all have practical uses. If it is said that it cannot produce consciousness, so it cannot transform, this reasoning is also incorrect. Form etc.

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界鼻．舌根雖不能生識。本識亦變故。生盲等亦爾。故知本識定變他根。然無實根用。非他識依故。此即安惠等諸大論師解　然即彼論舊本第四頌言。根．塵．我．及識。本識生似彼。此不應爾。豈複本識亦起我也。亦緣心乎　今正翻云。識生變似義．有情．我．及了。此境實非有。境無故識無　識者八識　生變似義。即是五塵。義之言境。以依他法似實有故　變似有情。即是五根。眾生數法　情即根是。名薩埵故　變似我者。是末那緣變　及了者。六識緣之。即第八緣塵．根二色。第七緣我。六識緣六塵所了法義　舊論長行義與此同。彼頌翻錯。譯師意存一意識義。彼頌長行自違返故。今此論引彼長行文。彼論但言似自．他身五根而現。為是誰緣。不定說言第八能緣自他根故。

論。有義唯能至非所用故。

述曰。此護法菩薩等解。唯變他根依處。他根於己都無用故。若無用亦變。何不變七識。無緣慮用而得緣故。

若爾彼說自他根現文如何通。

論。似自他身至各自變義。

述曰。彼說自他阿賴耶識各自變為根。非自變他根。一則無用不變他根。二由彼論不定說言自身本識變他根故。不可為證。又色界化生。根無處可無。欲界不爾。又彼色界不變根者。依處便丑。如木人鼻．舌。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 界鼻（界限）、舌根雖然不能直接產生意識，但根本識（本識，Alaya-vijñana）會發生變化，從而影響它們。就像天生盲人等情況一樣。因此，可以知道根本識一定會影響其他根（感官）。然而，這些根並沒有實際的作用，因為它們不依賴於其他識。這是安慧（Anhui）等大論師的解釋。 然而，在那部論的舊版本第四頌中說：『根、塵、我、及識，本識生似彼。』這不應該這樣說。難道根本識也會產生『我』嗎？也會緣取心嗎？ 現在正確的翻譯是：『識生變似義、有情、我、及了。此境實非有，境無故識無。』 這裡的『識』指的是八識（八種意識，Eight Consciousnesses）。『生變似義』，指的是五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸，the five sense objects）。『義』的意思是『境』，因為依他起法（dependent origination）看起來像是真實存在一樣。 『變似有情』，指的是五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身，the five sense organs）。是眾生之數的法。『情』就是根，被稱為薩埵（Sattva）。 『變似我者』，是末那識（末那識，Manas-vijñana）緣取的變化。 『及了者』，是六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識，the six consciousnesses）緣取的變化。也就是第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijñana）緣取塵、根二色，第七識（末那識，Manas-vijñana）緣取『我』，六識緣取六塵所了知的法義。 舊論的長行（散文解釋）的意義與此相同。那首頌翻譯錯了，譯者意在強調單一意識的意義，但那首頌的長行解釋自相矛盾。現在這部論引用了那部長行文，那部論只是說『看起來像是自身和他身五根而顯現』，但沒有確定說是誰緣取的，因此不能確定說是第八識能夠緣取自身和他人的根。 論：有一種觀點認為，阿賴耶識只能到達，而不能被使用。 述曰：這是護法菩薩（Dharmapala）等人的解釋。阿賴耶識只能變化其他根作為依靠之處，其他根對自身沒有任何作用。如果沒有作用也會變化，為什麼不變化第七識呢？因為第七識沒有緣慮的作用卻能緣取。 如果這樣，那麼他們所說的『自身和他身根顯現』的說法該如何解釋呢？ 論：看起來像是自身和他身，各自變化意義。 述曰：他們所說的自身和他身，是阿賴耶識各自變化為根，而不是自身變化為他人的根。一是沒有作用就不會變化他人的根，二是由於那部論沒有明確地說自身本識變化為他人的根，所以不能作為證據。而且，化生（化生，Opapāduka）的眾生，根沒有地方可以不具備，欲界（Kāmadhātu）的眾生不是這樣。而且，那些化生眾生不變根的話，依靠之處就會醜陋，就像木頭人的鼻子、舌頭一樣。 English version Although the boundary nose (Jiebi) and tongue roots cannot directly generate consciousness, the fundamental consciousness (Alaya-vijñana) changes and affects them. This is similar to the case of congenital blindness. Therefore, it can be known that the fundamental consciousness definitely affects other roots (senses). However, these roots do not have actual functions because they do not depend on other consciousnesses. This is the explanation of great masters such as Anhui. However, in the fourth verse of the old version of that treatise, it says: 'Roots, dust, self, and consciousness, the fundamental consciousness seems to generate them.' This should not be said like this. Does the fundamental consciousness also generate 'self'? Does it also grasp the mind? Now the correct translation is: 'Consciousness arises and transforms, resembling meaning, sentient beings, self, and understanding. These realms are not real, and without realms, there is no consciousness.' Here, 'consciousness' refers to the Eight Consciousnesses. 'Arising and transforming, resembling meaning' refers to the five dusts (form, sound, smell, taste, touch). 'Meaning' means 'realm,' because dependent origination appears to be real. 'Transforming, resembling sentient beings' refers to the five roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body). It is the dharma of the number of sentient beings. 'Sentient' is the root, called Sattva. 'Transforming, resembling self' is the transformation grasped by Manas-vijñana. 'And understanding' is the transformation grasped by the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness). That is, the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñana) grasps the two forms of dust and root, the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñana) grasps 'self,' and the six consciousnesses grasp the meaning of the dharmas understood by the six dusts. The meaning of the prose explanation (long line) in the old treatise is the same as this. That verse was translated incorrectly. The translator intended to emphasize the meaning of a single consciousness, but the prose explanation of that verse contradicts itself. Now this treatise quotes that prose text. That treatise only says 'it appears like one's own and others' five roots,' but it does not determine who grasps it, so it cannot be determined that the eighth consciousness can grasp one's own and others' roots. Treatise: There is a view that Alaya-vijñana can only reach, but cannot be used. Commentary: This is the explanation of Bodhisattva Dharmapala and others. Alaya-vijñana can only transform other roots as a place of reliance. Other roots have no function for themselves. If there is no function, it will also transform. Why doesn't it transform the seventh consciousness? Because the seventh consciousness does not have the function of grasping and contemplating, but it can grasp. If so, how should their statement that 'one's own and others' roots appear' be explained? Treatise: It looks like one's own and others' bodies, each transforming meaning. Commentary: What they say about one's own and others' bodies is that Alaya-vijñana transforms into roots respectively, not that one's own transforms into others' roots. First, without function, it will not transform others' roots. Second, because that treatise does not explicitly say that one's own fundamental consciousness transforms into others' roots, it cannot be used as evidence. Moreover, for beings born by transformation (Opapāduka), there is no place where roots can be lacking. This is not the case for beings in the Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu). Moreover, if those beings born by transformation do not transform roots, the place of reliance will be ugly, like the nose and tongue of a wooden man.

【English Translation】 English translation line 1 English translation line 2

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由善業殊勝。所感依處極甚光凈。故要假根相扶依處方好。此則不爾。故不為例　若爾欲界亦有感得他殊妙身而受用之。何不變根扶助依處令其光潔　此理不然。色界諸根自識所變。令則變他。何以為例。又彼色界只是無識。識若依根。根則有用。今欲界者。若變為根殊無實用。非自他識之所依故。殊不相例。是義應思。

何以得知變他依處。

論。故生他地至猶見相續。

述曰。若生他地或上或下。或入無餘。彼余屍骸猶見相續。不爾應無餘屍骸義。以不能變他依處故。由此故知變他依處　如生色界鼻舌二根。如何會釋　身為自情變。無根依亦無。他塵非己情。何必須根有。此理應思。

雖知根處各變自他。然他地者亦得緣不。

論。前來且說至界地差別。

述曰。自下第三即總料簡　于中有二。初簡前未盡顯所未明。后略說此識以下。總束以前義門分別。上來所說界地差別唯緣自地。以隨識系能受用故。

論。若定等力至則不決定。

述曰。言定等者。等取通力。或借識起或大願力。或法威力。此通諸識有五種力。若第八變唯有定通。

或總四力　大愿即法力。更無別能故　通力所變其事云何　變異地身者。如除如來得有漏通者。身在地獄地。起上天眼

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由於善業殊勝，所感得的依處極其光明潔凈，所以需要藉助根的相扶，依處才好。但這種情況並非如此，所以不能作為例子。如果這樣說，欲界也有感得他人殊妙之身而受用的情況，為什麼不變根扶助依處，使其光明潔凈呢？這個道理不對。諸根是自身意識所變現的，如果讓其變現他人之物，又怎麼能作為例子呢？而且那只是無識之物。意識如果依附於根，根才有用。現在欲界的情況是，如果變為根，殊無實用，因為它不是自身或他人意識所依附的。這兩種情況很不相同，這個道理應該仔細思考。

如何得知變現他人依處？

論：所以生於他地，乃至還能見到（屍骸的）相續。

述記：如果生於他地，或上或下，或者進入無餘涅槃，他剩餘的屍骸還能見到相續。否則，就不應該有無餘屍骸的說法，因為不能變現他人依處。由此可知，（第八識）能變現他人依處。比如生出鼻根和舌根，如何解釋？身體是自身情識所變現的，沒有根也能存在。他人的塵境不是自己的情識，為什麼必須要有根才能存在？這個道理應該仔細思考。

雖然知道根和處所各自變現自身和他人的，但是他地之物也能緣取嗎？

論：前面且說到界地差別。

述記：從下文第三段開始，就是總體的料簡。其中有兩點：第一，簡要說明前面未盡之意，顯明尚未闡明之處；第二，簡略地說從『此識』以下，總括以前的義門分別。上面所說的界地差別，只能緣取自地之物，因為隨順意識的繫縛，才能受用。

論：如果依靠禪定等力量，則不一定。

述記：所說的『禪定等』，『等』包括神通力。或者憑藉意識生起，或者憑藉大願力，或者憑藉法的威力。這五種力量普遍存在於各種識中。如果第八識變現，只有禪定和神通力。

或者總共有四種力量。大願力就是法力，沒有其他能力。神通力所變現的事情是怎樣的呢？變異地身的情況是，比如除了如來，得到有漏神通的人，身體在地獄，卻能生起上天的天眼。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the excellence of virtuous karma, the support (依處, yīchù - support/basis) felt is extremely bright and pure, so it needs the support of the roots (根, gēn - sense organs) to be good. This is not the case here, so it cannot be taken as an example. If so, the desire realm (欲界, yùjiè - realm of desire) also has the case of feeling and enjoying the wonderful bodies of others. Why not change the roots to support the support, making it bright and clean? This reasoning is not correct. The roots are transformed by one's own consciousness (識, shí - consciousness). If it is transformed into something of others, how can it be taken as an example? Moreover, that is just something without consciousness. If consciousness relies on the roots, then the roots are useful. Now, in the desire realm, if it is transformed into roots, it is of no practical use, because it is not relied upon by one's own or others' consciousness. These two situations are very different, and this principle should be carefully considered.

How can we know that it transforms the support of others?

Treatise: Therefore, being born in another land, one can still see the continuation (of the corpse).

Commentary: If one is born in another land, either above or below, or enters Nirvana without residue (無餘涅槃, wúyú nièpán - Nirvana without remainder), the remaining corpse can still be seen to continue. Otherwise, there should be no such thing as a corpse without residue, because it cannot transform the support of others. From this, we know that (the eighth consciousness) can transform the support of others. For example, how to explain the arising of the nose and tongue roots? The body is transformed by one's own emotions and consciousness. It can exist without roots. The dust of others is not one's own emotions and consciousness, so why must there be roots? This principle should be carefully considered.

Although it is known that the roots and places each transform themselves and others, can things from other lands also be cognized?

Treatise: Previously, we only talked about the differences between realms and lands.

Commentary: From the third section below, there is a general discussion. There are two points: first, a brief explanation of the unfinished meaning of the previous section, clarifying what has not yet been clarified; second, a brief statement from 'this consciousness' onwards, summarizing the previous distinctions of the meaning gates. The differences between realms and lands mentioned above can only cognize things from one's own land, because they can be enjoyed by following the bondage of consciousness.

Treatise: If relying on the power of Samadhi (禪定, chándìng - meditation) and so on, then it is not certain.

Commentary: The 'Samadhi and so on' includes supernatural powers (神通力, shéntōng lì - supernatural power). Or it arises by relying on consciousness, or by relying on great vows, or by relying on the power of the Dharma. These five powers are common to all kinds of consciousness. If the eighth consciousness transforms, there are only Samadhi and supernatural powers.

Or there are a total of four powers. Great vows are the power of the Dharma, and there is no other power. What is the matter transformed by supernatural power? The situation of transforming the body of a different land is like, for example, apart from the Tathagata (如來, Rúlái - Thus Come One), those who have obtained defiled supernatural powers, their body is in the lower realm, but they can generate the heavenly eye (天眼, tiānyǎn - divine eye) of the upper heavens.

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．耳．及大扶根塵時。第八識緣彼為境。即自通力緣異地身　身者通名。非謂身根。此有幾處。謂眼．耳．色．觸。或亦有聲。無文別說起身根者。又無用故。亦無上地起下天眼．耳。以無用故。亦無文故。下欣上可起上。上厭下不起下　通力所變餘地器者。如以通力馬勝比丘。上入色界見梵王等。第八識緣彼身中扶根大等。亦由通力色界諸天佛前聽法。令此界生見彼身等。能見之者雖未得通。色界天等以通力故。變為色身令彼得見。地獄見者名由通力　上地見下。佛放豪光至色究竟。令此悉見類亦應然　又大菩薩以神通力變為五境。令餘地生得見變者。可得五塵雖第八變。其定之力不見第八能變異地之內身文。不由定力引他地身地獄起故　無色界無通。佛邊聽法令他得見。但是定力。亦非是身。以無根故　或亦名身。有積聚故。

八地以去．及在佛身。通．定無差。一念俱起。變為身者。理即不遮其定．通力　若作此解。如上界天見下三災。身在地獄以上天眼等見彼地色等。豈第八亦緣耶。彼既不緣。故知馬勝往色界處。何必此第八即緣彼色等　若相離者雖見其色。而第八不緣。若近處者何妨第八亦變。由此故知。天眼．耳境非必有本質　此義應思違下論文　五識疏所緣緣必有之文應更思審。如樞要說　餘地

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當耳識以及大扶根塵（四大種所生的扶助色根）生起時，第八識（阿賴耶識）以它們為所緣境。憑藉神通力，可以緣取異地的身體——這裡的『身』是一個通用的名稱，並非特指身根。這種情況有幾種：比如眼識、耳識緣取色塵、觸塵，或者也可能緣取聲塵。經典中沒有特別說明身根的情況，而且也沒有實際用途。同樣，上界天人也不會生起地獄的天眼、天耳，因為沒有實際用途，也沒有經典依據。地獄天人羨慕上界，可以生起上界的天眼、天耳；上界天人厭惡地獄，不會生起地獄的天眼、天耳。神通力所變的異地器物，比如馬勝比丘以神通力上升到忉利天，見到梵王等。第八識緣取他們身體中的扶根大等，也是通過神通力，諸天在佛前聽法，讓此界眾生看到他們的身體等。能看到這些景象的人即使沒有得到神通，諸天等也能以神通力變化出他們的色身，讓其他人看到。地獄眾生所見到的景象，稱為『由通力』所致。 上界天人看到地獄，比如佛陀放出毫光照到色究竟天，讓地獄眾生都能看到，情況也應該類似。此外，大菩薩以神通力變化出五塵境界，讓其他地方的眾生能夠看到。雖然五塵境界是第八識所變，但憑藉禪定的力量，無法看到第八識能變異地的內在身體。因為不是通過禪定力將其他地方的身體引導到地獄顯現的緣故。沒有神通，也沒有禪定力，在佛陀身邊聽法而讓其他人看到，這只是禪定力所致，也不是真實的身體，因為沒有根。或者也可以稱為『身』，因為有積聚的緣故。 八地菩薩以上，以及在佛陀的境界中，神通和禪定沒有差別，一念之間同時生起。變化出身體，從道理上來說，並不妨礙禪定力和神通力。如果這樣解釋，就像上界天人看到地獄的三災，身體在地獄，卻以上界的天眼等看到地獄的色塵等，難道第八識也緣取這些嗎？既然第八識不緣取這些，那麼就可以知道，馬勝比丘前往忉利天，第八識未必緣取那裡的色塵等。如果相隔很遠，即使看到了那裡的色塵，第八識也不緣取。如果距離很近，不妨礙第八識也變化出景象。由此可知，天眼、天耳所見的境界，不一定有真實的本質。這個道理應該仔細思考，因為它與下文的論述相違背。《五識疏》中關於所緣緣必須存在的說法，應該更加仔細地思考，就像《樞要》中所說的那樣。其他地方...

【English Translation】 English version: When the ear consciousness and the great supporting root-dust (the auxiliary material roots produced by the four great elements) arise, the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) takes them as its object. Through supernormal powers (abhijñā), one can perceive bodies in other lands—here, 'body' is a general term, not specifically referring to the body-root. There are several instances of this: for example, eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness perceiving form-dust and touch-dust, or possibly sound-dust as well. There is no specific mention of the body-root in the scriptures, and it also has no practical use. Similarly, beings in higher realms do not generate the heavenly eye or heavenly ear of lower realms, because it has no practical use and no scriptural basis. Beings in lower realms, admiring the higher realms, can generate the heavenly eye and heavenly ear of the higher realms; beings in higher realms, disliking the lower realms, do not generate the heavenly eye and heavenly ear of the lower realms. Objects in other lands transformed by supernormal powers, such as Maudgalyāyana ascending to the Trāyastriṃśa Heaven with supernormal powers and seeing Brahmā, etc. The eighth consciousness perceiving the supporting root-great elements in their bodies is also through supernormal powers. Devas listening to the Dharma before the Buddha, allowing beings in this realm to see their bodies, etc. Even if those who see these scenes have not attained supernormal powers, the devas can transform their form-bodies with supernormal powers, allowing others to see them. The scenes seen by beings in the lower realm are said to be 'due to supernormal powers'. Beings in higher realms seeing the lower realms, such as the Buddha emitting a ray of light that illuminates the Akaniṣṭha Heaven, allowing beings in the lower realms to see, should be a similar situation. Furthermore, great Bodhisattvas transform the five sense objects with supernormal powers, allowing beings in other places to see them. Although the five sense objects are transformed by the eighth consciousness, one cannot see the inner body of the eighth consciousness transforming other lands through the power of samādhi (concentration). This is because it is not due to the power of samādhi that bodies from other places are guided to appear in the lower realm. Without supernormal powers or samādhi, listening to the Dharma near the Buddha and allowing others to see is only due to the power of samādhi, and it is not a real body, because it has no root. Or it can also be called a 'body', because it has an accumulation. From the eighth bhūmi (stage) onwards, and in the realm of the Buddha, there is no difference between supernormal powers and samādhi; they arise simultaneously in a single thought. Transforming a body, in principle, does not hinder the power of samādhi and supernormal powers. If explained in this way, like beings in higher realms seeing the three calamities of the lower realms, the body is in the lower realm, but they see the form-dust of the lower realms with the heavenly eye, etc. of the higher realms. Does the eighth consciousness also perceive these? Since the eighth consciousness does not perceive these, then it can be known that when Maudgalyāyana went to the Trāyastriṃśa Heaven, the eighth consciousness did not necessarily perceive the form-dust there. If they are far apart, even if the form-dust there is seen, the eighth consciousness does not perceive it. If they are close, it does not hinder the eighth consciousness from also transforming the scene. From this, it can be known that the realms seen by the heavenly eye and heavenly ear do not necessarily have a real essence. This principle should be carefully considered, because it contradicts the discussion in the following text. The statement in the Commentary on the Five Consciousnesses that the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya) must exist should be considered more carefully, as stated in the Essentials. Other places...

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器者。即法處實色。瑜伽五十四云。法處所攝勝定果色。彼果彼境是實物有。定心所緣名境。勤求起故即名為果。即通有漏．及與無漏。此謂聖者得威德定。變為此色饒益有情　然第八識　一唯緣有漏不緣無漏。如種子故。雖緣無漏遂不相似。體仍有漏。非如有漏形狀相似　又解以初禪眼．耳識。見上地色等。不異系故。由此三識所知必同初禪系。此義應思　又解異地系。因緣變有用故　二此在色界亦通無色。無色聖者亦雨淚故　三唯變色．觸亦變余塵。此通五塵。三十七說通能變為色．香．味觸。又凈土中變五塵故。五十三說。無色界定色能變一切故。五十四說。勝定果色唯有顯色等相。以彼香等生因闕故。又無用故。此約色界異生及無色界波羅蜜多聲聞。唯能起色．聲．觸。不能起香．味。以無加行心因別起。亦不能令自他有用故。若十地菩薩。及色界波羅蜜聲聞。即許起之。故華嚴等云聞無色界宮殿之香。法華云光音及遍凈初生。及退沒。聞香悉能知。即菩薩等入彼定變　四為唯造色。亦變大種。如對法第一卷疏末解。應廣如彼五十四解　五然與定力何差別。二乘．異生若為嬉戲。通果無記。即變化心。可說與彼定境為異。一根本境。一解脫境。一善心境。一無記境。故成差別。若八地已去菩薩定之與通。此亦

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『器』指的是法處所攝的實色。瑜伽師地論第五十四卷說：『法處所攝的殊勝禪定所生的果報之色，此果報和此境界是真實存在的。』禪定之心所緣的稱為境界。精勤尋求而生起的就稱為果報。這包括有漏和無漏。這是說聖者獲得威德禪定，變化出這種色法來饒益有情眾生。然而第八識（阿賴耶識），只緣有漏，不緣無漏，就像種子一樣。雖然緣無漏，卻不相似，其體仍然是有漏的，並非如有漏的形狀相似。又有一種解釋，以初禪的眼識、耳識，見上地之色等，因為不異於初禪所繫縛的緣故。由此，這三種識所知必定與初禪所繫縛的相同。這個意義應該仔細思考。又有一種解釋，因為異地系，因緣變化而有用。其次，這在（此處原文有誤，應為『此』）也通於無色界。因為無色界的聖者也會流淚。再次，唯有變化色、觸，也變化其餘的塵境。這通於五塵。攝大乘論第三十七卷說，通能變化為色、香、味、觸。又因為凈土中變化五塵的緣故。瑜伽師地論第五十三卷說，無（此處原文有誤，應為『礙』）定色能變化一切。瑜伽師地論第五十四卷說，殊勝禪定所生的果報之色，唯有顯色等相，因為香等生起的因緣闕少的緣故，又因為沒有用處的緣故。這是指（此處原文有誤，應為『凡』）異生以及無（此處原文有誤，應為『礙』）波羅蜜多的聲聞，只能生起色、聲、觸，不能生起香、味。因為沒有加行心，因緣不同而生起，也不能令自他有用處的緣故。如果是十地菩薩，以及（此處原文有誤，應為『礙』）波羅蜜多的聲聞，就允許生起香、味。所以華嚴經等說，聞到無（此處原文有誤，應為『礙』）宮殿的香。法華經說，光音天和遍凈天初生以及退沒時，聞到香都能知道。這是菩薩等入彼定而變化的。第四，是唯有造色，也變化大種。如對法第一卷疏末的解釋，應該廣泛地如瑜伽師地論第五十四卷所解釋的那樣。第五，那麼與定力有什麼差別呢？二乘、異生如果爲了嬉戲，通於果報無記，即變化心。可以說與彼定境不同。一個是根本境，一個是解脫境，一個是善心境，一個是無記境，所以成就差別。如果是八地以上的菩薩的禪定與神通，這也是

【English Translation】 English version: 'Receptacle' refers to the real form (rupa) included in the sphere of objects (dharma-ayatana). Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 54, states: 'The color (rupa) that is the result of superior samadhi, included in the sphere of objects, this result and this realm are real existents.' What is cognized by the mind in samadhi is called the realm. What arises from diligent seeking is called the result. This includes both defiled (with outflows, sāsrava) and undefiled (without outflows, anāsrava). This refers to a holy being who has attained the samadhi of majestic virtue, transforming this color to benefit sentient beings. However, the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), only cognizes the defiled, not the undefiled, like a seed. Although it cognizes the undefiled, it is not similar; its substance is still defiled, not like the shape of the defiled. Another explanation is that the eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness of the first dhyana see the forms of higher realms, etc., because they are not different from the bondage of the first dhyana. Therefore, what is known by these three consciousnesses must be the same as what is bound by the first dhyana. This meaning should be carefully considered. Another explanation is that because of different realms, the causes and conditions change and become useful. Secondly, this also applies to the formless realm. Because holy beings in the formless realm also shed tears. Thirdly, only color and touch are transformed, and the remaining sense objects are also transformed. This applies to the five sense objects. Mahāyānasaṃgraha, volume 37, states that the power can transform into color, smell, taste, and touch. Also, because the five sense objects are transformed in the Pure Land. Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 53, states that unobstructed samadhi-color can transform everything. Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 54, states that the color that is the result of superior samadhi only has the characteristics of visible form, etc., because the causes for the arising of smell, etc., are lacking, and also because it is useless. This refers to ordinary beings and śrāvakas with unobstructed paramita, who can only produce color, sound, and touch, but cannot produce smell and taste. Because there is no additional effort of mind, and the causes arise differently, and also because they cannot make themselves or others useful. If it is a tenth-ground Bodhisattva, and a śrāvaka with unobstructed paramita, then it is permissible to produce smell and taste. Therefore, the Avatamsaka Sutra, etc., say that one can smell the fragrance of the unobstructed palaces. The Lotus Sutra says that when the Light Sound Heaven and the Pure Everywhere Heaven are first born and die, they can know everything by smelling the fragrance. This is because the Bodhisattvas, etc., enter that samadhi and transform it. Fourthly, it is only formative color, and also transforms the great elements. As explained at the end of the commentary on the first volume of Abhidharmasamuccaya, it should be as widely explained as in Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 54. Fifthly, then what is the difference between this and the power of samadhi? If śrāvakas and ordinary beings do it for fun, it is connected to the result of neutral karma, which is the mind of transformation. It can be said that it is different from that realm of samadhi. One is the fundamental realm, one is the realm of liberation, one is the realm of wholesome mind, and one is the realm of neutral mind, so there is a difference. If it is the samadhi and supernormal powers of Bodhisattvas from the eighth ground onwards, this is also

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何異。通力由先加行思惟方乃得生。故心引起變化事等。定力但是任運生故。故二別也。或是根本。及果所變。故成別也。此定．及通義分為別。在佛無別故。皆通變．及化。通可引起根之與塵。定即不爾。唯起于塵　六又依神通變根等不。九十八說不變四事。一根。二心。三心所。四業果。設復變作似而非真。如下第十自有二解。

由定力變異身．器者。謂即瑜伽五十四說。色．無色天變身萬億共立毛端。是平等心。無色既無通。即唯是定力。色界亦說有。亦令互相見故變異地身　及器者。華嚴經云。菩薩鼻根聞無色界宮殿之香　阿含經云。舍利弗入涅槃時。色．無色天空中淚下如春細雨　波阇波提入涅槃時。色．無色天佛邊側立。及實色中定境者。是　色．無色天皆由通力現身．境等。此有何過　以瑜伽論但說通依靜慮。無色現色但定所生。以惠不均故無通也。無色界變色。已如前辨。應如瑜伽五十四等．及佛地解。

所變境．身為相續。為間斷。

論。所變身器至系發起故。

述曰。內身多續。少分間斷。由有生一念即便命終故。或如蜉蝣等。生已即死故。若變外器多分長時。瑜伽第三說。外器定一劫。若變內身即隨壽故多分相續。聲．光多暫時。少有相續故　等者等取華色．華香等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有什麼不同呢？神通力是由先前的加行（加行指為達到目標而做的準備工作）和思惟才能產生的。因此，心能引起變化事物等。而禪定力只是任運（自然而然）產生。所以這兩者是有區別的。或者一個是根本，一個是果所變現，因此成就也有區別。這種禪定和神通的意義區分在於，在佛那裡是沒有區別的，都是神通變化。神通可以引起根（六根：眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）和塵（六塵：色、聲、香、味、觸、法），而禪定則不能這樣，只能引起塵。六者，又依據神通是否能改變根等？《九十八》中說不能改變四件事：一、根；二、心；三、心所（心的作用）；四、業果。即使改變了，也是相似而非真實的，如下面的第十個問題中有兩種解釋。

由禪定力變異身和器物，指的是《瑜伽師地論》第五十四卷所說，色界天和無色界天能變現萬億身體，共同站立在一個毛端上，這是平等心。無色界天既然沒有神通，那麼就只是禪定力。也說有，也能讓互相看見，因此變異地身和器物。《華嚴經》說，菩薩的鼻根能聞到無宮殿的香。《阿含經》說，舍利弗（Śāriputra）入涅槃時，色界天和無色界天在空中流淚，像春天的細雨。波阇波提（Prajapati）入涅槃時，色界天和無色界天站在佛的旁邊。以及在真實色界中的禪定境界，都是色界天和無色界天通過神通力顯現身和境界等，這有什麼過失呢？因為《瑜伽師地論》只說神通依賴於靜慮（禪定），無色界天顯現色界天只是禪定所生。因為智慧不均等，所以沒有神通。無**變色，已經在前面辨析過了。應該按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十四卷等以及《佛地經論》的解釋。

所變現的境界和身體是相續的，還是間斷的？

論：所變現的身和器物，乃至繫念發起，所以是……

述記說：內身多是相續的，少部分是間斷的。因為有眾生一生下來一念之間就命終的，或者像蜉蝣等，生下來就死了。如果變現外在的器物，大多是長時間的。《瑜伽師地論》第三卷說，外在的器物可以定住一個劫（kalpa）。如果變現內在的身體，就隨著壽命的長短，所以大多是相續的。聲音和光大多是暫時的，很少有相續的。等者，等同於取華色、華香等。

【English Translation】 English version What is the difference? Supernormal power (通力, tōnglì) arises from prior preliminary practices (加行, jiāxíng) and contemplation. Therefore, the mind can cause changes in things, etc. But meditative power (定力, dìnglì) arises naturally. So, these two are different. Or one is fundamental, and the other is a transformation of the result, so the achievements are also different. This distinction between the meaning of meditation and supernormal power is that there is no difference in the Buddha; they are all supernormal transformations. Supernormal power can cause the arising of the roots (根, gēn) [the six sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind] and the objects (塵, chén) [the six sense objects: form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma], but meditation cannot do this; it can only cause the arising of objects. Sixthly, does supernormal power change the roots, etc.? The Ninety-Eight (九十八, Jiǔshíbā) says that four things cannot be changed: 1. the roots; 2. the mind; 3. mental functions (心所, xīsuǒ); 4. the results of karma (業果, yèguǒ). Even if they are changed, they are similar but not real, as there are two explanations in question ten below.

The transformation of body and objects by the power of meditation refers to what is said in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Yújiāshī dìlùn), volume fifty-four: the form realm (色界, sèjiè) and formless realm (無色界, wúsèjiè) heavens can transform billions of bodies, standing together on the tip of a hair; this is equanimity. Since the formless realm heavens do not have supernormal powers, it is only the power of meditation. ** also says that they can also allow each other to see, thus transforming the earth, body, and objects. The Avataṃsaka Sūtra (華嚴經, Huáyán jīng) says that the nose root of a Bodhisattva can smell the fragrance of the palaces of the **. The Agamas (阿含經, Āhán jīng) say that when Śāriputra (舍利弗) entered Nirvana, the form and formless realm heavens shed tears in the sky like fine spring rain. When Prajapati (波阇波提) entered Nirvana, the form and formless realm heavens stood beside the Buddha. And the meditative states in the real form realm are all manifestations of bodies and realms, etc., by the power of supernormal abilities of the form and formless realm heavens. What fault is there in this? Because the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra only says that supernormal powers rely on dhyana (靜慮, jìnglǜ) [meditation], and the manifestation of form by the formless realm heavens is only produced by meditation. Because wisdom is not equal, there are no supernormal powers. The ** transformation of form has already been discussed earlier. It should be explained according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume fifty-four, etc., and the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra (佛地經論, Fódì jīnglùn).

Are the transformed realms and bodies continuous or intermittent?

Treatise: The transformed body and objects, even to the arising of mindfulness, therefore...

Commentary says: The inner body is mostly continuous, and a small part is intermittent. Because there are beings who die in a single thought after being born, or like mayflies, which die as soon as they are born. If external objects are transformed, they are mostly long-lasting. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume three, says that external objects can be fixed for a kalpa (劫, jié). If the inner body is transformed, it mostly continues according to the length of life. Sound and light are mostly temporary, and rarely continuous. 'Etc.' includes taking the color and fragrance of flowers, etc.

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。何以然者。由擊發故聲等方生。緣力盡時彼即不續　有法師云。第八不緣聲。以間斷故。如心．心所斷故亦不緣　若作此說亦應不緣等流色等。以間斷故。如電光等。第七末那既恒相續。何故不緣　問曰。若爾第八恒相續。如何緣斷法　答如鏡恒時明。境至方影起。第八任運起。有境便即緣。此復何妨。

論。略說此識至所現實色。

述曰。總略說緣。第二段也　于中有三。第一依處分者。十色處中五塵通外內。五根唯內唯緣實境。第八亦緣法處實色。謂威德定所行境色。如瑜伽論五十四卷彼極分別。應如彼會　言隨者是攝義。即是法處攝色之異名也　種子何處攝。隨何處攝　雖唯意緣。以與現行實法不定異故。隨現行攝。此中有難。如理應思　問曰。本識豈不緣極略等四色　答曰。以假故不緣。如不相應法　問曰。彼何以假　無實體故。如對法第一．五十四等。極略．極迥。但是第六意識分折為極微故。第八不緣。受所引色中。若定道共色。即此不緣。唯以現行思為體故。別解表業此亦不緣。以亦思故。無表色可爾。是思種故。既緣諸種。故得緣之　若爾如二無心定等皆依種立應亦得緣　由此即是心等種上差別功能。但緣種體不緣別能。即不緣者無表亦爾。是思種上差別功能。亦是防色之別能故。故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：為什麼會這樣呢？因為敲擊和發射等動作才會產生聲音等現象。當力量耗盡時，這些現象就會停止延續。有法師說，第八識（Alaya-識，阿賴耶識）不緣取聲音，因為它有間斷性，就像心和心所（mental factors）斷滅一樣，所以不緣取聲音。如果這樣說，那麼第八識也應該不緣取等流色等，因為它有間斷性，就像閃電一樣。第七識（Manas-識，末那識）既然恒常相續，為什麼不緣取呢？有人問：如果第八識恒常相續，如何緣取斷滅的法呢？回答：就像鏡子一直都是明亮的，當外境出現時，鏡中才會顯現影像。第八識是任運而起的，當有外境出現時，它就會緣取。這又有什麼妨礙呢？ 論：簡略地說，這個識（第八識）緣取所顯現的真實色法。 述記：總括地簡略說明第八識所緣取的對象，這是第二段的內容。其中有三點：第一，從所依處來區分，十色處（ten kinds of material objects）中的五塵（five sense objects）通於外在和內在。五根（five sense organs）只屬於內在，只緣取真實的外境。第八識也緣取法處（dharmadhatu）中的真實色法，也就是威德（majesty）和禪定（samadhi）所行的境界色，如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十四卷所詳細分別的那樣，應該參考那裡來理解。『隨』字是攝取的意思，也就是法處所攝的色法的異名。種子（seeds）屬於哪裡攝取呢？隨屬於哪裡攝取呢？雖然只是意識緣取，但因為它和現行的真實法不是絕對不同的，所以隨現行法攝取。這裡面有一些難題，應該仔細思考。有人問：本識（根本識，即第八識）難道不緣取極微色（extremely small particles）等四種色法嗎？回答：因為它們是假立的，所以不緣取，就像不相應行法（non-associated formations）一樣。有人問：它們為什麼是假立的呢？因為它們沒有實體。如《對法論》（Abhidharma-sastra）第一和第五十四卷等所說，極微和極遠都是第六意識（意識）分析為極微的結果，所以第八識不緣取。在受所引色（karma-produced matter）中，如果是定道共色（matter common to meditative states and paths），那麼第八識不緣取，因為它只是以現行的思（thought）為體。別解脫戒的表業（revealing actions）第八識也不緣取，因為它也是思。無表色（non-revealing matter）可以緣取，因為它是思的種子。既然緣取諸種子，所以就能緣取它。如果這樣，像二無心定（two unconscious states）等都依種子而建立，也應該可以緣取嗎？由此可見，這只是心等種子上的差別功能，只緣取種子的本體，不緣取特別的功能。不緣取無表色也是這樣，它是思的種子上的差別功能，也是防止惡行的特別功能，所以不緣取。

【English Translation】 English version: Why is it so? Because sounds and other phenomena arise from striking and emitting. When the force is exhausted, they cease to continue. Some Dharma masters say that the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) does not cognize sound because it is intermittent, just as the mind and mental factors (citta and caitta) cease, so it does not cognize sound. If this is said, then the eighth consciousness should also not cognize isodharmic matter (equal-flowing matter), because it is intermittent, like lightning. Since the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana) is constantly continuous, why does it not cognize? Question: If the eighth consciousness is constantly continuous, how does it cognize discontinuous dharmas? Answer: Just as a mirror is always bright, images appear only when objects are present. The eighth consciousness arises spontaneously, and it cognizes when objects are present. What is the problem with this? Treatise: Briefly speaking, this consciousness (the eighth consciousness) cognizes the real matter that is manifested. Commentary: This is a general and brief explanation of what the eighth consciousness cognizes, and this is the second section. There are three points: First, distinguishing from the dependent base, among the ten sense bases (ten kinds of material objects), the five sense objects (five dusts) are common to both external and internal. The five sense organs are only internal and only cognize real external objects. The eighth consciousness also cognizes real matter in the dharma-dhatu (dharmadhatu), which is the realm of majesty and samadhi, as explained in detail in the fifty-fourth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. It should be understood as explained there. The word 'following' means 'including', which is another name for the matter included in the dharma-dhatu. Where are the seeds included? Where does it follow to be included? Although it is only cognized by the mind, because it is not absolutely different from the actual existing dharma, it follows the actual existing dharma. There are some difficulties here, which should be carefully considered. Question: Does the fundamental consciousness (the eighth consciousness) not cognize extremely small particles and the four kinds of matter? Answer: Because they are hypothetical, it does not cognize them, just like non-associated formations. Question: Why are they hypothetical? Because they have no substance. As stated in the first and fifty-fourth volumes of the Abhidharma-sastra, extremely small particles and extremely distant things are the result of the sixth consciousness (vijnana) analyzing into extremely small particles, so the eighth consciousness does not cognize them. Among karma-produced matter, if it is matter common to meditative states and paths, then the eighth consciousness does not cognize it, because it is only based on the present thought. The revealing actions of individual liberation vows are also not cognized by the eighth consciousness, because it is also thought. Non-revealing matter can be cognized, because it is a seed of thought. Since it cognizes all seeds, it can cognize it. If so, since the two unconscious states are based on seeds, should they also be cognized? From this, it can be seen that this is only a differential function on the seeds of the mind, etc., and only cognizes the substance of the seeds, not the special function. The non-revealing matter that is not cognized is also like this, it is a differential function on the seeds of thought, and it is also a special function of preventing evil deeds, so it is not cognized.

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知如彼亦不得緣　遍計所起色。若說唯是映象．水月。此亦不緣。唯第六識遍計起故。若唯意緣通根．塵者。亦此中攝故。第八所緣諸根．塵等。以總從別。以暗從明。皆本處攝故。說不緣遍計所起之色。又定所生色中。如十一切處觀。亦此中攝。第八緣不　答曰。不緣。假想色故。故此論文但緣實色不緣假故。第八所緣必有用故。彼無實用第八不緣　然諸法體。一者有法。二者無法。上二法中第八何故不緣無法。此任運緣非分別故。無籌度故。后得智等有籌度故。諸六識等有分別故。由此故知。第八識體不緣我也。第八識變。變必有用故不緣無。無無用故。故不緣我等。以無體用故　于有法中略有二種。一者有為。二者無為。何故此識不緣無為　若實無為因未證故。若假無為無體用故皆不得緣。于有為中色．心．心所．不相應行。如前已辨緣實非假等。

何故不緣心．心所法．不相應行。故外人問。

論。何故此識至為所緣耶。

述曰。等即等取不相應行．及諸無為．無法為問。

論。有漏識變至勢力故變。

述曰。第二廢立也。因緣生者。謂由先業．及名言實種。即要有力。唯任運心。非由作意其心乃生。即五．八識隨其增上異熟因為緣。名言種為因故變于境。八俱五數即無勝力

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果認為第八識不能緣遍計所起的色法，那是因為遍計所起的色法，比如幻象、水中的月亮，都不能作為真實的所緣。這些都是由第六識遍計所產生的。如果認為第八識只能緣通根和塵境，那麼這些也包含在第八識所緣的範圍內。第八識所緣的諸根、塵境等，是從總體上把握個別，從暗處把握光明，都屬於第八識的本處所攝。因此說第八識不緣遍計所起的色法。此外，在禪定中所產生的色法，比如十一切處觀，也屬於第八識所緣的範圍。第八識是否緣假想的色法？答案是：不緣。因為是假想的色法。所以這裡的論文說，第八識只緣真實的色法，不緣虛假的色法。第八識所緣的必定是有用的，沒有實際用處的，第八識不緣。 然而，一切法的體性，可以分為有法和無法兩種。在這兩種法中，第八識為什麼不緣無法？因為第八識是任運而緣，不是分別而緣。沒有籌度思量，而後得智等有籌度思量，諸六識等有分別。由此可知，第八識的體性不緣我。第八識的變現，變現必定是有用的，所以不緣無。因為無沒有用處，所以不緣我等，因為我等沒有體用。 在有法中，略有有為和無為兩種。為什麼第八識不緣無為法？如果是真實的無為法，因為證悟的因緣尚未成熟；如果是虛假的無為法，因為沒有體用，所以都不能作為第八識的所緣。在有為法中，色、心、心所、不相應行，如前面已經辨析的，第八識緣真實的，不緣虛假的。 為什麼第八識不緣心、心所法、不相應行？外人因此發問。 論：為什麼這個識……作為所緣呢？ 述記：『等』字等同於包括不相應行以及諸無為法、無法，作為提問的內容。 論：有漏識的變現……因為勢力的緣故而變現。 述記：第二是廢立。因緣所生，是指由先前的業和名言的實種所生，即必須要有力。只有任運的心，不是由作意而生起的心，即第五識和第八識，隨其增上異熟因為緣，名言種為因而變現於境界。八個識同時生起，五數沒有勝力。

【English Translation】 English version: If it is thought that the eighth consciousness cannot cognize the color (rupa) arising from parikalpita (conceptual construction), it is because the color arising from parikalpita, such as illusions and the moon in water, cannot be taken as real objects of cognition. These are all produced by the sixth consciousness through parikalpita. If it is thought that the eighth consciousness can only cognize the sense organs (indriya) and sense objects (visaya), then these are also included within the scope of what the eighth consciousness cognizes. The sense organs, sense objects, etc., cognized by the eighth consciousness grasp the particular from the general, and grasp the light from the darkness, all of which belong to the original scope of the eighth consciousness. Therefore, it is said that the eighth consciousness does not cognize the color arising from parikalpita. Furthermore, the color arising from samadhi (concentration), such as the ten kasinas (ten all-pervading spheres of perception), also belongs to the scope of what the eighth consciousness cognizes. Does the eighth consciousness cognize imagined color? The answer is: no. Because it is imagined color. Therefore, this treatise says that the eighth consciousness only cognizes real color, not false color. What the eighth consciousness cognizes must be useful; if it has no practical use, the eighth consciousness does not cognize it. However, the nature of all dharmas (phenomena) can be divided into two types: existing dharmas (bhava) and non-existing dharmas (abhava). Among these two types of dharmas, why does the eighth consciousness not cognize non-existing dharmas? Because the eighth consciousness cognizes spontaneously, not through discrimination. There is no deliberation or calculation, while subsequent wisdom (prsthalabdha-jnana) and others have deliberation and calculation, and the six consciousnesses and others have discrimination. From this, it can be known that the nature of the eighth consciousness does not cognize 'self' (atman). The transformation of the eighth consciousness must be useful, so it does not cognize non-existence. Because non-existence has no use, it does not cognize 'self' and others, because 'self' and others have no substance or function. Among existing dharmas, there are roughly two types: conditioned (samskrta) and unconditioned (asamskrta). Why does the eighth consciousness not cognize unconditioned dharmas? If it is a real unconditioned dharma, it is because the cause for realization has not yet matured; if it is a false unconditioned dharma, it is because it has no substance or function, so it cannot be cognized by the eighth consciousness. Among conditioned dharmas, color (rupa), mind (citta), mental factors (caitasika), and non-associated formations (citta-viprayukta-samskara), as analyzed earlier, the eighth consciousness cognizes the real, not the false. Why does the eighth consciousness not cognize mind, mental factors, and non-associated formations? An outsider asks this question. Treatise: Why does this consciousness... serve as the object of cognition? Commentary: The word 'etc.' is equivalent to including non-associated formations, as well as all unconditioned dharmas and non-existing dharmas, as the content of the question. Treatise: The transformation of the contaminated consciousness... transforms because of the power. Commentary: The second is the establishment and rejection. What is born from causes and conditions refers to what is born from previous karma (action) and the real seed of name and form (nama-rupa), which must have power. Only the spontaneous mind, not the mind that arises from intention, that is, the fifth and eighth consciousnesses, transforms into the realm with the enhanced result of other-ripening (vipaka) as the condition, and the seed of name and form as the cause. The five consciousnesses arising simultaneously with the eight consciousnesses do not have superior power.

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。設任運生。境無實用。因緣變法必有實體。非橫計故。非無用故。

論。二隨分別勢力故變。

述曰。謂作意生心。是籌度心。即六．七識。隨自分別作意生故。由此六．七緣無等時影像相分。無有實體。未必有用。亦非由說分別故變境體定無。亦緣有故　或初通五．八全．及第六少分。后第七全。通第六少分。此解順論有用等文。

論。初必有用后但為境。

述曰。初隨因緣變。必有實體用。即五．八等所變之境。后隨分別變。但能為境。非必有體用。即七識等　今正明第八不緣心等義。兼五識等不緣心等。總談心等緣境道理　又解初唯第八異熟主故。所熏處故。能持種故。變必有用。后餘七識。所變色觸等。皆無實用。似本質用。如鏡中火　既爾五識應一向緣假。青等應非實　問若隨因緣變必有用。第八識俱觸等五法境應有用　答非報主故。非自在故。順第二解。由此復言隨因緣者此是何義。隨任運義。隨種子義。順第一解。第八五數。第六識等中報心所緣。非必有用。以此見分雖任運生。不隨實體種子因緣變境相故。但是影像種子所生。如彼眼根等無見用故。不能發生眼等識故　問觸等所變根。無見用故非因變。觸等所變色。非因變故無礙用。五識所變為例亦爾　答理齊。亦無礙用

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：假設它們是自然產生的，但境界沒有實際效用。如果因緣所生的變法必定有實體，那是因為它們不是隨意臆造的，也不是沒有用處的。

論：二者隨各自的分辨勢力而轉變。

述記：這裡指的是作意而生起的心，是籌量思度的心，也就是第六識和第七識。它們隨著各自的分辨作意而生起，因此，第六識和第七識所緣的無等時影像相分，沒有實體，不一定有用處。但也不能因為說是分別而轉變，就斷定境界的體性一定沒有。它們也是緣于存在的。 或者最初通於前五識、第八識的全部，以及第六識的少部分；後來第七識全部，通於第六識的少部分。這種解釋符合論中有用等文的含義。

論：最初的轉變必定有用處，後來的轉變只是作為境界。

述記：最初隨因緣而轉變的，必定有實體和用處，也就是前五識和第八識等所轉變的境界。後來隨分別而轉變的，只能作為境界，不一定有體性和用處，也就是第七識等。現在正是要說明第八識不緣心等義，兼及前五識等不緣心等，總的來說明心等緣境界的道理。 又解釋說，最初只有第八識是異熟主，是受熏習之處，是能持種子的，所以它的轉變必定有用處。後來的其餘七識，所轉變的色、觸等，都沒有實際效用，類似於本質的作用，就像鏡子中的火。 既然這樣，那麼前五識應該一概緣假，青色等應該不是真實的。 問：如果隨因緣而轉變必定有用處，那麼第八識相應的觸等五法所緣的境界應該有用處。 答：因為它們不是報主，也不是自在的。這符合第二種解釋。因此又說，隨因緣者，這是什麼意思呢？是隨任運的意思，是隨種子的意思。這符合第一種解釋。第八識的五種心所，以及第六識等中的報心所緣，不一定有用處。因為這種見分雖然是自然產生的，但不隨著實體種子的因緣而轉變境界的相狀，而只是影像種子所生，就像眼根等沒有見的作用，不能發生眼等識。 問：觸等所轉變的根，因為沒有見的作用，所以不是因轉變的。觸等所轉變的色，因為不是因轉變的，所以沒有阻礙的作用。前五識所轉變的可以作為例子，也是這樣。 答：道理是一樣的，也沒有阻礙的作用。

【English Translation】 English version: Suppose they arise spontaneously, but the realm has no practical utility. If the transformations arising from causes and conditions necessarily have substance, it is because they are not arbitrarily fabricated and are not without purpose.

Treatise: The two transform according to the power of their respective discriminations.

Commentary: This refers to the mind arising from volition, which is a mind of deliberation and consideration, namely the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. They arise according to their own discriminating volition. Therefore, the image-aspects (影像相分) of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, which are not simultaneous, have no substance and are not necessarily useful. However, one cannot conclude that the nature of the realm is necessarily without substance simply because it is said to transform through discrimination. They also arise from existence. Or initially, it encompasses all of the first five consciousnesses, the entire eighth consciousness, and a small portion of the sixth consciousness; later, the entire seventh consciousness and a small portion of the sixth consciousness. This interpretation aligns with the meaning of 'useful' and other terms in the treatise.

Treatise: The initial transformation necessarily has utility; the subsequent transformation merely serves as an object.

Commentary: The initial transformation, which arises from causes and conditions, necessarily has substance and utility, namely the realms transformed by the first five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness. The subsequent transformation, which arises from discrimination, can only serve as an object and does not necessarily have substance and utility, namely the seventh consciousness. Now, the intention is to explain that the eighth consciousness does not cognize mind, etc., and also that the first five consciousnesses do not cognize mind, etc., generally discussing the principle of how mind, etc., cognize realms. It is also explained that initially, only the eighth consciousness is the ripening-result master (異熟主), the place where impressions are received, and the one that can hold seeds (種子), so its transformation necessarily has utility. The subsequent transformations of form, touch, etc., by the remaining seven consciousnesses have no practical utility, resembling the function of an essence, like fire in a mirror. Since this is the case, then the first five consciousnesses should invariably cognize the false, and blue, etc., should not be real. Question: If transformation arising from causes and conditions necessarily has utility, then the realms cognized by the five mental functions (觸等五法) associated with the eighth consciousness should have utility. Answer: Because they are not the ripening-result master and are not independent. This aligns with the second interpretation. Therefore, it is further said, 'What does it mean by arising from causes and conditions?' It means arising spontaneously, it means arising from seeds. This aligns with the first interpretation. The five mental functions of the eighth consciousness, as well as the realms cognized by the retribution-mind (報心) in the sixth consciousness, etc., do not necessarily have utility. Because this seeing-faculty (見分), although arising spontaneously, does not transform the characteristics of the realm according to the causes and conditions of substantial seeds, but only arises from image-seeds, like the eye-organ, etc., which has no seeing function and cannot give rise to eye-consciousness, etc. Question: The organs transformed by touch, etc., because they have no seeing function, are not transformed by causes. The form transformed by touch, etc., because it is not transformed by causes, has no obstructive function. The transformations of the first five consciousnesses can be taken as an example, and it is the same. Answer: The principle is the same, and there is also no obstructive function.

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。七識所變並無用故。此依第二解。此二義護法等菩薩解　若瑜伽釋家。亦有許觸等與識同實變。即不違此文。然違成業。多種共生一芽之失。前解為勝。順下第三卷等文　又解因緣者。是諸法真實有用種子。若用此種子故生諸法心緣變之。變必有用。以能生者實因緣故。其八俱五數所變之相。非實種生。但假種起故但為境。分別變攝　分別變者。心．心所之總名。隨心．心所之勢力故變。不從真實有用因緣種子所生。彼但為境無漏亦爾非必有用。隨其所應五識相應心．心所。及第八識體五俱意識。或定心所緣。有實種生者皆因緣變。余無實用但名似色．心等。名隨分別勢力故變。此解為正。無諸妨難。由能緣心任運有力。彼所變相從實種生名因緣變。若能緣心不任運起。雖任運起而無勝力。所變之相非實種生名分別變。初必有用。無無用者。后但為境當情現故非必有用。若論依他假因緣起亦是有用。非是如色有礙等用。稱其自相名為有用。若第六報心五識俱者。亦隨因緣變。其境或有用　問前所說若隨分別變但為境。定心．及五識所變之境應全無用　答隨彼實體種子因生故境有用。由此故言隨分別者此是何義。隨加行義。分別變者諸心．心所強籌度義。定心．及五識。有雖加行生不皆強籌度。故變必有用。然一念心

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：七識所變現的（境界）並沒有實際用處，這是依據第二種解釋。這兩種解釋是護法（Dharmapāla）等菩薩的理解。如果按照《瑜伽師地論》的解釋，也有人認為觸等（法）與識一樣是真實變現的，這樣就不違背這段經文。然而，這會違背『業』的原則，導致多種（業力）共同產生一個（現象，如）芽的過失。因此，前一種解釋更為優勝，也符合下文第三卷等的內容。 又一種解釋是，『因緣』是指諸法真實有用的種子。如果使用這種種子，就能生出諸法，心緣變現它們，這種變現必定有用，因為能生出（諸法）的是真實的因緣。而第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna）及其俱生的五種心所（觸、作意、受、想、思）所變現的相，不是由真實的種子所生，只是假借種子而起，所以僅僅作為（所緣）境，屬於分別變。 『分別變』是心和心所的總稱，隨著心和心所的勢力而變現，不是從真實有用的因緣種子所生。它們僅僅作為（所緣）境，無漏（法）也是如此，並非必定有用。根據情況，與五識相應的心和心所，以及第八識的自體和五俱意識，或者禪定中的心所緣，凡是由真實種子所生的，都屬於因緣變；其餘沒有實際用處的，只是名為相似的色、心等，名稱隨著分別的勢力而變現。這種解釋是正確的，沒有各種妨礙和困難。由於能緣的心任運而有力，它所變現的相是從真實種子所生，稱為因緣變。如果能緣的心不是任運而起，或者雖然任運而起但沒有強大的力量，那麼所變現的相不是由真實種子所生，稱為分別變。前者必定有用，沒有無用的；後者僅僅作為（所緣）境，當下顯現，所以不一定有用。如果從依他起（性質）和假借因緣而起的角度來說，也是有用的，但不是像色法那樣具有障礙等作用，而是稱其自相為有用。如果第六意識（Mano-vijñāna）報告（情況），五識同時生起，也隨著因緣而變現，其境或者有用。 問：前面所說，如果隨著分別變，就僅僅作為（所緣）境，那麼禪定中的心和五識所變現的境，應該完全沒有用處？ 答：隨著它們實體種子的因緣而生，所以境是有用的。因此，說『隨著分別』是什麼意思呢？是隨著加行的意思。『分別變』是指諸心和心所強烈籌度的意思。禪定中的心和五識，雖然有加行而生，但不是都強烈籌度，所以變現必定有用。然而，一念心（的生起）

【English Translation】 English version: The transformations of the seven consciousnesses are useless. This is based on the second explanation. These two explanations are the understanding of Bodhisattvas such as Dharmapāla (defender of the Dharma). If according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), some also allow that touch, etc., are transformed as real as consciousness, then this does not contradict this text. However, this would violate the principle of 'karma' (action), leading to the fault of multiple (karmic forces) jointly producing one (phenomenon, such as) a sprout. Therefore, the former explanation is superior and consistent with the content of the third volume below. Another explanation is that 'causation' (hetu-pratyaya) refers to the real and useful seeds of all dharmas (phenomena). If these seeds are used, they can generate all dharmas, and the mind's conditions transform them. This transformation must be useful because the real cause is what generates (the dharmas). However, the appearances transformed by the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) and its co-arisen five mental factors (touch, attention, sensation, perception, volition) are not born from real seeds, but only arise by borrowing seeds, so they only serve as (objects) and belong to conceptual transformation (parikalpita-parinama). 'Conceptual transformation' is the general name for mind and mental factors, transforming according to the power of mind and mental factors, and not born from real and useful causal seeds. They only serve as (objects), and the unconditioned (anāsrava) is also like this, not necessarily useful. Depending on the situation, the mind and mental factors corresponding to the five consciousnesses, as well as the self of the eighth consciousness and the five co-arisen consciousnesses, or the objects of mental factors in meditation, all that are born from real seeds belong to causal transformation; the rest that have no practical use are only named similar forms, minds, etc., and the names transform according to the power of conceptualization. This explanation is correct and has no obstacles or difficulties. Because the perceiving mind is spontaneously powerful, the appearances it transforms are born from real seeds and are called causal transformation. If the perceiving mind does not arise spontaneously, or if it arises spontaneously but does not have great power, then the appearances transformed are not born from real seeds and are called conceptual transformation. The former must be useful, and there is nothing useless; the latter only serves as (objects), appearing in the present moment, so it is not necessarily useful. If viewed from the perspective of dependent origination (paratantra) and borrowed causes, it is also useful, but not like form having obstructive functions, but rather calling its own nature useful. If the sixth consciousness (Mano-vijñāna) reports (the situation) and the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously, they also transform according to causation, and their objects may be useful. Question: As mentioned earlier, if it transforms according to conceptualization, it only serves as (objects), then the objects transformed by the mind in meditation and the five consciousnesses should be completely useless? Answer: Because they are born from the causal conditions of their substantial seeds, the objects are useful. Therefore, what does it mean to say 'according to conceptualization'? It means according to effort. 'Conceptual transformation' refers to the strong deliberation of all minds and mental factors. Although the mind and five consciousnesses in meditation arise with effort, they do not all strongly deliberate, so the transformation must be useful. However, a single moment of mind (arising)

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得成二種。如定心緣十八界。返顯八俱具有二變。性境不隨心因緣變攝。獨影．帶質皆分別變。

論。異熟識變至必有實有。

述曰。顯變色等從實種生。故所變法必有體用。

論。若變心等至不能緣故。

述曰。相分心．心所如化心等。故不緣之。緣便無用。深密經說。諸變化心無自依心有依他心　佛地論第六卷．此第十亦云。無自緣慮實體之心。有隨見分所變相分似慮之心。如鏡中火。乃至廣說。

問若爾何故心．心所法從第八生。既不能變不須生故。

論。須彼實用別從此生。

述曰。須七識等受用於境從第八生。非不緣故即不令起。如無漏心亦從起故。

若有實體第八即緣。無為有體應第八緣。

論。變無為等亦無實用。

述曰。若第八緣實無為者。無為無用。此未證故。若似無為非實無為。故不變也。論說等言。又無為中有等字故。亦辨假法不相應行。即前答心．及心所法。今解無為．不相應行。亦無有過。此解是本。故前問中何故此識不能變似心．心所等。既言等者故取假法．及與無為。

論。故異熟識不緣心等。

述曰。此總結也　問若有漏識因緣有相。分別之相未必體有。至無漏位無分別故。應不緣無。因緣生故皆應緣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 成就兩種情況。如果定心緣於十八界（十八界：眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根，色、聲、香、味、觸、法六塵，以及眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識六識），反過來顯示第八識（第八識：阿賴耶識）同時具有兩種轉變。性境（性境：客觀存在的境界）不隨心而變，是因緣所攝。獨影境（獨影境：沒有外部對應物的心理影像）和帶質境（帶質境：以實體為基礎產生的心理影像）都是分別變的。

論：異熟識（異熟識：阿賴耶識的別名，指其儲存善惡業種，成熟時產生果報的功能）所變現的，必定有真實的存在。

述曰：顯現變現的色等，是從真實的種子生出來的。所以所變現的法，必定有體和用。

論：如果變現心等，就不能緣取（緣：認知、攀緣）的緣故。

述曰：相分（相分：心識所呈現的外部對像）的心、心所（心所：伴隨心識生起的各種心理活動）就像變化出來的心等，所以不能緣取它。如果能緣取，就變得沒有意義了。《深密經》說，各種變化出來的心，沒有自依心，有依他心。《佛地論》第六卷也說，沒有能自己緣慮的實體之心，有隨見分（見分：心識能見、能認識的功能）所變現的相分，類似於能慮之心，就像鏡子中的火，乃至廣說。

問：如果這樣，為什麼心、心所法從第八識生起？既然不能變現，就不需要生起。

論：需要它們實際的功用，特別地從第八識生起。

述曰：需要第七識等受用境界，從第八識生起。不能緣取，並不是就不讓它生起。就像無漏心（無漏心：沒有煩惱染污的心）也是從第八識生起的。

如果有實體，第八識就緣取。無為法（無為法：不生不滅、無造作的法）有實體，應該被第八識緣取。

論：變現無為法等，也沒有實際的功用。

述曰：如果第八識緣取真實的無為法，無為法就沒有作用。這是因為還沒有證得的緣故。如果相似於無為法，就不是真實的無為法，所以不被變現。《論》中說『等』字，又因為無為法中有『等』字，也辨析假法（假法：依因緣和合而成的法）、不相應行法（不相應行法：既非色法，也非心法或心所法，而是依心識假立的概念）。前面回答了心和心所法的問題，現在解釋無為法和不相應行法，也沒有過失。這個解釋是根本。所以前面問到，為什麼這個識不能變現類似心、心所等？既然說了『等』字，所以包括了假法以及無為法。

論：所以異熟識不緣取心等。

述曰：這是總結。問：如果有漏識（有漏識：有煩惱染污的識）因緣有相，分別的相未必有實體。到了無漏位（無漏位：斷盡煩惱的境界），沒有分別的緣故，應該不緣取無。因緣生起的，都應該緣取。

【English Translation】 English version Two kinds of accomplishments are achieved. If the concentrated mind focuses on the eighteen realms (eighteen realms: the six sense organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind; the six sense objects of form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma; and the six consciousnesses of eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness), it conversely reveals that the eighth consciousness (eighth consciousness: Ālaya-consciousness) simultaneously possesses two transformations. The Svabhāva-bhūmi (Svabhāva-bhūmi: the objective realm that exists independently) does not change with the mind and is included within the scope of conditions. The Ekāki-pratibhāsa (Ekāki-pratibhāsa: mental image without an external counterpart) and the Sākāra-pratibhāsa (Sākāra-pratibhāsa: mental image based on a real entity) are both transformations of discrimination.

Treatise: What is transformed by the Vipāka-vijñāna (Vipāka-vijñāna: another name for Ālaya-consciousness, referring to its function of storing seeds of good and evil karma, which mature to produce karmic results) must have real existence.

Commentary: Manifested transformations such as form arise from real seeds. Therefore, the transformed dharmas must have substance and function.

Treatise: If it transforms mind, etc., it cannot grasp (grasp: to cognize, to cling to) because of that reason.

Commentary: The nimitta-bhāga (nimitta-bhāga: the external object presented by consciousness) of mind and mental factors (mental factors: various mental activities that arise with consciousness) are like magically created minds, etc., so they cannot be grasped. If they could be grasped, it would be meaningless. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra says that various magically created minds do not have self-dependent minds; they have other-dependent minds. The sixth volume of the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra also says that there is no mind with the substance of self-cognizance; there is a nimitta-bhāga transformed by the dṛśya-bhāga (dṛśya-bhāga: the function of consciousness that sees and recognizes), resembling a mind that can cognize, like fire in a mirror, and so on, extensively.

Question: If that is so, why do mind and mental factors arise from the eighth consciousness? Since they cannot transform, there is no need for them to arise.

Treatise: They need their actual function, which specifically arises from the eighth consciousness.

Commentary: The seventh consciousness, etc., need to experience objects, and they arise from the eighth consciousness. The fact that they cannot be grasped does not mean that they are not allowed to arise. Just like the Anāsrava-citta (Anāsrava-citta: mind without defilements) also arises from the eighth consciousness.

If there is substance, the eighth consciousness grasps it. If Asaṃskṛta-dharmas (Asaṃskṛta-dharmas: unconditioned dharmas) have substance, they should be grasped by the eighth consciousness.

Treatise: Transforming Asaṃskṛta-dharmas, etc., also has no actual function.

Commentary: If the eighth consciousness grasps real Asaṃskṛta-dharmas, Asaṃskṛta-dharmas would have no function. This is because it has not yet been realized. If it is similar to Asaṃskṛta-dharmas, it is not real Asaṃskṛta-dharmas, so it is not transformed. The Treatise says 'etc.', and because there is 'etc.' in Asaṃskṛta-dharmas, it also analyzes the Prajñapti-dharmas (Prajñapti-dharmas: conceptual dharmas, those established by conditions) and Asaṃprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas (Asaṃprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas: dharmas that are neither form nor mind or mental factors, but are concepts provisionally established by consciousness). The previous answer addressed the question of mind and mental factors; now, explaining Asaṃskṛta-dharmas and Asaṃprayukta-saṃskāra-dharmas is also without fault. This explanation is fundamental. Therefore, the previous question asked why this consciousness cannot transform things similar to mind, mental factors, etc.? Since 'etc.' is mentioned, it includes Prajñapti-dharmas and Asaṃskṛta-dharmas.

Treatise: Therefore, the Vipāka-vijñāna does not grasp mind, etc.

Commentary: This is a conclusion. Question: If contaminated consciousness (contaminated consciousness: consciousness with defilements) has characteristics due to conditions, the characteristics of discrimination may not necessarily have substance. When one reaches the state of no outflows (state of no outflows: the state of completely eliminating defilements), because there is no discrimination, one should not grasp the unconditioned. What arises from conditions should all be grasped.

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實。

論。至無漏位至亦現彼影。

述曰。于無漏位勝惠相應。雖無籌度取相分別。而澄凈故。非如有漏體是滓濁。今設無用亦現彼影。即緣于無．及心等影無為影等。以親證故。知無是無故緣無等。

論。不爾諸佛應非遍智。

述曰。不知無故非遍智也。由佛第八現諸法影。名一切智。是遍知故　若爾諸佛大圓鏡智。亦應緣自相應心所。是遍智故　許亦無失。卷初但遮上座．法蜜親為所緣。不遮疏故　若爾應成心．心所法不同所緣。自體見分不自緣故　此亦不爾。自自證分與他見分同一緣故。亦無有失　又解相應心所雖不相緣亦無有失。自證緣見成遍智故。見分取于相應心故。法皆盡故。自證復能緣見分故。但約見分同一所緣不說自證。斯有何過。

論。故有漏位至及有漏種。

述曰。此第八識不能具緣十八界故。故有漏位與無漏殊。境有寬狹勝劣。其六．七識非必有用。即現．比二量是有用心。可應分別。

論。在欲色界至緣有漏種。

述曰。第三明三界境別。如護月等於無色界亦變器身。此中但有護法正義。總結於前三界緣也。

論。厭離色故至此色為境。

述曰。無色無色。厭離色故。無業果故。若定果色亦得緣之。如前已辨。于理無違。即

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

論：乃至無漏位，也仍然會顯現那些（有漏法）的影像。

述記：在無漏的境界，與殊勝的智慧相應，雖然沒有籌量思度、取相分別，但因為澄澈清凈，不像有漏的本體那樣混濁。假設沒有實際作用，也會顯現那些（有漏法）的影像。也就是緣于『無』，以及心等影像、無為的影像等。因為親身證悟的緣故，知道『無』確實是『無』，所以能夠緣于『無』等等。

論：如果不是這樣，諸佛就不應是遍知一切了。

述記：因為不知道『無』，就不能說是遍知一切。由於佛的第八識能夠顯現諸法的影像，所以稱為一切智，是遍知一切的緣故。如果這樣，諸佛的大圓鏡智，也應該緣于自身相應的『心所』（Cittasika，心理活動），因為是遍知一切的緣故。允許這樣也沒有過失。窺基在卷首隻是遮止上座部、法密部認為大圓鏡智親身為所緣，並沒有遮止疏遠的緣。如果這樣，就會形成心、心所法所緣不同，因為自體見分不緣自身。這也不對，自體的自證分與他人的見分是同一所緣的緣故，也沒有過失。又一種解釋是，相應的『心所』雖然不互相緣，也沒有過失，因為自證分緣見分，成就遍知一切的緣故。見分取于相應的心的緣故，一切法都窮盡的緣故，自證分又能緣見分的緣故，只是就見分是同一所緣來說，沒有說自證分，這有什麼過錯呢？

論：所以有漏的境界，以及有漏的種子（Bīja，潛能）。

述記：這第八識不能完全緣於十八界，所以有漏的境界與無漏的境界不同，在所緣的境上，有寬狹、殊勝低劣的差別。第六識和第七識不一定有用，只有現量和比量這兩種量是有用心的，可以進行分別。

論：在欲界，乃至緣于有漏的種子。

述記：第三說明三界的境界差別。如護月在無**（Arūpadhātu，無色界）也能夠變現器世間。這裡只有護法的正義，總結於前面所說的三界所緣。

論：因為厭離色的緣故，所以以這色為境。

述記：無色界的眾生，因為厭離色的緣故，沒有業果的緣故。如果是定果色，也可以緣於它，如前面已經辨析過，在道理上沒有違背。也就是...

【English Translation】 English version:

Treatise: Even in the non-defiled state, it still manifests the shadows of those (defiled dharmas).

Commentary: In the non-defiled state, it corresponds with supreme wisdom. Although there is no deliberation, measurement, or distinguishing of characteristics, it is clear and pure, unlike the defiled entity which is turbid. Even if it has no practical use, it still manifests those shadows. That is, it is conditioned by 'non-existence,' as well as the shadows of mind, etc., and the shadows of the unconditioned. Because of direct realization, it is known that 'non-existence' is indeed 'non-existence,' so it can be conditioned by 'non-existence,' etc.

Treatise: If not, the Buddhas should not be omniscient.

Commentary: Because not knowing 'non-existence' means not being omniscient. Because the Buddha's eighth consciousness can manifest the shadows of all dharmas, it is called all-knowing, and is the reason for being omniscient. If so, the Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom of the Buddhas should also be conditioned by its corresponding 'Cittasika' (mental activities), because it is omniscient. Allowing this is not a mistake. Kuiji only prevented the Sarvāstivāda and Dharmaguptaka schools from considering the Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom as directly conditioned, but did not prevent distant conditioning. If so, it would form a difference in what the mind and mental activities are conditioned by, because the self-cognition division does not condition itself. This is also incorrect, because the self-verifying division of the self and the perception division of others are conditioned by the same thing, so there is no mistake. Another explanation is that even if the corresponding 'Cittasika' do not condition each other, there is no mistake, because the self-verifying division conditions the perception division, achieving omniscience. Because the perception division takes the corresponding mind, and because all dharmas are exhausted, and because the self-verifying division can condition the perception division, it only speaks of the perception division being conditioned by the same thing, without mentioning the self-verifying division. What fault is there in this?

Treatise: Therefore, the defiled state, as well as the defiled 'Bīja' (seeds, potentials).

Commentary: This eighth consciousness cannot fully condition the eighteen realms, so the defiled state is different from the non-defiled state. In terms of what is conditioned, there are differences in breadth, superiority, and inferiority. The sixth and seventh consciousnesses are not necessarily useful; only the two valid cognitions of direct perception and inference are useful, and can be distinguished.

Treatise: In the desire realm, even conditioned by defiled seeds.

Commentary: The third explains the differences in the realms of the three realms. For example, in the 'Arūpadhātu' (formless realm), even Hùyuè can transform the physical world. Here, there is only the correct meaning of Dharmapāla, summarizing what was said earlier about the three realms being conditioned.

Treatise: Because of aversion to form, therefore, this form is taken as the object.

Commentary: Beings in the formless realm, because of aversion to form, and because there is no karmic result. If it is a form resulting from samādhi, it can also be conditioned by it, as has been analyzed before, and there is no contradiction in principle. That is...

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此中文若定通力。同界同地．異界異地緣一切處。五十三云。無色界定於一切色得自在故。

自下第二解不可知。有二。初解不可知。后問答辨論。

論。不可知者至難可了知。

述曰。謂前頌說不可知言。第一見分行相難可了知。

論。或此所緣至名不可知。

述曰。此中第二相分難知。內執受境。即有漏種．及有根身微細難知。非執受境外器世界量大難知。總第二段。如瑜伽論五十一說。于欲界中緣狹小境　此中謂約身器為小。色界廣大。亦約身器。初禪器等小千界故。身大可知。空識無邊處緣無量執受境。即約種子生現行識時。作此行解故。緣此無量行解之種。名緣無量所執受境。無所有處等準此應知　既緣種上差別功能。故知亦緣二無心定　此理不然。所言緣者從果為名。非緣此種子無量行解。故不緣無心定等。如前已說。

論。云何是識至行相難知。

述曰。謂外問言。即經部等．薩婆多等。既行難知應非是識。此行相言但言見分。

論。如滅定中至應信為有。

述曰。此舉喻答。此答經部。彼末計許滅定有心。故以例答。如滅定中不離身識。行亦難知　應信第八識恒體有。此答上座．及末經部。有細意識。於此可然。

薩婆多等定中無識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『此中文若定通力』。『同界同地』，『異界異地』緣『一切處』。五十三云：『無**定於一切色得自在故』。

自下第二解『不可知』。有二：初解『不可知』，后問答辨論。

論：『不可知者至難可了知』。

述曰：謂前頌說『不可知』言，第一見分行相難可了知。

論：『或此所緣至名不可知』。

述曰：此中第二相分難知。內執受境，即有漏種（指有煩惱的種子），及有根身微細難知。非執受境外器世界量大難知。總第二段，如《瑜伽論》五十一說：『于欲界中緣狹小境』，此中謂約身器為小，**廣大，亦約身器。初禪器等小千界故，身大可知。空識無邊處緣無量執受境，即約種子生現行識時，作此行解故，緣此無量行解之種，名緣無量所執受境。無所有處等準此應知。既緣種上差別功能，故知亦緣二無心定（指無想定和滅盡定）。此理不然，所言緣者從果為名，非緣此種子無量行解，故不緣無心定等，如前已說。

論：『云何是識至行相難知』。

述曰：謂外問言，即經部等、薩婆多（一切有部）等。既行難知應非是識。此行相言但言見分。

論：『如滅定中至應信為有』。

述曰：此舉喻答。此答經部。彼末計許滅定有心，故以例答。如滅定中不離身識，行亦難知，應信第八識恒體有。此答上座及末經部。有細意識，於此可然。

薩婆多（一切有部）等定中無識。

【English Translation】 English version: 'This Chinese if fixed through power'. 'Same realm same ground', 'different realm different ground' conditions 'all places'. Fifty-three says: 'Without ** fixed in all colors, one obtains freedom'.

From below, the second explanation of 'unknowable'. There are two: first, explaining 'unknowable', then questions and answers for debate.

Treatise: 'That which is unknowable is extremely difficult to understand'.

Commentary: Referring to the previous verse saying 'unknowable', the first seeing-division's (見分) characteristics are difficult to understand.

Treatise: 'Or this that is conditioned is named unknowable'.

Commentary: Here, the second object-division (相分) is difficult to know. The internal grasped-object (執受境), namely the seeds with outflows (有漏種) [referring to seeds with afflictions], and the subtle body with roots are difficult to know. The external world outside of the grasped-object, with its large quantity, is difficult to know. In general, the second section, as the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra (瑜伽論) fifty-one says: 'In the desire realm, conditioning a narrow and small object', here it refers to the body and its vessel as small, ** vast and extensive, also referring to the body and its vessel. The first dhyana's vessel etc. is a small chiliocosm, hence the body is large and knowable. The sphere of infinite space and the sphere of infinite consciousness condition limitless grasped-objects, namely when seeds give rise to manifest consciousness, this understanding is made, hence conditioning these limitless kinds of understanding, it is named conditioning limitless grasped-objects. The sphere of nothingness etc. should be understood accordingly. Since it conditions the differentiated functions on the seeds, therefore it is known that it also conditions the two non-mind samadhis [referring to the non-perception samadhi and cessation samadhi]. This reasoning is not correct, what is said to be conditioned takes its name from the result, it does not condition these limitless kinds of understanding of the seeds, therefore it does not condition the non-mind samadhis etc., as previously explained.

Treatise: 'How is it that consciousness' characteristics are difficult to know'.

Commentary: Referring to the external question, namely from the Sautrantikas (經部) etc., Sarvastivadins (薩婆多) etc. Since the characteristics are difficult to know, it should not be consciousness. This 'characteristics' only refers to the seeing-division (見分).

Treatise: 'Like in cessation samadhi, one should believe it exists'.

Commentary: This uses an analogy to answer. This answers the Sautrantikas (經部). They ultimately allow that there is mind in cessation samadhi, therefore it is answered with an analogy. Like in cessation samadhi, the consciousness that does not leave the body, its characteristics are also difficult to know, one should believe that the eighth consciousness's constant substance exists. This answers the Sthaviras (上座) and the later Sautrantikas (經部). There is subtle consciousness, this is acceptable.

The Sarvastivadins (薩婆多) etc. say there is no consciousness in samadhi.

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。如隔日瘧。答薩婆多。彼不許滅定有識故。以理答之。

論。然必應許至如有心時。

述曰。比量如文。

論。無想等位應知亦爾。

述曰。此亦所立同。二計宗各解不同無不定過　此中亦有無心悶絕。睡眠等位。唯自所許　或皆等中　此等有識。下自廣成。

成唯識論述記卷第三(本)

成唯識論述記卷第三(末)

基撰

論第三卷

若解本識十門義中。上來合二段已解五門訖　自下第三辨第六義心所相應門　于中有五。一問起論端。二舉頌正答。三釋常字顯五相應所在位次。四別釋五所體性．作用。五釋頌中相應之義　或分為二。一問。二答　答中有二。初舉頌。后廣釋　廣釋中有三。初釋常字．五相應位。二別解五所。三解相應義。

論。此識與幾心所相應。

述曰。此初問也。

論。常與觸作意受想思相應。

述曰。此舉頌答。即第二句相應之言。亦通五受。下釋家解。

論。阿賴耶識至心所相應。

述曰。此釋本頌相應位次。即解常字。第三段也　謂此本識三位名中。舉初狹名釋識寬體。故從無始來乃至未轉。即除成佛餘一切位。此說自體三位通二。恒與此五心所相應。

論。以是遍行心所攝故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 就像隔日瘧一樣。答：薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）。他們不允許滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti）中有識存在，所以用道理來回答。

論：然而必須允許到有心的時候。

述記：比量就像文中所說。

論：無想等位（Asamjñika）應該知道也是這樣。

述記：這裡所立的觀點相同。兩個學派各自的解釋不同，沒有不定的過失。這裡也有無心、悶絕、睡眠等狀態，唯有自己所允許的。或者在所有狀態中，這些都有識。下面會詳細闡述。

《成唯識論述記》卷第三（本）

《成唯識論述記》卷第三（末）

基撰

論第三卷

如果理解本識（Ālaya-vijñāna）十門義中，上面兩段已經解釋了五門。下面第三段辨析第六義，心所相應門。其中有五點：一、提問引起論端；二、舉頌正式回答；三、解釋『常』字，顯示五種相應心所的所在位次；四、分別解釋五種心所的體性、作用；五、解釋頌中相應的意義。或者分為二：一、提問；二、回答。回答中有二：初、舉頌；后、廣釋。廣釋中有三：初、解釋『常』字和五種相應心所的位次；二、分別解釋五種心所；三、解釋相應的意義。

論：此識與幾種心所相應？

述記：這是最初的提問。

論：常與觸（Sparśa，接觸）、作意（Manaskāra，注意）、受（Vedanā，感受）、想（Samjñā，表象）、思（Cetanā，意志）相應。

述記：這是舉頌回答。就是第二句『相應』的含義，也通於五種感受。下面是解釋家的解釋。

論：阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna）與心所相應。

述記：這是解釋本頌相應位次，也就是解釋『常』字。第三段。所謂這個本識在三個位次名稱中，舉出最初狹隘的名稱來解釋識的寬廣本體。所以從無始以來乃至沒有轉依（轉變），也就是除了成佛以外的一切位次。這裡說自體三位都通於二，恒常與這五種心所相應。

論：因為是被遍行心所（Sarvatraga-caitasika）所攝的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version: It is like tertian malaria. Answer: Sarvastivada (everything exists school). They do not allow that there is consciousness in Nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment), so they answer with reason.

Treatise: However, it must be allowed until there is a mind.

Commentary: The analogy is like the text says.

Treatise: It should be known that the state of Asamjñika (non-perception) is also like this.

Commentary: The established view here is the same. The two schools have different interpretations, and there is no indefinite fault. Here, there are also states of mindlessness, fainting, and sleep, which are only allowed by oneself. Or in all states, these have consciousness. It will be explained in detail below.

Verses on the Consciousness-Only Treatise, Volume 3 (Beginning)

Verses on the Consciousness-Only Treatise, Volume 3 (End)

Composed by Ji

Treatise, Volume 3

If understanding the ten meanings of the fundamental consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), the above two sections have already explained five meanings. The third section below discusses the sixth meaning, the mental functions in association. There are five points: 1. Asking a question to raise the topic; 2. Citing a verse to give a formal answer; 3. Explaining the word 'constant' to show the positions of the five associated mental functions; 4. Separately explaining the nature and function of the five mental functions; 5. Explaining the meaning of association in the verse. Or it can be divided into two: 1. Asking a question; 2. Answering. There are two parts to the answer: first, citing the verse; second, giving a detailed explanation. There are three parts to the detailed explanation: first, explaining the word 'constant' and the positions of the five associated mental functions; second, separately explaining the five mental functions; third, explaining the meaning of association.

Treatise: With how many mental functions is this consciousness associated?

Commentary: This is the initial question.

Treatise: It is constantly associated with Sparśa (contact), Manaskāra (attention), Vedanā (feeling), Samjñā (perception), and Cetanā (volition).

Commentary: This is citing the verse to answer. It is the meaning of 'association' in the second sentence, and it also applies to the five feelings. The following is the explanation of the commentators.

Treatise: The Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) is associated with mental functions.

Commentary: This explains the positions of association in the verse, which is also explaining the word 'constant'. This is the third section. The so-called fundamental consciousness, in the three names of positions, uses the initial narrow name to explain the broad essence of consciousness. Therefore, from beginningless time until there is no transformation (reversal), which is all positions except for becoming a Buddha. Here it says that the three positions of the self-essence all connect to two, and are constantly associated with these five mental functions.

Treatise: Because it is included in the Sarvatraga-caitasika (omnipresent mental functions).

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述曰。以此五種體是遍行心所攝故決定相應。雖復不增亦不可減定俱生滅。名遍行故　此在因位故亦不與余法相應。此下論中自當解釋。雖復藏識二乘能斷。斷已亦但五數相應。故至轉位諸心所俱。

論。觸謂三和至所依為業。

述曰。自下第四別解五所。于中有二。初別解五體性．作業。次總釋此得與識俱　別解各有二。初總。次別　總中體．業二種不同。顯揚論等文並同此。即出體顯業。

論。謂根境識至故名三和。

述曰。次下別解有二。初廣前。故破他　正三和體謂根．境．識。體異名三。不相乖返更相交涉名為隨順。如識不生根．境或起名為乖返。又如耳根．眼識．香境三法乖返不名三和。若相順者。三必俱生。既不相違故名隨順。根可為依。境可為取。識二所生。可依于根而取于境。如此交涉名三和體。

下解于觸由二義故亦名三和。

論。觸依彼生至故說為彼。

述曰。即由二義觸名三和　一依彼生　彼即根等。是觸之因。依三和故亦名三和。故聖教言三和生觸。對法亦云依三和合　二令彼合　彼亦根等。即觸之果。謂觸能令根等三法合為依．取．所生了別。此三和合由觸故然。故說觸能和合三法。由此二義觸名三和。非一觸體可名三故。從觸之

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：因為這五種心所是遍行心所所攝，所以決定相應。即使不再增加，也不可減少，必定同時生滅。因為名為『遍行』。這在因位，所以也不與其他法相應。這在下面的論中會自行解釋。即使阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna）二乘（Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna）能夠斷除，斷除后也只是五數相應。所以到了轉位，各種心所都一起出現。

論：觸，是指根、境、識三者和合，以『所依』為業。

述曰：下面第四部分，分別解釋五種心所。其中分為兩部分：首先分別解釋五種心所的體性和作用；其次總的解釋這些心所如何與識同時生起。分別解釋又各有兩部分：首先是總的解釋，其次是分別解釋。總的解釋中，體性和作用兩種不同。《顯揚論》等文獻的文字與此相同，即是闡述體性，彰顯作用。

論：所謂根、境、識，相互隨順，不相違背，所以名為『三和』。

述曰：下面分別解釋，分為兩部分：首先是廣泛地解釋前面所說的，從而破斥其他觀點。真正的『三和』的體性是指根、境、識。體性不同，所以名為『三』。不相互違背，而是相互交涉，名為『隨順』。例如，識不生起，根、境或許會生起，這名為『乖返』。又如，耳根、眼識、香境這三種法相互違背，不能稱為『三和』。如果相互隨順，三者必定同時生起。既然不相互違背，所以名為『隨順』。根可以作為所依，境可以作為所取，識是兩者所生。可以依于根而取于境。如此交涉，名為『三和』的體性。

下面解釋觸，由於兩種原因，也可以稱為『三和』。

論：觸依彼而生，觸能和合，所以說為『彼』。

述曰：即由於兩種原因，觸可以稱為『三和』。一是依彼而生。『彼』即根等，是觸的因。因為依於三和，所以也名為『三和』。所以聖教說『三和生觸』。《對法》也說『依三和合』。二是令彼和合。『彼』也是根等，是觸的果。意思是說，觸能夠使根等三種法和合成為所依、所取、所生了別。這三者和合，是因為觸的緣故。所以說觸能夠和合三種法。由於這兩種原因，觸可以稱為『三和』。不是說觸的本體可以名為『三』。從觸的

【English Translation】 English version: Statement: Because these five mental functions are included in the pervasive mental functions, they are definitely corresponding. Even if they do not increase, they cannot decrease, and they must arise and cease simultaneously. This is because they are called 'pervasive'. This is in the causal stage, so it does not correspond to other dharmas. This will be explained in the following treatise. Even if the Ālayavijñāna (store consciousness) can be severed by the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), after severance, only five functions correspond. Therefore, when it comes to the transformation stage, all mental functions arise together.

Treatise: Contact (Sparśa) refers to the union of the three (root, object, and consciousness), with 'support' as its function.

Statement: The fourth part below separately explains the five mental functions. It is divided into two parts: first, it separately explains the nature and function of the five mental functions; second, it generally explains how these mental functions arise simultaneously with consciousness. The separate explanations each have two parts: first, a general explanation, and second, a separate explanation. In the general explanation, the nature and function are different. The texts of the Śūnyatā-saptati and other documents are the same as this, that is, elaborating on the nature and highlighting the function.

Treatise: The so-called root, object, and consciousness are mutually compliant and not contradictory, so they are called 'three unions'.

Statement: The following separate explanation is divided into two parts: first, a broad explanation of what was said earlier, thereby refuting other views. The true nature of the 'three unions' refers to the root, object, and consciousness. The natures are different, so they are called 'three'. They do not contradict each other, but rather interact with each other, which is called 'compliance'. For example, if consciousness does not arise, the root and object may arise, which is called 'discrepancy'. Also, for example, the ear root, eye consciousness, and smell object are contradictory and cannot be called 'three unions'. If they are mutually compliant, the three must arise simultaneously. Since they do not contradict each other, they are called 'compliant'. The root can be the support, the object can be the taken, and consciousness is born from both. One can rely on the root to take the object. Such interaction is called the nature of the 'three unions'.

The following explains contact, which can also be called 'three unions' for two reasons.

Treatise: Contact arises dependent on them, and contact can unite, so it is said to be 'them'.

Statement: That is, due to two reasons, contact can be called 'three unions'. First, it arises dependent on them. 'Them' refers to the root, etc., which are the cause of contact. Because it depends on the three unions, it is also called 'three unions'. Therefore, the holy teachings say 'three unions give rise to contact'. The Abhidharma also says 'dependent on the combination of the three unions'. Second, it causes them to unite. 'Them' also refers to the root, etc., which are the result of contact. It means that contact can cause the three dharmas, such as the root, etc., to unite into support, taken, and the arising of discernment. The union of these three is due to contact. Therefore, it is said that contact can unite the three dharmas. Due to these two reasons, contact can be called 'three unions'. It is not to say that the nature of contact can be called 'three'. From the contact of

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因．及所和果。說觸為彼三和合也　問境在未來根住過去。識居現在。觸如何和　答令相隨順為依．為取．為二所生。即名三和　豈是合三令住一處方名三和　或依增上根說三和。非等無間觸名三和。于理無失。根．境．識三常現在世。無一根境住於他世。去．來二世非實有故　問境在未來。觸在現在。如何說觸是彼果耶　答誰言所生即是彼果。未來諸法為現取時。但能為境順生心等。故現識．觸名境所生。非要所生即是彼果　又彼境界體唯現在。似於去．來觸雖所生。亦名為果。

上來解總觸謂三和　自下釋前分別變異。

論。三和合位至說名變異。

述曰。初解變異。后釋分別　謂根．境．識三和合位。除未合時故言和位。此三之上。皆有順生一切心所功能作用名為變異。謂此三法居種子時。及未合前。皆無順生心所作用。於三合位功能乃生。既與前。珠說名變異。變異即是三體上用。

正解變異體即三法。次解分別。

論。觸似彼起故名分別。

述曰。分別之用是觸功能。謂觸之上。有似前三順生心所變異用功能說名分別　分別即是領似異名。如子似父名分別父　此意總顯根等三法。有能順起心所功能名為變異。此觸亦有順生心所功能作用領似彼三。是故名為分別變異　

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：『因』（hetu，原因）、『及所』（alambana，所緣）和『果』（phala，結果）是什麼關係？為什麼說『觸』（sparśa，感覺）是這三者的和合？ 答：『觸』是令它們相互隨順，作為所『依』（āśraya，依靠）、所『取』（upādāna，執取）以及二者所『生』（janman，產生）的。這就叫做『三和』（trisamgraha，三和合）。難道一定要把三者合在一起，讓它們處於同一處，才叫做『三和』嗎？ 或者，依據『增上緣』（adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣）的根來說『三和』，而不是『等無間緣』（samanantara-pratyaya，等無間緣）。這樣說『觸』是『三和』，在道理上沒有缺失。根、境（viṣaya，對像）、識（vijñāna，意識）三者常常存在於現在世（vartamāna，現在），沒有一個根或境是存在於其他世的。因為過去世（atīta，過去）和未來世（anāgata，未來）不是真實存在的。 問：境在未來，觸在現在，為什麼說觸是境的果呢？ 答：誰說所生就一定是它的果呢？未來的諸法在被現在取用時，只能作為境來順生心等。所以現在的識和觸被稱為境所生，但並非所生就一定是它的果。 而且，那個境界的體性唯有現在。類似於過去和未來，觸雖然是所生的，也可以被稱為果。

以上解釋了總的『觸』，即『三和』。下面解釋之前的分別變異。

論：在三和合的位置，就說名為變異。

述曰：首先解釋『變異』（vikāra，變異），然後解釋『分別』（vikalpa，分別）。所謂根、境、識三者和合的位置，排除了未和合的時候，所以說是『和位』。在這三者之上，都有順生一切心所的功能作用，這叫做『變異』。也就是說，這三個法在種子位時，以及未和合之前，都沒有順生心所的作用。在三和合的位置，功能才產生。既然與之前的珠子相似，就說名為『變異』。『變異』就是三體的作用。

正確地解釋『變異』的體性就是這三個法。接下來解釋『分別』。

論：觸類似於它們而生起，所以名為分別。

述曰：『分別』的作用是觸的功能。所謂觸之上，有類似於前面三者順生心所的變異作用功能，就說名為『分別』。『分別』就是領略相似的異名。如同兒子類似於父親，就說分別父親。這個意思總的顯示了根等三法，有能夠順起心所的功能，這叫做『變異』。這個觸也有順生心所的功能作用，領略類似於那三者，所以名為『分別變異』。

【English Translation】 English version Question: What is the relationship between 『hetu』 (cause), 『alambana』 (object), and 『phala』 (result)? Why is 『sparśa』 (contact) said to be the combination of these three? Answer: 『Sparśa』 is what causes them to be mutually compliant, serving as the 『āśraya』 (support), 『upādāna』 (grasping), and 『janman』 (arising) of the two. This is called 『trisamgraha』 (threefold aggregation). Is it necessary to combine the three and place them in the same location to be called 『trisamgraha』? Alternatively, 『trisamgraha』 is spoken of based on the root as 『adhipati-pratyaya』 (dominant condition), not as 『samanantara-pratyaya』 (immediately preceding condition). There is no fault in saying that 『sparśa』 is 『trisamgraha』 in this way. The three—root, 『viṣaya』 (object), and 『vijñāna』 (consciousness)—always exist in the present 『vartamāna』 (present) moment. No root or object exists in other moments because the past 『atīta』 (past) and future 『anāgata』 (future) are not truly existent. Question: If the object is in the future and contact is in the present, why is contact said to be the result of the object? Answer: Who said that what arises must necessarily be its result? When future dharmas are taken up in the present, they can only serve as objects to facilitate the arising of mind, etc. Therefore, present consciousness and contact are called object-born, but what arises is not necessarily its result. Moreover, the nature of that object is only present. Similar to the past and future, although contact is what arises, it can also be called a result.

The above explains the general 『sparśa』 (contact), which is 『trisamgraha』 (threefold aggregation). The following explains the previous distinctions and variations.

Treatise: In the position of the three combining, it is said to be named variation.

Commentary: First, explain 『vikāra』 (variation), then explain 『vikalpa』 (distinction). The so-called position of the combination of root, object, and consciousness excludes the time before combination, hence it is called 『combined position』. Above these three, there are functional operations that facilitate the arising of all mental functions, which is called 『variation』. That is to say, these three dharmas, when in the seed state and before combination, do not have the function of facilitating the arising of mental functions. The function only arises in the position of the three combining. Since it is similar to the previous pearl, it is said to be named 『variation』. 『Variation』 is the function of the three entities.

Correctly explain that the nature of 『variation』 is these three dharmas. Next, explain 『vikalpa』 (distinction).

Treatise: Because contact arises similarly to them, it is named distinction.

Commentary: The function of 『distinction』 is the function of contact. The so-called contact has a functional operation of variation that facilitates the arising of mental functions, similar to the previous three, which is called 『distinction』. 『Distinction』 is the different name for grasping similarity. Just as a son resembles his father, it is said to distinguish the father. This meaning generally shows that the three dharmas, such as the root, have the function of being able to facilitate the arising of mental functions, which is called 『variation』. This contact also has the functional operation of facilitating the arising of mental functions, grasping similarly to those three, so it is named 『distinction variation』.

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問三和之上有功能順生於觸名變異。觸既似彼有功能。亦自順生名分別　設爾何失　若自順生名分別。應說觸觸以為緣。如順生受有功能。說觸用名分別故。若自不順名為分別。何故似生受等。非似生於觸耶　答觸不似彼生觸功能。不自生故。如受等法不能生余。即無領似。例觸應爾。又分限故。謂根．及境能生於識。亦能生余。二種功能。識但生余無自生用。例觸應爾。觸不似彼生識．及觸二種功能。無勢分故。若約見．自證分相生。亦有似義。又如受領觸不領作意等　問若似三功能。名分別變異。何故集論第一等。云于根變異分別為體。為答此問故次說云。

論。根變異力至根之變異。

述曰。下會相違。謂三和位引觸起時。根變異力勝餘二種。故集論等。但說分別根之變異。不說分別識．境變異　今言等者。等取雜集　復言根之第六轉者。顯變異是根體之用。對法論中以根用勝但分別根。仍不分別根功能盡。唯能領似順生三受所有功能。以受是觸近所生故。辨中邊論第一卷云。觸能分別根．境．識三順三受故　分別生三受同對法文。分別根．境．識稍寬對法。皆有順生三受相故。此中通取似一切能。最為盡理　又彼論中言分別者。是分別義。根等有能生三受分位。觸能分別令三位珠。分三位別故名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：在三和合（根、境、識三者和合）之上，觸（sparśa）具有產生感受（vedanā）的功能，並順著名（nāma）而產生變異。既然觸類似於具有產生感受的功能，那麼它也能順著自身產生名的分別（nāma-vikalpa）嗎？如果這樣，會有什麼過失呢？如果觸順著自身產生名的分別，那麼應該說觸是觸的緣（pratyaya），就像它順著產生感受並具有功能一樣，說觸的作用是名的分別。如果觸不順著自身產生名的分別，那麼為什麼它類似於產生感受等（vedanā-ādi），而不類似於產生觸呢？ 答：觸不像感受那樣產生觸的功能，因為它不是自生的。就像感受等法不能產生其他法一樣，它就沒有領受相似的作用。觸也應該如此。此外，還有分限的緣故。也就是說，根（indriya）和境（viṣaya）能夠產生識（vijñāna），也能產生其他法，具有兩種功能。識只能產生其他法，沒有自生的作用。觸也應該如此。觸不像感受那樣產生識和觸兩種功能，因為它沒有勢力的區分。如果從見分（darśana-bhāga）和自證分（svasaṃvedana-bhāga）相互產生來看，也有相似的意義。又如感受領受觸，而觸不領受作意（manaskāra）等。 問：如果觸類似於三種功能，即名的分別變異，那麼《集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第一等為什麼說以根的變異為體呢？爲了回答這個問題，接下來這樣說： 論：根的變異力乃至根的變異。 述曰：下面會解釋這種相違之處。也就是說，在三和合的位次，引發觸生起時，根的變異力勝過其餘兩種（境和識）。所以《集論》等只說分別根的變異，不說分別識和境的變異。現在說『等者』，是等取《雜集》（Yogācārabhūmi-saṃgraha）。再說『根的第六轉』，顯示變異是根體的作用。《對法論》（Abhidharma）中以根的作用勝過其他，但只分別根，仍然沒有分別根的所有功能。只能領受類似於順著產生三種感受的所有功能，因為感受是觸近處所生的緣故。《辨中邊論》（Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya）第一卷說，觸能分別根、境、識三種，順著三種感受的緣故。分別產生三種感受與《對法》的文義相同。分別根、境、識稍寬於《對法》，都具有順著產生三種感受的相狀。這裡通取類似於一切功能，最為合理。又彼論中說『分別』，是分別的意義。根等具有產生三種感受的分位，觸能分別，令三位如珠，區分三位的差別，所以名為分別。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: Upon the conjunction of the three (tri-samāhita, the union of sense organ (indriya), object (viṣaya), and consciousness (vijñāna)), does contact (sparśa) have the function of generating feeling (vedanā) and does it arise in accordance with name (nāma) undergoing transformation? Since contact resembles that which has the function of generating feeling, can it also generate name-discrimination (nāma-vikalpa) by itself? If so, what fault would there be? If contact generates name-discrimination by itself, then it should be said that contact is the condition (pratyaya) for contact, just as it generates feeling and has function, saying that the function of contact is name-discrimination. If contact does not generate name-discrimination by itself, then why does it resemble the generation of feeling, etc. (vedanā-ādi), and not resemble the generation of contact? Answer: Contact does not resemble the function of generating contact like feeling, because it is not self-generated. Just as feeling and other dharmas cannot generate other dharmas, it does not have the function of receiving similarity. Contact should also be like this. Moreover, there is also the reason of limitation. That is to say, the sense organ (indriya) and the object (viṣaya) can generate consciousness (vijñāna), and can also generate other dharmas, having two functions. Consciousness can only generate other dharmas, and does not have the function of self-generation. Contact should also be like this. Contact does not resemble the two functions of generating consciousness and contact like feeling, because it does not have the distinction of power. If viewed from the perspective of the seeing-aspect (darśana-bhāga) and self-cognition-aspect (svasaṃvedana-bhāga) generating each other, there is also a similar meaning. Also, feeling receives contact, but contact does not receive attention (manaskāra), etc. Question: If contact resembles the three functions, namely the transformation of name-discrimination, then why does the first part of the Abhidharmasamuccaya say that it takes the transformation of the sense organ as its essence? To answer this question, it is said next: Treatise: The power of the transformation of the sense organ extends to the transformation of the sense organ. Commentary: The following will explain this contradiction. That is to say, in the state of the conjunction of the three, when contact is initiated, the power of the transformation of the sense organ surpasses the other two (object and consciousness). Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, etc., only speak of discriminating the transformation of the sense organ, and do not speak of discriminating the transformation of consciousness and object. Now, saying 'etc.' includes the Yogācārabhūmi-saṃgraha. Furthermore, saying 'the sixth transformation of the sense organ' shows that transformation is the function of the essence of the sense organ. In the Abhidharma, the function of the sense organ surpasses others, but it only discriminates the sense organ, and still does not discriminate all the functions of the sense organ. It can only receive similarity to all the functions of generating the three feelings in accordance, because feeling is generated near contact. The first volume of the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya says that contact can discriminate the three of sense organ, object, and consciousness, because it accords with the three feelings. Discriminating the generation of the three feelings is the same as the meaning of the Abhidharma. Discriminating the sense organ, object, and consciousness is slightly broader than the Abhidharma, and all have the appearance of according with the generation of the three feelings. Here, taking it as similar to all functions is the most reasonable. Also, in that treatise, saying 'discrimination' is the meaning of discrimination. The sense organ, etc., have the divisions of generating the three feelings, and contact can discriminate, causing the three positions to be like beads, distinguishing the differences of the three positions, so it is called discrimination.

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分別。今此解好　問何故三和唯根獨勝　答一由主故。有珠勝能名之為主。二由近故。能近生心．及心所也。三由遍故。不唯生心所。亦能生心故。四由續故。常相續有。境．識不爾。故境體雖能生心．心所。以非主故。又非近故。偏闕二義不名為勝。心雖是主近生心所。不能生心。不自生故非遍也。闕遍一義故非勝。境．識皆不續。識有境生故俱闕續義。非得勝名。唯根獨勝。

問觸之功能如前可解。豈不能與心等同緣。唯此份量名為觸耶。

論。和合一切至是觸自性。

述曰。更有餘能非觸爾所。謂觸亦能和合一切心。心所法。不令離散各別行相。同趣一境。是觸自性。設無觸者。其心．心所各各離散不能同緣。今不散時皆觸功力。

說自性已。觸業如何。前解功能雖即是業。舉業顯體故非業門。

論。既似順起至所依為業。

述曰。即此觸數。既似三和有能順生心所作用。即能生起余心所法。故以受等所依為業。受等心所皆依此生。若無生能非所依故。

何以知者。

論。起盡經說至觸為緣故。

述曰。經明生滅名起盡經。從彼所明以立經號。若觸但能生受非餘者。應餘二蘊不以觸為依。無心起時無諸心所故諸心所皆觸為依。

論。由斯故說至

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：現在來解釋這個『好』字。問：為什麼在根、境、識三者和合時，只有根是殊勝的？答：一是因為根是主導。根具有產生殊勝作用的能力，所以稱為主導。二是因為根是鄰近的。根能夠鄰近地產生心和心所（citta-caitta，心理活動）。三是因為根是普遍的。根不僅能產生心所，也能產生心。四是因為根是持續的。根是常相續存在的，而境和識則不是這樣。所以，境的體性雖然能產生心和心所，但因為它不是主導，又不是鄰近的，缺少了主導和鄰近這兩個含義，所以不能稱為殊勝。心雖然是主導，也鄰近地產生心所，但它不能產生心，因為它不能自己產生自己，所以不是普遍的。缺少了普遍這個含義，所以不是殊勝的。境和識都不持續，識是由境產生的，所以都缺少持續的含義，不能得到殊勝的名稱。只有根是殊勝的。 問：觸（sparśa，感覺）的功能如前面所解釋的那樣可以理解。難道觸不能與心等同地緣取對象，而只有這個份量才稱為觸嗎？ 論：和合一切，是觸的自性。 述曰：還有其他的功用不是觸所具有的。觸也能和合一切心和心所法，使它們不離散，各自具有不同的行相，共同趨向一個對象。這是觸的自性。如果沒有觸，心和心所就會各自離散，不能共同緣取對象。現在不離散的時候，都是觸的功力。 說了觸的自性之後，觸的業（karma，行為）是什麼呢？前面解釋的功能雖然就是業，但爲了舉業來顯示體性，所以不是業的範疇。 論：既似順起，以受等所依為業。 述曰：這個觸數，既然類似於三和，具有能夠順生心所的作用，就能生起其餘的心所法，所以以受（vedanā，感受）等所依為業。受等心所都依靠觸而生。如果沒有生起的能力，就不能作為所依。 憑什麼知道呢？ 論：起盡經說，以觸為緣故。 述曰：經中說明生滅，名為《起盡經》。從經中所闡明的內容來確立經名。如果觸只能產生受，而不能產生其餘的，那麼其餘的二蘊（skandha，蘊）就不應該以觸為所依。沒有心生起的時候，就沒有諸心所，所以諸心所都以觸為所依。 論：因此說，

【English Translation】 English version: Now, to explain this word 'good'. Question: Why, when the three (root, object, and consciousness) are in harmony, is only the root considered superior? Answer: Firstly, because it is the master. The root has the power to produce superior functions, so it is called the master. Secondly, because it is near. It can closely produce the mind (citta) and mental factors (caitta). Thirdly, because it is pervasive. It not only produces mental factors but also produces the mind. Fourthly, because it is continuous. It exists in constant succession, unlike the object and consciousness. Therefore, although the nature of the object can produce the mind and mental factors, it is not called superior because it is neither the master nor near, lacking these two meanings. Although the mind is the master and closely produces mental factors, it cannot produce the mind itself because it does not self-arise, so it is not pervasive. Lacking the meaning of pervasiveness, it is not superior. The object and consciousness are both not continuous; consciousness arises from the object, so both lack the meaning of continuity and cannot obtain the name of superior. Only the root is superior. Question: The function of contact (sparśa) can be understood as explained before. Can't contact also apprehend objects in the same way as the mind, and only this aspect is called contact? Treatise: Harmonizing everything is the nature of contact. Commentary: There are other functions that contact does not possess. Contact can also harmonize all minds and mental factors, preventing them from scattering and having different appearances, and directing them towards one object. This is the nature of contact. Without contact, the mind and mental factors would scatter and not be able to apprehend objects together. Now, when they are not scattered, it is all due to the power of contact. Having spoken of the nature of contact, what is the karma (action) of contact? Although the function explained earlier is karma, it is not in the category of karma because it is used to reveal the nature. Treatise: Since it seems to arise accordingly, taking feeling etc. as its support is its karma. Commentary: This contact element, since it is similar to the three harmonies and has the function of producing mental factors accordingly, can generate the remaining mental factors. Therefore, taking feeling (vedanā) etc. as its support is its karma. Feeling and other mental factors all arise depending on contact. If it does not have the ability to generate, it cannot be the support. How is this known? Treatise: The Sutra on Arising and Ceasing says, 'Because contact is the condition'. Commentary: The sutra explains arising and ceasing, so it is named the 'Sutra on Arising and Ceasing'. The name of the sutra is established based on what is clarified in it. If contact could only produce feeling and not the rest, then the remaining two aggregates (skandha) should not depend on contact. When the mind does not arise, there are no mental factors, so all mental factors depend on contact. Treatise: Therefore, it is said,

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和合而生。

述曰。由前理教契經復說。識．觸受等因二．三．四和合而生　如經所說眼．色為緣能生眼識。說識依根．境二法和合生。經雖復言作意力故識乃得生。此辨所依故今不說。彼能警心依心而有。非心依故此不說之　問觸依三和生。名分別變異。識依二合生名分別根．境　答準于觸理亦可然。又是主故不同於觸。二解並得。契經復說三和故觸。說觸依根．境．識三和合生。起盡經說受等皆以觸為緣故。即是受等依根．境．識．觸四法和合生　問若無自證。可說心是二和合生。既有自證。心亦依心。心體亦是三和合生　答今依見分別體者說。同體為依非此所說。若亦說者。如次復以三．四．五和合生。心．心所法各自依故。此說親．現依。不說疏．種子。若說疏依．及種子者。法則有多　問若諸心所皆依觸生。何故瑜伽第三．及五十五。說以受．想．思所依為業。不說所餘心所法也。

論。瑜伽但說至舉此攝余。

述曰。由此思體為主勝故　一者思是行蘊主。故集論初說云何行蘊。謂六思身　彼自釋言為導首故　二者思能造諸業勝。舉思攝余法。非但獨取思。故諸心所皆依觸生。

問曰若爾何故集論．顯揚第一．五蘊等。云受依為業。

論。集論等說至近而勝故。

述

曰。此即總舉唯受所由。

何者為近。復是勝耶。

論。謂觸所取至引發勝故。

述曰。觸之所取可意．不可意．及俱相違相。與受所取順益．損害及．俱相違相極相鄰近。相鄰近者是相似義。即可意等相。與順益等相。行相極相似。故名為相鄰。如世有言此物．彼物深極相似。相似．相鄰體一名異。此解即是約境相近　又觸引發受勝餘心所。故觸觸苦等觸時。受受于苦等受。三受分位觸．受相同。此解即是行相相似故名為勝。余不領此可意等相。及苦等位。故集論等不說作依　問。觸似三和名分別變異。受似於觸名分別觸耶　答釋此難至受當知。

然今大乘。同一切有部觸體是實。唯經部一師三和成觸者。難大乘曰。說觸是三和。何得有實體。為破彼計故次說云。

論。然觸自性是實非假。

述曰。此立宗也。

論。六六法中心所性故。

述曰。自下三因。此即初也。俱舍第十．正理等云。謂六內處。六外處．六識身．六愛身．六觸身．六受身。今取界身足論六六。謂六識．六觸．六受．六想．六思．六愛　經部計愛亦是實有。思分位故不同假觸　破之量云。觸別有體。六六法中心所性故。如受．愛等　若依俱舍六六法者。彼計根．境假非實故。言心所意簡前二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 說：這總括地指出了感受所由來的原因。

什麼最為接近？又什麼是殊勝的呢？

論：是指觸所取之境，能引發殊勝的感受。

述記：觸所取的，無論是可意的、不可意的，還是兩者相違背的相狀，都與感受所取的順益、損害以及兩者相違背的相狀極其相鄰近。相鄰近的意思是相似。即可意等相，與順益等相，行相極其相似，所以叫做相鄰。就像世俗所說，此物與彼物極其相似。相似和相鄰，體性相同，只是名稱不同。這種解釋是從境界上來說的相近。另外，觸引發感受，勝過其他心所。所以當觸及苦等觸時，感受也感受苦等感受。三受的分位，觸和受是相同的。這種解釋是從行相上來說的相似，所以叫做殊勝。其餘心所不能領受這種可意等相，以及苦等位，所以《集論》等不說觸是感受的所依。 問：觸類似於三和合，名稱是分別變異。感受類似於觸，名稱是分別觸嗎？答：解釋這個難題直到『受當知』。

然而現在大乘的觀點，與一切有部相同，認為觸的體性是真實的。只有經部的一位論師認為三和合而成觸，他會質難大乘說：既然說觸是三和合，怎麼會有實體呢？爲了破斥他們的觀點，所以接下來論述說：

論：然而觸的自性是真實的，不是虛假的。

述記：這是立宗。

論：因為觸是六六法中的心所的體性。

述記：以下是三個理由。這是第一個理由。《俱舍論》第十、《正理論》等說：所謂的六內處（adhyātmikāyatana），六外處（bahirdhāyatana），六識身（vijñānakāya），六愛身（tṛṣṇākāya），六觸身（sparśakāya），六受身（vedanākāya）。現在取界身（dhātukāya）就足夠說明六六法了。即六識（ṣaṭvijñāna），六觸（ṣaṭsparśa），六受（ṣaḍvedanā），六想（ṣaṭsaṃjñā），六思（ṣaṭcetanā），六愛（ṣaṭtṛṣṇā）。經部認為愛也是真實存在的，因為它是思的分位，不同於虛假的觸。破斥他們的量式是：觸別有體，因為它是六六法中的心所的體性，就像受、愛等。如果依據《俱舍論》的六六法，他們認為根、境是虛假的，不是真實的，所以說『心所』是爲了簡別前兩者。

【English Translation】 English version: It is said: This is a general statement of the cause of feeling.

What is the closest? And what is superior?

Treatise: It refers to what is taken by contact (sparśa), leading to the arising of superior feeling (vedanā).

Commentary: What is taken by contact, whether it is agreeable, disagreeable, or mutually contradictory, is extremely close to what is taken by feeling, whether it is beneficial, harmful, or mutually contradictory. 'Close' means similar. That is, the characteristics of agreeable, etc., are extremely similar to the characteristics of beneficial, etc., so it is called close. Just as the world says, 'This thing and that thing are extremely similar.' Similar and close are the same in essence but different in name. This explanation is about the closeness in terms of the object. Furthermore, contact causes feeling, which is superior to other mental factors. Therefore, when contact touches painful contacts, feeling also feels painful feelings. In the divisions of the three feelings, contact and feeling are the same. This explanation is about the similarity in terms of characteristics, so it is called superior. Other mental factors cannot perceive these agreeable characteristics, etc., and painful states, etc., so the Abhidharmasamuccaya does not say that contact is the basis of feeling. Question: Is contact similar to the combination of three, named 'discriminating change'? Is feeling similar to contact, named 'discriminating contact'? Answer: Explain this difficulty until 'feeling should be known'.

However, now the view of the Mahayana, like that of the Sarvastivadins, is that the nature of contact is real. Only one teacher of the Sautrantikas believes that contact is formed by the combination of three. He would challenge the Mahayana by saying: Since it is said that contact is the combination of three, how can it have a real substance? To refute their view, it is then stated:

Treatise: However, the nature of contact is real, not false.

Commentary: This is establishing the proposition.

Treatise: Because contact is the nature of mental factors within the six-six dharmas.

Commentary: Below are three reasons. This is the first reason. The tenth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa, the Nyāyānusāra, etc., say: The so-called six internal bases (adhyātmikāyatana), six external bases (bahirdhāyatana), six bodies of consciousness (vijñānakāya), six bodies of craving (tṛṣṇākāya), six bodies of contact (sparśakāya), and six bodies of feeling (vedanākāya). Now, taking the body of elements (dhātukāya) is sufficient to explain the six-six dharmas. That is, the six consciousnesses (ṣaṭvijñāna), six contacts (ṣaṭsparśa), six feelings (ṣaḍvedanā), six perceptions (ṣaṭsaṃjñā), six volitions (ṣaṭcetanā), and six cravings (ṣaṭtṛṣṇā). The Sautrantikas believe that craving is also real, because it is a division of volition, unlike false contact. The refuting syllogism is: Contact has a separate substance, because it is the nature of mental factors within the six-six dharmas, like feeling, craving, etc. If based on the six-six dharmas of the Abhidharmakośa, they believe that the sense faculties and objects are false, not real, so saying 'mental factors' is to distinguish from the former two.

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。如順正理第十卷中廣破經部。

論。是食性故。

述曰。此第二因　又此觸數定是實有。四食性故。如餘三食　段食香．味．觸既許是實。故以為喻。四大觸實故。于理無違。或應心所亦通於下。簡略便盡。

論。能為緣故。

述曰。此第三因　又此觸數定是實有。緣起支中心所攝故。如愛緣取。

思分位故彼亦許實。諸心所支皆是實有。

若就他宗。十二支中設但少實。即得為喻彼全不許觸少分實。許少分實余假不成。無異因故。

論。如受等性非即三和。

述曰。言受等者。等二因之喻。及初喻中受等心所法。或受可通初后二喻。但等中喻。即以三因破彼經部　非即三和。亦得說為第二宗法。此為宗法即無妨也　此中大乘。觸別有體非即三和　經部一師說三和成觸。觸即三和。是假非實　又一師說三和生觸觸非三和　一切有部觸雖別有。不能分別變異而生心．心所等。但以受等所依為業　三部不同。

論。作意謂能至引心為業。

述曰。解第二數。文可知也　初略明體．業。次廣。后破。顯揚等同　何名警心　如何警心　何位警心　起已方警。更何須警。先已起故　未起即警。應警一切心。能警作意亦未生故。如何能警。

論。謂此警覺

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《如順正理》第十卷中廣泛駁斥了經部宗的觀點。

論：因為它是食的性質。

述記：這是第二個理由。此外，這個觸（Sparsha，感覺）的法數一定是實有的，因為它具有四種食（Āhāra，食物）的性質，就像其餘三種食一樣。段食（Kabaḍīkāra-āhāra，粗 खाद्य），香、味、觸既然被認為是實有的，所以可以作為比喻。四大（Mahābhūta，महाभूत）的觸是真實的，所以在道理上沒有違背。或者，心所（Caitasika，चैतसिक）也可以通用於下文，這樣簡略而完備。

論：因為它能作為緣。

述記：這是第三個理由。此外，這個觸的法數一定是實有的，因為它被攝屬於緣起支（Pratītyasamutpāda，प्रतीत्यसमुत्पाद）中的心所，就像愛緣取一樣。

因為思（Cetanā，चेतना）有分位，所以他們也承認它是真實的。所有的心所支都是實有的。

如果就其他宗派而言，十二支中即使只有少部分是真實的，也可以作為比喻。他們完全不承認觸有少部分是真實的。如果承認少部分是真實的，其餘虛假的就不能成立，因為沒有不同的原因。

論：就像受等（Vedanā，वेदना）的性質不是即三和（Trisamgraha，त्रिसंग्रह）。

述記：說到受等，是等於兩個理由的比喻，以及最初比喻中的受等心所法。或者，受可以通用於最初和最後的兩個比喻，但等於中間的比喻。這就是用三個理由來駁斥經部宗。『不是即三和』，也可以說是第二個宗法。這作為宗法是沒有妨礙的。這裡的大乘認為，觸是別有實體的，不是即三和。經部宗的一個師父說，三和成就了觸，觸就是三和，是虛假的而不是真實的。又一個師父說，三和生了觸，觸不是三和。一切有部（Sarvāstivāda，सर्वास्तिवाद）認為，觸雖然是別有的，但不能分別變異而生心、心所等，只是以受等所依為作用。這三個部派的觀點不同。

論：作意（Manaskāra，मनस्कार）是指能夠引導心，以此為作用。

述記：解釋第二個法數，文義可以理解。最初簡略地說明體和作用，其次是廣泛地說明，最後是駁斥，與《顯揚聖教論》等相同。什麼叫做警心？如何警心？在什麼位置警心？已經生起之後才警，又何須警？因為先前已經生起了。未生起就警，應該警一切心，因為能警的作意也未生起，如何能警？

論：所謂警覺。

【English Translation】 English version: The tenth volume of Nyayanusarini refutes the Sautrantika school extensively.

Statement: Because it is of the nature of food.

Commentary: This is the second reason. Furthermore, this number of contact (Sparsha) must be truly existent, because it has the nature of the four foods (Āhāra), like the other three foods. Coarse food (Kabaḍīkāra-āhāra), smell, taste, and touch are admitted to be real, so they can be used as metaphors. The touch of the four great elements (Mahābhūta) is real, so there is no contradiction in reason. Alternatively, mental factors (Caitasika) can also be applied to the following, so it is concise and complete.

Statement: Because it can be a condition.

Commentary: This is the third reason. Furthermore, this number of contact must be truly existent, because it is included in the mental factors of the dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda), like craving conditioning grasping.

Because volition (Cetanā) has divisions, they also admit it is real. All mental factor branches are truly existent.

If, according to other schools, even if only a small part of the twelve links is real, it can be used as a metaphor. They completely do not admit that contact has a small part that is real. If a small part is admitted to be real, the remaining false parts cannot be established, because there is no different reason.

Statement: Like the nature of feeling (Vedanā) and so on, it is not identical to the aggregation of three (Trisamgraha).

Commentary: Speaking of feeling and so on, it is equal to the metaphor of two reasons, and the mental factors of feeling and so on in the initial metaphor. Alternatively, feeling can be applied to the initial and final two metaphors, but it is equal to the middle metaphor. This is using three reasons to refute the Sautrantika school. 『It is not identical to the aggregation of three』 can also be said to be the second thesis. There is no obstacle to this being the thesis. Here, the Mahayana believes that contact has a separate entity and is not identical to the aggregation of three. One teacher of the Sautrantika school said that the aggregation of three constitutes contact, and contact is the aggregation of three, which is false and not real. Another teacher said that the aggregation of three produces contact, and contact is not the aggregation of three. The Sarvāstivāda school believes that although contact is separate, it cannot distinguish and transform to produce mind, mental factors, etc., but only takes the basis of feeling and so on as its function. The views of these three schools are different.

Statement: Attention (Manaskāra) means being able to lead the mind, taking this as its function.

Commentary: Explaining the second number, the meaning of the text can be understood. Initially, the entity and function are briefly explained, then they are explained extensively, and finally they are refuted, which is the same as the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and so on. What is called alerting the mind? How to alert the mind? In what position to alert the mind? Alerting after it has already arisen, why is there a need to alert? Because it has already arisen previously. Alerting before it has arisen, all minds should be alerted, because the attention that can alert has not yet arisen, how can it alert?

Statement: So-called awareness.

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至故名作意。

述曰。謂作意等並未生位。其作意種。義警應生心之種曰可起趣境。非警一切心之種子。彼未逢緣不定生故　作意警心有二功力。一者令心未起正起。二者令心起已趣境故。言警覺應起心種引令趣境故。正理師說。作意之用在未來起。此在種子義勢亦同。由作動意立作意名。作意種子能警心種。此解依文　或現作意與識同時。義說警彼應生心種令起趣境。理亦無違。起已方警。警理難見。故論不許　問作意警於心。種位言能警。觸等生心所。現位不能生　於此難中應設功力。種子之位未有三種不和之義。亦無心．心所合不同觸境故。觸唯說現行有用　問心種能生現。作意警方生。心所無能警。種應不生現　答由作意警心所方生理與心齊。何得為難。

問既爾應說。

論。雖此亦能至俱說引心。

述曰。即是作意遍能警覺。但說心者為是主故　問心等自能生作意警方起。作意無能警。應種不能生　答曰。受等三和生。更說由觸起。觸不由觸起。自體應不生　問此質不定。為如觸數無能生觸。為如生等復有能生　於此難中復應思擇。

然順正理第十一卷解作意云。謂能令心回趣異境。但住此境行相微隱。故今敘云。

論。有說令心回趣異境。

述曰。此敘彼計

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 至故名作意。

述曰：所謂的作意等，是指它們還未顯現的狀態。作意的種子，其含義是警覺並使相應的心識種子生起，使其能夠趨向所緣境。並非警覺一切心識的種子，因為那些種子未遇到因緣時，不一定會生起。作意警覺心識具有兩種功用：一是使未生起的心識開始生起，二是使已生起的心識趨向所緣境。所以說，警覺並使相應的心識種子生起，引導其趨向所緣境。正理師（Nyaya）認為，作意的作用在於未來生起。這在種子層面上的意義也是相同的。由於『作動』之意而立名為作意。作意的種子能夠警覺心識的種子。這種解釋是依據字面意義。

或者，現行的作意與識同時存在，從意義上說，是警覺那些應生起的心識種子，使其生起並趨向所緣境，這在道理上也沒有衝突。如果心識生起之後才警覺，這種說法在道理上難以成立，所以論典不認可。

問：作意在心識的種子位上說能夠警覺，而觸（sparśa）等生起的心所（caitasika），在現行位上卻不能生起嗎？

對於這個疑問，應該設立『功力』。在種子位上，還沒有三種（根、境、識）不和合的意義，也沒有心、心所合而不同觸境的情況。觸只在現行時才說有用。

問：心識的種子能夠生起現行，作意警覺后才能生起。如果心所沒有能夠警覺的，那麼心所的種子應該不能生起現行吧？

答：由於作意警覺心所，心所才能生起，這在道理上與心識的生起是同步的，怎麼能成為疑問呢？

問：既然如此，應該說：

論：雖然作意也能普遍地警覺，但只說心識，是因為心識是主要的。

述曰：這就是說作意普遍能夠警覺。但只說心識，是因為心識是主要的。

問：心識等自己能夠生起，作意警覺后才能生起。如果作意沒有能夠警覺的，那麼作意的種子應該不能生起吧？

答：受（vedanā）等是三種和合而生起的，更要說是由觸而生起的。如果觸不由觸而生起，那麼觸的自體應該不能生起。

問：這個質不定，是像觸一樣沒有能生觸的，還是像生等一樣還有能生的？

對於這個疑問，應該進一步思考。

然而，《順正理論》（Nyāyānusāra-śāstra）第十一卷解釋作意說：『是指能夠使心識迴轉趨向不同的所緣境。』但心識只是安住在這個所緣境上，其行相非常微細隱蔽，所以現在敘述如下：

論：有人說，作意是使心識迴轉趨向不同的所緣境。

述曰：這是敘述其他宗派的觀點。

【English Translation】 English version: To this end, it is called 'attention' (manasikara).

Commentary: 'Attention' and the like refer to their state before manifestation. The seed of attention means that it alerts and causes the corresponding seed of consciousness to arise, enabling it to turn towards the object. It does not alert all seeds of consciousness, because those seeds do not necessarily arise when they have not encountered the appropriate conditions. Attention has two functions in alerting consciousness: first, it causes consciousness that has not yet arisen to begin to arise; second, it causes consciousness that has already arisen to turn towards the object. Therefore, it is said that it alerts and causes the corresponding seed of consciousness to arise, guiding it to turn towards the object. The Naiyayikas (logicians) believe that the function of attention lies in its future arising. This is the same in the sense of the seed. The name 'attention' is established because of the meaning of 'causing to act'. The seed of attention can alert the seed of consciousness. This explanation is based on the literal meaning.

Alternatively, the present attention exists simultaneously with consciousness. In terms of meaning, it alerts those seeds of consciousness that should arise, causing them to arise and turn towards the object. There is no conflict in this reasoning. If consciousness is alerted after it has arisen, this explanation is difficult to establish, so the treatises do not accept it.

Question: Attention is said to be able to alert in the seed state of consciousness, but can mental factors such as contact (sparśa) that arise not arise in the present state?

Regarding this question, 'power' should be established. In the seed state, there is no meaning of the three (root, object, consciousness) not being in harmony, nor is there a situation where mind and mental factors combine but do not touch the object. Contact is only said to be useful when it is present.

Question: The seed of consciousness can give rise to the present. Attention can only arise after alerting. If mental factors do not have the ability to alert, then the seeds of mental factors should not be able to give rise to the present, right?

Answer: Mental factors can only arise because attention alerts them, and their arising is synchronized with the arising of consciousness. How can this be a question?

Question: If that's the case, it should be said:

Treatise: Although attention can universally alert, it only mentions consciousness because consciousness is the main thing.

Commentary: This means that attention can universally alert. But it only mentions consciousness because consciousness is the main thing.

Question: Consciousness and the like can arise on their own, and attention can only arise after alerting. If attention does not have the ability to alert, then the seed of attention should not be able to arise, right?

Answer: Feeling (vedanā) and the like arise from the combination of the three, and it must also be said that they arise from contact. If contact does not arise from contact, then the self-nature of contact should not be able to arise.

Question: This quality is uncertain. Is it like contact, which has nothing that can produce contact, or is it like birth and the like, which have something that can produce them?

Regarding this question, further consideration should be given.

However, the eleventh volume of the Nyāyānusāra-śāstra explains attention as: 'It refers to the ability to turn consciousness back towards different objects.' But consciousness only abides in this object, and its characteristics are very subtle and hidden, so it is now described as follows:

Treatise: Some say that attention is what turns consciousness back towards different objects.

Commentary: This is a description of the views of other schools.

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。下破之云。此應非遍行。住此境無故。彼名大地法。亦遍行義故。若相微隱由何知有。

瑜伽第三謂心迴轉。然約顯相處說。非為盡理。不同彼執得為盡理。

集論初說于所緣境持心令住。故論敘言。

論。或於一境持心令住。

述曰。此敘彼計。集論文意亦非盡理。下破之云不異定故。定行相亦能持心住境故。此師亦可應非遍行。若散亂心行相無故。

論。彼俱非理至不異定故。

述曰。應非遍行故。破正理師　應不異定故。破雜集論師　已如前說。由雜集師不解集論。約此行相以為真理故今破之　然救初云。且約新起異緣勝說。非非遍行。救第二云。據修中行定勝作意說。故與定別　此亦不然。義不具故。既說行相應盡理明。理既不周故如論破。與薩婆多別。如俱舍第四　問何故百法等。作意為初。此論中所明觸為先說　答和合三法攝心．心所令同取境。是觸勝能。警心．心所令皆能起。作意勝力。此約和合。觸乃先明。彼論約警。作意初說。各據一門不相違也。

論。受謂領納至起愛為業。

述曰。解第三數。初辨自義。后破外執。體．業可知。

論。能起合離非二欲故。

述曰。解起愛為業。謂於樂受未得希合。已得復有不乖離欲。于苦未

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 破斥如下：這應不是遍行心所，因為它只存在於特定境界中。正理師稱其為大地法（Mahābhūmika），是因為它具有遍行的意義。如果作意的相狀非常微弱和隱蔽，又如何知道它的存在呢？

《瑜伽師地論》第三卷說作意是心迴轉的作用，但這只是就其明顯的相狀而言，並非完全的道理。這與正理師認為作意是完全的道理不同。

《集論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）最初說作意是使心專注于所緣境，所以正理師的論述說：

『或者使心專注於一個境界。』

這是敘述正理師的觀點。《集論》的本意也並非完全的道理。下面會破斥說，作意與禪定沒有區別，因為禪定的行相也能使心專注于境界。這位正理師也可能認為作意不是遍行心所，因為散亂的心沒有作意的行相。

『他們雙方的說法都不合理，』到『與禪定沒有區別』。

因為『應不是遍行』，所以破斥正理師。因為『應不異於禪定』，所以破斥《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā）的作者。前面已經說過，因為《雜集論》的作者不理解《集論》，認為這種行相是真理，所以現在破斥他。然而，正理師辯解說：『暫且就新產生的、與之前不同的因緣來說，作意是殊勝的，並非不是遍行。』又辯解說：『根據修行中禪定的殊勝作意來說，作意與禪定是有區別的。』這些說法也是不成立的，因為意義不完備。既然說行相應該完全明瞭，道理既然不周全，所以就像論中所破斥的那樣。這與薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda）的觀點不同，如《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）第四卷所說。問：為什麼在《百法明門論》等論著中，作意被放在首位？而在此論中，觸（sparśa）被放在前面來說？答：和合三法，即根、境、識，使心和心所共同取境，這是觸的殊勝功能。警覺心和心所，使它們都能生起，這是作意的殊勝力量。此論是就和合而言，所以觸先被說明。彼論是就警覺而言，所以作意先被說明。各自根據一個方面，並不矛盾。

『受（vedanā）是指領納……以生起愛（taṇhā）為業。』

解釋第三個心所——受。首先辨別受的自體意義，然後破斥外道的執著。受的體和業可以知道。

『能生起合離，因為沒有兩種慾望。』

解釋『生起愛為業』。對於樂受（sukha vedanā），未得到時希望得到，已得到后不希望分離。對於苦受（duḥkha vedanā），未

【English Translation】 English version: Refutation: This should not be a universal mental factor (Sarvatraga), because it only exists in specific realms. The Vaibhāṣika calls it a 'Great Ground Dharma' (Mahābhūmika) because it has the meaning of being universal. If the aspect of attention (manaskāra) is very subtle and hidden, how can we know of its existence?

The third book of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that attention is the function of turning the mind, but this is only in terms of its obvious aspect, and is not the complete truth. This is different from the Vaibhāṣika's view that attention is the complete truth.

The Abhidharma-samuccaya initially says that attention is to keep the mind focused on the object of attention, so the Vaibhāṣika's treatise says:

'Or to keep the mind focused on one object.'

This is a narration of the Vaibhāṣika's view. The original meaning of the Abhidharma-samuccaya is also not the complete truth. It will be refuted below that attention is no different from samādhi (concentration), because the aspect of samādhi can also keep the mind focused on the object. This Vaibhāṣika may also think that attention is not a universal mental factor, because the distracted mind has no aspect of attention.

'Both of their statements are unreasonable,' up to 'no different from samādhi.'

Because 'it should not be universal,' therefore refuting the Vaibhāṣika. Because 'it should not be different from samādhi,' therefore refuting the author of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā. As mentioned earlier, because the author of the Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā does not understand the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and considers this aspect to be the truth, therefore it is now refuted. However, the Vaibhāṣika defends by saying: 'For the time being, in terms of newly arising conditions that are different from before, attention is superior, and is not non-universal.' And defends by saying: 'According to the superior attention of samādhi in practice, attention is different from samādhi.' These statements are also not valid, because the meaning is incomplete. Since it is said that the aspect should be completely clear, and the reasoning is not comprehensive, therefore it is refuted as in the treatise. This is different from the view of the Sarvāstivāda, as stated in the fourth book of the Abhidharmakośa. Question: Why is attention placed first in treatises such as the Hundred Dharmas? And in this treatise, why is contact (sparśa) mentioned first? Answer: The combination of the three dharmas, namely root, object, and consciousness, causes the mind and mental factors to jointly grasp the object, which is the superior function of contact. Alerting the mind and mental factors, causing them to arise, is the superior power of attention. This treatise is in terms of combination, so contact is explained first. That treatise is in terms of alerting, so attention is explained first. Each is based on one aspect, and there is no contradiction.

'Feeling (vedanā) means experiencing... its function is to give rise to craving (taṇhā).'

Explaining the third mental factor - feeling. First, distinguish the self-meaning of feeling, and then refute the externalist's attachment. The substance and function of feeling can be known.

'It can give rise to union and separation, because there are no two desires.'

Explaining 'giving rise to craving as its function'. For pleasant feeling (sukha vedanā), when not obtained, one hopes to obtain it; when obtained, one does not hope to separate from it. For painful feeling (duḥkha vedanā), when not

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得有不合欲。已得之中有乖離欲。欲者欣求。即通三性。此業可通有漏．無漏。今唯依無明觸所生受故。此唯是愛。依染分說。如緣起中受緣愛故。有漏受能為愛之緣故　此釋一切染愛作業。非第八識。不生愛故　又第八俱受。疏起六識中愛。義亦無妨。受善．惡境起諸愛故。如想起言疏亦起故　欲非遍行不決定起。故受業用非是遍理。此五數中。唯受．想業約勝能說。余之三業乃是遍能。

然大乘中雖領于觸。約領境勝以立受體　故薩婆多。亦領于境。及同時觸。故俱舍說受領隨觸　正理論師。有二種受評取領觸。是受自性　故論破之。

論。有作是說至謂領俱觸。

述曰。初敘彼計。領所緣境名境界受。領同時觸名領自性。觸有苦．樂．舍。受皆能領故。

彼師評云。

論。唯自性受至共余相故。

述曰。唯自性受是受自相。余心所法不能領觸。無是相故。若境界受通余心．心所。以彼皆能領境界相故。

初敘計訖。二論主破云。

論。彼說非理至俱生觸故。

述曰。今應問彼。如何說受能領俱觸。受定不緣俱生觸。故不可說緣而受名領觸。緣相應法如前已破。又違汝宗。若觸前受后。后受領前觸。既不緣前觸。如何名為領。或應觸．受一念不俱。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『得有不合欲』，指的是已經獲得的事物不能完全滿足慾望。『已得之中有乖離欲』，指的是已經得到的事物中又產生了分離的慾望。『欲』指的是欣求，可以通於三種性質（善、惡、無記）。這種『業』可以通於有漏和無漏。現在這裡僅僅依據無明觸所生的感受，所以這裡說的『欲』僅僅是『愛』，是依據染污的方面來說的。就像緣起法中說『受緣愛』一樣，有漏的感受能夠成為『愛』的緣。這裡解釋的是一切染污的『愛』的造作，而不是第八識（阿賴耶識），因為第八識不會產生『愛』。 而且，第八識同時產生的感受，間接地引發了第六識中的『愛』，這種說法也沒有妨礙。因為感受善或惡的境界會產生各種『愛』。就像想起語言文字，間接地引發意義一樣。『欲』不是遍行心所，也不是決定會生起的，所以感受的業用不是普遍的道理。這五種心所中，只有『受』和『想』的業是就其殊勝的功能來說的，其餘三種業則是普遍的功能。 然而，在大乘佛教中，雖然領納的是『觸』，但主要是根據領納境界的殊勝來建立『受』的體性。所以薩婆多部（一切有部）也認為領納的是境界以及同時的『觸』。因此，《俱舍論》說『受』領納的是隨『觸』而來的感受。正理論師認為有兩種『受』，評量和領納『觸』是『受』的自性。所以論主對此進行了駁斥。 論：『有作是說至謂領俱觸。』 述曰：首先敘述他們的觀點。領納所緣的境界叫做『境界受』，領納同時的『觸』叫做領納自性。『觸』有苦、樂、舍三種，『受』都能領納。 那位論師評論說： 論：『唯自性受至共余相故。』 述曰：只有領納自性的『受』才是『受』的自相。其他心所法不能領納『觸』，因為沒有這種能力。如果說領納境界的『受』可以通於其他心和心所，因為它們都能領納境界的相。 首先敘述了他們的觀點，然後論主駁斥說： 論：『彼說非理至俱生觸故。』 述曰：現在應該問他們，如何說『受』能夠領納同時產生的『觸』？『受』一定不會緣同時產生的『觸』，所以不能說因為緣而『受』就叫做領納『觸』。緣相應法在前面已經駁斥過了。而且這違背了你們的宗義。如果『觸』在前，『受』在後，後面的『受』領納前面的『觸』，既然不緣前面的『觸』，如何能叫做領納？或者『觸』和『受』應該不是同一念同時產生的。

【English Translation】 English version 'Having something that doesn't satisfy desire' refers to the fact that what has already been obtained cannot fully satisfy desire. 'Within what has been obtained, there is a desire for separation' refers to the arising of a desire for separation from what has already been obtained. 'Desire' refers to joyful seeking, which can encompass the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral). This 'karma' can encompass both defiled (with outflows) and undefiled (without outflows). Here, it is solely based on the feeling born of contact with ignorance, so the 'desire' spoken of here is solely 'attachment,' spoken of in terms of defilement. Just as in dependent origination, it is said that 'feeling conditions attachment,' defiled feeling can be a condition for 'attachment.' This explains the activity of all defiled 'attachment,' not the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), because the eighth consciousness does not generate 'attachment.' Moreover, the feeling that arises simultaneously with the eighth consciousness indirectly triggers 'attachment' in the sixth consciousness, and this statement is not contradictory. This is because feeling wholesome or unwholesome objects generates various 'attachments.' It's like recalling language indirectly triggers meaning. 'Desire' is not a pervasive mental factor and does not arise determinately, so the function of feeling is not a universal principle. Among these five mental factors, only the karma of 'feeling' and 'perception' are spoken of in terms of their superior function; the other three karmas are universal functions. However, in Mahayana Buddhism, although what is cognized is 'contact,' the nature of 'feeling' is established primarily based on the superiority of cognizing the object. Therefore, the Sarvāstivāda school also believes that what is cognized is the object and the simultaneous 'contact.' Therefore, the Abhidharmakośa says that 'feeling' cognizes what comes with 'contact.' The Nyāyānusāra masters believe that there are two kinds of 'feeling,' evaluating and cognizing 'contact' is the nature of 'feeling.' Therefore, the treatise refutes this. Treatise: 'Some say that cognizing simultaneous contact is feeling.' Commentary: First, it describes their view. Cognizing the object of cognition is called 'object feeling,' and cognizing simultaneous 'contact' is called cognizing self-nature. 'Contact' has three types: painful, pleasant, and neutral; 'feeling' can cognize all of them. That master commented: Treatise: 'Only self-nature feeling is the self-nature of feeling, because other mental factors cannot cognize contact.' Commentary: Only 'self-nature feeling' is the self-nature of 'feeling.' Other mental factors cannot cognize 'contact' because they do not have this ability. If it is said that 'object feeling' can be common to other minds and mental factors, it is because they can all cognize the aspect of the object. First, their view is described, and then the treatise master refutes it: Treatise: 'That saying is not reasonable because of simultaneous contact.' Commentary: Now, they should be asked, how can it be said that 'feeling' can cognize simultaneously arising 'contact'? 'Feeling' certainly does not cognize simultaneously arising 'contact,' so it cannot be said that because of cognizing, 'feeling' is called cognizing 'contact.' Cognizing corresponding dharmas has already been refuted earlier. Moreover, this contradicts your own tenets. If 'contact' is before and 'feeling' is after, and the later 'feeling' cognizes the earlier 'contact,' since it does not cognize the earlier 'contact,' how can it be called cognizing? Or 'contact' and 'feeling' should not arise simultaneously in the same moment.

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三彼復救言受領觸者。似俱時觸說名為領非緣名領。四論主難。

論。若似觸生名領觸者。

述曰。此牒彼計。

論。似因之果應皆受性。

述曰。正難於彼。如果穀子。似因粟故。等流果等應皆受性。以似因故。猶如於受。謂有果法不似於因。如粟莖等。言果似因為簡于彼。或即因是果。或似因之果。復為簡彼論說之言。第六轉攝。此難體破。彼返質云。受領于觸即緣俱生。觸領根等應緣根等　此不為例。觸不唯以領根為自相。令心．心所同觸于境是觸之用。汝宗唯以領觸為受自相。何得不緣。不說緣境之行相故。

五彼若救言體是心所似俱因觸說名為受。粟等似因體非心所。等流果法。及余心所。不似俱觸。互闕一義故皆非受。何得以余例難同受。故次第六論主復難。

論。又既受因至何名自性。

述曰。觸能生受即是受因。既領于因可名因受。名自性受于理豈成。此難名破。

次下第七彼復救言。如王食邑非食土田。土田所生諸禾稼等。是王所食。言食邑者從所依說。以邑之體即土田故　受例亦然。觸如土田。受如禾稼。受是觸果。觸是受因。受能領觸所生受體。即自領義。名自性受。言領觸者從所依說。如言食邑食彼所生。

論。若謂如王至名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 三、對方再次辯解說，領受（vedanā）是領納接觸（sparśa）的感受，這種感受似乎是與接觸同時發生的，所以稱為『領』，而不是因為緣起（pratītyasamutpāda）的緣故而稱為『領』。 四、論主反駁： 論：如果因為類似接觸而產生的感受就稱為『領』， 述曰：這是引述對方的觀點。 論：那麼，所有類似原因的結果都應該具有感受的性質。 述曰：這是直接反駁對方。如果穀子的結果類似粟米的原因，那麼等流果等都應該具有感受的性質，因為它們類似原因，就像感受一樣。這是說有些結果並不類似原因，比如粟米的莖等。說『結果類似原因』是爲了區別于那些原因本身就是結果的情況，或者類似原因的結果。這也是爲了區別于對方的論述。這是第六轉攝。這個反駁直接破斥了對方的觀點。對方反過來質問說，領受領納接觸是緣起俱生的，那麼接觸領納根等也應該緣起根等。這不能作為例子，因為接觸不僅僅以領納根為自身的特徵，它還能使心和心所同時接觸外境，這是接觸的作用。而你們的宗派只以領納接觸作為感受的自相，怎麼能不緣起呢？因為沒有說緣起外境的行相。 五、如果對方辯解說，領受的本體是心所（caitta），它類似同時發生的因——接觸，所以稱為『受』。而粟米等類似原因，但本體不是心所，等流果法以及其他心所，不類似同時發生的接觸，互相缺少一個條件，所以都不是領受。怎麼能用其他的例子來反駁領受呢？因此，接下來第六個問題，論主再次反駁： 論：既然領受是因，那麼什麼是自性呢？ 述曰：接觸能夠產生領受，就是領受的因。既然領納的是因，可以稱為『因受』，稱為『自性受』在道理上怎麼能成立呢？這個反駁是名破。 接下來第七個問題，對方再次辯解說，就像國王吃的是封邑，而不是吃土地。土地所生長的各種莊稼等，是國王所吃的。說『吃封邑』是從所依處來說的，因為封邑的本體就是土地。領受也是如此。接觸就像土地，領受就像莊稼。領受是接觸的結果，接觸是領受的因。領受能夠領納接觸所產生的領受本體，就是領納自己的意思，稱為『自性受』。說『領納接觸』是從所依處來說的，就像說吃封邑是吃封邑所生長的東西。 論：如果說像國王吃封邑一樣，那麼怎麼稱呼...

【English Translation】 English version 3. Furthermore, they argue that 'feeling' (vedanā) is the reception of contact (sparśa), and this reception seems to occur simultaneously with contact, hence it is called 'reception' (領) not because of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). 4. The treatise master refutes: Treatise: If something is called 'reception' because it is similar to the arising of contact, Commentary: This is quoting their view. Treatise: then all results that are similar to their causes should have the nature of feeling. Commentary: This is a direct refutation. If the result of a grain of millet is similar to the cause of rice, then the isodipa-fruit (等流果) etc., should all have the nature of feeling, because they are similar to the cause, just like feeling. This is to say that some results are not similar to their causes, such as the stalk of rice. Saying 'the result is similar to the cause' is to distinguish it from those cases where the cause itself is the result, or the result is similar to the cause. This is also to distinguish it from their argument. This is the sixth conversion. This refutation directly breaks their view. They retort by questioning whether feeling receives contact as dependently co-arising, then contact receiving the root etc., should also dependently originate from the root etc. This cannot be taken as an example, because contact does not only take receiving the root as its own characteristic, it also enables the mind and mental factors (caitta) to simultaneously contact the external environment, which is the function of contact. Whereas your school only takes receiving contact as the self-nature of feeling, how can it not dependently originate? Because it does not speak of the characteristics of dependently originating from the external environment. 5. If they argue that the substance of feeling is a mental factor (caitta), which is similar to the simultaneously arising cause—contact, hence it is called 'feeling'. Whereas millet etc., are similar to the cause, but their substance is not a mental factor, and the isodipa-fruit and other mental factors are not similar to the simultaneously arising contact, lacking one condition, so they are not feeling. How can you use other examples to refute feeling? Therefore, in the next, sixth question, the treatise master refutes again: Treatise: Since feeling is a cause, then what is its self-nature? Commentary: Contact can produce feeling, which is the cause of feeling. Since what is received is the cause, it can be called 'cause-feeling', how can it be established as 'self-nature-feeling' in principle? This refutation is a name-breaking. Next, in the seventh question, they argue again that just as the king eats the fief, not the land. The various crops etc., grown on the land are what the king eats. Saying 'eating the fief' is speaking from the place of reliance, because the substance of the fief is the land. Feeling is also like this. Contact is like the land, feeling is like the crops. Feeling is the result of contact, and contact is the cause of feeling. Feeling can receive the substance of feeling produced by contact, which is the meaning of receiving itself, called 'self-nature-feeling'. Saying 'receiving contact' is speaking from the place of reliance, just like saying eating the fief is eating what grows on the fief. Treatise: If it is said to be like the king eating the fief, then how is it called...

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自性受。

述曰。此牒彼計。

次下第八論主復非。

論。理亦不然至不自證故。

述曰。若言自緣名領自性。違汝自執。不自證故。彼計心等不能自緣。故說自緣便違自失。

故次第九彼復救曰。言自領者。非謂自緣。不拾受自相。名自性受故　故次第十論主復非。

論。若不捨自性名自性受。

述曰。此牒彼計。

論。應一切法皆是受自性。

述曰。正破彼執。由一切法皆不捨離自體相故。應皆名受。設彼救言要心所法不捨自性方名為受。餘思．想等應立受名。若言要有所緣。領觸所生受之自體。名自性受。一一過難皆同前破。

次第十一彼設難言受領于因不得名受。觸似三和應不名觸　十二答曰。此難不然。觸似三和復能令心等同觸于境故別名為觸。汝今但執受能領似因觸名受。不依境界以立受名。如何以受令觸義同。

論。故彼所說但誘嬰兒。

述曰。此結非也。理既非勝。但誘嬰兒。非關智者。此總結破。

次第十三彼復問曰。言自性受汝已廣非。境界既共余。如何說受別　十四論主答。

論。然境界受至不共余故。

述曰。此義如何。能領順．違．俱非境相。定屬已者名境界受。謂余心等但取所緣。不謂

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 自性受。

述曰：這是駁斥他們的觀點。

接下來第八個論主再次否定。

論：理也不然，因為不能自證。

述曰：如果說自緣名為領自性，就違背了你自己的執著，因為不能自證。他們認為心等不能自緣，所以說自緣就違背了自己之前的觀點。

因此，第九個論者又辯解說：所說的『自領』，不是指自緣，而是不捨棄自身的體相，名為自性受。因此，第十個論主再次否定。

論：如果不捨棄自性就名為自性受，

述曰：這是駁斥他們的觀點。

論：那麼一切法都應該是受的自性。

述曰：這是直接破斥他們的執著。因為一切法都不捨離自身的體相，所以都應該名為受。假設他們辯解說，必須是心所法不捨棄自性才能名為受，那麼其餘的思、想等也應該立為受名。如果說必須有所緣，領觸所生的受的自體，才名為自性受，那麼每一個過失和責難都和前面所破斥的一樣。

第十一個論者假設提出疑問：受領于因不能名為受，觸類似三和（三種條件的和合）應該不名為觸。第十二個論者回答說：這個責難不對。觸類似三和，又能使心等同觸于境界，所以特別名為觸。你現在只是執著于受能領類似因的觸而名為受，不依據境界來建立受名，怎麼能用受來使觸的意義相同呢？

論：所以他們所說的只是誘騙嬰兒。

述曰：這是總結否定。道理既然不勝，只是誘騙嬰兒，與智者無關。這是總結性的破斥。

第十三個論者又問：所說的自性受你已經廣泛地否定了，境界既然是和其餘心所法共有的，如何說受是特別的？第十四個論主回答。

論：然而境界受，因為不和其餘心所法共有。

述曰：這個道理是什麼呢？能夠領順境、違境、俱非境的相狀，並且確定屬於自己的，名為境界受。意思是其餘的心等只是取所緣境，不認為...

【English Translation】 English version Self-Nature Feeling (Zìxìng shòu).

Commentary: This refutes their argument.

Next, the eighth debater refutes again.

Treatise: The principle is also not so, because it cannot self-prove.

Commentary: If you say that 'self-cognition' (zìyuán) is called 'grasping self-nature' (lǐng zìxìng), it contradicts your own adherence, because it cannot self-prove. They argue that the mind and so on cannot self-cognize, so saying 'self-cognition' contradicts and loses their own position.

Therefore, the ninth opponent again defends, saying: What is called 'self-grasping' (zì lǐng) does not mean 'self-cognition' (zìyuán), but rather not abandoning its own characteristic appearance, which is called 'self-nature feeling' (zìxìng shòu). Therefore, the tenth debater refutes again.

Treatise: If not abandoning self-nature is called 'self-nature feeling' (zìxìng shòu),

Commentary: This refutes their argument.

Treatise: Then all dharmas should be the self-nature of feeling.

Commentary: This is a direct refutation of their adherence. Because all dharmas do not abandon their own characteristic appearance, they should all be called 'feeling' (shòu). Suppose they defend by saying that it must be a mental factor (c心所法, xīnsuǒfǎ) that does not abandon its self-nature to be called 'feeling' (shòu), then the remaining thought (思, sī), conception (想, xiǎng), etc., should also be established as 'feeling' (shòu). If you say that there must be an object of cognition (所緣, suǒyuán), grasping the self-essence of feeling produced by contact (觸, chù), to be called 'self-nature feeling' (zìxìng shòu), then each fault and difficulty is the same as the previous refutations.

The eleventh opponent hypothetically raises a question: Feeling grasping the cause cannot be called 'feeling' (shòu), contact (觸, chù) is similar to the union of three conditions (三和, sānhé), so it should not be called 'contact' (觸, chù). The twelfth debater answers: This difficulty is not correct. Contact (觸, chù) is similar to the union of three conditions (三和, sānhé), and can also cause the mind and so on to similarly contact the object, so it is specially called 'contact' (觸, chù). You are now only adhering to feeling being able to grasp the contact (觸, chù) that is similar to the cause and calling it 'feeling' (shòu), not establishing the name of feeling based on the object of cognition (境界, jìngjiè), how can you use feeling to make the meaning of contact (觸, chù) the same?

Treatise: Therefore, what they say is only to deceive infants.

Commentary: This is a concluding negation. Since the reasoning is not superior, it is only deceiving infants, and has nothing to do with the wise. This is a concluding refutation.

The thirteenth opponent asks again: You have already widely negated what is called 'self-nature feeling' (zìxìng shòu), since the object of cognition (境界, jìngjiè) is shared with other mental factors (心所法, xīnsuǒfǎ), how can you say that feeling (shòu) is special? The fourteenth debater answers.

Treatise: However, the feeling of the object of cognition (境界受, jìngjiè shòu), because it is not shared with other mental factors (心所法, xīnsuǒfǎ).

Commentary: What is this principle? Being able to grasp the characteristics of agreeable (順, shùn), disagreeable (違, wéi), and neither agreeable nor disagreeable (俱非, jūfēi) objects of cognition (境, jìng), and being definitely belonging to oneself, is called 'feeling of the object of cognition' (境界受, jìngjiè shòu). The meaning is that the other minds and so on only take the object of cognition (所緣境, suǒyuán jìng), and do not consider...

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定令境攝屬己。于順．違等行相淺近。不攝為己有故。皆不名受。如多人共處。傍有人言汝面是奴。中有奴者攝為罵己。余非奴者不攝屬己。故受亦然。領于境界定屬己故。領境界名不通余法。何勞虛構取自性受　問受領于觸應名分別。設爾無失　如是所明前三心所。樂大乘者。應對余宗．及餘論文知其勝劣。

論。想謂于境至名言為業。

述曰。體性可知。業言施設者安立之異名。建立發起者亦名施設。

論。謂要安立至種種名言。

述曰。此中安立。取像異名。謂此是青。非非青等。作此分齊而取共相名為安立。由取此像便起名言此是青等。性類眾多故名種種。諸論說名為其想者。從因而說。說想為名。從果而說。如世人言汝想是何名是何等。此業但是意俱之想。余識俱想不起名故。設疏起名亦無失者。第八識想如何起名。由此故知此業不遍。

論。思謂令心至役心為業。

述曰。其義可知。

論。謂能取境至令造善等。

述曰。謂瑜伽論第三卷。說即此邪正俱相違行因相。由思了別　謂邪．正等行即身．語業。此行之因即善．惡境。由了此境相故思作諸業。起善．惡等事故。言取境正因等相是思之業　問思令心作。為亦令彼心所法作不。若亦令心所法作。何

故不說。若唯令心作。何故不同作意亦令心所作　行相實同作意。亦令心所造作。以心勝故但說作心。

此別解已次下總釋俱。

論。此五既是至決定相應。

述曰。釋與五俱無心起時無隨一故。

論。其遍行相后當廣釋。

述曰。指遍行義．及心所等緣總別相。如第五卷自當廣說。

上來第四已解五所。自下第五解前頌中相應二字。此或通五數。或通舍受。二處皆得　準此初答文。相應屬五數。

論。此觸等五至故名相應。

述曰。五十五說。由四等故說名相應。謂事等．處等．時等．所依等　事．處相似名之為等。時．依定一名之為等。正與此同。今約見分為行相。影像相分為所緣。自體名事　等者相似義。體各唯一境相相似。故所緣．事皆名為等。以觸等五相。托本識相生。所緣既相似。故名為等。唯識為宗。不約本質名為所緣。亦非影像名為行相　時謂剎那。定同一世　依謂依根俱有。無間。如下當辨。不取種子。以各別故。即以四義解頌相應。謂除行相。

或雖不同亦兼取彼。瑜伽論等第一卷。說同一所緣不同一行相。以境相似故說名為同。其實各別　此約實義名所緣等　彼約相同名同一所緣　又此約影像說為相分名所緣等。相各別故　彼約本質

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所以不說（唯令心作）。如果僅僅讓心來造作，為什麼不同樣讓作意（Manasikara）也令心來造作呢？作意的行相（ākāra）實際上與心相同。也讓心所（caitta）來造作，因為心是主要的，所以只說『作心』。

以上分別解釋完畢，下面總結解釋『俱』（sahā）。

論：這五者既然是……直到決定相應（samprayukta）。

述記：解釋與五俱起，因為無心起時沒有隨一（心所）的緣故。

論：它們的遍行相（sarvatraga-ākāra）以後會詳細解釋。

述記：指遍行義，以及心所等緣總別相。如第五卷自會詳細說明。

上面第四部分已經解釋了五所（五種心所）。下面第五部分解釋前面頌中的『相應』二字。這或者通於五數（五種心所的數量），或者通於舍受（upekṣā-vedanā）。兩處都可以。根據這個，最初的回答是，相應屬於五數。

論：這觸（sparśa）等五者……因此名為相應。

述記：五十五說，由四等（catuḥ-samatā）的緣故說名為相應。即事等（vastu-samatā）、處等（āśraya-samatā）、時等（kāla-samatā）、所依等（ālambana-samatā）。事、處相似，稱之為『等』。時、依一定相同，稱之為『等』。正與此相同。現在根據見分（darśana-bhāga）來說是行相，影像相分（pratibimba-lakṣaṇa-bhāga）說是所緣（ālambana），自體（svabhāva）名為事。『等』是相似的意思。體各只有一個，境相相似。所以所緣、事都稱為『等』。因為觸等五相，依託本識相（mūla-vijñāna-lakṣaṇa）而生，所緣既然相似，所以名為『等』。以唯識（Vijñānavāda）為宗，不根據本質（svabhāva）稱為所緣，也不是影像稱為行相。時，指剎那（kṣaṇa），一定同一世（eka-kāla）。依，指依根（indriya）俱有（sahabhū），無間（anantara）。如下面將要辨析的。不取種子（bīja），因為各自不同的緣故。即以四義解釋頌中的『相應』，即除去行相。

或者雖然不同，也兼取它。瑜伽論（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）等第一卷，說同一所緣不同一行相，因為境相似的緣故說名為同。其實各自不同。這是根據實義（paramārtha）名為所緣等。那是根據相同（sāmānya）名為同一所緣。又這是根據影像說為相分（lakṣaṇa-bhāga），名為所緣等。相各自不同。那是根據本質。

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, it is not said (that only the mind acts). If only the mind were to act, why not also let Manasikara (作意, attention) cause the mind to act? The ākāra (行相, aspect) of Manasikara is actually the same as the mind. It also allows the caittas (心所, mental factors) to act, but because the mind is primary, only 『acting mind』 is mentioned.

The separate explanations above are completed; below is a summary explanation of 『sahā』 (俱, together).

Treatise: These five, since they are… until determined to be samprayukta (相應, associated).

Commentary: Explains being together with the five, because when the mind does not arise, there is not a single (mental factor) that follows.

Treatise: Their sarvatraga-ākāra (遍行相, pervasive aspects) will be explained in detail later.

Commentary: Refers to the meaning of pervasiveness, as well as the general and specific aspects of the conditions of mental factors, etc. As will be explained in detail in the fifth fascicle.

The fourth part above has explained the five caittas. The fifth part below explains the word 『samprayukta』 (相應, associated) in the previous verse. This can either refer to the five numbers (the number of five mental factors) or to upekṣā-vedanā (舍受, neutral feeling). Both places are possible. According to this, the initial answer is that association belongs to the five numbers.

Treatise: These five, such as sparśa (觸, contact)… therefore, they are called associated.

Commentary: Fifty-five says that they are called associated because of the four samatās (四等, equalities). Namely, vastu-samatā (事等, equality of substance), āśraya-samatā (處等, equality of basis), kāla-samatā (時等, equality of time), and ālambana-samatā (所依等, equality of object). Substance and basis are similar, and are called 『equal』. Time and support are definitely the same, and are called 『equal』. This is exactly the same. Now, according to the darśana-bhāga (見分, seeing aspect), it is the ākāra (行相, aspect); the pratibimba-lakṣaṇa-bhāga (影像相分, image-characteristic aspect) is said to be the ālambana (所緣, object); the svabhāva (自體, self-nature) is called substance. 『Equal』 means similar. Each entity is only one, but the aspects of the objects are similar. Therefore, the object and substance are both called 『equal』. Because the five aspects, such as contact, arise relying on the mūla-vijñāna-lakṣaṇa (本識相, fundamental consciousness aspect), since the objects are similar, they are called 『equal』. Taking Vijñānavāda (唯識, Consciousness-only) as the doctrine, the essence is not called the object, nor is the image called the aspect. Time refers to kṣaṇa (剎那, moment), definitely the same eka-kāla (同一世, same time). Support refers to being together with the indriya (根, sense faculty), sahabhū (俱有, co-existent), anantara (無間, without interval). As will be distinguished below. Seeds are not taken because they are different from each other. That is, the four meanings are used to explain 『association』 in the verse, which excludes the aspect.

Or, although different, it also includes it. The first fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), etc., says that the same object has different aspects, because the objects are similar, they are said to be the same. In fact, they are different from each other. This is based on the paramārtha (實義, ultimate meaning) and is called the object, etc. That is based on sāmānya (相同, sameness) and is called the same object. Also, this is based on the image and is said to be the lakṣaṇa-bhāga (相分, characteristic aspect), and is called the object, etc. The aspects are different from each other. That is based on the essence.

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說為所緣故名為同。亦不違也。下此論文許有二故。如樞要中釋此疑難　此中五義各有所簡　時簡前後　依簡別識　行簡依同其境各別　緣簡別見　事簡體多。

雖具上義。若事不等不名相應。如五與意唯依．事簡　或但四義。唯除行相。以各別故。一一應思非無所以。

上來已解相應門訖。自下解頌唯舍受言。此第四段。即是第七五受分別。

論。此識行相至舍受相應。

述曰。此有二文。初三複次等釋唯舍俱。后簡不與余所相應之所以也　初中第一三複次釋。后解外難　三複次中。一一有多所以　且初釋中復有五義。一極不明瞭是舍受相。若苦．樂受必明瞭故。此中憂．喜入苦．樂中。依三受門不言憂．喜　二不能分別違．順境相取中容境。是舍受相。若是余受取順．違境故　三由微細。若是余受行相必粗　四由一類。若是余受必是易脫。此行相定。故成一類。五相續而轉。若是余受必有間斷。此恒相續故唯舍受　若許明瞭行相可知。便應不能攝益相續　若能分別違．順境相。非真異熟。真異熟者取境定故　若粗動者。應如余心非異熟主。顯行相難知異余識也　若許易脫。即善．惡趣皆悉不能互攝彼種。許是善識能持惡種。與理相違。攝論第三亦有此解　若有間斷。便非彼生。亦不受熏

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為所緣相同，所以稱為『同』，這並不矛盾。下面的論文允許有兩種原因。如同《樞要》中解釋這個疑問一樣。這裡五種含義各有其簡別之處：時間簡別前後，所依簡別不同的識，行相簡別所依相同但境各別的識，所緣簡別見分，事體簡別多重性。 即使具備上述含義，如果事體不等同，也不能稱為相應。例如，五識與意識只在所依和事體上簡別。或者只有四種含義，唯獨排除行相，因為各自不同。每一個都應該仔細思考，並非沒有原因。 上面已經解釋了相應門完畢。下面解釋頌文，只剩下『舍受』一詞。這是第四段，也就是第七個五受的分別。 論：此識的行相與舍受相應。 述記：這裡有兩段文字。首先，『複次』等解釋唯有舍受是俱有的。然後簡別不與其他所相應的原因。最初的三『複次』解釋，之後解釋外來的疑問。在三個『複次』中，每一個都有多種原因。首先，在最初的解釋中，又有五種含義：一是極其不明顯是舍受的相狀。如果是苦受或樂受，必定很明顯。這裡憂和喜歸入苦和樂之中，依據三受門而不說憂和喜。二是不能分別違和順的境相，取中間容忍的境，這是舍受的相狀。如果是其他的受，則取順或違的境。三是由於微細。如果是其他的受，行相必定粗大。四是由於一類。如果是其他的受，必定容易脫落。這個行相是確定的，所以成為一類。五是相續而轉。如果是其他的受，必定有間斷。這個恒常相續，所以唯有舍受。如果允許行相明顯可知，就應該不能攝益相續。如果能夠分別違和順的境相，就不是真正的異熟。真正的異熟是取境確定的。如果粗動，就應該像其他的識一樣，不是異熟的主體。顯示行相難以知曉，不同於其他的識。如果允許容易脫落，那麼善趣和惡趣都不能互相攝取彼此的種子。如果允許是善識能夠持有惡的種子，就與道理相違背。《攝大乘論》第三也有這種解釋。如果有間斷，就不是它所生的，也不受熏習。

【English Translation】 English version: It is called 'same' because the objects of cognition are the same, and this is not contradictory. The following treatise allows for two reasons. As explained in the 'Essentials,' this doubt is clarified. Here, each of the five meanings has its own distinctions: time distinguishes between before and after, the basis distinguishes different consciousnesses, the activity distinguishes those with the same basis but different realms, the object distinguishes the seeing aspect, and the substance distinguishes multiplicity. Even if the above meanings are present, if the substance is not equal, it cannot be called corresponding. For example, the five consciousnesses and the mind consciousness are distinguished only in terms of basis and substance. Or there are only four meanings, excluding activity, because they are different. Each one should be carefully considered, as there is a reason for everything. The section on correspondence has been explained above. Next, the verse will be explained, leaving only the word 'neutral feeling'. This is the fourth section, which is the seventh distinction of the five feelings. Treatise: The activity of this consciousness corresponds to neutral feeling (upeksha vedana). Commentary: There are two passages here. First, 'furthermore' etc. explain that only neutral feeling is concurrent. Then, it distinguishes the reasons for not corresponding with others. The initial three 'furthermore' explanations are followed by an explanation of external doubts. Within the three 'furthermore' explanations, each has multiple reasons. First, in the initial explanation, there are five meanings: first, extreme obscurity is the characteristic of neutral feeling. If it were painful or pleasant feeling, it would be clear. Here, sorrow and joy are included in pain and pleasure, based on the three feelings and not mentioning sorrow and joy. Second, it cannot distinguish between agreeable and disagreeable objects, taking a middle, tolerant object. This is the characteristic of neutral feeling. If it were other feelings, it would take agreeable or disagreeable objects. Third, it is subtle. If it were other feelings, the activity would be coarse. Fourth, it is of one kind. If it were other feelings, it would be easily detached. This activity is fixed, so it becomes one kind. Fifth, it continues uninterrupted. If it were other feelings, there would be interruptions. This is constantly continuous, so it is only neutral feeling. If it is allowed that the activity is clear and knowable, then it should not be able to benefit continuous existence. If it can distinguish between agreeable and disagreeable objects, it is not true fruition. True fruition is fixed in taking objects. If it is coarse and moving, it should be like other minds, not the master of fruition. It shows that the activity is difficult to know, different from other consciousnesses. If it is allowed that it is easily detached, then good and evil destinies would not be able to mutually contain each other's seeds. If it is allowed that it is a good consciousness that can hold evil seeds, it contradicts reason. The third chapter of the Compendium of Mahayana also has this explanation. If there are interruptions, then it is not born from it, nor is it influenced.

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。已舍壽故。性非堅故。如余心等　由此五義必具有故。便能受熏持種相續　又解。此識極不明瞭。簡無惠．念。惠．念行相極明瞭故　不能分別違．順境相。顯唯．舍受非苦．樂俱。及簡不與善．染等並　微細之緣。簡定及非異熟。非異熟法相粗動故。定深取所緣。此任運細不深取故　一類之義。簡勝解數。先不定境今印定時有勝解故　相續而轉。顯無有欲。今有希望方有欲起。此相續故無有欲也　由此五義。第二正顯唯舍所由。所餘四緣。因簡別境等故唯與舍俱　雖有二解前解為勝。顯舍受俱。不應于中簡其別境等。

論。又此相應至唯是舍受。

述曰。此第二複次。顯是異熟總業所招故唯舍並。

論。苦樂二受至非此相應。

述曰。顯此不與苦．樂二受相應所由。如八證中最初執受五因之內。任運生解。如五十一．對法第二說　異熟生等。並如前釋。由六識中異熟生受。待緣方起。故今簡之。

論。又由此識至為自內我。

述曰。常者。相續義　無轉者。一類義　我是一．常。故此似我。顯第七識恒緣執我。

論。若與苦樂至舍受相應。

述曰。顯我不緣苦．樂二受。非一類故。故唯舍俱。生善．惡趣余受轉故。第三複次也　由前三義故唯舍俱　勘諸經論。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『已舍壽故（因為已經捨棄了壽命）』，『性非堅故（因為自性並非堅固）』，如同其餘的心等。由於這五個原因必然具備，便能接受熏習、保持種子、相續不斷。又一種解釋是，這個識極其不明瞭，所以排除慧（智慧）、念（憶念）。因為慧、唸的行相極其明瞭。不能分別違背、順從的境界相，顯示只有舍受（不苦不樂的感受），並非苦受、樂受同時存在。並且排除不與善、染等法並存。微細的緣，排除禪定以及非異熟（非由業力直接產生的果報）。因為非異熟法相粗糙動搖。禪定深入地執取所緣境，而這個識任運微細，不深入執取。『一類之義（單一性質的意義）』，排除勝解（殊勝的理解）心所。因為先前不確定境界，現在印定時才有勝解。『相續而轉（持續不斷地運轉）』，顯示沒有欲（慾望）。現在有希望才會有慾望生起，這個識是相續不斷的，所以沒有慾望。由於這五個原因，第二方面正是爲了顯示唯有舍受的原因。其餘四個原因，因為簡別境界等，所以只與舍受同時存在。雖然有兩種解釋，但前一種解釋更為殊勝。顯示與舍受同時存在，不應在其中簡別其它的境界等。 論：又此相應至唯是舍受。 述曰：這是第二種解釋。再次顯示這是由異熟總業所招感，所以唯有舍受並存。 論：苦樂二受至非此相應。 述曰：顯示這個識不與苦受、樂受相應的原因。如同八個證據中最初執受的五個原因之內，任運而生。如同《對法》第二中第五十一說。異熟生等，都如前面的解釋。由於六識中的異熟生受，等待因緣才生起，所以現在簡別它。 論：又由此識至為自內我。 述曰：『常（恒常不變）』，是相續的意義。『無轉（沒有變異）』，是單一性質的意義。我是一、常的，所以這個識類似我。顯示第七識恒常緣取並執著於我。 論：若與苦樂至舍受相應。 述曰：顯示我不緣取苦受、樂受，因為不是單一性質的緣故。所以只與舍受同時存在。因為在生善趣、惡趣時，其餘的感受會轉變。這是第三種解釋。由於前面三個原因，所以唯有舍受同時存在。勘察各種經論。

【English Translation】 English version 'Having relinquished life (yi she shou gu)' because life has been relinquished, 'nature is not firm (xing fei jian gu)' because its nature is not solid, like other minds and so on. Because these five reasons are necessarily present, it can receive熏習 (xun xi, influence), maintain seeds, and continue uninterruptedly. Another explanation is that this consciousness is extremely unclear, thus excluding 慧 (hui, wisdom) and 念 (nian, mindfulness). Because the characteristics of 慧 (hui) and 念 (nian) are extremely clear. It cannot distinguish between opposing and conforming realms, showing that there is only 舍受 (she shou, neutral feeling), not both苦受 (ku shou, painful feeling) and 樂受 (le shou, pleasant feeling) simultaneously. And it excludes being together with good and defiled dharmas. Subtle conditions exclude 定 (ding, concentration) and 非異熟 (fei yi shu, not directly produced by karma). Because the characteristics of non-異熟 (yi shu) dharmas are coarse and moving. 定 (ding) deeply grasps the object of focus, while this consciousness operates subtly and does not deeply grasp. 'The meaning of one kind (yi lei zhi yi)' excludes 勝解 (sheng jie, superior understanding). Because previously the realm was uncertain, and only when it is now confirmed is there 勝解 (sheng jie). 'Continues to turn (xiang xu er zhuan)' shows that there is no 欲 (yu, desire). Only when there is hope now will desire arise, but this consciousness is continuous, so there is no desire. Because of these five reasons, the second aspect precisely shows the reason why there is only 舍受 (she shou). The remaining four reasons, because of distinguishing realms and so on, it only exists simultaneously with 舍受 (she shou). Although there are two explanations, the former is more superior. Showing that it exists simultaneously with 舍受 (she shou), one should not distinguish other realms within it. Treatise: Moreover, this corresponding to only 舍受 (she shou). Commentary: This is the second explanation. Again, it shows that this is summoned by the total karma of 異熟 (yi shu), so only 舍受 (she shou) exists together. Treatise: 苦受 (ku shou) and 樂受 (le shou) are not corresponding to this. Commentary: Shows the reason why this consciousness does not correspond with 苦受 (ku shou) and 樂受 (le shou). Like within the initial five reasons of grasping in the eight proofs, it arises naturally. As said in the fifty-first of 《對法》 (dui fa, Abhidharma) second. 異熟生 (yi shu sheng) and so on, are all like the previous explanations. Because the 異熟生受 (yi shu sheng shou) in the six consciousnesses arises only when waiting for conditions, so now we distinguish it. Treatise: Moreover, this consciousness is for the inner self. Commentary: 'Constant (chang)' means continuous. 'Without transformation (wu zhuan)' means of one kind. The self is one and constant, so this consciousness is similar to the self. Shows that the seventh consciousness constantly focuses on and clings to the self. Treatise: If with 苦受 (ku shou) and 樂受 (le shou) corresponding to 舍受 (she shou). Commentary: Shows that I do not focus on 苦受 (ku shou) and 樂受 (le shou), because it is not of one kind. So it only exists simultaneously with 舍受 (she shou). Because when born in good and evil realms, the remaining feelings will transform. This is the third explanation. Because of the previous three reasons, so only 舍受 (she shou) exists simultaneously. Examine various sutras and treatises.

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唯初複次五義之中第四義解。

上來依理解頌文訖。自下依義釋外妨難。

論。若爾如何至惡業異熟。

述曰。薩婆多等為此難也。彼部難云。舍受寂靜。善業調順可能招之。如何逼迫業。亦招寂靜果。此依彼宗故以為難。

論。既許善業至此亦應然。

述曰。即返質答。既許善業能招舍受。此不善業類亦應然。能招舍受。

論。舍受不違至善惡俱招。

述曰。此顯所由．及同法喻。舍受行相不違苦．樂二種品故。此質解也　舍受不違苦。惡業不得招　舍受不違樂。善業應不感　苦．樂自相違。善．惡之業不招于苦．樂　舍受不違二。何妨善．惡並能招。如無記法二業俱感不違二故。不以寂靜解舍。亦通惡業感。中容之行名為舍故通不善招　問返詰雖然理猶未曉。如何寂靜果。逼迫因所招　答曰無記既寂靜。何為惡業果。舍雖寂靜。不違二故得為惡果。下同禪定禪之寂靜。此無所能為故通惡業感。餘七轉識設起苦．樂。此識皆俱。以舍不違苦．樂品故　若或苦．樂俱於人．天中應不受苦果。以相違故。三惡趣中應不受樂果。亦相違故　此中苦．樂皆是別報。故舍不違。若隨所生受便轉變。即易脫故。過失如前。

外人復難。

論。如何此識至心所相應。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：唯識的最初五義中第四義的解釋。

前面已經依據理解解釋了頌文。下面將依據義理來解釋並消除外來的妨難。

論：如果這樣，為什麼惡業會導致異熟果？

述記：薩婆多部等用這個問題來為難。他們的難點在於，舍受（upeksha-vedana，不苦不樂的感受）是寂靜的，善業是調順的，可能招致舍受。但為什麼逼迫性的惡業也能招致寂靜的果報？這是依據他們的宗義提出的疑問。

論：既然允許善業能夠招致舍受，那麼惡業也應該如此。

述記：這是反過來質問並回答。既然允許善業能夠招致舍受，那麼這種不善業也應該類似，能夠招致舍受。

論：舍受不違背苦和樂，所以善業和惡業都能招致舍受。

述記：這顯示了原因以及相同的比喻。舍受的行相不違背苦和樂兩種品類，所以可以這樣解釋。舍受不違背苦，惡業才能招致舍受；舍受不違背樂，善業才能感得舍受。苦和樂的自性是相違背的，所以善業和惡業不會招致苦和樂。舍受不違背苦和樂，為什麼妨礙善業和惡業都能招致舍受呢？就像無記法（avyākrta，非善非惡的性質）一樣，善業和惡業都能感得它，因為它不違背苦和樂。不要用寂靜來理解舍受，它也通於惡業所感。中容之行（不偏不倚的行為）名為舍，所以通於不善業的招感。問：反詰雖然如此，但道理仍然不明白。為什麼寂靜的果報是由逼迫的因所招致的？答：無記既然是寂靜的，為什麼不能是惡業的果報呢？舍受雖然是寂靜的，但不違背苦和樂，所以可以作為惡果。下面用禪定（dhyāna，冥想狀態）來類比，禪定的寂靜，這種無所作為的狀態，所以通於惡業的感應。其餘的七轉識（意識的不同層面）如果生起苦和樂，這個識都與之相應。因為舍受不違背苦和樂的品類。如果苦和樂同時存在，那麼在人道和天道中就不應該感受苦果，因為它們是相違背的。在三惡趣中就不應該感受樂果，也是因為它們是相違背的。這裡說的苦和樂都是別報（不同的果報），所以舍受不違背它們。如果隨著所生之處，感受便發生轉變，就容易脫離，過失就像前面所說的那樣。

外人再次提出疑問。

論：為什麼這個識與心所相應？

【English Translation】 English version: Explanation of the Fourth Meaning Among the Initial Five Meanings of Consciousness-Only.

Having finished explaining the verses based on understanding, we will now explain based on the meaning and eliminate external objections.

Treatise: If so, how does evil karma lead to the fruition of dissimilar maturation (vipāka)?

Commentary: The Sarvāstivādins and others use this question to create difficulties. Their difficulty lies in the fact that equanimity (upeksha-vedana, neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling) is tranquil, and wholesome karma is harmonious, so it is possible to bring about equanimity. But how can oppressive evil karma also bring about a tranquil result? This question is based on their doctrine.

Treatise: Since it is accepted that wholesome karma can bring about equanimity, then evil karma should also be the same.

Commentary: This is a counter-question and answer. Since it is accepted that wholesome karma can bring about equanimity, then this unwholesome karma should also be similar and able to bring about equanimity.

Treatise: Equanimity does not contradict suffering and pleasure, so both wholesome and evil karma can bring about equanimity.

Commentary: This reveals the reason and the similar analogy. The characteristic of equanimity does not contradict the two categories of suffering and pleasure, so this explanation is possible. Equanimity does not contradict suffering, so evil karma can bring about equanimity; equanimity does not contradict pleasure, so wholesome karma can bring about equanimity. The nature of suffering and pleasure are contradictory, so wholesome and evil karma do not bring about suffering and pleasure. Equanimity does not contradict suffering and pleasure, so what prevents both wholesome and evil karma from bringing about equanimity? Just like neutral phenomena (avyākrta, neither good nor bad qualities), both wholesome and evil karma can bring it about because it does not contradict suffering and pleasure. Do not understand equanimity as tranquility; it also applies to what is brought about by evil karma. The practice of impartiality is called equanimity, so it applies to the influence of unwholesome karma. Question: Although the counter-question is like this, the principle is still not understood. Why is the result of tranquility brought about by the cause of oppression? Answer: Since neutrality is tranquil, why can't it be the result of evil karma? Although equanimity is tranquil, it does not contradict suffering and pleasure, so it can be an evil result. Below, use meditation (dhyāna, meditative state) as an analogy; the tranquility of meditation, this state of non-action, so it applies to the influence of evil karma. If the remaining seven transformations of consciousness (different levels of consciousness) arise with suffering and pleasure, this consciousness is in accordance with them. Because equanimity does not contradict the categories of suffering and pleasure. If suffering and pleasure exist simultaneously, then one should not experience the result of suffering in the human and heavenly realms, because they are contradictory. One should not experience the result of pleasure in the three evil realms, also because they are contradictory. The suffering and pleasure mentioned here are all separate retributions, so equanimity does not contradict them. If the feeling changes according to the place of birth, it is easy to escape, and the fault is as mentioned before.

An outsider raises another question.

Treatise: How does this consciousness correspond to mental factors?

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述曰。解受俱中。自下第二釋不與余心所相應。既知唯舍已便難唯五俱。

論。互相違故。

述曰。此論主答。別境．善等行相。與識既互相違。故不俱也。此總答之。

論。謂欲希望至無所希望。

述曰。下別答也。隨何世境樂便有欲。任運之識不樂觀境。故無有欲。

論。勝解印持至無所印持。

述曰。勝解印持曾為猶預境今得決定事　此識行相𧄼瞢闇昧　境非先不定今可須印之。故無勝解。

論。念唯明記至不能明記。

述曰。念相明記曾習事轉　此識昧而且劣。恒緣任運現在之境　不能明記曾所受境故無有念。

論。定能令心至剎那別緣。

述曰。定雖影像相分剎那新起。其加行時所觀本質前後相續。恒專注緣　此識任運不作加行專注本質。恒緣現在影像所緣。但新新起　且定行相。一．一剎那深取專注趣向所緣。此識浮疏行相不爾。故非定俱　言任運者。是隨業轉。

論。惠唯簡擇至不能簡擇。

述曰。德等事者。等失．俱非。余文可解　此之別簡。行相周通。于佛起別境。于理亦無失。

論。故此不與別境相應。

述曰。此總結也。

已說別境非此識俱　次簡善等不俱所以。

論。此識唯是至

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：解釋了受（vedanā）和想（saṃjñā）都包含在其中。下面第二段解釋了不與其餘心所（caitasika）相應的道理。既然知道只有舍受（upekṣā）相應，那麼就很難理解為什麼只有五識（pañca-vijñāna）同時生起。

論：因為互相違背的緣故。

述曰：這是論主的回答。別境（pratiniyata-viṣaya），善（kuśala）等心所的行相，與識（vijñāna）既然互相違背，所以不能同時生起。這是總體的回答。

論：所謂欲（chanda），是希望達到某種境界，直到沒有希望為止。

述曰：下面是分別回答。無論在什麼世間，只要有快樂的境界，就會有欲。任運而生的識（vijñāna）不觀察快樂的境界，所以沒有欲。

論：勝解（adhimokṣa）是印持，直到沒有印持為止。

述曰：勝解（adhimokṣa）印持曾經猶豫不決的境界，現在得到確定的事情。這個識（vijñāna）的行相昏昧不明，境界不是先前不確定，現在可以需要印持的。所以沒有勝解（adhimokṣa）。

論：念（smṛti）只是明記，直到不能明記為止。

述曰：念（smṛti）的相是明記曾經學習過的事情。這個識（vijñāna）昏昧而且低劣，恒常緣于任運而生的現在的境界，不能明記曾經接受過的境界，所以沒有念（smṛti）。

論：定（samādhi）能夠使心，直到剎那間分別緣取。

述曰：定（samādhi）即使是影像相分，也是剎那間新生的。在加行的時候，所觀察的本質前後相續，恒常專注緣取。這個識（vijñāna）任運而生，不作加行專注本質，恒常緣于現在的影像所緣，只是新新生起。而且定（samādhi）的行相，每一剎那都深入專注趣向所緣。這個識（vijñāna）浮疏，行相不是這樣，所以不是定（samādhi）同時生起。所說任運，是隨業力運轉。

論：慧（prajñā）只是簡擇，直到不能簡擇為止。

述曰：德等事，等同於失、俱非。其餘的文字可以理解。這種分別簡擇，行相周遍通達。對於佛（Buddha）生起別境（pratiniyata-viṣaya），對於道理也沒有缺失。

論：所以這個識（vijñāna）不與別境（pratiniyata-viṣaya）相應。

述曰：這是總結。

已經說了別境（pratiniyata-viṣaya）不與這個識（vijñāna）同時生起，接下來簡別善（kuśala）等不俱的原因。

論：這個識（vijñāna）只是……

【English Translation】 English version: Statement: Explains that both feeling (vedanā) and perception (saṃjñā) are included. The second section below explains why it does not correspond with the remaining mental factors (caitasika). Since it is known that only neutral feeling (upekṣā) corresponds, it is difficult to understand why only the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna) arise simultaneously.

Treatise: Because they contradict each other.

Statement: This is the treatise master's answer. The characteristics of specific object (pratiniyata-viṣaya), wholesome (kuśala), etc., contradict the consciousness (vijñāna), so they do not arise simultaneously. This is a general answer.

Treatise: So-called desire (chanda) is the hope of reaching a certain state, until there is no hope.

Statement: The following is a separate answer. No matter in what world, as long as there is a happy state, there will be desire. The consciousness (vijñāna) that arises spontaneously does not observe the happy state, so there is no desire.

Treatise: Resolution (adhimokṣa) is conviction, until there is no conviction.

Statement: Resolution (adhimokṣa) confirms the state that was once hesitant, and now obtains a definite matter. The characteristics of this consciousness (vijñāna) are obscure and unclear. The state was not previously uncertain, and now it may need to be confirmed. So there is no resolution (adhimokṣa).

Treatise: Mindfulness (smṛti) is just clear recollection, until it cannot be clearly recollected.

Statement: The characteristic of mindfulness (smṛti) is clearly remembering what has been learned. This consciousness (vijñāna) is obscure and inferior, constantly clinging to the present state that arises spontaneously, and cannot clearly remember the state that has been received, so there is no mindfulness (smṛti).

Treatise: Concentration (samādhi) can make the mind, until it separately grasps in an instant.

Statement: Even if concentration (samādhi) is an image aspect, it is newly generated in an instant. During the effort, the essence observed is continuous before and after, and constantly focuses on grasping. This consciousness (vijñāna) arises spontaneously, does not make effort to focus on the essence, and constantly clings to the present image object, only newly arising. Moreover, the characteristic of concentration (samādhi) is that each instant deeply focuses on and directs towards the object. This consciousness (vijñāna) is superficial, and its characteristics are not like this, so it is not concentration (samādhi) arising simultaneously. What is said to be spontaneous is to follow the karma's operation.

Treatise: Wisdom (prajñā) is just discernment, until it cannot discern.

Statement: Virtues and other things are the same as loss and neither. The remaining words can be understood. This kind of separate discernment, its characteristics are comprehensive and thorough. For the Buddha (Buddha), specific object (pratiniyata-viṣaya) arises, and there is no loss for the principle.

Treatise: Therefore, this consciousness (vijñāna) does not correspond with specific object (pratiniyata-viṣaya).

Statement: This is the conclusion.

It has already been said that specific object (pratiniyata-viṣaya) does not arise simultaneously with this consciousness (vijñāna), and next, the reason for distinguishing that wholesome (kuśala) etc. are not together.

Treatise: This consciousness (vijñāna) is only...

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亦不相應。

述曰。異熟必非通善．染故。十一．六．二十亦定不相應　等者。等取余善等法。即不定四既通三性亦在其中。

然有難曰。善．染非異熟。可說不相應。不定中無記。何非此識並　為答此問故次說云。

論。惡作等四至定非異熟。

述曰。非異熟者。非真異熟。不遮異熟生亦有惡作等。下不定中自當分別。非一切時常相續故非此相應。

上來第七唯舍門訖　下第五段。即是第八何性俱門。

論。法有四種至何法攝耶。

述曰。此最初問　法有四種。何法所攝　大乘亦有自性善等。如本．釋中。此三種性。或各分二。一世俗。二勝義。有為善法名世俗善。招世．出世可愛果故。粗重．生滅．非安隱故。無為善法名勝義善。最極寂靜性安隱故　諸極惡法名世俗不善。能招粗顯非愛果故。諸有漏法名勝義不善。自性粗重不安隱故　有為無記法名世俗無記。不能招愛．非愛果故。自性粗重濫不善故　虛空．非擇滅。名勝義無記。不招二果。無所濫故　或各分三。善有三者　一感愛果善。謂有漏善法　二性巧便善。謂有為善法　三性安隱善。謂無為善法　不善三者　一感非愛果不善。謂極惡法　二性非巧便不善。謂染污法　三性不安隱不善。謂有漏法　無記三者　一

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 也不相應。

述曰：異熟果必然不是遍通善性或染污性的，所以第十一、第六、第二十等心所（指悔、眠、尋等）也必定不相應。『等者』，是等取其餘的善等法。即不定法中的四種（指惡作、睡眠、尋、伺）既然通於三種性質，也包含在其中。

然而有人提問說：善和染不是異熟果，可以說不相應。但不定法中的無記性，為什麼不能與此識並存呢？爲了回答這個問題，接下來論述說：

論：惡作等四（指惡作、睡眠、尋、伺）乃至必定不是異熟果。

述曰：『非異熟者』，不是真正的異熟果，但不妨礙異熟所生的法中也有惡作等。下面的不定法中會自行分別。因為不是一切時常相續的，所以不與此識相應。

上面第七門，即唯有舍受的討論完畢。下面第五段，即是第八識與何種性質的法俱起的討論。

論：法有四種性質，乃至屬於哪種法所攝呢？

述曰：這是最初的提問。法有四種性質，屬於哪種法所攝？大乘也有自性善等說法，如《瑜伽師地論》和它的解釋中提到。這三種性質，或者各自分為二種：一是世俗，二是勝義。有為的善法稱為世俗善，因為它能招感世間和出世間可愛的果報，但它是粗重、生滅、不安穩的；無為的善法稱為勝義善，因為它最極寂靜，性質安穩。諸極惡的法稱為世俗不善，因為它能招感粗顯的不可愛果報。諸有漏法稱為勝義不善，因為它自性粗重，不安穩。有為的無記法稱為世俗無記，因為它不能招感可愛或不可愛的果報，而且自性粗重，與不善法相混濫。虛空和非擇滅稱為勝義無記，因為它不招感兩種果報，也沒有與其它法相混濫的情況。或者各自分為三種。善有三種：一是感可愛果的善，指有漏的善法；二是性質巧妙方便的善，指有為的善法；三是性質安穩的善，指無為的善法。不善有三種：一是感不可愛果的不善，指極惡的法；二是性質不巧妙方便的不善，指染污的法；三是性質不安穩的不善，指有漏的法。無記有三種：一是

【English Translation】 English version Also, they are not corresponding.

Commentary: The Vipaka (異熟, result of actions) definitely cannot be universally good or defiled. Therefore, the eleventh, sixth, and twentieth mental factors (referring to regret, sleep, and investigation, etc.) are also definitely not corresponding. 'Etc.' includes other good dharmas, etc. That is, the four uncertain dharmas (referring to regret, sleep, investigation, and analysis) which are of three natures are also included.

However, there is a question: Good and defilement are not Vipaka, so it can be said that they are not corresponding. But why can't the indeterminate nature of the undetermined dharmas coexist with this consciousness? To answer this question, it is stated next:

Treatise: The four (regret, sleep, investigation, and analysis) such as Akrcya (惡作, regret) are definitely not Vipaka.

Commentary: 'Not Vipaka' means not truly Vipaka, but it does not prevent Vipaka-born dharmas from also having Akrcya, etc. The following undetermined dharmas will be distinguished by themselves. Because they are not constantly continuous at all times, they are not corresponding to this consciousness.

The above seventh section, the discussion of only having neutral feeling, is completed. The following fifth section is the discussion of what nature of dharmas the eighth consciousness arises with.

Treatise: Dharmas have four natures, up to which dharma are they included in?

Commentary: This is the initial question. Dharmas have four natures, which dharma are they included in? Mahayana also has the saying of self-nature good, etc., as mentioned in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) and its explanation. These three natures are either divided into two each: one is conventional (世俗), and the other is ultimate (勝義). Conditioned good dharmas are called conventional good because they can attract desirable results in the world and beyond, but they are coarse, impermanent, and not peaceful. Unconditioned good dharmas are called ultimate good because they are extremely quiet and peaceful in nature. All extremely evil dharmas are called conventional unwholesome because they can attract coarse and obvious undesirable results. All contaminated dharmas are called ultimate unwholesome because they are coarse and unpeaceful in nature. Conditioned neutral dharmas are called conventional neutral because they cannot attract desirable or undesirable results, and their nature is coarse and mixed with unwholesome dharmas. Space and Nirodha-asamskrta (非擇滅, cessation through wisdom) are called ultimate neutral because they do not attract two kinds of results and are not mixed with other dharmas. Or each is divided into three kinds. There are three kinds of good: one is the good that attracts desirable results, referring to contaminated good dharmas; the second is the good of skillful means in nature, referring to conditioned good dharmas; and the third is the good of peaceful nature, referring to unconditioned good dharmas. There are three kinds of unwholesome: one is the unwholesome that attracts undesirable results, referring to extremely evil dharmas; the second is the unwholesome of unskillful means in nature, referring to defiled dharmas; and the third is the unwholesome of unpeaceful nature, referring to contaminated dharmas. There are three kinds of neutral: one is

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相應無記。謂諸無記心．心所法　二不相應無記。謂無記色．不相應行　三真實無記。謂虛空。非擇滅　或各分四。善有四者　一自性善。謂信等十一唯善心所　二相應善。謂信等相應心．心所法　三等起善。謂諸善色．不相應行。種子善者準義亦爾　四勝義善。謂善無為　不善四者　一自性不善。謂無慚等十唯不善心所　二相應不善。謂無慚等相應心．心所法　三等起不善。謂不善色。不相應行。種子亦爾　四勝義不善。謂有漏法　無記四者　一能變無記。謂諸無記心．心所法　二所變無記。謂無記色法。種子亦爾　三分位無記。謂無記不相應法　四勝義無記。謂虛空．非擇滅　如對法第三末．第四卷初諸門解善等。皆以此義通釋于彼。此中一一如理應知。

論。此識唯是至異熟性故。

述曰。下答有三。初總答。次別答。后釋無記名。此總答也。若善．惡性必非異熟。

下別答之。

論。異熟若是至應不得成。

述曰。別有三釋。此為一因證唯無記。攝論第三卷未自解。善趣既是善。應不生不善。恒生善故即無流轉。由集故生死流。由苦故生死轉。惡趣翻亦然。既恒生惡應無還滅。由道故還。由滅故滅。

第二因云。

論。又此識是至俱作所依。

述曰。此識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相應無記：指那些無記的心和心所法。 二不相應無記：指無記的色法和不相應行。 三真實無記：指虛空（ākāśa）和非擇滅（pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）。 或者可以各自分為四類。善有四種： 一自性善：指信等十一種唯善的心所。 二相應善：指與信等相應的那些心和心所法。 三等起善：指由善心所產生的那些善的色法和不相應行。善的種子也依此準則。 四勝義善：指善的無為法（asaṃskṛta）。 不善有四種： 一自性不善：指無慚（āhrīkya）等十種唯不善的心所。 二相應不善：指與無慚等相應的那些心和心所法。 三等起不善：指由不善心所產生的那些不善的色法和不相應行。不善的種子也依此準則。 四勝義不善：指有漏法（sāsrava）。 無記有四種： 一能變無記：指那些無記的心和心所法。 二所變無記：指無記的色法。無記的種子也依此準則。 三分位無記：指無記的不相應法。 四勝義無記：指虛空（ākāśa）和非擇滅（pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）。 如《對法》（Abhidharma）第三卷末和第四卷初的各種門解釋善等，都用這個意義來貫通解釋它們。這裡面每一個都應該如理了解。

論：這個識僅僅是異熟性（vipāka）。

述曰：下面回答有三個部分。首先是總的回答，其次是分別回答，最後是解釋無記的名稱。這是總的回答。如果是善或惡的性質，必定不是異熟。

下面分別回答。

論：如果異熟是善或惡，就應該不能成立。

述曰：分別有三種解釋。這是用一個原因來證明它僅僅是無記。在《攝論》（Abhidharma-saṃgraha）第三卷中沒有自己解釋。善趣既然是善的，就不應該產生不善。因為恒常產生善，就沒有流轉。由於集（samudaya）而有生死流，由於苦（duḥkha）而有生死轉。惡趣的情況也相反。既然恒常產生惡，就應該沒有還滅。由於道（mārga）而還，由於滅（nirodha）而滅。

第二個原因是：

論：而且這個識是俱作所依（sahakāri-hetu）。

述曰：這個識

【English Translation】 English version Correspondingly indeterminate: refers to those indeterminate minds and mental factors (citta-caitta). Two, non-correspondingly indeterminate: refers to indeterminate form (rūpa) and non-corresponding formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra). Three, truly indeterminate: refers to space (ākāśa) and cessation through discrimination (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). Or each can be divided into four categories. Good has four types: One, intrinsically good: refers to the eleven exclusively good mental factors such as faith (śraddhā). Two, correspondingly good: refers to those minds and mental factors that correspond with faith (śraddhā) and the like. Three, equitably arising good: refers to those good forms (rūpa) and non-corresponding formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra) that arise from good mental factors. The seeds of good are also according to this principle. Four, ultimately good: refers to the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) that is good. Unwholesome has four types: One, intrinsically unwholesome: refers to the ten exclusively unwholesome mental factors such as lack of shame (āhrīkya). Two, correspondingly unwholesome: refers to those minds and mental factors that correspond with lack of shame (āhrīkya) and the like. Three, equitably arising unwholesome: refers to those unwholesome forms (rūpa) and non-corresponding formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra) that arise from unwholesome mental factors. The seeds of unwholesome are also according to this principle. Four, ultimately unwholesome: refers to the contaminated (sāsrava) dharmas. Indeterminate has four types: One, transforming indeterminate: refers to those indeterminate minds and mental factors (citta-caitta). Two, transformed indeterminate: refers to indeterminate form (rūpa). The seeds of indeterminate are also according to this principle. Three, divisionally indeterminate: refers to indeterminate non-corresponding formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra). Four, ultimately indeterminate: refers to space (ākāśa) and cessation through discrimination (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). As the various gates explaining good and the like in the end of the third and the beginning of the fourth volumes of the Abhidharma, all use this meaning to connect and explain them. Each of these should be understood according to reason.

Treatise: This consciousness is only of the nature of resultant (vipāka).

Commentary: The following answer has three parts. First is the general answer, second is the separate answer, and last is the explanation of the name 'indeterminate'. This is the general answer. If it is of a good or bad nature, it is certainly not resultant.

The following is the separate answer.

Treatise: If the resultant were good or bad, it should not be established.

Commentary: There are three separate explanations. This uses one reason to prove that it is only indeterminate. The third volume of the Abhidharma-saṃgraha does not explain this itself. Since a good realm is good, it should not produce unwholesome. Because it constantly produces good, there is no transmigration. Because of accumulation (samudaya), there is the flow of birth and death; because of suffering (duḥkha), there is the turning of birth and death. The situation in bad realms is the opposite. Since it constantly produces bad, there should be no reversal and cessation. Because of the path (mārga), there is reversal; because of cessation (nirodha), there is cessation.

The second reason is:

Treatise: Moreover, this consciousness is the basis of co-action (sahakāri-hetu).

Commentary: This consciousness

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既是果報之主。為善．染法之所依止。既恒是善。應不為惡依。是惡。亦應不為善依。互相違故。何得與二俱作所依。

第三因云。

論。又此識是至應不受熏。

述曰。如前已說唯無記性可受熏習。

薩婆多等若復難言無熏習識亦有何過。

論。無熏習故至俱不成立。

述曰。此論主答。得等如前破　若無熏習者。染凈因果俱不成立。既無熏習即無種子。種子若無即是無因。因既無故其果亦無。

論。故此唯是無覆無記。

述曰。此總結也。

自下第三釋無記等義。

論。覆謂染法障聖道故。

述曰。何名無覆。覆謂覆障。體即染法　覆義如何　障聖道故。

論。又能蔽心令不凈故。

述曰。合以二義解其覆字　即覆者。覆蔽也。蔽心令不凈故名為覆。

論。此識非染故名無覆。

述曰。總結釋也。

論。記謂善惡至可記別故。

述曰。何名無記。記謂善．惡。此有二義可名為記。一善有可愛果。不善有不可愛果。可記別故。二善．惡法體勝無記法。可調和故。或𢤱戾故。可記別也　世尊記此當得此果。體性如是可記別故。說名為記。

論。此非善．惡故名無記。

述曰。此結釋名　總是

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：既然它是果報的主宰，又是善良和染污法的所依止。如果它一直是善良的，就不應該成為罪惡的所依止；如果是罪惡的，也不應該成為善良的所依止。因為善惡互相違背，怎麼能同時作為善惡二者的所依止呢？

第三個原因是：

論：而且這個識應該是完全不受薰染的。

述曰：正如前面已經說過的，只有無記性的事物才能接受熏習。

如果薩婆多部等反駁說，沒有熏習的識又有什麼過錯呢？

論：因為沒有熏習，染污和清凈的因果都不能成立。

述曰：這是論主的回答。如果像前面一樣破斥，如果沒有熏習，那麼染污和清凈的因果都不能成立。既然沒有熏習，就沒有種子（bija）。沒有種子就是沒有原因。沒有原因，就沒有結果。

論：所以這個識只是無覆無記。

述曰：這是總結。

下面第三部分解釋無記等的含義。

論：『覆』指的是染污法，因為它能障礙聖道。

述曰：什麼叫做『無覆』？『覆』指的是覆蓋和障礙，其本體就是染污法。『覆』的含義是什麼？因為它能障礙聖道。

論：而且它能遮蔽心識，使之不清凈。

述曰：綜合兩種含義來解釋『覆』字。『覆』就是覆蓋和遮蔽。遮蔽心識使之不清凈，所以叫做『覆』。

論：這個識不是染污的，所以叫做『無覆』。

述曰：這是總結性的解釋。

論：『記』指的是善和惡，因為它們可以被記別。

述曰：什麼叫做『無記』？『記』指的是善和惡。這裡有兩種含義可以稱為『記』。一是善良有可愛的結果，不善良有不可愛的結果，所以可以記別。二是善和惡的法體勝過無記法，可以調和或乖戾，所以可以記別。世尊（Buddha）記述此事會得到這樣的結果，其體性是這樣的，可以記別，所以叫做『記』。

論：這個識不是善也不是惡，所以叫做『無記』。

述曰：這是總結性的解釋。總之

【English Translation】 English version: Since it is the master of karmic retribution and the basis for both wholesome and defiled dharmas (phenomena). If it is always wholesome, it should not be the basis for evil. If it is evil, it should not be the basis for good. Because good and evil contradict each other, how can it serve as the basis for both?

The third reason is:

Treatise: Furthermore, this consciousness (識, vijnana) should be entirely un-obscured.

Commentary: As previously stated, only that which is of an indeterminate (無記性, avyākrta) nature can be influenced.

If the Sarvāstivādins (薩婆多) and others object, saying, 'What fault is there in a consciousness that is not influenced?'

Treatise: Because there is no influence, the causes and effects of defilement and purity cannot be established.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's response. If, as refuted earlier, there is no influence, then the causes and effects of defilement and purity cannot be established. Since there is no influence, there are no seeds (bija). If there are no seeds, there is no cause. If there is no cause, there is no effect.

Treatise: Therefore, this is only un-obscured and indeterminate.

Commentary: This is the conclusion.

The following third section explains the meaning of 'indeterminate' (無記, avyākrta) and so on.

Treatise: 'Obscured' (覆, āvarana) refers to defiled dharmas because they obstruct the holy path.

Commentary: What is meant by 'un-obscured' (無覆, anāvarana)? 'Obscured' refers to covering and obstructing, and its substance is defiled dharmas. What is the meaning of 'obscured'? It is because it obstructs the holy path.

Treatise: Moreover, it can obscure the mind, causing it to be impure.

Commentary: Combining two meanings to explain the word 'obscured'. 'Obscured' means to cover and conceal. Obscuring the mind and causing it to be impure is called 'obscured'.

Treatise: This consciousness is not defiled, so it is called 'un-obscured'.

Commentary: This is a concluding explanation.

Treatise: 'Indeterminate' (記, vyākrta) refers to good and evil because they can be distinguished.

Commentary: What is meant by 'indeterminate'? 'Indeterminate' refers to good and evil. There are two meanings here that can be called 'indeterminate'. First, goodness has a lovely result, and unwholesomeness has an unlovely result, so they can be distinguished. Second, the substance of good and evil dharmas surpasses indeterminate dharmas; they can be harmonized or perverse, so they can be distinguished. The Buddha (世尊, Buddha) recorded that this matter would have such a result, and its nature is such that it can be distinguished, so it is called 'indeterminate'.

Treatise: This consciousness is neither good nor evil, so it is called 'indeterminate'.

Commentary: This is a concluding explanation. In short,

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第八何性俱門。自下第六段諸心所法例同於心。非是分別識自體門。

論。觸等亦如是者至必同性故。

述曰。此四說中第一。第二。第四說同護法等一師多複次。義不違也　義雖有四。文段有三牒前頌第八句也　初師唯以五心所法。例同心王無記性矣。次無記性後有亦如是故。如文可知。

自下即是第二師說。

論。又觸等五至亦如是言。

述曰。此師意說。例于識體五種義同。一異熟。二所緣行相俱不可知。三緣三種境。四五法相應。五無覆無記。前雖已有本識八門。隨其所應故但有五。於十義中此別開不可知為一門　然但有四。除自相．一切種．及行相．並舍受俱。因果不斷。轉舍時位。在例后明。此例以前。如其所應亦如是故　問本識五法俱。觸等亦如是。觸雖不與觸自相應。五法是同隨應相例。本識行相即是了別。觸隨所應應例行相。令心．心所同觸前境。是觸行相故。余例難亦然　答余門通故可咸相例。行相既言了別。何得觸等例同　此不成救。與識相應既言觸等。觸等亦應與自俱故　此理不然。隨所應有觸．非觸俱。相應有五法。五法相應例得同。了別在識不通余。何得觸等例行相。了別行相在於識。亦令觸等例皆同。與舍相應不在受。亦應受等例成失。此上二說義雖

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 第八 何性俱門。從下面第六段開始，各種心所法都和心一樣，不是分別識的自體門。

論：『觸等亦如是』到『必同性故』。

述記：這四種說法中，第一、第二、第四種說法與護法等人的觀點相同，只是多次重複，意義上沒有衝突。意義上雖然有四種，但文段只有三個，呼應了前面頌文的第八句。第一位論師只用五種心所法，來比喻心王的無記性。其次，無記性之後也有『亦如是』，就像文中所說的那樣。

從下面開始就是第二位論師的說法。

論：『又觸等五』到『亦如是言』。

述記：這位論師的意思是說，用五種意義來比喻識體是相同的：一是異熟，二是所緣行相都不可知，三是緣三種境，四是五法相應，五是無覆無記。前面雖然已經有了本識的八個方面，但根據情況只說了五個。在十個方面中，這裡特別將『不可知』分開作為一個方面。然而只有四個方面，去除了自相、一切種、行相，以及與舍受俱。因果不斷，轉變捨棄的時間和位置，在比喻之後說明。這個比喻在前面，因為『如其所應亦如是故』。問：本識五法都具備，觸等也是這樣。觸雖然不與觸自身相應，但五法是相同的，可以根據情況進行比喻。本識的行相就是了別，觸應該根據情況比喻行相，使心、心所與觸前面的境界相同，這是觸的行相。其餘的比喻困難也是這樣。答：因為其餘的方面是共通的，所以可以互相類比。既然行相說是了別，怎麼能用觸等來比喻呢？這個辯解不成立。既然與識相應說是觸等，觸等也應該與自身俱有。這個道理不對。根據情況，有觸，也有非觸。相應有五法，五法相應可以類比相同。了別在于識，不共通於其他，怎麼能用觸等來比喻行相呢？了別行相在於識，也讓觸等都比喻相同。與舍相應不在受，也應該讓受等比喻成過失。以上兩種說法意義雖然

【English Translation】 English version Chapter 8: The Gate of Shared Nature. From the sixth section below, all mental functions (cetasikas) are like the mind (citta), and are not the gate of the self-nature of discriminating consciousness (vijnana).

Treatise: 'Contact (sparsa) and others are also like this' to 'necessarily have the same nature'.

Commentary: Among these four explanations, the first, second, and fourth explanations are the same as those of Dharmapala and others, with multiple repetitions, but there is no conflict in meaning. Although there are four meanings, there are only three sections in the text, echoing the eighth line of the previous verse. The first teacher only uses five mental functions to exemplify the non-defiled (avyakrta) nature of the mind-king. Secondly, after the non-defiled nature, there is also 'also like this', as can be seen from the text.

From below is the explanation of the second teacher.

Treatise: 'Also, contact and other five' to 'also like this statement'.

Commentary: This teacher's intention is to say that the five aspects of the consciousness-body are the same: first, the result of karma (vipaka); second, the object and appearance of what is cognized are both unknowable; third, it conditions the three realms; fourth, it corresponds to the five dharmas; and fifth, it is neither obscured nor non-defiled. Although there are already eight aspects of the fundamental consciousness (alaya-vijnana), only five are mentioned according to the situation. Among the ten aspects, 'unknowable' is specifically separated here as one aspect. However, there are only four aspects, excluding self-nature (svalaksana), all seeds (sarva-bija), appearance (akara), and being together with indifference (upeksa). The cause and effect are continuous, and the time and position of transformation and abandonment are explained after the analogy. This analogy is in front, because 'as it should be, it is also like this'. Question: The fundamental consciousness has all five dharmas, and contact and others are also like this. Although contact does not correspond to itself, the five dharmas are the same, and can be analogized according to the situation. The appearance of the fundamental consciousness is cognition (jnana), and contact should be analogized to appearance according to the situation, so that the mind and mental functions are the same as the object in front of contact, which is the appearance of contact. The remaining difficulties in analogy are also like this. Answer: Because the remaining aspects are common, they can be analogized to each other. Since appearance is said to be cognition, how can contact and others be used to analogize it? This defense is not valid. Since it is said that contact and others correspond to consciousness, contact and others should also be together with themselves. This reasoning is not correct. According to the situation, there is contact, and there is also non-contact. Correspondence has five dharmas, and the correspondence of the five dharmas can be analogized to be the same. Cognition is in consciousness and is not common to others, so how can contact and others be used to analogize appearance? The appearance of cognition is in consciousness, and also allows contact and others to be analogized to be the same. Being together with indifference is not in feeling (vedana), and it should also cause feeling and others to be analogized into faults. Although the meanings of the above two explanations are

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未周。以理而言亦無妨難。

論。有義觸等至無簡別故。

述曰。此難陀論師等多人為此解。初許觸等受熏。后被難已轉計。方言緣種名一切種　此第三說例上五門．並不可知。即有其六。謂從異熟乃至無記。除識自相．行相．受俱。頌言觸等。即是自相。故不須例　此論體例。若正義無違或合為一。若邪宗謬義假作別師。非必異說今此別師。

第四師破。

論。彼說非理。

述曰。第一非也。

論。所以者何。

述曰。第二彼問有何所以。

論。觸等依識不自在故。

述曰。三論主答。既非心王故不自在。前第二卷于可熏中有自在義　世親攝論四外別立有自在義方能受熏。

論。如貪信等至能持種子。

述曰。染中舉貪等取嗔等。善中舉信等精進等。既如貪等故。不可說觸等同識能持種子。此乃不例一切種門　問所熏有心．及心所。心所不自在故不受熏。能熏之中有心所。心所不自在故非能熏　答心所有增減義具可能熏。心所不自在故非所熏攝　問何故受熏則遮心所。及其能熏心所亦得　答為因據有力。心所亦能熏。受熏須報主心所非所熏　問心所為因能熏言有力。心所為果有力言所熏　答心所能熏無過失。心所亦能熏。心所受熏過失多。心

所非所熏　問何故能熏即言無失。為所熏者過失便多　答為因之日有力而是能熏。為果之時無力乃非所熏　問何者名過失　答頓生六果失　問何故心所受熏。后時頓生六果。心所能熏。後果不頓生六。　答心所受熏。即能熏心．心所。一念便熏成六種。後生現時頓生六果。心所能熏。相分．見分。但隨己數而熏。非一一法皆有六種。即所熏無頓生六果。唯熏心王一體法故。若六法受熏。便有三十六種見．相分種。各自生己現行本識等。即有頓生六果之過　問如緣本識增上緣中熏成種時。同時心所亦熏成本識種。緣彼心所亦爾。何故心所能熏。所熏無頓生果之妨　答即能熏心王。緣本識及五數熏成種子。此種后時。生本識及五數現行。能熏心所不熏彼本識。及五數種。此相分熏種。但生自相分現行。非親生彼本識等故。故無此妨　問心所能熏。何不同彼心王能熏。俱生於彼本質之法。心所能熏。即生自相分現行。不生本質耶　答若能熏之心是一。緣本識及五數。所熏有六故即熏六個。能熏之心后種生現行。頓生六果妨。不可論其本質生與不生。所熏六種乍可論其本質．影像。其所熏不然　此亦不然。受熏例應爾。心所生影像。心王生本質。由是義故。如實義者。如緣本識熏種之時。能熏心聚。共熏成一本識之種。此增上

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『所非所熏』，問：為什麼能熏即說沒有過失？作為被熏者過失就多。答：因為作為因的時候有力，所以是能熏；作為果的時候無力，所以不是所熏。問：什麼叫做過失？答：頓然產生六果是過失。問：為什麼心所受熏，後來頓然產生六果，心所能熏，後果不頓然產生六果？答：心所受熏，即能熏心王、心所，一念之間便熏成六種，後來產生現行時頓然產生六果。心所能熏，相分、見分，但隨著自己的數量而熏，不是每一個法都有六種，所以所熏沒有頓然產生六果。只是熏心王一體的法，如果六法受熏，便有三十六種見分、相分種，各自產生自己的現行本識等，便有頓然產生六果的過失。問：如緣本識增上緣中熏成種子時，同時心所也熏成本識種，緣彼心所也是這樣，為什麼心所能熏，所熏沒有頓生果的妨礙？答：即能熏心王，緣本識及五數熏成種子，此種后時，生本識及五數現行，能熏心所不熏彼本識及五數種，此相分熏種，但生自相分現行，非親生彼本識等故，故無此妨。問：心所能熏，為什麼不同於心王能熏，都生於本質之法？心所能熏，即生自相分現行，不生本質呢？答：如果能熏的心是一個，緣本識及五數，所熏有六個，所以就熏六個。能熏的心后種生現行，頓生六果妨，不可論其本質生與不生。所熏六種乍可論其本質、影像，其所熏不然。此亦不然，受熏例應爾，心所生影像，心王生本質。由於這個道理，如實義者，如緣本識熏種之時，能熏心聚，共熏成一本識之種，此增上

【English Translation】 English version 'What is not what is perfumed': Question: Why is it said that there is no fault when it can perfume? If it is what is perfumed, there are many faults. Answer: Because it has power as a cause, it can perfume. When it is a result, it has no power, so it is not what is perfumed. Question: What is called a fault? Answer: Suddenly producing six results is a fault. Question: Why does the mental associate receive perfume and then suddenly produce six results, while the mental associate can perfume, but the subsequent results are not suddenly produced six? Answer: The mental associate receives perfume, which can perfume the mind-king and mental associates. In one thought, it perfumes into six kinds, and later, when the present action arises, it suddenly produces six results. The mental associate can perfume, the appearance-division (相分) and the seeing-division (見分), but it perfumes according to its own number. Not every dharma has six kinds, so what is perfumed does not suddenly produce six results. It only perfumes the dharma of the one body of the mind-king. If six dharmas receive perfume, there will be thirty-six kinds of seeing-division and appearance-division seeds, each producing its own present action fundamental consciousness (本識) and so on, which has the fault of suddenly producing six results. Question: If, when perfuming into a seed in the conditioning cause (增上緣) of the fundamental consciousness, the mental associate also perfumes into a fundamental consciousness seed at the same time, and it is the same for conditioning that mental associate, why is it that the mental associate can perfume, but what is perfumed does not have the hindrance of suddenly producing a result? Answer: That is, the mind-king that can perfume, conditions the fundamental consciousness and the five aggregates (五數) to perfume into a seed. Later, this seed produces the present action of the fundamental consciousness and the five aggregates. The mental associate that can perfume does not perfume that fundamental consciousness and the five aggregates seeds. This appearance-division perfuming seed only produces its own appearance-division present action, not directly producing that fundamental consciousness and so on, so there is no such hindrance. Question: Since the mental associate can perfume, why is it not the same as the mind-king that can perfume, both producing the essential nature (本質) dharma? The mental associate can perfume, which produces its own appearance-division present action, but does not produce the essential nature? Answer: If the mind that can perfume is one, conditioning the fundamental consciousness and the five aggregates, what is perfumed is six, so it perfumes six. The mind that can perfume later produces present action from the seed, and the hindrance of suddenly producing six results makes it impossible to discuss whether its essential nature is produced or not. What is perfumed as six kinds can tentatively discuss its essential nature and image, but what is perfumed is not like that. This is also not right, the example of receiving perfume should be like that, the mental associate produces the image, and the mind-king produces the essential nature. Because of this reason, the one with the true meaning, like when conditioning the fundamental consciousness to perfume the seed, the group of minds that can perfume, together perfume into one fundamental consciousness seed, this conditioning

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緣。本有種子為因緣故。無頓生六果之妨。多種生一芽。因緣便無此事。增上緣等理亦無失　又設能熏各各熏一本識種子。雖為六種。六種共生一果亦無妨難。能持之識體是一故　論所言如貪．信等不能受熏。此對難陀亦熏心所。非對經部。經部說心所亦非所熏故。如攝論云是能依故。不自在故。若對彼宗有立已成之過。由大乘異師。亦有說心所是所熏故。今以為喻　量云。第八五數。應非所熏。是能依故。不自在故。如貪．信等　若爾七識應是所熏。既是自在．及所依故　此亦不然。因明者說但遮能依心所體是所熏。不表七識心王是所熏法。觸等五法既非所熏。如何同識能持種子　又以不能持諸種子。為第二宗于理無失。文有宗二因．喻唯一。

四第三師言。受熏何失　五論主牒破。

論。又若觸等至有六種體。

述曰。即一有情能熏所熏。隨是何法有六個種。以六法體為所熏故。一．一所熏有一種故。

六外人復言。六種何失。

論。若爾果起從何種生。

述曰。此即第七論主復徴。若爾果生從何種起。

八外人復云。皆從彼起　九論主復云。

論。理不應言至生一芽故。

述曰。成業論中廣破此義。量云。別能持中六種種子。應不共生一果。因緣性故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 緣。因為本來就有種子作為因緣，所以不會有立即產生六種結果的妨礙。如果多種子只產生一個芽，那麼因緣的道理就行不通了。增上緣等的道理也不會有錯失。又假設能熏習的力量各自熏習一個本識種子，即使有六種，六種共同產生一個結果也沒有妨礙，因為能持（保持）種子的識體是同一個。論中所說的像貪（tan，貪婪）和信（xin，信仰）等不能接受熏習，這是針對難陀（Nanda）也熏習心所（xin suo，心理活動）的說法，不是針對經部（Jing Bu，佛教部派之一）。經部認為心所也不是被熏習的對象。就像《攝大乘論》（She Da Cheng Lun）所說，心所是能依（neng yi，依賴者），不自在（bu zi zai，不自主）。如果針對經部宗派提出這個觀點，就有已經成立的過失，因為大乘（Da Cheng，大乘佛教）的其他師父也有說心所是被熏習的。現在用這個來做比喻。量云：第八識（第八識，第八種意識，又稱阿賴耶識）和五數（觸等五法），應該不是被熏習的對象，因為它們是能依，不自在，就像貪和信等。如果這樣，第七識（第七識，第七種意識，又稱末那識）應該是被熏習的對象，因為它既是自在的，也是所依（suo yi，被依賴者）。這種說法也不對。因明（yin ming，因明學，古印度邏輯學）學者說，只是遮止了能依的心所的本體是被熏習的，並沒有表明第七識心王（xin wang，意識主體）是被熏習的法。觸（chu，感覺）、等（deng，等等）五法既然不是被熏習的，怎麼能和識一樣保持種子呢？又因為不能保持各種種子，作為第二種觀點在道理上沒有錯失。文中宗（zong，論點）和因（yin，理由）有兩個，比喻只有一個。 第四位論師說，接受熏習有什麼過失？第五位論主駁斥。 論：又如果觸等有六種體。 述曰：即一個有情（you qing，眾生）的能熏和所熏，無論是哪種法都有六個種類，因為六法（liu fa，六種法）的本體是被熏習的。每一個被熏習的對象都有一種。 第六位外人又說，六種有什麼過失？ 論：如果這樣，結果從哪一種產生？ 述曰：這是第七位論主再次提問，如果這樣，結果是從哪一種產生的？ 第八位外人又說，都從那一種產生。第九位論主又說： 論：道理上不應該說產生一個芽。 述曰：《成業論》（Cheng Ye Lun）中廣泛地駁斥了這個觀點。量云：在不同的能持中，六種種子不應該共同產生一個結果，因為它們具有因緣的性質。

【English Translation】 English version Cause. Because there are inherently seeds as causes and conditions, there is no obstruction to the sudden arising of six results. If multiple seeds produce only one sprout, then the principle of cause and condition would not work. The principle of dominant condition (Adhipati-pratyaya) and others would also not be mistaken. Furthermore, suppose the power of the 'able to perfume' (perfuming force) individually perfumes one seed of the fundamental consciousness (alaya-vijnana), even if there are six types, it is not contradictory for the six types to jointly produce one result, because the nature of the consciousness that can hold (maintain) the seeds is the same. What the treatise says, such as greed (tan) and faith (xin) etc., cannot receive perfuming, this is in response to the Nanda's perfuming of mental factors (xin suo) as well, not in response to the Sautrantika (Jing Bu, a Buddhist school). The Sautrantika school believes that mental factors are also not objects of perfuming. Just as the Compendium on the Mahayana (She Da Cheng Lun) says, mental factors are dependent (neng yi), not independent (bu zi zai). If this view is presented against the Sautrantika school, there is the fault of being already established, because other masters of the Mahayana (Da Cheng, Mahayana Buddhism) also say that mental factors are objects of perfuming. Now this is used as a metaphor. The inference states: the eighth consciousness (eighth consciousness, the eighth type of consciousness, also known as alaya-vijnana) and the five aggregates (touch and other five dharmas), should not be objects of perfuming, because they are dependent and not independent, like greed and faith etc. If so, the seventh consciousness (seventh consciousness, the seventh type of consciousness, also known as manas-vijnana) should be an object of perfuming, because it is both independent and a support (suo yi). This statement is also incorrect. Scholars of epistemology (yin ming, Hetu-vidya, ancient Indian logic) say that they are only negating that the nature of the dependent mental factors is perfumed, and do not indicate that the seventh consciousness mind-king (xin wang, the subject of consciousness) is a perfumed dharma. Since the five dharmas of touch (chu), etc. (deng) are not perfumed, how can they hold seeds like consciousness? Furthermore, because it cannot hold various seeds, as the second view, there is no error in principle. In the text, there are two theses (zong) and reasons (yin), but only one metaphor. The fourth teacher says, what is the fault of receiving perfuming? The fifth master refutes. Treatise: Furthermore, if touch and others have six kinds of entities. Commentary: That is, the 'able to perfume' and 'perfumed' of one sentient being (you qing, sentient being), whatever dharma it is, has six types, because the nature of the six dharmas (liu fa, six dharmas) is perfumed. Each perfumed object has one type. The sixth outsider asks again, what is the fault of six types? Treatise: If so, from which type does the result arise? Commentary: This is the seventh master asking again, if so, from which type does the result arise? The eighth outsider says again, it arises from that type. The ninth master says again: Treatise: It is not reasonable to say that one sprout arises. Commentary: The Treatise on the Accomplishment of Karma (Cheng Ye Lun) extensively refutes this view. The inference states: among different holders, six types of seeds should not jointly produce one result, because they have the nature of cause and condition.

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。如六能熏。能熏雖有六現。不是因緣共生一果種　若爾雜集第八卷如何通。彼許多因生一果故。如五無間業受一期報故　成業論中自解此妨。可許多緣生一果體。不許多因能生一果。因緣辨體無此事故。前立量中。已有因緣因果言故。

十外人轉言。熏種雖多。生果之時但從一種　此下十一論主復非。

論。若說果生至便為無用。

述曰。初二句牒。下二句難。此就見分能熏為論　問既爾護法等如何釋此文。新舊之種若隨用一。舊新種中一無用故。又能熏有六熏成六種共生一果。為難亦爾。此乃自違。不勞他語　答曰。新舊因緣。能熏有六熏成六種勢力齊等。俱逢緣合可許此類共生一果。如一麥中有多極微。可許同生一芽等果。非許一一微各各生果故　若爾成業難多種生一芽何為會釋　彼破經部色．心二法各各有種共生一果。如二麥等共生一芽。非此所許。今五數中各有種子共生一果。故是所非。若一識中同類種子共生無妨　故此文言。若一種生余無用等。不爾此言深為自害。若能持是一。多同類種許共生一果。若能持是別。雖同類種。不許同生果。

十二外人云。次第生果　十三論主復難。

論。亦不可說至勢力等故。

述曰。同熏之種。一生果時余亦應生。熏習同時勢力

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：比如六種能熏習的力量。雖然能熏習的力量有六種顯現，但不是因緣共同產生一個果的種子。如果這樣，那麼《雜集論》第八卷如何解釋呢？因為那裡說許多因產生一個果，比如五無間業（是指殺父、殺母、殺阿羅漢、破和合僧、出佛身血這五種罪業）承受一期的果報。在《成業論》中自己解釋了這個妨難。可以有許多緣產生一個果的本體，但不可以有許多因能產生一個果。因緣辨別本體沒有這樣的事情。前面立論證的時候，已經有因緣、因果的說法了。 外人又轉而說：熏習的種子雖然多，但產生果的時候只從一種種子產生。下面第十一位論主再次否定這種說法。 論：如果說果是這樣產生的，那麼其餘的種子就變得沒有用了。 述曰：前面兩句是引述，後面兩句是反駁。這裡是就見分（指認識的主體部分）的能熏習來討論。問：既然這樣，護法（Dharmapala）等人如何解釋這段文字呢？如果新舊的種子只隨一種起作用，那麼新舊種子中就有一種沒有用了。又能熏習有六種熏習，形成六種種子，共同產生一個果，這樣來反駁也是一樣的。這實際上是自相矛盾，不需要別人來說。答：新舊的因緣，能熏習有六種熏習，形成六種勢力相等。都遇到緣聚合，可以允許這種情況共同產生一個果。就像一粒麥子中有許多極微小的部分，可以允許它們共同產生一個芽等果。不是允許每一個極微小的部分各自產生果。如果這樣，《成業論》中多種子產生一個芽的難點如何解釋呢？那裡是破斥經部（Sautrantika）色法（物質現象）、心法（精神現象）兩種法各自有種子，共同產生一個果，就像兩粒麥子等共同產生一個芽。這不是這裡所允許的。現在五數（指五蘊：色、受、想、行、識）中各有種子，共同產生一個果，所以是被否定的。如果一個識中同類種子共同產生沒有妨礙。所以這段文字說：如果一種產生，其餘的就沒有用了等等。不然，這段話就深深地傷害了自己。如果能持（指保持種子）是一樣的，那麼多種同類種子可以允許共同產生一個果。如果能持是不同的，即使是同類種子，也不允許共同產生一個果。 第十二位外人說：種子是次第產生果的。第十三位論主再次反駁。 論：也不能說次第產生果，因為熏習是同時的，勢力是相等的。

【English Translation】 English version: For example, the six powers of 'able to perfume' (六能熏, liù néng xūn). Although there are six manifestations of 'able to perfume', it is not that causes and conditions jointly produce one seed of a result. If that is the case, how can the eighth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論, Zájí lùn) be explained? Because it says there that many causes produce one result, such as the five heinous crimes (五無間業, wǔ wújiàn yè, referring to the karmas of killing one's father, killing one's mother, killing an Arhat, disrupting the Sangha, and drawing blood from a Buddha) receiving one period of retribution. The Karma-siddhi (成業論, Chéng yè lùn) itself explains this difficulty. It is permissible for many conditions to produce one entity of a result, but it is not permissible for many causes to produce one result. There is no such thing in the discrimination of entities by causes and conditions. In the previous establishment of the argument, there were already the terms 'causes and conditions' and 'cause and effect'. An outsider then changes his argument and says: Although there are many perfumed seeds, when a result is produced, it only comes from one kind of seed. The eleventh master refutes this below. Treatise: If it is said that the result is produced in this way, then the rest become useless. Commentary: The first two sentences are a quotation, and the last two sentences are a refutation. This is discussed in terms of the 'able to perfume' of the 'seeing-portion' (見分, jiàn fēn, the subjective aspect of cognition). Question: Since this is the case, how do Dharmapala (護法, Hùfǎ) and others explain this passage? If the old and new seeds only follow one in functioning, then one of the old and new seeds is useless. Also, if the 'able to perfume' has six perfumations, forming six seeds that jointly produce one result, the refutation is the same. This is actually self-contradictory and does not need others to say it. Answer: The old and new causes and conditions, the 'able to perfume' has six perfumations, forming six equal powers. If they all encounter the aggregation of conditions, it can be allowed that this kind jointly produces one result. Just like there are many extremely small parts in one grain of wheat, it can be allowed that they jointly produce a sprout or other result. It is not allowed that each extremely small part individually produces a result. If that is the case, how is the difficulty in the Karma-siddhi of many seeds producing one sprout explained? There, it refutes the Sautrantika's (經部, Jīngbù) view that form (色法, sè fǎ, material phenomena) and mind (心法, xīn fǎ, mental phenomena) each have seeds that jointly produce one result, like two grains of wheat jointly producing one sprout. This is not what is allowed here. Now, each of the five aggregates (五數, wǔ shù, referring to the five skandhas: form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness) has seeds that jointly produce one result, so it is what is being negated. If seeds of the same kind in one consciousness jointly produce a result, there is no obstacle. Therefore, this passage says: If one kind produces, the rest are useless, and so on. Otherwise, this statement would deeply harm itself. If the 'able to hold' (能持, néng chí, referring to the ability to maintain the seed) is the same, then many seeds of the same kind can be allowed to jointly produce one result. If the 'able to hold' is different, even if they are seeds of the same kind, they are not allowed to jointly produce a result. The twelfth outsider says: The seeds produce results in sequence. The thirteenth master refutes again. Treatise: It cannot be said that the results are produced in sequence, because the perfuming is simultaneous and the powers are equal.

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等故。如生果種故不可說心種先生。余觸等種次第生果。此中比量易而可知。

十四外人復云。六果頓起。

十五論主復難。

論。又不可說六果頓生。

述曰。此即總非。

有何過失。

論。勿一有情至俱時生故。

述曰。若六果生便有此失　彼若救言如摩醯首羅面有三目。復有龍王有八萬眼。有六種體。于理何違　難此不爾。不可說心中之種生此眼。心所中種能生彼眼。即應一念有六本識。又無多眼者。彼如何通。故唯心王持種于理為善　又如人二眼。識但是一。多眼龍王何必識多　又若許爾即一有情有六本識。便為六身非為一體。

次第十六彼復轉救。

論。誰言觸等至持諸種子。

述曰。外人轉計。此即不例同於本識持種受熏名一切種。

故第十七論主復問。

論。不爾如何至名一切種。

述曰。問觸所由。

次第十八外人復云。

論。謂觸等五至名一切種。

述曰。此解似種。　本識變種能生果故名為真種。觸等與識同一所緣。故彼亦能變為種子。不能生果名為似種。

十九問彼何故須然　二十彼答。

論。觸等與識所緣等故。

述曰。此顯三因觸等似種。若不緣種。心．心所法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為這樣的緣故。例如，因為果實的種子先生長，所以不能說心識的種子先生長。其餘的觸等種子是依次產生果實的。這其中的比量很容易理解。

十四、外道又說，六種果報同時產生。

十五、論主再次反駁。

論：又不能說六種果報同時產生。

述記：這是總體的否定。

有什麼過失呢？

論：不要讓一個有情眾生同時產生六種果報。

述記：如果六種果報同時產生，就會有這樣的過失。如果他們辯解說，就像摩醯首羅（Maheśvara，印度教主神之一，以其三眼而聞名）的面孔有三隻眼睛，或者龍王有八萬隻眼睛，有六種身體，在道理上有什麼違背呢？反駁說，情況並非如此。不能說心中之種產生這隻眼睛，心所中之種能產生那隻眼睛。那就應該一念之間有六個根本識。而且沒有那麼多眼睛的人，他們又如何解釋呢？所以只有心王（根本識）持有種子在道理上是合理的。又比如人有兩隻眼睛，但識只有一個。多眼龍王又何必有多個識呢？又如果允許這樣，那麼一個有情眾生就有六個根本識，那就成了六個身體而不是一個整體。

次第十六、他們又轉變辯解。

論：誰說觸等能持有諸多種子？

述記：外道轉變計較。這不能類比于根本識持有種子並接受熏習，被稱為一切種。

所以第十七、論主再次發問。

論：如果不是這樣，那又如何被稱為一切種呢？

述記：詢問觸所由來的原因。

次第十八、外道又說。

論：所謂的觸等五蘊，與識有相同所緣，所以被稱為一切種。

述記：這是類似種子的解釋。本識變現的種子能產生果報，所以被稱為真種子。觸等與識有相同的所緣，所以它們也能變現為種子。但不能產生果報，所以被稱為似種子。

十九、問他們為什麼必須這樣？二十、他們回答。

論：觸等與識所緣相同，所以它們也是一切種。

述記：這顯示了三種原因，觸等是類似種子。如果不緣于種子，心和心所法

【English Translation】 English version For such reasons. For example, because the seed of a fruit comes into being first, it cannot be said that the seed of consciousness comes into being first. The remaining seeds of contact, etc., produce fruits in sequence. The analogy here is easy to understand.

1. The outsider further says that the six fruits arise simultaneously.

2. The treatise master refutes again.

Treatise: Furthermore, it cannot be said that the six fruits arise simultaneously.

Commentary: This is a general negation.

What fault is there?

Treatise: Lest one sentient being produce all six simultaneously.

Commentary: If the six fruits arise, then there would be this fault. If they argue, like Maheśvara (a major Hindu deity, known for his three eyes) whose face has three eyes, or the Dragon King who has eighty thousand eyes, having six bodies, what contradiction is there in principle? Refute that this is not the case. It cannot be said that the seed in the mind produces this eye, and the seed in the mental functions produces that eye. Then there should be six fundamental consciousnesses in one thought. Moreover, for those who do not have many eyes, how do they explain it? Therefore, it is reasonable for only the mind-king (fundamental consciousness) to hold the seeds. Furthermore, like humans with two eyes, there is only one consciousness. Why must the Dragon King with many eyes have many consciousnesses? Moreover, if this is allowed, then one sentient being would have six fundamental consciousnesses, which would be six bodies instead of one entity.

Sequentially 16, they further change their defense.

Treatise: Who says that contact, etc., can hold all the seeds?

Commentary: The outsider changes his argument. This cannot be compared to the fundamental consciousness holding seeds and receiving熏習 (xūn xí, influence/habituation), which is called 'all seeds'.

Therefore, 17, the treatise master asks again.

Treatise: If not, how is it called 'all seeds'?

Commentary: Asking about the origin of contact.

Sequentially 18, the outsider says again.

Treatise: The so-called five aggregates of contact, etc., have the same object as consciousness, so they are called 'all seeds'.

Commentary: This is an explanation similar to seeds. The seeds transformed by the fundamental consciousness can produce fruits, so they are called true seeds. Contact, etc., have the same object as consciousness, so they can also transform into seeds. But they cannot produce fruits, so they are called pseudo-seeds.

1. Asking them why it must be so? 20. They answer.

Treatise: Contact, etc., have the same object as consciousness, so they are also all seeds.

Commentary: This shows three reasons why contact, etc., are similar seeds. If not based on seeds, the mind and mental functions

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所緣。便有不同之失。

論。無色觸等有所緣故。

述曰。生無色界既不緣色。不緣種者。此何所緣。

論。親所緣緣定應有故。

述曰。若但緣本識相分之種。自不須變。即無親所緣緣。自無相分故。便非唯識。心外取故。若托彼變但是疏緣。不于觸等之上現影像故。

論。此似種相至生現識等。

述曰。無實用故。不能生現識根境等　等者等取諸根．境等。

此如何等。

論。如觸等上至非識所依。

述曰。心所所變似眼根等。不能為依親生五識。親生五識者。心王所變故。色等亦爾。亦非實礙。此六眼根等。同時同處不相障礙。

論。亦如似火無能燒用。

述曰。此顯同喻。鏡中之火名為似火。無燒用故。

此上並是第三師救　次二十一論主難云。

論。彼救非理至而相例故。

述曰。謂若是觸等緣似種相名一切種。即是第四緣境之門。在第三門一切種后執受處中方應相例。如何於前一切種中乃例緣境。

論。由此前說至有重言失。

述曰。此顯正義。由此理故。前句所說一切種言。定目本識有彼受熏能持種義。不目緣種．似種等義。故不可以觸等五數緣種為例　若不是說受熏持種名一切種爾者。本頌乃

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 所緣（所觀注的對象）不同，就會產生偏差。

論：無色觸等因為有所緣的緣故。

述曰：如果生無色界眾生既不緣色，也不緣種子，那麼他們緣的是什麼呢？

論：親所緣緣（直接的所緣緣）必定應該存在。

述曰：如果僅僅緣本識（根本識）相分的種子，自身不需要轉變，就沒有親所緣緣。自身沒有相分，就不是唯識，因為是從心外獲取的。如果依託于彼（觸等）的轉變，那只是疏遠的緣，因為不在觸等之上顯現影像。

論：這類似於種子相，乃至生起現識等。

述曰：因為沒有實際作用，不能生起現識、根、境等。等者，包括諸根、境等。

這如何等同呢？

論：如觸等之上，乃至不是識所依。

述曰：心所（心所有法）所變的類似於眼根等，不能作為所依親自身生起五識。親自身生起五識，是因為心王（根本識）所變的緣故。色等也是如此，也不是真實的障礙。這六個眼根等，同時同處不互相障礙。

論：也像類似於火，沒有燃燒的作用。

述曰：這顯示了一個比喻。鏡子中的火被稱為類似於火，因為沒有燃燒的作用。

以上都是第三位論師的辯護。接下來是第二十一位論主的詰難。

論：他的辯護不合道理，因為是相互類比。

述曰：如果說觸等緣類似於種子相，名為一切種（一切種子識），那就是第四個緣境之門。在第三個門，一切種的執受處中才應該相互類比。為什麼在前面的一切種中就類比緣境呢？

論：因此，前面所說，會有重複言語的過失。

述曰：這顯示了正確的意義。因為這個道理，前面句子所說的一切種，一定是說本識具有接受熏習、能夠保持種子的意義，不是說緣種子、類似於種子等的意義。所以不可以用觸等五數緣種子為例。如果不是說接受熏習、保持種子叫做一切種，那麼本頌就……

【English Translation】 English version: If the object of perception (所緣, suo yuan) is different, errors will arise.

Treatise: Because formless touch and so on have objects of perception.

Commentary: If beings born in the Formless Realm neither perceive form nor seeds, what do they perceive?

Treatise: The direct condition of perception (親所緣緣, qin suo yuan yuan) must exist.

Commentary: If one only perceives the seed of the aspect-division (相分, xiang fen) of the fundamental consciousness (本識, ben shi), without self-transformation, then there is no direct condition of perception. If there is no aspect-division of oneself, then it is not only consciousness, because it is taken from outside the mind. If relying on the transformation of those (touch, etc.), it is only a distant condition, because images do not appear on touch, etc.

Treatise: This is similar to the seed-aspect, up to the arising of manifest consciousness, etc.

Commentary: Because it has no practical use, it cannot generate manifest consciousness, roots, objects, etc. 'Etc.' includes roots, objects, etc.

How are these equal?

Treatise: Like touch, etc., up to not being the basis of consciousness.

Commentary: What is transformed by mental functions (心所, xin suo), such as the eye-root, etc., cannot be the basis for the direct arising of the five consciousnesses. The direct arising of the five consciousnesses is due to the transformation of the mind-king (心王, xin wang). The same is true of form, etc., which are not real obstacles. These six eye-roots, etc., are not mutually obstructive at the same time and place.

Treatise: It is also like a semblance of fire, without the ability to burn.

Commentary: This shows an analogy. The fire in a mirror is called a semblance of fire because it has no burning function.

The above is all the defense of the third teacher. Next is the challenge of the twenty-first master.

Treatise: His defense is unreasonable because it is an analogy.

Commentary: If touch, etc., perceive a semblance of the seed-aspect, it is called 'all seeds' (一切種, yi qie zhong), which is the fourth door of perceiving objects. It should be analogous in the third door, in the place of appropriation of all seeds. Why is it analogous to perceiving objects in the previous 'all seeds'?

Treatise: Therefore, the previous statement has the fault of redundant words.

Commentary: This shows the correct meaning. Because of this reason, the 'all seeds' mentioned in the previous sentence definitely refers to the fundamental consciousness having the meaning of receiving熏習 (xun xi, influence), holding seeds. It does not refer to the meaning of perceiving seeds, semblance of seeds, etc. Therefore, the example of the five aggregates of touch, etc., perceiving seeds cannot be used. If it is not said that receiving influence and holding seeds is called 'all seeds', then this verse...

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有重言之失。上解一切種已言緣種。下解執受中復言緣種故　若彼救言緣種子者名一切種。執受處中說有根身。無重過者。理亦不然。世親攝論第一引阿毗達磨經言。執受有二。一五色根。及根依處。二相名分別習氣　種子可執。復是所緣。與身別明此有何位。故所說非也。

二十二第三師問。若不如我所說義者。亦如是言應有簡別。以不許例持諸種故　次二十三論主復答。

論。又彼所說至定不成證。

述曰。此總非也。

論。勿觸等五亦能了別。

述曰。此下正難　了別。唯是識行相故。

論。觸等亦與觸等相應。

述曰。上勿字流至此。勿觸等五與觸等相應。以說本識觸等相應故。不爾如何觸等相例。

論。由此故知至非謂一切。

述曰。由此理故。故知頌中亦如是言。隨所應說。若前若后。性相求故應可例有。隨理無違即便相例。非謂一切皆令例之。此例幾門。即有六門。前第二師例同五門。今加斷舍隨所應故。余不例者準義可知。以隨文便中間相例。故亦可許例于舍位。欲顯初后皆有例法。及非例法。故中間說觸等相例。若最後句方說例者。恐謂一切皆合例故　上來雖有多文。非是正明本識。例彼觸等義門分別　下第七段。即是第九解本識因果法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 存在重複言語的錯誤。上面解釋『一切種』（sarvabīja，指所有種子的集合）時已經說了『緣種』（pratyaya-bīja，指生起果的助緣種子），下面解釋『執受』（ādāna，指被執持的事物）時又說了『緣種』，所以是重複。如果對方辯解說，所謂的『緣種子』就是指『一切種』，並且在『執受』之處說明有根身（indriya-kāya，指感覺器官及其所依賴的身體），這樣就沒有重複的過失。但這個理由也是不成立的。世親（Vasubandhu）在《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第一品中引用《阿毗達磨經》（Abhidharma Sūtra）說，『執受』有兩種：一是五色根（pañca rūpa indriya，指五種感覺器官），以及根所依賴之處；二是相、名、分別的習氣（saṃjñā-nāma-vikalpa-vāsanā，指概念、名稱和分別的習性）。種子可以被執持，又是所緣（ālambana，指認識的對象）。與身體有別，說明這一點有什麼意義？所以你所說的並不正確。 第二十二，第三位論師提問：如果不如我所說的意義，也應該像這樣說，應該有簡別，因為不允許類比執持所有的種子。接下來第二十三，論主再次回答。 論：而且你所說的，必定不能成立為證據。 述記：這是完全否定。 論：勿觸等五也能了別。 述記：這下面是正式的責難。了別，僅僅是識的行相。 論：觸等也與觸等相應。 述記：上面的『勿』字延續到這裡。勿觸等五與觸等相應，因為說了本識（mūla-vijñāna，根本識）的觸等相應。不然如何觸等可以類比？ 論：由此可知，並非指一切。 述記：由於這個道理，所以知道頌文中也像這樣說，隨著所應該說的，無論是前還是后，因為尋求自性和相狀，所以應該可以類比存在。隨著道理沒有違背，就可以類比。並非指一切都令其類比。這種類比有幾種方式？即有六種方式。前面第二位論師類比相同有五種方式，現在加上斷舍，隨著所應該的緣故。其餘不類比的，根據意義可以知道。因為隨著文句的方便，中間可以類比，所以也可以允許類比于舍位。想要顯示最初和最後都有類比的方法，以及非類比的方法，所以中間說觸等類比。如果最後一句才說類比，恐怕認為一切都應該類比。上面雖然有很多文句，但不是正式說明本識，類比那些觸等義門的分別。下面第七段，就是第九個解釋本識的因果法。

【English Translation】 English version: There is a fault of redundant speech. Above, in explaining 'all seeds' (sarvabīja), it has already been said 'causal seeds' (pratyaya-bīja). Below, in explaining 'appropriation' (ādāna), it is again said 'causal seeds', so it is redundant. If the opponent argues that the so-called 'causal seeds' refers to 'all seeds', and it is explained in the context of 'appropriation' that there is a root body (indriya-kāya), then there is no fault of redundancy. But this reasoning is also not valid. Vasubandhu, in the first chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, quotes the Abhidharma Sūtra, saying that there are two types of 'appropriation': first, the five sense faculties (pañca rūpa indriya), and the places on which they rely; second, the habit-energies (vāsanā) of signs, names, and discriminations (saṃjñā-nāma-vikalpa). Seeds can be appropriated and are also objects of cognition (ālambana). Being distinct from the body, what is the significance of explaining this? Therefore, what you say is not correct. Twenty-second, the third teacher asks: If it is not according to the meaning I have stated, it should also be said in this way, there should be distinctions, because it is not permissible to analogize holding all seeds. Next, twenty-third, the treatise master replies again. Treatise: Moreover, what you say will definitely not be established as evidence. Commentary: This is a complete negation. Treatise: The five, such as non-contact, can also distinguish. Commentary: Below is the formal refutation. Distinguishing is merely the characteristic of consciousness. Treatise: Contact, etc., are also associated with contact, etc. Commentary: The 'non-' from above continues here. The five, such as non-contact, are associated with contact, etc., because it is said that the fundamental consciousness' (mūla-vijñāna) contact, etc., are associated. Otherwise, how can contact, etc., be analogous? Treatise: From this, it is known that it does not refer to everything. Commentary: Because of this reason, it is known that the verse also says in this way, according to what should be said, whether before or after, because seeking the nature and characteristics, it should be possible to analogize existence. According to reason, without contradiction, it can be analogized. It does not mean that everything should be analogized. How many ways are there for this analogy? There are six ways. The second teacher before analogized the same in five ways, now adding cutting off and abandoning, because of what should be. The rest that are not analogized can be known according to the meaning. Because it is convenient according to the sentences, it can be analogized in the middle, so it can also be allowed to analogize to the position of abandoning. Wanting to show that both the beginning and the end have methods of analogy, and methods of non-analogy, so in the middle it is said that contact, etc., are analogous. If the last sentence says analogy, it is feared that it would be thought that everything should be analogized. Although there are many sentences above, it is not formally explaining the fundamental consciousness, analogizing those distinctions of the meaning of contact, etc. Below, the seventh section, is the ninth explanation of the cause and effect dharma of the fundamental consciousness.

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．喻門。是本頌中第九句恒轉如暴流也　于中有二。初問。后答。將欲解文寄問徴起。

論。阿賴耶識為斷為常。

述曰。此為問也。前解自相唯阿賴耶。今分別中依自相說。

論。非斷非常以恒轉故。

述曰。此第二正答所問　于中有三。初解本頌。次破外執。后勸歸信　初中有三。初解法。次解喻。后總結　解法中有二。先舉所明因果之法。后廣解釋。此即初也　舉頌二字正答前問。經部師等持種色．心。無色無心有時斷滅　僧佉自性。雖為法種仍體是常　為簡彼宗言非常斷。

恒義如何。

論。恒謂此識至常無間斷。

述曰。下廣解也。先解恒義　一類者。常無記義　相續者。未曾斷義。

何義要須中無間斷。

論。是界趣生施設本故。

述曰。此意即是依此識故。施設三界．五趣．四生。是引果故。識是界．趣．生之本也。下自當知　言施設者。安立異名。識若斷滅非界．趣．生。故此恒言正遮于斷。即重顯上一類義也。若善．染等。體非一類。趣生應雜許雜起故。由此識是一類無記。不可雜起。

論。性堅持種令不失故。

述曰。此言顯上相續之義。此義可知　言性堅者。四義受熏即初堅義。乃至金剛此不斷故。故能受熏。若

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 喻門。這是本頌中第九句『恒轉如暴流』的含義。其中分為兩部分：首先是提問，然後是回答。爲了解釋經文，先通過提問來引發討論。

論：阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna，根本識）是斷滅的還是常存的？

述曰：這是提問。前面解釋自相時只說了阿賴耶識，現在在分別中依據自相進行說明。

論：非斷非常，因為它恒常流轉。

述曰：這是第二部分，正面回答所提出的問題。其中分為三個部分：首先解釋本頌，其次駁斥外道的主張，最後勸人歸信。解釋本頌又分為三個部分：首先解釋法，其次解釋比喻，最後進行總結。解釋法又分為兩個部分：首先列舉所要闡明的因果之法，然後廣泛地進行解釋。這裡是第一部分，列舉頌文的兩個字來正面回答前面的問題。經部師等認為，持有種子的是色、心，無色無心有時會斷滅。僧佉派認為自性雖然是法的種子，但本體是常存的。爲了簡別這些宗派，所以說『非常斷』。

『恒』的含義是什麼？

論：『恒』是指此識常無間斷。

述曰：下面廣泛地解釋『恒』的含義。『一類』是指常無記的性質。『相續』是指未曾斷絕。

為什麼一定要中間沒有間斷呢？

論：因為它是界、趣、生施設的根本。

述曰：這裡的意思是，正是依靠這個識，才有了三界（欲界、色界、無色界）、五趣（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）、四生（卵生、胎生、濕生、化生）的施設。這是引出結果，識是界、趣、生的根本。下面自然會明白。『施設』是指安立不同的名稱。如果識斷滅了，就沒有界、趣、生了。所以這個『恒』字正是爲了遮止斷滅，也就是再次顯明上面『一類』的含義。如果識是善、染等，本體不是一類，那麼趣生就應該混雜，允許混雜生起。因此，這個識是一類無記，不可能混雜生起。

論：因為它能堅定地執持種子，使之不失壞。

述曰：這句話是爲了顯明上面『相續』的含義。這個含義可以理解。『性堅』是指四義受熏，也就是最初的堅固之義，乃至金剛心都不會斷絕，所以能夠接受熏習。如果

【English Translation】 English version: The gate of analogy. This refers to the ninth line of the verse, 'constantly flowing like a torrent.' It consists of two parts: first, the question, and then the answer. To explain the text, we begin by raising a question to initiate the discussion.

Treatise: Is the Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) annihilated or permanent?

Commentary: This is the question. The previous explanation of self-nature only mentioned Ālayavijñāna. Now, in the differentiation section, we explain it based on its self-nature.

Treatise: It is neither annihilated nor permanent because it is constantly transforming.

Commentary: This is the second part, directly answering the question. It consists of three parts: first, explaining the verse; second, refuting external views; and third, encouraging faith. Explaining the verse is further divided into three parts: first, explaining the Dharma; second, explaining the analogy; and third, summarizing. Explaining the Dharma is divided into two parts: first, listing the Dharma of cause and effect to be clarified; and second, providing a broad explanation. This is the first part, listing the two words of the verse to directly answer the previous question. The Sautrāntikas (Scripture School) and others believe that what holds the seeds are form and mind, and that formless and mindless states sometimes cease to exist. The Sāṃkhya school believes that although primordial nature is the seed of Dharma, its essence is permanent. To distinguish from these schools, it is said 'neither annihilated'.

What is the meaning of 'constant'?

Treatise: 'Constant' means that this consciousness is always without interruption.

Commentary: The following provides a broad explanation of the meaning of 'constant'. 'Of one kind' refers to the nature of being constantly neutral. 'Continuous' refers to never being interrupted.

Why is it necessary to have no interruption in the middle?

Treatise: Because it is the basis for the establishment of realms, destinies, and births.

Commentary: The meaning here is that it is precisely because of this consciousness that there is the establishment of the Three Realms (Desire Realm, Form Realm, Formless Realm), the Five Destinies (hell-beings, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, gods), and the Four Births (oviparous, viviparous, moisture-born, and metamorphic). This is to bring forth the result; consciousness is the basis of realms, destinies, and births. This will become clear later. 'Establishment' refers to establishing different names. If consciousness were annihilated, there would be no realms, destinies, or births. Therefore, the word 'constant' is precisely to prevent annihilation, which is to re-emphasize the meaning of 'of one kind' mentioned above. If consciousness were good, defiled, etc., its essence would not be of one kind, then destinies and births should be mixed, allowing mixed arising. Therefore, this consciousness is of one kind, neutral, and cannot be mixed in its arising.

Treatise: Because it firmly holds the seeds, preventing them from being lost.

Commentary: This sentence is to clarify the meaning of 'continuous' mentioned above. This meaning can be understood. 'Firm in nature' refers to the four meanings of receiving impressions, which is the initial meaning of firmness, and even the diamond mind will not be cut off, so it can receive impressions. If

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不堅者。如六。七識應不受熏　復言持種令不失者。簡經部等色．心受熏而能持種。于無色界入無心時此種便失　此識不爾。種不失故。故不可斷。此解恒義。

論。轉謂此識至前後變異。

述曰。此遮常．一此簡自性．及我。為常。為一。以諸有情起分別心計為我故　言有生滅等。簡彼一．常故。

論。因滅果生非常一故。

述曰。因果性故。簡一。非我也　有生滅故。簡常。非自性也。

常．一之法無因果故。

何不是常。常有何過。

論。可為轉識熏成種故。

述曰。顯可熏義。不能受熏是為過也。不為轉識熏成種過。常阿賴耶應不受熏。以是常故。如虛空等。若不受熏。即無生死．涅槃差別。

此上解轉。總釋頌中恒轉二字。四義受熏即皆具足。一無記。二堅。三可熏非常一是。四相應可為識熏是　下釋如暴流三字。有三義喻。

論。恒言遮斷至因果法爾。

述曰。下解譬喻　于中有二。先舉法生滅喻。后廣解之。此即初也。一切因果皆非斷．常故言法爾。

論。如暴流水至令不出離。

述曰。暴謂卒暴。即泛暴水。前能引后名曰非常。后水續前稱為非斷。生人天喻飄。居惡趣如溺。本識能持業煩惱等漂溺有情。以水為喻

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『不堅者。如六。七識應不受熏』：如果六識和七識是『不堅』的，那麼它們就不應該接受熏習。這句話反駁了認為六識和七識可以接受熏習的觀點。 『復言持種令不失者。簡經部等色．心受熏而能持種。于無**入無心時此種便失』：進一步說，阿賴耶識能夠『持種令不失』，這與經量部等宗派的觀點不同，他們認為色法和心法雖然可以接受熏習並持有種子，但在進入無想定時，這些種子就會消失。而阿賴耶識則不然，它所持有的種子不會消失，因此是不可斷滅的。這解釋了『恒』的含義。

『論。轉謂此識至前後變異』：『轉』是指這個識（阿賴耶識）會不斷地轉變，經歷前後的變異。

『述曰。此遮常．一此簡自性．及我。為常。為一。以諸有情起分別心計為我故　言有生滅等。簡彼一．常故』：這句是爲了否定常和一的特性，也排除了自性和我的概念。因為眾生常常生起分別心，執著于『我』，所以說阿賴耶識不是常和一，因為它有生滅變化。

『論。因滅果生非常一故』：因為因滅果生，所以阿賴耶識不是常和一。

『述曰。因果性故。簡一。非我也　有生滅故。簡常。非自性也。常．一之法無因果故』：因為具有因果的性質，所以不是『一』，也不是『我』。因為它有生滅變化，所以不是『常』，也不是『自性』。常和一的法沒有因果關係。

『何不是常。常有何過』：為什麼說阿賴耶識不是常？常有什麼過失？

『論。可為轉識熏成種故』：因為阿賴耶識可以被轉識熏習，從而形成新的種子。

『述曰。顯可熏義。不能受熏是為過也。不為轉識熏成種過。常阿賴耶應不受熏。以是常故。如虛空等。若不受熏。即無生死．涅槃差別』：這說明了阿賴耶識可以被熏習的特性。不能接受熏習就是一種過失。如果阿賴耶識是常的，那麼它就不應該接受熏習，就像虛空一樣。如果它不受熏習，那麼就沒有生死和涅槃的差別了。

『此上解轉。總釋頌中恒轉二字。四義受熏即皆具足。一無記。二堅。三可熏非常一是。四相應可為識熏是　下釋如暴流三字。有三義喻』：以上解釋了『轉』的含義，總的解釋了頌中的『恒』和『轉』兩個字。阿賴耶識具有四種可以接受熏習的特性：一是無記性，二是堅固性，三是可以被熏習且非常非一，四是相應性，可以被其他識熏習。下面解釋『如暴流』三個字，有三種比喻意義。

『論。恒言遮斷至因果法爾』：『恒』這個詞是爲了遮止斷滅的觀點，說明因果的法則是自然而然的。

『述曰。下解譬喻　于中有二。先舉法生滅喻。后廣解之。此即初也。一切因果皆非斷．常故言法爾』：下面解釋比喻。其中分為兩部分，先舉出法生滅的比喻，然後廣為解釋。這裡是第一部分。一切因果都不是斷滅或常恒的，所以說是『法爾』。

『論。如暴流水至令不出離』：就像湍急的流水一樣，阿賴耶識的力量強大，使得眾生難以從中脫離。

『述曰。暴謂卒暴。即泛暴水。前能引后名曰非常。后水續前稱為非斷。生人天喻飄。居惡趣如溺。本識能持業煩惱等漂溺有情。以水為喻』：『暴』是指突然而猛烈的，就像氾濫的洪水。前面的水流能夠引導後面的水流，所以說是『非常』；後面的水流接續前面的水流，所以說是『非斷』。生於人天道就像漂浮在水面上，處於惡趣就像溺水。根本識能夠持有業和煩惱等，從而漂溺有情，這裡用水來做比喻。

【English Translation】 English version: 『Those that are not firm, such as the six and seven consciousnesses, should not be subject to熏 (xun, influence/perfume)』: If the six and seven consciousnesses are 『not firm,』 then they should not be subject to being influenced. This statement refutes the view that the six and seven consciousnesses can be influenced. 『Furthermore, saying that it holds seeds and does not lose them distinguishes it from the Sautrantikas (經部, Jīngbù) and others, whose form and mind are influenced and can hold seeds, but these seeds are lost when entering the state of no-thought (無**入無心時).』 The Alaya consciousness (阿賴耶識, Ālāyéshì) is not like that; its seeds are not lost, so it cannot be cut off. This explains the meaning of 『constant (恒, héng).』

『Treatise: 『Turning』 refers to this consciousness undergoing changes from beginning to end.』

『Commentary: This negates permanence and oneness; it excludes self-nature and the 『I.』 It is permanent and one because sentient beings give rise to discriminating minds and consider it as 『I.』 The statement 『having arising and ceasing』 excludes that which is one and permanent.』

『Treatise: Because cause ceases and effect arises, it is neither permanent nor one.』

『Commentary: Because of the nature of cause and effect, it is not one, nor is it 『I.』 Because it has arising and ceasing, it is not permanent, nor is it self-nature. Permanent and one dharmas have no cause and effect.』

『Why is it not permanent? What is the fault of being permanent?』

『Treatise: Because it can be influenced by the turning consciousness to form seeds.』

『Commentary: This reveals the meaning of being able to be influenced. Not being able to be influenced is a fault. If the Alaya consciousness were permanent, it should not be influenced, like space. If it were not influenced, there would be no difference between samsara (生死, shēngsǐ) and nirvana (涅槃, nièpán).』

『The above explains 『turning.』 It generally explains the words 『constant』 and 『turning』 in the verse. The four meanings of being influenced are all complete: (1) non-determined (無記, wújì), (2) firm, (3) able to be influenced and neither permanent nor one, and (4) corresponding, able to be influenced by consciousness. The following explains the three words 『like a torrent,』 with three metaphorical meanings.』

『Treatise: The word 『constant』 prevents the view of annihilation, up to the naturalness of cause and effect.』

『Commentary: The following explains the metaphor. There are two parts: first, the metaphor of the arising and ceasing of dharmas is given, and then it is explained in detail. This is the first part. All causes and effects are neither annihilated nor permanent, so it is said to be 『natural (法爾, fǎ'ěr).』

『Treatise: Like a rushing torrent, it makes it difficult to escape.』

『Commentary: 『Rushing』 means sudden and violent, like a flood. The preceding water leads the following water, so it is called 『not permanent.』 The following water continues the preceding water, so it is called 『not annihilated.』 Being born in the human and heavenly realms is like floating, while dwelling in the evil realms is like drowning. The fundamental consciousness can hold karma (業, yè), afflictions (煩惱, fánnǎo), etc., causing sentient beings to drown. Water is used as a metaphor.』

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。

論。又如暴流至而恒相續。

述曰。又識持種三界生故。一浪因至一浪生。多浪因至多浪起。故名暴流。以水為喻。如下文說。

論。又如暴流至恒相隨轉。

述曰。此第三喻。漂水下魚．水上之草。喻內習氣．外觸受等內外法也。

論。如是法喻至非斷常義。

述曰。此合法．喻釋其大意。

論。謂此識性至恒轉如流。

述曰。果生故非斷者。后法續故　因滅故非常者。不恒住故。此解法義令同於喻。余文可解。

上來大乘自述己義成立因果　自下第二破斥諸部。

論。過去未來至緣起正理。

述曰。此下有三　初牒說一切有部．正量等難破彼宗執　二破上座部師。三破經部　初文有十此即初也。有部．正量等彼皆過．未有體性故　此意難言。若如我等過．未有體。未來續故不斷。往過去故不常。汝過去無可許非常。未來既無後法應斷。現不住故。當無體故。如是豈成緣起正理。

論。過去未來至緣起正理。

述曰。此即第二論主反質。過去．未來汝執實有可許非斷。未來續故與我不同。如何過去說恒有故不是常義。前言我宗斷不成緣起理。今汝既是常。常豈緣生理。

論。豈斥他過己義便成。

述曰。第三外

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：又如暴流涌至，恒常相續。

述曰：又因為識持有三界眾生的種子，所以一個浪潮因緣到來，就生起一個浪潮；多個浪潮因緣到來，就生起多個浪潮。所以名為暴流。用水來做比喻，如下文所說。

論：又如暴流涌至，恒常相隨流轉。

述曰：這是第三個比喻。漂在水下的魚、水上的草，比喻內在的習氣、外在的觸受等等內外之法。

論：像這樣的法和比喻，說明了非斷非常的意義。

述曰：這是合法、比喻，解釋其大意。

論：所謂此識的性質，是恒常流轉如暴流。

述曰：因為果報生起，所以不是斷滅。后一個法相續不斷。因為因緣滅盡，所以不是恒常，因為不是恒常住留。這是解釋法義，使其與比喻相同。其餘的文字可以自行理解。

以上是大乘自述己義，成立因果。以下第二部分，破斥其他部派。

論：過去未來，都無法成立緣起正理。

述曰：以下有三個部分。首先是列舉說一切有部（Sarvastivada）、正量部（Sammitiya）等的難點，來破斥他們的宗派執著。第二是破斥上座部（Theravada）的師說。第三是破斥經部（Sautrantika）。第一個部分有十個方面，這是第一個方面。有部、正量部等，他們都認為過去、未來有實體。這個意思是說，如果像我們一樣，過去、未來沒有實體，未來可以相續，所以不是斷滅；往昔已經過去，所以不是恒常。你們的過去是無可取的，所以不是恒常。未來既然沒有，後來的法就應該是斷滅。現在不住留，當體就沒有，這樣怎麼能成立緣起正理呢？

論：過去未來，都無法成立緣起正理。

述曰：這是第二個方面，論主反過來質問。過去、未來，你們執著為實有，可以承認不是斷滅。未來相續不斷，與我們不同。為什麼過去說是恒常存在，卻又不是恒常的意義呢？前面說我宗斷滅，不能成立緣起之理。現在你們既然是常，恒常怎麼能生起理呢？

論：難道斥責別人的過失，自己的義理就能成立嗎？

述曰：第三個方面，外人反駁。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: It is like a violent torrent that constantly continues.

Commentary: Furthermore, because consciousness holds the seeds of beings in the Three Realms, one wave arises due to one cause, and multiple waves arise due to multiple causes. Therefore, it is called a violent torrent. It is likened to water, as explained in the following text.

Treatise: It is like a violent torrent that constantly flows along.

Commentary: This is the third analogy. The fish drifting under the water and the grass on the water are metaphors for internal habits and external sensations, etc., which are internal and external dharmas.

Treatise: Such dharma and analogy illustrate the meaning of neither permanent nor discontinuous.

Commentary: This is the combination of dharma and analogy to explain its main idea.

Treatise: The nature of this consciousness is constantly flowing like a torrent.

Commentary: Because the result arises, it is not discontinuous. Because the subsequent dharma continues. Because the cause ceases, it is not permanent, because it does not constantly abide. This explains the meaning of the dharma, making it the same as the analogy. The remaining text can be understood on your own.

The above is the Mahayana's (Great Vehicle) self-description of its own meaning, establishing cause and effect. The following second part refutes other schools.

Treatise: Neither the past nor the future can establish the correct principle of dependent origination.

Commentary: There are three parts below. The first is to list the difficulties of the Sarvastivada (All Exists School), Sammitiya (Personalist School), etc., to refute their sectarian attachments. The second is to refute the teachings of the Theravada (Elders School). The third is to refute the Sautrantika (Sutra School). The first part has ten aspects, and this is the first aspect. The Sarvastivada, Sammitiya, etc., all believe that the past and future have substance. The meaning of this is that if, like us, the past and future have no substance, the future can continue, so it is not discontinuous; the past has already passed, so it is not permanent. Your past is unacceptable, so it is not permanent. Since the future does not exist, the subsequent dharma should be discontinuous. The present does not abide, and there is no substance in the present, so how can the correct principle of dependent origination be established?

Treatise: Neither the past nor the future can establish the correct principle of dependent origination.

Commentary: This is the second aspect, where the debater questions back. You insist that the past and future are real, and it can be admitted that they are not discontinuous. The future continues, which is different from us. Why do you say that the past is constantly existing, but it is not the meaning of permanence? Earlier, you said that our school is discontinuous and cannot establish the principle of dependent origination. Now that you are permanent, how can permanence give rise to principle?

Treatise: Can one's own doctrine be established merely by criticizing the faults of others?

Commentary: The third aspect, the outsider refutes.

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人反云。論主遭難不能出理而行返質。豈斥他過己義便成。

下第四答。

論。若不摧邪難以顯正。

述曰。此論主答。黑山既傾白日斯現。故須破也。

次出正理。

論。前因滅位至低昂時等。

述曰。我宗因果。前因滅位後果即生。中間無隔因果不斷。如秤兩頭低昂時等。由彼低時此昂時故。

論。如是因果至方成非斷。

述曰。前生．后滅相續如流。豈假去．來是有。方成因果不斷。不籍去．來因果足不斷故。謂但一種在現在時流入過去。此之種子后念即起。剎那剎那恒時現在。而是無常因果不斷。

下第五難。

論。因現有位至誰離斷常。

述曰。外難云。如一種子因於現在有作用時後果未生。果法未來既體是無。不可定其所生之果。

此說因者是誰之因。無果可屬因定能生彼故。問果亦爾。現為因即無果。現為果即無因。因果既無斷．常誰離。初但難斷。今亦難常。

論。若有因時至豈離斷常。

述曰。論主反質。即第六也。此為彼部未來有故。其果之體未來已有。現在為因之時果已先有。果已先有何待于因。若果本無可待因有。果先已有何待于因　量云未來果法應不待因。體已有故。如已生果　因義本欲生果。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有人反駁說：論主遭到詰難，不能用正理來辯解，反而回歸到詭辯。難道指責別人的過失，就能成就自己的正確嗎？

下面是第四個回答。

論：如果不摧毀邪說，就難以彰顯正理。

述曰：這是論主的回答。如同黑山傾倒，白日才會顯現。所以必須破除邪說。

接下來闡述正理。

論：前因滅去的位置，與後果產生、高低起伏的時間是相等的。

述曰：我宗認為因果關係是，前因滅去的位置，後果立即產生。中間沒有間隔，因果不會斷絕。就像天平的兩端，一端低下去，另一端就抬起來，時間是相等的。因為一端低下去的時候，另一端就抬起來了。

論：像這樣，因果相續，才能成就非斷滅的道理。

述曰：前生后滅，相續不斷，如同流水。難道需要假設有『去』、『來』這樣的實在，才能成就因果不斷嗎？不需要憑藉『去』、『來』，因果本身就足以不斷絕。意思是說，只有一種狀態存在於現在，流入過去。這個種子，后念立即生起。剎那剎那，恒常處於現在，所以是無常的，但因果卻不會斷絕。

下面是第五個詰難。

論：如果因在現有位置時，果法未來，那麼誰能脫離斷滅和常恒的說法？

述曰：外道詰難說：如果一種種子，在現在有作用的時候，後果還沒有產生。果法在未來，本體是空無。無法確定它所產生的果實。

這種說法，因是什麼的因？沒有果可以歸屬，因就無法確定能產生那個果。反過來問果也是一樣。現在作為因，就沒有果；現在作為果，就沒有因。因果既然都沒有，誰能脫離斷滅和常恒的說法？最初只是詰難斷滅，現在也詰難常恒。

論：如果因存在的時候，果已經在未來存在，那麼因又有什麼作用？又怎麼能脫離斷滅和常恒的說法？

述曰：論主反過來詰問對方，這是第六個回答。因為對方宗派認為未來果是存在的。果的本體在未來已經存在。現在作為因的時候，果已經先存在了。果已經先存在了，還等待因做什麼呢？如果果本來就無可等待，因的存在又有什麼用呢？果已經先存在了，還等待因做什麼呢？可以這樣衡量：未來的果法不應該等待因，因為它本體已經存在了。就像已經產生的果實一樣。因的意義本來就是要產生果實。

【English Translation】 English version Someone retorts: The debater, encountering difficulties, cannot use reason to argue and instead reverts to sophistry. Does criticizing others' faults make one's own righteousness complete?

The following is the fourth response.

Treatise: If one does not destroy the heretical, it is difficult to reveal the correct.

Statement: This is the debater's response. Just as when the Black Mountain collapses, the White Sun appears. Therefore, it is necessary to destroy the heretical.

Next, the correct reasoning is presented.

Treatise: The position where the prior cause ceases is equal in time to the arising of the subsequent effect, its rise and fall.

Statement: Our school believes that in the relationship of cause and effect, the position where the prior cause ceases, the subsequent effect immediately arises. There is no gap in between, and cause and effect are not severed. It is like the two ends of a scale, when one end goes down, the other end goes up, and the time is equal. Because when one end goes down, the other end goes up.

Treatise: In this way, cause and effect continue, and the principle of non-cessation is established.

Statement: Prior arising and subsequent ceasing continue like a stream. Is it necessary to assume that there are 'going' and 'coming' realities in order to establish that cause and effect are not severed? It is not necessary to rely on 'going' and 'coming'; cause and effect themselves are sufficient to not be severed. The meaning is that only one state exists in the present, flowing into the past. This seed, the subsequent thought immediately arises. Moment by moment, constantly in the present, so it is impermanent, but cause and effect are not severed.

The following is the fifth challenge.

Treatise: If the cause is in the existing position, and the effect is in the future, then who can escape the assertions of annihilation and permanence?

Statement: An outsider challenges: If a seed, when it has an effect in the present, the subsequent effect has not yet arisen. The effect-dharma (果法) in the future, its essence is emptiness. It is impossible to determine the fruit it will produce.

This statement, what is the cause a cause of? There is no effect to belong to, so the cause cannot be determined to produce that effect. Conversely, asking about the effect is the same. The present as the cause, there is no effect; the present as the effect, there is no cause. Since cause and effect do not exist, who can escape the assertions of annihilation and permanence? Initially, it was only a challenge to annihilation, now it is also a challenge to permanence.

Treatise: If when the cause exists, the effect already exists in the future, then what is the use of the cause? And how can one escape the assertions of annihilation and permanence?

Statement: The debater challenges the other party in return; this is the sixth response. Because the other party's school believes that the future effect exists. The essence of the effect already exists in the future. When the present is the cause, the effect already exists first. The effect already exists first, what is there to wait for the cause to do? If the effect originally has nothing to wait for, what is the use of the cause's existence? The effect already exists first, what is there to wait for the cause to do? It can be measured in this way: the future effect-dharma (果法) should not wait for the cause, because its essence already exists. Just like a fruit that has already been produced. The meaning of the cause is originally to produce the effect.

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果有不待于因。因義不成。有果義亦應無　量云。所言果法。應非是果。以先有體故。由如於因　汝所言因。應不是因。先有體故。猶如於果　無因．無果豈離斷．常　言我不離。汝豈離耶　初隨返質唯難於常。今隨雙難亦破于斷。

論。因果義成至非預我宗。

述曰。此即第七外人解質。未來因果雖先有體。名因果時。要依作用不依于體。未有作用名未來。正有作用名現在。作用已息名過去。現有因用果用未生。因義既成果義便立。故所詰難非預我宗　預者。關也。

論。體既本有至亦本有故。

述曰。此第八論主難。體既本有用亦應然。以體．用無別故　量云。所計作用。未來應有。不離體故。猶如於體　所計體法。應未來無。即是用故。亦如作用　汝去來法。應是無為許有法體無作用故。如無為法　又相未相法。應是無為。許有法體非相遷故。如無為法　設彼救前難言未來用．體雖皆具有。緣不合故。用不起者　應難彼云。既言諸法本來皆有。所待之緣亦應本有。緣既許本有。未來應起用　量云。未來一切法。用應常起。因緣具故。如現在法。若言緣等或未來無。即非未來有一切法。又說未來有生相用。過去說有與果用者。過．未有用應名現在　彼救不然。今言用者。謂取．與用　難

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 如果結果不需要依賴於因（hetu），那麼因的意義就無法成立，結果的意義也應該不存在。 量（pramāṇa）認為：你所說的果法（phala-dharma），應該不是真正的果，因為它已經預先存在實體（sat-kāya）了，就像因一樣。 你所說的因，應該不是真正的因，因為它已經預先存在實體了，就像果一樣。 沒有因，沒有果，難道不是脫離了斷見（uccheda-dṛṣṭi）和常見（śāśvata-dṛṣṭi）嗎？ 你說你沒有脫離，那你難道脫離了嗎？ 最初的隨返質難（prasajyāpādana）只是針對常見，現在隨雙難（ubhaya-saṅkaṭa）也破斥了斷見。

論：因果的意義成立，所以這些詰難不關我們的宗義。

述曰：這是第七個外道（tīrthika）的解釋和辯解。未來的因果雖然預先存在實體，但在稱之為因果時，是依據作用（kriyā）而不是依據實體。沒有作用時稱為未來，正在發生作用時稱為現在，作用已經停止時稱為過去。現在有因的作用，果的作用尚未產生，因的意義成立，果的意義也就成立了。所以你所詰難的，不關我們的宗義。預，是關涉的意思。

論：實體既然本來就存在，那麼作用也應該本來就存在。

述曰：這是第八個論主的詰難。實體既然本來就存在，那麼作用也應該如此，因為實體和作用沒有區別。 量認為：你所認為的作用，未來應該存在，因為它不離實體，就像實體一樣。 你所認為的實體，未來應該不存在，因為它就是作用，也像作用一樣。 你所說的過去和未來的法，應該是無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma），因為你允許有法的實體而沒有作用，就像無為法一樣。 此外，相（lakṣaṇa）和未相（alakṣaṇa）的法，應該是無為法，因為你允許有法的實體而不是相的遷變，就像無為法一樣。 假設對方爲了避免之前的詰難而說，未來的作用和實體雖然都具有，但因為緣（pratyaya）不聚合，所以作用不起。 應該詰難對方說：既然說諸法本來都存在，那麼所依賴的緣也應該本來就存在。緣既然允許本來就存在，未來就應該起作用。 量認為：未來的一切法，作用應該經常生起，因為因緣具足，就像現在的法一樣。如果說緣等或許未來不存在，那就不是未來有一切法了。又說未來有生相（jāti-lakṣaṇa）的作用，過去說有給予果的作用，過去和未來的作用應該稱為現在。 對方的辯解是不成立的。現在說作用，是指取和給予的作用。 難

【English Translation】 English version If a result does not depend on a cause (hetu), then the meaning of cause cannot be established, and the meaning of result should also not exist. Pramāṇa (means of valid cognition) argues: What you call 'result-dharma' (phala-dharma) should not be a true result, because it already has an existing entity (sat-kāya), just like a cause. What you call 'cause' should not be a true cause, because it already has an existing entity, just like a result. Without cause and without result, isn't that deviating from annihilationism (uccheda-dṛṣṭi) and eternalism (śāśvata-dṛṣṭi)? You say you are not deviating, but are you deviating or not? The initial prasajyāpādana (reductio ad absurdum) only targets eternalism, now the ubhaya-saṅkaṭa (double bind) also refutes annihilationism.

Treatise: The meaning of cause and result is established, so these challenges are not relevant to our doctrine.

Commentary: This is the seventh explanation and defense from an outsider (tīrthika). Although future cause and result pre-exist as entities, when they are called cause and result, it is based on function (kriyā) rather than on entity. When there is no function, it is called future; when function is occurring, it is called present; when function has ceased, it is called past. Now there is the function of the cause, and the function of the result has not yet arisen; the meaning of cause is established, and the meaning of result is also established. Therefore, what you challenge is not relevant to our doctrine. 'Pre' means related.

Treatise: Since the entity inherently exists, then the function should also inherently exist.

Commentary: This is the eighth challenge from the treatise master. Since the entity inherently exists, then the function should also be so, because there is no difference between entity and function. Pramāṇa argues: What you consider as function should exist in the future, because it is inseparable from the entity, just like the entity. What you consider as entity should not exist in the future, because it is the function, just like the function. The past and future dharmas you speak of should be unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta-dharma), because you allow the entity of the dharma to exist without function, just like unconditioned dharmas. Furthermore, dharmas with characteristics (lakṣaṇa) and without characteristics (alakṣaṇa) should be unconditioned dharmas, because you allow the entity of the dharma to exist without the change of characteristics, just like unconditioned dharmas. Suppose the opponent, in order to avoid the previous challenge, says that although future function and entity both exist, function does not arise because the conditions (pratyaya) are not assembled. One should challenge the opponent by saying: Since you say that all dharmas inherently exist, then the conditions on which they depend should also inherently exist. Since you allow the conditions to inherently exist, function should arise in the future. Pramāṇa argues: The function of all future dharmas should constantly arise, because the causes and conditions are complete, just like present dharmas. If you say that conditions, etc., perhaps do not exist in the future, then it is not the case that all dharmas exist in the future. Furthermore, saying that the future has the function of origination (jāti-lakṣaṇa), and saying that the past has the function of giving the result, the functions of the past and future should be called present. The opponent's defense is not established. Now, when we speak of function, we are referring to the function of taking and giving. Challenge

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云。等無間緣過去取果婆沙正說。即應過去有半作用。有取果用故。又言未來世有三法作用。光明．生相．及苦法忍。婆沙正文。應名現在　彼與果用滅覆滅失。取果之用生復生過。若言與果但是功能非謂作用。即阿羅漢末後之心。應不名現在。無取果用故。又若此心。初無作用應名已滅。如何后時更復言滅。又彼功能。改名作用。而復何異　若言非是無學末心不能取果。彼后念緣闕故。果不生者。此亦非理違汝宗故。汝說後心非無間緣故。廣如婆沙第十文說。終心後果既定不生。如何定知現在之法有能生用　若言後果若緣不闕。定從此生者。因既緣不闕故有作用。何不能生果。若因不能生果。即是無用故。

論。由斯汝義至緣起正理。

述曰。第九曲結申正義也。

論。謂此正理至皆假施設。

述曰。自下申其正義。今明諸法自相離言。離言所以如前已說。所有因果。及余法言皆假施設　此是立宗。

論。觀現在法至對說現因。

述曰。謂大乘中唯有現法。觀此現法有能引生當果之用　當果雖無。而現在法上有引彼用。用者功能。行者尋見現法之上有此功用。觀此法果。遂心變作未來之相。此似未來實是現在。即假說此所變未來名為當果。對此假當有之果。而說現在法為因　

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：云：如果按照《阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論》（Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra）所說，等無間緣（samanantarapratyaya，意為「等無間緣」）過去之後才能取果，那麼過去法應該有部分作用，因為它有取果的作用。又說未來世有三種法的作用：光明、生相和苦法忍。如果按照《阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論》的原文，這些應該被稱為現在法，因為它們與取果的作用同時生滅。如果說與果的作用只是功能而不是作用，那麼阿羅漢（arhat，意為「阿羅漢」）的最後之心就不應該被稱為現在，因為它沒有取果的作用。而且，如果這個心最初沒有作用，就應該被認為是已經滅了，怎麼能在之後又說它滅了呢？又或者，把功能改名為作用，又有什麼區別呢？如果說不是無學（aśaikṣa，意為「無學」）的最後之心不能取果，因為它的后念緣闕，果不生，這也是不合理的，因為這違反了你的宗義。你說後心不是無間緣，這在《阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論》第十卷中有詳細說明。既然最後之心的後果已經確定不會產生，又怎麼能確定現在之法有能生的作用呢？如果說後果如果緣不闕，一定從此產生，那麼因既然緣不闕，所以有作用，為什麼不能生果呢？如果因不能生果，那就是無用的。 論：因此，你的觀點違背了緣起（pratītyasamutpāda，意為「緣起」）的正理。 述曰：第九次總結，闡述正義。 論：所謂正理，是指一切法皆是假施設。 述曰：下面闡述其正義。現在說明諸法的自相是離言的，離言的原因如前所述。所有的因果以及其他法的言說，都是假施設。這是立宗。 論：觀察現在法，是爲了說明現在的因。 述曰：所謂大乘（mahāyāna，意為「大乘」）中只有現在法，觀察這個現在法有能引生當來果的作用。當來果雖然沒有，但是現在法上有引生它的作用。作用就是功能。修行者尋見現在法上有這種功用，觀察這個法果，於是心變作出未來的相。這個看似未來，實際上是現在。就假說這個所變的未來，名為當來果。針對這個假當有的果，而說現在法為因。

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, according to the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra, if the immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya) must pass before a result is obtained, then the past dharma should have some function, because it has the function of obtaining the result. It is also said that there are three functions of future dharmas: luminosity, the characteristic of arising, and the forbearance of suffering-dharma. According to the original text of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra, these should be called present dharmas, because they arise and cease simultaneously with the function of obtaining the result. If it is said that the function of giving the result is only a potential and not an actual function, then the final thought of an Arhat (arhat) should not be called present, because it has no function of obtaining the result. Moreover, if this thought initially has no function, it should be considered to have already ceased; how can it be said to cease again later? Or, what is the difference between renaming a potential as a function? If it is said that it is not the final thought of a non-learner (aśaikṣa) that cannot obtain the result, because its subsequent condition is deficient and the result does not arise, this is also unreasonable, because it contradicts your own doctrine. You say that the subsequent thought is not an immediately preceding condition, as explained in detail in the tenth chapter of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra. Since the consequence of the final thought is determined not to arise, how can it be determined that the present dharma has the function of producing? Treatise: Therefore, your view contradicts the correct principle of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Commentary: The ninth summary elaborates on the correct meaning. Treatise: The so-called correct principle is that all dharmas are provisional designations. Commentary: The following elaborates on its correct meaning. Now it is explained that the self-nature of all dharmas is beyond words, and the reason for being beyond words has been explained earlier. All causes and effects, as well as other dharma-words, are provisional designations. This is establishing the thesis. Treatise: Observing the present dharma is to explain the present cause. Commentary: In Mahayana (mahāyāna), there is only the present dharma. Observing this present dharma has the function of leading to the future result. Although the future result does not exist, the present dharma has the function of leading to it. The function is the potential. The practitioner finds that the present dharma has this function, and observing this dharma-result, the mind transforms and creates the appearance of the future. This seems like the future, but it is actually the present. So, this transformed future is provisionally called the future result. In response to this provisionally existing result, the present dharma is said to be the cause.

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此未來果。即觀現法功能而假變也。

論。觀現在法至對說現果。

述曰。其因亦爾。觀此現法有酬前之相。即熟變相等。觀此所從生處。而心變為過去。實非過去而是現在。假說所變為現法因。對此假曾有過去因。而說現在為果。

論。假謂現識似彼相現。

述曰。何者為假。識緣於此現法。之時。尋所從生說之為因。說現為果。尋現世法。及所生法。變似未來之相。現名為因。未來為果。故言假也。而實所觀之法。非因。非不因。非果。非不果。且如於因。性離言故非定是因。有功能故非定不因。果亦如是。

論。如是因果至應順修學。

述曰。此結勸學。即第十文。有因故非常。有果故非斷。故離二邊契會中道。勸諸智者應順修學。此答於前生滅分位法也　中道者。無漏真智之異名也。以理合智故名契道。如下自解　此性離言。假說曾．當名為因果。非謂實有。此即無有二邊之過。除遍計所執。說依他性有故。言非因．非不因等　因此總敘大乘真義。法唯現在。識變有三世　諸義不同如瑜伽論五十一卷．六十九卷．顯揚第十．對法第三．中邊第一。皆說三世依種子立。約曾．當義說其世也　六十六卷．對法第四．及第十三．薩遮尼乾子經。皆說有六通三乘差別。宿命智緣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這種未來的結果，是觀察現在的法的功能而假立轉變的。

論：觀察現在的法，乃至（佛）對（弟子）說現在的果報。

述記：其原因也是這樣。觀察這現在的法有酬報前因的表相，即成熟變化等等。觀察這（法）所從生的地方，而心轉變為過去（的認識）。實際上並非過去而是現在，假說所轉變的是現在法的因。對此假立曾有的過去因，而說現在為果。

論：假立是指現在的識，相似於那個（過去）相的顯現。

述記：什麼是假立呢？識緣于這現在的法的時候，尋找（此法）所從生之處，說它是因，說現在是果。尋找現世的法，以及所生的法，轉變相似於未來的相，顯現（此未來之相）名為因，未來為果。所以說是假立。而實際上所觀察的法，非因，非非因，非果，非非果。且如對於因，（因為）自性離於言說，所以不能確定是因；（因為）有功能，所以不能確定不是因。果也是這樣。

論：像這樣因果的道理，應該順應（佛法）修行學習。

述記：這是總結勸學，即第十段文字。因為有因，所以不是常；因為有果，所以不是斷。所以遠離二邊，契合中道。勸告各位智者應該順應（佛法）修行學習。這是回答前面關於生滅分位法的問題。中道，是無漏真智的別名。因為理與智相合，所以名為契道，如下文自己解釋。這（因果）自性離於言說，假說曾經、將來的（狀態）名為因果，不是說真實存在。這就是沒有二邊的過失。去除遍計所執（parikalpita，遍計所執性），說依他性（paratantra，依他起性）有，所以說非因、非非因等等。因此總述大乘真義，法唯有現在，識的轉變有三世。各種意義的不同，如《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷、第六十九卷，《顯揚聖教論》第十，《對法論》第三，《中邊分別論》第一。都說三世依種子而立，依據曾經、將來的意義來說明它的世。第六十六卷、《對法論》第四以及第十三、《薩遮尼乾子經》，都說有六通（sadabhijna，六神通），三乘（triyana，三乘）的差別，宿命智（purvanivasanusmrti-jnana，宿命智）緣（過去）。

【English Translation】 English version: This future result is a provisional transformation based on observing the function of the present dharma (phenomena, law).

Treatise: Observing the present dharma, up to (the Buddha) speaking to (disciples) about the present result.

Commentary: The cause is also like this. Observing this present dharma has the appearance of repaying previous causes, such as maturation and change. Observing the place from which this (dharma) arises, the mind transforms into a past (cognition). In reality, it is not the past but the present; it is provisionally said that what is transformed is the cause of the present dharma. Regarding this provisional past cause, the present is said to be the result.

Treatise: Provisional means that the present consciousness appears similar to that (past) appearance.

Commentary: What is provisional? When consciousness cognizes this present dharma, seeking the place from which (this dharma) arises, it is said to be the cause, and the present is said to be the result. Seeking the present dharma and the dharma that arises, transforming to resemble the future appearance, the appearance (of this future appearance) is called the cause, and the future is the result. Therefore, it is said to be provisional. In reality, the dharma that is observed is neither a cause nor a non-cause, neither a result nor a non-result. For example, regarding the cause, (because) its nature is apart from words, it cannot be determined to be a cause; (because) it has function, it cannot be determined not to be a cause. The result is also like this.

Treatise: Like this principle of cause and result, one should accord with (the Dharma) to cultivate and learn.

Commentary: This is a concluding exhortation to learn, which is the tenth passage. Because there is a cause, it is not permanent; because there is a result, it is not annihilation. Therefore, it is apart from the two extremes, and it accords with the Middle Way (madhyama-pratipad, 中道). It exhorts all wise people to accord with (the Dharma) to cultivate and learn. This is the answer to the previous question about the dharma of the divisions of arising and ceasing. The Middle Way is another name for un-outflowed true wisdom. Because principle and wisdom accord with each other, it is called according with the Way, as the following text explains itself. This (cause and result) nature is apart from words; provisionally speaking of the past and future (states) as cause and result, it is not saying that they truly exist. This is without the fault of the two extremes. Removing the imagined nature (parikalpita, 遍計所執性), it is said that the dependent nature (paratantra, 依他起性) exists, so it is said to be neither a cause nor a non-cause, etc. Therefore, it generally describes the true meaning of Mahayana (mahayana, 大乘), the dharma is only present, and the transformation of consciousness has three times. The differences in various meanings are as in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) , volumes 51 and 69, the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations (顯揚聖教論) , volume 10, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論) , volume 3, and the Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya (中邊分別論) , volume 1. All say that the three times are established based on seeds, and they explain its time based on the meaning of past and future. Volume 66, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論) , volumes 4 and 13, and the Satyakanirgrantha Sutra (薩遮尼乾子經) , all say that there are six superknowledges (sadabhijna, 六神通), the differences of the Three Vehicles (triyana, 三乘), and the knowledge of previous existences (purvanivasanusmrti-jnana, 宿命智) cognizes (the past).

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過去。生死智緣未來。他心．漏盡緣現在。三世等雖非種子亦有三世　今於此中。復約識變曾．當因果以說去．來　諸經論說雖多不同。總束而言莫過三種　一道理三世。即依種子曾．當義。說有去．來世。當有名未來。曾有名過去。現有名現在。于現法上義說三故　二依神通。其智生時法爾皆有如此功力。由異生．聖者功能各殊。既非妄心所見皆實。但由智力。非是妄識之所變也。前第二說。由澄凈故亦現彼影。由多修習此去．來法。法爾能現隨其勢分多少時節。理實能緣。及所緣法唯在現在　三依唯識。此義雖通。然前二外別有異體。多分分別妄心所變。似去．來相。實唯現在　此中論文。法體離言但唯有識　或復更釋。雖有唯識．道理二種無別神通。恐濫妄緣故分三種。

約此三義解諸違文。皆並攝入此所會義。余不過此。設立四減三皆為妄說。今猶未盡。此中所明粗陳梗概。如別抄中廣引誠說。

論。有餘部說至恒相續義。

述曰。自下第二。其上座部於此起救　于中有三。一總立宗。二出所以。三結救意。此即初也。此中亦同勝軍論師種子等法前果后因俱時而生。彼謂因果恐有斷過。被他如先有因時無果等難已。復以大乘。假說現在之三相用不同時起。前法至生后法未起。至住之時後法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 過去、未來和現在三種時間狀態的智慧之緣起（生死智緣未來），以及他心通（他心）和漏盡通（漏盡緣）的緣起都屬於現在。雖然三世（三世）本身不是種子，但也具有三世的特性。現在在這裡，進一步根據識的變現，從曾有和當有的因果關係來解釋過去和未來。各種經論的說法雖然很多且不同，但總的來說不超過三種： 第一種是道理上的三世，即依據種子的曾有和當有之義，來說明有過去和未來世。當有名為未來，曾有名為過去，現在名為現在。這是在現法的基礎上，從義理上說明三世。 第二種是依據神通。當智慧產生時，自然具有這樣的功力。由於凡夫（異生）和聖者的功能各不相同，雖然不是虛妄心所見，但都是真實的。只是憑藉智慧的力量，而不是虛妄意識的變現。前面第二種說法，由於澄凈的緣故，也能顯現彼方的影像。通過多次修習這種過去和未來的法，自然能夠顯現，並根據其勢力的多少和時節因緣。但實際上，所能緣和所緣的法都只存在於現在。 第三種是依據唯識。這種意義雖然普遍，但在前兩種之外，還有不同的本體。大部分是分別妄心所變現的，看起來像是過去和未來的相狀，但實際上都只是現在。 這裡的論文說，法的本體是無法用語言表達的，只是唯有識的存在。 或者進一步解釋，雖然有唯識和道理兩種，但沒有神通的差別。只是爲了避免與虛妄的緣起相混淆，所以分為三種。 根據這三種意義來解釋各種相互矛盾的經文，都可以歸納到這裡所會通的意義中。其餘的都不能超出這個範圍。設立四減三等說法都是虛妄的。現在還沒有完全說完，這裡所闡明的只是粗略的梗概。詳細的說明可以參考其他的抄本，其中廣泛引用了可靠的說法。 論：有其餘部派說到恒常相續的意義。 述記：下面是第二部分，上座部（上座部）對此提出了反駁。其中有三點：一是總的立宗，二是說明理由，三是總結反駁的意圖。這裡是第一點。這裡也和勝軍論師（勝軍論師）的觀點相同，認為種子等法的前果后因是同時產生的。他們認為，如果因果不同時，恐怕會有斷滅的過失。在被他人用『先前有因時沒有果』等問題責難后，又用大乘的觀點，假設現在的三種相用不是同時生起的。前法已經生起，后法還沒有生起，到安住的時候后法

【English Translation】 English version: The causal conditions of wisdom regarding the past, future, and present (生死智緣未來), as well as the causal conditions of telepathy (他心) and the extinction of outflows (漏盡緣), all belong to the present. Although the three times (三世) themselves are not seeds, they also possess the characteristics of the three times. Now, here, further explain the past and future based on the transformation of consciousness, from the causal relationship of what has been and what will be. Although there are many different statements in various sutras and treatises, in general, they do not exceed three types: The first is the three times in terms of principle, that is, based on the meaning of the seed's having been and being about to be, to explain that there are past and future lives. What is about to be is called the future, what has been is called the past, and what is now is called the present. This is to explain the three times from the perspective of principle, based on the present dharma. The second is based on supernormal powers. When wisdom arises, it naturally has such power. Because the functions of ordinary beings (異生) and sages are different, although they are not seen by deluded minds, they are all real. It is only by the power of wisdom, not by the transformation of deluded consciousness. The second statement earlier said that because of purity, it can also manifest the image of the other side. By repeatedly practicing this dharma of the past and future, it can naturally manifest, and according to the amount of its power and the timing. But in reality, the objects that can be cognized and the objects that are cognized only exist in the present. The third is based on Consciousness-only (唯識). Although this meaning is universal, there is a different entity besides the previous two. Most of them are transformed by the discriminating deluded mind, appearing like the appearances of the past and future, but in reality, they are all only the present. The essay here says that the essence of the dharma cannot be expressed in words, but only the existence of consciousness. Or further explain that although there are two types, Consciousness-only and principle, there is no difference in supernormal powers. It is only to avoid confusion with deluded arising, so it is divided into three types. According to these three meanings, to explain the various contradictory scriptures, they can all be summarized into the meaning that is understood here. The rest cannot exceed this range. Establishing four subtractions and three, etc., are all false statements. It is not completely finished yet, what is explained here is only a rough outline. For detailed explanations, please refer to other copies, which widely cite reliable statements. Treatise: Some other schools talk about the meaning of constant continuity. Commentary: The following is the second part, the Theravada school (上座部) raised a rebuttal to this. There are three points: first, the general establishment of the doctrine; second, the explanation of the reasons; and third, the summary of the intention of the rebuttal. This is the first point. Here, it is also the same as the view of Master Shengjun (勝軍論師), who believes that the previous effect and the subsequent cause of the seed and other dharmas arise simultaneously. They believe that if the cause and effect are not simultaneous, there may be the fault of annihilation. After being blamed by others with questions such as 'when there was a cause before, there was no effect', they used the Mahayana point of view to assume that the three aspects of the present do not arise simultaneously. The previous dharma has arisen, the subsequent dharma has not yet arisen, and when it comes to abiding, the subsequent dharma

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未生。至異之時後果方生。恐因果斷故。此之義意同此中破　又有二趣並生過故。前人等趣至異之時。後天等趣已至生故　彼言以是次生時勝。前法變異無多力能。但名一趣。隨所當生彼得趣名。非於前趣故無此過者。不然。阿賴耶識分二趣故。及違此文。勝軍論師雖有此義云立亦得。然自不遵。亦無章疏現行於世。

論。謂現在法至生滅二時。

述曰。下出法體有三。一直顯。上座等云。色法遲鈍有三相用時經一世。謂生．住．滅。更無異時。心法迅速但有二時。謂生．及滅。此二相即法辨。離法無別體。然俱現在。彼無過．未故　此中且舉心．心所法為論。故言極迅速者猶有二時。

論。生時酬因至而體是一。

述曰。下顯因果不斷之義。二於一法辨　法生時酬因。即后法為果。在現在法滅時引果。即前法為因。在現在。此是二法為二時　今此所論。即一法體生時為果。滅時為因。為果之時與前法俱。為因之時與后法並。此是一法。然現在二時。前後位別故。此之二時俱現在有。時雖有二前後位別。而體是一。無別法體。即於一法而辨二時。為因為果。

論。前因正滅至而俱是有。

述曰。三於二法辨。前因正滅後果正生。此二法辨相接不斷。因滅果生二俱現在故　體相雖

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 未生（指尚未產生的果報）。如果到了異時（不同的時間）後果才產生，恐怕因果會斷滅。這個意思和前面破斥的觀點相同。另外，還會出現二趣並生的過失。因為前人等趣（指前一類眾生）到達異時的時候，後天等趣（指后一類眾生）已經出生了。他們說，這是因為次生時（下一個生命產生時）的力量更強大，前法（之前的法）變異沒有足夠的力量，只能算作一趣（一種生命形式）。隨著所應當出生的狀態，他們獲得了趣名（生命形式的名稱），而不是之前的趣，所以沒有這個過失。但這種說法不對。因為阿賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識）可以分為二趣。而且也違反了經文。勝軍論師（Śūrasena）雖然有這個觀點，認為可以成立，但他自己並不遵循，也沒有相關的章疏流傳於世。

論：所謂的現在法，有生和滅兩個時間。

述曰：下面闡述法體的存在，分為三個方面。一是直接顯示。上座部（Sthavira nikāya）等認為，色法（rūpa，物質現象）遲鈍，有生、住、滅三個相用，經歷一個世（kalpa，時間單位）。沒有其他的時間。心法（citta，精神現象）迅速，只有生和滅兩個時間。這兩個相就是法（dharma，事物或規律）的體性，離開法沒有其他的體。但都是現在。因為他們沒有過去和未來。這裡暫且以心、心所法（caitta，心理活動）為例進行討論。所以說即使是極迅速的法，也有兩個時間。

論：生時酬因，體是一。

述曰：下面闡述因果不斷滅的含義。二是在一個法上進行辨析。法產生的時候酬因，即后法是果。在現在法滅的時候引果，即前法是因，也在現在。這是兩個法，對應兩個時間。現在這裡所討論的，即一個法體，生的時候是果，滅的時候是因。作為果的時候與前法同時，作為因的時候與后法並存。這是一個法，但現在有兩個時間，前後位置不同。這兩個時間都是現在存在的。時間雖然有兩個，前後位置不同，但體性是一個。沒有其他的法體。即在一個法上辨析兩個時間，作為因和果。

論：前因正滅，至而俱是有。

述曰：三是在兩個法上進行辨析。前因（hetu，原因）正在滅，後果（phala，結果）正在生。這兩個法辨析相接不斷。因滅果生，兩個都是現在存在的。體相雖然不同。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Not yet born.' If the consequence only arises at a different time, there is a fear that cause and effect will be severed. This meaning is the same as the refutation in the previous section. Furthermore, there is the fault of two destinies arising simultaneously. This is because when the previous beings, etc., reach a different time, the later beings, etc., have already been born. They say that this is because the power of the next birth is greater. The previous dharma (phenomena) changes and does not have enough power, so it can only be considered one destiny. According to what should be born, they obtain the name of destiny, not the previous destiny, so there is no fault. But this statement is incorrect. Because the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) can be divided into two destinies. And it also violates the scriptures. Although Śūrasena (a commentator) has this view and thinks it can be established, he himself does not follow it, and there are no related commentaries circulating in the world.

Treatise: The so-called present dharma (phenomena) has two times: arising and ceasing.

Commentary: The following explains the existence of dharma-essence in three aspects. First, it is directly shown. The Sthavira nikāya (Theravada school), etc., believes that rūpa (form, material phenomena) is slow and has three characteristics: arising, abiding, and ceasing, experiencing one kalpa (aeon). There is no other time. Citta (mind, mental phenomena) is rapid and only has two times: arising and ceasing. These two characteristics are the nature of dharma, and there is no other entity apart from dharma. But they are all present. Because they have no past and future. Here, we will temporarily take citta (mind) and caitta (mental activities) as examples for discussion. Therefore, it is said that even the extremely rapid dharma has two times.

Treatise: When arising, it repays the cause, and the essence is one.

Commentary: The following explains the meaning of the non-cessation of cause and effect. Second, it is analyzed on one dharma. When a dharma arises, it repays the cause, that is, the subsequent dharma is the result. When the present dharma ceases, it leads to the result, that is, the previous dharma is the cause, which is also in the present. These are two dharmas, corresponding to two times. What is being discussed here is that one dharma-essence, when arising, is the result, and when ceasing, is the cause. When it is the result, it exists simultaneously with the previous dharma, and when it is the cause, it coexists with the subsequent dharma. This is one dharma, but now there are two times, with different positions before and after. These two times both exist in the present. Although there are two times, with different positions before and after, the essence is one. There is no other dharma-essence. That is, analyzing two times on one dharma, as cause and result.

Treatise: The previous cause is ceasing, and they both exist.

Commentary: Third, it is analyzed on two dharmas. The previous hetu (cause) is ceasing, and the subsequent phala (result) is arising. The analysis of these two dharmas is continuous. The cause ceases and the result arises, and both exist in the present. Although the essence and characteristics are different.

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殊。因．果二法故　而俱是有。並現在世同時有故。

論。如是因果至舍此信余。

述曰。此總結也雖無去．來足為因果。非同餘部薩婆多等立有過．未。虛妄計度法增常過。不同大乘是假施設法減斷過。既離斷常過。又無前諸難。謂難有部。果既本有何待前因。難大乘雲。因是誰因。果誰果等。既無諸失。誰有智者舍此勝義。而信于余不了義耶。

論。彼有虛言至而有二時。

述曰。下破有七。今總非云彼虛言等　何容一念而有二時。此第一難。念者剎那之異名。時者生滅之兩位。剎那迅速即有前後。極微至小應有二分。

論。生滅相違寧同現在。

述曰。此第二難。義意可知。

已下徴滅。

論。滅若現在生應未來。

述曰。此難令同薩婆多等。以滅現在。生未來故。生滅二法定不俱時。相違法故。如明闇等。

論。有故名生至寧非過去。

述曰。此令同大乘。滅是過去故。

彼若救言。誰言于滅滅即是無。同薩婆多滅體是有。今難之云。

論。滅若非無生應非有。

述曰。以生違滅。滅即非無。以滅違生。生應非有。生既不成無。滅體如何有。滅若現在非無。生應現在非有。

論。生既現有滅應現無。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 殊勝之處在於，因（hetu）和果（phala）這兩種法，都是真實存在的。並且在現在的世間同時存在。

論：像這樣因果的道理，誰有智慧會捨棄它而去相信其他的呢？

述曰：這是總結。即使沒有過去（atīta）和未來（anāgata），也足以構成因果。這不同於有部（Sarvāstivāda）等宗派，他們認為過去和未來是真實存在的，虛妄地計度法會增長或恒常的過失。也不同於大乘（Mahāyāna），認為法是假施設，會有減損或斷滅的過失。既然遠離了斷滅和恒常的過失，又沒有前面所說的那些難題，例如，有部被質問：如果果本來就存在，那還需要什麼前因？大乘被質問：因是誰的因？果是誰的果？既然沒有這些過失，那麼誰有智慧會捨棄這種殊勝的真義，而去相信那些不了義的說法呢？

論：他們有虛妄的言論，怎麼能說一念之中會有兩個時間呢？

述曰：下面破斥有部的七種觀點。現在總的否定他們，說他們的虛妄言論等。怎麼能說一念（kṣaṇa）之中會有兩個時間（kāla）呢？這是第一個難題。念，是剎那的另一種說法。時，是生滅的兩個階段。剎那非常迅速，所以有前後。極微細小的事物也應該有兩個部分。

論：生（utpāda）和滅（nirodha）相互違背，怎麼能同時存在於現在呢？

述曰：這是第二個難題。意思很明顯。

以下是針對滅的質問。

論：如果滅是現在，那麼生應該是未來。

述曰：這是爲了讓他們和薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）一樣。因為滅是現在，生是未來，所以生滅兩種法一定不能同時存在，因為它們相互違背，就像光明和黑暗一樣。

論：因為存在所以叫做生，滅不是過去又是什麼呢？

述曰：這是爲了讓他們和大乘一樣，認為滅是過去。

如果他們辯解說：誰說滅的滅就是沒有呢？和薩婆多部一樣，滅的本體是存在的。現在反駁他們說：

論：如果滅不是沒有，那麼生應該不是有。

述曰：因為生和滅相反，滅就不是沒有。因為滅和生相反，生應該不是有。生既然不能成立為沒有，那麼滅的本體怎麼能是有呢？如果滅是現在而不是沒有，那麼生應該是現在而不是有。

論：生既然是現在有，那麼滅應該是現在無。

【English Translation】 English version The special thing is that both hetu (cause) and phala (effect) are real. And they exist simultaneously in the present world.

Treatise: Like this principle of cause and effect, who with wisdom would abandon it and believe in others?

Commentary: This is a summary. Even without the past (atīta) and the future (anāgata), it is enough to constitute cause and effect. This is different from the Sarvāstivāda school, etc., which believe that the past and the future are real, and falsely measure that the Dharma will increase or have the fault of being constant. It is also different from the Mahāyāna, which believes that the Dharma is a false establishment and will have the fault of diminishing or being cut off. Since it is far away from the faults of annihilation and constancy, and there are no previous problems, for example, the Sarvāstivāda is questioned: If the effect originally exists, then what previous cause is needed? The Mahāyāna is questioned: Whose cause is the cause? Whose effect is the effect? Since there are no such faults, then who with wisdom would abandon this superior true meaning and believe in those unclear meanings?

Treatise: They have false words, how can they say that there are two times in one thought?

Commentary: Below are the seven views refuting the Sarvāstivāda. Now, generally deny them, saying their false words, etc. How can there be two times (kāla) in one thought (kṣaṇa)? This is the first difficulty. Thought is another way of saying kṣaṇa. Time is the two stages of arising and ceasing. Kṣaṇa is very fast, so there is before and after. Extremely small things should also have two parts.

Treatise: Arising (utpāda) and ceasing (nirodha) contradict each other, how can they exist in the present at the same time?

Commentary: This is the second difficulty. The meaning is obvious.

The following are questions about cessation.

Treatise: If cessation is present, then arising should be future.

Commentary: This is to make them the same as the Sarvāstivāda school. Because cessation is present and arising is future, the two dharmas of arising and ceasing must not exist at the same time, because they contradict each other, like light and darkness.

Treatise: Because it exists, it is called arising, what else is cessation if it is not the past?

Commentary: This is to make them the same as the Mahāyāna, thinking that cessation is the past.

If they argue: Who said that the cessation of cessation is nothing? Like the Sarvāstivāda, the substance of cessation exists. Now refute them:

Treatise: If cessation is not nothing, then arising should not be something.

Commentary: Because arising and ceasing are opposite, cessation is not nothing. Because cessation and arising are opposite, arising should not be something. Since arising cannot be established as nothing, then how can the substance of cessation be something? If cessation is present and not nothing, then arising should be present and not something.

Treatise: Since arising is present, then cessation should be present and nothing.

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述曰。生既現在有。滅無應過去。令同大乘。生．滅二法定不俱世。相違法故。如解惑等。

論。又二相違至見有是事。

述曰。此立比量。又生與滅二法相違。如何同體。如苦．樂等不同一體　故。量云。生．滅二法。體應非一。以相違故。如苦．樂等　彼宗現在一法之上辨生．滅故。

論。生滅若一至寧體同說。

述曰。生滅若一。法生之時應即滅故。故無二時。生．滅若是異不應說體同。二若即者。此法滅時此法應生。即是生故。如生。二若異者。生體非滅體。以是異故。如苦．樂等。

論。故生滅時至理必不成。

述曰。生滅二時。俱在現在一世而有。雖復相違而體同者。理必不成。此總結破上座等訖。大乘生．滅。非定一法有．無異故。非定異法即生法滅。非別法滅故無有過。

論。經部師等至能持種故。

述曰。破諸部計。自下第三經部師等。既見上座被徴便曰。雖無去．來不同一切有。生．滅異世不同上座師。而色．心中諸功能用即名種子。前生后滅如大乘等。為因果性相續不斷甚為勝義　今破之言。理亦不成。彼不許有阿賴耶故。經部師等。等自類中。非唯一故。破之量云。經部所說持種色．心。不能持種。非第八故。如聲．電等　過．未無體．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：窺基法師述：既然『生』是現在有的，那麼『滅』就不應該發生在過去。爲了使他們（上座部）理解大乘的觀點，『生』和『滅』這兩種法，必定不能同時存在於一個世界中，因為它們在現象上是相互違背的，就像理解迷惑和產生迷惑一樣。

世親菩薩的《阿毗達磨俱舍論》：如果『生』和『滅』是相互違背的，那麼怎麼能認為它們是同一件事呢？

窺基法師述：這是建立一個比量。『生』和『滅』這兩種法是相互違背的，怎麼能是同一個本體呢？就像『苦』和『樂』等，不是同一個本體一樣。所以，可以建立一個量式：『生』和『滅』這兩種法，本體應該不是同一個，因為它們是相互違背的，就像『苦』和『樂』等。他們（上座部）認為在現在的一個法之上，既有『生』也有『滅』。

世親菩薩的《阿毗達磨俱舍論》：如果『生』和『滅』是同一個，那麼在法產生的時候就應該立即滅亡，所以不會有兩個時間。如果『生』和『滅』是不同的，就不應該說它們的本體相同。如果兩者是相同的，那麼這個法滅亡的時候，這個法就應該產生，因為它就是『生』。如果兩者是不同的，那麼『生』的本體就不是『滅』的本體，因為它們是不同的，就像『苦』和『樂』等。

世親菩薩的《阿毗達磨俱舍論》：所以，『生』和『滅』同時存在，這種道理必定不能成立。

窺基法師述：『生』和『滅』這兩個時間，都在現在這一世存在，雖然相互違背，但本體相同，這種道理必定不能成立。這是總結並破斥了上座部等的觀點。大乘的『生』和『滅』，不是固定在一個法上，因為有和無是不同的。也不是固定在不同的法上，因為生法滅亡，不是別的法滅亡，所以沒有過失。

世親菩薩的《阿毗達磨俱舍論》：經部師等認為，即使沒有過去和未來，也不同於一切有部（Sarvastivada），『生』和『滅』異於世，也不同於上座部。但在色（Rupa, 物質）和心（Citta, 精神）中，各種功能作用就叫做種子（Bija, seed）。前生后滅，就像大乘一樣，作為因果的性質相續不斷，是非常殊勝的意義。

窺基法師述：現在破斥他們的觀點，這種道理也不能成立。因為他們不承認有阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness）。經部師等，以及他們同類中的其他學派，不是唯一的。破斥他們的量式是：經部所說的能持種子的色和心，不能持種子，因為它不是第八識（阿賴耶識），就像聲音和閃電等。過去和未來沒有實體。

【English Translation】 English version: Master Kuiji states: Since 'birth' (Sheng) exists in the present, 'cessation' (Mie) should not occur in the past. To make them (the Sthavira school) understand the Mahayana viewpoint, the two dharmas of 'birth' and 'cessation' must not coexist in the same world, because they are contradictory in phenomena, just like understanding delusion and generating delusion.

Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosha-bhashya: If 'birth' and 'cessation' are contradictory, how can they be considered the same thing?

Master Kuiji states: This establishes a syllogism. The two dharmas of 'birth' and 'cessation' are contradictory, how can they be the same entity? Just like 'suffering' (Dukkha) and 'happiness' (Sukha) etc., are not the same entity. Therefore, a syllogism can be established: the two dharmas of 'birth' and 'cessation' should not be the same entity, because they are contradictory, just like 'suffering' and 'happiness' etc. They (the Sthavira school) believe that on the present one dharma, there is both 'birth' and 'cessation'.

Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosha-bhashya: If 'birth' and 'cessation' are the same, then when a dharma arises, it should immediately cease, so there would be no two times. If 'birth' and 'cessation' are different, it should not be said that their entities are the same. If the two are identical, then when this dharma ceases, this dharma should arise, because it is 'birth'. If the two are different, then the entity of 'birth' is not the entity of 'cessation', because they are different, just like 'suffering' and 'happiness' etc.

Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosha-bhashya: Therefore, the simultaneous existence of 'birth' and 'cessation' is necessarily untenable.

Master Kuiji states: The two times of 'birth' and 'cessation' both exist in the present lifetime, although they are contradictory, their entities are the same, this principle is necessarily untenable. This is a summary and refutation of the views of the Sthavira school etc. The Mahayana 'birth' and 'cessation' are not fixed on one dharma, because existence and non-existence are different. Nor are they fixed on different dharmas, because the cessation of the birth-dharma is not the cessation of another dharma, so there is no fault.

Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosha-bhashya: The Sautrantika school etc. believe that even without the past and future, it is different from the Sarvastivada (everything exists), 'birth' and 'cessation' are different from the world, and also different from the Sthavira school. But in form (Rupa) and mind (Citta), various functional operations are called seeds (Bija). The prior arising and subsequent cessation, like Mahayana, as the nature of cause and effect continuing uninterrupted, is a very supreme meaning.

Master Kuiji states: Now refuting their view, this principle is also untenable. Because they do not acknowledge the Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness). The Sautrantika school etc., and other schools within their category, are not unique. The syllogism to refute them is: the form and mind that the Sautrantika school says can hold seeds, cannot hold seeds, because it is not the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), just like sound and lightning etc. The past and future have no substance.

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及無本識。于無色界色久時斷。入無心時心久時滅。何法持種得為因果。因果既斷名為不然。彼不許有第八識故。

論。由此應信至緣起正理。

述曰。第三總結。有為諸法從緣而生名為緣起。勸彼應信大乘正理。

論。此識無始至當究竟舍。

述曰。此第八段。于中有二。初問。次答。此即問也。即解頌中第十句。第十門也　答中有二。初略舉頌答。后廣解之。

論。阿羅漢位方究竟舍。

述曰。此正舉頌總答問也。

論。謂諸聖者至名阿羅漢。

述曰。下廣答也　于中復二。初略釋。后廣釋。此即初也　謂諸聖者。即通三乘　斷煩惱障究竟盡者。彼位若是永害隨眠。皆在金剛心時斷已皆成阿羅漢果。三乘並然　若伏斷永不起此言斷者。即通八地已去。下有三師。此既總文亦為三釋　若據正義。唯初二釋順此論文。此據位全。除二乘金剛心。少故不說。八地菩薩隨應二釋　此中唯依斷煩惱障盡名阿羅漢。非據所知障。害煩惱賊故。非是縛故。又依除分段生以名無生。非所知障故。

其相如何。

論。爾時此識至說之為舍。

述曰。由於彼位此識之中煩惱粗重永遠離故說之為舍。非體亦無。此粗重言顯煩惱種。對法論等。說種子粗重故。雖煩惱

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：並且沒有根本識。在無色界長時間斷滅，進入無心定時心識長時間滅盡。那麼是什麼法能夠持有種子，從而形成因果呢？如果因果斷滅，就叫做不然（不成立）。他們不承認有第八識的緣故。

論：因此，應當相信緣起的正理。

述記：第三，總結。有為諸法從因緣而生，叫做緣起。勸他們應當相信大乘的正理。

論：此識無始以來，直到最終捨棄。

述記：這是第八段。其中有兩部分。首先是提問，然後是回答。這裡是提問。也就是解釋頌中的第十句，第十個門。回答中也有兩部分。首先是簡略地舉頌回答，然後是詳細地解釋。

論：在阿羅漢果位才能最終捨棄。

述記：這是正式地舉頌總括回答提問。

論：所謂聖者，直到稱為阿羅漢。

述記：下面是詳細的解釋。其中又分為兩部分。首先是簡略地解釋，然後是詳細地解釋。這裡是簡略的解釋。所謂聖者，是通於三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）。斷除煩惱障究竟清凈的人，那個果位如果是永遠斷除了隨眠煩惱，都在金剛心時斷除，都已經成就阿羅漢果。三乘都是這樣。如果只是伏斷，永遠不再生起，那麼這個『斷』字，就通於八地菩薩以上。下面有三師的解釋。這裡是總的文句，也可以作為三種解釋。如果根據正義，只有前兩種解釋順應這篇論文。這是根據果位的完全。除去二乘的金剛心，因為少，所以不說。八地菩薩隨應這兩種解釋。這裡僅僅是依據斷除煩惱障清凈而稱為阿羅漢，不是依據所知障。因為是損害煩惱賊，不是束縛。又是依據除去分段生死而稱為無生，不是所知障的緣故。

它的相狀是怎樣的呢？

論：那時，此識中的煩惱粗重永遠離開，所以說之為捨棄。不是本體也沒有了。這個『粗重』一詞顯示的是煩惱的種子。《對法論》等，說種子是粗重的緣故。即使是煩惱

【English Translation】 English version: And there is no fundamental consciousness. It is severed for a long time in the realm of non-form, and when entering the state of no-mind, the mind ceases for a long time. What dharma can hold the seeds to form cause and effect? If cause and effect are severed, it is called 'not so' (untenable). This is because they do not acknowledge the existence of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna).

Treatise: Therefore, one should believe in the correct principle of dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda).

Commentary: Third, a conclusion. Conditioned dharmas arise from causes and conditions, which is called dependent origination. It is advised that they should believe in the correct principle of Mahāyāna.

Treatise: This consciousness, from beginningless time, will be ultimately abandoned.

Commentary: This is the eighth section. It has two parts. First, a question, then an answer. This is the question. It explains the tenth line of the verse, the tenth door. The answer also has two parts. First, a brief answer citing the verse, then a detailed explanation.

Treatise: Only in the state of Arhatship is it ultimately abandoned.

Commentary: This is the formal citation of the verse, a general answer to the question.

Treatise: The so-called noble ones, until they are called Arhats (Ārhant).

Commentary: The following is a detailed explanation. It is divided into two parts. First, a brief explanation, then a detailed explanation. This is the brief explanation. The so-called noble ones refer to all three vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna). Those who have completely eliminated the afflictive obscurations (Kleśa-āvaraṇa), if that state is one where the latent tendencies (Anuśaya) are permanently destroyed, all are severed at the time of the Vajra-like Samādhi (Diamond Samadhi), and all have attained the fruit of Arhatship. All three vehicles are like this. If they are only subdued and will never arise again, then this word 'severed' applies to the eighth Bhumi (stage) Bodhisattvas and above. There are three teachers' explanations below. This is a general statement and can also be taken as three explanations. According to the correct meaning, only the first two explanations accord with this treatise. This is based on the completeness of the state. Excluding the Vajra-like Samādhi of the two vehicles, because it is rare, it is not mentioned. The eighth Bhumi Bodhisattvas correspond to these two explanations. Here, one is called an Arhat only based on the complete elimination of the afflictive obscurations, not based on the cognitive obscurations (Jñeya-āvaraṇa). Because it harms the thieves of afflictions, it is not a bondage. Also, one is called 'no-birth' (Anutpāda) based on the elimination of the segmented existence (Saṃsāra), not because of the cognitive obscurations.

What is its appearance like?

Treatise: At that time, the coarse burdens of afflictions are forever separated from this consciousness, so it is said to be abandoned. It is not that the substance is also gone. This word 'coarse burdens' indicates the seeds of afflictions. The Abhidharma texts say that the seeds are coarse burdens. Even if afflictions

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現行亦名粗重。無堪任性亦名粗重。然今但取種子非余。由種斷時現行執藏。發潤之惑皆不起故。說名為舍。此執藏名唯約縛說。法執非縛故不說斷。又畢竟無現行粗重。亦說為舍。通八地故。若說習氣四位不成。

問阿羅漢名通在幾乘。幾位中有。

論。此中所說至無學果位。

述曰。下正廣解。于中有二。初廣阿羅漢。后廣捨位　初有三師。第一師中有五。一釋頌文。二問。三答。四徴。五釋　阿羅漢者。此正云應。應者契當之義。應斷煩惱。應受供故。應不復受分段生故。若但言應即通三義。故言如來應不言應供。若著供字。唯得一義。便失二義。顯阿羅漢通攝三乘唯無學位。餘位未滿。非可應故。

問何故有學非阿羅漢。三無學得阿羅漢名。

論。皆已永害至分段生故。

述曰。阿羅漢言應。即殺賊。應供。無生三義故也　何故不言離所知障　所知障體不障解脫。無能發業潤生用故　何故不言離變易死　二乘無學有變易生。此非由煩惱所招起故。已離繫縛得解脫故無分段死　有學亦是殊勝福田。如見道出等供養獲現福。何故不得名應供耶　非一切時堪受供故。望自乘無學。非是圓滿故。

論。云何知然。

述曰。第二外人問曰。何知此識三乘皆舍。阿羅漢

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 現行也叫做粗重（指煩惱的活動狀態）。沒有堪能性也叫做粗重（指無法勝任解脫的狀態）。然而現在只取種子（指煩惱的潛在力量），而不是其他的。因為當種子斷滅時，現行的執藏（指對事物的執著）和發潤（指煩惱的滋生）的迷惑都不會生起，所以說名為舍（指捨棄煩惱）。這種執藏的名稱只是就束縛而言說的。法執（指對佛法的執著）不是束縛，所以不說斷。而且，畢竟沒有現行的粗重，也說為舍，這通於八地（指菩薩修行的八個階段）。如果說習氣（指煩惱的殘留影響），那麼四位（指修行的四個階段）就不能成立。 問：阿羅漢（梵文：Arhat，指斷盡煩惱，證得解脫的聖者）的名稱通用於幾乘（指聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）？在幾個位（指修行的階段）中有？ 論：這裡所說的是指無學果位（指修行達到最高階段，不再需要學習的果位）。 述曰：下面正式廣泛地解釋。其中有二，首先廣泛解釋阿羅漢，然後廣泛解釋舍位。首先有三師的觀點。第一師的觀點中有五個方面：一是解釋頌文，二是提問，三是回答，四是征問，五是解釋。阿羅漢，正確的說法是『應』，『應』是契合、恰當的意思。應斷煩惱，應受供養，應不再承受分段生死（指眾生因業力而產生的生死）。如果只說『應』，就通於三種含義。所以說如來應，不說應供。如果著重於『供』字，就只有一種含義，便失去了兩種含義。顯示阿羅漢通攝三乘，只有無學位才能達到。其餘的位次沒有圓滿，不是可以稱為『應』的。 問：為什麼有學（指還在學習階段的修行者）不是阿羅漢？三種無學（指三種不同層次的無學聖者）才能得到阿羅漢的名稱？ 論：都已永遠斷除了煩惱，不再承受分段生死。 述曰：阿羅漢的意思是『應』，即殺賊（指斷除煩惱），應供，無生（指不再有生死）這三種含義。為什麼不說離開所知障（指對真理的認知障礙）？因為所知障的本體不障礙解脫，沒有能引發業力、滋潤生死的功用。為什麼不說離開變易死（指菩薩因願力而產生的生死）？二乘（指聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的無學有變易生，這不是由煩惱所招起的。已經離開了繫縛，得到解脫，所以沒有分段死。有學也是殊勝的福田，如見道（指證悟真理的階段）等，供養可以獲得現世的福報。為什麼不能稱為應供呢？因為不是一切時候都堪受供養，相對於自身的無學來說，不是圓滿的。 論：怎麼知道是這樣的呢？ 述曰：第二位外人問道：怎麼知道這個識（指阿賴耶識）三乘都捨棄了，阿羅漢（捨棄了阿賴耶識）？

【English Translation】 English version Active manifestations are also called 'coarse and heavy' (referring to the active state of afflictions). The lack of fitness is also called 'coarse and heavy' (referring to the inability to attain liberation). However, now only the seeds (referring to the potential power of afflictions) are taken, not the others. Because when the seeds are cut off, the delusions of active clinging (referring to attachment to things) and the arising of moistening (referring to the growth of afflictions) will not arise, so it is said to be 'abandoned' (referring to abandoning afflictions). This name of clinging is only spoken in terms of bondage. The clinging to Dharma (referring to attachment to Buddhist teachings) is not bondage, so it is not said to be cut off. Moreover, since there is ultimately no active coarse and heavy, it is also said to be abandoned, which applies to the Eight Grounds (referring to the eight stages of a Bodhisattva's practice). If we talk about habitual tendencies (referring to the residual influence of afflictions), then the Four Positions (referring to the four stages of practice) cannot be established. Question: The name Arhat (Sanskrit: Arhat, referring to a saint who has exhausted afflictions and attained liberation) is common to how many Vehicles (referring to the Sravaka Vehicle, Pratyekabuddha Vehicle, and Bodhisattva Vehicle)? In how many positions (referring to the stages of practice) does it exist? Treatise: What is said here refers to the stage of No More Learning (referring to the highest stage of practice, the stage where no more learning is needed). Commentary: The following is a formal and extensive explanation. There are two parts: first, an extensive explanation of Arhat; second, an extensive explanation of the abandoned position. First, there are the views of three teachers. In the view of the first teacher, there are five aspects: first, explaining the verse; second, asking questions; third, answering; fourth, questioning; fifth, explaining. Arhat, the correct term is 'worthy' or 'deserving'. 'Worthy' means fitting and appropriate. Worthy of cutting off afflictions, worthy of receiving offerings, and worthy of no longer undergoing segmented birth and death (referring to the birth and death of sentient beings caused by karma). If only 'worthy' is said, it applies to three meanings. Therefore, it is said that the Tathagata is worthy, not worthy of offerings. If the word 'offering' is emphasized, there is only one meaning, and the other two meanings are lost. It shows that Arhat encompasses the Three Vehicles, and only the stage of No More Learning can be attained. The remaining positions are not complete and cannot be called 'worthy'. Question: Why are those still learning (referring to practitioners who are still in the learning stage) not Arhats? Why do the three types of No More Learning (referring to the three different levels of saints who have no more to learn) attain the name Arhat? Treatise: All have permanently eliminated afflictions and no longer undergo segmented birth and death. Commentary: The meaning of Arhat is 'worthy', which means killing the thief (referring to cutting off afflictions), worthy of offerings, and no birth (referring to no more birth and death). Why not say leaving the obstruction of knowledge (referring to the obstruction of the knowledge of truth)? Because the substance of the obstruction of knowledge does not obstruct liberation, and it has no function of initiating karma and moistening birth and death. Why not say leaving the change and death (referring to the birth and death of Bodhisattvas caused by vows)? The No More Learning of the Two Vehicles (referring to the Sravaka Vehicle and the Pratyekabuddha Vehicle) has change and birth, but this is not caused by afflictions. Having left the bondage and attained liberation, there is no segmented death. Those still learning are also excellent fields of merit, such as seeing the path (referring to the stage of realizing the truth), and making offerings can obtain present blessings. Why can't they be called worthy of offerings? Because they are not worthy of receiving offerings at all times, and they are not complete in relation to their own No More Learning. Treatise: How do we know this is so? Commentary: The second outsider asks: How do we know that this consciousness (referring to the Alaya consciousness) is abandoned by the Three Vehicles, and that the Arhat (has abandoned the Alaya consciousness)?

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號通在三乘。故論總問云何知然。

論。抉擇分說至阿賴耶故。

述曰。第三此答初問也。舍通三乘。抉擇分中第一卷說四句分別　謂有成就轉識非阿賴耶識。謂三乘無學．不退菩薩不入無心位　有成就阿賴耶非轉識。謂七地以前。二乘有學。一切異生入無心位　有俱成就。謂此第二句不入無心位　有俱不成。謂第一句入無心位。然今但引初句三人。

論。集論復說至及如來故。

述曰。又如雜集論第十四卷．集論第七說　若諸菩薩得菩提時。頓斷煩惱．及所知障。成阿羅漢．及如來故　佛既得名阿羅漢者。二乘無學不說自成。答第二問阿羅漢名。通三乘有。佛亦由斷所知障故。亦名如來。二乘不然。不可為難如阿羅漢號。便令通二乘。十地菩薩不能少斷俱生煩惱。金剛定時方頓斷盡。一者故留。二不障地　其所知障分分除之。故煩惱障即言頓斷。所知障不然。此師意說。不退菩薩雖不起現我愛執藏暫時伏離。種猶有故未名為舍。三乘無學我愛種盡乃名為舍。

外人復問。

論。若爾菩薩至阿賴耶識。

述曰。第四徴也。由前立宗煩惱種盡方名為舍。菩薩煩惱種子未除。如何名舍。違聖教故。為此難也。前引抉擇分四句之中初句有四人。三乘無學．及不退地以去菩薩。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 號通於三乘。所以論中總的提問是：如何得知是這樣的呢？

論：抉擇分中說到阿賴耶識的緣故。

述記：這是第三個回答第一個問題。舍識通於三乘。抉擇分第一卷中說了四句分別：有成就轉識而非阿賴耶識的，指的是三乘的無學（無須再學習者）、不退轉菩薩不入無心位；有成就阿賴耶識而非轉識的，指的是七地以前的菩薩、二乘的有學（仍需學習者）、一切異生（凡夫）進入無心位；有俱成就的，指的是第二句中不入無心位的；有俱不成就的，指的是第一句中進入無心位的。然而現在只引用第一句中的三人。

論：集論又說到阿羅漢以及如來的緣故。

述記：又如《雜集論》第十四卷、《集論》第七卷所說：如果諸位菩薩得到菩提時，頓然斷除煩惱障以及所知障，成就阿羅漢以及如來。佛既然得名阿羅漢，二乘的無學不能說自己成就。回答第二個問題，阿羅漢這個名稱，通於三乘都有。佛也因為斷除了所知障的緣故，也名為如來，二乘不是這樣。不可以因為阿羅漢這個稱號，就認為通於二乘。十地菩薩不能稍微斷除俱生煩惱，在金剛定時才能頓然斷盡。一者，所以保留；二者，不障礙菩薩的果位。其所知障是分分去除的，所以煩惱障就說是頓斷，所知障不是這樣。這位論師的意思是說，不退轉菩薩雖然不起現行的我愛執藏，暫時伏藏遠離，但種子仍然存在，所以不能稱為舍。三乘的無學我愛種子斷盡，才能稱為舍。

外人又問：

論：如果這樣，菩薩如何能捨阿賴耶識？

述記：這是第四個提問。因為前面立宗說煩惱種子斷盡才能稱為舍。菩薩的煩惱種子沒有去除，如何能稱為舍？違背聖教的緣故。為此而提出的疑問。前面引用的抉擇分四句之中，第一句有四人：三乘的無學以及不退地以上的菩薩。

【English Translation】 English version The designation is common to the Three Vehicles. Therefore, the treatise generally asks: How do we know this is so?

Treatise: Because the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī (Collection of Decisions) speaks of the Ālaya-vijñāna (Storehouse Consciousness).

Commentary: This is the third answer to the first question. The relinquishing of consciousness is common to the Three Vehicles. The first chapter of the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī speaks of fourfold distinctions: There are those who accomplish the transforming consciousness but not the Ālaya-vijñāna, referring to the Arhats (worthy ones) of the Three Vehicles and the non-regressing Bodhisattvas (enlightenment beings) who do not enter the state of no-mind; there are those who accomplish the Ālaya-vijñāna but not the transforming consciousness, referring to Bodhisattvas before the seventh Bhūmi (level), the Śaikṣas (those still learning) of the Two Vehicles, and all ordinary beings who enter the state of no-mind; there are those who accomplish both, referring to those in the second category who do not enter the state of no-mind; and there are those who accomplish neither, referring to those in the first category who enter the state of no-mind. However, we are now only citing the three types of people in the first category.

Treatise: The Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) also speaks of Arhats and Tathāgatas (Thus-gone ones).

Commentary: Furthermore, as the fourteenth chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the seventh chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya state: 'If all Bodhisattvas attain Bodhi (enlightenment), they suddenly sever the Kleśa-āvaraṇa (afflictive obscurations) and the Jñeya-āvaraṇa (cognitive obscurations), becoming Arhats and Tathāgatas.' Since the Buddha is named Arhat, the Śaikṣas of the Two Vehicles cannot claim to have achieved this themselves. Answering the second question, the name Arhat is common to all Three Vehicles. The Buddha is also named Tathāgata because he has severed the Jñeya-āvaraṇa, which is not the case for the Two Vehicles. It cannot be argued that the title Arhat makes it common to the Two Vehicles. Bodhisattvas on the ten Bhūmis cannot slightly sever the Sahaja-kleśas (innate afflictions); they can only be completely severed during the Vajrasamādhi (diamond concentration). One reason is to preserve the title; the second is not to obstruct the Bodhisattva stages. The Jñeya-āvaraṇa is removed gradually, so the Kleśa-āvaraṇa is said to be severed suddenly, but not the Jñeya-āvaraṇa. This teacher means that although non-regressing Bodhisattvas do not give rise to manifest attachment to self, temporarily subduing and separating from it, the seeds still exist, so it is not called relinquishing. Only when the seeds of attachment to self are completely exhausted by the Arhats of the Three Vehicles is it called relinquishing.

An outsider asks again:

Treatise: If so, how can Bodhisattvas relinquish the Ālaya-vijñāna?

Commentary: This is the fourth question. Because the previous proposition stated that relinquishing is only possible when the seeds of affliction are completely exhausted. Since the seeds of affliction of Bodhisattvas have not been removed, how can it be called relinquishing? This contradicts the holy teachings. This is the question raised. Among the four sentences cited earlier from the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī, the first sentence includes four types of people: the Arhats of the Three Vehicles and the Bodhisattvas from the non-regressing stage onwards.

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先不論故今為難　不退有二種。一已得不退。二未得不退。前初地得。后八地得。故言不退　初地已去證不退。八地以去行不退。初地已去尚有相續趣求所得。未能唸唸轉轉增進。初說迴心名不退者。即地前位皆名不退。不退起煩惱故。而義有別亦不相違。由是不退總有四種。一信不退。即十信第六心。二證不退。入地已往。三行不退。八地以上。四煩惱不退。謂無漏道所斷煩惱。一切聖者　今說迴心名不退者。即第四不退。以得證凈故亦名信不退。然未至彼位　若十住第七心等亦名住不退。即應有五。論直往者唯四不退。

論。彼說二乘至阿賴耶識。

述曰。第五釋也。彼說四人。三人據決定。菩薩即迴心已。必定不退起諸煩惱。從初發心二萬劫。乃至成佛已來。皆名不退。又趣菩提轉名菩薩。非直往者是第四人。煩惱種子未永害。故　若現行一分無故名舍。分別一分無應亦名舍。又見道以去第七．不起執藏之時。應亦名舍　以全未舍故　若不爾直往八地已去簡非不退。以不能捨阿賴耶故　若爾入地諸菩薩等應亦名退。以全未舍阿賴耶故。

問既爾此文。何故不說不退菩薩。

論。即攝在此至不違此義。

述曰。彼攝在此阿羅漢中。從本說故。故彼抉擇之文。不違此中說義。三乘有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 先不論過去和現在哪個更難，不退（avaivartika）有二種。一是已得不退，二是未得不退。前者是初地（prathama-bhumi）菩薩所得，後者是八地（astami-bhumi）菩薩所得。所以說不退：初地已去證得不退，八地已去行得不退。初地已去尚有相續趣求所得，未能唸唸轉轉增進。最初說迴心向大乘即名不退者，即地前位（bhumi-purva）皆名不退，因為仍然會生起煩惱。而意義有所區別，亦不相違背。由此，不退總共有四種：一、信不退，即十信（dasa sraddha）中的第六心；二、證不退，入地（bhumi）之後；三、行不退，八地以上；四、煩惱不退，指無漏道（anasrava-marga）所斷的煩惱，一切聖者皆是如此。現在說迴心向大乘即名不退者，即第四種不退，因為得到證凈的緣故，也名為信不退，然而尚未到達那個位次。如果十住（dasa vihara）中的第七心等也名為住不退，那麼就應該有五種不退了。論中只說直往菩薩有四種不退。

論：他們說二乘（sravaka-yana, pratyeka-buddha-yana）行者到達阿賴耶識（alaya-vijnana）。

述記：這是第五種解釋。他們所說的四種人，前三種是根據決定性來說的。菩薩一旦迴心向大乘，必定不會退轉而生起各種煩惱。從最初發心到二萬劫（kalpa），乃至成佛以來，都名為不退。又趣向菩提（bodhi）就轉名為菩薩。非直往菩薩是第四種人，因為煩惱的種子沒有被永遠斷除。如果現行的一分煩惱沒有了，就名為舍（prahana）；分別的一分煩惱沒有了，也應該名為舍。又見道（darshana-marga）以後，第七識（manas）不起執藏作用的時候，也應該名為舍。因為完全沒有捨棄的緣故。如果不是這樣，直往菩薩八地以上就不能算是真正的不退，因為他們不能捨棄阿賴耶識。如果這樣，入地的諸菩薩等也應該名為退，因為他們完全沒有捨棄阿賴耶識。

問：既然如此，這篇文章為什麼不說不退菩薩呢？

論：即包含在此阿羅漢（arhat）之中，不違背這個意義。

述記：他們包含在此阿羅漢中，是從根本上來說的。所以他們的抉擇之文，不違背此中的說法。三乘（triyana）都有。

【English Translation】 English version: Without discussing whether the past or present is more difficult, there are two types of avaivartika (non-retrogression). The first is already attained non-retrogression, and the second is unattained non-retrogression. The former is attained by Bodhisattvas of the first bhumi (prathama-bhumi), and the latter is attained by Bodhisattvas of the eighth bhumi (astami-bhumi). Therefore, it is said that non-retrogression: from the first bhumi onwards, one attains non-retrogression in realization; from the eighth bhumi onwards, one attains non-retrogression in practice. From the first bhumi onwards, there is still continuous striving for attainment, and one cannot advance moment by moment. The initial statement that turning the mind towards Mahayana is called non-retrogression means that all stages before the bhumis (bhumi-purva) are called non-retrogression, because afflictions still arise. However, the meanings are different and not contradictory. Therefore, there are four types of non-retrogression in total: first, non-retrogression in faith, which is the sixth mind in the ten faiths (dasa sraddha); second, non-retrogression in realization, which is after entering the bhumis; third, non-retrogression in practice, which is from the eighth bhumi onwards; fourth, non-retrogression in afflictions, which refers to the afflictions severed by the anasrava-marga (path of non-outflow), which is the case for all sages. Now, the statement that turning the mind towards Mahayana is called non-retrogression refers to the fourth type of non-retrogression, because one has attained pure realization, and it is also called non-retrogression in faith, but one has not yet reached that stage. If the seventh mind in the ten abodes (dasa vihara) is also called non-retrogression in abiding, then there should be five types of non-retrogression. The treatise only mentions four types of non-retrogression for direct-path Bodhisattvas.

Treatise: They say that the two vehicles (sravaka-yana, pratyeka-buddha-yana) reach the alaya-vijnana (store consciousness).

Commentary: This is the fifth explanation. The four types of people they mention, the first three are based on certainty. Once a Bodhisattva turns their mind towards Mahayana, they will definitely not regress and give rise to various afflictions. From the initial aspiration to twenty thousand kalpas (kalpa), and even since becoming a Buddha, they are called non-retrogressing. Furthermore, turning towards bodhi (bodhi) is called a Bodhisattva. Non-direct-path Bodhisattvas are the fourth type of people, because the seeds of afflictions have not been permanently eradicated. If a portion of manifest afflictions is gone, it is called prahana (abandonment); if a portion of discriminated afflictions is gone, it should also be called abandonment. Furthermore, after the darshana-marga (path of seeing), when the seventh consciousness (manas) no longer functions as a clinging store, it should also be called abandonment, because it has not been completely abandoned. If this is not the case, then direct-path Bodhisattvas from the eighth bhumi onwards cannot be considered truly non-retrogressing, because they cannot abandon the alaya-vijnana. If this is the case, then Bodhisattvas who have entered the bhumis should also be called regressing, because they have not completely abandoned the alaya-vijnana.

Question: Since this is the case, why does this text not mention non-retrogressing Bodhisattvas?

Treatise: They are included within these arhats (arhat), and it does not contradict this meaning.

Commentary: They are included within these arhats, from a fundamental perspective. Therefore, their text of determination does not contradict the meaning stated here. All three vehicles (triyana) have it.

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學金剛心位。雖斷煩惱我執種無。以時少故。彼論不說。此亦不論。二乘有學回心向大。不名不退。起煩惱故。

下第二說。

論。又不動地至永不行故。

述曰。此即護法菩薩亦假為二義。于理無違。即同前師也。下文有二。初述不退菩薩體。后顯名舍。

此義意言。三乘無學。直往菩薩八地已去。亦舍此識。名不退者。行亦不退。于未得法亦復不退。四理證知。一者一切煩惱永不行故。八地以去無漏相續無現執藏。故可說舍。

論。法駃流中任運轉故。

述曰。此第二理。十地論第十卷說。第八地已上菩薩。于無相海任運而轉。諸佛勸等。乃至廣說。剎那剎那真．俗雙運。以無功用故任運轉。

論。能諸行中起諸行故。

述曰。此第三理。十地論說。初地至六地名為少行。第七地名大行八地已去名為廣行　前六地一行中修一切行。是故名少。第七地雖亦然。以能即空方便智。發起有中殊勝行。勝前六地故立大名。前五地中。雖合此難合真俗雙行。然極用功方始能起。此第七地雖未任運。少用功力即能現前。故與前異立其大名。八地以去。一切行中修一切行。故名為廣　然舊地持云。勝解行已去名少。初地至六地名大。七地已去名廣。以見道前一行中修一行故名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於學習金剛心位，即使斷除了煩惱和我執的種子，因為時間短暫的緣故，《瑜伽師地論》中沒有說明，這裡也不討論。二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的有學位者，即使迴心向大乘，也不能稱為不退轉，因為他們還會生起煩惱。

下面第二部分進行說明。

論：又，從不動地（第八地）開始，直到永遠不再退轉。

述記：這裡護法菩薩也假設了兩種含義，在道理上沒有違背，與之前的說法相同。下面分為兩部分，首先敘述不退轉菩薩的本體，然後闡明捨棄（阿賴耶識）。

此處的含義是說，三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的無學位者，以及直往菩薩（直接趣向菩提的菩薩）從八地菩薩開始，也捨棄了阿賴耶識，被稱為不退轉，他們的修行也不會退轉，對於未得到的法也不會退轉。有四種理由可以證明：一是所有的煩惱永遠不再生起，八地菩薩之後，無漏的智慧相續不斷，沒有現行的執著，所以可以說捨棄了阿賴耶識。

論：在法流中能夠任運運轉的緣故。

述記：這是第二個理由。《十地經論》第十卷說，八地以上的菩薩，在無相的智慧海中任運而轉，諸佛勸請等等，乃至廣說。剎那剎那之間，真諦和俗諦雙運，因為沒有造作的功用，所以能夠任運運轉。

論：能夠在一切行中生起一切行的緣故。

述記：這是第三個理由。《十地經論》說，初地到六地稱為少行，第七地稱為大行，八地以上稱為廣行。前六地在一種行中修一切行，所以稱為少行。第七地雖然也是這樣，但是能夠用即空的方便智慧，發起有為法中殊勝的修行，勝過前六地，所以稱為大行。前五地中，雖然也能夠勉強地真俗雙運，但是需要極大的努力才能生起。第七地雖然還不能任運，但是稍微用一點功力就能現前，所以與前五地不同，稱為大行。八地以上，在一切行中修一切行，所以稱為廣行。然而，《地持經》舊譯中說，勝解行地之後稱為少行，初地到六地稱為大行，七地之後稱為廣行，因為在見道之前，一種行中修一種行，所以稱為少行。

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the study of the Vajra-heart position, even if the seeds of afflictions and self-grasping are severed, it is not discussed in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra due to the limited time, and it is not discussed here either. Those in the stage of learning in the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), even if they turn their minds towards the Mahāyāna, cannot be called non-retrogressing, because they still give rise to afflictions.

The second part below provides an explanation.

Treatise: Furthermore, from the Immovable Ground (Acalā-bhūmi, the eighth Bodhisattva ground) onwards, there is no more regression forever.

Commentary: Here, the Bodhisattva Dharmapāla also assumes two meanings, which are not contradictory in principle, and are the same as the previous statement. The following is divided into two parts: first, describing the substance of the non-retrogressing Bodhisattva; then, clarifying the abandonment (of the Ālaya-vijñāna).

The meaning here is that the non-learners of the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna), and the direct-path Bodhisattvas (those who directly approach Bodhi) from the eighth ground onwards, also abandon the Ālaya-vijñāna, and are called non-retrogressing. Their practice will not regress, and they will not regress from the Dharma they have not yet attained. There are four reasons to prove this: first, all afflictions will never arise again. After the eighth ground, the un-outflowed wisdom continues uninterruptedly, and there is no manifest clinging, so it can be said that the Ālaya-vijñāna has been abandoned.

Treatise: Because they can operate freely in the stream of Dharma.

Commentary: This is the second reason. The tenth volume of the Dasabhumika-sutra-sastra says that Bodhisattvas above the eighth ground operate freely in the sea of non-form wisdom, with the Buddhas exhorting them, and so on. In every moment, the truth and the conventional are both operating, and because there is no contrived effort, they can operate freely.

Treatise: Because they can generate all practices within all practices.

Commentary: This is the third reason. The Dasabhumika-sutra-sastra says that the first to sixth grounds are called 'few practices', the seventh ground is called 'great practices', and the eighth ground and above are called 'extensive practices'. The first six grounds cultivate all practices within one practice, so they are called 'few practices'. Although the seventh ground is also like this, it can use the expedient wisdom of emptiness to generate excellent practices in conditioned phenomena, surpassing the first six grounds, so it is called 'great practices'. In the first five grounds, although it is possible to force the dual operation of truth and conventional, it requires great effort to arise. Although the seventh ground is not yet effortless, it can manifest with a little effort, so it is different from the first five grounds and is called 'great practices'. From the eighth ground onwards, all practices are cultivated within all practices, so they are called 'extensive practices'. However, the old translation of the Bodhisattva-bhumi says that the stage of understanding and practice is called 'few practices', the first to sixth grounds are called 'great practices', and the seventh ground and above are called 'extensive practices', because before seeing the path, one practice is cultivated within one practice, so it is called 'few practices'.

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少。次六地中於一行中修一切行故名為大。七地已去真俗雙行名為廣。所望不同不相違也　今菩薩地瑜伽四十八卷說。初劫名波羅蜜多。第二劫名近波羅蜜多。第三劫名大波羅蜜多　此約波羅蜜多別。亦不相違　然初地已前於六波羅蜜。一行中修一行。初地已去。於六波羅蜜。一行中修一切行。八地以去。一切行中修一切行。七地已前。唯於六度唯有修一。以一切行而莊嚴之。八地已去。于萬行中具修萬行。然所修愿．力．智度。漸次勝前別立其名。非唯修此。今第三證與彼文同。

論。剎那剎那轉增進故。

述曰。此第四理。謂八地后無漏相續無有漏間。又彼亦無未得之退。故能唸唸增進諸行。勘十地．地持．及菩薩地等。彼謂從此八地已去。于初剎那能得過前二阿僧祇所行功德智惠一倍。第二剎那更倍前念。如是展轉勝進倍前。

論。此位方名不退菩薩。

述曰。此四因中。初因簡解行地已前。十地菩薩能伏煩惱畢竟不行。非第七識。今通七識　第二因簡前六地　第三因簡第七地　第四因簡一切地。由四因故。直往菩薩八地已去方名不退。舍賴耶名。

論。然此菩薩至為自內我。

述曰。上解不退。下解舍名也。第七識等煩惱我執現行無故。

論。由斯永舍至名阿羅

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：少：因為在第六地之前，於一行中只修一行，所以名為『少』。次六地中於一行中修一切行故名為『大』。七地之後，真諦和俗諦雙修並行，名為『廣』。所期望的目標不同，因此並不互相違背。現在《菩薩地瑜伽》第四十八卷說，第一劫名為波羅蜜多（paramita，意為『到彼岸』），第二劫名為近波羅蜜多（upaparamita，意為『接近到彼岸』），第三劫名為**羅蜜多。這是從波羅蜜多的差別來說的，也不互相違背。然而，初地之前，對於六波羅蜜，在一行中只修一行。初地之後，對於六波羅蜜，在一行中修一切行。八地之後，一切行中修一切行。七地之前，只是在六度中修習一種，以一切行來莊嚴它。八地之後，在萬行中具足修習萬行。然而，所修的愿、力、智度，逐漸勝過之前，因此特別立名，並非只是修習這些。現在第三個證據與彼文相同。 論：剎那剎那轉增進故。 述曰：這是第四個理由。指八地之後，無漏的智慧相續不斷，沒有有漏的煩惱間斷。而且，他們也沒有未得而退失的情況。因此能夠唸唸增進各種修行。可以參考《十地經》、《地持經》以及《菩薩地經》等。他們認為，從這第八地開始，在最初的剎那，能夠獲得超過之前兩個阿僧祇劫所修行的功德智慧的一倍。第二個剎那，更是比前一念增加一倍。就這樣輾轉勝進，倍增於前。 論：此位方名不退菩薩。 述曰：在這四個原因中，第一個原因是爲了簡別解行地之前的情況。十地菩薩能夠降伏煩惱，畢竟不行惡事，但並非針對第七識（末那識）。現在是通指第七識。第二個原因是爲了簡別前六地。第三個原因是爲了簡別第七地。第四個原因是爲了簡別一切地。由於這四個原因，直往菩薩從第八地開始才被稱為不退轉菩薩，捨棄了阿賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna）的名稱。 論：然此菩薩至為自內我。 述曰：上面解釋了不退轉，下面解釋了捨棄名稱。因為第七識等的煩惱我執不再現行。 論：由斯永舍至名阿羅

【English Translation】 English version: 'Few': Because before the sixth Bhumi (stage of Bodhisattva), only one practice is cultivated within one line of practice, hence it is called 'Few'. After the sixth Bhumi, all practices are cultivated within one line of practice, hence it is called 'Great'. After the seventh Bhumi, the true and conventional are cultivated in parallel, hence it is called 'Vast'. The goals are different, so they do not contradict each other. Now, the forty-eighth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the first kalpa (aeon) is called Paramita (pāramitā, perfection or transcendence), the second kalpa is called Upaparamita (upapāramitā, near perfection), and the third kalpa is called Paramita. This is from the difference of Paramita, and it does not contradict each other either. However, before the first Bhumi, for the six Paramitas, only one practice is cultivated in one line of practice. After the first Bhumi, for the six Paramitas, all practices are cultivated in one line of practice. After the eighth Bhumi, all practices are cultivated in all lines of practice. Before the seventh Bhumi, only one of the six perfections is cultivated, and it is adorned with all practices. After the eighth Bhumi, all ten thousand practices are fully cultivated in the ten thousand lines of practice. However, the vows, powers, and wisdom degrees that are cultivated gradually surpass the previous ones, so they are specially named, and it is not just these that are cultivated. Now, the third evidence is the same as that text. Treatise: Because it increases and progresses from moment to moment. Commentary: This is the fourth reason. It refers to the fact that after the eighth Bhumi, the continuous stream of non-outflow wisdom is uninterrupted by outflowing defilements. Moreover, they also do not regress from what they have not yet attained. Therefore, they can increase and progress in all practices from moment to moment. Refer to the Ten Bhumis Sutra, Bodhisattva-bhumi, and Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, etc. They believe that from this eighth Bhumi onwards, in the first moment, one can obtain twice the merit and wisdom that was cultivated in the previous two asamkhya kalpas (asaṃkhya-kalpa, countless aeons). In the second moment, it is doubled again compared to the previous moment. In this way, it progresses and advances, doubling the previous one. Treatise: Only in this position is one called a Non-Regressing Bodhisattva. Commentary: Among these four reasons, the first reason is to distinguish the situation before the stage of understanding and practice. Bodhisattvas of the Ten Bhumis can subdue afflictions and ultimately do not engage in evil deeds, but this is not directed at the seventh consciousness (manas-vijñāna). Now it refers to the seventh consciousness in general. The second reason is to distinguish the first six Bhumis. The third reason is to distinguish the seventh Bhumi. The fourth reason is to distinguish all Bhumis. Because of these four reasons, only from the eighth Bhumi onwards are direct-path Bodhisattvas called Non-Regressing Bodhisattvas, abandoning the name of Alaya-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna). Treatise: However, this Bodhisattva is extremely self-contained. Commentary: The above explains non-regression, and the following explains abandoning the name. Because the afflictions and ego-clinging of the seventh consciousness, etc., no longer manifest. Treatise: Therefore, they permanently abandon and are called Arhat.

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漢。

述曰。此師意說。無現執藏瑜伽說此即名為舍。以阿賴耶是藏義故。此亦說彼名阿羅漢。三義具故。如前應知　問若現不執即名為舍。七地以前亦有不執。入無漏心等。應皆名舍　答此不然。非竟畢故。畢竟不行方名為舍故　問若爾二乘金剛心。應名舍此識　答實亦應名舍。以時促故。彼瑜伽等略而不論。亦不違理。初師名舍斷種名舍．此第二說。若斷．若伏畢竟不行。說之為舍。故七地前不得舍名。

下第三解。

論。有義初地至所顯理故。

述曰。下文有六。一正釋。二破。三救。四徴。五會。六難申正義。　初中有二。初出不退體。后辨舍。由五因故證入地菩薩亦舍此識名。此第一因。即難陀論師等作如是解。文中易解。無勞解釋。

論。已得二種殊勝智故。

述曰。此第二因。二智即是正體．后得。

論。已斷分別二重障故。

述曰。此第三因。二障名重以猛利故。

論。能一行中起諸行故。

述曰。此第四因。即唯約六波羅蜜論。不爾即與一切行中。修一切行無有差別。以一一行中。皆能修集一切行故。

論。雖為利益至不退菩薩。

述曰。即第五因。名為不退。此如攝論十地菩薩觀為利益。不動染心而方起惑。非不知

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：這是護法論師的意說。如果現行位不執著阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，藏識），瑜伽行派就說這叫做『舍』。因為阿賴耶識是『藏』的意思。這裡也說證得阿羅漢（Arhat）果位的人也『舍』了阿賴耶識，因為他們具足了斷煩惱、證真如、度眾生三種含義。如前文所說，應該知道。 問：如果現行位不執著就叫做『舍』，那麼七地菩薩以前也有不執著的時候，比如入無漏心等，應該都叫做『舍』嗎？ 答：這不對。因為不是究竟圓滿的舍。必須是畢竟不再行持，才叫做『舍』。 問：如果這樣，二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的金剛心（Vajra heart）也應該叫做『舍』了阿賴耶識？ 答：確實也應該叫做『舍』。因為時間短暫的緣故，瑜伽行派等經典略而不論，也不違背道理。初地菩薩的『舍』是指斷除種子，而這裡說的『舍』是指斷除或降伏，畢竟不再行持，才說之為『舍』。所以七地以前不能得到『舍』的名稱。

下面是第三種解釋。

論：有義是初地菩薩證得所顯之理的緣故。

述曰：下文有六個部分：一、正式解釋；二、破斥；三、救護；四、提問；五、會通；六、進一步闡述正義。 首先是正式解釋，其中又有兩點：一是說明不退轉位的體性，二是辨析『舍』的含義。因為有五種原因，所以證入初地的菩薩也可以說『舍』了阿賴耶識。這是第一個原因，即難陀論師等作這樣的解釋。文中的意思容易理解，無需過多解釋。

論：已經得到兩種殊勝智慧的緣故。

述曰：這是第二個原因。兩種智慧即是根本智（正體）和后得智。

論：已經斷除分別二重障的緣故。

述曰：這是第三個原因。二重障稱為『重』，是因為它們非常猛利。

論：能在一個行門中發起諸多行門的緣故。

述曰：這是第四個原因。這裡僅就六波羅蜜（Six Pāramitās）而言。否則，就與在一切行門中修一切行沒有差別了。因為在一個行門中，都能修集一切行。

論：雖然爲了利益眾生，乃至不退轉菩薩。

述曰：這是第五個原因，稱為不退轉。這就像《攝大乘論》所說，十地菩薩觀察眾生爲了利益他們，不動染污之心而發起惑業，並非不知。

【English Translation】 English version: Śūnyatā states: This is the meaning explained by this teacher. If, in the present manifestation, there is no attachment to the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness), the Yogācāra school says this is called 'abandoning' (舍, śe). Because Ālaya means 'storehouse'. It is also said here that those who attain the Arhat (worthy one) state also 'abandon' the Ālaya-vijñāna, because they possess the three meanings of cutting off afflictions, realizing Suchness, and delivering sentient beings. As mentioned earlier, it should be known. Question: If non-attachment in the present manifestation is called 'abandoning', then even before the seventh ground (Bhūmi) Bodhisattvas also have times of non-attachment, such as entering the undefiled mind, etc. Should all of these be called 'abandoning'? Answer: That is not correct. Because it is not ultimate and complete abandoning. It must be that it is no longer practiced at all, then it is called 'abandoning'. Question: If that is the case, then the Vajra heart (diamond heart) of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) should also be called 'abandoning' the Ālaya-vijñāna? Answer: Indeed, it should also be called 'abandoning'. Because of the brevity of time, the Yogācāra school and other scriptures omit discussing it, but it does not contradict the principle. The 'abandoning' of the first ground Bodhisattva refers to cutting off the seeds, while the 'abandoning' mentioned here refers to cutting off or subduing, and no longer practicing at all, then it is called 'abandoning'. Therefore, before the seventh ground, one cannot obtain the name of 'abandoning'.

The following is the third explanation.

Treatise: Some say it is because the Bodhisattva on the first ground realizes the principle that is revealed.

Śūnyatā states: The following text has six parts: 1. Formal explanation; 2. Refutation; 3. Defense; 4. Question; 5. Reconciliation; 6. Further elaboration of the correct meaning. First is the formal explanation, which has two points: one is to explain the nature of the non-retrogressive position, and the other is to distinguish the meaning of 'abandoning'. Because of five reasons, it can be said that Bodhisattvas who enter the first ground also 'abandon' the Ālaya-vijñāna. This is the first reason, which is the explanation made by teachers such as Nanda. The meaning in the text is easy to understand, and there is no need for much explanation.

Treatise: Because they have already obtained two kinds of excellent wisdom.

Śūnyatā states: This is the second reason. The two wisdoms are the Fundamental Wisdom (正體, zhèngtǐ) and the Acquired Wisdom.

Treatise: Because they have already cut off the two heavy obstacles of discrimination.

Śūnyatā states: This is the third reason. The two obstacles are called 'heavy' because they are very fierce.

Treatise: Because they can initiate many practices within one practice.

Śūnyatā states: This is the fourth reason. Here, it only refers to the Six Pāramitās (六波羅蜜, liù bōluómì). Otherwise, there would be no difference from cultivating all practices in all practices. Because in one practice, one can cultivate all practices.

Treatise: Although it is for the benefit of sentient beings, even the non-retrogressive Bodhisattvas.

Śūnyatā states: This is the fifth reason, called non-retrogressive. This is like what the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, the Bodhisattvas of the tenth ground observe sentient beings and, for the benefit of them, initiate karmic activities without moving their defiled minds, not because they do not know.

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而起。即瑜伽論七十七．八云要知方起。非不知而起。

論。然此菩薩至名阿羅漢。

述曰。上釋不退。下辨舍。舍中有二。初理辨舍。后引證。此初也。煩惱分別少分舍故。舍執藏名。其文易解。

論。故集論中至名阿羅漢。

述曰。下引證也。集論第七．雜集十四。亦有此文。十地菩薩。雖未永斷一切煩惱等。雖有不為失。無漏智力如咒．藥故。如阿羅漢已斷煩惱無過失故。此中亦名為阿羅漢。故攝此菩薩在阿羅漢中。

論。彼說非理至阿賴耶名。

述曰。第二破也。六識我見四地不行。七地以前第七我見猶現行故。為此難也。前第二師作如此難。

論。若彼分別至諸論所說。

述曰。若彼已下乃至為舍。第三牒前師救意　則預流下乃至所說。正是第四徴難辭。此下難中。以預流果例同彼菩薩。應舍賴耶名。然聖教不說。若謂菩薩雙斷二障。法我亦除非預流者。此唯人見名為執藏非於法執。若不爾者。其阿羅漢應名不捨阿賴耶識。以有俱生法我見故。故知但以人執為藏不以法執。

第五段。第三師會云。

論。地上菩薩至例此菩薩。

述曰。十地菩薩所起煩惱不為過失。非預流等。以預流等所起煩惱。皆不正知為過失故。如瑜伽論七十七八

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 而生起。即《瑜伽師地論》第七十七卷第八頁說，要知道之後才生起，不是不知道而生起。 論：然而此菩薩達到名為阿羅漢（Arhat，斷盡煩惱，證得解脫的聖者）。 述曰：上面解釋不退轉，下面辨析捨棄。捨棄中有兩種，首先從理上辨析捨棄，然後引用證據。這是第一個方面。因為煩惱分別少分捨棄的緣故，捨棄執藏之名。文句容易理解。 論：所以《集論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）中說，名為阿羅漢。 述曰：下面是引用證據。《集論》第七卷、《雜集論》第十四卷，也有這段文字。十地菩薩，雖然沒有永遠斷除一切煩惱等，雖然有不成為過失的煩惱，因為有無漏智慧的力量，如同咒語、藥物一樣。如同阿羅漢已經斷除煩惱沒有過失一樣。因此，這裡也名為阿羅漢。所以將此菩薩攝入阿羅漢之中。 論：他們的說法不合理，以至於阿賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）之名。 述曰：第二是破斥。第六識的我見在四地不行，七地以前第七識的我見仍然現行。這是爲了反駁。前面第二位論師作如此反駁。 論：如果他們分別，以至於諸論所說。 述曰：如果他們以下，乃至爲了捨棄。第三是重複前一位論師的救護之意。那麼預流（Srotāpanna，入流果）以下，乃至所說。正是第四個方面，提出質疑的言辭。下面在質疑中，以預流果為例，類比于那位菩薩，應該捨棄賴耶之名。然而聖教沒有這樣說。如果說菩薩同時斷除二障，法我也除非是預流者。這只是人見，名為執藏，不是對於法執。如果不是這樣，那麼阿羅漢應該不捨棄阿賴耶識之名，因為有俱生法我見的緣故。所以知道只是以人執為藏，不以法執。 第五段。第三位論師會通說： 論：地上菩薩，類比於此菩薩。 述曰：十地菩薩所生起的煩惱不成為過失，不是預流等。因為預流等所生起的煩惱，都是不正知，成為過失的緣故。如《瑜伽師地論》第七十七卷第八頁。

【English Translation】 English version: And arise. That is, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, seventy-seventh fascicle, eighth page, says that one must know before arising, not arise without knowing. Treatise: However, this Bodhisattva reaches the name Arhat (one who has eradicated all afflictions and attained liberation). Commentary: Above explains non-retrogression, below distinguishes abandonment. There are two types of abandonment, first, distinguishing abandonment in principle, then citing evidence. This is the first aspect. Because afflictions are partially abandoned, the name 'clinging-store' is abandoned. The sentences are easy to understand. Treatise: Therefore, the Abhidharma-samuccaya says, named Arhat. Commentary: Below is citing evidence. The seventh fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the fourteenth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya also have this passage. Although the Bodhisattvas of the Ten Grounds have not permanently severed all afflictions, etc., although there are afflictions that do not become faults, because of the power of non-outflow wisdom, like mantras and medicines. Just as Arhats have already severed afflictions and have no faults. Therefore, here they are also named Arhats. Therefore, this Bodhisattva is included among the Arhats. Treatise: Their statement is unreasonable, even to the name Ālaya (store consciousness). Commentary: The second is refutation. The sixth consciousness's view of self does not function on the four grounds, and before the seventh ground, the seventh consciousness's view of self still manifests. This is for refuting. The second teacher before made such a refutation. Treatise: If they distinguish, even to what the treatises say. Commentary: If they are below, even to abandonment. The third is repeating the previous teacher's intention to save. Then the Stream-enterer (Srotāpanna) is below, even to what is said. This is precisely the fourth aspect, raising words of questioning. Below, in the questioning, taking the Stream-enterer as an example, analogous to that Bodhisattva, the name Ālaya should be abandoned. However, the holy teachings do not say this. If it is said that Bodhisattvas simultaneously sever the two obscurations, the Dharma-self is also except for the Stream-enterer. This is only the view of self, named clinging-store, not clinging to Dharma. If it is not like this, then the Arhat should not abandon the name Ālaya-consciousness, because there is co-arisen Dharma-self view. Therefore, it is known that only clinging to self is the store, not clinging to Dharma. Fifth section. The third teacher reconciles and says: Treatise: The Bodhisattvas on the grounds, analogous to this Bodhisattva. Commentary: The afflictions that arise from the Bodhisattvas on the Ten Grounds do not become faults, not like Stream-enterers, etc. Because the afflictions that arise from Stream-enterers, etc., are all not rightly known, becoming faults. As in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, seventy-seventh fascicle, eighth page.

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說菩薩起煩惱有三。一名無染污相。謂正知故起等。

論。彼六識中至預流等同。

述曰。下第六段。論主難云。彼入地菩薩前六識中所起煩惱。雖由正知不為過失。間斷起故。相貌粗故。可由正知而方故起。其第七識一類無斷。任運現行非相粗顯。于有學位除無漏心滅盡定外有漏心時。執藏此識。寧不與彼預流等同。有時執故。預流等唯入人空觀無漏心時此識不行。有漏心時即便現起。與此菩薩同不名舍。何故菩薩即名為舍。

論。由此故知彼說非理。

述曰。此結非也。第八地去諸菩薩等。無漏相續。一切煩惱皆不現行。雖有種子現行皆盡。可得名舍。非七地前煩惱不起。如何說舍。彼抉擇分七十七八．及菩薩地四十八。說八地已去一切菩薩。一切煩惱不現行故。故此釋非。前二師是也。

論。然阿羅漢至為自內我。

述曰。下結正義。且如初釋。直往菩薩八地已去。非是此中阿羅漢攝。有種染故。三乘無學方名為舍。

第二師釋。直往菩薩八地已去。是此中攝。故總說言阿羅漢舍。斷種永伏現行煩惱。皆已盡故併名為舍。

論。由斯永失至第八識體。

述曰。不復執藏說名為舍。非是第八識體全無名舍識也。

全無第八于理何違。

論。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於菩薩生起煩惱，有三種情況。第一種稱為『無染污相』，意思是說因為具有正知（samprajanya，對身心活動保持清晰覺知）而生起煩惱等。

論：在（菩薩的）前六識中，（這種煩惱的生起）與預流（srota-apanna，須陀洹）等同。

述記：下面是第六段。論主提出疑問：入地菩薩的前六識中所生起的煩惱，雖然因為具有正知，所以不算是過失，因為是間斷生起，而且相貌粗顯，可以通過正知來防止生起。但是，第七識（末那識，manas）是持續不斷的，任運現行，而且相貌不粗顯。在有學位的菩薩，除了無漏心（anāsrava-citta，沒有煩惱的心）和滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti，止息一切心識活動的禪定）之外，在有漏心（sāsrava-citta，有煩惱的心）的時候，執藏此識。這難道不與預流等同嗎？因為有時執藏的緣故。預流等只有在進入人空觀（pudgala-śūnyatā，對補特伽羅的空性認知）的無漏心時，此識才不行，有漏心時就會立即現起。與此菩薩相同，不能稱為舍。為什麼菩薩就可以稱為舍呢？

論：由此可知，他們的說法是不合理的。

述記：這是總結他們的說法是不對的。第八地（不動地，acalā bhūmi）以後的菩薩等，無漏相續，一切煩惱都不現行。雖然有煩惱的種子（bīja），但現行的煩惱都已斷盡，可以稱為舍。不是說七地（遠行地，dūrangamā bhūmi）之前的菩薩煩惱不起，怎麼能說舍呢？《抉擇分》第七十七、七十八，以及《菩薩地》第四十八，都說八地以後的一切菩薩，一切煩惱都不現行。所以這種解釋是不對的。前面兩位論師的說法就是這樣。

論：然而，阿羅漢（arhat）乃至認為是自內的我。

述記：下面總結正確的意義。暫且按照第一種解釋，直往菩薩八地以後，不是這裡所說的阿羅漢所包含的。因為還有煩惱的種子。三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的無學（aśaikṣa，不再需要學習的人）才能稱為舍。

第二位論師解釋，直往菩薩八地以後，是這裡所包含的。所以總的說阿羅漢舍。斷除種子，永遠降伏現行煩惱，都已斷盡，所以都稱為舍。

論：因此，永遠失去乃至第八識（阿賴耶識，ālayavijñāna）的體性。

述記：不再執藏，就說名為舍。不是說第八識的體性完全沒有了，才叫舍識。

完全沒有第八識，在道理上有什麼違背呢？

論：

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the arising of afflictions in Bodhisattvas, there are three aspects. The first is called 'non-defiled appearance,' meaning that afflictions arise due to having clear awareness (samprajanya, clear knowing of the activities of body and mind) and so on.

Treatise: In the first six consciousnesses (of a Bodhisattva), (the arising of such afflictions) is the same as that of a Stream-enterer (srota-apanna).

Commentary: The following is the sixth section. The treatise master raises a question: The afflictions that arise in the first six consciousnesses of a Bodhisattva who has entered a bhumi (stage), although not considered a fault because of having clear awareness, are intermittent and have coarse appearances, so they can be prevented from arising through clear awareness. However, the seventh consciousness (manas) is continuous, spontaneously active, and its appearance is not coarse. In a Bodhisattva who is still in the stage of learning (with remaining defilements), except during the state of non-defiled mind (anāsrava-citta) and cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti), this consciousness is clinging to the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna) during the time of defiled mind (sāsrava-citta). Isn't this the same as a Stream-enterer? Because of occasional clinging. Stream-enterers only do not have this consciousness active when entering the non-defiled mind of the view of emptiness of persons (pudgala-śūnyatā), but it immediately arises during the defiled mind. Being the same as this Bodhisattva, it cannot be called abandonment. Why can the Bodhisattva be called abandonment?

Treatise: From this, it is known that their explanation is unreasonable.

Commentary: This concludes that their explanation is incorrect. Bodhisattvas from the eighth bhumi (immovable bhumi, acalā bhūmi) onwards have a continuous stream of non-defiled consciousness, and all afflictions do not manifest. Although there are seeds (bīja) of afflictions, all manifesting afflictions are exhausted, so it can be called abandonment. It is not that afflictions do not arise in Bodhisattvas before the seventh bhumi (far-going bhumi, dūrangamā bhūmi), so how can it be called abandonment? The Discriminating Exposition sections seventy-seven and seventy-eight, and the Bodhisattva Bhumi section forty-eight, all say that all afflictions do not manifest in all Bodhisattvas from the eighth bhumi onwards. Therefore, this explanation is incorrect. This is the view of the first two teachers.

Treatise: However, an Arhat (arhat) even considers it as his inner self.

Commentary: The following concludes the correct meaning. For the time being, according to the first explanation, Bodhisattvas who directly progress from the eighth bhumi onwards are not included in the Arhats mentioned here, because they still have seeds of defilement. Only the non-learners (aśaikṣa) of the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna) can be called abandonment.

The second teacher explains that Bodhisattvas who directly progress from the eighth bhumi onwards are included here. Therefore, it is generally said that Arhats abandon. They have cut off the seeds, permanently subdued the manifesting afflictions, and exhausted them all, so they are all called abandonment.

Treatise: Therefore, there is permanent loss, even of the nature of the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna).

Commentary: No longer clinging, it is said to be called abandonment. It is not that the nature of the eighth consciousness is completely non-existent, that is called abandoning consciousness.

What contradiction is there in principle if the eighth consciousness is completely non-existent?

Treatise:

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勿阿羅漢至無餘涅槃。

述曰。無第八體。即阿羅漢無識持種。于金剛心正斷此時。即便應入無餘涅槃。以有漏果盡無識持種故。勿阿羅漢得有此事。故不得舍第八識體。此中說舍唯約執藏。以過重故。不約能所藏以為舍也。

論。然第八識至立種種名。

述曰。上來已廣阿羅漢訖。下正解舍　于中有二。初列異名。后頌以下方正明舍。一切有情皆有此體。故隨別義立種種名。名非一故。于有情中。有成就此名。不成就此名。如下分別。

論。謂或名心至所積集故。

述曰。梵云質多。此名心也。攝論第一云由種種法積集種子等。即積集義是心義。集起義是心義。以能集生多種子故。或能熏種於此識中。既積集已後起諸法。故說此識名為心義心．意．識中心之心也。何以得知心是此識。攝論等云心體第三離阿賴耶識不可得故。對法第二亦有心義。與此不同。彼攝法異。據一邊說。

論。或名阿陀那至令不壞故。

述曰。梵云阿陀那。此云執持。執持諸種．有色根故。此通凡．聖。攝論第一云爲取所依。唯在凡夫一染義說。非通諸聖。雜集論等．第七十三．解深密同此。亦能持根依。然據勝說。約根為論。至下自知。

論。或名所知至為依止故。

述曰。所知

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 從阿羅漢到無餘涅槃。

述曰：沒有第八識的身體，即阿羅漢沒有了能持種子的意識，在金剛心正確斷除煩惱的此時，就應該進入無餘涅槃。因為有漏的果報已經窮盡，沒有了能持種子的意識的緣故。不要讓阿羅漢有這樣的事情發生，所以不能捨棄第八識的身體。這裡所說的捨棄，只是針對執藏而言，因為執藏的過失太重。不是針對能藏和所藏而說的捨棄。

論：然而第八識到建立種種名稱。

述曰：上面已經廣泛地解釋了阿羅漢。下面正式解釋捨棄。其中有兩點：首先列出不同的名稱，然後用頌文以下的部分來正式說明捨棄。一切有情都有這個身體，所以根據不同的意義建立種種名稱。因為名稱不是唯一的，所以在有情中，有成就這個名稱的，也有不成就這個名稱的，如下面分別說明。

論：或者名為心，到所積集的緣故。

述曰：梵語叫質多（Citta），這裡翻譯為心。攝論第一說，由於種種法積集種子等，即積集的意思就是心的意思，集起的意思也是心的意思。因為它能集生多種子。或者能熏習種子在這個識中，既然積集之後就能生起諸法，所以說這個識名為心，是心、意、識中心的心。憑什麼知道心就是這個識呢？攝論等說，心的本體第三，離開了阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna）就不可得。對法第二也有心的意義，與這裡不同，它所攝的法不同，只是根據一邊來說。

論：或者名為阿陀那，到令不壞的緣故。

述曰：梵語叫阿陀那（Ādāna），這裡翻譯為執持。執持諸種子、有色根的緣故。這個通於凡夫和聖人。攝論第一說，爲了取得所依，只在凡夫一染義上說，不通於諸聖。雜集論等、第七十三、解深密經（Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra）也與此相同。也能執持根依，然而根據殊勝來說，就根而論，到下面自然會知道。

論：或者名為所知，到作為依止的緣故。

述曰：所知

【English Translation】 English version: From Arhat to Nirupadhisesa-nirvana (無餘涅槃).

Commentary: There is no eighth body, meaning an Arhat without the seed-holding consciousness. At the moment of correctly severing afflictions with the Vajra-like mind, one should enter Nirupadhisesa-nirvana. This is because the fruitions of contaminated actions are exhausted, and there is no seed-holding consciousness. Do not allow this to happen to an Arhat, therefore, one cannot abandon the body of the eighth consciousness. The abandonment mentioned here refers only to the 'clinging' aspect, because the fault of clinging is too severe. It does not refer to the abandonment of the 'container' and 'contained' aspects.

Treatise: However, the eighth consciousness... to establish various names.

Commentary: The above has extensively explained the Arhat. Below, it formally explains abandonment. There are two points: first, listing different names; then, using the verses below to formally explain abandonment. All sentient beings have this body, so various names are established according to different meanings. Because the names are not unique, among sentient beings, some achieve this name, and some do not, as explained separately below.

Treatise: Or it is called 'Mind'... because of what is accumulated.

Commentary: In Sanskrit, it is called Citta (質多), which is translated here as 'Mind'. The first chapter of the Saṃgrahaṇī states that due to various dharmas accumulating seeds, etc., the meaning of accumulation is the meaning of 'Mind', and the meaning of 'gathering' is also the meaning of 'Mind'. Because it can gather and produce various seeds. Or it can imprint seeds in this consciousness, and after accumulating, it can generate various dharmas. Therefore, this consciousness is called 'Mind', which is the 'Mind' in 'Mind, Intellect, Consciousness'. How do we know that 'Mind' is this consciousness? The Saṃgrahaṇī, etc., state that the third essence of 'Mind' is unattainable apart from the Ālaya-vijñāna (阿賴耶識). The second chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya also has the meaning of 'Mind', which is different from this. The dharmas it encompasses are different, and it is only based on one aspect.

Treatise: Or it is called Ādāna... so that it does not decay.

Commentary: In Sanskrit, it is called Ādāna (阿陀那), which is translated here as 'Grasping'. It grasps the various seeds and material faculties. This applies to both ordinary beings and sages. The first chapter of the Saṃgrahaṇī states that it is only spoken of in the context of the defiled meaning of ordinary beings, not applying to all sages, in order to obtain what is relied upon. The Abhidharmasamuccaya, the seventy-third chapter, and the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (解深密經) are the same as this. It can also hold the root-basis, but according to the superior explanation, it is discussed in terms of the root. You will naturally know below.

Treatise: Or it is called 'That which is Known'... because it is a basis.

Commentary: 'That which is Known'

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者。即三性與彼為依名所知依。即攝論第一所知依品是。此所知依阿賴耶識之別名也。故中邊云。虛妄分別有。於此二都無。此中唯有空　是故三性法。皆依此識有。

論。或名種子識至諸種子故。

述曰。即與諸法為種子義。前第一名心是積集種在其中義。今此取能生諸法義。故二差別。攝論無此一名。如雜集第二．瑜伽七十三。皆有此名。

論。此等諸名通一切位。

述曰。此言等者。如小乘名根本識。如攝論第二卷初。亦名第八識。亦名為意。及寶性論等眾名。如別抄說。此通有無漏．及若凡若聖。名一切位。即是相續執持位名。

論。或名阿賴耶至自內我故。

述曰。能藏．所藏．執藏義故。與雜染法互為緣故。我見緣故　此文雜染。能所藏中唯有能藏。令雜染等法不失故　我愛緣之為執藏義。即識為所藏　又始終為論此能執藏亦通無漏。始終為論此為所藏不通無漏。諸佛位中非所藏故。我執已盡。又不熏故。此中名藏故不取能藏。唯在因中以得其名。故略不論染為能藏義。

論。此名唯在至執藏義故。

述曰。此在異生．二乘有學．七地已前菩薩。現行我愛緣故　若爾二乘金剛心時有學所攝。何故不除　略故不說。初師第三隨理應說。非無學位．及不退

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

這是指三自性與阿賴耶識相互依存，因此阿賴耶識也被稱為『所知依』（ālambana，認識的基礎）。這在《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第一品『所知依品』中有詳細闡述。『所知依』是阿賴耶識的另一個名稱。因此，《中邊分別論》（Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya）中說：『虛妄分別存在，但其中沒有能取和所取。其中只有空性，因此三自性法都依賴於這個識而存在。』 論：或者稱為『種子識』（bīja-vijñāna），因為它包含所有種子。 述記：這意味著阿賴耶識具有作為諸法種子的意義。前面第一個名稱『心』（citta）是指積聚種子在其中的含義。現在這個名稱指的是能夠產生諸法的含義。因此，這兩個名稱有所不同。《攝大乘論》中沒有這個名稱，但在《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第二和《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第七十三中都有這個名稱。 論：這些名稱可以通用於一切階段。 述記：這裡說的『等』，例如小乘佛教稱之為『根本識』（mūla-vijñāna）。如《攝大乘論》第二捲開頭，也稱之為『第八識』（aṣṭama-vijñāna），也稱為『意』（manas），以及《寶性論》（Ratnagotravibhāga）等中的眾多名稱，如其他抄本所說。這些名稱可以通用於有漏和無漏，以及凡夫和聖人的一切階段。指的是相續執持位的名稱。 論：或者稱為『阿賴耶』（ālaya），因為它具有能藏、所藏、執藏的含義，與雜染法互為因緣，並且是我見（ātma-dṛṣṭi）的緣故。 述記：這段文字指的是雜染法。在能藏和所藏中，只有能藏，因為它使雜染等法不會消失。我愛（ātma-sneha）的緣故是執藏的含義，即識是所藏。此外，從始終的角度來說，這個能執藏也通於無漏。從始終的角度來說，這個所藏不通於無漏，因為在諸佛的果位中，它不是所藏，因為我執已經斷盡，並且不再被熏習。這裡稱為『藏』，因此不取能藏的含義，只在因位中得到這個名稱。因此，略而不論染法作為能藏的含義。 論：這個名稱只存在於異生（pṛthagjana，凡夫）、二乘有學（śaikṣa，有待學習者）、七地（saptama-bhūmi）之前的菩薩中，因為他們有現行的我愛。 述記：如果這樣，二乘在金剛心（vajra-citta）時仍然屬於有學，為什麼不去除這個名稱呢？因為這裡省略了。初師的第三種觀點應該按照道理來說明。非無學位（aśaikṣa，無學）以及不退轉者（avaivartika）。

【English Translation】 English version:

That is, the three natures and the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) are mutually dependent, hence it is known as 『ālambana』 (support of cognition). This is explained in detail in the 『Ālambana-pariccheda』 (Support of Cognition Chapter), the first chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna). 『Ālambana』 is another name for the Ālaya-vijñāna. Therefore, the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (Commentary on the Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes) says: 『Imaginary discrimination exists, but there is neither grasper nor grasped in it. Only emptiness exists in it, therefore all three natures exist dependent on this consciousness.』 Treatise: Or it is called 『bīja-vijñāna』 (seed consciousness) because it contains all the seeds. Commentary: This means that the Ālaya-vijñāna has the meaning of being the seed of all dharmas. The first name 『citta』 (mind) refers to the meaning of accumulating seeds within it. Now this name refers to the meaning of being able to produce all dharmas. Therefore, these two names are different. This name is not found in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, but it is found in the second chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) and the seventy-third chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice). Treatise: These names can be applied to all stages. Commentary: The 『etc.』 here refers to names such as 『mūla-vijñāna』 (root consciousness) in Hīnayāna Buddhism. As in the beginning of the second chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, it is also called 『aṣṭama-vijñāna』 (eighth consciousness), also called 『manas』 (mind), and numerous names in the Ratnagotravibhāga (Treatise on the Jewel Nature), as stated in other commentaries. These names can be applied to all stages of defiled and undefiled, as well as ordinary beings and sages. It refers to the name of the continuous upholding stage. Treatise: Or it is called 『ālaya』 (storehouse) because it has the meaning of being able to store, being stored, and holding, being the cause of mutual conditioning with defiled dharmas, and being the cause of self-view (ātma-dṛṣṭi). Commentary: This passage refers to defiled dharmas. Among the able to store and being stored, there is only the able to store, because it prevents defiled dharmas from disappearing. The cause of self-love (ātma-sneha) is the meaning of holding, that is, the consciousness is what is stored. In addition, from beginning to end, this able to hold is also applicable to the undefiled. From beginning to end, this being stored is not applicable to the undefiled, because in the stage of the Buddhas, it is not what is stored, because self-grasping has been completely eliminated, and it is no longer conditioned. Here it is called 『storehouse』, therefore the meaning of able to store is not taken, only in the causal stage is this name obtained. Therefore, the meaning of defiled dharmas as the able to store is briefly not discussed. Treatise: This name only exists in ordinary beings (pṛthagjana), śaikṣa (learners) of the Two Vehicles, and Bodhisattvas before the seventh ground (saptama-bhūmi), because they have manifest self-love. Commentary: If so, why is this name not removed when the Two Vehicles are still included in the śaikṣa at the time of the vajra-citta (diamond mind)? Because it is omitted here. The third view of the initial teacher should be explained according to reason. Not aśaikṣa (non-learners) and avaivartika (non-retrogression).

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菩薩。以彼非有雜染品法執藏義故。此中長讀文勢亦遠謂非無學．及不退菩薩。有此雜染執藏之義。即無學聖．不退菩薩無此我愛執藏位名。

論。或名異熟識至異熟果故。

述曰。此意顯是引果義故。有漏無記名為異熟。與因異故。從異熟因所生起故。無漏是善非名異熟。非與因異。及異熟因生故。

論。此名唯在至無記法故。

述曰。此名唯在異生．二乘有學無學．及第十地已還菩薩皆有此名。有漏果故　金剛心菩薩。云何猶有異熟識名。有漏皆舍故　由此義故種子生現異時說云。此心菩薩未舍此識。以此文證。如來地方舍故。若不爾者。爾時已舍何不名佛。及不說此位已舍此識。既不名佛。及不說舍。明圓鏡智此時未生。入如來地方舍此識智方生故　若說金剛心已舍此識。今此但約多分為論。亦不相違。其如來地純無漏善。無無記故。如佛地論第三．四等諸諍中說。此小乘名窮生死蘊．有分識等。與異熟識分位相似。生死盡故。若約斷縛說。即二乘無學無有此名。彼二乘無學已斷生死縛故。前解為勝。八地菩薩分段生盡。不名舍此異熟識故。更無死此生彼處故。此準能緣以分三位　一補特伽羅我見相應位。名染污末那緣阿賴耶　二法我見相應名不染末那緣異熟識　三但為末那緣阿陀識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 菩薩，因為阿賴耶識沒有雜染品法執藏的含義。這裡長篇累牘地論述，也是爲了說明並非無學和不退轉菩薩沒有這種雜染執藏的含義。也就是說，無學聖者和不退轉菩薩沒有這種我愛執藏的位名。

論：或者稱為異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識），因為它能產生異熟果（Vipāka-phala，果報果）。

述記：這段話的意思是說，因為能引生果報的緣故，有漏無記法被稱為異熟，因為它與因不同。因為它從異熟因所生起。無漏法是善的，所以不稱為異熟，因為它與因不異，也不是從異熟因所生。

論：這個名稱只存在於異生（Pṛthag-jana，凡夫）、二乘（Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyekabuddha-yāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的有學（Śaikṣa，還在學習的聖者）、無學（Arhat，阿羅漢，已完成學習的聖者），以及第十地（Daśabhūmi，菩薩十地）之前的菩薩，因為他們都有有漏果。

金剛心菩薩（Vajra-citta Bodhisattva，即將成佛的菩薩），為什麼還有異熟識的名稱呢？因為他們還沒有捨棄有漏法。因此，根據種子生起現行的異時性來說，可以說這位菩薩還沒有捨棄這個識。以此文證，只有在如來地（Tathāgata-bhūmi，佛的境界）才能捨棄。如果不是這樣，那麼如果那時已經捨棄了，為什麼不稱為佛呢？而且也沒有說這個位次已經捨棄了這個識。既然不稱為佛，也沒有說捨棄，說明大圓鏡智（Ādarśa-jñāna，佛的四智之一）此時還沒有生起。進入如來地才能捨棄這個識，智慧才能生起。如果說金剛心菩薩已經捨棄了這個識，那麼現在這只是就大多數情況而言，也不矛盾。因為如來地純粹是無漏善法，沒有無記法。正如《佛地論》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra）第三、四卷等所說的各種爭論。這個小乘（Hīnayāna，小乘佛教）的名稱窮盡了生死蘊（Skandha，五蘊）和有分識等，與異熟識的分位相似，因為生死已經窮盡。如果從斷除束縛來說，那麼二乘的無學就沒有這個名稱，因為他們已經斷除了生死束縛。前一種解釋更好。八地菩薩（Aṣṭamabhūmi Bodhisattva，八地菩薩）的分段生死已經窮盡，所以不稱為捨棄了這個異熟識，因為他們不再有從這裡死亡到那裡出生的過程。以此為準，可以根據能緣來劃分三個位次：一、與補特伽羅（Pudgala，補特伽羅，一種常一主宰的『我』的觀念）我見相應的位次，稱為染污末那（Kliṣṭa-manas，染污的意根）緣阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，藏識）；二、與法我見相應的位次，稱為不染污末那（Akliṣṭa-manas，不染污的意根）緣異熟識；三、僅僅是末那緣阿陀那識（Ādāna-vijñāna，執持識）。

【English Translation】 English version Bodhisattvas, because the Ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness) does not have the meaning of clinging to defiled dharmas. The lengthy discussion here is also to explain that it is not that non-learners (Arhats) and non-retrogressing Bodhisattvas do not have this meaning of clinging to defilements. That is to say, non-learning saints and non-retrogressing Bodhisattvas do not have this positional name of clinging to self-love.

Treatise: Or it is called Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) because it produces Vipāka-phala (resultant fruit).

Commentary: The meaning of this passage is to show that because it can produce resultant retribution, the defiled and indeterminate is called Vipāka (resultant), because it is different from the cause. Because it arises from the Vipāka cause. The undefiled is good, so it is not called Vipāka, because it is not different from the cause, nor is it born from the Vipāka cause.

Treatise: This name only exists in Pṛthag-jana (ordinary beings), Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyekabuddha-yāna (the Hearer Vehicle and Solitary Realizer Vehicle) learners (Śaikṣa), non-learners (Arhats), and Bodhisattvas before the tenth ground (Daśabhūmi), because they all have defiled results.

Why does a Vajra-citta Bodhisattva (diamond mind Bodhisattva, a Bodhisattva about to attain Buddhahood) still have the name of Vipāka-vijñāna? Because they have not yet abandoned the defiled. Therefore, according to the heterochrony of the arising of phenomena from seeds, it can be said that this Bodhisattva has not yet abandoned this consciousness. As evidenced by this text, it is only in the Tathāgata-bhūmi (Buddha-ground) that it can be abandoned. If not, then if it had already been abandoned at that time, why not call it Buddha? And it is not said that this position has abandoned this consciousness. Since it is not called Buddha and it is not said to be abandoned, it shows that the Ādarśa-jñāna (Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom) has not yet arisen at this time. Entering the Tathāgata-bhūmi can abandon this consciousness, and wisdom can arise. If it is said that the Vajra-citta Bodhisattva has already abandoned this consciousness, then this is only in terms of the majority of cases, and it is not contradictory. Because the Buddha-ground is purely undefiled and good, without indeterminate dharmas. As stated in the various disputes in the third and fourth volumes of the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra (Treatise on the Buddha-Ground), etc. This Hīnayāna (Small Vehicle) name exhausts the Skandha (five aggregates) of birth and death, and the Bhavāṅga-sota (life-continuum consciousness), etc., which are similar to the positions of Vipāka-vijñāna, because birth and death have been exhausted. If speaking in terms of cutting off bonds, then the non-learners of the Two Vehicles do not have this name, because they have already cut off the bonds of birth and death. The former explanation is better. The segmented birth and death of the eighth-ground Bodhisattva (Aṣṭamabhūmi Bodhisattva) has been exhausted, so it is not called abandoning this Vipāka-vijñāna, because they no longer have the process of dying here and being born there. Based on this, the three positions can be divided according to the object of cognition: First, the position corresponding to the Pudgala (self, a concept of a permanent and independent 'self') self-view is called Kliṣṭa-manas (defiled mind) that cognizes the Ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness); second, the position corresponding to the dharma self-view is called Akliṣṭa-manas (undefiled mind) that cognizes the Vipāka-vijñāna; third, it is only the Manas (mind) that cognizes the Ādāna-vijñāna (grasping consciousness).

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。若平等性智相應。通緣三位。七地以前緣阿賴耶。執藏之義未舍。故緣餘二可知。仍加緣無垢識。以能緣從所緣分三。所緣亦從能緣分三。

論。或名無垢識至所依止故。

述曰。唯無漏依。體性無垢。先名阿末羅識。或名阿摩羅識。古師立為第九識者。非也。然楞伽經有九種識。如上下會。此無垢識。是圓鏡智相應識名。轉因第八心體得之。

論。此名唯在至第八識故。

述曰。今顯此識唯如來有。無漏善法不可熏故。即顯無漏諸法種子。皆是因中已熏滿足。佛果已去更無熏習。前佛后佛無差別故。功能齊故。若受熏時功德異故。如佛地論。有為無漏皆不受熏。是無漏故。如涅槃等。金剛心菩薩等既有二說。若已起者。時少故不說。

論。如契經說至圓鏡智相應。

述曰。此即如來功德莊嚴經頌也。證無垢識圓鏡智俱。此頌易知故不須釋　界者。性義等如下當解。然此本識三位差別。下第七識三位別中。自當別對鉅細料簡　何故此中不說根本識。有分識．窮生死蘊名。攝論第二說。阿賴耶識為性。心為性。阿陀那識為性。阿賴耶為性。此末一名是薩婆多阿含經中愛．樂．欣．喜之名。彼經不說有識言故。此中不說小乘之名　答此等在後證中說故。所以此中略而不論。又前第

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果與平等性智（Samatajnana，四智之一，能平等看待一切事物）相應，則普遍緣於三種狀態。七地菩薩以前緣于阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，第八識，含藏一切種子），因為執藏的意義尚未捨棄。所以緣于其餘兩種狀態是可以理解的。仍然加上緣于無垢識（Amala-vijnana，第九識，純凈無染），因為能緣是從所緣劃分出三種，所緣也是從能緣劃分出三種。

論：或者名為無垢識，直至所依止的緣故。

述曰：唯有無漏法（Anasrava-dharma，超越煩惱的法）才能作為所依。體性無垢，先前名為阿末羅識（Amala-vijnana，第九識的另一種稱呼），或者名為阿摩羅識（Amala-vijnana，第九識的另一種稱呼）。古代的法師立為第九識的說法是不正確的。然而《楞伽經》（Lankavatara Sutra）中有九種識，如上下會所說。此無垢識是與圓鏡智（Adarsa-jnana，四智之一，如明鏡般反映一切事物）相應的識的名稱，通過轉因第八識的心體而獲得。

論：此名稱唯在佛果位有，直至第八識的緣故。

述曰：現在顯示此識唯有如來（Tathagata，佛的稱號）才有。因為無漏善法不可熏習。即顯示無漏諸法的種子，都是因地中已經熏習滿足的。佛果位以後更沒有熏習。前佛后佛沒有差別，因為功能相同。如果接受熏習時，功德會有差異。如《佛地論》（Buddhabhumika-sastra）所說，有為無漏法都不接受熏習，因為是無漏的，如涅槃（Nirvana，寂滅）等。金剛心菩薩（Vajracitta Bodhisattva）等既有兩種說法。如果已經生起，因為時間短暫所以不說。

論：如契經所說，與圓鏡智相應。

述曰：此即如來功德莊嚴經的偈頌。證明無垢識與圓鏡智同時存在。此偈頌容易理解所以不需要解釋。界（Dhatu）的性義等，如下文將要解釋。然而此本識有三種狀態的差別。下文第七識的三種狀態差別中，自然會分別對比大小進行詳細考察。為什麼此處不說根本識（Mula-vijnana，阿賴耶識的別名）、有分識（Bhavanga-citta，生命流轉的識）、窮生死蘊名（蘊：構成個體的五種要素，色、受、想、行、識）？《攝大乘論》（Mahayana-samgraha）第二說，阿賴耶識為自性，心為自性，阿陀那識（Adana-vijnana，執持識）為自性，阿賴耶為自性。此末一名是薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，一切有部）阿含經（Agama，佛教經典）中愛、樂、欣、喜的名稱。彼經沒有說有識的言論，所以此處不說小乘（Hinayana，聲聞乘）的名稱。回答：這些在後面的論證中說明，所以此處省略而不論。又前第

【English Translation】 English version: If it corresponds to Samatajnana (Wisdom of Equality, one of the Four Wisdoms, which can view all things equally), it universally relates to the three states. Before the seventh Bhumi (stage of Bodhisattva), it relates to Alaya-vijnana (Storehouse Consciousness, the eighth consciousness, containing all seeds), because the meaning of clinging is not yet abandoned. Therefore, it is understandable that it relates to the other two states. It still adds relating to Amala-vijnana (Immaculate Consciousness, the ninth consciousness, pure and undefiled), because the subject of cognition is divided into three from the object of cognition, and the object of cognition is also divided into three from the subject of cognition.

Treatise: Or it is named Immaculate Consciousness, until the reason for the basis of reliance.

Commentary: Only Anasrava-dharma (undefiled dharma, dharma beyond afflictions) can serve as the basis of reliance. Its nature is immaculate, previously named Amala-vijnana (another name for the ninth consciousness), or named Amala-vijnana. The ancient teachers' establishment of the ninth consciousness is incorrect. However, the Lankavatara Sutra (Descent to Lanka Sutra) has nine kinds of consciousness, as mentioned in the upper and lower sections. This Immaculate Consciousness is the name of the consciousness corresponding to Adarsa-jnana (Mirror-like Wisdom, one of the Four Wisdoms, reflecting all things like a clear mirror), obtained by transforming the mind-essence of the eighth consciousness.

Treatise: This name exists only in the Buddha-fruit position, until the eighth consciousness.

Commentary: Now it is shown that this consciousness is only possessed by the Tathagata (the title of Buddha). Because undefiled good dharma cannot be perfumed. It shows that the seeds of all undefiled dharmas are already fully perfumed in the causal ground. After the Buddha-fruit position, there is no more perfuming. There is no difference between the previous Buddha and the later Buddha, because the functions are the same. If it accepts perfuming, the merits will be different. As stated in the Buddhabhumika-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Buddhahood), conditioned undefiled dharmas do not accept perfuming, because they are undefiled, such as Nirvana (extinction). There are two views on Vajracitta Bodhisattva (Diamond Mind Bodhisattva). If it has already arisen, it is not mentioned because the time is short.

Treatise: As the Sutra says, it corresponds to Mirror-like Wisdom.

Commentary: This is the verse from the Tathagata's Meritorious Adornment Sutra. It proves that Immaculate Consciousness and Mirror-like Wisdom exist simultaneously. This verse is easy to understand, so it does not need to be explained. The nature of Dhatu (realm), etc., will be explained below. However, this fundamental consciousness has three different states. In the three different states of the seventh consciousness below, there will naturally be separate comparisons of size and detailed examination. Why are the Mula-vijnana (Root Consciousness, another name for Alaya-vijnana), Bhavanga-citta (Life-stream Consciousness), and the name of the aggregates that exhaust life and death (Skandha: the five elements that constitute an individual, form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness) not mentioned here? The second chapter of the Mahayana-samgraha (Compendium of Mahayana) says that Alaya-vijnana is the nature, mind is the nature, Adana-vijnana (Grasping Consciousness) is the nature, and Alaya is the nature. This last name is the name of love, joy, delight, and happiness in the Agama (Buddhist scriptures) of the Sarvastivada (Everything Exists School). That scripture does not say there are words of consciousness, so the name of Hinayana (the Vehicle of Hearers) is not mentioned here. Answer: These are explained in the subsequent proofs, so they are omitted here. Also, the previous

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一解通名中心等通故。等中亦等更不須顯。準義令知　然此位總有三。謂我愛執藏位等。如前卷說準此名知。

問名有眾多。此論頌中偏說阿賴耶。何不說餘者。

論。阿賴耶名至此中偏說。

述曰。雜染執藏過失重故。有漏二位名最初舍故。以二義故此中偏說　唯說阿羅漢舍。不說舍異熟識等。此據舍縛。若據異熟識舍時。即阿賴耶同。故以體說異熟識舍。不說依縛異熟舍位。

論。異熟識體至涅槃時舍。

述曰。前言識名通局。不論舍之位次　阿賴耶名以下。方明眾名舍之位次　將得菩提舍異熟名。無間．解脫。將得．正得二釋。此中皆名將得。然準下說此為二義　一云種生現同時有二。護法雲金剛心與異熟識俱生。解脫道是菩提。與圓鏡智俱起。如世第一法舍異生性。正舍名舍。菩提在未來。故名將得　二云亦種生現行同時義。金剛心生異熟識滅。菩提在當解脫道時。得與成熟既無別體。其時已舍異熟識。菩提將成熟。故名為將得。其種生現異時同前。初師初得名得。得已成就。金剛心與異熟識俱生。解脫道在未來。各為將得。爾時舍異熟識。異熟識雖在現在。名為正舍。如世第一法舍異生性等。義說成就與得差別。實無別體　此並護法弟子。種生現時二家異說　問何故前明識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『一解通名中心等通故』。『等中亦等更不須顯』，按照文義可以理解。然而此位總共有三種，即我愛執藏位等等，如前卷所說，參照此名稱可以知曉。

問：名稱有很多，此論頌中偏偏只說阿賴耶（Ālayavijñāna，藏識），為什麼不說其他的呢？

論：阿賴耶（Ālayavijñāna，藏識）這個名稱在此處特別說明。

述曰：因為雜染執藏的過失嚴重，有漏二位的名稱最初被捨棄。因為這兩個原因，所以在此處特別說明。只是說阿羅漢（Arhat）捨棄，沒有說捨棄異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）等等。這是根據捨棄束縛來說的。如果根據異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）捨棄的時候，就和阿賴耶（Ālayavijñāna，藏識）相同。所以用本體來說異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）的捨棄，沒有說依靠束縛的異熟舍位。

論：異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）的本體到涅槃（Nirvana）時捨棄。

述曰：前面說識的名稱的通用和侷限，沒有說捨棄的位次。阿賴耶（Ālayavijñāna，藏識）這個名稱以下，才說明眾多名稱捨棄的位次。將要得到菩提（Bodhi）時捨棄異熟（Vipāka）之名，『無間』、『解脫』，將要得到、正得到，有兩種解釋。此處都名為將要得到。然而按照下文所說，這有兩種含義。一種說法是種子生出現行同時有二。護法（Dharmapāla）說金剛心和異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）同時產生，解脫道是菩提（Bodhi），和圓鏡智同時生起。如同世第一法捨棄異生性，正捨棄名為捨棄。菩提（Bodhi）在未來，所以名為將要得到。另一種說法是種子生出現行同時義。金剛心生起異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）滅。菩提（Bodhi）在當解脫道時，得到和成熟既然沒有別的本體，那個時候已經捨棄異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）。菩提（Bodhi）將要成熟，所以名為將要得到。種子生出現異時和前面相同。初師初得名得，得已成就。金剛心和異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）同時產生，解脫道在未來，各自為將要得到。爾時捨棄異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）。異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）雖然在現在，名為正捨棄。如同世第一法捨棄異生性等等。義說成就和得到的差別，實際沒有別的本體。這些都是護法（Dharmapāla）弟子的，種子生現時兩家的不同說法。問：為什麼前面說明識

【English Translation】 English version 『One explanation is that the name universally applies because the center is universally connected.』 『Among equals, equality is self-evident and needs no further clarification.』 The meaning can be understood accordingly. However, this position has three aspects in total, namely the position of attachment to self-love, the position of clinging to the storehouse consciousness, etc., as mentioned in the previous chapter. This name can be understood by referring to that.

Question: There are many names. Why does this treatise's verse specifically mention Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) and not the others?

Treatise: The name Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) is specifically discussed here.

Commentary: Because the faults of defiled clinging to the storehouse are serious, and because the names of the two positions with outflows are initially abandoned. For these two reasons, it is specifically discussed here. It only mentions the Arhat's abandonment, not the abandonment of Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness), etc. This is based on abandoning bondage. If based on the time of abandoning Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness), it is the same as Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness). Therefore, the abandonment of Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) is discussed in terms of its essence, without mentioning the position of Vipāka (resultant) that relies on bondage.

Treatise: The essence of Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) is abandoned at the time of Nirvana.

Commentary: The previous statement about the generality and specificity of the name 'consciousness' did not discuss the order of abandonment. From the name Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) onwards, the order of abandoning various names is clarified. When about to attain Bodhi, the name Vipāka (resultant) is abandoned. 'Without interval' and 'liberation' refer to 'about to attain' and 'actually attaining'. Both are interpreted as 'about to attain' here. However, according to what is said below, there are two meanings to this. One explanation is that the seed-generation and manifestation occur simultaneously in two ways. Dharmapāla (protector of Dharma) says that the Vajra mind and Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) arise simultaneously, and the path of liberation is Bodhi, which arises simultaneously with the Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom. Just as the World's First Dharma abandons the nature of an ordinary being, actual abandonment is called abandonment. Bodhi is in the future, so it is called 'about to attain'. Another explanation is that the seed-generation and manifestation occur simultaneously. When the Vajra mind arises, Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) ceases. Bodhi is attained at the time of the path of liberation, and since attainment and maturation have no separate essence, Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) has already been abandoned at that time. Bodhi is about to mature, so it is called 'about to attain'. The seed-generation and manifestation at different times are the same as before. The initial teacher calls the initial attainment 'attainment', and after attainment, it is accomplished. The Vajra mind and Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) arise simultaneously, and the path of liberation is in the future, each being 'about to attain'. At that time, Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) is abandoned. Although Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) is in the present, it is called 'actual abandonment', just as the World's First Dharma abandons the nature of an ordinary being, etc. The difference between accomplishment and attainment is explained in terms of meaning, but there is actually no separate essence. These are different explanations from the two schools of Dharmapāla's (protector of Dharma) disciples regarding seed-generation and manifestation. Question: Why did the previous explanation clarify consciousness

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名通局次第不同。今者次第與前乃別　答彼約寬狹先寬后狹。此約斷位性相求故。故與前別　二乘正入無餘時舍。若是菩薩金剛心舍。不行名舍。非斷縛義。

論。無垢識體至無盡時故。

述曰。以大乘人不入寂滅故。如抉擇分有餘依地。問佛．及聲聞無餘何別。彼言不別者。彼答苦依盡真如為論。非謂入寂為同答也。阿賴耶識上已說舍不須重說。

論。心等通故隨義應說。

述曰。謂此心等隨染愛藏。隨是何乘。金剛心位．及或八地已去方舍。若異熟位亦舍心者。即二乘入涅槃時舍。無漏心者無有舍時　心言等者。謂所知依。執持識等　或心義者。菩薩因中。二乘無學實有熏習。佛無熏習。前有熏習。熏習之種如來亦有。亦得名心。

論。然第八識至執受處境。

述曰。前來八段十義解本頌訖。此下第二總料簡之。此識因果三乘而論。總有二位。一有漏位。即十地菩薩。二乘無學已前諸位。唯無記性。異熟所攝。雖無學等已斷諸業。先業招故。舊業勢分亦名異熟　唯與觸等五數相應。但緣前說執受根身．種子．處境　處謂處所。此有三門。謂性．俱．境。前十門中與佛不同。此中分別。同者不論　謂自相．果相．及舍三門次前已說。有言有漏位。即顯前二．及后一門。其因相

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 名相通達的局面次第有所不同。現在所說的次第與之前不同。問：之前的次第是按照寬泛到狹窄的順序，先寬后窄。答：這裡是按照斷除的位次、自性與現象來探求，所以與之前不同。二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）真正進入無餘涅槃時就捨棄了阿賴耶識。如果是菩薩，在金剛心位捨棄阿賴耶識，這不稱為『舍』，並非斷除繫縛的意義。

論：無垢識的本體直至無盡時都存在。

述記：因為大乘人不入寂滅涅槃。如《抉擇分》所說，還有餘依地。問：佛和聲聞的無餘涅槃有什麼區別？如果他們說沒有區別，那麼他們的回答是就苦依滅盡、顯現真如而言，並非說進入寂滅涅槃是相同的。阿賴耶識上面已經說過捨棄的問題，不需要重複說明。

論：心等法普遍相通，所以根據意義應該說明。

述記：這裡所說的心等法，隨著染愛而藏伏。隨著是哪個乘，在金剛心位或者八地以上才捨棄。如果異熟位也捨棄心，那麼就是二乘入涅槃時捨棄。無漏心沒有捨棄的時候。心言『等』，是指所知依、執持識等。或者『心』的意義是，菩薩在因地，二乘的無學果位，實際上有熏習。佛沒有熏習。之前有熏習，熏習的種子如來也有，也可以稱為『心』。

論：然而第八識（阿賴耶識）乃至執受處境。

述記：前面八段十義解釋了本頌完畢。下面第二部分總括地簡要分析。這個識，從因果和三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的角度來說，總共有兩個位次：一是有漏位，即十地菩薩、二乘無學之前的各個位次，只有無記性，屬於異熟所攝。雖然無學等已經斷除了各種業，但由於先前的業力招感，舊業的勢力仍然可以稱為異熟。只與觸等五種心所相應，只緣前文所說的執受根身、種子、處境。『處』是指處所。這裡有三個方面：自性、俱生、境界。前面十個方面中與佛不同的，這裡分別說明，相同的就不說了。自相、果相、以及捨棄這三個方面，緊接前面已經說過。說『有漏位』，就顯示了前面兩個以及後面一個方面。其中的因相。

【English Translation】 English version: The circumstances of names being universally understood differ in sequence. The sequence now being discussed is different from before. Question: The previous sequence was from broad to narrow, first broad then narrow. Answer: This is based on seeking according to the stages of severance, nature, and characteristics, so it is different from before. The Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) truly relinquish the Ālaya-consciousness when entering Nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa (Nirvana without remainder). If it is a Bodhisattva, relinquishing the Ālaya-consciousness at the Vajra-like Samādhi (Diamond Mind) stage is not called 'relinquishing'; it does not mean severing bonds.

Treatise: The substance of the Immaculate Consciousness exists until the time of no end.

Commentary: Because Mahāyāna practitioners do not enter quiescent extinction. As the Discrimination Section states, there is still the Ground of Residual Basis. Question: What is the difference between the Buddha's and the Śrāvaka's Nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa? If they say there is no difference, then their answer is in terms of the exhaustion of the basis of suffering and the manifestation of Suchness; it does not mean that entering quiescent extinction is the same. The relinquishing of the Ālaya-consciousness has already been discussed above and does not need to be repeated.

Treatise: Because the mind and other factors are universally connected, they should be discussed according to their meaning.

Commentary: The mind and other factors mentioned here are concealed along with defiled love. Depending on which vehicle it is, relinquishing occurs at the Vajra-like Samādhi stage or from the Eighth Ground onwards. If the mind is also relinquished at the Vipāka (Resultant) stage, then it is relinquished when the Two Vehicles enter Nirvāṇa. The unconditioned mind has no time of relinquishing. The word 'other' in 'mind and other' refers to the basis of what is knowable, the sustaining consciousness, etc. Or, the meaning of 'mind' is that Bodhisattvas in the causal stage and Arhats (those beyond learning) of the Two Vehicles actually have habituation. Buddhas do not have habituation. Previously there was habituation, and the seeds of habituation are also present in the Tathāgata, and can also be called 'mind'.

Treatise: However, the Eighth Consciousness (Ālaya-consciousness) extends to the realm of what is sustained and the objective realm.

Commentary: The previous eight sections and ten meanings have completed the explanation of the original verse. The second part below provides a general and concise analysis. This consciousness, from the perspective of cause and effect and the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna), has two stages in total: one is the conditioned stage, which includes the Ten Grounds of Bodhisattvas and all stages before the Arhats of the Two Vehicles, and is only of indeterminate nature, belonging to the category of Vipāka. Although Arhats and others have already severed various karmas, due to the influence of previous karmic forces, the power of old karma can still be called Vipāka. It only corresponds to the five mental factors such as contact, and only cognizes the sustained root body, seeds, and objective realm mentioned earlier. 'Realm' refers to the location. There are three aspects here: nature, co-arising, and object. Among the previous ten aspects, the differences with the Buddha are explained here, and the similarities are not discussed. The self-nature, the resultant nature, and the relinquishing have been discussed immediately before. Saying 'conditioned stage' reveals the previous two and the last one. The causal aspect within them.

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一切種．不可知了．舍俱恒轉。通因果故。此中不說。唯性．俱．境因果不同。故今分別。然受相應恐濫因位。故無漏位標舉簡之。欲顯一類無改易故。

論。二無漏位唯善性攝。

述曰。此唯如來地。非菩薩．二乘。果未圓滿。功德劣故。四智未得故。此無漏位唯是善性。如來無有異熟法故。非業煩惱所招身故。一切功德皆圓滿故。無有不善。

論。與二十一至各五善十一。

述曰。假．實通說有二十一。謂不放逸．舍．及不害體假有故。若實而論唯有十八。不放逸．舍皆三善根．精進少分。不害無嗔善根分故。謂遍行．別境此二各五。並善十一故二十一也。

何故與遍行心所相應也。

論。與一切心恒相應故。

述曰。觸等五法與一切心恒相應故。無漏亦有。

何故有別境。

論。常樂證知所觀境故。

述曰。由此有欲。欲無減故。樂境相故。

論。于所觀境恒印持故。

述曰。故有勝解。勝解印持。佛于境無疑。恒有印持故。勝解無減。

論。于曾受境恒明記故。

述曰。由斯有念。謂于曾習境。有明記憶故。念無減也。

論。世尊無有不定心故。

述曰。故得有定。於一切時恒入定故。無有散心。定無

減也。

論。於一切法常抉擇故。

述曰。故言有惠。非少於境不知而說。亦非誤知。恒時抉擇故定有惠。惠無減也。故五別境亦得相應。若在因位一心一時不緣過．未。如來不爾。故念．欲俱　又彼如來。雖起念．欲追欣前後所有境相。然恒緣彼現世等法。而作證解一一而知。故念．欲俱也。

何以有善等十一。

論。極凈信等常相應故。

述曰。善十一數。法爾一切定心必俱。如來既得四證凈故。必信等俱。

論。無染污故。

述曰。貪等本六．及隨煩惱二十二法。性是染故必不俱有。

何故不與不定相應。

論。無散動故。

述曰。惡作．睡眠定心必無。唯散心有　尋．伺二種多發身．語門。是粗動攝。如來身．語任運現行恒時湛然。故無尋．伺　此尋．伺通無漏等不。下不定中自當解釋。然不說佛亦有尋伺　問不放逸依他假。如來之智說相應。尋．伺依思或依惠。如來應亦有　答曰不放逸等止於惡因果俱得有。尋．伺唯因位。如來故說無　問佛惡已除有不放逸。佛雖果滿應有尋．伺　答此發身．語。又非任運。佛已果滿。故不須之。惡須深防。功德雖滿。須不放逸等　問佛豈不發身．語等耶。許通無漏于理無防。何故不許　不爾便違十地等說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 減少。

論：因為對於一切法常常能做出決斷和抉擇。

述記：所以說具有智慧。不是因為對所緣境瞭解不足而說，也不是錯誤地瞭解。因為恒常能夠決斷和抉擇，所以必定具有智慧，智慧沒有減少。所以五別境（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）也能相應。如果在因位，一個心識一個時間不能緣過去、未來。如來不是這樣。所以念、欲都具有。而且如來，雖然生起念、欲來追憶欣樂過去所有的境相，但恒常緣于現世等法，而作證解，一一了知。所以念、欲都具有。

為什麼具有善等十一法？

論：因為極凈信等常常相應。

述記：善十一法，法爾如此，一切定心必定都具有。如來既然已經獲得四種證凈，必定具有信等。

論：因為沒有染污。

述記：貪等根本六煩惱，以及隨煩惱二十二法，性質是染污的，所以必定不具有。

為什麼不與不定法相應？

論：因為沒有散動。

述記：惡作（後悔）、睡眠，定心中必定沒有，只有散心中才有。尋、伺二種，多從身、語門發出，屬於粗動。如來的身、語任運現行，恒時湛然不動，所以沒有尋、伺。這尋、伺通於無漏等嗎？在下面的不定法中會解釋。然而不說佛也有尋伺。問：不放逸依他假立，如來的智慧說相應。尋、伺依思或者依慧，如來應該也有。答：不放逸等，止息惡的因和果都能有。尋、伺只在因位。如來所以說沒有。問：佛的惡已經去除，有不放逸。佛雖然果位圓滿，應該有尋、伺。答：這會引發身、語，又不是任運的。佛已經果位圓滿。所以不需要它。惡需要深深地防範。功德雖然圓滿。需要不放逸等。問：佛難道不引發身、語等嗎？允許通於無漏，在道理上沒有妨礙。為什麼不允許？如果這樣，就違背了十地等的說法。

【English Translation】 English version Reduction.

Treatise: Because one constantly makes decisive choices regarding all dharmas.

Commentary: Therefore, it is said to possess wisdom. It is not because of insufficient understanding of the object, nor is it a mistaken understanding. Because one is constantly able to make decisive choices, one certainly possesses wisdom, and wisdom is not diminished. Therefore, the five specific mental factors (desire, conviction, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) can also be associated. If in the causal stage, one mind at one time cannot focus on the past or future. The Tathagata is not like this. Therefore, both mindfulness and desire are present. Moreover, the Tathagata, although arising mindfulness and desire to recall and delight in all past object appearances, constantly focuses on present phenomena and other such dharmas, and makes realization and understanding, knowing each one individually. Therefore, both mindfulness and desire are present.

Why are the eleven wholesome factors present?

Treatise: Because utmost pure faith and other factors are constantly associated.

Commentary: The eleven wholesome factors are naturally such that all concentrated minds must possess them. Since the Tathagata has already attained the four kinds of pure faith, they must possess faith and other factors.

Treatise: Because there is no defilement.

Commentary: The six root afflictions such as greed, and the twenty-two secondary afflictions, are by nature defiled, so they certainly are not present.

Why are they not associated with the indeterminate factors?

Treatise: Because there is no distraction.

Commentary: Regret and sleep are certainly not present in a concentrated mind, only in a distracted mind. Initial application and sustained application mostly arise from the body and speech doors, and are included in coarse movement. The Tathagata's body and speech manifest effortlessly and are constantly serene, so there is no initial application or sustained application. Do these initial application and sustained application extend to the unconditioned and other factors? This will be explained in the section on indeterminate factors below. However, it is not said that the Buddha also has initial application and sustained application. Question: Non-carelessness is dependently imputed, and the Tathagata's wisdom is said to be associated with it. Initial application and sustained application rely on thought or wisdom, so the Tathagata should also have them. Answer: Non-carelessness and other factors can stop both the cause and effect of evil. Initial application and sustained application are only in the causal stage. Therefore, the Tathagata is said to not have them. Question: The Buddha's evil has already been removed, and there is non-carelessness. Although the Buddha's fruition is complete, they should have initial application and sustained application. Answer: This would initiate body and speech, and it is not effortless. The Buddha's fruition is already complete. So they are not needed. Evil needs to be deeply guarded against. Although merit is complete. Non-carelessness and other factors are needed. Question: Does the Buddha not initiate body and speech and other factors? Allowing it to extend to the unconditioned is not a hindrance in principle. Why is it not allowed? If so, it would contradict the teachings of the ten grounds and other teachings.

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。下自當知。

論。此亦唯與至平等轉故。

述曰。亦如本識因中。唯與舍受相應。恒任運轉故。不作分別故。非有易脫故。不可動搖故。如佛地論說不可動搖非如余智　依何靜慮而起此智　或說通四無色．色界六地。遊觀無漏通此地故。起現行者唯第四定。多依天住故。此智多分起大悲故。大悲唯在第四靜慮。此為德本。功德多依第四定故。如集論第七．雜集十四說　有說通下六定。無理遮故。色界有遍緣心。非無色故。無色設遍。不能唸唸遍緣一切。故唯色界六地中有。然恒處彼第四定者。以殊勝故。雖下地有。仍唯舍受。舍受寂靜無動搖故。不變易故。六十三說阿賴耶識與舍受俱。於三受位俱行不絕。所餘三受當知思惟之所引發非是俱生。時時作意引發現前。彼俱生受極微細故難可分別。此言三受即苦．樂．舍。謂余中者。此佛地中類因舍受。故不得起樂．喜二受。此乃思惟所引發故　有說唯是第四定有。餘地總無　六十九說如來功德多依第四。如入見道　以此準知。此三說中第一解勝。雖色．無色皆有此智修彼種增。必不現起。如三類邊所有等智。不易脫故。無動搖故。設通十地無漏地有。于理無妨。此唯遊觀。于理無違。此總第二辨相應門。

論。以一切法至一切法故。

述曰。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 下自當知。

論。此亦唯與至平等轉故。

述曰。亦如本識因中。唯與舍受（不苦不樂的感受）相應。恒任運轉故。不作分別故。非有易脫故。不可動搖故。如《佛地論》說不可動搖非如余智。依何靜慮而起此智？或說通四無色（四種無色定）。六地（欲界、色界、無色界）。遊觀無漏通此地故。起現行者唯第四定。多依天住故。此智多分起大悲故。大悲唯在第四靜慮。此為德本。功德多依第四定故。如《集論》第七、《雜集》十四說。有說通下六定。無理遮故。有遍緣心。非無色故。無色設遍。不能唸唸遍緣一切。故唯六地中有。然恒處彼第四定者。以殊勝故。雖下地有。仍唯舍受。舍受寂靜無動搖故。不變易故。《六十三》說阿賴耶識與舍受俱。於三受位俱行不絕。所餘三受當知思惟之所引發非是俱生。時時作意引發現前。彼俱生受極微細故難可分別。此言三受即苦（不適意的感受）、樂（舒適的感受）、舍（不苦不樂的感受）。謂余中者。此佛地中類因舍受。故不得起樂、喜二受。此乃思惟所引發故。有說唯是第四定有。餘地總無。六十九說如來功德多依第四。如入見道。以此準知。此三說中第一解勝。雖色、無色皆有此智修彼種增。必不現起。如三類邊所有等智。不易脫故。無動搖故。設通十地無漏地有。于理無妨。此唯遊觀。于理無違。此總第二辨相應門。

論。以一切法至一切法故。

述曰。

【English Translation】 English version The following will naturally be understood.

Treatise: This also only functions with equanimity.

Commentary: It is like the fundamental consciousness in the causal stage, which only corresponds to the feeling of equanimity (neither pleasant nor unpleasant). It constantly and naturally operates, without making distinctions, not easily detached, and unshakeable. As the Buddhabhumi Sutra states, it is unshakeable, unlike other wisdoms. Upon which dhyana (meditative absorption) does this wisdom arise? Some say it pervades the four arupa (formless realms), and the six planes (desire realm, form realm, formless realm), because it travels and observes the anasrava (untainted) throughout these planes. Those that manifest only arise from the fourth dhyana, mostly relying on dwelling in the heavens. This wisdom mostly arises from great compassion, and great compassion is only in the fourth dhyana. This is the root of virtue, and merits mostly rely on the fourth dhyana, as stated in the seventh chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the fourteenth chapter of the Samuccayavyakhya. Some say it pervades the lower six dhyanas, as there is no reason to prevent it. It has a mind that pervades all, and is not formless. Even if the formless realms pervade, they cannot pervasively cognize everything in every moment. Therefore, it only exists in the six planes. However, it constantly resides in that fourth dhyana because of its superior nature. Although it exists in the lower planes, it is still only equanimity. Equanimity is tranquil and unshakeable, and does not change easily. The Sixty-three states that the Alaya consciousness is always with equanimity. Among the three feelings, it continues without interruption. The remaining three feelings should be understood as being induced by thought and not being innate. They are induced and manifested by intention from time to time. Those innate feelings are extremely subtle and difficult to distinguish. These three feelings are duhkha (suffering, unpleasant feeling), sukha (pleasure, comfortable feeling), and upeksa (equanimity, neither pleasant nor unpleasant). As for the remaining ones, in this Buddhabhumi, they are similar to the causal equanimity. Therefore, the feelings of pleasure and joy cannot arise. These are induced by thought. Some say it only exists in the fourth dhyana, and is completely absent in other planes. The Sixty-nine states that the merits of the Tathagata (Buddha) mostly rely on the fourth dhyana, such as entering the path of seeing. Based on this, it can be known that the first explanation among these three is superior. Although both the form and formless realms have this wisdom, cultivating its seeds increases it, but it will not necessarily manifest. It is like the wisdom of the three types of boundaries. It is not easily detached and unshakeable. Even if it pervades the ten bhumis (grounds) of the anasrava (untainted) realms, there is no contradiction in principle. This only travels and observes, and there is no contradiction in principle. This is the second section, discussing the aspect of correspondence.

Treatise: Because of all dharmas (phenomena) to all dharmas.

Commentary:

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此辨緣境。緣十八界有為．無為。鏡智遍緣一切法故。心等自性及相應法皆悉能緣。見分亦現自證分影。及相應影。故名遍智。如第二卷已解。佛地第四．下第十卷諸門分別。下第七解轉何界識生鏡智等　上來總以十門分別第八識訖。此隨頌文。若相應法例本識者。即十一門。若別隨釋。即有無量。一一如前別門解釋。總是第一諸門分別釋頌文訖。

成唯識論述記卷第三(末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

成唯識論述記卷第四(本)

沙門基撰

次下第二以五教十理證有本識。于中有三。初問。次答。第三至第四卷云別有此識教理顯然下。總結勸信。

論。云何應知至有別自體。

述曰。此即外問。不言阿賴耶言第八識者。此言通故。不退菩薩。三乘無學。皆得有故。彼名既局。無學等無故。舉第八不言賴耶。如是諸處準此應知。如斷．常中言阿賴耶者。此從因為名　復言至轉位。即通二乘．菩薩十地為論。故非一向依此例說。此顯依初舍為名。彼意顯通諸位為文。故有二別　何故言離眼等識有別自體者。小乘等計。阿賴耶名我教亦有。如下別辨。然即六識更無別體。故今問言。云何得知離眼等識有別自體。若言識等。舉識等取余色等法。今言

等識。唯取余識不取色等　又準下說一切有中。破五取蘊非愛著處。計離色等無別自體。不唯在色。今者應言眼等識者。等取心所．及色法等。不離識故略不言色。舉王取臣不言心所。舉實取假不言得等。涅槃非愛境故此不論。是雖共許五取蘊外無別有體。此離識蘊不共許故。今總答之。

論。聖教正理為定量故。

述曰。答中有二。初總。次別。此即第一初舉教．理言識有體。此非世間現量境故。唯信聖言。及比知有。以此二量為決定證。故言定量。量謂量度揩定之義。如常應知。

次下初引教別答。后為理別答　就教中。初引不共大乘教。小乘不信故。次引共許小乘教。二宗皆信故　就不共教中有二。初以四頌三經證此識有。后立大乘至教量攝　初引經中有二。初別引經。后總指例。然二經攝論等同。一經諸論不有。初之二頌阿毗達磨經。后之二經文自彰顯。此之初經即攝論第一。彼無此等解。應勘彼文。

論。謂有大乘至契經中說。

述曰。此簡小乘阿毗達磨。是大乘故。阿毗達磨及契經言。如常分別。不言對有法言對法者。具軌．持義非有法故。義準因明。法與有法不定故不應為難。

已下經中皆有三。初引經頌。二長行別解。三末後總結。更于下文不繁指迷。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『等識』（deng shi）：指等等的識。這裡只取其餘的識，不取色等。又按照下文所說，一切有部中，破斥五取蘊（wu qu yun），認為不是愛著之處，計度離開色等沒有別的自體。不只是在色蘊中這樣認為。現在應當說眼等識，等等，包括心所（xin suo）、以及色法（se fa）等等。因為不離識的緣故，所以省略不說色。舉出君王來包括臣子，所以不說心所。舉出真實的來包括虛假的，所以不說『得』等等。涅槃（nie pan）不是愛著的對象，所以這裡不討論。雖然共同承認五取蘊之外沒有別的自體，但是這離開識蘊的觀點是不被共同認可的，所以現在總的回答。

論：聖教（sheng jiao）和正理（zheng li）是可靠的衡量標準。

述曰：回答中有兩個部分。首先是總的回答，然後是分別的回答。這裡是第一部分，首先提出聖教和正理，說明識是有自體的。因為這不是世間現量（xian liang）的境界，所以只能相信聖言（sheng yan），以及通過比量（bi liang）來了解它的存在。用這兩種量作為決定的證據，所以說是可靠的衡量標準。『量』的意思是衡量和確定。應該像平常一樣理解。

接下來，首先引用聖教來分別回答，然後用正理來分別回答。在聖教中，首先引用不共的大乘教義，因為小乘不相信。然後引用共同認可的小乘教義，因為兩個宗派都相信。在不共的教義中，首先用四頌三經來證明這個識的存在。然後確立大乘的地位，使其被教量所攝。首先引用經文，分為分別引用經文和總的指出例子。然而，兩部經被《攝大乘論》（She Da Cheng Lun）等所收錄是相同的。一部經是各種論典中所沒有的。最初的兩個頌出自《阿毗達磨經》（A Bi Da Mo Jing）。後面的兩個經文文義自然彰顯。這第一部經就是《攝大乘論》的第一部分。那裡沒有這樣的解釋，應該對照那裡的經文。

論：所謂大乘，乃至契經（qi jing）中說。

述曰：這裡簡別小乘的阿毗達磨。因為這是大乘的緣故。《阿毗達磨》和《契經》的說法，像平常一樣分別。不說『對有法』而說『對法』，是因為它具有規範和持守的意義，而不是有法。義理上可以參照因明（yin ming）。法和有法是不定的，所以不應該以此為難。

以下經文中都有三個部分：首先是引用經頌，然後是用長行文來分別解釋，最後是總結。在下面的文章中不再繁瑣地指出迷誤。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Deng shi' (等識): Refers to 'etcetera' consciousnesses. Here, only the remaining consciousnesses are taken, not including form, etc. Furthermore, according to what is said below, in the Sarvastivada (一切有部), the five aggregates of clinging (五取蘊, wu qu yun) are refuted, considering them not to be objects of attachment, and it is reckoned that apart from form, etc., there is no separate self-nature. This is not only considered to be the case within the form aggregate. Now, it should be said that eye consciousness, etc., includes mental factors (心所, xin suo), as well as form dharmas (色法, se fa), etc. Because they are not separate from consciousness, form is omitted. Mentioning the king includes the ministers, so mental factors are not mentioned. Mentioning the real includes the false, so 'attainment' etc., are not mentioned. Nirvana (涅槃, nie pan) is not an object of attachment, so it is not discussed here. Although it is commonly accepted that there is no separate self outside of the five aggregates of clinging, this view of being separate from the consciousness aggregate is not commonly accepted, so now a general answer is given.

Treatise: The sacred teachings (聖教, sheng jiao) and correct reasoning (正理, zheng li) are reliable standards of measurement.

Commentary: There are two parts to the answer. First, a general answer, then separate answers. This is the first part, first presenting the sacred teachings and correct reasoning, explaining that consciousness has a self-nature. Because this is not a realm of direct perception (現量, xian liang) in the world, one can only believe in the sacred words (聖言, sheng yan), and understand its existence through inference (比量, bi liang). Using these two means as conclusive evidence, it is said to be a reliable standard of measurement. 'Measurement' means measuring and determining. It should be understood as usual.

Next, first quoting the sacred teachings to answer separately, then using correct reasoning to answer separately. Within the sacred teachings, first quoting the uncommon Mahayana teachings, because the Hinayana does not believe. Then quoting the commonly accepted Hinayana teachings, because both schools believe. Within the uncommon teachings, first using four verses from three sutras to prove the existence of this consciousness. Then establishing the position of Mahayana, so that it is included within the scope of scriptural authority. First quoting the sutras, divided into quoting the sutras separately and pointing out examples in general. However, the two sutras are the same as those included in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, She Da Cheng Lun), etc. One sutra is not found in various treatises. The first two verses are from the Abhidharma Sutra (阿毗達磨經, A Bi Da Mo Jing). The meaning of the latter two sutras is naturally evident. This first sutra is the first part of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. There is no such explanation there, so the text there should be compared.

Treatise: So-called Mahayana, and even the sutras (契經, qi jing) say.

Commentary: Here, the Hinayana Abhidharma is distinguished. Because this is Mahayana. The terms Abhidharma and Sutra are distinguished as usual. Not saying 'regarding the subject of dharma' but saying 'regarding dharma' is because it has the meaning of norms and upholding, rather than being a subject of dharma. In terms of reasoning, one can refer to Hetuvidya (因明, yin ming). Dharma and the subject of dharma are uncertain, so it should not be used as a difficulty.

The following sutras all have three parts: first, quoting the sutra verses, then using prose to explain separately, and finally summarizing. In the following text, errors will not be pointed out tediously.

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論。無始時來界至及涅槃證得。

述曰。此後釋中總有三解。初一廣。后二略。初廣中上半解為因．緣。如世親攝論第一．及瑜伽五十一。後半解流轉．還滅亦然。

論。此第八識至而顯示之。

述曰。下釋有二。初解外伏難。后別解頌。此即初也　謂有難云。欲顯其識當須顯體。何故約義以解識耶　故今答云。此識體性微細難顯。故以作用而顯其體。今言自性體異名也　自下釋中初判。后標釋。

論。頌中初半至作依持用。

述曰。此初判也。下半可知。上半頌文義有異故其句亦別。其第一句解為因用。次第二句解為緣用。然第一句無始時來四字。通第二句依用。第二句一切法三字。該上因用。互相顯故。故初二句各致一言。

所以者何。

論。界是因義至故名為因。

述曰。下別釋有二。初解上半。后解下半　解上半中。初別解二句。后結所明。解第一句為因用。言界者即是因義。故成因用。種．現識中是種子識。雖復現行亦名因相。能生諸法種子親故　無始時來展轉相續。剎那不斷　親生諸法。親生之言。顯為因義。非為助緣。親能生故　言諸法者。即第二句一切法言。此以諸言牒下一切。此識無始時來。與一切法為因。故經言界是為因用。

論。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：從無始以來，阿賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna，第八識，儲存一切種子）作為界限，一直到涅槃（nirvāṇa，解脫）的證得。

述記：對於這段經文的解釋，總共有三種。最初一種比較詳細，后兩種比較簡略。最初詳細的解釋中，前半部分解釋為因和緣，如世親（Vasubandhu）《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第一，以及《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第五十一所說。後半部分解釋流轉和還滅也是如此。

論：這第八識（阿賴耶識）的作用在於顯示。

述記：下面的解釋分為兩部分。首先解釋外來的詰難，然後分別解釋頌文。這裡是第一部分，也就是解釋外來的詰難。有人提出疑問說：如果要顯示這個識，應當顯示它的本體。為什麼只從意義上來解釋這個識呢？所以現在回答說：這個識的體性非常微細難以顯示，所以用它的作用來顯示它的本體。現在說的自性，就是本體的異名。

從『自下釋中』開始，先進行判斷，然後標明解釋。

論：頌文的前半部分是作為因和依持的作用。

述記：這是最初的判斷。後半部分可以類推得知。頌文的上半部分和下半部分的意義有所不同，所以它們的句子結構也不同。第一句解釋為因的作用，第二句解釋為緣的作用。然而，第一句中的『無始時來』四個字，也適用於第二句的依持作用。第二句中的『一切法』三個字，涵蓋了上面的因的作用。因為互相顯發，所以最初的兩句各自表達了一個意思。

為什麼這樣說呢？

論：界是因的意思，所以稱為因。

述記：下面的解釋分為兩部分。首先解釋前半部分，然後解釋後半部分。在解釋前半部分中，首先分別解釋兩句，然後總結所要說明的內容。解釋第一句為因的作用。所說的『界』，就是因的意思，所以成為因的作用。種子識和現行識中，是種子識。即使是現行，也稱為因相，因為它能親近地產生諸法。從無始以來，輾轉相續，剎那不斷，親近地產生諸法。『親生』這個詞，顯示了因的意思，而不是助緣。因為是親近地產生，所以稱為因。所說的『諸法』，就是第二句中的『一切法』。這裡用『諸』字來指代下面的一切。這個識從無始以來，與一切法作為因，所以經文說『界』是因的作用。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: From beginningless time, the realm (dhātu) [ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness, the eighth consciousness, storing all seeds)] serves as the boundary, up to the attainment of nirvāṇa (liberation).

Commentary: There are three explanations for this passage in total. The first is extensive, while the latter two are brief. In the first extensive explanation, the first half is explained as cause and condition, as in Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium on the Great Vehicle), first [chapter], and the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) fifty-first [chapter]. The second half, explaining saṃsāra (cyclic existence) and nirvāṇa (cessation), is similar.

Treatise: This eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) serves to reveal.

Commentary: The following explanation is divided into two parts. First, it addresses external objections, and then it separately explains the verse. This is the first part, addressing external objections. Someone raises the question: If you want to reveal this consciousness, you should reveal its substance. Why only explain this consciousness in terms of its meaning? Therefore, the answer is: The nature of this consciousness is subtle and difficult to reveal, so we use its function to reveal its substance. What is now called 'self-nature' is another name for substance.

From 'From '自下釋中' onwards, first make a judgment, and then mark the explanation.

Treatise: The first half of the verse serves as the function of cause and support.

Commentary: This is the initial judgment. The second half can be inferred. The meanings of the first and second halves of the verse are different, so their sentence structures are also different. The first sentence is explained as the function of cause, and the second sentence is explained as the function of condition. However, the four words '無始時來' (from beginningless time) in the first sentence also apply to the function of support in the second sentence. The three words '一切法' (all dharmas) in the second sentence cover the function of cause above. Because they reveal each other, the first two sentences each express a meaning.

Why is this so?

Treatise: 'Realm' means cause, so it is called cause.

Commentary: The following explanation is divided into two parts. First, explain the first half, and then explain the second half. In explaining the first half, first explain the two sentences separately, and then summarize what is to be explained. Explain the first sentence as the function of cause. The so-called 'realm' means cause, so it becomes the function of cause. Among seed consciousness and manifest consciousness, it is seed consciousness. Even if it is manifest, it is also called the aspect of cause, because it closely produces all dharmas. From beginningless time, it continues uninterruptedly, moment by moment, closely producing all dharmas. The word 'closely produces' shows the meaning of cause, not auxiliary condition. Because it closely produces, it is called cause. The so-called 'all dharmas' are the 'all dharmas' in the second sentence. Here, the word 'all' is used to refer to everything below. This consciousness, from beginningless time, serves as the cause for all dharmas, so the scripture says 'realm' is the function of cause.

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依是緣義至故名為緣。

述曰。下解第二句有二。初總解頌。后別解依。此總解頌。即現執持諸法識也　無始時來。牒上四字　與一切法。牒下三字　平等為依止故。言為緣。

此為略解。下廣緣義。

論。謂能執持至及為彼依。

述曰。下別解依。于中復二。初總。后別。此總也。現所執持。牒前因義顯與為依。謂現行識能執持種。由此因義故。與一切現行諸法為所依故。即變為彼現行諸法。及能與彼現行諸法為所依止。與諸現法為依雖同。變．不變異。故置別說。

論。變為彼者至及有根身。

述曰。下別釋依。即是所緣變之境界。不說變種者。相沉隱故略而不說。又種識故略而不說。又種識故即前執持。

論。為彼依者至作所依止。

述曰。即總七轉識不緣變之果。

如何為依。先釋五識。

論。以能執受至依之而轉。

述曰。由此執受五色根故五識得轉。即顯此識展轉為依。若不執持其五根者。識不得依。如死人等。故說為緣。亦有種依。然是因緣。今約五根增上共許顯處說故。

釋意識者。

論。又與末那至依之而轉。

述曰。雖第八識能與末那。為俱有依．種子依根。及為所緣。今者但取俱有之依。言與末那為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

因為是依這種緣起之義而存在，所以稱為緣。

述記中說：下面解釋第二句，分為兩部分。首先總的解釋頌文，然後分別解釋『依』。這裡是總的解釋頌文，也就是指現行執持諸法的阿賴耶識。『無始時來』，是重複上面的四個字。『與一切法』，是重複下面的三個字。『平等為依止故』，所以說是緣。

這是簡略的解釋，下面廣泛解釋緣的意義。

論中說：是指能執持種子，以及作為它們的所依。

述記中說：下面分別解釋『依』，其中又分為兩部分，先是總的解釋，然後是分別解釋。這裡是總的解釋。現行所執持，是重複前面的因義，顯示『與』是作為所依。意思是說，現行識能執持種子，因為這種因義，所以與一切現行諸法作為所依，也就是變現為那些現行諸法，以及能與那些現行諸法作為所依止。雖然與諸現法作為所依相同，但變現與不變現不同，所以另外說明。

論中說：變現為那些（境界），以及有根身。

述記中說：下面分別解釋『依』，也就是所緣變現的境界。不說變現種子，是因為相狀沉隱，所以省略不說。又因為是種子識，所以省略不說。又因為是種子識，所以就是前面所說的執持。

論中說：作為它們的所依，從而作為所依止。

述記中說：這是總說第七轉識不緣變現的果。

如何作為所依？先解釋五識。

論中說：因為能執受五色根，所以五識得以運轉。

述記中說：這顯示了此識輾轉作為所依。如果不執持那些五根，識就不能有所依，就像死人等。所以說是緣。也有種子依，那是因緣。現在是就五根增上共許的顯現處所說。

解釋意識：

論中說：又與末那（manas，末那識）為（俱有）依，所以得以運轉。

述記中說：雖然第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）能與末那（manas，末那識）作為俱有依、種子依根，以及作為所緣，但現在只取俱有之依，說與末那（manas，末那識）為（俱有）依。

【English Translation】 English version:

Because it exists based on the meaning of this condition, it is called a condition (緣).

The commentary states: The following explains the second phrase in two parts. First, a general explanation of the verse, and then a separate explanation of '依' (support). This is a general explanation of the verse, which refers to the currently active Alaya-vijnana (阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness) that upholds all dharmas (法, phenomena). 'From beginningless time' repeats the four words above. 'With all dharmas' repeats the three words below. 'Because it equally serves as a support,' it is said to be a condition.

This is a brief explanation; the following extensively explains the meaning of condition.

The treatise states: It refers to the ability to uphold seeds and to serve as their support.

The commentary states: The following separately explains '依' (support), which is further divided into two parts: first, a general explanation, and then a separate explanation. This is the general explanation. The currently active upholding repeats the previous meaning of cause, showing that 'with' serves as a support. It means that the currently active consciousness can uphold seeds, and because of this causal meaning, it serves as a support for all currently active dharmas, that is, it transforms into those currently active dharmas and can serve as a support for those currently active dharmas. Although it is the same in serving as a support for all currently active dharmas, the transformation and non-transformation are different, so it is explained separately.

The treatise states: Transforming into those (realms), as well as having rooted bodies.

The commentary states: The following separately explains '依' (support), which is the realm transformed by the object of perception. It does not mention transforming seeds because their characteristics are hidden, so it is omitted. Also, because it is seed consciousness, it is omitted. Also, because it is seed consciousness, it is what was previously mentioned as upholding.

The treatise states: Serving as their support, thereby serving as a support.

The commentary states: This is a general statement about the result of the seventh consciousness (末那識, manas) not perceiving transformation.

How does it serve as a support? First, explain the five consciousnesses.

The treatise states: Because it can uphold the five sense organs, the five consciousnesses can function.

The commentary states: This shows that this consciousness serves as a support in turn. If it does not uphold those five roots, the consciousness cannot have a support, like a dead person, etc. Therefore, it is said to be a condition. There is also seed support, which is a causal condition. Now, it is discussed in terms of the commonly accepted manifest location of the five roots.

Explaining the mind consciousness:

The treatise states: Also, with the manas (末那, mind consciousness) as a (co-existent) support, it can function.

The commentary states: Although the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, 阿賴耶識) can serve as a co-existent support, seed support root, and object of perception for the manas (末那, mind consciousness), now only the co-existent support is taken, saying that it is with the manas (末那, mind consciousness) as a (co-existent) support.

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所依止。第六意識依之得轉。又第八識能與諸法為本依止故。末那為依第六識轉。如眼根等增上緣根。

六別依七。七依第八。諸宗不許。故應立量。

論。末那意識至依俱有根。

述曰。七．六二識。亦依俱有依。轉識攝故。如眼等五識　第六識因言轉識攝。即以第七末那為依。許第六識轉識攝故。末那之因亦轉識攝而為因者。此所隨一。今應先成第六有根即是末那。末那成已許是轉識故得為因。此中宗．因準文取理。

上來已辨本識為依訖。恐他外難第八識性應亦有依。下顯第八識亦以七為依。七不斷故。餘六斷故。

論。第八理應至為俱有依。

述曰。量云。八應以七為俱有依。是識性故。如第六識　此有五識為不定過。應云許是識性非五識故　此亦不爾。其第七識許非五識是識性故　應總云。第八理應有俱有依。是識性故。如眼等識。此法不言以第七為依故。無不定過。如是雖言與轉識為依。而因顯八以第七為依　或若不爾。前言末那以第八識為俱有依有不定過。以第八無俱有依故。故說第八亦有俱依　此中不諍等無間依．種子之因。種子之因前句。是故俱諍俱有。

論。是謂此識為因緣用。

述曰。第二總結上二句頌。

次釋下二句。于中有二。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：第六意識依靠它才能運轉。而且第八識能作為諸法的根本所依止，所以末那識（Manas-vijnana，第七識，意為『意』）是第六識運轉的所依，就像眼根等增上緣根一樣。

第六識特別依賴第七識，第七識依賴第八識。其他宗派不承認這一點，所以應該立一個量（推理）。

論：末那意識乃至依靠俱有根（同時存在的根）。

述曰：第七識和第六識也依靠俱有依。因為它們屬於轉識（變化的意識），就像眼等五識一樣。第六識因為被稱為轉識，所以以第七末那識為所依。如果末那識的原因也是轉識，那麼這二者之間存在隨一性。現在應該先證明第六識有根，這個根就是末那識。末那識成立后，因為它被認為是轉識，所以可以作為原因。這裡宗（論題）、因（理由）可以根據文中的道理來理解。

上面已經辨析了本識（根本識，即第八識阿賴耶識Alaya-vijnana）作為所依止的問題。恐怕有人會提出疑問，認為第八識的性質也應該有所依止。下面說明第八識也以第七識為所依，因為第七識是持續不斷的，而其他六識是間斷的。

論：第八識理應乃至作為俱有依。

述曰：可以這樣立量：第八識應該以第七識作為俱有依，因為它具有識的性質，就像第六識一樣。這裡存在五識作為不定過（不確定的例子）的問題。應該說：『承認它是識的性質，但不是五識。』這樣也不對，因為第七識也被認為是識的性質，但不是五識。應該總的說：第八識理應有俱有依，因為它具有識的性質，就像眼等識一樣。這個論證沒有說以第七識為所依，所以沒有不定過的錯誤。雖然說與轉識作為所依，但原因在於顯明第八識以第七識為所依。或者，如果不是這樣，前面說末那識以第八識為俱有依，就存在不定過的錯誤，因為第八識沒有俱有依。所以說第八識也有俱有依。這裡不爭論等無間依（緊接著的所依）和種子之因（潛在原因）。種子之因在前一句中已經提到，所以這裡只爭論俱有依。

論：這就是說這個識作為因緣的作用。

述曰：第二，總結上面兩句頌。

接下來解釋下面兩句，其中包含兩個方面。

【English Translation】 English version: The sixth consciousness relies on it to function. Moreover, the eighth consciousness can serve as the fundamental basis for all dharmas (phenomena), so Manas-vijnana (the seventh consciousness, meaning 'mind') is the basis upon which the sixth consciousness operates, just like the enhancing root of the eye faculty, etc.

The sixth consciousness specifically relies on the seventh consciousness, and the seventh consciousness relies on the eighth consciousness. Other schools do not acknowledge this, so a Hetu (logical argument) should be established.

Treatise: Manas-vijnana even relies on co-existent roots.

Commentary: The seventh and sixth consciousnesses also rely on co-existent bases because they are included in the transforming consciousnesses, just like the five consciousnesses such as the eye consciousness. The sixth consciousness is said to be included in the transforming consciousnesses, so it relies on the seventh Manas-vijnana. If the cause of Manas-vijnana is also a transforming consciousness, then there is a relationship of 'one following the other' between the two. Now, it should first be proven that the sixth consciousness has a root, and this root is Manas-vijnana. Once Manas-vijnana is established, it can be taken as a cause because it is considered a transforming consciousness. Here, the proposition and the reason can be understood according to the principles in the text.

The above has already clarified the issue of the fundamental consciousness (the eighth consciousness, Alaya-vijnana) as the basis. Fearing that others might raise the question that the nature of the eighth consciousness should also have a basis, the following explains that the eighth consciousness also takes the seventh consciousness as its basis because the seventh consciousness is continuous, while the other six consciousnesses are intermittent.

Treatise: The eighth consciousness should reasonably be a co-existent basis.

Commentary: A Hetu can be established as follows: The eighth consciousness should take the seventh consciousness as a co-existent basis because it has the nature of consciousness, just like the sixth consciousness. Here, there is the problem of the five consciousnesses as an uncertain example. It should be said: 'It is acknowledged that it has the nature of consciousness, but it is not the five consciousnesses.' This is also not correct, because the seventh consciousness is also considered to have the nature of consciousness, but it is not the five consciousnesses. It should be said in general: The eighth consciousness should reasonably have a co-existent basis because it has the nature of consciousness, just like the eye consciousness, etc. This argument does not say that it takes the seventh consciousness as its basis, so there is no error of uncertain example. Although it is said to take the transforming consciousnesses as its basis, the reason lies in clarifying that the eighth consciousness takes the seventh consciousness as its basis. Or, if it is not like this, the previous statement that Manas-vijnana takes the eighth consciousness as a co-existent basis would have the error of uncertain example because the eighth consciousness does not have a co-existent basis. Therefore, it is said that the eighth consciousness also has a co-existent basis. Here, there is no dispute about the immediately preceding basis and the cause of the seed. The cause of the seed has already been mentioned in the previous sentence, so here only the co-existent basis is disputed.

Treatise: This is to say that this consciousness functions as a cause and condition.

Commentary: Secondly, summarize the above two verses.

Next, explain the following two sentences, which contain two aspects.

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初解有諸趣。后解有涅槃等　解有趣中有三。初總解頌。次別解。后總結。此等初也。

論。由此有者由有此識。

述曰。謂由有前第二句說。能與現行一切法等為所依識。

頌中有字貫通二處。謂在此識能有之中。及下諸趣．涅槃證得所有之中　又由有此識言。貫通下染．凈所有之中。

論。有諸趣者有善惡趣。

述曰。以善．惡言攝五趣故。即上有字通下所有染中是也。

論。謂由有此至流轉生死。

述曰。此下第二廣前有義　于中有二。初正釋。后料簡。此正釋也　謂由有此第二句所說現所依識故。執持第一句雜染種子故。云界者因。則種子識。此染種子順流轉法能生現行。令諸有情流轉生死。現行染法名為流轉。種子染法名順流轉。成有漏法皆名流轉。對法第四云。何者是流轉。謂一切生死。即前順后其體順用。

若爾即應有漏苦．集皆名流轉。何故頌中偏言諸趣。

論。雖惑業生至勝故偏說。

述曰。下正料簡有二義解。此初義也。解此難云。雖惑．業．生有漏集．苦。皆是流轉。皆生死法。然五趣是生死苦果勝故偏說。果正生死。是所順法。業．惑能順生死果性。故偏舉果　此中所解執持一切順流轉法。既生死果為流轉體　執持順者。即

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 初解說的是諸趣（gati，輪迴的去處）。后解說的是涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）等等。解說諸趣中有三個部分：首先是總的解釋偈頌，其次是分別解釋，最後是總結。這些是最初的部分。

論：由於有這個，是因為有這個識（vijnana，意識）。

述記說：意思是由於有前面第二句所說的，能夠作為現行一切法等等所依賴的識。

偈頌中的『有』字貫穿兩個地方。一是指在這個識能夠存在之中，以及下面諸趣、涅槃證得的所有之中。又由於有這個識這句話，貫穿下面染污、清凈的所有之中。

論：有諸趣，指的是有善趣和惡趣。

述記說：用善和惡這兩個字概括了五趣的緣故。也就是上面的『有』字貫通下面所有的染污之中。

論：指的是由於有這個，以至於流轉生死。

述記說：這下面第二部分是廣泛解釋前面的『有』的含義。其中有兩部分：首先是正式解釋，然後是簡要分析。這是正式解釋的部分。指的是由於有這第二句所說的現行所依賴的識的緣故，執持著第一句的雜染種子（bija，潛能）。所謂的『界』指的是因。那麼種子識，這種染污的種子，順應流轉的法則，能夠產生現行，使得諸有情流轉生死。現行的染污法被稱為流轉，種子的染污法被稱為順流轉。成為有漏法都叫做流轉。《對法》第四卷說：什麼是流轉？指的是一切生死。也就是前面順應後面，它的本體是順應作用的。

如果這樣，那麼就應該說有漏的苦、集都叫做流轉。為什麼偈頌中偏偏說諸趣？

論：雖然迷惑、業力產生，但因為五趣殊勝的緣故而偏說。

述記說：下面正式簡要分析有兩種解釋。這是第一種解釋。解釋這個疑問說：雖然迷惑、業力、生是有漏的集、苦，都是流轉，都是生死之法。然而五趣是生死苦果中最殊勝的，所以偏偏說五趣。果報正是生死，是所順從的法。業力、迷惑能夠順從生死果報的性質，所以偏偏舉出果報。這裡所解釋的執持一切順應流轉的法，既然生死果報是流轉的本體，那麼執持順應的，就是

【English Translation】 English version: The initial explanation concerns the various Gatis (destinations of rebirth). The later explanation concerns Nirvana (liberation) and so on. There are three parts to the explanation of the Gatis: first, a general explanation of the verse; second, a separate explanation; and third, a summary. These are the initial parts.

Treatise: Because of this, it is because of this Vijnana (consciousness).

Commentary states: Meaning, because of what is said in the preceding second line, it is the Vijnana that can serve as the basis for all existing Dharmas and so on.

The word 'has' in the verse connects two places. Namely, within the ability of this Vijnana to exist, and within all the Gatis and Nirvana attained below. Also, the statement 'because of this Vijnana' connects all the defilements and purities below.

Treatise: 'Has various Gatis' means has good and bad Gatis.

Commentary states: Because the words 'good' and 'bad' encompass the five Gatis. That is, the word 'has' above connects to all the defilements below.

Treatise: Meaning, because of this, it leads to the cycle of Samsara (birth and death).

Commentary states: The second part below broadly explains the meaning of 'has' mentioned earlier. There are two parts within it: first, a formal explanation; second, a brief analysis. This is the formal explanation. Meaning, because of this Vijnana mentioned in the second line, which serves as the basis for present existence, it holds the seeds (Bija, potentials) of defilement mentioned in the first line. The so-called 'realm' refers to the cause. Then the seed consciousness, this seed of defilement, in accordance with the law of Samsara, can produce present existence, causing sentient beings to cycle through birth and death. The present defiled Dharmas are called Samsara, and the seeds of defilement are called in accordance with Samsara. Becoming a contaminated Dharma is all called Samsara. The fourth volume of the Abhidharma states: What is Samsara? It refers to all birth and death. That is, the former accords with the latter, its essence is in accordance with its function.

If that is the case, then the contaminated suffering and accumulation should all be called Samsara. Why does the verse specifically mention the Gatis?

Treatise: Although delusion and Karma arise, it is specifically mentioned because the five Gatis are superior.

Commentary states: The formal brief analysis below has two interpretations. This is the first interpretation. Explaining this question, it says: Although delusion, Karma, and birth are contaminated accumulation and suffering, they are all Samsara, all Dharmas of birth and death. However, the five Gatis are the most superior of the suffering results of birth and death, so the five Gatis are specifically mentioned. The result is precisely birth and death, which is the Dharma to be followed. Karma and delusion can follow the nature of the result of birth and death, so the result is specifically mentioned. What is explained here is that holding all Dharmas in accordance with Samsara, since the result of birth and death is the essence of Samsara, then holding in accordance with it is

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執業．惑能順之法。非如色等名為執持。此即執持依持名執。識為現惑業依執持故。識不執彼現行惑．業以為境故。此解與前別。

與前解同者。

論。惑諸趣言通能所趣。

述曰。此第二義。業．惑．中有。亦是頌中所說諸趣。業．惑．中有。是能趣故。何故能趣亦名為趣。趣是所趣。業．惑．中有。相從名趣。

論。諸趣資具亦得趣名。

述曰。謂器世間是趣所須。趣之資具。相從所趣故亦名趣　或資具言。釋惑．業二名趣所由。唯說內故　總而言者。生死流轉通諸有漏。今此頌中獨言趣者。能所．資具皆立趣名非唯所趣。如喜．及順喜法名喜覺支等。

論。諸惑業生至作依持用。

述曰。第三總結。由有此識煩惱雜染成。業雜染成。生雜染成。世間凈成。攝諸有漏故。此等成者如上所言。是與流轉作依持用。

與還滅等作依持用。其義如何。

論。及涅槃證得者至有涅槃證得。

述曰。自下第二解下句頌。于中有三。初總釋頌。次別解。后總結。此初也。謂上由此有言。亦通於此。牒上能有此識已。顯下所有涅槃證得。

論。謂由有此至證得涅槃。

述曰。此廣別解。于中有二。初總說也。下自料簡　身中無漏種。名順還滅法。言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

『執業』（karmic actions）是指能夠順應惑（kleshas，煩惱）的法則。它不像色（rupa，物質）等那樣被稱為『執持』（holding）。這裡所說的『執』（holding）是指依持（depending on）而得名『執』。識（consciousness）之所以是現行惑（manifested kleshas）和業（karma）的依持，是因為識不執取那些現行的惑和業作為其境界。這種解釋與之前的不同。

與之前的解釋相同之處：

論：『惑諸趣』（kleshas in all destinies）一詞，『趣』（destinies）既包括能趣（that which leads to a destiny）也包括所趣（that which is led to a destiny）。

述曰：這是第二種含義。業、惑、中有（antarabhava，中陰身）也是頌中所說的『諸趣』。業、惑、中有是能趣，為什麼能趣也稱為『趣』呢？『趣』是所趣。業、惑、中有，相隨而名為『趣』。

論：『諸趣資具』（requisites for all destinies）也可以稱為『趣』。

述曰：指的是器世間（bhajana-loka，物質世界）是趣所需要的，是趣的資具。相隨於所趣，所以也稱為『趣』。或者說，『資具』一詞，解釋了惑、業二者是名為『趣』的原因。只說了內在的原因。總而言之，生死流轉（samsara，輪迴）貫通所有有漏（asrava，煩惱）。現在這首頌中單獨說『趣』，是因為能趣、所趣、資具都可以稱為『趣』，不只是所趣。例如，喜（priti，喜悅）以及順應喜的法（dharma）被稱為喜覺支（priti-sambojjhanga）等。

論：『諸惑業生至作依持用』（all kleshas, karma, and births serve as the basis and support）。

述曰：這是第三個總結。由於有此識，煩惱雜染（klesa-samklesa）成就，業雜染（karma-samklesa）成就，生雜染（janma-samklesa）成就，世間清凈成就，總攝所有有漏。這些成就如上所說，是與流轉（samsara）作為依持之用。

與還滅（nirodha，寂滅）等作為依持之用，其含義如何？

論：『及涅槃證得者至有涅槃證得』（and the attainment of Nirvana）。

述曰：下面第二部分解釋下半句頌。其中有三個部分：首先是總釋頌，其次是分別解釋，最後是總結。這是第一部分。說上面『由此有』（because of this）也貫通於此。在陳述上面能夠有此識之後，顯示下面所有涅槃的證得。

論：『謂由有此至證得涅槃』（that by having this, one attains Nirvana）。

述曰：這是廣泛地分別解釋。其中有兩個部分：首先是總說，下面是自我簡擇。身中無漏種（anasrava-bija，無漏種子），名為順還滅法（anuloma-nirodha-dharma，順向寂滅之法）。

【English Translation】 English version:

'Karmic actions' (karmic actions) refer to the law that can accord with 'kleshas' (kleshas, afflictions). It is not called 'holding' (holding) like 'rupa' (rupa, matter) and so on. The 'holding' (holding) here refers to 'holding' named by 'depending on' (depending on). The reason why 'consciousness' (consciousness) is the support of 'manifested kleshas' (manifested kleshas) and 'karma' (karma) is that consciousness does not hold those manifested kleshas and karma as its realm. This explanation is different from the previous one.

Similarities with the previous explanation:

Treatise: The term 'kleshas in all destinies' ('kleshas in all destinies'), 'destinies' ('destinies') includes both 'that which leads to a destiny' (that which leads to a destiny) and 'that which is led to a destiny' (that which is led to a destiny).

Commentary: This is the second meaning. Karma, kleshas, and 'antarabhava' (antarabhava, intermediate state) are also the 'all destinies' mentioned in the verse. Karma, kleshas, and antarabhava are 'that which leads to a destiny', so why is 'that which leads to a destiny' also called 'destiny'? 'Destiny' is 'that which is led to a destiny'. Karma, kleshas, and antarabhava are named 'destiny' accordingly.

Treatise: 'Requisites for all destinies' (requisites for all destinies) can also be called 'destiny'.

Commentary: It refers to the 'bhajana-loka' (bhajana-loka, material world) which is needed by destiny and is the requisite for destiny. According to 'that which is led to a destiny', it is also called 'destiny'. Or, the term 'requisite' explains that kleshas and karma are the reasons for being named 'destiny'. Only the internal reasons are mentioned. In general, 'samsara' (samsara, reincarnation) runs through all 'asrava' (asrava, afflictions). Now, the verse alone says 'destiny' because 'that which leads to a destiny', 'that which is led to a destiny', and 'requisite' can all be called 'destiny', not just 'that which is led to a destiny'. For example, 'priti' (priti, joy) and the 'dharma' (dharma) that accords with joy are called 'priti-sambojjhanga' (priti-sambojjhanga) and so on.

Treatise: 'All kleshas, karma, and births serve as the basis and support' (all kleshas, karma, and births serve as the basis and support).

Commentary: This is the third summary. Because of this consciousness, 'klesa-samklesa' (klesa-samklesa) is accomplished, 'karma-samklesa' (karma-samklesa) is accomplished, 'janma-samklesa' (janma-samklesa) is accomplished, and the world's purity is accomplished, encompassing all 'asrava'. These accomplishments, as mentioned above, serve as the basis for 'samsara'.

What is the meaning of serving as the basis for 'nirodha' (nirodha, cessation) and so on?

Treatise: 'And the attainment of Nirvana' (and the attainment of Nirvana).

Commentary: The second part below explains the second half of the verse. There are three parts: first, a general explanation of the verse, second, separate explanations, and third, a summary. This is the first part. Saying 'because of this' above also runs through this. After stating that this consciousness can be had above, it shows all the attainment of Nirvana below.

Treatise: 'That by having this, one attains Nirvana' (that by having this, one attains Nirvana).

Commentary: This is a broad and separate explanation. There are two parts: first, a general statement, and below is self-selection. 'Anasrava-bija' (anasrava-bija, seed of non-outflows) in the body is called 'anuloma-nirodha-dharma' (anuloma-nirodha-dharma, dharma of conforming to cessation).

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還滅者。五十一解。還即道諦。滅即滅諦。即種順現行。道能證滅也。或與現行道為依持令證得涅槃。前順於后。體順於用。還順於滅。準前應釋　此解順下第一但說證得師解。即出世凈若無此識皆不得成。或攝世間凈。遠證涅槃故　或但涅槃是識執持。亦是依執。雖言執持無漏法種。而意證涅槃但取涅槃。是所依執故。攝論第四三性中言依他起性為遍計所執依。亦圓成實之所依也。涅槃是所求果故此偏說。順下第二但取涅槃解　第三雙取。執持無漏種。及涅槃依故。

釋頌中言涅槃證得。為取證得。為取涅槃。

論。此中但說至此識有故。

述曰。下料簡有三義。此初也。謂此但說能證得道。執無漏種非執涅槃。涅槃不親依此識故。疏則可依。今說親故。此第一師。

論。或此但說至正所求故。

述曰。此第二說。如前引教。唯親執無漏種。涅槃是所求故。

論。或此雙說至品類攝故。

述曰。此第三義。二法俱是還滅品類之所攝故。謂此意說。非唯道是還。涅槃是滅。道為能還。涅槃所還故。涅槃亦是還品類攝。滅是滅體。道亦順彼斷滅染法。以能順滅故。亦說是滅品類攝。道與涅槃俱可言還。俱可言滅故。言俱是還滅品攝。是彼品攝。非是彼體。

何以得知

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『還滅』是指什麼？有五十一解。『還』即是道諦（指通往解脫的道路真理），『滅』即是滅諦（指滅除煩惱的真理），也就是指能產生順於現行的作用。道諦能夠證得滅諦。或者說道諦作為依持，使得能夠證得涅槃。前者順應後者，本體順應作用，『還』順應『滅』。按照前面的解釋應該這樣理解。這個解釋順應下文的第一種解釋，只說證得，是師長的解釋。也就是說，如果沒有這種識，出世間的清凈都不能成就。或者也包括世間的清凈，是爲了長遠地證得涅槃。或者僅僅是涅槃被識所執持，也是一種依執。雖然說執持無漏法種，但意在證得涅槃，只是取涅槃作為所依執的對象。因此，《攝大乘論》第四品三性中說，依他起性是遍計所執性的所依，也是圓成實性的所依。涅槃是所求的果，因此這裡偏重於說涅槃。順應下文的第二種解釋，只取涅槃來解釋。第三種解釋是雙取，既執持無漏種，又以涅槃為所依。

解釋頌文中的『涅槃證得』，是取『證得』，還是取『涅槃』？

論：這裡只是說……因為有這種識。

述記：下面進行分析，有三種含義。這是第一種。意思是說，這裡只是說能夠證得道，執持無漏種，而不是執持涅槃。因為涅槃不是直接依靠這種識。疏文則可以依靠，現在說的是直接依靠。這是第一位師長的觀點。

論：或者這裡只是說……因為是真正所求。

述記：這是第二種說法。如前面引用的教義，只是直接執持無漏種，涅槃是所求的果。

論：或者這裡雙重說明……因為屬於同一品類。

述記：這是第三種含義。兩種法都屬於還滅品類所攝。意思是說，不僅僅是道是『還』，涅槃是『滅』，道是能夠『還』的，涅槃是所『還』的。因此，涅槃也屬於『還』的品類所攝。『滅』是滅的本體，道也順應滅除染法，因為能夠順應滅，所以也說是滅的品類所攝。道與涅槃都可以說是『還』，都可以說是『滅』。因此說都是還滅品所攝。是屬於那個品類，而不是那個本體。

如何得知？

【English Translation】 English version: What is 『Cessation』 (還滅)? There are fifty-one interpretations. 『Cessation』 (還) refers to the Truth of the Path (道諦, mārga-satya, the truth of the path leading to liberation), and 『Extinction』 (滅) refers to the Truth of Extinction (滅諦, nirodha-satya, the truth of the cessation of suffering), which means generating actions that accord with the present. The Truth of the Path can realize the Truth of Extinction. Alternatively, the Truth of the Path serves as a support, enabling the realization of Nirvana. The former accords with the latter, the substance accords with the function, and 『Cessation』 accords with 『Extinction.』 It should be understood according to the previous explanation. This explanation accords with the first explanation below, only speaking of attainment, which is the teacher's explanation. That is to say, without this consciousness, the purity of transcendence cannot be achieved. Or it includes worldly purity, for the sake of attaining Nirvana in the long run. Or it is merely that Nirvana is held by consciousness, which is also a kind of dependent holding. Although it is said to hold the seed of undefiled dharma, the intention is to realize Nirvana, only taking Nirvana as the object of dependent holding. Therefore, in the fourth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論), concerning the three natures, it is said that the dependent nature (依他起性, paratantra-svabhāva) is the support of the imagined nature (遍計所執性, parikalpita-svabhāva), and also the support of the perfected nature (圓成實性, pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). Nirvana is the desired result, so here the emphasis is on Nirvana. It accords with the second explanation below, only taking Nirvana for explanation. The third explanation takes both, holding both the undefiled seed and taking Nirvana as the support.

Explaining the phrase 『Nirvana attained』 in the verse, does it take 『attained』 or 『Nirvana』?

Treatise: Here it only says… because there is this consciousness.

Commentary: The following analysis has three meanings. This is the first. It means that here it only says that it can attain the Path, holding the undefiled seed, not holding Nirvana. Because Nirvana does not directly rely on this consciousness. The commentary can rely on it, but now it is said to rely directly. This is the view of the first teacher.

Treatise: Or here it only says… because it is the truly sought after.

Commentary: This is the second saying. As the doctrine quoted earlier, it only directly holds the undefiled seed, and Nirvana is the desired result.

Treatise: Or here it doubly explains… because it belongs to the same category.

Commentary: This is the third meaning. Both dharmas belong to the category of Cessation. It means that not only is the Path 『Cessation,』 but Nirvana is 『Extinction,』 the Path is able to 『Cessate,』 and Nirvana is what is 『Extinguished.』 Therefore, Nirvana also belongs to the category of 『Cessation.』 『Extinction』 is the substance of extinction, and the Path also accords with the extinction of defiled dharmas, because it can accord with extinction, so it is also said to belong to the category of extinction. Both the Path and Nirvana can be said to be 『Cessation,』 and both can be said to be 『Extinction.』 Therefore, it is said that both are included in the category of Cessation. It belongs to that category, not that substance.

How is it known?

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此中雙說。

論。謂涅槃言至顯能得道。

述曰。即頌涅槃言。顯涅槃等故。即總指上。故知雙說。

論。由能斷道至證得涅槃。

述曰。謂由還故斷前流轉證得涅槃。故雙取也。

論。能所斷證至作依持用。

述曰。第三總結。能斷道。所斷惑。能證道。所證滅。皆依此識。故與還滅為依持用。一斷言通能．所也。一所言通斷．證也。此中三說應準解頌。

次第二解。

論。又此頌中至為所依止。

述曰。于中有三。初總科頌。次別解之。后總結也。此初總科。即第一句顯此識體非今始有無始有故。出識自體即種子識。后之三句顯此識與染．凈二法總別為依。謂一切法等所依句。是染及凈二法總依。即現行識。或俱現行　界性．因義故　何者為染．凈。由此有諸趣。是能依染法　及涅槃證得。是凈法能依。此是染．凈二法別依。第二句依。屬總之依。由此有言。屬二別依。通染．凈故。或屬能．所依。以通能有．及所有故。

何者染法。

論。雜染法者至生及業惑。

述曰。下別解也。謂苦．集二諦一切有漏法。所趣苦諦。能趣集諦。生．及業．惑是也。此別相解。然生．業．惑皆通苦．集　又大乘中有苦非集。謂諸異熟無記法等生唯

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這裡有雙重含義。

論：所說的『涅槃』一詞，顯示了能夠證得解脫之道。

述記：即是讚頌『涅槃』一詞，顯示了涅槃等等的含義。『即』字總括指代上文，因此可知是雙重含義。

論：由於能夠斷除輪迴之道，從而證得涅槃。

述記：意思是說，由於『還滅』的緣故，斷除了之前的流轉，從而證得了涅槃。因此是雙重取義。

論：能斷之道，所斷之惑，能證之道，所證之滅，都以此識作為依持和作用。

述記：這是第三個總結。能斷之道，所斷之惑，能證之道，所證之滅，都依賴於這個阿賴耶識，因此將『還滅』作為依持和作用。一個『斷』字，貫通了能斷和所斷。一個『所』字，貫通了斷和證。這裡的三重含義，應該參照頌文來理解。

接下來是第二種解釋。

論：又，這首頌中，此識是染凈諸法的所依止。

述記：其中有三個部分。首先是總括頌文，其次是分別解釋，最後是總結。這是最初的總括。即第一句顯示了這個識體並非現在才有，而是無始以來就有的。顯現了識的自體，即種子識。後面的三句顯示了這個識與染、凈二法總括和分別的作為所依。所謂『一切法』等所依的句子，是染和凈二法的總依，即現行識。或者同時是現行的界性、因義。什麼是染、凈？『由此有諸趣』，是能依的染法，以及『涅槃證得』，是凈法能依。這是染、凈二法的分別所依。第二句的『依』，屬於總的所依。『由此有』這句話，屬於二種分別所依，貫通了染和凈。或者屬於能依和所依，因為它貫通了能有和所有。

什麼是染法？

論：雜染法是指苦、集二諦中的一切有漏法，所趣向的是苦諦，能趣向的是集諦，即生、業、惑。

述記：下面是分別解釋。所謂苦、集二諦中的一切有漏法，所趣向的是苦諦，能趣向的是集諦，即生、業、惑。這是分別相的解釋。然而，生、業、惑都貫通苦、集二諦。又，在大乘佛法中，有苦而非集的情況，比如各種異熟無記法等，生唯

【English Translation】 English version: Herein lies a dual meaning.

Treatise: The term 'Nirvana' indicates the ability to attain the path to liberation.

Commentary: That is, praising the term 'Nirvana', revealing the meaning of Nirvana and so on. 'That is' generally refers to the above, so it is known to have a dual meaning.

Treatise: Because of the ability to sever the path of transmigration, thereby attaining Nirvana.

Commentary: It means that due to 'cessation', the previous transmigration is severed, thereby attaining Nirvana. Therefore, it is a dual interpretation.

Treatise: The path that can sever, the delusion that is severed, the path that can realize, the cessation that is realized, all take this consciousness as the basis for support and function.

Commentary: This is the third summary. The path that can sever, the delusion that is severed, the path that can realize, the cessation that is realized, all rely on this Alaya consciousness, therefore taking 'cessation' as the basis for support and function. The word 'sever' encompasses both the ability to sever and what is severed. The word 'what' encompasses both severing and realization. The triple meaning here should be understood in reference to the verse.

Next is the second explanation.

Treatise: Moreover, in this verse, this consciousness is the basis for all defiled and pure dharmas (phenomena).

Commentary: There are three parts to it. First, a general summary of the verse, second, a separate explanation, and finally a summary. This is the initial summary. That is, the first sentence shows that this consciousness is not something that exists only now, but has existed since beginningless time. It reveals the self-nature of consciousness, that is, seed consciousness (bija-vijnana). The following three sentences show that this consciousness is the general and separate basis for both defiled and pure dharmas. The phrase 'all dharmas' and so on, which are the basis, is the general basis for both defiled and pure dharmas, that is, the manifest consciousness. Or it is simultaneously the manifest realm-nature, the meaning of cause. What is defiled and pure? 'From this there are various destinies', which are the defiled dharmas that can be relied upon, and 'Nirvana is attained', which is the pure dharma that can be relied upon. This is the separate basis for the two defiled and pure dharmas. The 'basis' in the second sentence belongs to the general basis. The phrase 'from this there are' belongs to the two separate bases, encompassing both defiled and pure. Or it belongs to the basis that can be relied upon and the basis that is relied upon, because it encompasses both what can exist and what exists.

What are defiled dharmas?

Treatise: Defiled dharmas refer to all contaminated dharmas (asrava-dharma) in the two truths of suffering (duhkha) and accumulation (samudaya). What is approached is the truth of suffering, and what can be approached is the truth of accumulation, namely birth (jati), karma (karma), and affliction (klesha).

Commentary: The following is a separate explanation. The so-called contaminated dharmas in the two truths of suffering and accumulation, what is approached is the truth of suffering, and what can be approached is the truth of accumulation, namely birth, karma, and affliction. This is an explanation of separate characteristics. However, birth, karma, and affliction all encompass the two truths of suffering and accumulation. Moreover, in Mahayana Buddhism, there is suffering that is not accumulation, such as various resultant neutral dharmas, birth only

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苦諦。解染別中雖唯言趣。亦通能趣。故取集諦。

何者凈法。

論。清凈法者至涅槃及道。

述曰。謂滅．道二諦。即一切無漏有為．無為。滅諦所證。道諦能證。此中唯取諸無漏者為道諦體。不取加行．資糧道中諸有漏者。不證滅故。前言聞熏通有．無漏。對法同故。

論。彼二皆依至理不成故。

述曰。第三總結。染．凈二法皆依此有。轉識不能無始恒有為染．凈法總．別依故。總結上也。

論。或復初句至為所依止。

述曰。第三解。中有二。初科。后配。此初也　或復初句顯此識體無始相續。后三顯與三種自性為所依止。

此總科已。下別屬當。

論。謂依他起至如次應知。

述曰。謂依他起。是第二句一切法等依。有漏無漏有為法也。即此含藏諸法種故說為所依。遍計所執。即第三句由此有諸趣。謂起執故諸趣遂有生彼趣也　或緣諸趣而起于執。此由彼起故是彼性　或趣是見趣。起二執故　圓成實性。是第四句及涅槃證得。即無漏法有為．無為。四清凈法為圓成實性也。涅槃．證得各別說故。攝論等說阿賴耶識是染．凈依。言依他性亦為遍計．圓成．依他依也。依他性本即此識故。次配三句如此應知　然以義準。頌中四句。集．苦．滅．

道四諦別釋于理無違。以趣即是三乘所趣滅諦理故。

釋第一經訖。然攝論中解此同異。隨勘此文。然此三解彼論未有。

論。今此頌中至皆不得者。

述曰。此總結也。

論。即彼經中至勝者我開示。

述曰。達磨經中第二頌也。下自廣解。故不釋之。

論。由此本識至諸雜染法。

述曰。下釋有三。初合解上二句。次解第三句。后解第四句。此初也　取初句由字．次句識．及一切種言。加此本具三字故。言由此本識具諸種子　然始卻。取第一句中攝藏之上加故能二字。諸法二字中加雜染字。故能攝藏諸雜染法。

論。依斯建立阿賴耶名。

述曰。下第二總取第三句結。依斯建立阿賴耶名。是故名阿賴耶也。即是能藏以解藏識。非唯能藏以解阿賴耶。八地等后不名藏識故。此中以對勝性等論。但舉能藏以解藏義。

此正述阿賴耶名義。次簡外執。外執云。三德冥性將起轉變名為勝性。轉為大等二十三諦。具如前敘。彼雖計有因果。而體定一。是常。今阿賴耶識。

論。非如勝性至體非一故。

述曰。此遮僧佉計為勝性。即自性體起用名勝性。非如彼一。此阿賴耶與諸法果不一．不異。且對彼說體性異故。

論。能依所依俱生滅故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 解釋四聖諦的差別在道理上沒有衝突，因為所趨向的目標就是三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）所趨向的滅諦之理。

第一部經文解釋完畢。然而《攝大乘論》中對此的解釋有同有異，可以參考該文。然而這三種解釋在《攝大乘論》中沒有。

論：『今此頌中至皆不得者』

述曰：這是總結。

論：『即彼經中至勝者我開示』

述曰：這是《達磨經》中的第二頌。下面將詳細解釋，所以這裡不解釋。

論：『由此本識至諸雜染法』

述曰：下面解釋分為三部分。首先是合併解釋上面兩句，然後解釋第三句，最後解釋第四句。這是第一部分。取第一句中的『由』字、第二句中的『識』字，以及『一切種』這幾個字，加上『此本具』這三個字，所以說『由此本識具諸種子』。然後，取第一句中『攝藏』之上加上『故能』二字，『諸法』二字中加上『雜染』二字，所以說『故能攝藏諸雜染法』。

論：『依斯建立阿賴耶名』

述曰：下面第二部分是總取第三句來總結。『依斯建立阿賴耶名』，所以叫做阿賴耶。即是用『能藏』來解釋藏識（Alaya-vijñana）。並非僅僅用『能藏』來解釋阿賴耶，因為八地菩薩等之後不再稱為藏識。這裡是針對勝性等理論進行討論，所以只舉出『能藏』來解釋藏的含義。

這裡正是闡述阿賴耶名稱的含義。接下來簡要駁斥外道的執著。外道認為，三德冥性將要發生轉變，稱為勝性（Pradhana），轉變為大等二十三諦。具體情況如前所述。他們雖然認為有因果，但本體始終是唯一的，是常。而現在的阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijñana）。

論：『非如勝性至體非一故』

述曰：這是爲了駁斥僧佉派（Samkhya）所認為的勝性（Pradhana）。即自性體起作用稱為勝性。不像他們那樣是唯一的。這個阿賴耶與諸法果不是完全相同，也不是完全不同。這裡是針對他們的觀點來說，體性是不同的。

論：『能依所依俱生滅故』

【English Translation】 English version: Explaining the differences in the Four Noble Truths does not contradict reason, because the goal is the cessation of suffering (Nirodha Satya), which is the same goal pursued by the Three Vehicles (Triyana) – the Sravakayana (Vehicle of Hearers), Pratyekabuddhayana (Vehicle of Solitary Buddhas), and Bodhisattvayana (Vehicle of Bodhisattvas).

The explanation of the first sutra is completed. However, the Mahayanasamgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana) has similarities and differences in its explanation of this. You can refer to that text. However, these three explanations are not found in that treatise.

Treatise: 'Now, in this verse, up to 'all cannot be obtained'.'

Commentary: This is a summary.

Treatise: 'In that sutra, up to 'the victor, I reveal'.'

Commentary: This is the second verse in the Dharma Sutra. It will be explained in detail below, so it is not explained here.

Treatise: 'Because of this fundamental consciousness, up to 'all defiled dharmas'.'

Commentary: The explanation below is divided into three parts. First, the first two lines are explained together, then the third line is explained, and finally the fourth line is explained. This is the first part. Taking the word 'by' from the first line, the word 'consciousness' from the second line, and the words 'all seeds', adding the three words 'this fundamentally possesses', therefore it is said 'because of this fundamental consciousness, it possesses all seeds'. Then, taking the words 'able to' and adding them above 'contains' in the first line, and adding the words 'defiled' to the words 'all dharmas', therefore it is said 'therefore, it is able to contain all defiled dharmas'.

Treatise: 'Based on this, the name Alaya is established.'

Commentary: The second part below is to summarize by taking the third line as a whole. 'Based on this, the name Alaya is established', therefore it is called Alaya (Alaya-vijñana). That is, using 'able to contain' to explain the store consciousness (Alaya-vijñana). It is not only using 'able to contain' to explain Alaya, because after the eighth Bhumi (stage of a Bodhisattva), it is no longer called store consciousness. Here, it is discussing in relation to theories such as Pradhana (primordial substance), so only 'able to contain' is used to explain the meaning of store.

This is precisely explaining the meaning of the name Alaya. Next, briefly refute the externalist's (non-Buddhist) attachment. Externalists believe that the three Gunas (qualities of nature) in their state of equilibrium will undergo transformation, called Pradhana (primordial substance), and transform into the twenty-three Tattvas (elements of reality) such as Mahat (intellect). The specific details are as described earlier. Although they believe in cause and effect, the substance is always unique and constant. But the current Alaya-vijñana (store consciousness).

Treatise: 'Not like Pradhana, up to 'the substance is not one'.'

Commentary: This is to refute the Samkhya school's belief in Pradhana (primordial substance). That is, the substance of self-nature arising into function is called Pradhana. It is not unique like theirs. This Alaya and the fruits of all dharmas are not completely the same, nor are they completely different. This is said in response to their views, the substance is different.

Treatise: 'The dependent and the depended upon arise and cease together.'

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述曰。諸法及識。能依．所依俱生滅故。非如彼常。故與僧佉所計異也。然攝論文更難於是。義意極同　然卻結故名阿賴耶言。

論。與雜染法至名阿賴耶。

述曰。頌中但破勝性為因。唯據能藏以解阿賴耶。非為我者。今互攝藏攝論文同。然今有情執為我者。頌中所無。義意增說。以執為我正名藏故。具此義故名阿賴耶　或故名阿賴耶言。別顯藏義。即與染法為互攝藏等是　前解結上二句。此更別顯賴耶義。故與前別。

勝者我開示者。

論。已入見道至正為開示。

述曰。下第四句。入地菩薩名為勝者。彼契唯識故能證解阿賴耶識。不生誹謗分別我執。故我世尊正為開示。自位已得令其重明凈今更示之。后地未得令其進修今為開也。

問曰若爾地前不為說者。何以得聞。何所造修。后入地時得真唯識。

論。或諸菩薩至故亦為說。

述曰。不問地上．地前菩薩皆名勝者。佛皆為說。地前雖猶未能證解。而能信解不生誹謗。希求此識轉依之果。故亦為說　我即世尊自指稱也　開示對於若我．若法。皆準前解。不說地上已前同故。攝論第二但有初解更無後解。與此稍別。

論。非諸轉識有如是義。

述曰。此總結也。唯第八識攝藏諸法。是

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

窺基法師述：諸法和識，能依（指阿賴耶識作為所依）和所依（指諸法依阿賴耶識而生）都是同時生滅的，不像僧佉派所說的常住不變。因此，與僧佉派的觀點不同。然而，《攝大乘論》中的相關論述更難理解，但其義理與本論極其相似，所以特別用『阿賴耶』這個詞來總結。

論：與雜染法相互攝藏，所以名為阿賴耶（Ālaya）。

窺基法師述：頌文中只是破斥勝性（Prakṛti）作為萬物之因的觀點，僅根據『能藏』的含義來解釋阿賴耶識，並非認為阿賴耶識就是『我』。現在本論與《攝大乘論》在相互攝藏的觀點上相同。然而，現在有情執著阿賴耶識為『我』，這是頌文中所沒有的，是義理上的補充說明。因為執著阿賴耶識為『我』，才真正稱之為『藏』。具備這些含義，所以名為阿賴耶。或者說，特別用『阿賴耶』這個詞來彰顯『藏』的含義，即與染法相互攝藏等。前面的解釋是總結前兩句頌文，這裡進一步分別闡釋阿賴耶的含義，所以與前面不同。

勝者，我開示者。

論：已經進入見道的菩薩，我才真正為他們開示。

窺基法師述：下文第四句，入地的菩薩被稱為『勝者』。他們契合唯識的道理，因此能夠證悟和理解阿賴耶識，不會產生誹謗和分別我執。所以，我世尊才真正為他們開示。對於已經證得阿賴耶識的菩薩，讓他們更加明白；對於尚未證得的菩薩，讓他們進一步修習，現在為他們開示。

問：如果這樣，那麼地上菩薩之前的人不為他們說，他們如何聽聞？如何修造？之後入地時才能得到真正的唯識。

論：或者，諸位菩薩，我也為他們說。

窺基法師述：不論是地上還是地前的菩薩，都稱為『勝者』，佛都為他們宣說。地前菩薩雖然還不能證悟和理解，但能夠信解，不生誹謗，希求此識轉依的果報，所以也為他們宣說。『我』即世尊（Śākyamuni）自指。開示的對象，無論是『我』還是『法』，都按照前面的解釋。不說地上菩薩，是因為地上菩薩和地前菩薩相同。《攝大乘論》第二品只有最初的解釋，沒有後面的解釋，與本論稍有不同。

論：不是諸轉識有這樣的含義。

窺基法師述：這是總結。只有第八識阿賴耶識才能攝藏諸法，是。

【English Translation】 English version:

Commentary by Kuiji: All dharmas and consciousnesses, both the dependent (referring to Ālaya-consciousness as the basis) and the depended upon (referring to dharmas arising dependent on Ālaya-consciousness), arise and cease simultaneously, unlike what the Sāṃkhya school claims to be permanent and unchanging. Therefore, it differs from the views of the Sāṃkhya school. However, the relevant discussions in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha are more difficult to understand, but their meaning is extremely similar to this treatise, so the term 'Ālaya' is specifically used to summarize.

Treatise: Because it mutually contains defiled dharmas, it is called Ālaya (Ālaya).

Commentary by Kuiji: The verse only refutes the view of Prakṛti as the cause of all things, and only explains Ālaya-consciousness based on the meaning of 'capable of storing,' not considering Ālaya-consciousness to be 'self.' Now, this treatise and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha are the same in the view of mutual containment. However, sentient beings now cling to Ālaya-consciousness as 'self,' which is not in the verse, but is a supplementary explanation in the meaning. Because clinging to Ālaya-consciousness as 'self' is truly called 'store.' Having these meanings, it is called Ālaya. Or, the term 'Ālaya' is specifically used to highlight the meaning of 'store,' that is, mutually containing defiled dharmas, etc. The previous explanation summarizes the first two lines of the verse, and here it further explains the meaning of Ālaya separately, so it is different from the previous one.

'The superior ones, I reveal.'

Treatise: Only for the Bodhisattvas who have entered the path of seeing do I truly reveal.

Commentary by Kuiji: The fourth line below, Bodhisattvas who have entered the bhūmi (stage) are called 'superior ones.' They are in accordance with the principle of Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-only), so they can realize and understand Ālaya-consciousness, and will not generate slander and discriminating self-clinging. Therefore, I, the World-Honored One (Śākyamuni), truly reveal to them. For Bodhisattvas who have already attained Ālaya-consciousness, let them understand it more clearly; for those who have not yet attained it, let them further cultivate, and now reveal it to them.

Question: If so, then those before the bhūmi are not spoken to, how do they hear? How do they cultivate? Only when they enter the bhūmi later can they obtain true Vijñānavāda.

Treatise: Or, for all Bodhisattvas, I also speak to them.

Commentary by Kuiji: Whether Bodhisattvas on or before the bhūmi are called 'superior ones,' the Buddha speaks to them all. Although Bodhisattvas before the bhūmi cannot yet realize and understand, they can believe and understand, do not generate slander, and hope for the result of the transformation of this consciousness, so they are also spoken to. 'I' refers to the World-Honored One (Śākyamuni) referring to himself. The objects of revelation, whether 'self' or 'dharma,' are all in accordance with the previous explanation. Not speaking of Bodhisattvas on the bhūmi is because Bodhisattvas on the bhūmi are the same as Bodhisattvas before the bhūmi. The second chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha only has the initial explanation and no later explanation, which is slightly different from this treatise.

Treatise: It is not that the transforming consciousnesses have such a meaning.

Commentary by Kuiji: This is a summary. Only the eighth consciousness, Ālaya-consciousness, can contain all dharmas, it is.

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種子識。名阿賴耶。世尊為勝者方解說故。六識不然翻此可解。

第三頌者。是解深密經中之頌。瑜伽五十一等與此文同。

論。解深密經至恐彼分別執為我。

述曰。長行自解。

論。以能執持至名阿陀那。

述曰。此三義釋。攝論有二無初種子。若望種子即名執持。令種子不失。無覺受故。色根．依處名為執受。令根不壞。生覺受故。若初結生後生相續名為執取。取諸有故。或為種依持領以為境名曰執持。執色根等令生覺受名為執受。攝初結生名為執取。若望外依處不名阿陀那。無執持等義。此解執持義。識義如常故。前中后頌俱不解識。具此三義此識名阿陀那。結第一句上四字也。卻取第四識字。而結上三字故也。

論。無性有情至故名甚細。

述曰。五種姓中無性有情。不能窮解其源底故說為甚深。此唯凡夫。餘二乘種姓決定者。若凡若聖不能通達。謂不能證故名甚細。通達者。謂無漏道真證得之。彼不證故。非不為說名不通達。不愚法聲聞亦信聞故。然不造修。由此有生無色入滅定等。非有大乘種姓若聖若凡。及二乘中若凡若聖不定姓者。佛不為說。若彼定姓大乘凡夫亦不為說。即誰造修真唯識觀。我等如何得聞此識。二乘迴心若凡若聖。皆不為說。應不名回

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：種子識，又名阿賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子之處）。世尊（釋迦牟尼佛）是爲了那些有能力理解的人才這樣解釋的。前六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）並非如此，反過來解釋就容易理解了。

第三頌，是《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra）中的頌文。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第五十一卷等處與此文相同。

論：在《解深密經》中說，是爲了防止他們錯誤地執著此識為『我』（ātman）。

述記：長行部分自己解釋。

論：因為它能夠執持一切種子，所以名為阿陀那識（ādāna-vijñāna，執取識）。

述記：這是從三個方面解釋。在《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中有兩種解釋，沒有最初的種子義。如果從種子的角度來看，就叫做『執持』，使種子不失壞，因為它沒有覺受的緣故。色根（rūpa-indriya，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五根）和所依處（ālambana，根所依賴的境界）名為『執受』，使根不壞，從而產生覺受。如果最初結生（pratisaṃdhi，生命開始）之後相續不斷，就叫做『執取』，因為它取著各種有（bhava，存在）。或者，作為種子的所依，執持並領納境界，這叫做『執持』。執持色根等，使之產生覺受，這叫做『執受』。攝取最初的結生，這叫做『執取』。如果從外在所依處來看，則不稱為阿陀那識，因為它沒有執持等的含義。這裡的解釋是『執持』的含義。識的含義如常，所以前面、中間和後面的頌文都沒有解釋『識』。具備這三種含義，這個識就叫做阿陀那識。總結第一句的前四個字。卻取第四個『識』字，來總結前面的三個字。

論：沒有自性（prakṛti，本性）的有情，因此說它非常微細。

述記：五種姓（pañca-gotra，五種不同的根性）中沒有自性的有情，不能徹底瞭解它的根源，所以說它非常深奧。這僅僅指凡夫。其餘二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）種姓決定的人，無論是凡夫還是聖人，都不能完全通達。所謂不能通達，是指不能證得，所以說它非常微細。能夠通達的人，是指通過無漏道（anāsrava-mārga，沒有煩惱的道路）真正證得它的人。那些不能證得的人，並非佛不為他們說，而是他們不能通達。不愚法的聲聞（śrāvaka，聽聞佛法的人）也相信聽聞到的，然而他們不造作修習。由此，有生於無色界（arūpadhātu，沒有物質的禪定境界）和入滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti，斷滅一切心識活動的禪定）等情況。並非具有大乘（Mahāyāna，大乘佛教）種姓的人，無論是聖人還是凡夫，以及二乘中無論是凡夫還是聖人，不定種姓的人，佛都不為他們說。即使是那些決定種姓的大乘凡夫，佛也不為他們說。那麼，到底是誰造作修習真正的唯識觀（vijñapti-mātratā，萬法唯識的觀法）呢？我們如何才能聽聞到這個識呢？二乘迴心（轉向大乘）的人，無論是凡夫還是聖人，佛都不為他們說。這樣，應該不能稱為迴心。

【English Translation】 English version: The seed consciousness, also known as the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness, the place where all seeds are stored). The World Honored One (Śākyamuni Buddha) explained it this way for those who are capable of understanding. The first six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness) are not like this; it is easier to understand by explaining it the other way around.

The third verse is a verse from the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra). Yogaśāstrabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) Volume 51 and others are the same as this text.

Treatise: In the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, it says that it is to prevent them from mistakenly clinging to this consciousness as 'self' (ātman).

Commentary: The prose section explains itself.

Treatise: Because it can uphold all seeds, it is called the Ādāna-vijñāna (grasping consciousness).

Commentary: This is explained from three aspects. In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna), there are two explanations, without the initial meaning of seed. If viewed from the perspective of seeds, it is called 'upholding,' preventing the seeds from being lost, because it has no sensation. The sense organs (rūpa-indriya, the five roots of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) and the supporting bases (ālambana, the objects upon which the roots rely) are called 'reception,' preventing the roots from being damaged, thereby producing sensation. If the initial rebirth (pratisaṃdhi, the beginning of life) continues uninterrupted, it is called 'grasping,' because it grasps various existences (bhava). Alternatively, as the basis of the seeds, upholding and receiving the objects, this is called 'upholding.' Upholding the sense organs, etc., causing them to produce sensation, this is called 'reception.' Grasping the initial rebirth, this is called 'grasping.' If viewed from the external supporting bases, it is not called the Ādāna-vijñāna, because it does not have the meaning of upholding, etc. The explanation here is the meaning of 'upholding.' The meaning of consciousness is as usual, so the verses in the beginning, middle, and end do not explain 'consciousness.' Possessing these three meanings, this consciousness is called the Ādāna-vijñāna. Summarizing the first four words of the first sentence. Instead, taking the fourth word 'consciousness' to summarize the preceding three words.

Treatise: Sentient beings without nature (prakṛti, inherent nature), therefore it is said to be very subtle.

Commentary: Among the five lineages (pañca-gotra, five different dispositions), sentient beings without nature cannot thoroughly understand its origin, so it is said to be very profound. This refers only to ordinary people. Those of the determined Two Vehicle (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) lineage, whether ordinary or saintly, cannot fully comprehend it. The so-called inability to comprehend means the inability to attain it, so it is said to be very subtle. Those who can comprehend are those who truly attain it through the unconditioned path (anāsrava-mārga, the path without afflictions). Those who cannot attain it, it is not that the Buddha does not speak to them, but that they cannot comprehend it. Śrāvakas (listeners of the Dharma) who are not ignorant of the Dharma also believe what they hear, but they do not create and cultivate it. Therefore, there are cases of being born in the Formless Realm (arūpadhātu, meditative states without material form) and entering the Cessation of Perception and Sensation (nirodha-samāpatti, meditative state of cessation of all mental activity). It is not that those with the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) lineage, whether saintly or ordinary, and those of the Two Vehicles, whether ordinary or saintly, with undetermined lineage, the Buddha does not speak to them. Even those ordinary Mahāyāna practitioners with determined lineage, the Buddha does not speak to them. Then, who exactly creates and cultivates the true Mind-Only (vijñapti-mātratā, the view that all phenomena are only mind) contemplation? How can we hear about this consciousness? Those of the Two Vehicles who turn their minds (towards the Mahāyāna), whether ordinary or saintly, the Buddha does not speak to them. In this way, it should not be called turning the mind.

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心不作唯識觀三性觀等　唯此所除。佛不為說令其證入。非不除者亦不為說　由此應知。攝論總說凡夫．二乘。理未定故。有前過故。

即解于上一句頌訖。次下解第二句。

論。是一切法真實種子。

述曰。正出現行此識之體。種是因故。即上四字。

論。緣擊便生至猶如暴流。

述曰。此即正出識之功能。翻顯于喻。正生論文。恒無間斷猶如暴流。

第二句訖。次下第三．第四句合解　且解第三句中凡．愚二字。即取第四句中恐彼起分別過。卻向上取我世尊不為開演。

論。凡即無性愚即趣寂。

述曰。即前所除。

論。恐彼於此至不為開演。

述曰。若起分別我．法二執。凡墮惡趣。愚障聖道。凡無聖道故。愚聖可生故。故各偏義說。恐有此過故。我世尊不為開演。然不為說。凡．愚第七識。恒緣第八執為我法二見亦生。何故不為凡．愚等說。此即南印度羅羅國正量部僧名般若鞠多。此名惠藏。安惠之學徒。三代帝王師。造七百頌誹謗大乘。論中作如此說。是佛說者何故相違。撥大乘理為非善說。此不達義。謂不為說。其第七識但生俱生我見。不生惡趣未障聖道。若為說時。便增煩惱．所知分別我．法二見。第六者起障生聖道。便生惡趣故不為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 心不作唯識觀、三性觀等，唯有這些（不修習這些觀法的人）才會被排除在外。佛陀不會為他們宣說，讓他們證入（這些觀法）。對於那些沒有被排除在外的人，佛陀也不會為他們宣說。由此應該知道，《攝大乘論》（She Lun）總括地說，凡夫和二乘（聲聞、緣覺）的根器不定，因為有之前的過失。

以上一句頌文解釋完畢。接下來解釋第二句。

論：這是一切法真實的種子。

述記：這裡指的是正出現行（正在顯現執行）的阿賴耶識（Alaya-識）的本體。種子是因，就是指上面的四個字。

論：緣擊便生，乃至猶如暴流。

述記：這正是說明阿賴耶識的功能，反過來顯現出比喻的含義。正式開始解釋論文，（阿賴耶識）恒常無間斷，猶如暴流。

第二句解釋完畢。接下來合併解釋第三、第四句。先解釋第三句中的『凡』、『愚』二字，然後從第四句中『恐怕他們因此產生分別』的過失，反過來向上取『我世尊不為開演』。

論：凡，指的是無性；愚，指的是趣向寂滅。

述記：就是指前面所排除的那些人。

論：恐怕他們因此產生我法二執，所以不為他們開演。

述記：如果（凡夫、二乘）因此產生我執、法執，『凡』就會墮入惡趣，『愚』就會障礙聖道。『凡』沒有聖道，『愚』可以生出聖道，所以各自偏重一方面來說。因為恐怕有這樣的過失，所以我的世尊不為他們開演。然而，不是不為他們說。『凡』、『愚』的第七識（末那識，Manas-識）恒常緣著第八識（阿賴耶識）執著為我、法二見也會產生。為什麼不為『凡』、『愚』等人宣說呢？這裡指的是南印度羅羅國（Lalou）正量部（Sammitiya）的僧人，名叫般若鞠多（Prajnakaragupta），這個名字的意思是惠藏，是安慧（Sthiramati）的學徒，曾是三代帝王的老師。他寫了七百頌來誹謗大乘佛教，論中這樣說，如果說是佛陀說的，為什麼會互相違背，否定大乘的道理，認為不是善說呢？這是不理解其中的含義。所謂不為他們說，是因為他們的第七識只是產生俱生的我見，不會墮入惡趣，也沒有障礙聖道。如果為他們宣說，就會增加煩惱和所知障，產生分別的我、法二見，第六識（意識，Manovijnana）就會產生障礙，阻礙生出聖道，就會墮入惡趣，所以不為他們宣說。

【English Translation】 English version Those who do not cultivate the Mind-Only contemplation, the Three Natures contemplation, etc., are the only ones excluded. The Buddha does not expound for them, so that they may realize (these contemplations). Nor does the Buddha expound for those who are not excluded. From this, it should be known that the She Lun (Compendium of Mahayana, Mahāyānasaṃgraha) generally states that ordinary beings and the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas) have undetermined capacities, because of the previous faults.

The explanation of the above verse is completed. Next, the second line is explained.

Treatise: This is the real seed of all dharmas.

Commentary: This refers to the very substance of the Ālaya-consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) that is currently manifesting and operating. The seed is the cause, which refers to the above four words.

Treatise: When struck by conditions, it arises, even like a torrential flow.

Commentary: This precisely explains the function of the consciousness, revealing the meaning of the metaphor. The treatise formally begins to explain that (the Ālaya-consciousness) is constant and uninterrupted, like a torrential flow.

The second line is explained. Next, the third and fourth lines are explained together. First, the words 'ordinary' and 'ignorant' in the third line are explained, and then from the fault of 'fearing that they will generate discriminations' in the fourth line, it is taken upwards to 'my World-Honored One does not expound for them'.

Treatise: 'Ordinary' refers to no-self-nature; 'ignorant' refers to tending towards quiescence.

Commentary: This refers to those who were previously excluded.

Treatise: Fearing that they will generate the two attachments of self and dharma, therefore, he does not expound for them.

Commentary: If (ordinary beings and the Two Vehicles) generate the attachments to self and dharma, the 'ordinary' will fall into the evil destinies, and the 'ignorant' will obstruct the holy path. The 'ordinary' do not have the holy path, and the 'ignorant' can generate the holy path, so each is emphasized in one aspect. Because of the fear of such faults, my World-Honored One does not expound for them. However, it is not that he does not speak to them. The seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñāna) of the 'ordinary' and 'ignorant' constantly clings to the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), holding it as the self and dharma, and the two views also arise. Why does he not expound for the 'ordinary' and 'ignorant' and others? This refers to the monk Prajnakaragupta from the Sammitiya school in Lalou, South India, whose name means 'Wisdom Treasury'. He was a student of Sthiramati and a teacher of three generations of emperors. He wrote seven hundred verses slandering Mahayana Buddhism. The treatise says this: if it is said by the Buddha, why would it contradict itself, denying the principles of Mahayana and considering it not well-spoken? This is not understanding the meaning. The so-called not speaking to them is because their seventh consciousness only generates the innate view of self, and does not fall into the evil destinies, nor does it obstruct the holy path. If he were to expound for them, it would increase afflictions and cognitive obscurations, generating the discriminating views of self and dharma, and the sixth consciousness (Manovijñāna) would generate obstacles, hindering the generation of the holy path, and they would fall into the evil destinies, so he does not expound for them.

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說。何開第七俱我見也。此唯有覆。彼不善故。前為說別。而汝不知俱生．分別二惑過失。妄為此難。此即大師于制惡見中有此分別。西方師等咸皆宗仰。后戒日王三度往喚般若毬多。欲令共我大師論議。辭不肯來。一度辭不能乘馬。一度辭輿熱。復將母像往迎。即辭年老。遙嘆大師深生敬伏。但以智窮海性。學盡玄源。故所出言千古模範。然觀凡．愚俱愚法故。故不為說。若不愚法雖決定性亦為說之。然後有難。如外道等雖為不說有阿陀那。亦有分別我法障生。此何不為說者。不然彼妄計我沉淪惡趣。冀其修無我而得斷除。今更為說返增重病。彼便執為實體別有。分別我法深增惡趣。故不為說。雖有種姓可聞信解。根未熟故亦不為說。如一乘法信根若熟即便為說。此中約全五姓作論。非約少分故不說言。雖有種姓根未熟者生誹謗故。不為他說深細等義。

論。唯第八識有如是相。

述曰。第三總結。

次下第四頌。即第三經。

論。入楞伽經亦作是說。

述曰。楞伽是師子國山名也。言入昔佛入于彼為彼王神說法故復言入。即十卷楞迦第二卷中佛答頌。四卷楞迦第一卷中頌。譬如巨海浪。斯由猛風起。洪波鼓冥豁。無有斷絕時。藏識海亦然。境界風所動。種種諸識浪。騰踴而轉生。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 說：什麼是第七俱生我見（Sahaja-ātmadrsti）呢？這僅僅是『有覆』，因為它是不善的。之前已經分別說明過，而你不知道俱生和分別這兩種惑的過失，妄加以此為難。這正是大師在制止惡見時所作的區分。西方的法師們都宗奉仰慕。後來戒日王（Śīlāditya）三次派人去請般若毬多（Prajñāgupta），想讓他與我的大師辯論，但他都推辭不來。一次推辭說不能騎馬，一次推辭說轎子太熱。又用母象去迎接，就推辭說年老了。遙遠地讚歎大師，深深地敬佩信服。只是因為智慧窮盡瞭如海的佛性，學問探究到了玄妙的根源，所以說出的話是千古的典範。然而，觀察凡夫和愚人都是愚昧於佛法的，所以不為他們說。如果不愚昧於佛法，即使是決定性的人，也為他們說。然後才會有疑問，例如外道等人，即使不為他們說有阿陀那（Ādāna），也有分別我法（Vikalpa-ātmadharma）的障礙產生，為什麼不為他們說呢？不是這樣的，他們妄自認為『我』會沉淪到惡趣，希望他們修習無我（Anātman）而得以斷除。現在如果再為他們說，反而會增加他們的病癥。他們便會執著認為是實體，分別我法會深深地增加惡趣。所以不為他們說。即使有種姓可以聽聞信解，但因為根基尚未成熟，也不為他們說。例如一乘法（Ekayāna），如果信根成熟了，就為他們說。這裡是就全部五姓（Pañcagotra）來作論述，不是就少部分，所以不說。即使有種姓根基未成熟的人，會產生誹謗，所以不為他們說深奧細微的意義。

論：只有第八識（Ālayavijñāna）有這樣的相。

述記：第三，總結。

接下來是第四頌，即第三經。

論：《入楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）也這樣說。

述記：楞伽（Laṅkā）是師子國（Siṃhala）的山名。說『入』，是說過去佛進入那裡為那裡的國王和神說法，所以又說『入』。即十卷《楞伽經》第二卷中佛的回答偈頌，四卷《楞伽經》第一卷中的偈頌：譬如巨大的海浪，這是由於猛烈的風吹起。巨大的波濤轟鳴開闊，沒有斷絕的時候。藏識海（Ālayavijñāna-sāgara）也是這樣，被境界的風所動。種種諸識的波浪，騰涌而轉變生起。

【English Translation】 English version: He says: What is the seventh Sahaja-ātmadrsti (innate self-view)? This is only 'covered' (有覆), because it is not wholesome. It has been explained separately before, but you do not know the faults of the two delusions, innate and discriminating, and falsely use this as a difficulty. This is precisely the distinction made by the master in curbing evil views. The Western Dharma masters all revered and admired him. Later, King Śīlāditya summoned Prajñāgupta three times, wanting him to debate with my master, but he declined to come. Once he declined saying he could not ride a horse, and another time he declined saying the palanquin was too hot. Then he sent a female elephant to welcome him, but he declined saying he was too old. He remotely praised the master, deeply respecting and believing in him. It is only because his wisdom exhausted the Buddha-nature like the sea, and his learning explored the profound source, that his words are a model for all time. However, observing that ordinary people and fools are ignorant of the Dharma, he does not speak for them. If they are not ignorant of the Dharma, even those of fixed nature, he will speak for them. Then there will be questions, such as why the heretics, even if they are not told about Ādāna, still have the obstacles of Vikalpa-ātmadharma (discriminating self-dharma) arising, why are they not told about it? It is not like that; they falsely believe that 'self' will sink into the evil realms, hoping that they will cultivate Anātman (non-self) and be able to cut it off. Now, if they are told about it again, it will only increase their illness. They will then cling to it as a real entity, and discriminating self-dharma will deeply increase the evil realms. Therefore, they are not told about it. Even if there are those of good lineage who can hear, believe, and understand, but because their roots are not yet mature, they are not told about it either. For example, the Ekayāna (One Vehicle) Dharma, if the roots of faith are mature, then they are told about it. Here, the discussion is based on all five gotras (Pañcagotra), not just a small part, so it is not mentioned. Even if there are those of good lineage whose roots are not yet mature, they will give rise to slander, so they are not told about profound and subtle meanings.

Treatise: Only the eighth Ālayavijñāna (store consciousness) has such characteristics.

Commentary: Third, a summary.

Next is the fourth verse, which is the third sutra.

Treatise: The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Descent into Lanka Sutra) also says this.

Commentary: Laṅkā is the name of a mountain in Siṃhala (Sri Lanka). Saying 'enter' means that the past Buddha entered there to preach the Dharma to the king and gods there, so it is also said 'enter'. That is, the Buddha's reply verses in the second volume of the ten-volume Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, and the verses in the first volume of the four-volume Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra: 'Like the huge ocean waves, this is due to the fierce wind rising. The huge waves roar and open up, without ceasing. The Ālayavijñāna-sāgara (store consciousness ocean) is also like this, moved by the wind of the realm. The waves of various consciousnesses surge and transform and arise.'

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然彼經頌與此稍別。彼言楞迦言不正也。

論。如海遇風緣至現前作用轉。

述曰。頌言別者理準可知。無勞別解。但此頌中法喻相屬。隨文可悉　然境等風所擊之中。此第八識自境不熏成種。不能擊發藏識。是七識境。相分熏種也。復言等者。謂非但所緣緣擊發。亦為增上七識見分種子因緣。前等無間等。之所擊故。或自境界雖非能熏。為須受用故。亦說本識生。故言境等。此是親所擊發。如自等無間雖不熏種亦擊生故。故法中言恒起諸識浪。即喻中言無有間斷時。亦是恒義。現前作用轉者。謂生七識等功能。是現前作用。

論。眼等諸識至第八識性。

述曰。此總結成識有用也。眼等轉識無如海等。文易可知。

論。此等無量至此第八識。

述曰。大乘經者。如顯揚第一所引經。云無明覆愛結系愚夫感得有識之身等。又如五種子。乃至名有取識等皆是所等。

上來總引大乘經為證訖。下外人以經為不定。不許為至教故。自下初以比量成大乘是佛語。第二引莊嚴論成立是佛語。

論。諸大乘經至至教量攝。

述曰。說至教者。言忠於理真實教也。故諸論等無不定失。若成佛語即初四因加契經攝字。不爾四因皆有不定。六足等論。雖順無我等。非佛語故。量

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 然而那部經的偈頌與這部經的稍有不同。那部經說楞伽（Lanka，地名）的語言不純正。

論：就像大海遇到風的因緣，顯現出作用而轉動。

述記：偈頌說『不同』，其中的道理可以推知，無需特別解釋。但這個偈頌中，法和比喻相互對應，隨著文句就能明白。就像境界等同於風所衝擊，這第八識（Alaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）的自境界不熏習成種子，不能衝擊引發藏識（Ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識），而是七識的境界，相分熏習成種子。又說『等』，是指不僅是所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya，認識對像）衝擊引發，也是增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya，起主導作用的條件），七識見分（darśana-bhāga，認識作用）的種子因緣，被前等無間緣（samanantara-pratyaya，緊鄰的條件）等所衝擊。或者自境界雖然不能熏習，但爲了需要受用，也說本識（mūla-vijñāna，根本識）生起，所以說『境界等』。這是直接被衝擊引發的，就像自等無間緣雖然不熏習種子，也衝擊而生起。所以法中說『恒常生起諸識浪』，就比喻中說『沒有間斷的時候』，也是恒常的意思。『顯現出作用而轉動』，是指產生七識等功能，就是顯現的作用。

論：眼等諸識沒有像大海一樣的功能，直到第八識的性質。

述記：這是總結說明識的作用。眼等轉識（pravṛtti-vijñāna，轉變識）沒有像大海一樣的功能，文句容易理解。

論：這些無量經典都說到這個第八識。

述記：大乘經，比如《顯揚聖教論》（Abhisamayālaṃkāra，一部重要的佛教論著）第一品所引用的經文，說『無明（avidyā，對事物真相的迷惑）覆蓋，愛結（tṛṣṇā，渴愛）束縛，愚夫感受而得到有識之身』等等。又如五種子，乃至名為有取識等等，都是所指的。

上面總共引用大乘經作為證據完畢。下面外人認為經文不定，不認為是至高無上的教誨。因此，下面首先用比量（anumāna，推理）成立大乘是佛語，第二引用《莊嚴經論》（Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra，又稱《大乘莊嚴經論》）成立是佛語。

論：諸大乘經都屬於至高無上的教量所包含。

述記：說至高無上的教誨，是指忠於真理、真實的教誨。所以各種論典等沒有不確定的錯誤。如果成立是佛語，就最初的四個因加上『契經』包含的字眼。否則四個因都有不確定的地方。比如《六足論》（Abhidhamma Pitaka，阿毗達摩藏），雖然順應無我（anatta，沒有不變的「我」）等教義，但不是佛語。量（pramāṇa，量度）。

【English Translation】 English version: However, that verse in that scripture is slightly different from this one. That scripture says that the language of Lanka (place name) is not pure.

Treatise: Like the ocean encountering the conditions of the wind, it manifests its function and turns.

Commentary: The verse says 'different,' and the reason for this can be inferred, so there is no need for special explanation. However, in this verse, the dharma and the metaphor correspond to each other, and it can be understood by following the sentences. Just as the realm is like being struck by the wind, this eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness)'s own realm does not become a seed through熏習(xunxi, influence), and cannot strike and trigger the storehouse consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness), but rather it is the realm of the seven consciousnesses, and the appearance aspect becomes a seed through 熏習(xunxi, influence). Furthermore, saying 'equal' means that not only is the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya, object of cognition) striking and triggering, but it is also the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya, the condition that plays a leading role), the seed cause of the seeing aspect (darśana-bhāga, cognitive function) of the seven consciousnesses, which is struck by the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya, immediately preceding condition) and so on. Or, although the self-realm cannot be 熏習(xunxi, influence), it is also said that the fundamental consciousness (mūla-vijñāna, fundamental consciousness) arises because it needs to be experienced, so it is said 'realm equal'. This is directly struck and triggered, just as the self-immediately preceding condition, although it does not 熏習(xunxi, influence) seeds, also strikes and arises. Therefore, the dharma says 'constantly arising waves of consciousness,' which is like the metaphor saying 'there is no time of interruption,' which also means constant. 'Manifesting its function and turning' refers to the function of producing the seven consciousnesses and so on, which is the manifested function.

Treatise: The eye consciousness and other consciousnesses do not have the function of the ocean, until the nature of the eighth consciousness.

Commentary: This is a summary explaining the function of consciousness. The transforming consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna, transforming consciousnesses) such as eye consciousness do not have the function of the ocean, and the sentences are easy to understand.

Treatise: These immeasurable sutras all speak of this eighth consciousness.

Commentary: The Mahayana sutras, such as the sutra quoted in the first chapter of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra (a major Buddhist treatise), say 'Ignorance (avidyā, delusion about the true nature of things) covers, the bond of love (tṛṣṇā, craving) binds, and foolish beings feel and obtain a body of consciousness' and so on. Also, like the five seeds, and even the name 'consciousness with grasping,' etc., are all referring to this.

Above, the general quotation of Mahayana sutras as evidence is completed. Below, outsiders consider the sutras to be uncertain and do not consider them to be the supreme teaching. Therefore, below, first, the anumāna (inference) is used to establish that the Mahayana is the Buddha's word, and second, the Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra (also known as the Great Vehicle Ornament of Sutras) is quoted to establish that it is the Buddha's word.

Treatise: All Mahayana sutras belong to the supreme teaching.

Commentary: Saying supreme teaching refers to the teaching that is faithful to the truth and is real. Therefore, various treatises and so on do not have uncertain errors. If it is established that it is the Buddha's word, then the initial four causes are added to the words included in the 'sutra'. Otherwise, the four causes all have uncertain places. For example, the Abhidhamma Pitaka, although it conforms to the teachings of anatta (no self) and so on, it is not the Buddha's word. Pramāṇa (means of knowledge).

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中有五因。兩句為一因。及末後樂大乘者許能顯示無顛倒理契經攝故。為第五也。初言諸大乘經。末言至教量攝是宗也。中間是因。如增一等喻。然初四因有隨一過。彼不許此順無我等故　又若以契經為至教有不定過。大乘等諸論。皆順無我。違數取趣。豈即至教量所攝也。以為不定。彼非至教故。唯第五因有所簡別。自許能顯示無顛倒理契經攝故。簡他不極成　然自亦許增一等至教量故。前四種因皆以末後因成立得為因。因既成已。即總及別有十比量。前四因為宗有四。皆以許能顯示等為因。又以諸大乘經至教量攝為宗。兩對為一因。各加樂大乘者許契經攝故字。因既有五。合前為九。又總以中間四對為宗。唯取許能顯示為因。且略而言故有十種。若二三合等隨義應知　然攝大乘說。諸大乘經皆是佛語。一切不違補特伽羅無我性故。如增一者　此對小乘有隨一過。設許不違補特伽羅無我。便共許發智等為不定。彼亦不違人無我　諸師於此未能了達。然有大名居士。德重智高。芳振一時。英流八表。時人不敢斥其尊德。號曰抱跋迦此云食邑。以其學業有餘理當食邑。即是勝軍論師。四十餘年成立一量云。諸大乘經皆是佛說。宗也。兩俱極成非諸佛語所不攝故。因也。如增一等阿笈摩經。喻也。注在唯識抉擇釋中。時世

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 中有五因。兩句為一因。以及最後『樂大乘者』（Adhimukticaryā，對大乘有信樂者）承認能夠顯示無顛倒真理的『契經』（sūtra，佛經）所攝，這是第五個原因。最初說『諸大乘經』，最後說『至教量攝』是宗（pakṣa，論題）。中間是因（hetu，理由），例如《增一阿含經》等是比喻（dṛṣṭānta，例子）。然而，前四個原因有『隨一過』（ekatara-asiddha，部分不成立的過失），因為他們不承認這種順應『無我』（anātman，非我）等的說法。 又如果以『契經』作為『至教』（āpta-vacana，可靠的教言），則有『不定過』（anaikāntika，不定過失）。大乘等各種論著，都順應『無我』，違背『數取趣』（pudgala，補特伽羅，有情），難道就是『至教量』（āpta-pramāṇa，可靠的量）所攝嗎？因為是不定的。它們不是『至教』的緣故。只有第五個原因有所簡別，因為自己承認能夠顯示無顛倒真理的『契經』所攝，簡別了他人不極成（aprasiddha，不成立）。 然而自己也承認《增一阿含經》等是『至教量』，所以前四種原因都以最後一個原因成立而成為原因。原因既然成立，那麼總的以及個別的就有十個比量（anumāna，推論）。前四個原因作為宗有四個，都以『承認能夠顯示』等作為原因。又以『諸大乘經至教量攝』作為宗，兩對作為一個原因，各自加上『樂大乘者許契經攝故』這句話。原因既然有五個，合起來前面就是九個。又總以中間四對作為宗，只取『承認能夠顯示』作為原因。暫且簡略而言所以有十種。如果二三合併等，應該根據意義來理解。 然而《攝大乘論》說，諸大乘經都是佛語，一切都不違背『補特伽羅無我性』（pudgala-nairātmya，人無我性），如同《增一阿含經》那樣。這對於小乘（Hīnayāna，聲聞乘）有『隨一過』。假設承認不違背『補特伽羅無我』，就共同承認《發智論》等為不定，它們也不違背『人無我』（pudgala-nairātmya，人無我）。 各位論師對此未能完全理解。然而有一位大名居士，德行深重智慧高超，聲名遠揚一時，英才流佈四方。當時的人不敢指責他的尊貴德行，號稱『抱跋迦』（Bhoṭṭaka），此云『食邑』，因為他的學業有餘，理應享有食邑。他就是勝軍論師（Jitāri），四十餘年成立一個量云：『諸大乘經都是佛說』，這是宗。『兩俱極成非諸佛語所不攝故』，這是原因。『如增一等阿笈摩經』，這是比喻。註釋在《唯識抉擇釋》中。當時世。

【English Translation】 English version There are five reasons (hetu). Two phrases form one reason. And the last, that 『Adhimukticaryā』 (those who aspire to Mahāyāna) admit that it is included in the 『sūtra』 (scripture) that can reveal the non-inverted truth, is the fifth reason. The initial statement 『all Mahāyāna sūtras』 and the final statement 『included in authoritative teachings』 is the thesis (pakṣa). The middle part is the reason, such as the Ekottara Āgama being an example (dṛṣṭānta). However, the first four reasons have the fault of 『ekatara-asiddha』 (partially unestablished), because they do not admit this conformity to 『anātman』 (non-self) and so on. Furthermore, if 『sūtra』 is taken as 『āpta-vacana』 (reliable teachings), there is the fault of 『anaikāntika』 (inconclusive). Various treatises such as Mahāyāna conform to 『anātman』 and contradict 『pudgala』 (individual), so how can they be included in 『āpta-pramāṇa』 (reliable means of knowledge)? Because it is inconclusive. They are not 『āpta-vacana』. Only the fifth reason has some distinction, because it admits that it is included in the 『sūtra』 that can reveal the non-inverted truth, distinguishing it from others' aprasiddha (unestablished). However, it also admits that the Ekottara Āgama and others are 『āpta-pramāṇa』, so the first four reasons are established by the last reason and become reasons. Since the reason is established, there are ten inferences (anumāna) in total and individually. The first four reasons as the thesis have four, all using 『admitting that it can reveal』 etc. as the reason. Also, taking 『all Mahāyāna sūtras are included in authoritative teachings』 as the thesis, two pairs form one reason, each adding the phrase 『Adhimukticaryā admit that it is included in the sūtra』. Since there are five reasons, combined with the previous ones, there are nine. Also, taking the four pairs in the middle as the thesis, only 『admitting that it can reveal』 is taken as the reason. It is briefly stated, so there are ten types. If two or three are combined, it should be understood according to the meaning. However, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that all Mahāyāna sūtras are the words of the Buddha, and none of them contradict 『pudgala-nairātmya』 (the selflessness of the individual), like the Ekottara Āgama. This has the fault of 『ekatara-asiddha』 for the Hīnayāna (Śrāvakayāna). If it is admitted that it does not contradict 『pudgala-nairātmya』, then the Jñānaprasthāna and others are jointly admitted as inconclusive, and they also do not contradict 『pudgala-nairātmya』. The various teachers have not fully understood this. However, there was a great Upāsaka (lay practitioner) named, with profound virtue and high wisdom, whose reputation spread far and wide. People at that time did not dare to criticize his noble virtue, and he was called 『Bhoṭṭaka』, which means 『fief』, because his learning was abundant, and he should enjoy a fief. He was the teacher Jitāri, who established a measure for more than forty years, saying: 『All Mahāyāna sūtras are the words of the Buddha』, this is the thesis. 『Both are extremely established and not excluded by the words of all Buddhas』, this is the reason. 『Like the Ekottara Āgama and other Āgama scriptures』, this is the example. The commentary is in the Commentary on the Discrimination of Consciousness Only. At that time.

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久行　我師至彼而難之曰。此亦不然。且發智論亦極成非佛語所不攝。彼宗自許真是佛語。雖聖者集本是佛說。亦外道等及汝大乘者。兩俱極成非佛語所不攝。非如增一等。若以發智為宗。因犯兩俱不成。宗犯違教失。不以為宗。故知此因有自不定。為如發智。兩俱極成非佛語所不攝故。汝大乘教如自所許發智非佛語耶。為如增一等。兩俱極成非佛語所不攝故。大乘是佛語耶。若直言為如發智極成非佛語不攝。小乘即違自宗。自許是佛語故。故今應言為如汝自許發智。極成非佛語不攝。彼大乘非佛語耶。以不定中有自有他。及兩俱過。此犯自失。由此理故遂正彼云。自許極成非佛語所不攝故簡彼六足等非自許故。即無前失。

論。又聖慈氏至真是佛說。

述曰。自下第二引莊嚴論為證。然顯揚論第二十卷有十因證大乘是佛說。大勝。與此七因有少不同。一一如彼論。此中對引。然莊嚴論頌文彌勤所說。長行釋者世親所為。舊人不知。總謂天親作謬也。梵言梅呾利耶。此翻言慈氏。梅呾羅曳尼。此聲轉之異。婆羅門十八姓中慈為一姓。氏謂氏族。曾．當皆生此種姓家故以為號。今莊嚴論說有八因。依勘梵本但有七種。此中第五有無有因。彼別離之故為八種。本合為一。長行有七故字。皆是彼文。余文並是此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 久行：我的老師到那裡，用以下理由反駁對方：『這種說法也不對。而且，《發智論》（Abhidharma-jnana-prasthana-sastra）也被普遍認為是並非佛語所包含的。你們宗派自己也承認它是真正的佛語。即使是聖者編輯的版本，本來是佛說的，也被外道等以及你們大乘行者，雙方都普遍認為並非佛語所包含的。它不像《增一阿含經》（Ekottara Agama）等。如果以《發智論》為宗，那麼因就犯了雙方都不成立的過失，宗也犯了違背教義的過失。如果不以它為宗，那麼就知道這個因有自不定。例如《發智論》，雙方都普遍認為並非佛語所包含，你們大乘教義如你們自己所承認的《發智論》那樣，不是佛語嗎？還是像《增一阿含經》等，雙方都普遍認為並非佛語所包含，大乘就是佛語呢？』如果直接說像《發智論》那樣，普遍認為不包含在佛語中，小乘就會違背自己的宗派，因為他們自己承認《發智論》是佛語。所以現在應該說，像你們自己承認的《發智論》那樣，普遍認為不包含在佛語中，那麼大乘就不是佛語嗎？因為不定中既有自過，也有他過，以及雙方都有的過失，這犯了自失。因為這個道理，所以就糾正對方說，『自己承認普遍認為不包含在佛語中』，以此來排除六足論等，因為不是自己承認的，所以就沒有前面的過失。

論：而且，聖慈氏（Arya Maitreya）所說是真正的佛說。

述：下面第二點，引用《莊嚴論》（Mahayana-sutralamkara-sastra）作為證據。然而，《顯揚論》（Asanga's Compendium of Determinations）第二十卷有十個理由證明大乘是佛說，非常殊勝，與這裡的七個理由略有不同，一一如彼論所述。這裡是對照引用。然而，《莊嚴論》的頌文是彌勒（Maitreya）所說，長行的解釋是世親（Vasubandhu）所作。舊人不瞭解，總認為是天親（Vasubandhu）所作，這是錯誤的。梵語梅呾利耶（Maitreya），這裡翻譯為慈氏。梅呾羅曳尼（Maitreyani），這是聲音的轉變。婆羅門十八姓中，慈是一個姓。氏是指氏族。曾經或將來都出生在這個姓氏家族，所以用它作為稱號。現在《莊嚴論》說有八個理由，根據梵文字的勘校，只有七種。這裡第五個有無有因，他們把它分離出來，所以成為八種，原本是合為一個。長行有七個『故』字，都是那裡的原文，其餘的文字都是這裡的。

【English Translation】 English version: Jiuxing: My teacher went there and refuted him, saying, 'This is also not right. Moreover, the Abhidharma-jnana-prasthana-sastra (Treatise on the Foundation of Knowledge) is also universally acknowledged as not included in the Buddha's words. Your sect itself admits that it is the true words of the Buddha. Even the version compiled by the sages, which was originally spoken by the Buddha, is universally acknowledged by both outsiders and you Mahayana practitioners as not included in the Buddha's words. It is not like the Ekottara Agama (Gradual Sayings) and others. If you take the Abhidharma-jnana-prasthana-sastra as the thesis, then the reason commits the fault of being unestablished for both sides, and the thesis also commits the fault of violating the teachings. If you do not take it as the thesis, then you know that this reason has self-uncertainty. For example, the Abhidharma-jnana-prasthana-sastra, which is universally acknowledged by both sides as not included in the Buddha's words, is your Mahayana teaching, like the Abhidharma-jnana-prasthana-sastra that you yourself acknowledge, not the Buddha's words? Or is it like the Ekottara Agama and others, which are universally acknowledged by both sides as not included in the Buddha's words, and the Mahayana is the Buddha's words?' If you directly say that it is like the Abhidharma-jnana-prasthana-sastra, which is universally acknowledged as not included in the Buddha's words, the Hinayana will violate its own sect, because they themselves acknowledge that the Abhidharma-jnana-prasthana-sastra is the Buddha's words. So now it should be said that, like the Abhidharma-jnana-prasthana-sastra that you yourself acknowledge, which is universally acknowledged as not included in the Buddha's words, then the Mahayana is not the Buddha's words? Because in the uncertain there is both self-fault, other-fault, and the fault of both sides, this commits self-loss. Because of this reason, he then corrected the other party, saying, 'Acknowledging oneself as universally acknowledged as not included in the Buddha's words,' in order to exclude the six-footed treatises and others, because it is not self-acknowledged, so there is no previous fault.

Treatise: Moreover, what Arya Maitreya (Holy Loving One) said is the true words of the Buddha.

Commentary: The second point below cites the Mahayana-sutralamkara-sastra (The Ornament of the Mahayana Sutras) as evidence. However, the twentieth volume of Asanga's Compendium of Determinations (Asanga's Compendium of Determinations) has ten reasons to prove that the Mahayana is the Buddha's words, which is very excellent, and is slightly different from the seven reasons here, each as described in that treatise. Here is a comparative citation. However, the verses of the Mahayana-sutralamkara-sastra were spoken by Maitreya, and the explanation of the prose was done by Vasubandhu. The old people did not understand, and generally thought that it was done by Vasubandhu, which is wrong. The Sanskrit word Maitreya, here translated as Loving One. Maitreyani, this is a change of sound. Among the eighteen surnames of Brahmins, Loving is one surname. Clan refers to the clan. Having been or will be born in this surname family, so it is used as a title. Now the Mahayana-sutralamkara-sastra says that there are eight reasons, according to the collation of the Sanskrit text, there are only seven kinds. Here the fifth has the cause of existence and non-existence, they separated it, so it became eight kinds, originally it was combined into one. The prose has seven 'therefore' words, all of which are the original text there, and the rest of the text is here.

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說。

論。一先不記故至先預記別。

述曰。謂小乘者說。大乘經是壞正法者之所說故　若爾何故世尊不預記別。如當有可怖事。皆先記別故。如分十八部滅正法等。莊嚴論言。一不記故。無先字也。顯揚同此。應立量云。諸大乘經若是壞正法者說。佛先應記。宗也。汝說自法內廣壞正法者所起等故。因也。如正法滅事等。喻也　余可怖事。謂正法滅經說。瞻波羅國國城邑。有諸比丘滅我正法。可怖等事。又分十八部等　此中應有不定過難。諸小乘外道后造諸論。雖佛不記亦壞正法者說故。外道非自法內。小乘非廣壞法者所說。無不定失　又諸大乘經。定非自法內廣壞正法者說。佛先不明記故。如增一等。如小乘者造謗大乘論。佛雖不記。非廣壞正法者說。如疥癬故　此下和上制惡見等一一皆有七個比量。彼論中廣說。諸小乘人云佛無功用舍故不說。謂佛不作意觀。不記後有大乘者。于彼復言。佛有三因何故不記。一無功用智恒起現在前。即惠．天眼所見。二恒作正勤守護正法。三知未來智無有障礙。如余可怖事。何故不預記。彼論雖無文傳小乘難。佛亦記已。如經說言師子中蟲自食其肉。即住法內自說大乘或亂正法。豈非師子之蟲自食肉也。今應難言。世尊何故不預分明顯記我滅度後有某甲比丘等說壞

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問： 答：因為佛陀沒有預先記別，所以他們認為大乘經典是破壞正法的人說的。 論：一種觀點認為，因為佛陀沒有預先記別，所以他們認為大乘經典是破壞正法的人說的。 述曰：這是小乘修行者的觀點。他們認為大乘經典是那些破壞正法的人所說的。如果這樣，為什麼世尊不預先記別呢？就像將要發生的可怕的事情，佛陀都會預先記別一樣，例如分十八部，正法將要滅亡等等。《莊嚴論》中說：『因為佛陀沒有記別』，這裡沒有『預先』二字。《顯揚論》的觀點與此相同。應該這樣立論：如果所有的大乘經典都是破壞正法的人說的，那麼佛陀應該預先記別。這是論點。因為你們所說的（大乘經典）是自身教法內部廣泛破壞正法的人所造的。這是理由。就像正法滅亡的事情等等。這是比喻。其他可怕的事情，如《正法滅經》所說：瞻波羅國的城鎮中，有些比丘會滅我的正法，這些都是可怕的事情。還有分十八部等等。 這裡應該有一個不定過難：那些小乘外道後來製造的各種論著，雖然佛陀沒有記別，但也是破壞正法的人說的。外道不是自身教法內部的人，小乘也不是廣泛破壞正法的人所說，所以沒有不定過失。而且，所有的大乘經典，一定不是自身教法內部廣泛破壞正法的人所說，因為佛陀沒有明確記別。就像《增一阿含經》等。就像小乘修行者製造誹謗大乘的論著，佛陀雖然沒有記別，但他們不是廣泛破壞正法的人，就像疥癬一樣。 以下和上制惡見等，每一個都有七個比量，這些在他們的論中廣泛論述。那些小乘人說，佛陀沒有功用舍，所以不說。意思是佛陀不作意觀察，不記別以後會有大乘修行者。他們又說，佛陀有三種原因，為什麼不記別呢？一是無功用智恒常生起，顯現在眼前，也就是智慧和天眼所見。二是恒常精進守護正法。三是知道未來智沒有障礙，就像其他可怕的事情一樣，為什麼不預先記別呢？他們的論中雖然沒有文字記載小乘的責難，但佛陀也已經記別了，就像經中說：『獅子中的蟲子自己吃自己的肉』，也就是住在佛法內部的人自己說大乘，或者擾亂正法，這難道不是獅子中的蟲子自己吃自己的肉嗎？現在應該反駁說：世尊為什麼不預先分明地記別，在我滅度后，有某甲比丘等說破壞正法的話呢？

【English Translation】 English version: Question: Answer: Because the Buddha did not make prior predictions, they believe that the Mahayana sutras were spoken by those who destroy the true Dharma. Treatise: One view is that because the Buddha did not make prior predictions, they believe that the Mahayana sutras were spoken by those who destroy the true Dharma. Statement: This is the view of the Hinayana practitioners. They believe that the Mahayana sutras were spoken by those who destroy the true Dharma. If so, why didn't the World Honored One make prior predictions? Just like terrible things that are about to happen, the Buddha would make prior predictions, such as the division into eighteen schools, the imminent destruction of the true Dharma, and so on. The Adornment of the Sutras Treatise says: 'Because the Buddha did not make predictions,' there is no word 'prior' here. The Exposition of the Meaning Treatise holds the same view. It should be argued as follows: If all the Mahayana sutras were spoken by those who destroy the true Dharma, then the Buddha should have made prior predictions. This is the argument. Because what you say (the Mahayana sutras) are created by those within one's own teachings who extensively destroy the true Dharma. This is the reason. Just like the destruction of the true Dharma, and so on. This is the metaphor. Other terrible things, as the Sutra on the Extinction of the Dharma says: In the towns of the Champa country, there will be monks who will destroy my true Dharma, these are terrible things. And the division into eighteen schools, and so on. There should be an uncertain fallacy here: those various treatises later created by the Hinayana heretics, although the Buddha did not record them, were also spoken by those who destroy the true Dharma. Heretics are not people within one's own teachings, and Hinayana is not said by those who extensively destroy the Dharma, so there is no uncertain fault. Moreover, all the Mahayana sutras are certainly not spoken by those within one's own teachings who extensively destroy the true Dharma, because the Buddha did not clearly record them. Like the Ekottara Agama Sutra, etc. Just like Hinayana practitioners create treatises that slander Mahayana, although the Buddha did not record them, they are not people who extensively destroy the true Dharma, like scabies. Below, the preceptor's creation of evil views, etc., each has seven arguments, which are widely discussed in their treatises. Those Hinayana people say that the Buddha has no functional abandonment, so he does not speak. It means that the Buddha does not intentionally observe and does not record that there will be Mahayana practitioners in the future. They also say that the Buddha has three reasons, why doesn't he record them? First, the wisdom of no effort constantly arises and manifests before one's eyes, which is what wisdom and the divine eye see. Second, constantly diligently protecting the true Dharma. Third, knowing that future wisdom has no obstacles, like other terrible things, why not make prior predictions? Although there is no written record of the Hinayana's accusations in their treatises, the Buddha has already recorded them, just like the sutra says: 'The insects in the lion eat their own flesh,' that is, the people who live within the Buddhadharma themselves speak of Mahayana, or disturb the true Dharma, isn't this the insects in the lion eating their own flesh? Now it should be retorted: Why didn't the World Honored One clearly record in advance that after my extinction, there would be so-and-so monks who would say words that destroy the true Dharma?

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正法名為大乘。初總說言自食其肉。應立量云。師子中蟲自食其肉教。非定授我記。不分明記故。如記汝驢披師子皮教等。此義寧知非授汝記。責謗大乘名為自食。又汝非我。我不非汝。汝為自食。

論。二本俱行故至獨非佛說。

述曰。莊嚴論言同行者。同一時行也。設許前難佛滅後方造大乘。何故與汝小乘之教一時俱行　量云。諸大乘經。佛滅即行。許明無我理契經攝故。如增一等　然成佛說諸大乘經真是佛說。許佛滅后本來俱行故。如增一等　又小乘經。應非佛說。與大乘經本俱行故。如汝許大乘經。雖違大乘自宗。以許彼經是佛語故。然義逼應爾為相違過。何故大乘獨非佛語。而小乘教是佛語耶。彼許大乘一時俱有不須成立佛滅即行。

問若是佛語何故聲聞等不信樂不聞說耶。彼無廣解。

論。三非余境故至非非佛說。

述曰。莊嚴論言不行故。謂聲聞智不能行故。大乘理教廣大甚深。外道．小乘思量不及故不為說。彼經論中曾所未說。設為彼說亦不信受。根器小故。非彼境故。如阿陀那識中頌。

應立量云。大乘經。是佛語。許非餘外道等境契經攝故。如增一等　不言契經攝。即大乘論為不定失。又阿陀那識前已成有。故今為量。除彼識教外諸大乘經。皆是佛說。許

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 正法被稱為大乘（Mahāyāna，偉大的載具）。首先總的來說，（對方）說『自食其肉』。應該這樣立論：『師子中蟲自食其肉』的教義，不能確定是佛陀授予我的記別（vyākaraṇa，預言）。因為它不是明確的記別。就像記別『你像驢子披著獅子皮』的教義等等。怎麼知道這個意思不是授予你的記別呢？（因為這是）責備誹謗大乘，名為『自食』。而且你不是我，我不是你，你才是『自食』。

論：因為兩種版本同時流傳，所以說只有大乘不是佛陀所說。

述記：在《莊嚴論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中說『同行』，是指同一時間流傳。假設允許之前的責難，即佛陀滅度后才造出大乘，那麼為什麼大乘的教義會與你們小乘（Hināyāna，較小的載具）的教義同時流傳呢？可以這樣立論：所有的大乘經典，在佛陀滅度后立即流傳，因為它們允許闡明無我的道理，並且被攝入契經（sūtra，佛經）之中，就像《增一阿含經》（Ekottara Āgama）等經典一樣。然而，如果承認佛陀所說的大乘經典是真實的佛語，那麼就允許它們在佛陀滅度后本來就同時流傳，就像《增一阿含經》等經典一樣。此外，小乘經典，應該不是佛陀所說，因為它與大乘經典本來就同時流傳，就像你們允許大乘經典一樣。雖然這違背了大乘自身的宗義，但因為你們允許那些經典是佛陀所說。然而，從義理上來說，這必然是相違背的過失。為什麼只有大乘不是佛陀所說，而小乘的教義卻是佛陀所說呢？他們允許大乘是同時存在的，不需要成立『佛滅即行』的觀點。

問：如果是佛陀所說，為什麼聲聞（Śrāvaka，聽聞佛法者）等不信樂，也不聽聞宣說呢？因為他們沒有廣大的理解能力。

論：因為不是其他境界，所以說不是非佛陀所說。

述記：《莊嚴論》中說『不行故』，是指聲聞的智慧不能行持。大乘的道理和教義廣大而深奧，外道和小乘的思量無法企及，所以不為他們宣說。那些經典和論典中從未說過這些道理。即使為他們宣說，他們也不會相信和接受，因為他們的根器太小，不是他們的境界。就像《阿陀那識經》（Ādāna-vijñāna，執持識）中的偈頌一樣。

應該這樣立論：大乘經典，是佛陀所說，因為它們允許不是其他外道等境界，並且被攝入契經之中，就像《增一阿含經》等經典一樣。如果不說『被攝入契經』，就會有不確定的過失。而且阿陀那識之前已經成立存在，所以現在立論，除了那個識的教義之外，所有的大乘經典，都是佛陀所說，因為它們允許。

【English Translation】 English version: The right Dharma is called Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle). Initially, in general terms, (the opponent) says 'eating one's own flesh'. One should establish the following argument: The teaching of 'worms in a lion eating their own flesh' is not a definite prediction (vyākaraṇa) granted to me. Because it is not a clear prediction. Like the teaching of predicting 'you are like a donkey wearing a lion's skin', etc. How do we know that this meaning is not a prediction granted to you? (Because it is) blaming and slandering Mahāyāna, calling it 'eating one's own flesh'. Moreover, you are not me, and I am not you; you are the one 'eating your own flesh'.

Treatise: Because two versions circulate simultaneously, it is said that only Mahāyāna is not spoken by the Buddha.

Commentary: In the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna), it says 'circulating together', meaning circulating at the same time. Even if we allow the previous objection, that Mahāyāna was created only after the Buddha's Parinirvana, why would the teachings of Mahāyāna circulate simultaneously with your teachings of Hināyāna (Smaller Vehicle)? One can establish the following argument: All Mahāyāna sutras circulate immediately after the Buddha's Parinirvana, because they allow the clarification of the principle of no-self and are included in the sutras (sūtra), like the Ekottara Āgama (Increasing by One) and other sutras. However, if one admits that the Mahāyāna sutras spoken by the Buddha are the true words of the Buddha, then one allows them to circulate simultaneously from the beginning after the Buddha's Parinirvana, like the Ekottara Āgama and other sutras. Furthermore, the Hināyāna sutras should not be spoken by the Buddha, because they circulate simultaneously with the Mahāyāna sutras from the beginning, just as you allow the Mahāyāna sutras. Although this contradicts the Mahāyāna's own doctrine, it is because you allow those sutras to be the words of the Buddha. However, in terms of meaning, this is necessarily a contradictory fault. Why is it that only Mahāyāna is not spoken by the Buddha, while the teachings of Hināyāna are spoken by the Buddha? They allow Mahāyāna to exist simultaneously, without needing to establish the view that it 'circulates immediately after the Buddha's Parinirvana'.

Question: If it is spoken by the Buddha, why do the Śrāvakas (listeners) and others not believe in it, nor hear it being preached? Because they do not have broad understanding.

Treatise: Because it is not the realm of others, it is said that it is not not spoken by the Buddha.

Commentary: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says 'not practiced', meaning that the wisdom of the Śrāvakas cannot practice it. The principles and teachings of Mahāyāna are vast and profound, beyond the comprehension of non-Buddhists and Hināyāna practitioners, so it is not preached to them. These principles have never been mentioned in those sutras and treatises. Even if it were preached to them, they would not believe or accept it, because their capacity is too small, and it is not their realm. Like the verses in the Ādāna-vijñāna (Storehouse Consciousness) Sutra.

One should establish the following argument: The Mahāyāna sutras are spoken by the Buddha, because they allow not being the realm of other non-Buddhists, etc., and are included in the sutras, like the Ekottara Āgama and other sutras. If one does not say 'included in the sutras', there will be an uncertain fault. Moreover, the Ādāna-vijñāna has already been established as existing, so now the argument is that, apart from the teachings of that consciousness, all the Mahāyāna sutras are spoken by the Buddha, because they allow it.

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諸聲聞所不聞信契經攝故。如阿陀那識教。又彼論言。有五因故。彼忖度人不得入大乘境。一有依故。智依教生。非證智故。二不定故。有時有處有異智生故。三緣俗故。忖度世諦不及第一義諦故。四不普故。雖緣世諦但得少解不解一切故。五退屈故。諍論辨窮即默然故。大乘智無依有證智。乃至終無退屈。故大乘經理非忖度人境。彼言忖度人。即聲聞．外道。

然彼復言。前三因建立大乘雖是佛說。然今釋迦如來不說此法。

論。四應極成故至其理極成。

述曰。若言大乘是迦葉等余佛語。非釋迦語。則極成許大乘是佛說。今佛。亦應說此大乘。佛智等故。如迦葉等佛。何故乃言大乘非佛說翻覆自違。彼文廣論問答。又縱汝許是佛所說。不是佛說。皆有過失。

論。五有無有故至不可得故。

述曰。莊嚴論第五體。第六非體二合為一。彼言有體者。若汝言余佛有大乘體。此佛無大乘體。亦成我義。大乘無異。體是一故　非體者。若汝云此佛無大乘體。即聲聞乘亦無體。若言聲聞乘是佛說有體。大乘不然無佛乘者。有佛出世說聲聞乘者有大過故。與此少異。此意亦以他佛有大乘體。此佛無大乘體。誰出世說聲聞等意同前　又此佛別有大乘體。即是此教所詮。彼無此義。又非唯體。若教

{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：", "這些是小乘聲聞弟子們從未聽聞過的，因為它們被包含在甚深信契經中，例如《阿陀那識經》（Ādāna-vijñāna Sūtra，關於阿陀那識的經典）所教導的內容。此外，該論典中說，有五個原因導致那些依靠忖度（猜測、推測）的人無法進入大乘的境界：", "一、因為他們有所依賴（有依故）：他們的智慧依賴於教法而生，而不是通過證悟獲得的智慧（非證智故）。", "二、因為他們的智慧不穩定（不定故）：有時在某些地方會產生不同的理解和智慧（有時有處有異智生故）。", "三、因為他們所緣的是世俗（緣俗故）：他們的忖度只涉及世俗諦，無法觸及第一義諦（忖度世諦不及第一義諦故）。", "四、因為他們的理解不全面（不普故）：即使他們緣於世俗諦，也只能獲得少許理解，無法理解一切（雖緣世諦但得少解不解一切故）。", "五、因為他們容易退縮（退屈故）：在爭論辯論窮盡時，他們就會沉默不語（諍論辨窮即默然故）。", "而大乘的智慧是無所依賴的，是證悟的智慧，乃至最終都不會退縮。因此，大乘的經典和道理不是那些依靠忖度的人所能理解的境界。", "這裡所說的『忖度人』，指的就是聲聞乘的修行者和外道。", "然而，該論典又說，即使根據前三個原因可以建立大乘是佛所說，但現在的釋迦如來（Śākyamuni，佛教創始人）並沒有宣說這種法。", "論：第四點應該通過極成來證明，直到其道理完全成立（四應極成故至其理極成）。", "述曰：如果說大乘是迦葉佛（Kāśyapa，過去七佛之一）等其他佛所說，而不是釋迦佛所說，那麼這就已經承認了大乘是佛所說。既然如此，現在的佛也應該宣說這種大乘，因為佛的智慧是相同的，就像迦葉佛等佛一樣。為什麼反而說大乘不是佛所說呢？這豈不是自相矛盾？這些內容在論典中有廣泛的問答討論。而且，縱然你承認大乘是佛所說，或者不是佛所說，都會有過失。", "論：第五點是有或無的問題，直到無法獲得（五有無有故至不可得故）。", "述曰：《莊嚴論》（Mahāyānālaṃkāra，無著菩薩所著）的第五體和第六非體，在這裡合二為一。該論典說，如果說有體性，那麼如果你說其他佛有大乘的體性，而這位佛（釋迦牟尼佛）沒有大乘的體性，這也成就了我的觀點，因為大乘沒有差異，體性是相同的。如果說沒有體性，那麼如果你說這位佛沒有大乘的體性，那麼聲聞乘也沒有體性。如果說聲聞乘是佛所說，有體性，而大乘不是這樣，沒有佛乘，那麼佛出世只說聲聞乘就會有很大的過失。這與前面略有不同，這裡的意思是，其他佛有大乘的體性，而這位佛沒有大乘的體性，誰會出世宣說聲聞乘呢？意思與前面相同。而且，如果這位佛有不同於其他佛的大乘體性，那就是此教所詮釋的。其他佛沒有這個含義。而且不僅僅是體性，還有教法。", "english_translations": [ "English version:", "These are unheard of by all Śrāvakas (disciples of the Hearer Vehicle), because they are contained within the profound Samdhinirmocana Sūtra (Scripture Unraveling the Thought), such as the teachings of the Ādāna-vijñāna Sūtra (Scripture on the Ādāna-vijñāna, the storehouse consciousness). Furthermore, that treatise states that there are five reasons why those who rely on speculation (conjecture, inference) cannot enter the realm of the Mahāyāna:", "1. Because they have a reliance (have a basis): their wisdom arises from teachings, not from wisdom attained through realization (not from realized wisdom).", "2. Because their wisdom is unstable (uncertain): sometimes in certain places, different understandings and wisdom arise (sometimes in certain places, different wisdom arises).", "3. Because they are focused on the mundane (related to the mundane): their speculation only involves conventional truth, unable to touch upon the ultimate truth (speculating on conventional truth does not reach the ultimate truth).", "4. Because their understanding is not comprehensive (not universal): even if they are focused on conventional truth, they can only obtain a little understanding, unable to understand everything (although focused on conventional truth, they only gain a little understanding and do not understand everything).", "5. Because they are easily discouraged (retreating): when arguments and debates are exhausted, they become silent (when arguments and debates are exhausted, they become silent).", "But the wisdom of the Mahāyāna is without reliance, it is realized wisdom, and ultimately will not retreat. Therefore, the scriptures and principles of the Mahāyāna are not realms that those who rely on speculation can understand.", "The 'speculative people' mentioned here refer to practitioners of the Śrāvakayāna (Hearer Vehicle) and non-Buddhists.", "However, that treatise also states that even if it can be established that the Mahāyāna is spoken by the Buddha based on the first three reasons, the current Śākyamuni (founder of Buddhism) does not expound this Dharma.", "Treatise: The fourth point should be proven through established truth, until its reasoning is completely established (the fourth should be proven through established truth until its reasoning is completely established).", "Commentary: If it is said that the Mahāyāna is spoken by other Buddhas such as Kāśyapa (one of the past seven Buddhas), and not by Śākyamuni Buddha, then this has already acknowledged that the Mahāyāna is spoken by the Buddha. In that case, the current Buddha should also expound this Mahāyāna, because the wisdom of the Buddhas is the same, just like Kāśyapa Buddha and other Buddhas. Why then say that the Mahāyāna is not spoken by the Buddha? Isn't this self-contradictory? These contents have extensive question and answer discussions in the treatise. Moreover, even if you admit that the Mahāyāna is spoken by the Buddha, or not spoken by the Buddha, there will be faults.", "Treatise: The fifth point is the question of existence or non-existence, until it cannot be obtained (the fifth is the question of existence or non-existence until it cannot be obtained).", "Commentary: The fifth entity and sixth non-entity of the Mahāyānālaṃkāra (Ornament of the Great Vehicle Sutras, written by Asanga) are combined into one here. That treatise says that if there is an entity, then if you say that other Buddhas have the entity of the Mahāyāna, while this Buddha (Śākyamuni Buddha) does not have the entity of the Mahāyāna, this also fulfills my view, because the Mahāyāna has no difference, the entity is the same. If there is no entity, then if you say that this Buddha does not have the entity of the Mahāyāna, then the Śrāvakayāna also has no entity. If it is said that the Śrāvakayāna is spoken by the Buddha and has an entity, while the Mahāyāna is not like this, there is no Buddha Vehicle, then there would be a great fault if the Buddha only spoke the Śrāvakayāna when he appeared in the world. This is slightly different from the previous one, the meaning here is that other Buddhas have the entity of the Mahāyāna, while this Buddha does not have the entity of the Mahāyāna, who would appear in the world to expound the Śrāvakayāna? The meaning is the same as before. Moreover, if this Buddha has a different entity of the Mahāyāna from other Buddhas, that is what this teaching explains. Other Buddhas do not have this meaning. And it is not just the entity, but also the teachings." ] }

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若理若行若事皆是。故應總言。教此何所攝。大乘以何為體。彼智為體有局義故。謂許有大乘教等。無問自他佛。即此所說是。離此所說大乘無故　量云。諸大乘體等。定以此教而為能詮。許能顯彼深妙理等故。如增一等教。

論。若無大乘至不應正理。

述曰。若無大乘體等。聲聞乘教亦應不有。以無能詮佛教所詮佛行。依誰成佛說聲聞乘。佛應別有乘教。三乘攝故。或果別故。或佛．聲聞中隨一攝故。如餘二乘。若言佛乘增一等是。亦應佛果即聲聞等。應佛即聲聞。許能詮教是一故。如聲聞等。又逼之言。汝聲聞乘等。亦應非有。三乘攝故。如汝佛乘。彼論廣中言。若汝言有體者即聲聞乘是大乘體。以此乘得大菩提故。有四因緣非以聲聞乘為大乘體　一非全故。聲聞唯自利不利他故　二非不違故。有言自利法教於他即是利他者。不然。雖以自利安他。彼自求涅槃。不可以此得大菩提故。

三非行故。有言若久行聲聞乘行。則得大菩提者。不然。聲聞乘非大菩提方便故。非以久行非方便得大菩提。如構牛角不出乳故　四非教授故。大乘教授聲聞乘無故。聲聞乘不即是大乘　又五因故大乘與聲聞乘相違。一發心異。二教授異。三方便異。皆為自得涅槃故。四住持異。福智聚少故。五時節異。三生得

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果道理、修行、事業都是大乘，那麼就應該總括而言。那麼，『教』包含哪些內容呢？大乘以什麼為本體呢？因為『智』作為本體具有侷限性。這裡所說的是承認有大乘教等，無論是佛自己宣說，還是其他佛宣說，都是如此。因為離開了這些所說，就沒有大乘了。可以這樣論證：所有大乘的本體等，一定以這些教義作為能詮釋的工具。因為這些教義能夠顯現深奧的道理等，就像《增一阿含經》等教義一樣。

論：如果沒有大乘，那麼聲聞乘的存在就不合道理。

述：如果沒有大乘的本體等，那麼聲聞乘的教義也就不應該存在。因為沒有能夠詮釋佛教所詮釋的佛行，依靠誰來成佛並宣說聲聞乘呢？佛應該有另外的乘教，因為要被三乘所攝，或者因為果位不同，或者因為被佛乘、聲聞乘中的任何一個所攝，就像其餘二乘一樣。如果說佛乘就是《增一阿含經》等，那麼佛的果位也應該就是聲聞等，佛就應該等同於聲聞。因為承認能詮釋的教義是相同的，就像聲聞等一樣。進一步逼問說，你們的聲聞乘等，也不應該存在，因為要被三乘所攝，就像你們的佛乘一樣。彼論廣中說：如果你們說有本體，那麼聲聞乘就是大乘的本體，因為通過這個乘可以獲得大菩提。有四個原因說明不能以聲聞乘作為大乘的本體：一、不全面，因為聲聞乘只求自利而不利他；二、並非不相違背，有人說自利的法教導他人就是利他，不是這樣的。雖然以自利來安定他人，但他自己尋求涅槃，不能通過這個獲得大菩提。

三、並非修行方式，有人說如果長期修行聲聞乘的修行方式，就能獲得大菩提，不是這樣的。因為聲聞乘不是獲得大菩提的方便，不能通過長期修行非方便的法門來獲得大菩提，就像擠壓牛角不會產奶一樣；四、並非教授，因為大乘的教授在聲聞乘中沒有。所以聲聞乘不等於大乘。又有五個原因說明大乘與聲聞乘是相違背的：一、發心不同；二、教授不同；三、方便不同，聲聞乘都是爲了自己獲得涅槃；四、住持不同，福德和智慧的積累少；五、時節不同，三生才能獲得。

【English Translation】 English version: If the principles, practices, and activities are all Mahayana (Great Vehicle), then they should be spoken of in general terms. What does the 'teaching' encompass? What is the essence of Mahayana? Because 'wisdom' as the essence has limitations. What is being said here is the acknowledgement that there are Mahayana teachings, whether spoken by the Buddha himself or by other Buddhas. Because apart from these teachings, there is no Mahayana. It can be argued that all the essence of Mahayana, etc., must use these teachings as the means of expression. Because these teachings can reveal profound principles, etc., just like the teachings of the Ekottara Agama (Increasing by One Sutra), etc.

Treatise: If there is no Mahayana, then the existence of the Sravaka Vehicle (Vehicle of Hearers) would be unreasonable.

Commentary: If there is no essence of Mahayana, etc., then the teachings of the Sravaka Vehicle should also not exist. Because there is no way to express the Buddha's conduct as taught by the Buddha, who would rely on it to attain Buddhahood and proclaim the Sravaka Vehicle? The Buddha should have another vehicle and teachings, because it must be encompassed by the Three Vehicles, or because the fruition is different, or because it is encompassed by either the Buddha Vehicle or the Sravaka Vehicle, just like the other two vehicles. If it is said that the Buddha Vehicle is the Ekottara Agama, etc., then the Buddha's fruition should also be the same as the Sravakas, and the Buddha should be the same as the Sravakas. Because it is acknowledged that the teachings that express it are the same, just like the Sravakas, etc. Furthermore, it is pressed to say that your Sravaka Vehicle, etc., should also not exist, because it must be encompassed by the Three Vehicles, just like your Buddha Vehicle. The extensive discussion in that treatise says: If you say there is an essence, then the Sravaka Vehicle is the essence of the Mahayana, because one can attain Great Bodhi (Great Enlightenment) through this vehicle. There are four reasons why the Sravaka Vehicle cannot be the essence of the Mahayana: First, it is not complete, because the Sravaka Vehicle only seeks self-benefit and does not benefit others; Second, it is not non-contradictory, some say that teaching others the Dharma (teachings) of self-benefit is benefiting others, but this is not the case. Although one uses self-benefit to settle others, he himself seeks Nirvana (liberation), and cannot attain Great Bodhi through this.

Third, it is not the practice, some say that if one practices the Sravaka Vehicle for a long time, one can attain Great Bodhi, but this is not the case. Because the Sravaka Vehicle is not a means to attain Great Bodhi, one cannot attain Great Bodhi through prolonged practice of a non-expedient method, just like squeezing a cow's horn will not produce milk; Fourth, it is not the instruction, because the instructions of the Mahayana are not present in the Sravaka Vehicle. Therefore, the Sravaka Vehicle is not the same as the Mahayana. There are also five reasons why the Mahayana and the Sravaka Vehicle are contradictory: First, the aspiration is different; Second, the instructions are different; Third, the means are different, the Sravaka Vehicle is all for oneself to attain Nirvana; Fourth, the sustenance is different, the accumulation of merit and wisdom is less; Fifth, the timing is different, it takes three lifetimes to attain.

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解脫故。大乘翻此。故非即聲聞乘。

有言大乘依行無果非佛說者。

論。六能對治故至是佛所說。

述曰。莊嚴論云。七能持勤修行時。得無分別智。對治一切煩惱。此即三乘通所斷者。若求佛者先斷法執。諸法分別執是違此智故。學無相法所治遣此。顯揚意與此同　量云大乘是佛說。許有對治真無漏道故。如增一等。

若有說言。大乘非佛說。說法空故者。

論。七義異文故至謂非佛語。

述曰。大乘意深。不可隨文而取其義便生誹謗。彼廣中言。若汝言佛語有三相。入修多羅顯示毗尼不違法空。汝大乘一切法無自性而為教授。違此三理故非佛語　今不違三相故是佛語。入自大乘修多羅故。現自煩惱毗尼故。菩薩以分別為煩惱。廣大甚深即是菩薩法空。不違此空得大菩提故　量云。大乘是佛語。許詮深理義異於文契經攝故。如殺害於父母等言。彼阿含經中亦以為義異文故。謂覺不堅為堅等。貪愛以為父等。

論。是故大乘真是佛說。

述曰。總結之也。

論。如莊嚴論至對治異文故。

述曰。自引頌中。末後故字通為上因。然彼論第一卷第二品說。先略為八因。后廣為細各各分別。尋之大精。應言莊嚴大乘經論。能莊嚴大乘經故。先云大乘莊嚴經

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為解脫的緣故。大乘（Mahāyāna，廣大的交通工具）翻譯了這個。所以它不是聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna，弟子乘坐的交通工具）。

有人說大乘只有修行而沒有結果，不是佛陀所說的。

論：因為六種對治的緣故，所以是大乘是佛陀所說。

述曰：《莊嚴論》中說：『七種力量能夠支援勤奮的修行，獲得無分別智（nirvikalpa-jñāna，沒有分別的智慧），對治一切煩惱。』這指的是三乘（triyāna，三種交通工具，即聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）共同斷除的煩惱。如果想要求得佛果，首先要斷除法執（dharma-graha，對法的執著）。對諸法的分別執著是違背這種智慧的。學習無相法（animitta，沒有特徵的法）是爲了對治和去除這種執著。《顯揚意》的觀點與此相同。量論認為，大乘是佛陀所說，因為它允許有對治煩惱的真實無漏道（anāsrava-mārga，沒有煩惱的道路），就像《增一阿含經》等經典一樣。

如果有人說：大乘不是佛陀所說，因為它的說法是空性的。

論：因為七種意義不同於文字的緣故，所以不能說它不是佛陀所說。

述曰：大乘的意義深奧，不能隨便按照文字來理解，就產生誹謗。彼廣中說：『如果你們說佛陀的語言有三種特徵：符合修多羅（sūtra，經），顯示毗奈耶（vinaya，戒律），不違背法空（dharma-śūnyatā，法的空性）。你們的大乘說一切法沒有自性（svabhāva，自身本性），以此作為教授，違背這三種道理，所以不是佛陀的語言。』現在不違背這三種特徵，所以是佛陀的語言。因為它符合大乘修多羅，展現了自身的煩惱毗奈耶。菩薩以分別作為煩惱，廣大甚深就是菩薩的法空。不違背這種空性，才能獲得大菩提（mahābodhi，偉大的覺悟）。量論認為，大乘是佛陀的語言，因為它允許詮釋深刻的道理，意義不同於文字，被契經（sūtra，佛經）所攝。就像『殺害父母』等言論一樣，在《阿含經》中也被認為是意義不同於文字。例如，把不堅固的認為是堅固的，把貪愛認為是父母等。

論：因此，大乘確實是佛陀所說。

述曰：這是總結。

論：如《莊嚴論》所說，對治意義不同於文字的緣故。

述曰：這是引用頌文中的話。最後的『故』字可以和上面的因聯繫起來。然而，《莊嚴論》第一卷第二品說，先簡略地說了八個原因，然後廣泛地細緻地分別說明。仔細研究會發現非常精妙。應該說是《莊嚴大乘經論》，因為它能夠莊嚴大乘經。先前說的是《大乘莊嚴經》。

【English Translation】 English version Because of liberation. Mahāyāna (the Great Vehicle) translates this. Therefore, it is not Śrāvakayāna (the Hearer's Vehicle).

Some say that Mahāyāna only has practice without result and is not spoken by the Buddha.

Treatise: Because of the six antidotes, Mahāyāna is said to be spoken by the Buddha.

Commentary: The Ornament Treatise says: 'Seven powers can support diligent practice, attain non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna), and counteract all afflictions.' This refers to the afflictions that the three vehicles (triyāna, the three vehicles, namely Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) jointly eliminate. If one seeks Buddhahood, one must first eliminate the attachment to dharmas (dharma-graha). The discriminating attachment to dharmas is contrary to this wisdom. Studying the signless dharma (animitta) is to counteract and remove this attachment. The meaning of Exposition of the Meaning is the same as this. The logical argument holds that Mahāyāna is spoken by the Buddha because it allows for the true unconditioned path (anāsrava-mārga) that counteracts afflictions, just like the Ekottara Agama and other scriptures.

If someone says: Mahāyāna is not spoken by the Buddha because its teachings are emptiness.

Treatise: Because the seven meanings are different from the words, it cannot be said that it is not spoken by the Buddha.

Commentary: The meaning of Mahāyāna is profound, and one should not casually understand it according to the words and then give rise to slander. The Extensive Commentary says: 'If you say that the Buddha's words have three characteristics: conforming to the sūtras (sūtra), revealing the vinaya (vinaya), and not contradicting the emptiness of dharmas (dharma-śūnyatā). Your Mahāyāna says that all dharmas have no self-nature (svabhāva), and uses this as a teaching, which contradicts these three principles, so it is not the Buddha's words.' Now it does not contradict these three characteristics, so it is the Buddha's words. Because it conforms to the Mahāyāna sūtras, it reveals its own afflictions and vinaya. Bodhisattvas take discrimination as affliction, and vastness and profundity are the emptiness of dharmas for Bodhisattvas. Without contradicting this emptiness, one can attain great bodhi (mahābodhi). The logical argument holds that Mahāyāna is the Buddha's words because it allows for the interpretation of profound principles, the meaning is different from the words, and it is included in the sūtras (sūtra). Just like the statements 'killing parents' and so on, in the Agama Sutras it is also considered that the meaning is different from the words. For example, considering what is impermanent as permanent, and considering greed as parents, etc.

Treatise: Therefore, Mahāyāna is indeed spoken by the Buddha.

Commentary: This is a conclusion.

Treatise: As the Ornament Treatise says, because counteracting the meaning is different from the words.

Commentary: This is quoting the words in the verse. The final word 'therefore' can be connected to the above cause. However, the first chapter and second section of the Ornament Treatise say that first, eight reasons are briefly stated, and then they are extensively and meticulously explained separately. Careful study will reveal that it is very subtle. It should be said that it is the Ornament of the Great Vehicle Sutra Treatise because it can adorn the Great Vehicle Sutra. What was previously said was the Great Vehicle Ornament Sutra.

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論者非也。無有大乘莊嚴經故。正引大乘不共許經。及為量等廣成立已。

論。餘部經中至有別自性。

述曰。下引共教。初總。次別。此即總也。即引聲聞乘經以密。意說此識。如攝論第二。

下別之中有四部別。文即為四。

論。謂大眾部至有如是義。

述曰。攝論亦同。摩訶僧祇名大眾部。釋此部等名如宗輪記　於此部中名根本識。是諸識所依止故。非六轉識可名根本。不能發起六轉識故。其喻可知　阿笈摩者。此翻為教。展轉傳說故名為傳。唯第八識有如是義。結喻可知。

論。上座部經至為三有因。

述曰。分別論者。舊名分別說部。今說假部。說有分識。體恒不斷。周遍三界。為三有因。其餘六識時間斷故。有不遍故。故非有分　世親攝論無文。唯無性釋有九心輪。此是阿賴耶識。九心者。一有分。二能引發。三見。四等尋求。五等觀徹。六安立。七勢用。八反緣。九有分心。余如樞要說。

論。化地部說至名窮生死蘊。

述曰。人中國主化地理人。舍位出家因為部主名化地部也。謂無色界色無。無相天等心無。不相應行體無。余不可名窮生死蘊。第八識可然。諸位皆有故。無性釋云。彼部有三蘊。一一念蘊。謂剎那生滅法。二一期生蘊。謂乃

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論者之言並非如此。因為沒有《大乘莊嚴經》的緣故。只能引用大乘中不共同認可的經典，並且作為衡量標準等廣泛地成立觀點之後才能進行論證。

論：其他部派的經典中，存在著不同的自性。

述曰：下面引用共同的教義。先總說，后別說。這裡是總說。即引用聲聞乘的經典來秘密地說明此識。如同《攝大乘論》第二卷所說。

下面的別說之中有四個部派的區別。文句就分為四個部分。

論：所謂大眾部乃至有這樣的意義。

述曰：《攝大乘論》也相同。摩訶僧祇（Mahāsaṃghika，大眾部）被稱為大眾部。解釋此部等的名稱如同《宗輪記》所記載。在此部中稱為根本識。因為是諸識所依止的緣故。不是六轉識可以稱為根本識，因為不能發起六轉識的緣故。其比喻可以知道。阿笈摩（Āgama，阿含）的意思是教。輾轉傳說所以名為傳。只有第八識有這樣的意義。結論和比喻可以知道。

論：上座部經乃至作為三有的原因。

述曰：分別論者，舊時稱為分別說部，現在稱為假部。說有分識，本體恒常不斷，周遍三界，作為三有的原因。其餘六識因為時間斷滅的緣故，也有不周遍的緣故，所以不是有分。世親（Vasubandhu）的《攝大乘論》沒有此文，只有無性（Asaṅga）的解釋中有九心輪。這是阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna）。九心是：一、有分；二、能引發；三、見；四、等尋求；五、等觀徹；六、安立；七、勢用；八、反緣；九、有分心。其餘的如同《樞要》所說。

論：化地部說乃至名為窮生死蘊。

述曰：人中國主化地理人，捨棄王位出家，因為作為部主，所以名為化地部。所謂無色無（Arūpa），無相天等心無，不相應行體無，其餘不可稱為窮生死蘊。第八識可以這樣說，因為各個位都有的緣故。無性解釋說，那個部有三蘊。一、一一念蘊，指剎那生滅法；二、一期生蘊，指乃至

【English Translation】 English version: The debater is wrong. It is because there is no Mahāyāna-saṃgraha-śāstra (大乘莊嚴經). One can only cite the sūtras not commonly accepted in Mahāyāna, and only after establishing viewpoints extensively as a measure, etc., can one argue.

Treatise: In the sūtras of other schools, there are different self-natures.

Commentary: Below, common teachings are cited. First, a general statement, then a specific one. This is the general statement. That is, citing the Śrāvakayāna sūtras to secretly explain this consciousness. As stated in the second volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

Among the specific statements below, there are distinctions among four schools. The text is divided into four parts.

Treatise: The Mahāsaṃghika (大眾部) school says that there is such a meaning.

Commentary: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha is also the same. Mahāsaṃghika (大眾部) is called the Mahāsaṃghika school. The explanation of the names of this school, etc., is as recorded in the Zonglun Ji. In this school, it is called the fundamental consciousness (mūla-vijñāna). It is because it is the basis upon which all consciousnesses rely. The six vijñānas cannot be called fundamental because they cannot initiate the six vijñānas. The analogy can be understood. Āgama (阿笈摩) means teaching. It is called transmission because it is transmitted from one to another. Only the eighth consciousness has such a meaning. The conclusion and analogy can be understood.

Treatise: The Sthavira (上座部) school's sūtras say that it is the cause of the three realms of existence.

Commentary: The Vibhajyavāda (分別論者), formerly called the Vibhajyavāda school, is now called the provisional school. It says that there is bhavaṅga-citta (有分識), whose essence is constant and continuous, pervading the three realms, and is the cause of the three realms of existence. The other six consciousnesses are interrupted in time and are not pervasive, so they are not bhavaṅga. Vasubandhu's (世親) Mahāyānasaṃgraha does not have this text, only Asaṅga's (無性) explanation has the nine wheels of mind. This is the Ālayavijñāna (阿賴耶識). The nine minds are: 1. Bhavaṅga; 2. That which can initiate; 3. Seeing; 4. Seeking equally; 5. Thoroughly observing equally; 6. Establishing; 7. Potential; 8. Reversing conditions; 9. Bhavaṅga-citta. The rest is as described in the Shuyao.

Treatise: The Mahīśāsaka (化地部) school says that it is called the aggregate that exhausts life and death.

Commentary: The king of a country in India transformed the land and its people, renounced his throne and became a monk, and because he was the leader of the school, it was called the Mahīśāsaka school. What is meant is that there is no form in the Arūpadhātu (無色), there is no mind in the heavens without form, and there is no non-associated formation. The rest cannot be called the aggregate that exhausts life and death. The eighth consciousness can be said to be so because it exists in all positions. Asaṅga explains that that school has three aggregates: 1. The aggregate of each thought, referring to phenomena that arise and cease in an instant; 2. The aggregate of a lifetime, referring to even

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至死恒隨轉法。根等法是。三窮生死蘊。乃至金剛喻定恒隨轉法。于彼三類蘊以立三名。余色．心等如前已說。是有間斷非窮生死。故唯第八是第三蘊。世親無此解。

論。說一切有部至喜阿賴耶。

述曰。于中有三。一敘經。二釋義。三總結。即初文也。

自下釋義文有其三。一釋彼四名即第八識。二謂生已下。徴余非此。三異生有學下。顯理起愛所著之處必阿賴耶。此中所說即初文也　四阿含經。一名增一。二名中。三名長。四名雜。明從一法增至百法名增一。不略不廣明義名中。若明事義文廣曰長。雜雜明事名為雜。于增一中名阿賴耶。

論。謂阿賴耶識至立以四名。

述曰。四名如論　是貪總別三世境故。無性云。愛是總句。餘三現在．過去．未來如其次第三世別說。此性恒時極希愿故由樂．欣．喜。是故總名阿賴耶也。世親一解同前。第二更解謂于現在愛。於過去樂。由先樂故復於今世欣。欣故於未來喜。今但總言是貪總別三世境故。非但有前解亦無有後釋。四體即貪　無性解言是貪三世總別之境。如前解取　世親后說是貪三世境。是故不取總別之言。

論。有情執為至是真愛著處。

述曰。執為內我簡法我他我。至金剛心恒行不息故。阿賴耶識是真愛著處。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 直至死亡都持續相隨並轉變的法，指的是根等法。這三種窮盡生死的蘊，乃至金剛喻定（Vajropama Samadhi，一種堅固如金剛的禪定）都持續相隨並轉變的法，對於這三類蘊，分別設立了三個名稱。其餘的色、心等法，如前文已經說過。那些是有間斷而非窮盡生死的法，所以只有第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識）是第三蘊。世親（Vasubandhu，印度佛教論師）對此沒有這樣的解釋。

論：說一切有部（Sarvāstivāda，一個古老的佛教部派）非常喜歡阿賴耶（Ālaya，執著）。

述記：其中有三個部分。一是敘述經文，二是解釋含義，三是總結。這裡是第一部分。

從下面開始是解釋含義的部分，有三個方面。一是解釋這四個名稱，即第八識。二是說明『生已下』，指出其餘的不是這個。三是『異生有學下』，顯示由理而生起的愛所執著的地方必定是阿賴耶。這裡所說的是第一部分。四阿含經（Āgama，原始佛教經典），一名《增一阿含經》（Ekottara Āgama），二名《中阿含經》（Majjhima Āgama），三名《長阿含經》（Dīrgha Āgama），四名《雜阿含經》（Saṃyukta Āgama）。說明從一個法增加到一百個法，名為增一。不簡略也不廣，明白意義，名為中。如果說明事義，文句廣博，叫做長。雜亂地說明事情，名為雜。在《增一阿含經》中，提到了阿賴耶。

論：所謂的阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識）……設立了四個名稱。

述記：這四個名稱如論中所說。這是因為貪愛是總括過去、現在、未來三世境界的緣故。無性（Asaṅga，印度佛教論師，世親的哥哥）說，『愛』是總的語句，其餘三個（樂、欣、喜）分別對應現在、過去、未來三世。這種性質是恒常的，極其希望得到的，因為有樂、欣、喜，所以總的名稱是阿賴耶。世親的一種解釋與前面相同。第二種解釋認為是對於現在是愛，對於過去是樂，因為先前的樂，所以在今世感到欣，因為欣，所以對未來感到喜。現在只是總的說這是貪愛總括和分別三世境界的緣故。不僅僅有前面的解釋，也沒有後面的解釋。這四個本體就是貪愛。無性的解釋說是貪愛三世總括和分別的境界，如前面的解釋。世親後來說是貪愛三世的境界，所以不採用總括和分別的說法。

論：有情執著于……是真正愛著的地方。

述記：執著于內在的『我』，是爲了簡別於法我、他我。直至金剛心（Vajra heart，比喻堅固不壞的菩提心）恒常執行不息的緣故。阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識）是真正愛著的地方。

【English Translation】 English version The Dharma that constantly accompanies and transforms until death refers to the root faculties and other Dharmas. These three aggregates that exhaustively follow the cycle of birth and death, even up to the Vajropama Samadhi (a samadhi as firm as a diamond), are the Dharmas that constantly accompany and transform. For these three types of aggregates, three names are established respectively. The remaining forms, minds, and other Dharmas have been discussed earlier. Those are interrupted and do not exhaustively follow the cycle of birth and death, so only the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) is the third aggregate. Vasubandhu (an Indian Buddhist philosopher) does not have this interpretation.

Treatise: The Sarvāstivāda (an ancient Buddhist school) greatly favors Ālaya (attachment).

Commentary: There are three parts to this. First, narrating the sutra; second, explaining the meaning; and third, summarizing. This is the first part.

From below begins the part explaining the meaning, which has three aspects. First, explaining these four names, which is the eighth consciousness. Second, stating 'from birth onwards,' pointing out that the rest are not this. Third, 'under the ordinary being with learning,' showing that the place where love arises from reason and is attached to must be Ālaya. What is said here is the first part. The Four Āgamas (original Buddhist scriptures) are named: first, Ekottara Āgama; second, Majjhima Āgama; third, Dīrgha Āgama; and fourth, Saṃyukta Āgama. It explains that from one Dharma increasing to a hundred Dharmas is called Ekottara. Neither brief nor broad, clearly explaining the meaning, is called Majjhima. If explaining matters and meanings, with extensive sentences, it is called Dīrgha. Confusedly explaining matters is called Saṃyukta. In the Ekottara Āgama, Ālaya is mentioned.

Treatise: The so-called Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness)... establishes four names.

Commentary: These four names are as mentioned in the treatise. This is because craving is the total and separate object of the three times: past, present, and future. Asaṅga (an Indian Buddhist philosopher, Vasubandhu's brother) says that 'love' is the general statement, and the remaining three (joy, delight, happiness) correspond to the present, past, and future respectively. This nature is constant and extremely desirable, because of joy, delight, and happiness, so the general name is Ālaya. One interpretation of Vasubandhu is the same as before. The second interpretation considers that for the present there is love, for the past there is delight, and because of the previous delight, there is delight in the present life, and because of delight, there is happiness in the future. Now it is simply said that this is because craving encompasses the total and separate objects of the three times. Not only is there the previous interpretation, but there is also no later explanation. These four entities are craving. Asaṅga's explanation says that it is the total and separate object of craving in the three times, as in the previous explanation. Vasubandhu later said that it is the object of craving in the three times, so he does not adopt the terms 'total' and 'separate'.

Treatise: Sentient beings are attached to... is the place of true attachment.

Commentary: Being attached to the inner 'self' is to distinguish it from the Dharma-self and the other-self. Until the Vajra heart (a metaphor for the firm and indestructible Bodhi mind) constantly operates without ceasing. The Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) is the place of true attachment.

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彼部計云。執余蘊等。但是貪所著處即名阿賴耶故。

論。不應執餘五取蘊等。

述曰。總標生下。不應于餘五取蘊計。但令于彼阿賴耶識計。

論。謂生一向至受快樂故。

述曰。自下第一徴余非此。文有其七。七種非是所愛著故　一向苦處。即三惡趣極苦之處。世親說此三處於彼有時樂生者。是等流果。今言總非樂。彼極苦故。厭逆身．心念我何時當舍此命．等此類．此身心。此眾同分即是行蘊。總厭五蘊故。

論。五欲亦非至而愛我故。

述曰。有言五欲是此亦非真。謂若凡若聖離欲界已猶愛我故。如聞雷聲起怖畏故。此不極成。彼許離欲無有我故。此以理逼如聞聲怖等。彼攝論據共許有我者說。故不說離欲者有我。

論。樂受亦非至而愛我故。

述曰。樂受是我。非是苦．舍。不順己故。不增悅故。彼非真著處。離第三靜慮染極厭樂受凡聖皆有我故。世親不解。無性云。貪俱樂受。是樂及貪總是著處。樂為貪增故。此即總緣。或各別緣。是此著處。別心緣故。此中但有樂受無貪。即有別緣者。然無唯緣貪者。

論。身見亦非至猶生愛故。

述曰。有計我見是愛著處。彼非真處。除無學者以無我故。攝論不言除。以極成有我非有學故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 　　其他宗派認為，執著于其他的五蘊等，只是因為貪愛執著的地方才叫做阿賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）。

論：不應該執著于其他的五取蘊等。

述記：總的標明產生的原因。不應該對於其他的五取蘊進行計度，而只是對於阿賴耶識進行計度。

論：因為眾生總是趨向于感受快樂。

述記：從下面開始，第一點指出其他的不是這個。文中有七點。七種不是所貪愛執著的地方。一是總是痛苦的地方，即三惡趣極其痛苦的地方。世親（Vasubandhu）說這三個地方有時也有快樂產生，那是等流果。現在說總的來說不是快樂，因為那裡極其痛苦。厭惡違逆身心，想著我什麼時候才能捨棄此命等等，此類，此身心，此眾同分即是行蘊。總的來說是厭惡五蘊。

論：五欲也不是總是趨向于愛我的。

述記：有人說五欲是這個，也不是真的。無論是凡夫還是聖人，離開了欲界之後仍然愛我。比如聽到雷聲產生恐懼。這並不完全成立。他們認為離開了慾望就沒有我了。這是用道理來逼迫，比如聽到聲音恐懼等。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）根據共同認可有我的人來說的。所以不說離開慾望的人有我。

論：樂受也不是總是趨向于愛我的。

述記：樂受是我，不是苦受和舍受。因為不順從自己，不增加喜悅。那不是真正的執著之處。離開了第三禪靜慮的染污，極其厭惡樂受，凡夫和聖人都有我。世親（Vasubandhu）不理解。無性（Asaṅga）說，貪和樂受在一起，是快樂和貪婪總是執著之處。快樂為貪婪增加。這即是總的緣，或者各自別緣。是這個執著之處。因為是別心緣故。此中只有樂受沒有貪婪，即有別緣的人。然而沒有唯獨緣貪婪的人。

論：身見也不是總是趨向于仍然產生愛的。

述記：有人認為我見是愛執著之處。那不是真正的地方。除了無學（Arhat）之人，因為沒有我。攝論（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）沒有說除了，因為完全成立有我，不是有學之人。

【English Translation】 English version 　　The other schools argue that clinging to the other five skandhas (pañca-skandha, five aggregates) etc., is only because the place of attachment and clinging is called Ālaya (storehouse consciousness).

Treatise: One should not cling to the other five aggregates of clinging, etc.

Commentary: Generally indicates the cause of arising. One should not speculate about the other five aggregates of clinging, but only speculate about the Ālaya consciousness.

Treatise: Because beings always tend to experience happiness.

Commentary: From below, the first point indicates that the others are not this. There are seven points in the text. The seven are not the places of attachment and clinging. First, places that are always painful, that is, the three evil destinies, which are extremely painful places. Vasubandhu said that these three places sometimes have happiness arising, which is the result of equipotential cause. Now it is said that generally it is not happiness, because that place is extremely painful. Disgust and aversion to body and mind, thinking about when I can abandon this life, etc., this kind, this body and mind, this commonality of beings is the activity aggregate (saṃskāra-skandha). Generally speaking, it is aversion to the five aggregates.

Treatise: The five desires are also not always tending to love me.

Commentary: Some say that the five desires are this, but it is not true. Whether ordinary people or sages, after leaving the desire realm, still love me. For example, hearing the sound of thunder causes fear. This is not completely established. They believe that without desire, there is no self. This is forced by reason, such as fear of hearing sounds, etc. The Compendium on the Mahāyāna (Mahāyānasaṃgraha) is based on those who commonly acknowledge that there is a self. Therefore, it does not say that those who have left desire have a self.

Treatise: Pleasant feeling is also not always tending to love me.

Commentary: Pleasant feeling is me, not painful feeling and neutral feeling. Because it does not conform to oneself, it does not increase joy. That is not the real place of attachment. After leaving the defilement of the third dhyana (jhāna, meditative state), there is extreme aversion to pleasant feeling, and both ordinary people and sages have a self. Vasubandhu did not understand. Asaṅga said that greed and pleasant feeling are together, and that happiness and greed are always the places of attachment. Happiness increases greed. This is the general condition, or each separate condition. It is this place of attachment. Because it is a separate mind condition. In this, there is only pleasant feeling and no greed, that is, there are people with separate conditions. However, there are no people who only condition greed.

Treatise: The view of self is also not always tending to still produce love.

Commentary: Some believe that the view of self is the place of love and attachment. That is not the real place. Except for those who are without learning (Arhat), because there is no self. The Compendium on the Mahāyāna (Mahāyānasaṃgraha) did not say except, because it is completely established that there is a self, not those who are still learning.

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凡夫離欲少亦有故。今理所逼述宗令有。下識中亦然。余有學．凡夫信無我者。若證．若信。雖於我見不著。于內我猶愛故。身見非著處。既厭身見應不愛我。

論。轉識等非至而愛我故。

述曰。轉識亦非。除無學如前說。余有學異生求滅心者。即無相定．及滅定等。雖厭轉識而愛我故。非想九品及余有想定。皆極成有我故。言識等者意兼心所。即是識受想蘊全．行蘊少分。以上總取蘊．別中樂受．身見三。攝論等有。然無五欲及下別遮五蘊。此識等中若苦若舍皆是所著。前唯言樂。此中見取等並是。前唯言身見故。

論。色身亦非至而愛我故。

述曰。即是五根扶根塵等。離色染生無色。猶由愛我故。若唯言五欲。據在家者說。此通出家．外道。即色蘊全。

論。不相應行至真愛著處。

述曰。無實體故。不應于無體法生愛著故。不言無為者。內道小乘不計爲著處。彼非著處故。外道云我是著處我愛我。已不應即為能所著處。此共小乘諍賴耶無遮愛著處。此中除彼犢子部師。彼亦如前非著處破。非有為．無為故　上來總別破訖。前第一是總遮。次三隨增計度遮。下三別蘊遮。故有爾所。

論。異生有學至真愛著處。

述曰。此下第三顯理起愛所著之處必第八識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：即使是凡夫，斷除少許慾望也是有可能的，為什麼說沒有呢？ 答：現在從道理上推斷，爲了順應宗義，所以說有。下意識中也是如此。其餘的有學位者和凡夫，如果相信沒有『我』（ātman），無論是通過證悟還是信仰，即使他們不執著于『我見』（ātmadṛṣṭi），但內心仍然愛著『我』（ātman）。『身見』（satkāya-dṛṣṭi）不是執著之處。既然厭惡『身見』，應該就不會愛『我』了。

論：『轉識』（vijñāna）等不是因為達到而愛『我』的。

述曰：『轉識』也不是。除了無學位者，如前所述。其餘的有學位者和異生，爲了滅除心識，進入『無想定』（asaṃjñā-samāpatti）和『滅盡定』（nirodha-samāpatti）等，即使厭惡『轉識』，仍然愛著『我』。『非想非非想處定』（naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana）的九品以及其他的『有想定』（saṃjñā-samāpatti），都極度地認為有『我』。說『識等』，意思是兼指心所（caitta），也就是識蘊（vijñāna-skandha）的全部、受蘊（vedanā-skandha）、想蘊（saṃjñā-skandha）的全部，以及行蘊（saṃskāra-skandha）的少部分。以上總括地取了五蘊（pañca-skandha），特別地取了樂受（sukha-vedanā）和『身見』這三者。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）等中有提到。然而，沒有五欲（pañca kāmaguṇā），並且在下面特別遮止了五蘊。這『識等』之中，無論是苦受（duḥkha-vedanā）還是舍受（upekṣā-vedanā），都是所執著的。前面只說了樂受，這裡『見取』（dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa）等都是。前面只說了『身見』。

論：色身（rūpa-kāya）也不是因為達到而愛『我』的。

述曰：也就是五根（pañcendriya）、扶根塵（indriya-gocara）等。離開色界的染污而生到無色界（arūpadhātu），仍然是因為愛『我』的緣故。如果只說五欲，那是針對在家居士說的。這裡通指出家眾和外道。也就是色蘊（rūpa-skandha）的全部。

論：『不相應行』（citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra）不是真正愛著之處。

述曰：因為沒有實體。不應該對沒有實體的法生起愛著。不說『無為法』（asaṃskṛta-dharma）的原因是，內道小乘（Hīnayāna）不認為『無為法』是執著之處，因為它們不是執著之處。外道說『我是執著之處，我愛我』，這不應該同時作為能執著和所執著之處。這是共同和小乘爭論阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna）沒有遮止愛著之處。這裡排除了犢子部（Vātsīputrīya）的觀點，他們的觀點也如前面一樣，不是執著之處，因為不是有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma）或無為法。以上總括和分別地破斥完畢。第一個是總括地遮止，第二個是隨著增上的計度遮止，下面三個是分別對蘊遮止。所以有這些。

論：異生和有學位者不是真正愛著之處。

述曰：下面第三個顯示了生起愛和執著之處必定是第八識（第八識，即阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna）。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: Even ordinary beings can relinquish some desires, so why do you say it's not possible? Answer: Now, reasoning from principle, to accord with the tenets of our school, we say it is possible. It is also so in the lower consciousness. As for the remaining learners and ordinary beings who believe in no-self (ātman), whether through realization or faith, even if they are not attached to self-view (ātmadṛṣṭi), they still love 'self' (ātman) internally. 'View of self' (satkāya-dṛṣṭi) is not a place of attachment. Since they厭惡'view of self', they should not love 'self'.

Treatise: 'Transformed consciousness' (vijñāna), etc., is not the reason for loving 'self' because of attainment.

Commentary: 'Transformed consciousness' is also not. Except for those who have nothing more to learn, as mentioned before. The remaining learners and different beings who seek to extinguish consciousness, entering 'state of non-perception' (asaṃjñā-samāpatti) and 'cessation attainment' (nirodha-samāpatti), etc., even if they厭惡'transformed consciousness', they still love 'self'. The nine grades of 'neither perception nor non-perception' (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana) and other 'attainments of perception' (saṃjñā-samāpatti) all firmly believe in the existence of 'self'. Saying 'consciousness, etc.' implies mental factors (caitta), that is, the entirety of the consciousness aggregate (vijñāna-skandha), the feeling aggregate (vedanā-skandha), the perception aggregate (saṃjñā-skandha), and a small part of the formation aggregate (saṃskāra-skandha). Above, we generally take the five aggregates (pañca-skandha), and specifically take pleasant feeling (sukha-vedanā) and 'view of self'. The Compendium of Mahāyāna (Mahāyānasaṃgraha) and others mention this. However, there are no five desires (pañca kāmaguṇā), and below, the five aggregates are specifically negated. Within this 'consciousness, etc.', both painful feeling (duḥkha-vedanā) and neutral feeling (upekṣā-vedanā) are objects of attachment. Previously, only pleasant feeling was mentioned; here, 'grasping at views' (dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa), etc., are included. Previously, only 'view of self' was mentioned.

Treatise: The physical body (rūpa-kāya) is also not the reason for loving 'self' because of attainment.

Commentary: That is, the five sense faculties (pañcendriya), the supporting sense objects (indriya-gocara), etc. Leaving the defilements of the form realm (rūpadhātu) and being born in the formless realm (arūpadhātu) is still due to the love of 'self'. If we only speak of the five desires, that is in reference to lay practitioners. Here, it applies to both renunciants and non-Buddhists. That is, the entirety of the form aggregate (rūpa-skandha).

Treatise: 'Non-associated formations' (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra) are not the place of true attachment.

Commentary: Because they have no substance. One should not generate attachment to dharmas without substance. The reason for not mentioning 'unconditioned dharmas' (asaṃskṛta-dharma) is that the Inner Way (Buddhism) of the Hīnayāna does not consider 'unconditioned dharmas' to be places of attachment, because they are not places of attachment. Non-Buddhists say, 'I am the place of attachment; I love myself.' This should not simultaneously be the place of attachment and the one who attaches. This is a common dispute with the Hīnayāna regarding the storehouse consciousness (ālayavijñāna) not preventing the place of attachment. Here, we exclude the view of the Vātsīputrīya school, whose view, as before, is not a place of attachment because it is neither conditioned (saṃskṛta-dharma) nor unconditioned. The above is a complete refutation, both generally and specifically. The first is a general negation, the second is a negation based on increasing conceptualization, and the following three are negations of the aggregates individually. Therefore, there are these.

Treatise: Different beings and learners are not the place of true attachment.

Commentary: The third point below reveals that the place where love and attachment arise must be the eighth consciousness (eighth consciousness, i.e., the storehouse consciousness, ālaya-vijñāna).

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總結。異生．有學起我愛時。雖于余蘊若總若別有計．不計起分別愛。於此識中任運我愛決定生起。如童子等雖無分別此蘊彼蘊。然必愛我。故唯此識是真著處。

論。由是彼說至此阿賴耶識。

述曰。此總結也。攝論文少別。並如彼抄。

證第八識總有二分。第一引經。雖有自許他許經別。總是第一引明瞭經　自下第二引共許經文含隱者依經申理。即是理證。然瑜伽．顯揚．對法八證。未是擬宜。攝論無性．世親三卷何以方類。至下文中一一對出盡．不盡理　引理證中有三。初結前生后以發論端。二正引經申其理證。三廣證已后總結之。

論。已引聖教當顯正理。

述曰。即初也。

次依經附理一一別釋。總為十證。總一頌云。持種．異熟心。趣生．有受．識。生死．緣．依食。滅定．心染凈　證各有三。第一引經無此識而經義不成。如此第一中謂契經說下是。第二別顯徴其義明違理不成。如此中雲謂諸轉識在滅定等下是。三總結歸本識彰他義不成。如此中末後心即是此第八識是。下多分一一有三隨文準解。然八證中此但有五。可具對明。不解三者。下自當悉。

論。謂契經說至故名為心。

述曰。第一引經。不出經之題目。但隨解釋　雜染法者。即有漏法。善

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：總結。在異生位（異生：指凡夫位），有學位的修行者生起我愛執時，即使對於其他的蘊（蘊：構成人身的五種要素，即色、受、想、行、識）總的或者分別地進行衡量，不衡量就生起分別愛執。在這種識中，任運（任運：自然而然）的我愛執決定會生起。就像孩童一樣，雖然沒有分別這個蘊或者那個蘊，但必定會愛我。所以只有這個識才是真正執著的地方。

論：因此，他們說到了阿賴耶識（阿賴耶識：第八識，儲存一切種子）。

述記：這是總結。概括了論文中少量不同的地方，都如同彼抄所說。

證明第八識總共有兩個部分。第一部分是引用經文。雖然有自許和他許的經文區別，但總是第一部分，引用明瞭的經文。從下面第二部分開始，引用共同認可的經文，包含隱晦之處，依據經文闡述道理，這就是理證。然而，《瑜伽師地論》、《顯揚聖教論》、《對法論》中的八個證明，並不是擬宜的。《攝大乘論》無性釋、世親釋的三卷，又該如何比類呢？到下面的文中，一一對應指出盡與不盡的道理。引用理證中有三個部分。首先是總結前面，引發後面，以開啟論端。第二是正式引用經文，闡述其中的理證。第三是廣泛論證之後，進行總結。

論：已經引用了聖教，應當闡明正理。

述記：這就是第一個部分。

接下來依據經文，附帶道理，一一分別解釋。總共有十個證明。總括為一個頌：『持種、異熟心，趣生、有受、識，生死、緣、依食，滅定、心染凈』。每個證明各有三個方面。第一是引用經文，說明沒有這個識，經文的意義就不能成立。比如第一個證明中，『謂契經說』（謂契經說：意思是說契經中說）以下就是。第二是分別顯示，徵詢其中的意義，說明違背道理就不能成立。比如這個證明中，『謂諸轉識在滅定等』（謂諸轉識在滅定等：意思是說各種轉識在滅盡定等情況下）以下就是。第三是總結歸於本識，彰顯其他的意義不能成立。比如這個證明中最後『心即是此第八識』（心即是此第八識：意思是說這個心就是第八識）。下面的大部分都一一有這三個方面，隨著文句來理解。然而八個證明中，這裡只有五個，可以具體對應說明。不解釋三個證明的原因，下面自然會詳細說明。

論：所謂契經中說，乃至所以名為心。

述記：這是第一個引用經文的證明。沒有指出經的題目，只是隨著解釋。雜染法（雜染法：指不清凈的法）就是有漏法（有漏法：指有煩惱的法）。善

【English Translation】 English version: Summary. When a practitioner in the state of being an ordinary being (異生, yìshēng: referring to the state of a common person) or a learner (有學, yǒu xué) generates attachment to 'I', even if they measure the remaining skandhas (蘊, yùn: the five aggregates that constitute a person, namely form, sensation, perception, volition, and consciousness) in a general or separate way, they generate discriminating attachment without measuring. In this consciousness, attachment to 'I' arises naturally and decisively. Just like children, although they do not distinguish between this skandha or that skandha, they will certainly love 'I'. Therefore, only this consciousness is the true place of attachment.

Treatise: Therefore, they speak of this Ālaya-consciousness (阿賴耶識, Ālāyéshì: the eighth consciousness, the storehouse consciousness).

Commentary: This is a summary. It summarizes the few differences in the treatise, all as stated in that copy.

Proving that the eighth consciousness has two parts in total. The first part is quoting the sutras. Although there are differences in sutras that are self-admitted and others admitted, it is always the first part, quoting clear sutras. Starting from the second part below, quoting commonly accepted sutras, containing hidden meanings, explaining the principles according to the sutras, this is the logical proof. However, the eight proofs in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Yújiāshī dìlùn), Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations (顯揚聖教論, Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn), and Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論, Duìfǎ lùn) are not suitable. How can the three volumes of Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Shè dàchéng lùn) by Asaṅga and Vasubandhu be compared? In the following text, the complete and incomplete principles are pointed out one by one. There are three parts in quoting logical proofs. First, summarize the previous and initiate the following to open the discussion. Second, formally quote the sutras to explain the logical proofs within them. Third, after extensive argumentation, summarize it.

Treatise: Having quoted the holy teachings, we should explain the correct principles.

Commentary: This is the first part.

Next, based on the sutras, with attached reasoning, explain each one separately. There are ten proofs in total. Summarized in one verse: 'Holding seeds, Vipāka-mind, Destination of birth, Having reception, Consciousness, Birth and death, Condition, Dependent food, Cessation attainment, Mind defiled and pure'. Each proof has three aspects. First, quoting the sutras, stating that without this consciousness, the meaning of the sutras cannot be established. For example, in the first proof, it is '謂契經說' (wèi qìjīng shuō: meaning 'it is said in the sutras') below. Second, separately showing, inquiring about the meaning within them, stating that violating the principles cannot be established. For example, in this proof, it is '謂諸轉識在滅定等' (wèi zhū zhuǎnshì zài mièdìng děng: meaning 'the various transforming consciousnesses in cessation attainment, etc.') below. Third, summarizing and returning to the original consciousness, highlighting that other meanings cannot be established. For example, in this proof, the last '心即是此第八識' (xīn jí shì cǐ dìbā shì: meaning 'this mind is the eighth consciousness'). Most of the following have these three aspects one by one, understand according to the sentences. However, among the eight proofs, there are only five here, which can be specifically corresponded and explained. The reason for not explaining the three proofs will be explained in detail below.

Treatise: What is said in the sutras, up to therefore it is called mind.

Commentary: This is the first proof of quoting the sutras. It does not point out the title of the sutra, but simply follows the explanation. Defiled dharmas (雜染法, zá rǎn fǎ: impure dharmas) are leaky dharmas (有漏法, yǒu lòu fǎ: dharmas with afflictions). Good

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．染皆是　清凈法者。即無漏法。五蘊並是。或順解脫分等名清凈。順清凈故。分位之中有清凈無漏種故　之所集起故名心者。或諸法種於此集起名心。心是所集起處故。即通有漏．無漏所集起處。或諸法種子之所集起名心。心是諸種所集起故。如善．不善業為異熟因。無記種子為因緣。集起現識。果唯有漏不通無漏。無漏不生此識故。無漏識者無漏集起。此即引經。

論。若無此識至不應有故。

述曰。無第八識如經持種心不應有故。即無此識理爽前經。隨諸部釋。雖下自有簡。然於此中。總敘諸部釋此經。下方次第別難。謂諸部中經部強勝。故須先破。

次第二段文。

論。謂諸轉識至有間斷故。

述曰。自下第二別顯徴其義明違理不成　于中有五。初破經部　于中有三。一破五蘊受熏持種。二破識類。三合破識及類前後相熏。

初中有三。一正破六識。二破色．不相應。三破心所　初中又二。先破違教。后破違理　違教有二。初破他。后顯自。譬喻部師即經部也　如五十一．對法等。解種子義中雲。又心．相續長時間斷。不應經文流轉不息者。是以轉識間斷故。不能持種受熏。夫堅性者可持種故。識若不斷其種恒在。識既斷故種亦隨滅。后法等起從何種生。有間斷故不能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本

染污法和清凈法：清凈法指的是無漏法（anāsrava-dharma）。五蘊（pañca-skandha）都屬於清凈法，或者說，順於解脫的部分等可以稱為清凈，因為它們順於清凈。在不同的階段，存在清凈的無漏種子。所謂『心』，是指諸法種子集起的地方。或者說，諸法種子在此集起，故名為『心』。心是諸法種子集起之處，既包括有漏（sāsrava）的集起處，也包括無漏的集起處。或者說，諸法種子集起的地方名為『心』，心是諸種所集起的地方。例如，善業和不善業是異熟因（vipāka-hetu），無記種子是因緣（pratyaya），集起現識。果報唯有有漏，不包括無漏，因為無漏不生起這種識。無漏識是無漏法集起。這引自經文。

論：如果無此識，則不應有（種子）。

述記：如果沒有第八識（ālaya-vijñāna），如經文所說，持種的心就不應存在。即如果沒有此識，道理就與之前的經文相悖。隨各部派的解釋，雖然下面有簡述，但在這裡，總括敘述各部派對此經的解釋。下方將次第分別進行駁難。因為在各部派中，經部（Sautrāntika）最為強勢，所以需要先破斥。

接下來是第二段文字。

論：所謂的轉識（pravṛtti-vijñāna）是有間斷的。

述記：下面第二部分分別顯示並論證其意義，表明其違背道理，不能成立。其中有五個方面。首先破斥經部。其中有三個方面：一、破斥五蘊受熏持種；二、破斥識類；三、合併破斥識及識類前後互相熏習。

首先，在破斥五蘊受熏持種中，有三個方面：一、正面破斥六識（ṣaḍ-vijñāna）；二、破斥色（rūpa）和不相應行法（citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra）；三、破斥心所（caitta）。在正面破斥六識中，又有兩個方面：首先破斥他宗，然後闡明自宗。譬喻部師，即經部。如《對法》第五十一等，在解釋種子義中說：『心相續長時間斷，不應經文流轉不息。』這是因為轉識有間斷，所以不能持種受熏。堅固的性質才能持種，如果識不斷，其種子恒常存在。識既然斷滅，種子也隨之滅亡。後來的法從何種生起？因為有間斷，所以不能。

【English Translation】 English version

Defiled and Pure Dharmas: 'Pure dharmas' refer to the 'unleaked dharmas' (anāsrava-dharma). The five aggregates (pañca-skandha) are all pure dharmas, or those aspects that lead to liberation can be called pure because they are conducive to purity. In different stages, there exist pure, unleaked seeds. 'Mind' is the place where the seeds of all dharmas gather. Alternatively, the seeds of all dharmas gather here, hence it is called 'mind.' The mind is the place where the seeds of all dharmas gather, including both defiled (sāsrava) and pure gathering places. Or, the place where the seeds of all dharmas gather is called 'mind,' and the mind is the place where all seeds gather. For example, wholesome and unwholesome karma are the causes of different maturation (vipāka-hetu), and neutral seeds are conditions (pratyaya), gathering to manifest present consciousness. The result is only defiled, not including the unleaked, because the unleaked does not give rise to this consciousness. Unleaked consciousness is the gathering of unleaked dharmas. This is quoted from the sutra.

Treatise: If there were no such consciousness, there should be no (seeds).

Commentary: If there were no eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), as the sutra says, the mind that holds the seeds should not exist. That is, if there were no such consciousness, the reasoning would contradict the previous sutra. According to the interpretations of various schools, although there is a summary below, here, a general account of the interpretations of this sutra by various schools is given. Below, the refutations will be presented separately in order. Because among the various schools, the Sautrāntika school is the strongest, it needs to be refuted first.

Next is the second paragraph.

Treatise: The so-called 'evolving consciousness' (pravṛtti-vijñāna) has interruptions.

Commentary: Below, the second part separately displays and argues for its meaning, showing that it violates reason and cannot be established. There are five aspects to this. First, refute the Sautrāntika school. There are three aspects to this: 1. Refute the five aggregates receiving impressions and holding seeds; 2. Refute the categories of consciousness; 3. Combine and refute the mutual perfuming of consciousness and categories of consciousness before and after.

First, in refuting the five aggregates receiving impressions and holding seeds, there are three aspects: 1. Directly refute the six consciousnesses (ṣaḍ-vijñāna); 2. Refute form (rūpa) and non-associated formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra); 3. Refute mental factors (caitta). In directly refuting the six consciousnesses, there are two aspects: first, refute other schools, and then explain one's own school. The Exemplification School teacher is the Sautrāntika school. As in the fifty-first chapter of the Abhidharma, etc., in explaining the meaning of seeds, it says: 'The mind continuum has long interruptions, and the sutra text should not flow without ceasing.' This is because evolving consciousness has interruptions, so it cannot hold seeds and receive impressions. A firm nature can hold seeds, and if consciousness does not cease, its seeds are always present. Since consciousness ceases, the seeds also perish with it. From what seeds do later dharmas arise? Because there are interruptions, it cannot.

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持種。然彼但言滅定等長時者不取余法　凡間斷者。共經部師有五位故。謂即無心睡眠．悶絕．無想．滅定．無想異熟。其大乘中命終．受生悶絕中攝故。此等諸位轉識不行。唯第八識相續不斷。

此中以下諸識言者。多分兼心所。言王取臣故。或不取者下。自別解心所法故。

然此中下電光等喻。一喻通三因。謂六轉識不能受熏。有間斷故。如電光等。即下說云。一非可熏習。二不能持種。三非染．凈種所集起心。此皆是法。以此一因通三宗量。此皆遮量。設各自熏。或互相熏。皆此中攝。

論。根境作意至易脫起故。

述曰。經部六識不俱時有。破大眾部。然彼無熏習義。設破熏習。又以經部有熏習故。設許俱時。亦不成熏。此破經部設許六俱。有熏習故。是義之本　攝論第二無性解云。若六轉識定俱有者。不應所依．所緣．作意三種各別。以各別故無相應義。此難俱時起識熏義　世親攝論云。復有餘義。謂行相亦別。此不成因。第八．六識根等許別行相亦異。又無同喻非極成因　無性意謂根．境等定別。非定俱時故不成熏。故此中言根．境．作意。即三差別互相熏故　量云。眼等。非可為耳等所熏。根．境．作意三定各別故。此無同喻。然以理責之。令不得互相熏　或如自他身六種轉

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『持種』（bhrūṇa-dhāraka，保持種子）。然而，他們只說『滅定』（nirodha-samāpatti，滅盡定）等長時間的狀態不攝取其他法，凡是間斷的，都與經部師（Sautrāntika，佛教部派之一）的五位相同。這五位是指無心睡眠、悶絕、無想（asaṃjñā，無想）、滅定、無想異熟（asaṃjñika-vipāka，無想果報）。在大乘（Mahāyāna，佛教宗派之一）中，命終和受生都包含在悶絕中。這些狀態中，轉識（vijñāna，意識）不行，只有第八識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）相續不斷。

這裡所說的『以下諸識』，大多兼指心所（caitta，心所法）。說『王』（指心王，即識）攝取『臣』（指心所）的緣故。或者說『不取』，是因為各自別解心所法的緣故。

然而，這裡所說的電光等比喻，一個比喻貫通三種因（hetu，原因）。即六轉識不能受熏（vāsanā，熏習），因為有間斷的緣故，如同電光等。即下面所說：一、不可熏習；二、不能持種；三、不是染（kleśa，煩惱）凈種所集起的心。這些都是法（dharma，法）。用這一個因貫通三種宗量（pakṣa，論題）。這些都是遮量（pratiṣedha-anumāna，遮遣推理）。假設各自熏，或者互相熏，都包含在這裡面。

論：根（indriya，感覺器官）、境（viṣaya，感覺對像）、作意（manasikāra，心理活動）容易脫離和生起，所以……

述曰：經部認為六識（ṣaḍ-vijñāna，六種意識）不同時存在，以此破斥大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika，佛教部派之一）。然而，他們沒有熏習的意義。假設破斥熏習，又因為經部有熏習。假設允許同時存在，也不能成就熏習。這是破斥經部假設六識同時存在，有熏習的根本意義。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha，論名）第二，無性（Asaṅga，人名）解釋說：如果六轉識一定是同時存在的，就不應該所依（āśraya，所依靠者）、所緣（ālambana，所緣對像）、作意三種各別。因為各別，所以沒有相應的意義。這是難於同時生起識的熏習。《世親攝大乘論》（Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha，論名）說：還有其他的意義，即行相（ākāra，相狀）也不同。這不能成為因，第八識和第六識的根等允許有不同的行相。又沒有相同的比喻，不是極成的因。無性的意思是根、境等一定是不同的，不是一定同時存在，所以不能成就熏習。所以這裡說根、境、作意，即三種差別互相熏習的緣故。量云：眼等，不能被耳等所熏，因為根、境、作意三種一定是各別的緣故。這沒有相同的比喻。然而用道理責備它，使它不能互相熏習。或者如同自己和他人的身體的六種轉識……

【English Translation】 English version: 'Holding the seed' (bhrūṇa-dhāraka, maintaining the seed). However, they only say that 'cessation attainment' (nirodha-samāpatti, attainment of cessation) and other long-lasting states do not include other dharmas (phenomena), and all intermittent states are the same as the five positions of the Sautrāntikas (a Buddhist school). These five positions refer to mindless sleep, fainting, non-perception (asaṃjñā, without perception), cessation attainment, and the fruition of non-perception (asaṃjñika-vipāka, the result of non-perception). In Mahāyāna (a Buddhist school), death and rebirth are included in fainting. In these states, the transforming consciousnesses (vijñāna, consciousnesses) do not function, only the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness) continues uninterrupted.

Here, the 'lower consciousnesses' mostly refer to mental factors (caitta, mental events). It is said that the 'king' (referring to the mind-king, i.e., consciousness) takes in the 'ministers' (referring to mental factors). Or 'does not take in' because they separately understand mental factors.

However, the analogy of lightning here, one analogy connects three causes (hetu, reasons). That is, the six transforming consciousnesses cannot be influenced (vāsanā, perfumed) because they are intermittent, like lightning. That is, it is said below: 1. Cannot be influenced; 2. Cannot hold seeds; 3. Not the mind arising from defiled (kleśa, afflictions) or pure seeds. These are all dharmas (phenomena). Using this one cause connects three propositions (pakṣa, thesis). These are all negative inferences (pratiṣedha-anumāna, negative inference). Assuming they influence each other individually or mutually, they are all included here.

Treatise: Because the faculties (indriya, sense organs), objects (viṣaya, sense objects), and attention (manasikāra, mental activity) are easy to detach from and arise, therefore...

Commentary: The Sautrāntikas believe that the six consciousnesses (ṣaḍ-vijñāna, six consciousnesses) do not exist simultaneously, thereby refuting the Mahāsāṃghikas (a Buddhist school). However, they have no meaning of influence. Assuming they refute influence, it is because the Sautrāntikas have influence. Assuming they allow simultaneous existence, influence cannot be achieved. This is the fundamental meaning of refuting the Sautrāntikas' assumption that the six consciousnesses exist simultaneously and have influence. In the second chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (a treatise), Asaṅga (a person's name) explains: If the six transforming consciousnesses must exist simultaneously, then the basis (āśraya, support), object (ālambana, object of focus), and attention should not be different. Because they are different, there is no meaning of correspondence. This is difficult for the influence of consciousnesses arising simultaneously. Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha (a treatise) says: There are other meanings, that is, the aspects (ākāra, characteristics) are also different. This cannot become a cause, the roots, etc., of the eighth and sixth consciousnesses are allowed to have different aspects. Also, there is no similar example, it is not an established cause. Asaṅga means that the faculties, objects, etc., must be different, they do not necessarily exist simultaneously, so influence cannot be achieved. Therefore, it is said here that the faculties, objects, and attention, that is, the three differences influence each other. Inference: The eyes, etc., cannot be influenced by the ears, etc., because the faculties, objects, and attention must be different. This has no similar example. However, it is blamed with reason, so that it cannot influence each other. Or like the six transforming consciousnesses of one's own and others' bodies...

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識。故論文雲根．境．作意類別起故。不爾此言說之何用。攝論唯有此中一因　前解設破經部六識俱時受熏。今解但遮六識體非受熏。以根．境等三種各別非必剎那剎那皆具足故。非識恒起故無熏習。不同無性　前解雖本。不作此解自為不定。八識三別互相熏故。又六與八非一向異。依之而起故許相應。彼六不然故無自失　善等類別易脫起故者。瑜伽等種子中有四位。一三性善等位。互相望起。二三界位。謂下．中．妙界心互相望起。三有漏．無漏位。互相望起。四世．出世位。互相望起。今以善為首等取彼位。故言善等類別易脫起故。宗如前量。因云易脫起故。喻如電光等。等取聲等。

論。如電光等不堅住故。

述曰。此則同喻．及第三因　不堅住故者。因也　如電光等。喻也。

論。非可熏習至所集起心。

述曰。下三宗之法。因如前說三種之因。或一一因皆成三法。或三種因各各別成。如次．逆次．超間．合二。準作可知。若與根等類別為因既有同喻。即言類別為因亦成。既有四因。此遮六識非可熏義。

論。此識一類至所說心義。

述曰。此顯正義。成第八識是可熏識。以一類故。從初至終無間斷故。如苣勝等。等取衣等。此非極成喻。亦非無間故。然從生至滅一期

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：識。因此論文中說，根（indriya，感覺器官）、境（viṣaya，感覺對像）、作意（manasikara，心理活動）的類別各不相同，所以才會生起。否則，這些言論有什麼用呢？《攝大乘論》中只有這一個原因。前面的解釋假設並駁斥了經部宗認為六識同時接受熏習的觀點。現在的解釋只是遮止六識的自體不是受熏習的，因為根、境等三種類別各自不同，並非必然在每個剎那都具足。如果識不是恒常生起，就沒有熏習，這與無性宗的觀點不同。前面的解釋雖然是根本，但不作此解釋就變得不確定了，因為八識的三種類別互相熏習。而且，六識與八識並非完全不同，六識依八識而生起，所以允許相應。其他的六識不是這樣，所以沒有自身的過失。『善等類別容易脫離生起』是因為瑜伽等種子中有四種位：一是三性（善、惡、無記）等位，互相觀望而生起；二是三界（欲界、色界、無色界）位，地獄、中界、妙界的心互相觀望而生起；三是有漏、無漏位，互相觀望而生起；四是世間、出世間位，互相觀望而生起。現在以善為首，等同於取彼位，所以說『善等類別容易脫離生起』。宗（pakṣa，論題）如前面的量（pramāṇa，論證）。因（hetu，理由）是『容易脫離生起』。喻（dṛṣṭānta，例子）如閃電等，等同於取聲音等。 論：如閃電等不堅固安住的緣故。 述曰：這是同喻和第三因。『不堅固安住的緣故』是因。『如閃電等』是喻。 論：不是可以熏習，直到所集起的心。 述曰：下面是三種宗的法。因如前面所說的三種因。或者每一個因都成就三種法，或者三種因各自別成。如次第、逆次、超間、合二，準此可以知道。如果與根等類別作為因，既然有同喻，那麼說類別作為因也成立。既然有四種因，這就遮止了六識不是可以熏習的意義。 論：此識一類，直到所說的心義。 述曰：這顯示了正義，成就了第八識是可以熏習的識，因為它是一類，從初至終沒有間斷。如苣勝等，等同於取衣服等。這不是極成喻，也不是沒有間斷的緣故。然而從生到滅一期。

【English Translation】 English version: Consciousness. Therefore, the treatise says that the categories of indriya (sense organs), viṣaya (sense objects), and manasikara (mental activity) are different, so they arise. Otherwise, what is the use of these statements? The Saṃgraha only has this one reason. The previous explanation assumes and refutes the Sautrāntika's view that the six consciousnesses are simultaneously subject to conditioning. The current explanation only prevents the self-nature of the six consciousnesses from being subject to conditioning, because the three categories of indriya, viṣaya, etc., are different and not necessarily complete in every moment. If consciousness does not arise constantly, there is no conditioning, which is different from the view of Asaṅga. Although the previous explanation is fundamental, it becomes uncertain if this explanation is not made, because the three categories of the eight consciousnesses condition each other. Moreover, the six consciousnesses and the eight consciousness are not completely different. The six consciousnesses arise depending on the eight consciousness, so correspondence is allowed. The other six consciousnesses are not like this, so there is no self-contradiction. 'Categories such as good are easy to detach and arise' is because there are four positions in the seeds of yoga, etc.: first, the positions of the three natures (good, evil, and non-specified), which arise by observing each other; second, the positions of the three realms (desire realm, form realm, and formless realm), where the minds of the lower realm, middle realm, and subtle realm arise by observing each other; third, the positions of defiled and undefiled, which arise by observing each other; fourth, the positions of mundane and supramundane, which arise by observing each other. Now, taking 'good' as the head is equivalent to taking those positions, so it is said that 'categories such as good are easy to detach and arise'. The pakṣa (thesis) is like the previous pramāṇa (proof). The hetu (reason) is 'easy to detach and arise'. The dṛṣṭānta (example) is like lightning, etc., equivalent to taking sounds, etc. Treatise: Like lightning, etc., because they are not firmly abiding. Commentary: This is a similar example and the third reason. 'Because they are not firmly abiding' is the reason. 'Like lightning, etc.' is the example. Treatise: It is not conditionable, until the mind that is accumulated and arises. Commentary: Below are the three types of dharma of the thesis. The reason is like the three reasons mentioned earlier. Or each reason accomplishes three dharmas, or the three reasons each separately accomplish. Such as sequential, reverse, super-interval, combined two, according to this can be known. If the categories such as indriya are taken as the reason, since there is a similar example, then saying that the category is the reason is also established. Since there are four reasons, this prevents the meaning that the six consciousnesses are not conditionable. Treatise: This consciousness is of one kind, until the meaning of the mind that is spoken of. Commentary: This shows the correct meaning, accomplishing that the eighth consciousness is a conditionable consciousness, because it is of one kind, without interruption from beginning to end. Like sesame seeds, etc., equivalent to taking clothes, etc. This is not a well-established example, nor is it without interruption. However, from birth to death, one lifetime.

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無間少同第八。得以為喻。可言極成。此中比量如文可知　一類之因。簡前善等類別之因。恒無間斷。簡滅定等五位間斷　堅住之言。簡不堅住。以根．境等不成量故。此無所遮　或一類言。義亦兼彼。此中法闕。但有可熏略無持種。以苣勝非集起之心。三量成已方始成立所集起心。故次論云契當彼經所說心義。此違經中但有二宗法。一者可熏。二者契彼心義。然以苣勝可為熏習。文但明舉。遂義合云契當彼經所說心義。下違理中方言不許有持種心便違正理舉第三宗。然違經中亦得具三。違理亦爾。各舉勝義。互舉不足是文字意。

論。若不許有至亦違正理。

述曰。第二違理。若不許有此更違于理。

上來依經申理難。以下經外別生難。

論。謂諸所起至唐捐其功。

述曰。下出別理。起染凈法不熏成種。所起唐捐。空無果故。唐之言虛。捐之言棄也。生死．涅槃無由斷．得。故無生死亦無涅槃。

論。染凈起時至執自然生。

述曰。若現行起無種子者。同外道自然生。唯以自然為因無餘因故。下第十破中亦云無所熏故。若無自種則界地往還等。諸染污法無因而生過　然彼經部執色受熏持種。如五十一末敘。或雖不相應彼計是假無體法。大眾有不相應。然無量習。今並

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：第八節，『無間少同』（Anantarikasamatā）可以作為一個比喻，可以被認為是極成（atyantasiddha）。此處的比量（anumāna）可以從文字中理解。『一類之因』（ekajātihetu）是爲了區分之前提到的善等類別之因。『恒無間斷』（nityānantarika）是爲了區分滅盡定（nirodhasamāpatti）等五種狀態中的間斷。『堅住』（sthira）這個詞是爲了區分不堅住（asthira），因為根（indriya）、境（viṣaya）等不能成為有效的量（pramāṇa），所以這裡沒有遮止。或者，『一類』（ekajāti）這個詞也包含了那些含義。這裡缺少法（dharma），只有可熏習（vāsanā）而略去了持種（bīja）。因為苣勝（kṣut-citta，微弱的心）不是集起之心（samudayacitta），只有在三量（traya pramāṇa）成立之後，才能成立所集起之心。因此，接下來的論述說，『契合了彼經所說的心義』。這與經中的說法相悖，經中只有兩種法：一是可熏習，二是契合彼心義。然而，由於苣勝可以被熏習，文字只是明確地舉例說明，因此在意義上符合『契合了彼經所說的心義』。下面的『違理』（yukti viruddha）中，才說不承認有持種心，這便違背了正理，提出了第三種觀點。然而，在『違經』（āgama viruddha）中，也可以具備這三種觀點。『違理』也是如此。各自舉出殊勝的意義，互相補充不足，這是文字的意圖。 論：如果不承認有持種心，這也違背了正理。 述曰：第二是違背正理。如果不承認有持種心，這更加違背了正理。 上面是依據經文來闡述理證的困難，下面是從經文之外另外產生困難。 論：所謂的諸所起（yat utpadyate），如果不起熏成種子的作用，那麼所起的一切都將是徒勞無功的。 述曰：下面提出了另外的理證。如果生起的染污法（saṃkleśa dharma）和清凈法（vyavadāna dharma）不能熏成種子，那麼所生起的一切都將是徒勞無功的，因為沒有結果。『唐』的意思是虛空，『捐』的意思是拋棄。生死（saṃsāra）和涅槃（nirvāṇa）將無法斷除和獲得，因此既沒有生死，也沒有涅槃。 論：染污和清凈生起的時候，如果沒有種子，就如同外道所執著的自然生（svabhāva utpāda）。 述曰：如果現行（prādurbhāva）生起時沒有種子，就如同外道所執著的自然生，因為只有自然作為原因，沒有其他原因。在第十破斥中也說，因為沒有所熏習的，如果沒有自種（svabīja），那麼界（dhātu）、地（bhūmi）的往還等，各種染污法就會無因而生。然而，經部（Sautrāntika）認為色（rūpa）、受（vedanā）可以熏習並持有種子，如第五十一末尾所述。或者，即使是不相應的法（viprayukta dharma），他們也認為是假立的，沒有實體。大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）有不相應的法，然而有無量的習氣（vāsanā），現在一併...

【English Translation】 English version: Section 8, 'Anantarikasamatā' (Uninterrupted Sameness) can be used as a metaphor and can be considered as 'atyantasiddha' (absolutely established). The anumāna (inference) here can be understood from the text. 'Ekajātihetu' (Cause of the Same Kind) is to distinguish it from the causes of categories such as good mentioned earlier. 'Nityānantarika' (Constantly Uninterrupted) is to distinguish it from the interruptions in the five states such as nirodhasamāpatti (cessation attainment). The word 'sthira' (firm) is to distinguish it from 'asthira' (unfirm), because indriya (faculty), viṣaya (object), etc., cannot become valid pramāṇa (means of knowledge), so there is no prohibition here. Alternatively, the word 'ekajāti' (same kind) also includes those meanings. Here, dharma (element) is lacking, there is only vāsanā (perfuming) and the bīja (seed) is omitted. Because kṣut-citta (weak mind) is not samudayacitta (accumulating mind), only after the traya pramāṇa (three means of knowledge) are established can the accumulated mind be established. Therefore, the following discussion says, 'It corresponds to the meaning of mind as described in that sutra.' This contradicts the statement in the sutra, which only has two dharmas: one is vāsanā, and the other is corresponding to that meaning of mind. However, since kṣut-citta can be perfumed, the text only explicitly illustrates, so in meaning it corresponds to 'It corresponds to the meaning of mind as described in that sutra.' In the following 'yukti viruddha' (contradiction of reason), it is said that not admitting the existence of a seed-holding mind contradicts reason and puts forward a third view. However, in 'āgama viruddha' (contradiction of scripture), it can also possess these three views. The same is true for 'yukti viruddha'. Each cites the superior meaning, supplementing each other's deficiencies, which is the intention of the text. Treatise: If one does not admit the existence of a seed-holding mind, this also contradicts reason. Commentary: The second is a contradiction of reason. If one does not admit the existence of a seed-holding mind, this further contradicts reason. The above is based on the scriptures to explain the difficulty of reasoning, and the following is to create difficulties separately from outside the scriptures. Treatise: The so-called 'yat utpadyate' (whatever arises), if it does not function to perfume and form seeds, then everything that arises will be in vain. Commentary: The following presents another reasoning. If the arising saṃkleśa dharma (defiled dharmas) and vyavadāna dharma (purified dharmas) cannot perfume and form seeds, then everything that arises will be in vain, because there is no result. 'Tang' means emptiness, and 'juan' means abandonment. Saṃsāra (birth and death) and nirvāṇa (liberation) will not be able to be cut off and attained, so there is neither birth and death nor nirvāṇa. Treatise: When defilement and purity arise, if there are no seeds, it is like the svabhāva utpāda (natural arising) adhered to by the heretics. Commentary: If prādurbhāva (manifestation) arises without seeds, it is like the natural arising adhered to by the heretics, because only nature is the cause, and there are no other causes. In the tenth refutation, it is also said that because there is nothing to be perfumed, if there is no svabīja (own seed), then the going back and forth of dhātu (realm), bhūmi (ground), etc., various defiled dharmas will arise without cause. However, the Sautrāntika (Sutra School) believes that rūpa (form) and vedanā (feeling) can be perfumed and hold seeds, as described at the end of the fifty-first. Or, even if they are viprayukta dharma (non-associated dharmas), they are considered to be provisionally established and have no substance. The Mahāsāṃghika (Great Assembly School) has non-associated dharmas, but has immeasurable vāsanā (habitual energies), now together...

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設遮。亦有執故。

論。色不相應至豈能持種。

述曰。量云。色．不相應。理非染凈內法所熏。亦不能持種。此中二宗。因云。非心性故。喻云。如聲．光等　內法所熏。簡苣勝等色。為外法熏故。此中不取堅性為法。故知性不堅住。非宗之法。即是因也。總配別配色．不相應。因．宗可解。

論。又彼離識至內種依止。

述曰。此色．不相應。不可說為內種依止。離識無實性故。如龜毛等。色體即心故。唯應心為諸種依止。不相應假依心而立。亦應實法為種子依。前已數遮故不為量。但可言異。

論。轉識相應至亦不受熏。

述曰。下第三遮心所。有八比量。四因各成二宗法故隨其所應　量云。此不能持種。亦不受熏。有間斷故。易脫起故。如前諸識。法在於后令通前量　又宗如前。不自在故。非心性故。如電光等　此中但有前二因之喻。前已遮心是可熏已。故得為喻。后二因．喻略而不論。如前說故。非六識是不自在等。故應別喻。

論。故持種心理應別有。

述曰。此總結也。然無性次下有前念熏后念計。上已破云不俱有故無相應義。如他．我身前後之心不能受熏。總是經部義。

此下第二破經部中遮識類受熏。彼論據計唯識前熏后。此說許識類亦

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 設遮（Setuca，人名）。也是因為有執著。

論：色法和不相應行法不能持有種子。

述記：量式如下：色法、不相應行法，從道理上講，不是被染污或清凈的內在法所熏習，也不能持有種子。這裡有兩種宗派的觀點。因為它們不是心性的緣故。例如聲音、光等。內在法所熏習的，可以簡別苣勝等的色法，因為它們是被外在法所熏習的。這裡不取堅性作為法，所以知道自性不是堅固常住的。不是宗所依的法，就是因。總的來說，分別配對色法和不相應行法，因和宗可以理解。

論：而且，這些色法和不相應行法離開識就沒有實在的自性，不能作為內在種子的依止。如同龜毛等。色法的本體就是心，所以只有心才能作為諸種子的依止。不相應行法是假借心而建立的。也應該以實法作為種子的依止。前面已經多次遮破，所以不作為量式，但可以說它們是不同的。

論：與轉識相應的法，也不能接受熏習。

述記：下面第三個遮破心所。有八個比量，四個因各自成立兩種宗派的法，所以根據情況而定。量式如下：這些不能持有種子，也不能接受熏習，因為它們有間斷。容易脫離和生起。如同前面的各種識。法在於後面，使之與前面的量式相通。又宗如前。因為它們不自在，不是心性的緣故。例如閃電的光等。這裡只有前面兩個因的譬喻。前面已經遮破心是可以被熏習的，所以可以作為譬喻。後面兩個因和譬喻省略而不論，如同前面所說。不是說六識是不自在等，所以應該有不同的譬喻。

論：所以，持有種子的心，理應是另外存在的。

述記：這是總結。然而，無性論師接下來有前念熏后唸的計度。上面已經破斥說，因為不是同時存在，所以沒有相應的意義。如同他人或我身前後的心不能接受熏習。總的來說，這是經部的觀點。

下面第二部分是破斥經部中遮止識類接受熏習的觀點。他們的論據是認為只有識才能前熏后。這裡說允許識類也

【English Translation】 English version Setuca (name of a person). It is also because of attachment.

Treatise: Form and non-associated formations cannot hold seeds.

Commentary: The argument is as follows: Form and non-associated formations, in principle, are not influenced by defiled or pure internal dharmas, nor can they hold seeds. Here, there are two sectarian viewpoints. Because they are not of the nature of mind. For example, sound, light, etc. What is influenced by internal dharmas can be distinguished from the form of Jutseng, etc., because they are influenced by external dharmas. Here, we do not take solidity as a dharma, so we know that the nature is not solid and permanent. What is not the dharma relied upon by the proposition is the reason. In general, matching form and non-associated formations separately, the reason and the proposition can be understood.

Treatise: Moreover, these forms and non-associated formations, apart from consciousness, have no real nature and cannot be the basis for internal seeds. Like turtle hair, etc. The essence of form is mind, so only mind can be the basis for all seeds. Non-associated formations are established by borrowing from the mind. Real dharmas should also be the basis for seeds. It has been refuted many times before, so it is not used as an argument, but it can be said that they are different.

Treatise: Dharmas associated with the transforming consciousness also cannot be influenced.

Commentary: The third part below refutes mental factors. There are eight arguments, and the four reasons each establish the dharmas of two sects, so it depends on the situation. The argument is as follows: These cannot hold seeds, nor can they be influenced, because they are intermittent. Easy to detach and arise. Like the various consciousnesses before. The dharma is in the back, making it consistent with the previous argument. Also, the proposition is as before. Because they are not independent, and not of the nature of mind. For example, the light of lightning, etc. Here, there are only metaphors for the first two reasons. It has been refuted before that the mind can be influenced, so it can be used as a metaphor. The last two reasons and metaphors are omitted and not discussed, as mentioned before. It is not to say that the six consciousnesses are not independent, etc., so there should be different metaphors.

Treatise: Therefore, the mind that holds the seeds should exist separately.

Commentary: This is a summary. However, the Anālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) master then has the calculation of the previous thought influencing the subsequent thought. It has been refuted above that because they do not exist simultaneously, there is no corresponding meaning. Like the minds before and after another person or my body cannot be influenced. In general, this is the view of the Sautrāntika school.

The second part below is to refute the view of the Sautrāntika school that prevents the category of consciousness from being influenced. Their argument is that only consciousness can influence the subsequent one. Here it says that it is allowed that the category of consciousness also

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然故前後異也。上總經部計熏。設縱六識俱有。除第八識餘五取蘊並如前遮非持種等。故持種心理應別有。即第八識。此等經部本計　然後有經部異師第二。于中有二。初敘宗。后正破。

論。有說六識至第八識性。

述曰。此敘彼宗。是識轉變剎那即滅。識上假．立一類不變。無別前後。識類是一。故此可熏。亦可持種。識既被遮。故須計類。因類既成。何勞第八。

論。彼言無義。

述曰。下破有四。初論主非。

論。所以者何。

述曰。次彼返詰也。

論。執類是實則同外道。

述曰。第三別破中有四。一徴假實。二徴何性。三徴間斷。四徴類同　初徴有二。一實二假。此徴實也　吠世史迦同異實故。

論。許類是假至內法實種。

述曰。此徴假也。類不能持內法實種。許無實故。無勝用故。如龜毛等。此中二因。一是假故。二無勝用故。如瓶．衣等定不能持內法種子。外種可然。麻衣是假許可持故。本宗說類是假。今言實者是設遮也。如攝論總有二種。一識類。識家之流。二剎那類。即無常之流。二皆假法。此假實徴。

論。又執識類何性所攝。

述曰。次三性徴。總問何性。

論。若是善惡至猶如擇滅。

述曰。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，前後是有差異的。上面總結了經部（Sautrantika）關於『熏』的計算。假設六識（six consciousnesses）都存在，除了第八識（eighth consciousness）之外，其餘五個取蘊（five aggregates）的遮遣都和前面一樣，否定了它們持有種子等功能。因此，持有種子的心理活動應該另有，那就是第八識。這些是經部的原本觀點。然後是經部中的不同見解，分為兩個部分：首先敘述其宗派觀點，然後正式駁斥。

論：有人說六識乃至第八識的『性』。

述曰：這是敘述他們的宗派觀點。他們認為識的轉變是剎那生滅的，在識上假立一種不變的『類』，沒有前後之分。識的『類』是一個整體，因此可以被熏習，也可以持有種子。既然識已經被否定，所以需要建立『類』。既然『類』已經成立，何必需要第八識呢？

論：他們的說法沒有意義。

述曰：下面開始駁斥，分為四個部分：首先是論主的否定。

論：為什麼呢？

述曰：其次是對方的反駁。

論：如果執著『類』是真實的，那就和外道一樣了。

述曰：第三部分是分別駁斥，分為四個方面：一、質疑真假；二、質疑何種性質；三、質疑間斷；四、質疑『類』的相同性。首先質疑真假，分為真實和虛假。這裡是質疑真實性。因為勝論學派（Vaisheshika）認為『同』和『異』是真實的。

論：如果承認『類』是虛假的，那麼就不能持有內在法的真實種子。

述曰：這是質疑虛假性。『類』不能持有內在法的真實種子，因為承認『類』是虛假的，沒有殊勝的作用。就像兔角一樣。這裡有兩個原因：一是『類』是虛假的，二是『類』沒有殊勝的作用。比如瓶子、衣服等肯定不能持有內在法的種子，外在的種子或許可以。麻衣是虛假的，可以持有種子。本宗認為『類』是虛假的，現在說『類』是真實的，這是一種假設性的遮遣。如《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）總共有兩種『類』：一是識的『類』，即識的流類；二是剎那的『類』，即無常的流類。這兩種都是假法。以上是關於真假的質疑。

論：又執著識的『類』屬於哪種性質？

述曰：接下來是關於三性的質疑，總的提問是屬於哪種性質。

論：如果是善或惡，那就如同擇滅（pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）一樣。

述曰：

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, there is a difference between before and after. The above summarizes the Sautrantika's calculation regarding 'perfuming' (熏). Assuming that all six consciousnesses (六識) exist, except for the eighth consciousness (第八識), the rejection of the remaining five aggregates (取蘊) is the same as before, denying their function of holding seeds, etc. Therefore, the psychological activity of holding seeds should be separate, which is the eighth consciousness. These are the original views of the Sautrantika. Then there is a second differing view within the Sautrantika, which has two parts: first, narrating their sectarian view, and then formally refuting it.

Treatise: Some say that the 'nature' of the six consciousnesses, up to the eighth consciousness.

Commentary: This narrates their sectarian view. They believe that the transformation of consciousness is momentary arising and ceasing, and a kind of unchanging 'class' (類) is falsely established on the consciousness, without any distinction between before and after. The 'class' of consciousness is a whole, so it can be perfumed and can also hold seeds. Since consciousness has been negated, it is necessary to establish 'class'. Since 'class' has been established, why is there a need for the eighth consciousness?

Treatise: Their statement is meaningless.

Commentary: The following begins the refutation, which is divided into four parts: first, the treatise master's negation.

Treatise: Why is that?

Commentary: Secondly, their counter-question.

Treatise: If you cling to 'class' as real, then it is the same as the non-Buddhists.

Commentary: The third part is a separate refutation, which is divided into four aspects: 1. Questioning reality and falsehood; 2. Questioning what kind of nature; 3. Questioning interruption; 4. Questioning the similarity of 'class'. First, questioning reality and falsehood, which is divided into real and false. This is questioning reality. Because the Vaisheshika school believes that 'sameness' and 'difference' are real.

Treatise: If you admit that 'class' is false, then it cannot hold the real seeds of the inner dharma.

Commentary: This is questioning falsehood. 'Class' cannot hold the real seeds of the inner dharma because it admits that 'class' is false and has no superior function. Like rabbit horns. There are two reasons here: one is that 'class' is false, and the other is that 'class' has no superior function. For example, bottles, clothes, etc., definitely cannot hold the seeds of the inner dharma, but external seeds may be able to. Hemp clothing is false and can hold seeds. This school believes that 'class' is false, and now saying that 'class' is real is a hypothetical negation. As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha has two kinds of 'class' in total: one is the 'class' of consciousness, that is, the stream of consciousness; the other is the 'class' of momentariness, that is, the stream of impermanence. Both of these are false dharmas. The above is the questioning about reality and falsehood.

Treatise: Also, what nature does the 'class' of consciousness belong to?

Commentary: Next is the questioning about the three natures, the general question is what nature it belongs to.

Treatise: If it is good or evil, then it is like cessation through discrimination (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha).

Commentary:

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此類。應不受熏。汝許有記故。如擇滅。此中宗略。若難不持種。便違宗失。非自不許彼故。

論。若是無記至此類應斷。

述曰。若唯無覆。善惡心時此即應斷　此義意言。許間斷故如識自體事非可熏等。前已破故。

而彼若言善．噁心時此類不斷性是無記。具堅．無記義故可熏者。今非之云。

論。非事善惡至別事性故。

述曰。非識自體事善惡性類成無記。所以者何。別類必同別事性故。非如眾同分是總類。同異句等是總類故。彼與法自體事性異。此是別法。法之別類唯在識上有不通余故。雖無同喻以理徴之。

彼言識法同分是無記識通三性。此類可然故可熏者。

論。又無心位至持種受熏。

述曰。設縱類無記。異其善等心。此不斷故故可熏者。如五位無心時此類定無。是識類故。如識間斷。性非堅住。故不可執持種受熏。此二比量義準前成。攝論同也。

論。又阿羅漢至許便有失。

述曰。第四徴類同。中有二。初凡聖類同。后根．法類同。此初也　聖．異生心。識類同故。前成凡夫。后成阿羅漢。或是異身但類同者。應互相熏。諸阿羅漢為諸染熏。異生應為無漏法熏。是識類故。如自異生自聖者等。許便有失。無凡聖故。

論。又

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 此類（指某種類別）。應不受熏（不應被薰染）。你既然承認有記（有標記），就像擇滅（Nirvana attained by extinction of defilements）。這裡只是簡略地說明宗義。如果認為它不能持種（不能保持種子），就違反了宗義的原則。因為你並非不承認它（擇滅）的緣故。

論：如果它是無記（neither good nor bad）的，那麼此類就應該斷滅。

述曰：如果僅僅是無覆無記（morally neutral and not obstructing liberation），在善惡心生起時，它就應該斷滅。這個意思是指，因為它允許間斷，就像識（consciousness）的自體事（self-nature）不可被薰染一樣。因為之前已經破斥過這種觀點。

如果他們說，在善惡心生起時，此類不斷滅，其自性是無記的，因為它具有堅固和無記的性質，所以可以被薰染。現在反駁如下：

論：不是說識的自體事是善惡的性質，所以才成為無記的。因為類別不同，必然導致事性不同。不像眾同分（community of beings）是總類，同異句（phrases of similarity and difference）等是總類。它與法的自體事性不同。這是不同的法。法的不同類別只在識上有，不通於其他。雖然沒有相同的比喻，但可以用道理來證明。

他們說，識法同分（consciousness and dharma share the same category）是無記的，識通於三性（善、惡、無記），此類是可以的，所以可以被薰染。

論：又，在無心位（state of no-mind）時，此類必定沒有，所以不能執持種子，接受薰染。

述曰：假設此類是無記的，不同於善等心。因為它不斷滅，所以可以被薰染。比如在五位無心（five states of mindlessness）時，此類必定沒有，因為它是識的類別。就像識會間斷一樣，其自性並非堅固常住，所以不能執持種子，接受薰染。這兩個比量（inference）的意義可以參照前面的內容來理解。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）也是同樣的觀點。

論：又，阿羅漢（Arhat, one who has attained Nirvana）的心識與凡夫的心識是同一類，如果允許這種說法，就會有過失。

述曰：第四個征難是關於類別相同的問題，其中包含兩個方面。首先是凡夫和聖者的類別相同，然後是根（indriya, faculty）和法（dharma, phenomena）的類別相同。這裡是第一個方面。聖者和異生（ordinary beings）的心識類別相同。前者成就了凡夫，後者成就了阿羅漢。或者只是不同的身體，但類別相同。應該互相薰染。諸位阿羅漢被各種染污所薰染，異生應該被無漏法（undefiled dharma）所薰染。因為它們是識的類別。就像自己的異生和自己的聖者等。如果允許這種說法，就會有過失，因為沒有凡夫和聖者的區別了。

論：又

【English Translation】 English version: This kind (referring to a certain category) should not be influenced (should not be tainted). Since you admit that it is marked (has a characteristic), like Nirvāṇa attained by extinction of defilements (擇滅). This is a brief explanation of the principle. If it is considered that it cannot hold seeds (cannot maintain seeds), then it violates the principle. Because you do not deny it (Nirvāṇa).

Treatise: If it is morally neutral (無記), then this kind should be extinguished.

Commentary: If it is only morally neutral and not obstructing liberation (無覆無記), it should be extinguished when good and evil thoughts arise. This means that because it allows for interruption, like the self-nature of consciousness (識) cannot be influenced. Because this view has been refuted before.

If they say that when good and evil thoughts arise, this kind is not extinguished, and its nature is morally neutral, because it has the nature of being firm and morally neutral, so it can be influenced. Now, the refutation is as follows:

Treatise: It is not that the self-nature of consciousness is good or evil, so it becomes morally neutral. Because different categories necessarily lead to different natures. Unlike the community of beings (眾同分) which is a general category, phrases of similarity and difference (同異句) etc. are general categories. It is different from the self-nature of dharma. This is a different dharma. The different categories of dharma only exist in consciousness and do not extend to others. Although there is no similar analogy, it can be proven by reason.

They say that consciousness and dharma share the same category (識法同分) is morally neutral, and consciousness is connected to the three natures (good, evil, morally neutral), this kind is possible, so it can be influenced.

Treatise: Also, in the state of no-mind (無心位), this kind must not exist, so it cannot hold seeds and receive influence.

Commentary: Suppose this kind is morally neutral, different from good and other thoughts. Because it is not extinguished, so it can be influenced. For example, in the five states of mindlessness (五位無心), this kind must not exist, because it is the category of consciousness. Just like consciousness is interrupted, its nature is not firm and permanent, so it cannot hold seeds and receive influence. The meaning of these two inferences can be understood by referring to the previous content. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論) also has the same view.

Treatise: Also, the consciousness of an Arhat (阿羅漢, one who has attained Nirvana) and the consciousness of ordinary beings are of the same kind, if this statement is allowed, there will be a fault.

Commentary: The fourth challenge is about the problem of the same category, which contains two aspects. The first is that the categories of ordinary beings and sages are the same, and then the categories of faculties (根) and phenomena (法) are the same. Here is the first aspect. The consciousness categories of sages and ordinary beings (異生) are the same. The former achieves ordinary beings, and the latter achieves Arhats. Or it is just a different body, but the category is the same. They should influence each other. The Arhats are influenced by various defilements, and ordinary beings should be influenced by undefiled dharma (無漏法). Because they are the category of consciousness. Like one's own ordinary beings and one's own sages, etc. If this statement is allowed, there will be a fault, because there is no distinction between ordinary beings and sages.

Treatise: Also

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眼等根至識類受熏。

述曰。下徴根．法　謂眼等根．及所餘法與眼等識。一則根同。眼識等亦為次第滅根故名意根故。亦與余法類同。法義通故　或信等余法。與眼等根義同。眼等根法。與非根法法類同。應互相熏。然汝不許違自宗故　義雖通爾。以彼本計識類受熏。即眼等根是識根類。或所餘法是識法類。應互相熏。識之類故。然汝不許是此本意。若以根等與余信等為根類同。便令相熏。失彼宗意　此法類同攝論亦無。彼言或應意根成造色性。與眼等根類同故。第四結云故不應執識類受熏。

論。又六識身至必俱時故。

述曰。第三破事．類雙熏計。準世親。前熏后不言類唯取識。是譬喻部師。無性亦然。並無類前熏后。今此設遮經部。兼破譬喻師。譬喻師是經部異師。即日出論者。是名經部。此有三種。一根本即鳩摩羅多。二室利邏多。造經部毗婆沙。正理所言上座是。三但名經部。以根本師造結鬘論廣說譬喻。名譬喻師。從所說為名也。其實總是一種經部　上來事．類俱時被破。即事及類前熏於後。今破云。前念事．類。不熏次後念事．類。不俱有故。如隔多念。隔多念者彼計不遠熏故得為喻。但熏次後故。設遮識熏類。類熏識。識熏識。類熏類。皆不成立。故總遮云非互相熏。能熏所熏

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 眼等根至識類受熏。

述曰：下面是關於根和法的論述。眼等根，以及其餘的法與眼等識，一方面，眼等根與意根相同（因為眼識等次第滅去，所以眼根也被稱為意根），另一方面，也與其餘的法類似，因為法的意義是相通的。或者說，信等其餘的法，與眼等根的意義相同；眼等根法，與非根法在法類上相同，應該互相熏習。但是你們（指對方宗派）不承認這一點，這違反了你們自己的宗義。

即使意義上是相通的，但按照他們（指對方宗派）原本的觀點，是識類受熏，也就是說，眼等根是識根類，或者其餘的法是識法類，應該互相熏習，因為它們都屬於識的範疇。但是你們不承認這一點，這才是本意。如果認為根等與其餘的信等屬於根類相同，就令它們互相熏習，就失去了他們宗派的本意。這種法類相同的說法，在《攝大乘論》中也沒有。該論中說，或者意根會成為造色性，因為它與眼等根屬於同一類。第四點總結說，所以不應該執著于識類受熏。

論：又六識身至必俱時故。

述曰：第三點是破除事和類雙重熏習的觀點。按照世親的觀點，前熏后，不談類，只取識，這是譬喻部師的觀點。無性也是如此，都沒有類前熏后的說法。現在這裡設立遮破，是針對經部，同時也破斥譬喻師。譬喻師是經部的異師，也就是《日出論》的作者，被稱為經部。經部有三種：一是根本經部，即鳩摩羅多；二是室利邏多，他造了《經部毗婆沙》，也就是《正理》中所說的上座；三是但名經部。因為根本師造了《結鬘論》，廣泛地闡述了譬喻，所以被稱為譬喻師，這是從他們所說的內容來命名的。實際上，總的來說，他們都是一種經部。

上面所說的事和類同時被破斥，也就是事和類在前熏習在後。現在破斥說，前唸的事和類，不熏習次後的唸的事和類，因為它們不是同時存在的。比如間隔了很多念頭，因為他們認為不是遙遠的熏習，只能熏習緊接著的念頭。假設遮破識熏習類，類熏習識，識熏習識，類熏習類，都不能成立。所以總的遮破說，不是互相熏習，能熏和所熏的關係也不成立。

【English Translation】 English version The roots such as eyes, etc., up to the class of consciousness, are subject to being influenced.

Explanation: The following discusses the roots and dharmas. The roots such as eyes, etc., and the remaining dharmas, along with the consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness, etc., are similar in one aspect because the eye-consciousness, etc., sequentially cease, so the eye-root is also called the mind-root (意根). On the other hand, they are also similar to the remaining dharmas because the meaning of dharmas is interconnected. Alternatively, the remaining dharmas such as faith, etc., are similar in meaning to the roots such as eyes, etc.; the dharmas of the roots such as eyes, etc., are similar to non-root dharmas in the class of dharmas, and should influence each other. However, you (referring to the opposing school) do not acknowledge this, which contradicts your own doctrine.

Even if they are interconnected in meaning, according to their (referring to the opposing school) original view, it is the class of consciousness that is subject to being influenced, that is, the roots such as eyes, etc., are the class of consciousness-roots, or the remaining dharmas are the class of consciousness-dharmas, and should influence each other because they all belong to the category of consciousness. But you do not acknowledge this, which is the original intention. If it is considered that the roots, etc., and the remaining faith, etc., belong to the same class of roots, then they would influence each other, which would lose the original intention of their school. This statement of the same class of dharmas is also not found in the Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra. The sutra says that the mind-root (意根) might become the nature of form (造色性) because it belongs to the same class as the roots such as eyes, etc. The fourth point concludes that one should not adhere to the view that the class of consciousness is subject to being influenced.

Treatise: Furthermore, the six bodies of consciousness necessarily occur simultaneously.

Explanation: The third point is to refute the view of dual influence of both events and classes. According to Vasubandhu's view, the former influences the latter, without mentioning classes, only taking consciousness, which is the view of the Sautrāntika school. Asaṅga is also the same, without the statement of the former class influencing the latter. Now, this establishment of refutation is aimed at the Sautrāntika school, and also refutes the Dṛṣṭāntavāda school. The Dṛṣṭāntavāda school is a different school of the Sautrāntika, which is the author of the Sunrise Treatise, called the Sautrāntika. There are three types of Sautrāntika: one is the fundamental Sautrāntika, namely Kumāralāta; the second is Śrīlāta, who created the Sautrāntika Vibhāṣā, which is the elder mentioned in the Nyāyānusāra; the third is simply called the Sautrāntika. Because the fundamental teacher created the Kalpanā-maṇḍitikā, extensively explaining the analogies, he is called the Dṛṣṭāntavāda, which is named from what they say. In fact, generally speaking, they are all one type of Sautrāntika.

The above-mentioned events and classes are refuted simultaneously, that is, events and classes influence the latter in the former. Now, the refutation says that the events and classes of the previous thought do not influence the events and classes of the subsequent thought because they do not exist simultaneously. For example, there are many intervening thoughts, because they do not consider distant influence, but can only influence the immediately following thought. Suppose the refutation of consciousness influencing class, class influencing consciousness, consciousness influencing consciousness, class influencing class, all cannot be established. Therefore, the general refutation says that they do not influence each other, and the relationship between the influencer and the influenced is not established.

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必俱時故者。顯熏習義。非是前後如隔念故。又此文外破前後心異性。或后是善惡類亦然。如何前熏后。后無記可爾。

以前經部本計熏習。設六識俱轉　今次敘大眾部。彼計唯有六轉識俱而無熏習。設有熏義。

論。執唯六識至能持種義。

述曰。此既別破大眾六識俱轉。故知初破但破經部。縱成俱轉難非受熏。由前破經部同時六識受熏故。彼大眾部六識無持種義。此不立假類受熏故言唯六識。無前熏后故言唯俱轉。

以下第三破上座部。無性第三云經部師者。即此上座部中自有以經為量者故言經部。

論。有執色心至為證不成。

述曰。于中有三。一敘宗。二申難。三破救。此初也。謂色望色。心等望心。自類前後。前為后因。因義既成。故先所說證第八識有不成也。

論。彼執非理無熏習故。

述曰。次申難有三。初破無熏習。次難后不生。后難無後蘊。此總非。

論。謂彼自類至前為后種。

述曰。既無熏習如何前後為種。若曾自類相熏前念中有後種子。前可生后。既無熏習何得為因。無性攝論云。二念不俱有故不得熏習。如前已破　量云。前心等不為後心等種。無熏習故。如瓦礫等。

論。又間斷者應不更生。

述曰。此第二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

『必俱時故者。顯熏習義。』意思是必須同時存在才能體現熏習的意義。如果不是同時，而是像間隔一個念頭那樣，就不能體現熏習的意義了。而且，這段文字還在表面上破斥了前後心識異性的觀點。或者說，后一個心識是善或惡的類別也是如此。如果前一個心識如何薰染后一個心識呢？后一個心識是無記性的，這怎麼可能呢？ 以前經部（Sautrantika）的觀點來計算熏習。假設六識同時運作。現在接下來敘述大眾部（Mahasanghika）的觀點。他們認為只有六個轉識同時運作，而沒有熏習。即使有熏習的意義，也是沒有的。 論：『執唯六識至能持種義。』 述記：這裡特別破斥大眾部六識同時運作的觀點。因此可知，最初破斥的只是經部的觀點。即使六識同時運作成立，也難以接受熏習。因為之前已經破斥了經部同時六識接受熏習的觀點。他們大眾部六識沒有保持種子意義的功能。這裡不建立假立的類別接受熏習，所以說『唯六識』。因為沒有前一個薰染后一個，所以說『唯俱轉』。 以下第三個部分是破斥上座部（Sthavira school）的觀點。無性在《第三云經》中說，經部師就是上座部中那些以經為衡量標準的人，所以稱為經部。 論：『有執色心至為證不成。』 述記：其中有三個部分。一是敘述宗派觀點，二是提出疑問，三是破斥辯解。這是第一個部分。意思是說，色法相對於色法，心識等等相對於心識，都是同類的前後相續。前一個作為后一個的因。因的意義既然成立，那麼先前所說的證明第八識存在的說法就不成立了。 論：『彼執非理無熏習故。』 述記：接下來提出疑問，有三個方面。首先是破斥沒有熏習，其次是質疑后一個心識如何產生，最後是質疑沒有後來的蘊。這裡是總體的否定。 論：『謂彼自類至前為后種。』 述記：既然沒有熏習，那麼如何前後相續成為種子呢？如果曾經有同類相互薰染，前一個念頭中就有後一個念頭的種子，那麼前一個念頭就可以產生后一個念頭。既然沒有熏習，又怎麼能成為因呢？無性在《攝論》中說，兩個念頭不是同時存在的，所以不能熏習，就像之前已經破斥的那樣。量云：前一個心識等等不能作為后一個心識等等的種子，因為沒有熏習，就像瓦礫等等一樣。 論：『又間斷者應不更生。』 述記：這是第二個方面。

【English Translation】 English version:

'Because they must be simultaneous.' This highlights the meaning of 'impregnation' (熏習, xunxi). If they are not simultaneous, but separated by a thought, the meaning of impregnation cannot be demonstrated. Moreover, this passage overtly refutes the view that prior and subsequent consciousnesses are of different natures. Or, it could be said that the subsequent consciousness being of a good or evil category is also the same. How can the prior consciousness impregnate the subsequent one? If the subsequent consciousness is neutral (無記, wu ji), how is that possible? Previously, the Sautrantika (經部) school calculated impregnation based on the assumption that the six consciousnesses operate simultaneously. Now, we will discuss the view of the Mahasanghika (大眾部) school. They believe that only the six transforming consciousnesses operate simultaneously, and there is no impregnation. Even if there is a meaning of impregnation, it is absent. Treatise: 'Holding only to the six consciousnesses, up to the meaning of being able to maintain seeds.' Commentary: This specifically refutes the Mahasanghika's view that the six consciousnesses operate simultaneously. Therefore, it is known that the initial refutation only targeted the Sautrantika's view. Even if the simultaneous operation of the six consciousnesses is established, it is difficult to accept impregnation. This is because the previous refutation already addressed the Sautrantika's view that the six simultaneous consciousnesses receive impregnation. The Mahasanghika's six consciousnesses do not have the function of maintaining the meaning of seeds. Here, a falsely established category receiving impregnation is not established, hence the statement 'only the six consciousnesses.' Because there is no prior consciousness impregnating the subsequent one, it is said 'only simultaneous operation.' The following third section refutes the view of the Sthavira (上座部) school. Vasubandhu in the 'Third Cloud Sutra' says that the Sautrantikas are those within the Sthavira school who use the sutras as their standard, hence they are called Sautrantikas. Treatise: 'Some hold that matter and mind, up to the proof is not established.' Commentary: There are three parts to this. First, stating the sectarian view; second, raising questions; and third, refuting defenses. This is the first part. It means that matter in relation to matter, consciousness and so on in relation to consciousness, are of the same kind in a continuous sequence. The prior serves as the cause for the subsequent. Since the meaning of cause is established, then the previously stated proof for the existence of the eighth consciousness is not established. Treatise: 'Their view is unreasonable because there is no impregnation.' Commentary: Next, raising questions, there are three aspects. First, refuting the absence of impregnation; second, questioning how the subsequent consciousness arises; and third, questioning the absence of subsequent aggregates. This is a general negation. Treatise: 'Saying that their own kind, up to the prior as the seed for the subsequent.' Commentary: Since there is no impregnation, how can they be continuously related as seeds? If there was ever mutual impregnation of the same kind, the prior thought would contain the seed of the subsequent thought, then the prior thought could produce the subsequent thought. Since there is no impregnation, how can it be a cause? Vasubandhu in the Compendium on the Mahayana says that two thoughts do not exist simultaneously, so they cannot impregnate each other, just as previously refuted. The measure states: the prior consciousness and so on cannot be the seed for the subsequent consciousness and so on, because there is no impregnation, just like rubble and so on. Treatise: 'Moreover, those that are interrupted should not arise again.' Commentary: This is the second aspect.

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難。攝論云。謂生無色色久時斷。後生地獄色應不生。彼說過去現無體故。滅盡定等心斷亦然。前久已無。應非后種。因則不遍。

論。二乘無學至為后種故。

述曰。此第三難。彼色生色心復生心。二乘后蘊如前餘位無斷絕故。但言二乘簡自宗故。佛無此事　量云。極成二乘無學後心不得入涅槃。許能為因故。如前前位　極成言簡佛為不定。彼不極成故。

自下經部諸師。既見上座被此難已更方轉計。或設遮上座部有熏習救。前解是本。恐無心時心斷故。色中有心等種。無色時色斷故。心中有色等種。更互含藏受熏故無過失。今子段第二論主非之。

論。亦不應執至前已遮故。

述曰。下破轉救色．心展轉互為種生。無色．無心後生諸色．諸心無失。轉識．及色非所熏習先已破故。轉識不受熏。許有間故。色根不受熏。許非心故。並如聲．電。如何可能為諸法種。並如五十一敘計。

下第四破一切有部。于中有二。初敘宗。后正破　敘宗中文二。初正敘。後會違。

論。有說三世至能持種識。

述曰。敘彼宗計。因能感果。果能赴因。無不皆成。何勞計執別有識體。復言熏習即雙非上諸部及大乘義。

次彼會經。

論。然經說心至勢用強故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 難。《攝論》（《攝大乘論》）中說：『如果說產生沒有長久的時間間隔，後生的地獄色法就不應該產生。』因為他們說過去和現在沒有實體。滅盡定等情況，心識斷滅也是一樣。之前的（心識）已經很久沒有了，應該不是後來的種子。這樣，因就不普遍了。

論：二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的無學（阿羅漢）至（涅槃）為後來的種子，所以（沒有過失）。

述曰：這是第三個難點。他們的色法產生色法，心識產生心識。二乘的后蘊（最後的心識）像之前其餘的階段一樣，沒有斷絕的緣故。只說二乘，是爲了區別于自宗（大乘）。佛沒有這種情況。量云：極成的二乘無學後心不得入涅槃，允許能夠作為因的緣故，像之前之前的階段一樣。『極成』是爲了簡別佛，因為佛不極成（不屬於這種情況）。

從下面開始，經部（佛教部派之一）的諸位法師，既然看到上座部（佛教部派之一）被這個難點所困擾，就更加想方設法地轉換計策。或者設立遮止，說上座部有熏習的救濟。之前的解釋是根本。恐怕沒有心識的時候，心識會斷滅的緣故。色法中有心識等的種子，沒有色法的時候，色法會斷滅的緣故。心識中有色法等的種子。互相包含隱藏，接受熏習的緣故，沒有過失。現在子段，第二位論主否定它。

論：也不應該執著（這種說法），因為之前已經遮止過了。

述曰：下面破斥轉換救濟的說法，即色法和心識輾轉互相作為種子產生。無色界、無心識之後產生諸色法、諸心識沒有過失。轉識和色法不是所熏習的，之前已經破斥過了。轉識不接受熏習，因為允許有間隔的緣故。色根不接受熏習，因為允許不是心識的緣故。並且像聲音、閃電一樣。怎麼可能作為諸法的種子。並且像第五十一敘述的計較一樣。

下面第四個破斥一切有部（佛教部派之一）。其中有二個部分。首先敘述宗義，然後正式破斥。敘述宗義中又有二個部分。首先正式敘述，然後會合違背之處。

論：有人說三世（過去、現在、未來）的諸法，各自具有各自的體性，能夠保持種子識。

述曰：敘述他們的宗義計較。因能夠感得果，果能夠赴向因，沒有不成就的。何必勞煩計較執著別有識體。又說熏習就雙重否定了上座部的諸部和大乘的意義。

其次，他們會合經典。

論：然而經典說心識具有強大的勢力作用的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version: Objection. The Śāstra (Abhidharma-samuccaya) says: 'If production has no long interval, then the subsequent production of form in the lower realms should not occur.' This is because they say that the past and present have no substance. The same applies to the cessation attainment and other cases where the mind ceases. The previous (mind) has been gone for a long time, so it should not be the seed for the later (mind). Thus, the cause is not universal.

Treatise: The Arhats of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) until (Nirvana) are the subsequent seeds, so (there is no fault).

Commentary: This is the third difficulty. Their form produces form, and mind produces mind. The later aggregates of the Two Vehicles, like the previous remaining stages, are not interrupted. Only mentioning the Two Vehicles is to distinguish them from our own school (Mahayana). The Buddha does not have this situation. Proof: The final mind of the Arhats of the Two Vehicles, which is universally accepted, cannot enter Nirvana, because it is allowed to be a cause, just like the previous stages. 'Universally accepted' is to distinguish the Buddha, because the Buddha is not universally accepted (does not belong to this category).

From here on, the teachers of the Sautrāntika school (a Buddhist school), seeing that the Sthavira school (a Buddhist school) is troubled by this difficulty, try even harder to change their strategy. Or they establish a defense, saying that the Sthavira school has the remedy of vāsanā (habitual energy). The previous explanation is fundamental. They fear that when there is no mind, the mind will cease. Therefore, there are seeds of mind, etc., in form; and when there is no form, form will cease. There are seeds of form, etc., in mind. Because they mutually contain and conceal each other, and receive vāsanā, there is no fault. Now, in this section, the second author of the treatise denies it.

Treatise: One should also not cling to (this view), because it has already been refuted before.

Commentary: Below, he refutes the transformed remedy, that is, form and mind reciprocally act as seeds to produce each other. There is no fault in the production of forms and minds after the formless realm and the absence of mind. The transformed consciousness and form are not what is influenced by vāsanā, as has already been refuted before. Transformed consciousness does not receive vāsanā because it is allowed to have intervals. Form-sense-bases do not receive vāsanā because they are allowed to be non-mind. And like sound and lightning. How can they be the seeds of all dharmas? And like the calculations narrated in the fifty-first section.

Below, the fourth refutation is of the Sarvāstivāda school (a Buddhist school). There are two parts to it. First, narrating the tenets; then, formally refuting. Within the narration of the tenets, there are two parts. First, formally narrating; then, reconciling contradictions.

Treatise: Some say that the dharmas of the three times (past, present, and future) each have their own substance and can maintain the seed consciousness.

Commentary: Narrating their tenets and calculations. The cause can bring about the effect, and the effect can go towards the cause, and nothing is not accomplished. Why bother calculating and clinging to a separate entity of consciousness? Furthermore, saying vāsanā doubly negates the meaning of the Sthavira school and the Mahayana.

Next, they reconcile the scriptures.

Treatise: However, the scriptures say that the mind has a strong force and function.

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述曰。心用強勝非如色等故唯說心。非心持種可受熏習。經部以色為持種法。心類亦然。但說於心以心勝故。大眾部．上座部俱云。雖說有色心。心能起色故但說心。

次當論主非一切有言。

論。彼說非理至非實有故。

述曰。過去．未來。非實有體。非常無為。非現在故。如空華等。

論。又無作用至皆不得成。

述曰。其去．來世。非因緣性。以無取果用故。如無為等。去．來既無。無持種識。故於諸部一切因果皆不得成。

論。有執大乘至及一切法。

述曰。第五清辨無相大乘。于俗諦中亦說依他．圓成有故。真諦皆空故。今言空者遣遍計所執。彼執此文為正解故。彼依掌珍真性有為空等似比量。撥無此識及一切法皆言無體。

言似比量者。謂約我宗真性有為無為非空不空。有法一分非極成過。汝不許有我勝義故。四種世俗．勝義之中各隨攝故　若隨小乘彼轉實有。便違自宗。若隨汝自宗勝義空者。我不許汝空勝義故。亦非極成　又以我說若約世俗無為有為二俱是有。若約勝義非空不空。汝今說空。即有違自教之失。名似比量。

論。彼持違害前所引經。

述曰。違前染凈集起心經。

論。知斷證修至成大邪見。

述曰。知苦

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：因為心的作用強大且殊勝，不像色法等那樣，所以只說心。不是說色法不能持有種子，經部宗認為色法是持有種子的法。心類也是這樣，但因為心殊勝的緣故，所以只說心。大眾部和上座部都認為，雖然說有色法和心，但因為心能生起色法，所以只說心。

接下來應當討論論主『非一切有』的觀點。

論：他們的說法不合理，因為過去和未來不是真實存在的。

述曰：過去和未來，沒有真實的自體。非常和無為法，不是現在存在的，就像空中的花朵等。

論：而且沒有作用，所以一切都不能成立。

述曰：過去和未來世，不是因緣的自性，因為沒有取果的作用，就像無為法等。過去和未來既然沒有，就沒有持有種子的識，所以在各個部派中，一切因果都不能成立。

論：有人執著大乘，以及一切法。

述曰：第五，清辨（Bhavaviveka）的無相大乘，在世俗諦中也說依他起（paratantra，緣起）和圓成實（parinispanna，真實）是存在的，在真諦中一切皆空。現在說『空』，是爲了遣除遍計所執（parikalpita，虛妄分別）。他們執著這段文字是正確的解釋。他們依據《掌珍論》（Karatalaratna）中『真性有為空』等相似的比量，否定有這種識以及一切法，都說是沒有實體的。

所說的『相似比量』，是指就我宗而言，真性有為和無為，非空非不空。有法的一部分不是極成過失。因為你不承認我有勝義諦的緣故。在四種世俗諦和勝義諦中，各自隨其所攝。如果隨順小乘，他們轉為實有，就違背了自己的宗義。如果隨順你自己的宗義，勝義是空的，我不承認你的空勝義，也不是極成。而且我說，如果就世俗諦而言，無為和有為二者都是有的。如果就勝義諦而言，非空非不空。你現在說空，就是有違背自己教義的過失，叫做相似比量。

論：他們堅持違背前面所引用的經文。

述曰：違背了前面所引用的關於染凈集起心的經文。

論：知道、斷除、證得、修習，成為大邪見。

述曰：知道苦（duhkha，痛苦）……

【English Translation】 English version: Statement: Because the function of the mind is strong and superior, unlike form and other things, only the mind is discussed. It is not that form cannot hold seeds; the Sautrantika school believes that form is the dharma that holds seeds. The same is true for the mind category, but because the mind is superior, only the mind is discussed. The Mahasanghika and Theravada schools both believe that although form and mind are mentioned, because the mind can generate form, only the mind is discussed.

Next, we should discuss the thesis of the proponent 'non-existence of everything'.

Treatise: Their statement is unreasonable because the past and future are not truly existent.

Statement: The past and future do not have a real substance. The unconditioned and non-existent are not present, like flowers in the sky, etc.

Treatise: Moreover, there is no function, so everything cannot be established.

Statement: The past and future lives are not of the nature of causes and conditions because they do not have the function of taking results, like the unconditioned, etc. Since the past and future do not exist, there is no consciousness that holds seeds, so in all schools, all causes and effects cannot be established.

Treatise: Some are attached to the Mahayana, as well as all dharmas.

Statement: Fifth, Bhavaviveka's (清辨) non-substantial Mahayana also says that the dependent nature (paratantra, 依他起) and the perfectly accomplished nature (parinispanna, 圓成實) exist in the conventional truth, and everything is empty in the ultimate truth. Now, saying 'empty' is to eliminate the completely conceptualized (parikalpita, 遍計所執). They insist that this passage is the correct interpretation. They rely on the 'true nature of conditioned things is empty' and other similar analogies in the Karatalaratna (掌珍論) to deny that there is such a consciousness and that all dharmas are without substance.

The so-called 'similar analogy' refers to the fact that, according to my school, the true nature of conditioned and unconditioned things is neither empty nor non-empty. A part of the subject is not an unestablished fault. Because you do not admit that I have the ultimate truth. Among the four types of conventional and ultimate truths, each follows what it encompasses. If you follow the Hinayana, they turn into real existence, which violates their own doctrine. If you follow your own doctrine, the ultimate is empty, I do not admit your empty ultimate, and it is also not established. Moreover, I say that if we talk about conventional truth, both the unconditioned and the conditioned exist. If we talk about ultimate truth, it is neither empty nor non-empty. Now you say it is empty, which is a fault of violating your own teachings, called a similar analogy.

Treatise: They insist on violating the previously cited scriptures.

Statement: It violates the previously cited scriptures about the mind that accumulates defilement and purity.

Treatise: Knowing, cutting off, attaining, and cultivating become great wrong views.

Statement: Knowing suffering (duhkha, 苦)...

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斷集證滅修道。染苦集．凈滅道．集道因．苦滅果。皆執為非實。成大邪見。

彼若救言我依世諦不說為無但言非實。

論。外道譭謗至但執非實故。

述曰。則同外道。外道邪見譭謗。亦不謂染．凈等皆無。現所見故。但執非實。染因不能感惡果。善因不能感善果。以非實故。如空華等。

論。若一切法至用為軍旅。

述曰。一切法無。菩薩不應起大悲捨生死集菩提資糧。誰有智者為除虛幻之敵。求石女之兒以為軍旅而共摧敵。要賊是有。方求資糧而求斷彼。

論。故應信有至染凈因果。

述曰。因果不無可信此識。勸清辨等以生信也　此中可說三性有無。略述掌珍清辨本意。分二見之是非。定雙情之邪正。我真諦中亦非法無。但不可說為因為果。言語道斷故。俗諦之中依他．圓成有故。遍計所執無故。

第三大文總結之。

論。彼心即是此第八識。

述曰。持種等心是此第八。即八證中第四種子證。及攝論第二熏習中。及安立本識第三中義。

論。又契經說至不應有故。

述曰。第二異熟心。別經等可知。然此中意破經部．薩婆多皆得。即八證中身受證故。

論。謂眼等識至非異熟心。

述曰。下文有四。一破計。二申

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 斷集證滅修道（斷除煩惱，實證寂滅，修習正道）。染苦集（染污、痛苦、集諦），凈滅道（清凈、寂滅、道諦）。集道因（集諦和道諦是因），苦滅果（苦諦和滅諦是果）。如果都執著認為這些不是真實的，就會形成很大的邪見。

如果他們辯解說，『我是依據世俗諦來說這些不是真實的，並非說它們完全不存在。』

論：外道譭謗佛法，就是因為他們執著認為這些不是真實的。

述曰：那麼就和外道一樣了。外道的邪見和譭謗，也不是說染污、清凈等完全不存在，因為這些是顯而易見的。他們只是執著認為這些不是真實的，認為染污的因不能感得惡果，善良的因不能感得善果，因為這些都不是真實的，就像空中的花朵一樣。

論：如果一切法都是虛無的，那麼菩薩就不應該發起大悲心，捨棄生死，積聚菩提資糧。誰會有智慧去消滅虛幻的敵人，去尋找石女的兒子作為軍隊來共同摧毀敵人呢？只有當賊是真實存在的時候，才會去尋求資糧來斷除他們。

論：所以應該相信有染凈因果。

述曰：因果不是虛無的，應該相信這個識。勸清辨等人產生信心。這裡可以討論三性的有無。簡要闡述掌珍和清辨的本意，區分兩種觀點的對錯，確定兩種情執的邪正。我在真諦中也認為法不是沒有，只是不可說為因或為果，因為言語道斷。在俗諦中，依他起性和圓成實性是存在的，遍計所執性是不存在的。

第三大段總結。

論：他們的心就是這第八識（阿賴耶識）。

述曰：持種等心就是這第八識，即八個證據中的第四個種子證，以及《攝大乘論》第二熏習中的含義，以及安立本識第三中的含義。

論：另外，契經中說異熟心（果報心）不應有。

述曰：第二個是異熟心。其他經典等可以知道。然而，這裡的意圖是破斥經部和薩婆多部。即八個證據中的身受證。

論：所謂的眼識等不是異熟心。

述曰：下面有四個部分。一是破斥計較，二是申述。

【English Translation】 English version: Cutting off the accumulation, realizing cessation, cultivating the path. Defiled suffering and accumulation (Kleśa, suffering, and Samudaya), pure cessation and path (Nirodha and Marga). Accumulation and path are causes, suffering and cessation are results. If all these are clung to as unreal, it leads to great wrong views.

If they argue, 'I am speaking according to conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), not saying they are non-existent, but saying they are unreal.'

Treatise: The heretics slander because they cling to these as unreal.

Commentary: Then they are the same as the heretics. The heretics' wrong views and slanders do not claim that defilement and purity are completely non-existent, because they are apparent. They merely cling to them as unreal, believing that defiled causes cannot produce bad results, and good causes cannot produce good results, because they are unreal, like flowers in the sky.

Treatise: If all dharmas are non-existent, then Bodhisattvas should not arouse great compassion, abandon samsara, and accumulate the resources for Bodhi. Who would be wise enough to eliminate illusory enemies, or seek the son of a barren woman as an army to destroy enemies together? Only when the thieves are real will one seek resources to cut them off.

Treatise: Therefore, one should believe in the cause and effect of defilement and purity.

Commentary: Cause and effect are not non-existent; one should believe in this consciousness. This is to encourage Bhāviveka and others to generate faith. Here, one can discuss the existence or non-existence of the three natures (trisvabhāva). Briefly explaining the original intention of Tattvaratnāvalī and Bhāviveka, distinguishing the right and wrong of the two views, and determining the correctness or incorrectness of the two attachments. In the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), I also consider that dharmas are not non-existent, but they cannot be spoken of as cause or effect, because the path of language is cut off. In conventional truth, the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva) and the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva) exist, while the imputed nature (parikalpita-svabhāva) does not exist.

The third major section concludes.

Treatise: Their mind is this eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna).

Commentary: The mind that holds the seeds is this eighth consciousness, which is the fourth seed proof among the eight proofs, and the meaning in the second perfuming in the Saṃgrahaṇī, and the meaning in the third establishing the fundamental consciousness.

Treatise: Moreover, the sutras say that the vipāka-citta (resultant mind) should not exist.

Commentary: The second is the vipāka-citta. Other sutras can be known. However, the intention here is to refute the Sautrāntika and Sarvāstivāda schools. This is the body and sensation proof among the eight proofs.

Treatise: The so-called eye consciousness, etc., are not vipāka-citta.

Commentary: There are four parts below. First, refuting the calculations; second, stating.

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義。三明身受。四立異熟心　初有二。初總破。后別破　此為二因立二比量諍異熟體　六種轉識中業所感者。非真異熟心。斷已更續故。有時間斷故。如彼電光．長養色等。若不別言業所感者。有一分相符過。彼善惡心說非異熟故。若不言真異熟心。即違自宗。自說亦是異熟生故　或總非六識。不應是真異熟心。非一切時是業果故。如電光等　或有間斷。斷已更續故。此因皆是總非六識。言此諸識中不應說有真異熟心故無相符過。

論。異熟不應至無斯事故。

述曰。彼說命根．五根等異熟者。必相續無間。一切時是業果故。斷已不續。故知六識非是異熟心。非大乘中許眼根等是真異熟。彼宗說故。

此總非訖。下別破。

論。眼等六識至非真異熟。

述曰。破小乘言。汝六識中業所感者。非真異熟。非恒相續故。如聲．風等　故知前破但是總破　又彼識中業所感者。是異熟所生。非恒續故。如自許聲等　大乘許是異熟生故　此中更有斷已更續因。皆準前作。此中文略。

論。定應許有至作有情依。

述曰。自下第二申歸正義。定應許有真異熟心。一切時續者。酬牽引業。非滿業者。有間斷者是滿業故。引果之識遍三界有。六識不遍。無色．無心定等。五識．及意無故　

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 意義。三明身受。四建立異熟心。 首先是總破斥，然後是分別破斥。 這是用兩個原因建立兩個比量來爭論異熟的本體。 六種轉識中由業力所感生的，不是真正的異熟心。因為斷滅后還會繼續產生，因為有時間上的間斷，就像閃電、長養色等。 如果不特別說明是由業力所感生的，就會有一部分相符的過失，因為善惡心被說成不是異熟。 如果不說是真正的異熟心，就違背了自己的宗義，因為自己也說是異熟所生的。 或者總的來說，六識不應該是真正的異熟心，因為不是所有時候都是業的果報，就像閃電等。 或者有間斷，斷滅后還會繼續產生。這些原因都是總的否定六識，意思是這些識中不應該說有真正的異熟心，所以沒有相符的過失。

論：異熟不應該到沒有這種事情的地步。

述記說：他們所說的命根、五根等異熟，一定是相續不斷，所有時候都是業的果報。斷滅后不會繼續產生，所以知道六識不是異熟心。大乘中不承認眼根等是真正的異熟，因為他們的宗義是這樣說的。

以上是總的破斥完畢，下面是分別破斥。

論：眼等六識不是真正的異熟。

述記說：破斥小乘的觀點，你們六識中由業力所感生的，不是真正的異熟，因為不是恒常相續的，就像聲音、風等。所以知道前面的破斥只是總的破斥。 而且，那些識中由業力所感生的，是異熟所生的，不是恒常相續的，就像你們自己承認的聲音等。大乘承認是異熟所生的。 這裡還有斷滅后還會繼續產生的原因，都按照前面的做法。這裡文字簡略。

論：一定應該承認有作為有情所依的。

述記說：下面第二部分是闡述歸正的意義。一定應該承認有真正的異熟心，是所有時間都相續不斷的，用來酬償牽引業，而不是圓滿業。有間斷的是圓滿業。牽引果報的識遍佈三界，六識不遍佈，因為在無色界、無心定等狀態下，沒有五識和意識。

【English Translation】 English version: Meaning. Threefold clear understanding and experience. Fourth, establishing the Vipāka-citta (resultant consciousness). First, there is a general refutation, followed by a specific refutation. This uses two reasons to establish two inferences to argue about the substance of Vipāka (resultant). Among the six kinds of transforming consciousness, those produced by karma are not true Vipāka-citta. Because they cease and then continue, because they have temporal interruptions, like lightning, nourishing colors, etc. If it is not specifically stated that they are produced by karma, there will be a partial correspondence fallacy, because good and evil minds are said not to be Vipāka. If it is not said to be true Vipāka-citta, it contradicts one's own doctrine, because one also says that it is Vipāka-born. Or, generally speaking, the six consciousnesses should not be true Vipāka-citta, because they are not always the result of karma, like lightning, etc. Or there are interruptions, ceasing and then continuing. These reasons are all generally denying the six consciousnesses, meaning that among these consciousnesses, it should not be said that there is true Vipāka-citta, so there is no correspondence fallacy.

Treatise: Vipāka should not reach the point of having no such thing.

Commentary says: Those who say that life force, the five roots, etc., are Vipāka, must be continuous without interruption, and always be the result of karma. Ceasing and not continuing, so it is known that the six consciousnesses are not Vipāka-citta. The Mahāyāna does not admit that the eye root, etc., are true Vipāka, because their doctrine says so.

The above is the completion of the general refutation, below is the specific refutation.

Treatise: The six consciousnesses such as eye consciousness are not true Vipāka.

Commentary says: Refuting the Śrāvakayāna's view, among your six consciousnesses, those produced by karma are not true Vipāka, because they are not constantly continuous, like sound, wind, etc. So it is known that the previous refutation was only a general refutation. Moreover, those consciousnesses produced by karma are Vipāka-born, but not constantly continuous, like the sound, etc., that you admit. The Mahāyāna admits that they are Vipāka-born. Here there is also the reason of ceasing and then continuing. All are done according to the previous method. The text is brief here.

Treatise: It should definitely be admitted that there is something to rely on for sentient beings.

Commentary says: The second part below is to clarify the meaning of returning to the correct doctrine. It should definitely be admitted that there is true Vipāka-citta, which is constantly continuous at all times, to compensate for the attracting karma, not the fulfilling karma. Those with interruptions are fulfilling karma. The consciousness that attracts the result pervades the three realms, but the six consciousnesses do not pervade, because in the formless realm, the state of no-mind samādhi, etc., there are no five consciousnesses and no mind consciousness.

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無斷者言恒故。變為身．器。以身．器恒有。必由心變故。然境不離心故。非身．器色法能作有情依。有情是假者。假者依此識而建立故。若無此識如死屍等。便不可立假者有情。

何須恒時變為身器。

論。身器離心理非有故。

述曰。身器離心理非有故。不可為有情依。此總對諸部。又無色界應無有情。以無色故如前已說故　若爾命根．同分足為有情依。遍而無斷可為真異熟。何須此識。

論。不相應法無實體故。

述曰。以其無故不可為依。此偏對薩婆多。

論。諸轉識等非恒有故。

述曰。亦不可依。非恒有故。應無心位即非有情。無所依故。此偏對經部　或總俱對。

論。若無此心至恒立有情。

述曰。若無第八誰變身器。復依何法恒立有情。有情之體以有心是。無心非故。

論。又在定中至身受生起。

述曰。第三明身受。若在定中或不在定。若有漏無漏定皆此攝盡。瑜伽等文有如理思．不如理思。彼或不思惟。或復推尋。即是此中有別思慮．無別思慮。謂在定．散皆有身受　有別思慮無別思慮。別思慮者。意識別緣一深妙理或別事等時。無思慮者。或無心時等。在此有別思慮．無別思慮時。理有眾多身受生起。在定等中有身受起

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

主張『無斷滅』的學派認為，世界是恒常存在的，所以身體（身，蘊之一）和外在世界（器，指物質世界）也是恒常變化的。因為身體和外在世界是恒常存在的，所以必然是由心識變化而來的。然而，外在世界不離心識，所以身體和外在世界的色法不能作為有情（sattva，眾生）的所依。有情是假立的，因為有情是依此心識而建立的。如果沒有這個心識，就像死屍一樣，就不能假立有情。

為什麼需要恒常變化為身體和外在世界呢？

論：因為身體和外在世界離開心識，就不能存在。

述：身體和外在世界離開心識就不能存在，所以不能作為有情的所依。這是總的駁斥各部派的觀點。而且，如果沒有色蘊，也就不應該有有情，因為沒有色蘊，就像前面已經說過的。如果這樣，那麼命根（jīvitendriya，生命力）、同分（nikāyasabhāga，同類相）足以作為有情的所依，普遍而沒有斷滅可以作為真實的異熟果（vipāka，果報），為什麼需要這個心識呢？

論：因為不相應行法（cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra-dharmas，不與心相應的行法）沒有實體。

述：因為不相應行法沒有實體，所以不能作為所依。這是偏駁斥薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）的觀點。

論：因為各種轉識（pravṛtti-vijñāna，轉變識）等不是恒常存在的。

述：轉識等也不能作為所依，因為不是恒常存在的。如果沒有心識的時候，就應該沒有有情，因為沒有所依。這是偏駁斥經部（Sautrāntika，經量部）的觀點，或者總的駁斥各部派的觀點。

論：如果沒有這個心識，就無法恒常地建立有情。

述：如果沒有第八識（阿賴耶識，ālayavijñāna），誰來變化身體和外在世界？又依靠什麼法來恒常地建立有情？有情的本體是因為有心識，沒有心識就不是有情。

論：又在禪定中，乃至身體感受生起。

述：第三說明身體感受。無論在禪定中還是不在禪定中，無論是有漏定還是無漏定，都包括在這裡。瑜伽行派（Yogācāra，瑜伽行派）的經文中，有如理作意（yoniso manasikāra，如理思維）和不如理作意（ayoniso manasikāra，不如理思維）。他們或者不思惟，或者反覆推尋，這就是這裡所說的有分別思慮和無分別思慮。所謂在禪定中和散亂心中都有身體感受。有分別思慮是指意識特別緣取一個深奧的道理或者特別的事情等的時候。無分別思慮是指或者沒有心識的時候等。在這種有分別思慮和無分別思慮的時候，理應有眾多的身體感受生起。在禪定等中有身體感受生起。

【English Translation】 English version:

The proponents of 'non-cessation' argue that the world is constant, therefore the body (skandha, one of the five aggregates) and the external world (bhājana-loka, the world of material objects) are also constantly changing. Because the body and the external world are constant, they must be transformed by consciousness. However, since the external world is inseparable from consciousness, the form (rūpa) of the body and the external world cannot serve as the basis for sentient beings (sattva). Sentient beings are conceptual constructs, established based on this consciousness. Without this consciousness, like a corpse, one cannot establish the existence of a sentient being.

Why is it necessary to constantly transform into the body and the external world?

Treatise: Because the body and the external world cannot exist apart from consciousness.

Commentary: The body and the external world cannot exist apart from consciousness, therefore they cannot serve as the basis for sentient beings. This is a general refutation of the views of various schools. Moreover, if there is no form, there should be no sentient beings, because there is no form, as previously stated. If so, then the life-force (jīvitendriya) and class-identity (nikāyasabhāga) are sufficient as the basis for sentient beings, and universal and non-ceasing can serve as true result (vipāka). Why is this consciousness needed?

Treatise: Because non-associated formations (cittaviprayuktasaṃskāra-dharmas) have no substance.

Commentary: Because non-associated formations have no substance, they cannot serve as a basis. This is a specific refutation of the views of the Sarvāstivāda school.

Treatise: Because the various active consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna) are not constant.

Commentary: The active consciousnesses also cannot serve as a basis, because they are not constant. If there is no consciousness, there should be no sentient beings, because there is no basis. This is a specific refutation of the views of the Sautrāntika school, or a general refutation of the views of various schools.

Treatise: If there is no such consciousness, one cannot constantly establish sentient beings.

Commentary: If there is no eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna), who will transform the body and the external world? And based on what dharma can one constantly establish sentient beings? The essence of sentient beings is because there is consciousness; without consciousness, it is not a sentient being.

Treatise: Furthermore, in meditation, even the bodily sensations arise.

Commentary: Thirdly, it explains bodily sensations. Whether in meditation or not, whether in contaminated (with outflows) or uncontaminated meditation, all are included here. In the texts of the Yogācāra school, there are appropriate attention (yoniso manasikāra) and inappropriate attention (ayoniso manasikāra). They either do not think or repeatedly investigate, which is what is meant here by conceptual thought and non-conceptual thought. That is, there are bodily sensations in both meditation and distraction. Conceptual thought refers to when consciousness specifically focuses on a profound principle or a special matter, etc. Non-conceptual thought refers to when there is no consciousness, etc. In these times of conceptual and non-conceptual thought, there should be many bodily sensations arising. In meditation, etc., bodily sensations arise.

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。然無五識或別緣等。故在定等中意身等識不覺。唯第八識領受此境。此等位中損益身故。故名身受　或從果為名。后時損益身故。

論。此若無者至或復勞損。

述曰。若在定等無身受者。不應出定等后時。身有順故怡適。或復違境勞損。如坐禪師在定之中心別緣故。縱有勞損．怡適未知。后出定已方有損益．或適．或勞。由前定等中有損益境第八識取故。后時得有勞損於身等。舉後果位顯因定有。言身受者。身所受故。非謂受數。此即是境。

論。若不恒有至有此身受。

述曰。若無第八真異熟心定中領之。彼定出等位中。如何有此身受。

論。非佛起余至非佛有情故。

述曰。第四立異熟　量云。非佛起余善心等位。必應現起真異熟心(宗也)。非佛有情故(因也)。如許起彼時(喻也)　非佛者。謂菩薩．二乘．及異生等。此簡佛者。佛起善心位無異熟心故　起餘者。余有二種。即是共許六識中異熟心餘。即善無漏心位等。或是余無心位等。此簡起異熟心。更立異熟心。便犯相符。無同喻故。在彼位中必應現起真異熟心　此下二句是法。前二句是有法　非佛有情故者。不言非佛但言有情。有不定過。或違自宗。佛亦示現為有情故。善．無心等時無異熟心故　如許起彼時

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：然而，如果沒有五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）或其他因緣等，所以在禪定等狀態中，意識、身識等都無法覺察。只有第八識（阿賴耶識）領受此境界。因為在這些狀態中，身體會受到損益，所以稱為身受。或者從結果來命名，因為之後的時間裡身體會受到損益。

論：如果此身受不存在，乃至或者勞累損傷。

述曰：如果在禪定等狀態中沒有身受，那麼不應該在出定等之後，身體有順適的怡悅，或者因為違逆境界而勞累損傷。例如，禪師在禪定中心識分別緣取，即使有勞損或怡悅也不知道。出定之後才會有損益，或者適意，或者勞累。這是因為之前的禪定等狀態中有損益的境界，被第八識所取。之後才會有勞損於身體等。舉出結果的階段，是爲了顯示原因的禪定中有。所說的身受，是身體所感受的，不是指受的數量。這指的是境界。

論：如果不是恒常存在，乃至有此身受。

述曰：如果沒有第八真異熟心（阿賴耶識）在禪定中領受，那麼在出定等狀態中，怎麼會有此身受呢？

論：不是佛陀生起其餘，乃至不是佛陀的有情。

述曰：第四，建立異熟。量云：非佛生起其餘善心等狀態，必定應該現起真異熟心（宗）。因為不是佛陀的有情（因）。例如，允許生起彼時（喻）。非佛，指的是菩薩、二乘（聲聞、緣覺）以及凡夫等。這裡簡別佛陀，因為佛陀生起善心時沒有異熟心。生起其餘，其餘有兩種。即是共同認可的六識中的異熟心以外，即善、無漏心等狀態。或者是其餘無心位等。這裡簡別生起異熟心。如果再生立異熟心，就犯了相符的錯誤，沒有同喻。在那個狀態中，必定應該現起真異熟心。以下兩句是法，前兩句是有法。非佛有情故，如果不說非佛，只說有情，就有不定的過失，或者違背自己的宗義。因為佛陀也示現為有情。善心、無心等時沒有異熟心。例如，允許生起彼時。

【English Translation】 English version: However, if there are no five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) or other conditions, then in states such as samadhi (deep meditation), the mind consciousness, body consciousness, etc., are unable to perceive. Only the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) experiences this realm. Because in these states, the body is subject to benefit and harm, it is called 'body sensation'. Or it is named from the result, because the body will be subject to benefit and harm later.

Treatise: If this body sensation does not exist, even to the point of fatigue and damage.

Commentary: If there is no body sensation in states such as samadhi, then after emerging from samadhi, the body should not have pleasant comfort due to favorable conditions, or fatigue and damage due to adverse conditions. For example, a meditation master in samadhi may have mental discriminations, but even if there is fatigue or pleasure, he does not know it. Only after emerging from samadhi will there be benefit or harm, or comfort, or fatigue. This is because in the previous state of samadhi, there was a realm of benefit and harm, which was taken by the eighth consciousness. Only then will there be fatigue to the body, etc. Mentioning the stage of the result is to show that there is a cause in samadhi. What is called 'body sensation' is what the body experiences, not referring to the number of sensations. This refers to the realm.

Treatise: If it is not constantly present, even to the point of having this body sensation.

Commentary: If there is no eighth true ripening consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) to experience it in samadhi, then how can there be this body sensation in the state of emerging from samadhi?

Treatise: It is not that the Buddha arises other, even to the point of not being a sentient being of the Buddha.

Commentary: Fourth, establishing ripening. Proof: In the state where a non-Buddha arises other wholesome thoughts, etc., the true ripening consciousness must arise (thesis). Because it is a sentient being that is not a Buddha (reason). For example, it is allowed to arise at that time (example). 'Non-Buddha' refers to Bodhisattvas, the two vehicles (Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas), and ordinary beings, etc. This distinguishes the Buddha, because the Buddha does not have ripening consciousness when wholesome thoughts arise. 'Arising other' has two meanings. That is, other than the ripening consciousness in the commonly accepted six consciousnesses, namely the states of wholesome, non-outflow consciousness, etc. Or other states of no-mind, etc. This distinguishes the arising of ripening consciousness. If ripening consciousness is established again, it commits the error of being identical, and there is no similar example. In that state, the true ripening consciousness must arise. The following two sentences are the dharma, and the previous two sentences are the subject of the dharma. 'Because it is a sentient being that is not a Buddha', if it does not say 'non-Buddha' but only says 'sentient being', there is the fault of being indefinite, or contradicting one's own doctrine. Because the Buddha also manifests as a sentient being. There is no ripening consciousness at the time of wholesome thoughts, no-mind, etc. For example, it is allowed to arise at that time.

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。如汝自許。或我許汝宗起彼六識中業所感心是真異熟。故得為喻。不爾便有所立不成。不許六識真異熟故。又不舉此即無同喻。若以此宗第八為喻。彼說無故。無俱不成。起六識中異熟心是非佛有情。何故善心起時無異熟心。亦非佛有情故。

論。由是恒有至此第八識。

述曰。由此道理故。必恒有真異熟心。此總結也。即是解八證中身受文也。無此解者難解彼文。

自下第三。

論。又契經說至不應有故。

述曰。說趣生體。以經為證。通破一切有．經部等諸部。皆說得也。

論。謂要實有至正實趣生。

述曰。下文有三。一具義多少。二遮余非。三歸本識。此即初也　四義具故方名趣生　一要實有。謂要有體。假法非趣生。趣生實有故。即業所感是實有故　二要恒續。謂無間斷法方趣生體。生此趣此生中。一期時須恒故。若有間斷便非趣生故　三要周遍。謂通三界九地。不可此趣生唯在一處界不在余處界。以趣生通三界諸地故。若是有漏有情皆趣生攝。若不遍者即非趣生故　四要無雜。謂生此趣生方起此法名此趣生。若生此趣生可起余趣生法。則非趣生。應成多趣多生故　具此四義是正是實趣生之體　此言正實。簡能趣法及中有等皆名趣生。諸經論中言煩惱等是趣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果像你所認為的，或者我贊同你所說的，認為從那六識中由業力所感生的心識是真實的異熟果，那麼就可以用它來作比喻。否則，你所提出的觀點就不能成立，因為你不承認六識是真實的異熟果。如果不舉出這個例子，就沒有相同的比喻了。如果用你宗派的第八識來作比喻，那是因為你們的說法沒有依據，所以無法共同成立。由六識產生的異熟心不是佛，而是有情眾生。為什麼善心生起的時候沒有異熟心呢？這也是因為它不是佛，而是有情眾生。

論：因此，恒常存在直至此第八識。

述記：因為這個道理，所以必定恒常存在真實的異熟心。這是總結。也就是解釋八識證中的身受文。沒有這樣的解釋，就難以理解那段經文。

下面是第三點。

論：又如契經所說，不應有故。

述記：說的是趣生之體。以經文作為證據，普遍破斥一切有部、經部等各部派的觀點，他們都認為有『得』的存在。

論：所謂真正具有的，才是真實趣生。

述記：下面有三點：一是具備意義的多少，二是遮止其他的非趣生，三是歸於本識。這裡是第一點。具備四種意義才能稱為趣生：一是要真實存在。指的是要有實體，虛假的法不是趣生，趣生是真實存在的，也就是由業力所感的是真實存在的。二是要恒常相續。指的是沒有間斷的法才是趣生之體。在此趣中生，在此生中，一期生命必須是恒常的。如果有了間斷，就不是趣生。三是要周遍。指的是要貫通三界九地。不能說此趣生只在一處界，而不在其他處界。因為趣生貫通三界諸地。如果是有漏的有情，都屬於趣生所攝。如果不周遍，就不是趣生。四是要沒有雜染。指的是生在此趣中，才生起此法，才能稱為此趣生。如果生在此趣中，可以生起其他趣生的法，那就不是趣生，應該成為多趣多生了。具備這四種意義，才是真正真實的趣生之體。這裡說的『正實』，是簡別能趣之法以及中有等，這些都可以稱為趣生。諸經論中說煩惱等是趣生。

【English Translation】 English version: If, as you assume, or as I agree with you, that the mind arising from the six consciousnesses due to karmic influence is a true Vipāka (異熟, result of karma), then it can be used as a metaphor. Otherwise, your proposition cannot stand because you do not acknowledge the six consciousnesses as true Vipāka. If this example is not cited, there is no similar metaphor. If the eighth consciousness of your school is used as a metaphor, it is because your claim lacks basis, and therefore cannot be jointly established. The Vipāka mind arising from the six consciousnesses is not a Buddha, but a sentient being. Why is there no Vipāka mind when wholesome thoughts arise? This is also because it is not a Buddha, but a sentient being.

Treatise: Therefore, there is always the constant existence up to this eighth consciousness.

Commentary: Because of this principle, there must always be a true Vipāka mind. This is a summary. It is also an explanation of the body and sensation passages in the proof of the eight consciousnesses. Without this explanation, it is difficult to understand that passage.

The following is the third point.

Treatise: Moreover, as the Sutra says, it should not exist.

Commentary: It speaks of the nature of 'going to be born' (趣生, inclination to be born). The Sutra is used as evidence to universally refute the views of all schools, including the Sarvāstivāda and Sautrāntika, who all believe in the existence of 'attainment'.

Treatise: What truly possesses is the real 'going to be born'.

Commentary: There are three points below: first, the quantity of meanings possessed; second, the exclusion of other non-'going to be born'; and third, the return to the fundamental consciousness. This is the first point. To be called 'going to be born', four meanings must be possessed: first, it must truly exist. This refers to having a substance; false dharmas are not 'going to be born'. 'Going to be born' truly exists, that is, what is influenced by karma truly exists. Second, it must be constantly continuous. This refers to dharmas without interruption being the nature of 'going to be born'. Being born in this realm, in this life, a lifetime must be constant. If there is interruption, it is not 'going to be born'. Third, it must be pervasive. This refers to penetrating the Three Realms and Nine Lands. It cannot be said that this 'going to be born' is only in one realm and not in other realms, because 'going to be born' penetrates all realms and lands. If it is a sentient being with outflows, it is included in 'going to be born'. If it is not pervasive, it is not 'going to be born'. Fourth, it must be without impurities. This refers to only when born in this realm does this dharma arise, and only then can it be called 'going to be born' in this realm. If, when born in this realm, other 'going to be born' dharmas can arise, then it is not 'going to be born', and it should become multiple 'going to be born'. Possessing these four meanings is the true and real nature of 'going to be born'. The term 'true and real' here distinguishes the dharmas that can lead to 'going to be born' and the intermediate state (中有, antarābhava), which can all be called 'going to be born'. In various sutras and treatises, afflictions, etc., are said to be 'going to be born'.

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生者。是假趣生。相似趣生。非是正實趣生之體。今言正實意在於此。

論。非異熟法至趣生法故。

述曰。下遮余非。四義遮也。即第一遮。此有二意　一者總簡。謂除第八識外。皆是非異熟法。非真異熟法故。此意在真前言正故。種類言之。住一趣一生。可起諸餘趣生法故　二別簡。下簡得善。別報心心法．及色．不相應行已。今此中雖復總言非異熟法。在下所簡外。謂余加行善．及染污。余無記心．心法。長養等流色。皆可起余趣生法故　第七識不在此中。非共有故。今簡共有者故。即是四因中第四無雜因簡。此從下向上解。

論。諸異熟色至全無彼故。

述曰。此第二遮。異熟色中有九處。除聲．及法處。無色界中無異熟色故　及五識中業所感者。即苦．樂．舍受相應報心異熟生者是　不遍趣生。天趣．化生　即無色界之中全無彼故。此舉全處。于別別地亦無有故。鼻．舌色界無。餘三識二禪以上無。諸色分別可知。此中不舉分無處故。但約所無簡別為論。此具四因中多少。即第三因簡。

論。諸生得善至而不恒有。

述曰。即第三遮。此唯第六意識中者。五識雖亦無雜起者。無色全無。如前類遮。非此所說。及意中別報者。雖遍趣生起時無雜。而不恒有。有間斷故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

『生者。是假趣生。相似趣生。非是正實趣生之體。今言正實意在於此。』

意思是說，所謂的『生』，是虛假的趣生，相似的趣生，而不是真正實在的趣生之本體。現在所說的『正實』，意義就在於此。

『論。非異熟法至趣生法故。』

論述：不是異熟法，才能產生趣生法。

『述曰。下遮余非。四義遮也。即第一遮。此有二意　一者總簡。謂除第八識（阿賴耶識，儲存所有業力種子的根本識）外。皆是非異熟法。非真異熟法故。此意在真前言正故。種類言之。住一趣一生。可起諸餘趣生法故　二別簡。下簡得善。別報心心法．及色．不相應行已。今此中雖復總言非異熟法。在下所簡外。謂余加行善．及染污。余無記心．心法。長養等流色。皆可起余趣生法故　第七識（末那識，執著阿賴耶識為『我』的識）不在此中。非共有故。今簡共有者故。即是四因中第四無雜因簡。此從下向上解。』

解釋說：下面要遮止其餘不是趣生法的。用四種意義來遮止。這是第一種遮止。這裡有兩種含義：一是總的簡別，就是說除了第八識（阿賴耶識，儲存所有業力種子的根本識）之外，都是非異熟法，因為它們不是真正的異熟法。這個意思在於『真』字前面說了『正』字。從種類上說，安住在一個趣，一生，可以生起其他的趣生法。二是分別簡別，下面簡別得到善。分別報應的心心所法，以及色法，不相應行法已經說了。現在這裡雖然又總的說非異熟法，但在下面所簡別的之外，就是說其餘的加行善，以及染污，其餘的無記心，心所法，長養等流色，都可以生起其餘的趣生法。第七識（末那識，執著阿賴耶識為『我』的識）不在這裡面，因為它不是共有的。現在簡別共有的，就是四因中的第四個無雜因簡別。這是從下向上解釋。

『論。諸異熟色至全無彼故。』

論述：各種異熟色，乃至完全沒有那些（異熟色）的緣故。

『述曰。此第二遮。異熟色中有九處。除聲．及法處。無中無異熟色故　及五識中業所感者。即苦．樂．舍受相應報心異熟生者是　不遍趣生。天趣．化生　即無之中全無彼故。此舉全處。于別別地亦無有故。鼻．舌**無。餘三識二禪以上無。諸色分別可知。此中不舉分無處故。但約所無簡別為論。此具四因中多少。即第三因簡。』

解釋說：這是第二種遮止。異熟色中有九處，除了聲處和法處。無（無色界）中沒有異熟色的緣故。以及五識中業力所感生的，就是與苦受、樂受、舍受相應的報應心所生的異熟。不普遍趣生。天趣、化生，就是在無（無色界）之中完全沒有那些（異熟色）的緣故。這裡舉出全部的處所。在個別的處所也沒有的緣故。鼻識、舌識**沒有。其餘的三識在二禪以上沒有。各種色法分別可以知道。這裡不舉出部分沒有的處所的緣故。只是根據所沒有的來簡別論述。這裡具備四因中的多少，就是第三因簡別。

『論。諸生得善至而不恒有。』

論述：各種生得的善，乃至不是恒常存在的。

『述曰。即第三遮。此唯第六意識中者。五識雖亦無雜起者。無色全無。如前類遮。非此所說。及意中別報者。雖遍趣生起時無雜。而不恒有。有間斷故。』

解釋說：這是第三種遮止。這只是第六意識（分別事物的意識）中的。五識雖然也沒有雜起的，無色界完全沒有，像前面類似的遮止，不是這裡所說的。以及意識中的別報，雖然普遍趣生，生起時沒有雜染，但不是恒常存在的，有間斷的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version:

'The born is a false birth of interest, a similar birth of interest, not the body of a true and real birth of interest. The meaning of 'true and real' lies in this.'

It means that the so-called 'birth' is a false birth of interest, a similar birth of interest, not the true and real essence of the birth of interest. The meaning of 'true and real' lies in this.

'Treatise: It is not a different ripening dharma, therefore it is a birth of interest dharma.'

Treatise: It is not a Vipaka (異熟) dharma, therefore it can produce the dharma of rebirth.

'Explanation: The following negates the rest that are not. It is negated by four meanings. This is the first negation. There are two meanings here: First, a general simplification, which means that except for the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, the fundamental consciousness that stores all karmic seeds), all are non-Vipaka dharmas, because they are not true Vipaka dharmas. This meaning is because 'true' is said before 'real'. In terms of types, residing in one gati (趣), one birth, can give rise to other gati birth dharmas. Second, a separate simplification, the following simplifies obtaining goodness. Separate retribution mind and mental functions, as well as form, and non-corresponding formations have already been said. Now, although it is generally said that it is not a Vipaka dharma, outside of what is simplified below, it means that the remaining effort of goodness, as well as defilement, the remaining neutral mind, mental functions, nourishing and flowing form, can all give rise to other gati birth dharmas. The seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana, the consciousness that clings to Alaya-vijnana as 'I') is not included here, because it is not shared. Now, simplifying what is shared is the fourth non-mixed cause simplification among the four causes. This is explained from bottom to top.'

Explanation: The following negates the rest that are not rebirth dharmas. It is negated by four meanings. This is the first negation. There are two meanings here: First, a general simplification, which means that except for the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, the fundamental consciousness that stores all karmic seeds), all are non-Vipaka dharmas, because they are not true Vipaka dharmas. This meaning is because 'true' is said before 'real'. In terms of types, residing in one gati (趣), one birth, can give rise to other gati birth dharmas. Second, a separate simplification, the following simplifies obtaining goodness. Separate retribution mind and mental functions, as well as form, and non-corresponding formations have already been said. Now, although it is generally said that it is not a Vipaka dharma, outside of what is simplified below, it means that the remaining effort of goodness, as well as defilement, the remaining neutral mind, mental functions, nourishing and flowing form, can all give rise to other gati birth dharmas. The seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana, the consciousness that clings to Alaya-vijnana as 'I') is not included here, because it is not shared. Now, simplifying what is shared is the fourth non-mixed cause simplification among the four causes. This is explained from bottom to top.

'Treatise: All Vipaka forms, even to the reason that there are none at all.'

Treatise: All kinds of Vipaka forms, even to the reason that there are none at all (Vipaka forms).

'Explanation: This is the second negation. There are nine places in Vipaka form, except for sound and the place of dharma. There is no Vipaka form in Arupaloka (無色界) because of this. And those sensed by karma in the five consciousnesses, that is, those born from Vipaka of the retribution mind corresponding to suffering, joy, and equanimity, do not pervade rebirth. The realm of gods, transformation birth, that is, there are none at all in Arupaloka (無色界) because of this. This cites all places. There are also none in separate places because of this. There are none in nose and tongue **. The remaining three consciousnesses have none above the second dhyana. The various forms can be known separately. This does not cite places where there are partial absences because of this. It only simplifies and discusses based on what is absent. This possesses more or less of the four causes, which is the third cause simplification.'

Explanation: This is the second negation. There are nine places in Vipaka form, except for sound and the place of dharma. There is no Vipaka form in Arupaloka (無色界) because of this. And those sensed by karma in the five consciousnesses, that is, those born from Vipaka of the retribution mind corresponding to suffering, joy, and equanimity, do not pervade rebirth. The realm of gods, transformation birth, that is, there are none at all in Arupaloka (無色界) because of this. This cites all places. There are also none in separate places because of this. There are none in nose and tongue **. The remaining three consciousnesses have none above the second dhyana. The various forms can be known separately. This does not cite places where there are partial absences because of this. It only simplifies and discusses based on what is absent. This possesses more or less of the four causes, which is the third cause simplification.

'Treatise: All innate goodness, even to not being constant.'

Treatise: All kinds of innate goodness, even to not being constantly present.

'Explanation: This is the third negation. This is only in the sixth consciousness (the consciousness that distinguishes things). Although the five consciousnesses also have no mixed arising, there is none at all in the formless realm, like the previous similar negation, which is not what is said here. And the separate retribution in the mind, although it pervades rebirth, there is no impurity when it arises, but it is not constant, because there are interruptions.'

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六位無故。或無漏心。異類心中。皆說無故。即第二恒因簡　然此雖復說不共因。亦說共因謂遍．無雜二。有體通上亦有故。此中不說。然此說所有者。影顯前後皆有所具因故。類此應說。恐厭煩文故略影顯。

論。不相應行至是實趣生。

述曰。即第四遮。此初因簡。前數成故更無比量。然此四因。非但一一別簡。共簡非是業果。具四義者是業果故。是第七識非共有故。此中不簡。然入第三恒中。以入地有轉易故。入滅定等有間斷故。非業果故。無性之人第七非業果也　此下所簡彼心所法亦在彼中。隨所餘生即屬彼故。此中言王意並臣故。

論。唯異熟心至是正實趣生。

述曰。自下第三歸本識也。于中又三。一歸本識。二破他非。三簡佛位。此即初也。如是所簡餘五蘊法。皆不可立正實趣生。又此業果。明知無為．無漏有為。皆非趣生體。唯異熟心及彼心所。體是實．是恒．是遍．是無雜。是正實趣生。

論。此心若無至應非趣生。

述曰。下破他非。設許別報心是趣生。既知除異熟無記心外無趣生體故。此心若無。生無色界起善等位。應非趣生。謂在彼界起善心性有覆心時。應非趣生。此時無報故。不同地獄有報色故　若此本難唯經部師。無不相應命根等故　若破薩婆多

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：六個原因是不成立的。或者說，無漏的心，以及不同種類的心中，都說沒有原因是不成立的。這是對第二種恒常原因的簡別。雖然這裡也說了不共因，但也說了共因，即普遍和無雜兩種。有體性通於上方也有原因，但這裡沒有說。然而，這裡說所有者，是爲了影射前後都有所具備的原因。類似的情況應該說，但恐怕厭煩文辭，所以略去影射。

論：不相應行到這是真實趣生。

述曰：這是第四重遮止。這是最初的原因簡別。因為前面的數量已經成立，所以不再用比量。然而，這四個原因，不僅僅是各自簡別，共同簡別也不是業果。具備四種意義的才是業果。是第七識，不是共有的。這裡不簡別。然而，進入第三種恒常中，因為進入地有轉變的緣故，進入滅盡定等有間斷的緣故，所以不是業果。無性的人的第七識也不是業果。下面所簡別的心所法也在其中，隨著其餘所生，就屬於那裡。這裡說王，也包括臣的意思。

論：唯有異熟心到這是真正真實趣生。

述曰：下面第三部分是歸於本識。其中又有三個部分：一是歸於本識，二是破斥他人的錯誤觀點，三是簡別佛的果位。這是第一部分。像這樣所簡別的其餘五蘊法，都不能成立為真正真實趣生。而且，這個業果，明確知道無為法、無漏有為法，都不是趣生的本體。只有異熟心以及它的心所，本體是真實的、是恒常的、是普遍的、是無雜的，是真正真實趣生。

論：此心如果不存在，就應該不是趣生。

述曰：下面是破斥他人的錯誤觀點。假設允許別報心是趣生，既然知道除了異熟無記心之外沒有趣生的本體，那麼此心如果不存在，在沒有**（此處原文缺失，無法翻譯）起善等位的時候，就應該不是趣生。就是在那個界限里，生起善心性有覆心的時候，就應該不是趣生。因為這個時候沒有報，不同於地獄有報色。如果這個根本的責難只針對經部師，因為沒有不相應的命根等。如果是破斥薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）

【English Translation】 English version: The six reasons are untenable. Or rather, it is untenable to say that there is no cause in the minds of those without outflows (arhats), and in minds of different kinds. This is a distinction of the second constant cause. Although it speaks of non-common causes here, it also speaks of common causes, namely, pervasive and non-mixed. Having substance extends to the above and also has a cause, but this is not mentioned here. However, saying 'possessor' here is to imply that both before and after have the causes that are possessed. Similar situations should be stated, but for fear of tedious writing, the implication is omitted.

Treatise: Non-corresponding activities up to this are truly born of interest.

Commentary: This is the fourth negation. This is the initial cause distinction. Because the previous number has been established, there is no need for further inference. However, these four causes are not only distinguished individually, but also jointly distinguished as not being karmic results. Those with four meanings are karmic results. It is the seventh consciousness, not a shared one. This is not distinguished here. However, entering the third constant, because entering the ground has transformation, entering cessation meditation and the like has interruptions, so it is not a karmic result. The seventh consciousness of a person without nature is also not a karmic result. The mental functions distinguished below are also in it, and as the rest are born, they belong there. Saying 'king' here also includes the meaning of 'minister'.

Treatise: Only the Vipaka (resultant) mind up to this is truly born of interest.

Commentary: The third part below is returning to the fundamental consciousness (Alaya-vijnana). Within it, there are three parts: first, returning to the fundamental consciousness; second, refuting others' wrong views; and third, distinguishing the Buddha's position. This is the first part. Like this, the remaining five aggregates that are distinguished cannot be established as truly born of interest. Moreover, this karmic result clearly knows that unconditioned dharmas and undefiled conditioned dharmas are not the substance of interest-birth. Only the Vipaka (resultant) mind and its mental functions, the substance is real, constant, pervasive, and unmixed, are truly born of interest.

Treatise: If this mind does not exist, then it should not be born of interest.

Commentary: Below is refuting others' wrong views. Suppose it is allowed that the separate retribution mind is born of interest, since it is known that there is no substance of interest-birth other than the Vipaka (resultant) indeterminate mind, then if this mind does not exist, when there is no ** (missing text in original, unable to translate) arising of goodness, etc., then it should not be born of interest. That is, in that realm, when good-mindedness arises and there is obscured mind, then it should not be born of interest. Because at this time there is no retribution, unlike the lower realm which has retribution-form. If this fundamental difficulty is only directed at the Sautrantikas (Sautrāntika, 經量部), because there are no non-corresponding life faculties, etc. If it is refuting the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivada, 一切有部)

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。不許彼不相應已今為此難。于理不遮。故知設許別報法是趣生難。前已遮善等非趣生雜起故。一趣成多趣法。應是多趣身故。第一設許別報心是趣生訖。

論。設許趣生至便違正理。

述曰。次第二設許趣生攝一切有漏。即善等皆是。生無色界起無漏心。應非趣生。即是便違正理。有二乘聖者非趣生攝故。即攝論第三云生非想處起無所有處無漏心時。即應二趣皆應滅離等。但有設許一切有漏是趣生難。皆以前難應尋彼會。此通諸部。義準前釋。

論。勿有前過至正實趣生。

述曰。勿有前說不具四義過。及有此識最後失故。唯異熟法是正實趣生。若有第八識一切時恒有。無此過難由。以異熟法為正實趣生故。

論。由是如來至無記法故。

述曰。下簡佛位。佛非趣生攝。佛無報法故。

論。亦非界攝至已永斷故。

述曰。四智俱善。亦非界攝。非有漏故。有漏是界義故。界是縛義故　又彼何故非繫縛者。世尊已舍苦．集二諦名世尊故。何故無苦．集。有漏諸戲論種已永斷故。即有漏法名為戲論。無漏法名不繫法故非同戲論。故正實趣生唯異熟心．心所。

論。正實趣生至此第八識。

述曰。世尊有處說為人趣。名化生者如下食中自當解釋。皆是示現

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不應該因為彼（指對方的觀點）不相應，就以此來為難。這在道理上是說不通的。所以，如果承認別報法（指不同的業報）是趣生（指引向輪迴的因素），就會面臨趣生難（指難以解釋趣生的運作方式）。之前已經遮止了善等法不是趣生，因為它們是雜亂生起的。如果一個趣可以成就多個趣法，那麼這個法應該是多個趣的身（指多個輪迴的身體）。第一，如果承認別報心是趣生，那麼關於趣生的討論就結束了。

論：如果承認趣生（攝取）一切有漏法，那就違背了正理。

述曰：其次，如果承認趣生包含一切有漏法，那麼善等法也都是趣生。如果生起無漏心，那麼它就不應該是趣生。這樣就違背了正理，因為有阿羅漢等二乘聖者不被趣生所攝。就像《攝論》第三卷所說，在非想非非想處生起無所有處的無漏心時，就應該有兩個趣都滅離等等。但是，如果承認一切有漏法都是趣生，那麼就會面臨之前的難題，應該去尋找解決的方法。這適用於各個部派。根據前面的解釋，可以推斷出這個含義。

論：不要有之前的過失，才能成為真正的趣生。

述曰：不要有之前所說的，不具備四種意義的過失，以及有此識（指第八識）最後消失的過失。只有異熟法（指由業力成熟而產生的果報）才是真正的趣生。如果有一個第八識，它在一切時都恒常存在，就不會有這些過失。因為以異熟法作為真正的趣生。

論：因此，如來（Tathagata，佛的稱號之一）不是趣生所攝，因為佛沒有報法。

述曰：下面簡要說明佛的地位。佛不是趣生所攝，因為佛沒有報法。

論：四智（指佛的四種智慧）也不是界（指三界，即欲界、色界、無色界）所攝，因為它們不是有漏法，而有漏法才是界的含義。界是繫縛的含義。而且，世尊（Bhagavan，佛的稱號之一）為什麼不是被繫縛者呢？因為世尊已經捨棄了苦、集二諦（指苦諦和集諦，佛教四聖諦中的前兩個）的名稱。為什麼沒有苦、集呢？因為有漏的諸戲論種子已經被永遠斷除。也就是說，有漏法被稱為戲論，無漏法被稱為不繫法，所以不同於戲論。因此，真正的趣生只有異熟心和心所。

論：真正的趣生只有異熟心和心所，而不是第八識。

述曰：世尊在有些地方說人為趣，名為化生者，在下文的食物中會自行解釋。這些都是示現。

【English Translation】 English version: It is not permissible to create difficulties based on that (referring to the opponent's view) being inconsistent. This is not justifiable in reason. Therefore, if one admits that 'different retribution dharma' (referring to different karmic retributions) is 'destiny-leading' (referring to factors leading to reincarnation), one will face the 'destiny-leading difficulty' (referring to the difficulty in explaining the operation of destiny-leading). It has already been refuted that good dharmas, etc., are not destiny-leading because they arise in a mixed manner. If one destiny can accomplish multiple destiny-leading dharmas, then this dharma should be the body of multiple destinies (referring to bodies in multiple reincarnations). First, if one admits that 'different retribution mind' is destiny-leading, then the discussion about destiny-leading is concluded.

Treatise: If one admits that destiny-leading encompasses all contaminated dharmas, then it violates the correct principle.

Commentary: Secondly, if one admits that destiny-leading includes all contaminated dharmas, then good dharmas, etc., are also destiny-leading. If uncontaminated mind arises, then it should not be destiny-leading. This violates the correct principle because Arhats and other Hearer-vehicle (Sravakayana) saints are not included in destiny-leading. Just as the third volume of the Compendium of Abhidharma says, when an uncontaminated mind of the realm of neither perception nor non-perception arises in the realm of nothingness, then two destinies should be extinguished and separated, etc. However, if one admits that all contaminated dharmas are destiny-leading, then one will face the previous difficulties, and one should seek a way to resolve them. This applies to all schools. According to the previous explanation, this meaning can be inferred.

Treatise: Do not have the previous faults in order to become true destiny-leading.

Commentary: Do not have the faults mentioned earlier of not possessing the four meanings, and the fault of this consciousness (referring to the eighth consciousness) eventually disappearing. Only 'resultant-ripening dharma' (referring to the karmic retribution that matures and arises) is true destiny-leading. If there is an eighth consciousness that constantly exists at all times, then there will be no such faults. Because 'resultant-ripening dharma' is taken as true destiny-leading.

Treatise: Therefore, the Tathagata (one of the titles of the Buddha) is not included in destiny-leading because the Buddha has no retribution dharma.

Commentary: Below is a brief explanation of the Buddha's status. The Buddha is not included in destiny-leading because the Buddha has no retribution dharma.

Treatise: The Four Wisdoms (referring to the Buddha's four wisdoms) are also not included in the realm (referring to the Three Realms, namely the Desire Realm, the Form Realm, and the Formless Realm) because they are not contaminated dharmas, and contaminated dharmas are the meaning of the realm. The realm is the meaning of bondage. Moreover, why is the Bhagavan (one of the titles of the Buddha) not a bound one? Because the Bhagavan has abandoned the names of the two truths of suffering and accumulation (referring to the Truth of Suffering and the Truth of Accumulation, the first two of the Four Noble Truths in Buddhism). Why is there no suffering and accumulation? Because the seeds of contaminated discursive proliferation have been permanently severed. That is to say, contaminated dharmas are called discursive proliferation, and uncontaminated dharmas are called non-bound dharmas, so they are different from discursive proliferation. Therefore, true destiny-leading is only 'resultant-ripening mind' and mental factors.

Treatise: True destiny-leading is only 'resultant-ripening mind' and mental factors, not the eighth consciousness.

Commentary: In some places, the Bhagavan says that humans are a destiny, called those born by transformation, which will be explained in the following text on food. These are all manifestations.

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。非正實趣生。彼全無漏故。此是報法故。佛地論中亦同此解。

論。又契經說至不應有故。

述曰。自下第四引經證能執受。是八證中初執受證。然此稍廣。初通破諸部能執心計。

論。謂五色根至能執受心。

述曰。下文有三。一顯所執彰能執心。二明執心顯唯第八。三破異計非能執受。此即初也　五根在自身。非己相分他身五根。依處。除聲。皆非執受。故對法執受九處除聲。聲非所執故　問曰何以聲非所執受　以有間故。又聲疏斷。故非所執。然五十五等亦說是執受。以依執故。非生執受。如前已說　唯現在世是有情故。可有執受。過．未非也。經部去．來無。薩婆多非過．未。此出所受。彼唯身根能生覺受。余根等同聚亦名執受。其身識轉時名為執受。身識不轉亦名執受。是彼類故。此等所執受法。定由有已能執受心持令不壞。經雖但言有色根身是有執受。自非能執。自若能執。應別有所執。既無別所執。而言有執受。故知有他能執受自也。

論。唯異熟心至無如是義。

述曰。下明執心顯唯第八于中有二。一顯八有七無。二簡言濫。此初文也　何心能執受。唯異熟心。謂第八識。先業所引體任運起。非現緣起。縱第七識亦現緣引。不能執受。即是八證執受五因中第

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：非正實趣生（並非真正具有實在樂趣的產生）。彼全無漏故（因為它是完全沒有煩惱的）。此是報法故（這是果報之法）。《佛地論》中也同樣如此解釋。

論：又契經說至不應有故。

述曰：從下面第四個部分開始，引用經文來證明有能執受（能執持領受）的心。這是八個證明中的第一個執受證明。然而，這裡稍微擴充套件了一些。首先，總的破斥各部派關於能執心（能執持的心）的計度。

論：謂五色根至能執受心。

述曰：下文有三個部分。一是顯示所執（被執持的對象），彰顯能執心（能執持的心）。二是闡明執心（執持的心）唯有第八識。三是破斥其他宗派的計度，認為它們不是能執受。這裡是第一個部分。五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）在自身中，不是自己相分（認識的主體）的他身五根。依處（所依賴之處），除了聲塵（聲音），都不是執受。所以，《對法論》中執受九處（九種執受的處所）排除了聲塵，因為聲音不是所執。問：為什麼聲音不是所執受？因為有間隔的緣故。而且聲音是疏遠斷續的，所以不是所執。然而，五十五蘊等也說是執受，因為是依執（依賴於執持）的緣故，不是生執受（直接產生執持），如前面已經說過的。只有現在世是有情（有情識的眾生），才可能有執受。過去世和未來世則沒有。經部宗認為過去和未來沒有。薩婆多部認為沒有過去和未來。這裡說明了所受（被領受的對象）。只有身根（身體的感官）才能產生覺受。其餘的根等同於聚（聚集），也名為執受。其身識（身體的意識）轉動時名為執受。身識不轉動時也名為執受，因為是同類。這些所執受的法，一定是由有能執受的心（能執持領受的心）來保持，使之不壞。經文雖然只說有色根身（具有色法的根身）是有執受的，但自身不是能執（能執持者）。自身如果能執，應該另外有所執（被執持的對象）。既然沒有另外的所執，卻說有執受，所以知道有其他的能執受自身。

論：唯異熟心至無如是義。

述曰：下面闡明執心（執持的心）唯有第八識，其中有兩個部分。一是顯示第八識有，而前七識沒有。二是簡別容易混淆的說法。這裡是第一個部分。什麼心能執受？唯有異熟心（第八識）。也就是第八識，由先前的業力所牽引，其體性自然而然地生起，不是由現在的因緣所生起。即使第七識也由現在的因緣所牽引，也不能執受。這就是八個證明中執受的第五個原因。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Non-genuinely real interest arises.' Because it is entirely without outflows (of defilements). This is because it is a resultant dharma. The Buddhabhumi Sutra also explains it in the same way.

Treatise: 'Moreover, the sutra says, up to, it should not exist.'

Commentary: From the fourth section below, scriptures are cited to prove that there is a mind that can grasp and receive. This is the first proof of grasping among the eight proofs. However, this is slightly expanded here. First, it generally refutes the calculations of various schools regarding the mind that can grasp.

Treatise: 'Namely, the five sense organs, up to, the mind that can grasp.'

Commentary: The following text has three parts. The first is to reveal what is grasped and to highlight the mind that can grasp. The second is to clarify that only the eighth consciousness is the grasping mind. The third is to refute other schools' calculations, arguing that they are not capable of grasping. This is the first part. The five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) are within oneself, not the five sense organs of another's body that are one's own object-aspect (the subjective aspect of cognition). The bases (the places of reliance), except for sound, are not grasped. Therefore, the Abhidharma excludes sound from the nine places of grasping, because sound is not what is grasped. Question: Why is sound not what is grasped? Because there is an interval. Moreover, sound is sparse and discontinuous, so it is not what is grasped. However, the fifty-five aggregates, etc., are also said to be grasping, because they rely on grasping, not because they directly produce grasping, as has been said before. Only in the present lifetime can sentient beings have grasping. The past and future do not. The Sautrantika school believes that the past and future do not exist. The Sarvastivada school believes that the past and future do not exist. This explains what is received (the object of reception). Only the body sense (the sense of the body) can produce feeling. The other senses are the same as aggregates, and are also called grasping. When the body consciousness moves, it is called grasping. When the body consciousness does not move, it is also called grasping, because it is of the same kind. These dharmas that are grasped must be maintained by a mind that can grasp, so that they do not decay. Although the sutra only says that the body with its sense organs is what is grasped, the self is not the grasper. If the self could grasp, there should be something else that is grasped. Since there is nothing else that is grasped, but it is said that there is grasping, it is known that there is another that can grasp the self.

Treatise: 'Only the resultant mind, up to, there is no such meaning.'

Commentary: The following clarifies that only the eighth consciousness is the grasping mind, which has two parts. The first is to show that the eighth consciousness exists, while the first seven do not. The second is to distinguish easily confused statements. This is the first part. What mind can grasp? Only the resultant mind (the eighth consciousness). That is, the eighth consciousness, which is drawn by previous karma, arises naturally in its essence, not from present conditions. Even if the seventh consciousness is also drawn by present conditions, it cannot grasp. This is the fifth reason for grasping among the eight proofs.

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一因。下自為量。不能煩述　非善．染等。等取威儀等無記。彼是第二因。彼言六識善．惡可得故。不能執受　一類。謂第八識一類異熟無記性攝。次第三因。彼言六識一類異熟無記性攝不可得故。不能執受　能遍執受者。謂唯本識遍能執受五根等法。是第四因。彼言六識各別依故。不能遍執。此中第八佛色根證如下自解。

相續執受。謂第八識一切時執。非有執．不執。不執時即爛壞故。是第五因。彼言六識所依應成數數執受過失　唯第八識具此五義。眼等七種轉識皆非業引。不具五義故非能執。

論。此言意顯至無執受故。

述曰。下簡言濫。論中意言。顯六轉識皆無一類能遍相續自內能執有色根身。既六轉識不能執受。即唯異熟第八能執。此言非顯唯異熟心方能執受。勿諸佛色身亦無執受故。佛善第八亦能執故　謂前二因但義差別。即一類攝盡。一類異熟無記。即雙攝盡故今說三　又前二因簡本識．轉識同異。后三因中明七轉識不能遍執受內有根身。卻明執內有漏色身唯異熟識。非顯能執識唯異熟心。佛能執心為不定故。

論。然能執受至故作是說。

述曰。執有漏身唯異熟心。非善等心。雖佛善心亦能執受。執善無漏非有漏身。故作是說。

論。謂諸轉識至如非擇滅。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 第一因：從下往上推斷，因為數量太大，無法一一陳述。這裡說的『非善、染等』，『等』字包括了威儀等無記法。這些是第二因。因為六識的善惡是可以識別的，所以不能執受。 『一類』：指的是第八識（Alaya識，又稱阿賴耶識），它屬於一類異熟無記性。這是第三因。因為六識屬於一類異熟無記性是不可識別的，所以不能執受。 『能遍執受者』：指的是隻有本識（根本識，即阿賴耶識）才能普遍地執受五根等法。這是第四因。因為六識各自有不同的所依，所以不能普遍地執受。這裡第八識如何執受佛的色根，將在下文解釋。 『相續執受』：指的是第八識在一切時中都能執受，而不是有時執受，有時不執受。如果不執受，身體就會腐爛。這是第五因。因為六識的所依應該成為數數執受的過失。 只有第八識具備這五種特性。眼等七種轉識都不是由業力所引導的，不具備這五種特性，所以不能執受。 論：這段話是爲了表明六識沒有執受。 述記：爲了避免言語的泛濫，論中的意思是說，六轉識都沒有一類、能普遍、能相續、能自主地執受有色根身。既然六轉識不能執受，那麼只有異熟的第八識才能執受。這段話並不是說只有異熟心才能執受，以免諸佛的色身也沒有執受。因為佛的善性第八識也能執受。前兩個原因只是在意義上有所差別，可以歸為一類。一類異熟無記，可以雙重涵蓋，所以現在說三個原因。另外，前兩個原因是爲了區分本識和轉識的同異，后三個原因是爲了說明七轉識不能普遍地執受內在的有根身，從而說明執受內在的有漏色身只有異熟識，而不是說能執受的識只有異熟心。佛能執受的心是不定的。 論：然而，能執受有漏身的是異熟心，所以才這樣說。 述記：執受有漏身的是異熟心，而不是善等心。雖然佛的善心也能執受，但執受的是善的無漏身，而不是有漏身，所以才這樣說。 論：指的是諸轉識，比如非擇滅（一種無為法）。

【English Translation】 English version First cause: Inferring from the bottom up, it cannot be fully described due to the large quantity. 'Non-wholesome, defiled, etc.' here, 'etc.' includes the unrecordable such as demeanor. These are the second cause. Because the wholesomeness and unwholesomeness of the six consciousnesses are identifiable, they cannot grasp and maintain. 'One category': Refers to the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), which belongs to one category of maturationally indeterminate nature. This is the third cause. Because the six consciousnesses belonging to one category of maturationally indeterminate nature are unidentifiable, they cannot grasp and maintain. 'The one who can universally grasp and maintain': Refers to only the fundamental consciousness (i.e., Alaya-vijnana) that can universally grasp and maintain the five roots and other dharmas. This is the fourth cause. Because the six consciousnesses each have different bases, they cannot universally grasp and maintain. How the eighth consciousness grasps and maintains the Buddha's physical roots will be explained below. 'Continuously grasping and maintaining': Refers to the eighth consciousness grasping and maintaining at all times, rather than sometimes grasping and sometimes not grasping. If it does not grasp and maintain, the body will decay. This is the fifth cause. Because the bases of the six consciousnesses should become the fault of grasping and maintaining repeatedly. Only the eighth consciousness possesses these five characteristics. The seven transforming consciousnesses, such as the eye consciousness, are not led by karma and do not possess these five characteristics, so they cannot grasp and maintain. Treatise: This passage is to show that the six consciousnesses do not have grasping and maintaining. Commentary: To avoid the ambiguity of language, the meaning in the treatise is that the six transforming consciousnesses do not have one category, the ability to universally and continuously, autonomously grasp and maintain the physical root body. Since the six transforming consciousnesses cannot grasp and maintain, then only the maturationally produced eighth consciousness can grasp and maintain. This passage does not mean that only the maturationally produced mind can grasp and maintain, lest the Buddha's physical body also has no grasping and maintaining. Because the Buddha's wholesome eighth consciousness can also grasp and maintain. The first two causes are only different in meaning and can be classified into one category. One category of maturationally indeterminate, can be doubly covered, so now three causes are stated. In addition, the first two causes are to distinguish the similarities and differences between the fundamental consciousness and the transforming consciousnesses, and the latter three causes are to explain that the seven transforming consciousnesses cannot universally grasp and maintain the inner rooted body, thereby explaining that only the maturationally produced consciousness grasps and maintains the inner contaminated physical body, rather than saying that the consciousness that can grasp and maintain is only the maturationally produced mind. The mind that the Buddha can grasp and maintain is indeterminate. Treatise: However, it is the maturationally produced mind that can grasp and maintain the contaminated body, so it is said this way. Commentary: It is the maturationally produced mind that grasps and maintains the contaminated body, not the wholesome mind, etc. Although the Buddha's wholesome mind can also grasp and maintain, it grasps and maintains the wholesome uncontaminated body, not the contaminated body, so it is said this way. Treatise: Refers to the transforming consciousnesses, such as non-selective cessation (a type of unconditioned dharma).

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述曰。下破異計。初有五量總破識等非。后遮色等。初中有二。初破心。后例所　謂諸轉識。總破六識。皆不能執受有漏色身。即取下言以為宗法。現緣起故。如風聲等。即對先說阿賴耶識。先業所引以能執受。又宗法中不言不能執有漏身者。設六轉識無漏性者。亦不能執佛無漏身故。又下法中不能執受有漏色身。自乃具足。下皆準知。此第一因　自下第二別破異性。彼轉識中善．染性等。等取威儀等心。皆不能執受有漏色身。非業引故。如非擇滅。自對前說非善染等。然無漏識不執有漏色身。故無過失。俱共許故。

論。異熟生者至有漏色身。

述曰。此對前說一類．能遍．相續三義比量　彼轉識中異熟生者。亦不能執有漏色身。自下三因皆破六識異熟心不能執受。非真異熟故。前已極成既有間斷非真異熟。故得為因。前第三因。有間斷是非一類故　又非遍依故者。即各別依轉。第四因是。即同攝論生不凈章各別依也　又不相續故。數執過失。是第五因。亦生不凈中不堅住也　喻云如電光等。上第八識五因次配。然舊作五因量別。勘瑜伽等抄。此等三喻。雖一即得遍於五因。論師欲生惠巧便故此別出喻。勘諸八證第一執受。不見此文但知虛讀過。

論。諸心識言至如唯識言。

述

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述曰：下面破斥其他宗派的觀點。首先用五種理由總的破斥『識』等不是阿賴耶識。然後遮止『色』等。首先破斥『心』，然後以類比的方式破斥所謂的各種轉識。總的來說，六識都不能執持領受有漏的色身。即取下面的話作為宗法：『現緣起故，如風聲等』。這是針對前面所說的阿賴耶識，阿賴耶識由先前的業力所牽引，所以能夠執持領受。另外，在宗法中沒有說『不能執有漏身』，是因為假設六轉識是無漏的，也不能執持佛的無漏身。另外，下面的法中『不能執受有漏色身』，自身就已具足，下面的內容都可以依此類推。這是第一個因。 從下面開始是第二個，分別破斥異性。那些轉識中的善性、染性等（『等』字包括威儀等心），都不能執持領受有漏的色身，因為不是由業力所牽引的，就像非擇滅一樣。這是針對前面所說的非善染等。然而，無漏識不執持領受有漏的色身，所以沒有過失，因為這是雙方都認可的。 論：由異熟所生的轉識，也不能執持領受有漏的色身。 窺基法師述曰：這是針對前面所說的一類、能遍、相續這三種意義的比量。那些轉識中由異熟所生的，也不能執持領受有漏的色身。從下面的三個因，都是破斥六識的異熟心不能執持領受。因為不是真正的異熟果，前面已經完全成立，既然有間斷，就不是真正的異熟果，所以可以作為因。前面的第三個因，是有間斷，不是一類。 『又非遍依故』，就是各別依轉，這是第四個因。即如同《攝大乘論》『生不凈品』中所說的各別依。『又不相續故，數執過失』，這是第五個因。也如同『生不凈品』中的不堅住。比喻說，就像電光等。上面的第八識的五因依次對應。然而，舊的說法是五因量是分別的，查閱《瑜伽師地論》等抄本，這三個比喻，雖然一個就可以遍於五個因，但論師爲了產生智慧的方便，所以分別列出比喻。查閱各種八識的證據，第一執受，沒有見到這段文字，只知道是虛讀而過。 論：各種心識的言說，都如同唯識的言說一樣。

【English Translation】 English version: Shu Yue (Commentary by Kuiji): The following refutes the views of other schools. First, it uses five reasons to generally refute that 'consciousness' (識, shí) etc. are not Ālaya consciousness (阿賴耶識, Ālaya-vijñāna). Then it refutes 'form' (色, rūpa) etc. First, it refutes 'mind' (心, citta), and then refutes the so-called various transformed consciousnesses (轉識, vijnana) by analogy. In general, the six consciousnesses (六識, ṣaḍ-vijñāna) cannot grasp and receive the contaminated physical body (有漏色身, sāsrava-rūpakāya). That is, take the following words as the proposition (宗, paksa): 'Because it arises from present conditions (現緣起故, pratyayotpāda), like wind and sound etc.' This is in response to the previously mentioned Ālaya consciousness, which is led by previous karma (業, karma) and therefore can grasp and receive. In addition, the proposition does not say 'cannot grasp the contaminated body' because even if the six transformed consciousnesses are uncontaminated (無漏, anāsrava), they cannot grasp the Buddha's uncontaminated body. Furthermore, in the following Dharma (法, dharma), 'cannot grasp the contaminated physical body' is self-sufficient, and the following content can be inferred by analogy. This is the first reason. From below is the second, separately refuting otherness. Those good nature (善性, kuśala), defiled nature (染性, akusala) etc. in the transformed consciousnesses (the 'etc.' includes dignified behavior etc. mind), cannot grasp and receive the contaminated physical body, because they are not led by karma, like non-selective cessation (非擇滅, apratisamkhyā-nirodha). This is in response to the previously mentioned non-good and non-defiled etc. However, uncontaminated consciousness does not grasp and receive the contaminated physical body, so there is no fault, because this is mutually acknowledged. Treatise: Those transformed consciousnesses born from the result of maturation (異熟生, vipāka-ja) also cannot grasp and receive the contaminated physical body. Shu Yue (Commentary by Kuiji): This is in response to the previously mentioned inference of the three meanings of same kind (一類, eka-jati), all-pervasive (能遍, sarva-vyāpin), and continuous (相續, samtāna). Those transformed consciousnesses born from the result of maturation also cannot grasp and receive the contaminated physical body. The following three reasons all refute that the matured mind of the six consciousnesses cannot grasp and receive. Because it is not a true result of maturation, it has already been fully established before, and since there is interruption, it is not a true result of maturation, so it can be used as a reason. The previous third reason is that there is interruption and it is not of the same kind. 'Also, because it is not universally dependent (非遍依故, na sarvatra-āśrita)', that is, it depends on each separately, this is the fourth reason. That is, like the separate dependence mentioned in the 'Chapter on the Production of Impurities' in the Compendium of the Mahāyāna (攝大乘論, Mahāyānasaṃgraha). 'Also, because it is not continuous, repeatedly grasping faults', this is the fifth reason. It is also like the non-steadfastness in the 'Chapter on the Production of Impurities'. The analogy is like lightning etc. The above five reasons of the eighth consciousness correspond in order. However, the old saying is that the five reasons are separate, checking the copies of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), these three analogies, although one can pervade the five reasons, the treatise writer separately lists the analogies for the convenience of generating wisdom. Checking various evidences of the eight consciousnesses, the first grasping, I have not seen this passage, I only know that it is a vain reading. Treatise: Various statements of consciousness are like the statements of Consciousness-Only (唯識, vijnapti-mātra).

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曰。例破心所。上來如是異熟心言。諸轉識言。亦攝心所。定相應故。如唯識言。彼亦不遣心所法故。由此一文。證知上下諸文皆爾。中以作法影初后故。上來通破諸部六識非能執受。

論。非諸色根至如虛空等。

述曰。自下別破經部．薩婆多色等執受。謂經部師計。有心色互持種子及能受熏。如前已破。今破色根亦不能執有漏色身。無所緣故。如虛空等。謂薩婆多心能執受。前已破訖。若謂命根．同分為能執受。今此亦非。不相應行雖舉總名。意取命根．及眾同分。余不計故。

或設遮余。並不能執有漏色身。無所緣故。如虛空等。此設許有體。不爾即應言無體性故。今正非無體。亦得以無所緣為因。

論。故應別有至此第八識。

述曰。余既不能執。故知別有阿賴耶識為能執受。無前過難。

論。又契經說至得相續住。

述曰。自下第五三法契經。文各有三。準上可解。此經有頌。謂壽．暖．及與識。三法捨身時。所捨身僵仆。如木無思覺　此中更互依持之經。是長行文。與頌稍別　此經意說。于有色界有壽．暖處有能持識。三法攝故。識如彼二亦應相續。故以為證。

論。若無此識至不應有故。

述曰。總以理成。

下自別解。第二正解有三

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 說：例如破除心所（Cittasikara，心理活動）。上面像這樣說『異熟心』，『諸轉識』，也包含心所，因為它們與定相應。就像《唯識論》所說，『它們也不排除心所法』。由此一句話，可以證明上下各處的文句都是這樣理解的。中間用作法影的初因和後緣。上面總的破斥了各部派認為六識不能執持領受的觀點。

論：不是諸色根乃至如虛空等。

述記：下面分別破斥經部（Sautrantika）和薩婆多（Sarvastivada）關於色等執持領受的觀點。經部師認為，有心和色互相持有種子，並且能夠接受熏習，這在前面已經破斥過了。現在破斥色根也不能執持領受有漏的色身，因為它沒有所緣的緣故，就像虛空一樣。薩婆多認為心能夠執持領受，這在前面已經破斥過了。如果認為命根（Jivitindriya）和同分（Nikayasabhaga）能夠執持領受，這也是不對的。不相應行雖然舉了一個總的名稱，但意在指命根和眾同分，因為其他的不被考慮。

或者假設遮止其他的，它們也不能執持領受有漏的色身，因為它沒有所緣的緣故，就像虛空一樣。這裡假設它們有自體。否則就應該說沒有體性。現在正是因為它們並非沒有自體，也可以用沒有所緣作為原因。

論：所以應該別有乃至此第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）。

述記：因為其他的不能執持領受，所以可知別有阿賴耶識作為能執持領受者，沒有之前的過失和責難。

論：又契經說乃至得相續住。

述記：下面第五個是三法契經，經文各有三個方面，參照上面可以理解。此經有偈頌說：『壽、暖、以及識，三法捨身時，所捨身僵仆，如木無思覺。』這其中互相依持的經典，是長行文，與偈頌稍有不同。此經的意思是說，在有情（Sattva）存在壽、暖的地方，就有能持的識，因為這三種法是相互包含的。識就像壽和暖一樣，也應該相續存在，所以用它來作為證據。

論：如果無此識乃至不應有故。

述記：總的用道理來成立。

下面自己分別解釋。第二，正式解釋有三個方面。

【English Translation】 English version: It says: For example, to refute the mental factors (Cittasikara). As mentioned above regarding 'Vipaka-citta' (resultant consciousness) and 'all the transformed consciousnesses,' these also include mental factors because they are in accordance with Samadhi (concentration). As the Vijnaptimatrata-sastra (Treatise on Consciousness-Only) states, 'They do not exclude mental factors.' From this one sentence, it can be inferred that all the sentences above and below should be understood in this way. In the middle, it uses the initial cause and subsequent condition of the act-created shadow. Above, it generally refutes the Sarvastivadins' view that the six consciousnesses cannot grasp and receive.

Treatise: It is not the sense organs, even like space, etc.

Commentary: Below, it refutes the Sautrantikas and Sarvastivadins' views on grasping and receiving of form, etc., respectively. The Sautrantikas believe that mind and form mutually hold seeds and can receive熏習 (influence), which has been refuted before. Now, it refutes that the sense organs cannot grasp and receive the contaminated body either, because they have no object to grasp, just like space. The Sarvastivadins believe that the mind can grasp and receive, which has been refuted before. If it is argued that Jivitindriya (life faculty) and Nikayasabhaga (community of beings) can grasp and receive, this is also incorrect. Although Asamskrta-dharmas (non-associated formations) are mentioned as a general term, it refers to Jivitindriya and Nikayasabhaga, because others are not considered.

Or, suppose it prevents others, they also cannot grasp and receive the contaminated body, because they have no object to grasp, just like space. Here, it is assumed that they have self-nature. Otherwise, it should be said that they have no nature. Now, precisely because they are not without self-nature, it can also be used as a reason for not having an object to grasp.

Treatise: Therefore, there should be another, even this eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana).

Commentary: Because others cannot grasp and receive, it can be known that there is another Alaya-vijnana as the one who can grasp and receive, without the previous faults and criticisms.

Treatise: Moreover, the Sutra says, until it can continue to abide.

Commentary: Below, the fifth is the Sutra of the Three Dharmas, each Sutra has three aspects, which can be understood by referring to the above. This Sutra has a verse that says: 'Life, warmth, and consciousness, when these three abandon the body, the abandoned body becomes stiff, like wood without thought.' Among these, the Sutra of mutual dependence is a prose text, which is slightly different from the verse. The meaning of this Sutra is that where there is life and warmth in a sentient being (Sattva), there is a consciousness that can hold, because these three dharmas are mutually inclusive. Consciousness, like life and warmth, should also continue to exist, so it is used as evidence.

Treatise: If there is no such consciousness, then it should not exist.

Commentary: Generally, it is established by reason.

Below, it explains separately. Second, the formal explanation has three aspects.

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。先非轉識。次即賴耶。后難異執。

論。謂諸轉識至持壽暖識。

述曰。此非轉識。六種轉識於五位有間斷。於三性有轉變。由斯義理無恒持用故。如聲風等　此中三量。因有三故。一有間。二有轉。三無恒用。不可立為持壽．暖識。通破諸部。或彼設言轉識有持用。而非恒持。即以此一為極成因。設言有細第六意識有恒持用。今以為法無恒持用。有間轉故。如聲風等。亦得為量。

論。唯異熟識至持壽暖識。

述曰。此即賴耶。取第八識立為持壽．暖識。無間轉故。許有恒持用故。猶如壽．暖　此喻有失。以壽．暖非能持識故。又識可持暖．壽二法。暖不持暖。壽不持壽故　今可應言我第八識可能持暖。許無間轉故。及恒持用故。如壽　或能持壽。因如前。喻如暖　又第八識可為能持。許壽．暖．識中三法攝故。如彼二法。論無此因。此因通故。然此論文義具為論。非要文具。故論文云持壽．暖識。以壽．暖為喻。或覆成立第八識性有恒持用及無間轉。前以許無間轉因。后以許有恒持用因。

次以義逐。

論。經說三法至豈符正理。

述曰。后難異執。于中有三。一申難。二返質。三解徴。此申難也　經說三法更互依持。餘二相續獨識間斷豈符正理。闕一不可名互依

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：首先，這並非轉識（vijñāna，即眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意這六種識）。其次，這也不是賴耶識（ālayavijñāna，又稱阿賴耶識，第八識）。最後，這難以與其他的執見相符。

論：所謂的諸轉識，乃至能持壽、暖的識。

述記：這並非轉識。六種轉識在五位（五種不同的心所活動階段）中有間斷，在三性（善、惡、無記）中有轉變。由於這些道理，它沒有恒常保持的作用，就像聲音和風一樣。這裡有三個量（推理的根據），因為有三個原因：一是有間斷，二是有轉變，三是沒有恒常的作用。因此，不能將其立為能持壽、暖的識。這可以用來普遍駁斥各個部派的觀點。或者他們會假設說轉識有保持的作用，但不是恒常保持。那麼就用這一個（非恒常保持）作為極成因（雙方都認可的理由）。假設說有細微的第六意識有恒常保持的作用，現在認為法沒有恒常保持的作用，因為它有間斷和轉變，就像聲音和風一樣，也可以作為量。

論：唯有異熟識（vipākavijñāna，即第八識阿賴耶識）才能持壽、暖識。

述記：這就是賴耶識。選取第八識，立為能持壽、暖的識，因為它沒有間斷和轉變，並且允許它有恒常保持的作用，就像壽命和暖氣一樣。這個比喻有缺失，因為壽命和暖氣不是能持的識。而且識可以保持暖氣和壽命這兩種法，但暖氣不能保持暖氣，壽命不能保持壽命。現在可以這樣說，我的第八識可能保持暖氣，因為它被認為是無間斷的轉變，並且是恒常保持的，就像壽命一樣。或者說，它能保持壽命，原因如前，比喻就像暖氣一樣。此外，第八識可以作為能持者，因為它被認為是壽命、暖氣、識這三種法所包含的，就像那兩種法一樣。論中沒有這個原因，這個原因很普遍。然而，這篇論文的意義在於完整，而不是要求文字完整。所以論文說能持壽、暖的識，用壽命和暖氣作為比喻。或者進一步成立第八識的性質，它具有恒常保持的作用和無間斷的轉變。前面用允許無間斷的轉變作為原因，後面用允許恒常保持的作用作為原因。

接下來用義理來追究。

論：經中說三種法更互相依持，其餘二者相續，唯獨識有間斷，這豈能符合正理？

述記：這是最後對其他執見的責難。其中有三點：一是申述責難，二是反過來質問，三是解釋征問。這是申述責難。經中說三種法（壽、暖、識）更互相依持，其餘二者（壽和暖）相續不斷，唯獨識有間斷，這怎麼能符合正理呢？缺少一個就不能稱為互相依持。

【English Translation】 English version: First, this is not the transforming consciousness (vijñāna, referring to the six consciousnesses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind). Second, this is not the Ālayavijñāna (also known as the storehouse consciousness, the eighth consciousness). Finally, this is difficult to reconcile with other views.

Treatise: The so-called transforming consciousnesses, up to the consciousness that maintains life and warmth.

Commentary: This is not the transforming consciousness. The six transforming consciousnesses have interruptions in the five stages (five different stages of mental activity) and transformations in the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral). Because of these reasons, it does not have a constant maintaining function, just like sound and wind. Here there are three proofs, because there are three reasons: first, there are interruptions; second, there are transformations; third, there is no constant function. Therefore, it cannot be established as the consciousness that maintains life and warmth. This can be used to universally refute the views of various schools. Or they might hypothesize that the transforming consciousness has a maintaining function, but it is not constant. Then use this one (non-constant maintaining) as a siddha-hetu (a reason accepted by both parties). Suppose that there is a subtle sixth consciousness that has a constant maintaining function, now it is considered that the dharma does not have a constant maintaining function, because it has interruptions and transformations, just like sound and wind, it can also be used as a proof.

Treatise: Only the Vipākavijñāna (the eighth consciousness, Ālayavijñāna) can maintain life and warmth.

Commentary: This is the Ālayavijñāna. Select the eighth consciousness and establish it as the consciousness that maintains life and warmth, because it has no interruptions and transformations, and it is allowed to have a constant maintaining function, just like life and warmth. This metaphor has a flaw, because life and warmth are not the consciousness that can maintain. Moreover, consciousness can maintain the two dharmas of warmth and life, but warmth cannot maintain warmth, and life cannot maintain life. Now it can be said that my eighth consciousness may maintain warmth, because it is considered to be an uninterrupted transformation and is constantly maintained, just like life. Or, it can maintain life, the reason is the same as before, the metaphor is like warmth. In addition, the eighth consciousness can be the maintainer, because it is considered to be included in the three dharmas of life, warmth, and consciousness, just like those two dharmas. There is no this reason in the treatise, this reason is universal. However, the meaning of this paper lies in completeness, rather than requiring complete wording. So the treatise says the consciousness that maintains life and warmth, using life and warmth as a metaphor. Or further establish the nature of the eighth consciousness, it has a constant maintaining function and uninterrupted transformation. The former uses allowing uninterrupted transformation as the reason, and the latter uses allowing constant maintaining function as the reason.

Next, pursue it with reason.

Treatise: The sutra says that the three dharmas rely on each other, the other two continue, only consciousness has interruptions, how can this be in accordance with right reason?

Commentary: This is the final accusation against other views. There are three points: first, stating the accusation; second, questioning in return; third, explaining the question. This is stating the accusation. The sutra says that the three dharmas (life, warmth, and consciousness) rely on each other, the other two (life and warmth) continue without interruption, only consciousness has interruptions, how can this be in accordance with right reason? Lacking one cannot be called mutual reliance.

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持。彼說六識故言間轉。間者斷。轉者易　量云。三法中識應一類相續。三法攝故。如壽．暖二　又或應返質。壽．暖二法亦應間斷。三法攝故。如彼許識　此論主徴。

論。雖說三法至獨有間轉。

述曰。此外返質。雖說三法互持。兩家共許唯暖一種不遍三界。非壽與識亦如於暖。今者論主何不許識獨有間斷。例言三法更互依持。暖不遍三界。依持許三法。何妨其識獨許間轉。

論。此於前理至恒相持用。

述曰。下解徴也。論主釋言。此於我前理非為過難。經中說三法互相依者。謂若是處具有三法。即欲．色界無間轉者。可恒相持。不爾便無恒相持用。謂有間轉名不爾者。如六轉識無恒持用。經言三法更互相依。非令無色亦有暖法。

論。前以此理至其理極成。

述曰。前者我言恒持用理。顯三法中所說識言非詮轉識。意目第八恒有用故。汝舉暖不遍。豈壞我前理。我前所言識不遍者。可以暖為例。我以識無恒用。何得以暖為理　彼救意言。識有間故無恒持用。暖無色無。亦應如識　論主意解。具有三法處。可有恒持用。在欲．色界為難於汝。此則不可具三法處。唯識間轉壽．暖不然。非於無色唯說暖無。便則例令具三法處。許識間轉有恒持用。故我前說其理極成。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 持。對方說有六識，所以說『間轉』（kān zhuǎn）。『間』（kān）是斷絕，『轉』（zhuǎn）是改變。 量論說：在三種法（三法）中，識應該是一種連續不斷的類別，因為它被三種法所包含。就像壽（shòu，壽命）和暖（nuǎn，體溫）這兩種法一樣。 或者應該反過來質疑：壽和暖這兩種法也應該有間斷，因為它也被三種法所包含。就像你們承認識有間斷一樣。 這裡論主提出質疑。 論：雖然說三種法... 述曰：這是反駁對方的質疑。雖然說三種法互相依存，但兩家都承認只有暖這一種法不遍及三界（sān jiè，欲界、色界、無色界）。壽和識並不像暖一樣。現在論主為什麼不承認識有間斷呢？例如說三種法互相依存，暖不遍及三界，因為依存才承認有三種法，為什麼妨礙承認識有間斷呢？ 論：這對於之前的道理... 述曰：下面解釋質疑。論主解釋說：這對於我之前的道理來說，並不是什麼過分的責難。經中說三種法互相依存，指的是如果某個地方具有三種法，即欲界、色界，沒有間斷改變的，就可以恒常互相依存。否則就沒有恒常互相依存的作用。所謂有間斷改變，就叫做『不爾』（bù ěr，不是這樣），例如六轉識（liù zhuǎn shí）就沒有恒常的依存作用。經中說三種法互相依存，並不是要讓無色界（wú sè jiè）也有暖法。 論：之前用這個道理... 述曰：之前我說恒常依存的作用，表明三種法中所說的『識』（shí）並不是指轉識（zhuǎn shí）。意思是說第八識（第八識）是恒常有作用的。你舉暖不遍及三界，難道能破壞我之前的道理嗎？我之前所說的識不遍及三界，可以用暖作為例子。我因為識沒有恒常的作用，怎麼能用暖作為道理呢？ 對方辯解說：識有間斷，所以沒有恒常的依存作用；暖在無色界沒有，也應該像識一樣。 論主解釋說：具有三種法的地方，才可能有恒常的依存作用。在欲界、色界，這對於你們來說是責難。這裡不可能具有三種法的地方，只有識有間斷，壽和暖不是這樣。不是在無色界只說沒有暖，就因此類推到具有三種法的地方，承認識有間斷和恒常的依存作用。所以我之前說的道理是極其成立的。

【English Translation】 English version Support. Because they speak of the six consciousnesses, they say 'intermittent transformation' (kān zhuǎn). 'Intermittent' (kān) means cessation. 'Transformation' (zhuǎn) means change. The argument states: Among the three dharmas (sān fǎ), consciousness should be a continuous category because it is encompassed by the three dharmas. Like life (shòu) and warmth (nuǎn). Or perhaps the quality should be reversed. Life and warmth should also be intermittent because they are encompassed by the three dharmas, just as you admit that consciousness is intermittent. Here, the author of the treatise raises a question. Treatise: Although it is said that the three dharmas... Commentary: This is a rebuttal to the opponent's question. Although it is said that the three dharmas are mutually supportive, both sides admit that only warmth does not pervade the Three Realms (sān jiè: the Desire Realm, the Form Realm, and the Formless Realm). Life and consciousness are not like warmth. Why doesn't the author of the treatise admit that consciousness is intermittent? For example, it is said that the three dharmas are mutually dependent, and warmth does not pervade the Three Realms. Because of dependence, the three dharmas are acknowledged. Why hinder the admission that consciousness is intermittent? Treatise: This, regarding the previous principle... Commentary: The following explains the question. The author of the treatise explains: This is not an excessive criticism of my previous principle. The sutra says that the three dharmas are mutually dependent, referring to places where the three dharmas are present, namely the Desire Realm and the Form Realm, without intermittent change, and can be constantly mutually dependent. Otherwise, there is no constant mutual dependence. What is called intermittent change is 'not so' (bù ěr), such as the six consciousnesses (liù zhuǎn shí), which do not have constant dependence. The sutra says that the three dharmas are mutually dependent, not to make the Formless Realm (wú sè jiè) also have warmth. Treatise: Previously, using this principle... Commentary: Previously, I said the function of constant dependence, indicating that the 'consciousness' (shí) mentioned in the three dharmas does not refer to the transforming consciousness (zhuǎn shí). It means that the eighth consciousness (第八識) is constantly functioning. You cite warmth not pervading the Three Realms, can that destroy my previous principle? My previous statement that consciousness does not pervade the Three Realms can use warmth as an example. Because consciousness does not have constant function, how can warmth be used as a principle? The opponent argues: Consciousness is intermittent, so there is no constant dependence; warmth is absent in the Formless Realm, so it should be like consciousness. The author of the treatise explains: Only where the three dharmas are present can there be constant dependence. In the Desire Realm and the Form Realm, this is a criticism for you. It is impossible for a place to have the three dharmas, only consciousness is intermittent, life and warmth are not like this. It is not that only the absence of warmth is mentioned in the Formless Realm, and therefore it is extrapolated to places with the three dharmas, admitting that consciousness has intermittent and constant dependence. Therefore, my previous statement is extremely established.

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論。又三法中至定非無漏。

述曰。前不齊解。設復任汝識間轉如暖。汝宗六識為此中識。應不通三性及與無漏。如壽與暖故。論無三性準例應成。故云又三法中乃至定非無漏　此亦不然。如壽能持暖非是壽。以能持故壽應非壽。彼既不然此云何爾。是故何得以識能持故。令如壽．及暖。非通三性。及非無漏。此意不然。謂無漏法不持有漏故。識如壽．暖唯有漏有持。豈得言三性有壽非壽等為例成失。一切難中俱有此例。

又此中文第二別難。

論。生無色界至能持彼壽。

述曰。且許有色界以色身有故。識無漏時壽。暖可在　或有色界有色身故。設識無漏以義隱故今不為難。

生無色界既無于暖。起無漏心爾時。何識能持彼壽。無色身故何所依持。

論。由此故知至此第八識。

述曰。總結之也。由此故知。有異熟識。無記一類。相續恒有。體遍三界。能持壽．暖。彼識即是此第八識。如俱舍第五命根中難　然今以識種上功能為壽。即現行望種為互依持　此義如何。種生于現有力因緣。因望所生能持可爾。現望于種既非能熏。無力引生。能持寧在　因緣義者非要能熏。種自類生為例。即是第八現行。雖非能熏望彼種子亦非因緣。然稱有力。若無持者便失壞故。此中相

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：又，在三種法中，達到禪定的狀態並非沒有無漏的成分。

述曰：前面不一致的解釋。假設任由你的識在中間像暖氣一樣運轉。你的宗派認為六識是這中間的識，應該不通達三性和無漏。就像壽命和暖氣一樣。論中沒有三性的說法，按照這個例子應該成立。所以說，『又在三種法中，乃至禪定並非沒有無漏的成分』。這也是不對的。就像壽命能夠維持暖氣，但壽命不是暖氣。因為能夠維持，所以壽命應該不是壽命。既然那樣不對，這裡為什麼可以這樣說呢？所以，怎麼能因為識能夠維持，就讓它像壽命和暖氣一樣，不通達三性，並且不是無漏的呢？這個意思不對。因為無漏法不持有漏法。識像壽命和暖氣一樣，只有有漏的成分才能持有。怎麼能說三性中有壽命和非壽命等情況，作為例子來成立錯誤呢？一切辯難中都有這樣的例子。

又，這是中文中的第二個特別的辯難。

論：沒有**（涅槃）時，乃至能夠維持那個壽命。

述曰：姑且允許有（涅槃），因為色身存在。識是無漏的時候，壽命和暖氣是可以存在的。或者有（涅槃），因為有色身。假設識是無漏的，因為意義隱晦，所以現在不進行辯難。

沒有**（涅槃）時，既然沒有暖氣。生起無漏心的時候，什麼識能夠維持那個壽命呢？因為沒有色身，依靠什麼來維持呢？

論：因此可知，乃至這個第八識（阿賴耶識）。

述曰：總結。因此可知，有異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna），是無記的一類，相續不斷地存在，本體遍及三界，能夠維持壽命和暖氣。那個識就是這個第八識（阿賴耶識）。就像《俱舍論》第五卷中關於命根的辯難。然而現在以識的種子上的功能作為壽命。即現行望向種子為互相依持。這個道理如何呢？種子產生現行，有力的因緣。因望向所生，能夠維持是可以的。現行望向種子，既然不是能熏，沒有力量引生，能夠維持在哪裡呢？因緣的意義不是一定要能熏。以種子自類產生為例。即是第八識（阿賴耶識）的現行。雖然不是能熏，望向那個種子也不是因緣。然而稱為有力。如果沒有維持者，就會失壞。這其中相互。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: Furthermore, among the three dharmas, reaching the state of Samadhi is not without the element of non-outflow (Anāsrava).

Commentary: The previous inconsistent explanations. Suppose you let your consciousness operate in the middle like warmth. Your school considers the six consciousnesses to be this middle consciousness, which should not penetrate the three natures (Trisvabhāva) and non-outflow. Just like life and warmth. The treatise does not mention the three natures; according to this example, it should be established. Therefore, it is said, 'Furthermore, among the three dharmas, even Samadhi is not without the element of non-outflow.' This is also incorrect. Just like life can maintain warmth, but life is not warmth. Because it can maintain, life should not be life. Since that is incorrect, why can it be said here? Therefore, how can it be said that because consciousness can maintain, it is like life and warmth, not penetrating the three natures and not being non-outflow? This meaning is incorrect. Because non-outflow dharmas do not hold outflow dharmas. Consciousness is like life and warmth; only outflow elements can hold. How can it be said that there are situations like life and non-life in the three natures, as an example to establish a mistake? All debates have such examples.

Also, this is the second special debate in Chinese.

Treatise: When there is no **(Nirvana), even to be able to maintain that life.

Commentary: Let's allow there to be (Nirvana), because the physical body exists. When consciousness is non-outflow, life and warmth can exist. Or there is (Nirvana), because there is a physical body. Suppose consciousness is non-outflow, because the meaning is obscure, so we will not debate it now.

When there is no **(Nirvana), since there is no warmth. When the non-outflow mind arises, what consciousness can maintain that life? Because there is no physical body, what does it rely on to maintain?

Treatise: Therefore, it can be known, even this eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna).

Commentary: Summary. Therefore, it can be known that there is Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness), which is a type of neutral (avyākrta), continuously exists, and its essence pervades the three realms, capable of maintaining life and warmth. That consciousness is this eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna). Just like the debate about the life faculty in the fifth volume of the Abhidharmakośa. However, now the function on the seed of consciousness is taken as life. That is, the present activity relies on the seed for mutual support. How is this principle? The seed produces the present activity, with powerful causes and conditions. The cause looking towards what is produced, being able to maintain is acceptable. The present activity looking towards the seed, since it is not able to perfume (cause further conditioning), and has no power to generate, where is the ability to maintain? The meaning of cause and condition is not necessarily to be able to perfume. Take the seed producing its own kind as an example. That is the present activity of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna). Although it is not able to perfume, looking towards that seed, it is not a cause and condition. However, it is called powerful. If there is no maintainer, it will be lost. This is mutual.

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持非因緣義。由此識．壽兩互相持。更互為緣於斯義立。

論。又契經說至不應有故。

述曰。自下第六。此初引經便證識有。謂此大乘及通小部。受生．命終必住散位及與有心。方得受生及命終理此中合文必住散心。非住無心及非住定位而得命終受生者也。下破經部等。所以者何。瑜伽第八十云。諸無學者要先入滅定後方入無餘。亦無心命終。彼無六識非無第八。由斯即顯。若以六識為命終識彼如何成。若說意識受生命終。彼由無學願力致然。既有第八亦非無心。又說諸異生．有學。不相違也。

論。謂生死時至必不現起。

述曰。下文有五。一破六識非。二顯第八是。三破大乘異說。四破上座部義。五難死時漸舍之識　初中有三。如文自顯。此即第一舉無轉識　此位身心俱太惛昧。身惛昧。硬強性。心惛昧。闇劣性。如睡無夢。即五位中無心睡眠。極悶絕時因鬼．藥等有此事起。如抉擇分無心地說。然瑜伽師生死二位既無六心。無心地中不別說者。即悶絕攝。今言悶絕離死。生外為鬼．藥等所悶絕故　今此二位非是住定。住散位攝。有此無心故引為證　量云。即生．死位。明瞭轉識必不現起。身心惛昧故。如睡無夢等　此二位中身心惛昧。大小二乘悉皆共許。故極成因。轉識生死位無唯

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：堅持非因緣的意義，由此，『識』（vijñāna，了別作用）和『壽』（āyus，壽命）兩者互相支援，相互作為因緣，這個意義才能成立。

論：經中又說，以至於不應該存在（六識作為命終識）。

述記：從下面第六段開始，首先引用經文來證明『識』（vijñāna）的存在。這裡所說的大乘以及通於小部的觀點是，受生和命終必定處於散位（ citta-vikṣepa，心散亂的狀態）以及有心的狀態，才能成立受生和命終的道理。這裡綜合經文的意思，必定是處於散亂心，而不是處於無心或定位（samāhita，禪定狀態）而能夠命終和受生的。下面破斥經部等的觀點。為什麼這樣說呢？《瑜伽師地論》第八十卷說，無學者（arhat，阿羅漢）要先進入滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti，一種高級禪定），然後才能進入無餘涅槃（nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa，沒有剩餘煩惱的涅槃），也是無心命終。他們沒有前六識，但並非沒有第八識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）。由此就顯示出，如果以六識作為命終識，這怎麼能成立呢？如果說意識（mano-vijñāna，第六識）受生命終，那是由於無學者的願力所致。既然有第八識，也不是無心。又說諸異生（pṛthag-jana，凡夫）、有學（śaikṣa，還在學習的聖者），並不相違背。

論：意思是說，生死之時，六識必定不會現起。

述記：下文有五個部分：一是破斥六識不是命終識，二是顯示第八識是命終識，三是破斥大乘的異說，四是破斥上座部的觀點，五是責難死時漸舍之識。初一部分中有三個方面，如文中所顯示的那樣。這裡是第一點，提出沒有轉識（pravṛtti-vijñāna，現行識）。這個狀態下，身心都非常昏昧。身體昏昧，表現爲僵硬強直；心昏昧，表現爲暗鈍低劣。就像睡眠沒有做夢一樣，也就是五位（pañca sthānāni，五種心所生起的狀態）中的無心睡眠。極度悶絕的時候，因為鬼神、藥物等原因，會有這種情況發生。如《抉擇分》中關於無心地的說法。然而，《瑜伽師地論》中生死二位既然沒有六識，無心地中沒有特別說明，就是包含在悶絕之中。現在說悶絕是離開死亡、出生之外，因為被鬼神、藥物等所悶絕的緣故。現在這兩種狀態不是處於禪定，而是屬於散位。因為有這種無心的狀態，所以引用作為證據。可以這樣比量：即生死位，明瞭的轉識必定不會現起，因為身心昏昧的緣故，就像睡眠無夢等。這兩種狀態中身心昏昧，大小乘都是共同承認的，所以是極成的因。轉識在生死位中沒有，是唯一的。

【English Translation】 English version: Holding to the meaning of non-causality, 'consciousness' (vijñāna, the function of discernment) and 'lifespan' (āyus, duration of life) support each other. They mutually serve as conditions, and this meaning is established.

Treatise: Moreover, the sutra says, 'to the extent that it should not exist' (the six consciousnesses as the consciousness at the time of death).

Commentary: From the sixth section below, the sutra is first quoted to prove the existence of 'consciousness' (vijñāna). What is said here by the Mahayana and also common to the Hinayana schools is that rebirth and death must occur in a state of distraction (citta-vikṣepa, a state of mental scattering) and with a conscious mind, so that the principle of rebirth and death can be established. Combining the meaning of the sutra here, it must be in a distracted mind, not in a state of mindlessness or concentration (samāhita, meditative state), that one can die and be reborn. The views of the Sautrantika school, etc., are refuted below. Why is this so? The eightieth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that an Arhat (arhat, a liberated being) must first enter the cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti, an advanced meditative state) before entering nirvana without remainder (nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa, nirvana without remaining afflictions), and also dies without mind. They do not have the first six consciousnesses, but they are not without the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness). From this, it is clear that if the six consciousnesses are taken as the consciousness at the time of death, how can this be established? If it is said that the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna, the mind consciousness) experiences rebirth and death, it is due to the power of the vows of the Arhat. Since there is the eighth consciousness, it is not without mind. Furthermore, it is said that ordinary beings (pṛthag-jana, common people) and trainees (śaikṣa, those still learning on the path) are not contradictory.

Treatise: It means that at the time of birth and death, the six consciousnesses will definitely not manifest.

Commentary: There are five parts in the following text: first, refuting that the six consciousnesses are not the consciousness at the time of death; second, showing that the eighth consciousness is the consciousness at the time of death; third, refuting the different views of the Mahayana; fourth, refuting the views of the Sthavira school; and fifth, questioning the consciousness that is gradually abandoned at the time of death. There are three aspects in the first part, as shown in the text. Here is the first point, proposing that there is no active consciousness (pravṛtti-vijñāna, the evolving consciousness). In this state, both body and mind are very dull. The body is dull, manifesting as stiffness and rigidity; the mind is dull, manifesting as darkness and inferiority. It is like sleeping without dreaming, which is the mindless sleep among the five states (pañca sthānāni, five states of arising mental factors). In a state of extreme faintness, this can happen due to ghosts, medicines, etc. As stated in the Discrimination Section regarding the mindless state. However, since the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states that there are no six consciousnesses in the two states of birth and death, and there is no special mention in the mindless state, it is included in faintness. Now, faintness is said to be outside of death and birth, because it is caused by ghosts, medicines, etc. Now, these two states are not in meditation, but belong to the distracted state. Because there is this mindless state, it is cited as evidence. It can be inferred that in the states of birth and death, clear active consciousness will definitely not manifest, because the body and mind are dull, like sleeping without dreaming, etc. The dullness of body and mind in these two states is commonly acknowledged by both Mahayana and Hinayana, so it is a well-established cause. The absence of active consciousness in the states of birth and death is unique.

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大乘義。故得為宗。對薩婆多此喻不成。彼但三位說無心故　然先釋有二。一謂唯有第八無餘六轉。此文可然。宗無餘故。即以瑜伽第一為證。謂入母胎說有本識。不說意故。又以對法論文為證。唯以無記心命終故　二說亦有意識。豈以瑜伽不說意識即便無者。第七應然。以不說故。此位應無。若無記心命終受生便唯第八。第八恒有何須說也。即以此文證有第六。簡異性故說唯無記。若不然者說無心位。何不別說受生．命終唯言五位　前師解云。亦即悶絕。俱是惛昧位中攝故。然今此中文勢本意。唯取有本識義為正所宗。言無意識。受生．命終唯有本識。若無本識。以誰為受生．命終之心也　今助釋云。是破他故且言無意。非唯一說此兼兩師　然下既無別說。即以前師為正。

論。又此位中至必不現行。

述曰。子段第二立六量非。此二位中必無轉識。行相．所緣不可知故。如無心位　正破薩婆多。引三位無心為喻。若兼破經部等。即前二散．及與二定。無想五位。然彼二部等說五識無。執有意識。然今此中正破彼意識。及設遮五通言六識。非正遮計。此即難全無。

論。六種轉識至如余時故。

述曰。第三段設縱有六識難。令行相．所緣亦可得知。汝之生死許有轉識行相所緣應可了知。轉

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這是關於大乘教義的解釋，因此可以作為宗義的依據。用這個例子來反駁薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins，一切有部），是不成立的。因為他們只在三種狀態下說沒有心識。然而，先前的解釋有兩種：一種認為只有第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālayavijñāna）而沒有其餘的六種轉識。這種說法與本文的意思相符，因為宗義中說沒有其餘的識。可以用《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第一卷作為證據，其中說進入母胎時有本識（阿賴耶識），而沒有說意識。又可以用《阿毗達磨集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）的論文作為證據，其中說只有無記心（中性心，neither wholesome nor unwholesome）才會死亡。另一種說法認為也有意識。難道因為《瑜伽師地論》沒有說意識，就認為沒有意識嗎？如果是這樣，第七識（末那識，Manas）也應該如此，因為它也沒有被提及。那麼，在這種狀態下就應該沒有第七識了。如果只有無記心才會死亡和受生，那麼就只有第八識了。第八識恒常存在，何須特別說明呢？因此，可以用這段文字來證明有第六識（意識，Vijñāna），因為爲了區分不同的性質，才說只有無記心。如果不是這樣，在說無心位時，為什麼不分別說明受生和死亡，而只說五種狀態呢？ 之前的老師解釋說，這也包括悶絕（fainting），都屬於昏昧的狀態。然而，現在這段文字的本意，只是以有本識的意義作為主要的宗義。說沒有意識，是指受生和死亡時只有本識。如果沒有本識，那麼以什麼作為受生和死亡的心識呢？ 現在我來輔助解釋說，這是爲了駁斥他人，所以才說沒有意識，並非只有一種說法，而是兼顧了兩種觀點。然而，下文既然沒有特別說明，就以前面的老師的說法為準。

論：又在這種狀態中，六種轉識必定不會現行。

述記：子段的第二部分，確立六量（六種衡量標準）來否定。在這兩種狀態中，必定沒有轉識，因為行相（aspect）和所緣（object）是不可知的，就像無心位一樣。這是爲了正面駁斥薩婆多部，引用三種無心狀態作為比喻。如果兼顧駁斥經量部（Sautrāntika）等，那就是前面的兩種散亂狀態，以及兩種禪定狀態，還有無想等五種狀態。然而，經量部等認為五識不存在，而執著于有意識。現在這裡主要是爲了駁斥他們的意識，以及假設性地遮止五通（五種神通）來說六識，並非真正地遮止他們的計度。這也就是要駁斥他們完全沒有（轉識）。

論：六種轉識，就像其餘時間一樣。

述記：第三段，假設縱然有六識，也難以得知其行相和所緣。如果你們認為生死中有轉識，那麼它的行相和所緣應該可以了知。轉

【English Translation】 English version: This explains the meaning of Mahayana, and therefore can be taken as the basis of its doctrine. Using this example to refute the Sarvastivadins (those who believe in the existence of all things), is not valid, because they only claim the absence of mind in three states. However, there are two prior interpretations: one holds that there is only the eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness) and not the remaining six transforming consciousnesses. This interpretation aligns with the meaning of the text, because the doctrine states that there are no remaining consciousnesses. The first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) can be used as evidence, which states that there is a fundamental consciousness (Ālayavijñāna) when entering the womb, but does not mention consciousness. Also, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) can be used as evidence, which states that only a neutral mind (neither wholesome nor unwholesome) ceases at death. The other interpretation holds that there is also consciousness. Just because the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra does not mention consciousness, does it mean that there is no consciousness? If so, the seventh consciousness (Manas, mind consciousness) should also be absent, because it is not mentioned either. Then, in this state, there should be no seventh consciousness. If only a neutral mind ceases at death and rebirth, then there is only the eighth consciousness. The eighth consciousness is always present, so why is it necessary to specifically mention it? Therefore, this passage can be used to prove the existence of the sixth consciousness (Vijñāna, discriminating consciousness), because it is only to distinguish different natures that it is said that there is only a neutral mind. If this were not the case, when speaking of the state of no-mind, why not separately mention rebirth and death, but only mention five states? The previous teachers explained that this also includes fainting, which belongs to the state of unconsciousness. However, the original intention of this passage is to take the meaning of having a fundamental consciousness as the main doctrine. Saying that there is no consciousness refers to the fact that only the fundamental consciousness exists at rebirth and death. If there is no fundamental consciousness, then what serves as the consciousness for rebirth and death? Now I will provide a supplementary explanation, saying that this is to refute others, so it is said that there is no consciousness, not just one interpretation, but taking into account both viewpoints. However, since there is no special explanation below, the previous teacher's statement is taken as the standard.

Treatise: Moreover, in this state, the six transforming consciousnesses will definitely not manifest.

Commentary: The second part of the sub-section establishes six measures (six standards of measurement) to negate. In these two states, there are definitely no transforming consciousnesses, because the aspect and object are unknowable, just like the state of no-mind. This is to directly refute the Sarvastivadins, citing the three states of no-mind as a metaphor. If also refuting the Sautrāntikas (those who uphold the authority of the sutras) and others, then there are the previous two distracted states, as well as the two meditative states, and the five states such as non-perception. However, the Sautrāntikas and others believe that the five consciousnesses do not exist, and cling to the existence of consciousness. Now, the main purpose here is to refute their consciousness, and to hypothetically prevent the five supernormal powers (five psychic powers) by speaking of the six consciousnesses, not to truly prevent their calculations. This is to refute their complete absence (of transforming consciousnesses).

Treatise: The six transforming consciousnesses, just like other times.

Commentary: The third section assumes that even if there are six consciousnesses, it is difficult to know their aspect and object. If you believe that there are transforming consciousnesses in birth and death, then their aspect and object should be knowable. Transforming

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識攝故。如余散有心位。今隨文便先言其因。謂六種轉識。次言其宗。宗中先言有法行相所緣。次復言有。此言有者謂有轉識。行相．所緣必應可知。可知即是法。如余時是喻。以因故字。安置喻中。非直文勢便能。亦復義生巧逐。上下諸文多分如此。準此可解。

既有此難外返伏難。說有轉識遂令行相等可知。既有賴耶。應行相等可說。

論。真異熟識至不違正理。

述曰。第二顯第八是　極微細故行相所緣俱不可知。簡第六意體非微細非真異熟　是引業果。總報攝故　一期相續。中無斷故　恒無轉變。其性定故　是散心位。非定位故　是有心時。非同五位無心時故　名生死心不違正理。我今此識既非轉識。體極微細。生死雖有。行相．所緣俱不可知。非同粗識可知之識。故六轉識違于正理　此中所以惛昧為因解生死時無轉識義。諸賢共稟眾教同說。次難陀論師等無量論師．正法藏．勝軍師等時以為住。恒用闡揚殊增智慮。名光月氏譽美方今。無識之儔同遵南指。唯我大師至生微破。及其披此更益前非。如次論下及制惡見中正陳其義。今諸釋既備勝義雲集。群賢敘之盛當所指。

論。有說五識至意識亦無。

述曰。下第三破大乘異說有六。一敘宗。二正破。三救義。四破救。五更救

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為『識』被攝持的緣故。例如其餘散亂有心位的情況。現在爲了方便理解文義，先說其原因。即六種轉識。其次說其宗旨。宗旨中先說有法（dharma）的行相（ākāra）和所緣（ālambana）。然後又說『有』。這裡說的『有』是指有轉識。行相和所緣必定應該是可以知道的。可以知道的就是法。如同其餘時候是比喻。因為『因故』二字，安置在比喻中。不僅僅是文勢上的方便，也是義理上的巧妙安排。上下很多文句大都如此，可以參照理解。

既然有這樣的詰難，外人反過來詰難說，說有轉識，於是行相等就可以知道。既然有阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna），應該行相等也可以說出來。

論：真實的異熟識（vipāka-vijñāna）乃至不違背正理。

述曰：第二點顯示第八識（阿賴耶識）極其微細，所以行相和所緣都不可知。簡別第六識（意識，manovijñāna），它的體不是微細的，也不是真實的異熟識，是引業的果報。總的來說，它攝持一期相續，中間沒有間斷，恒常沒有轉變，其性質是決定的，是散心位，不是定位，是有心時，不同於五位無心時，名為生死心，不違背正理。我現在說的這個識，既不是轉識，體又極其微細，生死雖然有，行相和所緣都不可知，不像粗糙的識那樣可以知道。所以六轉識違背了正理。這裡用昏昧作為原因，解釋生死時沒有轉識的含義。各位賢者共同稟承眾多教義，共同宣說。其次，難陀論師（Nanda）等無量論師、正法藏（Dharmakośa）、勝軍師（Jitāri）等，時常以此為依據，恒常用以闡揚，特別增加了智慧的思考。名字光耀月氏（印度北部地區），美譽傳遍四方。沒有識的同類都遵從南指（指向南方）。只有我的大師（指世親，Vasubandhu）才產生微小的破斥。等到他們批駁這些，更加增添了之前的錯誤。如次論下以及制惡見中，正確地陳述了其中的含義。現在各位解釋已經具備了殊勝的意義，賢者們聚集在一起敘述，盛況應當是指這個。

論：有人說五識（pañca-vijñāna）乃至意識也沒有。

述曰：下面第三點破斥大乘的異說，有六個方面。一是敘述宗義，二是正式破斥，三是救護義理，四是破斥救護，五是再次救護。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the 'consciousness' being apprehended. For example, in the case of other distracted mind states. Now, for the sake of convenience in understanding the text, let's first talk about its cause. That is, the six kinds of transforming consciousnesses (ṣaḍ-vijñāna). Next, talk about its tenet. Within the tenet, first talk about the characteristics (ākāra) and object (ālambana) of the dharma (phenomena). Then again talk about 'existence'. The 'existence' here refers to the existence of transforming consciousnesses. The characteristics and object must be knowable. What is knowable is dharma. Like other times, it is a metaphor. Because of the words 'because of cause', placed in the metaphor. It is not only a convenience in the text, but also a clever arrangement in the meaning. Many sentences above and below are mostly like this, which can be understood by reference.

Since there is such a difficulty, outsiders retort, saying that there are transforming consciousnesses, so the characteristics and so on can be known. Since there is the Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness), the characteristics and so on should also be able to be spoken of.

Treatise: The true Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) even does not contradict the correct principle.

Commentary: The second point shows that the eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna) is extremely subtle, so the characteristics and object are both unknowable. Distinguishing the sixth consciousness (Manovijñāna), its essence is not subtle, nor is it a true Vipāka-vijñāna, it is the result of karma that leads to rebirth. In general, it encompasses a lifetime's continuity, without interruption in the middle, constantly without change, its nature is fixed, it is a distracted mind state, not a samādhi state, it is a mind-having time, unlike the five mind-less times, it is called the mind of birth and death, which does not contradict the correct principle. The consciousness I am talking about now is neither a transforming consciousness, nor is its essence extremely subtle, although birth and death exist, the characteristics and object are both unknowable, unlike the coarse consciousness that can be known. Therefore, the six transforming consciousnesses contradict the correct principle. Here, confusion is used as the reason to explain that there is no transforming consciousness at the time of birth and death. All the wise ones commonly inherit many teachings and commonly proclaim. Secondly, Nanda (teacher's name) and other countless teachers, Dharmakośa (Treasure of Dharma), Jitāri (Conqueror of Foes) and others, often use this as a basis, constantly use it to expound, especially increasing the wisdom of thinking. The name shines brightly in the northern region of India, and the reputation spreads all over the world. Those of the same kind who have no consciousness all follow the southern pointing (pointing to the south). Only my master (Vasubandhu) produces slight refutations. When they criticize these, they add to the previous mistakes. In the following treatises and in the 'Establishing Correct Views', the meaning is correctly stated. Now, the explanations of the various masters have the supreme meaning, and the wise ones gather together to narrate, the grand occasion should refer to this.

Treatise: Some say that the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna) and even the Manovijñāna (mind consciousness) are also not present.

Commentary: The third point below refutes the different views of the Mahāyāna, there are six aspects. First, narrating the tenets, second, formally refuting, third, protecting the meaning, fourth, refuting the protection, fifth, protecting again.

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。六復難。此敘宗也　五種轉識生．死定無大小教同。然諸賢等於此無諍。唯第六識今應分別。意識取境凡有三因。或因五識。隨緣五塵。或因他教。別生解故。或定為因。境界殊妙　死位既同以惛昧為因故無異說。唯于生位更增此釋。生位前因既不可得故受生位意識亦無。言死位中或因五識．他教等故意識可有。唯正得以惛昧為因。初受生位諸因不成故獨為證　然雖更有獨起意識。不緣于教。不緣五塵。不緣定境。取增人法。此何不說。無心別起不託五塵．他教．定力別生計度。本但三因。如見．聞等。無別因起必應爾故。

論。若爾有情至無由起故。

述曰。破上異師別生解者。謂生無色初剎那后。彼時意識應永不生。初無意識彼此同故。若彼伏言受生已次入定無散意者。理亦不然。定心必由散意識引。或加行為因。如聞．思等。或生得善引生方起。此通三界。五識．他教此之二因。彼界無有。能引起定。散心意識。在彼界中無由起故定如何生。非初受生即可得定。故彼三因彼初無有。彼界散意何緣得生。

論。若謂彼定至能現在前。

述曰。彼復救解。若生地獄非串習定。可藉散意引生彼定。下串習力後生彼時。定心率爾能現在前。故無過失。

論。彼初生時寧不現起。

述曰。論主難云。彼界定心即初生位一剎那中。寧不現起。亦由地獄串習力故。由如后時。

論。又欲色界至亦應現起。

述曰。下初受生一剎那位。前生曾習第六意識亦應現起。即生得善。或勤煩惱久習工巧等。

論。若由惛昧至何勞別說。

述曰。若汝救言。無色界中初生定心。及地獄中初生位散心。由惛昧故初未現前。此即是前諸論諸賢共稟之因。何勞于中妄生別說。

論。有餘部說至俱不可了。

述曰。上座部師說。有根本計。有末所計。根本計粗細二意許得並生。末計不然。必別時起。今此本計。別有細意識。生死位中。一類微細行相．所緣俱不可了。非如薩婆多等故我無咎者。不然。

論。應知即是至不如是故。

述曰。此即是我第八之識。所以者何。極成意識不如是故。即以汝因還復破汝。謂彼計有二意識生。一粗二細。細者受生命終俱不可知。異粗意識　無著攝論本云。應二意識俱時轉等。又依染污故時無斷故。意識所緣不可得故。又此所依是種子識。即我所說第八識者。

攝論諸師未悟此文。由不曾見唯識論故。無二意識並生論者。上座部云。我不頌此經。我部經中無此語故　或說無二粗意並生。及二細意並生言先。不障粗．細二識並

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師的述記中說，論主反駁道：『彼界（指色界或無色界）的禪定之心，即使在初生位的一剎那間，難道不應該現起嗎？這也是由於地獄（指欲界）串習的力量所致，就像後來一樣。』

論：『又，（如果）欲界（的意識）至（彼界），也應該現起。』

窺基法師的述記中說，（在）地獄初次受生的一剎那，前一生曾經串習的第六意識也應該現起，即與生俱來的善法，或者長期勤奮修習的煩惱、工巧等。

論：『如果由於昏昧（而不現起），何勞另外說明？』

窺基法師的述記中說，如果你們辯解說，無色界中初生的禪定之心，以及地獄中初生位的散亂之心，由於昏昧的緣故，最初沒有現前。這正是先前各論和各位賢者共同秉持的原因，何必在其中妄加別論呢？

論：『有餘部（指上座部）說，（根本計和末所計）俱不可了。』

窺基法師的述記中說，上座部的師父說，有根本計，有末所計。根本計認為粗細兩種意識可以同時產生，末計則不然，必定在不同時間產生。現在這個根本計，另外有一種細微的意識，在生死位中，它的行相和所緣都非常微細，無法瞭解。不像薩婆多部等那樣，所以我沒有過失。』（論主反駁說）不對。

論：『應當知道，（你所說的細意識）就是（我的）第八識，不如是故。』

窺基法師的述記中說，這正是我的第八識（阿賴耶識）。為什麼這麼說呢？因為你所極力主張的意識不是這樣的。即用你的理由反過來駁斥你。你認為有兩種意識產生，一種粗顯，一種細微，細微的意識在受生和命終時都無法知道，不同於粗顯的意識。《無著攝論》（Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha）的根本文中說，『應（有）二意識俱時轉等。』又因為依靠染污，所以時間上沒有間斷，意識的所緣無法得到，而且這個所依是種子識，就是我所說的第八識。

《攝論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）的諸位法師沒有領悟這段文字，因為沒有見過《唯識論》（Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi）。沒有二意識同時產生的論點。上座部說：『我不贊同這部經，我的經典中沒有這句話。』或者說沒有兩種粗顯的意識同時產生，以及兩種細微的意識同時產生，不障礙粗顯和細微兩種意識同時產生。

【English Translation】 English version: In Master Kuiji's commentary, the debater argues: 'The meditative mind of that realm (referring to the Form Realm or Formless Realm), even in the first moment of rebirth, shouldn't it arise? This is also due to the force of habituation from the lower realm (referring to the Desire Realm), just like later on.'

Treatise: 'Furthermore, (if) the Desire Realm (consciousness) reaches (that realm), it should also arise.'

Kuiji's commentary says, '(In) the first moment of rebirth in the lower realm, the sixth consciousness that was habituated in the previous life should also arise, that is, innate goodness, or diligently practiced afflictions, skills, etc.'

Treatise: 'If it's due to faintness (that it doesn't arise), why bother explaining it separately?'

Kuiji's commentary says, 'If you argue that the initial meditative mind in the Formless Realm, and the scattered mind in the initial state in the lower realm, do not manifest initially due to faintness, this is precisely the reason commonly held by previous treatises and sages. Why fabricate separate arguments within it?'

Treatise: 'Some other school (referring to the Theravada school) says that (both the fundamental and derived accounts) are incomprehensible.'

Kuiji's commentary says, 'The Theravada masters say that there is a fundamental account and a derived account. The fundamental account considers that both coarse and subtle consciousnesses can arise simultaneously, while the derived account does not, and they must arise at different times. Now, this fundamental account has another subtle consciousness, in the states of birth and death, its characteristics and objects are very subtle and cannot be understood. It's not like the Sarvastivada school, so I have no fault.' (The debater refutes) That's not right.

Treatise: 'It should be known that (the subtle consciousness you speak of) is (my) eighth consciousness, because it is not like that.'

Kuiji's commentary says, 'This is precisely my eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna). Why is that? Because the consciousness that you strongly advocate is not like this. That is, using your reason to refute you in turn. You believe that there are two types of consciousness arising, one coarse and one subtle, the subtle consciousness cannot be known at the time of birth and death, different from the coarse consciousness. The root text of Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, 'There should be two consciousnesses arising simultaneously, etc.' Moreover, because it relies on defilement, so there is no interruption in time, the object of consciousness cannot be obtained, and this basis is the seed consciousness, which is what I call the eighth consciousness.'

The masters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha did not understand this passage because they had not seen the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi. There is no argument for two consciousnesses arising simultaneously. The Theravada school says: 'I do not endorse this sutra, there is no such statement in my scriptures.' Or it says that two coarse consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously, and two subtle consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously, it does not hinder the simultaneous arising of coarse and subtle consciousnesses.

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生故無妨也　又因明法因有三相。依染污因。時無斷因。闕無同品定有一相。非正比量。意識所緣不可知者。如大乘本識緣身．器故。所依種識即本識者。何勞虛認。此體非汝所計之識　今論意言。汝謂不然。且初二意並生有難。亦應有粗．細二眼識並生。轉識攝故。如意識　或意識不得有粗細二識並生。轉識攝故。如眼等識。故知經上無文定說以理證爾。豈得隨情便撥聖教　次三因者此非正量。謂立量云。汝所言細意識者。決非意識。極成意識不如是故。如眼等識　或意識所緣分明行相不可得故。猶如五識　唯第三因成是比量。前二返顯以理直遂不為比量何得悟徴。今此論言極成意識不如是者。即彼第三因。文雖不同義勢是一。由是前量故。汝細意即我賴耶故。故上座師不符正理。

自下論文通破諸部。

論。又將死時至冷觸漸起。

述曰。下第五難死漸舍識。世親．無性攝論皆云。善業從下冷。惡業從上冷。由生勝趣惡趣別故　瑜伽第一云。隨下．上冷后至於心。此處初生最後舍故。

論。若無此識至執受身故。

述曰。如上所明六非執受。以舍執受冷便起故。

論。眼等五識至或不行故。

述曰。五識依別。若能執受無識之時身冷應起。若身識遍能執受者。或不行

故。漸命終時亦有先舍五識身故。

論。第六意識不住身故。

述曰。意識住身可由起觸。不是決定住于身中取觸等故。非無意識身便冷生。第八住身即有暖起。不住身處故冷觸起。

論。境不定故。

述曰。又第六識境不定故緣境轉易。此命終時行相微細。緣一類境。非第六識有是相狀。

論。遍寄身中恒相續故。

述曰。第六意識恒常起時。逢境即緣隨依即止。不同本識久住一依定緣此境。

不應冷觸由六漸生　由是等文下七識中有一類計。第八識以五根為依。如此中言五識各別依不能執故。通依者能執。若不依根能執受者第六應然。若不依不能執。便以第八為不定故。第八故以五根為依。及此中言不住身故。故第八識亦住于身。

論。唯異熟心至不相離故。

述曰。下總結言。唯第八識真異熟心。由先業力恒不斷。遍相續執于身。舍執受處冷觸便起。壽．暖．識三不相離故。

論。冷觸起處至此第八識。

述曰。識不執處即是非情。引果所攝外器之類。雖第八識變而亦緣而不執受如發發等。故此識有　上來或初引教共諍別破異部。二引事為難。三總結上文。

論。又契經說至不應有故。

述曰。自下第七難名色經。攝論第三

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，人在漸漸死亡的時候，也會有先捨棄前五識的情況。

論：因為第六意識不住于身體的緣故。

述曰：意識能夠住于身體，可以通過產生觸覺來實現。但它不是決定性地住在身體中來獲取觸覺等。因此，並非沒有意識的身體就會產生冷觸。第八識如果住在身體中，就會有暖觸產生；如果不住在身體中，就會產生冷觸。

論：因為所緣的境界不確定的緣故。

述曰：又因為第六識所緣的境界不確定，所以它緣境時會轉變。人在臨終時，其行相非常微細，只能緣一類境界，而第六識不具有這種狀態。

論：因為它普遍寄託在身體中，並且恒常相續的緣故。

述曰：第六意識在恒常生起的時候，遇到境界就緣取，隨著所依止的根而停止。這不同於本識（第八識），它能長久地住在同一個所依根上，並且固定地緣取這個境界。

不應該認為冷觸是由第六識逐漸產生的。根據這些經文，下文第七識中有一類觀點認為，第八識以五根為所依。就像這裡所說的，五識各自所依的根不能執持，而通用的所依根才能執持。如果不是依靠根就能執持，那麼第六識就應該可以這樣。如果不是依靠根就不能執持，那麼就認為第八識是不確定的。因此，第八識才以五根為所依。以及這裡所說的，不住于身體的緣故，所以第八識也住在身體中。

論：只有異熟心（第八識）直到最後都不會分離的緣故。

述曰：下面總結說，只有第八識是真正的異熟心，由於先前業力的作用，它恒常不斷，普遍地相續執持著身體。當它捨棄執持的地方，冷觸就會產生。壽命、暖觸、識這三者是不會互相分離的。

論：冷觸產生的地方，就是指這第八識。

述曰：識不執持的地方，就是無情之物，比如由異熟果所包含的外在器物等。雖然第八識變現它們，但也只是緣取而不執持，比如頭髮等。所以這個識是存在的。以上或者最初引用教證共同辯論，分別破斥異部的觀點；第二引用事例作為詰難；第三總結上文。

論：又如契經所說，不應該有這樣的說法。

述曰：下面第七個詰難是關於《名色經》的。《攝大乘論》第三卷。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, when a person is gradually dying, there are also cases where the first five consciousnesses are abandoned first.

Treatise: Because the sixth consciousness does not reside in the body.

Commentary: Consciousness can reside in the body by generating tactile sensation. However, it is not definitively residing in the body to grasp tactile sensations, etc. Therefore, the absence of consciousness does not necessarily lead to the generation of cold touch. If the eighth consciousness resides in the body, warmth will be generated; if it does not reside in the body, cold touch will be generated.

Treatise: Because the object of perception is not fixed.

Commentary: Furthermore, because the object of perception of the sixth consciousness is not fixed, it transforms when perceiving objects. At the time of death, its activity is very subtle, only able to perceive one type of object, and the sixth consciousness does not have this characteristic.

Treatise: Because it universally relies on the body and constantly continues.

Commentary: When the sixth consciousness constantly arises, it grasps the object when it encounters it, and stops according to the basis it relies on. This is different from the fundamental consciousness (eighth consciousness), which can reside in the same basis for a long time and fixedly perceive this object.

It should not be thought that cold touch is gradually produced by the sixth consciousness. According to these texts, one view in the seventh consciousness below considers the eighth consciousness to rely on the five roots. Just as it is said here, the roots relied on by each of the five consciousnesses cannot hold, while the common relying root can hold. If one could hold without relying on the root, then the sixth consciousness should be able to do so. If one cannot hold without relying on the root, then the eighth consciousness is considered uncertain. Therefore, the eighth consciousness relies on the five roots. And as it is said here, 'does not reside in the body,' therefore the eighth consciousness also resides in the body.

Treatise: Only the Vipaka-citta (eighth consciousness) does not separate until the end.

Commentary: The following summarizes that only the eighth consciousness is the true Vipaka-citta (resultant consciousness). Due to the power of previous karma, it constantly continues without interruption, universally holding onto the body. When it abandons the place it holds, cold touch arises. Life, warmth, and consciousness are inseparable.

Treatise: The place where cold touch arises refers to this eighth consciousness.

Commentary: The place that consciousness does not hold is insentient, such as external objects included in the resultant fruit. Although the eighth consciousness transforms them, it only perceives them without holding onto them, such as hair, etc. Therefore, this consciousness exists. The above either initially quotes teachings for common debate, separately refuting the views of different schools; secondly, it uses examples as challenges; thirdly, it summarizes the above text.

Treatise: Furthermore, as the sutra says, such a statement should not exist.

Commentary: The seventh challenge below is about the 'Namarupa Sutra'. Yogacarabhumi-sastra , the third volume.

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引經同此。文易可知。

第二為難。

論。謂彼經中至羯邏藍等。

述曰。下文有四。一敘經。二申難。三破救。四立量。即敘經也　彼經自釋。名謂非色四蘊。色謂羯邏藍等。等諸餘位。此羯邏藍名為雜穢。父母不凈名雜。深可厭患名穢。

論。此二與識至不相舍離。

述曰。謂名與色此二與識相依而住。無性釋言。此二皆用識為因緣。識復依此展轉相續而轉。即是此中互相依義。復引俱時因果為例。如二蘆束更互為緣恒俱時轉不相舍離　薩婆多師。羯邏藍時無五識故故唯有意。意即為識。識俱心所說為名。名既通攝非色四蘊。彼宗釋言。名總攝四實但有三。謂無識蘊故不與名相應　經自釋言。名通四蘊故相違也。若謂初時雖無有識。第二念識名名中識。說初念識為名外識。說相依者。即束蘆喻道理不成。不俱有故。設此位及后許有五識。生諸識不併故無相依俱義。即是彼部絕解此經。更無理救。經部師等道理同此　瑜伽第九有二義解。一云俱有依根曰色。等無間滅依根曰名。隨其所應為六識所依。依止彼故。乃至命終諸識流轉。此解則通大小。非此所諍。便助彼宗非欲自解。又復彼設爾但以自相望前後為緣。束蘆喻不成。彼論次文亦有此喻。故知此說且隨小相。仍非同喻　第二解

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 引用的經典與此相同，文字淺顯易懂。

第二點是提出的難題。

論：指的是彼經中提到的羯邏藍（kalala，受精卵最初的凝結狀態）等。

述：下文分為四個部分：一是敘述經典，二是提出難題，三是駁斥辯解，四是建立論證。這裡是敘述經典。彼經自己解釋，『名』指的是非色的四蘊（name refers to the four aggregates that are not form），『色』指的是羯邏藍等，以及其他的階段。這個羯邏藍被稱為雜穢，父母的不凈之物稱為『雜』，令人深感厭惡的稱為『穢』。

論：這二者與識（consciousness）互相依存，不相分離。

述：指的是『名』與『色』這二者與『識』相互依存而住。無性解釋說，這二者都以『識』為因緣，『識』又依此輾轉相續而轉，這就是此中互相依存的含義。又引用俱時因果作為例子，如同兩束蘆葦互相作為緣，恒常同時運轉，不相舍離。薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的老師認為，羯邏藍時期沒有五識，所以只有意識，意識即為識。與識俱生的心所被稱為『名』。『名』既然統攝了非色的四蘊，他們宗派解釋說，『名』總攝了四蘊，但實際上只有三個，因為沒有識蘊，所以不與『名』相應。經典自己解釋說，『名』貫通四蘊，所以與他們的觀點相違背。如果認為最初時雖然沒有識，第二唸的識被稱為『名』中的識，說最初唸的識為『名』外的識，那麼說相互依存，用蘆葦的譬喻道理就不能成立，因為不是俱有的。假設這個階段以及之後允許有五識，產生的諸識不是並存的，所以沒有相互依存的含義。這就是他們宗派徹底解釋這部經典，再沒有道理可以辯解。經部師等道理與此相同。瑜伽師地論第九有二種解釋，一種說法是俱有依根的稱為『色』，等無間滅依根的稱為『名』，根據其所應為六識所依，因為依止於彼，乃至命終諸識流轉。這種解釋則貫通大小乘，不是這裡所爭論的，反而幫助了他們的宗派，不是想要自己解釋。而且他們假設只是以自相望前後作為緣，蘆葦的譬喻不能成立。彼論的下文也有這個譬喻，所以知道這種說法只是隨順小乘的觀點，仍然不是相同的譬喻。第二種解釋

【English Translation】 English version: The scriptures cited are the same as this, and the text is easy to understand.

The second point is the difficulty raised.

Treatise: Refers to the kalala (羯邏藍, the initial coagulation state of a fertilized egg) etc. mentioned in that scripture.

Commentary: The following text is divided into four parts: first, narrating the scripture; second, stating the difficulty; third, refuting the defense; and fourth, establishing the argument. This is the narration of the scripture. The scripture itself explains that 『name』 refers to the four aggregates that are not form, and 『form』 refers to kalala etc., and other stages. This kalala is called impure and defiled. The impurity of the parents is called 『impure,』 and what is deeply disgusting is called 『defiled.』

Treatise: These two are interdependent with consciousness (識, vijnana) and are inseparable.

Commentary: Refers to 『name』 and 『form』 which are interdependent and dwell with 『consciousness.』 Vasubandhu explains that these two both use 『consciousness』 as the cause and condition, and 『consciousness』 relies on this to continuously transform, which is the meaning of mutual dependence here. It also cites simultaneous cause and effect as an example, like two bundles of reeds that mutually serve as conditions, constantly operating simultaneously and inseparably. The Sarvastivada (薩婆多) teachers believe that there are no five consciousnesses during the kalala stage, so there is only mind-consciousness, and mind-consciousness is consciousness. The mental factors that arise together with consciousness are called 『name.』 Since 『name』 encompasses the four aggregates that are not form, their school explains that 『name』 encompasses the four aggregates, but in reality, there are only three, because there is no aggregate of consciousness, so it does not correspond with 『name.』 The scripture itself explains that 『name』 penetrates the four aggregates, so it contradicts their view. If it is argued that although there is no consciousness at the beginning, the consciousness of the second thought is called the consciousness within 『name,』 and the consciousness of the first thought is said to be the consciousness outside 『name,』 then saying that they are interdependent, the analogy of the reeds cannot be established, because they are not co-existent. Assuming that this stage and later stages allow for the existence of the five consciousnesses, the consciousnesses that arise do not coexist, so there is no meaning of mutual dependence. This is their school's thorough explanation of this scripture, and there is no further reason to defend it. The reasoning of the Sautrantika (經部) teachers is the same as this. The ninth chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) has two explanations. One explanation is that what is co-existent and relies on the root is called 『form,』 and what is immediately ceased and relies on the root is called 『name,』 and according to what is appropriate, it is relied upon by the six consciousnesses, because it relies on them, and even until the end of life, the consciousnesses flow. This explanation penetrates both the Mahayana and Hinayana, and is not what is being debated here, but instead helps their school, and is not intended to explain itself. Moreover, they assume that it is only taking the self-nature and looking at the front and back as conditions, and the analogy of the reeds cannot be established. The following text of that treatise also has this analogy, so it is known that this statement is only following the view of the Hinayana, and is still not the same analogy. The second explanation

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云。又五色根。根所依大種。及根處所彼能生大種曰色。所餘曰名。要由有識執受諸根墮相續法方得流轉。即同此解。故小無解。唯上座部細意名識。粗意名名。如前已遮有二識起。故今不說。

論。眼等轉識至說誰為識。

述曰。第二申難中。設令乃至頞部曇位。眼等轉識攝在四蘊名中。若無此本識者。六識不俱故。說誰為識。

論。亦不可說至無五識故。

述曰。三破救也。若彼言名四蘊中識謂五識身。所與相依識是第六識。若爾羯邏藍時無五識故。說誰為名中識。大小共許羯邏藍位七日已來並無五識。故於此位無名中識。若彼難言汝亦七日無五識身。彼名中識其體是何。第七識也。又除初念余時亦許第六識起。意識即是名中識蘊有何所違。其大眾部諸識並生。七日已前身識等未起。七日已後身識等生為名中識。遂復解云。經言名色互為緣者。除初七日餘長時位。如汝大乘說第六意為名中識。初念許無已后俱起說互為緣。從多位說。我亦如是。七日猶如初念。餘位亦復長時。據長時說亦互為緣無爽于理。此亦不然。我之初念亦互為緣。別有末那為名中識。第二念后意識復生。無相違失。經中非據長時有說。故非識證。

論。又諸轉識至顯第八識。

述曰。四立量也。設許長

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 云：又五色根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官），根所依賴的四大種（地、水、火、風），以及根的處所，這些能夠產生大種的，叫做『色』（Rupa，物質）。其餘的叫做『名』（Nama，精神）。必須要由有『識』（Vijnana，意識）執持領受，諸根才能墮入相續之法，才能流轉。這和前面的解釋相同。所以小乘沒有這個解釋。只有上座部認為細微的意念是『識』，粗大的意念是『名』。如同前面已經駁斥過的，不可能有兩個『識』同時生起，所以現在不再討論。

論：眼等轉識（通過眼等感覺器官產生的意識）……說到誰是『識』？

述曰：第二重申難點在於，假設乃至頞部曇（Arbuda，胎兒發育的最初階段）位，眼等轉識被包含在四蘊（色、受、想、行）的『名』中。如果沒有這個根本識，六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）不能同時生起，那麼，說誰是『識』呢？

論：也不可說……因為沒有五識的緣故。

述曰：這是第三個破斥對方的辯解。如果他們說，四蘊中的『識』指的是五識身（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識），所與之相互依存的『識』是第六識（意識）。如果是這樣，羯邏藍（Kalala，胚胎的第一週）時沒有五識，那麼，說誰是『名』中的『識』呢？大小乘都承認羯邏藍位七日以來並沒有五識。所以在這個階段沒有『名』中的『識』。如果他們反駁說，你們也承認七日沒有五識身，那麼你們的『名』中的『識』的本體是什麼呢？是第七識（末那識，Manas）嗎？而且除了最初一念，其餘時間也允許第六識生起，意識就是『名』中的識蘊，有什麼違背呢？大眾部認為諸識同時生起，七日以前身識等沒有生起，七日以後身識等生起，作為『名』中的『識』。於是又解釋說，經文說『名色互為緣』，指的是除了最初七日以外的長時間。如同你們大乘說第六意識是『名』中的『識』，最初一念允許沒有，之後同時生起，說是互為緣，是從多數情況來說的。我們也一樣，七日猶如最初一念，其餘階段也是長時間。根據長時間來說，也是互為緣，沒有違背道理。這種說法也是不對的。我們的最初一念也是互為緣的，另有末那識作為『名』中的『識』。第二念后意識又生起，沒有相互違背的缺失。經文並非根據長時間來說，所以不是『識』的證據。

論：又諸轉識……顯示第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）。

述曰：這是第四個立論。假設允許長時間

【English Translation】 English version Cloud: Furthermore, the five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), the four great elements (earth, water, fire, wind) upon which the organs depend, and the places of the organs, those that can produce the great elements are called 'Rupa' (form, matter). The rest are called 'Nama' (name, mind). It is necessary that the sense organs are grasped and received by 'Vijnana' (consciousness) in order to fall into the continuous dharma and flow. This is the same as the previous explanation. Therefore, the Hinayana does not have this explanation. Only the Sthavira school considers subtle thoughts as 'Vijnana' and coarse thoughts as 'Nama'. As previously refuted, it is impossible for two 'Vijnana' to arise simultaneously, so it will not be discussed now.

Treatise: The transforming consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness... speaking of who is 'Vijnana'?

Commentary: The second reiteration of the difficulty lies in the assumption that even in the Arbuda (the first stage of fetal development), the transforming consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness are included in the 'Nama' of the four aggregates (form, feeling, perception, volition). If there is no fundamental consciousness, the six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, mind-consciousness) cannot arise simultaneously, then who is said to be 'Vijnana'?

Treatise: It is also not possible to say... because there are no five consciousnesses.

Commentary: This is the third refutation of the other party's defense. If they say that the 'Vijnana' in the four aggregates refers to the five aggregates of consciousness (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness), and the 'Vijnana' that depends on it is the sixth consciousness (mind-consciousness). If so, there are no five consciousnesses in the Kalala (the first week of the embryo), then who is said to be the 'Vijnana' in 'Nama'? Both the Mahayana and Hinayana acknowledge that there are no five consciousnesses since the seven days of the Kalala stage. Therefore, there is no 'Vijnana' in 'Nama' at this stage. If they retort that you also admit that there are no five aggregates of consciousness in the seven days, then what is the substance of your 'Vijnana' in 'Nama'? Is it the seventh consciousness (Manas)? Moreover, except for the first thought, the sixth consciousness is also allowed to arise at other times, and the mind-consciousness is the aggregate of consciousness in 'Nama', so what is the contradiction? The Mahasanghika school believes that all consciousnesses arise simultaneously, and the body-consciousness etc. have not arisen before the seven days, and the body-consciousness etc. arise after the seven days, as the 'Vijnana' in 'Nama'. Then they explain that the sutra says 'Nama and Rupa are mutually conditioned', referring to the long time other than the first seven days. Just as you Mahayana say that the sixth consciousness is the 'Vijnana' in 'Nama', the first thought is allowed to be absent, and then they arise simultaneously, saying that they are mutually conditioned, which is from the majority of cases. We are the same, the seven days are like the first thought, and the rest of the stages are also long. According to the long time, they are also mutually conditioned, and there is no violation of the principle. This statement is also incorrect. Our first thought is also mutually conditioned, and there is another Manas as the 'Vijnana' in 'Nama'. After the second thought, the mind-consciousness arises again, and there is no mutual contradiction. The sutra is not based on a long time, so it is not evidence of 'Vijnana'.

Treatise: Furthermore, the transforming consciousnesses... revealing the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana).

Commentary: This is the fourth establishment of the thesis. Suppose it is allowed for a long time

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時後位及初位有其五識。即諸轉識有間斷有轉易。性是不堅無力一切時執持名色。如何乃說恒與為緣。體非恒故　量云。轉識不能恒持名色。有間轉故。如聲風等　攝論齊識退還。識若不斷壞名色得增長不等。皆此中攝。理即互為緣識攝故。此識是第八識性。

成唯識論述記卷第四(本)

成唯識論述記卷第四(末)

沙門基撰

論。又契經說至不應有故。

述曰。下第八證。引四食經　識食既成即第八識。謂佛初逾城出家。于外道尼乾子所學修苦行。由彼外道懸頭拔髮自餓投巖。故佛六年日食麻麥。既知非道便棄捨之。牧牛女邊受乳糜食。受吉祥草詣菩提樹。于其後夜便證菩提。彼外道等見受乳糜。遂生誹謗言破我戒。復聞證得無上菩提。伺佛晨朝入城乞食。便往試佛先詣城門。既見如來便為問曰。言證一法世不能知。請為具陳。其義何者。佛欲除彼無義苦行乃報之曰。一切有情皆依食住。正覺正說。余不能知。外道笑曰。愚者亦解。何言正覺。深生誹謗　此經即是彼時所說。大小二乘皆共信有。雖總言食破彼自餓。意許四種。無一有情一剎那中無四食者。即遍三界．五趣．四生。其中識者即阿賴耶。是因緣本。佛悟諸法密意說之。言雖在近意在於遠。文段有三。一如上解。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 當后位和初位存在時，五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）也存在。這些轉識（指前七識）是有間斷、有變化的，其性質是不穩定、無力的，卻在一切時候執持著名色（精神和物質現象）。如果這樣，怎麼能說它恒常地作為緣呢？因為它的體性不是恒常的。譬如，轉識不能恒常地執持名色，因為它有間斷和變化，就像聲音和風一樣。在《攝大乘論》中說，當識退還時，如果識不斷絕，名色就能增長，這都包含在其中。從道理上說，它們是互相為緣，被識所攝持的。這個識就是第八識（阿賴耶識）的性質。

《成唯識論述記》卷第四（本）

《成唯識論述記》卷第四（末）

沙門基 撰

論：又契經說至不應有故。

述曰：下面是第八識的證據。引用《四食經》。識食已經成就，就是第八識。說的是佛陀最初逾越城墻出家，在外道尼乾子（一種外道）那裡學習修行苦行。因為那些外道懸頭、拔髮、自餓、投巖，所以佛陀六年時間每天只吃麻麥。後來知道這不是正道就放棄了。在牧牛女那裡接受乳糜的供養，接受吉祥草后前往菩提樹。在那個夜晚就證得了菩提。那些外道看到佛陀接受乳糜，就誹謗說佛陀破了他們的戒律。又聽說佛陀證得了無上菩提，就在佛陀早上入城乞食的時候，前往試探佛陀，先到城門。見到如來后就問佛陀說：『您說證得了一種世人不能理解的法，請您詳細地陳述，那是什麼意思？』佛陀爲了去除他們沒有意義的苦行，就回答他們說：『一切有情（一切有情眾生）都依靠食物而住，這是正覺（佛陀）所正確宣說的，其他人不能理解。』外道笑著說：『愚蠢的人也理解，為什麼說是正覺呢？』深深地誹謗佛陀。這部經就是那個時候所說的。大小乘佛教都共同相信這部經的存在。雖然總的來說是說食物，爲了破除他們的自餓，但實際上是允許四種食物（段食、觸食、思食、識食）的存在。沒有一個有情在一剎那中沒有四種食物的，這遍及三界（欲界、色界、無色界）、五趣（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）、四生（卵生、胎生、濕生、化生）。其中的識食就是阿賴耶識（第八識），是因緣的根本。佛陀領悟到諸法的秘密含義才這樣說的。言語雖然在近處，但含義卻在遠處。文段有三個。一是如上面的解釋。

【English Translation】 English version: When the later position and the initial position exist, the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) also exist. These transforming consciousnesses (referring to the first seven consciousnesses) are intermittent and changing in nature. They are unstable and weak, yet they constantly grasp name and form (mental and material phenomena) at all times. If this is the case, how can it be said that it constantly acts as a condition? Because its essence is not constant. For example, transforming consciousness cannot constantly hold name and form because it is intermittent and changing, just like sound and wind. In the Saṃgraha-mahāyāna it is said that when consciousness retreats, if consciousness is not interrupted, name and form can grow, and this is all included in it. In principle, they are mutually conditioned and are grasped by consciousness. This consciousness is the nature of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna).

Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji (Commentary on the Consciousness-Only Treatise) Volume Four (Beginning)

Cheng Weishi Lun Shuji Volume Four (End)

Composed by Śramaṇa (Buddhist monk) Ji

Treatise: Furthermore, the sutra says, '...therefore it should not exist.'

Commentary: The following is evidence for the eighth consciousness. Quoting the Four Kinds of Food Sutra. The food of consciousness having been established is the eighth consciousness. It refers to when the Buddha initially went beyond the city walls to leave home and studied ascetic practices with the heretic Nirgrantha (Nigaṇṭha, a type of ascetic). Because those heretics hung their heads, pulled out their hair, starved themselves, and threw themselves off cliffs, the Buddha ate only sesame and wheat for six years. Later, knowing that this was not the right path, he abandoned it. He received milk porridge from a cowherd girl and, after receiving auspicious grass, went to the Bodhi tree. That night, he attained Bodhi. Those heretics, seeing the Buddha receiving milk porridge, slandered him, saying that the Buddha had broken their precepts. Hearing that the Buddha had attained unsurpassed Bodhi, they went to test the Buddha when he entered the city in the morning to beg for food, first going to the city gate. Seeing the Tathāgata (如來, Thus Come One), they asked the Buddha, saying, 'You say you have attained a dharma that the world cannot understand. Please explain it in detail. What is its meaning?' The Buddha, in order to remove their meaningless ascetic practices, replied to them, saying, 'All sentient beings (有情, all beings with consciousness) abide by food. This is what the Samyak-saṃbuddha (正覺, Perfectly Awakened One) has correctly proclaimed, and others cannot understand.' The heretics laughed and said, 'Even fools understand this. Why say it is perfect enlightenment?' They deeply slandered the Buddha. This sutra was spoken at that time. Both the Mahāyāna (大乘, Great Vehicle) and Hīnayāna (小乘, Lesser Vehicle) schools commonly believe in the existence of this sutra. Although it generally speaks of food, in order to refute their self-starvation, it actually allows for the existence of the four kinds of food (physical food, contact, volition, and consciousness). There is no sentient being who does not have the four kinds of food in a single moment, and this pervades the Three Realms (欲界, Realm of Desire; 色界, Realm of Form; 無色界, Realm of Formlessness), the Five Destinies (地獄, hell; 餓鬼, hungry ghosts; 畜生, animals; 人, humans; 天, devas), and the Four Births (卵生, egg-born; 胎生, womb-born; 濕生, moisture-born; 化生, transformation-born). The food of consciousness among them is the Ālaya-vijñāna (阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness), which is the root of conditions. The Buddha realized the secret meaning of all dharmas and spoke in this way. Although the words are near, the meaning is far. There are three sections. One is as explained above.

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論。謂契經說食有四種。

述曰。此則總標。

下文有四。初陳自宗義。二方破他。三結識食體。四釋妨難。

論。一者段食變壞為相。

述曰。陳宗有四。一出體。二法攝。三釋義。四辨界。此出體也。先出食相　今言段者即分段義。香．味．觸三變壞為相。于變壞時為食相故。先言團食言可團聚。此言非也。其水飲等不可團故。但可說言分分受之故名段食。

此何為性。

論。謂欲界系至能為食事。

述曰。由此準知下三不言界即許界通三。幾事為性香．味．觸三。六十六云。攝食由諸句等。及五十七末極廣明之。對法五說。十一界攝。即此三界。此三一切皆是食耶　于變壞時能為食事。非未變壞說為段食。即非此三一切皆食　對法五說。有變壞故。有變壞者資益之時方名食故。初食未壞但觸所得。六十六說名為觸食。望一食者。非望餘生。若望一切有非是食。即於色界應有段食。由欲界三皆是食故。色界有觸而非段食。如俱舍論第二卷中。問答色界無此所以。

問何故色處非段食耶。

論。由此色處至色無用故。

述曰。勝定果色亦色處類。非變壞時能為資益故非段食。以變壞時色于自根不能資益。于其自根既無資用。于余根等亦無作用。不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論：經書中說，食物有四種。

述曰：這是總體的概括。

下文有四個部分。首先陳述自己的宗義，其次反駁其他觀點，再次確定食物的本體，最後解釋疑問。

論：第一種是段食，以變壞為特徵。

述曰：陳述宗義有四個方面：一是指出本體，二是歸納到法，三是解釋含義，四是辨別界限。這裡是指出本體。首先說明食物的相狀。這裡說的『段』，就是分段的意思。香、味、觸三種以變壞為特徵。在變壞的時候才成為食物的相狀。之前說團食，意思是可團聚的食物。這種說法是不對的，因為水、飲料等不能團聚。只能說它們是分分受用的，所以叫做段食。

這是什麼性質的？

論：指的是欲界所繫，能夠作為食物。

述曰：由此可以推知，下三種食物沒有說明界限，就是允許它們通於三界。有幾種事物是它的性質？香、味、觸三種。《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷說，攝食由諸句等，以及第五十七卷末尾極廣地說明。《阿毗達磨對法論》第五卷說，由十一界所攝，就是這三界。這三種事物都是食物嗎？在變壞的時候能夠作為食物。沒有變壞的時候不能說是段食。也就是說，這三種事物並非都是食物。《阿毗達磨對法論》第五卷說，因為有變壞。有變壞的，在資益的時候才叫做食物。最初的食物沒有變壞，只是觸所得到的。《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷說，這叫做觸食。對於一種食物來說，不是對於其餘的生命。如果對於一切有情來說，就不是食物。也就是說，在應有段食。因為欲界的三種事物都是食物。有觸覺但不是段食。如同《俱舍論》第二卷中，問答**沒有這個原因。

問：為什麼色處不是段食呢？

論：因為色處，乃至色沒有作用。

述曰：勝定果色也是色處的一種。因為在變壞的時候不能提供資益，所以不是段食。因為在變壞的時候，色對於自己的根不能提供資益。對於自己的根既然沒有資用，對於其他的根也沒有作用。不

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: The sutras say that there are four kinds of food.

Commentary: This is a general introduction.

The following text has four parts. First, it presents its own doctrine; second, it refutes other views; third, it identifies the substance of food; and fourth, it explains the difficulties.

Treatise: The first is segment food (Duan Shi), characterized by change and decay.

Commentary: There are four aspects to presenting the doctrine: first, to point out the substance; second, to categorize it into the Dharma; third, to explain the meaning; and fourth, to distinguish the boundaries. This is to point out the substance. First, explain the characteristics of food. The term 'segment' (Duan) here means segmentation. The three: smell (香), taste (味), and touch (觸) are characterized by change and decay. It is in the process of change and decay that it becomes the characteristic of food. Previously, it was said 'lump food', meaning food that can be lumped together. This is not correct, because water, drinks, etc., cannot be lumped together. It can only be said that they are received in segments, hence the name segment food.

What is its nature?

Treatise: It refers to what is related to the desire realm (欲界), and can serve as food.

Commentary: From this, it can be inferred that the following three types of food do not specify boundaries, which means they are allowed to be common to the three realms. How many things are its nature? The three: smell, taste, and touch. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) Volume 66 says that the intake of food is due to various phrases, etc., and Volume 57 at the end explains it very extensively. The Abhidharma-samuccaya (阿毗達磨對法論) Volume 5 says that it is included in the eleven realms, which are these three realms. Are these three things all food? It is when they change and decay that they can serve as food. When they have not changed and decayed, they cannot be called segment food. That is to say, these three things are not all food. The Abhidharma-samuccaya Volume 5 says, because there is change and decay. Those that have change and decay are called food only when they provide nourishment. The initial food has not changed and decayed, but is only obtained through touch. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra Volume 66 says that this is called contact food (觸食). For one type of food, it is not for the remaining lives. If it is for all sentient beings, then it is not food. That is to say, in the there should be segment food. Because the three things in the desire realm are all food. There is touch but it is not segment food. As in the Abhidharmakosa (俱舍論) Volume 2, the question and answer **there is no such reason.

Question: Why is the form element (色處) not segment food?

Treatise: Because the form element, and even form, has no function.

Commentary: The form of the fruit of superior samadhi (勝定果色) is also a type of form element. Because it cannot provide nourishment when it changes and decays, it is not segment food. Because when it changes and decays, form cannot provide nourishment to its own root. Since it has no function for its own root, it also has no function for other roots. It does not

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資養等　又色粗著與根相離方能為境。不與根合故非是食。如攝事分中第九十四卷亦廣分別。本地第五卷亦具明之。不能煩敘。

聲體疏遠。離質用興不能資益故非是食　問此三為食。為對自根。亦對余識　答此三入腹變壞之時。先資自根為資養已。然後乃能資諸根等。發識明利說名為食。非要別對自識所取　其廢立等諸門分別。如別章說。

論。二者觸食至能為食事。

述曰。如六十六．攝事分中。皆以觸數為此食體。由有漏觸才觸境時。攝受喜．樂能為食事。謂能資養生長喜．樂．舍受令增攝益於身故名為食八識俱觸皆是食耶。

論。此觸雖與至資養勝故。

述曰。此觸食體皆通八觸。雖體通與諸識相應。屬六識者。食義偏勝。勝義如何。所觸之境相粗顯故。別能攝受喜．樂受故。能生順益身之舍故。是偏勝義。七．八俱觸境微細故。全不能生喜．樂受故。雖生舍受。但不為損而非益故。由此義顯觸生苦．憂非順益舍有非食體。不資養故。

有人因見世親攝論第三卷。云觸食屬六識。便云觸食體即六識。此義不然。六十六卷．攝事分中　今此論中亦說觸數為觸食體。世親但言此屬六識。此中會取屬六之觸。非取彼識。此文為定　問喜．樂．舍受既能資益。何故非食　答得根

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 資養等：又因為色是粗顯的，並且與根（indriya，感覺器官）相分離，才能成為所緣境。因為它不與根結合，所以不是食（āhāra，食物）。正如《攝事分》中第九十四卷也廣泛地分別說明了這一點。本地第五卷也詳細地闡明了這一點，這裡就不再贅述了。 聲的實體是疏遠的，離開物質而生起作用，不能資助和補益，所以不是食。問：這三種食，是對治自身的根，還是對治其他的識（vijñāna，意識）？答：這三種食進入腹中變壞的時候，先資助自身的根，作為資養之後，然後才能資助諸根等，使意識明利，這被稱為食。並非一定要特別地對治自身意識所取。關於廢立等各種門類的分別，如在其他章節中所說。 論：二者，觸食（sparśa-āhāra，觸所滋養的食物）乃至能成為食事。 述曰：如第六十六卷《攝事分》中，都以觸數（sparśa-saṃkhyā，觸的數目）作為這種食的本體。由於有漏的觸在接觸境界時，攝受喜、樂，能成為食事。意思是說，它能資養、生長喜、樂、舍受（upekṣā-vedanā，不苦不樂的感受），使之增長，攝益於身，所以名為食。八識（aṣṭa vijñāna，八種意識）俱生的觸都是食嗎？ 論：這種觸雖然與（諸識相應），但資養的作用更勝。 述曰：這種觸食的本體，普遍與八觸相應。但屬於六識（ṣaṭ vijñāna，六種意識）的觸，食的意義更加殊勝。殊勝的意義是什麼呢？因為所觸的境界相是粗顯的，所以特別能夠攝受喜、樂受。能夠產生順益於身體的舍受，這是偏勝的意義。第七識和第八識俱生的觸，境界微細，完全不能產生喜、樂受。即使產生舍受，但它不是損害，也不是利益，因此，這個意義顯示，觸所生的苦、憂不是順益，舍受也不是食的本體，因為它不能資養。 有人因為看到世親（Vasubandhu）的《攝論》第三卷，說觸食屬於六識，就說觸食的本體就是六識。這種說法是不對的。《六十六卷·攝事分》中，以及現在的這部論中，也都說觸數是觸食的本體。世親只是說它屬於六識，這裡會取屬於六識的觸，而不是取彼識。這個文句是確定的。問：喜、樂、舍受既然能夠資益，為什麼不是食？答：得到根

【English Translation】 English version: 'Nourishment' and so on: Furthermore, form (rūpa) is coarse and separate from the root (indriya, sense organ) in order to become an object (ālambana). Because it does not combine with the root, it is not food (āhāra). As explained extensively in the ninety-fourth fascicle of the Saṃgrahavastu, and also detailed in the fifth fascicle of the Local Treatise. I will not elaborate further here. The substance of sound is distant, arising and functioning separately from matter, and cannot nourish or benefit, so it is not food. Question: Are these three foods directed towards their own roots, or towards other consciousnesses (vijñāna)? Answer: When these three foods enter the abdomen and are transformed, they first nourish their own roots. After providing nourishment, they can then nourish the other roots, etc., making the consciousnesses clear and sharp, which is called food. It is not necessarily directed specifically towards what is apprehended by one's own consciousness. The distinctions regarding establishment and abolition, etc., are as discussed in other chapters. Treatise: Secondly, contact-food (sparśa-āhāra) can even become food. Commentary: As in the sixty-sixth fascicle of the Saṃgrahavastu, the number of contacts (sparśa-saṃkhyā) is taken as the substance of this food. Because defiled contact, when it touches an object, gathers joy and pleasure, it can become food. That is to say, it can nourish and grow joy, pleasure, and neutral feeling (upekṣā-vedanā), increasing and benefiting the body, so it is called food. Is contact arising with all eight consciousnesses (aṣṭa vijñāna) food? Treatise: Although this contact is associated with (all consciousnesses), its nourishing function is superior. Commentary: The substance of this contact-food is universally associated with the eight contacts. However, for contact belonging to the six consciousnesses (ṣaṭ vijñāna), the meaning of food is particularly superior. What is the meaning of superior? Because the object touched is coarse and manifest, it is particularly able to gather feelings of joy and pleasure. It can produce neutral feeling that benefits the body, which is the meaning of being particularly superior. Contact arising with the seventh and eighth consciousnesses has subtle objects and cannot produce feelings of joy and pleasure at all. Even if it produces neutral feeling, it is neither harmful nor beneficial. Therefore, this meaning shows that the suffering and sorrow produced by contact are not beneficial, and neutral feeling is not the substance of food, because it cannot nourish. Some people, seeing that Vasubandhu's Saṃgraha Treatise, third fascicle, says that contact-food belongs to the six consciousnesses, then say that the substance of contact-food is the six consciousnesses. This view is incorrect. In the sixty-sixth fascicle of the Saṃgrahavastu, and also in this treatise, it is said that the number of contacts is the substance of contact-food. Vasubandhu only says that it belongs to the six consciousnesses; here, we take the contact that belongs to the six consciousnesses, not taking those consciousnesses themselves. This passage is definitive. Question: Since joy, pleasure, and neutral feeling can nourish, why are they not food? Answer: Obtaining the root

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本境本資益者。唯觸數故。

論。三意思食至能為食事。

述曰。此體即是有漏思數。與欲數俱方是食體。余相應思無希望相故。若希可愛境。此通未來及與現在。然對法等欲緣未來現在無慾。即欲無減不緣三世。今言希望希望三世皆與其合。何妨此欲通緣三世。若緣過去與念何異。念但追憶。而不希望與彼法合。若爾應念亦緣未來。念類無失。緣亦無爽。

論。此思雖與至希望勝故。

述曰。此食通與八識相應故。雖通與八識相應。屬意識者食義偏勝。故瑜伽說。深勝希望及緣未來。非余俱思希望勝故。由此亦準。屬六識者體非六識。不爾思食體應第六　問欲何故不為食體。而取俱思　答思慮益根非欲能故。

論。四者識食至能為食事。

述曰。由前三食勢分力故。此識得增長。識復長養諸根大種能為食事。六十六等說。由段食等資養根大。令所發識明利現前故。由段等三食勢力資長於識。五十七說。令識增盛已識后長養諸根大種。

論。此識雖通至執持勝故。

述曰。識食體通八識。而第八識食義勝。故攝論．對法。皆唯取第八。但由觸．思資長第八。為遠疏緣亦由段食　此第八何以勝。不改易。恒一類。無間斷。常相續。執持勝故。

論。由是集論至

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 本境和本資益的，唯有觸數（sparśa，感覺）的緣故。

論：三種意思食乃至能作為食事。

述曰：此體就是有漏的思數（cetanā，思）。與欲數（chanda，意欲）共同存在才是食的本體。其餘相應的思沒有希望的相狀的緣故。如果希望可愛的境界，這貫通未來以及現在。然而對法等認為欲緣未來現在沒有欲，即欲沒有減少不緣三世。現在說希望，希望三世都與它結合。不妨礙此欲貫通緣三世。如果緣過去與念（smṛti，憶念）有什麼不同？念只是追憶，而不希望與那個法結合。如果這樣，應該念也緣未來。唸的種類沒有缺失，緣也沒有差錯。

論：此思雖然與乃至希望殊勝的緣故。

述曰：此食貫通與八識相應故。雖然貫通與八識相應，屬於意識的食義偏勝。所以瑜伽論說，深勝的希望以及緣未來，不是其餘共同的思希望殊勝的緣故。由此也準，屬於六識的體不是六識。不然思食的本體應該是第六識。問：欲為什麼不作為食的本體？而取共同的思？答：思慮增益根，不是欲能夠做到的緣故。

論：四者識食乃至能作為食事。

述曰：由前三種食的勢分力故，此識得以增長。識又長養諸根大種，能作為食事。六十六等說，由段食等資養根大，令所發之識明利現前故。由段等三種食的勢力資長於識。五十七說，令識增盛已，識后長養諸根大種。

論：此識雖然通乃至執持殊勝的緣故。

述曰：識食的本體貫通八識。而第八識的食義殊勝。所以攝論、對法，都只取第八識。但由觸、思資長第八識，作為遠疏的緣，也由段食。此第八識為什麼殊勝？不改變，恒常一類，沒有間斷，常常相續，執持殊勝的緣故。

論：由是集論乃至

【English Translation】 English version: That which is the source and the nourishment of this realm is solely due to the nature of contact (sparśa).

Treatise: The three kinds of mental food, up to, are capable of being food.

Commentary: This substance is the tainted thought-factor (cetanā). Only when it exists together with the desire-factor (chanda) does it constitute the essence of food. Other associated thoughts do not have the aspect of hope. If one hopes for a desirable realm, this encompasses the future as well as the present. However, the Abhidharma and others consider that desire does not exist in relation to the future and present, meaning that desire does not diminish and does not relate to the three times. Now, when we speak of hope, it is hoped that all three times will be united with it. There is no reason why this desire cannot relate to all three times. If it relates to the past, how is it different from memory (smṛti)? Memory merely recalls, without hoping to be united with that dharma. If that were the case, then memory should also relate to the future. The category of memory is not lost, and the relation is also not mistaken.

Treatise: This thought, although associated with, is superior in hope.

Commentary: This food is universally associated with the eight consciousnesses. Although it is universally associated with the eight consciousnesses, its function as food is particularly prominent when it belongs to the mind-consciousness. Therefore, the Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra says that profound and superior hope and relation to the future are not due to the superior hope of other associated thoughts. From this, it can also be inferred that the substance belonging to the six consciousnesses is not the six consciousnesses themselves. Otherwise, the substance of thought-food should be the sixth consciousness. Question: Why is desire not considered the substance of food, but rather the associated thought? Answer: Because thought benefits the roots, which desire is incapable of doing.

Treatise: The fourth is consciousness-food, up to, is capable of being food.

Commentary: Due to the power and strength of the previous three foods, this consciousness is able to grow. Consciousness, in turn, nourishes the roots and the great elements, and is capable of being food. The Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and others say that the coarse food and others nourish the roots and the great elements, causing the consciousness that arises from them to be clear and manifest. The power of the three foods, such as coarse food, nourishes and increases consciousness. The Pañcavimsatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra says that after consciousness has been increased, it then nourishes the roots and the great elements.

Treatise: This consciousness, although universally, is superior in holding.

Commentary: The substance of consciousness-food universally encompasses the eight consciousnesses. However, the function of the eighth consciousness as food is superior. Therefore, both the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Abhidharmasamuccaya only take the eighth consciousness. However, the eighth consciousness is nourished and increased by contact and thought, serving as a distant and indirect cause, and also by coarse food. Why is this eighth consciousness superior? Because it does not change, is constantly of one kind, has no interruption, is constantly continuous, and is superior in holding.

Treatise: Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya up to

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十一界攝。

述曰。第二法攝。由此段食三處為性。觸思體者即觸．思數。識食體通八識。集論第三．雜集第五。說三蘊．五處．十一界一分為體。三蘊即色．行．識。五處即香．味．觸．意．法處。十一界即七心．香．味．觸．法界。然彼言一分。此處略之。彼通有漏．無漏。今唯取有漏。又彼通等流．長養．報．非報．三性．三受等故。

何故名食。

論。此四能持至故名為食。

述曰。第三釋食義也。

論。段食唯于至隨識有無。

述曰。第四辨界。段食地獄用。順欲勝故。觸．意思二遍三界用。六相應者隨識或無。八相應者隨識恒有。故依識轉隨識有無。即顯識食亦通三界。故四食體不減不增。如大論第六十六．攝事分．本地第五等卷說。

此上大乘引傍乘義且出食體。自下第二破執諸識為識食者。于中有四。一總破諸部。二別破薩婆多。三別破上座。四別破經部。

論。眼等轉識至能持身命。

述曰。此是初總。謂六轉識五位有間斷。三性等轉易。不遍三界。亦非恒時。故不能持身及命也。

自下別解。隨其所應各對宗說。

論。謂無心定至有間斷故。

述曰。釋上間斷　無心定者。二無心定　熟眠者。無心眠　悶絕亦爾　生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 十一界所攝。

述曰：第二法攝。由此段食以三處為自性。觸、思的本體即觸數和思數。識食的本體通於八識。《集論》第三、《雜集》第五說，三蘊、五處、十一界的一部分為本體。三蘊即色蘊、行蘊、識蘊。五處即香處、味處、觸處、意處、法處。十一界即七心界、香界、味界、觸界、法界。然而彼處說'一部分'，此處省略了。彼處通於有漏、無漏，今此處只取有漏。又彼處通於等流果、長養果、異熟果、非異熟果、三性、三受等。

何故名為食？

論：此四種食能持續滋養，故名為食。

述曰：第三解釋食的含義。

論：段食唯在欲界使用，隨識的有無而存在。

述曰：第四辨別界限。段食在地獄使用，因為順應慾望的緣故。觸、意思二者遍於三界使用，與六識相應的隨識的有無而存在，與八識相應的隨識恒常存在。所以依識而轉，隨識的有無而存在。這顯示識食也通於三界。所以四食的本體不減少也不增加。如《大毗婆沙論》第六十六、《攝事分》、《本地分》第五等卷所說。

以上大乘引用傍論的意義，暫且說明食的本體。從下面開始，第二部分是破斥執著諸識為識食的觀點。其中有四個部分：一是總破斥各部派，二是分別破斥薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins），三是分別破斥上座部（Theravadins），四是分別破斥經部（Sautrantikas）。

論：眼等轉識不能持續滋養身命。

述曰：這是最初的總破斥。說六轉識在五位中有間斷，三性等會轉變，不遍於三界，也不是恒常存在，所以不能持續滋養身及命。

從下面開始，分別解釋，根據各自的情況對各宗派進行駁斥。

論：所謂無心定等狀態，因為有間斷的緣故。

述曰：解釋上面的間斷。無心定者，指二無心定。熟眠者，指無心睡眠。悶絕也是如此。生...

【English Translation】 English version Included within the eleven realms.

Commentary: The second is the 'collection of dharmas'. Because of this, 'coarse food' (段食) has the nature of three 'locations' (處). The substance of 'contact' (觸) and 'volition' (思) are the numbers of 'contact' and 'volition'. The substance of 'consciousness-food' (識食) pervades the eight consciousnesses. The third volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (集論) and the fifth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccayavyākhyā (雜集) state that the three aggregates, five locations, and a portion of the eleven realms are its substance. The three aggregates are the aggregates of form (色), formation (行), and consciousness (識). The five locations are the locations of smell (香), taste (味), touch (觸), mind (意), and dharma (法). The eleven realms are the seven 'mind-realms' (七心界), and the realms of smell (香), taste (味), touch (觸), and dharma (法). However, they say 'a portion' there, which is omitted here. That pervades the contaminated (有漏) and uncontaminated (無漏), but here we only take the contaminated. Moreover, that pervades the 'equal-flowing result' (等流果), 'nourishing result' (長養果), 'retribution result' (異熟果), 'non-retribution result' (非異熟果), the three natures, and the three feelings, etc.

Why is it called 'food'?

Treatise: These four are able to sustain, therefore they are called 'food'.

Commentary: The third explains the meaning of 'food'.

Treatise: 'Coarse food' is only used in the desire realm (欲界), and exists depending on the presence or absence of consciousness.

Commentary: The fourth distinguishes the boundaries. 'Coarse food' is used in the lower realm because it accords with desire. 'Contact' and 'volition' are used throughout the three realms. Those that correspond to the six consciousnesses exist depending on the presence or absence of consciousness, while those that correspond to the eight consciousnesses are always present depending on consciousness. Therefore, it turns according to consciousness, existing depending on the presence or absence of consciousness. This shows that 'consciousness-food' also pervades the three realms. Therefore, the substance of the four foods neither decreases nor increases, as stated in the sixty-sixth volume of the Mahāvibhāṣā (大毗婆沙論), the Saṃgrahavastu (攝事分), and the fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi (本地分), etc.

The above is the meaning of the Great Vehicle, quoting the meaning of the side-vehicles, and temporarily explaining the substance of food. From below, the second part is to refute the view that the various consciousnesses are 'consciousness-food'. There are four parts: first, a general refutation of the various schools; second, a separate refutation of the Sarvastivadins (薩婆多部); third, a separate refutation of the Theravadins (上座部); and fourth, a separate refutation of the Sautrantikas (經部).

Treatise: The transforming consciousnesses (轉識) such as eye-consciousness, etc., cannot continuously sustain the body and life.

Commentary: This is the initial general refutation. It says that the six transforming consciousnesses have interruptions in the five positions, the three natures, etc., transform, do not pervade the three realms, and are not constant, so they cannot continuously sustain the body and life.

From below, they are explained separately, refuting each school according to its respective situation.

Treatise: The so-called 'mindless samādhi' (無心定), etc., is because there are interruptions.

Commentary: Explaining the above interruptions. 'Mindless samādhi' refers to the two 'mindless samādhis' (二無心定). 'Sound sleep' refers to 'mindless sleep' (無心眠). 'Fainting' is also like this. Birth...

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無想天有間斷故。此解有間。

論。設有心位至非遍非恒。

述曰。設除此五位。隨所依根．所緣境界．三性異．三界別．九地殊．漏無漏等。有轉易故。此解有轉　于持身命。非遍三界。亦非是恒互持諸根。六種轉識。一非恒有。二轉易故。

論。諸有執無至皆依食住。

述曰。二十部中。汝若執無第八識者。依何等食經說是言。一切有情皆依食住。若以轉識而為食者。即入無心定等位時。便有有情不依食住。如何佛說一切有情皆依食住。

論。非無心位至無體用故。

述曰。破薩婆多等。薩婆多言無心位中雖無有識。入定前識為識食體有何過失。我過去有故　然彼起食用。唯過．現世。非未來世。今設遮之言未來也。今言不應爾。總非量云。定之前後去來有漏順益之識。非食體用。非現．常故。如空花等。彼宗不許無體用因。故但宗法。遮過去令無食體用。但遮未來食體。今設遮未來用。此是不許有體等難。

論。設有體用至非食性故。

述曰。自下設許有體用難。去來識等如上所言。亦非食性。非現在故。如虛空等。以無為非食故。非現在因。雖現在者非皆是食體。是同品定有性故。得成正因。

論。亦不可說至有情為食。

述曰。上來破世。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『無想天』（Sañjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana，非想非非想處天）的禪定是有間斷的，因此這種解脫也是有間斷的。

論：假設有心識的狀態，它不是普遍存在，也不是恒常存在的。

述曰：假設排除這五種無心位，心識會隨著所依賴的根、所緣的境界、三性（善、惡、無記）的不同、三界（欲界、色界、無色界）的差別、九地（九種禪定境界）的殊異、有漏無漏等等而發生轉變，因此這種解脫是有轉變的。對於維持身命來說，心識不是普遍存在於三界，也不是恒常存在，而是互相維持諸根。六種轉識，一是非恒常存在，二是容易轉變。

論：那些執著沒有第八識的人，都依賴食物而住。

述曰：在二十部派中，如果你們執著沒有第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālayavijñāna）的話，那麼依據什麼食物，佛經上說『一切有情皆依食住』？如果以轉識作為食物，那麼進入無心定等狀態時，就會有有情不依賴食物而住。那麼佛陀怎麼會說一切有情都依賴食物而住呢？

論：無心位不是沒有，而是沒有體和用。

述曰：這是爲了駁斥薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）等。薩婆多部說，無心位中雖然沒有識，但是入定前的識作為識食的體，有什麼過失呢？因為我過去有。然而，那個（入定前的識）起作用，只在過去和現在，不在未來。現在假設遮止它，說的是未來。現在說不應該是這樣。總的來說，可以用比量來證明：入定前後，過去和未來的有漏的、順益的識，不是食的體和用，因為它不是現在和常有的，就像空中的花朵等。他們的宗義不允許沒有體用的因，所以只用宗法，遮止過去，使它沒有食的體用，只是遮止未來的食的體。現在假設遮止未來的用。這是不允許有體等難。

論：假設有體和用，也不是食的性質。

述曰：下面假設允許有體和用，來設定難題。過去和未來的識等，就像上面所說的，也不是食的性質，因為它不是現在的，就像虛空等。因為無為法不是食，所以不是現在的因。即使是現在的，也不是都是食的體，因為它是同品（指與食同類的法）的，並且是定有的性質，所以可以成為正因。

論：也不可說有情以有情為食。

述曰：上面是爲了駁斥世間。

【English Translation】 English version The 『Sañjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana』 (the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception) has interruptions, therefore this liberation is also interrupted.

Treatise: Suppose there is a state of mind that is neither universal nor constant.

Commentary: Suppose we exclude these five states of mindlessness, the consciousness will change according to the roots it relies on, the objects it perceives, the differences in the three natures (good, evil, and neutral), the distinctions in the three realms (desire realm, form realm, and formless realm), the variations in the nine grounds (nine levels of meditative absorption), the presence or absence of outflows, and so on. Therefore, this liberation is subject to change. In terms of sustaining life, consciousness is neither universally present in the three realms nor constant, but rather mutually sustains the faculties. The six transforming consciousnesses are, firstly, not constant, and secondly, easily changeable.

Treatise: Those who insist on the absence of the eighth consciousness all rely on food for sustenance.

Commentary: Among the twenty schools, if you insist that there is no eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness), then according to what food does the sutra say, 『All sentient beings rely on food for sustenance』? If the transforming consciousnesses are taken as food, then when entering states of mindlessness, there would be sentient beings not relying on food for sustenance. How could the Buddha say that all sentient beings rely on food for sustenance?

Treatise: The state of mindlessness is not non-existent, but rather lacks substance and function.

Commentary: This is to refute the Sarvāstivāda school, etc. The Sarvāstivādins say that although there is no consciousness in the state of mindlessness, what fault is there in the consciousness before entering samadhi being the substance of consciousness-food? Because I had it in the past. However, that (consciousness before entering samadhi) only functions in the past and present, not in the future. Now, suppose we prevent it, referring to the future. Now we say it should not be like this. In general, we can use inference to prove that the defiled, beneficial consciousness of the past and future before and after entering samadhi is not the substance and function of food, because it is not present and constant, like flowers in the sky, etc. Their doctrine does not allow for causes without substance and function, so they only use the proposition, preventing the past, so that it has no substance and function of food, only preventing the future substance of food. Now suppose we prevent the future function. This is the difficulty of not allowing substance, etc.

Treatise: Suppose there is substance and function, it is still not the nature of food.

Commentary: Below, suppose we allow substance and function, to set up a difficult question. The consciousness of the past and future, etc., as mentioned above, is also not the nature of food, because it is not present, like empty space, etc. Because unconditioned dharmas are not food, they are not present causes. Even if it is present, it is not all the substance of food, because it is of the same kind (referring to dharmas of the same category as food) and has a definite nature, so it can become a correct cause.

Treatise: It also cannot be said that sentient beings take sentient beings as food.

Commentary: The above is to refute the worldly view.

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下別破法。此正破彼宗。薩婆多雲。定前久心非是食性。鄰入定心正是食體。與無心位有情為食。亦名食住。

論。住無心時至已極成故。

述曰。不然。住無心時已滅無故現在無食。過去非食已極成故。說非現常如空花故。要現在識方名食故。此無性釋。余世親釋。

論。又不可說至即為彼食。

述曰。難本計已。彼設救言。無想定等體即是食。及在定中命根．同分不相應行正是食性。今言不爾。

論。段等四食所不攝故。

述曰。如聲等法定非是食。此縱有體難。

論。不相應法非實有故。

述曰。假法非食。如瓶．盆等。又前難無想等為食。后難以命根等為食。無性釋云心．心所滅亦非是食。但有此中無想定等。無命根等。

上來破薩婆多訖。自下第三上座部師救云。

論。有執滅定等至后當廣破。

述曰。至下當知。此世親有。經部師計亦同上座。

自下第四正破經部。兼破薩婆多。

論。又彼應說至不可為食。

述曰。諸識不併。生上二界起無漏心時以何為食。地獄可然。有段食故。無漏識等非彼之食。破壞有故。如涅槃等。非於彼界無漏是食。

論。亦不可執至有漏種故。

述曰。此但破經部。汝

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 下面是別破法（針對其他宗派的破斥方法）。這正是破斥薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的宗義。薩婆多部認為，入定之前的久遠心念不是食（ahara，食物）的性質，鄰近入定的心念才是真正的食的本體，對於處於無心位的有情來說，這也是食，也叫做食住。

論：處於無心狀態時，已經到了極點，所以（不是食）。

述曰：不然。處於無心狀態時，心已滅盡，所以現在沒有食。過去的心念不是食，這已經確定了，所以說它不是現在的，也不是常有的，就像空中的花一樣。必須是現在的識（vijnana，意識）才能稱為食。這是無性（Asanga）的解釋。世親（Vasubandhu）也有解釋。

論：又不可說（無想定等）的體就是他們的食。

述曰：這是難破薩婆多部的計議。他們假設救護之言，認為無想定（Asamjnasamadhi，無想定）等的體就是食，以及在定中的命根（jivitendriya，生命力）、同分（nikayasabhaga，同類性）等不相應行（viprayuktasamskara，不相應行法）正是食的性質。現在說不是這樣的。

論：因為段食（kabali-kara，段食）等四食所不包含。

述曰：就像聲等法一樣，確定不是食。這即使有體性也很難成立。

論：因為不相應法不是真實存在的。

述曰：虛假的法不是食，如瓶、盆等。又，前面是難破無想定等為食，後面是難以命根等為食。無性解釋說，心、心所（citta-caitta，心所法）滅盡也不是食。只是在這種情況下，有無想定等，沒有命根等。

上面破斥薩婆多部完畢。下面第三，上座部師（Sthavira，上座部）救護說：

論：有人執著滅盡定（nirodha-samapatti，滅盡定）等是食，後面將廣泛破斥。

述曰：到後面就知道了。這是世親的觀點。經部師（Sautrantika，經量部）的計議也與上座部相同。

下面第四，正式破斥經部，兼破薩婆多部。

論：又他們應該說，（在上二界）以什麼為食？（無漏心）不可為食。

述曰：諸識不能同時並存。在上二界生起無漏心（anasrava-citta，無漏心）時，以什麼為食？地獄還可以，因為有段食的緣故。無漏識等不是他們的食，因為破壞了有（bhava，存在）。如涅槃等，不是在那個界無漏就是食。

論：也不可執著（無漏識等）是有漏種（sasrava-bija，有漏種子）。

述曰：這只是破斥經部。你們...

【English Translation】 English version: Next is the 'other-breaking' method (a method of refuting other schools). This is precisely refuting the tenets of the Sarvastivada (the 'All Exists' school). The Sarvastivadins say that the long-lasting thoughts before entering Samadhi (concentration) are not of the nature of 'ahara' (food), but the thoughts just before entering Samadhi are the actual substance of 'food'. For sentient beings in a state of no-mind, this is also 'food', and it is also called 'food-abiding'.

Treatise: Abiding in a state of no-mind has already reached its extreme, therefore (it is not food).

Commentary: That is not so. When abiding in a state of no-mind, the mind has already ceased, so there is no 'food' now. Past thoughts are not 'food', this has already been established, so it is said that it is neither present nor permanent, like flowers in the sky. Only present consciousness (vijnana) can be called 'food'. This is Asanga's explanation. Vasubandhu also has an explanation.

Treatise: Also, it cannot be said that the substance of (Asamjnasamadhi, etc.) is their 'food'.

Commentary: This is a difficult refutation of the Sarvastivada's argument. They hypothetically offer a saving argument, believing that the substance of Asamjnasamadhi (Non-Perception Samadhi), etc., is 'food', and that the jivitendriya (life-faculty), nikayasabhaga (species-similarity), etc., which are 'viprayuktasamskara' (non-associated formations) in Samadhi, are precisely the nature of 'food'. Now it is said that this is not so.

Treatise: Because it is not included in the four kinds of 'food' such as 'kabali-kara' (physical food).

Commentary: Just like sound and other dharmas, it is certain that they are not 'food'. Even if this has substance, it is difficult to establish.

Treatise: Because 'non-associated formations' are not truly existent.

Commentary: False dharmas are not 'food', such as bottles, basins, etc. Also, the previous difficulty was refuting Asamjnasamadhi, etc., as 'food', and the latter difficulty is refuting jivitendriya, etc., as 'food'. Asanga explains that the cessation of mind and mental factors (citta-caitta) is also not 'food'. It is just that in this case, there are Asamjnasamadhi, etc., but no jivitendriya, etc.

The refutation of the Sarvastivada school is now complete. Next, the Sthavira (Elder) school offers a saving argument:

Treatise: Some hold that Nirodha-samapatti (Cessation Samadhi), etc., are 'food', which will be widely refuted later.

Commentary: It will be known later. This is Vasubandhu's view. The Sautrantika (Sutra school) also has the same argument as the Sthavira school.

Next, the fourth, formally refuting the Sautrantika school, and also refuting the Sarvastivada school.

Treatise: Also, they should say, what is 'food' (in the upper two realms)? (Anasrava-citta, the undefiled mind) cannot be 'food'.

Commentary: The various consciousnesses cannot coexist. When an undefiled mind (anasrava-citta) arises in the upper two realms, what is 'food'? It is possible in the lower realm because there is physical food. The undefiled consciousness, etc., are not their 'food' because they destroy existence (bhava). Like Nirvana, etc., it is not that the undefiled is 'food' in that realm.

Treatise: Also, it cannot be held that (the undefiled consciousness, etc.) are 'sasrava-bija' (defiled seeds).

Commentary: This is only refuting the Sautrantika school. You...

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又若言無漏識中有有漏種。即以無漏為彼食體。此亦不然。無漏識等不能為食。不能執持有漏種故。如涅槃等。若言此因有隨一失。我許執持有漏種故。應立宗言。無漏之識。不得執持有漏種子。是無漏故。如涅槃等。

論。復不可說至彼身命故。

述曰。上本宗。下設義雙破二部。彼設救言。在彼上界起無漏時。有情身．命既互相持即互為食。此亦不然。四食不攝彼身．命故。彼身．命定非是食。四食不攝故。如生住等。

論。又無色無身至無實體故。

述曰。設許身是食。理亦不然。無色界無身。汝之命根無能持故。若言眾同分能持命根等。皆無實體故。亦非是食。

論。由此定知至令不斷壞。

述曰。自下第三結識食體。由異熟識具三義故。

論。世尊依此至皆依食住。

述曰。由本識故作是說言。一切有情皆依食住。由此本識無間。無轉。一類住故。是遍是恒故名為食。然有難言。佛是有情即無有食。無心定等何廢無食。一切有情言即不遍故。

下第四正答難言。

論。唯依取蘊至非有情攝。

述曰。此中正顯一切有情言不遍於佛。

論。說為有情至示現而說。

述曰。示現為有情。亦示現有食。據實而言。佛非有情。非

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果又說無漏識（Anasrava-vijnana，指沒有煩惱的清凈意識）中存在有漏種（Sasrava-bija，指有煩惱的種子），那麼就以無漏識作為有漏種的食（Ahara，指滋養）。這也是不成立的。無漏識等不能作為食，因為它們不能執持（Dharana，指保持）有漏種，就像涅槃（Nirvana，指解脫）等一樣。如果說這個原因有隨一失（Anyatara-siddhi，指不能完全成立），我承認無漏識執持有漏種。應該立宗說：無漏的識，不能執持有漏的種子，因為它本身是無漏的，就像涅槃等一樣。

論：又不可說乃至彼身命故。

述曰：上面是本宗（Svapaksha，指自己的宗義），下面是設義（Arthapatti，一種論證方法）雙重破斥二部（指不同的佛教派別）。他們假設救護說：在彼上界（Urdhva-bhumi，指色界和無色界）生起無漏識時，有情（Sattva，指眾生）的身（Kaya，指身體）、命（Jivita，指生命）既然互相支援，就互相作為食。這也是不成立的。四食（Catvaro Ahara，指四種滋養生命的因素）不包括他們的身命。他們的身命必定不是食，因為四食不包括它們，就像生（Jati，指出生）、住（Sthiti，指存在）等一樣。

論：又無色無身乃至無實體故。

述曰：假設允許身是食，道理也是不成立的。無色界（Arupadhatu，指沒有物質形態的境界）沒有身。你的命根（Jivitendriya，指維持生命的要素）沒有能執持者。如果說眾同分（Nikayasabhaga，指同類眾生的共業）能執持命根等，但它們都沒有實體，所以也不是食。

論：由此定知乃至令不斷壞。

述曰：從下面第三部分總結識食的體性。由於異熟識（Vipaka-vijnana，指果報識）具有三種意義。

論：世尊依此乃至皆依食住。

述曰：由於本識（Mula-vijnana，指根本識）的緣故，才這樣說：一切有情都依靠食而住。由此本識無間（Avici，指沒有間隔）、無轉（Avrtti，指沒有轉變）、一類住（Sajatiya-sthiti，指同類相續），所以是普遍的、恒常的，因此稱為食。然而有人提出疑問：佛（Buddha，指覺悟者）是有情，那麼就沒有食了嗎？無心定（Asamjnika-samapatti，指無想定）等為什麼妨礙沒有食呢？一切有情這個說法就不普遍了。

下面第四部分正式回答疑問。

論：唯依取蘊乃至非有情攝。

述曰：這裡正式表明一切有情這個說法不包括佛。

論：說為有情乃至示現而說。

述曰：示現為有情，也示現為有食。但據實而言，佛不是有情，不是有

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, if it is said that in the Anasrava-vijnana (undefiled consciousness), there exist Sasrava-bija (defiled seeds), then the Anasrava-vijnana is considered as Ahara (nourishment) for them. This is also not valid. The Anasrava-vijnana and others cannot be Ahara because they cannot perform Dharana (holding) of the Sasrava-bija, just like Nirvana (liberation). If it is said that this reason has Anyatara-siddhi (one-sidedness), I concede that the Anasrava-vijnana holds the Sasrava-bija. It should be established as a proposition: undefiled consciousness cannot hold defiled seeds because it is undefiled, just like Nirvana.

Treatise: Furthermore, it cannot be said, up to their body and life.

Commentary: The above is the Svapaksha (own doctrine), and the following is the Arthapatti (implication) that doubly refutes the two schools (different Buddhist schools). They hypothetically offer a defense: when Anasrava arises in the Urdhva-bhumi (higher realms), the Kaya (body) and Jivita (life) of Sattva (sentient beings) support each other and thus serve as Ahara for each other. This is also not valid. The Catvaro Ahara (four kinds of nourishment) do not include their body and life. Their body and life are definitely not Ahara because the four kinds of nourishment do not include them, just like Jati (birth), Sthiti (existence), etc.

Treatise: Furthermore, in the Arupadhatu (formless realm), there is no body, up to no substantial entity.

Commentary: Supposing it is allowed that the body is Ahara, the reasoning is also not valid. In the Arupadhatu, there is no body. Your Jivitendriya (life faculty) has no one to hold it. If it is said that the Nikayasabhaga (community of beings) can hold the life faculty, etc., but they have no substantial entity, so they are also not Ahara.

Treatise: From this, it is definitely known, up to causing it to not be interrupted and destroyed.

Commentary: From the following third part, the nature of Vijnana-ahara (consciousness as nourishment) is concluded. Because the Vipaka-vijnana (resultant consciousness) has three meanings.

Treatise: The World-Honored One, relying on this, up to all rely on Ahara to abide.

Commentary: Because of the Mula-vijnana (root consciousness), it is said that all Sattva abide relying on Ahara. Because this Mula-vijnana is Avici (uninterrupted), Avrtti (non-returning), and has Sajatiya-sthiti (homogeneous continuity), it is pervasive and constant, therefore it is called Ahara. However, someone raises a question: the Buddha (enlightened one) is a Sattva, so is there no Ahara? Why do Asamjnika-samapatti (non-perceptual attainment) and others prevent the absence of Ahara? The statement 'all Sattva' is not pervasive.

The following fourth part formally answers the question.

Treatise: Only relying on taking aggregates, up to not included in Sattva.

Commentary: Here it is formally stated that the statement 'all Sattva' does not include the Buddha.

Treatise: Said to be Sattva, up to showing and speaking.

Commentary: Showing as Sattva, also showing as having Ahara. But in reality, the Buddha is not a Sattva, not having

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非情等。故集論等說佛是示現依止住食。

論。既異熟識至此第八識。

述曰。第三總結。雖知識食通諸八識。唯異熟識是勝食性。彼食即是此第八識。此食諸門分別義理。勘諸經論。並俱舍等。如六十六廣有諸門。

論。又契經說至識不離身。

述曰。自下第九滅定契經。入此定者滅身行入出息。第四定上氣即絕行。況此位故。語行尋．伺。心行受．想無不皆滅。行者因義。此中亦有以十大地俱為心行。隨心有無故。然隨勝者唯說受．想以為心行　而壽不滅。即薩婆多師命根。命根體即壽。大乘前說種子是壽。即命根故。經量部師既無命根。以何為壽。色．心不斷于上假立　亦不離暖根無變壞。隨部所計即彼法持　識不離身。正是所諍。然欲出經同法為例。兼誦余文。非正所競。

論。若無此識至不應有故。

述曰。此總非已。

次下第二正解之中有二　初破滅定識不離身。二例無想應爾　初中有四。第一總破諸部小乘在滅定中說無本識。出已正義。第二破薩婆多。第三破經部本計。第四破經部末計。

論。謂眼等識至彼識皆滅。

述曰。眼等諸識有二行相。一者粗。二者動。粗則相貌。易知。動乃數加轉易。或復間斷。或變其性。有處無有多緣散亂故名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 非情等。因此，《集論》等論著說佛是示現依止住食（佛爲了教化眾生，示現需要依止住所和食物）。 論：既然異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，第八識的別名）…直到此第八識（第八阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijñāna）。 述曰：第三，總結。雖然知識食（Vijñāna-āhāra，四食之一）通於諸八識（眼識、耳識等八種識），但只有異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）是殊勝的食性。彼食（指異熟識）即是此第八識（第八阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijñāna）。此食（指異熟識）的各種門類的分別義理，可以參考諸經論，以及《俱舍論》等，如第六十六卷廣有諸門。 論：又契經說…直到識不離身。 述曰：自下第九，滅定契經（指描述滅盡定的經典）。入此定者，滅身行（Kāya-saṃskāra，身業）——入出息（呼吸）。第四禪以上，氣息即絕，何況此位（滅盡定）？所以語行（Vacī-saṃskāra，語業）——尋（Vitarka，粗分別）、伺（Vicāra，細分別），心行（Citta-saṃskāra，意業）——受（Vedanā，感受）、想（Saṃjñā，概念）無不皆滅。行者，因義。此中也有以十大地法（十大地法，一切心識生起時必然伴隨的十種心理作用）俱為心行。隨心有無故。然而，隨殊勝者，唯說受、想以為心行。而壽（Āyus，壽命）不滅。即薩婆多師（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）認為命根（Jīvitendriya，維持生命的能力）的體性即是壽。大乘前說種子（Bīja，阿賴耶識中的種子）是壽，即命根故。經量部師（Sautrāntika，經部）既然沒有命根，以何為壽？色（Rūpa，物質）、心（Citta，精神）不斷于上假立。亦不離暖（Uṣṇatā，體溫），根（Indriya，感覺器官）無變壞。隨部所計，即彼法持。識不離身，正是所諍。然欲出經同法為例，兼誦余文，非正所競。 論：若無此識…直到不應有故。 述曰：此總非已。 次下第二，正解之中有二：初破滅定識不離身，二例無想應爾。初中有四：第一總破諸部小乘在滅定中說無本識，出已正義。第二破薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）。第三破經部本計。第四破經部末計。 論：謂眼等識…直到彼識皆滅。 述曰：眼等諸識有二行相：一者粗，二者動。粗則相貌，易知。動乃數加轉易，或復間斷，或變其性。有處無有多緣散亂故名。

【English Translation】 English version: Non-sentient things, etc. Therefore, the Samgraha-śāstra and other treatises state that the Buddha manifests as relying on dwelling and food (the Buddha manifests the need to rely on dwelling and food in order to teach sentient beings). Treatise: Since the Vipāka-vijñāna (another name for the eighth consciousness)... up to this eighth consciousness (the eighth Ālaya-vijñāna). Commentary: Third, a summary. Although Vijñāna-āhāra (consciousness as food, one of the four kinds of food) is common to all eight consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, etc.), only the Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) is the superior nature of food. That food (referring to the Vipāka-vijñāna) is this eighth consciousness (the eighth Ālaya-vijñāna). The various categories and detailed meanings of this food (referring to the Vipāka-vijñāna) can be found in the various sutras and treatises, as well as the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, etc., such as the sixty-sixth volume, which extensively discusses these categories. Treatise: Moreover, the sutra says... until consciousness does not leave the body. Commentary: From here, the ninth, the sutra on cessation samādhi (referring to the scriptures describing the Nirodha-samāpatti). Those who enter this samādhi extinguish the body-saṃskāra (bodily activities) – inhalation and exhalation (breathing). Above the fourth dhyāna, the breath is cut off, let alone in this state (cessation samādhi). Therefore, vacī-saṃskāra (verbal activities) – vitarka (coarse thought) and vicāra (subtle thought), citta-saṃskāra (mental activities) – vedanā (feeling) and saṃjñā (perception) are all extinguished. 'Activities' refers to the cause. Here, there are also those who consider the ten universal mental factors (the ten universal mental factors that necessarily accompany the arising of all consciousnesses) to be mental activities. Because they exist or do not exist with the mind. However, according to the superior ones, only feeling and perception are said to be mental activities. And āyus (lifespan) does not cease. That is, the Sarvāstivāda school considers the jīvitendriya (life faculty, the ability to maintain life) to be the nature of lifespan. The early Mahāyāna teachings say that the bīja (seed, the seed in the Ālaya-vijñāna) is lifespan, which is the life faculty. Since the Sautrāntika school does not have a life faculty, what do they consider to be lifespan? They falsely establish it upon the continuous rūpa (matter) and citta (mind). It also does not leave uṣṇatā (warmth), and the indriya (sense organs) do not change or decay. According to the calculations of each school, that is how they maintain it. 'Consciousness does not leave the body' is exactly what is being disputed. However, wanting to cite the sutra as an example of the same principle, reciting the remaining text as well, is not the main point of contention. Treatise: If there were no such consciousness... until it should not exist. Commentary: This is a general refutation. Next, the second, in the correct explanation, there are two parts: first, refuting that consciousness does not leave the body in cessation samādhi; second, using the example of non-perception to show that it should be the same. In the first part, there are four sections: first, a general refutation of the Hinayana schools that say there is no fundamental consciousness in cessation samādhi, presenting the correct meaning. Second, refuting the Sarvāstivāda school. Third, refuting the original view of the Sautrāntika school. Fourth, refuting the later view of the Sautrāntika school. Treatise: Namely, eye consciousness, etc.... until those consciousnesses are all extinguished. Commentary: Eye consciousness and other consciousnesses have two aspects: one is coarse, and the other is moving. The coarse aspect is the appearance, which is easy to know. The moving aspect is the frequent changes, or intermittent, or changing its nature. In some places, there are many causes for distraction, hence the name.

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為動。既爾。起者必有勞慮。凡夫愚而莫知。聖者惠而生厭。此熟彼宗眼等諸識起必勞慮　勞謂疲倦　慮謂粗動　暫求止息漸次伏除。從粗至細緣無相想至未都盡位。一期分位無心。或但一日。或復七日。大乘一劫餘。依此位立住滅定者　成業論問。若有第八云何名無心。彼答有二心等。應如彼論　既厭六．七而入定中。故此定中轉識皆滅。

論。若不許有至識不離身。

述曰。下正結云。若不許有體微細者。翻前粗也。下翻前動。常無記一類性不變易。復是恒而無斷。體遍三界無處不有　執持壽等。等取根等　無此識在依何識故說不離身　壽即命根　能持壽者持識種也。壽不滅者命非無也　攝論云非為治此滅定生故。唯為對治諸轉識故。此述正義合遮諸部。

薩婆多人先來救義。

論。若謂后時至名不離身。

述曰。次下第二破一切有。初敘宗。后申難。此初也　謂彼救言出定后時。彼識還起。名不離身。如隔日瘧雖非現有。說瘧不離身。故識應類然。

論。是則不應至起滅同故。

述曰。下難有五。初難云。是則不應說心行滅。心行定中無。出定方始有。即說定中心行滅。轉識定中無。出定方始有。何為說不離。應說定中識體非有。何乃說識不離於身。識與想等生滅

同故。以汝想等名大地故。比量可知。

論。壽暖諸根至便成大過。

述曰。第二難。壽．暖二法及與諸根。應亦如識。所以者何。說彼定中不離壽。而實定中壽不無。亦說定中不離識。而實定中識是有。暖及諸根為難亦爾　量云。識在滅定。實應不離。如來說言滅定有故。如暖．壽等。汝壽．暖等。滅定位無。佛說有故。如汝許識。

論。故應許識至實不離身。

述曰。下結正也。由如是等故。應許識如壽．暖等。不離於身在定中有。彼不許暖等出定方有故。

論。又此位中至位滅定者。

述曰。第三汝住滅定者。應非有情數。許全無識故。如瓦礫等。又亦不名住滅定者。許全無識故。如瓦礫等。此中總有二爾比量。

論。又異熟識至便無壽暖。

述曰。第四。在此位中誰能執持諸根．壽．暖。前言三法互相持故。應言此位壽．暖等法。皆應壞滅。無執持識故。猶如死屍　又此位中。應無壽等。無能執持識故。如死屍等。

論。既爾後識至彼何所屬。

述曰。第五。既爾定中無異熟識。如死屍等。后出定識必不還生。經中說識不離身言。何所屬著。何所因也。

論。諸異熟識至無重生故。

述曰。若有阿賴耶。是真異熟故一切時有。汝

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 同樣的原因。因為你認為想蘊等同於大地（Mahāprthivī）的緣故。可以通過比量來推知。

論：如果壽命、暖（體溫）和諸根（indriya）消失，就會造成很大的過失。

述記：這是第二個難點。壽命、暖這兩種法以及諸根，應該也像識一樣。為什麼呢？因為經中說在滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti）中不離壽命，而實際上滅盡定中壽命並非沒有。也說在滅盡定中不離識，而實際上滅盡定中識是存在的。用暖和諸根來反駁也是一樣。比量如下：識在滅盡定中，實際上不應該離開，因為如來說滅盡定中有識的緣故，就像暖、壽命等一樣。你們認為壽命、暖等在滅盡定中沒有，佛卻說有，就像你們承認識一樣。

論：所以應該承認識就像壽命、暖等一樣，實際上不離身。

述記：下面是總結肯定。因為像這樣的緣故，應該承認識就像壽命、暖等一樣，不離開身體，在滅盡定中存在。因為他們不承認暖等是出定后才有的。

論：還有，處於這個狀態中的人，不應被認為是處於滅盡定的人。

述記：第三個難點。你們這些處於滅盡定中的人，應該不屬於有情數，因為你們認為完全沒有識的緣故，就像瓦礫等無情物一樣。而且也不應該被稱為處於滅盡定的人，因為你們認為完全沒有識的緣故，就像瓦礫等無情物一樣。這裡總共有兩個比量。

論：還有，如果異熟識（vipāka-vijñāna）不存在，那麼誰來執持諸根和壽命、暖呢？

述記：第四個難點。在這個狀態中，誰能夠執持諸根、壽命、暖呢？前面說過這三種法互相執持的緣故。應該說這個狀態中，壽命、暖等法都應該壞滅，因為沒有執持的識的緣故，就像死屍一樣。還有，這個狀態中，應該沒有壽命等，因為沒有能夠執持的識的緣故，就像死屍等一樣。

論：既然這樣，那麼後來的識又屬於哪裡呢？

述記：第五個難點。既然滅盡定中沒有異熟識，就像死屍一樣，那麼後來出定后的識必定不會再生起。經中說識不離身，那麼這個識又屬於哪裡呢？它的因是什麼呢？

論：如果諸異熟識不是一切時都有，那麼就沒有重新生起的可能了。

述記：如果存在阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna），它是真正的異熟識，所以一切時都有。你們...

【English Translation】 English version: For the same reason. Because you consider the skandha of thought (saṃjñā-skandha) etc., to be the same as the great earth (Mahāprthivī). This can be known through inference.

Treatise: If life, warmth (ūṣman), and the faculties (indriya) disappear, it would cause a great fault.

Commentary: This is the second difficulty. Life, warmth, and the faculties should also be like consciousness. Why? Because it is said that in cessation meditation (nirodha-samāpatti), life is not separate, and in reality, life is not absent in cessation meditation. It is also said that consciousness is not separate in cessation meditation, and in reality, consciousness exists in cessation meditation. The same applies to warmth and the faculties. The inference is as follows: Consciousness in cessation meditation should not be separate, because the Tathāgata said that cessation meditation has consciousness, just like warmth, life, etc. You believe that life, warmth, etc., are absent in cessation meditation, but the Buddha said they exist, just like you admit consciousness.

Treatise: Therefore, it should be admitted that consciousness, like life, warmth, etc., is actually not separate from the body.

Commentary: The following is a concluding affirmation. Because of such reasons, it should be admitted that consciousness, like life, warmth, etc., does not leave the body and exists in cessation meditation. Because they do not admit that warmth, etc., only exist after emerging from meditation.

Treatise: Furthermore, someone in this state should not be considered to be in cessation meditation.

Commentary: The third difficulty. You, who are in cessation meditation, should not belong to the category of sentient beings, because you believe that there is no consciousness at all, just like inanimate objects such as tiles and pebbles. Moreover, you should not be called someone in cessation meditation, because you believe that there is no consciousness at all, just like inanimate objects such as tiles and pebbles. There are two inferences in total here.

Treatise: Furthermore, if the resultant consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna) does not exist, then who will hold the faculties, life, and warmth?

Commentary: The fourth difficulty. In this state, who can hold the faculties, life, and warmth? Because it was previously said that these three dharmas hold each other. It should be said that in this state, life, warmth, etc., should all perish, because there is no consciousness to hold them, just like a corpse. Furthermore, in this state, there should be no life, etc., because there is no consciousness to hold them, just like a corpse.

Treatise: Since this is the case, then where does the subsequent consciousness belong?

Commentary: The fifth difficulty. Since there is no resultant consciousness in cessation meditation, just like a corpse, then the subsequent consciousness after emerging from meditation will certainly not arise again. The sutra says that consciousness is not separate from the body, so where does this consciousness belong? What is its cause?

Treatise: If the resultant consciousnesses are not present at all times, then there is no possibility of rebirth.

Commentary: If there is an Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness), it is the true resultant consciousness, so it exists at all times. You...

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無本識於此位中異熟識斷。異熟斷已離托餘生無重生故。即攝論同。量云出滅定已應是重生。許真異熟識斷已重生故。如余重生身　又異熟心。斷已應不續。異熟攝故。如異熟色。六識異熟雖斷可生。自許說彼非真異熟。雖是他許真異熟法。然非此宗共所許故。無不定過。

自下第三正破經部本計。于中有二。初申四難。后總結之。

論。又若此位至如何得生。

述曰。第一難。此言能持種子識者。以經部師許有種故說識能持。無本識故后識無種。應不得生。

論。過去未來至已極成故。

述曰。第二難。去．來二世．及不相應。非實有體。兩宗並無。已極成故。設薩婆多亦今有種後果生故。無去．來世法體生故。今對彼言不相應等已極成立。前已破故。

次經部云。此位有色即能持種。不假余識．及去．來等。

論。諸色等法至亦已遮故。

述曰。第三難。色不離識如第一卷。持種受熏如第二．三卷。破色不離識意說何等。此位有色明有本識。非本識無而許有色。本識可受熏。而非色持種。

既雙破二宗。下俱結正義。

論。然滅定等至有情攝故。

述曰。第四比量難也。所說五位無心位中。定實有識。具根．壽．暖有情攝故。如有心位　具

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果無根本識，那麼在此位（指滅盡定等無心位）中，異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識）就應該斷滅。如果異熟識斷滅，就應該因為已經脫離了依託，不會再有來生的緣故，而不會再次產生。這與《攝大乘論》（Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）的觀點相同。量式如下：從滅盡定出定后，應該是再次產生（新的生命），因為你（經部宗）承認真實的異熟識已經斷滅后還會再次產生，就像其他的再次產生的身體一樣。此外，異熟心斷滅后，應該不會再相續，因為它屬於異熟的範疇，就像異熟色一樣。六識的異熟雖然斷滅了還可以產生，這是因為你們（瑜伽行唯識學派）自己也承認它們不是真正的異熟。雖然這是其他宗派（指經部宗）所承認的真正的異熟法，但並非我們這個宗派共同承認的，所以沒有不決定的過失。

下面第三部分，正式破斥經部宗的根本主張。其中分為兩部分：首先提出四難，然後進行總結。

論：又如果在此位（滅盡定等無心位）……如何能夠產生（後來的識）？

述記：這是第一難。這裡所說的能夠持有種子的識，是因為經部宗承認有種子，所以說識能夠持有。如果沒有根本識，那麼後來的識就沒有種子，應該無法產生。

論：過去、未來……已經完全成立的緣故。

述記：這是第二難。過去世、未來世以及不相應的行法，都不是真實存在的實體，這是我們兩個宗派（指瑜伽行唯識學派和經部宗）都認可的，已經是完全成立的。即使是薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda），也認為現在有種子，果才能產生，沒有過去世、未來世的法體產生。現在針對他們（經部宗）說不相應等法，已經是完全成立的，因為之前已經破斥過了。

接下來，經部宗說：在此位（滅盡定等無心位）有色法，色法就能持有種子，不需要其他的識以及過去、未來等。

論：諸色等法……也已經遮止的緣故。

述記：這是第三難。色不離識，如《成唯識論》第一卷所說。持種、受熏，如第二、三卷所說。破斥色不離識，意在說明什麼呢？此位有色，說明有根本識。如果沒有根本識，卻承認有色，那麼根本識可以接受熏習，而不是色法持有種子。

既然同時破斥了兩個宗派（指瑜伽行唯識學派和經部宗），下面共同總結正義。

論：然而滅盡定等……屬於有情所攝的緣故。

述記：這是第四個比量難。所說的五種無心位中，確實有識存在，因為具備根、壽、暖，屬於有情所攝，就像有心位一樣。具備

【English Translation】 English version: If there is no fundamental consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness), then in this state (referring to the states of no-mind such as Nirodha-samāpatti, cessation attainment), the Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) should be terminated. If the Vipāka-vijñāna is terminated, it should not arise again because it has already been separated from its support and there will be no rebirth. This is the same as the view in the Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (The Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle). The logical argument is as follows: After emerging from Nirodha-samāpatti, there should be a rebirth (new life), because you (the Sautrāntika school) admit that the true Vipāka-vijñāna has been terminated and will arise again, just like other reborn bodies. Furthermore, after the Vipāka-citta (resultant mind) is terminated, it should not continue, because it belongs to the category of Vipāka, just like Vipāka-rūpa (resultant form). Although the Vipāka of the six consciousnesses can arise even after being terminated, this is because you (the Yogācāra school) yourself admit that they are not true Vipāka. Although this is a true Vipāka-dharma (resultant dharma) admitted by other schools (referring to the Sautrāntika school), it is not commonly admitted by our school, so there is no fallacy of uncertainty.

Below, in the third part, the fundamental assertions of the Sautrāntika school are formally refuted. This is divided into two parts: first, four difficulties are presented, and then a summary is made.

Treatise: Moreover, if in this state (states of no-mind such as Nirodha-samāpatti)... how can (later consciousness) arise?

Commentary: This is the first difficulty. The statement here that the consciousness is capable of holding seeds is because the Sautrāntika school admits that there are seeds, so it is said that consciousness is capable of holding them. If there is no fundamental consciousness, then the later consciousness has no seeds and should not be able to arise.

Treatise: The past, future... because it has already been fully established.

Commentary: This is the second difficulty. The past world, the future world, and non-associated formations are not real entities, which is recognized by both of our schools (referring to the Yogācāra school and the Sautrāntika school), and it is already fully established. Even the Sarvāstivāda school believes that there are seeds now, and only then can the result arise; there is no arising of the dharma-body of the past and future worlds. Now, addressing them (the Sautrāntika school) about non-associated dharmas, etc., is already fully established, because it has been refuted before.

Next, the Sautrāntika school says: In this state (states of no-mind such as Nirodha-samāpatti), there is form (rūpa), and form can hold the seeds, without the need for other consciousnesses and the past, future, etc.

Treatise: All forms, etc.... have also already been refuted.

Commentary: This is the third difficulty. Form is inseparable from consciousness, as stated in the first volume of the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi. Holding seeds and receiving熏習 (xūnxí, perfuming), as stated in the second and third volumes. What is the intention of refuting that form is inseparable from consciousness? The presence of form in this state indicates the presence of fundamental consciousness. If there is no fundamental consciousness but form is admitted, then the fundamental consciousness can receive perfuming, but it is not form that holds the seeds.

Since both schools (referring to the Yogācāra school and the Sautrāntika school) have been refuted simultaneously, the correct meaning is summarized together below.

Treatise: However, Nirodha-samāpatti, etc.... because they are included in sentient beings.

Commentary: This is the fourth logical difficulty. In the five states of no-mind mentioned, there is indeed consciousness, because they possess roots (indriya), life (āyus), and warmth (uṣman), and are included in sentient beings, just like the states of mind. Possessing

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根壽暖言。引經具證也。

論。由斯理趣至實不離身。

述曰。總結文也。上來已破經部本計。下破經部末宗轉計。上座部師亦許定中有細意識。生死等位已遮破訖　極成意識不如是故下。破有二。初總破有心。二別徴有心所。

論。若謂此位至無心定故。

述曰。初破有心中。文分為三。初難違名。次難違理。后結意趣。此即初也。此牒計非此不應理。此定亦名無心定故。故知不得有第六識。此並對勘二家攝論．及成業論。義更無違　而彼救言。如名無心定汝本識不無。今名無心定何妨意識有。解云我名無心定。無粗動識名無心。即是六識俱無之義。汝名無心定。說何以為無。

論。若無五識至五識身故。

述曰。下違理中有四比量。此第一也。彼若答言。無五識故名為無心非無第六。今牒之云。若如是者應立量云　汝應一切定。皆名無心。諸定皆說無前五識身故。如汝許滅定　若不言定中。無五識身故。即不定過。以無心悶絕等亦無五識。彼此共許非無心定。今應助難。滅定無五識說名無心定。此位亦無五識相應受．想等法。名為心行滅。然有心所無心所家。皆須名無第六受想。以有心行滅言等故。

論。意識攝在至滅定非有。

述曰。第二比量。此位第六意

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 根壽暖言，這是引用經文來充分證明。

論：由於這個道理和趣味，真實不離自身。

述曰：這是總結性的文字。前面已經破斥了經部的根本主張，下面破斥經部的末流轉計。上座部的老師也承認禪定中有細微的意識。生死等位已經被遮破完畢。『極成意識不如是故』以下，破斥分為兩部分：首先總破有心，其次分別徵詢有心所。

論：如果說這個位置是無心定，所以沒有。

述曰：這是最初破斥有心。文分為三個部分：首先是難違背名稱，其次是難違背道理，最後是總結意趣。這裡是第一個部分。這裡是牒計，如果不是這樣就不合理。這個禪定也叫做無心定。所以知道不能有第六識。這都是對照勘查二家的《攝論》以及《成業論》，意義上沒有違背。而他們辯解說，就像名為無心定，你的本識不是沒有。現在名為無心定，為什麼妨礙意識存在？解釋說，我名為無心定，沒有粗動的識叫做無心，就是六識都沒有的意思。你名為無心定，說什麼叫做沒有？

論：如果沒有五識，就沒有五識身。

述曰：下面違背道理中有四個比量，這是第一個。如果他們回答說，因為沒有五識所以叫做無心，不是沒有第六識。現在牒之說，如果這樣，應該立量說：你應該一切禪定，都叫做無心。因為所有禪定都說沒有前五識身。就像你承認的滅盡定。如果不說禪定中沒有五識身，就是不定過失。因為無心悶絕等也沒有五識，彼此都承認不是無心定。現在應該幫助辯難，滅盡定沒有五識，說叫做無心定。這個位置也沒有五識相應的受、想等法，叫做心行滅。然而有心所和無心所的學派，都必須說沒有第六受想。因為有心行滅的說法等。

論：意識包含在滅盡定中，不是有。

述曰：第二個比量。這個位置的第六意識

【English Translation】 English version: Gen Shou Nuan Yan. This is quoting scriptures to fully prove it.

Treatise: Because of this reason and interest, the truth does not leave the body.

Commentary: This is a concluding text. The fundamental argument of the Sautrāntika school has already been refuted above, and below, the derivative arguments of the Sautrāntika school are refuted. The Sthavira school also admits that there is subtle consciousness in Samadhi. The positions of birth and death have already been refuted. 'The extremely established consciousness is not like this,' below, the refutation is divided into two parts: first, a general refutation of the existence of mind, and second, a separate inquiry into mental factors.

Treatise: If it is said that this position is a state of 'no-mind' (Wu Xin Ding), therefore it does not exist.

Commentary: This is the initial refutation of the existence of mind. The text is divided into three parts: first, the difficulty of contradicting the name; second, the difficulty of contradicting the reason; and third, the conclusion of the intention. This is the first part. This is a restatement of the argument; if it were not so, it would be unreasonable. This Samadhi is also called 'no-mind' Samadhi. Therefore, it is known that there cannot be a sixth consciousness. This is all in comparison with the two schools' She Lun (Compendium of Abhidharma) and the Cheng Ye Lun (Treatise on the Establishment of Karma), and there is no contradiction in meaning. And they argue, 'Just as it is called 'no-mind' Samadhi, your fundamental consciousness is not non-existent. Now that it is called 'no-mind' Samadhi, why does it hinder the existence of consciousness?' The explanation is, 'I call it 'no-mind' Samadhi, and the absence of coarse, active consciousness is called 'no-mind,' which means that all six consciousnesses are absent.' You call it 'no-mind' Samadhi, what do you say is absent?

Treatise: If there are no five consciousnesses, then there is no body of five consciousnesses.

Commentary: Below, there are four analogies that contradict reason, and this is the first. If they answer that it is called 'no-mind' because there are no five consciousnesses, not because there is no sixth consciousness, then it is now stated that if this is the case, it should be established that 'You should call all Samadhis 'no-mind,' because all Samadhis are said to be without the body of the first five consciousnesses, just as you admit the Cessation Attainment (Mie Jin Ding).' If it is not said that there is no body of five consciousnesses in Samadhi, then it is an indefinite fault, because unconsciousness and fainting also have no five consciousnesses, and both sides admit that it is not 'no-mind' Samadhi. Now, one should help to argue that the Cessation Attainment has no five consciousnesses and is said to be 'no-mind' Samadhi. This position also has no feelings (受, shou), perceptions (想, xiang), etc., corresponding to the five consciousnesses, and is called the cessation of mental activities. However, the schools of mental factors and non-mental factors must all say that there are no sixth feelings and perceptions, because there is a saying of the cessation of mental activities, etc.

Treatise: Consciousness is included in the Cessation Attainment, it is not existent.

Commentary: The second analogy. The sixth consciousness in this position

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識。應無。六轉識攝故。如五識身。

次第三量。

論。或此位識至非第六識。

述曰。彼亦自說自位之識行相．所緣微細難知。故以為因。

或汝所言此位第六識。應非是實第六識攝。行相．所緣不可知故。如壽．暖等。

論。若此位有至非此位攝。

述曰。此第四量。設彼救言此位第六識行相．所緣俱可了知。因隨一者。今破量云　汝滅定位。應非是實滅盡定位。許有行相．所緣可知識故。如餘位等　更應返難　汝宗除此余時。亦應名滅定位。有行相．所緣可知識在故。如汝許滅定。

論。本為止息至入此定故。

述曰。此總結成。為止六識入此定故。

此即第一總破有心。下別破有心所。文復有二。初總徴。下別破。

論。又若此位至為有為無。

述曰。此總徴也。不問余識相應心所。故論言彼。

自下別破。于中有二。初破有心所。二破無心所。二義俱是經部轉計。有心所中有七問答。初破中第一違經失。

論。若有心所至心行皆滅。

述曰。許大地法皆滅盡故。經部本立三大地。及三心行。謂思．受．想。皆名心行。受．想勝故彼偏得名。

自下體違名失。

論。又不應名滅受想定。

述曰。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：識。應無。因為是六轉識（Lục zhuǎn shí, six consciousnesses transformed from the Alaya consciousness）所攝。如同五識身（wǔ shí shēn, the aggregate of the five sense consciousnesses）。

其次是第三個量。

論：或者此位識至非第六識。

述曰：他們也自己說自己位置的識的行相（xíng xiàng, characteristics）和所緣（suǒ yuán, object of cognition）微細難以知曉。所以以此為因。

或者你所說的這個位置的第六識（dì liù shí, the sixth consciousness, i.e., the mind consciousness），應該不是真實的第六識所攝。因為行相和所緣不可知。如同壽（shòu, life force）、暖（nuǎn, warmth）等。

論：若此位有至非此位攝。

述曰：這是第四個量。假設他們辯解說這個位置的第六識行相和所緣都可以了知，因（yīn, reason）隨一者。現在破斥這個量說：你的滅盡定（miè jìn dìng, cessation attainment）位，應該不是真實的滅盡定位。因為允許有行相和所緣可以被知識所知。如同其他位置等。更應該反過來責難：你的宗（zōng, tenet）除了這個以外的其他時候，也應該叫做滅盡定位。因為有行相和所緣可以被知識所知存在。如同你允許的滅盡定。

論：本為止息至入此定故。

述曰：這是總結完成。爲了止息六識（liù shí, six consciousnesses）進入這個定（dìng, samadhi）的緣故。

這即是第一總破有心。下面分別破斥有心所（yǒu xīn suǒ, mental concomitants）。文義又有兩種。首先是總的提問。下面是分別破斥。

論：又若此位至為有為無。

述曰：這是總的提問。不問其他識相應的心所。所以論中說『彼』。

從下面開始分別破斥。其中有兩種。首先破斥有心所。其次破斥無心所。兩種義理都是經部（jīng bù, Sautrantika school）的轉變計度。有心所中有七個問答。首先破斥中第一違背經文的過失。

論：若有心所至心行皆滅。

述曰：因為允許大地法（dà dì fǎ, universal mental factors）都滅盡的緣故。經部本來立三大地法，及三種心行（xīn xíng, mental activities）。即思（sī, volition）、受（shòu, feeling）、想（xiǎng, perception）。都叫做心行。因為受和想殊勝的緣故，他們偏得這個名稱。

自**違名失。

論：又不應名滅受想定。

述曰：

【English Translation】 English version: Consciousness. Should not exist. Because it is included in the six transformed consciousnesses (Lục zhuǎn shí). Like the aggregate of the five sense consciousnesses (wǔ shí shēn).

Next is the third inference.

Treatise: Or the consciousness in this state up to not being the sixth consciousness.

Commentary: They also say themselves that the characteristics (xíng xiàng) and object of cognition (suǒ yuán) of the consciousness in their own state are subtle and difficult to know. Therefore, they use this as a reason.

Or what you say, the sixth consciousness (dì liù shí) in this state, should not be included in the real sixth consciousness. Because the characteristics and object of cognition are unknowable. Like life force (shòu), warmth (nuǎn), etc.

Treatise: If there are mental concomitants in this state, up to not being included in this state.

Commentary: This is the fourth inference. Suppose they argue that the characteristics and object of cognition of the sixth consciousness in this state can be known, the reason (yīn) follows one. Now refuting this inference, saying: Your state of cessation attainment (miè jìn dìng) should not be the real cessation attainment. Because it is allowed that there are characteristics and object of cognition that can be known by knowledge. Like other states, etc. It should be retorted: Your tenet (zōng), other than this time, should also be called cessation attainment. Because there are characteristics and object of cognition that can be known existing. Like the cessation attainment you allow.

Treatise: Originally to stop up to entering this samadhi.

Commentary: This is the conclusion. In order to stop the six consciousnesses (liù shí) from entering this samadhi (dìng).

This is the first general refutation of the existence of mind. Below, separately refuting the mental concomitants (yǒu xīn suǒ). The meaning again has two kinds. First is the general question. Below is the separate refutation.

Treatise: Also, if in this state, up to being existent or non-existent.

Commentary: This is the general question. Not asking about the mental concomitants corresponding to other consciousnesses. Therefore, the treatise says 'that'.

From below, separately refuting. Among them, there are two kinds. First, refuting the existent mental concomitants. Second, refuting the non-existent mental concomitants. Both meanings are the transformed calculation of the Sautrantika school (jīng bù). Among the existent mental concomitants, there are seven questions and answers. First, refuting the first fault of contradicting the sutras.

Treatise: If there are mental concomitants, up to all mental activities cease.

Commentary: Because it is allowed that the universal mental factors (dà dì fǎ) all cease. The Sautrantika school originally established three universal mental factors, and three mental activities (xīn xíng). Namely, volition (sī), feeling (shòu), perception (xiǎng). All are called mental activities. Because feeling and perception are superior, they particularly obtain this name.

Self contradictory name fault.

Treatise: Also, it should not be called cessation of feeling and perception samadhi.

Commentary:

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既有心所法。何名滅受想。經部救言言有心所非謂受想。有餘思等故。又難何故唯受．想滅。思等不滅。

論。此定加行至唯受想滅。

述曰。上來難訖。次下第二經部救云。此定加行但厭受．想。受．想能于靜慮。無色修行勝故。於此定中唯受．想滅非餘思等。

有伏難彼云。何故唯受．想二名為心行。乃覆滅之。思等不名。乃復不滅。

論。受想二法至何所相違。

述曰。謂修靜慮．無色等時。受．想用強獨名心行。增勞慮故。非餘思等說心行滅。何所相違。

論。無想定中至然汝不許。

述曰。自下第三論主難云。滅盡定前厭于受．想。勞慮強故。唯受．想滅思等不滅。無想定中唯厭于想。想勞慮故。應唯想滅。然汝不許。余亦滅故。

論。既唯受想至心亦應滅。

述曰。受．想所倚既亡。能倚心應隨滅。所倚強故令心應滅。資助之法強已滅故。

自下第四經部師救。

論。如身行滅至令同行滅。

述曰。此經部救。入第四定以上。入出息無其身尚在。雖受．想滅何妨心有。

自下第五論主非言。

論。若爾語行至而非所許。

述曰。應尋．伺滅語應不滅。尋．伺語行滅。語隨尋．伺無。受．想心行無。心應隨

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果存在心所法（Cittasikharas，與心識相關的心理活動），為什麼說滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti，一種高級禪定狀態）中滅除了受（Vedanā，感受）和想（Saṃjñā，認知）？ 經部（Sautrāntika，佛教的一個學派）辯解說：『經中說有心所，並非指受和想。還有其他的思等心所存在。』 又有人反駁：『為什麼只有受和想滅除，而思等不滅除？』

論：這種禪定（指滅盡定）的加行（Prayoga，準備階段）只是爲了滅除受和想。 述曰：上面是提問完畢。接下來是經部的第二種辯解，說這種禪定的加行只是厭惡受和想。因為受和想對於靜慮（Dhyāna，禪定）和無色定（Ārupyasamāpatti，超越物質形態的禪定）的修行有很大的妨礙。因此，在這種禪定中，只有受和想滅除，而不是其他的思等。

有人進一步質問：『為什麼只有受和想這兩個被稱為心行（Cittasaṅkhāra，心的活動），並且要滅除它們？而思等不被稱為心行，也不被滅除？』

論：受和想這兩種法在修習靜慮和無色定等時，作用強烈，因此單獨被稱為心行，因為它們會增加勞慮。其他的思等不被稱為心行，因此也不需要滅除，這有什麼矛盾的呢？

論：在無想定（Asañjñāsamāpatti，一種禪定狀態，滅除所有認知）中，只是厭惡想，因為想會帶來勞慮。因此，應該只有想滅除。但是你們（指經部）並不承認這一點，因為其他的（心所）也滅除了。 述曰：下面是論主（論師，佛教論著的作者）的第三個反駁，說在滅盡定之前，是因為厭惡受和想，因為它們會帶來強烈的勞慮，所以只有受和想滅除，而思等不滅除。在無想定中，只是因為厭惡想，因為想會帶來勞慮，所以應該只有想滅除。但是你們不承認這一點，因為其他的（心所）也滅除了。

論：既然受和想所依賴的（心）已經消失，那麼能依賴的（心）也應該隨之滅除。因為所依賴的（受和想）非常強烈，所以導致心也應該滅除。因為資助（心）的法已經強烈地滅除了。

下面是經部師的第四種辯解。

論：就像身行（Kāyasaṅkhāra，身體的活動）滅除時，身體仍然存在一樣，受和想滅除，為什麼妨礙心識的存在呢？ 述曰：這是經部的辯解。進入第四禪以上，入息和出息（呼吸）停止，但身體仍然存在。即使受和想滅除，為什麼會妨礙心識的存在呢？

下面是論主的第五種否定。

論：如果是這樣，那麼尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（Vicāra，細緻的思考）滅除時，語（Vacīsaṅkhāra，語言的活動）應該不滅除。尋和伺是語行，尋和伺滅除，語也應該隨之消失。受和想是心行，受和想滅除，心也應該隨之消失。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: If there are Cittasikharas (mental activities associated with consciousness), why is it said that in Nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment, an advanced state of meditation), Vedanā (feeling) and Saṃjñā (perception) are extinguished? The Sautrāntika (a Buddhist school) defends: 'The sutras say there are Cittasikharas, but this does not refer to Vedanā and Saṃjñā. There are other mental activities such as thought (cetasikā).' Someone retorts: 'Why are only Vedanā and Saṃjñā extinguished, while thought and others are not?'

Treatise: The preparatory practice (Prayoga) for this samādhi (referring to Nirodha-samāpatti) is only to extinguish Vedanā and Saṃjñā. Commentary: The question is finished above. Next is the Sautrāntika's second defense, saying that the preparatory practice for this samādhi is only to厭惡 (dislike) Vedanā and Saṃjñā. Because Vedanā and Saṃjñā greatly hinder the practice of Dhyāna (meditation) and Ārupyasamāpatti (formless attainments, meditations beyond material form). Therefore, in this samādhi, only Vedanā and Saṃjñā are extinguished, not other thoughts and so on.

Someone further questions: 'Why are only Vedanā and Saṃjñā called Citta-saṅkhāra (mental formations), and why are they extinguished? Why are thought and others not called Citta-saṅkhāra, nor are they extinguished?'

Treatise: When practicing Dhyāna and Ārupyasamāpatti, the functions of Vedanā and Saṃjñā are strong, so they are uniquely called Citta-saṅkhāra, because they increase labor and worry. Other thoughts and so on are not called Citta-saṅkhāra, so there is no contradiction in saying they are not extinguished.

Treatise: In Asañjñāsamāpatti (perception cessation attainment, a state of meditation that eliminates all perception), there is only厭惡 (dislike) of Saṃjñā, because Saṃjñā brings labor and worry. Therefore, only Saṃjñā should be extinguished. But you (referring to the Sautrāntika) do not admit this, because others (mental factors) are also extinguished. Commentary: Below is the third refutation by the treatise master (the author of the Buddhist treatise), saying that before Nirodha-samāpatti, it is because of厭惡 (dislike) of Vedanā and Saṃjñā, because they bring strong labor and worry, so only Vedanā and Saṃjñā are extinguished, while thought and others are not. In Asañjñāsamāpatti, it is only because of厭惡 (dislike) of Saṃjñā, because Saṃjñā brings labor and worry, so only Saṃjñā should be extinguished. But you do not admit this, because others (mental factors) are also extinguished.

Treatise: Since what Vedanā and Saṃjñā rely on (the mind) has disappeared, then what can rely on (the mind) should also disappear. Because what is relied on (Vedanā and Saṃjñā) is very strong, it should cause the mind to also be extinguished. Because the dharma that supports (the mind) has been strongly extinguished.

Below is the fourth defense by the Sautrāntika master.

Treatise: Just as when Kāyasaṅkhāra (bodily formations) are extinguished, the body still exists, why does the extinction of Vedanā and Saṃjñā hinder the existence of consciousness? Commentary: This is the Sautrāntika's defense. Entering the fourth Dhyāna and above, inhalation and exhalation (breath) cease, but the body still exists. Even if Vedanā and Saṃjñā are extinguished, why would it hinder the existence of consciousness?

Below is the fifth negation by the treatise master.

Treatise: If that is the case, then when Vitarka (gross thought) and Vicāra (subtle thought) are extinguished, Vacīsaṅkhāra (verbal formations) should not be extinguished. Vitarka and Vicāra are verbal formations, and when Vitarka and Vicāra are extinguished, speech should also disappear. Vedanā and Saṃjñā are mental formations, and when Vedanā and Saṃjñā are extinguished, the mind should also disappear.

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行滅。以彼身行滅。身猶現在故。遂令心行滅。亦令心尚在。亦應以彼身行滅故。語行應如身。然非所許。大乘佛等無尋．伺雖復有語。尋．伺亦非遍行。今難違宗就他為論。故以為例名非所許。

彼復救言。我以身行同心行。汝以語行同心行。二難既等。誰是誰非。

論。然行於法至法或猶在。

述曰。此論主釋。此即總出。一切行於法。謂行隨法有無名遍行。遍行法滅時。法定隨滅故。不隨有無名非遍行。非遍行法滅時。法或猶在故。

今應且出共許。何者為非遍行。

論。非遍行者至身猶在故。

述曰。入第四禪以上入出息滅。其息滅時身猶在故名非遍行。第四禪中余法所持令身不壞。下地之息于身有力。身虛疏故說息為行。除此無有唯有此牒。

論。尋伺于語至語定無故。

述曰。尋．伺引語名為遍行故。二禪已上尋．伺無故語定隨無　大乘不然。此隨他語。

論。受想於心至大地法故。

述曰。如尋．伺故比量所諍。許如思等大地法故　根本經部說有三法遍行。大乘．薩婆多。各說有二。謂即受．想。故別立蘊。作用強故　彼說三大地故。今言思等等取何法。謂有二計。一唯計有三法。如前觸即三合。無別體故。二計有四法。即觸數故。下

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

身行滅，因為那個身體的活動停止了。由於身體仍然存在，所以導致心行滅，也導致心識仍然存在。也應該因為那個身行滅的緣故，語行應該像身行一樣（也滅），然而這是不被允許的。大乘的佛等沒有尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（Vicara，精細的思考），即使有語言，尋和伺也不是普遍存在的。現在的責難是違背宗義，就對方的觀點來討論，所以用這個例子來說明是不被允許的。

對方又辯解說：『我用身行等同於心行，你用語行等同於心行，這兩個責難既然相等，誰是誰非呢？』

論：然而，行對於法，法或者仍然存在。

述曰：這是論主的解釋。這裡是總的說明。一切行對於法，意思是行隨著法的有無而存在，這叫做遍行。遍行法滅的時候，法必定隨著滅，所以不隨著有無而存在，這叫做非遍行。非遍行法滅的時候，法或者仍然存在。

現在應該先說出共同認可的，什麼是非遍行。

論：非遍行，直到身體仍然存在。

述曰：進入第四禪以上，入息和出息都停止了。當呼吸停止的時候，身體仍然存在，所以叫做非遍行。在第四禪中，其他的法維持著身體不壞。下地的呼吸對於身體有力量，因為身體虛弱疏鬆，所以說呼吸是行。除了這個沒有其他的，只有這個解釋。

論：尋伺對於語言，直到語言必定沒有了的緣故。

述曰：尋和伺引導語言，所以叫做遍行。二禪以上，尋和伺沒有了，所以語言必定隨著沒有了。大乘不是這樣，這是隨順對方的說法。

論：受想對於心，直到大地法（Mahabhūmika dharmas，普遍存在於所有心識中的心理活動）的緣故。

述曰：像尋和伺一樣，通過比量來爭論。允許像思等大地法一樣。根本經部說有三種法是遍行，大乘和薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）各說有兩種，就是受和想。所以特別設立蘊，因為作用強大。他們說三大地法，現在說思等等，是取什麼法呢？有兩種說法。一種只認為有三種法，像前面的觸就是三種的結合，沒有別的自體。另一種認為有四種法，就是觸數。

【English Translation】 English version:

The body-conduct ceases because that bodily activity has stopped. Since the body still exists, it leads to the cessation of mind-conduct, and also implies that the mind-consciousness still remains. It should also be the case that because that body-conduct ceases, speech-conduct should be like body-conduct (also cease), however, this is not permissible. In Mahayana, Buddhas, etc., do not have Vitarka (gross thought) and Vicara (subtle thought), even if there is speech, Vitarka and Vicara are not universally present. The current criticism violates the tenets of the school, discussing from the opponent's viewpoint, so this example is used to illustrate what is not permissible.

The opponent further argues: 'I equate body-conduct with mind-conduct, you equate speech-conduct with mind-conduct, since these two criticisms are equal, who is right and who is wrong?'

Treatise: However, conduct in relation to a dharma, the dharma may still exist.

Commentary: This is the explanation of the treatise master. This is a general explanation. All conduct in relation to a dharma means that conduct exists depending on the presence or absence of the dharma, this is called pervasive conduct. When a pervasive dharma ceases, the dharma must cease along with it, so not depending on presence or absence is called non-pervasive conduct. When a non-pervasive dharma ceases, the dharma may still exist.

Now we should first state what is commonly accepted as non-pervasive conduct.

Treatise: Non-pervasive conduct, until the body still exists.

Commentary: Entering the fourth Dhyana (meditative state) and above, inhalation and exhalation cease. When breathing ceases, the body still exists, so it is called non-pervasive conduct. In the fourth Dhyana, other dharmas maintain the body from decaying. The breath of the lower realms has power over the body, because the body is weak and sparse, so breathing is said to be conduct. Besides this, there is nothing else, only this explanation.

Treatise: Vitarka and Vicara in relation to speech, until speech is definitely absent.

Commentary: Vitarka and Vicara guide speech, so it is called pervasive conduct. Above the second Dhyana, Vitarka and Vicara are absent, so speech must cease along with them. Mahayana is not like this, this follows the opponent's statement.

Treatise: Vedanā (feeling) and Samjñā (perception) in relation to mind, until the Mahabhūmika dharmas (mental activities universally present in all consciousness).

Commentary: Like Vitarka and Vicara, arguing through inference. Allowing it to be like Manas (thought), etc., which are Mahabhūmika dharmas. The fundamental sutras say that there are three dharmas that are pervasive, Mahayana and Sarvāstivāda each say there are two, which are Vedanā and Samjñā. Therefore, Skandha (aggregate) is specially established, because its function is strong. They say the three Mahabhūmika dharmas, now saying Manas, etc., what dharmas are being taken? There are two views. One only considers there to be three dharmas, like the previous Sparśa (contact) which is the combination of three, without a separate self-nature. The other considers there to be four dharmas, which is the number of Sparśa.

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言三和成觸即是前計。三和生觸即第二計。計別有體。故今言等意攝二家　又設有餘非別有法。此論別體。若依分位。于思之上亦名為定等理亦無違。一念之思所望別故。然未見文。準俱舍云。謂通三性．有尋伺等三地名為大地。即更有餘法　今量云。受．想定是遍行。許是大地法故。如思等法。

論。受想滅時至彼滅心在。

述曰。汝之此位受．想滅時心應隨滅。許大地法滅故。如思等滅心定隨滅。無心睡眠等位心隨思滅故。既爾受．想滅心定隨滅。如何可說彼受．想滅而心猶在　彼者。彼受．想也。

論。又許思等至彼亦應滅。

述曰。此返難云　此位。思等應滅。許大地法故。如受．想。

論。既爾信等至余可在故。

述曰。經部以思分位名為信等。此位非無。思等既滅。信等善法亦無。非是遍行諸法滅已。余非遍行法可在故。

論。如何可言有餘心所。

述曰。既思．信等此位俱無。如何可言除受及想有餘心所。

論。既許思等至大地法故。

述曰。此無心位。受．相應有。許大地故。如思等法。此則例以大地法齊如思說有。

論。又此定中至觸力生故。

述曰。上來但總破。故思言等等取有觸。此位有思。亦應有觸。余心所法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『言三和成觸即是前計』：當三種要素（言、意、觸）和合產生觸時，這是第一個錯誤觀點。 『三和生觸即第二計』：三種要素和合產生觸時，這是第二個錯誤觀點。認為觸是獨立存在的實體。因此，現在所說的『等意』包含了這兩家的觀點。此外，如果存在其他並非獨立存在的法，那麼這個論點就認為存在獨立的實體。如果依據分位的觀點，在思之上也可以稱為定等，這在道理上也沒有衝突，因為一念之思所期望的是不同的。然而，我沒有看到相關的文獻。根據《俱舍論》所說，『通三性、有尋伺等三地名為大地』，這意味著存在其他的法。 現在用量式來論證：受（Vedana，感受）、想（Samjna，表象）是遍行心所（Sarvatraga，普遍存在的心所），因為它們被認為是『大地法』（Mahabhumika，普遍存在於一切心識中的法），就像思等法一樣。

論：當受和想滅盡時，如果受想滅盡，心識也應該隨之滅盡。

述曰：你的這個位置（指無心定），當受和想滅盡時，心識應該隨之滅盡。因為你承認『大地法』滅盡，就像思等滅盡一樣，心識必定隨之滅盡。在無心睡眠等狀態下，心識隨著思的滅盡而滅盡。既然如此，受和想滅盡，心識必定隨之滅盡。怎麼能說受和想滅盡，而心識仍然存在呢？『彼』指的是受和想。

論：又承認思等是『大地法』，那麼在這個狀態下，思等也應該滅盡。

述曰：這是反駁的論點。在這個狀態下，思等應該滅盡，因為你承認它們是『大地法』，就像受和想一樣。

論：既然如此，信等（Sraddha，信仰）等心所，在這個狀態下也可以存在。

述曰：經部宗認為思的分位可以稱為信等。在這個狀態下，信等並非不存在。既然思等滅盡，信等善法也就不存在了。因為並非是遍行心所的諸法滅盡后，其他非遍行心所的法就可以存在。

論：怎麼能說還有其他的心所存在呢？

述曰：既然思和信等在這個狀態下都不存在，怎麼能說除了受和想之外，還有其他的心所存在呢？

論：既然承認思等是『大地法』。

述曰：在這個無心狀態下，受和想應該存在，因為你承認它們是『大地法』，就像思等法一樣。這就像用『大地法』來比擬思，說它們是存在的。

論：又在這個禪定中，因為觸的力量產生。

述曰：上面只是總體的破斥，所以說思等包含了觸。在這個狀態下有思，也應該有觸，以及其他的心所法。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Speech, three, and contact forming touch is the first calculation': When three elements (speech, intention, and contact) combine to produce touch, this is the first erroneous view. 'Three combining to produce touch is the second calculation': When three elements combine to produce touch, this is the second erroneous view, which considers touch to be an independently existing entity. Therefore, the 'equal intention' mentioned now encompasses the views of both schools. Furthermore, if there exist other dharmas that are not independently existing, then this argument posits the existence of independent entities. If based on the view of divisions, 'samadhi' (concentration) etc. can also be named above 'thought', which is not contradictory in principle, because what is expected of a single thought is different. However, I have not seen relevant literature. According to the Abhidharmakosa, 'the three grounds that pervade the three natures, with investigation and discernment, are called the Great Ground', which means that there are other dharmas. Now, let's use a syllogism to argue: Feeling (Vedana) and perception (Samjna) are universal mental factors (Sarvatraga), because they are considered 'Great Ground dharmas' (Mahabhumika), just like thought etc.

Treatise: When feeling and perception cease, if feeling and perception cease, consciousness should also cease along with them.

Commentary: In your position (referring to the state of no-mind concentration), when feeling and perception cease, consciousness should cease along with them. Because you admit that 'Great Ground dharmas' cease, just like thought etc. cease, consciousness must cease along with them. In states like mindless sleep, consciousness ceases with the cessation of thought. Since this is the case, feeling and perception cease, and consciousness must cease along with them. How can it be said that feeling and perception cease, but consciousness still exists? 'They' refers to feeling and perception.

Treatise: Furthermore, admitting that thought etc. are 'Great Ground dharmas', then in this state, thought etc. should also cease.

Commentary: This is a refutation. In this state, thought etc. should cease, because you admit that they are 'Great Ground dharmas', just like feeling and perception.

Treatise: Since this is the case, mental factors like faith (Sraddha) etc. can also exist in this state.

Commentary: The Sautrantika school believes that the divisions of thought can be called faith etc. In this state, faith etc. are not non-existent. Since thought etc. cease, virtuous dharmas like faith etc. also do not exist. Because it is not the case that after the cessation of pervasive mental factors, other non-pervasive mental factors can exist.

Treatise: How can it be said that there are other mental factors existing?

Commentary: Since thought and faith etc. do not exist in this state, how can it be said that besides feeling and perception, there are other mental factors existing?

Treatise: Since it is admitted that thought etc. are 'Great Ground dharmas'.

Commentary: In this state of no-mind, feeling and perception should exist, because you admit that they are 'Great Ground dharmas', just like thought etc. This is like comparing thought to 'Great Ground dharmas', saying that they exist.

Treatise: Also, in this samadhi, because the power of contact arises.

Commentary: The above is just a general refutation, so saying thought etc. includes contact. In this state, if there is thought, there should also be contact, as well as other mental factors.

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皆依觸力生故　量云。此位。應有觸。有思等故。如余有心位余有心位以觸為本。無有本無而末有故。以末例本亦令本有。

論。若許有觸至觸緣受故。

述曰。此位之中。亦應有受。觸緣受故。如餘位觸。

論。既許有受至不相離故。

述曰。此應有想。有受故。如余散心等位　既爾則應一切心所無不皆有。何得獨言無有受．想。

論。如受緣愛至其理不成。

述曰。自下第六經部救言。如言受緣愛。非一切受皆能起愛。無漏善受不起愛故。故觸緣受。應如於愛非一切觸皆能起受。此位有觸無受生故。由斯理齊故。前所難理不成立。

次下第七論主破之。

論。彼救不然有差別故。

述曰。此論主非。二例異故。

所以者何。

論。謂佛自簡至簡觸生受。

述曰。佛簡別言唯是無明所增之觸所生諸受。有漏染受為緣生愛。以相順故。非一切受皆能生愛。曾無有教簡觸生受。此散心位觸能生受。此滅定位觸不生受。何得為例。

論。故若有觸至其理決定。

述曰。此位有觸必有受生。定相隨故。受．想必俱其理決定。

論。或應如餘位至有思等故。

述曰。此位。受．想亦應許有。許有思等故。如所餘位。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 皆因依賴於觸力而產生，可以推測說：此位（指滅盡定）應該有觸（sparśa，感官接觸），有思（cetanā，意志）等。如同其他有心位（citta-sthiti，心之所住），其他有心位以觸為根本。沒有從無到有的情況，以末（結果）來推斷本（原因），也應是本來就有的。

論：如果允許有觸，那麼觸是受（vedanā，感受）的緣。

述曰：在此位之中，也應該有受，因為觸是受的緣。如同其他位的觸。

論：既然允許有受，那麼受和想（saṃjñā，知覺）是不相分離的。

述曰：此位應該有想，因為有受。如同其他散心等位。既然如此，那麼應該一切心所（caitta，心所法）沒有不都存在的。怎麼能單獨說沒有受和想呢？

論：如同受緣愛（tṛṣṇā，渴愛），那樣的道理是不成立的。

述曰：下面第六，經部（Sautrāntika）救助說，如同說受緣愛，並非一切受都能生起愛。無漏善受不能生起愛。所以觸緣受，應該如同愛一樣，並非一切觸都能生起受。此位有觸，沒有受產生。因此道理相同，所以前面所難的道理不成立。

接下來第七，論主破斥它。

論：那種救助是不對的，因為有差別。

述曰：此論主否定，因為兩個例子不同。

原因是什麼呢？

論：佛親自簡別說，只有無明（avidyā，無明）所增長的觸所生的諸受，有漏染受作為緣才能生愛。因為相順的緣故。並非一切受都能生愛。從來沒有教導說簡別觸生受，說此散心位觸能生受，此滅定（nirodha-samāpatti，滅盡定）位觸不能生受。怎麼能作為例子呢？

論：所以如果有觸，那麼必定有受產生。因為是決定的相隨關係。受和想必定同時存在，這個道理是決定的。

論：或者應該如同其他位一樣，因為有思等。

述曰：此位，受和想也應該允許有。因為允許有思等。如同其餘的位。

【English Translation】 English version Since all arise depending on the force of contact (sparśa), it can be inferred: this state (referring to Nirodha-samāpatti, cessation attainment) should have contact, volition (cetanā), etc. Like other states of mind (citta-sthiti), other states of mind have contact as their root. There is no case of going from non-existence to existence; inferring the cause from the effect, it should also be originally existent.

Treatise: If contact is admitted, then contact is the condition for feeling (vedanā).

Commentary: Within this state, there should also be feeling, because contact is the condition for feeling, just like contact in other states.

Treatise: Since feeling is admitted, feeling and perception (saṃjñā) are inseparable.

Commentary: This state should have perception because it has feeling, like other distracted mind states. If that's the case, then all mental factors (caitta) should be present. How can it be said that there is no feeling and perception?

Treatise: Like feeling conditioning craving (tṛṣṇā), that reasoning is not established.

Commentary: Below, the sixth, the Sautrāntika school offers a defense, saying that just as it is said that feeling conditions craving, not all feelings can give rise to craving. Non-defiled wholesome feelings do not give rise to craving. Therefore, just as contact conditions feeling, it should be like craving, where not all contacts can give rise to feeling. In this state, there is contact, but no feeling arises. Therefore, the reasoning is the same, so the previous difficulty is not established.

Next, the seventh, the treatise master refutes it.

Treatise: That defense is not correct because there is a difference.

Commentary: This treatise master negates it because the two examples are different.

What is the reason?

Treatise: The Buddha himself distinguished and said that only the feelings arising from contact increased by ignorance (avidyā), defiled feelings with outflows, can condition craving. Because they are in accordance. Not all feelings can give rise to craving. There has never been a teaching that distinguishes contact giving rise to feeling, saying that contact in this distracted mind state can give rise to feeling, while contact in this cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti) state cannot give rise to feeling. How can it be used as an example?

Treatise: Therefore, if there is contact, then feeling must arise. Because it is a definite relationship. Feeling and perception must exist simultaneously; this reasoning is definite.

Treatise: Or it should be like other states because there is volition, etc.

Commentary: In this state, feeling and perception should also be admitted because volition, etc., are admitted, just like in other states.

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此難則以有思理齊。如餘位說受．想有故。與前少別。

許有受．想亦復何辜。

論。許便違害至滅受想定。

述曰。初違教失　心行滅言。行即受．想故　亦不得成滅受想定。名體相違故。

就別破中。上破有心所訖。次破無心所。俱舍云尊者世友問論中說。此即經部異師　二法為種滅定無心。色為種子心后依生。經部本計滅定無心　次復轉計。滅定有心。次有心所　今更轉計。彼無心所。即末轉計　此中意言。滅定有心而無心所。為避前難所以計生。

論。若無心所至離心所故。

述曰。于中有二。初破有令無難。后縱有別生徴。初中有五問答。初問中文長　此諍大地非信．貪等。以彼無時心尚有故　量云。滅定之位。無第六心。以無大地心所法故。如悶絕等位。

彼若救言此受等如信等。信等雖無仍有心故。如起染時。即復難言。

論。余遍行滅法隨滅故。

述曰。前難中雲。受．想二法如尋．伺是遍行法故。故彼滅定位心定應滅。

彼若復言。此非遍行故可滅也。

論。受等應非大地法故。

述曰。以心有時此所無故。如貪等者。此受．想等應非大地法。

彼若救言雖名大地據餘位得名。非約滅定。

論。此識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果用有思和推理來衡量這個困難，就像之前所說，因為有受（vedanā，感受）和想（saṃjñā，知覺）的存在，所以與之前的情況略有不同。

如果承認有受和想，那又有什麼過錯呢？

論：如果承認有受和想，那就違背了達到滅受想定（nirodha-samāpatti，止息想受的禪定）的教義。

述記：這首先違背了教義，失去了『心行滅』的說法。因為『行』就是指受和想，所以也不能成就滅受想定，因為名義和體相是相違背的。

在個別破斥中，上面已經破斥了有心所（caitta，心所法）。接下來破斥無心所。俱舍論中尊者世友（Vasumitra）在問論中說：這指的是經部（Sautrāntika）的異師，他們認為兩種法是滅定的種子，即色（rūpa，色蘊）是種子，心（citta，心）在之後依賴它而生起。經部原本認為滅定是無心的，後來又轉而認為滅定是有心的，之後又認為有心所。現在又進一步轉而認為滅定沒有心所，這是最後的轉變。這裡的意思是說，滅定有心而沒有心所，爲了避免之前的困難，所以這樣設想。

論：如果沒有心所，那麼……（導致）遠離心所。

述記：這裡有兩部分，首先破斥『有』，使其變為『無』，從而產生困難；然後假設『有』，並從差別上提出質疑。在第一部分中，有五個問答。第一個問題篇幅較長。這裡爭論的是大地法（mahābhumika，普遍存在的心所），而不是信（śraddhā，信仰）、貪（rāga，貪慾）等，因為信、貪等在沒有心的時候仍然存在。可以這樣推理：在滅定的時候，沒有第六識（manovijñāna，意識），因為沒有大地心所法，就像悶絕等狀態一樣。

如果對方辯解說，受等就像信等一樣，信等雖然沒有，但仍然有心存在，就像生起染污心的時候一樣。那麼就可以反駁說：

論：其餘遍行（sarvatraga，一切時處皆有）的法隨著（受想的）滅而滅。

述記：之前的難點在於，受和想這兩種法就像尋（vitarka，尋）和伺（vicāra，伺）一樣，是遍行法，所以當它們滅的時候，滅定中的心也應該滅。

如果對方再次辯解說，受和想不是遍行法，所以可以滅。

論：受等應該不是大地法。

述記：因為心有時存在而受等有時不存在，就像貪等一樣，所以受和想等應該不是大地法。

如果對方辯解說，雖然名為大地法，但這是根據其他情況而得名，不是指滅定。

論：此識（vijñāna，識蘊）……

【English Translation】 English version: This difficulty is resolved by considering thought and reasoning. As previously stated, it differs slightly because of the presence of feeling (vedanā) and perception (saṃjñā).

If feeling and perception are admitted, what is the fault?

Treatise: If feeling and perception are admitted, it contradicts the attainment of the cessation of feeling and perception (nirodha-samāpatti).

Commentary: This initially contradicts the teaching, losing the statement of 『cessation of mental activities.』 Because 『activities』 refer to feeling and perception, the cessation of feeling and perception cannot be achieved, as the name and substance are contradictory.

In the individual refutations, the existence of mental factors (caitta) has been refuted above. Next, the non-existence of mental factors is refuted. In the Kośa, Venerable Vasumitra in his questions states: This refers to the heterodox teachers of the Sautrāntika school, who consider two dharmas as seeds for cessation, namely, form (rūpa) as the seed, and mind (citta) arising later dependent on it. The Sautrāntika originally held that cessation is without mind, then they changed their view to cessation with mind, and then with mental factors. Now they further change their view to cessation without mental factors, which is the final change. The meaning here is that cessation has mind but no mental factors, conceived to avoid the previous difficulties.

Treatise: If there are no mental factors… (it leads to) being apart from mental factors.

Commentary: There are two parts here. First, refuting 『existence』 to make it 『non-existence,』 thus creating a difficulty; then assuming 『existence』 and questioning from the difference. In the first part, there are five questions and answers. The first question is lengthy. The dispute here is about universal mental factors (mahābhumika), not faith (śraddhā), greed (rāga), etc., because faith, greed, etc., still exist even when there is no mind. It can be reasoned: In the state of cessation, there is no sixth consciousness (manovijñāna), because there are no universal mental factors, just like in a state of fainting.

If the opponent argues that feeling, etc., are like faith, etc., and although faith, etc., are absent, the mind still exists, like when defiled mind arises, then it can be countered:

Treatise: The remaining pervasive (sarvatraga) dharmas cease with the cessation (of feeling and perception).

Commentary: The previous difficulty was that feeling and perception, like initial thought (vitarka) and sustained thought (vicāra), are pervasive dharmas, so when they cease, the mind in cessation should also cease.

If the opponent argues again that feeling and perception are not pervasive dharmas, so they can cease.

Treatise: Feeling, etc., should not be universal mental factors.

Commentary: Because the mind sometimes exists while feeling, etc., sometimes do not, like greed, etc., feeling, perception, etc., should not be universal mental factors.

If the opponent argues that although named universal mental factors, this is named based on other situations, not referring to cessation.

Treatise: This consciousness (vijñāna)…

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應非相應法故。

述曰。此相應法。余時亦有心所相應。此位之心既無心所故。如色等。應非相應。

彼若復言此位之心非相應法。如無表色非有質礙。

論。許則應無至亦非心故。

述曰。謂此位心。應無所依．緣。非相應法故。如色等法。

又此應非心。非相應法故。如聲．香等。

此中所依。謂即根。等等無間意　所緣。謂境等。等言等取此非能緣。以非心故。無相應法故。此心若有緣何等境。既無心所如何領納。如何取像等。故應有心所。如成業論。

上乃違理。次出違經。

論。又契經說至有受想思。

述曰。引經可知。成業論說十問經也。

依經難言。

論。若此定中至必應有觸。

述曰。不諍觸體別有不有。但總令有三和合因。然彼所許。以經中言三和合觸故令定有。

論。觸既定與至而無心所。

述曰。觸既非無。觸必緣于受．想．思故。應定相應。如何可言彼無心所。如經既爾　成業又云十問經中受．想．行蘊皆觸為緣。如何有三和。識而無心所。如余為比故。

論。若謂余時至亦無受等。

述曰。自下第二經部之中有二師救。一無別觸。即三和是觸故。二別有觸數。三和外別有故。即今經

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為不是相應法。

述曰：這種相應法，其他時候也有心所相應。這個位次的心既然沒有心所，所以就像色法等一樣，應該不是相應法。

如果他們又說這個位次的心不是相應法，就像無表色沒有質礙一樣。

論：如果承認，就應該沒有所依、所緣，也不是心。

述曰：意思是說，這個位次的心，應該沒有所依、所緣，因為它不是相應法，就像色法等一樣。

而且這應該不是心，因為它不是相應法，就像聲、香等一樣。

這裡所說的所依，就是指根。等等無間意。所緣，就是指境等。等字等同於取此非能緣，因為它不是心。沒有相應法的原因。這個心如果緣何種境？既然沒有心所，如何領納？如何取像等？所以應該有心所，就像《成業論》所說。

上面是違背道理，下面是違背經典。

論：而且契經說，有受、想、思。

述曰：引用經典就可以知道。《成業論》說的是《十問經》。

依據經典來責難。

論：如果這個定中沒有觸，那麼必定應該有觸。

述曰：不爭論觸的本體是別有還是沒有，但總的來說要有三和合的因。然而他們所承認的，因為經典中說三和合是觸，所以讓這個定中有觸。

論：觸既然已經確定，那麼必定與受、想、思相應，而沒有心所。

述曰：觸既然不是沒有，觸必定緣于受、想、思，所以應該一定相應。怎麼能說它沒有心所呢？就像經典既然這樣說，《成業論》又說《十問經》中受、想、行蘊都以觸為緣。怎麼會有三和，識而沒有心所呢？就像其他的比喻一樣。

論：如果說其他時候沒有觸，那麼受等也沒有。

述曰：下面第二經部中有兩位論師來救。一是沒有別的觸，就是三和就是觸。二是別有觸數，在三和之外別有觸。就是現在的經。

【English Translation】 English version: Because it is not a corresponding dharma (ying fei xiangying fa).

Commentary: This corresponding dharma, at other times, also has mental factors (xin suo) corresponding. Since the mind in this state has no mental factors, it should not be a corresponding dharma, like form (se) and so on.

If they further say that the mind in this state is not a corresponding dharma, like non-revealing form (wu biao se) has no physical obstruction.

Treatise: If admitted, then there should be no basis (suo yi) or object (suo yuan), and it is also not mind.

Commentary: Meaning that the mind in this state should have no basis or object, because it is not a corresponding dharma, like form and other dharmas.

Moreover, this should not be mind, because it is not a corresponding dharma, like sound (sheng), smell (xiang), and so on.

Here, 'basis' refers to the roots (gen). And so on, the immediately preceding mind (dengdeng wu jian yi). 'Object' refers to the objects (jing), and so on. 'And so on' is equivalent to taking this as non-cognizing (fei neng yuan), because it is not mind. Because there are no corresponding dharmas. If this mind cognizes what kind of object? Since there are no mental factors, how can it receive (ling na)? How can it take images (qu xiang), etc.? Therefore, there should be mental factors, as the 'Treatise on Accomplishing Karma' (Cheng Ye Lun) says.

The above is contrary to reason. Next, it is contrary to the scriptures.

Treatise: Moreover, the sutras say that there are feeling (shou), perception (xiang), and volition (si).

Commentary: Quoting the sutras makes it known. The 'Treatise on Accomplishing Karma' speaks of the 'Ten Questions Sutra' (Shi Wen Jing).

Based on the scriptures, it is difficult to argue.

Treatise: If in this samadhi (ding) there is no contact (chu), then there must be contact.

Commentary: There is no dispute whether the substance of contact is separate or not, but in general, there must be the cause of the three convergences (san he he yin). However, what they admit is that the sutras say that the three convergences are contact, so let there be contact in this samadhi.

Treatise: Since contact is determined, then it must correspond with feeling, perception, and volition, but there are no mental factors.

Commentary: Since contact is not non-existent, contact must be related to feeling, perception, and volition, so it should definitely correspond. How can it be said that there are no mental factors? Just as the sutras say, the 'Treatise on Accomplishing Karma' also says that in the 'Ten Questions Sutra', the aggregates of feeling, perception, and volition all take contact as their condition. How can there be three convergences, consciousness (shi) without mental factors? Like other analogies.

Treatise: If it is said that at other times there is no contact, then there is also no feeling, etc.

Commentary: Below, in the second Sutra School (Jing Bu), there are two teachers who come to the rescue. One is that there is no separate contact, that is, the three convergences are contact. The second is that there is a separate number of contacts, separate from the three convergences. That is the current sutra.

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部猶有二師。彼皆余時三和有力。無別觸故能成於觸。有別觸故能生於觸。以有或成。或生觸故。能俱起受等。此是定前心等俱也。由此定前厭患心所。所既被厭。故在定位三事無能。隨彼二說不成生觸。既爾此位亦無受等。不可以余不被厭位而例此中。

自下第三論主返難。

論。若爾應名至滅受想耶。

述曰。且就他破。以一切心所皆滅故。如何但說滅受．想二法耶。

論。若謂厭時至以立定名。

述曰。自下第四經部救言。厭時唯緣二法。二法既滅故心所皆滅。此定依彼定前所厭以立其名故無失者。

論。既爾此中至如余心所。

述曰。自下第五論主難云。既爾此定。心亦應滅。與前所厭受等俱故。如厭心所。隨彼計難。非謂共許。此他比量。

若伏救云如厭貪等染心所滅而心不滅。寧厭受等心所滅故心亦遣滅。論主若言厭貪等時心亦已隨滅。后時別有心生者。此亦應然。厭時之心隨受．想滅。后時別有無所心生。

論。不爾如何名無心定。

述曰。論主難云。若心不滅故言不爾。如何名為無心定也。此中心應滅。名所無心故。如受．想。受．想名為滅受想定。此二即無。心例亦應爾。名無心定故。

此上破有令無難。自下縱有別生徴。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 還有兩位老師。他們都是過去某個時候三和合力（三種條件和諧有力）的結果。因為沒有不同的觸（sparsha，感覺），所以能夠成就觸。因為有不同的觸，所以能夠產生觸。因為有或者成就，或者產生觸的緣故，能夠一起生起受（vedana，感受）等等。這是入定前心等等一起生起的情況。由此，入定前對心所（citta-samprayukta-dharma，與心相關的心理活動）產生厭惡。既然心所被厭惡，所以在入定的時候，這三種（受、想、行）都不能起作用。按照他們兩種說法，不能成就產生觸。既然如此，這個狀態下也沒有受等等。不能用其他沒有被厭惡的狀態來類比這種情況。

下面第三部分是論主的駁斥。

論：如果這樣，應該叫做至滅受想（sanjna，知覺）嗎？

述：這是就對方的觀點進行駁斥。因為一切心所都滅盡了，為什麼只說滅受和想這兩種法呢？

論：如果說厭惡的時候達到，以此來建立定的名稱。

述：下面第四部分是經部的辯護。厭惡的時候只緣于兩種法。這兩種法既然滅盡了，所以心所都滅盡了。這個定是依據入定前所厭惡的來建立名稱，所以沒有過失。

論：既然這樣，那麼這個定中，心也應該像其他心所一樣滅盡。

述：下面第五部分是論主的詰難。既然這樣，那麼這個定中，心也應該滅盡，因為它和之前所厭惡的受等等一起生起。就像厭惡心所一樣。這是按照對方的觀點進行詰難，並非共同認可的觀點。這是他人的比量。

如果對方辯護說，就像厭惡貪等等染污的心所滅盡，而心沒有滅盡一樣。為什麼厭惡受等等心所滅盡，心也應該被捨棄滅盡呢？論主如果說，厭惡貪等的時候，心也已經隨之滅盡。之後另外有心產生。那麼這種情況也應該如此。厭惡的時候，心隨著受和想滅盡。之後另外有無所緣的心產生。

論：如果不是這樣，怎麼能叫做無心定（asaṃjñā-samāpatti，無想定）呢？

述：論主詰難說，如果心不滅，所以說不是這樣。那麼怎麼能叫做無心定呢？這個定中，心應該滅盡，名稱上是無心，所以。就像受和想一樣。受和想被稱為滅受想定。這兩種就是沒有。心也應該如此類比。因為叫做無心定。

以上是破斥有，使之成為無的詰難。下面是縱然有其他產生而進行徵詢。

【English Translation】 English version There are still two teachers. They were all the result of three harmonious and forceful conditions (tri-samavāya-bala) at some point in the past. Because there is no separate sparsha (touch, sensation), it is possible to accomplish touch. Because there is a separate touch, it is possible to generate touch. Because there is either accomplishment or generation of touch, it is possible to arise together with vedana (feeling, sensation) and so on. This is the case where the mind and so on arise together before entering samadhi (meditative absorption). Therefore, before entering samadhi, there is aversion to citta-samprayukta-dharma (mental factors associated with the mind). Since the mental factors are disliked, these three (feeling, perception, volition) cannot function when in samadhi. According to their two views, it is not possible to accomplish the generation of touch. Since this is the case, there are no feelings and so on in this state either. One cannot use other states that have not been disliked to compare with this situation.

The third part below is the refutation by the treatise master.

Treatise: If that's the case, should it be called cessation of feeling and sanjna (perception, cognition)?

Commentary: This is refuting from the other party's point of view. Since all mental factors are extinguished, why only say that feeling and perception are extinguished?

Treatise: If it is said that the name of the samadhi is established based on reaching the time of aversion.

Commentary: The fourth part below is the defense by the Sautrantika school. At the time of aversion, only two dharmas (elements of existence) are cognized. Since these two dharmas are extinguished, all mental factors are extinguished. This samadhi is named based on what was disliked before entering samadhi, so there is no fault.

Treatise: If that's the case, then in this samadhi, the mind should also be extinguished like other mental factors.

Commentary: The fifth part below is the treatise master's challenge. If that's the case, then in this samadhi, the mind should also be extinguished, because it arises together with the feeling and so on that were previously disliked. Just like disliking mental factors. This is challenging according to the other party's point of view, not a mutually agreed-upon view. This is the other's inference.

If the other party defends by saying that just as the defiled mental factors such as greed are extinguished, but the mind is not extinguished. Why should the mind also be abandoned and extinguished when the mental factors such as feeling are disliked? If the treatise master says that at the time of disliking greed and so on, the mind has already been extinguished along with it. Then another mind arises later. Then this should also be the case. At the time of aversion, the mind is extinguished along with feeling and perception. Then another mind without any object of cognition arises later.

Treatise: If it's not like that, how can it be called asaṃjñā-samāpatti (the samadhi of non-perception)?

Commentary: The treatise master challenges, saying that if the mind is not extinguished, then it is not like that. Then how can it be called the samadhi of non-perception? In this samadhi, the mind should be extinguished, and the name is without mind, therefore. Just like feeling and perception. Feeling and perception are called the samadhi of cessation of feeling and perception. These two are non-existent. The mind should also be analogous to this. Because it is called the samadhi of non-perception.

The above is the challenge of refuting existence and making it non-existent. Below is inquiring even if there is another arising.

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于中有二。初總問。次別破。

論。又此定位意識是何。

述曰。此總問也。

論。不應是染或無記性。

述曰。初破非善。此設遮計　若是染者。應貪等相應。以是染心故。如餘位染心　設與相應亦應有觸。許有無明故。又無想定尚不許染。況此定耶　若無記者。四無記中是何法攝。如成業徴文勢稍異。

論。諸善定中無此事故。

述曰。今但總言。余善定中無此染污．無記事故。即八凈定為例亦是。

論。余染無記心必有心所故。

述曰。此位既無染心所法故。非染無記。為例量也。

論。不應厭善起染等故。

述曰。非求善定起染無記心。與加行因不相應故。

彼若救言厭染起善心。厭善起染心何失。

論。非求寂靜翻起散故。

述曰。量云。汝宗求緣涅槃心。應起散心。求緣寂靜故。如滅定前心。以此返彼亦得可知。

下破本計。

論。若謂是善至善根相應。

述曰。未見經部立四善所由。今以義逼令有四種。滅定之心何善所攝。此正彼計。心是相應善　若彼說言此心是善。今難言。應無貪等善根相應。許相應善故。如餘位善心。

論。此心不應至及涅槃故。

述曰。設彼若言是自性善．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 於此中有兩種情況。首先是總的提問，然後是分別破斥。

論：那麼，這個定位意識是什麼？

述曰：這是總的提問。

論：不應該是染污的或者無記性的。

述曰：首先破斥它不是善的。這裡設定一個遮止的計較：如果是染污的，應該與貪等相應，因為它是一個染污的心，就像其他位次的染污心一樣。如果與貪等相應，也應該有觸。因為允許有無明（avidyā）。而且，無想定（asaññāsamāpatti）尚且不允許有染污，更何況這個定呢？如果是無記性的，那麼在四種無記中屬於哪一種？就像《成業論》中引用的文句，文勢稍微不同。

論：在各種善定中沒有這種事情。

述曰：現在只是總的來說。其他的善定中沒有這種染污、無記的事情。以八凈定（aṣṭau śubha-kṛtsnāyatana）為例也是如此。

論：其他的染污、無記心必然有心所（caitta）伴隨。

述曰：這個位次既然沒有染污的心所法，所以不是染污的或無記性的。這是用例子來衡量。

論：不應該因為厭惡善而生起染污等。

述曰：不是爲了尋求善定而生起染污、無記心，因為它與加行因不相應。

如果對方辯解說，厭惡染污可以生起善心，那麼厭惡善而生起染污心又有什麼過失呢？

論：不是爲了尋求寂靜反而生起散亂。

述曰：可以這樣衡量：你宗派尋求緣涅槃（nirvāṇa）的心，應該生起散亂心，因為是尋求寂靜的緣故，就像滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti）之前的心一樣。用這個反過來推論對方也是可以理解的。

下面破斥對方的根本主張。

論：如果認為它是善的，與至善根相應。

述曰：沒有見過經部（sūtra-anta）建立四種善所依。現在用義理來逼迫他們有四種。滅定的心屬於哪種善所攝？這正是對方的主張，心是相應的善。如果他們說這個心是善的，現在可以反駁說，不應該沒有貪等善根相應，因為允許是相應的善，就像其他位次的善心一樣。

論：這個心不應該達到至及涅槃。

述曰：假設對方說這是自性善（prakṛti-kuśala）。

【English Translation】 English version: Herein are two aspects. First, a general question. Second, specific refutations.

Treatise: Furthermore, what is this consciousness of fixed position?

Commentary: This is the general question.

Treatise: It should not be of a defiled or neutral nature.

Commentary: First, refuting that it is not wholesome. This establishes a counter-argument: If it were defiled, it should be associated with greed (lobha) and the like, because it is a defiled mind, like other defiled minds in other states. If it is associated with them, there should also be contact (sparśa), because ignorance (avidyā) is admitted. Moreover, even in the state of non-perception (asaññāsamāpatti), defilement is not allowed, let alone in this samādhi? If it is neutral, which of the four types of neutral states does it belong to? As in the text cited in the Treatise on the Completion of Karma, the wording is slightly different.

Treatise: In all wholesome samādhis, there is no such occurrence.

Commentary: Now, it is only stated generally. In other wholesome samādhis, there is no such occurrence of defilement or neutrality. The eight pure abodes (aṣṭau śubha-kṛtsnāyatana) can also be taken as an example.

Treatise: Other defiled or neutral minds necessarily have mental factors (caitta).

Commentary: Since in this state there are no defiled mental factors, it is neither defiled nor neutral. This is measured by example.

Treatise: One should not arise defilement etc. from厭disgusting wholesomeness.

Commentary: It is not that one arises defiled or neutral mind in order to seek wholesome samādhi, because it is not in accordance with the cause of application.

If the other party argues that one can arise a wholesome mind from厭disgusting defilement, then what is wrong with arising a defiled mind from厭disgusting wholesomeness?

Treatise: One should not arise distraction instead of seeking tranquility.

Commentary: One can measure it thus: Your school's mind seeking the condition of nirvāṇa should arise a distracted mind, because it is seeking tranquility, like the mind before the cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti). It can be understood that this can be used to refute the other party as well.

Below, refuting the original claim.

Treatise: If it is considered wholesome, it is associated with the ultimate wholesome root.

Commentary: I have not seen the Sūtra School (sūtra-anta) establish the four supports of wholesomeness. Now, I compel them to have four by reason. Which wholesome category does the mind of cessation attainment belong to? This is exactly the other party's claim that the mind is associated wholesomeness. If they say that this mind is wholesome, now it can be refuted that it should not be associated with wholesome roots such as non-greed (alobha), because it is admitted to be associated wholesomeness, like wholesome minds in other states.

Treatise: This mind should not reach the ultimate and nirvāṇa.

Commentary: Suppose the other party says that this is intrinsic wholesomeness (prakṛti-kuśala).

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或勝義善。違自宗故。是為大過。又非自性善。非善根故。如貪等法。非勝義善。非涅槃故。如余有為善心等。

論。若謂此心至非等起故。

述曰。彼復轉計謂等起善。以加行善所引發故。理亦不然。違自宗故　又違比量。謂此位心。非等起善。是善心故。如余善心　彼計余善心非等起善故。善身語業是等起故。

論。善心無間至由前等起。

述曰。餘位善心後起二性之心。皆應是等起善。善心引發故。如此位心。

論。故心是善由相應力。

述曰。以是義故。故心是善。由相應力。如餘位善心故。

論。既爾必與至心亦應無。

述曰。此心。必與善根等相應。是相應善心故。如餘位善心。為例既多。寧說此心獨無心所。心所無故心亦應無。一切心所皆非有故。如涅槃等。

論。如是推徴至此第八識。

述曰。此下第三論主總結歸正義。眼等轉識於此定位非不離身。實離身故。契經所言不離身識。即是第八。

論。入滅定時至執持識故。

述曰。如成業論云。心有二種。一集起心。二種種心。為第二故名無心定。今言入定時。不為止息此極寂靜執持識故。即是第一集起心也。此定故有第八識在。滅定他諍說或有心。或說無心。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：或者說是勝義善（paramārtha-kuśala，終極的善），但這樣就違背了你自己的宗義，這是很大的過失。而且它也不是自性善（prakṛti-kuśala，本質上的善），因為它不是善根（kuśala-mūla，善的根源），就像貪等法一樣。它也不是勝義善，因為它不是涅槃（nirvāṇa，解脫），就像其他的有為善心等一樣。

論：如果認為這個心不是等起（samutthāna，生起）的，所以是善的。

述曰：他們又轉變想法，認為它是等起善，因為它是由加行善（prayoga-kuśala，通過努力獲得的善）所引發的。但這個理由也不成立，因為它違背了你自己的宗義。而且也違背了比量（anumāna，推理），即這個位次的心不是等起善，因為它是一個善心，就像其他的善心一樣。他們認為其他的善心不是等起善，所以善的身語業才是等起善。

論：善心無間（anantara，緊接著）生起，是由之前的等起所致。

述曰：其他位次的善心，以及之後生起的二性（ उभय，善與非善）之心，都應該是等起善，因為它們是由善心引發的，就像這個位次的心一樣。

論：所以心是善的，是由相應（saṃprayoga，伴隨）的力量。

述曰：因為這個緣故，所以心是善的，是由相應力。就像其他位次的善心一樣。

論：既然如此，必然與善根等相應，那麼這個心也應該沒有心所（caitta，心理活動）。

述曰：這個心必然與善根等相應，因為它是一個相應的善心，就像其他位次的善心一樣。這樣的例子很多，怎麼能說這個心獨獨沒有心所呢？心所都沒有了，心也應該沒有了，因為一切心所都不是實有的，就像涅槃等一樣。

論：這樣推究考察，最終指向這第八識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）。

述曰：下面第三點，論主總結歸納正確的意義。眼等轉識（pravṛtti-vijñāna，轉變識）在這個定位中並非不離身，實際上是離身的。契經（sūtra，佛經）所說的不離身的識，就是第八識。

論：進入滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti，止滅一切感受和想法的禪定）時，是因為執持識（ādanavijñāna，執取識）的緣故。

述曰：如《成業論》所說，心有兩種，一是集起心（saṃcicitta，積聚業力的心），二是種種心（nānācitta，各種不同的心）。爲了第二種心而名為無心定（acittaka-samāpatti，無心禪定）。現在說進入定時，不是爲了止息這種極寂靜的執持識。這就是第一種集起心。這個禪定中，第八識是存在的。關於滅盡定，其他的爭論說或者有心，或者說無心。

【English Translation】 English version: Or it is said to be paramārtha-kuśala (ultimate good), but this contradicts your own tenets, which is a great fault. Moreover, it is not prakṛti-kuśala (naturally good), because it is not kuśala-mūla (root of good), like greed and other dharmas. It is not paramārtha-kuśala, because it is not nirvāṇa (liberation), like other conditioned good minds, etc.

Treatise: If it is argued that this mind is good because it is not samutthāna (arising).

Commentary: They further change their argument, claiming it is samutthāna-kuśala (arisen good) because it is caused by prayoga-kuśala (goodness through effort). But this reasoning is also not valid, because it contradicts your own tenets. Moreover, it contradicts anumāna (inference), namely, the mind in this state is not samutthāna-kuśala, because it is a good mind, like other good minds. They believe that other good minds are not samutthāna-kuśala, so good bodily and verbal actions are samutthāna-kuśala.

Treatise: A good mind arises anantara (immediately) due to the previous samutthāna.

Commentary: Other good minds in other states, as well as minds of ubhaya (both good and non-good) nature that arise later, should all be samutthāna-kuśala, because they are caused by good minds, just like the mind in this state.

Treatise: Therefore, the mind is good due to the power of saṃprayoga (association).

Commentary: Because of this reason, the mind is good due to the power of association. Like other good minds in other states.

Treatise: Since this is the case, it must be associated with kuśala-mūla (roots of good), etc., then this mind should also be without caitta (mental activities).

Commentary: This mind must be associated with kuśala-mūla, etc., because it is an associated good mind, like other good minds in other states. There are many such examples, how can it be said that this mind alone has no caitta? If there are no caitta, then the mind should also not exist, because all caitta are not real, like nirvāṇa, etc.

Treatise: Through such investigation and examination, it ultimately points to this eighth ālayavijñāna (store consciousness).

Commentary: Below, in the third point, the author of the treatise summarizes and returns to the correct meaning. The pravṛtti-vijñāna (transforming consciousness) such as eye consciousness, etc., in this state are not inseparable from the body, but are actually separate from the body. The consciousness that the sūtra (scripture) speaks of as inseparable from the body is the eighth consciousness.

Treatise: When entering nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment), it is because of the ādanavijñāna (clinging consciousness).

Commentary: As the Cheng Ye Lun says, there are two types of mind: one is saṃcicitta (accumulating mind), and the other is nānācitta (various minds). It is called acittaka-samāpatti (mindless attainment) for the sake of the second type of mind. Now, saying 'entering samāpatti' is not to stop this extremely quiet ādanavijñāna. This is the first type of saṃcicitta. In this samāpatti, the eighth consciousness exists. Regarding nirodha-samāpatti, other debates say that there is mind or that there is no mind.

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論。無想等位類此應知。

述曰。無想定．無心天亦爾。與此同故。隨計隨破。然除眠．悶絕。以無所厭故。有所厭心所心便不滅。非不厭故心王猶在　此第九段大文有二。初出滅定有心無心破他自立。二例無想定等準破應爾。

論。又契經說至不應有故。

述曰。自下第十引染凈心經。維摩等云。心凈故眾生凈。心垢故眾生垢。其阿含等亦有此文　今言心染故情染等。此如瑜伽五十四卷識住中解。此中意說。以本識現．種為染凈心令有情染凈即當攝論染凈章。染章即三雜染。凈章即是世出世凈。

論。謂染凈法至持彼種故。

述曰。下別解中。先總解。后別破。此總中言染凈諸法以心為本。若有漏無漏．常無常．有為無為。染凈之法皆以本識為本。故言心染情染。心凈情凈　此言有為等法總句。無為法等別句。染凈之法至下當知。有漏現行依心生。種子依心住。心受無漏現行熏。持彼無漏種故　又解初句如前。因心而生者。謂有為現行法。皆因種子心而生　依心住者。謂有為現行法。皆依現行識法而住　心受彼熏者。謂本識現行受染凈有為現行之熏。釋上依住　持彼有為之種子故。釋上因心生　隨心染凈有情染凈。即以所生能依之法和合假者為有情故　或心體是有情。心染故情染。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論：無想定等情況，依此類推即可得知。

述曰：無想定、無心天也是如此，因為與此相同。隨其計度而破斥。然而，除了睡眠、悶絕之外，因為沒有厭惡，所以有所厭惡的心所就不會滅。因為不是不厭惡，所以心王仍然存在。這第九段大文有二：一是提出滅定有心無心，破斥他宗，建立自宗；二是類比無想定等，準此破斥，應當如此。

論：又契經說……以至……不應有故。

述曰：下面第十，引用染凈心經。《維摩經》等說：『心凈故眾生凈，心垢故眾生垢。』《阿含經》等也有此文。現在說心染故情染等，這如《瑜伽師地論》第五十四卷識住中解釋。此中意思是說，以本識的現行、種子作為染凈心，使有情染凈，即相當於《攝大乘論》的染凈章。染章即是三雜染，凈章即是世出世凈。

論：謂染凈法……以至……持彼種故。

述曰：下面分別解釋中，先總解釋，後分別破斥。這總解釋中說，染凈諸法以心為根本。若是有漏無漏、常無常、有為無為，染凈之法都以本識為根本。所以說心染情染，心凈情凈。這裡說有為等法是總句，無為法等是別句。染凈之法至下當知。有漏現行依心生，種子依心住，心受無漏現行熏，持彼無漏種故。又解釋第一句如前，因心而生者，指有為現行法，都因種子心而生。依心住者，指有為現行法，都依現行識法而住。心受彼熏者，指本識現行受染凈有為現行之熏，解釋上面的『依住』。持彼有為之種子故，解釋上面的『因心生』。隨心染凈有情染凈，即以所生能依之法和合假者為有情故。或者心體是有情，心染故情染。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: States such as the Asaṃjñisamāpatti (無想定, Nirodha-samāpatti, the attainment of non-perception) should be understood similarly.

Commentary: The Asaṃjñāsamāpatti (無想定, the attainment of non-perception) and the heavens of no-mind (無心天, heavens where beings exist without mental activity) are also like this, because they are the same. Refute them according to their assertions. However, except for sleep and fainting, because there is no aversion, the mental factors that have aversion will not cease. Because it is not non-aversion, the mind-king (心王, citta) still exists. This ninth major section has two parts: first, it presents the existence or non-existence of mind in the Nirodha-samāpatti (滅定, cessation attainment), refuting others and establishing one's own position; second, it analogizes to the Asaṃjñisamāpatti (無想定, the attainment of non-perception) and others, refuting them accordingly, which should be done in this way.

Treatise: Moreover, the sutras say... up to... therefore, it should not exist.

Commentary: Below, in the tenth section, the sutra on defiled and undefiled mind is cited. The Vimalakīrti Sutra and others say: 'Because the mind is pure, sentient beings are pure; because the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled.' The Agamas and others also have this passage. Now it says that because the mind is defiled, emotions are defiled, etc. This is explained in the fifty-fourth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, in the section on the abodes of consciousness. The meaning here is that the manifestation and seeds of the fundamental consciousness are taken as the defiled and undefiled mind, causing sentient beings to be defiled and undefiled, which corresponds to the chapter on defilement and purification in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. The chapter on defilement is the three defilements, and the chapter on purification is the worldly and supramundane purification.

Treatise: The so-called defiled and undefiled dharmas... up to... because it holds those seeds.

Commentary: Below, in the separate explanations, first a general explanation is given, then separate refutations. In this general explanation, it is said that all defiled and undefiled dharmas take the mind as their root. Whether they are afflicted (有漏, with outflows) or unafflicted (無漏, without outflows), permanent (常, nitya) or impermanent (無常, anitya), conditioned (有為, saṃskṛta) or unconditioned (無為, asaṃskṛta), all defiled and undefiled dharmas take the fundamental consciousness as their root. Therefore, it is said that when the mind is defiled, emotions are defiled; when the mind is pure, emotions are pure. Here, saying 'conditioned dharmas, etc.' is a general statement, while 'unconditioned dharmas, etc.' is a separate statement. The defiled and undefiled dharmas will be known below. Afflicted manifestations arise depending on the mind, and seeds abide depending on the mind. The mind receives the influence of undefiled manifestations and holds those undefiled seeds. Also, the explanation of the first sentence is as before: 'Arising from the mind' refers to conditioned manifestations, which all arise from the seed-mind. 'Abiding depending on the mind' refers to conditioned manifestations, which all abide depending on the manifesting consciousness. 'The mind receives their influence' refers to the fundamental consciousness receiving the influence of defiled and undefiled conditioned manifestations, explaining the above 'depending and abiding'. 'Because it holds the seeds of the conditioned' explains the above 'arising from the mind'. Sentient beings are defiled or undefiled according to the defilement or undefilement of the mind, that is, sentient beings are the provisional combination of the dharmas that are produced and that depend. Or, the essence of the mind is sentient beings; when the mind is defiled, emotions are defiled.

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心凈故情凈　此文有釋。以心為本總句如初。因心而生。謂雜染法。即是有漏三性。皆是以相順。故遂別各生　依心住故。謂清凈法。有為無漏不順本識。故但說依心住　心受彼熏持彼種故。釋上所由。並通染凈　又心受彼熏。是有漏法　持彼種故。是無漏法　又有別解。以心為本總句　因心而生依心住故。並有漏法現行依種子心生。依現行識住　心受彼熏持彼種者。即無漏有為法。雖心相違。心受彼現行之熏。能持彼現行種故。後心凈時有情隨凈。

論。然雜染法至種類別故。

述曰。下別解中有二。初解雜染。后解清凈　染中有二。初總舉。后別破。即攝攝論三種雜染。三界見．修所有煩惱名煩惱。一切有漏善．不善業名業。此業所得總別異熟名果。

此總舉已。下自別破。別破之中文分為二。初明煩惱。后明業．果。

論。若無此識至皆應無因。

述曰。余文可知。先言持種。為破經部　界地往還者。攝論第二云。從無想等諸地沒來生此間。爾時煩惱及隨煩惱所染初識。此識生時應無種子。由所依止。及彼熏習。並已過去。現無體故。往謂生他地。還謂生自地　無染心後者。攝論云。對治煩惱識名已生。一切世間余識已滅。爾時若離阿賴耶識。所餘煩惱。及隨煩惱種子。在此對

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『心凈故情凈』，此文對此有所解釋。以『心』為根本，是總括性的句子，如同最初所說。因為『心』而生起，指的是雜染法，也就是有漏的三性（善、惡、無記），都是以相互順應的方式，所以各自別別生起。『依心住故』，指的是清凈法，有為的無漏法不順應本識，所以只說『依心住』。『心受彼熏持彼種故』，解釋了上述的原因，並且貫通染凈二法。另外，『心受彼熏』，指的是有漏法；『持彼種故』，指的是無漏法。還有另一種解釋，以『心為本』是總括性的句子，『因心而生依心住故』，指的是有漏法，現行依種子心生起，依現行識而住。『心受彼熏持彼種者』，指的是無漏有為法，雖然與『心』相違，但『心』接受彼現行的熏習，能夠保持彼現行的種子，所以後來的『心』清凈時，有情也隨之清凈。

論：『然雜染法至種類別故。』

述曰：下面分別解釋，分為兩部分。首先解釋雜染，然後解釋清凈。染法中又分為兩部分，首先是總括地舉出，然後是分別破斥，也就是《攝大乘論》中的三種雜染。三界（欲界、色界、無色界）見道、修道所斷的所有煩惱，稱為『煩惱』。一切有漏的善業、不善業，稱為『業』。這些業所得到的總報和別報的異熟果，稱為『果』。

總括地舉出之後，下面分別破斥。分別破斥的內容分為兩部分，首先說明煩惱，然後說明業和果。

論：『若無此識至皆應無因。』

述曰：其餘的文字可以自己理解。先說『持種』，是爲了破斥經部宗的觀點。『界地往還者』，《攝大乘論》第二卷說：『從無想定等諸地死亡後來生到這個世間，那時煩惱以及隨煩惱所染的最初的識，這個識生起的時候應該沒有種子，因為所依止的以及彼等熏習都已經過去，現在沒有實體。』『往』指的是生到其他地，『還』指的是生到自己所在的地。『無染心後者』，《攝大乘論》說：『對治煩惱的識的名字已經生起，一切世間的其餘的識已經滅去，那時如果離開阿賴耶識，其餘的煩惱以及隨煩惱的種子，』在這個對治

【English Translation】 English version: 『The mind being pure, the emotions are pure.』 This passage offers an explanation. Taking 『mind』 as the root is a general statement, as initially stated. Arising from 『mind』 refers to defiled dharmas, which are the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) of the contaminated, all in accordance with each other, hence arising separately. 『Dwelling in mind』 refers to pure dharmas; conditioned, uncontaminated dharmas do not accord with the fundamental consciousness, so it is only said to 『dwell in mind.』 『The mind receives their perfuming and holds their seeds』 explains the aforementioned reasons, encompassing both defiled and pure dharmas. Furthermore, 『the mind receives their perfuming』 refers to contaminated dharmas; 『holds their seeds』 refers to uncontaminated dharmas. There is also another interpretation: 『Taking mind as the root』 is a general statement; 『arising from mind, dwelling in mind』 refers to contaminated dharmas, with present actions arising dependent on the seed-mind and dwelling dependent on the present-acting consciousness. 『The mind receives their perfuming and holds their seeds』 refers to uncontaminated, conditioned dharmas. Although contradictory to 『mind,』 the 『mind』 receives the perfuming of their present actions and can hold the seeds of their present actions, so when the later 『mind』 is pure, sentient beings also become pure accordingly.

Treatise: 『However, defiled dharmas lead to different kinds of seeds.』

Commentary: The following separate explanations are in two parts. First, explaining defilement, then explaining purity. Within defilement, there are two parts: first, a general summary; then, separate refutations, which are the three kinds of defilement in the Compendium of the Mahayana. All afflictions severed by the paths of seeing and cultivation in the three realms (desire realm, form realm, formless realm) are called 『afflictions.』 All contaminated wholesome and unwholesome karmas are called 『karma.』 The general and specific ripened results obtained from these karmas are called 『results.』

After the general summary, the following are separate refutations. The content of the separate refutations is divided into two parts: first, explaining afflictions; then, explaining karma and results.

Treatise: 『If there were no such consciousness, all would be without cause.』

Commentary: The remaining text can be understood on your own. First, saying 『holds seeds』 is to refute the views of the Sautrantika school. 『Those who go and return between realms and grounds,』 the second volume of the Compendium of the Mahayana says: 『Those who die from the grounds of non-perception, etc., and are reborn in this world, at that time, the initial consciousness defiled by afflictions and secondary afflictions, when this consciousness arises, there should be no seeds, because the support and their perfuming have already passed, and there is no entity now.』 『Going』 refers to being born in another ground; 『returning』 refers to being born in one's own ground. 『Those without a defiled mind later,』 the Compendium of the Mahayana says: 『The name of the consciousness that counteracts afflictions has already arisen, and all other consciousnesses in the world have ceased. At that time, if apart from the Alaya consciousness, the remaining afflictions and the seeds of secondary afflictions』 in this counteraction

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治識中。不應道理。此對治識自性解脫故。乃至復於後時世間識生。若離阿賴耶識等。應無種子而更得生　世親．無性二師別解。此中意言。即二時後諸煩惱起。皆應無因。無持種故。

論。余法不能持彼種故。

述曰。經部若言余色等中持彼種故。往還等惑起以此為因者。理亦不然。余色等法無染心等。不能持彼有漏種子。非第八識故。如色聲等。

論。過去未來非實有故。

述曰。彼論釋言。非過去煩惱生今煩惱等。經部師計去．來無故。此論依彼正破經部。此中文意兼破薩婆多。彼以去．來有故。界地往還無失。今言非實。如前類破無染心后煩惱不生。彼言我宗有得得者。今破彼言。亦非實有。同去．來故。前已破故。類下凈章中。得等非實故　又言持種略得不言。正破經部故　設彼救云界地往還諸煩惱等后時無因生。

論。若諸煩惱至皆應起故。

述曰。此牒計非。若爾則無三乘等果。前已所斷者。無因更起故。

論。若無此識至亦應無因。

述曰。此下第二破業．及果。于中有二。初難界地往還等起無因。后難行緣識等不成。此等初也　若無此識持業．果種。界地往還亦應無因。此業之中攝論無解。彼第三云。若有於此非等引地沒已生時。依中有位意。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果對治識的理解不符合道理，這是因為對治識的自性是解脫的。乃至後來世間識產生，如果離開阿賴耶識（儲存一切種子識），就應該沒有種子而能夠產生。世親（Vasubandhu）和無性（Asanga）兩位論師對此有不同的解釋。他們的意思是說，即使在兩個時間點之後，所有煩惱的生起都應該沒有原因，因為沒有東西持有種子。

論：其他的法不能持有那些種子。

述記：如果經部（Sautrantika）說，其他的色法等持有那些種子，所以往還等迷惑的生起以此為因，那麼這個道理也是不成立的。因為其他的色法等沒有染污心等，不能持有有漏的種子，因為它們不是第八識，就像色聲等一樣。

論：過去和未來不是真實存在的。

述記：那個論典解釋說，不是過去的煩惱產生現在的煩惱等。經部師認為過去和未來不存在。這個論典依據這一點來破斥經部。這裡的文意也兼破薩婆多（Sarvastivada）。他們認為過去和未來存在，所以界地往還不會有缺失。現在說過去和未來不是真實存在的，就像之前那樣破斥沒有染污心之後煩惱不會生起。他們說他們的宗派有『得』和『得者』。現在破斥他們說，『得』和『得者』也不是真實存在的，和過去未來一樣。之前已經破斥過了，在下面的清凈章節中，『得』等不是真實存在的。又說持有種子可以省略不說，正是爲了破斥經部。假設他們辯解說，界地往還的各種煩惱等，在後來沒有原因地生起。

論：如果所有的煩惱都到齊了，就應該全部生起。

述記：這是對他們觀點的駁斥。如果這樣，那麼就不會有三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的果位了，因為之前已經斷除的煩惱，會沒有原因地再次生起。

論：如果沒有這個識，那麼界地往還也應該沒有原因。

述記：下面第二部分是破斥業和果。其中有兩點。首先是責難界地往還等生起沒有原因，然後是責難行緣識等不能成立。這些是第一點。如果沒有這個識來持有業和果的種子，那麼界地往還也應該沒有原因。這裡的『業』，在《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中沒有解釋。那部論典的第三部分說，如果有人從非等引地（Asamāhita-bhūmi）死亡，在生時，依據中有（Antarābhava）的意。

【English Translation】 English version: If the understanding of the antidote consciousness (pratipakṣa-jñāna) is not in accordance with reason, it is because the self-nature of the antidote consciousness is liberation. Even when worldly consciousness arises later, if it is apart from the Ālaya consciousness (storehouse consciousness), there should be no seeds and yet it could arise. Vasubandhu and Asanga have different interpretations of this. Their meaning is that even after two time points, the arising of all afflictions should be without cause, because there is nothing holding the seeds.

Treatise: Other dharmas cannot hold those seeds.

Commentary: If the Sautrantika (Sūtra School) says that other form dharmas etc. hold those seeds, so the arising of wandering and other delusions is caused by this, then this reasoning is also not valid. Because other form dharmas etc. do not have defiled mind etc., they cannot hold the seeds of the contaminated (āsrava), because they are not the eighth consciousness, just like form, sound, etc.

Treatise: The past and future are not truly existent.

Commentary: That treatise explains that it is not that past afflictions produce present afflictions, etc. The Sautrantika masters believe that the past and future do not exist. This treatise relies on this point to refute the Sautrantika. The meaning here also refutes the Sarvastivada (the doctrine that 'everything exists'). They believe that the past and future exist, so there is no fault in traversing realms and grounds. Now it is said that the past and future are not truly existent, just like before, refuting that afflictions do not arise after the undefiled mind. They say that their school has 'attainment' and 'attainer'. Now refute them by saying that 'attainment' and 'attainer' are also not truly existent, just like the past and future. It has already been refuted before, in the following chapter on purity, 'attainment' etc. are not truly existent. It is also said that holding the seeds can be omitted, precisely to refute the Sautrantika. Suppose they argue that the various afflictions etc. of traversing realms and grounds arise without cause later.

Treatise: If all afflictions were to arrive, they should all arise.

Commentary: This is a refutation of their view. If so, then there would be no fruits of the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna), because the afflictions that have already been cut off before would arise again without cause.

Treatise: If there is no such consciousness, then traversing realms and grounds should also be without cause.

Commentary: The second part below is to refute karma and result. There are two points in it. First is to blame the arising of traversing realms and grounds etc. without cause, and then to blame that the formation of action-conditioned consciousness etc. cannot be established. These are the first point. If there is no such consciousness to hold the seeds of karma and result, then traversing realms and grounds should also be without cause. The 'karma' here is not explained in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. The third part of that treatise says that if someone dies from the non-concentrated ground (Asamāhita-bhūmi), at the time of birth, according to the intention of the intermediate existence (Antarābhava).

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起染污意識結生相續。乃至有二意識。于母胎中同時而轉等。但釋其果。又若從此沒于等引地正受生時。由非等引染污意識結生相續。此非等引染污之心彼地所攝。離異熟識。餘種子體定不可得等。生無色界等名為往還　異類法後者。攝論云。又即于彼若出世心正現在前。余世間心皆應滅盡。爾時便應滅離彼趣。若生非想非非想處。無所有處出世間心現在前時。即應二趣皆應滅離等是。世親．無性皆有此解。此等之後其業．果起皆應無因。無種子故。

論。餘種余因前已遮故。

述曰。彼若救言。后報業．果今時熟故。余為種子色等持種。余為其因去．來世有。因言所以。以去．來世為所以故。今言總非前已破故。二部如前。

論。若諸業果至還復應生。

述曰。若此業．果無因生者。入涅槃已。業．果還應生。

設若救言無煩惱故入涅槃已。業．果不生者。難云。既許業．果無因而生。

論。煩惱亦應無因生故。

述曰。此文可解。

且復業中。

論。又行緣識至前已遮故。

述曰。攝論第二末云。又行緣識不相應故。應定緣義。若以行熏識名緣。即不熏轉識。如前已破。此正破經部。

論。結生染識非行感故。

述曰。自下雙破經部

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 引發染污的意識導致了結生相續。乃至存在兩種意識，在母胎中同時運作等等，但只是解釋了它的結果。又如果從等引地（Samadhi，禪定）的正受狀態去世，由於非等引的染污意識導致結生相續。這種非等引的染污之心並非該地所攝，離開了異熟識（Vipaka-vijnana，果報識），其餘的種子體必定不可得等等。生無**等被稱為往還。異類法後者，《攝大乘論》中說：『又正是在那（入定）時，如果出世間心（Lokottara-citta，超越世間的心）正在顯現，其餘的世間心都應該滅盡。那時就應該滅離那個趣（Gati，輪迴的去處）。如果生於非想非非想處（Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana，無所有處之上的禪定境界），出世間心顯現時，就應該兩個趣都滅離等等。』世親（Vasubandhu）和無性（Asanga）都有這樣的解釋。這些之後，它們的業和果的生起都應該沒有原因，因為沒有種子。

論：其餘的種子和原因，之前已經遮破過了。

述記：如果他們辯解說，后報的業和果現在成熟，其餘的作為種子，色等持有種子，其餘的作為原因，過去和未來世存在。原因是指所以，因為過去和未來世是所以。現在說總的否定，之前已經破斥過了。二部如前所述。

論：如果諸業果到了還復應該生起。

述記：如果這些業和果沒有原因而生起，進入涅槃（Nirvana，寂滅）后，業和果還應該生起。

假設他們辯解說，因為沒有煩惱，進入涅槃后，業和果不會生起。反駁說：既然允許業和果沒有原因而生起。

論：煩惱也應該沒有原因而生起。

述記：這段文字可以理解。

而且在業中。

論：又行緣識（Samskara-pratyaya-vijnana，行緣識）等等，之前已經遮破過了。

述記：《攝大乘論》第二末尾說：『又行緣識不相應，應該確定緣義。』如果以行熏識名為緣，即不熏轉識，如前已經破斥。這正是破斥經部（Sautrantika）的觀點。

論：結生染識不是行所感。

述記：下面雙重破斥經部的觀點。

【English Translation】 English version: The defiled consciousness that initiates rebirth leads to the continuity of existence. Even when there are two consciousnesses operating simultaneously in the mother's womb, it only explains the result. Furthermore, if one dies from the state of perfect Samadhi (concentration), the defiled consciousness, which is not in Samadhi, causes the continuity of rebirth. This defiled mind, which is not in Samadhi, is not included in that state; apart from the Vipaka-vijnana (resultant consciousness), the remaining seed-entities are definitely unattainable, and so on. Being born without ** etc. is called going and returning. As for the latter of dissimilar dharmas, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of Mahayana) says: 'Moreover, precisely at that time (during Samadhi), if the Lokottara-citta (transcendental mind) is manifesting, all other mundane minds should cease. At that time, one should cease from that Gati (course of rebirth). If one is born in Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana (the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception), when the transcendental mind manifests, both courses should cease, and so on.' Vasubandhu and Asanga both have this interpretation. After these, the arising of their karma and results should be without cause, because there are no seeds.

Treatise: The remaining seeds and causes have already been refuted before.

Commentary: If they argue that the later-retribution karma and results are now ripening, the remaining ones serve as seeds, such as form, etc., holding seeds, and the remaining ones serve as causes, with past and future lives existing. 'Cause' refers to the reason, because past and future lives are the reason. Now, saying a general negation, it has already been refuted before. The two schools are as mentioned before.

Treatise: If the fruits of karma arrive, they should arise again.

Commentary: If these karma and results arise without cause, after entering Nirvana (cessation), the karma and results should still arise.

Suppose they argue that because there are no afflictions, after entering Nirvana, the karma and results will not arise. The rebuttal is: Since you allow karma and results to arise without cause,

Treatise: Afflictions should also arise without cause.

Commentary: This passage is understandable.

Moreover, regarding karma,

Treatise: Again, Samskara-pratyaya-vijnana (volitional action conditioning consciousness), etc., has already been refuted before.

Commentary: The end of the second part of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Moreover, volitional action conditioning consciousness is not corresponding, one should determine the meaning of condition.' If taking volitional action perfuming consciousness as condition, it does not perfume the transforming consciousness, as has been refuted before. This is precisely refuting the view of the Sautrantika school.

Treatise: The defiled consciousness that initiates rebirth is not caused by volitional action.

Commentary: Below, there is a double refutation of the view of the Sautrantika school.

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．薩婆多師。若設許行能招識故名行緣識。結生染識非行感故。

經部師言。我雖無有去．來時分。行緣識生既有種子。似汝大乘現行。能招于當可生名色位識。名行緣識斯有何過。

薩婆多師既有未世。設復救言。初生染識非行所招。名色位中有異熟識方名行感。雖約分位以說緣生。但感名緣于理無失。難云。

論。應說名色行為緣故。

述曰。既約分位以辨緣生。名色時識即是名攝。言行緣識理定不成　若對經部。若熏若感其義皆然。初生染識非所熏故　對薩婆多。唯感名緣。

彼復救言。既約分位以說緣生。初生之時識體。雖染非行所感。此時有色異熟為性。亦名識支分位說故。為行所感故說名緣于理何失。此則一切有部正救。經部兼之。無去．來故。應答彼言。

論。時分懸隔無緣義故。

述曰。懸謂懸遠。隔謂隔絕。謂答薩婆多言。汝許有去．來。然我實不許。設許有者。且行在現在。色果在未來。或是一劫。或一劫餘。經八萬等。業．果相望時分懸隔無緣義。故因既不得成。如何能感果。如外法等非異熟因。又行不緣識位中色。無異熟識可名果識支。如何俱色說行能感名緣于識　又若感於識位中色名之為懸。若感后時名色位識名之為隔。俱無緣義　答經部言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）：如果假設『行』（karma，業）能夠招感『識』（vijnana，了別），因此說『行緣識』。那麼結生時的染污識不是由『行』所感，這個如何解釋？

經部師（Sautrantika，經量部）說：我雖然不承認有過去、未來時分，但是『行緣識』的生起，既然有種子存在，類似於你們大乘所說的現行，能夠招感未來可生名色位上的『識』，說『行緣識』有什麼過錯？

薩婆多部既然承認有未來世，假設再次辯解說：最初生起的染污識不是由『行』所招感，名色位中的異熟識才稱為『行』所感。雖然是就分位來說緣起，但說『行』能感『名』，在道理上沒有錯。難點在於：

論：應該說『名色』是『行』的緣故。

述曰：既然是就分位來辨別緣起，名色時的『識』就是『名』所攝。說『行緣識』在道理上一定不能成立。如果針對經部，無論是熏習還是招感，道理都是一樣的。因為最初生起的染污識不是所熏習的緣故。針對薩婆多部，只有招感才能稱為緣。

他們再次辯解說：既然是就分位來說緣起，最初生起時的識體，雖然是染污的，但不是『行』所感。此時有以異熟為自性的『色』，也稱為『識』的支分，就分位來說。因為是『行』所感，所以說『行緣識』，在道理上有什麼錯？這是所有一切有部的正確辯解，經部也贊同這種說法，因為他們不承認過去、未來。應該這樣回答他們：

論：時分懸隔，沒有緣起之義。

述曰：懸，是懸遠的意思。隔，是隔絕的意思。這是回答薩婆多部：你們承認有過去、未來，但我實際上不承認。即使承認有，且『行』在現在，『色』果在未來，或者是一劫，或者超過一劫，經過八萬劫等等。業和果相互觀望，時分懸隔，沒有緣起之義。因為因不能成立，如何能感果？如同外法等不是異熟因。而且『行』不緣『識』位中的『色』，沒有異熟識可以稱為果識的支分。如何能說俱生的『色』，『行』能夠招感『名』緣于『識』？又如果招感『識』位中的『色』，就稱為懸遠。如果招感後來的名色位上的『識』，就稱為隔絕。都沒有緣起之義。這是回答經部。

【English Translation】 English version Sarvastivadins: If it is assumed that 'karma' (action) can cause 'vijnana' (consciousness), hence the saying 'karma conditions consciousness'. Then how to explain that the defiled consciousness at the time of rebirth is not caused by 'karma'?

Sautrantika says: Although I do not admit the existence of past and future time divisions, since the arising of 'karma conditions consciousness' has seeds, similar to what you Mahayana call present action, which can cause the 'consciousness' in the future arising of name and form, what is wrong with saying 'karma conditions consciousness'?

Since the Sarvastivadins admit the existence of the future, suppose they argue again: The initial defiled consciousness is not caused by 'karma', only the resultant consciousness in the stage of name and form is called caused by 'karma'. Although dependent origination is explained in terms of stages, there is nothing wrong in principle with saying that 'karma' can cause 'name'. The difficulty lies in:

Treatise: It should be said that 'name and form' are the condition for 'karma'.

Commentary: Since dependent origination is distinguished in terms of stages, the 'consciousness' at the time of name and form is included in 'name'. It is certain that the saying 'karma conditions consciousness' cannot be established in principle. If it is directed at the Sautrantika, whether it is perfuming or causing, the principle is the same. Because the initial defiled consciousness is not what is perfumed. Directed at the Sarvastivadins, only causing can be called a condition.

They argue again: Since dependent origination is explained in terms of stages, the nature of the consciousness at the time of initial arising, although defiled, is not caused by 'karma'. At this time, there is 'form' whose nature is resultant, which is also called a part of 'consciousness', in terms of stages. Because it is caused by 'karma', there is nothing wrong in principle with saying 'karma conditions consciousness'. This is the correct argument of all the Sarvastivadins, and the Sautrantika also agrees with this statement, because they do not admit the past and future. They should be answered like this:

Treatise: Because the time divisions are far apart, there is no meaning of condition.

Commentary: Far means distant. Apart means separated. This is answering the Sarvastivadins: You admit the existence of past and future, but I actually do not admit it. Even if it is admitted, 'karma' is in the present, and the 'form' result is in the future, either one kalpa, or more than one kalpa, passing through eighty thousand kalpas, etc. The karma and the result look at each other, the time divisions are far apart, and there is no meaning of condition. Because the cause cannot be established, how can it cause the result? Like external dharmas, etc., they are not the cause of resultant. Moreover, 'karma' does not condition the 'form' in the stage of 'consciousness', and there is no resultant consciousness that can be called a part of the result consciousness. How can it be said that the co-arising 'form' can be caused by 'karma', and 'name' is conditioned by 'consciousness'? Also, if the 'form' in the stage of 'consciousness' is caused, it is called distant. If the 'consciousness' in the later stage of name and form is caused, it is called separated. Neither has the meaning of condition. This is answering the Sautrantika.

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。設許行支能感色者。未來非有。猶若龜毛。時分懸隔勢非鄰近。如何說行能為識緣。故但說熏名行緣識。非謂感也。又懸．隔別。如前已說。準此總應言。懸故無緣義。隔故無緣義。無果識可名識支。即無緣義。三文合也。此等文意極為深遠。諸論所未詳。群賢所未究。

論。此不成故后亦不成。

述曰。此則如文。

后不成者。攝論云。又取緣有亦不得成為難。兩家熏緣．感果。難之返覆準上應知。又非但后取緣于有。次第相望皆可得爾。果中相緣故。

次別破凈。于中有二。第一總顯凈法。后別破之。

論。諸清凈法至斷果別故。

述曰。凈法有三。一世道。二出世道。三斷果。有漏六行名世道。無漏能治名出世道。所得無為名斷果。斷是果也。

下別破中有二。初破世出世道。后破無為。

論。若無此識至皆應無因。

述曰。于中有二。初難異類后無因。后難初道不生。此即初也　若無本識持二道種。異類心後者。即起異界．及雜染．清凈等心。即是攝論第三云。云何世間清凈不成。謂未離欲廛貪未得色廛善心。即以欲廛心為離欲廛貪故勤修加行。此欲廛心與色廛心不俱生故非彼所熏。為彼種子不應道理。乃至廣說　世出世間凈章云。又此如理作意

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：假設許行（hetu-kriya-anga，能感知的行為支分）能夠感知色法，那麼未來就不存在了，就像龜毛一樣。時間和空間上相隔遙遠，力量也不相鄰近，怎麼能說行能作為識的緣呢？所以只能說熏習叫做行緣識，而不是說感知。而且懸隔的道理，前面已經說過了。依此推論，總應該說，懸隔所以沒有緣的意義。沒有果識可以叫做識支，也就是沒有緣的意義。這三段文字的意思非常深遠，是各部論著所沒有詳細闡述的，是眾位賢者所沒有徹底研究的。

論：因為這個不成立，所以後面的也不成立。

述記：這就像文中所說。

後面的不成立，是指《攝大乘論》中說：『又以取緣有也不得成為難』。兩家熏習為緣、感知為果，難題的反覆應該參照上面所說的來理解。而且不僅僅是後來取緣于有，次第相望都可以這樣。因為在果中互相為緣的緣故。

接下來分別破斥清凈法。其中分為兩部分。第一部分總的顯示清凈法，後面分別破斥。

論：各種清凈法，直到斷果的差別。

述記：清凈法有三種。一是世道，二是出世道，三是斷果。有漏的六行叫做世道，無漏的能對治煩惱的叫做出世道，所得到的無為法叫做斷果。斷是果。

下面分別破斥，其中分為兩部分。先破斥世間道和出世間道，后破斥無為法。

論：如果沒有這個識，那麼都應該沒有原因。

述記：其中分為兩部分。先難異類后無因，后難初道不生。這裡是第一部分。如果沒有本識來持有二道的種子，那麼異類心之後，就會生起異界以及雜染、清凈等心。也就是《攝大乘論》第三中說：『為什麼世間清凈不能成立？』就是說沒有離開欲界貪慾，沒有得到色界善心。就用欲界心爲了離開欲界貪慾而勤奮修行加行。這個欲界心和色界心不一起產生，所以不是它所熏習的，作為它的種子是不應該的。』乃至廣說。世出世間清凈章中說：『又如此如理作意』

【English Translation】 English version: Suppose that hetu-kriya-anga (the limb of action that can sense), is able to sense form (rupa), then the future would not exist, just like the fur of a tortoise. Time and space are far apart, and the power is not close, how can it be said that action can be a condition for consciousness? Therefore, it can only be said that the perfuming is called action as a condition for consciousness, not sensing. Moreover, the principle of being suspended and separated has already been said before. By analogy, it should be said that being suspended means there is no condition. Being separated means there is no condition. No resultant consciousness can be called a limb of consciousness, which means there is no condition. The meaning of these three passages is very profound, which has not been elaborated in detail in various treatises, and has not been thoroughly studied by all the wise men.

Treatise: Because this is not established, the latter is also not established.

Commentary: This is as stated in the text.

The latter is not established, referring to what is said in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: 'Moreover, taking the conditioned existence as a difficulty is also not established.' The two schools, perfuming as a condition and sensing as a result, the repetition of the difficulty should be understood by referring to what was said above. Moreover, it is not only that the latter takes the conditioned existence, but it can be like this in successive views. Because they are conditions for each other in the result.

Next, refute the pure dharmas separately. It is divided into two parts. The first part generally shows the pure dharmas, and the latter refutes them separately.

Treatise: All pure dharmas, up to the difference of the result of cessation.

Commentary: There are three kinds of pure dharmas. First, the mundane path; second, the supramundane path; and third, the result of cessation. The six actions with outflows are called the mundane path, the outflows that can cure afflictions are called the supramundane path, and the unconditioned dharma obtained is called the result of cessation. Cessation is the result.

Below, refute them separately, which is divided into two parts. First, refute the mundane and supramundane paths, and then refute the unconditioned.

Treatise: If there is no such consciousness, then there should be no cause.

Commentary: It is divided into two parts. First, it is difficult to have different kinds, and then there is no cause. Then it is difficult for the initial path to not arise. This is the first part. If there is no fundamental consciousness to hold the seeds of the two paths, then after the different kinds of minds, different realms and defiled and pure minds will arise. That is, the third volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Why can't mundane purity be established?' That is to say, one has not left the desire realm's greed, and has not obtained the good mind of the form realm. Then, one diligently cultivates the practice of addition with the mind of the desire realm in order to leave the greed of the desire realm. This mind of the desire realm and the mind of the form realm do not arise together, so it is not perfumed by it, and it should not be its seed.' And so on. The chapter on mundane and supramundane purity says: 'Also, such rational attention'

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相應心。是世間心。彼正見相應心。是出世心。曾未有時俱生俱滅。是故此心非彼所熏。非彼所熏為彼種子不應道理。乃至廣說。此對經部兼薩婆多。

論。所執余因前已破故。

述曰。準染應知。

論。若二凈道至還復應生。

述曰。入涅槃已二道應生。許無因生故。

彼若救言。入涅槃已道無所依身。故入涅槃已遂更不生已。

論。所依亦應無因生故。

述曰。論主難云。即所依身亦應無因而更得生。許無因生故　前染業果無惑不生。難彼言煩惱應無因生。彼若更言無所依故。準此為難。然文略巧。初后顯之。

論。又出世道至法爾種故。

述曰。難經部師無法爾種。此無漏道初不應生。無法持彼法爾種故。以唯新熏而為不正。

設彼若言以世第一法為因緣生。不假法爾無漏種者。論主難言。

論。有漏類別非彼因故。

述曰。前第二卷已廣說訖。

又彼若言初無漏生但無因起。何假汝立法爾種子。論主難云。

論。無因而生非釋種故。

述曰。說有因生釋迦子故。不爾便同自然外道。

論。初不生故至三乘道果。

述曰。此初無漏既不生故。后時無漏亦應不生。初后無漏既並不生。是則應無三乘道

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：與染污心相應的，是世間心。與正見相應的，是出世間心。從來沒有同時生起同時滅去的情況，因此這個心不是被那個（染污心）所薰染的。不是被它所薰染，卻作為它的種子，這是不合道理的。乃至廣說，這是針對經部宗和薩婆多宗（一切有部，Sarvastivada）的。

論：所執著的其他的因，前面已經破斥過了，所以不成立。

述曰：參照染污的情況，應該知道（這個道理）。

論：如果兩個清凈的道（指無漏道）到了涅槃之後，還應該再生起。

述曰：進入涅槃之後，這兩個道還應該生起，這等於承認了無因生。

如果他們辯解說：進入涅槃之後，道沒有所依的身，所以進入涅槃之後，就不會再生起了。

論：那麼所依的身也應該無因而生。

述曰：論主反駁說：那麼所依的身也應該無因而再次產生，因為你承認無因生。前面說染污的業果，沒有迷惑就不會產生。反駁他們說煩惱應該無因而生。他們如果再次辯解說因為沒有所依，參照這個來反駁。然而文辭簡略而巧妙，前後呼應。

論：而且出世間的道，最初不應該產生，因為沒有法爾種（本來自然存在的種子）。

述曰：反駁經部師沒有法爾種的觀點。這個無漏道最初不應該產生，因為沒有東西持有那個法爾種。因為只有新熏習是不正確的。

假設他們說，以世第一法（Laukikagra-dharma）為因緣而生，不需要本來自然存在的無漏種。論主反駁說：

論：有漏的類別不是它的因。

述曰：前面第二卷已經詳細說明過了。

如果他們又說，最初的無漏產生，只是無因而起，為什麼要假設你們所說的法爾種子？論主反駁說：

論：無因而生，不符合釋迦（Sakya）的教義。

述曰：因為釋迦牟尼佛（Sakyamuni）說有因生。否則就和自然外道一樣了。

論：最初不產生，所以最終也不會有三乘（Triyana）的道果。

述曰：這個最初的無漏既然不產生，那麼後來的無漏也應該不產生。最初和後來的無漏都不產生，那麼就應該沒有三乘的道果。

【English Translation】 English version: The mind that corresponds to defiled mind is the mundane mind. The mind that corresponds to right view is the supramundane mind. There has never been a case of simultaneous arising and simultaneous ceasing. Therefore, this mind is not influenced by that (defiled mind). If it is not influenced by it, yet serves as its seed, this is unreasonable. And so on, extensively speaking. This is directed against the Sautrantika (Sautrantika) and Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada) schools.

Treatise: The other causes that are adhered to have already been refuted earlier, so they are not established.

Commentary: Refer to the case of defilement, and you should understand (this principle).

Treatise: If the two pure paths (referring to the undefiled paths) should still arise after reaching Nirvana.

Commentary: After entering Nirvana, these two paths should still arise, which is equivalent to admitting causeless arising.

If they argue: After entering Nirvana, the path has no body to rely on, so after entering Nirvana, it will not arise again.

Treatise: Then the body relied upon should also arise without a cause.

Commentary: The treatise master refutes: Then the body relied upon should also arise again without a cause, because you admit causeless arising. Earlier, it was said that the defiled karmic result will not arise without delusion. Refute them by saying that afflictions should arise without a cause. If they argue again that it is because there is no reliance, refer to this to refute. However, the wording is concise and skillful, echoing the beginning and the end.

Treatise: Moreover, the supramundane path should not arise initially because there is no dharma-nature seed (naturally existing seed).

Commentary: Refute the Sautrantika's view that there is no dharma-nature seed. This undefiled path should not arise initially because there is nothing to hold that dharma-nature seed. Because only new perfuming is incorrect.

Suppose they say that it arises with the World's Supreme Dharma (Laukikagra-dharma) as the cause and condition, and does not require the naturally existing undefiled seed. The treatise master refutes:

Treatise: The category of defiled is not its cause.

Commentary: The second chapter earlier has already explained it in detail.

If they say again that the initial undefiled arising is just causeless arising, why assume your so-called dharma-nature seed? The treatise master refutes:

Treatise: Causeless arising does not accord with the teachings of Sakya (Sakya).

Commentary: Because Sakyamuni Buddha (Sakyamuni) said that there is arising with a cause. Otherwise, it would be the same as the naturalistic heretics.

Treatise: Because it does not arise initially, there will ultimately be no fruit of the Three Vehicles (Triyana).

Commentary: Since this initial undefiled does not arise, then the later undefiled should also not arise. If the initial and later undefiled do not arise, then there should be no fruit of the Three Vehicles.

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果。

自下第二明其斷果。

論。若無此識至亦不得成。

述曰。要由本識持煩惱種故得證斷。

論。謂道起時至俱非有故。

述曰。無漏道起一切煩惱及彼種子俱非有故。道者無間道　此正破經部。言種子故。薩婆多計惑得俱故。染法現．種俱非有故。斷何所斷。於此時中無有漏識故。

若言惑種在無漏識中。

論。染凈二心不俱起故。

述曰。有漏種等非無漏識中。

量云。

論。道相應心至如涅槃故。

述曰。聖道。不持煩惱種子。與煩惱種自性相違故。如涅槃法。

論。去來得等非實有故。

述曰。此則雙破。非經部師許有去．來。故不得言惑在過去惑在未來　薩婆多言。我宗不立識能持種。實有去．來及與得等故有斷果。又命根．同分設持惑種無此過失。今言去來得等非實有故。如上已破。

經部師言余皆有失我今復言惑種在於色等之中。難言。

論。余法持種理不成故。

述曰。一切色等不能持種。理不成故。色中無種如上已破。

論總結言。

論。既無所斷至而立斷果。

述曰。既無所斷之惑。以無依故無種。能斷之道亦無依。依何煩惱由何斷道而立斷果。

論。若由

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 果。 自下第二明其斷果。 論。若無此識至亦不得成。 述曰。要由本識持煩惱種故得證斷。 論。謂道起時至俱非有故。 述曰。無漏道起一切煩惱及彼種子俱非有故。道者無間道　此正破經部（Sautrantika）。言種子故。薩婆多（Sarvastivada）計惑得俱故。染法現．種俱非有故。斷何所斷。於此時中無有漏識故。 若言惑種在無漏識中。 論。染凈二心不俱起故。 述曰。有漏種等非無漏識中。 量云。 論。道相應心至如涅槃故。 述曰。聖道。不持煩惱種子。與煩惱種自性相違故。如涅槃法。 論。去來得等非實有故。 述曰。此則雙破。非經部師許有去．來。故不得言惑在過去惑在未來　薩婆多言。我宗不立識能持種。實有去．來及與得等故有斷果。又命根．同分設持惑種無此過失。今言去來得等非實有故。如上已破。 經部師言余皆有失我今復言惑種在於色等之中。難言。 論。余法持種理不成故。 述曰。一切色等不能持種。理不成故。色中無種如上已破。 論總結言。 論。既無所斷至而立斷果。 述曰。既無所斷之惑。以無依故無種。能斷之道亦無依。依何煩惱由何斷道而立斷果。 論。若由

【English Translation】 English version Result. The second part below explains the result of cutting off. Treatise: If this consciousness does not exist, then the result cannot be achieved. Commentary: It is necessary that the original consciousness holds the seeds of afflictions in order to realize the cutting off. Treatise: It means that when the path arises, all are non-existent. Commentary: When the undefiled path arises, all afflictions and their seeds are non-existent. 'Path' refers to the path of immediate cessation. This directly refutes the Sautrantika (Sutra School). Because it mentions 'seeds,' the Sarvastivada (School of Everything That Exists) believes that afflictions and attainment exist together. Since defiled phenomena, both manifest and latent, are non-existent, what is being cut off? At this time, there is no defiled consciousness. If it is said that the seeds of afflictions are in the undefiled consciousness. Treatise: Defiled and undefiled minds do not arise simultaneously. Commentary: Defiled seeds, etc., are not in the undefiled consciousness. Argument: Treatise: The mind corresponding to the path is like Nirvana. Commentary: The noble path does not hold the seeds of afflictions because it is contradictory in nature to the seeds of afflictions, like the Dharma of Nirvana. Treatise: Past, future, attainment, etc., are not truly existent. Commentary: This refutes both. The Sautrantika does not admit the existence of past and future. Therefore, it cannot be said that afflictions are in the past or in the future. The Sarvastivada says, 'Our school does not establish that consciousness can hold seeds. Because past, future, and attainment, etc., are truly existent, there is a result of cutting off.' Furthermore, the life force and commonality establish the holding of affliction seeds without this fault. Now it is said that past, future, attainment, etc., are not truly existent, as refuted above. The Sautrantika says that others all have faults, and now I further say that the seeds of afflictions are in form, etc. It is difficult to say. Treatise: The principle of other dharmas holding seeds is not established. Commentary: All forms, etc., cannot hold seeds because the principle is not established. There are no seeds in form, as refuted above. Treatise concludes: Treatise: Since there is nothing to be cut off, how can the result of cutting off be established? Commentary: Since there are no afflictions to be cut off, there are no seeds because there is no basis. The path that can cut off also has no basis. Based on what afflictions and by what path of cutting off is the result of cutting off established? Treatise: If by

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道力至應成無學。

述曰。此牒計非　經部救言無斷果體但由道力后惑不生即立斷果。何須本識持煩惱種立實斷果　論主難云。則初道起應成無學。

論。后諸煩惱至永不生故。

述曰。釋前所以。后煩惱等由初斷道皆已無因。種子無故。永不生故。便成無學。有我本識。雖前起道斷隨應惑。后煩惱起持煩惱種。得初道時不成無學。后斷煩惱而得斷果。若無此識持煩惱種。初道起位惑種皆無。應初道起即成無學。

論。許有此識至染凈種故。

述曰。總結一章染凈二法。攝論三卷．瑜伽．對法合證本識。此論之中自前卷末至此中並攝盡。更有異同。諸賢自悉。文有上下。說有廣略。宜細尋之不能具述。

論。證此識有至略示綱要。

述曰。第三此即總結十理證。如文易解故今不釋　恐厭繁者。除此十證所不攝證。謂八證中最初生起。明瞭生起。業用不可得等。皆此未說故今例之　彼最初等。下第七卷皆具演之。非正是證。前十證中所攝八證。諸后講者一一敘之。

論。別有此識至應深信受。

述曰。此總結上教．理二證第三文也。

三能變中上來已解第一門訖。自下次解第二能變。

論。如是已說至其相云何。

述曰。下文有二。初結前

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

『道力至應成無學』

述曰：這是爲了駁斥經部的觀點。經部辯解說，並沒有斷滅果體的說法，只是通過修道的威力，使得後來的煩惱不再產生，從而確立斷果。何必需要根本識來持有煩惱的種子，從而確立真實的斷果呢？論主反駁說，如果這樣，那麼初道生起時就應該成為無學果位了。

論：『后諸煩惱至永不生故』。

述曰：這是解釋前面的原因。後來的煩惱等，由於最初的斷道已經沒有了原因，種子也已經沒有了，所以永遠不會產生，這樣就成爲了無學。如果存在我的根本識，即使前面生起道力斷除了相應的迷惑，後來的煩惱生起時，根本識仍然持有煩惱的種子，所以在得到初道的時候，不會成為無學。在後來斷除煩惱的時候，才能得到斷果。如果沒有這個識來持有煩惱的種子，那麼在初道生起的時候，迷惑的種子就都沒有了，應該在初道生起的時候就成為無學了。

論：『許有此識至染凈種故』。

述曰：這是總結一章的內容，包括染污和清凈兩種法。在《攝大乘論》第三卷、《瑜伽師地論》、《阿毗達磨集論》中，都共同證明了根本識的存在。本論中，從前面的卷末到這裡，都包含了這些內容。其中還有一些異同之處，希望各位賢者自己去了解。文句有上下之分，說法有廣略之別，應該仔細地去尋思，不能全部敘述。

論：『證此識有至略示綱要』。

述曰：這是第三部分，總結了十個道理來證明阿賴耶識的存在。因為文句容易理解，所以現在不解釋。恐怕厭煩繁瑣的人，可以去除這十個證明所沒有包含的證明，比如八個證明中最初生起、明瞭生起、業用不可得等等，這些都沒有說到，所以現在舉例說明。這些最初生起等，在第七卷中都會詳細地闡述。這些不是真正的證明，前面十個證明中所包含的八個證明，後來的講解者會一一敘述。

論：『別有此識至應深信受』。

述曰：這是總結上面的教證和理證，是第三段文字。

在三能變中，上面已經解釋了第一能變完畢。從下面開始解釋第二能變。

論：『如是已說至其相云何』。

述曰：下面的內容分為兩個部分，首先是總結前面的內容。

【English Translation】 English version:

『Dàolì zhì yìng chéng wúxué』 (道力至應成無學 - By the power of the path, one should attain the state of no-more-learning).

Shù yuē (述曰 - Commentary): This refutes the view of the Sautrāntikas. The Sautrāntikas argue that there is no such thing as the annihilation of the fruit-body. It is simply that through the power of cultivation, later afflictions do not arise, thereby establishing the fruit of cessation. Why is it necessary to posit a fundamental consciousness (本識 - běnshì, ālaya-vijñāna) to hold the seeds of afflictions in order to establish a real fruit of cessation? The author of the treatise refutes this, saying that if this were the case, then the arising of the initial path should result in the attainment of the state of no-more-learning (無學 - wúxué, arhat).

Lùn (論 - Treatise): 『Hòu zhū fánnǎo zhì yǒng bù shēng gù』 (后諸煩惱至永不生故 - Because later afflictions will never arise).

Shù yuē (述曰 - Commentary): This explains the reason given earlier. Later afflictions, etc., have no cause because of the initial path of cessation, and the seeds are also gone. Therefore, they will never arise, and one will attain the state of no-more-learning. If there is my fundamental consciousness, even if the arising of the path earlier cuts off the corresponding delusions, the fundamental consciousness still holds the seeds of afflictions when later afflictions arise. Therefore, one will not attain the state of no-more-learning when one attains the initial path. Only when one later cuts off the afflictions can one attain the fruit of cessation. If there is no such consciousness to hold the seeds of afflictions, then when the initial path arises, the seeds of delusion will all be gone. One should attain the state of no-more-learning when the initial path arises.

Lùn (論 - Treatise): 『Xǔ yǒu cǐ shí zhì rǎn jìng zhǒng gù』 (許有此識至染凈種故 - It is admitted that there is this consciousness because it holds the seeds of defilement and purity).

Shù yuē (述曰 - Commentary): This summarizes a chapter, including both defiled and pure dharmas. The third volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, and the Abhidharmasamuccaya all jointly prove the existence of the fundamental consciousness. This treatise, from the end of the previous volume to here, includes all of these contents. There are also some differences, which I hope the wise ones will understand for themselves. The sentences are arranged in different orders, and the explanations are broad or concise. One should carefully contemplate them and not describe them all.

Lùn (論 - Treatise): 『Zhèng cǐ shí yǒu zhì lüè shì gāngyào』 (證此識有至略示綱要 - To prove the existence of this consciousness, a brief outline is given).

Shù yuē (述曰 - Commentary): This is the third part, summarizing ten reasons to prove the existence of the Ālaya-vijñāna (阿賴耶識 - Ālāyéshì). Because the sentences are easy to understand, I will not explain them now. For those who are afraid of being tedious, they can remove the proofs that are not included in these ten proofs, such as the initial arising, clear arising, and the unavailability of karmic function in the eight proofs. These are not mentioned, so I will give examples now. These initial arising, etc., will be explained in detail in the seventh volume. These are not real proofs. The eight proofs included in the previous ten proofs will be described one by one by later lecturers.

Lùn (論 - Treatise): 『Bié yǒu cǐ shí zhì yìng shēn xìn shòu』 (別有此識至應深信受 - There is a separate consciousness, which should be deeply believed and accepted).

Shù yuē (述曰 - Commentary): This is a summary of the above scriptural and logical proofs, and is the third paragraph.

Among the three transformations, the first transformation has been explained above. From below, the second transformation will be explained.

Lùn (論 - Treatise): 『Rúshì yǐ shuō zhì qí xiāng yúnhé』 (如是已說至其相云何 - It has been said thus, but what is its nature?).

Shù yuē (述曰 - Commentary): The following content is divided into two parts. The first is to summarize the previous content.

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生后以發論端。次依所問以辨其相。此即初也。

論。頌曰至出世道無有。

述曰。下依問辨。此依三頌其第七識十門分別。初舉第二能變出末那名。二解所依。三解所緣。四出體釋義。五釋行相。六顯染俱。七觸等相應。八三性分別。九界地分別。十隱顯分別。即是伏斷之位次也。于下顯中一一廣釋　問何故本識不辨所依。次能變中解彼依體　答本識諸識之本．與他為依義顯。他與為依義隱。故不出其所依。第七既八之餘。所以出其依體　問若爾本識與他依義顯。何不說之　答前頌已說。謂彼頌說恒轉如流。如流之言義生余識即是依義　問何故不說第七與他為依。第三能變中不釋根．境　答是作論者意欲爾故不應責之　或影略門。謂初能變但釋所緣。故前頌言執受處是。第三能變唯釋所依。故后頌言依止本識。第二能變依．緣俱顯。欲令學者可知一隅三隅返故　或謂本識諸法之本。但說與他為依。出自識體．所緣。前之六識境粗不說。但出所依。依止根本識等者是。故下論云。此所緣．及別依。粗顯．極成故此不說。第七依．緣俱隱。根．境合釋。所以作論三種不同。非但說所緣而無依等　何故本識不出界系　論主略故　或言異熟即是界系。隨何界異熟。即彼界系故　此亦應然。言染俱已即隨彼系　此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 從生命誕生后，首先從頭髮開始討論。然後根據提出的問題來辨別其相狀。這就是最初的階段。

論：頌文說到了出世之道，沒有（第七識）。

述記：下面根據提問來辨析。這裡依據三頌來分別解釋第七識的十個方面。首先提出第二個能變識，也就是末那識（manas，意為『意』）的名稱。第二解釋它所依賴的。第三解釋它所緣的。第四說明它的體性並解釋其含義。第五解釋它的行相。第六顯示它與染污法同時存在。第七說明它與觸等相應。第八分別它的三種性質。第九分別它的界地。第十分別它的隱顯。這就是伏斷的位置次序。在下面的『顯』中，一一廣泛解釋。問：為什麼本識（ālayavijñāna，意為『藏識』）不辨別它所依賴的？在第二個能變識中解釋它所依賴的體性。答：本識是諸識的根本，給予其他識作為所依的意義是明顯的。其他識給予它作為所依的意義是隱晦的。所以不提出它所依賴的。第七識是第八識之外的，所以提出它所依賴的體性。問：如果這樣，本識給予其他識作為所依的意義是明顯的，為什麼不說呢？答：前面的頌文已經說了。就是那句『恒轉如流』。『如流』的意思是產生其餘的識，也就是所依的意義。問：為什麼不說第七識給予其他識作為所依？第三個能變識中不解釋根和境？答：這是作論者的意願，所以不應該責問。或者是因為省略的緣故。就是說，第一個能變識只解釋了所緣。所以前面的頌文說『執受處是』。第三個能變識只解釋了所依。所以後面的頌文說『依止本識』。第二個能變識，所依和所緣都顯示出來。想要讓學者可以知道一隅，然後可以推知三隅。或者說，本識是諸法的根本，只說給予其他識作為所依，出自識體和所緣。前面的六識境界粗糙，所以不說。只說它所依賴的。依賴根本識等就是。所以下面的論說：『此所緣及別依，粗顯極成故此不說』。第七識所依和所緣都隱晦。根和境合起來解釋。所以作論有三種不同的方式。不是隻說所緣而沒有所依等。為什麼本識不提出界系？論主省略了。或者說，異熟（vipāka，意為『果報』）就是界系。隨屬於哪個界的異熟，就是那個界的繫縛。這裡也應該這樣。說與染污法同時存在，就已經隨屬於那個繫縛了。這裡……

【English Translation】 English version: After birth, the discussion begins with the hair. Then, based on the questions asked, its characteristics are distinguished. This is the initial stage.

Treatise: The verse says that there is no (seventh consciousness) in the path of transcendence.

Commentary: Below, distinctions are made based on questions. Here, based on three verses, the ten aspects of the seventh consciousness are explained separately. First, the name of the second transforming consciousness, namely Manas (meaning 'mind'), is mentioned. Second, what it relies on is explained. Third, what it cognizes is explained. Fourth, its nature is described and its meaning is explained. Fifth, its characteristics are explained. Sixth, it is shown to exist simultaneously with defiled dharmas. Seventh, it is explained to be associated with contact, etc. Eighth, its three natures are distinguished. Ninth, its realms and grounds are distinguished. Tenth, its hidden and manifest aspects are distinguished. This is the order of the position of subduing and severing. In the 'manifest' below, each is explained extensively. Question: Why doesn't the Ālayavijñāna (meaning 'storehouse consciousness') distinguish what it relies on? In the second transforming consciousness, its relying nature is explained. Answer: The Ālayavijñāna is the root of all consciousnesses, and the meaning of giving reliance to other consciousnesses is obvious. The meaning of other consciousnesses giving reliance to it is obscure. Therefore, what it relies on is not mentioned. The seventh consciousness is outside of the eighth consciousness, so what it relies on is mentioned. Question: If so, the meaning of the Ālayavijñāna giving reliance to others is obvious, why isn't it mentioned? Answer: The previous verse has already said it. That is, the phrase 'constantly flowing like a stream'. The meaning of 'like a stream' is that it produces the remaining consciousnesses, which is the meaning of reliance. Question: Why isn't it said that the seventh consciousness gives reliance to others? Why aren't the roots and objects explained in the third transforming consciousness? Answer: This is the intention of the author of the treatise, so it shouldn't be questioned. Or it is because of omission. That is, the first transforming consciousness only explains what is cognized. Therefore, the previous verse says 'the grasped place is'. The third transforming consciousness only explains what is relied on. Therefore, the later verse says 'relying on the Ālayavijñāna'. In the second transforming consciousness, both the reliance and the cognized are shown. The intention is to allow scholars to know one corner and then infer the other three corners. Or it is said that the Ālayavijñāna is the root of all dharmas, and only says that it gives reliance to others, originating from the nature of consciousness and what is cognized. The realms of the previous six consciousnesses are coarse, so they are not mentioned. Only what it relies on is mentioned. Relying on the fundamental consciousness, etc., is what it is. Therefore, the following treatise says: 'This cognized and separate reliance, because they are coarse, obvious, and extremely established, are not mentioned here'. The reliance and cognized of the seventh consciousness are both obscure. The roots and objects are explained together. Therefore, there are three different ways of writing the treatise. It is not just saying what is cognized without reliance, etc. Why doesn't the Ālayavijñāna mention the realms and affiliations? The author of the treatise omitted it. Or it is said that Vipāka (meaning 'retribution') is the realms and affiliations. Whichever realm the Vipāka belongs to, it is the affiliation of that realm. It should be like this here as well. Saying that it exists simultaneously with defiled dharmas already belongs to that affiliation. Here...

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不為例。謂前六識起與本識非必同系。除無漏識此與本識起必同界。恐類前六故今說之　又作法各別不應為難　后能變中即不解故。

論。次初異熟至能變識相。

述曰。下有二文。一以八段依釋十門。合釋體義及行相故。合釋染所．余心所故。以義類同故合明也。或開為九。四染煩惱與余心所別門說故。

二以二教．六理證有此識。隨文可知　初段有二。一釋頌。二問答　異熟識先此識為后。故言次後。解頌初句次第二能變　應辨思量能變識相。即出頌中能變之言。釋能變名。如第二卷解。

論。是識聖教至勝餘識故。

述曰。即指此識故言是識　于聖教中別名末那。總名識故。末那是意。故楞伽云識有八種。識即通名　六十三云。雖諸識皆名心意識。隨義勝說第八名心。第七名意。余識名識　攝論第一亦言意名無有義心體第三等。故末那名別目第七　又雖諸識皆名為意。為此標意。余識不然。雖標總稱即別名也。是故論言是識聖教別名末那　何故諸識不別名意。恒審思量勝餘識故　六十三卷有心地云。若末那恒思量為性相續而轉。佛言出世末那云何建立。答名假施設。不必如義　此義意言。出世末那更不思量。任運知故。無粗慧故。無散慧故。不名末那。即唯有漏非在無漏。此一

解也　又云遠離顛倒正思量故　此義意言。遠離顛倒思量有正思量故。即通無漏亦有此名。二解如是。

論。此名何異第六意識。

述曰。上釋頌文。下問答辨。于中有二。文顯可知　問曰如言八識此亦名識。末那名意。總別合論即名意識。又六十三云。識有二種。一者阿賴耶識。二者轉識。此復七種。所謂眼識。乃至意識。即是第七名為意識。此名何異第六意識。一則總別合名為理難。二以論文為例難。

論。此持業釋至識異意故。

述曰。意是自體。識即是意。於六釋中是持業釋。業謂業用。體能持用。即似舊言功能受稱。此六釋名皆二法相對辨差別釋。非一一法究理括盡。如阿賴耶名藏識。識體即藏亦是此釋。此與彼同。故指為喻。何為此釋。識缽即意故。其第六識體雖是識。而非是意。非恒審故。彼依主釋。主謂第七。即似舊言從所依得名　如眼識等。眼是所依。而體是識。依眼之識故名眼識。何為此釋識異意故。能所依別。從依得名。

問今者得名既各不同。何故不併名意識。而於第七但立意名。若名意識顯是持業得名。但名為意竟有何理。

論。然諸聖教至但立意名。

述曰。諸聖教中恐此第七濫彼第六。於此第七但立意名而不言識。第一義也。

次

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 解釋說，又說因為遠離顛倒的正思量，所以有此名稱。這個意思是指，因為遠離顛倒的思量，才會有正確的思量，因此即使是無漏的智慧，也可以有這個名稱。這是兩種解釋。

論：這個名稱與第六意識有什麼不同？

述記說：上面解釋頌文，下面用問答來辨析。其中包含兩層意思，文字顯而易見。問：如果說有八識，那麼這個（第七識）也叫做識，末那（manas，意）叫做意，總合起來說就叫做意識。而且《六十三》中說，識有兩種，一是阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna，藏識），二是轉識，這轉識又有七種，就是眼識，乃至意識。那麼這個第七識也叫做意識，這與第六意識有什麼不同呢？一是總別合起來說名稱的道理難以理解，二是引用論文作為例子來提出疑問。

論：這是持業釋（karmadhāraya compound）的解釋，因為識就是意。

述記說：意是自體，識就是意。在六種解釋中，這是持業釋。業指的是業用，體能夠持有業用，就像以前所說的功能受稱。這六種解釋名稱都是兩種法相對來辨別差別的解釋，不是一種法就能窮盡所有道理。比如阿賴耶（ālaya，藏）叫做藏識，識的體性就是藏，也是這種解釋。這個和那個相同，所以用它來做比喻。為什麼要用這種解釋呢？因為識缽（識的體性）就是意。而第六識的體性雖然是識，但不是意，因為它不是恒常審思的。第六識是依主釋（tatpuruṣa compound），主指的是第七識，就像以前所說的從所依而得名，比如眼識等。眼是所依，而體性是識，依靠眼的識所以叫做眼識。為什麼要用這種解釋呢？因為識與意不同，能所依是不同的，所以從所依而得名。

問：現在得名的依據各自不同，為什麼不都叫做意識，而只在第七識上建立意的名稱呢？如果叫做意識，就顯示是持業釋得名，但只叫做意，究竟有什麼道理呢？

論：然而各種聖教經典中，爲了防止這個第七識與那個第六識相混淆，所以在這個第七識上只建立意的名稱，而不說識，這是第一層含義。

其次

【English Translation】 English version: It is explained, and it is also said that because of being far from inverted correct thinking, it has this name. This meaning refers to the fact that only by being far from inverted thinking can there be correct thinking. Therefore, even unconditioned wisdom can have this name. These are two explanations.

Treatise: What is the difference between this name and the sixth consciousness?

Commentary: The above explains the verse, and the following uses questions and answers to distinguish. It contains two layers of meaning, and the text is obvious. Question: If it is said that there are eight consciousnesses, then this (seventh consciousness) is also called consciousness, and Manas (意, mind) is called '意' (intention). When combined, it is called '意識' (consciousness). Moreover, it is said in the Sixty-Three that there are two kinds of consciousness: one is Ālayavijñāna (阿賴耶識, store consciousness), and the other is transforming consciousness, which has seven types, namely eye consciousness, up to consciousness. Then this seventh consciousness is also called '意識' (consciousness). What is the difference between this and the sixth consciousness? First, it is difficult to understand the principle of combining the general and the specific to form a name. Second, it uses the text as an example to raise questions.

Treatise: This is an explanation of karmadhāraya compound (持業釋), because consciousness is intention.

Commentary: Intention is the self-nature, and consciousness is intention. Among the six explanations, this is karmadhāraya compound. 'Karma' refers to function, and the substance can hold the function, just like what was previously said about the function receiving the name. These six explanations of names are all explanations that distinguish differences by comparing two dharmas, and one dharma cannot exhaust all principles. For example, Ālaya (阿賴耶, store) is called store consciousness, and the nature of consciousness is the store, which is also this explanation. This is the same as that, so it is used as a metaphor. Why use this explanation? Because the nature of consciousness is intention. Although the nature of the sixth consciousness is consciousness, it is not intention, because it is not constant and deliberative. The sixth consciousness is tatpuruṣa compound (依主釋), where '主' (master) refers to the seventh consciousness, just like what was previously said about obtaining the name from what is relied upon, such as eye consciousness, etc. The eye is what is relied upon, and the nature is consciousness. The consciousness that relies on the eye is called eye consciousness. Why use this explanation? Because consciousness and intention are different, the relier and the relied upon are different, so the name is obtained from what is relied upon.

Question: Now that the basis for obtaining names is different, why not call them all consciousness, but only establish the name of intention on the seventh consciousness? If it is called consciousness, it shows that the name is obtained from karmadhāraya compound, but if it is only called intention, what is the reason?

Treatise: However, in various sacred teachings, in order to prevent this seventh consciousness from being confused with that sixth consciousness, only the name of intention is established on this seventh consciousness, and consciousness is not mentioned. This is the first meaning.

Secondly

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第二釋。

論。又標意名至劣余識故。

述曰。唯立意名為簡心．識。雖皆可說名心．意．識。據增勝義但七名意。積集心義．了別識義劣余識故。簡後心．前識但立意名。恒審思故。

次第三云。

論。或欲顯此至故但名意。

述曰。顯此第七與彼第六意識。為近所依故但名意　近所依者。以相順故。同計度故。六緣境時七與力故。所以七無漏六無漏。七有漏時六非無漏。非七緣境第六與力。故六有識七但名意。為簡第八亦與第六之力。故復言近。彼容可為遠所依故。五十一云。由有第八故有末那。末那為依意識得轉。故彼第八為遠所依此為近依　又有別釋。以相續思量故此但名意。第六緣境轉易．間斷故加識名　又欲顯此為六識中不共所依故但名意。無間緣意亦共依故　又由六種依七種生故名近依如眼識等。

此即第一齣能變體釋其名義。自下第二明其所依。

論。依彼轉者顯此所依。

述曰。此下有二。初略后廣　略中有二。初總解依彼轉言。后別解依彼轉三字。此即初也。

論。彼謂即前至依藏識故。

述曰。自下即別解。初解彼字。次解依字。后解轉字。此解彼字。顯此依彼第八識也。由有阿賴耶故得有末那故名聖說。

次解依字。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 第二重解釋。

論：又標明『意』這個名稱，是因為它比其他識更低劣。

述記：唯獨建立『意』這個名稱是爲了簡別『心』和『識』。雖然都可以稱為『心』、『意』、『識』，但根據增勝的意義，只有第七識被稱為『意』。因為它積集了『心』的意義，並且『了別識』的意義比其他識更低劣。爲了簡別後面的『心』和前面的『識』，所以只建立『意』這個名稱，因為它恒常審思。

《次第三》中說：

論：或者想要顯示第七識是第六意識的近所依，所以只稱為『意』。

述記：顯示這第七識與第六意識是近所依的關係，所以只稱為『意』。所謂『近所依』，是因為它們相互順應，共同計度。第六識緣境時，第七識給予力量。所以第七識有無漏時，第六識也有無漏；第七識有有漏時，第六識並非無漏。並非第七識緣境時，第六識給予力量。所以第六識有『識』的名稱，而第七識只稱為『意』。爲了簡別第八識也給予第六識力量，所以又說『近』。因為第八識也可以作為遠所依。五十一卷中說：由於有第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālayavijñāna，the storehouse consciousness），所以有末那識（Manas，the mind）。末那識作為所依，意識才能運轉。所以第八識是遠所依，第七識是近所依。還有其他的解釋，因為相續思量，所以第七識只稱為『意』。第六識緣境時，會轉變、間斷，所以加上『識』的名稱。又想要顯示第七識是第六識中不共的所依，所以只稱為『意』。無間緣『意』也是共同的所依。又因為六種識依靠第七識而生，所以稱為近依，如眼識等。

以上是第一重解釋，說明能變識的體性，解釋它的名稱和意義。下面第二重解釋，說明它的所依。

論：依靠它而運轉，顯示了第七識的所依。

述記：下面有兩部分，先是簡略的解釋，然後是詳細的解釋。簡略的解釋中有兩部分，先是總的解釋『依彼轉』這句話，然後是分別解釋『依』、『彼』、『轉』三個字。這裡是總的解釋。

論：『彼』指的是前面的第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālayavijñāna，the storehouse consciousness），因為第七識依靠藏識（阿賴耶識，Ālayavijñāna，the storehouse consciousness）。

述記：下面是分別解釋。先解釋『彼』字，再解釋『依』字，最後解釋『轉』字。這裡解釋『彼』字，顯示第七識依靠第八識。因為有阿賴耶識，所以才能有末那識，所以稱為聖說。

接下來解釋『依』字。

【English Translation】 English version: Second Explanation.

Treatise: Furthermore, the designation 'Manas' (意, the mind) is specified because it is inferior to the other consciousnesses.

Commentary: The sole establishment of the name 'Manas' is to distinguish it from 'Citta' (心, the heart-mind) and 'Vijñāna' (識, consciousness). Although all can be referred to as 'Citta,' 'Manas,' and 'Vijñāna,' according to the superior meaning, only the seventh consciousness is called 'Manas.' This is because it accumulates the meaning of 'Citta' and the meaning of 'discriminating consciousness' (了別識) is inferior to the other consciousnesses. To distinguish it from the subsequent 'Citta' and the preceding 'Vijñāna,' only the name 'Manas' is established, because it constantly and deliberately thinks.

The Ci Di San (次第三) says:

Treatise: Or, it is intended to show that this seventh consciousness is the near support of the sixth consciousness, hence it is only named 'Manas.'

Commentary: It shows that this seventh consciousness is the near support of the sixth consciousness, hence it is only named 'Manas.' The so-called 'near support' is because they are mutually compliant and jointly deliberate. When the sixth consciousness cognizes objects, the seventh consciousness provides strength. Therefore, when the seventh consciousness is unconditioned, the sixth consciousness is also unconditioned; when the seventh consciousness is conditioned, the sixth consciousness is not unconditioned. It is not the case that when the seventh consciousness cognizes objects, the sixth consciousness provides strength. Therefore, the sixth consciousness has the name 'Vijñāna,' while the seventh consciousness is only called 'Manas.' To distinguish that the eighth consciousness also gives strength to the sixth consciousness, it is further said 'near.' Because the eighth consciousness can also be a distant support. Volume 51 says: Because there is the eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, 阿賴耶識, the storehouse consciousness), there is the Manas (末那, the mind). With the Manas as the support, the consciousness can function. Therefore, the eighth consciousness is the distant support, and this is the near support. There is also another explanation: because of continuous deliberation, this is only called 'Manas.' When the sixth consciousness cognizes objects, it changes and is interrupted, so the name 'Vijñāna' is added. Furthermore, it is intended to show that this is the uncommon support among the six consciousnesses, hence it is only called 'Manas.' The immediately preceding condition 'Manas' is also a common support. Furthermore, because the six kinds of consciousnesses rely on the seventh consciousness to arise, it is called near support, such as eye consciousness, etc.

The above is the first explanation, explaining the nature of the transforming consciousness, and explaining its name and meaning. The following is the second explanation, explaining its support.

Treatise: Relying on it to function, it shows the support of this seventh consciousness.

Commentary: Below there are two parts, first a brief explanation, then a detailed explanation. In the brief explanation there are two parts, first a general explanation of the phrase 'relying on it to function,' then a separate explanation of the three words 'relying,' 'it,' and 'function.' This is the general explanation.

Treatise: 'It' refers to the preceding eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, 阿賴耶識, the storehouse consciousness), because the seventh consciousness relies on the storehouse consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, 阿賴耶識, the storehouse consciousness).

Commentary: Below is the separate explanation. First explain the word 'it,' then explain the word 'relying,' and finally explain the word 'function.' Here, the word 'it' is explained, showing that the seventh consciousness relies on the eighth consciousness. Because there is the Ālayavijñāna, there can be the Manas, hence it is called the holy teaching.

Next, the word 'relying' is explained.

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有其二說。

論。有義此意至方得生故。

述曰。是第一義。難陀．勝子皆作是說。此師意說。第七現識唯依第八種子識。不依彼現行。以第七恒無間。不假現識為俱有依。約依種子故名依彼。

下護法等諸論師釋。

論。有義此意至方得生故。

述曰。此第七識以彼種子識．及現行果識俱為所依。此識隨在因果位中雖無間斷。于入見道等而有轉易。或善或染。必假現識為俱有依方得生故。若不爾者。體有轉易殊無勝力如何得生。賴相續識可得生故　問前師曰。今言依彼言依種子者。五十一云。由有本識有末那等文如何通　應言由有本識意識得轉。第六亦依本識種故　問后師曰。初地等轉易第六引生。第八於七有何勝力。如定中聞聲。意識不共耳識同取。當時唯有現行相續七．八二識。應亦得說為耳識依。雖無引力仍說依故　前師答曰。如對法第二眼識種子依眼根種。眼根種為所依眼識種為能依。要根種子導識種子生現根已。其識種子方得生識。不爾識種定無生義。而現行眼識。一自種依彼根種。二自現依彼根現。其第六識由第七種子導生。第七望六有力勝故說六依七。非第六識不依本識之種子故。今第七依言但依彼種。非彼現識。若說依現如何說依。不與七同緣。行相殊異故。但可

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有兩種不同的說法。

論：因為只有依靠這種意義才能產生。

述記：這是第一義。難陀（Nanda，佛陀的堂弟）和勝子（Vijayasuta，一位論師）都這樣說。這位論師的意思是說，第七末那識（Manas-vijnana，末那識，也稱意根）僅僅依靠第八阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識，也稱藏識）的種子識，而不依靠阿賴耶識的現行。因為第七識是恒常無間斷的，不需要現識作為俱有依。因為是依靠種子，所以稱為『依彼』。

以下是護法（Dharmapala，一位論師）等諸位論師的解釋。

論：因為只有依靠這種意義才能產生。

述記：這第七識既依靠第八識的種子識，也依靠現行果識作為所依。此識無論在因位還是果位中，雖然沒有間斷，但在進入見道（Darshana-marga，佛教修行道路的第一個階段）等階段時會有轉變，或者變好或者變壞。必須依靠現識作為俱有依才能產生。如果不是這樣，本體有轉變而又沒有殊勝的力量，如何能夠產生？依靠相續識才能產生。問前一位論師：現在說『依彼』，是指依靠種子嗎？《五十一論》中說：『由於有本識（Mula-vijnana，根本識，即阿賴耶識），才有末那（Manas，末那識）等』，如何解釋？應該說，由於有本識，意識（Vijnana，了別識）才能運轉。第六識（意識）也依靠本識的種子。問后一位論師：初地（Prthivi，菩薩十地之第一地）等階段的轉變是第六識引起的，第八識對於第七識有什麼殊勝的力量？比如在禪定中聽到聲音，意識不與耳識（Srotra-vijnana，聽覺）共同取境。當時只有現行相續的第七識和第八識，也應該可以說耳識是依靠它們的。雖然沒有引導的力量，仍然說是依靠。前一位論師回答說：如同《對法論》第二卷所說，眼識（Caksu-vijnana，視覺）的種子依靠眼根（Caksu-indriya，視覺器官）的種子。眼根的種子是所依，眼識的種子是能依。必須眼根的種子引導產生現行的眼根之後，眼識的種子才能產生眼識。否則，眼識的種子一定沒有產生的道理。而現行的眼識，一是自己的種子依靠眼根的種子，二是自己的現行依靠眼根的現行。第六識是由第七識的種子引導產生的。第七識對於第六識有殊勝的力量，所以說第六識依靠第七識。並非第六識不依靠本識的種子。現在說第七識依靠，只是依靠它的種子，不是依靠它的現識。如果說是依靠現識，如何說是依靠？因為它不與第七識共同緣取，行相也不同。只能說

【English Translation】 English version There are two different views on this.

Treatise: Because only by relying on this meaning can it arise.

Commentary: This is the first meaning. Nanda (Buddha's cousin) and Vijayasuta (a commentator) both say this. This teacher's meaning is that the seventh Manas-vijnana (Manas-consciousness, also known as the mind-basis consciousness) relies solely on the seed consciousness of the eighth Alaya-vijnana (Alaya-consciousness, also known as the storehouse consciousness), and does not rely on the Alaya-consciousness's present activity. Because the seventh consciousness is constant and uninterrupted, it does not need the present consciousness as a co-existent basis. Because it relies on the seed, it is called 'relying on it'.

The following are the explanations of Dharmapala (a commentator) and other commentators.

Treatise: Because only by relying on this meaning can it arise.

Commentary: This seventh consciousness relies on both the seed consciousness and the present resultant consciousness of the eighth consciousness as its basis. Although this consciousness is uninterrupted whether in the causal stage or the resultant stage, it will change when entering the stage of seeing the truth (Darshana-marga, the first stage of the Buddhist path), either for the better or for the worse. It must rely on the present consciousness as a co-existent basis in order to arise. If this were not the case, how could it arise if its essence changes and it has no special power? It can arise by relying on the continuous consciousness. Question to the previous teacher: Now when we say 'relying on it', does it mean relying on the seed? The Fifty-One Treatise says: 'Because there is the fundamental consciousness (Mula-vijnana, the root consciousness, i.e., Alaya-consciousness), there is Manas (Manas-consciousness) etc.', how should this be explained? It should be said that because there is the fundamental consciousness, the consciousness (Vijnana, discriminating consciousness) can function. The sixth consciousness (consciousness) also relies on the seed of the fundamental consciousness. Question to the latter teacher: The changes in the first ground (Prthivi, the first of the ten Bodhisattva grounds) etc. are caused by the sixth consciousness. What special power does the eighth consciousness have over the seventh consciousness? For example, when hearing a sound in meditation, the consciousness does not jointly take the object with the ear consciousness (Srotra-vijnana, hearing). At that time, only the continuously active seventh and eighth consciousnesses are present, and it should also be said that the ear consciousness relies on them. Although there is no guiding power, it is still said to rely on them. The former teacher replied: As the second volume of the Abhidharma Treatise says, the seed of the eye consciousness (Caksu-vijnana, vision) relies on the seed of the eye organ (Caksu-indriya, visual organ). The seed of the eye organ is the basis, and the seed of the eye consciousness is the enabler. The seed of the eye organ must guide the production of the present eye organ before the seed of the eye consciousness can produce the eye consciousness. Otherwise, there is no reason for the seed of the eye consciousness to arise. And the present eye consciousness, firstly, its own seed relies on the seed of the eye organ, and secondly, its own present activity relies on the present activity of the eye organ. The sixth consciousness is guided and produced by the seed of the seventh consciousness. The seventh consciousness has a special power over the sixth consciousness, so it is said that the sixth consciousness relies on the seventh consciousness. It is not that the sixth consciousness does not rely on the seed of the fundamental consciousness. Now when it is said that the seventh consciousness relies, it only relies on its seed, not on its present activity. If it is said to rely on the present activity, how can it be said to rely on it? Because it does not jointly cognize with the seventh consciousness, and its characteristics are also different. It can only be said that

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說言緣彼現識。不可言依　若爾如何說六依七。所緣行相併不同故。非如眼等為眼識依所取等故　答曰兩人依別復兩處住。如王與臣等仍說相依。有為諸法勢分力故。此識亦爾。所作．行相雖復不同。而第七勢分為第六依。非第八現為第七依　問曰若爾如何知七於六有勢分非八現於七。故知說八為第七依　彼質答曰。如何為境復說為依。依．緣何異　答而復質曰。如第六緣七。如何為境。又復為依。理無過故。此亦應爾　后師答曰。前師有過。我理無失。且初地轉易。八於七識有何勝力者。若無第八現行。彼七必無故。意識不爾。故說非七依。即如定中聞聲。意識無時耳必不轉。彼必同取。今此七．八雖不同境。勢分牽故竟有何失。第七識必有現行所依。名轉識故。如前六識。或應有識為俱有依。六．七識中名轉識故。如第六意識　問曰如設無第七非五識生。七非五識依。何故無第八時。七不有第八為七依。八例七等亦爾　如下廣解。然賴耶根本說七依八。與力令生故。非如七無五識不有。七非本故。不與力故。又若無七五識必無。故今說七依八現．種。準此二師雖無評義。然後師勝。無過親故。前理難故。下自當知。

次解轉義。

論。轉謂流轉至取所緣故。

述曰。流是相續義。轉是起義。謂

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：說（第六）意識緣于（第七識的）現識，不能說（第七識）依于（第八識）。如果是這樣，為什麼說六識依于第七識，第七識依于第八識呢？因為所緣和行相併不相同，不像眼識等依于眼根，因為眼識等取（眼根）的緣故。 答：兩人（比如國王和大臣）依據不同的身份，住在不同的地方，仍然可以稱為相互依存，因為有為諸法有其各自的勢力和作用。這個（第七）識也是如此。雖然所作和行相不同，但第七識的勢力作用是第六識的所依，而不是第八識的現行是第七識的所依。 問：如果是這樣，如何知道第七識對於第六識有勢力作用，而不是第八識的現行對於第七識有勢力作用呢？因此可知說第八識是第七識的所依。 前師答：如何能把作為（第七識的）境，又說成是（第七識的）所依呢？所依和所緣有什麼區別？ 后師反問：比如第六識緣于第七識，如何既作為（第七識的）境，又作為（第六識的）所依呢？道理上沒有過失，這裡也應該如此。 后師答：前師的說法有錯，我的道理沒有缺失。且不說初地轉易的時候，第八識對於第七識有什麼殊勝的力量。如果沒有第八識的現行，第七識必定不會存在。意識不是這樣，所以說（第八識）不是第七識的所依。就像在禪定中聽到聲音，意識沒有的時候，耳識必定不會轉變，必定會一同取境。現在第七識和第八識雖然所緣的境不同，但因為勢力牽引的緣故，究竟有什麼過失呢？第七識必定有現行所依，名為轉識的緣故，就像前六識一樣。或者應該有識作為俱有依，因為六、七識中名為轉識的緣故，就像第六意識一樣。 問：如果假設沒有第七識，前五識就不會產生，所以第七識不是前五識的所依。為什麼沒有第八識的時候，第七識不會存在，所以第八識是第七識的所依呢？第八識類比第七識等也是如此。 如下文廣為解釋。然而賴耶（阿賴耶，ālaya）根本識說第七識依于第八識，因為（第八識）給予力量使（第七識）產生。不像沒有第七識，前五識就不會存在，因為第七識不是根本，不給予力量的緣故。又如果假設沒有第七識，前五識必定不會存在，所以現在說第七識依于第八識的現行和種子。準此，兩位法師雖然沒有評判意義，然後師的說法更勝一籌，因為沒有過失且更貼近（事實），前師的道理難以成立，下文自然會知曉。 接下來解釋轉的含義。 論：轉，是指流轉到取所緣的緣故。 述記：流是相續的意思，轉是生起的意思，指（識）流轉相續，生起而取所緣的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: It is said that the (sixth) consciousness is conditioned by the manifest consciousness (of the seventh consciousness), and it cannot be said that (the seventh consciousness) relies on (the eighth consciousness). If so, why is it said that the six consciousnesses rely on the seventh consciousness, and the seventh consciousness relies on the eighth consciousness? Because the objects and characteristics are not the same, unlike the eye consciousness, etc., which rely on the eye organ, because the eye consciousness, etc., take (the eye organ) as their object. Answer: Two people (such as a king and a minister) rely on different identities and live in different places, but they can still be called interdependent, because conditioned dharmas have their own powers and functions. This (seventh) consciousness is also like this. Although the functions and characteristics are different, the power of the seventh consciousness is the basis of the sixth consciousness, rather than the manifestation of the eighth consciousness being the basis of the seventh consciousness. Question: If so, how do we know that the seventh consciousness has power over the sixth consciousness, rather than the manifestation of the eighth consciousness having power over the seventh consciousness? Therefore, it can be known that the eighth consciousness is said to be the basis of the seventh consciousness. Former Master's Answer: How can something that is the object (of the seventh consciousness) be said to be its basis? What is the difference between a basis and an object? Later Master's Counter-question: For example, the sixth consciousness is conditioned by the seventh consciousness, how can it be both the object (of the seventh consciousness) and the basis (of the sixth consciousness)? There is no fault in the reasoning, so it should be the same here. Later Master's Answer: The former master's statement is flawed, my reasoning has no defects. Let's not talk about when the first ground is transformed, what superior power does the eighth consciousness have over the seventh consciousness? If there is no manifestation of the eighth consciousness, the seventh consciousness will definitely not exist. The consciousness is not like this, so it is said that (the eighth consciousness) is not the basis of the seventh consciousness. Just like hearing a sound in meditation, when the consciousness is absent, the ear consciousness will definitely not change, and it will definitely take the object together. Now, although the seventh and eighth consciousnesses have different objects, what fault is there after all because of the influence of power? The seventh consciousness must have a manifest basis, because it is called a transforming consciousness, just like the first six consciousnesses. Or there should be a consciousness as a co-existent basis, because it is called a transforming consciousness in the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, just like the sixth consciousness. Question: If it is assumed that without the seventh consciousness, the first five consciousnesses will not arise, so the seventh consciousness is not the basis of the first five consciousnesses. Why is it that when there is no eighth consciousness, the seventh consciousness will not exist, so the eighth consciousness is the basis of the seventh consciousness? The eighth consciousness is analogous to the seventh consciousness, etc., as well. The following text explains it in detail. However, the Ālaya (ālaya) fundamental consciousness says that the seventh consciousness relies on the eighth consciousness, because (the eighth consciousness) gives power to (the seventh consciousness) to arise. It is not like without the seventh consciousness, the first five consciousnesses will not exist, because the seventh consciousness is not fundamental and does not give power. Also, if it is assumed that without the seventh consciousness, the first five consciousnesses will definitely not exist, so now it is said that the seventh consciousness relies on the manifestation and seeds of the eighth consciousness. Based on this, although the two masters have no critical meaning, the later master's statement is better, because it has no faults and is closer to (the facts), and the former master's reasoning is difficult to establish, as will be known in the following text. Next, explain the meaning of 'transformation'. Treatise: 'Transformation' refers to flowing and transforming to take the object. Commentary: 'Flow' means continuity, and 'transformation' means arising, referring to (consciousness) flowing and continuing, arising and taking the object.

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依第八或種．或現相續起義。顯示此第七識恒依彼第八識起取所緣故。第七行相取所緣境相續不斷而生起義。

此文上來已依常理略解所依竟　諸心．心所下廣解所依。以上第八識及下諸識中不辨所依義故。今因廣論。依下正文即傍乘義　于中有三。初總泛出極成所依有三。次別敘諸師於三依中各有異計。后結歸正義。

論。諸心心所至總有三種。

述曰。泛出所依中文勢有三。初總舉有所依法顯所依之數。次別列釋所依體。后總結前　皆有所依者。能有所依故名有所依。于大乘中何處經論名有所依。瑜伽五十五說心．心所法名有所依等。說無量名　然彼言所依。唯約俱有依說。以恒定依故。大小二乘俱極成故　此中所言。然彼所依總有三種者。恒不恒．定不定。合說為所依。所依．及依皆名所依。如下文云此假說故。如瑜伽論第一卷云。眼識俱有依謂眼。等無間依謂意。種子依謂阿賴耶識　此中三依約三緣作名。何以爾者。彼論以理為名。此論以緣為目。體．義無別。

論。一因緣依至必不生故。

述曰。自下別列釋所依體。約識而論唯種子識。今言泛說諸有為法皆托此依。據通依故。一切有為法無無因緣者故。此三得名皆持業釋。

論。二增上緣依至必不轉故。

述

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『依第八或種，或現相續起義』。這顯示了第七識（末那識，ego-consciousness）恒常依賴於第八識（阿賴耶識，storehouse consciousness）而生起並執取所緣境的緣故。第七識的行相是執取所緣境，並且這種執取是相續不斷地生起的。

上文已經依據常理簡略地解釋了所依。『諸心．心所下廣解所依』，以下將廣泛地解釋所依。因為在以上關於第八識以及以下諸識的討論中，沒有詳細辨析所依的含義，所以現在藉此機會廣泛地論述。『依下正文即傍乘義』，依據下面的正文，也順便討論相關的含義。

其中有三點：首先，總括性地提出普遍認可的三種所依；其次，分別敘述各家學說對於這三種所依的不同見解；最後，總結歸納出正確的觀點。

論：『諸心心所至總有三種』。

述曰：總括性地提出所依，文勢上有三個要點：首先，總括地列舉有所依的法，從而顯示所依的數量；其次，分別解釋所依的體性；最後，總結前述內容。『皆有所依者』，能夠成為所依，所以稱為有所依。在大乘佛教中，哪些經論中提到了『有所依』？《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷說，心、心所法稱為有所依等等，類似的說法有很多。『然彼言所依』，但是那裡所說的所依，僅僅是就俱有依（simultaneous condition）而言的，因為它是恒常不變的依持。大小乘佛教都普遍認可這一點。『此中所言，然彼所依總有三種者』，這裡所說的所依總共有三種，包括恒常與不恒常、固定與不固定。將這些合起來稱為所依。所依以及依都稱為所依。如下文所說『此假說故』。如《瑜伽師地論》第一卷所說，眼識的俱有依是眼根，等無間依（immediately preceding condition）是意根，種子依（seed condition）是阿賴耶識。這裡的三種依是根據三種緣來命名的。為什麼這樣說呢？因為《瑜伽師地論》是以理來命名的，而本論是以緣來命名的，體性和意義沒有區別。

論：『一因緣依至必不生故』。

述曰：下面分別解釋所依的體性。如果僅就識而言，只有種子識（阿賴耶識）才能作為所依。現在泛泛而說，一切有為法都要依託於此依。這是從普遍的所依的角度來說的。一切有為法沒有不是由因緣產生的。這三種依的得名都是持業釋（一個梵文複合詞的語法分析）。

論：『二增上緣依至必不轉故』。

述

【English Translation】 English version: 『Relying on the eighth, either seeds or present continuations arise.』 This shows that the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana, ego-consciousness) constantly relies on the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) to arise and grasp its object. The characteristic of the seventh consciousness is to grasp its object, and this grasping arises continuously.

The above has briefly explained the support based on common sense. 『The following extensively explains the support of all minds and mental factors.』 The following will extensively explain the support. Because the meaning of the support is not discussed in detail in the above discussion of the eighth consciousness and the following consciousnesses, now we take this opportunity to discuss it extensively. 『Relying on the following text also discusses related meanings.』 Based on the following text, we also discuss related meanings.

There are three points: First, generally put forward the universally recognized three supports; second, respectively describe the different views of various schools on these three supports; and finally, summarize and draw the correct conclusion.

Treatise: 『All minds and mental factors have a total of three supports.』

Commentary: Generally put forward the support, there are three main points in the text: First, generally list the dharmas that have support, thus showing the number of supports; second, respectively explain the nature of the support; and finally, summarize the foregoing content. 『All have support』 means that they can become support, so they are called having support. In Mahayana Buddhism, which sutras and treatises mention 『having support』? The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 55, says that mind and mental factors are called having support, and so on. There are many similar statements. 『However, the support mentioned there』 only refers to the simultaneous condition, because it is a constant and unchanging support. Both Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhism universally recognize this point. 『What is said here, however, that there are three types of support in total』 includes constant and inconstant, fixed and unfixed. These are collectively called support. Support and relying are both called support, as stated in the following text, 『This is a provisional designation.』 As stated in the first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the simultaneous condition of eye consciousness is the eye faculty, the immediately preceding condition is the mind faculty, and the seed condition is the Alaya-vijnana. The three supports here are named according to the three conditions. Why is this so? Because the Yogacarabhumi-sastra is named according to reason, while this treatise is named according to conditions. The nature and meaning are not different.

Treatise: 『First, the causal condition, if it did not exist, would certainly not arise.』

Commentary: The following explains the nature of the support separately. If only consciousness is considered, only seed consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) can serve as support. Now, generally speaking, all conditioned dharmas must rely on this support. This is from the perspective of universal support. All conditioned dharmas are not produced without causal conditions. The naming of these three supports is all in the appositional compound.

Treatise: 『Second, the dominant condition, if it did not exist, would certainly not transform.』

Commentary:

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曰。謂內六處。即眼根等。八識俱有依皆不過內六處故。若對大乘即通六處。若對小部唯在五內。意處說是等無間故。

論。三等無間緣依至必不起故。

述曰。謂前滅意不取心所。總而言之。即通八識相望得作如下諍論　此開導依。若言開避。二義無別。開即避故。今言開者。離其處所即開彼路。復言導者引彼令生。引導招彼令生此處。故梵言羯爛多。此可言次第緣。如逆次第云阿奴羯爛多。阿奴是逆義。羯爛多雲次第。須次第者。云缽剌底羯爛多。缽剌底是順義。此緣既云三摩難咀啰故。言等無間緣也　三是等義　摩是無義　難咀啰是間義故。若言種子依。即唯現行法有種。種望種子應無此依。今言因緣依者。令知寬遍故　若言俱有依。即種．果同時。應名俱有依。以緣簡別顯增上緣故非種子　若爾俱時心所應是此緣。彼非所依故。心王是所依。唯種相似故后簡之。如下當辨　若言無間依即前滅種子望后種子應是此依。簡異彼故言等無間緣依　若爾前念心所應是此依。是此緣故。不爾心所非是所依。言等無間復是所依故復雙簡也　種子所依辨體生故。言必不生　增上緣依隨須與力不障彼故。言必不轉　開導之依顯開彼路導彼生故。言必不起。三文有異。

論。唯心心所至非所餘法。

述

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：什麼是內六處？即眼根等六種感覺器官（眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根、意根）。八識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）的生起都依賴於內六處。如果從大乘佛教的角度來說，六處都包括在內。如果從小乘佛教的角度來說，則只包括前五種（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身），因為意處被認為是等無間緣（saṃanantarapratyaya，指前念意識為后念意識生起所提供的無間斷的條件）。

論：三種等無間緣的依賴關係，會導致（結果）必然不生起。

述：這裡指的是前一念滅去的意識不取心所（citta-caitta，與心相應的心理活動）。總的來說，可以對八識之間的相互關係進行如下辯論：這種開導依（apāyadvāra，指開闢道路，引導生起），如果說是『開避』，兩種含義沒有區別，因為『開』就是『避』。現在說『開』，是指離開原來的處所，就是開闢了道路。再說『導』，是指引導它生起，引導招引它生到這裡。所以梵語karanta（羯爛多），可以翻譯為『次第緣』。如果逆著次第，就說anukaranta（阿奴羯爛多），anu（阿奴）是逆的意思，karanta（羯爛多）是次第的意思。需要次第的，就說pratikaranta（缽剌底羯爛多），prati（缽剌底）是順的意思。這個緣既然說是samanantara（三摩難咀啰），所以說是等無間緣。『三』是等的意思，『摩』是無的意思，『難咀啰』是間的意思。如果說是種子依，那麼只有現行法才有種子。種子相對於種子，應該沒有這種依賴關係。現在說是因緣依，是爲了讓人知道它的寬泛普遍。如果說是俱有依，那麼種子和果同時存在，應該叫做俱有依。用緣來簡別，是爲了顯示增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya，指強有力的條件），所以不是種子。如果這樣，那麼同時存在的心所應該是這種緣。但心所不是所依賴的對象，心王（citta，心識）才是所依賴的對象，只是因為種子相似，所以後面要進行簡別，如下面會辨析。如果說是無間依，那麼前一念滅去的種子相對於后一念的種子，應該是這種依賴關係。爲了區分它們，所以說是等無間緣依。如果這樣，那麼前一念的心所應該是這種依賴關係，因為它是這種緣。不是這樣的，因為心所不是所依賴的對象。說是等無間，又是所依賴的對象，所以再次進行雙重簡別。種子所依賴的是辨別體性生起，所以說『必然不生』。增上緣的依賴是隨著需要給予力量，不障礙它，所以說『必然不轉』。開導的依賴是顯示開闢道路，引導它生起，所以說『必然不起』。這三種說法有所不同。

論：只有心和心所是（等無間緣），不是其餘的法。

述：

【English Translation】 English version: Question: What are the six internal āyatanas (internal sense bases)? They are the six sense organs, namely the eye-organ, etc. All eight consciousnesses (the eight vijñānas: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, mind-consciousness, manas-consciousness, and ālaya-consciousness) arise dependent on the six internal āyatanas. If viewed from the perspective of Mahayana Buddhism, all six are included. If viewed from the perspective of Hinayana Buddhism, only the first five are included, because the mind-āyatana (manāyatana) is considered to be the immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya, the uninterrupted condition that the preceding thought provides for the arising of the subsequent thought).

Treatise: The dependence on the three kinds of immediately preceding conditions leads to (the result) necessarily not arising.

Commentary: This refers to the preceding extinguished consciousness not taking mental factors (citta-caitta, mental activities associated with consciousness). Generally speaking, the relationship between the eight consciousnesses can be debated as follows: This 'opening and guiding dependence' (apāyadvāra, referring to opening a path and guiding arising), if said to be 'opening and avoiding,' there is no difference in meaning, because 'opening' is 'avoiding.' Now, saying 'opening' means leaving the original place, which is opening a path. Furthermore, saying 'guiding' means guiding it to arise, guiding and attracting it to be born here. Therefore, the Sanskrit word karanta can be translated as 'sequential condition.' If in reverse order, it is called anukaranta, where anu means reverse, and karanta means sequential. If sequence is needed, it is called pratikaranta, where prati means forward. Since this condition is called samanantara, it is called the immediately preceding condition. 'Sama' means equal, 'an' means without, and 'antara' means interval. If it is said to be seed-dependence, then only manifest dharmas have seeds. Seed in relation to seed should not have this dependence. Now, saying causal-dependence is to let people know its broad pervasiveness. If it is said to be co-existent dependence, then the seed and the result exist simultaneously, and it should be called co-existent dependence. Using conditions to differentiate is to show the adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition), so it is not a seed. If so, then the mental factors existing simultaneously should be this condition. But mental factors are not the objects of dependence; the mind (citta) is the object of dependence. It is only because the seeds are similar that further differentiation is needed later, as will be analyzed below. If it is said to be uninterrupted dependence, then the preceding extinguished seed in relation to the subsequent seed should be this dependence. To distinguish them, it is called the immediately preceding condition. If so, then the mental factors of the preceding thought should be this dependence, because it is this condition. It is not so, because mental factors are not the objects of dependence. Saying immediately preceding and also being the object of dependence is to doubly differentiate again. What the seed depends on is distinguishing the nature of arising, so it is said 'necessarily does not arise.' The dependence on the dominant condition is giving strength as needed, not obstructing it, so it is said 'necessarily does not transform.' The dependence on opening and guiding is showing opening a path, guiding it to arise, so it is said 'necessarily does not arise.' These three statements are different.

Treatise: Only the mind and mental factors are (the immediately preceding condition), not other dharmas.

Commentary:

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曰。此言可解。即總結簡　今言唯心心所具三所依名有所依非所餘法者。諸色等法唯有因緣無餘二依。今假設如小乘無心定。是等無間緣果。有等無間依。及因緣依。無俱有增上緣依義。不具三故不名有所依。

此前泛出三種所依通心心所。然其道理既未明顯。更須廣示第二廣諍。三依不同即為三段。

論。初種子依至現果方生。

述曰。此有二說。初說有二。一標宗。二引證。今即初也　因果異時。經部等義。世親菩薩為往昔時東天竺有僧。共數論師學徒論議。彼立二十五諦。說大地等常。今無念念生滅。廣敘彼宗。此僧難言。今必有滅。以後劫壞等有滅故。準前有滅。外道難言。后必不滅。今無滅故。如今時山等。彼僧於時竟不能答。王見信受僧佉外道。遂辱此僧令乘驢等。然彼外道為王重已造七十行頌論。王賜千金以顯揚之。故今金七十論即其由致也。世親乃造第一義諦論。亦名勝義七十論。以對彼論而破彼外道言。彼非能破。宗．因．喻過。我僧並無故。又汝所立因有隨一過。誰言今無滅故后亦無滅。我僧但言大地等法前必有轉變滅。後有滅故。如燈焰等。汝不解量乃非我僧。其時國王遂將世親此論。遍諸方域宣令流佈。無人當者。遂起昔時王。及僧佉外道證義者等骸骨。或縛草為人。擬

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 他說：『這話可以解釋。』就是總結簡要地說，現在說只有心和心所具備三種所依，名為『有所依』，不是其餘的法。諸如色法等，只有因緣，沒有其餘兩種所依。現在假設像小乘的無心定，是等無間緣的果，有等無間依和因緣依，沒有俱有增上緣依的意義。因為不具備三種所依，所以不名為『有所依』。 前面泛泛地提出了三種所依，通於心和心所。然而其中的道理還沒有明顯，更需要廣泛地闡釋第二種廣泛的爭論。三種所依的不同，分為三段。 論：最初的種子依，到顯現果實才產生。 述曰：這裡有兩種說法。第一種說法分為兩部分：一是標明宗旨，二是引用證據。現在就是第一部分。因果不同時，是經部等的觀點。世親菩薩爲了往昔東天竺的一位僧人，與數論師的學徒辯論。他們立二十五諦，說大地等是常住的，現在沒有唸唸生滅。廣泛地敘述了他們的宗派。這位僧人反駁說，現在必定有滅，因為以後劫壞等有滅的緣故。按照之前的說法，有滅。外道反駁說，以後必定不滅，因為現在沒有滅的緣故，就像現在的山等。當時這位僧人竟然不能回答。國王見此情形，信奉並接受了僧佉外道，於是羞辱這位僧人，讓他騎驢等。然後那位外道為國王寫了七十行頌的論著。國王賞賜千金來顯揚它。所以現在的《金七十論》就是這樣來的。世親於是寫了《第一義諦論》，也叫《勝義七十論》，來對抗他們的論著，駁斥外道的說法。他們不能駁倒，因為宗、因、喻都有過失，我們僧人都沒有。而且你們所立的因有隨一過。誰說現在沒有滅，以後也沒有滅？我們僧人只是說大地等法，之前必定有轉變滅，以後有滅的緣故，就像燈焰等。你們不理解量，不是我們僧人。當時國王於是將世親的論著，遍佈各個地方宣揚流傳。沒有人能駁倒他。於是挖出以前的國王，以及僧佉外道證明義理的人等的骸骨，或者用草紮成人，來模擬辯論。

【English Translation】 English version: He said, 'This statement can be explained.' That is, to summarize briefly, now it is said that only the mind and mental functions possess the three supports, called 'that which has support' (有所依, you suo yi), not the remaining dharmas. Dharmas such as form (色, se) only have causal conditions (因緣, yin yuan), without the other two supports. Now, suppose like the non-mind samadhi (無心定, wu xin ding) of the Hinayana, it is the result of immediately preceding condition (等無間緣, deng wu jian yuan), having immediately preceding support (等無間依, deng wu jian yi) and causal condition support (因緣依, yin yuan yi), without the meaning of co-existent dominant condition support (俱有增上緣依, ju you zeng shang yuan yi). Because it does not possess the three supports, it is not called 'that which has support'. Previously, it was generally stated that the three supports are common to the mind and mental functions. However, since the reasoning behind this is not yet clear, it is necessary to further elaborate on the second extensive debate. The differences in the three supports are divided into three sections. Treatise: The initial seed support (種子依, zhong zi yi) only arises when the manifest result (現果, xian guo) appears. Commentary: There are two explanations here. The first explanation is divided into two parts: first, stating the principle; second, citing evidence. Now is the first part. Cause and effect are not simultaneous, which is the view of the Sautrantika school (經部, jing bu) and others. Bodhisattva Vasubandhu (世親菩薩, Shi Qin Pu Sa) debated with the students of Samkhya (數論, Shu Lun) in ancient East India. They established twenty-five principles (二十五諦, er shi wu di), saying that the great earth and so on are permanent, and there is no moment-to-moment arising and ceasing now. They extensively narrated their school. The monk refuted, saying that there must be cessation now, because there will be cessation in the future when the kalpa is destroyed. According to the previous statement, there is cessation. The heretics refuted, saying that there will definitely be no cessation in the future, because there is no cessation now, like the mountains now. At that time, the monk was unable to answer. Seeing this, the king believed in and accepted the Samkhya heretics, and humiliated the monk, making him ride a donkey, etc. Then that heretic wrote a treatise of seventy verses for the king. The king rewarded him with a thousand gold coins to promote it. So the current 'Golden Seventy Treatise' (金七十論, Jin Qi Shi Lun) came about in this way. Vasubandhu then wrote the 'Treatise on the First Principle' (第一義諦論, Di Yi Yi Di Lun), also called the 'Seventy Treatise on the Supreme Truth' (勝義七十論, Sheng Yi Qi Shi Lun), to counter their treatise and refute the heretics' claims. They cannot refute, because the thesis, reason, and analogy all have faults, which our monks do not have. Moreover, the reason you establish has the fault of 'one at a time'. Who says that because there is no cessation now, there will be no cessation in the future? Our monks only say that the dharmas such as the great earth must have transformation and cessation before, because there will be cessation in the future, like the flame of a lamp, etc. You do not understand the measure, you are not our monks. At that time, the king then spread Vasubandhu's treatise throughout various regions. No one could refute him. So they dug up the bones of the former kings and those who proved the doctrines of the Samkhya heretics, or made people out of grass to simulate the debate.

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彼時眾而加撻之。此非世親之師。世親認取為師。又為親所教師。如意論師有大名譽。聰明博學。每共王等坐時。常舉一足恒下一足。下足意在敬王。舉足意在踐履小乘．外道論師頂上。時無人當者。王甚憚之。后王因夢令人佔之。占者言王必獲奇獸。后得伏藏。王遂遊獵逢白野豬。特異恒獸。王以為夢應。尋之失跡。遂問諸人。有知跡者賜金千斤。有一貧人遂視豬跡。因賜千金。遂命史官書王寬惠。如意論師乃競此名。令人剔發不欲令痛。婆羅門中有淨髮種遂為剃之。論師不覺入睡。睡覺問彼人言發已凈也。彼人答言我已凈訖。論師以能淨髮遂賜千金。亦命吏官書其寬惠。論師德望既高。賜奉彌厚。故多財物。王復痼嫉方欲掠僧。乃問論師曰。我不信佛汝實無知。論師答言。請世論師共我論議。王命五天一百論師共論之曰。若彼皆負我遂深信。論師乃難殺九十九人。至第一百人因言集．苦合言苦．集。諸人共證將為犯聲。論師乃曰。粗淺之間聲勢似犯。據其細理亦無失也。言因感果可先言集。王遂恥論師。命其史官依此實事具委書之。論師意憤乃白責曰。此舌何為牛群中語。遂自嚙舌落因而致死。故勝義七十亦為救之。彼明因果前後相生。亦有將為經部之義。大乘雖復認之。時人謂未入大乘時作。故傳世親菩薩老年

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 當時眾人就鞭打他。這個人不是Vasubandhu（世親，一位著名的佛教哲學家）的老師，但Vasubandhu卻認他為師，而且也是Vasubandhu親近的老師。如意論師（一個論師的名字）有很大的名聲，聰明博學。每次和國王等人坐在一起時，常常舉起一隻腳，總是放下一隻腳。放下腳的意思在於尊敬國王，舉起腳的意思在於踐踏小乘（Hinayana，一種佛教派別）、外道論師的頭頂。當時沒有人能抵擋他，國王非常害怕他。後來國王因為做夢，讓人占卜，占卜的人說國王必定會獲得奇異的野獸，之後會得到伏藏（隱藏的寶藏）。國王於是去遊獵，遇到一頭白色的野豬，特別不同於尋常的野獸。國王認為這是夢的應驗，尋找它卻失去了軌跡。於是問眾人，有知道軌跡的人賞賜黃金千斤。有一個貧窮的人於是檢視豬的軌跡，因此被賞賜千金。於是命令史官記載國王的寬厚恩惠。如意論師於是爭競這個名聲，讓人剃髮，不希望感到疼痛。婆羅門（Brahmin，印度教中的祭司階層）中有擅長淨髮的種姓，於是為他剃髮。論師不知不覺睡著了，醒來后問那個人說頭髮已經乾淨了嗎？那個人回答說我已經弄乾凈了。論師因為他能弄乾凈頭髮，於是賞賜千金，也命令史官記載他的寬厚恩惠。論師的德行和聲望已經很高，賞賜和供奉更加豐厚，所以有很多財物。國王又長期嫉妒，正想要掠奪僧人，於是問論師說：『我不相信佛，你實在沒有知識。』論師回答說：『請世間的論師和我一起論議。』國王命令五天（印度五個地區）的一百個論師一起和他論辯，說：『如果他們都輸了，我就深深地相信。』論師於是辯論駁倒了九十九人，到第一百人的時候，因為說了『集（Samudaya，佛教術語，意為「苦」的根源）、苦（Dukkha，佛教術語，意為「苦難」）』合起來就是『苦』、『集』。眾人共同指證他將要犯聲（違反語法規則）。論師於是說：『粗淺之間，聲音氣勢好像是犯了，根據其細微的道理，也沒有過失。說因感果，可以先說集。』國王於是羞辱論師，命令他的史官依據這個真實的事情詳細地記載下來。論師意憤，於是自己責備說：『這條舌頭為什麼像牛群中發出的聲音一樣？』於是自己咬斷舌頭而死。所以《勝義七十論》（Sāṃkhyakārikā，一種哲學著作）也爲了救他，說明因果前後相生。也有人認為這是經部（Sautrāntika，一個佛教派別）的義理。大乘（Mahayana，一種佛教派別）雖然也認可它，當時的人認為這是Vasubandhu菩薩未進入大乘時所作，所以流傳下來，是Vasubandhu菩薩老年時期的作品。

【English Translation】 English version: At that time, the crowd whipped him. This person was not the teacher of Vasubandhu (a famous Buddhist philosopher), but Vasubandhu recognized him as his teacher, and he was also a teacher close to Vasubandhu. The philosopher Ruyi (name of a philosopher) had a great reputation, being intelligent and erudite. Every time he sat with the king and others, he would often raise one foot and always put down one foot. Putting down the foot meant respecting the king, and raising the foot meant trampling on the heads of Hinayana (a Buddhist school) and heretical philosophers. At that time, no one could resist him, and the king was very afraid of him. Later, because the king had a dream, he had someone interpret it. The interpreter said that the king would definitely obtain a strange beast and then obtain a hidden treasure (a hidden treasure). The king then went hunting and encountered a white wild boar, which was particularly different from ordinary beasts. The king thought this was the fulfillment of the dream, but he lost track of it while searching. So he asked everyone, and anyone who knew the tracks would be rewarded with a thousand catties of gold. A poor man then looked at the pig's tracks and was rewarded with a thousand gold. So he ordered the historian to record the king's generosity and kindness. The philosopher Ruyi then competed for this reputation, asking someone to shave his hair, not wanting to feel pain. Among the Brahmins (the priestly class in Hinduism) there was a caste that was good at cleaning hair, so they shaved it for him. The philosopher fell asleep without realizing it, and when he woke up, he asked the person if the hair was clean. The person replied that he had cleaned it. Because the philosopher was able to clean the hair, he rewarded him with a thousand gold, and also ordered the historian to record his generosity and kindness. The philosopher's virtue and reputation were already very high, and the rewards and offerings were even more generous, so he had a lot of wealth. The king had long been jealous and was about to plunder the monks, so he asked the philosopher: 'I don't believe in the Buddha, you really have no knowledge.' The philosopher replied: 'Please let the worldly philosophers debate with me.' The king ordered a hundred philosophers from the five regions of India to debate with him, saying: 'If they all lose, I will deeply believe.' The philosopher then debated and defeated ninety-nine people. When it came to the hundredth person, because he said 'Samudaya (Buddhist term, meaning the origin of suffering), Dukkha (Buddhist term, meaning suffering)' together is 'suffering' and 'Samudaya'. Everyone jointly accused him of violating grammar rules. The philosopher then said: 'In a superficial sense, the sound and momentum seem to be a violation, but according to its subtle principles, there is no fault. Speaking of cause and effect, one can first speak of Samudaya.' The king then humiliated the philosopher and ordered his historian to record this true event in detail. The philosopher was indignant and blamed himself, saying: 'Why does this tongue sound like the sound from a herd of cows?' So he bit off his tongue and died. Therefore, the Sāṃkhyakārikā (a philosophical work) also tried to save him, explaining that cause and effect arise one after another. Some also consider this to be the meaning of the Sautrāntika (a Buddhist school). Although Mahayana (a Buddhist school) also recognizes it, people at that time thought that it was written by Bodhisattva Vasubandhu before he entered Mahayana, so it has been passed down as a work from Bodhisattva Vasubandhu's old age.

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已來。則遣人講自聽此論身猶廢忘。

今難陀．勝子等朋彼論勢遂復引證對法第三云。

論。無種已生集論說故。

述曰。謂無學最後蘊。此時種入過去。過去是無。當果不生。現種已滅唯有現行蘊在。名無種已生。此中文略。集論本但有無種已生之言。今釋家取以為證。瑜伽第五十六云。或有眼非眼界亦爾。此則引教。

論。種與芽等不俱有故。

述曰。此為理證。粗相因果為此例故　言果俱有者。此前後俱也　俱生俱滅者。二法俱有生有滅也。非謂因果同一時生一時滅。故瑜伽第五。然法與他性為因。及后自性為因。非即此念。長讀此文。兩法並非即此念故。

自下第二。

論。有義彼說至后種說故。

述曰。此說有四。一破前。二立理。三會違。四結正。此即初也。護法等釋。彼集論中據不能生后種說故。謂此時緣闕。現在種子。不能更引生后念種。非謂此念現行無種。種在過去名為無種。對法無解。此略解教。瑜伽準知。

論。種生芽等非勝義故。

述曰。此下比量對前師說。義準應知。又出前師所有過失。世俗因果雖復似然。非勝義故。不可以勝義種．現為例。或彼非因緣此是因緣。我不說彼故非勝義。

又汝所言種滅芽生。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 已（已經）來了。就派人講解，自己聽這部論著，身體都疲憊忘記了。 現在難陀（Nanda，人名）和勝子（Vijayasena，人名）等人，依仗他們的理論勢力，於是又引用《對法論》第三卷的說法： 論：沒有種子，已經產生，這是《集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）所說的。 述曰：指的是無學（Arhat，佛教修行最高果位）的最後蘊（skandha，構成個體經驗的五種要素）。這個時候，種子已經進入過去。過去是『無』。未來的果不會產生。現在的種子已經滅盡，只有現在的行蘊（samskara-skandha，意志和心理活動）存在。這叫做『沒有種子，已經產生』。這裡文字省略了。《集論》原本只有『沒有種子，已經產生』這句話。現在的解釋者拿來作為證據。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十六卷說：『或者有眼非眼界也是這樣。』這是引用經教。 論：種子和芽等不同時存在，所以（不能作為現行和種子的例子）。 述曰：這是理證。粗顯的因果關係可以作為這個例子的說明。說果同時存在，指的是前後同時。俱生俱滅，指的是兩種法同時產生同時滅亡。不是說因果同一時間產生同一時間滅亡。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五卷說，法以他性為因，以及後來的自性為因，不是指這一個念頭。仔細閱讀這段文字。兩種法並非指這一個念頭。 下面是第二部分。 論：有的人說，（《集論》）是根據不能產生後來的種子而說的。 述曰：這裡說了四點。一是破斥前面的觀點，二是建立道理，三是調和矛盾，四是總結歸正。這是第一點。護法（Dharmapala，人名）等人的解釋是，《集論》中是根據不能產生後來的種子而說的。指的是這個時候因緣缺失，現在的種子不能再引發產生後來的念頭種子。不是說這個念頭的現行沒有種子，種子在過去叫做『沒有種子』。《對法論》沒有這樣的解釋。這裡簡略地解釋了經教。《瑜伽師地論》可以參照理解。 論：種子產生芽等不是勝義諦（paramartha-satya，最高真理），所以（不能作為現行和種子的例子）。 述曰：下面用比量來反駁前面論師的說法。其中的含義應該知道。又指出了前面論師所有的過失。世俗的因果雖然看起來相似，但不是勝義諦，所以不能用勝義諦的種子和現行來作為例子。或者他們不是因緣，而我們這是因緣。我不說他們，所以不是勝義諦。 還有你說種子滅了，芽就產生了。

【English Translation】 English version: Having already arrived, he sent people to explain, and he himself listened to this treatise, his body becoming weary and forgetting everything. Now Nanda (name of a person) and Vijayasena (name of a person) and others, relying on the strength of their theories, then quoted the third volume of the Abhidharma texts: Thesis: There is no seed, already produced, as stated in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma). Commentary: This refers to the last skandha (aggregate, the five elements constituting individual experience) of an Arhat (one who has attained the highest state of enlightenment in Buddhism). At this time, the seed has already entered the past. The past is 'non-existent'. The future result will not arise. The present seed has already been extinguished, and only the present samskara-skandha (aggregate of mental formations, volition and psychological activities) exists. This is called 'no seed, already produced'. The text here is abbreviated. The Abhidharmasamuccaya originally only had the phrase 'no seed, already produced'. Present-day commentators take this as evidence. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) Volume 56 says: 'Or there is an eye that is not the eye realm, and so on.' This is quoting scripture. Thesis: Seeds and sprouts, etc., do not exist simultaneously, therefore (they cannot be used as examples of current activity and seeds). Commentary: This is a logical proof. The coarse cause and effect relationship can be used as an illustration of this example. Saying that the results exist simultaneously refers to the simultaneous existence of before and after. 'Co-arising and co-ceasing' refers to two dharmas (phenomena, elements of existence) arising and ceasing simultaneously. It does not mean that cause and effect arise and cease at the same time. Therefore, Yogacarabhumi-sastra Volume 5 says that a dharma takes otherness as its cause, and later its own nature as its cause, not referring to this one thought. Read this passage carefully. The two dharmas do not refer to this one thought. The following is the second part. Thesis: Some say that (the Abhidharmasamuccaya) speaks of not being able to produce later seeds. Commentary: Here, four points are made. First, refuting the previous view; second, establishing the principle; third, reconciling contradictions; and fourth, summarizing and correcting. This is the first point. Dharmapala's (name of a person) and others' explanation is that the Abhidharmasamuccaya speaks of not being able to produce later seeds. This refers to the fact that at this time, the conditions are lacking, and the present seed can no longer cause the production of later seeds of thought. It does not mean that the present activity of this thought has no seed; the seed in the past is called 'no seed'. The Abhidharma texts do not have this explanation. This is a brief explanation of the scriptures. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra can be consulted for understanding. Thesis: The production of sprouts from seeds, etc., is not ultimate truth (paramartha-satya, the highest truth), therefore (they cannot be used as examples of current activity and seeds). Commentary: Below, the argument is used to refute the previous teacher's statement. The meaning should be understood. It also points out all the faults of the previous teacher. Although worldly cause and effect appear similar, they are not ultimate truth, so the seed and present activity of ultimate truth cannot be used as examples. Or they are not causes and conditions, while we are causes and conditions. I am not talking about them, so it is not ultimate truth. Also, you say that when the seed is extinguished, the sprout is produced.

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論。種滅芽生非極成故。

述曰。又種與芽初時俱有。后漸增長相生。展轉可為異時。初生之時同念轉故。又如青蓮根生芽必俱故。又如影生等。又汝所說種滅芽生是因緣者。此非極成。我不許故。

論。焰炷同時互為因故。

述曰。如燈炷生焰既許同時。為彼不定。其義可知。

論。然種自類至決定俱有。

述曰。二立理有二。初標宗。后引證。實種自類相生不俱。若生現行決定俱有。

所以得知。

論。故喻伽說至是因緣義。

述曰。三引證也。彼論第五說種子七義。現行望種名不相似。或能．不能緣。或礙．不礙等名為異類。種子自望名為同類。

此大法師以六．七望本識。是異類故同念生。五根等名同類故異念生者。不然。

論。自性言顯至互為因義。

述曰。釋瑜伽文義如上說。

論。攝大乘說至俱時而有。

述曰。又攝論說。藏識染法互為因緣非異時故。即第二卷。

論。又說種子至定非前後。

述曰。攝論第二。六義中說。種子與果必俱時故定非前後。應生分別。至下斷惑轉依中敘。然異念生。如前第二卷破異時因果中說。同時無妨　問如勝義七十論異時因果如何會釋　答非但彼處。

論。設

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：種子滅后，新芽才生長出來，這並非是絕對成立的道理。

述曰：種子和新芽最初是同時存在的，之後逐漸增長，相互產生，可以認為是不同時期的狀態。但在最初生長的時候，它們是同時生起的。又如青蓮的根和芽必然同時存在。又如影像的產生等。而且，你所說的種子滅后新芽才生長出來，是因緣所生，這並非是絕對成立的，我不認可這種說法。

論：火焰和燈芯同時存在，並且相互作為原因。

述曰：就像燈芯產生火焰，既然允許它們同時存在，那麼燈芯和火焰之間的關係就是不確定的，這個道理是可以理解的。

論：然而，種子和同類的種子，直到最終結果產生，都是同時存在的。

述曰：這裡建立論證有兩個步驟：首先是提出論點，然後是引用證據。實際上，種子和同類的種子相互產生，並非同時。如果是產生現行（指已經顯現的結果），那麼一定是同時存在的。

如何得知這一點呢？

論：所以《瑜伽師地論》中說，這就是因緣的意義。

述曰：這是第三個步驟，引用證據。《瑜伽師地論》第五卷中說了種子的七種意義。現行相對於種子來說，被稱為不相似，或者能作為緣，或者不能作為緣，或者有障礙，或者沒有障礙等，這些都屬於異類。種子自身相互比較，被稱為同類。

現在有大法師用六識、七識來比望阿賴耶識（本識），認為六識、七識是異類，所以與阿賴耶識同時生起。五根等是同類，所以與阿賴耶識不同時生起。這種說法是不對的。

論：『自性』這個詞語，顯示了相互作為原因的意義。

述曰：解釋《瑜伽師地論》的文義如上所述。

論：《攝大乘論》中說，藏識和染法相互作為因緣，不是不同時產生的。

述曰：這是《攝大乘論》第二卷的內容。

論：又說種子和果實必定是同時存在的，所以一定不是前後關係。

述曰：這是《攝大乘論》第二卷，在六種意義中說的。種子和果實必定是同時存在的，所以一定不是前後關係。應該進行分別，直到下文斷除疑惑、轉依的部分再敘述。然而，不同念頭產生，就像前面第二卷中破斥異時因果時所說的那樣，同時產生是沒有妨礙的。問：如果按照勝義諦的《七十論》，異時因果應該如何解釋？答：不僅僅是那個地方。

論：假設

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: The destruction of a seed and the subsequent growth of a sprout is not an absolute truth.

Commentary: Furthermore, the seed and the sprout exist simultaneously at the beginning. They gradually grow and produce each other, which can be considered as different stages. However, at the time of initial growth, they arise simultaneously. Also, like the root and sprout of a blue lotus, they must exist together. Also, like the arising of a shadow, etc. Moreover, your statement that the seed is destroyed and then the sprout grows, being caused by conditions, is not an absolute truth. I do not accept this statement.

Treatise: The flame and the wick exist simultaneously and are mutual causes.

Commentary: Just as the wick produces the flame, since it is allowed that they exist simultaneously, then the relationship between the wick and the flame is uncertain. The meaning of this is understandable.

Treatise: However, seeds and seeds of the same kind exist simultaneously until the final result is determined.

Commentary: There are two steps to establishing this argument: first, state the proposition, and then cite evidence. In reality, seeds and seeds of the same kind produce each other, but not simultaneously. If it is the production of manifest phenomena (referring to the result that has already appeared), then it must be simultaneous.

How is this known?

Treatise: Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that this is the meaning of dependent origination.

Commentary: This is the third step, citing evidence. The fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra speaks of the seven meanings of seeds. The manifest phenomenon is called dissimilar in relation to the seed, or it can be a condition, or it cannot be a condition, or there is an obstacle, or there is no obstacle, etc. These all belong to different categories. Seeds compared to each other are called the same category.

Now, there are great Dharma masters who compare the six consciousnesses and the seventh consciousness to the Alaya-vijnana (store consciousness), believing that the six consciousnesses and the seventh consciousness are different categories, so they arise simultaneously with the Alaya-vijnana. The five roots, etc., are the same category, so they do not arise simultaneously with the Alaya-vijnana. This statement is incorrect.

Treatise: The word 'self-nature' shows the meaning of being mutual causes.

Commentary: The explanation of the meaning of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra is as described above.

Treatise: The Mahayanasamgraha says that the Alaya-vijnana and defiled dharmas are mutual causes and conditions, not arising at different times.

Commentary: This is the content of the second volume of the Mahayanasamgraha.

Treatise: It also says that seeds and fruits must exist simultaneously, so they are definitely not in a before-and-after relationship.

Commentary: This is said in the second volume of the Mahayanasamgraha, in the six meanings. Seeds and fruits must exist simultaneously, so they are definitely not in a before-and-after relationship. There should be distinctions made, and it will be narrated further in the section on cutting off doubts and transformation of the basis. However, different thoughts arise, just as it was said in the previous second volume when refuting the cause and effect of different times, simultaneous arising is not an obstacle. Question: If according to the Samkhyakarika (Saptati), the cause and effect of different times, how should it be explained? Answer: Not only in that place.

Treatise: Suppose

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有處說至隨轉理門。

述曰。三會諸文也。隨經部師異時因果。非為正理。

論。如是八識至種子所依。

述曰。四結正。此通有漏無漏皆有。

次第二依有四師解。

論。次俱有依至必有彼故。

述曰。此即難陀等義。于中有三。初解五依。次七．八依。后第六依。初文有二。先立宗。后引證。此立宗也　言次者。第二故　言有作是說。此不正故。此說眼等以第六識為俱有依。五現行時必有彼故。何以知者。如解深密經．第七十六說。眼識俱隨行。同時同境有分別意識轉等。又五十五云．有分別．無分別心。應言同緣現在境。何以故然。彼自答言。由三因故。一極明瞭。若不同緣意不明故。二于彼作意。本欲緣此故須同緣。若彼不於此同緣者。應非作意。三依資養。謂養五識導令生故。設雖定中聞外聲等。意不得緣。耳不聞聲。必有意識與彼同緣。以彼劣故。

論。無別眼等至即種子故。

述曰。此師意說。無別凈色大種所造為眼等根。根體即是識種子故。

論。二十唯識至佛說彼為十。

述曰。下引教證。世親所造二十唯識彼自釋言。世尊說此十二處教。應受有情無我教者。便能趣入數取趣無我。彼論護法為釋。頌雖二十長行亦世親自作。即舊真

【現代漢語翻譯】 有處說到隨轉理門。

述曰：這是指三會（Trikāya，佛的三身）諸經文所說。隨順經部師的異時因果，並非真正的道理。

論：如是八識（Eight Consciousnesses）乃至種子所依。

述曰：這是第四個總結。這裡指的是有漏（with outflows）和無漏（without outflows）都具有的。

其次，關於第二依（second dependence condition）有四位論師的解釋。

論：次俱有依（co-existent dependence condition）乃至必有彼故。

述曰：這是難陀（Nanda）等人的觀點。其中有三個部分。首先解釋五依（five dependence conditions），其次是七、八依，最後是第六依（sixth consciousness as dependence condition）。第一部分分為兩個部分：先立宗（establish the thesis），后引證（cite evidence）。這裡是立宗。『次者』，指的是第二。『言有作是說』，這是不正確的。這種說法認為眼等以第六識為俱有依，因為五識現行時必定有第六識。為什麼知道呢？如《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra）第七十六說，眼識俱隨行，同時同境有分別意識轉等。又第五十五云，有分別、無分別心，應言同緣現在境。為什麼這樣說呢？經中自己回答說，由三個原因：一、極明瞭，如果不同緣，意識就不明瞭；二、于彼作意，本來想要緣這個，所以必須同緣，如果不同緣，就不應該有作意；三、依資養，指的是滋養五識，引導它們產生。假設即使在禪定中聽到外面的聲音等，意識也不能緣，耳朵聽不到聲音，必定有意識與它同緣，因為它很弱。

論：無別眼等乃至即種子故。

述曰：這位論師的意思是說，沒有別的清凈色大種所造的眼等根，根的本體就是識的種子。

論：二十唯識（Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only）乃至佛說彼為十。

述曰：下面引用教證。世親（Vasubandhu）所造的《二十唯識》，他自己解釋說，世尊說這十二處教（twelve sense bases），應該接受有情無我（no-self）的教導，這樣才能趣入數取趣無我（no-self of the aggregates）。護法（Dharmapāla）論師為這部論作了解釋。雖然頌只有二十個，但長行也是世親自己寫的，就是舊的真諦（Paramārtha）所翻譯的版本。

【English Translation】 It speaks of the 'gate of reason that follows along'.

Commentary: This refers to the various texts of the Trikāya (Three Bodies of the Buddha). Following the heterodox causality of the Sautrāntika school is not the correct principle.

Treatise: Thus, the eight consciousnesses (Eight Consciousnesses) up to the seed's support.

Commentary: This is the fourth conclusion. This refers to both with outflows (āsrava) and without outflows (anāsrava).

Next, regarding the second dependence condition (second dependence condition), there are four teachers' explanations.

Treatise: Next, the co-existent dependence condition (co-existent dependence condition) up to 'it must exist because of that'.

Commentary: This is the view of Nanda and others. There are three parts to it. First, explain the five dependence conditions (five dependence conditions), second, the seven and eight dependence conditions, and finally the sixth dependence condition (sixth consciousness as dependence condition). The first part is divided into two parts: first establish the thesis (establish the thesis), then cite evidence (cite evidence). This is establishing the thesis. 'Next' refers to the second. 'It is said that' is incorrect. This statement believes that the eye, etc., take the sixth consciousness as the co-existent dependence condition, because when the five consciousnesses are manifest, the sixth consciousness must be present. How do we know this? As the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra), verse seventy-six, says, the eye consciousness accompanies, and at the same time, in the same realm, there is a discriminating consciousness turning, etc. Also, verse fifty-five says, 'discriminating and non-discriminating minds' should be said to cognize the present realm together. Why is this so? The sutra itself answers that it is due to three reasons: first, extreme clarity; if they do not cognize together, the consciousness will not be clear; second, attention to that; originally wanting to cognize this, so they must cognize together; if they do not cognize together, there should be no attention; third, reliance on nourishment, referring to nourishing the five consciousnesses, guiding them to arise. Suppose even if one hears external sounds, etc., in samādhi (samādhi), the consciousness cannot cognize, and if the ear does not hear the sound, there must be a consciousness cognizing with it, because it is weak.

Treatise: There is no separate eye, etc., up to 'it is the seed'.

Commentary: This teacher's meaning is that there are no separate pure color great elements that create the eye, etc., the essence of the root is the seed of consciousness.

Treatise: Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only) up to 'the Buddha said they are ten'.

Commentary: Below, cite scriptural evidence. The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only created by Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu), he himself explained that the World Honored One said that these twelve sense bases (twelve sense bases) should accept the teaching of no-self (no-self) for sentient beings, so that they can enter the no-self of the aggregates (no-self of the aggregates). Dharmapāla (Dharmapāla) wrote an explanation for this treatise. Although there are only twenty verses, the prose was also written by Vasubandhu himself, which is the version translated by the old Paramārtha (Paramārtha).

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諦．菩提流支所翻唯識論是。彼乃有二十四頌。文言剩也。此頌即彼第十一頌。依今新本第八頌也　自種生者。此師意說。見分．相分俱名自種。下準此釋　自有三種。一因緣。自即見分種。二所緣緣。自即相分種。此二下文並有自義。三增上緣。自能感五識之業種也。下護法救業為根故　十者。十色處。古論頌云故佛說此二非也。

論。彼頌意說至即五識種。

述曰。為成十二處。為破外道有實我故。說五識種子名五色根。實無別根。即識種子名五根故。五識種子三釋。如前境不離識可許彼有。根離識故不別說有　五識相分。即色等塵。

論。觀所緣論至無始互為因。

述曰。觀所緣論陳那菩薩所造。破小乘等心外境有成所緣緣。彼有八頌。此第八頌。如下自解。釋頌功能亦如自種各有三種。一見分種。二相分種。三業種。準前解頌有三義配。

論。彼頌意說至無別眼等。

述曰。彼觀所緣頌中意說。第八識上有生眼等色識種子。不須分別見分．相分。但總說言。由現行識變似色塵等。故說此識名為色識。即此種子名眼等根。能生現識故。生色識故。名色功能言內色根。非體是色。故說現識名為色識　又見分識變似色故名為色識　或相分色不離識故名為色識　或相分名色。見

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這是菩提流支（Bodhiruci，譯者名）所翻譯的《唯識論》中的內容。該論有二十四頌，文字較為繁瑣。這裡所引用的頌是其中的第十一頌，相當於現在新版本的第八頌。「自種生者」，這位論師的意思是說，見分和相分都可以稱為「自種」。下面的解釋也遵循這個原則。「自有三種」，第一種是因緣，這裡的「自」指的是見分的種子；第二種是所緣緣，這裡的「自」指的是相分的種子。這兩者在下文中都包含「自」的含義。第三種是增上緣，指的是能夠感生五識的業種子。下文護法（Dharmapala，論師名）的解釋以業為根本原因。「十者」，指的是十色處。舊論的頌文中說「故佛說此二非也」，是不正確的。

論：那首頌的意思是說……直到五識的種子。

述記：爲了成就十二處，爲了破斥外道認為有真實「我」的觀點，所以說五識的種子名為五色根。實際上並沒有單獨的根，而是識的種子被稱為五根。五識的種子有三種解釋，如同前面所說，境界不離識，可以允許它們存在。根離開了識，所以不單獨說明它們的存在。五識的相分，就是色等塵境。

論：觀察所緣論……直到無始互相為因。

述記：《觀所緣論》是陳那菩薩（Dignāga，古印度佛教論師）所造，用來破斥小乘等認為心外有境，從而成立所緣緣。該論有八頌，這裡是第八頌，如下文的自解。解釋頌的功能也像「自種」一樣各有三種：第一是見分的種子，第二是相分的種子，第三是業的種子。按照前面的解釋，這首頌有三種含義可以對應。

論：那首頌的意思是說……直到沒有別的眼等。

述記：那首《觀所緣頌》中的意思是說，第八識上有產生眼等色識的種子，不需要分別見分和相分，只需要總的說，由於現行識變現出類似色塵等，所以說這個識名為色識。即這個種子名為眼等根，能夠產生現識，因為產生色識，所以稱為色功能，指的是內在的色根，但本體不是色。所以說現識名為色識。又，見分識變現得像色，所以名為色識。或者，相分色不離識，所以名為色識。或者，相分名為色，見分名為識。

【English Translation】 English version: This is from the Vijnaptimatrata-sastra (Treatise on Consciousness-Only) translated by Bodhiruci (translator's name). That treatise has twenty-four verses, and the wording is rather verbose. The verse quoted here is the eleventh verse in that treatise, which corresponds to the eighth verse in the current new version. 'Self-seed born' means, according to this teacher, that both the seeing-aspect (dṛśya-bhāga) and the appearing-aspect (ākāra-bhāga) can be called 'self-seed'. The following explanations also follow this principle. 'Self has three types': the first is the cause-condition (hetu-pratyaya), where 'self' refers to the seed of the seeing-aspect; the second is the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya), where 'self' refers to the seed of the appearing-aspect. Both of these contain the meaning of 'self' in the following text. The third is the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya), which refers to the karma-seed that can generate the five consciousnesses. The following explanation by Dharmapala (teacher's name) takes karma as the fundamental cause. 'Ten' refers to the ten sense-fields (dasa-rupa-ayatana). The old treatise's verse says 'therefore the Buddha said these two are not', which is incorrect.

Treatise: The meaning of that verse is... until the seeds of the five consciousnesses.

Commentary: In order to accomplish the twelve sense-fields, and in order to refute the externalist view that there is a real 'self', it is said that the seeds of the five consciousnesses are called the five sense-organs (pañca-indriya). In reality, there are no separate organs; rather, the seeds of consciousness are called the five organs. There are three explanations for the seeds of the five consciousnesses, as mentioned earlier: the realm is not separate from consciousness, so they can be allowed to exist. The organs are separate from consciousness, so their existence is not separately explained. The appearing-aspect of the five consciousnesses is the objects of sense, such as form, etc.

Treatise: The Examination of the Perceived Object... until beginningless mutual causes.

Commentary: The 'Examination of the Perceived Object' (Alambana-pariksa) was composed by Dignāga (ancient Indian Buddhist logician), to refute the Lesser Vehicle (Hinayana) and others who believe that there are objects outside of the mind, thereby establishing the object-condition. That treatise has eight verses, and this is the eighth verse, as explained below. The function of explaining the verse is also like 'self-seed', each having three types: the first is the seed of the seeing-aspect, the second is the seed of the appearing-aspect, and the third is the karma-seed. According to the previous explanation, this verse has three meanings that can correspond.

Treatise: The meaning of that verse is... until there are no separate eyes, etc.

Commentary: The meaning in that verse of the 'Examination of the Perceived Object' is that on the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) there are seeds that produce the eye and other form-consciousnesses. There is no need to distinguish between the seeing-aspect and the appearing-aspect; it is only necessary to say in general that because the manifest consciousness transforms into something resembling form-objects, this consciousness is called form-consciousness. That is, this seed is called the eye and other organs, which can produce manifest consciousness, because it produces form-consciousness, it is called the function of form, referring to the inner form-organ, but its substance is not form. Therefore, manifest consciousness is called form-consciousness. Also, the seeing-aspect consciousness transforms to resemble form, so it is called form-consciousness. Or, the appearing-aspect form is not separate from consciousness, so it is called form-consciousness. Or, the appearing-aspect is called form, and the seeing-aspect is called consciousness.

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分名識。此二同種故名色識種子　然前解者見．相別種。如彼論說。有二境色。一俱時見分識所變者。二前念識相為后識境。引本識中生似自果功能令起不違理故。即是前念相分所熏之種。生今現行之色識故。說前相是今識境。不用前識為今所緣。如親相分能生見分。有體影生名所緣者。前相亦然。有體為緣生今識相名為行相。故望今識亦為所緣。故頌中言功能與境色。境色即前色也。

論。種與色識至遞為因故。

述曰。釋頌下半。此說見分種名為五根。現行見分變似境色名為色識。與種互為因見分是能熏故　或相分現行亦是能熏。此種名眼等。與現行法互為因也。相色不離識名為色識。又此所言種與色識者。此亦無違。從前念說是今識境故名境色。此如頌說。據現在說名為色識。如長行說。故種與色識。常互為因等。即以現在更互為因。若說前念即是境色。即顯二念相似。種是一故。勘彼論說　若以此見分種與色識常互為因。境鬚根用故。境為緣有種子根。根鬚境用故。根為緣而變似境。名互為因。因者因由。非因緣義。色識是能熏。根種是所熏。互為能生遞為因故　此師意說。識種名根。識相名色。境無別實有。如第一卷已略敘計。以意識為前五俱有依。如解深密等經說故。無五色根。如二十唯識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 分名識。此二者同一種子，所以稱為名色識種子（nama-rupa-vijnana bija，構成存在的要素的種子）。然而，之前的解釋認為見分（darsana-bhaga，能見部分）和相分（nimitta-bhaga，所見部分）是不同的種子。正如《唯識論》（Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi）所說，有兩種境色（visaya-rupa，作為對象的色）：一是與見分識同時生起的識所變現的；二是前一念的識相（vijnana-nimitta）作為后一識的境界。這是因為前一念的識相，能從本識（alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）中引生類似其自身果的功能，使其生起，這並不違背道理。也就是說，前一念的相分所熏習的種子，產生了現在正在執行的色識（rupa-vijnana，對色的認知）。因此說前一念的相分是現在識的境界。這裡並不需要前一識作為現在識所緣的對象。如同親相分（pratyaksha-nimitta-bhaga，直接的相分）能夠產生見分一樣，有實體的影像生起，被稱為所緣（alambana，對像）。前一念的相分也是如此，有實體作為緣，產生現在識的相分，稱為行相（akara，作用）。所以，對於現在的識來說，前一念的相分也是所緣。因此頌文中說『功能與境色』，境色就是指前一念的色。

論：種子與色識，互相遞為因緣。

述曰：解釋頌文的下半部分。這裡說見分的種子被稱為五根（panca-indriya，五種感覺器官）。現在執行的見分變現出類似境界的色，被稱為色識。見分與種子互為因緣，因為見分是能熏習的。或者，相分的現行也是能熏習的。這種子被稱為眼等（caksu-adi，眼根等）。與現行法互為因緣。相色不離識，被稱為色識。而且，這裡所說的種子與色識，也沒有矛盾。從前一念來說，是現在識的境界，所以稱為境色。這就像頌文所說。根據現在來說，稱為色識，就像長行文所說。所以種子與色識，常常互相為因緣等，就是以現在互相為因緣。如果說前一念就是境色，就顯示出兩個念頭相似，種子是同一個。可以參考《唯識論》的說法。如果說這個見分的種子與色識常常互相為因緣，那麼境界需要根的作用，所以境界作為緣而有種子根。根需要境界的作用，所以根作為緣而變現出類似境界的色，這被稱為互相為因緣。因，是因由，不是因緣的意義。色識是能熏習的，根的種子是所熏習的，互相為能生，遞相為因緣。這位論師的意思是說，識的種子稱為根，識的相分稱為色，境界沒有另外真實的實體。正如第一卷已經簡略敘述的觀點。以意識（mano-vijnana，第六識）作為前五識的俱有依（sahabhu-asraya，共同的所依），正如《解深密經》（Samdhinirmocana Sutra）等經典所說，沒有五色根。如同《二十唯識論》（Vimsatika-vijnaptimatrata-siddhi）所說。

【English Translation】 English version Distinguishing Names and Consciousness. These two share the same seed, hence they are called seeds of name, form, and consciousness (nama-rupa-vijnana bija, seeds of the elements constituting existence). However, the previous explanation considered the seeing-aspect (darsana-bhaga, the seeing part) and the appearance-aspect (nimitta-bhaga, the seen part) as different seeds. As stated in the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only (Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi), there are two types of object-form (visaya-rupa, form as object): one is transformed by the consciousness that arises simultaneously with the seeing-aspect; the other is the appearance of the previous thought-moment's consciousness (vijnana-nimitta) serving as the object for the subsequent consciousness. This is because the appearance of the previous thought-moment can elicit from the storehouse consciousness (alaya-vijnana, the alaya consciousness) a function similar to its own result, causing it to arise, which is not contrary to reason. That is, the seed impressed by the appearance-aspect of the previous thought-moment produces the currently functioning form-consciousness (rupa-vijnana, cognition of form). Therefore, it is said that the appearance-aspect of the previous thought-moment is the object of the current consciousness. Here, the previous consciousness is not needed as the object cognized by the current consciousness. Just as the direct appearance-aspect (pratyaksha-nimitta-bhaga, direct appearance-aspect) can produce the seeing-aspect, with a substantial image arising, which is called the object cognized (alambana, object). The appearance-aspect of the previous thought-moment is also like this, with a substance serving as the condition, producing the appearance-aspect of the current consciousness, which is called the acting-aspect (akara, function). Therefore, for the current consciousness, the appearance-aspect of the previous thought-moment is also the object cognized. Hence, the verse says 'function and object-form,' where object-form refers to the form of the previous thought-moment.

Treatise: Seeds and form-consciousness are mutually causal.

Commentary: Explaining the latter half of the verse. Here, it is said that the seed of the seeing-aspect is called the five sense faculties (panca-indriya, five sense organs). The currently functioning seeing-aspect transforms into a form resembling the object, which is called form-consciousness. The seeing-aspect and the seed are mutually causal, because the seeing-aspect is the imprinter. Alternatively, the current functioning of the appearance-aspect is also the imprinter. This seed is called the eye faculty, etc. (caksu-adi, eye faculty, etc.). It is mutually causal with the currently functioning dharma. Form and color inseparable from consciousness are called form-consciousness. Moreover, there is no contradiction in what is said here about seeds and form-consciousness. From the perspective of the previous thought-moment, it is the object of the current consciousness, so it is called object-form. This is as the verse says. According to the present, it is called form-consciousness, as the extended passage says. Therefore, seeds and form-consciousness are constantly mutually causal, etc., that is, they are mutually causal in the present. If it is said that the previous thought-moment is the object-form, it shows that the two thought-moments are similar, and the seed is the same. Refer to the explanation in the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only. If it is said that this seed of the seeing-aspect and form-consciousness are constantly mutually causal, then the object needs the function of the faculty, so the object serves as the condition for the seed-faculty. The faculty needs the function of the object, so the faculty serves as the condition and transforms into a form resembling the object, which is called mutually causal. 'Cause' means 'because of,' not the meaning of 'condition.' Form-consciousness is the imprinter, and the seed of the faculty is the imprinted, mutually generating, and causally related. The meaning of this master is that the seed of consciousness is called the faculty, the appearance-aspect of consciousness is called form, and there is no separate real entity in the object. As the view briefly described in the first volume. The mind-consciousness (mano-vijnana, the sixth consciousness) is taken as the co-existent basis (sahabhu-asraya, common basis) of the first five consciousnesses, as stated in the Sutra Unraveling the Thought (Samdhinirmocana Sutra) and other scriptures, there are no five physical sense faculties. As stated in the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (Vimsatika-vijnaptimatrata-siddhi).

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等。

論。第七八識至自力勝故。

述曰。七．八二識無此俱依。恒相續自力起。不假俱有根。故諸論說言由有阿賴耶故有未那者。此由根本。非為俱有依。

論。第六意識至而得起故。

述曰。第六別有此俱有依。即第七識。何以爾者。自體間斷要托末那方得起故　問何故不託第八為依　彼不相順。第七有時相順與勢故　問何不依五識　五識無時此亦有故。不假方生故。

論。有義彼說至應成雜亂。

述曰。下文有二。初破前說。后申正義　初中有三。一總非。二別非。三結非　理教相違。是總非也　別非有三。一非五。二非六。三非七。初中又二。初非。後會。若教若理二皆違故。即安惠等諸師所說。雖實無色似色等現。就此為難。下皆準知　初非五中有二。初申十難。后總結非　初十難中。第一諸界雜亂難。瑜伽五十一。云惡叉聚喻十八界種　又五十六云。云何種種界。謂十八界展轉異相性。云何非一界等。乃至廣說　攝事分中言十八界種子各別　對法第一說種隨現即彼界攝。故種成雜亂失。又色種非識種。故成雜亂。

論。然十八界至處處說故。

述曰。如前已說自下第二二種俱非難。

論。又五識種至名眼等根。

述曰。此定問也。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

論：第七、八識是由於自身的力量而強大。

述曰：第七識和第八識沒有這種俱有依。它們恒常相續，依靠自身的力量生起，不依賴於俱有的根。因此，各種論典說，由於有阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna，藏識，根本識），所以有末那識（Manas-vijñāna，意識）。這是由於根本識的原因，而不是作為俱有依。

論：第六意識要依賴第七識才能生起。

述曰：第六意識特別有這種俱有依，就是第七識。為什麼這樣說呢？因為第六意識的自體有間斷，必須要依靠末那識才能生起。問：為什麼不依靠第八識作為依呢？因為第八識不與第六識相順。第七識有時與第六識相順，並且有勢力。問：為什麼不依靠前五識呢？因為前五識有時沒有，而第六識有時有。第六識不依賴前五識就能生起。

論：有人說，如果這樣，就會造成雜亂。

述曰：下面有兩部分。首先破斥前面的說法，然後闡述正確的意義。首先破斥前面的說法，其中有三點：一是總的否定，二是分別否定，三是總結否定。理和教義相違背，這是總的否定。分別否定有三點：一是否定前五識，二是否定第六識，三是否定第七識。在否定前五識中，又有兩點：一是闡述十難，二是總結否定。如果按照教義和道理，二者都相違背。這是安慧等諸位論師所說的。雖然實際上沒有色，但顯現出類似色的東西。就此進行責難，下面都依此準則來理解。在否定前五識中，有兩點：一是闡述十難，二是總結否定。在最初的十難中，第一是諸界雜亂難。《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷說，惡叉聚（Akṣa-prakarana，骰子）比喻十八界種。又第五十六卷說，什麼是種種界？就是十八界展轉異相性。什麼不是一界等？乃至廣說。《攝事分》中說，十八界種子各不相同。《對法論》第一說，種子隨現，即屬於那個界。因此，種子會造成雜亂的過失。而且色種不是識種，所以會造成雜亂。

論：然而，十八界在很多地方都有說明。

述曰：如前面已經說過，下面第二是兩種俱非難。

論：又前五識的種子，名為眼等根。

述曰：這是確定的問難。

【English Translation】 English version:

Treatise: The seventh and eighth consciousnesses are strong due to their own power.

Commentary: The seventh and eighth consciousnesses do not have this co-existing basis. They are constantly continuous, arising from their own power, and do not rely on co-existing roots. Therefore, various treatises say that because there is Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness, fundamental consciousness), there is Manas-vijñāna (mind consciousness). This is due to the fundamental consciousness, not as a co-existing basis.

Treatise: The sixth consciousness relies on the seventh consciousness to arise.

Commentary: The sixth consciousness specifically has this co-existing basis, which is the seventh consciousness. Why is this so? Because the sixth consciousness's own nature is intermittent and must rely on Manas-vijñāna to arise. Question: Why not rely on the eighth consciousness as a basis? Because the eighth consciousness is not in accordance with the sixth consciousness. The seventh consciousness is sometimes in accordance with the sixth consciousness and has power. Question: Why not rely on the first five consciousnesses? Because the first five consciousnesses sometimes do not exist, while the sixth consciousness sometimes does. The sixth consciousness can arise without relying on the first five consciousnesses.

Treatise: Some say that if this is the case, it will cause confusion.

Commentary: There are two parts below. First, refute the previous statement, and then elaborate on the correct meaning. First, refute the previous statement, which has three points: first, a general negation; second, a separate negation; and third, a concluding negation. Reason and doctrine contradict each other, which is a general negation. Separate negation has three points: first, negating the first five consciousnesses; second, negating the sixth consciousness; and third, negating the seventh consciousness. In negating the first five consciousnesses, there are two points: first, elaborating on the ten difficulties; and second, summarizing the negation. If according to doctrine and reason, the two contradict each other. This is what the masters such as Anhui said. Although there is actually no form, something similar to form appears. This is used as a criticism, and the following should be understood according to this principle. In negating the first five consciousnesses, there are two points: first, elaborating on the ten difficulties; and second, summarizing the negation. In the initial ten difficulties, the first is the difficulty of the confusion of the realms. Chapter 51 of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that Akṣa-prakarana (dice) is a metaphor for the seeds of the eighteen realms. Chapter 56 also says, what are the various realms? That is, the eighteen realms transform into different characteristics. What is not one realm, etc.? And so on. The Śrāvakabhūmi says that the seeds of the eighteen realms are different from each other. The first chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that the seed follows the manifestation and belongs to that realm. Therefore, the seed will cause the fault of confusion. Moreover, the form seed is not the consciousness seed, so it will cause confusion.

Treatise: However, the eighteen realms are explained in many places.

Commentary: As previously stated, the second below is the difficulty of both being non-existent.

Treatise: Also, the seeds of the first five consciousnesses are called the eye and other roots.

Commentary: This is a definite question.

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論。若見分種至應外處攝。

述曰。若即見種五根應識蘊攝。若相分種五根應外處攝。

五根非識蘊攝。即五十七二十二根中．及五十四云。色蘊攝十界處全故等　相分種者應外處攝。如五十五等解心．心所所依中。五根內處攝故　此即設許識．色異種而為此難。故不同前一種子難。又五十六界四句中雲。如眼非界等。如是一切內界亦爾等。

論。便違聖教王內處所攝。

述曰。如前已說。

自下第三四緣相違難。

論。又若五根至增上緣攝。

述曰。不應說為增上緣者。以識種子望于現識是因緣性。種子既即根。根望于識即非增上緣故。如瑜伽第三．第五十四．對法第五等說。

自下第四根．識系異難。

論。又鼻舌根至聖教相違。

述曰。對法第四云。謂四界．二處全．及餘一分是欲界系。四界者謂香．味．鼻．舌識。色界系中除前四界餘一分色界系。五十六云。四唯欲界系。十一唯欲．色二界系。故知鼻．舌根色界亦有。若識種即根。根應唯欲界系　或應二識通色界系。識種即根。彼有根故。明有現識。翻返二許。俱與教違。

論。眼耳身根至為難亦然。

述曰。以眼．耳．身根即三識種子。三識通二地。三根通五地。相望為難

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：如果見分（vijñāna-bhāga）的種子屬於五根，那麼它應該被歸入外處（bāhyāyatana）所攝。

述記：如果見分的種子就是五根，那麼五根應該被歸入識蘊（vijñāna-skandha）所攝。如果相分（nimitta-bhāga）的種子就是五根，那麼五根應該被歸入外處所攝。

五根並非識蘊所攝。正如《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷和第二十二根中，以及第五十四卷所說：『色蘊（rūpa-skandha）包含十界（daśa dhātava）和全部的處（āyatana）』等等。相分的種子應該被歸入外處所攝。正如第五十五卷等解釋心和心所（citta-caitta）所依之處時所說，五根屬於內處（ādhyātmikāyatana）所攝。這實際上是假設識和色是不同的種子而提出的詰難。因此，這與之前提出的同一種子的詰難不同。此外，第五十六卷關於界的四句中說：『例如眼不是界等等，同樣一切內界也是如此』等等。

論：這樣就違背了聖教，因為聖教說五根屬於內處所攝。

述記：正如前面已經說過的。

以下是第三個關於四緣（catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ）相違的詰難。

論：此外，如果五根是識的種子，那麼它們應該被歸入增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya）所攝。

述記：不應該說五根是增上緣，因為識的種子對於現識（vartamāna-vijñāna）來說是因緣（hetu-pratyaya）的性質。種子既然就是根，那麼根對於識來說就不是增上緣。正如《瑜伽師地論》第三卷、第五十四卷、《對法論》（Abhidharma）第五卷等所說。

以下是第四個關於根和識的系（bandhana）不同的詰難。

論：此外，鼻根（ghrāṇendriya）和舌根（jihvendriya）的系與聖教相違。

述記：《對法論》第四卷說：『所謂的四界（catasro dhātava）、兩個全部的處以及其餘一部分是欲界系（kāmadhātu-bandhana）。』四界指的是香（gandha）、味（rasa）、鼻識（ghrāṇa-vijñāna）和舌識（jihvā-vijñāna）。系中除了前面的四界，其餘一部分是系。第五十六卷說：『四者僅僅是欲界系，十一者僅僅是欲界和色界（rūpadhātu）二界系。』因此可知鼻根和舌根也有系。如果識的種子就是根，那麼根應該僅僅是欲界系，或者應該兩個識都通系。識的種子就是根，因為它們有根。表明有現識。反過來，兩種假設都與聖教相違背。

論：眼根（cakṣurindriya）、耳根（śrotrendriya）和身根（kāyendriya）的系，作為詰難也是如此。

述記：因為眼根、耳根和身根就是三個識的種子，這三個識通於二地（dve bhūmī），這三個根通於五地（pañca bhūmayaḥ），相互之間構成詰難。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: If the seed of the seeing-division (vijñāna-bhāga) belongs to the five roots, then it should be included within the scope of the external sense bases (bāhyāyatana).

Commentary: If the seed of the seeing-division is identical to the five roots, then the five roots should be included within the scope of the consciousness aggregate (vijñāna-skandha). If the seed of the object-division (nimitta-bhāga) is identical to the five roots, then the five roots should be included within the scope of the external sense bases.

The five roots are not included within the scope of the consciousness aggregate. As stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 57 and in the twenty-two roots, as well as in volume 54: 'The form aggregate (rūpa-skandha) includes the ten realms (daśa dhātava) and all of the sense bases (āyatana),' etc. The seed of the object-division should be included within the scope of the external sense bases. As explained in volume 55, etc., when discussing the basis of mind and mental factors (citta-caitta), the five roots belong to the internal sense bases (ādhyātmikāyatana). This is actually a challenge posed by assuming that consciousness and form are different seeds. Therefore, this is different from the previous challenge of the same seed. Furthermore, in volume 56, regarding the fourfold analysis of realms, it states: 'For example, the eye is not a realm, etc., similarly, all internal realms are also like that,' etc.

Treatise: This would contradict the sacred teachings, because the sacred teachings state that the five roots are included within the scope of the internal sense bases.

Commentary: As has been said before.

The following is the third challenge regarding the contradiction of the four conditions (catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ).

Treatise: Furthermore, if the five roots are the seeds of consciousness, then they should be included within the scope of the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya).

Commentary: It should not be said that the five roots are the dominant condition, because the seed of consciousness is of the nature of the causal condition (hetu-pratyaya) in relation to the manifest consciousness (vartamāna-vijñāna). Since the seed is identical to the root, then the root is not the dominant condition in relation to consciousness. As stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 3, volume 54, and the Abhidharma, volume 5, etc.

The following is the fourth challenge regarding the difference in the affiliation (bandhana) of the roots and consciousness.

Treatise: Furthermore, the affiliation of the nose root (ghrāṇendriya) and tongue root (jihvendriya) contradicts the sacred teachings.

Commentary: The Abhidharma, volume 4, states: 'The so-called four elements (catasro dhātava), two complete sense bases, and the remaining part are affiliated with the desire realm (kāmadhātu-bandhana).' The four elements refer to smell (gandha), taste (rasa), nose consciousness (ghrāṇa-vijñāna), and tongue consciousness (jihvā-vijñāna). Within the affiliation, apart from the preceding four elements, the remaining part is affiliated. Volume 56 states: 'Four are only affiliated with the desire realm, eleven are only affiliated with the desire realm and the form realm (rūpadhātu).' Therefore, it is known that the nose root and tongue root also have affiliation. If the seed of consciousness is identical to the root, then the root should only be affiliated with the desire realm, or both consciousnesses should be universally affiliated. The seed of consciousness is identical to the root, because they have roots. It indicates that there is manifest consciousness. Conversely, both assumptions contradict the sacred teachings.

Treatise: The affiliation of the eye root (cakṣurindriya), ear root (śrotrendriya), and body root (kāyendriya), as a challenge, is also the same.

Commentary: Because the eye root, ear root, and body root are the seeds of the three consciousnesses, these three consciousnesses are common to two planes (dve bhūmī), and these three roots are common to five planes (pañca bhūmayaḥ), constituting a challenge to each other.

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亦如前二。五十六云。幾唯欲界。幾唯欲系．色界系等文是。又五十六次下文。有上地無尋伺起眼識等難是。

自下第五根通三性難。

論。又五識種至非唯無記。

述曰。因種隨現既通善．惡眼等亦應非唯無記。種若唯無記。即五識體應不能感果　五根無記者。對法第四等云。八界八處全．餘一分是無記。八界處者。謂五色根．香．味．觸界處。余通善．惡故言一分。種隨現攝故通善．惡。此是共許。

自下第六根無執受難。

論。又五識種至非有執受。

述曰。執為自體能生覺受名為執受。種子即非。不爾便違種名執受。五識種是無執受。五根應非有執受攝。根即種故。瑜伽論五十六說幾執受．非執受。答五是執受。五種一分非執受。故與此相違。

自下第七五．七不齊難。

論。又五色根至為用法故。

述曰。若五根五識種。第六根應意識種。攝論第一以五色根為同法故。第六有別根。五識亦應有根。五識既以種子為根。意識應爾。何須別立。若立六識有現根者。五為同法例亦應然。

自下第八三依𨷂一難。

論。又瑜伽說至依但應二。

述曰。如瑜伽第一等說六識皆有三依。謂因緣依等。汝之五識依但應二。以種子為但有根故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

如同前面兩種情況一樣。《五十六卷》中說，『有多少唯是欲界，有多少唯是欲系』，等等的文字就是例證。另外，在第五十六卷接下來的文字中，有關於上地沒有尋伺卻能生起眼識等等的詰難。

下面是第五個詰難，關於根通三性：

論：又五識的種子……乃至並非唯是無記。

述記：因為種子隨其顯現，既能通於善、惡，那麼眼等五根也應該並非唯是無記。如果種子唯是無記，那麼五識的自體就應該不能感果。關於五根是無記的說法，《對法論》第四卷等處說，八界八處全部、其餘一分是無記。八界八處指的是五色根、香、味、觸界處。其餘的則通於善、惡，所以說是一分。種子隨其顯現而攝持，所以通於善、惡。這是共許的。

下面是第六個詰難，關於根無執受：

論：又五識的種子……乃至並非有執受。

述記：執，是自體能夠產生覺受，名為執受。種子就不是這樣。否則就違背了種子名為執受的說法。五識的種子是無執受的，那麼五根應該並非有執受所攝。因為根就是種子。瑜伽論第五十六卷說，有多少是執受、非執受？回答說，五是執受，五種一分是非執受。所以與此相違背。

下面是第七個詰難，關於五、七不齊：

論：又五色根……乃至爲了用法。

述記：如果五根和五識有種子，那麼第六根應該有意識的種子。《攝大乘論》第一卷以五色根為同法。第六有別的根，五識也應該有根。五識既然以種子為根，意識也應該這樣，何須另外建立？如果說六識有現根，那麼五識作為同法，也應該如此。

下面是第八個詰難，關於三依唯一：

論：又瑜伽論說……乃至所依應該只有二。

述記：如瑜伽論第一卷等處說，六識都有三依，即因緣依等。你的五識所依應該只有二，因為種子作為根，所以只有根。

【English Translation】 English version:

It's just like the previous two cases. Volume 56 says, 'How many are solely in the Desire Realm, and how many are solely bound by the Desire Realm,' and so on. Also, in the text following Volume 56, there are difficulties regarding the arising of eye consciousness without investigation and analysis in the higher realms.

Below is the fifth difficulty, concerning the roots being of the three natures:

Treatise: Furthermore, the seeds of the five consciousnesses... up to not being solely neutral.

Commentary: Because the seeds, according to their manifestation, can be both virtuous and non-virtuous, the five roots such as the eye should also not be solely neutral. If the seeds were solely neutral, then the essence of the five consciousnesses should not be able to produce results. Regarding the statement that the five roots are neutral, the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) Volume 4 and others say that eight realms and eight places are entirely neutral, and the remaining portion is neutral. The eight realms and places refer to the five sense faculties (five roots), and the realms and places of smell, taste, and touch. The remaining ones are connected to both virtuous and non-virtuous, so it is said to be a portion. Seeds are included according to their manifestation, so they are connected to both virtuous and non-virtuous. This is a commonly accepted view.

Below is the sixth difficulty, concerning the roots not having appropriation:

Treatise: Furthermore, the seeds of the five consciousnesses... up to not having appropriation.

Commentary: Appropriation (執受, zhi shou) means that the self-nature is able to produce sensation and experience. Seeds are not like this. Otherwise, it would contradict the statement that seeds are called appropriation. The seeds of the five consciousnesses do not have appropriation, so the five roots should not be included in those that have appropriation. Because the roots are the seeds. Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽論, Yu伽論) Volume 56 says, how many are appropriation and non-appropriation? The answer is that five are appropriation, and a portion of the five seeds are non-appropriation. Therefore, it contradicts this.

Below is the seventh difficulty, concerning the disparity between the five and the seven:

Treatise: Furthermore, the five sense faculties... up to for the sake of usage.

Commentary: If the five roots and the five consciousnesses have seeds, then the sixth root should have the seeds of consciousness. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, She Da Cheng Lun) Volume 1 uses the five sense faculties as the same dharma. The sixth has a separate root, and the five consciousnesses should also have roots. Since the five consciousnesses use seeds as roots, consciousness should also be like this, why establish it separately? If it is said that the six consciousnesses have manifest roots, then the five consciousnesses, as the same dharma, should also be like this.

Below is the eighth difficulty, concerning the three supports being only one:

Treatise: Furthermore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽論, Yu伽論) says... up to the supports should only be two.

Commentary: As the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽論, Yu伽論) Volume 1 and others say, the six consciousnesses all have three supports, namely the causal support, etc. Your five consciousnesses should only have two supports, because the seeds are the root, so there is only the root.

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與因緣根無別體故但應二。

第九諸根唯種子難。

論。又諸聖教至聖教相違。

述曰。如對法第一等說。眼界者謂曾．現見及此種子積集異熟等。若五色根即是種子。何容更言及此種子。乃至識界亦言現種。若謂五根唯種子者。則違如是一切聖教。諸識亦應唯種子妨。此等皆有無量教文。不能煩引。皆為比量。不能具作之。一一皆應出其理教。

此中引教粗略而已。自下第十假為他救難。于中有十。初敘救。

論。有避前來至善須瑜伽。

述曰。上難本宗。下難救義。此申難也。護法假朋二十唯識等文為本。避前來過設轉救之眼等五根非識種子。感識業種即是五根。故一無諸種雜。二無識蘊雜。三非外處雜。四無因緣雜。五無闕三依失。六無根唯種失。隨下諸解一一疏條無雜過色　妙符二頌。銷釋可知　善須瑜伽。無前說過。

論。彼有虛言至非無記故。

述曰。下安惠破。十難第一。此說不然業通善．惡性。根唯無記失。

論。又彼應非至唯內處故。

述曰。第二依身業色可有執受。聲．意二業無執受失　第三由業通身．語．意三故。根通色．行二蘊失　第四業通色．聲．法。意業法處攝故。根非唯內處失。

論。鼻舌唯應至五地系故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 與作為因緣的『根』（indriya）沒有不同的自體，所以應該只有兩種。

第九，關於諸『根』（indriya）僅僅是種子的難題。

論：而且，這與許多聖教，乃至聖教的表述相違背。

述記：如在《對法》第一等處所說：『眼界』（cakkhu-dhātu）是指曾經、現在所見的，以及這些種子的積集、異熟等等。如果五色『根』（pañca-indriya）就是種子，怎麼能再說『以及這些種子』呢？乃至『識界』（viññāṇa-dhātu）也說是現在的種子。如果說五『根』（pañca-indriya）僅僅是種子，那就違背了所有這些聖教。諸『識』（vijñāna）也應該僅僅是種子，這樣就有了妨礙。這些都有無量的教文，不能一一列舉。這些都是比量，不能完全製作出來。每一個都應該指出其理和教證。

這裡引用的教證只是粗略的。下面第十，假設他人來救，進行辯難。其中有十個方面。首先敘述救助的觀點。

論：有人爲了避免前面的過失，認為需要善巧地運用瑜伽。

述記：上面的辯難是針對本宗的，下面的辯難是針對救助的觀點。這是申述辯難。護法（Dharmapāla）假借朋友的《二十唯識》等文為依據，爲了避免前面的過失，假設轉變觀點，認為眼等五『根』（pañca-indriya）不是『識』（vijñāna）的種子，而是感生『識』（vijñāna）的業種子，就是五『根』（pañca-indriya）。所以，第一，沒有諸種雜亂的過失；第二，沒有與『識蘊』（vijñāna-skandha）雜亂的過失；第三，不是與外『處』（āyatana）雜亂的過失；第四，沒有與『因緣』（hetu-pratyaya）雜亂的過失；第五，沒有缺少三『依』（āśraya）的過失；第六，沒有『根』（indriya）僅僅是種子的過失。隨著下面的各種解釋，一一疏通條理，沒有雜亂的過失，巧妙地符合二頌，解釋說明可以知道。善巧地運用瑜伽，沒有前面的過失。

論：他們的說法是虛妄的，因為並非無記性。

述記：下面是安慧（Sthiramati）的破斥。這是十難中的第一個。這裡說，這樣說是不對的，『業』（karma）通於善、惡的性質，而『根』（indriya）僅僅是無記性，這是個過失。

論：而且，它們應該不是唯有內『處』（āyatana），因為……

述記：第二，依身『業』（karma）的色可以有執受，而聲、意二『業』（karma）沒有執受，這是個過失。第三，由於『業』（karma）通於身、語、意三者，所以『根』（indriya）通於色、行二『蘊』（skandha），這是個過失。第四，『業』（karma）通於色、聲、法，意『業』（karma）屬於法『處』（āyatana）所攝，所以『根』（indriya）並非唯有內『處』（āyatana），這是個過失。

論：鼻、舌應該僅僅是五地所繫縛的，因為……

【English Translation】 English version Since there is no separate entity from the 'roots' (indriya) as conditions, there should only be two.

Ninth, the difficulty of all 'roots' (indriya) being only seeds.

Treatise: Moreover, this contradicts many sacred teachings, even the expressions of sacred teachings.

Commentary: As stated in the first part of the Abhidharma, 'eye element' (cakkhu-dhātu) refers to what has been seen in the past and present, as well as the accumulation of these seeds, their resultant maturation, and so on. If the five sense 'roots' (pañca-indriya) are seeds, how can one further say 'as well as these seeds'? Even the 'consciousness element' (viññāṇa-dhātu) is said to be the present seed. If it is said that the five 'roots' (pañca-indriya) are only seeds, then this contradicts all these sacred teachings. The 'consciousnesses' (vijñāna) should also be only seeds, which is an obstacle. There are countless scriptural texts on these, which cannot be listed one by one. These are all inferences and cannot be fully elaborated. Each one should point out its reason and scriptural evidence.

The scriptural evidence cited here is only a rough outline. Below, in the tenth section, a hypothetical rescue is proposed, followed by refutation. There are ten aspects to this. First, the rescuing viewpoint is described.

Treatise: Some, in order to avoid the previous faults, think that skillful application of yoga is necessary.

Commentary: The above refutation is directed at our own school, and the following refutation is directed at the rescuing viewpoint. This is a statement of the refutation. Dharmapāla, relying on his friend's Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only and other texts, in order to avoid the previous faults, hypothetically changes the viewpoint, arguing that the five 'roots' (pañca-indriya) such as the eye are not seeds of 'consciousness' (vijñāna), but rather the seeds of karma that generate 'consciousness' (vijñāna) are the five 'roots' (pañca-indriya). Therefore, first, there is no fault of mixing various seeds; second, there is no fault of mixing with the 'consciousness aggregate' (vijñāna-skandha); third, there is no fault of mixing with external 'sense fields' (āyatana); fourth, there is no fault of mixing with 'causes and conditions' (hetu-pratyaya); fifth, there is no fault of lacking the three 'supports' (āśraya); sixth, there is no fault of the 'roots' (indriya) being only seeds. As the various explanations below unfold, each one is clarified and organized, without the fault of mixing, skillfully conforming to the two verses, and the explanation can be understood. Skillful application of yoga avoids the previous faults.

Treatise: Their statement is false, because it is not of an indeterminate nature.

Commentary: Below is Sthiramati's refutation. This is the first of the ten difficulties. Here it is said that this is not correct, 'karma' (karma) is of a nature that is both wholesome and unwholesome, while the 'roots' (indriya) are only of an indeterminate nature, which is a fault.

Treatise: Moreover, they should not be only internal 'sense fields' (āyatana), because...

Commentary: Second, the form of the 'karma' (karma) that relies on the body can be grasped, while the 'karma' (karma) of sound and mind cannot be grasped, which is a fault. Third, because 'karma' (karma) is connected to the three actions of body, speech, and mind, the 'roots' (indriya) are connected to the two 'aggregates' (skandha) of form and formations, which is a fault. Fourth, 'karma' (karma) is connected to form, sound, and mental objects, and mental 'karma' (karma) is included in the mental object 'sense field' (āyatana), so the 'roots' (indriya) are not only internal 'sense fields' (āyatana), which is a fault.

Treatise: The nose and tongue should only be bound by the five realms, because...

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述曰。第五鼻．舌唯欲失。三根非五地失。鼻．舌識業唯欲界系。眼．耳．身識業唯通二地故。此二．三識返難亦然。略而不述。

論。感意識業至非色根故。

述曰。七以五根為同法故。應同五識體即業種。第六意業即末那失　第七眼等無現失　第八業是色．聲．思。眼等應非色根失。體是色．聲．意所攝故。

論。又若正識至非為善救。

述曰。第九五識唯無記恒業所感失。彼復若言根雖是業種。此業未熟是故五識非唯無記者。第十善等五識既非業感。應無眼等為俱有依。如色．聲等。

此上別破等二師訖然護法論師假為此救。非用彼義。故下正義護法所說　即今西方正法藏等解此文云。護法菩薩業招眼等五色根勝。根從緣稱說彼為業。實有別根　下總破上二種計非。

論。又諸聖教至撥無色根。

述曰。聖說本識變似根等。汝撥為無便違聖教。謂解深密經．楞迦．中邊頌。識生變似義等。及七十六．並五十一．顯揚十七等。說識變根等。

論。許眼等識至深違教理。

述曰。何故許色眼識所變。不許五根為本識變。即迷本識及迷論文。謬執種子為五色根。以上破他。

論。然伽他說至即識業種。

述曰。二會前文雙解二頌。彼頌意

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述：第五，鼻識和舌識只在欲界才會失去。前三根（眼、耳、身）並非在五地（五種不同的禪定境界）都會失去。鼻識和舌識的業只與欲界相關。眼識、耳識和身識的業則通於二地（欲界和色界），因此，用這兩種或三種識來反駁也是一樣的，所以在此省略不述。

論：感受意識的業，乃至不是色根的緣故。

窺基法師述：第七，因為五根是同法，所以應該和五識的體性一樣，都是業的種子。第六，意識的業就是末那識（manas, 末那識）失去作用。第七，眼等（眼根等）沒有顯現的失去。第八，業是色、聲、思，眼等應該不是色根的緣故，因為它們的體性是被色、聲、意所包含的。

論：又如果正識，乃至不是好的救濟。

窺基法師述：第九，五識只是由無記（中性，非善非惡）的恒常業所感得才會失去作用。他們又說，根雖然是業的種子，但此業尚未成熟，所以五識並非只是由無記業所感得。第十，善等（善業等）感得的五識既然不是由業感得，那麼應該沒有眼等（眼根等）作為俱有依（共同存在的依靠），就像色、聲等一樣。

以上分別破斥了兩位論師的觀點。然而，護法（Dharmapala）論師假設了這種辯解，但並非採用他們的意義。所以，下面的正義是護法所說的。現在的西方正法藏等解釋此文說，護法菩薩認為，業招感眼等五色根（五種感覺器官），爲了順應因緣而稱說它們為業，但實際上有別的根。下面總破斥以上兩種計度（觀點）。

論：又各種聖教，乃至否定色根。

窺基法師述：聖教說本識（alaya-vijñana, 阿賴耶識）變現出類似根等（感覺器官等）的形象，你否定它們的存在，就違背了聖教。例如，《解深密經》、《楞伽經》、《中邊分別論頌》等，都說識生起時會變現出類似外境的義相等，以及第七十六、第五十一、《顯揚聖教論》第十七等，都說識能變現出根等。

論：允許眼等識，乃至深深違背教理。

窺基法師述：為什麼允許色是眼識所變現的，卻不允許五根（五種感覺器官）是本識所變現的呢？這就是迷惑了本識，也迷惑了論文。錯誤地執著種子為五色根。以上是破斥他人的觀點。

論：然而伽他說，乃至就是識的業種。

窺基法師述：再次會合前文，雙重解釋兩首偈頌。這些偈頌的意義是...

【English Translation】 English version: Shu (Commentary) by Kuiji: Fifth, the nose and tongue consciousnesses are only lost in the desire realm. The first three roots (eye, ear, and body) are not lost in all five grounds (five different meditative states). The karma of nose and tongue consciousnesses is only related to the desire realm. The karma of eye, ear, and body consciousnesses is common to two grounds (desire and form realms), so using these two or three consciousnesses to refute is the same, and therefore omitted here.

Treatise: The karma that causes consciousness to perceive, even not being a result of the physical sense organs.

Shu (Commentary) by Kuiji: Seventh, because the five sense organs are of the same nature, they should be like the nature of the five consciousnesses, which are seeds of karma. Sixth, the karma of consciousness is the loss of the function of manas (manas, the mind). Seventh, the eye and other sense organs do not have manifest loss. Eighth, karma is form, sound, and thought; the eye and other sense organs should not be physical sense organs, because their nature is encompassed by form, sound, and thought.

Treatise: Moreover, if correct consciousness, even not being a good salvation.

Shu (Commentary) by Kuiji: Ninth, the five consciousnesses are only lost when caused by neutral (neither good nor evil) constant karma. They also say that although the sense organs are seeds of karma, this karma has not yet matured, so the five consciousnesses are not only caused by neutral karma. Tenth, since the five consciousnesses caused by good karma are not caused by karma, then there should be no eye and other sense organs as co-existent support, just like form, sound, and so on.

The above separately refutes the views of two teachers. However, Dharmapala assumes this explanation, but does not adopt their meaning. Therefore, the following correct meaning is what Dharmapala said. The current Western Dharma Treasury and others explain this text by saying that Bodhisattva Dharmapala believes that karma attracts the five physical sense organs such as the eye, and they are called karma to conform to conditions, but there are actually other roots. The following generally refutes the above two kinds of views.

Treatise: Moreover, various sacred teachings, even denying physical sense organs.

Shu (Commentary) by Kuiji: The sacred teachings say that the alaya-vijñana (alaya-vijñana, storehouse consciousness) transforms into images similar to sense organs and so on. If you deny their existence, you violate the sacred teachings. For example, the Sandhinirmocana Sutra, Lankavatara Sutra, Madhyantavibhaga-karika and others all say that when consciousness arises, it transforms into images similar to external objects, as well as the seventy-sixth, fifty-first, and seventeenth of Yogacarabhumi-sastra, all say that consciousness can transform into sense organs and so on.

Treatise: Allowing eye and other consciousnesses, even deeply violating doctrine and reason.

Shu (Commentary) by Kuiji: Why is it allowed that form is transformed by eye consciousness, but it is not allowed that the five sense organs are transformed by the alaya-vijñana? This is being confused about the alaya-vijñana and also being confused about the texts. Erroneously clinging to seeds as the five physical sense organs. The above is refuting the views of others.

Treatise: However, the Gatha says, even being the karmic seeds of consciousness.

Shu (Commentary) by Kuiji: Again, combining the previous text, doubly explaining the two verses. The meaning of these verses is...

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為破經部等執識外有實色根故。于本識所變似眼根等。此根有發五識用故。二十唯識假名種子。觀所緣論假名功能。以經部師許有種子故。然此根相非現量得。但可比知。以有發生五識用故比知有根。以果比因故。若不爾者。如生欲界成就眼識。闕眼根故不能見物。若無別根既成眼識。何不見物。非謂五色根即是識種．及與業種。本．轉二計雙牒言故云識業種。

論。又緣五境至五識俱故。

述曰。二非六識也。今汝以意為五識依。明瞭意識應以五識為俱有依。必與五識同緣境故。

論。若彼不依至勢力等故。

述曰。不然。即有不明瞭失。與五相望可為例故。如瑜伽論五十五說。有分別心．無分別心同緣現在境。由三因故。一極明瞭等。若彼意識不依五識。亦應不與五識為依。五．六相望勢力等故。五識賴意引而方生。意識由五同而明瞭故。

論。又第七識至有俱有依。

述曰。三非七也。于中有二。初立理。后引證。此立理也。雖許不斷亦有俱依。有轉易故。如六轉識　不爾應非轉識所攝。無俱依故。如第八識。

論。不爾彼應至轉識有七。

述曰。彼若不許第七有依。亦應非是轉識所攝。則違聖教。六十三云轉識有七。彼言識有二。一藏識。二轉識。謂眼識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了駁斥經部等宗派認為在意識之外存在實在的色根（Rupa-indriya，物質性的感覺器官）的觀點，我們認為眼識等是由本識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）所變現的，類似於眼根（caksu-indriya，眼睛）。因為這個根能夠引發五識（panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）的作用，所以《二十唯識論》中說它是假名種子（prajnapti-bija，假立的種子），《觀所緣論》中說它是假名功能（prajnapti-karitra，假立的功能）。這是因為經部師承認有種子（bija，種子）的緣故。然而，這個根的相狀不是現量（pratyaksa，直接感知）所能獲得的，只能通過比量（anumana，推理）來了解。因為有發生五識的作用，所以通過推理得知有根的存在，這是以果推因。如果不是這樣，比如在欲界（kama-dhatu，慾望界）中，雖然成就了眼識（caksu-vijnana，眼識），但因為缺少眼根（caksu-indriya，眼睛），所以不能看見物體。如果沒有別的根，既然已經成就了眼識，為什麼不能看見物體呢？並非說五色根（panca-rupa-indriya，五種物質性的感覺器官）就是識種（vijnana-bija，意識的種子）以及業種（karma-bija，業的種子），本識和轉識兩種說法都提到了，所以說是識業種（vijnana-karma-bija，意識和業的種子）。 論：又因為緣五境（panca-visaya，色、聲、香、味、觸）的緣故，五識（panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）同時生起。 述曰：這裡說的不是六識（sad-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）。現在你認為意識（manas，意）是五識（panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）的所依，那麼明瞭的意識（manas，意）應該以五識為俱有依（sahabhu-asraya，共同存在的所依），必定與五識一同緣境（visaya，對像）。 論：如果那個意識（manas，意）不依賴五識（panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識），就會有勢力（bala，力量）等方面的問題。 述曰：不是這樣的。那樣就會有不明瞭的過失。與五識相互比較可以作為例子。如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十五卷所說，有分別心（savikalpa-citta，有分別的心）和無分別心（nirvikalpa-citta，無分別的心）一同緣現在境（vartamana-visaya，現在的對象），有三個原因：一是極明瞭等。如果那個意識（manas，意）不依賴五識（panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識），也應該不與五識作為所依，五識和意識相互比較，勢力等方面是相似的。五識依賴意的引導才能產生，意識因為與五識共同作用而更加明瞭。 論：又第七識（manas，末那識）也是轉識（pravrtti-vijnana，轉變識），所以有俱有依（sahabhu-asraya，共同存在的所依）。 述曰：這裡說的不是第七識（manas，末那識）。這裡面有兩層意思：先是立理，后是引證。這裡是立理。雖然承認第七識不斷滅，但也有俱有依（sahabhu-asraya，共同存在的所依），因為它有轉變。如同六轉識（sad-pravrtti-vijnana，六個轉變識）一樣。否則，第七識就不應該屬於轉識所攝，因為它沒有俱有依（sahabhu-asraya，共同存在的所依），如同第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）一樣。 論：如果不是這樣，第七識也應該不屬於轉識（pravrtti-vijnana，轉變識）所攝，那麼轉識（pravrtti-vijnana，轉變識）就有七個了。 述曰：如果他們不承認第七識有依，那麼第七識也就不應該屬於轉識所攝，那就違背了聖教。第六十三卷說轉識有七個。那裡說識有兩種，一是藏識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識），二是轉識（pravrtti-vijnana，轉變識），也就是眼識（caksu-vijnana，眼識）。

【English Translation】 English version: To refute the Sautrantika and other schools that hold that real Rupa-indriya (material sense organs) exist outside of consciousness, we maintain that eye-consciousness and the like are transformations of the Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness), resembling caksu-indriya (the eye organ). Because this organ can give rise to the function of the panca-vijnana (five consciousnesses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses), the Vimsatika-vijnaptimatrata (Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only) calls it a prajnapti-bija (provisionally established seed), and the Alambana-pariksa (Examination of the Object) calls it a prajnapti-karitra (provisionally established function). This is because the Sautrantika masters acknowledge the existence of bija (seeds). However, the characteristics of this organ cannot be obtained through pratyaksa (direct perception), but can only be understood through anumana (inference). Because it has the function of giving rise to the five consciousnesses, we infer the existence of the organ, using the effect to infer the cause. If this were not the case, for example, in the Kama-dhatu (desire realm), although eye-consciousness is achieved, one cannot see objects because of the lack of caksu-indriya (the eye organ). If there were no other organ, since eye-consciousness has already been achieved, why can't one see objects? It is not that the panca-rupa-indriya (five material sense organs) are the same as vijnana-bija (seeds of consciousness) and karma-bija (seeds of karma). Both Alaya and Pravrtti accounts mention both, hence the term vijnana-karma-bija (seeds of consciousness and karma). Treatise: Moreover, because of the condition of the panca-visaya (five objects: form, sound, smell, taste, and touch), the panca-vijnana (five consciousnesses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) arise simultaneously. Commentary: This does not refer to the sad-vijnana (six consciousnesses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind consciousnesses). Now, you consider manas (mind) to be the basis of the five consciousnesses. Therefore, the clear manas (mind) should take the five consciousnesses as its sahabhu-asraya (co-existent basis), necessarily cognizing the same visaya (object) as the five consciousnesses. Treatise: If that manas (mind) does not rely on the five consciousnesses, there would be problems with bala (power) and other aspects. Commentary: That is not the case. There would be the fault of unclearness. Comparing it with the five consciousnesses can serve as an example. As stated in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), volume fifty-five, savikalpa-citta (discriminating mind) and nirvikalpa-citta (non-discriminating mind) both cognize present vartamana-visaya (present objects), for three reasons: one is extreme clarity, etc. If that manas (mind) does not rely on the five consciousnesses, it should also not take the five consciousnesses as its basis. Comparing the five consciousnesses and the mind consciousness, the power and other aspects are similar. The five consciousnesses rely on the mind's guidance to arise, and the mind consciousness becomes clearer through its co-operation with the five consciousnesses. Treatise: Furthermore, the seventh consciousness (manas, the seventh consciousness) is also a pravrtti-vijnana (evolving consciousness), so it has a sahabhu-asraya (co-existent basis). Commentary: This does not refer to the seventh consciousness (manas, the seventh consciousness). There are two layers of meaning here: first, establishing the principle, then providing evidence. This is establishing the principle. Although it is acknowledged that the seventh consciousness is continuous, it also has a sahabhu-asraya (co-existent basis), because it undergoes transformation. Like the sad-pravrtti-vijnana (six evolving consciousnesses). Otherwise, the seventh consciousness should not be included among the evolving consciousnesses, because it does not have a sahabhu-asraya (co-existent basis), like the Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness). Treatise: If that were not the case, the seventh consciousness should also not be included among the pravrtti-vijnana (evolving consciousnesses), then there would be seven pravrtti-vijnana (evolving consciousnesses). Commentary: If they do not acknowledge that the seventh consciousness has a basis, then the seventh consciousness should also not be included among the evolving consciousnesses, which would contradict the sacred teachings. Volume sixty-three states that there are seven evolving consciousnesses. It says that there are two types of consciousness: one is the Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness), and the other is the pravrtti-vijnana (evolving consciousness), which is caksu-vijnana (eye consciousness).

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．乃至意識　顯揚十七．八．九亦然。

論。故應許彼至第八識攝。

述曰。其文可解。

自下引證。

論。如瑜伽論至意識得轉。

述曰。以何為量。謂瑜伽說。有藏識故有末那等。五十一說。顯揚十七皆亦同之。

論。彼論意言至非由彼種。

述曰。正取現行。

論。不爾應說至理教相違。

述曰。前師若言此說種依非現依者。應說有藏識故得有第六。何故展轉相望而有。前師若言以第六種生現識時。必隨遂第七種子方生故以為依。得展轉說者。不爾五根．五識為例應然。亦有別根故。此如對法第二卷說眼識依眼中。屬眼之識處說。第三結云。由此彼非是。

論。是故應言至同時意識。

述曰。二總結正。其前五識各定有二依。謂五色根。增上緣攝。非如種子。及用第六。同時意依。瑜伽第三．七十六．五十五云必俱故。七．八疏故。非與此力。故不名依。

論。第六轉識至為俱有依。

述曰。意識與七同緣．不緣皆定依故。若與五同緣。亦依五識。如前教證。

論。第七轉識至謂第八識。

述曰。以七有轉易。如六有俱有依。

論。唯第八識至無俱有依。

述曰。以于因中不轉易故。不假俱依不違

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：乃至（乃至：表示遞進或補充）意識，在《顯揚聖教論》（顯揚十七：指《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷）中也同樣闡述了十七、八、九識的道理。

論：所以應該認可末那識（末那識：第七識，意為『意』）是依第八識（第八識：阿賴耶識，意為『藏識』）而存在的。

述曰：這段文字容易理解。

自下引證：下面引用經文來證明。

論：如《瑜伽師地論》（瑜伽論：指《瑜伽師地論》）所說，乃至意識得以轉變。

述曰：以什麼作為依據呢？就是《瑜伽師地論》所說。因為有阿賴耶識，所以才有末那識等。《瑜伽師地論·五十一》和《顯揚聖教論·十七》都同樣闡述了這個道理。

論：該論的意旨是說，並非由彼種子（彼種子：指第六識的種子）所生。

述曰：這裡是著重指現行（現行：指已經生起的識）。

論：如果不是這樣說，就應該說有藏識才能有第六識，否則在道理和教義上都相違背。

述曰：如果前一位論師說，這裡所說的『依』是指種子依，而不是現行依，那麼就應該說因為有藏識才能有第六識，為什麼需要輾轉相望而有呢？如果前一位論師說，以第六識的種子生起現識時，必定隨順第七識的種子才能生起，所以才說是相互依存。如果不是這樣，那麼五根（五根：眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根）和五識（五識：眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）也應該如此。因為也有各自不同的根。這就像《對法論》（對法：指《阿毗達摩》）第二卷所說，眼識依賴於眼根。屬於眼的識處這樣說。第三卷總結說，由此可見，並非如此。

論：所以應該說，前五識各自都有兩個所依，即五色根（五色根：指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官），屬於增上緣（增上緣：指能幫助事物產生的條件），不像種子。以及第六識（第六識：意識），作為同時意依（同時意依：指與意識同時存在的意根）。

述曰：總結並糾正之前的觀點。前五識各自都有兩個確定的所依，即五色根，屬於增上緣，不像種子。以及第六識，作為同時意依。《瑜伽師地論》第三、七十六、五十五卷都說必須同時存在。第七識和第八識是疏遠的因緣，所以沒有這種力量，因此不稱為『依』。

論：第六轉識（第六轉識：指意識）與第七識（第七識：末那識）同緣或不同緣，都是它的俱有依（俱有依：指同時存在的所依）。

述曰：意識與第七識同緣或不同緣，都是確定的所依。如果與前五識同緣，也依賴於前五識，如前面的教證所說。

論：第七轉識的俱有依，就是第八識。

述曰：因為第七識有轉變和變易，就像第六識有俱有依一樣。

論：只有第八識沒有俱有依。

述曰：因為第八識在因地中沒有轉變和變易，所以不需要俱有依，這並不違背教義。

【English Translation】 English version: Even consciousness is similarly explained in the Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (Xianyang Shiqi: referring to the 17th volume of Xianyang Shengjiao Lun), regarding the principles of the seventeenth, eighth, and ninth consciousnesses.

Treatise: Therefore, it should be acknowledged that Manas (Manas: the seventh consciousness, meaning 'mind') relies on the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness, meaning 'storehouse consciousness').

Commentary: The text is easy to understand.

Citing evidence from below: The following quotes scriptures to prove it.

Treatise: As stated in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yoga Lun: referring to Yogacarabhumi-sastra), even consciousness can be transformed.

Commentary: What is the basis for this? It is what the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says. Because there is Alaya consciousness, there are Manas and others. Yogacarabhumi-sastra 51 and Xianyang Shengjiao Lun 17 both explain this principle in the same way.

Treatise: The intention of that treatise is that it is not produced by that seed (that seed: referring to the seed of the sixth consciousness).

Commentary: Here, the emphasis is on the manifest (manifest: referring to the consciousness that has already arisen).

Treatise: If it is not said this way, it should be said that only with the Alaya consciousness can there be the sixth consciousness, otherwise it contradicts reason and doctrine.

Commentary: If the previous teacher said that the 'reliance' mentioned here refers to seed reliance, not manifest reliance, then it should be said that because there is Alaya consciousness, there can be the sixth consciousness. Why is it necessary to rely on each other in a roundabout way? If the previous teacher said that when the seed of the sixth consciousness arises as manifest consciousness, it must follow the seed of the seventh consciousness to arise, so it is said to be interdependent. If this is not the case, then the five roots (five roots: eye-root, ear-root, nose-root, tongue-root, body-root) and the five consciousnesses (five consciousnesses: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) should also be the same. Because there are also different roots for each. This is like what the second volume of the Abhidharma (Abhidharma: referring to Abhidhamma) says, that eye-consciousness relies on the eye-root. It is said in the context of the consciousness belonging to the eye. The third volume concludes that this is not the case.

Treatise: Therefore, it should be said that each of the first five consciousnesses has two reliances, namely the five sense organs (five sense organs: referring to the five sense organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body), which belong to the dominant condition (dominant condition: referring to the conditions that help things arise), unlike seeds. And the sixth consciousness (sixth consciousness: consciousness) as the simultaneous mental reliance (simultaneous mental reliance: referring to the mental root that exists simultaneously with consciousness).

Commentary: Summarizing and correcting the previous views. Each of the first five consciousnesses has two definite reliances, namely the five sense organs, which belong to the dominant condition, unlike seeds. And the sixth consciousness, as the simultaneous mental reliance. The third, seventy-sixth, and fifty-fifth volumes of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra all say that they must exist simultaneously. The seventh and eighth consciousnesses are distant causes, so they do not have this power, and therefore are not called 'reliance'.

Treatise: The sixth transformed consciousness (sixth transformed consciousness: referring to consciousness), whether it shares the same object with the seventh consciousness (seventh consciousness: Manas) or not, is its co-existent reliance (co-existent reliance: referring to the reliance that exists simultaneously).

Commentary: Whether consciousness shares the same object with the seventh consciousness or not, it is a definite reliance. If it shares the same object with the first five consciousnesses, it also relies on the first five consciousnesses, as the previous scriptural evidence shows.

Treatise: The co-existent reliance of the seventh transformed consciousness is the eighth consciousness.

Commentary: Because the seventh consciousness has transformation and change, just like the sixth consciousness has a co-existent reliance.

Treatise: Only the eighth consciousness has no co-existent reliance.

Commentary: Because the eighth consciousness does not have transformation and change in the causal ground, it does not need a co-existent reliance, which does not contradict the doctrine.

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聖教。

就廣第二俱有依中。上來二師別說為理引教如前　自下第三凈月等師復非前義。

論。有義此說猶未盡理。

述曰。于中有三。初立理。次結正。后指前　立理有三　此說者。指次前　言猶未者。明理未足。即是可止之辭。于次前說有所述可。有所闕少差別之義。其述可者下自指之。余如前說更不別敘。所差別者今正敘之。

論。第八類余至有俱有依。

述曰。總例余識令八有根　量云。第八之識。有但有根。與餘七識同識性故。如餘七識　此即對前。次前師故得為因也　若對初師即第七識為不定過。以彼不許有此依故。

前師問曰。前七別依已如前辨。前第八所依謂以何法。

論。第七．八識至斯有何失。

述曰。謂此二識恒俱轉故令互相依　量云。其第八識。應依於他恒轉之識。以恒起故。如第七識　若不言他即自依不定過。不能自依故。若不言恒轉云第七識。即無同喻過。第七不依第七識故　若言識性為因。令依第七。即第七前五為不定失　又此恒轉言便無用　今但言依他恒轉識。明令依第七。以七恒轉余皆間斷故。即此總出依第七也。

自下第二以種子識例現行識令有所依。

論。許現起識至許依現識。

述曰。謂共許現行識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 聖教。

就廣第二俱有依中。上來二師別說為理引教如前 自下第三凈月等師復非前義。

論。有義此說猶未盡理。

述曰。于中有三。初立理。次結正。后指前 立理有三 此說者。指次前 言猶未者。明理未足。即是可止之辭。于次前說有所述可。有所闕少差別之義。其述可者下自指之。余如前說更不別敘。所差別者今正敘之。

論。第八類余至有俱有依。

述曰。總例余識令八有根 量云。第八之識。有但有根。與餘七識同識性故。如餘七識 此即對前。次前師故得為因也 若對初師即第七識為不定過。以彼不許有此依故。

前師問曰。前七別依已如前辨。前第八所依謂以何法。

論。第七．八識至斯有何失。

述曰。謂此二識恒俱轉故令互相依 量云。其第八識。應依於他恒轉之識。以恒起故。如第七識 若不言他即自依不定過。不能自依故。若不言恒轉云第七識。即無同喻過。第七不依第七識故 若言識性為因。令依第七。即第七前五為不定失 又此恒轉言便無用 今但言依他恒轉識。明令依第七。以七恒轉余皆間斷故。即此總出依第七也。

自下第二以種子識例現行識令有所依。

論。許現起識至許依現識。

述曰。謂共許現行識

【English Translation】 English version: Sacred Teachings.

Regarding the second 'simultaneous dependence' in detail. The preceding two teachers have already presented their separate explanations based on reason and scripture. From here onwards, the teacher Jingyue (Pure Moon) and others refute the previous meaning.

Treatise: Some argue that this explanation still does not fully capture the principle.

Commentary: There are three parts here: first, establishing the principle; second, concluding and affirming; and third, referring to the previous. There are three aspects to establishing the principle. 'This explanation' refers to the immediately preceding one. 'Still does not fully' indicates that the principle is not yet complete, suggesting that it can be stopped here. The immediately preceding explanation has both acceptable and deficient aspects. The acceptable aspects will be pointed out below. The rest is as previously stated and will not be narrated separately. The aspects that differ are now being narrated.

Treatise: The eighth category, the remainder, up to having simultaneous dependence.

Commentary: Generally, the remaining consciousnesses are exemplified to show that the eighth has a root. Argument: The eighth consciousness must have a root, being of the same nature as the other seven consciousnesses. Like the other seven consciousnesses. This is in response to the immediately preceding teacher, and thus can be used as a reason. If it is directed at the first teacher, then the seventh consciousness becomes an uncertain fault, because they do not accept that it has this dependence.

The previous teacher asks: The separate dependence of the previous seven has already been distinguished as before. What dharma does the previous eighth rely on?

Treatise: The seventh and eighth consciousnesses, up to what fault is there in this?

Commentary: Because these two consciousnesses constantly co-arise, they depend on each other. Argument: The eighth consciousness should depend on another constantly arising consciousness, because it constantly arises, like the seventh consciousness. If 'another' is not stated, then there is the fault of self-dependence, because it cannot depend on itself. If 'constantly arising' is not stated and it is said 'like the seventh consciousness,' then there is the fault of lacking a similar example, because the seventh does not depend on the seventh consciousness. If consciousness-nature is used as the reason, causing it to depend on the seventh, then the previous five to the seventh become an uncertain fault. Also, the words 'constantly arising' become useless. Now, only saying 'depending on another constantly arising consciousness' clearly indicates dependence on the seventh, because the seventh is constant while the rest are intermittent. This generally shows dependence on the seventh.

From here onwards, the seed consciousness is used as an example for the manifest consciousness, causing it to have dependence.

Treatise: Accepting that manifest consciousness arises, up to accepting dependence on manifest consciousness.

Commentary: Meaning that manifest consciousness is mutually accepted.

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以種為依。故今令種應依現識。若謂論文應言現行以種子為因緣依者。即此中種依現行識無同喻過。俱有依故　問曰種望現。現望種。皆是因緣如前已解。何故今言亦應為依等　今助解云。雖許種望于現。現望種。為因緣依。然不名種子依現非種子故。既現行與種子非種子依。故今此師令成俱有依義。又現行望種雖是因緣。然異熟現行不能熏成種。于種無力非因緣依。故此不言余心現行望自種子。但言異熟現行望之。余皆能熏故　又諸識現行異熟心皆有俱有依。已如前解。而種望彼現非因緣亦同於此。今略不述。今不說依于種無力故。但今說彼第八識故。唯第八種望現是依。

現行有二。一是異熟識。二是能熏識。此種望比比皆是依不。

論。能熏異熟為生長住依。

述曰。皆是依義。謂彼能熏六．七現行。是新所熏種子生依。是本有種子長依。前彼本無故。后此令增故。以能熏現行為生長依。以異熟識為住依。第八現行雖不生種。種依彼住故。以異熟識現行為住依。

問若言初生及增長。唯可說能熏。若言相續住。唯可說異熟。何須雙說。

論。識種離彼不生長住故。

述曰。以是義故二皆是依。始末為論故。此令異熟種以現行為依。以種子因緣依與現行俱有依為例。此並新

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 以種子為所依。所以現在說種子應當以現識為所依。如果說論文中應當說現行以種子為因緣所依，那麼這裡種子依現行識，就沒有同喻的過失，因為兩者都是相互依存的。問：種子對於現行，現行對於種子，都是因緣，如前面已經解釋的。為什麼現在說也應當為所依等？現在幫助解釋說，雖然允許種子對於現行，現行對於種子，是因緣所依，但不稱為種子依現行，因為不是種子。既然現行與種子不是種子所依，所以現在這位論師使之成為俱有依的意義。又現行對於種子雖然是因緣，但異熟現行不能熏成種子，對於種子沒有力量，不是因緣所依。所以這裡不說其餘心現行對於自己的種子，只說異熟現行對於種子。其餘的都能熏習。又各種識的現行，異熟心都有俱有依，如前面已經解釋的。而種子對於那些現行，不是因緣，也與此相同。現在略去不述說。現在不說依于種子，因為沒有力量。但現在說第八識的緣故，只有第八識的種子對於現行是所依。

現行有兩種。一是異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識），二是能熏識（Kleśa-vijñāna，染污識）。這兩種種子對於它們都是所依嗎？

論：能熏和異熟是生長和安住的所依。

述：都是所依的意義。所說的能熏六、七現行，是新熏習的種子生長的所依，是本有種子增長的所依。前面那些本來沒有，後面這些使之增長。以能熏現行作為生長所依，以異熟識作為安住的所依。第八現行雖然不生種子，但種子依靠它安住，所以以異熟識現行作為安住的所依。

問：如果說初生和增長，只能說是能熏。如果說相續安住，只能說是異熟。為什麼需要一起說？

論：識的種子離開它們就不能生長和安住。

述：因為這個緣故，兩者都是所依。從始末來說，所以這使得異熟的種子以現行為所依。以種子因緣所依與現行俱有依為例。這些都是新的。

【English Translation】 English version Seeds are the basis. Therefore, it is now stated that seeds should rely on present consciousness (Vijnana). If it is said that the treatise should state that present activity relies on seeds as the causal basis, then there is no fault of dissimilar analogy in this case of seeds relying on present consciousness, because both are mutually dependent. Question: Seeds in relation to present activity, and present activity in relation to seeds, are all causes and conditions, as previously explained. Why is it now said that they should also be the basis, etc.? Now, to help explain, although it is allowed that seeds in relation to present activity, and present activity in relation to seeds, are causal bases, it is not called seeds relying on present activity, because it is not a seed. Since present activity and seeds are not seed-dependent, the teacher now makes it the meaning of co-existing dependence. Furthermore, although present activity in relation to seeds is a cause, the Vipāka-vijñāna (異熟識, resultant consciousness) cannot perfume and form seeds, and has no power over seeds, so it is not a causal basis. Therefore, it is not said here that the present activity of other minds is in relation to their own seeds, but only that the Vipāka-vijñāna (異熟識, resultant consciousness) is in relation to seeds. The rest can all perfume. Furthermore, the present activities of various consciousnesses, and Vipāka-citta (異熟心, resultant mind), all have co-existing dependence, as previously explained. And seeds in relation to those present activities are not causes, which is the same as this. Now, it is omitted. It is not said now that it relies on seeds, because it has no power. But now it is said because of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識), only the seeds of the eighth consciousness are the basis for present activity.

There are two kinds of present activity. One is Vipāka-vijñāna (異熟識, resultant consciousness), and the other is Kleśa-vijñāna (能熏識, defiled consciousness). Are these seeds the basis for both of them?

Treatise: The perfuming and Vipāka (異熟, resultant) are the basis for growth and abiding.

Commentary: Both are the meaning of the basis. The so-called perfuming sixth and seventh present activities are the basis for the growth of newly perfumed seeds, and the basis for the increase of original seeds. The former did not exist originally, and the latter causes them to increase. The perfuming present activity is taken as the basis for growth, and the Vipāka-vijñāna (異熟識, resultant consciousness) is taken as the basis for abiding. Although the eighth present activity does not produce seeds, the seeds rely on it to abide, so the Vipāka-vijñāna (異熟識, resultant consciousness) is taken as the basis for abiding.

Question: If it is said that initial birth and growth can only be said to be perfuming. If it is said that continuous abiding can only be said to be Vipāka (異熟, resultant). Why is it necessary to say both together?

Treatise: The seeds of consciousness cannot grow and abide without them.

Commentary: Because of this reason, both are the basis. Speaking from beginning to end, so this makes the Vipāka (異熟, resultant) seeds rely on present activity as the basis. Taking the seed causal basis and the present activity co-existing basis as examples. These are all new.

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舊合用之義。

自下第三令第八識亦依色根。

論。又異熟識至依色根轉。

述曰。此初總出令依色根。后引經論。文易可知。

第二引經。

論。如勢經說至恒相續轉。

述曰。楞伽經文。勘彼文同　遍依根者。異五識故。隨所有根皆能依故。余文可解。

論。瑜伽亦說至有色根身。

述曰。瑜伽八證中。五十一。顯揚．對法等皆同此。眼等六識各別依故。不能執受有色諸根。謂八證中第一執受五因中第四因。量如前卷已解說。以六識為各別依故。不能執受五種色根。明第八識遍依諸根故能執受。

論。若異熟識至非能執受。

述曰。量斥前師。若第八識不遍依諸根。而能執受者。六識應然。並非遍依故。全分不依能執受者。第六應然。亦全不依五色根故　量云。汝異熟識。非能執受。不遍依止有色根故。如前六識　以無過量令非執受故　或前六識亦能執受有色根身。以性是識不遍依止有色根故。如汝所許第八識性　若但第六為量。因云無有少分依色根故。如汝許第八。此為大失。故依色根。

論。或所立因有不定失。

述曰。謂彼論以各別依故。六種轉識非能執受。五識不成。然第六識不別依色根。何得以此因為比量。如前十證第四

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 舊合用之義。

自下第三令第八識亦依色根。

論。又異熟識至依色根轉。

述曰。此初總出令依色根。后引經論。文易可知。

第二引經。

論。如勢經說至恒相續轉。

述曰。楞伽經文。勘彼文同　遍依根者。異五識故。隨所有根皆能依故。余文可解。

論。瑜伽亦說至有色根身。

述曰。瑜伽八證中。五十一。顯揚．對法等皆同此。眼等六識各別依故。不能執受有色諸根。謂八證中第一執受五因中第四因。量如前卷已解說。以六識為各別依故。不能執受五種色根。明第八識遍依諸根故能執受。

論。若異熟識至非能執受。

述曰。量斥前師。若第八識不遍依諸根。而能執受者。六識應然。並非遍依故。全分不依能執受者。第六應然。亦全不依五色根故　量云。汝異熟識。非能執受。不遍依止有色根故。如前六識　以無過量令非執受故　或前六識亦能執受有色根身。以性是識不遍依止有色根故。如汝所許第八識性　若但第六為量。因云無有少分依色根故。如汝許第八。此為大失。故依色根。

論。或所立因有不定失。

述曰。謂彼論以各別依故。六種轉識非能執受。五識不成。然第六識不別依色根。何得以此因為比量。如前十證第四

【English Translation】 English version The old meaning is still applicable.

From below, the third instruction is that the eighth consciousness also relies on the sense organ of form (rupa-ayatana).

Treatise: Furthermore, the Vipaka-vijnana (異熟識) [resultant consciousness]... up to... functions relying on the sense organ of form.

Commentary: This initially gives a general statement that it relies on the sense organ of form. Later, scriptures and treatises are cited. The text is easy to understand.

Second, citing scriptures.

Treatise: As the Lankavatara Sutra says... up to... constantly and continuously functions.

Commentary: This is from the Lankavatara Sutra (楞伽經). Compare it with that text, and they are the same. 'Universally relying on the sense organs' is because it is different from the five consciousnesses. It can rely on all existing sense organs. The remaining text can be understood.

Treatise: The Yoga (瑜伽) also says... up to... the body with sense organs of form.

Commentary: In the eight proofs of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論), it is in the fifty-first section. The Xianyang (顯揚), Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法) and others are all the same as this. Because the six consciousnesses, such as eye consciousness, each rely separately, they cannot grasp the sense organs of form. That is, the first of the eight proofs, the fourth cause among the five causes of grasping. The measure has been explained in the previous volume. Because the six consciousnesses rely separately, they cannot grasp the five sense organs of form. It clarifies that the eighth consciousness universally relies on all sense organs, therefore it can grasp them.

Treatise: If the Vipaka-vijnana (異熟識) [resultant consciousness]... up to... is not able to grasp.

Commentary: This is a refutation of the previous teacher. If the eighth consciousness does not universally rely on all sense organs, but is able to grasp, then the six consciousnesses should also be able to do so, because they do not universally rely. If something that does not rely at all can grasp, then the sixth consciousness should be able to do so, because it does not rely on the five sense organs of form at all. The measure says: 'Your Vipaka-vijnana (異熟識) [resultant consciousness] is not able to grasp because it does not universally rely on the sense organ of form, like the previous six consciousnesses.' Because there is no excessive measure, it is not able to grasp. Or the previous six consciousnesses can also grasp the body with sense organs of form, because their nature is consciousness and they do not universally rely on the sense organ of form, like the nature of the eighth consciousness as you have accepted. If only the sixth consciousness is used as the measure, the cause would be that there is no small part that relies on the sense organ of form, like the eighth consciousness as you have accepted. This would be a great mistake. Therefore, it relies on the sense organ of form.

Treatise: Or the established cause has the fault of being uncertain.

Commentary: That is, that treatise uses the reason that the six transforming consciousnesses cannot grasp because they rely separately. This does not hold for the five consciousnesses. However, the sixth consciousness does not separately rely on the sense organ of form. How can this cause be used as a comparison? Like the fourth of the previous ten proofs.

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有證。彼論雖言各別依故不能執受。即是顯彼非遍依故不能執受。若不爾者各別依故。即無同喻　應云。六種轉識。非能執受。非遍依故。如電光等　今取言非遍依因故與此為不定。為如電等非遍依故。眼等六識不能執受有色根身。為如所許第八識性非遍依故。我此六識而能遍執有色根身。因既無不定。故知第八亦依色根。

第二總結歸申正義。

論。是故藏識至亦依色根。

述曰。第八現起定恒依一依。常與一識俱轉故。即第七識。此通三界。在有色界亦依色根。即現行識。此不定故。有此二俱有依。

論。若識種子至亦依能熏。

述曰。第八現行是住依故。又隨新熏．本有種子。初熏習位或生或長。亦依能熏。則有二依后不定故。此顯第八現．種所依與前有別。

論。余如前說。

述曰。第三指前。義無別故。余指如前。

自下第四護法菩薩解　于中有三。一總斥前師。二申義指。三總結正。

論。有義前說至與依別故。

述曰。此總非前。而本未了何謂依義。從下而徴。解亦應爾。

論。依謂一切至而得生住。

述曰。下申正義指　文復有二。初解依．所依別。后解具依多少　初中又有二。先解二別。后解違文。此出依體。即攝有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有證據表明，雖然之前的論述認為由於各自所依賴的對象不同，所以不能執取，這恰恰表明它們並非普遍依賴，因此不能執取。如果不是這樣，因為各自所依賴的對象不同，就沒有共同的比喻了。應該說，六種轉識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）不能執取，因為它們不是普遍依賴的，就像閃電的光芒等。現在採用『非普遍依賴』作為原因，這與之前的論點是不確定的。例如，像閃電等不是普遍依賴的，所以眼等六識不能執取有色根身（具有顏色的感覺器官和身體）。或者像所承認的第八識（阿賴耶識）的性質，雖然不是普遍依賴的，但我這六識卻能普遍執取有色根身。既然原因沒有不確定性，就知道第八識也依賴於色根。 第二，總結並重申正確的觀點。 論：因此，藏識（阿賴耶識）也依賴於色根。 述記：第八識現起時，必定恒常地依賴於一個所依，並且常常與一個識（即第七識，末那識）一同運作。這適用於三界。在有漏界，它也依賴於色根，即現行識。因為這種依賴是不確定的，所以有時兩者都有所依賴。 論：如果識的種子也依賴於能熏習者。 述記：第八識的現行是住的所依。並且，隨著新熏習和本有的種子，在最初熏習的階段，或者產生或者增長，也依賴於能熏習者。因此，有兩種所依，因為后一種所依是不確定的。這表明第八識的現行和種子所依賴的對象與之前有所不同。 論：其餘的如前所述。 述記：第三，指向前面所說的內容，因為意義沒有區別。其餘的指向前面。 從下面開始是護法菩薩的解釋，其中有三點：一、總的駁斥之前的觀點；二、闡述意義的要點；三、總結正確的觀點。 論：有觀點認為之前的說法與所依賴的對象不同。 述記：這總的否定了之前的觀點，但根本沒有理解什麼是『所依』的含義。從下面開始提問，解釋也應該如此。 論：所依是指一切能夠使之產生和存在的事物。 述記：下面闡述正確觀點的要點。文章又有兩部分：首先解釋所依和能依的區別，然後解釋具依的多少。首先解釋兩者的區別，然後解釋與經文的矛盾。這裡闡述了所依的本體，即攝有。

【English Translation】 English version: There is evidence that although the previous arguments stated that because they rely on different objects, they cannot be apprehended, this precisely shows that they are not universally dependent, and therefore cannot be apprehended. If this were not the case, because they rely on different objects, there would be no common analogy. It should be said that the six types of transforming consciousness (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness) cannot apprehend because they are not universally dependent, like the flash of lightning, etc. Now, taking 'not universally dependent' as the reason, this is uncertain with the previous argument. For example, like lightning, etc., are not universally dependent, so the six consciousnesses such as eye consciousness cannot apprehend the colored sense organs and body (having colored sensory organs and body). Or like the nature of the eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna) that is acknowledged, although it is not universally dependent, my six consciousnesses can universally apprehend the colored sense organs and body. Since the reason has no uncertainty, it is known that the eighth consciousness also relies on the colored sense organs. Second, summarize and reiterate the correct view. Treatise: Therefore, the store consciousness (Ālayavijñāna) also relies on the colored sense organs. Commentary: When the eighth consciousness manifests, it must constantly rely on one basis, and often operates with one consciousness (i.e., the seventh consciousness, Manas). This applies to the three realms. In the realm of defilements, it also relies on the colored sense organs, which is the present consciousness. Because this dependence is uncertain, sometimes both have a basis of reliance. Treatise: If the seeds of consciousness also rely on the one that can perfumed. Commentary: The manifestation of the eighth consciousness is the basis of abiding. And, along with the newly perfumed and inherent seeds, in the initial stage of perfuming, either arising or growing, it also relies on the one that can perfumed. Therefore, there are two bases of reliance, because the latter basis is uncertain. This shows that the objects on which the manifestation and seeds of the eighth consciousness rely are different from before. Treatise: The rest is as described before. Commentary: Third, pointing to what was said before, because the meaning is no different. The rest refers to what was before. From below begins the explanation of Bodhisattva Dharmapāla, which has three points: 1. A general refutation of the previous views; 2. Elucidating the key points of meaning; 3. Summarizing the correct view. Treatise: Some views hold that the previous statements are different from the objects on which they rely. Commentary: This generally negates the previous views, but fundamentally does not understand what the meaning of 'basis' is. Starting from below, ask questions, and the explanation should be the same. Treatise: The basis refers to everything that enables it to arise and exist. Commentary: Below, elucidate the key points of the correct view. The article has two parts: first, explain the difference between the basis and the one that relies, and then explain the number of bases. First, explain the difference between the two, and then explain the contradiction with the scriptures. Here, the essence of the basis is explained, which is to include all.

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為　何者依義　以有為法杖因托緣而得生．住。不問因緣．及餘三緣。望此有力皆是依故。諸法新起名為得生。本來無故。如新熏種等　若法本有名而得住。非新生故。如本有種等　新熏因者即現行法　緣者即本識等余之三緣　本有因者前自類法　緣者即現行有漏法等。

論。諸所杖托至互相依等。

述曰。其喻可知。此即所依亦名為依。依義通故。諸無為法與有為法能為緣故。亦是有為諸法之依。可托彼生故。諸有為法非無為依。不託此等而生．住故。

論。若法決定至即內六處。

述曰。此解所依．及所依義　所以者何　具此四義乃名所依　一決定義。有法若依此生。無時不依此生。故言決定。簡第六識以五識為依。彼不定故。第六生時五不定有。不以五為依　及簡第八以五根為依。設無五根亦得生故　又簡七．八以五．六為依。七．八恒轉。五．六間斷故　即一切種子望能熏現行彼非所依。后無現行自相續故非決定義。並別境善．染等非但𨷂自在亦𨷂決定。唯除遍行．及色行蘊少分　若爾四大種．及五根扶塵．四大。應與五識而為所依。命根．種子．及無為等。應與諸法亦為所依。並決定故　不爾。即五蘊中除識蘊少分相望　二有境義。雖是決定體須有境。即簡四大．五有色塵．及諸

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：什麼叫做『依義』？ 答：『依義』是指有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma，指由因緣和合而成的法）憑藉因和緣而生起和住立。這裡不問及『因緣』（hetu-pratyaya，直接產生結果的條件）以及其餘三種緣（等無間緣、所緣緣、增上緣）。考慮到這些條件的力量，它們都是『依』。諸法新產生起稱為『得生』，因為它們本來不存在，就像新熏的種子一樣。如果法本來就存在而能夠住立，那就不是新生，就像本有的種子一樣。新熏的『因』是指現行法（vartamāna-dharma，正在發生作用的法），『緣』是指本識（mūla-vijñāna，根本識）等其餘三種緣。本有的『因』是指前一刻的同類法，『緣』是指現行的有漏法（sāsrava-dharma，有煩惱的法）等。

論：所有憑藉和依託，以至互相依賴等。

述記：其中的比喻可以理解。這裡所憑藉的也稱為『依』，因為『依』的意義是相通的。所有無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma，不依賴因緣而存在的法）能夠作為有為法的『緣』，因此也是有為諸法的『依』，因為有為法可以依託它們而生起。所有有為法不是無為法的『依』，因為有為法的生起和住立不依託無為法。

論：如果法是決定的，那就是內六處（adhyātma-ṣaḍāyatana，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六種感覺器官）。

述記：這裡解釋了『所依』以及『所依』的意義。為什麼這麼說呢？具備這四種意義才能稱為『所依』：一是『決定義』。如果一個法依靠另一個法而生起，那麼任何時候都依靠它而生起，所以說是『決定』。這排除了第六識（mano-vijñāna，意識）以五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺識）為依的情況，因為第六識並不總是依靠五識。第六識生起時，五識不一定存在，所以第六識不以五識為依。也排除了第八識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）以五根（pañcendriya，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）為依的情況，因為即使沒有五根，第八識也能生起。又排除了第七識（mana，末那識）和第八識以五、六識為依的情況，因為第七識和第八識恒常運轉，而五、六識是間斷的。即一切種子（sarva-bīja，一切法的種子）相對於能熏的現行法來說，不是『所依』，因為後來的現行法沒有自身的相續，所以不是『決定義』。並且別境（viniścaya，五種特殊的心所）中的善、染等法，不僅依賴自在，也依賴決定。只有遍行（sarvatraga，普遍存在的心所）以及色行蘊（rūpa-skandha，色蘊）的少部分是決定的。如果這樣，那麼四大種（mahābhūta，地、水、火、風四種基本元素）以及五根所依賴的扶塵根（upādāya-rūpa，由四大構成的感覺器官），四大，應該與五識成為『所依』。命根（jīvitendriya，維持生命的心所）、種子以及無為法等，應該與諸法成為『所依』，因為它們也是決定的。不是這樣的。即五蘊（pañca-skandha，色、受、想、行、識五種聚合）中，除了識蘊（vijñāna-skandha，識蘊）的少部分，彼此之間是『所依』。二是『有境義』。雖然是決定的，但本體必須有境。這排除了四大、五有色塵（rūpa-viṣaya，色塵）以及諸

【English Translation】 English version: Question: What is meant by 'depending on meaning'? Answer: 'Depending on meaning' refers to conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta-dharma, phenomena arising from causes and conditions) that arise and abide by relying on causes and conditions. This does not inquire into 'causal conditions' (hetu-pratyaya, the direct conditions that produce a result) and the other three conditions (equal and immediate condition, object-condition, and dominant condition). Considering the power of these conditions, they are all 'depending'. The new arising of dharmas is called 'being born', because they did not exist originally, like newly perfumed seeds. If a dharma originally exists and is able to abide, then it is not newly born, like an original seed. The newly perfumed 'cause' refers to the currently active dharma (vartamāna-dharma, the dharma that is currently functioning), and the 'condition' refers to the fundamental consciousness (mūla-vijñāna, the root consciousness) and the other three conditions. The original 'cause' refers to the previous dharma of the same kind, and the 'condition' refers to the currently active defiled dharmas (sāsrava-dharma, dharmas with afflictions), and so on.

Treatise: All that is relied upon and entrusted to, up to mutual dependence, etc.

Commentary: The analogy is understandable. That which is relied upon is also called 'depending', because the meaning of 'depending' is interconnected. All unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta-dharma, phenomena that do not depend on causes and conditions) can serve as conditions for conditioned dharmas, and therefore are also the 'depending' of all conditioned dharmas, because conditioned dharmas can rely on them to arise. All conditioned dharmas are not the 'depending' of unconditioned dharmas, because the arising and abiding of conditioned dharmas do not rely on unconditioned dharmas.

Treatise: If a dharma is definite, then it is the six internal sense bases (adhyātma-ṣaḍāyatana, the six sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind).

Commentary: This explains 'that which is depended upon' and the meaning of 'that which is depended upon'. Why is this so? Only when these four meanings are complete can it be called 'that which is depended upon': First, 'definiteness'. If a dharma arises relying on another dharma, then it always arises relying on it, so it is called 'definite'. This excludes the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna, mind consciousness) relying on the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna, the five sense consciousnesses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body), because the sixth consciousness does not always rely on the five consciousnesses. When the sixth consciousness arises, the five consciousnesses do not necessarily exist, so the sixth consciousness does not rely on the five consciousnesses. It also excludes the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) relying on the five roots (pañcendriya, the five sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body), because even without the five roots, the eighth consciousness can arise. It also excludes the seventh consciousness (mana, the mind consciousness) and the eighth consciousness relying on the five and six consciousnesses, because the seventh and eighth consciousnesses constantly operate, while the five and six consciousnesses are intermittent. That is, all seeds (sarva-bīja, the seeds of all dharmas) in relation to the perfuming active dharmas are not 'that which is depended upon', because the subsequent active dharmas do not have their own continuity, so it is not 'definiteness'. Furthermore, the good and defiled dharmas among the specific objects (viniścaya, the five specific mental factors) not only depend on freedom but also depend on definiteness. Only the pervasive (sarvatraga, the mental factors that are universally present) and a small part of the form aggregate (rūpa-skandha, the aggregate of form) are definite. If so, then the four great elements (mahābhūta, the four basic elements: earth, water, fire, and wind) and the supporting roots (upādāya-rūpa, the sense organs composed of the four great elements) on which the five roots rely, the four great elements, should become 'that which is depended upon' with the five consciousnesses. The life faculty (jīvitendriya, the mental factor that maintains life), seeds, and unconditioned dharmas, etc., should become 'that which is depended upon' with all dharmas, because they are also definite. It is not like this. That is, among the five aggregates (pañca-skandha, the five aggregates: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness), except for a small part of the consciousness aggregate (vijñāna-skandha, the aggregate of consciousness), they are 'that which is depended upon' in relation to each other. Second, 'having an object'. Although it is definite, the entity must have an object. This excludes the four great elements, the five sense objects (rūpa-viṣaya, the objects of form), and all

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種子．與現行法．一切無為為所依義。並非有境故。及不相應體雖是假如命根等亦是決定。是非有境故此簡之。即色蘊中唯除五根。所餘色蘊．及不相應行蘊．五蘊種子。故前所難彼非所依　若爾遍行五應是識所依。亦是決定。有境法故　不爾三為主故。雖體決定．亦是有境。謂要是主有自在力令余法生。即簡遍行．及余心所為余所依　四令心．心所取自所緣。即顯種子不以本識而為所依。種子不能取所緣故。此簡受．想蘊全．行蘊少分　總而言之。合除色．識蘊少分。受．想．行三蘊．五蘊種子。及無為法全。即唯五根．及八識相望少分是所依。四義具足能令心．心所取自所緣故。一一簡中皆須置此言。所簡之法不具四義令心．心所生故　今釋所依雖具四義。而以義準由少義理。謂自身識為依。非后為前前為后依。及他為自依故此所依義。他為自不決定。前後相望入后依攝非此所依。五識皆應以身根為所依。無所𨷂故。此亦不然。略有二解。如樞要說。其體是何。謂內六處。即是五根．及意根也。

論。余非有境定為主故。

述曰。謂前所除六處之餘。皆非有境。非定。非主。故前除蘊。除界除處應盡。當知以非有境．定．為主故　何以簡余先言有境。次有定言　顯文影互三因不定皆互說故　何以知然

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 種子、與現行法、一切無為法，是作為所依的意義。因為它們並非有境（vishaya，所緣境）的緣故。以及不相應行蘊的自體，雖然像是假立的命根等，也是決定的。因為它們不是有境的緣故，因此加以簡別。即色蘊中唯獨除去五根（indriya，眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根），其餘的色蘊、以及不相應行蘊、五蘊的種子，所以前面所提出的責難，它們並非所依。 如果這樣，遍行五蘊（指遍行觸、遍行作意、遍行受、遍行想、遍行思）應該是識（vijñāna，了別作用）的所依。因為它們也是決定的，並且是有境法的緣故？ 不是這樣的，因為三者（指根、境、識）是為主的緣故。雖然自體是決定的，也是有境的。意思是說，要是作為主，具有自在的力量，能夠令其餘的法產生。這就簡別了遍行，以及其餘的心所法，因為它們是其餘法所依的。 四者能夠令心、心所取自所緣境。這就顯示了種子不是以本識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）作為所依。因為種子不能取所緣境的緣故。這就簡別了受蘊、想蘊的全部，以及行蘊的小部分。 總而言之，合起來除去色蘊、識蘊的小部分，受蘊、想蘊、行蘊這三個蘊、五蘊的種子，以及全部的無為法。那麼就只有五根、以及八識（指眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）相互觀望的小部分是所依。四種意義都具備，能夠令心、心所取自所緣境的緣故。在每一個簡別中，都必須加上這句話：所簡別的法不具備四種意義，不能令心、心所生起的緣故。 現在解釋所依，雖然具備四種意義，但是以義理來衡量，由於缺少義理。意思是說，自身的識作為所依，不是後面的識作為前面的識的所依，也不是前面的識作為後面的識的所依，以及他者作為自身的所依，因此這個所依的意義，他者作為自身所依是不決定的，前後相互觀望，歸入後面的所依，不是這個所依。五識（指眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）都應該以身根作為所依，因為沒有所憑藉的緣故。這樣說也是不對的。大概有兩種解釋。如同《樞要》所說，它的體是什麼？就是內六處（āyatana，處），也就是五根、以及意根（manas-indriya）了。 論：其餘的不是有境，不是決定，不是為主的緣故。 述記：所說的前面所除去的六處之外的，都不是有境，不是決定，不是為主。所以前面除去蘊、除去界、除去處，應該窮盡。應當知道因為不是有境、決定、為主的緣故。 為什麼要簡別其餘的，先說有境，其次說決定呢？ 顯示文、影互相，三種原因不決定，都是互相說明的緣故。 為什麼知道是這樣的呢？

【English Translation】 English version Seeds, along with manifest dharmas (phenomena), and all unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta-dharma), serve as the meaning of 'that which is relied upon' (āśraya). This is because they are not objects of cognition (vishaya). Furthermore, the substance of non-associated formations (viprayukta-saṃskāra), although seemingly like hypothetical life-force (jīvita), is also determinate. This is because they are not objects of cognition, hence this distinction. Specifically, within the form aggregate (rūpa-skandha), only the five sense faculties (indriya) are excluded. The remaining form aggregate, as well as non-associated formations, and the seeds of the five aggregates (pañca-skandha), are not the basis, as previously argued. If that's the case, the five pervasive mental factors (sarvatraga; i.e., pervasive contact, pervasive volition, pervasive sensation, pervasive perception, pervasive thought) should be what the consciousness (vijñāna) relies on, since they are determinate and are objects of cognition? That is not the case, because the three (sense faculty, object, and consciousness) are primary. Although the substance is determinate and is an object of cognition, it means that being primary, it has the power to freely cause other dharmas to arise. This distinguishes the pervasive mental factors and other mental factors, because they are what other dharmas rely on. The fourth enables the mind and mental factors to take their own objects. This shows that seeds do not rely on the store consciousness (ālayavijñāna). This is because seeds cannot take objects. This distinguishes the entirety of the feeling aggregate (vedanā-skandha) and perception aggregate (saṃjñā-skandha), and a small part of the formation aggregate (saṃskāra-skandha). In summary, altogether exclude the form aggregate, a small part of the consciousness aggregate, the feeling, perception, and formation aggregates, the seeds of the five aggregates, and all unconditioned dharmas. Then only the five sense faculties and a small part of the mutual observation of the eight consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, manas, alaya) are what is relied upon. They fully possess the four meanings, enabling the mind and mental factors to take their own objects. In each distinction, it is necessary to add this statement: the dharmas being distinguished do not possess the four meanings, and therefore cannot cause the mind and mental factors to arise. Now explaining what is relied upon, although possessing the four meanings, it is measured by reason, due to a lack of meaning. It means that one's own consciousness is what is relied upon, not the later consciousness relying on the former, nor the former relying on the later, nor others relying on oneself. Therefore, the meaning of 'what is relied upon' is that others relying on oneself is not determinate. Mutual observation between before and after falls under the later reliance, not this reliance. The five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) should all rely on the body faculty, because there is nothing to depend on. This is also incorrect. There are roughly two explanations. As the Essentials say, what is its substance? It is the six internal sense bases (āyatana), which are the five sense faculties and the mind faculty (manas-indriya). Treatise: The rest are not objects of cognition, not determinate, and not primary. Commentary: What was said earlier about excluding the rest of the six sense bases are not objects of cognition, not determinate, and not primary. Therefore, the earlier exclusion of aggregates, realms, and sense bases should be exhaustive. It should be known that it is because they are not objects of cognition, determinate, and primary. Why, when distinguishing the rest, is 'object of cognition' mentioned first, and then 'determinate'? It shows that the text and its shadow are mutually related, and the three causes are indeterminate, so they are all explained mutually. How is it known to be so?

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依．所依別。五十五云。心．心所法何故名有所依　答由一種類托眾所依差別轉故。雖有為法無無依者。然非此中所說依義。唯恒所依為此量故　此中唯一種類托眾所依者。顯心．心所各各一故非如色等。唯心．心所有此所依。非所餘法有所依故。余法但名有依非所依義。乃至唯恒所依為此量故。即是此中決定之義。若名有所依心所亦是。體是所依心所即非。彼論言有依此言是故。

此如何等。

論。此但如王非如臣等。

述曰。如世間王為臣所依。非如臣等為王所依。以非主故。此喻但據少分為論。體不相似。臣與王非六處。定等四義不具故。非所依據一邊說。不得更互為因依故。此所說喻非具正合。

論。故諸聖教至無所緣故。

述曰。即前有境眼等為果。無所緣境故非有所依。此解所有．能依。翻出能有所依。以顯所有所依之義。四義不具色等非依。即第二義非有境簡。

論。但說心所至彼非主故。

述曰。但說心所心為所依。依於心故心為所主　不說心所為心所依。以彼心所體非主故。即第三義。此是依外別簡之法。故重言之。然諸識相望有不得者。此第一義。略而不論。下出依中正簡之故。

問如前第三本識五數。解五平等義中。言而時依同所緣事等。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

依和所依的區別。《五十五》中說：『心（citta，意識）和心所法（caitta，心理活動）為什麼被稱為有所依？』回答：『因為同一種類依託眾多所依的差別而轉變。』雖然有為法（saṃskṛta，有條件的現象）沒有無所依的，但這不是這裡所說的依的含義。只有恒常的所依才是這裡的衡量標準。

這裡只有同一種類依託眾多所依，顯示心和心所各自唯一，不像色等。只有心和心所具有這種所依，其餘的法沒有所依。其餘的法只是被稱為有依，而不是所依的含義。乃至只有恒常的所依才是這裡的衡量標準，這就是這裡決定的含義。如果名為有所依，心所也是。體是所依，心所就不是。彼論說有依，這裡說是故。

這是如何的呢？

論：這就像國王，不像臣子等。

述曰：就像世間的國王為臣子所依，不像臣子等為國王所依，因為不是主。這個比喻只是根據少部分來論述，體並不相似。臣子與國王不是六處（ṣaḍāyatana，感覺器官），定等四義不具備。不是所依根據一邊說，不能更互為因依。這裡所說的比喻不是完全恰當。

論：所以諸聖教到達無所緣故。

述曰：即前面有境的眼等為果，沒有所緣境，所以不是有所依。這個解釋所有、能依，翻出能有所依，以顯示所有所依的含義。四義不具備，色等不是依。即第二義，非有境簡。

論：只說心所至彼非主故。

述曰：只說心所心為所依，依於心故心為主。不說心所為心所依，因為彼心所體不是主。即第三義。這是依外別簡的方法，所以重複說。然而諸識相互觀望有不得的，這是第一義，省略而不論。下面出依中正簡的緣故。

問：如前第三本識五數，解釋五平等義中，說而時依同所緣事等。

【English Translation】 English version:

The difference between 'supported' and 'that which supports'. The Fifty-Five states: 'Why are the mind (citta, consciousness) and mental factors (caitta, mental activities) called 'having support'?' The answer is: 'Because the same kind relies on the differences of many supports and transforms.' Although conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta, conditioned phenomena) are not without support, this is not the meaning of 'support' as discussed here. Only constant support is the measure here.

Here, only the same kind relies on many supports, showing that the mind and mental factors are each unique, unlike form, etc. Only the mind and mental factors have this support; other dharmas do not have support. Other dharmas are only called 'having support,' but not in the sense of 'that which supports.' Furthermore, only constant support is the measure here; this is the definitive meaning here. If it is called 'having support,' mental factors are also. If the entity is 'that which supports,' then mental factors are not. That treatise says 'having support,' and this says 'therefore'.

What is this like?

Treatise: This is like a king, not like ministers, etc.

Commentary: Just as a king in the world is supported by ministers, not like ministers being supported by the king, because they are not the master. This metaphor is only based on a small part for discussion; the entities are not similar. Ministers and the king are not the six sense bases (ṣaḍāyatana, sense organs), and the four meanings of 'fixed,' etc., are not complete. It is not 'that which supports' based on one side; they cannot mutually be cause and support. The metaphor mentioned here is not entirely appropriate.

Treatise: Therefore, all the holy teachings reach the point of having no object of thought.

Commentary: That is, the eyes, etc., which previously had objects, are the result. Because there is no object of thought, they are not 'having support.' This explains 'that which has' and 'that which relies,' reversing to bring out 'that which can have support,' in order to show the meaning of 'that which has support.' The four meanings are not complete; form, etc., are not support. This is the second meaning, excluding 'having an object'.

Treatise: It only says that mental factors are supported by the mind, because the mind is the master.

Commentary: It only says that the mind is what mental factors rely on, because they rely on the mind, and the mind is the master. It does not say that mental factors are supported by mental factors, because the entity of those mental factors is not the master. This is the third meaning. This is a method of distinguishing externally, so it is repeated. However, the various consciousnesses cannot observe each other; this is the first meaning, omitted without discussion. The reason for the correct distinction within the support is given below.

Question: As in the previous third fundamental consciousness, the five numbers, in explaining the meaning of the five equalities, it says that time, reliance, the same object, etc.

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即以所依說為依等。如瑜伽第一。五識所依有三。一種子依。乃至第三等無間依。前此論言諸心．心所皆有所依。然所依有三。即以種子．等無間依皆名所依。何故此中定以六內處為所依。余但是依。

論。然有處說至皆隨宜假說。

述曰。此解相違。如次前引所依為依。皆是隨宜假說。一隨情宜。二隨文宜假說。所依為依。依為所依。非謂依．所依互得相因。今思審者所依可說依。依義通故。有依非所依。所依義局故。

既爾幾識有此俱有所依。

論。由此五識至六七八識。

述曰。下解具依多少　于中有二。初解識依。后解心所　初中復四。一解五識。二解第六。三解第七。四解第八。此即初也　眼等五識有四所依。謂五色根．六．七．八識。以五根為依。如大論．對法第一等非一　以六．七．八為所依出何典記。亦有誠證。如解深密七十六等。說五識起時必有一分別意識。如前數引。雖或不同境。由六有方生。如定中聞聲等。此亦同緣故。不見無意識時。五識獨起聞文。故世親攝論第四云五識以意為依。意散亂時五不生故。準彼明五以六為依　何故得知以七為依　如無性攝論第一證有第七中言。謂若不說有染污意。義不符順等。此中意言。由有第七識染故。施等有漏善法不成無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 即以作為依靠的事物說成是依靠等等。如《瑜伽師地論》第一卷所說，五識的依靠有三種：一種子依（bīja-āśraya，指阿賴耶識中儲存的五識種子），乃至第三種等無間依（samanantara-āśraya，指前一剎那的意識）。前面這部論典說，所有心和心所都有所依靠。然而，所依靠的事物有三種，即種子依和等無間依都可稱為所依。為什麼這裡特別指定六內處（ṣaḍ āyatana，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六種感覺器官）作為所依，而其餘的只是依呢？ 論：然而，有些地方說……都隨順情況而假說。 述記：這是爲了解釋前後矛盾之處。像前面引用的那樣，把所依說成依，都是隨順情況而假說的。一是隨順情理，二是隨順文句而假說。把所依說成依，把依說成所依，並不是說依和所依可以互相作為原因。現在仔細思考，所依可以說成依，因為依的含義更寬泛。有些依不是所依，因為所依的含義更侷限。 既然如此，有幾種識具有這種共同的所依？ 論：由此，五識……六、七、八識。 述記：下面解釋具有依靠的多少。其中分為兩部分：首先解釋識的依靠，然後解釋心所的依靠。在解釋識的依靠中又分為四個部分：一是解釋五識，二是解釋第六識，三是解釋第七識，四是解釋第八識。這裡是第一個部分。眼等五識有四種所依，即五色根（pañca rūpāyatana，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）、第六識（意識，manovijñāna）、第七識（末那識，manaḥ）、第八識（阿賴耶識，ālayavijñāna）。以五根作為依靠，如《大毗婆沙論》、《對法論》第一卷等，並非只有一種。以第六、第七、第八識作為所依，出自哪些經典記載？也有確鑿的證據。如《解深密經》第七十六節等，說五識生起時必定有一個分別意識。像前面多次引用的那樣，即使五識和意識所緣的境界不同，也因為有第六識才能產生。比如在禪定中聽到聲音等，這也是因為它們緣的是同一個法。沒有見到在沒有意識的時候，五識能夠單獨生起的情況。所以世親（Vasubandhu）的《攝大乘論》第四卷說，五識以意（manas）為依靠，因為意散亂的時候，五識就不會生起。根據這部論典，可以明白五識以第六識為依靠。為什麼能夠得知五識以第七識為依靠？如無性（Asaṅga）的《攝大乘論釋》第一卷證明有第七識時說，如果說沒有染污意（kliṣṭa-manas），義理就不符合等等。這裡說的意，是因為有第七識的染污，佈施等有漏的善法才不能成為無漏。

【English Translation】 English version: That is, speaking of what is relied upon as reliance, and so on. As stated in the first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the reliance of the five consciousnesses is threefold: first, the seed-reliance (bīja-āśraya, referring to the seeds of the five consciousnesses stored in the Ālaya-consciousness), and up to the third, the immediately preceding reliance (samanantara-āśraya, referring to the consciousness of the previous moment). The aforementioned treatise states that all minds and mental factors have something they rely upon. However, there are three kinds of things relied upon, namely, the seed-reliance and the immediately preceding reliance, both of which can be called 'that which is relied upon'. Why is it specifically designated here that the six internal sense bases (ṣaḍ āyatana, referring to the six sense organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) are 'that which is relied upon', while the rest are merely 'reliance'? Treatise: However, in some places it is said... all are provisionally stated according to circumstances. Commentary: This is to resolve the contradiction. As quoted earlier, speaking of 'that which is relied upon' as 'reliance' is all provisionally stated according to circumstances. First, it is provisionally stated according to sentiment; second, it is provisionally stated according to the wording. Speaking of 'that which is relied upon' as 'reliance', and 'reliance' as 'that which is relied upon', does not mean that 'reliance' and 'that which is relied upon' can mutually serve as causes. Upon careful consideration, 'that which is relied upon' can be spoken of as 'reliance' because the meaning of 'reliance' is broader. Some 'reliance' is not 'that which is relied upon' because the meaning of 'that which is relied upon' is more limited. Given this, how many consciousnesses have this shared 'that which is relied upon'? Treatise: Therefore, the five consciousnesses... the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses. Commentary: The following explains the quantity of possessions. It is divided into two parts: first, explaining the reliance of consciousnesses, and then explaining the reliance of mental factors. The explanation of the reliance of consciousnesses is further divided into four parts: first, explaining the five consciousnesses; second, explaining the sixth consciousness; third, explaining the seventh consciousness; and fourth, explaining the eighth consciousness. This is the first part. The five consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, have four 'that which is relied upon', namely, the five sense organs (pañca rūpāyatana, referring to the five sense organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body), the sixth consciousness (mind-consciousness, manovijñāna), the seventh consciousness (Manas-consciousness, manaḥ), and the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-consciousness, ālayavijñāna). That the five sense organs serve as reliance is stated in texts such as the Mahāvibhāṣā and the first volume of the Abhidharmakośa, and it is not just one. What scriptural records state that the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses serve as 'that which is relied upon'? There is also solid evidence. For example, the seventy-sixth section of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra states that when the five consciousnesses arise, there must be a discriminating mind-consciousness. As quoted many times before, even if the objects of the five consciousnesses and the mind-consciousness are different, they can arise because of the sixth consciousness. For example, hearing sounds in meditation is also because they are related to the same dharma. It has not been seen that the five consciousnesses can arise independently when there is no mind-consciousness. Therefore, Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium on the Great Vehicle) states in the fourth volume that the five consciousnesses rely on the mind (manas) because the five consciousnesses do not arise when the mind is distracted. According to that treatise, it can be understood that the five consciousnesses rely on the sixth consciousness. How can it be known that the five consciousnesses rely on the seventh consciousness? For example, Asaṅga's commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha proves the existence of the seventh consciousness by saying that if there is no defiled mind (kliṣṭa-manas), the meaning would not be consistent, and so on. The 'mind' mentioned here is because of the defilement of the seventh consciousness, so that meritorious deeds with outflows, such as giving, cannot become without outflows.

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漏。為彼染識之所漏故。如彼引頌言。如是染污意。是識之所依。此未滅識縛。終不得解脫等　世親攝論第一云。非是異生一期身中。離此我執應正道理。故知五識成有漏中。其第七識乃至彼未究竟滅。終不成無漏。如后卷說。故五識有漏　何以得知亦依第八者　世親攝論第一五同法中。彼五識身有五根．阿賴耶識為俱有依。此亦如是。有染污意．阿賴耶識為俱有依等。不能煩引　無性五同法雲阿賴耶識雖是意識俱生所依。然不應立為此別依。是共依故。因緣性故。現行是共依。種子是因緣　瑜伽．顯揚亦說由有阿賴耶識故執受色根。五種識身依之而轉等　又顯揚第一解阿賴耶識。云與轉識等作所依因。此文亦證與六．七為依。下一一引此等非一。故知五識以本識為共所依。

文雖有四與諸論同。何故五識要須具四。

論。隨闕一種至所依別故。

述曰。望彼五識並有力故具前四義。故於此四中。若隨闕一種。五識必不轉故　此四何別。五根與五識為同境依共取現境故。余則不定。獨得此名。第六意識與前五識為分別依。與依同緣分別境故。五雖無分別。意是分別為無分別依。如五十五說有分別心．無分別心。當言同緣現在境。乃至由三因故等。雖有不同緣如定中聞聲等。從多分．及長時為論。故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『漏』。因為被染污的識所漏失的緣故。如頌文所說：『如此染污的意（manas，末那識，第七識），是識（vijñāna，了別識，前六識）所依止的。此未滅識的束縛，終究不能得到解脫。』等等。世親（Vasubandhu）《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第一卷說：『不是異生（prthag-jana，凡夫）在一期生命中，離開了我執（ātma-graha）是合乎正理的。』所以知道五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）成為有漏（sāsrava）的，其中第七識乃至它沒有究竟滅盡，終究不能成為無漏（anāsrava）的，如後面章節所說。所以五識是有漏的。

憑什麼得知五識也依止第八識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）呢？

世親《攝大乘論》第一卷五同法中說：『這五識身有五根（pañcendriya）和阿賴耶識作為俱有依（sahabhū-āśraya）。這裡也是這樣，有染污的意和阿賴耶識作為俱有依。』等等。不能繁瑣地引用。

無性（Asaṅga）《五同法》說：『阿賴耶識雖然是意識（mano-vijñāna，第六識）俱生所依，但不應立為意識的別依（viśeṣa-āśraya），因為是共依（sādhāraṇa-āśraya）的緣故，是因緣性的緣故。現行（vartamāna）是共依，種子（bīja）是因緣。』

《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）、《顯揚聖教論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）也說由於有阿賴耶識的緣故，執受色根（rūpendriya），五種識身依止它而運轉等等。

又《顯揚聖教論》第一卷解釋阿賴耶識時說：『與轉識（pravṛtti-vijñāna，現行識）等作為所依因（āśraya-hetu）。』此文也證明阿賴耶識與第六識、第七識作為所依。下面一一引用，此類非一。所以知道五識以本識（阿賴耶識）作為共同的所依。

文中雖然有四種所依，與各論相同。為什麼五識必須具備這四種所依？

論：『缺少任何一種，都會導致所依不同。』

述曰：考慮到五識並有力量的緣故，具備前面的四種意義。因此，在這四種所依中，如果缺少任何一種，五識必定不能運轉。這四種所依有什麼區別？五根與五識是同境依（samanantara-āśraya），共同取現前的境界的緣故。其餘則不一定，唯獨得到這個名稱。第六意識與前五識是分別依（manasikāra-āśraya），與所依的五識共同緣取分別的境界的緣故。五識雖然沒有分別，意識是分別為無分別的所依。如《五十五》所說，有分別心、無分別心，應當說共同緣取現在的境界，乃至由於三個原因等等。雖然有不同緣取，如在禪定中聽到聲音等等。從大多數情況以及長時間來說，是這樣論述的。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Leakage (āsrava)'. Because of being leaked by the defiled consciousness (vijñāna). As the verse says: 'Such a defiled mind (manas), is what consciousness relies on. If the bonds of this unextinguished consciousness are not eliminated, one will ultimately not attain liberation.' And so on. Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna), Volume 1, states: 'It is not reasonable for ordinary beings (prthag-jana) in a single lifetime to be without attachment to self (ātma-graha).' Therefore, it is known that the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna) are with leakage (sāsrava), and the seventh consciousness (manas), until it is completely extinguished, ultimately cannot become without leakage (anāsrava), as stated in later chapters. Therefore, the five consciousnesses are with leakage.

How is it known that the five consciousnesses also rely on the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna)?

Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Volume 1, in the five common characteristics, states: 'These five aggregates of consciousness have the five sense organs (pañcendriya) and the ālayavijñāna as co-existent bases (sahabhū-āśraya). It is the same here, with the defiled mind and the ālayavijñāna as co-existent bases.' And so on. It is not possible to quote exhaustively.

Asaṅga's Five Common Characteristics states: 'Although the ālayavijñāna is the co-existent base of the mind consciousness (mano-vijñāna), it should not be established as a separate base (viśeṣa-āśraya) for the mind consciousness, because it is a common base (sādhāraṇa-āśraya), and because of its causal nature. The present activity (vartamāna) is a common base, and the seed (bīja) is the cause.'

The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) also state that because of the existence of the ālayavijñāna, it grasps the sense organ of form (rūpendriya), and the five aggregates of consciousness rely on it to function, and so on.

Furthermore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, Volume 1, explains the ālayavijñāna, stating: 'It serves as the causal basis (āśraya-hetu) for the evolving consciousnesses (pravṛtti-vijñāna).' This passage also proves that the ālayavijñāna serves as the basis for the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. The following will cite these one by one, and there are many such instances. Therefore, it is known that the five consciousnesses take the fundamental consciousness (ālayavijñāna) as their common basis.

Although there are four bases mentioned in the text, which is consistent with various treatises, why must the five consciousnesses possess these four bases?

Treatise: 'Lacking any one of them will lead to a different basis.'

Commentary: Considering that the five consciousnesses have power, they possess the preceding four meanings. Therefore, among these four bases, if any one is lacking, the five consciousnesses will definitely not function. What are the differences among these four bases? The five sense organs and the five consciousnesses are the bases of the same object (samanantara-āśraya), because they jointly take the present object. The others are not necessarily so, and only they receive this name. The sixth consciousness is the basis of discrimination (manasikāra-āśraya) for the preceding five consciousnesses, because it jointly grasps the discriminated object with the five consciousnesses that it relies on. Although the five consciousnesses do not have discrimination, the mind consciousness is the basis of discrimination for the non-discriminating consciousnesses. As stated in Fifty-Five, with discriminating mind and non-discriminating mind, it should be said that they jointly grasp the present object, and so on, due to three reasons. Although there are different grasps, such as hearing sounds in meditation, and so on. This is discussed from the perspective of the majority of cases and over a long period of time.

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言分別依。此據散位非謂定心　或分別言非謂散心。后得智中緣事之智亦名分別。是彼類故。無不遍失。定中之心亦名分別。故第六識唯得此名。

第七與五識為染凈依。五識由此根本染故成有漏。根本凈故成無漏。全成凈已不漏五識。名根本凈　因中第六起善心時不漏五識。但由七故一切時漏。乃至意識善心亦為彼漏故　其第八識與前五識為根本依。如前說故。故此四依其義差別　若爾何故如對法第一等。言眼識者依眼緣色似色了別。乃至廣說。

論。聖教唯說至近相順故。

述曰。言五根者。以不共故。余識不依故。一也　又此必與五識同境。二也　此又相近。余依遠故。三也　又此相順。余境別故。四也　所以不說余之三依。

下第二段也。

論。第六意識至必不轉故。

述曰。此第六識唯二所依。引證如前。其文可解。瑜伽五十一．顯揚十七等。云由有阿賴耶識故有末那。末那為依意得轉等。如前攝論共依文等是。

問五俱必有意五以意為依。意了五不無。五應為意依。為釋此難。

論。雖五識俱至故非所依。

述曰。雖五識俱意識明瞭。而不定有。無五識時意識亦有。故此不說。不取為所依。可是依義。

何故余處如對法第二等。又意依有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『言分別依』。這裡指的是散位，而不是指在禪定中的心。或者說，『分別言』不是指散亂的心。在後得智（Prajñā obtained after meditation）中，緣於事物的智慧也稱為『分別』，因為它與前述的『分別』屬於同一類。如果不是這樣，那麼所有的『分別』都會失去其普遍性。在禪定中的心也稱為『分別』，因此第六識（意識，Manovijñāna）只能得到這個名稱。

第七識（末那識，Manas）與前五識（眼識，耳識，鼻識，舌識，身識）互為染污和清凈的所依。前五識由於第七識這個根本是染污的，所以成為有漏（具有煩惱）的；由於第七識這個根本是清凈的，所以成為無漏（沒有煩惱）的。當第七識完全成為清凈的時候，就不會再漏失到前五識，這叫做『根本凈』。在因位中，第六識生起善心的時候，不會漏失到前五識，但是由於第七識的緣故，一切時候都會漏失，乃至第六識的善心也會因為第七識的緣故而漏失。第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālayavijñāna）與前五識互為根本所依，就像前面所說的那樣。因此，這四種所依的意義是不同的。如果是這樣，那麼為什麼像《阿毗達磨對法論》（Abhidharma）第一卷等經論中說，眼識是依靠眼根（眼睛，Eye）緣於色塵（顏色，Form）而產生類似於色塵的了別作用，乃至廣說呢？

論：聖教只是說了最接近和最順應的所依。

述曰：說五根（眼根，耳根，鼻根，舌根，身根）是因為它們是不共的，其他的識不依靠它們，這是一點。而且，這五根必定與前五識同境，這是第二點。這五根又很接近，其他的所依很遙遠，這是第三點。而且，這五根很順應，其他的境是不同的，這是第四點。所以沒有說其他的三個所依。

下面是第二段。

論：第六意識只是依靠第六意識和第七識，而且第七識必定不會轉變。

述曰：這第六識只是依靠兩種所依。引用的證據就像前面一樣，其中的文字可以理解。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第五十一卷、《顯揚聖教論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第十七卷等經論中說，由於有阿賴耶識，所以有末那識，末那識作為所依，意識才能運轉等等，就像前面《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中的共同所依的文字一樣。

問：前五識同時生起的時候必定有意識，前五識以意識為所依。意識了別前五識的時候，前五識不會沒有。前五識應該作為意識的所依。爲了解釋這個難題。

論：雖然前五識同時生起的時候意識是明瞭的，但是不一定是有的。沒有前五識的時候，意識也是有的。所以這裡不說前五識作為意識的所依，不取前五識作為所依。但是可以是依的意義。

為什麼其他地方，比如《阿毗達磨對法論》第二卷等經論中，又說意識的所依有……

【English Translation】 English version 'Speech relies on discrimination (Vikalpa)'. This refers to the scattered state of mind, not the mind in Samadhi (meditative absorption). Alternatively, 'discriminative speech' does not refer to the scattered mind. In the wisdom attained after meditation (Prajñā obtained after meditation), the wisdom that cognizes objects is also called 'discrimination', because it belongs to the same category as the aforementioned 'discrimination'. Otherwise, all 'discriminations' would lose their universality. The mind in Samadhi is also called 'discrimination'; therefore, the sixth consciousness (Manovijñāna) only gets this name.

The seventh consciousness (Manas) serves as the basis for defilement and purity for the first five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses). Because this root, the seventh consciousness, is defiled, the first five consciousnesses become afflicted (with outflows, i.e., having afflictions). Because this root is pure, the first five consciousnesses become un-afflicted (without outflows, i.e., free from afflictions). When the seventh consciousness becomes completely pure, it no longer leaks into the first five consciousnesses; this is called 'fundamental purity'. In the causal stage, when the sixth consciousness generates wholesome thoughts, it does not leak into the first five consciousnesses, but because of the seventh consciousness, it leaks at all times, even the wholesome thoughts of the sixth consciousness leak because of the seventh consciousness. The eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna) serves as the fundamental basis for the first five consciousnesses, as mentioned earlier. Therefore, the meanings of these four bases are different. If so, then why do scriptures like the first volume of the Abhidharma say that eye consciousness relies on the eye organ (Eye) and cognizes forms (Form), producing a discernment similar to forms, and so on?

Treatise: The sacred teachings only speak of the closest and most agreeable bases.

Commentary: The five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body organs) are mentioned because they are unique; the other consciousnesses do not rely on them, this is one point. Also, these five organs necessarily share the same objects as the first five consciousnesses, this is the second point. Furthermore, these five organs are very close, while the other bases are distant, this is the third point. Moreover, these five organs are agreeable, while the other objects are different, this is the fourth point. Therefore, the other three bases are not mentioned.

The following is the second section.

Treatise: The sixth consciousness relies only on the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, and the seventh consciousness necessarily does not transform.

Commentary: This sixth consciousness relies only on two bases. The cited evidence is as before, and the text can be understood. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 51, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, volume 17, and other scriptures say that because there is the Ālayavijñāna, there is the Manas, and with the Manas as the basis, the mind can function, etc., just like the text on the common basis in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

Question: When the first five consciousnesses arise simultaneously, there must be a mind; the first five consciousnesses rely on the mind. When the mind cognizes the first five consciousnesses, the first five consciousnesses cannot be absent. The first five consciousnesses should serve as the basis for the mind. To explain this difficulty.

Treatise: Although the mind is clear when the first five consciousnesses arise simultaneously, it is not necessarily present. The mind can be present even when the first five consciousnesses are absent. Therefore, the first five consciousnesses are not mentioned as the basis for the mind; they are not taken as the basis. However, they can be the meaning of reliance.

Why do other places, such as the second volume of the Abhidharma, say that the basis for the mind is...

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二。一無間滅意。是後世依。二俱有依。謂第七不言第八。

論。聖教唯說至近相順故。

述曰。以染凈依故。所以如前。一也　同轉識攝。二也　近三也　相順者。多引意識起染污執等由第七識。故言相順俱計度故。非如第八。四也。所以第八有處不說。

下第三段也。

論。第七意識至定不轉故。

述曰。此依第八。如六十三說第七為意識。正與此同。八若無時七亦無故。瑜伽論說由有本識故有末那等。又無性言本識是共依。故知此所依。

論。如伽他說至余轉識得生。

述曰。楞伽經第九卷總品中頌。舊偈云依止阿梨耶。能轉生意識。依止依心意。能生於轉識。稍與此別。準此前依足為好證。今文可解。

論。阿賴耶識至定不轉故。

述曰。下第四段有四。一標宗。二引證。三會違。四解種。第八所依唯亦一種。謂第七識。第七若無八不轉故。

何以知然。

論。論說藏識至此即末那。

述曰。下引證也。六十三說恒與末那一俱轉故　又說藏識恒依染污。即如無性第三卷云或有說言。與四煩惱恒相應心名染污依。同世親說。由此既言恒依染污。故知第八以七為依　前第三師初以七為八依　量云。是識性故。有俱有依。或應依無間斷

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二。一、無間滅意（anantarya-nirodha-citta，指前念滅后立即生起后唸的意識）。是後世所依賴的。二、俱有依（sahabhu-ashraya，共同存在的所依）。指的是第七識（manas）而不說是第八識（ālayavijñāna）。

論：聖教只說最接近和順應的緣故。

述記：因為染凈的所依的緣故。所以如前所說。一、同屬于轉識所攝。二、接近。三、相順應。多數情況下，意識（vijñāna）產生染污的執著等，都是由於第七識。所以說是相順應，共同進行計度。不像第八識。四、所以第八識在有些地方沒有被提及。

下面是第三段。

論：第七意識決定不轉變的緣故。

述記：這是依據第八識來說的。如第六十三卷所說，第七識是意識。正好與此相同。第八識如果不存在，第七識也就不存在。瑜伽論說，由於有本識（mula-vijñāna），所以有末那（manas）等。又無性說，本識是共同的所依。因此可知這是所依賴的。

論：如伽他（gāthā，偈頌）所說，其餘轉識才能產生。

述記：楞伽經（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）第九卷總品中的偈頌。舊的偈頌說，依靠阿梨耶（ālayavijñāna），能夠轉生意識。依靠依心意（citta-manas-manovijñāna），能夠產生轉識。稍微與此不同。按照前面的依據，足以作為好的證明。現在的文句可以這樣解釋。

論：阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna）決定不轉變的緣故。

述記：下面第四段有四點。一、標明宗旨。二、引用證據。三、會通牴觸。四、解釋種子。第八識所依賴的也只有一種，就是第七識。第七識如果不存在，第八識就不會轉變。

憑什麼知道是這樣呢？

論：論中說，藏識（ālayavijñāna）始終與末那（manas）在一起。

述記：下面引用證據。第六十三卷說，始終與末那一起運轉。又說，藏識始終依賴染污。就像無性第三卷所說，或者有人說，與四種煩惱（kleśas）始終相應的心，名為染污依。與世親（Vasubandhu）所說相同。由此既然說始終依賴染污，因此可知第八識以第七識為所依。前面第三師最初以第七識為第八識的所依。量云：因為是識的自性，所以有俱有的所依。或者應該依賴無間斷。

【English Translation】 English version II. 1. The meaning of uninterrupted cessation (anantarya-nirodha-citta). This is what the subsequent existence relies on. 2. Co-existent dependence (sahabhu-ashraya). This refers to the seventh consciousness (manas) without mentioning the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna).

Treatise: The Holy Teaching only speaks of what is closest and most agreeable.

Commentary: Because of being the basis for defilement and purity. Therefore, as mentioned before: 1. It is included in the transformed consciousness. 2. It is close. 3. It is agreeable. In most cases, the consciousness (vijñāna) generates defiled attachments, etc., due to the seventh consciousness. Therefore, it is said to be agreeable, jointly performing conceptualization. It is not like the eighth consciousness. 4. Therefore, the eighth consciousness is not mentioned in some places.

The following is the third section.

Treatise: The seventh consciousness is definitely not transformed.

Commentary: This is based on the eighth consciousness. As stated in the sixty-third fascicle, the seventh consciousness is the consciousness. It is exactly the same as this. If the eighth consciousness does not exist, the seventh consciousness will not exist either. The Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra states that because there is the fundamental consciousness (mula-vijñāna), there is manas, etc. Furthermore, Asaṅga (Wuxing) says that the fundamental consciousness is the common basis. Therefore, it can be known that this is what is relied upon.

Treatise: As the gāthā (verse) says, the remaining transformed consciousnesses can arise.

Commentary: The verse in the General Chapter of the ninth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. The old verse says, 'Relying on the Ālaya (ālayavijñāna), the consciousness can be transformed and arise. Relying on the mind-consciousness (citta-manas-manovijñāna), the transformed consciousness can arise.' It is slightly different from this. According to the previous basis, it is sufficient as good evidence. The current text can be explained in this way.

Treatise: The Ālaya consciousness (ālayavijñāna) is definitely not transformed.

Commentary: The following fourth section has four points: 1. Stating the purpose. 2. Citing evidence. 3. Reconciling contradictions. 4. Explaining seeds. The eighth consciousness relies on only one thing, which is the seventh consciousness. If the seventh consciousness does not exist, the eighth consciousness will not be transformed.

How is it known to be so?

Treatise: The treatise says that the store consciousness (ālayavijñāna) is always with the manas.

Commentary: The following cites evidence. The sixty-third fascicle says that it always operates with the manas. It also says that the store consciousness always relies on defilement. Just as Asaṅga (Wuxing) says in the third fascicle, 'Or some say that the mind that is always associated with the four afflictions (kleśas) is called the defiled basis.' It is the same as what Vasubandhu said. Since it is said to always rely on defilement, therefore it can be known that the eighth consciousness relies on the seventh consciousness. The previous third teacher initially regarded the seventh consciousness as the basis of the eighth consciousness. The reasoning is: Because it is the nature of consciousness, there is co-existent dependence. Or it should rely on uninterrupted cessation.

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識。識體無間斷故。如第七　故此第八有俱有依。如前師成立。此等諸說第三及第四說第八有依謂第七者。皆是三位有第七識。前第一師難言無者與七為例。言恒相續。故無有依亦是此流。第二師說唯獨不許第八有依。即是三位無第七家。亦作此義無相違故。

前第二師等問。第八既有依謂第七。何故說三位無第七。即依義不定故。

論。而說三位至此亦應爾。

述曰。下會違也。論主答曰。依有覆說謂三位無。隨何乘障有覆性說。無有覆故言無末那非謂無體。不障彼乘之識。或無漏識。亦得有故。如五十一言四位無阿賴耶。非無第八之體。此類應然。非無第七之體。既不間斷故得為依　言三位者。六十三等說。謂滅盡定．無學位．聖道現前　四位無阿賴耶者。即五十一．及顯揚十七等四句中。成就轉識非阿賴耶。謂聲聞．獨覺．不退菩薩．如來。不入無心位　問六七為依。非七轉時六不轉。八七為依。七既轉時八應轉。又八為七依。依轉七亦轉。八七為依。依轉八亦轉。於此義中應設功力。此中轉者。謂轉無漏。

又各別依故因。即色界第八亦依色根。是遍依故。何故不說。

論。雖有色界至非所依攝。

述曰。闕一義故但可為依。而非所依。亦不違論。

第三師云。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：識（Vijnana，了別作用）。識的自體沒有間斷的緣故。例如第七識（末那識，Manas-vijnana，意根）的緣故，因此第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana，藏識）有俱生的所依。如之前的論師所成立的。這些說法中，第三和第四種說法認為第八識的所依是第七識。都是在三種情況下有第七識。之前的第一個論師難以說沒有，以第七識為例，說它恒常相續，所以沒有所依也是這種流派的觀點。第二個論師說唯獨不允許第八識有所依，就是在三種情況下沒有第七識的觀點，也可以這樣解釋，沒有相違背的地方。

之前的第二個論師等問：第八識既然有所依，認為是第七識，為什麼說三種情況下沒有第七識？就是因為所依的意義不確定。

論：而說三種情況，這裡也應該這樣理解。

述記說：下面會解釋相違之處。論主回答說：依據有覆蓋來說，認為三種情況下沒有。隨著什麼乘的障礙有覆蓋性，就說什麼乘沒有有覆性，所以說沒有末那識，不是說沒有末那識的自體。不障礙那個乘的識，或者無漏識，也是可以有的。如《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷所說，四種情況下沒有阿賴耶識，不是說沒有第八識的自體。這類情況應該這樣理解，不是說沒有第七識的自體。既然不間斷，所以可以作為所依。說三種情況，如《成唯識論》第六十三卷等所說，是指滅盡定（Nirodha-samapatti，滅受想定）、無學位（Asekha，無學果位）、聖道現前。四種情況下沒有阿賴耶識，就是《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷以及《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷等四句中所說，成就轉識（Pravrtti-vijnana，現行識）而非阿賴耶識，是指聲聞（Sravaka，聞法覺悟者）、獨覺（Pratyekabuddha，緣覺）、不退菩薩（Avinivartaniya-bodhisattva，不退轉菩薩）、如來（Tathagata，佛）。不入無心位。問：第六識和第七識作為所依，不是第七識轉的時候第六識不轉。第八識和第七識作為所依，第七識既然轉的時候第八識應該轉。又第八識作為第七識的所依，所依轉的時候第七識也轉。第八識和第七識作為所依，所依轉的時候第八識也轉。在這個意義中應該設立功力。這裡所說的轉，是指轉為無漏。

又因為各自不同的所依的緣故。就是第八識也依色根（Rupa-indriya，眼耳鼻舌身五根）。因為是普遍的所依的緣故，為什麼不說？

論：雖然有，但不是所依所攝。

述記說：缺少一個意義的緣故，只可以作為依，而不是所依。也不違背論的說法。

第三個論師說：

【English Translation】 English version: Vijnana (consciousness, the function of distinguishing). Because the substance of consciousness is without interruption. For example, because of the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana, the root of mind), therefore the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) has a co-existing support. As established by the previous teachers. Among these statements, the third and fourth statements consider the seventh consciousness as the support of the eighth consciousness. All are in the three situations where there is a seventh consciousness. The previous first teacher found it difficult to say there is none, taking the seventh consciousness as an example, saying that it is constantly continuous, so the view that there is no support is also of this school. The second teacher said that he alone does not allow the eighth consciousness to have a support, which is the view that there is no seventh consciousness in the three situations, and it can also be explained in this way, without any contradiction.

The previous second teacher and others asked: Since the eighth consciousness has a support, considering it to be the seventh consciousness, why is it said that there is no seventh consciousness in the three situations? It is because the meaning of support is uncertain.

Treatise: And saying three situations, it should also be understood here.

Commentary says: The contradiction will be explained below. The treatise master replied: Based on having obscuration, it is considered that there is none in the three situations. Depending on what vehicle's obstacles have obscuration, it is said that what vehicle does not have obscuration, so it is said that there is no Manas-vijnana, not that there is no substance of Manas-vijnana. It does not obstruct the consciousness of that vehicle, or the unconditioned consciousness, which is also possible. As stated in the fifty-first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, there is no Alaya-vijnana in the four situations, not that there is no substance of the eighth consciousness. This kind of situation should be understood in this way, not that there is no substance of the seventh consciousness. Since it is not interrupted, it can be used as a support. Saying three situations, as stated in the sixty-third volume of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra and others, refers to Nirodha-samapatti (cessation attainment), Asekha (the state of no more learning), and the manifestation of the holy path. There is no Alaya-vijnana in the four situations, which is stated in the fifty-first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the seventeenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and others, in the four sentences, achieving Pravrtti-vijnana (active consciousness) rather than Alaya-vijnana, refers to Sravaka (hearer), Pratyekabuddha (solitary Buddha), Avinivartaniya-bodhisattva (non-retrogressing Bodhisattva), and Tathagata (Buddha). Not entering the state of no-mind. Question: The sixth and seventh consciousnesses are the support, it is not that when the seventh consciousness turns, the sixth consciousness does not turn. The eighth and seventh consciousnesses are the support, since the seventh consciousness turns, the eighth consciousness should turn. Also, the eighth consciousness is the support of the seventh consciousness, when the support turns, the seventh consciousness also turns. The eighth and seventh consciousnesses are the support, when the support turns, the eighth consciousness also turns. In this meaning, effort should be made. The turning mentioned here refers to turning into the unconditioned.

Also, because of the different supports. That is, the eighth consciousness also relies on Rupa-indriya (the five roots of eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body). Because it is a universal support, why not say it?

Treatise: Although there is, it is not included in the supported.

Commentary says: Because it lacks a meaning, it can only be used as a support, but not as a supported. It does not contradict the statement of the treatise.

The third teacher said:

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諸識種子應有所依。七．八現行識具三義。如前理說。

論。識種不能至而無所依。

述曰。下解種子。其種子識不能現緣自親現行所緣之境。前立宗言令心．心所取自所緣是所依義。種非心．心所故。由闕一義故。可有依非有所依攝　又解此文現行不以種為所依。闕有境義非現所依　此中二解。一簡現行第八非種所依。二簡種子非現所依　此等諸解雖文不同理切論成。妙符中者其第四說。

論。心所所依至相應之心。

述曰。第二段解心所也。心所之法隨識應說。始但有四乃至有一。復各加自相應之心即相應依。初五識心所有五所依。乃至第八心所有二所依。此前三師皆隨自所立識所依說其多少。復各加自相應之依。

論。若作是說妙符理教。

述曰。三總結正。第四說者妙符理教。如前所引。此等義理諸論雖有。由文散隱諸賢勿究。今類夜光顯彼義矣。

成唯識論述記卷第四(末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

成唯識論述記卷第五(本)

沙門基撰

論。云后開導依至不相續故。

述曰。即是難陀等長徒之義。文分為三。一辨五識。二辨第六。三辨七．八。此等即初。此依居末故復言后。開導依名如前已釋

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 各種識的種子應當有所依處。第七識和第八識的現行識具有三種含義，如前面所說的道理一樣。

論：識的種子不能自己產生，必須有所依。

述記：下面解釋種子。這些種子識不能直接緣取自己親近的現行識所緣的境界。前面立宗說，使心和心所取自己所緣的境界是所依的含義。種子不是心和心所，因為它缺少一種含義。可以有依處，但不被攝為有所依。又解釋這段文字，現行識不以種子為所依，因為它缺少有境界的含義，不是現行識的所依。這裡有兩種解釋：一是簡別現行第八識不是種子的所依；二是簡別種子不是現行識的所依。這些解釋雖然文字不同，但道理切合，論述成立。最符合中道的，是第四種說法。

論：心所的所依是與它相應的心。

述記：第二段解釋心所。心所之法隨著識而說。開始只有四個，乃至只有一個。又各自加上自己相應的心，即是相應的依處。前五識的心所有五個所依，乃至第八識的心所有兩個所依。此前三位法師都隨著自己所立的識的所依，說其多少。又各自加上自己相應的依處。

論：如果這樣說，就非常符合道理和教義。

述記：第三總結正義。第四種說法最符合道理和教義，如前面所引用的。這些義理，各種論著雖然有，但因為文字分散隱晦，各位賢者沒有深入研究。現在用夜光石來顯明那些義理。

《成唯識論述記》卷第四（末） 大正藏第43冊 No. 1830 《成唯識論述記》

《成唯識論述記》卷第五（本）

沙門基撰

論：說後面開導依處，因為不相續的緣故。

述記：這就是難陀（Nanda，人名）等長徒的義理。文字分為三部分：一是辨別五識；二是辨別第六識；三是辨別第七識和第八識。這些是第一部分。這個依處位於最後，所以又說後面。開導依的名稱，如前面已經解釋。

【English Translation】 English version: The seeds of all consciousnesses should have a basis. The manifest consciousnesses of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses have three meanings, as explained in the previous reasoning.

Treatise: The seeds of consciousness cannot arise on their own and must have a basis.

Commentary: The following explains the seeds. These seed consciousnesses cannot directly cognize the realm cognized by their own close, manifest consciousnesses. The previous proposition stated that causing the mind and mental functions to take their own cognized realm is the meaning of a basis. Seeds are not mind and mental functions because they lack one meaning. There can be a basis, but it is not included as having a basis. Also, this passage explains that manifest consciousnesses do not take seeds as their basis because they lack the meaning of having a realm; they are not the basis of manifest consciousnesses. There are two explanations here: one distinguishes that the manifest eighth consciousness is not the basis of seeds; the other distinguishes that seeds are not the basis of manifest consciousnesses. Although these explanations differ in wording, the reasoning is appropriate, and the treatise is established. The most consistent with the middle way is the fourth explanation.

Treatise: The basis of mental functions is the mind that corresponds to them.

Commentary: The second section explains mental functions. The dharma of mental functions should be explained along with consciousnesses. Initially, there are only four, and even only one. Each also adds its own corresponding mind, which is the corresponding basis. The mental functions of the first five consciousnesses have five bases, and the mental functions of the eighth consciousness have two bases. The previous three masters all explained the number of bases according to the bases of the consciousnesses they established. Each also added its own corresponding basis.

Treatise: If it is said in this way, it is very consistent with reason and doctrine.

Commentary: The third summarizes the correct meaning. The fourth explanation is most consistent with reason and doctrine, as quoted earlier. Although these meanings are present in various treatises, because the wording is scattered and obscure, the wise have not deeply studied them. Now, use a noctilucent stone to illuminate those meanings.

Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume Four (End) Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 43, No. 1830, Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only

Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume Five (Beginning)

Composed by the Shramana (Buddhist monk) Kui Ji (K'uei-chi)

Treatise: Saying that the subsequent guiding basis is because of non-continuity.

Commentary: This is the meaning of Nanda (Nanda, a person's name) and other long-term disciples. The text is divided into three parts: one is to distinguish the five consciousnesses; the second is to distinguish the sixth consciousness; and the third is to distinguish the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. These are the first part. This basis is located at the end, so it is said again later. The name of the guiding basis has been explained before.

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。此師意說。如瑜伽等第一。五識六業中第四業云唯一剎那了別。彼第三云。又非五識身有二剎那俱生。亦非展轉無間而生。故大乘中。五識唯一剎那必不相續。終始必然。又彼第三云。又一剎那五識生已。從此無間必意識生。從此無間。或時散亂。或耳識生。餘五識中隨一生等。故知五識自類前後。及與他前後。皆不相續。

論。必第六識至為開導依。

述曰。如前數引。非自力生。彼第三又云。說眼識等隨意識轉。亦是唯以第六意識為無間依。第七．八識於此無力不引此生。非此開導。故前五識各唯依六。

論。第六意識至為開導依。

述曰。或由五識所引生故。彼第三云五識無間必意識生。故是此證。即明瞭心後生意識。即以自．及五識。合八識中以前六識為開導依。

論。第七八識至為開導依。

述曰。自相續故。不假他力所引生故。但自類為依　問曰平等智起等時何非此依　答彼先自生。但由六識令其轉變。非由今引方始令起故非此依。彼力疏遠。此常徒義。

論。有義彼說未為究理。

述曰。安惠等解。文有其二。一破斥。二申正義　破中有三。一總非。二別破。三結。此即第一。撥前全非故言未究。

論。且前五識至可如所說。

述曰

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 此師的意說是，如《瑜伽師地論》等第一義中，五識六業中的第四業說，五識『唯一剎那了別』。該論第三義中說：『又不是五識身有二剎那同時生起，也不是輾轉無間而生。』所以大乘中，五識唯一剎那，必定不相續，終結和開始是必然的。又該論第三義中說：『又一剎那五識生起后，從此無間必定意識生起。從此無間，或者散亂，或者耳識生起，其餘五識中隨一生起等。』所以知道五識自類前後，以及與他類前後，都不相續。 論：必定是第六識才能作為開導依。 述曰：如前面多次引用的，五識不是自身的力量產生。該論第三義又說：『說眼識等隨著意識轉，也是唯以第六意識作為無間依。』第七識（末那識，Manas-vijnana）、第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）對此沒有力量，不能引導五識生起，不是五識的開導者。所以前五識各自唯一依靠第六識（意識，Manovijnana）。 論：第六意識才能作為開導依。 述曰：或者由五識所引導而生起。該論第三義說五識無間必定意識生起，所以這是證明。即明瞭心後生意識，即以自身以及五識，合八識中以前六識作為開導依。 論：第七識、第八識才能作為開導依。 述曰：因為自身相續，不假借其他力量所引導生起。只是自類作為所依。問：平等性智（Samatajnana）生起等時候，為什麼不是第七識、第八識作為所依？答：因為平等性智先自身生起，只是由第六識令其轉變，不是由現在引導才開始生起，所以不是第七識、第八識作為所依。第七識、第八識的力量疏遠，這是常隨的意義。 論：有義是說，那種說法還沒有達到究竟的道理。 述曰：安慧（Sthiramati）等的解釋，文中有兩種：一是破斥，二是闡述正義。破斥中有三：一是總的否定，二是分別破斥，三是總結。這即是第一，否定前面的全部，所以說沒有達到究竟。 論：且前五識至少可以如所說。

【English Translation】 English version: This teacher's meaning is, as in the first meaning of treatises like the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論), the fourth karma in the six karmas of the five consciousnesses says that the five consciousnesses 'discern only for a single moment'. The third meaning of that treatise says: 'Moreover, it is not that two moments of the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously, nor do they arise through uninterrupted succession.' Therefore, in Mahayana, the five consciousnesses are only a single moment, and they definitely do not continue in succession; the beginning and end are inevitable. Also, the third meaning of that treatise says: 'Moreover, after the five consciousnesses arise for a single moment, the mind consciousness (Manovijnana) inevitably arises without interruption. After this uninterruptedly, sometimes distraction arises, or the ear consciousness arises, or one of the other five consciousnesses arises, etc.' Therefore, it is known that the five consciousnesses, whether in their own category before and after, or with other categories before and after, do not continue in succession. Treatise: It must be the sixth consciousness that serves as the guiding support. Commentary: As quoted many times before, the five consciousnesses do not arise from their own power. The third meaning of that treatise also says: 'It is said that the eye consciousness, etc., follow the mind consciousness, and it is also only the sixth consciousness that serves as the uninterrupted support.' The seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana) and the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) do not have the power to guide the five consciousnesses to arise; they are not the guides of the five consciousnesses. Therefore, each of the first five consciousnesses relies solely on the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana). Treatise: The sixth consciousness serves as the guiding support. Commentary: Or it arises because it is guided by the five consciousnesses. The third meaning of that treatise says that the mind consciousness inevitably arises without interruption after the five consciousnesses, so this is the proof. That is, the mind consciousness arises after the clear mind, that is, using itself and the five consciousnesses, combining the first six consciousnesses among the eight consciousnesses as the guiding support. Treatise: The seventh and eighth consciousnesses serve as the guiding support. Commentary: Because they are self-continuing, they do not rely on the power of others to be guided to arise. They only take their own category as support. Question: When the Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana) arises, etc., why are the seventh and eighth consciousnesses not the support? Answer: Because the Equality Wisdom arises by itself first, it is only transformed by the sixth consciousness, it is not guided to arise now, so the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are not the support. The power of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses is distant; this is the meaning of constant following. Treatise: Some say that that explanation has not reached the ultimate truth. Commentary: The explanation of Sthiramati (安慧) and others, the text has two aspects: one is refutation, and the other is expounding the correct meaning. There are three aspects to the refutation: one is general negation, two is separate refutation, and three is conclusion. This is the first, negating all of the preceding, so it is said that it has not reached the ultimate. Treatise: And the first five consciousnesses can at least be as described.

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。下別破斥。文有其四。一破五識。二破第六。三破末那。四破第八。

破五識中。初縱。后奪。此即縱也。前師五識唯一念生。今先破此故言且如前。五種識等。謂五識有三位。若論多分可一念生。一未自在位。二率爾遇境位。三遇非勝境位。上一位言通下二處。次一遇言貫下第三。后境之言復通第二。若此三位可如汝說。除此三位余應相續。

自下奪中即成三奪。先翻未自在位。

論。若自在位至寧不相續。

述曰。翻第一位。此有二說。不正義者。初地亦得轉五識故。若正義者。此位即在八地以去皆能任運。此于有漏五根。亦能得互用故。無漏殊勝非前位故。然此舉勝故說如來。次致等言意攝餘者。諸大菩薩方始能然。余不可爾。謂佛世尊于境自在。轉變皆成。以眼聞聲諸根互用。不假分別恒緣於此故名任運。更無疑慮故言決定。無所未知即無尋求。恒決定緣。此五識身何不相續。瑜伽第一．第三等說。若於此不決定。五識之後起意尋求心。為先未決故。諸佛先決故無尋求。彼論復言前三心是無記。諸佛心善故無尋求。亦應諸佛無率爾心。若以此時境至為論假說有者。以於此境今初見故。若皆已見故無尋求。已曾見竟無率爾心。即諸佛率爾心時。亦名決定。亦名染凈。亦名等流。於一

【現代漢語翻譯】 下面分別進行破斥。文章分為四個部分：一、破斥五識；二、破斥第六識；三、破斥末那識（Manas, 意根）；四、破斥第八識。

在破斥五識中，先是縱容，后是剝奪。這裡是縱容。之前的老師認為五識只有一念產生。現在先破斥這種觀點，所以說『且如前』。『五種識等』，指的是五識有三種情況。如果從大多數情況來說，可以一念產生：一、未自在位；二、率爾遇境位；三、遇非勝境位。第一種情況可以涵蓋下面兩種情況。第二種情況可以貫穿第三種情況。最後『境』這個詞又可以涵蓋第二種情況。如果這三種情況可以像你所說的那樣。除了這三種情況，其餘情況應該相續不斷。

從下面開始剝奪，即形成三重剝奪。首先推翻未自在位。

論：『若自在位至寧不相續。』

述曰：推翻第一種情況。對此有兩種說法。不正義的說法是，初地菩薩也能轉變五識。如果按照正義的說法，這種情況發生在八地菩薩之後，他們都能任運自如。對於有漏的五根，也能互相使用。無漏殊勝，不是之前的境界。然而，這裡舉出殊勝的例子，所以說是如來（Tathagata, 佛）。『次致等言意攝餘者』，意思是包括其他情況。諸大菩薩才能做到這樣，其他人不行。意思是佛世尊（Buddha-Bhagavan, 佛）對於境界自在，轉變都能成功。用眼睛聽聲音，各種根互相使用。不假分別，恒常緣於此境，所以叫做任運。不再有疑慮，所以說是決定。沒有什麼不知道的，即沒有尋求。恒常決定緣於此境。這五識身為什麼不相續不斷？《瑜伽師地論》第一、第三等篇說，如果對此不決定，五識之後產生意尋求心，是因為之前沒有決定。諸佛（Buddhas, 佛）之前已經決定，所以沒有尋求。那部論又說，前三心是無記。諸佛的心是善的，所以沒有尋求。也應該諸佛沒有率爾心。如果以此時境至為論，假設有這種情況，是因為對於此境現在是初次見到。如果都已經見過，所以沒有尋求。已經曾經見過，就沒有率爾心。即諸佛率爾心的時候，也叫做決定，也叫做染凈，也叫做等流。對於一個

【English Translation】 Next, refutations will be made separately. The text is divided into four parts: 1. Refuting the five consciousnesses; 2. Refuting the sixth consciousness; 3. Refuting Manas (意根); 4. Refuting the eighth consciousness.

In the refutation of the five consciousnesses, first there is allowance, then deprivation. This is allowance. The previous teacher believed that the five consciousnesses only arise in a single moment. Now, this view is refuted first, so it says '且如前'. '五種識等' refers to the five consciousnesses having three situations. If speaking from the majority of cases, they can arise in a single moment: 1. The state of not being at ease; 2. The state of encountering a situation suddenly; 3. The state of encountering a non-superior situation. The first situation can cover the following two situations. The second situation can run through the third situation. Finally, the word '境' (situation) can also cover the second situation. If these three situations can be as you say. Apart from these three situations, the remaining situations should be continuous.

From below, deprivation begins, which forms a triple deprivation. First, overturn the state of not being at ease.

Treatise: '若自在位至寧不相續。'

Commentary: Overturning the first situation. There are two explanations for this. The incorrect explanation is that bodhisattvas of the initial ground can also transform the five consciousnesses. If according to the correct explanation, this situation occurs after the eighth ground bodhisattvas, they can all be at ease. For the five defiled roots, they can also use each other. The undefiled is superior, not the previous state. However, here a superior example is given, so it is said Tathagata (如來). '次致等言意攝餘者' means including other situations. Only great bodhisattvas can do this, others cannot. It means that the Buddha-Bhagavan (佛世尊) is at ease with situations, and transformations are all successful. Hearing sounds with the eyes, the various roots use each other. Without false distinctions, constantly connected to this situation, so it is called being at ease. No longer having doubts, so it is said to be decisive. There is nothing unknown, which means no seeking. Constantly and decisively connected to this situation. Why are these five aggregates of consciousness not continuous? The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, first and third sections, etc., say that if there is no decision about this, the mind seeking after the five consciousnesses arises because there was no decision before. The Buddhas (諸佛) have already decided before, so there is no seeking. That treatise also says that the first three minds are neutral. The minds of the Buddhas are good, so there is no seeking. It should also be that the Buddhas do not have sudden minds. If taking the arrival of the situation at this time as a discussion, assuming there is this situation, it is because this is the first time seeing this situation. If they have all been seen, so there is no seeking. Having seen it before, there is no sudden mind. That is, when the Buddhas have a sudden mind, it is also called decisive, also called defiled and pure, also called equal flow. For one

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時中具四義故。然但有三。餘人之境有所未知故心前後。佛則不爾。非此未定後方定故顯五心者。謂自在位即翻第一未自在位五可間斷。佛即相續。

已前總是以事望理難。次當更說。為非初過等流心后亦得相續。

論。等流五識至多念相續。

述曰。自下乃至引大論云故非二識互相續生。是翻第二率爾遇境。初出理。次引證。後重成。此意亦如未自在位。其五識等流者。其五心中既為第三決定。第四染凈。第六意識作意引生。如睹佛像。專注一緣未休睹來名未舍頃。意．眼二識俱並未舍。如何不許多念相續。

此則出理。次引論文。

論。故瑜伽說至應知亦爾。

述曰。第三決定無記心后。方有第四染凈心生。引五識等等流心起。瑜伽第一五識生時三心可得等。此文可解。如彼論中第一抄解。五心次第如別章釋　而彼不由自分別力者。顯是意識所引生義。其文易了。既引論已。

論。彼意定顯至俱相續轉。

述曰。下重成。非五識身一念即滅。可言五識互相續生　彼若解言五識定斷。若爾何故言相續轉。遞相續生。非眼識斷已唯有意識。后複眼生可言相續。

論。既眼識時至互相續生。

述曰。論主難云。既眼識時非無意識。五識斷已后意識生。若

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有時具備四種含義，然而（這裡）只有三種。（因為）其他人的境界有所未知，所以心有前後之分。佛則不然，不是因為先前未定，之後才定。顯示五心，是指在自在位時，立即翻轉第一心（率爾心，Manasikara）。未自在位時，五心可以間斷，佛則是相續不斷。

之前總是從事上觀察理難以理解。接下來應當進一步說明，是否非最初的等流心之後也能相續？

論：等流五識最多念相續。

述曰：從下面開始，乃至引用《瑜伽師地論》的說法，所以不是兩種識互相續生。這是翻轉第二心（尋求心，Sparsa），率爾遇境。先提出道理，再引用證據，最後重新成立。這個意思也像未自在位。其五識的等流，其五心中，既然是第三決定心（受，Vedana），第四染凈心（想，Samjna），第六意識作意引生。如看到佛像，專注一緣，未停止觀看之前，名為未舍頃。意、眼二識都未捨棄。如何不能許多念相續？

這是提出道理。接下來引用論文。

論：所以《瑜伽師地地論》說，乃至應當知道也是這樣。

述曰：第三決定無記心后，才有第四染凈心生。引用五識等等流心起。《瑜伽師地論》第一五識生時，三心可得等。此文可以解釋。如該論中第一抄解。五心次第如別章解釋。而那不由自分別力者，顯示是意識所引生的含義。其文容易理解。既然引用了論。

論：他的意思是明顯顯示，乃至俱相續轉。

述曰：下面重新成立。不是五識身一念即滅，可以說五識互相續生。他們如果解釋說五識一定斷滅，如果這樣，為什麼說相續轉？遞相續生。不是眼識斷滅后只有意識，之後又生眼識，可以說相續。

論：既然眼識時，乃至互相續生。

述曰：論主反駁說：既然眼識時並非沒有意識，五識斷滅后意識才生，如果...

【English Translation】 English version: Sometimes it possesses four meanings, but (here) there are only three. (Because) other people's realms have something unknown, so the mind has before and after distinctions. The Buddha is not like this; it is not because it was not determined before that it is determined later. Showing the five minds refers to, in the state of freedom, immediately reversing the first mind (Manasikara, initial attention). In the state of unfreedom, the five minds can be interrupted, but the Buddha's are continuous.

Before, it was always difficult to understand from observing the principle through events. Next, it should be further explained whether non-initial isodiasmic minds can continue subsequently.

Treatise: Isodiasmic five consciousnesses continue for the most thoughts.

Commentary: From below onwards, even quoting the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, therefore, it is not that two consciousnesses are born continuously to each other. This is reversing the second mind (Sparsa, contact), encountering the environment impulsively. First, the principle is put forward, then evidence is cited, and finally, it is re-established. This meaning is also like the state of unfreedom. The isodiasmic of the five consciousnesses, among the five minds, since it is the third decisive mind (Vedana, feeling), the fourth defiled and pure mind (Samjna, perception), and the sixth consciousness's volition that leads to birth. For example, when seeing a Buddha image, focusing on one condition, before stopping watching, it is called the moment of not abandoning. Both the mind and eye consciousnesses have not abandoned. How can it not be that many thoughts continue?

This is putting forward the principle. Next, quote the thesis.

Treatise: Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says, even to the point that it should be known that it is also like this.

Commentary: After the third decisive neutral mind, there is the fourth defiled and pure mind born. Quoting the arising of the isodiasmic minds of the five consciousnesses, etc. When the first five consciousnesses are born in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, three minds can be obtained, etc. This text can be explained. Like the first excerpt in that treatise. The order of the five minds is explained in a separate chapter. And that which is not due to one's own discriminating power shows the meaning of being led to birth by consciousness. The text is easy to understand. Since the treatise has been quoted.

Treatise: His meaning is clearly shown, even to the point that they continue to turn together.

Commentary: Below, it is re-established. It is not that the body of the five consciousnesses is destroyed in one thought, so it can be said that the five consciousnesses continue to be born to each other. If they explain that the five consciousnesses are certainly cut off, if so, why say that they continue to turn? Born continuously in succession. It is not that after the eye consciousness is cut off, there is only consciousness, and then the eye consciousness is born again, so it can be said to be continuous.

Treatise: Since at the time of eye consciousness, even to the point that they continue to be born to each other.

Commentary: The author of the treatise refutes, saying: Since at the time of eye consciousness, it is not that there is no consciousness, and consciousness is born only after the five consciousnesses are cut off, if...

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爾此是意相續生。如何乃言五識相續。如眼識時無意識。意識時無五識。更遞生故可互相續。此既不爾。故非二識互相續生名為相續。

此第二以理成教難。次第三翻遇非勝境。以教成理難。

論。若增盛境至戲忘天等。

述曰。自下文有三。初標宗。次引證。后理成。此初也。若遇中境。不能逼身奪於心故。可許暫舍五識不續。設許不續。若遇勝境逼身奪心。或雙逼奪身．心。即五識身亦應相續。境增勝故。此位正在未自在位　其如何等　舉現事者如熱地獄。火增盛故　戲忘天等等憤恚天。總言即是欲界上四天。無別處所。但樂．憎者。瑜伽第五四句中雲欲界諸天不別言處。如毗婆沙第一百九十九有二說。一云住妙高層級。二云即三十三天。若準瑜伽即上四欲天。以下二天可相殺故。此善．惡人緣強難捨。故五識身定有相續。

釋唯一念文。此據率爾．境平等故。

複次引教成。

論。故瑜伽說至名為意根。

述曰。五十二說。文言通故六識。明知互為緣也。

論。若五識前後至等無間緣。

述曰。下理成也。其文易解。若五識間斷故前後定唯有意識。彼第三說眼識率爾心后。定有意識尋求。此後或時散亂。或是耳等識生故。非眼識后許耳識生。以此中言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 你所說的只是意（manas）的相續產生。為什麼說五識（five consciousnesses）是相續的呢？比如眼識（eye consciousness）生起時沒有意識（mind consciousness），意識生起時沒有五識。因為它們是交替產生的，所以可以互相接續。但五識的情況並非如此，因此不能說兩種識互相接續產生就叫做相續。 這是第二點，用道理來成立教義的困難。接下來是第三點，反過來用教義來成立道理的困難，即遇到非殊勝境界的情況。 論：如果遇到增盛的境界，比如在戲忘天（Playful Heaven）等等。 述曰：從下面開始有三部分。首先是標明宗旨，其次是引證，最後是用道理來成立。這是第一部分。如果遇到中等的境界，不能逼迫身體、奪取心識，所以可以允許暫時捨棄五識，不令其相續。假設允許不相續，如果遇到殊勝的境界，逼迫身體、奪取心識，或者同時逼迫、奪取身心，那麼五識身也應該相續，因為境界增盛的緣故。這個階段正處於未自在位。『其如何等』，舉出現實的事例，比如熱地獄（hot hells），因為火焰增盛的緣故。『戲忘天等等』，比如憤恚天（wrathful heavens）。總而言之，就是欲界（desire realm）上面的四天（four heavens）。沒有其他特別的處所。只是樂於憎恨罷了。瑜伽（Yoga）第五十四句中說，欲界諸天沒有特別說明處所。比如毗婆沙（Vibhasa）第一百九十九有二種說法。一種說法是住在妙高山（Mount Meru）的層級上。另一種說法就是三十三天（Trayastrimsa Heaven）。如果按照瑜伽的說法，就是上面的四欲天。下面的二天可以互相殺害。這些善人、惡人的因緣強烈，難以捨棄。所以五識身一定有相續。 解釋『唯一念』的說法。這是根據率爾（momentary）、境界平等的情況來說的。 再次，引教義來成立。 論：所以瑜伽經（Yoga Sutra）說……名為意根（manas）。 述曰：五十二說。經文的語言是通用的，所以包括六識（six consciousnesses）。明確地表明瞭互相為緣。 論：如果五識前後……等無間緣（immediately preceding condition）。 述曰：下面是用道理來成立。經文容易理解。如果五識間斷，所以前後一定只有意識。彼第三說，眼識率爾心之後，一定有意識尋求。這之後或者有時散亂，或者有耳識等生起，所以不允許眼識之後生起耳識。因為這裡說的是……

【English Translation】 English version: What you are referring to is the continuous arising of manas (mind). How can you say that the five consciousnesses (five senses) are continuous? For example, when eye consciousness (seeing) arises, there is no mind consciousness (thinking); when mind consciousness arises, there are no five consciousnesses. Because they arise alternately, they can succeed each other. But this is not the case with the five consciousnesses, so it cannot be said that the continuous arising of two consciousnesses is called continuity. This is the second point, the difficulty of establishing doctrine with reason. Next is the third point, conversely using doctrine to establish reason, that is, the situation of encountering non-superior states. Treatise: If encountering intensified states, such as in the Playful Heaven (devas who are forgetful in their play), etc. Commentary: From below, there are three parts. First, stating the principle; second, citing evidence; and third, establishing with reason. This is the first part. If encountering a moderate state, it cannot force the body or seize the mind, so it can be allowed to temporarily abandon the five consciousnesses, not allowing them to continue. Suppose it is allowed not to continue, if encountering a superior state, forcing the body and seizing the mind, or simultaneously forcing and seizing body and mind, then the five consciousness bodies should also continue, because the state is intensified. This stage is precisely in the non-self-mastery position. 'How so?' Giving a real-world example, such as the hot hells, because the flames are intensified. 'Playful Heaven, etc.,' such as the Wrathful Heavens. In general, it is the four heavens above the desire realm (kama-dhatu). There are no other special places. It is just being fond of hatred. The Yoga (Yoga Sutra), verse 54, says that the devas of the desire realm do not specifically mention places. For example, the Vibhasa (Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra), chapter 199, has two explanations. One explanation is that they reside on the levels of Mount Meru. The other explanation is that they are the Thirty-three Heavens (Trayastrimsa Heaven). If according to the Yoga, it is the four heavens above the desire realm. The two heavens below can kill each other. The karmic connections of these good and evil people are strong and difficult to abandon. Therefore, the five consciousness bodies must have continuity. Explaining the statement 'only one thought'. This is based on the situation of momentary and equal states. Again, citing doctrine to establish. Treatise: Therefore, the Yoga Sutra says... is called manas (mind). Commentary: Fifty-two says. The language of the sutra is universal, so it includes the six consciousnesses (six senses). Clearly indicating that they are mutually conditioned. Treatise: If the five consciousnesses are before and after... immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya). Commentary: Below is establishing with reason. The text is easy to understand. If the five consciousnesses are interrupted, then before and after there must only be mind consciousness. The third says that after the momentary mind of eye consciousness, there must be mind consciousness seeking. After this, it is sometimes scattered, or ear consciousness, etc., arises, so it is not allowed for ear consciousness to arise after eye consciousness. Because it says here...

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眼識后唯意識。不言五識生故。即五十二應云若此一意識。為彼六識緣。乃至此六識。為彼一意識緣。以前後定唯有意故。

論。既不如是至有相續義。

述曰。結五識也。

上來第一破五識身不相續義自他五識無無間緣。自下第二破第六意識以前五識。不以七．八為開導依。有二。

論。五識起時至為開導依。

述曰。謂瑜伽第三說五識身隨意識轉。及六十七．集量論等云五識俱時必有意識。即此意識能引第二尋求意識生。即以前念自類意識為無間緣。何假五識。若前一念獨起五識。後方意識尋求心生。可如所說五為意緣。既不如是。故知意識不以五識為開導依。五識自無勝勢力故。第一破意用五為依。

論。無心睡眠至為開導依。

述曰。此下第二難第六意。令以七．八二識為依。五位無心第六識斷。此滅定等有無第七如常徒說。此等五位唯有七．八二識相續。后出無心時第七．八識。應與第六意識為依。彼先間斷。此恒續故。如在定中耳聞聲等。意雖不同緣。然為耳識依。以意先有故。此耳間生故。五位無心。以七．八識同彼定意。以此斷意同彼耳識故理應爾。

論。若彼用前至彼云何爾。

述曰。難前師說。彼滅定等。對法第五。以先滅心為無間緣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 眼識之後只有意識存在，因為不認為有前五識產生的情況。就像《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷所說，如果這個意識能被前六識所緣，乃至這六識能被這個意識所緣，那是因為前後相續的只有意識。

論：既然不是這樣，就說明五識沒有相續的意義。

述記：總結五識。

上面第一部分破斥了五識身沒有相續的意義，即自身和他人的五識沒有無間緣。下面第二部分破斥了第六意識不以之前五識，以及第七識、第八識作為開導依。分為兩部分。

論：五識生起的時候，不是作為意識的開導依。

述記：瑜伽師地論第三卷說，五識身隨著意識運轉。以及第六十七卷、《集量論》等說，五識同時生起時必定有意識。這個意識能引導第二剎那的尋求意識產生，即以前一念的自類意識作為無間緣，何必需要五識呢？如果前一念只有五識單獨生起，之後才有意識的尋求心生起，或許可以像你所說的那樣，五識作為意識的緣。既然不是這樣，就知道意識不以五識作為開導依，因為五識自身沒有強大的勢力。這是第一部分，破斥意識以五識為依。

論：在無心睡眠等狀態下，五識不是作為意識的開導依。

述記：這是下面第二部分，為難第六意識，讓它以第七識、第八識作為依。五種無心位時，第六識斷滅。滅盡定等狀態下是否有第七識，就像平常一樣是徒勞的爭論。這五種狀態下只有第七識、第八識相續。之後從無心位出來時，第七識、第八識應該作為第六意識的依。因為第六意識先前間斷，而第七識、第八識恒常相續。就像在禪定中聽到聲音等情況，意識雖然緣不同的對象，但作為耳識的依。因為意識先前存在，而耳識是後來產生的。五種無心位時，第七識、第八識類似於禪定中的意識。以此斷滅的意識類似於耳識，所以理應如此。

論：如果第七識、第八識用之前的滅盡定心作為無間緣，那又該如何解釋呢？

述記：這是爲了反駁之前的說法。滅盡定等狀態，根據《對法論》第五卷，以先前滅盡的心作為無間緣。

【English Translation】 English version After eye-consciousness, there is only mind-consciousness, because it is not considered that the previous five consciousnesses arise. Just as it is said in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), volume 52, if this consciousness can be conditioned by the previous six consciousnesses, and even these six consciousnesses can be conditioned by this one consciousness, it is because only consciousness continues from moment to moment.

Treatise: Since it is not so, it shows that the five consciousnesses have no meaning of continuity.

Commentary: Concluding the five consciousnesses.

The first part above refutes the meaning that the five aggregates of consciousness do not have continuity, that is, one's own and others' five consciousnesses do not have immediate condition (anantara-pratyaya). The second part below refutes that the sixth consciousness does not take the previous five consciousnesses, as well as the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, as guiding support. It is divided into two parts.

Treatise: When the five consciousnesses arise, they are not the guiding support of consciousness.

Commentary: The third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the five aggregates of consciousness operate according to the mind-consciousness. And the sixty-seventh volume, the Hetuvidyā-nyāya-dvāra-tarka-śāstra (Compendium on Logic) and others say that when the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously, there must be mind-consciousness. This consciousness can guide the arising of the seeking consciousness in the second moment, that is, taking the previous moment of consciousness of the same type as the immediate condition, why is there a need for the five consciousnesses? If only the five consciousnesses arise alone in the previous moment, and then the seeking mind of consciousness arises, perhaps it can be as you said, the five consciousnesses serve as the condition for consciousness. Since it is not so, it is known that consciousness does not take the five consciousnesses as guiding support, because the five consciousnesses themselves do not have strong power. This is the first part, refuting that consciousness relies on the five consciousnesses.

Treatise: In the state of mindless sleep, etc., the five consciousnesses are not the guiding support of consciousness.

Commentary: This is the second part below, to challenge the sixth consciousness, and let it take the seventh and eighth consciousnesses as support. When there are five kinds of mindless states, the sixth consciousness is cut off. Whether there is a seventh consciousness in the state of cessation of perception and sensation (nirodha-samāpatti) and other states is a futile argument as usual. In these five states, only the seventh and eighth consciousnesses continue. Later, when coming out of the mindless state, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses should be the support of the sixth consciousness. Because the sixth consciousness was previously interrupted, while the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are constantly continuous. Just like hearing sounds in meditation and other situations, although consciousness conditions different objects, it serves as the support of ear-consciousness. Because consciousness existed previously, and ear-consciousness arose later. In the five kinds of mindless states, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are similar to the consciousness in meditation. This extinguished consciousness is similar to ear-consciousness, so it should be so.

Treatise: If the seventh and eighth consciousnesses use the previous mind of cessation of perception and sensation as the immediate condition, then how should it be explained?

Commentary: This is to refute the previous statement. The state of cessation of perception and sensation, according to the fifth volume of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya (Commentary on the Treasury of Abhidharma), takes the previously extinguished mind as the immediate condition.

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。中間都無自心隔故。唯以自類為依。不假他七．八者　五識體雖斷。無一自心隔故。應如彼意不以意為緣。其五識此既不許然。以先意識為無間緣。不以自類五識為緣。彼滅定等第六意識何故即爾。是即意識不假五識。亦是六以七．八為緣。例同五識用意為依。

自下第三六為七依難。彼先七．八各自為緣故。

論。平等性智至為開導依。

述曰。即顯末那名通無漏。雖即六識轉末那得名為第七。實非第七。不通凈故。不爾違經。初地初心第七識俱平等性智。由先念心世第一法二空觀有漏心引生。故七應以第六為依。唯於此時要由第六引方生故。即準余時起平等智義亦應爾。

自下第四八以六．七為依難。于中有二。先果中識難。

論。圓鏡智俱至方便引生。

述曰。此識唯在金剛心中。此有二說如前已解。此位之前得二智故。故此時第八以六．七為依。余時無故。

論。又異熟心至相應善心。

述曰。此第二以因中識難　攝論第三說異熟心依染污意。無性染意即是第六。世親染意或第七心。故知第八亦依六．七。此約異生．一分有學。菩薩受生如對法第五。有是願力者。此要十地大菩薩眾為度有情。若分段．若變易。亦由二智善心為緣第八得起。此說通初地　

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：中間沒有自身的心識阻隔的緣故，僅僅以同類心識作為所依。不需要其他的第七識、第八識作為所依。五識的自體雖然斷滅，但沒有自身的心識阻隔的緣故，應該像他們所認為的那樣，不以意識作為緣。但五識這裡是不允許這樣的，而是以先前的意識作為無間緣，不以同類的五識作為緣。那麼滅盡定等等狀態下的第六意識，為什麼就是那樣呢？那就是說，第六意識不需要五識作為所依，也是第六識以第七識、第八識作為緣，例子如同五識以意識作為所依。

下面第三個問題是，第六識以第七識作為所依的難題。因為第七識、第八識先前各自作為自己的緣故。

論：平等性智（Samatajnana，四智之一，指證得諸法平等之理的智慧）乃至作為開導的所依。

述曰：這表明末那識（Manas-vijnana，第七識，意根）的名字也通於無漏。雖然是從第六識轉變而來，末那識才得名為第七識，但實際上並非真正的第七識，因為它不通於清凈的境界。如果不是這樣，就違背了經文。初地菩薩的最初心念，第七識與平等性智同時生起，由於先前的念心、世第一法（Lokagradharma，一種禪定狀態）以及二空觀（Dvyasunyata-darsana，對人空和法空的觀照）的有漏心所引發。因此，第七識應該以第六識作為所依，唯有在這個時候，需要由第六識的引導才能產生。那麼，根據其他時候生起平等性智的道理，也應該如此。

下面第四個問題是，第八識以第六識、第七識作為所依的難題。其中有兩個方面。首先是從果位中的識來提出難題。

論：圓鏡智（Adarsa-jnana，四智之一，如明鏡般照見一切的智慧）同時生起乃至以方便善巧來引導產生。

述曰：這個識僅僅在金剛心中存在。對此有兩種說法，如前面已經解釋過的。在這個位之前已經獲得了兩種智慧。所以，這個時候第八識以第六識、第七識作為所依，其餘時候則沒有。

論：又，異熟心（Vipaka-citta，第八識中的果報心）乃至與相應的善心。

述曰：這是第二個問題，從因位中的識來提出難題。《攝大乘論》第三卷說，異熟心依賴於染污意（Klista-manas，染污的第七識）。無性菩薩認為染污意就是第六識，世親菩薩認為染污意或者是第七識。所以知道第八識也依賴於第六識、第七識。這是就異生（Prthag-jana，凡夫）和一部分有學（Saiksa，正在學習的聖者）而言的。菩薩受生，如《對法論》第五卷所說，有的是由於願力的緣故。這需要十地的大菩薩爲了度化有情，無論是分段生死（Samsara，三界內的生死輪迴）還是變易生死（parinama-marana，聖者因迷妄而產生的微細生死），也是由兩種智慧的善心作為緣，第八識才能生起。這裡說的是通於初地菩薩的情況。

【English Translation】 English version: Because there is no self-mind intervening in between, it relies solely on its own kind. It does not need other seventh or eighth consciousnesses as its basis. Although the substance of the five consciousnesses is severed, because there is no self-mind intervening, it should, according to their view, not take the mind-consciousness as a condition. However, this is not allowed for the five consciousnesses here. Instead, it takes the preceding consciousness as the immediately preceding condition, not its own kind of five consciousnesses as a condition. Then, why is the sixth consciousness in states like Nirodha-samapatti (cessation attainment, 滅盡定) like that? That is to say, the sixth consciousness does not need the five consciousnesses as its basis; it is also that the sixth consciousness takes the seventh and eighth consciousnesses as conditions, just as the five consciousnesses take the mind-consciousness as their basis.

The third difficulty below is that the sixth consciousness relies on the seventh consciousness. Because the seventh and eighth consciousnesses previously served as their own conditions.

Treatise: Samatajnana (平等性智, the Wisdom of Equality, one of the Four Wisdoms) even serves as the basis for guidance.

Commentary: This shows that the name Manas-vijnana (末那識, the seventh consciousness, the mind-basis consciousness) also applies to the unconditioned. Although it is transformed from the sixth consciousness, the Manas-vijnana is named the seventh consciousness, but it is not actually the true seventh consciousness because it does not extend to pure realms. If it were not so, it would contradict the sutras. In the initial thought of the first Bhumi (初地, the first of the ten Bodhisattva grounds), the seventh consciousness and the Samatajnana arise simultaneously, caused by the preceding mind of thought, Lokagradharma (世第一法, the highest mundane dharma, a state of Samadhi), and the conditioned mind of Dvyasunyata-darsana (二空觀, the contemplation of the two emptinesses, emptiness of self and emptiness of dharma). Therefore, the seventh consciousness should rely on the sixth consciousness, and only at this time does it need to be guided by the sixth consciousness to arise. Then, according to the principle of arising Samatajnana at other times, it should also be like this.

The fourth difficulty below is that the eighth consciousness relies on the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. There are two aspects to this. First, the difficulty is raised from the consciousness in the fruition.

Treatise: Adarsa-jnana (圓鏡智, the Mirror-like Wisdom, one of the Four Wisdoms) arises simultaneously and even guides its production with skillful means.

Commentary: This consciousness exists only in the Vajra-citta (金剛心, the diamond mind). There are two explanations for this, as explained earlier. Before this position, two wisdoms have already been obtained. Therefore, at this time, the eighth consciousness relies on the sixth and seventh consciousnesses; it does not exist at other times.

Treatise: Moreover, Vipaka-citta (異熟心, the resultant mind, the mind of karmic retribution in the eighth consciousness) even with corresponding wholesome minds.

Commentary: This is the second difficulty, raised from the consciousness in the cause. The third volume of the Mahayana-samgraha says that the Vipaka-citta relies on the Klista-manas (染污意, the defiled mind, the defiled seventh consciousness). Asanga (無性) believes that the Klista-manas is the sixth consciousness, while Vasubandhu (世親) believes that the Klista-manas is either the seventh consciousness. Therefore, it is known that the eighth consciousness also relies on the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. This is in reference to ordinary beings (Prthag-jana, 異生) and a portion of those who are still learning (Saiksa, 有學). The rebirth of Bodhisattvas, as stated in the fifth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, is due to the power of vows. This requires great Bodhisattvas of the tenth Bhumi to liberate sentient beings, whether it is Samsara (分段生死, segmented life and death, the cycle of birth and death within the three realms) or Parinama-marana (變易生死, subtle life and death, the subtle cycle of change and death experienced by advanced practitioners), it is also through the wholesome minds of the two wisdoms as conditions that the eighth consciousness can arise. This refers to the situation that applies to Bodhisattvas of the first Bhumi.

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或說在八地　前說為勝。

論。既爾必應至都未盡理。

述曰。既有三證。故知第八以六．七為依。由前八識皆有過證。第三結云彼所說言都無盡理。

論。應說五識至為開導依。

述曰。以下結正歸宗。五識以前六識皆得為依。自相續故。他引生故。得次無間生。大論第三云亦非五識無間而生者。此據多分率爾心語。

論。第六意識至為開導依。

述曰。不假五引。故用前自類為開導依。五位無心時。或第七．八為依。例與五依故。

論。第七末那至為開導依。

述曰。如起大乘初無漏心。亦以第六為開導依。

論。阿陀那識至由前說故。

述曰。第八初起圓鏡智時。諸異生等初受生等。以前六．七為開導依皆不違理。由彼如前所說理故總結成義　言阿陀那者通無漏故。此中四緣如下廣解。

論。有義此說亦不應理。

述曰。于中有三。初總非前。次申其義。后總結正。即初文也。此護法釋。

所以者何。

論。開導依者至等無間緣。

述曰。下申其義。文意有四。一出體．義。二破前非。三申正理。四釋違難。下即初也　開導依者。與四緣中無間緣別。但是開導依必是無間緣。有是無間緣非開導依。謂前念滅自類

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 或有人說在第八地（菩薩修行的一個階段），之前所說的（指前文對開導依的解釋）才是正確的。

論：如果這樣說，必定沒有完全窮盡道理。

述記：既然有三種證據，就知道第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）以第六識（意識，Manas-vijnana）和第七識（末那識，Klista-manas-vijnana）為所依。因為前八識都有過失的證據，所以第三個結論說他們所說的話都沒有窮盡道理。

論：應該說五識以至為開導依。

述記：以下總結歸於正宗。五識以前的六識都可以作為所依，因為它們是自相續的，也是由他引生的，可以次第無間地產生。《大論》第三卷說，也不是五識無間地產生，這是根據多數情況下粗略的心語。

論：第六意識以至為開導依。

述記：不需要五識的引導，所以用前面的自類作為開導依。在五位無心時，或者以第七識、第八識為所依，例如與五識相同。

論：第七末那識以至為開導依。

述記：例如發起大乘最初的無漏心時，也以第六識作為開導依。

論：阿陀那識（Adana-vijnana，即第八識的異名）以至為開導依，這是由前面所說的緣故。

述記：第八識最初生起圓鏡智（Adarsa-jnana）時，以及各種異生最初受生時，以前六識、第七識作為開導依，都不違背道理。因為那些都如前面所說的道理，所以總結成義。說阿陀那，是因為它通於無漏。這裡面的四緣，在下面會詳細解釋。

論：有人說這種說法也不合道理。

述記：其中有三種含義。首先是總的否定前面，其次是闡述它的意義，最後是總結歸於正理。這裡是第一個含義，這是護法的解釋。

為什麼呢？

論：開導依，與等無間緣（Samanantara-pratyaya）不同。

述記：下面闡述它的意義。文中的意思有四點：一是說明體和義，二是破斥前面的錯誤，三是闡述正確的道理，四是解釋違背和困難。下面是第一點。開導依，與四緣中的無間緣不同。但是開導依一定是無間緣，有些是無間緣但不是開導依，比如前念滅去的自類。

【English Translation】 English version Or someone says that in the eighth Bhumi (a stage of Bodhisattva practice), what was said before (referring to the previous explanation of the 'opening and guiding support') is correct.

Treatise: If that's the case, it must not have fully exhausted the reasoning.

Commentary: Since there are three pieces of evidence, it is known that the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) relies on the sixth (Manas-vijnana) and seventh (Klista-manas-vijnana) consciousnesses as its support. Because the previous eight consciousnesses all have evidence of faults, the third conclusion says that what they said has not exhausted the reasoning.

Treatise: It should be said that the five consciousnesses take to be the 'opening and guiding support'.

Commentary: The following concludes and returns to the orthodox teaching. The six consciousnesses before the five consciousnesses can all be taken as support, because they are self-continuous and are also produced by others, and can arise in sequential uninterrupted succession. The third volume of the Great Treatise says that it is not that the five consciousnesses arise without interruption, this is based on the rough mental speech in most cases.

Treatise: The sixth consciousness takes to be the 'opening and guiding support'.

Commentary: It does not need the guidance of the five consciousnesses, so it uses the preceding self-category as the 'opening and guiding support'. During the five states of no-mind, the seventh or eighth consciousnesses may be the support, for example, being the same as the five consciousnesses.

Treatise: The seventh Manas consciousness takes to be the 'opening and guiding support'.

Commentary: For example, when initially arousing the undefiled mind of the Mahayana, it also takes the sixth consciousness as the 'opening and guiding support'.

Treatise: The Adana-vijnana takes to be the 'opening and guiding support', this is because of what was said before.

Commentary: When the eighth consciousness initially arises as the Mirror Wisdom (Adarsa-jnana), and when various ordinary beings are first born, it is not contrary to reason to take the previous six and seventh consciousnesses as the 'opening and guiding support'. Because those are all as the reasoning said before, so it concludes into meaning. Saying 'Adana' is because it is common to the undefiled. The four conditions here will be explained in detail below.

Treatise: Some say that this statement is also not reasonable.

Commentary: There are three meanings in it. First, it generally denies the previous, second, it elaborates its meaning, and third, it concludes and returns to the correct principle. Here is the first meaning, this is the explanation of Dharmapala.

Why is that?

Treatise: The 'opening and guiding support' is different from the Samanantara-pratyaya (immediately preceding condition).

Commentary: The following elaborates its meaning. There are four points in the meaning of the text: first, to explain the substance and meaning, second, to refute the previous errors, third, to elaborate the correct reasoning, and fourth, to explain the contradictions and difficulties. The following is the first point. The 'opening and guiding support' is different from the Samanantara-pratyaya among the four conditions. But the 'opening and guiding support' must be the Samanantara-pratyaya, some are Samanantara-pratyaya but not the 'opening and guiding support', such as the self-category of the preceding thought that has ceased.

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心所。

開導依者謂有緣法。謂若有法體是有緣。即簡色．不相應．無為法等。有所緣有力者能引生故　無主者。即簡一切心所法等。彼非主故。要主有力方可為依　能作等無間緣者。簡異類他識為此識依。或自類識後心不為前心依。或雖是心俱時。不得為心所依。俱非開導故　故言等無間緣即唯自類。

論。此於後生至非心所等。

述曰。前念心王此於後心．及心所法。能開避彼路引導令生故為此依。此但屬心。非諸心所．色．不相應。皆無力故。亦非無為。無前後故。故復言等。此則第一釋依體．義。

論。若此與彼至為開導依。

述曰。下破前非。其有兩種。一諸識不俱難。二色．心無異難。下初難也。說此與彼為此依者。即是要有開導力故。一身八識既容許有俱起之理。如何自識與他類識為開導依。開避彼處引導令生要相有力。他現生處不障我路。非如自前心。如何他識與此為依。如薩婆多師六識不俱起。心相障故可互為依。今既俱生應無開導。

論。若許為依至心不併生。

述曰。若互為依。互相障故。同小乘等異部之心無並生義。以薩婆多等皆不併生得為緣故。此即第二難互相望前有依義。

論。又一身中至色等應爾。

述曰。以下第二色．心

【現代漢語翻譯】 心所（Citta-vrtti）：

開導依者謂有緣法。謂若有法體是有緣，即簡色（Rupa，物質）．不相應（Citta-viprayukta，不相應行法）．無為法（Asamskrta-dharma，無為法）等。有所緣有力者能引生故；無主者，即簡一切心所法等，彼非主故。要主有力方可為依；能作等無間緣者，簡異類他識為此識依，或自類識後心不為前心依，或雖是心俱時，不得為心所依，俱非開導故；故言等無間緣即唯自類。

論：此於後生至非心所等。

述曰：前念心王此於後心．及心所法，能開避彼路引導令生故為此依。此但屬心，非諸心所．色．不相應，皆無力故。亦非無為，無前後故。故復言等。此則第一釋依體．義。

論：若此與彼至為開導依。

述曰：下破前非。其有兩種。一諸識不俱難。二色．心無異難。下初難也。說此與彼為此依者，即是要有開導力故。一身八識既容許有俱起之理，如何自識與他類識為開導依。開避彼處引導令生要相有力。他現生處不障我路，非如自前心。如何他識與此為依。如薩婆多師（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）六識不俱起，心相障故可互為依。今既俱生應無開導。

論：若許為依至心不併生。

述曰：若互為依，互相障故，同小乘等異部之心無並生義。以薩婆多等皆不併生得為緣故。此即第二難互相望前有依義。

論：又一身中至色等應爾。

述曰：以下第二色．心

【English Translation】 Citta-vrtti (Mental factors):

'Opening and guiding' relies on 'having an object' (alambana). If a dharma has an object, it excludes Rupa (matter), Citta-viprayukta (non-associated formations), and Asamskrta-dharma (unconditioned dharmas). Because that which has an object has the power to generate. 'Without a master' excludes all mental factors, as they are not the master. Only the master has the power to be relied upon. 'Capable of being an immediately preceding condition' excludes other consciousnesses of different types from being the basis for this consciousness, or the later mind of the same type of consciousness from being the basis for the previous mind. Or, even if it is a mind that arises simultaneously, it cannot be the basis for the mental factor, as neither opens and guides. Therefore, 'immediately preceding condition' refers only to the same type.

Treatise: This, in subsequent arising, up to not being mental factors, etc.

Commentary: The previous moment of the mind-king, in relation to the subsequent mind and mental factors, can open the path and guide them to arise, therefore it is the basis. This only belongs to the mind, not to the mental factors, Rupa (matter), or non-associated formations, as they all lack the power. Nor is it unconditioned, as it lacks before and after. Therefore, it is said 'etc.' This is the first explanation of the substance and meaning of 'basis'.

Treatise: If this and that, up to being a guiding basis.

Commentary: The following refutes the previous statement. There are two difficulties: 1. The difficulty of consciousnesses not arising simultaneously. 2. The difficulty of no difference between Rupa (matter) and mind. The following is the first difficulty. Saying that 'this and that' are the basis for this means that there must be the power to open and guide. Since the eight consciousnesses in one body are allowed to arise simultaneously, how can one's own consciousness and another's consciousness of a different type be a guiding basis? Opening the path and guiding to arise requires substantial power. The place where another arises does not obstruct my path, unlike one's own previous mind. How can another's consciousness be the basis for this? Like the Sarvastivadins (the 'all exists' school) whose six consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously, because the minds obstruct each other, they can be mutually dependent. Now that they arise simultaneously, there should be no opening and guiding.

Treatise: If it is allowed to be a basis, up to minds not arising together.

Commentary: If they are mutually dependent, they obstruct each other, like the minds of the Hinayana and other different schools, there is no meaning of arising together. Because the Sarvastivadins and others do not arise together, they can be conditions. This is the second difficulty: mutually regarding each other as having the meaning of a previous basis.

Treatise: Also, in one body, up to Rupa (matter) etc. should be so.

Commentary: The following is the second, Rupa (matter) and mind.

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無異難。中有二。一難無異。二釋相違。此初也。八識俱起多少不定。如五十一等說。第八識或一識俱。或乃至七等。若如前說得互作緣。色法應爾。多少不定　言等者。一者體等。二者用等。體等者前後一法故。如心唯一。乃至受等亦唯有一。鄰次而生無餘自心隔故名無間。若許一心為多心緣。應非是等。如色等故。

若彼復言色如心等許是無間緣。

論。便違聖說至唯心心所。

述曰。心．心所法四緣定故。如菩薩地第三十八十因中。云唯心．心所是等無間緣。亦如瑜伽第三等。云四緣能生識。攝論第一云。心．心所法四緣定故。故非色有等無間緣。

彼復難言。何為攝論第三云阿羅漢心唯可容有等無間緣。故知色法亦有此緣。

論。然攝大乘說至應成無用。

述曰。下釋相違。攝論所說是縱奪言。謂假縱小乘上座部中經部師色有等無間緣。奪彼因緣。彼無第八心。以色為因故。即是設許色有此緣無因緣義。不作此解等言無用。謂前及后各有一法相似名等。今不相似亦名等故。此設縱言有二種義。一者彼部計色有此緣故。此文為證　若爾何故攝論第一。云非經部師唯色等法名無間緣　第三卷中約色之中含諸種子或及心故說有此緣。彼第一卷據彼無識．及種子故唯有色法。言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 難陀（Nanda）提出了一個異議。這個異議包含兩個方面：一是質疑『無異』的說法，二是解釋其中的矛盾之處。這是第一個方面。八識同時生起，數量不定，就像五十一心所等所說的那樣。第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）可能與一個識同時生起，或者甚至與七個識同時生起。如果像前面所說的那樣，它們可以互相作為生起的條件，那麼色法（Rūpa）也應該如此，數量不定。 這裡所說的『等』，包含兩種含義：一是『體等』，二是『用等』。『體等』指的是前後是同一個法，就像心只有一個一樣，乃至受等也只有一個。它們緊鄰著產生，沒有其他自心間隔，所以稱為『無間』。如果允許一個心作為多個心的生起條件，那就不應該是『等』了，就像色法等一樣。 如果對方又說，色法可以像心一樣，被允許作為無間緣（Samanantara-pratyaya）。 論：那就違背了聖人的說法，即只有心和心所（Citta-caitta）才有無間緣。 述曰：心和心所法（Citta-caitta dharma）的四緣（catvāri pratyayāḥ）是確定的。就像《菩薩地》（Bodhisattvabhūmi）第三十八品中的十因中說的那樣，只有心和心所才是等無間緣。也像《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第三品等所說的那樣，四緣能夠產生識。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第一品說，心和心所法四緣是確定的。所以色法沒有等無間緣。 對方又提出疑問：為什麼《攝大乘論》第三品說阿羅漢（Arhat）的心只能容許有等無間緣？由此可知色法也有這種緣。 論：然而，《攝大乘論》所說的……應該成為無用。 述曰：下面解釋其中的矛盾之處。《攝大乘論》所說是縱奪之言。意思是，假設縱容小乘（Hīnayāna）上座部（Sthavira nikāya）中的經部師（Sautrāntika）認為色法有等無間緣，是爲了奪取他們的因緣。他們沒有第八識，以色法為因。這就是假設允許色法有這種緣，也沒有因緣的意義。如果不這樣解釋，『等』這個詞就沒有用了。所謂『等』，是指前後各有一個相似的法才叫『等』。現在不相似也叫『等』了。這種假設縱容的說法有兩種含義：一是那些部派認為色法有這種緣，這段文字可以作為證據。如果這樣，為什麼《攝大乘論》第一品說，只有經部師才認為色法等法是無間緣？第三卷中，因為色法中包含各種種子或者包含心，所以說有這種緣。第一卷是根據他們沒有識以及種子，只有色法來說的。

【English Translation】 English version: Nanda raises an objection. This objection has two aspects: first, it questions the statement of 'no difference'; second, it explains the contradictions within it. This is the first aspect. The eight consciousnesses arise simultaneously, with an indefinite number, as stated in the fifty-one mental factors and so on. The eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) may arise simultaneously with one consciousness, or even with up to seven. If, as previously stated, they can mutually serve as conditions for arising, then form (Rūpa) should also be the same, with an indefinite number. The term 'equal' here has two meanings: first, 'equality of substance'; second, 'equality of function'. 'Equality of substance' refers to the fact that before and after, it is the same dharma, just as there is only one mind, and even feeling, etc., there is only one. They arise in close proximity, without any other self-mind intervening, so they are called 'without interval'. If one mind is allowed to be the condition for the arising of multiple minds, then it should not be 'equal', like form, etc. If the opponent further says that form can be allowed to be a contiguous condition (Samanantara-pratyaya) like the mind. Treatise: Then it contradicts the words of the sages, that only mind and mental factors (Citta-caitta) have the contiguous condition. Commentary: The four conditions (catvāri pratyayāḥ) of mind and mental factors (Citta-caitta dharma) are fixed. Just as in the thirty-eighth chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi, among the ten causes, it is said that only mind and mental factors are the contiguous condition. Also, as stated in the third chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the four conditions can produce consciousness. The first chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that the four conditions of mind and mental factors are fixed. Therefore, form does not have the contiguous condition. The opponent further asks: Why does the third chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say that the mind of an Arhat (Arhat) can only accommodate the contiguous condition? From this, it can be known that form also has this condition. Treatise: However, what the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says... should become useless. Commentary: The following explains the contradictions within it. What the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says is a statement of concession and refutation. It means that if we hypothetically concede that the Sautrāntikas (Sautrāntika) in the Theravada (Sthavira nikāya) of the Hinayana (Hīnayāna) believe that form has the contiguous condition, it is to take away their conditions. They do not have the eighth consciousness, and they take form as the cause. This means that even if we hypothetically allow form to have this condition, it has no meaning of cause and condition. If we do not explain it this way, the word 'equal' is useless. The so-called 'equal' means that there is a similar dharma before and after, which is called 'equal'. Now, even if they are not similar, they are called 'equal'. This hypothetical concession has two meanings: first, those schools believe that form has this condition, and this text can be used as evidence. If so, why does the first chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha say that only the Sautrāntikas consider form, etc., to be the contiguous condition? In the third chapter, because form contains various seeds or contains the mind, it is said that it has this condition. The first chapter is based on the fact that they do not have consciousness and seeds, and only have form.

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不得成等無間緣。或第一卷是經部計。第三卷中上座部等義　二者以彼第一論文為正。此義為正。經部本計非必許色為無間緣。以不等故。第三卷中且設許有欲奪因緣。非彼計色為等無間。此中即是色．心前後前為后因。

論。若謂等言至等無間緣。

述曰。前師復救。前但總說等字未更分別　彼謂不然。不遮多少各一法故名為等也。但表前念是此心．心所。后亦此心．心所。表此同類得為緣者。便違汝執異類識作等無間緣。不相依故。八識相望各各異類。何得為緣。

論。是故八識至俱起義故。

述曰。大文第三申其正理。自類眼識等無俱起義故。所以自類前念之識與后為依。

論。心所此依隨識應說。

述曰。其心所法既屬於心。各隨本識以說所依。故隨識說。

自下大文第四釋難。于中有五。一諸心相應難　問八識俱時起。異類相望不作緣。異類心所既同生。應非心所導。

論。雖心心所至不應為例。

述曰。受．想等法異類並生。而互相應不相違背。和合似一。故顯揚論．五十五等云。心．心所和合非不和合。不可離別施設殊異。定俱生滅。事業必同。俱取此境。故隨一心開導之時。相應心所亦能開導。具此五義故。故得心與心所。心所與心。等作

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不得成為等無間緣（anantarika-pratyaya，直接且無間隔的緣）。或者第一卷是經部（Sautrāntika）的觀點。第三卷中，上座部（Sthavira nikāya）等宗義認為，二者以他們的第一篇論文為正確，此義為正確。經部原本的觀點並非必須允許色法（rūpa，物質現象）作為無間緣，因為它們不相等。第三卷中且假設允許有欲奪因緣（chanda-viprayoga-pratyaya，意願分離的緣），但他們並不認為色法是等無間（samanantara，相等且無間隔）的。這裡指的是色法和心識前後相續，前一個成為后一個的因。

論：如果說『等』字，直到『等無間緣』。

述記：前一位論師再次辯護。之前只是總的說了『等』字，沒有進一步分別。他們認為不是這樣的。不排除數量上各自是一個法，所以稱為『等』。只是表明前一念是這個心和心所（caitta，心理作用），后一念也是這個心和心所。表明同類的才能作為緣，就違背了你所執著的異類識作為等無間緣的觀點，因為它們不相互依賴。八識（aṣṭa vijñāna，八種識）相互之間都是異類，怎麼能作為緣呢？

論：因此，八識之間沒有同時生起的意義。

述記：這是第三大段，闡述其正確的道理。自類的眼識等沒有同時生起的意義，所以自類的前念之識才能作為后唸的所依。

論：心所應該依隨識來說。

述記：心所法既然屬於心，就各自依隨本識來說明所依。

從下面開始是第四大段，解釋疑問。其中有五個方面。一是諸心相應的疑問：如果八識同時生起，異類之間不作為緣，那麼異類的心所既然同時生起，應該不是心所引導。

論：雖然心和心所不同，但不應該作為例子。

述記：受（vedanā，感受）、想（saṃjñā，概念）等法雖然是異類，但同時生起，互相相應，不相違背，和合得像一個整體。《顯揚論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第五十五等處說，心和心所和合非不和合，不可分離地施設差別，必定同時生滅，事業必定相同，共同取境。所以隨一心開導之時，相應的心所也能開導。具備這五個方面的意義。所以心與心所，心所與心，可以平等地作為...

【English Translation】 English version: It cannot become anantarika-pratyaya (immediately preceding condition). Or the first volume is the view of Sautrāntika. In the third volume, the Sthavira nikāya and other doctrines hold that the two consider their first treatise to be correct, and this meaning is correct. The original view of Sautrāntika does not necessarily allow rūpa (material phenomena) to be an anantarika-pratyaya, because they are not equal. In the third volume, it is assumed that chanda-viprayoga-pratyaya (condition of separation of intention) is allowed, but they do not consider rūpa to be samanantara (equal and without interval). Here, it refers to the continuous sequence of rūpa and consciousness, where the former becomes the cause of the latter.

Treatise: If it is said that the word 'equal' extends to 'samanantara-pratyaya'.

Commentary: The previous teacher defends again. Previously, only the word 'equal' was mentioned in general, without further distinction. They think it is not like that. It does not exclude that each is one dharma in quantity, so it is called 'equal'. It only indicates that the previous thought is this mind and caitta (mental function), and the subsequent thought is also this mind and caitta. It indicates that those of the same kind can be the condition, which violates your adherence to the view that different kinds of consciousness are samanantara-pratyaya, because they do not depend on each other. The eight vijñāna (eight consciousnesses) are different from each other, how can they be the condition?

Treatise: Therefore, there is no meaning of simultaneous arising between the eight consciousnesses.

Commentary: This is the third major section, elaborating its correct reasoning. The eye consciousness and others of the same kind do not have the meaning of simultaneous arising, so the previous consciousness of the same kind can be the basis of the subsequent consciousness.

Treatise: Mental functions should be described according to consciousness.

Commentary: Since mental functions belong to the mind, they are described according to their respective consciousnesses.

From below is the fourth major section, explaining the questions. There are five aspects. One is the question of the correspondence of all minds: If the eight consciousnesses arise simultaneously, and different kinds do not act as conditions, then since different kinds of mental functions arise simultaneously, it should not be that mental functions guide.

Treatise: Although the mind and mental functions are different, they should not be taken as an example.

Commentary: Vedanā (feeling), saṃjñā (perception), and other dharmas, although of different kinds, arise simultaneously, correspond to each other, do not contradict each other, and are harmoniously like a whole. The Abhidharmasamuccaya, fifty-fifth, etc., says that the mind and mental functions are harmoniously non-unharmonious, and it is impossible to separately establish differences, they must arise and cease simultaneously, their activities must be the same, and they take the same object together. Therefore, when one mind guides, the corresponding mental functions can also guide. Possessing these five aspects of meaning. Therefore, the mind and mental functions, mental functions and mind, can equally act as...

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無間緣　言五義者。一相應。即所依．時．事．處四義等同故。二和合似一。三俱生滅。四事業同。三性必等。五開導同　諸識不然。各互相望不具此五。不應例心所令同異識。

自下第二心所成依難　問心．心所法雖異類相望互作緣。緣義既無差。為依亦應等。

論。然諸心所至無主義故。

述曰。其心所法非開導依。於後念所引生無主義故。依是主義。心所非依。緣是由義。心所亦是。

自下第三各應為緣難　問八識自類如前眼識等為后眼識等依何故受等不唯為后受等依。而眼識俱受。得與后自俱想等為依。此何故不如著名沙門義想望想。受望受等耶。為解此難。

論。若心心所至此緣便闕。

述曰。心唯望心。心所別別望別別心所。自類為依者。第七．八識隨其何位。初轉依時相應信等此緣便闕。自有漏位未曾有故。為成此有緣故。心望心所得作此緣。

問緣闕何事。

論。則違聖說至皆四緣生。

述曰。既違聖教。減三緣故。即與攝論第一等云心及心所四緣定故言相違也。

自下第四後起由他難　問如出五位無心之時。六由七．八先有故生。何不第六以七．八為依。

論。無心等位至即前自類。

述曰。彼位雖斷。而後起時彼開

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無間緣：關於五種意義的闡述。一、相應：即所依（所依賴的事物）、時（時間）、事（事件）、處（處所）四種意義相同。二、和合似一：和合在一起就像一個整體。三、俱生滅：同時產生和滅亡。四、事業同：作用相同。三性必等：三種自性必定相等。五、開導同：引導和啓發相同。各種識（vijñāna）並非如此，它們各自相互觀望，不具備這五種意義，不應該把心所（caitasika）作為例子，認為它們與識相同或相異。

下面是第二個關於心所成依的詰難：問：心（citta）、心所法（caitasika-dharma）雖然種類不同，相互之間可以作為緣（hetu-pratyaya），但緣的意義既然沒有差別，作為所依也應該相等。

論：然而，各種心所法，乃至沒有主義的緣故。

述曰：這些心所法不是開導依，對於后念所引發的產生沒有主義的緣故。依是主義，心所不是依；緣是由義，心所也是。

下面是第三個關於各自應該為緣的詰難：問：八識（aṣṭa vijñāna）的自類，如前面的眼識（cakṣur-vijñāna）等為後面的眼識等所依，為什麼受（vedanā）等不只是為後面的受等所依，而眼識卻與受俱生？得到與後面的自俱想（saṃjñā）等作為所依。這為什麼不如著名的沙門（śrāmaṇa）義，想望想（saṃjñā望saṃjñā），受望受（vedanā望vedanā）等呢？爲了解釋這個詰難。

論：如果心和心所，乃至這個緣就缺失了。

述曰：心唯獨望心，心所分別望分別的心所，自類作為所依。第七識（mana-vijñāna）、第八識（ālaya-vijñāna）隨其任何位置，初轉依時，相應的信（śraddhā）等，這個緣就缺失了，因為自有漏位（sāsrava-bhūmi）未曾有故。爲了成就這個有緣的緣故，心望心所才能作為這個緣。

問：緣缺失了什麼事？

論：那就違背了聖人的說法，乃至一切都是四緣所生。

述曰：既然違背了聖教，減少了三種緣的緣故。即與《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第一等所說的心及心所四緣決定相違背。

下面是第四個關於後起由他的詰難：問：如出五位無心（pañca citta-viprayukta）之時，第六識（mano-vijñāna）由第七識、第八識先有而生，為什麼第六識不以第七識、第八識為依？

論：無心等位，乃至即前自類。

述曰：那些位置雖然斷絕，而後起時，那些開導

【English Translation】 English version The Immediate Cause: Explaining the Five Meanings. 1. Correspondence: That is, the four meanings of what is relied upon (the object of reliance), time, event, and place are the same. 2. Harmonious Union as One: Being harmoniously united like a single entity. 3. Simultaneous Arising and Ceasing: Arising and ceasing at the same time. 4. Identity of Function: Having the same function. The Three Natures Must Be Equal: The three natures must be equal. 5. Identity of Guidance: Guidance and enlightenment are the same. The various consciousnesses (vijñāna) are not like this; they each look at each other and do not possess these five meanings. One should not take the mental functions (caitasika) as an example, thinking they are the same or different from the consciousnesses.

Below is the second challenge regarding mental functions as the basis: Question: Although the mind (citta) and mental functions (caitasika-dharma) are different in kind and can act as causes (hetu-pratyaya) to each other, since the meaning of cause is not different, their status as a basis should also be equal.

Treatise: However, the various mental functions, even to the point of having no principle.

Commentary: These mental functions are not guiding bases because they have no principle in the arising caused by subsequent thoughts. A basis is a principle; mental functions are not bases. A cause is a reason; mental functions are also causes.

Below is the third challenge regarding each should be a cause: Question: The self-nature of the eight consciousnesses (aṣṭa vijñāna), such as the preceding eye-consciousness (cakṣur-vijñāna) etc., is the basis for the subsequent eye-consciousness etc. Why is feeling (vedanā) etc. not only the basis for the subsequent feeling etc., but eye-consciousness arises together with feeling? Obtaining and the subsequent self-associated perception (saṃjñā) etc. are the basis. Why is this not like the famous śrāmaṇa meaning, perception looking at perception (saṃjñā looking at saṃjñā), feeling looking at feeling (vedanā looking at vedanā) etc.? To explain this challenge.

Treatise: If the mind and mental functions, even to the point that this cause is missing.

Commentary: The mind only looks at the mind, and the mental functions separately look at separate mental functions, with self-nature as the basis. The seventh consciousness (mana-vijñāna) and the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), in whatever position they are, when initially transforming the basis, the corresponding faith (śraddhā) etc., this cause is missing because it has never existed in the contaminated state (sāsrava-bhūmi). To accomplish this cause with a cause, the mind must look at the mental functions to act as this cause.

Question: What is missing from the cause?

Treatise: Then it contradicts the words of the sages, even to the point that everything arises from four causes.

Commentary: Since it contradicts the holy teachings, it reduces the three causes. That is, it contradicts the statement in the first part of the Compendium of the Great Vehicle (Mahāyānasaṃgraha) that the four causes of the mind and mental functions are definite.

Below is the fourth challenge regarding subsequent arising depending on others: Question: For example, when emerging from the five states of mindlessness (pañca citta-viprayukta), the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna) arises from the prior existence of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. Why doesn't the sixth consciousness take the seventh and eighth consciousnesses as its basis?

Treatise: States of mindlessness, even to the point of the preceding self-nature.

Commentary: Although those positions are severed, when they subsequently arise, those guiding

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導依。唯以已前初入定時自類為依。如對法第五說。

論。間斷五識至名無間故。

述曰。以第六意為同法故。但無自類心中為隔故名無間緣。

問何時為依過去無故。

論。彼先滅時至為開導依。

述曰。曾住現在將滅之時。已能為依於今時識為開導故。彼設若不去。后不得生故。由前理．教故知不假異類之識為開導依。

自下第五諸教相違難　問如解深密等五識由意引。大論第三五識引意尋求心生。佛地經．莊嚴論。說平等智初起。第八初得凈時攝論依染污。對法依悲願等。皆云諸識互相引生。此豈非教異類依文。今何翻解。

論。然聖教中至故不相違。

述曰。此前所引皆依殊勝增上緣中。說相引生名為無間。非實是此等無間緣故不違彼。

論。瑜伽論說至名意根者。

述曰。八十五卷有四緣廣分別義。正與此同。如大論第五．顯揚十八云。此心．心所等無間乃至決定生。阿羅漢後心即非此緣。以不生故。率爾心后定意識生。又五十二說又此六識等名意根等。皆諸識相望為緣。何故今時別識不為緣也。

論。言總意別亦不相違。

述曰。彼論言總遍於六識。意乃別說六識自類。各各相望亦不違理。即總意言。若諸識生意取決定識。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 導依（引導和依賴）。只有以先前初入定時同類的意識作為依賴。如《對法》第五卷所說。

論：間斷五識直至名為無間緣的緣故。

述曰：因為第六意識是同法，但因為沒有同類心識作為間隔，所以名為無間緣。

問：何時作為依賴？因為過去已經滅去。

論：在它先前滅去時，能夠作為開導依賴。

述曰：曾經存在於現在，將要滅去的時候，已經能夠作為開導，引導現在的意識。如果它不滅去，後面的意識就無法產生。由於之前的道理和教義，可知不需要不同類的意識作為開導依賴。

自下第五 諸教相違難：問：如《解深密經》等說五識由意根引導，《大論》第三卷說五識引導意識尋求心生。《佛地經》、《莊嚴論》說平等智初起，第八識初得清凈時，《攝論》依據染污，《對法》依據悲願等，都說諸識互相引導產生。這難道不是教義上不同類的意識作為依賴的說法嗎？現在為何要推翻這種解釋？

論：然而聖教中都依據殊勝增上緣而說，所以不相違背。

述曰：之前所引用的經文，都是依據殊勝增上緣中，說互相引導產生，名為無間。並非實際上是此等無間緣，所以不違背那些經文。

論：《瑜伽師地論》說，名為意根者。

述曰：《瑜伽師地論》第八十五卷有四緣廣分別義，正與此相同。如《大論》第五卷、《顯揚聖教論》第十八卷說，此心、心所等無間乃至決定生。阿羅漢後心即非此緣，因為不再產生。率爾心后定意識生。又第五十二卷說，又此六識等名為意根等，都是諸識相互作為緣。為何現在不同類的意識不能作為緣呢？

論：言總意別，也不相違背。

述曰：那些論典所說的『總』，是普遍指六識；『意』則是分別指六識各自的同類。各自相互作為緣，也不違背道理。即總意而言，如果諸識生起意識，則取決定識。

【English Translation】 English version Guidance and reliance. Only the consciousness of the same kind in the initial entry into Samadhi (deep meditative state) is taken as reliance, as stated in the fifth book of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma).

Treatise: Interruption of the five consciousnesses until it is called the condition of contiguity (anantarapratyaya).

Commentary: Because the sixth consciousness is of the same Dharma (principle), but because there is no consciousness of the same kind as an interval, it is called the condition of contiguity.

Question: When is it taken as reliance? Because the past has already ceased.

Treatise: When it previously ceases, it can serve as a guiding reliance.

Commentary: Having existed in the present, when about to cease, it can already serve as guidance, guiding the present consciousness. If it does not cease, the subsequent consciousness cannot arise. Due to the previous reasoning and teachings, it is known that different kinds of consciousness are not needed as guiding reliance.

From below, the fifth difficulty of conflicting teachings: Question: As the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra) and others say that the five consciousnesses are guided by the manas (mind), the third book of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana) says that the five consciousnesses guide the consciousness to seek the arising of the mind. The Buddhabhūmi Sūtra (Buddha Land Sutra) and the Śūraṅgama Sūtra (Heroic Progress Sutra) say that the initial arising of Equality Wisdom (samatā-jñāna), when the eighth consciousness initially attains purity, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha relies on defilement, and the Abhidharmasamuccaya relies on compassion and vows, all say that the consciousnesses guide each other to arise. Isn't this a teaching that different kinds of consciousness serve as reliance? Why overturn this explanation now?

Treatise: However, the holy teachings all speak based on the superior condition of augmentation (adhipati-pratyaya), so there is no contradiction.

Commentary: The sutras and treatises quoted earlier all speak of mutual guidance and arising within the superior condition of augmentation, called contiguity. They are not actually this condition of contiguity, so they do not contradict those sutras and treatises.

Treatise: The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Stages of Yoga Practice) says, 'That which is called the manas-indriya (faculty of mind)'...

Commentary: The eighty-fifth book of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra has a broad explanation of the meaning of the four conditions, which is exactly the same as this. As the fifth book of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha and the eighteenth book of the Abhidharmasamuccaya say, 'This mind, mental factors, etc., arise contiguously and even decisively.' The mind after the Arhat (liberated being) is not this condition, because it no longer arises. After the initial thought, the determined consciousness arises. Also, the fifty-second book says, 'Also, these six consciousnesses are called the manas-indriya, etc.,' all of which are the consciousnesses serving as conditions for each other. Why can't different kinds of consciousness serve as conditions now?

Treatise: Speaking of the general and the specific is also not contradictory.

Commentary: What those treatises say as 'general' refers universally to the six consciousnesses; 'manas' refers specifically to the same kind of each of the six consciousnesses. Each serving as a condition for the other also does not contradict reason. That is, in terms of the general meaning, if the consciousnesses give rise to consciousness, then it takes the determined consciousness.

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不取一切。今總言故諸識生等。如攝論第一云一法未達未遍知意。

論。故自類依深契教理。

述曰。第三結正。故知八識自類為依深契教理。並無違故。

自下第三生下總結。

論。傍論已了應辨正論。

述曰。因此識依遂廣分別名傍論也。諸識所依總說頌曰。五四六有二。七．八一俱依。及開導．因緣。一一皆增二。

問如上說依遂有三種。此頌中言依彼轉者約何依說。

論。此能變識至但顯前二。

述曰。除無間緣。此泛說故。

問何故唯說彼初二依。

論。為顯此識依緣同故。

述曰。此有二解。

一云但總聚言不須分別。種子不離識自體故亦名為緣。即是正義　二云以二所依即所緣故。即是第七緣種等義。不爾因緣依此便非有。無間滅依此理定無。第七不緣自前念故。

論。又前二依有勝用故。

述曰。俱依相近。種子親生。又並俱時。故論合說。非無間緣異時遠故。即是不緣種子等義。

論。或開導依易了知故。

述曰。以開導依易故不說。唯言此依第八本識。餘二隱密所以說之。

上來第二解所依訖。次第三門當解所緣。于中有二。初結前問后以發論端。第二依頌隨別解釋。

論。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不執取一切（不執著于任何事物）。現在總的來說，各種識的生起等等（都是如此）。如《攝大乘論》第一卷所說：『對一個法沒有通達，沒有完全瞭解』的意思。

論：所以說，（第八）識的自類相依，深刻地契合了佛教的教義和道理。

述記：第三，總結歸正。所以知道第八識以自類為所依，深刻地契合了教義和道理，並沒有任何違背之處。

從下面開始，第三部分總結上文。

論：旁論已經結束，應該辨析正論。

述記：因為討論識的所依，所以廣泛地分別，稱為旁論。各種識的所依，總的來說，用頌文概括為：『五、四、六有二，七、八一俱依，及開導、因緣，一一皆增二。』

問：如上所說，所依有三種，這頌文中說的『依彼轉』是指哪一種所依而言？

論：這些能變識（指第八識）……只是爲了顯示前兩種（所依）。

述記：除了無間緣（之外），這裡是泛泛而談。

問：為什麼只說前兩種所依？

論：爲了顯示這種識的所依和所緣是相同的。

述記：對此有兩種解釋。

一種說法是，只是總括而言，不需要分別。種子不離識的自體，所以也稱為緣，這是正確的解釋。另一種說法是，因為兩種所依就是所緣。也就是第七識緣種子的含義。否則，因緣依此便不存在了，無間滅依此理肯定沒有。因為第七識不緣自己的前念。

論：而且前兩種所依有殊勝的作用。

述記：俱依（同時依）很接近，種子親近產生。而且都是同時的，所以論中合在一起說。無間緣是異時的，距離遙遠。也就是不緣種子等的含義。

論：或者開導依容易瞭解。

述記：因為開導依容易理解，所以不說。只說這種依是第八本識。其餘兩種隱秘，所以才說。

上面第二部分解釋所依完畢。接下來第三部分將要解釋所緣。其中有兩部分。首先總結前文，提出問題，然後展開論述。第二部分依據頌文，分別解釋。

論：

【English Translation】 English version: 'Not taking everything' (not being attached to anything). Now, generally speaking, the arising of various consciousnesses, etc. (are all like this). As stated in the first volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana): 'The meaning of not penetrating, not fully understanding a single dharma (phenomenon).'

Treatise: Therefore, the self-category dependence of the (eighth) consciousness deeply accords with the teachings and principles of Buddhism.

Commentary: Third, concluding and correcting. Therefore, it is known that the eighth consciousness takes its own category as its support, deeply accords with the teachings and principles, and there is no contradiction.

From below, the third part summarizes the above.

Treatise: The digression is finished, and the main argument should be distinguished.

Commentary: Because the support of consciousness is discussed, it is widely distinguished, called a digression. The supports of various consciousnesses, in general, are summarized in a verse: 'Five, four, six have two, seven, eight have one concurrent support, and guiding and causal conditions, each increases by two.'

Question: As mentioned above, there are three types of support. Which type of support does the verse 'dependent on that it transforms' refer to?

Treatise: These transforming consciousnesses (referring to the eighth consciousness)... only to show the first two (supports).

Commentary: Except for the immediate condition (anantarapratyaya), this is a general statement.

Question: Why only mention the first two supports?

Treatise: To show that the support and object of this consciousness are the same.

Commentary: There are two explanations for this.

One explanation is that it is just a general statement and does not need to be distinguished. Seeds are inseparable from the self-nature of consciousness, so they are also called conditions, which is the correct explanation. The other explanation is that because the two supports are the objects. That is, the seventh consciousness is related to the meaning of seeds. Otherwise, the causal condition would not exist, and the immediate cessation would definitely not exist. Because the seventh consciousness is not related to its previous thought.

Treatise: Moreover, the first two supports have superior functions.

Commentary: Concurrent support is close, and seeds are closely produced. And they are all simultaneous, so they are discussed together in the treatise. The immediate condition is at a different time and far away. That is, it is not related to seeds, etc.

Treatise: Or the guiding support is easy to understand.

Commentary: Because the guiding support is easy to understand, it is not mentioned. It only says that this support is the eighth fundamental consciousness (Ālayavijñāna). The other two are hidden, so they are mentioned.

The second part above explains the support. Next, the third part will explain the object. There are two parts in it. First, summarize the previous text, raise questions, and then start the discussion. The second part explains separately according to the verse.

Treatise:

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如是已說至所緣云何。

述曰。即初文也。

論。謂即緣彼。

述曰。下文有三。初解頌中緣彼之言次顯因果識所緣相。三釋妨難　初中有二。初舉頌答。后更別解。此舉頌答。

自下釋頌。

論。彼謂即前此所依識。

述曰。自下別釋。于中復二。初總解。后別諍。此即初也　所依之彼。彼初能變　所緣之彼。彼此第七所依之識。意顯所依即是所緣更非異彼。

何以知者。

論。聖說此識緣藏識故。

述曰。大論．顯揚．對法等諸論皆同此說。故知此識緣自所依。

此即通解。此下敘諍。諍有四說。初難陀等義。

論。有義此意至及相應法。

述曰。此顯不緣相分色等及彼種子。以於三界中一類緣故不緣彼境　若緣彼境者。即我所執有時無故　若緣彼種者。無能緣用。非殊勝法不可計我故。又應我所有時斷故。唯緣識體及彼心所。

以何為證。

論。論說末那至恒相應故。

述曰。由此緣識體為我。心所為所。由心是主故執為我。由所助伴故為我所　何等論說有我．我所。瑜伽六十三有心地抉擇．對法第二．顯揚第一等皆爾。

論。謂緣彼體至我及我所。

述曰。以理屬教令義明瞭。即一念心有二行解

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果像這樣已經說了，那麼所緣（ālambana）是什麼呢？

述記說：就是最初的文句。

論：就是緣取那個。

述記說：下面的文句有三部分。第一部分解釋頌文中的『緣彼』之言，第二部分顯示因果識所緣的相狀，第三部分解釋妨難。第一部分中有兩個部分。首先舉頌回答，然後另外解釋。這裡是舉頌回答。

從下面開始解釋頌文。

論：彼，指的是前面的此所依識（āśraya-vijñāna）。

述記說：從下面開始分別解釋。其中又分為兩個部分。首先是總的解釋，然後是分別的辯論。這裡是最初的部分。所依的『彼』，是最初的能變。所緣的『彼』，是彼此第七識所依的識。意思是說所依就是所緣，不是另外的『彼』。

憑什麼知道呢？

論：聖者說這個識緣取藏識（ālayavijñāna）的緣故。

述記說：《大論》、《顯揚》、《對法》等各種論典都這樣說。所以知道這個識緣取自己所依的識。

這以上是總的解釋。這下面敘述辯論。辯論有四種說法。首先是難陀（Nanda）等的觀點。

論：有一種觀點認為，這個意（manas）緣取藏識的自體以及相應的法（caitasika dharma）。

述記說：這表明不緣取相分（nimitta-bhāga）的色等以及它們的種子（bīja）。因為在三界（trayo dhātavaḥ）中，它只緣取一類，所以不緣取那些境界。如果緣取那些境界，那麼我所執著的有時會不存在。如果緣取那些種子，就沒有能緣的作用。不是殊勝的法，所以不能計為我。而且我所擁有的有時會斷滅。所以只緣取識的自體以及它的心所。

以什麼為證據？

論：論典說，末那（manas）與藏識恒常相應。

述記說：由此緣取識的自體作為我，心所作為我所。因為心是主要的，所以執著為我。因為心所是輔助的，所以作為我所。什麼論典說了有我、我所？《瑜伽師地論》第六十三卷有《心地抉擇》，《對法論》第二卷，《顯揚論》第一卷等都是這樣說的。

論：意思是說，緣取那個自體，執著為我以及我所。

述記說：用道理和教證使意義明確。就是一念心中有二種行相的理解。

【English Translation】 English version: If it has been spoken thus, then what is the object (ālambana)?

The commentary says: It is the initial statement.

The treatise says: Namely, it cognizes that.

The commentary says: The following text has three parts. The first part explains the words 'cognizes that' in the verse, the second part reveals the characteristics of the object cognized by the causal consciousness, and the third part explains the objections. The first part has two parts. First, it answers by citing the verse, and then explains it separately. Here, it answers by citing the verse.

From below, it explains the verse.

The treatise says: 'That' refers to the preceding āśraya-vijñāna (store consciousness).

The commentary says: From below, it explains separately. Within this, there are two parts. First, a general explanation, and then a separate debate. This is the initial part. The 'that' of the support is the initial transformation. The 'that' of the object is the consciousness supported by the seventh consciousness. It means that the support is the object, and is not different from 'that'.

How is this known?

The treatise says: Because the sages say that this consciousness cognizes the ālayavijñāna (store consciousness).

The commentary says: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Śūnyatā-saptati, Abhidharmasamuccaya, and other treatises all say the same. Therefore, it is known that this consciousness cognizes its own support.

The above is a general explanation. Below, it narrates the debate. There are four views in the debate. First, the view of Nanda and others.

The treatise says: Some argue that this manas (mind) cognizes the self-nature of the store consciousness and its associated mental factors (caitasika dharmas).

The commentary says: This indicates that it does not cognize the form (rūpa) of the objective aspect (nimitta-bhāga) and their seeds (bīja). Because it cognizes only one type within the three realms (trayo dhātavaḥ), it does not cognize those objects. If it cognized those objects, then what I am attached to would sometimes not exist. If it cognized those seeds, it would not have the function of a cognizer. It is not a superior dharma, so it cannot be considered as 'I'. Moreover, what I possess would sometimes be cut off. Therefore, it only cognizes the self-nature of the consciousness and its mental factors.

What is the proof?

The treatise says: The treatise says that manas is constantly associated with the store consciousness.

The commentary says: Therefore, it cognizes the self-nature of the consciousness as 'I', and the mental factors as 'mine'. Because the mind is the main thing, it is attached to as 'I'. Because the mental factors are auxiliary, they are regarded as 'mine'. Which treatises say that there is 'I' and 'mine'? The sixty-third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra has the Heart-Mind Determination, the second volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and the first volume of the Śūnyatā-saptati, etc., all say so.

The treatise says: It means that it cognizes that self-nature, and is attached to it as 'I' and 'mine'.

The commentary says: Use reason and scriptural authority to make the meaning clear. That is, in one moment of mind, there are two aspects of understanding.

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。若緣我時即帶我所行相轉故。

問若緣體為我心所為所。何故論言但緣彼識不言緣所。為答此問。

論。然諸心所至無違教失。

述曰。謂諸心所不離識故。說識之時亦已說所。如唯識言。無違教失。論言有我所。故知緣心所。若緣本識之境。境不定故。不可緣彼立此義也。

論。有義彼說至緣觸等故。

述曰。火辨等解。此第二意。心所．心王各各有體。我．我所執行相不同。若緣王為我。心所為所。論應別說。說既不別故述妄情　何謂妄情。為解此疑。曾無處言緣觸等故。觸等即是遍行五法。前說與彼第八俱者。論不言緣。今為七境設屬我所深是妄情。以理驗教甚相乖角。

若爾以何為我所境。

論。應言此意至不違聖說。

述曰。許緣彼識見．及相分。相不離見。教有成文。執我．我所論有明證。故知我境以能變之功。但屬識之見分。我所有屬他之用。但屬識境。即現色蘊。非彼種子。心所既別有體。論復不說別緣。故知識之見．相如次執為我．及我所。相．見二分俱一識為體故不違聖說。所以者何。有我所故明緣彼境不離識故明不緣所。但言緣第八識故不違教。

論。有義此說至非識蘊故。

述曰。此安惠說。非次前師。所以者何。論言緣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果攀緣于『我』(ātman)時，就會帶著『我所』(ātmanīya)的行相轉變的緣故。

問：如果攀緣于自體，那麼心和心所分別是『我』和『我所』嗎？為什麼論中只說攀緣于那個識，而不說攀緣于『所』呢？爲了回答這個問題。

論：然而諸心所不離識，所以沒有違背教義的過失。

述曰：因為諸心所不離識的緣故，所以在說識的時候，也已經說了『所』。如《唯識論》所說，沒有違背教義的過失。論中說有『我所』，所以知道是攀緣心所。如果攀緣本識的境，境不確定，所以不可以攀緣它來建立這個意義。

論：有義是說，乃至攀緣觸等法的緣故。

述曰：火辨等人解釋說，這是第二種意思。心所和心王(citta-rāja)各自有自體，『我』和『我所』的執行相不同。如果攀緣於心王為『我』，心所為『我所』，論中應該分別說明。既然沒有分別說明，所以是陳述虛妄的情執。什麼是虛妄的情執呢？因為沒有地方說過攀緣觸等法。觸等法就是遍行五法。前面說與第八識(ālaya-vijñāna)俱起的那些法，論中沒有說攀緣。現在爲了第七識(manas)的境設立屬於『我所』，這是很深的虛妄情執。用道理來驗證教義，非常不相違背。

如果這樣，那麼以什麼作為『我所』的境呢？

論：應該說這個意思是，不違背聖說的。

述曰：允許攀緣那個識的見分和相分。相分不離見分，教義中有明確的文句。執著『我』和『我所』，論中有明確的證據。所以知道『我』的境，以能變的作用，只屬於識的見分。『我所』有屬於他的作用，只屬於識的相分，即顯現的色蘊(rūpa-skandha)，不是它的種子。心所既然另外有自體，論中又沒有說另外攀緣，所以知道識的見分和相分，如次第地執著為『我』和『我所』。相分和見分都以一個識為體，所以不違背聖說。為什麼這樣說呢？因為有『我所』的緣故，說明攀緣那個境不離識的緣故，說明不攀緣『所』。只說攀緣第八識，所以不違背教義。

論：有義是說，乃至不是識蘊的緣故。

述曰：這是安慧的說法，不是前面的老師的說法。為什麼這樣說呢？論中說攀緣

【English Translation】 English version: If, when clinging to 'self' (ātman), it transforms with the characteristics of 'what belongs to self' (ātmanīya).

Question: If clinging to the self-essence, are the mind and mental factors respectively 'self' and 'what belongs to self'? Why does the treatise only mention clinging to that consciousness and not to 'what belongs'? To answer this question.

Treatise: However, since all mental factors are inseparable from consciousness, there is no fault of contradicting the teachings.

Commentary: Because all mental factors are inseparable from consciousness, when consciousness is mentioned, 'what belongs' is also mentioned. As the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi states, there is no fault of contradicting the teachings. The treatise mentions 'what belongs to self,' so it is known that it clings to mental factors. If clinging to the object of the fundamental consciousness, the object is uncertain, so it cannot be clung to in order to establish this meaning.

Treatise: Some say that it is because of clinging to contact, etc.

Commentary: Huobian and others explain that this is the second meaning. Mental factors and the mind-king (citta-rāja) each have their own essence, and the functions of 'self' and 'what belongs to self' are different. If clinging to the mind-king as 'self' and mental factors as 'what belongs to self,' the treatise should explain them separately. Since it does not explain them separately, it is stating false emotional attachments. What are false emotional attachments? Because there is nowhere that says to cling to contact, etc. Contact, etc., are the five omnipresent mental factors. The treatise does not mention clinging to those that arise together with the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) mentioned earlier. Now, to establish what belongs to self for the object of the seventh consciousness (manas) is a deep false emotional attachment. Using reason to verify the teachings, they are very contradictory.

If so, what is the object of 'what belongs to self'?

Treatise: It should be said that this meaning does not contradict the holy teachings.

Commentary: It is permissible to cling to the seeing-aspect and object-aspect of that consciousness. The object-aspect is inseparable from the seeing-aspect, and there are clear statements in the teachings. Clinging to 'self' and 'what belongs to self' has clear evidence in the treatise. Therefore, it is known that the object of 'self,' with the function of transformation, only belongs to the seeing-aspect of consciousness. 'What belongs to self' has the function of belonging to others and only belongs to the object-aspect of consciousness, which is the manifested form aggregate (rūpa-skandha), not its seed. Since mental factors have separate essences, and the treatise does not mention clinging to them separately, it is known that the seeing-aspect and object-aspect of consciousness are clung to as 'self' and 'what belongs to self' in order. The object-aspect and seeing-aspect both have one consciousness as their essence, so it does not contradict the holy teachings. Why is this so? Because there is 'what belongs to self,' it explains that clinging to that object is inseparable from consciousness, and it explains not clinging to 'what belongs.' Only saying to cling to the eighth consciousness does not contradict the teachings.

Treatise: Some say that it is because it is not the consciousness aggregate.

Commentary: This is Anhui's statement, not the previous teacher's statement. Why is this so? The treatise says to cling to

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彼阿賴耶識。即識蘊攝。許緣彼境者。即通色蘊。然此色蘊非識蘊攝。如何言緣識。而亦得攝色。色若是識蘊。緣識之言許緣色。色既非識蘊。緣識之言不攝色。

論。應同五識亦緣外故。

述曰。五識緣五塵五識言緣外。末那緣五塵。亦應緣外境。如何可言緣內起我。若緣內色名緣內者。五亦應然。等流境故。

論。應如意識緣共境故。

述曰。意識緣五塵與五同故。名緣共境。第七緣五塵。亦應如意名緣共境。

論。應生無色者不執我所故。

述曰。下緣有色蘊。緣之起我所。若生無色時應無有我所。

論。厭色生彼不變色故。

述曰。若言彼有色謂定所生難云。聖者有此色。聖者有我所。凡夫不變色。應無有我所　又若變為色者。生彼有我所。不變為色者。生彼無我所　又極厭色生彼不變色故。故知無色界定無有我所　既爾緣何說起我所。

論。應說此意至我及我所。

述曰。此但緣彼現行藏識及種藏識。如次執為我及所故。

論。以種即是至不違聖教。

述曰。種子是彼現識功能。非實有物。體是假有。論言緣識正當二種。種子．現行皆名識故。于諸論中不簡現行及種子故。故得緣種。即緣識故。不緣余法。不違聖教。名我所故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：如果阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識）是識蘊（vijñāna-skandha，五蘊之一，指意識）所包含的，並且被允許緣取（pratītyasamutpāda，指依賴於條件而生起）彼境（viṣaya，對像），那麼它也通於色蘊（rūpa-skandha，五蘊之一，指物質形態）。然而，這個色蘊並非識蘊所包含。如何說緣取識，而也能被包含呢？如果是識蘊，那麼『緣識』的說法就被允許；如果不是識蘊，那麼『緣識』的說法就不能包含色蘊。

論：應該和前五識一樣，也是緣取外境的緣故。

述曰：前五識緣取五塵（pañca viṣaya，色、聲、香、味、觸），所以說前五識緣取外境。末那識（manas-vijñāna，第七識，意根）緣取五塵，也應該緣取外境。如何能說緣取內在而生起『我』的執著呢？如果緣取內在的色法就叫做緣取內在，那麼前五識也應該如此，因為它們所緣取的境界是等流（niṣyanda，同類相續）的緣故。

論：應該像意識一樣，緣取共同的境界的緣故。

述曰：意識緣取五塵，與前五識相同，所以叫做緣取共同的境界。第七識緣取五塵，也應該像意識一樣，叫做緣取共同的境界。

論：應該生於無色界（ārūpya-dhātu，沒有物質存在的禪定境界）的人不執著『我所』（mamakāra，屬於我的）的緣故。

述曰：地獄緣取有色蘊，緣取它而生起『我所』的執著。如果生於無色界時，應該沒有『我所』的執著。

論：厭離色法而生於彼界，是因為色法沒有改變的緣故。

述曰：如果說彼界有色法，是禪定所生的，那麼難以說聖者（ārya，證悟者）有此色法，聖者有『我所』的執著。凡夫沒有改變色法，應該沒有『我所』的執著。又如果變為色法，那麼生於彼界就有『我所』的執著；如果沒有變為色法，那麼生於彼界就沒有『我所』的執著。又因為極度厭離色法而生於彼界，是因為色法沒有改變的緣故。所以知道沒有禪定就沒有『我所』的執著。既然如此，緣取什麼而說生起『我所』的執著呢？

論：應該說此意（manas，意根）執著于『我』（ātman，自我）以及『我所』。

述曰：此意只是緣取彼現行藏識（pravṛtti-ālayavijñāna，現行阿賴耶識）以及種子藏識（bīja-ālayavijñāna，種子阿賴耶識），依次執著為『我』以及『我所』的緣故。

論：因為種子就是現識的功能，所以不違背聖教（ārya-dharma，聖者的教導）。

述曰：種子是彼現識的功能，並非實有的事物，本體是假有的。論中說緣取識，正是指兩種：種子和現行，都叫做識的緣故。在各種論典中，沒有區分現行和種子。所以能夠緣取種子，就是緣取識的緣故，不緣取其他法，不違背聖教，所以叫做『我所』。

【English Translation】 English version Question: If the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness, the consciousness that stores all seeds) is included within the vijñāna-skandha (the aggregate of consciousness, one of the five aggregates), and is allowed to arise dependently (pratītyasamutpāda) on that object (viṣaya), then it also extends to the rūpa-skandha (the aggregate of form, one of the five aggregates, referring to material form). However, this rūpa-skandha is not included within the vijñāna-skandha. How can it be said to arise dependently on consciousness, and also be included? If it is the vijñāna-skandha, then the statement 'arising dependently on consciousness' is allowed; if it is not the vijñāna-skandha, then the statement 'arising dependently on consciousness' cannot include form.

Treatise: It should be the same as the first five consciousnesses, because they also arise dependently on external objects.

Commentary: The first five consciousnesses arise dependently on the five sense objects (pañca viṣaya, form, sound, smell, taste, and touch), so it is said that the first five consciousnesses arise dependently on external objects. The manas-vijñāna (the seventh consciousness, the mind) arises dependently on the five sense objects, so it should also arise dependently on external objects. How can it be said to arise dependently on the internal and give rise to the attachment to 'self'? If arising dependently on internal form is called arising dependently on the internal, then the first five consciousnesses should also be the same, because the realm they arise dependently on is of the same flow (niṣyanda, continuous flow of the same kind).

Treatise: It should be like the consciousness, because it arises dependently on a shared realm.

Commentary: The consciousness arises dependently on the five sense objects, which is the same as the first five consciousnesses, so it is called arising dependently on a shared realm. The seventh consciousness arises dependently on the five sense objects, so it should also be called arising dependently on a shared realm like the consciousness.

Treatise: It should be that those born in the formless realm (ārūpya-dhātu, meditative states without material existence) do not cling to 'mine' (mamakāra, belonging to me).

Commentary: The lower realms arise dependently on the aggregate of form, arising dependently on it and giving rise to the attachment to 'mine'. If born in the formless realm, there should be no attachment to 'mine'.

Treatise: Disgusting form and being born in that realm is because form has not changed.

Commentary: If it is said that there is form in that realm, which is born from meditation, then it is difficult to say that the noble ones (ārya, enlightened beings) have this form, and the noble ones have the attachment to 'mine'. Ordinary people have not changed form, so there should be no attachment to 'mine'. Also, if it is transformed into form, then being born in that realm there is attachment to 'mine'; if it is not transformed into form, then being born in that realm there is no attachment to 'mine'. Also, because of extreme disgust with form and being born in that realm, it is because form has not changed. Therefore, it is known that without meditation there is no attachment to 'mine'. Since this is the case, what is it that arises dependently on which gives rise to the attachment to 'mine'?

Treatise: It should be said that this mind (manas, the mind) clings to 'self' (ātman, the self) and 'mine'.

Commentary: This mind only arises dependently on the manifest storehouse consciousness (pravṛtti-ālayavijñāna, the active Ālaya-vijñāna) and the seed storehouse consciousness (bīja-ālayavijñāna, the seed Ālaya-vijñāna), clinging to them in turn as 'self' and 'mine'.

Treatise: Because the seed is the function of the manifest consciousness, it does not contradict the teachings of the noble ones (ārya-dharma, the teachings of the noble ones).

Commentary: The seed is the function of that manifest consciousness, and is not a real thing, its essence is provisionally existent. The treatise says that arising dependently on consciousness refers precisely to two types: seeds and the manifest, both are called consciousness. In various treatises, there is no distinction between the manifest and the seeds. Therefore, it is possible to arise dependently on the seeds, which is arising dependently on consciousness, not arising dependently on other dharmas, not contradicting the teachings of the noble ones, so it is called 'mine'.

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。明緣彼種。言緣識故。不緣余法　問彼何故計種無別物。若計別體。即五蘊種子是五蘊攝。第七亦緣五蘊為所故。不可簡別緣此種子非彼種故　說種為假前第二卷已述此義。但本識上有彼能生五蘊功能名種識故。故無有失　問何故大論五十二．攝論第二。皆言種別有物　此簡遍計所執。彼無體故。非有為故。對彼言有。非如五蘊現行是實有物。故不相違　問前三師曰。何故五十一．顯揚第十七等。皆云唯有我見不言有所　彼文略故。非實無所。

論。有義前說至非識蘊故。

述曰。護法菩薩總非　前說皆不應理。非前三師。若緣種者。第七末那既緣識蘊。色等種子非識蘊故　若彼救言識蘊攝者。難云能生色蘊種是種非色攝。能生識蘊種是種非識收。

若言識體能生故。生識之種非色蘊。色蘊不能生。生色之種是識蘊。難云。識種非余蘊。望識可因緣。色種非色蘊。望色非因緣。因緣之種可生識。非因之種不生色。

論。論說種子是實有故。

述曰。即違彼宗。難云說種是實有。言種便成假。言識是實有。是識便非實。識既不然故種非假。

論。假應如無非因緣故。

述曰。又種是假。望現行法應無因緣。非實有故。如無法等。

此等以教附理。非前第三師無教難

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 。闡明以彼種子為緣。說以識為緣故。不以其餘法為緣。問：他們為何認為種子沒有其他不同的東西？如果認為有不同的自體，那麼五蘊的種子就被五蘊所包含。第七識也以五蘊為所緣，所以無法區分緣的是此種子而非彼種子。答：說種子是假立的，在前面的第二卷已經闡述了這個意義。只是本識上有它能產生五蘊的功能，名為種識，所以沒有過失。問：為何《大論》第五十二卷和《攝論》第二卷都說種子是別有的事物？答：這是爲了簡別遍計所執性，因為遍計所執性沒有自體，也不是有為法。針對遍計所執性而說『有』，並非像五蘊現行那樣是真實存在的事物，所以沒有矛盾。問：前三位法師說，為何第五十一卷和《顯揚》第十七卷等都說只有我見，而不說有所緣？答：那些經文比較簡略，並非真的沒有所緣。

論：有義認為前面的說法都不對，乃至色等種子不是識蘊所攝。

述記：護法菩薩總的否定了前面的說法，認為都不合理。如果說緣種子，那麼第七末那識既然緣識蘊，色等的種子就不是識蘊所攝。如果他們辯解說被識蘊所包含，那麼反駁說，能生色蘊的種子是種子，不是色蘊所攝；能生識蘊的種子是種子，不是識蘊所攝。

如果他們說識體能夠產生，所以產生識的種子不是色蘊，色蘊不能產生。產生色的種子是識蘊。反駁說，識的種子不是其餘蘊，對於識來說可以作為因緣；色的種子不是色蘊，對於色來說不能作為因緣。作為因緣的種子可以產生識，不是因緣的種子不能產生色。

論：論中說種子是真實存在的。

述記：這就違背了他們的宗義。反駁說，說種子是真實存在的，說種子就變成了假立的；說識是真實存在的，識就不是真實存在的。識既然不是這樣，所以種子不是假立的。

論：如果是假立的，就應該像沒有一樣，沒有因緣。

述記：又，種子是假立的，對於現行法來說就應該沒有因緣，因為不是真實存在的，就像沒有法等一樣。

這些都是以教義附會理，並非前三位法師沒有教義上的依據來反駁。

【English Translation】 English version: Clarifying that the condition is that seed. It is said that the condition is consciousness, not other dharmas. Question: Why do they consider that seeds have no other distinct entities? If they consider them to have distinct entities, then the seeds of the five skandhas (five aggregates) are included within the five skandhas. The seventh consciousness also takes the five skandhas as its object, so it is impossible to distinguish whether it is conditioning this seed or that seed. Answer: Saying that seeds are provisionally established, this meaning has already been explained in the second volume. It is just that on the Alaya consciousness (storehouse consciousness) there is the function of it being able to produce the five skandhas, which is called seed consciousness, so there is no fault. Question: Why do the Mahayana-samgraha (Great Treatise) in the fifty-second volume and the She Lun (Compendium of Treatises) in the second volume both say that seeds are separate entities? Answer: This is to distinguish the parikalpita (completely conceptualized nature), because the parikalpita has no entity and is not a conditioned dharma. Saying 'existent' in relation to the parikalpita is not like the actual manifestation of the five skandhas, which are truly existent entities, so there is no contradiction. Question: The previous three masters said, why do the fifty-first volume and the seventeenth volume of the Xianyang (Manifestation of the Holy Teaching) etc., all say that there is only the view of self, and do not say that there is an object? Answer: Those texts are brief, not that there is really no object.

Treatise: Some argue that the previous statements are all incorrect, even to the point that seeds of form etc. are not included within the consciousness skandha.

Commentary: Bodhisattva Dharmapala generally negates the previous statements, considering them all unreasonable. If it is said that one conditions seeds, then since the seventh manas consciousness conditions the consciousness skandha, the seeds of form etc. are not included within the consciousness skandha. If they argue that they are included within the consciousness skandha, then it is refuted by saying that the seed that can produce the form skandha is a seed, not included within the form skandha; the seed that can produce the consciousness skandha is a seed, not included within the consciousness skandha.

If they say that the nature of consciousness is able to produce, so the seed that produces consciousness is not the form skandha, the form skandha cannot produce. The seed that produces form is the consciousness skandha. It is refuted by saying that the seed of consciousness is not the other skandhas, and can be a cause and condition for consciousness; the seed of form is not the form skandha, and cannot be a cause and condition for form. The seed that is a cause and condition can produce consciousness, the seed that is not a cause and condition cannot produce form.

Treatise: The treatise says that seeds are truly existent.

Commentary: This contradicts their doctrine. It is refuted by saying that saying seeds are truly existent, saying seeds then becomes provisionally established; saying consciousness is truly existent, consciousness is then not truly existent. Since consciousness is not like this, therefore seeds are not provisionally established.

Treatise: If it is provisionally established, it should be like non-existence, without cause and condition.

Commentary: Also, seeds are provisionally established, and for manifest dharmas there should be no cause and condition, because they are not truly existent, like non-existent dharmas etc.

These are all attaching doctrine to reason, not that the previous three masters had no doctrinal basis to refute.

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自下獨理責合前三師。

論。又此識俱至有我我所。

述曰。此薩婆多．經部．大乘三。解此名如第六疏　任運一類。無始相似非分別起　恒相續生。明無間斷。寧容別執有我．我所。若不相續有間斷時。如第六識可許起別執。此既恒生一類而細。寧別起執　八十八云。依分別我見有二十句。不依俱生。若別起我所見。即別緣諸蘊為我所　如第一師緣心所。第二緣相分。第三緣種子。皆有過失。

論。無一心中至俱轉義故。

述曰。且於世事。無一念心中有斷．常二境。起二別執俱轉義故。前後可然。此即舉事。如斷．常者二境。非一心中起彼二別執。如何我．我所二境。或五蘊多境。而起二別執。非執可然。佛真俗智一用義分。彼非是執。不堅著故　執則不然。堅著境故名為執故。故無此事。人．法二執非別所緣。行相不返故得俱有。

若復有說前起我後起所者。

論。亦不應說至一味轉故。

述曰。非前粗后細。非前勝后劣。非前親后疏等。故言一味。執用相似故。

此緣何法。

論。應知此意至似常一故。

述曰。下申正義。但緣見分。非余相分．種子．心所。所以者何。唯識見分無始時來。粗細一類似常似一不斷故　似常。簡彼境界。彼色

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 自下文開始，我將獨自梳理並整合前三位論師的觀點。

論：此外，這個末那識（末那識，Manas-vijnana）與生俱來就執著于『我』（Atman）和『我所』（Atmiya）。

述記：薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）、經部（Sautrantika）、大乘（Mahayana）三家都這樣解釋。具體解釋如同第六疏所說：任運而生，屬於同一類，無始以來相似相續，並非通過分別而生起，並且恒常相續不斷。怎麼能容許另外執著有『我』和『我所』呢？如果不是相續不斷，而是有間斷的時候，就像第六識（意識，Vijnana）那樣，可以允許生起分別執著。既然這個末那識是恒常生起，屬於同一類，而且非常微細，怎麼能另外生起執著呢？《八十八結使經》中說：『依分別我見有二十種見解，不依俱生我見。』如果另外生起我所見，那就是另外緣取諸蘊（Skandha）作為我所。就像第一位論師緣取心所（Caitasika），第二位論師緣取相分（Nimitta-bhaga），第三位論師緣取種子（Bija），都有過失。

論：因為沒有在一個心中同時生起對斷滅和常恒兩種境的執著。

述記：先從世俗的事情來說，沒有在一個念頭心中，同時對斷滅和常恒兩種境，生起兩種不同的執著。前後念可以這樣。這裡是舉例說明，就像斷滅和常恒這兩種境，不是在一個心中生起這兩種不同的執著。怎麼能對『我』和『我所』這兩種境，或者對五蘊（Panca-skandha）等多種境，而生起兩種不同的執著呢？這種執著是不可能的。佛的真智和俗智，雖然作用不同，但那不是執著，因為不堅固執著。執著就不同了，因為堅固執著于所緣境，所以稱為執著。所以沒有這樣的事情。人執（Pudgala-graha）和法執（Dharma-graha）不是緣取不同的所緣境，因為行相不相反，所以可以同時存在。

如果又有人說，先起我執，後起我所執。

論：也不應該這樣說，因為它們是一味相續轉起的。

述記：不是前面的粗，後面的細；不是前面的殊勝，後面的低劣；不是前面的親近，後面的疏遠等等。所以說是一味。執著的作用相似。

這個末那識緣取什麼法呢？

論：應該知道，這個末那識的意趣，是緣取見分（Darsana-bhaga），因為它相似於常恒和單一。

述記：下面申述正確的義理。末那識只是緣取見分，不是緣取其他的相分、種子、心所。為什麼呢？因為唯識的見分從無始以來，粗細相同，類似常恒，類似單一，沒有間斷。

【English Translation】 English version: From here on, I will independently sort out and integrate the views of the previous three masters.

Treatise: Furthermore, this Manas-vijnana (末那識, Manas-vijnana) inherently clings to 'self' (Atman) and 'what belongs to self' (Atmiya).

Commentary: The Sarvastivada (薩婆多部, Sarvastivada), Sautrantika (經部, Sautrantika), and Mahayana (大乘, Mahayana) schools all explain it this way. The specific explanation is as stated in the Sixth Commentary: arising spontaneously, belonging to the same category, similar and continuous since beginningless time, not arising through discrimination, and constantly continuous without interruption. How can one allow for additionally clinging to 'self' and 'what belongs to self'? If it were not continuous but had interruptions, like the sixth consciousness (Vijnana, 意識), it would be permissible to generate discriminative clinging. Since this Manas-vijnana constantly arises, belongs to the same category, and is extremely subtle, how can one separately generate clinging? The 'Eighty-Eight Bonds Sutra' states: 'Based on discriminative self-view, there are twenty kinds of views, not based on innate self-view.' If one separately generates the view of what belongs to self, then one separately grasps the aggregates (Skandha, 蘊) as what belongs to self. Just like the first master grasping mental factors (Caitasika, 心所), the second master grasping the image-aspect (Nimitta-bhaga, 相分), and the third master grasping seeds (Bija, 種子), all have faults.

Treatise: Because there is no simultaneous arising of clinging to both annihilation and permanence in one mind.

Commentary: First, let's talk about worldly matters. There is no single moment of mind in which one simultaneously clings to both annihilation and permanence. Successive moments can be like that. This is an example. Just like the two objects of annihilation and permanence, these two different clingings do not arise in one mind. How can one generate two different clingings to the two objects of 'self' and 'what belongs to self,' or to the multiple objects of the five aggregates (Panca-skandha, 五蘊)? Such clinging is impossible. Although the Buddha's true wisdom and conventional wisdom have different functions, they are not clinging because they are not firmly attached. Clinging is different because it firmly clings to the object, hence it is called clinging. Therefore, such a thing does not exist. Clinging to self (Pudgala-graha, 人執) and clinging to dharma (Dharma-graha, 法執) do not grasp different objects because their characteristics are not contradictory, so they can coexist.

If someone says that the clinging to self arises first, and then the clinging to what belongs to self arises later.

Treatise: It should not be said like that either, because they arise continuously with the same flavor.

Commentary: It is not that the former is coarse and the latter is subtle; it is not that the former is superior and the latter is inferior; it is not that the former is close and the latter is distant, and so on. Therefore, it is said to be of the same flavor. The function of clinging is similar.

What dharma does this Manas-vijnana grasp?

Treatise: It should be known that the intention of this Manas-vijnana is to grasp the seeing-aspect (Darsana-bhaga, 見分), because it is similar to permanence and oneness.

Commentary: Below, the correct meaning is stated. Manas-vijnana only grasps the seeing-aspect, not the image-aspect, seeds, or mental factors. Why? Because the seeing-aspect of Consciousness-Only (Vijnapti-matrata) has been the same in coarseness and subtlety since beginningless time, similar to permanence, similar to oneness, and without interruption.

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等法皆間斷故　種子亦然。或被損伏。或時永斷故。由此亦遮計余識為我　似一故。簡心所。心所多法故。

何故不緣余分。夫言我者有作用相。見分受境作用相顯似於我故不緣余分自證等用細難知故。

問何故不俱緣一受等為我。亦常一故。為答此問。

論。恒與諸法為所依故。

述曰。夫言我者是自在義。萬物主義。與一切法而為所依。心所不然。不計為我。故唯心王。是所依故。此第七識恒執為內我。非色等故不執為外我。

若唯緣識即唯起我無有我所。聖教說有我所。此何相違。

論。此唯執彼至說我所言。

述曰。乘語勢故論說我所言。非實離我別起我所執。由前理故。須文便故。言穩易故。此是語勢。

又有義解。

論。或此執彼至義說二言。

述曰。執彼第八是我之我。前我五蘊假者。第六所緣。后我第七所計　或前我前念。后我后念。二但第七所計　或即一念計此即是此。唯第七所計　或前是體。后我是用。於一我見之上。亦義說之為我及所二言。實但一我見。

論。若作是說至有我見故。

述曰。此順理教。所以者何。多處唯言有我見不言有所故。何謂多處　五十一云。由此末那我見．慢等恒共相應　揚十七初云由此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為一切法都是間斷的，所以種子也是如此，或者被損害、被壓伏，或者有時被永遠斷滅。因此，這也否定了認為存在其他識作為『我』的觀點，因為它看起來是單一的。這排除了心所（Citta-vrtti，心理活動），因為心所是多種多樣的法。

為什麼第七識不緣其他部分呢？因為說到『我』，就具有作用的相狀。見分（Dṛṣṭi-bhāga，能見分）領受境界的作用相狀顯得像是『我』，所以不緣其他部分，因為自證等作用細微難以知曉。

問：為什麼第七識不一起緣一個受（Vedanā，感受）等作為『我』呢？因為受等也是常一的。爲了回答這個問題，下面進行論述。

論：恒常與諸法作為所依。

述曰：說到『我』，就是自在的意思，是萬物的主宰，與一切法作為所依。心所不是這樣，所以不被認為是『我』。因此只有心王（Citta-rāja，心識）是所依。這第七識恒常執著為內在的『我』，因為不是色等，所以不執著為外在的『我』。

如果僅僅緣識，就僅僅生起『我』，而沒有『我所』（Mamakāra，我所執）。但聖教（Ārya-dharma，聖者的教導）說有『我所』，這有什麼矛盾嗎？

論：這僅僅是執著彼，才說『我所』。

述曰：憑藉語言的趨勢，論中才說『我所』，並非實際上離開『我』而另外生起『我所』的執著。因為前面的道理，爲了文句的方便，爲了言語的穩妥和容易，這只是語言的趨勢。

又有另一種解釋。

論：或者這是執著彼第八識是我之『我』，才說二者。

述曰：執著彼第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）是『我』的『我』。前面的『我』是五蘊（Pañca-skandha，色、受、想、行、識）假立的，是第六識（Mano-vijñāna，意識）所緣的。後面的『我』是第七識（Kliṣṭa-manas，末那識）所計度的。或者前面的『我』是前念，後面的『我』是后念，這二者都只是第七識所計度的。或者就是一念，計度『這』就是『這』，唯有第七識所計度。或者前面是體，後面是用，在一個『我見』（Ātma-dṛṣṭi，我見）之上，也根據意義說成是『我』和『我所』兩個詞，實際上只有一個『我見』。

論：如果這樣說，就符合道理和教義，因為多處只說有『我見』，而不說有『我所』。

述曰：這符合道理和教義。為什麼這樣說呢？因為很多地方只說有『我見』，而不說有『我所』。什麼是多處呢？第五十一卷說：『由此末那（Manas，末那識）的我見、慢等恒常共同相應。』揚十七的開頭說：『由此』

【English Translation】 English version Because all dharmas are intermittent, so are the seeds. They are either damaged, suppressed, or sometimes permanently cut off. Therefore, this also refutes the view that there is another consciousness as 'self' (Ātman), because it appears to be singular. This excludes mental functions (Citta-vrtti), because mental functions are diverse dharmas.

Why doesn't the seventh consciousness cognize other parts? Because when we speak of 'self', it has the aspect of function. The function aspect of the seeing-part (Dṛṣṭi-bhāga) receiving objects appears like 'self', so it doesn't cognize other parts, because the functions of self-awareness etc. are subtle and difficult to know.

Question: Why doesn't the seventh consciousness simultaneously cognize one feeling (Vedanā) etc. as 'self'? Because feeling etc. are also constant and singular. To answer this question, the following is discussed.

Treatise: It constantly serves as the basis for all dharmas.

Commentary: When we speak of 'self', it means independence, the master of all things, serving as the basis for all dharmas. Mental functions are not like this, so they are not considered 'self'. Therefore, only the mind-king (Citta-rāja) is the basis. This seventh consciousness constantly clings to it as the inner 'self', and because it is not form etc., it does not cling to it as the external 'self'.

If it only cognizes consciousness, then only 'self' arises, and there is no 'what belongs to self' (Mamakāra). But the Holy Teachings (Ārya-dharma) say there is 'what belongs to self', is there a contradiction?

Treatise: This is only clinging to that, that's why 'what belongs to self' is spoken of.

Commentary: Relying on the force of language, the treatise speaks of 'what belongs to self', but in reality, there is no separate clinging to 'what belongs to self' apart from 'self'. Because of the previous reasoning, for the convenience of the text, for the stability and ease of speech, this is just the force of language.

There is another interpretation.

Treatise: Or this is clinging to that eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) as the 'self' of 'self', that's why the two are spoken of.

Commentary: Clinging to that eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) as the 'self' of 'self'. The previous 'self' is the provisional establishment of the five aggregates (Pañca-skandha), which is what the sixth consciousness (Mano-vijñāna) cognizes. The latter 'self' is what the seventh consciousness (Kliṣṭa-manas) measures. Or the previous 'self' is the previous thought, and the latter 'self' is the subsequent thought, both of which are only measured by the seventh consciousness. Or it is just one thought, measuring 'this' as 'this', only measured by the seventh consciousness. Or the former is the substance, and the latter is the function, and on top of one 'self-view' (Ātma-dṛṣṭi), it is also said in terms of meaning as the two words 'self' and 'what belongs to self', but in reality, there is only one 'self-view'.

Treatise: If it is said this way, it accords with reason and doctrine, because in many places it only says there is 'self-view', and does not say there is 'what belongs to self'.

Commentary: This accords with reason and doctrine. Why is it said this way? Because in many places it only says there is 'self-view', and does not say there is 'what belongs to self'. What are the many places? Volume fifty-one says: 'Therefore, the Manas (Manas), with its self-view, pride, etc., is constantly in association.' The beginning of Yang seventeen says: 'Therefore'

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意根恒與我見．我慢等相應　彼卷復云。如前所說意根恒與四惑俱。謂薩迦耶見．我慢．我愛．無明相應。薩迦耶言雖攝我所。然不別說故以為證　前三師即以此為證。亦攝我所故。若我見言即不攝所　十九顯揚云我見．我慢相應。亦無我所故。

論。我我所執不俱起故。

述曰。行相及境二俱別故不可並生。無此事故。善心等可然。彼非執亦不可例。人．法二執境是一故。或境是多行相是一。亦可得之。今二行相及二境界不可得也。於四解中第四為上。

論。未轉依位至佛影像故。

述曰。自下第二正解因果識所緣相。未起對治斷其我執名未轉依　唯緣藏識。即除四人。此應分別。初地已去既轉依已入無漏心。亦緣真如及餘一切法。二乘無學等唯緣異熟識。佛地經說證得十種平等性故。彼論第五乃有三說。此第三評家義　十種平等者。一諸相增上喜愛。二一切領受緣起。三遠離異相非相。四弘濟大慈。五無待大悲。六隨諸有情所樂示現。七一切有情敬受所說。八世間寂靜皆同一味。九世間諸法苦樂一味。十修殖無量功德究竟。廣如彼說　知諸有情勝解等。亦如彼解。即知十地有情勝解意樂差別。能現受用身之影像。

既許通緣一切法者。何故此言緣彼第八。

論。此中且說至

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：意根總是與我見（Sakkāya-ditthi，認為五蘊和合的身體為我）、我慢等煩惱相應。瑜伽師地論中也說：『如前所說，意根總是與四種煩惱一起生起，即薩迦耶見、我慢、我愛、無明相應。』雖然薩迦耶見包含了『我所』，但經文中沒有單獨說明，所以可以作為證據。前三位論師也以此為證，認為薩迦耶見也包含了『我所』。如果只是『我見』，就不包含『我所』了。顯揚聖教論第十九卷說，我見、我慢相應，也沒有『我所』的說法。

論：我執和我所執不會同時生起。

述記：因為它們的行相和所緣的境界都不同，所以不可能同時生起。沒有這樣的情況發生。善心等可以同時生起，但它們不是執著，不能作為例子。人執和法執的境界是同一個，或者境界是多個，但行相是同一個，這都是有可能的。但現在這兩種執著的行相和境界都不同，所以不可能同時生起。在四種解釋中，第四種解釋最好。

論：在沒有轉依（Parāvṛtti，轉變所依）之前，只能見到佛的影像。

述記：下面第二部分正式解釋因果識所緣的相。在沒有生起對治力斷除我執之前，叫做未轉依。只能緣取阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，第八識，藏識）。這排除了四種人（聲聞、緣覺、菩薩、佛）。這裡應該分別說明。初地菩薩以上，既然已經轉依，進入無漏心，也能緣取真如（Tathātā，事物的真實如是性）和其餘一切法。二乘的無學等只能緣取異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識）。佛地經中說，證得了十種平等性。瑜伽師地論第五卷中有三種說法，這裡採用第三種，是窺基的觀點。十種平等性是：一、諸相增上喜愛；二、一切領受緣起；三、遠離異相非相；四、弘濟大慈；五、無待大悲；六、隨諸有情所樂示現；七、一切有情敬受所說；八、世間寂靜皆同一味；九、世間諸法苦樂一味；十、修殖無量功德究竟。詳細內容可以參考該論。瞭解諸有情的勝解等，也按照該論的解釋。即瞭解十地有情的勝解意樂差別，能夠顯現受用身的影像。

既然允許通緣一切法，為什麼這裡只說緣取第八識？

論：這裡只是說在……

【English Translation】 English version: The mind-basis (Manas, the 7th consciousness) is always associated with the view of self (Sakkāya-ditthi, the view that the aggregate of the five skandhas is 'I'), arrogance, and other afflictions. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra also states: 'As previously mentioned, the mind-basis always arises together with four afflictions, namely, the view of self, arrogance, self-love, and ignorance.' Although the view of self includes 'what belongs to self,' it is not separately mentioned in the scriptures, so it can be used as evidence. The previous three masters also used this as evidence, believing that the view of self also includes 'what belongs to self.' If it is only the 'view of self,' it does not include 'what belongs to self.' The nineteenth chapter of the Śūnyatā-sampatti-mahāyāna-sūtra states that the view of self and arrogance are associated, but there is no mention of 'what belongs to self.'

Treatise: The clinging to 'self' and the clinging to 'what belongs to self' do not arise simultaneously.

Commentary: Because their characteristics and the objects they grasp are different, they cannot arise simultaneously. There is no such occurrence. Wholesome thoughts, etc., can arise simultaneously, but they are not clinging, so they cannot be used as examples. The object of the clinging to persons and the clinging to phenomena is the same, or the object is multiple, but the characteristic is the same, which is possible. But now the characteristics and objects of these two clingings are different, so they cannot arise simultaneously. Among the four explanations, the fourth explanation is the best.

Treatise: Before the transformation of the basis (Parāvṛtti, turning the basis), one can only see the image of the Buddha.

Commentary: The second part below formally explains the characteristics of the objects grasped by the consciousness of cause and effect. Before the power of antidote arises to cut off the clinging to self, it is called the untransformed basis. One can only grasp the Ālaya-vijñāna (the 8th consciousness, storehouse consciousness). This excludes the four types of people (Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas, and Buddhas). This should be explained separately. Bodhisattvas from the first ground onwards, since they have already transformed the basis and entered the unconditioned mind, can also grasp the Suchness (Tathātā, the true suchness of things) and all other dharmas. The Arhats of the Two Vehicles can only grasp the Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness). The Buddhabhūmi Sūtra says that they have attained ten kinds of equality. The fifth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra has three statements, and the third one is adopted here, which is Kuiji's view. The ten kinds of equality are: 1. Increasing delight in all appearances; 2. The arising of all experiences; 3. Being far from different appearances and non-appearances; 4. Great compassion that benefits universally; 5. Great compassion that is unconditional; 6. Manifesting according to what sentient beings desire; 7. All sentient beings respectfully receive what is said; 8. The tranquility of the world is all of one taste; 9. The suffering and happiness of all dharmas in the world are of one taste; 10. Ultimately cultivating immeasurable merits. Detailed content can be found in that treatise. Understanding the superior understanding of sentient beings, etc., is also according to the explanation of that treatise. That is, understanding the differences in the superior understanding and intention of sentient beings in the ten grounds, being able to manifest the image of the enjoyment body.

Since it is allowed to grasp all dharmas universally, why does it only say here that it grasps the eighth consciousness?

Treatise: Here it only says that until...

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遍不遍故。

述曰。今此論說未轉依時。非入十地等。所以者何。無漏名悟。有漏是迷。無漏是通。有漏名局。道理應爾。無漏無我。有漏有我。無我境遍。有我不遍故也。

論。如何此識緣自所依。

述曰。自下第三釋外妨難　問前言緣彼彼即所依。如何此識緣自所依。

論。如有後識至此亦何咎。

述曰。如第六識緣前等無間緣意。既是所依亦是所緣。大小二乘既共許。此第七緣第八亦即依之有何過也。此中亦如第六緣第七。隱故局故。此中不說。

即是第三解所緣訖。自下第四合解自性．行相二法。前論頌中第一行頌第四句云思量為性相。第四．第五門。今牒之云。

論。頌言思量至自性行相。

述曰。此中雙顯體性．行相自證．見分二法體也。

所以者何。

論。意以思量至為行相故。

述曰。第七末那以思量為自性故。對法第二．攝論第一．六十三皆云思量是意。即自證分。前第八識了別是行相。今既言意。故意即是第七行相。即是見分。體性難知。以行相顯。其實思量但是行相。其體即是識蘊攝故。

論。由斯兼釋至名末那故。

述曰。通名心識。非此相關。由此性．相二義。兼解所立名意所由。能審思量各自所取名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『遍不遍故。』

述曰：現在這個論述，在沒有轉依（Paravrtti，指轉變和依靠）的時候，不是進入十地（Bhumi，菩薩修行的十個階段）等等。為什麼呢？無漏（Anasrava，沒有煩惱）叫做悟，有漏（Sasrava，有煩惱）是迷。無漏是通達，有漏是侷限。道理應該是這樣。無漏是無我（Anatta，沒有永恒不變的自我），有漏是有我（Atta，有永恒不變的自我）。無我境界是普遍的，有我則不普遍。

『論：如何此識緣自所依？』

述曰：下面第三個部分解釋外來的妨難。問：前面說緣彼彼就是所依，為什麼這個識能緣自身所依呢？

『論：如有後識至此亦何咎？』

述曰：比如第六識緣前一剎那的等無間緣（Samanantarapratyaya，緊接著前一念生起的因緣）的意（Manas，意識）。既然是所依也是所緣。大小乘佛教都認可。這個第七識緣第八識也是依靠它，有什麼過錯呢？這裡也像第六識緣第七識一樣，因為隱蔽和侷限，所以這裡不說。

這就是第三個部分，解釋所緣結束。下面第四個部分，合併解釋自性（Svabhava，事物自身不變的性質）和行相（Akara，事物呈現出的狀態）兩種法。前面論頌中第一行頌的第四句說『思量為性相』，就是第四、第五門。現在引用它說：

『論：頌言思量至自性行相。』

述曰：這裡同時顯示體性（本質，本質）和行相，以及自證分（Svasamvedana，能認知自身的部分）和見分（Darsanabhaga，能認知對象的部分）兩種法的本體。

為什麼呢？

『論：意以思量至為行相故。』

述曰：第七末那識（Manas-vijnana，末那識）以思量為自性。對法（Abhidharma，阿毗達摩）第二，《攝論》（Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma）第一、六十三都說思量是意，就是自證分。前面第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）的了別是行相，現在既然說是意，所以意就是第七識的行相，就是見分。體性難以知曉，通過行相來顯示。其實思量只是行相，它的本體是識蘊（Vijnana-skandha，五蘊之一，識蘊）所包含的。

『論：由斯兼釋至名末那故。』

述曰：心識（Citta-vijnana，心識）是通用的名稱，和這裡無關。通過自性和行相這兩種含義，兼帶解釋所立名為意的原因。能夠審慎思量各自所取名為末那（Manas，末那）。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Because of pervasiveness or non-pervasiveness.'

Commentary: This discourse now, when there is no turning of the basis (Paravrtti), is not entering the ten grounds (Bhumi) and so on. Why is that? Non-outflow (Anasrava) is called enlightenment, outflow (Sasrava) is delusion. Non-outflow is thorough, outflow is limited. The principle should be like this. Non-outflow is no-self (Anatta), outflow is self (Atta). The realm of no-self is pervasive, self is not pervasive.

'Treatise: How does this consciousness cognize its own basis?'

Commentary: The third part below explains external objections. Question: Earlier it was said that cognizing that-that is the basis. How can this consciousness cognize its own basis?

'Treatise: If there is a subsequent consciousness, what fault is there in this?'

Commentary: For example, the sixth consciousness cognizes the immediately preceding mental faculty (Manas) as its immediately preceding condition (Samanantarapratyaya). Since it is both the basis and the object of cognition. Both the Greater and Lesser Vehicles acknowledge this. This seventh consciousness cognizing the eighth consciousness is also relying on it, what fault is there? Here it is also like the sixth consciousness cognizing the seventh consciousness, because it is hidden and limited, so it is not discussed here.

This is the end of the third part, explaining the object of cognition. The fourth part below combines the explanation of the two dharmas of self-nature (Svabhava) and characteristic (Akara). The fourth line of the first verse in the previous treatise says 'Thinking is the nature and characteristic', which is the fourth and fifth doors. Now quoting it, it says:

'Treatise: The verse says thinking reaches self-nature and characteristic.'

Commentary: Here, the essence and characteristic, as well as the self-cognition (Svasamvedana) and the cognitive aspect (Darsanabhaga), of the two dharmas are simultaneously revealed.

Why is that?

'Treatise: Because the mind (Manas) takes thinking as its characteristic.'

Commentary: The seventh Manas-consciousness (Manas-vijnana) takes thinking as its self-nature. The second of Abhidharma, the first and sixty-third of Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma all say that thinking is the mind, which is the self-cognition aspect. The distinguishing of the previous eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) is the characteristic, now since it is said to be the mind, therefore the mind is the characteristic of the seventh consciousness, which is the cognitive aspect. The essence is difficult to know, it is revealed through the characteristic. In fact, thinking is only the characteristic, its essence is contained within the consciousness aggregate (Vijnana-skandha).

'Treatise: Therefore, it also explains why it is named Manas.'

Commentary: Mind-consciousness (Citta-vijnana) is a general term, which is not relevant here. Through the two meanings of self-nature and characteristic, it also explains the reason for establishing the name as mind. Being able to carefully think about what each takes is called Manas.

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末那故。

論。未轉依位至無我相故。

述曰。初地已前．二乘有學等。恒審思我相。即有漏末那。初轉依位亦審思量無我相故。亦名末那。此解疑難。恐疑無漏七不名末那故　六十三問如世尊言出世末那。云何建立。答有二義。一名不必如義。彼無漏第七不名末那。名是假故　二能審思量無我相故。亦名末那。顯通無漏。即知此名非唯有漏。

即是第四體．第五行相門　次下第五段。合解第六．第七二門。此總問言。此幾所俱。后總答言且與四種。故合為文。

論。此意相應有幾心所。

述曰。此即初問。

論。且與四種煩惱常俱。

述曰。下答之中文分為二。初解因相應。后辨果相應　辨因相應中分三。一解染俱二釋余俱。三解受俱　就釋染俱中復分為二。初釋頌文。后辨廢立　釋頌文中又分為三。初解總句。四煩惱常俱。次顯別句。烈四煩惱。后解煩惱字。總舉頌中第五句答。

論。此中俱言顯相應義。

述曰。釋頌俱言。顯非余義。

論。謂從無始至煩惱相應。

述曰。顯與四種相應位次。行相所由。相應五義如第八識處即第三卷說。此初五字且解俱字。及因解四。非一法故　煩惱。后解。

論。其四者何。

述曰。下烈

【現代漢語翻譯】 末那故（因此）。

論（論述）。因為在未轉依位（未轉變所依的狀態）時，末那識執著于『我』的表相，所以有『我』的觀念。

述曰（解釋）。初地（菩薩修行第一階段）之前的二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）有學（還在學習的修行者）等，總是審慎地思量『我』的表相，這就是有漏（有煩惱）的末那識。在初轉依位（開始轉變所依的狀態）時，也審慎地思量『無我』的表相，因此也稱為末那。這解釋了疑問，恐怕有人懷疑無漏（沒有煩惱）的第七識不稱為末那。六十三問：如世尊所說，出世的末那（超越世間的末那），如何建立？答：有兩種含義。一是名稱不必完全符合含義，那無漏的第七識不稱為末那，因為名稱是假立的。二是能夠審慎地思量『無我』的表相，因此也稱為末那。這表明末那也包括無漏的，即知道這個名稱並非只有有漏的。

即是第四體（本體）、第五行相門（執行狀態）。接下來是第五段，合併解釋第六、第七兩個門。這裡總的提問是：此（末那識）與哪些心所（心理活動）相應？後面總的回答是：暫且與四種（煩惱）相應。所以合併爲一段文字。

論（論述）。此意（末那識）相應有幾心所（心理活動）？

述曰（解釋）。這是最初的提問。

論（論述）。暫且與四種煩惱常常相應。

述曰（解釋）。下面的回答分為兩部分。首先解釋因相應（與因的相應），然後辨別果相應（與果的相應）。在辨別因相應中又分為三部分：一是解釋染俱（與染污同時生起），二是解釋余俱（與其餘同時生起），三是解釋受俱（與感受同時生起）。在解釋染俱中又分為兩部分：一是解釋頌文（偈頌的文字），二是辨別廢立（辨別哪些應該廢除，哪些應該建立）。在解釋頌文中又分為三部分：一是解釋總句，四煩惱常俱（四種煩惱常常一起生起）；二是顯示別句（分別列出四種煩惱）；三是解釋煩惱字。總的用頌中的第五句來回答。

論（論述）。此中『俱』言（『俱』這個字）顯示相應的含義。

述曰（解釋）。解釋頌中的『俱』字，顯示不是其餘的含義。

論（論述）。謂從無始（從無始以來）至煩惱相應。

述曰（解釋）。顯示與四種煩惱相應的位次、執行狀態和原因。相應的五種含義如第八識處，即第三卷所說。這最初的五個字暫且解釋『俱』字，以及因為解釋四種煩惱，不是一種法，所以要這樣解釋。『煩惱』，後面解釋。

論（論述）。其四者何（這四種是什麼）？

述曰（解釋）。下面列出。

【English Translation】 Mano therefore.

Treatise: Because in the state before transformation of the basis (before the transformation of the supported state), Manas consciousness clings to the appearance of 'self', hence there is the concept of 'self'.

Commentary: Before the first ground (the first stage of Bodhisattva practice), the Hearers and Pratyekabuddhas (those in the Vehicle of Hearers and Solitary Realizers) who are still learning (practitioners who are still learning), always carefully contemplate the appearance of 'self', which is the afflicted (with defilements) Manas consciousness. In the initial state of transformation of the basis (the state of beginning to transform the supported state), they also carefully contemplate the appearance of 'no-self', hence it is also called Manas. This explains the doubt, fearing that some might suspect that the non-afflicted (without defilements) seventh consciousness is not called Manas. Sixty-three questions: As the World Honored One said, how is the supramundane Manas (the Manas that transcends the world) established? Answer: There are two meanings. First, the name does not necessarily fully match the meaning, that non-afflicted seventh consciousness is not called Manas, because the name is provisionally established. Second, it is able to carefully contemplate the appearance of 'no-self', hence it is also called Manas. This shows that Manas also includes the non-afflicted, that is, knowing that this name is not only for the afflicted.

This is the fourth essence (substance), the fifth mode of operation. Next is the fifth section, combining to explain the sixth and seventh gates. Here the general question is: What mental factors (mental activities) does this (Manas consciousness) associate with? The general answer later is: For now, it associates with four kinds (of afflictions). Therefore, it is combined into one section of text.

Treatise: How many mental factors (mental activities) are associated with this mind (Manas consciousness)?

Commentary: This is the initial question.

Treatise: For now, it is constantly associated with four kinds of afflictions.

Commentary: The following answer is divided into two parts. First, explain the association with the cause (association with the cause), then distinguish the association with the result (association with the result). In distinguishing the association with the cause, it is further divided into three parts: First, explain the defiled co-arising (arising simultaneously with defilements), second, explain the remaining co-arising (arising simultaneously with the remaining), and third, explain the feeling co-arising (arising simultaneously with feeling). In explaining the defiled co-arising, it is further divided into two parts: First, explain the verse text (the words of the verse), and second, distinguish what should be discarded and established (distinguish what should be discarded and what should be established). In explaining the verse text, it is further divided into three parts: First, explain the general sentence, 'four afflictions constantly co-arise' (four kinds of afflictions constantly arise together); second, show the specific sentences (separately list the four kinds of afflictions); and third, explain the word 'affliction'. Generally, use the fifth sentence in the verse to answer.

Treatise: In this, the word 'co-arise' (the word 'co-arise') shows the meaning of association.

Commentary: Explain the word 'co-arise' in the verse, showing that it is not the meaning of the remaining.

Treatise: Meaning from beginningless time (from beginningless time) to association with afflictions.

Commentary: Show the position, mode of operation, and cause of association with the four kinds of afflictions. The five meanings of association are as in the eighth consciousness section, that is, as said in the third volume. These initial five words temporarily explain the word 'co-arise', and because they explain the four kinds of afflictions, it is not one dharma, so it must be explained in this way. 'Affliction', explained later.

Treatise: What are the four (What are these four)?

Commentary: Listed below.

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別名。釋次二句問起烈名。

論。謂我癡我見至是名四種。

述曰。舉頌第六．第七句答。于中有二。初列頌名。后依列別釋。此以無明為本。因先有故先說無明。后三果故后說餘三。諸論先陳其果。后說其因。以尤重故。

論。我癡者至故名我見。

述曰。釋二種名如論可解。

其無明相瑜伽第十．及緣起經。對法第一．第四。顯揚第一等解。並諸無明相攝不共無明等。如下證中說。

論。我慢者至故名我愛。

述曰。釋此二名亦如后卷　踞者倚恃　傲者傲憚　其我愛如第十瑜伽．對法第一．第六．顯揚第一等說　我慢．我見並如大論五十五．五十八等說。

論。並錶慢愛至無相應義。

述曰。自下第三解並等字。前頌中雲並我慢．我愛。今解彼並字。謂頌並字。錶慢．愛二法與見俱起。愛與慢俱起。今此通言。雲表慢．愛有見．慢俱。意遮薩婆多等無相應義。彼不許相應。各自力起。大乘相應。如下當解。

論。此四常起至恒成雜染。

述曰。自下卻解煩惱之名　因先列名及出體已方釋煩惱。此文勢也　今解煩字。擾者亂。濁者渾。此四常起擾濁內心。非如所餘六識中惑。擾濁他人等故。體是不善。今內緣故令外六轉識恒成雜染雜染之言通

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 別名。釋次二句問起烈名。

論。謂我癡我見至是名四種。

述曰。舉頌第六．第七句答。于中有二。初列頌名。后依列別釋。此以無明（avidya）為本。因先有故先說無明（avidya）。后三果故后說餘三。諸論先陳其果。后說其因。以尤重故。

論。我癡者至故名我見（atma-dṛṣṭi）。

述曰。釋二種名如論可解。

其無明（avidya）相瑜伽第十．及緣起經。對法第一．第四。顯揚第一等解。並諸無明（avidya）相攝不共無明（avidya）等。如下證中說。

論。我慢者至故名我愛（atma-sneha）。

述曰。釋此二名亦如后卷　踞者倚恃　傲者傲憚　其我愛（atma-sneha）如第十瑜伽．對法第一．第六．顯揚第一等說　我慢（atma-mana）．我見（atma-dṛṣṭi）並如大論五十五．五十八等說。

論。並錶慢愛至無相應義。

述曰。自下第三解並等字。前頌中雲並我慢（atma-mana）．我愛（atma-sneha）。今解彼並字。謂頌並字。錶慢．愛二法與見俱起。愛與慢俱起。今此通言。雲表慢．愛有見．慢俱。意遮薩婆多等無相應義。彼不許相應。各自力起。大乘相應。如下當解。

論。此四常起至恒成雜染。

述曰。自下卻解煩惱之名　因先列名及出體已方釋煩惱。此文勢也　今解煩字。擾者亂。濁者渾。此四常起擾濁內心。非如所餘六識中惑。擾濁他人等故。體是不善。今內緣故令外六轉識恒成雜染雜染之言通

【English Translation】 English version Alias. The second sentence of Shi Ci asks about the fierce name.

Treatise: 'I-ignorance', 'I-view' are the names of these four.

Commentary: The sixth and seventh verses are cited as the answer. There are two parts to this. First, the names of the verses are listed. Then, explanations are given according to the list. This takes ignorance (avidya) as its root. Because it exists first, ignorance (avidya) is discussed first. The latter three are consequences, so the remaining three are discussed later. Some treatises present the consequences first and then the causes, because the consequences are particularly important.

Treatise: 'I-ignorance' is so named because of 'I-view' (atma-dṛṣṭi).

Commentary: The explanation of the two names can be understood from the treatise.

The characteristics of ignorance (avidya) are explained in the tenth section of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra, the first and fourth sections of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and the first section of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, as well as the non-common ignorance (avidya) included in the characteristics of ignorance (avidya). This will be discussed in the following proof.

Treatise: 'I-conceit' is so named because of 'I-love' (atma-sneha).

Commentary: The explanation of these two names is also found in the later volumes. 'To sit' means to rely on. 'Arrogant' means arrogant and fearful. 'I-love' (atma-sneha) is discussed in the tenth section of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the first and sixth sections of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and the first section of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. 'I-conceit' (atma-mana) and 'I-view' (atma-dṛṣṭi) are discussed in the fifty-fifth and fifty-eighth sections of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

Treatise: 'And' indicates that conceit and love have no corresponding meaning.

Commentary: From here, the third explanation of the word 'and' is given. In the previous verse, it said 'and I-conceit (atma-mana), and I-love (atma-sneha)'. Now, this 'and' is explained. The word 'and' in the verse indicates that conceit and love arise together with view. Love and conceit arise together. Now, this is said generally, stating that love and conceit have view and conceit together. This is intended to refute the Sarvāstivāda school's view that there is no correspondence. They do not allow correspondence, and each arises by its own power. Mahāyāna allows correspondence, as will be explained below.

Treatise: These four constantly arise and always become defiled.

Commentary: From here, the name 'affliction' is explained. Because the names were listed first and the substance was presented, the afflictions are now explained. This is the structure of the text. Now, the word 'affliction' is explained. 'Disturbing' means chaotic. 'Turbid' means muddy. These four constantly arise and disturb and muddy the inner mind, unlike the delusions in the remaining six consciousnesses, which disturb and muddy others. The substance is unwholesome. Now, because it is an internal condition, it causes the outer six consciousnesses to constantly become defiled. The term 'defiled' is general.

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三性有漏。

論。有情由此至故名煩惱。

述曰。有情由此四煩惱故。恒執我等生死淪回。此中淪字。謂淪沒也。回者轉也。如車輪迴無有休息淪沒生死不能出離得聖道等。此解煩惱字。故名煩惱。惱亂行者。煩藉身心故。

論。彼有十種此何唯四。

述曰。自下第二廢立門也。于中有二。初廢立根本自類。后自釋妨　根本煩惱有十。此中何故唯有四耶。

論。有我見故至有二惠故。

述曰。說無餘見其文可解。行相別故。

論。如何此識要有我見。

述曰。此外人問。於五見中。何不起余見要起我見也。

論。二取邪見至修所斷故。

述曰。此中三見俱分別起。唯見所斷。瑜伽五十八．對法等皆作是說。此俱煩惱唯是俱生。修道所斷。故不相應。何以知者。如下引文金剛喻定方能斷故。對法第四云。任運起者修道斷故。

論。我所邊見至要有我見。

述曰。我所及邊見。依我見後生。此識相應不依彼起。任運緣內相續而生。不假他後起故。不起我所及邊見也　其我所見何見所攝　此非我見。我見局故。薩迦耶見攝。以名通故　若爾何故不與我所．邊見二種互相續生　以恒內執無有間斷。不容余見互相續起故論說言恒內執我。又前二見通

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：三性是有漏洞的。

論：有情眾生由此而受苦，所以稱為煩惱（Klesha）。

述曰：有情眾生因為這四種煩惱的緣故，總是執著于『我』等觀念，在生死輪迴中沉淪。這裡的『淪』字，是沉沒的意思。『回』是旋轉的意思，就像車輪一樣輪迴，沒有休息的時候，沉沒在生死之中，不能出離，不能證得聖道等等。這是解釋煩惱這個詞，因為煩惱惱亂修行的人，煩惱依附於身心。

論：煩惱有十種，為什麼這裡只有四種？

述曰：下面第二部分是關於廢立的討論。其中分為兩部分，首先討論廢立的根本自類，然後解釋妨難。根本煩惱有十種，為什麼這裡只有四種呢？

論：因為有我見（Satkayadristi）的緣故，乃至因為有二種智慧的緣故。

述曰：說沒有其餘的見解，其文義可以理解。因為行相不同。

論：為什麼這個識一定要有我見？

述曰：這是外人的提問。在五見（五種錯誤的見解）中，為什麼不生起其他的見解，一定要生起我見呢？

論：二取邪見（邪惡的見解）乃至修所斷的緣故。

述曰：這三種見解都是分別產生的，只是見所斷。瑜伽師地論第五十八卷、對法等都這樣說。這些伴隨煩惱都是俱生的，是修道所斷的。所以不相應。憑什麼知道呢？如下文所引，只有金剛喻定才能斷除。對法第四卷說：『任運而起的，是修道所斷的。』

論：我所見（認為有屬於我的事物）和邊見（執著于斷或常的極端見解）乃至一定要有我見的緣故。

述曰：我所見和邊見，依附於我見之後產生。這個識相應，不依附於它們而生起。任運緣于內在的相續而生，不憑藉其他的因緣而生起，所以不生起我所見和邊見。那麼我所見屬於哪種見解呢？這不是我見，因為我見是侷限的，屬於薩迦耶見（Satkayadristi），因為名稱是相通的。如果這樣，為什麼不與我所見、邊見這兩種互相連續生起呢？因為恒常內在執著，沒有間斷，不容許其他的見解互相連續生起，所以論中說恒常內在執著於我。又前兩種見解是共通的

【English Translation】 English version: The three natures are flawed.

Treatise: Sentient beings suffer because of this, hence the name affliction (Klesha).

Commentary: Because of these four afflictions, sentient beings constantly cling to notions of 'self' and are trapped in the cycle of birth and death. Here, 'trapped' means submerged. 'Cycle' means revolving, like a wheel turning without rest, submerged in birth and death, unable to escape and attain the path of the sages. This explains the term affliction, because afflictions trouble practitioners, relying on body and mind.

Treatise: There are ten afflictions, why only four here?

Commentary: The second part below discusses acceptance and rejection. It is divided into two parts: first, it discusses the fundamental categories of acceptance and rejection, and then it explains the difficulties. There are ten fundamental afflictions, so why are there only four here?

Treatise: Because of the view of self (Satkayadristi), and up to because of the two kinds of wisdom.

Commentary: Saying there are no other views, the meaning of the text is understandable. Because the characteristics are different.

Treatise: Why must this consciousness necessarily have a view of self?

Commentary: This is a question from an outsider. Among the five views (five erroneous views), why doesn't it generate other views, but must generate the view of self?

Treatise: Dualistic attachment to wrong views (evil views), and up to what is severed by cultivation.

Commentary: These three views are all produced by discrimination, and are only severed by insight. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 58, and the Abhidharmasamuccaya all say this. These accompanying afflictions are all innate and are severed by the path of cultivation. Therefore, they are not corresponding. How do we know this? As quoted below, only the Vajropamasamadhi can sever them. The fourth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'Those that arise spontaneously are severed by the path of cultivation.'

Treatise: The view of what belongs to self (the belief in possessions) and the extreme views (clinging to extreme views of permanence or annihilation), and up to the necessity of having a view of self.

Commentary: The view of what belongs to self and the extreme views arise after the view of self. This consciousness corresponds, but does not arise dependent on them. It spontaneously arises relying on the internal continuum, not relying on other conditions to arise, so it does not generate the view of what belongs to self and the extreme views. Then, to which view does the view of what belongs to self belong? This is not the view of self, because the view of self is limited, it belongs to Satkayadristi (薩迦耶見), because the name is common. If so, why don't the view of what belongs to self and the extreme views arise continuously with each other? Because there is constant internal clinging without interruption, not allowing other views to arise continuously with each other, so the treatise says there is constant internal clinging to self. Also, the previous two views are common.

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緣內外。此唯恒內執有我故要有我見。而餘四見非此相應。

何故不起疑等。

論。由見審決至煩惱唯四。

述曰。此中身見能審決故。疑行猶豫故不相應。對法等云。疑都無所有　以此愛．見順著我故。無憎背瞋故。此俱唯四。行相不同故要唯四也。無明等中迷事．理者。唯是迷理。相應．不共分別者如下說　四種愛以為集諦。此何愛攝。七慢等分別。如別章抄。

論。見慢愛三如何俱起。

述曰。自下第二釋自妨難。外小乘等諸異計問。見與二法如何俱起。以此各許自力生故。

論。行相無違俱起何失。

述曰。此論主答。以行相同。對法第六．五十八等許相應故。

論。瑜伽論說至寧不相違。

述曰。外人復曰。五十五說貪令心下。慢令心舉。寧云行相互不相違。

論。分別俱生至義無乖返。

述曰。此論主答　一分別俱生二種別故。謂五十五說分別。五十八說俱生。分別者唯見斷。又未必唯見斷。即修道中強分別生不相續者。亦是類故。分別起故。煩惱增猛貪下慢舉。故二相違。俱生起者微細相續。故得相應　二外境．內境二義別故。若緣外境多分見斷。亦通修斷。貪染生愛心必下之。此通見修。若於彼慢即不卑下故。設卑慢亦不許與

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：緣于內在和外在。這僅僅是因為總是執著于內在，認為有『我』（ātman），所以一定會有『我見』（satkāya-dṛṣṭi）。而其餘四種『見』（dṛṣṭi）不與此相應。

為什麼不生起『疑』（vicikitsa）等？

論：由於『見』（dṛṣṭi）的審決，乃至『煩惱』（kleśa），只有四種。

述曰：這裡，『身見』（satkāya-dṛṣṭi）能夠審決，而『疑』（vicikitsa）的行相是猶豫不決，所以不相應。《對法》等經論說，『疑』（vicikitsa）是完全不存在的。因為這種『愛』（rāga）和『見』（dṛṣṭi）順著執著于『我』（ātman），沒有憎恨背離的『瞋』（dveṣa），所以這裡只有四種。行相不同，所以一定只有四種。『無明』（avidyā）等之中，迷惑於事和理的，只是迷惑于理。相應和不共的分別，如下面所說。四種『愛』（rāga）被認為是『集諦』（samudaya）。這屬於哪種『愛』（rāga）？七種『慢』（māna）等的分別，如其他章節的抄錄。

論：『見』（dṛṣṭi）、『慢』（māna）、『愛』（rāga）這三者如何同時生起？

述曰：下面第二部分解釋他人的妨難。外道小乘等各種不同觀點的人提問，『見』（dṛṣṭi）與這兩種法如何同時生起？因為他們各自認為是由自身的力量產生的。

論：行相沒有違背，同時生起有什麼過失？

述曰：這是論主的回答。因為行相相同。《對法》第六卷第五十八頁等經論允許相應。

論：《瑜伽論》說，貪使心下沉，慢使心高舉，難道不相違背嗎？

述曰：外人又說，《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷說，『貪』（rāga）使心下沉，『慢』（māna）使心高舉，怎麼能說行相不相違背呢？

論：分別俱生兩種不同，所以意義上沒有矛盾。

述曰：這是論主的回答。一是分別生起，二是俱生起，這兩種是不同的。第五十五卷說的是分別生起的，第五十八卷說的是俱生起的。分別生起的只是『見』（dṛṣṭi）所斷的，又不一定只是『見』（dṛṣṭi）所斷的，即使在修道中強烈分別生起的不相續的，也是同類的。因為是分別生起的，煩惱增猛，『貪』（rāga）使心下沉，『慢』（māna）使心高舉，所以這兩種是相違背的。俱生起的是微細相續的，所以能夠相應。二是外境和內境這兩種意義不同。如果緣于外境，大部分是『見』（dṛṣṭi）所斷的，也通於修道所斷的。『貪』（rāga）染而生『愛』（rāga），心必定下沉。這通於『見』（dṛṣṭi）和『修』（bhāvanā）。如果對於那個對像生起『慢』（māna），就不會卑下。即使卑下，也不允許與...

【English Translation】 English version: Pertaining to internal and external. This is solely because of the constant adherence to the internal, holding that there is a 'self' (ātman), therefore there must be 'self-view' (satkāya-dṛṣṭi). The other four 'views' (dṛṣṭi) are not in accordance with this.

Why do 'doubt' (vicikitsa) and others not arise?

Treatise: Due to the decisiveness of 'view' (dṛṣṭi), up to 'afflictions' (kleśa), there are only four.

Commentary: Here, 'self-view' (satkāya-dṛṣṭi) is able to decide, while the characteristic of 'doubt' (vicikitsa) is hesitation, so it is not in accordance. The Abhidharma and other scriptures say that 'doubt' (vicikitsa) is completely non-existent. Because this 'attachment' (rāga) and 'view' (dṛṣṭi) follow attachment to 'self' (ātman), there is no 'hatred' (dveṣa) of aversion, so there are only four here. Because the characteristics are different, there must be only four. Among 'ignorance' (avidyā) and others, those who are deluded about phenomena and principle are only deluded about principle. The distinction between corresponding and non-corresponding will be explained below. The four types of 'attachment' (rāga) are considered to be the 'origin of suffering' (samudaya). Which type of 'attachment' (rāga) does this belong to? The distinctions of the seven types of 'conceit' (māna) and others are as recorded in other chapters.

Treatise: How can 'view' (dṛṣṭi), 'conceit' (māna), and 'attachment' (rāga) arise simultaneously?

Commentary: The second part below explains the objections of others. Those with various different views, such as external Hinayana, ask, how can 'view' (dṛṣṭi) arise simultaneously with these two dharmas? Because they each believe that it arises from its own power.

Treatise: If the characteristics are not contradictory, what is the fault in arising simultaneously?

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. Because the characteristics are the same. The sixth volume, page fifty-eight, etc., of the Abhidharma scriptures allow correspondence.

Treatise: The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that greed makes the mind sink, and pride makes the mind rise. Aren't they contradictory?

Commentary: The outsider further says, the fifty-fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that 'greed' (rāga) makes the mind sink, and 'conceit' (māna) makes the mind rise, how can it be said that the characteristics are not contradictory?

Treatise: Because the two types of arising, discrimination and co-emergence, are different, there is no contradiction in meaning.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. One is arising from discrimination, and the other is co-emerging, these two are different. The fifty-fifth volume speaks of arising from discrimination, and the fifty-eighth volume speaks of co-emergence. Arising from discrimination is only what is severed by 'view' (dṛṣṭi), and it is not necessarily only what is severed by 'view' (dṛṣṭi), even those that arise strongly from discrimination in the path of cultivation that are not continuous are of the same kind. Because it arises from discrimination, the afflictions increase fiercely, 'greed' (rāga) makes the mind sink, and 'conceit' (māna) makes the mind rise, so these two are contradictory. What arises co-emergently is subtle and continuous, so it can correspond. Two, the meanings of external objects and internal objects are different. If it is related to external objects, most of it is what is severed by 'view' (dṛṣṭi), and it also extends to what is severed by the path of cultivation. 'Greed' (rāga) is tainted and gives rise to 'attachment' (rāga), and the mind must sink. This extends to 'view' (dṛṣṭi) and 'cultivation' (bhāvanā). If 'conceit' (māna) arises towards that object, it will not be humble. Even if it is humble, it is not allowed to be with...

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貪相應故。若緣內身為境。以自愛故心不卑下。緣之起慢以自高故得二相應。五十五約外。五十八等約內　三所陵．所恃二境別故。謂若陵彼起慢之時必不起愛。故二相違。若自恃起愛心必高舉。或陵他故。故得相應。並通見修斷　四由粗．細二行相殊。粗猛利者說不相應。二粗行相相違返故。若細者可相應。此二行相不相違故。通見．修斷有四義別　五更加之。或隨轉理門說不相應。真實理門說相應故。彼此二文不相違返。或復多分說不相應。據實說之亦得相應。然凡簡略先在遍行。煩惱便言先問根本。根本既訖更問所餘。

自下第二段第七餘所相應門。于中有二。初問。后答。

論。此意心所唯有四耶。

述曰。此即外人乘前起問。所以者何。此意因中恒時染污。欲明惑本先明前四。遍行五數諸識定有。別境等法或隨有無。故在後門。

論。不爾及余觸等俱故。

述曰。答中有二。初舉頌答。后廣分別。此即初也　不爾故三字釋者加也。非唯有四故言不爾。頌有餘字遂有諍生。下有二解餘字。即為二文。一謂四惑之餘。即次第一解是。二謂觸等之餘。即下四師解是。

論。有義此意至定相應故。

述曰。第一師中文勢有二。初釋本頌。后釋無餘心所所以。釋本頌中。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為與貪相應。如果以自身（內身，指自身的身體）為所緣境，因為自愛的緣故，心不會卑下，緣此生起慢心，因為自我抬高的緣故，得到兩種相應。第五十五頌是關於外境，第五十八頌等是關於內境。三、所輕視（所陵，指輕視的對象）和所依仗（所恃，指依賴的對象）兩種境界不同。意思是如果輕視他人而生起慢心的時候，必定不會生起愛心，所以二者相違背。如果依仗自己而生起愛心，心必定會高舉，或者輕視他人，所以可以相應。都通於見道和修道所斷的煩惱。四、由於粗猛和細微兩種行相不同。粗猛的就說不相應，因為兩種粗猛的行相相互違背。如果是細微的就可以相應，因為這兩種行相不相違背。通於見道和修道所斷，有四種意義上的區別。五、更加詳細地說明。或者按照隨順事理的門徑說不相應，按照真實事理的門徑說相應，所以這兩種說法不相違背。或者多數情況下說不相應，根據實際情況來說也可以相應。然而，凡是簡略的，先說遍行，煩惱就先問根本。根本說完之後，再問其餘的。

下面是第二段第七部分，關於其餘心所相應的門。其中有兩部分。首先是提問，然後是回答。

論：這種『意』心所只有四種嗎？

述曰：這是外人根據前面的內容提出的問題。為什麼這樣說呢？因為這種『意』在因地中恒常是染污的，想要說明惑的根本，先要說明前面的四種（指遍行）。遍行五數，各種識都一定具有。別境等法，或者隨有或者隨無，所以在後面的門中。

論：不是這樣的，還有觸等心所一起生起。

述曰：回答中有兩部分。首先是引用頌文回答，然後是廣泛地分別解釋。這是第一部分。『不是這樣的』這三個字是解釋者加上去的。不是隻有四種，所以說『不是這樣的』。頌文中有『余』字，於是產生了爭論。下面有兩種解釋『余』字的方法。一種是說四惑之外的，也就是第一種解釋。另一種是說觸等之外的，也就是下面四位論師的解釋。

論：有義是，這種『意』乃至與定相應。

述曰：第一位論師的文勢有兩種。首先是解釋本頌，然後是解釋沒有其餘心所的原因。解釋本頌文中。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of being associated with greed (貪, tān). If taking one's own body (內身, nèishēn, referring to one's own body) as the object, because of self-love, the mind will not be humble. Arising arrogance from this, because of self-exaltation, two are obtained in association. Verse 55 is about external objects, verse 58 and others are about internal objects. Three, the objects of what is despised (所陵, suǒ líng, referring to the object of contempt) and what is relied upon (所恃, suǒ shì, referring to the object of reliance) are different. Meaning, if one despises others and arrogance arises, one will certainly not generate love, so the two are contradictory. If one relies on oneself and love arises, the mind will certainly be elevated, or one will despise others, so they can be associated. Both are common to afflictions severed in the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation. Four, due to the difference between coarse and subtle characteristics. The coarse and fierce are said to be not associated, because the two coarse characteristics contradict each other. If they are subtle, they can be associated, because these two characteristics do not contradict each other. Common to what is severed in the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation, there are four kinds of differences in meaning. Five, explain in more detail. Or, according to the path of following reasoning, it is said to be not associated; according to the path of true reasoning, it is said to be associated, so these two statements do not contradict each other. Or, in most cases, it is said to be not associated; according to the actual situation, it can also be associated. However, in all brevity, the pervasive (遍行, biànxíng) is mentioned first, and for afflictions, the root is asked first. After the root is finished, the rest is asked.

Below is the second section, the seventh part, concerning the door of association with other mental factors. There are two parts in it. First is the question, then the answer.

Treatise: Are there only four types of this 'intention' (意, yì) mental factor?

Commentary: This is a question raised by an outsider based on the previous content. Why is it said so? Because this 'intention' is constantly defiled in the causal ground, and if one wants to explain the root of delusion, one must first explain the previous four (referring to the pervasive ones). The pervasive five numbers, all consciousnesses certainly possess. The specific object (別境, biéjìng) and other dharmas, either exist or do not exist, so they are in the later door.

Treatise: It is not so, and there are mental factors such as contact (觸, chù) that arise together.

Commentary: There are two parts in the answer. First, answer by quoting the verse, then explain it extensively and separately. This is the first part. The three words 'It is not so' are added by the interpreter. It is not only four types, so it is said 'It is not so'. There is the word 'other' (余, yú) in the verse, so disputes arise. There are two ways to explain the word 'other' below. One is to say what is outside the four afflictions, which is the first explanation. The other is to say what is outside of contact and others, which is the explanation of the four masters below.

Treatise: Some mean that this 'intention' is even associated with concentration (定, dìng).

Commentary: There are two kinds of literary styles of the first master. First, explain the verse itself, and then explain the reason why there are no other mental factors. In the explanation of the verse itself.

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初以二義解余。后釋及字。此識總與九心所俱。前四及四之餘觸等五法。意與遍行定相應故　五十五說。諸識生時與幾遍行心所俱起。答五。即作意等　瑜伽第三云通一切性．處．時一切耶等。故證此文言遍諸識。此則一解。餘字四惑之餘也。

次第二解。

論。前說觸等至故置余言。

述曰。此第二解。余恐謂此中觸等五法。亦同於前異熟識俱者。亦是無覆無記性攝。顯此俱五性異於彼相應五性故置余言　問若爾何故次後復說是有覆性　答言餘者為異前性。不知何性。復言有覆分別自體。為簡彼前性故置余言。

問餘字既然。及字何用。

論。及是集義至恒相應故。

述曰。及是相違義。顯諸心所體各不同。又及者等義。舉四煩惱等余觸等。然今此師但以合集而釋及言。前四煩惱．后五遍行合此九法此識相應。顯非唯一法與此相應故。合集九法與此俱也。故置及言令知有九。

上來第一釋本頌訖　次釋無餘心所相應。為欲了知更須發問。

論。此意何故無餘心所。

述曰。此外人問。遍行許有。其別境等何義故無。

一一應答。初答別境。次答善所。次答隨惑。后答不定。

論。謂欲希望至故無有欲。

述曰。欲緣從來未合事故。此恒

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 首先，第一種解釋是根據兩個含義來解釋『余』字。然後解釋『及』字。這個識與全部九個心所（Citta-vrtti，心理活動）一起生起。前面的『四』指的是四種根本煩惱（Kleshas，精神上的困擾），『四之餘』指的是觸（Sparsha，感覺）等五種遍行心所（Sarvatraga-cittavrttika，普遍存在的心理活動）。因為這個識與遍行心所恒常相應，所以《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十五卷說：『諸識生起時，與幾種遍行心所一起生起？』回答是五種，即作意（Manaskara，注意）等。瑜伽第三卷說，遍行心所『通一切性、處、時一切耶等』。因此，可以證明這段經文說的是遍及所有識。這是一種解釋。『余』字指的是四種煩惱之外的。

接下來是第二種解釋。

論：前面已經說了觸等，所以設定『余』字。

述記：這是第二種解釋。之所以用『余』字，是恐怕有人認為這裡的觸等五法，也和前面的異熟識（Vipaka-vijnana，果報識）一樣，屬於無覆無記性（Avyakrta，非善非惡）。爲了表明這五種心所的性質與異熟識相應的五種心所不同，所以設定『余』字。問：如果這樣，為什麼接下來又說是有覆性（Klista，染污的）？答：說『余』字是爲了區別於前面的性質，但不知道是什麼性質，所以又說『有覆』來分別它的自體。爲了簡別前面的性質，所以設定『余』字。

問：『余』字既然已經解釋清楚了，那麼『及』字有什麼用？

論：『及』是集合的意思，表示恒常相應。

述記：『及』是相反的意思，表明各種心所的體性各不相同。『及』也有等同的意思，包括四種煩惱等以及觸等。然而，現在的這位論師只是用合集的意思來解釋『及』字。前面的四種煩惱和後面的五種遍行心所合起來，這九種法與這個識相應。表明不是隻有一種法與這個識相應，所以合集九種法與這個識一起生起。因此，設定『及』字是爲了讓人知道有九種。

上面是第一種解釋本頌完畢。接下來解釋『無餘心所相應』。爲了瞭解這一點，需要進一步提問。

論：這個意思是什麼？為什麼沒有其餘的心所？

述記：這是外人提問。遍行心所已經被允許存在，那麼別境心所（Visesa-cittavrttika，特定境的心理活動）等為什麼沒有？

一一回答。首先回答別境心所，其次回答善心所（Kusala-cittavrttika，善良的心理活動），再次回答隨煩惱（Upaklesha，小煩惱），最後回答不定心所（Aniyata-cittavrttika，不確定的心理活動）。

論：因為慾望希望從來沒有實現，所以沒有慾望。

述記：慾望所緣的從來是沒有實現的事情，這個識是恒常存在的。

【English Translation】 English version Initially, the first explanation interprets '余' (yu, remainder/other) based on two meanings. Then, it explains the word '及' (ji, and). This consciousness (識, vijnana) arises together with all nine mental functions (心所, citta-vrtti). The preceding '四' (si, four) refers to the four fundamental afflictions (煩惱, kleshas), and '四之餘' (si zhi yu, remainder of the four) refers to the five pervasive mental functions (遍行心所, sarvatraga-cittavrttika) such as touch (觸, sparsha). Because this consciousness is constantly associated with pervasive mental functions, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) in its fifty-fifth fascicle states: 'When consciousnesses arise, with how many pervasive mental functions do they arise together?' The answer is five, namely attention (作意, manaskara) and others. The third fascicle of the Yoga states that pervasive mental functions 'permeate all natures, places, times, and all others.' Therefore, this passage can be proven to refer to pervading all consciousnesses. This is one explanation. The word '余' (yu, remainder) refers to what is left over from the four afflictions.

Next is the second explanation.

Treatise: The word '余' (yu, remainder) is placed because touch and others have already been mentioned earlier.

Commentary: This is the second explanation. The reason for using the word '余' (yu, remainder) is to prevent someone from thinking that the five dharmas such as touch here are also of the nature of non-afflictive and neutral (無覆無記性, avyakrta), like the previously mentioned resultant consciousness (異熟識, vipaka-vijnana). To show that the nature of these five associated mental functions is different from the nature of those five associated with the resultant consciousness, the word '余' (yu, remainder) is placed. Question: If that is the case, why is it then said later that it is of an afflictive nature (有覆性, klista)? Answer: The word '余' (yu, remainder) is used to distinguish it from the previous nature, but since it is not known what nature it is, it is further said 'afflictive' to distinguish its own nature. To differentiate from the previous nature, the word '余' (yu, remainder) is placed.

Question: Since the word '余' (yu, remainder) has been explained clearly, what is the use of the word '及' (ji, and)?

Treatise: '及' (ji, and) means collection, indicating constant association.

Commentary: '及' (ji, and) has the meaning of opposition, showing that the natures of the various mental functions are different from each other. '及' (ji, and) also has the meaning of equality, including the four afflictions and touch, etc. However, this master of treatises now only explains the word '及' (ji, and) in the sense of aggregation. The preceding four afflictions and the following five pervasive mental functions combine, and these nine dharmas are associated with this consciousness. It shows that it is not only one dharma that is associated with this consciousness, so the nine dharmas are aggregated to arise together with this consciousness. Therefore, the word '及' (ji, and) is placed to let people know that there are nine.

The above is the completion of the first explanation of the original verse. Next, the explanation of 'not associated with other mental functions.' To understand this, further questions need to be asked.

Treatise: What is the meaning of this? Why are there no other mental functions?

Commentary: This is a question from an outsider. Pervasive mental functions have already been allowed to exist, so why are there no specific object mental functions (別境心所, visesa-cittavrttika), etc.?

Answer one by one. First answer specific object mental functions, then answer wholesome mental functions (善心所, kusala-cittavrttika), then answer secondary afflictions (隨煩惱, upaklesha), and finally answer indeterminate mental functions (不定心所, aniyata-cittavrttika).

Treatise: Because desire and hope have never been realized, there is no desire.

Commentary: What desire is based on is something that has never been realized; this consciousness is constant.

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緣合境常是我故。若憶過．未而起希望。已合即念。未合即欲。五十五說于所愛事有欲生故。若爾諸佛應無有欲。無未合事故。今說非佛言未遂合。非說于佛有未合事。故不相違。下諸心所皆準此釋。又欲但觀所樂事轉。所樂之事名末遂合。故此無慾。文與前別。與第八識所簡乃同。

論。勝解印持至故無勝解。

述曰。勝解但能印前疑事．不了事生。此恒決定計我非余。非先有疑及曾未了今方印可。故無勝解。此約因位。非佛行相。五十五說於今決定勝解生故。

論。念唯記憶至故無有念。

述曰。念能憶昔曾所習事。曾於現在習者已滅今起追憶。非我已滅今生追憶。境恒有故。五十五說于串習事念方生故。

論。定唯繫心至故無有定。

述曰。定唯別作意繫心專一境。由加行心趣求一境。唯緣本質一法。不作別緣前後念解。亦非常解。此識任運不深趣求專緣一法。剎那別緣故無定也。五十五說于所觀事其定方生。任運緣者即無此定　既爾如來便應無定。任運緣故　此難不然。如來識等深取所緣。非如七．八任運粗淺隨業等境　又佛識等因定類生。設令能緣其必有定。非七．八識前時有定。種類引生專緣一境而不定也　又佛專心。此散漫故。

論。惠即我見故不別說。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 緣起聚合的境界常被認為是『我』的緣故。如果回憶過去、未來而生起希望，已經聚合的就思念，未聚合的就產生慾望。《五十五》中說對於所愛的事物有慾望產生。如果這樣，諸佛應該沒有慾望，因為沒有未聚合的事情。現在說的是非佛的言語沒有完全實現聚合，不是說佛有未聚合的事情。所以不相違背。下面的各種心所都按照這個解釋類推。而且慾望只是觀察所喜樂的事情而運轉，所喜樂的事情名為未完全聚合。因此這裡沒有慾望。文句與前面不同，與第八識所簡擇的相同。

論：勝解是印持的緣故，所以沒有勝解。

述曰：勝解只能對先前疑惑的事情、不瞭解的事情產生。這個（第八識）恒常決定地認為是我而不是其他，不是先前有疑惑或者曾經不瞭解現在才印可。所以沒有勝解。這是就因位而言，不是佛的行相。《五十五》中說對於現在決定的勝解產生。

論：念只是記憶的緣故，所以沒有念。

述曰：念能夠回憶過去曾經學習過的事情。曾經在現在學習過的事情已經滅去，現在生起追憶。不是『我』已經滅去，現在生起追憶，因為境界恒常存在。《五十五》中說對於串習的事情念才產生。

論：定只是繫心的緣故，所以沒有定。

述曰：定只是特別作意，將心專注於一個境界。由於加行心趨向追求一個境界，只是緣于本質的一個法，不作其他的緣，前後唸的理解，也不是恒常的理解。這個識任運而不深入地追求，專注於一個法，剎那間分別緣，所以沒有定。《五十五》中說對於所觀察的事情，它的定才產生。任運緣的就沒有這個定。既然這樣，如來就應該沒有定，因為是任運緣的。這個責難不對。如來的識等深入地取所緣，不像第七、第八識任運粗淺地隨業等境界。而且佛的識等是由定類產生的，即使能夠緣，也必定有定。不是第七、第八識先前有定，種類引生專注於一個境界而不定。而且佛是專心的，這個是散漫的。

論：慧就是我見，所以不另外說明。

【English Translation】 English version The state of conditioned arising is often regarded as 'self'. If one recalls the past and future and gives rise to hope, then what has already come together is remembered, and what has not yet come together is desired. The Fifty-five says that desire arises for things that are loved. If that were the case, the Buddhas should have no desire, because there is nothing that has not yet come together. Now it is said that it is non-Buddhas whose words have not fully achieved coming together, not that the Buddhas have things that have not yet come together. Therefore, there is no contradiction. All the mental factors below should be interpreted in the same way. Moreover, desire only observes the things that are liked and revolves around them, and the things that are liked are called not yet fully come together. Therefore, there is no desire here. The wording is different from before, and the same as what is selected by the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana).

Treatise: Because conviction (adhimoksha) is the nature of holding firm, there is no conviction.

Commentary: Conviction can only arise in relation to things that were previously doubted or not understood. This (eighth consciousness) constantly and decisively considers it to be 'I' and not something else. It is not that there was previous doubt or lack of understanding that is now being affirmed. Therefore, there is no conviction. This is in terms of the causal stage, not the conduct of the Buddhas. The Fifty-five says that a decisive conviction arises now.

Treatise: Because mindfulness (smriti) is only memory, there is no mindfulness.

Commentary: Mindfulness is able to recall things that were previously learned. Things that were previously learned in the present have already ceased, and now recollection arises. It is not that 'I' has already ceased, and now recollection arises, because the realm is constantly present. The Fifty-five says that mindfulness only arises in relation to things that have been practiced.

Treatise: Because concentration (samadhi) is only focusing the mind, there is no concentration.

Commentary: Concentration is only special attention, focusing the mind on a single object. Because of the effort of the mind to seek a single object, it only relates to the essence of one dharma, not making other connections, understanding of previous and subsequent thoughts, nor is it constant understanding. This consciousness (eighth consciousness) spontaneously and without deep seeking focuses on a single dharma, momentarily relating to different things, so there is no concentration. The Fifty-five says that concentration only arises in relation to the things that are observed. Spontaneous relating does not have this concentration. If that were the case, the Tathagata should have no concentration, because it is spontaneous relating. This objection is not valid. The consciousness of the Tathagata deeply grasps what is related to, not like the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, which spontaneously and superficially follow the realms of karma and so on. Moreover, the consciousness of the Buddhas and so on arises from the category of concentration. Even if it is able to relate, it must have concentration. It is not that the seventh and eighth consciousnesses previously had concentration, and the category gives rise to focusing on a single realm without concentration. Moreover, the Buddha is focused, this is scattered.

Treatise: Wisdom (prajna) is the same as the view of self, so it is not separately explained.

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述曰。惠與我見非二並故。五十五說。見世俗有。即惠分故。余別有性　問惠緣觀察事。此識言惠俱。定緣觀察事。此俱應有定　答任運亦推度。此識說惠俱。深專一境有定生。此俱故無定　問二緣觀察事。任運惠得生。任運既無定。應不緣觀察　答定境加行必惠緣。定得緣觀察。有惠之境定．不定故。此識俱無有定。雖同緣觀察。而惠寬定狹。故此無定。

論。善是凈故非此識俱。

述曰。第二簡善。其善十一體非染故非與此俱。此俱唯染故。

自下第三何故無隨惑。根本前已說。

論。隨煩惱生至無隨煩惱。

述曰。煩惱分位前後差別建立隨惑。隨惑離根本無別體故不得並生。或無慚．無愧．不信．懈怠。論雖說實。然是根本轉變分位。如所造觸。非如長等諸形色等。雖說有體。自不能與他根本俱。隨根本後起。又且如瞋。輕微者名瞋。餘名忿等。如長等色即于彼假。故忿等二十。不與根本俱生。此識恒與四根本俱。前後無始一類分位無差別故。此俱無隨惑。此師意說。隨惑皆離根本無體。故對法雲忿等皆假。此識一向非隨惑俱。言余染心說俱義者。約第六識及五識說。非謂此識。無分位別故。三文別者約別義說。通不善有覆心中名遍染心。非但是染心彼皆能起。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：慧與我見並非二者並存，如五十五種說法所言。見世俗存在，即是慧的一部分。其餘則有各自的體性。 問：慧緣于觀察事物，此時識與慧同時存在。如果定也緣于觀察事物，那麼識與定也應該同時存在。 答：任運（自然而然）也可能進行推度，此時識與慧同時存在。如果深度專注且唯一指向某個境界，則會產生定。因為識與慧同時存在，所以沒有定。 問：如果二者都緣于觀察事物，任運狀態下慧可以產生。既然任運沒有定，那麼任運應該不能緣于觀察。 答：在有定的境界中，如果加上加行（努力），必然有慧緣。有定才能緣于觀察。因為有慧的境界，有定也有不定，所以識與慧都沒有定。雖然都緣于觀察，但慧的範圍寬廣，定的範圍狹窄，因此這裡沒有定。 論：善是清凈的，因此不與此識同時存在。 述曰：第二是簡擇善法。其善的十一種法，因為不是染污的，所以不與此識同時存在。此識同時存在的只有染污法。 自下第三，為何沒有隨煩惱？根本煩惱在前面已經說過。 論：隨煩惱生起，直到沒有隨煩惱。 述曰：煩惱的分位、前後差別，建立了隨煩惱。隨煩惱離開根本煩惱，沒有單獨的體性，因此不能同時產生。或者如無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠等。論中雖然說它們是實在的，但實際上是根本煩惱轉變的分位，如同所造的觸，不像長等諸形色等。雖然說有體性，但自身不能與根本煩惱同時存在，而是在根本煩惱之後才生起。又比如瞋，輕微的叫做瞋，其餘的叫做忿等。如同長等色，只是在彼處假立。因此忿等二十種隨煩惱，不與根本煩惱同時生起。此識恒常與四種根本煩惱同時存在，前後無始以來都是同一類分位，沒有差別，因此此識沒有隨煩惱。此師的意思是說，隨煩惱都離開根本煩惱就沒有體性。因此《對法》中說忿等都是假立的。此識一向不與隨煩惱同時存在。說其餘染心同時存在，是約第六識和五識來說的，不是說此識。因為沒有分位的差別。三文的差別是約不同的意義來說的。通於不善的有覆心中，稱為遍染心，並非只是染心才能生起。

【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: 'Wisdom' (惠, hui) and 'my view' are not coexistent, as stated in the fifty-five theses. Seeing worldly existence is part of 'wisdom'. The rest have their own distinct nature. Question: 'Wisdom' arises from observing things; at this time, 'consciousness' (識, shi) and 'wisdom' are coexistent. If 'concentration' (定, ding) also arises from observing things, then 'consciousness' and 'concentration' should also be coexistent. Answer: 'Spontaneous action' (任運, ren yun) can also involve inference; at this time, 'consciousness' and 'wisdom' are coexistent. If there is deep and exclusive focus on a single state, 'concentration' will arise. Because 'consciousness' and 'wisdom' are coexistent, there is no 'concentration'. Question: If both arise from observing things, 'wisdom' can arise in a state of 'spontaneous action'. Since 'spontaneous action' has no 'concentration', then 'spontaneous action' should not arise from observation. Answer: In a state of 'concentration', if effort (加行, jia xing) is added, 'wisdom' will necessarily arise. Only with 'concentration' can one observe. Because the state of 'wisdom' can be either 'concentrated' or 'unconcentrated', neither 'consciousness' nor 'wisdom' has 'concentration'. Although both arise from observing, the scope of 'wisdom' is broad, and the scope of 'concentration' is narrow; therefore, there is no 'concentration' here. Treatise: Goodness is pure; therefore, it is not coexistent with this 'consciousness'. Commentary: The second is to distinguish good dharmas. The eleven types of good dharmas, because they are not defiled, are not coexistent with this 'consciousness'. Only defiled dharmas are coexistent with this 'consciousness'. From here, the third point: Why are there no secondary afflictions (隨煩惱, sui fan nao)? The fundamental afflictions have already been discussed earlier. Treatise: Secondary afflictions arise until there are no secondary afflictions. Commentary: The divisions and differences in time of afflictions establish the secondary afflictions. Secondary afflictions, apart from the fundamental afflictions, have no separate substance; therefore, they cannot arise together. Or like 'shamelessness' (無慚, wu chan), 'lack of embarrassment' (無愧, wu kui), 'lack of faith' (不信, bu xin), 'laziness' (懈怠, xie dai), etc. Although the treatise says they are real, they are actually divisions transformed from the fundamental afflictions, like the 'produced touch' (所造觸, suo zao chu), not like shapes and colors such as 'length' (長, chang) etc. Although it is said they have substance, they themselves cannot coexist with the fundamental afflictions, but arise after the fundamental afflictions. Furthermore, like 'anger' (瞋, chen), the slight one is called 'anger', and the rest are called 'resentment' (忿, fen) etc. Like colors such as 'length', they are merely provisionally established there. Therefore, the twenty secondary afflictions such as 'resentment' do not arise together with the fundamental afflictions. This 'consciousness' is constantly coexistent with the four fundamental afflictions. From beginningless time, they have been the same type of division, without difference; therefore, this 'consciousness' has no secondary afflictions. This teacher's meaning is that secondary afflictions have no substance apart from the fundamental afflictions. Therefore, the Abhidharma says that 'resentment' etc. are all provisional. This 'consciousness' is never coexistent with secondary afflictions. Saying that other defiled minds are coexistent refers to the sixth consciousness and the five consciousnesses, not to this 'consciousness', because there is no difference in division. The difference in the three texts refers to different meanings. In the context of unwholesome obscured minds, it is called 'pervasive defiled mind' (遍染心, bian ran xin), meaning that it is not only defiled minds that can arise.

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不定四中。

論。惡作追悔至故無惡作。

述曰。其文可解。

論。睡眠必依至故彼非有。

述曰。睡眠若起必依身．心沉重惛昧。此是內緣　外眾緣力。即是病等。或涼風等　有時暫起。如對法論第一末說。即是間斷非相續義　惡作雖亦然。而約義別說　此第七識所藉緣少　一類無始。簡別不假內緣而起　又言內執不假外緣而起。簡別外緣　由此緣故無睡眠也。

論。尋伺俱依至故非彼俱。

述曰。尋．伺二法並依外門。緣外境生故。此二多依身．語門轉故。尋則淺推。伺則深度。尋則粗發言。伺則細發語。此識唯依內門。緣內我生故。一類執我。無淺深推度粗細發言故。不與彼俱。故此識俱唯有九法　或此師之意。其隨煩惱不遍根本特越常倫　且如惛沈等五。染心若無即非染心。論有誠說。遂言說彼六識中遍。遍行說通諸識。七．八應無　解云不然。遍行遍七．八。諸論說七．八。五染遍染心。何處言遍七　若爾五染言遍。染六識中皆有。六識起根本。應知五亦無。汝言遍六染心。遍何位地說之為遍。故知后說于義為勝　只如五遍染心。無此不成染。六染中文。無五中惛沈等。何妨論言五遍染七識中無。即是六識中。除根本餘一切染此五皆有。無則不成染　若互有無。如

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不定四中。

論：如果因為追悔而沒有惡作（kukkritya，對已做錯事的後悔），那麼就不會有惡作。

述曰：這段文字可以理解。

論：睡眠必定依賴於（內外）因緣，所以第七識中沒有睡眠。

述曰：睡眠如果生起，必定依賴於身體和內心的沉重和昏昧。這是內在的因緣。外在的因緣則是疾病等等，或者涼風等等。有時會暫時生起，如《阿毗達磨集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第一卷末尾所說，意思是間斷而不是相續的。惡作雖然也如此，但從意義上來說有所區別。第七識所依賴的因緣較少，屬於一類無始的，區別在於不需要內在的因緣而生起。又說內在的執著不需要外在的因緣而生起，區別于外在的因緣。因為這個緣故，第七識中沒有睡眠。

論：尋（vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（vicara，精細的思考）都依賴於外在的門，因為緣于外在的境界而生起。所以這二者多依賴於身門和語門運轉。尋是淺顯的推度，伺是深度的推度。尋是粗略的發言，伺是細緻的發言。第七識只依賴於內在的門，緣于內在的我而生起，一類執著於我，沒有淺顯和深度的推度，也沒有粗略和細緻的發言，所以不與尋和伺同在。因此，第七識同時只有九種法。或者這位論師的意思是，隨煩惱（upaklesha）不普遍存在於根本煩惱（klesha）中，而是特別超越常理。比如惛沈（styana，精神萎靡）等五種，如果染污心沒有它們，就不是染污心，論中誠實地這樣說。於是說它們在六識中普遍存在。遍行（sarvatraga）可以通於各個識，第七識和第八識應該沒有。解釋說不是這樣，遍行遍於第七識和第八識，各個論典都說第七識和第八識，五種染污遍於染污心，哪裡說過遍於第七識？如果這樣，五種染污說遍，在染污的六識中都有。六識生起根本，應該知道五種染污也沒有。你說遍於六識的染污心，在什麼位次上說它是遍的？所以知道后一種說法在義理上更為殊勝。就像五種遍染污心，沒有它們就不能構成染污。六識的染污文中，沒有五種中的惛沈等，不妨礙論典說五種遍於第七識中沒有，就是在六識中，除了根本煩惱之外，其餘一切染污都有這五種。沒有它們就不能構成染污。如果互相有無，比如……

【English Translation】 English version The Four Uncertainties.

Treatise: If there is no kukkritya (remorse for wrong deeds) due to repentance, then there is no kukkritya.

Commentary: The text is understandable.

Treatise: Sleep necessarily depends on (internal and external) conditions, therefore sleep is not present in the seventh consciousness.

Commentary: If sleep arises, it necessarily depends on the heaviness and dullness of body and mind. This is an internal condition. External conditions are illnesses, etc., or cool breezes, etc. Sometimes it arises temporarily, as stated at the end of the first volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, meaning it is intermittent and not continuous. Although kukkritya is also like this, it is distinguished in terms of meaning. The seventh consciousness relies on fewer conditions, belonging to a category that is beginningless, distinguished by arising without the need for internal conditions. It is also said that internal clinging arises without the need for external conditions, distinguishing it from external conditions. For this reason, there is no sleep in the seventh consciousness.

Treatise: Vitarka (gross thought) and vicara (subtle thought) both depend on external doors, because they arise from external objects. Therefore, these two mostly operate through the body and speech doors. Vitarka is shallow inference, vicara is deep inference. Vitarka is coarse speech, vicara is subtle speech. The seventh consciousness only depends on the internal door, arising from the internal self, clinging to the self in a uniform way, without shallow or deep inference, and without coarse or subtle speech, so it is not together with vitarka and vicara. Therefore, the seventh consciousness only has nine dharmas at the same time. Or, the intention of this master is that the upakleshas (secondary defilements) are not universally present in the kleshas (fundamental defilements), but are particularly beyond the norm. For example, styana (mental torpor) and the other five; if the defiled mind does not have them, it is not a defiled mind, as the treatise truthfully states. Thus, it is said that they are universally present in the six consciousnesses. Sarvatraga (universals) can be common to all consciousnesses, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses should not have them. The explanation is not so, sarvatraga pervades the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, various treatises say the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, the five defilements pervade the defiled mind, where is it said to pervade the seventh consciousness? If so, the five defilements are said to pervade, they are all present in the defiled six consciousnesses. The six consciousnesses give rise to the root, it should be known that the five defilements are also not present. You say pervading the defiled mind of the six consciousnesses, in what position is it said to be pervading? Therefore, it is known that the latter statement is more superior in meaning. Just like the five universally defiling minds, without them, defilement cannot be constituted. In the text of the defilement of the six consciousnesses, there is no styana, etc. among the five, it does not hinder the treatise from saying that the five pervade and are not present in the seventh consciousness, that is, in the six consciousnesses, except for the fundamental defilements, all other defilements have these five. Without them, defilement cannot be constituted. If they mutually exist or do not exist, such as...

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下自解　若作此釋前解為勝。

論。有義彼說至顯隨煩惱。

述曰。下第二師重釋餘字。初總解。后別諍。此即總釋。頌中餘字義實不然。何以知者。頌說此五有覆攝故。即知餘字不簡前性。若言餘字簡前性者。此言有覆明自體。明自體時足簡前故。何須別簡。此破前師第二解也　汝第一解言即四之餘謂觸等五。若頌但言及觸等俱。誰不知觸等是四之餘。更說餘字。故知但是觸等余也　若不爾者闕此意俱隨煩惱故。何以知者。返覆徴難理無逃處。故知餘字目隨煩惱。何以如此。煩惱必與隨煩惱俱故。此余言定顯隨煩惱。

自下別諍有四師說。今此第一諸師共同。下有別者一一廣解。第一因釋諸論相違。就此解余是觸等余中。總有四說。

論。此中有義至染心相應。

述曰。文意有二。初泛出遍染隨。后解此識俱　初中有四。一標宗。二引證。三立理。四會違。此即初也。

論。如集論說至恒共相應。

述曰。此引證也。五隨遍與諸染心俱。何以知者。對法第六說。謂惛沈。掉舉乃至恒共相應。是集論第三卷文。

論。若離無堪任性等至無是處故。

述曰。下立理也。是雜集論文與此同也。謂離惛沈等則不成染。惛沈是無堪任。等取餘四。何以知者。對法第一

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

下文是另一種解釋，如果這樣解釋，之前的解釋就更勝一籌。

論：有一種觀點認為，這個『余』字指的是明顯的隨煩惱。

述記：下面第二位論師重新解釋『余』字。首先是總體的解釋，然後是分別的爭論。這裡是總體的解釋。頌文中的『余』字含義實際上並非如此。為什麼這麼說呢？因為頌文說這五種（隨煩惱）是有覆攝的，因此可知『余』字並不簡別之前的自性。如果說『余』字簡別之前的自性，那麼『有覆』這個詞本身就足以說明自性，足以簡別之前的（四根本煩惱），何須再用『余』字來簡別呢？這是對前一位論師第二種解釋的駁斥。你（前一位論師）的第一種解釋說，『余』字指的是四種根本煩惱之外的觸等五種（遍行心所）。如果頌文只說『及觸等俱』，誰不知道觸等是四種根本煩惱之外的？何必再說『余』字呢？因此可知『余』字只是指觸等之外的（隨煩惱）。如果不是這樣，就會缺少『與此意俱是隨煩惱』的含義。為什麼這麼說呢？因為反覆地提問和辯難，理無遁形。因此可知『余』字指的是隨煩惱。為什麼會這樣呢？因為煩惱必定與隨煩惱同時生起，所以這個『余』字一定顯示的是隨煩惱。

下面分別爭論，有四位論師的說法。現在這是第一種，是諸位論師共同的觀點。下面有不同的觀點，會一一詳細解釋。第一種觀點是因為解釋諸論時互相矛盾。在這種解釋『余』字是觸等之外的（隨煩惱）的觀點中，總共有四種說法。

論：這裡有一種觀點認為，（『余』字指的是）遍染隨煩惱，它們與染污心相應。

述記：文中的意思是兩個方面。首先是泛泛地提出遍染隨煩惱，然後解釋這些（隨煩惱）與識俱生。首先有四點：一、標明宗旨；二、引用證據；三、建立理由；四、調和矛盾。這裡是第一點，標明宗旨。

論：如《集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）所說，（這些遍染隨煩惱）總是與染污心相應。

述記：這是引用證據。五種隨煩惱總是與各種染污心同時生起。為什麼這麼說呢？《對法》（Abhidharma）第六卷說，即『惛沈（styana），掉舉（auddhatya）乃至恒共相應』。這是《集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第三卷的原文。

論：如果離開無堪任性等，則不成染污，沒有這樣的道理。

述記：下面是建立理由。《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā）的文義與此相同。即離開惛沈（styana）等，則不成染污。惛沈（styana）是無堪任性，『等』字包括其餘四種（遍行隨煩惱）。為什麼這麼說呢？《對法》（Abhidharma）第一卷...

【English Translation】 English version:

The following is another interpretation; if interpreted this way, the previous interpretation is superior.

Treatise: One view holds that this 'remaining' refers to the obvious secondary defilements (upaklesha).

Commentary: Below, the second teacher re-interprets the word 'remaining'. First, there is a general explanation, then separate arguments. This is the general explanation. The meaning of the word 'remaining' in the verse is actually not so. How do we know this? Because the verse says that these five (secondary defilements) are included as 'covered' (with obscuration), thus it is known that the word 'remaining' does not distinguish the previous nature. If it is said that the word 'remaining' distinguishes the previous nature, then the term 'covered' itself is sufficient to explain the nature and distinguish the previous (four root defilements), so why is it necessary to use the word 'remaining' to distinguish them again? This is a refutation of the first teacher's second interpretation. Your (the first teacher's) first interpretation says that the word 'remaining' refers to the five (pervasive mental factors) such as contact (sparsha) besides the four. If the verse only said 'and contact, etc., together', who would not know that contact, etc., are besides the four? Why say 'remaining' again? Therefore, it is known that the word 'remaining' only refers to what is besides contact, etc. (the secondary defilements). If it is not so, it would lack the meaning of 'being secondary defilements together with this intention'. How do we know this? Because through repeated questioning and debate, there is no escape from the truth. Therefore, it is known that the word 'remaining' refers to the secondary defilements. Why is this so? Because defilements necessarily arise together with secondary defilements, so this word 'remaining' definitely indicates the secondary defilements.

Below are separate arguments, with the views of four teachers. Now this is the first view, which is the common view of the teachers. Below there are different views, which will be explained in detail one by one. The first view is because the explanations of the treatises contradict each other. Within this view of interpreting 'remaining' as being besides contact, etc. (the secondary defilements), there are a total of four interpretations.

Treatise: Here, one view holds that ('remaining' refers to) the pervasive defiled secondary defilements (pariśuddha-upakleśa), which are associated with defiled minds.

Commentary: The meaning of the text has two aspects. First, it broadly presents the pervasive defiled secondary defilements, then it explains that these (secondary defilements) arise together with consciousness. First, there are four points: 1. stating the principle; 2. citing evidence; 3. establishing reasons; 4. reconciling contradictions. Here is the first point, stating the principle.

Treatise: As the Compendium of Abhidharma (Abhidharmasamuccaya) says, (these pervasive defiled secondary defilements) are always associated with defiled minds.

Commentary: This is citing evidence. The five secondary defilements always arise together with various defiled minds. How do we know this? The sixth fascicle of the Abhidharma says, namely, 'lethargy (styana), excitement (auddhatya), and even always associated together'. This is the original text from the third fascicle of the Compendium of Abhidharma (Abhidharmasamuccaya).

Treatise: If separated from the lack of fitness, etc., then it would not be defiled; there is no such reason.

Commentary: Below is establishing reasons. The meaning of the text of the Collected Explanations of Abhidharma (Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā) is the same as this. Namely, if separated from lethargy (styana), etc., then it would not be defiled. Lethargy (styana) is the lack of fitness; 'etc.' includes the other four (pervasive secondary defilements). How do we know this? The first fascicle of the Abhidharma...

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云惛沈者無堪任為性。掉舉者不寂靜為性。不信者不忍等為性。懈怠者心不策勵為性。放逸者不防有漏為性故也。若離無堪任。染性不成故。

論。煩惱起時至必有彼五。

述曰。煩惱起位心稱染污。故染心位定有彼五。

有何所以。

論。煩惱若起至懈怠放逸故。

述曰。諸煩惱起必由無堪任。即惛沈也。囂動是掉舉。餘三可知。無起煩惱無無堪任性。及非囂動者故　問如定．變化障硬澀無堪任。即通三性法。善中豈有惛沈性耶　答由第七有故。余成無堪任。如有漏善。非是善中有惛沈故　此五必遍一切染心。不爾即非是染心故。

問不信．懈怠．惛沈可然。或體實有。或是假有。或通諸惑一分。或是愚癡分　此中掉舉既是貪分。如何瞋時有。而言通染心。此師解云。

論。掉舉雖遍至但說貪分。

述曰。下會違也。有二段文。初會掉貪分。後會六．十遍。此等初也。一切染心即瞋起時。而亦定有掉舉自性。而貪起位即掉舉增。多順貪故。而實有體故遍染心。五十三說是假有者必無別體。是實有者即有別體。世俗有者或別有體或別無體。如下自解此世俗有。故是實有。此中所辨實有體等。或文外意。諸論多約依貪上立故言貪分。世俗有中克實出體即別有也。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 云惛沈（mudita）：以無能為力為自性。 掉舉（uddhacca）：以不寂靜為自性。 不信（assaddha）：以不忍等為自性。 懈怠（kosajja）：以心不策勵為自性。 放逸（pamada）：以不防止有漏為自性。 如果離開無能為力，染污的自性就不能成立。

論：煩惱生起時，必定有這五種情況。

述曰：煩惱生起的位置，心被稱為染污。因此，染污的心位必定有這五種情況。

有什麼原因呢？

論：煩惱如果生起，就會導致懈怠和放逸。

述曰：各種煩惱的生起必定由於無能為力，也就是惛沈。囂動就是掉舉。其餘三種可以知道。沒有生起煩惱就沒有無能為力的自性，以及不是囂動的情況。問：如果像定、變化障礙硬澀的無堪任，就是通於三性的法。善中怎麼會有惛沈的自性呢？答：由於第七識有這個緣故。其餘的成為無能為力。如有漏的善。不是善中有惛沈的緣故。這五種必定遍及一切染污的心，否則就不是染污的心。

問：不信、懈怠、惛沈可以這樣說。或者本體是實有，或者是假有。或者通於各種迷惑的一部分，或者是愚癡的一部分。這裡掉舉既然是貪的一部分，為什麼嗔恨時也有，而說通於染污的心。這位論師解釋說：

論：掉舉雖然普遍，但只說是貪的一部分。

述曰：下面會違背。有兩段文字。開始會合掉舉是貪的一部分，後面會合六、十遍。這是開始。一切染污的心，即使嗔恨生起時，也必定有掉舉的自性。而貪婪生起的位置，掉舉就增加，更多地順從貪婪的緣故。而確實有本體，所以遍及染污的心。五十三說這是假有的，必定沒有別的本體。是實有的，就有別的本體。世俗有的，或者有別的本體，或者沒有別的本體。如下面自己解釋這種世俗有。所以是實有。這裡所辨別的實有本體等。或者在文字之外的意思。各種論典大多依據貪婪而建立，所以說貪婪的一部分。世俗有中，切實地顯出本體，就是有別的本體。

【English Translation】 English version Cloudedness and Heaviness (mudita): Its nature is being incapable. Restlessness (uddhacca): Its nature is being un-tranquil. Lack of Faith (assaddha): Its nature is being intolerant, etc. Laziness (kosajja): Its nature is the mind not being energetic. Negligence (pamada): Its nature is not guarding against outflows. If one departs from being incapable, the nature of defilement cannot be established.

Treatise: When afflictions arise, these five are invariably present.

Commentary: When afflictions arise, the mind is called defiled. Therefore, in the state of a defiled mind, these five are definitely present.

What is the reason for this?

Treatise: If afflictions arise, it leads to laziness and negligence.

Commentary: The arising of all afflictions is necessarily due to being incapable, which is cloudedness and heaviness. Agitation is restlessness. The other three can be understood. Without the arising of afflictions, there is no nature of being incapable, nor is there a state of non-agitation. Question: If, like the immovability and unchangeability that obstruct hardness and roughness, being incapable is a dharma that pervades the three natures, how can there be a nature of cloudedness and heaviness in goodness? Answer: It is because of the presence of the seventh consciousness. The rest become incapable. Like the goodness with outflows. It is not because there is cloudedness and heaviness in goodness. These five must pervade all defiled minds; otherwise, it is not a defiled mind.

Question: Lack of faith, laziness, cloudedness and heaviness can be said to be so. Is the substance real or is it provisional? Does it pervade a portion of all delusions, or is it a portion of ignorance? Since restlessness here is a part of greed, why is it present during anger, and why is it said to pervade the defiled mind? This teacher explains:

Treatise: Although restlessness is pervasive, it is only said to be a part of greed.

Commentary: The following will contradict this. There are two sections of text. The first section combines restlessness as a part of greed, and the second section combines six or ten pervasives. This is the first. All defiled minds, even when anger arises, definitely have the nature of restlessness. And when greed arises, restlessness increases, because it is more in accordance with greed. And because it truly has a substance, it pervades the defiled mind. Fifty-three say that what is provisionally existent necessarily has no separate substance. What is really existent has a separate substance. What is conventionally existent either has a separate substance or does not have a separate substance. The following will explain this conventional existence. Therefore, it is really existent. What is distinguished here is the really existent substance, etc. Or it is the meaning outside the text. Most treatises are established based on greed, so it is said to be a part of greed. In conventional existence, truly revealing the substance means having a separate substance.

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為會此文遍染心起。舉如何等。

論。如眠與悔至但說為癡分。

述曰。其惡作者此中名悔。雖遍三性心起體是實有。而於癡起位相增。但說此二以為癡分。若眠．悔無體。是愚癡分。即善．無記心此應非有。不爾愚癡應通善心有。五十五云。惡作．睡眠是世俗有。是愚癡分。對法論等言遍三性。故別有體。不可在善．無記之中即言有體。染污之中即言無體。而彼但言尋．伺假故。今例掉舉何義不同。

問若以此五文為正者。何故瑜伽五十五說六法遍染。五十八說十遍染心。

論。雖余處說至一切染心。

述曰。下會六．十遍。諸論雖爾。而彼二文俱依別義說之為遍。非實遍也。

六依何義。

論。謂依二十至相顯說六。

述曰。依二十種。不取別境染分為體。妄念．散亂．不正知三是癡分故。說二十二即取別境染分說。此三及欲．解．皆彼少分故。今言二十者。簡欲．勝解二法及不定四。瑜伽此四說名隨煩惱。今約二十說故簡別之　隨煩惱者。簡去於前根本十法。彼亦名隨。不說根本名為遍故　解通粗細者。顯此行相通粗細位。簡前忿等十法彼解唯粗故　無記不善者。顯通二性。簡無慚．無愧二法。彼亦通粗細解。然唯不善　通障定惠相粗者顯此六法障定及

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：爲了理解這段經文，當遍染心生起時，會涉及哪些（隨煩惱）？

論：如睡眠（Middha）與惡作（Kaukṛtya，也譯作悔）等，只是說它們是癡（Moha）的一部分。

述記：這裡的『惡作』指的是後悔。雖然它遍及三性（善、惡、無記），心生起的體性是真實存在的，但在癡生起時，其作用會增強。因此，只說這二者是癡的一部分。如果睡眠和惡作沒有自體，只是愚癡的一部分，那麼在善心和無記心中就不應該存在。否則，愚癡就應該能通達善心。瑜伽師地論第五十五卷說，惡作和睡眠是世俗諦中存在的，是愚癡的一部分。對法論等說它們遍及三性，因此有獨立的體性。不能說在善心和無記心中就說它們有體性，而在染污心中就說它們沒有體性。而且，那些論典只是說尋（Vitarka）和伺（Vicara）是假立的，那麼現在舉例掉舉（Audhathya），又有什麼不同呢？

問：如果以這五種（隨煩惱）為正，那麼為什麼瑜伽師地論第五十五卷說六法遍染，第五十八卷說十法遍染心？

論：雖然其他地方說……乃至一切染心。

述記：下面解釋六法和十法遍染的含義。雖然各論典的說法不同，但這兩處經文都是依據不同的含義來說的，並非真正意義上的遍染。

六法是依據什麼含義說的？

論：是依據二十種（隨煩惱），乃至顯示說六法。

述記：依據二十種隨煩惱，不取別境（Vinishcita）染分為體。妄念（Styana）、散亂（Vikshepa）、不正知（Asamprajanya）三種是癡的一部分。說二十二種，就是取了別境染分來說。這三種以及欲（Chanda）、解（Adhimoksha），都是那些（別境）的少分。現在說二十種，是爲了簡別欲、勝解（Adhimoksha）二法以及不定四法。瑜伽師地論將這四種稱為隨煩惱。現在依據二十種來說，所以要簡別它們。所謂隨煩惱，是爲了簡去前面的根本十法（根本煩惱）。它們也被稱為『隨』，但不說根本煩惱是遍染。『解通粗細』，顯示這些行相通於粗細位。簡別前面的忿（Krodha）等十法，因為它們的解只有粗顯。『無記不善』，顯示通於二性（無記和不善）。簡別無慚（Ahrikya）、無愧（Anapatrapya）二法，它們也通於粗細解，但只有不善性。『通障定慧相粗』，顯示這六法能障礙定和慧，而且相狀粗顯。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: To understand this text, what (secondary defilements) are involved when pervasive defiled mind arises?

Treatise: Such as drowsiness (Middha) and remorse (Kaukṛtya), it is only said that they are part of ignorance (Moha).

Commentary: 'Remorse' here refers to regret. Although it pervades the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), the substance of the mind arising is real. However, when ignorance arises, its function is enhanced. Therefore, it is only said that these two are part of ignorance. If drowsiness and remorse have no self-nature, but are only part of ignorance, then they should not exist in wholesome and neutral minds. Otherwise, ignorance should be able to penetrate wholesome minds. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 55, says that remorse and drowsiness exist in conventional truth and are part of ignorance. The Abhidharma texts say that they pervade the three natures, so they have independent substance. It cannot be said that they have substance in wholesome and neutral minds, but no substance in defiled minds. Moreover, those treatises only say that conception (Vitarka) and discernment (Vicara) are provisional. So, what is the difference in the example of excitement (Audhathya)?

Question: If these five (secondary defilements) are considered correct, then why does the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 55, say that six dharmas pervasively defile, and volume 58 say that ten dharmas pervasively defile the mind?

Treatise: Although other places say... up to all defiled minds.

Commentary: The meaning of the six and ten pervasive defilements will be explained below. Although the treatises differ, these two passages are based on different meanings and are not truly pervasive defilements.

Based on what meaning are the six dharmas spoken of?

Treatise: It is based on twenty (secondary defilements), up to showing that six are spoken of.

Commentary: Based on twenty secondary defilements, the defiled division of determination (Vinishcita) is not taken as the substance. Forgetfulness (Styana), distraction (Vikshepa), and non-awareness (Asamprajanya) are part of ignorance. Saying twenty-two is to take the defiled division of determination. These three, as well as desire (Chanda) and conviction (Adhimoksha), are minor parts of those (determinations). Now, saying twenty is to distinguish desire, conviction, and the four uncertain dharmas. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra calls these four secondary defilements. Now, based on twenty, they are distinguished. The so-called secondary defilements are to distinguish them from the previous ten fundamental defilements (root afflictions). They are also called 'secondary,' but the fundamental defilements are not said to be pervasive. 'Conviction pervades coarse and subtle,' showing that these characteristics pervade coarse and subtle positions. Distinguishing the previous anger (Krodha) and other ten dharmas, because their conviction is only coarse. 'Neutral and unwholesome,' showing that it pervades two natures (neutral and unwholesome). Distinguishing shamelessness (Ahrikya) and lack of embarrassment (Anapatrapya), which also pervade coarse and subtle convictions, but are only unwholesome. 'Pervasively obstructs samadhi and wisdom, and the characteristics are coarse,' showing that these six dharmas can obstruct samadhi and wisdom, and their characteristics are coarse.

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惠二俱相顯簡惛沈．掉舉二法。

對法第一說惛沈障毗缽舍那。掉舉障奢摩他　瑜伽等說惛沈障定。掉舉障惠。別障定．惠。非俱通障　對法論中說彼行相相翻障故惛沈障惠。瑜伽說彼行相相順障說惛沈障定。掉舉亦爾。翻此應知。然無一文行相相翻相順。說惛．掉二法粗相通障定之與惠。故以通障定．惠相顯簡惛．掉二然約其體細得通障。今說行相相順相翻二俱粗障。彼即不爾。其不信．懈怠．放逸．惡念．散亂．惡惠。于染位中遍此三義。故言遍也。一解通粗細。二通二性。三通障定．惠。二十隨惑之言。雖復簡他。非所遍義。即此六法皆能遍故。名遍染心。非一切染者六皆能遍。

十隨惑者。放逸．掉舉．惛沈．不信．懈怠．邪欲．邪勝解．邪念．散亂．不正知。取五別境染分為隨。成二十二　已知說六。十遍者何。

論。依二十二至非互相違。

述曰。解十遍文　二十二者。邪欲．勝解明攝在中。亦簡不定　隨。簡根本　解通粗細。簡忿等十　二性。簡別無慚．無愧。通后二義言遍　說十。非所餘法。二十二等雖簡他法非所遍義。故論三文亦無違理。

論。然此意俱至並別境惠。

述曰。下解此識俱中。初顯有。后辨無。此顯有也。此有十五。前九．五隨．別境中惠。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 智慧能夠清楚地區分昏沉和掉舉這兩種法。

《對法論》第一義說昏沉障礙毗缽舍那（Vipassanā，內觀），掉舉障礙奢摩他（Śamatha，止禪）。《瑜伽師地論》等說昏沉障礙禪定，掉舉障礙智慧。這是分別障礙禪定和智慧，而不是共同障礙。 《對法論》中說，因為它們的作用方式相反，所以昏沉障礙智慧。《瑜伽師地論》說，因為它們的作用方式相似，所以昏沉障礙禪定。掉舉也是如此，可以反過來理解。然而，沒有哪篇文章說昏沉和掉舉的作用方式是相反或相似的，只是說這兩種法粗略地共同障礙禪定和智慧。因此，通過共同障礙禪定和智慧來區分昏沉和掉舉。然而，就其本質而言，它們細微地共同障礙。現在說作用方式相似或相反，都是粗略的障礙。那些不信、懈怠、放逸、惡念、散亂、惡慧，在染污的狀態中普遍存在這三種含義，所以說是『遍』。一是普遍地包含粗細，二是普遍地包含兩種性質（善與惡），三是普遍地障礙禪定和智慧。二十隨煩惱的說法，雖然排除了其他，但不是普遍的含義。只有這六種法都能夠普遍存在，所以稱為『遍染心』，而不是一切染污都能夠普遍存在這六種。

十隨煩惱是：放逸、掉舉、昏沉、不信、懈怠、邪欲、邪勝解、邪念、散亂、不正知。取五別境（five specific mental factors）的染污部分作為隨煩惱，總共二十二種。 已經知道了六遍煩惱，那麼十隨煩惱是什麼？

論：依據二十二種煩惱，它們並非互相違背。

述記：解釋十遍煩惱的文句。 二十二種煩惱，是將邪欲和邪勝解包含在其中。也排除了不定隨煩惱，排除了根本煩惱，解釋了包含粗細，排除了忿等十種煩惱，兩種性質，排除了無慚和無愧。普遍包含后兩種含義，說的是十遍煩惱，而不是其餘的法。二十二種煩惱等雖然排除了其他法，但不是普遍的含義。所以論中的三段文字也沒有違背道理。

論：然而，這個意思是在一起，包括別境慧。

述記：下面解釋這個識在一起，首先顯示存在，然後辨別不存在。這裡顯示存在。這裡有十五種，前九種，五隨煩惱，別境中的慧。

【English Translation】 English version: Wisdom can clearly distinguish between the two dharmas of torpor and agitation.

The first meaning in the Abhidharma says that torpor obstructs Vipassanā (inner vision), and agitation obstructs Śamatha (tranquility meditation). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and others say that torpor obstructs samādhi (concentration), and agitation obstructs wisdom. This is a separate obstruction of samādhi and wisdom, not a common obstruction. The Abhidharma says that because their modes of operation are opposite, torpor obstructs wisdom. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that because their modes of operation are similar, torpor obstructs samādhi. The same is true of agitation, which can be understood in reverse. However, no text says that the modes of operation of torpor and agitation are opposite or similar, only that these two dharmas coarsely and commonly obstruct samādhi and wisdom. Therefore, torpor and agitation are distinguished by their common obstruction of samādhi and wisdom. However, in essence, they subtly obstruct in common. Now it is said that similar or opposite modes of operation are both coarse obstructions. Those of non-belief, laziness, recklessness, evil thoughts, distraction, and evil wisdom, universally exist in these three meanings in a defiled state, so it is said to be 'pervasive'. First, it universally includes coarse and subtle; second, it universally includes two natures (good and evil); and third, it universally obstructs samādhi and wisdom. The statement of twenty secondary afflictions, although excluding others, is not a universal meaning. Only these six dharmas can all be universally present, so they are called 'pervasively defiling the mind', not that all defilements can universally include these six.

The ten secondary afflictions are: recklessness, agitation, torpor, non-belief, laziness, evil desire, evil superior understanding, evil mindfulness, distraction, and incorrect knowledge. Taking the defiled part of the five specific mental factors (pañca-prati-vikalpa) as secondary afflictions, there are a total of twenty-two. Having already known the six pervasive afflictions, what are the ten secondary afflictions?

Treatise: According to the twenty-two afflictions, they are not mutually contradictory.

Commentary: Explaining the sentences about the ten pervasive afflictions. The twenty-two afflictions include evil desire and evil superior understanding. It also excludes the indeterminate secondary afflictions, excludes the root afflictions, explains the inclusion of coarse and subtle, excludes the ten afflictions such as anger, two natures, excludes shamelessness and lack of embarrassment. Universally includes the latter two meanings, referring to the ten pervasive afflictions, not the remaining dharmas. Although the twenty-two afflictions and others exclude other dharmas, they are not universal meanings. Therefore, the three paragraphs in the treatise do not violate reason.

Treatise: However, this meaning is together, including the wisdom of specific mental factors.

Commentary: Below, explaining that this consciousness is together, first showing existence, then distinguishing non-existence. Here it shows existence. Here there are fifteen kinds, the previous nine, five secondary afflictions, and the wisdom in specific mental factors.

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以是見故得成十五。

問豈二惠得俱也。

論。我見雖是至故開為二。

述曰。我見即是別境所攝。五十一心所中義別說為二。一惠是別境。通三性．九地故。二見唯染污。通九地等故。既有寬狹別說不同。故開為二。如不以見即惠體故別說見。今亦不以惠即見故別說惠也。

論。何緣此意無餘心所。

述曰。下顯無也。雖知更加五隨煩惱與此俱起。不知何緣無餘心所。

論。謂忿等十至故非彼俱。

述曰。且從染答。前根本中無餘六者。五師皆同下不別說　又上已說無有根本。諸師同故。此論師明五十一心所故。不明邪欲．及邪勝解。且二十隨。忿等初十皆解唯粗。此識審細故無彼十。

論。無慚無愧至非彼相應。

述曰。彼唯不善。此有覆故。

論。散亂令心至故彼非有。

述曰。散亂若別有體無體。令心馳流外境上轉緣外方起。此緣內審故無散亂。此師意存別有體也。下論說言若別境中定為體者。是假不遍。餘者說遍。然今此師設別有體。以緣外起或間斷故。不遍一切染。此識中無。一恒故。二內執故。三一類境生故。不外馳流故無散亂。

論。不正知者至故非彼俱。

述曰。此數設是別境惠分。或是癡分。多起外門身．語

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，由於這樣的觀察，才能成就十五種功德。

問：難道智慧和見解這兩種功德可以同時獲得嗎？

論：我的見解雖然是究竟的，所以才分為兩種。

述曰：『我見』實際上是被『別境』所包含的。在五十一心所中，因為意義不同，所以分為兩種。第一種智慧是『別境』，它貫通三性（善、惡、無記）和九地（欲界、色界、無色界）。第二種見解僅僅是染污的，也貫通九地等等。既然有寬泛和狹隘的區別，所以說法不同，因此分為兩種。正如不認為『見』就是『惠』的本體，所以分別說『見』。現在也不認為『惠』就是『見』的本體，所以分別說『惠』。

論：為什麼這種『意』沒有其餘的心所伴隨呢？

述曰：下面說明沒有其餘心所伴隨的原因。即使知道還會有五種隨煩惱與此『意』一同生起，但不知道為什麼沒有其餘心所。

論：因為忿、恨等十種隨煩惱過於粗糙，所以不與此『意』同時生起。

述曰：這裡先從染污的角度回答。前面根本煩惱中沒有其餘六種，五位論師都相同，下面不再分別說明。而且上面已經說過沒有根本煩惱，各位論師的觀點相同。此論師爲了闡明五十一心所，所以沒有說明邪欲以及邪勝解。且說二十種隨煩惱，忿、恨等最初的十種都容易理解，只是過於粗糙。此識審察細微，所以沒有那十種隨煩惱。

論：因為無慚、無愧僅僅是不善的，而此『意』是有覆的，所以不與此『意』相應。

述曰：無慚和無愧僅僅是不善的，而此『意』是有覆無記的。

論：因為散亂使心向外馳流，所以此『意』中沒有散亂。

述曰：散亂如果另外有自體，那麼它會使心馳流到外境上，向外境轉移緣取外境。而此『意』是緣取內在進行審察，所以沒有散亂。這位論師認為散亂是另外有自體的。下面的論述說，如果在『別境』中確定散亂是自體，那就是虛假的，不普遍。其餘的論述說散亂是普遍的。然而現在這位論師假設散亂另外有自體，因為它緣取外境或者間斷，所以不普遍存在於一切染污心中。此識中沒有散亂，一是恒常存在，二是執取內在，三是緣取同一類境而生起，不向外馳流，所以沒有散亂。

論：因為不正知是外在的身語行為，所以不與此『意』同時生起。

述曰：這種說法假設不正知是『別境』智慧的一部分，或者是愚癡的一部分，多半是引發外在的身語行為。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is through this observation that fifteen accomplishments are achieved.

Question: Can these two benefits, wisdom and insight, be obtained simultaneously?

Treatise: Although my view is ultimate, it is divided into two.

Commentary: 『My view』 is actually included within 『Determining Cognition』 (Viśeṣa). Among the fifty-one mental factors, it is divided into two because of the difference in meaning. The first, wisdom, is a 『Determining Cognition』 that pervades the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) and the nine grounds (desire realm, form realm, and formless realm). The second, view, is only defiled and also pervades the nine grounds, etc. Since there is a difference between broad and narrow, the explanation is different, hence the division into two. Just as 『view』 is not considered to be the essence of 『wisdom,』 so 『view』 is explained separately. Now, 『wisdom』 is also not considered to be the essence of 『view,』 so 『wisdom』 is explained separately.

Treatise: Why is it that this 『intention』 (mati) is not accompanied by other mental factors?

Commentary: The following explains the reason why it is not accompanied by other mental factors. Even if it is known that the five secondary afflictions arise together with this 『intention,』 it is not known why there are no other mental factors.

Treatise: Because anger, resentment, etc. are too coarse, they do not arise simultaneously with it.

Commentary: Here, the answer is given from the perspective of defilement. Among the root afflictions mentioned earlier, the absence of the other six is the same for all five masters, and it will not be explained separately below. Moreover, it has already been said above that there are no root afflictions, which is the same for all masters. This treatise explains the fifty-one mental factors, so it does not explain wrong desire and wrong understanding. Furthermore, regarding the twenty secondary afflictions, the initial ten, such as anger and resentment, are easy to understand but are too coarse. This consciousness examines subtly, so it does not have those ten secondary afflictions.

Treatise: Because shamelessness and lack of shame are only unwholesome, while this 『intention』 is obscured, they are not in accordance with it.

Commentary: Shamelessness and lack of shame are only unwholesome, while this 『intention』 is obscured and neutral.

Treatise: Because distraction causes the mind to wander outward, it is not present in this 『intention.』

Commentary: If distraction has a separate entity, it causes the mind to wander to external objects, shifting to external realms and grasping external objects. But this 『intention』 grasps internally and examines, so there is no distraction. This master believes that distraction has a separate entity. The following discussion says that if distraction is determined to be an entity within 『Determining Cognition,』 then it is false and not pervasive. Other discussions say that distraction is pervasive. However, this master now assumes that distraction has a separate entity because it grasps external objects or is intermittent, so it is not pervasive in all defiled minds. This consciousness does not have distraction because: 1. it is constant; 2. it grasps internally; 3. it arises from grasping the same type of object; it does not wander outward, so there is no distraction.

Treatise: Because incorrect knowledge is external bodily and verbal behavior, it does not arise simultaneously with this 『intention.』

Commentary: This statement assumes that incorrect knowledge is a part of the wisdom of 『Determining Cognition』 or a part of ignorance, mostly causing external bodily and verbal behavior.

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．意業。緣外染污三種業生違越軌則。三界皆然。並越善故名違軌則。彼緣外生。此唯緣內故彼無也。亦非是遍。緣內無故　且如二十二隨煩惱中忿等十四如文說無。別境五法。及隨惑中忘念．邪欲．邪勝解三。何故此中不說。隨三亦非遍欲也。答隨中三即是別境之中三分。故此不說。

論。無餘心所義如前說。

述曰。此例與上第一師同。若遠例于上。第八識同故不別說。根本四惑如前共說。然忘念一縱是癡分。以其行相與別境中念分無別故不說有。不正知設惠分。亦是癡分。散亂別體者。與定．惠行相別。恐謂亦俱故今別說　又以不正知行相增強。既許有惠。恐亦許有故為簡之　忘念．邪欲．邪解。由前理故亦非遍數。別境少分故此不說。

論。有義應說至染心相應。

述曰。文亦有二。初出遍隨。后此識俱。初中有四。並準於前。此標宗也。立彼六種隨惑遍諸染心。

何以知者。

論。瑜伽論說至皆相應故。

述曰。下引證也。五十五說不信等至皆相應故。名有六也。此師意說。一切染心此之六種皆相應故。

不信．懈怠．放逸三種行相不違。如前師說實遍染心。忘念等三前來未解故今應釋。

論。忘念散亂至起諸煩惱。

述曰。下立理也。忘

念．散亂．惡惠三法。若無心必不能起諸煩惱。無此三故。如善心等。以忘念惠是癡等攝。散亂別有故遍染心。

如何要有忘念等三。

論。要緣曾受至諸煩惱故。

述曰。起諸煩惱者。要緣先時曾受之境諸已得者。或雖未曾受是曾受之境種類。發起忘念．及邪簡擇。故有忘念．及不正知。失正念故。邪簡擇故。起染污心　如緣滅道起邪見等。或聞未來有殊勝樂如天上樂等。皆先聞名。而起邪見及貪等故。無始曾得之境界也。或撥無滅諦等。撥先曾受所聞之境種類名故。非撥彼體。親不證故。但親撥無彼類名故。如他界緣惑。皆緣名生緣自心相　故染心時定有此二　問曰染心皆有惠。五識應有執。以有惠故　答曰五識定無深推求故。雖有不正知。無五見中我見故無執也。法我．人我皆我見故　又此癡分。故遍染心。

又緣于內如何起散亂。誰謂不起。如何名散亂。

論。煩惱起時至起散亂故。

述曰。煩惱起時。心必馳流於境縱蕩。非如善位。此何為也。皆由於境起散亂故方流蕩也。諸論解散亂皆言不寂。不寂者流蕩之義。與此理同　故此三法遍諸染心。無無此三而成染者。

何故無惛沈．掉舉二法。

論。惛沉掉舉至皆能遍起。

述曰。下會違也。釋無惛

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於念（smṛti，憶念）、散亂（vikṣepa，心散亂）和惡惠（dus-prajñā，惡慧）這三種法。如果沒有憶念，必定不能生起各種煩惱。因為沒有這三種法，就像善心等情況一樣。因為忘念和惡慧被歸類為癡等，而散亂是獨立存在的，所以它遍染一切心。

為什麼一定要有忘念等三種法？

論：因為要緣于曾經領受過的境界，才能生起各種煩惱。

述曰：生起各種煩惱，必須要緣于先前曾經領受過的境界，或者雖然沒有曾經領受過，但是屬於曾經領受過的境界的種類。發起忘念以及邪簡擇（mithyā-nirṇaya，錯誤的抉擇），所以有忘念以及不正知（asaṃprajanya，非正知）。因為失去正念，因為邪簡擇，所以生起染污心。例如，緣于滅諦（nirodha-satya，寂滅諦）和道諦（mārga-satya，道諦）而生起邪見等。或者聽到未來有殊勝的快樂，例如天上的快樂等，都是先聽到名稱，然後生起邪見和貪等。這是因為無始以來曾經獲得的境界。或者否定沒有滅諦等，否定先前曾經領受過的所聞的境界的種類名稱，而不是否定它的本體，因為沒有親自證得。只是親自否定沒有那類名稱。例如，他界的緣惑，都是緣于名稱而生，緣于自心相。所以染心時一定有這兩種情況。問：染心都有慧，五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）應該有執著，因為有慧的緣故。答：五識一定沒有深入的推求，所以雖然有不正知，但是沒有五見（pañca-dṛṣṭi，五種邪見）中的我見（satkāya-dṛṣṭi，有身見），所以沒有執著。法我（dharma-ātman，法我）和人我（pudgala-ātman，人我）都是我見。而且這種癡（moha，愚癡）的部分，所以遍染一切心。

又緣于內心，如何生起散亂？誰說不能生起？如何稱為散亂？

論：煩惱生起時，心必定馳流於境界，縱任放蕩，不像處於善位時那樣。這是為什麼呢？都是由於緣于境界而生起散亂，然後才流蕩。各種論典解釋散亂都說是不寂靜，不寂靜就是流蕩的意思，與這個道理相同。所以這三種法遍及各種染心，沒有沒有這三種法而能成為染污的。

為什麼沒有惛沈（styāna，昏沉）和掉舉（auddhatya，掉舉）這兩種法？

論：惛沈掉舉都能普遍生起。

述曰：下文會違背。解釋沒有惛沈

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the three dharmas of smṛti (mindfulness), vikṣepa (distraction), and dus-prajñā (bad wisdom). If there is no mindfulness, various afflictions definitely cannot arise. Because there are not these three, like in the case of wholesome mind, etc. Because forgetfulness and bad wisdom are included in ignorance, etc., and distraction exists separately, therefore it pervades and taints all minds.

Why must there be these three, such as forgetfulness?

Treatise: Because one must rely on previously experienced realms to give rise to various afflictions.

Commentary: To generate afflictions, one must rely on previously experienced realms, or those that have already been obtained, or although not previously experienced, they belong to the category of previously experienced realms. Giving rise to forgetfulness and mithyā-nirṇaya (wrong discernment), therefore there is forgetfulness and asaṃprajanya (non-comprehension). Because of losing right mindfulness, because of wrong discernment, defiled mind arises. For example, relying on nirodha-satya (truth of cessation) and mārga-satya (truth of the path) to generate wrong views, etc. Or hearing about future excellent happiness, such as heavenly happiness, etc., all first hear the name, and then generate wrong views and greed, etc. This is because of realms obtained since beginningless time. Or denying the absence of nirodha-satya, etc., denying the names of the categories of realms previously experienced and heard, but not denying their substance, because they have not been personally realized. Only personally denying the names of those categories. For example, the delusions of other realms all arise from names, relying on the appearance of one's own mind. Therefore, when the mind is defiled, these two definitely exist. Question: All defiled minds have wisdom, so the five vijñānas (five consciousnesses) should have attachment, because they have wisdom. Answer: The five consciousnesses definitely do not have deep investigation, so although there is non-comprehension, there is no satkāya-dṛṣṭi (self-view) among the five dṛṣṭis (five views), so there is no attachment. Dharma-ātman (self of phenomena) and pudgala-ātman (self of person) are both self-view. Moreover, this part of moha (delusion) pervades and taints all minds.

Furthermore, relying on the inner, how does distraction arise? Who says it cannot arise? How is it called distraction?

Treatise: When afflictions arise, the mind necessarily rushes and flows to the realm, indulging and unrestrained, not like when in a wholesome state. Why is this? It is all because of relying on the realm to generate distraction, and then it flows. Various treatises explain distraction as non-tranquility, and non-tranquility means flowing, which is the same as this principle. Therefore, these three dharmas pervade all defiled minds, and there is no defilement that can be formed without these three.

Why are there not styāna (lethargy) and auddhatya (excitement)?

Treatise: Lethargy and excitement can both universally arise.

Commentary: The following will contradict. Explaining the absence of lethargy

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沈．掉舉所以。行相相違起一無一。非諸染心皆能遍起。掉舉外相高生。惛沈內相下起。

若爾何故對法等說五為遍也。

論。論說五法至通二性故。

述曰。彼論言遍遍於四義。

一者通粗細。簡忿等十。唯粗事故　二者唯違善法。即明不信翻信。懈怠翻精進。惛沈翻輕安。掉舉返舍。放逸翻不放逸來。即簡散亂從定數來。設別有體。所障之定通三性故。不唯違善。忘念．惡惠．邪欲勝解。隨彼所翻理亦應然。並翻別境之數來故。

三者純隨煩惱者。簡根本惑及不定四。彼亦通名隨煩惱故。貪等唯違善中無貪等。然非純隨。故今簡也　四通二性者。簡無慚愧。由斯四義故。對法說五遍染心。非但染心即皆有也。

何義說十。

論。說十遍言義如前說。

述曰。如初家說。遍二義故。

論。然此意俱至及加惛沈。

述曰。下此識俱申正義也。初顯有。后辨無。此相應法心所十九。前九．六隨如文可解。並別境中念．定．惠三。及加惛沈。

論。此別說念準前惠釋。

述曰。此別說念。如次前師說惠所以。即我見故。此中忘念即念數故　此不正知亦即惠故。義說為二。邪簡擇故名為惡惠。執我故名我見　或是癡分即非我見。或可。義別說之

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：什麼是惛沈（sloth）和掉舉（restlessness）的原因？ 答：它們的行相（characteristics）是相反的，一個使心下沉，一個使心高舉，並且不是所有的染污心（defiled minds）都能普遍生起這些煩惱。掉舉的外在表現是高揚，惛沈的內在表現是下沉。 問：如果是這樣，為什麼《對法論》（Abhidharma）等論典說五種遍行心所（universal mental factors）是普遍的呢？ 答：論典說這五種法是普遍的，是因為它們通於二性（two natures）。 解釋：那部論典說『遍』有四種含義： 一、通於粗細（gross and subtle）：這可以用來區分忿（anger）等十種小隨煩惱（minor defilements），因為它們只緣粗顯的事物。二、只違背善法（wholesome dharmas）：也就是說，不信（lack of faith）違背信（faith），懈怠（laziness）違背精進（diligence），惛沈違背輕安（tranquility），掉舉違背舍（equanimity），放逸（negligence）違背不放逸（diligence）。這可以用來區分散亂（distraction），因為它從定（concentration）的範疇而來。即使散亂有單獨的體性，它所障礙的定也通於三性（three natures），所以不只是違背善法。忘念（forgetfulness）、惡慧（wrong wisdom）、邪欲勝解（wrong aspiration）等，按照它們所違背的，道理也應該一樣，因為它們也從別境（specific object）的範疇而來。 三、純粹是隨煩惱（secondary defilements）：這可以用來區分根本煩惱（root defilements）和不定四心所（the four uncertain mental factors），因為它們也通稱為隨煩惱。貪（greed）等只是違背善法中的無貪（non-greed）等，但不是純粹的隨煩惱，所以現在要區分開。四、通於二性：這可以用來區分無慚（shamelessness）和無愧（lack of remorse）。由於這四種原因，《對法論》說五種遍行心所普遍存在於染污心中，但並不是說只要是染污心就一定有這些心所。 問：那麼，為什麼又說有十種隨煩惱呢？ 答：說十種遍行煩惱的含義和前面說的一樣。 解釋：就像第一家所說，因為『遍』有二種含義。 答：然而，這裡的意思是，這些煩惱都與識（consciousness）俱起，並且加上了惛沈。 解釋：下面這段話是爲了闡述正義。首先顯示存在，然後辨別不存在。這裡與心識相應的法（mental factors associated with consciousness）有十九種，前九種和六種隨煩惱可以按照經文來理解，再加上別境中的念（mindfulness）、定（concentration）、慧（wisdom）三種，以及加上惛沈。 答：這裡特別提到念，可以參照前面解釋慧的方法。 解釋：這裡特別提到念，就像之前的老師解釋慧的原因一樣，是因為我見（self-view）的緣故。這裡所說的忘念（forgetfulness）就是念數（mindfulness factor）；這裡所說的不正知（wrong knowledge）也就是慧（wisdom）的緣故，所以從意義上來說可以分為兩種。邪簡擇（wrong discernment）叫做惡慧（wrong wisdom），執著於我（self）叫做我見（self-view）。或者，它只是癡（ignorance）的一部分，而不是我見。或許，從意義上有所區別，所以分別說明。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: What are the causes of Styana (sloth) and Auddhatya (restlessness)? Answer: Their characteristics are opposite; one causes the mind to sink, and the other causes the mind to be elevated. Furthermore, not all defiled minds universally give rise to these afflictions. The external manifestation of Auddhatya is elevation, while the internal manifestation of Styana is sinking. Question: If that is the case, why do treatises such as the Abhidharma say that the five universal mental factors are universal? Answer: The treatises say that these five dharmas are universal because they are common to two natures. Explanation: That treatise says that 'universal' has four meanings: 1. Common to gross and subtle: This can be used to distinguish Krodha (anger) and the other ten minor defilements because they only concern gross objects. 2. Only contrary to wholesome dharmas: That is to say, Asraddha (lack of faith) is contrary to Sraddha (faith), Kausidya (laziness) is contrary to Virya (diligence), Styana is contrary to Prasrabdhi (tranquility), Auddhatya is contrary to Upeksha (equanimity), and Pramada (negligence) is contrary to Apramada (diligence). This can be used to distinguish Vikshepa (distraction) because it comes from the category of Samadhi (concentration). Even if Vikshepa has a separate nature, the Samadhi that it obstructs is common to the three natures, so it is not only contrary to wholesome dharmas. Musitasmrtita (forgetfulness), Duskprജ്ഞa (wrong wisdom), and Mithyadhimoksha (wrong aspiration), according to what they are contrary to, the principle should be the same, because they also come from the category of Visesa (specific object). 3. Purely secondary defilements: This can be used to distinguish the root defilements and the four uncertain mental factors because they are also commonly called secondary defilements. Raga (greed) and others are only contrary to non-greed and others in wholesome dharmas, but they are not purely secondary, so they must be distinguished now. 4. Common to two natures: This can be used to distinguish Ahrikya (shamelessness) and Anapatrapya (lack of remorse). Because of these four reasons, the Abhidharma says that the five universal mental factors are universally present in defiled minds, but it does not mean that as long as it is a defiled mind, it must have these mental factors. Question: Then, why is it said that there are ten secondary defilements? Answer: The meaning of saying that there are ten universal afflictions is the same as what was said before. Explanation: Just like the first school said, because 'universal' has two meanings. Answer: However, the meaning here is that these afflictions all arise together with consciousness and include Styana. Explanation: The following passage is to clarify the correct meaning. First, it shows existence, and then it distinguishes non-existence. Here, there are nineteen mental factors associated with consciousness. The first nine and the six secondary defilements can be understood according to the text, plus the three of mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom in the specific objects, and the addition of Styana. Answer: Here, mindfulness is specifically mentioned, and the method of explaining wisdom can be referred to from before. Explanation: Here, mindfulness is specifically mentioned, just like the previous teacher explained the reason for wisdom, because of self-view. The forgetfulness mentioned here is the mindfulness factor; the wrong knowledge mentioned here is also the reason for wisdom, so in terms of meaning, it can be divided into two types. Wrong discernment is called wrong wisdom, and attachment to self is called self-view. Or, it is just a part of ignorance, not self-view. Perhaps, there is a difference in meaning, so it is explained separately.

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為二　能發惡業者。是第六識．五識中語。非約第七。故此識俱有不正知。如前惠說更不問之。

論。並有定者至曾不捨故。

述曰。何意有定。專注一類所執我境不暫舍故。如於志念緣曾受境。此緣一物故有定也。不同前師。彼無念故。緣新新現境故亦無定。此中有之所存別故。

論。加惛沈者至心惛沈故。

述曰。無明重故。內迷執故。不外追故。故有惛沈。

論。無掉舉者此相違故。

述曰。下顯無也。此與惛沈性相違故。不可雙起。

論。無餘心所如上應知。

述曰。無別境欲．及勝解二。及染污中邪欲勝解．忿等前十二。並不定四。如前第一．第二師說。互有無者此略說之。余如上說。應可知也。

論。有義復說至染心相應。

述曰。此第三師。說有十遍。文段準前。此標宗也。

論。瑜伽論說至三界系故。

述曰。下引證也。五十八卷。說有惛．掉．不信．懈怠．放逸五種即同初師。有忘念．惡惠．散亂三種同第二說。加欲．勝解故偏簡也。

論。若無邪欲至起諸煩惱。

述曰。下立理也。若無邪欲勝解。必不起煩惱。此即總言染心有也。

有何所以。

論。于所受境至諸煩惱故。

述曰。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二、能引發惡業的是哪個識？是第六識（意識）和五識（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）中的語言行為。這裡不是指第七識（末那識）。因此，這個識伴隨著不正知。就像之前的慧沼法師所說，這裡不再贅述。

論：並且有『定』，是因為它從不捨棄所執著的境界。

述記：為什麼說有『定』呢？因為它專注于所執著的『我』的境界，從不暫舍。就像對於志念，緣于曾經領受過的境界。因為緣於一個事物，所以有『定』。這與之前的法師不同，他們沒有念頭，因為緣于不斷新出現的境界，所以也沒有『定』。這裡面有它存在的差別。

論：加上『惛沈』，是因為內心惛沈。

述記：因為無明深重，內心迷惑執著，不向外追逐，所以有『惛沈』。

論：沒有『掉舉』，是因為與『惛沈』的體性相反。

述記：下面會顯示沒有『掉舉』。因為『掉舉』與『惛沈』的體性相反，所以不可能同時生起。

論：沒有其餘的心所，應該像上面所說的那樣理解。

述記：沒有別境中的欲、勝解這兩種心所，以及染污中的邪欲、勝解、忿等前十二種心所，以及不定中的四種心所。就像前面第一位和第二位法師所說，互相之間有有無的情況，這裡只是簡略地說一下。其餘的就像上面所說的那樣，應該可以理解。

論：有義認為，還有十種遍行心所與染心相應。

述記：這是第三位法師的觀點，認為有十種遍行心所。文段的結構與前面類似。這裡是標明宗義。

論：《瑜伽師地論》說，有惛沈、掉舉等五種心所，因為它們屬於三界。

述記：下面是引證。《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷說，有惛沈、掉舉、不信、懈怠、放逸這五種心所，與第一位法師的觀點相同。有忘念、惡慧、散亂這三種心所，與第二位法師的觀點相同。加上欲、勝解，所以是特別簡略的說法。

論：如果沒有邪欲和勝解，就不會生起各種煩惱。

述記：下面是立論。如果沒有邪欲和勝解，必定不會生起煩惱。這總的說明了染心中有邪欲和勝解。

為什麼這樣說呢？

論：對於所領受的境界，會產生各種煩惱。

述記：

【English Translation】 English version 2. Which consciousness can generate evil karma? It is the language behavior in the sixth consciousness (Mano-vijnana) and the five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses). This is not referring to the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana). Therefore, this consciousness is accompanied by incorrect knowledge. As Master Huizhao said before, I will not repeat it here.

Treatise: And there is 'Samadhi' (定), because it never abandons the object it clings to.

Commentary: Why is it said that there is 'Samadhi'? Because it focuses on the object of 'self' that it clings to and never abandons it even for a moment. It is like with intention and mindfulness, it is related to the realm that has been experienced. Because it is related to one thing, it has 'Samadhi'. This is different from the previous teachers, they have no thought, because they are related to constantly newly appearing realms, so they also have no 'Samadhi'. There is a difference in its existence here.

Treatise: Adding 'Mental Obscuration' (惛沈), because the mind is obscured.

Commentary: Because ignorance is deep, the mind is confused and attached, and does not pursue outwards, so there is 'Mental Obscuration'.

Treatise: There is no 'Restlessness' (掉舉), because it is opposite in nature to 'Mental Obscuration'.

Commentary: It will be shown below that there is no 'Restlessness'. Because 'Restlessness' is opposite in nature to 'Mental Obscuration', they cannot arise simultaneously.

Treatise: There are no other mental factors, it should be understood as mentioned above.

Commentary: There are no desire (欲) and certainty (勝解) in the specific mental factors, as well as the twelve mental factors such as evil desire (邪欲), certainty (勝解), anger (忿) etc. in defilement, and the four uncertain mental factors. Just like what the first and second teachers said before, there are mutual presences and absences, this is just a brief statement. The rest should be understandable as mentioned above.

Treatise: Some argue that there are also ten pervasive mental factors that correspond to the defiled mind.

Commentary: This is the view of the third teacher, who believes that there are ten pervasive mental factors. The structure of the passage is similar to the previous ones. This is to state the doctrine.

Treatise: The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) says that there are five mental factors such as mental obscuration (惛沈), restlessness (掉舉), because they belong to the three realms.

Commentary: The following is a citation. The 58th volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that there are five mental factors: mental obscuration (惛沈), restlessness (掉舉), disbelief (不信), laziness (懈怠), and laxity (放逸), which is the same as the view of the first teacher. There are three mental factors: forgetfulness (忘念), evil wisdom (惡慧), and distraction (散亂), which is the same as the view of the second teacher. Adding desire (欲) and certainty (勝解), so it is a particularly brief statement.

Treatise: If there is no evil desire and certainty, various afflictions will not arise.

Commentary: The following is the establishment of the theory. If there is no evil desire and certainty, afflictions will certainly not arise. This generally explains that there are evil desire and certainty in the defiled mind.

Why is this so?

Treatise: For the realm that is received, various afflictions will arise.

Commentary:

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不問何世有為無為。法順己者要樂合故。法違己者要樂離故。先或起貪。后或起恚　若是不愛不憎之境。有處中欲。即是不合不離之慾。此中所攝　又未有于境不樂合．離起煩惱者。邪見緣滅亦是離欲。戒見取等即是合欲　若於境界。不樂合．離。及不印持。即無煩惱。無煩惱時可無邪欲．及邪勝解。由此二種非遍行故。故染污心要定有欲。于所受境要必印持。印持事相。無染心起不印持者。既要欲樂及印持故方起貪等。是故此二染心非無。即證十有餘證有如前說。

問如疑諦理等豈有印持耶。

論。諸疑理者至亦有勝解。

述曰。下會違也。諸疑理者。此念之時于苦等事必無猶豫。即一心緣事．理二境。于理可疑於事必印。無有獨緣理不於事印故。如薩婆多十遍行中。勝解疑心如何俱耶即此理證。彼宗說是遍行故　今者大乘於事生疑。此念決定除此疑事。不于余境生決印故。勝解之數非遍行攝。于理疑是煩惱。於事中必印持。謂此苦事生其印可。苦理有無方生疑故。故疑相應定有勝解　問印是定。疑不定。相違得俱起。見是決。疑不決。相返得俱生　答疑時解用劣。相返得俱生。疑．見行俱增。相違不併起　問事決理猶豫。疑．解二俱生。事決不生疑。所緣應不一。如何得說同一所緣　答據二行

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不問什麼時代存在『有為』（saṃskṛta，有造作）或『無為』（asaṃskṛta，無造作）。順應自己心意的法，必定會因喜愛而想要結合；違背自己心意的法，必定會因厭惡而想要分離。最初可能生起貪慾，之後可能生起嗔恚。如果是不愛不憎的境界，就會產生中性的慾望，即是不結合也不分離的慾望，這些都包含在其中。此外，沒有對於境界不樂於結合或分離而生起煩惱的。邪見（mithyā-dṛṣṭi）的緣滅也是一種離欲，而戒禁取見（śīlāvrata-parāmarśa）等則是合欲。如果對於境界，不樂於結合或分離，也不認可和執持，就不會有煩惱。沒有煩惱的時候，就可以沒有邪欲和邪勝解（mithyādhimokṣa），因為這兩種不是普遍存在的。因此，染污心必定有慾望，對於所接受的境界必定會認可和執持。如果認可和執持的事相不存在，就不會生起染污心；不認可和執持的，必定會因為想要慾望和認可執持，才會生起貪慾等。因此，這兩種染污心不是沒有的，可以證明十種有餘的證有，如前所述。

問：像懷疑諦理等情況，難道也有認可和執持嗎？

論：那些懷疑真理的人，也有勝解（adhimokṣa）。

述曰：下面會解釋這種矛盾。那些懷疑真理的人，在產生懷疑的念頭時，對於苦等事實必定沒有猶豫，即一心緣於事和理兩種境界。對於道理可以懷疑，但對於事實必定認可。沒有隻緣于道理而不認可事實的情況。就像薩婆多宗（Sarvāstivāda）所說的十種遍行心中，勝解和疑心怎麼能同時存在呢？這就是這個道理的證明。他們宗派說是遍行。現在大乘認為，對於事情產生懷疑，這個念頭決定要排除這個懷疑的事情，不會對於其他境界產生決定的認可。勝解的數量不是遍行所包含的。對於道理的懷疑是煩惱，對於事情必定認可和執持，即認可和執持這個是苦的事實，對於苦的道理是否存在才產生懷疑。因此，與懷疑相應，必定有勝解。問：認可（印）是確定的，懷疑是不確定的，相互矛盾怎麼能同時生起？見（dṛṣṭi）是決定的，懷疑是不決定的，相互對立怎麼能同時產生？答：懷疑的時候，勝解的作用較弱，相互對立可以同時產生。懷疑和見同時增強，相互矛盾就不會同時生起。問：對於事情是確定的，對於道理是猶豫的，懷疑和勝解兩種同時生起。事情是確定的，就不會產生懷疑，所緣的境界應該不是同一個，怎麼能說是同一個所緣？答：根據兩種行為（二行）。

【English Translation】 English version It does not ask in what age there is 'saṃskṛta' (conditioned) or 'asaṃskṛta' (unconditioned). The dharma that accords with oneself will certainly want to combine due to liking it; the dharma that goes against oneself will certainly want to separate due to disliking it. Initially, greed may arise; later, hatred may arise. If it is a state of neither love nor hate, then a neutral desire arises, which is a desire of neither combining nor separating. These are all included within. Furthermore, there is no one who does not like to combine or separate from a state and then arises afflictions. The cessation of the condition of wrong view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi) is also a kind of desire to separate, while adherence to precepts and vows (śīlāvrata-parāmarśa) and the like are desires to combine. If, with regard to a state, one does not like to combine or separate, nor does one approve or uphold it, then there will be no afflictions. When there are no afflictions, there can be no wrong desire or wrong understanding (mithyādhimokṣa), because these two are not universally present. Therefore, a defiled mind must have desire, and it must approve and uphold the state it receives. If the characteristics of what is approved and upheld do not exist, then a defiled mind will not arise; if one does not approve and uphold, it is because one wants desire and approval and upholding that greed and the like arise. Therefore, these two defiled minds are not non-existent, which can prove the existence of the ten remaining proofs, as mentioned earlier.

Question: In cases such as doubting the truth of the Noble Truths, is there also approval and upholding?

Treatise: Those who doubt the truth also have conviction (adhimokṣa).

Commentary: The following will explain this contradiction. Those who doubt the truth, when the thought of doubt arises, certainly have no hesitation regarding suffering and other facts; that is, they focus their mind on both the state and the principle. One can doubt the principle, but one must approve the fact. There is no case of only focusing on the principle without approving the fact. Just as the Sarvāstivāda school says that among the ten universally present mental factors, how can conviction and doubt exist simultaneously? This is proof of this principle. Their school says it is universally present. Now, the Mahāyāna believes that when doubt arises about a thing, this thought is determined to eliminate this doubtful thing, and it will not produce a definite approval for other states. The number of convictions is not included in the universally present. Doubting the principle is an affliction, but one must approve and uphold the fact, that is, approve and uphold that this is a fact of suffering, and only then does doubt arise about whether the principle of suffering exists. Therefore, corresponding to doubt, there must be conviction. Question: Approval (印) is certain, doubt is uncertain, how can they arise simultaneously when they contradict each other? View (dṛṣṭi) is definite, doubt is indefinite, how can they arise simultaneously when they are opposite to each other? Answer: When doubting, the function of conviction is weaker, and opposites can arise simultaneously. When doubt and view increase simultaneously, contradictions will not arise simultaneously. Question: The fact is certain, the principle is hesitant, doubt and conviction arise simultaneously. The fact is certain, doubt will not arise, the objects of focus should not be the same, how can it be said to be the same object of focus? Answer: According to the two actions (二行).

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相增。事決無疑相。論其體同取。理疑亦解生。

問若於理疑必於事印。若於事疑則無所印。此疑相應便無邪解。邪解之法不遍染也。

論。于所緣事至如疑人杌。

述曰。若於事中獨生疑者。此是苦事。此非苦事。不迷理生疑者。此非煩惱。如疑于杌為人．非人。是異熟生無記心攝。非染污心。若是染心必有邪欲。故此心中無邪勝解。勝解非是遍行法故　問耽染名貪。理事俱貪。猶豫名疑。理事俱疑　答此不然。疑行猛利於事名疑。貪行相通境該理事　問于理生猶豫。事中即決定。於事生猶豫。理中決定耶　答理是事之理。疑理事必定　問亦可事是理之事。疑事理必定　答事可現知。理難曉若於理疑。事必印。非迷於事理可知故。迷事時理不印。如迷人時必迷法。自有述法不迷人。不可以迷人必迷法。便令迷法定迷人。瑜伽五十八等。說疑於五事。謂他世等者。此約事于理疑。非但迷世。緣他事時亦迷彼理。非不迷彼理。但迷他世事。若此迷時。一心於現事必生印可故。

問欲．解遍染心。論文何不說。

論。余處不說至非粗顯故。

述曰。餘論不說此二遍者。由此二體雖遍染心。若緣非愛事。情則不欲此事。疑于理時不印于理。於此二境。欲．及勝解相非粗故。體細是有。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相增，事理決斷，無疑慮相隨。若從本體相同之處來討論，即使是義理上的疑惑，也能迎刃而解。

問：如果對義理產生懷疑，必定會在事相上尋求印證；如果對事相產生懷疑，那就無從印證。這樣，懷疑相應，就不會產生邪見。邪見的法並非普遍染污一切。

論：對於所緣的事物，就像懷疑木樁是人一樣。

述：如果只是在事相中單獨產生懷疑，比如懷疑『這是苦的事』或『這不是苦的事』，而不迷惑于義理而產生的懷疑，就不是煩惱。比如懷疑木樁是人還是非人，這是異熟所生的無記心所攝，不是染污心。如果是染污心，必定有邪欲。因此，這種心中沒有邪勝解（錯誤的深刻理解）。勝解不是遍行法，所以不會普遍存在於所有心中。問：耽染稱為貪，事和理都可貪著；猶豫稱為疑，事和理都可懷疑。答：不是這樣的。疑的行相猛利，在事相上稱為疑；貪的行相普遍，境界涵蓋事和理。問：如果對義理產生猶豫，在事相中就能確定；如果對事相產生猶豫，在義理中就能確定嗎？答：義理是事相的義理，懷疑義理，必定會懷疑事相。問：也可以說事相是義理的事相，懷疑事相，義理就必定被懷疑嗎？答：事相容易直接認知，義理難以理解。如果對義理產生懷疑，事相必定會被印證，因為不迷惑於事相，義理是可以理解的。如果迷惑於事相，義理就無法印證。就像迷惑於人時，必定迷惑於法。但也有闡述法而不迷惑於人的情況。不能因為迷惑於人必定迷惑於法，就認為迷惑於法就必定迷惑於人。《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷等，說懷疑五事，比如懷疑他世等，這是從事相上對義理產生懷疑。不僅僅是迷惑於他世，緣于其他事物時，也會迷惑于其中的義理，並非不迷惑于其中的義理，只是迷惑於他世的事相。如果產生這種迷惑時，一心對於現在的事相必定會產生印可。

問：欲和勝解是普遍染污心的，論文為什麼沒有說？

論：其他地方沒有說這兩個遍行法，是因為這兩個的體性雖然普遍存在於染污心中，但如果緣于非可愛的事物，情意就不會想要這件事。懷疑義理時，就不會印證義理。在這兩種境界中，欲和勝解的相狀並不明顯。體性細微，是存在的。

【English Translation】 English version They increase each other. When matters are decided, there is no doubt. Discussing their shared essence, even doubts about principles can be resolved.

Question: If there is doubt about a principle, it must be confirmed by an event. If there is doubt about an event, there is nothing to confirm it with. If doubt corresponds in this way, there will be no wrong understanding. The method of wrong understanding does not universally defile everything.

Treatise: Regarding the object of thought, it is like doubting whether a tree stump is a person.

Commentary: If doubt arises solely in relation to an event, such as doubting 'this is a painful event' or 'this is not a painful event,' and not from confusion about the underlying principle, then it is not a klesha (affliction). For example, doubting whether a tree stump is a person or not a person is included in the indeterminate mind produced by vipaka (result of karma), and is not a defiled mind. If it were a defiled mind, there would certainly be an evil desire. Therefore, there is no wrong adhimoksha (firm conviction) in this mind. Adhimoksha is not a sarvatraga (universal mental factor), so it is not universally present in all minds. Question: Attachment is called greed, and both events and principles can be objects of greed. Hesitation is called doubt, and both events and principles can be objects of doubt. Answer: That is not so. The activity of doubt is intense, and it is called doubt in relation to events. The activity of greed is common, and its scope covers both events and principles. Question: If hesitation arises about a principle, can it be determined in an event? If hesitation arises about an event, can it be determined in a principle? Answer: The principle is the principle of the event. Doubting the principle will certainly lead to doubting the event. Question: Can it also be said that the event is the event of the principle? If the event is doubted, will the principle certainly be doubted? Answer: Events can be known directly, while principles are difficult to understand. If there is doubt about a principle, the event must be confirmed, because if one is not confused about the event, the principle can be understood. If one is confused about the event, the principle cannot be confirmed. It is like when one is confused about a person, one is certainly confused about the dharma (teachings). But there are also cases where one explains the dharma without being confused about the person. One cannot assume that because confusion about a person necessarily leads to confusion about the dharma, confusion about the dharma necessarily leads to confusion about the person. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, in its fifty-eighth section, etc., speaks of doubting five things, such as doubting other worlds, etc. This refers to doubting the principle from the perspective of the event. It is not just confusion about other worlds; when one is related to other events, one is also confused about the principles within them. It is not that one is not confused about the principles within them, but that one is only confused about the events of other worlds. If this confusion arises, one's mind will certainly produce confirmation regarding the present event.

Question: Desire and adhimoksha universally defile the mind. Why does the treatise not mention this?

Treatise: The reason why these two universal mental factors are not mentioned elsewhere is that, although their nature is universally present in defiled minds, if they are related to non-beloved events, the intention will not desire that event. When doubting a principle, one will not confirm the principle. In these two states, the characteristics of desire and adhimoksha are not obvious. Their nature is subtle, but they exist.

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相非顯著。不說者約粗顯。論體實是有。顯此二時即無慾．解不說為遍。此據有體所以言遍。

論。余互有無義如前說。

述曰。五中無餘忘念等三。如說六之家會其五也。說六之中無沈．掉二。如說五家會六說也。余互有無故如前說。

論。此意心所至準前理釋。

述曰。下解識俱。初顯有也。有二十四。謂前九法。十隨煩惱。加別境五。準前理釋。五十三心所各各別說。故攝惠等。

論。無餘心所如上應知。

述曰。下辨無也。說此相應無善十一．不定中四．根本六惑．忿等諸隨。如上準說。

論。有義前說皆未盡理。

述曰。護法菩薩為第四說。于中有三。初總非。次申理。后總結。此初也。

論。且疑他世至欲勝解相。

述曰。下申理。

申理中有二。初顯遍隨。后此識俱　初中有二。初破前。后顯遍。此破前說　且難第三十遍家云。汝言于理生疑必帶事印。如五十八等說。疑由五相。謂於他世．作用．因果．諸諦．寶中心懷猶豫。即於事生疑亦是煩惱。汝何故言於事疑非煩惱。既於事疑是疑惑者。如何有欲．勝解二數。若謂彼言於他世疑。必于現在而生印可。未來世中而生希望。為無或有故。于現在為罪為福有差別故。于疑他世中亦

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相（Lakshana）非顯著。不說者約粗顯。論體實是有。顯此二時即無慾（Chanda）。解不說為遍。此據有體所以言遍。

論：余互有無義如前說。

述曰：五中無餘忘念等三。如說六之家會其五也。說六之中無沈（Styana）、掉（Audhatya）二。如說五家會六說也。余互有無故如前說。

論：此意心所至準前理釋。

述曰：下解識俱。初顯有也。有二十四。謂前九法。十隨煩惱。加別境五。準前理釋。五十三心所各各別說。故攝惠（Prajna）等。

論：無餘心所如上應知。

述曰：下辨無也。說此相應無善十一．不定中四．根本六惑．忿（Krodha）等諸隨。如上準說。

論：有義前說皆未盡理。

述曰：護法（Dharmapala）菩薩為第四說。于中有三。初總非。次申理。后總結。此初也。

論：且疑他世至欲（Chanda）勝解（Adhimoksha）相。

述曰：下申理。

申理中有二。初顯遍隨。后此識俱　初中有二。初破前。后顯遍。此破前說　且難第三十遍家云。汝言于理生疑必帶事印。如五十八等說。疑由五相。謂於他世．作用．因果．諸諦．寶中心懷猶豫。即於事生疑亦是煩惱。汝何故言於事疑非煩惱。既於事疑是疑惑者。如何有欲（Chanda）．勝解（Adhimoksha）二數。若謂彼言於他世疑。必于現在而生印可。未來世中而生希望。為無或有故。于現在為罪為福有差別故。于疑他世中亦

【English Translation】 English version Lakshana (characteristic) is not obvious. What is not spoken of refers to the rough and obvious. The substance of the treatise is real. Manifesting these two times means there is no Chanda (desire). Understanding 'not spoken of' as pervasive. This is based on the existence of substance, hence the term 'pervasive'.

Treatise: The meaning of mutual existence and non-existence is as previously stated.

Commentary: Among the five, there are no remaining three such as forgetting mindfulness. It is like saying that the six categories gather the five. Among the six, there are no Styana (lethargy) and Audhatya (excitement). It is like saying that the five categories gather the six. The mutual existence and non-existence are as previously stated.

Treatise: This meaning of mental factors should be explained according to the previous reasoning.

Commentary: The following explains the co-occurrence with consciousness. First, it manifests existence. There are twenty-four. These are the previous nine dharmas, ten secondary afflictions, plus the five specific objects. Explained according to the previous reasoning. The fifty-three mental factors are each separately explained, hence including Prajna (wisdom) and others.

Treatise: The remaining mental factors should be understood as above.

Commentary: The following distinguishes non-existence. It says that in this association, there are no eleven wholesome factors, four indeterminate factors, six fundamental afflictions, Krodha (anger) and other secondary afflictions. As above, according to the explanation.

Treatise: Some argue that the previous explanations have not fully exhausted the truth.

Commentary: Dharmapala Bodhisattva gives the fourth explanation. Within this, there are three parts: first, a general negation; second, a statement of reason; and third, a conclusion. This is the first.

Treatise: Furthermore, doubt about other worlds leads to the aspect of Chanda (desire) and Adhimoksha (resolution).

Commentary: The following states the reason.

Within stating the reason, there are two parts: first, manifesting pervasive association; second, co-occurrence with this consciousness. The first part has two parts: first, refuting the previous; second, manifesting pervasiveness. This refutes the previous explanation. Furthermore, challenging the thirtieth pervasive category, you say that doubt arising from reason must carry the imprint of an event, as stated in the fifty-eighth and others. Doubt arises from five aspects: hesitation in the mind regarding other worlds, actions, cause and effect, the various truths, and precious objects. That is, doubting an event is also an affliction. Why do you say that doubting an event is not an affliction? Since doubting an event is doubt, how can there be two numbers of Chanda (desire) and Adhimoksha (resolution)? If you say that doubting other worlds necessarily gives rise to approval in the present and hope in the future, whether it exists or not. Because there is a difference between sin and merit in the present, there is also doubt in doubting other worlds.

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迷彼理。非不迷理而唯迷事。故於現印亦有勝解者。難言疑未來為無。此應有我見。我見是推求。疑推求時無我見。印持是決定。疑時無勝解　又於他世等疑。一心有勝解。疑杌為人時。此心應有解。若爾許者應是遍行　若此疑心相違故無者。彼疑理心如何得有。亦相違故。其尋．伺相違貪．瞋相返等皆應難之　二云然于去．來若事．若理生猶豫者。心不緣現在但緣去．來。於何生印。于釋種涅槃中生猶豫者有何印相。故知欲．解不遍染心。此亦去．來理．事雙疑。前解但緣事疑。以疑理所引亦見道斷。不可難言緣事起故非見道斷。行相迷理緣事故。如見取等。此行相深不同疑杌。彼行相淺非是煩惱。

此破第三師十遍義。若爾何故說十俱耶。如初師解。

論。煩惱起位至無堪任性。

述曰。次破第二六遍師義。起煩惱時若無惛沈。此染污心應不定有無堪任性。若有堪任便是善性。非染心攝。名堪任故。如善心性。染心若有無堪任性異於善者。有惛沈故　對法等云惛沈性者無堪任性　又云離無堪任染性不成。是故惛沉定遍染起。故起掉時既是染心。惛沉定有。

論。掉舉若無至非染污位。

述曰。又染心位掉舉若無應無囂動。囂動者擾惱義囂謂諠囂舉也。動謂摻動掉也。染心既是囂動

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 對於真理感到迷惑。並非不迷惑真理而只是迷惑於事物。因此，對於現前的印證也有產生勝解（adhimoksha，深刻理解）的人。難以說懷疑未來是虛無的。這種懷疑應該包含我見（ātma-dṛṣṭi，認為有「我」存在的錯誤觀念）。我見是推求。懷疑推求的時候沒有我見。印持是決定。懷疑的時候沒有勝解。又對於他世等等產生懷疑。一心之中有勝解。懷疑樹樁是人的時候，這個心中應該有理解。如果承認這樣，就應該是遍行（sarvatraga，普遍存在）。如果因為這種疑心相互矛盾而認為沒有，那麼懷疑真理的心如何能夠存在？也是因為相互矛盾。對於尋（vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（vicāra，精細的思考）相互矛盾，貪（rāga，貪慾）和瞋（dveṣa，嗔恨）相互對立等等，都應該提出質疑。 第二種觀點認為，對於過去和未來，無論是事物還是真理產生猶豫的人，心不緣于現在，只緣於過去和未來。對於什麼產生印證？對於釋迦族涅槃產生猶豫的人有什麼印相？因此可知欲（chanda，意欲）和解（adhimoksha，深刻理解）不普遍存在於染污心中。這既是對過去和未來的真理和事物雙重懷疑。之前的理解只是緣于對事物的懷疑。因為懷疑真理所導致的，也會被見道（darśana-mārga，證悟真理的道路）所斷除。不能說因為緣於事物而起，就不是見道所斷。行相迷惑真理而緣於事物，如同見取（dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa，執著于錯誤的見解）等等。這種行相深刻，不同於懷疑樹樁。懷疑樹樁的行相淺顯，不是煩惱。 這是爲了駁斥第三位老師的十遍義。如果這樣，為什麼說十俱呢？如同第一位老師的解釋。 論：煩惱生起的位置達到無堪任性（asamarthatā，無能力）。 述曰：接下來駁斥第二位六遍師的觀點。生起煩惱的時候如果沒有惛沈（styāna，精神萎靡），這種染污心應該不一定有無堪任性。如果有堪任性，那就是善性。不是染污心所包含的。因為名為堪任。如同善心的性質。染污心如果有無堪任性，不同於善心，那是因為有惛沈的緣故。《對法》等說，惛沈的性質是無堪任性。又說，離開無堪任性，染污的性質不能成立。因此惛沈一定普遍存在於染污生起的時候。因此生起掉舉（auddhatya，心神不定）的時候，既然是染污心，惛沈一定存在。 論：掉舉如果不存在，就達不到非染污的位置。 述曰：又，染污心位，掉舉如果不存在，應該沒有囂動。囂動是指擾惱的意思，囂是指喧囂，舉也。動是指摻動掉也。染污心既然是囂動。

【English Translation】 English version Confused about the principle (理, lǐ). Not confused about the principle but only confused about the matter (事, shì). Therefore, there are those who have adhimoksha (勝解, shèngjiě, profound understanding) even regarding the present evidence. It is difficult to say that doubting the future is non-existent. This doubt should contain ātma-dṛṣṭi (我見, wǒjiàn, the erroneous view of a self). Ātma-dṛṣṭi is seeking. When doubting the seeking, there is no ātma-dṛṣṭi. Imprinting is determination. When doubting, there is no adhimoksha. Also, there is doubt regarding other lives, etc. In one mind, there is adhimoksha. When doubting a tree stump as a person, this mind should have understanding. If this is admitted, it should be sarvatraga (遍行, biànxíng, universally present). If it is argued that this doubt does not exist because it is contradictory, how can the mind that doubts the principle exist? It is also because it is contradictory. The contradiction between vitarka (尋, xún, gross thought) and vicāra (伺, sì, subtle thought), the opposition between rāga (貪, tān, greed) and dveṣa (瞋, chēn, hatred), etc., should all be questioned. The second view is that for those who hesitate about the past and future, whether it is matter or principle, the mind does not focus on the present but only on the past and future. What is the evidence for? What is the evidence for those who hesitate about the Nirvana of the Shakya clan? Therefore, it can be known that chanda (欲, yù, desire) and adhimoksha (解, jiě, profound understanding) are not universally present in the defiled mind. This is a double doubt about the principle and matter of the past and future. The previous understanding only focused on doubting the matter. Because it is caused by doubting the principle, it will also be cut off by the darśana-mārga (見道, jiàndào, the path of seeing the truth). It cannot be said that because it arises from focusing on the matter, it is not cut off by the darśana-mārga. The aspect is confusing the principle and focusing on the matter, like dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa (見取, jiànqǔ, clinging to wrong views), etc. This aspect is profound and different from doubting a tree stump. The aspect of doubting a tree stump is shallow and not a klesha (煩惱, fánnǎo, affliction). This is to refute the ten pervasive meanings of the third teacher. If so, why is it said that the ten are together? Like the explanation of the first teacher. Treatise: The position where afflictions arise reaches asamarthatā (無堪任性, wúkānrènxìng, incapacity). Commentary: Next, refute the view of the second teacher who holds six pervasive meanings. If there is no styāna (惛沈, hūnchén, mental dullness) when afflictions arise, this defiled mind should not necessarily have incapacity. If there is capacity, then it is a wholesome nature. It is not included in the defiled mind. Because it is called capacity. Like the nature of a wholesome mind. If the defiled mind has incapacity that is different from the wholesome mind, it is because of styāna. The Abhidharma, etc., say that the nature of styāna is incapacity. It also says that without incapacity, the nature of defilement cannot be established. Therefore, styāna is certainly pervasive when defilement arises. Therefore, when auddhatya (掉舉, diàojǔ, restlessness) arises, since it is a defiled mind, styāna must exist. Treatise: If auddhatya does not exist, it will not reach the position of non-defilement. Commentary: Also, in the position of the defiled mind, if auddhatya does not exist, there should be no agitation. Agitation means disturbance, 'uproar' means clamor, and 'raising' also. 'Moving' means stirring and restlessness. Since the defiled mind is agitation.

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。明知定有掉舉。若無囂動便非染心。無囂動故。如善．無記心。故此掉舉必遍染心。便如善等非染污言。或通難前無惛沈因　即二法中各有兩難。一無勘任無囂動。二非染污位。然此與惛沈二粗行相不可並增。若一粗時其一行細。體皆具有　此難第二師唯六無沈．掉。

論。若染心中至煩惱現前。

述曰。次難初師唯許五俱。若染心中無散亂者。應非流蕩如善心等。既有流蕩由散亂故。此有三體。一別境定數染者名散亂。違善定故。如薩婆多比諸法師皆作此說。今無此文。

二無別體性。非彼定數。此復二說。一是愚癡分。無明為體。二云貪．瞋．癡分。對法等同。五十五云忘念．散亂．惡惠是癡分等。故遍染心生　三別有體性。第六卷說故　念．定二法別境為體。故亦無別體。或是癡分。若無失念．不正知者。如何能起煩惱現前。必失正念。及不正知此是．非故而起煩惱。由有失念．不正知二法。非彼染心是正念等。故汝所言無此二。染心應是善性自無記心。許無此二故。如加行善等。此破初師。無此三故。

論。故染污心至不正知。

述曰。下顯遍隨。染心定有八隨惑俱。加第一師三。加第二師二。彼無惛．掉故。除第三師二。

論。忘念不正知至由前說故。

述

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：明明知道一定會有掉舉（心神不定）。如果沒有喧囂浮動，那就不是染污心。因為沒有喧囂浮動，就像善良和無記的心一樣。因此，這種掉舉必定遍及染污心。如果像善良等一樣不是染污的說法，或者可以用來反駁前面沒有惛沈（精神萎靡）的原因——即兩種法中各有兩難：一是沒有勘任（沒有能力），沒有喧囂浮動；二是非染污的地位。然而，這和惛沈兩種粗重的行為不能同時增強。如果一種粗重，另一種就細微，但本體都具有。這個難題，第二位論師只承認六個，沒有惛沈和掉舉。

論：如果染污心中，乃至煩惱現前。

述曰：接下來反駁第一位論師只允許五個同時存在。如果染污心中沒有散亂，應該不會流蕩，就像善良的心等。既然有流蕩，是因為散亂的緣故。這有三種本體：一是別境（特定境界）定數染污的稱為散亂，因為違背善良的禪定。就像薩婆多比諸法師都這樣說。現在沒有這樣的文字。

二是無別本體性，不是那種定數。這又有兩種說法：一是愚癡的一部分，以無明為本體。二是貪、瞋、癡的一部分，與《對法》等相同。《五十五》中說忘念、散亂、惡慧是癡的一部分等，因此遍及染污心產生。三是另有本體性，第六卷中說。念、定兩種法，以別境為本體。因此也沒有別的本體，或者也是癡的一部分。如果沒有失念、不正知，如何能生起煩惱現前？必定失去正念，以及不正知這是非，因此生起煩惱。由於有失念、不正知兩種法，不是那種染污心是正念等。因此你們所說沒有這兩種，染污心應該是善良的自性或者無記心。允許沒有這兩種，就像加行善等。這是反駁第一位論師，因為沒有這三種。

論：因此染污心，乃至不正知。

述曰：下面顯示普遍隨行。染污心一定有八個隨惑同時存在。加上第一位論師的三個，加上第二位論師的兩個，因為他們沒有惛沈和掉舉。除去第三位論師的兩個。

論：忘念不正知，乃至由前面所說。

述

【English Translation】 English version: It is clearly known that there will definitely be distraction (restlessness of mind). If there is no clamorous agitation, then it is not a defiled mind. Because there is no clamorous agitation, it is like a virtuous and neutral mind. Therefore, this distraction must pervade the defiled mind. If it is said that it is not defiled like virtue, etc., or it can be used to refute the previous reason for not having torpor (mental dullness) - that is, each of the two dharmas has two difficulties: one is that there is no competence (no ability), no clamorous agitation; the second is the state of non-defilement. However, this and the two coarse behaviors of torpor cannot be increased at the same time. If one is coarse, the other is subtle, but the substance is all present. This difficulty, the second teacher only admits six, without torpor and distraction.

Treatise: If in the defiled mind, even until afflictions manifest.

Commentary: Next, refute the first teacher who only allows five to exist simultaneously. If there is no scattering in the defiled mind, it should not wander, like a virtuous mind, etc. Since there is wandering, it is because of scattering. This has three entities: first, the defilement of specific object (particular object) fixed number is called scattering, because it violates virtuous samadhi. Just like the Sarvastivadins and other Dharma masters all say this. Now there is no such text.

Second, there is no separate substantial nature, not that fixed number. This again has two explanations: one is a part of ignorance, with ignorance as its substance. The second is a part of greed, hatred, and delusion, the same as the Abhidharma, etc. Fifty-five says that forgetfulness, scattering, and evil wisdom are parts of delusion, etc., therefore pervading the defiled mind to arise. Third, there is another substantial nature, as stated in the sixth volume. Mindfulness and samadhi, two dharmas, take specific object as their substance. Therefore, there is also no other substance, or it is also a part of delusion. If there is no loss of mindfulness and incorrect knowledge, how can afflictions arise? One must lose right mindfulness and not know what is right and wrong, therefore afflictions arise. Because there are two dharmas of loss of mindfulness and incorrect knowledge, it is not that the defiled mind is right mindfulness, etc. Therefore, what you say is that there are not these two, the defiled mind should be the nature of virtue or a neutral mind. Allowing that there are not these two, like preparatory virtuous actions, etc. This is refuting the first teacher, because there are not these three.

Treatise: Therefore, the defiled mind, even until incorrect knowledge.

Commentary: Below shows universal concomitance. The defiled mind must have eight secondary afflictions existing simultaneously. Add the three of the first teacher, add the two of the second teacher, because they do not have torpor and distraction. Remove the two of the third teacher.

Treatise: Forgetfulness and incorrect knowledge, even until what was said before.

Commentary:

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曰。為簡別境亦是遍染故言忘念等。忘念．不正知。若即別境念．惠為性。不遍染心。論又言遍者。依無明分說。所以者何。破第二師。以彼唯執是彼數故　非諸染心皆緣曾受。破彼念數。且如邪見撥無滅諦此豈曾受。彼若言是先聞名故方撥無者。豈撥名耶。今邪見撥體。體未曾受故　非諸染心皆有簡擇。簡前師說有不正知是惠分故。此二若以無明為體。可遍染心　其五遍中亦可。約此別境為體者。以不遍故不說有之。六中但約無明為體。遍故說也　問曰此中所說何假何實　如后自解　問如起邪惠簡擇法時亦有愚癡。即便有二不正知耶。余忘念等為問亦爾　答曰不然。說有惠分時。不說無明分。無惠分時。說有無明分。有不正知時。亦說有無明。義別說故。餘數亦爾。或總于惠．無明。立一不正知。不正知是假。不可言有二。如放逸等依四法立。不約貪等別。說二相應故。

論。然此意俱至並別境惠。

述曰。下顯識俱。有十八法。謂前九法及八隨惑以別境惠。即我見故如初師釋。忘念等法非別境為性。故不取別境數。

論。無餘心所至不違教理。

述曰。無別境四。及善十一．根本六種．忿等十二．並不定四．邪欲解二。及論三文不同所以。如前諸師綺互而說。依此褒貶。雖無論文定許八

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 答：爲了區分別境，也因為它們是普遍染污的，所以才說忘念等。忘念（遺忘正念）、不正知（缺乏正確的認知）。如果別境的念（憶念）和慧（智慧）是其自性，就不會普遍染污心。論中又說『遍』，是依無明（avidyā，對事物真相的無知）的部分來說的。這是爲了駁斥第二位論師，因為他們只執著于這些心所是彼（指無明）的一部分。並非所有染污的心都緣于曾經感受過的。這是爲了駁斥他們的念數（憶念的心所）。例如，邪見（mithyā-dṛṣṭi，錯誤的見解）否定滅諦（nirodha-satya，苦滅的真理），這難道是曾經感受過的嗎？他們如果說是先聽聞其名，然後才否定，難道是否定這個名嗎？現在邪見否定的是體（事物的本質），而這個體是未曾感受過的。並非所有染污的心都有簡擇（選擇和判斷）。這是爲了駁斥前一位論師所說的不正知是慧的一部分。這兩個（忘念和不正知）如果以無明為體，就可以普遍染污心。在五遍行（五種普遍存在的心所）中也可以這樣理解。如果約這些別境為體，因為它們不普遍，所以不說有。六個根本煩惱中，只約無明為體，因為它普遍，所以才說有。問：這裡所說的是假（虛假）還是實（真實）？如後面自己解釋。問：如果生起邪慧（錯誤的智慧）簡擇法時，也有愚癡（moha，迷惑），那麼就會有兩個不正知嗎？其餘的忘念等也可以這樣問嗎？答：不是這樣的。說有慧的部分時，不說無明的部分；沒有慧的部分時，才說有無明的部分。有不正知時，也說有無明，因為意義不同所以這樣說。其餘的心所也是這樣。或者總合慧和無明，立一個不正知。不正知是假立的，不可說有兩個。如放逸等依四法而立，不約貪等分別說二者相應。

論：然而，這個意思俱至（同時到達）並別境的慧。

述曰：下面顯示識俱（意識同時生起）有十八法，即前九法和八隨惑（upa-klesha，隨煩惱），以別境的慧，即我見（ātma-dṛṣṭi，認為有『我』的錯誤見解），如第一位論師所解釋。忘念等法不是以別境為自性，所以不取別境數。

論：沒有其餘心所至（到達），不違背教理。

述曰：沒有別境的四種（欲、勝解、念、定），以及善十一（信等十一善心所）、根本六種（貪等六根本煩惱）、忿等十二（忿等十二隨煩惱）、並不定四（悔等四不定心所）、邪欲解二（邪欲和邪解）、以及論中的三種不同說法的原因。如前諸位論師互相交錯而說，依此進行褒貶。雖然無論文中是否明確說明，都一定允許有八種。

【English Translation】 English version: Answer: It is to distinguish the specific objects (viṣaya) and because they are universally defiling, hence the terms 'forgetfulness of mindfulness' (muṣitasmṛtitā) and 'incorrect knowledge' (asaṃprajanya). If mindfulness (smṛti) and wisdom (mati) of the specific objects are their nature, they would not universally defile the mind. The treatise also says 'universal' (sarvatraga) based on the aspect of ignorance (avidyā, ignorance of the true nature of things). This is to refute the second teacher, because they only insist that these mental factors are part of it (referring to ignorance). Not all defiled minds are related to what has been previously experienced. This is to refute their enumeration of mindfulness. For example, wrong view (mithyā-dṛṣṭi, incorrect view) denies the cessation of suffering (nirodha-satya, the truth of cessation), has this been previously experienced? If they say that it is because they first heard the name and then denied it, are they denying the name? Now, wrong view denies the substance (the essence of things), and this substance has not been previously experienced. Not all defiled minds have discernment (discrimination). This is to refute the previous teacher's statement that incorrect knowledge is part of wisdom. If these two (forgetfulness of mindfulness and incorrect knowledge) take ignorance as their substance, they can universally defile the mind. This can also be understood in the five universals (five universally present mental factors). If these specific objects are taken as the substance, because they are not universal, it is not said to exist. Among the six root afflictions, only ignorance is taken as the substance, because it is universal, hence it is said to exist. Question: What is said here, is it false (imaginary) or real (true)? As explained later. Question: If wrong wisdom (incorrect wisdom) arises to discern the Dharma, there is also delusion (moha, confusion), then will there be two incorrect knowledges? Can the rest of forgetfulness of mindfulness, etc., also be asked in this way? Answer: It is not like that. When it is said that there is a part of wisdom, it is not said that there is a part of ignorance; when there is no part of wisdom, it is said that there is a part of ignorance. When there is incorrect knowledge, it is also said that there is ignorance, because the meanings are different, so it is said in this way. The rest of the mental factors are also like this. Or, combining wisdom and ignorance, establish one incorrect knowledge. Incorrect knowledge is a hypothetical construct, it cannot be said that there are two. Just as non-diligence (styāna) is established based on four dharmas, it is not specifically said that greed, etc., are correspondingly two.

Treatise: However, this meaning simultaneously reaches and is separate from the wisdom of specific objects.

Commentary: The following shows that the consciousness simultaneously arises with eighteen dharmas, namely the previous nine dharmas and the eight secondary afflictions (upa-klesha, secondary defilements), with the wisdom of specific objects, which is the view of self (ātma-dṛṣṭi, the false view of a 'self'), as explained by the first teacher. The dharmas of forgetfulness of mindfulness, etc., do not take specific objects as their nature, so they are not included in the enumeration of specific objects.

Treatise: No other mental factors reach, without contradicting the teachings and reasoning.

Commentary: There are no four of the specific objects (desire, ascertainment, mindfulness, concentration), as well as the eleven virtuous ones (eleven virtuous mental factors such as faith), the six root ones (six root afflictions such as greed), the twelve of anger, etc. (twelve secondary afflictions such as anger), the four unfixed ones (four unfixed mental factors such as regret), the two of wrong desire and understanding (wrong desire and wrong understanding), and the reasons for the three different statements in the treatise. As the previous teachers spoke in a mutually intertwined manner, praise and criticism are made based on this. Although it is not explicitly stated in the text, eight types are certainly allowed.

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遍。今以諸論上下雜有致此推究。第三總結作如是說不違教理。

論第五卷

論。此染污意何受相應。

述曰。解此因位心所俱中文別有三。上第一解染俱。第二顯余俱　此下第三解五受俱。頌中以同初能變故所以不說。今說有異。是故說之　于中有二。初問。后答。此初問也。此下諸說非必別師。頗設異計后申正義。

論。有義此俱至生喜愛故。

述曰。我既欣行。故唯喜俱。

論。有義不然至違聖言故。

述曰。應許喜受通於三界．九地系故。此破前師。以此識受一類而轉故此應通　違聖言故者。違瑜伽第十二說。初定出憂。第二定出苦。第三定出喜。第四定出樂。于無相中出舍根。乃至廣說。若許喜．樂通在有頂。應許憂．苦通三界有。

論。應說此意至善業果故。

述曰。許此意與四受相應。唯除苦根唯五識故。余文可解　此師意說。第七所緣阿賴耶識是引業果。隨在彼善．惡地。此第七識即與彼地能引果業之增上受類相應。緣彼業果為境界故　又地所有增上之受此地之業。隨是何受緣彼地業果故。見隨彼增上與彼受俱　欲界雖有舍受之果。此識應與舍受相應。而業劣故此不說俱　如苦．樂受。唯在五識非引業俱。故今不說　初二定樂怡悅五根。義

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 遍。現在因為各種論著上下混雜，導致了這種推究。第三，總結說這樣做不違背教理。 論第五卷 論：此染污意與何種感受相應？ 述曰：解釋此處，在因位心所俱中，文別有三種。上面第一種解釋染俱。第二種顯示其餘俱。此下第三種解釋五受俱。頌中因為與最初能變相同，所以沒有說。現在因為有不同，所以說它。其中有二，首先是提問，然後是回答。這是最初的提問。此下各種說法不一定出自不同的老師，而是先提出不同的見解，然後闡述正確的道理。 論：有的人認為，此染污意與喜受相應，因為能生喜愛。 述曰：我既然欣然行事，所以只與喜受相應。 論：有的人認為不然，因為這違背了聖言。 述曰：應該承認喜受貫通三界（Trailokya）、九地（Nine grounds），被煩惱所繫縛。這是爲了駁斥前面的觀點。因為這個識的感受是一類相續轉變的，所以應該貫通。違背聖言是指違背《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第十二卷所說。初禪（Dhyāna）生出憂受，第二禪生出苦受，第三禪生出喜受，第四禪生出樂受，在無想中生出舍受。乃至廣說。如果承認喜受、樂受貫通有頂天（Akanistha），就應該承認憂受、苦受貫通三界。 論：應該說此染污意與四種感受相應，除了苦受，因為苦受只與五識相應。其餘的文字可以自己理解。這個師父的意思是說，第七識所緣的阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna）是引業的果報。隨著它在善、惡地，這個第七識就與那個地能引發果報之業的增上受類相應，以那個業果為境界。又，地所有增上的感受，就是此地的業。無論是何種感受，都緣于那個地的業果。可見，隨著那個增上，就與那個感受相應。欲界（Kāmadhātu）雖然有舍受的果報，這個識也應該與舍受相應，但是因為業力微弱，所以這裡不說相應。如同苦受、樂受，只在五識中，不與引業相應，所以現在不說。初禪、二禪的樂受令人怡悅五根，是這個意思。

【English Translation】 English version: Everywhere. Now, because various treatises are mixed up and down, this kind of investigation has been caused. Thirdly, it is concluded that doing so does not violate the teachings. Treatise Volume 5 Treatise: With what feeling does this defiled mind correspond? Commentary: Explaining this, in the cause-position mind-accompaniments, the text has three distinctions. The first explanation above is about defilement-accompaniment. The second shows the remaining accompaniments. The third explanation below is about the five feelings-accompaniment. In the verse, because it is the same as the initial transformer, it is not mentioned. Now, because there is a difference, it is explained. Among them, there are two parts: first, the question; then, the answer. This is the initial question. The various statements below do not necessarily come from different teachers, but rather first propose different views and then elaborate on the correct principle. Treatise: Some argue that this corresponds to joy (prīti) because it generates fondness. Commentary: Since I gladly act, it only corresponds to joy. Treatise: Some argue that this is not the case because it violates the sacred words. Commentary: It should be admitted that joy pervades the Three Realms (Trailokya) and the Nine Grounds, being bound by afflictions. This is to refute the previous view. Because the feeling of this consciousness is a continuous transformation of one kind, it should pervade. Violating the sacred words refers to violating what is said in the twelfth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The first Dhyāna produces sorrow (dauhkhada), the second Dhyāna produces suffering (duhkha), the third Dhyāna produces joy (prīti), the fourth Dhyāna produces pleasure (sukha), and in non-perception, equanimity (upekṣā) arises. And so on. If it is admitted that joy and pleasure pervade Akanistha, it should be admitted that sorrow and suffering pervade the Three Realms. Treatise: It should be said that this mind corresponds to four feelings, except for suffering, because suffering only corresponds to the five consciousnesses. The rest of the text can be understood by oneself. The meaning of this teacher is that the Ālaya-vijñāna (Ālaya-vijñāna) cognized by the seventh consciousness is the result of karma that draws forth (karma). As it is in the good or evil ground, this seventh consciousness corresponds to the dominant feeling-category of the karma that can draw forth the result of that ground, taking that karma-result as its object. Moreover, the dominant feeling of the ground is the karma of this ground. Whatever the feeling, it is related to the karma-result of that ground. It can be seen that along with that dominance, it corresponds to that feeling. Although the Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu) has the result of equanimity, this consciousness should also correspond to equanimity, but because the karma is weak, it is not said to correspond here. Like suffering and pleasure, they are only in the five consciousnesses and do not correspond to karma that draws forth, so they are not mentioned now. The pleasure of the first and second Dhyānas delights the five roots, that is the meaning.

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別說故亦不說之。準可知也。

論。有義彼說至不相應故。

述曰。第三師言。第二師說亦不應理。此無始來一由任運故恒。二由一類故無變。故唯舍受。非是舍受可名變異。有易脫故。瑜伽六十三證俱生舍受第八識俱。非可起余憂．喜等受。亦證此義。然樂．憂等皆思惟引發。此識任運。如何不起舍。

論。又此末那至唯有舍受。

述曰。謂此本頌說此末那。與第八識義有異者。皆別說之。此若與彼四受相應。頌應別說。如依緣等。既本頌中略不別說此與受俱。故知同彼唯有舍受　問異熟一切種等既有不同。何故此識而不別說　答彼是第八自相別義。此中亦解識之自性。又言染污顯即異彼。故不別說　觸等五同。何故今說　何不須說多少異故謂加愛等　恒轉如流何故不說　此三位舍。即顯非恒如流轉故。又如樞要解　又此若與四受相應。則金剛心非頓斷過。由前位中少分斷故　問若爾如欲界中不伏之修惑。與此何別　答彼前前地已永離故。此合於後方永離故。

論。未轉依位至平等轉故。

述曰。自下第二顯因果位相應多少。若在因位同前諸師所說多少。此第七識已轉依位。與二十一心所俱生。如第八識已轉依位說　亦如彼唯舍受俱。任運而轉曾不易脫。不分別生。六識可然

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『不說』也就不說了，由此可以得知（其中的道理）。

論：因為有道理，所以他們的說法是不相應的。

述記：第三位論師說，第二位論師的說法也不合理。這個（第七識）從無始以來，一是由於任運（自然而然）的緣故，所以是恒常的；二是由於同一類（舍受）的緣故，所以沒有變化。因此只有舍受。不是說舍受可以稱為變異，因為它是容易脫離的。瑜伽六十三中證明俱生的舍受與第八識（Alaya-識，阿賴耶識）同在。不可能生起其他的憂、喜等感受。這也證明了這個道理。然而樂、憂等都是思惟引發的。這個識是任運的，怎麼會不起舍受呢？

論：而且這個末那（Manas，末那識）……只有舍受。

述記：說這個本頌說的是這個末那。與第八識的意義有不同之處，都分別說明了。這個如果與四種感受相應，頌中應該分別說明，比如依靠緣等。既然本頌中省略了，沒有分別說明這個與感受同在，所以知道它和第八識一樣，只有舍受。問：異熟一切種等既然有不同，為什麼這個識不分別說明呢？答：那是第八識自相的不同的意義。這裡也是解釋識的自性。而且說『染污』就顯示了它與第八識的不同，所以不分別說明。觸等五種（心所）相同，為什麼現在要說呢？為什麼不需要說多少不同呢？因為加上了愛等（煩惱）。恒常流轉，為什麼不說呢？因為這三個位是舍受，就顯示了它不是恒常的，而是像流水一樣流轉的。又如樞要的解釋。而且這個如果與四種感受相應，那麼金剛心（Vajra heart，金剛心）就不是頓斷（一下子斷除）的過失了，因為在前一個階段中已經斷除了一部分。問：如果這樣，那麼像欲界中沒有降伏的修惑，與這個有什麼區別？答：它們在前一個階段已經永遠離開了，而這個是與后一個階段結合才永遠離開的。

論：未轉依位……平等轉的緣故。

述記：從下面開始，第二部分顯示因果位相應的心所多少。如果在因位，與前面各位論師所說的多少相同。這個第七識已經轉依位，與二十一個心所俱生，就像第八識已經轉依位時所說的那樣。也像第八識一樣，只有舍受俱生，任運而轉，曾經不容易脫離，不分別而生。第六識是可以這樣的。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Not speaking' is also not spoken, from which one can understand (the principle).

Treatise: Because there is reason, their statements are inconsistent.

Commentary: The third teacher says that the second teacher's statement is also unreasonable. This (seventh consciousness) from beginningless time, firstly, because of its spontaneous (nimitta) nature, is constant; secondly, because of its uniform (equanimity) nature, it does not change. Therefore, it only has neutral feeling (upeksha). It is not that neutral feeling can be called change, because it is easy to detach from. Yoga sixty-three proves that the co-born neutral feeling is together with the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana). It is impossible to generate other feelings such as sorrow or joy. This also proves this principle. However, joy, sorrow, etc., are all induced by thought. This consciousness is spontaneous, how can it not arise neutral feeling?

Treatise: Moreover, this Manas (Manas-vijnana)... only has neutral feeling.

Commentary: Saying that this verse speaks of this Manas. If there are differences in meaning from the eighth consciousness, they are explained separately. If this were associated with the four feelings, it should be explained separately in the verse, such as relying on conditions, etc. Since this verse omits and does not separately explain that this is together with feeling, it is known that it is the same as the eighth consciousness, only having neutral feeling. Question: Since the different results and all seeds are different, why is this consciousness not explained separately? Answer: That is the different meaning of the eighth consciousness's self-nature. Here, the self-nature of consciousness is also explained. Moreover, saying 'defiled' shows that it is different from the eighth consciousness, so it is not explained separately. The five (mental factors) such as contact are the same, why say it now? Why is it not necessary to say the difference in quantity? Because afflictions such as attachment are added. Constantly flowing, why not say it? Because these three positions are neutral feeling, which shows that it is not constant, but flows like water. Also, like the explanation in the Essentials. Moreover, if this were associated with the four feelings, then the Vajra heart (Vajra-citta) would not be the fault of sudden cutting off, because a part has already been cut off in the previous stage. Question: If so, then what is the difference between the un-subdued delusions of cultivation in the desire realm and this? Answer: They have already been permanently separated in the previous stage, while this is permanently separated only when combined with the later stage.

Treatise: Before the transformation of the basis... because of equal transformation.

Commentary: From below, the second part shows the number of mental factors corresponding to the cause and effect positions. If in the cause position, it is the same as the number stated by the previous teachers. This seventh consciousness has already transformed the basis, and is co-born with twenty-one mental factors, as stated when the eighth consciousness has already transformed the basis. Also like the eighth consciousness, it only has neutral feeling, spontaneously turning, and has never been easy to detach from, arising without discrimination. The sixth consciousness can be like this.

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。雖初地以去有行不行。成佛已去無不行時。據此義故亦名無動搖。故唯舍受　又復此智多起平等。平等即大悲等。佛位多勝。功德相應在第四禪故唯舍受　又設下地有平等智。不變異故。如在因位唯舍受俱　若在十地隨第六識所引何地乃至有頂皆有此智。依彼地心法空智引。入滅定時彼地有故。不可定說下地第七為有頂依。雖通諸地皆唯舍受。此義應思。不可以因數難。彼心所法未必皆似故。恒于所緣平等轉故。唯舍受俱。諸善心所法爾作用有二十一心所俱起。

次下第六依其本頌以釋性俱。

論。末那心所何性所攝。

述曰。此為問起。此識及心所何性所攝。

下答有二。初依頌答因位。后總解果位。

論。有覆無記所攝非余。

述曰。此舉頌答。

論。此意相應至故名無記。

述曰。今以相應顯心是染。性非染故。初釋有覆名。如第八識中解。梵云昵佛栗多。此云有覆。言隱沒者不善言故。余文可知。

論。如上二界至亦無記攝。

述曰。上界定力惑成有覆　問上界煩惱由定力故可名有覆。此識何為名為無記　此識相應四煩惱等雖無定力。以所依識行微細故。任運轉故。不障善故。遍三性故。亦無記攝。非如見道欲界一切分別生惑。及修道粗能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：即使在初地菩薩的階段，也存在著『去有行不行』的情況，而成佛之後，則不存在『去無不行』的時候。根據這個道理，也可以稱之為『無動搖』。因此，第七識唯與舍受相應。此外，這種智慧多與平等相應，而平等即是大悲等。佛的果位具有諸多殊勝之處，功德相應于第四禪，所以第七識唯與舍受相應。即使下地菩薩具有平等智，也不會發生改變，就像在因位時一樣，唯與舍受相應。如果在十地菩薩的階段，隨著第六識的引導，無論在哪一地，乃至有頂天，都具有這種智慧。這是依據彼地的心法空智所引發的。入滅定的時候，彼地仍然存在這種智慧，所以不能斷定下地菩薩的第七識以有頂天為所依。雖然第七識通於諸地，但都唯與舍受相應。這個道理應該仔細思考，不能用因數來責難，因為彼心所法未必都相似。第七識恒常于所緣境平等轉動，所以唯與舍受相應。諸善心所法自然的作用是與二十一個心所同時生起。 接下來，根據本頌來解釋第七識的自性相應。 論：末那（Manas，意為『意』）心所屬於什麼性質？ 述曰：這是提問。這個識及其心所屬於什麼性質？ 下面回答分為兩部分。首先依據本頌回答因位的情況，然後總括地解釋果位的情況。 論：屬於有覆無記，不屬於其他性質。 述曰：這是引用本頌來回答。 論：此意相應，所以稱為無記。 述曰：現在用相應來顯示心是染污的，而自性並非染污。首先解釋『有覆』的含義，如同在第八識中解釋的那樣。梵語是『Nivrta』（Nivrta，意為『覆蓋』），這裡翻譯為『有覆』，意思是隱沒，因為是不善的緣故。其餘的文字可以自己理解。 論：如同上二界（指色界和無色界）一樣，也屬於無記。 述曰：上界的定力使惑成為有覆。問：上界的煩惱由於定力的緣故，可以稱為有覆，那麼這個識為什麼稱為無記呢？這個識相應的四種煩惱等，雖然沒有定力，但由於所依的識行微細，任其運轉，不障礙善法，遍於三性，所以也屬於無記。不像見道位欲界的一切分別產生的迷惑，以及修道位粗重的煩惱。

【English Translation】 English version: Even at the stage of the first Bhumi (初地, the first of the ten Bodhisattva stages), there are instances of 'going with existence and not going'. However, after attaining Buddhahood, there is no instance of 'going without going'. Based on this principle, it can also be called 'unwavering'. Therefore, the seventh consciousness (末那, Manas) is only associated with equanimity (舍受, Upeksha). Furthermore, this wisdom is mostly associated with equality, and equality is great compassion, etc. The state of Buddhahood has many superior aspects, and merits correspond to the fourth Dhyana (禪, meditative state), so the seventh consciousness is only associated with equanimity. Even if a Bodhisattva in a lower Bhumi has the wisdom of equality, it will not change, just like in the causal stage, it is only associated with equanimity. If it is at the stage of the ten Bhumis, following the guidance of the sixth consciousness, no matter which Bhumi, even up to the peak of existence (有頂, Bhavagra), this wisdom is present. This is based on the emptiness wisdom of the mind-dharma of that Bhumi. When entering cessation meditation (滅定, Nirodha-samapatti), that Bhumi still has this wisdom, so it cannot be determined that the seventh consciousness of a lower Bhumi relies on the peak of existence. Although the seventh consciousness is common to all Bhumis, it is only associated with equanimity. This principle should be carefully considered and cannot be challenged with causal numbers, because the mental factors of that mind are not necessarily all similar. The seventh consciousness constantly turns equally in relation to the object of cognition, so it is only associated with equanimity. The natural function of all wholesome mental factors is to arise simultaneously with twenty-one mental factors. Next, based on the verse, the inherent nature of the seventh consciousness is explained. Treatise: What nature does the Manas (末那, 'mind') mental factor belong to? Commentary: This is the question. What nature does this consciousness and its mental factors belong to? The answer below is divided into two parts. First, based on the verse, the causal stage is answered, and then the resultant stage is explained in general. Treatise: It belongs to obscured indeterminate (有覆無記, Nivrita-avyakrita), not to other natures. Commentary: This is quoting the verse to answer. Treatise: This mind corresponds, so it is called indeterminate. Commentary: Now, correspondence is used to show that the mind is defiled, but its nature is not defiled. First, the meaning of 'obscured' is explained, as explained in the eighth consciousness. The Sanskrit is 'Nivrta' (昵佛栗多, Nivrta, 'covered'), which is translated here as 'obscured', meaning hidden, because it is unwholesome. The rest of the text can be understood by oneself. Treatise: Like the upper two realms (上二界, the Form Realm and Formless Realm), it also belongs to the indeterminate. Commentary: The power of Samadhi (定, meditative concentration) in the upper realms makes delusion obscured. Question: The afflictions of the upper realms can be called obscured because of the power of Samadhi, so why is this consciousness called indeterminate? Although the four afflictions, etc., corresponding to this consciousness do not have the power of Samadhi, because the actions of the consciousness on which it relies are subtle, allowing it to operate, not obstructing wholesome dharmas, and pervading the three natures, it also belongs to the indeterminate. It is not like all the conceptually arisen delusions of the Desire Realm in the path of seeing (見道, Darshana-marga), and the coarse afflictions of the path of cultivation (修道, Bhavana-marga).

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發惡行者皆是不善。此微細言攝論二本皆第一說　此中兩解。一云前問及頌答。總問答心及心所法。今此解中以心性非染。舉相應染以顯心體。以心體細顯此俱惑是有覆性。俱染障聖。唯惑覆心名為有覆。心不自覆。但依相應亦障聖道故名有覆　二云或由解中唯解心所。準前問顯皆唯問答心所不問未那。以俱染法說為不共無明等故。恐是不善故。唯問心所以顯心王亦有覆攝。

論。若已轉依唯是善性。

述曰。上依本頌解因有覆。今顯果位唯是善性。以順理故。以寂靜故。

次第七段第九系界別門。于中有二。初辨染。次明凈。染中有二。初問。次答。

論。末那心所何地系那。

述曰。此為問已。

論。隨彼所生彼地所繫。

述曰。答中有二。此舉頌答。后釋頌答。此初也。

論。謂生欲界至應知亦然。

述曰。下釋頌答中有二。初且總解。后別顯之。此初也。乃至有頂九地皆然。即彼地系。若第八識生彼欲界乃至有頂。現染末那相應心所即欲界系。餘地亦爾。與六十三等同。然顯揚十九約界為論。無地分別。

何以爾者。

論。任運恒緣至非他地故。

述曰。此識恒執自地藏識為內我故。我見唯緣自地而起。不見世間俱生別緣他地法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 造作惡行的人都是不善的。這句精微的話語在《攝大乘論》的兩個版本中都是首先提出的。這裡有兩種解釋。一種說法是，前面的提問和偈頌回答，總括地提問和回答了心和心所法。現在的這種解釋中，因為心的本性並非染污，所以舉出與染污相應的法來顯示心的本體。因為心的本體微細，所以顯示這種俱生的迷惑是有覆性的。俱生的染污會障礙聖道。只有迷惑覆蓋了心才稱為有覆。心本身不會覆蓋自己，但依靠相應的法也會障礙聖道，所以稱為有覆。另一種說法是，或者因為解釋中只解釋了心所，根據前面的提問顯示，都是隻提問和回答心所，沒有提問末那（Manas，意根）。因為俱生的染污法被說成是不共無明等等。恐怕是不善的，所以只提問心所，來顯示心王（Citta，心）也有有覆的攝屬。

論：如果已經轉依（Paravrtti，轉變所依），就只有善的性質。

述記：上面依據本頌解釋了因位的有覆。現在顯示果位只有善的性質。因為順應真理的緣故，因為寂靜的緣故。

接下來是第七段第九系界差別門。其中有二部分。首先辨別染污，其次闡明清凈。染污中又有二部分。首先提問，其次回答。

論：末那（Manas，意根）心所屬於哪個地（Bhumi，層次）的繫縛？

述記：這是爲了提問。

論：隨著它所生的地方，就被那個地方所繫縛。

述記：回答中有二部分。這裡舉出偈頌來回答。後面解釋偈頌的回答。這是第一部分。

論：所謂生於欲界（Kāmadhātu，欲界）乃至有頂（Bhavāgra，非想非非想處天）都應該知道也是這樣。

述記：下面解釋偈頌的回答中有二部分。首先是總體的解釋，然後分別顯示。這是第一部分。乃至有頂天的九地都是這樣，就被那個地所繫縛。如果第八識（Ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）生於欲界乃至有頂天，現行的染污末那相應的心所，就是欲界所繫縛。其餘的各個地也是這樣。與六十三等相同。然而《顯揚聖教論》第十九卷是按照界來論述的，沒有地的分別。

為什麼是這樣呢？

論：因為任運（Anābhoga，任運）恒常緣著，乃至不是其他地的緣故。

述記：這個識（末那，Manas）恒常執著自己地的藏識（Ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）作為內在的我，所以，我見（Ātma-dṛṣṭi，我見）只緣著自己地而生起，不會見到世間俱生的會特別緣著其他地法的。

【English Translation】 English version: Those who commit evil deeds are all unwholesome. This subtle statement is the first to be mentioned in both versions of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. There are two interpretations here. One is that the previous question and the verse answer encompass the question and answer about mind and mental factors in general. In this interpretation, because the nature of the mind is not defiled, the defiled factors associated with it are cited to reveal the essence of the mind. Because the essence of the mind is subtle, it shows that this co-arisen delusion has the nature of being obscured. Co-arisen defilements obstruct the path to enlightenment. Only delusion that covers the mind is called obscured. The mind itself does not cover itself, but relying on associated factors also obstructs the path to enlightenment, so it is called obscured. The other interpretation is that, perhaps because the explanation only explains mental factors, according to the previous question, it shows that only mental factors are questioned and answered, and not Manas (意根, the mind). Because co-arisen defiled factors are described as non-common ignorance, etc., fearing that it is unwholesome, only mental factors are questioned to show that the Citta (心王, the mind-king) is also included in the obscured.

Treatise: If there has been a transformation of the basis (Paravrtti, 轉變所依), it is only of a wholesome nature.

Commentary: The above explanation, based on the verse, concerns the obscured nature of the cause. Now it shows that the result state is only of a wholesome nature, because it accords with the truth, because it is tranquil.

Next is the seventh section, the ninth division on the distinction of realms and bonds. There are two parts to it. First, distinguishing defilement, and second, clarifying purity. There are two parts to defilement. First, the question, and second, the answer.

Treatise: To which realm is the Manas (意根, the mind) mental factor bound?

Commentary: This is for the purpose of questioning.

Treatise: It is bound to the realm in which it arises.

Commentary: There are two parts to the answer. Here, the verse is cited to answer. Later, the verse answer is explained. This is the first part.

Treatise: That is to say, it should be known that it is the same from the desire realm (Kāmadhātu, 欲界) up to the peak of existence (Bhavāgra, 非想非非想處天).

Commentary: Below, there are two parts to the explanation of the verse answer. First, a general explanation, and then a separate explanation. This is the first part. It is the same for the nine realms up to the peak of existence, and it is bound to that realm. If the eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, 阿賴耶識) arises in the desire realm up to the peak of existence, the currently defiled Manas mental factors are bound to the desire realm. The other realms are also like this, the same as the sixty-three, etc. However, the nineteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya discusses it according to realms, without distinguishing the levels.

Why is it so?

Treatise: Because it spontaneously and constantly clings to, and is not of other realms.

Commentary: This consciousness (Manas) constantly clings to the store consciousness (Ālayavijñāna) of its own realm as the inner self. Therefore, the view of self (Ātma-dṛṣṭi, 我見) only arises in its own realm and does not see that the co-arisen in the world would particularly cling to the dharmas of other realms.

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為我等故。對法第六他界緣云。不見世間緣他地法計為我故。我見隨境自地所繫。他地諸法非我境故。此依俱生別緣我見行相說。由此故知。第七不緣本識種子。種子許通他地法故。亦不緣色等。色等亦通故。第八異熟心。通緣自他地。不作自他解。第七作我解故。不緣他地　若爾命終心緣何以為我。緣未來生即是緣自地。所生處故。此別緣我。故唯自地。若總緣我。許之緣他。如下自解。即是正義第七唯緣第八識家。

此上文總。已下別解。

論。若起彼地至名彼所繫。

述曰。若起彼地藏識現行。除于種子。乃生彼地。為簡種子。故論說言異熟藏識。因中染污第七末那。緣彼執我。系屬第八名彼所繫。八非能系。七非所繫。相從名系。不可難以相應．所緣二縛名系。相從相屬是此係義。第八是所屬。第七為能屬。即是以彼所緣為所屬。第七屬彼也。如王為所屬。臣等為能屬。隨王系國。

論。或為彼地至名彼所繫。

述曰。此第二解。此識俱惑。隨生處是何地即此地攝。此第七意。為自俱時四惑所繫名彼所繫。識是所繫。煩惱能系也。何名所生。為第八識所生之地煩惱繫縛。名彼所繫　又解此文三釋。一云謂生欲界乃至應知亦爾以來。此中意說。若生欲界之現行末那。其相應心所

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 爲了我們（眾生）的緣故，《對法》第六卷中關於他界緣的說法是：『因為不見世間的緣，將他地的法計為我。』我的見解是隨著境界，只與自己的地界相關聯。他地的諸法不是我所能認識的境界。這是依據俱生和別緣的我見行相來說的。由此可知，第七識（末那識，Manas-vijnana）不緣本識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）的種子，因為種子被認為是通於他地之法的。第七識也不緣色等，因為色等也是共通的。第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana），即異熟心，普遍緣自地和他地，但不作自他和他的分別理解。第七識因為執著于『我』的理解，所以不緣他地。 如果這樣，臨終時心緣何以為『我』呢？緣未來生，也就是緣自己的地界，因為是所生之處。這是別緣的我，所以只緣自地。如果總緣『我』，則允許緣他地，如下文自己解釋的那樣，這才是正確的意義。第七識只緣第八識。

以上是總的解釋，以下是分別解釋。

論：如果生起彼地的藏識現行，除了種子之外，就生於彼地，稱為『彼所繫』。

述記：如果生起彼地的藏識現行，除了種子之外，才生於彼地。爲了簡別種子，所以論中說『異熟藏識』。因中的染污第七末那識，緣彼（第八識）而執著為『我』，系屬於第八識，稱為『彼所繫』。第八識不是能系，第七識不是所繫，而是互相依從而稱為『系』。不能以相應和所緣二縛來解釋『系』，互相依從和相屬才是『系』的含義。第八識是所屬，第七識是能屬，也就是以彼所緣為所屬，第七識屬於彼（第八識）。如同國王是所屬，臣等是能屬，隨著國王而系屬於國家。

論：或者因為彼地的緣故，稱為『彼所繫』。

述記：這是第二種解釋。此識與俱生的惑，隨著所生之處是何地，就屬於此地所攝。此第七識的意圖，是被自身俱生的四惑所繫縛，稱為『彼所繫』。識是所繫，煩惱是能系。什麼叫做『所生』？就是第八識所生之地的煩惱繫縛，稱為『彼所繫』。又對此文有三種解釋。一種說法是，從『謂生欲界乃至應知亦爾』以來，此中的意思是說，如果生於欲界的現行末那識，其相應的心所……

【English Translation】 English version: For our (sentient beings') sake, the sixth volume of the Abhidharma states regarding the condition of other realms: 'Because one does not see the conditions of the world, one considers the dharmas of other realms as 'I'.' My view is that it follows the realm and is only related to one's own realm. The dharmas of other realms are not the realm that I can recognize. This is based on the characteristics of innate and separately conditioned 'I'-view. From this, it can be known that the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana) does not condition the seeds of the fundamental consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), because seeds are considered to be common to the dharmas of other realms. The seventh consciousness also does not condition form, etc., because form, etc., are also common. The eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), the resultant mind, universally conditions both its own realm and other realms, but does not make distinctions of self and other. Because the seventh consciousness clings to the understanding of 'I', it does not condition other realms. If this is the case, what does the mind condition as 'I' at the time of death? It conditions future birth, which is conditioning one's own realm, because it is the place of birth. This is the 'I' conditioned separately, so it only conditions one's own realm. If the 'I' is conditioned generally, then it is allowed to condition other realms, as explained below, which is the correct meaning. The seventh consciousness only conditions the eighth consciousness.

The above is a general explanation; the following is a separate explanation.

Treatise: If the manifestation of the store consciousness of that realm arises, except for the seeds, then it is born in that realm, and it is called 'related to that realm'.

Commentary: If the manifestation of the store consciousness of that realm arises, except for the seeds, then it is born in that realm. To distinguish the seeds, the treatise says 'resultant store consciousness'. The defiled seventh Manas consciousness in the cause, conditions that (eighth consciousness) and clings to it as 'I', and is related to the eighth consciousness, and it is called 'related to that realm'. The eighth consciousness is not the one that binds, and the seventh consciousness is not the one that is bound, but they are called 'related' because they are mutually dependent. The 'related' cannot be explained by the two bonds of correspondence and conditioned object; mutual dependence and belonging are the meaning of 'related'. The eighth consciousness is the one that is belonged to, and the seventh consciousness is the one that belongs, that is, the conditioned object is the one that is belonged to, and the seventh consciousness belongs to that (eighth consciousness). Just as the king is the one that is belonged to, and the ministers are the ones that belong, and the country is related to the king.

Treatise: Or because of the conditions of that realm, it is called 'related to that realm'.

Commentary: This is the second explanation. This consciousness and the co-arisen afflictions, depending on where it is born, belong to that realm. The intention of this seventh consciousness is that it is bound by the four co-arisen afflictions, and it is called 'related to that realm'. Consciousness is the one that is bound, and afflictions are the ones that bind. What is called 'born'? It is the afflictions that bind the realm born from the eighth consciousness, and it is called 'related to that realm'. There are also three explanations for this text. One explanation is that, from 'it is said that it is born in the desire realm, and it should be known that it is the same', the meaning here is that if the manifesting Manas consciousness is born in the desire realm, its corresponding mental factors...

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。隨彼心王即欲界系。系是屬義。如臣屬王　任運恒緣乃至名彼所繫以來。此中意說。以能緣心屬彼所緣之地所繫相從名系。如牛屬舍　任運恒緣至非他地故以來。釋能緣心屬所緣義。下方正解。先顯所由。后解屬故　或為彼地乃至名彼所繫以來。此中意說。心王屬彼。隨第八識所生之地煩惱所繫。以王屬臣屬相應縛　雖有此義前解為勝。

論。若已轉依即非所繫。

述曰。此在因中初地已去已轉依位。有非所繫。是無漏故。前所繫言亦通法執。是彼類故。

自下第八段。依第十門起滅分位。

論。此染污意至或暫斷耶。

述曰。于中初問。后答。因欲舉頌故先徴起。

論。阿羅漢滅定出世道無有。

述曰。此下隨答。文中有二。一正解本文伏斷分位。二傍乘義解行相分位　初中有二。初舉頌答。后廣諍答　初中有二。初舉頌。后別釋。此即初也　即與對法第二等同。六十三中唯有二位。一無學。二有學。無滅定者非是相違。彼說滅定二位中起故亦攝盡。又彼說世道伏與不伏。因言出世道故不舉滅定。滅定非道故。亦非有學。非無學故。又彼唯依人故說二位。此依人及法故說有三位。

言無有者。有永暫義。如下自解。

論。阿羅漢者至故說無有。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：隨彼心王（Citta-rāja，心識之王）即欲界系（Kāmadhātu-saṃbandha，與欲界相關的束縛）。『系』是『屬於』的意思，就像臣子屬於君王一樣。『任運恒緣乃至名彼所繫以來』，這裡的意思是說，以能緣之心屬於它所緣的境地，相互隸屬相隨，就叫做『系』，就像牛屬於牛棚一樣。『任運恒緣至非他地故以來』，解釋了能緣之心屬於所緣之境的含義。下面正式解釋，先說明原因，后解釋『屬於』。『或為彼地乃至名彼所繫以來』，這裡的意思是說，心王屬於它所隨順的，由第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）所生的境地和煩惱所束縛。因為君王屬於臣子，相互之間有相應的束縛。雖然有這個意思，但前面的解釋更好。 論：如果已經轉依（āśraya-parivṛtti，轉變所依），那就不是被束縛的了。 述曰：這在因位中，初地（prathamā bhūmi，歡喜地）以後，已經轉依的位次，有不是被束縛的，因為是無漏（anāsrava，沒有煩惱）的緣故。前面所說的『所繫』也包括法執（dharma-graha，對法的執著），因為是同一類的緣故。 自下第八段，依據第十門，起滅分位。 論：此染污意（kliṣṭa-manas，染污的意）至或暫斷耶？ 述曰：這裡先提問，后回答。因為要引出頌文，所以先提出問題。 論：阿羅漢（Arhat，斷盡煩惱的聖者）滅定（nirodha-samāpatti，滅盡定）出世道（lokottara-mārga，超越世間的道）無有。 述曰：下面是隨文回答，文中有兩部分。一是正式解釋本文中伏斷的分位，二是旁及解釋行相的分位。第一部分中有兩點，一是舉頌回答，二是廣泛辯論回答。首先是舉頌，然後分別解釋，這裡是第一點。這與《對法論》（Abhidharma，阿毗達磨）第二相同，六十三中只有兩個位次，一是無學（aśaikṣa，無須再學的聖者），二是有學（śaikṣa，還在學習的聖者）。沒有滅定的人，並非是相違背的，因為他們說滅定是在兩個位次中生起的，所以也包括在內。而且他們說世間道（laukika-mārga，世間的道）是伏藏與不伏藏的。因為說了出世道，所以沒有提到滅定，因為滅定不是道，也不是有學，也不是無學。而且他們只是依據人來說這兩個位次，這裡是依據人和法來說這三個位次。 『言無有者』，有『永』和『暫』兩種含義，如下面自己會解釋。 論：阿羅漢者至故說無有。

【English Translation】 English version: Associated with that Citta-rāja (mind-king) is the Kāmadhātu-saṃbandha (bondage of the desire realm). 'Saṃbandha' means 'belonging to,' like a subject belongs to a king. 'From the spontaneous and constant connection, even to being named as belonging to that,' the meaning here is that the mind that can cognize belongs to the realm it cognizes, and their mutual belonging and association is called 'saṃbandha,' like a cow belongs to a shed. 'From the spontaneous and constant connection to not being another realm,' explains the meaning of the cognizing mind belonging to the cognized realm. The explanation below will formally explain, first stating the reason, then explaining 'belonging to.' 'Or being that realm, even to being named as belonging to that,' the meaning here is that the Citta-rāja belongs to what it follows, the realm and afflictions born from the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna). Because the king belongs to the subject, there is a corresponding bond between them. Although this meaning exists, the previous explanation is better. Treatise: If one has already achieved āśraya-parivṛtti (transformation of the basis), then one is not bound. Commentary: This is in the stage of cause, after the first bhūmi (joyful ground), in the stage of having already achieved āśraya-parivṛtti, there are those who are not bound, because they are anāsrava (without outflows). The previously mentioned 'saṃbandha' also includes dharma-graha (attachment to dharmas), because it is of the same kind. From here, the eighth section, based on the tenth door, the phases of arising and ceasing. Treatise: This kliṣṭa-manas (afflicted mind) to or is it temporarily ceased? Commentary: Here, first a question, then an answer. Because a verse is to be introduced, the question is raised first. Treatise: For an Arhat (one who has extinguished all afflictions), nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment) and lokottara-mārga (transcendental path) do not exist. Commentary: Below is the answer following the text, there are two parts in the text. First, a formal explanation of the division of subduing and cutting off in this text, second, a collateral explanation of the phases of practice. There are two points in the first part, first, quoting the verse to answer, second, widely debating the answer. First is quoting the verse, then explaining separately, this is the first point. This is the same as the second in the Abhidharma, there are only two stages in sixty-three, first, aśaikṣa (one beyond learning), second, śaikṣa (one still learning). Those without cessation attainment are not contradictory, because they say cessation attainment arises in two stages, so it is also included. Moreover, they say the laukika-mārga (mundane path) is either hidden or not hidden. Because the lokottara-mārga is mentioned, cessation attainment is not mentioned, because cessation attainment is not a path, nor is it śaikṣa, nor is it aśaikṣa. Moreover, they only rely on people to say these two stages, here it relies on people and dharmas to say these three stages. 'The words 'do not exist' have the meanings of 'eternal' and 'temporary,' as will be explained below. Treatise: Arhats to therefore it is said that they do not exist.

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述曰。別釋之中復分為二。初總解。后別釋。此等即初　總攝三乘無學果位。如第八識斷舍之中。引對法等文。然第八識唯從煩惱以立藏名。今名染污亦通法執。約自體說。此中不退菩薩。即是出世道所攝故。法執在故。能染菩薩。暫舍門攝。非永舍攝　在無學舍。隨其所應有二種染。一染三乘。即謂人執。在無學俱不行。二謂法執。不染二乘。但染菩薩唯如來舍。此中通說故言染意現種永滅。非唯人執　問人執染二乘。所執藏識二乘可名舍。法執染菩薩。所執藏名菩薩應不捨　答煩惱障粗。藏名從立。法執既細。菩薩不從得名。又煩惱染三乘。所執藏名舍。法執染菩薩。不從立藏名。設有能執不名藏識　問通染三乘所執可共名藏。但染菩薩所執獨名為藏。應設劬勞　答藏名據縛唯在煩惱。染體據障亦通法執。

論。學位滅定至故說無有。

述曰。隨其所應。三乘學位滅定。出世道中暫伏滅者。即隨何乘所障便伏。二乘初果已去。大乘初地頓悟。二乘及菩薩．人空。唯伏人染。頓．漸二悟菩薩法空亦伏法染。

論。謂染污意至違我執故。

述曰。上總解頌阿羅漢．聖道．滅定三位不行。下別解三。

于中有二。初解滅定．聖道不行。后解無學　初中有三。先解聖道不行之位。此意有漏

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述：在別解中又分為兩個部分。首先是總體的解釋，然後是分別的解釋。這些是最初總括三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的無學果位。例如，在第八識（阿賴耶識，根本識）斷舍的部分，引用了《對法論》等文獻。然而，第八識只是從煩惱的角度來建立『藏』這個名稱。現在說『染污』也包括了法執（對法的執著）。從自體上來說，這裡的不退菩薩，就是被出世道所攝的，因為法執還在，所以能夠染污菩薩。只是暫時地捨棄，不是永遠地捨棄，在無學位的捨棄中，根據情況有兩種染污。一種是染污三乘，也就是人執（對自我的執著），在無學位中都不起作用。另一種是法執，不染污二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘），只染污菩薩，只有如來才能捨棄。這裡是通說的，所以說染污意（末那識）的現行種子永遠滅除，不是隻有人執。 問：人執染污二乘，所執著的藏識（阿賴耶識）二乘可以稱為捨棄。法執染污菩薩，所執著的藏識菩薩應該不捨棄嗎？ 答：煩惱障粗重，藏識的名稱由此而立。法執細微，菩薩不因此而得名。而且煩惱染污三乘，所執著的藏識名稱捨棄。法執染污菩薩，不因此而立藏識的名稱。即使有能執著，也不稱為藏識。 問：通染三乘所執著的可以共同稱為藏，只染污菩薩所執著的單獨稱為藏，應該要特別說明。 答：藏的名稱是根據束縛而立的，只在于煩惱。染污的本體是根據障礙而說的，也包括法執。

論：在學位（有學位的階段）滅盡定（一種禪定狀態）時，染污意就停止了，所以說沒有。

窺基法師述：根據情況，三乘的學位滅盡定，在出世道中暫時伏滅的，就是隨順哪一乘的障礙就伏滅。二乘的初果（須陀洹果）以後，大乘的初地（歡喜地）頓悟，二乘和菩薩的人空（對自我的空性認知），只是伏滅人染。頓悟和漸悟的菩薩法空（對法的空性認知）也伏滅法染。

論：所謂的染污意，是因為違背了我執（對自我的執著）。

窺基法師述：上面總體解釋了頌文中阿羅漢（斷盡煩惱的聖者）、聖道（通往解脫的道路）、滅盡定這三種狀態下染污意不起作用。下面分別解釋這三種狀態。 其中分為兩個部分。首先解釋滅盡定和聖道中染污意不起作用，然後解釋無學位。首先解釋聖道中染污意不起作用的階段。這個染污意是有漏的。

【English Translation】 English version: Master Kuiji states: The separate explanation is further divided into two parts. First, a general explanation, then a specific explanation. These are the initial summaries of the non-learning fruition positions of the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna). For example, in the section on the abandonment of the Eighth Consciousness (Ālayavijñāna, the fundamental consciousness), texts such as the Abhidharmasamuccaya are cited. However, the Eighth Consciousness is named 'store' (藏) only from the perspective of afflictions. Now, 'defilement' also includes attachment to dharma (法執, clinging to the idea of phenomena). From the perspective of its own nature, the non-regressing Bodhisattva here is included in the supramundane path because attachment to dharma still exists, so it can defile the Bodhisattva. It is only temporarily abandoned, not permanently abandoned. In the abandonment of the non-learning position, there are two types of defilement according to the situation. One is the defilement of the Three Vehicles, which is attachment to self (人執, clinging to the idea of self), which does not function in the non-learning position. The other is attachment to dharma, which does not defile the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), but only defiles the Bodhisattva, and only the Tathāgata can abandon it. This is a general statement, so it says that the manifest seeds of the defiled mind (Manas-vijnana) are permanently extinguished, not just attachment to self. Question: Attachment to self defiles the Two Vehicles, and the store consciousness (Ālayavijñāna) that is clung to can be said to be abandoned by the Two Vehicles. Attachment to dharma defiles the Bodhisattva, so shouldn't the store consciousness that is clung to by the Bodhisattva not be abandoned? Answer: Affliction-obstacles are coarse, and the name 'store consciousness' is established from this. Attachment to dharma is subtle, and the Bodhisattva does not gain a name from this. Moreover, affliction defiles the Three Vehicles, and the name of the store consciousness that is clung to is abandoned. Attachment to dharma defiles the Bodhisattva, but the name of the store consciousness is not established from this. Even if there is clinging, it is not called store consciousness. Question: What is clung to by the Three Vehicles can be commonly called 'store', but what is clung to only by the Bodhisattva is uniquely called 'store'. There should be a special explanation. Answer: The name 'store' is based on bondage and only exists in afflictions. The substance of defilement is based on obstacles and also includes attachment to dharma.

Treatise: In the state of cessation attainment (滅定, Nirodha-samāpatti) during the stage of learning (學位, Śaikṣa-bhūmi), it is said to be non-existent because it ceases.

Master Kuiji states: According to the situation, the cessation attainment of the learning stage of the Three Vehicles, which is temporarily suppressed in the supramundane path, is suppressed according to the obstacles of whichever vehicle. After the first fruit (須陀洹果, Srotaāpanna) of the Two Vehicles, the sudden enlightenment of the first ground (歡喜地, Pramuditā-bhūmi) of the Mahāyāna, the selflessness (人空, Pudgala-śūnyatā) of the Two Vehicles and the Bodhisattva only suppresses the defilement of self. The sudden and gradual enlightenment of the Bodhisattva's dharma-śūnyatā (法空, emptiness of phenomena) also suppresses the defilement of dharma.

Treatise: The so-called defiled mind (染污意, Kliṣṭa-manas) is because it contradicts attachment to self (我執, Atma-graha).

Master Kuiji states: The above generally explains that the defiled mind does not function in the three states of Arhat (阿羅漢, one who has extinguished all afflictions), the Noble Path (聖道, Ārya-mārga), and cessation attainment, as mentioned in the verse. The following separately explains these three states. It is divided into two parts. First, it explains that the defiled mind does not function in cessation attainment and the Noble Path, and then it explains the non-learning stage. First, it explains the stage where the defiled mind does not function in the Noble Path. This defiled mind is afflicted.

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道不能伏。六十三說同。彼論云。何以故已離欲猶行故　又解世道唯是事觀。此迷理故世道不伏　此諸煩惱皆是本識種子所引。於一切時微細一類任運而生。非所對治及能對治。境界緣力差別轉故　八十八云。俱生薩迦耶見世道不伏　彼約六識中語。彼緣三界法為我所故。然不言金剛心方斷。此不同彼斷。然不伏相似　隨其所應三乘無漏心起方伏。無分別智真無我解。違我執故。隨人．法觀並自違故。

論。后得無漏至亦違此意。

述曰。無漏后得智。隨人．法觀無分別智等流引生。一分或全亦不現行。若二乘．菩薩等。入有漏后得智即不然。非彼等流故。以有漏法不能善達無我理故。六十三同。

論。真無我解至名出世道。

述曰。顯出世道亦攝后得。以無漏故。如無分別。

論。滅定既是至此亦非有。

述曰。次解滅盡定。滅盡定中何故不起。聖道后得無漏觀之等流是彼果故。猶如涅槃極寂靜故。與彼相違故亦非有。

論。由未永斷至乃至未滅。

述曰。后顯前二滅已後生。小乘人空．菩薩法觀引者。生及法執。隨其所應亦不現行。出觀後行未永斷故。對法第二．大論六十三．顯揚十九．十七等同。

論。然此染意至非非所斷。

述曰。解阿羅漢

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 道不能降伏。（六十三說與此相同）。他們的論點說：『為什麼已經離欲的人仍然會這樣做呢？』又解釋說，世俗之道只是對事物的觀察。因為這種對真理的迷惑，所以世俗之道不能被降伏。這些煩惱都是由本識（Alaya-vijñana）的種子所引發的，在任何時候都會以微細而相似的方式自然而然地產生，既不是被對治的對象，也不是能對治的主體。這是因為境界和因緣的力量不同而轉變的緣故。（第八十八卷）說：『俱生的薩迦耶見（Satkayadrishti，身見）不能被世俗之道降伏。』那是針對六識（six consciousnesses）中的說法。因為他們以三界（Three Realms）的法為『我』的所有。然而，並沒有說要用金剛心（Vajrasattva）才能斷除。這與他們的斷除方式不同。然而，這並不是相似的降伏。根據情況，三乘（Three Vehicles）的無漏心（anāsrava-citta）生起時才能降伏。無分別智（nirvikalpa-jñāna）是真正無我的理解，因為它違背了我執（ātma-graha）。因為它既違背了對人（pudgala）的觀察，也違背了對法（dharma）的觀察。 論：后得無漏智乃至也違背這個意思。 述曰：無漏后得智（anāsrava-pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna），隨著對人、對法的觀察，無分別智等等流引生。一部分或全部也不現行。如果是二乘（Two Vehicles）、菩薩（Bodhisattva）等，進入有漏后得智（sāsrava-pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna）就不是這樣了。因為它不是那些的等流，因為有漏法不能很好地通達無我的道理。六十三說與此相同。 論：真無我解乃至名為出世道。 述曰：顯示出世道（lokottara-mārga）也包括后得智，因為它是無漏的，就像無分別智一樣。 論：滅定既然是乃至此也不是有。 述曰：接下來解釋滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti）。為什麼在滅盡定中不生起呢？聖道（ārya-mārga）后得無漏觀的等流是它的結果。就像涅槃（nirvāṇa）一樣極其寂靜，因為它與涅槃相違背，所以也不是有。 論：由於沒有永遠斷除乃至沒有滅盡。 述曰：後面顯示前二者滅除后又生起。小乘人（Hinayana）的空觀、菩薩的法觀所引導的，生起人執和法執。根據情況，也不現行。因為出定后所行的還沒有永遠斷除。對法第二、大論六十三、顯揚十九、十七等都相同。 論：然而這種染污的意乃至不是非所斷。 述曰：解釋阿羅漢（Arhat）

【English Translation】 English version The path cannot subdue. (Sixty-three accounts agree with this). Their argument says: 'Why do those who have already abandoned desire still act in this way?' It also explains that the worldly path is merely the observation of things. Because of this delusion about truth, the worldly path cannot be subdued. These afflictions are all induced by the seeds of the Alaya-vijñana (store consciousness), which arise naturally in a subtle and similar manner at all times, neither being the object to be treated nor the subject that can treat. This is because the power of the realm and conditions differ and transform. (Volume Eighty-eight) says: 'The co-arisen Satkayadrishti (view of self) cannot be subdued by the worldly path.' That is in reference to the six consciousnesses. Because they take the dharmas of the Three Realms as 'mine'. However, it does not say that the Vajrasattva (diamond mind) is needed to cut it off. This is different from their way of cutting off. However, this is not a similar subduing. Depending on the situation, the arising of the anāsrava-citta (undefiled mind) of the Three Vehicles can subdue. Nirvikalpa-jñāna (non-discriminating wisdom) is the true understanding of no-self, because it contradicts ātma-graha (self-grasping). Because it contradicts both the observation of pudgala (person) and the observation of dharma (phenomena). Treatise: The subsequent undefiled wisdom even contradicts this meaning. Commentary: The anāsrava-pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna (undefiled wisdom attained subsequently), along with the observation of persons and dharmas, is induced by the outflow of nirvikapa-jñana and so on. A part or all of it does not manifest. If it is the Two Vehicles, Bodhisattvas, etc., entering the sāsrava-pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna (defiled wisdom attained subsequently) is not like this. Because it is not the outflow of those, because defiled dharmas cannot well understand the principle of no-self. Sixty-three accounts agree with this. Treatise: The true understanding of no-self is called the supramundane path. Commentary: Showing the lokottara-mārga (supramundane path) also includes subsequent wisdom, because it is undefiled, just like non-discriminating wisdom. Treatise: Since cessation is, it is not existent. Commentary: Next, explain nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment). Why does it not arise in cessation attainment? The outflow of the undefiled observation of the ārya-mārga (noble path) attained subsequently is its result. Just like nirvāṇa (extinction) is extremely tranquil, because it contradicts nirvāṇa, so it is not existent. Treatise: Because it has not been permanently cut off until it is not extinguished. Commentary: Later, it shows that after the former two are extinguished, they arise again. Those guided by the emptiness observation of the Hinayana (Small Vehicle) and the dharma observation of the Bodhisattva, give rise to the grasping of persons and the grasping of dharmas. Depending on the situation, it also does not manifest. Because what is practiced after emerging from samadhi has not been permanently cut off. The second of Abhidharma, the sixty-third of the Great Treatise, the nineteenth and seventeenth of the Compendium of Determinations are the same. Treatise: However, this defiled intention is not what is to be cut off. Commentary: Explaining Arhat (worthy one)

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無所由義。非見道斷。任運生故非分別故。然此染故非是不斷。不斷之法並無漏故。明是修斷。

於何時斷。

論。極微細故至永不復起。

述曰。此識染法三界相望雖有九品。于其地地最下品故第九品攝。一切地者與有頂地第九下下品俱時頓斷。以各自地極微細故　同障無學一時頓斷　名勢力等。欲界所繫與彼相似。不能發業潤生等故。與彼惑同金剛喻定現在前時斷成無學　若有難言。既有九品。應隨彼地九品道斷。許此我見有九品故。即在一界中粗細非一類　此識既行常一類故。故與下下同時頓斷。即是一品無九品義　答此不然。若以同時斷便言品力齊。如超二果人。亦以欲第九。與非想第九煩惱同斷。力品豈齊　今解如彼實有九品。彼由加行合為九品。此障無學故一時斷。但由此一類勝道。方能斷彼多品之惑。然此第七自地無九品。與自地六識中第九品我見相似。于金剛心時。與非想第九品一時頓斷　若許粗細三界相似。便無增減。無性有情此第七識應非能重。𨷂第三義故。由此應知實有九品。知斷善邪見唯第九品。仍作九品能斷善根。此亦應爾。一品之中分九品故　又解此言勢力等者。品數同故。與有頂地下下品惑。粗細同之故一時頓斷　若爾無性有情第七應非能熏。𨷂增減故　此亦不然

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『無所由義』（沒有產生的原因）。不是見道所斷，因為它是任運而生，不是分別產生的。然而，因為這種染污的緣故，它不是不斷的。沒有不斷的法，因為它與無漏法並存，所以很明顯是修道所斷。

在什麼時候斷除？

論：因為它極其微細，直到永遠不再生起。

述曰：此識的染污法，從三界相互比較來看，雖然有九品，但在每一地的最下品，也就是第九品所攝。一切地的染污，與有頂地（Bhava-agra，三界最高處）的第九下下品同時頓斷。因為各自地的染污極其微細，同障無學（Arhat，阿羅漢）道，所以一時頓斷，名為勢力相等。欲界（Kama-dhatu，欲界）所繫的染污與此相似，不能引發業和潤生等作用。與彼惑（煩惱）相同，在金剛喻定（Vajropama-samadhi，如金剛般堅固的禪定）現在前時斷除，成就無學（Asaiksa，無學果位）。

如果有人提問：既然有九品，應該隨著彼地的九品道來斷除。因為允許此我見（Atma-dristi，我見）有九品，即使在一界中，粗細也非一類。此識既然恒常執行，始終是一類，所以與下下品同時頓斷，即是一品，沒有九品的意義。回答：不是這樣的。如果因為同時斷除就說品力相等，就像超越二果的人，也以欲界第九品，與非想第九品煩惱一同斷除，品力難道相等嗎？

現在的解釋是，實際上有九品，他們通過加行（Prayoga，修行）合為九品。此識障礙無學道，所以一時斷除。但由此一類殊勝的道，才能斷除彼多品之惑。然而，此第七識（末那識，Manas-vijnana）在自地沒有九品，與自地六識中的第九品我見相似，在金剛心時，與非想第九品一時頓斷。如果允許粗細三界相似，便沒有增減。無性有情（無性有情，Apratisthita-parinirvana）的此第七識應該不能重複熏習，違背了第三義。由此應該知道，實際上有九品。知道斷除善邪見（Kusala-mithyadristi，不善的邪見）只有第九品，仍然作為九品能斷善根。此識也應該如此，一品之中分為九品。

又解釋說，此言『勢力等』，是因為品數相同，與有頂地下下品惑，粗細相同，所以一時頓斷。如果這樣，無性有情的第七識應該不能熏習，違背了增減的原則。也不是這樣的。

【English Translation】 English version 'Wu suo you yi' (no cause or reason). It is not severed by the Path of Seeing, because it arises spontaneously and not from discrimination. However, because of this defilement, it is not that it is not severed. There is no dharma that is not severed, because it coexists with the unconditioned dharma, so it is clear that it is severed by the Path of Cultivation.

When is it severed?

Treatise: Because it is extremely subtle, until it never arises again.

Commentary: The defiled dharmas of this consciousness, when compared among the Three Realms, although there are nine grades, in the lowest grade of each realm, that is, included in the ninth grade. The defilements of all realms are severed simultaneously with the ninth lowest grade of the Realm of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception (Bhava-agra, the highest realm of the Three Realms). Because the defilements of each realm are extremely subtle, they simultaneously sever the obstruction to the Arhat (Arhat, one who has attained liberation), called equal in power. The defilements related to the Desire Realm (Kama-dhatu, the realm of desire) are similar to this, unable to initiate karma and nourish rebirth, etc. They are the same as those afflictions, severed when the Vajropama-samadhi (Vajropama-samadhi, diamond-like samadhi) manifests, accomplishing the state of No More Learning (Asaiksa, the state of Arhat).

If someone asks: Since there are nine grades, they should be severed according to the nine grades of the path of that realm. Because it is allowed that this view of self (Atma-dristi, the view of self) has nine grades, even within one realm, the coarseness and subtlety are not of one kind. Since this consciousness constantly operates and is always of one kind, it is severed simultaneously with the lowest grade, that is, one grade, without the meaning of nine grades. Answer: It is not like that. If because of simultaneous severance, it is said that the power of the grades is equal, like a person who has surpassed the second fruit, also severs the ninth grade of the Desire Realm together with the ninth grade of afflictions of the Realm of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception, are the power of the grades equal?

The current explanation is that there are actually nine grades, they are combined into nine grades through effort (Prayoga, practice). This consciousness obstructs the path of No More Learning, so it is severed simultaneously. But only by this one kind of supreme path can the many grades of afflictions be severed. However, this seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana, the seventh consciousness) does not have nine grades in its own realm, it is similar to the ninth grade of the view of self in the six consciousnesses of its own realm, and is severed simultaneously with the ninth grade of the Realm of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception at the time of the diamond mind. If it is allowed that the coarseness and subtlety of the Three Realms are similar, then there is no increase or decrease. This seventh consciousness of those without the nature (Apratisthita-parinirvana, those without the potential for enlightenment) should not be able to be repeatedly perfumed, violating the third meaning. From this, it should be known that there are actually nine grades. Knowing that severing the wholesome wrong view (Kusala-mithyadristi, unwholesome wrong view) is only the ninth grade, it still acts as nine grades to sever wholesome roots. This consciousness should also be like this, dividing one grade into nine grades.

Another explanation is that the words 'equal in power' are because the number of grades is the same, and the coarseness and subtlety are the same as the lowest grade of afflictions in the Realm of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception, so they are severed simultaneously. If so, the seventh consciousness of those without the nature should not be able to be perfumed, violating the principle of increase and decrease. It is not like that.

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。如前第二能熏中解。無相違失。此二說中前解為勝　若二乘人斷此染者。斷縛彼故。若菩薩斷無染亦除　問見道除惡趣。惡趣之果第八亦言除。所緣第八既言無。能緣此識亦應斷。若以不行名為斷。此識可除。若以斷體。于彼不可爾。實理解者。彼趣果無。謂彼不善業所招者無。非彼身中一切修惑皆無。不可以此例彼。如下斷障及別抄說。

論。二乘無學至不別說之。

述曰。若斷種子畢竟斷者。即迂會無學。名不退菩薩。何故不說。同第八識初師舍義為問。然上所明因位之中二乘有學．頓悟菩薩．迴心有學菩薩。同類故不別簡。定性之中三乘無學。並已明訖。唯有迴心無學與菩薩不同。應次別說。為同何例　此一切時與彼未迴心者等故。此雖是菩薩。仍名阿羅漢。以應義等。即攝彼在畢竟斷位阿羅漢中。故不別說。如前第八識中第一師解。

以上文義諸家共同更無異說。文勢總故。

下明三位無義。為體為義。余如樞要。

論。此中有義至三位無故。

述曰。下更諍也。安惠等云。三位體無。此識俱時。唯有人執無有法執。對法等說三位無故。若此俱有法執。應言三位有。準此師計。即成佛時無第七識。餘七識成佛。

論。又說四惑恒相應故。

述曰。顯揚第

一說四惑俱。故無法執。不言凈位有此識故。然今此論。不依佛地．無性攝論為證義文。本經．本論不言七識有凈亦通無漏故。

論。又說為識雜染依故。

述曰。攝論第一論本。不言為凈依故。無凈第七法執第七。滅定．聖道．無學三位。無第七體也。

論。有義彼說至經說有故。

述曰。護法等釋。三位無染義。非體亦無。六十三云。問若彼末那於一切時思量而轉。如世尊說。出世末那云何建立。準此大論及此處文稱經說有。準下證有此識。即是解脫經。六十三中有二解。一名假不如義。即出世末那實不思量故。二遠離顛倒思量能正思量。故通於凈。

此違教。次違理。

論。無染意識至不共依故。

述曰。彼言有學出世道現前。及無學位有漏無漏第六意識。皆無第七依者。此等無染意。定有俱生不共所依。次第逆簡第八．及無間緣．種子等。宗也。是意識故。如有染時意識　論闕因也。下六證中自具作量。故此言略。

論。論說藏識至則七俱轉。

述曰。至下當知。第五十一。及解深密經。當七十六。

論。若住滅定至一識俱轉。

述曰。此難前說滅定之中二乘無法執。大乘位中無凈第七者　論說恒與一識俱言。既非是恒。亦非是定。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一種說法是四種迷惑（四惑）同時存在，因此沒有法執（無法執）。因為沒有說清凈位（凈位）有這個識（第七識末那識），所以不採用佛地經論（佛地）和無性攝論（無性攝論）作為論證的依據。本經（本經）和本論（本論）都沒有說第七識有清凈的，也通於無漏（無漏）的說法。

論：又說第七識是雜染（雜染）的所依。

述曰：攝論（攝論）第一論本，沒有說第七識是清凈的所依。沒有清凈的第七識，法執（法執）的第七識，滅盡定（滅定）、聖道（聖道）、無學（無學）這三個階段，沒有第七識的自體。

論：有觀點認為彼論（彼說）到經中說有（經說有）。

述曰：護法（護法）等人的解釋，這三個階段沒有染污的意義，並非自體也沒有。六十三卷（六十三云）說：『問：如果那個末那（末那，第七識）在一切時都在思量而轉，如世尊（世尊）所說，出世間的末那（出世末那）如何建立？』 依據這部大論（大論）和這裡的文句，稱經中說有。依據下文證明有這個識，就是解脫經（解脫經）。六十三卷中有兩種解釋，一種是假名不如實義，即出世間的末那實際上不思量；另一種是遠離顛倒思量，能夠正確思量，因此通於清凈。

這違背了教義（違教），其次違背了道理（違理）。

論：無染污的意識（無染意識）到不共的所依（不共依）。

述曰：彼論說有學（有學）的出世道（出世道）現前，以及無學位的有漏（有漏）無漏（無漏）的第六意識（第六意識），都沒有第七識作為所依。這些沒有染污的意識，一定有俱生（俱生）的不共所依。次第反向簡別第八識（第八）、以及無間緣（無間緣）、種子（種子）等。這是宗（宗）的說法。因為是意識的緣故，如同有染污時的意識。論中缺少因（因）。下文六個證據中自己具備了量（量），因此這裡省略。

論：論中說藏識（藏識）到第七識同時轉起（七俱轉）。

述曰：到下文應當知道，第五十一卷（第五十一），以及解深密經（解深密經），應當在七十六卷（七十六）。

論：如果住在滅盡定（滅定）到一個識同時轉起（一識俱轉）。

述曰：這是爲了反駁前面所說滅盡定中二乘（二乘）沒有法執，大乘（大乘）位中沒有清凈的第七識。論中說恒常與一個識同時，既然不是恒常，也不是定。

【English Translation】 English version One view is that the four delusions (四惑, sì huò) exist simultaneously, therefore there is no attachment to dharma (無法執, wú fǎ zhí). Because it is not stated that the pure state (凈位, jìng wèi) has this consciousness (識, shì, the seventh consciousness, Manas-vijnana), the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (佛地, Fódì) and the Asanga's Summary of the Mahayana (無性攝論, Wúxìng Shèlùn) are not used as the basis for argumentation. Neither this sutra (本經, běn jīng) nor this treatise (本論, běn lùn) state that the seventh consciousness is pure and also connected to the unconditioned (無漏, wú lòu).

Treatise: It is also said that the seventh consciousness is the basis for defilement (雜染, zá rǎn).

Commentary: The first chapter of the Asanga's Summary of the Mahayana (攝論, Shèlùn) does not say that the seventh consciousness is the basis for purity. There is no pure seventh consciousness, the seventh consciousness of attachment to dharma (法執, fǎ zhí), in the three stages of cessation attainment (滅定, miè dìng), the path of the noble ones (聖道, shèng dào), and the state of no more learning (無學, wú xué), there is no self-nature of the seventh consciousness.

Treatise: Some argue that 'that treatise' (彼說, bǐ shuō) refers to 'the sutra says there is' (經說有, jīng shuō yǒu).

Commentary: The explanations of Dharmapala (護法, Hùfǎ) and others, the meaning of no defilement in these three stages, is not that the self-nature also does not exist. Volume 63 (六十三云, liùshísān yún) says: 'Question: If that Manas (末那, Mònà, the seventh consciousness) is constantly thinking and revolving, as the World Honored One (世尊, Shìzūn) said, how is the supramundane Manas (出世末那, chūshì mònà) established?' According to this great treatise (大論, dàlùn) and the sentences here, it is said that the sutra says there is. According to the following proof that there is this consciousness, that is the Nirvana Sutra (解脫經, Jiětuō Jīng). There are two explanations in Volume 63, one is a false name that is not in accordance with the meaning, that is, the supramundane Manas actually does not think; the other is that it is far from inverted thinking and can think correctly, therefore it is connected to purity.

This contradicts the teachings (違教, wéi jiào), and secondly contradicts reason (違理, wéi lǐ).

Treatise: The undefiled consciousness (無染意識, wú rǎn yìshí) refers to the uncommon basis (不共依, bù gòng yī).

Commentary: That treatise says that when the supramundane path (出世道, chūshì dào) of the learner (有學, yǒu xué) manifests, and the defiled (有漏, yǒu lòu) and undefiled (無漏, wú lòu) sixth consciousness (第六意識, dìliù yìshí) of the state of no more learning, there is no seventh consciousness as the basis. These undefiled consciousnesses must have a co-arisen (俱生, jù shēng) uncommon basis. Sequentially and inversely distinguish the eighth consciousness (第八, dìbā), as well as the immediately preceding condition (無間緣, wú jiàn yuán), seeds (種子, zhǒngzǐ), etc. This is the statement of the thesis (宗, zōng). Because it is a consciousness, like the consciousness when there is defilement. The treatise lacks the reason (因, yīn). In the six proofs below, it has the measure (量, liàng) itself, therefore it is omitted here.

Treatise: The treatise says that the storehouse consciousness (藏識, zàngshí) until the seventh consciousness arises simultaneously (七俱轉, qī jù zhuǎn).

Commentary: It should be known in the following, Volume 51 (第五十一, dìwǔshíyī), and the Sandhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經, Jiěshēnmì Jīng), should be in Volume 76 (七十六, qīshíliù).

Treatise: If one dwells in cessation attainment (滅定, miè dìng) until one consciousness arises simultaneously (一識俱轉, yī shí jù zhuǎn).

Commentary: This is to refute the previous statement that the two vehicles (二乘, èr shèng) in cessation attainment have no attachment to dharma, and the Mahayana (大乘, dàshèng) position has no pure seventh consciousness. The treatise says that it is constantly with one consciousness, since it is not constant, nor is it fixed.

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位無故。

前師說云此據多分。若不爾者非定恒俱故。

論。住聖道時至定二俱轉。

述曰。此難聖道隨法執。及凈第七無者。第六意起唯一識俱。如何可言二識俱轉。

前師若云據多時語。

論。顯揚論說至通染不染。

述曰。彼第一說。復如何通。翻彼相應平等行故。煩惱相應恃舉行故　然所引識起多少中。有無學五識起唯六識俱。非七俱難文。意似為有藏識之言故不說也。無學無藏識故。

論。若由論說至便無第八。

述曰。若由大論六十三。說阿羅漢位無有意故便無第七。則無學身應無第八。以聖說故。何愛第八而便許有。憎第七而言無。言無染意以俱許故。

論。彼既不爾此云何然。

述曰。彼第八既不唯在染位中有爾。此第七識如何言然唯染位有。

論。又諸論言至有能依故。

述曰。莊嚴論．攝論第九。轉第七得平等智。平等智定有所依識。故有第七凈也　量云平等性智定有別所依識。說轉得故。如餘三智　第七若無。即平等智亦應非有。非離所依心有能依智故。

論。不可說彼至如鏡智故。

述曰。又彼若言經言平等智。非第八俱。第八俱者名鏡智故。即依第六。此中唯取第六識也。又六識中隨依一識之能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 位無故。

前師說云此據多分。若不爾者非定恒俱故。

論。住聖道時至定二俱轉。

述曰。此難聖道隨法執。及凈第七無者。第六意起唯一識俱。如何可言二識俱轉。

前師若云據多時語。

論。顯揚論說至通染不染。

述曰。彼第一說。復如何通。翻彼相應平等行故。煩惱相應恃舉行故　然所引識起多少中。有無學五識起唯六識俱。非七俱難文。意似為有藏識之言故不說也。無學無藏識故。

論。若由論說至便無第八。

述曰。若由大論六十三。說阿羅漢（Arhat）位無有意故便無第七。則無學身應無第八。以聖說故。何愛第八而便許有。憎第七而言無。言無染意以俱許故。

論。彼既不爾此云何然。

述曰。彼第八既不唯在染位中有爾。此第七識如何言然唯染位有。

論。又諸論言至有能依故。

述曰。莊嚴論．攝論第九。轉第七得平等智（Samatajnana）。平等智定有所依識。故有第七凈也　量云平等性智定有別所依識。說轉得故。如餘三智　第七若無。即平等智亦應非有。非離所依心有能依智故。

論。不可說彼至如鏡智故。

述曰。又彼若言經言平等智。非第八俱。第八俱者名鏡智（Adarsajnana）故。即依第六。此中唯取第六識也。又六識中隨依一識之能

【English Translation】 English version Position without cause.

The former teacher said that this is based on the majority of cases. Otherwise, it is not necessarily always together.

Treatise: When dwelling in the holy path, both reach the point where the two consciousnesses transform together.

Commentary: This challenges those who hold onto the Dharma in the holy path, and those who deny the pure seventh consciousness. When the sixth consciousness arises, it is only together with one consciousness. How can it be said that two consciousnesses transform together?

If the former teacher says it is based on most of the time.

Treatise: The Xianyang Treatise says it extends to both defiled and undefiled.

Commentary: That first statement, how can it extend? Because it reverses the corresponding equal conduct. Because it relies on the arising of afflictions. However, among the arising of consciousnesses mentioned, the five consciousnesses of a non-learner arise only together with the sixth consciousness. It is not a difficult text about being together with the seventh consciousness. The intention seems to be that because there is mention of the alaya consciousness, it is not mentioned. Because a non-learner does not have the alaya consciousness.

Treatise: If according to the treatise, then there would be no eighth consciousness.

Commentary: If according to the sixty-third section of the great treatise, it says that there is no intention in the position of an Arhat (one who has attained Nirvana), therefore there is no seventh consciousness. Then the body of a non-learner should not have the eighth consciousness, because the holy one said so. Why love the eighth consciousness and allow it to exist, while hating the seventh and saying it does not exist? Saying there is no defiled intention is because both are allowed to exist.

Treatise: Since that is not the case, how can this be so?

Commentary: Since that eighth consciousness is not only present in the defiled state, how can it be said that this seventh consciousness is only present in the defiled state?

Treatise: Also, various treatises say that there is a basis for it.

Commentary: The Zhuangyan Treatise and the ninth section of the She Lun say that transforming the seventh consciousness obtains the Samatajnana (wisdom of equality). The wisdom of equality definitely has a consciousness it relies on. Therefore, there is a pure seventh consciousness. The inference is that the wisdom of equality definitely has a separate consciousness it relies on, because it is said to be obtained through transformation, like the other three wisdoms. If there is no seventh consciousness, then the wisdom of equality should also not exist, because there is no wisdom that can rely on something without a mind to rely on.

Treatise: It cannot be said that it is like mirror wisdom.

Commentary: Also, if they say that the sutra says the wisdom of equality is not together with the eighth consciousness, because that which is together with the eighth consciousness is called Adarsajnana (mirror wisdom), then it relies on the sixth consciousness. Here, only the sixth consciousness is taken. Also, among the six consciousnesses, it depends on the ability of one consciousness.

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依智者。不然。佛地經中說此智品佛位恒行。即汝共許。許佛恒無轉異行如鏡智故。非六識智。六識智有轉異不恒故。又間斷名不行。此非間斷名恒行。如下第十平等智處說。

論。又無學位至如余識性故。

述曰。無學無此識。第八應無依。若許八無依。違比量過。汝無學位第八必有現行俱有依。是識性故。如餘七識。

彼師許第七以第八為依故。

論。又如未證至彼依何識。

述曰。又難。如凡夫等未證人空人執恒行。二乘人等未證法空。法執亦應恒現前有。為例均故。若此識無。法執恒行依於何識。二乘定有故。

論。非依第八彼無惠故。

述曰。彼說八識皆有執故。不可說執依第八識。第八識俱無惠執故。非八俱也。

論。由此應信至法無我故。

述曰。二乘聖道。及滅定位。法執有故。此第七識恒行不絕。未證法空故。意顯迴心．頓悟人等入初地已。分證法空有此凈智。

論。又諸論中至為第六依。

述曰。瑜伽第五十一。攝論第一證七識中。以五識為同法。證有第七為第六依。

論。聖道起時至便俱有失。

述曰。若聖道起在有學。及無學。無第七為六依。彼二論所立之宗因應俱有過　謂若總言第六意識。必有俱生不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 依仗智者。不然。在《佛地經》（Buddhabhumi Sutra）中說，這種智慧品性在佛的果位上是恒常執行的。這是你們共同認可的。認可佛陀恒常沒有轉變和差異的行持，就像鏡智（Adarsa-jnana）一樣。這不是六識的智慧，因為六識的智慧有轉變和差異，不是恒常的。而且，間斷就不能稱為恒常執行。這種智慧不是間斷的，所以稱為恒常執行。如下面第十平等智（Samata-jnana）之處所說。

論：又，無學位的聖者沒有此識，就像其餘的識一樣。

述記：無學位的人沒有第七識，那麼第八識應該沒有所依。如果承認第八識沒有所依，就違背了比量的過失。你們認為無學位的聖者，第八識必定有現行，並且有俱有的所依。因為它是識的性質，就像其餘的七識一樣。

對方的老師承認第七識以第八識為所依。

論：又如未證得人無我時，人執恒常執行，那麼第七識以什麼識為所依呢？

述記：又一個難點。比如凡夫等沒有證得人空（Pudgala-sunyata），人執（Pudgala-graha）恒常執行。二乘人等沒有證得法空（Dharma-sunyata），法執（Dharma-graha）也應該恒常現前存在。因為例子是相同的。如果此第七識沒有，法執恒常執行，那麼它以什麼識為所依呢？二乘人肯定有法執。

論：不是以第八識為所依，因為第八識沒有智慧。

述記：對方說八識都有執著，所以不能說執著依于第八識。因為第八識沒有智慧，所以不是和第八識俱有的。

論：由此應該相信，二乘聖道和滅盡定中，法執仍然存在，因為沒有證得法無我。

述記：二乘的聖道，以及滅盡定中，法執是存在的，因為沒有證得法空。這意味著迴心、頓悟的人等進入初地（Prathama-bhumi）后，分證法空，才有這種清凈的智慧。

論：又，在各種論典中，都說第七識以第六識為所依。

述記：《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十一卷，《攝大乘論》（Mahayanasamgraha）第一卷證明七識時，以五識為同法，證明有第七識以第六識為所依。

論：聖道生起時，如果無學位的聖者沒有第七識，那麼《瑜伽師地論》和《攝大乘論》所立的宗和因就都有過失。

述記：如果聖道生起時，在有學位和無學位，沒有第七識作為第六識的所依，那麼《瑜伽師地論》和《攝大乘論》所立的宗和因就都有過失。也就是說，如果總的說第六意識，必定有俱生的不...

【English Translation】 English version: Relying on the wise. Not so. In the Buddhabhumi Sutra, it is said that this wisdom quality constantly operates in the Buddha's position. This is what you both acknowledge. Acknowledge that the Buddha's constant and unchanging conduct is like the Mirror Wisdom (Adarsa-jnana). This is not the wisdom of the six consciousnesses, because the wisdom of the six consciousnesses has changes and differences, and is not constant. Moreover, interruption cannot be called constant operation. This wisdom is not interrupted, so it is called constant operation. As stated in the tenth Equality Wisdom (Samata-jnana) below.

Treatise: Furthermore, those in the state of No-More-Learning do not have this consciousness, just like the other consciousnesses.

Commentary: Those in the state of No-More-Learning do not have the seventh consciousness, then the eighth consciousness should have no basis. If it is admitted that the eighth consciousness has no basis, it violates the fallacy of inference. You believe that those in the state of No-More-Learning must have the eighth consciousness currently operating and having a co-existing basis. Because it is the nature of consciousness, just like the other seven consciousnesses.

The other teacher admits that the seventh consciousness takes the eighth consciousness as its basis.

Treatise: Furthermore, just as when one has not realized the non-self of persons, the clinging to persons constantly operates, then what consciousness does the seventh consciousness rely on?

Commentary: Another difficulty. For example, ordinary people, etc., have not realized the emptiness of persons (Pudgala-sunyata), and the clinging to persons (Pudgala-graha) constantly operates. Those in the Two Vehicles, etc., have not realized the emptiness of phenomena (Dharma-sunyata), and the clinging to phenomena (Dharma-graha) should also constantly appear. Because the examples are the same. If this seventh consciousness does not exist, and the clinging to phenomena constantly operates, then what consciousness does it rely on? Those in the Two Vehicles certainly have clinging to phenomena.

Treatise: It does not rely on the eighth consciousness, because the eighth consciousness has no wisdom.

Commentary: The other party says that all eight consciousnesses have clinging, so it cannot be said that clinging relies on the eighth consciousness. Because the eighth consciousness has no wisdom, it is not co-existing with the eighth consciousness.

Treatise: From this, it should be believed that in the holy path of the Two Vehicles and in the cessation attainment, clinging to phenomena still exists, because the non-self of phenomena has not been realized.

Commentary: In the holy path of the Two Vehicles, as well as in the cessation attainment, clinging to phenomena exists, because the emptiness of phenomena has not been realized. This means that those who turn their minds, those who have sudden enlightenment, etc., after entering the first ground (Prathama-bhumi), partially realize the emptiness of phenomena and have this pure wisdom.

Treatise: Furthermore, in various treatises, it is said that the seventh consciousness relies on the sixth consciousness.

Commentary: In the fifty-first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the first volume of the Mahayanasamgraha, when proving the seven consciousnesses, the five consciousnesses are taken as the same dharma, proving that the seventh consciousness relies on the sixth consciousness.

Treatise: When the holy path arises, if those in the state of No-More-Learning do not have the seventh consciousness, then the tenets and reasons established in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the Mahayanasamgraha will both have faults.

Commentary: If, when the holy path arises, in the states of Learning and No-More-Learning, there is no seventh consciousness as the basis for the sixth consciousness, then the tenets and reasons established in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the Mahayanasamgraha will both have faults. That is to say, if generally speaking of the sixth consciousness, there must be co-arisen non...

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共增上別依。即違自宗一分宗過。自計聖道及無學意無所依故。若言除聖道及無學意識。余意識必有此依。即有比量相違之過。此一分意識無依。與余令有依者為比量故。若以六識攝故為因。成前總宗。此因即有自不定過。為如五識六識攝故意識有依。為如汝聖道。無學意識。六識攝故。意識無依。若以六識攝故之因成后宗者。便有自法自相相違。決定相違過失　謂彼一分意定無依。六識攝故。如汝聖道．無學意識　故無第七。攝論．大論比量宗．因。皆有此失。善因明者應乃知之。

論。或應五識至六亦應爾。

述曰。義雖不然。汝之五識亦應許有無依之時。六識攝故。如汝意識　此有自宗相違過失以就他宗　然成返難。五識恒有依。意識應亦爾。結成前難。

論。是故定有至此亦應爾。

述曰。故無染意于上三位亦恒現前。二乘三位法執無染。菩薩三位或凈無漏無染心起。是隨所應思之差別。迴心向大其理皆然。論說三位無末那者。隨何乘說染污意無。非無第七識體。如說四位不退菩薩等無阿賴耶。非無第八識體。舍染名故。故人執俱定有法執　下自更解無漏亦有凈第七識。一一皆如佛地論說。及樞要說。諸門分別如第十解。下唯正義。◎

成唯識論述記卷第五(本)

成

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 共增上緣和所依。這違反了你宗派的一部分主張，因為你認為聖道（āryamārga，證悟的道路）和無學意（aśaikṣa-citta，已證悟者的心）沒有所依。如果你說除了聖道和無學意識之外，其餘意識一定有所依，那麼就犯了比量相違的過失。因為這一部分沒有所依的意識，與其餘有依的意識形成了比量。如果以『被六識所攝』作為原因，來成立之前的總宗，那麼這個原因就犯了自不定的過失。是因為像五識一樣，被六識所攝的意識有所依呢？還是像你的聖道和無學意識一樣，被六識所攝的意識沒有所依呢？如果以『被六識所攝』作為原因來成立後面的宗，那麼就犯了自法自相相違，決定相違的過失。也就是說，你的一部分意念是肯定沒有所依的，因為它被六識所攝，就像你的聖道和無學意識一樣。所以沒有第七識。攝論（Saṃgraha，指《攝大乘論》）、大論（Mahāyāna-sūtra，指大乘經）的比量宗和原因，都有這個過失。精通因明的人應該知道這一點。

論：或者應該說五識乃至六識也應該如此。

述記：雖然義理上並非如此，但你的五識也應該承認有無所依的時候，因為它被六識所攝，就像你的意識一樣。這犯了自宗相違的過失，因為是就他宗而言。然而，這構成了反駁。五識恒常有所依，意識也應該如此。總結並構成之前的責難。

論：因此，一定有，乃至此處也應該如此。

述記：因此，染污意在上三位（指菩薩的三個階段）也恒常現前。二乘（śrāvaka-yāna和pratyekabuddha-yāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的三位中，法執是無染的。菩薩的三位中，或者清凈無漏的無染心生起。這是隨所應思量的差別。迴心向大乘的道理都是這樣。論中說三位沒有末那（manas，意），是隨何種乘來說染污意沒有，並非沒有第七識的體性。就像說四位不退轉的菩薩等沒有阿賴耶（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識），並非沒有第八識的體性。因為捨棄了染污的名稱。所以人執和俱生法執一定是有的。下面自己進一步解釋無漏也有清凈的第七識。這些都如《佛地論》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra）所說，以及《樞要》（樞要記）所說。各種門類的分別，如第十品所解釋的。下面只是正義。 《成唯識論述記》卷第五（本） 成

【English Translation】 English version: Both the co-operative condition and the basis. This violates a portion of your own doctrine, because you believe that the āryamārga (the noble path, the path to enlightenment) and aśaikṣa-citta (the mind of one who has attained enlightenment) have no basis. If you say that, except for the āryamārga and the non-learning consciousness, the remaining consciousnesses must have a basis, then you commit the fault of contradictory inference. Because this portion of consciousness that has no basis forms an inference with the remaining consciousnesses that have a basis. If you use 'being included in the six consciousnesses' as the reason to establish the previous general proposition, then this reason commits the fault of being self-uncertain. Is it because, like the five consciousnesses, the consciousness included in the six consciousnesses has a basis? Or is it like your āryamārga and non-learning consciousness, the consciousness included in the six consciousnesses has no basis? If you use 'being included in the six consciousnesses' as the reason to establish the latter proposition, then you commit the fault of self-property and self-characteristic contradiction, and definitive contradiction. That is to say, a portion of your mind is definitely without a basis, because it is included in the six consciousnesses, just like your āryamārga and non-learning consciousness. Therefore, there is no seventh consciousness. The inference propositions and reasons in the Saṃgraha (referring to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha), and the Mahāyāna-sūtra (referring to Mahāyāna sutras), all have this fault. Those who are proficient in Hetuvidya (logic) should know this.

Treatise: Or it should be said that the five consciousnesses, and even the six consciousnesses, should also be like this.

Commentary: Although the meaning is not so, your five consciousnesses should also be admitted to have times when they are without a basis, because they are included in the six consciousnesses, just like your consciousness. This commits the fault of self-doctrine contradiction, because it is in terms of another's doctrine. However, this constitutes a refutation. The five consciousnesses always have a basis, and the consciousness should also be like this. Summarize and constitute the previous criticism.

Treatise: Therefore, there must be, and even here it should be like this.

Commentary: Therefore, the defiled mind is also constantly present in the upper three stages (referring to the three stages of a Bodhisattva). In the three stages of the two vehicles (śrāvaka-yāna and pratyekabuddha-yāna), the attachment to dharma is undefiled. In the three stages of a Bodhisattva, either a pure, undefiled mind free from outflows arises. This is the difference in what should be contemplated. The principle of turning the mind towards the Mahāyāna is all like this. The treatise says that there is no manas (mind) in the three stages, it is according to which vehicle it is said that there is no defiled mind, not that there is no nature of the seventh consciousness. Just like saying that there is no ālayavijñāna (store consciousness) in the four stages of non-retreating Bodhisattvas, etc., it is not that there is no nature of the eighth consciousness. Because the name of defilement is abandoned. Therefore, the attachment to self and the co-arisen attachment to dharma must exist. Below, it further explains that there is also a pure seventh consciousness free from outflows. These are all as stated in the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra, and the Essential Notes. The distinctions of various categories are as explained in the tenth chapter. Below is only the correct meaning. Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 5 (Original) Establishing

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唯識論述記卷第五(末)

沙門基撰

◎論。此意差別略有三種。

述曰。上來依頌第十門中。已略分別伏斷位訖。自下第二因乘義解分位行相　于中有三。初標分位行相差別之數次列其名。后隨別釋。此即初也。

論。一補特伽羅至平等性智相應。

述曰。即列名也。以相應法顯識行相。

論。初通一切至有漏心位。

述曰。由此三種短長不同故成位別　自下別釋有二。初別解三位。後重斷簡。此是第一與人我見相應。正云補特伽羅。通五趣攝。非唯人故。如前已解。即一切異生全。二乘有學有漏心位。起此見故。除八地已去。彼永不起此人我見。七地已前一類菩薩有漏心位。一類之言。謂即簡取頓悟菩薩初地至七地。漸悟菩薩．二乘有學從初發心初二阿僧祇劫。除二乘無學回心菩薩者。故言一類。彼已永無故。此菩薩．及二乘有學起有漏心時者。但起無漏人執必無故。

論。彼緣阿賴耶識起補特伽羅我見。

述曰。此識緣阿賴耶識起數取趣見也。七地已前第八未舍阿賴耶名故也。第七非不與法見俱。法見位長。人我位短。又人我粗。法我細故。故偏說之。此為初無。此即舍名　問能緣人我。七地以前有漏心時方言有者。此意是入無漏時舍。如下亦然。舍

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《唯識論述記》卷第五(末)

沙門基 撰

◎論。此意差別略有三種。

述曰。上來依頌第十門中。已略分別伏斷位訖。自下第二因乘義解分位行相　于中有三。初標分位行相差別之數次列其名。后隨別釋。此即初也。

論。一補特伽羅（Pudgala，意為『人』或『有情』）至平等性智相應。

述曰。即列名也。以相應法顯識行相。

論。初通一切至有漏心位。

述曰。由此三種短長不同故成位別　自下別釋有二。初別解三位。後重斷簡。此是第一與人我見相應。正云補特伽羅（Pudgala，意為『人』或『有情』）。通五趣攝。非唯人故。如前已解。即一切異生全。二乘有學有漏心位。起此見故。除八地已去。彼永不起此人我見。七地已前一類菩薩有漏心位。一類之言。謂即簡取頓悟菩薩初地至七地。漸悟菩薩．二乘有學從初發心初二阿僧祇劫。除二乘無學回心菩薩者。故言一類。彼已永無故。此菩薩．及二乘有學起有漏心時者。但起無漏人執必無故。

論。彼緣阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，意為『藏識』）起補特伽羅（Pudgala，意為『人』或『有情』）我見。

述曰。此識緣阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，意為『藏識』）起數取趣見也。七地已前第八未舍阿賴耶名故也。第七非不與法見俱。法見位長。人我位短。又人我粗。法我細故。故偏說之。此為初無。此即舍名　問能緣人我。七地以前有漏心時方言有者。此意是入無漏時舍。如下亦然。舍

【English Translation】 English version Verses on Consciousness-Only, with Commentary, Volume 5 (End)

Composed by Śramaṇa (Buddhist monk) Kui Ji

◎ Treatise: The differences in this meaning are roughly of three kinds.

Commentary: Above, based on the tenth section of the verses, the stages of subduing and eliminating afflictions have been briefly distinguished. From here below is the second part, explaining the aspects of the stages of the causal vehicle. There are three parts within this: first, indicating the number of differences in the aspects of the stages; second, listing their names; and third, explaining them separately. This is the first.

Treatise: One, 'Pudgala' (person or sentient being) up to correspondence with the Wisdom of Equality.

Commentary: This is listing the names. The aspects of consciousness are manifested by the corresponding dharmas.

Treatise: Initially, it encompasses all up to the stage of defiled mind.

Commentary: Because these three are different in length, they constitute different stages. Below, there are two parts to the separate explanation: first, separately explaining the three stages; second, re-examining and simplifying. This is the first, corresponding to the view of self in persons. It is properly called 'Pudgala' (person or sentient being), encompassing all five destinies, not just humans, as explained before. This includes all ordinary beings entirely, the defiled minds of śaikṣas (those still in training) of the Two Vehicles. Because this view arises, it excludes the eighth bhūmi (stage) and beyond, as they never give rise to this view of self in persons. Before the seventh bhūmi, it includes a certain type of Bodhisattva with defiled minds. 'A certain type' refers to specifically selecting Bodhisattvas who attain sudden enlightenment from the first to the seventh bhūmi, and Bodhisattvas who attain gradual enlightenment, as well as śaikṣas of the Two Vehicles, from the initial arising of the mind for the first two asaṃkhyeya-kalpas (incalculable eons). It excludes Arhats of the Two Vehicles who turn their minds towards Bodhisattvahood. Therefore, it is said 'a certain type,' because they no longer have it. When these Bodhisattvas and śaikṣas of the Two Vehicles give rise to defiled minds, they only give rise to defiled clinging to persons, never to undefiled clinging to persons.

Treatise: They rely on the Ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness) to give rise to the view of self in 'Pudgala' (person or sentient being).

Commentary: This consciousness relies on the Ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness) to give rise to the view of 'seeker of rebirth'. Because before the seventh bhūmi, the eighth has not abandoned the name Ālaya (store). The seventh is not without the view of self in dharmas. The stage of the view of self in dharmas is long, while the stage of the view of self in persons is short. Moreover, the view of self in persons is coarse, while the view of self in dharmas is subtle. Therefore, it is discussed specifically. This is initially non-existent. This is abandoning the name. Question: The ability to rely on the view of self in persons, which is said to exist only when the mind is defiled before the seventh bhūmi, means that it is abandoned upon entering the undefiled state, as is the case below. Abandoning.

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此相應。何故第八舍阿賴耶名。不言七地以前起無漏心時舍　答八據永舍。以性未能離他執故。七據暫舍。以染污體少時無故。不相違也。不可說彼得互舍也。以二乘有學未名舍故。若許暫舍。二乘有學入無漏心亦應名舍。染污末那違無漏故。

論。次通一切至不現前位。

述曰。即是第二法見相應。此若初位必有此位。有此位時未必有初。此位長也。即諸異生。一切二乘不問有學．無學身全。一切菩薩。即兼頓悟。及學無學漸悟菩薩。十地之中法智及果不現前位　法空智者。謂無分別智入法空觀時　果者。即是此正智果。謂法空后得智。及依法空后得智入滅定位。無分別智所引起故。名法空智果。此時第七識必起平等智。第六法空心細。第七法執障彼法空智。法空智起故平等智生。等流亦爾。體類同故。然此中言。簡取人空無分別智。及人空后得智。並此人空所引滅定。此位之時雖滅人執。法執仍在。人空觀粗。法執行細不障彼智。唯第七人執可障彼智。故入人觀位人執不行。如來地時此識無漏。故不說也。

論。彼緣異熟識起法我見。

述曰。此法執心緣異熟識起法我見。法我見位既長。異熟之心亦爾。見．相相當故說緣也。非人執心不緣異熟。異熟位長故不說彼。非法執心不緣賴耶。

賴耶短故不說之也。

論。后通一切至現在前位。

述曰。即平等智相應心也。后勝全論。即一切如來全。無有漏故。一切菩薩見道全。通頓．漸悟。一切菩薩必法空觀入見道故。此非三心真見道義。及一切菩薩修道位中法空智。及果現在前位。皆起平等智故。人觀不然。如前已說。然果中有遠果。有近果。如何等者。佛地論說。后得智若是法觀等流者。即是法觀　若定爾者。八地已去不出無漏觀。彼位何時非法觀果　由此應說。鄰近果者。如佛地論說法觀后得現前。若遠果者。即人觀后得現前　或八地以去無分別智自入人觀。彼果起人觀后得智亦無妨　然此中據初解鄰近果說。若約后義即果全論　又此果有緣慮不緣慮。不緣慮者即滅定。緣慮者可知。

論。彼緣無垢至起平等性智。

述曰。此第三智緣何法境。于佛地時緣無垢識等。即緣無垢第八凈識一切有為及真如故言等。菩薩見修道位。緣異熟識及真如故　問若許菩薩亦緣真如。即第七識一心之中。雙緣真俗有漏無漏二境界失　答若在真見道。及一切緣真如無分別智此第七識。一向緣如不緣第八。唯理觀故。其相見道。及修道中后得智品平等性智。或唯緣第八。或亦緣似真如。其實唯有為。通緣有漏無漏為境由第六識引生別故。今此總

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識）非常微細，難以覺察，所以不說它。

論：后得智通於一切位，直至果位現前。

述記：即與平等性智（Samatā-jñāna，證悟諸法平等性的智慧）相應的心。后得智在勝鬘經的完整論述中，指一切如來（Tathāgata，佛的稱號）的全部智慧，因為其中沒有煩惱。也指一切菩薩（Bodhisattva，立志成佛的修行者）見道位的全部智慧，貫通頓悟和漸悟。一切菩薩必定通過法空觀（Dharma-śūnyatā-darśana，對諸法空性的觀照）進入見道。這並非三心（過去心、現在心、未來心）的真見道之義，而是指一切菩薩在修道位中，以及果位現前時，所生起的法空智。人觀（對人的觀察）並非如此，如前所述。然而，果位中有遠果和近果，如何區分呢？《佛地論》（Buddhabhūmi-śāstra，解釋佛果的論著）說，后得智如果是法觀的等流果，那就是法觀的果。如果一定是這樣，那麼八地菩薩以後，所產生的智慧都離不開無漏觀（Anāsrava-darśana，無煩惱的觀照）。那麼，這些菩薩在哪個階段不是法觀的果呢？因此，應該說，鄰近的果，就像《佛地論》所說的，是法觀后得智的現前。而遙遠的果，就是人觀后得智的現前。或者，八地菩薩以後，無分別智（Nirvikalpa-jñāna，無分別的智慧）自然進入人觀，其果位生起人觀后得智也沒有妨礙。然而，這裡根據最初的解釋，說的是鄰近的果。如果按照後面的意義，那就是果位的全部論述。此外，這個果位有緣慮和不緣慮兩種。不緣慮的就是滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti，一種禪定狀態）。緣慮的則可以理解。

論：彼平等性智緣無垢識等，能起平等性智。

述記：這第三種智慧緣何種法境呢？在佛地時，緣無垢識（Amala-vijñāna，清凈的第八識）等，即緣清凈的第八識的一切有為法（Saṃskṛta，因緣和合而成的法）和真如（Tathātā，諸法的真實本性），所以說『等』。菩薩在見道和修道位時，緣異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，第八識的別名）和真如。問：如果允許菩薩也緣真如，那麼第七識（末那識，執著第八識為自我的識）在一心之中，同時緣真俗二境，既有有漏（Sāsrava，有煩惱）的境界，也有無漏的境界，這就有過失了。答：如果在真見道，以及一切緣真如的無分別智中，這個第七識始終緣真如，不緣第八識，因為是唯理觀。在相見道，以及修道中的后得智品平等性智中，或者只緣第八識，或者也緣相似的真如，但其實只是有為法，普遍以有漏和無漏為境界，由第六識（意識，分別事物的識）引導而產生差別。現在這裡總的來說……

【English Translation】 English version: Because the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness, the consciousness that stores all seeds) is very subtle and difficult to perceive, it is not discussed.

Treatise: Subsequent wisdom (后得智, hòudézhì) encompasses all stages up to the attainment of Buddhahood.

Commentary: This refers to the mind that corresponds to Samatā-jñāna (平等性智, píngděngxìngzhì, wisdom of equality). In the complete discourse of the Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra, subsequent wisdom refers to the entirety of all Tathāgatas (如來, Rúlái, 'Thus-gone one', an epithet of the Buddha), because it is free from outflows (漏, lòu, defilements). It also refers to the entirety of the path of seeing (見道, jiàndào) for all Bodhisattvas (菩薩, Púsà, beings striving for enlightenment), encompassing both sudden and gradual enlightenment. All Bodhisattvas necessarily enter the path of seeing through the contemplation of the emptiness of dharmas (法空觀, fǎkōngguān, Dharma-śūnyatā-darśana). This is not the meaning of true seeing on the path of the three minds (三心, sānxīn, past, present, and future minds), but rather refers to the wisdom of the emptiness of dharmas that arises in all Bodhisattvas during the stage of cultivation, as well as during the stage when the fruit of Buddhahood is manifested. Human observation (人觀, rén guān, observation of beings) is not like this, as previously explained. However, within the fruit of Buddhahood, there are distant fruits and near fruits. How are they distinguished? The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra (佛地論, Fódìlùn, Treatise on the Buddha-land) states that if subsequent wisdom is a result of the flow of Dharma observation, then it is the fruit of Dharma observation. If this is always the case, then after the eighth bhūmi (地, dì, stage), the wisdom that arises will always be free from outflows. When is it that these Bodhisattvas are not the fruit of Dharma observation? Therefore, it should be said that the near fruit is the manifestation of subsequent wisdom after Dharma observation, as stated in the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra. The distant fruit is the manifestation of subsequent wisdom after human observation. Alternatively, after the eighth bhūmi, non-discriminating wisdom (無分別智, wúfēnbiézhì, Nirvikalpa-jñāna) naturally enters human observation, and there is no obstacle to the arising of subsequent wisdom based on human observation as its fruit. However, this passage, according to the initial explanation, refers to the near fruit. According to the later meaning, it refers to the complete discourse on the fruit of Buddhahood. Furthermore, this fruit has both object-cognizing and non-object-cognizing aspects. The non-object-cognizing aspect is Nirodha-samāpatti (滅盡定, mièjìndìng, cessation attainment). The object-cognizing aspect is understandable.

Treatise: That Samatā-jñāna arises by cognizing the Amala-vijñāna, etc.

Commentary: What Dharma-object does this third wisdom cognize? At the stage of Buddhahood, it cognizes the Amala-vijñāna (無垢識, wúgòushì, stainless consciousness), etc., that is, it cognizes all conditioned dharmas (有為法, yǒuwéifǎ, Saṃskṛta) and Suchness (真如, zhēnrú, Tathātā) of the pure eighth consciousness, hence the use of 'etc.'. Bodhisattvas in the stages of seeing and cultivation cognize the Vipāka-vijñāna (異熟識, yìshúshì, resultant consciousness) and Suchness. Question: If it is accepted that Bodhisattvas also cognize Suchness, then the seventh consciousness (末那識, mònàshì, Manas-vijñāna) simultaneously cognizes both mundane and supramundane, defiled and undefiled realms within one mind, which is a fault. Answer: In true seeing on the path, and in all non-discriminating wisdom that cognizes Suchness, this seventh consciousness always cognizes Suchness and does not cognize the eighth consciousness, because it is purely a contemplation of principle. In the path of seeing and in the subsequent wisdom of the path of cultivation, Samatā-jñāna either only cognizes the eighth consciousness, or also cognizes something similar to Suchness, but in reality, it is only conditioned dharmas, universally taking defiled (有漏, yǒulòu, Sāsrava) and undefiled as its objects, due to the differences generated by the sixth consciousness (意識, yìshì, Mano-vijñāna). Now, this passage generally...

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言緣異熟等。等真如等故。以後得智不親緣真如。不名真俗雙行。至五地中方合此難合合令相應。故亦無妨　又解若在佛果。此平等智雙緣真俗。若在十地唯緣異熟。未能緣如。無如前失　此亦不然。十平等中許緣真如。佛地論中第五卷說初地即得。故知因中亦緣真俗。前解為勝　或第八未舍名。得言緣賴耶。性未離故。故復言等。即是識字及一等字。通在無垢及異熟識。此解難知。既無能藏。藏義應暫舍。

問二執俱起。何故分位前後不同。初廣前人執。

論。補特伽羅至方謂人等故。

述曰。自下第二重明前位。文有其二。唯廣初二故　廣初有二。初明二執寬狹。后明用．體同別。此初也。今顯初位必帶后位。以初短故。人我位必有法我。人我必依法我起故。人我是主宰作者等用故。法我有自性勝用等故。即法我通。人我狹也　如人要迷杌不知是杌等方執為人。迷杌為先後方人起。

此中喻況理有淺．深。淺喻謂人是人執。迷杌是法執。深喻即迷杌是迷法空。謂人是起人執。法中據迷理。人中起事執　問人中亦可言迷理。法中起事執　答不然。人狹法寬。以法為本故　難淺喻云。若執是杌即執人。可使執杌是法執。既言迷杌起於人。迷杌應非是法執　答不然。迷者不了。不了杌時似於法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 言說緣起、異熟等等。（等等是因為包括）等同於真如等等。因為以後的得智不能直接緣于真如，所以不能稱為真俗雙行。要到五地菩薩才能將這種難以調和的狀態調和相應，所以也沒有妨礙。又有一種解釋說，如果在佛果位，這種平等效能同時緣于真和俗。如果在十地菩薩位，只能緣于異熟識，不能緣于真如，沒有像前面說的過失。這種說法也不對。十平等中允許緣于真如。《佛地論》第五卷說初地菩薩就能證得，所以知道在因地也能緣于真俗。前面的解釋更好。或者第八識（阿賴耶識）還沒有捨棄名稱，可以稱為緣于阿賴耶識，因為它的體性還沒有離開。所以又說『等』，就是『識』字和『一等』字，都通用於無垢識和異熟識。這種解釋難以理解。既然沒有能藏識，藏的含義應該暫時捨棄。

問：人我和法我二執同時生起，為什麼在不同階段表現不同？首先廣泛闡述前人的執著。

論：補特伽羅（pudgala，意為人）直到…才稱為人等等。

述曰：從下面第二段重新闡明前面的階段。文中有兩種情況，只廣泛闡述了最初兩種情況。廣泛闡述最初的情況有兩種：首先闡明人我和法我二執的寬泛和狹隘，然後闡明它們的體和用是否相同或不同。這是第一種情況。現在顯示最初的階段必然帶有後面的階段，因為最初的階段比較短。人我執必然有法我執，人我執必然依據法我執而生起。人我是主宰、作者等作用，法我有自性、殊勝作用等，所以法我執是普遍的，人我執是狹隘的。比如人要迷惑于木樁，不知道是木樁等，才執著為人。迷惑于木樁是先發生的，然後才產生人我執。

這裡面的比喻，道理有深有淺。淺顯的比喻是說，執著人就是人我執，迷惑于木樁就是法我執。深層的比喻是說，迷惑于木樁就是迷惑於法的空性。說執著人就是生起人我執，法中是根據迷惑的道理，人中是生起對事物的執著。問：人中也可以說是迷惑道理，法中是生起對事物的執著嗎？答：不是這樣。人我執狹隘，法我執寬泛，因為法是根本。難：淺顯的比喻說，如果執著是木樁，就是執著人。可以使執著木樁是法我執。既然說迷惑于木樁而生起人我執，那麼迷惑于木樁應該不是法我執。答：不是這樣。迷惑的人不瞭解真相。不瞭解木樁的時候，類似於法我執。

【English Translation】 English version: Speaking of conditioned arising, resultant maturation, and so on. (The 'and so on' is because it includes) being equal to Suchness (Tathata) and so on. Because the wisdom attained later cannot directly cognize Suchness, it cannot be called the simultaneous practice of truth and convention. Only at the fifth Bhumi (stage of a Bodhisattva) can this difficult-to-harmonize state be harmonized and made corresponding, so there is no obstacle. Another explanation is that, in the Buddha-fruit position, this equality-nature can simultaneously cognize truth and convention. If in the ten Bhumis, it can only cognize the resultant maturation consciousness, and cannot cognize Suchness, without the fault mentioned earlier. This explanation is also incorrect. Among the ten equalities, it is permissible to cognize Suchness. The fifth volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra says that the first Bhumi is attained immediately, so it is known that in the causal stage, one can also cognize truth and convention. The previous explanation is better. Or the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) has not yet abandoned its name, so it can be called cognizing the Alaya. Because its nature has not departed. Therefore, it is said again 'and so on', which means the word 'consciousness' and the word 'one equal', both apply to the stainless consciousness and the resultant maturation consciousness. This explanation is difficult to understand. Since there is no capable-of-storing consciousness, the meaning of storing should be temporarily abandoned.

Question: Since the two attachments (self-attachment and dharma-attachment) arise simultaneously, why do they manifest differently at different stages? First, extensively explain the former people's attachment.

Treatise: Pudgala (person) until... is called a person, and so on.

Commentary: From the second section below, re-clarify the previous stages. There are two situations in the text, only extensively explaining the first two situations. There are two ways to extensively explain the initial situation: first, clarify the breadth and narrowness of the two attachments (self-attachment and dharma-attachment), and then clarify whether their substance and function are the same or different. This is the first situation. Now it is shown that the initial stage necessarily carries the later stage, because the initial stage is shorter. Self-attachment necessarily has dharma-attachment, and self-attachment necessarily arises based on dharma-attachment. Self-attachment is the function of being the master, creator, etc., and dharma-attachment has the nature, superior function, etc., so dharma-attachment is universal, and self-attachment is narrow. For example, a person must be deluded about a tree stump, not knowing it is a tree stump, etc., before attaching to it as a person. Being deluded about the tree stump happens first, and then self-attachment arises.

The analogy here has deep and shallow meanings. The shallow analogy is that attaching to a person is self-attachment, and being deluded about a tree stump is dharma-attachment. The deep analogy is that being deluded about a tree stump is being deluded about the emptiness of dharmas. Saying that attaching to a person is arising self-attachment, in dharmas it is based on the deluded principle, and in persons it is arising attachment to things. Question: Can it also be said that in persons it is being deluded about the principle, and in dharmas it is arising attachment to things? Answer: It is not like that. Self-attachment is narrow, and dharma-attachment is broad, because dharma is the root. Objection: The shallow analogy says that if one attaches to it as a tree stump, then one is attaching to a person. It can make attaching to a tree stump be dharma-attachment. Since it is said that self-attachment arises from being deluded about a tree stump, then being deluded about a tree stump should not be dharma-attachment. Answer: It is not like that. A deluded person does not understand the truth. When one does not understand the tree stump, it is similar to dharma-attachment.

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執。非謂執是實杌方為不了　問若不了杌與疑何別　答彼猶豫故。此決定故。決定迷杌遂執是人。故是法執。

問如何二執得俱起耶。

論。我法二見至此亦應然。

述曰。下顯體．用同別。我法用別。惠體是一。同一種生無違于理。如一眼識緣青．黃兩境。二行相生。然今此中以兩境兩行共許識。喻不共執心。然今所執非是二境。無一心中於二境起二行執故　問若爾前言疑于理印於事。豈非二行二境耶　彼雖非執行相別故。執則不然。以推求故。以堅著故。境．行別者亦不俱起。今此不違故許俱起。

即是廣前初人執位。此下廣前法執位中有三。初總廣一切唯法執位。次更重諍八地以上。后解法執染．不染義。

論。二乘有學至我執已伏故。

述曰。廣前第二法執位也。此執寬故。初位必有此法執故。更不須釋一切異生。理無疑滯具有人執　定性二乘有學起聖道住滅定。二位現在前時通見．修道。除此亦有人執　頓悟菩薩。除見道全。此依一心真見道說。一向法觀違法執故。若三心觀即初念時唯人觀故　于修道位生空智及此果。果即人空后得智。及人空所引滅定也。有學漸悟菩薩。一切位中生空智。及二果現在前時。即皆唯起此識法執。以此人執障人空智故。定性二乘聖道．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：執著。並非說執著于虛妄之物才算是不明瞭真理。問：如果不明瞭虛妄之物，與疑惑有什麼區別？答：疑惑是猶豫不決，而執著是堅決認定的。因為堅決地迷戀虛妄之物，所以執著于認為是真實的人，因此是法執。

問：如何能同時生起人執和法執這兩種執著呢？

論：我見和法見到了這種程度也應該如此。

述記：下面闡明體和用的同異。人執和法執的用是不同的，智慧的體是一樣的。同一種生起方式，在道理上沒有違背。比如一眼識緣取青色和黃色兩種境界，兩種行相生起。然而現在這裡用兩種境界兩種行相共同認可的識，比喻不共同執著的心。然而現在所執著的不是兩種境界，沒有在一個心中對兩種境界生起兩種行相的執著。問：如果這樣，之前說疑惑在於理，印證在於事，難道不是兩種行相兩種境界嗎？雖然那不是執行，行相是不同的。執著則不然，因為有推求，因為有堅固的執著。境界和行相不同，也不能同時生起。現在這裡沒有違背，所以允許同時生起。

這就是廣泛地闡述了最初入門的人的執著位置。下面廣泛地闡述法執的位置，其中有三點。首先總的闡述一切唯有法執的位置。其次再次爭論八地以上的菩薩。最後解釋法執的染污和不染污的含義。

論：二乘（Sravaka-yana and Pratyeka-buddha-yana，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的有學（Saiksa，還在學習的修行者）因為我執（Atma-graha，對自我的執著）已經被降伏。

述記：廣泛地闡述了第二種法執的位置。因為這種執著範圍很寬泛，最初的位置必定有這種法執，所以不需要解釋一切異生（prthag-jana，凡夫）。道理上沒有疑惑和滯礙，具有人執。定性的二乘有學，生起聖道（Arya-marga，通往涅槃的道路）住在滅盡定（Nirodha-samapatti，一種高級禪定狀態）。這兩種狀態現在前的時候，貫通見道（Darshana-marga，見真理的道）和修道（Bhavana-marga，通過修行培養智慧的道）。除此之外也有人執。頓悟的菩薩，除了見道全部斷除人執。這是依據一心真見道說的，一向法觀違揹人執的緣故。如果三心觀，那麼最初一念的時候只有人觀的緣故。在修道位生起生空智（Nairatmya-jnana，認識到一切事物沒有固定不變的自性的智慧）以及這種智慧的果。果就是人空后得智（Prsthalabdha-jnana，在證悟空性后獲得的智慧），以及人空所引發的滅盡定。有學的漸悟菩薩，一切位置中生空智以及兩種果現在前的時候，就都只生起這種識法執。因為這種人執障礙人空智的緣故。定性的二乘聖道。

【English Translation】 English version: Attachment. It is not said that only clinging to unreal things is considered not understanding the truth. Question: If one does not understand unreal things, what is the difference between that and doubt? Answer: Doubt is hesitation, while attachment is firm conviction. Because of firmly clinging to unreal things, one is attached to considering it a real person, therefore it is Dharma-attachment (Dharma-graha, attachment to the idea of self).

Question: How can both self-attachment (Atma-graha, attachment to the idea of self) and Dharma-attachment arise simultaneously?

Treatise: The views of self and Dharma should also be like this to this extent.

Commentary: Below, the similarities and differences between essence and function are explained. The functions of self-attachment and Dharma-attachment are different, but the essence of wisdom is the same. The same kind of arising does not violate the principle. For example, one eye-consciousness perceives two realms of blue and yellow, and two characteristics arise. However, here, the consciousness recognized by both realms and both characteristics is used to illustrate the mind that does not commonly cling. However, what is clung to now is not two realms; there is no clinging to two characteristics arising in one mind towards two realms. Question: If so, didn't the previous statement that doubt lies in principle and verification lies in matter mean two characteristics and two realms? Although that is not execution, the characteristics are different. Attachment is not like that, because there is seeking, because there is firm clinging. If the realm and characteristic are different, they cannot arise simultaneously. Here, there is no violation, so it is allowed to arise simultaneously.

This is a broad explanation of the position of attachment for those who are just beginning. Below is a broad explanation of the position of Dharma-attachment, which has three points. First, a general explanation of the position of all Dharma-attachment. Second, a re-argument about Bodhisattvas above the eighth ground (Bhumi, level of Bodhisattva realization). Finally, an explanation of the meaning of defiled and undefiled Dharma-attachment.

Treatise: The Hearers (Sravakas, disciples of Buddha) and Solitary Buddhas (Pratyekabuddhas, those who attain enlightenment on their own) in the Two Vehicles (Sravaka-yana and Pratyeka-buddha-yana, the vehicles of Hearers and Solitary Buddhas) who are still learning (Saiksa, those still in training) because self-attachment has already been subdued.

Commentary: A broad explanation of the second position of Dharma-attachment. Because this attachment is broad, the initial position must have this Dharma-attachment, so there is no need to explain all ordinary beings (prthag-jana, common people). In principle, there is no doubt or stagnation, and they have self-attachment. Those in the Two Vehicles who are fixed in their nature and are still learning, when the Noble Path (Arya-marga, the path to Nirvana) arises and they dwell in the Cessation Attainment (Nirodha-samapatti, a high state of meditation), these two states are present, penetrating the Path of Seeing (Darshana-marga, the path of seeing the truth) and the Path of Cultivation (Bhavana-marga, the path of cultivating wisdom through practice). Apart from this, there is also self-attachment. Bodhisattvas who have sudden enlightenment, except for the complete elimination of self-attachment in the Path of Seeing. This is based on the one-mind true Path of Seeing, because the one-sided Dharma-view violates self-attachment. If there is a three-mind view, then only the view of self is present in the first thought. In the Path of Cultivation, the Wisdom of Selflessness (Nairatmya-jnana, the wisdom of realizing that all things have no fixed self) arises, as well as the fruit of this wisdom. The fruit is the Wisdom Attained After (Prsthalabdha-jnana, the wisdom gained after realizing emptiness), as well as the Cessation Attainment caused by the emptiness of self. Gradual enlightenment Bodhisattvas who are still learning, when the Wisdom of Selflessness and the two fruits are present in all positions, then only this consciousness of Dharma-attachment arises. Because this self-attachment obstructs the Wisdom of Selflessness. The Noble Path of the Two Vehicles who are fixed in their nature.

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滅定。頓漸菩薩生空智及果位我執已伏。至金剛心方能斷故。唯有法執。頓．漸菩薩皆除見道法空智及果者。必無法執故。

然唯起法執中。定性二乘無學及此漸悟如何。

論。二乘無學至我執已斷故。

述曰。明此二種人也。謂此定性二乘無學全。及此漸悟菩薩一切位中。法空智及果不現前時。若住散．定心有漏．無漏心。皆唯起法執。我執已斷故。漸悟即除見道全．及修道中法空智。及果現在前位。此位法執定不行故。餘位非所除。皆有法執也。然此一切若是漸悟有學．無學。頓悟菩薩八地已去。大勢相似。七地已前有漏心間不同八地。

自下第二故重諍之。

論。八地以去至不相違故。

述曰。重諍八地已上三地。彼位人我執皆永不行。不行有二。無學漸悟彼已永斷名為不行。有學漸悟。及頓悟菩薩。此位永伏名為不行。即是第八舍其名也。能緣不行故。此三地法空智不現前。起人觀時猶起法執。不相違故。細執不障粗觀起故。若不然者即應起法觀。唯無漏相續。無有漏心隔。以此為證。

八地已去。若彼許起第六意識有漏心者。何故人執彼位不行。人執不障有漏心故。設未永斷彼人執種但是永伏。故知無漏心常起人．法觀。

此以何為證。如解深密經。當

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti）。頓悟和漸悟的菩薩，其人我空智以及果位上的我執已經降伏。因為要到金剛心（Vajra-citta）才能斷除我執，所以（此時的菩薩）唯有法執。頓悟和漸悟的菩薩，如果已經除去了見道位的法空智以及果位，那麼必定沒有法執。

然而，在唯有法執的情況下，定性二乘的無學（Aśaikṣa）以及漸悟菩薩又如何呢？

論：二乘的無學，因為我執已經斷除。

述曰：這是在說明這兩種人。即定性二乘的無學，以及漸悟菩薩的一切位次中，法空智以及果位沒有顯現的時候，如果住在散心或定心，有漏心或無漏心中，都唯有法執，因為我執已經斷除。漸悟菩薩，在除去見道位以及修道位中的法空智以及果位顯現的位次，這個位次法執一定不會生起。其餘位次沒有被除去，都有法執。然而，這一切無論是漸悟的有學（Śaikṣa）、無學，還是頓悟菩薩八地（Aṣṭamī bhūmi）以後，大體情況相似。七地（Saptamī bhūmi）以前的有漏心與八地不同。

下面第二點，所以再次爭論。

論：八地以後，因為不相違背。

述曰：再次爭論八地以上的三個地。那個位次的人我執都永遠不會生起。不行有兩種情況：無學的漸悟菩薩，因為已經永遠斷除，所以稱為不行；有學的漸悟菩薩以及頓悟菩薩，在這個位次永遠降伏，所以稱為不行，也就是第八地捨棄其名稱。因為能緣不行，所以這三個地的法空智不顯現，生起人觀的時候仍然會生起法執，因為不相違背。細微的執著不妨礙粗略的觀想生起。如果不是這樣，就應該生起法觀，只有無漏相續，沒有有漏心間隔，以此作為證明。

八地以後，如果他們允許生起第六意識的有漏心，為什麼人執在那個位次不行？因為人執不妨礙有漏心。假設沒有永遠斷除人執的種子，也只是永遠降伏。所以知道無漏心常常生起人觀和法觀。

以什麼作為證明？如《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra）所說。

【English Translation】 English version: Nirodha-samāpatti (Cessation attainment). For Bodhisattvas of both sudden and gradual paths, the wisdom of emptiness of self and the ego-attachment in the fruition stage have been subdued. Because ego-attachment can only be severed at the Vajra-citta (Diamond Mind), there remains only attachment to phenomena (dharma-attachment). If Bodhisattvas of both sudden and gradual paths have eliminated the wisdom of emptiness of phenomena and its fruition in the path of seeing, then they certainly have no dharma-attachment.

However, in the case where only dharma-attachment arises, what about the fixed-nature Arhats (eternal Śrāvakas) in the stage of no-more-learning (Aśaikṣa) and the gradually enlightened Bodhisattvas?

Treatise: Arhats in the stage of no-more-learning, because ego-attachment has already been severed.

Commentary: This clarifies these two types of individuals. Namely, the fixed-nature Arhats in the stage of no-more-learning, and in all stages of the gradually enlightened Bodhisattvas, when the wisdom of emptiness of phenomena and its fruition are not manifest, whether dwelling in distracted or concentrated mind, defiled or undefiled mind, only dharma-attachment arises, because ego-attachment has already been severed. For gradually enlightened Bodhisattvas, in the stage of eliminating the wisdom of emptiness of phenomena and its fruition in the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, dharma-attachment certainly does not arise in this stage. In other stages that have not been eliminated, dharma-attachment exists. However, all of this is similar for gradually enlightened Śaikṣas (learners) and Aśaikṣas, and for suddenly enlightened Bodhisattvas after the eighth bhūmi (Aṣṭamī bhūmi). The defiled mind before the seventh bhūmi (Saptamī bhūmi) differs from the eighth bhūmi.

The second point below is why it is debated again.

Treatise: After the eighth bhūmi, because there is no contradiction.

Commentary: It is debated again about the three bhūmis above the eighth bhūmi. In that stage, ego-attachment never arises. 'Does not arise' has two meanings: for Aśaikṣa gradually enlightened Bodhisattvas, it is called 'does not arise' because it has been permanently severed; for Śaikṣa gradually enlightened Bodhisattvas and suddenly enlightened Bodhisattvas, it is called 'does not arise' because it is permanently subdued in this stage, which is the eighth bhūmi abandoning its name. Because the object of cognition does not arise, the wisdom of emptiness of phenomena does not manifest in these three bhūmis, and dharma-attachment still arises when the view of self arises, because there is no contradiction. Subtle attachments do not hinder the arising of coarse contemplation. If it were not so, then the view of phenomena should arise, and only undefiled continuity would exist, with no defiled mind intervening, as evidence of this.

After the eighth bhūmi, if they allow the defiled mind of the sixth consciousness to arise, why does ego-attachment not arise in that stage? Because ego-attachment does not hinder the defiled mind. Even if the seed of ego-attachment has not been permanently severed, it is only permanently subdued. Therefore, it is known that the undefiled mind constantly gives rise to the view of self and the view of phenomena.

What is the evidence for this? As stated in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經).

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七十八。二障三處過也。

論。如契經說至所知障在。

述曰。八地已上一切煩惱不復現行。唯有所依所知障在。此經文也。

論。此所知障至亦應在故。

述曰。八地已去所有法執。是現行非種子。此非第六識中法執現種。說彼地地皆能斷故　若謂彼說第七惑余識中法執種子非有現行。現行所知障此位無故者。即煩惱種子亦應言在。十地之中未斷第七及余修道煩惱種故。應言此位煩惱．所知二障俱在。何故唯言所知障在。若言第六識可起現行法執故。言法為依者。此與何法為所依也。第六非所依。第七是所依。又若許第六起此染心。何故不起煩惱人執。何法為障令不生耶。不見余時第六意識唯有法執。經於一切時都無人執故。然上重諍初．及第二位。不言平等性等位者。彼易了故。

自下第三重解法執染．不染義　問何故上言二乘．異生全言有也。

論。法執俱意至不障彼智故。

述曰。於二乘等。等諸異生。雖名不染于菩薩名為染。障菩薩智故。由此法執通二無記。望二乘是無覆。望菩薩亦名有覆無記。不障二乘故。

論。是異熟生攝至此名通故。

述曰。有四無記。此何無記攝。是異熟生攝。從異熟識性恒時生故名異熟生。非是從善．惡異熟業所生名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 七十八。二障三處過也。

論。如契經說至所知障在。

述曰。八地已上一切煩惱不復現行。唯有所依所知障在。此經文也。

論。此所知障至亦應在故。

述曰。八地已去所有法執。是現行非種子。此非第六識中法執現種。說彼地地皆能斷故　若謂彼說第七惑余識中法執種子非有現行。現行所知障此位無故者。即煩惱種子亦應言在。十地之中未斷第七及余修道煩惱種故。應言此位煩惱．所知二障俱在。何故唯言所知障在。若言第六識可起現行法執故。言法為依者。此與何法為所依也。第六非所依。第七是所依。又若許第六起此染心。何故不起煩惱人執。何法為障令不生耶。不見余時第六意識唯有法執。經於一切時都無人執故。然上重諍初．及第二位。不言平等性等位者。彼易了故。

自下第三重解法執染．不染義　問何故上言二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）．異生全言有也。

論。法執俱意至不障彼智故。

述曰。於二乘等。等諸異生。雖名不染于菩薩名為染。障菩薩智故。由此法執通二無記。望二乘是無覆。望菩薩亦名有覆無記。不障二乘故。

論。是異熟生攝至此名通故。

述曰。有四無記。此何無記攝。是異熟生攝。從異熟識性恒時生故名異熟生。非是從善．惡異熟業所生名

【English Translation】 English version Seventy-eight. The two hindrances and three locations are transcended.

Treatise: As the sutra says, 'until the obstacle of the knowable remains'.

Commentary: Above the eighth Bhumi (stage of a Bodhisattva), all afflictions no longer manifest. Only the obstacle of the knowable, which is the basis, remains. This is the sutra's statement.

Treatise: 'This obstacle of the knowable also should remain'.

Commentary: All attachments to Dharma (teachings, laws) from the eighth Bhumi onwards are manifest, not seeds. These are not the manifest seeds of attachment to Dharma in the sixth consciousness. It is said that each Bhumi can sever them. If it is said that the seeds of attachment to Dharma in the seventh consciousness and other consciousnesses are not manifest, because the manifest obstacle of the knowable is not present at this stage, then the seeds of afflictions should also be said to remain. Because the seeds of afflictions of the seventh consciousness and other paths of cultivation have not been severed within the ten Bhumis. It should be said that both the hindrances of afflictions and the knowable remain at this stage. Why is it only said that the obstacle of the knowable remains? If it is said that the sixth consciousness can give rise to manifest attachment to Dharma, and it is said that Dharma is the basis, then what Dharma is it the basis of? The sixth consciousness is not the basis; the seventh consciousness is the basis. Furthermore, if it is permitted that the sixth consciousness gives rise to this defiled mind, why does it not give rise to attachment to persons due to afflictions? What Dharma obstructs it from arising? It is not seen that the sixth consciousness only has attachment to Dharma at other times; it never has attachment to persons at all times. However, the above heavily disputes the first and second stages. The reason for not mentioning the stages of equality, etc., is that they are easily understood.

From here onwards, the third layer explains the meaning of attachment to Dharma being defiled or undefiled. Question: Why was it said above that the Sravakas (Disciples of Buddha) and Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas), and ordinary beings entirely possess it?

Treatise: 'Both attachments to Dharma mean that they do not obstruct their wisdom'.

Commentary: For the Sravakas, etc., including all ordinary beings, although it is called undefiled, it is called defiled for Bodhisattvas because it obstructs the wisdom of Bodhisattvas. Therefore, attachment to Dharma encompasses both indeterminate states. In relation to the Sravakas, it is uncovered. In relation to the Bodhisattvas, it is also called covered indeterminate, because it does not obstruct the Sravakas.

Treatise: 'It is included in the maturation-born, because this name is common'.

Commentary: There are four indeterminate states. Which indeterminate state does this belong to? It is included in the maturation-born. It is called maturation-born because it constantly arises from the nature of the Alaya consciousness (storehouse consciousness). It is not named as being born from the karma of good or evil maturation.

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異熟生。異熟生無記名通故攝此。

論。如增上緣至皆入此攝。

述曰。三緣不攝。皆此緣攝。三無記不攝。皆此無記攝　何者非異熟生耶。餘三雖亦從異熟生。然有別名。此不在彼別名中故。是總名攝。然即別名。非餘三故。如佛地第七．及此論下二障中敘。

然此第二雖是總束上為三位解第十門訖。自下第二大段引教及理證有此識。

論。云何應知至有別自體。

述曰。文中有三。初問。次答。后釋頌。下會唯立六識是也。小乘執此即是六識入過去者。故為此問。

答中有二。初總以教理為量。二別以教理為量。

論。聖教正理為定量故。

述曰。是總答也。

論。謂薄伽梵至是三別義。

述曰。自下別答　于中有二。初依顯經以教證有。次依隱經以理證有　初中有二。初不共許經。二共許經。明此等經通大小有。然七十六．解深密經．及楞伽大有文　小乘謂未來名心。過去是意。現在是識。等種種分別。然無別體　今顯于經言別有體。上總解已。

論。如是三義至了別轉故。

述曰。雖通八識皆名心意識。而隨勝顯第八名心。為一切現行熏。是集諸法種。現行為依。種子識為因。能生一切法故。是起諸法。然六十三中。心等具有此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『異熟生』（Vipāka-ja，由果報產生的）。『異熟生』是無記性（Avyākṛta，既非善也非惡）的，因此包含在此範疇內。

論：如增上緣（Adhipati-pratyaya，增強的條件）所產生的都包含在此範疇內。

述記：前述的三種緣（因緣、等無間緣、所緣緣）不包含的，都由此增上緣包含。前述的三種無記性不包含的，都由此無記性包含。什麼不是『異熟生』呢？其餘三種（指作意、觸、受）雖然也從異熟產生，但有其他的名稱。這些不包含在『異熟生』這個特別的名稱中，因此屬於總稱。然而，『異熟生』本身也是一個特別的名稱，因為它不是其餘三種。正如佛地的第七識，以及本論下文二障中所敘述的那樣。

然而，這第二部分是對前面內容的總結，分為三個層次來解釋第十個問題。從現在開始，第二大部分引用經文和道理來證明有這個識（阿賴耶識）。

論：如何得知有與六識不同的自體（Svalakṣaṇa，自性）？

述記：這段文字分為三個部分：首先是提問，然後是回答，最後是解釋偈頌。下文將討論唯識宗只建立六識的觀點。小乘佛教認為這個識就是進入過去的六識，因此有此提問。

回答分為兩個部分：首先是總的以經教和道理作為衡量標準，其次是分別以經教和道理作為衡量標準。

論：聖教（Ārya-vacana，聖者的教導）和正理（Yukti，正確的道理）是可靠的衡量標準。

述記：這是總的回答。

論：例如，薄伽梵（Bhagavān，世尊）在《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra）中說：『阿陀那識（Ādāna-vijñāna，執持識）甚深且微細，與一切種子共同存在，我不會對愚癡的人說，恐怕他們會執著它為我。』以及《入楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）中說：『如海浪般深邃，由意識所推動，我說是阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，藏識），愚者不理解。』以及《大乘阿毗達磨經》（Mahāyāna Abhidharma Sūtra）中說：『無始時來，有本識（Mūla-vijñāna，根本識），是諸法之所依，有情于中執為我，由此有諸趣流轉。』這三種是不同的含義。

述記：下面分別回答。分為兩個部分：首先依據顯經（Nītārtha Sūtra，究竟了義的經典）以經教證明有阿賴耶識，其次依據隱經（Neyārtha Sūtra，不了義的經典）以道理證明有阿賴耶識。首先討論不共許的經典，然後討論共許的經典。說明這些經典大小乘都認可。然而，《解深密經》和《楞伽經》中有大量關於阿賴耶識的文字。小乘佛教認為未來叫做心，過去叫做意，現在叫做識，等等各種分別，但沒有獨立的自體。現在顯經中說有獨立的自體。以上是總的解釋。

論：如是三種，皆不離心，以能集諸法種故，能起諸法故，了別轉故。

述記：雖然八識都可稱為心、意、識，但隨其殊勝而顯現，第八識稱為心，因為它熏習一切現行，是聚集諸法種子的處所，是現行法的所依，種子識是因，能生一切法，所以是生起諸法。然而，在第六十三卷中，心等具有這些功能。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Vipāka-ja' (produced from resultant maturation). 'Vipāka-ja' is indeterminate (Avyākṛta, neither good nor bad), therefore it is included in this category.

Treatise: Whatever arises from the Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition) is included in this.

Commentary: What is not included in the three conditions (hetu-pratyaya, samanantara-pratyaya, alambana-pratyaya) is included in this dominant condition. What is not included in the three types of indeterminate nature is included in this indeterminate nature. What is not 'Vipāka-ja'? Although the other three (referring to attention, contact, and feeling) also arise from resultant maturation, they have other names. These are not included in the specific name 'Vipāka-ja,' so they belong to the general term. However, 'Vipāka-ja' itself is also a specific name because it is not the other three. As described in the seventh consciousness of the Buddha-bhūmi and in the two obstacles mentioned later in this treatise.

However, this second part is a summary of the previous content, divided into three levels to explain the tenth question. From now on, the second major section cites scriptures and reasoning to prove the existence of this consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna).

Treatise: How can it be known that there is a distinct self-nature (Svalakṣaṇa) different from the six consciousnesses?

Commentary: This passage is divided into three parts: first, the question; then, the answer; and finally, the explanation of the verse. The following will discuss the view of the Yogācāra school that only establishes six consciousnesses. The Hīnayāna Buddhism believes that this consciousness is the six consciousnesses entering the past, hence this question.

The answer is divided into two parts: first, a general measure based on scriptures and reasoning; second, a separate measure based on scriptures and reasoning.

Treatise: The sacred teachings (Ārya-vacana) and correct reasoning (Yukti) are reliable measures.

Commentary: This is the general answer.

Treatise: For example, the Bhagavan (World-Honored One) said in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra): 'The Ādāna-vijñāna (clinging consciousness) is very deep and subtle, coexisting with all seeds. I do not speak of it to the foolish, lest they cling to it as self.' And in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Descent into Lanka Sutra): 'Like the deep ocean waves, driven by consciousness, I say it is the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness), which the foolish do not understand.' And in the Mahāyāna Abhidharma Sūtra (Great Vehicle Abhidharma Sutra): 'From beginningless time, there is the Mūla-vijñāna (root consciousness), which is the basis of all dharmas. Sentient beings cling to it as self, and from this, the streams of existence flow.' These three are different meanings.

Commentary: The following are separate answers. Divided into two parts: first, based on the Nītārtha Sūtra (definitive meaning sutra), the existence of Ālaya-vijñāna is proven by scriptures; second, based on the Neyārtha Sūtra (provisional meaning sutra), the existence of Ālaya-vijñāna is proven by reasoning. First, discuss the scriptures not commonly accepted, and then discuss the scriptures commonly accepted. It is explained that these scriptures are recognized by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna. However, there is a large amount of text about Ālaya-vijñāna in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Hīnayāna Buddhism believes that the future is called mind, the past is called thought, and the present is called consciousness, and so on, with various distinctions, but there is no independent self-nature. Now, the explicit scriptures say that there is an independent self-nature. The above is a general explanation.

Treatise: Thus, these three are inseparable from the mind, because they can collect the seeds of all dharmas, can arise all dharmas, and function with discernment.

Commentary: Although the eight consciousnesses can all be called mind, thought, and consciousness, the eighth consciousness is called mind because it perfumes all manifest activities, is the place where the seeds of all dharmas are gathered, is the basis of manifest dharmas, and the seed consciousness is the cause, which can generate all dharmas, so it is the arising of all dharmas. However, in the sixty-third volume, mind, etc., have these functions.

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通別名。所以稍廣　第七名意。恒審思量為我等故。因中有漏唯緣我境。無漏緣第八．及真如。果上許緣一切法故。論言等也　餘六識名識。於六別境體是粗動有間斷法了別轉故。易了名粗。轉易名動。不續名間。各有此勝各別得名。

何以知心等是第八等耶。

論。如入楞伽至是說名為識。

述曰。即是彼經第九卷頌。舊云本識但是心。意能念境界。能取諸境界。故我說唯心。然彼錯翻。次下顯證第八是無記等。謂心常無記法。意二邊取相。取現法是識。彼是善．不善　意二邊者。應言有我．我所執。頌翻錯也。不計斷．常故　即第八是心。第七是意。思量性故。餘六是識。六是能了諸境相故。

論。又大乘經至故此別有。

述曰。謂入楞伽上下無量文。及佛地經等亦爾。說有平等智。莊嚴論說轉第七識得。此唯大乘所信。

論。諸大乘經至故不重成。

述曰。經教成佛說。第七非無。

論。解脫經中至非曾非當有。

述曰。此大小乘通許之經。非是解解脫義名解脫經。然四阿含不攝零落之經。諸部皆有。如天請問經等。並是為阿含不攝。此經解脫阿含故名為解脫經。若言零落經名字惡也。

其此頌文長行自解。

論。彼經自釋至我慢我癡。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 通別名：所以略微寬泛的是第七識的『意』（manas，末那識）。 第七名『意』：它恒常審察思量，執著自我等概念。在因位時，它是有染污的，只緣于『我』的境界。無漏狀態時，它緣于第八識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）以及真如（tathatā，事物的真實如是之性）。在果位上，它被允許緣於一切法。論中說『等』字，就是這個意思。 其餘六識名為『識』（vijñāna，了別識）：因為它們對於六種別境的體性是粗糙、動搖、有間斷的，並且以了別為作用。容易了知叫做『粗』。轉變容易叫做『動』。不連續叫做『間』。每一種識都有這些殊勝之處，各自因此而得名。

『憑什麼知道心等是第八識等呢？』

論：如《入楞伽經》所說：『這被稱為識。』

述記：這就是那部經的第九卷中的偈頌。舊譯說本識只是心，意能夠念境界，能夠取諸境界，所以我說唯心。然而那是錯誤的翻譯。接下來顯示證明第八識是無記等。所謂心是常無記法，意在二邊取相，取現法是識，那是善、不善的。意在二邊，應該說是有我、我所執。偈頌翻譯錯了。不計較斷、常。即第八識是心，第七識是意，因為有思量的性質。其餘六識是識，六識能夠了知諸境的相。

論：又如大乘經典所說：『所以這裡特別有。』

述記：如《入楞伽經》上下無量的文句，以及《佛地經》等也是這樣。說有平等智，莊嚴論說轉第七識而得到。這隻有大乘才相信。

論：諸大乘經典都這樣說，所以不再重複成立。

述記：經典教義成就佛陀所說，第七識並非不存在。

論：在《解脫經》中說：『不是曾經有，也不是將來有。』

述記：這是大小乘共同認可的經典。不是因為解釋解脫的意義而叫做《解脫經》。然而四阿含經不收錄零散的經典，各個部派都有。如《天請問經》等，都是阿含經不收錄的。這部經解釋解脫阿含，所以叫做《解脫經》。如果說是零散的經，名字就不好聽了。

其中這首偈頌的長行部分是自己解釋的。

論：那部經自己解釋說：『我慢我癡。』

【English Translation】 English version: Common and Specific Names: Therefore, what is slightly broader is the 'manas' (意, seventh consciousness) of the seventh consciousness. The Seventh Name 'Manas': It constantly examines and contemplates, clinging to concepts such as self. In the causal stage, it is defiled, only clinging to the realm of 'self'. In the state of non-outflow, it clings to the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識) and suchness (tathatā, 事物的真實如是之性). In the fruition stage, it is allowed to cling to all dharmas. The treatise says 'etc.', which means this. The remaining six consciousnesses are called 'vijñāna' (識, discriminating consciousness): Because their nature towards the six separate realms is coarse, moving, and intermittent, and they function by discriminating. Easy to know is called 'coarse'. Easy to transform is called 'moving'. Not continuous is called 'intermittent'. Each consciousness has these superior qualities, and each gains its name accordingly.

'How do we know that the mind, etc., are the eighth consciousness, etc.?'

Treatise: As stated in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra: 'This is called consciousness.'

Commentary: This is the verse in the ninth chapter of that sutra. The old translation says that the fundamental consciousness is only the mind, the manas can contemplate realms, and can grasp all realms, therefore I say only mind. However, that is a wrong translation. Next, it is shown and proven that the eighth consciousness is neutral, etc. The so-called mind is always neutral, the manas grasps appearances on two sides, grasping present dharmas is consciousness, that is good and non-good. Manas on two sides, it should be said that there is clinging to self and what belongs to self. The verse is wrongly translated. Not calculating annihilation and permanence. That is, the eighth consciousness is the mind, the seventh consciousness is the manas, because it has the nature of contemplation. The remaining six consciousnesses are consciousness, the six consciousnesses can understand the appearances of all realms.

Treatise: Also, as stated in the Mahāyāna sutras: 'Therefore, there is especially this.'

Commentary: Such as the countless sentences up and down in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, and also the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra, etc. It is said that there is equality wisdom, and the Śūraṅgama Sūtra says that it is obtained by transforming the seventh consciousness. Only Mahāyāna believes this.

Treatise: All the Mahāyāna sutras say this, so it is not repeated to establish it.

Commentary: The teachings of the sutras accomplish what the Buddha said, the seventh consciousness is not non-existent.

Treatise: In the Vimokṣa Sūtra it says: 'It was not in the past, nor will it be in the future.'

Commentary: This is a sutra commonly accepted by both Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna. It is not called the Vimokṣa Sūtra because it explains the meaning of liberation. However, the four Agamas do not include scattered sutras, and all schools have them. Such as the Sūtra of Heavenly Questioning, etc., are not included in the Agamas. This sutra explains the liberation Agama, so it is called the Vimokṣa Sūtra. If it is said to be a scattered sutra, the name is not good.

Among them, the prose section of this verse is self-explanatory.

Treatise: That sutra itself explains: 'Conceit and ignorance of self.'

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述曰。釋頌初半。無明為后同瑜伽等。以是主故。如攝論中無性第一。世親亦然　解云。由我故起慢。此二有故有愛。此三皆用無明為因。然今少別。

論。對治道生至便得解脫。

述曰。釋頌後半中初句。成無學竟居解脫道中。此意從彼無間道斷已。解脫道中便得解脫更不為拘。

論。爾時此意至無自性故。

述曰。釋第四句。住無學位。此意相應諸煩惱等。非唯現無。亦無過．未。現在理無。不俱起故。種已斷故。然薩婆多等計。惑雖斷於過．未世仍有體在。去來世有故。今舉共許則云非唯現無。偏破彼宗故。云亦無過．未。過未．無體故。頌中唯言去．來無。不言現在無。為極成故　此經大小共信。十八部共許諸部解別　上座部等計。即染第六識惑許並生。別有細心是第六意恒現行故。如受生心等。

大眾．經部等解。如常施食受樂。非謂一切時有名恒　薩婆多等非四惑同時俱。此即前後有俱。常施食等　今大乘雲即是我第七識。此中至教諸論所無。

論。如是等教至故不繁述。

述曰。指略說也。

理中有三。初結前生后。次依標正釋。后總結。

論。已引聖教當顯正理。

述曰。此結前顯教生后隱教諍理取之。

論。謂契經

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述：解釋偈頌的前半部分，『無明』是後面所說的慢、愛等煩惱的根本，如同《瑜伽師地論》等所說。因為無明是主因，所以像《攝大乘論》中無性菩薩的解釋是第一位的，世親菩薩也是這樣認為的。解釋說：由於『我』（ātman）的觀念，才會生起『慢』（māna）。有了『我』和『慢』，才會有『愛』（rāga）。這三者都以『無明』（avidyā）為根本原因。但現在稍有不同。

論：對治道生起，就能得到解脫。

窺基法師述：解釋偈頌後半部分的第一句。成就無學果位后，處於解脫道中。意思是說，從無間道斷除煩惱后，在解脫道中就能得到解脫，不再被束縛。

論：那時，這個意思是指沒有自性。

窺基法師述：解釋第四句。安住于無學位的聖者，與此相應的各種煩惱等，不僅現在沒有，過去和未來也沒有。現在沒有，是因為煩惱和智慧不能同時生起；過去和未來沒有，是因為煩惱的種子已經斷除。然而，薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）等認為，煩惱即使斷除了，在過去和未來世仍然有實體存在，因為過去和未來世是存在的。現在爲了舉出大家共同認可的觀點，所以說『不僅現在沒有』，主要是爲了破斥他們的宗派，所以說『過去和未來也沒有』。因為過去和未來沒有實體，所以偈頌中只說過去和未來沒有，沒有說現在沒有，因為這是大家都認可的。這部經大小乘都信奉，十八部派都認可，只是各部的解釋不同。上座部（Theravāda）等認為，染污的第六識（mano-vijñāna）的煩惱可以同時生起，因為另外有細微的心是第六意識，恒常現行，就像受生心等。

大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）、經量部（Sautrāntika）等解釋說，就像平常佈施食物而得到快樂，並不是說任何時候都有一個叫『恒』的東西存在。薩婆多部等認為，四種煩惱（貪嗔癡慢）不是同時生起的，而是有前後的。就像平常佈施食物等。現在大乘說這就是我的第七識（末那識，mana-vijñāna），這種說法在經教和各種論典中都沒有。

論：像這樣的教證很多，所以不詳細敘述。

窺基法師述：指略說。

理中有三個部分：首先是總結前面，引出後面；其次是根據標示進行正式解釋；最後是總結。

論：已經引用了聖教，應當顯示正理。

窺基法師述：這是總結前面的顯教，引出後面隱藏的教義，並從中選取道理。

論：所謂契經（sūtra）...

【English Translation】 English version: Śāstra by Kuiji: Explaining the first half of the verse, 『ignorance』 (avidyā) is the root of the subsequent afflictions such as pride (māna) and attachment (rāga), as stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and others. Because ignorance is the primary cause, the explanation by Asaṅga in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is considered the foremost, and Vasubandhu also holds this view. The explanation says: Due to the notion of 『self』 (ātman), 『pride』 arises. With 『self』 and 『pride』, there is 『attachment』. All three have 『ignorance』 as their root cause. However, there is a slight difference now.

Treatise: When the antidotal path arises, one attains liberation.

Śāstra by Kuiji: Explaining the first sentence of the latter half of the verse. After attaining the state of no-more-learning (arhat), one resides in the path of liberation. This means that after severing afflictions in the immediate path (anantarya-marga), one attains liberation in the path of liberation and is no longer bound.

Treatise: At that time, this meaning refers to the absence of self-nature.

Śāstra by Kuiji: Explaining the fourth sentence. Abiding in the state of no-more-learning, the various afflictions associated with this state are not only absent in the present, but also in the past and future. They are absent in the present because afflictions and wisdom cannot arise simultaneously; they are absent in the past and future because the seeds of afflictions have been severed. However, the Sarvāstivāda school believes that even if afflictions are severed, they still exist in the past and future, because the past and future exist. Now, in order to present a commonly accepted view, it is said 『not only absent in the present,』 mainly to refute their school, so it is said 『also absent in the past and future.』 Because the past and future have no substance, the verse only mentions the absence in the past and future, not the absence in the present, because this is universally acknowledged. This sūtra is believed by both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna, and accepted by the eighteen schools, although their interpretations differ. The Theravāda school believes that the defiled afflictions of the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna) can arise simultaneously, because there is another subtle mind that is the sixth consciousness, constantly active, like the mind at the time of rebirth.

The Mahāsāṃghika and Sautrāntika schools explain that just as one receives joy from ordinary food offerings, it does not mean that there is something called 『constant』 at all times. The Sarvāstivāda school believes that the four afflictions (greed, hatred, delusion, and pride) do not arise simultaneously, but sequentially. Like ordinary food offerings, etc. Now, the Mahāyāna says that this is my seventh consciousness (mana-vijñāna), but this view is not found in the scriptures and various treatises.

Treatise: There are many such scriptural proofs, so they are not described in detail.

Śāstra by Kuiji: Refers to a brief explanation.

There are three parts to the reasoning: first, summarizing the previous and introducing the following; second, formally explaining according to the headings; and finally, summarizing.

Treatise: Having cited the sacred teachings, we should reveal the correct reasoning.

Śāstra by Kuiji: This is summarizing the previous explicit teachings, introducing the hidden teachings that follow, and selecting the reasoning from them.

Treatise: The so-called sūtra...

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說至彼應非有。

述曰。此第七識六證頌云。不共六二緣。意名二定別。無想許有染。有情我不成　自下第二正辨難中有六義證。此初證中文有其二。初引經證。后理徴釋　如緣起經有四無明。一現。二種。三相應。四不相應。或有為二。共．不共等。此中難不共者。謂此微細常行行相難知。覆無我理蔽無漏智名覆蔽真實。真實有二。一無我理。二無漏見。義有二義。一謂境義。見分境故。二謂義理。真如即理故。然不共無明大小乘經皆共依信。此上經文。若無此識彼應非有。是論師說。

何名不共。

論。謂諸異生至障聖惠眼。

述曰。下釋有二。初破小乘立有第七。后釋不共之義　初中有二。初釋經義。后正難之。此除聖者。聖者無漏道現行時彼不有故。如下當知　一切分。通三性心　恒起。釋經恒行之字　迷理不共無明。迷無我理故　覆真實義者。能覆真如釋覆義。義如前說　障聖惠眼者。遮無漏智。釋蔽義。

論。如伽他說至謂不共無明。

述曰。真義之心。無漏真智。攝論無著本第一說。此無明通三性心恒與俱起。如次前說。

論。是故契經至曾無醒覺。

述曰。說異生類恒處長夜。夜是闇故。無明恒有說為長夜。若生死中無無明者便中明故　無明所盲

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 說如果那樣，它就不應該存在。

述曰：這是第七識的六個論證頌中的一句：『不共六二緣，意名二定別，無想許有染，有情我不成。』下面第二部分正式辨析論難，其中有六個義理作為論證。這是第一個論證，其中又包含兩個部分：首先引用經文作為論證，然後用道理來解釋。

如《緣起經》中有四種無明（avidyā，無知）：一、現行無明；二、種子無明；三、相應無明；四、不相應無明。或者分為兩種：共無明和不共無明等。這裡論難的是不共無明，因為這種無明非常微細，恒常執行，其行相難以知曉，它覆蓋了無我的道理，遮蔽了無漏的智慧，所以稱為『覆蔽真實』。真實有兩種：一是指無我的道理，二是指無漏的見解。『義』也有兩種含義：一是指境的含義，因為見分以境為對像；二是指義理，真如（tathātā，事物的真實本性）就是義理。然而，不共無明在大乘和小乘經典中都共同依賴並相信。以上是經文的內容。如果不存在這個識，那麼它就不應該存在，這是論師的觀點。

什麼叫做『不共』？

論：指那些異生（pṛthagjana，凡夫）乃至遮障聖者的智慧之眼。

述曰：下面解釋『不共』，分為兩個部分：首先破斥小乘，確立第七識的存在；然後解釋『不共』的含義。第一部分又分為兩個部分：首先解釋經文的含義，然後正式進行論難。這裡排除了聖者，因為聖者在無漏道現行的時候，這種無明是不存在的，如下文將要說明的。『一切分』，通於三性心（善、惡、無記）。『恒起』，解釋經文中『恒行』二字。『迷理不共無明』，因為迷惑了無我的道理。『覆真實義者』，能夠覆蓋真如，解釋『覆』的含義。『義』的含義如前所述。『障聖惠眼者』，遮蔽無漏的智慧，解釋『蔽』的含義。

論：如伽他（gāthā，偈頌）所說：『與真義之心，恒常共同生起，因此經中說，謂之不共無明。』

述曰：『真義之心』，指無漏的真智。《攝大乘論》無著（Asaṅga）本第一說，這種無明通於三性心，恒常共同生起，如前面所說。

論：是故契經（sūtra，佛經）說：『異生之類，恒處長夜，曾無醒覺。』

述曰：說異生之類恒常處於長夜之中，因為夜晚是黑暗的緣故。無明恒常存在，所以說是長夜。如果生死之中沒有無明，那麼就應該是明亮的緣故。被無明所矇蔽。

【English Translation】 English version: It is said that if that were the case, it should not exist.

Commentary: This is a line from the seventh consciousness's six proofs, which states: 'Not common to the six or two conditions, named mind and two samādhis separately, the non-thinking state is allowed to have defilements, sentient beings do not achieve the self.' The second part below formally analyzes the difficulties, with six meanings as proofs. This is the first proof, which includes two parts: first, quoting scriptures as proof, and then explaining it with reason.

As in the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra (Discourse on Dependent Arising), there are four kinds of ignorance (avidyā, ignorance): 1. Manifest ignorance; 2. Seed ignorance; 3. Corresponding ignorance; 4. Non-corresponding ignorance. Or it can be divided into two types: common ignorance and uncommon ignorance, etc. Here, the difficulty lies in uncommon ignorance, because this ignorance is very subtle, constantly operating, and its characteristics are difficult to know. It covers the principle of non-self and obscures the wisdom of non-outflow, so it is called 'covering the truth.' There are two kinds of truth: one refers to the principle of non-self, and the other refers to the non-outflow insight. 'Meaning' also has two meanings: one refers to the meaning of the object, because the seeing-aspect takes the object as its object; the other refers to the meaning of principle, as suchness (tathātā, the true nature of things) is the principle. However, uncommon ignorance is commonly relied upon and believed in both Mahayana and Hinayana scriptures. The above is the content of the scripture. If this consciousness does not exist, then it should not exist, which is the view of the master.

What is meant by 'uncommon'?

Treatise: It refers to those ordinary beings (pṛthagjana, common people) who even obstruct the eye of wisdom of the saints.

Commentary: The explanation of 'uncommon' below is divided into two parts: first, refuting the Hinayana and establishing the existence of the seventh consciousness; then explaining the meaning of 'uncommon.' The first part is further divided into two parts: first, explaining the meaning of the scripture, and then formally conducting the debate. Here, saints are excluded, because when the non-outflow path is manifested in saints, this ignorance does not exist, as will be explained below. 'All divisions' apply to the three natures of mind (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral). 'Constantly arising' explains the words 'constantly operating' in the scripture. 'Deluded by principle, uncommon ignorance' is because it is deluded by the principle of non-self. 'Covering the meaning of truth' means being able to cover suchness, explaining the meaning of 'covering.' The meaning of 'meaning' is as mentioned before. 'Obstructing the eye of saintly wisdom' means obscuring the non-outflow wisdom, explaining the meaning of 'obstructing.'

Treatise: As the gāthā (gāthā, verse) says: 'With the mind of true meaning, constantly arising together, therefore the scripture says, it is called uncommon ignorance.'

Commentary: 'Mind of true meaning' refers to the non-outflow true wisdom. The first chapter of Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that this ignorance applies to the three natures of mind and constantly arises together, as mentioned before.

Treatise: Therefore, the sūtra (sūtra, Buddhist scripture) says: 'Beings of ordinary kind are constantly in the long night, never awakened.'

Commentary: It says that beings of ordinary kind are constantly in the long night, because the night is dark. Ignorance is constantly present, so it is called the long night. If there is no ignorance in saṃsāra, then it should be bright. Blinded by ignorance.

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者。謂此不共恒現行故盲其惠眼。不爾中途有無無明時即非無明盲　惛昧醉亂恒自纏心曾無醒覺。惛即無覺。醉即無醒。若中途有無無明時便有醒覺。以此經證無明恒行遍三性位。

不爾恒行。

論。若異生位至便違經義。

述曰。下正申難。小乘等說經言恒者謂多分說。實理亦有不起時故。今以違教為彼宗過。

論。俱異生位至不應理故。

述曰。此違比量　量云。汝言異生起善．無記位無無明時。無明應亦起。異生位故。如余起時。

論。此依六識至便無此失。

述曰。若謂不共在六識身。亦不應理。所以者何。應許此無明間斷。從所依識故。彼六識恒染。從無明續故。經．頌俱言無明恒起。其六識身許通三性。若六識身有此無明。此便間斷。彼六識身便唯染俱。許與無明恒相應故。

攝論無性第一卷云。此於五識無容得有。非不染意識中有。亦非染意識中有。若謂意識由彼煩惱成染等　若復有說。善心俱轉等。若有說。染意俱有別善心等。料簡大精。然彼不共與此下相違。至彼對會。許有末那便無此失。

上破小乘。下因解不共之義。

論。染意恒與至何名不共。

述曰。初小乘問。彼宗不共。無惑相應故。

論。有義此俱至名不

共何失。

述曰。下有三說。此即初師。此中無明不與根本共。非不與隨共。然此四惑非是根本。是隨惑攝故無此失　何隨惑攝耶　此有二義。一云非二十隨。二十外攝。雜事說。隨有多種故。即諸煩惱分位差別。隨其所應根本分位。

二云即隨惑。義說不正知為我見。憍為我慢。掉為我愛。無明一種是根本故。

論。有義彼說至不說此三故。

述曰。此師有三。初破前。次申義。后釋難。此初也。二十隨非名煩惱。如前已說。不見不正知名我不正知。亦不見憍名為我憍掉名我掉。又離二十外無別此三隨。更別推求無此三故。是為一失。

論。此三六十煩惱攝故。

述曰。依瑜伽等說六根本煩惱對法等論說十根本煩惱。此三皆是若六。若十煩惱所攝。何名隨感。

論。處處皆說至恒相應故。

述曰。論說與四煩惱俱故。不言與隨煩惱俱故。對法第七說諸煩惱皆名為隨前師可爾。若隨非根本。此是根本亦是隨攝。以隨不言是煩惱故。即此三種唯說是根本。純隨中無。故證此三非隨惑也。

若爾此癡何名不共。

論。應說四中至癡增上故。

述曰。此申義也　主是自在義。為因依義。與彼為依故名不共。何故無明名為不共　謂從無始際。顯長夜常起

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 共何失？

述曰：以下有三種說法。這裡指的是第一位論師的觀點。此處的無明（avidyā，指對事物真相的迷惑）不與根本煩惱（mūlakleśa，指貪、嗔、癡、慢、疑、不正見六種根本性的煩惱）共同生起，但並非不與隨煩惱（upakleśa，指由根本煩惱生起的次要煩惱）共同生起。然而，這四種惑（指不正知、憍、掉舉、無明）並非根本煩惱，而是屬於隨煩惱，因此沒有這種過失。屬於何種隨煩惱呢？

對此有兩種解釋。一種說法是，它們不屬於二十隨煩惱（krodha, upanāha, mrakṣa, pradāsa, īrṣyā, mātsarya, śāṭhya, māyā, stambha, mada, vihiṃsā, āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, styāna, auddhatya, āśraddhya, kaukritya, middha, vitarka, vicāra，指二十種較粗重的隨煩惱），而是屬於二十隨煩惱之外的。如《雜事》（瑜伽師地論的組成部分）所說，隨煩惱有多種，即各種煩惱的分位差別，隨其所應屬於根本煩惱的分位。

另一種說法是，它們就是隨煩惱。《義》（指某種論釋）中說，不正知被視為我見（satkāyadṛṣṭi，指認為五蘊和合的身體為真實自我的邪見），憍被視為我慢（asmimāna，指以『我』為中心的驕傲自大），掉舉被視為我愛（ātmaprema，指對自我的執著和貪愛），無明是一種根本煩惱。

論：有義彼說至不說此三故。

述曰：這位論師有三重含義：首先是破斥前一種觀點，其次是闡述自己的觀點，最後是解釋疑問。這是第一重含義。二十隨煩惱不被稱為煩惱，如前所述。不能說不正知就是我見，也不能說憍就是我慢，掉舉就是我掉。而且，除了二十隨煩惱之外，沒有其他這三種隨煩惱。再另外去推求，也找不到這三種隨煩惱。這是第一個過失。

論：此三六十煩惱攝故。

述曰：根據《瑜伽師地論》等論典的說法，有六種根本煩惱；根據《對法》（阿毗達摩）等論典的說法，有十種根本煩惱。這三種（不正知、憍、掉舉）都屬於這六種或十種煩惱所攝，怎麼能說是隨煩惱呢？

論：處處皆說至恒相應故。

述曰：論典中說（無明）與四種煩惱（貪、嗔、慢、見）俱生，沒有說與隨煩惱俱生。在《對法》第七卷中說，諸煩惱都可以稱為隨煩惱，前一位論師的觀點或許可以成立。如果說隨煩惱不是根本煩惱，那麼這（無明）是根本煩惱，也屬於隨煩惱所攝。因為隨煩惱不被稱為煩惱，而這三種（不正知、憍、掉舉）僅僅被認為是根本煩惱，在純粹的隨煩惱中沒有。因此可以證明這三種不是隨煩惱。

若果真如此，那麼這種癡（moha，指愚昧無知）為何被稱為不共無明（asaṃpramoha，指與所有煩惱不共同生起的無明）？

論：應說四中至癡增上故。

述曰：這是闡述自己的觀點。『主』是自在的意思，是作為因和所依的意思。因為（無明）是它們（貪、嗔、慢、見）的所依，所以稱為不共。為什麼無明被稱為不共呢？因為從無始以來，它顯示出長夜常起（指無明持續不斷地生起）。

【English Translation】 English version What is the fault of 'together'?

Commentary: There are three explanations below. This refers to the view of the first teacher. In this context, ignorance (avidyā) does not arise together with the fundamental afflictions (mūlakleśa), but it does not mean it does not arise together with the secondary afflictions (upakleśa). However, these four defilements (incorrect knowing, conceit, excitement, and ignorance) are not fundamental afflictions; they are included within the secondary afflictions, so there is no such fault. Which secondary afflictions are they included in?

There are two interpretations of this. One explanation is that they do not belong to the twenty secondary afflictions (krodha, upanāha, mrakṣa, pradāsa, īrṣyā, mātsarya, śāṭhya, māyā, stambha, mada, vihiṃsā, āhrīkya, anapatrāpya, styāna, auddhatya, āśraddhya, kaukritya, middha, vitarka, vicāra), but are included outside of the twenty. As stated in the Miscellaneous Matters (a component of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra), there are various kinds of secondary afflictions, which are the differentiations of the divisions of afflictions, and they belong to the divisions of the fundamental afflictions as appropriate.

Another explanation is that they are secondary afflictions. The Meaning (referring to a certain commentary) says that incorrect knowing is regarded as the view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi), conceit is regarded as self-conceit (asmimāna), excitement is regarded as self-love (ātmaprema), and ignorance is a type of fundamental affliction.

Treatise: Some say that they do not mention these three, therefore...

Commentary: This teacher has three meanings: first, refuting the previous view; second, stating his own view; and third, explaining the questions. This is the first meaning. The twenty secondary afflictions are not called afflictions, as mentioned earlier. It cannot be said that incorrect knowing is the view of self, nor can it be said that conceit is self-conceit, nor excitement is self-excitement. Moreover, apart from the twenty secondary afflictions, there are no other three secondary afflictions. If one seeks further, these three cannot be found. This is the first fault.

Treatise: These three are included within the sixty afflictions, therefore...

Commentary: According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other treatises, there are six fundamental afflictions; according to the Abhidharma and other treatises, there are ten fundamental afflictions. These three (incorrect knowing, conceit, and excitement) are all included within these six or ten afflictions. How can they be called secondary afflictions?

Treatise: Everywhere it is said that they are constantly associated, therefore...

Commentary: The treatise says that (ignorance) arises together with the four afflictions (greed, hatred, pride, and views), but it does not say that it arises together with the secondary afflictions. In the seventh volume of the Abhidharma, it is said that all afflictions can be called secondary afflictions, so the view of the previous teacher may be valid. If it is said that secondary afflictions are not fundamental afflictions, then this (ignorance) is a fundamental affliction and is also included within the secondary afflictions. Because secondary afflictions are not called afflictions, these three (incorrect knowing, conceit, and excitement) are only considered fundamental afflictions, and they are not found in pure secondary afflictions. Therefore, it can be proven that these three are not secondary afflictions.

If that is really the case, then why is this delusion (moha) called unshared ignorance (asaṃpramoha)?

Treatise: It should be said that among the four, ignorance is predominant, therefore...

Commentary: This is stating one's own view. 'Lord' means independence, meaning being the cause and support. Because (ignorance) is the support of them (greed, hatred, pride, and views), it is called unshared. Why is ignorance called unshared? Because from beginningless time, it shows that the long night constantly arises (referring to the continuous arising of ignorance).

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恒內惛迷。明一切時生。

曾不省察。彰恒執我無修返時。此意總顯癡主自在義。

論。此俱見等至應名不共。

述曰。下釋難也。此外人問。此俱見等非為主故應名相應。若許為主。彼亦應名不共。以癡例余為主應爾。

論。如無明故許亦無失。

述曰。餘三為主時。亦得名不共。亦如無明為主義故。此義未詳。不見諸論名不共貪故。對余癡故論多說癡。理實貪等亦有不共名故。然此師意。非第七識中有不共貪等。無明為主故。今此據彼六識作論。若此師意。即六識中獨行貪等名不共貪。通見．修斷等。唯此俱貪不與六識慢等俱者方名相應。不為主故。是主無明余識亦有　又如無明故。總是難文。許亦無失。是答前難文　又此俱見等應名相應者。是破前師。前師見等亦名不共。今言非主應名相應。總是第二說之文也。若為主時應名不共者。初師難文。若以為主名為不共。此俱見等不為主非不共者。餘六識中見等為主時。亦應名不共如無明故。論答許亦無失　又如無明以下。總是答此前師難文　並得合為四解。

論。有義此癡至唯此識有故。

述曰。下文有三。一釋不共。二問答辨。三顯差別。此初也。即攝論無性。其論本意亦同於此。頌言俱行一切分故。故此無明唯

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

恒常處於內心昏聵迷惑的狀態，卻說明一切時都存在覺醒的可能性。 從不自我反省，彰顯了恒常執著于『我』，沒有停止和改正的時候。這總的來說顯示了癡作為主導的自在含義。 論：這種共同生起的等至（Samāpatti，禪定）應該被稱為不共。 述曰：下面解釋這個難題。這是外人提出的問題：這種共同生起的見等（Dṛṣṭi，見解）不是主導，因此應該被稱為相應。如果允許它是主導，那麼它也應該被稱為不共。以癡為例，其餘的作為主導也應該如此。 論：就像無明（Avidyā，無知）一樣，允許這樣說也沒有過失。 述曰：其餘三種（貪、嗔、慢）作為主導時，也可以被稱為不共，就像無明作為主導一樣。這個含義不太清楚，因為沒有在各種論典中看到被稱為不共貪的情況。因為針對其餘的癡，所以論典中多說癡。實際上，貪等也有不共的名稱。然而，這位論師的意思是，第七識中沒有不共的貪等，因為無明是主導。現在這是根據第六識來作論述。如果這位論師的意思是，第六識中單獨生起的貪等被稱為不共貪，普遍的見、修所斷等。只有這種共同生起的貪不與第六識的慢等同時生起時，才被稱為相應，因為它不是主導。是主導的無明，其餘識中也有。又如無明一樣，總是難題。允許這樣說也沒有過失，是回答前面的難題。又是這種共同生起的見等應該被稱為相應，這是破斥前一位論師的觀點。前一位論師認為見等也可以被稱為不共，現在說它不是主導，應該被稱為相應。總是第二種說法。如果作為主導時應該被稱為不共，這是最初的論師提出的難題。如果認為它是主導，就稱為不共，這種共同生起的見等不是主導，所以不是不共。其餘六識中，見等作為主導時，也應該被稱為不共，就像無明一樣。論典回答說，允許這樣說也沒有過失。又是像無明以下，總是回答此前一位論師的難題。可以合併爲四種解釋。 論：有一種觀點認為，這種癡是唯一的，因為它只存在於這個識中。 述曰：下面有三部分：一是解釋不共，二是問答辨析，三是顯示差別。這是第一部分。也就是《攝大乘論》的無性釋。其論的本意也與此相同。頌文說，因為與一切部分共同生起。所以這種無明只...

【English Translation】 English version:

Constantly being in a state of inner confusion and delusion, yet explaining that the possibility of awakening exists at all times. Never self-reflecting, highlighting the constant attachment to 'self', without cessation or correction. This generally shows the meaning of ignorance (moha) as the dominant, self-existing nature. Treatise: This co-emergent Samāpatti (state of meditative absorption) should be called non-common. Commentary: The following explains this difficulty. This is a question raised by an outsider: This co-emergent view (Dṛṣṭi, view) etc. is not dominant, therefore it should be called corresponding. If it is allowed to be dominant, then it should also be called non-common. Taking ignorance (moha) as an example, the rest being dominant should also be the same. Treatise: Just like ignorance (Avidyā, ignorance), allowing this is also without fault. Commentary: When the other three (greed, hatred, pride) are dominant, they can also be called non-common, just like ignorance being dominant. This meaning is not very clear, because there is no case of greed being called non-common in various treatises. Because it is directed at the remaining ignorance, the treatises mostly talk about ignorance. In reality, greed etc. also have non-common names. However, this commentator's meaning is that there is no non-common greed etc. in the seventh consciousness, because ignorance is dominant. Now this is based on the sixth consciousness for discussion. If this commentator's meaning is that greed etc. arising alone in the sixth consciousness is called non-common greed, universal views, those to be abandoned by cultivation, etc. Only when this co-emergent greed does not arise simultaneously with the pride etc. of the sixth consciousness, it is called corresponding, because it is not dominant. The dominant ignorance also exists in the remaining consciousnesses. Also, like ignorance, it is always a difficult question. Allowing this is also without fault, which is answering the previous difficult question. Also, this co-emergent view etc. should be called corresponding, which is refuting the view of the previous commentator. The previous commentator thought that view etc. could also be called non-common, now saying that it is not dominant, it should be called corresponding. It is always the second statement. If it should be called non-common when it is dominant, this is the difficult question raised by the initial commentator. If it is considered dominant, it is called non-common, this co-emergent view etc. is not dominant, so it is not non-common. In the remaining six consciousnesses, when view etc. are dominant, they should also be called non-common, just like ignorance. The treatise answers that allowing this is also without fault. Also, like ignorance below, it is always answering the difficult question of the previous commentator. It can be combined into four interpretations. Treatise: There is a view that this ignorance is unique, because it only exists in this consciousness. Commentary: There are three parts below: first, explaining non-common; second, question and answer analysis; third, showing the difference. This is the first part. That is, the Asanga's commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. The original intention of the treatise is also the same as this. The verse says that because it arises together with all parts. Therefore, this ignorance only...

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此識有。余識所無。如不共法非二乘共。不言自十八中唯一法。不與余法共也。

論。若爾余識至應名不共。

述曰。下問答辨有四。一問。二答。三難。四通。此問也　前師難言。余識相應一切煩惱如見取等。此識中無應名不共。

論。依勝義立至皆名不共。

述曰。此答也。謂此無明勝遍三性位。余識無此遍三性心之無明故名為不共。非在自有餘識所無名不共等。

論。謂第七識至故名不共。

述曰。重顯前義。其文可解。

論。既爾此俱三亦應名不共。

述曰。此外人難。此識相應三見．慢．愛應名不共。亦非余識有。遍三性心故。

論。無明是主獨得此名。

述曰。此論主通。無明主義。如前已解。此一答文也。不許見等名為不共。彼非主故。

論。或許餘三至且說無明。

述曰。此第二釋。許此俱三亦名不共　若爾何故唯說無明　對余識中無明惑故。且說此識不共無明。非此餘三不名不共。謂餘部計余識無明是不共攝。不遍三性心。今此勝用能遍諸心。故偏對彼說。餘三名不共。論師理準未見正文。

論。不共無明至此識非有。

述曰。下顯差別有三。一彰二別明識有．無。二引證。三大小異。此初也。此總凡解

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 此識（alaya consciousness，阿賴耶識）具有某些特性，是其他識所不具備的，例如不共法（unique characteristics），這是二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）所沒有的。這裡並不是說十八界（十八種感官領域）中只有一種法（dharma，佛法）是這樣，而是說它不與其他法共同具有這些特性。

論：如果這樣，那麼其他識也應該被稱為不共。

述記：下面的問答辨析分為四個部分：一問，二答，三難，四通。這是提問。之前的論師提出質疑說，其他識相應的一切煩惱，例如見取（holding wrong views as supreme），在這個識中沒有，因此應該被稱為不共。

論：依據勝義（ultimate truth）而建立，這個識的無明（ignorance）遍及三性（三種性質：善、惡、無記），因此被稱為不共。

述記：這是回答。意思是說，這個無明在勝義諦上遍及三性，而其他識沒有這種遍及三性的心的無明，因此被稱為不共。而不是說僅僅存在於自身，其他識沒有的才叫不共。

論：因為第七識（末那識）恒常與我癡（ignorance about self）、我見（view of self）、我慢（pride of self）、我愛（love of self）相應，所以被稱為不共。

述記：再次顯明之前的含義，文句容易理解。

論：既然這樣，那麼與此識俱生的三見（三種邪見）、慢、愛也應該被稱為不共。

述記：這是外人的質疑。與此識相應的邪見、慢、愛也應該被稱為不共，因為其他識沒有遍及三性的心。

論：無明是主要的，所以單獨獲得這個名稱。

述記：這是論主的解釋。無明是主要的，如前所述。這是一段回答。不允許見等被稱為不共，因為它們不是主要的。

論：或許其他三種（見、慢、愛）也可以被稱為不共，但這裡暫且只說無明。

述記：這是第二種解釋。承認與此識俱生的三種（見、慢、愛）也可以被稱為不共。如果這樣，為什麼只說無明呢？因為針對其他識中沒有無明惑的緣故，所以暫且只說此識的不共無明。並非說此識的其他三種不能被稱為不共。意思是說，其他部派認為其他識的無明是不共所攝，不遍及三性心。現在這個識的殊勝作用能夠遍及所有心，所以特別針對他們而說。其他三種被稱為不共，論師的道理是依據這個，但沒有見到明確的經文。

論：不共的無明遍及三性，這種特性只有這個識才有。

述記：下面顯示差別，分為三個方面：一、彰顯兩種差別，明確識的有無；二、引用證據；三、大小不同。這是第一個方面。這裡總括地進行解釋。

【English Translation】 English version: This consciousness (alaya consciousness) possesses certain characteristics that other consciousnesses do not, such as non-common dharmas (unique characteristics), which are not shared by the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna). It is not saying that only one dharma (Buddha's teachings) among the eighteen realms (eighteen sensory fields) is like this, but rather that it does not share these characteristics with other dharmas.

Treatise: If that's the case, then the other consciousnesses should also be called non-common.

Commentary: The following question-and-answer analysis is divided into four parts: a question, an answer, a refutation, and a resolution. This is the question. The previous teacher raised the objection that all the afflictions associated with other consciousnesses, such as holding wrong views as supreme, are not present in this consciousness, so they should be called non-common.

Treatise: Based on ultimate truth, this consciousness's ignorance pervades the three natures (three kinds of qualities: wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), so it is called non-common.

Commentary: This is the answer. It means that this ignorance pervades the three natures in ultimate truth, and other consciousnesses do not have this kind of ignorance of the mind that pervades the three natures, so it is called non-common. It is not that only what exists in itself and is not present in other consciousnesses is called non-common.

Treatise: Because the seventh consciousness (Manas consciousness) is constantly associated with self-ignorance, self-view, self-pride, and self-love, it is called non-common.

Commentary: Again, it clarifies the previous meaning, and the sentences are easy to understand.

Treatise: Since that's the case, then the three views, pride, and love that arise together with this consciousness should also be called non-common.

Commentary: This is an objection from an outsider. The wrong views, pride, and love associated with this consciousness should also be called non-common because other consciousnesses do not have minds that pervade the three natures.

Treatise: Ignorance is the main one, so it alone gets this name.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's explanation. Ignorance is the main one, as mentioned before. This is one answer. It is not allowed for views, etc., to be called non-common because they are not the main ones.

Treatise: Perhaps the other three (views, pride, and love) can also be called non-common, but here we will only talk about ignorance for now.

Commentary: This is the second explanation. It admits that the three (views, pride, and love) that arise together with this consciousness can also be called non-common. If that's the case, why only talk about ignorance? Because it is aimed at the fact that there is no ignorance affliction in other consciousnesses, so we will only talk about the non-common ignorance of this consciousness for now. It is not that the other three of this consciousness cannot be called non-common. It means that other schools believe that the ignorance of other consciousnesses is included in the non-common, and it does not pervade the mind of the three natures. Now, the superior function of this consciousness can pervade all minds, so it is specifically addressed to them. The other three are called non-common, and the treatise master's reasoning is based on this, but no clear textual evidence has been seen.

Treatise: Non-common ignorance pervades the three natures, and this characteristic is only present in this consciousness.

Commentary: The following shows the differences, divided into three aspects: first, highlighting the two differences, clarifying the existence or non-existence of consciousness; second, citing evidence; third, differences in size. This is the first aspect. Here, a general explanation is given.

---

。不共無明顯此識者。一恒行不共。此七俱是。今此所諍。余識無也　其第二獨行不共。則與忿等相應起故名為獨行。或不與余俱起無明獨迷諦理。此識非有。

為成此後所說無明。

論。故瑜伽說至名獨行無明。

述曰。下引證有二。初引教。后釋別。此引教　五十八言無明有二等。但言非貪等俱。即令知與第六識俱無明。非謂第七。不障與忿等二十俱起。故知唯在第六識也。

論。是主獨行至不造新業。

述曰。下釋別。此第二無明中有二。一主獨行。迷諦理起。唯分別起。唯見道斷。不與忿等十種相應。若在欲界。與后五隨．無慚。無愧七隨俱轉。或八．或十二．或十。如前四說諸隨煩惱遍染相應。此何以知。如契經說等。唯是分別。緣起初勝法門經第二卷說。即知彼文唯據此一無明為論。非謂一切。

論。非主獨行至見所斷故。

述曰。第二不共是見道斷。亦通修道斷。所以者何。忿等十皆通見所斷故。彼言通見。明知亦修。以極成故。所以不說。以忿等十各別頭生故。與相應名非主獨行。此十亦增上是主。故無此十時唯無明增。此隨小乘名為不共。然此忿等無別有體。即根本故。從輕相說名不共也。此雖二別。仍是不遍三性心起無明所攝。

論。恒行不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 沒有與此識同時顯現的不共無明。一種是恒行不共，與第七識同時存在。現在我們討論的是，其他識中沒有的無明。 另一種是獨行不共，它與忿（krodha，憤怒）等煩惱相應而生，因此稱為獨行。或者說，它不與其他煩惱同時生起，只有無明獨自迷惑真諦。這種識是不存在的。 爲了成就後面所說的無明。 論：所以《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）說，稱為獨行無明。 述記：下面引用經證有兩種，先引教證，后解釋差別。這裡是引教證。《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷說無明有兩種等。只說不與貪（rāga，貪慾）等同時生起，就可知與第六識同時生起的無明，不是指第七識。它不妨礙與忿等二十種煩惱同時生起。所以知道只存在於第六識中。 論：這是主要的獨行無明，迷惑真諦而生，只是分別產生的，只能在見道位斷除，不與忿等十種煩惱相應。如果在欲界，與后五隨煩惱、無慚（ahrīka，無慚）、無愧（anapatrāpya，無愧）這七種隨煩惱同時生起。或者八種、或者十二種、或者十種，如前面四種說法，各種隨煩惱普遍地與染污心相應。這是怎麼知道的呢？如契經所說等。只是分別。緣起初勝法門經第二卷說。就知道那段經文只是根據這一個無明來討論，不是指所有的無明。 論：不是主要的獨行無明，是見道所斷，也通於修道所斷。為什麼呢？因為忿等十種煩惱都通於見道所斷。這裡說通於見道，明顯知道也通於修道。因為這是極成之理，所以不說。因為忿等十種煩惱各自獨立產生，與無明相應稱為非主要的獨行。這十種煩惱也增上是主要的。所以沒有這十種煩惱時，只有無明增長。這種隨煩惱在小乘佛教中稱為不共。然而這忿等煩惱沒有單獨的自體，就是根本無明。從輕微的相狀來說稱為不共。這雖然是兩種差別，仍然是不遍三性心生起的無明所攝。 論：恒行不共

【English Translation】 English version There is no uncommon ignorance that manifests simultaneously with this consciousness. One is the constantly accompanying uncommon ignorance, which exists simultaneously with the seventh consciousness. What we are discussing now is the ignorance that is absent in other consciousnesses. The other is the independently arising uncommon ignorance, which arises in conjunction with afflictions such as krodha (anger), hence it is called independently arising. Alternatively, it does not arise simultaneously with other afflictions; only ignorance alone deludes the truth. This kind of consciousness does not exist. In order to establish the ignorance discussed later. Treatise: Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, it is called independently arising ignorance. Commentary: The citations of scriptural evidence below are of two kinds: first, citing the teachings; then, explaining the differences. This is citing the teachings. Volume 58 of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that there are two kinds of ignorance, etc. It only says that it does not arise simultaneously with rāga (greed), etc., so it can be known that the ignorance arising simultaneously with the sixth consciousness does not refer to the seventh consciousness. It does not hinder the simultaneous arising with twenty kinds of afflictions such as krodha. Therefore, it is known that it only exists in the sixth consciousness. Treatise: This is the primary independently arising ignorance, which arises from delusion of the truth, is only produced by discrimination, can only be eliminated in the path of seeing, and does not correspond to ten kinds of afflictions such as krodha. If it is in the desire realm, it arises simultaneously with the latter five secondary afflictions, ahrīka (shamelessness), and anapatrāpya (lack of consideration), these seven secondary afflictions. Or eight kinds, or twelve kinds, or ten kinds, as in the previous four explanations, various secondary afflictions universally correspond to defiled minds. How is this known? As the sutras say, etc. It is only discrimination. The second volume of the Pratītyasamutpāda-ādi-nirdeśa-sūtra says. It is known that that passage only discusses this one ignorance, not referring to all ignorance. Treatise: It is not the primary independently arising ignorance, it is eliminated by the path of seeing, and also extends to being eliminated by the path of cultivation. Why? Because the ten kinds of afflictions such as krodha all extend to being eliminated by the path of seeing. Saying that it extends to the path of seeing clearly indicates that it also extends to the path of cultivation. Because this is an established principle, it is not mentioned. Because the ten kinds of afflictions such as krodha each arise independently, corresponding to ignorance is called non-primary independently arising. These ten kinds of afflictions also increasingly are primary. Therefore, when these ten kinds of afflictions are absent, only ignorance increases. This kind of secondary affliction is called uncommon in Theravada Buddhism. However, these afflictions such as krodha do not have a separate substance, they are the fundamental ignorance. From the perspective of a slight characteristic, it is called uncommon. Although these are two differences, they are still encompassed by the ignorance arising from minds that do not pervade the three natures. Treatise: Constantly accompanying uncommon

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共至此彼俱有。

述曰。大小異也。然第七識恒行不共。餘部所無。唯大乘有。今以聖教逼之令信。獨行．不共。大乘小教。此彼俱有。

論。又契經說至彼意非有。

述曰。自下第二證六二緣經。文中有二。初引經證。后破諸部。初文可解　世親攝論證六二緣與此有異。謂眼等五．本識二故。無性．及此據共許緣。世親唯說不共許緣。謂如眼識。以本識．及眼為二。乃至意識應有二緣。若無第七。六識唯一。彼文似難大乘異師有八無七。然對所依以辨從二。非謂二緣。二緣即是根．境法故。故阿賴耶是不共許。

論。謂如五識至俱有所依。

述曰。破中有四。初總破薩婆多等。初句是喻。下簡次第滅意．反現本識．因緣所依。逆次第配。此為宗法。

論。意識既是至如是所依。

述曰。此舉有法及舉因成。意識者。是有法。因云六識中攝。言在中攝。不言六識攝。是一識攝故。喻如五識。此皆舉之。

論。此識若無彼依寧有。

述曰。結上明非。此第七識無。第六依寧有。

論。不可說色至二分別故。

述曰。第二上座部救。胸中色物為其意根非第七者。不然　意非色故。說七心界皆是心故　意識應無二分別故。如五識等依色根故。不言自性

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

共至此彼俱有。

述曰：大小乘的觀點不同。然而，第七識（Manas, 末那識，意為『意』）是恒常執行且不與其它識共同作用的，這是其它部派所沒有的，只有大乘佛教才有。現在用聖教來逼使他們相信。獨行、不共的特性，是大乘和小乘教義中都存在的。

論：又契經說至彼意非有。

述曰：下面第二部分是引用契經來證明六二緣。經文中有兩層含義：首先是引用經文來證明，然後是駁斥各個部派的觀點。第一部分經文容易理解。世親（Vasubandhu）在《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中對六二緣的論述與此有所不同，他認為是眼等五識和本識（根本識，即阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）兩種緣故。無性和此處的觀點是基於共同認可的緣。世親只說了不共同認可的緣，比如眼識，以本識和眼為二緣。乃至意識也應該有二緣。如果沒有第七識，六識就只有一種緣。他的文章似乎在為難大乘佛教中持有八識而無第七識的異師。然而，這是針對所依而辨別出兩種，並非指二緣。二緣指的是根和境法。所以，阿賴耶識是不共同認可的。

論：謂如五識至俱有所依。

述曰：破斥中有四個方面。首先是總的破斥薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）等。第一句是比喻，下面是簡述次第滅意、反顯本識、因緣所依。逆著次第來對應。這是宗法。

論：意識既是至如是所依。

述曰：這是舉出有法並舉出原因來成立。意識，這是有法。原因是六識中攝。說在中攝，不說六識攝，是因為一識攝的緣故。比如五識，這都是舉出的例子。

論：此識若無彼依寧有。

述曰：總結上面，表明否定。如果沒有第七識，第六識所依賴的又怎麼會有呢？

論：不可說色至二分別故。

述曰：第二，上座部（Theravada）進行辯解，認為胸中的色物是他們的意根，而不是第七識。但這是不對的。因為意不是色法。因為經中說七心界都是心法。意識應該沒有兩種分別，就像五識等依靠色根一樣。這裡沒有說自性。

【English Translation】 English version:

'Common to both here and there.'

Commentary: The views of the Mahayana and Hinayana differ. However, the seventh consciousness (Manas, 末那識, meaning 'mind') is constantly active and does not function jointly with other consciousnesses. This is unique to Mahayana Buddhism. Now, we use the sacred teachings to compel them to believe. The characteristics of being solitary and non-common are present in both Mahayana and Hinayana teachings.

Treatise: 'Moreover, the sutras say that the intention is not present there.'

Commentary: The second part below quotes the sutras to prove the six-two conditions. There are two layers of meaning in the sutra text: first, quoting the sutras to prove, and then refuting the views of various schools. The first part of the sutra text is easy to understand. Vasubandhu (世親) in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論) discusses the six-two conditions differently, believing that it is due to the five consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness and the fundamental consciousness (root consciousness, i.e., Ālaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識) being two conditions. Vasubandhu and this view are based on commonly recognized conditions. Vasubandhu only spoke of conditions that are not commonly recognized, such as eye-consciousness, with the fundamental consciousness and the eye as two conditions. Even consciousness should have two conditions. If there is no seventh consciousness, the six consciousnesses have only one condition. His article seems to be difficult for the heterodox teachers in Mahayana Buddhism who hold eight consciousnesses without the seventh consciousness. However, this is to distinguish two types based on what is relied upon, not referring to two conditions. The two conditions refer to the root and the object-dharma. Therefore, Ālaya-vijñāna is not commonly recognized.

Treatise: 'Like the five consciousnesses, they all have a basis.'

Commentary: There are four aspects to the refutation. The first is a general refutation of the Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多部) school, etc. The first sentence is a metaphor, and below is a brief description of the sequential extinction of intention, the reverse manifestation of the fundamental consciousness, and the basis of cause and condition. Correspond in reverse order. This is the principle.

Treatise: 'Consciousness is based on such a basis.'

Commentary: This is to cite the existing dharma and cite the reason to establish it. Consciousness, this is the existing dharma. The reason is that it is included in the six consciousnesses. Saying it is included in the middle, not saying it is included in the six consciousnesses, is because it is included in one consciousness. For example, the five consciousnesses, these are all examples cited.

Treatise: 'If this consciousness does not exist, how can that basis exist?'

Commentary: Summarize the above, indicating negation. If there is no seventh consciousness, how can what the sixth consciousness relies on exist?

Treatise: 'It cannot be said that form has two distinctions.'

Commentary: Second, the Theravada (上座部) school defends, believing that the form-matter in the chest is their mind-root, not the seventh consciousness. But this is not right. Because intention is not form-dharma. Because the sutras say that the seven mind-realms are all mind-dharma. Consciousness should not have two kinds of distinctions, just like the five consciousnesses rely on the form-root. Here, the self-nature is not mentioned.

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分別者合有二解。一云五識實有自性。二云三種皆無。此隨彼語。如瑜伽第一抄。對法第二抄會。及下第七方可了知。

論。亦不可說至如芽影故。

述曰。第三經部師救云五識無俱依。前念五根生后五識。意識亦爾。所難同喻不成者　謂不許有同時因果故　此計不然　以世現見極成法難　彼五識與五根。如芽與影必同時故。影由芽發既必同時。五識．五根當知亦爾。

論。又識與根至決定俱時。

述曰。若說芽．影必異時有非同喻者。心．心所法同緣一境。應計異時心．心所法同緣一境。如思受等與所依心說是因果。既許同時故。五識．根同取一境。亦許同時。因果義立。然彼愛等心所之法。雖前後起。今以為宗。以思等為難令同時已。方為同喻例于根．識。不爾便有他不定過。量思可解。由此同時五根生識。

自下第四為總破前．后說量云。

論。由此理趣至隨一攝故。

述曰。極成意識。是有法。言極成者。簡諸部計最後身菩薩有漏不善意識。及他簡自他方佛意。若俱立此一切意。宗便有他．自所別不成過。故今簡之　次論復言必有不共顯自名處等無間不攝增上生所依是法。不共者簡現第八識。以是共依故。非親生故。非相近故。今對五轉識生所依說故。但言不共

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

關於『分別者合』有兩種解釋。一種說法是前五識確實具有自性。另一種說法是三種（指五根、五境、五識）都沒有自性。這取決於他們所說的內容。正如《瑜伽師地論》第一抄、《對法論》第二抄所彙集的，以及下文第七部分才能理解。

論：也不可說……以至於像芽和影一樣。

述記：第三，經部師反駁說，前五識沒有共同的所依。前一念的五根產生后一念的五識，意識也是如此。所提出的難題，即類比不成立，是因為他們不承認有同時的因果關係。這種觀點是不對的，因為世間現見的極成之法難以推翻。前五識與五根，就像芽和影一樣，必定是同時的。影子由芽而生，既然必定是同時的，那麼五識和五根也應當知道是這樣。

論：又，識與根……以至於決定是同時的。

述記：如果說芽和影必定是不同時存在，因此類比不成立，那麼心和心所法共同緣取一個境界，就應該認為心和心所法是不同時緣取一個境界。比如思、受等與所依之心，說是因果關係，既然允許是同時的，那麼五識和五根共同取一個境界，也允許是同時的，因果關係成立。然而，像愛等心所之法，雖然是前後生起，現在以此作為論點。用思等來責難，使其成為同時，然後才能用同樣的類比來比喻根和識。否則就會有『他不定過』。量思可以理解。由此，同時五根產生五識。

從下面第四部分開始，是爲了總破斥前後的說法，立量云：

論：由此理趣……以至於隨一所攝。

述記：極成的意識，是有法。說『極成』，是爲了簡別諸部所計的最後身菩薩的有漏不善意識，以及其他方佛的意識。如果都立這些意識，那麼宗就會有『他、自所別不成過』。所以現在簡別它們。其次，論中又說，必定有不共的，能顯現自身名稱處所等，無間斷地不攝受增上生所依的法。『不共』，是爲了簡別現行的第八識，因為它是共同的所依。不是親生的緣故，不是相近的緣故。現在針對五轉識的生起所依而說，所以只說『不共』。

【English Translation】 English version:

There are two interpretations regarding 'the aggregation of differentiators'. One is that the five consciousnesses (five senses consciousnesses) truly possess self-nature. The other is that all three (referring to the five roots (five sense organs), five objects (five sense objects), and five consciousnesses) lack self-nature. This depends on what they are talking about. As compiled in the first copy of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), the second copy of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Scholasticism), and as will be understood in the seventh section below.

Treatise: It also cannot be said... to the extent that it is like a sprout and its shadow.

Commentary: Thirdly, the Sautrantika (Sutra School) master refutes, saying that the five consciousnesses do not have a simultaneous basis. The five roots of the previous moment give rise to the five consciousnesses of the subsequent moment, and the same is true for consciousness. The difficulty raised, that the analogy does not hold, is because they do not acknowledge simultaneous cause and effect. This view is incorrect because the extremely established phenomena seen in the world are difficult to overturn. The five consciousnesses and the five roots, like a sprout and its shadow, must be simultaneous. Since the shadow arises from the sprout and must be simultaneous, then the five consciousnesses and the five roots should also be known to be so.

Treatise: Moreover, consciousness and root... to the extent that they are definitely simultaneous.

Commentary: If it is said that the sprout and shadow must exist at different times, and therefore the analogy does not hold, then mind and mental factors (citta and caitta) that jointly cognize one object should be considered as cognizing an object at different times. For example, thinking, feeling, etc., and the mind on which they rely, are said to be cause and effect. Since it is allowed that they are simultaneous, then the five consciousnesses and the five roots jointly taking one object are also allowed to be simultaneous, and the meaning of cause and effect is established. However, mental factors such as love, although they arise sequentially, are now taken as the thesis. Using thinking, etc., to challenge and make them simultaneous, then the same analogy can be used to compare roots and consciousnesses. Otherwise, there would be the fault of 'uncertainty regarding the other'. The reasoning can be understood through contemplation. Therefore, the five roots simultaneously give rise to the five consciousnesses.

From the fourth part below, it is to generally refute the preceding and following statements, establishing the measure (inference) thus:

Treatise: From this reasoning... to the extent that it is included in one.

Commentary: The extremely established consciousness is the subject (dharmin). Saying 'extremely established' is to distinguish the defiled and unwholesome consciousness of the bodhisattva in their last life, as asserted by various schools, and the consciousness of Buddhas in other realms. If all these consciousnesses are established, then the thesis would have the fault of 'non-establishment due to distinction between self and other'. Therefore, they are now distinguished. Secondly, the treatise further states that there must be a dharma that is uncommon, able to manifest its own name, place, etc., and does not uninterruptedly include the basis for the arising of superior states. 'Uncommon' is to distinguish the currently active eighth consciousness (alaya-vijnana), because it is a common basis. It is not a direct cause, not proximate. Now, speaking in relation to the basis for the arising of the five sense consciousnesses, therefore only 'uncommon' is said.

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。若不簡之。便成有共依。所立不成過。又無同喻。他不許五依第八故。設許五喻。所立不成　顯自名處者。此即顯是十二處中意處所攝。簡上座部胸中色物以為意根。彼是法處。非意處故。唯第六識得微細之色。法處所收。此理不爾應外處攝。為簡外處故置。顯自名處所攝。意言顯是意處所攝。恐無同喻但可總說顯自名處。彼非所立。違自宗故。對上座師立已成故　等無間不攝。簡次第滅意等無間緣。今成俱有依。若不簡者便非所立。立已成過。過去之意一切小乘皆許有故。增上者簡因緣即種子依。若對余宗便非所立。若對經部便立已成。若舉五識以為同喻。所立不成　生所依者。簡第七識與八．五識為依。是八染凈依。非親生故。非相近故。是五染凈依。非生依攝。今顯第七為六生依。以近勝故。又簡俱時心所亦第六識依故。前無同喻過。后立已成過。

又所依言。簡余依法。彼但是依非所依故。立已成過。此中一一互相簡略然思可知。故不可說　因云極成六識隨一攝故。此簡如前。如極成眼等識喻。此上宗中極成之言通下喻故　此中問曰。五根別有體。意別立第七。五塵體實有。法亦實有耶　答經云從六二緣。不言有體無體故　問法雖無體亦意得生。為例不成者。亦應從二緣生。根現無體亦得成。以過去

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果不進行簡別，就會變成與『有』共同的所依，導致『所立不成』的過失。而且沒有相同的比喻，因為對方不承認五識以第八識為所依。假設承認五識的比喻，也會導致『所立不成』。『顯自名處者』，這表明它屬於十二處中的意處所攝。這是爲了簡別上座部所說的胸中色物作為意根，因為他們認為是法處，而非意處。只有第六識才能得到微細的色法，屬於法處所收。如果不是這樣，就應該被歸為外處所攝。爲了簡別外處，所以加上『顯自名處所攝』。『意』這個詞表明屬於意處所攝。恐怕沒有相同的比喻，只能總的說『顯自名處』。但那不是所要建立的，因為違背了自己的宗義。對於上座部的觀點來說，這已經成立了。 『等無間不攝』，是爲了簡別次第滅意的等無間緣。現在成為俱有依。如果不簡別，就會導致『非所立』，產生『立已成』的過失，因為過去之意一切小乘都承認有。『增上者』，是爲了簡別因緣，即種子依。如果針對其他宗派，就不是『所立』。如果針對經部，就『立已成』。如果舉五識作為同喻，就會導致『所立不成』。 『生所依者』，是爲了簡別第七識與第八識、五識作為所依。第八識是染凈依，但不是親生的，不是相近的。五識是染凈依，但不是生依所攝。現在表明第七識是第六識的生依，因為它更接近且更殊勝。也簡別了俱時心所，因為它們也是第六識的所依。前面有『無同喻』的過失，後面有『立已成』的過失。 『又所依言』，是爲了簡別其餘的依法，因為它們只是依，而不是所依，會導致『立已成』的過失。這裡每一項都互相簡別，仔細思考就可以明白，所以不必多說。『因云極成六識隨一攝故』，這個簡別如前所述。比如極成的眼識等作為比喻，這個上宗中的『極成』一詞也適用於下面的比喻。 這裡提問：五根有各自的體性，意另外設立第七識。五塵的體性是真實存在的，法也是真實存在的嗎？回答：經中說『從六二緣』，沒有說有體性還是沒有體性。提問：法即使沒有體性，也能在意中產生，作為例子不成立。也應該從二緣產生，根現在沒有體性也能成立，因為是過去。

【English Translation】 English version: If it is not distinguished, it will become a common support with 'existence', leading to the fault of 'unestablished thesis'. Moreover, there is no similar analogy because the opponent does not acknowledge the five consciousnesses relying on the eighth consciousness. Assuming the analogy of the five consciousnesses is accepted, it will also lead to 'unestablished thesis'. 'Manifesting its own name-base' indicates that it belongs to the mind-base among the twelve bases. This is to distinguish the colored object in the chest mentioned by the Theravada school as the mind-root, because they consider it to be the dharma-base, not the mind-base. Only the sixth consciousness can obtain subtle forms, which are included in the dharma-base. If this were not the case, it should be categorized as an external base. To distinguish external bases, 'manifesting its own name-base' is added. The word 'mind' indicates that it belongs to the mind-base. Fearing that there is no similar analogy, it can only be generally said 'manifesting its own name-base'. But that is not what is to be established because it contradicts one's own doctrine. For the Theravada view, this is already established. 'Not included in immediate succession' is to distinguish the immediate succession condition of the mind that ceases in sequence. Now it becomes a co-existent support. If it is not distinguished, it will lead to 'unestablished thesis', resulting in the fault of 'establishing what is already established', because all Hinayana schools acknowledge the past mind. 'Dominant condition' is to distinguish the causal condition, namely the seed-support. If it is directed at other schools, it is not 'thesis to be established'. If it is directed at the Sautrantika school, it is 'establishing what is already established'. If the five consciousnesses are cited as a similar analogy, it will lead to 'unestablished thesis'. 'Support for arising' is to distinguish the seventh consciousness as the support for the eighth and five consciousnesses. The eighth consciousness is the defiled and purified support, but it is not directly born, not close. The five consciousnesses are the defiled and purified support, but they are not included in the support for arising. Now it shows that the seventh consciousness is the support for the arising of the sixth consciousness because it is closer and more superior. It also distinguishes the co-existent mental factors because they are also the support of the sixth consciousness. The former has the fault of 'no similar analogy', and the latter has the fault of 'establishing what is already established'. 'Also, the word support' is to distinguish the remaining dharma-supports because they are only supports, not the supported, which will lead to the fault of 'establishing what is already established'. Each item here distinguishes each other, and it can be understood with careful thought, so there is no need to say more. 'Because the cause says that the perfectly established six consciousnesses are included in one of them', this distinction is as mentioned before. For example, the perfectly established eye-consciousness etc. are used as an analogy. The word 'perfectly established' in this upper school also applies to the analogy below. Here is the question: The five roots have their own nature, and the seventh consciousness is established separately for the mind. The nature of the five objects of sense is real, is the dharma also real? Answer: The sutra says 'from six and two conditions', without saying whether there is nature or no nature. Question: Even if the dharma has no nature, it can arise in the mind, and the example is not established. It should also arise from two conditions, and the root can be established even if it has no nature now because it is in the past.

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意而為意故　答不然。根能順生。同世一處有力故現。無體故即不成。法但為境即生心故。法無時不例五。此如五十二中說。問難大好。

論。又契經說至彼應非有。

述曰。自下第三意名不成經。文中有三。初文可解。

論。謂若意識至已滅非有。

述曰。第二破薩婆多等。彼小乘言。思量名意。過去心是。今破不然。識現生時意已謝滅。現無思量之用。過去之心如何名意。

論。過去未來至說名為意。

述曰。彼言去．來有者。不然。去．來理無故。如薩婆多等前已破訖　經部等義。去．來無體。若過．未無體。如何言思量　雙問二家。如何思量　設前有體亦已無用。后無體故其用理無。用體既無。如何名意。

論。若謂假說至假依何立。

述曰。經部宗言過去無體假說用者。難云。汝之現在無正思量。假法何立。假法必有法可似故。無有現在實正思量。假依何立。大乘前破衛世外道假依真事。如此理難乖前義者不然。據理而說。不依于真方有似轉。經部所計。現在正思。過去似此。假名為意。就彼宗難。無違教失。故前所說存自就他難。今者廢已從他難　又前約勝義難。真實義中不依于真而辨假故。今依世俗難。世俗之中有真．似故。

論。若謂現在

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果認為『意』是因為『意』而成立的，回答：不是這樣的。根（indriya）能夠順應產生，因為在同一個世界、同一個地方具有力量而顯現。因為沒有實體，所以『意』本身不能成立。法（dharma）僅僅作為所緣境才能產生心，法在任何時候都與五識相同。這就像在五十二心所中說的那樣。這些問難非常好。

論：此外，契經上說，到達彼岸應該是不存在的。

述記：從下面開始是第三個『意名不成』的經文。文中有三部分，第一部分可以理解。

論：如果認為意識在已經滅去之後就不存在了。

述記：第二部分是破斥薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）等。他們這些小乘部派認為，思量就是『意』，指的是過去的心。現在破斥這種觀點，認為當識（vijnana）現生的時候，『意』已經謝滅了，現在沒有思量的作用，過去的心怎麼能稱為『意』呢？

論：過去和未來，（如果）說它們被稱為『意』。

述記：他們認為過去和未來是存在的，但這是不對的。因為過去和未來在道理上是不存在的，就像薩婆多部等之前已經破斥過的那樣。經部（Sautrantika）等的觀點認為，過去和未來沒有實體。如果過去和未來沒有實體，怎麼能說思量呢？這是同時質問兩家（薩婆多部和經部）。如何思量呢？假設過去有實體，也已經沒有用了；未來沒有實體，它的作用在道理上也是不存在的。作用和實體都沒有，怎麼能稱為『意』呢？

論：如果認為這是假說，那麼假說依據什麼而成立呢？

述記：經部宗認為過去沒有實體，只是假說其作用。反駁說，你們的現在沒有真正的思量，假法依據什麼而成立呢？假法必定有可以相似的法作為依據。如果沒有現在的真實思量，假說依據什麼而成立呢？大乘之前破斥衛世外道（Vaisheshika）的假說依據真實事物，如果用這個道理來反駁，就會與之前的意義相悖，但實際上並非如此。這是根據道理而說的，不依據真實事物才能有相似的轉變。經部所認為的，現在的思量是真實的，過去的思量與此相似，所以假名為『意』。這是就他們的宗義進行反駁，沒有違背教義的過失。所以之前所說是保留自己的觀點，就對方的觀點進行反駁；現在是放棄自己的觀點，順從對方的觀點進行反駁。此外，之前是約勝義諦（paramartha-satya）進行反駁，在真實義中不依據真實事物而辨別假說；現在是依據世俗諦（samvriti-satya）進行反駁，在世俗之中有真實和相似。

論：如果認為現在（有思量）

【English Translation】 English version: If it is thought that 'mind' (意, yi) is established because of 'mind', the answer is: it is not so. The root (根, indriya) can arise in accordance because it manifests with power in the same world and the same place. Because it has no substance, 'mind' itself cannot be established. Dharma (法, dharma) only produces mind as an object, and dharma is always the same as the five consciousnesses. This is as explained in the fifty-two mental factors. These questions and answers are very good.

Treatise: Moreover, the sutra says that reaching the other shore should be non-existent.

Commentary: From below is the third sutra text of 'the name of mind is not established'. There are three parts in the text, and the first part can be understood.

Treatise: If it is thought that consciousness does not exist after it has ceased.

Commentary: The second part refutes the Sarvastivada (薩婆多部) and others. These Hinayana schools believe that thinking is 'mind', which refers to the past mind. Now, this view is refuted, arguing that when consciousness (識, vijnana) arises, 'mind' has already ceased. There is no function of thinking in the present, so how can the past mind be called 'mind'?

Treatise: The past and the future, (if) it is said that they are called 'mind'.

Commentary: They think that the past and the future exist, but this is not correct. Because the past and the future do not exist in principle, as the Sarvastivada and others have been refuted before. The Sautrantika (經部) and others believe that the past and the future have no substance. If the past and the future have no substance, how can one speak of thinking? This is questioning both schools (Sarvastivada and Sautrantika) at the same time. How to think? Assuming that the past has substance, it is already useless; the future has no substance, so its function does not exist in principle. Since both function and substance do not exist, how can it be called 'mind'?

Treatise: If it is thought that it is a hypothetical statement, then on what is the hypothetical statement based?

Commentary: The Sautrantika school believes that the past has no substance, but only hypothetically states its function. The rebuttal says, your present has no real thinking, on what is the hypothetical dharma based? A hypothetical dharma must have a dharma that can be similar as a basis. If there is no real thinking in the present, on what is the hypothetical statement based? The Mahayana previously refuted the hypothetical statement of the Vaisheshika (衛世外道) based on real things. If this principle is used to refute, it will contradict the previous meaning, but it is not actually so. This is said according to reason, and there can be a similar transformation without relying on real things. What the Sautrantika believes is that the present thinking is real, and the past thinking is similar to this, so it is hypothetically called 'mind'. This is refuting based on their own doctrine, and there is no fault of violating the teachings. Therefore, what was said before was to retain one's own point of view and refute from the other's point of view; now it is to abandon one's own point of view and follow the other's point of view to refute. In addition, the previous refutation was about the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya), and in the real meaning, hypothetical statements are distinguished without relying on real things; now the refutation is based on the conventional truth (samvriti-satya), and in the conventional there are real and similar.

Treatise: If it is thought that the present (has thinking)

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至寧說為意。

述曰。彼經部救。或薩婆多雲。彼過去意于現在時曾有思量。故過去名意者。難云。爾時名識寧說為意。了別名識。現在名識。汝義定然。如何過去法。曾思量名意。設彼似現意故名意。應似現了別故名識。識不得名。意如何似可名思量。

論。故知別有至假立意名。

述曰。第三總結。第七末那一切時思量。現在起故。不似他故。正名為意。過去之心不問何識。依此現起意。假立意名。其實過去亦非是意。以無體故。若爾彼應似現識名識。如何似現意名意也。意有二義。一思量義。二依止義。第七通有二名。過去但唯依止。體雖現無。與現依止。思量之意相似。故但名意。不名為識。

論。又契經說至彼應無別。

述曰。自下第四二定無差經。文亦有三。其文易解。初二句是經文。下二句論意。

論。謂彼二定至彼二何別。

述曰。第二正破。彼二定中俱滅六識。六識滅同。說無第七彼宗義故　體數無別者。謂二定所滅者。各二十二心。心所法。即此能滅二十二數以為定體故。無別也。若小乘唯二十一。善大地唯十故。無染第七意。于無想定中有。于滅定中無。彼二何別。若有第七。即滅定中無。無想定有。所滅體數多少不同。無想滅一識。滅定滅二識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 至寧說什麼是意（manas）。

述曰：經部（Sautrantika）或薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）認為，過去的意在現在時曾經有過思量，所以過去被稱為意。反駁說：那時被稱為識（vijnana），又該如何說是意呢？了別（區分）名為識，現在名為識，按照你們的說法，這是確定的。那麼，過去的法，曾經思量就叫做意，這怎麼說得通呢？如果過去的意因為類似現在的意而被稱為意，那麼它也應該類似現在的了別而被稱為識，但識卻不能被稱為意。意如何類似，才能被稱為思量呢？

論：所以要知道，另外有假立的意名。

述曰：這是第三個總結。第七末那（manas）一切時都在思量，因為現在生起，不像其他的識，所以才被正式稱為意。過去的心，不論是什麼識，都依此現在的意而生起，所以假立意名。其實過去的心也不是意，因為它沒有實體。如果這樣，那麼它應該像現在的識一樣被稱為識，怎麼能像現在的意一樣被稱為意呢？意有兩個含義：一是思量，二是依止。第七識同時具有這兩個名稱。過去的心只有依止的含義，雖然現在沒有實體，但與現在的依止和思量的意相似，所以只被稱為意，不被稱為識。

論：另外，契經（sutra）說，如果這樣，那麼它們之間應該沒有區別。

述曰：下面是第四個，確定無差別經。經文也有三個部分，經文容易理解。前兩句是經文，后兩句是論的含義。

論：也就是說，這兩個定（禪定）都滅除了六識（意識），那麼這兩個定有什麼區別呢？

述曰：這是第二個正面的駁斥。這兩個定中都滅除了六識，六識的滅除是相同的。因為他們宗派的觀點中沒有第七識，所以體數沒有區別。所謂體數沒有區別，是指這兩個定所滅除的，各有二十二個心、心所法。即用這能滅除二十二個心、心所法的數量作為定的本體，所以沒有區別。如果小乘（Hinayana）只有二十一個，善大地只有十個。沒有染污的第七意，在無想定（Asamjna-samapatti）中有，在滅盡定（Nirodha-samapatti）中沒有，那麼這兩個定有什麼區別呢？如果有第七識，那麼滅盡定中沒有，無想定中有，所滅除的體數多少就不同。無想定滅除一個識，滅盡定滅除兩個識。

【English Translation】 English version: To ask what is designated as manas (意).

Commentary: The Sautrantikas (經部) or Sarvastivadins (薩婆多部) argue that the past manas had thoughts in the present, hence the past is called manas. Objection: At that time, it is called vijnana (識), so how can it be called manas? Discrimination is called vijnana, the present is called vijnana; according to your view, this is certain. Then, how can the past dharma, having thought, be called manas? If the past manas is called manas because it resembles the present manas, then it should also resemble the present discrimination and be called vijnana, but vijnana cannot be called manas. How can manas be similar enough to be called thought?

Treatise: Therefore, it should be known that there is a provisional name for manas.

Commentary: This is the third conclusion. The seventh manas (末那) is constantly thinking, because it arises in the present, unlike other consciousnesses, so it is formally called manas. The past mind, no matter what consciousness it is, arises based on this present manas, so a provisional name of manas is established. In fact, the past mind is not manas, because it has no substance. If so, then it should be called vijnana like the present vijnana; how can it be called manas like the present manas? Manas has two meanings: one is thinking, and the other is reliance. The seventh consciousness has both names. The past only has the meaning of reliance. Although it has no substance in the present, it is similar to the present reliance and thinking manas, so it is only called manas and not vijnana.

Treatise: Moreover, the sutra (契經) says that if this is the case, then there should be no difference between them.

Commentary: The following is the fourth, determining the sutra of no difference. The text also has three parts, and the text is easy to understand. The first two sentences are the sutra, and the last two sentences are the meaning of the treatise.

Treatise: That is to say, both of these samadhis (定) extinguish the six consciousnesses (識), so what is the difference between these two samadhis?

Commentary: This is the second direct refutation. Both of these samadhis extinguish the six consciousnesses, and the extinction of the six consciousnesses is the same. Because their sect's view does not have the seventh consciousness, there is no difference in substance and number. The so-called no difference in substance and number means that what is extinguished by these two samadhis each has twenty-two mental factors (心所法). That is, using the number of these twenty-two mental factors that can be extinguished as the substance of the samadhi, so there is no difference. If the Hinayana (小乘) only has twenty-one, and the good great earth only has ten. The undefiled seventh manas is present in the Asamjna-samapatti (無想定), but not in the Nirodha-samapatti (滅盡定), so what is the difference between these two samadhis? If there is a seventh consciousness, then it is not present in the Nirodha-samapatti, but it is present in the Asamjna-samapatti, and the number of substances extinguished is different. The Asamjna-samapatti extinguishes one consciousness, and the Nirodha-samapatti extinguishes two consciousnesses.

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。遂各有異。既無第七故無別也。今滅第七但滅染也。攝論難云俱滅何異。未辨大乘定體多少。今因辨之。準所滅數並第七識二定多少。種上總假立一。並所滅數多少別也。

論。若謂加行至由此有故。

述曰。而彼救言加行等別二定別者。謂攝論云出離想．靜住想。即是此中所說加行　界謂三界　地謂九地。依謂依身。聖者．異生依各別故　等者二得．二名．內道．外道．五蘊．四蘊果等種種別故。二定別者。不然彼加行差別因。由此第七識方有故。此第七識無者。彼加行差別亦無。謂第七識在凡不滅。故一切聖厭無想定而不欣入。在聖滅故一切聖欣。由此可言加行等別。若無第七。無凡可厭。無聖可欣。故加行等無因可別。

論。此若無者彼因亦無。

述曰。設言但因六識無漏凡聖別者。此六識無漏復如何成。成凡．聖者亦由第七。

論。是故定應別有此意。

述曰。第三總結。

論。又契經說至彼應無染。

述曰。自下第五說無想無漏失經。亦有三文。此中一期無心之義。二說如后。

論。謂彼長時至我執便無。

述曰。下第二文。于中有四。一總破諸部。二破一切有部三破大眾部等。四破經部。其文可解。無六識者亦有二解。一一生長時。二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：於是各自產生了差異。既然沒有第七識，也就沒有區別了。現在所滅的第七識，只是滅除染污而已。《攝大乘論》中有人質疑說，如果一起滅除，有什麼區別呢？這是因為沒有辨明大乘禪定的體性有多少。現在因此辨明它。依照所滅除的數量，以及第七識的兩種禪定的多少，在種子之上總合假立一個。並且依照所滅除的數量多少而有區別。

論：如果說加行直到由此有故。

述記：而他們的辯解說，加行等的差別導致兩種禪定的差別。所謂《攝大乘論》中說的出離想、靜住想，就是這裡所說的加行。界，指三界。地，指九地。依，指所依之身。聖者和異生所依之身各自不同。等，指二得、二名、內道、外道、五蘊、四蘊果等種種差別。兩種禪定的差別，不是這樣的。那些加行的差別是原因，由此第七識才存在。如果此第七識不存在，那些加行的差別也就沒有了。因為第七識在凡夫位不滅，所以一切聖者厭惡無想定而不喜歡進入。在聖位滅除，所以一切聖者欣喜。由此可以說加行等有差別。如果沒有第七識，就沒有凡夫可以厭惡，沒有聖者可以欣喜。所以加行等沒有原因可以區分。

論：此若無者彼因亦無。

述記：假設說僅僅因為六識的無漏而有凡聖的差別，那麼這六識的無漏又是如何成就的呢？成就凡夫和聖者也是由於第七識。

論：是故定應別有此意。

述記：第三，總結。

論：又契經說直到彼應無染。

述記：從下面第五點開始，說明無想定的無漏會失去經典依據。也有三段文字。這裡說的是一期無心的意義。第二種說法在後面。

論：謂彼長時直到我執便無。

述記：下面是第二段文字。其中有四點。一、總破各部。二、破一切有部。三、破大眾部等。四、破經部。文義可以理解。沒有六識的情況也有兩種解釋。一、一生長時。二

【English Translation】 English version: Thus, each had its differences. Since there is no seventh consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), there is no distinction. Now, the seventh consciousness that is extinguished is only the extinction of defilement. In the Saṃgraha (攝大乘論), someone questioned, 'If they are extinguished together, what is the difference?' This is because the nature of Mahayana samadhi has not been distinguished in terms of quantity. Now, therefore, we distinguish it. According to the number of things extinguished, and the quantity of the two samadhis of the seventh consciousness, one is generally provisionally established on the seeds. And there are differences according to the quantity of things extinguished.

Treatise: If it is said that the application (加行) leads to 'because of this, there is'.

Commentary: And their defense says that the differences in application, etc., lead to the differences in the two samadhis. What the Saṃgraha says about the thought of detachment (出離想) and the thought of stillness (靜住想) are what is meant here by application. Realm (界) refers to the three realms (三界). Ground (地) refers to the nine grounds (九地). Basis (依) refers to the body on which one relies. The bases of the sages and ordinary beings are different. 'Etc.' refers to the various differences in two attainments, two names, insiders, outsiders, the fruits of the five aggregates, the four aggregates, etc. The difference in the two samadhis is not like this. Those differences in application are the cause, and because of this, the seventh consciousness exists. If this seventh consciousness does not exist, those differences in application would also not exist. Because the seventh consciousness is not extinguished in the state of ordinary beings, all sages detest the non-perceptual samadhi (無想定) and do not rejoice in entering it. It is extinguished in the state of sages, so all sages rejoice. From this, it can be said that there are differences in application, etc. If there were no seventh consciousness, there would be no ordinary beings to detest, and no sages to rejoice. Therefore, application, etc., would have no cause to be distinguished.

Treatise: If this does not exist, that cause also does not exist.

Commentary: Suppose it is said that the difference between ordinary beings and sages is solely due to the undefiled six consciousnesses, then how are these undefiled six consciousnesses accomplished? The accomplishment of ordinary beings and sages is also due to the seventh consciousness.

Treatise: Therefore, it should definitely be that there is a separate meaning to this.

Commentary: Third, a conclusion.

Treatise: Moreover, the sutras say until 'there should be no defilement'.

Commentary: From the fifth point below, it is explained that the undefiled nature of the non-perceptual samadhi would lose its scriptural basis. There are also three sections of text. Here, it speaks of the meaning of a period of no-mind. The second explanation is later.

Treatise: Meaning that for a long time until 'the attachment to self would be gone'.

Commentary: Below is the second section of text. There are four points in it. First, a general refutation of the various schools. Second, a refutation of the Sarvāstivāda school. Third, a refutation of the Mahāsāṃghika school, etc. Fourth, a refutation of the Sautrāntika school. The meaning of the text can be understood. There are also two explanations for the situation where there are no six consciousnesses. First, a lifetime of growth. Second,

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除初后。故言長時。

論。非於余處至同所訶厭。

述曰。以余具縛者為例喻　量云。無想有情位。應起我執。異生攝故。如余異生趣位　又無想定都無我執心．心所者。應如涅槃非是聖賢之所訶厭　量云。無想聖人應不訶厭。無我執故。如涅槃等。

論。初後有故無如是失。

述曰。第二薩婆多等小乘救言。初生之位。後命終時。皆有心起。有我執故。故無失也。

難云。

論。中間長時無故有過。

述曰。中間長時無我執故。有大失也。如余具縛有情。非長時無我執故。

除經部師餘部救言。

論。去來有故無如是失。

述曰。長時雖不起。亦名有我執。故無失也。

論。彼非現常無故有過。

述曰。汝去。來世非現在有無為常故。無故有過不成我執。

論。所得無故能得亦無。

述曰。小乘救言去．來二世雖現在無。有得現在名成我執。難云。所得之世既無。能得之得非有。能得無故不成我執。

次大眾部．一說等四部．及化地等。云別有隨眠是不相應行。此位成就故名成我執。

論。不相應行前已遮故。

述曰。上已破故。此正破大眾等部。及破正量部等得類即不失增長。並在此中。

經

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『除初后。故言長時。』

論：並非在其他地方也同樣受到呵責厭惡。

述記：以其他被煩惱束縛的有情為例來比喻。量式如下：無想有情位，應該生起我執（Atman-graha）。因為屬於異生（Prthag-jana）所攝，就像其他異生所處的境界一樣。又，如果無想定完全沒有我執的心和心所，就應該像涅槃（Nirvana）一樣，不是聖賢所呵責厭惡的。量式如下：無想的聖人應該不會受到呵責厭惡，因為沒有我執，就像涅槃等。

論：因為最初和最後有，所以沒有這樣的過失。

述記：第二，薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）等小乘（Hinayana）辯解說，最初出生的時候，和最後命終的時候，都有心生起，有我執的緣故，所以沒有過失。

難：提出疑問。

論：因為中間長時沒有，所以有過失。

述記：因為中間長時沒有我執的緣故，有很大的過失。就像其他被煩惱束縛的有情一樣，不是長時間沒有我執的緣故。

除了經部師（Sautrantika）之外的其他部派辯解說：

論：因為過去和未來有，所以沒有這樣的過失。

述記：即使長時間不起（我執），也名為有我執，所以沒有過失。

論：因為那過去和未來不是現在有，也不是常有，所以有過失。

述記：你們所說的過去和未來世，不是現在有，也不是無為法常有，所以因為沒有的緣故，不能成立我執。

論：因為所獲得（的世）沒有，能獲得（的得）也沒有。

述記：小乘辯解說，過去和未來二世雖然現在沒有，但是有獲得現在的名，可以成立我執。難：提出疑問，所獲得的世既然沒有，能獲得的得也就沒有，能獲得的沒有，所以不能成立我執。

其次，大眾部（Mahasanghika）、一說部等四部，以及化地部（Kasyapiya）等，認為別有隨眠（Anusaya）是不相應行（Citta-viprayukta-samskara）。因為這個位置成就，所以名為成立我執。

論：因為不相應行之前已經遮破過了。

述記：因為上面已經破斥過了，這裡正是破斥大眾部等部派，以及破斥正量部（Sammitiya）等得類即不失增長的觀點，都包含在這裡面。

經

【English Translation】 English version 'Except for the beginning and the end. Therefore, it is said to be a long time.'

Treatise: It is not in other places that it is equally condemned and disliked.

Commentary: Using other beings bound by afflictions as an example for comparison. The logical statement is as follows: The state of unconscious beings should give rise to self-grasping (Atman-graha). Because it is included within ordinary beings (Prthag-jana), just like the states where other ordinary beings reside. Furthermore, if the unconscious state completely lacks the mind and mental factors of self-grasping, it should be like Nirvana (Nirvana), not condemned and disliked by sages and saints. The logical statement is as follows: Unconscious saints should not be condemned and disliked, because they lack self-grasping, just like Nirvana and so on.

Treatise: Because there is a beginning and an end, there is no such fault.

Commentary: Secondly, the Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada) and other Hinayana (Hinayana) schools argue that at the time of initial birth and at the time of final death, the mind arises, and because there is self-grasping, there is no fault.

Objection: Raising a question.

Treatise: Because there is no self-grasping in the long intervening period, there is a fault.

Commentary: Because there is no self-grasping in the long intervening period, there is a great fault. Just like other beings bound by afflictions, it is not because they lack self-grasping for a long time.

Apart from the Sautrantika (Sautrantika) school, other schools argue:

Treatise: Because there is past and future, there is no such fault.

Commentary: Even if it (self-grasping) does not arise for a long time, it is still called having self-grasping, so there is no fault.

Treatise: Because that past and future are not present and are not permanent, there is a fault.

Commentary: The past and future lives you speak of are not present, nor are they permanent unconditioned dharmas, so because they do not exist, self-grasping cannot be established.

Treatise: Because what is obtained (the time) does not exist, what can be obtained (the attainment) also does not exist.

Commentary: The Hinayana school argues that although the past and future two lives do not exist in the present, there is the name of obtaining the present, which can establish self-grasping. Objection: Raising a question, since the time that is obtained does not exist, the attainment that can be obtained also does not exist, and since what can be obtained does not exist, self-grasping cannot be established.

Next, the Mahasanghika (Mahasanghika), Ekavyavaharikas and other four schools, as well as the Kasyapiya (Kasyapiya) and others, believe that there is a separate latent tendency (Anusaya) that is a non-associated formation (Citta-viprayukta-samskara). Because this position is accomplished, it is called establishing self-grasping.

Treatise: Because non-associated formations have already been refuted before.

Commentary: Because it has already been refuted above, this is precisely refuting the Mahasanghika and other schools, as well as refuting the view of the Sammitiya (Sammitiya) and others that the category of attainment does not lose or increase, all of which are included here.

Sutra

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部救言雖無彼現行。此位有種子在。名有我執。

論。藏識無故熏習亦無。

述曰。何有種子。若彼救言我有色．心皆得受熏。彼有色根故有種子者。

論。余法受熏已辨非理。

述曰。唯除藏識余法受熏。上來已辨彼非理故。

論。故應別有至同訶厭彼。

述曰。第三總結。故有第七于彼起我執。是異生故。出定已后。復沉生死起諸煩惱。聖賢所訶。若無第七。不應訶彼。無過失定。

論。又契經說至彼不應有。

述曰。自下第六我執不有失。于中有三。初引經。云異生者不言有學等。以彼無漏善心無我執故。此據全分者故。

論。謂異生類至而內恒執我。

述曰。下第二文。于中有三。一顯自我執。二破他宗。三成已有漏　初中又三。一立宗。二引證。三釋教。此即初也。其文易了。

何以知然。

論。由執我故至不能亡相。

述曰。亡由無也　相謂相狀。雜染相狀。通三性也　由我執故起施等善法。由有第七內執我故。外行施等分別相生。若有漏三性俱心無我執者。如無漏心便能亡相應成無漏。故攝論云謂我能行施等。今有二解　一云我者即是第七內緣行相。非必外緣　二云此我外緣。行相粗猛非第七起。由第七故第六起此

。舉由七生增明為論。非實顯之。彼是第六識中我執體有間斷。遍三性心間雜生故。此解為勝。是根本故。第七不緣外境生故。

為證此義。

論。故瑜伽說至相縛解脫。

述曰。瑜伽五十一．顯揚十七等。同云染污末那為依止等。由第七故余諸識中相縛不脫。此中通言六識相縛。瑜伽等說第六相縛。彼據親生識語。此約實由為論　既爾二乘染末那滅。何故五識相縛猶在　答由七中法執。雖非縛體執有相故。是先我執所引生故。令六識等相縛不脫。若斷法執已相縛便脫　或由因類相縛猶在。不爾生空智應亦有相縛　了別者心行相。境相能縛心。名相了別縛。

論。言縛者至故名相縛。

述曰。下釋教也。何謂相縛。謂于境相不能了知依他緣生如幻事．陽焰等。能緣見分諸心．心所。為境相分之所拘礙不得自在。體便粗重無所明覺。起時硬澀有分別相。相分縛心名相縛也　問相分為見緣縛見名相縛。見分自證緣縛體名見縛。縛證自證例亦應然。何故不名為見縛等　答以相縛見體狀易彰。或所縛見有非．比量。或能縛相通於內外。從此勝義且名相縛　非見分等體非能縛。自證分等說非所縛。如前第二展轉相望。互為能所二種縛也。問有漏有相即名相縛。后得有相應為相縛　答此亦不然。作

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 以第七識所生的七種生滅變化來增進明瞭作為論述，而不是直接顯現真理。這是因為第六識中的我執本體是有間斷的，並且遍及三性（善、惡、無記）之心，相互混雜而生。這種解釋更為殊勝，因為第七識是根本。第七識不緣外境而生。

爲了證明這個道理。

論：所以《瑜伽師地論》說，乃至相縛解脫。

述記：在《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷、《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷等經論中，都說染污的末那識（manas, 第七識）是依止處等等。由於第七識的緣故，其餘諸識中的相縛不能解脫。這裡通泛地說六識的相縛。《瑜伽師地論》等只說第六識的相縛，那是根據第六識是直接產生相縛的識來說的。這裡是從根本原因來論述。既然如此，二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）聖者滅除了染污的末那識，為什麼五識的相縛仍然存在呢？回答：因為第七識中的法執，雖然不是相縛的本體，但執著于相的存在。這是先前我執所引發的，所以使得六識等的相縛不能解脫。如果斷除了法執，相縛便會解脫。或者由於因類相似，相縛仍然存在。否則，生空智（證悟空性的智慧）也應該有相縛。了別者，是指心的行相。境相能夠束縛心，稱為相了別縛。

論：所說的『縛』，乃至故名相縛。

述記：下面解釋教義。什麼是相縛？就是對於境相不能了知它是依他緣起、如幻事、陽焰等。能緣的見分（諸心、心所）被境相分所拘礙，不得自在。本體變得粗重，沒有明覺。生起時，感覺硬澀，有分別之相。相分束縛心，就叫做相縛。問：相分束縛見分，緣縛見分，稱為相縛。見分自證分緣縛本體，稱為見縛。那麼，束縛證自證分也應該如此，為什麼不稱為見縛等呢？答：因為相束縛見分，其體狀容易顯現。或者所束縛的見分有非量、比量。或者能束縛的相通於內外。因此，從殊勝的意義上來說，暫且稱為相縛。不是說見分等的本體不能束縛，自證分等不是被束縛的。如同前面第二種情況，展轉相望，互為能縛和所縛兩種關係。問：有漏的識有相，就叫做相縛。那麼，后得智（證悟后所獲得的智慧）有相，也應該成為相縛嗎？答：這也未必。作為……

【English Translation】 English version: To elaborate on the seven transformations arising from the seventh consciousness to enhance understanding, rather than directly revealing the truth. This is because the ego-grasping entity in the sixth consciousness is intermittent and pervades the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) of the mind, arising in a mixed manner. This explanation is superior because the seventh consciousness is fundamental. The seventh consciousness does not arise by cognizing external objects.

To prove this point.

Treatise: Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, up to the liberation from the bondage of characteristics (lakṣaṇa-bandha).

Commentary: In the fifty-first fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the seventeenth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, it is stated that the defiled manas (seventh consciousness) is the support, etc. Due to the seventh consciousness, the bondage of characteristics in the other consciousnesses cannot be liberated. Here, it is generally said that the six consciousnesses are bound by characteristics. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, etc., only mention the sixth consciousness being bound by characteristics, which is based on the fact that the sixth consciousness directly produces the bondage of characteristics. This is discussed from the perspective of the fundamental cause. If that is the case, why does the bondage of characteristics still exist in the five consciousnesses even after the arhats of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) have extinguished the defiled manas? Answer: Because of the dharma-grasping in the seventh consciousness, although it is not the entity of the bondage, it clings to the existence of characteristics. This is caused by the previous ego-grasping, which prevents the bondage of characteristics in the six consciousnesses, etc., from being liberated. If the dharma-grasping is severed, the bondage of characteristics will be liberated. Or, due to the similarity of causes, the bondage of characteristics still exists. Otherwise, the wisdom of emptiness (śūnyatā) should also have the bondage of characteristics. The 'discriminator' refers to the appearance of the mind's activity. The appearance of objects can bind the mind, which is called the bondage of discriminating characteristics.

Treatise: The so-called 'bondage' is, therefore, called the bondage of characteristics.

Commentary: The following explains the teachings. What is the bondage of characteristics? It means that one cannot understand the appearance of objects as dependently originated, like illusions, mirages, etc. The perceiving aspect (darśana-bhāga) of the cognizing consciousnesses and mental factors is constrained by the objective aspect (nimitta-bhāga), unable to be free. The entity becomes coarse and heavy, without clear awareness. When it arises, it feels stiff and has the appearance of discrimination. The objective aspect binding the mind is called the bondage of characteristics. Question: The objective aspect binds the perceiving aspect, and the condition binds the perceiving aspect, which is called the bondage of characteristics. The self-cognizing aspect binds the entity, which is called the bondage of perception. Then, binding the witnessing self-cognizing aspect should also be the same, so why isn't it called the bondage of perception, etc.? Answer: Because the state of the objective aspect binding the perceiving aspect is easily manifested. Or the bound perceiving aspect has non-valid or inferential cognition. Or the binding characteristic is common to both internal and external. Therefore, from the superior meaning, it is temporarily called the bondage of characteristics. It is not that the entity of the perceiving aspect, etc., cannot bind, or that the self-cognizing aspect, etc., is not bound. As in the second case mentioned earlier, they mutually regard each other as the binding and the bound. Question: If a consciousness with outflows (sāsrava) has characteristics, it is called the bondage of characteristics. Then, the subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna) with characteristics should also become the bondage of characteristics? Answer: That is not necessarily the case. As...

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證解故　既爾自證應非見縛　此亦不然體是惑故　若爾善心見應非縛　此有漏故。煩惱增故。有漏第八之所生故。有漏末那之所增故。后得無漏時能斷此故。有粗重故。不可為例。即通三性皆有相縛。如下第九自當解釋。粗重縛體亦通有漏。至后當知。

論。依如是義至識縛終不脫。

述曰。無性攝論彼亦言如說。不知何處論文　然有解云何毗達磨經。五十一中有此義同。文有少異。以上攝論但言施等有於我執。此中通論三性心有。彼據勝顯說故。此頌即彼文也。

論。又善無覆至不俱起故。

述曰。第二破他有三。一破一切有等。二破大眾部等。三破經部。重成有我執。諸法成有漏。皆由第七故。所以者何。要與自身煩惱俱者方成有漏故。善心．無覆。既與煩惱不俱。應不成有漏。以彼說無第七識故。

若彼薩婆多等。言由前及後去．來煩惱發故。緣故。此善等成有漏者。不然。

論。去來緣縛理非有故。

述曰。其世體無猶如兔角。故縛無也。

論。非由他或至成無漏故。

述曰。彼若救言如無學身雖非己身現有煩惱。然由現在他緣縛故。成有漏者。此亦不然。非由他惑成已有漏　若彼救言何為不得。故應難云。勿由他解成己無漏。如何有漏由他漏成。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 證解故，既然如此，自己證得解脫，應該不是被見惑所束縛。這種說法也不對，因為自體就是迷惑的緣故。如果這樣說，那麼善心所生的見解應該不是束縛，這是因為它是有漏的緣故，是煩惱增長的緣故，是有漏的第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālayavijñāna）所生的緣故，是有漏的末那識（末那識，Manas）所增長的緣故，在獲得無漏智慧時能夠斷除這些的緣故，有粗重性的緣故，所以不能作為例子。也就是說，通於三性（善、惡、無記）都有相的束縛，如下文第九卷會自行解釋。粗重性的束縛也通於有漏，到後面就會知道。

論：依據這樣的意義，直到識的束縛終究不能解脫。

述曰：無性《攝論》中也這樣說，不知是哪裡的論文。然而有解釋說，在《毗達磨經》第五十一中有此義相同，文字略有差異。以上《攝論》只說佈施等有我執，這裡通論三性心都有。前者是根據殊勝之處而說，此頌就是那裡的文字。

論：又善心、無覆無記心，因為不與煩惱同時生起。

述曰：第二，破斥其他宗派有三種：一、破斥一切有部等；二、破斥大眾部等；三、破斥經部。重新成立有我執，諸法成為有漏，都是由於第七識（末那識，Manas）的緣故。為什麼這樣說呢？因為一定要與自身的煩惱同時生起，才能成為有漏的緣故。善心、無覆無記心，既然不與煩惱同時生起，應該不能成為有漏，因為他們說沒有第七識的緣故。

如果彼薩婆多部等說，由過去和未來的煩惱引發的緣故，作為因緣的緣故，這些善心等成為有漏的，這種說法不對。

論：過去和未來的因緣束縛，道理上是不存在的緣故。

述曰：過去和未來的世體是不存在的，猶如兔角，所以束縛也是不存在的。

論：不是由於其他的煩惱，或者說，成為無漏的緣故。

述曰：他們如果辯解說，如同無學之身雖然不是自身現有煩惱，但是由於現在的其他因緣束縛的緣故，成為有漏的，這種說法也不對。不是由於其他的迷惑，成為自己已有的有漏。如果他們辯解說，為什麼不可以呢？所以應該反駁說，不要由於其他的解脫，成為自己的無漏。如何能說有漏是由其他的有漏造成的呢？

【English Translation】 English version Because of the proof of liberation, since it is so, self-proven liberation should not be bound by the afflictions of views. This is also not correct, because its very nature is delusion. If that's the case, then the views arising from wholesome minds should not be a bondage, because they are tainted (with outflows, sāsrava), because they increase afflictions, because they are produced by the tainted eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna), because they are increased by the tainted Manas, because they can be severed when attaining untainted wisdom, and because they possess coarseness. Therefore, they cannot be taken as examples. That is to say, all three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) are bound by characteristics, as will be explained in detail in the ninth fascicle below. The bondage of coarseness also pervades the tainted; this will be known later.

Treatise: According to this meaning, one will ultimately not be liberated from the bondage of consciousness.

Commentary: Vasubandhu's Śāstra on the Summary of the Great Vehicle also says this. It is not known which treatise it is from. However, there is an explanation that this meaning is the same as that in the fifty-first section of the Abhidharma Sutra, with slight differences in wording. The Śāstra on the Summary only states that giving, etc., involve attachment to self, while this discusses all three natures of mind. The former speaks according to what is most prominent, and this verse is from that text.

Treatise: Furthermore, wholesome and neutral minds do not arise simultaneously with afflictions.

Commentary: Secondly, there are three refutations of other schools: first, refuting the Sarvāstivāda school, etc.; second, refuting the Mahāsāṃghika school, etc.; and third, refuting the Sautrāntika school. It re-establishes the existence of attachment to self. All dharmas become tainted because of the seventh consciousness (Manas). Why is this so? Because they must arise simultaneously with one's own afflictions in order to become tainted. Wholesome and neutral minds do not arise simultaneously with afflictions, so they should not become tainted, because they say there is no seventh consciousness.

If the Sarvāstivāda school, etc., says that these wholesome minds, etc., become tainted because they are triggered by past and future afflictions, and because of the condition of causality, this is not correct.

Treatise: The bondage of past and future conditions does not exist in principle.

Commentary: The substance of the past and future does not exist, like rabbit horns, so bondage also does not exist.

Treatise: It is not due to the afflictions of others, or else it would become untainted.

Commentary: If they argue that, like the body of an Arhat, although it does not currently have afflictions, it becomes tainted due to the bondage of other conditions, this is also not correct. One's own existing taintedness is not due to the delusions of others. If they argue, 'Why not?', then it should be countered by saying, 'Don't let the liberation of others become your own untaintedness.' How can it be said that taintedness is caused by the taintedness of others?

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此薩婆多等死訖。

論。又不可說至已極成故。

述曰。第二大眾等救。今破之言。不相應假隨眠非實。正量部等不失增長破。極成故。

論。亦不可說至可成有漏故。

述曰。第三經部師等言。如無學身諸有漏識法。雖不由他惑緣。及過去緣縛是煩惱引。然自身中有有漏種在生此有漏法故。此善等例亦然者。不然。論主難云。彼善等種成有漏者。先無因故可成有漏。謂此善種能熏熏時。無始已來先皆不與煩惱俱有。有何所以得成有漏。

論。非由漏種至亦成有漏故。

述曰。彼若救言。雖無先時善等之位有煩惱俱生。由漏種子隨遂善等種故。善等種成有漏者不然。勿學無漏心亦成有漏故。無漏種子俱亦有漏種逐。無漏之法不成有漏。有漏善等種如何成有漏。我大乘宗。無漏不與現行煩惱我執俱故。雖有種逐。無漏之法不成有漏。有漏善等與此相違。故成有漏。汝宗如何善等成有漏。

問如對法雲。漏所縛者有漏善法。漏所隨者即餘地法。漏隨順者抉擇分善等。彼豈皆與漏俱起故名有漏耶。為答此等疑。

論。雖由煩惱至表漏俱故。

述曰。此即牒前漏所縛云。雖知如此。而第六識中漏。與施等不俱起。故非有漏正因。雖亦由之發。而傍因故成有漏。非是正

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『此薩婆多等死訖。』（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部，在此消亡。）

論：又不可說至已極成故。

述曰：第二大眾等救。今破之言。不相應假隨眠非實。正量部等不失增長破。極成故。

論：亦不可說至可成有漏故。

述曰：第三經部師等言。如無學身諸有漏識法。雖不由他惑緣。及過去緣縛是煩惱引。然自身中有有漏種在生此有漏法故。此善等例亦然者。不然。論主難云。彼善等種成有漏者。先無因故可成有漏。謂此善種能熏熏時。無始已來先皆不與煩惱俱有。有何所以得成有漏。

論：非由漏種至亦成有漏故。

述曰：彼若救言。雖無先時善等之位有煩惱俱生。由漏種子隨遂善等種故。善等種成有漏者不然。勿學無漏心亦成有漏故。無漏種子俱亦有漏種逐。無漏之法不成有漏。有漏善等種如何成有漏。我大乘宗。無漏不與現行煩惱我執俱故。雖有種逐。無漏之法不成有漏。有漏善等與此相違。故成有漏。汝宗如何善等成有漏。

問如對法雲。漏所縛者有漏善法。漏所隨者即餘地法。漏隨順者抉擇分善等。彼豈皆與漏俱起故名有漏耶。為答此等疑。

論：雖由煩惱至表漏俱故。

述曰：此即牒前漏所縛云。雖知如此。而第六識中漏。與施等不俱起。故非有漏正因。雖亦由之發。而傍因故成有漏。非是正

【English Translation】 English version: 'This Sarvāstivāda etc. is dead.' (Sarvāstivāda: 'All Exists' school, here it is finished.)

Treatise: Moreover, it cannot be said to be completely established.

Commentary: The second group, the Mahāsāṃghikas, etc., try to salvage the situation. Now, refuting them, it is said that the non-corresponding hypothetical latent afflictions are not real. The Vaibhāṣikas, etc., refute the loss of increase because it is completely established.

Treatise: Also, it cannot be said to be able to become tainted.

Commentary: The third group, the Sautrāntikas, etc., say: 'Like the tainted consciousness dharmas in the body of an Arhat (one who has attained enlightenment), although they are not caused by other afflictive conditions or bound by past conditions, they are induced by afflictions. However, within themselves, there are tainted seeds that give rise to these tainted dharmas. The same applies to these wholesome dharmas.' This is not correct. The treatise master refutes, saying: 'If those wholesome seeds become tainted, then because there was no prior cause, they can become tainted. When these wholesome seeds are able to imprint, from beginningless time, they have never co-existed with afflictions. How can they become tainted?'

Treatise: Not because of tainted seeds, but also because they become tainted.

Commentary: If they try to salvage the situation by saying: 'Although there were no afflictions co-arising in the past position of wholesome dharmas, because the tainted seeds follow and accompany the wholesome seeds, the wholesome seeds become tainted,' this is not correct. Otherwise, even untainted minds would become tainted. Even though untainted seeds are accompanied by tainted seeds, untainted dharmas do not become tainted. How can tainted wholesome seeds become tainted? In my Mahayana school, untainted dharmas do not co-exist with manifest afflictions or ego-grasping. Therefore, even though there are seeds that follow, untainted dharmas do not become tainted. Tainted wholesome dharmas are contrary to this, so they become tainted. How do wholesome dharmas in your school become tainted?'

Question: As it says in the Abhidharma, 'What is bound by taints are tainted wholesome dharmas. What is followed by taints are the dharmas of other realms. What accords with taints are the determinative wholesome dharmas, etc.' Are they all called tainted because they all arise together with taints? This is to answer these doubts.

Treatise: Although due to afflictions, it indicates the co-existence of taints.

Commentary: This refers to the previous statement that what is bound by taints. Although it is known that in the sixth consciousness, taints do not arise together with giving, etc., therefore, it is not the direct cause of being tainted. Although it is also caused by it, it is a secondary cause for becoming tainted, not the direct cause.

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因。正因之言要俱起故。即他緣縛亦傍因也。由此大乘不緣他境。各各別變故。若緣他縛他。便非各各變境。即應我作他受果失。此甚新義。以有漏言正表此法與漏俱故。

論。又無記業至得成有漏。

述曰。若以漏發名為有漏。如無記業如何有漏。彼非煩惱引故。如無漏善。若言由他緣縛。亦如前破。

論。然諸有漏至方成有漏。

述曰。第三成有漏義。諸有漏法。由與自身現行煩惱俱生俱滅。互相增益方成有漏　自身者。簡他身。不縛己　現行。簡種子。唯種不縛。故對法等云漏所隨謂逐他地者。但言漏隨不言縛他地。復不相增益故　俱生俱滅。簡前後發　相增益者。遞為緣相生義。正解漏義簡無漏法。

論。由此熏成至有漏義成。

述曰。有漏現行起故。熏成有漏種。后時善等起有漏義成。亦非無始無因故成有漏。亦非漏種逐故成有漏。

論。異生既然有學亦爾。

述曰。異生三種既然。有學亦爾。有煩惱俱故第七未滅。余識之中必無煩惱與善俱故。

為會前疑。

論。無學有漏至於理無違。

述曰。無學有漏雖非漏俱。而猶先時有漏種起故成有漏。對法第三云。漏種類者謂無學身諸有漏法。以先有漏后名種類。小乘等不然。先無有漏種

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因。正因的含義是要同時生起。即使是其他因緣的束縛，也只是傍助之因。因此，大乘佛教不緣于其他外境，而是各自獨立變化。如果緣于其他事物而被束縛，那就不是各自獨立變化之境。就會出現我造作業卻由他人承受果報的過失。這是非常新穎的觀點。用『有漏』這個詞，正是爲了表明此法與煩惱同時存在。

論：又，無記業乃至得以成為有漏。

述曰：如果因為煩惱引發而稱為有漏，那麼無記業怎麼能算是有漏呢？因為它不是由煩惱所引發的，就像無漏的善業一樣。如果說是由於其他因緣的束縛，也像前面那樣駁斥。

論：然而，諸有漏法乃至才能成為有漏。

述曰：第三個解釋成為有漏的含義。各種有漏法，由於與自身現行的煩惱同時生起、同時滅去，互相增益，才能成為有漏。『自身』，是爲了區別於他身，不會束縛自己。『現行』，是爲了區別于種子，只有種子不會束縛。所以《對法》等論典說，『漏所隨』是指追逐其他地界的事物，只是說煩惱隨逐，沒有說束縛其他地界，而且也不會互相增益。『同時生起、同時滅去』，是爲了區別於前后引發的情況。『互相增益』，是指互相作為因緣而生起。正確解釋有漏的含義是爲了區別于無漏法。

論：由此熏習形成乃至有漏的含義成立。

述曰：由於有漏的現行生起，熏習形成有漏的種子，之後善等生起，有漏的含義才成立。也不是因為無始無因而成為有漏，也不是因為煩惱的種子追逐而成為有漏。

論：異生（凡夫）如此，有學（聖者）也是如此。

述曰：凡夫的三種情況既然如此，有學也是如此。因為有煩惱同時存在，所以第七識（末那識）還沒有滅盡。其他識之中必然沒有煩惱與善同時存在的情況。

爲了消除之前的疑問。

論：無學（阿羅漢）的有漏乃至在道理上沒有違背。

述曰：無學的有漏雖然不是與煩惱同時存在，但仍然是由於先前有漏的種子生起而成為有漏。《對法》第三卷說：『煩惱的種類』是指無學之身中的各種有漏法，因為先前存在有漏，後來才稱為種類。小乘佛教等不這樣認為，認為先前沒有有漏的種子。

【English Translation】 English version: Cause. The meaning of 'direct cause' is that it must arise simultaneously. Even the bondage of other conditions is only an auxiliary cause. Therefore, Mahayana Buddhism does not rely on external objects, but each independently transforms. If one is bound by relying on other things, then it is not an independent transformation of the realm. Then there would be the fault of 'I create karma, but others receive the consequences'. This is a very novel view. The term 'with outflows' (有漏, yǒu lòu) precisely indicates that this dharma exists simultaneously with afflictions.

Treatise: Furthermore, non-virtuous karma eventually becomes with outflows.

Commentary: If it is called 'with outflows' because it is caused by afflictions, then how can non-virtuous karma be considered with outflows? Because it is not caused by afflictions, like virtuous karma without outflows. If it is said to be due to the bondage of other conditions, it is refuted as before.

Treatise: However, all dharmas with outflows eventually become with outflows.

Commentary: The third explanation of becoming 'with outflows'. All dharmas with outflows, because they arise and cease simultaneously with their own present afflictions, mutually increasing each other, can become 'with outflows'. 'Own' is to distinguish from others, not binding oneself. 'Present' is to distinguish from seeds, only seeds do not bind. Therefore, treatises such as the Abhidharma say that 'followed by outflows' refers to things that pursue other realms, only saying that afflictions follow, not saying that they bind other realms, and they do not mutually increase each other. 'Arising and ceasing simultaneously' is to distinguish from situations of arising before and after. 'Mutually increasing' refers to arising as causes and conditions for each other. Correctly explaining the meaning of 'with outflows' is to distinguish it from dharmas without outflows.

Treatise: Therefore, through this perfuming, the meaning of 'with outflows' is established.

Commentary: Because the present activity of 'with outflows' arises, it perfumes and forms the seeds of 'with outflows', and later, when virtuous things arise, the meaning of 'with outflows' is established. It is not because of beginninglessness and causelessness that it becomes 'with outflows', nor is it because the seeds of afflictions pursue that it becomes 'with outflows'.

Treatise: Just as it is for ordinary beings (異生, yì shēng), so it is for those in training (有學, yǒu xué).

Commentary: Since the three situations are like this for ordinary beings, so it is for those in training. Because afflictions exist simultaneously, the seventh consciousness (末那識, mò nà shì, manas) has not yet been extinguished. In other consciousnesses, there is certainly no situation where afflictions and virtue exist simultaneously.

To resolve previous doubts.

Treatise: The 'with outflows' of the Arhat (無學, wú xué) is not contradictory in principle.

Commentary: Although the 'with outflows' of the Arhat is not simultaneous with afflictions, it is still 'with outflows' because the seeds of 'with outflows' from the past arise. The third volume of the Abhidharma says: 'The types of afflictions' refer to the various dharmas with outflows in the body of the Arhat, because 'with outflows' existed previously, and later it is called 'types'. Theravada Buddhism and others do not think this way, believing that there were no seeds of 'with outflows' previously.

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子故。今亦非種類。

論。由有末那至此第七識。

述曰。第三總結。若有第七恒起我執。故善等法成有漏也。即是攝論我執不有失。望此極差。

論。證此識有至應隨信學。

述曰。自下第三結會。今且隨攝大乘第一說有六證。總結前也。理第三文。

此說八識。何故阿含經等中說有六識。

論。然有經中至隨轉理門。

述曰。總第三文也。此有二義。一隨轉理門。依小根器未建立於第七．八者說故。

論。或隨所依至實有八種。

述曰。此第二解。依不共根．不共境故。說有六種。非謂盡理　而識類別實有八種　大乘之中於處門中不開識者。以此理通。第八卷中當廣證理。

上來已解第二能變。自下次解第三能變。

論。如是已說至其相云何。

述曰。于中有二。初結前生后以發論端。第二舉頌依問正答　就此能變總有九頌。以九門分別。第一齣能變差別。第二自性。第三行相。第四三性。第五心所相應。第六三受俱起。第七所依。第八俱轉。第九起滅。唯有四頌所明。可知　然中間有初遍行等五頌。重明前相應法體。非別分別六識之門　雖有九頌總束為三段　一明初四門。即此一頌是　二心所相應．及三受俱。次六頌是。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 子故。現在也不是種類。

論：由於有末那（manas，意根）至此第七識（第七意識，末那識）。

述曰：第三總結。若有第七識恒常生起我執（ātma-graha，對自我的執著），所以善等法才成為有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱的）。這就是攝論（《攝大乘論》）中說我執不存在的錯誤。與此相比，差別極大。

論：證明此識存在，應當隨順信受學習。

述曰：自下第三總結會通。現在且隨《攝大乘論》第一義說有六個證據。總結前面所說。理第三文。

此說有八識（八種意識）。為什麼《阿含經》（Āgama）等經典中說有六識（六種意識）？

論：然而有些經中，是隨順所依的道理。

述曰：總第三文。這有兩種解釋。一是隨順所依的道理，因為是對小根器的人，沒有建立第七識和第八識（第八意識，阿賴耶識）的說法。

論：或者隨順所依的根基和境界不同，所以說有六種識，並非窮盡真理，而識的類別實際上有八種。大乘（Mahāyāna）之中，在處門中沒有開顯第八識，也是因為這個道理。第八卷中將廣泛論證這個道理。

上面已經解釋了第二能變（第二種轉變，指末那識的轉變）。下面解釋第三能變（指阿賴耶識的轉變）。

論：像這樣已經說了，它的相是什麼？

述曰：其中有二。首先總結前面，引發後面的討論。第二舉頌，依據提問正面回答。就此能變，總共有九頌，用九個方面來分別。第一是說明能變的差別。第二是自性。第三是行相。第四是三性（三種性質，善、惡、無記）。第五是心所相應（citta-samprayukta，與心相應的心理活動）。第六是三受俱起（三種感受同時生起，苦、樂、舍）。第七是所依。第八是俱轉（同時運作）。第九是起滅。只有四頌是明確說明的，可以知道。然而中間有初遍行等五頌，是重新說明前面相應法的體性，不是分別說明六識的方面。雖然有九頌，總共歸納為三段。一是說明前四門，就是這一頌。二是心所相應以及三受俱起，是接下來的六頌。

【English Translation】 English version: Son's cause. Now it is also not a category.

Treatise: Because there is Manas (意根, mind-basis) up to this seventh consciousness (第七識, seventh consciousness, Manas-consciousness).

Commentary: The third conclusion. If the seventh consciousness constantly arises with ego-grasping (我執, ātma-graha, clinging to self), then good dharmas and others become tainted (有漏, sāsrava, with afflictions). This is the error in the Compendium on the Mahāyāna (攝大乘論) that ego-grasping does not exist. Compared to this, the difference is extreme.

Treatise: To prove the existence of this consciousness, one should follow, believe, and learn.

Commentary: From here down, the third concludes and integrates. Now, let's follow the first meaning of the Compendium on the Mahāyāna and say there are six proofs. Summarizing what was said before. Reason, the third text.

This says there are eight consciousnesses (八識, eight kinds of consciousness). Why do the Agama Sutras (阿含經) and other scriptures say there are six consciousnesses (六識, six kinds of consciousness)?

Treatise: However, in some sutras, it follows the principle of what is relied upon.

Commentary: The third text in general. There are two explanations for this. One is following the principle of what is relied upon, because it is spoken to those with lesser faculties, without establishing the seventh and eighth consciousnesses (第八識, eighth consciousness, Ālaya-consciousness).

Treatise: Or, depending on the different bases and realms relied upon, it is said there are six kinds of consciousness. It is not that it exhausts the truth, but the categories of consciousness actually have eight kinds. In the Mahāyāna (大乘), not revealing the eighth consciousness in the 'place' section is also because of this reason. The eighth volume will extensively prove this principle.

The second transformation (第二能變, second transformation, referring to the transformation of Manas-consciousness) has been explained above. From here down, the third transformation (第三能變, referring to the transformation of Ālaya-consciousness) is explained.

Treatise: Like this has already been said, what is its appearance?

Commentary: Within this, there are two parts. First, summarizing the previous and initiating the following discussion. Second, citing the verse and answering the question directly. Regarding this transformation, there are a total of nine verses, which are distinguished by nine aspects. First is explaining the differences in transformation. Second is self-nature. Third is characteristics. Fourth is the three natures (三性, three natures: good, evil, and neutral). Fifth is mental concomitants (心所相應, citta-samprayukta, mental activities associated with the mind). Sixth is the simultaneous arising of the three feelings (三受俱起, simultaneous arising of three feelings: suffering, pleasure, and indifference). Seventh is what is relied upon. Eighth is simultaneous operation. Ninth is arising and ceasing. Only four verses are clearly explained, which can be known. However, in the middle, there are five verses such as the initial pervasive ones, which are re-explaining the nature of the corresponding dharmas mentioned earlier, not separately explaining the aspects of the six consciousnesses. Although there are nine verses, they are summarized into three sections. One is explaining the first four aspects, which is this one verse. Two is mental concomitants and the simultaneous arising of the three feelings, which are the following six verses.

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三依止．俱轉．起滅。后二頌是。

論。頌曰至善不善俱非。

述曰。今初頌中有四門義。如文可知。

論。曰至能變識相。

述曰。於此釋中。初釋六名。次解性．相。后辨三性　初中有二。二句別故　能變有三。末那第二。此居后故。此即第三能變。次第二能變之後也。此謂解頌第一句也。

論。此識差別總有六種。

述曰。解第二句頌于中有三。初釋六因。次隨別解。后顯不說。此即初也。六種差別至下當知。

何以言六更不分別為多或少。

論。隨六根境種類異故。

述曰。謂根與境各有六別識隨彼異。故非多少。亦非定別。又明此識既隨根．境有六數定明得名時非唯據一。即于根．境二處得名。大論亦說隨根名識。隨境名識。乃至亦名青等識等。

何者依根名六根識。

論。謂名眼識乃至意識。

述曰。下隨別釋。文復有二。初別解。后料簡。此依主釋。根是主故。對法等說依眼緣色似色了別。初句即是此識得名。依所依故。此各有種。如瑜伽說。

問辨識得名。實通根．境。何為諸論依根得名。謂名眼識乃至意識。

論。隨根立名具五義故。

述曰。勝於境故偏從根稱。

何謂五義。

論。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 三依止（三種所依）、俱轉（共同運作）、起滅（生起和滅沒）。後面兩句偈頌是關於這些的。

論：偈頌說：至善不善俱非（既非至善也非不善）。

述記：現在第一句偈頌中有四種含義，如文中所述可以理解。

論：說：至能變識相（能夠轉變的識的相）。

述記：在這段解釋中，首先解釋六個名稱，然後解釋體性和相狀，最後辨別三種自性。首先，在第一部分中有兩個方面，因為兩句話是分開的。能變有三種，末那識（Manas-vijnana，第七識）是第二種。這個（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana，第八識）位於最後，因此是第三種能變。這是在第二能變之後。這指的是解釋偈頌的第一句。

論：此識差別總有六種（這個識的差別總共有六種）。

述記：解釋第二句偈頌，其中有三個方面。首先解釋六個原因，然後分別解釋，最後顯示沒有說出的原因。這是第一個方面。六種差別將在下面知道。

為什麼說是六種，不再分別說是多或少呢？

論：隨六根境種類異故（隨著六根和六境的種類不同）。

述記：意思是說，根和境各有六種差別，識隨著它們的不同而不同，所以不是多或少，也不是固定不變的。此外，明確了這個識既然隨著根和境有六種數量，那麼在命名時就不是僅僅根據一種。即在根和境兩個方面都得到了名稱。《大論》也說，隨著根而命名為識，隨著境而命名為識，乃至也命名為青等識等。

何者依根名六根識（哪些是依據根而命名的六根識）？

論：謂名眼識乃至意識（即眼識乃至意識）。

述記：下面分別解釋。文中又有兩個方面。首先是分別解釋，然後是簡要分析。這是依據主釋，因為根是主導。對法等論說，依據眼緣色，相似於色而了別。第一句就是這個識的得名，依據所依之故。這些各有種類，如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）所說。

問：辨識的得名，實際上貫通根和境。為什麼各種論典依據根來命名，稱為眼識乃至意識？

論：隨根立名具五義故（隨著根來立名，具備五種意義）。

述記：勝於境故偏從根稱（因為根勝過境，所以偏重於從根來稱呼）。

何謂五義（什麼是五種意義）？

論：

【English Translation】 English version Three supports, co-arising, arising and ceasing. The latter two verses are about these.

Treatise: The verse says: 'Neither supremely good nor not good'.

Commentary: Now, the first verse has four meanings, which can be understood as stated in the text.

Treatise: Says: 'To the aspect of the transforming consciousness'.

Commentary: In this explanation, first, the six names are explained, then the nature and characteristics are explained, and finally, the three natures are distinguished. First, in the first part, there are two aspects because the two sentences are separate. There are three transformations, with Manas-vijnana (the seventh consciousness) being the second. This (Alaya-vijnana, the eighth consciousness) is located at the end, so it is the third transformation. This is after the second transformation. This refers to explaining the first line of the verse.

Treatise: 'The distinctions of this consciousness are generally of six kinds'.

Commentary: Explaining the second verse, there are three aspects within it. First, the six causes are explained, then they are explained separately, and finally, the unstated causes are revealed. This is the first aspect. The six kinds of distinctions will be known below.

Why are there said to be six kinds, and not distinguished as more or less?

Treatise: 'Because of the differences in the types of the six roots and objects'.

Commentary: It means that the roots and objects each have six kinds of differences, and the consciousness varies with their differences, so it is neither more nor less, nor is it fixed. Furthermore, it is clear that since this consciousness has six kinds of numbers according to the roots and objects, then it is not named solely based on one. That is, it obtains its name from both the roots and objects. The Mahashastra also says that it is named consciousness according to the root, named consciousness according to the object, and even named blue consciousness, etc.

Which are the six consciousnesses named according to the roots?

Treatise: 'They are called eye-consciousness, up to mind-consciousness'.

Commentary: The following explains them separately. There are two aspects in the text. First is the separate explanation, and then the brief analysis. This is explained based on the primary, because the root is the primary. The Abhidharma, etc., say that based on the eye perceiving form, it distinguishes form similarly to form. The first sentence is the naming of this consciousness, because it is based on what it relies on. These each have kinds, as stated in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra.

Question: The naming of consciousness actually encompasses both the root and the object. Why do various treatises name it based on the root, calling it eye-consciousness up to mind-consciousness?

Treatise: 'Naming it according to the root has five meanings'.

Commentary: 'Because the root is superior to the object, it is referred to from the root'.

What are the five meanings?

Treatise:

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五謂依發屬助如根。

述曰。謂依于根。根之所發。屬於彼根。助於彼根。如於根故　對法第二卷說。若了別色等故名為識。何故但名眼等識。不名色等識耶。以于眼等五種解釋。非於色等　此中第一依眼之識。彼有二義。且如眼識。眼中之識故名眼識。依眼處所識得有故。此第七囀。及由有眼識得有故。此第三囀　且如意識。如何意中　雖七無處所。而意亦依彼。同無色所依。在無色所依中也。及由有第七故得有意識。非是境色得識住中。不由有色識定生故。且據粗相。以盲冥者不能見故。雖知有色識不必生　第二根所發者。彼云眼所發之識故名眼識。由眼變異識必變異。如迦末羅病損眼根故。所見青色皆以為黃。非壞色時而識名壞。第七如何。謂由有此第七識故。第六相縛不得解脫。即其事也。后七若無漏。六必無漏故　第三屬於根者。彼云屬眼之識故名眼識。由識種子隨逐于根而得生故。此謂生依。非染凈依．及根本依．引發依也。由此故知。七於六有勢力。謂六種子隨七種子。七種子生現時六方得起與彼力故。不爾不生。非色種子識種隨之　此如何等。此色有時必識所變。如有識時必根所生。何得識種不隨色起　色是外法。根是內法。根恒相續。色即不然。不可為例　第四助於根者。彼云助眼之識故名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 五謂依發屬助如根。

述曰：這五種關係是說，識依于根（indriya，感覺器官），根所引發的，屬於那個根的，以及有助於那個根的，就像根一樣。對法（Abhidharma，論藏）第二卷說：『如果了別色等而名為識（vijñāna，意識），為什麼只稱為眼等識，而不稱為色等識呢？』因為對於眼等有五種解釋，而對於色等則沒有。

這裡面，第一種是依眼之識。它有兩種含義。比如眼識（cakṣur-vijñāna），眼中之識，所以名為眼識。因為依眼這個處所，識才得以產生，這是第七囀（locative case）。以及因為有眼識才得以存在，這是第三囀（instrumental case）。

比如意識（mano-vijñāna），如何是意中之識呢？雖然第七識（末那識，manas-vijñāna）沒有處所，但意（manas，意根）也依於它，如同無色界（arupa-dhatu）所依。以及因為有第七識，才得以有意識。而不是境色（rupa，色法）使識得以存在。因為不由有色，識就一定產生。這只是就粗略的現象來說。因為盲人看不見東西。即使知道有色，識也不一定產生。

第二種是根所發者。它說，眼所發之識，所以名為眼識。因為眼發生變異，識也必定發生變異。比如得了迦末羅病（kamala，黃疸病）的人，損害了眼根，所見到的青色都以為是黃色。而不是壞了色的時候，識才被稱為壞。第七識如何呢？因為有這個第七識，第六識（意識，mano-vijñāna）才被束縛而不得解脫，就是這個道理。後來的第七識如果是無漏（anasrava，沒有煩惱），第六識必定也是無漏的。

第三種是屬於根者。它說，屬於眼之識，所以名為眼識。因為識的種子（bija，潛在力量）隨逐于根而得以產生。這是指生依（janma-asraya，生起所依），不是染凈依（samklesa-vyavadana-asraya，雜染清凈所依）、根本依（mulakasraya，根本所依）和引發依（utpadakasraya，引發所依）。由此可知，第七識對於第六識有勢力。就是說，第六識的種子隨逐于第七識的種子，第七識的種子生起時，第六識才能生起，並給予它力量。否則就不能生起。而不是色的種子，識的種子隨逐於它。

這如何解釋呢？這色有時必定是識所變現的。如有識的時候，必定是根所生的。怎麼能說識的種子不隨色而起呢？

色是外法（bahirdha-dharma，外部的法），根是內法（adhyatmika-dharma，內部的法）。根恒常相續，色卻不是這樣。不能以此為例。

第四種是助於根者。它說，助眼之識，所以名為眼識。

【English Translation】 English version The five refer to reliance, origination, belonging, assistance, like the root (indriya).

Statement: The five refer to the fact that consciousness relies on the root (indriya), originates from the root, belongs to that root, and assists that root, just like the root itself. The second volume of the Abhidharma (對法, Abhidharma, collection of treatises) says: 'If it is called consciousness (識, vijñāna, consciousness) because it distinguishes forms (色, rupa) and so on, why is it only called eye-consciousness (眼識, cakṣur-vijñāna) and so on, and not form-consciousness and so on?' This is because there are five explanations for the eye and so on, but not for form and so on.

Here, the first is consciousness relying on the eye. It has two meanings. For example, eye-consciousness (眼識, cakṣur-vijñāna) is consciousness in the eye, hence it is called eye-consciousness. Because consciousness can arise by relying on the location of the eye, this is the seventh case (locative case). And because eye-consciousness exists, it can exist, this is the third case (instrumental case).

For example, how is mind-consciousness (意識, mano-vijñāna) consciousness in the mind? Although the seventh consciousness (末那識, manas-vijñāna) has no location, the mind (意, manas, mind-root) also relies on it, like what the formless realm (無色界, arupa-dhatu) relies on. And because there is the seventh consciousness, there can be mind-consciousness. It is not that form (境色, rupa, form-dharma) allows consciousness to exist. Because consciousness does not necessarily arise from form. This is only in terms of the rough appearance. Because blind people cannot see things. Even if one knows there is form, consciousness does not necessarily arise.

The second is that which originates from the root. It says that consciousness originating from the eye is called eye-consciousness. Because if the eye changes, consciousness will also change. For example, a person with Kamala disease (迦末羅病, kamala, jaundice) damages the eye-root, and all the blue colors they see are thought to be yellow. It is not that when the form is destroyed, consciousness is called destroyed. What about the seventh consciousness? Because there is this seventh consciousness, the sixth consciousness (意識, mano-vijñāna) is bound and cannot be liberated, that is the reason. If the later seventh consciousness is without outflows (無漏, anasrava, without afflictions), the sixth consciousness must also be without outflows.

The third is that which belongs to the root. It says that consciousness belonging to the eye is called eye-consciousness. Because the seed (種子, bija, potential power) of consciousness follows the root and can arise. This refers to the reliance on birth (生依, janma-asraya, reliance on arising), not the reliance on defilement and purification (染凈依, samklesa-vyavadana-asraya, reliance on defilement and purification), the fundamental reliance (根本依, mulakasraya, fundamental reliance), and the reliance on origination (引發依, utpadakasraya, reliance on origination). From this, it can be known that the seventh consciousness has power over the sixth consciousness. That is, the seed of the sixth consciousness follows the seed of the seventh consciousness. When the seed of the seventh consciousness arises, the sixth consciousness can arise and give it power. Otherwise, it cannot arise. It is not that the seed of form, the seed of consciousness follows it.

How is this explained? This form is sometimes necessarily transformed by consciousness. If there is consciousness, it must be born from the root. How can it be said that the seed of consciousness does not arise with form?

Form is an external dharma (外法, bahirdha-dharma, external dharma), and the root is an internal dharma (內法, adhyatmika-dharma, internal dharma). The root is constantly continuous, but form is not like this. It cannot be taken as an example.

The fourth is that which assists the root. It says that consciousness assisting the eye is called eye-consciousness.

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眼識。由根合識有所領受。令根損益非於境界故。謂由根合識令根有損．益。非由色合識令色有損．益。離識之色識雖無損．益。色有損．益故。如為他損色。如第六識俱無漏故。第七損有漏成無漏故　第五如於根者。彼云如眼之識故名眼識。根．識二法俱有情數。非彼色法定是有情。六．七亦爾。唯內攝故　隨根五義勝。多說依根名。

問前等無間中六識皆依意。何故第六獨名意識。意識不然眼等可爾。

論。雖六識身至無相濫過。

述曰。若如所問六皆依意。然唯第六獨依第七不共意根餘五即無。今依不共以立其名獨名意識。如五識身亦依于意。依不共根以得稱故。彼名眼識不名意識。此亦如是。五義具故　問如前說依五．八依七。何故第六稱不共依　答若染凈依．及俱有依。七望五．八俱是所依。然近順生不共識者。即唯第六。今言不共意顯近而順生。以六種子必隨七故。餘五等不然。故此得名無相濫失。此為一解。

論。或唯依意故名意識。

述曰。謂眼等五亦依眼等五有色根。此第六識若等無間。若俱有依唯依意根。依唯意故得意識名。五通意．色二所依故。

若爾七．八二識亦唯依意。或第八識唯依于意。第七依心。應名心識。或名意識。

論。辨識得名心

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 眼識（Cakṣur-vijñāna）：由根（indriya）與識（vijñāna）結合而產生領受。對根造成損益，並非對境界（viṣaya）造成損益。也就是說，由根與識結合，使根有損或有益，不是由色（rūpa）與識結合，使色有損或有益。離開識的色，識雖然沒有損益，但色本身可能有損益。例如，色被他人損壞。如同第六識（mano-vijñāna）是俱生的無漏（anāsrava）識，第七識（kliṣṭa-manas）通過損減有漏（sāsrava）而成就無漏。第五識（kāya-vijñāna）如同對於根的認知，被稱為眼之識，所以名為眼識。根和識這兩種法都屬於有情數（sattva-saṃkhyāta），並非色法一定是屬於有情。第六識和第七識也是如此，因為它們只被內攝。隨根的五種意義而殊勝，所以多依根來命名。

問：前面說等無間緣（samanantarapratyaya）中，六識都依于意（manas），為什麼第六識單獨名為意識（mano-vijñāna）？意識不是這樣，眼等識可以這樣。

論：即使六識身（ṣaḍ-vijñānakāya）達到無相（animitta），也會有混淆的過失。

述曰：如果像你所問的，六識都依于意，然而只有第六識單獨依于第七不共的意根（manas-indriya），其餘五識則沒有。現在依據不共的意根來建立它的名稱，單獨名為意識。如同五識身也依于意，依于不共的根而得到名稱，它們名為眼識，不名為意識，這個也是如此，五種意義都具備。問：如前面所說，五識依於五根，第八識（ālaya-vijñāna）依于第七識，為什麼第六識被稱為不共的所依？答：如果從染凈的所依，以及俱有的所依來說，第七識對於五識和第八識都是所依。然而，從近順生起不共的識來說，就只有第六識。現在說的不共意，顯示的是近而順生。因為第六識的種子必定跟隨第七識。其餘五識等不是這樣，所以第六識得到這個名稱，沒有無相的混淆過失。這是一種解釋。

論：或者僅僅依于意，所以名為意識。

述曰：眼等五識也依于眼等五種有色根（rūpa-indriya）。這第六識，無論是等無間緣，還是俱有依，都僅僅依于意根。因為僅僅依于意，所以得到意識的名稱。五識通於意和色兩種所依。

如果這樣，第七識和第八識也僅僅依于意，或者第八識僅僅依于意，第七識依於心（citta），應該名為心識（citta-vijñāna），或者名為意識。

論：辨識得到名稱，心（citta）。

【English Translation】 English version Eye-consciousness (Cakṣur-vijñāna): Arises from the combination of the root (indriya) and consciousness (vijñāna), resulting in perception. It causes benefit or harm to the root, not to the object (viṣaya). That is, the combination of the root and consciousness causes the root to be harmed or benefited, not the combination of form (rūpa) and consciousness causing form to be harmed or benefited. When form is separated from consciousness, although consciousness is not harmed or benefited, form itself may be harmed or benefited. For example, form is damaged by others. Like the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna), which is co-arisen and unconditioned (anāsrava), the seventh consciousness (kliṣṭa-manas) achieves unconditionality by diminishing the conditioned (sāsrava). The fifth consciousness (kāya-vijñāna) is like the cognition of the root, called the consciousness of the eye, hence named eye-consciousness. Both the root and consciousness are counted among sentient beings (sattva-saṃkhyāta), not that form is necessarily sentient. The sixth and seventh consciousnesses are also like this, because they are only internally included. It is superior in the five meanings of the root, so it is mostly named according to the root.

Question: Earlier it was said that in the immediately preceding condition (samanantarapratyaya), the six consciousnesses all rely on the mind (manas), why is the sixth consciousness uniquely named mind-consciousness (mano-vijñāna)? Mind-consciousness is not like this, eye-consciousness and others can be like this.

Treatise: Even if the six aggregates of consciousness (ṣaḍ-vijñānakāya) reach the state of no-image (animitta), there will be the fault of confusion.

Commentary: If, as you asked, the six consciousnesses all rely on the mind, then only the sixth consciousness uniquely relies on the seventh, the uncommon mind-root (manas-indriya), the other five consciousnesses do not. Now, based on the uncommon mind-root, its name is established, uniquely named mind-consciousness. Just as the five aggregates of consciousness also rely on the mind, obtaining their names based on the uncommon root, they are named eye-consciousness, not mind-consciousness, this is also the same, possessing all five meanings. Question: As said before, the five consciousnesses rely on the five roots, the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) relies on the seventh consciousness, why is the sixth consciousness called the uncommon support? Answer: If speaking from the support of defilement and purity, and the co-existent support, the seventh consciousness is the support for the five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness. However, from the perspective of the near and sequential arising of uncommon consciousness, it is only the sixth consciousness. The uncommon mind spoken of now indicates near and sequential arising. Because the seeds of the sixth consciousness necessarily follow the seventh consciousness. The other five consciousnesses are not like this, so the sixth consciousness obtains this name, without the fault of confusion of no-image. This is one explanation.

Treatise: Or it is named mind-consciousness because it only relies on the mind.

Commentary: The five consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness also rely on the five form-roots (rūpa-indriya) such as the eye. This sixth consciousness, whether it is the immediately preceding condition or the co-existent support, only relies on the mind-root. Because it only relies on the mind, it obtains the name mind-consciousness. The five consciousnesses are connected to both the mind and form as supports.

If that is the case, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses also only rely on the mind, or the eighth consciousness only relies on the mind, the seventh consciousness relies on the heart (citta), it should be named heart-consciousness (citta-vijñāna), or named mind-consciousness.

Treatise: Discriminating consciousness obtains the name, heart (citta).

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意非例。

述曰。謂識有六相望辨名。第八名心。第七名意。非此所況故例非成。不望彼故。若望心．意六得名者。彼三各據一義勝故。心攝藏法集起法勝。意思量境恒計度勝。意識了境從所依勝　問何故七．八不從所依以得其名。意識即爾　答七．八相續當體彰名。六有間斷從依得稱。七．八據依亦有此義。諸論但依自勝立名。六對七．八以得名識。兼釋七．八得名意別。

此下六識從境得名。

論。或名色識乃至法識。

述曰。此亦依士釋。能緣彼彼境之識故。

論。隨境立名至了別名識。

述曰。謂了境名識。即隨境立名。順通．別名識之義故。謂於六境了別名識。釋順義也。

問眼識所了色亦是法。意識所了亦有色等。何故眼識不名法識。第六意識不名色識。為答此問故次論云。

論。色等五識至了一切法。

述曰。前之五識唯了色等。境界狹故不名法識。第六法識能了一切法。了境寬故不名色等識。

又第六識更為別解。

論。或能了別法獨得法識名。

述曰。謂十二處中別名法者。謂第六外處。別名為法不與余境共同名故。此之別法第六能了。從獨所了以得彼名。故唯第六識若法識也。亦從不共得法識名。此能了言即是見分

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 意非例。

述曰：這是說，爲了辨別六種識的名稱，需要參照它們之間的關係。第八識名為心（Citta，儲存一切種子），第七識名為意（Manas，恒常思量），但這裡所說的情況並非如此，因此不能作為例子。因為它們之間沒有相互參照的關係。如果說心、意和六識都可以根據某種特性來命名，那是因為它們各自在某一方面特別突出。心在攝藏和積聚諸法方面最為突出，意在思量境界和恒常計度方面最為突出，意識在了別境界和依附於所依方面最為突出。問：為什麼第七識和第八識不根據它們所依的根來命名，就像意識那樣？答：第七識和第八識的相續性直接體現了它們的名稱的意義，而六識是有間斷的，所以根據它們所依的根來命名。第七識和第八識也可以根據它們所依的根來命名，但各種論典只是根據它們各自最突出的特點來命名。六識是相對於第七識和第八識來命名的，同時也解釋了第七識和第八識獲得『意』這個名稱的不同含義。

以下說明六識如何根據所緣的境界來命名。

論：或者稱為色識（Rūpa-vijñāna，緣色的識）乃至法識（Dharma-vijñāna，緣法的識）。

述曰：這也是依士釋，即能緣彼彼境界的識。

論：隨著所緣的境界而立名，最終都稱為識（Vijñāna，了別作用）。

述曰：所謂了別境界名為識，就是隨著所緣的境界而立名，這樣就符合了通名和別名都稱為識的含義。也就是說，對於六種境界的了別都稱為識，這是解釋『順』的含義。

問：眼識所了別的色也是法，意識所了別的也有色等。為什麼眼識不稱為法識，第六意識不稱為色識？爲了回答這個問題，接下來論述說：

論：前五識只能了別色等，不能了別一切法。

述曰：前面的五識只能了別色等境界，境界狹窄，所以不稱為法識。第六法識能夠了別一切法，了別的境界寬廣，所以不稱為色等識。

此外，對於第六識還有更特別的解釋。

論：或者能夠了別法的才能單獨獲得法識的名稱。

述曰：所謂十二處（Dvādaśa-āyatana）中特別名為法的是指第六外處，特別名為法，不與其他境界共同得名。這個特別的法是第六識所能了別的，所以從它所單獨了別的境界而獲得這個名稱。因此只有第六識才是法識。也是從不共的境界而獲得法識的名稱。這裡的『能了』就是見分（Darśana-bhāga）。

【English Translation】 English version: '意非例' (yì fēi lì).

Commentary: This refers to distinguishing the names of the six consciousnesses by considering their relationships. The eighth consciousness is called Citta (心, storehouse consciousness), the seventh is called Manas (意, mind, constant thinking), but the situation described here is not analogous, so it cannot serve as an example because there is no mutual reference between them. If it is said that Citta, Manas, and the six consciousnesses can each be named based on a certain characteristic, it is because each excels in a particular aspect. Citta excels in storing and accumulating dharmas, Manas excels in thinking about objects and constant deliberation, and consciousness excels in discerning objects and relying on its base. Question: Why are the seventh and eighth consciousnesses not named based on their respective bases, as is the case with consciousness? Answer: The continuity of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses directly reflects the meaning of their names, while the six consciousnesses are intermittent, so they are named based on their bases. The seventh and eighth consciousnesses could also be named based on their bases, but various treatises name them based on their most prominent characteristics. The six consciousnesses are named in relation to the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, which also explains the different meanings of the name 'Manas' for the seventh and eighth consciousnesses.

The following explains how the six consciousnesses are named based on the objects they cognize.

Treatise: Or they are called Rūpa-vijñāna (色識, consciousness of form) and even Dharma-vijñāna (法識, consciousness of dharma).

Commentary: This is also an 'agent-object' explanation, meaning the consciousness that can cognize those respective objects.

Treatise: Names are established according to the objects, ultimately called Vijñāna (識, consciousness, discernment).

Commentary: 'Discerning objects is called Vijñāna' means that names are established according to the objects, which aligns with the meaning of both general and specific names being called Vijñāna. That is, the discernment of the six objects is called Vijñāna, which explains the meaning of 'accordance'.

Question: The form cognized by eye-consciousness is also a dharma, and what is cognized by mind-consciousness also includes form, etc. Why is eye-consciousness not called Dharma-vijñāna, and the sixth consciousness not called Rūpa-vijñāna? To answer this question, the following treatise states:

Treatise: The first five consciousnesses can only discern form, etc., and cannot discern all dharmas.

Commentary: The preceding five consciousnesses can only discern objects such as form, their scope is narrow, so they are not called Dharma-vijñāna. The sixth Dharma-vijñāna can discern all dharmas, its scope is broad, so it is not called Rūpa-vijñāna, etc.

Furthermore, there is a more specific explanation for the sixth consciousness.

Treatise: Or only that which can discern dharmas can uniquely obtain the name Dharma-vijñāna.

Commentary: Among the twelve āyatanas (十二處, twelve sense bases), what is specifically called dharma refers to the sixth external base, which is uniquely called dharma and does not share its name with other objects. This specific dharma is what the sixth consciousness can discern, so it obtains this name from the object it uniquely discerns. Therefore, only the sixth consciousness is Dharma-vijñāna. It also obtains the name Dharma-vijñāna from the uncommon object. The term 'can discern' here refers to the Darśana-bhāga (見分, seeing-aspect).

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。分別之言即是相分。非謂別上有了字故遂言了別也　或彼法處六能了別獨名法識。即了別言唯在見分。亦有此義。然不共名別。是本義意。

論。故六識名無相濫失。

述曰。由斯理故六識得名互有所長。無相濫失。俱舍云。雖色等境通皆名法。但法界名法。余不名法。雖標總稱而即別名。意能了此故名法識。

問六識得名依根依境。為唯凡有。通在三乘。

論。此後隨境至無相濫失。

述曰。下料簡也。隨境立名。意名可爾。然前五識依五色根未自在說。薩遮尼乾子經是此論證。正法念經違此應會。蛇眼聞聲是正量部。非大乘義。大乘不然。故不違也。若得自在根互用故何名自在。如佛地論轉五識時。總有二解。或從初地即名自在。無漏五識現在前故。或成佛時成所作識彼方起故。然有別義入地菩薩無漏五識雖不現前。得后得智引生五識。于凈土等中現神變事。何妨五識一一通緣一切異境界。不思議力所引生故　或有別義。七地已前由有煩惱現行不絕。未殊勝故不名自在。入八地已去煩惱不行。純無漏起。引生五識可得互緣方名自在。

論。莊嚴論說至同類境說。

述曰。彼第二卷中菩薩品說。此能唯在成所作中故唯佛地。或即初地。或入八地。此是本義。彼論一依

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『分別』這個詞指的是相分（nimitta-bhāga，心識所認識的對象）。並非說在其他事物上有了『字』，因此才說『了別』。或者，彼法處（dharma-dhātu，法界）的六種能夠了別的能力，唯獨被稱為法識（dharma-vijñāna，能夠識別法的意識）。也就是說，『了別』這個詞只存在於見分（darśana-bhāga，心識的能見部分）。也有這種說法。然而，不共有的名稱是『別』，這是本義。

論：所以六識被稱為『無相濫失』。

述記：由於這個道理，六識才有了各自的名稱，互有所長，沒有互相混淆和缺失。俱舍論說：『雖然色等境通通可以被稱為法，但只有法界才能被稱為法，其他的不能被稱為法。』雖然標明的是總稱，但實際上是別名。意識能夠了別這個，所以被稱為法識。

問：六識的得名是依據根（indriya，感覺器官）還是依據境（viṣaya，感覺對像）？是隻有凡夫才有，還是三乘（triyāna，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）都有？

論：此後，隨著境而立名，直到『無相濫失』。

述記：下面進行簡別。隨著境而立名，意識的命名可以這樣說。然而，前五識依據五色根（pañca rūpa indriyāṇi，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）還沒有自在的說法。《薩遮尼乾子經》是此論的證據。《正法念經》如果與此相違，應該會通。蛇眼聽到聲音是正量部的觀點，不是大乘的意義。大乘不是這樣，所以不違背。如果得到自在，根可以互相使用，為什麼還叫自在？如《佛地論》在轉五識時，總共有兩種解釋：或者從初地（prathamā bhūmi，歡喜地）就叫做自在，因為無漏五識（anāsrava pañca-vijñāna，沒有煩惱的五識）現在前；或者成佛時，成所作智（kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna，佛的五智之一）才生起。然而，還有別的意義：入地的菩薩，無漏五識雖然不現前，但得到后得智（prsthalabdha-jñāna，證得真如后所獲得的智慧）引生的五識，在凈土等中顯現神通變化的事情，為什麼妨礙五識一一通緣一切不同的境界？這是不可思議的力量所引生的。或者還有別的意義：七地（saptamī bhūmi，遠行地）以前，由於有煩惱現行不絕，沒有殊勝，所以不叫自在。入八地（aṣṭamī bhūmi，不動地）以後，煩惱不行，純粹的無漏生起，引生的五識可以互相緣，才叫做自在。

論：《莊嚴論》說到同類境說。

述記：彼論第二卷中的菩薩品說，這種能力只在成所作智中，所以只有佛地才有。或者就是初地，或者入八地。這是本義。彼論一依

【English Translation】 English version: The term 'differentiation' refers to the nimitta-bhāga (the object cognized by consciousness). It doesn't mean that there is a 'word' on other things, therefore we say 'differentiation'. Alternatively, the six abilities to differentiate in the dharma-dhātu (the realm of phenomena) are uniquely called dharma-vijñāna (consciousness that can distinguish dharmas). That is to say, the term 'differentiation' only exists in the darśana-bhāga (the seeing aspect of consciousness). There is also this view. However, the non-common name is 'differentiation', which is the original meaning.

Treatise: Therefore, the six consciousnesses are called 'non-intermixing and non-losing of characteristics'.

Commentary: Due to this reason, the six consciousnesses have their respective names, each with its own strengths, without intermingling or losing their characteristics. The Abhidharmakośa states: 'Although objects such as form can all be called dharmas, only the dharma-dhātu can be called dharma, others cannot be called dharma.' Although it indicates a general term, it is actually a specific name. The mind is able to differentiate this, therefore it is called dharma-vijñāna.

Question: Are the names of the six consciousnesses based on the indriya (sense organs) or the viṣaya (sense objects)? Is it only for ordinary beings, or do all three yānas (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) have them?

Treatise: Hereafter, names are established according to the object, until 'non-intermixing and non-losing of characteristics'.

Commentary: The following is a clarification. Establishing names according to the object, the naming of the mind consciousness can be said in this way. However, the first five consciousnesses, based on the pañca rūpa indriyāṇi (five sense organs of sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch), do not yet have the saying of being independent. The Saccakanirgrantha Sutra is evidence for this treatise. If the Zhengfa Nianchu Jing (Sutra on the Establishment of Mindfulness) contradicts this, it should be reconciled. The snake's eyes hearing sounds is the view of the Sautrāntika school, not the meaning of Mahayana. Mahayana is not like this, so it does not contradict. If one attains independence, the sense organs can be used interchangeably, why is it called independence? As in the Buddhabhūmi Śāstra when transforming the five consciousnesses, there are two explanations in total: either from the prathamā bhūmi (first ground, Joyful Ground) it is called independence, because the anāsrava pañca-vijñāna (five undefiled consciousnesses) are now present; or at the time of becoming a Buddha, the kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna (wisdom of accomplishing what needs to be done) arises. However, there is another meaning: Bodhisattvas who have entered the grounds, although the undefiled five consciousnesses are not present, they obtain the five consciousnesses generated by the prsthalabdha-jñāna (wisdom attained after realization), manifesting miraculous transformations in pure lands, etc. Why does it hinder the five consciousnesses from universally cognizing all different realms? This is generated by inconceivable power. Or there is another meaning: Before the saptamī bhūmi (seventh ground, the Going Afar Ground), because afflictions are constantly manifesting, it is not superior, so it is not called independence. After entering the aṣṭamī bhūmi (eighth ground, the Immovable Ground), afflictions do not function, pure undefiled arises, the generated five consciousnesses can mutually cognize, then it is called independence.

Treatise: The Śūraṅgama Sūtra speaks of the same kind of object.

Commentary: The Bodhisattva chapter in the second volume of that treatise says that this ability is only in the kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna, so only the Buddha-bhūmi has it. Or it is the first ground, or entering the eighth ground. This is the original meaning. That treatise relies on

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粗顯。二依同類。實緣一切皆無障礙。

為緣如不。西方二說。一云許緣。佛智通故。二云不緣。名成所作緣事智故。準下論文此解為勝。然甚難知。如何諸根說名互用證此識義。一根發識緣一切境。舉所依根顯能依識　如何互用。了色名眼不至能取。法相所談。了觸名眼令至能取。豈非雜亂　名字於法非即銓定。是客名故。了色名眼。且依小聖．異生身說。若據佛位了觸亦名眼。此文為證。二得名中。但隨第一依根受稱。通在自在位無相濫失。如樞要說。

論。佛地經說至無此能故。

述曰。佛地論第六廣解此義　三業化合有十種。其四記等亦如彼說　抉擇心行。即八萬四千法門意業化也。四記亦爾。佛地經說。身化有三。一現神通化。二現受生化。三現業果化　語化亦三。一慶慰語化。二方便語化。三辨揚語化　意化有四一抉擇意化。二造作意化。三發起意化。四領受意化　此中所說抉擇有情心行差別。初意化也　賢劫經第二卷說。最初修習法波羅蜜多。乃至最後分佈佛體波羅蜜多。三百五十。一一皆具六到彼岸。如是總有二千一百。對治貪．嗔．癡。及等分有情心行。八千四百。除四大種。及六無義所生過失。十轉合數八萬四千　領受化中作四記等。謂一向記．分別記．返問記．應置記。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：粗略地顯示。第二，依據同類事物。實際上，是因為一切都沒有障礙。

作為所緣，是否如實？西方有兩種說法。一種說法是允許作為所緣，因為佛的智慧是通達的。另一種說法是不作為所緣，因為這是成就所作緣事智（Chengsuozuochengshi zhi，the wisdom of accomplishing what needs to be done）的緣故。參照下面的論文，這種解釋更為優勝。然而，這非常難以理解。如果諸根（zhugen，the organs）被稱為互相使用，如何證明這種識（shi，consciousness）的意義？一根（yigen，one organ）發出識，緣取一切境界。舉出所依之根，是爲了顯示能依之識。如何互相使用？瞭解色法（sefa，form）名為眼（yan，eye），但不至於能取。這是法相（faxiang，dharma characteristics）所談論的。瞭解觸（chu，touch）名為眼，使其達到能取，難道不是雜亂嗎？名字對於法並非立即確定，因為是客名（keming，guest name）的緣故。瞭解色法名為眼，且依據小聖（xiaosheng，lesser sage）、異生身（yisheng shen，different life form）來說。如果根據佛的地位，瞭解觸也名為眼，這段文字可以作為證明。在第二種得名中，只是隨著第一所依之根接受稱呼。在自在位（zizai wei，position of freedom）中，沒有互相混淆喪失的情況，如樞要（shuyao，key points）所說。

論：佛地經（Fodijing，Buddha-bhumi Sutra）說，乃至沒有這種能力的緣故。

述曰：佛地論（Fodilun，Buddha-bhumi Sutra）第六廣泛地解釋了這個意義。三業（sanye，three karmas）化合有十種，其中的四記（siji，four types of records）等也如那裡所說。抉擇心行（jueze xinxing，deciding mental activities），就是八萬四千法門（bawan siqian famen，eighty-four thousand dharma gates）的意業（yiye，mental karma）化現。四記也是這樣。佛地經說，身化（shenhua，body transformation）有三種：一是顯現神通化（xianshi shentong hua，manifesting supernatural powers transformation），二是顯現受生化（xianshi shousheng hua，manifesting rebirth transformation），三是顯現業果化（xianshi yeguo hua，manifesting karmic result transformation）。語化（yuhua，speech transformation）也有三種：一是慶慰語化（qingwei yuhua，congratulatory speech transformation），二是方便語化（fangbian yuhua，expedient speech transformation），三是辨揚語化（bianyang yuhua，eloquent speech transformation）。意化（yihua，mind transformation）有四種：一是抉擇意化（jueze yihua，deciding mind transformation），二是造作意化（zaozuo yihua，creating mind transformation），三是發起意化（faqi yihua，initiating mind transformation），四是領受意化（lingshou yihua，receiving mind transformation）。這裡所說的抉擇有情心行差別，是最初的意化。賢劫經（Xianjiejing，Bhadrakalpika Sutra）第二卷說，最初修習法波羅蜜多（faxi boluomiduofa，dharma paramita），乃至最後分佈佛體波羅蜜多（fenbu foti boluomiduofa，distributing Buddha-body paramita），三百五十。每一個都具備六到彼岸（liu dao bi'an，six perfections）。這樣總共有二千一百，對治貪（tan，greed）、嗔（chen，hatred）、癡（chi，ignorance），以及等分有情心行（dengfen youqing xinxing，equally divided sentient beings' mental activities），八千四百。除去四大種（sida zhong，four great elements），以及六無義所生過失（liu wuyi suo sheng guoshi，six meaningless faults），十轉合數八萬四千。領受化中作四記等，即一向記（yixiang ji，straightforward record）、分別記（fenbie ji，discriminatory record）、反問記（fanwen ji，counter-questioning record）、應置記（yingzhi ji，appropriate record）。

【English Translation】 English version: Roughly manifested. Secondly, based on similar categories. In reality, it is because everything is without obstruction.

As an object of cognition, is it as it is? There are two Western interpretations. One says it is allowed as an object of cognition because the Buddha's wisdom is all-pervasive. The other says it is not an object of cognition because it is the nature of the wisdom of accomplishing what needs to be done (Chengsuozuochengshi zhi). According to the following thesis, this interpretation is superior. However, it is very difficult to understand. If the organs (zhugen) are said to be used mutually, how does this prove the meaning of this consciousness (shi)? One organ (yigen) emits consciousness, cognizing all realms. Raising the dependent organ is to reveal the consciousness that depends on it. How are they used mutually? Understanding form (sefa) is called the eye (yan), but it does not reach the point of being able to grasp. This is what is discussed in the Dharma Characteristics (faxiang). Understanding touch (chu) is called the eye, causing it to reach the point of being able to grasp. Isn't this confusing? Names are not immediately fixed for dharmas because they are guest names (keming). Understanding form is called the eye, and it is based on the lesser sage (xiaosheng) and different life forms (yisheng shen). If based on the Buddha's position, understanding touch is also called the eye, as this text can prove. In the second naming, it is only named according to the first dependent organ. In the position of freedom (zizai wei), there is no mutual confusion or loss, as the key points (shuyao) say.

Treatise: The Buddha-bhumi Sutra (Fodijing) says, '...until there is no such ability.'

Commentary: The sixth chapter of the Buddha-bhumi Sutra (Fodilun) extensively explains this meaning. The combination of the three karmas (sanye) has ten types, and the four types of records (siji) are also as described there. Deciding mental activities (jueze xinxing) is the mental karma (yiye) manifestation of the eighty-four thousand dharma gates (bawan siqian famen). The four records are also like this. The Buddha-bhumi Sutra says that body transformation (shenhua) has three types: first, manifesting supernatural powers transformation (xianshi shentong hua); second, manifesting rebirth transformation (xianshi shousheng hua); and third, manifesting karmic result transformation (xianshi yeguo hua). Speech transformation (yuhua) also has three types: first, congratulatory speech transformation (qingwei yuhua); second, expedient speech transformation (fangbian yuhua); and third, eloquent speech transformation (bianyang yuhua). Mind transformation (yihua) has four types: first, deciding mind transformation (jueze yihua); second, creating mind transformation (zaozuo yihua); third, initiating mind transformation (faqi yihua); and fourth, receiving mind transformation (lingshou yihua). The deciding of sentient beings' mental activities mentioned here is the initial mind transformation. The Bhadrakalpika Sutra (Xianjiejing), in its second volume, says that initially practicing the dharma paramita (faxi boluomiduofa), and finally distributing the Buddha-body paramita (fenbu foti boluomiduofa), there are three hundred and fifty. Each one possesses the six perfections (liu dao bi'an). In total, there are two thousand one hundred, counteracting greed (tan), hatred (chen), ignorance (chi), and the equally divided sentient beings' mental activities (dengfen youqing xinxing), eight thousand four hundred. Removing the four great elements (sida zhong) and the six meaningless faults (liu wuyi suo sheng guoshi), the combined number is eighty-four thousand. In the receiving transformation, the four records are made, namely, straightforward record (yixiang ji), discriminatory record (fenbie ji), counter-questioning record (fanwen ji), and appropriate record (yingzhi ji).

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中復有人法不同。如別抄中當廣分別　其身化中。佛地經說現業果化現根心等。然瑜伽說四事不可化。一根．二心．三心所．四業果。與彼相違準下第十說不化心。依二乘等說。業果等亦爾。故知在佛通能化之。又佛化之無實勝用故名不化。似化亦得。由智境遍故有此能。

問此本頌文雖明唯識但說見分。然見依根起。相猶見生。何故本文不辨根．境。

論。然六轉識至故此不說。

述曰。下顯不說。共依下說。且顯不共依　頌中不說。一色粗而且顯。二乃諸論皆有彼此極成。故本頌文更不別說。此即會本文無說根．境之頌。謂本頌中初能變識。唯明所緣不明所依。第二能變俱明二種。此之六識明其所依不明所緣。以粗而且顯又復極成。頌文略而不說。

論。前隨義便至義便當說。

述曰。然所依少別前已廣論。所緣別者義便當說。謂次下引云眼識云何即是說也。宗明唯識故不明境　又解前文非明頌無。我長行中以粗顯故不別說也。謂如瑜伽等說。眼謂四大所造凈色為性有見有對。各從自種生。或是異熟。或是長養。通何界系。漏．無漏等。斷．不斷等。有眾多門。非此所明我亦不說。此解第二句差別有六種訖。即前言種類義是差別義。謂隨六根．境立六識名。即義差別有六種也。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 此外，不同的人有不同的法。例如，在其他抄本中應當廣泛地分別說明。關於化身，在《佛地經》（Buddhabhumi Sutra）中說，顯現業果能化現根、心等。然而，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）說四件事不可化：一、根（indriya，感覺器官）；二、心（citta，意識）；三、心所（caitta，心理活動）；四、業果（karmaphala，行為的果報）。這與《佛地經》相違背，參照下文第十品所說，不化心。依據二乘（sravaka-yana，聲聞乘和pratyekabuddha-yana，緣覺乘）等的說法，業果等也是如此。因此，可知在佛（Buddha）那裡，普遍能夠化之。而且，佛的化現沒有真實的殊勝作用，所以稱為不化。類似化現也是可以的，由於智慧境界普遍，所以有這種能力。

問：此本頌文雖然闡明唯識（vijnapti-matrata，唯識論），但只說了見分（darsana-bhaga，能見之部分）。然而，見分依根（indriya，感覺器官）而生起，相分（nimitta-bhaga，所見之對象）由見分所生。為什麼本文不辨析根和境（visaya，對像）？

論：然而，六轉識（sad vijnana-pravrtti，六種轉變的意識）……所以這裡不說。

述曰：下面解釋為什麼不說。『共依』（samanya-asraya，共同所依）在下文說明。首先解釋不共依（asadharana-asraya，不共同所依）。頌文中不說：一、色（rupa，物質）粗而且明顯；二、乃是諸論（sastra，論典）都有，彼此極為明確。因此，本頌文不再另外說明。這就是會通本文沒有說明根和境的頌文。意思是說，本頌中初能變識（prathama-parinama-vijnana，第一能變識，即阿賴耶識）只說明所緣（alambana，對像）而不說明所依（asraya，所依靠之物）。第二能變（dvitiya-parinama-vijnana，第二能變識，即末那識）同時說明兩種。這六識（sad vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）說明它們所依，而不說明所緣，因為粗而且明顯，又極為明確，所以頌文省略而不說。

論：前面隨著意義方便……意義方便應當說明。

述曰：然而，所依的差別很少，前面已經廣泛地論述過。所緣的差別，意義方便時應當說明。意思是說，接下來引用的『眼識云何』（caksur-vijnana katham，什麼是眼識）就是說明。宗旨在闡明唯識，所以不說明境。又解釋說，前面的文不是說頌文中沒有，而是我的長行（dirgha-nibandha，長篇解釋）中因為粗顯而不另外說明。例如，《瑜伽師地論》等說，眼（caksu，眼睛）是指四大（catvari mahabhutani，地、水、火、風）所造的清凈色，以有見有對為性質，各自從自己的種子（bija，潛在力量）生起，或者是異熟（vipaka，果報），或者是長養（aharaja，滋養）。通於哪個界系（dhatu，界）？有漏（sasrava，有煩惱）還是無漏（anasrava，無煩惱）等？斷（uccheda，斷滅）還是不斷（anuccheda，不中斷）等？有很多方面，不是這裡所要闡明的，我也不說明。這是解釋第二句的差別有六種完畢。也就是前面所說的『種類義』就是差別義。意思是說，隨著六根（sad indriya，六種感覺器官）、境（visaya，對像）而立六識（sad vijnana，六種意識）之名，即意義差別有六種。

【English Translation】 English version: Moreover, different people have different dharmas. For example, in other manuscripts, there should be extensive and separate explanations. Regarding the transformation body, the Buddhabhumi Sutra says that the manifestation of karmic results can transform the sense faculties, mind, etc. However, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that four things cannot be transformed: 1. sense faculties (indriya); 2. mind (citta); 3. mental factors (caitta); 4. karmic results (karmaphala). This contradicts the Buddhabhumi Sutra. Referring to the tenth section below, the mind cannot be transformed. According to the teachings of the Two Vehicles (sravaka-yana and pratyekabuddha-yana), karmic results, etc., are also the same. Therefore, it is known that the Buddha (Buddha) can universally transform them. Furthermore, the Buddha's transformation does not have real, superior function, so it is called non-transformation. Similar transformations are also possible because the realm of wisdom is universal, so there is this ability.

Question: Although this verse elucidates Vijnapti-matrata (Consciousness-only), it only speaks of the seeing-aspect (darsana-bhaga). However, the seeing-aspect arises based on the sense faculties (indriya), and the object-aspect (nimitta-bhaga) is produced by the seeing-aspect. Why does this text not analyze the sense faculties and objects (visaya)?

Treatise: However, the six evolving consciousnesses (sad vijnana-pravrtti)... therefore, it is not discussed here.

Commentary: The reason for not discussing it is explained below. 'Common basis' (samanya-asraya) is explained below. First, explain the uncommon basis (asadharana-asraya). It is not mentioned in the verse: 1. Form (rupa) is coarse and obvious; 2. It is present in all treatises (sastra) and is extremely clear to each other. Therefore, this verse does not separately explain it. This is to reconcile the verse that does not explain the sense faculties and objects. It means that the first transformation consciousness (prathama-parinama-vijnana, i.e., Alaya-consciousness) in this verse only explains the object (alambana) and does not explain the basis (asraya). The second transformation (dvitiya-parinama-vijnana, i.e., Manas-consciousness) explains both. These six consciousnesses (sad vijnana, i.e., eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness) explain their basis but do not explain the object because it is coarse and obvious, and extremely clear, so the verse omits it.

Treatise: Previously, according to the convenience of meaning... the convenience of meaning should be explained.

Commentary: However, the differences in the basis are few, and they have been extensively discussed previously. The differences in the object should be explained when it is convenient to do so. It means that the following quotation, 'What is eye-consciousness?' (caksur-vijnana katham), is the explanation. The purpose is to elucidate Consciousness-only, so the object is not explained. It is also explained that the previous text does not mean that it is not in the verse, but in my long commentary (dirgha-nibandha), it is not separately explained because it is coarse and obvious. For example, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, etc., says that the eye (caksu) refers to the pure form made of the four great elements (catvari mahabhutani, i.e., earth, water, fire, and wind), with seeing and opposition as its nature, arising from its own seeds (bija), or it is a result of maturation (vipaka), or it is nourishment (aharaja). Which realm (dhatu) does it belong to? Is it with outflows (sasrava) or without outflows (anasrava), etc.? Is it cut off (uccheda) or not cut off (anuccheda), etc.? There are many aspects, which are not to be explained here, and I will not explain them either. This is the end of explaining the six kinds of differences in the second sentence. That is, the 'meaning of kinds' mentioned earlier is the meaning of differences. It means that the names of the six consciousnesses (sad vijnana) are established according to the six sense faculties (sad indriya) and objects (visaya), which means that there are six kinds of differences in meaning.

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自下解第三句第二三門也。

論。次言了境至為行相故。

述曰。于中有二。初釋頌。後會經。此初也。如前第七性相中解。

論。由斯兼釋至名為識故。

述曰。釋心．意．識三種名中所名識別名也　能了別境名為識故。謂了別行粗故。非心．意名識。

論。如契經說至了別諸法。

述曰。下會經也。此言可解。謂有問言。且如眼識。亦依余根。緣境通能了一切法。云何但說依眼了色。不言依六．及七．八識了聲等耶。牒經問已。

為答此問故次論云。

論。彼經且說至見分所了。

述曰。彼經且說諸所依中不共所依。簡余依也　未轉依位。簡已轉依緣一切法。但言緣色等　見分所了。簡自證分。其實五識亦了識等。若依余根．轉依位．自證分等。義即不定。亦了聲等。乃至廣說今此且據少分位說。非究竟言　有義此解非稱論文。此中論云如經說等。但明六識之次。引彼六識之經。證成六識自性。非為前伏難有此論也　即第三句了境為性相。體．相二門　了者即通自性　自性即自證分　行相即是識之見分。緣相為境。自證為見之依緣見為境。是故總言了境為性相　又解不須如是分別。此中但解了境者。是識自性。亦是行相。行相是用故。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 以下解釋第三句中的第二和第三個方面。

論：接下來解釋『了境』（understanding objects）直到『為行相故』（because it is the characteristic of activity）。

述記：其中有兩部分。首先解釋頌文，然後會合經文。這是第一部分。如前第七『性相』（nature and characteristics）中解釋。

論：由於這個原因，也解釋了『心』（citta，mind）、『意』（manas，thought）、『識』（vijñāna，consciousness）三種名稱中『識』的含義，因為能了別境（distinguish objects）名為『識』。也就是說，了別的行為是粗顯的，所以『心』和『意』不能稱為『識』。

論：如契經（sūtra，scripture）所說，……了別諸法（distinguishing all dharmas）。

述記：下面會合經文。這段話可以理解為：有人問，比如眼識（eye-consciousness），也依賴於其他根（indriya，sense organs），緣取境（objects）時普遍能了知一切法（all dharmas）。為什麼只說依賴於眼（eye）了知色（rūpa，form），而不說依賴於六識（six consciousnesses）、第七識（seventh consciousness，末那識，manas-vijnana）、第八識（eighth consciousness，阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna）了知聲（śabda，sound）等呢？先引述經文的提問。

爲了回答這個問題，接下來論述說：

論：彼經且說至見分所了（that sutra only speaks of what is perceived by the seeing-aspect）。

述記：彼經只是說了諸所依（the bases of consciousness）中不共的所依（unique bases），排除了其他的所依。未轉依位（before the transformation of the basis），排除了已轉依（after the transformation of the basis）緣取一切法。只說了緣取色等。見分所了（perceived by the seeing-aspect），排除了自證分（self-awareness aspect）。實際上，五識（five consciousnesses）也能了知識等。如果依賴於其他根、轉依位、自證分等，意義就不確定了，也能了知聲等，乃至廣說。現在這裡只是根據少部分情況來說，不是究竟的說法。有義認為這種解釋不符合論文。此中論云『如經說等』，只是說明六識的次第，引用彼六識的經文，證明六識的自性，不是爲了先前伏藏的難題而有此論。即第三句『了境』為性相，體（essence）、相（characteristics）二門。了者即通自性，自性即自證分，行相即是識之見分。緣相為境，自證為見之依，緣見為境。是故總言『了境』為性相。又解不須如是分別。此中但解了境者，是識自性，亦是行相，行相是用故。

論

【English Translation】 English version This explains the second and third aspects of the third phrase from below.

Treatise: Next, it speaks of 'understanding objects' up to 'because it is the characteristic of activity'.

Commentary: There are two parts in this. First, explain the verse, then reconcile with the sutra. This is the first part. As explained in the previous seventh 'nature and characteristics'.

Treatise: Because of this, it also explains the meaning of 'consciousness' among the three names of 'citta' (mind), 'manas' (thought), and 'vijñāna' (consciousness), because being able to distinguish objects is called 'consciousness'. That is to say, the activity of distinguishing is coarse, so 'citta' and 'manas' cannot be called 'consciousness'.

Treatise: As the sutra says, ... distinguishing all dharmas.

Commentary: Below, reconcile with the sutra. This passage can be understood as: Someone asks, for example, eye-consciousness also relies on other indriyas (sense organs), and when taking objects, it can universally understand all dharmas. Why only say that it relies on the eye to understand rūpa (form), and not say that it relies on the six consciousnesses, the seventh consciousness (manas-vijnana), and the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) to understand śabda (sound), etc.? First, quote the question from the sutra.

In order to answer this question, the treatise next says:

Treatise: That sutra only speaks of what is perceived by the seeing-aspect.

Commentary: That sutra only speaks of the unique bases among the bases of consciousness, excluding other bases. Before the transformation of the basis, it excludes those who have already transformed the basis and perceive all dharmas. It only speaks of perceiving rūpa, etc. Perceived by the seeing-aspect, it excludes the self-awareness aspect. In reality, the five consciousnesses can also understand consciousnesses, etc. If relying on other sense organs, the transformed basis, the self-awareness aspect, etc., the meaning becomes uncertain, and they can also understand sound, etc., and so on. Now, this is only based on a small part of the situation, not the ultimate statement. Some argue that this explanation does not conform to the treatise. In this treatise, it says 'as the sutra says, etc.', only explaining the order of the six consciousnesses, quoting the sutra of the six consciousnesses, proving the nature of the six consciousnesses, not for the previously hidden difficult question that this treatise exists. That is, the third phrase 'understanding objects' is the nature and characteristics, the essence and characteristics. 'Understanding' generally refers to the self-nature, the self-nature is the self-awareness aspect, and the characteristic of activity is the seeing-aspect of consciousness. Taking the appearance as the object, self-awareness is the basis of seeing, and taking seeing as the object. Therefore, it is generally said that 'understanding objects' is the nature and characteristics. Another explanation does not require such distinctions. Here, it only explains that 'understanding objects' is the self-nature of consciousness, and it is also the characteristic of activity, because the characteristic of activity is the function.

Treatise

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。余所依瞭如前已說。

述曰。余依者。即分別依．染凈依．根本依。如前第四卷解。若依境立名。如次前說　余了者。若自證分。如第二卷解。若自在五識見分境。如次前說。故此總言余所依瞭如前已說。雖后明四智。今但指前。今應義準因果十八界為緣不同　頌曰。因見各隨應。五三六有二。六一一不定。自在．等分別。所依之頌如前已說　準前文中。且依不共依。簡因．無間．及染．同境．共依等故。未自在位非他所引。若由他力定．通所引。亦緣法故　又此應說三界系．不繫之識。異生．聖者三乘人等緣境分齊。如對法第二末。六十五等抄說。

次第三段。將解第四三性之門。初寄問起。后依問答。

論。此六轉識何性攝耶。

述曰。此即問起。然前第八識。辨心．心所已。方說言是無覆無記。今者解識即辨其性。前顯心．心所法其性必同。所以解心所已方始解性。今者識后明性。顯此聚亦爾。但是影顯二文令相互照。又彼諸法不定通三性。此定通故。使後學之惠起異論端故。

下答之中。初舉頌。下別釋。

論。謂善不善俱非性攝。

述曰。此舉頌答。即顯六識並通三性。

論。俱非者至故名俱非。

述曰。別釋有三。初正解頌文。次諍申同異。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：我所依賴的和所了知的，都如前面已經說過的。

述記說：我所依賴的，就是分別依（指末那識，manas，第七識，恒時執持阿賴耶識為『我』）、染凈依（指阿賴耶識，ālayavijñāna，第八識，含藏一切種子）、根本依（也是指阿賴耶識）。如前面第四卷所解釋的。如果依據所緣境來立名，就像前面所說的。我所了知的，如果是自證分，如第二卷所解釋的。如果是在五識的見分境中自在，也如前面所說的。所以這裡總說『我所依賴的和所了知的，都如前面已經說過的』。雖然後面會說明四智，但現在只是指前面所說的。現在應該義理上比照因果和十八界，因為緣不同。

頌文說：『因見各隨應，五三六有二，六一一不定，自在．等分別。』所依的頌文如前面已經說過的。比照前面的文，且依據不共依，簡別因、無間、以及染、同境、共依等。未自在的地位不是由他所引導的。如果是由於他力而決定的、共通的所引導的，也是緣於法。另外，這裡應該說明三界系、不繫的識，異生（指凡夫，prthagjana）、聖者（ārya）三乘人等所緣境的範圍，如《對法論》第二卷末尾所說，六十五等抄錄。

接下來是第三段，將要解釋第四個三性之門。首先通過提問來引出，然後依據問題來回答。

論：這六個轉識屬於什麼性質的範疇呢？

述記說：這是提問引出。然而前面第八識，辨別了心、心所之後，才說它是無覆無記（不障礙解脫的非善非惡性質）。現在解釋識就辨別它的性質。前面顯示心、心所法，它們的性質必定相同。所以解釋了心所之後才開始解釋性質。現在在識之後說明性質，顯示這個集合也是這樣。這只是爲了使兩段文字相互照應。而且那些法不一定貫通三性，這個（六轉識）一定貫通三性。使後來的學習者產生不同的議論。

下面的回答中，先舉出頌文，然後分別解釋。

論：所謂善、不善、俱非（非善非不善）的性質都包括。

述記說：這是舉出頌文來回答，顯示六識都貫通三性。

論：所謂『俱非』，是因為……所以叫做『俱非』。

述記說：分別解釋有三個方面。首先是正確地解釋頌文，其次是爭論並申明相同和不同之處。

【English Translation】 English version: What I rely on and what I understand are as previously stated.

The commentary states: What I rely on are the dependent basis of discrimination (referring to the manas, the seventh consciousness, which constantly clings to the ālayavijñāna as 'I'), the dependent basis of defilement and purity (referring to the ālayavijñāna, the eighth consciousness, which contains all seeds), and the fundamental basis (also referring to the ālayavijñāna). As explained in the fourth volume earlier. If names are established based on the object of cognition, it is as previously stated. What I understand, if it is the self-cognizing aspect, is as explained in the second volume. If it is freely acting within the perceived object of the seeing aspect of the five consciousnesses, it is also as previously stated. Therefore, it is generally said here that 'what I rely on and what I understand are as previously stated.' Although the Four Wisdoms will be explained later, this only refers to what was said earlier. Now, the principles should be compared to cause and effect and the Eighteen Realms, because the conditions are different.

The verse says: 'Causes and perceptions each correspond accordingly, five have three, six have two, six have one one uncertain, freely acting, equally discriminating.' The verse on the dependent basis is as previously stated. Comparing to the previous text, and based on the non-common dependent basis, distinguishing between cause, immediate, and defiled, same object, common dependent basis, etc. The state of not being free is not guided by others. If it is determined and commonly guided by the power of others, it is also conditioned by the Dharma. In addition, it should be explained here the consciousnesses of the Three Realms bound and unbound, the scope of objects cognized by ordinary beings (prthagjana), noble ones (ārya), and those of the Three Vehicles, as stated at the end of the second volume of the Abhidharmakośa, and copied in sixty-five sections, etc.

Next is the third section, which will explain the fourth gate of the Three Natures. First, it is introduced through questioning, and then answered based on the question.

Treatise: To what nature do these six transformed consciousnesses belong?

The commentary states: This is the introduction through questioning. However, previously, after distinguishing between mind and mental factors for the eighth consciousness, it was said to be non-obstructed and neutral (neither good nor evil, not hindering liberation). Now, explaining consciousness is to distinguish its nature. Previously, it was shown that the nature of mind and mental factors must be the same. Therefore, the nature was explained after explaining the mental factors. Now, explaining the nature after the consciousness shows that this collection is also like that. This is only to make the two texts correspond to each other. Moreover, those dharmas do not necessarily pervade the three natures, but this (the six transformed consciousnesses) certainly pervades the three natures. This causes later learners to raise different arguments.

In the following answer, first the verse is cited, and then explained separately.

Treatise: The so-called good, non-good, and neither (neither good nor non-good) natures are all included.

The commentary states: This is citing the verse to answer, showing that the six consciousnesses all pervade the three natures.

Treatise: The so-called 'neither' is because... therefore it is called 'neither'.

The commentary states: There are three aspects to the separate explanation. The first is to correctly explain the verse, and the second is to argue and state the similarities and differences.

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后顯果位是何性攝　初中又二。初解三性。名字隱故先解。是何謂無記性。謂三性中無記性也。何名俱非。顯彼自性非善．不善二種自性故名俱非。釋無記名下自別出。

且何名為善。

論。能為此世至故不名善。

述曰。謂一一法要令此．他二世順益方名為善。謂有漏善前世益。今世益後世益。俱得樂果人．天所仰。無漏有為．無為亦爾。此世．他世違越生死。有得有證。及由涅槃。獲二世益。非生惡趣等。故併名為善　人．天樂果唯順益一世。非二世故不名為善。是無記果法故。體非是善。於後世中作衰損故　不作此解便有問言若順益名善。人．天樂果亦現益故應名為善。為答此問故說彼非。

論。能為此世至故非不善。

述曰。此中不善。翻善可知。惡趣苦果。今解彼文準前亦爾。但是無記苦果。令身苦故。

論。于善不善至故名無記。

述曰。此違順益．損。其義易知。體非殊勝不可記別。

即是第一解三性名已。次顯識俱。今依大乘。亦得三性各有四種。諸論總收亦有此義。于理不違。故別建立。如前已說。

論。此六轉識至是善性攝。

述曰。此中未必要十一法俱。如不定地唯十法俱故。此舉一聚總有為言。

論。與無慚等至不善

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：后顯果位（指修行后最終顯現的果報地位）屬於哪種性質的範疇？ 答：初中又分為二。首先解釋三種性質。因為名稱隱晦，所以先解釋。什麼是無記性（既非善也非惡的性質）？ 答：是指三種性質中的無記性。 問：什麼叫做『俱非』（既非善也非惡）？ 答：顯示它的自性既不是善，也不是不善這兩種自性，所以叫做『俱非』。解釋無記的名稱，下面會分別說明。

問：那麼，什麼叫做善？ 論：能夠利益今生乃至後世，才叫做善。 述曰：就是說，每一種法都要使今生和來世都得到順益，才叫做善。有漏善（指有煩惱的善行）能利益前世，利益今世，利益後世，都能得到快樂的果報，為人天所仰慕。無漏有為（指沒有煩惱的有為法）和無為法（指沒有煩惱的無為法）也是這樣，能使今生和來世都超越生死，有的得到證悟，以及通過涅槃，獲得今生和來世的利益，不會墮落到惡趣等地方，所以都叫做善。人天的快樂果報只能順益一生，不能利益兩世，所以不叫做善。這是無記的果報法，所以本體不是善，在後世中會造成衰損。如果不這樣解釋，就會有人問：如果順益就叫做善，人天的快樂果報也現在就能帶來利益，應該叫做善。爲了回答這個問題，所以說它不是。

論：能夠利益今生乃至後世，才不是不善。 述曰：這裡的不善，反過來理解善就可以知道。惡趣的苦果也是這樣。現在解釋這段文字，參照前面的說法也是一樣。但是這是無記的苦果，使身體感到痛苦。

論：對於善和不善都不能歸屬，所以叫做無記。 述曰：這違背了順益和損害，其中的含義容易理解。本體不是殊勝的，所以無法記別。

以上是第一部分，解釋三種性質的名稱。接下來顯示識的聚合。現在依據大乘的觀點，也可以說三種性質各有四種。各種論典總括起來也有這個意思，在道理上沒有違背，所以分別建立。如同前面已經說過的。

論：這六個轉識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）屬於善性所攝。 述曰：這裡不一定需要十一種法都具備，比如不定地只有十種法具備。這裡舉出一個聚合，總的來說是有為法。

論：與無慚（不知恥辱）等相應，屬於不善。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: To what nature does the ultimately manifested Fruition Position (the state of attainment manifested after practice) belong? Answer: The initial part is further divided into two. First, explain the three natures. Because the names are obscure, explain them first. What is meant by the indeterminate nature (neither good nor evil)? Answer: It refers to the indeterminate nature among the three natures. Question: What is called 'neither' (neither good nor evil)? Answer: It shows that its own-nature is neither good nor non-good, hence it is called 'neither'. Explaining the name 'indeterminate', it will be separately explained below.

Question: Then, what is called good? Treatise: Being able to benefit this life and the next is called good. Commentary: That is to say, each and every dharma must benefit both this life and the next in order to be called good. Leaky good (good deeds with afflictions) benefits the previous life, benefits this life, and benefits the next life, and all can obtain the fruit of happiness, admired by humans and devas. Unleaky conditioned (conditioned dharmas without afflictions) and unconditioned dharmas (unconditioned dharmas without afflictions) are also like this, enabling this life and the next to transcend birth and death, some attaining realization, and through Nirvana, obtaining the benefits of both lives, not falling into evil realms, etc., so they are all called good. The happiness fruit of humans and devas only benefits one life, not two lives, so it is not called good. This is an indeterminate fruition dharma, so its essence is not good, and it will cause decline in the next life. If it is not explained in this way, someone might ask: If benefiting is called good, the happiness fruit of humans and devas also brings immediate benefits, so it should be called good. To answer this question, it is said that it is not.

Treatise: Being able to benefit this life and the next is not non-good. Commentary: Here, non-good can be understood by reversing the understanding of good. The suffering fruit of evil realms is also like this. Now, explaining this passage, it is the same as the previous explanation. However, this is an indeterminate suffering fruit, causing physical pain.

Treatise: Not belonging to either good or non-good is called indeterminate. Commentary: This contradicts benefiting and harming, and the meaning is easy to understand. The essence is not outstanding, so it cannot be distinguished.

The above is the first part, explaining the names of the three natures. Next, it shows the aggregation of consciousnesses. Now, according to the Mahayana viewpoint, it can also be said that each of the three natures has four types. Various treatises also summarize this meaning, and there is no contradiction in principle, so they are established separately. As has been said before.

Treatise: These six transforming consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness) are included in the nature of good. Commentary: Here, it is not necessary for all eleven dharmas to be present, such as in the indeterminate ground where only ten dharmas are present. Here, an aggregation is mentioned, generally speaking of conditioned dharmas.

Treatise: Corresponding to shamelessness (lack of a sense of shame) etc., it belongs to non-good.

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性攝。

述曰。義準不善返善亦爾。非必十法俱故。望聚為論。不善中十唯不善故。謂嗔．及忿等七。除諂．誑．憍取無慚愧。故成十也。

論。俱不相應無記性攝。

述曰。通前二故。如雜集論。善有十三門。不善有十二門。無記十四門。別應對相攝。又此二．三．四門三性。前本識中已略辨訖。若有為有種子者。種子隨現行彼性中攝。然此二．三．四門。與對法有為．無為．有漏．無漏等不同。一一對別各據一義。四無記如大論第一。五識不能轉心發業。但作隨轉發業。緣威儀等故名威儀。是威儀等心攝。四無記具三。除變化。

頌中第四句善．不善．俱非。雖六識皆通三性。問諸識性總同時者。唯是一性。為許同時各別性攝。

論。有義六識至互相違故。

述曰。自下第二諍申同異。初文有三。一標宗。二立理。三釋難。此初二也　所以者何　此六轉識同緣外境。諸三性等互相違故。瑜伽第三說又非五識有二剎那相隨俱生。亦無展轉無間更互而生。五識生已從此無間必意識生等。五識既無俱生之義。是故五識三性不俱。此立宗義同外門轉。第一因也。定中聞聲非我所許。三性俱起。設縱許者定心可然。散位無故。非五識中三性俱轉。

論。五識必由至成善染故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 性攝。

述曰：按照道理，不善轉為善也是如此。不一定十法全部具備，只是從聚合的角度來討論。不善之中，十法都只是不善，指的是嗔（krodha，憤怒）、忿（upanaha，怨恨）等七種。去除諂（maya，虛偽）、誑（satya，欺騙）、憍（mada，驕傲），取無慚（ahrikya，無慚）和無愧（anapatrapya，無愧），就構成了十種不善法。

論：都屬於不相應行蘊和無記性。

述曰：這是總括前兩種情況。如《雜集論》所說，善有十三種門類，不善有十二種門類，無記有十四種門類，分別對應于各自的相而攝取。此外，這二、三、四種門類具有三種性質。在前面的本識中已經略微辨析過了。如果有為法有種子，那麼種子就隨著現行而歸屬於它的性質之中。然而，這二、三、四種門類，與《對法論》中的有為、無為、有漏、無漏等不同，每一種對別都各自依據一種意義。四種無記的情況，如《大論》第一卷所說。五識不能夠轉變心而引發業，只能作為隨轉而引發業。因為緣于威儀等，所以稱為威儀。屬於威儀等心所攝。四種無記具備三種（性質），除了變化。

頌中的第四句是善、不善、俱非。雖然六識都通於三種性質，但如果問諸識的性質總和在同一時間出現，那麼只有一種性質。是否允許同時存在各自不同的性質呢？

論：有觀點認為，六識……以至於互相違背。

述曰：從下面開始，第二部分爭論相同與不同。最初的文有三個部分：一、標明宗旨；二、建立理由；三、解釋疑問。這裡是最初的兩個部分。『所以者何』，這六個轉識共同緣于外境，諸如三種性質等互相違背。瑜伽第三卷說，又不是五識有兩個剎那相隨俱生，也沒有輾轉無間地更替而生。五識生起之後，從此無間必定是意識生起等等。五識既然沒有俱生的意義，所以五識的三種性質不會同時出現。這裡建立的宗旨與外門轉相同，是第一種原因。定中聽到聲音不是我所允許的，三種性質同時生起。假設縱然允許，也只是定心可以這樣，散亂位是不可能的。所以五識中三種性質不會同時運轉。

論：五識必定由於……以至於成就善染。

English version Sexual inclusion.

Commentary: According to reason, the transformation of unwholesome into wholesome is also the same. It is not necessary for all ten dharmas to be present; it is discussed from the perspective of aggregation. Among the unwholesome, the ten dharmas are all unwholesome, referring to anger (krodha), resentment (upanaha), and the like. Removing deceit (maya), falsehood (satya), arrogance (mada), and taking shamelessness (ahrikya) and non-conscientiousness (anapatrapya), the ten unwholesome dharmas are formed.

Treatise: All are included in the non-associated formations and are of indeterminate nature.

Commentary: This is to encompass the previous two cases. As stated in the Samuccaya, wholesome has thirteen categories, unwholesome has twelve categories, and indeterminate has fourteen categories, each corresponding to its respective characteristic for inclusion. Furthermore, these two, three, and four categories have three natures. They have already been briefly analyzed in the preceding alaya-vijnana. If conditioned dharmas have seeds, then the seeds follow the manifestation and belong to its nature. However, these two, three, and four categories are different from the conditioned, unconditioned, defiled, and undefiled, etc., in the Abhidharma; each pair is based on a different meaning. The four indeterminate natures are as described in the first volume of the Mahayana-samgraha. The five consciousnesses cannot transform the mind and initiate karma; they can only initiate karma as a subsequent transformation. Because they are related to deportment, etc., they are called deportment. They are included in the mind of deportment, etc. The four indeterminate natures possess three (qualities), except for transformation.

The fourth line in the verse is wholesome, unwholesome, and neither. Although the six consciousnesses all have three natures, if one asks whether the sum of the natures of the consciousnesses occurs at the same time, then there is only one nature. Is it permissible for each to have its own different nature at the same time?

Treatise: Some argue that the six consciousnesses... to the point of contradicting each other.

Commentary: From below, the second part argues about similarities and differences. The initial text has three parts: first, stating the purpose; second, establishing the reason; and third, explaining the doubts. Here are the first two parts. 'What is the reason?' These six transforming consciousnesses commonly cognize external objects, and the three natures, etc., contradict each other. The third volume of the Yoga says that it is not the case that two moments of the five consciousnesses arise together, nor do they arise in alternating succession without interruption. After the five consciousnesses arise, the mind consciousness must arise without interruption, and so on. Since the five consciousnesses do not have the meaning of arising together, the three natures of the five consciousnesses will not occur simultaneously. The established purpose here is the same as the external transformation, which is the first reason. Hearing sounds in meditation is not what I allow; the three natures arise simultaneously. Even if it were allowed, it would only be possible in the meditative mind, not in the distracted state. Therefore, the three natures do not operate simultaneously in the five consciousnesses.

Treatise: The five consciousnesses must be due to... to the point of achieving wholesome and defiled.

【English Translation】 Sexual inclusion.

Commentary: According to reason, the transformation of unwholesome into wholesome is also the same. It is not necessary for all ten dharmas to be present; it is discussed from the perspective of aggregation. Among the unwholesome, the ten dharmas are all unwholesome, referring to anger (krodha), resentment (upanaha), and the like. Removing deceit (maya), falsehood (satya), arrogance (mada), and taking shamelessness (ahrikya) and non-conscientiousness (anapatrapya), the ten unwholesome dharmas are formed.

Treatise: All are included in the non-associated formations and are of indeterminate nature.

Commentary: This is to encompass the previous two cases. As stated in the Samuccaya, wholesome has thirteen categories, unwholesome has twelve categories, and indeterminate has fourteen categories, each corresponding to its respective characteristic for inclusion. Furthermore, these two, three, and four categories have three natures. They have already been briefly analyzed in the preceding alaya-vijnana. If conditioned dharmas have seeds, then the seeds follow the manifestation and belong to its nature. However, these two, three, and four categories are different from the conditioned, unconditioned, defiled, and undefiled, etc., in the Abhidharma; each pair is based on a different meaning. The four indeterminate natures are as described in the first volume of the Mahayana-samgraha. The five consciousnesses cannot transform the mind and initiate karma; they can only initiate karma as a subsequent transformation. Because they are related to deportment, etc., they are called deportment. They are included in the mind of deportment, etc. The four indeterminate natures possess three (qualities), except for transformation.

The fourth line in the verse is wholesome, unwholesome, and neither. Although the six consciousnesses all have three natures, if one asks whether the sum of the natures of the consciousnesses occurs at the same time, then there is only one nature. Is it permissible for each to have its own different nature at the same time?

Treatise: Some argue that the six consciousnesses... to the point of contradicting each other.

Commentary: From below, the second part argues about similarities and differences. The initial text has three parts: first, stating the purpose; second, establishing the reason; and third, explaining the doubts. Here are the first two parts. 'What is the reason?' These six transforming consciousnesses commonly cognize external objects, and the three natures, etc., contradict each other. The third volume of the Yoga says that it is not the case that two moments of the five consciousnesses arise together, nor do they arise in alternating succession without interruption. After the five consciousnesses arise, the mind consciousness must arise without interruption, and so on. Since the five consciousnesses do not have the meaning of arising together, the three natures of the five consciousnesses will not occur simultaneously. The established purpose here is the same as the external transformation, which is the first reason. Hearing sounds in meditation is not what I allow; the three natures arise simultaneously. Even if it were allowed, it would only be possible in the meditative mind, not in the distracted state. Therefore, the three natures do not operate simultaneously in the five consciousnesses.

Treatise: The five consciousnesses must be due to... to the point of achieving wholesome and defiled.

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述曰。第二因云。五識生時必由意識導引五識方五俱生。亦復同境方成善．染。先顯五識三性所由。后申俱難。即彼大論第三卷。說五識善染必意導生。

論。若許五識至故定不俱。

述曰。若雖導生五三性並。即許意識一念之中通三性義。所引五識既一念中許通三性。能引之意性必須同。如次所引。如顯揚第十九說。設定中聞聲。由二因取。謂由了別定所緣境。及種種所緣境意識故。二由此俱生耳識故。故雖在定亦是同緣。故定不俱。如不善眼識與意俱行。設聲緣至亦不能了。要眼識滅耳識方生。故定不俱。無意引故。此師意說。五識不相續故。五識不併生。亦非五識次第生。故三性不併。上說五識唯一念解　又解設率爾唯一念。等流通多念。亦不許三性並生。能引之意非三性故。此同性．同緣之理如下當解。

若三性不俱何故瑜伽第五十一．顯揚第一．及十七皆云本識一時三性俱轉。會此文云。

論。瑜伽等說至無相違過。

述曰。下釋難也。等取顯揚等。依多念說名俱。喻云如瑜伽第三．及五十六說有一心。非是一生滅剎那。故言俱也。彼第三云。如經言起一心多心。云何一心。謂世俗言說。一心剎那非生起剎那。謂一處為依止。於一境界事。有爾所了別生。總爾所時名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述：第二重因由是說，五識生起時必定由意識引導，五識才能同時生起。也只有在同緣一境的情況下，才能形成善或染。首先闡明五識具有三種性質的原因，然後提出共同生起的困難。正如《瑜伽師地論》第三卷所說，五識的善染必定由意識引導而生。

論：如果允許五識同時生起，那麼在禪定中聽聞聲音的情況就無法解釋，因此五識必定不能同時生起。

窺基法師述：如果允許意識引導五識生起時，五識的三種性質同時存在，那就等於允許意識在一念之中同時具有三種性質。既然所引導的五識在一念之中允許具有三種性質，那麼能引導的意識的性質必須相同，才能依次引導。正如《顯揚聖教論》第十九卷所說，在禪定中聽到聲音，是由兩個原因造成的：一是通過了別禪定所緣之境，以及種種所緣境的意識；二是通過同時生起的耳識。因此，即使在禪定中，也是同緣一境。所以五識必定不能同時生起。例如，不善的眼識與意識同時執行，即使聲音的因緣到來，也不能了別。只有當眼識滅去，耳識才能生起。所以五識必定不能同時生起，因為沒有意識的引導。這位論師的意思是說，五識不是相續不斷的，所以五識不是同時生起，也不是五識依次生起。因此，三種性質不能同時存在。上面所說五識只有一念的理解，又解釋說即使是最初的一念，也只是流通於多個念頭，也不允許三種性質同時生起，因為能引導的意識不是三種性質同時存在。這種同性、同緣的道理如下面將要解釋的。

如果三種性質不能同時存在，為什麼《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷、《顯揚聖教論》第一卷和第十七卷都說本識一時具有三種性質同時運轉呢？解釋這段經文說：

論：《瑜伽師地論》等所說的一時，只是依多念來說，並沒有互相違背的過失。

窺基法師述：下面解釋這個疑問。『等』字包括《顯揚聖教論》等。依據多個念頭來說，稱之為『俱』（同時）。例如《瑜伽師地論》第三卷和第五十六卷所說，有一個心，並非指一生滅的剎那。所以說『俱』（同時）。《瑜伽師地論》第三卷說：『如經中所說，起一心多心。什麼是『一心』呢？』這是世俗的言說。一心不是指生起的那一剎那，而是指以一個處所為依託，對於一個境界的事物，有多少了別生起，總共所用的時間，就叫做一心。

【English Translation】 English version: Śrāvakācāra states: The second cause states that when the five consciousnesses arise, they must be guided by the mind-consciousness (manovijñāna). Only then can the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously. Also, only when they perceive the same object can they become wholesome or defiled. First, it explains the reason why the five consciousnesses have three natures, and then it raises the difficulty of simultaneous arising. As stated in the third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), the wholesomeness or defilement of the five consciousnesses must be guided by the mind-consciousness to arise.

Treatise: If the five consciousnesses are allowed to arise simultaneously, then the situation of hearing sounds in meditation cannot be explained. Therefore, the five consciousnesses must not arise simultaneously.

Śrāvakācāra states: If it is allowed that when the mind-consciousness guides the five consciousnesses to arise, the three natures of the five consciousnesses exist simultaneously, then it is equivalent to allowing the mind-consciousness to simultaneously possess three natures in one thought. Since the guided five consciousnesses are allowed to have three natures in one thought, the nature of the guiding mind-consciousness must be the same in order to guide them in sequence. As stated in the nineteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (顯揚聖教論), hearing sounds in meditation is caused by two reasons: first, through the mind-consciousness that distinguishes the object of meditation and various objects; second, through the simultaneously arising ear-consciousness. Therefore, even in meditation, they perceive the same object. So the five consciousnesses must not arise simultaneously. For example, an unwholesome eye-consciousness operates simultaneously with the mind-consciousness, but even if the condition of sound arrives, it cannot distinguish it. Only when the eye-consciousness ceases can the ear-consciousness arise. Therefore, the five consciousnesses must not arise simultaneously because there is no guidance from the mind-consciousness. This teacher's meaning is that the five consciousnesses are not continuous, so the five consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously, nor do the five consciousnesses arise in sequence. Therefore, the three natures cannot exist simultaneously. The above said that the five consciousnesses have only one thought of understanding, and also explained that even the initial thought only circulates through multiple thoughts, and does not allow the three natures to arise simultaneously, because the guiding mind-consciousness does not have three natures simultaneously. The principle of this same nature and same object will be explained below.

If the three natures cannot exist simultaneously, why do the fifty-first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the first and seventeenth volumes of the Abhidharmasamuccaya all say that the ālaya-vijñāna (本識) simultaneously has three natures operating at the same time? Explain this passage by saying:

Treatise: The 'simultaneous' mentioned in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and others is only based on multiple thoughts, and there is no fault of mutual contradiction.

Śrāvakācāra states: The word 'others' includes the Abhidharmasamuccaya and others. Based on multiple thoughts, it is called 'simultaneous'. For example, the third and fifty-sixth volumes of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra say that there is one mind, which does not refer to a moment of arising and ceasing. Therefore, it is said to be 'simultaneous'. The third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'As it is said in the sutras, arising of one mind and many minds. What is 'one mind'?' This is a worldly expression. One mind does not refer to the moment of arising, but refers to the time when, relying on one place, there are so many distinctions arising regarding one object, and the total time used is called one mind.

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一心剎那。又相似相續亦說名一。與第二念極相似故等。明第八識與五識等三性不俱。善眼染七自無記故。雖有三性。俱遮余轉識三俱生故。

論。有義六識至容俱起故。

述曰。此師正義。于中有五。一標宗。二立理。三釋難。四引證。五解違。此初二也　三性容俱。非一切時皆必定俱。有俱時故論言容也。此立義。已下為理。言率爾．等流眼等五識或多或少容俱起故。此引五識相續文者。如前等無間依中說。既等流心許多念故五識容俱。此如何等。如眼識緣善色至等流心多念善已後有不善聲境現前。意與耳同緣。雖亦緣色境。而聲境勝。乃至起不善耳識。令彼不善耳識生。前眼識善耳不善未滅。如是等流多念生已。乃至余無記香等至。乃至意雖同緣。隨境強引起無記鼻識生。即等流多率爾少　或前一眼識久已不斷。雖已起尋求。尋求未了。眼更重觀。意復尋求。尋求未已不起決定。如是或多率爾。后時耳等識生一率爾已。乃至即有等流耳識次而起故。是率爾多念等流少也。容許五識有俱行故。得三性並　又解率爾．等流二心之時。眼等五中。或三．四等多。一．二等少。容俱起故。雖五一念三性得俱　若一向同境時。即不善意隨眼識並行已。設耳緣至亦不緣聲　不爾即須眼識斷滅意方緣聲此前師意。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一個心念的剎那。又相似的相續也可以稱為一，因為它與第二個念頭極其相似等等。這表明第八識與五識等的三種性質不同時存在，因為善良的眼識被染污的第七識所染污，而第七識本身是無記的。雖然有三種性質，但它們一起遮止了其他轉識的三種性質同時產生。

論：有義認為六識乃至可以同時生起。

述曰：這是這位論師的正義，其中有五個方面：一、標明宗旨；二、建立理由；三、解釋難題；四、引用證據；五、解釋矛盾。這裡是前兩個方面。三種性質可以同時存在，但並非所有時候都必定同時存在，因為有同時存在的時候，所以論中說『容』。這是建立理由。以下是理由：因為率爾心（最初一念）、等流心（相似相續的心念）以及眼等五識，或多或少，可以同時生起。這裡引用五識相續的經文，如前面等無間依中所說。既然等流心有很多念頭，所以五識可以同時生起。這是如何同時生起的呢？例如，眼識緣于善良的色境，直到等流心產生多個善良的念頭之後，有不善良的聲境出現在面前，意識與耳識共同緣於此聲境。雖然意識也緣於色境，但聲境更為強烈，乃至生起不善良的耳識，使那個不善良的耳識產生。之前的善良眼識和不善良耳識尚未斷滅。像這樣，等流心產生多個念頭之後，乃至其餘無記的香等境出現，乃至意識雖然共同緣於此境，但隨著更強烈的境界，引起無記的鼻識產生。這就是等流心多，率爾心少。或者，之前的眼識很久都沒有中斷，雖然已經開始尋求，但尋求尚未結束，眼睛又重新觀看，意識又繼續尋求，尋求尚未結束，沒有產生決定。像這樣，或者多個率爾心，之後耳等識產生一個率爾心之後，乃至立即有等流耳識緊隨其後產生。這就是率爾心多，等流心少。允許五識有同時生起的情況，就可以得到三種性質並存。又解釋率爾心和等流心兩種心念的時候，眼等五識中，或者三、四等多個，一、二等較少，可以同時生起。即使五識只有一個念頭，三種性質也可以同時存在。如果一直緣于相同的境界，那麼不善良的意識會隨著眼識並行。假設耳識緣于其他境界，也不會緣于聲音。否則，就必須眼識斷滅，意識才能緣于聲音。這是此前論師的觀點。

【English Translation】 English version A single moment of thought. Furthermore, similar continuity can also be called one, because it is extremely similar to the second thought, and so on. This indicates that the eighth consciousness does not simultaneously exist with the three natures of the five consciousnesses, etc., because the virtuous eye consciousness is tainted by the defiled seventh consciousness, which itself is neutral. Although there are three natures, they together prevent the simultaneous arising of the three natures of other transformed consciousnesses.

Treatise: Some argue that the six consciousnesses can even arise simultaneously.

Commentary: This is the correct view of this master, which has five aspects: 1. Stating the principle; 2. Establishing the reason; 3. Explaining the difficulties; 4. Citing evidence; 5. Resolving contradictions. Here are the first two aspects. The three natures can exist simultaneously, but they do not necessarily exist simultaneously at all times, because there are times when they exist simultaneously, so the treatise says 'may'. This is establishing the reason. The following is the reason: Because the '率爾心' (cù ěr xīn) (initial thought), '等流心' (děng liú xīn) (similar continuous thought), and the five consciousnesses such as eye consciousness, may arise simultaneously, either many or few. Here, the sutra text of the continuous five consciousnesses is cited, as mentioned in the previous '等無間依' (děng wú jiàn yī) (immediately preceding condition). Since the '等流心' (děng liú xīn) has many thoughts, the five consciousnesses can arise simultaneously. How do they arise simultaneously? For example, the eye consciousness is conditioned by a virtuous form, until the '等流心' (děng liú xīn) produces multiple virtuous thoughts, and then an unwholesome sound appears in front, and the mind consciousness and ear consciousness are jointly conditioned by this sound. Although the mind consciousness is also conditioned by the form, the sound is stronger, and even an unwholesome ear consciousness arises, causing that unwholesome ear consciousness to arise. The previous virtuous eye consciousness and the unwholesome ear consciousness have not yet ceased. In this way, after the '等流心' (děng liú xīn) produces multiple thoughts, and even the remaining neutral smells, etc., appear, and even though the mind consciousness is jointly conditioned by this object, it causes the neutral nose consciousness to arise due to the stronger object. This is where the '等流心' (děng liú xīn) is many and the '率爾心' (cù ěr xīn) is few. Or, the previous eye consciousness has not been interrupted for a long time, and although it has begun to seek, the seeking has not ended, and the eyes look again, and the mind consciousness continues to seek, and the seeking has not ended, and no decision has been made. In this way, or multiple '率爾心' (cù ěr xīn), and then after the ear consciousness, etc., produces one '率爾心' (cù ěr xīn), and even immediately there is a '等流心' (děng liú xīn) ear consciousness that arises immediately after. This is where the '率爾心' (cù ěr xīn) is many and the '等流心' (děng liú xīn) is few. Allowing the five consciousnesses to arise simultaneously allows the three natures to coexist. Also, when explaining the two thoughts of '率爾心' (cù ěr xīn) and '等流心' (děng liú xīn), among the five consciousnesses such as eye consciousness, either three or four are many, and one or two are few, and they can arise simultaneously. Even if the five consciousnesses have only one thought, the three natures can exist simultaneously. If one is always conditioned by the same object, then the unwholesome mind consciousness will run parallel with the eye consciousness. If the ear consciousness is conditioned by other objects, it will not be conditioned by sound. Otherwise, the eye consciousness must cease in order for the mind consciousness to be conditioned by sound. This is the view of the previous master.

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今說一意識與五同緣而性不定。

論。五識與意至於此唐捐。

述曰。此釋難也。雖必俱起與前師同。與五同性即不決定。由此理故。前所設難能引意識通三性者。於此唐捐。

問如解深密等。說意與五同緣故定同性。集量論說五俱意識必現量故。何故得知不同性也。為答此問也。

論。故瑜伽說至余耳識生。

述曰。下引證也。明此緣者。如大目連獼猴池側。坐無所有處定。有象哮吼．猿猴戲聲。即便出定。薩婆多師出已方聞。今此大乘聞已方出。若先不聞如何出定　問豈有無所有處心得緣欲界聲等境也　六十五等說廣惠聲聞有學．無學無色界心緣三界法。故得無違。六十三卷三摩呬多地末說。謂有行人若遇聲緣從定起者。遇聲耳識與定相應意識俱轉起聞于聲。名遇聲緣從定而起　或復起者。即是耳識。此舉定中得起耳識　或者。謂假者。即得定人由定中聞故出。

論。非唯彼定至能取此聲。

述曰。此顯聞聲非唯意取。顯揚論說種種意故。然彼耳識亦能取聲。非唯定中意識能取此聲。共耳一時聞故。意不唯緣定中事故。

論。若不爾者至不應出定。

述曰。返成耳識。若在定中唯意緣聲。耳不聞聲者。於此音聲。定中耳識不領受故。后時不應為此聲故而

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 現在來說說這意識與五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）共同緣取外境，但其自性並不固定。

論：如果五識和意識在此處是相同的，那麼之前的論證就白費了。

述記：這是爲了解釋之前的難題。雖然五識和意識必然同時生起，這與之前的觀點相同，但如果說它們具有相同的自性，那就無法確定了。因為這個道理，之前提出的難題，即意識可以通於三性（善、惡、無記），在這裡就變得沒有意義了。

問：像《解深密經》等經典中說，意識與五識共同緣取外境，所以它們的自性必定相同。《集量論》中說，五識同時生起時，意識必定是現量（直接的認知），為什麼能得知它們的自性不同呢？這是爲了回答這個問題。

論：所以《瑜伽師地論》中說……直到其餘的耳識生起。

述記：下面引用經文來證明。說明這種緣取的情況，就像大目連（Mahāmaudgalyāyana，佛陀十大弟子之一，以神通著稱）在獼猴池邊，安住在無所有處定（一種禪定境界）中。有大象的吼叫聲、猿猴的嬉戲聲，他就從禪定中出來了。薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda，說一切有部，佛教部派之一）的修行者，出來后才聽到這些聲音。現在這位大乘修行者，聽到聲音后才出來。如果事先沒有聽到，怎麼能從禪定中出來呢？問：難道無所有處定的心，能夠緣取欲界（Desire realm）的聲音等境界嗎？第六十五卷等經典中說，廣慧聲聞（Śrāvaka，聽聞佛法而證悟的修行者）的有學（正在學習的修行者）、無學（已經完成學習的修行者）的心，能夠緣取三界（Three Realms）的法，所以沒有衝突。第六十三卷《三摩呬多地》的末尾說，如果有修行人在禪定中遇到聲音的因緣而從禪定中出來，遇到聲音時，耳識與禪定相應的意識同時生起，聽到聲音，這叫做遇到聲音的因緣而從禪定中出來。或者出來的人，就是耳識。這裡舉例說明在禪定中能夠生起耳識。或者，是指假借的，也就是得到禪定的人，因為在禪定中聽到聲音而出來。

論：不僅僅是那個禪定……能夠獲取這個聲音。

述記：這表明聽到聲音不僅僅是意識的作用。《顯揚聖教論》中說了種種意識的緣故。然而，那個耳識也能獲取聲音，不僅僅是禪定中的意識能夠獲取這個聲音。因為與耳朵同時聽到，所以意識不僅僅緣取禪定中的事情。

論：如果不是這樣……就不應該從禪定中出來。

述記：反過來證明耳識的作用。如果在禪定中只有意識緣取聲音，耳朵沒有聽到聲音，那麼對於這個聲音，禪定中的耳識沒有領受，之後就不應該因為這個聲音而從禪定中出來。

【English Translation】 English version Now, let's discuss how consciousness (mano-vijñāna) and the five senses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) jointly perceive external objects, yet its nature is not fixed.

Treatise: If the five senses and consciousness were the same in this context, then the previous arguments would be in vain.

Commentary: This is to explain the previous difficulty. Although the five senses and consciousness necessarily arise simultaneously, which is the same as the previous view, if we say they have the same nature, then it cannot be determined. Because of this principle, the previous difficulty raised, that consciousness can be connected to the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), becomes meaningless here.

Question: As stated in scriptures like the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經), consciousness and the five senses jointly perceive external objects, so their nature must be the same. The Hetuvidyā-nyāya-dvāra-tarka-śāstra (集量論) says that when the five senses arise simultaneously, consciousness must be direct perception (pratyakṣa), so how can we know that their natures are different? This is to answer this question.

Treatise: Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) says... until the remaining ear-consciousness arises.

Commentary: The following quotes scriptures to prove it. Explaining this perception, it's like Mahāmaudgalyāyana (大目連, one of the Buddha's ten great disciples, known for his supernatural powers) was by the Monkey Pond, abiding in the state of 'nothingness' (ākiṃcanyāyatana, 無所有處定). There were sounds of elephants roaring and monkeys playing, and he came out of meditation. Practitioners of the Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多部, a Buddhist school) only heard these sounds after coming out. Now, this Mahāyāna practitioner only came out after hearing the sounds. If he hadn't heard them beforehand, how could he have come out of meditation? Question: Can the mind in the state of 'nothingness' perceive realms like sounds in the Desire Realm (欲界)? Volume 65 and other scriptures say that the Śrāvakas (聲聞, listeners of the Buddha's teachings) of great wisdom, both learners (śaikṣa, 有學) and non-learners (aśaikṣa, 無學), can perceive the dharmas of the Three Realms (三界), so there is no conflict. Volume 63 of the Samāhitā Bhūmi says that if a practitioner encounters a sound and comes out of meditation, when encountering the sound, the ear-consciousness and the consciousness corresponding to the meditation arise simultaneously, hearing the sound, this is called encountering the sound and coming out of meditation. Or the one who comes out is the ear-consciousness. This exemplifies that ear-consciousness can arise in meditation. 'Or' refers to the assumed, that is, the person who has attained meditation comes out because they heard the sound in meditation.

Treatise: It is not only that meditation... is able to grasp this sound.

Commentary: This shows that hearing the sound is not only the function of consciousness. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (顯揚聖教論) speaks of various reasons for consciousness. However, that ear-consciousness can also grasp the sound, it is not only the consciousness in meditation that can grasp this sound. Because it is heard simultaneously with the ear, consciousness does not only perceive things in meditation.

Treatise: If it were not so... one should not come out of meditation.

Commentary: This proves the function of ear-consciousness in reverse. If only consciousness perceives the sound in meditation, and the ear does not hear the sound, then for this sound, the ear-consciousness in meditation has not received it, and afterwards one should not come out of meditation because of this sound.

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出於定。后時既為聲故出定。明在定內耳與意俱同念聞聲　破小乘等立一量云。如汝所為欲聞聲末後出定之意識。應不即聞聲時出定。不聞聲故。如未聞聲之定意識　故知返成聞聲方出。

論。非取聲時至后時方出。

述曰。顯聞聲位由在定中。非當取聲即便出定。領受聲已定中意識。希望是何方始出故。聞聲后時方始出定。

論。在定耳識至定無記故。

述曰。上引教已。下以理難。在定耳識率爾聞聲。雖意與彼同緣引起。理應非善。瑜伽論說率爾等五心中。前三定無記故。此約未轉依位五識。無漏時即唯善性故。

論。由此誠證至善等性同。

述曰。此結。五．六不定同性。定中意是善。與耳性不同。亦俱生故。以定中不同。證在散位俱有五者。不定同性。

若爾何故解深密經．及七十六說五識同時意識同緣。

論。諸處但言至不說同性。

述曰。下解違也。此會彼文。彼說同緣不言同性。故不相違。彼論無定同性言故。謂雖言同緣。不言五．意定須同性。故知亦有不同者故。如前論說。顯揚十九如前定中意．耳亦明同緣不言同性。定中起耳識故。彼文大好　然前師豈不解此文耶　答解如前已解。

前師問言若定中實得起耳識為例不同性。何故雜

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 出於定（chū yú dìng）：從禪定中出來。后時既為聲故出定：之後因為聽到了聲音才從禪定中出來。明在定內耳與意俱同念聞聲：明明在禪定之中，耳朵和意識一同念及聽聞聲音。破小乘等立一量云：爲了駁斥小乘等宗派，立下一個量式說，如汝所為欲聞聲末後出定之意識：就像你們所認為的那樣，想要聽聞聲音，最後才從禪定中出來的意識。應不即聞聲時出定：應該不是在聽到聲音的時候立即出定。不聞聲故：因為沒有聽到聲音的緣故。如未聞聲之定意識：就像沒有聽到聲音時的禪定意識。故知返成聞聲方出：所以可知反而是在聽到聲音之後才出定。

論：非取聲時至后時方出。

述曰：顯聞聲位由在定中：闡明聽聞聲音的時刻，是因為在禪定之中。非當取聲即便出定：不是在獲取聲音的時候就立即出定。領受聲已定中意識：領受聲音之後，禪定中的意識。希望是何方始出故：希望是什麼時候才開始出定的緣故。聞聲后時方始出定：在聽到聲音之後才開始出定。

論：在定耳識至定無記故。

述曰：上引教已：上面已經引用了經教。下以理難：下面用道理來辯駁。在定耳識率爾聞聲：在禪定中的耳識突然聽聞聲音。雖意與彼同緣引起：雖然意識與它一同緣起。理應非善：道理上應該不是善的。瑜伽論說率爾等五心中：瑜伽論中說，在率爾等五種心中。前三定無記故：前三種禪定是無記的緣故。此約未轉依位五識：這是指未轉依位的五識。無漏時即唯善性故：在無漏的時候就只有善性了。

論：由此誠證至善等性同。

述曰：此結：這是結論。五．六不定同性：五識和六識的不定同性。定中意是善：禪定中的意識是善的。與耳性不同：與耳識的性質不同。亦俱生故：也是同時產生的緣故。以定中不同：因為禪定中不同。證在散位俱有五者：證明在散亂的狀態下，五識都是。不定同性：不定同性。

若爾何故解深密經．及七十六說五識同時意識同緣：如果這樣，為什麼《解深密經》（Jiě Shēn Mì Jīng）和第七十六卷說五識同時，意識也同時緣取呢？

論：諸處但言至不說同性。

述曰：下解違也：下面解釋違背之處。此會彼文：這是會通那些經文。彼說同緣不言同性：他們說的是同時緣取，沒有說性質相同。故不相違：所以不相違背。彼論無定同性言故：他們的論述中沒有確定性質相同的說法。謂雖言同緣：就是說，雖然說了同時緣取。不言五．意定須同性：沒有說五識和意識一定需要性質相同。故知亦有不同者故：所以知道也有不同的時候。如前論說：就像前面的論述所說。顯揚十九如前定中意．耳亦明同緣不言同性：顯揚宗第十九卷也像前面一樣，禪定中的意識和耳識也明明是同時緣取，但沒有說性質相同。定中起耳識故：因為禪定中生起了耳識的緣故。彼文大好：那段經文非常好。然前師豈不解此文耶：然而之前的法師難道不理解這段經文嗎？答解如前已解：回答是理解，就像前面已經解釋過的那樣。

前師問言若定中實得起耳識為例不同性：之前的法師問道，如果禪定中確實可以生起耳識，作為不同性質的例子。何故雜：

【English Translation】 English version Being out of Samadhi (chū yú dìng): Coming out of meditation. Later, being out of Samadhi because of sound: Afterwards, coming out of Samadhi because a sound was heard. Clearly, within Samadhi, the ear and mind together contemplate hearing the sound: It is clear that within Samadhi, the ear and consciousness together contemplate hearing the sound. Refuting the Hinayana and others, establish a measure, saying: As you claim, the consciousness that desires to hear the sound and then exits Samadhi: Just as you believe, the consciousness that wants to hear the sound and only exits Samadhi at the end. It should not be exiting Samadhi immediately upon hearing the sound: It should not be exiting Samadhi immediately upon hearing the sound. Because there is no hearing of the sound: Because there is no hearing of the sound. Like the Samadhi consciousness that has not heard the sound: Like the Samadhi consciousness that has not heard the sound. Therefore, it is known that one exits only after hearing the sound: Therefore, it can be known that one exits only after hearing the sound.

Treatise: It is not that one exits at the moment of perceiving the sound, but only later.

Commentary: Manifesting the position of hearing the sound is due to being in Samadhi: Clarifying that the moment of hearing the sound is because of being in Samadhi. It is not that one exits Samadhi immediately upon perceiving the sound: It is not that one exits Samadhi immediately upon perceiving the sound. After receiving the sound, the consciousness in Samadhi: After receiving the sound, the consciousness in Samadhi. Hoping for what reason does one begin to exit: Hoping for what reason does one begin to exit Samadhi. One exits Samadhi only after hearing the sound: One exits Samadhi only after hearing the sound.

Treatise: The ear consciousness in Samadhi leads to the state of neutral sensation in Samadhi.

Commentary: The above has already cited the teachings: The above has already cited the scriptures. Below, refute with reason: Below, refute with reason. The ear consciousness in Samadhi suddenly hears a sound: The ear consciousness in Samadhi suddenly hears a sound. Although the mind and it arise from the same condition: Although the mind and it arise from the same condition. It should not be wholesome: In principle, it should not be wholesome. The Yogaśāstra says that among the five types of mind, such as initial thought: The Yogaśāstra says that among the five types of mind, such as initial thought. The first three are neutral: The first three types of Samadhi are neutral. This refers to the five consciousnesses in the state before transformation: This refers to the five consciousnesses in the state before transformation. When there is no outflow, it is only wholesome: When there is no outflow, it is only wholesome.

Treatise: From this, it is truly proven that the nature of wholesomeness and so on are the same.

Commentary: This is the conclusion: This is the conclusion. The five and six consciousnesses have the same indeterminate nature: The five and six consciousnesses have the same indeterminate nature. The mind in Samadhi is wholesome: The mind in Samadhi is wholesome. It is different from the nature of the ear: It is different from the nature of the ear consciousness. They also arise simultaneously: They also arise simultaneously. Because they are different in Samadhi: Because they are different in Samadhi. Proving that all five are present in the scattered state: Proving that all five consciousnesses are present in the scattered state. Indeterminate nature: Indeterminate nature.

If so, why does the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Jiě Shēn Mì Jīng) and the seventy-sixth chapter say that the five consciousnesses are simultaneous and the consciousness also simultaneously apprehends?: If so, why does the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and the seventy-sixth chapter say that the five consciousnesses are simultaneous and the consciousness also simultaneously apprehends?

Treatise: In various places, it is only said that they share the same object, but not that they have the same nature.

Commentary: Below, explain the contradiction: Below, explain the contradiction. This reconciles those texts: This reconciles those texts. They say that they share the same object, but not that they have the same nature: They say that they share the same object, but not that they have the same nature. Therefore, there is no contradiction: Therefore, there is no contradiction. Their discourse does not define the same nature: Their discourse does not define the same nature. That is to say, although it is said that they share the same object: That is to say, although it is said that they share the same object. It is not said that the five consciousnesses and the mind must have the same nature: It is not said that the five consciousnesses and the mind must have the same nature. Therefore, it is known that there are also differences: Therefore, it is known that there are also differences. As the previous discourse says: As the previous discourse says. The nineteenth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Xiǎn Yáng Zōng) also states that the mind and ear in Samadhi clearly share the same object, but do not say that they have the same nature: The nineteenth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra also states that the mind and ear in Samadhi clearly share the same object, but do not say that they have the same nature. Because the ear consciousness arises in Samadhi: Because the ear consciousness arises in Samadhi. That text is excellent: That text is excellent. But did the previous teacher not understand this text?: But did the previous teacher not understand this text? The answer is that they understood, as explained previously: The answer is that they understood, as explained previously.

The previous teacher asked: If it is true that the ear consciousness can arise in Samadhi as an example of different natures: The previous teacher asked: If it is true that the ear consciousness can arise in Samadhi as an example of different natures. Why mix:

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集論第七說三摩呬多位余識無耶。此非集論本文。是師子覺義。有師引證。

論。雜集論說至依多分說。

述曰。彼雖非證然為會之。對法論中言余無者。約多分說。多分有二義　一多識。二多人。多人．多識不起言無。謂二乘等定中唯得起耳非餘四識。非菩薩故　問如何定中意識俱受。與耳同緣　散意入舍定即引生耳。耳識率爾必是舍故。初起之時必昧劣故。意既同緣。必非異受。入喜樂定耳必不生　二解雖復同緣。何妨異受。其性亦許有不同故。

瑜伽論說率爾等三是無記性。定心尋求如何是善。又在定得起幾心　唯初二心。若有希望即出定故。希求即是尋求心也　若散五心。初三無記。論說多分。若在定位。亦通善等。又五識必由尋．伺所引。此入定心何地之法　應唯初定復無尋．伺故。此如第七卷尋．伺中解　又此定為唯有漏。亦通無漏　答文不遮二種俱得　又欲界耳識許異地心引生。二定以上起三識時。異地心引無尋．伺意識為能引耶　答初起五識必尋伺引。后位已去非尋．伺心引此亦得。唯率爾心。等流心等。即不許爾。如在欲界。豈一切五識生。要由尋．伺引。初起由尋．伺。後起不必故。

問五為所引。意是能引。所引三性既俱。能引意識應通三性。

論。若五識中

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：『集論』第七品說，在『三摩呬多』（Samāhita，等持）位，是否沒有其餘的識？這並非『集論』的原文，而是師子覺的觀點，有老師引用來作證。

論：『雜集論』說到『乃至依多分說』。

述：雖然那不是證據，但可以用來解釋。『對法論』中說沒有其餘的識，是就大多數情況而言。『多分』有兩種含義：一是多數的識，二是多數的人。多數的人、多數的識不起作用，意思是說二乘等在禪定中只能生起意識，不能生起其餘四識，因為他們不是菩薩。問：如何在禪定中，意識和耳識同時發生作用，並且與耳識同緣？散亂的心進入舍受的禪定，就會引發耳識。因為耳識的『率爾』（最初一念）必然是舍受，最初生起時必然是昧劣的，所以意識既然與耳識同緣，必然不是不同的感受。進入喜受或樂受的禪定，耳識必然不會生起。另一種解釋是，即使意識和耳識同緣，又有什麼妨礙它們有不同的感受呢？它們的性質也可能不同。

『瑜伽論』說，『率爾』等三種心是無記性的。禪定中的心尋求真理，怎麼會是善的呢？又在禪定中能生起幾種心？只能生起最初的兩種心，如果有希望，就會出定。『希求』就是尋求的心。如果是散亂的心，五識中的最初三種是無記性的，『瑜伽論』說的是大多數情況。如果在禪定位置，也可能通於善等。而且五識必然是由尋、伺所引導的，這進入禪定的心屬於哪個地？應該只屬於初禪，因為沒有尋、伺。這就像第七卷中解釋尋、伺一樣。又這種禪定是隻有有漏的，還是也通於無漏的？回答是，經文沒有排除兩種情況都可以得到。又欲界的耳識允許由異地的心所引發。二禪以上生起三種識時，異地的心，沒有尋、伺的意識，能作為引發者嗎？回答是，最初生起五識必然由尋、伺引導，後面的階段就不一定由尋、伺心引導了，也可以。只有『率爾』心、『等流』心等才不允許這樣。就像在欲界，難道一切五識的生起都要由尋、伺引導嗎？最初生起由尋、伺引導，後面生起就不一定了。

問：五識是被意識所引導的，意識是能引導的。被引導的五識的三性既然都有，那麼能引導的意識應該也通於三性。

論：如果五識中……

【English Translation】 English version: Question: In the seventh chapter of the 『Abhidharmasamuccaya』 (Compendium of Abhidharma), does it say that in the 『Samāhita』 (state of concentration) position, there are no other consciousnesses? This is not the original text of the 『Abhidharmasamuccaya』, but rather the view of Simhaja, which some teachers cite as evidence.

Treatise: The 『Mahāyānasaṃgraha』 (Compendium of Mahayana) speaks of 『even according to the majority view』.

Commentary: Although that is not evidence, it can be used to explain it. In the 『Abhidharma』 treatises, saying that there are no other consciousnesses refers to the majority of cases. 『Majority』 has two meanings: one is the majority of consciousnesses, and the other is the majority of people. The majority of people and the majority of consciousnesses do not arise, meaning that Śrāvakas (Hearers) and Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas), etc., can only generate consciousness in meditation, and cannot generate the other four consciousnesses, because they are not Bodhisattvas. Question: How can both consciousness and ear-consciousness arise simultaneously in meditation, and be related to the same object? A distracted mind entering the meditation of neutral feeling will trigger ear-consciousness. Because the 『at-that-moment』 (率爾, kṣaṇika) of ear-consciousness is necessarily neutral feeling, and it is necessarily faint and weak when it first arises, therefore, since consciousness is related to the same object as ear-consciousness, it must not be a different feeling. Entering the meditation of joy or pleasure, ear-consciousness will necessarily not arise. Another explanation is that even if consciousness and ear-consciousness are related to the same object, what prevents them from having different feelings? Their natures may also be different.

The 『Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra』 (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) says that the three types of mind, such as 『at-that-moment』 (率爾, kṣaṇika), are of indeterminate nature. How can the mind seeking truth in meditation be good? Also, how many types of mind can arise in meditation? Only the first two types of mind can arise; if there is hope, one will exit meditation. 『Hope』 is the mind of seeking. If it is a distracted mind, the first three of the five consciousnesses are of indeterminate nature; the 『Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra』 speaks of the majority of cases. If in the position of meditation, it can also be connected to good, etc. Moreover, the five consciousnesses are necessarily guided by investigation and analysis (尋, vitarka and 伺, vicāra). To which realm does this mind entering meditation belong? It should only belong to the first dhyana (禪, meditation), because there is no investigation and analysis. This is like the explanation of investigation and analysis in the seventh volume. Also, is this meditation only with outflows (有漏, āsrava), or does it also connect to without outflows (無漏, anāsrava)? The answer is that the text does not exclude the possibility of obtaining both.

Also, ear-consciousness in the desire realm is allowed to be triggered by a mind from a different realm. When three consciousnesses arise above the second dhyana, can a mind from a different realm, a consciousness without investigation and analysis, be the trigger? The answer is that the initial arising of the five consciousnesses is necessarily guided by investigation and analysis, but the later stages are not necessarily guided by the mind of investigation and analysis; it is also possible. Only the 『at-that-moment』 (率爾, kṣaṇika) mind, the 『flowing』 (等流, niṣyanda) mind, etc., are not allowed in this way. Just like in the desire realm, does the arising of all five consciousnesses have to be guided by investigation and analysis? The initial arising is guided by investigation and analysis, but the later arising is not necessarily so.

Question: The five consciousnesses are guided by consciousness, and consciousness is the guide. Since the three natures of the guided five consciousnesses all exist, then the guiding consciousness should also connect to the three natures.

Treatise: If in the five consciousnesses...

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至三性容俱。

述曰。且散心位隨五識唯一念．或相續。皆得三性並生。取長徒義。如敘二說別抄．五十一抄說。然後時引五識俱生已。意隨所偏注境強者。同五識之性。如在定意唯是善性。不同耳識率爾心是無記。若兼緣諸處於五無偏便無記性。此效能與五識善．惡不相違故。若與五識別緣唯緣法處。既無此心。由此故知。集量論等五俱意識定現量者。必同緣故。其量既然。耳俱意識聽教之時。但作證解故必現量。五俱之意亦無法執等以此為證。諸師於此覺惠異說。如別抄故。八地．二乘．凡夫等位。六識三性容俱時轉。如第八識與餘三性俱。以此為證。

論。得自在位至戲論種故。

述曰。自下顯在果位唯善性攝。若五識轉依。隨前二師所解位次。唯善性攝唯在佛也。唯善性故。不爾初地已去。五識之中尚有不善。八地已去或時亦有無記五識故。唯佛色．心是道諦故。唯善性攝。何以然者。諸戲論種已永無故。應細拾文推其義理　三乘無學．菩薩后得智中。何性六識俱起。然今不能煩文具解。雖知六識體通三性。五識之中通有覆者。如受中說。善中通生得．加行。加行有聞．思．修。論其五識。聞思于義自性即無。為彼所引亦通所成。如聽經觀字而思法義。意成聞．思。所引眼．耳豈非亦是聞

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

至三性容俱。

述曰：且散心位，隨五識唯一念或相續，皆得三性並生，取長徒義。如敘二說別抄、五十一抄說。然後時引五識俱生已，意隨所偏注境強者，同五識之性。如在定意唯是善性，不同耳識率爾心是無記。若兼緣諸處於五無偏便無記性，此效能與五識善、惡不相違故。若與五識別緣唯緣法處，既無此心，由此故知，集量論等五俱意識定現量者，必同緣故。其量既然，耳俱意識聽教之時，但作證解故必現量。五俱之意亦無法執等以此為證。諸師於此覺惠異說，如別抄故。八地（菩薩修行階位）二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）凡夫等位，六識三性容俱時轉。如第八識與餘三性俱，以此為證。

論：得自在位至戲論種故。

述曰：自下顯在果位唯善性攝。若五識轉依，隨前二師所解位次，唯善性攝唯在佛也。唯善性故，不爾初地（菩薩修行階位）已去，五識之中尚有不善。八地（菩薩修行階位）已去或時亦有無記五識故。唯佛色、心是道諦故，唯善性攝。何以然者？諸戲論種已永無故。應細拾文推其義理。三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）無學（已證阿羅漢果位）菩薩后得智中，何性六識俱起？然今不能煩文具解。雖知六識體通三性，五識之中通有覆者，如受中說。善中通生得、加行。加行有聞、思、修。論其五識，聞思于義自性即無，為彼所引亦通所成。如聽經觀字而思法義，意成聞、思，所引眼、耳豈非亦是聞？ English version:

'To the co-existence of the three natures.'

Commentary: Furthermore, in the state of a distracted mind, following the five consciousnesses, whether it's a single thought or a continuous stream, all three natures can arise together, adopting the meaning of 'taking the longer path'. As described in the separate notes on the two explanations and the fifty-one notes. Then, when the five consciousnesses arise together, the mind follows the strongest object it is focused on, sharing the nature of the five consciousnesses. For example, the mind in meditation is only of a wholesome nature, unlike the spontaneous mind of the ear consciousness, which is neutral. If it simultaneously engages with various objects without bias, it is of a neutral nature, as this nature does not contradict the wholesome or unwholesome of the five consciousnesses. If it separately engages with the five consciousnesses, only engaging with the realm of dharmas, since there is no such mind, it is known that those who assert the simultaneous arising of the five consciousnesses and the mind in the Samuccaya-laksana (Compendium of Characteristics) and other texts, as a definite perception, must have the same object. Since that is the case, when the mind associated with the ear consciousness listens to teachings, it only acts as a verifying understanding, and is therefore a definite perception. The mind associated with the five consciousnesses also does not have attachment to dharmas, etc., as evidence of this. Various teachers have different explanations regarding this wisdom, as described in the separate notes. In the stages of the Eighth Ground (of a Bodhisattva), Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), ordinary beings, etc., the three natures of the six consciousnesses can arise and transform together. As the eighth consciousness is associated with the other three natures, this serves as evidence.

Treatise: 'Reaching the state of self-mastery, up to the seeds of discursive thought.'

Commentary: From here onwards, it is shown that in the fruition stage, only the wholesome nature is included. If the transformation of the five consciousnesses, according to the positions explained by the previous two teachers, only the wholesome nature is included, and this only exists in the Buddha. Because it is only of a wholesome nature, otherwise, from the First Ground (of a Bodhisattva) onwards, there would still be unwholesome aspects among the five consciousnesses. From the Eighth Ground (of a Bodhisattva) onwards, there might sometimes be neutral five consciousnesses. Only the Buddha's form and mind are the Truth of the Path, therefore only the wholesome nature is included. Why is this so? Because all seeds of discursive thought have been permanently eliminated. One should carefully examine the text and infer its meaning. In the subsequent wisdom of the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) Arhats (those who have attained the state of no more learning) and Bodhisattvas, what nature of the six consciousnesses arises together? However, I cannot explain it in detail now. Although it is known that the substance of the six consciousnesses encompasses the three natures, among the five consciousnesses, there are those that are obscured, as described in the section on feeling. Among the wholesome, there are those that are naturally born and those that are acquired through effort. Acquired through effort includes hearing, thinking, and cultivating. Considering the five consciousnesses, hearing and thinking do not inherently possess meaning in themselves, but are also accomplished through what they are led by. For example, listening to scriptures, observing the words, and thinking about the meaning of the Dharma, the mind accomplishes hearing and thinking. Are the eyes and ears that are led by this not also hearing?

【English Translation】 'To the co-existence of the three natures.' Commentary: Furthermore, in the state of a distracted mind, following the five consciousnesses, whether it's a single thought or a continuous stream, all three natures can arise together, adopting the meaning of 'taking the longer path'. As described in the separate notes on the two explanations and the fifty-one notes. Then, when the five consciousnesses arise together, the mind follows the strongest object it is focused on, sharing the nature of the five consciousnesses. For example, the mind in meditation is only of a wholesome nature, unlike the spontaneous mind of the ear consciousness, which is neutral. If it simultaneously engages with various objects without bias, it is of a neutral nature, as this nature does not contradict the wholesome or unwholesome of the five consciousnesses. If it separately engages with the five consciousnesses, only engaging with the realm of dharmas, since there is no such mind, it is known that those who assert the simultaneous arising of the five consciousnesses and the mind in the Samuccaya-laksana (Compendium of Characteristics) and other texts, as a definite perception, must have the same object. Since that is the case, when the mind associated with the ear consciousness listens to teachings, it only acts as a verifying understanding, and is therefore a definite perception. The mind associated with the five consciousnesses also does not have attachment to dharmas, etc., as evidence of this. Various teachers have different explanations regarding this wisdom, as described in the separate notes. In the stages of the Eighth Ground (of a Bodhisattva), Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), ordinary beings, etc., the three natures of the six consciousnesses can arise and transform together. As the eighth consciousness is associated with the other three natures, this serves as evidence. Treatise: 'Reaching the state of self-mastery, up to the seeds of discursive thought.' Commentary: From here onwards, it is shown that in the fruition stage, only the wholesome nature is included. If the transformation of the five consciousnesses, according to the positions explained by the previous two teachers, only the wholesome nature is included, and this only exists in the Buddha. Because it is only of a wholesome nature, otherwise, from the First Ground (of a Bodhisattva) onwards, there would still be unwholesome aspects among the five consciousnesses. From the Eighth Ground (of a Bodhisattva) onwards, there might sometimes be neutral five consciousnesses. Only the Buddha's form and mind are the Truth of the Path, therefore only the wholesome nature is included. Why is this so? Because all seeds of discursive thought have been permanently eliminated. One should carefully examine the text and infer its meaning. In the subsequent wisdom of the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) Arhats (those who have attained the state of no more learning) and Bodhisattvas, what nature of the six consciousnesses arises together? However, I cannot explain it in detail now. Although it is known that the substance of the six consciousnesses encompasses the three natures, among the five consciousnesses, there are those that are obscured, as described in the section on feeling. Among the wholesome, there are those that are naturally born and those that are acquired through effort. Acquired through effort includes hearing, thinking, and cultivating. Considering the five consciousnesses, hearing and thinking do not inherently possess meaning in themselves, but are also accomplished through what they are led by. For example, listening to scriptures, observing the words, and thinking about the meaning of the Dharma, the mind accomplishes hearing and thinking. Are the eyes and ears that are led by this not also hearing?

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．思所成。非生得故。香積佛土鼻．舌等識。類此應知。后得智中凈土聽法所生五識。豈非三惠之所成也。成所作智即是修故。所成之言義寬遍也。此等皆由隨意引生故　不善之中有任運．分別。此五皆通。亦許五識通見斷故。此中各有煩惱．所知障並許通。由意引起故。下文自說　無記皆通有覆無記。亦意引故。緣起經說。欲界意識。除潤生愛等亦有有覆性故。四無記中。唯異熟生．威儀．工巧。無變化心。通果可爾。天眼．耳通彼俱惠故。然非變化相從四中變化所攝。五識緣威儀．工巧。不能發威儀．工巧故。如大論第一說五識雖不作轉心發業。亦作隨轉心發業故。即通威儀．工巧．異熟生攝。無變化者八十九雖言欲界有變化。不是五識。實是上界系。據意識中相似者說。或所變化。似欲界故名為欲界。或是生得變化。但是異熟心攝。瑜伽自說是生得變化故。論文自說欲界無變化。色界無工巧。無色又無威儀。即今大乘。亦通五識有威儀．工巧。四識緣威儀。五識緣工巧。若不爾者異熟生攝。不同小乘是威儀類名威儀心。異熟生心寬。威儀心狹。處處皆有文勢皆顯。

次第二頌。解第五相應。第六受俱門。

論。六識與幾心所相應。

述曰。此問起也。

論。頌曰至皆三受相應。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由思慮產生的（智慧），因為它不是天生就有的。香積佛土（Buddhakṣetra of Fragrant Accumulation）的鼻識、舌識等，應該可以此類推。后得智（pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna）中，在凈土（Pure Land）聽法所產生的五識，難道不是由聞、思、修三慧所成就的嗎？成所作智（kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna）即是修習所得，所以『所成』一詞的含義更為寬泛。這些都是由隨意的引導而產生的，所以在不善法中，有任運（spontaneous）和分別（discriminating）兩種。這五識都通達，也允許五識通達見斷（darśana-prahātavya）。這裡面各自都有煩惱障（kleśa-āvaraṇa）和所知障（jñeya-āvaraṇa），並且允許它們通達，因為它們是由意根引起的。下文會自己說明。無記（avyākṛta）都通達有覆無記（sāvṛtāvyākṛta），也是由意根引導的。緣起經（Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra）說，欲界（Kāmadhātu）的意識，除了潤生愛（bhava-tṛṣṇā）等，也有有覆性。在四種無記中，只有異熟生（vipāka-ja）、威儀（iryāpatha）、工巧（nairmāṇika）沒有變化心（nirmāṇa-citta）。通達果報是可以理解的。天眼（divyacakṣus）、天耳（divyaśrotra）都通達，因為它們都屬於智慧。然而，它們不是從四種變化中變化出來的，五識緣威儀、工巧，不能引發威儀、工巧。如《大論》第一卷所說，五識雖然不作轉心發業（pravṛtti-citta），也作隨轉心發業（anuvṛtti-citta）。即通達威儀、工巧、異熟生所攝。沒有變化者，八十九種雖然說欲界有變化，但不是五識，實際上是上界系（ūrdhvāgāmi-dhātu）。根據意識中相似者來說。或者所變化的事物，類似於欲界，所以名為欲界。或者這是天生的變化，但是屬於異熟心所攝。瑜伽行派（Yogācāra）自己說是天生的變化。論文自己說欲界沒有變化，沒有工巧，無色界（Arūpadhātu）又沒有威儀。即現在的大乘（Mahāyāna），也通達五識有威儀、工巧。四識緣威儀，五識緣工巧。如果不是這樣，就是異熟生所攝。不同於小乘（Hīnayāna），是威儀類名威儀心。異熟生心寬泛，威儀心狹窄。處處都有文句顯示這一點。 接下來第二頌，解釋第五相應，第六受俱之門。 論：六識與幾種心所相應？ 述曰：這是提問。 論：頌曰至皆三受相應。

【English Translation】 English version: That which is accomplished by thought, because it is not naturally obtained. The nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, etc., in the Buddhakṣetra of Fragrant Accumulation (Xiangji Fotu), should be understood in a similar way. In post-attainment wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna), are not the five consciousnesses arising from listening to the Dharma in the Pure Land (Jingtu) accomplished by the three wisdoms of hearing, thinking, and cultivation? Accomplishment-wisdom (kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna) is precisely that which is obtained through cultivation, so the meaning of the term 'accomplished' is broader and more comprehensive. All of these arise from intentional guidance, so within unwholesome dharmas, there are both spontaneous (任運) and discriminating (分別) aspects. These five consciousnesses are all pervasive, and it is also accepted that the five consciousnesses penetrate that which is to be abandoned by seeing (darśana-prahātavya). Within these, each has afflictive obstructions (kleśa-āvaraṇa) and cognitive obstructions (jñeya-āvaraṇa), and it is accepted that they penetrate, because they are caused by the mind-basis. The text below will explain this itself. The indeterminate (avyākṛta) all penetrate the obscured-indeterminate (sāvṛtāvyākṛta), also guided by the mind-basis. The Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra says that the consciousness of the desire realm (Kāmadhātu), apart from the love that nourishes rebirth (bhava-tṛṣṇā), also has an obscured nature. Among the four types of indeterminate, only the result of maturation (vipāka-ja), deportment (iryāpatha), and skillful activities (nairmāṇika) lack transformative mind (nirmāṇa-citta). Penetrating the result is understandable. The divine eye (divyacakṣus) and divine ear (divyaśrotra) both penetrate, because they both belong to wisdom. However, they are not transformed from the four transformations. The five consciousnesses, in relation to deportment and skillful activities, cannot initiate deportment and skillful activities. As the first volume of the Mahāyāna-śāstra says, although the five consciousnesses do not create the mind that initiates action (pravṛtti-citta), they also create the mind that follows action (anuvṛtti-citta). That is, they penetrate that which is encompassed by deportment, skillful activities, and the result of maturation. Those without transformation, although it is said that the desire realm has transformation in eighty-nine cases, it is not the five consciousnesses; in reality, it belongs to the upper realm (ūrdhvāgāmi-dhātu). It is spoken of according to those similar in consciousness. Or that which is transformed resembles the desire realm, so it is called the desire realm. Or this is a natural transformation, but it is encompassed by the mind of maturation. The Yogācāra school itself says it is a natural transformation. The text itself says that the desire realm has no transformation, no skillful activities, and the formless realm (Arūpadhātu) has no deportment. That is, the current Mahāyāna also penetrates that the five consciousnesses have deportment and skillful activities. The four consciousnesses are related to deportment, and the five consciousnesses are related to skillful activities. If it were not so, then it would be encompassed by the result of maturation. Different from the Hīnayāna, it is the name of the category of deportment, the mind of deportment. The mind of maturation is broad, and the mind of deportment is narrow. Everywhere, the wording shows this. Next, the second verse explains the fifth association and the sixth feeling-togetherness gate. Treatise: With how many mental factors do the six consciousnesses associate? Commentary: This is the question being raised. Treatise: The verse says to all three feelings are associated.

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述曰。上三句列六位心所總名。下一句正解受俱。

論。曰此六轉識至謂遍行等。

述曰。下文有二。初解心所等頌上三句。后解受俱。初中復二。初總解此心所等上三句意。后別解。此即總也。正解此字。指頌可知。

何名心所。心所何義。

論。恒依心起至故名心所。

述曰。自下別解有二。初解心所二字。后解遍行等義　解心所中復三。初解心所之義。次解行相。后總結之。此即初也　略以三義解心所總名　一恒依心起。心若無心所不生。要心為依方得生故。若爾心望遍行應名心所　二與心相應。彼五說與心相應故。心不與心相應故。又時．依．緣．事四義具故。說名相應。由此色等亦非心所。既爾心具五義。與五相應應名心所　三系屬於心。以心為主。所繫屬之心有自在非所以是義故系屬於心。有此三義故名心所　又初義顯遍行。恒依心故。第二顯餘一切心所。非恒依心。心相應故。第三正解心所之義　又解心王不名為所。不屬心故。由此三義簡別心．色等。不得名心所　又解第一句顯一切心所得名心所。第二句簡一切色等不名心所。第三句顯心所得名為所。以系屬他。以非主故。心不名所　又初句簡無為。不依心起故。第二句簡色．不相應。第三句正解心所得名所以。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：上面三句列出了六位心所（citta-caitta，心理活動）的總名稱。下面一句正式解釋了與『受』（vedanā，感受）俱起。

論：說這六個轉識（vijñāna，意識）乃至遍行（sarvatraga，普遍心理活動）等。

述曰：下面的文字分為兩部分。首先解釋心所等，對應上面的三句頌文。然後解釋與『受』俱起。在第一部分中又分為兩部分。首先總的解釋這些心所等，對應上面三句的含義。然後分別解釋。這裡是總的解釋。正式解釋『此』字，指向頌文就可以知道。

什麼叫做心所？心所是什麼意思？

論：總是依靠心而生起，所以叫做心所。

述曰：從下面開始分別解釋，分為兩部分。首先解釋『心所』這兩個字，然後解釋遍行等的含義。解釋『心所』中又分為三部分。首先解釋『心所』的意義，其次解釋行相（ākāra，狀態），最後總結它。這裡是第一部分。略微用三種意義來解釋『心所』這個總名稱。一、總是依靠心而生起。心如果沒有心所就不會產生。必須以心為依靠才能產生。如果這樣，心對於遍行來說應該叫做心所。二、與心相應。因為五遍行（pañca-sarvatraga，五種普遍心理活動）說是與心相應。心不與心相應。而且時間、所依、緣、事四種意義都具備，所以叫做相應。因此色等不是心所。既然這樣，心具備五種意義，與五種相應，應該叫做心所。三、系屬於心。以心為主。所繫屬的心有自在，不是『所以』的意義，所以系屬於心。因為有這三種意義，所以叫做心所。而且第一種意義顯示了遍行，總是依靠心。第二種意義顯示了其餘一切心所，不是總是依靠心，而是與心相應。第三種意義正式解釋了心所的意義。又解釋心王（citta-rāja，主要意識）不叫做『所』，因為它不屬於心。因為這三種意義，區分了心、色等，不能叫做心所。又解釋第一句顯示了一切心所都得名『心所』。第二句區分了一切色等，不叫做心所。第三句顯示了心所得名『所』，因為它系屬於其他，因為它不是主。心不叫做『所』。又第一句區分了無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma，非因緣和合的法），因為它不依靠心而生起。第二句區分了色等，因為它們不相應。第三句正式解釋了心所得名『所以』。

【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: The above three lines list the general names of the six categories of mental factors (citta-caitta). The following line specifically explains their co-occurrence with 'feeling' (vedanā).

Treatise: Saying that these six consciousnesses (vijñāna), up to pervasive mental factors (sarvatraga), etc.

Commentary: The following text is divided into two parts. First, it explains the mental factors, corresponding to the above three lines of the verse. Then, it explains their co-occurrence with 'feeling'. The first part is further divided into two parts. First, it generally explains the meaning of these mental factors, corresponding to the above three lines. Then, it explains them separately. This is the general explanation. The specific explanation of the word 'this' refers to the verse and can be understood.

What is called a mental factor? What is the meaning of a mental factor?

Treatise: Always arising in dependence on the mind, therefore they are called mental factors.

Commentary: From below, the explanation is divided into two parts. First, it explains the two words 'mental factor', and then it explains the meaning of pervasive mental factors, etc. The explanation of 'mental factor' is further divided into three parts. First, it explains the meaning of 'mental factor', second, it explains its characteristics (ākāra), and finally, it summarizes it. This is the first part. Briefly, it explains the general name 'mental factor' with three meanings. 1. Always arising in dependence on the mind. If the mind does not have mental factors, they will not arise. They must depend on the mind to arise. If so, the mind should be called a mental factor in relation to the pervasive mental factors. 2. Corresponding to the mind. Because the five pervasive mental factors (pañca-sarvatraga) are said to correspond to the mind. The mind does not correspond to the mind. Moreover, the four meanings of time, basis, condition, and object are all present, so it is called correspondence. Therefore, form, etc., are not mental factors. Since this is the case, the mind possesses five meanings and corresponds to the five, so it should be called a mental factor. 3. Belonging to the mind. Taking the mind as the master. The mind to which they belong has autonomy, not the meaning of 'that by which', so they belong to the mind. Because it has these three meanings, it is called a mental factor. Moreover, the first meaning reveals the pervasive mental factors, always depending on the mind. The second meaning reveals all other mental factors, not always depending on the mind, but corresponding to the mind. The third meaning specifically explains the meaning of mental factor. Also, it explains that the mind-king (citta-rāja) is not called 'that which belongs', because it does not belong to the mind. Because of these three meanings, it distinguishes between mind, form, etc., which cannot be called mental factors. Also, it explains that the first sentence reveals that all mental factors are named 'mental factor'. The second sentence distinguishes all forms, etc., which are not called mental factors. The third sentence reveals that mental factors are named 'that which belongs', because they belong to others, because they are not the master. The mind is not called 'that which belongs'. Also, the first sentence distinguishes unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta-dharma), because they do not arise in dependence on the mind. The second sentence distinguishes form, etc., because they do not correspond. The third sentence specifically explains that mental factors are named 'that by which'.

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論。如屬我物立我所名。

述曰。舉喻已顯此亦如是。

何故相應。唯說遍行等屬心。不說心屬於受等耶。為答此問因解第二行相之門與心同異。

論。心於所緣至亦取別相。

述曰。上解心所義。下釋心所等行相。于中有三。一總舉。二引證。三結。心取境之總相。但總取而已。不別分別。如言緣青但總取青不更分別。心所于彼取總．別相故說亦言。

何以心王唯取總相。心所兼取總．別二相。且釋名者。

論。助成心事至作模填彩。

述曰。助成心事名心所故。師謂博士。資謂弟子。如師作模畫形況已弟子填彩彩于模填不離模故。如取總相。著彩色時令媚好出。如亦取別相。心．心所法取境亦爾。

何以知者。

論。故瑜伽說至所取別相。

述曰。上總舉。下引證。彼第三說。識能了別事之總相。不言取別。以是主故。若取別相即心所故。作意了此所未了相。此者即識所取總相。作意取此總相。及亦取識所未了相。未了相者即是別相。即余心所所取之別相。皆識所未了。作意一法。獨能取彼眾多別相。如彼論第三云。即此所未了別能了別者。說名作意。所未了境相即是別相故。能了別者名為作意。能緣別相者即作意也。故知心所取總．別相

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：如果某物屬於我，我就稱它為『我所』（Atman，靈魂，真我）。 述曰：這個比喻已經很清楚地表明瞭這一點。 為什麼會這樣相應呢？為什麼只說遍行等心所（Caitasikas，心所法）屬於心（Citta，意識），而不說心屬於受（Vedana，感受）等呢？爲了回答這個問題，需要解釋第二種行相之門，即心與心所的同異。 論：心對於所緣境（Alambana，對像），也只是取其總相（Samanya-lakshana，共相），並取其差別相（Visesa-lakshana，自相）。 述曰：上面解釋了心所的意義，下面解釋心所等的行相。其中有三點：一是總的舉出，二是引證，三是結論。心取境的總相，只是總的取而已，不作分別。例如說緣青色，只是總的取青色，不再分別。心所對於所緣境，既取總相，也取差別相，所以說『亦』。 為什麼心王（Citta-raja，心，意識）只取總相，而心所兼取總相和差別相呢？先解釋名稱。 論：幫助成就心的作用，就像製作模具和填塗色彩一樣。 述曰：幫助成就心的作用，所以叫做心所。老師好比博士，資助好比弟子。如同老師製作模具，畫出形狀，然後弟子填塗色彩，色彩填塗在模具上，不離開模具。如同取總相。著上色彩時，使之美好而出色。如同也取差別相。心和心所法取境也是這樣。 憑什麼知道呢？ 論：所以《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）說，識（Vijnana，了別）能夠了別事物的總相，沒有說取差別相。 述曰：上面是總的舉出，下面是引證。《瑜伽師地論》第三卷說，識能夠了別事物的總相，沒有說取差別相，因為識是主（Pradhana，主要）。如果取差別相，那就是心所的作用。作意（Manaskara，注意）了別識所未了別的相。這個『此』，就是識所取的總相。作意取這個總相，並且也取識所未了別的相。未了別的相，就是差別相。也就是其餘心所所取的差別相，都是識所未了別的。作意這一法，獨自能夠取彼眾多差別相。如《瑜伽師地論》第三卷說：『即此所未了別能了別者，說名作意。』所未了境相就是差別相，能夠了別者名為作意。能夠緣差別相的就是作意。所以知道心所取總相和差別相。

【English Translation】 English version Treatise: If something belongs to me, I call it 'mine' (Atman, soul, self). Commentary: The analogy already clearly illustrates this point. Why is there such correspondence? Why is it only said that pervasive mental factors (Caitasikas, mental properties) belong to the mind (Citta, consciousness), and not that the mind belongs to feeling (Vedana, sensation) etc.? To answer this question, it is necessary to explain the second aspect of characteristics, namely the similarities and differences between the mind and mental factors. Treatise: The mind, with respect to its object (Alambana, object of perception), only grasps the general characteristic (Samanya-lakshana, common characteristic) and also grasps the specific characteristic (Visesa-lakshana, distinct characteristic). Commentary: Above, the meaning of mental factors is explained; below, the characteristics of mental factors etc. are explained. There are three points: first, a general statement; second, a citation; and third, a conclusion. The mind grasps the general characteristic of an object, only grasping it generally, without making distinctions. For example, when it is said to perceive blue, it only grasps the blue color generally, without further distinguishing. Mental factors, with respect to the object, grasp both the general and specific characteristics, hence the word 'also'. Why does the mind-king (Citta-raja, mind, consciousness) only grasp the general characteristic, while mental factors grasp both the general and specific characteristics? First, explain the names. Treatise: Helping to accomplish the function of the mind is like making a mold and filling it with colors. Commentary: Helping to accomplish the function of the mind is why it is called a mental factor. The teacher is like a professor, and assistance is like a disciple. Just as the teacher makes a mold, drawing the shape, and then the disciple fills it with colors, the colors are filled in the mold, not separate from the mold. It is like grasping the general characteristic. When colors are applied, they make it beautiful and outstanding. It is like also grasping the specific characteristic. The mind and mental factors grasp objects in this way. How is this known? Treatise: Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that consciousness (Vijnana, discrimination) can discriminate the general characteristics of things, but does not say that it grasps the specific characteristics. Commentary: Above is the general statement, below is the citation. The third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that consciousness can discriminate the general characteristics of things, but does not say that it grasps the specific characteristics, because consciousness is the principal (Pradhana, main). If it grasps the specific characteristics, that is the function of mental factors. Attention (Manaskara, attention) discriminates the characteristics that consciousness has not yet discriminated. This 'this' is the general characteristic grasped by consciousness. Attention grasps this general characteristic, and also grasps the characteristics that consciousness has not yet discriminated. The undiscriminated characteristics are the specific characteristics. That is, the specific characteristics grasped by the other mental factors are all undiscriminated by consciousness. Attention alone can grasp those many specific characteristics. As the third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'That which can discriminate what has not yet been discriminated is called attention.' The undiscriminated aspect of the object is the specific characteristic, and that which can discriminate is called attention. That which can cognize the specific characteristic is attention. Therefore, it is known that mental factors grasp both the general and specific characteristics.

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。王唯取總。如一懸令唯知懸之總事。懸承稟命明府。雖為副貳取總相已。后取一切別相。自余懸尉亦取各別之相。此舉作意例余可知。由作意能令心．心所取境功力勝故。有此總取多法別相也。故瑜伽以作意為初。此論以觸為初。和合勝故。各據一義。

論。觸能了此至攝受等相。

述曰。觸能取三。謂可意．不可意．俱相違相。受中攝受等者。等損害．俱相違。此二取相近相順也。

論。想能了此至名心所法。

述曰。言說因相者。謂如前第三卷八識中說。取境分齊相故。謂此是青。非非青等。便起言說。故想之相言說因也　思了正因等者。謂正因．邪因．俱相違等。即是境上正邪等相。業之因也。此中一一如作意說亦取別相。

何以知心所亦取總相。

論。此表心所亦緣總相。

述曰。瑜伽說此言。表心所法亦緣總相故。謂彼論言。又識能了事之總相。即此所未了別所了境相能了別者說名作意。意說作意了此總相及識所未了別相。謂境別相。此境上別相作意亦能了。即是了此識所取總相。亦取所未了別別相故。彼論此言顯取總故。此五遍行如大論說。然楞伽經中。亦言心緣總相等。顯揚十八有頌說此五．及心王取總．別相。

論。余處復說至德失等相。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：譬如長官委任總務，就像只知曉懸掛命令的總務官。懸掛命令承稟于明府（地方長官），即使是副手，也只是先負責總務。之後才處理一切其他事務。其餘的懸尉（下級官員）也各自負責不同的事務。這個例子說明了作意的作用，其餘情況可以依此類推。由於作意能夠增強心和心所對境的認知能力，所以才能總括地把握多種法的不同方面。因此，《瑜伽師地論》以作意為首，而本論以觸為首，是因為和合的作用更為重要。兩者各有側重。

論：觸能夠識別可喜的、不可喜的以及兩者皆非的相。

述記：觸能夠識別三種相，即可喜的、不可喜的以及兩者皆非的相。受中的攝受等，包括損害和兩者皆非。這兩種相的認知是相近且順應的。

論：想能夠識別言說的原因以及名心所法。

述記：言說因相，如前文第三卷八識中所說，是由於對境的分齊相的認知。例如，認知到『這是青色，不是非青色』等，從而產生言說。因此，想的相是言說的原因。思能夠識別正因、邪因以及兩者皆非等，這些是境上的正邪等相，是業的原因。這裡所說的每一種心所，都像作意一樣，也能夠識別不同的相。

如何得知心所也能夠識別總相？

論：這表明心所也緣于總相。

述記：《瑜伽師地論》中的這段話表明，心所法也緣于總相。該論說：『識能夠識別事物的總相，而對於識尚未明確識別的境相，能夠明確識別的就叫做作意。』意思是說，作意能夠識別總相以及識尚未明確識別的境的各個方面，即境的別相。作意也能夠識別境上的別相，也就是說，它能夠識別識所取到的總相，也能夠識別尚未識別的各個方面。該論的這段話表明了作意能夠識別總相。這五種遍行心所，如《大毗婆沙論》所說。然而，《楞伽經》中也說心緣于總相等等。《顯揚聖教論》第十八頌中說，這五種遍行心所以及心王能夠識別總相和別相。

論：其他地方還說到德、失等相。

【English Translation】 English version: For example, a chief clerk is appointed to handle general affairs, just like a chief clerk who only knows about the general matters of posting orders. Posting orders are reported to the magistrate (local official), and even if it is a deputy, they are only responsible for general affairs first. Only then do they handle all other matters. The remaining subordinate officials (lower-ranking officials) are also each responsible for different matters. This example illustrates the function of manaskara (attention), and other situations can be inferred by analogy. Because manaskara can enhance the cognitive ability of the mind and mental factors towards objects, it can comprehensively grasp the different aspects of multiple dharmas. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra begins with manaskara, while this treatise begins with sparsha (contact), because the function of combination is more important. Each has its own emphasis.

Treatise: Sparsha (contact) can recognize the agreeable, the disagreeable, and the mutually contradictory aspects.

Commentary: Sparsha (contact) can recognize three aspects, namely the agreeable, the disagreeable, and the mutually contradictory. 'Reception, etc.' in vedana (feeling) includes harm and the mutually contradictory. The cognition of these two aspects is similar and in accordance.

Treatise: Samjna (perception) can recognize the cause of speech and the mental factors of name.

Commentary: The cause of speech, as mentioned in the eighth consciousness in the third volume, is due to the cognition of the delimiting aspect of the object. For example, recognizing 'This is blue, not non-blue,' etc., thereby generating speech. Therefore, the aspect of samjna (perception) is the cause of speech. Cetanā (volition) can recognize the right cause, the wrong cause, and the mutually contradictory, etc., which are the right and wrong aspects on the object, and are the cause of karma. Each of the mental factors mentioned here, like manaskara (attention), can also recognize different aspects.

How do we know that mental factors can also recognize the general aspect?

Treatise: This indicates that mental factors also cognize the general aspect.

Commentary: This statement in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra indicates that mental factors also cognize the general aspect. The treatise says: 'Consciousness can recognize the general aspect of things, and what can clearly recognize the aspects of objects that consciousness has not yet clearly recognized is called manaskara (attention).' It means that manaskara (attention) can recognize the general aspect and the various aspects of the object that consciousness has not yet clearly recognized, that is, the specific aspects of the object. Manaskara (attention) can also recognize the specific aspects on the object, that is, it can recognize the general aspect taken by consciousness, and it can also recognize the various aspects that have not yet been recognized. This statement in the treatise indicates that manaskara (attention) can recognize the general aspect. These five omnipresent mental factors are as described in the Mahavibhasa. However, the Lankavatara Sutra also says that the mind cognizes the general aspect, etc. The eighteenth verse of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that these five omnipresent mental factors and the mind-king can recognize the general and specific aspects.

Treatise: Other places also mention the aspects of virtue, fault, etc.

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述曰。中邊第一彌勒頌云。總了境名心。亦別名心所。世親解云。心唯總了。心所亦別。非唯總故。是謂心王．心所異相。余文可解。大小乘同。

論。由此于境起善染等。

述曰。子段第三結之。由前十法取總．別故。于境起善十一．染三十二．不定四等。

論。諸心所法至兼取別相。

述曰。第三總結。

上類解頌此心所三字竟。自下第二別解遍行等義　問既言心所名義乃同。有何差別。

論。雖諸心所至種類差別。

述曰。下文有六。一總標。二列位。三結數。四釋名。五會文。六總結。此初也。心所名義雖同。而體一一類各別故。

論。謂遍行有五至不定有四。

述曰。列位也。解下六位上三句頌也。

論。如是六位合五十一。

述曰。結數也。此中開張與對法第一．大論五十三。五十五不同。以開合五見增邪欲解故。此與顯揚．五蘊．百法同也。

論。一切心中至而得生故。

述曰。釋名也　一切心可得。即遍行五。不問何心但起必有故　緣別別境而得生者。五別境也。此意即顯遍性．地等。唯緣別別境界方生。故余不例。如五十五說。於四事中生五別境。如下當知。或俱．不俱。別事生故。

論。唯善心中

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：在《中邊分別論》的第一首彌勒頌中說：『總括了境（vishaya，所緣境）而名為心（citta，心王），也分別地名為心所（caitta，心所有法）。』世親（Vasubandhu）解釋說：『心唯有總括的作用，心所也有分別的作用。』並非只有總括的作用，這就是所謂的心王和心所的差異之處。其餘的文字可以自行理解，大乘和小乘的觀點相同。

論：由此對於所緣境生起善、染等（情緒）。

述曰：子段的第三部分總結說：由於前面的十法（指心王和十種心所法）具有總括和分別的作用，因此對於所緣境會生起善（kusala，十一）、染（klesha，三十二）、不定（aniyata，四）等（情緒）。

論：各種心所法……乃至兼取分別的相。

述曰：第三部分是總結。

上面一類解釋了頌文中的『此心所』三個字完畢。從下面開始第二部分，分別解釋遍行等含義。問：既然說心所的名稱和意義相同，那麼有什麼差別呢？

論：雖然各種心所……乃至種類上的差別。

述曰：下面的文字有六個部分：一是總標，二是列位，三是結數，四是釋名，五是會文，六是總結。這裡是第一個部分。心所的名稱和意義雖然相同，但是它們的體性一一類各不相同。

論：所謂的遍行（sarvatraga）有五種……乃至不定（aniyata）有四種。

述曰：這是列出各個位置。解釋下面六個位置和上面三句頌文。

論：像這樣六個位置合起來共有五十一種。

述曰：這是總結數量。這裡所說的開合與《對法論》第一、《大論》的五十三種、五十五種不同，因為開合了五見（五種邪見），增加了邪欲的解釋。這裡與《顯揚》、《五蘊》、《百法》相同。

論：在一切心中……乃至才能生起，所以稱為遍行。

述曰：這是解釋名稱。一切心中都可以得到，就是遍行五。不論是什麼心，只要生起就一定有它們。緣取個別的境界才能生起，就是五別境（viniyata）。這個意思是顯示遍性、地等。只有緣取個別的境界才會生起，所以其餘的不舉例。如五十五種說法，在四件事中生起五別境，如下面將會知道。或者同時生起，或者不同時生起，因為是不同的事情而生起。

論：唯有善心中……

【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: The first verse of Maitreya's 'Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā' states: 'It generally comprehends the object and is named mind (citta), and is also separately named mental factors (caitta).' Vasubandhu explains: 'The mind only has the function of general comprehension, while mental factors also have the function of distinction.' It is not merely the function of general comprehension; this is the so-called difference between the mind-king and mental factors. The remaining text can be understood on its own; the views of both Mahayana and Hinayana are the same.

Treatise: From this, good, defiled, etc. (emotions) arise in relation to the object.

Commentary: The third part of the subsection concludes: Because the preceding ten dharmas (referring to the mind-king and ten mental factors) have the function of general comprehension and distinction, good (kusala, eleven), defiled (klesha, thirty-two), indeterminate (aniyata, four), etc. (emotions) arise in relation to the object.

Treatise: Various mental factors... up to and including taking separate characteristics.

Commentary: The third part is a conclusion.

The above category explains the three words 'these mental factors' in the verse. From below begins the second part, separately explaining the meanings of pervasive, etc. Question: Since it is said that the names and meanings of mental factors are the same, what is the difference?

Treatise: Although various mental factors... up to the difference in categories.

Commentary: The following text has six parts: first, a general statement; second, a list of positions; third, a conclusion of numbers; fourth, an explanation of names; fifth, a synthesis of texts; and sixth, a conclusion. This is the first part. Although the names and meanings of mental factors are the same, their natures are different in each category.

Treatise: The so-called pervasive (sarvatraga) has five types... up to the indeterminate (aniyata) having four types.

Commentary: This is listing the positions. Explaining the six positions below and the three verses above.

Treatise: In this way, the six positions together total fifty-one.

Commentary: This conclusion of numbers. The opening and closing here differ from the fifty-three and fifty-five types in the first chapter of the 'Abhidharmakośa' and the 'Mahāyāna-samgraha', because the five views (five kinds of wrong views) are opened and closed, and the explanation of evil desire is increased. This is the same as the 'Yogācārabhūmi', 'Skandhaka', and 'Hundred Dharmas'.

Treatise: In all minds... and thus can arise, therefore it is called pervasive.

Commentary: This is explaining the name. Can be obtained in all minds, that is, the five pervasive ones. No matter what mind it is, as long as it arises, it must have them. Only by cognizing separate objects can they arise, that is, the five determinates (viniyata). This meaning shows pervasiveness, ground, etc. Only by cognizing separate objects will they arise, so the rest are not exemplified. As the fifty-five types say, the five determinates arise in four matters, as will be known below. Or they arise simultaneously, or they do not arise simultaneously, because they arise from different matters.

Treatise: Only in good minds...

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至煩攝故。

述曰。十一善法唯善心有。體性根本能生諸惑。即貪等六。

論。唯是。煩惱至皆不定故。

述曰。二十隨惑根本等流。等流者同類所引義。非前後等流也　于善染心皆不定者。即不定四。謂于善．染．無記三性心皆不定故　復說等言。下第七不定中。云于善．染．等皆不定故。彼復有言。非遍心起。非遍地有。總此三門。初門簡唯善．染心所。第二門簡遍行。第三簡別境。此中言等等取餘二門也。

論。然瑜伽論至俱是染故。

述曰。會文有二。如文易知。彼論．此論合開不同。彼論第三合六為五。根本．及隨俱是染故合為一也。

論。復以四一切至及地時俱。

述曰。即彼第三。以四一切辨五位別。謂彼言一切處．一切地．一切時．一切耶　此中解言。謂一切性．及地．時．俱。俱者即一切耶。謂定俱生故。處者三性。三性之處皆得起故。言時者。謂或一切有心皆有。或無始不斷。或緣一切境故總言時。地有二說。一云三界九地。二云有尋等三地。此解為勝。輕安不遍故。性即三性。

論。五中遍行至唯有初二一切。

述曰。一一如彼說。遍行具四。無處無故。別境有初二。不緣一切境。亦非相續。非心有即有。故無時也。又此未必並生無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為它們被煩惱所包含。

解釋：這十一種善法只有在善心中才有。貪等六種煩惱是體性和根本，能夠產生各種迷惑。

論：僅僅是這樣。因為煩惱等在所有情況下都不確定。

解釋：這二十種隨煩惱是根本煩惱的等流（同類相引的意思，不是指前後相續的等流）。對於善心和染心來說，它們都是不確定的。這裡的不確定指的是四種不定法，即對於善、染、無記這三種性質的心來說，它們都是不確定的。再次提到『等』字，是因為在第七種不定法中，說它們對於善、染等都是不確定的。那裡還說，它們不是普遍生起于所有心中，也不是存在於所有層次上。總的來說，這三點，第一點是爲了區分僅僅存在於善心和染心的心所，第二點是爲了區分遍行心所，第三點是爲了區分別境心所。這裡說的『等』字，就是指的其餘兩點。

論：然而，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）認為，根本煩惱和隨煩惱都是染污的。

解釋：對於這段經文的理解有兩種，如字面意思一樣容易理解。《瑜伽師地論》和本論在分類上有所不同。《瑜伽師地論》第三卷將六種根本煩惱合併爲五種，因為根本煩惱和隨煩惱都是染污的，所以合併爲一種。

論：又以四種『一切』來區分五位的不同，即一切處、一切地、一切時、一切耶。

解釋：也就是《瑜伽師地論》第三卷，用四種『一切』來區分五位的不同，即它所說的一切處、一切地、一切時、一切耶。這裡解釋說，即一切性、一切地、一切時、一切俱。『俱』就是指一切耶，意思是說它們一定是同時產生的。『處』指的是三性（善、惡、無記），因為在三性之處都可以生起。『時』指的是，或者一切有心的時候都有，或者無始以來從未間斷，或者緣於一切境界，所以總稱為『時』。『地』有兩種說法，一種說法是三界九地，另一種說法是有尋等三地。后一種解釋更好，因為輕安（Prasrabdhi）不是普遍存在的。『性』就是指三性。

論：五種遍行心所中，只有前兩種具有一切性。

解釋：每一種都如《瑜伽師地論》所說。遍行心所具有四種『一切』，因為沒有不存在的地方。別境心所只有前兩種『一切』，不緣於一切境界，也不是相續不斷的，不是隻要有心就一定有，所以沒有『時』。而且這些心所未必同時產生。

【English Translation】 English version: Because they are encompassed by afflictions.

Explanation: These eleven wholesome dharmas (good qualities) exist only in wholesome minds. The six afflictions, such as greed, are the nature and root, capable of generating various delusions.

Treatise: It is only so. Because afflictions, etc., are all uncertain in all cases.

Explanation: These twenty secondary afflictions are the is equal flow of the root afflictions (meaning that they are attracted by the same kind, not referring to the equal flow of before and after). For wholesome and defiled minds, they are all uncertain. The uncertainty here refers to the four uncertain dharmas, that is, for the minds of the three natures of wholesome, defiled, and neutral, they are all uncertain. The word 'etc.' is mentioned again because in the seventh uncertain dharma, it is said that they are uncertain for wholesome, defiled, etc. It also says there that they do not arise universally in all minds, nor do they exist on all levels. In general, these three points, the first point is to distinguish the mental factors that exist only in wholesome and defiled minds, the second point is to distinguish the pervasive mental factors, and the third point is to distinguish the specific object mental factors. The word 'etc.' here refers to the remaining two points.

Treatise: However, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) considers both root afflictions and secondary afflictions to be defiled.

Explanation: There are two ways to understand this passage, which are as easy to understand as the literal meaning. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and this treatise differ in their classifications. The third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra combines the six root afflictions into five because both root afflictions and secondary afflictions are defiled, so they are combined into one.

Treatise: Furthermore, the differences between the five positions are distinguished by the four 'alls', namely, all places, all grounds, all times, and all yas.

Explanation: That is, the third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, uses the four 'alls' to distinguish the differences between the five positions, that is, what it says is all places, all grounds, all times, and all yas. Here it is explained that is all natures, all grounds, all times, and all together. 'Together' refers to all yas, meaning that they must be produced at the same time. 'Place' refers to the three natures (wholesome, evil, and neutral), because they can all arise in the place of the three natures. 'Time' refers to either having it at all times when there is a mind, or never being interrupted since the beginningless, or being related to all realms, so it is generally called 'time'. There are two theories about 'ground', one theory is the nine grounds of the three realms, and the other theory is the three grounds of searching, etc. The latter explanation is better because ease (Prasrabdhi) is not universal. 'Nature' refers to the three natures.

Treatise: Among the five pervasive mental factors, only the first two have all natures.

Explanation: Each one is as stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The pervasive mental factors have four 'alls' because there is no place where they do not exist. The specific object mental factors have only the first two 'alls', they are not related to all realms, nor are they continuous, and they are not necessarily present as long as there is a mind, so there is no 'time'. Moreover, these mental factors are not necessarily produced at the same time.

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俱。

論。善唯有一至謂。一切性。

述曰。善中地者。如次前說遍三地也。此中輕安不遍欲界。若如初說。從多分或加行等說故　染四皆無亦從多故。如無明．貪等。通三界地。八大隨惑非皆通地及俱　以非皆通地等故。總言非四。依種類而作論故　后四不定通三性故。唯有一也。此所無義應審簡別。

論。由此五位種類差別。

述曰。此總結也。

上來第一解五位三句訖。自下第二解第四句受俱。

論。此六轉識至非二相故。

述曰。于中有二。初解因位受俱。后解果位受俱　因位中有二。初解本頌。后別分別　然此六識非如七．八。體皆易脫。恒不定故。易脫是間斷轉變義。不定是欣．戚舍行互起故。皆通三受所以如文。

論。領順境相至名不苦樂受。

述曰。增上出生名根故局。領納屬己名受故通。領順．違境相。俱適身悅心。俱逼身迫心別也。故成三受。或身及心。俱通適悅。俱逼迫也。

下別分別中有三。初以增減分別。次例攝余門。后辨三受俱義。增減門中從二至五。有二二。兩三。二四。一五。

論。如是三受至唯依心故。

述曰。五識通依色．心二依。意唯依心。五識依心非不共依。色是別依。故言別依。其意唯心。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 俱。（指所有）

論：善唯有一至謂。一切性。

述曰：善中地者。如次前說遍三地也。此中輕安不遍欲界。若如初說。從多分或加行等說故。染四皆無亦從多故。如無明（Avidya，指對實相的無知）．貪等。通三界地。八大隨惑非皆通地及俱。以非皆通地等故。總言非四。依種類而作論故。后四不定通三性故。唯有一也。此所無義應審簡別。

論：由此五位種類差別。

述曰：此總結也。

上來第一解五位三句訖。自下第二解第四句受俱。

論：此六轉識至非二相故。

述曰：于中有二。初解因位受俱。后解果位受俱。因位中有二。初解本頌。后別分別。然此六識非如七．八。體皆易脫。恒不定故。易脫是間斷轉變義。不定是欣．戚舍行互起故。皆通三受所以如文。

論：領順境相至名不苦樂受。

述曰：增上出生名根故局。領納屬己名受故通。領順．違境相。俱適身悅心。俱逼身迫心別也。故成三受。或身及心。俱通適悅。俱逼迫也。

下別分別中有三。初以增減分別。次例攝余門。后辨三受俱義。增減門中從二至五。有二二。兩三。二四。一五。

論：如是三受至唯依心故。

述曰：五識通依色．心二依。意唯依心。五識依心非不共依。色是別依。故言別依。其意唯心。

【English Translation】 English version Together.

Treatise: 'Good' is only one, referring to... all natures.

Commentary: 'Among the good grounds,' as previously stated, pervades the three grounds. Here, tranquility and ease (Prasrabdhi) do not pervade the desire realm (Kama-dhatu). If as initially stated, it is spoken from the perspective of the majority or application, etc. The four defilements are all absent, also due to the majority, such as ignorance (Avidya) and greed, etc., which pervade the three realms. The eight great secondary afflictions do not all pervade the grounds and occur together, because they do not all pervade the grounds, etc. Generally speaking, they are not four. The treatise is based on categories. The latter four are indefinite and pervade the three natures, thus being only one. The meaning of what is absent here should be carefully distinguished.

Treatise: 'Due to these five positions, there are differences in categories.'

Commentary: This is a summary.

The first explanation of the five positions and three phrases is now complete. From here onwards, the second explanation of the fourth phrase, 'feeling together,' begins.

Treatise: 'These six consciousnesses... up to not being two aspects.'

Commentary: There are two parts here. First, explaining 'feeling together' in the causal stage. Second, explaining 'feeling together' in the resultant stage. In the causal stage, there are two parts. First, explaining the original verse. Second, separately distinguishing. However, these six consciousnesses are not like the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, whose substance is easily detached and constantly indefinite. 'Easily detached' means intermittent transformation. 'Indefinite' means that joy, sorrow, and equanimity arise alternately. All pervade the three feelings, so it is as the text says.

Treatise: 'Apprehending the aspect of agreeable objects... is called neither painful nor pleasant feeling.'

Commentary: Arising from enhancement is called 'root,' hence limited. Receiving and accepting belongs to oneself is called 'feeling,' hence general. Apprehending the aspect of agreeable and disagreeable objects, both being comfortable and pleasing to the body and mind, or both being oppressive and distressing to the body and mind, are different. Therefore, three feelings are formed. Or the body and mind both generally experience comfort and pleasure, or both experience oppression and distress.

Below, there are three separate distinctions. First, distinguishing by increase and decrease. Second, exemplifying and including other categories. Third, distinguishing the meaning of 'three feelings together.' In the increase and decrease category, from two to five, there are two twos, two threes, two fours, and one five.

Treatise: 'Thus, these three feelings... only rely on the mind.'

Commentary: The five consciousnesses generally rely on both form and mind. The mind only relies on the mind. The five consciousnesses rely on the mind, but not in a non-common way. Form is a separate reliance, hence it is called 'separate reliance.' The mind only relies on the mind.

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其理可解　又解對法第一。雲集色所依集無色所依。色根相異言別依身。如彼疏解稍有異同。

論。又三皆通至無漏引故。

述曰。一云若憂根．苦根皆能引無漏。無漏所引皆通無漏。受寬根狹。故論說苦受通無漏　一云五根中。唯以苦根于學．無學身中。無漏第六意引生故。或唯后得智中。方起五識精進等故。有苦根假名無漏。然五十七說是無漏。何以知者。彼漏．無漏門作是說故。此苦雖然憂非無漏。雖亦能為無漏加行。仍為未知欲知根性。非無漏引生。不俱起故。非無漏攝。

論。或各分三至非所斷故。

述曰。此準前說五受．三受作論可然。五十七說十四一分見所斷。一分修所斷。謂除信等五．及三無漏。其七色．及命由約不生斷故通見斷。其餘可然。信等善法。依斷緣縛故不說見斷。若互相顯。隨其所應。十二一分修所斷。一分通不斷。謂前六及后六。前六一分非所斷攝。即是已前見道斷中六。謂五受．意根。憂．苦二根亦非斷故。隨順趣向不斷法故假名非斷。體非不斷。以此義準趣向無漏應名無漏。無漏不引論不說之。不可說六中是命根無學身有故。五根亦應爾故不可也。信等五．及初無漏。有漏修斷。無漏是不斷。

論。又學無學非二為三。

述曰。非二。謂非

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 其理可以理解。又解釋對法第一，說的是集合色所依（rupa-asraya，指色蘊所依賴的處所）和集合無色所依（arupa-asraya，指無色蘊所依賴的處所）。色根（rupa-indriya，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五根）的相各不相同，言語表達也不同，都依賴於身體。如同那些疏解所說，稍有異同。

論：又三種（指憂根、苦根、舍根）都通於無漏（anasrava，指沒有煩惱的清凈狀態），因為它們能引發無漏。

述曰：一種說法是，如果憂根（daurmanasya-indriya，指憂愁的感受）、苦根（duhkha-indriya，指痛苦的感受）都能引發無漏，那麼無漏所引發的就都通於無漏。感受的範圍寬泛，根的範圍狹窄。所以論中說苦受（duhkha-vedana，指痛苦的感受）通於無漏。另一種說法是，五根（panca-indriya，指信、精進、念、定、慧五根）中，只有苦根在有學（saiksa，指還在學習的階段）、無學（asiksa，指已經完成學習的階段）的身體中，能由無漏的第六意識（manovijnana，指意識）引發產生。或者只有在后得智（prsthalabdha-jnana，指證得真如后所獲得的智慧）中，才會生起五識（panca-vijnana，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺）的精進等。有苦根可以假名為無漏。然而五十七種說法認為它是無漏。憑什麼知道呢？因為在漏（sasrava，指有煩惱的狀態）、無漏的分類中是這樣說的。這苦根雖然憂愁，但並非無漏。雖然也能作為無漏的加行（prayoga，指為達到某種目的而進行的努力），但仍然是未知欲知根性（ajnata-ajnatavindriya，指想要了解未知事物的根性），並非無漏所引發產生，因為不是同時生起，所以不屬於無漏。

論：或者各自分為三類，直到非所斷故。

述曰：這裡參照前面所說的五受（panca-vedana，指樂、苦、喜、憂、舍五種感受）、三受（tri-vedana，指樂、苦、舍三種感受）來作論述是可以的。五十七種說法認為，十四種中的一部分是見所斷（darshana-heya，指通過見道所斷除的煩惱），一部分是修所斷（bhavana-heya，指通過修道所斷除的煩惱）。所說的除了信等五根（sraddha-indriya，virya-indriya，smrti-indriya，samadhi-indriya，prajna-indriya，指信、精進、念、定、慧五種根）以及三種無漏（tri-anasrava，指三種無漏智）之外，其餘的七種色法（rupa-dharma，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、色、法七種），以及命根（jivitendriya，指維持生命活動的根）由於是不生斷（anutpada-nirodha，指通過不生起而斷除），所以通於見斷。其餘的可以理解。信等善法，依據斷除的因緣束縛，所以不說見斷。如果互相顯現，隨其所應。十二種中的一部分是修所斷，一部分通於不斷。所說的是前六種和后六種。前六種的一部分是非所斷攝（aheya，指不能被斷除的），也就是前面見道斷除中的六種，指的是五受和意根（manas-indriya，指意識的根）。憂根、苦根也不是斷除的對象，因為它們隨順趣向于不斷法，所以假名為非斷。它們的體性並非不斷。以此義類推，趣向無漏的應該名為無漏。無漏不引發，論中沒有說。不可說六種中是命根，無學身中有，所以五根也應該如此，所以是不可以的。信等五根以及最初的無漏，有漏是修所斷，無漏是不斷。

論：又學、無學、非二分為三類。

述曰：非二，指的是既非學也非無學。

【English Translation】 English version: The principle can be understood. Furthermore, the first chapter of Abhidharma explains the collection of rupa-asraya (the place where the form aggregate relies) and the collection of arupa-asraya (the place where the formless aggregate relies). The characteristics of the rupa-indriya (the five sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) are different, and the expressions are different, all relying on the body. As those commentaries say, there are slight differences and similarities.

Treatise: Furthermore, all three (referring to the roots of sorrow, suffering, and equanimity) are connected to the anasrava (the pure state without afflictions) because they can give rise to the anasrava.

Commentary: One explanation is that if the daurmanasya-indriya (the feeling of sorrow) and the duhkha-indriya (the feeling of suffering) can both give rise to the anasrava, then what is given rise to by the anasrava is all connected to the anasrava. The scope of feeling is broad, and the scope of the root is narrow. Therefore, the treatise says that duhkha-vedana (the feeling of suffering) is connected to the anasrava. Another explanation is that among the panca-indriya (the five roots of faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom), only the duhkha-indriya in the body of the saiksa (one who is still learning) and the asiksa (one who has completed learning) can be given rise to by the anasrava sixth consciousness (manovijnana). Or only in the prsthalabdha-jnana (wisdom attained after realization) will the vigor of the five consciousnesses (panca-vijnana) arise. There is a duhkha-indriya that can be nominally called anasrava. However, the fifty-seven kinds of explanations consider it to be anasrava. How do we know this? Because it is said so in the classification of sasrava (the state with afflictions) and anasrava. Although this duhkha-indriya is sorrowful, it is not anasrava. Although it can also serve as an prayoga (effort) for the anasrava, it is still the ajnata-ajnatavindriya (the root of wanting to know the unknown), not given rise to by the anasrava, because it does not arise simultaneously, so it does not belong to the anasrava.

Treatise: Or each is divided into three categories, until 'because it is not to be abandoned'.

Commentary: Here, referring to the previously mentioned panca-vedana (the five feelings of pleasure, pain, joy, sorrow, and equanimity) and tri-vedana (the three feelings of pleasure, pain, and equanimity) to make the argument is acceptable. The fifty-seven kinds of explanations consider that a portion of the fourteen kinds is darshana-heya (to be abandoned by the path of seeing), and a portion is bhavana-heya (to be abandoned by the path of cultivation). What is said, besides the sraddha-indriya, virya-indriya, smrti-indriya, samadhi-indriya, prajna-indriya (the five roots of faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom) and the tri-anasrava (three kinds of non-outflow wisdom), the remaining seven rupa-dharma (the seven forms of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, form, and dharma), and the jivitendriya (the root of maintaining life) because it is anutpada-nirodha (cessation through non-arising), so it is connected to darshana-heya. The rest can be understood. The good dharmas such as faith, according to the conditions of abandonment and bondage, are not said to be darshana-heya. If they manifest each other, it depends on the situation. A portion of the twelve kinds is bhavana-heya, and a portion is connected to non-abandonment. What is said is the first six kinds and the last six kinds. A portion of the first six kinds is aheya (not to be abandoned), which is the six kinds in the previously abandoned path of seeing, referring to the five feelings and the manas-indriya (the root of consciousness). The roots of sorrow and suffering are also not objects of abandonment, because they follow and tend towards non-abandonment dharmas, so they are nominally called non-abandonment. Their nature is not non-abandonment. By analogy, those tending towards the anasrava should be called anasrava. The anasrava does not give rise, and the treatise does not say. It cannot be said that among the six kinds is the jivitendriya, which exists in the body of the asiksa, so the five roots should also be like this, so it is not possible. The five roots such as faith and the initial anasrava, the outflow is to be abandoned by cultivation, and the non-outflow is not to be abandoned.

Treatise: Furthermore, the learned, the unlearned, and the non-two are divided into three categories.

Commentary: Non-two refers to neither learned nor unlearned.

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學．無學。五十七說三受可通無學所攝。彼說隨彼所有根性。隨順彼者即是彼故。憂．苦根並是學。苦根亦無學。一一如彼文。又六十六有諸門。分別學．斷等稍勝勘會。此等諸門雖名同小。法體全別。

論。或總分四至二無記受。

述曰。此長徒義。文易可知。言總分四故無異說。

論。有義三受至是無記故。

述曰。此說有四。一標宗。二指法。三引證。四總結。此初二也　五識皆通有此四性。且為理者。五識俱貪．癡任運起者。嗔不善故此中除之。及第六意識在純苦趣中不發業煩惱。六十七．八等論云謂不發業煩惱。即貪等三。謂癡．慢．愛。修道煩惱一分。及身．邊二見全是無記。

論。彼皆容與苦根相應。

述曰。欲界見道惑等定不善故。此中容與苦受俱故。憂唯二性。故說苦根。

何以為證。

論。瑜伽論說至一切根相應。

述曰。下引證也。五十九說任運生等。如文所引。既言任運即是修道一切煩惱。三受可得。即是三受門明義。一切修道煩惱皆須通三受。若貪．恚．癡三可然。通六識故。慢亦可然。若不通五識身．邊二見。唯在意地。如何與意一切三根相應。彼非憂受。是無記故。既云與三受相應。故惡趣中意有苦受。如下自知。

論。雜集論說至各容分四。

述曰。雜集第四卷初。此非集論是雜集文。欲界煩惱任運起者。能發惡行是不善。所餘不發惡行是無記。身．邊二見及此相應。即修道不發惡行之惑。五十八云俱生薩迦耶見唯無記等。身．邊二見唯不發業與三受俱。非憂是苦。餘三通二性　此五識中如何相狀　今以義準。依緣起經。欲界系貪信所伏故有覆無記。即在意識有覆心后引生五識貪．癡二種。可有此性。如率爾等五心中意是染凈者。意識爾時但起有覆。不可等流五識乃是不善．無覆攝。又非有覆意識不引五識生故。故知五識定有有覆。以此為正應理稍通。故總結云容分四等。

論。或總分五謂苦．樂憂喜舍。

述曰。此門有三。初列五名。次釋開合。后辨處位。此列五名。

論。三中苦樂至相各異故。

述曰。下釋開合。以苦．樂受于身．心各別故。所以者何。謂在五識即楚利逼切。明利適悅。名苦．樂。在意稍．降逼切。如可適悅。名憂．喜受。身．心異相也。

論。由無分別至有差別故。

述曰。又在五識逼迫．適悅俱無分別。名為苦．樂。意有分別逼迫．適悅故是憂．喜。又在五識逼迫．適悅二俱粗重故名苦．樂。在意輕微故名憂．喜。又在意識動勇逼．悅故名憂．喜。在五

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論。《雜集論》說到各容分為四。

述曰。《雜集》第四卷初。此非集論，是《雜集》文。欲界煩惱任運而起者，能引發惡行的是不善，其餘不引發惡行的是無記。身見（Sakkāya-ditthi，認為五蘊和合的身體是「我」的邪見）、邊見（Antagāhika-ditthi，執斷常二邊的邪見）及與此相應的，即修道時不會引發惡行的迷惑。《五十八》說俱生薩迦耶見唯是無記等。身見、邊見唯有不引發業，且與三受（苦受、樂受、舍受）俱起，不是憂受，憂受是苦受。其餘三種受通於二性（善與不善）。這五識中如何顯現相狀？現在以義理推準，依據緣起經，欲界系貪心所伏，所以是有覆無記。即在意識中有覆心后，引生五識的貪、癡二種。可能有這種性質。如率爾等五心中，意是染凈者，意識爾時只起有覆，不可等同五識乃是不善、無覆所攝。又非有覆意識不引生五識的緣故。所以知道五識一定有有覆。以此為正，應道理稍通。所以總結說容分四等。

論。或總分為五，謂苦、樂、憂、喜、舍。

述曰。此門有三。初列五名。次釋開合。后辨處位。此列五名。

論。三中苦樂至於身心相各異故。

述曰。下釋開合。以苦、樂受于身、心各別故。所以者何？謂在五識即楚利逼切，明利適悅，名苦、樂。在意稍降逼切，如可適悅，名憂、喜受。身、心異相也。

論。由無分別至於有差別故。

述曰。又在五識逼迫、適悅俱無分別，名為苦、樂。意有分別逼迫、適悅故是憂、喜。又在五識逼迫、適悅二俱粗重故名苦、樂。在意輕微故名憂、喜。又在意識動勇逼、悅故名憂、喜。在五

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise. The Miscellaneous Collection Treatise speaks of each aspect being divided into four.

Statement: The beginning of the fourth volume of the Miscellaneous Collection. This is not the Collection Treatise, but the text of the Miscellaneous Collection. Desires and afflictions arising spontaneously in the desire realm that can initiate evil actions are unwholesome. The remaining ones that do not initiate evil actions are neutral. The view of self (Sakkāya-ditthi, the false view that the aggregate of the five skandhas is 'I') and the extreme view (Antagāhika-ditthi, the false view of clinging to the extremes of permanence and annihilation) and those associated with them, that is, the delusions that do not initiate evil actions during the path of cultivation. The 'Fifty-eight' says that the innate Sakkāya-ditthi is only neutral, etc. The view of self and the extreme view only do not initiate karma and arise together with the three feelings (suffering, pleasure, and equanimity), not sorrow, sorrow is suffering. The remaining three feelings are common to two natures (wholesome and unwholesome). How do these appearances manifest in the five consciousnesses? Now, based on the meaning, according to the Sutra of Dependent Origination, the desire realm is bound by greed and subdued by faith, so there is covered neutral. That is, after the covered mind in consciousness, the two kinds of greed and ignorance of the five consciousnesses are produced. It may have this nature. For example, in the five minds such as 'at once', the mind is defiled or pure, at that time the consciousness only arises covered, it cannot be equated with the five consciousnesses being unwholesome and uncovered. Moreover, the covered consciousness does not cause the five consciousnesses to arise. Therefore, it is known that the five consciousnesses must have covered. Taking this as correct, the principle should be slightly understood. Therefore, it is concluded that the capacity is divided into four, etc.

Treatise. Or generally divided into five, namely suffering, pleasure, sorrow, joy, and equanimity.

Statement: This section has three parts. First, list the five names. Second, explain the opening and closing. Third, distinguish the positions. This lists the five names.

Treatise. Among the three, suffering and pleasure are different in body and mind.

Statement: The following explains the opening and closing. Because suffering and pleasure are different in body and mind. Why is this so? That is, in the five consciousnesses, it is sharp and pressing, bright and pleasant, called suffering and pleasure. In the mind, it is slightly less pressing, such as being pleasant, called sorrow and joy. The appearances of body and mind are different.

Treatise. Because there is no distinction, there is a difference.

Statement: Also, in the five consciousnesses, there is no distinction between pressing and pleasant, called suffering and pleasure. The mind has distinction between pressing and pleasant, so it is sorrow and joy. Also, in the five consciousnesses, pressing and pleasant are both coarse, so they are called suffering and pleasure. In the mind, they are subtle, so they are called sorrow and joy. Also, in the consciousness, moving and vigorous pressing and pleasant are called sorrow and joy. In the five

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識中但動而不勇故名苦．樂。是二別相　動者粗動。勇者勇躍。

論。不苦不樂至平等轉故。

述曰。翻前三相其義可知。故不分二。以悅．迫受諸地不定故應分別。

論。諸適悅受至恒名為樂。

述曰。下辨處位。初明悅受。復明迫受。欲界。初定隨應皆樂。由前理故。

論。意識相應至悅身心故。

述曰。大乘初．二近分有喜。瑜伽五十七。未至地十一根有喜故　顯揚第二亦然　何以無樂。以彼適悅不遍五根故。但適意識．及身處少分。彼論自言不充遍悅故。五十七中亦爾。如下當知　根本初二名喜．樂者。適悅五根故。由動勇故。複名為喜。欲界可知。五十七．對法第七．顯揚第二等皆同。

論。若在第三至無分別故。

述曰。第三禪中近分．根本二俱有樂。如顯揚第二引經等廣解。以安靜適悅故。無分別適悅故名樂。尤重故名樂。即是在意名樂所以。彼論自說。以喜動勇。第三定悅安靜故是樂。然或有義初二近分有樂．如顯揚第二引經云。根本．近分俱有離生喜樂言故。五根雖無遍悅。何不名樂。五十七說初門顯未至亦有喜．樂等。何故有喜之言即證有喜。有樂之言非證有樂　顯揚論第二云。初二定根本．近分一一皆云有喜．樂故。第三近分亦言有樂。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：識蘊中，『動』表示不平靜，『勇』表示活躍。因為它們不平靜和活躍，所以被稱為『苦』和『樂』。這是兩種不同的相狀，『動』是粗略的動，『勇』是勇猛的躍動。

論：不苦不樂的感受，是因為心處於平等狀態的轉變。

述記：對前面三種感受的解釋，其含義可以理解，所以不再分為兩種。因為悅受和迫受在各個地界並不確定，所以應該加以區分。

論：所有令人感到舒適愉悅的感受，持續不斷地被稱為『樂』。

述記：下面辨別樂的處所和位次。首先說明悅受，然後說明迫受。欲界和初禪（初定）中，相應的感受都是樂，這是因為前面的道理。

論：與意識相應的感受，能使身心感到愉悅，所以是樂。

述記：在大乘的初禪和二禪的近分定中，有喜的感受。《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷說，未至定的十一根也有喜的感受。《顯揚聖教論》第二卷也是這樣說的。為什麼沒有樂的感受呢？因為那裡的適悅感沒有遍及五根，只是適悅于意識和身體的少部分。該論自己說，因為沒有充分的遍悅。第五十七卷中也是這樣。如下面將會知道的。根本定的初禪和二禪被稱為喜和樂，是因為適悅了五根，由於動和勇的緣故，又被稱為喜。欲界的情況可以類推得知。《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷、《對法論》第七卷、《顯揚聖教論》第二卷等都相同。

論：如果在第三禪中，因為沒有分別的緣故，所以是樂。

述記：在第三禪中，近分定和根本定都有樂的感受，如《顯揚聖教論》第二卷引經等廣泛解釋的那樣。因為安靜和適悅的緣故，沒有分別的適悅的緣故，所以稱為樂。特別重要，所以稱為樂。這就是在意念中稱為樂的原因。該論自己說，因為喜是動和勇的，第三禪的悅是安靜的，所以是樂。然而，或者有義理認為，初禪和二禪的近分定也有樂，如《顯揚聖教論》第二卷引經說，根本定和近分定都有離生喜樂的說法。五根雖然沒有遍悅，為什麼不能稱為樂呢？《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷說，初禪的入門顯示未至定也有喜和樂等。為什麼有喜的說法就能證明有喜，而有樂的說法不能證明有樂呢？《顯揚聖教論》第二卷說，初禪和二禪的根本定和近分定都說有喜和樂，第三禪的近分定也說有樂。這裡...

【English Translation】 English version: In the Skandha (aggregate) of consciousness, 'movement' indicates restlessness, and 'courage' indicates activity. Because they are restless and active, they are called 'suffering' (苦, ku) and 'pleasure' (樂, le). These are two distinct characteristics; 'movement' is coarse movement, and 'courage' is vigorous leaping.

Treatise: The feeling of neither suffering nor pleasure is due to the transformation of the mind being in a state of equanimity.

Commentary: The meaning of the explanation of the previous three feelings can be understood, so it is no longer divided into two. Because pleasant feelings and oppressive feelings are not certain in each realm, they should be distinguished.

Treatise: All feelings that are comfortable and pleasant, continuously, are called 'pleasure'.

Commentary: Below, the location and position of pleasure are distinguished. First, pleasant feelings are explained, and then oppressive feelings are explained. In the Desire Realm and the First Dhyana (初定, chuding) (First Concentration), the corresponding feelings are all pleasure, because of the previous reasoning.

Treatise: Feelings that correspond to consciousness can make the body and mind feel pleasant, so it is pleasure.

Commentary: In the Proximate Concentration (近分定, jinfending) of the First and Second Dhyanas in Mahayana, there is a feeling of joy (喜, xi). The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) Volume 57 says that the eleven roots of the Untranscended Realm (未至定, weizhiding) also have the feeling of joy. The Asanga's Compendium of Determinations (顯揚聖教論) Volume 2 also says the same. Why is there no feeling of pleasure? Because the pleasant feeling there does not pervade the five roots, but only pleases the consciousness and a small part of the body. The treatise itself says that it is because there is not enough pervasive pleasure. It is also like this in Volume 57. As will be known below. The First and Second Dhyanas of the Fundamental Concentration (根本定, genbending) are called joy and pleasure because they please the five roots, and because of movement and courage, they are also called joy. The situation in the Desire Realm can be inferred. Yogacarabhumi-sastra Volume 57, Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論) Volume 7, Asanga's Compendium of Determinations Volume 2, etc., are all the same.

Treatise: If it is in the Third Dhyana, because there is no discrimination, it is pleasure.

Commentary: In the Third Dhyana, both the Proximate Concentration and the Fundamental Concentration have the feeling of pleasure, as explained extensively in the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations Volume 2, etc. Because of the quiet and pleasant feeling, and because there is no discriminating pleasant feeling, it is called pleasure. It is particularly important, so it is called pleasure. This is why it is called pleasure in the mind. The treatise itself says that because joy is moving and courageous, and the pleasure of the Third Dhyana is quiet, it is pleasure. However, or there is a meaning that the Proximate Concentration of the First and Second Dhyanas also has pleasure, as the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations Volume 2 quotes the sutra saying that both the Fundamental Concentration and the Proximate Concentration have the saying of joy and pleasure born of detachment. Although the five roots are not pervaded with pleasure, why can't it be called pleasure? Yogacarabhumi-sastra Volume 57 says that the entry point of the First Dhyana shows that the Untranscended Realm also has joy and pleasure, etc. Why can the saying of joy prove that there is joy, but the saying of pleasure cannot prove that there is pleasure? Asanga's Compendium of Determinations Volume 2 says that the Fundamental Concentration and the Proximate Concentration of the First and Second Dhyanas all say that there is joy and pleasure, and the Proximate Concentration of the Third Dhyana also says that there is pleasure. Here...

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說即有。何故初．二近分不令有樂。今解正者非近分中不許有樂。然未至定言十一根者。少故不說。相未明滿故不說之。今此論中同十一根文。下文以此例解地獄有憂之義。亦即苦故。以悅根少但得喜名。以迫心強亦得名苦受。苦受中等。若言樂受．苦受。即通喜．憂。文言寬故。若言苦根者。唯一受也。

論。諸逼迫受至恒名為苦。

述曰。上解悅受。下解迫受。此在五識極明利故。

論。意識俱者至名憂根故。

述曰。此中第一。文有三。一標。二證。三結。此意唯有憂。唯分別故。下引證云。諸聖教說意識相應所有戚受皆名憂故。此長徒義。若言地獄意有苦者。何故不說。

論。瑜伽論說至苦憂相續。

述曰。六十六等論有此文。且舉重者。意尚名憂。例余輕文。彼約五趣辨是異熟。非異熟文　異熟無間。謂初生心。是第八識　苦憂相續。次此後生。彼意唯苦。何故言憂。此師意說。五十七言地獄成八根。定約六識作論。依客受說。五十一等說六識中受名為客受。謂五色根．意．命．或憂。定成就故。余皆間斷。或復取苦。或一形．或二形說。如下自知。若餘三不成現。即喜．樂．舍。此約六識。爾時必無舍受起故。

論。又說地獄至傍生亦爾。

述曰。瑜

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

問：既然說有（樂受），為什麼在初禪和二禪的近分定中不讓人有樂受？

答：現在的解釋是，並非近分定中不允許有樂受，而是因為還沒有達到禪定的十一種根（十一根：眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根、意根、命根、樂根、苦根、喜根、憂根）的程度，所以樂受少而不說，相狀還不明顯和圓滿所以不說。

現在這部論中，和具有十一種根的文義相同。下文用這個例子來解釋地獄有憂愁的含義，也是因為地獄的感受主要是苦，所以悅受少，只能稱為喜；因為逼迫身心的感受強烈，也可以稱為苦受。苦受是中等的。如果說樂受、苦受，就包括了喜和憂，文義比較寬泛。如果說苦根，就只有苦受一種。

論：各種逼迫的感受，一直都叫做苦。

述記：上面解釋悅受，下面解釋逼迫的感受。這是因為在五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）中，感受非常明顯和敏銳的緣故。

論：和意識相應的感受，叫做憂根。

述記：這段經文有三個部分。第一是標示，第二是論證，第三是結論。這個意思是說只有憂，因為只有分別的緣故。下面引用論證說：『各種聖教都說，和意識相應的各種悲慼的感受，都叫做憂。』這是長徒的觀點。如果說地獄的意識中有苦，為什麼不說呢？

論：《瑜伽師地論》說，苦和憂是相續不斷的。

述記：第六十六卷等論中有這段經文。這裡先舉出比較重的感受，意思是說意識尚且可以稱為憂，可以類推其他比較輕微的感受。那裡是就五趣（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）來辨別這是異熟果報，而不是異熟果報的文義。異熟果報是無間斷的，指的是最初生起的心，是第八識（阿賴耶識）。苦和憂是相續不斷的，指的是在此之後生起的。他們的意思是隻有苦，為什麼說憂呢？這位論師的意思是說，《五十七卷》說地獄成就八根，一定是就六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）來作論的，是依據客受來說的。《五十一卷》等說六識中的受叫做客受，指的是五色根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）、意（意識）、命（命根），或者有憂，一定是成就的，其餘的都是間斷的，或者又取苦，或者說一種形、或者兩種形，如下文自會明白。如果其餘三種（喜、樂、舍）沒有現前，就是喜、樂、舍。這是就六識來說的，因為那時一定沒有舍受生起。

論：又說地獄，乃至傍生也是這樣。

述記：《瑜伽師地論》 English version:

Question: Since it is said that there is (pleasant feeling), why are pleasant feelings not allowed in the preliminary stages of the first and second Dhyanas (meditative states)?

Answer: The current explanation is that it is not that pleasant feelings are not allowed in the preliminary stages, but rather that the eleven roots (eleven roots: eye root, ear root, nose root, tongue root, body root, mind root, life root, pleasure root, pain root, joy root, sorrow root) of Dhyana have not yet been attained, so pleasant feelings are few and not mentioned, and their characteristics are not yet clear and complete, so they are not mentioned.

In this treatise, it is the same as the meaning of having eleven roots. The following text uses this example to explain the meaning of sorrow in hell, which is also because the feelings in hell are mainly suffering, so pleasant feelings are few and can only be called joy; because the feelings that oppress the body and mind are strong, they can also be called painful feelings. Painful feelings are moderate. If we talk about pleasant feelings and painful feelings, it includes joy and sorrow, and the meaning of the text is broader. If we talk about the pain root, there is only one kind of painful feeling.

Treatise: All kinds of oppressive feelings are always called suffering.

Commentary: The above explains pleasant feelings, and the following explains oppressive feelings. This is because the feelings are very obvious and sharp in the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness).

Treatise: Feelings associated with consciousness are called the root of sorrow.

Commentary: This passage has three parts. The first is the indication, the second is the proof, and the third is the conclusion. The meaning of this is that there is only sorrow, because there is only discrimination. The following quotes proof: 'All the holy teachings say that all the sad feelings associated with consciousness are called sorrow.' This is the view of the Long Disciples. If it is said that there is suffering in the consciousness of hell, why not say it?

Treatise: The Yoga-bhumi-sastra says that suffering and sorrow are continuous.

Commentary: This passage is in the sixty-sixth volume and other treatises. Here, the heavier feelings are mentioned first, meaning that consciousness can still be called sorrow, and other lighter feelings can be inferred by analogy. There, it is to distinguish this as the result of different maturation based on the five realms (hell, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, gods), not the meaning of the text of different maturation. The result of different maturation is uninterrupted, referring to the first arising mind, which is the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness). Suffering and sorrow are continuous, referring to what arises after this. Their meaning is only suffering, why say sorrow? The meaning of this teacher is that the fifty-seventh volume says that hell achieves eight roots, which must be based on the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness) to make a theory, based on the guest feeling. The fifty-first volume and others say that the feeling in the six consciousnesses is called the guest feeling, referring to the five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), mind (consciousness), life (life root), or there is sorrow, it must be achieved, the rest are intermittent, or take suffering again, or say one form, or two forms, as will be understood later. If the other three (joy, pleasure, equanimity) are not present, it is joy, pleasure, and equanimity. This is based on the six consciousnesses, because there must be no equanimity arising at that time.

Treatise: It is also said that hell, and even animals, are the same.

Commentary: Yoga-bhumi-sastra

【English Translation】 Question: Since it is said that there is (pleasant feeling), why are pleasant feelings not allowed in the preliminary stages of the first and second Dhyanas (meditative states)? Answer: The current explanation is that it is not that pleasant feelings are not allowed in the preliminary stages, but rather that the eleven roots (eleven roots: eye root, ear root, nose root, tongue root, body root, mind root, life root, pleasure root, pain root, joy root, sorrow root) of Dhyana have not yet been attained, so pleasant feelings are few and not mentioned, and their characteristics are not yet clear and complete, so they are not mentioned. In this treatise, it is the same as the meaning of having eleven roots. The following text uses this example to explain the meaning of sorrow in hell, which is also because the feelings in hell are mainly suffering, so pleasant feelings are few and can only be called joy; because the feelings that oppress the body and mind are strong, they can also be called painful feelings. Painful feelings are moderate. If we talk about pleasant feelings and painful feelings, it includes joy and sorrow, and the meaning of the text is broader. If we talk about the pain root, there is only one kind of painful feeling. Treatise: All kinds of oppressive feelings are always called suffering. Commentary: The above explains pleasant feelings, and the following explains oppressive feelings. This is because the feelings are very obvious and sharp in the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness). Treatise: Feelings associated with consciousness are called the root of sorrow. Commentary: This passage has three parts. The first is the indication, the second is the proof, and the third is the conclusion. The meaning of this is that there is only sorrow, because there is only discrimination. The following quotes proof: 'All the holy teachings say that all the sad feelings associated with consciousness are called sorrow.' This is the view of the Long Disciples. If it is said that there is suffering in the consciousness of hell, why not say it? Treatise: The Yoga-bhumi-sastra says that suffering and sorrow are continuous. Commentary: This passage is in the sixty-sixth volume and other treatises. Here, the heavier feelings are mentioned first, meaning that consciousness can still be called sorrow, and other lighter feelings can be inferred by analogy. There, it is to distinguish this as the result of different maturation based on the five realms (hell, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, gods), not the meaning of the text of different maturation. The result of different maturation is uninterrupted, referring to the first arising mind, which is the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness). Suffering and sorrow are continuous, referring to what arises after this. Their meaning is only suffering, why say sorrow? The meaning of this teacher is that the fifty-seventh volume says that hell achieves eight roots, which must be based on the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness) to make a theory, based on the guest feeling. The fifty-first volume and others say that the feeling in the six consciousnesses is called the guest feeling, referring to the five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body), mind (consciousness), life (life root), or there is sorrow, it must be achieved, the rest are intermittent, or take suffering again, or say one form, or two forms, as will be understood later. If the other three (joy, pleasure, equanimity) are not present, it is joy, pleasure, and equanimity. This is based on the six consciousnesses, because there must be no equanimity arising at that time. Treatise: It is also said that hell, and even animals, are the same. Commentary: Yoga-bhumi-sastra

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伽第五五趣分別尋．伺。說地獄中尋．伺憂俱。然彼唯說鬼趣同之不言傍生。六十六有。此中通論故言鬼．傍生也。八十七說憂．苦逼者。謂地獄故。定依客受地獄有憂。

論。故知意地至況余輕者。

述曰。此結也。以意重處例余輕處。重逼尚然。況余輕逼。第一師意　問第六識中舍受。既亦不善業招。何故地獄無舍根　答以苦重故。不善業輕即有舍根。以少靜故。然不同總報。總報相續故。趣體故。報主故。若是苦者。違善趣故。

論。有義通二至有輕重故。

述曰。下護法等第二師說。文中有五。一標宗。二引證。三立理。四會違。五總結　人．天逼迫輕非尤重故。在意唯憂受。鬼．畜處通。若唯苦處。地獄相似。五十七說與地獄同。純受重故。若雜受處。容有喜．樂。況復無憂。雜受輕故。

論。捺落迦中至無分別故。

述曰。其諸地獄一向苦故。唯苦無憂。以迫尤重為苦所逼。亦無分別。以憂分別方得生故　捺落迦者。此云苦器。受罪處也　那落迦者。受彼苦者。故二別也　問無分別故無分別煩惱耶　答曰不然。豈以第三定有樂無分別故。亦無見道見等也。憂即分別。加行分別故。逼迫既極不假分別。

又彼無此分別煩惱亦無妨難。何以知爾。

論。瑜

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 伽第五十五：關於趣（Gati，生命形式）、分別（Vikalpa，區分）和尋·伺（Vitarka-Vicara，粗略和精細的思考）。經中說地獄中的尋·伺伴隨著憂（Dukkha，痛苦）。然而，經中只提到鬼趣（Pretagati，餓鬼道）與此相同，沒有提及傍生（Tiryagyoni，畜生道）。六十六有（Bhava，存在）中，這裡是普遍討論，所以說鬼趣和傍生道。第八十七說被憂和苦逼迫的是地獄，因此可以確定，即使是意地（Manobhumi，意識層面）也承受痛苦，更何況其他較輕的處境呢？ 論：因此可知，意地（Manobhumi，意識層面）尚且如此，更何況其他較輕的處境呢？ 述曰：這是總結。以意地這種嚴重的地方為例，其他較輕的地方就更不用說了。嚴重逼迫尚且如此，何況較輕的逼迫呢？第一位論師的觀點：問：第六識（Manovijnana，意識）中的舍受（Upeksha-vedana，不苦不樂的感受），也是不善業（A-kusala karma，不善的行為）所招感的，為什麼地獄中沒有舍根（Upeksha-indriya，舍受的官能）？答：因為苦太重了。不善業輕微時，才會有舍根，因為有少許平靜。但這不同於總報（Samanya-vipaka，普遍的果報），總報是相續的，是趣的本體，是果報的主體。如果是純粹的苦，就違背了善趣（Sugati，好的生命形式）。 論：有一種觀點認為，（舍受）可以通於二趣（指鬼趣和傍生道），因為（這二趣的逼迫）有輕重之分。 述曰：下面是護法（Dharmapala）等第二位論師的說法。這段文字包含五個部分：一、標明宗旨；二、引用證據；三、建立理由；四、調和矛盾；五、總結。人道和天道的逼迫較輕，不是特別嚴重，所以在意地只有憂受。鬼趣和畜生道則通於（憂受和舍受）。如果只有苦，就類似於地獄。第五十七說（鬼趣和畜生道）與地獄相同，因為純粹承受沉重的痛苦。如果（鬼趣和畜生道）是混合的感受，就可能存在喜受和樂受，更何況沒有憂受呢？因為混合的感受較輕。 論：在那落迦（Naraka，地獄）中，因為總是苦，所以只有苦而沒有憂，因為被極重的痛苦所逼迫，也沒有分別。 述曰：因為所有的地獄都是一向的苦，所以只有苦而沒有憂。因為被極重的痛苦所逼迫，所以也沒有分別。因為憂這種分別才能產生。捺落迦（Naraka）的意思是苦器，是受罪的地方。那落迦（Naraka）的意思是承受那些痛苦的人，所以這兩個詞有所區別。問：因為沒有分別，所以沒有分別煩惱（Vikalpa-klesha，分別產生的煩惱）嗎？答：不是這樣的。難道因為第三禪定（Dhyana，禪定）有樂受而沒有分別，就沒有見道（Darshana-marga，見道的修行）的見等嗎？憂就是分別，是加行（Prayoga，修行）的分別。因為逼迫已經到了極點，所以不需要分別。 而且，在那裡沒有這種分別煩惱也沒有妨礙。為什麼知道是這樣呢？ 論：瑜伽（Yoga，瑜伽經）中說……

【English Translation】 English version Verse 55: On Gati (destiny, life-form), Vikalpa (discrimination), and Vitarka-Vicara (gross and subtle thought). It is said that in hell, Vitarka-Vicara are accompanied by Dukkha (suffering). However, it only mentions that Pretagati (the realm of hungry ghosts) is the same in this regard, without mentioning Tiryagyoni (the animal realm). In the sixty-six Bhavas (existences), this is a general discussion, so it mentions both the realm of hungry ghosts and the animal realm. Verse 87 says that those oppressed by Dukkha and suffering are in hell, so it can be determined that even the Manobhumi (mind-ground, the level of consciousness) experiences suffering, let alone other lighter situations. Treatise: Therefore, it is known that if the Manobhumi (mind-ground, the level of consciousness) is like this, what about other lighter situations? Commentary: This is the conclusion. Taking the severe situation of the Manobhumi as an example, let alone other lighter situations. If severe oppression is like this, what about lighter oppression? The view of the first teacher: Question: Since Upeksha-vedana (equanimity, neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling) in the sixth Vijnana (Manovijnana, consciousness) is also caused by A-kusala karma (unwholesome actions), why is there no Upeksha-indriya (faculty of equanimity) in hell? Answer: Because the suffering is too heavy. Only when A-kusala karma is light will there be Upeksha-indriya, because there is a little tranquility. But this is different from Samanya-vipaka (general retribution), because Samanya-vipaka is continuous, it is the essence of Gati, it is the master of retribution. If it is pure suffering, it goes against Sugati (good destinies). Treatise: One view is that (Upeksha-vedana) can be common to two Gatis (referring to the realm of hungry ghosts and the animal realm), because (the oppression in these two realms) has varying degrees of severity. Commentary: The following is the statement of the second teacher, Dharmapala, etc. This text contains five parts: 1. Stating the purpose; 2. Citing evidence; 3. Establishing reasons; 4. Reconciling contradictions; 5. Conclusion. The oppression in the human and Deva (heavenly) realms is lighter, not particularly severe, so there is only Dukkha-vedana in the Manobhumi. The realm of hungry ghosts and the animal realm are common to (Dukkha-vedana and Upeksha-vedana). If there is only suffering, it is similar to hell. Verse 57 says that (the realm of hungry ghosts and the animal realm) are the same as hell, because they purely endure heavy suffering. If (the realm of hungry ghosts and the animal realm) have mixed feelings, there may be Sukha-vedana (pleasant feeling) and happiness, let alone no Dukkha-vedana? Because mixed feelings are lighter. Treatise: In Naraka (hell), because it is always suffering, there is only suffering and no Dukkha, because it is oppressed by extremely heavy suffering, there is also no Vikalpa (discrimination). Commentary: Because all hells are always suffering, there is only suffering and no Dukkha. Because they are oppressed by extremely heavy suffering, there is also no Vikalpa. Because Dukkha, this kind of Vikalpa, can arise. Naraka means 'vessel of suffering', it is the place of punishment. Naraka means 'those who endure that suffering', so these two words are different. Question: Because there is no Vikalpa, is there no Vikalpa-klesha (afflictions arising from discrimination)? Answer: It is not like that. Is it because the third Dhyana (meditative state) has Sukha-vedana and no Vikalpa, that there is no Darshana-marga (path of seeing) and so on? Dukkha is Vikalpa, it is the Vikalpa of Prayoga (practice). Because the oppression has reached the extreme, there is no need for Vikalpa. Moreover, there is no obstacle to not having this Vikalpa-klesha there. How do we know this is the case? Treatise: The Yoga (Yoga Sutra) says...

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伽論說至廣說如前。

述曰。二引證也。此所引任運生等如前已說。此五十九文。

論。又說俱生至應知亦爾。

述曰。五十八云俱生我見唯無記性。彼文雖無邊見。例必應爾。

論。此俱苦受至非無記故。

述曰。既言三受容皆相應。故非憂受。以非無記故。五十七說一根善．不善。以三性為境。二十二根中。又非余法故。

論。又瑜伽說至傍生亦爾。

述曰。五十七說。問生那落迦成就幾根。答八現．種皆成。除三所餘或成．不成。三約現行不成。種子或成謂般涅槃法。或不成無涅槃法。餘三現行故不成就。種子故成就。一向苦處鬼．畜亦爾。若雜．受．處后三種．現亦成就。現．種俱成八者。五根．意．命為七。三無漏現定不成。種或成不成。有性．無性別故。三定成種。現不成中。喜．樂定不成現。其信等五．男女二根。或現不成。斷善．不斷善。有一．二形別故　前師意。以憂根為第八定成。苦根入．不定中。舍根入三現行不成種定成中。以客舍受彼定無故。此師以舍根入第八。七．八識相應故。苦根入現不定中。以彼苦根受生．命終等。有成．不成時。以憂根入三現不成中。種必有故。是故證此地獄餘三。現行不成種定成就。故知意有苦。鬼．畜一分亦爾。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 伽論說：至於廣說，如前所述。

述曰：這是第二個引證。這裡所引用的任運生等，如前已經說過。這是第五十九條經文。

論：又說，俱生我見（sahaja-ātmadrsti，與生俱來的我見）唯是無記性（avyākrta，非善非惡的性質），應知也是如此。

述曰：第五十八條說，俱生我見唯是無記性。那條經文雖然沒有提到邊見（antagrāha，極端的見解），但依此類推，也必定是如此。

論：此俱苦受（duhkha-vedana，痛苦的感受）等，並非無記的緣故。

述曰：既然說三種感受都可能相應，所以不是憂受（daurmanasya-vedana，憂愁的感受），因為它不是無記的緣故。第五十七條說，一個根可以是善或不善，以三種性質為境界。在二十二根中，又不是其餘的法，所以如此。

論：又《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）說，乃至傍生（tiryak，畜生）也是如此。

述曰：第五十七條說，問：生在那落迦（naraka，地獄）的眾生，成就幾種根？答：八種現行和種子都成就。除了三種，其餘的或者成就，或者不成就。三種是就現行來說不成就，種子或者成就，指的是般涅槃法（parinirvana-dharma，趨向涅槃的法）。或者不成就，指的是沒有涅槃法的。其餘三種因為是現行，所以不成就。因為是種子，所以成就。一向處於苦處的鬼和畜生也是如此。如果雜、受、處后三種，現行也成就。現行和種子都成就的八種是：五根（pañcendriya，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）、意根（manendriya，意識）、命根（jīvitendriya，生命力）為七種。三種無漏現定不成就，種子或者成就或者不成就，因為有性和無性的區別。三種定成就種子，現行不成就中，喜定（prīti-samādhi，喜悅的禪定）、樂定（sukha-samādhi，快樂的禪定）不成就現行。其中的信等五根、男女二根，或者現行不成就，斷善、不斷善，有一形、二形的區別。前師的觀點，以憂根為第八種定成就。苦根進入不定中。舍根（upekṣā-indriya，舍受）進入三種現行不成就的種子定成就中，因為客舍受彼定沒有的緣故。此師以舍根進入第八，因為與七、八識相應。苦根進入現不定中，因為那裡的苦根受生、命終等，有成就、不成就的時候。以憂根進入三種現行不成就中，種子必定有。所以證明此地獄其餘三種，現行不成就種子定成就。所以知道意根有苦。鬼、畜一部分也是如此。

【English Translation】 English version: The Gāthā says: As for the extensive explanation, it is as previously stated.

Commentary: This is the second citation. The spontaneous arising, etc., cited here have been discussed before. This is the fifty-ninth text.

Treatise: It is also said that the innate view of self (sahaja-ātmadrsti) is only of an indeterminate nature (avyākrta); it should be understood that it is also the same.

Commentary: The fifty-eighth text says that the innate view of self is only of an indeterminate nature. Although that text does not mention extreme views (antagrāha), it must necessarily be the same by analogy.

Treatise: This co-occurring painful feeling (duhkha-vedana), etc., is not of an indeterminate nature.

Commentary: Since it is said that all three feelings can correspond, it is therefore not sorrowful feeling (daurmanasya-vedana), because it is not of an indeterminate nature. The fifty-seventh text says that a root can be either wholesome or unwholesome, taking the three natures as its object. Among the twenty-two roots, it is not other dharmas, so it is like this.

Treatise: Moreover, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that even animals (tiryak) are the same.

Commentary: The fifty-seventh text says: Question: How many roots are accomplished by beings born in Naraka (hell)? Answer: Eight are accomplished in both manifestation and seed form. Except for three, the rest are either accomplished or not accomplished. The three are not accomplished in manifestation; the seeds are either accomplished, referring to the dharma of approaching Nirvana (parinirvana-dharma), or not accomplished, referring to those without the dharma of Nirvana. The remaining three are not accomplished because they are manifest. They are accomplished because they are seeds. Ghosts and animals who are always in suffering are also the same. If the latter three of mixed, feeling, and place, the manifestation is also accomplished. The eight that are accomplished in both manifestation and seed form are: the five roots (pañcendriya) (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body), the mind root (manendriya), and the life root (jīvitendriya), making seven. The three undefiled manifest concentrations are not accomplished; the seeds are either accomplished or not accomplished, because of the distinction between having the nature and not having the nature. The three concentrations accomplish the seeds; among those not accomplished in manifestation, the concentration of joy (prīti-samādhi) and the concentration of happiness (sukha-samādhi) are not accomplished in manifestation. Among them, the five roots of faith, etc., and the two roots of male and female, are either not accomplished in manifestation, whether they have cut off wholesome roots or not, and whether they have one or two forms. The former teacher's view is that the root of sorrow is the eighth that is accomplished in concentration. The root of suffering enters into the indeterminate. The root of equanimity (upekṣā-indriya) enters into the seeds of the three that are not accomplished in manifestation, because the guest equanimity is not present in that concentration. This teacher considers the root of equanimity to enter into the eighth, because it corresponds to the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. The root of suffering enters into the indeterminate in manifestation, because the root of suffering there, such as birth and death, has times of accomplishment and non-accomplishment. The root of sorrow enters into the three that are not accomplished in manifestation, because the seeds are certainly present. Therefore, it proves that the remaining three of this hell are not accomplished in manifestation, but the seeds are accomplished in concentration. Therefore, it is known that the mind root has suffering. A portion of ghosts and animals are also the same.

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論。餘三定是至現行舍故。

述曰。三立理有四。一申難。二反詰。三更徴。四總結。此初也　餘三。定是憂．喜等。所以者何。以彼定有七．八二識相續不斷。定成現舍受。又非無苦故。

論。豈不客舍彼定不成。

述曰。二返詰。此前師問。此辨六識故無客舍。不約八識作法為論。不爾餘三即無法故。若言喜．樂更取一形。以無二形故者。豈鬼．畜中亦無二形者。又地獄何故不許有二形也。故彼三無兼取客舍。

論。寧知彼文唯說客受。

述曰。三更徴有三。一乘前徴。二別生徴。三舉例徴。下初也。后師返問。所說舍受現定不成。汝依何道理知是客受。

前師云。五十一說地獄全．一分鬼．畜名一向苦。不苦樂受為純苦。映奪略而不論。是故知者。

論。應不說彼至有時無故。

述曰。汝以受依容受為論。亦約容受所依識故。如彼六識有時無故不成意根。其六轉識生．死．悶絕諸位不行。

若彼救言意依主意。受依容說。

論。不應彼論至無異因故。

述曰。不應瑜伽受中唯說容受。意中通說主識。主識即第八。以第八識必受俱故。無異所以別作論故。

論。又若彼論至定成八根。

述曰。下別生徴。且縱汝言依容

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：其餘三種（憂、喜、舍）一定是至現行舍受的緣故。

述曰：對於三種立理有四個步驟：一是提出疑問，二是反駁詰問，三是進一步徵詢，四是總結。這是第一個步驟。其餘三種，一定是憂、喜等。為什麼呢？因為那些禪定有第七、第八識相續不斷，禪定成就現行的舍受。又不是沒有苦受的緣故。

論：難道客舍（指非定中所生之受）在那些禪定中不能成立嗎？

述曰：這是第二個步驟，反駁詰問。這是之前的論師提出的問題。這裡辨析的是第六識，所以沒有客舍。不以第八識作為法來討論。不然的話，其餘三種（憂、喜、舍）就沒有法了。如果說喜、樂可以再取一種形，因為沒有兩種形，那麼難道鬼、畜中也沒有兩種形嗎？又地獄為什麼不允許有兩種形呢？所以那三種（憂、喜、舍）沒有兼取客舍。

論：憑什麼知道那段經文只是說客受（非定中所生之受）？

述曰：這是第三個步驟，進一步徵詢，有三種：一是承接前面的徵詢，二是另外產生徵詢，三是舉例徵詢。這是第一個。後來的論師反問，所說的舍受現定不能成立，你依據什麼道理知道那是客受？

之前的論師說：五十一卷說地獄全部、一部分鬼、畜名為一向苦。不苦不樂受為純苦，映襯掩蓋而略而不論。因此知道的。

論：不應該說那些（六識），因為有時沒有的緣故。

述曰：你以受依附於容受（所容納之物）來討論，也是依據容受所依附的識。比如那六識有時沒有的緣故，不能成為意根（manas）。那六轉識在生、死、悶絕等狀態下不行。

如果對方辯解說，意根（manas）依附於主意（主要的意），受依附於容受來說。

論：不應該在那篇論述中只說容受，沒有其他原因的緣故。

述曰：不應該在《瑜伽師地論》的受中只說容受，而在意中通說主識。主識就是第八識（阿賴耶識 alaya-vijnana），因為第八識必定與受俱生。沒有其他原因而另外作論的緣故。

論：又如果那篇論述中說，禪定成就八根。

述曰：這是另外產生徵詢。且縱容你的說法，依附於容受。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: The remaining three (sorrow, joy, equanimity) must be due to the present equanimity.

Commentary: There are four steps in establishing the principle of the three: first, raising a question; second, refuting the question; third, further inquiry; and fourth, summarizing. This is the first step. The remaining three are definitely sorrow, joy, etc. Why? Because those samadhis (meditative states) have the seventh and eighth consciousnesses continuously flowing without interruption, and the samadhi achieves the present equanimity. Moreover, it is not without suffering.

Treatise: Could it be that guest reception (referring to feelings not arising from samadhi) cannot be established in those samadhis?

Commentary: This is the second step, refuting the question. This is the question raised by the previous teacher. Here, the analysis is of the sixth consciousness, so there is no guest reception. It does not discuss the eighth consciousness as a dharma. Otherwise, the remaining three (sorrow, joy, equanimity) would have no dharma. If it is said that joy and pleasure can take another form, because there are no two forms, then do ghosts and animals also not have two forms? And why are two forms not allowed in hell? Therefore, those three (sorrow, joy, equanimity) do not concurrently take guest reception.

Treatise: How do you know that the scripture only speaks of guest reception (feelings not arising from samadhi)?

Commentary: This is the third step, further inquiry, which has three types: first, continuing the previous inquiry; second, raising a separate inquiry; and third, giving an example. This is the first. The later teacher asks in return, the equanimity said to be present in samadhi cannot be established, according to what principle do you know that it is guest reception?

The previous teacher said: Volume 51 says that all of hell, and a portion of ghosts and animals, are called exclusively suffering. Neither suffering nor pleasure is purely suffering, overshadowing and omitting discussion. Therefore, it is known.

Treatise: It should not be said that those (six consciousnesses) sometimes do not exist.

Commentary: You are discussing based on feeling relying on reception (that which is received), also based on the consciousness that reception relies on. For example, those six consciousnesses sometimes do not exist, so they cannot become the manas (mind). Those six transforming consciousnesses do not function in the states of birth, death, fainting, etc.

If the other party argues that the manas (mind) relies on the main intention (the primary intention), and feeling relies on reception to explain.

Treatise: It should not be that in that treatise only reception is mentioned, without other reasons.

Commentary: It should not be that in the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (瑜伽師地論) on feeling, only reception is mentioned, while in intention, the main consciousness is generally discussed. The main consciousness is the eighth consciousness (alaya-vijnana 阿賴耶識), because the eighth consciousness must arise together with feeling. There is no other reason for making a separate treatise.

Treatise: Also, if that treatise says that samadhi achieves the eight roots.

Commentary: This is raising a separate inquiry. And indulging your statement, relying on reception.

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受說。如何說地獄定成八根。第八者何。

論。若謂五識至寧有憂根。

述曰。彼若救言五識間斷無苦定成。但說憂根為其第八。今難之云。若生．死．悶絕三時。如何有憂根。此時意識亦定無故。故知定成第七．八意根及與舍受。若彼師言不云生．死二位。彼時無容識故。今者據有容識已去憂必相續非謂生．死。汝若爾者。等活地獄亦有悶絕無心之時。意識何處有。設前師言彼即死位。更不別有悶絕之時意識間斷。至下當解。

論。有執苦根至亦同此破。

述曰。汝設若以身識等定相續。以苦根為第八者。如憂間斷何處定成。又若爾者。彼更憂根何須間斷。更無別義意識間斷五識相續故。又意無舍受。非易起受故　今解此中有苦師意。必定無憂。以苦為不定。意中苦受即約容受許亦間斷。

論。設執一形至容無形故。

述曰。隨何男．女以為第八。故定成者。理亦不然。形不定故。今言生彼定則成就。且如男根非生彼已定皆成就。其鬼．畜等又惡業招。容無形故。無文遮故。

問化生如瑜伽論第二說或具諸根。或復不具。何故地獄定有五根。不許男．女隨一定有。

論。彼由惡業至於彼何用。

述曰。彼惡業故。令彼有情五根之中皆受苦故。所以定成。必

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：您所說的地獄中必定成就的八根是什麼？第八根是什麼？

答：如果認為五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）至多隻有憂根，

解釋：如果他們辯解說五識是間斷的，沒有苦，所以必定成就。但說憂根是第八根。現在反駁說，在出生、死亡、昏迷這三種情況下，怎麼會有憂根呢？因為此時意識也必定沒有。所以知道必定成就的是第七末那識、第八阿賴耶識以及舍受。如果那位老師說不包括出生、死亡這兩種狀態，因為那時沒有容納識的空間。現在是根據有容納識的情況來說，憂必定相續，不是指出生、死亡。如果你們這樣說，那麼等活地獄也有昏迷無心的時候，意識在哪裡呢？如果之前的老師說那就是死亡的狀態，沒有另外的昏迷的時候，意識間斷。下文會解釋。

答：有人執著苦根必定相續，也用同樣的道理來反駁。

解釋：你們假設身識等必定相續，以苦根作為第八根，就像憂根間斷一樣，在哪裡必定成就呢？而且如果這樣，他們更需要憂根，何必間斷呢？沒有別的意義，意識間斷，五識相續。而且意沒有舍受，不容易生起受。現在解釋這裡有苦的老師的觀點，必定沒有憂，以苦為不定。意中的苦受是就容納來說，允許也是間斷的。

答：假設執著男根或女根中的一種作為第八根，所以必定成就，這個道理也是不成立的，因為形是不定的。

解釋：無論男根還是女根，認為是第八根，所以必定成就，這個道理也是不成立的。因為形是不定的。現在說生到那裡必定成就。比如男根，不是生到那裡就必定成就。那些鬼、畜等，又是惡業招感，可能沒有形。沒有經文禁止。

問：化生，如《瑜伽師地論》第二卷所說，或者具有諸根，或者不具有。為什麼地獄必定有五根，不允許男根、女根隨一定有？

答：因為他們的惡業，使那些有情在五根之中都感受痛苦，所以必定成就。

解釋：因為他們的惡業，使那些有情在五根之中都感受痛苦，所以必定成就。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: What are the eight roots that you say are definitely established in hell? What is the eighth?

Answer: If you say that the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) at most only have the root of sorrow,

Explanation: If they argue that the five consciousnesses are intermittent and there is no suffering, so it is definitely established. But saying that the root of sorrow is the eighth. Now refute it by saying, how can there be a root of sorrow in the three situations of birth, death, and fainting? Because at this time, consciousness is also definitely absent. Therefore, it is known that what is definitely established is the seventh manas consciousness, the eighth alaya consciousness, and neutral sensation. If that teacher says that it does not include the two states of birth and death, because there is no space to accommodate consciousness at that time. Now it is based on the situation where there is space to accommodate consciousness, sorrow must continue, not referring to birth and death. If you say this, then there are also times of fainting and unconsciousness in the Sañjīva Hell (等活地獄), where is consciousness then? If the previous teacher says that that is the state of death, there is no other time of fainting, consciousness is intermittent. It will be explained below.

Answer: Some people insist that the root of suffering is definitely continuous, and the same reasoning is used to refute it.

Explanation: You assume that body consciousness, etc., are definitely continuous, and take the root of suffering as the eighth root, just like the root of sorrow is intermittent, where is it definitely established? And if so, they need the root of sorrow even more, why interrupt it? There is no other meaning, consciousness is intermittent, the five consciousnesses are continuous. Moreover, the mind does not have neutral sensation, it is not easy to arise sensation. Now explain the view of the teacher who has suffering here, there is definitely no sorrow, taking suffering as uncertain. The suffering sensation in the mind is in terms of accommodation, allowing it to be intermittent as well.

Answer: Assuming that one of the male or female organs is insisted upon as the eighth root, so it is definitely established, this reasoning is also not valid, because the form is uncertain.

Explanation: Whether it is the male or female organ, thinking it is the eighth root, so it is definitely established, this reasoning is also not valid. Because the form is uncertain. Now it is said that being born there is definitely established. For example, the male organ, it is not that being born there is definitely established. Those ghosts, animals, etc., are also caused by evil karma, and may not have form. There is no sutra prohibiting it.

Question: Transformation birth, as stated in the second volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), either has all the roots, or does not have them. Why must hell have five roots, and not allow the male or female organ to be definitely present?

Answer: Because of their evil karma, those sentient beings all experience suffering among the five roots, so it is definitely established.

Explanation: Because of their evil karma, those sentient beings all experience suffering among the five roots, so it is definitely established.

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令有男．女根于彼何用。非男．女根處能受苦故。

論。非於無間至淫慾事故。

述曰。非於彼中可有淫事故。或無根。小地獄中可有此貪故。又若以為緣故令其受苦須彼一形者。即應一切定成二形。或復應彼一有情身罪極重者。有百千形令多。為彼受苦緣故。

論。由斯第八至舍相應故。

述曰。故彼第八定是舍根。以七．八識彼定有故。

若彼救言意識定恒有彼憂受無舍受故。據起意已后必相續。彼文無妨者。難云。

論。如極樂地至無有憂根。

述曰。下舉例徴　意悅名樂無有喜根。即第三定。應極苦處意迫名苦無有憂根。故憂非有　問后師有第六識。此俱舍受彼處有不　答有亦無妨。對法等說真于末位與舍俱故。或說無亦無妨。

論。故餘三言定憂喜樂。

述曰。四總結彼三法種成現不成。

若彼唯苦。何故世親攝論第三。說純苦處有等流樂耶。

論。余處說彼至名純苦故。

述曰。四會違有三。此會攝論。應知彼論隨小乘中薩婆多等說。若依大乘解彼文云。或彼通說餘二趣雜受處有等流樂。非極苦地獄中有等流樂。彼無異熟樂。名純苦處故。又彼無異熟有等流樂。此名純苦一切皆無。

會通文。

論。然諸聖教至

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果（地獄中）有男人和女人，那麼男女的性器官在那裡有什麼用呢？因為不是男女的性器官的地方也能感受到痛苦。

答：論中說，（男女根）不是爲了無間地獄中的性慾之事。

述記解釋：不是說在地獄中可能有性慾之事。或者說，即使沒有性器官，在小地獄中也可能有這種貪慾。又如果認為需要性器官這種形體才能承受痛苦，那麼就應該一切都變成雙性，或者說，罪孽極其深重的有情，應該有成百上千的形體，以便更多地承受痛苦。

論中說：因此，第八識（阿賴耶識）一定是與舍受相應的。

述記解釋：所以說，第八識一定是舍受，因為第七識（末那識）和第八識一定存在於那裡。

如果有人辯解說，意識一定是恒常存在的，並且只有憂受而沒有舍受，因為在生起意念之後一定會相續不斷，那麼這段經文就沒有妨礙。對此，可以反駁說：

論中說：就像極樂世界沒有憂根一樣。

述記解釋：下面舉例說明，意念愉悅叫做樂，沒有喜根，就像第三禪定一樣。應該說，在極其痛苦的地方，意念逼迫叫做苦，沒有憂根，所以憂受不是一定存在的。問：後來的論師認為有第六識（意識），那麼這種俱舍受在那裡存在嗎？答：存在也沒有妨礙。《對法》等論典說，真正的舍受在最後階段與舍俱生。或者說，說沒有也沒有妨礙。

論中說：所以其餘三種說法一定是憂、喜、樂。

述記解釋：總結這三種法，種子的狀態是成還是不成。

如果那裡只有苦，為什麼世親（Vasubandhu）在《攝論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第三品中說，純粹是苦的地方也有等流樂（nisyanda-sukha）呢？

論中說：其他地方說那裡叫做純粹是苦的地方。

述記解釋：解釋這種矛盾有三種方式。這裡解釋《攝論》。應該知道那部論是隨順小乘中的薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins）等說的。如果按照大乘來解釋那段經文，可以說，或者那是通俗的說法，指其餘二趣（地獄趣除外）雜受之處有等流樂，而不是極苦的地獄中有等流樂。那裡沒有異熟樂（vipaka-sukha），所以叫做純粹是苦的地方。又或者那裡沒有異熟樂，但有等流樂，這裡叫做純粹是苦，一切都沒有。

會通文。

論中說：然而，各種聖教……

【English Translation】 English version: Question: If there are men and women (in hell), what is the use of male and female sexual organs there? Because suffering can be felt even in places without male and female sexual organs.

Answer: The treatise says that (sexual organs) are not for the sake of sexual desire in Avici Hell (Avici - uninterrupted hell).

Commentary: It is not to say that there may be sexual desire in hell. Or, even without sexual organs, there may be such greed in small hells. Also, if it is thought that a physical form with sexual organs is needed to endure suffering, then everything should become hermaphroditic, or those sentient beings with extremely heavy sins should have hundreds or thousands of forms in order to endure more suffering.

The treatise says: Therefore, the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) must be associated with neutral feeling (upekṣā).

Commentary: So, the eighth consciousness must be neutral feeling, because the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñāna) and the eighth consciousness must exist there.

If someone argues that consciousness must be constant, and there is only sorrowful feeling (duhkha) without neutral feeling, because it will continue uninterrupted after the arising of intention, then this passage is not an obstacle. In response, it can be argued:

The treatise says: Just like the Land of Ultimate Bliss (Sukhavati) has no root of sorrow.

Commentary: The following example illustrates that pleasant thought is called happiness, and there is no root of joy, just like the third Dhyana (third level of meditative absorption). It should be said that in extremely painful places, oppressive thought is called suffering, and there is no root of sorrow, so sorrowful feeling is not necessarily present. Question: Later masters believe that there is a sixth consciousness (consciousness), so does this feeling of Kosa (Abhidharmakośa) exist there? Answer: Its existence is not an obstacle. The Abhidharma (Buddhist texts) and other treatises say that true neutral feeling arises together with neutral feeling in the final stage. Or, saying that it does not exist is also not an obstacle.

The treatise says: Therefore, the remaining three statements must be sorrow, joy, and happiness.

Commentary: Summarizing these three dharmas, whether the state of the seeds is accomplished or not.

If there is only suffering there, why does Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu) say in the third chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Abhidharmasamuccaya) that there is also outflowing happiness (nisyanda-sukha) in places that are purely suffering?

The treatise says: Other places say that place is called a purely suffering place.

Commentary: There are three ways to explain this contradiction. Here, the Abhidharmasamuccaya is explained. It should be known that that treatise follows the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins) and others in Hinayana (Hinayana). If that passage is interpreted according to Mahayana (Mahayana), it can be said that it is either a common saying, referring to the places of mixed feelings in the other two realms (excluding the hell realm), where there is outflowing happiness, but not in the extremely painful hells. There is no resultant happiness (vipaka-sukha) there, so it is called a purely suffering place. Or, there is no resultant happiness there, but there is outflowing happiness, and this is called purely suffering, where nothing exists.

Explanation of reconciliation.

The treatise says: However, all the holy teachings...

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無相違過。

述曰。又對法第七等。說真于意識與憂相應等　意戚名憂者。依多分說。即人天趣全．鬼畜趣少分故。或隨小乘薩婆多等。說在意識嗔憂俱故。瑜伽五十九說。彼五十八相應者。依隨轉門．或粗相說。若細分別。一切見道惑通在意。一切俱生。通三受故。故不相違　若爾六十六說地獄亦有食。唯長喜．樂名食。何故言彼處無樂也　答假相故名食。非實是食。

論。瑜伽論說至亦依隨轉門。

述曰。下會六十六　有憂苦者。第一解。亦隨轉。謂大眾部等諸識並生苦．憂相續。隨彼部也。或依上座部。彼計由異熟果而生故。此中言異熟無間也。即是無性第二。上座九心隨彼說也　大論第五尋．伺憂俱者。依經部師門。謂經部尋．伺唯在意識。然地獄中意唯憂受故。亦隨轉門　或依彌沙塞部。彼亦有異熟意識生故。

問彼六十六說諸趣中。何故不隨他語。唯地獄等耳也。故今應解。

論。又彼苦根至假說為憂。

述曰。彼地獄等苦根。意識俱者。與余雜受處．及人天中憂根相似。亦在意識逼迫受故。說彼苦根為憂。實非憂受。

問若爾第三定樂。似餘地意識中喜。應名喜根。為決此疑更今應解。

論。或彼苦根至而亦名憂。

述曰。彼地獄等苦根。通

【現代漢語翻譯】 無相違過。

述曰。又對法第七等。說真于意識與憂相應等　意戚名憂者。依多分說。即人天趣全．鬼畜趣少分故。或隨小乘薩婆多等（Sarvastivadins）。說在意識嗔憂俱故。瑜伽五十九說。彼五十八相應者。依隨轉門．或粗相說。若細分別。一切見道惑通在意。一切俱生。通三受故。故不相違　若爾六十六說地獄亦有食。唯長喜．樂名食。何故言彼處無樂也　答假相故名食。非實是食。

論。瑜伽論說至亦依隨轉門。

述曰。下會六十六　有憂苦者。第一解。亦隨轉。謂大眾部等諸識並生苦．憂相續。隨彼部也。或依上座部。彼計由異熟果而生故。此中言異熟無間也。即是無性第二。上座九心隨彼說也　大論第五尋．伺憂俱者。依經部師門。謂經部尋．伺唯在意識。然地獄中意唯憂受故。亦隨轉門　或依彌沙塞部。彼亦有異熟意識生故。

問彼六十六說諸趣中。何故不隨他語。唯地獄等耳也。故今應解。

論。又彼苦根至假說為憂。

述曰。彼地獄等苦根。意識俱者。與余雜受處．及人天中憂根相似。亦在意識逼迫受故。說彼苦根為憂。實非憂受。

問若爾第三定樂。似餘地意識中喜。應名喜根。為決此疑更今應解。

論。或彼苦根至而亦名憂。

述曰。彼地獄等苦根。通

【English Translation】 No contradiction.

Statement: Furthermore, the seventh section of Abhidharma (對法) and others state that truth corresponds to consciousness and sorrow. 'Mental distress is called sorrow' is mostly said in accordance with the fact that it fully exists in the realms of humans and gods, and partially in the realms of ghosts and animals. Or, following the Sarvastivadins (薩婆多等) of the Hinayana (小乘), it is said to exist in consciousness along with anger and sorrow. Chapter 59 of the Yogacara (瑜伽) states that the 58 corresponding factors are based on the aspect of following transformation or coarse appearance. If analyzed in detail, all delusions of the path of seeing (見道) are connected to the mind, and all innate factors are connected to the three feelings. Therefore, there is no contradiction. If so, why does section 66 state that there is also food in hell, and only prolonged joy and pleasure are called food, when it is said that there is no pleasure there? Answer: It is nominally called food due to a false appearance, but it is not actually food.

Treatise: The Yogacara (瑜伽) treatise states that it also depends on the aspect of following transformation.

Statement: The following reconciles section 66. For those with sorrow and suffering, the first explanation is also based on following transformation. This means that in schools like the Mahasanghika (大眾部), multiple consciousnesses arise simultaneously with continuous suffering and sorrow, following that school. Or, based on the Theravada (上座部), they believe it arises from the result of differentiated maturation (異熟果), hence the statement here of immediate differentiated maturation. This refers to the second aspect of non-self-nature. The nine minds of the Theravada (上座) follow that explanation. The fifth chapter of the Great Treatise states that seeking and examining are accompanied by sorrow, based on the perspective of the Sautrantika (經部) masters. This means that in the Sautrantika (經部), seeking and examining only exist in consciousness, but in hell, the mind only experiences sorrow. This also depends on the aspect of following transformation. Or, based on the Mahisasaka (彌沙塞) school, they also have consciousness arising from differentiated maturation (異熟).

Question: Why does section 66 only follow the language of others regarding hell and so on, among all the realms? Therefore, it should be explained now.

Treatise: Furthermore, that root of suffering is falsely called sorrow.

Statement: That root of suffering in hell and so on, which is associated with consciousness, is similar to the root of sorrow in other mixed feeling places and in the realms of humans and gods. It is also said that the root of suffering is sorrow because it is experienced as oppressive in consciousness, but it is not actually the feeling of sorrow.

Question: If so, the pleasure of the third dhyana (第三定), which is similar to joy in the consciousness of other realms, should be called the root of joy. To resolve this doubt, it should be explained now.

Treatise: Or, that root of suffering is also called sorrow.

Statement: That root of suffering in hell and so on, generally

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能損身．心故。雖苦根攝而亦名憂。

論。如近分喜至具顯此義。

述曰。初．二近分地中喜受益身．心故。雖喜根攝而亦名樂。此說在何處。顯揚第二論具說此義。謂彼論云。如經說所謂離生喜樂之所滋潤。乃至廣說。是謂初．二靜慮近分等。五十七．對法第七皆與彼同。故復言等。豈為有樂言便近分有樂受。

有亦何爽。

論。然未至地至十一根故。

述曰。地法無故。五十七說彼唯有十一根。彼自言有喜無樂故。十一根者。謂信等五．二無漏．意．喜．舍。即苦名憂。義說為二。即喜名樂二義說之也。

論。由此應知至亦苦根攝。

述曰。五總結也。故知意戚受在純苦處亦名苦根。亦余時意戚受憂故。若地獄中無樂等者。如何彼得有段食耶。以生喜．樂方成食故。六十六等。約余趣處生喜．樂方名食。如大論第四等說。地獄中腑藏間風以為段食。資養于身但令不壞相續名食。生其舍受非謂要生喜．樂。喜．樂者通雜受處語。下第七卷更有異釋。應引彼文。

論。此等聖教至故不繁述。

述曰。此下第二例余門也。此中聖教差別多門者。即明三．五受多門。謂有報．無報．界地系．何地斷等名曰多門。恐有繁廣故略應止。

論。有義六識至無相違

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：能損害身心，所以即使屬於苦根，也稱為憂。

論：如近分喜至具顯此義。

述曰：初、二近分地中喜能使身心受益，所以即使屬於喜根，也稱為樂。這在何處說明？《顯揚》第二論詳細說明了這個意義。該論說：『如經中所說，所謂由離生喜樂所滋潤』，乃至廣說。這就是初、二靜慮近分等。《對法》第五十七也與此相同，所以說『等』。難道因為有樂這個詞，就說近分有樂受嗎？

有，又有什麼妨礙呢？

論：然而未至地只有十一根。

述曰：因為地法沒有。第五十七說那裡只有十一根。那裡自己說有喜沒有樂。十一根是：信等五根、二無漏根、意根、喜根、舍根。苦即名為憂，從意義上說分為二。喜即名為樂，也是從意義上說的。

論：由此可知，至也屬於苦根。

述曰：這是第五個總結。所以知道意戚受在純苦之處也稱為苦根。也因為其餘時候意戚受是憂。如果地獄中沒有樂等，那麼他們如何能有段食呢？因為產生喜樂才能成為食物。第六十六等，是說其餘趣處產生喜樂才稱為食，如《大論》第四等所說，地獄中腑臟間的風作為段食，滋養身體只是爲了不壞相續，這稱為食。產生舍受，不是說一定要產生喜樂。喜樂是通於雜受之處說的。下第七卷還有不同的解釋，應該引用那裡的文字。

論：這些聖教，所以不繁述。

述曰：這是下面的第二個例子，類推其餘方面。這裡聖教差別有很多方面，即說明三受、五受有很多方面。如有報、無報、界地系、何地斷等，稱為很多方面。恐怕過於繁瑣，所以應該省略。

論：有義，六識沒有相違。

【English Translation】 English version: It can harm body and mind, so even though it belongs to the root of suffering (苦根, kǔ gēn), it is also called sorrow (憂, yōu).

Treatise: Such as the joy near the division (近分喜, jìnfēn xǐ) to fully manifest this meaning.

Commentary: The joy in the first and second near division grounds (初．二近分地, chū. èr jìnfēn dì) benefits body and mind, so even though it belongs to the root of joy (喜根, xǐ gēn), it is also called pleasure (樂, lè). Where is this explained? The second treatise of the Xianyang (顯揚, Xiǎnyáng) explains this meaning in detail. That treatise says: 'As the sutra says, so-called nourished by joy and pleasure born of detachment (離生喜樂, lí shēng xǐ lè)', and so on. This is the first and second dhyana (靜慮, jìnglǜ) near division, etc. The fifty-seventh of Abhidharma (對法, Duìfǎ) seventh is the same as that, so it says 'etc.'. Is it because there is the word 'pleasure' that the near division has pleasure reception?

Having, what harm is there?

Treatise: However, the not-yet-arrived ground (未至地, wèizhì dì) has eleven roots.

Commentary: Because the ground dharma (地法, dìfǎ) is not there. The fifty-seventh says that there are only eleven roots there. It itself says that there is joy but no pleasure. The eleven roots are: the five roots of faith (信, xìn) etc., the two unconditioned roots (無漏根, wúlòu gēn), the mind root (意根, yì gēn), the joy root (喜根, xǐ gēn), and the equanimity root (舍根, shě gēn). Suffering is called sorrow, and from the meaning, it is divided into two. Joy is called pleasure, and it is also said from the meaning.

Treatise: From this, it should be known that 'to' (至, zhì) also belongs to the root of suffering.

Commentary: This is the fifth conclusion. So know that mental distress reception (意戚受, yì qī shòu) in the place of pure suffering is also called the root of suffering. Also because at other times mental distress reception is sorrow. If there is no pleasure etc. in hell, then how can they have solid food (段食, duànshí)? Because the arising of joy and pleasure becomes food. The sixty-sixth etc. is saying that in other realms, the arising of joy and pleasure is called food, as the fourth etc. of the Great Treatise (大論, Dàlùn) says, the wind between the internal organs in hell is taken as solid food, nourishing the body only to prevent it from decaying and continuing, this is called food. The arising of equanimity reception (舍受, shě shòu) does not necessarily mean that joy and pleasure must arise. Joy and pleasure are said to be common to places of mixed reception. There is a different explanation in the seventh volume below, and that text should be quoted.

Treatise: These holy teachings, therefore, are not described in detail.

Commentary: This is the second example below, analogizing to other aspects. Here, there are many aspects of difference in the holy teachings, that is, explaining that there are many aspects of the three receptions (三受, sān shòu) and five receptions (五受, wǔ shòu). Such as having retribution (有報, yǒu bào), not having retribution (無報, wú bào), realm-ground bound (界地系, jiè dì xì), which ground is severed (何地斷, hé dì duàn), etc., are called many aspects. Fearing that it would be too cumbersome, it should be omitted.

Treatise: Some say that the six consciousnesses (六識, liùshí) are not contradictory.

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過。

述曰。于中有三。一舉。二證。三會　第六識三受俱．不俱門。初師所說同三性中初引文解。如彼可知。余文可解。

第二師云。

論。有義六識至五受同故。

述曰。此亦同前引六十三文證三性俱。定中通喜．樂受。率爾耳識但舍受故。

論。于偏注境至三受容俱。

述曰。此中所說一切義意。餘二偏注。不偏注等。皆如前說。由斯理故三受容俱。即以五十一．顯揚第一．十七等證。此亦有二師。一五識一念。二相續。一一如前三性中敘　此約因位。

論。得自在位至憂苦事故。

述曰。此中果位。謂成佛時。或轉得無漏初地即得。唯樂．喜．舍。如五十七苦通無漏。以順無漏法無漏引生名為無漏。非斷漏名無漏。故佛無苦。又佛六識三受並通。第六識以第三定有無漏樂故。五識唯有樂．舍無喜。雖有漏三識唯二地。然無漏五識。即依色界四地有。彼有所依五根故。文易可知故不須釋　問無色界有無漏眼根耶　答有。如淚下如雨。即有定眼依處。非實有根。故知有也。色界上三定有無漏五識。以此為例　問八地皆有無漏八識耶　答有　若爾何故第七．八無漏唯舍相應耶　答常處第四靜慮故。一類無變故。非易脫故。喜．樂受易脫。非一類任運故。餘地雖有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

述曰：此中有三部分。一、提出觀點。二、提供證據。三、總結歸納。關於第六識同時具有或不具有三種感受的問題，第一位論師的觀點與三性中的觀點相同，最初引用經文進行解釋，如前文所述。其餘部分容易理解。

第二位論師說：

論：有觀點認為，第六識乃至五識，因為五種感受相同。

述曰：這也與之前引用的第六十三條經文相同，用以證明三種性質同時存在。在禪定中，普遍存在喜受和樂受。而率爾的耳識只有舍受。

論：在偏重於觀察的境界中，三種感受可以同時存在。

述曰：這裡所說的一切意義，如其餘二種偏重觀察、不偏重觀察等，都如前文所述。因為這個道理，三種感受可以同時存在。即以第五十一、顯揚第一、第十七等經文來證明。這裡也有兩位論師的觀點。一是五識在一念之間，二是五識相續存在。一一如前文三性中所述。這是從因位的角度來說。

論：在獲得自在的果位，乃至憂苦的事情。

述曰：這是從果位的角度來說，指的是成佛的時候，或者轉為無漏的初地時就能獲得。只有樂受、喜受和舍受。如第五十七條所說，苦受通於無漏，因為順應無漏法，無漏法引生，所以稱為無漏。並非斷除煩惱才稱為無漏。所以佛沒有苦受。而且佛的第六識三種感受都具備。第六識因為第三禪定中有無漏的樂受。五識只有樂受和舍受，沒有喜受。雖然有漏的三識只有二地，但是無漏的五識，是依於四禪地而有。因為那裡有所依的五根。經文容易理解，所以不需要解釋。問：無色界是否有無漏的眼根？答：有。如淚水落下如雨水，即有禪定之眼所依之處，並非實際有眼根。因此可知有。色界上三禪定有無漏的五識，以此為例。問：八地都有無漏的八識嗎？答：有。如果這樣，為什麼第七識和第八識的無漏都只與舍受相應呢？答：因為它們常處於第四禪定中，屬於同一類，沒有變化。不容易脫離。喜受和樂受容易脫離，不是同一類任運而生。其餘的禪地雖然有。

【English Translation】 English version:

Statement: There are three parts to this. First, raising the point. Second, providing evidence. Third, summarizing and concluding. Regarding the question of whether the sixth consciousness simultaneously possesses or does not possess three kinds of feelings, the first teacher's view is the same as that in the Three Natures, initially explaining by quoting scriptures, as mentioned earlier. The rest is easy to understand.

The second teacher says:

Treatise: Some argue that the sixth consciousness, and even the five consciousnesses, are the same because the five feelings are the same.

Statement: This is also the same as the sixty-third scripture quoted earlier, used to prove that the three natures exist simultaneously. In meditation, joy and pleasure are common. But the spontaneous ear consciousness only has neutral feeling.

Treatise: In the realm of focused observation, the three feelings can exist simultaneously.

Statement: All the meanings stated here, such as the other two types of focused observation, non-focused observation, etc., are as mentioned earlier. Because of this reason, the three feelings can exist simultaneously. That is, it is proved by scriptures such as the fifty-first, the first of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), and the seventeenth. There are also two teachers' views here. One is that the five consciousnesses are in one thought, and the other is that the five consciousnesses exist continuously. Each is as described in the previous Three Natures. This is from the perspective of the causal stage.

Treatise: In the state of attaining freedom, even the matter of sorrow and suffering.

Statement: This is from the perspective of the fruition stage, referring to the time of attaining Buddhahood, or when transforming into the uncontaminated first ground. There are only pleasure, joy, and neutral feeling. As stated in the fifty-seventh, suffering is common to the uncontaminated, because it conforms to the uncontaminated Dharma, and the uncontaminated Dharma arises, so it is called uncontaminated. It is not called uncontaminated only by cutting off afflictions. Therefore, the Buddha has no suffering. Moreover, the Buddha's sixth consciousness possesses all three feelings. The sixth consciousness has uncontaminated pleasure because of the third dhyāna (meditative absorption). The five consciousnesses only have pleasure and neutral feeling, and no joy. Although the contaminated three consciousnesses only have two grounds, the uncontaminated five consciousnesses are based on the four dhyāna grounds. Because there are five roots on which to rely. The scriptures are easy to understand, so there is no need to explain. Question: Does the arūpadhātu (formless realm) have uncontaminated eye roots? Answer: Yes. Like tears falling like rain, there is a place for the eye of meditation to rely on, not an actual eye root. Therefore, it can be known to exist. The upper three dhyānas of the rūpadhātu (form realm) have uncontaminated five consciousnesses, taking this as an example. Question: Do all eight grounds have uncontaminated eight consciousnesses? Answer: Yes. If so, why are the uncontaminated seventh and eighth consciousnesses only associated with neutral feeling? Answer: Because they are always in the fourth dhyāna, belonging to the same category, without change. It is not easy to escape. Joy and pleasure are easy to escape, not arising from the same category of spontaneous action. The remaining dhyāna grounds, although they have.

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而不現前。如無色界見道傍修。有種非彼現行。或唯第四定有第七．八。以彼邊際功德勝故。七．八二識功德依故。大悲．天住等並多第四定故。或唯五識在初定。以有有漏三識故。尋．伺上無故。有漏既爾無漏翻之　三識可爾。何得有鼻．舌二識。彼無因故。如不變為香。香因闕故　不然。小乘不變香。色界無種故。大乘具變境。亦有香．味故。鼻．舌識亦有　問初禪無鼻．舌。無漏即言有。以上無三識。無漏應言有　答一云。初禪無二識。有餘三識故。類餘二識有。上地五識本來無。無彼種類。如何有　又四靜慮皆有五識。但佛多起第四定者。以殊勝故　又解唯第四定有。如七．八識。此中三解任情取之　上來已解六識六門一差別．二體性．三行相．四三性．五相應．六三受說　無漏八識應束為義幾師所說。

成唯識論述記卷第五(末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

成唯識論述記卷第六(本)

沙門基撰

論。前所略標至彼差別相。

述曰。自下重解六位心所。于中有二。初標所說總勸教興。次隨解釋。此即初也　就解釋中大文有二。初以五頌別顯心所。后總料簡心所與心為一為異。就此初中分為五段。初一頌辨二位。次一頌辨善位。次半頌辨煩

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 而不現前。例如沒有見道（見諦之道）傍修（輔助修行）。有種子並非彼現行（當下生起）。或者只有第四禪定有第七識（末那識）、第八識（阿賴耶識）。因為第四禪定的邊際功德殊勝的緣故。第七識、第八識是功德所依之處的緣故。大悲（大慈悲）、天住（梵天所住之處）等大多是第四禪定的緣故。或者只有前五識在初禪。因為有有漏的三識的緣故。尋（粗略的思考）、伺（精細的思考）在更高的禪定中沒有的緣故。有漏既然如此，無漏就反過來。三識可以這樣說。為什麼會有鼻識、舌識這兩種識？因為它們沒有原因。例如不變為香，因為香的因緣缺失的緣故。不然。小乘不變香，因為沒有種子的緣故。大乘具有變現境界的能力，也有香、味，所以鼻識、舌識也有。問：初禪沒有鼻、舌，無漏就說有。以上沒有三識，無漏應該說有。答：一種說法是，初禪沒有兩種識，有其餘三種識的緣故。類似於其餘兩種識有。上地五識本來就沒有，沒有它們的種類，怎麼會有？又，四靜慮（四禪定）都有五識，但佛陀大多起于第四禪定，因為第四禪定殊勝的緣故。又一種解釋是隻有第四禪定有，如同第七識、第八識。這裡三種解釋任憑選擇。上面已經解釋了六識的六門：一、差別，二、體性，三、行相，四、三性，五、相應，六、三受。無漏的八識應該歸納為幾個義理，是幾位論師所說的？

《成唯識論述記》卷第五（末） 大正藏第43冊 No. 1830 《成唯識論述記》

《成唯識論述記》卷第六（本） 沙門基 撰

論：前面所略微標出的，到彼差別相。

述曰：從下面重新解釋六位心所。其中有二：首先標出所說的內容，總的勸導教化，引發興趣；其次是隨文解釋。這裡是第一部分。在解釋中，大的方面有二：首先用五頌分別顯示心所；然後總的料簡心所與心是一還是異。這裡是第一部分，分為五段。第一頌辨別二位，第二頌辨別善位，第三個半頌辨別煩

【English Translation】 English version: And not manifest. For example, without seeing the Path (the path of seeing truth) auxiliary practice. Having a seed that is not its present manifestation (arising in the moment). Or only the fourth Dhyana (meditative absorption) has the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana), and the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana). Because the marginal merits of the fourth Dhyana are supreme. The seventh and eighth consciousnesses are the basis of merit. Great compassion (Maha-karuna), the abode of the gods (Brahma's abode), etc., are mostly in the fourth Dhyana. Or only the first five consciousnesses are in the first Dhyana. Because there are three consciousnesses with outflows (asravas). Coarse thought (vitarka) and subtle thought (vicara) are not present in higher Dhyanas. Since it is with outflows, the opposite is true for without outflows. The three consciousnesses can be said this way. Why are there nose consciousness and tongue consciousness? Because they have no cause. For example, not transforming into fragrance, because the cause of fragrance is lacking. Not so. The Hinayana (Small Vehicle) does not transform fragrance, because there is no seed. The Mahayana (Great Vehicle) has the ability to transform realms, and also has fragrance and taste, so there are also nose consciousness and tongue consciousness. Question: The first Dhyana has no nose and tongue, but it is said to have them without outflows. Above, there are no three consciousnesses, so it should be said to have them without outflows. Answer: One explanation is that the first Dhyana has no two consciousnesses, but has the remaining three consciousnesses. Similar to the other two consciousnesses having them. The five consciousnesses of the higher realms originally do not exist, and there is no category of them, so how can they exist? Also, the four Dhyanas (meditative absorptions) all have the five consciousnesses, but the Buddha mostly arises in the fourth Dhyana because the fourth Dhyana is supreme. Another explanation is that only the fourth Dhyana has them, like the seventh and eighth consciousnesses. Choose any of these three explanations. The above has explained the six doors of the six consciousnesses: 1. Difference, 2. Essence, 3. Characteristics, 4. Three natures, 5. Correspondence, 6. Three feelings. The eight consciousnesses without outflows should be summarized into how many meanings, and by how many teachers is this said?

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only, Volume 5 (End) T43, No. 1830, Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only, Volume 6 (Beginning) Composed by the Shramana (Buddhist monk) Kui Ji

Treatise: What was briefly outlined earlier, up to the differences.

Commentary: From below, the six categories of mental factors are re-explained. There are two parts: first, the content is outlined, and general exhortation and teaching are given to arouse interest; second, the explanation follows the text. This is the first part. In the explanation, there are two major aspects: first, the mental factors are shown separately using five verses; then, it is generally considered whether the mental factors and the mind are one or different. This is the first part, divided into five sections. The first verse distinguishes the two categories, the second verse distinguishes the wholesome category, and the third half-verse distinguishes the afflictive

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惱位。次二頌辨隨煩惱位。後半頌辨不定位　以一頌辨二位中。有二。初問起論端。后隨問答。

論。且初二位其相云何。

述曰。即初問也。

論。頌曰至所緣事不同。

述曰。下第二段別答所問。初一句頌顯明初位。前本識中已辨其相。今略標之。下三句頌。釋第二位。于中有二。上二句顯第二位名。下一句釋別境義。下長行中。準頌所明分為二段。解遍行中有二。初總解頌初句。后釋遍行之義。

論。曰六位中初至如前廣說。

述曰。此即總釋頌中初句。今解初字及觸等字。此五遍行自性．作業。前第三卷第八識中已廣解訖。彼卷所言遍行之義后當說者。今此說之。

論。此遍行相云何應知。

述曰。下有三。初問。次答。后結。釋頌所言遍行之義。初薩婆多等問但五遍。經部師等問有實五以為遍行。

論。聖教正理為定量故。

述曰。下答有二。初總。次別。此即總答。由教及理二門知故。

論。此中教者至四是遍行。

述曰。即是別答。初教答。后理答。瑜伽五十六卷亦引此經破經部等。大小共許。即阿含經。前者亦言起盡經也。此是初經。何故此中但說四者舉觸為依。如前第三云。瑜伽何故唯說觸與受．想．思三法為依。舉

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 惱位（Nao Wei，煩惱的位置）。接下來用兩句頌詞辨析隨煩惱位（Sui Fan Nao Wei，伴隨煩惱的位置）。後半句頌詞辨析不定位（Bu Ding Wei，不確定的位置）。用一句頌詞辨析這兩個位置。其中分為兩部分。首先提問以開啟討論，然後是隨後的問答。

論：且說最初的兩個位置，它們的相狀是怎樣的？

述曰：這就是最初的提問。

論：頌詞說……直到所緣事不同。

述曰：下面第二段分別回答所問。第一句頌詞顯明最初的位置。之前在第八識中已經辨析過它的相狀，現在略微標示一下。下面三句頌詞，解釋第二個位置。其中分為兩部分。上面兩句顯明第二個位置的名稱，下一句解釋別境（Bie Jing，特殊的境界）的含義。下面的長行中，按照頌詞所闡明的分為兩段。解釋遍行（Bian Xing，普遍執行）中有兩部分。首先總的解釋頌詞的第一句，然後解釋遍行的含義。

論：說六個位置中最初的……如同之前廣泛的解說。

述曰：這便是總的解釋頌詞中的第一句。現在解釋『初』字以及觸（Chu，接觸）等字。這五個遍行的自性、作用，之前在第三卷第八識中已經廣泛的解釋完畢。那一卷所說的遍行的含義之後應當說明的，現在在這裡說明。

論：這遍行的相狀應當如何理解？

述曰：下面有三部分。首先提問，然後回答，最後總結。解釋頌詞所說的遍行的含義。最初薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）等提問只有五個遍行。經部師（Sautrantika，經量部）等提問有真實的五個作為遍行。

論：聖教（Sheng Jiao，神聖的教義）和正理（Zheng Li，正確的道理）作為衡量標準，所以……

述曰：下面回答有兩部分。首先總的回答，然後分別回答。這便是總的回答。因為通過教義和道理兩個方面來了解。

論：這其中教義方面……四種是遍行。

述曰：這便是分別回答。首先用教義回答，然後用道理回答。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十六卷也引用這部經來破斥經部等。大小乘共同認可。就是《阿含經》（Agama Sutra）。前面也說了是《起盡經》（Qi Jin Jing）。這是最初的經。為什麼這裡只說四種呢？因為舉出觸作為所依。如同之前第三卷所說，瑜伽行派為什麼只說觸與受（Shou，感受）、想（Xiang，想法）、思（Si，思考）這三種法作為所依，舉出……

【English Translation】 English version: Nao Wei (Position of Afflictions). Next, two verses are used to distinguish the Sui Fan Nao Wei (Position of Accompanying Afflictions). The latter half of the verse distinguishes the Bu Ding Wei (Indeterminate Position). One verse is used to distinguish between the two positions. It is divided into two parts. First, a question is raised to initiate the discussion, followed by questions and answers.

Treatise: Let's talk about the first two positions, what are their characteristics?

Commentary: This is the initial question.

Treatise: The verse says... until the objects of perception are different.

Commentary: The second section below answers the questions separately. The first verse clearly shows the initial position. Its characteristics have been analyzed in the eighth consciousness before, and now it is briefly indicated. The following three verses explain the second position. It is divided into two parts. The above two verses show the name of the second position, and the next verse explains the meaning of Bie Jing (Distinct Realm). In the following long passage, it is divided into two sections according to what is explained in the verse. There are two parts to explaining Bian Xing (Universal Activity). First, generally explain the first sentence of the verse, and then explain the meaning of Bian Xing.

Treatise: It is said that the first of the six positions... as explained extensively before.

Commentary: This is the general explanation of the first sentence in the verse. Now explain the word 'first' and words such as Chu (Contact). The nature and function of these five Bian Xing have been extensively explained in the eighth consciousness of the third volume. The meaning of Bian Xing mentioned in that volume should be explained later, and now it is explained here.

Treatise: How should the characteristics of this Bian Xing be understood?

Commentary: There are three parts below. First, ask a question, then answer, and finally summarize. Explain the meaning of Bian Xing mentioned in the verse. Initially, Sarvastivada (the 'All Exists' school) and others asked only about the five Bian Xing. Sautrantika (the 'Sutra school') and others asked about the real five as Bian Xing.

Treatise: Sheng Jiao (Sacred Teachings) and Zheng Li (Correct Reasoning) are used as measuring standards, so...

Commentary: There are two parts to the answer below. First, a general answer, and then separate answers. This is the general answer. Because it is understood through the two aspects of doctrine and reason.

Treatise: Among these, in terms of doctrine... four are Bian Xing.

Commentary: This is the separate answer. First answer with doctrine, then answer with reason. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) Volume 56 also quotes this sutra to refute the Sautrantika and others. Both Mahayana and Hinayana recognize it. It is the Agama Sutra. It was also mentioned earlier as the Qi Jin Jing (Sutra of Arising and Ceasing). This is the initial sutra. Why are only four mentioned here? Because Chu (Contact) is cited as the basis. As mentioned in the third volume before, why does the Yogacara school only say that Chu (Contact) and Shou (Feeling), Xiang (Perception), and Si (Volition) are the three dharmas as the basis, citing...

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蘊勝故。即是觸生三蘊。且隱作意不說。即行蘊攝故。

若爾何義故知作意必有。

論。又契經說至方能生識。

述曰。即像跡喻經。

論。余經復說至亦是遍行。

述曰。經復說故。起盡經也。如前第三卷第八遍行中引。合顯揚引經云恒共和合等。及五十五亦云四無色蘊恒和合等。即諸經論不相乖返。不相離相應故名和合。故知作意亦是遍行。亦前四也。

論。此等聖教誠證非一。

述曰。大論第三解。根不壞境現前等。五十五亦言。五遍行心所。遍一切心生。第三亦爾。五蘊．百法皆是說故。即是誠證非一。五十五所引是經。余是論故。此即教證。

論。理謂識起至觸一境故。

述曰。下引理證。諸識起時必緣境依根名有三和。三和定生觸。亦由觸故方有三和。又若無觸時。心．心所應離散不能和合同觸一境故。今既三合及心．心所和合同觸于境。故必有觸。定是遍行。

論。作意引心至心應無故。

述曰。作意之效能警心．心所令趣自境。此若無者心則不起。不起故心現行無。非無種子。

論。受能領納至無隨一故。

述曰。歡等三相如次配順．違．中三境。即是三受。余文可知。

論。想能安立至境分齊相。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為蘊積殊勝的緣故。這便是觸所生的三個蘊。且隱藏了作意沒有說，是因為它被包含在行蘊之中。

如果這樣，根據什麼意義得知作意必定存在？

論：又契經上說，根、境、識三者聚合才能產生識。

述曰：即《象跡喻經》。

論：其他經典又說，作意也是遍行心所。

述曰：經中又說，即《起盡經》。如前面第三卷第八遍行中引用的那樣。結合《顯揚聖教論》引用的經文說，恒常共同和合等。以及第五十五卷也說，四個無色蘊恒常和合等。即各種經典和論典不相違背，不相分離，相互相應，所以叫做和合。所以得知作意也是遍行心所，也是前四者之一。

論：這些聖教的真實證據不止一個。

述曰：《大毗婆沙論》第三卷解釋說，根沒有損壞，境界現前等。第五十五卷也說，五種遍行心所，遍一切心而生。第三卷也是這樣。五蘊、百法都是這樣說的。這就是真實的證據不止一個。第五十五卷所引用的是經文，其餘的是論典。這便是教證。

論：理證是指識生起時，必定緣于境界，依靠根，名為三和。三和必定產生觸。也因為有觸，才會有三和。又如果無觸時，心和心所應當離散，不能和合同觸于同一境界。現在既然有三和，以及心和心所和合同觸于境界，所以必定有觸，必定是遍行心所。

論：作意引導心趨向境界，如果無作意，心應無法生起。

述曰：作意的效能是警覺心和心所，使它們趨向各自的境界。如果缺少作意，心便不會生起。不起，指的是心的現行不起，不是指種子不存在。

論：受能領納順、違、中庸三種境界，因此有苦、樂、舍三種感受，不會只有其中一種。

述曰：歡喜等三種相，依次配合順境、違境、中庸之境。這就是三種感受。其餘文句可以理解。

論：想能安立名言，于境界上施設種種差別。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the excellence of the aggregates (skandha), these are the three aggregates born of contact (sparśa). And the mental engagement (manasikara) is hidden and not mentioned, because it is included within the aggregate of volition (samskara).

If that is so, by what meaning is it known that mental engagement must exist?

Treatise: Moreover, the sutras say that the aggregation of root (indriya), object (visaya), and consciousness (vijnana) is necessary to generate consciousness.

Commentary: That is, the 'Elephant Footprint Simile Sutra'.

Treatise: Other sutras also say that mental engagement is also a universal mental factor (sarvatraga).

Commentary: The sutra says again, that is, the 'Sutra of Arising and Ceasing'. As quoted in the eighth section on universal mental factors in the third volume above. Combining the sutra quoted in the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra', it says 'constantly together and harmonizing', etc. And the fifty-fifth volume also says that the four formless aggregates are constantly harmonizing, etc. That is, the various sutras and treatises do not contradict each other, do not separate, and correspond to each other, so they are called harmonizing. Therefore, it is known that mental engagement is also a universal mental factor, and is also one of the first four.

Treatise: These teachings of the sages are not just one reliable proof.

Commentary: The third volume of the 'Mahavibhasa' explains that the root is not damaged, the object appears, etc. The fifty-fifth volume also says that the five universal mental factors arise in all minds. The third volume is also like this. The five aggregates and the hundred dharmas are all spoken of in this way. This is not just one reliable proof. What is quoted in the fifty-fifth volume is the sutra, and the rest are treatises. This is doctrinal proof.

Treatise: The logical proof is that when consciousness arises, it must rely on the object and depend on the root, which is called the three conditions coming together (trisamgati). The three conditions coming together necessarily produce contact. It is also because of contact that there are three conditions coming together. Moreover, if there is no contact, the mind and mental factors should be scattered and unable to harmonize and contact the same object. Now that there are three conditions coming together, and the mind and mental factors harmonize and contact the object, there must be contact, which must be a universal mental factor.

Treatise: Mental engagement leads the mind to the object; if there is no mental engagement, the mind should not arise.

Commentary: The function of mental engagement is to alert the mind and mental factors, causing them to move towards their respective objects. If this is lacking, the mind will not arise. 'Not arise' refers to the present activity of the mind not arising, not that the seed does not exist.

Treatise: Feeling (vedana) can receive the three kinds of experiences: agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral; therefore, there are three kinds of feelings: suffering, pleasure, and equanimity; not just one of them.

Commentary: The three aspects of joy, etc., are respectively matched with agreeable, disagreeable, and neutral experiences. These are the three feelings. The rest of the text can be understood.

Treatise: Conception (samjna) can establish names and apply various distinctions to objects.

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述曰。謂如取是青非非青所緣。及處以來分齊隨多隨少或大或小等。安立義者。施設等也。若無想不能取境此分齊相多少所緣。故想定有。

論。思令心取至故必有思。

述曰。能取正因等。等者等取邪．俱相違相。如第三卷說。故是遍行。

論。由此證知至義至當說。

述曰。結上所明。第三文也。然破經部等無別有心所。故顯此五心起皆生。如顯揚第一引證說有。余欲等五經不說有。理不遍生故別境攝。觸等五法性．業。指前第三卷說。其餘非遍行之義如下當知。此結前生后也。即是解第一句頌訖。

次解下三。合有二文。初以五門分別。后例余門。

論。次別境者謂欲至惠。

述曰。第一列名釋別境義。解第二句上三字。以下二字及第三句全。如文別解。

論。所緣事境至次初說故。

述曰。釋第四句及解次言。釋別境名也。然別四境一一可知。五十五云。所樂．決定．串習．觀察四境別也。

次別解五。第二齣體。體中有二。初別出。后總非遍行。

論。云何為欲。

述曰。自下各有二。初問。次答。此問也。答中有三。初解體．業。次廣前文。后破異執。此即問也。

論。于所樂境至勤依為業。

述曰。然勤依

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師的《述記》中說：例如，取青色時，所緣的並非非青色。以及在處所等方面，根據多少、大小等來區分。安立義，就是施設等。如果無想定不能取境，就無法區分這些分齊相的多少和所緣，所以說想定是存在的。

論：思能令心取境，所以必定有思。

窺基法師的《述記》中說：能取正因等。等，是等取邪因、俱相違因。如《成唯識論》第三卷所說。所以思是遍行心所。

論：由此可知，這些義理將在後面詳細說明。

窺基法師的《述記》中說：總結以上所說明的內容，這是第三段文字。然而，爲了破斥經部等宗派認為沒有獨立的心所，所以顯示這五種心所生起時都是同時生起的。如《顯揚聖教論》第一卷引證說有這五種心所。其餘的欲等五種心所，經典中沒有說它們是普遍生起的，理應不普遍生起，所以屬於別境心所。觸等五法，它們的體性和作用，指的是前面第三卷所說的內容。其餘非遍行的意義，將在後面說明。這既是總結前文，也是引出後文。也就是解釋第一句頌文完畢。

接下來解釋下面的三句頌文。總共有兩段文字。首先用五門來分別，然後用其餘的門類來類推。

論：其次，別境心所是指欲（chanda），勝解（adhimoksha），念（smṛti），定（samādhi），慧（prajñā）。

窺基法師的《述記》中說：首先列出名稱，解釋別境的含義。解釋第二句頌文的上三個字，以及下面的兩個字和第三句頌文的全部內容。按照文句分別解釋。

論：所緣的事境不同，所以安立為別境。這是爲了次第最初說明的緣故。

窺基法師的《述記》中說：解釋第四句頌文，以及解釋『次』字的含義。解釋別境的名稱。然而，別境的四種境界，一一可以知曉。《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷說：所樂境、決定境、串習境、觀察境，這四種境界是不同的。

接下來分別解釋五種別境心所。第二是說明它們的體性。體性中有兩種，首先是分別說明，然後總的說明它們不是遍行心所。

論：什麼是欲？

窺基法師的《述記》中說：從下面開始，每一種心所都有兩個部分，首先是提問，然後是回答。這是提問。回答中有三個部分，首先是解釋體性和作用，其次是擴充套件前面的文義，最後是破斥不同的觀點。這裡是提問。

論：對於所喜好的境界，希望能夠獲得，這是欲，以策勤為作用。

窺基法師的《述記》中說：策勤是它的作用。

【English Translation】 English version: In Master Kuiji's 'Commentary' it says: For example, when perceiving blue, what is cognized is not non-blue. And in terms of location, etc., distinctions are made based on quantity, size, etc. Establishing meaning refers to designation, etc. If the state of non-perception cannot grasp objects, it cannot distinguish the quantity and characteristics of these divisions and what is cognized. Therefore, the state of samādhi (concentration) exists.

Treatise: Thought enables the mind to grasp objects, so thought must exist.

Master Kuiji's 'Commentary' says: It can grasp the correct cause, etc. 'Etc.' includes grasping incorrect causes and mutually contradictory causes, as explained in the third volume of 'Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only)'. Therefore, thought is a universal mental factor.

Treatise: From this, it is known that these meanings will be explained in detail later.

Master Kuiji's 'Commentary' says: Summarizing what has been explained above, this is the third section of text. However, in order to refute the Sautrāntika school and others who believe that there are no independent mental factors, it is shown that these five mental factors arise simultaneously when they arise. As the first volume of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yogic Practice)' cites and says that these five mental factors exist. The remaining five mental factors, such as desire (chanda), are not said in the scriptures to arise universally, and it is reasonable that they do not arise universally, so they belong to the specific object mental factors. The nature and function of the five dharmas, such as contact (sparśa), refer to what was said in the third volume earlier. The meaning of the remaining non-universal factors will be known later. This both summarizes the previous text and introduces the following text. That is, the explanation of the first verse is completed.

Next, the following three verses are explained. There are two sections of text in total. First, they are distinguished using five gates, and then the remaining categories are used for analogy.

Treatise: Next, the specific object mental factors refer to desire (chanda), conviction (adhimoksha), mindfulness (smṛti), concentration (samādhi), and wisdom (prajñā).

Master Kuiji's 'Commentary' says: First, the names are listed to explain the meaning of specific object. Explaining the first three words of the second verse, as well as the following two words and the entire third verse. Explain according to the sentences separately.

Treatise: The objects of cognition are different, so they are established as specific objects. This is for the sake of explaining the order from the beginning.

Master Kuiji's 'Commentary' says: Explaining the fourth verse, as well as explaining the meaning of the word 'next'. Explaining the name of specific object. However, the four objects of specific object can be known one by one. The fifty-fifth volume of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' says: The object of delight, the object of certainty, the object of familiarity, and the object of observation, these four objects are different.

Next, the five specific object mental factors are explained separately. Second is explaining their nature. There are two types of nature, first is explaining separately, and then generally explaining that they are not universal mental factors.

Treatise: What is desire (chanda)?

Master Kuiji's 'Commentary' says: From below, each mental factor has two parts, first is asking, then is answering. This is asking. There are three parts to the answer, first is explaining the nature and function, second is expanding the previous meaning, and finally is refuting different views. This is asking.

Treatise: Regarding the desired object, hoping to obtain it, this is desire (chanda), with exertion as its function.

Master Kuiji's 'Commentary' says: Exertion is its function.

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者如此下說。及對法第十等皆云。信為欲依。欲為精進依。即入佛法次第依也。然欲既通三性。即唯善欲為依。今又解。勤者勤劬。染法懈怠勤作諸惡亦是勤故。無記事勤即欲．勝解。若言精進。精進唯善。勤通三性。皆欲為依。非唯善勤。下文說欲能起正勤。前解為勝。下三師解。此中所說第一總意。

論。有義所樂至有希望故。

述曰。其可欣境。謂漏．無漏可欣之事方生於欲。此據情可欣故通三性。非唯無漏實可欣法。于可欣事欲見．欲聞．欲覺．欲知故有希望。即是四境之中所樂境也。

論。于可厭事至豈非有欲。

述曰。此外人問。謂苦穢事等。未得之者希彼不合。已得之者望彼別離。豈非有欲。緣可厭事欲既得生。如何唯言可欣生欲。

論。此但緣彼至非可厭事。

述曰。論主答云。此不緣可厭事。謂此欲但求彼可厭之事未合不合。已合得離之位。可欣自體。若自內身可欣不合。及后離位。若欲外境此位。即是緣可欣事生。非可厭事。

論。故於可厭至亦無慾起。

述曰。可厭之處即通六識。或唯第六。其中容境八識俱通。全不起欲。不欣彼故。非可欣故。境雖可欣。若不希望亦無慾起。唯前六識。如邪見撥滅．道等時亦無有欲。

論。有義所

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 像這樣在《及對法第十》等處都說：『信為欲的所依，欲為精進的所依。』這就是進入佛法的次第所依。然而，『欲』既然貫通三性（善、惡、無記），那麼只有善欲才能作為所依。現在又解釋，『勤』是勤勞，對於染污之法懈怠，對於作諸惡事卻很勤勞，這也是勤。無記事中的勤，就是欲和勝解。如果說是『精進』，精進唯有善性。勤貫通三性，都以欲為所依，不只是善勤。下文說欲能發起正勤，之前的解釋更為殊勝。下面三師的解釋，是此處所說的第一總意。

論：有義是說，因為有所樂，所以才有希望。

述曰：那些令人欣喜的境界，指的是有漏、無漏的令人欣喜之事，才產生欲。這是根據情識上令人欣喜而言，所以貫通三性，不只是無漏的真實令人欣喜之法。對於令人欣喜之事，想要見、想要聞、想要覺、想要知，所以才有希望。這就是四境（所緣境）之中所樂的境界。

論：對於令人厭惡之事，乃至難道沒有欲嗎？

述曰：這是外人的提問。指的是苦、穢等事，未得到時希望不合，已得到時希望別離。難道沒有欲嗎？緣于令人厭惡之事，欲既然能夠產生，為何只說令人欣喜才能產生欲？

論：這只是緣于那些，並非令人厭惡之事。

述曰：論主回答說，這並非緣于令人厭惡之事。所說的欲，只是求那些令人厭惡之事未合時不合，已合時得離的狀態，是令人欣喜的自體。如果是自身內令人欣喜的不合，以及後來的離位；如果是欲求外境的這個狀態，就是緣于令人欣喜之事而生，並非令人厭惡之事。

論：所以在令人厭惡之處，也沒有欲生起。

述曰：令人厭惡之處，貫通六識，或者唯有第六識（意識）。其中容納境界，八識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）都貫通，完全不生起欲，因為不欣喜那些，不是令人欣喜的緣故。境界即使令人欣喜，如果不希望，也沒有欲生起，唯有前六識。如邪見撥滅、道等時，也沒有欲。

論：有義是說

【English Translation】 English version: It is said in places such as 'Chapter Ten of the Abhidharma', 'Faith is the basis of desire, and desire is the basis of diligence.' This is the sequential basis for entering the Buddha-dharma. However, since 'desire' encompasses the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), only wholesome desire can serve as a basis. Now, it is further explained that 'diligence' refers to exertion. One may be lazy towards defiled dharmas but diligent in committing evil deeds; this is also diligence. Diligence in neutral matters is desire and adhimoksha (決意). If we speak of 'effort', effort is only wholesome. Diligence encompasses the three natures, all based on desire, not just wholesome diligence. The following text says that desire can initiate right effort; the previous explanation is more excellent. The following explanation by the three masters is the primary overall meaning here.

Treatise: Some say that because there is something pleasurable, there is hope.

Commentary: Those delightful realms refer to the delightful things of the defiled and undefiled, which then give rise to desire. This is based on what is delightful to the emotions, so it encompasses the three natures, not just the truly delightful undefiled dharmas. Regarding delightful things, wanting to see, wanting to hear, wanting to perceive, wanting to know, therefore there is hope. This is the pleasurable realm among the four realms (objects of perception).

Treatise: Regarding unpleasant things, is there not desire?

Commentary: This is an outsider's question. It refers to things like suffering and impurity. When not yet obtained, one hopes they will not arise; when already obtained, one hopes for separation from them. Is there not desire? Since desire can arise from unpleasant things, why is it said that desire only arises from pleasant things?

Treatise: This only arises from those, not from unpleasant things.

Commentary: The treatise master replies, 'This does not arise from unpleasant things.' The desire spoken of only seeks that those unpleasant things do not arise when not yet arisen, and that one can be separated from them when they have already arisen; this is a delightful self-nature. If one's own delightful self is not in union, and later in a state of separation; if one desires this state of external objects, then it arises from delightful things, not unpleasant things.

Treatise: Therefore, in unpleasant places, no desire arises.

Commentary: Unpleasant places encompass the six consciousnesses, or only the sixth consciousness (意識, manovijnana). Among them, the realm of what is contained, all eight consciousnesses (眼識, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, manovijnana, 末那識, manasvijnana, 阿賴耶識, alayavijnana) are encompassed, and no desire arises at all, because one does not delight in those, because they are not delightful. Even if a realm is delightful, if there is no hope, no desire arises. Only the first six consciousnesses. Such as when wrong views are eradicated, or during the path, there is also no desire.

Treatise: Some say

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樂至亦無慾起。

述曰。第二師。所樂者。謂所求之境。隨境體性可欣可厭。但求于彼可欣事上。未得望合。已得愿不離。可厭之事。未得愿不得合。已得愿別離中。皆得起欲。故論但言求合離等。等取彼也。即緣此二皆得生欲。余文可解。故體寬於第一。唯前七識。或唯第六。有此欲故。于中容境全不起欲。即通八識。或唯前六．及八。以第七識常希求故。

論。有義所樂至即全無慾。

述曰。第三師。所樂者謂欲觀境。不但求彼若合若離。但欲作意隨何識欲觀等者。皆有欲生。唯前六識。或唯第六．七．八因中無作意欲觀。任運起故。七．八二識全。及六識異熟心等一分。但隨因．境勢力任運緣者全無慾起。余皆欲生。

論。由此理趣欲非遍行。

述曰。結也。於此三中。第三最勝。境稍寬故。即七．八識無慾理生。正合前七識中第四師義。

論。有說要由至為諸法本。

述曰。自下破執。薩婆多說。要由有欲希望境力。諸心．心所方取所緣。若不希望如何取境。即欲遍諸心欲為諸法本。證欲遍義。

論。彼說不然至心心所故。

述曰。今破不然。心等取境作意功力。警心．心所令取所緣。如前已說。聖教但言作意能生識。不言欲能生心。故知作意令心

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 樂受生起時，不一定伴隨慾望的產生。

述記說：第二位論師認為，所謂的『所樂』，是指所追求的境界。隨著境界的體性，可以令人欣喜，也可以令人厭惡。但凡追求那些令人欣喜的事物，未得到時希望得到，已得到時希望不失去；對於令人厭惡的事物，未遇到時希望不遇到，已遇到時希望擺脫。在這些情況下，都會產生慾望。所以本論只說追求結合或分離等等，『等等』包括了以上這些情況。也就是說，緣于這兩種情況都會產生慾望。其餘文句容易理解。因此，此處的『體』比第一種情況更寬泛。只有前七識，或者只有第六識，才會有這種慾望。在這種情況下，容許有境界完全不產生慾望的情況，即通於八識。或者只有前六識以及第八識，因為第七識總是希求的緣故。

論中說：有論師認為，只要是樂受生起，就完全沒有慾望。

述記說：第三位論師認為，所謂的『所樂』，是指想要觀察的境界。不僅僅是追求境界的結合或分離，只要想要通過作意，隨順任何識的慾望去觀察等等，都會產生慾望。只有前六識，或者只有第六、七、八識。因為在因地中沒有作意去觀察的慾望，而是任運而起。第七、第八識全部，以及第六識的異熟心等一部分，只是隨著因、境的勢力任運緣取，完全沒有慾望生起。其餘情況都會產生慾望。

論中說：由此道理來看，慾望不是遍行心所。

述記說：這是結論。在這三種觀點中，第三種最為殊勝，因為境界稍微寬泛一些。第七、第八識沒有慾望的道理由此產生，正好符合前面第七識中的第四位論師的觀點。

論中說：有人說，必須要有慾望，才能成為諸法的根本。

述記說：以下是破斥其他宗派的執著。薩婆多（Sarvastivadins）宗認為，必須要有慾望，希望境界的力量，各種心和心所才能取所緣境。如果沒有希望，如何取境呢？也就是說，慾望遍於所有心，慾望是諸法的根本，以此來證明慾望是遍行的。

論中說：他們的說法不對，因為心等取境是作意的功勞。

述記說：現在破斥他們的觀點。心等取境是作意的功勞，作意警覺心和心所，使它們取所緣境，如前面已經說過的那樣。聖教只是說作意能夠產生識，沒有說慾望能夠產生心。所以知道是作意令心

【English Translation】 English version: When pleasure (sukha) arises, it is not necessarily accompanied by desire (chandas).

Commentary states: The second teacher says that 'what is pleasurable' refers to the object being sought. Depending on the nature of the object, it can be pleasing or displeasing. However, when pursuing those pleasing things, one desires to obtain what has not yet been obtained, and desires not to lose what has already been obtained. Regarding displeasing things, one desires not to encounter what has not yet been encountered, and desires to escape what has already been encountered. In these situations, desire arises. Therefore, the treatise only speaks of seeking union or separation, etc.; 'etc.' includes the above situations. That is to say, desire arises from both of these situations. The remaining sentences are easy to understand. Therefore, the 'scope' here is broader than the first case. Only the first seven consciousnesses, or only the sixth consciousness, have this desire. In this case, it is permissible for a situation where no desire arises at all, which is common to all eight consciousnesses. Or only the first six consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness, because the seventh consciousness is always seeking.

The treatise states: Some teachers believe that as long as pleasure arises, there is no desire at all.

Commentary states: The third teacher says that 'what is pleasurable' refers to the object one wants to observe. It is not just seeking the union or separation of the object, but as long as one wants to observe through attention (manaskara), following the desire of any consciousness, desire will arise. Only the first six consciousnesses, or only the sixth, seventh, and eighth consciousnesses. Because in the causal stage, there is no desire to observe through attention, but it arises spontaneously. The entire seventh and eighth consciousnesses, and a portion of the sixth consciousness's resultant mind (vipaka-citta), only spontaneously grasp objects according to the power of the cause and object, and no desire arises at all. In other situations, desire will arise.

The treatise states: From this reasoning, desire is not a universal mental factor (sarvatraga).

Commentary states: This is the conclusion. Among these three views, the third is the most superior, because the scope of the object is slightly broader. The reason why the seventh and eighth consciousnesses have no desire arises from this, which exactly matches the view of the fourth teacher in the preceding discussion of the seventh consciousness.

The treatise states: Some say that desire is necessary to be the root of all dharmas.

Commentary states: The following refutes the attachment of other schools. The Sarvastivadins say that there must be desire, the power of hoping for an object, for the various minds and mental factors to grasp the object. If there is no hope, how can they grasp the object? That is to say, desire pervades all minds, and desire is the root of all dharmas, in order to prove that desire is universal.

The treatise states: Their statement is not correct, because the mind, etc., grasp objects through the effort of attention.

Commentary states: Now refute their view. The mind, etc., grasp objects through the effort of attention. Attention alerts the mind and mental factors, causing them to grasp the object, as has been said before. The sacred teachings only say that attention can produce consciousness, and do not say that desire can produce mind. Therefore, it is known that attention causes the mind

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等取境。何待于欲。

論。如說諸法至皆由愛生。

述曰。此即難言。經亦說愛為諸法本。豈一切心皆由愛有。

若言如愛非遍生心。如何說欲為諸法本順正理第十廣引此經。乃至未云解脫堅固究竟涅槃。

論。故說欲為至勤依為業。

述曰。經中所說。說欲所起一切事業。由欲為彼本。通三性法皆有勤故。由此文知。入法初首。由善法欲能發精進。由精進故。助成於欲一切善事。此即說欲為諸善法本。如說信為法本但是善因。欲為法本理應如是。對法十五。謂一切法欲為根本。乃至出離為後邊等。故對法．顯揚皆說勤依為業。欲通緣三世。欲作意觀故非唯未來。以前三師一一三世辨對可知。

論。云何勝解至引轉為業。

述曰。此判文等一如於欲。

論。謂邪正等至不能引轉。

述曰。謂此勝解。由邪教．邪理．邪證等力。或正教等力。或非邪正教．理．證力。即泛所緣。于所取境審決印持此事如是非不如是。以生勝解。或教者教示。或是言說。但由轉習。理者有此道理。非謂四諦真實理也。即攝一切事及真理。謂此木是木之理等。乃至一切法亦然。證者即修禪定。或諸識現量等心能審決者皆有勝解。由此道理生印可故。更有異緣不能引轉令此心中更生疑

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：如果說（一切心識的）生起取決於所取境界，那又何必依賴於『欲』（chanda，意願）呢？

論：正如經文所說：『諸法（dharma，事物）的生起都源於愛（prema，喜愛）。』

述記：這實際上是難以辯駁的說法。因為經文也說，愛是諸法的根本。難道一切心識的產生都源於愛嗎？

如果說，像愛這樣的情感並非普遍產生心識，那麼又如何能說『欲』是諸法的根本呢？《順正理論》第十卷廣泛引用了這部經，甚至提到了未云解脫（vimoksha，解脫）、堅固（dridha，堅定）、究竟涅槃（atyanta-nirvana，最終涅槃）。

論：所以說，『欲』是（一切事業的）根本，以勤奮為事業。

述記：經文中所說，由『欲』所產生的一切事業，都以『欲』為根本。因為通於三性（善、惡、無記）的法都具有勤奮的特性。由此文可知，進入佛法的最初階段，是由善法之『欲』發起精進（virya，努力）。由於精進的緣故，幫助成就『欲』所希望的一切善事。這正是說『欲』是諸善法的根本。正如說『信』（sraddha，信仰）是佛法的根本，但只是善的因緣。『欲』作為佛法的根本，道理也應當如此。《對法論》第十五卷說，一切法以『欲』為根本，乃至以出離為最終目標等等。所以《對法論》和《顯揚論》都說，勤奮以『欲』為所依之業。『欲』可以緣於三世（過去、現在、未來），因為『欲』能引發作意和觀察，所以並非僅僅緣于未來。以前三師（世親、無著、師子覺）一一以三世來辨別對應，就可以明白了。

論：什麼是勝解（adhimoksha，殊勝的理解）？以引導和轉變（心識）為事業。

述記：這段判釋的文字等同於對『欲』的解釋。

論：所謂的邪見、正見等，都不能引導和轉變（心識）。

述記：所謂的勝解，是由於邪教、邪理、邪證等力量，或者正教等力量，或者非邪非正的教、理、證的力量，即普遍地緣于所緣境界，對於所取境界審慎地決定和印持『這件事是這樣，不是那樣』。由此產生勝解。或者由教導者教示，或者由言說，但通過反覆的練習。『理』是指有這樣的道理，並非指四諦（catuh-satya，四聖諦）的真實道理。即攝取一切事物以及真理，例如說『這棵樹是樹』的道理等等，乃至一切法也是如此。『證』是指通過修習禪定，或者諸識現量等心識能夠審慎決定的，都具有勝解。由於這些道理產生印可，所以其他的因緣不能引導和轉變，使這個心中再生起疑惑。

【English Translation】 English version Question: If the arising (of all consciousness) depends on the object taken, then why rely on 'chanda' (intention, desire)?

Treatise: As the sutra says: 'The arising of all dharmas (things, phenomena) originates from prema (love, affection).'

Commentary: This is actually a difficult statement to refute. Because the sutra also says that love is the root of all dharmas. Does all consciousness arise from love?

If it is said that emotions like love do not universally produce consciousness, then how can it be said that 'chanda' is the root of all dharmas? The tenth volume of the Nyayanusarasastra extensively quotes this sutra, even mentioning the unclouded vimoksha (liberation), dridha (firmness), and atyanta-nirvana (ultimate nirvana).

Treatise: Therefore, it is said that 'chanda' is the root (of all endeavors), with diligence as its function.

Commentary: What is said in the sutra is that all endeavors arising from 'chanda' have 'chanda' as their root. Because dharmas that are common to the three natures (good, evil, and neutral) all possess the characteristic of diligence. From this text, it can be known that the initial stage of entering the Dharma is initiated by the 'chanda' for good dharmas, which gives rise to virya (effort). Due to effort, it helps to accomplish all the good deeds desired by 'chanda'. This is precisely saying that 'chanda' is the root of all good dharmas. Just as it is said that 'sraddha' (faith) is the root of the Dharma, but is only a condition for goodness. The principle of 'chanda' as the root of the Dharma should be the same. The fifteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that all dharmas have 'chanda' as their root, and liberation as their ultimate goal, and so on. Therefore, both the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations say that diligence takes 'chanda' as its dependent function. 'Chanda' can be related to the three times (past, present, future), because 'chanda' can give rise to attention and observation, so it is not only related to the future. It can be understood by distinguishing and corresponding to the three times by the previous three masters (Vasubandhu, Asanga, Simhabodhi) one by one.

Treatise: What is adhimoksha (superior understanding)? It takes guiding and transforming (consciousness) as its function.

Commentary: This passage of judgment is equivalent to the explanation of 'chanda'.

Treatise: So-called wrong views, right views, etc., cannot guide and transform (consciousness).

Commentary: The so-called adhimoksha is due to the power of wrong teachings, wrong reasoning, wrong proofs, etc., or the power of right teachings, etc., or the power of teachings, reasoning, and proofs that are neither wrong nor right, that is, universally related to the object taken, carefully deciding and affirming 'this matter is like this, not like that' with respect to the object taken. From this, adhimoksha arises. Or it is taught by the teacher, or by speech, but through repeated practice. 'Reasoning' refers to having such a principle, not referring to the true principle of the Four Noble Truths (catuh-satya). That is, it encompasses all things and truth, for example, saying 'this tree is the principle of a tree,' and so on, and so it is with all dharmas. 'Proof' refers to the ability to carefully decide through the practice of dhyana (meditation), or the present consciousness of the various consciousnesses. Because these principles give rise to affirmation, other conditions cannot guide and transform it, causing doubt to arise again in this mind.

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惑。

論。故猶預境至非遍行攝。

述曰。即疑心中全無解起。即染心中少分無也。非審決心亦無勝解。便通三性。

論。有說心等至皆有勝解。

述曰。順正理云。有餘師言。今此中解。即薩婆多異師。諸對法異計說。心取境時無拘礙故皆有勝解。謂不同大乘印境決定名為勝解。即疑心中全無彼故。我宗但言無物拘礙心。令心於境能緣者即是勝解。故遍行攝。

論。彼說非理至即心等故。

述曰。汝言不拘礙者。若是能不礙名勝解。除心．心所以外法。皆是能不礙。與心．心所為增上緣皆不礙故。若是所不礙。即心．心所皆是所不礙。故言心等等取心所。何但一法。

若彼救言但由勝解增勝力故。發起心等。不為所礙。

論。勝發起者根作意故。

述曰。勝發起因根及作意二法之力。何關勝解。

若彼救言。根．作意二自力。不能為勝發起諸心．心所。亦由此勝解力故。彼根作意方能發起。

論。若由此故至便有無窮失。

述曰。亦應勝解應自無力為勝發起。應復待余法方能勝發。是心所故。如汝作意。若許勝解復待餘者。便有無窮失。若勝解不待余。作意等亦應爾故。但以印可為勝解相。故疑心中不得起也。若言心起決定有之。但相

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 惑（huò）：疑惑，猶豫不決的狀態。

論（lùn）：因此，猶豫不決的狀態出現時，不屬於遍行心所（biàn xíng xīn suǒ，普遍存在的心理活動）。

述曰（shù yuē）：在疑惑心中，完全沒有理解產生。即使在染污心中，也只有少部分沒有理解。即使不是審慎的決心，也沒有殊勝的理解，因此它貫通三性（sān xìng，善、惡、非善非惡）。

論（lùn）：有人說，即使在禪定狀態中，也存在殊勝的理解。

述曰（shù yuē）：《順正理論》（Shùn Zhèng Lǐ Lùn）中說，有其他老師認為，這裡所說的『解』，是薩婆多部（Sà pó duō bù）其他老師，以及《對法論》（Duì Fǎ Lùn）中不同觀點的說法。他們認為，心在取境時沒有阻礙，因此都存在殊勝的理解。這與大乘佛教（Dà Chéng Fó Jiào）將印證境界的決定性認知稱為殊勝理解不同。因為在疑惑心中完全沒有這種決定性認知。我們宗派只是說，沒有事物阻礙心，使心能夠緣取境界，這就是殊勝的理解，因此屬於遍行心所。

論（lùn）：他們的說法不合理，因為心等同於...

述曰（shù yuē）：你說的不受阻礙，如果能不受阻礙就叫做殊勝理解，那麼除了心和心所（xīn suǒ，心理活動）之外的法，都是能不受阻礙的。因為它們作為心和心所的增上緣（zēng shàng yuán，輔助條件）都不構成阻礙。如果說是不受阻礙的對象，那麼心和心所都是不受阻礙的對象。所以說心等等同於心所，為什麼只說一種法呢？

如果他們辯解說，只是由於殊勝理解的增強力量，才發起心等，而不受阻礙。

論（lùn）：殊勝的發起者是根（gēn，感覺器官）和作意（zuò yì，心理活動）。

述曰（shù yuē）：殊勝發起的原因是根和作意這兩種法的力量，與殊勝理解有什麼關係？

如果他們辯解說，根和作意自身的力量，不能殊勝地發起諸心和心所，也是由於這種殊勝理解的力量，根和作意才能發起。

論（lùn）：如果由於這個原因……就會有無窮的過失。

述曰（shù yuē）：那麼也應該說殊勝理解自身沒有力量殊勝地發起，應該再等待其他法才能殊勝地發起。因為它也是心所，就像你的作意一樣。如果允許殊勝理解再等待其他的法，就會有無窮的過失。如果殊勝理解不等待其他的法，作意等也應該如此。只是以印證認可作為殊勝理解的相狀，所以在疑惑心中不能產生。如果說心生起時一定有它，但只是相狀不同而已。

English version Confusion.

Treatise: Therefore, the state of hesitation, when it arises, is not included within the pervasive mental factors (biàn xíng xīn suǒ, universal mental activities).

Commentary: In a mind of doubt, there is absolutely no understanding arising. Even in a defiled mind, there is only a small portion without understanding. Even if it is not a deliberate decision, there is no superior understanding, thus it pervades the three natures (sān xìng, wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral).

Treatise: Some say that even in meditative states, there is superior understanding.

Commentary: The Nyayanusara says: 'Other teachers say that the 'understanding' mentioned here is the view of other teachers of the Sarvastivada (Sà pó duō bù) school and different views in the Abhidharma treatises (Duì Fǎ Lùn). They believe that when the mind takes an object, there is no obstruction, so there is superior understanding. This is different from the Mahayana (Dà Chéng Fó Jiào) tradition, which calls the decisive cognition that confirms a state 'superior understanding.' Because in a mind of doubt, there is absolutely no such decisive cognition. Our school only says that there is nothing obstructing the mind, enabling the mind to apprehend an object, and this is superior understanding, thus it is included within the pervasive mental factors.'

Treatise: Their statement is unreasonable because the mind is equivalent to...

Commentary: You say 'unobstructed.' If being unobstructed is called superior understanding, then all dharmas other than the mind and mental factors (xīn suǒ, mental activities) are capable of being unobstructed. Because they, as the dominant condition (zēng shàng yuán, auxiliary condition) for the mind and mental factors, do not constitute an obstruction. If it is said to be the object that is unobstructed, then both the mind and mental factors are the objects that are unobstructed. So, saying 'mind, etc.' is equivalent to mental factors. Why only speak of one dharma?

If they argue that it is only due to the enhanced power of superior understanding that the mind, etc., are aroused and are not obstructed.

Treatise: The superior arouser is the sense faculty (gēn, sense organ) and attention (zuò yì, mental activity).

Commentary: The cause of superior arousal is the power of these two dharmas, the sense faculty and attention. What does it have to do with superior understanding?

If they argue that the power of the sense faculty and attention themselves cannot superiorly arouse all minds and mental factors; it is also due to the power of this superior understanding that the sense faculty and attention can arouse.

Treatise: If it is due to this reason... then there would be the fault of infinite regress.

Commentary: Then it should also be said that superior understanding itself does not have the power to superiorly arouse; it should wait for another dharma to be able to superiorly arouse. Because it is also a mental factor, like your attention. If you allow superior understanding to wait for other dharmas, there will be the fault of infinite regress. If superior understanding does not wait for other dharmas, attention, etc., should also be the same. It is only taking confirmation and approval as the characteristic of superior understanding, so it cannot arise in a mind of doubt. If it is said that when the mind arises, it certainly has it, but it is only that the characteristics are different.

【English Translation】 English translation line 1 English translation line 2

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微隱何以知也。若以餘位有比此亦有。即餘位有尋．伺。上地亦應有。但相隱故不可知者。如是大失。即唯決定境起勝解也。

論。云何爲念至定依為業。

述曰。故四法跡念是定因。

論。謂數憶持至能引定故。

述曰。重釋業用。曾所受境。念中或有已受彼體。或未得體但受彼類。如無漏緣染污心等。即近親取名緣彼體。若遠取不著總名彼類。他界緣使等並彼中攝。后得智緣有為無漏等。名念彼體。緣真如等。名緣彼類名等。無分別智緣真如時。名緣彼體。初起一念名緣彼類。雖非曾受曾受名故。加行道中作彼觀故。名為曾體。亦名彼類。令心明記此生定者。由多增故。定專注故。即唯善念生正定故。若散心念非必生定。

論。于曾未受至全不起念。

述曰。釋曾未受若體若類。如涅槃等全不起念。即通三世緣之起念。多於過去亦念未來。與前所受諸境合故。若曾聞說涅槃等名而起念者。亦名曾受彼境之類而起于念。若總不聞心散慢緣。便無念起。

論。設曾所受至遍行所攝。

述曰。此類非一。雖聞涅槃等。及七．八識境。不明記故亦不生念。

論。有說心起至憶念因故。

述曰。然經部師不說遍有。但薩婆多師。正理論第十文。謂有說言失念

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如何得知『微隱』（微細的隱沒）？如果根據其他位置也有類似情況來推斷，那麼這裡也應該有。既然其他位置有『尋』（粗略的觀察）和『伺』（精細的觀察），那麼上地（更高的禪定境界）也應該有『尋』和『伺』。如果說因為它們相互隱沒而無法得知，那麼這種說法就大錯特錯了。這僅僅是對於決定的境界生起殊勝的理解。

論：什麼是『念』（憶念）？它的作用是什麼？『定』（禪定）依靠什麼？它的作用是什麼？

述曰：因此，四法跡（四種修行方法）中的『念』是『定』的原因。

論：指的是數數憶持，最終能夠引發『定』。

述曰：再次解釋『念』的作用。對於曾經領受過的境界，『念』中或者已經領受過它的本體，或者沒有得到本體但領受過它的類別。例如，無漏心緣染污心等。如果近距離地取，就稱為緣彼體（緣彼本體）；如果遠距離地取，不執著于總相，就稱為緣彼類（緣彼種類）。他界緣使等都包含在其中。后得智緣有為無漏等，稱為『念』彼體；緣真如等，稱為『念』彼類。無分別智緣真如時，稱為緣彼體；初起一念，稱為緣彼類。雖然不是曾經領受過的，但因為曾經領受過它的名稱，在加行道中作過那樣的觀想，所以稱為曾經的本體，也稱為彼類。使心明記，這能產生『定』，是因為多次增長的緣故，『定』專注的緣故。只有善念才能產生正『定』，如果是散亂的心念，不一定能產生『定』。

論：對於曾經沒有領受過的，乃至完全不生起『念』。

述曰：解釋曾經沒有領受過的，無論是本體還是類別。例如，對於『涅槃』（寂滅）等完全不生起『念』。這包括三世所緣而生起的『念』。大多是憶念過去，也憶念未來，與先前所領受的各種境界相合。如果曾經聽聞過『涅槃』等的名稱而生起『念』，也稱為曾經領受過那個境界的類別而生起『念』。如果完全沒有聽聞過，心散亂而緩慢地緣，就不會生起『念』。

論：假設曾經領受過的，乃至是遍行所攝的。

述曰：這類情況並非只有一種。即使聽聞過『涅槃』等，以及第七識、第八識的境界，因為不明確地記著，也不會生起『念』。

論：有人說，心生起……憶念的原因。

述曰：然而，經部師（Sautrantika）不認為『念』是遍有的。但是薩婆多師（Sarvastivada），在《正理論》第十卷中說，有人說失『念』。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: How is 'subtle obscuration' known? If based on other locations having similar instances, then this location should also have them. Since other locations have 'Vitarka' (gross investigation) and 'Vicara' (subtle investigation), then the higher grounds (higher levels of Samadhi) should also have 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara'. If it is said that because they are mutually obscured, they cannot be known, then this statement is greatly mistaken. This is merely the arising of superior understanding regarding a determined object.

Treatise: What is 'Smrti' (mindfulness)? What is its function? What does 'Samadhi' (concentration) rely on? What is its function?

Commentary: Therefore, 'Smrti' among the four foundations of mindfulness is the cause of 'Samadhi'.

Treatise: It refers to repeatedly recollecting and maintaining, ultimately capable of inducing 'Samadhi'.

Commentary: Re-explaining the function of 'Smrti'. Regarding objects that have been previously experienced, in 'Smrti', either the essence of that object has been experienced, or the essence has not been obtained but its category has been experienced. For example, the unwholesome mind conditions the defiled mind, etc. If it is taken closely, it is called conditioning its essence; if it is taken distantly, without clinging to the general characteristics, it is called conditioning its category. Conditioning the afflictions of other realms, etc., are included in this. The wisdom attained later conditions the conditioned, unwholesome, etc., and is called 'Smrti' of its essence; conditioning 'Tathata' (suchness), etc., is called conditioning its category. When non-discriminating wisdom conditions 'Tathata', it is called conditioning its essence; the initial arising of a single thought is called conditioning its category. Although it has not been previously experienced, it is called having experienced its name, and because such contemplation has been done in the path of application, it is called the former essence, and also called its category. Making the mind clear and mindful, this generates 'Samadhi', because of the increase in frequency, and because 'Samadhi' is focused. Only wholesome 'Smrti' can generate correct 'Samadhi'; if it is a distracted mind, it will not necessarily generate 'Samadhi'.

Treatise: Regarding what has never been experienced, up to the point of not arising any 'Smrti' at all.

Commentary: Explaining what has never been experienced, whether it is the essence or the category. For example, regarding 'Nirvana' (cessation), etc., no 'Smrti' arises at all. This includes the 'Smrti' that arises from conditioning the three times. Mostly it is recollecting the past, and also recollecting the future, combining with the various objects previously experienced. If one has heard the name of 'Nirvana', etc., and 'Smrti' arises, it is also called having experienced the category of that object and 'Smrti' arises. If one has never heard of it at all, and the mind is distracted and slow in conditioning, then 'Smrti' will not arise.

Treatise: Supposing what has been previously experienced, up to being included in the pervasive.

Commentary: These kinds of situations are not just one. Even if one has heard of 'Nirvana', etc., and the objects of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, because they are not clearly remembered, 'Smrti' will not arise.

Treatise: Some say that the mind arises... the cause of recollection.

Commentary: However, the Sautrantikas (Sutra School) do not consider 'Smrti' to be pervasive. But the Sarvastivadins (Realist School), in the tenth chapter of the 'Abhidharmakosha', say that some say there is loss of 'Smrti'.

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亂心。即無念故非遍行者。彼復說言。以於後時有憶念故。明今有念為后念因。

論。彼說非理至前亦有故。

述曰。今破彼計。勿於後時有染癡等．善信等故。今恒有彼類亦為后因故。若言後生癡等。亦前癡等為因。即念非遍心有。如癡等故。若爾如自證分為后憶念因知前亦有。念亦應爾者不然。心許前有體之上更立用。今已不許前有念體后念等生。何得以念例於心也。

論。前心心所至憶念因故。

述曰。心等取境已熏功能在本識中。足為后時有憶念因。何須今念順生后念。或想取像勝故。為因生后時念足得。何待今念后念方生。

論。云何為定至智依為業。

述曰。能生智者此多分言。或凈分說。非謂一切。即如定後起癡心故。

論。謂觀德失至抉擇智生。

述曰。心專一境依教而緣。證解所緣心便明凈。由斯遂有無漏智生。能知所緣德失等相。約四法跡定能生智。非定須然。

論。心專注言至非唯一境。

述曰。此專注言。非是定心唯緣一物。即隨所注心多少境。或一剎那別欲注心處。深取所緣定即得生。非要前後唯緣一境。

論。不爾見道至應無等持。

述曰。其相見道為十六心。觀境應無等持。以要前後唯緣一境故。彼一一

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 亂心（擾亂的心）。即無念故非遍行者（因為沒有念頭，所以不是普遍存在的心理活動）。他們又說，因為之後會有憶念，說明現在有念是之後憶念的原因。

論：他們的說法不合理，因為之前也有（類似的情況）。

述曰（解釋）：現在駁斥他們的觀點。不要因為之後會有染污的愚癡等、善良的信心等，就認為現在一直有這些，並作為之後的原因。如果說之後產生愚癡等，也是之前的愚癡等作為原因，那麼念就不是普遍存在於心中，就像愚癡等一樣。如果說，就像自證分（心的自我認知部分）作為之後憶念的原因，所以知道之前也有自證分，念也應該如此，這是不對的。心允許在之前的體之上建立作用，現在已經不允許之前有唸的體，之後念等產生。怎麼能用念來類比心呢？

論：之前的心和心所（心理活動）足以作為憶念的原因。

述曰：心等取境后，已經熏習了功能在本識（根本識）中，足以作為之後產生憶念的原因。何須現在的念順著產生之後的念？或者說，想（心理活動）取像殊勝，作為原因產生之後的念就足夠了，何必等待現在的念產生之後的念呢？

論：什麼是定（禪定）？以智慧為所依，以智慧為事業。

述曰：能產生智慧的定，這裡大多是就清凈的部分來說的，不是說一切定都能產生智慧。例如，在禪定之後也可能產生愚癡的心。

論：所謂觀察功德和過失，直到抉擇智產生。

述曰：心專注於一個境界，依照教義而緣取，證悟和理解所緣的境界，心便會明凈。由此便會有無漏智（沒有煩惱的智慧）產生，能夠知道所緣的功德、過失等相。依靠四法跡（四種修行方法），定能夠產生智慧，但不是說一定要這樣。

論：心專注的意思，不是說只緣一個境界。

述曰：這裡所說的專注，不是說禪定之心只緣一個事物。而是隨著所專注的心有多少境界，或者一個剎那間想要專注在哪個地方，深入地緣取所緣的境界，禪定就能產生。不是一定要前後只緣一個境界。

論：如果不是這樣，見道（證悟真理的道路）的觀境就應該沒有等持（專注）。

述曰：見道的相是十六心，如果一定要前後只緣一個境界，那麼觀境就應該沒有等持。

【English Translation】 English version Distracted Mind. That is, because there is no 'nian' (念, mindfulness/thought), it is not a 'pratityasamutpada' (遍行者, universally present mental factor). They further say that because there will be recollection later, it shows that the present 'nian' is the cause of the later recollection.

Treatise: Their statement is unreasonable because the same situation exists before.

Commentary: Now we refute their view. Don't assume that because there will be defiled ignorance, etc., or virtuous faith, etc., later, that these are constantly present now and serve as the cause for what follows. If you say that later ignorance, etc., arises because of previous ignorance, etc., then 'nian' is not universally present in the mind, just like ignorance, etc. If you argue that just as the self-cognition aspect (of mind) is the cause of later recollection, so we know that the self-cognition aspect exists before, then 'nian' should be the same, that is not correct. The mind allows for establishing a function on top of the previous substance, but now it is not allowed that the substance of 'nian' exists before and later 'nian', etc., arise. How can you use 'nian' to analogize the mind?

Treatise: The previous mind and mental factors are sufficient as the cause of recollection.

Commentary: After the mind, etc., takes an object, it has already perfumed the function into the 'alayavijnana' (本識, store consciousness), which is sufficient as the cause for later recollection. Why is it necessary for the present 'nian' to smoothly generate the later 'nian'? Or, the 'samjna' (想, perception) takes the image excellently, which is sufficient as the cause for generating the later 'nian'. Why wait for the present 'nian' to generate the later 'nian'?

Treatise: What is 'samadhi' (定, concentration)? It takes wisdom as its support and wisdom as its activity.

Commentary: 'Samadhi' that can generate wisdom, this mostly refers to the pure aspect, not that all 'samadhi' can generate wisdom. For example, after 'samadhi', an ignorant mind can also arise.

Treatise: So-called observing merits and faults, until decisive wisdom arises.

Commentary: The mind focuses on one object, relies on the teachings to engage with it, and realizes and understands the object, then the mind becomes clear and pure. From this, 'anasrava-jnana' (無漏智, undefiled wisdom) arises, which can know the merits, faults, etc., of the object. Relying on the four 'dharmapada' (四法跡, foundations of mindfulness), 'samadhi' can generate wisdom, but it is not necessarily required.

Treatise: The meaning of mind focusing is not that it only engages with one object.

Commentary: The focus mentioned here does not mean that the mind in 'samadhi' only engages with one thing. Rather, depending on how many objects the focused mind has, or which place one wants to focus on in a moment, deeply engaging with the object allows 'samadhi' to arise. It is not necessary to only engage with one object before and after.

Treatise: If not, the observation of objects in the 'darshana-marga' (見道, path of seeing) should not have 'samatha' (等持, tranquility).

Commentary: The characteristic of the 'darshana-marga' is sixteen minds. If it is necessary to only engage with one object before and after, then the observation of objects should not have 'samatha'.

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念皆住其心。於一境轉深取所緣故有定也。

論。若不繫心至故非遍行。

述曰。即散亂心不專注者便無定起。其第七識雖亦別緣。不專注心於境轉故。不深取故。故非定俱。如前第五卷說。故彼與此非是相違。此許易境亦名定故。能深取故。

論。有說爾時至應說誠言。

述曰。正理師等。亂心等時亦有定起。但相微隱相難知者。今詰彼曰應說誠言。誠謂誠諦。虛言說有理未可通。應緣實言令我知有。

論。若定能令至是觸用故。

述曰。若彼救言定能令心等和合同趣一境。心起皆有故是遍者。理亦不然。此觸用故。觸能和合心．心所法不令離別。同一緣故。

論。若謂此定至無易義故。

述曰。又汝若言令剎那頃能住一境。心不易緣故遍行攝者。理亦不然。一剎那心等。自然於一境無改易義。何須定爾。非一念心緣此復可更緣彼故。彼謂不然。心等性不定。非唯一念能住一境。由此經言心如猿猴難禁制故。故若一念住一境者。此由定數故有爾也。問彼設無定者。一念之心亦易緣不。彼言若無于定心住一境。則貪等無心自成染。此例不然。專注所緣必由定有。心住于境豈假定爾。不可以貪等無而不成染。便言定等無時心不緣慮。緣慮之事心先自成。豈假余法。其

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：念頭都安住於他的心中。因為在一個境界上深入地執取所緣，所以才有了定。

論：如果不是繫心專注，那麼定就不是遍行。

述曰：就是說散亂的心不專注，就沒有定的生起。第七識雖然也分別緣取，但不專注，在境界上不深入執取，所以不是與定同時生起。如前面第五卷所說。所以那裡的說法與這裡並不矛盾。這裡允許容易的境界也稱為定，因為能夠深入執取。

論：有人說，在散亂心等的時候也有定生起，只是相貌微弱難以察覺。現在詰問他們，應該說誠實的話。誠就是誠實，用虛假的話說有理也難以通達。應該用真實的語言讓我知道有。

論：如果說定能夠使心等和合，共同趨向一個境界，心的生起都有定，所以是遍行。這個道理也是不成立的，因為這是觸的作用。觸能夠和合心和心所法，不讓它們分離，因為它們緣取同一個對象。

論：如果說這個定能夠使剎那間的心安住於一個境界，心不改變所緣，所以被攝為遍行。這個道理也是不成立的。一個剎那的心等，自然在一個境界上沒有改變的意義，何須定呢？不是說一個念頭的心緣取這個之後還可以再緣取那個。他們認為不是這樣，心等的自性是不定的，不是隻有一個念頭能夠安住於一個境界。因此經中說心像猿猴一樣難以禁制。所以如果一個念頭安住於一個境界，這是因為有定的緣故。問他們，如果沒有定，一個念頭的心也容易改變所緣嗎？他們說，如果沒有定，心安住於一個境界，那麼貪等沒有心也會自然成為染污。這個比喻是不成立的。專注所緣必定是因為有定，心安住于境界難道是憑藉定嗎？不能因為貪等沒有就不成為染污，就說定等沒有的時候心就不緣慮。緣慮的事情心本來就能做到，難道要憑藉其他法嗎？

【English Translation】 English version: Thoughts all abide in his mind. Because of deeply grasping the object of focus in one state, there is Samadhi (定).

Treatise: If the mind is not focused, then Samadhi is not all-pervasive.

Commentary: That is to say, a scattered mind that is not focused will not give rise to Samadhi. Although the seventh consciousness also separately cognizes, it is not focused, and does not deeply grasp the object, so it does not arise simultaneously with Samadhi. As stated in the fifth fascicle earlier. Therefore, that statement does not contradict this one. Here, easy states are also called Samadhi because they can deeply grasp.

Treatise: Some say that even during times of a scattered mind, Samadhi arises, but its appearance is subtle and difficult to perceive. Now, questioning them, one should speak truthfully. 'Truth' means being honest; using false words to claim reason is difficult to accept. One should use truthful language to let me know it exists.

Treatise: If it is said that Samadhi can harmonize the mind and its functions, causing them to jointly move towards one state, and that the arising of the mind always has Samadhi, therefore it is all-pervasive. This reasoning is also not valid because this is the function of Contact (觸). Contact can harmonize the mind and mental functions, preventing them from separating, because they cognize the same object.

Treatise: If it is said that this Samadhi can make the mind abide in one state for an instant, and the mind does not change its object of focus, therefore it is included as all-pervasive. This reasoning is also not valid. The mind and its functions in an instant naturally have no meaning of change in one state; why need Samadhi? It is not that a mind in one thought can cognize this and then cognize that. They think it is not like this; the nature of the mind and its functions is not fixed; it is not that only one thought can abide in one state. Therefore, the sutra says that the mind is like a monkey, difficult to restrain. So, if a thought abides in one state, it is because of Samadhi. Questioning them, if there is no Samadhi, does the mind in one thought easily change its object of focus? They say that if there is no Samadhi, the mind abides in one state, then greed, etc., without the mind, will naturally become defiled. This analogy is not valid. Focusing on the object of focus must be because of Samadhi; does the mind abiding in a state rely on Samadhi? One cannot say that because greed, etc., without the mind, do not become defiled, therefore, when Samadhi, etc., are absent, the mind does not contemplate. The matter of contemplation is something the mind can do on its own; does it need to rely on other dharmas?

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心剎那住境亦爾。若緣慮時必住境故。但深取境假定方能。由此心等不假于定。一念之中能住于境。

論。若言由定至取所緣故。

述曰。彼復救言令心取境名之為定。復難彼言。令心取境作意之功。非由定力。如前已說。如須正理第十一救言大廣。

論。有說此定至心一境性。

述曰。此經部師。以經三學中說為心學。靜慮支中說為心一境性。故離心無。

論。彼非誠證至說彼言故。

述曰。今破不然。心學者依攝心故。心一境者。令心住一境故說為心。非體即心。

論。根力學支至非即心故。

述曰。五根．五力．七覺．八道支中別說故。定非即心。如念．惠等。念．惠等法彼體是思。然非即心故以為喻。此中比量如文可解。亦如正理論第十一廣闡。

論。云何為惠至斷疑為業。

述曰。此說勝惠故言斷疑。疑心俱時亦有惠故。至下當知。

論。觀謂德失至非遍行攝。

述曰。釋業義。顯非遍行。然于愚昧心中無者。非一切愚皆無。以邪見者癡增上故。今但愚而亦昧心即無也。愚不昧者或可有故。第八識昧而不愚亦無惠也。

正理師云。

論。有說爾時至天愛寧知。

述曰。但相微隱。彼時亦有。今應問彼。天愛

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：心念剎那停留于所緣境也是如此。如果緣慮時，心必然會停留在所緣境上。但只有深入地專注于所緣境，才能假立為『定』。因此，心等（心王和心所）並不依賴於『定』，在一念之中就能停留在所緣境上。

論：如果說因為有『定』才能達到對所緣境的執取。

述曰：對方又辯解說，使心執取所緣境就叫做『定』。反駁他們說，使心執取所緣境是作意的作用，不是依靠『定』的力量。如前面已經說過的。如《須正理》第十一中廣為辯解。

論：有人說，這個『定』是指心專注于單一境性。

述曰：這是經部師的觀點。因為在經部的三學中，『定』被歸為心學，在靜慮的各個支分中，『定』被說成是心專注于單一境性，所以『定』不是獨立於心之外的。

論：這種說法不是可靠的證據，因為經典只是那樣說而已。

述曰：現在破斥這種觀點。『心學』是因為它能攝持心，『心一境性』是因為它能使心安住于單一境，所以才說它是『心』，但它的體性並不是心本身。

論：五根、五力、七覺支、八正道支中都分別提到了『定』，所以『定』不是心本身。

述曰：五根（panca indriya），五力（panca bala），七覺支（sapta bodhyangani），八正道支（astangika-marga）中都分別提到了『定』，所以『定』不是心本身。就像『念』（smrti）、『慧』（prajna）等。『念』、『慧』等法的體性是思，但它們不是心本身，所以用它們來作比喻。其中的比量可以按照文義來理解。也如《正理論》第十一中廣為闡述。

論：什麼是『慧』？以斷除疑惑為作用。

述曰：這裡說的是殊勝的『慧』，所以說它能斷除疑惑。因為在疑惑的心中，也有『慧』存在。到後面會知道。

論：觀察是指對功德和過失的辨別，所以不屬於遍行心所。

述曰：解釋『慧』的作用，表明它不屬於遍行心所。然而，在愚昧的心中沒有『慧』，但並非所有的愚昧都一定沒有『慧』。因為有邪見的人，是愚癡更加嚴重。現在只是愚昧而且心識昏昧，才沒有『慧』。愚昧但不昏昧的人，或許有『慧』。第八識（Alaya-vijnana）昏昧而不愚昧，也沒有『慧』。

《正理師》說：

論：有人說，那時『慧』只是相狀微隱，實際上是存在的。現在應該問他們：天愛（Devanampiya）啊，你怎麼知道？

述曰：只是相狀微隱，那時也是存在的。現在應該問他們：天愛（Devanampiya）啊，你怎麼知道？

【English Translation】 English version: The mind's momentary dwelling on an object is also like this. If there is contemplation, the mind will necessarily dwell on the object. But only by deeply focusing on the object can 'samadhi' (concentration) be nominally established. Therefore, the mind and its functions do not depend on 'samadhi'; in a single moment, they can dwell on the object.

Treatise: If it is said that it is because of 'samadhi' that one can achieve grasping of the object.

Commentary: The opponent argues that causing the mind to grasp the object is called 'samadhi'. Refuting them, it is said that causing the mind to grasp the object is the function of 'manaskara' (attention), not relying on the power of 'samadhi'. As has been said before. As explained extensively in the eleventh section of the Nyayasutra.

Treatise: Some say that this 'samadhi' refers to the mind's one-pointedness.

Commentary: This is the view of the Sautrantika school. Because in the three learnings of the Sautrantika school, 'samadhi' is classified as mental training, and in the branches of dhyana (meditation), 'samadhi' is described as the mind's one-pointedness, so 'samadhi' is not independent of the mind.

Treatise: This statement is not reliable evidence, because the scriptures only say that.

Commentary: Now refuting this view. 'Mental training' is because it can gather the mind, and 'one-pointedness of mind' is because it can make the mind dwell on a single object, so it is called 'mind', but its nature is not the mind itself.

Treatise: The five roots, five powers, seven factors of enlightenment, and eightfold noble path all mention 'samadhi' separately, so 'samadhi' is not the mind itself.

Commentary: The five roots (panca indriya), five powers (panca bala), seven factors of enlightenment (sapta bodhyangani), and eightfold noble path (astangika-marga) all mention 'samadhi' separately, so 'samadhi' is not the mind itself. Like 'smrti' (mindfulness), 'prajna' (wisdom), etc. The nature of 'smrti', 'prajna', etc., is thought, but they are not the mind itself, so they are used as metaphors. The inference in this can be understood according to the meaning of the text. It is also extensively explained in the eleventh section of the Nyayabhusana.

Treatise: What is 'prajna'? Its function is to eliminate doubt.

Commentary: Here, it refers to superior 'prajna', so it is said that it can eliminate doubt. Because in a doubtful mind, there is also 'prajna' present. This will be known later.

Treatise: Observation refers to the discrimination of merits and faults, so it does not belong to the omnipresent mental factors.

Commentary: Explaining the function of 'prajna', it shows that it does not belong to the omnipresent mental factors. However, in an ignorant mind, there is no 'prajna', but not all ignorance necessarily lacks 'prajna'. Because those with wrong views have more severe ignorance. Now, only those who are ignorant and whose minds are also dull lack 'prajna'. Those who are ignorant but not dull may have 'prajna'. The eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) is dull but not ignorant, and also lacks 'prajna'.

The Nyayabhusana says:

Treatise: Some say that at that time, 'prajna' is only subtly hidden, but it actually exists. Now, they should be asked: Devanampiya (Beloved of the Gods), how do you know?

Commentary: It is only subtly hidden, and it also exists at that time. Now, they should be asked: Devanampiya (Beloved of the Gods), how do you know?

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寧知。

論。對法說為大地法故。

述曰。天愛救言。發智．六足俱我所宗。總名對法。對法說為大地法故。

論。諸部對法至執為定量。

述曰。今應難曰。諸部對法展轉相違。非是根本佛所說故。汝等如何執彼對法以為定量。總非諸部。

大段第二遮是遍行。

論。唯觸等五至不應固執。

述曰。唯五是遍行。如前引經。說十非經。不應固執。須依本經。非末論故。

既別說已。次總結之。

論。然欲等五至如信貪等。

述曰。此中比量。欲等五法。定非遍行。非觸等五故。如信．貪等。

大段第三明欲等五獨或並生。

論。有義此五至必有餘四。

述曰。此師意說。此欲等五。若一起時必有餘四。相資之時方作用轉。五必俱生。若一不起時。餘四皆不起。此安惠義。西方共責。論說四境能生欲等。如何此五定可俱生。又若有境非曾所受。但聞此勝名即生希欲。如何有念。不專注故如何有定。不印是非亦無勝解。故必不俱。彼言四境能生欲等。約欲等五行相增說。謂欲但于所樂境增。故偏說之。非實于中無細餘四。故必相資。

論。有義不定至無後二故。

述曰。起欲等五或俱不俱。所以知者。瑜伽第三說四一切

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 寧知。

論：對法（Abhidharma，佛教經論之一種）說為大地法（mahā-bhūmi-dharma，普遍存在的法）的緣故。

述曰：天愛救（Devatrāṇa，論師名）說：發智（Jñānaprasthāna，論書名）、六足（六足論，佛教論書的合稱）都是我所宗奉的。總稱為對法。對法說為大地法的緣故。

論：諸部對法乃至執為定量（pramāṇa，衡量、標準）。

述曰：現在應該反駁說：諸部對法輾轉互相違背，不是根本佛（釋迦牟尼佛）所說，你們如何執持那些對法作為衡量標準？總的來說，不是所有部派都這樣。

大段第二，遮止它是遍行（sarvatraga，普遍存在）的。

論：唯有觸（sparśa，感覺）、等五（指作意、受、想、思）乃至不應固執。

述曰：只有五者是遍行的。如前面引用的經文。說十者不是經文。不應該固執。必須依據根本的經文，而不是末端的論著。

已經分別說明之後，接下來總結它。

論：然而欲（chanda，意欲）、等五（指勝解、念、定、慧）乃至如信（śraddhā，信仰）、貪（rāga，貪慾）等。

述曰：這裡用比量（anumāna，推理）來說明。欲等五法，必定不是遍行的，因為它們不是觸等五法，如同信、貪等。

大段第三，說明欲等五種是單獨生起或者同時生起。

論：有義（一部分學者的觀點）認為，這五種（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）如果一起生起，必定有其餘四種。

述曰：這位論師的意思是說，這欲等五種，如果一起生起時，必定有其餘四種。相互資助的時候才發揮作用。五者必定同時生起。如果一個不生起時，其餘四個都不生起。這是安慧（Sthiramati，論師名）的觀點。西方學者共同責難。論中說四境（色、聲、香、味）能夠生起欲等，如何這五種必定可以同時生起？又如果有的境界不是曾經感受過的，只是聽到這個殊勝的名字就生起希望和慾望，怎麼會有念？因為不專注的緣故，怎麼會有定？因為不印證是非也沒有勝解。所以必定不是同時生起。他們說四境能夠生起欲等，是就欲等五種的行相增上來說的。說欲只是在所喜愛的境界上增長，所以偏重說它。不是說實際上其中沒有細微的其餘四種，所以必定是相互資助的。

論：有義（另一部分學者的觀點）認為，生起欲等五種或者同時或者不同時。之所以知道這一點，瑜伽第三（瑜伽師地論第三卷）說四一切（四種一切性）

述曰：生起欲等五種或者同時或者不同時。之所以知道這一點，瑜伽第三（瑜伽師地論第三卷）說四一切（四種一切性），因為沒有後二者的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version Ning Zhi.

Treatise: Abhidharma (a type of Buddhist scripture and commentary) is said to be a Mahā-bhūmi-dharma (a universally existing dharma) because of this.

Commentary: Devatrāṇa (name of a commentator) said: Jñānaprasthāna (name of a treatise), and the Six Feet (Ṣaṭpāda-abhidharma, a collective name for Buddhist treatises) are all what I uphold. They are collectively called Abhidharma. Abhidharma is said to be a Mahā-bhūmi-dharma because of this.

Treatise: The Abhidharma of various schools even hold it as a pramāṇa (measure, standard).

Commentary: Now it should be refuted by saying: The Abhidharma of various schools contradict each other, and they were not spoken by the fundamental Buddha (Śākyamuni Buddha), how do you uphold those Abhidharma as a measure? In general, not all schools do this.

The second major section, refuting that it is sarvatraga (universally present).

Treatise: Only sparśa (touch, sensation), and the five etc. (referring to manasikara, vedanā, saṃjñā, cetanā) even should not be rigidly adhered to.

Commentary: Only these five are sarvatraga. As the sutra quoted earlier. Saying ten is not from the sutra. One should not rigidly adhere to it. One must rely on the fundamental sutra, not the later treatises.

After having explained them separately, next summarize them.

Treatise: However, chanda (desire, intention), and the five etc. (referring to adhimokṣa, smṛti, samādhi, prajñā) even like śraddhā (faith), rāga (greed) etc.

Commentary: Here, use anumāna (inference) to explain. The five dharmas such as chanda are definitely not sarvatraga, because they are not the five dharmas such as sparśa, like śraddhā, rāga etc.

The third major section, explaining that the five such as chanda arise alone or simultaneously.

Treatise: Some (the view of some scholars) believe that if these five (chanda, adhimokṣa, smṛti, samādhi, prajñā) arise together, there must be the other four.

Commentary: The meaning of this commentator is that, these five such as chanda, if they arise together, there must be the other four. They only function when they support each other. The five must arise simultaneously. If one does not arise, the other four do not arise. This is the view of Sthiramati (name of a commentator). Western scholars commonly criticize this. The treatise says that the four objects (rūpa, śabda, gandha, rasa) can give rise to chanda etc., how can these five necessarily arise simultaneously? Also, if some realm has not been previously experienced, but one hears the excellent name of it and hope and desire arise, how can there be smṛti? Because one is not focused, how can there be samādhi? Because one does not confirm right and wrong, and there is no adhimokṣa. Therefore, they definitely do not arise simultaneously. They say that the four objects can give rise to chanda etc., which is speaking about the increasing aspect of the characteristics of the five such as chanda. Saying that chanda only increases in the beloved realm, therefore it is emphasized. It is not that there are actually no subtle other four within it, therefore they must support each other.

Treatise: Some (the view of another group of scholars) believe that the arising of the five such as chanda is either simultaneous or not simultaneous. The reason for knowing this is that the third of Yoga (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the third volume) says four all (four kinds of all-ness)

Commentary: The arising of the five such as chanda is either simultaneous or not simultaneous. The reason for knowing this is that the third of Yoga (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the third volume) says four all (four kinds of all-ness), because there are no latter two.

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。說此五種無後二故。第三是時。第四是俱。未必俱故。若言欲等行相不俱增故彼不說俱。五體既俱有。彼處應說。

論。又說此五至非定俱故。

述曰。五十五說此欲等五緣四境生。所樂．決定．曾習．所觀。所緣四境能緣欲等。非是俱故。論說此五依四境生。若境不必俱。欲等未必並。所緣．能緣各各非定俱故。非必相資。

此義如何等。

論。應說此五至唯起憶念。

述曰。此欲等五緣四境時。或時起一于所樂境唯起于欲。境非串習故無念起。境不決定故無勝解。非所觀境故無定．惠。此所樂境既如是簡。次餘三境準此可知。

論。或於所觀至有定無惠。

述曰。于第四境唯起專注　問定．惠境同二必俱有。何得別生　答謂愚昧類極愚癡者。為欲攝斂粗動心故。專注繫念。非有簡擇諸法道理。但學緣眉間等。住心。於此時中都無有惠。世間之人皆共知彼有定無惠。

若爾此境何名所觀。所觀之言惠之境故。以本論言定緣所觀必惠境故。

論。彼加行位至緣所觀境。

述曰。此愚昧者。于攝斂心加行位中有少聞思。或依師傳聞說斂心眉間之言。或獨尋經論見斂心之語少有簡擇。然斂心時但住所緣。繫心眉間不能簡擇。此定所緣之境。從前加行位。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為以上五種情況不包括后兩種（指「俱」和「時」）。第三種是「時」，第四種是「俱」，但並非必然同時發生。如果說「欲」等心所的行相不是同時增長的，那麼就不應該說它們是「俱」。既然五種條件都同時具備，那麼在相應的地方就應該說明。

論：又說這五種情況並非一定同時具備。

述記：第五十五卷說，這五種（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）緣於四種境而生起：所樂境、決定境、曾習境、所觀境。這四種境是「欲」等心所的所緣境，是能緣。「並非是同時具備的」意思是說，論中說這五種心所依四種境而生起，如果境不是必然同時具備，那麼「欲」等心所也未必同時生起。所緣和能緣各自都不是必然同時具備的，因此並非必須互相資助。

這種意義如何理解呢？

論：應該說這五種情況，有時只會生起憶念。

述記：這五種心所緣四種境時，有時只生起一種。例如，在所樂境上，只會生起「欲」。因為這個境不是串習的，所以沒有「念」生起；因為這個境不是決定的，所以沒有「勝解」；因為這個境不是所觀的，所以沒有「定」和「慧」。這個所樂境既然如此簡略，那麼其餘三種境的情況可以依此類推。

論：或者在所觀境上，只有「定」而沒有「慧」。

述記：對於第四種境（所觀境），有時只會生起專注。問：定和慧的境相同，兩者必然同時具備，為什麼會單獨生起「定」呢？答：這是指愚昧之人，極其愚癡的人。爲了攝斂粗動的心，所以專注繫念，但沒有簡擇諸法道理的能力，只是學習緣眉間等處來住心。在此時中，完全沒有「慧」。世間之人都知道這些人只有「定」而沒有「慧」。

如果這樣，這個境為什麼叫做「所觀」呢？「所觀」這個詞是「慧」的境啊！因為本論說「定」緣「所觀境」必然是「慧」的境。

論：那些在加行位的人，緣所觀境。

述記：這些愚昧之人，在攝斂心的加行位中，有少許的聞思。或者依據師長的傳授，聽說過攝斂心於眉間的說法；或者獨自尋閱經論，看到過攝斂心的語句，有少許的簡擇。然而在攝斂心的時候，只是安住所緣，繫心于眉間，不能簡擇。這個「定」所緣的境，是從前面的加行位而來。

【English Translation】 English version: Because these five conditions do not include the latter two (referring to 'simultaneity' and 'time'). The third is 'time', and the fourth is 'simultaneity', but they do not necessarily occur at the same time. If it is said that the characteristics of mental factors such as 'desire' do not increase simultaneously, then it should not be said that they are 'simultaneous'. Since all five conditions are present simultaneously, it should be explained in the corresponding place.

Treatise: Furthermore, it is said that these five conditions are not necessarily present simultaneously.

Commentary: Volume 55 states that these five (desire (欲), ascertainment (勝解), mindfulness (念), concentration (定), wisdom (慧)) arise from four objects: the desirable object, the determined object, the previously practiced object, and the contemplated object. These four objects are the objects of mental factors such as 'desire', and are the able-object. 'Not necessarily present simultaneously' means that the treatise says that these five mental factors arise based on four objects. If the objects are not necessarily present simultaneously, then mental factors such as 'desire' may not arise simultaneously. The object and the able-object are not necessarily present simultaneously, so they do not necessarily assist each other.

How should this meaning be understood?

Treatise: It should be said that these five conditions sometimes only give rise to mindfulness.

Commentary: When these five mental factors are related to the four objects, sometimes only one arises. For example, in the desirable object, only 'desire' arises. Because this object is not habitually practiced, 'mindfulness' does not arise; because this object is not determined, 'ascertainment' does not arise; because this object is not contemplated, 'concentration' and 'wisdom' do not arise. Since this desirable object is so simple, the situation of the other three objects can be inferred by analogy.

Treatise: Or in the contemplated object, there is only 'concentration' without 'wisdom'.

Commentary: For the fourth object (the contemplated object), sometimes only focus arises. Question: The objects of concentration and wisdom are the same, and the two must be present simultaneously, so why does 'concentration' arise alone? Answer: This refers to ignorant people, extremely foolish people. In order to restrain the coarse and agitated mind, they focus and maintain mindfulness, but they do not have the ability to discern the principles of all dharmas. They only learn to focus on the space between the eyebrows, etc., to abide in the mind. At this time, there is no 'wisdom' at all. People in the world all know that these people only have 'concentration' and no 'wisdom'.

If so, why is this object called 'contemplated'? The word 'contemplated' is the object of 'wisdom'! Because this treatise says that 'concentration' related to the 'contemplated object' must be the object of 'wisdom'.

Treatise: Those who are in the stage of application (加行位) relate to the contemplated object.

Commentary: These ignorant people, in the stage of application of restraining the mind, have a little hearing and thinking. Or based on the transmission of teachers, they have heard of the saying of restraining the mind at the space between the eyebrows; or they have independently searched through scriptures and treatises and seen the words of restraining the mind, and have a little discernment. However, when restraining the mind, they only abide in the object, focusing the mind on the space between the eyebrows, and cannot discern. The object of this 'concentration' comes from the previous stage of application.

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說名所觀境。

論。或依多分至其類寔繁。

述曰。此第二解。或所觀境多定．惠俱。此愚昧者雖無惠數。從余多分故說定境名為所觀。如欲界中戲忘念天。以多耽染故專注一境。意憤恚天角眼相視專心致死。又或起貪。或瞋他等。唯有專注而無簡擇。亦癡多故。其類非一。如此愚癡闇昧多者。唯有定故於所觀起一定也。

論。或於所觀至馳散推求。

述曰。或唯起惠。謂掉舉多者不專一境。馳散其心推求法相或復事理。唯有惠無定亦世所共成。即四境中一一別起。境互所無合有五種。

論。或時起二至合有十二。

述曰。此說于境但具二義。故說起二。今說或於二境起二。即以所樂為初合余有四。今論但舉欲之所樂合。謂所樂．決定為初合起欲．解。以所樂．曾習境合起欲．念。以所樂．所觀合起欲．定。以所樂．所觀合起欲．惠　次以決定為初合余有三。謂以決定．曾習境合起解．念。以決定．所觀合起解．定。以決定．所觀合起解．惠　次以曾習為初有二。謂以曾習．所觀合起念．定。以曾習．所觀合起念．惠　次以所觀同起定．惠為一。今論有三。舉初之二。及此後一。總合以前有十個二數也。

論。或時起三至合有十三。

述曰。此說於四境起三數。初

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 說明所觀的境界。

論：或者依據多數情況，這類境界確實繁多。

述記：這是第二種解釋。或者所觀的境界，是禪定和智慧都有。那些愚昧的人雖然沒有智慧，但因為多數是禪定，所以說禪定境界是所觀的。例如欲界中的戲忘念天（指沉迷於嬉戲而忘記正念的天人），因為多數沉溺於染著，所以專注一個境界。意憤恚天（指充滿憤怒的天人）用眼角互相瞪視，專心致志地想要殺死對方。又或者生起貪慾，或者嗔恨他人等等，只有專注而沒有簡擇，也是因為愚癡居多。這類情況並非只有一種。像這樣愚癡闇昧居多的人，因為只有禪定，所以對於所觀的境界只生起禪定。

論：或者對於所觀的境界，心識馳散，推求法相。

述記：或者僅僅生起智慧。指掉舉（心識浮動不定）多的人，不能專注於一個境界，心識馳散，推求法相或者事理。只有智慧而沒有禪定，這也是世俗所共有的。即在四種境界中，每一種都單獨生起。境界之間互相沒有，合起來共有五種。

論：或者有時生起兩種，合起來共有十二種。

述記：這裡說對於境界只具備兩種意義，所以說生起兩種。現在說或者對於兩種境界生起兩種。即以所樂的境界為開始，和其餘的境界結合，共有四種。現在論中只舉出慾望所樂的結合。即以所樂、決定為開始，結合生起慾望、理解。以所樂、曾習的境界結合，生起慾望、憶念。以所樂、所觀的境界結合，生起慾望、禪定。以所樂、所觀的境界結合，生起慾望、智慧。其次以決定為開始，和其餘的境界結合，共有三種。即以決定、曾習的境界結合，生起理解、憶念。以決定、所觀的境界結合，生起理解、禪定。以決定、所觀的境界結合，生起理解、智慧。其次以曾習為開始，共有兩種。即以曾習、所觀的境界結合，生起憶念、禪定。以曾習、所觀的境界結合，生起憶念、智慧。其次以所觀的境界同時生起禪定、智慧為一種。現在論中有三種，舉出最初的兩種，以及這最後一種，總合以前有十個兩種的情況。

論：或者有時生起三種，合起來共有十三種。

述記：這裡說對於四種境界生起三種的情況。最初

【English Translation】 English version Explaining the observed realm.

Treatise: Or, according to the majority of cases, the types of these realms are indeed numerous.

Commentary: This is the second explanation. Or the observed realm includes both Dhyana (meditative concentration) and Prajna (wisdom). Although those who are ignorant lack wisdom, because they mostly have Dhyana, the realm of Dhyana is said to be what is observed. For example, the Playful Forgetful Heavens (referring to beings in the desire realm who are engrossed in play and forget mindfulness), because they are mostly immersed in attachment, focus on one realm. The Wrathful Heavens (referring to beings filled with anger) glare at each other, intently seeking to kill each other. Or they may generate greed, or anger towards others, etc., having only focus without discernment, also because of prevalent ignorance. These types are not just one kind. Like those who are mostly ignorant and unenlightened, because they only have Dhyana, they only generate Dhyana towards what is observed.

Treatise: Or, regarding the observed realm, the mind wanders and seeks after the characteristics of phenomena.

Commentary: Or only Prajna arises. This refers to those with much agitation (restlessness of mind), who cannot focus on one realm, their minds wander, seeking after the characteristics of phenomena or principles. Only having wisdom without Dhyana, this is also commonly seen in the world. That is, in the four realms, each arises separately. The realms are mutually exclusive, combining to form five types.

Treatise: Or sometimes two arise, combining to form twelve types.

Commentary: This says that regarding the realm, only two meanings are possessed, so it is said that two arise. Now it is said that or regarding two realms, two arise. That is, taking the desired realm as the beginning, combining with the remaining realms, there are four types. Now the treatise only mentions the combination of what is desired. That is, taking what is desired and determination as the beginning, combining to generate desire and understanding. Combining what is desired and the realm of past habits, generating desire and mindfulness. Combining what is desired and the observed realm, generating desire and Dhyana. Combining what is desired and the observed realm, generating desire and wisdom. Next, taking determination as the beginning, combining with the remaining realms, there are three types. That is, combining determination and the realm of past habits, generating understanding and mindfulness. Combining determination and the observed realm, generating understanding and Dhyana. Combining determination and the observed realm, generating understanding and wisdom. Next, taking past habits as the beginning, there are two types. That is, combining past habits and the observed realm, generating mindfulness and Dhyana. Combining past habits and the observed realm, generating mindfulness and wisdom. Next, the observed realm simultaneously generates Dhyana and wisdom as one type. Now there are three types in the treatise, mentioning the first two, and this last one, combining with the previous ones, there are a total of ten instances of two.

Treatise: Or sometimes three arise, combining to form thirteen types.

Commentary: This says that regarding the four realms, three arise. Initially

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以所樂為首合余有六。論但舉一。謂于所樂．決定．曾習合起欲．解．念三。復以所樂．決定．所觀合起欲．解．定三。復以所樂．決定．所觀合起欲．解．惠三。復以所樂．曾習．所觀合起欲．念．定三。復以所樂．曾習．所觀起欲．念．惠三。復以所樂．所觀起欲．定．惠三。如是以決定為首有三。謂于決定．曾習．所觀起解．念．定三。復于決定．曾習．所觀起解．念．惠三。復以決定．所觀起解．定．惠三。如是于曾習．所觀起念．定．惠三。合總四境起欲等有十個三也。此中但舉初一后一。

論。或時起四至合為五四。

述曰。謂於四境更互除一。謂初于所樂．決定．曾習．所觀起初四除惠。如是於前四境除定取惠。如是於前四境中除曾習。即於三境起四。除念取定。如是四境中除決定。於三境中起四。除解取念。如是四境除所樂於三境起四。除欲取勝解。即互除一。合四境起亦有五個四也。此中但舉后一初一。一一料簡如前可知。

論。或時起五至具起五種。

述曰。文易知故。

論。如是於四至三十一句。

述曰。合前一一別起乃至起五。總有三十一句。此中所說皆據因位。

論。或有心位至此類非一。

述曰。六識一時中五皆不起。如非四境現前

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以『所樂』（喜歡的）為首，總共有六種組合。論中只舉了一個例子，即以『所樂』、『決定』（決定的）、『曾習』（曾經練習過的）結合，生起『欲』（慾望）、『解』（理解）、『念』（憶念）三種心所。又以『所樂』、『決定』、『所觀』（所觀察的）結合，生起『欲』、『解』、『定』（禪定）三種心所。又以『所樂』、『決定』、『所觀』結合，生起『欲』、『解』、『惠』（智慧）三種心所。又以『所樂』、『曾習』、『所觀』結合，生起『欲』、『念』、『定』三種心所。又以『所樂』、『曾習』、『所觀』結合，生起『欲』、『念』、『惠』三種心所。又以『所樂』、『所觀』結合，生起『欲』、『定』、『惠』三種心所。像這樣，以『決定』為首有三種組合，即以『決定』、『曾習』、『所觀』生起『解』、『念』、『定』三種心所。又以『決定』、『曾習』、『所觀』生起『解』、『念』、『惠』三種心所。又以『決定』、『所觀』生起『解』、『定』、『惠』三種心所。像這樣，以『曾習』、『所觀』生起『念』、『定』、『惠』三種心所。總共四種境界生起『欲』等心所，有十個三種組合。這裡只舉了第一個和最後一個例子。 論：或者有時生起四種心所，總共有五個四種組合。 述曰：指的是在四種境界中，每次去除一種。例如，最初在『所樂』、『決定』、『曾習』、『所觀』中生起最初的四種心所，去除『惠』。像這樣，在前四種境界中去除『定』，取『惠』。像這樣，在前四種境界中去除『曾習』，即在三種境界中生起四種心所，去除『念』，取『定』。像這樣，在四種境界中去除『決定』，在三種境界中生起四種心所，去除『解』，取『念』。像這樣，四種境界中去除『所樂』，在三種境界中生起四種心所，去除『欲』，取『勝解』。即互相去除一種，四種境界生起也有五個四種組合。這裡只舉了最後一個和第一個例子。一一分析，如前可知。 論：或者有時生起五種心所，直到完全生起五種。 述曰：文句容易理解，故不贅述。 論：像這樣，從四種心所到三十一種。 述曰：合起來，從一一分別生起，乃至生起五種，總共有三十一種。這裡所說的都是根據因位（修行位）。 論：或者有心位，此類情況不止一種。 述曰：六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）同時運作時，五種心所都不能同時生起。例如，如果不是四種境界同時現前。

【English Translation】 English version: With 'what is liked' (所樂) as the head, there are six combinations in total. The treatise only gives one example, which is the combination of 'what is liked', 'determination' (決定), and 'what has been practiced' (曾習), giving rise to the three mental factors of 'desire' (欲), 'understanding' (解), and 'mindfulness' (念). Also, with the combination of 'what is liked', 'determination', and 'what is observed' (所觀), the three mental factors of 'desire', 'understanding', and 'concentration' (定) arise. Also, with the combination of 'what is liked', 'determination', and 'what is observed', the three mental factors of 'desire', 'understanding', and 'wisdom' (惠) arise. Also, with the combination of 'what is liked', 'what has been practiced', and 'what is observed', the three mental factors of 'desire', 'mindfulness', and 'concentration' arise. Also, with the combination of 'what is liked', 'what has been practiced', and 'what is observed', the three mental factors of 'desire', 'mindfulness', and 'wisdom' arise. Also, with the combination of 'what is liked' and 'what is observed', the three mental factors of 'desire', 'concentration', and 'wisdom' arise. In this way, with 'determination' as the head, there are three combinations, namely, with 'determination', 'what has been practiced', and 'what is observed', the three mental factors of 'understanding', 'mindfulness', and 'concentration' arise. Also, with 'determination', 'what has been practiced', and 'what is observed', the three mental factors of 'understanding', 'mindfulness', and 'wisdom' arise. Also, with 'determination' and 'what is observed', the three mental factors of 'understanding', 'concentration', and 'wisdom' arise. In this way, with 'what has been practiced' and 'what is observed', the three mental factors of 'mindfulness', 'concentration', and 'wisdom' arise. In total, there are four objects giving rise to 'desire' and other mental factors, with ten combinations of three. Here, only the first and last examples are given. Treatise: Or sometimes four mental factors arise, totaling five combinations of four. Commentary: This refers to removing one of the four objects each time. For example, initially, in 'what is liked', 'determination', 'what has been practiced', and 'what is observed', the first four mental factors arise, removing 'wisdom'. In this way, in the previous four objects, 'concentration' is removed, and 'wisdom' is taken. In this way, in the previous four objects, 'what has been practiced' is removed, that is, in three objects, four arise, removing 'mindfulness' and taking 'concentration'. In this way, in the four objects, 'determination' is removed, and in the three objects, four arise, removing 'understanding' and taking 'mindfulness'. In this way, in the four objects, 'what is liked' is removed, and in the three objects, four arise, removing 'desire' and taking 'superior understanding'. That is, removing one another, there are also five combinations of four arising from the four objects. Here, only the last and first examples are given. Each analysis can be understood as before. Treatise: Or sometimes five mental factors arise, until all five arise completely. Commentary: The text is easy to understand, so it will not be elaborated. Treatise: In this way, from four mental factors to thirty-one. Commentary: Combining them, from each arising separately, up to the arising of five, there are thirty-one in total. What is said here is all based on the causal position (the stage of practice). Treatise: Or there are mental states, and there are more than one of this kind. Commentary: When the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness) operate simultaneously, the five mental factors cannot all arise at the same time. For example, if the four objects are not all present at the same time.

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。于散疑境等率爾心起六識。皆無此欲等五。此舉粗顯。乃至等流亦有此事。準義應知。或第八識俱此五亦無。第七識如前有諍。故知欲等非必定俱。

自下第四八識分別。

論。第七八識至如前已說。

述曰。此七．八識若因若果位或有或無。如前已說。

論。第六意識至皆不遮故。

述曰。若在因中。或五俱起。或一一別生。若在果時一向定有。此中即是諸位容有。若轉依．未轉依皆不遮故。

論。有義五識至無簡擇故。

述曰。此五皆無。五識緣現在已得法起。任運緣故無慾。欲緣未得境作意希望生。故五識無也。五識任運緣境。勝解審決印持。故五無勝解。五識剎那恒取新境。不緣過去故境而生。無有追憶。故無念也。五識如對法第一末說。自性散動無有專注。故無定也。五識不能推度無有簡擇。故無惠也。此師以天眼．耳通是意識相應惠。瑜伽論依眼．耳俱時意識相應智說為通性也。后師即彼二識為所依。智為能依故有惠也。

論。有義五識至念境類故。

述曰。第二師云。五識亦非決定有此。然或有時容皆具有。若上意識增上希望未來境等。即五識無。緣現在境由意引生。微劣希望亦樂現境。故有欲也。八非意引任運而生。于境不樂故無慾也。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：在散亂、疑惑的境界等情況下，第六識突然生起，都沒有貪慾等五種心所。這裡只是粗略地顯示，乃至等流果中也有這種情況，根據道理應該知道。或者第八識（阿賴耶識，儲存所有經驗的根本識）與之俱起時，這五種心所也沒有。第七識（末那識，執著第八識為自我的意識）的情況如前所述，存在爭議。因此可知，貪慾等心所並非必定同時存在。

下面第四部分，分別討論第八識。

論：第七識和第八識的情況，如前所述。

述記：這第七識和第八識，無論在因位還是果位，或者有或者沒有，如前面已經說過。

論：第六意識（分別事物的意識）在任何情況下都不被遮止，所以...

述記：如果在因位，或者五種心所同時生起，或者一一分別生起。如果在果位，則一向必定存在。這裡指的是各種情況都可能存在，無論轉依（轉化煩惱為智慧）還是未轉依，都不被遮止。

論：有種觀點認為，五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）都沒有這些心所，因為它們沒有簡擇能力。

述記：這種觀點認為，五識都沒有這些心所。五識緣取現在已經獲得的法而生起，是任運而緣，所以沒有貪慾。貪慾是緣取未獲得的境界，通過作意希望而生起，所以五識沒有貪慾。五識任運緣取境界，進行勝解（確認）、審決（判斷）、印持（確定），所以五識沒有勝解。五識剎那剎那地攝取新的境界，不緣取過去的境界而生起，沒有追憶，所以沒有念。五識如《對法》第一卷末尾所說，自性散動，沒有專注，所以沒有定。五識不能推度，沒有簡擇，所以沒有慧。這位論師認為，天眼通、天耳通是與意識相應的智慧。《瑜伽師地論》依據眼識、耳識同時與意識相應的智慧，說為通性。後來的論師認為，這兩種識是所依，智慧是能依，所以有慧。

論：有種觀點認為，五識並非決定沒有這些心所，但有時也可能都具有，因爲念境類似。

述記：第二位論師說，五識並非決定有這些心所，但有時也可能都具有。如果上位的意識增強，希望未來的境界等，那麼五識就沒有這些心所。五識緣取現在的境界，由意識引導而生，微弱地希望，也樂於現在的境界，所以有貪慾。第八識不是由意識引導，而是任運而生，對境界不樂，所以沒有貪慾。

【English Translation】 English version: In scattered, doubtful states, etc., when the sixth consciousness suddenly arises, none of them have the five mental factors such as desire. This is just a rough indication, and even in the outflowing result, this situation exists. According to reason, it should be understood. Or when the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, the fundamental consciousness storing all experiences) arises together with it, these five mental factors are also absent. The situation of the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñāna, the consciousness that clings to the eighth consciousness as self) is as previously mentioned, and there is controversy. Therefore, it can be known that desire and other mental factors are not necessarily present simultaneously.

The fourth part below discusses the eighth consciousness separately.

Treatise: The situations of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are as previously mentioned.

Commentary: These seventh and eighth consciousnesses, whether in the causal stage or the resultant stage, may or may not be present, as previously mentioned.

Treatise: The sixth consciousness (the consciousness that distinguishes things) is not restricted in any situation, so...

Commentary: If in the causal stage, either the five mental factors arise simultaneously, or they arise separately one by one. If in the resultant stage, then they are always definitely present. This refers to the possibility of various situations, whether it is transformation of the basis (turning afflictions into wisdom) or non-transformation, it is not restricted.

Treatise: Some argue that the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) do not have these mental factors because they do not have the ability to discriminate.

Commentary: This view holds that the five consciousnesses do not have these mental factors. The five consciousnesses arise by grasping the present, already obtained dharmas, and they grasp them spontaneously, so there is no desire. Desire arises by grasping the unobtained realm, through intention and hope, so the five consciousnesses do not have desire. The five consciousnesses spontaneously grasp the realm, performing ascertainment, judgment, and confirmation, so the five consciousnesses do not have ascertainment. The five consciousnesses grasp new realms moment by moment, and do not arise by grasping past realms, there is no recollection, so there is no mindfulness. The five consciousnesses, as mentioned at the end of the first volume of Abhidharma, are scattered in nature and lack focus, so there is no concentration. The five consciousnesses cannot infer and do not have discrimination, so there is no wisdom. This teacher believes that the divine eye and divine ear are wisdom corresponding to consciousness. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra relies on the wisdom corresponding to the simultaneous consciousness of the eye and ear consciousnesses, and says that it is a common nature. Later teachers believe that these two consciousnesses are the supported, and wisdom is the supporter, so there is wisdom.

Treatise: Some argue that the five consciousnesses are not necessarily without these mental factors, but sometimes they may all be present because the mindfulness of the realm is similar.

Commentary: The second teacher says that the five consciousnesses are not necessarily without these mental factors, but sometimes they may all be present. If the higher consciousness is enhanced, hoping for future realms, etc., then the five consciousnesses do not have these mental factors. The five consciousnesses grasp the present realm, arising guided by consciousness, weakly hoping, and also delighting in the present realm, so there is desire. The eighth consciousness is not guided by consciousness, but arises spontaneously, and does not delight in the realm, so there is no desire.

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五識雖無增上審境如第六識。由意引故亦有微劣印境義也。五識雖無如第六識念曾所受境體之念亦有意引微劣於現境上念也。現在之境是過去之類。念現在故亦有念也。若第六識亦念過去曾受境體。亦念現在曾受境類故是增上。皆意引生。

論。雖不作意至故容有定。

述曰。五識雖無如第六識作加行意繫念恒於一境之定。亦有六引微劣專注現境義。故有定俱也。雜集論中遮有漏五識能入三摩呬多等引之定。不遮三摩地等持定也。謂等持通定散。但專注境義。等引唯定心作意專注故。

言等引者。一引等故名等引謂身心中所有分位安和之性。平等之時名之為等。此由定力故此位生。引生等故名為等引。二等所引故名等引。謂在定位身心平等。由前加行入定之時定勢力制伏沈．掉。名之為等。此等引生在定分位。此在定位定數。從前加行得名。名為等引。等能引故　其等持者。平等持心等但于境轉。名為等持。故通定散　其等至者。亦有二義。一云至等。謂在定定數勢力令身心等有安和相。至此等位名為等至。二言等至由前加行伏沈．掉等能力。至此安和分位名為等至。此與等引大義少同。梵云三摩呬多此云等引。三摩地此云等持。三摩缽底此云等至。

論。雖于所緣至有惠無失。

述

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）雖然不像第六識（意識）那樣具有增上力來審察境界，但由於意的引導，也具有微弱的印境之義。五識雖然沒有像第六識那樣憶念曾經領受過的境界本體的念頭，但也有意引導的、微弱的對現在境界生起念頭的作用。現在的境界是過去境界的同類，憶念現在境界也包含著憶念過去境界的成分。如果第六識既能憶念過去曾經領受過的境界本體，又能憶念現在曾經領受過的境界種類，那麼它就是增上的，這些都是由意引導而產生的。

論：即使不作意，五識也可能具有定。

述記：五識雖然沒有像第六識那樣，通過作加行意，持續不斷地專注於一個境界的定，但也具有在意的引導下，微弱地專注于現在境界的定。因此，五識也具有定。在《雜集論》中，遮止了有漏的五識能夠進入三摩呬多（Samahita，等引）等引之定，但並沒有遮止三摩地（Samadhi，等持）等持之定。等持既可以存在於定心中，也可以存在於散亂心中，只要專注于境界即可。而等引只有在定心中，通過作意專注才能產生。

所謂『等引』，有兩種解釋：一是『引等』，即因為引導而達到平等，指的是身心中所有分位的安和之性，在平等的時候稱為『等』。這是由定的力量所產生的，因為引導產生平等，所以稱為『等引』。二是『等所引』，即由平等所引導，指的是在定位時，身心處於平等狀態。在之前通過加行進入定的時候，定的力量會制伏昏沉和掉舉，這被稱為『等』。這種『等』會引導產生在定中的分位，這種在定位的定數，從之前的加行中得名，被稱為『等引』，是平等能夠引導的結果。所謂『等持』，指的是平等地保持心，只是專注于境界的運轉，所以既可以存在於定心中，也可以存在於散亂心中。所謂『等至』，也有兩種解釋：一是『至等』，即達到平等，指的是在定中，定數的力量使身心等具有安和之相，達到這種平等的狀態稱為『等至』。二是『等至』，即通過之前的加行，制伏昏沉和掉舉等能力，達到這種安和的分位稱為『等至』。這與『等引』的意義大致相同。梵語三摩呬多（Samahita）翻譯成漢語是『等引』，三摩地（Samadhi）翻譯成漢語是『等持』，三摩缽底（Samapatti）翻譯成漢語是『等至』。

論：即使對於所緣境，五識也具有慧，不會失去。

【English Translation】 English version Although the five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) do not have the dominant power to examine objects like the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness), they also have a subtle meaning of imprinting objects due to the guidance of the mind. Although the five consciousnesses do not have the thought of recalling the essence of previously experienced objects like the sixth consciousness, they also have a subtle function of generating thoughts about the present object under the guidance of the mind. The present object is of the same kind as the past object, and recalling the present object also contains the element of recalling the past object. If the sixth consciousness can both recall the essence of previously experienced objects and recall the kind of presently experienced objects, then it is dominant, and these are all produced by the guidance of the mind.

Treatise: Even without intention, the five consciousnesses may have concentration.

Commentary: Although the five consciousnesses do not have the concentration of constantly focusing on one object through the intentional effort of the sixth consciousness, they also have a subtle meaning of focusing on the present object under the guidance of the mind. Therefore, the five consciousnesses also have concentration. In the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma), it is prohibited that the defiled five consciousnesses can enter the concentration of Samahita (等引, equanimity) and other attainments, but it does not prohibit the concentration of Samadhi (等持, concentration). Samadhi can exist in both concentrated and scattered minds, as long as it focuses on the object. Samahita, on the other hand, can only be produced in a concentrated mind through intentional focus.

The term 'equanimity' (Samahita, 等引) has two explanations: First, 'leading to equanimity,' which refers to the peaceful nature of all aspects of body and mind. When it is in a state of equality, it is called 'equanimity.' This is produced by the power of concentration. Because leading produces equanimity, it is called 'leading to equanimity.' Second, 'led by equanimity,' which refers to the state of body and mind being in equilibrium during concentration. When entering concentration through prior effort, the power of concentration subdues dullness and agitation, which is called 'equanimity.' This 'equanimity' leads to the production of the state of being in concentration. This state of being in concentration is named after the prior effort and is called 'leading to equanimity,' which is the result of equanimity being able to lead. 'Concentration' (Samadhi, 等持) refers to maintaining the mind in a state of equality, simply focusing on the movement of the object. Therefore, it can exist in both concentrated and scattered minds. 'Attainment' (Samapatti, 等至) also has two explanations: First, 'reaching equanimity,' which refers to the power of concentration in concentration causing the body and mind to have a peaceful appearance. Reaching this state of equanimity is called 'attainment.' Second, 'equanimity attained,' which refers to the ability to subdue dullness and agitation through prior effort, reaching this peaceful state is called 'attainment.' This has a similar meaning to 'leading to equanimity.' The Sanskrit word Samahita (三摩呬多) is translated into Chinese as 'leading to equanimity' (等引), Samadhi (三摩地) is translated into Chinese as 'concentration' (等持), and Samapatti (三摩缽底) is translated into Chinese as 'attainment' (等至).

Treatise: Even with regard to the object of perception, the five consciousnesses have wisdom and do not lose it.

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曰。五識雖無推度深取。亦有微劣簡擇之義。故有惠俱。由此大論六十六說眼．耳二通是二識相應智。前師解此如前已說。既二識有惠故。例餘三識亦然。或是無記。或生得惠。或加行惠。聞．思修所成即彼類故。佛地論說除漏盡．神通。余通妙觀察智者。以眼．耳俱意。亦是二通故。多時相續不間斷故。五識數間斷故。但說意俱之者。多分妙觀察智攝。

論。未自在位至此五定有。

述曰。因中五識或有．或無。無此時多。有此時少。第六意識有此時多。無此時少。

論。樂觀諸境至作事智故。

述曰。此釋佛地有欲無減等。其文可知。然佛五識不同凡夫許佛亦緣三世起。故知有念緣曾受境體。非如因中唯念境類。佛地五識有作事智。故知有惠。莊嚴論等說故。

論。此別境五何受相應。

述曰。此下第五問也。

論。有義欲三至非所樂故。

述曰。欲通三受俱。除憂．苦二。以此二境是逼迫法方生憂．苦。欲緣所樂故非二受俱。又五識中無此等五。欲非苦俱。受如前說。

論。餘四通四至五識無故。

述曰。餘四通四受除苦。勝解等四五識無故。亦非意地有苦根也。前第一師意中無苦。五無慾等之師義也。

論。有義一切至求欲證故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 答：雖然前五識沒有推測和深入認知的能力，但也有輕微的簡擇作用，因此與慧（prajna）相應。因此，《大乘阿毗達磨集論》第六十六卷說，眼識和耳識這兩種神通是與二識相應的智慧。前代論師對此的解釋如前所述。既然眼識和耳識有慧，那麼可以推斷其餘三種識也是如此。這些慧可能是無記性的，也可能是生來就有的，或者是通過後天努力獲得的。通過聽聞、思考和修習所獲得的智慧，都屬於這一類。佛地論說，除了漏盡通（asrava-ksaya-jnana）和神通（abhijna）之外，其餘神通都屬於妙觀察智（pratyaveksana-jnana）。因為眼識和耳識都與意識（manas）相關聯，也屬於兩種神通，並且能夠長時間連續不斷地運作。前五識是間斷的，所以只說與意識相關聯的屬於妙觀察智，因為大部分都屬於妙觀察智所攝。

論：未自在位至此五定有。

述記：在因位（hetu）中，前五識可能存在，也可能不存在。不存在的時候多，存在的時候少。第六意識（mano-vijnana）存在的時候多，不存在的時候少。

論：樂觀諸境至作事智故。

述記：這是解釋佛地（Buddha-bhumi）中存在欲（chanda）而沒有減損等情況。其文義可以理解。然而，佛的五識不同於凡夫，允許佛的五識也緣於三世（過去、現在、未來）而生起。因此，可知佛的五識有憶念（smrti），能夠緣于曾經領受過的境的體性，而不是像因位中那樣僅僅憶念境的種類。佛地的五識具有作事智（kritya-anusthana-jnana），因此可知具有慧。《莊嚴論》等經典中也有相關說明。

論：此別境五何受相應。

述記：這是第五個問題。

論：有義欲三至非所樂故。

述記：欲（chanda）可以與三種受（vedana）相應，即樂受（sukha）、舍受（upeksa）和喜受（saumanasya），但不包括憂受（domanassya）和苦受（duhkha）。因為憂受和苦受只有在受到逼迫的情況下才會產生，而欲是緣于所喜樂的境界，所以不會與這兩種受相應。而且，五識中沒有這五種受。欲不會與苦受相應，受的解釋如前所述。

論：餘四通四至五識無故。

述記：其餘四種別境（勝解、念、定、慧）可以與四種受相應，即樂受、舍受、喜受和憂受，但不包括苦受。因為勝解等四種別境在五識中不存在，而且也不是意地（mano-bhumi）中存在苦根（duhkha-indriya）。前述第一位論師認為意中沒有苦受，這是與五識中沒有欲等情況的論師的觀點。

論：有義一切至求欲證故。

【English Translation】 English version: Answer: Although the five consciousnesses (vijnana) do not have the ability to speculate and deeply comprehend, they also have a slight function of discernment, therefore they are associated with wisdom (prajna). Therefore, the sixty-sixth volume of the Mahayana Abhidharma Samuccaya says that the two kinds of supernatural powers (abhijna) of eye-consciousness (caksu-vijnana) and ear-consciousness (srotra-vijnana) are wisdom corresponding to the two consciousnesses. The previous masters' explanation of this has been stated before. Since eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness have wisdom, it can be inferred that the other three consciousnesses are also like this. These wisdoms may be neutral (avyakrta), innate (sahaja), or acquired through effort (prayoga). The wisdom acquired through hearing, thinking, and cultivation all belong to this category. The Buddhabhumi Sutra says that except for the exhaustion of outflows (asrava-ksaya-jnana) and supernatural powers (abhijna), the remaining supernatural powers belong to the wonderful observing wisdom (pratyaveksana-jnana). Because eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness are both related to mind-consciousness (manas), they also belong to two kinds of supernatural powers, and they can operate continuously for a long time. The five consciousnesses are intermittent, so it is only said that those associated with mind-consciousness belong to the wonderful observing wisdom, because most of them are included in the wonderful observing wisdom.

Treatise: In the state of non-mastery, these five definitely exist.

Commentary: In the causal stage (hetu), the five consciousnesses may or may not exist. They exist less often than they do not exist. The sixth consciousness (mano-vijnana) exists more often than it does not exist.

Treatise: Observing pleasant realms leads to the wisdom of accomplishing tasks.

Commentary: This explains the existence of desire (chanda) without diminution, etc., in the Buddha-bhumi (Buddha-field). The meaning of the text can be understood. However, the Buddha's five consciousnesses are different from those of ordinary beings. It is permissible for the Buddha's five consciousnesses to arise from the three times (past, present, future). Therefore, it can be known that the Buddha's five consciousnesses have mindfulness (smrti), which can be related to the nature of the realm that has been experienced, rather than just remembering the types of realms as in the causal stage. The five consciousnesses of the Buddha-bhumi have the wisdom of accomplishing tasks (kritya-anusthana-jnana), so it can be known that they have wisdom. The Ornament Sutra and other scriptures also have relevant explanations.

Treatise: With what feeling (vedana) do these five specific objects (niyata-visaya) correspond?

Commentary: This is the fifth question.

Treatise: Some say desire corresponds to three, because it is not what is disliked.

Commentary: Desire (chanda) can correspond to three feelings (vedana): pleasure (sukha), indifference (upeksa), and joy (saumanasya), but does not include sorrow (domanassya) and pain (duhkha). Because sorrow and pain only arise when under duress, and desire is related to the realm that is liked, it will not correspond to these two feelings. Moreover, the five consciousnesses do not have these five feelings. Desire will not correspond to pain, and the explanation of feeling is as stated before.

Treatise: The remaining four correspond to four, because the five consciousnesses do not have them.

Commentary: The remaining four specific objects (resolution, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom) can correspond to four feelings: pleasure, indifference, joy, and sorrow, but do not include pain. Because the four specific objects such as resolution do not exist in the five consciousnesses, and there is also no root of suffering (duhkha-indriya) in the mind-ground (mano-bhumi). The first teacher mentioned earlier believes that there is no suffering in the mind, which is the view of the teacher who believes that there is no desire, etc., in the five consciousnesses.

Treatise: Some say all, because they seek to prove desire.

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述曰。第二師說。一切五受皆五相應。何以憂根與欲俱也。瑜伽五十七。對法第十說憂根于無上法思慕。欲證愁戚所攝。即善法欲與憂俱也。證憂余時亦得俱也。

論。純受苦處至前已說故。

述曰。此證苦俱。又地獄全。鬼畜少分純受苦處。如前已說意有苦受。亦希求解脫。解脫者解脫彼苦。故欲苦俱。

論。論說貪愛至必有欲故。

述曰。對法第七．瑜伽五十九。說貪與憂．苦相應。貪必欲前境故必欲俱。亦知欲數苦．憂俱也。即答前師。欲憂．苦並。

論。苦根既有至苦俱何咎。

述曰。如前已說苦根在意。故后餘四亦得相應。此就他宗設說五識無慾等。故說自意識有苦根義。

論。又五識俱至義如前說。

述曰。此說正義。五識並有。已說欲與憂．苦相應。故但說四與苦等俱。並如前說。有微細解等。五受相應。

論。由斯欲等五受相應。

述曰。結政義也。此論上文逐難分別。

自下第六三性。第七三界。第八三學。第九三斷。第十漏．無漏。第十一報．非報等諸門分別。

論。此五復依至如理應思。

述曰。任自思取。然五數與煩惱．隨煩惱相應。有漏善心或俱．不俱等。下自當知。非以煩惱等中欣．戚行別故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：第二位論師說，一切五種感受都與五種心所相應。為什麼憂根（duhkha-indriya，憂的根本）會與欲（chanda，意願）同時生起呢？《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷和《阿毗達磨集論》第十卷說，憂根是對無上法的思慕，被想要證得（涅槃）的愁戚所攝持。這就是說，善法欲（kushala-chanda，善的意願）可以與憂（duhkha，苦）同時生起。證得憂（duhkha，苦）的其他時候，也可以同時生起。

論：純粹感受痛苦之處，之前已經說過了。

述曰：這是爲了證明苦（duhkha，苦）可以同時生起。而且，地獄眾生完全、餓鬼和畜生道眾生少部分，都純粹感受痛苦。正如之前所說，他們的意識中有苦受（duhkha-vedana，苦的感受），也希望求解脫（moksha，解脫）。解脫（moksha，解脫）就是爲了解脫他們的痛苦，所以欲（chanda，意願）可以與苦（duhkha，苦）同時生起。

論：論中說，貪愛（raga，貪）必定有欲（chanda，意願）。

述曰：《阿毗達磨集論》第七卷和《瑜伽師地論》第五十九卷說，貪（raga，貪）與憂（duhkha，苦）、苦（daurmanasya，憂）相應。貪（raga，貪）必定想要之前的境界，所以必定與欲（chanda，意願）同時生起。由此可知，欲（chanda，意願）與苦（duhkha，苦）、憂（daurmanasya，憂）也同時生起。這就是對前一位論師的迴應，欲（chanda，意願）與憂（duhkha，苦）、苦（daurmanasya，憂）並存。

論：苦根（duhkha-indriya，苦的根本）既然存在於意（manas，意），那麼（其他四種感受）與苦（duhkha，苦）同時生起有什麼過錯呢？

述曰：正如之前所說，苦根（duhkha-indriya，苦的根本）存在於意（manas，意）中，所以後來的四種感受也可以與苦（duhkha，苦）相應。這是就其他宗派假設五識（pancha-vijnana，五種感官意識）沒有欲（chanda，意願）等心所而說的。所以說，自意識（sva-manovijnana，自己的意識）有苦根（duhkha-indriya，苦的根本）的意義。

論：而且，五識（pancha-vijnana，五種感官意識）同時生起，意義如前所說。

述曰：這是說的正義。五識（pancha-vijnana，五種感官意識）都有（五種感受）。之前已經說過欲（chanda，意願）與憂（duhkha，苦）、苦（daurmanasya，憂）相應，所以只說四種感受與苦（duhkha，苦）等同時生起。都如之前所說，有微細的理解等。五種感受相應。

論：因此，欲（chanda，意願）等五種感受相應。

述曰：這是總結政論的意義。此論以上文逐一辯難分別。

從下面開始，第六是三性（tri-svabhava，三種自性），第七是三界（tri-dhatu，三種界），第八是三學（tri-siksha，三種學習），第九是三斷（tri-prahana，三種斷除），第十是有漏（sasrava，有煩惱）和無漏（anasrava，無煩惱），第十一是報（vipaka，果報）和非報（avipaka，非果報）等各種門類的分別。

論：這五種感受再依據如理作意（yoniso-manasikara，如理思維），應當如理思維。

述曰：任憑自己思考領會。然而，五種感受與煩惱（klesha，煩惱）、隨煩惱（upaklesha，隨煩惱）相應。有漏善心（sasrava-kushala-citta，有煩惱的善心）或者同時生起，或者不同時生起等等。下面自然會知道。不是因為煩惱等之中有欣（nandi，歡喜）、戚（arati，不悅）等行為的差別。

【English Translation】 English version: Statement: The second teacher said that all five feelings are associated with five corresponding mental factors. Why does the root of sorrow (duhkha-indriya, root of sorrow) arise together with desire (chanda, intention)? Yoga-bhumi (Yogacarabhumi-sastra) 57 and Abhidharma-samuccaya 10 say that the root of sorrow is longing for the unsurpassed Dharma, and is governed by the distress of wanting to attain (Nirvana). This means that the desire for good Dharma (kushala-chanda, desire for good) can arise simultaneously with sorrow (duhkha, suffering). At other times when sorrow (duhkha, suffering) is attained, they can also arise simultaneously.

Treatise: The place of purely experiencing suffering has already been discussed before.

Statement: This is to prove that suffering (duhkha, suffering) can arise simultaneously. Moreover, hell beings entirely, and ghosts and animals in small part, purely experience suffering. As mentioned before, their consciousness has the feeling of suffering (duhkha-vedana, feeling of suffering), and they also hope to seek liberation (moksha, liberation). Liberation (moksha, liberation) is to liberate them from their suffering, so desire (chanda, intention) can arise simultaneously with suffering (duhkha, suffering).

Treatise: The treatise says that craving (raga, craving) must have desire (chanda, intention).

Statement: Abhidharma-samuccaya 7 and Yoga-bhumi (Yogacarabhumi-sastra) 59 say that craving (raga, craving) is associated with sorrow (duhkha, suffering) and distress (daurmanasya, distress). Craving (raga, craving) must desire the previous realm, so it must arise simultaneously with desire (chanda, intention). From this, it can be known that desire (chanda, intention) also arises simultaneously with suffering (duhkha, suffering) and distress (daurmanasya, distress). This is a response to the previous teacher, that desire (chanda, intention) coexists with sorrow (duhkha, suffering) and distress (daurmanasya, distress).

Treatise: Since the root of suffering (duhkha-indriya, root of suffering) exists in the mind (manas, mind), what fault is there in (the other four feelings) arising simultaneously with suffering (duhkha, suffering)?

Statement: As mentioned before, the root of suffering (duhkha-indriya, root of suffering) exists in the mind (manas, mind), so the later four feelings can also be associated with suffering (duhkha, suffering). This is said in the context of other schools assuming that the five consciousnesses (pancha-vijnana, five sense consciousnesses) do not have mental factors such as desire (chanda, intention). Therefore, it is said that self-consciousness (sva-manovijnana, one's own consciousness) has the meaning of the root of suffering (duhkha-indriya, root of suffering).

Treatise: Moreover, the five consciousnesses (pancha-vijnana, five sense consciousnesses) arise simultaneously, the meaning is as mentioned before.

Statement: This is the correct meaning. The five consciousnesses (pancha-vijnana, five sense consciousnesses) all have (five feelings). It has been said before that desire (chanda, intention) is associated with sorrow (duhkha, suffering) and distress (daurmanasya, distress), so it is only said that four feelings arise simultaneously with suffering (duhkha, suffering) and so on. All are as mentioned before, there are subtle understandings and so on. The five feelings are associated.

Treatise: Therefore, the five feelings such as desire (chanda, intention) are associated.

Statement: This is the meaning of summarizing the arguments. This treatise refutes and distinguishes each point in the above text.

From below, the sixth is the three natures (tri-svabhava, three natures), the seventh is the three realms (tri-dhatu, three realms), the eighth is the three learnings (tri-siksha, three learnings), the ninth is the three severances (tri-prahana, three severances), the tenth is with outflows (sasrava, with outflows) and without outflows (anasrava, without outflows), the eleventh is retribution (vipaka, result) and non-retribution (avipaka, non-result), and so on, the distinctions of various categories.

Treatise: These five feelings, based on appropriate attention (yoniso-manasikara, appropriate attention), should be contemplated appropriately.

Statement: Let oneself think and comprehend. However, the five feelings are associated with afflictions (klesha, afflictions) and secondary afflictions (upaklesha, secondary afflictions). Defiled wholesome mind (sasrava-kushala-citta, defiled wholesome mind) may arise simultaneously or not simultaneously, and so on. It will naturally be known below. It is not because there are differences in actions such as joy (nandi, joy) and sorrow (arati, displeasure) among the afflictions and so on.

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善中加行．生得緣世．無為別故不與相應。前遍行五有心必有。明通一切皆無遮故。但于欲等諸門分別。◎

◎論第六

論。已說遍行至其相云何。

述曰。明心所中。下第二段。初結前問后也。

論。頌曰至行舍及不害。

述曰。自下依問別答。初頌。后釋。即為二也。然百法等信后說勤。此中根後方說勤者。彼依因依以辨次第。信為欲依。欲為勤依故。此約立依以辨次第。依根．精進立舍等三。理須相合。故不同也　言行舍者。此行蘊舍。別受舍故。及言有二。至下當知。

下長行中文別有三。初釋善得名破異宗執。次依頌列別出善體。下諸門辨。

論曰。唯善心俱至定有十一。

述曰。解善得名破異執也。解頌善字。定十一故者。遮異執故。且薩婆多法救．俱舍．雜心等說善有十種。除此無癡。乃減此一。正理論師說有十二更加欣．厭。婆沙雖說別有厭等。法救等不說。故此中非之但言唯善十一。不言遍善　故遮彼也　正量部說十三唯善。此十一外更加欣．厭。故此定言遮增減執。又遮薩婆多等輕安遍善。今言唯善非必遍善。下雖更說有多善法。其勝用者唯十一故。

論。云何為信至心凈為性。

述曰。次下第二齣諸善體分為八段。合慚．愧為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 善心中增長的努力，產生於有情眾生的因緣和合，因為其無為的特性，所以不與（煩惱）相應。之前的五種遍行心所，有心識活動就必定存在。明瞭通達一切，沒有阻礙的緣故。只是在欲界等不同的層面進行區分。

◎論第六

論：已經說了遍行心所，那麼它的相狀是怎樣的呢？

述記：在心所法中，下面是第二段。首先總結前文，然後引出後面的問題。

論：頌曰：行舍及不害。

述記：從下面開始，根據問題分別回答。先是頌文，然後是解釋。分為兩個部分。然而《百法明門論》等在信之後說勤奮，這裡在根之後才說勤奮的原因是，前者依據因果關係來辨別次第，信是慾望的所依，慾望是勤奮的所依。這裡是依據建立的所依來辨別次第，依靠根、精進建立舍等三種（善法），道理上需要相互結合。所以不同。《行舍》指的是行蘊中的舍，區別于受蘊中的舍。及字有兩個含義，到下文應當知曉。

下面的長行文字中，分別有三個部分。首先解釋善的得名，破斥不同的宗派的執著。其次依據頌文，分別列出善的體性。下面在不同的層面進行辨析。

論曰：唯有善心相應，必定有十一種。

述記：解釋善的得名，破斥不同的執著。解釋頌文中的善字。必定有十一種的原因是，爲了遮止不同的執著。比如薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）的法救（Dharmatrāta）、《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośabhāṣya）、《雜心論》（Saṃyuktabhidharmasāraśāstra）等認為善有十種，去除了無癡（amoha），乃是減少了一種。正理論師（Abhidharmakośabhāṣya）說有十二種，更加了欣（delight）、厭（disgust）。《婆沙論》（Vibhasa）雖然說有厭等，法救等沒有說，所以這裡否定了他們，只說唯有善心相應，必定有十一種，沒有說遍善。所以遮止了他們。正量部（Saṃmitīya）說有十三種唯善，在這十一種之外，更加了欣、厭。所以這裡用『定』字來遮止增加或減少的執著。又遮止了薩婆多部等認為輕安（prasrabdhi）是遍善的觀點。現在說唯善，並非必定是遍善。下面雖然還說有很多善法，但其殊勝的作用只有十一種。

論：什麼是信？以心清凈為體性。

述記：下面第二部分，列出各種善的體性，分為八段。合併慚（hrī）和愧（apatrāpya）為一段。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Goodness-increasing effort' arises from the conditioned world of sentient beings. Because of its unconditioned nature, it does not correspond with (afflictions). The previous five omnipresent mental factors are necessarily present when there is mental activity. They are clear and unobstructed in all aspects. They are only distinguished in different realms such as the desire realm.

◎ Treatise 6

Treatise: Having discussed the omnipresent mental factors, what are their characteristics?

Commentary: In the section on mental factors, the following is the second part. First, it summarizes the previous discussion and introduces the following question.

Treatise: Verse: Equanimity of conduct and non-harming.

Commentary: From here on, answers are given separately according to the questions. First is the verse, then the explanation. It is divided into two parts. However, the Hundred Dharmas and others discuss diligence after faith, while here diligence is discussed after the roots. The reason is that the former distinguishes the order based on cause and effect, where faith is the basis of desire, and desire is the basis of diligence. Here, the order is distinguished based on the established basis, relying on the roots and diligence to establish the three (good qualities) of equanimity, etc. In principle, they need to be combined with each other. Therefore, it is different. 'Equanimity of conduct' refers to equanimity in the aggregate of formations, which is different from equanimity in the aggregate of feelings. The word 'and' has two meanings, which should be understood later.

In the following prose, there are three parts. First, explain the naming of goodness and refute the attachments of different schools. Second, list the nature of goodness separately according to the verse. Below, analyze from different perspectives.

Treatise: Only when associated with a good mind, there are definitely eleven.

Commentary: Explaining the naming of goodness and refuting different attachments. Explaining the word 'goodness' in the verse. The reason why there are definitely eleven is to prevent different attachments. For example, Dharmatrāta of the Sarvastivada school, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, and the Saṃyuktabhidharmasāraśāstra believe that there are ten kinds of goodness, removing ignorance (amoha), which is a reduction of one. The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya says there are twelve kinds, adding delight (hri) and disgust (apatrāpya). Although the Vibhasa mentions disgust, Dharmatrāta and others do not, so they are denied here. It only says that only when associated with a good mind, there are definitely eleven, without saying omnipresent goodness. Therefore, it prevents them. The Saṃmitīya school says there are thirteen kinds of exclusively good qualities, adding delight and disgust to these eleven. Therefore, the word 'definitely' is used here to prevent the attachment of increasing or decreasing. It also prevents the view of the Sarvastivada school, etc., that tranquility (prasrabdhi) is omnipresent goodness. Now it says only goodness, not necessarily omnipresent goodness. Although it is also said below that there are many good qualities, only eleven have superior functions.

Treatise: What is faith? Its nature is the purity of mind.

Commentary: The second part below lists the nature of various good qualities, divided into eight sections. Combining shame (hrī) and embarrassment (apatrāpya) into one section.

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一。三善根為一故。別解信中初申正義。下破外執　申正義中。初略。后廣。略中體．業。此即性也。顯揚．對法．五蘊論等雖文同此。然有實等不別分別。唯此說之　實．德．能三是信依處。是境第七　深忍．樂欲是信因果　心凈為性。正顯自體。

論。對治不信樂善為業。

述曰。此明業用。顯揚說有五業。然治不信。初與此同。此言樂善。即彼四種。能得菩提資糧滿故。利益自他故。趣善道。增長信。即是論中堅固信也。對法論說。樂欲所依為業。即是彼第九云。信為欲依。約入佛法初首為論。若言通論一切信業。顯揚五業中。除第二菩提因。

論。然信差別略有三種。

述曰。下廣前難有三。初解依處。次解業用。后解自性。初中又二。先標。后釋。此初也。

論。一信實有至深信忍故。

述曰。謂於一切法若事若理信忍皆是。對法雲。于實有體起忍可信。古師依此謂此四諦體實有也。今此中言。若信虛空此是何等。體非實故。亦非諦故。為信虛空即此攝故。但可總言若理若事。空雖體無。有空理故。

論。二信有德至深信樂故。

述曰。同體別體．有漏無漏．住持真行所有三寶。皆是彼攝。如真凈故。所餘是此真凈方便亦名真凈。

論。三信有能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一。三善根（three wholesome roots）歸結為一個，所以在解釋『信』（faith）時，首先闡述其正確的含義，然後破除外道的執著。在闡述正確含義時，先簡略地說明其體和業，這裡指的是『信』的自性。雖然《顯揚聖教論》（Asanga's Exposition of the Topics of Manifestation），《阿毗達磨對法論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya），《五蘊論》（Pañcaskandha-prakarana）等論著在文字上與此相同，但它們沒有像這樣分別解釋『實』（reality）等概念，只有這裡做了這樣的區分。

實、德、能三者是『信』的所依之處，是『信』的境界。

深忍（deep acceptance）、樂欲（aspiration）是『信』的因和果。

心凈（purity of mind）是『信』的自性，直接顯示了『信』的本體。

論：對治不信，以樂於行善作為『信』的作用。

述曰：這裡說明了『信』的作用。 《顯揚聖教論》中說有五種作用，但對治不信這一點，最初與這裡相同。這裡說的『樂善』，就包含了《顯揚聖教論》中的四種作用，即能夠圓滿菩提資糧，能夠利益自己和他人，能夠趣向善道，能夠增長信心，也就是論中所說的『堅固信』。《阿毗達磨對法論》中說，以樂欲為所依是『信』的作用，也就是該論第九品所說的『信為欲依』，這是就最初進入佛法而言的。如果通論一切『信』的作用，《顯揚聖教論》五種作用中，可以去除第二種，即菩提之因。

論：然而，『信』的差別略有三種。

述曰：下面廣泛地解釋前面提出的疑問，有三個方面。首先解釋『信』的所依之處，其次解釋『信』的作用，最後解釋『信』的自性。這裡是第一個方面，又分為兩部分，先標示，后解釋。這裡是標示。

論：一、信實有（belief in reality），以至於深信忍（deep acceptance）。

述曰：指的是對於一切法，無論是事還是理，都深信並接受。 《阿毗達磨對法論》中說，對於真實存在的本體生起忍可之信。古代的法師依據此說，認為四諦的本體是真實存在的。現在這裡說，如果相信虛空，這屬於哪一種『信』呢？因為虛空不是真實存在的本體，也不是諦。因為相信虛空也包含在這裡面，所以只能總的說，無論是理還是事，都包含在內。雖然虛空沒有本體，但有虛空的道理。

論：二、信有德（belief in virtue），以至於深信樂（deep aspiration）。

述曰：無論是同體的三寶，還是異體的三寶，無論是有漏的三寶，還是無漏的三寶，無論是住持三寶，還是真行三寶，都包含在其中。如同真實清凈的三寶一樣，其餘的則是真實清凈的方便，也可以稱為真實清凈。

論：三、信有能（belief in potentiality）

【English Translation】 English version I. Because the three wholesome roots are one, the correct meaning is first stated in the explanation of 'faith' (śraddhā), and then external attachments are refuted. In stating the correct meaning, it is first brief, then extensive. The brief explanation covers essence and function, which refers to the nature of 'faith'. Although the texts of Asanga's Exposition of the Topics of Manifestation (Vyākaraṇa), Abhidharma-samuccaya, Pañcaskandha-prakarana, etc., are the same in wording, they do not separately distinguish between 'reality' (sat), etc., as this text does.

The three, reality, virtue, and potentiality, are the bases upon which 'faith' relies; they are the objects of 'faith'.

Deep acceptance (adhimukti) and aspiration (chanda) are the causes and effects of 'faith'.

Purity of mind (citta-prasāda) is the nature of 'faith', directly revealing its essence.

Treatise: To counteract disbelief, taking pleasure in wholesome actions is the function of 'faith'.

Commentary: This explains the function of 'faith'. Asanga's Exposition of the Topics of Manifestation says there are five functions, but the initial one, counteracting disbelief, is the same as this. 'Taking pleasure in wholesome actions' here includes the four functions in that text: being able to fulfill the accumulation of merit for enlightenment, being able to benefit oneself and others, being able to proceed to wholesome paths, and being able to increase faith, which is the 'firm faith' mentioned in the treatise. Abhidharma-samuccaya says that relying on aspiration is the function of 'faith', which is what the ninth chapter of that treatise says: 'Faith is the basis of desire.' This is discussed in terms of initially entering the Buddha's teachings. If we speak generally of all the functions of 'faith', we can remove the second one, the cause of enlightenment, from the five functions in Asanga's Exposition of the Topics of Manifestation.

Treatise: However, the distinctions of 'faith' are briefly threefold.

Commentary: Below, the previous questions are extensively explained in three aspects. First, the bases upon which 'faith' relies are explained; second, the functions of 'faith' are explained; and third, the nature of 'faith' is explained. This is the first aspect, which is further divided into two parts: first, the indication; second, the explanation. This is the indication.

Treatise: First, belief in reality (sat), up to deep acceptance (adhimukti).

Commentary: This refers to deeply believing and accepting all dharmas, whether they are matters or principles. Abhidharma-samuccaya says that one generates acceptable faith in a truly existing entity. Ancient teachers, based on this, believed that the essence of the Four Noble Truths is truly existent. Now, this text says, if one believes in emptiness (śūnyatā), what kind of 'faith' is this? Because emptiness is not a truly existing entity, nor is it a Truth. Because believing in emptiness is also included here, we can only say in general that both principles and matters are included. Although emptiness has no entity, it has the principle of emptiness.

Treatise: Second, belief in virtue (guṇa), up to deep aspiration (chanda).

Commentary: Whether it is the Three Jewels (triratna) of the same entity or different entities, whether it is the Three Jewels with outflows or without outflows, whether it is the Three Jewels that are upheld or the Three Jewels of true practice, all are included in this. Like the truly pure Three Jewels, the rest are expedient means to true purity, and can also be called truly pure.

Treatise: Third, belief in potentiality (śakti)

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至起希望故。

述曰。謂于有漏無漏善法。信己及他。今能得后能成。無為得有為成。世善得出世成。起希望故。希望欲也。忍．樂．欲三如次配上。對法但言謂我有力能得能成。且據自成。此亦通他總致能得等言。

上來已解信所依訖。隨文便故未解心凈。次釋彼業。

論。由斯對治至世出世善。

述曰。正治不信彼實事等。能起愛樂於無為證。有為善修。故是信業。

自下欲顯忍．樂．欲三是信因果。及欲顯彼心凈之言是信自相寄問徴起。于中有四。一問。二答。三難。四通。

論。忍謂勝解至自相是何。

述曰。此外問也。前言忍者即謂勝解。忍可境故。即是此信同時之因。下言樂．欲並是欲數。樂希境故。即是同時信所生果。此中何者是信自相。確實論其自相是何。確者實也。或忍．樂．欲。異時因果。理無遮也。

下論主答彼。因解心凈。

論。豈不適言心凈為性。

述曰。適者向也．才也。

論。此猶未了至為難亦然。

述曰。三外難言。此由未了彼心凈言。若凈體即是心持業釋者。信應非心所。凈即心故　若凈體非即心令心凈者。心之凈故依依士釋第三轉聲。慚等何別。亦令心凈故。若心俱凈法。鄰近釋者。凈與心俱故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

至起希望故。

述曰：這是說對於有漏（sāsrava，指有煩惱的）和無漏（anāsrava，指沒有煩惱的）的善法，相信自己和他人，現在能夠獲得，將來能夠成就。無為法（asaṃskṛta，指不生不滅的法）能夠獲得，有為法（saṃskṛta，指生滅變化的法）能夠成就。世間善能夠得出世間成就，因此生起希望。希望就是欲求。忍（kṣānti，指安忍）、樂（ruci，指喜愛）、欲（chanda，指意願）這三者依次與上述內容相配。《對法論》中只說『謂我有力能得能成』，只是就自己成就而言。這裡也通於他人，總括地說能夠獲得等。

上來已經解釋了信所依的含義。因為文句的便利，還沒有解釋心凈（citta-prasāda，指心清凈）。接下來解釋信的業（karma，指作用）。

論：由斯對治至世出世善。

述曰：正是對治不信彼實事等，能夠生起愛樂於無為的證悟，有為的善修，所以是信的業。

自下想要顯示忍、樂、欲三者是信的因和果。以及想要顯示心凈之言是信的自相，寄託于問答來引發。其中有四部分：一問，二答，三難，四通。

論：忍謂勝解至自相是何。

述曰：這是外人的提問。前面說忍就是勝解（adhimokṣa，指殊勝的理解），因為能夠忍可境界。這就是此信同時的因。下面說的樂和欲都是欲數（chanda-saṃkhyā，指欲的種類），因為喜愛所希望的境界。這其中哪個是信的自相？確實論述它的自相是什麼？『確』就是『實』的意思。或者忍、樂、欲是不同時期的因果，道理上沒有阻礙。

下論主回答他，因此解釋心凈。

論：豈不適言心凈為性。

述曰：『適』是『向』、『才』的意思。

論：此猶未了至為難亦然。

述曰：三外人的詰難說：這由於沒有了解心凈之言。如果凈的體性就是心，是持業釋（karmadhāraya，一種梵文複合詞的構成方式）的解釋，那麼信就不應該是心所（caitta，指心所有法），因為凈就是心。如果凈的體性不是心，而是使心清凈，是依士釋（tad-dhita，一種梵文複合詞的構成方式）的第三轉聲，那麼與慚（hrī，指慚愧）等有什麼區別？也能夠使心清凈。如果是與心俱生的凈法，是鄰近釋（samīpa，一種梵文複合詞的構成方式），那麼凈與心同時存在。

【English Translation】 English version:

To arise hope.

Commentary: This refers to, regarding both sāsrava (with outflows, referring to defiled) and anāsrava (without outflows, referring to undefiled) virtuous dharmas, believing in oneself and others, that one can attain now and accomplish in the future. Asaṃskṛta (unconditioned) can be attained, and saṃskṛta (conditioned) can be accomplished. Worldly virtue can lead to supramundane accomplishment, hence arising hope. Hope is desire. Kṣānti (patience), ruci (liking), and chanda (intention) are matched with the above in order. The Abhidharmakośa only says 'I have the power to attain and accomplish,' which only refers to self-accomplishment. This also applies to others, generally saying one can attain, etc.

Above, the support of faith has been explained. Due to the convenience of the text, citta-prasāda (clarity of mind) has not yet been explained. Next, the karma (action) of faith is explained.

Treatise: Because of this antidote, up to worldly and supramundane virtue.

Commentary: It precisely counteracts disbelief in those real things, etc., and can give rise to love and joy in the realization of the unconditioned, and the virtuous cultivation of the conditioned, therefore it is the karma of faith.

From here on, it is desired to show that kṣānti, ruci, and chanda are the cause and effect of faith. And it is desired to show that the words 'clarity of mind' are the self-nature of faith, relying on questions and answers to elicit it. There are four parts: first, a question; second, an answer; third, a refutation; fourth, a resolution.

Treatise: Kṣānti is called adhimokṣa, what is its self-nature?

Commentary: This is an external question. The previous statement that kṣānti is adhimokṣa, because it can endure and accept the object. This is the simultaneous cause of this faith. The ruci and chanda mentioned below are both chanda-saṃkhyā (categories of desire), because they like the desired object. Which of these is the self-nature of faith? What exactly is its self-nature? 'Exactly' means 'really'. Or kṣānti, ruci, and chanda are causes and effects at different times, there is no obstacle in principle.

Below, the treatise master answers him, therefore explaining clarity of mind.

Treatise: Isn't it appropriate to say that clarity of mind is its nature?

Commentary: 'Appropriate' means 'towards', 'just'.

Treatise: This is still not understood, so the difficulty is also the same.

Commentary: The three external refutations say: This is because the words 'clarity of mind' are not understood. If the nature of clarity is the mind, which is a karmadhāraya (determinative compound) explanation, then faith should not be a caitta (mental factor), because clarity is the mind. If the nature of clarity is not the mind, but makes the mind clear, which is a tad-dhita (possessive compound) explanation in the third case, then what is the difference from hrī (shame)? It can also make the mind clear. If it is a clear dharma that arises simultaneously with the mind, which is a samīpa (appositional compound) explanation, then clarity and mind exist simultaneously.

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為難同令凈。亦慚等無別。

論。此性澄清至立心凈名。

述曰。論主通曰。此信體澄清能凈心等。余心．心所法但相應善。此等十一是自性善。彼相應故。體非善。非不善。由此信等俱故心等方善。故此凈信能凈心等。依依士釋。又慚等十法體性雖善。體非凈相。此凈為相。故名為信。唯信是能凈。余皆所凈故。以心王是主。但言心凈。不言凈心所。文言略也。

論。如水精珠能清濁水。

述曰。喻如水精珠能清濁水。濁水喻心等。清珠喻信體。以投珠故濁水便清。以有信故其心遂凈。

若爾慚等例亦應然。體性凈故。斯有何別。

論。慚等雖善至無濫彼失。

述曰。其餘慚等體性。雖善令心等善。不以凈為相。但以修善．羞恥等為相。此信以凈為相。無濫慚等之失。非慚慚故。信是無慚。非信信故。慚是不信。今此凈者。信體之能。

論。又諸染法至故凈為相。

述曰。此第二義。所餘一切染法等中。各別有相。如貪．愛等。染心所內唯有不信。自相渾濁。渾濁余心等令成染污。如極穢物自穢穢他。亦如泥鰍動泥濁水。不信亦爾。唯一別相渾穢染污。得總染也。信正翻彼不信渾濁。故以凈為信之相也。下破有二。如文可知也。

論。有說信者愛樂

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 為難（Vairam，困難）與同令凈（Samling，共同清凈）。亦慚（Hri，慚愧）等無別。

論：此自性澄清，乃至立心凈之名。

述曰：論主總括而言，此信（Shraddha，信仰）之體澄清，能清凈心等。其餘心、心所法（Citta-caitta dharmas，心和心理活動）只是相應于善。此等十一法是自性善，因為它們是相應的。其體非善，亦非不善。由此信等共同作用，心等才能變得善良。因此，此清凈之信能清凈心等。這是依士釋（Yishi Shi，依士的解釋）。又慚等十法，體性雖然是善，但體非清凈之相。此清凈是其相。因此名為信。唯有信是能清凈者，其餘都是所清凈者。因為心王（Citta-raja，心識之王）是主要的，所以只說心凈，而不說凈心所。這是文辭上的省略。

論：如水精珠能清濁水。

述曰：譬如水精珠能清濁水。濁水比喻心等。清珠比喻信體。因為投入珠子，濁水便清澈。因為有信，其心便清凈。

若如此，慚等也應該如此。因為體性清凈。這有什麼區別呢？

論：慚等雖然是善，但沒有濫用彼失。

述曰：其餘慚等體性，雖然是善，能使心等變善，但不以清凈為相，而是以修善、羞恥等為相。此信以清凈為相，沒有濫用慚等的過失。不是因為慚愧才是慚愧，信是無慚（Ahrīka，無慚）。不是因為信才是信，慚是不信（Ashraddha，不信）。現在此清凈者，是信體之功能。

論：又諸染法，乃至故凈為相。

述曰：這是第二種解釋。其餘一切染法等中，各自有不同的相。如貪（Lobha，貪婪）、愛（Raga，愛慾）等。在染污的心所中，唯有不信，其自相渾濁。渾濁其餘心等，使之成為染污。如同極穢之物，自己污穢也污穢他人。也像泥鰍攪動泥土，使水變濁。不信也是如此。唯一不同的相是渾濁染污。得到總體的染污。信正是翻轉彼不信的渾濁，所以以清凈為信的相。下面破斥有兩種，如文可知。

論：有人說信就是愛樂（Adhimukti，勝解）。

【English Translation】 English version: Vairam (Difficulty) and Samling (Joint Purity) cause purity together. Also, Hri (Shame) and others are no different.

Treatise: This nature is clear, hence establishing the name of pure mind.

Commentary: The author of the treatise generally says that the essence of this Shraddha (Faith) is clear and can purify the mind, etc. The remaining Citta-caitta dharmas (mind and mental activities) only correspond to goodness. These eleven dharmas are good in their self-nature because they are corresponding. Their essence is neither good nor not good. Because of the joint action of this faith, etc., the mind, etc., can become good. Therefore, this pure faith can purify the mind, etc. This is the Yishi Shi (Explanation based on the Practitioner). Furthermore, although the essence of the ten dharmas such as Hri (Shame) is good, their essence is not the characteristic of purity. This purity is their characteristic. Therefore, it is called faith. Only faith is the purifier, and the rest are what is purified. Because Citta-raja (King of Mind) is the main one, only the purity of the mind is mentioned, not the purity of mental activities. This is an abbreviation in the text.

Treatise: Like a crystal bead that can purify muddy water.

Commentary: It is like a crystal bead that can purify muddy water. Muddy water is a metaphor for the mind, etc. The clear bead is a metaphor for the essence of faith. Because the bead is thrown in, the muddy water becomes clear. Because there is faith, the mind becomes pure.

If so, Hri (Shame) and others should also be like this. Because their essence is pure. What is the difference?

Treatise: Although Hri (Shame) and others are good, they do not misuse that loss.

Commentary: The essence of the remaining Hri (Shame) and others, although good, can make the mind, etc., good, but they do not take purity as their characteristic, but rather take cultivating goodness, shame, etc., as their characteristics. This faith takes purity as its characteristic and does not misuse the faults of Hri (Shame) and others. It is not because of shame that there is shame; faith is Ahrika (Shamelessness). It is not because of faith that there is faith; shame is Ashraddha (Lack of Faith). Now, this purity is the function of the essence of faith.

Treatise: Also, among all the defiled dharmas, hence purity is the characteristic.

Commentary: This is the second explanation. Among all the remaining defiled dharmas, each has different characteristics. Such as Lobha (Greed), Raga (Desire), etc. Among the defiled mental activities, only lack of faith has a turbid self-nature. It makes the remaining minds, etc., turbid, making them defiled. Like extremely filthy things, they defile themselves and also defile others. It is also like a loach stirring up mud, making the water turbid. Lack of faith is also like this. The only different characteristic is turbid defilement. Overall defilement is obtained. Faith is precisely the reversal of the turbidity of that lack of faith, so purity is taken as the characteristic of faith. There are two refutations below, as can be known from the text.

Treatise: Some say that faith is Adhimukti (Resolution).

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為相。

述曰。上座部義。或大乘異師。謂愛樂彼法故。

論。應通三性至非信所緣。

述曰。論主難云。應通三性。愛三境故。若許三性體應即欲。欲緣所樂故。若汝之信有其善．惡。惡不信可是有。于無記中其信是無。復非是欲。又信於三。信非三性。何妨愛三而唯性善。及為遮此妨作是言。又於四諦皆有信生。若愛樂是信。應于苦．集二諦信不緣之。誰有聖者愛樂苦．集故。苦．集諦應非信所緣。

論。有執信者隨順為相。

述曰。或大乘異師。或是大眾部。以隨順彼法是信相故。

論。應通三性即勝解欲。

述曰。境有三性故隨通三。若許爾者應勝解．欲。

彼若救言雖言隨順體非解欲者。

論。若印順者至即是欲故。

述曰。論主難云。隨順有二種。一者印順即是勝解。印而順彼故。二者樂順即是欲數。樂於彼法即是欲故。

若彼救言二俱之順體是信。非即欲．解。

論。離彼二體至心凈是信。

述曰。論主難云。若離欲．解決非順相。非彼二故。如受．想等。故論但言離彼二體無順相故。由此應知心凈為信。忍可及欲是信之具。正理論師以忍可為信。即當此勝解也。

論。云何為慚至止息惡行為業。

述

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 為相。

述曰：上座部的觀點，或者大乘的某些不同派別的老師認為，因為喜愛那些法。

論：應該貫通三種性質，乃至不是信所緣的。

述曰：論主反駁說，應該貫通三種性質，因為所緣的三種境界。如果承認有三種性質，那麼本體就應該等同於欲，因為欲緣于所樂。如果你的信有善、惡，惡的不信或許是有的，但在無記中，信是不存在的。而且信不是欲。又信對於三性都存在，信並非三種性質，為什麼妨礙喜愛三性而唯獨是善性呢？爲了遮止這種妨礙，所以這樣說。又對於四諦都有信產生。如果愛樂就是信，那麼對於苦、集二諦，信就不緣於它們。誰會有聖者喜愛苦、集二諦呢？苦、集二諦應該不是信所緣的。

論：有些人認為信以隨順為相。

述曰：或者大乘的某些不同派別，或者是大眾部，認為以隨順那些法作為信的相。

論：應該貫通三種性質，等同於勝解和欲。

述曰：境界有三種性質，所以隨順貫通三種性質。如果承認這樣，那麼就應該等同於勝解和欲。

如果他們辯解說，雖然說是隨順，但本體不是勝解和欲。

論：如果印可隨順，乃至就是欲的緣故。

述曰：論主反駁說，隨順有兩種。一種是印可隨順，也就是勝解，因為印可而隨順它。另一種是樂於隨順，也就是欲的範疇，因為樂於那些法就是欲的緣故。

如果他們辯解說，兩種隨順的本體都是信，不是等同於欲和勝解。

論：離開那兩種本體，乃至心凈是信。

述曰：論主反駁說，如果離開欲和勝解，就沒有隨順的相，因為不是那兩者。如同受、想等等。所以論中只說離開那兩種本體就沒有隨順的相。由此應該知道，心凈是信，忍可和欲是信的工具。正理論師以忍可作為信，也就是這裡的勝解。

論：什麼是慚，乃至止息惡行為業。

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the characteristic.

Explanation: The Theravada school's view, or some different teachers of Mahayana, hold that it is because of the love and delight in those dharmas.

Treatise: It should pervade the three natures, even to the point of not being what faith cognizes.

Explanation: The treatise master refutes, saying that it should pervade the three natures because of the three realms it cognizes. If you admit that there are three natures, then the essence should be identical to desire, because desire cognizes what is pleasurable. If your faith has good and evil, disbelief in evil may exist, but in neutral states, faith does not exist. Moreover, faith is not desire. Also, faith exists for all three natures, and faith is not of the three natures. What prevents loving the three natures while only being of good nature? To prevent this objection, it is said that faith arises in relation to the Four Noble Truths. If love and delight are faith, then for the truths of suffering and accumulation, faith does not cognize them. Who among the sages loves suffering and accumulation? The truths of suffering and accumulation should not be what faith cognizes.

Treatise: Some hold that faith has the characteristic of compliance.

Explanation: Or some different schools of Mahayana, or the Mahasamghika school, hold that compliance with those dharmas is the characteristic of faith.

Treatise: It should pervade the three natures, being identical to ascertainment and desire.

Explanation: The realm has three natures, so compliance pervades the three natures. If you admit this, then it should be identical to ascertainment and desire.

If they defend by saying that although it is said to be compliance, the essence is not ascertainment and desire.

Treatise: If it is approval and compliance, then it is because of desire.

Explanation: The treatise master refutes, saying that there are two kinds of compliance. One is approval and compliance, which is ascertainment, because it approves and complies with it. The other is joyful compliance, which is in the category of desire, because joy in those dharmas is the reason for desire.

If they defend by saying that the essence of both compliances is faith, not identical to desire and ascertainment.

Treatise: Apart from those two essences, purity of mind is faith.

Explanation: The treatise master refutes, saying that if it is apart from desire and ascertainment, there is no characteristic of compliance, because it is not those two. Like feeling, thought, etc. Therefore, the treatise only says that apart from those two essences, there is no characteristic of compliance. From this, it should be known that purity of mind is faith, and acceptance and desire are the tools of faith. The Nyaya theorists take acceptance as faith, which is the ascertainment here.

Treatise: What is Hri (Shame), up to ceasing evil conduct as its function.

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曰。下第二段慚．愧合解。于中有二。初別解。后總解　依自法力者。顯揚云。依自增上及法增上羞恥過惡。即是二緣。今此乃顯慚之別相。即是崇重賢．善二法。謂于有賢德者若凡若聖。而生崇敬。於一切有漏．無漏善法。而生崇重。此是慚之別相。至下當知。對治無慚其義可知。與止息惡行為所依。由此故惡不轉。顯揚皆例于信起五業。初皆所治別業。即皆同此。

論。謂依自法至息諸惡行。

述曰。謂于自身生自尊愛。增上於法生貴重。增上二種力故。崇賢重善。羞恥過惡。謂作是意言。我如是身乃作諸惡。彼法甚好次依用之。即雖依周．孔之書皆名貴法。世禮儀故。然以刑防惡如國法律。即是後文世間愧攝。

論。云何為愧至止息惡行為業。

述曰。依世間力輕拒暴惡。別者謂若他人譏毀。及羞諸惡法。而不作皆名依世間。惡法名他。故對法但言羞他為體。顯揚即言於世增上。即是緣也。有惡者名暴。染法體名惡。于彼二法。輕有惡者而不親。拒惡法業而不作。或總輕拒。或總暴惡。此皆是愧別相。餘業如前。

論。謂依世間至息諸惡業。

述曰。謂為世人所訶。自厭于惡染己二增上力。所以乃止息諸惡業。

論。羞恥過惡至假說為體。

述曰。下總解有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 說：下面第二段是慚愧的合理解釋，其中分為兩部分。首先是分別解釋，然後是總體解釋。依靠自身的力量是指，《顯揚論》中說：『依靠自身的增上和法的增上，羞恥過錯』，這就是兩種因緣。這裡是顯示慚的個別相狀，即是崇敬賢和善兩種法。對於有賢德的人，無論是凡人還是聖人，都產生崇敬之心；對於一切有漏和無漏的善法，都產生崇重之心。這是慚的個別相狀，下文將會詳細說明。對治無慚的意義是可以理解的，以止息惡行為所依，因此惡行不會發生。《顯揚論》都以信為例子，發起五種行業，最初都是所要對治的個別行業，都與此相同。

論：所謂依靠自身和法力，以至於止息各種惡行。

述記說：所謂對於自身產生自尊自愛，增上對於法產生貴重之心，依靠這兩種力量，崇敬賢人，重視善法，羞恥過錯。意思是說：『我這樣的身體竟然會做出各種惡行，那些法非常好，應該依從它。』即使是依靠周公、孔子的書籍，都可以稱為貴法，因為它們是世間的禮儀。然而用刑罰來防止邪惡，就像國家的法律一樣，這就是後文中所說的世間愧所包含的內容。

論：什麼是愧？以至於止息惡行為業。

述記說：依靠世間的力量，輕視和拒絕暴惡。個別來說，如果他人譏諷譭謗，以及羞恥各種惡法，而不去做，都可以稱為依靠世間。惡法被稱為『他』，所以對於法，只說是『羞他』為體。《顯揚論》中說『對於世間增上』，這就是因緣。有惡行的人被稱為『暴』，染污的法體被稱為『惡』。對於這兩種法，輕視有惡行的人而不親近，拒絕惡法而不去做。或者總的來說是輕視和拒絕，或者總的來說是暴惡。這些都是愧的個別相狀，其餘的行業和前面一樣。

論：所謂依靠世間，以至於止息各種惡業。

述記說：因為被世人所呵斥，自己厭惡染污自己，這兩種增上力量，所以能夠止息各種惡業。

論：羞恥過錯，以至於假說為體。

述記說：下面總體解釋。

【English Translation】 English version It is said: The second section below is a combined explanation of hri (shame) and apatrapya (embarrassment). It is divided into two parts: first, a separate explanation, and then a general explanation. 'Relying on one's own power' means, as the Xianyang Lun (Compendium of Determinations) says: 'Relying on one's own increase and the increase of the Dharma, being ashamed of faults.' These are the two conditions. This shows the individual characteristics of hri, which is to revere the two dharmas of virtue and goodness. Towards those with virtue, whether ordinary or saintly, one generates reverence; towards all dharmas, whether with outflows or without outflows, one generates reverence. This is the individual characteristic of hri, as will be explained below. The meaning of counteracting shamelessness is understandable, taking the cessation of evil actions as its basis, so that evil actions do not occur. The Xianyang Lun uses faith as an example to initiate the five types of actions, initially all being the individual actions to be counteracted, all being the same as this.

Treatise: So-called relying on oneself and the power of the Dharma, to the extent of ceasing all evil actions.

Commentary says: So-called generating self-respect and self-love towards oneself, increasing respect for the Dharma, relying on these two powers, revering the virtuous, valuing the good, being ashamed of faults. It means saying: 'My body like this actually commits various evil actions, those dharmas are very good, I should follow them.' Even relying on the books of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius can be called valuable dharmas, because they are worldly etiquette. However, using punishments to prevent evil is like the laws of the country, which is what the later text refers to as being included in worldly apatrapya.

Treatise: What is apatrapya? Taking the cessation of evil actions as its function.

Commentary says: Relying on the power of the world, despising and rejecting violence and evil. Individually speaking, if others criticize and slander, and are ashamed of various evil dharmas, and do not do them, it can be called relying on the world. Evil dharmas are called 'others', so regarding the dharma, it is only said that 'shaming others' is its essence. The Xianyang Lun says 'increasing towards the world', which is the condition. Those with evil actions are called 'violent', the defiled substance of the dharma is called 'evil'. Towards these two dharmas, despising those with evil actions and not being close to them, rejecting evil dharmas and not doing them. Or generally speaking, despising and rejecting, or generally speaking, violence and evil. These are all individual characteristics of apatrapya, the remaining functions are the same as before.

Treatise: So-called relying on the world, to the extent of ceasing all evil actions.

Commentary says: Because of being scolded by the world, one dislikes defiling oneself, these two increasing powers, so one can cease all evil actions.

Treatise: Being ashamed of faults, to the extent of nominally taking it as its essence.

Commentary says: The following is a general explanation.

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四。一會舊文。二難古說。三釋外問。四解自他。此初也。羞恥等是慚．愧二法之通相。故諸對法．顯揚等。依此通相假說為二別體。彼雖言他．自增上等。然是起緣非是別相。

今難彼言。

論。若執羞恥至有此義故。

述曰。下難古說有四。一體無別難。二不相應難。三非實有難。四不遍善難。此初二難也。執彼羞恥為此二別相。應此二體無有差別。相無異故。既爾二體定不相應。無二受二想等體有此俱起義故。二量可知。

論。若待自他至便違聖教。

述曰。此非實有難。謂彼若言由待自．他境差別故二體有別可俱起者。應此二種。皆非實有。有所待故。如長短等。無別自體待自．他故方成二別。豈非是假。若許是假便違聖教。五十五等說十一善中八是實有。

論。若許慚愧至十遍善心。

述曰。不遍善難。又彼若言此二體定實有。然前後生。不可俱起。待自．他故。若爾復違論說十遍善心。此大論中六十九說。至下當知。故知二法非前後起。

論。崇重輕拒至何乃偏責。

述曰。下解釋外問有六。一問。二答。三難。四通。五徴。六釋。此問也。若崇重善為慚。唯緣善故。輕拒惡為愧。唯緣惡故。是二之別相者。此二所緣既有異故。應不俱生。彼此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 四。一會舊文。二難古說。三釋外問。四解自他。這是第一個部分。羞恥等是慚（Hri，對自身惡行的羞恥感）和愧（Apatrapya，對他人惡行的羞恥感）二法的共通之處。因此，《阿毗達磨》（Abhidharma）和《顯揚聖教論》（Asamyojanasutra）等論典，依據這個共通之處，假設它們是兩個不同的實體。他們雖然說依賴於『他』和『自』的增上緣等，但這只是生起的因緣，而不是它們各自的差別相。

現在反駁他們的說法。

論：如果執著羞恥…以至於有此意義的緣故。

述曰：下面反駁古說有四點：一體無差別難，二不相應難，三非實有難，四不遍善難。這是最初的兩個難點。如果執著他們所說的羞恥是這二者的差別相，那麼這二者的本體應該沒有差別，因為它們的相沒有差異。既然如此，這兩個本體必定不相應，因為沒有兩個受（Vedana）、兩個想（Samjna）等本體具有同時生起的意義。這可以通過理智和經驗來了解。

論：如果依賴於自他…便違背聖教。

述曰：這是非實有難。如果他們說由於依賴於『自』和『他』的境界差別，所以二者的本體有差別，可以同時生起，那麼這兩種都應該不是實有的，因為有所依賴。就像長和短等，沒有各自的自體，依賴於『自』和『他』才能成為兩種差別。這難道不是虛假的嗎？如果承認是虛假的，便違背了聖教。《五十五事》（Pancapancasat）等經中說，十一善法中有八個是實有的。

論：如果允許慚愧…十遍善心。

述曰：這是不遍善難。又如果他們說這二者的本體一定是實有的，然而前後生起，不可同時生起，因為依賴於『自』和『他』的緣故。如果這樣，又違背了論典所說的十遍善心。這部《大論》（Mahavastu）第六十九卷中說，到後面會知道。所以知道這兩種法不是前後生起的。

論：崇重輕拒…為何偏責？

述曰：下面解釋外問有六個步驟：一問，二答，三難，四通，五征，六釋。這是提問。如果崇重善法是慚（Hri），僅僅緣于善法；輕拒惡法是愧（Apatrapya），僅僅緣于惡法。這是二者的差別相的話，那麼這二者所緣的境界既然有差異，應該不能同時生起。彼此

【English Translation】 English version Four: 1. Explaining old texts, 2. Refuting ancient theories, 3. Answering external questions, 4. Resolving self and other's views. This is the first part. Shame and disgrace are common characteristics of Hri (shame for one's own misdeeds) and Apatrapya (shame for the misdeeds of others). Therefore, treatises such as the Abhidharma and the Asamyojanasutra, based on this common characteristic, hypothetically consider them as two separate entities. Although they speak of relying on the 'self' and 'other' as dominant conditions, these are merely the conditions for arising, not their distinct characteristics.

Now, refuting their claims.

Treatise: If one insists on shame... to the extent that it has this meaning.

Commentary: Below are four refutations of the ancient theories: 1. No difference in essence, 2. Incompatibility, 3. Not truly existent, 4. Not universally virtuous. These are the first two difficulties. If one insists that what they call shame and disgrace are the distinguishing characteristics of these two, then the essence of these two should be no different, because their characteristics are not different. In that case, these two entities are certainly incompatible, because no two Vedana (feelings), two Samjna (perceptions), etc., have the meaning of arising simultaneously. This can be understood through reason and experience.

Treatise: If it depends on self and other... then it contradicts the sacred teachings.

Commentary: This is the difficulty of not being truly existent. If they say that because of the difference in the objects of 'self' and 'other', the essence of the two is different and can arise simultaneously, then both of these should not be truly existent, because they are dependent. Like long and short, etc., they do not have their own inherent existence; they become two distinct entities only by depending on 'self' and 'other'. Isn't this false? If it is admitted to be false, then it contradicts the sacred teachings. The Pancapancasat and other sutras say that eight out of the eleven virtuous qualities are truly existent.

Treatise: If one allows shame and disgrace... the ten universally virtuous minds.

Commentary: This is the difficulty of not being universally virtuous. Furthermore, if they say that the essence of these two must be truly existent, but they arise sequentially and cannot arise simultaneously because they depend on 'self' and 'other', then this again contradicts what the treatises say about the ten universally virtuous minds. This is stated in the sixty-ninth chapter of the Mahavastu, as will be known later. Therefore, it is known that these two dharmas do not arise sequentially.

Treatise: Honoring and respecting, lightly rejecting... why single out blame?

Commentary: Below are six steps to explain external questions: 1. Question, 2. Answer, 3. Refutation, 4. Explanation, 5. Inquiry, 6. Clarification. This is the question. If honoring and respecting good is Hri (shame), only related to good; lightly rejecting evil is Apatrapya (disgrace), only related to evil. If these are the distinguishing characteristics of the two, then since the objects of these two are different, they should not be able to arise simultaneously. Each other

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二失既同。何乃偏能嘖我。我亦境別。緣自他故。不同時故。

論。誰言二法所緣有異。

述曰。此論主答。即是慚．愧同一境也。

論。不爾如何。

述曰。此外人難。

論。善心起時至所緣無別。

述曰。此論主通。善心起時隨緣何境。不簡諸諦．實等。皆是隨一善心。此一聚心等中。皆有崇重善及拒憚惡義。此二種義是二別相。非二所緣。所緣同故。即是二法各別功能。是二別相。一效能崇善。一效能拒惡。善心起時必有此二故得俱起。此中非是二所緣故二必同緣。故此二法遍善心也。

論。豈不我說亦有此義。

述曰。外人復徴。我前所言亦有不緣自他境別。但是二法待自及他。功能異故。許俱時生。體非假有。

論。汝執慚愧至前所設難。

述曰。此論主釋。慚．愧俱以羞恥為相。即是此二自相既同。何理能遮我前所設難。一體無別難。二不相應難。三應假有難。四非遍善難。故我可然。有二別相所緣不別故。

論。然諸聖教至名自他故。

述曰。下解自．他。其中二釋。一自身及法名自。世間王法等名他。內外異故。又涅槃經．對法等。說此二別顧自他者。崇善是顧自義。拒惡名顧他義。所以者何。下通二義。於己益名自。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二者過失既然相同，為什麼偏偏要責備我呢？我也是因為所緣的境界不同，因緣來自自身和他人的緣故，以及時間不同的緣故。

論：誰說這兩種法所緣的境界有所不同呢？

述曰：這是論主的回答，即是說慚（Hri，對自己的過錯感到羞恥）和愧（Apatrapya，對別人的過錯感到羞恥）所緣的境界是相同的。

論：如果不是這樣，又該如何解釋呢？

述曰：這是外人的提問。

論：善心生起時，乃至所緣的境界沒有差別。

述曰：這是論主的解釋。善心生起時，隨順任何境界，不區分諸諦（Satya，真諦）、實等，都是隨順於同一善心。在這同一組心中，都有崇尚善和拒絕惡的含義。這兩種含義是兩種不同的相，而不是兩種所緣。所緣是相同的。這兩種法各自的功能不同，是兩種不同的相。一種效能崇尚善，一種效能拒絕惡。善心生起時必定有這兩種功能，所以能夠同時生起。這裡不是因為兩種所緣不同，所以這兩種法必定緣于同一境界，因此這兩種法遍及所有善心。

論：難道我說就沒有這種含義嗎？

述曰：外人再次提出質疑。我之前所說也有不緣于自身和他人的境界差別，只是因為兩種法對待自身和他人的功能不同，所以允許同時產生，本體並非假有。

論：你執著于慚愧的說法，就會面臨之前所設的難題。

述曰：這是論主的解釋。慚和愧都以羞恥為相，即是說這兩種法的自相既然相同，有什麼道理能夠阻止我之前所提出的難題呢？一體沒有差別這個難題，二者不相應這個難題，應該是假有這個難題，並非遍及所有善心這個難題。所以我可以認為，有兩種不同的相，所緣的境界沒有差別。

論：然而各種聖教經典都說，名稱來自自身和他人的緣故。

述曰：下面解釋自身和他人的含義。其中有兩種解釋。自身和法稱為自，世間的王法等稱為他，因為內外不同。另外，《涅槃經》（Nirvana Sutra）、《對法》（Abhidharma）等經典說這兩種區別在於顧及自身和他人的緣故。崇尚善是顧及自身的含義，拒絕惡是顧及他人的含義。為什麼這樣說呢？下面解釋這兩種含義。對於自己有益的稱為自。

【English Translation】 English version If the two faults are the same, why do you particularly blame me? My situation is also different because the objects of my attention are different, the causes and conditions come from myself and others, and the times are different.

Treatise: Who says that the objects of the two dharmas are different?

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer, which is to say that Hri (shame, feeling ashamed of one's own faults) and Apatrapya (remorse, feeling ashamed of others' faults) have the same object.

Treatise: If not, how should it be explained?

Commentary: This is the question from an outsider.

Treatise: When a wholesome mind arises, even the objects of attention are not different.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's explanation. When a wholesome mind arises, it follows any object, without distinguishing between the Truths (Satya), reality, etc., all of which follow the same wholesome mind. In this same group of minds, there are meanings of respecting good and rejecting evil. These two meanings are two different characteristics, not two objects of attention. The objects of attention are the same. The functions of these two dharmas are different, and they are two different characteristics. One has the ability to respect good, and the other has the ability to reject evil. When a wholesome mind arises, it must have these two functions, so they can arise simultaneously. Here, it is not because the two objects of attention are different, so these two dharmas must be related to the same object, therefore these two dharmas pervade all wholesome minds.

Treatise: Don't you think I also have this meaning?

Commentary: The outsider raises the question again. What I said before also has the difference of not being related to oneself and others, but it is only because the functions of the two dharmas are different in dealing with oneself and others, so they are allowed to arise simultaneously, and the substance is not hypothetical.

Treatise: If you are attached to the saying of Hri and Apatrapya, you will face the difficulties set up earlier.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's explanation. Both Hri and Apatrapya take shame as their characteristic, which means that since the self-characteristics of these two dharmas are the same, what reason can prevent the difficulties I raised earlier? The difficulty that the one body has no difference, the difficulty that the two are not corresponding, the difficulty that it should be hypothetical, and the difficulty that it does not pervade all wholesome minds. So I can think that there are two different characteristics, and the objects of attention are not different.

Treatise: However, various sacred teachings say that the names come from oneself and others.

Commentary: The following explains the meaning of oneself and others. There are two explanations. Oneself and the Dharma are called self, and the king's law in the world is called others, because the inside and outside are different. In addition, the Nirvana Sutra and Abhidharma and other scriptures say that these two differences are due to taking care of oneself and others. Respecting good is the meaning of taking care of oneself, and rejecting evil is the meaning of taking care of others. Why do you say that? The following explains these two meanings. What is beneficial to oneself is called self.

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於己損名他。故即會自他是二別相。正理論師云。羞現罪因名自。現屬身故。羞罪果名他。非現屬己故。今顯別彼也。

論。無貪等者至近對治故。

述曰。下文有二。初總。后別。總中又二。初牒頌顯。后釋善根。頌中所云無貪等三根。等者等取無瞋．無癡。釋根名者。生善勝故。有何勝也。三不善根正相翻對。近別對治故。此遠總對治。即正見也。非別治故。然準此下文。三不善根。由三義故。一六識相應。二正煩惱攝。此二簡諸一切心所非不善根。三起惡勝故。正釋根義。其此三法正對翻彼名為善根。今準此文。善根由二義。一三不善根近對治故。簡餘一切善心所等不名善根。非不善根近對治故。二生善勝故。正釋根義。餘論無此。如文可解。

論。云何無貪至作善為業。

述曰。下別釋有二。初解無貪瞋。后解無癡。初中又二。初別解二。后總解之。有謂三有之果。有具即能生三有之因。相順之因唯是有漏。為緣之因亦取涅槃。能發貪等故亦是具。中有．業．惑皆是業具。無著為性。惡行不起故善能作。

論。云何無瞋至作善為業。

述曰。苦謂三苦。苦具即彼能生苦者一切皆是。準無貪中。滅諦涅槃亦是苦具。違理生故。

論。善心起時至俱遍善心。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 損害自己名聲，有利於他人。因此，就會自然區分自己和他人這兩種不同的狀態。正理論師說：『因為羞於呈現罪惡的起因，所以稱為「自」，因為這個起因屬於自身。羞於呈現罪惡的結果，所以稱為「他」，因為這個結果不屬於自身。』現在是爲了彰顯自己和他人之間的區別。

論：『無貪』等是指能直接對治（不善根）的（善根）。

述記：下文分為兩部分。首先是總說，然後是別說。總說又分為兩部分。首先是引述頌文以彰顯其義，然後解釋善根。頌文中所說的『無貪』等三種根，『等』字包括無瞋、無癡。解釋『根』這個名稱，是因為它們能產生殊勝的善法。有什麼殊勝之處呢？因為這三種善根正好與三種不善根相反，能直接對治它們。這是從遠處進行總的對治，也就是正見。因為正見不是分別對治。然而，根據下文，三種不善根有三個特點：一是與六識相應，二是屬於煩惱，這兩個特點是爲了區分所有不是不善根的心所。三是能產生強大的惡業，這正是解釋了『根』的含義。這三種法正好與不善根相反，所以被稱為善根。現在根據這段文字，善根有兩個特點：一是能直接對治三種不善根，這是爲了區分其他一切不屬於善根的善心所等，因為它們不能直接對治不善根。二是能產生殊勝的善法，這正是解釋了『根』的含義。其他論典沒有這些內容，可以按照字面意思理解。

論：『什麼是無貪？』直到『以行善為業』。

述記：下面分別解釋，分為兩部分。首先解釋無貪和無瞋，然後解釋無癡。第一部分又分為兩部分。首先分別解釋無貪和無瞋，然後總的解釋。『有』是指三有（欲有、色有、無色有）的果報。『有具』是指能夠產生三有的原因。與三有相順的原因只有有漏法。作為緣的原因也包括涅槃。因為能引發貪等煩惱，所以也是『具』。中有（中陰身）、業、惑都是業的工具。以不執著為體性，惡行不會產生，所以能夠行善。

論：『什麼是無瞋？』直到『以行善為業』。

述記：『苦』是指三苦（苦苦、壞苦、行苦）。『苦具』是指能夠產生苦的一切事物。按照無貪中的解釋，滅諦（Nirvana）涅槃也是苦的工具，因為它違背真理而產生。

論：『善心生起時』直到『普遍存在於善心中』。

【English Translation】 English version It harms one's own reputation and benefits others. Therefore, it naturally distinguishes between the two separate states of oneself and others. The Sautrāntika (a school of Buddhism) masters say: 'Because one is ashamed to present the cause of sin, it is called 'self,' because this cause belongs to oneself. Being ashamed to present the result of sin is called 'other,' because this result does not belong to oneself.' Now it is to highlight the distinction between oneself and others.

Treatise: 'Non-greed' etc. refers to (wholesome roots) that directly counteract (unwholesome roots).

Commentary: The following text is divided into two parts. First, a general explanation, then a specific explanation. The general explanation is further divided into two parts. First, quoting the verse to highlight its meaning, then explaining the wholesome roots. The 'non-greed' etc. mentioned in the verse includes non-hatred and non-delusion. The explanation of the name 'root' is because they can generate excellent wholesome dharmas. What is so excellent about them? Because these three wholesome roots are exactly the opposite of the three unwholesome roots, they can directly counteract them. This is a general counteraction from afar, which is right view. Because right view is not a separate counteraction. However, according to the following text, the three unwholesome roots have three characteristics: first, they are associated with the six consciousnesses; second, they belong to afflictions; these two characteristics are to distinguish all mental factors that are not unwholesome roots. Third, they can generate powerful evil karma, which is precisely the explanation of the meaning of 'root.' These three dharmas are exactly the opposite of unwholesome roots, so they are called wholesome roots. Now, according to this text, wholesome roots have two characteristics: first, they can directly counteract the three unwholesome roots, which is to distinguish all other wholesome mental factors etc. that are not called wholesome roots, because they cannot directly counteract unwholesome roots. Second, they can generate excellent wholesome dharmas, which is precisely the explanation of the meaning of 'root.' Other treatises do not have these contents, and can be understood literally.

Treatise: 'What is non-greed?' until 'taking wholesome actions as its function'.

Commentary: The following is a separate explanation, divided into two parts. First, explaining non-greed and non-hatred, then explaining non-delusion. The first part is further divided into two parts. First, separately explaining non-greed and non-hatred, then a general explanation. 'Existence' refers to the result of the three realms of existence (desire realm, form realm, formless realm). 'The means of existence' refers to the causes that can generate the three realms of existence. The causes that are in accordance with the three realms of existence are only defiled dharmas. The causes as conditions also include Nirvana (the state of liberation). Because it can cause greed and other afflictions, it is also a 'means'. The intermediate state (antarabhava), karma, and afflictions are all tools of karma. Its nature is non-attachment, evil actions will not arise, so it can perform wholesome actions.

Treatise: 'What is non-hatred?' until 'taking wholesome actions as its function'.

Commentary: 'Suffering' refers to the three sufferings (suffering of suffering, suffering of change, suffering of conditioning). 'The means of suffering' refers to all things that can generate suffering. According to the explanation in non-greed, cessation (Nirvana) is also a tool of suffering, because it arises contrary to the truth.

Treatise: 'When a wholesome mind arises' until 'universally present in the wholesome mind'.

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述曰。此總解二。其諸善心隨緣何境。一一心中皆無著無恚。此是功能。貪對有．有具。瞋對苦．苦具。立二別相。觀謂觀待。如慚與愧觀待自．他。非要無貪緣有．有具。無瞋緣苦．苦具。故遍善心。如慚．愧說。貪通三界發業。潤生。總說有．有具。瞋唯欲界發業力勝。故云于苦．苦具。然對法與此同。顯揚瞋但約有情重處為論。今能除法並通三界。

下解無癡有二。初略。后廣。

論。云何無癡至作善為業。

述曰。此略也。無癡于理及一切事明解不迷。作善止惡是此體．業。

論。有義無癡至抉擇性故。

述曰。廣有二說。體即別境惠。對法第一說。報．教．證．智抉擇為體。彼是本論。彼釋云。謂報．教．證．智。是生得．聞．思．修。如次配之。以報為生得。生便即得故。從所依名報。聞緣教生。從境為名故。思能引證故。說思為證。證是修惠。是思所生。思惠從果以彰號。智謂修惠。是所生故。當體得名。若名修惠。從因定為名。

問若體即是別境惠者。何須善中唯說于惠。餘四別境善中不說也。

論。此雖即惠至故復別說。

述曰。為顯善品有勝功能。增長善故。斷不善根故。如煩惱中見用增勝故別說之。

論。有義無癡至善根攝故。

述曰。下文有四。一標宗。二引證。三會違。四立理。此初也。此以量破。無癡。非惠別有自性。正對不善之中無明善根攝故。如無貪等　量云。無癡。定別有體。所正對治是不善根故。如無貪瞋　又此離惠實有自性無貪等三善根攝故。如無貪瞋　不言是善十一善根攝。舍等為過故。

論。論說大悲至應惠等根攝。

述曰。下引證。有二文證。此以教理齊難。何以知實。亦有文證。瑜伽五十七卷說大悲以彼無嗔．無癡二法為體。非二十二根攝。若無癡以惠為性。此大悲如十力。應二十二根中惠根。三無漏等根所攝。彼說十力．四無畏等惠根等攝。不攝悲故。此為一違。然彼前師何以解此文。彼云以有無嗔為體故非根攝。至下當知。

論。又若無癡至余皆是實。

述曰。又引論難。若此無癡以惠為性。如不害等應非實物。不害以無嗔為性。此以惠為體故。若許無癡是假。便違大論五十五說十一善中不放逸．舍．及不害三是世俗有。余皆實有。由前一理二教故別有體。

若爾對法文如何通。

論。然集論說至理必應爾。

述曰。此會違也。惠為體者。舉無癡之因果以顯無癡。無癡之因及果皆通四惠。或是俱時。或是別念。此是等流．增上．士用果故。如彼論解信中。亦以

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述曰：下文分為四個部分：一是標明宗義，二是引用證據，三是調和牴觸，四是建立理據。這裡是第一個部分。這裡用量（推理）來破斥『無癡』（amoha，不愚癡，智慧）並非與『惠』（prajna，智慧）有不同的自性。因為『無癡』所針對的正是『不善』（akusala）中的『無明』（avidya，愚昧），屬於『善根』（kusalamula）所攝，就像『無貪』（alobha，不貪婪）等一樣。量式如下：『無癡』必定有其獨立的自體，因為它所針對和對治的是『不善根』，就像『無貪』和『無嗔』（advesa，不嗔恨）一樣。此外，『無癡』如果離開『惠』而有實在的自性，就應被歸為『無貪』等三種『善根』所攝，就像『無貪』和『無嗔』一樣。這裡不說『無癡』屬於『善』中的『十一善根』所攝，是因為會犯『舍』（upeksha，舍受，平靜）等的過失。 論：論中說『大悲』（mahakaruna，偉大的悲憫）應為『惠』等根所攝。 窺基法師述曰：下面是引用證據的部分，有兩段經文可以作為證據。這裡用教證和理證一同進行辯難。憑什麼知道『無癡』是實有自體的呢？也有經文可以證明。瑜伽師地論第五十七卷說，『大悲』以『無嗔』和『無癡』兩種法為體，不屬於二十二根所攝。如果『無癡』以『惠』為自性，那麼『大悲』就像『十力』（dasabala，佛的十種力量）一樣，應該屬於二十二根中的『惠根』，以及『三無漏根』（trinyanindriyani，三種無漏根）等所攝。論中說『十力』、『四無畏』（catu vaisaradyani，四種無所畏懼）等屬於『惠根』等所攝，但不包括『大悲』。這是一個牴觸之處。然而，之前的論師如何解釋這段經文呢？他們說，因為『大悲』以『無嗔』為體，所以不屬於根所攝。這一點在下文將會說明。 論：又如果『無癡』以『惠』為自性，就像『不害』（avihimsa，不損害）等一樣，應該不是實物。『不害』以『無嗔』為自性，因為『無癡』以『惠』為體。如果承認『無癡』是假有，就違背了《大論》第五十五卷所說，十一善中，『不放逸』（apramada，不放逸）、『舍』以及『不害』三種是世俗有，其餘都是實有。由於前面的道理和兩段教證，所以『無癡』是別有自體的。 如果這樣，《對法論》（Abhidharma，阿毗達摩）的經文該如何解釋呢？ 論：然而，《集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya，阿毗達摩集論）說，道理必定應該是這樣。 窺基法師述曰：這是調和牴觸之處。說『惠』為體，是用『無癡』的因果來顯示『無癡』。『無癡』的因和果都通於四種『惠』。或者同時，或者不同時。這是等流果、增上果和士用果。就像論中解釋『信』（sraddha，信仰）一樣。

【English Translation】 English version: Shu Yue: The following text has four parts: 1. Stating the doctrine; 2. Citing evidence; 3. Reconciling contradictions; 4. Establishing principles. This is the first part. Here, it uses reasoning to refute that 'Amoha' (non-ignorance, wisdom) does not have a separate self-nature from 'Prajna' (wisdom). Because 'Amoha' is directed against 'Avidya' (ignorance) in 'Akusala' (unwholesome), it is included in 'Kusalamula' (roots of good), like 'Alobha' (non-greed) and others. The reasoning is as follows: 'Amoha' must have its independent entity because what it targets and counteracts is the 'unwholesome root', like 'Alobha' and 'Advesa' (non-hatred). Furthermore, if 'Amoha' has a real self-nature apart from 'Prajna', it should be included in the three 'good roots' such as 'Alobha', like 'Alobha' and 'Advesa'. It is not said here that 'Amoha' belongs to the 'eleven good roots' in 'goodness' because it would commit the fault of 'Upeksha' (equanimity) and others. Treatise: The treatise says that 'Mahakaruna' (great compassion) should be included in the roots such as 'Prajna'. Shu Yue: The following is the part of citing evidence, with two passages as evidence. Here, both doctrinal and logical proofs are used to argue. How do we know that 'Amoha' has a real self-nature? There are also scriptures that can prove it. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 57, says that 'Mahakaruna' takes 'Advesa' and 'Amoha' as its substance and does not belong to the twenty-two roots. If 'Amoha' takes 'Prajna' as its nature, then 'Mahakaruna', like 'Dasabala' (the ten powers of the Buddha), should belong to the 'Prajna root' among the twenty-two roots, as well as the 'three Anāsrava roots' (three non-outflow roots). The treatise says that 'Dasabala', 'Catu vaisaradyani' (four fearlessnesses), etc., belong to the 'Prajna root', etc., but do not include 'Mahakaruna'. This is a contradiction. However, how did the previous masters explain this passage? They said that because 'Mahakaruna' takes 'Advesa' as its substance, it is not included in the roots. This will be explained below. Treatise: Furthermore, if 'Amoha' takes 'Prajna' as its nature, like 'Avihimsa' (non-harming), etc., it should not be a real entity. 'Avihimsa' takes 'Advesa' as its nature because 'Amoha' takes 'Prajna' as its substance. If it is admitted that 'Amoha' is falsely existent, it would violate what the Mahāyāna-sūtra, volume 55, says: among the eleven good dharmas, 'Apramada' (non-negligence), 'Upeksha', and 'Avihimsa' are conventionally existent, and the rest are really existent. Due to the preceding reasoning and two scriptural proofs, 'Amoha' has a separate self-nature. If so, how should the text of the Abhidharma be explained? Treatise: However, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that the principle must be like this. Shu Yue: This is the part of reconciling contradictions. Saying that 'Prajna' is the substance is to use the cause and effect of 'Amoha' to reveal 'Amoha'. The cause and effect of 'Amoha' both connect to the four kinds of 'Prajna'. Either simultaneously or not simultaneously. This is the nisyanda-phala (result of outflow), adhipati-phala (result of dominance), and purusakara-phala (result of effort). It's just like how the treatise explains 'Sraddha' (faith).

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忍樂即勝解欲。舉信因果以解信故。無癡亦然。以為同喻理必應然。以四惠為因果而表無癡。

所以者何。

論。以貪嗔癡至立不善根。

述曰。下立理也。由此三種能具二義。一六識相應。即簡疑等。二正煩惱攝。簡不信等。余非此位。小乘三義簡。此中二義簡。及起惡勝故。解于根義。二簡余法。由一義故立不善根。

舉此所治方辨能治。

論。斷彼必由至必應別有。

述曰。斷彼三時必由二對治。一通對治。即唯善惠。能總斷故。二別對治。即無貪嗔癡。如貪．嗔二有通．別對治。不善根攝故癡亦爾。不善根攝亦有二對治。如貪．嗔二故。必別有無癡。以不善根起惡勝故須二對治。余惑不然。由此因緣無癡離惠定別有體　前師解大悲非根攝云。以用無嗔．無癡二法為體。論從無嗔說為非根。實是根攝　若爾即三念住等亦爾　不爾大悲似四無量中悲唯以無嗔為性。今從無嗔說根所不攝。念住依惠故根所攝。且約影顯非實理文　若爾即三世俗有文如何通　答實有者體即惠故　問不害體即無嗔。應非假有　答世俗有言通假實故。如種子世俗有言。即是實故。三是世俗皆是假有。此亦不然。如五見惠分說為世俗有故非是假有。此無癡亦爾　若爾不害無嗔分。如何通　故后師為正。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 忍樂（對事物忍耐和喜愛）等同於勝解欲（通過殊勝的理解而產生的慾望）。這是因為相信因果才能理解併產生信心。無癡（沒有愚癡）也是如此，可以用同樣的道理來比喻，這是必然的。以四種恩惠作為因果來表明沒有愚癡。

為什麼這麼說呢？

論：因為貪、嗔、癡才成立不善根（一切惡行的根本）。

述曰：下面闡述這個道理。因為這三種（貪、嗔、癡）能夠具備兩種含義：一是與六識相應，這就排除了疑等；二是屬於正煩惱所攝，這就排除了不信等。其餘的（法）不屬於這個範疇。小乘佛教用三種含義來排除，而這裡用兩種含義來排除。並且因為生起惡行的力量強大，所以解釋為『根』的含義。二是排除其他法，因為具備一種含義，所以成立為不善根。

舉出所要對治的（不善根），才能辨別能對治的（善法）。

論：斷除這些（不善根）必定要通過……必定應該有其他的（對治法）。

述曰：斷除這三種（貪、嗔、癡）在三個時間段都需要通過兩種對治法：一是共通的對治法，也就是唯有善慧（智慧），能夠總的斷除；二是分別的對治法，也就是無貪、無嗔、無癡。如同貪和嗔有兩種共通和分別的對治法一樣，因為它們屬於不善根所攝，所以愚癡也是如此。因為屬於不善根所攝，所以也有兩種對治法，如同貪和嗔一樣。必定有另外的無癡，因為不善根生起惡行的力量強大，所以需要兩種對治法，其餘的迷惑不是這樣。因為這個因緣，無癡離開智慧必定有單獨的體性。之前的法師解釋大悲（偉大的慈悲）不是根所攝，說是因為以無嗔、無癡兩種法作為體性。論典是從無嗔的角度來說它不是根，實際上是根所攝。如果這樣，那麼三念住（身念住、受念住、心念住）等也是如此嗎？不是的，大悲類似於四無量心中的悲，僅僅以無嗔為體性。現在是從無嗔的角度來說它不是根所攝。念住依靠智慧，所以是根所攝。這只是從影子來顯現，不是真實的道理。如果這樣，那麼三世俗有（三種世俗諦）的文句如何解釋？回答說，真實有的體性就是智慧。問：不害的體性就是無嗔，應該不是假有。回答說，世俗有的說法既包括假有也包括實有。如同種子是世俗有，但實際上是實有。三種是世俗有，都是假有，這也不對。如同五見（五種錯誤的見解）的智慧部分說是世俗有，所以不是假有。這個無癡也是如此。如果這樣，那麼不害的無嗔部分，如何解釋？所以後來的法師的說法才是正確的。

【English Translation】 English version 『Ren Le』 (patience and joy) is equivalent to 『Sheng Jie Yu』 (desire arising from superior understanding). This is because believing in cause and effect leads to understanding and generating faith. 『Wu Chi』 (absence of ignorance) is also similar; the same principle can be used as an analogy, which is inevitable. Using the four kinds of kindness as cause and effect demonstrates the absence of ignorance.

Why is this so?

Treatise: Because of greed, hatred, and ignorance, the roots of unwholesome actions (evil deeds) are established.

Commentary: The following explains the principle. Because these three (greed, hatred, and ignorance) can possess two meanings: first, they correspond to the six consciousnesses, thus excluding doubt, etc.; second, they are included within the category of primary afflictions, thus excluding disbelief, etc. Other (dharmas) do not belong to this category. The Theravada school uses three meanings to exclude, while here, two meanings are used to exclude. And because the power of generating evil actions is strong, it is explained as the meaning of 『root.』 Second, it excludes other dharmas; because it possesses one meaning, it is established as a root of unwholesome actions.

By presenting what needs to be counteracted (the unwholesome roots), one can then discern what can counteract them (wholesome dharmas).

Treatise: Eradicating these (unwholesome roots) must be through… there must necessarily be other (antidotes).

Commentary: Eradicating these three (greed, hatred, and ignorance) at three time periods requires two types of antidotes: first, a common antidote, which is only wholesome wisdom, capable of eradicating them all; second, separate antidotes, which are non-greed, non-hatred, and non-ignorance. Just as greed and hatred have both common and separate antidotes, because they are included within the category of unwholesome roots, so too is ignorance. Because it is included within the category of unwholesome roots, it also has two antidotes, just like greed and hatred. There must necessarily be a separate non-ignorance, because the power of unwholesome roots generating evil actions is strong, thus requiring two antidotes; other delusions are not like this. Because of this condition, non-ignorance, apart from wisdom, must have a separate nature. The previous teacher explained that great compassion is not included within the roots, saying that it uses non-hatred and non-ignorance as its nature. The treatise speaks from the perspective of non-hatred, saying that it is not a root, but in reality, it is included within the roots. If that is the case, then are the three mindfulnesses (mindfulness of body, mindfulness of feeling, mindfulness of mind) also like this? No, great compassion is similar to compassion among the four immeasurables, only taking non-hatred as its nature. Now, it is spoken from the perspective of non-hatred that it is not included within the roots. Mindfulness relies on wisdom, so it is included within the roots. This is only revealing from a shadow, not the actual principle. If that is the case, then how can the sentences about the three conventional truths be explained? The answer is that the nature of what truly exists is wisdom. Question: The nature of non-harming is non-hatred; it should not be provisionally existent. Answer: The term 『conventional existence』 includes both provisional and real existence. Just as seeds are said to be conventionally existent, but in reality, they are truly existent. The three are conventionally existent and are all provisionally existent, which is also incorrect. Just as the wisdom portion of the five views (five wrong views) is said to be conventionally existent, so it is not provisionally existent. This non-ignorance is also like this. If that is the case, then how can the non-hatred portion of non-harming be explained? Therefore, the later teacher』s explanation is correct.

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頌所言勤安等者。

論。勤謂精進至滿善為業。

述曰。下文有二。初略后廣。勤苦名通三性。此即精進故體唯善。于善品修。于惡品斷。事中勇健。悍且勇而無惰。自策發也。悍而無懼耐勞惓也。勇者升進義。悍者堅牢義　滿善為業者。對法雲成滿一切善品為業。彼釋云。滿善品者。謂能圓滿隨初所入根本靜慮。成善品者。謂即於此極善修治。此中但言滿善。彼據因中一分隨所入定更復修治。此據行因成佛果滿。更不修治故唯言滿。即通三乘究竟果位。或作善事圓了名滿。能滿善故。非要聖果。

若唯言勤。三性之法俱可勤苦。然此中言何性所攝。

論。勇表勝進至唯善性攝。

述曰。下廣解有二。初釋前難。后辨差別。此初也　勇表唸唸高勝。非如染法。設雖增長。望諸善品。皆名為退。亦不名進。無益進故　進謂進成聖者身故　悍表精純。簡四無記無覆凈也。彼雖加行作意修習。而非精純。不應正理故不名精。復非染故乍可名純。今此精純即總釋也。

論。此相差別至無退無足。

述曰。有五如文。下辨差別有三。初論家作名。次引經屬。后顯位異。此初也。

論。即經所說至如次應知。

述曰。即以經屬。顯揚但有經之五名。對法二名皆悉

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 　　頌中所說的『勤安』等，是什麼意思呢？

論：『勤』指的是精進，以圓滿一切善行為目標。

述記：下文分為兩部分，先簡略后詳細。『勤』，就其辛苦的性質而言，可以通於善、惡、無記三性。但這裡所說的『勤』，實際上是『精進』，因此其體性唯是善。在修習善法時，要精進；在斷除惡法時，也要精進。在做事時，要勇猛果敢，既勇猛又沒有惰性，能夠自我鞭策。勇猛而不畏懼，能夠忍耐勞苦。『勇』意味著提升進步，『悍』意味著堅定牢固。『以圓滿一切善行為目標』，如《對法論》所說，是成就和圓滿一切善品。該論解釋說，『圓滿善品』，是指能夠圓滿最初所入的根本靜慮（dhyāna，禪定）。『成就善品』，是指能夠對已入的禪定進行極好的修治。這裡只說『圓滿』，是因為《對法論》是從因地中的一部分，即隨所入的禪定而更進一步修治的角度說的。而這裡是從行因成就佛果圓滿的角度說的，不再需要進一步修治，所以只說『圓滿』，這可以通於三乘（triyāna，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的究竟果位。或者說，完成一件善事就叫做『圓滿』，能夠圓滿善事。因此，不一定非要是聖果（āryaphala，證悟的果位）。

如果只說『勤』，那麼三性（善、惡、無記）的法都可以是『勤苦』的。但這裡所說的『勤』，是哪一性所攝呢？

論：『勇』表示殊勝的進步，因此唯有善性才能包含它。

述記：下面詳細解釋，分為兩部分，先解釋前面的疑問，后辨別差別。這是第一部分。『勇』表示唸唸高勝，不像染污法那樣，即使增長，相對於諸善品來說，都叫做退步，也不能叫做進步，因為沒有利益和進步。『進』是指進步成就聖者之身。『悍』表示精純，簡別了四種無記（不善不惡的狀態），即有覆無記和無覆無記。那些雖然也通過加行作意修習，但並非精純。不合正理，所以不能叫做『精』。又因為不是染污法，所以勉強可以叫做『純』。現在所說的『精純』，是總體的解釋。

論：這種相的差別，在於無退無足。

述記：有五種，如文所示。下面辨別差別，有三部分，首先是論家的命名，其次是引經證明，最後是顯示果位的不同。這是第一部分。

論：也就是經中所說的，如次第應當知道。

述記：就是用經文來證明。《顯揚論》只有經中的五種名稱，《對法論》的兩種名稱都有。

【English Translation】 English version What is meant by 'diligence and ease' as mentioned in the verse?

Treatise: 'Diligence' refers to exertion, with the aim of perfecting all virtuous deeds.

Commentary: The following text is divided into two parts: first, a brief explanation, and then a detailed one. 'Diligence,' in terms of its laborious nature, can be common to the three natures (virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral). However, the 'diligence' mentioned here is actually 'exertion,' so its essence is only virtuous. When cultivating virtuous dharmas, one should be diligent; when eliminating non-virtuous dharmas, one should also be diligent. When doing things, one should be brave and decisive, both courageous and without laziness, able to motivate oneself. Courageous without fear, able to endure hardship. 'Courage' means to elevate and progress, 'fierceness' means to be firm and solid. 'With the aim of perfecting all virtuous deeds,' as the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) says, is to accomplish and perfect all virtuous qualities. That treatise explains that 'perfecting virtuous qualities' refers to being able to perfect the fundamental dhyāna (meditative absorption) initially entered. 'Accomplishing virtuous qualities' refers to being able to excellently cultivate the dhyāna already entered. Here, it only says 'perfecting' because the Abhidharmasamuccaya speaks from the perspective of a part of the causal ground, that is, further cultivating according to the dhyāna entered. Here, it speaks from the perspective of accomplishing the complete fruit of Buddhahood through causal actions, no longer needing further cultivation, so it only says 'perfecting,' which can be applied to the ultimate fruit position of the Three Vehicles (triyāna, Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna). Or, completing a virtuous deed is called 'perfecting,' being able to perfect virtuous deeds. Therefore, it does not necessarily have to be the āryaphala (fruit of enlightenment).

If we only say 'diligence,' then dharmas of the three natures (virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral) can all be 'laborious.' But which nature does the 'diligence' mentioned here belong to?

Treatise: 'Courage' indicates superior progress, therefore only the virtuous nature can encompass it.

Commentary: The following is a detailed explanation, divided into two parts: first, explaining the previous question, and then distinguishing the differences. This is the first part. 'Courage' indicates constantly rising superiority, unlike defiled dharmas, which, even if they increase, are called regression compared to virtuous qualities, and cannot be called progress because there is no benefit or advancement. 'Progress' refers to progressing to become a sage. 'Fierceness' indicates purity, distinguishing the four neutral states (neither virtuous nor non-virtuous), namely, obscured neutral and unobscured neutral. Although those also cultivate through effort and intention, they are not pure. It is not reasonable, so it cannot be called 'pure.' And because it is not a defiled dharma, it can barely be called 'pure.' The 'purity' mentioned now is a general explanation.

Treatise: The difference in this characteristic lies in no regression and no satisfaction.

Commentary: There are five, as the text shows. The following distinguishes the differences, with three parts: first, the naming by the treatise writer, second, citing scriptures for proof, and finally, showing the difference in positions. This is the first part.

Treatise: That is, as the scriptures say, it should be known in order.

Commentary: That is, using the scriptures to prove it. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) only has the five names from the scriptures, while the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) has both names.

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具有。八十九云。最初發起猛利樂欲名被甲。經名有勢。如著鉀入陣即無所畏有大威勢。次起堅固勇悍方便名加行。經名有勤。堅固其心自策勤也。次為證得不自輕蔑亦無怯懼名無下。經名有勇。不自卑下更增勇銳。次能忍受寒．熱等苦。於劣等善不生厭足。欣求後後勝品功德等名無退。經名堅猛。遭苦不屈。堅猛其志。次後乃至漸次入諦觀等後後勝道名無足。經名不捨善軛。軛謂車軛。以軛牛者令牛不出能有所往。善法亦爾。軛修行者不越善品。往涅槃宮修曾不足。從喻為稱。

下顯位異。

論。此五別者至三品別故。

述曰。今此第一。即初發心。餘四修行。修行中有二。自分勝進。自分行中有上中下三品別故。總為五也。且如初地行舍有初發心。有下品中品上品行檀。檀成滿已方入二地。持戒勝進趣后名勝進行。如是乃至十地之中位位皆爾。如十地論廣解。

論。或初發心至修差別故。

述曰。下第二解。此五即是四種修中加初發心。謂長時修．無間修．殷重修．無餘修四。如對法第十二抄．及攝論第七廣解．下第十卷說。然十八任持精進有三。攝此四者亦如彼抄。本地菩薩地．及抉擇七十八等並爾。即六度皆有也。

論。或資糧等五道差別。

述曰。自下第三解

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 具有。八十九云：最初發起猛烈強烈的意願叫做『被甲』（披上盔甲）。經中名為『有勢』，如同穿上盔甲進入戰場，便無所畏懼，具有強大的威勢。其次，生起堅定勇猛的方便法門叫做『加行』（努力修行）。經中名為『有勤』，堅定自己的心，自我鞭策勤奮修行。再次，爲了證得真理，不輕視自己，也沒有怯懦恐懼，叫做『無下』（沒有低下的心）。經中名為『有勇』，不自輕視，更加增進勇猛銳利。再次，能夠忍受寒冷、炎熱等痛苦，對於低劣的善法不生厭倦滿足，欣求越來越殊勝的功德等等，叫做『無退』（沒有退轉）。經中名為『堅猛』，遭遇痛苦不屈服，堅定勇猛自己的意志。再次之後，乃至逐漸進入諦觀等等越來越殊勝的道，叫做『無足』（沒有滿足）。經中名為『不捨善軛』（不捨棄善的軛）。軛指的是車軛，用軛駕馭牛，使牛不脫離，能夠到達目的地。善法也是如此，用善法駕馭修行者，不超越善品，前往涅槃的宮殿，修行沒有滿足的時候，從比喻而得名。

下面顯示地位的不同。

論：這五種差別在於有三種品類的差別。

述曰：現在這第一種，就是最初發心。其餘四種是修行。修行中有兩種：自分勝進。自分行中有上、中、下三種品類的差別，總共為五種。例如初地菩薩的行舍有初發心，有下品、中品、上品行檀。佈施圓滿后才進入二地。持戒勝進，趨向後面的階段，叫做勝進行。像這樣乃至十地之中，每個階段都是如此。如《十地論》廣為解釋。

論：或者最初發心加上四種修行的差別。

述曰：下面第二種解釋。這五種就是四種修行加上最初發心。即長時修、無間修、殷重修、無餘修四種。如《對法》第十二抄，以及《攝論》第七廣為解釋，下面第十卷說。然而十八任持精進有三種。攝取這四種也如彼抄。《本地菩薩地》以及《抉擇》第七十八等也是這樣。即六度都具有。

論：或者資糧道等五道的差別。

述曰：從下面開始第三種解釋。

【English Translation】 English version: It possesses. Eighty-nine says: Initially arising fierce and intense desire is called 'Being Armored' (being clad in armor). In the sutra, it is named 'Having Power,' like entering the battlefield wearing armor, one becomes fearless and possesses great power. Secondly, generating steadfast and courageous skillful means is called 'Application' (diligent practice). In the sutra, it is named 'Having Diligence,' strengthening one's mind and self-motivating diligent practice. Again, in order to attain truth, without belittling oneself and without timidity or fear, it is called 'No Inferiority' (without a lowly mind). In the sutra, it is named 'Having Courage,' not underestimating oneself, further increasing courage and sharpness. Again, being able to endure cold, heat, and other sufferings, without becoming weary or satisfied with inferior good deeds, eagerly seeking increasingly superior merits, etc., is called 'No Regression' (without regression). In the sutra, it is named 'Steadfast and Fierce,' not yielding to suffering, steadfastly and fiercely resolving one's will. After that, gradually entering into contemplation of truth, etc., increasingly superior paths, is called 'No Satisfaction' (without satisfaction). In the sutra, it is named 'Not Abandoning the Good Yoke' (not abandoning the yoke of goodness). The yoke refers to the cart yoke; using the yoke to control the ox prevents it from straying and enables it to reach its destination. Good Dharma is also like this; using good Dharma to guide the practitioner does not surpass good qualities, going to the palace of Nirvana, practice is never enough, named from the metaphor.

Below shows the difference in positions.

Treatise: These five differences lie in the difference of the three categories.

Commentary: Now this first one is the initial arising of the mind. The remaining four are practices. Among the practices, there are two: self-advancement. Among self-practices, there are differences in the upper, middle, and lower categories, totaling five. For example, the practice of giving in the first ground of Bodhisattva has the initial arising of the mind, and the lower, middle, and upper categories of practicing giving. Only after the giving is completed does one enter the second ground. Advancing in upholding precepts, moving towards the later stages, is called superior practice. Like this, even in the ten grounds, each stage is like this. As explained extensively in the Treatise on the Ten Grounds.

Treatise: Or the difference between the initial arising of the mind plus the four practices.

Commentary: Below is the second explanation. These five are the four practices plus the initial arising of the mind. Namely, the four types of practice: prolonged practice, uninterrupted practice, earnest practice, and complete practice. As explained extensively in the twelfth copy of the Abhidharma, and the seventh of the Compendium of Abhidharma, and said in the tenth volume below. However, the eighteen sustaining efforts have three. These four are also included in that copy. The Local Bodhisattva Ground and the Seventy-eighth of the Determination are also like this. That is, all six perfections possess them.

Treatise: Or the difference between the five paths such as the path of accumulation.

Commentary: From below begins the third explanation.

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。資糧．加行．見．修．無學五位。如對法第八末．第九等解。

問既通三乘。三乘無學云何無足。不捨善軛。果已滿故。

論。二乘究竟道至樂利樂他故。

述曰。二乘無學。迴心欣大菩提故。佛究竟果。樂盡未來際利樂有情故。皆得名不捨善軛。趣寂二乘亦利樂他。即波羅蜜者。略故不說。

論。或二加行至勝進別故。

述曰。又加行等四道為五。然加行中有近有遠。名二加行。四道如后第十卷解。即此並前合有五解。

論。安謂輕安至轉依為業。

述曰。亦牒頌解謂輕而安隱。離重名輕。調暢名安。此有二種。一無漏者。除有漏粗重。粗重通三性。二有漏者。除煩惱粗重。唯是善性。此正對治惛沈一法。然對法說除一切障。顯揚云除粗重。然對法第十說亦同之。彼約通障。此約別障。以惛沈是無堪任性。安是堪任故唯除彼。

論。謂此伏除至轉安適故。

述曰。釋轉依業。有漏者伏無漏者除一切能障定法。此或煩惱。或是受數。但能障定即是所除。又今說此但是惛沈。令所依身轉去粗重得安隱故。

論。不放逸者至善事為業。

述曰。下有略廣。此略也　不放逸以精進及三根。于所斷惡法防令不起。所修善法修令增長。體是四法。約別功

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：資糧位（saṃbhāra-mārga，積累功德的階段）、加行位（prayoga-mārga，為證悟做準備的階段）、見道位（darśana-mārga，初見真理的階段）、修道位（bhāvanā-mārga，培養智慧的階段）和無學位（aśaikṣa-mārga，不再需要學習的階段）這五個階段，就像《對法論》第八卷末尾和第九卷等處所解釋的那樣。

問：既然三乘（triyāna，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）是共通的，為什麼說聲聞乘、緣覺乘的無學果位是不圓滿的呢？因為他們沒有捨棄行善的責任，並且已經證得了圓滿的果位。

論：二乘（dvayāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的究竟之道在於樂於利益自己和利益他人。

述曰：二乘的無學，會回心轉意欣求廣大的菩提（bodhi，覺悟），所以不捨棄行善的責任。佛的究竟果位，在於盡未來際利益安樂一切有情眾生，所以也得名不捨棄行善的責任。趣向寂滅的二乘也利益安樂他人，也就是行持波羅蜜（pāramitā，到彼岸），因為文略所以沒有詳細說明。

論：或者說，二乘的加行道和佛的勝進道有所區別。

述曰：又說加行等四道分為五種。然而加行道中有近有遠，所以名為二加行。四道的內容在後面的第十卷中解釋。這樣，加上前面的解釋，總共有五種解釋。

論：安，指的是輕安（praśrabdhi），其作用是轉依（āśraya-parivṛtti，轉變所依）。

述曰：這也是依照頌文來解釋。所謂輕而安隱，就是遠離沉重名為輕，調和暢適名為安。這有兩種：一種是無漏的輕安，能夠去除有漏的粗重，粗重通於三性（善、惡、無記）；另一種是有漏的輕安，能夠去除煩惱的粗重，唯是善性。這正是對治昏沉這一法。然而《對法論》說能去除一切障礙，《顯揚論》說能去除粗重，但《對法論》第十卷也說了同樣的意思。那裡是從普遍的障礙來說，這裡是從個別的障礙來說。因為昏沉是無堪任性，安是堪任性，所以唯獨能去除昏沉。

論：意思是說，這種輕安能夠伏除一切能障礙禪定的法，從而使身心轉變安適。

述曰：解釋轉依的作用。有漏的輕安伏住障礙，無漏的輕安去除一切能障礙禪定的法。這些障礙或者是煩惱，或者是受等心所。但凡能障礙禪定的，就是所要去除的。又現在說這個輕安只是針對昏沉，使所依的身心轉變，去除粗重，得到安隱。

論：不放逸（apramāda），其作用是修習一切善事。

述曰：下面有略說和廣說，這裡是略說。不放逸以精進和三根（信根、精進根、念根），對於所應斷除的惡法，防護使其不生起；對於所應修習的善法，修習使其增長。其體性是四法（精進、無貪、無嗔、無癡）。從個別的功用來說

【English Translation】 English version: The five stages of the path: Saṃbhāra-mārga (stage of accumulation), Prayoga-mārga (stage of preparation), Darśana-mārga (stage of seeing), Bhāvanā-mārga (stage of cultivation), and Aśaikṣa-mārga (stage of no more learning), as explained in the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, end of the eighth volume and the ninth volume, etc.

Question: Since the Three Vehicles (triyāna, Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) are common, why is it said that the Aśaikṣa stage of the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna is not complete? It is because they do not abandon the yoke of good deeds, and they have already attained the complete fruit.

Treatise: The ultimate path of the Two Vehicles (dvayāna, Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) lies in delighting in benefiting oneself and benefiting others.

Commentary: The Aśaikṣa of the Two Vehicles will turn their minds and rejoice in the vast Bodhi (bodhi, enlightenment), so they do not abandon the yoke of good deeds. The ultimate fruit of the Buddha lies in benefiting and bringing happiness to all sentient beings throughout the future, so it is also named as not abandoning the yoke of good deeds. The Two Vehicles who head towards tranquility also benefit and bring happiness to others, which is to practice Pāramitā (pāramitā, to the other shore), but it is not explained in detail due to brevity.

Treatise: Or, the Prayoga-mārga of the Two Vehicles is different from the superior progress of the Buddha.

Commentary: Also, the four paths such as Prayoga-mārga are divided into five types. However, within the Prayoga-mārga, there are near and far, so it is named as two Prayoga-mārgas. The content of the four paths is explained in the tenth volume later. Thus, adding the previous explanation, there are a total of five explanations.

Treatise: Tranquility (praśrabdhi) means lightness and ease, and its function is Āśraya-parivṛtti (āśraya-parivṛtti, transformation of the basis).

Commentary: This is also explained according to the verse. So-called light and ease means being away from heaviness is called light, and harmonious and comfortable is called ease. There are two types of this: one is the uncontaminated tranquility, which can remove the contaminated heaviness, and heaviness is common to the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral); the other is the contaminated tranquility, which can remove the heaviness of afflictions, and is only of wholesome nature. This is precisely the antidote to the one dharma of lethargy. However, the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya says that it can remove all obstacles, and the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that it can remove heaviness, but the tenth volume of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya also says the same meaning. There it is from the perspective of universal obstacles, and here it is from the perspective of individual obstacles. Because lethargy is the nature of unserviceability, and tranquility is the nature of serviceability, so it can only remove lethargy.

Treatise: It means that this tranquility can subdue and remove all dharmas that can hinder meditation, thereby transforming the body and mind to be comfortable.

Commentary: Explaining the function of Āśraya-parivṛtti. The contaminated tranquility subdues obstacles, and the uncontaminated tranquility removes all dharmas that can hinder meditation. These obstacles are either afflictions or mental factors such as feeling. But whatever can hinder meditation is what needs to be removed. Also, now it is said that this tranquility is only aimed at lethargy, so that the body and mind on which it relies can be transformed, removing heaviness and obtaining tranquility.

Treatise: Non-negligence (apramāda), its function is to cultivate all good deeds.

Commentary: Below there is a brief explanation and a detailed explanation, here is the brief explanation. Non-negligence uses diligence and the three roots (root of faith, root of diligence, root of mindfulness), to protect against the unwholesome dharmas that should be cut off, preventing them from arising; and to cultivate and increase the wholesome dharmas that should be cultivated. Its nature is four dharmas (diligence, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion). From the perspective of individual functions

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能假說不逸。所防中通一切有漏法。

論。謂即四法至無別用故。

述曰。下廣有二。初廢立。后問答辨。此初也。此非別有體。離彼四法無異相故。體性無別。無別用故。作用不殊。雙成無別體用也。其文易了。

問信等十法皆有防惡修善之能。何故唯於四法立也。

論。雖信慚等至故非此依。

述曰。其餘六法而方彼四。勢用微而且劣故。何謂為劣。此四法中三法為根。精進遍策一切能斷能修善心。彼餘六法非根及遍策故。非不放逸之依。即非勝也。

下問答有六。初問。次質。三答。四難。五徴。六釋。

論。豈不防修是此相用。

述曰。順正理等外人問曰。豈不防惡修善。是此不逸相用。何用以四為體。此則一切別立有體皆作是說。別有不逸不逸即是防修。隱不逸之名出防修為難。

論主次質。

論。防修何異精進三根。

述曰。此質也。汝之防修何異四法。四法能防惡。及修善故。

論。彼要待此方有作用。

述曰。外人答曰。彼四法無力不能防修。要待此中別有不逸。令其四法方有防修之用。故不以四法為防修體。故知別有不放逸也。

論。此應復待余便有無窮失。

述曰。論主難曰。四法能防修。四體

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 能假說不放逸（Apramada）。所防止的是包含一切有漏法的中間通道。

論：意思是說，就是這四法，因為沒有其他不同的作用。

述記：下面廣泛地解釋，分為兩部分。首先是廢立，然後是問答辨析。這是第一部分。這不放逸並非另外有一個自體，因為它與那四法沒有不同的相狀，體性和作用沒有差別。作用沒有不同，兩者共同構成沒有不同的體和用。文句很容易理解。

問：信等十法都有防止惡行、修習善行的能力，為什麼只對四法建立不放逸呢？

論：雖然有信、慚等，但它們的力量微弱，所以不是不放逸所依賴的。

述記：其餘六法與那四法相比，勢用微弱而且低下。什麼叫做低下呢？這四法中，有三法是根本，精進普遍策勵一切能夠斷惡修善的心。其餘六法不是根本，也不是普遍策勵，所以不是不放逸所依賴的，也就是不殊勝。

下面的問答分為六個部分。第一是提問，第二是質問，第三是回答，第四是責難，第五是徵引，第六是解釋。

論：難道防止惡行、修習善行不是這不放逸的相和作用嗎？

述記：順正理論等外人問道：難道防止惡行、修習善行不是這不放逸的相和作用嗎？為什麼要以四法作為它的體呢？這樣一切單獨建立有體的說法都可以這樣說。單獨建立不放逸，不放逸就是防止惡行、修習善行。隱藏不放逸的名稱，提出防止惡行、修習善行來責難。

論主接著質問。

論：防止惡行、修習善行與精進、三善根有什麼不同？

述記：這是質問。你的防止惡行、修習善行與四法有什麼不同？四法能夠防止惡行，以及修習善行。

論：它們要依賴這不放逸，才能有作用。

述記：外人回答說：那四法沒有力量，不能防止惡行、修習善行，要依賴這其中另外的不放逸，使那四法才有防止惡行、修習善行的作用。所以不以四法作為防止惡行、修習善行的體。所以知道另外有不放逸。

論：這樣應該還要依賴其他的，就會有無窮的過失。

述記：論主責難說：四法能夠防止惡行、修習善行，四法的體性

【English Translation】 English version: It can be hypothetically stated that it is Apramada (non-negligence). What is prevented is the middle passage that contains all contaminated dharmas (leaky laws).

Treatise: It means that it is these four dharmas, because there is no other different function.

Commentary: The following is a broad explanation, divided into two parts. First, the abolition and establishment, and then the question-and-answer analysis. This is the first part. This Apramada is not another self-entity, because it has no different characteristics from those four dharmas, and there is no difference in nature and function. The function is not different, and the two together constitute no different body and function. The sentences are easy to understand.

Question: The ten dharmas such as faith all have the ability to prevent evil deeds and cultivate good deeds. Why is Apramada established only for the four dharmas?

Treatise: Although there are faith, shame, etc., their power is weak, so they are not what Apramada relies on.

Commentary: Compared with those four dharmas, the remaining six dharmas are weak and inferior in power. What is called inferior? Among these four dharmas, three dharmas are fundamental, and diligence universally encourages all minds that can cut off evil and cultivate good. The remaining six dharmas are not fundamental, nor are they universally encouraging, so they are not what Apramada relies on, that is, they are not superior.

The following questions and answers are divided into six parts. The first is questioning, the second is questioning, the third is answering, the fourth is blaming, the fifth is quoting, and the sixth is explaining.

Treatise: Isn't preventing evil deeds and cultivating good deeds the characteristics and functions of this Apramada?

Commentary: Outsiders such as Shun Zhengli asked: Isn't preventing evil deeds and cultivating good deeds the characteristics and functions of this Apramada? Why use the four dharmas as its body? In this way, all statements that independently establish a body can be said in this way. Independently establish Apramada, and Apramada is to prevent evil deeds and cultivate good deeds. Hide the name of Apramada and raise the prevention of evil deeds and the cultivation of good deeds to question.

The treatise master then questioned.

Treatise: What is the difference between preventing evil deeds and cultivating good deeds and diligence and the three good roots?

Commentary: This is a question. What is the difference between your prevention of evil deeds and cultivation of good deeds and the four dharmas? The four dharmas can prevent evil deeds and cultivate good deeds.

Treatise: They must rely on this Apramada to have an effect.

Commentary: The outsider replied: Those four dharmas have no power and cannot prevent evil deeds and cultivate good deeds. They must rely on this other Apramada to make those four dharmas have the effect of preventing evil deeds and cultivating good deeds. Therefore, the four dharmas are not used as the body for preventing evil deeds and cultivating good deeds. So I know there is another Apramada.

Treatise: In this way, it should also rely on others, and there will be endless faults.

Commentary: The treatise master blamed and said: The four dharmas can prevent evil deeds and cultivate good deeds. The nature of the four dharmas

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無力故待不逸。不逸能防修。亦應無力復有所待。如彼四法。如是展轉。有無窮失。若不放逸別有自性。不待余法即能防修。彼四亦然。故非離彼別有不逸。

論。勤唯遍策至有防修用。

述曰。外人徴曰。勤體唯能遍策勵善心。三根但能為善法依。依是根義。如何說此四法有防修用。

論。汝防修用其相云何。

述曰。此論主問。

論。若普依持至即總四法。

述曰。若普依持一切善心名防修義。即是三根。依謂依處。持令增長。若能遍策發驅錄一切善心名防修。不異精進等此四別能也。若止惡不生進善令起名防修者。總此四法故無別體。

論。令不散亂至即應是念。

述曰。若令心等不散名防修。即應是定。若令心心所法同取一境。不乖返緣名防修。與觸何別。若所作善惡憶念不忘名防修。即應是念。

論。如是推尋至定無別體。

述曰。由前道理推不放逸防修之用。離無貪等四法總別之能。竟不可得。故不放逸定無別體　問何故此中以無貪為首等餘三法。不以精進為初　答次前別簡中。以無貪為首故。從近而結也。即顯不逸不如小乘體是實有。即是假有之所以也。

論。云何行舍至靜住為業。

述曰。行者行蘊。行蘊中舍。簡受蘊

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為沒有力量的緣故，所以需要依賴不放逸（apramāda）。不放逸能夠防止惡行，修習善行。但如果沒有力量，又需要依賴其他條件，就像前面說的四種法（無貪、無嗔、無癡、精進）。這樣輾轉相依，就會有無窮的過失。如果說不放逸有其自身的體性，不依賴其他法就能防止惡行、修習善行，那麼前面說的四種法也應該如此。所以，不放逸並非獨立於它們之外，另有自體。

論：勤的作用僅僅是普遍策勵，最終是爲了防止惡行、修習善行。

述曰：外人提出疑問：勤的體性只能普遍策勵善心，而三善根（無貪、無嗔、無癡）只能作為善法的所依，『依』是根的含義。怎麼能說這四種法具有防止惡行、修習善行的作用呢？

論：你所說的防止惡行、修習善行的作用，它的相狀是怎樣的呢？

述曰：這是論主的反問。

論：如果普遍依持一切善心，就叫做防止惡行、修習善行，那麼這就是總括了四種法。

述曰：如果普遍依持一切善心，就叫做防止惡行、修習善行，那麼這就是三善根（無貪、無嗔、無癡）。『依』是所依之處，『持』是令其增長。如果能夠普遍策發、驅使一切善心，就叫做防止惡行、修習善行，那麼這和精進等四種法就沒有區別了。如果說阻止惡的產生，促進善的生起叫做防止惡行、修習善行，那麼這總括了這四種法，所以不放逸沒有單獨的體性。

論：如果使心不散亂，就叫做防止惡行、修習善行，那麼這應該就是定（samādhi）。

述曰：如果使心等不散亂叫做防止惡行，那麼這應該就是定（samādhi）。如果使心和心所法共同取一個境界，不違背、返回緣取，叫做防止惡行，那麼這和觸（sparśa）有什麼區別？如果對所作的善惡憶念不忘叫做防止惡行，那麼這應該就是念（smṛti）。

論：像這樣推究，離開無貪等四法的總別作用，就無法找到不放逸的單獨體性。所以，不放逸必定沒有單獨的體性。問：為什麼這裡以無貪為首，等同於其餘三種法，而不以精進為首？答：因為前面在個別簡擇中，以無貪為首，所以這裡也從相近的進行總結。這也就顯示了不放逸不如小乘那樣體是實有，而是假有的原因。

論：什麼是行舍（saṃskāra-upekṣā），以寂靜安住為業？

述曰：行是指行蘊（saṃskāra-skandha），行蘊中的舍。簡別于受蘊（vedanā-skandha）。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of lacking strength, one relies on non-negligence (apramāda). Non-negligence can prevent evil and cultivate good. But if there is no strength, one must rely on other conditions, like the four dharmas mentioned earlier (non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion, and diligence). Relying on each other in this way leads to endless faults. If non-negligence has its own nature and can prevent evil and cultivate good without relying on other dharmas, then the four dharmas mentioned earlier should also be able to do so. Therefore, non-negligence is not separate from them and does not have its own independent nature.

Treatise: Diligence only universally encourages, ultimately to prevent evil and cultivate good.

Commentary: An outsider raises a question: The nature of diligence can only universally encourage good thoughts, while the three good roots (non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion) can only serve as the basis for good dharmas. 'Basis' is the meaning of root. How can it be said that these four dharmas have the function of preventing evil and cultivating good?

Treatise: What is the nature of the function of preventing evil and cultivating good that you speak of?

Commentary: This is the treatise master's counter-question.

Treatise: If universally relying on and upholding all good thoughts is called preventing evil and cultivating good, then this encompasses all four dharmas.

Commentary: If universally relying on and upholding all good thoughts is called preventing evil and cultivating good, then this is the three good roots (non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion). 'Relying' is the place of reliance, and 'upholding' is causing it to grow. If one can universally encourage and drive all good thoughts, it is called preventing evil and cultivating good, then there is no difference between this and diligence and the other four dharmas. If preventing the arising of evil and promoting the arising of good is called preventing evil and cultivating good, then this encompasses these four dharmas, so non-negligence does not have a separate nature.

Treatise: If making the mind not scattered is called preventing evil and cultivating good, then this should be concentration (samādhi).

Commentary: If making the mind and so on not scattered is called preventing evil, then this should be concentration (samādhi). If making the mind and mental factors jointly take one object, not contradicting or returning to the object, is called preventing evil, then what is the difference between this and contact (sparśa)? If remembering and not forgetting the good and evil that has been done is called preventing evil, then this should be mindfulness (smṛti).

Treatise: Investigating in this way, apart from the general and specific functions of the four dharmas of non-greed and so on, one cannot find the separate nature of non-negligence. Therefore, non-negligence definitely does not have a separate nature. Question: Why is non-greed taken as the head here, equal to the other three dharmas, and not diligence? Answer: Because in the previous individual selection, non-greed was taken as the head, so here we also summarize from what is close. This also shows that non-negligence is not truly existent in nature like in the Hinayana, but is provisionally existent.

Treatise: What is equanimity of formations (saṃskāra-upekṣā), with peaceful abiding as its function?

Commentary: Formations refer to the aggregate of formations (saṃskāra-skandha), equanimity within the aggregate of formations. Differentiating it from the aggregate of feeling (vedanā-skandha).

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中舍故置行言。非謂行也。亦以四法為體。別正對治掉舉。體性靜住為業。

論。謂即四法至寂靜而住。

述曰。下文有二。初正解體業。后解廢立。此初也。若通對治亦一切法。對法雲由舍相應離沉沒等不平等性故。即舉通障。此舉別障　平等正直者。對法雲。由舍與心俱離沉沒等。初心平等。遠離加行次心正直。于染無怯后無功用。廣如彼說。然諸論皆言。由不放逸斷諸惑已。此舍靜住不容雜染。謂如不逸是無間道。此舍是解脫道。解脫道中不容受雜染。此前後時別起勝用。或今所說此雖同時。同時不逸能除障已。舍令此心寂靜而住。義說前後。依此二用互增之時說其相也。此間據別障掉舉等取余法。不同對法第十除貪愛。對法第一明通能治一切法也。

論。此無別體至即心等故。

述曰。下廢立。然今此舍離前四法無別相及作用。何以故。若能令寂靜名舍。即四法之能。若所令寂靜名舍。即除四法外余心等是。然既以能寂靜為舍。故體即四法。信等凈相等。是非靜也。如前不逸就勝依立。義如前說。此亦應爾。就勝而說。余法不障。對法第十．及顯揚云。如契經說為除貪憂心依止舍。此據離欲或無漏舍相語。以憂根俱亦有舍也。然煩惱俱憂及貪皆是欲界。與善心等性相違返。說名除也

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：中舍，只是爲了方便說明而安立的名稱，並非實有『行』（Samkhya哲學中的自性）存在。它以四種法為體性：別（Prajna，智慧）、正（Upeksha，舍）、對治（Pratipaksha，對治煩惱）、掉舉（Audhatya，心的躁動）。其作用是使心體性寂靜安住。

論：意思是說，通過這四種法，心可以達到寂靜安住的狀態。

述記：下文分為兩部分。首先是正確解釋體性和作用，然後解釋廢立（舍的安立和廢除）。這是第一部分。如果從普遍對治的角度來說，一切法都可以是對治。對法（Abhidharma）中說，由於舍相應，可以遠離沉沒等不平等性。這裡是舉出普遍的障礙，而這裡（指本段）是舉出特別的障礙。『平等正直』，對法中說，由於舍與心共同遠離沉沒等，最初的心是平等的，遠離加行，其次的心是正直的，對於染污沒有怯懦，最後沒有功用。詳細內容如彼處所說。然而，各種論典都說，由於不放逸斷除了各種迷惑，這種舍的寂靜安住是不容許雜染的。就像不放逸是無間道，這種舍是解脫道。解脫道中不容許接受雜染。這是前後不同時段分別產生的殊勝作用。或者現在所說的這種舍雖然是同時的，但同時的不放逸能夠去除障礙之後，舍令此心寂靜安住。從意義上來說，是先後的。依據這兩種作用互相增上的時機，說明它們的相狀。這裡是根據特別的障礙掉舉等來選取其餘的法。不同於對法第十中去除貪愛。對法第一中說明普遍能夠對治一切法。

論：這種舍沒有單獨的體性，因為它的體性就是心等等。

述記：下面解釋廢立。然而，現在的這種舍，離開前面的四種法，沒有其他的相狀和作用。為什麼呢？如果能夠令心寂靜，就稱為舍，那麼這就是四種法的功能。如果所令寂靜，就稱為舍，那麼這就是除了四種法之外的其餘的心等等。然而，既然以能夠寂靜作為舍，所以它的體性就是四種法，比如信等等的清凈相等。這些不是寂靜。就像前面所說的不放逸，是就殊勝的所依而安立的。意義如前面所說。這裡也應該這樣，就殊勝的方面來說。其餘的法不障礙。對法第十以及顯揚中說，如契經所說，爲了去除貪憂，心依止於舍。這是根據離欲或者無漏的舍的相來說的。因為與憂根同時也有舍。然而，與煩惱同時的憂和貪都是欲界的，與善心等的體性相違背，所以說去除。

【English Translation】 English version: 『Central Equanimity』 (Zhong She) is merely a term established for the sake of explanation; it does not mean that 『Prakriti』 (Xing, the self-existent principle in Samkhya philosophy) actually exists. It takes the four dharmas as its essence: Discrimination (Bie, Prajna), Equanimity (Zheng, Upeksha), Antidote (Duizhi, Pratipaksha to counteract afflictions), and Agitation (Diao Ju, Audhatya, mental restlessness). Its function is to make the mind's essence tranquil and abiding.

Treatise: It means that through these four dharmas, the mind can reach a state of tranquility and abiding.

Commentary: The following text is divided into two parts. First, a correct explanation of the essence and function; then, an explanation of the establishment and abolition (the establishment and removal of equanimity). This is the first part. If viewed from the perspective of universal antidotes, all dharmas can be antidotes. The Abhidharma states that due to the correspondence of equanimity, one can be free from sinking and other unequal qualities. Here, a universal obstacle is mentioned, while here (referring to this passage) a specific obstacle is mentioned. 『Equality and Uprightness』: The Abhidharma states that because equanimity and the mind jointly depart from sinking, etc., the initial mind is equal, free from effort; the subsequent mind is upright, without timidity towards defilement, and ultimately without effort. Details are as described there. However, various treatises state that because non-remissness has severed various delusions, the tranquil abiding of this equanimity does not allow for contamination. Just as non-remissness is the immediate path, this equanimity is the path of liberation. The path of liberation does not allow for the acceptance of contamination. These are distinct superior functions arising at different times. Or, what is being said now is that although this equanimity is simultaneous, simultaneous non-remissness can remove obstacles, and then equanimity causes this mind to abide in tranquility. In terms of meaning, it is sequential. Based on the occasions when these two functions mutually enhance each other, their characteristics are explained. Here, the remaining dharmas are selected based on the specific obstacle of agitation, etc. This differs from the removal of greed in the tenth chapter of the Abhidharma. The first chapter of the Abhidharma explains that it can universally counteract all dharmas.

Treatise: This equanimity does not have a separate essence, because its essence is the mind, etc.

Commentary: The following explains the establishment and abolition. However, this equanimity now, apart from the preceding four dharmas, has no other characteristics or functions. Why? If it can cause the mind to be tranquil, it is called equanimity, then this is the function of the four dharmas. If what is caused to be tranquil is called equanimity, then this is the remaining mind, etc., apart from the four dharmas. However, since being able to be tranquil is taken as equanimity, its essence is the four dharmas, such as the purity aspect of faith, etc. These are not tranquility. Just as the previously mentioned non-remissness was established based on the superior support. The meaning is as previously stated. It should be the same here, speaking from the superior aspect. The remaining dharmas do not obstruct. The tenth chapter of the Abhidharma and the Samdhinirmocana Sutra state that, as the sutra says, in order to remove greed and sorrow, the mind relies on equanimity. This is based on the aspect of equanimity that is free from desire or unconditioned. Because equanimity also exists simultaneously with the root of sorrow. However, sorrow and greed that are simultaneous with afflictions are both of the desire realm, and their essence is contrary to that of wholesome minds, etc., so it is said to be removed.

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。對法第十八道支中說故。唯約無漏。

論。云何不害至悲愍為業。

述曰。此總舉已。

論。謂即無嗔至假名不害。

述曰。于有情不損惱。非謂不斷命。不斷命是無瞋故。故此但約不損惱事。余文可知。

問此既無瞋。何須別立。

論。無瞋翻對至粗相差別。

述曰。此有二解。無瞋返對斷物命之瞋。此不害即違于損惱物之害。故此二別。明害損物不為斷命。瞋斷物命不但損物。既爾如訶風等不斷物命。即非害故。故知此中且約粗相。于有情所辨此二別　又不約所治。但明此體別。前無瞋與有情樂。是慈之體。不害拔眾生之苦。即是悲也。故顯揚第四云。慈以無瞋為性。悲以不害為性。今此二翻約粗相別。

論。理實無瞋至彼二勝故。

述曰。理實無瞋體是實有。不害依無瞋一分拔苦之義勝故。假立不害　問前大悲以無瞋癡二法為體。今何故獨言不害　彼據實體。此約假成。又彼是大悲。此但是悲。四無量攝　問何不于無貪等上建立　答為顯功德中慈悲二相別。故依無瞋假立。不依無貪等　問諸功德等。如勝處等亦以無貪為性。何以善中。不依無貪之上。為顯功德別故。別立一假法也　答一切功德依聖人勝。于聖人身佛為最勝。佛身之中利樂有情勝。利

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『對法』第十八道支中這樣說，所以只針對無漏（指沒有煩惱的狀態）。

論：什麼是不害，直至以悲愍為業？

述曰：這是總體的概括。

論：指的就是從無嗔（沒有嗔恨心）到假名安立的不害（不損害）。

述曰：對於有情眾生不損害惱亂，不是說不斷絕其生命。不斷命是無嗔的體現。因此這裡只說不損害惱亂的事情，其餘文義可以類推得知。

問：既然已經有了無嗔，為什麼還要另外設立不害？

論：無嗔反過來針對斷物命的嗔恨，這個不害是違背損害惱亂事物的行為，所以這兩個是有區別的。說明損害事物不一定是斷命，嗔恨斷命不僅僅是損害事物。既然這樣，比如呵斥風等，沒有斷絕其生命，就不是損害。所以要知道這裡只是從粗略的表象上來說，對於有情眾生辨別這兩個的區別。或者不從所要對治的角度，只是說明本體的區別。前面的無嗔給予有情快樂，是慈愛的本體。不害拔除眾生的痛苦，就是悲憫。所以《顯揚》第四卷說，慈愛以無嗔為體性，悲憫以不害為體性。現在這兩個反過來從粗略的表象上區別。

論：理實際上無嗔的體性是真實存在的，不害依靠無嗔的一部分拔除痛苦的意義更為殊勝，所以假立不害。

問：前面說大悲以無嗔和無癡兩種法為體性，現在為什麼只說不害？那是根據實體來說的，這是根據假立成就來說的。而且那是大悲，這只是悲。四無量心所攝。問：為什麼不在無貪等上面建立？答：爲了顯示功德中慈悲兩種相的區別，所以依靠無嗔假立，不依靠無貪等。問：諸如功德等，比如勝處等也以無貪為體性，為什麼在善法中，不依靠無貪之上，爲了顯示功德的區別，另外設立一個假法呢？答：一切功德依靠聖人殊勝，在聖人身中佛最為殊勝，在佛身中利益安樂有情最為殊勝。

【English Translation】 English version: It is said in the eighteenth branch of the 『Abhidharma』 that it only refers to the Anāsrava (without outflows, referring to a state without afflictions).

Treatise: What is non-harming, up to having compassion as its function?

Commentary: This is a general summary.

Treatise: It refers to non-anger (absence of hatred) up to the nominally established non-harming (not causing harm).

Commentary: Not harming or disturbing sentient beings does not mean not taking their lives. Not taking life is a manifestation of non-anger. Therefore, this only refers to not harming or disturbing matters, and the rest of the meaning can be inferred.

Question: Since there is already non-anger, why is non-harming established separately?

Treatise: Non-anger, in turn, targets the anger that takes life. This non-harming is contrary to the harm that disturbs things. Therefore, these two are different. It explains that harming things does not necessarily mean taking life, and anger that takes life is more than just harming things. Since this is the case, such as scolding the wind, which does not take life, it is not harming. Therefore, it should be known that this is only from a rough appearance, distinguishing these two differences for sentient beings. Or, not from the perspective of what needs to be counteracted, but simply explaining the difference in essence. The previous non-anger gives happiness to sentient beings, which is the essence of loving-kindness (Maitrī). Non-harming removes the suffering of sentient beings, which is compassion (Karuṇā). Therefore, the fourth volume of the 『Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra』 says that loving-kindness has non-anger as its nature, and compassion has non-harming as its nature. Now, these two are distinguished from a rough appearance in reverse.

Treatise: In reality, the essence of non-anger is truly existent. Non-harming relies on a part of non-anger, and the meaning of removing suffering is more excellent, so non-harming is nominally established.

Question: Earlier, it was said that great compassion (Mahākaruṇā) has non-anger and non-ignorance as its essence. Why is only non-harming mentioned now? That was based on the real essence, and this is based on nominal establishment. Moreover, that is great compassion, and this is only compassion. Included in the four immeasurables (catuḥ-apramāṇa). Question: Why not establish it on non-greed, etc.? Answer: In order to show the difference between the two aspects of loving-kindness and compassion in merit, it is nominally established based on non-anger, not based on non-greed, etc. Question: Virtues such as the bases of mastery (abhibhāyatanas) also have non-greed as their nature. Why, in wholesome dharmas, is a nominal dharma not separately established based on non-greed in order to show the difference in merit? Answer: All merits rely on the excellence of the noble ones (ārya), and among the bodies of the noble ones, the Buddha is the most excellent. Among the bodies of the Buddha, benefiting and bringing happiness to sentient beings is the most excellent.

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樂之中慈．悲二種最勝。為顯極勝功德別故。依無瞋立不害。非無貪等　顯揚第二云喜是不嫉。何故立不為善根　答拔苦悲勝。別立不害。喜不勝悲。不立不嫉。

論。有說不害至謂賢善性。

述曰。薩婆多師正理論等。說謂賢善性。謂有此者人即賢善也。

論。此相云何。

述曰。此論主問。

論。謂不損惱。

述曰。此外人答。

論。無瞋亦爾至是無瞋故。

述曰。非離無瞋別有自性。謂于有情不為損惱。體性賢善之相即無瞋。故離無瞋無別不害。明不害是假也。第二齣十一善體已。

論。及顯十一至諸心所法。

述曰。自下第三諸門分別。于中有十二。第一義攝所餘。

頌云行舍及不害。此因解及字。謂及顯善十一之外。更有義別心所。謂欣．厭等。梵云遮有二義。一及。二等。不能置等言故總有及字。及字有二義。一顯十一各各體別。即相違釋。二顯十一外心所。今論但約等取余法一義解也。

論。雖義有別至故不別立。

述曰。釋不應為善法所以。此欣．厭等。雖義望前十一有別。然非實有　雜事經者。是阿含經雜事品。及今法蘊足並廣解。及大論五十六．六十九。皆具有染名字解之。翻彼善等。雖依義別說種種名。而

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 在快樂之中，慈愛（Maitrī，希望眾生快樂）和悲憫（Karuṇā，希望眾生離苦）這兩種心所最為殊勝。爲了彰顯其極其殊勝的功德差別，所以依據無瞋（Adveṣa，沒有嗔恨）而建立不害（Ahiṃsā，不傷害）。並非沒有貪婪等（Rāga，貪愛等煩惱）。《顯揚聖教論》（Śrāvakabhūmi）第二卷說，喜（Muditā，隨喜）是不嫉妒（Īrṣyā，嫉妒）。為什麼不把不嫉妒設立為善根（Kuśalamūla，善的根本）呢？回答是，拔除痛苦的悲憫心更為殊勝，所以特別設立不害。喜心不如悲心殊勝，所以不設立不嫉妒。

論：有的人說，不害是指賢善的性質。

述記：薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）的《正理論》等論典說，不害是指賢善的性質。意思是說，擁有這種性質的人就是賢善的人。

論：這種性質的相狀是什麼呢？

述記：這是論主的提問。

論：是指不損害惱亂。

述記：這是其他人的回答。

論：無瞋也是如此，因為這就是無瞋的緣故。

述記：並非離開無瞋之外，另有不害的自性。意思是說，對於有情眾生不加以損害惱亂，這種體性賢善的相狀就是無瞋。所以離開無瞋，就沒有另外的不害。說明不害是假立的。第二部分解釋完十一種善心所之後。

論：以及彰顯十一種心所法。

述記：從下面開始是第三部分，對各種門類進行分別，其中有十二個方面。第一是總括其餘的意義。

頌文說：行舍以及不害。這裡因為要解釋『及』字。意思是說，『及』字彰顯在十一種善心所之外，還有意義不同的心所，比如欣（滿意）和厭（厭惡）等。梵語的『遮』字有兩種含義：一是『及』，二是『等』。因為不能直接用『等』字，所以總用『及』字。『及』字有兩種含義：一是彰顯十一種心所各自的體性差別，這是相違的解釋；二是彰顯十一種心所之外的其他心所。現在本論只是採用『等』字來解釋其餘法的一種含義。

論：雖然意義上有差別，所以不另外設立。

述記：解釋不應該把欣、厭等作為善法的原因。這些欣、厭等心所，雖然在意義上與前面的十一種心所有差別，但並非真實存在。《雜事經》（Vinayavastu）是阿含經（Āgama）中的《雜事品》，以及現在的《法蘊足論》（Dharmaskandha）都對此進行了廣泛的解釋，還有《大毗婆沙論》（Mahāvibhāṣā）第五十六卷和第六十九卷，都具有染污的名字來解釋它。翻譯那些善法等，雖然依據意義的差別而說出種種名稱，但是...

【English Translation】 English version: Among joys, loving-kindness (Maitrī, wishing beings well) and compassion (Karuṇā, wishing beings free from suffering) are the most excellent. To highlight their supreme meritorious distinctions, non-harming (Ahiṃsā, non-violence) is established based on non-hatred (Adveṣa, absence of hatred). It's not that there are no greed, etc. (Rāga, attachment, etc.). The second chapter of the Śrāvakabhūmi (Stages of Disciples) states that joy (Muditā, sympathetic joy) is non-jealousy (Īrṣyā, envy). Why isn't non-jealousy established as a root of good (Kuśalamūla, root of virtue)? The answer is that compassion, which removes suffering, is superior, so non-harming is specifically established. Joy is not as superior as compassion, so non-jealousy is not established.

Treatise: Some say that non-harming refers to the nature of being virtuous.

Commentary: The Sarvāstivāda school's Treatise on Correct Principles and others say that it refers to the nature of being virtuous. It means that a person who possesses this nature is a virtuous person.

Treatise: What is the characteristic of this nature?

Commentary: This is the question of the treatise's author.

Treatise: It refers to not causing harm or annoyance.

Commentary: This is the answer of others.

Treatise: Non-hatred is also like that, because it is non-hatred.

Commentary: It's not that there is a separate nature of non-harming apart from non-hatred. It means that not causing harm or annoyance to sentient beings, this virtuous characteristic is non-hatred. Therefore, apart from non-hatred, there is no separate non-harming. It shows that non-harming is a provisional designation. After explaining the eleven wholesome mental factors in the second part.

Treatise: And to reveal the eleven mental factors.

Commentary: From below is the third part, distinguishing various categories, among which there are twelve aspects. The first is to encompass the remaining meanings.

The verse says: Equanimity, and non-harming. Here, it is because of explaining the word 'and'. It means that the word 'and' reveals that in addition to the eleven wholesome mental factors, there are mental factors with different meanings, such as satisfaction (欣, Xin) and aversion (厭, Yàn), etc. The Sanskrit word '遮' has two meanings: one is 'and', and the other is 'etc.'. Because the word 'etc.' cannot be directly used, the word 'and' is generally used. The word 'and' has two meanings: one is to reveal the distinct nature of each of the eleven mental factors, which is a contradictory explanation; the other is to reveal other mental factors besides the eleven mental factors. Now, this treatise only uses the word 'etc.' to explain one meaning of the remaining dharmas.

Treatise: Although there are differences in meaning, they are not separately established.

Commentary: Explaining the reason why satisfaction, aversion, etc., should not be considered wholesome dharmas. These mental factors such as satisfaction and aversion, although there are differences in meaning from the previous eleven mental factors, they are not truly existent. The Vinayavastu (Matters on Discipline) is the Matters section in the Āgama (Agama, collection of scriptures), and the current Dharmaskandha (Collection of Factors) provides extensive explanations on this, and the fifty-sixth and sixty-ninth volumes of the Mahāvibhāṣā (Great Commentary) also have defiled names to explain it. Translating those wholesome dharmas, etc., although various names are spoken based on the difference in meaning, but...

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體離此十一法更無異故。不別立之。

論。欣謂欲俱至不增恚故。

述曰。此是無瞋一分。于境不憎方欣彼故。此性非欲。欲俱法也。然八十六解三不善根眾名中。不說瞋名欣。貪亦名欣。今若翻彼名。不欣應無貪一分。貪是著義。染貪名欣。無貪厭義。無瞋名欣。各約一義亦不相違。

論。不忿恨惱至瞋一分故。

述曰。翻二十隨惑中四法。不忿．不恨．不惱．不嫉亦然。隨應正翻無瞋一分。彼所治者瞋之分故。隨應之言顯不同欣與欲俱故。此忿等不然。各各別翻。又但是彼無瞋一分。故言隨應。復言等者。依瑜伽八十九。等取不憤發．不惡說．非不忍．不抵突．不諀訾．無瞋尋．無害尋等七法。

論。厭謂惠俱至不染著故。

述曰。此即無貪一分。于所厭不染故。

論。不慳憍等至貪一分故。

述曰。翻隨二法不慳．不憍。此是無貪一分。彼是貪之分故。隨應之言前厭惠俱。此不爾故。又各各翻。等者依八十九。等取不研求。乃至不家勢尋等十八種。

論。不覆誑諂至貪癡一分故。

述曰。不覆．不誑．不諂三法。是二善根一分。隨應正翻貪．癡一分。無貪即翻貪分等。故言隨應。者義更等取六十二中不憍．不詐等。此中不覆所治之覆。有貪著名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 體離此十一法更無異故。不別立之。

論：欣謂與欲（Chanda）俱生，不會增長嗔恚（Dvesha），所以是無嗔（Advesha）的一部分。

述曰：這是無嗔的一部分。對於境界不憎惡，才會有欣悅。這種性質不是欲，而是與欲相應的法。然而，在八十六種解釋的三不善根（Akushala-mula）的眾名中，沒有說嗔名為欣。貪（Lobha）也名為欣。如果現在翻譯那個名稱，不欣應該就沒有貪的一部分。貪是執著的意思，染著貪名為欣，無貪是厭離的意思，無嗔名為欣，各自根據一個意義來說，也不互相違背。

論：不忿、不恨、不惱，是嗔的一部分。

述曰：翻譯二十隨惑（Upaklesha）中的四法。不忿、不恨、不惱、不嫉也是這樣。根據情況正確地翻譯為無嗔的一部分，因為它們所對治的是嗔的一部分。『隨應』這個詞顯示出不同於欣與欲俱生的情況，這忿等不是這樣，是各自單獨翻譯的。又只是那個無嗔的一部分，所以說『隨應』。再說『等』字，依據《瑜伽師地論》第八十九卷，『等』字包括不憤發、不惡說、非不忍、不抵突、不諀訾、無嗔尋、無害尋等七法。

論：厭謂與慧（Prajna）俱生，不會染著，所以是無貪的一部分。

述曰：這就是無貪的一部分，對於所厭惡的不會染著。

論：不慳、不憍等，是貪的一部分。

述曰：翻譯隨惑中的二法，不慳、不憍。這是無貪的一部分，因為它們是貪的一部分。『隨應』這個詞是因為前面的厭與慧俱生，這裡不是這樣，又是各自單獨翻譯。『等』字依據第八十九卷，『等』字包括不研求，乃至不家勢尋等十八種。

論：不覆、不誑、諂，是貪、癡（Moha）的一部分。

述曰：不覆、不誑、不諂這三種法，是二善根的一部分。根據情況正確地翻譯為貪、癡的一部分。無貪就是翻譯貪的一部分等，所以說『隨應』。『者』字的意思是更包括六十二種中的不憍、不詐等。這裡的不覆所對治的覆，是有貪著名。

【English Translation】 English version Since the substance is no different from these eleven dharmas, it is not established separately.

Treatise: 'Xin' (joy) means it arises together with Chanda (desire), and does not increase Dvesha (hatred), therefore it is a part of Advesha (non-hatred).

Commentary: This is a part of non-hatred. One is joyful towards a state because they do not hate it. This nature is not desire, but a dharma associated with desire. However, among the many names of the three unwholesome roots (Akushala-mula) in the eighty-six explanations, hatred is not called 'Xin'. Lobha (greed) is also called 'Xin'. If we now translate that name, 'not Xin' should not have a part of greed. Greed means attachment, being attached and greedy is called 'Xin', non-greed means aversion, non-hatred is called 'Xin', each according to one meaning, and they do not contradict each other.

Treatise: Non-indignation, non-resentment, non-annoyance are part of hatred.

Commentary: Translating the four dharmas in the twenty secondary afflictions (Upaklesha). Non-indignation, non-resentment, non-annoyance, and non-jealousy are also like this. Correctly translate them as part of non-hatred according to the situation, because what they counteract is part of hatred. The word 'accordingly' shows that it is different from 'Xin' arising together with desire; these indignations, etc., are not like that, they are translated separately. Moreover, it is only that part of non-hatred, so it is said 'accordingly'. Furthermore, the word 'etc.' according to Yogacarabhumi Shastra, eighty-ninth fascicle, 'etc.' includes seven dharmas such as non-outburst, non-evil speech, non-impatience, non-resistance, non-reproach, non-hatred seeking, and non-harmful seeking.

Treatise: 'Yan' (disgust) means it arises together with Prajna (wisdom), and does not become attached, therefore it is a part of non-greed.

Commentary: This is a part of non-greed, because one does not become attached to what one is disgusted with.

Treatise: Non-stinginess, non-arrogance, etc., are part of greed.

Commentary: Translating the two dharmas in the secondary afflictions, non-stinginess and non-arrogance. This is a part of non-greed, because they are part of greed. The word 'accordingly' is because the previous disgust arises together with wisdom, but this is not the case here, and they are translated separately. The word 'etc.' according to the eighty-ninth fascicle, 'etc.' includes eighteen kinds such as non-research, and even non-family seeking, etc.

Treatise: Non-concealment, non-deceit, and flattery are part of greed and Moha (delusion).

Commentary: These three dharmas of non-concealment, non-deceit, and non-flattery are part of the two wholesome roots. Correctly translate them as part of greed and delusion according to the situation. Non-greed is translating part of greed, etc., so it is said 'accordingly'. The meaning of the word 'those' is to further include non-arrogance, non-fraud, etc., in the sixty-two kinds. The concealment that non-concealment counteracts here is having a famous greed.

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故覆罪。有癡故覆罪故。今無貪癡一分。論唯說是癡分。起必有癡故。以理釋之。

論。有義不覆至亦貪一分故。

述曰。此教為證。此唯無癡一分。此所治覆。瑜伽．對法皆言癡分。不說為貪分故。貪名故覆。覆體亦癡。癡故然也。前解為勝。雖無論文理故勝也。

以前即忿等初九訖。以害有正翻故此中不出。上根本惑六中三根自有翻。餘三不翻。且翻不慢。

論。有義不慢至不慢彼故。

述曰。三說可知。然對法解。慢不敬苦生為業。即此中第三慚一分勝。以慚崇敬師長等故。此論卷下煩惱之中。但言障不慢。義可通三。然障于慚。如前理可。

論。有義不疑至無猶豫故。

述曰。不疑三解如文可知。瑜伽第八。疑謂分別異覺為體。覺即惠也。五十八云簡擇猶豫。故正簡擇即是正見。不疑說為正見少分。亦有此理。然隨煩惱有八。相翻入善之中。謂無慚．無愧．不信．懈怠．惛沈．掉舉．害．放逸。餘十二不翻。

前解九法訖。以是小煩惱攝一段明之。下有三法。皆通染心起。故在後簡。

論。不散亂體至即是正念。

述曰。不亂體即正定。雖散亂別有體或無體。即定少分。皆翻彼名正定。性對治故。根本中染見隨中不正知。今翻皆入善惠所攝。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，（因為）有覆藏罪業。（因為）有愚癡的緣故，所以覆藏罪業。（因為）現在沒有貪和癡的一部分。《論》中只說是癡的部分，（因為）生起（覆藏罪業）必定有愚癡的緣故，用道理來解釋它。

論：有義認為，不覆藏（罪業）乃至也是貪的一部分的緣故。

述曰：用這個教義作為證據。這裡只有沒有愚癡的一部分。這裡所對治的是覆藏（罪業）。《瑜伽師地論》、《阿毗達磨對法論》都說（是）癡的部分，不說（是）貪的部分的緣故。（因為）貪以名為覆藏，覆藏的本體也是愚癡，（因為）愚癡的緣故才是這樣。前面的解釋是殊勝的，雖然沒有論的文句，（但是）道理的緣故是殊勝的。

前面（解釋了）忿等最初的九種（隨煩惱）完畢。因為害有正確的翻譯，所以這裡不出現。上面根本煩惱六種之中，三種根本（煩惱）自有翻譯，其餘三種沒有翻譯。暫且翻譯不慢。

論：有義認為，不慢乃至是不慢他們的緣故。

述曰：三種說法可以知道。然而《對法論》解釋，慢以不尊敬苦和生為作用，就是這裡第三種慚的一部分殊勝，因為慚崇尚尊敬師長等的緣故。這部論在下卷煩惱之中，只說障礙不慢，意義可以通達三種。然而障礙慚，如前面的道理可以（理解）。

論：有義認為，不疑乃至是沒有猶豫的緣故。

述曰：不疑的三種解釋如文句可以知道。《瑜伽師地論》第八（卷）說，疑是以分別不同的覺為本體，覺就是慧。第五十八（卷）說簡擇猶豫，所以正確的簡擇就是正見。不疑說為正見的少分，也有這個道理。然而隨煩惱有八種，相反地進入善法之中，（它們）是無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠、惛沈、掉舉、害、放逸。其餘十二種沒有翻譯。

前面解釋九種法完畢。因為這是小煩惱所攝，（所以）一段說明它。下面有三種法，都通達染污心生起，所以在後面簡別。

論：不散亂的本體乃至就是正念。

述曰：不散亂的本體就是正定。雖然散亂另外有本體或者沒有本體，就是定的小部分，都翻譯它的名字為正定，（因為）性質是對治的緣故。根本（煩惱）中染污見，隨（煩惱）中不正知，現在翻譯都進入善慧所攝。

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, (because) there is concealment of sins. (Because) there is ignorance, therefore sins are concealed. (Because) now there is no part of greed and ignorance. The 'Treatise' only says it is a part of ignorance, (because) the arising (of concealing sins) must have ignorance, so explain it with reason.

Treatise: Some argue that not concealing (sins) is even a part of greed.

Commentary: Use this teaching as evidence. Here, there is only the absence of a part of ignorance. What is being countered here is concealment (of sins). Both 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (瑜伽師地論) and 'Abhidharma-samuccaya' (阿毗達磨對法論) say (it is) a part of ignorance, not saying (it is) a part of greed. (Because) greed takes the name of concealment, the substance of concealment is also ignorance, (because) it is because of ignorance that it is like this. The previous explanation is superior, although there are no words in the treatise, (but) the reason is superior.

The previous (explanation) of the first nine (secondary afflictions) such as anger is completed. Because harm has a correct translation, it does not appear here. Among the six root afflictions above, three root (afflictions) have their own translations, and the remaining three have no translations. For the time being, translate non-conceit.

Treatise: Some argue that non-conceit is even not being conceited towards them.

Commentary: The three explanations can be known. However, the 'Abhidharma-samuccaya' explains that conceit takes not respecting suffering and birth as its function, which is the superiority of a part of the third shame here, because shame respects teachers, elders, etc. In the chapter on afflictions in the lower volume of this treatise, it only says it obstructs non-conceit, and the meaning can be understood in three ways. However, it obstructs shame, as can be understood from the previous reasoning.

Treatise: Some argue that non-doubt is even the reason for no hesitation.

Commentary: The three explanations of non-doubt can be known from the text. 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (瑜伽師地論), volume eight, says that doubt takes distinguishing different perceptions as its substance, and perception is wisdom. Volume fifty-eight says selective hesitation, so correct selection is correct view. Non-doubt is said to be a small part of correct view, and there is also this reason. However, there are eight secondary afflictions that enter into good dharmas in reverse, (they) are shamelessness, lack of remorse, disbelief, laziness, dullness, agitation, harm, and carelessness. The remaining twelve are not translated.

The previous explanation of the nine dharmas is completed. Because this is included in the minor afflictions, it is explained in one section. Below are three dharmas, all of which are connected to the arising of defiled minds, so they are distinguished later.

Treatise: The substance of non-distraction is even right mindfulness.

Commentary: The substance of non-distraction is right concentration. Although distraction has a separate substance or no substance, it is a small part of concentration, and all translate its name as right concentration, (because) its nature is the antidote. In the root (afflictions), defiled views, and in the secondary (afflictions), incorrect knowledge, are now translated and all enter into the wisdom of good.

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不正知．或別境惠分。或癡分皆爾。性對治也。不忘失念。是正念。設別境念分。或是癡分。亦爾。

此三設是翻癡分者。以有別境分故。別境通三性。不翻為善。欲．勝解亦爾。然此唯說是癡分者。所以不說。前忿等即翻入善。以無別體不通三性故。

論。悔眠尋伺至無別翻對。

述曰。不定四法。通染不染三種性故。如遍行觸等。等餘四法。別境中欲等。亦等四法。無別翻對。唯惡不通三性法者。方翻之也。此前或有行相相翻。如舍治掉舉。掉舉相高。舍相靜故。亦得通治。以掉舉是貪．癡分故。又說性對治即忘念等三癡分者。是不忘念等正翻是。或有行相體性皆相翻。不忿等是無瞋一分等。如理應思。然八十九大有諸煩惱名字。一一應翻對之數彼多少何分所攝。

第二問答廢立。

論。何緣諸染至有不爾者。

述曰。外人問曰。何緣前說除別境等體外。合根本二十六隨煩惱中。十一別翻為善。餘者此中及諸論中不別翻之。有何所以。

論。相用別者至故不應責。

述曰。論主答曰。相用別者別立為善。余所翻善相用不別。故不立之。汝何須責。

問若爾此何別。自余何無用。

論。又諸染法至別立善法。

述曰。論主答曰。此諸染法遍六

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『不正知』（Asamprjanya，非正知），或者屬於『別境慧』（Visesa-citta，特定對像之智慧）的一部分，或者屬於『癡』（Moha，愚癡）的一部分，皆是如此。這是『性對治』（Svabhava-pratipaksa，自性對治）。『不忘失念』（Apramosa-smrti，不忘失正念）是『正念』（Smarana，憶念）。假設『別境念』（Visesa-citta-smarana，特定對像之憶念）的一部分，或者屬於『癡』（Moha，愚癡）的一部分，也是如此。

這三者假設是『癡』（Moha，愚癡）的一部分，因為有『別境』（Visesa-citta，特定對像）的部分。『別境』（Visesa-citta，特定對像）通於三性（善、惡、無記），所以不翻譯為善。『欲』（Chanda，意欲）、『勝解』（Adhimoksa，勝解）也是如此。然而這裡只說是『癡』（Moha，愚癡）的一部分，所以不說。前面的『忿』（Krodha，忿怒）等立即翻譯為善，因為沒有別的自體，不通於三性。

論：『悔』（Kaukṛtya，追悔）、『眠』（Styana，睡眠）、『尋』（Vitarka，尋）、『伺』（Vicara，伺）乃至沒有別的翻譯對應。

述曰：『不定』（Aniyata，不定）的四法，通於染污、不染污三種性質，如『遍行觸』（Sarvatraga-sparsha，普遍存在的觸）等。等於其餘四法，『別境』（Visesa-citta，特定對像）中的『欲』（Chanda，意欲）等，也等於這四法，沒有別的翻譯對應。只有惡而不通於三性的法，才翻譯它。這之前或者有行相的相互翻譯，如『舍』（Upeksha，舍）對治『掉舉』（Audhatya，掉舉），『掉舉』（Audhatya，掉舉）的行相高揚，『舍』（Upeksha，舍）的行相寂靜，所以也能通治。因為『掉舉』（Audhatya，掉舉）是『貪』（Lobha，貪）和『癡』（Moha，愚癡）的一部分。又說『性對治』（Svabhava-pratipaksa，自性對治）即『忘念』（Musitasmrtita，失念）等三種『癡』（Moha，愚癡）的部分，是不忘念等正翻譯的。或者有行相、體性都相互翻譯的，不『忿』（Akrodha，不忿怒）等是無『瞋』（Advesa，不瞋恚）的一部分等，如理應思。然而八十九大有諸煩惱名字，一一應該翻譯對應之，數量、多少、何部分所攝。

第二，問答廢立。

論：『何緣諸染』（Katham sarva klesah，為何諸煩惱）乃至『有不爾者』（Santi naiva，有非如此者）。

述曰：外人問道：為何前面說除了『別境』（Visesa-citta，特定對像）等體外，合計根本二十六隨煩惱中，十一種特別翻譯為善，其餘的在此中及諸論中不特別翻譯它，有什麼緣故？

論：『相用別者』（Laksana-karya-bhedat，相用有別）乃至『故不應責』（Tasmai na yuktam codana，故不應責難）。

述曰：論主答道：相用有別的就特別立為善，其餘所翻譯的善相用沒有區別，所以不設立它。你何須責難？

問：如果這樣，這有什麼區別？其餘的有什麼用？

論：『又諸染法』（Puna sarva klesah，又諸煩惱）乃至『別立善法』（Prthak sthapita kalyana dharma，分別安立善法）。

述曰：論主答道：這些染法遍及六

【English Translation】 English version 'Incorrect knowledge' (Asamprjanya), or a portion of 'wisdom regarding specific objects' (Visesa-citta), or a portion of 'delusion' (Moha), are all like that. This is 'antidote by nature' (Svabhava-pratipaksa). 'Non-forgetfulness of mindfulness' (Apramosa-smrti) is 'right mindfulness' (Smarana). Suppose a portion of 'mindfulness regarding specific objects' (Visesa-citta-smarana), or a portion of 'delusion' (Moha), is also like that.

These three, supposing they are a portion of 'delusion' (Moha), is because there is a portion of 'specific objects' (Visesa-citta). 'Specific objects' (Visesa-citta) pervades the three natures (good, evil, and neutral), so it is not translated as good. 'Desire' (Chanda) and 'certainty' (Adhimoksa) are also like that. However, here it is only said to be a portion of 'delusion' (Moha), so it is not mentioned. The preceding 'anger' (Krodha) etc. are immediately translated as good, because there is no other self-nature, and it does not pervade the three natures.

Treatise: 'Regret' (Kaukṛtya), 'sleep' (Styana), 'seeking' (Vitarka), 'investigation' (Vicara), up to having no separate translation counterpart.

Commentary: The four 'indefinite' (Aniyata) dharmas pervade the three natures of defilement and non-defilement, such as 'pervasive contact' (Sarvatraga-sparsha) etc. Equal to the remaining four dharmas, 'desire' (Chanda) etc. in 'specific objects' (Visesa-citta) are also equal to these four dharmas, having no separate translation counterpart. Only those evil dharmas that do not pervade the three natures are translated. Before this, there may be a mutual translation of characteristics, such as 'equanimity' (Upeksha) counteracting 'excitement' (Audhatya), the characteristic of 'excitement' (Audhatya) being elevated, and the characteristic of 'equanimity' (Upeksha) being tranquil, so it can also generally counteract. Because 'excitement' (Audhatya) is a portion of 'greed' (Lobha) and 'delusion' (Moha). Also, it is said that 'antidote by nature' (Svabhava-pratipaksa), which is the portion of the three 'delusions' (Moha) such as 'forgetfulness' (Musitasmrtita), is the correct translation of non-forgetfulness etc. Or there are mutual translations of characteristics and nature, such as non-'anger' (Akrodha) etc. being a portion of non-'hatred' (Advesa) etc., as should be considered reasonably. However, the eighty-nine great ones have names of various afflictions, each of which should be translated correspondingly, the number, quantity, and what portion is included.

Second, questions and answers regarding establishment and rejection.

Treatise: 'Why are all afflictions' (Katham sarva klesah) up to 'there are not so' (Santi naiva).

Commentary: An outsider asks: Why is it that, as mentioned earlier, apart from the entities of 'specific objects' (Visesa-citta) etc., among the twenty-six secondary afflictions, eleven are specifically translated as good, while the rest are not specifically translated in this or other treatises? What is the reason?

Treatise: 'Because of the difference in characteristics and function' (Laksana-karya-bhedat) up to 'therefore, one should not blame' (Tasmai na yuktam codana).

Commentary: The treatise master answers: Those with different characteristics and functions are specifically established as good, while the characteristics and functions of the remaining translated good are not different, so they are not established. Why do you need to blame?

Question: If so, what is the difference here? What is the use of the rest?

Treatise: 'Also, all afflictions' (Puna sarva klesah) up to 'separately establish good dharmas' (Prthak sthapita kalyana dharma).

Commentary: The treatise master answers: These defiled dharmas pervade the six

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識者。勝故翻之。以能染體遍多識故。過失流滿多識中故。

論。慢等忿等唯意識俱。

述曰。根本中慢等七。隨惑之中忿等九法。唯意識起流滿識少。所以不翻別立善法。不約一一功能增勝。不嫉即是喜無量故。亦應別翻。但以流滿識非多故。無此妨也。然不障余翻為善法。

問若爾者害唯在意。應不翻之。

論。害雖亦然至翻立不害。

述曰。論主答曰。害雖亦爾唯在意地。有三義故所以別翻。不同忿等。一數現起。即簡余煩惱。嫉．慳雖亦然。二此則損自．他。嫉等不然故。三障無上乘勝因之悲故。無上之乘要須悲救。悲因既闕。難以濟生。害之功能增障於此。故雖在意與余亦同。三義勝餘故須翻善。令知此失故翻立善。生得善位隨此而說。

若爾癡分忘念等三何故不翻。

論。失念散亂至善中不說。

述曰。失念．散亂．不正知等。雖有癡分及別境分性相相翻。翻入別境善少分故。善中不說。余慢等七．忿等九如前。

論。染凈相翻凈寧少染。

述曰。第三徴責多少。問從染翻凈。從凈翻染。何為染多凈少。對治不同。

論。凈勝染劣少敵多故。

述曰。論主答曰。凈體勝法。染體劣法。勝少敵劣多。故染多而凈少。其實體相相

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 識者。勝故翻之。以能染體遍多識故。過失流滿多識中故。 述曰。因為『識』具有殊勝的性質，所以要翻譯它。因為它能夠普遍地染污許多『識』，過失會流溢充滿在許多『識』之中。 論。慢等忿等唯意識俱。 述曰。在根本煩惱中的『慢』等七種，以及隨煩惱中的『忿』等九種法，都只與意識相應而生起，流溢充滿的『識』很少。因此，不另外翻譯它們，也不特別建立善法來對治。不是因為它們一一的功能不增勝，也不是因為『不嫉』就是『喜無量』，所以才不另外翻譯。只是因為流溢充滿的『識』不多，所以沒有這個必要。然而，這並不妨礙將其他的法翻譯為善法。 問若爾者害唯在意。應不翻之。 論。害雖亦然至翻立不害。 述曰。論主回答說，『害』雖然也只是在意地中產生，但有三種原因，所以要特別翻譯它，這與『忿』等不同。第一，它經常現起，這就區別于其他的煩惱，如『嫉』和『慳』雖然也只是在意地中產生，但不如『害』那樣經常現起。第二，『害』會損害自己和他人，而『嫉』等則不然。第三，『害』會障礙無上乘的殊勝之因——悲心。無上的佛乘需要悲心來救度眾生，如果悲心的因闕乏，就難以救濟眾生。『害』的功能會特別障礙這一點。因此，雖然『害』也只是在意地中產生，但與其他的煩惱不同，這三種原因使得它比其他的煩惱更殊勝，所以需要翻譯為善法，讓人知道這種過失，因此翻譯並建立『不害』。生得善位是隨著這種情況而說的。 若爾癡分忘念等三何故不翻。 論。失念散亂至善中不說。 述曰。『失念』、『散亂』、『不正知』等，雖然有癡的部分，以及別境的部分，它們的性質和相狀是相反的，但因為它們可以被翻譯為別境中的善少分，所以在善法中沒有特別說明。其餘的『慢』等七種，以及『忿』等九種，如前所述。 論。染凈相翻凈寧少染。 述曰。第三個問題是關於多少的責難。問：從染法翻譯為凈法，從凈法翻譯為染法，為什麼染法多而凈法少？這是因為對治的情況不同。 論。凈勝染劣少敵多故。 述曰。論主回答說，凈法的體性殊勝，染法的體性低劣。殊勝的少能敵對低劣的多，所以染法多而凈法少。實際上，它們的體性和相狀是相反的。

【English Translation】 English version Those who understand. It is translated because of its superiority. Because it can pervasively defile many 'consciousnesses' (識, shì, awareness, perception), and faults overflow and fill many consciousnesses. Commentary: Because 'consciousness' (識) has a superior nature, it needs to be translated. It can universally defile many 'consciousnesses', and faults overflow and fill many consciousnesses. Treatise: Pride (慢, màn), anger (忿, fèn), etc., only occur with the mind consciousness (意識, yìshì). Commentary: Among the fundamental afflictions, 'pride' and the other seven, and among the secondary afflictions, 'anger' and the other nine dharmas, only arise in conjunction with the mind consciousness, and the 'consciousnesses' that overflow and fill are few. Therefore, they are not translated separately, nor are good dharmas specifically established to counter them. It is not because their individual functions are not increasing and superior, nor because 'non-jealousy' is equivalent to 'immeasurable joy' (喜無量, xǐ wúliàng), that they are not translated separately. It is simply because the 'consciousnesses' that overflow and fill are not many, so there is no need. However, this does not prevent other dharmas from being translated as good dharmas. Question: If that is the case, then harm (害, hài) only exists in the intention (意, yì), so it should not be translated. Treatise: Although harm is also like that, it is translated and 'non-harm' (不害, bù hài) is established. Commentary: The treatise master replies, 'Although harm is also only produced in the intentional ground, there are three reasons why it is translated separately, unlike anger and the others. First, it frequently arises, which distinguishes it from other afflictions. Although jealousy (嫉, jí) and stinginess (慳, qiān) are also only produced in the intentional ground, they do not arise as frequently as harm. Second, harm harms oneself and others, while jealousy and the others do not. Third, harm obstructs the superior cause of the unsurpassed vehicle (無上乘, wúshàng shèng)—compassion (悲, bēi). The unsurpassed vehicle requires compassion to save beings, and if the cause of compassion is lacking, it is difficult to save beings. The function of harm particularly obstructs this. Therefore, although harm is also only produced in the intentional ground, it is different from other afflictions. These three reasons make it more superior than other afflictions, so it needs to be translated as a good dharma, to make people aware of this fault, and therefore 'non-harm' is translated and established. The naturally acquired good position is spoken of in accordance with this situation.' If that is the case, why are forgetfulness (忘念, wàngniàn), distraction (散亂, sànluàn), etc., which are parts of delusion (癡, chī), not translated? Treatise: Forgetfulness, distraction... are not spoken of in the good. Commentary: 'Forgetfulness', 'distraction', 'non-correct knowing' (不正知, bùzhèng zhī), etc., although they have parts of delusion and parts of separate objects (別境, biéjìng), their natures and characteristics are opposite. Because they can be translated as a small part of good in separate objects, they are not specifically explained in the good dharmas. The remaining 'pride' and the other seven, and 'anger' and the other nine, are as previously stated. Treatise: Defilement and purity are mutually opposite; why is purity less than defilement? Commentary: The third question is a criticism regarding quantity. Question: From translating defiled dharmas into pure dharmas, and from translating pure dharmas into defiled dharmas, why are defiled dharmas more and pure dharmas less? This is because the situations of counteracting are different. Treatise: Purity is superior, defilement is inferior; the superior few oppose the inferior many. Commentary: The treatise master replies, 'The nature of pure dharmas is superior, and the nature of defiled dharmas is inferior. The superior few can oppose the inferior many, so defiled dharmas are many and pure dharmas are few. In reality, their natures and characteristics are opposite.'

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翻頭數亦等。而此所違多少不同故有此答問。

此義雖爾。何故不立善多染少也。

論。又解理通至不應齊責。

述曰。此第二解。凈法是解順於正理。故雖翻染有不慢等多名。總即與此十一同體。以解理通。相通融故。可少攝多法同體也。迷情隔於物理事體既局。隨染增相故分多種。故染望凈不應令齊。又染順情。令知厭惡故須廣說。善法多說。恐起難修之心。故略不說。

何故染法六十四．及攝事分八十九中有眾多法。何故此中但言二十　答以用增勝遍染故。說但有二十。謂忿等十法。及無慚．無愧。增勝猛利故說之也。下之八法。或復十法。遍染心故所以說之。余法或非增猛。或不遍染。故此不說。此如下隨煩惱中說　問何故所治唯在欲。能治通上界。如瞋．忿等。或所治通三界。能治唯上二。如輕安治惛沈。何故所治染法唯在意識。能治善法即通六識。如害翻為不害是。或有所治通六。能治唯在意。如惛沈翻作輕安　答性相相當辨能．所治。不以通識及通界故。說能．所治。

第四假實。

論。此十一法至相用別故。

述曰。對法等同。五十五亦爾。彼言世俗有。世俗有言通假實故。如前已引。無癡善根無別體家。云如五見定世俗非體即假。以即別境之中惠故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 翻轉的次數也相等。而這裡所違背的多少不同，所以有這樣的答問。

即使道理是這樣，為什麼不建立善多染少的情況呢？

論：又解釋說，理通達，所以不應該一概而論。

述記：這是第二種解釋。清凈法是符合正理的解釋，所以即使翻轉染污法有不慢等多種名稱，總的來說也與這十一種（煩惱）同體。因為理解的道理是相通的，可以少量攝取多種同體的法。迷惑的情感隔絕於物理事體，事體既然侷限，隨著染污的增長而增加相狀，所以分為多種。因此，對於染污法，不應該要求與清凈法一樣。而且染污法順應情感，讓人知道厭惡，所以需要廣泛說明。善法如果多說，恐怕會引起難以修行的想法，所以簡略不說。

為什麼染污法在六十四法以及《攝事分》八十九法中有眾多法，而這裡只說二十種？答：因為它們的作用增長，並且普遍染污，所以只說二十種。即忿（krodha，憤怒）等十法，以及無慚（ahrikya，不知慚愧）、無愧（anapatrapya，不覺羞恥）。因為它們增長並且猛烈，所以說這些。下面的八法，或者十法，普遍染污心，所以說這些。其餘的法或者不是增長猛烈，或者不是普遍染污，所以這裡不說。這些如下面的隨煩惱中所說。問：為什麼所要對治的（煩惱）只在欲界（kāmadhātu， desire realm），能對治的（善法）卻通於上界？如瞋（dveṣa，嗔恨）、忿（krodha，憤怒）等。或者所要對治的通於三界（tridhātu， three realms），能對治的卻只在上二界？如輕安（praśrabdhi，輕快安適）對治惛沈（styāna， 昏沉）。為什麼所要對治的染污法只在意識（manovijñāna， mind consciousness），能對治的善法卻通於六識（ṣaṭ vijñāna， six consciousnesses）？如害（vihiṃsā， 損害）翻轉為不害（avihimsā， 不損害）就是。或者有所要對治的通於六識，能對治的卻只在意（manas， 意根）？如惛沈（styāna， 昏沉）翻轉為輕安（praśrabdhi， 輕快安適）。答：根據性質和相狀的相當來辨別能對治和所對治，不是因為通於哪個識或者哪個界，來說明能對治和所對治。

第四，假和實。

論：這十一種法……相狀和作用不同。

述記：《對法》等同，五十五法也是這樣。那裡說世俗有（saṃvṛti-satya， conventional truth），世俗有這個說法通於假和實，如前面已經引用的。無癡善根沒有別的自體家，說如五見（pañca dṛṣṭi， five false views）決定是世俗而非實體，就是假的。因為它就是別境（vikalpa， specific object）中的慧（prajñā， wisdom）。

【English Translation】 English version The number of reversals is also equal. However, the extent of violation differs here, hence this question and answer.

Even if the principle is such, why not establish the situation of 'more good, less defilement'?

Treatise: Furthermore, it is explained that the principle is universally accessible, so one should not make a blanket judgment.

Commentary: This is the second explanation. Pure Dharma is an explanation that accords with right principle. Therefore, even though reversing defilements has various names such as non-arrogance, it is generally of the same essence as these eleven (afflictions). Because the principle of understanding is interconnected, a small amount can encompass many dharmas of the same essence. Confused emotions are separated from physical matters, and since the substance is limited, the appearances increase with the growth of defilement, hence the division into many kinds. Therefore, one should not demand that defilements be treated the same as purity. Moreover, defilements accord with emotions, allowing one to know aversion, so they need to be explained extensively. If good dharmas are discussed too much, it might give rise to the thought of being difficult to practice, so they are briefly mentioned.

Why are there so many dharmas in the sixty-four defilements and the eighty-nine in the Compendium of Topics (Saṃgrahavastu), but only twenty mentioned here? Answer: Because their function increases and they universally defile, only twenty are mentioned. Namely, anger (krodha) and the other ten dharmas, as well as shamelessness (ahrikya) and lack of embarrassment (anapatrapya). Because they increase and are fierce, these are mentioned. The following eight or ten dharmas universally defile the mind, so they are mentioned. Other dharmas are either not increasing and fierce, or not universally defiling, so they are not mentioned here. These are mentioned in the subsequent secondary afflictions. Question: Why is what needs to be treated (afflictions) only in the desire realm (kāmadhātu), while what can treat (good dharmas) is universal to the upper realms? Such as anger (dveṣa), rage (krodha), etc. Or what needs to be treated is universal to the three realms (tridhātu), while what can treat is only in the upper two realms? Such as pliancy (praśrabdhi) treating lethargy (styāna). Why are the defiled dharmas that need to be treated only in mind consciousness (manovijñāna), while the good dharmas that can treat are universal to the six consciousnesses (ṣaṭ vijñāna)? Such as harm (vihiṃsā) being reversed into non-harm (avihimsā). Or what needs to be treated is universal to the six, while what can treat is only in mind (manas)? Such as lethargy (styāna) being reversed into pliancy (praśrabdhi). Answer: Distinguish the ability to treat and what needs to be treated based on the correspondence of nature and characteristics, not because of being universal to which consciousness or which realm.

Fourth, provisional and real.

Treatise: These eleven dharmas... their characteristics and functions are different.

Commentary: The Abhidharma is the same, so are the fifty-five dharmas. There it says conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), the statement of conventional truth is universal to provisional and real, as previously cited. The root of good, non-delusion, has no other self-nature family, saying that like the five views (pañca dṛṣṭi) are determined to be conventional and not substance, that is provisional. Because it is precisely wisdom (prajñā) within the specific object (vikalpa).

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無癡亦爾。雖言實有即惠善性。非如舍等用四法成體非別性　若爾不害例亦如惠　故今述正曰。與對法等同。三假八實。所以如文。

第五俱起。

論。有義十一至餘七不定。

述曰。此第一師。有三。一標宗。二立理。三引證。此初也。十一中四法遍善。定地．不定地。漏．無漏皆遍。功力遍故。餘七不然。

下立理也。

論。推尋事理至第二無故。

述曰。解七不遍。善心披讀推理未決。無信生故。信緣定境故信非遍。慚．愧如前依自他力別。俱以羞恥為其自相。以同類故。如二受等定不俱生。起一之時無第二故。故亦非遍。決未決時不障互起一。

論。要世間道至乃有不害故。

述曰。世道離欲方有輕安。除煩惱粗重故。不障有信．及慚愧一。不放逸．舍無漏道時乃方建立。四法功能彼方勝故。不障有前法。除緣無相等悲愍有情時有不害故。以正對治害損惱故。不障起前法。然散心位．或無漏位都無輕安。有漏善時無不放逸．舍。無相善心無不害故。故餘七法非遍善心。然說十遍者。據容有時有時起故。非謂皆遍一切善心。以何為證。

論。論說十一至有不害故。

述曰。下引證也。瑜伽論五十五說六位中起十一善。泛起善心不深心止染。無慚

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無癡（Alobha，不愚癡）也是如此。雖然說它實際上具有智慧的善良本性，但它不像舍（Upeksha，舍）、信（Shraddha，信）、慚（Hri，慚）、愧（Apatrapya，愧）等需要依靠四種法才能構成其自體，它並非一種獨立的自性。如果這樣說，那麼不害（Ahinsa，不害）也像智慧一樣，不會妨礙其他善法。因此，現在闡述正確的觀點說：不害與對法藏（Abhidharma，對法）等相同，都是三假八實（指勝義諦中部分法是假立的，部分是真實的）。之所以這樣說，就像經文所說的那樣。

第五，俱起（Sahabhu，同時生起）。

論：有義說，十一法是普遍的，其餘七法是不定的。

述：這是第一位論師的觀點。有三個部分：一是標明宗義，二是建立理由，三是引證。這是第一部分。在十一種法中，四種法是普遍存在於所有善心中的，無論是在定地還是不定地，無論是有漏還是無漏，都普遍存在。這是因為它們的力量普遍存在。其餘七種法並非如此。

下面是建立理由的部分。

論：推尋事理，直到第二種法不存在。

述：解釋七種法不普遍的原因。當善心披閱、推理但尚未決斷時，由於沒有信（Shraddha，信）產生，所以信不是普遍的。因為信的緣是確定的境界。慚（Hri，慚）和愧（Apatrapya，愧）如前所述，依賴於自身和他人的力量而有所不同。它們都以羞恥作為自身的體相，因為它們是同類的。就像兩種受（Vedana，感受）等，必定不會同時生起，當一種生起時，第二種就不存在。因此，它們也不是普遍的。在決斷或未決斷時，不會互相妨礙，可以交替生起。

論：需要世間道（Laukikamarga，世間道）離欲，才能有輕安（Prasrabdhi，輕安），因此不構成妨礙。

述：世間道只有在離欲之後才會有輕安，因為除去了煩惱的粗重。因此，它不會妨礙信（Shraddha，信）以及慚（Hri，慚）、愧（Apatrapya，愧）的生起。不放逸（Apramada，不放逸）和舍（Upeksha，舍）只有在無漏道（Anasravamarga，無漏道）時才能建立，因為這四種法的功能在那時才更加強大。它不會妨礙前面法的生起。除非在緣無相等，悲憫有情時，才不會有損害。因為它是正對治，能夠損害煩惱。因此，它不會妨礙前面法的生起。然而，在散亂心位或無漏心位，都沒有輕安。在有漏善心時，沒有不放逸和舍。在無相善心時，沒有不害。因此，其餘七種法不是普遍存在於所有善心中的。然而，說十種法是普遍的，是根據有時會生起的情況而言的，並非說它們普遍存在於一切善心中。以什麼為證據呢？

論：論中說，十一種法，直到有不害的緣故。

述：下面是引證的部分。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra，瑜伽師地論）第五十五卷說，在六種位中，會生起十一種善法。泛泛地生起善心，不深入地停止染污，沒有慚（Hri，慚）。

【English Translation】 English version: Alobha (Non-greed) is also like that. Although it is said to actually possess the good nature of wisdom, it is not like Upeksha (Equanimity), Shraddha (Faith), Hri (Shame), Apatrapya (Embarrassment), etc., which require reliance on four dharmas to constitute their own entity. It is not a separate self-nature. If that is the case, then Ahinsa (Non-harming) is also like wisdom, and will not hinder other good dharmas. Therefore, now stating the correct view, it is said that: Ahinsa is the same as the Abhidharma (Higher Knowledge) etc., all being 'three provisional and eight real' (referring to some dharmas in the ultimate truth being provisionally established and some being real). The reason for saying this is as the text says.

Fifth, Sahabhu (Co-arising).

Treatise: Some argue that eleven dharmas are universal, while the remaining seven are not fixed.

Commentary: This is the view of the first teacher. There are three parts: first, stating the doctrine; second, establishing the reason; third, citing evidence. This is the first part. Among the eleven dharmas, four are universally present in all good minds, whether in the realm of fixed concentration or unfixed concentration, whether with outflows or without outflows, they are all pervasive. This is because their power is pervasive. The remaining seven dharmas are not like this.

Below is the part establishing the reason.

Treatise: Investigating the principles of things, until the second dharma does not exist.

Commentary: Explaining the reason why the seven dharmas are not pervasive. When a good mind is reading and reasoning but has not yet made a decision, because Shraddha (Faith) does not arise, faith is not pervasive. Because the object of faith is a fixed realm. Hri (Shame) and Apatrapya (Embarrassment), as mentioned before, differ depending on the power of oneself and others. They both take shame as their own characteristic, because they are of the same kind. Just like the two Vedana (Feelings), etc., they definitely do not arise simultaneously. When one arises, the second does not exist. Therefore, they are also not pervasive. When deciding or not deciding, they do not hinder each other, and can arise alternately.

Treatise: It requires the Laukikamarga (Worldly Path) to be free from desire in order to have Prasrabdhi (Tranquility), therefore it does not constitute an obstruction.

Commentary: The Worldly Path only has tranquility after being free from desire, because it removes the coarseness of afflictions. Therefore, it does not hinder the arising of Shraddha (Faith) and Hri (Shame), Apatrapya (Embarrassment). Apramada (Diligence) and Upeksha (Equanimity) can only be established during the Anasravamarga (Path Without Outflows), because the function of these four dharmas is stronger at that time. It does not hinder the arising of the previous dharma. Unless when contemplating the absence of characteristics, compassion for sentient beings, there will be no harm. Because it is the correct antidote, it can harm afflictions. Therefore, it does not hinder the arising of the previous dharma. However, in the distracted mind state or the outflow-free mind state, there is no tranquility. In the wholesome mind with outflows, there is no diligence and equanimity. In the signless wholesome mind, there is no non-harming. Therefore, the remaining seven dharmas are not universally present in all wholesome minds. However, saying that ten dharmas are universal is based on the situation where they sometimes arise, not saying that they are universally present in all wholesome minds. What is the evidence?

Treatise: The treatise says, eleven dharmas, until there is the condition of non-harming.

Commentary: Below is the part citing evidence. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), volume fifty-five, says that in the six states, eleven wholesome dharmas will arise. Generally arising a wholesome mind, not deeply stopping defilements, there is no Hri (Shame).

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．愧起。不顧自他故。余如文可知。然今此師決定如是起時之語。不遮有時皆得相應。由此決定於其六位起十一善。雖慚．與愧起則別時。以俱止惡合一位攝。然又此位說有如是之時。非必一切不許有時或得俱起。此意總顯未必俱時。非必不俱。

后別但破說不俱時。許俱之時不是破限。

論。有義彼說至無凈信故。

述曰。下文有五。一破前。二釋難。三顯正。四引證。五解疑。此初也。前義不然。汝言推事未決有三性心。汝言彼善心中無信者。應非是善。無凈信故。如染無記心。染等者等取無記也。又云。善心定有信起。善心攝故。如定時善心。

論。慚愧異類至前已說故。

述曰。此之二法各有別相。體是異類。崇善拒惡故。依于自他增上雖別。而境是同。一時俱起遍善心有。前自體中已成立訖。

論。若出世道至非無漏故。

述曰。無漏之位若無輕安。應輕安覺支非無漏攝。前師若言散心無此輕安非遍。誰謂無漏輕安不俱。深為錯難。然以前師輕安覺支。非在無漏觀。有無漏觀後有漏觀時生。然亦名覺支。體非無漏說為無漏者。無漏定遠引故。如苦根無漏。

若爾佛應無此覺支。

論。若世間道至應有二故。

述曰。若舍．不放逸唯出世道有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

愧起。不顧自他故。其餘如同原文可以理解。然而現在這位論師決定這樣發起討論時所說的話，並不是要否定有時它們可以相應。由此決定在其六個位置發起十一善。雖然慚（Hri，一種道德上的自我約束）和愧（Apatrapya，因他人而產生的羞恥感）發起的時間不同，但因為它們都止息惡行，所以合為一個位置來攝取。然而又在這個位置說有這樣的時候，並非一定不允許有時或者可以同時生起。這個意思總的來說是顯示未必同時，但並非一定不同時。

後面特別只是破斥說不同時的情況。允許同時的情況不是破斥的範圍。

論：有義彼說至無凈信故。

述曰：下文有五點。一是破斥前面的觀點，二是解釋疑問，三是闡明正確的觀點，四是引用證據，五是解釋疑惑。這是第一點。前面的觀點不對。你說推理事物未決時有三種自性心。你說那個善心中沒有信（Śrāddha，信仰）的人，應該不是善的。因為沒有清凈的信。如同染污和無記心。染等，等同於取無記。又說，善心一定有信生起。因為是善心所攝。如同定時的善心。

論：慚愧異類至前已說故。

述曰：這兩種法各有不同的相狀。體性是不同的種類。因為崇尚善，拒絕惡。雖然依靠自身和他人的增上力有所不同。但境界是相同的。一時同時生起，普遍存在於善心中。在前面的自體中已經成立了。

論：若出世道至非無漏故。

述曰：無漏的地位如果無輕安（Prasrabdhi，輕快安適），那麼輕安覺支（Prasrabdhi Sambojjhanga，七覺支之一）就不應該被無漏所攝。前面的論師如果說散亂心沒有這種輕安，不是普遍存在的。誰說無漏的輕安不能同時存在？這是很錯誤的責難。然而以前面的論師認為，輕安覺支不是在無漏觀中。有無漏觀后，有有漏觀時生。然而也名為覺支。體性不是無漏，說為無漏的原因是，無漏的定力遙遠地引導。如同苦根（Duhkha-indriya，五根之一）是無漏的。

如果這樣，佛（Buddha，覺悟者）就不應該有這個覺支。

論：若世間道至應有二故。

述曰：如果舍（Tyaga，佈施）、不放逸（Apramada，精進）只有出世道才有

【English Translation】 English version:

'Kueiqi (Shame arises). Not considering self and others. The rest can be understood from the text. However, the words of this teacher when he decides to initiate such a discussion are not to deny that sometimes they can be corresponding. From this, it is decided that eleven good dharmas arise in its six positions. Although Hri (moral self-restraint) and Apatrapya (shame arising from others) arise at different times, they are included in one position because they both stop evil deeds. However, it is also said in this position that there are times like this, it is not necessarily forbidden that sometimes or can arise simultaneously. The general meaning of this is to show that it is not necessarily simultaneous, but it is not necessarily not simultaneous.'

'Later, it specifically refutes the situation of saying that they are not simultaneous. Allowing simultaneous situations is not within the scope of refutation.'

'Treatise: Some say that up to the reason of having no pure faith.'

'Commentary: There are five points in the following text. First, to refute the previous view, second, to explain the doubts, third, to clarify the correct view, fourth, to cite evidence, and fifth, to explain the confusion. This is the first point. The previous view is not correct. You say that when reasoning about things is undecided, there are three kinds of self-nature minds. You say that those who have no Śrāddha (faith) in that good mind should not be good. Because there is no pure faith. Like defiled and non-specified minds. Defiled, etc., is equivalent to taking non-specified.' Also, it is said that good mind must have faith arising. Because it is included in the good mind. Like the good mind at a fixed time.

'Treatise: Hri and Apatrapya are different kinds, as said before.'

'Commentary: These two dharmas each have different characteristics. The nature is different kinds. Because they admire good and reject evil. Although relying on the increasing power of oneself and others is different. But the realm is the same. Arising simultaneously at one time, universally existing in the good mind. It has been established in the previous self-nature.'

'Treatise: If the path of transcending the world up to the reason of not being without outflows.'

'Commentary: If there is no Prasrabdhi (ease and comfort) in the position of no outflows, then Prasrabdhi Sambojjhanga (one of the seven factors of enlightenment) should not be included in no outflows. If the previous teacher said that there is no such Prasrabdhi in the distracted mind, it is not universally existing. Who said that the Prasrabdhi of no outflows cannot exist simultaneously? This is a very wrong accusation. However, according to the previous teacher, the Prasrabdhi Sambojjhanga is not in the no-outflow contemplation. After the no-outflow contemplation, there is the arising of the outflow contemplation. However, it is also called Sambojjhanga. The nature is not no-outflow, and the reason for saying it is no-outflow is that the power of no-outflow meditation guides from afar. Like Duhkha-indriya (one of the five roots) is no-outflow.'

'If so, Buddha (the awakened one) should not have this Sambojjhanga.'

'Treatise: If the worldly path up to the reason of there should be two.'

'Commentary: If Tyaga (giving) and Apramada (diligence) only exist in the path of transcending the world'

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。世間道心應非寂靜。以無舍故。如染等心。亦應不能防惡修善。無不放逸故。亦如染等心。既有寂靜等故。有舍．不放逸　又世間善心。應不伏掉舉。及伏放逸。無能治故。如染心等。既知世間道。準散善亦有。然有比量。散善等中應有此二。是善心故。具四法故。如出世道。

論。善心起時至有不害故。

述曰。不害之數善心皆有。不損自他違害損故。如大悲心。但說大悲不害為體。豈余善位遂亦無也。理必應俱。精進等四以義同故所以不說。

若爾六位起十一文如何通。

論。論說六位至定非應理。

述曰。此釋難也。彼五十五依決定時信增。止染時慚．愧增等。非無餘法。即是依彼彼增。緣有六非一故。說彼彼增言。作此此說者。依決定時等信增故。遂言決定時有信等。六類非一。作此此說也。非無十法恒遍善心。

若爾如何。

論。應說信等至餘位無故。

述曰。下顯正也。此中十法遍一切善。輕安不遍。何以知者。初以理證。輕安調暢要除粗重。散位粗重體不無故。無輕安也。

以文證者。

論。抉擇分說至增輕安故。

述曰。下引證。六十九末說十善心所定地．不定地皆遍善心。定地之中增輕安故。十恒遍善。有時增十一。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：世間的道心應該不是寂靜的，因為它沒有捨棄（upekṣā，一種心理平衡的狀態）。就像貪染等心一樣，也應該不能防止惡行和修習善行，因為它沒有不放逸（apramāda，正念和謹慎）。也像貪染等心一樣。既然有寂靜等特性，就有捨棄和不放逸。此外，世間的善心應該不能夠制伏掉舉（auddhatya，內心的躁動），以及制伏放逸，因為它沒有能對治它們的力量，就像貪染等心一樣。既然知道世間的道，那麼按照類比，散亂的善心中也應該有這些。然而，通過比量可以推知，散亂的善心中應該有這兩種特性，因為它們是善心，具備四種要素，就像出世間的道一樣。

論：善心生起時，直至有不害（avihiṃsā，不傷害）的特性。

述曰：不害的特性，所有的善心都具有。因為不損害自己和他人，違背了傷害和損害。例如大悲心，只說不害作為它的體性。難道其餘的善心中就沒有了嗎？道理上必定應該都有。精進等四種要素，因為意義相同，所以沒有特別說明。

如果這樣，六位心所生起時，十一心所如何貫通？

論：論中說六位心所，如果說決定的時候才相應，那是不合理的。

述曰：這是解釋疑問。那五十五種心所，依據決定的狀態時，信心增長；止息貪染時，慚（hrī，對不道德行為的羞恥感）和愧（apatrāpya，對他人不認可的恐懼）增長等等，並非沒有其餘的心所。就是依據那些狀態而增長。因為緣起有六種而不是一種，所以說那些狀態增長。作這樣的說法，是依據決定的狀態時，信心增長的緣故，於是說決定的狀態時有信心等等。六類心所不是單一的，所以作這樣的說法。並非沒有十種心所恒常遍及善心。

如果這樣，應該如何解釋？

論：應該說信心等心所恒常遍及善心，因為其餘的心所在其他狀態沒有。

述曰：下面顯示正確的觀點。這其中十種心所遍及一切善心。輕安（praśrabdhi，身心的輕快安適）不遍及一切善心。憑什麼知道呢？首先用理證，輕安要調和暢順，必須去除粗重（daurbalya，沉重遲緩），散亂的狀態中粗重的體性並非沒有，所以沒有輕安。

用經文來證明：

論：抉擇分中說，在禪定中增長輕安的緣故。

述曰：下面引用經證。《抉擇分》第六十九頁末尾說，十種善心所，在定地（禪定狀態）和不定地（非禪定狀態）都遍及善心。在定地之中，增長輕安的緣故。十種心所恒常遍及善心，有時增長為十一種。

【English Translation】 English version: The wholesome mind in the mundane world should not be tranquil, because it lacks upekṣā (equanimity). Like minds with attachment, it should also be unable to prevent evil deeds and cultivate good deeds, because it lacks apramāda (diligence); it is just like minds with attachment. Since it possesses tranquility, etc., it possesses upekṣā and apramāda. Furthermore, the wholesome mind in the mundane world should not be able to subdue auddhatya (restlessness) and pramāda (negligence), because it lacks the power to counteract them, just like minds with attachment. Since we know the mundane path, by analogy, scattered wholesome minds should also have these. However, through inference, it can be deduced that scattered wholesome minds should have these two characteristics, because they are wholesome minds and possess four factors, just like the supramundane path.

Treatise: When a wholesome mind arises, it extends to having the characteristic of avihiṃsā (non-harming).

Commentary: The characteristic of non-harming is present in all wholesome minds, because it does not harm oneself or others, and it opposes harm and injury. For example, the great compassionate mind is said to have non-harming as its essence. Does this mean that other wholesome states do not have it? Logically, they must all have it. The four factors of diligence, etc., are not specifically mentioned because their meaning is the same.

If that is the case, how can the eleven mental factors that arise in the six categories be reconciled?

Treatise: The treatise says that the six categories of mental factors, if it is said that they only correspond at the time of determination, it is not reasonable.

Commentary: This is to explain the question. Those fifty-five mental factors, depending on the state of determination, faith increases; when stopping attachment, hrī (shame) and apatrāpya (embarrassment) increase, etc., it is not that there are no other mental factors. It is that they increase depending on those states. Because the conditions are six types and not one, it is said that those states increase. Making such a statement is because, depending on the state of determination, faith increases, so it is said that there is faith, etc., at the time of determination. The six categories of mental factors are not singular, so such a statement is made. It is not that there are no ten mental factors that constantly pervade the wholesome mind.

If that is the case, how should it be explained?

Treatise: It should be said that mental factors such as faith constantly pervade the wholesome mind, because the other mental factors are not present in other states.

Commentary: The following shows the correct view. Among these, ten mental factors pervade all wholesome minds. praśrabdhi (pliancy) does not pervade all wholesome minds. How do we know this? First, with logical proof, praśrabdhi must be harmonious and smooth, and it must remove daurbalya (heaviness); in the scattered state, the essence of heaviness is not absent, so there is no praśrabdhi.

Using scripture to prove it:

Treatise: The Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī says that praśrabdhi increases in meditation.

Commentary: The following quotes scriptural proof. The end of page sixty-nine of the Viniścaya-saṃgrahaṇī says that ten wholesome mental factors pervade the wholesome mind in both the meditative state and the non-meditative state. In the meditative state, praśrabdhi increases. Ten mental factors constantly pervade the wholesome mind, and sometimes increase to eleven.

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問此言定地增輕安。何者是定地。

論。有義定加行至通一切地。

述曰。上來是總。下子段異說解疑。如聞．思位修定之時。未得上定。定前近加行。亦名定地。此時微有調暢義故。除遠加行余散善位。今坐禪者。雖不得定亦有調暢故。即是欲界亦有輕安。若欲無者。便違本地分第三卷說信等十一法通一切地。若言從多地說言通。一切非實通者。應從多分說彼俱起。十恒俱故。既不許爾。故知欲界亦有輕安。其五十六．六十三卷．顯揚第六皆云不定地者。謂無輕安地。欲界者。謂除輕安俱定等。彼云謂若根本上界勝妙輕安無故。作如此說。非說無慾界輕安。如說無色界無色。彼非無定色故。

論。有義輕安至名不定地。

述曰。不然。輕安唯在上界定地中有。所以者何。由定滋潤所長養故。有調暢故。欲界斂心決非實定。故無滋潤名調暢也。何以得知。六十三等說欲界諸心．心所闕輕安故名不定地。不爾應言闕上界輕安故。名不定地。

若爾如何說通一切地。

論。說一切地至三地皆有故。

述曰。此等皆通有尋伺等三地。有何失也。初禪．中間．上地之定有輕安故。但諸心所無不皆然。然自於有尋伺等有長短也。然返覆文理。不言欲界有定得有輕安故。后師為勝

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 　　問：這種說法確定了在禪定之地可以增長輕安（Prasrabdhi，一種身心輕快安適的狀態）。那麼，什麼是禪定之地呢？

論：有一種觀點認為，從禪定的加行（Prayoga，為達到禪定所做的準備）開始，直到能夠通達一切地（Bhumi，指不同的禪定境界），都屬於禪定之地。

述記：上面是總體的提問。下面分段用不同的說法來解釋和消除疑惑。比如在聞、思的階段修習禪定時，還沒有得到真正的禪定。禪定之前的近加行，也可以稱為禪定之地。因為這個時候已經稍微有了調暢的意味。除了遠離加行之外，其餘散亂的善位也算。現在坐禪的人，即使沒有得到禪定，也有調暢的感覺，所以說欲界（Kāmadhātu，指眾生有情慾和物質慾望的生存領域）也有輕安。如果說欲界沒有輕安，就違背了《瑜伽師地論·本地分》第三卷所說的信等十一種心所法通達一切地的說法。如果說從多數情況來說，才說通達一切地，並非真正通達一切地，那麼就應該從多數情況來說，這些心所法都是同時生起的，因為它們十個總是同時生起的。既然不允許這樣說，所以就知道欲界也有輕安。第五十六卷、第六十三卷以及《顯揚聖教論》第六卷都說不定地（指沒有禪定的狀態）是指沒有輕安的地。說欲界是指除了與禪定相應的輕安之外的狀態。他們說，這是因為根本定和上界的殊勝輕安沒有的緣故，才這樣說的。並不是說欲界沒有輕安。就像說沒有無色界（Ārūpyadhātu，指沒有物質存在的精神領域）一樣，並不是說沒有禪定的色法。

論：有一種觀點認為，輕安只存在於上界的禪定之地中，所以稱為不定地。

述記：不是這樣的。輕安只在上界的禪定之地中才有。為什麼呢？因為輕安是由禪定的滋潤而生長出來的，所以有調暢的感覺。欲界的收攝心念，絕對不是真正的禪定，所以沒有滋潤，也就沒有調暢的感覺。怎麼知道的呢？第六十三卷等經論說，欲界的諸心、心所缺少輕安，所以稱為不定地。不然的話，就應該說缺少上界的輕安，所以稱為不定地。

如果這樣說，那麼如何解釋輕安通達一切地呢？

論：說通達一切地，是因為輕安在有尋有伺地（Savitarka-savicara-bhumi，指有粗細尋伺的禪定境界）、無尋唯伺地（Avitarka-vicara-matra-bhumi，指只有細伺的禪定境界）和無尋無伺地（Avitarka-avicara-bhumi，指既無粗尋也無細伺的禪定境界）這三地都有的緣故。

述記：這些都通達有尋有伺等三地，有什麼過失呢？初禪（Prathama Dhyana，色界的第一禪定）、中間禪（Dhyanantara，指未至定和中間定）以及上地的禪定都有輕安的緣故。但是，並非所有的心所法都是這樣。然而，輕安在有尋有伺等三地中，有長短的差別。然而，反覆推敲文理，並沒有說欲界有禪定，所以有輕安。後來的論師的觀點更為殊勝。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: This statement confirms that Prasrabdhi (a state of lightness and ease of body and mind) increases in the place of Samadhi (concentration). What is the place of Samadhi?

Treatise: One view is that from the Prayoga (preparation for achieving Samadhi) of Samadhi to the ability to penetrate all Bhumis (levels of meditative absorption), it is the place of Samadhi.

Commentary: The above is a general question. The following paragraphs use different statements to explain and dispel doubts. For example, when practicing Samadhi in the stages of hearing and thinking, one has not yet attained true Samadhi. The near Prayoga before Samadhi can also be called the place of Samadhi, because at this time there is already a slight sense of adjustment. Except for the distant Prayoga, the remaining scattered good states are also considered. Those who practice meditation now, even if they have not attained Samadhi, also have a feeling of adjustment, so it is said that the Kamadhatu (the realm of desire, referring to the realm of sentient beings with sensual and material desires) also has Prasrabdhi. If it is said that the Kamadhatu does not have Prasrabdhi, it would contradict the statement in the third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra's 'Local Section' that the eleven mental factors such as faith penetrate all Bhumis. If it is said that it is only said to penetrate all Bhumis from the perspective of the majority of cases, and not truly penetrate all Bhumis, then it should be said from the perspective of the majority of cases that these mental factors arise simultaneously, because all ten of them always arise simultaneously. Since this is not allowed, it is known that the Kamadhatu also has Prasrabdhi. Volumes 56 and 63, as well as the sixth volume of the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations, all say that the non-Samadhi ground (referring to the state without Samadhi) refers to the ground without Prasrabdhi. Saying that the Kamadhatu refers to the state other than Prasrabdhi corresponding to Samadhi. They say that this is because the fundamental Samadhi and the superior Prasrabdhi of the upper realms are absent, which is why they say this. It is not saying that the Kamadhatu does not have Prasrabdhi, just like saying there is no Arupyadhatu (the formless realm, referring to the mental realm without material existence), it is not saying that there is no form of Samadhi.

Treatise: One view is that Prasrabdhi only exists in the Samadhi ground of the upper realms, so it is called the non-Samadhi ground.

Commentary: That is not so. Prasrabdhi only exists in the Samadhi ground of the upper realms. Why? Because Prasrabdhi is grown by the nourishment of Samadhi, so there is a feeling of adjustment. The gathering of thoughts in the Kamadhatu is definitely not true Samadhi, so there is no nourishment, and therefore no feeling of adjustment. How do we know this? The 63rd volume and other sutras and treatises say that the various minds and mental factors of the Kamadhatu lack Prasrabdhi, so it is called the non-Samadhi ground. Otherwise, it should be said that it lacks the Prasrabdhi of the upper realms, so it is called the non-Samadhi ground.

If this is the case, how can it be explained that Prasrabdhi penetrates all Bhumis?

Treatise: Saying that it penetrates all Bhumis is because Prasrabdhi exists in all three grounds: Savitarka-savicara-bhumi (the ground with coarse and subtle thought), Avitarka-vicara-matra-bhumi (the ground with only subtle thought), and Avitarka-avicara-bhumi (the ground without coarse or subtle thought).

Commentary: These all penetrate the three grounds of Savitarka-savicara and so on, what fault is there? The Prathama Dhyana (the first Dhyana of the form realm), Dhyanantara (referring to the preliminary concentration and intermediate concentration), and the Samadhi of the upper realms all have Prasrabdhi. However, not all mental factors are like this. However, Prasrabdhi has differences in length in the three grounds of Savitarka-savicara and so on. However, repeatedly scrutinizing the text, it does not say that the Kamadhatu has Samadhi, so it has Prasrabdhi. The view of the later masters is more superior.

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。此中余義同故。更無異說。

論。此十一種至唯闕輕安。

述曰。此等可知。即第六門。皆說正義。

論。有義五識至無輕安故。

述曰。五無輕安。體散動故。此師即說。十五界有漏。佛無無漏五識若因若果二位皆然。

論。有義五識至必有輕安故。

述曰。此有三解。一云此唯在佛。由意引故五有輕安。又此五識成事智俱有輕安故。初約他引立宗。后論自俱引證。總約佛位。此解破前佛無無漏五識身解。即順三界分別之中。欲無輕安　第二又解。定所引善有輕安者。此在因位有漏五識。身在欲界定所引善五識之中。非無調暢。即如通果天眼．天耳。善者有輕安。無記者即無。破前所說因位五無。在果許有。此據因位。若在佛果此為正義。或初地時。成所作智俱必有輕安故　若作此解。違前所說欲無輕安中第二正義。鼻．舌二識欲界所繫。有輕安故。彼前但據一切異生。及下意識。說之為無。據理聖者后得智引五有輕安。不相違也。前文但對彼初師說。非為盡理　第三又解。此中五識在色者。彼無鼻舌。文中言總。理實三識。不違前文。

論。此善十一何受相應。

述曰。第七五受俱問也。

論。十五相應至無調暢故。

述曰。十一中除輕安余得

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：此處的其餘含義與之前相同，沒有其他的不同說法。

論：這十一種心所中，唯獨缺少輕安（Prajñābhi）。

述記：這些內容都是可以理解的，即第六門，都在闡述正確的含義。

論：有一種觀點認為，五識（five consciousnesses）沒有輕安，因為它們的體性是散亂和動搖的。

述記：五識沒有輕安，因為它們的體性是散亂和動搖的。這位論師認為，十五界（fifteen realms）是有漏的。佛陀沒有無漏的五識，無論是在因位還是果位都是如此。

論：有一種觀點認為，五識必定有輕安。

述記：對此有三種解釋。第一種解釋是，這僅僅在佛陀的境界中才存在，因為意（Manas）的引導，五識才會有輕安。而且，這五識與成事智（Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna）同時存在，因此具有輕安。最初是根據他人的引導來確立宗義，之後論述自身所具有的引證，總的來說是關於佛陀的果位。這種解釋駁斥了之前佛陀沒有無漏五識的說法，即順應三界分別之中的說法，認為欲界（Kāmadhātu）沒有輕安。第二種解釋是，由禪定所引發的善法具有輕安，這在因位的有漏五識中存在。身體在欲界，由禪定所引發的善的五識之中，並非沒有調暢。例如，神通果（Abhijñā-phala）中的天眼（Divyacakṣus）、天耳（Divya-śrotra），善的具有輕安，無記的就沒有。這駁斥了之前所說的因位五識沒有輕安的說法，在果位上則承認有。這是根據因位來說的，如果在佛陀的果位，這就是正確的含義，或者是在初地（first Bhumi）的時候，與成所作智同時存在，必定有輕安。如果這樣解釋，就違背了之前所說的欲界沒有輕安中的第二種正確含義，即鼻識（Ghrāṇa-vijñāna）、舌識（Rasana-vijñāna）這兩種識是欲界所繫的，具有輕安。之前只是根據一切異生（Pṛthagjana）以及下意識（lower consciousness）來說它們沒有輕安。根據道理，聖者（Ārya）的后得智（Pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna）引導五識具有輕安，這並不矛盾。之前的文只是針對最初的論師所說，並非窮盡真理。第三種解釋是，這裡所說的五識是在色界（Rūpadhātu）中的，那裡沒有鼻識和舌識。文中的說法是總的，但實際上是三種識，這不違背之前的文。

論：這善的十一種心所與哪種感受相應？

述記：這是第七個問題，詢問與五種感受的相應情況。

論：與十五種法相應，除了輕安之外，其餘的都具有調暢。

述記：十一種心所中，除了輕安之外，其餘的都得到。

【English Translation】 English version: The remaining meanings here are the same as before, with no other different explanations.

Treatise: Among these eleven mental factors, only Prajñābhi (lightness; ease) is missing.

Commentary: These contents are understandable, namely the sixth section, all explaining the correct meaning.

Treatise: Some argue that the five consciousnesses do not have Prajñābhi because their nature is scattered and agitated.

Commentary: The five consciousnesses do not have Prajñābhi because their nature is scattered and agitated. This teacher argues that the fifteen realms are defiled (with outflows). Buddhas do not have undefiled five consciousnesses, whether in the causal stage or the resultant stage.

Treatise: Some argue that the five consciousnesses must have Prajñābhi.

Commentary: There are three explanations for this. The first explanation is that this only exists in the realm of the Buddha, because the Manas (mind) leads to the five consciousnesses having Prajñābhi. Moreover, these five consciousnesses exist simultaneously with Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna (wisdom of accomplishing what needs to be done), therefore having Prajñābhi. Initially, the tenet is established based on the guidance of others, and then the evidence possessed by oneself is discussed, generally speaking about the resultant stage of the Buddha. This explanation refutes the previous statement that the Buddha does not have undefiled five consciousnesses, namely conforming to the distinctions within the three realms, believing that the Kāmadhātu (desire realm) does not have Prajñābhi. The second explanation is that the good dharmas induced by meditation have Prajñābhi, which exists in the defiled five consciousnesses in the causal stage. The body is in the desire realm, within the good five consciousnesses induced by meditation, there is no lack of harmony. For example, Divyacakṣus (divine eye) and Divya-śrotra (divine ear) in Abhijñā-phala (fruit of superknowledges), the good ones have Prajñābhi, the neutral ones do not. This refutes the previous statement that the five consciousnesses in the causal stage do not have Prajñābhi, while admitting it in the resultant stage. This is based on the causal stage; if it is in the resultant stage of the Buddha, this is the correct meaning, or at the time of the first Bhumi (stage), existing simultaneously with the wisdom of accomplishing what needs to be done, there must be Prajñābhi. If explained in this way, it contradicts the second correct meaning in the previous statement that the desire realm does not have Prajñābhi, namely that the Ghrāṇa-vijñāna (nose consciousness) and Rasana-vijñāna (tongue consciousness), these two consciousnesses are bound to the desire realm and have Prajñābhi. Previously, it was only based on all Pṛthagjana (ordinary beings) and lower consciousnesses to say that they do not have Prajñābhi. According to reason, the Pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna (wisdom attained subsequently) of the Ārya (noble ones) leads to the five consciousnesses having Prajñābhi, which is not contradictory. The previous text was only addressed to the initial teacher, not exhausting the truth. The third explanation is that the five consciousnesses mentioned here are in the Rūpadhātu (form realm), where there is no nose consciousness or tongue consciousness. The statement in the text is general, but in reality, it is three consciousnesses, which does not contradict the previous text.

Treatise: Which feeling does this good eleven mental factors correspond to?

Commentary: This is the seventh question, asking about the correspondence with the five feelings.

Treatise: Corresponding to fifteen dharmas, except for Prajñābhi, the rest have harmony.

Commentary: Among the eleven mental factors, except for Prajñābhi, the rest are obtained.

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五受俱。遍通三界故。輕安唯除憂．苦二受。唯地獄有。逼迫二受無調暢輕安故　若爾雖定所引五識。應無輕安　此理不然。所引善者。舍．樂俱故。然菩薩后得智。雖起苦根可名無漏。然無輕安。名迫受故。余受可有。即通果心　若爾鼻．舌．身三非通果如何通　苦根雖名無漏。不言輕安俱。輕安俱時怡悅五識。苦受逼迫五識不俱。然實菩薩后得智中起五識。有輕安俱無失。但除苦受。定滋潤故。然上界三識。地獄五識。

論。此與別境至不相違故。

述曰。自下第八與前別境相應。以遍行通所以不說。不定四者彼中自說。所以不論。故唯言別境。皆不違彼故。有漏位無漏位皆得相應。然欲界十俱除輕安。上界具十一。如前理說。此據別境五俱起時。可得為語。然彼有時一二等生故。

論。十一唯善至皆學等三。

述曰。第九三性。唯善。第十三界。輕安非欲。余通三界。如前可知　問何故所治有唯在欲。如瞋害等。能治通三界。煩惱隔情多不遍界。善順於理即通三界　彼無所治豈有能治。欲有惛沈。輕安豈有。但以性相相治。不以界系相望治之　第十一有學．無學．非學非無學。一切皆通。然學．無學身中皆通有漏．無漏。順學等故。如對法第三．五十八．九等皆爾。

論。非見

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 五種感受（五受）都普遍存在於三界之中。輕安只排除憂和苦兩種感受，並且只存在於地獄，因為逼迫的感受沒有調和舒暢的輕安。如果這樣，那麼即使是禪定所引發的五識，也應該沒有輕安。這個道理是不對的，因為禪定所引發的善法，包含舍受和樂受。然而，菩薩的后得智，即使生起苦根，也可以稱為無漏，但沒有輕安，因為是逼迫的感受。其餘的感受可以有，並且可以通達果位的心。如果這樣，那麼鼻、舌、身三種識不是通達果位的，如何通達呢？苦根雖然稱為無漏，但沒有說與輕安同時存在。輕安存在時，會怡悅五識，而苦受會逼迫五識，兩者不能同時存在。然而，實際上菩薩的后得智中生起五識，有輕安同時存在並沒有過失，只是排除了苦受，因為禪定能滋潤。然而，上界有三種識，地獄有五種識。

論：這與別境（別境）至不相違背。

述曰：從下面第八個開始，與前面的別境相應。因為遍行（遍行）是共通的，所以不說。不定（不定）四者，在其中自己說了，所以不討論。所以只說別境，都不違背它們。有漏位和無漏位都可以相應。然而，欲界十種心所都排除輕安，上界具備十一種，如前面所說的道理。這是根據別境五種心所同時生起時，可以這樣說。然而，它們有時會一個或兩個等生。

論：十一種心所只有善性，都屬於有學等三種。

述曰：第九種三性，只有善性。第十三界，輕安不在欲界，其餘的通達三界，如前面所知。問：為什麼所要對治的只有在欲界，如瞋（嗔，嗔恨）和害（害，傷害）等？能對治的通達三界。煩惱（煩惱）隔絕情識，大多不遍及各界，善法順應道理，就通達三界。沒有所要對治的，哪裡有能對治的？欲界有惛沈（惛沈，精神萎靡），哪裡有輕安？只是以性質和相狀相互對治，不以界系相互比較來對治。第十一種有學（有學，還在學習的人）、無學（無學，已經完成學習的人）、非學非無學（非學非無學，既不是有學也不是無學的人）一切都通達。然而，有學和無學身中都通達有漏和無漏，因為順應學習等。如《對法》第三、五十八、九等都是這樣。

論：非見（非見）

【English Translation】 English version The five feelings (five vedanāskandha) are universally present in the three realms. Tranquility (praśrabdhi) only excludes the feelings of sorrow and suffering, and only exists in the lower realm, because the feelings of oppression do not have the harmonious and pleasant tranquility. If this is the case, then even the five consciousnesses (pañca vijñāna) induced by samādhi should not have tranquility. This reasoning is incorrect, because the good dharmas induced by samādhi include both neutral feeling (upekṣā) and pleasure (sukha). However, the subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna) of a Bodhisattva, even if it gives rise to the root of suffering (duḥkha-mūla), can be called unconditioned (anāsrava), but it does not have tranquility, because it is an oppressive feeling. The remaining feelings can exist, and can penetrate the mind of the fruition stage (phala-citta). If this is the case, then how can the three consciousnesses of nose, tongue, and body, which do not penetrate the fruition stage, penetrate it? Although the root of suffering is called unconditioned, it is not said to exist simultaneously with tranquility. When tranquility exists, it pleases the five consciousnesses, while suffering oppresses the five consciousnesses, and the two cannot exist simultaneously. However, in reality, when the five consciousnesses arise in the subsequent wisdom of a Bodhisattva, there is no fault in having tranquility simultaneously, only excluding suffering, because samādhi can nourish. However, the upper realm has three consciousnesses, and the lower realm has five consciousnesses.

Treatise: This is not contradictory to the specific mental factors (pratiniyata-caitasika).

Commentary: From the eighth one below, it corresponds to the specific mental factors mentioned earlier. Because the pervasive (sarvatraga) is common, it is not mentioned. The four uncertain (aniyata) ones are mentioned by themselves within them, so they are not discussed. Therefore, only the specific mental factors are mentioned, and they do not contradict them. Both the conditioned (sāsrava) and unconditioned states can correspond. However, the ten mental factors of the desire realm exclude tranquility, while the upper realm possesses eleven, as explained earlier. This is based on the statement that when the five specific mental factors arise simultaneously, it can be said in this way. However, they sometimes arise one or two at a time.

Treatise: The eleven mental factors are only virtuous, and all belong to the three types of learners, etc.

Commentary: The ninth, the three natures (tri-svabhāva), only has virtuous nature. The thirteenth realm, tranquility is not in the desire realm, and the rest penetrate the three realms, as known earlier. Question: Why is what needs to be treated only in the desire realm, such as anger (krodha) and harm (vihiṃsā)? What can treat penetrates the three realms. Afflictions (kleśa) isolate emotions and consciousness, and mostly do not pervade all realms, while virtuous dharmas comply with reason and penetrate the three realms. If there is nothing to be treated, where is what can treat? The desire realm has torpor (styāna), where is tranquility? It is only treated by mutually treating the nature and characteristics, not by comparing the realm systems to treat them. The eleventh, the learners (śaikṣa), the non-learners (aśaikṣa), and the neither learners nor non-learners (naiva śaikṣa-nāśaikṣa), all penetrate. However, both the learners and non-learners penetrate both the conditioned and unconditioned in their bodies, because they comply with learning, etc. As in the third, fifty-eighth, and ninth of the Abhidharma, etc., it is all like this.

Treatise: Non-view (adarśana)

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所斷至非所斷故。

述曰。十二三斷。並非見斷。非障見故。非邪生故。以何為證。五十七二十二根中。說十四法一分見所斷。一分修所斷。謂七色．命．五受．及意。十二一分修所斷。一分非所斷。謂即十四中六．及餘六。謂五受．意．信等五根．未知當知。彼說二六五受．及意。通見除故。以為前六。其信等五．未知當知非見除故以為后六二非所斷。謂后二無漏根。今舉唯善後六為論。唯是修斷及與不斷　問此論下言無想定等是見斷故。又對法第四。一切往惡趣業果皆見斷。何妨善業見斷也　答彼不言善法斷緣縛名為見斷。若不爾者。下修道煩惱亦招惡趣等。豈見所斷。故以此為證。善非見斷。若言見斷。以此證非。略有四門。如下緣生中說　問分別業報可言見斷。修道業惑之果見道斷不。不斷違文。斷便違理。因未斷彼果豈斷也　答如無想天果．北郁單越果。雖亦斷彼。善豈斷耶。故知但果先亡因於后斷。何所以者。果粗障聖。入見斷果。因細不障見。入見不斷因。于善．染二因。三惡趣等皆名斷也。又無想定果見惑所引。見惑因亡果亦隨喪。如無想定。入聖亦不斷。但斷彼果。善法隨順可入聖故。若成彼果不得入聖。如下緣生中不生名斷。其因亦斷。斷緣縛斷。唯修所斷等。既爾惡趣善業亦見所斷。今

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：所斷的法並非完全是見所斷（Dṛṣṭi-heya），因為它們不障礙見道（Dṛṣṭimārga），也不是由邪見產生的。以什麼為證據呢？在五十七法和二十二根（Indriya）中，十四法被說成一部分是見所斷，一部分是修所斷（Bhāvanā-heya），即七色（Varṇa）、命根（Jīvitendriya）、五受（Pañca vedanā）、以及意根（Manendriya）。十二法一部分是修所斷，一部分是非所斷，即上述十四法中的六種，以及其餘六種，即五受、意根、信根（Śraddhendriya）等五根、未知當知根（Anājñātājñāsyāmīndriya）。那裡說二六五受以及意根，通過見道斷除，作為前六種。其信根等五根、未知當知根不是通過見道斷除，作為后六種。二種非所斷，即后兩種無漏根（Anāsravendriya）。現在只舉善的后六種來討論，它們只是修所斷以及非所斷。 問：此論下面說無想定（Asañjñisamāpatti）等是見所斷，又《對法論》（Abhidharmakośa）第四說，一切往惡趣的業果都是見所斷，為什麼善業不能是見所斷呢？ 答：那裡沒有說善法斷除的緣縛（Pratyayasamprayoga）名為見所斷。如果不是這樣，下面的修道煩惱（Bhāvanāmārga-kleśa）也會招感惡趣等，難道也是見所斷嗎？所以以此為證據，善不是見所斷。如果說是見所斷，以此來證明不是。略有四門，如下面的緣生（Pratītyasamutpāda）中說。 問：分別業報可以說成是見所斷，修道業惑的果在見道（Darśanamārga）斷除嗎？不斷除就違背經文，斷除就違背道理，因為因沒有斷除，它的果怎麼能斷除呢？ 答：如同無想天（Asañjñadeva）的果、北俱盧洲（Uttarakuru）的果，雖然也斷除了它們，善難道也斷除了嗎？所以知道只是果先滅亡，因在後面斷除。為什麼呢？因為果粗重，障礙聖道，進入見道斷除的果。因細微，不障礙見道，進入見道不斷除的因。對於善、染二因，三惡趣等都名為斷除。又無想定果是見惑（Dṛṣṭi-kleśa）所引，見惑的因滅亡，果也隨著喪失，如同無想定。入聖道（Āryamārga）也不斷除，只是斷除它的果。善法隨順可以進入聖道，如果成就了那個果，就不能進入聖道，如下面的緣生中不生名為斷除，它的因也斷除。斷緣縛斷，只是修所斷等。既然這樣，惡趣的善業也是見所斷嗎？現在...

【English Translation】 English version: What is severed is not entirely what is severed by view (Dṛṣṭi-heya), because they do not obstruct the path of seeing (Dṛṣṭimārga), nor are they produced by wrong views. What is the evidence for this? Among the fifty-seven dharmas and twenty-two roots (Indriya), fourteen dharmas are said to be partly severed by view and partly severed by cultivation (Bhāvanā-heya), namely the seven colors (Varṇa), the life faculty (Jīvitendriya), the five feelings (Pañca vedanā), and the mind faculty (Manendriya). Twelve dharmas are partly severed by cultivation and partly not severed, namely six of the above fourteen dharmas, and the remaining six, namely the five feelings, the mind faculty, the faculty of faith (Śraddhendriya), the five faculties including the faculty of 'I shall know what is not yet known' (Anājñātājñāsyāmīndriya). There it is said that the two sixes of the five feelings and the mind faculty are eliminated through the path of seeing, serving as the former six. The five faculties including the faculty of faith and the faculty of 'I shall know what is not yet known' are not eliminated through the path of seeing, serving as the latter six. Two are not severed, namely the latter two undefiled faculties (Anāsravendriya). Now, only the latter six of the wholesome are discussed, which are only severed by cultivation and not severed. Question: This treatise below says that the cessation attainment (Asañjñisamāpatti) and others are severed by view, and the fourth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa says that all karmic results leading to evil destinies are severed by view. Why can't wholesome karma be severed by view? Answer: There it is not said that the causal connection (Pratyayasamprayoga) of severing wholesome dharmas is called severance by view. If that were not the case, the afflictions of the path of cultivation (Bhāvanāmārga-kleśa) below would also attract evil destinies, etc. Would they also be severed by view? Therefore, this is taken as evidence that wholesomeness is not severed by view. If it is said to be severed by view, this is used to prove that it is not. There are roughly four aspects, as mentioned in the Pratītyasamutpāda below. Question: Differentiated karmic retribution can be said to be severed by view, but is the result of karma and afflictions of the path of cultivation severed on the path of seeing (Darśanamārga)? If it is not severed, it contradicts the scriptures; if it is severed, it contradicts reason, because if the cause is not severed, how can its result be severed? Answer: Just like the result of the heaven of non-perception (Asañjñadeva) and the result of Uttarakuru, although they are also severed, is wholesomeness also severed? Therefore, it is known that only the result perishes first, and the cause is severed later. Why? Because the result is coarse and obstructs the holy path, entering the result severed by the path of seeing. The cause is subtle and does not obstruct the path of seeing, entering the cause not severed by the path of seeing. For both wholesome and defiled causes, the three evil destinies, etc., are all called severance. Furthermore, the result of the cessation attainment is led by afflictions of view (Dṛṣṭi-kleśa). When the cause of afflictions of view perishes, the result also perishes accordingly, like the cessation attainment. Entering the holy path (Āryamārga) also does not sever it, but only severs its result. Wholesome dharmas are conducive to entering the holy path. If that result is achieved, one cannot enter the holy path. As in the Pratītyasamutpāda below, non-arising is called severance, and its cause is also severed. Severance of causal connection, only severed by cultivation, etc. Since this is the case, is the wholesome karma of evil destinies also severed by view? Now...

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據斷縛。故不相違。

論。余門分別如理應思。

述曰。謂有報。無報。何地緣何地。他皆於此。如理思之。

成唯識論述記卷第六(本)

成唯識論述記卷第六(末)

沙門基撰

論。如是已說至其相云何。

述曰。別解六位諸心所中辨三門訖。此當第四。初結前問后。如文可知。

次舉頌等。

論。頌曰至癡慢疑惡見。

述曰。百法等說癡居慢后。顯通利．鈍。遍上下故。此明不善根故在慢上。

下長行釋。釋中有三。第一辨煩惱得名。解頌上二字。第二齣體．業釋頌謂以下文。第三諸門廣辨明此六義。

論。曰至得煩惱名。

述曰。此釋總名。謂貪等六是隨煩惱之根本故。雖復亦得名隨煩惱而根本攝。非唯等流性。得煩惱名不名隨煩惱。雜集第七說。諸煩惱皆隨煩惱。有隨煩惱而非煩惱。由此即顯根本名煩惱。亦得名隨。亦隨他生故。忿等但名隨不名煩惱。非根本故。

論。云何為貪至生苦為業。

述曰。自下第二門也。釋六為六。于中各二。初出體．業。后逐難辨　云何等者。雙問體．業　于有有具等。即皆雙答。然有難處論覆成之　于有者。謂後有。即唯異熟三有果也　有具者。即中有。並煩惱業。及器世

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 據斷縛（根據斷除束縛的道理）。故不相違（所以與前面的說法並不矛盾）。

論（《成唯識論》）。余門分別如理應思（其他方面的分別，應當如理如實地思考）。

述曰（窺基大師解釋說）。謂有報（指有果報的），無報（指沒有果報的）。何地緣何地（什麼地界的煩惱緣于什麼地界的果報）。他皆於此（其他的種種情況），如理思之（都應當在這裡如理地思考）。

《成唯識論述記》卷第六(本)

《成唯識論述記》卷第六(末)

沙門基撰（沙門窺基撰寫）

論（《成唯識論》）。如是已說至其相云何（像這樣已經說完了，它們的相狀是怎樣的呢）？

述曰（窺基大師解釋說）。別解六位諸心所中辨三門訖（在分別解釋六位心所法中，辨析三種門類已經完畢）。此當第四（這裡應當是第四部分）。初結前問后（首先總結前面的內容，引出後面的問題）。如文可知（就像文中所說的那樣可以知道）。

次舉頌等（接下來舉出頌文等）。

論（《成唯識論》）。頌曰至癡慢疑惡見（頌文說：癡、慢、疑、惡見）。

述曰（窺基大師解釋說）。百法等說癡居慢后（《百法明門論》等論典中說，『癡』位於『慢』之後）。顯通利．鈍（顯示『癡』通於利根和鈍根）。遍上下故（遍於上地獄）。此明不善根故在慢上（這裡說明的是不善根，所以『癡』在『慢』之上）。

下長行釋（下面用長行文來解釋）。釋中有三（解釋中有三個方面）。第一辨煩惱得名（辨析煩惱的得名）。解頌上二字（解釋頌文的前兩個字）。第二齣體．業釋頌謂以下文（說明體性和作用，解釋頌文，即下面的文字）。第三諸門廣辨明此六義（從各個方面廣泛辨析，闡明這六種煩惱的含義）。

論（《成唯識論》）。曰至得煩惱名（說：從而得到煩惱的名稱）。

述曰（窺基大師解釋說）。此釋總名（這是解釋總的名稱）。謂貪等六是隨煩惱之根本故（因為貪等六種煩惱是隨煩惱的根本）。雖復亦得名隨煩惱而根本攝（雖然也可以稱為隨煩惱，但被根本煩惱所攝）。非唯等流性（不僅僅是等流性）。得煩惱名不名隨煩惱（得到煩惱的名稱，不稱為隨煩惱）。雜集第七說（《雜集論》第七卷說）。諸煩惱皆隨煩惱（所有的煩惱都是隨煩惱）。有隨煩惱而非煩惱（有的是隨煩惱但不是煩惱）。由此即顯根本名煩惱（由此就顯示出根本煩惱名為煩惱）。亦得名隨（也可以稱為隨煩惱）。亦隨他生故（也是隨其他煩惱而生起的緣故）。忿等但名隨不名煩惱（忿等煩惱只稱為隨煩惱，不稱為煩惱）。非根本故（因為不是根本煩惱的緣故）。

論（《成唯識論》）。云何為貪至生苦為業（什麼是貪？以產生痛苦為作用）。

述曰（窺基大師解釋說）。自下第二門也（下面是第二方面）。釋六為六（解釋六種煩惱為六部分）。于中各二（其中每一種煩惱又分為兩個方面）。初出體．業（首先說明體性和作用）。后逐難辨（然後根據疑問進行辨析）。云何等者（『云何』等字）。雙問體．業（同時詢問體性和作用）。于有有具等（『于有』、『有具』等）。即皆雙答（就是同時回答體性和作用）。然有難處論覆成之（然而有疑問的地方，論典會反覆論證，最終使之成立）。于有者（『于有』是指）。謂後有（指後有）。即唯異熟三有果也（也就是隻有異熟果，三有之果）。有具者（『有具』是指）。即中有（指中有），並煩惱業（以及煩惱業），及器世（以及器世界）。

【English Translation】 English version: According to the severance of bonds (according to the principle of severing bonds). Therefore, it is not contradictory (so it is not contradictory to the previous statement).

Treatise (《Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra》). Other aspects of differentiation should be considered rationally (other aspects of differentiation should be considered rationally and truthfully).

Commentary (Master Kuiji explains). So-called with retribution (referring to having karmic retribution), without retribution (referring to not having karmic retribution). What realm is conditioned by what realm (what realm's afflictions are conditioned by what realm's retribution). All others are here (all other situations), think about them rationally (should be rationally considered here).

《Commentary on the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra》 Volume 6 (Beginning)

《Commentary on the Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra》 Volume 6 (End)

Written by Śrāmaṇa Ji (Written by Śrāmaṇa Kuiji)

Treatise (《Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra》). Having spoken thus, what are their characteristics (having spoken thus, what are their characteristics)?

Commentary (Master Kuiji explains). Separately explaining the six categories of mental factors, the three aspects have been discussed (in separately explaining the six categories of mental factors, the analysis of the three aspects has been completed). This should be the fourth part (this should be the fourth part). First, summarize the previous and introduce the following (first summarize the previous content and introduce the following questions). As can be known from the text (as can be known from what is said in the text).

Next, cite the verse, etc. (Next, cite the verse, etc.).

Treatise (《Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra》). The verse says to ignorance, pride, doubt, and wrong views (the verse says: ignorance, pride, doubt, and wrong views).

Commentary (Master Kuiji explains). The 'Hundred Dharmas' etc. say that ignorance is after pride (the 《Hundred Dharmas》 etc. say that 'ignorance' is after 'pride'). Showing that it is common to both sharp and dull (showing that 'ignorance' is common to both sharp and dull faculties). Because it pervades the upper and lower realms (because it pervades the upper and lower realms). This explains the root of unwholesomeness, so it is above pride (this explains the root of unwholesomeness, so 'ignorance' is above 'pride').

The following long passage explains (the following long passage explains). There are three aspects in the explanation (there are three aspects in the explanation). First, distinguish the naming of afflictions (distinguish the naming of afflictions). Explain the first two words of the verse (explain the first two words of the verse). Second, explain the nature and function, explaining the verse, which is the following text (explain the nature and function, explaining the verse, which is the following text). Third, broadly distinguish the various aspects to clarify the meaning of these six (broadly distinguish the various aspects to clarify the meaning of these six afflictions).

Treatise (《Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra》). Saying to obtain the name of affliction (saying to obtain the name of affliction).

Commentary (Master Kuiji explains). This explains the general name (this explains the general name). Namely, greed, etc., are the root of the secondary afflictions (namely, greed, etc., are the root of the secondary afflictions). Although they can also be called secondary afflictions, they are included in the root (although they can also be called secondary afflictions, they are included in the root afflictions). It is not only of the nature of outflow (it is not only of the nature of outflow). Obtaining the name of affliction is not called secondary affliction (obtaining the name of affliction is not called secondary affliction). The seventh volume of the 《Compendium of Abhidharma》 says (the seventh volume of the 《Compendium of Abhidharma》 says). All afflictions are secondary afflictions (all afflictions are secondary afflictions). Some secondary afflictions are not afflictions (some secondary afflictions are not afflictions). From this, it is clear that the root is named affliction (from this, it is clear that the root affliction is named affliction). It can also be named secondary (it can also be named secondary affliction). Because it also arises following others (because it also arises following other afflictions). Anger, etc., are only named secondary, not affliction (anger, etc., are only named secondary afflictions, not afflictions). Because they are not the root (because they are not the root affliction).

Treatise (《Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra》). What is greed, to taking suffering as its function (what is greed? Taking suffering as its function).

Commentary (Master Kuiji explains). From here below is the second aspect (from here below is the second aspect). Explaining the six as six parts (explaining the six afflictions as six parts). In each of them, there are two aspects (in each of them, there are two aspects). First, explain the nature and function (first, explain the nature and function). Then, distinguish according to the difficulties (then, distinguish according to the difficulties). 'What' etc. (the words 'what' etc.). Simultaneously asking about nature and function (simultaneously asking about nature and function). 'In existence', 'the means of existence' etc. ('in existence', 'the means of existence' etc.). That is, answering both simultaneously (that is, answering both nature and function simultaneously). However, there are difficult points that the treatise repeatedly argues to establish (however, there are difficult points that the treatise repeatedly argues to establish them). 'In existence' ( 'in existence' refers to). Referring to future existence (referring to future existence). That is, only the result of different maturation, the fruit of the three existences (that is, only the result of different maturation, the fruit of the three existences). 'The means of existence' ( 'the means of existence' refers to). That is, the intermediate existence (that is, the intermediate existence), and the karma of afflictions (and the karma of afflictions), and the world of vessels (and the world of vessels).

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等。三有具故　或無漏法。論下文說與見等俱緣無漏起。緣生貪者皆名有具。薩婆多師緣無漏。貪是善法欲。今大乘說。愛佛貪滅皆染污收。與見俱生緣無漏起故。無漏法能資長有亦名有具。五十八等不說此貪緣無漏者。下文自會。

論。謂由愛力取蘊生故。

述曰。若發業。若潤生。皆令取蘊生。非謂唯潤惑。上二界中。由愛靜慮等故。彼諸煩惱因此增長亦取蘊生。大論第八．五十五．及五十八．顯揚．五蘊．對法皆廣說貪相。然大論第八同此。

論。云何為瞋至所依為業。

述曰。于苦苦具者。苦即三苦。皆生於瞋。增唯苦受。樂受乖離瞋亦依之生故。苦具者。一切有漏。及無漏法但能生苦者。皆是苦具。依之瞋生　問有漏順苦法。可名為苦具。無漏不順苦。如何名苦具　答隨順苦具。無漏即非。緣生於苦。無漏亦是。故邪見等謗無漏無。招惡趣苦。又五十八迷滅道諦。瞋亦親憎嫉滅．道故。亦說無漏為苦具也。對法等論但言苦具。不知是何。惑者云之唯有漏法。此不然矣大論第八同也。五十八云。有四。謂他見．有情．于所愛不饒益。于非愛作饒益。上但緣取生。然彼尚局據重處語。顯揚亦說但緣有情。據業道重語。非於余無瞋。

論。謂瞋必令至不善性故。

述曰。瞋

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：等等。因為具有三有（指欲有、色有、無色有）的因緣，或者因為無漏法（指超越世間煩惱的清凈之法）。《論》的下文說，貪與見解等一起，以無漏法為所緣而生起。凡是以生起貪愛的因緣，都可稱為有具。薩婆多部的觀點認為，貪愛以無漏法為所緣。貪是善法欲。現在大乘的觀點認為，對佛的愛，以及貪著于寂滅，都屬於染污的範疇。因為它與見解一起生起，以無漏法為所緣而生起。無漏法能夠資助增長三有，也可以稱為有具。《五十八》等處沒有說這種貪愛以無漏法為所緣，下文會自行解釋。

《論》中說：因為愛慾的力量，而執取五蘊（色、受、想、行、識）產生。

述曰：無論是發起業力，還是滋潤生命，都使五蘊產生。並非僅僅是滋潤迷惑。在上二界（色界和無色界）中，因為愛著禪定等，那些煩惱因此增長，也執取五蘊產生。《大論》第八卷、第五十五卷、第五十八卷，《顯揚》、《五蘊》、《對法》都廣泛地闡述了貪愛的相狀。然而《大論》第八卷與此相同。

《論》中說：什麼是嗔恚？它的作用是什麼？它的所依是什麼？

述曰：對於痛苦和痛苦的因緣，痛苦即是三苦（苦苦、壞苦、行苦），都會產生嗔恚。嗔恚只會增加苦受。即使是樂受乖離，嗔恚也會依之而生。痛苦的因緣，是指一切有漏法（指有煩惱的世間法）和無漏法（指超越世間煩惱的清凈之法），只要能夠產生痛苦的，都是痛苦的因緣。嗔恚依之而生。問：有漏的順苦之法，可以稱為痛苦的因緣。無漏的不順苦，如何稱為痛苦的因緣？答：隨順痛苦的因緣，無漏法就不是。因為生起痛苦的因緣，無漏法也是。所以邪見等誹謗無漏法，招致惡趣的痛苦。而且《五十八》中迷惑于滅諦和道諦，嗔恚也親近憎恨嫉妒滅諦和道諦，所以也說無漏法是痛苦的因緣。《對法》等論只說痛苦的因緣，不知道是什麼。迷惑的人說只有有漏法，這是不對的。《大論》第八卷也相同。《五十八》中說：有四種，即他人、有情、對於所愛的不饒益、對於非愛作饒益。上面只是緣取而生。然而那裡尚且侷限於重要的處所而言。顯揚也說只是緣有情。根據業道重要的方面來說，並非對於其他沒有嗔恚。

《論》中說：嗔恚必定會使人達到不善的性質。

述曰：嗔恚

【English Translation】 English version: Et cetera. Because of having the conditions for the three realms of existence (desire realm, form realm, formless realm), or because of undefiled dharmas (referring to pure dharmas that transcend worldly afflictions). The text below states that greed arises together with views, etc., taking undefiled dharmas as its object. All conditions that give rise to greed are called 'having conditions'. The Sarvastivada school believes that greed takes undefiled dharmas as its object. Greed is a wholesome desire. Now, the Mahayana view is that love for the Buddha and attachment to cessation are both categorized as defiled. Because it arises together with views, taking undefiled dharmas as its object. Undefiled dharmas can support and increase the three realms of existence, and can also be called 'having conditions'. The 'Fifty-Eight' and other texts do not mention that this greed takes undefiled dharmas as its object; the text below will explain this itself.

The text states: Because of the power of desire, the aggregates (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness) are grasped and produced.

Commentary: Whether it initiates karma or nourishes life, it causes the aggregates to arise. It is not just nourishing delusion. In the upper two realms (form realm and formless realm), because of attachment to meditative concentration, etc., those afflictions increase as a result, and also grasp the aggregates to produce them. The 'Great Treatise', volumes 8, 55, and 58, 'Exposition', 'Aggregates', and 'Abhidharma' all extensively explain the characteristics of greed. However, 'Great Treatise' volume 8 is the same as this.

The text states: What is anger? What is its function? What is its basis?

Commentary: Towards suffering and the causes of suffering, suffering refers to the three sufferings (suffering of suffering, suffering of change, suffering of pervasive conditioning), all of which give rise to anger. Anger only increases painful feelings. Even when pleasant feelings are absent, anger can still arise based on them. The causes of suffering refer to all defiled dharmas (referring to worldly dharmas with afflictions) and undefiled dharmas (referring to pure dharmas that transcend worldly afflictions), as long as they can produce suffering, they are all causes of suffering. Anger arises based on them. Question: Defiled dharmas that accord with suffering can be called causes of suffering. Undefiled dharmas that do not accord with suffering, how can they be called causes of suffering? Answer: Undefiled dharmas are not in accordance with the causes of suffering. Because they are the causes of the arising of suffering, undefiled dharmas are also. Therefore, wrong views, etc., slander undefiled dharmas, inviting the suffering of evil destinies. Moreover, in 'Fifty-Eight', being deluded about the cessation of suffering and the path to cessation, anger also closely hates and is jealous of the cessation and the path, so it is also said that undefiled dharmas are the causes of suffering. The 'Abhidharma' and other treatises only speak of the causes of suffering, without knowing what they are. Those who are deluded say that only defiled dharmas are, this is not right. 'Great Treatise' volume 8 is also the same. 'Fifty-Eight' states: There are four, namely, others, sentient beings, not benefiting what is loved, and benefiting what is not loved. The above only arises from grasping. However, it is still limited to important places. 'Exposition' also says that it only arises from sentient beings. According to the important aspects of karmic paths, it is not that there is no anger towards others.

The text states: Anger will certainly lead people to an unwholesome nature.

Commentary: Anger

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必起業不善性攝。發惡業者必不善故。意識為轉。五識為隨轉。如大論第一說　不安者。不安靜也。對法雲心懷憎恚多住苦故。此瞋與惡行．不安為所依也。

論。云何為癡至所依為業。

述曰。于理事者。謂獨頭無明迷理。相應等亦迷事也。

論。謂由無明至雜染法故。

述曰。此釋前業。謂由無明於諦等猶豫。邪見撥無。后余貪等次第生起。造諸惡業。乃復招後生諸雜染也。此中所謂見道無明生起次第。然修道者不必起疑及邪定故。謂由無明起貪等故。造人．天業招後生染。然對法中。以邪見者無明增故。說邪定為先後方有疑。然生次第此文為正。五十八云。有四種愚。乃至相應．不共。然第五卷第七識中已分別訖。此略不說。然諸論貪．瞋之後即次說慢。此中但以不善根同次說無明。瑜伽第五十八。及第八。皆見為首。以利惑故。復七種無知等相攝。如大論第九。緣起經等說。

論。云何為慢至生苦為業。

述曰。能障不慢。不慢者何。如善中說。

論。謂若有慢至受諸苦故。

述曰。于勝德法。及有德者。心不謙下故受眾苦。顯令厭舍勿復輪迴。然對法中但由有我故心高舉。此中所謂我見相應。及等流生。或遠從根本說。

論。此慢差別至我德處生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 必起業不善性攝：必定會產生由不善的性質所攝持的（行為）。發惡業者必不善故：發起惡業的人必定是不善的緣故。意識為轉，五識為隨轉：意識是主要的轉變者，五識是隨之轉變的。如《大論》第一卷所說。不安者，不安靜也：不安，就是指不安定、不平靜。對法論說，心中懷有憎恨，大多處於痛苦之中。此瞋與惡行、不安為所依也：這種嗔恨與惡行、不安是相互依存的。 論：云何為癡至所依為業？（論：什麼是愚癡，它的作用是什麼？） 述曰：于理事者，謂獨頭無明迷理，相應等亦迷事也。（解釋：對於理和事，單獨生起的無明迷惑真理，與它相應的（心所）等也迷惑事物。） 論：謂由無明至雜染法故。（論：因為無明，導致各種雜染法的產生。） 述曰：此釋前業。謂由無明於諦等猶豫，邪見撥無，后余貪等次第生起，造諸惡業，乃復招後生諸雜染也。此中所謂見道無明生起次第。然修道者不必起疑及邪定故。謂由無明起貪等故，造人．天業招後生染。然對法中，以邪見者無明增故，說邪定為先後方有疑。然生次第此文為正。五十八云：有四種愚，乃至相應．不共。然第五卷第七識中已分別訖。此略不說。然諸論貪．瞋之後即次說慢。此中但以不善根同次說無明。《瑜伽》第五十八，及第八，皆見為首，以利惑故。復七種無知等相攝。如《大論》第九，《緣起經》等說。（解釋：這是解釋前面的作用。因為無明，對於四諦等產生猶豫，邪見否定因果，之後其餘的貪等依次生起，造作各種惡業，進而招感後世的各種雜染。這裡說的是見道位無明生起的次第。然而修道的人不一定會產生懷疑和邪定。因為無明生起貪等，造作人、天之業，招感後世的染污。然而在《對法論》中，因為邪見者無明增長，所以說邪定在先後才會有懷疑。然而生起的次第，本文是正確的。《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷說：有四種愚，乃至相應、不共。然而第五卷第七識中已經分別完畢，這裡省略不說。然而各論中，貪、嗔之後就接著說慢。這裡只是因為無明與不善根相同，所以接著說無明。《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷和第八卷，都以見為首，因為是利使的迷惑。又有七種無知等相互攝持，如《大論》第九卷，《緣起經》等所說。） 論：云何為慢至生苦為業？（論：什麼是慢，它的作用是什麼？） 述曰：能障不慢。不慢者何？如善中說。（解釋：能夠障礙不慢。什麼是不慢？如善法中所說。） 論：謂若有慢至受諸苦故。（論：如果有了慢，就會遭受各種痛苦。） 述曰：于勝德法，及有德者，心不謙下故受眾苦。顯令厭舍勿復輪迴。然對法中但由有我故心高舉。此中所謂我見相應，及等流生。或遠從根本說。（解釋：對於殊勝的功德之法，以及有功德的人，心中不謙虛低下，所以遭受各種痛苦。顯示令人厭惡捨棄，不要再輪迴。然而在《對法論》中，只是因為有我，所以內心高舉。這裡說的是與我見相應，以及等流而生。或者從根本上來說。） 論：此慢差別至我德處生。（論：這種慢的差別，在於認為『我』有功德而產生。）

【English Translation】 English version: 'Must arise from the nature of unwholesome karma': It will certainly produce (actions) that are governed by an unwholesome nature. 'Those who generate evil karma are necessarily unwholesome': Those who initiate evil karma are necessarily unwholesome. 'Consciousness is the primary transformation, the five consciousnesses are the accompanying transformations': Consciousness is the main transformer, and the five consciousnesses transform along with it. As stated in the first volume of the Mahāyāna-samgraha. 'Restlessness, is not peaceful': Restlessness refers to being unstable and unpeaceful. The Abhidharma states that those who harbor hatred in their hearts mostly dwell in suffering. 'This hatred, along with evil deeds and restlessness, are interdependent': This hatred is interdependent with evil deeds and restlessness. 'Question: What is ignorance, and what is its function?' 'Explanation: Regarding principle and phenomena, single-rooted ignorance obscures principle, and corresponding (mental factors) also obscure phenomena.' 'Question: Because of ignorance, various defiled dharmas arise.' 'Explanation: This explains the previous function. Because of ignorance, one hesitates about the Four Noble Truths, etc., and wrong views deny causality. Then, other afflictions such as greed arise in sequence, creating various evil karmas, which in turn lead to various defilements in future lives. This describes the sequence of the arising of ignorance in the path of seeing. However, practitioners on the path of cultivation do not necessarily generate doubt and wrong concentration. Because ignorance gives rise to greed, etc., one creates karma leading to rebirth in the human or deva realms, resulting in defilement in future lives. However, in the Abhidharma, because ignorance increases in those with wrong views, it is said that wrong concentration leads to doubt. However, the sequence of arising in this text is correct. The fifty-eighth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states: There are four types of ignorance, namely, corresponding and non-common. However, the seventh consciousness in the fifth volume has already been discussed, so it is omitted here. However, in various treatises, pride is discussed after greed and hatred. Here, ignorance is discussed next because it shares the same unwholesome root. The fifty-eighth and eighth volumes of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra both consider view as the foremost, because it is a sharp delusion. Furthermore, seven types of unknowingness, etc., are mutually inclusive, as stated in the ninth volume of the Mahāyāna-samgraha and the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra, etc.' 'Question: What is pride, and what is its function?' 'Explanation: It can obstruct non-pride. What is non-pride? As described in the wholesome dharmas.' 'Question: If there is pride, one will suffer various kinds of suffering.' 'Explanation: Towards superior virtues and those who possess virtues, one's heart is not humble, thus suffering various kinds of suffering. This shows that one should be disgusted and abandon it, and not be reborn again. However, in the Abhidharma, it is only because of the self that the mind is arrogant. This refers to being associated with the view of self, and arising from its outflow. Or, it can be said from the root.' 'Question: The difference of this pride lies in the belief that 'I' have merit.'

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述曰。有七．九種。不過於五法上生。謂上中下三品。及我。並勝德處生。此義云何。如五蘊論說　謂七慢中。于下品及中品起第一慢。謂於劣計己勝。于等計己等。于中品于上品起過慢。謂于等計己勝。于勝計己等。于上品起慢過慢。謂于勝計己勝。於我蘊起我慢。自恃高舉。于未證勝德。起增上慢。雖得少分。于所未得謂己已得。于上品起卑慢。謂他多分勝己。謂己少分不及。己于無德。謂己有德起邪慢。此邪慢者全無謂有。其增上慢己得少勝。謂多殊勝。此即二別也。然於三品起四。滅起一。于德起二。於五處起七慢也　九慢者。大乘中不見文。顯揚第一云。如經說三慢類。我勝。我等。我劣慢類。婆沙等第一百九十九。及俱舍第十九說有九慢。前三為三。有勝．有等．有劣為三。無勝．無等．無劣為三。過慢．慢．卑慢如次初三。卑慢．慢．過慢如次中三。慢．過慢．卑慢如次後三。依本論及品類足兩說大廣。然九依我見後生。三品處起。此與諸見相應無失。

論。一切皆通至起亦無失。

述曰。彼小乘中通見．修斷。聖有而不行。無修道我慢故。今大乘修道既得有我慢。是故聖者現行。顯揚。及八十八等。云七慢或俱生或分別。故知九慢修起無失　五十八稍廣作差別說。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

述曰：有七種或九種慢，都離不開五法（五蘊）而生起。這五法指的是下品、中品、上品三種，以及我蘊，還有勝德之處。這是什麼意思呢？就像《五蘊論》所說：在七慢中，對於下品和中品生起第一種慢，也就是慢（māna），認為不如自己的人不如自己，和自己相等的人和自己相等；對於中品和上品生起過慢（atimāna），認為和自己相等的人不如自己，勝過自己的人和自己相等；對於上品生起慢過慢（mānātimāna），認為勝過自己的人不如自己；對於我蘊生起我慢（asmimāna），自我恃才傲物，高傲自大；對於未證得的殊勝功德，生起增上慢（adhimāna），雖然只得到少許，卻認為自己已經得到了未得到的功德；對於上品生起卑慢（ūnamāna），認為他人大多勝過自己，自己只有少部分不如他人；對於自己沒有功德，卻認為自己有功德，生起邪慢（mithyāmāna）。這種邪慢是完全沒有卻認為有。而增上慢是自己只得到少許殊勝功德，卻認為自己得到很多殊勝功德。這就是這兩種慢的區別。然而，對於三品（下品、中品、上品）生起四種慢，滅起一種慢，對於勝德生起兩種慢，在五處生起七種慢。

九慢在大乘經典中沒有明確的記載。《顯揚聖教論》第一卷說：『如經中所說的三種慢類：我勝慢、我等慢、我劣慢。』《婆沙論》第一百九十九卷和《俱舍論》第十九卷說有九慢。前三種慢分為三種：有勝、有等、有劣；無勝、無等、無劣。過慢、慢、卑慢依次對應最初的三種情況。卑慢、慢、過慢依次對應中間的三種情況。慢、過慢、卑慢依次對應最後的三種情況。根據本論和《品類足論》的兩種說法，九慢的範圍很大。然而，九慢是依據我見之後產生的，在三品處生起。這與各種見解相應，沒有錯誤。

論：一切（九慢）都通於見道和修道而生起，也沒有錯誤。

述曰：在小乘佛教中，九慢通於見道和修道而斷除。聖者有九慢，但不會現行，因為沒有修道中的我慢。現在大乘佛教修道既然可以有我慢，所以聖者可以現行我慢。《顯揚聖教論》和《八十八結》等經論說，七慢或者俱生，或者分別生起。因此可知，九慢在修道中生起沒有錯誤。五十八（指《百法明門論》中的五十八種心所）稍微廣泛地作了差別解說。

論：

【English Translation】 English version:

Statement: There are seven or nine types of māna (conceit, pride), all arising from the five skandhas (aggregates). These five skandhas refer to the lower, middle, and upper grades, as well as the 'I' aggregate (self), and the place of superior qualities. What does this mean? As stated in the Treatise on the Five Aggregates: Among the seven types of māna, the first type, māna, arises in relation to the lower and middle grades, meaning one considers oneself superior to those inferior to oneself, and equal to those equal to oneself. Atimāna (excessive conceit) arises in relation to the middle and upper grades, meaning one considers oneself superior to those equal to oneself, and equal to those superior to oneself. Mānātimāna (excessive conceit of conceit) arises in relation to the upper grade, meaning one considers oneself superior to those superior to oneself. Asmimāna (the conceit of 'I am') arises in relation to the 'I' aggregate, leading to self-reliance and arrogance. Adhimāna (conceit of thinking one has attained what one has not) arises in relation to unattained superior qualities, meaning one believes one has already attained what one has not, even with only a small attainment. Ūnamāna (inferiority conceit) arises in relation to the upper grade, meaning one considers oneself inferior to others in most aspects, and only slightly inferior. Mithyāmāna (false conceit) arises when one believes one possesses qualities one does not have. This false conceit is believing one has something when one has nothing at all. Adhimāna is thinking one has attained many superior qualities when one has only attained a few. These are the differences between these two types of conceit. However, four types of māna arise in relation to the three grades (lower, middle, upper), one type arises from cessation, and two types arise in relation to superior qualities. Seven types of māna arise in five places.

The nine types of māna are not explicitly mentioned in Mahayana sutras. The first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states: 'As mentioned in the sutras, there are three types of māna: 'I am superior,' 'I am equal,' and 'I am inferior'.' The 199th volume of the Mahāvibhāṣā and the 19th volume of the Abhidharmakośa state that there are nine types of māna. The first three types of māna are divided into three: superior, equal, and inferior; no superior, no equal, and no inferior. Atimāna, māna, and ūnamāna correspond to the first three situations respectively. Ūnamāna, māna, and atimāna correspond to the middle three situations respectively. Māna, atimāna, and ūnamāna correspond to the last three situations respectively. According to the two explanations in this treatise and the Dharmaskandha, the scope of the nine types of māna is very broad. However, the nine types of māna arise after the view of self, and arise in the three grades. This is consistent with various views and is not a mistake.

Treatise: All (nine types of māna) are common to both the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, and there is no error.

Statement: In Theravada Buddhism, the nine types of māna are common to both the path of seeing and the path of cultivation for abandonment. Noble ones have the nine types of māna, but they do not manifest them, because there is no māna in the path of cultivation. Now that Mahayana Buddhism allows for māna in the path of cultivation, noble ones can manifest māna. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the Eighty-eight Bonds and other sutras and treatises state that the seven types of māna arise either simultaneously or separately. Therefore, it can be known that the arising of the nine types of māna in the path of cultivation is not a mistake. Fifty-eight (referring to the fifty-eight mental factors in the Hundred Dharmas Treatise) provides a slightly broader and more differentiated explanation.

Treatise:

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。云何為疑至善不生故。

述曰。此中說疑迷於諦理猶豫。五十八中依五相別。謂他世．作用．因果．諦．寶。此中言諦亦攝彼盡。如理應思。即緣理．事俱是疑也。然疑杌為人。非此疑惑。或異熟心等。

論。有義此疑至說為疑故。

述曰。疑以慧為體。何以故。大論五十八說猶豫簡擇說為疑也。大論第八異覺為體。覺即是慧。決斷名慧。然簡擇猶豫異。決斷覺說為疑故。此以文證。

又訓釋中。

論。毗助末底至義無異故。

述曰。所謂末底是慧異名。與般若無別體。于慧上加毗字助之。毗是種種義。即種種慧也。大論言異慧疑。異者是種種義。故知疑體即慧。以末底．般若俱慧異名。以毗助之。豈別有體。此是大乘異師。非是別部。

論。有義此疑至非即慧故。

述曰。別有自體。然說猶豫．簡擇者。由同時疑。或異時疑令慧不決。故非是慧。

論。瑜伽論說至別有性故。

述曰。五十五說六煩惱中。見是世俗有。又彼自釋言即慧分故。餘五實有。彼亦自釋別有性故。故知疑體非即是慧。若即慧者。應同五見說世俗有。應立量云。疑體非即慧。六煩惱中不說世俗有故如貪等四。

論。毗助末底至智應為識。

述曰。訓釋辭中。汝以

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：什麼是『疑』？答：因為『疑』會阻礙至善的產生。

述曰：這裡所說的『疑』，是指對於真理的迷惑和猶豫。在《大毗婆沙論》第五十八卷中，根據五種不同的對象來區分『疑』，即對於他世（來世）、作用、因果、諦（真諦）、寶（佛法僧三寶）的懷疑。這裡所說的『諦』，也包含了以上所有的內容。應該如理作意，即緣于理和事都是『疑』的對象。然而，『疑』如果只是把樹樁誤認為人，就不是這裡所說的『疑惑』，或者只是異熟心等。

論：有一種觀點認為，『疑』的體性就是慧。為什麼這麼說呢？因為《大毗婆沙論》第五十八卷說，猶豫和簡擇就是『疑』。而《大毗婆沙論》第八卷認為，覺就是『疑』的體性，覺也就是慧，決斷就是慧。然而，簡擇和猶豫不同於決斷，所以說覺就是『疑』。這是用經文來證明。

又在訓釋中說：

論：『毗助末底』（Vibhajyamati）與般若（Prajna）的意義沒有區別。

述曰：這裡所說的『末底』（mati）是慧的別名，與般若（Prajna）沒有不同的體性。在慧的基礎上加上『毗』（vibhajya）字來輔助它，『毗』是種種的意思，也就是種種的慧。《大毗婆沙論》說『異慧疑』，『異』就是種種的意思。因此可知『疑』的體性就是慧。因為『末底』（mati）和般若（Prajna）都是慧的別名，用『毗』（vibhajya）來輔助它，難道還有別的體性嗎？這是大乘異師的觀點，不是別部的觀點。

論：有一種觀點認為，『疑』有其自身的體性，所以它不是慧。

述曰：『疑』有其自身的體性。之所以說猶豫和簡擇是『疑』，是因為同時產生『疑』，或者異時產生『疑』，導致慧不能決斷，所以『疑』不是慧。

論：《瑜伽師地論》說，在五十五卷中，六種煩惱中，見是世俗有，因為它只是慧的一部分。其餘五種煩惱是實有，因為它們有各自的體性。

述曰：《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷說，在六種煩惱中，『見』是世俗有，並且自己解釋說，『見』只是慧的一部分，所以是世俗有。其餘五種煩惱是實有，因為它們有各自的體性。因此可知『疑』的體性不是慧。如果『疑』就是慧，那麼應該和五見一樣，說是世俗有。可以這樣立論：『疑』的體性不是慧，因為它在六種煩惱中沒有被說成是世俗有，就像貪等四種煩惱一樣。

論：『毗助末底』（Vibhajyamati）不應該被解釋為智，而應該被解釋為識。

述曰：在訓釋的辭句中，你用

【English Translation】 English version: What is 'doubt' (疑, yi)? Answer: Because 'doubt' hinders the arising of supreme goodness.

Explanation: The 'doubt' spoken of here refers to confusion and hesitation regarding the truth. In the 58th fascicle of the Mahavibhasa, 'doubt' is distinguished based on five different objects: doubt about the afterlife (他世, tashe), function (作用, zuoyong), cause and effect (因果, yinguo), truth (諦, di), and the Three Jewels (寶, bao) (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha). The 'truth' mentioned here encompasses all of the above. One should contemplate appropriately, meaning that both principle and phenomena are objects of 'doubt'. However, if 'doubt' merely involves mistaking a tree stump for a person, it is not the 'doubt' being discussed here, nor is it referring to the mind of resultant maturation (異熟心, yishuxin) etc.

Treatise: Some argue that the nature of 'doubt' is wisdom (慧, hui). Why is that? Because the 58th fascicle of the Mahavibhasa says that hesitation and discernment are 'doubt'. And the 8th fascicle of the Mahavibhasa considers awareness (覺, jue) to be the nature of 'doubt', and awareness is wisdom, and decisive judgment is wisdom. However, discernment and hesitation are different from decisive judgment, so awareness is said to be 'doubt'. This is proven with scripture.

Furthermore, in the explanation it says:

Treatise: 'Vibhajyamati' (毗助末底) is no different in meaning from Prajna (般若).

Explanation: What is called 'mati' (末底) is another name for wisdom, and it has no different nature from Prajna. Adding the word 'vibhajya' (毗) to wisdom assists it. 'Vibhajya' means various, that is, various wisdoms. The Mahavibhasa says 'different wisdom doubt'. 'Different' means various. Therefore, it is known that the nature of 'doubt' is wisdom. Because 'mati' and Prajna are both different names for wisdom, and 'vibhajya' assists it, how could it have a separate nature? This is the view of a different Mahayana teacher, not a separate school.

Treatise: Some argue that 'doubt' has its own nature, so it is not wisdom.

Explanation: 'Doubt' has its own nature. The reason why hesitation and discernment are said to be 'doubt' is because 'doubt' arises simultaneously or at different times, causing wisdom to be unable to make a decision, so 'doubt' is not wisdom.

Treatise: The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that in the 55th fascicle, among the six afflictions, views (見, jian) are conventionally existent because they are only a part of wisdom. The other five afflictions are truly existent because they have their own nature.

Explanation: The 55th fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that among the six afflictions, 'views' are conventionally existent, and it explains itself that 'views' are only a part of wisdom, so they are conventionally existent. The other five afflictions are truly existent because they have their own nature. Therefore, it is known that the nature of 'doubt' is not wisdom. If 'doubt' were wisdom, then it should be said to be conventionally existent like the five views. One can establish the following argument: the nature of 'doubt' is not wisdom, because it is not said to be conventionally existent among the six afflictions, just like the four afflictions such as greed.

Treatise: 'Vibhajyamati' (毗助末底) should not be explained as intelligence (智, zhi), but should be explained as consciousness (識, shi).

Explanation: In the explanatory phrases, you use

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末底是慧毗助之故說慧體為疑。亦應若南是智。毗助之故說智為識。毗是種種義。由助智故變名為識。體非即智。何以助末底疑體即慧。又如職吉蹉是治療義。毗職吉蹉是疑義。豈以毗言助之。疑體即治療。

論。界由助力至非慧為體。

述曰。又且末底等是字界。界是性義。由毗字是緣。緣助界力義便轉變。何為緣助界已體尚是舊。故此疑非即慧。此師說疑。與顯揚對法同也。

論。云何惡見至招苦為業。

述曰。文中有二。初總。次別。若善．惡相翻。惡唯不善。若毀責名惡。惡通有覆。今此五見名為惡者。毀訾名故。于諸諦理顛倒推度者。即唯迷理。雖緣有親疏。迷理義等故。

論。謂惡見者多受苦故。

述曰。此釋前業。謂于欲界。唯除俱生。發招苦處業。是分別惑故。故惡見者多生於苦。

此乃總釋。然別說者。

論。此見行相差別有五。

述曰。此總標舉。

論。一薩迦耶見至所依為業。

述曰。下別釋有四。合二取故。梵云薩迦耶達利瑟致。經部師云。薩是偽義。迦耶是身。達利瑟致是見。身是聚義。即聚集假。應言緣聚身起見。名偽身見。佛遮當來薩婆多等執為有身見者故。說薩偽言。雖一薩言亦目于有。然今說是思誕提底薩

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果因為『毗』（Vi）的幫助，『末底』(mati，意為智慧)的慧體就被說成是『疑』，那麼也應該像『南』（nan）是智，因為『毗』（Vi）的幫助，智就被說成是識一樣。『毗』（Vi）是種種的意思，由於幫助了智，所以變名爲了識，但它的本體並非就是智。那麼憑什麼說幫助『末底』（mati，意為智慧）的『疑』的本體就是慧呢？又比如『職吉蹉』（cikitsa）是治療的意思，『毗職吉蹉』（vicikitsa）是疑的意思，難道因為『毗』（Vi）這個字幫助了它，『疑』的本體就變成了治療嗎？

論：『界』（dhatu）由於助力的緣故才達到，並非以慧為本體。

述曰：而且『末底』（mati）等是字『界』（dhatu）。『界』（dhatu）是『性』的意思。由於『毗』（Vi）字是緣，緣幫助了『界』（dhatu），力量和意義便轉變了。因為緣幫助了『界』（dhatu），它的本體仍然是舊的，所以這個『疑』並非就是慧。這位論師所說的『疑』，與《顯揚對法論》相同。

論：什麼樣的惡見會導致招致痛苦作為其業果？

述曰：文中有兩個部分，首先是總說，然後是別說。如果善和惡相對，那麼惡就只是不善。如果毀責稱為惡，那麼惡就通於有覆。現在這五種見解被稱為惡，是因為毀訾的緣故。對於諸諦之理顛倒推度的人，就是迷惑于真理。雖然緣有親疏，但迷惑真理的意義是相同的。

論：因為持有惡見的人大多遭受痛苦。

述曰：這是解釋前面的業。指的是在欲界中，除了俱生之外，引發招致痛苦之處的業，是分別惑的緣故。所以持有惡見的人大多會生於痛苦之中。

以上是總的解釋，接下來是分別的解說。

論：這種見解的行相差別有五種。

述曰：這是總的標舉。

論：一、薩迦耶見（satkayadristi，有身見）以執著所依為業。

述曰：下面分別解釋有四種，合二取故。梵語是『薩迦耶達利瑟致』（satkayadrsti）。經部師說，『薩』（sat）是虛偽的意思，『迦耶』（kaya）是身的意思，『達利瑟致』（dristi）是見的意思。身是聚集的意思，也就是聚集的假象。應該說緣于聚集之身而生起的見解，名為偽身見。佛陀爲了遮止未來薩婆多部等執著為有身見的人，所以說了『薩』（sat）是虛偽的。雖然一個『薩』（sat）字也指有，但現在說的是思誕提底薩。

【English Translation】 English version: If, because of the assistance of 'Vi', the essence of 'mati' (wisdom) is said to be 'doubt', then it should also be the case that 'nan' is wisdom, and because of the assistance of 'Vi', wisdom is said to be consciousness. 'Vi' means various, and because it assists wisdom, it changes its name to consciousness, but its essence is not wisdom itself. Then why is it said that the essence of 'doubt' that assists 'mati' (wisdom) is wisdom? Furthermore, for example, 'cikitsa' means treatment, and 'vicikitsa' means doubt. Is it because the word 'Vi' assists it that the essence of 'doubt' becomes treatment?

Treatise: 'Dhatu' (element, realm) is attained due to assistance, not with wisdom as its essence.

Commentary: Moreover, 'mati' and others are word 'dhatus' (elements, realms). 'Dhatu' means 'nature'. Because the word 'Vi' is a condition, the condition assists the 'dhatu', and the power and meaning change. Because the condition assists the 'dhatu', its essence is still the old one, so this 'doubt' is not wisdom. The 'doubt' spoken of by this master is the same as that in the Abhidharmasamuccaya.

Treatise: How does evil view lead to suffering as its karmic result?

Commentary: There are two parts in the text, first a general statement, then a specific statement. If good and evil are opposites, then evil is only unwholesome. If blame is called evil, then evil is common to the obscured. Now these five views are called evil because of blame. Those who perversely speculate on the principles of the truths are deluded about the truth. Although conditions have closeness and distance, the meaning of being deluded about the truth is the same.

Treatise: Because those who hold evil views mostly suffer.

Commentary: This explains the previous karma. It refers to the karma in the desire realm, except for that which is co-arisen, that causes suffering, because it is due to discriminating delusion. Therefore, those who hold evil views are mostly born into suffering.

The above is a general explanation, and next is a specific explanation.

Treatise: The characteristics of this view have five differences.

Commentary: This is a general statement.

Treatise: One, satkayadristi (view of self, belief in a substantial self) takes attachment to the basis as its function.

Commentary: The following separately explains four types, combining two to take. The Sanskrit is satkayadrsti. The Sautrantika masters say that 'sat' means false, 'kaya' means body, and 'dristi' means view. Body means aggregation, that is, the illusion of aggregation. It should be said that the view arising from the aggregated body is called the false view of self. The Buddha said that 'sat' is false in order to prevent future Sarvastivadins and others from clinging to the view of a substantial self. Although one 'sat' also refers to existence, what is now being said is samtati sat.

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義。故薩言表偽　薩婆多雲。薩是有義。迦耶等如前。雖是聚身而是實有。身者自體之異名。應言自體見。佛遮當來經部師等說為偽身見者故。說薩有言。雖一薩言亦目于偽。今者應言阿悉提底薩義故。薩言表有　大乘應言僧吃爛底薩。便成移轉。由此薩迦耶見大少別說。薩婆多名有身見。經部名虛偽身見。今大乘意。心上所現似我之相。體非實有是假法故也。又體非全無。依他起性成所緣緣故。既非實有。亦非虛偽。唯是依他移轉之法。我之所依。又依所執可言虛偽。依所變相可言為有。非如余宗定實定偽。故名移轉。此兼我所。不唯我見。或總緣蘊。或別緣蘊。分別．俱生或許總．別緣。如顯揚第一說。然俱生中如第七識唯計心為我。故雖不如分別起者簡擇別緣蘊。亦任運別緣故。然以此我見為所依本。諸見得生。故名一切見趣所依。趣者況也。或所歸處也。

論。此見差別至分別起攝。

述曰。謂二十句者。對法第一云。謂如計色是我。我有色。色屬我。我在色中。一蘊有四。五蘊二十句也。即二十句中五是我見。十五是我所見。何以五我見。十五我所者。以相應我所。隨遂我所。不離我所故。十五種是我所也。如對法第一自有問答廣解。分別行緣蘊。不分別所起處。故有二十句。分別行緣蘊。行

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 意義。所以薩（Sat, 有）表示虛假。薩婆多（Sarvastivada, 一切有部）說：『薩（Sat）是有意義的。』迦耶（Kaya, 身）等如前所述。雖然是聚集之身，但卻是真實存在的。身是自體（Atman, 我）的異名。應該說是自體見。佛陀遮止未來經部師等說這是虛假身見，所以說『薩（Sat）有』。即使一個『薩（Sat）』字也指虛假。現在應該說是『阿悉提底薩（Asiddhatva, 非成就）』的意義，所以『薩（Sat）』表示有。大乘應該說是『僧吃爛底薩（Samkranti, 移轉）』，便成為移轉。由此薩迦耶見（Satkayadristi, 有身見）有大小之別。薩婆多（Sarvastivada, 一切有部）名為有身見，經部名為虛偽身見。現在大乘的意思是，心上所顯現的相似於我的相，體性並非真實存在，是假法。又體性並非全無，依他起性（Paratantra, 依他起）成就所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya, 所緣緣）的緣故。既然非真實存在，也非虛偽，唯是依他移轉之法，是我所依賴的。又依所執著的可以說虛偽，依所變現的相可以說是有。不像其他宗派那樣定為真實或虛偽，所以名為移轉。這兼顧了我所（Atmiya, 我所），不唯是我見（Atma-dristi, 我見）。或者總緣五蘊（Skandha, 蘊），或者分別緣五蘊。分別、俱生或許總、別緣，如《顯揚聖教論》第一卷所說。然而在俱生中，如第七識（Manas, 末那識）唯計心為我，所以雖然不如分別起者簡擇分別緣五蘊，也任運分別緣的緣故。然而以此我見為所依之根本，諸見才能生起，所以名一切見趣所依。趣是趨向，或者所歸之處。

論：此見差別至於分別起攝。

述曰：所謂的二十句，對法第一卷說：『比如計色是我，我有，屬於我，我在色中。』一蘊有四句，五蘊有二十句。即二十句中有五句是我見，十五句是我所見。為什麼五句是我見，十五句是我所見呢？因為相應我所，隨逐我所，不離我所的緣故，十五種是我所。如《對法》第一卷自有問答廣解。分別行緣蘊，不分別所起之處，所以有二十句。分別行緣蘊，行

【English Translation】 English version: Meaning. Therefore, 'Sat' (Sat, existing) indicates falsity. Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, the 'all exists' school) says: 'Sat (Sat) has meaning.' Kaya (Kaya, body) etc. are as previously explained. Although it is an aggregate body, it is truly existent. 'Body' is another name for Atman (Atman, self). It should be called 'Atman-view'. The Buddha prevents future Sautrantika (Sautrantika, Sutra school) masters etc. from saying that this is a false body-view, therefore he says 'Sat (Sat) exists'. Even a single word 'Sat (Sat)' refers to falsity. Now it should be said to have the meaning of 'Asiddhatva (Asiddhatva, non-accomplishment)', therefore 'Sat (Sat)' indicates existence. The Mahayana (Mahayana, Great Vehicle) should say 'Samkranti (Samkranti, transference)', then it becomes transference. Hence, Satkayadristi (Satkayadristi, view of a real self) has major and minor distinctions. Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, the 'all exists' school) is named the view of a real self, the Sautrantika (Sautrantika, Sutra school) is named the view of a false self. Now the meaning of the Mahayana (Mahayana, Great Vehicle) is that the appearance similar to a self that appears in the mind, its nature is not truly existent, it is a false dharma. Moreover, its nature is not completely non-existent, because Paratantra (Paratantra, other-powered nature) accomplishes the condition of Alambana-pratyaya (Alambana-pratyaya, object-support condition). Since it is not truly existent, nor is it false, it is only a dharma of other-powered transference, which is what I rely on. Moreover, according to what is clung to, it can be said to be false; according to the appearance that is transformed, it can be said to be existent. It is not like other schools that define it as definitely real or definitely false, therefore it is named transference. This includes Atmiya (Atmiya, what belongs to self), not only Atma-dristi (Atma-dristi, self-view). Either it generally conditions the five Skandhas (Skandha, aggregates), or it separately conditions the five Skandhas. Discrimination, co-arising, perhaps general or separate conditioning, as explained in the first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. However, in co-arising, such as the seventh consciousness Manas (Manas, Manas-consciousness) only considers the mind as the self, so although it does not select and separately condition the aggregates like those arising from discrimination, it also spontaneously separately conditions them. However, this self-view is the root upon which all views arise, therefore it is named the basis of all views. 'Tendency' is inclination, or the place to which one returns.

Treatise: The difference of this view extends to what is included in discrimination.

Commentary: The so-called twenty sentences, the first volume of the Abhidharmakosa says: 'For example, considering form as self, I have , * belongs to me, I am in form.' One aggregate has four sentences, five aggregates have twenty sentences. That is, among the twenty sentences, five sentences are self-view, and fifteen sentences are what belongs to self. Why are five sentences self-view and fifteen sentences what belongs to self? Because of corresponding what belongs to self, following what belongs to self, and not being separate from what belongs to self, fifteen kinds are what belong to self. As the first volume of the Abhidharmakosa* has its own questions and answers with extensive explanations. Discriminatingly conditioning the aggregates, not discriminating the place where it arises, therefore there are twenty sentences. Discriminatingly conditioning the aggregates, action

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謂行相。是我．我所之行相也。所者我所。如但於色蘊分別其我．我所行相。不分別此所說我所之所起處。我所必依我見後起。此於色蘊所說三所不分別言此之我所依計何蘊為我此從彼起。但總分別我．我所行　問亦不分別計色之我。是何我所之所從起。何但說言不分別所　答我為根本。不從他起。言色是我。已分別訖。不是不分別其所起處。我所必依我見後起故不．同也　其六十二見等準此應知　六十五者。婆沙雜蘊第一世第一品末第十卷。約蘊約界．處等分別。此言等者。等處。等界也。謂如以色為我。于餘四蘊各有三所。謂是我瓔珞。我僮僕。我器。即有十二。色為一我。即總十三也。如是五蘊有六十我所。五我見也。此皆分別行緣蘊。亦分別所起處。又此是分別所起。非是俱生。俱生之我不別計故。以何為證。五十八說。二十句薩迦耶見皆見苦斷。唯依分別不依俱生。六十五見雖無正文。準二十句亦唯分別。此皆作意分別行。緣蘊等方始生故。然總緣蘊為我。亦通分別者。如顯揚說。此依一切異生為論。非依一人有此諸見。

論。二邊執見至出離為業。

述曰。謂由於前我見執我已。隨此我見后執為斷．常。謂緣前所緣為境。障非斷．常說有因果。處中行道諦。及出離滅諦。然此是總。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所謂『行相』，指的是『我』（ātman，靈魂）和『我所』（ātmīya，屬於我的）的行相。『所』指的是『我所』。例如，僅僅在色蘊（rūpa-skandha，物質之蘊）上分別『我』和『我所』的行相，而不分別這些所說的『我所』是從哪裡產生的。『我所』必定依賴於『我見』（ātma-dṛṣṭi，認為有我的邪見）之後才會產生。對於在色蘊上所說的三種『所』，不分別說這些『我所』是依計哪個蘊為『我』，以及這些『我所』是從哪個蘊產生的。只是總的分別『我』和『我所』的行相。 問：也不分別計色蘊為『我』，這個『我』是從哪個『我所』產生的嗎？為什麼只說不分別『所』？ 答：『我』是根本，不從其他產生。說『色蘊是我』，就已經分別完畢了。不是不分別它所產生的處所。『我所』必定依賴於『我見』之後才會產生，所以不同。六十二見等情況，可以依此類推得知。六十五見，在《婆沙雜蘊》第一世第一品末第十卷中，是約蘊、界、處等來分別的。這裡說的『等』，指的是等處、等界。例如，以色蘊為『我』，對於其餘四蘊，各有三種『所』，即『是我瓔珞』、『我僮僕』、『我器』，這樣就有十二種。色蘊為一個『我』，總共就是十三種。像這樣，五蘊就有六十種『我所』，五種『我見』。這些都是分別行緣蘊，也分別了所產生的處所。而且，這些是分別產生的，不是俱生（sahaja，與生俱來）的。俱生的『我』不特別計較。以什麼為證據？五十八說，二十句薩迦耶見（satkāya-dṛṣṭi，有身見）都是見苦斷（duḥkha-satya，苦諦）的，僅僅依賴於分別，不依賴於俱生。六十五見雖然沒有正文，但參照二十句，也僅僅是分別。這些都是作意（manasikāra，作意）分別行，緣蘊等才開始產生。然而，總的緣蘊為『我』，也通於分別者，如《顯揚》所說。這是依據一切異生（pṛthag-jana，凡夫）而說的，不是依據一個人有這些見解。 論：二邊執見（dvayānta-graha，執著于斷常二邊的邪見）以至於出離（niḥsaraṇa，解脫）為業。 述曰：由於先前我見執著于『我』之後，隨著這個『我見』，執著于斷（uccheda，斷滅）或常（śāśvata，永恒）。這是緣于先前所緣的為境，障礙非斷非常的中道（madhyamā-pratipad，中道），說有因果，處中行道諦（mārga-satya，道諦），以及出離滅諦（nirodha-satya，滅諦）。然而，這只是總的來說。

【English Translation】 English version What is meant by 'aspects of activity' (行相, ākara)? It refers to the aspects of activity related to 'self' (我, ātman) and 'what belongs to self' (我所, ātmīya). 'What belongs to self' refers to possessions. For example, one might only discriminate the aspects of activity related to 'self' and 'what belongs to self' in relation to the aggregate of form (色蘊, rūpa-skandha), without discriminating the origin of what is said to 'belong to self'. 'What belongs to self' necessarily arises after the view of self (我見, ātma-dṛṣṭi). Regarding the three 'belongings' mentioned in relation to the aggregate of form, one does not discriminate which aggregate is relied upon as 'self' for these 'belongings', nor from which aggregate these 'belongings' arise. One only generally discriminates the aspects of activity related to 'self' and 'what belongs to self'. Question: Does one also not discriminate that the 'self' in the aggregate of form arises from which 'belonging to self'? Why only say that one does not discriminate the 'belonging'? Answer: 'Self' is the root and does not arise from anything else. Saying 'the aggregate of form is self' is already a complete discrimination. It is not that one does not discriminate its origin. 'What belongs to self' necessarily arises after the view of self, so they are not the same. The sixty-two views and so on should be understood similarly. The sixty-five views, as described in the tenth fascicle of the first chapter of the first section of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra (婆沙雜蘊), are discriminated in terms of aggregates, realms, and bases. The 'and so on' here refers to bases and realms. For example, if one considers form to be 'self', then for each of the other four aggregates, there are three 'belongings': 'my necklace', 'my servant', 'my vessel'. This makes twelve. Form as one 'self' makes thirteen in total. Thus, the five aggregates have sixty 'belongings to self' and five views of self. These all discriminate the aggregates as conditions for activity and also discriminate the origin. Moreover, these are discriminated as arising, not as being co-arisen (俱生, sahaja). The co-arisen 'self' is not particularly considered. What is the evidence for this? The fifty-eight views state that the twenty sentences of satkāya-dṛṣṭi (薩迦耶見, view of a real self) are all abandoned by seeing suffering (苦諦, duḥkha-satya), relying only on discrimination, not on co-arising. Although there is no explicit text for the sixty-five views, based on the twenty sentences, they are also only discriminated. These all arise from intentional (作意, manasikāra) discrimination and activity, relying on aggregates and so on. However, generally considering aggregates as 'self' also applies to those who discriminate, as stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (顯揚). This is discussed based on all ordinary beings (異生, pṛthag-jana), not based on one person having all these views. Treatise: The view of clinging to extremes (二邊執見, dvayānta-graha) has liberation (出離, niḥsaraṇa) as its function. Commentary: Because of the previous view of self clinging to 'self', following this view of self, one clings to annihilation (斷, uccheda) or permanence (常, śāśvata). This is because one takes the previously perceived object as the object, obstructing the Middle Way (中道, madhyamā-pratipad) that is neither annihilation nor permanence, and saying that there is cause and effect, practicing the Path Truth (道諦, mārga-satya) in the middle, and the cessation Truth (滅諦, nirodha-satya) of liberation. However, this is a general statement.

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論。此見差別至分別起攝。

述曰。此下別說。然此邊見攝六十二見中四十七見。謂四遍常。乃至無想。及非有想非無想論此見俱非已來四十見。是常見。七斷滅論是斷見。皆意緣我有常斷故。言等者等取十四不可記事中。四常等中常等是常見。無常等是斷見　除邊等四。彼是邪見　如來死後四中亦有等是常。非有等是斷。命與身一等。是我見　又遍常一分常等。有緣他界為斷等。是他界緣中廣說　此六十二見唯分別起。五十八說故。彼文又說。緣梵王常是邪見。非我見後生。今此我見後生是邊見攝。又此邊見。此論下文除總緣蘊余非他界緣。設從我見後生。如何緣梵王常等是邊見。邊見根本亦分別我見。如何別緣我見。亦緣他界生。如下他界緣中。及別抄等會。應審推度　六十二見。如梵網六十二見經．長阿含第十四梵動品．婆沙第一百九十九．二百卷．瑜伽第六．第七．第八．第五十八．第八十七等廣解。今言見趣者。趣謂意趣。或是所趣。或謂趣況　言前際者。此依過去起分別見名為前際。依未來起分別見名為后際。若依現在起分別見此即不定。或名前際。未來前故。未來因故。或名后際。過去後故。過去果故　四遍常論者。一由能憶二十成壞劫。彼便執我．世間俱常。由隱顯故。二由能憶四十成壞劫。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：此處的『見』（Dṛṣṭi，觀點）的差別，歸屬於由分別產生的執著。

述曰：下面分別說明。這裡所說的『邊見』（Antāgrahadṛṣṭi，極端見解）包含了六十二見中的四十七種。即四種『遍常論』（Śāśvatavāda，常見論），乃至『無想論』（Sañjñā-nāsti-vāda，無想定論）以及『非有想非無想論』（Naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñā-vāda，非想非非想處論），這些觀點都認為『我』（Ātman，靈魂）是常住的，屬於常見。七種『斷滅論』（Ucchedavāda，斷見論）則認為『我』是斷滅的，屬於斷見。這些都是因為意識緣于『我』而產生的常或斷的執著。『等』字，包括了十四種『不可記事』（Avyākṛtavastu，不可記說之事）中的四種『常』等，其中『常』等屬於常見，『無常』等屬於斷見。除了『邊』等四種，那些是邪見。如來死後的四種情況中，『亦有』等屬於常，『非有』等屬於斷。『命與身一』等，是『我見』（Ātmadrsti，我見）。此外，『遍常』、『一分常』等，有緣於他界的，作為斷等，在他界緣中廣泛說明。這六十二見都只是由分別產生的。五十八種是這樣說的。那段經文又說，緣于『梵王』（Brahmā，大梵天）常住是邪見，不是『我見』后產生的。現在這裡說『我見』后產生的是『邊見』所包含的。此外，這個『邊見』，這個論的下文排除了總緣于蘊，其餘的不是他界緣。假設是從『我見』后產生的，如何緣于『梵王』常住等是『邊見』？『邊見』的根本也是分別『我見』，如何分別緣于『我見』？也緣於他界產生，如下面的他界緣中，以及其他抄本等會解釋。應該仔細推敲。六十二見，如《梵網六十二見經》（Brahmajāla Sutta）、《長阿含經》第十四《梵動品》（Brahmajāla Sūtra）、《婆沙論》（Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra）第一百九十九、二百卷、《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第六、第七、第八、第五十八、第八十七等廣泛解釋。現在說的『見趣』，『趣』指的是意趣，或者是指所趣向的，或者是指趣況。所說的『前際』，這是指依過去而產生分別見，稱為『前際』（Pūrvānta，前際）。依未來而產生分別見，稱為『后際』（Aparānta，后際）。如果依現在而產生分別見，這就不確定了。或者稱為『前際』，因為未來是之前的。因為未來是因。或者稱為『后際』，因為過去是之後的。因為過去是果。四種『遍常論』，第一種是由於能夠回憶起二十個成壞劫，因此就執著于『我』和『世間』（Loka，世界）都是常住的，因為有隱沒和顯現的緣故。第二種是由於能夠回憶起四十個成壞劫。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: The differences in these 'views' (Dṛṣṭi, perspectives) are included within the attachments arising from discrimination.

Commentary: Below are separate explanations. The 'extreme views' (Antāgrahadṛṣṭi, views of extremes) here encompass forty-seven of the sixty-two views. Namely, the four 'eternalist theories' (Śāśvatavāda, eternalism), up to and including the 'theory of non-perception' (Sañjñā-nāsti-vāda, doctrine of neither perception nor non-perception), and the 'theory of neither perception nor non-non-perception' (Naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñā-vāda, doctrine of neither perception nor non-perception). These views all hold that the 'self' (Ātman, soul) is permanent, belonging to the category of eternalism. The seven 'annihilationist theories' (Ucchedavāda, annihilationism) assert that the 'self' is annihilated, belonging to the category of annihilationism. These arise because consciousness clings to the 'self' as either permanent or annihilated. The word 'etc.' includes the four 'permanent' etc. from the fourteen 'unanswered questions' (Avyākṛtavastu, unanswerable questions), where 'permanent' etc. belong to eternalism, and 'impermanent' etc. belong to annihilationism. Except for the four 'extreme' etc., those are wrong views. Among the four possibilities after the death of the Tathāgata, 'exists' etc. belong to eternalism, and 'does not exist' etc. belong to annihilationism. 'Life and body are one' etc. is 'self-view' (Ātmadrsti, self-view). Furthermore, 'completely permanent', 'partially permanent' etc., some are related to other realms as annihilation etc., which is extensively explained in the section on conditions related to other realms. All sixty-two views arise solely from discrimination. Fifty-eight are described as such. That text also states that clinging to the permanence of 'Brahmā' (大梵天, the Great Brahma) is a wrong view, not arising after 'self-view'. Now it is said here that what arises after 'self-view' is included in 'extreme views'. Moreover, this 'extreme view', the subsequent text of this treatise excludes general conditions related to the aggregates, and the rest are not conditions related to other realms. Supposing it arises after 'self-view', how can clinging to the permanence of 'Brahmā' etc. be 'extreme views'? The root of 'extreme views' is also discriminating 'self-view', how can it separately cling to 'self-view'? It also arises from conditions related to other realms, as explained in the following section on conditions related to other realms, and in other commentaries etc. Careful consideration is needed. The sixty-two views are extensively explained in texts such as the Brahmajāla Sutta, the fourteenth chapter Brahmajāla Sūtra of the Dīrgha Āgama, the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra, volumes 199 and 200, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volumes 6, 7, 8, 58, and 87. The term 'view-inclination' (見趣) refers to the inclination of the mind, or what is inclined towards, or the state of inclination. The term 'prior extreme' (Pūrvānta, 前際) refers to generating discriminating views based on the past, called the 'prior extreme'. Generating discriminating views based on the future is called the 'posterior extreme' (Aparānta, 後際). If generating discriminating views based on the present, it is uncertain. It may be called the 'prior extreme' because the future is prior. Because the future is the cause. Or it may be called the 'posterior extreme' because the past is posterior. Because the past is the result. The four 'eternalist theories', the first is due to being able to recall twenty cycles of formation and destruction, thus clinging to the 'self' and the 'world' (Loka, world) as permanent, because of concealment and manifestation. The second is due to being able to recall forty cycles of formation and destruction.

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彼便執我．世間俱常。三由能憶八十成壞劫。便執為常。四由天眼見諸有情死時生時諸蘊相續。彼便執我．世間俱常。四中前三由依靜慮起。宿住通有上中下。第四由依天眼所見。此見道斷。即有見道常見亦他界緣。緣三界法並是常故。然依定後起。可通上界系。雖三界合緣。仍隨所應界地所繫。以獨影故唯從見說　四一分常論。一從梵天沒來生此間。得宿住通作如是執。我等皆是梵王所化。梵王是常。我等無常。二聞梵王有如是見等。大種常。心無常。或翻此說。同彼忍者或住梵世。乃至或是展轉聞如是道理。我以梵王為量。信其所言。是故世間一分常住　三有先從戲忘天沒來生此間。得通起執。在彼諸天不極戲等。在彼常住。我等無常　四有從意憤天沒。乃至如前。此天住處文如前已說　此四由執大梵．大種或心戲忘．憤恚四事而起。此之八見依前際起。以色界之我緣自地為我。或以地獄我見計梵王為他我故。計一分常常見所攝。不爾應非邊見所攝。但不得緣他地諸法為其自我。他我計故。其全常等理不相違　設自身我亦在中故。如何全常一個邊見緣上下生。一分常者是常見。無常者是何見　此雖非斷。然堅執發。亦是染污。非五見攝。但是染惠　又解邪見所攝。此不同於不可記事是斷見攝。彼言無常意說斷故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 彼便執著于『我』（ātman），認為世界是永恒不變的。有三種原因是因為能夠回憶起八十個成壞劫（saṃvartasthāyi-saṃvartakalpa），因此執著于永恒。第四種原因是通過天眼（divyacakṣus）看到眾生死時和生時，諸蘊（skandha）相續不斷，因此執著于『我』和世界的永恒。 這四種情況中，前三種是依靠靜慮（dhyāna）而生起的宿住通（pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna），有上、中、下三種層次。第四種是依靠天眼所見。這種見解在見道（darśanamārga）時會被斷除。這種有身見（satkāyadṛṣṭi）和常見（śāśvatadṛṣṭi）也是他界（paraloka）的因緣，因為它們緣於三界（trayo dhātavaḥ）的法，認為一切都是永恒的。然而，這種見解是依靠禪定之後生起的，可以通於上界（ūrdhvadhātu）所繫。雖然緣於三界之法，仍然隨其所應屬於相應的界地所繫。因為是獨影境（ekāki-pratibhāsa），所以只是從見的角度來說。 四種一分常論（ekadeśa-śāśvatikāḥ）：第一種是從梵天（brahmakāyika）死亡后投生到人間的人，獲得了宿住通，於是產生這樣的執著：『我們都是梵王（brahmā）所化生的，梵王是永恒的，我們是無常的。』第二種是聽聞梵王有這樣的見解等等，認為大種（mahābhūta）是常，心（citta）是無常，或者反過來說。與他們想法相同的人，或者住在梵世（brahmaloka），乃至輾轉聽聞這樣的道理，『我以梵王為標準，相信他所說的話，所以世界有一部分是常住的。』第三種是從戲忘天（krīḍāpradūṣika）死亡后投生到人間的人，獲得了神通，於是產生執著：『在那些天界，他們不怎麼嬉戲等等，在那裡是常住的，我們是無常的。』第四種是從意憤天（manopradoṣika）死亡后，乃至如前所述。這種天界的住處，文義如前已經說過。 這四種見解是由於執著大梵（mahābrahmā）、大種（mahābhūta）或者心（citta）、戲忘（krīḍāpradūṣika）、憤恚（manopradoṣika）這四件事而產生的。這八種見解是依靠前際（pūrvānta）而生起的，因為愚昧之人以自身所緣的『我』為『我』，或者以地獄（adhastādbhava）的我見（ātmadṛṣṭi）來計度梵王為『他我』（para-ātman），所以被計為一分常，屬於常見所攝。否則就不應屬於邊見（antagrāhadṛṣṭi）所攝。但是，不能緣於他地的諸法作為自己的『我』或『他我』來計度，因為這樣就與全常（sarva-śāśvata）等的道理不相違背。 假設自身之『我』也包含在其中，如何全常（sarva-śāśvata）和一個邊見（antagrāhadṛṣṭi）緣于上下而生起？一分常（ekadeśa-śāśvata）是常見（śāśvatadṛṣṭi），無常（anitya）是什麼見（dṛṣṭi）？雖然這並非斷見（ucchedadṛṣṭi），但如果堅執不放，也是染污的，不屬於五見（pañca dṛṣṭayaḥ）所攝，只是染污的智慧（duṣṭa-mati）。 另一種解釋是，它屬於邪見（mithyādṛṣṭi）所攝。這不同於不可記事（avyākṛtavastu），後者屬於斷見所攝，因為他們說無常，意思是說斷滅。

【English Translation】 English version Then they cling to 'self' (ātman), believing the world is permanent. Three reasons are due to being able to recall eighty aeons of formation and destruction (saṃvartasthāyi-saṃvartakalpa), thus clinging to permanence. The fourth reason is through divine eye (divyacakṣus), seeing beings die and are born, the aggregates (skandha) continuously arise, thus clinging to 'self' and the permanence of the world. Among these four, the first three arise from the meditative concentration (dhyāna), the knowledge of previous abodes (pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna), having upper, middle, and lower levels. The fourth arises from what is seen by the divine eye. This view is severed at the path of seeing (darśanamārga). This view of self (satkāyadṛṣṭi) and eternalism (śāśvatadṛṣṭi) are also causes of other realms (paraloka), because they are based on the dharmas of the three realms (trayo dhātavaḥ), believing everything is permanent. However, this view arises after meditation, and can be connected to the upper realm (ūrdhvadhātu). Although based on the dharmas of the three realms, it still belongs to the corresponding realm and ground. Because it is a solitary reflection (ekāki-pratibhāsa), it is only discussed from the perspective of view. Four types of partial eternalism (ekadeśa-śāśvatikāḥ): The first is someone who dies from the Brahma heaven (brahmakāyika) and is reborn in this world, obtaining the knowledge of previous abodes, thus developing this clinging: 'We are all created by Brahma (brahmā), Brahma is eternal, we are impermanent.' The second is hearing that Brahma has such a view, etc., believing that the great elements (mahābhūta) are permanent, and the mind (citta) is impermanent, or vice versa. Those who share their views, or live in the Brahma world (brahmaloka), or even hear such reasoning through transmission, 'I take Brahma as the standard, believing what he says, therefore a part of the world is permanent.' The third is someone who dies from the heaven of those corrupted by play (krīḍāpradūṣika) and is reborn in this world, obtaining supernatural powers, thus developing clinging: 'In those heavens, they do not indulge in excessive play, etc., they are permanent there, we are impermanent.' The fourth is someone who dies from the heaven of those corrupted by anger (manopradoṣika), and so on, as mentioned before. The dwelling place of this heaven, the meaning of the text has been explained before. These four views arise from clinging to Mahabrahma (mahābrahmā), the great elements (mahābhūta), or the mind (citta), those corrupted by play (krīḍāpradūṣika), those corrupted by anger (manopradoṣika). These eight views arise based on the past extreme (pūrvānta), because ignorant people take the 'self' that they perceive as 'self', or use the view of self (ātmadṛṣṭi) from the lower realm (adhastādbhava) to consider Brahma as 'other self' (para-ātman), so it is considered as partial eternalism, belonging to the category of eternalism. Otherwise, it should not belong to the category of extreme views (antagrāhadṛṣṭi). However, one cannot base on the dharmas of other lands to consider as one's own 'self' or 'other self', because this would not contradict the principle of complete eternalism (sarva-śāśvata). Assuming that one's own 'self' is also included in it, how can complete eternalism (sarva-śāśvata) and a single extreme view (antagrāhadṛṣṭi) arise from above and below? Partial eternalism (ekadeśa-śāśvata) is eternalism (śāśvatadṛṣṭi), what view (dṛṣṭi) is impermanence (anitya)? Although this is not nihilism (ucchedadṛṣṭi), if one clings to it firmly, it is also defiled, not belonging to the five views (pañca dṛṣṭayaḥ), but only defiled wisdom (duṣṭa-mati). Another explanation is that it belongs to wrong view (mithyādṛṣṭi). This is different from the unrecordable matter (avyākṛtavastu), which belongs to nihilism, because they say impermanence, meaning annihilation.

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前解為勝。不說一分通邪見故　及計后際有想十六者。初四見依三見立。一命者即身。二命者異身。三此總是我。遍滿無二。無異無缺　依第一見立第一我。有色死後有想。以執色為我故名我有色。取諸法想說名有想。在欲界全．色界一分。除無想天。許無色界亦有色者。此亦在彼前三無色。此有想故。不在後一　依第二見。故立第二我。無色死後有想。執無色蘊為我等。其釋名等如論應知。此在欲界．乃至無所有處。除無想天。依第三見立第三我。亦有色我亦無色。死後有想。執五蘊為我。乃至廣說。在欲界全乃至廣說　第四我非有色非無色。死後有想。即遮第三。無別依見。如是四種或依尋伺。或依等至。皆容得起　次四見一執我有邊死後有想。若執色為我。體有分限。或在身中。如指節量等。乃至廣說。非色為我。亦有分限。所依所緣有分限故。此在欲界全。色界一分。無色有色等如前說　二執我無邊死後有想。若執色為我。遍一切處。此所不知皆謂為有非其所見。能知無邊。三千界等有分限故。下準此解。以其智慮不知邊際名為無邊。非遠知也。余如前說　三執我亦有邊。亦無邊。死後有想。瑜伽第六云。執我隨身或舒或卷其量不定。身無量等。我亦無量等。余義準上　四執我非有邊非無邊。即遮第三。此四

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 先前的解釋是正確的。不說一分是因為通達了邪見，以及認為後世有想的十六種情況。最初的四種見解是基於三種見解而建立的：第一種，認為『命』（jiva）就是身體；第二種，認為『命』（jiva）與身體不同；第三種，認為『這總和』就是『我』（atman），遍滿一切，沒有差異，沒有缺失。基於第一種見解，建立了第一種『我』（atman）：有色，死後有想。因為執著色蘊為『我』（atman），所以稱為『我有色』。取諸法之想，稱為『有想』。這在欲界是全部，在色界是一部分，除了無想天。允許『無想』也『有色』的情況，這也在前三個無色界中。因為這裡『有想』，所以不在最後一個無色界中。 基於第二種見解，建立了第二種『我』（atman）：無色，死後有想。執著無色蘊為『我』（atman）等等。其解釋和名稱等，應如論中所說的那樣理解。這在欲界，乃至無所有處，除了無想天。基於第三種見解，建立了第三種『我』（atman）：亦有色我亦無色，死後有想。執著五蘊為『我』（atman），乃至廣說。在欲界全部，乃至廣說。第四種『我』（atman）：非有色非無色，死後有想。這只是遮止第三種，沒有其他的見解依據。這四種情況，或者依據尋伺（vitarka-vicara），或者依據等至（samapatti），都可能產生。 接下來的四種見解：第一種，執著『我』（atman）有邊，死後有想。如果執著色蘊為『我』（atman），那麼『我』（atman）的形體就有分限，或者在身體中，如指節的量等等，乃至廣說。如果不是執著色蘊為『我』（atman），也有分限，因為所依據和所緣的都有分限。這在欲界是全部，在色界是一部分。無色、有色等情況如前所述。第二種，執著『我』（atman）無邊，死後有想。如果執著色蘊為『我』（atman），那麼『我』（atman）就遍一切處。對於那些不知道的事物，都認為是存在的，但實際上並沒有看到。能知道無邊，是因為三千世界等有分限。下面的內容可以參照這個解釋。因為他們的智慧和思慮不知道邊際，所以稱為『無邊』，而不是真正遙遠的知見。其餘的如前所述。第三種，執著『我』（atman）亦有邊亦無邊，死後有想。《瑜伽師地論》第六卷說：執著『我』（atman）隨著身體或者舒展或者捲縮，其量不定。身體無量等等，『我』（atman）也無量等等。其餘的意義參照上面的解釋。第四種，執著『我』（atman）非有邊非無邊，這只是遮止第三種。這四種情況。

【English Translation】 English version: The previous explanation is correct. Not speaking of a fraction is because of understanding wrong views, as well as the sixteen cases of thinking there is perception after death. The first four views are established based on three views: first, considering 'life' (jiva) to be the body; second, considering 'life' (jiva) to be different from the body; third, considering 'this aggregate' to be 'self' (atman), pervading everything, without difference, without deficiency. Based on the first view, the first 'self' (atman) is established: having form, having perception after death. Because of clinging to the form aggregate as 'self' (atman), it is called 'I have form'. Taking thoughts of all dharmas is called 'having perception'. This is complete in the desire realm, and a part in the form realm, except for the Heaven of Non-Perception. Allowing the case of 'no perception' also 'having form', this is also in the first three formless realms. Because there is 'perception' here, it is not in the last formless realm. Based on the second view, the second 'self' (atman) is established: formless, having perception after death. Clinging to the formless aggregate as 'self' (atman), etc. The explanation and names, etc., should be understood as explained in the treatise. This is in the desire realm, up to the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, except for the Heaven of Non-Perception. Based on the third view, the third 'self' (atman) is established: also having form and also formless, having perception after death. Clinging to the five aggregates as 'self' (atman), and so on, extensively explained. Complete in the desire realm, and so on, extensively explained. The fourth 'self' (atman): neither having form nor formless, having perception after death. This is only negating the third, without other views to rely on. These four cases, either based on initial and sustained thought (vitarka-vicara), or based on meditative absorption (samapatti), can all arise. The next four views: first, clinging to 'self' (atman) as having boundaries, having perception after death. If clinging to the form aggregate as 'self' (atman), then the body of 'self' (atman) has limits, or is in the body, like the size of a finger joint, etc., and so on, extensively explained. If not clinging to the form aggregate as 'self' (atman), it also has limits, because what is relied on and what is cognized have limits. This is complete in the desire realm, and a part in the form realm. The cases of formless, having form, etc., are as previously explained. Second, clinging to 'self' (atman) as boundless, having perception after death. If clinging to the form aggregate as 'self' (atman), then 'self' (atman) pervades all places. For those things that are not known, they are all considered to exist, but in reality, they have not been seen. Being able to know boundlessness is because the three thousand worlds, etc., have limits. The following content can refer to this explanation. Because their wisdom and thought do not know the boundaries, it is called 'boundless', but it is not truly distant knowledge. The rest is as previously explained. Third, clinging to 'self' (atman) as both having boundaries and being boundless, having perception after death. The sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: clinging to 'self' (atman) as either stretching or contracting with the body, its size is uncertain. The body is immeasurable, etc., and 'self' (atman) is also immeasurable, etc. The remaining meaning refers to the above explanation. Fourth, clinging to 'self' (atman) as neither having boundaries nor being boundless, this is only negating the third. These four cases.

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依尋伺。等至皆起　次四依想異。一我有一想。二我有種種想。三我有小想。四我有無量想　次四依受一我純有樂死後有想。二我純有苦死後有想。三我純有苦有樂死後有想。四我純無苦無樂死後有想。一想者在前三無色。種種想在欲色界除無想天。少想者執少色為我等。想為我所等。我與彼合名為小想。在欲．色界除無想天。無色界如前說。無量想者。執無量色為我等。想為我所等如前說。乃至廣如彼論　如是四種尋伺．等至皆容得起。純有樂有想者。在前三靜慮乃至廣說。純有苦有想者。在地獄中。有苦有樂有想者。在畜生．鬼界．人．及欲天。無苦無樂有想者。在第四定以上。尋伺．等至皆容得起　無想八論者。有色等四。有邊等四。有色等四者。一我有色死後無想。執色為我得無想定。見他得定生彼作如是計等。二我無色死後無想。執命根為我得無想定等。乃至廣說。三執我亦有色亦無色死後無想。執色．命根為我。於此二中起一我想。乃至廣說。四執我非有色非無色死後無想。即遮第三無別有物。等至．尋伺皆容有起　有邊等四者。一執我有邊死後無想。執色為我。其量狹少等。得無想定等。乃至廣說。二執我無邊死後無想。執色為我。遍一切處等。乃至廣說。三執我亦有邊亦無邊死後無想。執色為我。或

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 依尋伺（根據探尋和考察）。等至（禪定）皆起。次四依想異：一、我有一想（認為『我』是存在的想法）。二、我有種種想（認為『我』有各種各樣的想法）。三、我有小想（認為『我』是渺小的想法）。四、我有無量想（認為『我』是無限的想法）。 次四依受：一、我純有樂死後有想（認為『我』只有快樂，死後仍然存在）。二、我純有苦死後有想（認為『我』只有痛苦，死後仍然存在）。三、我純有苦有樂死後有想（認為『我』既有痛苦也有快樂，死後仍然存在）。四、我純無苦無樂死後有想（認為『我』既沒有痛苦也沒有快樂，死後仍然存在）。 『一想』者，在前三無色界（指無色界的最初三個層次）。『種種想』在欲界（指充滿慾望的世界），除無想天（排除無想天）。『少想』者，執少色為我等（執著于少量的色蘊，認為是我等等）。想為我所等（想法被認為是我的等等）。我與彼合名為小想（『我』與那些結合在一起，被稱為小想）。在欲界、除無想天。無如前說（無如同前面所說）。『無量想』者，執無量色為我等（執著于無限的色蘊，認為是我等等）。想為我所等如前說（想法被認為是我的等等，如同前面所說）。乃至廣如彼論（乃至更詳細的解釋如同那部論典所說）。 如是四種尋伺、等至皆容得起（像這樣四種探尋和考察、禪定都可能生起）。『純有樂有想』者，在前三靜慮（指色界的前三個禪定層次），乃至廣說（乃至更詳細的解釋）。『純有苦有想』者，在地獄中（指地獄道）。『有苦有樂有想』者，在畜生、鬼界、人及欲天（指畜生道、餓鬼道、人道以及欲界天）。『無苦無樂有想』者，在第四定以上（指色界的第四禪定層次以上）。尋伺、等至皆容得起（探尋和考察、禪定都可能生起）。 無想八論者（關於無想的八種論點）：有色等四（關於有色的四種論點），有邊等四（關於有邊的四種論點）。有色等四者：一、我有色死後無想（認為『我』是有色的，死後什麼都沒有）。執色為我得無想定（執著於色蘊為『我』，從而獲得無想定）。見他得定生彼作如是計等（看到其他人獲得禪定，並因此產生這樣的想法等等）。二、我無色死後無想（認為『我』是沒有顏色的，死後什麼都沒有）。執命根為我得無想定等（執著于命根為『我』，從而獲得無想定等等）。乃至廣說（乃至更詳細的解釋）。三、執我亦有色亦無色死後無想（認為『我』既有色又無色，死後什麼都沒有）。執色、命根為我（執著於色蘊和命根為『我』）。於此二中起一我想（在這兩者中產生一個『我』的想法）。乃至廣說（乃至更詳細的解釋）。四、執我非有色非無色死後無想（認為『我』既不是有色的也不是無色的，死後什麼都沒有）。即遮第三無別有物（這是否定了第三種情況，沒有其他不同的東西）。等至、尋伺皆容有起（禪定、探尋和考察都可能生起）。 有邊等四者：一、執我有邊死後無想（認為『我』是有邊界的，死後什麼都沒有）。執色為我（執著於色蘊為『我』）。其量狹少等（它的量是狹窄而少的等等）。得無想定等（從而獲得無想定等等）。乃至廣說（乃至更詳細的解釋）。二、執我無邊死後無想（認為『我』是沒有邊界的，死後什麼都沒有）。執色為我（執著於色蘊為『我』）。遍一切處等（遍佈一切地方等等）。乃至廣說（乃至更詳細的解釋）。三、執我亦有邊亦無邊死後無想（認為『我』既有邊界又沒有邊界，死後什麼都沒有）。執色為我（執著於色蘊為『我』）。或

【English Translation】 English version Based on seeking and investigation. All Samadhi (state of meditative consciousness) arises. Next, the four dependent perceptions differ: 1. The perception 'I exist' (the thought that 'I' am existing). 2. The perception 'I have various thoughts' (the thought that 'I' have various kinds of thoughts). 3. The perception 'I am small' (the thought that 'I' am insignificant). 4. The perception 'I am infinite' (the thought that 'I' am limitless). Next, the four dependent feelings: 1. The perception 'I have only pleasure and exist after death' (the thought that 'I' have only pleasure and continue to exist after death). 2. The perception 'I have only suffering and exist after death' (the thought that 'I' have only suffering and continue to exist after death). 3. The perception 'I have both suffering and pleasure and exist after death' (the thought that 'I' have both suffering and pleasure and continue to exist after death). 4. The perception 'I have neither suffering nor pleasure and exist after death' (the thought that 'I' have neither suffering nor pleasure and continue to exist after death). The 'one perception' refers to the first three formless realms (the first three levels of the Formless Realm). 'Various perceptions' are in the Desire Realm (the realm full of desires), except for the Realm of Non-Perception (excluding the Realm of Non-Perception). The 'small perception' is clinging to a small amount of form as 'I', etc. (clinging to a small amount of Rupa (form), considering it as 'I', etc.). The perception is considered as belonging to 'I', etc. ('I' and those combined are called small perception). In the Desire Realm, except for the Realm of Non-Perception. Non- is as previously stated (Non- is as mentioned before). The 'infinite perception' is clinging to infinite form as 'I', etc. (clinging to infinite Rupa (form), considering it as 'I', etc.), as previously stated (the perception is considered as belonging to 'I', etc., as mentioned before). And so on, as extensively explained in that treatise (and so on, with more detailed explanations as in that treatise). Thus, these four types of seeking, investigation, and Samadhi can all arise (in this way, these four types of seeking and investigation, and Samadhi, can all arise). The one who 'purely has pleasure and has perception' is in the first three Dhyanas (the first three levels of the Form Realm), and so on (and so on, with more detailed explanations). The one who 'purely has suffering and has perception' is in hell (referring to the hell realm). The one who 'has both suffering and pleasure and has perception' is in the animal realm, the ghost realm, the human realm, and the desire heavens (referring to the animal realm, the hungry ghost realm, the human realm, and the Desire Realm heavens). The one who 'has neither suffering nor pleasure and has perception' is in the fourth Dhyana and above (referring to the fourth level of the Form Realm and above). Seeking, investigation, and Samadhi can all arise (seeking and investigation, and Samadhi, can all arise). The eight theses on non-perception: four on form, etc. (four theses on form), four on boundaries, etc. (four theses on boundaries). The four on form, etc.: 1. 'I have form and after death, there is no perception' (the thought that 'I' have form and after death, there is nothing). Clinging to form as 'I', one attains the Samadhi of Non-Perception (clinging to Rupa (form) as 'I', thereby attaining the Samadhi of Non-Perception). Seeing others attain Samadhi, one generates such thoughts, etc. (seeing others attain Samadhi, one generates such thoughts, etc.). 2. 'I have no form and after death, there is no perception' (the thought that 'I' have no form and after death, there is nothing). Clinging to the life force as 'I', one attains the Samadhi of Non-Perception, etc. (clinging to the life force as 'I', thereby attaining the Samadhi of Non-Perception, etc.). And so on (and so on, with more detailed explanations). 3. 'I have both form and no form and after death, there is no perception' (the thought that 'I' have both form and no form and after death, there is nothing). Clinging to form and the life force as 'I' (clinging to Rupa (form) and the life force as 'I'). From these two, one generates the thought of 'I' (from these two, one generates the thought of 'I'). And so on (and so on, with more detailed explanations). 4. 'I am neither with form nor without form and after death, there is no perception' (the thought that 'I' am neither with form nor without form and after death, there is nothing). This negates the third, there is nothing else (this negates the third situation, there is nothing else different). Samadhi, seeking, and investigation can all arise (Samadhi, seeking, and investigation can all arise). The four on boundaries, etc.: 1. 'I have boundaries and after death, there is no perception' (the thought that 'I' have boundaries and after death, there is nothing). Clinging to form as 'I' (clinging to Rupa (form) as 'I'). Its quantity is narrow and small, etc. (its quantity is narrow and small, etc.). One attains the Samadhi of Non-Perception, etc. (thereby attaining the Samadhi of Non-Perception, etc.). And so on (and so on, with more detailed explanations). 2. 'I have no boundaries and after death, there is no perception' (the thought that 'I' have no boundaries and after death, there is nothing). Clinging to form as 'I' (clinging to Rupa (form) as 'I'). Pervading all places, etc. (pervading all places, etc.). And so on (and so on, with more detailed explanations). 3. 'I have both boundaries and no boundaries and after death, there is no perception' (the thought that 'I' have both boundaries and no boundaries and after death, there is nothing). Clinging to form as 'I' (clinging to Rupa (form) as 'I'). Or

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卷或舒。乃至廣說。四執我非有邊非無邊死後無想。遮第三說。等至．尋伺皆容得起　俱非有八者。有色等四。有邊等四。一執我有色死後非有想非無想。執色為我見諸有情入非想非非想定想不明瞭。作如是執。唯尋．伺非得定。乃至廣說。二執我無色死後如前。執無色蘊為我等。入非想非非想定不明瞭故。作如是執。乃至廣說。非等至唯尋．伺起。三執我亦有色亦無色死後如前。執色．無色為我。見諸有情想不明瞭。作如是執。唯尋．伺者乃至廣說。四執我非有色非無色為我死後如前。遮第三是　有邊等四者。一執我有邊死後非有想非無想。乃至第四執我非有邊非無邊死後非有想非無想。如是一切皆執無色為我。已得非想非非想處定。容有此執。一由彼定時分促故。以一一蘊為所緣執我有邊。二由彼定時分長故。總以四蘊為所緣執我無邊。三由彼定時分或短或長。或一一蘊或總為我故成第三句。第四即遮說故。以上常見攝　七斷滅論者。一我有色。粗四大種所造為性。死後斷滅畢竟無有。見身死後有而無故。若自若他之我。皆以粗大種所造死後斷滅。現在此身亦得。後生他身亦得。后皆準此。二我欲界天死後斷滅。三我色界天死後斷滅。四我空無邊處死後斷滅。五我識處死後斷滅。六我無所有處死後斷滅。七我非想

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 捲起或舒開（經典）。乃至廣為解說。四種執著：我（ātman）有邊（有界限）/無邊（無界限），死後無想（saññā）。這是爲了駁斥第三種說法。等至（samāpatti，禪定）和尋伺（vitakka-vicāra，粗細分別的心理活動）都可能生起。 俱非有八種情況：有色等四種，有邊等四種。第一種，執著于『我有色（rūpa，物質），死後非有想（n』eva saññī，既非有想）非無想（nāsaññī，亦非無想）』。執著色蘊為我，看到一些眾生進入非想非非想定（nevasaññānāsaññāyatana），他們的想不明確，因而產生這樣的執著。只有尋（vitakka）和伺（vicāra）生起，而沒有禪定（samādhi）。乃至廣為解說。第二種，執著于『我無色（arūpa，非物質），死後』如前所述。執著無色蘊為我等等。因為進入非想非非想定，想不明確，所以產生這樣的執著。乃至廣為解說。沒有等至，只有尋和伺生起。第三種，執著于『我亦有色亦無色，死後』如前所述。執著色蘊和無色蘊為我。看到一些眾生的想不明確，因而產生這樣的執著。只有尋和伺的人，乃至廣為解說。第四種，執著于『我非有色非無色』為我，死後如前所述。這是爲了駁斥第三種說法。 有邊等四種情況：第一種，執著于『我有邊，死後非有想非無想』。乃至第四種，執著于『我非有邊非無邊，死後非有想非無想』。所有這些都是執著無色蘊為我。已經證得非想非非想處定（nevasaññānāsaññāyatana-samāpatti），可能產生這種執著。第一種情況，因為那個禪定狀態的時間短暫，所以以一一蘊（khandha，構成要素）為所緣（ārammaṇa，目標），執著于『我有邊』。第二種情況，因為那個禪定狀態的時間長久，所以總以四蘊為所緣，執著于『我無邊』。第三種情況，因為那個禪定狀態的時間或短或長，或者以一一蘊或者總以四蘊為我，所以形成第三句。第四種情況，就是爲了駁斥第三種說法。以上屬於常見（sassata-diṭṭhi，永恒論）所攝。 七種斷滅論（uccheda-diṭṭhi，斷滅論）：第一種，『我有色，以粗四大種（mahābhūta，地、水、火、風）所造為自性，死後斷滅，畢竟沒有』。看到身體死後，有而無的緣故。無論是自己還是他人的我，都以粗大的四大種所造，死後斷滅。現在這個身體也可以，後生到其他身體也可以。後面都依此準則。第二種，『我欲界天（kāmadhātu-deva，欲界天神）死後斷滅』。第三種，『我梵天（brahmadeva，色界天神）死後斷滅』。第四種，『我空無邊處（ākāsānañcāyatana，空無邊處）死後斷滅』。第五種，『我識處（viññāṇañcāyatana，識無邊處）死後斷滅』。第六種，『我無所有處（ākiñcaññāyatana，無所有處）死後斷滅』。第七種，『我非想（nevasaññā，非想）』

【English Translation】 English version: Rolled up or spread out (the scriptures). And so on, extensively explained. Four attachments: I (ātman) is finite (having boundaries) / infinite (without boundaries), after death, without perception (saññā). This is to refute the third statement. Both attainment (samāpatti, meditative absorption) and initial and sustained application of mind (vitakka-vicāra, coarse and subtle mental activities) can arise. Eight cases of neither: four of having form, etc., and four of having boundaries, etc. First, clinging to 'I have form (rūpa, matter), after death, neither with perception (n'eva saññī, neither having perception) nor without perception (nāsaññī, nor without perception)'. Clinging to the form aggregate as self, seeing some beings entering the realm of neither perception nor non-perception (nevasaññānāsaññāyatana), their perception is unclear, thus giving rise to such clinging. Only initial (vitakka) and sustained application (vicāra) arise, but not meditative absorption (samādhi). And so on, extensively explained. Second, clinging to 'I am formless (arūpa, immaterial), after death' as before. Clinging to the formless aggregates as self, etc. Because of entering the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, perception is unclear, thus giving rise to such clinging. And so on, extensively explained. There is no attainment, only initial and sustained application of mind arise. Third, clinging to 'I am both with form and without form, after death' as before. Clinging to both form and formless aggregates as self. Seeing some beings' perception is unclear, thus giving rise to such clinging. Only those with initial and sustained application of mind, and so on, extensively explained. Fourth, clinging to 'I am neither with form nor without form' as self, after death as before. This is to refute the third statement. Four cases of having boundaries, etc.: First, clinging to 'I have boundaries, after death, neither with perception nor without perception'. And so on, to the fourth, clinging to 'I am neither with boundaries nor without boundaries, after death, neither with perception nor without perception'. All these are clinging to the formless aggregates as self. Having attained the attainment of the realm of neither perception nor non-perception (nevasaññānāsaññāyatana-samāpatti), this clinging may arise. First case, because the time of that meditative state is short, therefore taking each aggregate (khandha, constituent element) as object (ārammaṇa, target), clinging to 'I have boundaries'. Second case, because the time of that meditative state is long, therefore taking all four aggregates as object, clinging to 'I am without boundaries'. Third case, because the time of that meditative state is either short or long, or taking each aggregate or all four aggregates as self, thus forming the third statement. The fourth case is to refute the third statement. The above are included in the eternalism (sassata-diṭṭhi, eternalist view). Seven annihilationist views (uccheda-diṭṭhi, annihilationist view): First, 'I have form, with the nature of being made of the coarse four great elements (mahābhūta, earth, water, fire, wind), after death, annihilated, ultimately non-existent'. Seeing that after the death of the body, there is existence and then non-existence. Whether it is one's own self or another's self, it is made of the coarse four great elements, and is annihilated after death. This present body is also possible, and being born into another body is also possible. The following are all based on this principle. Second, 'I, a deva of the desire realm (kāmadhātu-deva, deity of the desire realm), am annihilated after death'. Third, 'I, a Brahmā (brahmadeva, deity of the form realm), am annihilated after death'. Fourth, 'I, the sphere of infinite space (ākāsānañcāyatana, the dimension of infinite space), am annihilated after death'. Fifth, 'I, the sphere of infinite consciousness (viññāṇañcāyatana, the dimension of infinite consciousness), am annihilated after death'. Sixth, 'I, the sphere of nothingness (ākiñcaññāyatana, the dimension of nothingness), am annihilated after death'. Seventh, 'I, neither perception (nevasaññā, neither perception)'

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非非想處死後斷滅。此中后四執彼彼地為生死頂。故有想已下見皆依死後故名后際　問何故不說色界別地。乃說欲界為二。無色為四耶　答據實而言。依一一地處。各有斷滅論。然彼本計無色。無形修定加行難可得成。彼定若起必是加行。以更不見有上地法乃別計斷滅。色界有形加行易起。可見后地法。不別計為斷滅。但約總界說為斷滅。其實地地皆有。欲界之中。人．天趣異。故別別開。論實處處皆別起斷。若廣分別如毗婆沙。其等等十四不可記事中無常斷見。如前已說。

論。三邪見至名義遍故。

述曰。謗因者。謂對法雲。謂無施與。無愛樂。無祠祀。無妙行。無惡行等。謗果者。謂無妙行．及惡行業所招異熟。謗作用者。無此世間。無彼世間無母．無父．無化生有情等。謗實事者。謂無世間真阿羅漢等。及四見外余邪分別。即對法說言。謂餘一切分別倒見。五十八說。此有二種。一增益。謂餘四見。二損減。此謗因等名損減。故對法雲。一多分是損減見。即有邊等是增益見。即無因論等是損減等。謗因果等。對法第一．瑜伽第八．五十八並相違。如別抄會。然此見寬如增上緣。余所不攝皆此攝故。一者名寬不正名邪。一切不正見皆此所攝。二者義遍諸邪解者皆入此攝。

論。此見差別至不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 認為在非非想處天（既非有想也非無想的禪定境界）死後會完全斷滅。這些外道執著于將各個禪定境界視為生死的頂點。因此，從『有想』天以下的所有邪見，都是基於死後斷滅的觀點，所以被稱為『后際』。 問：為什麼不說其他各個禪定境界，而只說欲界分為二種（人、天），無色界分為四種呢？ 答：這是根據實際情況而言。依據每一個禪定境界，都有關於斷滅的論調。然而，那些外道認為，在無色界，由於沒有形體，修習禪定加行很難成就。如果禪定生起，必定是經過加行努力的結果。因為他們看不到更高層次的法，所以特別計較斷滅。而有形體的眾生，加行容易生起，也容易看到更高層次的法，所以不特別計較斷滅，只是總的來說認為斷滅。實際上，每一個禪定境界都有斷滅的觀點。在欲界中，人和天的趣向不同，所以分別開列。實際上，處處都有斷滅的產生。如果廣泛分別，就像《毗婆沙論》所說的那樣。在等等十四種不可記事中，關於無常和斷見的觀點，前面已經說過了。

論：三種邪見，是因為名義普遍的緣故。

述曰：誹謗因果的人，根據《對法論》的說法，是指認為沒有佈施、沒有愛樂、沒有祭祀、沒有善行、沒有惡行等等。誹謗果報的人，是指認為沒有善行和惡行所招感的不同果報。誹謗作用的人，是指認為沒有此世間、沒有彼世間、沒有父母、沒有化生有情等等。誹謗實事的人，是指認為沒有世間的真阿羅漢等等，以及四種常見之外的其他邪分別。也就是《對法論》所說的，指其他一切分別顛倒的見解。《五十八說》中說，這有二種，一是增益見，指四種常見；二是損減見，指誹謗因果等。所以《對法論》說，大部分是損減見，即有邊見等是增益見，即無因論等是損減見等等。關於誹謗因果等，《對法論》第一卷、《瑜伽師地論》第八卷、《五十八說》的說法互相違背，就像其他抄本所彙集的。然而，這種邪見範圍很寬，就像增上緣一樣，其他沒有包含的都包含在這裡。一是名稱寬泛，凡是不正的都稱為邪，一切不正見都包含在這裡。二是意義普遍，所有邪解的人都包含在這裡。

論：這種邪見的差別，在於不...

【English Translation】 English version: The view that after death in the Neither-perception-nor-non-perception realm (the state of meditative absorption that is neither with perception nor without perception), there is complete annihilation. These heretics cling to considering each of these realms as the summit of birth and death. Therefore, all wrong views from the 'perception' realm downwards are based on the view of annihilation after death, hence they are called 'posterior limits'. Question: Why not speak of other separate realms, but only say that the desire realm is divided into two (humans and gods), and the formless realm into four? Answer: This is according to the actual situation. Based on each meditative realm, there are arguments about annihilation. However, those heretics believe that in the formless realm, because there is no form, it is difficult to achieve the preliminary practices of meditative absorption. If meditative absorption arises, it must be the result of preliminary effort. Because they cannot see higher-level dharmas, they particularly calculate annihilation. Whereas beings with form, preliminary practices are easy to arise, and it is easy to see higher-level dharmas, so they do not particularly calculate annihilation, but generally consider annihilation. In reality, every meditative realm has the view of annihilation arising. Within the desire realm, the tendencies of humans and gods are different, so they are listed separately. In reality, annihilation arises everywhere. If we make broad distinctions, as stated in the Vibhasa. In the fourteen unrecordable matters, the views on impermanence and annihilation have already been discussed earlier.

Treatise: The three wrong views are due to the universality of names and meanings.

Commentary: Those who slander cause and effect, according to the Abhidharma, refer to those who believe that there is no giving, no delight, no sacrifice, no good conduct, no bad conduct, etc. Those who slander the result, refer to those who believe that there are no different results brought about by good and bad conduct. Those who slander the function, refer to those who believe that there is no this world, no other world, no mother, no father, no beings born by transformation, etc. Those who slander reality, refer to those who believe that there are no true Arhats in the world, etc., and other wrong discriminations besides the four common views. That is, as the Abhidharma says, referring to all other discriminating inverted views. The Fifty-eight Views say that there are two types: one is the view of increase, referring to the four common views; the other is the view of decrease, referring to the slander of cause and effect, etc. Therefore, the Abhidharma says that most are views of decrease, i.e., the view of finite limits is a view of increase, i.e., the theory of no cause is a view of decrease, etc. Regarding the slander of cause and effect, etc., the statements in the first volume of the Abhidharma, the eighth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, and the Fifty-eight Views contradict each other, as compiled in other copies. However, this view is broad, like the dominant condition, and everything not included elsewhere is included here. First, the name is broad, and everything that is not correct is called wrong, and all wrong views are included here. Second, the meaning is universal, and all those with wrong interpretations are included here.

Treatise: The difference in this view lies in not...

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死矯亂。

述曰。二無因者。一從無想天沒來生此間得宿住通。不能憶彼出心已前所有諸位。便執諸法本因無而起。諸法如我亦應一切本無而生。便執我及世間無因而起。二由尋伺不憶前身作如是執。無因而起乃至廣說。如是二見由無想天。虛忘尋伺二事而起　問此中何故但說二無因。亦有不知欲界。乃至第四定以前多身。應計無因故　答據實亦有地地不知因所從起執無因者。但宿住通無想沒顯但說其一。又約一生卻尋無想出心已前。微細位難見故。彼計無因。餘地前生因粗易見故。不計無因。四有邊者。一由一向能憶下至無間地獄上至第四靜慮天。執我于中悉皆遍滿。便作是念。過此有我我應能見。故知有邊　二由一向能憶傍無邊執我遍滿故執無邊　三由能憶下上如初近遠傍如第二不得邊際。于上下起有邊想于傍起無邊想。四由能憶壞劫分位。便生非有邊非無邊想。諸器世間無所得故。此四皆憶成壞劫故。得說前際　四不死矯亂者。不死謂天。以天長壽外道執為常住不死。由答不死天無亂問故得生彼天。今毀之言名為矯亂　一念我不知善不善等。有餘問我不得定答。我若定答。勿他鑒我無知因即輕笑。我于天秘密義不應皆說等　二行諂曲者作是思惟。非我凈天一切隱密皆許記別。謂自所證及修凈道故作如前語

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 死矯亂。

述曰：二無因者，一是由於從無想天（非想非非想處天，色界頂層天）去世后投生到人間，獲得了宿住通（一種神通，能回憶前世），但無法回憶起出離無想天心識之前的種種狀態，於是就執著認為諸法本無因而生起。他們認為諸法，包括『我』，也應該都是本無而生。因此就執著認為『我』以及世間都是無因而生起的。二是由於尋伺（粗略和精細的思考）能力不足，無法憶起前世，因而產生這樣的執著，認為萬事萬物都是無因而生起，乃至廣說。 像這樣的兩種見解，是由於從無想天而來，以及虛妄的尋伺這兩種原因而產生的。 問：為什麼這裡只說了兩種無因論？也有人因為不知道欲界（眾生有情慾和物質慾望的生存空間），乃至第四禪定（色界最高的禪定）之前多生的事情，也應該會認為萬事萬物是無因而生的吧？ 答：實際上也有各個層次的眾生因為不知道事物的原因是從哪裡產生的，而執著認為是無因而生的。但是因為宿住通和從無想天去世這兩個情況比較明顯，所以只說其中一種。另外，如果只追溯一生，那麼無想天出心識之前的微細狀態難以察覺，因此他們會認為那是無因而生的。而其他層次的前世因果比較容易看到，因此不會認為是無因而生的。 四有邊者，一是由於只能憶起下至無間地獄（八大地獄中最苦之處），上至第四靜慮天（色界最高的禪定）。執著認為『我』在其中完全遍滿，於是就認為，超過這個範圍之外還有『我』的話，『我』應該能夠看到。因此就認為宇宙是有邊際的。 二是由只能憶起旁邊是無邊無際的，執著認為『我』遍滿整個空間，因此就認為宇宙是無邊際的。 三是由於能憶起上下如同第一種情況，近處和遠處如同第二種情況，無法得知邊際。對於上下產生有邊際的想法，對於旁邊產生無邊際的想法。 四是由於能憶起壞劫（世界毀滅的時期）的分位，於是產生非有邊非無邊的想法。因為器世間（眾生所居住的環境）無法找到邊際。這四種情況都是因為能憶起世界的成住壞空，所以才能說出前世的事情。 四不死矯亂者，不死指的是天（天人）。因為天人的壽命很長，外道（佛教以外的宗教）執著認為是常住不滅的。由於回答關於不死天的問題時含糊其辭，因此才能投生到天界。現在批判這種說法，稱之為矯亂。 一是認為『我』不知道什麼是善，什麼是不善等等。如果有人問我，我無法給出確定的答案。如果我給出確定的答案，別人可能會認為我無知而輕視嘲笑我。關於天的秘密意義，我不應該全部都說出來等等。 二是行為諂媚的人這樣思考：我並非是清凈的天人，一切隱秘的事情都可以如實記述。爲了維護自己所證得的境界以及所修的清凈之道，所以才像之前那樣含糊其辭。

【English Translation】 English version Death and Evasion.

Explanation: 'Two without cause' refers to two situations. First, someone who is reborn in this world after dying from the Heaven of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception (the highest heaven in the Realm of Form), and who has attained the power of remembering past lives (宿住通), but cannot recall the states before the mind left the Heaven of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception. Therefore, they cling to the idea that all phenomena arise without a cause. They believe that all phenomena, including 'I,' should also arise without a cause. Thus, they cling to the idea that 'I' and the world arise without a cause. Second, due to insufficient contemplation and investigation (尋伺), they cannot recall their past lives, and thus develop the belief that all things arise without a cause, and so on. These two views arise from being from the Heaven of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception and from false contemplation and investigation. Question: Why are only two types of causelessness discussed here? There are also those who, because they do not know about their many lives before the Realm of Desire (欲界, the realm where beings have desires for sensual pleasures and material things) or even the Fourth Dhyana (第四禪定, the highest state of meditation in the Realm of Form), should also believe that all things arise without a cause, right? Answer: In reality, there are beings at every level who, because they do not know where the cause of things arises, cling to the idea that they arise without a cause. However, because the power of remembering past lives and dying from the Heaven of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception are more obvious, only one of them is mentioned. Furthermore, if one only traces back one lifetime, the subtle states before the mind left the Heaven of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception are difficult to perceive, so they believe that it arises without a cause. The causes and effects of previous lives in other realms are easier to see, so they do not believe that they arise without a cause. 'Four with boundaries' refers to someone who can only remember down to the Avici Hell (無間地獄, the most painful of the eight great hells) and up to the Fourth Dhyana Heaven (第四靜慮天, the highest state of meditation in the Realm of Form). They cling to the idea that 'I' completely pervades within this range, and thus believe that if 'I' exists beyond this range, 'I' should be able to see it. Therefore, they believe that the universe has boundaries. The second is someone who can only remember that the sides are boundless, clinging to the idea that 'I' pervades the entire space, and thus believes that the universe is boundless. The third is someone who can remember the top and bottom like the first case, and the near and far like the second case, but cannot know the boundaries. They have the idea of boundaries for the top and bottom, and the idea of boundlessness for the sides. The fourth is someone who can remember the stages of the destruction of the world (壞劫, the period of destruction of a world), and thus have the idea of neither boundaries nor boundlessness. Because the vessel world (器世間, the environment where beings live) cannot be found to have boundaries. All four of these cases are because they can remember the formation, existence, destruction, and emptiness of the world, so they can talk about past lives. 'Four evasions about immortality' refers to the heavens (天, devas). Because the lives of the devas are very long, non-Buddhist religions (外道) cling to the idea that they are permanent and immortal. Because they answered questions about the immortal heavens vaguely, they were able to be reborn in the heavens. Now, criticizing this kind of statement is called evasion. The first is thinking, 'I do not know what is good and what is not good, etc. If someone asks me, I cannot give a definite answer. If I give a definite answer, others may think I am ignorant and despise and laugh at me. I should not tell all the secret meanings about the heavens, etc.' The second is someone who acts flatteringly, thinking, 'I am not a pure deva, and I cannot truthfully record everything that is hidden. In order to maintain the state I have attained and the pure path I am cultivating, I speak vaguely as before.'

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三懷恐怖而無記別。勿我昧劣為他所知。由是因緣不得解脫。以此為失而自安處。懷恐怖故。如前廣說　四有愚戇專修止行不能矯言。但作是思。諸有問我我當返誥。隨彼所問我當一切隨言無減而印順之。此待未來亦名前際。然于現轉。又四皆緣先所聞教。皆前際攝。此四第一依怖無知。二行諂曲。三懷恐怖。四為愚戇而起。

論。及計后際五現涅槃。

述曰。一見現在受若人．天五欲樂。便謂涅槃。二厭五欲現住初定以為涅槃。引在身中名為得樂。見他現在住定亦爾。下皆準知。三厭欲．尋．伺故。現住第二定以為涅槃。四厭諸欲尋伺．喜故。現住第三定以為涅槃。五厭諸欲乃至入出息。現住第四定以為般涅　待過去故名為后際。又此執我現既有樂。后亦有樂故后際攝。現樂為先執后樂故。總名現法。然于無色不計涅槃者。以樂怡悅輕微不及色界故。此中且據地全作法。據實無色及欲天等處。各有計為涅槃者。前之斷滅人．天別開。今此涅槃人．天合者。彼依我后別起斷故。此總計涅槃故合之也。此等皆不依我見起故邪見攝。

論。或計自在至常恒不易。

述曰。自在者自在天也。

世主即是大自在天。為世間主　釋謂帝釋　梵謂梵王　余物類者。謂自性等。此未得定。及已得定

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 三、懷著恐懼而沒有明確的辨別能力，擔心自己愚昧無知被他人識破，因此無法獲得解脫，並以此為損失而自我安慰，心懷恐懼，情況如前文廣泛描述的那樣。 四、有些人愚笨遲鈍，只專注于修習止禪，不善於巧妙言辭。他們只是這樣想：『如果有人問我問題，我就反過來告訴他。無論他問什麼，我都將完全按照他的話語，不加刪減地印證和順從。』這種期待未來（得到解答）的情況也稱為前際。然而，對於當下的轉變，這四種情況都依賴於先前聽聞的教導，因此都屬於前際的範疇。這四種情況，第一種是基於恐懼和無知而產生，第二種是行為諂媚，第三種是心懷恐懼，第四種是由於愚笨遲鈍而產生。

論：以及執著于現世涅槃的五種情況。

述曰：一、認為現在享受人或天界的五種慾望之樂就是涅槃。二、厭惡五欲，現在安住于初禪，認為這就是涅槃。認為在自身中獲得了快樂。看到他人現在安住于禪定也這樣認為，以下情況都可以類推得知。三、厭惡慾望、尋、伺，因此現在安住于第二禪，認為這就是涅槃。四、厭惡各種慾望、尋伺、喜，因此現在安住于第三禪，認為這就是涅槃。五、厭惡各種慾望，乃至入出息，現在安住于第四禪，認為這就是般涅槃。因為期待過去（的快樂），所以稱為后際。又因為他們認為現在有快樂，將來也會有快樂，所以屬於后際的範疇。以現在的快樂為先導，執著于將來的快樂。總稱為現法。然而，在無色界中，他們不認為那是涅槃，因為那裡的快樂、怡悅非常輕微，不如（有形）的慾望。這裡暫且按照地界完全作為修行方法來說。實際上，在無色界以及欲界天等地方，各有認為那是涅槃的情況。前文的斷滅見，人、天分別列出。現在這個涅槃見，人、天合併列出，是因為前者是依據我見，在死後分別產生斷滅的觀點。這裡是總的執著于涅槃，所以合併列出。這些都不依賴於我見而產生，所以屬於邪見。

論：或者執著于自在天乃至常恒不變。

述曰：自在，指的是自在天（Maheśvara）。

世主，就是大自在天（Maheśvara），是世間的主宰。釋，指的是帝釋天（Indra）。梵，指的是梵天（Brahmā）。其餘物類，指的是自性等。這些人沒有獲得禪定，以及已經獲得禪定。

【English Translation】 English version 3. They harbor terror and lack clear discernment, fearing that their ignorance will be discovered by others, thus preventing them from attaining liberation. They console themselves with this loss, dwelling in fear, as described extensively earlier. 4. Some are foolish and dull, focusing solely on cultivating cessation (止, zhi) and not skilled in eloquent speech. They merely think: 'If someone asks me a question, I will answer him in return. Whatever he asks, I will completely affirm and agree with his words without any reduction.' This anticipation of the future (of receiving answers) is also called the 'prior extreme' (前際, pūrvānta). However, regarding the present transformation, all four situations rely on previously heard teachings, thus all belong to the category of the 'prior extreme'. The first of these four situations arises from fear and ignorance, the second is characterized by flattery, the third harbors terror, and the fourth arises from foolishness and dullness.

Treatise: And the five cases of clinging to present Nirvana.

Commentary: 1. Seeing the enjoyment of the five desires of humans or gods in the present, they consider it Nirvana. 2. Disgusted with the five desires, they now abide in the first dhyana (初禪, prathama-dhyāna) and consider it Nirvana, thinking they have attained happiness within themselves. Seeing others now abiding in dhyana, they think the same. The following cases can be understood analogously. 3. Disgusted with desire, vitarka (尋, vitarka), and vicara (伺, vicāra), they now abide in the second dhyana (第二禪, dvitīya-dhyāna) and consider it Nirvana. 4. Disgusted with all desires, vitarka, vicara, and joy, they now abide in the third dhyana (第三禪, tṛtīya-dhyāna) and consider it Nirvana. 5. Disgusted with all desires, even inhalation and exhalation, they now abide in the fourth dhyana (第四禪, caturtha-dhyāna) and consider it parinirvana (般涅槃, parinirvāṇa). Because they anticipate past (happiness), it is called the 'posterior extreme' (後際, aparantānta). Also, because they believe that they have happiness now and will have happiness in the future, it belongs to the category of the 'posterior extreme'. Taking present happiness as a precursor, they cling to future happiness. It is collectively called 'present dharma' (現法, dṛṣṭadharma). However, in the formless realms (無色界, arūpadhātu), they do not consider it Nirvana because the happiness and delight there are very subtle and not as good as (sensual) desires. Here, it is temporarily discussed according to the complete method of practice in the realms of form. In reality, in the formless realms and the heavens of the desire realm (欲界, kāmadhātu), there are those who consider it Nirvana. The previous annihilationism (斷滅, uccheda) was listed separately for humans and gods. This view of Nirvana is listed together for humans and gods because the former is based on the view of self, with the view of annihilation arising separately after death. Here, it is a general clinging to Nirvana, so it is listed together. These do not arise based on the view of self, so they belong to wrong views (邪見, mithyā-dṛṣṭi).

Treatise: Or clinging to Maheśvara (自在天, Maheśvara) as constant and unchanging.

Commentary: 'Maheśvara' refers to the god Maheśvara.

The lord of the world is the great Maheśvara, the master of the world. 'Śakra' refers to Indra (帝釋天, Indra). 'Brahmā' refers to Brahmā (梵天, Brahmā). 'Other kinds of things' refers to prakriti (自性, prakṛti), etc. These people have not attained dhyana, and have already attained dhyana.

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。不計彼為我。但計彼為常。故皆是邪見。不緣我有斷．常故　問無不得彼定別計彼為我。世間不計他地為我故。若設許得彼定得起上惑。此我見緣彼為我。我身在此未有色界法。計何為我。若緣欲界身計有我。亦是我見緣他地起　然有義者。謂色界我見總緣現身為我。即通有色界法。此我見是總緣故得緣他地。若別計一色等為我。即無他地緣。下論說然。此義應思。此計自在等如五十八。是計苦諦下邪見。

論。或計自在等至諸邪解脫。

述曰。即一切物因。集諦邪見。然不計為勝。設計為勝。然非見．戒及彼眷屬。故是邪見攝。非戒取攝。計諸邪解脫。是滅諦下邪見。雖非勝計勝。然非見．戒眷屬。又不計能得凈故。非見．戒取。

論。或有忘執至皆耶見攝。

述曰。計非道為。是道諦下邪見。雖非勝計勝。以非戒眷屬非戒取。又不計為勝故非戒取。至下當知　諸如是等者。謂等取十四不可記中有邊等四。是此中攝故。然六十二見。準五十八文。若邊見中攝唯苦諦斷。緣苦諦為我增長。邊見隨我斷故。邪見中攝彼自說。二無因唯集諦。五現法涅槃唯滅諦。迷有漏因迷涅槃果故。邊無邊等四。是苦．滅二諦下。迷有漏．無漏果生故。不死矯亂通四諦下斷。問答四諦。及迷四諦故。既無邊見

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不認為那個（五蘊）是我，卻認為那個是常（恒常不變的），所以這些都是邪見。因為我不執著于斷滅或常恒，所以沒有這些邪見。問：如果沒有得到彼定（指外道的禪定），是否就不能特別地認為那個（五蘊）是我？答：世間上不會認為其他地方（的五蘊）是我。如果假設得到了彼定，就能生起上界的迷惑。這種我見是緣于彼定而認為那個是我。我的身體在這裡，還沒有得到彼定，那麼認為什麼是我呢？如果緣于欲界的身而認為有我，這也是我見緣于其他地方而生起的。然而，有義理分析者認為，根本的我見總是緣于現在的身體而認為是我，這樣就貫通了有漏法和無漏法。這種我見是總緣，所以能夠緣于其他地方。如果分別地認為一個色等是我，就沒有其他地方的緣。下文會討論這些。這個認為自在天等是我，就像五十八見一樣，是苦諦下的邪見。

論：或者認為自在天等是萬物的根本，直到各種錯誤的解脫。

述：這就是一切事物的起因，是集諦的邪見。然而，不認為自在天等是殊勝的，卻設計認為是殊勝的。然而，這些不是見、戒以及它們的眷屬，所以是被邪見所包含，而不是被戒禁取見所包含。認為各種錯誤的解脫，是滅諦下的邪見。雖然不是殊勝地認為殊勝，然而不是見、戒的眷屬。又不認為能夠得到清凈，所以不是見取見或戒禁取見。

論：或者有忘失執著，直到所有這些都被邪見所包含。

述：認為不是正道是道，這是道諦下的邪見。雖然不是殊勝地認為殊勝，因為不是戒的眷屬，所以不是戒禁取見。又不認為是殊勝的，所以不是戒禁取見。下文會知道這些。諸如此類的，是指等同於十四不可記中的有邊等四種。這些都被包含在這裡。然而，六十二見，按照五十八見的文義，如果邊見中只包含苦諦的斷見，緣于苦諦而認為是我，增長了我見，邊見隨著我見而斷滅。邪見中包含著他們自己所說的。兩種無因論只包含集諦，五種現法涅槃論只包含滅諦，迷惑于有漏的因，迷惑于涅槃的果。有邊無邊等四種，是苦諦和滅諦兩種諦下的，迷惑于有漏和無漏的果的產生。不死矯亂論貫通四諦，問答四諦，以及迷惑於四諦。既然沒有邊見……

【English Translation】 English version: Not considering 'that' (the five skandhas) as 'me,' but considering 'that' as permanent, therefore, all these are wrong views. Because I do not cling to annihilation or permanence, therefore, there are no such wrong views. Question: If one has not attained 'that' samadhi (referring to the samadhi of externalists), can one not specifically consider 'that' (the five skandhas) as 'me'? Answer: In the world, one would not consider the (five skandhas) in another place as 'me.' If, hypothetically, one attains 'that' samadhi, then upper realm delusions can arise. This view of self arises from relying on 'that' samadhi and considering 'that' as 'me.' My body is here, and I have not yet attained 'that' samadhi, so what is considered 'me'? If one relies on the body of the desire realm and considers there to be a 'me,' this is also a view of self arising from relying on another place. However, some analysts argue that the fundamental view of self always relies on the present body and considers it as 'me,' thus connecting defiled and undefiled dharmas. This view of self is a general reliance, so it can rely on another place. If one separately considers one color, etc., as 'me,' then there is no reliance on another place. These will be discussed below. This considering of Ishvara (自在) etc., as 'me' is like the sixty-two views, and is a wrong view under the truth of suffering (苦諦).

Treatise: Or considering Ishvara (自在) etc., as the cause of all things, up to various wrong liberations.

Commentary: This is the cause of all things, a wrong view under the truth of accumulation (集諦). However, not considering Ishvara (自在) etc., as superior, but designing them to be superior. However, these are not views, precepts, or their retinues, so they are included in wrong views, not in adherence to precepts. Considering various wrong liberations is a wrong view under the truth of cessation (滅諦). Although not considering them superior in a superior way, they are not retinues of views or precepts. Also, not considering that one can attain purity, so they are not clinging to views or precepts.

Treatise: Or having forgotten clinging, until all these are included in wrong views.

Commentary: Considering what is not the path as the path, this is a wrong view under the truth of the path (道諦). Although not considering it superior in a superior way, because it is not a retinue of precepts, it is not adherence to precepts. Also, not considering it superior, so it is not adherence to precepts. These will be known below. Such things as these refer to the four among the fourteen unanswerable questions, such as having an end, etc. These are all included here. However, the sixty-two views, according to the meaning of the fifty-eight views, if the extreme views only include the annihilation view of the truth of suffering, relying on the truth of suffering and considering it as 'me,' increasing the view of self, the extreme view ceases along with the view of self. Wrong views include what they themselves say. The two causeless theories only include the truth of accumulation, the five present-life Nirvana theories only include the truth of cessation, being deluded about the defiled cause, being deluded about the fruit of Nirvana. The four having an end and not having an end, etc., are under the two truths of suffering and cessation, being deluded about the arising of defiled and undefiled fruits. The immortal evasive theories connect all four truths, questioning and answering the four truths, and being deluded about the four truths. Since there are no extreme views...

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中攝者苦諦斷文。但準二十句見見苦諦斷。即六十二中所隨我見亦爾。八十八云二十句見為依。發六十二見等故。

論。四見取至所依為業。

述曰。此于諸見即餘一切惡見。及此所依五蘊執為最勝。能得涅槃清凈法是見取。由此各各互執為勝諸見等故。一切外道斗諍因斯而起。若執非見及眷屬外余法為勝。得涅槃。或但執為勝非見取。大論第五十八初文。及迷四諦合與此同說。如小乘俱舍等。應言見等取。但執非勝為勝。皆見取故。此則不然。無前後別計。然於一聚見及眷屬方是此故。以所緣中見最勝故。言等亦得。至下當知。

論。五戒禁取至所依為業。

述曰。謂依諸見所受戒。說此戒為勝。順諸見戒。及戒所依五蘊眷屬執。為勝及能得涅槃凈名戒取。戒即是禁。戒性．遮別。由此戒一切外道。受持拔髮等無利勤苦故。除戒及眷屬外執餘一切法勝。及能為因得清凈。戒雖不執勝。但言能為因。並非戒取攝。亦大論五十八卷上下五處文同此說故。

問如對法第一．大論第八二文顯揚第一五蘊等。皆云見取執為最勝。不言能得凈。戒取名得凈不言是勝。與小乘等同。何故此中乃言見執見眷屬為最勝能凈。戒執戒眷屬為勝能得凈。

論。然有處說至或隨轉門。

述曰。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 中攝者苦諦斷文。但按照二十句見解來斷除見苦諦，即六十二見中所包含的隨我見也是如此。八十八結中說二十句見解是六十二見的依據，由此產生六十二種見解等。

論：四見取，以執著所依為業。

述記：這裡所說的見取，是指對於各種見解，即其餘一切惡見，以及這些惡見所依的五蘊，執著為最殊勝，認為能夠由此獲得涅槃清凈之法。由於各自互相執著為殊勝的見解等，一切外道的爭鬥由此而起。如果執著非見解及其眷屬之外的其他法為殊勝，能夠獲得涅槃，或者僅僅執著為殊勝而非見取，正如《大毗婆沙論》第五十八卷開頭所說，以及迷惑四諦的情況，都與此相同。如小乘《俱舍論》等，應該說是見等取，僅僅執著非殊勝為殊勝，都是見取。但這樣說並不正確，因為沒有前後差別之計。然而，對於同一聚集的見解及其眷屬，才是見取，因為在所緣境中，見解最為殊勝，所以說『等』也是可以的，下文將會說明。

論：五戒禁取，以執著所依為業。

述記：指依據各種見解所受持的戒律，認為這種戒律是殊勝的，順應各種見解的戒律，以及戒律所依的五蘊眷屬，執著為殊勝，並且認為能夠由此獲得涅槃清凈，這叫做戒禁取。戒律就是禁制，戒律的性質是遮止。由於這種戒律，一切外道受持拔髮等無益的勤苦。除了戒律及其眷屬之外，執著其餘一切法為殊勝，並且認為能夠作為獲得清凈的原因，即使戒律不執著為殊勝，但認為能夠作為原因，也不屬於戒禁取。這與《大毗婆沙論》第五十八卷上下五處所說的內容相同。

問：如《對法論》第一、《大毗婆沙論》第八十二卷、《顯揚論》第一中，五蘊等都說是見取，執著為最殊勝，沒有說能夠獲得清凈。戒禁取說是能夠獲得清凈，沒有說是殊勝，與小乘等相同。為什麼這裡卻說見取執著見解及其眷屬為最殊勝能夠清凈，戒禁取執著戒律及其眷屬為殊勝能夠獲得清凈？

論：然而，有的地方說，或者隨順轉門。

【English Translation】 English version The section on severing the suffering truth in the Compendium. But according to the twenty views, the suffering truth is severed, that is, the self-view contained in the sixty-two views is also the same. The eighty-eight bonds say that the twenty views are the basis of the sixty-two views, and from this, sixty-two views and so on arise.

Treatise: The fourth, clinging to views (ditthi-upadana), has the function of clinging to what is relied upon.

Commentary: Here, 'clinging to views' refers to various views, that is, all other evil views, and the five aggregates (skandhas) on which these evil views rely, are clung to as the most superior, believing that one can obtain Nirvana and pure Dharma from them. Because each clings to their own views as superior, all external disputes arise from this. If one clings to things other than views and their retinue as superior, believing that one can obtain Nirvana, or merely clings to them as superior but not as clinging to views, as stated at the beginning of the 58th volume of the Mahavibhasa, and the confusion of the Four Noble Truths, are the same as this. As in the Kosa of the Hinayana, it should be said 'clinging to views and so on', merely clinging to what is not superior as superior, all are clinging to views. But this is not correct, because there is no distinction between before and after. However, only the views and their retinue in the same group are this, because views are the most superior in the object of thought, so 'and so on' is also possible, as will be explained below.

Treatise: The fifth, clinging to precepts and vows (silabbata-upadana), has the function of clinging to what is relied upon.

Commentary: It refers to the precepts and vows that are adhered to based on various views, believing that these precepts are superior, precepts that conform to various views, and the five aggregates and retinue on which the precepts rely, are clung to as superior, and it is believed that one can obtain Nirvana and purity from this, which is called clinging to precepts and vows. Precepts are prohibitions, and the nature of precepts is to prevent. Because of these precepts, all externalists endure fruitless diligence and suffering such as pulling out their hair. Apart from precepts and their retinue, clinging to all other things as superior, and believing that they can be the cause of obtaining purity, even if precepts are not clung to as superior, but are believed to be the cause, they are not included in clinging to precepts and vows. This is the same as what is said in five places in the upper and lower parts of the 58th volume of the Mahavibhasa.

Question: As in the first volume of the Abhidharma, the 82nd volume of the Mahavibhasa, and the first volume of the Samdhinirmochana Sutra, the five aggregates are all said to be clinging to views, clinging to them as the most superior, without saying that one can obtain purity. Clinging to precepts and vows is said to be able to obtain purity, without saying that it is superior, which is the same as the Hinayana. Why does it say here that clinging to views clings to views and their retinue as the most superior and able to purify, and clinging to precepts and vows clings to precepts and their retinue as superior and able to obtain purity?

Treatise: However, in some places it is said, or following the turning gate.

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有二解。一影略說。謂見取中說執為勝。明戒取中亦執為勝。于戒取中執為能凈。明見取中亦執為能凈。欲令學者智見生故。影略說也。若不爾者。五十八說執見及所依蘊。為能得清凈解脫名見取。亦戒取亦然。及彼解迷四諦中皆有此說。故知影說　又彼多文非為盡理。隨小乘相說。

論。不爾如何至非二取攝。

述曰。若非影說及隨轉者。即五十八迷四諦中。如滅諦下。非滅計滅。非勝計勝。故應是見取。迷道諦中。非道計道。亦得凈故應名戒取。彼非因計因。亦是邪見。如前邪見中說。既是邪見。明不執見．戒等故。及雖計勝不計為能得凈。及雖計能得不計為勝。故非見戒．取。此大小二乘別也。若爾何故大論第八。三種四倒見倒中雲。非凈計凈是見取。非樂計樂是戒取　今釋之言。彼亦計諸見．眷屬．不凈。為凈及能得凈故名見取。然文但明是見取故。略不言諸見。及眷屬能得凈。但言非凈計凈故。戒取亦然。謂計戒所受拔髮等苦。為樂．勝．能得凈是戒取。略不言戒．及眷屬．能得凈。但言計苦為樂也。若非見．眷屬。非凈為凈。及非戒．眷屬。非樂為樂。即非見戒取但是邪見也。如非道計道等。

諸門分別中。大以十二門分別。若細者即十五門。

論。如是總別至俱得生故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有兩種解釋。一種是影略說，認為在見取（Skt: dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa，對錯誤的見解的執取）中，執著于認為是殊勝的。同樣，在戒禁取（Skt: śīla-vrata-parāmarśa，對不正確的戒律和苦行的執取）中，也執著于認為是殊勝的。在戒禁取中，執著于認為是能夠帶來清凈的。同樣，在見取中，也執著于認為是能夠帶來清凈的。這是爲了讓學者產生智慧見解而做的影略說法。如果不是這樣，五十八種說法中，執著于見解以及作為見解所依之蘊，認為能夠得到清凈解脫，這被稱為見取。戒禁取也是如此。並且在他們對四聖諦的迷惑中，都有這種說法。因此可知這是影略說。並且那些大量的經文並非完全窮盡真理，而是隨順小乘的觀點而說的。

論：如果不是影略說，那又如何解釋不是兩種取所攝的情況呢？

述曰：如果不是影略說以及隨順小乘的說法，那麼在五十八種對四聖諦的迷惑中，比如在滅諦之下，將非滅（Skt: nirodha，寂滅）視為滅，將非勝視為勝，因此應該屬於見取。在迷惑道諦（Skt: mārga-satya，通往解脫的道路的真理）中，將非道視為道，也因為認為能夠帶來清凈，所以應該被稱為戒禁取。將非因視為因，這也是邪見。如前面邪見中所說。既然是邪見，就表明沒有執著于見、戒等，並且雖然認為是殊勝的，但不認為能夠得到清凈；或者雖然認為能夠得到清凈，但不認為是殊勝的。因此不屬於見取和戒禁取。這是大乘和小乘的區別。如果是這樣，那麼為何《大論》第八卷中，在三種四倒見倒中說，將非凈視為凈是見取，將非樂視為樂是戒禁取呢？現在解釋說，那裡也是執著于各種見解、眷屬、不凈，認為是清凈以及能夠帶來清凈，因此稱為見取。然而經文中只是說明是見取，所以省略了各種見解以及眷屬能夠帶來清凈的說法，只是說將非凈視為凈。戒禁取也是如此，認為戒律所受的拔髮等苦，是快樂、殊勝、能夠帶來清凈，這是戒禁取。省略了戒律以及眷屬能夠帶來清凈的說法，只是說認為苦是快樂。如果不是見解、眷屬，將非凈視為凈，以及不是戒律、眷屬，將非樂視為樂，那麼就不是見取和戒禁取，而只是邪見。比如將非道視為道等。

在諸門分別中，大體上以十二門來分別，如果細緻地分，就是十五門。

論：像這樣總的、別的，都是因為同時產生。

【English Translation】 English version: There are two explanations. One is the 'shadow abbreviation' explanation, which states that in dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa (grasping at wrong views), one clings to what is considered superior. Similarly, in śīla-vrata-parāmarśa (grasping at incorrect precepts and asceticism), one also clings to what is considered superior. In śīla-vrata-parāmarśa, one clings to what is considered capable of bringing purity. Similarly, in dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa, one also clings to what is considered capable of bringing purity. This is a 'shadow abbreviation' explanation to help scholars develop wise insights. If not, in the fifty-eight views, clinging to views and the aggregates on which views are based, considering them capable of attaining pure liberation, is called dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa. The same is true for śīla-vrata-parāmarśa. And in their confusion about the Four Noble Truths, there are such statements. Therefore, it is known that this is a 'shadow abbreviation' explanation. Moreover, those numerous texts do not fully exhaust the truth but are spoken in accordance with the perspective of the Hinayana.

Treatise: If it is not a 'shadow abbreviation,' how can the situation where it is not included in the two grasps be explained?

Commentary: If it is not a 'shadow abbreviation' explanation or in accordance with the Hinayana perspective, then in the fifty-eight confusions about the Four Noble Truths, such as under the Truth of Cessation (nirodha), considering non-cessation as cessation, considering non-superior as superior, it should belong to dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa. In the confusion about the Truth of the Path (mārga-satya), considering non-path as path, and also because it is considered capable of bringing purity, it should be called śīla-vrata-parāmarśa. Considering non-cause as cause is also a wrong view. As mentioned in the previous section on wrong views. Since it is a wrong view, it indicates that there is no clinging to views, precepts, etc., and although it is considered superior, it is not considered capable of attaining purity; or although it is considered capable of attaining purity, it is not considered superior. Therefore, it does not belong to dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa and śīla-vrata-parāmarśa. This is the difference between Mahayana and Hinayana. If so, then why does the eighth volume of the Great Treatise say, in the three inverted views of the four inversions, that considering non-purity as purity is dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa, and considering non-pleasure as pleasure is śīla-vrata-parāmarśa? Now, the explanation is that there, one also clings to various views, retinues, and impurity, considering them pure and capable of bringing purity, hence it is called dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa. However, the text only states that it is dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa, so it omits the statement that various views and retinues are capable of bringing purity, only saying that non-purity is considered purity. The same is true for śīla-vrata-parāmarśa, considering the suffering of hair-pulling, etc., undergone in precepts, as pleasure, superior, and capable of bringing purity, this is śīla-vrata-parāmarśa. It omits the statement that precepts and retinues are capable of bringing purity, only saying that suffering is considered pleasure. If it is not a view, retinue, considering non-purity as purity, and not a precept, retinue, considering non-pleasure as pleasure, then it is not dṛṣṭi-parāmarśa and śīla-vrata-parāmarśa, but only a wrong view. Such as considering non-path as path, etc.

In the distinctions of various doors, it is generally distinguished by twelve doors; if distinguished in detail, it is fifteen doors.

Treatise: Thus, the general and the specific both arise simultaneously.

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述曰。此初門中有二。初正分別。后異解釋。此等初也。若總若別但有十種。一俱生分別。謂貪等六者。鈍四。利二。通分別．俱生。除疑．三見。任運起故是俱生。思察生故是分別。顯揚第一．及大論第八。皆云此六通俱生分別故。

論。疑后三見至方得生故。

述曰。疑一．及邪見．見取．戒取四法唯分別起。諸論共同。要由惡友．及邪教．自分別三緣生故。總聚而望更無異說。

論。邊執見中至方引生故。

述曰。下異解釋。初義有三。一標宗。二引教。三舉事。此初也。俱生唯有斷見。以常見相粗故。何謂相粗。要惡友．邪教．及自分別生故。

謂要不達後有不無方起我斷。既得現觀知生多少。何故乃執我斷非常。

論。瑜伽等說至何所在耶。

述曰。此引教也。如瑜伽第八十八．雜集第三．及第七說。唯有斷見。故論言等。觀我為斷知身後無。準此唯言修道斷見。不見修道常見相故。

論。故禽獸等至而起驚怖。

述曰。此以世事釋成前義。

論。有義彼論至亦通常見。

述曰。下文有三。一會前標舉。二引事。三類教。此初也。修道俱生亦有常見。瑜伽等依粗相說故。何謂粗相。謂得現觀者入無我觀。已知分別我已斷訖。出觀

之時便生恐怖。今者我我何所在耶。即初我者俱生我也。又言我者分別我也。修道我義言我分別我何所在耶。依此初出觀時。緣涅槃起恐怖斷見。非修道中說無常見。

此如何等。

論。謂禽獸等至長時資生。

述曰。引事也。如禽獸等以執常存故。熾然造及集長時窟穴資具。集長時飲食資具。如恐我斷定有俱生。此以事證。

以教成者。

論。故顯揚等至或分別起。

述曰。類教也。顯揚第一。大論第八說故。於五蘊計常．斷。通俱生．分別。不簡俱生無常見故。釋現觀者。觀先所斷我無之時。但有斷見故唯說斷。非預流等許無常見　若爾前師如何釋后所引文　此依總語。非許常見亦通俱生。通俱生常見有何相狀。如禽獸造．集。但為有我非為計常。常必由邪分別等故。然此二說。初則文全理闕。後有文顯理全。俱生常見有相狀故。俱取無失。

論。此十煩惱誰幾相應。

述曰。此下第二自類相應。此問起已。

論。貪與瞋疑定不俱起。

述曰。答文有六。一貪。二瞋。三慢。四疑。五見。六癡為首。此初也。對法第六．大論五十五．五十八三說文同。

問何以貪．瞋不得俱起。

論。愛憎二境必不同故。

述曰。染．憎不俱。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：那時便會產生恐懼。現在我的『我』在哪裡呢？是指最初與生俱來的『我』，還是指分別產生的『我』呢？如果按照修道的意義來說，我所分別的『我』又在哪裡呢？依據這種情況，最初出觀的時候，因為緣于涅槃而產生恐懼和斷滅見，而不是在修道中說沒有常常見解。

這是指什麼情況呢？

論：是指禽獸等爲了長久地維持生存而積蓄資糧。

述記：這是引用的事例。例如禽獸等因為執著于常存的觀念，所以才會熱衷於建造和積聚長久的巢穴和資具，積聚長久的飲食資具。就像害怕『我』斷滅一樣，必定有與生俱來的我執。這是用事例來證明。

用教義來成就的是：

論：所以《顯揚聖教論》等說，或者是由分別產生的。

述記：這是類似教義的例子。《顯揚聖教論》第一卷，《大乘阿毗達磨集論》第八卷都這樣說。對於五蘊計度為常或斷，包括俱生和分別兩種情況，並沒有區分俱生就沒有常常見解。解釋現觀的時候，觀察先前所斷滅的『我』不存在的時候，只有斷滅見，所以只說斷滅。並非預流果等承認沒有常常見解。如果這樣，之前的老師如何解釋後面引用的經文呢？這是依據總體的說法，並非允許常常見解也包括俱生。貫通俱生常常見解有什麼樣的相狀呢？就像禽獸建造和積聚資具一樣，只是爲了有『我』，而不是爲了計度常。常常見解必定是由邪分別等產生的。然而這兩種說法，前者文辭完整但道理欠缺，後者文辭顯明道理周全。俱生常常見解有相狀的緣故，全部採納沒有缺失。

論：這十種煩惱，哪些是同時相應的？

述記：下面第二部分是自類相應。這個問題提出來了。

論：貪和嗔，以及疑，必定不會同時生起。

述記：回答的文句有六個部分。一是貪，二是嗔，三是慢，四是疑，五是見，六是癡為首。這是第一個部分。《對法論》第六卷、《大乘阿毗達磨集論》第五十五卷、第五十八卷三處所說的文句相同。

問：為什麼貪和嗔不能同時生起？

論：因為愛和憎的對象必定不同。

述記：愛染和憎恨不會同時存在。

【English Translation】 English version: At that time, terror arises. Where is my 'I' now? Is it the 'I' that is innate, or the 'I' that is conceptually constructed? If according to the meaning of cultivation, where is the 'I' that I conceptually construct? Based on this situation, at the initial emergence from contemplation, due to being attached to Nirvana, terror and annihilationist views arise, rather than saying in cultivation that there is no permanent view.

What kind of situation is this?

Treatise: It refers to birds and beasts, etc., accumulating resources for long-term survival.

Commentary: This is a cited example. For example, birds and beasts, etc., because of their attachment to the idea of permanence, fervently build and accumulate long-term nests and resources, and accumulate long-term food resources. Just like fearing the annihilation of 'I', there must be an innate attachment to self. This is proven by example.

What is accomplished by doctrine is:

Treatise: Therefore, the Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (Treatise on Manifesting the Teaching), etc., say that it is either produced by conceptual construction.

Commentary: This is an example of a similar doctrine. The first volume of the Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (Treatise on Manifesting the Teaching), and the eighth volume of the Mahāyānābhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of the Mahayana Abhidharma) say this. Regarding the five skandhas (aggregates) as permanent or impermanent, it includes both innate and conceptual situations, without distinguishing that innate does not have a permanent view. When explaining present contemplation, observing that when the previously annihilated 'I' does not exist, there is only an annihilationist view, so it only speaks of annihilation. It is not that Srotāpanna (stream-enterers), etc., admit that there is no permanent view. If so, how did the previous teacher explain the later cited text? This is based on a general statement, not allowing that a permanent view also includes the innate. What is the appearance of connecting the innate permanent view? Just like birds and beasts building and accumulating resources, it is only for having an 'I', not for conceptualizing permanence. The permanent view must be produced by wrong conceptualizations, etc. However, of these two statements, the former has complete wording but lacks reason, while the latter has clear wording and complete reason. Because the innate permanent view has an appearance, adopting all of it has no loss.

Treatise: Which of these ten afflictions are mutually corresponding?

Commentary: The second part below is self-class correspondence. This question is raised.

Treatise: Greed and hatred, as well as doubt, definitely do not arise simultaneously.

Commentary: There are six parts to the answer. First is greed, second is hatred, third is pride, fourth is doubt, fifth is view, and sixth is ignorance as the head. This is the first part. The statements in the sixth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma), the fifty-fifth and fifty-eighth volumes of the Mahāyānābhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of the Mahayana Abhidharma) are the same.

Question: Why cannot greed and hatred arise simultaneously?

Treatise: Because the objects of love and hate must be different.

Commentary: Attachment and hatred do not coexist.

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境既不同。行相亦別。以相違故　若爾貪俱憂．苦相返。瞋俱樂．喜為例亦爾。何得相應。愛．迫二境得俱起故。行相不違故無此失。如下當知。

論。于境不決無染著故。

述曰。此釋愛．疑不得俱起。愛境必決。疑必不定。故貪．疑不俱。

上說不俱。下說俱者。

論。貪與慢見或得相應。

述曰。見即五見。如對法第五．瑜伽五十五。貪與慢同。彼五十八不得與慢相應。

論。所愛所陵至說得相應。

述曰。此解彼云。謂若於他起愛染者。必不陵彼。以境非同行相亦別。故不俱起。然緣己身起愛名所染。與所恃之我慢等境可一故。對法等說得相應。前約行相粗者。此約行相細者。如前第四卷第七識中已多門解。

論。於五見境至相應無失。

述曰。愛．見二種有時可同。皆可愛故。相應無失。諸論共同。無相違處。此中論言說者有二義。一約此論。自道理可得說與彼相應義。二解說者謂余瑜伽等約此理故說與俱起。又此言得相應。非謂一切恒相應。有時俱起故。然此中一行法。以第一問已以第二問余。舍第一不問。如是展轉已下可知。

論。瞋與慢疑至說得俱起。

述曰。第二瞋為首。瞋．慢．疑有時或得俱起。如何不得。謂若內境慢所

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果所處的境界不同，（憂、苦、樂、喜等）行相也會有所區別。因為它們是相互違背的緣故。如果這樣說，那麼與貪愛同時生起的憂愁和痛苦，它們的行相是相反的；與嗔恚同時生起的快樂和喜悅，也可以此為例。為什麼能夠相應呢？因為愛和迫這兩種心所緣的境界可以同時生起，它們的行相併不違背，所以沒有這個過失。如下文將會說明。

論：因為對於境界沒有決斷，所以沒有染著。

述記：這是解釋愛和疑不能同時生起的原因。愛所緣的境界必定是確定的，而疑必定是不確定的，所以貪愛和疑不能同時生起。

上面說不俱起，下面說俱起，這是為什麼呢？

論：貪愛與我慢和邪見有時可以相應。

述記：這裡的『見』指的是五種邪見。如《對法論》第五卷和《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷所說。貪愛與我慢相同。第五十八卷說（五見）不得與我慢相應。

論：所愛和所輕蔑，（對自身和我）說可以相應。

述記：這是解釋前面所說的。如果對他人產生愛染，必定不會輕蔑那個人，因為所緣的境界不同，行相也有區別，所以不會同時生起。然而，緣于自身而生起的愛，稱為『所染』。與所依仗的我慢等，境界可以相同，所以《對法論》等說可以相應。前面說的是行相粗略的情況，這裡說的是行相細微的情況。如前面第四卷第七識中已經從多個方面解釋過了。

論：對於五種邪見的境界，（愛和見）相應沒有過失。

述記：愛和見這兩種有時可以相同，因為都是可以喜愛的。相應沒有過失。各種論典都是相同的，沒有相互違背的地方。這裡論典所說的話有兩種含義：一是就這部論典而言，從道理上可以說明與它們相應的意義；二是解釋者認為，其他的《瑜伽師地論》等，也是根據這個道理來說明與它們同時生起的。而且，這裡說『得相應』，並不是說一切時候都相應，而是說有時會同時生起。然而，這裡是一種行法，用第一個問題已經問過了，用第二個問題問其餘的。捨棄第一個問題不問，像這樣輾轉，以下就可以知道了。

論：嗔恚與我慢和懷疑，（有時）說可以同時生起。

述記：第二種是以嗔恚為首。嗔恚、我慢、懷疑有時或許可以同時生起。為什麼不可以呢？如果內心對我慢所緣的境界感到不滿，

【English Translation】 English version: If the realms are different, the characteristics of mental activities will also be distinct, because they are contradictory. If this is the case, then the sorrow and suffering that arise together with greed are opposite in nature; the joy and happiness that arise together with hatred can also be taken as examples. How can they be compatible? Because the objects of love and compulsion can arise simultaneously, and their characteristics are not contradictory, so there is no fault. This will be explained below.

Treatise: Because there is no certainty about the object, there is no attachment.

Commentary: This explains why love and doubt cannot arise simultaneously. The object of love must be definite, while doubt must be uncertain, so greed and doubt cannot arise together.

The above says they do not arise together, but the following says they arise together. Why is this?

Treatise: Greed can sometimes be associated with pride and wrong views.

Commentary: 'Views' here refer to the five wrong views, as stated in the fifth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the fifty-fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. Greed is the same as pride. The fifty-eighth volume says that (the five views) cannot be associated with pride.

Treatise: What is loved and what is despised, (regarding oneself and I) it is said that they can be associated.

Commentary: This explains what was said earlier. If one develops love and attachment for another person, one will certainly not despise that person, because the objects of focus are different and the characteristics are also different, so they will not arise simultaneously. However, the love that arises from oneself is called 'what is stained'. It can be the same as the object of reliance, such as pride, so the Abhidharmasamuccaya and others say that they can be associated. The previous statement was about the coarse characteristics, while this statement is about the subtle characteristics. As explained in many ways in the seventh consciousness in the fourth volume.

Treatise: Regarding the objects of the five wrong views, (love and views) associating is without fault.

Commentary: Love and views can sometimes be the same, because they are both lovable. Associating is without fault. All the treatises are the same, and there are no contradictions. There are two meanings to the words spoken in this treatise: first, regarding this treatise, it can be explained that it is reasonable to say that it is associated with them; second, the commentators believe that other Yogacarabhumi-sastras and others explain that they arise simultaneously based on this principle. Moreover, the phrase 'can be associated' here does not mean that they are always associated, but that they sometimes arise simultaneously. However, this is one type of practice. The first question has already been asked, and the second question asks about the rest. Abandoning the first question without asking, like this, the following can be known.

Treatise: Hatred, pride, and doubt, (sometimes) it is said that they can arise simultaneously.

Commentary: The second is headed by hatred. Hatred, pride, and doubt can sometimes arise simultaneously. Why can't they? If one is dissatisfied with the object of pride in one's mind,

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恃已。非瞋所憎。境不同故。對法第六．五十八。說瞋不與慢相應。若外境之上慢所陵蔑瞋之所憎境可同故。五十五說瞋與慢得相應。又必不于自起瞋。后瞋他復慢彼故。

論。初猶豫時至說得相應。

述曰。釋與疑俱。又初疑時心尚輕未憎彼。故瑜伽五十五．五十八俱說不相應。若久思不決心遂重故便瞋于彼。對法第五說得瞋．疑相應。此初后位別解。

論。疑順違事隨應亦爾。

述曰。又順．違事解。若疑順己之事或不起瞋。謂疑苦．集諦。若疑違己之事。便瞋于彼說得相應。謂疑滅．道諦。又若現行善疑未來無。便與瞋俱。善法順已。行因無果故。若現行惡疑未來無。便瞋不俱。惡法損己故。于順．違二事各有俱．不俱。故言隨應亦爾。

論。瞋與二取至不憎彼故。

述曰。此必不俱。見取執為勝。戒取執為道。俱能得凈。順己之境不憎彼故。故不相應。諸論六煩惱明之。故無二取不俱起失。

論。此與三見至說得俱起。

述曰。瞋與三見或得俱起。且身．邊見。謂緣樂俱行蘊為我及常。見不生瞋故以順於己。對法約前二取及此。故說瞋非見俱。若於苦處緣苦俱行蘊。為我及常見。便生憎恚。云我何用此身。生憎恚故。瑜伽二文。依此一分說得俱起。此通俱

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『恃已』（依靠自己）。不是『瞋』（嗔恨，憎恨）所憎恨的。因為境界不同。在《對法論》第六卷第五十八節中說，『瞋』不與『慢』（傲慢）相應。如果外境之上，『慢』所輕蔑，『瞋』所憎恨，境界可能相同。第五十五節說『瞋』與『慢』可以相應。而且一定不會對自己生起『瞋』，之後嗔恨他人又傲慢他們。

論：最初猶豫時，到（後來）說（瞋與慢）可以相應。

述曰：解釋（瞋）與『疑』（懷疑）同時存在的情況。又最初懷疑時，心中尚且輕視，未憎恨他們。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷和第五十八卷都說不相應。如果長時間思考，不果斷，決心就加重，於是就嗔恨他們。《對法論》第五卷說可以『瞋』、『疑』相應。這是最初和後來的階段的區別解釋。

論：『疑』順（隨順）違（違背）之事，隨應也是這樣。

述曰：又（根據）順、違之事來解釋。如果懷疑隨順自己的事，或許不生起『瞋』，比如懷疑苦諦、集諦。如果懷疑違背自己的事，就嗔恨他們，說可以相應，比如懷疑滅諦、道諦。又如果現在行善，懷疑未來沒有（善報），就與『瞋』同時生起。善法隨順自己，因為行善因沒有善果。如果現在行惡，懷疑未來沒有（惡報），就『瞋』不一起生起。惡法損害自己。對於順、違二事，各有俱起、不俱起的情況。所以說隨應也是這樣。

論：『瞋』與『二取』（見取、戒禁取）一定不會同時生起，因為不憎恨他們。

述曰：這一定不會同時生起。『見取』執著（某種錯誤的）見解為殊勝，『戒禁取』執著（某種錯誤的）戒律為（解脫之）道。都能得到清凈，隨順自己的境界，不憎恨他們。所以不相應。各論都闡明了六種煩惱。所以沒有（因為）沒有『二取』（而導致『瞋』）不一起生起的過失。

論：『瞋』與『三見』（身見、邊見、邪見），（有時）說可以一起生起。

述曰：『瞋』與『三見』或許可以一起生起。且說『身見』、『邊見』。認為緣于快樂同時生起的蘊為『我』以及常（恒常不變）。（因為）見（解）不生起『瞋』，所以（是）隨順自己（的）。《對法論》是針對前面的『二取』以及這裡（的情況）。所以說『瞋』不是與『見』同時生起。如果在苦處，緣于痛苦同時生起的蘊，為『我』以及常見，就生起憎恨，說『我』要這個身體有什麼用。因為生起憎恨。《瑜伽師地論》的兩段經文，依據這（里）一部分（情況）說可以一起生起。這（種情況）是共通的。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Reliance on oneself'. It is not what 'anger' (hatred, resentment) despises. Because the realms are different. In the sixth volume, fifty-eighth section of the Abhidharma, it says that 'anger' does not correspond with 'pride' (arrogance). If, above the external realm, what 'pride' despises and what 'anger' hates are the same, the realms may be the same. The fifty-fifth section says that 'anger' and 'pride' can correspond. Moreover, one will certainly not generate 'anger' towards oneself, and then resent others and be arrogant towards them.

Treatise: From the initial hesitation to (later) saying (anger and pride) can correspond.

Commentary: Explains the situation where (anger) and 'doubt' (suspicion) exist simultaneously. Also, at the initial doubt, the mind is still light and does not hate them. Therefore, both the fifty-fifth and fifty-eighth volumes of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra say that they do not correspond. If one thinks for a long time without making a firm decision, the determination becomes heavier, and then one hates them. The fifth volume of the Abhidharma says that 'anger' and 'doubt' can correspond. This is a separate explanation of the initial and later stages.

Treatise: 'Doubt' about things that are favorable (compliant) or unfavorable (opposing), accordingly, is also like that.

Commentary: Also (explains) based on favorable and unfavorable things. If one doubts things that are favorable to oneself, perhaps 'anger' does not arise, such as doubting the Truth of Suffering and the Truth of Accumulation. If one doubts things that are unfavorable to oneself, then one hates them, saying that they can correspond, such as doubting the Truth of Cessation and the Truth of the Path. Also, if one currently performs good deeds and doubts that there will be no (good retribution) in the future, then it arises simultaneously with 'anger'. Good deeds are favorable to oneself, because performing good causes does not lead to good results. If one currently performs evil deeds and doubts that there will be no (evil retribution) in the future, then 'anger' does not arise simultaneously. Evil deeds harm oneself. For both favorable and unfavorable things, there are situations where they arise together and do not arise together. Therefore, it is said that accordingly, it is also like that.

Treatise: 'Anger' and the 'two attachments' (attachment to views, attachment to precepts and vows) will certainly not arise simultaneously, because one does not hate them.

Commentary: This will certainly not arise simultaneously. 'Attachment to views' clings to (certain erroneous) views as superior, and 'attachment to precepts and vows' clings to (certain erroneous) precepts as the (path to) liberation. Both can attain purity, complying with one's own realm, and one does not hate them. Therefore, they do not correspond. Various treatises clarify the six afflictions. Therefore, there is no fault (because) without the 'two attachments' (leading to 'anger') not arising together.

Treatise: 'Anger' and the 'three views' (self-view, extreme view, wrong view), (sometimes) it is said that they can arise together.

Commentary: 'Anger' and the 'three views' may arise together. Let's talk about 'self-view' and 'extreme view'. Thinking that the aggregates that arise simultaneously with happiness are 'self' and permanent (unchanging). (Because) the view (itself) does not generate 'anger', so (it is) compliant with oneself. The Abhidharma is aimed at the preceding 'two attachments' and this (situation). Therefore, it is said that 'anger' does not arise simultaneously with 'views'. If in a place of suffering, one thinks that the aggregates that arise simultaneously with suffering are 'self' and permanent, then hatred arises, saying 'What use is this body to me?'. Because hatred arises. The two passages in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra say that they can arise together based on this (one) part (of the situation). This (situation) is common.

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生．分別。如下無妨。

論。斷見翻此說瞋有無。

述曰。斷見返此我見常見。說瞋有無。謂於樂俱蘊執為斷。得與瞋相應。以恐失樂蘊故。于苦俱蘊起斷。便瞋不俱。喜苦無故。

論。邪見誹撥至或無或有。

述曰。惡事．好事邪見撥者。如次說瞋或無或有。謂撥惡事無。便不與瞋俱。喜苦無故。撥樂蘊無。便與瞋俱。憎樂無故。對法依三見一分二取全。說不與瞋俱。瑜伽約三見少分。說瞋相應。見為一門明故。

論。慢于境定至無相應義。

述曰。下第三慢為首。與貪．瞋說已。與疑定不俱。三論皆說故。境定不定故。不陵不定境。若疑彼勝負必不敢慢。慢若起者必自高故。境乃定也。

論。慢與五見至不相違故。

述曰。此總明慢與見皆容俱起。行相俱高緣順境起。不相違故。三處論皆同。總說見故。

論。然與斷見至無陵恃故。

述曰。斷見及慢必不俱生。執我斷心。定無陵他而自恃故。

論。與身邪見一分亦爾。

述曰。準下憂俱初師所說。若約粗相。慢多緣樂蘊生。與緣苦俱蘊我見一分。及邪見撥無苦．集諦理一分。不與慢俱起。據實亦得。故下文說。慢．身．邪見皆與憂俱。恃執苦劣故。今約粗相多分而解。若緣樂俱蘊為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 生。分別。如下無妨。

論。斷見翻此說瞋有無。

述曰。斷見返此我見常見。說瞋有無。謂於樂俱蘊執為斷。得與瞋相應。以恐失樂蘊故。于苦俱蘊起斷。便瞋不俱。喜苦無故。

論。邪見誹撥至或無或有。

述曰。惡事．好事邪見撥者。如次說瞋或無或有。謂撥惡事無。便不與瞋俱。喜苦無故。撥樂蘊無。便與瞋俱。憎樂無故。對法依三見一分二取全。說不與瞋俱。瑜伽約三見少分。說瞋相應。見為一門明故。

論。慢于境定至無相應義。

述曰。下第三慢為首。與貪．瞋說已。與疑定不俱。三論皆說故。境定不定故。不陵不定境。若疑彼勝負必不敢慢。慢若起者必自高故。境乃定也。

論。慢與五見至不相違故。

述曰。此總明慢與見皆容俱起。行相俱高緣順境起。不相違故。三處論皆同。總說見故。

論。然與斷見至無陵恃故。

述曰。斷見及慢必不俱生。執我斷心。定無陵他而自恃故。

論。與身邪見一分亦爾。

述曰。準下憂俱初師所說。若約粗相。慢多緣樂蘊生。與緣苦俱蘊我見一分。及邪見撥無苦．集諦理一分。不與慢俱起。據實亦得。故下文說。慢．身．邪見皆與憂俱。恃執苦劣故。今約粗相多分而解。若緣樂俱蘊為

【English Translation】 English version Birth. Discrimination. The following is not an obstacle.

Treatise: The annihilationist view reverses this, saying that anger exists or does not exist.

Commentary: The annihilationist view is the opposite of the self-view and eternalist view. It says that anger exists or does not exist. That is, if one clings to the aggregates associated with pleasure as being annihilated, it can be associated with anger, because one fears losing the aggregates of pleasure. If one holds an annihilationist view towards the aggregates associated with suffering, then anger does not arise together, because there is no pleasure in suffering.

Treatise: Wrong views slander and deny, to the point of saying that something either exists or does not exist.

Commentary: Those who slander and deny evil deeds and good deeds with wrong views say that anger either exists or does not exist, respectively. That is, if one denies that evil deeds exist, then one will not be associated with anger, because there is no pleasure in suffering. If one denies that the aggregates of pleasure exist, then one will be associated with anger, because one hates the absence of pleasure. The Abhidharma (對法) relies on one aspect of the three views and takes two aspects completely, saying that it does not arise together with anger. The Yoga (瑜伽) speaks of a small part of the three views, saying that it is associated with anger, because the view is clarified as one aspect.

Treatise: Pride, with respect to a definite object, to the point of having no meaning of association.

Commentary: The third, lower level of pride is the first. Having spoken of it in relation to greed and anger, it definitely does not arise together with doubt. All three treatises say this. Because the object is definite or indefinite, one does not despise an indefinite object. If one doubts the victory or defeat of the other, one will certainly not be arrogant. If pride arises, it must be self-aggrandizing, so the object is definite.

Treatise: Pride and the five views do not contradict each other.

Commentary: This generally clarifies that pride and views can both arise together. Their characteristics are both high, arising from favorable objects, and they do not contradict each other. The three treatises all agree, generally speaking of views.

Treatise: However, it does not arise together with the annihilationist view, because there is no despising and reliance.

Commentary: The annihilationist view and pride definitely do not arise together. Holding a mind that believes in annihilation, one certainly does not despise others and rely on oneself.

Treatise: It is also the same with one aspect of the view of the body and wrong views.

Commentary: According to what the first teacher said below about being associated with sorrow, if speaking in terms of coarse characteristics, pride mostly arises from the aggregates of pleasure. It does not arise together with one aspect of the self-view that is associated with the aggregates of suffering, and one aspect of the wrong view that denies the truth of suffering and the origin of suffering. In reality, it is also possible. Therefore, the following text says that pride, the view of the body, and wrong views are all associated with sorrow, because they rely on and cling to the inferiority of suffering. Now, it is explained in terms of the coarse characteristics and the majority of cases. If the object is the aggregates associated with pleasure, it is...

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我。及撥無滅．道。可與慢俱。故恃己樂陵滅．道故。

論。疑不審決至定不俱起。

述曰。下第四疑。雖與慧俱與五見不俱起。見審決。疑猶豫。行相相返故定不俱。簡擇．猶豫可說慧俱。不審決故不與見並。

論。五見展轉至有多慧故。

述曰。下第五五見自亦爾。非一心中有多慧故。此據法體並起然前說第七識我見與別境慧俱者。約義別門說有名俱。非二體並起名俱也。

論。癡與九種至必由癡故。

述曰。下第六無明有二種。相應無明與一切俱起。一切惑生必由癡故。獨行不然。但與諸論相違。此中皆會訖。

論。此十煩惱何識相應。

述曰。此為問起。第三識相應門。

論。藏識全無至起慢等故。

述曰。第七．八識如前已說。意識並有。五識但三。以無分別故無慢等。慢等必由有隨念．計度分別生故。又由慢于稱量門起方勝負故。疑猶豫簡擇門起。見推求門起。故非五識。故五識無此等行相。故對法第七。說稱量等門。即等猶豫門等也。

論。此十煩惱何受相應。

述曰。第四諸受相應門。此問起。

論。貪瞋癡三至五受相應。

述曰。下文有二。初實義。后粗相。實義中有四。一明貪．瞋．癡。二明慢。三疑

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 我（指作者，此處指護法）及撥無滅（否定因果和涅槃的邪見）的道，可以與慢（驕慢）同時生起。所以憑藉自己的快樂而輕視和否定涅槃之道。

論：疑（懷疑）不審決（不能決斷），所以與定（確定）不會同時生起。

述曰：下面是第四個問題，關於疑。疑雖然可以與慧（智慧）同時生起，但不會與五見（身見、邊見、邪見、見取見、戒禁取見）同時生起。因為見是審決的，而疑是猶豫的，它們的行相（心理活動狀態）相反，所以確定不會同時生起。簡擇（選擇）和猶豫可以說與慧同時生起，因為疑是不審決的，所以不會與五見並存。

論：五見展轉相生，乃至有多慧的緣故。

述曰：下面是第五個問題，關於五見本身也是如此。因為一個心中不可能同時存在多種智慧。這裡是根據法體（法的本體）並起來說的。然而，前面說第七識的我見與別境慧同時生起，那是從義理和不同的角度來說的，只是名義上同時存在，而不是兩個本體同時生起。

論：癡（愚癡）與九種煩惱相應，乃至必定由癡的緣故。

述曰：下面是第六個問題，關於無明（癡）有兩種：相應無明與一切煩惱同時生起，一切迷惑的產生必定由於癡的緣故。獨行無明則不是這樣。但這與一些論典的說法相違背，這裡都將進行調和。

論：這十種煩惱與哪個識相應？

述曰：這是提出的問題，關於第三個方面，煩惱與哪個識相應。

論：藏識（阿賴耶識）完全沒有（這些煩惱），因為沒有起慢等煩惱的緣故。

述曰：第七識和第八識的情況如前面已經說過的。意識（第六識）全部都有。前五識只有三種（貪、嗔、癡），因為前五識沒有分別，所以沒有慢等煩惱。慢等煩惱必定由於有隨念（回憶）、計度（推測）分別才會產生。而且，慢是通過在稱量（比較）的過程中產生勝負心而生起的。疑是通過猶豫和簡擇而生起的。見是通過推求而生起的。所以這些煩惱不是前五識所具有的。因此，前五識沒有這些行相。所以《對法論》第七卷說，稱量等，也就是猶豫等。

論：這十種煩惱與哪個受相應？

述曰：這是第四個方面，關於煩惱與哪個受相應。這是提出的問題。

論：貪、嗔、癡三種煩惱與五受（苦、樂、憂、喜、舍）相應。

述曰：下面的文字分為兩部分。首先是實際意義，然後是粗略的表相。實際意義中包含四個方面：一是說明貪、嗔、癡，二是說明慢，三是說明疑。

【English Translation】 English version I (the author, here referring to Dharmapala) and the path of annihilationism (the heretical view of denying causality and Nirvana) can coexist with pride (arrogance). Therefore, relying on one's own pleasure, one despises and denies the path to Nirvana.

Treatise: Doubt (hesitation) is not decisive (unable to make a decision), so it will not arise simultaneously with certainty (determination).

Commentary: Below is the fourth question, regarding doubt. Although doubt can arise simultaneously with wisdom (prajna), it will not arise simultaneously with the five views (self-view, extreme view, wrong view, view of holding to views, view of holding to precepts). Because views are decisive, while doubt is hesitant, their characteristics (mental activity states) are opposite, so they certainly will not arise simultaneously. Discernment (selection) and hesitation can be said to arise simultaneously with wisdom, because doubt is indecisive, so it will not coexist with the five views.

Treatise: The five views arise in turn, even because there is much wisdom.

Commentary: Below is the fifth question, regarding the five views themselves are also like this. Because it is impossible for multiple wisdoms to exist simultaneously in one mind. This is based on the dharma body (the essence of the dharma) arising together. However, earlier it was said that the self-view of the seventh consciousness arises simultaneously with the wisdom of the separate realm, that is from the perspective of meaning and different angles, it is only nominally simultaneous, not that the two entities arise simultaneously.

Treatise: Ignorance (delusion) corresponds to nine kinds of afflictions, even necessarily because of ignorance.

Commentary: Below is the sixth question, regarding ignorance (delusion) there are two kinds: corresponding ignorance arises simultaneously with all afflictions, the generation of all delusions is necessarily due to ignorance. Solitary ignorance is not like this. But this contradicts the statements of some treatises, which will all be reconciled here.

Treatise: Which consciousness do these ten afflictions correspond to?

Commentary: This is the question raised, regarding the third aspect, which consciousness do the afflictions correspond to.

Treatise: The store consciousness (Alaya consciousness) completely lacks (these afflictions), because it does not give rise to pride and other afflictions.

Commentary: The situation of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses is as previously stated. The mind consciousness (sixth consciousness) has all of them. The first five consciousnesses only have three (greed, hatred, delusion), because the first five consciousnesses do not have discrimination, so they do not have pride and other afflictions. Pride and other afflictions must be produced by recollection (memory) and conceptual (speculative) discrimination. Moreover, pride arises through generating a sense of superiority and inferiority in the process of weighing (comparison). Doubt arises through hesitation and discernment. Views arise through seeking. Therefore, these afflictions are not possessed by the first five consciousnesses. Therefore, the first five consciousnesses do not have these characteristics. Therefore, the seventh volume of the Abhidharma says that weighing, etc., is also hesitation, etc.

Treatise: Which feeling do these ten afflictions correspond to?

Commentary: This is the fourth aspect, regarding which feeling the afflictions correspond to. This is the question raised.

Treatise: The three afflictions of greed, hatred, and delusion correspond to the five feelings (suffering, pleasure, sorrow, joy, equanimity).

Commentary: The following text is divided into two parts. First is the actual meaning, then the rough appearance. The actual meaning contains four aspects: first, explaining greed, hatred, and delusion; second, explaining pride; third, explaining doubt.

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．及三身。四身．邊見。今初也。此之三根俱生．分別。一切容與五受俱起。對法第七．大論五十五。貪唯喜．樂．舍者。五十五云。此據多分相應道理。隨轉門說諸煩惱。今據究竟。應準此會。此與五十九同。彼云貪等通六識。俱生者與一切受相應故。分別貪等。彼一一自作法出行相。然今此中總解二種貪等行相。

下逐難解之。與憂．苦俱。謂別小乘故。

論。貪會違緣至喜樂俱故。

述曰。逐難釋也。且於欲界。五．六識中憂．苦俱故。謂失財等。瞋翻此說。見怨死等。一切應知。然此五趣分別至下當知　此中意說。即五識中亦有分別所起貪等。由意分別貪等引故。不爾瑜伽分別貪等。云何與苦受相應。非許意有苦。是決定義故。由五識有分別起貪等決定故。五十九作此定說。不爾如分別慢等。彼不言苦俱故。

論。有義俱生至憂相應故。

述曰。第二明慢有二說。此初也。此二種慢五趣為論。容四受俱。唯除苦受。由苦趣中亦恃己身有苦劣蘊。起慢之時與憂相應。此依實義慢與憂俱。前約相粗說慢不與身．邪見一分俱。不恃苦蘊故。此唯意識。故通分別。不同貪等苦得定說。

論。有義俱生至前已說故。

述曰。俱生之慢亦苦俱起。即五受俱。由五十九文。意地

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以及三身（Trikaya，佛的三種化身：法身、報身、應身），四身（Caturkaya，法身、報身、應身、自性身），邊見（Antagrahadrishti，執著于極端觀點的邪見）。現在開始討論第一個問題。這三種根源（貪、嗔、癡）既有俱生（Sahaja，與生俱來的）的，也有分別（Parikalpita，後天分別產生的）。一切（煩惱）都可能與五種感受（五受：苦、樂、喜、憂、舍）同時生起。《對法論》第七卷、《大毗婆沙論》第五十五卷說，貪只與喜、樂、舍三種感受相應。第五十五卷說，這是根據多數情況相應的道理，隨著煩惱的流轉而說的。現在是根據究竟的道理，應該按照這個來理解。這與第五十九卷相同。第五十九卷說，貪等煩惱通於六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識），俱生的貪等與一切感受相應。分別的貪等，是各自通過作意和修行而顯現的行相。然而，現在這裡總的解釋兩種貪等煩惱的行相。

下面逐一解釋難點。與憂、苦感受同時生起，這是爲了區別小乘的觀點。

論：貪會違背因緣，直至與喜樂感受同時生起。

述曰：這是逐一解釋難點。且在欲界，第五識、第六識中，貪與憂、苦感受同時生起，比如失去財物等。嗔與此相反，比如見到怨家死亡等。一切都應該知道。然而，這五趣（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）的分別，到後面會知道。這裡的意思是說，即使在第五識中，也有分別所引起的貪等煩惱。由於意識分別貪等煩惱的引導。否則，《瑜伽師地論》中分別的貪等煩惱，怎麼會與苦受相應呢？因為不允許意識有苦受，這是決定的定義。由於第五識有分別引起的貪等煩惱是決定的，所以第五十九卷作了這樣的確定說法。否則，如果像分別的慢等煩惱，那裡就不會說與苦受同時生起了。

論：有的人認為，俱生的慢與憂相應。

述曰：第二，說明慢有兩種說法。這是第一種。這兩種慢以五趣為討論範圍，可以與四種感受同時生起，唯獨排除苦受。因為在苦趣中，也仗恃自己的身體有苦劣的蘊，生起慢的時候與憂相應。這是依據真實的意義，慢與憂同時生起。前面是約略地說，慢不與身見、邪見的一部分同時生起，因為不仗恃苦蘊的緣故。這只是意識，所以通於分別。不同於貪等煩惱，苦受是確定的說法。

論：有的人認為，俱生的慢也與苦受同時生起，前面已經說過了。

述曰：俱生的慢也與苦受同時生起，即與五種感受同時生起。因為第五十九卷的文，在意識地。

【English Translation】 English version: And the three bodies (Trikaya, the three bodies of the Buddha: Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya), the four bodies (Caturkaya, Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya, Svabhavikakaya), and extreme views (Antagrahadrishti, the wrong views of clinging to extreme viewpoints). Now, let's begin with the first question. These three roots (greed, hatred, and delusion) are both innate (Sahaja, inborn) and conceptual (Parikalpita, produced by later discrimination). All (afflictions) can arise simultaneously with the five feelings (five sensations: suffering, pleasure, joy, sorrow, and equanimity). The seventh volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the fifty-fifth volume of the Mahavibhasa say that greed only corresponds to joy, pleasure, and equanimity. The fifty-fifth volume says that this is based on the principle of correspondence in most cases, according to the flow of afflictions. Now it is based on the ultimate principle, and it should be understood accordingly. This is the same as the fifty-ninth volume. The fifty-ninth volume says that greed and other afflictions are common to the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness), and innate greed and others correspond to all feelings. Conceptual greed and others are the appearances of each self-made dharma practice. However, here we generally explain the appearances of the two kinds of greed and other afflictions.

The following explains the difficult points one by one. To arise simultaneously with sorrow and suffering is to distinguish it from the views of the Hinayana.

Treatise: Greed will violate the causes and conditions until it arises simultaneously with joy and pleasure.

Commentary: This is to explain the difficult points one by one. Moreover, in the desire realm, in the fifth and sixth consciousnesses, greed arises simultaneously with sorrow and suffering, such as losing wealth, etc. Hatred is the opposite of this, such as seeing the death of an enemy, etc. Everything should be known. However, the distinction of these five realms (hell, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, and gods) will be known later. The meaning here is that even in the fifth consciousness, there are greed and other afflictions caused by discrimination. Because of the guidance of the mind's discrimination of greed and other afflictions. Otherwise, how can the discrimination of greed and other afflictions in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra correspond to suffering? Because it is not allowed for the mind to have suffering, this is a definite definition. Because the fifth consciousness has definite greed and other afflictions caused by discrimination, the fifty-ninth volume makes such a definite statement. Otherwise, if it is like the discrimination of pride and other afflictions, it would not be said there that it arises simultaneously with suffering.

Treatise: Some people think that innate pride corresponds to sorrow.

Commentary: Second, it is explained that there are two views on pride. This is the first. These two kinds of pride are discussed in the context of the five realms, and can arise simultaneously with four feelings, except for suffering. Because in the realm of suffering, one also relies on one's own body having suffering and inferior aggregates, and when pride arises, it corresponds to sorrow. This is based on the real meaning, and pride arises simultaneously with sorrow. The previous statement was approximate, that pride does not arise simultaneously with a part of self-view and wrong view, because it does not rely on the suffering aggregates. This is only the mind consciousness, so it is common to discrimination. It is different from greed and other afflictions, where suffering is a definite statement.

Treatise: Some people think that innate pride also arises simultaneously with suffering, as has been said before.

Commentary: Innate pride also arises simultaneously with suffering, that is, it arises simultaneously with the five feelings. Because of the text in the fifty-ninth volume, in the mind ground.

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俱生一切煩惱。意識一切受相應故。如前已說。

論。分別慢至邪教等故。

述曰。其地獄中與苦相應。于總聚中。但有得一切受相應義。非一切慢皆得相應。無分別慢等。即等一切分別貪．瞋．癡．疑．邪見．見．戒取等。以無邪教．邪師．及邪思惟故。

論。然彼不造至能發彼故。

述曰。所以者何。五十九說要分別煩惱發惡趣業故。此據總報多分為論。其別報者修道亦發。故五十九分別慢等不言與苦相應。下疑等準此應知。故知前師彼趣有分別煩惱。前生勢力故。即造惡趣業也。與對法第七。五十五違。此文皆如貪等會。

論。疑后三見至亦喜受俱故。

述曰。第三明疑．三見。三見謂見．戒取．邪見。四受除苦。隨意有無。唯是正義。以地獄無分別惑故。逐難解云。欲界之疑先作惡行。疑無苦．集諦等。亦喜受俱故。以後苦無故。上界即無。無惡行果故。上界疑與樂受俱故。此等皆通三界總聚。有處作法故。致極成之言。

論。二取若緣至與憂相應故。

述曰。若緣憂俱見．戒。及所依蘊。為勝能凈。與憂相應故。憂其不速得涅槃等。此中皆同五十九說。彼文一一別廣作法指事。此逐難舉。

論。有義俱生至唯無記故。

述曰。第四明身．邊

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 所有與生俱來的煩惱，都與意識以及所有感受相應，正如前面已經說過的。

論：因為有分別產生的慢、直至邪教等。

述記：在地獄中，煩惱與痛苦相應。在總體上，只是說得到與所有感受相應的意義，並非所有慢都相應，因為沒有分別產生的慢等。這裡說的『等』，包括一切分別產生的貪、嗔、癡、疑、邪見、見取見、戒禁取見等。因為地獄中沒有邪教、邪師以及邪思惟。

論：然而，地獄眾生不能造作（新的惡業），但能引發（過去的惡業）。

述記：為什麼這樣說呢？《五十九識論》中說，要通過分別煩惱才能引發惡趣的業。這是從總報的角度來說的，從別報的角度來說，修道也能引發（惡業）。所以《五十九識論》中分別慢等時，沒有說與苦相應。下面的疑等煩惱，可以依此類推。因此可知，前述論師認為地獄中有分別煩惱，是因為前生的勢力，即造作了惡趣的業。這與《對法論》第七卷第五十五頁相違背。此處的文義都與貪等煩惱的解釋相同。

論：疑以及後面的三種見，也與喜受相應。

述記：第三部分說明疑以及三種見。三種見指見取見、戒禁取見、邪見。四種感受中，除了苦受，隨意有無。這才是正確的解釋。因為地獄中沒有分別產生的迷惑。爲了駁斥難題，解釋說：欲界的疑，是先做了惡行，懷疑沒有苦諦、集諦等，所以也與喜受相應。因為以後沒有苦了。上界就沒有這種情況，因為沒有惡行之果。上界的疑與樂受相應。這些都通於三界總聚，因為有處作法。所以才用『極成』這個詞。

論：兩種取見如果緣于與憂愁相應的見、戒，以及所依之蘊，認為它們殊勝、能夠清凈，那麼就與憂愁相應。

述記：如果緣于與憂愁相應的見取見、戒禁取見，以及作為它們所依之蘊，認為這些是殊勝的、能夠帶來清凈，那麼就與憂愁相應。憂愁不能迅速得到涅槃等。這些都與《五十九識論》中的說法相同。該文中一一分別廣泛地闡述了作法和指事。這裡只是爲了駁斥難題而舉例說明。

論：有論師認為，與生俱來的身見、邊見，只是無記性。

述記：第四部分說明身見、邊見。

【English Translation】 English version: All innate afflictions are associated with consciousness and all feelings, as previously stated.

Treatise: Because of discriminatory pride, up to false teachings, etc.

Commentary: In hell, afflictions are associated with suffering. In general, it only means obtaining association with all feelings. Not all pride is associated, because there is no discriminatory pride, etc. The 'etc.' here includes all discriminatory greed, hatred, delusion, doubt, false views, holding to views, holding to precepts, etc. Because there are no false teachings, false teachers, or false thoughts in hell.

Treatise: However, they (hell beings) do not create (new evil karma), but can trigger (past evil karma).

Commentary: Why is this so? The Fifty-Nine Consciousness Treatise states that discriminatory afflictions are necessary to trigger the karma of evil realms. This is from the perspective of general retribution. From the perspective of specific retribution, cultivation can also trigger (evil karma). Therefore, the Fifty-Nine Consciousness Treatise does not say that discriminatory pride, etc., are associated with suffering. The afflictions of doubt, etc., below can be inferred accordingly. Thus, it is known that the aforementioned teacher believes that there are discriminatory afflictions in hell because of the power of previous lives, which is the creation of the karma of evil realms. This contradicts the seventh volume, page fifty-five of the Abhidharma Treatise. The meaning of this passage is the same as the explanation of greed, etc.

Treatise: Doubt and the three views that follow are also associated with joy.

Commentary: The third part explains doubt and the three views. The three views refer to holding to views, holding to precepts, and false views. Among the four feelings, except for suffering, they may or may not be present at will. This is the correct explanation. Because there is no discriminatory delusion in hell. To refute the difficulty, it is explained that the doubt in the desire realm is that one first commits evil deeds and doubts that there are no suffering truths, accumulation truths, etc., so it is also associated with joy. Because there is no suffering later. There is no such situation in the upper realms because there is no fruit of evil deeds. Doubt in the upper realms is associated with joy. These all apply to the general collection of the three realms because there is a method of action. Therefore, the term 'established' is used.

Treatise: If the two grasping views are based on views and precepts associated with sorrow, and the aggregates on which they are based, considering them superior and able to purify, then they are associated with sorrow.

Commentary: If one relies on views and precepts associated with sorrow, and the aggregates on which they are based, considering them superior and able to bring purification, then they are associated with sorrow, worrying about not quickly attaining Nirvana, etc. These are all the same as the statements in the Fifty-Nine Consciousness Treatise. In that text, the methods of action and pointing to things are explained separately and extensively. Here, it is only an example to refute the difficulty.

Treatise: Some teachers believe that innate self-view and extreme views are only neutral.

Commentary: The fourth part explains self-view and extreme views.

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二見有二說。此初也。身．邊二見唯喜．樂．舍俱。意無苦受。非五識俱故無苦受。此俱生者唯無記性。不與憂相應。憂二性故。其憂二性如五十七二十二根性分別門。俱生二見唯無記。如五十八說。

論。分別二見至與憂相應故。

述曰。分別二見得四受俱。在極苦處執苦俱蘊。為我．我所。及常。見者與憂相應。境可憂故。唯不善故。斷見執樂俱蘊斷。亦與憂俱故。恐失樂故。故言翻此。喜．樂等可知。非在五識等故。無苦俱義。

論。有義二見至苦相應故。

述曰。此第二師。分別二見同前。如地獄等極苦之處。無此身．邊分別見故。俱生二見亦苦受俱。在極苦處緣苦蘊故。

論。說俱生至余如前說。

述曰。引論為證。廣說如前五受諸趣分別。故知二見與苦俱故。不與憂俱。唯二性故　余如前說。謂分別二見等同第一師　此中同五十九實義。二師俱不違。分別煩惱二師皆同五十九說故。俱生煩惱。前師違五十九。彼無意苦受。身．邊二見非一切受俱故。

論。此依實義至四俱除苦。

述曰。下明粗相有二。初直明俱。后明俱地。此等初也。前據定得今隨相粗。貪．慢．四見行相唯欣非憂．苦俱。瞋唯戚行唯苦．憂．舍俱。邪見．及疑行通欣．戚。不在惡趣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有兩種關於二見的說法。這是第一種。身見（Satkayadristi, 認為五蘊和合的身體為真實自我的邪見）和邊見（Antagrahadristi, 執著于斷見或常見的邪見）只與喜受、樂受和舍受相應。因為意識中沒有苦受，所以沒有苦受。這種俱生（Sahaja, 與生俱來的）的二見只有無記性（Avyakrta, 非善非惡的性質），不與憂受相應，因為憂受具有兩種性質。關於憂受的兩種性質，可以參考五十七和二十二根性分別門。俱生的二見只有無記性，如第五十八所說。

論：分別二見乃至與憂相應故。

述曰：分別的二見可以與四種感受相應。在極度痛苦的地方，執著于與苦受相應的蘊，認為是『我』和『我的』，以及常。持有這種見解的人與憂受相應，因為所緣的境界令人憂慮。僅僅因為是不善的緣故。斷見執著于與樂受相應的蘊為斷滅，也與憂受相應，因為害怕失去快樂。所以說翻此。喜受、樂受等可以理解。因為不在五識等中，所以沒有與苦受相應的意義。

論：有義二見乃至苦相應故。

述曰：這是第二位論師的觀點。分別的二見與之前相同。如同在地獄等極度痛苦的地方，沒有這種身見和邊見的分別。俱生的二見也與苦受相應，因為在極度痛苦的地方緣于苦蘊。

論：說俱生乃至余如前說。

述曰：引用論典作為證據。廣泛的解釋如同之前五受和諸趣的分別。因此可知二見與苦受相應，但不與憂受相應，僅僅因為憂受具有兩種性質。其餘的如同之前所說。指的是分別的二見等同於第一位論師的觀點。這裡與第五十九的真實意義相同。兩位論師都沒有違背。分別的煩惱兩位論師都與第五十九的說法相同。俱生的煩惱，前一位論師違背了第五十九的說法，因為他沒有意識上的苦受。身見和邊見並非與一切感受相應。

論：此依實義乃至四俱除苦。

述曰：下面說明粗略的相有兩種。首先直接說明俱生，然後說明俱生的地。這些是最初的。之前是根據確定的獲得，現在是隨著相的粗略。貪、慢、四見的行為相只有欣，沒有憂和苦。嗔只有戚的行為，只有苦、憂、舍相應。邪見和疑的行為相通欣和戚，不在惡趣。

【English Translation】 English version There are two views regarding the two kinds of views (二見). This is the first. Self-view (Satkayadristi, the false view that the five aggregates that make up the body are the real self) and extreme views (Antagrahadristi, the false view that clings to either annihilationism or eternalism) are only associated with joy, pleasure, and equanimity. Because there is no suffering in consciousness, there is no suffering. These innate (Sahaja, inborn) two kinds of views are only of an indeterminate nature (Avyakrta, neither good nor evil), and are not associated with sorrow, because sorrow has two natures. Regarding the two natures of sorrow, refer to the section on the differentiation of the fifty-seven and twenty-two roots. Innate two kinds of views are only indeterminate, as stated in the fifty-eighth.

Treatise: Differentiated two kinds of views, even to the point of being associated with sorrow.

Commentary: Differentiated two kinds of views can be associated with the four kinds of feelings. In places of extreme suffering, clinging to the aggregates associated with suffering, considering them to be 'I' and 'mine,' and permanent. Those who hold this view are associated with sorrow, because the object of thought is distressing. Only because it is unwholesome. The annihilationist view clings to the aggregates associated with pleasure as annihilation, and is also associated with sorrow, because of the fear of losing pleasure. Therefore, it is said to overturn this. Joy, pleasure, etc., can be understood. Because it is not in the five consciousnesses, etc., there is no meaning of being associated with suffering.

Treatise: Some say that the two kinds of views are even associated with suffering.

Commentary: This is the view of the second teacher. Differentiated two kinds of views are the same as before. Just as in places of extreme suffering such as hell, there is no such differentiation of self-view and extreme views. Innate two kinds of views are also associated with suffering, because in places of extreme suffering, they are based on the suffering aggregate.

Treatise: It is said that innate views, even to the point that the rest is as said before.

Commentary: Quoting the treatise as evidence. The extensive explanation is like the previous differentiation of the five feelings and the various realms. Therefore, it can be known that the two kinds of views are associated with suffering, but not with sorrow, only because sorrow has two natures. The rest is as said before. Refers to the differentiated two kinds of views being the same as the view of the first teacher. Here, it is the same as the real meaning of the fifty-ninth. Neither teacher contradicts. The differentiated afflictions are the same for both teachers as stated in the fifty-ninth. The innate afflictions, the former teacher contradicts the fifty-ninth, because he does not have suffering in consciousness. Self-view and extreme views are not associated with all feelings.

Treatise: This is based on the real meaning, even to the point that the four together exclude suffering.

Commentary: Below, it explains that there are two kinds of coarse appearances. First, it directly explains the innate, then it explains the ground of the innate. These are the initial ones. Previously, it was based on definite attainment, now it is following the coarseness of the appearance. The behavior of greed, pride, and the four views is only joyful, not associated with sorrow and suffering. Anger only has the behavior of grief, only associated with suffering, sorrow, and equanimity. Wrong views and doubt have behavior that is common to joy and grief, and are not in the evil realms.

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及非在五故非苦俱。五十五說。此據多分相應道理。行相相順故。如文可知。

論。貪癡俱樂至欲唯憂舍。

述曰。下明俱地。如對法第七。初二定意有樂故。貪等亦樂俱。或初定三識與樂俱也。彼廣引證。舍受下三定。於一切相續末位起故。此據六識。若第七恒相續故。下逐難配諸地論。貪．癡與樂俱。通下四地。通六識故。除第四禪以上。除瞋餘七俱樂除欲界。欲界意識無樂受故。通次上三地。唯意識俱故。下逐難釋。疑雖許四受俱。無明雖許五受俱。疑在欲界唯憂．舍俱。不與喜俱者。對法第七云。于欲界不決定心未息。喜不生故。色界中疑疑上靜慮。由喜樂定力所引持故。亦得隨轉故。彼喜樂俱。獨行無明如疑理說。故唯憂．舍俱。粗相苦．樂及欲界之中。不在意故。

論。余受俱起如理應知。

述曰。貪等與喜．舍相應在何地。五見．及疑。與余喜受等相應在何地等。皆令如理知。故言余受俱等。逐難解已義之餘也。

論。此與別境幾互相應。

述曰。此問起也。第五別境相應門。

論。貪瞋癡慢至得有定故。

述曰。貪等四法得五數俱。逐難解之。此四專住一境得有定故。

論。疑及五見至不異慧故。

述曰。此之六法各容四俱。疑除勝

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『及非在五故非苦俱。五十五說。』這是根據多數情況相應的道理來說的，因為行相相似相順。具體內容可以參考原文。

論：貪、癡與樂受同時生起，直到欲界只有憂受和舍受。

述曰：下面說明同時生起的處所。如《對法》第七卷所說，初禪和第二禪因為有樂受，所以貪等也與樂受同時生起。或者初禪的三種識與樂受同時生起。那裡廣泛地引用了證據。舍受在下三禪中，因為在一切相續的末位生起，所以這裡指的是六識。如果說是第七識，因為恒常相續。下面逐一分析各個地與論的配合。貪和癡與樂受同時生起，通於下四地，通於六識。除了第四禪以上。除了瞋，其餘七種都同時生起，除了欲界。因為欲界的意識沒有樂受。通於次禪和上三地，只有意識同時生起。下面逐一解釋。雖然允許疑有四種受同時生起，無明雖然允許五種受同時生起，但疑在欲界只有憂受和舍受同時生起，不與喜受同時生起。 《對法》第七卷說，在欲界，不決定的心沒有停止，喜受就不會產生。**中，疑是懷疑上方的靜慮，因為喜樂的定力所引導和保持，所以也可以隨之轉變。因此，那裡喜受和樂受同時生起。獨行的無明就像懷疑的道理一樣，所以只有憂受和舍受同時生起。粗糙的苦受和樂受以及欲界之中，不在意念之中。

論：其餘的受同時生起，應該如理了解。

述曰：貪等與喜受、舍受相應在哪個地？五見以及疑，與其餘的喜受等相應在哪個地等？都應該如理了解。所以說其餘的受同時生起等，是逐一解釋之後的剩餘意義。

論：這些與別境心所的幾種互相相應？

述曰：這是提問。第五是別境心所的相應門。

論：貪、瞋、癡、慢這四種法，能夠與五種心所同時生起，是因為專注於一個境界，所以能夠有定。

論：疑以及五見，各自能夠與四種心所同時生起，疑除去了勝解。

述曰：這六種法各自能夠與四種心所同時生起，疑除去了勝解（勝解，adhimoksha）。

【English Translation】 English version: 'And not being in the five, therefore not together with suffering. Fifty-five says.' This is based on the principle of corresponding to the majority of situations, because the characteristics are similar and in accordance. The specific content can be found in the original text.

Treatise: Greed and ignorance arise simultaneously with pleasure, until in the desire realm there are only sorrow and equanimity.

Commentary: The following explains the locations where they arise simultaneously. As stated in the seventh volume of the Abhidharmakośa, the first and second dhyanas have pleasure, so greed and the like also arise simultaneously with pleasure. Or the three consciousnesses of the first dhyana arise simultaneously with pleasure. There, evidence is widely cited. Equanimity is in the lower three dhyanas, because it arises at the end of all continuations, so this refers to the six consciousnesses. If it is the seventh consciousness, it is constantly continuous. The following analyzes each location and its correspondence to the treatise. Greed and ignorance arise simultaneously with pleasure, extending to the lower four realms, extending to the six consciousnesses. Except for the fourth dhyana and above. Except for anger, the remaining seven arise simultaneously, except for the desire realm. Because the consciousness of the desire realm does not have pleasure. Extending to the next dhyana and the upper three realms, only consciousness arises simultaneously. The following explains each one. Although it is allowed that doubt has four feelings arising simultaneously, although ignorance is allowed to have five feelings arising simultaneously, doubt in the desire realm only has sorrow and equanimity arising simultaneously, not with joy. The seventh volume of the Abhidharmakośa says that in the desire realm, the undetermined mind has not stopped, so joy will not arise. In **, doubt is doubting the upper meditative states, because it is guided and maintained by the power of joy and pleasure, so it can also transform accordingly. Therefore, joy and pleasure arise simultaneously there. Solitary ignorance is like the principle of doubt, so only sorrow and equanimity arise simultaneously. Coarse suffering and pleasure, as well as the desire realm, are not in the mind.

Treatise: The remaining feelings arise simultaneously, and should be understood according to reason.

Commentary: In which realm do greed and the like correspond to joy and equanimity? In which realm do the five views and doubt correspond to the remaining joy and the like? All should be understood according to reason. Therefore, it is said that the remaining feelings arise simultaneously, etc., which is the remaining meaning after explaining each one.

Treatise: How many of these correspond to the mental factors of specific focus?

Commentary: This is a question. The fifth is the corresponding gate of the mental factors of specific focus (別境, viṣaya).

Treatise: Greed, anger, ignorance, and pride, these four dharmas can arise simultaneously with five mental factors, because they are focused on one object, so they can have concentration.

Treatise: Doubt and the five views, each can arise simultaneously with four mental factors, doubt excludes ascertainment.

Commentary: These six dharmas can each arise simultaneously with four mental factors, doubt excludes ascertainment (勝解, adhimoksha).

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解境．行相違故。見非惠俱。自體不併故。然疑行深。故定俱轉。此中不問俱生．分別說皆同也　又問上來雖有容得或五．或四俱。定得五．四一時俱不　如理應思。此中且問別境。問識。問受。不問遍行。問五受別。非遍行故。故為問也。不問與善等性相應。以後必問前故。前不問后。此應準知。

論。此十煩惱何性所攝。

述曰。此問起也。第六性門。

論。瞋唯不善至餘九通二。

述曰。瞋唯不善一性所攝。不起即已。起必損自．他。現世．他世皆名損故。餘九通二。此總言也。

論。上二界者至定所伏故。

述曰。在上二界定唯無記。不問俱生．分別皆爾。

論。若欲界系至損自他故。

述曰。欲界應分別。分別起者唯不善。一向發惡行故。對法第四初同此說故。俱生者有二。發惡業亦不善。瞋性定然。餘三少分損自．他故。

論。余無記攝至自他處故。

述曰。即唯除瞋。二見定唯無記性攝。餘三一分。一由微細。二不障善。善位亦起故。如第七識俱者。三非極損自．他。五十八說。數現行故。並此四因。

論。當知俱生至不障善故。

述曰。重顯二見唯無記性不發惡業。所以同前　問此二見中。亦有九品等也　答或言無。唯

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『解境』（understanding the object）與『行相』（mode of operation）是相違背的。『見』（views）不與『惠』（wisdom）同時存在，因為它們的自體不能並存。然而，『疑』（doubt）的『行』（operation）很深，所以與『定』（concentration）同時運轉。這裡不問『俱生』（innate）和『分別』（acquired），因為它們都是相同的。 又問：雖然上面允許或者五種心所，或者四種心所同時存在，是否一定能有五種或四種心所同時生起？ 應該如理思維。這裡暫且只問『別境』（specific object）。問『識』（consciousness），問『受』（feeling），不問『遍行』（universal mental factors）。問五種『受』（feeling）的區別，因為它們不是『遍行』（universal mental factors）。所以才問。不問與善等性相應，因為以後一定會問前面的。前面不問後面的，這一點應該知道。

論：這十種煩惱屬於什麼性質？

述曰：這是提問。

論：『瞋』（anger）唯有不善，其餘九種通於二性。

述曰：『瞋』（anger）唯有不善這一種性質所攝。不起則已，起必損害自己和他人。現世和來世都名為損害。其餘九種通於二性，這是總的來說。

論：在上二界（色界和無色界）中，『定』（concentration）唯有無記性（neither good nor bad），因為是被『定』（concentration）所伏。

述曰：在上二界（色界和無色界）中，『定』（concentration）唯有無記性（neither good nor bad）。不問『俱生』（innate）和『分別』（acquired）都是這樣。

論：如果欲界系（belonging to the desire realm），分別生起的『瞋』（anger）唯有不善，因為它總是引發惡行。俱生的『瞋』（anger）有二種情況，引發惡業也是不善。『瞋』（anger）的性質必然如此。其餘三種（慢、疑、不正見）少部分損害自己和他人。

論：其餘的屬於無記性（neither good nor bad），因為它們不嚴重損害自己和他人。

述曰：即是唯獨排除『瞋』（anger）。二『見』（views）必定唯有無記性（neither good nor bad）所攝。其餘三種（慢、疑、不正見）有一部分是無記性（neither good nor bad）。一是由於微細，二是不障礙善法，在善位也會生起。比如與第七識俱生的那些。這三種不是極度損害自己和他人。《五十八說》中說，它們經常現行。加上這四個原因。

論：應當知道，俱生的二『見』（views）不引發惡業，所以與前面相同。

述曰：再次說明二『見』（views）唯有無記性（neither good nor bad），不引發惡業。所以與前面相同。問：這二『見』（views）中，也有九品等等嗎？答：或者說沒有，只有...

【English Translation】 English version 'Understanding the object' (解境, jie jing) and 'mode of operation' (行相, xing xiang) are contradictory. 'Views' (見, jian) do not coexist with 'wisdom' (惠, hui) because their self-natures cannot exist together. However, the 'operation' (行, xing) of 'doubt' (疑, yi) is profound, so it operates simultaneously with 'concentration' (定, ding). Here, we do not ask about 'innate' (俱生, ju sheng) and 'acquired' (分別, fen bie) because they are the same. Furthermore, it is asked: Although the above allows for either five or four mental factors to exist simultaneously, is it certain that five or four mental factors can arise simultaneously? One should contemplate this reasonably. Here, we will only ask about 'specific object' (別境, bie jing) for the time being. Ask about 'consciousness' (識, shi), ask about 'feeling' (受, shou), but do not ask about 'universal mental factors' (遍行, bian xing). Ask about the differences between the five types of 'feeling' (受, shou) because they are not 'universal mental factors' (遍行, bian xing). That is why we ask. We do not ask about correspondence with qualities such as goodness because we will definitely ask about the former later. We do not ask about the latter before the former; this should be understood.

Treatise: What nature do these ten afflictions belong to?

Commentary: This is the question being raised.

Treatise: 'Anger' (瞋, chen) is only unwholesome, while the remaining nine are common to two natures.

Commentary: 'Anger' (瞋, chen) is only included in the nature of unwholesomeness. It is already bad if it does not arise, and if it arises, it will definitely harm oneself and others. Both the present life and future lives are called harm. The remaining nine are common to two natures; this is a general statement.

Treatise: In the upper two realms (the Form Realm and the Formless Realm), 'concentration' (定, ding) is only of the nature of neutral (neither good nor bad) because it is subdued by 'concentration' (定, ding).

Commentary: In the upper two realms (the Form Realm and the Formless Realm), 'concentration' (定, ding) is only of the nature of neutral (neither good nor bad). We do not ask about 'innate' (俱生, ju sheng) and 'acquired' (分別, fen bie); it is the same in both cases.

Treatise: If it belongs to the desire realm (欲界系, yu jie xi), 'anger' (瞋, chen) that arises from discrimination is only unwholesome because it always initiates evil actions. Innate 'anger' (瞋, chen) has two situations; initiating evil karma is also unwholesome. The nature of 'anger' (瞋, chen) is definitely like this. The remaining three (pride, doubt, and wrong views) slightly harm oneself and others.

Treatise: The rest are included in the nature of neutral (neither good nor bad) because they do not severely harm oneself and others.

Commentary: That is, it exclusively excludes 'anger' (瞋, chen). The two 'views' (見, jian) are definitely included only in the nature of neutral (neither good nor bad). The remaining three (pride, doubt, and wrong views) are partly neutral (neither good nor bad). One is due to subtlety, and the other does not obstruct good deeds; they can also arise in the position of goodness. For example, those that arise together with the seventh consciousness. These three do not extremely harm oneself and others. The 'Fifty-Eight Sayings' state that they frequently manifest. Add these four reasons.

Treatise: It should be known that the innate two 'views' (見, jian) do not initiate evil karma, so they are the same as before.

Commentary: It is stated again that the two 'views' (見, jian) are only of the nature of neutral (neither good nor bad) and do not initiate evil karma. Therefore, they are the same as before. Question: Among these two 'views' (見, jian), are there also nine grades, etc.? Answer: Some say no, there are only...

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第九品故。或言有。如別抄會。前解為勝。若如后解。如色界無記法體有九品故。

論。此十煩惱至余通三界。

述曰。此下第七界分別門。瞋唯不善。故但在欲。

論。生在下地至容現在前故。

述曰。子段第二。上下相起門。得上未至定。未得起上煩惱。即未至定不通有染。此中唯言得上根本定。方起彼地煩惱等故　若爾有不入根本而命終者若為　必無此者。必得根本定。或退。方命終故　又解當於此時。欲界煩惱未究竟伏。若皆斷盡方得起上。非未至定無有染污。第九品時入根本定已斷欲九品盡。得起未至惑方自在故。由是若有第九不入根本定者。亦不能起。凡．聖皆爾。未自在故。如求王位未自在時不作惡故。若得已去自在即起。亦同婆沙二說。一未至定無染。二有染。此無正文。顯揚第二凈染無漏定等中。細勘無之　此中說起。唯定煩惱非生煩惱。或亦通生。如遍常等。

論。諸有漏道至上根本定。

述曰。此顯伏修。于中粗者除身．邊見。及此相應。言漸次者。故顯非頓伏。

論。彼但迷事至正障定故。

述曰。何以世間道伏修不伏見。修道所伏之惑。一但迷事生。二依外門轉。簡見道貪等唯緣內見等生故。三此所伏煩惱體散亂故。四粗動正障于定。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 第九品的原因。或者說存在。如同其他抄本所記載。之前的解釋更為合理。如果按照後面的解釋，如同無記法（neither good nor bad phenomena）的本體有九品一樣。

論：這十種煩惱通於三界。

述曰：下面是第七界分別門。嗔（hatred）唯有不善，因此只存在於欲界。

論：生於下地，容許現在前的原因。

述曰：子段第二，上下相起門。得到上地未至定（preliminary stage of dhyana in the form realm），未得到時會生起上地煩惱。即未至定不通於有染。這裡只說得到上地根本定（basic level of dhyana in the form realm），才能生起彼地的煩惱等。如果有人沒有進入根本定就命終了怎麼辦？必定沒有這種情況。必定得到根本定，或者退失，才會命終。又解釋說，當此時，欲界煩惱沒有完全降伏。如果都斷盡了才能生起上地煩惱。並非未至定沒有染污。第九品時進入根本定已經斷盡欲界九品煩惱，才能自在地生起未至定之惑。因此，如果有人在第九品時沒有進入根本定，也不能生起（上地煩惱）。凡夫和聖人都是如此，因為沒有自在。如同求取王位，沒有自在時不會作惡。如果得到王位已經自在，就會生起（惡行）。也如同《婆沙論》的兩種說法，一是未至定沒有染污，二是有染污。這裡沒有明確的經文。在《顯揚聖教論》第二的凈染無漏定等中，仔細考察也沒有。這裡說的是生起定中的煩惱，不是生起一般的煩惱。或者也通於生起一般的煩惱，如遍常等。

論：諸所有漏之道，到達上地根本定。

述曰：這顯示了降伏和修習。其中粗重的，除了身見（belief in a substantial self）、邊見（belief in extremes）以及與此相應的煩惱。說漸次，是爲了顯示並非頓然降伏。

論：他們只是迷惑於事相，正是障礙定的原因。

述曰：為什麼世間道能降伏修惑而不能降伏見惑？修道所降伏的迷惑：一是隻迷惑於事相而生起；二是依靠外門而轉。簡別于見道的貪等，只緣于內見等而生起。三是此所降伏的煩惱本體散亂。四是粗動，正是障礙定的原因。

【English Translation】 English version The reason for the ninth category. Or it is said to exist. Like other copied versions. The previous explanation is more reasonable. If according to the latter explanation, it is like the substance of Avyakrta dharmas (neither good nor bad phenomena) having nine categories.

Treatise: These ten afflictions are common to the three realms.

Commentary: Below is the seventh section on distinguishing the realms. Hatred is only unwholesome, therefore it only exists in the desire realm.

Treatise: Being born in a lower realm, allowing the reason for the present manifestation.

Commentary: Second subsection, the arising of upper and lower realms. Having attained the Anagamin (preliminary stage of dhyana in the form realm) of the upper realm, without having attained it, afflictions of the upper realm will arise. That is, the Anagamin does not connect to defilement. Here it only says that having attained the basic level of dhyana in the form realm, then afflictions of that realm will arise. If someone dies without entering the basic level of dhyana, what should be done? There is definitely no such situation. One must attain the basic level of dhyana, or regress, before dying. Another explanation is that at this time, the afflictions of the desire realm have not been completely subdued. If they are all eradicated, then afflictions of the upper realm can arise. It is not that the Anagamin is without defilement. At the ninth category, entering the basic level of dhyana has already eradicated the nine categories of afflictions of the desire realm, then one can freely arise the delusion of the Anagamin. Therefore, if someone in the ninth category does not enter the basic level of dhyana, they also cannot arise (upper realm afflictions). Ordinary people and sages are the same, because they are not free. Like seeking the throne, one does not do evil when one is not free. If one has attained it and is free, then one will arise (evil deeds). It is also the same as the two sayings in the Mahavibhasa, one is that the Anagamin is without defilement, and the other is that it has defilement. There is no clear sutra here. In the second of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, in the pure, defiled, and non-outflow dhyana, there is no such thing after careful examination. Here it says that the afflictions in dhyana arise, not ordinary afflictions. Or it also connects to the arising of ordinary afflictions, such as pervasive and constant etc.

Treatise: All outflows of the path, reaching the basic level of dhyana in the upper realm.

Commentary: This shows subduing and cultivation. Among them, the coarse ones, except for Satkayadristi (belief in a substantial self), Antagrahadristi (belief in extremes) and the corresponding afflictions. Saying gradually, is to show that it is not a sudden subduing.

Treatise: They are only deluded by phenomena, which is the very reason for obstructing dhyana.

Commentary: Why can worldly paths subdue afflictions of practice but not afflictions of view? The delusions subdued by the path of practice: one is that they only arise from delusion about phenomena; two is that they turn by relying on external doors. Distinguishing from greed etc. in the path of seeing, which only arise from internal views etc. Three is that the substance of the afflictions subdued here is scattered. Four is that the coarse movement is the very reason for obstructing dhyana.

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定是事觀。事障障故　有義此身見等既不能伏。后越入聖得第三果。如第七識欲界系者。亦不能斷。要至金剛方能頓斷。唯障無學故。不同見惑正障見道。及見理故。此違第七卷滅定中文。不許聖者伏下生上。有種子故　今解亦斷。不可說以先不伏故即言不斷。見惑不伏。入見斷故。但有漏道既是事觀。不伏理惑。入現觀時理實亦斷。雖無正文任意取捨　于中復有二說。一云見道起二無間。一斷見惑。起解脫道已復起無間。斷前所伏修道之惑等已方起相見道。二云由加行時先已伏故。一無間道與分別俱斷。此為正義。

論。得彼定已至皆容現前。

述曰。下分別惑雖不能伏。得彼定。已得起上地分別起者。其修道我見等。前雖不伏。今得彼定如命終心得起上者。緣未來生故。非計他地法為我。未離下染何以不起上惑者。以相違故。恐相雜故　若爾見惑得彼定已。下地系者為起不起。五十八言不伏見等。對法第五成就品言。若生欲界三界煩惱隨煩惱種子成就故成就。離此地染成彼地等。五十八亦言生在下地得起上煩惱。不言未離染起上煩惱。正與此同(如樞要說)。

論。生在上地至皆容俱起。

述曰。此總立宗。

論。生第四定至俱生愛故。

述曰。對法第六。得第四定增上慢

比丘。謂是第四果既受中有已。即色界身起下邪見。便謗釋種無有涅槃。以於今時後有起故。此有邪見。及俱無明。或許有瞋。瞋涅槃故。既生地獄由邪見力。非色界邪見。不招下苦故。非於欲界身起此邪見。彼言中有生時起故。色界中有。欲界本有如何見之。非定通力住散心故。非由起上邪見為緣。欲界后報業熟生那落迦。無別文證。古師多作此解非也。亦非彼本有起此邪見。勢力遠故。無文說故。即起下不善分別惑也　若爾應地獄行上無明發。此中邪見俱行思即是。又可為難。以上行下無明發。以下例上亦然　如下緣生中自當分別。起潤生愛生下亦是。即是俱生無記煩惱也。此中應言我見．我愛．及慢．無明。無明．愛定有。我見．慢不定。未必俱故所以不說。又例起故。此舉方隅。無違理失。

下會五十八等文。

論。而言生上至或隨轉門。

述曰。謂餘三見。疑等。不起下故。唯此二時起此等故。或隨轉門。順薩婆多故。起余疑等無正文說。

然應如理思所餘分別．俱生之惑亦得起不。見斷瞋．癡可有。修斷慢等亦有。余不得起。唯潤生時起修斷惑。余時不起。故不可起修斷之瞋．及邊見二。無起相故。中有謗涅槃便墮地獄。但可起瞋與邪見並。時節極短。不可起余疑．見取等。無

起相故。若總說起。雖無正文遮。無行相故不可說起。唯得起下六。謂邪見．瞋．癡．愛．慢．我見。餘四不可起。分別．俱生隨其所應。下之起上得起幾法。若唯定煩惱非生煩惱。即唯有五。見．慢．愛．疑．無明。見即見取。若並生煩惱。我見潤生起亦無失。其戒取．邪見．邊見。未見正文。以理準者。亦得二取可起。執上地法為見．戒可有起理。得宿住通計梵王為常是邪見。亦有此理。邊見可得。得宿住計全常等是。上九煩惱下皆可起。未見起斷見文。然約九地三界得起上幾許。八地二界何者。今說色界。若無色界互起上下。如樞要說。此中幾是分別．俱生。亦應如理思。

論。下地煩惱至味上定故。

述曰。第三子門上下緣別。貪緣上者。一由味勝定。二由求生。此通見．修。六十二卷說五種愛緣上。此但舉一。但得緣故。顯揚等同。

論。既說瞋恚至離欲地故。

述曰。此唯見斷。瞋恚緣滅．道五十八文。此中為例。瞋親迷滅．道。亦應緣上地。以瞋緣事例于理故。深理尚然。何況淺事。

論。總緣諸行至得緣上故。

述曰。總緣諸行起我．我所。斷．常．慢得上緣者。八十八說。世間道不伏身見。由此見故於下上地所有俱行和雜自體。不觀差別總計為我．及我所等

。五十八云其世間道得離修道貪慾．瞋恚。及彼隨法鄰近憍．慢等。故知與我見俱慢．貪．及邊見亦不伏。此與我見相鄰近故。八十八以我見為本略不說余。此論中說總緣行中。不言貪者略也。以別有論文貪上緣故。和雜計為我。即上界種子等法也。不計現行故。此第六識。唯修所斷　或有異釋。見斷我見。如四全常亦得緣上。乃以三界合緣為我。除此不得緣別生故。

論。餘五緣上其理極成。

述曰。謂癡．疑．邪見．二取。對法第六與此同故。此中我見．邊見．及慢唯舉總緣。瞋唯別緣。貪．癡通總．別　有義我見．邊見。準六十二見一分常等亦通別緣。而緣上者。慢雖無文。陵他所得勝法。何妨見道所斷之慢亦得緣上。又緣梵王一分常者。是上地我見後生常見。得宿住智緣。起上界身．邊見故。正義唯是上地所繫。得宿住智後方起故。

論。而有處言至或依別緣。

述曰。對法第六。五十八．九等。貪．瞋．慢．及我見不緣上。此言等者等取我見。彼依粗相說。粗相說即小乘也　或粗顯行相非鉅細。鉅細即得。除此所說　或依別緣自身為我我見等不緣上故。或彼對法第六。見緣上中。唯除我見不除邊見略也。邊見隨我見後生。身見不緣。邊見應爾。故五十八迷苦諦等中。云緣大梵等為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：五十八卷中說，世間道能夠脫離修道中的貪慾、瞋恚，以及與這些隨順的法，如鄰近的憍慢等。因此可知，與我見同時存在的慢、貪以及邊見，也無法被降伏，因為它們與我見緊密相連。第八十八卷以我見為根本，簡略地沒有提及其他。此論中說，總緣於行蘊中，沒有提到貪，這是因為省略了。因為另有論文專門論述貪的緣起。和合雜亂地計度為『我』，指的是上界的種子等法。因為不計度現行的緣故，所以這第六識，唯有通過修道才能斷除。或者有不同的解釋，認為見斷的我見，如同四種完全的常法，也可以緣于上界。乃至於以三界合起來緣為『我』。除了這種情況，就不能緣于其他個別產生的事物。

論：其餘五種（煩惱）緣于上界，這個道理非常明顯。

述記：指的是癡、疑、邪見、兩種取。對法藏第六卷與此相同。這裡我見、邊見以及慢，只舉了總緣的情況。瞋只舉了別緣的情況。貪、癡通於總緣和別緣。有一種觀點認為，我見、邊見，按照六十二見的其中一部分，如常等，也通於別緣。而關於緣于上界的情況，慢雖然沒有明確的文字說明，但陵辱他人所得的殊勝之法，又有什麼妨礙見道所斷的慢也可以緣于上界呢？又，緣于梵天王的一部分常法，是上地我見后產生的常見。通過獲得宿住智而緣起上界之身見、邊見。正義認為，唯有上地所繫縛的，在獲得宿住智后才產生。

論：然而在有些地方說，或者依據別緣。

述記：對法藏第六卷，五十八卷、第九卷等，貪、瞋、慢以及我見不緣于上界。這裡說的『等』，是等取我見。這些是依據粗顯的相來說的。粗顯的相說，指的就是小乘。或者說，是粗顯的行相，而不是鉅細。鉅細指的是獲得。除了這裡所說的。或者依據別緣，以自身為我的我見等不緣于上界。或者彼對法藏第六卷，見緣于上界中，唯獨排除了我見，沒有排除邊見，這是省略了。邊見隨著我見之後產生，身見不緣，邊見也應該如此。所以五十八卷迷於苦諦等中，說緣于大梵等為...

【English Translation】 English version: Volume 58 states that the worldly path can detach from craving, hatred, and related phenomena such as arrogance and pride associated with the path of cultivation. Therefore, it is known that pride, craving, and extreme views that coexist with the view of self ('Atma-drishti' - view of self) cannot be subdued, as they are closely linked to the view of self. Volume 88 takes the view of self as its foundation, briefly omitting others. This treatise states that in the aggregate of formations, craving is not mentioned, which is an omission. This is because there is a separate treatise specifically discussing the arising of craving. To measure and combine confusedly as 'self' refers to the seeds of the upper realms and other such phenomena. Because it does not measure the present actions, this sixth consciousness is only severed through cultivation. Alternatively, there are different interpretations, considering the view of self severed by insight, like the four completely permanent phenomena, can also be related to the upper realms. Even to the point of combining the three realms to relate to as 'self'. Apart from this situation, it cannot relate to other individually arising things.

Treatise: The remaining five (afflictions) relating to the upper realms, this principle is very clear.

Commentary: Refers to ignorance ('moha' - ignorance), doubt ('vicikitsa' - doubt), wrong views ('mithya-drishti' - wrong views), and the two kinds of grasping. The sixth volume of the Abhidharma is the same as this. Here, the view of self, extreme views, and pride only cite the general relating. Hatred only cites the specific relating. Craving and ignorance are common to both general and specific relating. One view holds that the view of self and extreme views, according to a portion of the sixty-two views, such as permanence, also extend to specific relating. Regarding relating to the upper realms, although there is no explicit textual explanation for pride, what prevents the pride severed by the path of seeing, which insults the superior Dharma obtained by others, from also relating to the upper realms? Furthermore, relating to a portion of the permanence of Brahma ('Brahma' - a deity), is the common view arising after the view of self in the upper realms. Through obtaining the knowledge of past lives, the view of self and extreme views of the upper realms arise. The correct meaning is that only those bound by the upper realms arise after obtaining the knowledge of past lives.

Treatise: However, in some places it is said, or based on specific relating.

Commentary: The sixth volume of the Abhidharma, volumes 58, 9, etc., state that craving, hatred, pride, and the view of self do not relate to the upper realms. The 'etc.' mentioned here includes the view of self. These are based on the coarse aspects. The coarse aspect refers to the Hinayana. Or, it refers to the coarse and manifest characteristics, not the large and small. Large and small refers to attainment. Apart from what is stated here. Or, based on specific relating, the view of self that takes oneself as the self does not relate to the upper realms. Or, in the sixth volume of the Abhidharma, among the views relating to the upper realms, only the view of self is excluded, not the extreme views, which is an omission. Extreme views arise after the view of self, the view of body does not relate, so extreme views should be the same. Therefore, in volume 58, being deluded about the truth of suffering, etc., it is said that relating to the Great Brahma, etc., is...

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有情常是迷苦邪見。即地獄邪見緣上界起。彼卷初云六十二見全常等是常見。即依薩迦耶見後生故。如前已說。是他地邊見。隨計他地我見後生故。分別我見得定已去起上法故。此中例邊同於我見必依起故。此解為勝。

論。不見世間至身見起故。

述曰。一解云。無有見道別緣我見有計他地現行為我。以別緣者見所斷故。邊見亦爾。依彼起故。今此所解一分常等。隨於色界系我后而生。此極有理。然此正是得彼定者。依宿住通執為彼常。故如所說。依尋．伺者未得上定。不起上我見。如何起常。故如先說。今此又解。應言但是欲界所繫自身之我。不許別緣計他地法為自內我。計他之我理亦不遮。故於此後起常見等。是邊見攝。不爾此義道理難思。文中但舉修道總緣我見為他界緣。理準亦有見道所斷別緣我見。計他地法為他之我。文中但遮計為自我故　又解別緣者是多分義。謂非總緣。及六十二見所依我見以外。無任運．分別二種我見。別緣他地為我者故。其此總緣。六十二見時。理不應遮。緣者所以。依別所以說彼不緣　又解依小乘別緣者。不執他地法為我等。大乘無遮。

論。上地煩惱至而陵彼故。

述曰。上地之惑得緣下地。分別．俱生理俱無失。五十九說于下有情恃己勝德。而陵下

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有情眾生常常是迷惑、痛苦和持有邪見的。這意味著地獄的邪見會以上界為緣而生起。在《彼卷》的開頭說，六十二見中的『全常』等是常見，這是因為它們是依附於薩迦耶見（Sakkāya-ditthi，身見）而產生的，正如前面已經說過的。『是他地邊見』，是隨著對其他地方的『我』的執著而產生的，因為分別我見是在獲得禪定之後才生起對上界法的執著。這裡，邊見類似於我見，必定依附於我見而生起，這種解釋更為合理。

論：因為不能如實地見到世間，所以才會生起身見。

述曰：一種解釋是，沒有見道會特別地緣於我見，而執著于其他地方的顯現為『我』，因為特別緣於我見的會被見道所斷。邊見也是如此，因為它依附於我見而生起。現在這裡的解釋是，一部分的『常』等，是隨著對欲界所繫的『我』的執著而產生的，這非常有道理。然而，這正是那些獲得禪定的人，依靠宿住神通而執著于『彼』為常。因此，正如所說，依靠尋和伺的人，如果未獲得上定，就不會生起上界的我見，又怎麼會生起『常』呢？所以，正如先前所說。現在這裡又解釋說，應該說只是欲界所繫的自身之『我』，不允許特別地執著于其他地方的法為自己的內在之『我』。執著于其他的『我』，在道理上並不禁止，因此在此之後生起的常見等，屬於邊見所攝。否則，這個道理就難以理解。文中只是舉了修道總緣我見為他界緣，按照道理也應該有見道所斷的特別緣我見，執著于其他地方的法為其他的『我』。文中只是禁止執著為自我。又一種解釋是，特別緣指的是多分義，指的是非總緣，以及六十二見所依的我見以外，沒有任運和分別兩種我見，特別緣于其他地方為『我』。而這種總緣，在六十二見時，道理上不應該禁止。緣的原因，是因為特別，所以說它不緣。又一種解釋是，按照小乘的觀點，特別緣指的是不執著于其他地方的法為『我』等，大乘則沒有禁止。

論：上地的煩惱能夠緣于下地，並且能夠凌駕于下地之上。

述曰：上地的迷惑能夠緣于下地，分別和俱生的道理都沒有缺失。《五十九》中說，對於地獄有情，憑藉自己的殊勝功德，而凌駕于地獄有情之上。

【English Translation】 English version: Sentient beings are often deluded, suffering, and hold wrong views. This means that the wrong views of the lower realms arise based on the higher realms. At the beginning of 'That Volume', it says that 'completely permanent' etc. among the sixty-two views are common views, because they arise dependent on Sakkāya-ditthi (身見, view of self), as has been said before. 'It is the extreme view of other realms' arises following the attachment to the 'self' in other places, because the differentiated view of self arises after obtaining samadhi (禪定, meditative state) and clinging to the dharmas (法, teachings) of the higher realms. Here, the extreme view is similar to the view of self, and must arise dependent on the view of self, this explanation is more reasonable.

Treatise: Because one does not see the world as it truly is, the view of self arises.

Commentary: One explanation is that no path of seeing specifically arises from the view of self, and clings to the manifestation of other places as 'self', because what specifically arises from the view of self will be severed by the path of seeing. The extreme view is also like this, because it arises dependent on the view of self. The explanation here is that a portion of 'permanence' etc. arises following the attachment to the 'self' associated with the desire realm, which is very reasonable. However, this is precisely those who have attained samadhi, relying on the supernormal power of past lives, and clinging to 'that' as permanent. Therefore, as it is said, those who rely on investigation and analysis, if they have not attained higher samadhi, will not give rise to the view of self in the higher realms, how could 'permanence' arise? Therefore, as previously stated. Now here it is explained again that it should be said that it is only the 'self' of oneself associated with the desire realm, and it is not allowed to specifically cling to the dharmas of other places as one's own inner 'self'. Clinging to other 'selves' is not prohibited in principle, therefore the common views etc. that arise after this are included in the extreme views. Otherwise, this principle is difficult to understand. The text only cites the path of cultivation generally arising from the view of self as the condition of other realms, according to reason there should also be the path of seeing severing the specific arising from the view of self, clinging to the dharmas of other places as the 'self' of others. The text only prohibits clinging to it as one's own self. Another explanation is that specifically arising refers to the meaning of 'mostly', referring to non-general arising, and outside of the view of self on which the sixty-two views rely, there are no two kinds of views of self, spontaneous and differentiated, specifically arising from other places as 'self'. While this general arising, at the time of the sixty-two views, should not be prohibited in principle. The reason for arising is because it is specific, therefore it is said that it does not arise. Another explanation is that, according to the Hinayana (小乘, Lesser Vehicle) point of view, specifically arising refers to not clinging to the dharmas of other places as 'self' etc., while the Mahayana (大乘, Great Vehicle) does not prohibit it.

Treatise: The afflictions of the higher realms can arise from the lower realms, and can override the lower realms.

Commentary: The delusions of the higher realms can arise from the lower realms, and the principles of differentiated and co-arisen are not lacking. The Fifty-Nine says that, with regard to sentient beings in the lower realms, relying on one's own superior merits, one overrides the sentient beings in the lower realms.

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地亦起慢故。

論。總緣諸行至得緣下地。

述曰。如前已說此但修道。有文證故總緣起我．邊見．愛故。此亦有慢。別有相故略而不說。許起見道理亦無失。此決定然。

論。疑后三見如理應思。

述曰。癡已極成所以不說。疑及邪見．見取．戒取是后三見。如理應思。此中有義亦得緣下。疑于欲界佛世尊故。或復邪執得有邪見。撥疑下地苦．集理故。得上定已起彼二取執欲界聞．思。昔所起者為勝因故。有義不得。無文證故。又二見得行相如前。除邪見．疑。

論。而說上惑至或依別緣。

述曰。五十八等云上不緣下。彼依多分餘一切時一切異生故。依別行相緣計為我。邊見。及愛。不緣下故。總緣者得。

論。此十煩惱至彼唯善故。

述曰。第八大門中。學者有學．無學．非．學無學。然唯第三。非前二種。瑜伽五十七。二十二根中有學．無學。通漏．無漏。然彼唯善。此染故非。

論。此十煩惱何所斷耶。

述曰。此問第九三斷門。

論。非非所斷彼非染故。

述曰。此即總答。諸染皆斷。然通見．修故非非斷。非所斷法非是染故。

論。分別起者至細難斷故。

述曰。分別皆見斷。以粗易斷故。如對法第三．第四

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 地也會生起慢心，因為地也是被執著的對象。

論：總的來說，（上地煩惱）緣于諸行，乃至能夠緣于下地。

述記：如前所述，這僅僅是修道位上的情況。因為有經文證明，（上地煩惱）總的來說緣於我見、邊見和愛。這裡也有慢心，因為慢心有其獨特的相狀，所以略而不說。允許生起見解的道理也沒有錯失，這是確定的。

論：對於疑、邪見、見取見、戒禁取見這后三種見解，應該如理作意。

述記：愚癡（癡）已經非常明顯，所以不說。疑以及邪見、見取見、戒禁取見是后三種見。應該如理作意。這裡有一種觀點認為，（上地煩惱）也可以緣于下地。因為懷疑欲界的佛世尊。或者產生邪執，從而產生邪見，否定下地的苦、集之理。得到上地禪定后，會生起見取見和戒禁取見，執著于欲界的聞所成慧和思所成慧。因為過去所生起的（煩惱）是殊勝的因。另一種觀點認為，（上地煩惱）不能緣于下地，因為沒有經文證明。而且，見取見和戒禁取見的行相如前所述，除了邪見和疑。

論：而說上地煩惱不緣下地，或者依賴於不同的緣。

述記：五十八等說上地煩惱不緣下地，那是依據大多數情況，其餘一切時和一切異生都是緣下地的。依賴於不同的行相，緣于計執為我的我見、邊見和愛，所以不緣下地。總的來說，（上地煩惱）是可以緣下地的。

論：這十種煩惱在什麼情況下斷除呢？

述記：第八大門中，學者分為有學、無學、非學非無學。然而，這裡僅僅指第三種，不是前兩種。《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷中，二十二根中有有學、無學，通於有漏、無漏。然而，那裡僅僅是善法，這裡是染污法，所以不是。

論：這十種煩惱在什麼情況下斷除呢？

述記：這是詢問第九三斷門。

論：不是非所斷，因為它們不是染污法。

述記：這是總的回答。一切染污法都要斷除。然而，通於見道和修道，所以不是非所斷。非所斷的法不是染污法。

論：分別生起的（煩惱）容易斷除，因為它們粗顯。

述記：分別生起的煩惱都是見道所斷的，因為它們粗顯容易斷除。如《對法論》第三、第四卷所說。

【English Translation】 English version: The earth also gives rise to pride, because the earth is also an object of attachment.

Treatise: In general, (the afflictions of the higher realms) are conditioned by all activities, and can even be conditioned by the lower realms.

Commentary: As mentioned earlier, this only applies to the path of cultivation. Because there is scriptural proof that (the afflictions of the higher realms) are generally conditioned by the view of self, extreme views, and attachment. There is also pride here, but because pride has its unique characteristics, it is omitted. Allowing the arising of views is also not a mistake, this is certain.

Treatise: For the latter three views of doubt, wrong views, holding to views, and holding to precepts, one should contemplate them appropriately.

Commentary: Ignorance (moha) is already very obvious, so it is not mentioned. Doubt, wrong views, holding to views, and holding to precepts are the latter three views. One should contemplate them appropriately. There is a view here that (the afflictions of the higher realms) can also be conditioned by the lower realms. Because of doubting the Buddha, the World Honored One, in the desire realm. Or generating wrong attachments, thereby generating wrong views, denying the truths of suffering and accumulation in the lower realms. After attaining samadhi in the higher realms, one will generate holding to views and holding to precepts, clinging to the wisdom gained from hearing and thinking in the desire realm. Because the (afflictions) generated in the past are superior causes. Another view is that (the afflictions of the higher realms) cannot be conditioned by the lower realms, because there is no scriptural proof. Moreover, the characteristics of holding to views and holding to precepts are as mentioned earlier, except for wrong views and doubt.

Treatise: And it is said that the afflictions of the higher realms are not conditioned by the lower realms, or rely on different conditions.

Commentary: The fifty-eight, etc., say that the afflictions of the higher realms are not conditioned by the lower realms, that is based on most situations, the rest of the time and all ordinary beings are conditioned by the lower realms. Relying on different characteristics, being conditioned by the view of self, extreme views, and attachment that are clung to as self, therefore they are not conditioned by the lower realms. In general, (the afflictions of the higher realms) can be conditioned by the lower realms.

Treatise: Under what circumstances are these ten afflictions eliminated?

Commentary: In the eighth great gate, learners are divided into learners, non-learners, and neither learners nor non-learners. However, here it only refers to the third type, not the first two. In the fifty-seventh volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, among the twenty-two roots, there are learners and non-learners, encompassing defiled and undefiled. However, there it is only wholesome dharmas, here it is defiled dharmas, so it is not.

Treatise: Under what circumstances are these ten afflictions eliminated?

Commentary: This is asking about the ninth of the three eliminations.

Treatise: They are not non-eliminable, because they are not defiled dharmas.

Commentary: This is the general answer. All defiled dharmas must be eliminated. However, encompassing the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, so they are not non-eliminable. Non-eliminable dharmas are not defiled dharmas.

Treatise: (Afflictions) that arise from discrimination are easy to eliminate, because they are coarse.

Commentary: Afflictions that arise from discrimination are all eliminated by the path of seeing, because they are coarse and easy to eliminate. As stated in the third and fourth volumes of the Abhidharmakosa.

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卷初說。俱生唯修斷。如前已說。分別．俱生之數各有品類。然見所斷。為同小乘見四諦斷。為九品斷耶。

論。見所斷十至總緣諦故。

述曰。下別解斷。于中有二。初分別。后俱生　分別中初總。后別。此初也。此中十種皆俱頓斷。以真見道總緣諦故。總緣四諦之真如。真如雖自相觀望諦而說。並皆緣之。名總緣諦。至下第九斷惑中解。五十九說與壞緣諦作意相應故。煩惱雖九品。違一或三品智故。非如俱生九品諸惑違九品智故。數數修道方能斷之。然除利根由先聞．思力加行。以三界九地煩惱上下地九品。各各為類修道一時總斷。得第四果。

論。然迷諦相至怖畏處故。

述曰。下別解分別。第二迷諦總別。然于見道迷諦煩惱。有總有別。總者謂十皆通迷四諦。即一一煩惱皆起之時。迷四諦理。又諸煩惱有別行相。如何者是迷苦諦等。此一諦下別行相。謂隨此諦下見．疑後生。即名迷此。若唯爾者。邪見．疑．癡總迷撥疑四諦。及隨此起貪等。此是何諦攝。是故須說此總行相。即此總迷見．疑等。名通迷四諦見．疑。隨此見等起貪等。皆名通迷四諦貪等。貪等行相如見等總迷可爾。若別迷行相。是何諦下貪等。貪等不能獨頭別迷諦故。無隨總行相見等之貪等。是別迷諦下惑。由見道貪

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：卷初說，俱生煩惱唯有通過修習才能斷除，如前文已經說過。分別煩惱和俱生煩惱的數量各有品類。然而，見所斷的煩惱，是如同小乘佛教那樣通過觀察四聖諦來斷除，還是分為九品來斷除呢？

論：見所斷的煩惱，因為是總緣四諦的緣故，所以是頓斷的。

述曰：下面分別解釋斷除煩惱的方法。其中分為兩部分：首先是分別煩惱，然後是俱生煩惱。在分別煩惱中，首先是總的解釋，然後是分別的解釋。這裡是總的解釋。這十種煩惱都是一起頓斷的，因為真正的見道是總緣四諦的。總緣四諦的真如（tathata，事物的真實如是的狀態）。真如雖然可以從自相觀望四諦的角度來說明，但都是緣於四諦的，所以稱為總緣諦。至於下文第九斷惑中會解釋，五十九種煩惱與壞緣諦作意相應。煩惱雖然分為九品，但違背的是一品或三品智慧，所以不像俱生煩惱那樣，九品煩惱違背九品智慧，需要數數修道才能斷除。然而，除了利根之人，由於先前的聽聞和思考的力量，加上修行，可以將三界九地的煩惱，上下地分為九品，各自作為一類，通過修行一時總斷，從而獲得第四果（arahat，阿羅漢果）。

論：然而，因為迷惑於四諦的相狀，乃至對怖畏之處產生恐懼。

述曰：下面分別解釋分別煩惱。第二是迷惑四諦的總相和別相。在見道中，迷惑四諦的煩惱，有總相，也有別相。總相是指十種煩惱都普遍迷惑四諦。也就是說，每一個煩惱生起的時候，都迷惑四諦的道理。另外，各種煩惱有不同的行相。什麼是迷惑苦諦等呢？這是指在每一諦下有不同的行相，也就是隨著這一諦下產生邪見和懷疑。這就叫做迷惑此諦。如果僅僅是這樣，那麼邪見、懷疑、愚癡總的來說是撥無和懷疑四諦，以及隨之而起的貪等，這又屬於哪一諦所攝呢？所以需要說明這種總的行相，也就是這種總的迷惑，見、疑等，叫做普遍迷惑四諦的見、疑。隨著這種見等而生起的貪等，都叫做普遍迷惑四諦的貪等。貪等的行相可以像見等那樣總的迷惑。如果是分別迷惑的行相，那麼是哪一諦下的貪等呢？因為貪等不能單獨地分別迷惑諦，所以沒有隨著總的行相的見等而產生的貪等，而是分別迷惑諦下的煩惱，這是由於見道中的貪。

【English Translation】 English version: The beginning of the chapter says that co-nate afflictions can only be eliminated through cultivation, as mentioned earlier. The number of discriminated and co-nate afflictions each has its own categories. However, are the afflictions eliminated by insight (見所斷, Jian Suo Duan) eliminated by observing the Four Noble Truths (四聖諦, Sì Shèng Dì) as in Hinayana Buddhism, or are they eliminated in nine grades?

Treatise: The afflictions eliminated by insight are eliminated all at once because they are related to the entirety of the Four Noble Truths.

Commentary: Below, the methods of eliminating afflictions are explained separately. Among them, there are two parts: first, discriminated afflictions, and then co-nate afflictions. In discriminated afflictions, first is the general explanation, and then the separate explanation. This is the general explanation. These ten types of afflictions are all eliminated together at once because true insight is related to the entirety of the Four Noble Truths. The Suchness (真如, Zhēn Rú, tathata) of the entirety of the Four Noble Truths. Although Suchness can be explained from the perspective of observing the Four Noble Truths in their self-nature, it is related to all Four Noble Truths, so it is called the entirety of the Four Noble Truths. As for the explanation in the ninth elimination of afflictions below, the fifty-nine types of afflictions are related to the intention of destroying the conditions of the Truths. Although afflictions are divided into nine grades, they contradict one or three grades of wisdom, so they are not like co-nate afflictions, where nine grades of afflictions contradict nine grades of wisdom, and require repeated cultivation to eliminate them. However, except for those with sharp faculties, due to the power of previous hearing and thinking, plus cultivation, the afflictions of the nine grounds of the Three Realms can be divided into nine grades in the upper and lower grounds, each as a category, and eliminated all at once through cultivation, thereby obtaining the fourth fruit (arahat, 阿羅漢果).

Treatise: However, because of being deluded about the characteristics of the Four Noble Truths, and even fearing fearful places.

Commentary: Below, discriminated afflictions are explained separately. The second is being deluded about the general and specific characteristics of the Four Noble Truths. In the path of insight, the afflictions that are deluded about the Four Noble Truths have both general and specific characteristics. The general characteristic refers to the ten types of afflictions that universally delude the Four Noble Truths. That is to say, when each affliction arises, it deludes the principles of the Four Noble Truths. In addition, various afflictions have different characteristics. What is delusion about the Truth of Suffering, etc.? This refers to the different characteristics under each Truth, that is, the arising of wrong views and doubts under this Truth. This is called delusion about this Truth. If it is only like this, then wrong views, doubts, and ignorance generally negate and doubt the Four Noble Truths, and the greed, etc., that arise along with them, to which Truth do they belong? Therefore, it is necessary to explain this general characteristic, that is, this general delusion, views, doubts, etc., are called views and doubts that universally delude the Four Noble Truths. The greed, etc., that arise along with these views, etc., are all called greed, etc., that universally delude the Four Noble Truths. The characteristics of greed, etc., can be generally deluded like views, etc. If it is the characteristic of separate delusion, then under which Truth is greed, etc.? Because greed, etc., cannot separately delude the Truth alone, there is no greed, etc., that arises along with the views, etc., of the general characteristic, but rather the afflictions under the Truth that are separately deluded, which is due to greed in the path of insight.

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等緣見．疑生故　今此總有二種。一數總。諦各具十故。二行相總。有通迷四諦故。由此二二迷有六。三三迷有四。總迷有一。如壞緣念住　別亦有二。一數別。三諦有八。一諦有十故。二行相別。各各別迷故　何以十種皆能迷四諦。苦．集是十因．依處故。一是因。二是依處。對法第七。苦．集是十因緣。增長此十。又為依處。效能隨順生此十故。此等與大論第八同。滅．道是彼怖畏處所。性不隨順增長十種。但起迷撥猶豫等事。緣此二諦起十惑故。又外道於此二諦。起種種分別故。皆迷滅．道。其煩惱起皆具此二緣。然總迷者。行相總故說具二緣。其別行相不說有也。據實俱有。以行相迷有總．別故。總謂十種皆迷四諦。是數總也。因．依處等。是行相總　問如何于集．滅．道下起身．邊二見　答此二見行相深執取。不了三諦故　若爾即一切我見皆迷四諦　應云。此執三諦下煩惱．蘊等。為二見故。

論。別謂別迷至屬苦諦故。

述曰。集．滅．道三諦有別行相。不共無明迷三諦者。故得成八。身．邊二見多計諸有漏果法為二見故唯迷苦。唯于苦諦不了行相增故。非是能了余之三諦。此同小乘唯果處起。然實緣迷三諦。亦有二見緣三諦下所起諸惑為我等故。然以別緣諦十六行中空．非我二。唯屬苦諦

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 等緣見（通過因緣和合而產生的見解），疑生故（因為疑惑而產生）。今此總有二種（現在這裡總共有兩種情況）：一數總（第一種是數量上的總體）。諦各具十故（因為每一諦都具有十種）。二行相總（第二種是行相上的總體）。有通迷四諦故（因為普遍迷惑於四聖諦）。由此二二迷有六（因此，兩種兩種地迷惑，共有六種）。三三迷有四（三種三種地迷惑，共有四種）。總迷有一（完全迷惑有一種）。如壞緣念住（例如破壞因緣念住）。 別亦有二（區別也有兩種）：一數別（一是數量上的區別）。三諦有八（三諦有八種）。一諦有十故（一諦有十種）。二行相別（二是行相上的區別）。各各別迷故（因為各自不同的迷惑）。何以十種皆能迷四諦（為什麼這十種都能迷惑四聖諦）？苦．集是十因．依處故（因為苦和集是十種原因和依靠之處）。一是因（一個是原因）。二是依處（二是依靠之處）。對法第七（在《阿毗達摩》第七卷中）。苦．集是十因緣（苦和集是十種因緣）。增長此十（增長這十種）。又為依處（又作為依靠之處）。效能隨順生此十故（因為其效能隨順產生這十種）。此等與大論第八同（這些與《大毗婆沙論》第八卷相同）。滅．道是彼怖畏處所（滅和道是他們恐懼害怕的地方）。性不隨順增長十種（其性質不隨順增長這十種）。但起迷撥猶豫等事（只會產生迷惑、否定、猶豫等事情）。緣此二諦起十惑故（因為緣于這二諦而生起十種迷惑）。又外道於此二諦（而且外道對於這二諦）。起種種分別故（產生種種分別）。皆迷滅．道（都迷惑于滅和道）。其煩惱起皆具此二緣（其煩惱生起都具備這兩種因緣）。然總迷者（然而總體上的迷惑）。行相總故說具二緣（因為行相總體，所以說具備兩種因緣）。其別行相不說有也（其個別的行相就不說了）。據實俱有（實際上都具有）。以行相迷有總．別故（因為行相上的迷惑有總體和個別）。總謂十種皆迷四諦（總體是指十種都迷惑於四聖諦）。是數總也（這是數量上的總體）。因．依處等（原因、依靠之處等等）。是行相總（是行相上的總體）。問如何于集．滅．道下起身．邊二見（問：如何在集、滅、道之下產生身見和邊見）？答此二見行相深執取（答：這兩種見解的行相是深刻的執取）。不了三諦故（因為不瞭解三諦）。若爾即一切我見皆迷四諦（如果這樣，那麼一切我見都迷惑於四聖諦）？應云（應該說）。此執三諦下煩惱．蘊等（這種執著是把三諦之下的煩惱、五蘊等）。為二見故（當作兩種見解的緣故）。 論（論）：別謂別迷至屬苦諦故（區別是指個別地迷惑，直到屬於苦諦的緣故）。 述曰（述記說）：集．滅．道三諦有別行相（集、滅、道三諦有不同的行相）。不共無明迷三諦者（不共無明迷惑這三諦）。故得成八（所以能夠形成八種）。身．邊二見多計諸有漏果法為二見故（身見和邊見大多把各種有漏的果報之法當作兩種見解的緣故）。唯迷苦（只迷惑于苦）。唯于苦諦不了行相增故（只是對於苦諦不瞭解其行相而增加）。非是能了余之三諦（不是能夠了解其餘的三諦）。此同小乘唯果處起（這和小乘相同，只是在果報之處生起）。然實緣迷三諦（然而實際上是緣于迷惑三諦）。亦有二見緣三諦下所起諸惑為我等故（也有兩種見解，緣於三諦之下所產生的各種迷惑，當作是我等等的緣故）。然以別緣諦十六行中空．非我二（然而以個別的因緣，在諦的十六種行相中，空和非我這兩種）。唯屬苦諦（只屬於苦諦）。

【English Translation】 English version 』Deng Yuan Jian』 (Views arising from dependent origination), 『Yi Sheng Gu』 (arising from doubt). 『Jin Ci Zong You Er Zhong』 (Now, there are two kinds in total here): 『Yi Shu Zong』 (First, a numerical totality). 『Di Ge Ju Shi Gu』 (Because each Truth possesses ten aspects). 『Er Xing Xiang Zong』 (Second, a totality of characteristics). 『You Tong Mi Si Di Gu』 (Because there is a universal delusion regarding the Four Noble Truths). 『You Ci Er Er Mi You Liu』 (Therefore, with two-by-two delusions, there are six types). 『San San Mi You Si』 (With three-by-three delusions, there are four types). 『Zong Mi You Yi』 (A complete delusion exists as one type). 『Ru Huai Yuan Nian Zhu』 (Such as destroying the mindfulness of dependent origination). 』Bie Yi You Er』 (Distinctions also exist in two ways): 『Yi Shu Bie』 (First, a numerical distinction). 『San Di You Ba』 (The three Truths have eight). 『Yi Di You Shi Gu』 (One Truth has ten). 『Er Xing Xiang Bie』 (Second, a distinction in characteristics). 『Ge Ge Bie Mi Gu』 (Because of each distinct delusion). 『He Yi Shi Zhong Jie Neng Mi Si Di』 (Why can these ten types all delude the Four Noble Truths)? 『Ku, Ji Shi Shi Yin, Yi Chu Gu』 (Because suffering and accumulation are the ten causes and reliance places). 『Yi Shi Yin』 (One is the cause). 『Er Shi Yi Chu』 (Two is the reliance place). 『Dui Fa Di Qi』 (In the seventh volume of the 『Abhidharma』). 『Ku, Ji Shi Shi Yin Yuan』 (Suffering and accumulation are the ten causes and conditions). 『Zeng Zhang Ci Shi』 (Increasing these ten). 『You Wei Yi Chu』 (Also serving as reliance places). 『Xing Neng Sui Shun Sheng Ci Shi Gu』 (Because their nature can accordingly produce these ten). 『Ci Deng Yu Da Lun Di Ba Tong』 (These are the same as in the eighth volume of the 『Mahavibhasa』). 『Mie, Dao Shi Bi Bu Wei Chu Suo』 (Cessation and the path are the places of fear for them). 『Xing Bu Sui Shun Zeng Zhang Shi Zhong』 (Their nature does not accordingly increase these ten types). 『Dan Qi Mi Bo You Yu Deng Shi』 (They only give rise to confusion, denial, hesitation, and such things). 『Yuan Ci Er Di Qi Shi Huo Gu』 (Because of arising ten delusions based on these two Truths). 『You Wai Dao Yu Ci Er Di』 (Moreover, externalists regarding these two Truths). 『Qi Zhong Zhong Fen Bie Gu』 (Give rise to various discriminations). 『Jie Mi Mie, Dao』 (All are deluded about cessation and the path). 『Qi Fan Nao Qi Jie Ju Ci Er Yuan』 (The arising of their afflictions all possesses these two conditions). 『Ran Zong Mi Zhe』 (However, the overall delusion). 『Xing Xiang Zong Gu Shuo Ju Er Yuan』 (Because the characteristics are overall, it is said to possess two conditions). 『Qi Bie Xing Xiang Bu Shuo You Ye』 (Its individual characteristics are not mentioned). 『Ju Shi Ju You』 (In reality, both exist). 『Yi Xing Xiang Mi You Zong, Bie Gu』 (Because the delusion in characteristics has overall and individual aspects). 『Zong Wei Shi Zhong Jie Mi Si Di』 (Overall means that all ten types are deluded about the Four Noble Truths). 『Shi Shu Zong Ye』 (This is a numerical totality). 『Yin, Yi Chu Deng』 (Causes, reliance places, etc.). 『Shi Xing Xiang Zong』 (Are the totality of characteristics). 『Wen Ru He Yu Ji, Mie, Dao Xia Qi Shen, Bian Er Jian』 (Question: How do the views of self and extremes arise under accumulation, cessation, and the path)? 『Da Ci Er Jian Xing Xiang Shen Zhi Qu』 (Answer: The characteristics of these two views are deeply attached). 『Bu Liao San Di Gu』 (Because they do not understand the three Truths). 『Ruo Er Ji Yi Qie Wo Jian Jie Mi Si Di』 (If so, then all views of self are deluded about the Four Noble Truths)? 『Ying Yun』 (It should be said). 『Ci Zhi San Di Xia Fan Nao, Yun Deng』 (This attachment takes the afflictions, aggregates, etc., under the three Truths). 『Wei Er Jian Gu』 (As the reason for two views). 』Lun』 (Treatise): 『Bie Wei Bie Mi Zhi Shu Ku Di Gu』 (Distinction refers to individual delusion until it belongs to the Truth of Suffering). 』Shu Yue』 (Commentary says): 『Ji, Mie, Dao San Di You Bie Xing Xiang』 (The three Truths of accumulation, cessation, and the path have distinct characteristics). 『Bu Gong Wu Ming Mi San Di Zhe』 (Non-common ignorance deludes these three Truths). 『Gu De Cheng Ba』 (Therefore, it can form eight types). 『Shen, Bian Er Jian Duo Ji Zhu You Lou Guo Fa Wei Er Jian Gu』 (The views of self and extremes mostly consider the various conditioned resultant dharmas as the reason for two views). 『Wei Mi Ku』 (Only deluded about suffering). 『Wei Yu Ku Di Bu Liao Xing Xiang Zeng Gu』 (Only regarding the Truth of Suffering, not understanding its characteristics increases). 『Fei Shi Neng Liao Yu Zhi San Di』 (It is not capable of understanding the remaining three Truths). 『Ci Tong Xiao Sheng Wei Guo Chu Qi』 (This is the same as the Hinayana, only arising at the place of result). 『Ran Shi Yuan Mi San Di』 (However, in reality, it is due to delusion about the three Truths). 『Yi You Er Jian Yuan San Di Xia Suo Qi Zhu Huo Wei Wo Deng Gu』 (There are also two views, due to the various delusions arising under the three Truths, considering them as self, etc.). 『Ran Yi Bie Yuan Di Shi Liu Xing Zhong Kong, Fei Wo Er』 (However, with individual conditions, among the sixteen aspects of the Truths, emptiness and non-self). 『Wei Shu Ku Di』 (Only belong to the Truth of Suffering).

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故。不說三諦有此之二見。謂總空．非我通四諦。為總緣諦行方斷惑故。十六行非總行故。言別空．非我。屬言屬著。或言攝屬。二言皆得。初解是本后解無違　問若爾于集．滅諦如何起戒取　答執彼下見眷屬．戒等為戒取故。如五十八除二見一一別說。然對法第七．大論第八。約總迷諦故。十皆迷四諦。五十八。約別迷四諦故。二唯迷苦八通迷四。二論實不相違。總中有行相總者。緣迷多諦。至迷三．四名行相總。若迷少諦但迷一諦名行相別。然立一百二十八煩惱。唯依數總．別緣者說。若唯依總行相．數別說。便無一百二十八故。如相應無明隨不共說。此總行相隨別者說。理亦無失。

問此十迷四諦。為皆是親迷。亦有疏迷者。為答此問。及顯別行相故次論文。

論。謂疑三見親迷苦理。

述曰。以上總解迷諦數別。此下即是迷諦行別。且舉苦諦。謂疑．三見等。三見者謂邪．我．邊　親迷苦理。此四行相深取所緣。親從不了苦諦理起。

論。二取執彼至為勝能凈。

述曰。見．戒二取執前三見。及俱時蘊為勝能凈是見取。執彼俱戒．及蘊。為勝．能凈是戒取。然無執獨起貪慾．癡．慢為見．戒取。非見．戒故。非此二眷屬故。此之二取。雖復行解能深執取是迷理煩惱。然不親迷

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，如果說三諦（Three Truths）具有這兩種錯誤的觀點，那就是總空（totality of emptiness）和非我（non-self），貫通四諦（Four Noble Truths）。這是因為總緣諦（totality of conditions of truth）的修行才能斷除迷惑。十六行（Sixteen Aspects）不是總行（totality of practice）。說別空（distinct emptiness）和非我（non-self），屬於言語上的執著。或者說是攝屬，兩種說法都可以。最初的解釋是根本，後來的解釋沒有違背。 問：如果這樣，那麼對於集諦（Truth of the Origin of Suffering）和滅諦（Truth of the Cessation of Suffering），如何產生戒禁取見（belief in the efficacy of rites and rituals）？ 答：執著于那些低劣的見解，以及與戒律等相關的眷屬，作為戒禁取見的原因。就像五十八使（Fifty-eight Afflictions）中，除了兩種見解之外，其餘的都是分別說明的。然而，《阿毗達磨》（Abhidharma）第七卷和《大毗婆沙論》（Mahavibhasa）第八卷，是根據總體上迷惑真諦來說的，所以十使（Ten Afflictions）都迷惑四諦。五十八使是根據分別迷惑四諦來說的，其中兩種只迷惑苦諦（Truth of Suffering），八種貫通迷惑四諦。這兩部論典實際上並不矛盾。總體中存在行相總體的情況，即緣于迷惑多個真諦。達到迷惑三諦或四諦時，稱為行相總體。如果迷惑較少的真諦，只迷惑一個真諦，稱為行相分別。然而，建立一百二十八煩惱（One Hundred and Twenty-Eight Afflictions），只是依據數量上的總體和分別緣起來說的。如果只依據總體行相和數量分別來說，就沒有一百二十八煩惱了。就像相應無明（associated ignorance）隨著不共（uncommon）來說一樣，這個總體行相隨著分別來說，道理上也沒有缺失。 問：這十使迷惑四諦，是都是直接迷惑，還是也有間接迷惑的？爲了回答這個問題，以及顯示分別的行相，所以接下來討論。 論：所謂疑（doubt）、三見（three views）直接迷惑苦諦的道理。 述曰：以上總體解釋了迷惑真諦的數量差別，下面就是迷惑真諦的行相差別。先舉苦諦為例，所謂疑、三見等。三見指的是邪見（false view）、我見（self view）、邊見（extreme view），直接迷惑苦諦的道理。這四種行相深刻地執取所緣，直接從不了知苦諦的道理而產生。 論：二取（two attachments）執著那些，乃至認為是殊勝的、能夠清凈的。 述曰：見取（view attachment）和戒取（precept attachment）執著前面的三見，以及同時的五蘊（five aggregates），認為是殊勝的、能夠清凈的。執著那些戒律以及五蘊，認為是殊勝的、能夠清凈的，這是戒取。然而，沒有執著單獨生起的貪慾（greed）、愚癡（ignorance）、慢（pride）作為見取和戒取的，因為它們不是見解和戒律，不是這兩種的眷屬。這兩種取，雖然修行和理解能夠深刻地執取，是迷惑真理的煩惱，但不是直接迷惑。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, to say that the Three Truths possess these two erroneous views is to have the views of 'totality of emptiness' and 'non-self' pervading the Four Noble Truths. This is because only the practice of the 'totality of conditions of truth' can sever delusion. The Sixteen Aspects are not the 'totality of practice'. To speak of 'distinct emptiness' and 'non-self' belongs to verbal attachment. Or it can be said to be 'included within', both explanations are acceptable. The initial explanation is fundamental, and the later explanation does not contradict it. Question: If that is the case, then how does attachment to rites and rituals (belief in the efficacy of rites and rituals) arise with respect to the Truth of the Origin of Suffering (Samudaya) and the Truth of the Cessation of Suffering (Nirodha)? Answer: Holding onto those inferior views, and the retinue related to precepts and so on, as the cause of attachment to rites and rituals. Just like in the Fifty-eight Afflictions (Fifty-eight Afflictions), apart from the two views, the rest are explained separately. However, the seventh volume of the Abhidharma (Abhidharma) and the eighth volume of the Mahavibhasa (Mahavibhasa), speak in terms of generally being deluded about the Truths, so the Ten Afflictions (Ten Afflictions) are all deluded about the Four Noble Truths. The Fifty-eight Afflictions are spoken of in terms of being separately deluded about the Four Noble Truths, where two are only deluded about the Truth of Suffering (Dukkha), and eight pervade and delude the Four Noble Truths. These two treatises are not actually contradictory. Within the totality, there exists the case of the totality of aspects, which is to be conditioned by delusion about multiple Truths. Reaching the point of being deluded about three or four Truths is called the totality of aspects. If one is deluded about fewer Truths, only being deluded about one Truth, it is called the distinctness of aspects. However, the establishment of the One Hundred and Twenty-Eight Afflictions (One Hundred and Twenty-Eight Afflictions) is only spoken of based on the totality and distinctness of conditions in terms of number. If one only speaks based on the totality of aspects and the distinctness of number, then there would be no One Hundred and Twenty-Eight Afflictions. Just like associated ignorance (associated ignorance) is spoken of along with the uncommon (uncommon), this totality of aspects is spoken of along with the distinct, and there is no fault in the reasoning. Question: Are these Ten Afflictions that are deluded about the Four Noble Truths all directly deluded, or are there also indirectly deluded ones? In order to answer this question, and to reveal the distinct aspects, the following text is discussed. Treatise: So-called doubt (doubt) and the three views (three views) are directly deluded about the principle of the Truth of Suffering. Commentary: The above generally explains the numerical differences in being deluded about the Truths, and below is the difference in the aspects of being deluded about the Truths. First, taking the Truth of Suffering as an example, so-called doubt, the three views, and so on. The three views refer to false view (false view), self view (self view), and extreme view (extreme view), which are directly deluded about the principle of the Truth of Suffering. These four aspects deeply grasp the object of conditioning, directly arising from not understanding the principle of the Truth of Suffering. Treatise: The two attachments (two attachments) cling to those, and even consider them to be superior and capable of purification. Commentary: View attachment (view attachment) and precept attachment (precept attachment) cling to the preceding three views, and the simultaneous five aggregates (five aggregates), considering them to be superior and capable of purification. Clinging to those precepts and the five aggregates, considering them to be superior and capable of purification, is precept attachment. However, there is no clinging to greed (greed), ignorance (ignorance), and pride (pride) arising alone as view attachment and precept attachment, because they are not views and precepts, and are not the retinue of these two. These two attachments, although practice and understanding are able to deeply cling, are afflictions that are deluded about the Truth, but are not directly deluded.

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無我理等。

論。于自他見至起貪恚慢。

述曰。于自見起貪。他見起瞋。于自．他二見起慢。恃己陵他見故名隨應。皆亦疏迷。

論。相應無智至親迷苦理。

述曰。若此九相應無智。與前九惑隨所應同親疏迷理。不共無明不了苦理故親迷苦理。即十中五別起親迷苦理。五別起不然。然二取見法行相深遠。能深迷執故可言迷理。別起貪等行相淺近。不深迷執故。何言迷苦理。此但迷事不迷於理　若爾何故前言十皆迷諦　諦有事．理無相違失。又相應貪等。如次下說亦迷苦理。故復前言十皆迷諦。此苦諦已。

論。疑及邪見至準苦應知。

述曰。于集．滅．道三唯有八中除二見故。疑．及邪見．不共無明。親迷集等三諦。然實有身．邊別迷三諦。以說八故略而不論。二取．貪等準前苦說。以二見無故不唯親迷。

論。然瞋亦能至生憎嫉故。

述曰。瞋亦親迷滅．道。此意顯瞋無漏緣故。迷理生故。無瞋．苦．集理故此不說。但迷無漏之諦理也。由彼親迷二諦起故。此上皆與五十八同　又解雖親緣理非迷理惑。不深取故。又以不緣理故。便非迷理。但以行相深遠。取者能迷於理。故見戒取名迷理惑　此解不爾。何處煩惱親緣理生不名迷理。五十八說瞋迷滅諦等故。言

迷諦者。必是理故。前解為勝。如下忿等。迷諦同故。

論。迷諦親疏粗相如是。

述曰。未盡理故。五十八說亦粗相也。

論。委細說者至隨應如彼。

述曰。疑．三見．無明五法。親迷諦理。二取疏遠如前定說。且苦諦下貪．瞋．慢三。若獨頭起緣見生者。疏遠如前說。若此貪．慢與三法俱。瞋與疑等四俱起者。隨應如彼亦名親迷諦。慢．貪與我見俱生。于滅．道下煩惱後起亦名迷無漏。瞋與疑俱起或獨起。此約數總。若數別者。除集．滅．道下二見準前應說　若余獨頭起貪．瞋．慢。名迷四諦事。若三見．疑俱者。亦名迷四諦理。又瞋．慢可成無漏緣惑。若滅．道下無漏別緣貪。如何說成無漏緣惑。由此不說貪無漏緣。迷則可爾。是故言隨應。此即大論等所無也。

明見道已修道云何。

論。俱生二見至修道方斷。

述曰。身．邊二見。及此俱愛．慢．無明三。雖親迷苦諦理。以行相細難斷故。修道方斷。與苦諦下二見等別。彼粗行相故。

論。瞋余愛等至故修所斷。

述曰。瞋及除前二見相應。之外余獨行愛慢。及此相應無明。迷別有情或境事生不迷於理。不違四諦觀故修所斷。簡見道獨行貪等。雖有迷於事。然違諦觀故見所斷。

此第九大

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：如果執迷於真諦，必定是因為道理的緣故，那麼之前的解釋更為優勝，比如像下面的忿恨等，是因為執迷於真諦的緣故嗎？

論：執迷於真諦的親疏遠近和粗細表相就是這樣。

述曰：因為沒有窮盡道理，所以五十八種說法也是粗略的表相。

論：詳細的說法是，根據情況而定，就像那樣。

述曰：懷疑（疑）、三種邪見（三見）、無明（無明）這五種法，是直接執迷於真諦的道理。兩種執取（二取）則比較疏遠，就像之前所確定的說法。而且，在苦諦之下，貪（貪）、嗔（瞋）、慢（慢）這三種煩惱，如果單獨生起，因為緣于見解而生，就比較疏遠，就像之前所說。如果這貪、慢與三種邪見一起，嗔與懷疑等四種一起生起，那麼根據情況而定，也叫做直接執迷於真諦。慢、貪與我見一起生起，在滅諦、道諦之下，煩惱後來生起，也叫做執迷於無漏。嗔與懷疑一起生起，或者單獨生起。這是從數量總的方面來說。如果從數量個別方面來說，除了集諦、滅諦、道諦之下的兩種邪見，應該按照之前的說法。如果其餘單獨生起的貪、嗔、慢，叫做執迷於四諦的事。如果三種邪見、懷疑一起，也叫做執迷於四諦的理。而且，嗔、慢可以成為無漏的緣惑。如果在滅諦、道諦之下，沒有無漏的別緣貪，如何說成為無漏的緣惑？因此不說貪是無漏的緣。執迷則可以這樣說。所以說根據情況而定。這在大論等中是沒有的。

問：明白了見道之後，修道又如何呢？

論：俱生的兩種邪見，要到修道才能斷除。

述曰：身見（身見）、邊見（邊見）這兩種邪見，以及與此相應的俱生愛（愛）、慢（慢）、無明（無明）這三種煩惱，雖然直接執迷於苦諦的道理，但因為行相微細難以斷除，所以要到修道才能斷除。與苦諦之下的兩種邪見有所區別，因為它們是粗略的行相。

論：嗔（瞋）以及其餘的愛（愛）等，因此是修道所斷。

述曰：嗔以及除了前面兩種邪見相應的之外，其餘單獨生起的愛、慢，以及與此相應的無明，執迷於別的有情或者境事而生，不是執迷於道理，不違背四諦的觀想，所以是修道所斷。簡別于見道時單獨生起的貪等，雖然有執迷於事，但違背四諦的觀想，所以是見道所斷。

這是第九大段。

【English Translation】 English version Question: If one is deluded about the truth, it must be because of reason. Then the previous explanation is superior, such as the following anger, etc., because they are deluded about the truth?

Treatise: The closeness, distance, and coarse appearances of being deluded about the truth are like this.

Commentary: Because the reasoning is not exhausted, the fifty-eight views are also coarse appearances.

Treatise: The detailed explanation is that it depends on the situation, just like that.

Commentary: Doubt (疑, yi), the three wrong views (三見, sanjian), and ignorance (無明, wuming) these five dharmas are directly deluded about the truth. The two attachments (二取, erqu) are more distant, just as previously determined. Moreover, under the suffering truth, greed (貪, tan), hatred (瞋, chen), and pride (慢, man), if they arise alone, because they arise from views, they are more distant, as previously said. If this greed and pride are together with the three wrong views, and hatred is together with doubt and the other three, then depending on the situation, it is also called directly deluded about the truth. Pride and greed arise together with the view of self, and under the cessation truth and path truth, afflictions arise later, and are also called deluded about the unconditioned. Hatred arises together with doubt, or arises alone. This is from the total number. If from the individual number, except for the two views under the origination truth, cessation truth, and path truth, it should be said according to the previous explanation. If the remaining greed, hatred, and pride arise alone, they are called deluded about the events of the four truths. If the three wrong views and doubt are together, they are also called deluded about the principles of the four truths. Moreover, hatred and pride can become unconditioned causal delusions. If under the cessation truth and path truth, there is no unconditioned separate cause of greed, how can it be said to become an unconditioned causal delusion? Therefore, it is not said that greed is an unconditioned cause. Delusion can be said in this way. Therefore, it is said that it depends on the situation. This is not found in the Great Treatise, etc.

Question: After understanding the path of seeing, what about the path of cultivation?

Treatise: The two innate wrong views are only cut off by the path of cultivation.

Commentary: The view of self (身見, shenjian) and the view of extremes (邊見, bianjian), and the corresponding innate love (愛, ai), pride (慢, man), and ignorance (無明, wuming), although directly deluded about the principle of the suffering truth, are difficult to cut off because of their subtle appearances, so they are only cut off by the path of cultivation. They are different from the two views under the suffering truth, because they are coarse appearances.

Treatise: Hatred (瞋, chen) and the remaining love (愛, ai), etc., are therefore cut off by the path of cultivation.

Commentary: Hatred, and apart from the two wrong views mentioned earlier, the remaining love and pride that arise alone, and the corresponding ignorance, are deluded about other sentient beings or events, and are not deluded about the principle, and do not violate the contemplation of the four truths, so they are cut off by the path of cultivation. They are distinguished from the greed, etc., that arise alone on the path of seeing, which, although deluded about events, violate the contemplation of the truths, so they are cut off by the path of seeing.

This is the ninth major section.

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門中有二子門。一三斷。二總別迷諦。迷諦親．疏。兼明迷理．事。次下第十緣有事無事門。

論。雖諸煩惱至無事煩惱。

述曰。煩惱心等上說所變。皆有相分親所緣者。今不取之。但彼本質或有。或無。名緣有事．無事煩惱。如下所引有多論文。今取當對法第七。身見等及此相應法等。無本質我名緣無事。余不與此俱者名緣有事。以不執我故。此據人執為論。不據法執。法執通餘一切心故。非唯我見。若唯我見。及俱法。亦通攝法執盡。即餘四見。及疑無法執。必與我見不俱故。便為大失　此中煩惱。何者與我見俱。何者不共。如前自俱有門說　問一切皆有本質。乃至緣空亦有空名為本質故。即極微教。乃至龜毛等名若為本質。何故今言無本質名緣無事煩惱　答若余影外別有所託名本質。即無無本質者。今取如名之下有所目之質。即有體無之者。如空華．兔角等。故今言名緣無事煩惱。亦不相違。影像．本質雙言名緣有．無之煩惱。或直據本質名此二緣煩惱。今勘無漏緣中。不得作此後解。所引諸無事．有事論文。應為門義勒之。瑜伽論云。又十煩惱見所斷者名曰無事。彼所緣事非成實故。所餘煩惱有事．無事彼相違故。以見道惑以見為首。所取本質都無有故。重緣惑等相從而說名緣無事。修道雖有

【現代漢語翻譯】 門中有二子門：一是三斷，二是總別迷諦。迷諦有親疏之分，兼明迷理和迷事。接下來是第十緣有事無事門。

論：即使是諸煩惱，乃至無事煩惱。

述曰：煩惱心等，上面所說的所變現的，都有相分作為親所緣。現在不取這些，只取它們的本質，或者有，或者無，名為緣有事、無事煩惱。如下面所引用的多部論著。現在取當對法第七，身見（認為身體是我）等以及與此相應的法等，沒有本質的我，名為緣無事。其餘不與此俱的，名為緣有事，因為不執著於我。這是根據人執為論，不是根據法執。法執通於其餘一切心，不是唯有我見。如果唯有我見，以及俱法，也通攝法執盡，即其餘四見（邊見、邪見、見取見、戒禁取見），以及疑，沒有法執。必定與我見不俱，便會造成很大的缺失。這裡面的煩惱，哪些與我見俱，哪些不共，如前面自俱有門所說。問：一切都有本質，乃至緣空也有空名為本質，即極微教，乃至龜毛等名為本質。為什麼現在說沒有本質，名為緣無事煩惱？答：如果余影外別有所託，名為本質，就沒有沒有本質的。現在取如名之下有所目之質，即有體無之者，如空華（虛空中的花）、兔角（兔子頭上的角）等。所以現在說名為緣無事煩惱，也不相違。影像、本質雙言，名為緣有、無之煩惱。或者直接根據本質，名此二緣煩惱。現在考察無漏緣中，不得作此後解。所引用的諸無事、有事論文，應該為門義勒之。《瑜伽論》云：又十煩惱見所斷者，名叫無事，他們所緣的事不是真實的。其餘煩惱有事、無事，與他們相反。以見道惑以見為首，所取本質都沒有，重緣惑等相從而說，名叫緣無事。修道雖然有。

【English Translation】 There are two sub-sections within this section: one is the 'Three Severances,' and the other is the 'Overall and Specific Delusions Regarding Truth' (Zongbie Mi Di). Delusions regarding truth have close and distant aspects, and they also clarify delusions regarding principle and phenomena. Next is the tenth section, the 'Conditioned Matter and Unconditioned Matter' (Yuan Youshi Wushi) section.

Treatise: Even the various afflictions, up to the afflictions of unconditioned matter.

Commentary: The afflictive mind and so on, as described above, all have a 'semblance division' (xiang fen) as their directly conditioned object. We are not considering these now. We are only considering their essence, which may or may not exist, and is called 'afflictions conditioned by matter' (yuan youshi) and 'afflictions conditioned by unconditioned matter' (yuan wushi). As quoted in many treatises below. Now we take the seventh of the 'corresponding dharmas' (dang dui fa), such as 'self-view' (shenjian) [the view that the body is the self] and the dharmas corresponding to it. The non-essential self is called 'conditioned by unconditioned matter.' The rest that are not associated with this are called 'conditioned by matter,' because they do not cling to the self. This is based on the clinging to self by people, not based on the clinging to dharmas. Clinging to dharmas pervades all other minds, not just self-view. If it were only self-view, and the associated dharmas, it would also encompass all clinging to dharmas, that is, the remaining four views [extreme view, wrong view, holding to views, holding to precepts], and doubt, which do not have clinging to dharmas. It must not be associated with self-view, otherwise it would cause a great flaw. Among these afflictions, which are associated with self-view, and which are not, as mentioned in the previous section on 'self-associated existence.' Question: Everything has an essence, even the conditioned emptiness has emptiness as its essence, that is, the 'doctrine of ultimate particles' (ji wei jiao), even turtle hair and so on are called essence. Why do you now say that there is no essence, and it is called 'afflictions conditioned by unconditioned matter'? Answer: If there is something else outside the shadow that is relied upon, it is called essence. Then there is nothing without essence. Now we take the quality that is indicated under the name, that is, something that has substance or does not have substance, such as 'flowers in the sky' (konghua) [illusory flowers] and 'rabbit horns' (tujiao) [non-existent horns]. Therefore, we now say that it is called 'afflictions conditioned by unconditioned matter,' and it is not contradictory. The dual expression of image and essence is called 'afflictions conditioned by matter and unconditioned matter.' Or directly based on the essence, these two conditions are called afflictions. Now, examining the unconditioned condition, we cannot make this later explanation. The quoted treatises on unconditioned matter and conditioned matter should be summarized for the meaning of the section. The Yogacara-bhumi-sastra says: Furthermore, the ten afflictions that are severed by the path of seeing are called unconditioned matter, because the things they condition are not real. The remaining afflictions, conditioned matter and unconditioned matter, are the opposite of them. Taking the 'delusions of the path of seeing' (jian dao huo) with view as the head, the essence taken has nothing, and the re-conditioned delusions and so on follow and are called conditioned by unconditioned matter. Although there is cultivation on the path of cultivation.

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見境無事。多緣事故。從多名緣有事煩惱。下五十九云。諸見與慢是無事。貪．恚是有事。無明．疑通二種。此以理論。見．修諸見。慢中我慢。本質無故。貪等少故。略而不說。即彼卷下文云。有事緣。謂諸有事煩惱。無事緣。謂諸無事煩惱。此文總說亦不相違。亦云。無境緣謂緣分別所計滅道。及廣大佛法等所有煩惱。對法第五云。有事境所緣者。謂除見．慢。及此相應法。余所緣境界。無事者。謂前所除。同五十九初文所說。次下文云。非有所緣。謂顛倒心．心所。及緣過去．未來．夢．影．幻等所緣境界。此不論煩惱但本境無。有所緣。謂余所緣境界。即本質有三性心．心所對法第七亦云。煩惱有二種。謂緣有事．無事。無事者謂見。及見相應法。見謂薩迦耶見．及邊執見。所餘煩惱名緣有事者。以通見．修此之二見為首。本境實無。相應亦爾。此文盡理。與此文同。非瞋等惑可名無事故。如說樞要。

論。彼親所緣至無漏煩惱。

述曰。此下第十一。有漏緣．無漏緣分別。如疑．邪見．無明及此相應瞋．慢等法無漏緣者。親所緣雖皆有漏。而所杖本質亦通無漏。唯影像相是有漏故。今此但取本．影二境。名緣漏．無漏煩惱。準有．無事不但取本質。與有．無事緣別。不可為例。

論。緣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 觀察外境時本無事端，大多是因緣和合而產生事端。因為因緣眾多，所以才說有事，進而產生煩惱。《瑜伽師地論》第五十九卷說，各種『見』（dṛṣṭi）和『慢』（māna）是『無事』，『貪』（rāga）和『嗔』（dveṣa）是『有事』，『無明』（avidyā）和『疑』（vicikitsa）則通於二者。這是從理論上來說的。『見』指見道和修道所斷的各種『見』，『慢』指『我慢』（asmimāna），因為它們的本質是虛無的。『貪』等煩惱較少，所以略而不說。該卷下文說：『有事緣』是指各種『有事』煩惱，『無事緣』是指各種『無事』煩惱。這段總的來說，並不矛盾。也有人說，『無境緣』是指緣于分別所計的滅道，以及廣大的佛法等所產生的煩惱。《對法論》第五卷說：『有事境所緣』是指除了『見』和『慢』以及與它們相應的法之外，其餘所緣的境界。『無事』是指前面所排除的那些，與第五十九卷初文所說相同。接下來的下文說：『非有所緣』是指顛倒的心和心所，以及緣於過去、未來、夢、影、幻等所緣的境界。這裡不論煩惱，只是說其本境是虛無的。『有所緣』是指其餘所緣的境界，即本質上具有三性的心和心所。《對法論》第七卷也說：煩惱有兩種，即緣于『有事』和『無事』。『無事』是指『見』以及與『見』相應的法。『見』指『薩迦耶見』（satkāyadṛṣṭi，有身見）和『邊執見』（antagrahadṛṣṭi，邊見）。其餘的煩惱稱為緣于『有事』，以通於見道和修道的這兩種『見』為首，因為它們的本境實際上是虛無的，與它們相應的法也是如此。這段文字窮盡了事理，與此文相同。因為『嗔』等煩惱不能稱為『無事』，正如《如說樞要》所說。

論：彼親所緣至無漏煩惱。

述曰：下面第十一，是有漏緣和無漏緣的分別。如『疑』、『邪見』（mithyādṛṣṭi）、『無明』以及與它們相應的『嗔』、『慢』等法，其無漏緣是指，親所緣雖然都是有漏的，但所依賴的本質也通於無漏。只有影像相是有漏的。現在這裡只取本境和影像二境，稱為緣于有漏和無漏的煩惱。按照有事和無事的分別，不僅僅取本質，與有事和無事緣的分別不同，不可作為例子。

論：緣

【English Translation】 English version When observing external objects, there are originally no issues; most problems arise from the aggregation of conditions. Because of the multitude of conditions, it is said that there are 'things' (artha), which then lead to afflictions. The fifty-ninth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states that various 'views' (dṛṣṭi) and 'conceit' (māna) are 'without things' (nirartha), while 'greed' (rāga) and 'hatred' (dveṣa) are 'with things' (sārtha), and 'ignorance' (avidyā) and 'doubt' (vicikitsa) apply to both. This is from a theoretical perspective. 'Views' refer to the various 'views' to be abandoned on the paths of seeing and cultivation, and 'conceit' refers to 'self-conceit' (asmimāna), because their essence is empty. 'Greed' and other afflictions are fewer, so they are omitted. The lower part of that fascicle says: 'Conditions with things' refer to various afflictions 'with things,' and 'conditions without things' refer to various afflictions 'without things.' This general statement is not contradictory. Some also say that 'conditions without objects' refer to afflictions arising from objects of conceptual discrimination, such as the path of cessation and the vast Dharma of the Buddha. The fifth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: 'Objects of conditions with things' refer to the remaining objects of conditions except for 'views' and 'conceit' and their corresponding dharmas. 'Without things' refers to those previously excluded, which is the same as what is said in the initial text of the fifty-ninth fascicle. The following text says: 'Not having objects of conditions' refers to inverted minds and mental factors, as well as objects of conditions such as past, future, dreams, shadows, illusions, etc. This does not discuss afflictions, but only says that their original objects are empty. 'Having objects of conditions' refers to the remaining objects of conditions, that is, minds and mental factors that essentially possess the three natures. The seventh fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya also says: There are two types of afflictions, namely, those conditioned by 'things' and 'without things.' 'Without things' refers to 'views' and dharmas corresponding to 'views.' 'Views' refer to 'belief in a self' (satkāyadṛṣṭi) and 'extreme views' (antagrahadṛṣṭi). The remaining afflictions are called conditioned by 'things,' with these two 'views' that are common to the paths of seeing and cultivation being the foremost, because their original objects are actually empty, and the dharmas corresponding to them are also like that. This text exhausts the principles and is the same as this text. Because afflictions such as 'hatred' cannot be called 'without things,' as stated in the Essential Meaning of What Was Said.

Treatise: Their directly conditioned objects extend to unconditioned afflictions.

Commentary: Below, in the eleventh section, there is a distinction between conditioned and unconditioned conditions. For example, 'doubt,' 'wrong views' (mithyādṛṣṭi), 'ignorance,' and 'hatred,' 'conceit,' and other dharmas corresponding to them, their unconditioned conditions refer to the fact that although the directly conditioned objects are all conditioned, the underlying essence also extends to the unconditioned. Only the image-aspect is conditioned. Now, here, only the original object and the image are taken, and they are called afflictions conditioned by conditioned and unconditioned. According to the distinction between with and without things, it does not only take the essence, and it is different from the distinction between conditions with and without things, so it cannot be taken as an example.

Treatise: Conditioned

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自地者至所起名境。

述曰。自下第十二大門。緣自地煩惱依．緣俱增。名緣分別所起事境。此境本質。亦由今時分別起故。事者體也。緣他地。及無漏者。名緣分別所起名境。影像．本質不相似。滅．道深遠。地處遠故。依．緣不增。但尋彼名彼名可增。故言分別所起名境。或複名者。即心．心所相分之名。亦由能分別所起故。此如五十八．五十九．對法第六．第七抄說。有別所以。

論。余門分別如理應思。

述曰。謂有．無異熟。有漏．無漏。七隨眠攝。八纏諸蓋攝。乃至九品等分別。皆如理思。

論。已說根本至其相云何。

述曰。結前生后。

論。頌曰至散亂不正知。

述曰。下第四段明第五位。此舉頌列名。

論。曰至名隨煩惱。

述曰。長行為二。初釋體．業等相。后諸門釋。初門有六。初釋得名。二束為三位。三釋體．業。四解頌中與．並．及字。五解隨名之通局。六解廢立　釋頌之中隨煩惱字。謂忿等十．及忘念．不正知．放逸余假染心所。是貪等法根本粗行差別分位名隨煩惱。無慚．無愧．掉舉．惛沈．散亂．不信．懈怠七法。雖別有體。是前根本之等流性名隨煩惱。由根本為因此得有故。此據正義。又說唯四是實　言等流者。謂同類

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 自地者至所起名境。

述曰：自下第十二大門，緣于自地煩惱的依和緣都增加，名為緣分別所起事境。此境的本質，也是由現時的分別所生起。事，指的是體。緣於他地以及無漏的，名為緣分別所起名境。影像和本質不相似，滅和道深遠，因為地處遙遠，依和緣不增加，但尋彼名，彼名可增加，所以說分別所起名境。或者名，即心和心所相分之名，也是由能分別所生起。這如同五十八、五十九，《對法》第六、第七抄所說，有區別的原因。

論：其餘門的分別，應該如理思維。

述曰：指有、無異熟，有漏、無漏，七隨眠攝，八纏諸蓋攝，乃至九品等分別，都應該如理思維。

論：已經說了根本，至於它的相是怎樣的呢？

述曰：總結前面，引出後面。

論：頌曰至散亂不正知。

述曰：下面第四段說明第五位。這裡舉頌列出名稱。

論：曰至名隨煩惱。

述曰：長行分為兩部分。首先解釋體、業等相，然後是各門的解釋。第一門有六個方面：首先解釋得名，其次歸納為三個位，然後解釋體和業，第四解釋頌中的『與』、『並』、『及』字，第五解釋隨名的通局，第六解釋廢立。解釋頌中的隨煩惱字，指的是忿等十種，以及忘念、不正知、放逸等其餘假染心所。是貪等法根本粗行的差別分位，名為隨煩惱。無慚、無愧、掉舉、惛沈、散亂、不信、懈怠這七種法，雖然有各自的體，但屬於前面根本煩惱的等流性，名為隨煩惱。因為根本煩惱是其生起的原因。這是根據正義的說法。也有說只有四種是真實的。言等流者，指的是同類。

【English Translation】 English version 『From one's own ground』 refers to the 『name-realm arisen from discrimination』.

Commentary: From the twelfth great gate downwards, because the supports (依) and conditions (緣) of afflictions in one's own ground increase, it is called the 『object-realm arisen from discrimination of conditions』 (緣分別所起事境). The essence of this realm is also arisen from present discrimination. 『Object』 (事) refers to the substance (體). That which is conditioned by other grounds and the unconditioned (無漏) is called the 『name-realm arisen from discrimination of conditions』 (緣分別所起名境). The image (影像) and essence (本質) are not similar; extinction (滅) and the path (道) are profound and far-reaching. Because the ground is far away, the supports and conditions do not increase, but by seeking that name, that name can increase. Therefore, it is said to be the 『name-realm arisen from discrimination』. Or, 『name』 refers to the names of the aspect of mind and mental factors (心所相分), which are also arisen from the ability to discriminate. This is as explained in the fifty-eighth and fifty-ninth sections, and the sixth and seventh chapters of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法), where there are different reasons.

Treatise: The discriminations of the remaining gates should be considered according to reason.

Commentary: This refers to the discriminations of existence and non-existence of dissimilar fruition (異熟), conditioned (有漏) and unconditioned (無漏), the seven latent tendencies (隨眠), the eight entanglements (纏) and coverings (蓋), and even the nine grades, all of which should be considered according to reason.

Treatise: Having spoken of the root, what is its characteristic?

Commentary: This connects the preceding and introduces the following.

Treatise: The verse says, 『...to distraction and incorrect knowing』.

Commentary: The fourth section below explains the fifth position. This lists the names by citing the verse.

Treatise: It says, 『...named secondary afflictions』.

Commentary: The prose explanation is in two parts. First, it explains the characteristics of substance (體), function (業), etc.; then, it explains the various gates. The first gate has six aspects: first, it explains the attainment of the name; second, it summarizes them into three positions; then, it explains the substance and function; fourth, it explains the words 『with』 (與), 『and』 (並), and 『together with』 (及) in the verse; fifth, it explains the scope of the name 『secondary』; sixth, it explains the establishment and abandonment. Explaining the words 『secondary afflictions』 in the verse, it refers to the ten such as anger (忿), as well as forgetfulness (忘念), incorrect knowing (不正知), and laxity (放逸), which are the remaining falsely tainted mental factors. They are the differentiated positions of the fundamental coarse actions of greed (貪) and other such dharmas, and are named 『secondary afflictions』. The seven dharmas of shamelessness (無慚), lack of embarrassment (無愧), excitement (掉舉), torpor (惛沈), distraction (散亂), lack of faith (不信), and laziness (懈怠), although having separate substances, are the outflowing nature of the preceding fundamental afflictions, and are named 『secondary afflictions』 because the fundamental afflictions are the cause for their arising. This is according to the correct meaning. It is also said that only four are real. 『Outflowing』 (等流) refers to being of the same kind.

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義。勢非強勝。然非因故。不名根本。不能生余染心所等。或等流者是等流果　若爾即根本後方生非俱時義　此說同時為等流果。六十二二解。一云隨惱於心。二隨煩惱而生。今同后義。

論。此二十種至名小隨煩惱。

述曰。自下第二束為三位。此忿等十。自類相生。各別起故。非不共他中．大惑俱。行位局故。名之為小。

論。無慚等二至名中隨煩惱。

述曰。自得俱生。行通忿等。唯遍不善位局后八。

論。掉舉等八至名大隨煩惱。

述曰。自得俱生。但染皆遍。得俱生故不可名小。染皆遍故不可名中。二義既殊故八名大。三位料簡諸論無也。

自下第三齣其體．業。礭解心所指陳分別。當如下知。

論。云何為忿至憤發為性。

述曰。今以時分．行相顯體　依對現前不饒益境者。謂依現在可見聞事。或是有情。或是他見。即緣事生。五蘊論說現不饒益事故。非無漏法是現違緣事。忿行相淺不深取故。若對現無漏。此即是瞋。如前已說。

論。能障不忿至身表業故。

述曰。此顯作用。不忿即無瞋。顯揚論云。忿障無瞋故。此等如前善中已說。下一一應知執仗即是身惡表業仗謂器仗。從粗猛多分說。唯言執仗亦有惡言故。

論。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

義：這種力量並非強大到足以壓倒一切。然而，如果不是因為某種原因，它也不能被稱為根本，因為它不能產生其他的染污心所等等。或者，『等流』指的是等流果。

問：如果這樣，那麼等流果是在根本之後才產生的，而不是同時產生的，這與『同時為等流果』的說法相矛盾。

答：這裡所說的『同時』是指作為等流果的情況。六十二二種解釋：一種說法是，隨煩惱困擾內心；另一種說法是，隨煩惱而生起。現在採用后一種解釋。

論：這二十種心所，被稱為小隨煩惱。

述曰：下面第二部分將它們歸納為三個層次。這忿等十種，各自從同類中產生，各自獨立生起。因為它們不與不共無明、大隨煩惱同時生起，並且活動範圍有限，所以被稱為『小』。

論：無慚等二種心所，被稱為中隨煩惱。

述曰：它們是自性生起，活動範圍遍及忿等小隨煩惱，只遍及不善心所，活動範圍侷限於后八識。

論：掉舉等八種心所，被稱為大隨煩惱。

述曰：它們是自性生起，但遍及所有染污心，因為是自性生起，所以不能稱為『小』；因為遍及所有染污心，所以不能稱為『中』。這兩種含義都不同，所以這八種心所被稱為『大』。關於這三個層次的詳細分析，在其他論著中沒有。

下面第三部分闡述它們的體性和作用，明確解釋心所，詳細分別，具體內容如下所述。

論：什麼是忿？以憤發為特性。

述曰：現在用時間和行為來顯明其體性。依仗于眼前不令人愉快的境界，指的是依靠現在可以看見或聽見的事情，或者是有情眾生，或者是他人的見解，即緣于這些事情而生起。五蘊論中說，這是因為眼前不令人愉快的事情。不是無漏法，因為無漏法是現在的順緣。忿的行為淺顯，不會深入執取。如果針對的是無漏法，那就是瞋恨，如前所述。

論：能夠障礙不忿，乃至表現爲身體的惡行。

述曰：這顯示了它的作用。『不忿』即是沒有瞋恨。顯揚論中說，忿會障礙無瞋。這些內容如前面善法中所說，下面一一類推可知。『執仗』就是身體的惡行，『仗』指的是器仗。從粗暴猛烈的角度來說，所以只說『執仗』，也包含有惡語的含義。

【English Translation】 English version:

Meaning: This force is not so strong as to be overwhelming. However, if it were not for a cause, it could not be called fundamental, as it cannot generate other defiled mental factors, etc. Or, 'equal flow' refers to the result of equal flow.

Question: If so, then the result of equal flow arises after the fundamental, not simultaneously, which contradicts the statement that 'simultaneous is the result of equal flow'.

Answer: 'Simultaneous' here refers to the case of being a result of equal flow. There are sixty-two two kinds of explanations: one is that the afflictions trouble the mind; the other is that they arise following the afflictions. We now adopt the latter explanation.

Treatise: These twenty mental factors are called minor secondary afflictions.

Commentary: Below, the second part categorizes them into three levels. These ten, such as anger, arise from their own kind, each arising independently. Because they do not arise simultaneously with non-common ignorance and major secondary afflictions, and their scope of activity is limited, they are called 'minor'.

Treatise: The two mental factors, such as shamelessness, are called intermediate secondary afflictions.

Commentary: They arise naturally, their scope of activity extends to minor secondary afflictions such as anger, they only pervade unwholesome mental factors, and their scope of activity is limited to the latter eight consciousnesses.

Treatise: The eight mental factors, such as restlessness, are called major secondary afflictions.

Commentary: They arise naturally, but pervade all defiled minds. Because they arise naturally, they cannot be called 'minor'; because they pervade all defiled minds, they cannot be called 'intermediate'. Since these two meanings are different, these eight mental factors are called 'major'. There is no detailed analysis of these three levels in other treatises.

Below, the third part elucidates their nature and function, clearly explains mental factors, and distinguishes them in detail, the specific content is as described below.

Treatise: What is anger? Its characteristic is to be incited.

Commentary: Now, use time and behavior to reveal its nature. Relying on unpleasant objects in front of you, refers to relying on things that can be seen or heard now, or sentient beings, or the views of others, that is, arising from these things. The Five Aggregates Treatise says that this is because of unpleasant things in front of you. It is not unconditioned Dharma, because unconditioned Dharma is the current favorable condition. The behavior of anger is superficial and does not take deeply. If it is directed at unconditioned Dharma, then it is hatred, as mentioned earlier.

Treatise: Able to obstruct non-anger, and even manifest as evil actions of the body.

Commentary: This shows its function. 'Non-anger' is the absence of hatred. The Compendium of Determinations says that anger obstructs non-anger. These contents are as mentioned in the previous wholesome dharmas, and the following can be inferred one by one. 'Holding a weapon' is the evil action of the body, 'weapon' refers to an instrument. From the perspective of being rough and violent, so only 'holding a weapon' is mentioned, which also includes the meaning of evil speech.

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即瞋恚至忿相用故。

述曰。此對外人辨其假實。顯此所依若無諍義同。但敘一解。以皆義同故。若體別義異。即各敘之。不可嫌繁。又五十五．及五十八等說同者。抄中不說。若異者。一一別敘。

論。云何為恨至結怨為性。

述曰。恨忿後起。余文可知。

論。能障不恨至恨相用故。

述曰。熱惱為業。由恨故生惱。非俱時也。然忿亦生惱。親對輕故　但說恨生。此等顯揚各有五業。彼論隨所依之惑所翻實法。即為彼障。下一準知。彼同此者下不述也。異者當顯。

論。云何為覆至不安隱故。

述曰。自作罪已恐失財利及名譽故。隱藏為性。對法雲。法爾覆罪者心必憂悔。由此不得安隱而住。

論。有義此覆至覆自罪故。

述曰。皆由不懼當來之苦方覆罪故。諸懼苦者必不覆罪故。此以理顯　言論說者。五十五．對法說故。即以教成。然五十八中。是諂品類等流。此據隨惑之類。諂亦癡分亦不相違。

言諂品者。俱癡分故。

論。有義此覆至覆自罪故。

述曰。諸覆罪者。亦有恐失財利名譽故貪分。

論。論據粗顯至是貪分故。

述曰。論據無智俱為名譽而覆罪者。此相粗顯故唯說癡分。如諸論皆說掉舉是貪分。實別有

體亦癡分故。不極成者理必不然。

論。然說掉舉至唯是貪分。

述曰。二論說掉舉遍染心。故知亦癡分。或別有體。唯貪分者貪相增故。瞋等俱時便應無故。如前已說。

論。云何為惱至蛆螫為業。

述曰。追先忿．恨之境。觸現違緣心多佷戾者。慠佷𢤱戾。尤蛆惱螫於他人等。

論。謂追往惡至惱相用故。

述曰。此釋前業。緣過．現生。對法．顯揚第一．五蘊。皆言發兇險鄙惡粗弊之言者。以多發故。由惱起時亦發身業故。如忿亦發語但說執仗。囂謂諠囂。暴謂卒暴。兇謂兇儉．兇疏。鄙謂鄙惡。

論。云何為嫉至嫉相用故。

述曰。殉自名利。殉者。求也。訪也　不耐他榮。他榮者謂世間榮。即富貴安樂。出世之榮。即是證說勝品功德。通有．無為。顯揚云。謂於他所有功德名譽恭敬利養。心妒為嫉。然實見聞覺知之後皆得起嫉。此中據勝但言見聞　能障不嫉者。顯揚第一云能障慈仁為業。顯揚第二四無量中雲喜是不嫉善根為體。瑜伽皆云瞋之等流一分。故不嫉者即是無瞋。非別有體。

論。云何為慳至慳相用故。

述曰。財法者資具．妻子．榮位等事皆名為財。理．教．行．果皆名為法。至下當知　秘者藏也。吝者惜也。慳之異目。鄙謂鄙

惡。畜謂畜積。積集異名。鄙吝慳澀名不能捨。正出慳也。文易可知。對法唯約慳財。五蘊云謂施相違。施既通法。慳亦爾也。

論。云何為誑至誑相用故。

述曰。矯謂不實之義。詭詐虛偽之稱。謂自無德詐偽有德。貪利譽故邪命為依。謂矯誑之者心懷非意同異謀計。詐現精進之儀。雖亦癡故行此誑事。多現邪命事故。故對法雲邪命依者據多現也。五十五說但是癡分。五十八說邪見等流。諸誑者必癡。唯據定體。貪不定故。諸邪見者癡增上故。邪見之者多現於誑。矯現有德故彼偏說。此以貪．癡二法為體同於對法。

論。云何為謟至謟相用故。

述曰。險者不實之名。曲者不直之義　為網㥜他者。顯揚云爲欺彼故謟。或欺于彼而陵網于彼。或掩舍之名。謂雖事不合。曲順時之所宜。籠網矯詐設其方便入其所陵。故作網羅之字。此等為取他意。望他看好。或順己所求。或為此方便。欲藏己失謟為覆罪之因。故不堪任師友教也。貪名利故謟是貪分。無智故謟即是癡分　五蘊云。謂覆藏自過方便所攝故。謟後生覆。以果顯因。恐他說己之惡故行於諂望他說好。諂覆因也。不爾覆．諂俱覆罪故。二相難別。不爾應許覆．諂俱生。故今說謟是覆之因。五十八云。是邪見品類。五十五是癡分。如前誑中

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『惡』，是指『畜』，也就是『畜積』（chù jī，積聚）。『積集』是它的另一個名稱。『鄙吝』、『慳澀』（qiān sè，吝嗇）指的是不能捨棄，直接出自於慳吝。文句容易理解。對法論只針對慳吝錢財。五蘊論說，與佈施相反。既然佈施通用於法，那麼慳吝也是如此。

論：什麼是『誑』？以其『誑』的相狀和作用而定義。

述曰：『矯』是不真實的意思，是詭詐虛偽的稱呼。指的是自己沒有德行卻假裝有德行，因為貪圖利益和名譽，以邪命為依靠。指的是矯誑的人心懷不正當的意圖，與他人同謀或異謀，虛假地表現出精進的樣子。雖然也是因為愚癡才做出這種誑騙的事情，但大多表現為邪命的行為。所以對法論說，以邪命為依靠，是根據其大多表現的情況而說的。五十五論說，這只是愚癡的一部分。五十八論說，這是邪見的等流。所有誑騙的人必定是愚癡的，這是就其確定的體性而言。貪是不確定的。而所有持邪見的人，都是因為愚癡增上的緣故。持邪見的人大多表現出誑騙的行為，因為他們虛假地表現出有德行，所以偏重於這樣說。這裡以貪和癡兩種法作為其體性，與對法論相同。

論：什麼是『謟』？以其『謟』的相狀和作用而定義。

述曰：『險』是不真實的名稱，『曲』是不正直的意思。爲了籠絡欺騙他人。顯揚論說，爲了欺騙他人而諂媚，或者欺騙他人而凌駕於他人之上。或者掩蓋捨棄之名。指的是即使事情不合，也曲意順從當時的需要，用籠絡和矯詐設定方便，進入其所要凌駕的境地。所以用『網羅』這個詞。這些是爲了獲取他人的意圖，希望他人看好自己，或者順從自己的要求，或者以此為方便，想要隱藏自己的過失。諂媚是掩蓋罪過的原因，所以不能勝任作為師友的教導。因為貪圖名利，所以諂媚是貪的一部分。因為沒有智慧，所以諂媚就是癡的一部分。五蘊論說，指的是掩蓋自己的過失，被方便所攝持。諂媚之後產生覆藏，用結果來顯示原因。因為害怕別人說自己的壞話，所以進行諂媚，希望別人說好話。諂媚是覆藏的原因。否則，覆藏和諂媚都是掩蓋罪過，二者難以區分。否則，應該允許覆藏和諂媚同時產生。所以現在說諂媚是覆藏的原因。五十八論說，這是邪見的品類。五十五論說是愚癡的一部分，如同前面的誑騙一樣。

【English Translation】 English version 'Evil' (惡) refers to 'accumulation' (畜積, chù jī), which means 'to accumulate.' 'Accumulation' (積集) is another name for it. 'Miserliness' (鄙吝, bǐlìn) and 'stinginess' (慳澀, qiān sè) refer to the inability to give up, directly stemming from miserliness. The text is easy to understand. The Abhidharma only addresses miserliness regarding wealth. The Skandha Sutra states that it is the opposite of giving. Since giving applies to the Dharma, so does miserliness.

Treatise: What is 'deceit' (誑)? It is defined by its characteristic and function of 'deceit'.

Commentary: 'Distortion' (矯) means untruthfulness, a term for deceit and falsehood. It refers to pretending to have virtues when one does not, relying on wrong livelihood due to greed for profit and fame. It refers to those who deceive harboring improper intentions, conspiring with others or acting independently, falsely displaying diligence. Although they engage in such deceitful acts due to ignorance, they mostly manifest as wrong livelihood. Therefore, the Abhidharma states that relying on wrong livelihood is based on its frequent manifestation. The fifty-fifth treatise states that it is only a part of ignorance. The fifty-eighth treatise states that it is a consequence of wrong views. All who deceive are certainly ignorant, which is based on its definite nature. Greed is uncertain. And all who hold wrong views do so because ignorance is increased. Those who hold wrong views mostly manifest deceitful behavior because they falsely display virtues, so it is emphasized in that way. Here, it takes greed and ignorance as its nature, which is the same as the Abhidharma.

Treatise: What is 'flattery' (謟)? It is defined by its characteristic and function of 'flattery'.

Commentary: 'Perilous' (險) is a name for untruthfulness, and 'crooked' (曲) means not upright. It is to ensnare and deceive others. The Samdhinirmocana Sutra states that flattery is for deceiving others, or deceiving others and lording over them. Or it conceals the name of abandonment. It refers to even if things do not align, one still bends to comply with the needs of the time, using enticement and distortion to set up conveniences, entering the realm they want to dominate. Therefore, the word 'net' (網羅) is used. These are to obtain the intentions of others, hoping others will think well of oneself, or to comply with one's own demands, or to use this as a convenience to hide one's faults. Flattery is the cause of covering up sins, so one is not qualified to be taught by teachers and friends. Because of greed for fame and profit, flattery is a part of greed. Because of lack of wisdom, flattery is a part of ignorance. The Skandha Sutra states that it refers to concealing one's own faults, being governed by expedients. Covering up arises after flattery, using the result to reveal the cause. Because one fears others will speak ill of oneself, one engages in flattery, hoping others will say good things. Flattery is the cause of covering up. Otherwise, both covering up and flattery would be covering up sins, and the two would be difficult to distinguish. Otherwise, it should be allowed that covering up and flattery arise simultaneously. Therefore, it is now said that flattery is the cause of covering up. The fifty-eighth treatise states that it is a category of wrong views. The fifty-fifth treatise states that it is a part of ignorance, just like the previous deceit.

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說。

論。云何為害至害相用故。

述曰。于有情所無悲愍者。五十八云。于滅道起損害。彼亦緣無漏法起。此據修道通小乘之害。唯說有情。至下當知。對法等論同此損有情。然有二解一云彼言害者瞋之異名。非此害也。此唯緣有情故。以此文為正。二此害亦緣無漏。如彼文為正。前惱中亦然。由彼論言起恚惱心也。

論。瞋害別相準善應說。

述曰。瞋障無瞋正障于慈。害障不害正障于悲。故準善說。瞋能斷命。害但損他。故此別也。如善中說。

論。云何為憍至憍相用故。

述曰。憍中於自盛事者。顯揚云謂暫獲世間興盛等事心恃高舉。對法雲。隨一榮利之事。謂長壽相等。即是此興盛事也　然已聞．思。或已證得諸無漏法。豈不恃耶　聖者不緣已證生恃。生恃唯緣有漏事故。異生於所聞．思無漏。可恃生憍。然此有義但恃知見。即是有漏。有義恃所知諸法。亦通無漏。后解為勝。此中通言諸所知法亦名盛事。顯揚雖復引經。及對法唯據修道通小乘相多分之憍。亦不違也。於此等中。深生染著耽醉遨逸為性。而恃之也。醉者。惛迷異名也　生長一切染者。對法雲一切煩惱等所依。故不憍者即無貪也。然對法中言一分者必彼體也檻彼成故。分者是氣分。等流品類義。非即彼

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：什麼是「害」（Hài，傷害）？它的體性是什麼？它的作用是什麼？ 答：論述：對於有情眾生沒有悲憫之心，就是「害」。《五十八頌》中說：『對於滅道（涅槃之道）生起損害。』那也是緣于無漏法（超越煩惱的清凈之法）而生起的。這裡是根據修道而言，通於小乘的「害」。只說有情眾生，到下文自然會明白。《對法論》等論典也同樣認為「害」是損害有情眾生。然而有兩種解釋：一種認為，那裡所說的「害」，是「瞋」（Chēn，嗔恨）的異名，不是這裡的「害」。這裡的「害」僅僅緣于有情眾生。以這個說法為正確。另一種認為，這裡的「害」也緣于無漏法，如那裡的文句所說為正確。前面的「惱」（Nǎo，惱怒）也是這樣。因為那部論典說生起嗔恚惱怒之心。 論：瞋（Chēn，嗔恨）和害（Hài，傷害）的差別，應該參照善法（Kuśala-dharma）來說明。 答：論述：瞋（Chēn，嗔恨）障礙無瞋（Apratigha，不嗔），正是障礙慈（Maitrī，慈愛）；害（Hài，傷害）障礙不害（Avihiṃsā，不害），正是障礙悲（Karuṇā，悲憫）。所以參照善法來說明。瞋（Chēn，嗔恨）能夠斷命，害（Hài，傷害）只是損害他人，所以這是它們的區別。如同善法中所說。 問：什麼是「憍」（Māna，驕傲）？它的體性是什麼？它的作用是什麼？ 答：論述：憍（Māna，驕傲）中，對於自身興盛之事。《顯揚論》中說，是指暫時獲得世間的興盛等事，心中恃仗而高舉。《對法論》中說：『隨一種榮利之事』，指長壽等等，就是這種興盛之事。然而已經聽聞、思惟，或者已經證得各種無漏法（超越煩惱的清凈之法），難道不也恃仗嗎？聖者不緣于已經證得的法而生起恃仗之心。生起恃仗之心，僅僅緣于有漏（有煩惱）的事故。異生（凡夫）對於所聽聞、思惟的無漏法，可以恃仗而生起憍（Māna，驕傲）。然而這裡有一種說法，只是恃仗知見，那就是有漏的。有一種說法，恃仗所知的各種法，也通於無漏。后一種解釋更為殊勝。這裡總括地說各種所知法，也叫做興盛之事。《顯揚論》即使引用經文，以及《對法論》，也只是根據修道而言，通於小乘的相，多分是這樣。也不相違背。對於這些等等，深深地生起染著，耽溺沉醉，遨遊放逸，作為它的體性。而恃仗它。醉，是昏迷的異名。生長一切染污。《對法論》中說是一切煩惱等的所依。所以不憍（Amāna，不驕傲）就是沒有貪（Lobha，貪婪）。然而《對法論》中說『一分』，必定是那個本體。因為那個成就的緣故。『分』是氣分，等流品類的意思，不是就是那個本體。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: What is 'Hāi' (harm)? What is its nature? What is its function? Answer: Treatise: 'Hāi' is the lack of compassion towards sentient beings. The Fifty-Eight Verses state: 'It arises harm towards the path of cessation (Nirvana).' That also arises from attachment to the unconditioned dharma (pure dharma beyond afflictions). This is based on the path of cultivation, encompassing the 'Hāi' of the Hinayana. It only speaks of sentient beings, which will become clear later. The Abhidharma and other treatises similarly consider 'Hāi' as harming sentient beings. However, there are two interpretations: one considers the 'Hāi' mentioned there as a different name for 'Chēn' (anger), not this 'Hāi'. This 'Hāi' only arises in relation to sentient beings. This interpretation is considered correct. The other interpretation considers this 'Hāi' as also arising in relation to the unconditioned, as stated in that text. The previous 'Nǎo' (annoyance) is similar. Because that treatise speaks of generating a mind of anger and annoyance. Treatise: The difference between 'Chēn' (anger) and 'Hāi' (harm) should be explained by referring to wholesome dharmas (Kuśala-dharma). Answer: Treatise: 'Chēn' (anger) obstructs non-anger (Apratigha), precisely obstructing loving-kindness (Maitrī); 'Hāi' (harm) obstructs non-harm (Avihiṃsā), precisely obstructing compassion (Karuṇā). Therefore, it should be explained by referring to wholesome dharmas. 'Chēn' (anger) can end life, while 'Hāi' (harm) only damages others, so this is their difference. As explained in the context of wholesome dharmas. Question: What is 'Māna' (pride)? What is its nature? What is its function? Answer: Treatise: Among 'Māna' (pride), regarding one's own flourishing affairs. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states that it refers to temporarily obtaining worldly flourishing affairs, etc., relying on them in one's mind and becoming arrogant. The Abhidharmasamuccaya states: 'Following one kind of glorious affair,' referring to longevity, etc., which is this flourishing affair. However, having already heard, contemplated, or already attained various unconditioned dharmas (pure dharma beyond afflictions), wouldn't one also rely on them? Saints do not rely on what they have already attained to generate reliance. Generating reliance only arises in relation to conditioned (afflicted) affairs. Ordinary beings, regarding the unconditioned dharmas they have heard and contemplated, can rely on them to generate 'Māna' (pride). However, there is one view here that only relying on knowledge and views is conditioned. There is another view that relying on the various dharmas known also extends to the unconditioned. The latter interpretation is more superior. Here, generally speaking, the various known dharmas are also called flourishing affairs. Even if the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra quotes scriptures, and the Abhidharmasamuccaya, it is only based on the path of cultivation, encompassing the characteristics of the Hinayana, mostly in this way. It is not contradictory. Regarding these, etc., deeply generating attachment, indulging in intoxication, roaming freely, as its nature. And relying on it. Intoxication is another name for confusion. Growing all defilements. The Abhidharmasamuccaya states that it is the basis of all afflictions, etc. Therefore, non-pride (Amāna) is the absence of greed (Lobha). However, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says 'a part,' it must be that entity. Because of that accomplishment. 'Part' is a component, meaning of equal flow and category, not just that entity.

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體。如懈怠依四法。非即唯貪以為依。亦瞋等為依故。

上來已辨小隨惑訖。下辨中隨惑有二。初別解。得總釋。別釋為二。皆有略廣。如文可知。

論。云何無慚至諸惡行故。

述曰。此返慚相。應準前說。

論。云何無愧至諸惡行故。

述曰。準返善中愧為其相。然此中無慚言自法。與顯揚同。對法．五蘊云自不恥為無慚。法益於己亦名自故。此中以情．非情別故。雙舉不相違也。

論。不恥過惡至假說為體。

述曰。總解有四。一通教。二難古說。三明行相。四釋違文。此通教也。其諸經論解此二體謂以不恥。今此會云不恥是此二種通相。諸教約自．他之緣別故。假說通相為二別相。非彼別相。

論。若執不恥至體無差別。

述曰。下難古有四。一無別體難。二不俱生難。三非實有難。四非遍惡難。有人若執不恥是此二種別相。此二應無別。俱不恥故。如二受等俱領納故　若爾苦樂體應無別。俱領納故　此義不爾。分別．不分別。逼迫．適悅等。種種行相別故。不同不恥行相無別。俱是不恥緣約自他。

論。由斯二法至有此義故。

述曰。此不俱生難。既類同故應不俱生。非可受．相等許有此二並生故。

論。若待自他至俱遍噁心

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：體性。例如懈怠依賴四種條件（四法），並非僅僅以貪慾作為依賴，也以嗔恚等作為依賴。

上面已經辨析了小的隨煩惱（小隨惑）完畢。下面辨析中的隨煩惱（中隨惑），分為兩個部分。首先是分別解釋（別解），然後是總的解釋（總釋）。分別解釋又分為兩個部分，都有簡略和詳細的說明，如經文所示。

論：什麼是無慚，以至於產生各種惡行？

述曰：這是反過來說明慚的相狀，應該參照前面的說法。

論：什麼是無愧，以至於產生各種惡行？

述曰：參照反過來說明善中愧的相狀。然而這裡說無慚是關於自身（自法），與《顯揚論》相同。《對法論》、《五蘊論》說自己不以過惡為恥是無慚。法益於自己也稱為自，因此這裡因為情與非情的區別，所以同時舉出（無慚和無愧）並不矛盾。

論：不以過惡為恥，以假說為體性。

述曰：總的解釋有四點：一是通教，二是駁斥古人的說法（難古說），三是說明行相，四是解釋與經文的矛盾之處（釋違文）。這是通教的解釋。各經論解釋這二者的體性，都說以不恥為體。現在這裡說不恥是這兩種（無慚和無愧）共同的相狀（通相）。各種教義根據自身和他人的緣起來區分，所以假說共同的相狀作為兩種不同的相狀（別相），而不是它們各自不同的相狀。

論：如果執著不恥是這兩種（無慚和無愧）各自不同的相狀，那麼它們的體性就沒有差別。

述曰：下面駁斥古人的說法，有四個方面：一是沒有不同的體性（無別體難），二是不一起產生（不俱生難），三不是真實存在（非實有難），四不是普遍存在於噁心中（非遍惡難）。如果有人執著不恥是這兩種（無慚和無愧）各自不同的相狀，那麼這二者應該沒有差別，因為都是不恥的緣故。如同苦受和樂受等，都是領納的緣故。如果這樣，那麼苦和樂的體性也應該沒有差別，因為都是領納的緣故。這個道理不是這樣的，因為分別與不分別，逼迫與舒適等，種種行相不同。不同於不恥的行相沒有差別，都是不恥，只是緣于自身或他人。

論：由於這兩種法（無慚和無愧）種類相同，所以應該不一起產生，不能像受、想等一樣，允許這二者同時產生。

論：如果依賴自身或他人，那麼（無慚和無愧）都普遍存在於噁心中。

【English Translation】 English version: Nature. For example, sloth relies on four conditions (Si Fa), not just greed as its basis, but also anger and so on.

The minor secondary afflictions (Xiao Sui Huo) have been discussed above. The middle secondary afflictions (Zhong Sui Huo) are discussed below, in two parts. First, separate explanations (Bie Jie), then a general explanation (Zong Shi). The separate explanations are divided into two parts, both with brief and detailed explanations, as shown in the text.

Treatise: What is shamelessness (Wu Can), leading to all kinds of evil deeds?

Commentary: This is the reverse explanation of the characteristic of shame (Can), which should be referred to the previous statement.

Treatise: What is impudence (Wu Kui), leading to all kinds of evil deeds?

Commentary: Refer to the reverse explanation of the characteristic of shame (Kui) in goodness. However, here it says that shamelessness (Wu Can) is about oneself (Zi Fa), which is the same as in the Xianyang Lun. The Duifa Lun and Wu Yun Lun say that not being ashamed of one's own faults is shamelessness (Wu Can). The Dharma benefiting oneself is also called self (Zi), so here, because of the difference between sentient and non-sentient beings, mentioning both (shamelessness and impudence) at the same time is not contradictory.

Treatise: Not being ashamed of faults, taking the hypothetical (Jia Shuo) as its nature.

Commentary: The general explanation has four points: first, the common teaching (Tong Jiao); second, refuting the ancient sayings (Nan Gu Shuo); third, explaining the characteristics (Ming Xing Xiang); and fourth, explaining the contradictions with the scriptures (Shi Wei Wen). This is the explanation of the common teaching. The various sutras and treatises explain the nature of these two, saying that they take not being ashamed as their nature. Now it is said here that not being ashamed is the common characteristic (Tong Xiang) of these two (shamelessness and impudence). The various teachings distinguish them based on the conditions of oneself and others, so the hypothetical common characteristic is taken as two different characteristics (Bie Xiang), not their respective different characteristics.

Treatise: If one insists that not being ashamed is the respective different characteristic of these two (shamelessness and impudence), then their nature would have no difference.

Commentary: Below, the ancient sayings are refuted in four aspects: first, there is no different nature (Wu Bie Ti Nan); second, they do not arise together (Bu Ju Sheng Nan); third, they are not truly existent (Fei Shi You Nan); and fourth, they are not universally present in evil minds (Fei Bian E Nan). If someone insists that not being ashamed is the respective different characteristic of these two (shamelessness and impudence), then these two should have no difference, because both are due to not being ashamed. Just like painful feeling (Ku Shou) and pleasant feeling (Le Shou), etc., both are due to experiencing. If so, then the nature of pain and pleasure should also have no difference, because both are due to experiencing. This reasoning is not correct, because there are different characteristics such as distinguishing and not distinguishing, pressing and comfortable, etc. It is different from the characteristic of not being ashamed having no difference, both being not ashamed, only depending on oneself or others.

Treatise: Because these two dharmas (shamelessness and impudence) are of the same kind, they should not arise together, and cannot be like feeling (Shou), thought (Xiang), etc., allowing these two to arise simultaneously.

Treatise: If relying on oneself or others, then (shamelessness and impudence) are both universally present in evil minds.

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述曰。次非實有難。若待自．他立二故成體別。應非實有。如長．短等冷．暖亦然　若許此二至俱遍噁心下。非遍惡難。若此二體實許前後生者。復違瑜伽五十五等說俱遍噁心。有起．不起。非遍惡故。無此計者。然設說之。

外人問曰。別相如何。

論。不善心時至無別起失。

述曰。此解行相。隨緣何境皆有輕拒善等義故。翻善應說。

論。然諸聖教至名自他故。

述曰。下釋違文。于中二解會諸經違也。世間之中亦攝世典．王法令等。不益己故。

論。而論說為至非即彼性。

述曰。會相違也。此別有體。五十八說。為癡等流以遍依故。對法說為貪等三法分者。是等流故名分。非如忿等是彼性故名分。然五十五說為實有不言他分。此文為正。

論。云何掉舉至奢摩他為業。

述曰。令心不靜。體非唯不靜不靜乃是諸惑共相故　能障行舍。善法相違　障奢摩他。止品對治。若別善法相對行相。違于舍相。若總善法相對行相。違于止品。以過失重說有障二。對法顯揚皆言違于止品唯此論中違于舍善。對法第七五蓋障中掉舉障止。亦此同故。舍于惡法掉障最增。說之為障也。

論。有義掉舉至樂事生故。

述曰。初師謂唯貪分。無別

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：其次是否定『實有』的詰難。如果依賴於『自』（自身）和『他』（其他）來建立二元對立，從而形成不同的實體，那麼就應該不是『實有』的。例如，長和短、冷和暖等也是如此。如果允許這二者同時普遍存在於噁心之下，那麼就難以解釋為何不是普遍的惡。如果這兩個實體確實允許前後產生，那麼又違反了《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷等所說的，同時普遍存在於噁心中，有生起和不生起的情況，因為不是普遍的惡。沒有這種觀點的人，姑且設立這種說法。

外人問：『別相』（區別相）是怎樣的？

論：不善心生起時，沒有『別起』（分別生起）和『失』（失去）。

述曰：這是解釋行相。隨順任何境界，都有輕視、抗拒善等的意義。反過來說，善也應該如此。

論：然而，各種聖教都說，因為名稱是『自』和『他』的緣故。

述曰：下面解釋與經文相違之處。其中有兩種解釋來調和各種經文的矛盾。『世間之中』也包括世俗典籍、王法法令等，因為它們不能增益自己。

論：而論中說，並非就是那些性質。

述曰：這是調和相違之處。這個『別』（區別）有自己的實體。《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷說，是由於愚癡等流而普遍依附的緣故。《阿毗達磨》說，是貪等三種法的分位，是因為是等流的緣故而稱為分位，不像忿等是那些性質的緣故而稱為分位。然而，《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷說是『實有』，沒有說是其他分位。本文的說法是正確的。

論：什麼是掉舉（uddhacca，心不平靜）？以奢摩他（śamatha，止）為業。

述曰：使心不得平靜。其體性並非僅僅是不平靜，不平靜乃是各種煩惱的共同相狀。能夠障礙行舍（平靜的舍受），與善法相違背。障礙奢摩他（止），是止品的對治。如果從個別的善法相對來說，其行相違背于舍相；如果從總體的善法相對來說，其行相違背于止品。因為過失嚴重，所以說有障礙二者。對法和《顯揚聖教論》都說違背于止品，只有此論中說違背于舍善。《阿毗達磨》第七卷中，五蓋的障礙中，掉舉障礙止，也是同樣的道理。捨棄惡法時，掉舉的障礙最為強烈，所以說它是障礙。

論：有義認為，掉舉是因為喜歡樂事而生起的。

述曰：第一位論師認為，僅僅是貪的分位，沒有其他的。

【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: Next is the refutation of 'inherent existence'. If one relies on 'self' and 'other' to establish duality, thereby forming distinct entities, then it should not be 'inherently existent'. For example, long and short, cold and warm, are similar. If these two are allowed to simultaneously and universally exist under an evil mind, then it is difficult to explain why it is not a universal evil. If these two entities are indeed allowed to arise sequentially, then it contradicts the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 55, which states that they simultaneously and universally exist in the evil mind, with arising and non-arising, because it is not a universal evil. For those who do not hold this view, let us tentatively establish such a statement.

An outsider asks: What is the 'distinct characteristic' (viśeṣa-lakṣaṇa)?

Treatise: When an unwholesome mind arises, there is no 'separate arising' (viśeṣa-utpāda) and 'loss' (apāya).

Commentary: This explains the aspect of action. Following any circumstance, there is the meaning of slighting and resisting goodness, etc. Conversely, goodness should be spoken of similarly.

Treatise: However, various holy teachings say that it is because the names are 'self' and 'other'.

Commentary: The following explains the contradiction with the scriptures. Among them, there are two explanations to reconcile the contradictions in various scriptures. 'Among the world' also includes secular texts, royal laws and decrees, etc., because they do not benefit oneself.

Treatise: And the treatise says that it is not exactly those natures.

Commentary: This reconciles the contradictions. This 'distinction' (viśeṣa) has its own entity. Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 58, says that it is because of the outflow of ignorance (moha) and is universally dependent. The Abhidharma says that it is a division of the three dharmas of greed (rāga), etc., because it is an outflow and is called a division, unlike anger (krodha), etc., which are called divisions because they are of those natures. However, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 55, says that it is 'inherently existent' and does not say that it is another division. The statement in this text is correct.

Treatise: What is restlessness (uddhacca, mental unsteadiness)? Its function is śamatha (calm abiding).

Commentary: It makes the mind unable to be calm. Its nature is not merely unsteadiness; unsteadiness is the common characteristic of various afflictions. It can obstruct equanimity (upekṣā), which is contrary to wholesome dharmas. It obstructs śamatha (calm abiding), which is the antidote to the category of cessation. If it is considered in relation to individual wholesome dharmas, its aspect of action is contrary to the aspect of equanimity; if it is considered in relation to wholesome dharmas in general, its aspect of action is contrary to the category of cessation. Because the fault is serious, it is said to obstruct both. The Abhidharma and the Śāstra on the Exposition of the Teachings both say that it is contrary to the category of cessation; only this treatise says that it is contrary to equanimity and goodness. In the Abhidharma, volume 7, among the obstructions of the five hindrances, restlessness obstructs cessation, which is also the same reason. When abandoning evil dharmas, the obstruction of restlessness is the strongest, so it is said to be an obstruction.

Treatise: Some argue that restlessness arises because of delighting in pleasurable things.

Commentary: The first teacher believes that it is merely a division of greed (rāga), and there is nothing else.

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體性。五十五．五十八．顯揚．對法皆唯說貪分故。不言余分故。下以理成。此復由憶昔樂事生故。雖亦有貪現．未來故生。然修止相。策練其心。緣先境增故言憶昔。又五十五云此非遍染故。言遍染者有別義故。如第五卷會。

論。有義掉舉至遍染心故。

述曰。第二師說。文有其三。一破前。二申正。三會違。今初文也。此非唯貪。對法第六．瑜伽五十八說遍染心故。若唯貪分即不遍故。說不遍者。有別義故。如前已會。此舉教成。

論。又掉舉相至無別相故。

述曰。申正也。諸論皆言此掉舉相謂不寂靜。五蘊．對法此說皆同。然對法第六作此說言。不寂靜是共相故。此掉舉離一切染無別體性。

此師意說。即依一切煩惱上立。若爾何意論唯說是貪分。

論。雖依一切至說為貪分。

述曰。會違也。貪愛境界唯掉舉增。掉舉增時依貪分故。說為貪分。非唯依貪說是假相。此之二師以五十五云是世俗有故皆說假。

論。有義掉舉至亦假有故。

述曰。第三師說。文亦有四。一破初師。二會文。三顯正。四破第二師。此初也　貪等之外別有自性。由此故得遍諸染心。若唯貪分者。不遍一切染故。如不信．懈怠對法說為癡分。大論言是實有。非說是他癡分。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 體性。五十五．五十八．顯揚．對法都只說掉舉是貪的一部分，不說其他的成分。下面用道理來成立這個觀點：這是由於回憶過去的快樂事情而產生的。雖然也有貪的現在和未來而產生，但是修習止的相，鞭策鍛鍊內心，因為緣於之前的境界而增長，所以說是回憶過去。另外，五十五卷說，這並非普遍的染污，說普遍染污有其他的含義，如同第五卷的解釋。

論：有的人認為掉舉是普遍染污心。

述記：第二位論師的說法，文中有三個部分：一是破斥前面的觀點，二是闡述正確的觀點，三是解釋不一致的地方。現在是第一部分。掉舉不僅僅是貪。對法第六、瑜伽五十八說，掉舉是普遍染污心。如果只是貪的一部分，那就不是普遍的。說不普遍，有其他的含義，如同前面已經解釋的。這是舉出教證來成立。

論：又，掉舉的相，是指不寂靜，離開一切染污沒有其他的體性。

述記：這是闡述正確的觀點。各種論都說，掉舉的相是不寂靜。五蘊、對法都這樣說。然而，對法第六這樣說：不寂靜是共同的相。這個掉舉，離開一切染污，沒有其他的體性。

這位論師的意思是說，掉舉是依附於一切煩惱而建立的。如果是這樣，為什麼論中只說是貪的一部分？

論：雖然依附於一切煩惱，但是因為貪愛境界，掉舉會增長，所以說它是貪的一部分。

述記：這是解釋不一致的地方。貪愛境界，掉舉會增長，掉舉增長的時候，依附於貪的部分，所以說是貪的一部分。並非僅僅依附於貪，這只是假象。這兩位論師都認為五十五卷說是世俗有，所以都說是假。

論：有的人認為掉舉在貪等之外，有自己的體性，所以也是假有。

述記：第三位論師的說法，文中有四個部分：一是破斥第一位論師，二是解釋經文，三是闡述正確的觀點，四是破斥第二位論師。這是第一部分。在貪等之外，有其他的自性。因此，能夠普遍地存在於各種染污心中。如果僅僅是貪的一部分，那就不能普遍地存在於一切染污心中。如同不信、懈怠，對法說是癡的一部分，大論說是真實存在的，不是說它是其他的癡的一部分。

【English Translation】 English version: Nature. Fifty-five. Fifty-eight. Xianyang. Duifa all only say that distraction is a part of greed, not mentioning other components. The following uses reason to establish this view: it arises from recalling past pleasurable events. Although it also arises from the present and future of greed, by practicing the aspect of cessation and training the mind, it increases because of focusing on the previous state, hence it is said to be recalling the past. Furthermore, volume 55 says that this is not pervasive defilement, and saying pervasive defilement has other meanings, as explained in volume 5.

Treatise: Some argue that distraction is a pervasive defilement of the mind.

Commentary: The second teacher's explanation has three parts: first, refuting the previous view; second, stating the correct view; and third, explaining inconsistencies. This is the first part. Distraction is not only greed. Duifa 6 and Yoga 58 say that distraction is a pervasive defilement of the mind. If it were only a part of greed, it would not be pervasive. Saying it is not pervasive has other meanings, as explained earlier. This is establishing the view by citing teachings.

Treatise: Furthermore, the aspect of distraction refers to non-tranquility, and apart from all defilements, it has no other nature.

Commentary: This is stating the correct view. Various treatises say that the aspect of distraction is non-tranquility. The Five Aggregates and Duifa all say the same. However, Duifa 6 says: non-tranquility is a common aspect. This distraction, apart from all defilements, has no other nature.

This teacher means that distraction is established based on all afflictions. If so, why does the treatise only say it is a part of greed?

Treatise: Although it relies on all afflictions, distraction increases because of the object of craving, so it is said to be a part of greed.

Commentary: This is explaining inconsistencies. Distraction increases because of the object of craving, and when distraction increases, it relies on the part of greed, so it is said to be a part of greed. It is not merely relying on greed; this is just an appearance. Both of these teachers believe that volume 55 says it is conventionally existent, so they both say it is an appearance.

Treatise: Some argue that distraction has its own nature apart from greed, etc., so it is also conventionally existent.

Commentary: The third teacher's explanation has four parts: first, refuting the first teacher; second, explaining the scriptures; third, stating the correct view; and fourth, refuting the second teacher. This is the first part. Apart from greed, etc., it has another nature. Therefore, it can pervasively exist in various defiled minds. If it were only a part of greed, it could not pervasively exist in all defiled minds. Like disbelief and laziness, Duifa says they are a part of delusion, and the Great Treatise says they are truly existent, not saying they are a part of other delusions.

Note: Xianyang (顯揚) refers to Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (顯揚聖教論), Duifa (對法) refers to Apidharma (阿毗達磨).

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不信．懈怠便非實有。非說是貪他分。掉舉之體便非實有。勿不信等亦假有故。遍染心言是一分證。如不信等是實有故。此因不定。亦不遍故。以放逸遍染許是假故。

論。而論說為至隨他相說。

述曰。此會文也。五十五說世俗有者。如睡眠．惡作二法名世俗有體仍是實。彼亦隨他相說故。謂掉舉位而貪分增。從貪相說名世俗有。世俗有者仍非是假。睡眠有義不以為實。此中喻雖不成。以理逐之亦令實有。至下當說。故今為喻。

若爾別相云何。不靜是共相故。前來難通第一師義。下出其別相答第二師。

論。掉舉別相至不家靜故。

述曰。此申正也。謂囂掉舉動是此自性。令其俱生心心所法不寂靜故。

論。若離煩惱至非此別相。

述曰。破第二師也。若離一切煩惱無別此體相者。何故別說障于止也。一切煩惱不皆障止故。又諸煩惱能障一切善。不應別障。故知不寂靜非此別體相。別體相者即囂動故。

論。云何惛沉至毗缽舍那為業。

述曰。此乃別障善中輕安。通障觀品。顯過失增說有二障。

論。有義惛沉至是癡相故。

述曰。此第一師。據教立理以論為證。諸論同故。以理與癡無別相故。

論。有義惛沉至惛沈相故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不信和懈怠並非真實存在，因為它們不是貪婪的組成部分。掉舉的本體也並非真實存在，因為不要不信等等也只是假有。說『遍染心』只是一種部分證實，就像不信等等是真實存在一樣。這個原因是不確定的，也不普遍，因為放逸被認為是普遍的染污，但它被認為是假有的。

論：而論述是爲了迎合隨他相的說法。

述曰：這是會合經文的意思。第五十五條說世俗有，例如睡眠和惡作兩種法，名義上是世俗有，但本體仍然是真實的。那也是爲了迎合隨他相的說法。意思是說，在掉舉的狀態下，貪婪的部分會增加，從貪婪的方面來說，就叫做世俗有。世俗有仍然不是假的。睡眠在某種意義上不被認為是真實的。雖然這個比喻不成立，但如果從道理上推究，也可以使它成為真實的。下文將會說到。所以現在用作比喻。

如果這樣，那麼別相是什麼呢？不靜是共相，所以先前難以理解第一位論師的意義。下面給出別相來回答第二位論師。

論：掉舉的別相是使心和心所法不安靜，因為它們不居家安寧。

述曰：這是申明正義。意思是說，喧囂和掉動是掉舉的自性，使與其同時生起的心和心所法不安靜。

論：如果離開煩惱，就沒有這個本體的差別相。

述曰：這是駁斥第二位論師。如果離開一切煩惱，就沒有這個本體的差別相，那麼為什麼要特別說它障礙止呢？因為一切煩惱不都障礙止。而且，諸煩惱能障礙一切善，不應該特別說它障礙止。所以要知道，不寂靜不是這個的別體相，別體相就是喧囂動亂。

論：什麼是惛沉（Moha, 精神昏沉）？它的作用是障礙輕安，並與毗缽舍那（Vipassanā, 內觀）為業。

述曰：這是說它特別障礙善法中的輕安，普遍障礙觀品。顯示過失增加，所以說有兩種障礙。

論：有的人認為，惛沉就是癡（Moha, 愚癡）的相。

述曰：這是第一位論師，根據教義建立道理，以論典為證據。因為各種論典都相同。從道理上說，惛沉與癡沒有差別相。

論：有的人認為，惛沉是惛沉的相。

【English Translation】 English version Disbelief and sloth are not truly existent, as they are not part of greed. The essence of distraction is also not truly existent, because 'do not disbelieve' etc. are also only provisionally existent. Saying 'pervadingly defiled mind' is only a partial confirmation, just as disbelief etc. are truly existent. This reason is uncertain and not universal, because laxity is considered a pervasive defilement, but it is considered provisionally existent.

Treatise: And the discussion is to cater to the explanation of 'following the other's aspect'.

Commentary: This is to reconcile the texts. The fifty-fifth section says that conventional existents, such as sleep and regret, are nominally conventional existents, but their essence is still real. That is also to cater to the explanation of 'following the other's aspect'. It means that in the state of distraction, the part of greed increases, and from the aspect of greed, it is called conventional existent. Conventional existent is still not false. Sleep is not considered real in a certain sense. Although this analogy is not valid, if it is pursued from the perspective of reason, it can also make it real. It will be discussed below. So it is used as an analogy now.

If so, then what is the distinct characteristic? Non-stillness is a common characteristic, so it was previously difficult to understand the meaning of the first teacher. The following gives the distinct characteristic to answer the second teacher.

Treatise: The distinct characteristic of distraction is to make the mind and mental factors restless, because they do not dwell at home in peace.

Commentary: This is to clarify the correct meaning. It means that noise and agitation are the nature of distraction, making the mind and mental factors that arise simultaneously with it restless.

Treatise: If separated from afflictions, there is no distinct characteristic of this entity.

Commentary: This is to refute the second teacher. If separated from all afflictions, there is no distinct characteristic of this entity, then why specifically say that it obstructs cessation? Because not all afflictions obstruct cessation. Moreover, all afflictions can obstruct all good, so it should not be specifically said that it obstructs cessation. Therefore, it should be known that non-stillness is not the distinct characteristic of this entity, the distinct characteristic is noise and agitation.

Treatise: What is torpor (Moha, mental dullness)? Its function is to obstruct pliancy and its activity is associated with Vipassanā (Vipassanā, insight meditation).

Commentary: This says that it specifically obstructs pliancy among good dharmas, and universally obstructs the category of contemplation. It shows that the fault increases, so it is said that there are two obstructions.

Treatise: Some believe that torpor is the aspect of delusion (Moha, ignorance).

Commentary: This is the first teacher, establishing the principle according to the teachings, using the treatises as evidence. Because the various treatises are the same. From the perspective of reason, torpor and delusion have no distinct characteristics.

Treatise: Some believe that torpor is the aspect of torpor.

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述曰。此第二師。文有二。一立義。二會文。此初也。諸煩惱共相即是別相。即依一切煩惱上立。對法第六說無堪任是惑共相故。

論。雖依一切至但說癡分。

述曰。會論如前。此依一切煩惱假立。癡位增也。

論。有義惛沉至非即癡攝。

述曰。此第三師。文有四。一破初說。二申正。三破第二師。四辨差別。此初也。別說有體。會名癡分者。是癡等流故。同五十八說。不信．懈怠二法為喻。

論。隨他相說至是實有性。

述曰。此釋說名世俗所以。以癡增故名世俗有。如睡眠等是實有性。此通第一師文。通第二師難等。準前應說。

論。惛沈別相至無堪任故。

述曰。此申正也。謂即瞢重是此別相。瞢謂𧄼瞢。即是惛義。重謂沉重。那是沈義。此體別相非無堪任。令俱生法無堪任故。

論。若離煩惱至非此別相。

述曰。難第二師。若以煩惱共相為體。不應別說障其觀品。應一切名惛沈。一切皆障觀故。又能障一切善法。何但障觀品。如前已說。

與癡何別。

論。此與癡相至而非迷闇。

述曰。下辨差別。謂癡于境輕而迷闇。闇者不了義。正障善中無癡。別相於境不必𧄼瞢沉重。惛沈于境𧄼瞢沉重。障善輕安。別相於境不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：這是第二位論師的觀點。本文分為兩部分：一是確立定義，二是解釋經文。這是第一部分。各種煩惱的共相和別相，是建立在一切煩惱之上的。如《對法論》第六卷所說，無堪任性是煩惱的共相。

論：雖然是依據一切煩惱而立，但只說是癡的一部分。

述曰：解釋經文如前所述。這是依據一切煩惱假立的，因為癡的地位增強了。

論：有論師認為，惛沉（Moha: delusion）是實有的，但並非完全屬於癡。

述曰：這是第三位論師的觀點。本文分為四個部分：一是破斥第一種說法，二是闡述正確的觀點，三是破斥第二位論師的觀點，四是辨別差別。這是第一部分。認為惛沉是別有實體的，之所以稱之為癡的一部分，是因為它是癡的等流（nisyanda: outflow），如同第五十八卷所說，以不信和懈怠二法作為比喻。

論：隨順其他相而說，惛沉是實有自性的。

述曰：這是解釋說名為世俗有的原因。因為癡的程度加重，所以名為世俗有。如同睡眠等是實有自性的。這可以通用於第一位論師的觀點，也可以用來反駁第二位論師的疑問等，應該按照前面的方式來解釋。

論：惛沉的別相，是令心無堪任性。

述曰：這是闡述正確的觀點。所謂瞢重，就是惛沉的別相。瞢，就是𧄼瞢，也就是惛的意思。重，就是沉重，那就是沉的意思。這個體的別相併非無堪任性，而是令俱生法（sahaja-dharma: co-arisen phenomena）無堪任性。

論：如果離開煩惱的共相，那麼惛沉就不是它的別相。

述曰：這是反駁第二位論師的觀點。如果以煩惱的共相作為體，就不應該單獨說它障礙觀品（vipassana: insight）。應該一切都名為惛沉，因為一切都障礙觀。而且它也能障礙一切善法，為何只障礙觀品？如同前面已經說過的。

與癡有什麼區別？

論：此與癡相，于境雖復迷昧，而非迷闇。

述曰：下面辨別差別。癡對於境界是輕微的迷昧，而惛沉則是迷闇。闇，是不了義。正障善中沒有癡的別相，對於境界不必𧄼瞢沉重。惛沉對於境界是𧄼瞢沉重，障礙善的輕安。別相對於境界不是𧄼

【English Translation】 English version: Śāstra says: This is the view of the second teacher. The text has two parts: first, establishing the definition; second, explaining the text. This is the first part. The common and distinct characteristics of all afflictions are established based on all afflictions. As the sixth volume of the Abhidharmakośa says, the inability to function is the common characteristic of afflictions.

Treatise: Although it is established based on all afflictions, it is only said to be a part of ignorance (Moha).

Śāstra says: Explaining the text as before. This is hypothetically established based on all afflictions, because the position of ignorance is enhanced.

Treatise: Some teachers believe that torpor (styāna) is real, but not entirely included in ignorance.

Śāstra says: This is the view of the third teacher. The text has four parts: first, refuting the first statement; second, stating the correct view; third, refuting the view of the second teacher; fourth, distinguishing the differences. This is the first part. Believing that torpor has a separate entity, it is called a part of ignorance because it is an outflow (nisyanda) of ignorance, as the fifty-eighth volume says, using disbelief and laziness as metaphors.

Treatise: Speaking according to other characteristics, torpor is of real nature.

Śāstra says: This explains the reason for calling it conventionally existent. Because the degree of ignorance is increased, it is called conventionally existent. Like sleep, it is of real nature. This can be applied to the view of the first teacher, and can also be used to refute the questions of the second teacher, etc. It should be explained in the same way as before.

Treatise: The distinct characteristic of torpor is to make the mind unable to function.

Śāstra says: This is stating the correct view. The so-called mēng chóng (dimness and heaviness) is the distinct characteristic of torpor. Mēng (dimness) is hūnmēng (dazed), which means torpor. Chóng (heaviness) is heaviness, which means sinking. The distinct characteristic of this entity is not the inability to function, but rather to make co-arisen phenomena (sahaja-dharma) unable to function.

Treatise: If it is separated from the common characteristic of afflictions, then torpor is not its distinct characteristic.

Śāstra says: This is refuting the view of the second teacher. If the common characteristic of afflictions is taken as the entity, then it should not be said separately that it obstructs the contemplation factors (vipassana). Everything should be called torpor, because everything obstructs contemplation. Moreover, it can obstruct all good dharmas, why only obstruct contemplation factors? As has been said before.

What is the difference between this and ignorance?

Treatise: This and ignorance, although confused about the object, are not obscured.

Śāstra says: Below, the differences are distinguished. Ignorance is slightly confused about the object, while torpor is obscured. Obscured means not understanding. There is no distinct characteristic of ignorance in directly obstructing goodness, and it is not necessary to be hūnmēng chóng (dazed and heavy) about the object. Torpor is hūnmēng chóng (dazed and heavy) about the object, obstructing the ease of goodness. The distinct characteristic is not *hūn

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必迷闇。

論。云何不信至多懈怠故。

述曰。下文有二。初略后廣。以此等略也　惰依者。惰即懈怠也　實德能者。不信所依　不忍樂等。是不信相。

論。不信三相至心穢為性。

述曰。下廣有三。一辨境。二辨心穢。三釋不忍等差別。此初二也。所不信之三相等。返前信說。

論。由不信故至非別有故。

述曰。下解不忍等差別也。由不信故。于實等中。不忍．不樂．不欲者。非別實有不忍等性。前于善中忍．樂．欲。體即是欲．解。此于實等不忍．樂．欲。但是不信。由此信中於染法等不忍．不樂。亦即是信。無別有體。

論。若於餘事至非此自性。

述曰。若於染法起忍．樂等。體是欲等。非是不信。不信因果故。若於無記起忍．樂等。但是欲．解。非與余法為因果故。若於染法不忍．樂等。體即是信。亦非欲．解。

論。云何懈怠至滋長染故。

述曰。業中增者。是滋長義。

論。于諸染事至非別有故。

述曰。非但于善不勤名怠。于惡策勵亦是怠也。于無記事策勤是欲．勝解。非別有體。

論。如於無記至無信不信。

述曰。此以喻成。于無記事忍可樂欲。非信非不信。但是欲．勝解故。此等二法行相增猛。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 必迷闇（Bimi'an）：

論：為什麼會有不信，以至於如此懈怠？

述曰：下文分為兩部分。先簡略后詳細。這些是簡略的部分。惰依：惰就是懈怠。實德能：不信所依賴的。不忍樂等：是不信的表現。

論：不信的三種表現，乃至心穢為自性。

述曰：下面詳細解釋，分為三部分。一是辨別對象，二是辨別心穢，三是解釋不忍等的差別。這是前兩部分。所不信的三種表現等，是反過來說前面的信。

論：由於不信的緣故，乃至並非另外存在。

述曰：下面解釋不忍等的差別。由於不信的緣故，對於真實等，不忍、不樂、不欲，並非另外實有不忍等的性質。前面在善中忍、樂、欲，本體就是欲、解。這裡對於真實等不忍、樂、欲，只是不信。由此信中對於染法等不忍、不樂，也就是信，沒有另外的本體。

論：如果對於其他事情，乃至不是此自性。

述曰：如果對於染法生起忍、樂等，本體是欲等，不是不信。因為不信是因果關係。如果對於無記法生起忍、樂等，只是欲、勝解，因為不是與其它法互為因果關係。如果對於染法不忍、不樂等，本體就是信，也不是欲、解。

論：什麼是懈怠，乃至滋長染污的緣故？

述曰：業中增長，是滋長的意思。

論：對於各種染污的事情，乃至並非另外存在。

述曰：不僅僅對於善不勤奮叫做懈怠，對於惡事努力也是懈怠。對於無記事努力是欲、勝解，並非另外有本體。

論：比如對於無記事，乃至無信不信。

述曰：這是用比喻來論證。對於無記事忍可、樂欲，非信非不信，只是欲、勝解的緣故。這些二法，行相更加強烈。

【English Translation】 English version Bimi'an (必迷闇):

Treatise: Why is there disbelief, leading to such laziness?

Commentary: The following text is divided into two parts. First, a brief explanation, then a detailed one. These are the brief parts. 'Inertia-basis': Inertia is laziness. 'Real virtue-ability': That which disbelief relies on. 'Non-acceptance, non-joy, etc.': These are the manifestations of disbelief.

Treatise: The three characteristics of disbelief, up to the mind's impurity as its nature.

Commentary: The following is a detailed explanation, divided into three parts. First, distinguishing the object; second, distinguishing the mind's impurity; and third, explaining the differences in non-acceptance, etc. These are the first two parts. The three characteristics of what is disbelieved, etc., are the reverse of the aforementioned faith.

Treatise: Because of disbelief, up to not existing separately.

Commentary: The following explains the differences in non-acceptance, etc. Because of disbelief, regarding reality, etc., non-acceptance, non-joy, non-desire, are not separate, real natures of non-acceptance, etc. Previously, in goodness, acceptance, joy, and desire, their essence is desire and understanding. Here, regarding reality, etc., non-acceptance, non-joy, non-desire, are only disbelief. Therefore, in faith, regarding defiled dharmas, etc., non-acceptance, non-joy, is also faith, without a separate essence.

Treatise: If, regarding other matters, up to not being its own nature.

Commentary: If, regarding defiled dharmas, acceptance, joy, etc., arise, their essence is desire, etc., not disbelief. Because disbelief is a cause-and-effect relationship. If, regarding neutral dharmas, acceptance, joy, etc., arise, they are only desire and understanding, because they are not causally related to other dharmas. If, regarding defiled dharmas, non-acceptance, non-joy, etc., arise, their essence is faith, and not desire or understanding.

Treatise: What is laziness, up to the reason for nourishing defilements?

Commentary: 'Increasing in karma' means nourishing.

Treatise: Regarding various defiled matters, up to not existing separately.

Commentary: Not only is non-diligence towards goodness called laziness, but striving towards evil is also laziness. Diligence towards neutral matters is desire and superior understanding, not having a separate essence.

Treatise: For example, regarding neutral matters, up to neither faith nor disbelief.

Commentary: This uses an analogy to prove the point. Regarding neutral matters, acceptance, joy, and desire are neither faith nor disbelief, but only desire and superior understanding. These two dharmas have increasingly intense characteristics.

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但有善．染。無記行劣。無別二相。但欲．勝解。此上二法五十五說是實物有。對法等言應作分別。前因已會論言癡分等。五蘊同此。

論。云何放逸至非別有體。

述曰。縱謂縱恣　蕩謂蕩逸。余解性．業。翻善之中不放逸性。應知廢立。

論。雖慢疑等至如不放逸。

述曰。何以不依慢．疑等上立放逸者。四用勝故。障三善根及遍策法。遍策法者即是精進。翻善應說。此唯是假。論有成文。不勞疑故。

論。云何失念至心散亂故。

述曰。由失念故生起散亂。逐難解業。不能明記善等事故名為失念。

論。有義失念至相應念故。

述曰。此初師云。此是念一分。對法說是煩惱相應念故。瑜伽論說是癡分者。是等流故。

論。有義失念至故名失念。

述曰。此第二師說。是癡分。大論五十五．五十八。皆說此是癡一分故。對法言念俱分者。由癡令彼相應念失故。因會解名。

論。有義失念至遍染心故。

述曰。此第三師攝前二義。二文影說故以教證。言遍染心非唯念分。有染心時無有念故。

論。云何散亂至發惡慧故。

述曰。余文可知。流者馳流。即是散功能義。蕩者蕩逸。即是亂功能義。

論。有義散亂至是癡

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 但有善、染（指染污）、無記行（指非善非惡的行為）的差別，沒有其他兩種不同的相。只有欲（指慾望）、勝解（指殊勝的理解）。以上這兩種法，在《大毗婆沙論》第五十五卷中說是實物存在。對於《阿毗達磨對法論》等經論的說法，應該加以分別。前面的因已經與論中的癡分等相符。五蘊（色、受、想、行、識）也與此相同。

論：什麼是放逸？乃至不是另外有自體。

述曰：縱，指放縱；蕩，指放蕩逸樂。其餘解釋為性質、作用。在翻轉善法之中，不放逸的性質，應該知道這是廢立（指廢除放逸，建立不放逸）。

論：雖然慢、疑等，乃至如不放逸。

述曰：為什麼不依據慢、疑等來建立放逸呢？因為放逸的四種作用更殊勝。它能障礙三種善根以及普遍策勵的法。普遍策勵的法就是精進。在翻轉善法時應該說明。這僅僅是假立的。論中有明確的成文，不需要懷疑。

論：什麼是失念？乃至心散亂的緣故。

述曰：由於失唸的緣故，生起散亂。追逐難以理解的行業。不能清楚地記住善等事情，所以叫做失念。

論：有義認為，失念乃至與念相應故。

述曰：這是第一位論師的觀點。在《阿毗達磨對法論》中說是與煩惱相應的念。在《瑜伽師地論》中說是癡分，是等流的緣故。

論：有義認為，失念乃至故名失念。

述曰：這是第二位論師的觀點。是癡分。《大毗婆沙論》第五十五卷、第五十八卷，都說這是癡的一部分。在《阿毗達磨對法論》中說與念俱分，是因為癡使得與它相應的念失去作用。因為因緣和合而解釋名稱。

論：有義認為，失念乃至普遍染污心故。

述曰：這是第三位論師綜合了前面兩種觀點。用兩種經文的影子來解說，所以用教證。說普遍染污心，並非僅僅是念的一部分。有染污心的時候，就沒有唸的存在。

論：什麼是散亂？乃至引發惡慧的緣故。

述曰：其餘的經文可以知道。流，是馳流，就是散的功能意義。蕩，是蕩逸，就是亂的功能意義。

論：有義認為，散亂是癡

【English Translation】 English version: But there are distinctions of good, defilement (referring to contamination), and neutral actions (referring to actions that are neither good nor bad), without two other distinct characteristics. There are only desire (referring to craving) and superior understanding (referring to excellent comprehension). The above two dharmas are said to be real entities in the fifty-fifth fascicle of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra. Regarding the statements in the Abhidharma-samuccaya and other scriptures, distinctions should be made. The preceding cause already aligns with the ignorance component, etc., in the treatise. The five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness) are also the same as this.

Treatise: What is distraction? Up to, it is not a separate entity in itself.

Commentary: 'Indulgence' means to be unrestrained; 'dissipation' means to be dissolute and pleasure-seeking. The remaining is explained as nature and function. In reversing the good dharmas, the nature of non-distraction, it should be known that this is abolition and establishment (referring to abolishing distraction and establishing non-distraction).

Treatise: Although arrogance, doubt, etc., up to like non-distraction.

Commentary: Why not establish distraction based on arrogance, doubt, etc.? Because the four functions of distraction are more superior. It can obstruct the three roots of goodness and the universally urging dharma. The universally urging dharma is diligence. It should be explained when reversing the good dharmas. This is merely a provisional establishment. There is a clear statement in the treatise, so there is no need for doubt.

Treatise: What is forgetfulness? Up to, because of mental scattering.

Commentary: Due to the cause of forgetfulness, scattering arises. Pursuing difficult-to-understand actions. Not being able to clearly remember good things, etc., is called forgetfulness.

Treatise: Some argue that forgetfulness, up to, is because it is associated with mindfulness.

Commentary: This is the view of the first teacher. In the Abhidharma-samuccaya, it is said to be mindfulness associated with afflictions. In the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, it is said to be a component of ignorance, because it is a homogenous flow.

Treatise: Some argue that forgetfulness, up to, is therefore called forgetfulness.

Commentary: This is the view of the second teacher. It is a component of ignorance. The fifty-fifth and fifty-eighth fascicles of the Mahāvibhāṣā all say that this is a part of ignorance. In the Abhidharma-samuccaya, it is said to be a component shared with mindfulness, because ignorance causes the mindfulness associated with it to lose its function. The name is explained because of the combination of causes and conditions.

Treatise: Some argue that forgetfulness, up to, is because it universally contaminates the mind.

Commentary: This is the third teacher who combines the previous two views. He explains it using the shadows of the two scriptures, so he uses scriptural proof. Saying that it universally contaminates the mind, it is not merely a part of mindfulness. When there is a contaminated mind, there is no existence of mindfulness.

Treatise: What is scattering? Up to, because it gives rise to evil wisdom.

Commentary: The remaining scriptures can be understood. 'Flowing' is rushing, which is the functional meaning of scattering. 'Dissipating' is dissolute, which is the functional meaning of confusion.

Treatise: Some argue that scattering is ignorance.

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分故。

述曰。此第一師說是癡分。五十五說是癡分故。體是假有。

論。有義散亂至遍染心故。

述曰。第二師說是三法分。對法等說。等取五蘊。五蘊同說是三分故。瑜伽說癡分者。以遍染心故。彼二法分不遍染故。

何以但依三法上立。

論。謂貪瞋癡至說為散亂。

述曰。此之三法令心流蕩。勝慢等法故。是不善根故。行相數猛故。

論。有義散亂至名世俗有。

述曰。述第三師說。初標舉會文。二申正。三破前。四顯別。此初也。別有自性。論說三分者。是三分等流。隨彼相說。即是總會是癡分訖。如無慚愧對法亦說是三分故。大論復言是實有故。

此上標舉會文破第二師及第一師說。下顯正義。及破前說。

論。散亂別相至障三摩地。

述曰。謂躁擾是別相。躁者謂散。擾者謂亂。令俱生法流蕩。流蕩非自性。余惑共相故。破前說言。既言別障定。故是實有。不然應說通障余故。

論。掉舉散亂二用何別。

述曰。下顯差別。此問掉．亂用何差別。

論。彼令易解此令易緣。

述曰。下論主答。掉舉舉於心。境雖是一令俱生之心心所解數轉易。即一境多解也。散亂之功令心易緣別境。即一心易多境也。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 分故。

述曰：第一位論師說這是癡（moha）的一部分。第五十五頌說這是癡的一部分，所以它的體性是假有。

論：有一種觀點認為，散亂（viksepa）是因為它普遍染污心識。

述曰：第二位論師說這是三種法的一部分。《對法》等論典中這樣說，這裡『等』字包括五蘊（panca-skandha）。五蘊共同被稱為是三種法的一部分。瑜伽論典說這是癡的一部分，因為它普遍染污心識。那兩種法不是普遍染污。

為什麼只依據這三種法來建立（散亂）呢？

論：所謂貪（raga）、嗔（dvesa）、癡（moha）等，被稱為散亂。

述曰：這三種法使心流蕩。勝慢（adhimana）等法也是這樣，因為它們是不善的根本，而且行相和數量都很強烈。

論：有一種觀點認為，散亂的名字是世俗有。

述曰：這是第三位論師的說法。首先標舉會合經文，其次陳述正義，再次破斥前說，最後顯示差別。這是第一步。散亂有其自性。論典說這是三種法的一部分，是這三種法的等流，隨順它們的相狀而說。這就是總的會合，是癡的一部分的總結。如同無慚（ahrikya）、無愧（anapatrapya）在《對法》中也被稱為是三種法的一部分。大論又說這是實有的。

上面標舉會合經文，破斥第二位論師和第一位論師的說法。下面顯示正義，並破斥前說。

論：散亂的別相是躁擾，它障礙三摩地（samadhi）。

述曰：所謂躁擾是散亂的別相。『躁』指的是散，『擾』指的是亂。它使俱生法流蕩。流蕩不是自性，而是其他煩惱的共相。破斥前一種說法，說既然說是特別障礙禪定，所以是實有的。不然就應該說是普遍障礙其他（善法）。

論：掉舉（auddhatya）和散亂這兩種作用有什麼區別？

述曰：下面顯示差別。這裡問的是掉舉和散亂的作用有什麼差別。

論：掉舉使心容易理解（境），散亂使心容易攀緣（境）。

述曰：下面是論主的回答。掉舉是舉起心，即使所緣的境是同一個，也使俱生的心和心所的理解和數量容易轉移，即一個境有多種理解。散亂的作用是使心容易攀緣不同的境，即一個心容易攀緣多個境。

【English Translation】 English version Because of division.

Commentary: The first teacher says this is a division of delusion (moha). Verse fifty-five says it is a division of delusion, so its nature is provisionally existent.

Treatise: Some argue that distraction (viksepa) is because it pervasively taints the mind.

Commentary: The second teacher says this is a division of the three dharmas. As stated in texts like the Abhidharma, etc. 'Etc.' includes the five aggregates (panca-skandha). The five aggregates are collectively said to be a division of the three dharmas. The Yoga treatise says it is a division of delusion because it pervasively taints the mind. Those two dharmas do not pervasively taint.

Why is it established only based on these three dharmas?

Treatise: What are called greed (raga), hatred (dvesa), delusion (moha), etc., are said to be distraction.

Commentary: These three dharmas cause the mind to wander. Arrogance (adhimana) and other dharmas are also like this because they are the root of unwholesomeness, and their characteristics and number are intense.

Treatise: Some argue that the name of distraction is conventionally existent.

Commentary: This is the statement of the third teacher. First, he cites and gathers the texts; second, he states the correct meaning; third, he refutes the previous views; and fourth, he reveals the differences. This is the first step. Distraction has its own nature. The treatise says it is a division of the three dharmas, which is an outflow of these three dharmas, spoken of according to their characteristics. This is the general gathering, the conclusion of the division of delusion. Just as shamelessness (ahrikya) and lack of embarrassment (anapatrapya) are also said to be a division of the three dharmas in the Abhidharma. The Great Treatise also says it is truly existent.

Above, he cites and gathers the texts, refuting the statements of the second and first teachers. Below, he reveals the correct meaning and refutes the previous views.

Treatise: The distinct characteristic of distraction is agitation, which obstructs samadhi (samadhi).

Commentary: Agitation is the distinct characteristic of distraction. 'Agitation' refers to scattering, and 'disturbance' refers to confusion. It causes co-arisen dharmas to wander. Wandering is not its own nature but is a common characteristic of other afflictions. Refuting the previous view, he says that since it is said to specifically obstruct dhyana, it is truly existent. Otherwise, it should be said to universally obstruct other (wholesome dharmas).

Treatise: What is the difference between the functions of excitement (auddhatya) and distraction?

Commentary: Below, he reveals the differences. Here, the question is what is the difference between the functions of excitement and distraction.

Treatise: The former makes it easy to understand (the object), the latter makes it easy to grasp (the object).

Commentary: Below is the treatise master's answer. Excitement lifts up the mind. Even if the object is the same, it makes the understanding and number of co-arisen mental factors easily change, that is, one object has multiple understandings. The function of distraction is to make the mind easily grasp different objects, that is, one mind easily grasps multiple objects.

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問如五識等一念染心如何說易。

論。雖一剎那至有易義故。

述曰。雖一念中解．緣二法。雖無俱易義。而多念相續有易解．緣義故。一剎那中雖有此二行相難知。故以相續顯其行相。若唯一念隱故不說。

若爾即一切染心中掉力皆應易解。亂力應恒易緣何故不爾。若一境一心解．緣不易。所有染心應無此二。如愛味定等。所緣．行解俱無改易。無此二故。

論。染污心時至俱遍染心。

述曰。答此問云。染污心時由此二力常應唸唸易解易緣。俱生念定等力增故。制持此二如系猿猴。俱生染心有暫時住專注一境。掉亂力微體非無也　如掉亂增時。念．定等法行相劣故。互有增微。故此二法如諸論說俱遍染心。

論。云何不正知至多所毀犯故。

述曰。非迷於境而闇鈍也。但是錯謬邪解名不正知。不正知多發業。多起惡身．語業。而多犯戒等。顯揚．對法。五蘊皆同。

論。有義不正知至相應慧故。

述曰。第一師。以對法說是諸煩惱相應慧故。

論。有義不正知至名不正知。

述曰。此第二師。癡一分攝。五十五說是癡分故。名俱慧者令知不正名不正知。此上二師互相會文。皆是等流隨所執為定。然易解故。不繁一一。皆應準前。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：如果像五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）等一念染心，為什麼說容易改變？

論：即使只是一剎那，也有改變的意義。

述曰：即使在一念之中，有理解和緣取兩種作用。雖然沒有同時改變的意義，但由於多個念頭相續不斷，有容易理解和緣取的意義。在一剎那中，雖然這兩種行相難以察覺，所以用相續來顯示其行相。如果只有一念，因為隱蔽而不說。

如果這樣，那麼一切染心中，掉舉的力量都應該容易理解，散亂的力量應該總是容易緣取，為什麼不是這樣呢？如果一個境界，一個心，理解和緣取不容易改變，那麼所有的染心都應該沒有這兩種作用，就像愛味定等，所緣和行解都沒有改變，因為沒有這兩種作用。

論：在染污心的時候，掉舉和散亂兩種力量同時普遍存在於染心中。

述曰：回答這個問題說，染污心的時候，由於這兩種力量，常常應該唸唸容易理解和容易緣取。因為與生俱來的念和定等力量增強，所以控制這兩種力量，就像繫住猿猴一樣。與生俱來的染心有暫時停留，專注一個境界。掉舉和散亂的力量微弱，但本體並非沒有。就像掉舉和散亂增強的時候，念、定等法的行相減弱一樣。互相有增強和減弱。所以這兩種法，就像各種論典所說，同時普遍存在於染心中。

論：什麼是不正知？導致很多毀犯。

述曰：不是迷惑于境界而愚昧遲鈍，而是錯誤謬誤的邪見，叫做不正知。不正知容易引發行為，容易產生惡的身語行為，容易觸犯戒律等。《顯揚》、《對法》和《五蘊》都相同。

論：有的人認為，不正知是與煩惱相應的智慧。

述曰：第一位論師，根據《對法》的說法，認為不正知是與各種煩惱相應的智慧。

論：有的人認為，不正知是癡的一部分，所以叫做不正知。

述曰：這是第二位論師的觀點，認為不正知是癡（moha）的一部分。《五十五》中說是不癡的一部分，所以叫做俱慧，使人知道什麼是正，什麼是不正，所以叫做不正知。以上兩位論師互相會通文義，都是等流果，隨各自所執持的觀點而定。然而因為容易理解，所以不一一繁瑣解釋，都應該按照前面的方式來理解。

【English Translation】 English version Question: If a single moment of defiled mind, such as the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness), is so easily changed, how can this be explained?

Treatise: Even in a single kshana (moment), there is the meaning of change.

Commentary: Even within a single thought, there are two functions: understanding and grasping. Although there is no meaning of simultaneous change, because multiple thoughts continue in succession, there is the meaning of easily understanding and grasping. Within a single kshana, although these two characteristics are difficult to perceive, the succession reveals their characteristics. If there is only one thought, it is not discussed because it is hidden.

If that's the case, then in all defiled minds, the power of agitation (uddhacca) should be easily understood, and the power of distraction (vikshepa) should always be easily grasped. Why isn't it so? If one object and one mind are not easily changed in understanding and grasping, then all defiled minds should lack these two functions, like the samadhi of savoring pleasure, where the object and the understanding are not altered, because these two functions are absent.

Treatise: At the time of a defiled mind, both agitation and distraction are simultaneously pervasive in the defiled mind.

Commentary: Answering this question, it is said that at the time of a defiled mind, due to these two powers, one should constantly and easily understand and grasp in every moment. Because the power of innate mindfulness (smriti) and concentration (samadhi) increases, it controls these two powers, like tethering a monkey. Innate defiled mind has temporary dwelling, focusing on one object. The power of agitation and distraction is weak, but the essence is not absent. Just as when agitation and distraction increase, the characteristics of mindfulness, concentration, and other dharmas weaken. There is mutual increase and decrease. Therefore, these two dharmas, as the various treatises say, are simultaneously pervasive in the defiled mind.

Treatise: What is incorrect knowing (ayoniśo manasikāra)? It leads to many transgressions.

Commentary: It is not being deluded by the object and being dull, but rather a mistaken and erroneous wrong view is called incorrect knowing. Incorrect knowing easily initiates actions, easily generates evil bodily and verbal actions, and easily violates precepts. The Vyākaraṇa, Abhidharma, and Five Skandhas are all the same.

Treatise: Some argue that incorrect knowing is the wisdom associated with afflictions.

Commentary: The first teacher, according to the Abhidharma, argues that incorrect knowing is the wisdom associated with various afflictions.

Treatise: Some argue that incorrect knowing is a part of ignorance (moha), so it is called incorrect knowing.

Commentary: This is the view of the second teacher, who believes that incorrect knowing is a part of ignorance. The Fifty-five says it is a part of non-ignorance, so it is called kuhu (associated wisdom), making people know what is correct and what is incorrect, so it is called incorrect knowing. The above two teachers reconcile the meaning of the text, and both are nisyanda-phala (result of outflow), depending on each person's held view. However, because it is easy to understand, it is not explained in detail one by one, and it should all be understood according to the previous method.

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論。有義不正知至遍染心故。

述曰。此第三師。以二為體。二謂如前所引教故。五十五．八說遍染心。說不遍者有別義故。如前頻會。

論。與並及言至隨煩惱故。

述曰。自下第四釋前頌言誑諂與害憍。無慚及無愧等。與．並．及言顯隨煩惱二十外有。如法蘊解雜事經中。有多隨煩惱。同大論八十八卷．五十八卷亦引此經。然舊人不知。謂是雜藏。或謂毗奈耶中所說雜蘊。

論。隨煩惱名至非煩惱攝故。

述曰。自下第五解隨惑名通局。八十八貪等亦名隨煩惱。對法第七亦有此義。煩惱皆隨。隨非煩惱。如彼法蘊足等廣解。謂忿等及六十二說。趣向前行等是煩惱同類。染污法但名為隨。煩惱等流故。不名煩惱非根本故。

既有多種皆名為隨。何故此中唯說二十。

論。唯說二十至唯染粗故。

述曰。自下第六釋其廢立。謂有三義。貪等雖是隨。此中二十非煩惱故不說貪等。邪欲等法亦雖是隨。是別境法體通三性。此唯染故故不說彼。然失念等是癡分故說之。不爲念分故說也。以有癡分念攝在中無不定過。趣向前行等亦雖是隨。行相細故。此相但粗。是故具此三義。一非煩惱。二唯染。三粗故。唯說二十更不說余。

論。此余染法至如理應知。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：因為有義不正知導致遍染心（指心被普遍染污）的緣故。

述曰：這是第三位論師的觀點，以二者為本體。二者指的是前面引用的教義。第五十五卷和第八卷說的是遍染心，說不遍染心是因為有別的意義。如同前面多次提到的。

論：『與』、『並』、『及』等詞，是爲了說明誑、諂、與害、憍、無慚、及無愧等都是隨煩惱。

述曰：下面第四部分解釋前面頌文中的『誑、諂、與害、憍、無慚、及無愧』等。『與』、『並』、『及』等詞語是爲了表明，除了二十種隨煩惱之外，還有其他的隨煩惱。如同《法蘊解雜事經》中所說，有很多隨煩惱。與《大毗婆沙論》第八十八卷和第五十八卷也引用了這部經。然而舊時的學者不瞭解，認為是雜藏，或者認為是《毗奈耶》（Vinaya，戒律）中所說的雜蘊。

論：隨煩惱的名稱，是因為它們不是煩惱所攝。

述曰：下面第五部分解釋隨煩惱名稱的通用性和侷限性。《大毗婆沙論》第八十八卷中，貪等也被稱為隨煩惱。《對法論》第七卷也有這個意思。煩惱都是隨煩惱，但隨煩惱不一定是煩惱。如同《法蘊足論》等廣泛解釋的那樣，忿等以及六十二種說法，趣向前行等是與煩惱同類的染污法，但僅僅被稱為『隨』，因為它們是煩惱的等流，不是根本煩惱。

既然有多種都被稱為『隨』，為什麼這裡只說二十種？

論：只說二十種，是因為它們是唯一的染污且粗顯的。

述曰：下面第六部分解釋設立和廢除的原因。有三種原因：貪等雖然是『隨』，但這裡說的二十種不是煩惱，所以不說貪等。邪欲等法雖然也是『隨』，但它們是別境法，本體通於三性（善、惡、無記），這裡只說染污的，所以不說它們。然而，失念等是癡的一部分，所以說了它們，不是因為它們是念的一部分。因為有癡的部分包含在念中，所以沒有不確定的過失。趣向前行等雖然也是『隨』，但它們的行相很細微，這裡只說粗顯的。因此，具備這三種條件：一，不是煩惱；二，唯一染污；三，粗顯。所以只說這二十種，不再說其他的。

論：其餘的染污法，應當如理如實地瞭解。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: Because of the unrighteous and incorrect knowledge leading to the pervasively defiled mind (referring to the mind being universally tainted).

Commentary: This is the view of the third teacher, taking two aspects as its essence. The two aspects refer to the teachings quoted earlier. Volumes 55 and 8 speak of the pervasively defiled mind, while those that do not speak of pervasive defilement do so because they have different meanings, as mentioned in previous frequent gatherings.

Treatise: The words 'with,' 'and,' 'together with' are to indicate that deceit, flattery, harm, arrogance, shamelessness, and lack of embarrassment are all secondary afflictions (隨煩惱, suí fánnǎo).

Commentary: The fourth part below explains 'deceit, flattery, harm, arrogance, shamelessness, and lack of embarrassment' from the preceding verse. The words 'with,' 'and,' 'together with' are to indicate that in addition to the twenty secondary afflictions, there are others. As stated in the Dharma Skandha Miscellaneous Affairs Sutra, there are many secondary afflictions. The Mahavibhasa (大毗婆沙論, Dà Pí Póshā Lùn) in volumes 88 and 58 also quotes this sutra. However, earlier scholars did not understand this, considering it to be the miscellaneous collection (雜藏, zázàng), or the miscellaneous aggregates (雜蘊, záyùn) mentioned in the Vinaya (毗奈耶, Pí Nài Yé, discipline).

Treatise: The name 'secondary afflictions' is because they are not included within the afflictions.

Commentary: The fifth part below explains the generality and limitations of the name 'secondary afflictions.' In volume 88 of the Mahavibhasa, greed and so on are also called secondary afflictions. The seventh volume of the Abhidharma (對法論, Duì Fǎ Lùn) also has this meaning. All afflictions are secondary afflictions, but secondary afflictions are not necessarily afflictions. As explained extensively in the Dharma Skandha Foot Treatise and others, anger and the sixty-two views, the tendency to move forward, etc., are defiled dharmas of the same kind as afflictions, but are only called 'secondary' because they are outflows of afflictions, not fundamental afflictions.

Since there are many that are called 'secondary,' why are only twenty mentioned here?

Treatise: Only twenty are mentioned because they are the only defiled and coarse ones.

Commentary: The sixth part below explains the reasons for establishing and abolishing. There are three reasons: although greed and so on are 'secondary,' the twenty mentioned here are not afflictions, so greed and so on are not mentioned. Although evil desires and other dharmas are also 'secondary,' they are objects of specific attention (別境法, biéjìng fǎ), and their essence encompasses the three natures (善, shàn, good; 惡, è, evil; 無記, wújì, neutral), but here only defiled ones are mentioned, so they are not mentioned. However, forgetfulness and so on are part of ignorance (癡, chī), so they are mentioned, not because they are part of mindfulness. Because the part of ignorance is included in mindfulness, there is no fault of uncertainty. Although the tendency to move forward and so on are also 'secondary,' their characteristics are subtle, while here only coarse ones are mentioned. Therefore, possessing these three conditions: first, not afflictions; second, only defiled; third, coarse. Therefore, only these twenty are mentioned, and no others are mentioned.

Treatise: The remaining defiled dharmas should be understood as they truly are.

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述曰。然此二十外余染污法。如邪欲等是此等流。等流者。是同類義。或此分位。體不離此。於此不信等實法上。假立所餘假法。又諸假法。于無慚等有體法上假立名此分位。分位差別故。或此等流。謂身．語業亦名隨煩惱。是此等流。諸隨煩惱所等起故。皆此所說二十中攝。隨其類別如理應知。勘八十八一一此攝。即是此中不說大論邪欲等法之所以也。

論。如是二十至如前應知。

述曰。自下第二諸門分別。諸門分別中。別以十三門分別。第一假實分別。此忿等小十大中忘念．放逸．不正知此無異諍。對法第一云當知忿等皆是假有。此雖總言各別之中有實假者。又隨他相總名假有。如此等十三。他少分故名假。如餘七法無慚．無愧．不信．懈怠定是實有。隨他相說亦名為假。前之十三假。后之四種實。教理成故。五十五說無慚等四實物有故。凡世俗者亦有是假有。對勝義為言但言世俗。而體實有。此等言世俗。對勝義為論。以隨他相而體非假。掉．惛．亂三。有義是假。有義是實。如前說故今取實者為勝。上雖一一別明。未總顯二十中幾假實故。今總辨之。

論。二十皆通至勢力起故。

述曰。此第二俱生分別門。此依正義。下斷門中有說唯修。今不依彼。彼不正故。一一皆通二。隨

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述評：這二十種之外的其餘染污法，如邪欲等，是這些煩惱的『等流』。『等流』的意思是『同類』。或者說，這些煩惱的分位（狀態），其本體不離開這些煩惱。對於不信等真實存在的法，假立其餘虛假的法。又各種虛假的法，對於無慚等有實體的法，假立名稱，稱作這些煩惱的『分位』，因為分位有差別。或者說，這些煩惱的『等流』，指身、語業，也可以稱為隨煩惱，因為它們是隨這些煩惱而生起的。這些都包含在前面所說的二十種煩惱之中，應根據它們的類別如理了解。考察八十八種隨煩惱，它們都包含在這二十種之中。這就是《大論》中沒有單獨說明邪欲等法的原因。

正文：如是二十至如前應知。

窺基法師述評：下面第二部分是諸門分別，用十三種門來分別。第一是假實分別。這忿等小十大煩惱中，忘念、放逸、不正知這三者沒有異議。對法論第一卷說，應當知道忿等都是假有。這裡雖然總的說，但在各個別項中，有的是實有，有的是假有。又因為隨順他相，所以總稱為假有。像這十三種煩惱，因為它們所佔的成分少，所以稱為假。像其餘七種法，無慚、無愧、不信、懈怠，肯定是實有。隨順他相來說，也可以稱為假。前面的十三種是假，後面的四種是實，因為教理成立。五蘊論中說無慚等四種是實物存在。凡是世俗諦中的法，也有是假有的。相對於勝義諦來說，才說是世俗。而它們的本體是真實存在的。這裡說『世俗』，是相對於勝義諦來說的，因為它們隨順他相，但本體不是假的。掉舉、昏沉、散亂這三種，有的說法是假，有的說法是實，如前面所說，現在取實有為勝。上面雖然一一分別說明，但沒有總的顯示這二十種煩惱中，哪些是假，哪些是實，所以現在總的辨別一下。

正文：二十皆通至勢力起故。

窺基法師述評：這是第二種俱生分別門。這裡依據正義。在斷門中，有的說法是唯修所斷，現在不依據那種說法，因為那種說法不正確。這二十種煩惱，每一種都通於二種。

【English Translation】 English version: Commentary by Kuiji: These remaining defilements beyond these twenty, such as wrong desire, are the 'equal flow' of these afflictions. 'Equal flow' means 'of the same kind.' Or, the division (state) of these afflictions, their substance does not depart from these afflictions. Upon the real dharmas such as disbelief, false dharmas are falsely established. Also, various false dharmas, upon the substantial dharmas such as shamelessness, falsely establish names, called the 'divisions' of these afflictions, because the divisions are different. Or, the 'equal flow' of these afflictions refers to actions of body and speech, which can also be called secondary afflictions, because they arise following these afflictions. These are all included in the twenty afflictions mentioned earlier, and should be understood according to their categories as appropriate. Examining the eighty-eight secondary afflictions, they are all included in these twenty. This is why the Treatise does not separately explain dharmas such as wrong desire.

Text: These twenty, up to as previously known.

Commentary by Kuiji: The second part below is the differentiation of the doors, differentiating with thirteen doors. The first is the differentiation of false and real. Among the ten minor afflictions such as anger, there is no dispute regarding forgetfulness, laxity, and non-correct knowledge. The first volume of the Abhidharma says that it should be known that anger and the like are all falsely existent. Although it is said generally here, among the individual items, some are real and some are false. Also, because they follow other aspects, they are generally called falsely existent. Like these thirteen afflictions, because they occupy a small component, they are called false. Like the remaining seven dharmas, shamelessness, lack of shame, disbelief, and laziness, are definitely real. Speaking according to following other aspects, they can also be called false. The previous thirteen are false, and the latter four are real, because the teachings and reasoning are established. The Treatise on the Aggregates says that the four, such as shamelessness, are real substances. All dharmas in the conventional truth also have false existence. Relative to the ultimate truth, it is said to be conventional. And their substance is truly existent. Saying 'conventional' here is relative to the ultimate truth, because they follow other aspects, but their substance is not false. Agitation, torpor, and distraction, some say are false, and some say are real, as mentioned earlier, and now taking the real as superior. Although each was explained separately above, it was not generally shown which of these twenty afflictions are false and which are real, so now let's generally distinguish them.

Text: All twenty pervade up to arising from power.

Commentary by Kuiji: This is the second door of co-arising differentiation. This is based on the correct meaning. In the door of cutting off, some say that it is only cut off by cultivation, but now we do not rely on that saying, because that saying is incorrect. Each of these twenty afflictions pervades both.

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二惑起故。見等之後貪等之上。亦假立彼忿等十法故。至下當知。

論。此二十中至各為主故。

述曰。第三自相應門。小十忿等自各相望定不俱起。體性相違故。何故爾者。以行相粗猛。非如根本細和。一一各各為主故不併生。五十五．及五十八皆云忿等十法互不俱故。正與此同。

論。中二一切至皆容俱起。

述曰。無慚等中二。遍一切不善心俱。但不善心皆有故。對法第六．五十五．及五十八皆同於此相如前說。故知得與小．大並生。皆通不善故。義引五十八。說大八掉舉等遍諸染污心。展轉自相望。及與小．中十二。皆容俱起。不相違故。前第四卷說有四師。第四師為正。忘念．不正知是癡分故。散亂別有性故。餘者極成。故八遍也。此中但有後師正義。

論。有處說六至不俱起故。

述曰。若八遍染。何故五十五說不遍染耶。彼除惛．掉者。此二行相增時不俱起故。必一增一劣。如薩婆多尋．伺二法　問尋．伺行粗細。不許一心俱。惛．掉相下高。應非一心並　答別體下高互增。劣惛．掉得俱生。無體粗細不互然故。非一心並。俱增行相惛．掉相違。增．不增時體無乖返　問尋．伺相粗細。粗．細何則定。惛．掉相高．下。高．下增．不增　答彼無別體假立故然。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 由於兩種迷惑（二惑）生起的原因。在『見』等煩惱之後，『貪』等煩惱之上。也假立了『忿』（krodha，憤怒）等十種法，這一點在下文將會知曉。

論：這二十種法中，各自為主。

述記：第三是自相應門。小的十種『忿』等法，各自相對，必定不會同時生起。因為它們的體性相互違背。為什麼會這樣呢？因為它們的行相粗猛，不像根本煩惱那樣細微調和。每一種各自為主，所以不會同時產生。《對法論》第五十五卷和第五十八卷都說『忿』等十法互相不俱生，與此相同。

論：中間的兩種法，一切都容許同時生起。

述記：『無慚』（ahrikya，無慚）等中間的兩種法，遍於一切不善心同時生起。但是不善心並非都有這兩種法。對法第六卷、第五十五卷和第五十八卷都與此相同，如前所述。所以知道它們可以與小的、大的煩惱同時生起，因為都通於不善。義理上可以引用第五十八卷，說大的八種法，如『掉舉』（auddhatya，掉舉）等，遍於各種染污心。輾轉互相望，以及與小的、中間的十二種法，都容許同時生起，因為不相違背。前面第四卷說有四種師的觀點，第四種師的觀點是正確的。『忘念』（musitasmrtita，失念）、『不正知』（asamprajanya，不正知）是『癡』（moha，愚癡）的一部分，所以『散亂』（viksepa，散亂）有單獨的體性。其餘的都已極度成立，所以八種法是遍的。這裡只有后一種師的正確觀點。

論：有的地方說六種法不會同時生起。

述記：如果八種法是遍染污的，為什麼第五十五卷說不遍染污呢？因為那裡排除了『惛沉』（styana，昏沉）和『掉舉』（auddhatya，掉舉）。這兩種法的行相增強時不會同時生起，必定是一種增強，一種減弱。就像薩婆多宗的『尋』（vitarka，尋）和『伺』（vicara，伺）兩種法一樣。問：『尋』和『伺』的行相有粗細之分，不允許一心同時具有。『惛沉』和『掉舉』有上下之分，應該不能一心並存。答：別體的上下可以互相增強或減弱，『惛沉』和『掉舉』可以同時生起。沒有體性的粗細不能互相影響，所以不能一心並存。同時增強行相時，『惛沉』和『掉舉』相互違背。增強或不增強時，體性沒有乖離。問：『尋』和『伺』的行相有粗細之分，粗和細如何確定？『惛沉』和『掉舉』有上下之分，上下是增強還是不增強？答：它們沒有單獨的體性，是假立的，所以如此。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of the arising of two kinds of delusion (二惑). After 'views' (見) and before 'greed' (貪) etc., also hypothetically establishing the ten dharmas such as 'wrath' (krodha, 忿), which will be known below.

Treatise: Among these twenty, each is the main one.

Commentary: The third is the self-corresponding aspect. The small ten dharmas such as 'wrath' (忿), in relation to each other, will definitely not arise simultaneously because their natures contradict each other. Why is this so? Because their characteristics are coarse and fierce, unlike the subtle and harmonious fundamental afflictions. Each one is the main one, so they do not arise together. The Abhidharma-kosa, volumes 55 and 58, both say that the ten dharmas such as 'wrath' do not occur together, which is the same as this.

Treatise: The middle two, everything is allowed to arise simultaneously.

Commentary: The middle two, such as 'shamelessness' (ahrikya, 無慚), pervade all unwholesome minds simultaneously. However, not all unwholesome minds have these two dharmas. The Abhidharma-kosa, volumes 6, 55, and 58, are all the same as this, as mentioned before. Therefore, it is known that they can arise simultaneously with small and large afflictions because they all connect to unwholesomeness. In terms of meaning, volume 58 can be cited, which says that the large eight dharmas, such as 'restlessness' (auddhatya, 掉舉), pervade all defiled minds. In relation to each other, and with the small and middle twelve dharmas, they are all allowed to arise simultaneously because they do not contradict each other. In the fourth volume, it was said that there are four teachers' views, and the fourth teacher's view is correct. 'Forgetfulness' (musitasmrtita, 忘念) and 'non-awareness' (asamprajanya, 不正知) are part of 'ignorance' (moha, 癡), so 'distraction' (viksepa, 散亂) has a separate nature. The rest are extremely established, so the eight dharmas are pervasive. Here, there is only the correct view of the latter teacher.

Treatise: In some places, it is said that the six dharmas do not arise simultaneously.

Commentary: If the eight dharmas are pervasive in defilement, why does volume 55 say that they are not pervasive in defilement? Because it excludes 'lethargy' (styana, 惛沉) and 'restlessness' (auddhatya, 掉舉). When the characteristics of these two dharmas increase, they do not arise simultaneously; one must increase and one must weaken. Just like the two dharmas of 'initial application of thought' (vitarka, 尋) and 'sustained application of thought' (vicara, 伺) in the Sarvastivada school. Question: 'Initial application of thought' and 'sustained application of thought' have coarse and subtle characteristics, and it is not allowed for one mind to have both simultaneously. 'Lethargy' and 'restlessness' have low and high characteristics, so they should not coexist in one mind. Answer: The low and high of separate entities can enhance or weaken each other; 'lethargy' and 'restlessness' can arise simultaneously. The coarseness and subtlety without substance cannot affect each other, so they cannot coexist in one mind. When the characteristics are enhanced simultaneously, 'lethargy' and 'restlessness' contradict each other. When enhancing or not enhancing, the nature is not contrary. Question: 'Initial application of thought' and 'sustained application of thought' have coarse and subtle characteristics; how is the coarse and subtle determined? 'Lethargy' and 'restlessness' have high and low characteristics; is the high and low enhancing or not enhancing? Answer: They do not have separate entities; they are hypothetically established, so it is like that.

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有別體實故得爾　問貪．瞋應爾。亦有增．不增　答不爾。法性定故。掉等體遍。行相增劣。非如尋．伺體是不遍。不可為例。即惛．掉行相俱增時不俱生。非彼二體不俱生也。

論。有處但說至違唯善故。

述曰。對法六中說五遍者。謂不信．懈怠．惛沈．掉舉．放逸五法。以此五法違唯善法。惛障輕安。舉障于舍余文可知。非如忘念等許違三性。念等雖有癡分違無癡者。以有非癡分故不說之。以彼所違雖善正念。念通三性故。非如善法中法故不為例。

論。此唯染故至五識容有。

述曰。第四諸識俱門。八．七．六識可知。八如第三卷說。七如第五卷說。取癡分念等。舍念分念等。忿等小十行相粗而且猛。五識望彼即細故不俱。中二。大八。五識容有。遍不善．染故。

論。由斯中大五受相應。

述曰。第五受俱門。遍行之中餘四。義定不說之也。由遍於不善等故。說中及大遍五受俱。五受皆通不善．染故。

論。有義小十至四俱除苦。

述曰。此第一師。除諂．誑．憍余忿等七。唯喜．憂．舍三受俱起。非通上界。無意樂故。不在五識。欲界不通苦樂。地獄之中意無苦故。通歡戚行亦有喜故。諂．誑．憍三四受俱除苦。色界樂俱故。以初靜慮有意樂故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『有別體的實法，所以才這樣說。』問：『貪（Tanha，渴愛），瞋（Dosa，嗔恨）也應該這樣嗎？也有增長和不增長的情況嗎？』答：『不是這樣的。因為法性（Dhammata，事物本性）是恒定的。掉舉（Uddhacca，躁動）等的體性是周遍的，只是行相有強弱之分。不像尋（Vitakka，粗略的思考）、伺（Vicara，細緻的思考）的體性是不周遍的，不能作為例子。』即使是惛沉（Thina，昏沉）和掉舉的行相都增長時，也不是同時生起，但不能因此說它們的體性不是同時生起的。

論：『有些地方只說到違背，是因為唯有善法才這樣。』

述曰：對法藏論第六卷中說到五遍行，指的是不信（Assaddha，不信任）、懈怠（Kossajja，懶惰）、惛沉、掉舉、放逸（Pamada，放縱）這五種法。因為這五種法只違背善法。惛沉障礙輕安（Passaddhi，身心輕安），掉舉障礙舍（Upekkha，舍受），其餘的文句可以類推得知。不像忘念等，允許違背三性（善、惡、無記）。念等雖然有癡（Moha，愚癡）的部分，違背無癡，但因為也有非癡的部分，所以不這樣說。因為它們所違背的雖然是善的正念（Samma-sati，正念），但念本身通於三性，所以不像善法中的法那樣，不能作為例子。

論：『這些唯有染污法才有，乃至五識也有可能存在。』

述曰：第四個是關於諸識（Vinnana，意識）的俱生之門。第八識、第七識、第六識的情況可以類推得知。第八識的情況如第三卷所說，第七識的情況如第五卷所說。取癡的部分的念等，捨棄唸的部分的念等。忿（Kodha，憤怒）等小隨煩惱（Upa-kilesa，小煩惱）的十種，行相粗猛。五識相對於它們來說就顯得細微，所以不會同時生起。中隨煩惱二種，大隨煩惱八種，五識有可能存在。因為它們周遍于不善和染污法。

論：『因此，中隨煩惱和大隨煩惱與五受相應。』

述曰：第五個是受（Vedana，感受）的俱生之門。遍行中的其餘四種，根據意義可以確定，所以沒有說到。因為它們周遍于不善等，所以說中隨煩惱和大隨煩惱周遍於五受。五受都通於不善和染污法。

論：『有一種觀點認為，小隨煩惱十種中，除了諂（Maya，虛偽）、誑（Satheyya，欺騙）、憍（Mada，驕慢）之外，其餘的忿等七種，只有喜（Somanassa，喜受）、憂（Dukkha，苦受）、舍（Upekkha，舍受）三種受同時生起。不通於上界，因為沒有意樂（Adhimokkha，勝解）。不在五識中。欲界不通於苦受和樂受。地獄之中，意無苦受，通於歡戚的行相，也有喜受。諂、誑、憍這三種與四受俱生，除了苦受。因為有樂受的緣故。因為初禪有意的快樂。』

【English Translation】 English version 'It is because there are separate entities that it is said so.' Question: 'Should greed (Tanha, craving) and hatred (Dosa, aversion) also be like that? Are there also increases and non-increases?' Answer: 'It is not like that. Because the nature of phenomena (Dhammata, the nature of things) is constant. The nature of restlessness (Uddhacca, agitation) and others is pervasive, only the characteristics have strengths and weaknesses. Unlike initial thought (Vitakka, gross thought) and sustained thought (Vicara, subtle thought), whose nature is not pervasive, they cannot be taken as examples.' Even when the characteristics of both dullness (Thina, torpor) and restlessness increase, they do not arise simultaneously, but one cannot therefore say that their natures do not arise simultaneously.

Treatise: 'In some places, it is only said to be contrary because only wholesome dharmas are like this.'

Commentary: In the sixth volume of the Abhidharma, it is said that the five pervasives refer to the five dharmas of non-belief (Assaddha, lack of trust), laziness (Kossajja, idleness), dullness, restlessness, and carelessness (Pamada, heedlessness). Because these five dharmas only contradict wholesome dharmas. Dullness obstructs tranquility (Passaddhi, serenity), restlessness obstructs equanimity (Upekkha, equanimity), and the rest of the sentences can be inferred. Unlike forgetfulness and others, which are allowed to contradict the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral). Although mindfulness and others have a part of ignorance (Moha, delusion) that contradicts non-ignorance, they are not said to do so because they also have a non-ignorant part. Because what they contradict is wholesome right mindfulness (Samma-sati, right mindfulness), but mindfulness itself is common to the three natures, so it cannot be taken as an example like dharmas in wholesome dharmas.

Treatise: 'These only exist in defiled dharmas, and even the five consciousnesses may have them.'

Commentary: The fourth is about the gate of co-arising of the consciousnesses (Vinnana, consciousness). The situations of the eighth, seventh, and sixth consciousnesses can be inferred. The situation of the eighth consciousness is as described in the third volume, and the situation of the seventh consciousness is as described in the fifth volume. Taking mindfulness and others that are part of ignorance, abandoning mindfulness and others that are part of mindfulness. Anger (Kodha, wrath) and the other ten minor defilements (Upa-kilesa, minor afflictions) have coarse and fierce characteristics. The five consciousnesses appear subtle compared to them, so they do not arise simultaneously. The two secondary defilements and the eight major defilements may exist in the five consciousnesses. Because they pervade unwholesome and defiled dharmas.

Treatise: 'Therefore, the secondary and major defilements are associated with the five feelings.'

Commentary: The fifth is the gate of co-arising of feelings (Vedana, feeling). The remaining four of the pervasive ones can be determined according to their meaning, so they are not mentioned. Because they pervade unwholesome and others, it is said that the secondary and major defilements pervade the five feelings. The five feelings are all common to unwholesome and defiled dharmas.

Treatise: 'One view is that among the ten minor defilements, except for deceit (Maya, hypocrisy), deception (Satheyya, dishonesty), and conceit (Mada, pride), the remaining seven, such as anger, only arise simultaneously with the three feelings of joy (Somanassa, joy), sorrow (Dukkha, sorrow), and equanimity (Upekkha, equanimity). They do not extend to the upper realms because there is no intention (Adhimokkha, resolution). They are not in the five consciousnesses. The desire realm does not extend to painful and pleasant feelings. In hell, there is no painful feeling in the mind, and there are aspects of joy and grief, and there is also joy. Deceit, deception, and conceit arise simultaneously with the four feelings, except for painful feeling. Because there is pleasant feeling. Because the first dhyana has mental pleasure.'

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論。有義忿等至前已說故。

述曰。此第二師。七唯欲界系者。四受俱除樂。欲界意無樂故。諂．誑．憍三五受俱起。此增苦者。意有苦受故。如前數說。

此受相應之行相者。

論。此受俱相如煩惱說。

述曰。問忿等如何與喜俱。慳等如何與憂並。此如前根本煩惱中說。

論。實義如是至亦如實義。

述曰。此上所說約審細義。隨粗相者。一行相順多分起故。二隨小乘相。忿等五法唯憂．及舍俱。彼瞋分故。此戚行故。覆．慳喜舍俱。彼貪癡分。此欣行故。余諂．誑．憍三更增樂受。上地有故。除苦．憂二。唯欣行故。中．大隨粗。亦如此前自實義說。以通違順二行相故。

論。如是二十至不相違故。

述曰。第六別境相應門。皆得俱起。行相不相違故。

此總解訖。下逐難問答。問忘念云何與念俱。惡慧云何與慧俱。

論。染念染惠至亦得相應故。

述曰。此中忘唸唸為體者。不與別境中念俱。通癡分者。故得相應。惠準此知。亦有癡分故。此二合說故。言染念慧等。

問忿緣現在。念緣曾習。云何此二說得俱生。

論。念亦緣現至亦得相應。

述曰。念緣曾習。亦緣現在之境。有是過去曾習之類。故念亦緣現在

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：關於義忿等，之前已經說過了。

述記：這是第二位論師的觀點。七個（隨煩惱）只有欲界所繫縛，因為四種受中排除了樂受，這是因為欲界意地沒有樂受的緣故。諂、誑、憍三種（隨煩惱）與五種受都可能同時生起。這些增加痛苦，是因為意地有苦受的緣故。如同前面所說的。

這些與受相應的心行是怎樣的呢？

論：這些與受同時生起的狀態，如同煩惱所說的那樣。

述記：有人問，忿等如何與喜受同時生起？慳等如何與憂受並存？這些如同前面根本煩惱中所說的那樣。

論：真實的意義是這樣，也如實是這樣。

述記：上面所說的是從審慎細緻的意義上來說的。如果從粗略的相上來說，一種心行順應著，大部分會生起。二是隨順小乘的觀點，忿等五種法只與憂受和舍受同時生起，因為它們是瞋恚的一部分，這是因為它們有戚行的緣故。覆、慳與喜受和舍受同時生起，因為它們是貪和癡的一部分，這是因為它們有欣行的緣故。其餘的諂、誑、憍三種（隨煩惱）會增加樂受，因為上地有樂受的緣故，所以排除了苦受和憂受這兩種。只有欣行。中乘和大乘隨順粗略的相，也如同前面自己真實的意義所說的那樣，因為它們貫通了違背和順應兩種心行。

論：像這樣，二十種（隨煩惱）都能同時生起，因為它們的心行不相違背。

述記：第六個是別境相應門，（五種別境）都能同時生起，因為它們的心行不相違背。

以上是總體的解釋。下面逐一進行提問和回答。有人問，忘念如何與念同時生起？惡慧如何與慧同時生起？

論：染污的念和染污的慧，也能相應生起。

述記：這裡忘念以念為體性，不與別境中的念同時生起，但它通於癡的一部分，所以能夠相應。慧可以參照這個來理解，也有癡的一部分，所以這兩個合在一起說，所以說是染污的念和慧等。

有人問，忿緣于現在，念緣于曾經習過的，為什麼說這二者可以同時生起？

論：念也緣于現在，所以也能相應。

述記：念緣于曾經習過的，也緣于現在的境界，有的是過去曾經習過的同類事物，所以念也緣于現在。

【English Translation】 English version Treatise: Regarding righteous indignation (義忿 - yì fèn) and so on, it has already been discussed before.

Commentary: This is the view of the second teacher. The seven (secondary afflictions) are only bound by the desire realm, because the pleasure feeling is excluded from the four feelings, as the mind in the desire realm does not have pleasure. Flattery (諂 - chǎn), deceit (誑 - kuáng), and arrogance (憍 - jiāo), these three (secondary afflictions) can arise simultaneously with the five feelings. These increase suffering because the mind has painful feelings. As mentioned before.

What are the mental activities that correspond to these feelings?

Treatise: These states arising simultaneously with feelings are as described for afflictions.

Commentary: Someone asks, how can indignation (忿 - fèn) and so on arise simultaneously with joy? How can stinginess (慳 - qiān) and so on coexist with sorrow? These are as described in the fundamental afflictions before.

Treatise: The real meaning is like this, and it is also truly like this.

Commentary: What was said above is from the perspective of careful and detailed meaning. If speaking from a rough aspect, one mental activity arises in accordance with the majority. Secondly, following the view of the Small Vehicle (小乘 - xiǎo chéng), indignation (忿 - fèn) and the other five dharmas only arise simultaneously with sorrow and neutral feeling, because they are part of anger (瞋 - chēn), as they have the characteristic of affliction. Concealment (覆 - fù) and stinginess (慳 - qiān) arise simultaneously with joy and neutral feeling, because they are part of greed (貪 - tān) and ignorance (癡 - chī), as they have the characteristic of delight. The remaining three, flattery (諂 - chǎn), deceit (誑 - kuáng), and arrogance (憍 - jiāo), increase the feeling of pleasure, because the higher realms have pleasure, so painful and sorrowful feelings are excluded. Only the characteristic of delight exists. The Middle and Great Vehicles follow the rough aspect, also as described before in their own real meaning, because they penetrate both opposing and conforming mental activities.

Treatise: Like this, all twenty (secondary afflictions) can arise simultaneously because their mental activities do not contradict each other.

Commentary: The sixth is the object-oriented mental factors (別境 - bié jìng) corresponding gate, (the five object-oriented mental factors) can all arise simultaneously because their mental activities do not contradict each other.

The above is the overall explanation. Below, questions and answers are given one by one. Someone asks, how can forgetfulness (忘念 - wàng niàn) arise simultaneously with mindfulness (念 - niàn)? How can bad wisdom (惡慧 - è huì) arise simultaneously with wisdom (慧 - huì)?

Treatise: Defiled mindfulness and defiled wisdom can also arise correspondingly.

Commentary: Here, forgetfulness has mindfulness as its nature, it does not arise simultaneously with mindfulness in the object-oriented mental factors, but it is connected to a part of ignorance, so it can correspond. Wisdom can be understood by referring to this, it also has a part of ignorance, so these two are spoken of together, so it is said to be defiled mindfulness and wisdom, etc.

Someone asks, indignation is conditioned by the present, mindfulness is conditioned by what has been previously practiced, why is it said that these two can arise simultaneously?

Treatise: Mindfulness is also conditioned by the present, so it can also correspond.

Commentary: Mindfulness is conditioned by what has been previously practiced, and also conditioned by the present realm, some of which are things of the same kind that have been previously practiced, so mindfulness is also conditioned by the present.

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起故得與忿俱。如見舊怨起忿．念法。此以念從忿行。下以忿從念行。念緣過去次前剎那。亦名緣過去。現在一念故。忿緣分位現在。隨事究竟名緣現在。即忿亦緣剎那過去。忿．念二法隨就行相皆得相應。無過失也。

問定專一境。亂取多緣。云何俱起。

論。染定起時至相應無失。

述曰。染定起時既名染故。心亦躁擾不相違故。相應無失。非是散亂定取多緣。以躁擾是亂自相故。

論。中二大八十煩惱俱。

述曰。第七根本相應門。中二．大八十煩惱俱。遍染心故。遍不善故。然俱生者與俱生者俱。俱生者中除身．邊見。不與無慚愧俱。性相違故。余定容俱。

論。小十定非至彼審細故。

述曰。小十行．體性俱粗動。彼見及疑行相審細故。前說瞋．疑及二見一少分俱者。約細行相說。今忿等行粗行相相違。不俱生也。又憎嫉滅．道由疑不決。便憎等俱亦無過失。此約多分。亦不相違。

論。忿等五法至是瞋分故。

述曰。忿．恨．惱．嫉．害。容得慢．癡二法俱。非貪．恚二並。與貪行定相違故。瞋是忿等自體相故。由此證知。不共無明分位忘念．不正知。不遍此心。即癡分故。此義應思。不言不共無明定得與俱。但言與十俱。即此無明時。或有惠

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為這個原因，忿（krodha，憤怒）才能和（其他煩惱）一起生起。比如見到以前的仇人而生起憤怒，這是念（smṛti，憶念）的作用。這是因爲念跟隨忿而生起。下面要說的是忿跟隨念而生起。念所緣的是過去，是前一剎那，也可以說是緣於過去。因為現在只有一念。忿所緣的是分位現在，隨著事情的究竟而名為緣于現在。即使是忿，也緣于剎那過去。忿和念這兩種法，隨著它們各自的行相，都可以相應，沒有過失。

問：禪定是專注於一個境界，散亂則取多個所緣，怎麼能同時生起呢？

論：染污的禪定生起時，達到相應也沒有過失。

述曰：染污的禪定生起時，既然名為染污，心也是躁動不安的，所以不相違背。相應沒有過失。這不是散亂，禪定只取一個所緣。因為躁動不安是散亂的自相。

論：中品二種、大品八十種煩惱可以一起生起。

述曰：第七根本相應門中，中品二種、大品八十種煩惱可以一起生起。因為它們普遍染污心，普遍是不善的。然而，俱生者和俱生者一起生起。在俱生者中，除了身見（satkāya-dṛṣṭi，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）和邊見（antagrahadṛṣṭi，執斷或執常的極端見解），不和無慚（āhrīkya，不知羞恥）和無愧（anapatrāpya，不知慚愧）一起生起，因為它們的體性相違背。其餘的（煩惱）可以一起生起。

論：小品十種（煩惱）一定不能（和見、疑）一起生起，因為見和疑審察細微。

述曰：小品十種（煩惱）的行相和體性都粗猛躁動。而見（dṛṣṭi，邪見）和疑（vicikitsā，懷疑）的行相審察細微。前面說瞋（dveṣa，嗔恨）、疑以及二見（身見和邊見）中的一少部分可以一起生起，那是就細微的行相來說的。現在說忿等（煩惱）的行相粗猛，所以相違背，不能一起生起。而且，憎（upanāha，懷恨在心）和嫉（īrṣyā，嫉妒）的止息、道（mārga，修行之道）由於疑而不決，所以憎等（煩惱）一起生起也沒有過失。這是就大部分情況來說，也不相違背。

論：忿等五法，可以和慢、癡二法一起生起，因為是瞋的一部分。

述曰：忿、恨（mrakṣa，惱怒）、惱（pradāsa，怨恨）、嫉、害（vihiṃsā，損害），可以和慢（māna，傲慢）、癡（moha，愚癡）二法一起生起。但不能和貪（rāga，貪慾）、恚（dveṣa，嗔恚）二者並存，因為和貪的行相一定相違背。瞋是忿等的自體相。由此可以證明，不共無明（asaṃpramoha，與一切不善心相應的愚癡）的分位，忘念（muṣitasmṛtitā，失去正念）和不正知（asamprajanya，缺乏正知），不普遍存在於此心中，因為它們是癡的一部分。這個道理應該仔細思考。這裡沒有說不共無明一定能和（忿等）一起生起，只是說能和十種（煩惱）一起生起。即在這個無明的時候，或者有慧（prajñā，智慧）。

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, krodha (anger) can arise together with (other afflictions). For example, seeing an old enemy gives rise to anger, which is the function of smṛti (mindfulness). This is because mindfulness follows anger. What follows will discuss anger following mindfulness. What mindfulness cognizes is the past, the previous moment, which can also be said to be cognizing the past. Because there is only one thought in the present. What anger cognizes is the present in segments, which is called cognizing the present as the matter is completed. Even anger cognizes the past moment. Anger and mindfulness, these two dharmas, can be in accordance with their respective characteristics, without fault.

Question: Samadhi (concentration) focuses on one object, while distraction takes multiple objects. How can they arise together?

Treatise: When defiled samadhi arises, there is no fault in reaching accordance.

Commentary: When defiled samadhi arises, since it is called defiled, the mind is also restless, so there is no contradiction. There is no fault in accordance. This is not distraction, samadhi only takes one object. Because restlessness is the self-characteristic of distraction.

Treatise: The two medium and eighty major afflictions can arise together.

Commentary: In the seventh fundamental corresponding section, the two medium and eighty major afflictions can arise together. Because they universally defile the mind and are universally unwholesome. However, those that are co-arisen arise together with those that are co-arisen. Among those that are co-arisen, except for satkāya-dṛṣṭi (the view of considering the body composed of the five skandhas as the real self) and antagrahadṛṣṭi (the extreme views of eternalism or annihilationism), they do not arise together with āhrīkya (shamelessness) and anapatrāpya (lack of remorse), because their natures contradict each other. The remaining (afflictions) can arise together.

Treatise: The ten minor (afflictions) definitely cannot (arise together with views and doubt), because views and doubt are subtle in examination.

Commentary: The characteristics and nature of the ten minor (afflictions) are all coarse and agitated. While the characteristics of dṛṣṭi (wrong views) and vicikitsā (doubt) are subtle in examination. The previous statement that dveṣa (hatred), doubt, and a small part of the two views (satkāya-dṛṣṭi and antagrahadṛṣṭi) can arise together refers to the subtle characteristics. Now it is said that the characteristics of krodha (anger) and other (afflictions) are coarse, so they contradict each other and cannot arise together. Moreover, the cessation of upanāha (resentment) and īrṣyā (jealousy), and the path (mārga, the path of practice) are not determined due to doubt, so the arising of resentment and other (afflictions) together is also without fault. This refers to the majority of cases and is not contradictory.

Treatise: The five dharmas of krodha, etc., can arise together with māna and moha, because they are part of hatred.

Commentary: Krodha, mrakṣa (rancor), pradāsa (resentment), īrṣyā, vihiṃsā (harm), can arise together with māna (pride) and moha (ignorance). But they cannot coexist with rāga (greed) and dveṣa (hatred), because they necessarily contradict the characteristics of greed. Hatred is the self-characteristic of anger and others. From this it can be proven that the segments of asaṃpramoha (non-common ignorance, ignorance corresponding to all unwholesome minds), muṣitasmṛtitā (loss of mindfulness) and asamprajanya (lack of correct knowledge) do not universally exist in this mind, because they are part of ignorance. This principle should be carefully considered. It is not said here that non-common ignorance can necessarily arise together with (anger, etc.), but only that it can arise together with ten (afflictions). That is, at the time of this ignorance, there may be prajñā (wisdom).

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分故。然癡分者定遍一切染心聚故。非言不共無明一法。定與惡惠俱。此無明聚中。余法與此俱故。即于無明假建立故。

論。慳癡慢俱至是貪分故。

述曰。慳與癡．慢二法容俱。非貪並自性故。非瞋並相違故。

論。憍唯癡俱至是貪分故。

述曰。憍唯癡俱。是貪分故。不與瞋．貪並。與慢解別。不與慢俱。憍緣自高舉生。慢亦緣他下逸起。故不俱生。

論。覆誑與諂至貪癡分故。

述曰。此三與貪．癡．慢俱。行相無違故與彼俱。貪．癡分故不與瞋並。貪分故與癡俱。癡分故與貪並。

然此應思。貪分覆等可不瞋俱。獨頭癡分覆等。何不瞋俱起。豈彼三生皆定有貪也。今解必無唯癡分覆等。覆等俱時必有貪分故。又設無貪而癡覆者。欣．戚別故亦無瞋俱。若如前解無違理失。此覆等行必貪名利等故(如樞要說)。

論。小七中二至亦通無記。

述曰。第八三性門。小七．中二唯不善。唯欲界系。唯發惡行故。小三．大八亦通無記。通色界有。三八遍染．無記故。

論。小七中二至余通三界。

述曰。第九界門。子門有三。一界有攝。小七中二。如前唯欲界攝。唯發惡行唯粗鄙故。諂．誑欲．色有。王．臣等處二方有故。余通三界。謂憍及

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 分故。然而，愚癡（Mohā）是遍及一切染污心識的，因此並非說不共無明（Asādhāraṇa-moha）僅僅是一種法。愚癡必定與惡慧（Dus-prajñā）同時生起，因為在這個無明聚中，其他的法也與它同時生起，所以就在無明的基礎上假立。

論：慳吝（Mātsarya）、愚癡（Mohā）、我慢（Māna）都屬於貪（Lobha）的部分。

述曰：慳吝與愚癡、我慢這兩種法可以同時生起，但慳吝不能與貪的自性同時生起，也不能與嗔恨（Dveṣa）同時生起，因為嗔恨與貪是相違背的。

論：憍慢（Stambha）只與愚癡（Mohā）同時生起，屬於貪（Lobha）的部分。

述曰：憍慢只與愚癡同時生起，屬於貪的部分。它不與嗔恨、貪同時生起，與我慢的理解不同，不與我慢同時生起。憍慢緣于自我高舉而生，我慢則緣于貶低他人而生，所以兩者不同時生起。

論：覆藏（Mrakṣa）、虛誑（Śāṭhya）與諂媚（Māyā）都屬於貪（Lobha）和愚癡（Mohā）的部分。

述曰：這三種煩惱與貪、愚癡、我慢同時生起，因為它們的行相沒有衝突，所以與它們同時生起。屬於貪和愚癡的部分，所以不與嗔恨同時生起。屬於貪的部分，所以與愚癡同時生起；屬於愚癡的部分，所以與貪同時生起。

然而，這裡應該思考的是：屬於貪的部分的覆藏等煩惱可以不與嗔恨同時生起，那麼單獨屬於愚癡的部分的覆藏等煩惱，為什麼不能與嗔恨同時生起呢？難道這三種煩惱生起時都一定有貪嗎？現在的解釋是，必定沒有單獨屬於愚癡部分的覆藏等煩惱。覆藏等煩惱同時生起時，必定有貪的部分。又假設沒有貪而只有愚癡的覆藏，因為欣和戚是不同的，所以也不會與嗔恨同時生起。如果像前面的解釋那樣，就沒有違背道理的過失。這種覆藏等的行為必定是爲了貪圖名利等（如《樞要》所說）。

論：小隨煩惱七種，中隨煩惱兩種，也通於無記（Avyākṛta）。

述曰：在第八「三性門」中，小隨煩惱七種、中隨煩惱兩種，僅僅是不善的，僅僅是欲界所繫的，僅僅是引發惡行的。小隨煩惱三種、大隨煩惱八種，也通於無記。通於有，因為三八遍及染污和無記。

論：小隨煩惱七種，中隨煩惱兩種，其餘的通於三界。

述曰：在第九「界門」中，「子門」有三種。一、界有攝。小隨煩惱七種、中隨煩惱兩種，如前所述，僅僅為欲界所攝，僅僅引發惡行，僅僅是粗鄙的。諂媚、虛誑在欲界、色界有，只有在君王、大臣等處才有。其餘的通於三界，指憍慢以及...

【English Translation】 English version Division of causes. However, ignorance (Mohā) is definitely pervasive in all defiled minds, therefore it is not said that non-common ignorance (Asādhāraṇa-moha) is merely one dharma. Ignorance must arise simultaneously with bad wisdom (Dus-prajñā), because in this aggregate of ignorance, other dharmas also arise simultaneously with it, so it is provisionally established on the basis of ignorance.

Treatise: Stinginess (Mātsarya), ignorance (Mohā), and pride (Māna) all belong to the part of greed (Lobha).

Commentary: Stinginess can arise simultaneously with ignorance and pride, but stinginess cannot arise simultaneously with the nature of greed, nor can it arise simultaneously with hatred (Dveṣa), because hatred is contrary to greed.

Treatise: Haughtiness (Stambha) only arises simultaneously with ignorance (Mohā), belonging to the part of greed (Lobha).

Commentary: Haughtiness only arises simultaneously with ignorance, belonging to the part of greed. It does not arise simultaneously with hatred or greed, and its understanding differs from pride, not arising simultaneously with pride. Haughtiness arises from exalting oneself, while pride arises from belittling others, so the two do not arise simultaneously.

Treatise: Concealment (Mrakṣa), deceit (Śāṭhya), and flattery (Māyā) all belong to the part of greed (Lobha) and ignorance (Mohā).

Commentary: These three afflictions arise simultaneously with greed, ignorance, and pride, because their characteristics do not conflict, so they arise simultaneously with them. Belonging to the part of greed and ignorance, they do not arise simultaneously with hatred. Belonging to the part of greed, they arise simultaneously with ignorance; belonging to the part of ignorance, they arise simultaneously with greed.

However, it should be considered here: concealment and other afflictions belonging to the part of greed may not arise simultaneously with hatred, so why can't concealment and other afflictions belonging solely to the part of ignorance arise simultaneously with hatred? Is it that greed is definitely present when these three afflictions arise? The current explanation is that there is definitely no concealment or other afflictions belonging solely to the part of ignorance. When concealment and other afflictions arise simultaneously, there must be a part of greed. Also, assuming there is no greed but only ignorance in concealment, because joy and sorrow are different, it will not arise simultaneously with hatred either. If it is like the previous explanation, there is no fault of violating reason. This behavior of concealment and the like must be for the sake of greed for fame and profit, etc. (as stated in the 'Key Essentials').

Treatise: The seven minor secondary afflictions and the two intermediate secondary afflictions also extend to the indeterminate (Avyākṛta).

Commentary: In the eighth 'Three Natures' section, the seven minor secondary afflictions and the two intermediate secondary afflictions are only unwholesome, only related to the desire realm, and only cause evil actions. The three minor secondary afflictions and the eight major secondary afflictions also extend to the indeterminate. They extend to existence, because the three eights pervade defilement and indeterminacy.

Treatise: The seven minor secondary afflictions and the two intermediate secondary afflictions, the rest extend to the three realms.

Commentary: In the ninth 'Realm Section', there are three 'Sub-sections'. 1. Realm has inclusion. The seven minor secondary afflictions and the two intermediate secondary afflictions, as mentioned before, are only included in the desire realm, only cause evil actions, and are only coarse. Flattery and deceit exist in the desire and form realms, only existing in places such as kings and ministers. The rest extend to the three realms, referring to haughtiness and...

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后八。唯緣自起等。遍諸染心故。

論。生在下地至起憍誑諂故。

述曰。第二子門。生下上起上下門。生在下地容起上十一。耽定故起憍一法。於他欲界有情等起誑．諂故。餘八通染。潤生心等皆有彼故。

論。若生上地至容起彼故。

述曰。若生上地起下後十。中有邪見俱有無慚等二。潤生愛俱有後八故。

論。小十生上至及謗滅故。

述曰。此十忿等生上不起下。一非潤生。下十唯不善。潤生無記故。不與愛俱。又不謗滅故。不與邪見並。除此二時生上必不起下心。故忿等十上不起下。

第三子門上下相緣。

論。中二大八下至相應起故。

述曰。十下緣上。與前根本之中所說上緣貪等。相應起故。

論。有義小十至不遠取故。

述曰。此第一師。小十下者不得緣上。此十行相淺近。不能遠深取彼界故。嫉上地者嫉名聞故。嫉心不以彼地為質。故非如余心行相深遠取。慳相亦爾。此義應思。十並不上緣。

論。有義嫉等至生嫉等故。

述曰。第二師說。忿等七法定不緣上。嫉等三法亦緣上起。于勝地法生嫉等故。言嫉等者。等取慳．憍二法。定者謂嫉他所得靜慮無色故。憍恃所證知解彼地法故。慳所證知解上地法也。誑．諂

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 后八。唯緣自起等。遍諸染心故。

論。生在下地至起憍誑諂故。

述曰。第二子門。生下上起上下門。生在下地容起上十一。耽定故起憍一法。於他欲界有情等起誑（欺騙）．諂（諂媚）故。餘八通染。潤生心等皆有彼故。

論。若生上地至容起彼故。

述曰。若生上地起下後十。中有邪見俱有無慚等二。潤生愛俱有後八故。

論。小十生上至及謗滅故。

述曰。此十忿等生上不起下。一非潤生。下十唯不善。潤生無記故。不與愛俱。又不謗滅故。不與邪見並。除此二時生上必不起下心。故忿等十上不起下。

第三子門上下相緣。

論。中二大八下至相應起故。

述曰。十下緣上。與前根本之中所說上緣貪等。相應起故。

論。有義小十至不遠取故。

述曰。此第一師。小十下者不得緣上。此十行相淺近。不能遠深取彼界故。嫉上地者嫉名聞故。嫉心不以彼地為質。故非如余心行相深遠取。慳相亦爾。此義應思。十並不上緣。

論。有義嫉等至生嫉等故。

述曰。第二師說。忿等七法定不緣上。嫉等三法亦緣上起。于勝地法生嫉等故。言嫉等者。等取慳（吝嗇）．憍（驕傲）二法。定者謂嫉他所得靜慮（禪定）無色（無色界）故。憍恃所證知解彼地法故。慳所證知解上地法也。誑（欺騙）．諂（諂媚）

【English Translation】 English version The latter eight. Only arising from conditions, etc. Pervading all defiled minds.

Treatise: Being born in a lower realm, up to arising arrogance, deceit, and flattery.

Commentary: The second subsidiary section. Arising from lower to higher and higher to lower realms. Being born in a lower realm, it is possible to arise the eleven of the higher realm. Due to being absorbed in samadhi (定), arrogance (憍) arises as one dharma. Towards sentient beings in other desire realms, deceit (誑) and flattery (諂) arise. The remaining eight are common defilements. Because the mind that moistens birth and so on all have them.

Treatise: If born in a higher realm, up to possibly arising those.

Commentary: If born in a higher realm, the latter ten of the lower realm arise. Among them, there are two that are accompanied by wrong views, namely, shamelessness and the like. The love that moistens birth is accompanied by the latter eight.

Treatise: The minor ten, being born in the higher realm, up to and including slandering cessation.

Commentary: These ten, such as anger, do not arise in the lower realm when born in the higher realm. One is not a moistener of birth. The ten of the lower realm are only unwholesome. The moistener of birth is neutral. Therefore, it is not associated with love. Also, because it does not slander cessation, it is not associated with wrong views. Except for these two times, the mind born in the higher realm will certainly not arise in the lower realm. Therefore, the ten, such as anger, do not arise in the lower realm when born in the higher realm.

The third subsidiary section: Conditions between higher and lower realms.

Treatise: The middle two, the major eight, from the lower, up to arising in accordance.

Commentary: The ten of the lower realm condition the higher realm. They arise in accordance with greed and so on, which were mentioned earlier in the fundamental section as the higher realm conditioning.

Treatise: Some argue that the minor ten, up to not taking from afar.

Commentary: This is the first teacher. The minor ten of the lower realm cannot condition the higher realm. The characteristics of these ten are shallow and near. They cannot take that realm from afar. Those who are jealous of the higher realm are jealous of fame and reputation. The mind of jealousy does not take that realm as its substance. Therefore, it is not like other minds whose characteristics are deep and far-reaching. The characteristic of stinginess is also like this. This meaning should be considered. All ten do not condition the higher realm.

Treatise: Some argue that jealousy and so on, up to giving rise to jealousy and so on.

Commentary: The second teacher says that the seven dharmas, such as anger, definitely do not condition the higher realm. The three dharmas, such as jealousy, also arise conditioning the higher realm. Because they give rise to jealousy and so on towards the dharmas of the superior realm. The term 'jealousy and so on' includes stinginess (慳) and arrogance (憍). 'Definitely' means being jealous of others' attained dhyana (靜慮) and formlessness (無色). Arrogance relies on the knowledge and understanding of the dharmas of that realm. Stinginess is the knowledge and understanding of the dharmas of the higher realm. Deceit (誑) and flattery (諂).

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二法定無上緣。無誑諂色界勝有情故。有義許爾。誑．諂亦于殊勝處起故。如稱梵王以為本師行諂等是。然前解為勝。見於勝人所不生諂．誑。若準后解亦得起。于自界勝上起諂．誑故。恐失利譽故望他順己故。有說害亦緣上。尚許害諸佛。何況色界有情故也。忿等不緣者。行相如前說。若瞋上界必非是忿。對現境生行相細故。

論。大八諂誑至非所恃故。

述曰。中二忿等七上界無故。不須分別。大八諂．誑十法上亦緣下。與前根本中所說下緣慢等。相應俱起故有大八。梵王執馬勝手。是諂．誑故。此據本質。若影像者皆唯自地。屬自心故。唯憍不緣下。下地法劣非所恃故。

論。二十皆非至彼唯凈故。

述曰。第十一學等門。可知。

論。后十唯通至相應起故。

述曰。下第十二見斷等門。二段分別初明後十為一段。初中有三子門。一見修斷。后十通見修斷。與二煩惱俱故。言唯者不通不斷。

論。見所斷者至皆如煩惱說。

述曰。第二子門。迷諦總別。第三迷行親疏。皆類可知。

自下第二段解前十。

論。前十有義至任運生故。

述曰。第一師。唯修斷同小乘。此十緣粗事境。不分別生唯任運起故。

論。有義亦通至生忿等故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 二、決定法（二法定）的無上緣。因為沒有欺騙（誑）和虛偽（諂）的殊勝有情（勝有情）。有人認為可以這樣理解，因為欺騙和虛偽也會在殊勝的境界中產生。例如，稱梵天（梵王）為本師卻行虛偽等行為就是如此。然而，之前的解釋更為殊勝，因為在殊勝的人那裡不會產生虛偽和欺騙。如果按照後面的解釋，也可以產生，因為在自己的境界之上產生虛偽和欺騙。因為害怕失去利益和名譽，希望他人順從自己。有人說嗔恨（害）也緣于上界，尚且允許嗔恨諸佛（諸佛），更何況有情（有情）呢。憤怒（忿）等不緣于上界，其行相如前所述。如果嗔恨上界，必定不是憤怒，因為是對現前境界產生，行相微細。

論：大的八種（大八）指諂和誑，乃至不是所依賴的（非所恃故）。

述記：中間的兩種（中二）指憤怒等，因為上界沒有，所以不需要分別。大的八種指諂和誑，這十種法也緣于地獄，與前面根本中所說的地獄緣于慢等相應俱起，所以有大的八種。梵天執持馬勝的手，就是諂和誑。這是根據本質而言。如果是影像，則都只是自地，屬於自心。只有驕慢（憍）不緣于地獄，因為下地的法低劣，不是所依賴的。

論：二十種（二十）都不是，乃至那裡只有清凈（彼唯凈故）。

述記：第十一學等門，可以知道。

論：後面的十種（后十）只通，乃至相應而起（相應起故）。

述記：下面的第十二見斷等門，分為兩段。首先說明後面的十種為一段。第一段中有三個子門：一是見所斷和修所斷。後面的十種通於見所斷和修所斷，與兩種煩惱同時產生。說『只通』，是不通於非斷。

論：見所斷的（見所斷者），乃至都如煩惱所說（皆如煩惱說）。

述記：第二個子門，迷惑真諦的總相和別相。第三個子門，迷惑行為的親近和疏遠。都可以類比知道。

從下面第二段解釋前面的十種。

論：前面的十種（前十），有人認為，乃至任運而生（任運生故）。

述記：第一位老師，只有修所斷，與小乘相同。這十種緣于粗糙的事境，不分別而生，只是任運而起。

論：有人認為也通，乃至產生憤怒等（生忿等故）。

【English Translation】 English version: 2. The supreme condition of the two fixed dharmas (二法定). Because there are no deceit (誑) and flattery (諂) in the superior sentient beings (勝有情). Some interpret it as such because deceit and flattery can also arise in superior states. For example, addressing Brahma (梵王) as the original teacher while engaging in flattery. However, the previous interpretation is superior because flattery and deceit do not arise in superior individuals. According to the latter interpretation, they can arise because deceit and flattery arise above one's own realm, fearing the loss of benefits and reputation, and hoping others will comply with oneself. Some say that hatred (害) also arises towards superiors, as hatred towards Buddhas (諸佛) is permitted, let alone sentient beings (有情). Anger (忿) and the like do not arise towards superiors, as their characteristics have been described earlier. If one is angry with a superior realm, it is certainly not anger, because it arises towards the present environment and its characteristics are subtle.

Treatise: The eight great ones (大八) refer to flattery and deceit, up to not being relied upon (非所恃故).

Commentary: The two in the middle (中二) refer to anger and the like, which are absent in the upper realms, so there is no need to distinguish them. The eight great ones refer to flattery and deceit, and these ten dharmas also arise towards the lower realms, corresponding and arising together with the lower realms that arise from pride and the like mentioned earlier in the root text, hence there are the eight great ones. Brahma holding the hand of Asvajit (馬勝) is flattery and deceit. This is according to the essence. If they are images, then they are all only of one's own ground, belonging to one's own mind. Only arrogance (憍) does not arise towards the lower realms because the dharmas of the lower realms are inferior and not to be relied upon.

Treatise: None of the twenty (二十) are, up to there being only purity there (彼唯凈故).

Commentary: The eleventh section on learning and the like can be understood.

Treatise: The latter ten (后十) only connect, up to arising in accordance (相應起故).

Commentary: The twelfth section below on what is severed by seeing and the like is divided into two parts. First, it is explained that the latter ten form one part. In the first part, there are three sub-sections: first, what is severed by seeing and what is severed by cultivation. The latter ten connect to what is severed by seeing and what is severed by cultivation, arising simultaneously with the two afflictions. Saying 'only connect' means they do not connect to non-severance.

Treatise: What is severed by seeing (見所斷者), up to all being as described for afflictions (皆如煩惱說).

Commentary: The second sub-section is about confusion regarding the general and specific aspects of the truth. The third sub-section is about confusion regarding the closeness and distance of actions. They can all be understood by analogy.

From the second section below, the previous ten are explained.

Treatise: The previous ten (前十), some think, up to arising spontaneously (任運生故).

Commentary: The first teacher, only what is severed by cultivation, is the same as in the Hinayana. These ten arise towards coarse objects, arising without discrimination, only arising spontaneously.

Treatise: Some think they also connect, up to giving rise to anger and the like (生忿等故).

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述曰。第二師說。通見．修斷。此無別體。依二煩惱俱生分別勢力起故。故通二種。非但緣粗事生。亦緣他身見生忿等故。此後師正。故前俱生分別中唯取正義。然五十八說迷諦中。于滅諦起損害心恚惱心。即害．惱二親迷理生。亦通見斷。出佛身血害。緣無漏生。對法雲憎嫉出離。嫉緣理生。故亦見斷。九十卷云。或嫉妒性。乃至於有情起邪見行。發惡業種種事。故知能發惡趣業也。唯分別起。更有八十六已去忿等發惡趣業文。忘不知處。又何緣假立唯修非見。又于諦言嫉等。即非是嫉等但名為瞋者。於事言嫉等。何故是嫉等。

論。見所斷者至皆通四部。

述曰。下第二段。子門第二迷諦總．別。皆通四部。隨所依止前能所引生煩惱。或從所緣以分四諦。依四諦下煩惱引生。依止假立故。

論。此中有義至不深取故。

述曰。第三子門。迷諦親疏。此第一義。忿等十法但緣迷諦惑生。不親迷諦。五十八說害．惱等者瞋異名故。以此等行相粗而浮淺。但緣有情等生。不能深取。又設緣諦。而不是迷。不深取故。五十八說瞋迷滅者。此通言故。實非是迷。若緣故即言迷。不緣者應不迷。如二取等。二取等行相深故。不緣亦迷。瞋等雖緣淺故何妨不迷。

論。有義嫉等至生嫉等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述評：第二位論師說，『通見』（既能通過見道斷除）和『修斷』（只能通過修道斷除）的煩惱，並沒有不同的本體。這是因為它們都是依賴於俱生煩惱和分別煩惱的勢力而產生的。因此，它們貫通於兩種斷除方式。這些煩惱不僅僅是緣于粗顯的事物而生起，也緣于對他人身體的錯誤見解而生起忿恨等情緒。后一位論師的觀點是正確的。因此，在前面討論俱生煩惱和分別煩惱時，我們只採納了正確的觀點。然而，在第五十八卷中說，對於真諦的迷惑中，對滅諦生起損害心和恚惱心，也就是『害』（損害）和『惱』（惱怒）這兩種親近的煩惱是由於迷惑真理而產生的，這也貫通於見道所斷的煩惱。故意傷害佛陀身體使其出血，是緣于無漏法而生起的。對法藏中說，憎恨和嫉妒出離心，嫉妒是緣于真理而生起的，因此也是見道所斷的。第九十卷中說，或者由於嫉妒的本性，乃至對於有情眾生生起邪見的行為，引發各種惡業。因此，可知嫉妒能夠引發墮入惡趣的業。這僅僅是分別煩惱所引發的。還有第八十六卷之後關於忿恨等情緒引發惡趣業的經文，一時忘記了出處。又是什麼緣故要人為地設立忿恨等情緒僅僅是修道所斷，而不是見道所斷呢？又對於真諦而言，嫉妒等情緒，就不是僅僅被稱為嗔恨嗎？對於事物而言，嫉妒等情緒，為什麼就是嫉妒等情緒呢？ 世親菩薩《俱舍論》：見道所斷的煩惱，都貫通於四部（指四諦：苦、集、滅、道）。 窺基法師述評：下面是第二段，子門第二，對真諦的迷惑，總體上和分別上，都貫通於四部。隨著所依賴的處所，之前能夠引發煩惱的，或者從所緣的對象來區分四諦。依賴於四諦而引發煩惱，依賴於這些而人為地設立。 世親菩薩《俱舍論》：這裡有一種觀點認為，忿恨等十種煩惱，只是緣于對真諦的迷惑而產生，並不是直接迷惑真諦。 窺基法師述評：第三個子門，對真諦迷惑的親疏關係。這是第一種觀點。忿恨等十種法僅僅是緣于對真諦的迷惑而生起，並不是直接迷惑真諦。第五十八卷中說到的『害』（損害）、『惱』（惱怒）等，是嗔恨的不同名稱。因為這些行為的行相粗糙而膚淺，僅僅是緣于有情眾生等而生起，不能深入地把握真諦。又假設緣于真諦，而不是迷惑真諦，因為不能深入地把握真諦。第五十八卷中說嗔恨迷惑滅諦，這是通俗的說法。實際上並不是迷惑。如果緣于真諦就說是迷惑，不緣于真諦就應該不是迷惑。如同二取（有和無的執取）等。二取等的行相深刻，即使不緣于真諦也是迷惑。嗔恨等雖然緣于真諦，但因為淺顯，為什麼妨礙它不是迷惑呢？ 世親菩薩《俱舍論》：有一種觀點認為，嫉妒等煩惱，是由於嗔恨而生起嫉妒等煩惱。

【English Translation】 English version: Vasubandhu's Commentary: The second teacher says that 'universally seen' (can be eliminated through the path of seeing) and 'cultivation-eliminated' (can only be eliminated through the path of cultivation) afflictions do not have different entities. This is because they arise depending on the power of both innate and discriminatory afflictions. Therefore, they are common to both types of elimination. These afflictions not only arise from coarse matters but also from seeing anger, etc., arising from wrong views about the bodies of others. The view of the latter teacher is correct. Therefore, in the previous discussion of innate and discriminatory afflictions, we only adopted the correct view. However, in the fifty-eighth volume, it is said that in the delusion of the truth, giving rise to a mind of harming and a mind of anger towards the cessation truth, that is, the two close afflictions of 'harm' and 'annoyance' arise from the delusion of truth, which also extends to the afflictions eliminated by the path of seeing. Intentionally harming the Buddha's body and causing it to bleed arises from the unconditioned. In the Abhidharma, it is said that hatred and jealousy of renunciation, jealousy arises from truth, so it is also eliminated by the path of seeing. The ninetieth volume says that or due to the nature of jealousy, even giving rise to evil views towards sentient beings, causing various evil deeds. Therefore, it can be known that jealousy can cause karma that leads to falling into evil realms. This is only caused by discriminatory afflictions. There are also texts after the eighty-sixth volume about anger and other emotions causing evil karma, but I have forgotten the source for the moment. Also, for what reason should it be artificially established that anger and other emotions are only eliminated by cultivation and not by seeing? Also, with regard to the truth, are jealousy and other emotions not merely called hatred? With regard to things, why are jealousy and other emotions jealousy and other emotions? Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosha: The afflictions eliminated by the path of seeing all extend to the four noble truths (suffering, accumulation, cessation, and path). Vasubandhu's Commentary: Below is the second section, the second sub-section, the delusion of truth, both generally and separately, extends to the four noble truths. Depending on the place of reliance, what was previously able to cause afflictions, or distinguishing the four noble truths from the object of what is perceived. Relying on the four noble truths to cause afflictions, artificially establishing based on these. Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosha: Here, there is a view that the ten afflictions such as anger only arise from the delusion of truth and do not directly delude the truth. Vasubandhu's Commentary: The third sub-section, the closeness and distance of the delusion of truth. This is the first view. The ten dharmas such as anger only arise from the delusion of truth and do not directly delude the truth. The 'harm' and 'annoyance' mentioned in the fifty-eighth volume are different names for hatred. Because the characteristics of these actions are coarse and superficial, they only arise from sentient beings, etc., and cannot deeply grasp the truth. Also, assuming that it is related to the truth, but not deluding the truth, because it cannot deeply grasp the truth. The fifty-eighth volume says that hatred deludes the cessation truth, which is a common saying. In reality, it is not a delusion. If it is related to the truth, it is said to be a delusion, and if it is not related to the truth, it should not be a delusion. Like the two grasps (grasping of existence and non-existence), etc. The characteristics of the two grasps are profound, so even if they are not related to the truth, they are still delusions. Although hatred, etc., are related to the truth, but because they are superficial, why does it prevent them from not being delusions? Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosha: There is a view that jealousy and other afflictions arise from hatred, giving rise to jealousy and other afflictions.

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故。

述曰。又說七得。除覆．誑．諂三。滅．道勝法不能誑．諂故　又解嫉．惱．害．慳．憍五法亦親迷諦。五十八說于滅諦等生嫉等故。如前所引。然不見說憍亦迷諦。以理準有。恃所證故。大論第二帙說。有慳諦等文勘。楞伽第九頌謂外道嫉妒說法。故亦見斷迷諦。準此諦皆有二十。其數可知。

論。然忿等十至方得生故。

述曰。下第十三有事等門。忿等但緣有事。不與我見俱。我見俱心等名緣無事。本質我無故。此據人執心本質名緣無事。準知后十通二所緣。

論。緣有漏等準上應知。

述曰。唯有無漏所起事所起名。準上煩惱說。或此上來所明之義。說其嫉等名緣無漏所起名等。忿等名緣有漏所起事故。此事名緣。如五十八．九卷抄會。有漏等言。等取有異熟等門。有九品潤生髮業門等。皆如理思。

成唯識論述記卷第六(末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

成唯識論述記卷第七(本)

沙門基撰

論。已說二十至其相云何。

述曰。下第五以半頌。釋第六不定心所。初結前生后以發論端。后舉頌答。此即初也。

論。頌曰至尋伺二各二。

述曰。上二字標位總名。次五字烈別名字。下三字顯

【現代漢語翻譯】 故。

述曰。又說七得。除覆（隱藏）、誑（欺騙）、諂（諂媚）三者。滅（涅槃）、道（通往涅槃的道路）勝法不能誑、諂故。又解釋嫉（嫉妒）、惱（惱怒）、害（傷害）、慳（吝嗇）、憍（驕傲）五法也親近迷惑真諦。五十八說于滅諦等生嫉等故。如前所引。然不見說憍也迷惑真諦。以理準有。恃所證故。《大論》第二帙說。有慳諦等文勘。《楞伽經》第九頌謂外道嫉妒說法。故也見斷迷惑真諦。準此諦皆有二十。其數可知。

論。然忿（憤怒）等十至方得生故。

述曰。下第十三有事等門。忿等但緣有事，不與我見俱。我見俱心等名緣無事。本質我無故。此據人執心本質名緣無事。準知后十通二所緣。

論。緣有漏（有煩惱的）等準上應知。

述曰。唯有無漏（沒有煩惱的）所起事所起名。準上煩惱說。或此上來所明之義。說其嫉等名緣無漏所起名等。忿等名緣有漏所起事故。此事名緣。如五十八．九卷抄會。有漏等言。等取有異熟等門。有九品潤生髮業門等。皆如理思。

《成唯識論述記》卷第六(末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 《成唯識論述記》

《成唯識論述記》卷第七(本)

沙門基撰

論。已說二十至其相云何。

述曰。下第五以半頌。釋第六不定心所。初結前生后以發論端。后舉頌答。此即初也。

論。頌曰至尋（粗略的觀察）伺（精細的觀察）二各二。

述曰。上二字標位總名。次五字烈別名字。下三字顯

【English Translation】 Thus.

Commentary: It further explains the 'seven attainments,' excluding concealment (covering up faults), deceit (lying), and flattery (obsequiousness). The supreme Dharma of cessation (Nirvana) and the path (to Nirvana) cannot be deceived or flattered. It also explains that jealousy (envy), annoyance (irritation), harm (injury), stinginess (miserliness), and arrogance (pride) are also closely associated with delusion regarding the true meaning. Chapter 58 states that jealousy arises in relation to cessation. As previously cited, it is not explicitly stated that arrogance also obscures the truth, but it can be inferred logically because it relies on what has been attained. The second fascicle of the Mahāyāna-samgraha discusses texts related to stinginess and truth. The ninth verse of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra states that non-Buddhists are jealous of the Dharma being taught, thus it can be seen that delusion regarding the truth is also severed. Based on this, each truth has twenty aspects, and their number can be known.

Treatise: However, anger (wrath) and the other ten arise only when there is an object.

Commentary: In the thirteenth section below, regarding the 'matter' and other categories, anger and the like arise only in relation to an object and do not occur together with the view of self. Mental states that occur together with the view of self are called 'arising without an object' because the essence of self does not exist. This is based on the essence of mind as perceived by people, which is called 'arising without an object.' It should be understood that the latter ten encompass two types of objects.

Treatise: 'Arising from defiled (with afflictions)' and the like should be understood based on the above.

Commentary: Only those arising from undefiled (without afflictions) are called 'arising from a matter.' This is explained based on the afflictions mentioned above. Or, according to the meaning explained above, jealousy and the like are called 'arising from undefiled,' while anger and the like are called 'arising from defiled matters.' This 'matter' is called 'arising from.' As compiled in chapters 58 and 9, the term 'defiled' includes categories such as 'resulting in different maturation.' There are nine categories related to generating karma that leads to rebirth. All of this should be considered rationally.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Volume Six (End) Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 43, No. 1830, Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Volume Seven (Beginning)

Composed by the Śrāmaṇa (Buddhist monk) Ji

Treatise: Having explained the twenty, what are their characteristics?

Commentary: In the fifth section below, half a verse is used to explain the sixth indeterminate mental factors. First, it connects the previous and introduces the following to initiate the discussion. Then, it presents the verse as an answer. This is the first part.

Treatise: Verse: 'Initial (gross thought) and subtle (detailed thought), each has two.'

Commentary: The first two characters indicate the general name of the position. The next five characters list the separate names. The following three characters reveal

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不定義。

論曰。至皆不定故。

述曰。于長行中文段有二。初釋頌。后義辨。釋中有三。初解不定得名。次解別體。后釋二各二言。今此所標即第一也　于善染等皆不定者。一解。顯不定義。此界．性．識等皆不定故。二解。簡前信等．貪等。此通三性。性不定故。彼類非一故說等言。

若爾應遍行攝。

論。非如觸等定遍心故。

述曰。於五．七．八識。及上二界全多分無故。此先舉觸。作用先故。如前已說。

既不定染．善。不遍一切心。應是別境。

論。非如欲等定遍地故立不定名。

述曰。此界系局。亦非遍無漏。此但舉地。故非別境。由不同前餘五位法。立不定名。

論。悔謂惡作至追悔為性。

述曰。自下第二別解為二。初解悔．眠。后解尋．伺。于中各二。初別。后總。別即為二　悔謂惡作者。以體即因。即諸論說惡作者是。惡作非悔。悔之體性追悔者是。如文可知　惡作之體以何為性。惡者悔也。即嫌惡所作業。諸所作業起心嫌惡。已而追悔之方是悔性。若所作是惡名為惡作。即悔體唯善。唯悔惡事故。若嫌惡所作體寧非悔。言是悔因。若先惡所作方生於悔。惡作非悔其體何也。此義應思　此中有解。此唯是厭。若爾厭應通三性。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論曰：至（zhì，到達）皆不定故。

述曰：于長行中文段有二。初釋頌。后義辨。釋中有三。初解不定得名。次解別體。后釋二各二言。今此所標即第一也。于善染等皆不定者。一解。顯不定義。此界（jiè，界限）.性（xìng，性質）.識（shí，意識）等皆不定故。二解。簡前信等.貪等。此通三性。性不定故。彼類非一故說等言。

若爾應遍行攝。

論：非如觸（chù，接觸）等定遍心故。

述曰：於五.七.八識。及上二界全多分無故。此先舉觸。作用先故。如前已說。

既不定染.善。不遍一切心。應是別境。

論：非如欲（yù，慾望）等定遍地故立不定名。

述曰：此界系局。亦非遍無漏。此但舉地。故非別境。由不同前餘五位法。立不定名。

論：悔（huǐ，後悔）謂惡作（è zuò，惡行）至追悔為性。

述曰：自下第二別解為二。初解悔.眠（mián，睡眠）。后解尋（xún，尋思）.伺（sì，伺察）。于中各二。初別。后總。別即為二。悔謂惡作者。以體即因。即諸論說惡作者是。惡作非悔。悔之體性追悔者是。如文可知。惡作之體以何為性。惡者悔也。即嫌惡所作業。諸所作業起心嫌惡。已而追悔之方是悔性。若所作是惡名為惡作。即悔體唯善。唯悔惡事故。若嫌惡所作體寧非悔。言是悔因。若先惡所作方生於悔。惡作非悔其體何也。此義應思。此中有解。此唯是厭。若爾厭應通三性。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise says: 'Reaching' is indefinite.

Commentary says: In the prose section, there are two parts. First, explaining the verses. Second, analyzing the meaning. In the explanation, there are three parts. First, explaining the name 'indefinite'. Second, explaining the distinct entity. Third, explaining the two 'each two words'. What is indicated here is the first part. 'Being indefinite in good, defiled, etc.' has one explanation: it reveals indefiniteness. This realm (dhātu), nature (svabhāva), consciousness (vijñāna), etc., are all indefinite. A second explanation: it simplifies the preceding faith, greed, etc. This pervades the three natures (tri-svabhāva). Because the nature is indefinite. Because those categories are not one, the word 'etc.' is used.

If so, it should be included in the universally present.

Treatise: It is not like contact (sparśa), etc., which are definitely pervasive in the mind.

Commentary: In the five, seven, and eight consciousnesses, and in the upper two realms, it is mostly absent. Here, contact is mentioned first because its function comes first, as previously stated.

Since it is indefinite in defiled and good, and not pervasive in all minds, it should be a separate object (viṣaya).

Treatise: It is not like desire (chanda), etc., which are definitely pervasive in the ground (bhūmi), hence the name 'indefinite'.

Commentary: This realm is limited. It is also not pervasive in the unconditioned (anāsrava). Here, only the ground is mentioned, so it is not a separate object. Because it is different from the other five mental functions, the name 'indefinite' is established.

Treatise: Remorse (kaukṛtya) refers to regret for bad deeds, with repentance as its nature.

Commentary: From here on, the second separate explanation is divided into two parts. First, explaining remorse and sleep (styāna). Second, explaining investigation (vitarka) and analysis (vicāra). Within each, there are two parts. First, separate. Second, general. The separate is divided into two. 'Remorse refers to bad deeds' because the entity is the cause. That is, the treatises say that bad deeds are the cause. Bad deeds are not remorse. The nature of remorse is repentance. As the text shows. What is the nature of the entity of bad deeds? The bad is remorse. That is, disliking what has been done. When one dislikes what has been done and then repents, that is the nature of remorse. If what is done is bad, it is called a bad deed. That is, the entity of remorse is only good. It only repents for bad deeds. If disliking what has been done is not remorse, then it is said to be the cause of remorse. If remorse arises only after a bad deed, what is the entity of bad deeds if it is not remorse? This meaning should be considered. There is an explanation here: this is only aversion. If so, aversion should pervade the three natures.

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何故唯善。此宗不爾。薩婆多正理論師厭體唯善。若同於彼有如前妨　有云厭是省察心．心所無別體性。大乘厭通三性。于義無違　若爾善．染．無記之厭俱依何立。前第六卷云善中厭是無貪一分。準彼染厭體即是嗔。由憎恚彼方厭善故。有欣上惡法是貪。厭下惡法亦是嗔分　若爾無記之厭是何建立　即無記欲。于所作事雖不生欲。於此不作亦生欲故名為厭也。如信．不信但有善．染而無無記。無記信即是欲．解。此亦應爾。悔因即是前之厭．欲二法。然說惡作通三性者。從果為言。悔通三性故　或有解云。所作是境。而嫌惡所作是悔惡義。今言作者是所作事。能生於悔惡。即是悔因。因者境界。依作因依之生悔故。以惡作言通說彼境故。總言惡作是悔之因。其實惡者即是悔也　又解惡作善者是愧。以拒惡故。不善者是無慚。不顧賢善故。無記者是慧。威儀．工巧慧所攝故　又解三性俱體是惠。簡擇推度所作事故。言先不作後方追悔者。前後因果。或即俱時義說先後。然由境故心乃得生。

論。障止為業。

述曰。非是五蓋之中止相。止相通定．惠故。止下心故。今言止者即奢摩他。能止住心非令止下。

論。此即于果至後方追悔故。

述曰。惡作是因。悔體是果。悔名惡作。從因為名。先

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 為什麼只有善的厭？這個宗派不這樣認為。薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）正理論師不喜歡『唯善』的說法。如果和他們一樣，就會有之前的妨礙。有人說，厭是省察心，心和心所沒有不同的體性。大乘的厭通於三性（善、惡、無記）。在義理上沒有違背。如果這樣，善、染、無記的厭都依什麼而建立呢？前面第六卷說，善中的厭是無貪的一部分。按照那個說法，染的厭的本體就是嗔，因為憎恨那個對像才厭惡善。有欣求上等惡法是貪，厭惡下等惡法也是嗔的一部分。如果這樣，無記的厭是依什麼建立的呢？就是無記的欲。對於所要做的事情，雖然不產生欲，對於不做這件事也產生欲，所以叫做厭。如同信和不信只有善和染，而沒有無記。無記的信就是欲和解。這個也應該這樣。悔的因就是之前的厭和欲這兩種法。然而說惡作通於三性，是從結果來說的，因為悔通於三性。或者有人解釋說，所作是境，而嫌惡所作是悔惡的意義。現在說作者是所作的事情，能夠產生悔惡，就是悔的因。因就是境界，依靠作因依靠它而產生悔。用惡作來總說那個境界。總而言之，惡作是悔的因，其實惡就是悔。又有人解釋說，惡作中的善是愧，因為拒絕惡的緣故。不善是無慚，因為不顧及賢善的緣故。無記是慧，因為威儀和工巧慧所攝的緣故。又有人解釋說，三性都以慧為體，簡擇推度所作的事情。說先不作後來才追悔，是前後因果。或者就是同時，用先後的意義來說。然而因為境界的緣故，心才得以產生。

論：以障礙止為作用。

述曰：不是五蓋（五種障礙修行的負面心理狀態）中的止相。止相通於定（禪定）和慧（智慧），因為止下心。現在說的止就是奢摩他（Samatha，止），能夠止住心，不是讓心停止向下。

論：這就是對於結果到後來才追悔的緣故。

述曰：惡作是因，悔的本體是果。悔名為惡作，是從因來命名的。先

【English Translation】 English version Why only good aversion? This school does not think so. The Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, the 'all exists' school) theoreticians dislike the idea of 'only good'. If it were the same as them, there would be the previous obstacles. Some say that aversion is the mind of reflection, and the mind and mental factors do not have different entities. The Mahayana aversion encompasses the three natures (good, evil, and neutral). There is no contradiction in meaning. If so, upon what are the good, defiled, and neutral aversions established? The sixth volume earlier said that aversion in good is a part of non-greed. According to that statement, the substance of defiled aversion is anger, because hating that object causes aversion to good. Having a desire for superior evil dharmas is greed, and aversion to inferior evil dharmas is also a part of anger. If so, upon what is neutral aversion established? It is neutral desire. Although desire does not arise for what is to be done, desire also arises for not doing it, so it is called aversion. Just as belief and disbelief only have good and defiled, and there is no neutral. Neutral belief is desire and understanding. This should also be the case. The cause of regret is the previous two dharmas of aversion and desire. However, saying that evil deeds encompass the three natures is speaking from the result, because regret encompasses the three natures. Or some explain that what is done is the object, and disliking what is done is the meaning of regretting evil. Now saying that the doer is what is done, which can produce regret for evil, is the cause of regret. The cause is the realm, relying on the cause of action and relying on it to produce regret. Using 'evil deed' to generally describe that realm. In short, evil deed is the cause of regret, but in reality, evil is regret. Others explain that good in evil deeds is shame, because of rejecting evil. Non-good is shamelessness, because of not caring about virtue. Neutral is wisdom, because it is encompassed by dignified behavior and skillful wisdom. Others explain that the three natures all take wisdom as their substance, selecting and considering what is done. Saying that one does not do it first and then regrets it later is the cause and effect of before and after. Or it is at the same time, using the meaning of before and after to speak. However, because of the realm, the mind is able to arise.

Treatise: Its function is to obstruct cessation.

Commentary: It is not the aspect of cessation in the five coverings (five negative mental states that hinder practice). The aspect of cessation is common to dhyana (meditation) and prajna (wisdom), because it stops the mind from going down. The cessation now spoken of is Samatha (calm abiding), which can stop and hold the mind, not make the mind stop and go down.

Treatise: This is why one regrets the result later.

Commentary: Evil deed is the cause, and the substance of regret is the result. Regret is named evil deed, named from the cause. First

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惡所作顯其因。後方追悔明其果。如前已釋。

論。悔先不作至是我惡作。

述曰。今顯緣無亦生惡作。言所作者。非要悔先有事已作名為惡作。悔先不作亦惡作故。如追悔言我先不作如是事業是我惡作。如是之事是我惡邊作也。作者措也。是我惡措此事。俗云措．作一體異名。瑜伽第十一廣說同此。顯揚第一云于已作．未作追戀為體。障業亦言障奢摩他。正與此同。

論。眠謂睡眠至昧略為性。

述曰。以此單名即諸教復。此令身不自在。坐亦睡故。乃至能他搖動亦不覺等故。此令心極闇昧輕略為性。不明利沉重故。

論。障觀為業。

述曰。即毗缽舍那。此別障觀。非如蓋中能障于舉。舉通定惠令心高也。顯揚同此。

論。謂睡眠位至一門轉故。

述曰。釋上不自在　身不自在。制不自專心不自在　心極闇劣一門轉者。唯一意識都無五識。闇劣轉故無明瞭時。為別余心亦有五識。有闇劣昧無明瞭時故。

論。昧簡在定至非無體用。

述曰。雖專注微細。然與定不同。此唯昧故。故昧簡在定。余散心雖有闇。而不輕略。亦沉重故。略別寤時。寤時廣故。瑜伽第十一亦云昧略為性。然俗中言汝等睡在。無心之時亦言睡故。或復有義亦恐經部師于總別聚

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

惡所作，顯現其因，之後方才追悔，明白其果，如前文已經解釋。

論：追悔先前沒有做，就是我所作的惡。

述曰：現在說明因緣缺失也會產生惡作。所說『所作』，並非一定要追悔先前已經做過的事情才叫做惡作，追悔先前沒有做也是惡作。例如追悔說：『我先前沒有做這樣的事業，這是我所作的惡。』這樣的事情是我惡劣的作為。『作者』是措施的意思，是我錯誤地措施了這件事。俗話說『措』和『作』是一個意思，不同的名稱。《瑜伽師地論》第十一卷廣泛地說明與此相同。《顯揚聖教論》第一卷說以對於已做和未做的事情的追戀為體性，障礙業也說是障礙奢摩他（止，samatha），正與此相同。

論：睡眠，是指睡眠，以昏昧輕略為性質。

述曰：用這一個單一名詞就概括了各種教義。這使身體不自在，因為坐著也會睡著。乃至別人搖動也不覺得等等。這使心極度昏暗輕微簡略為性質，不明白事理而沉重。

論：以障礙觀（毗缽舍那，vipassana）為作用。

述曰：就是毗缽舍那（觀，vipassana）。這特別地障礙觀，不像蓋障中能夠障礙舉，舉通於定和慧，使心高揚。 《顯揚聖教論》與此相同。

論：是指睡眠的狀態，因為只有一個門在運轉。

述曰：解釋上面所說的『不自在』。身體不自在，控制不了自己。心不自在，心極度昏暗低劣，只有一個門在運轉，是指只有一個意識，完全沒有五識。因為昏暗低劣地運轉，所以沒有明瞭的時候。爲了區別于其他也有五識的心，因為有昏暗低劣的昧，沒有明瞭的時候。

論：昏昧，是爲了簡別在禪定中的狀態，並非沒有體和作用。

述曰：雖然專注在微細的事物上，然而與禪定不同，因為這只是昏昧。所以昏昧是爲了簡別在禪定中的狀態。其餘散亂的心雖然也有昏暗，但不輕略，也沉重。輕略是爲了區別于清醒的時候，因為清醒的時候是廣大的。《瑜伽師地論》第十一卷也說以昏昧輕略為性質。然而世俗中說『你們睡著了』，在沒有心的時候也說睡著了。或者還有一種解釋，也是爲了防止經部師對於總相和別相的執著。

【English Translation】 English version:

Evil deeds manifest their causes; only later does one regret and understand their consequences, as previously explained.

Treatise: Regretting not having done something earlier is also an evil deed.

Commentary: Now it is shown that even the absence of conditions can give rise to evil deeds. What is meant by 'deeds' is not necessarily regretting something already done as an evil deed; regretting not having done something earlier is also an evil deed. For example, regretting and saying, 'I did not do such a thing earlier; this is my evil deed.' Such a thing is my evil action. 'Action' means measure; it is my wrong measure of this matter. In common parlance, 'measure' and 'action' are synonymous, different names for the same thing. The eleventh volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra extensively explains this in the same way. The first volume of the Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma says that its nature is attachment to things done and not done, and the obstructing karma also says that it obstructs samatha (tranquility), which is exactly the same as this.

Treatise: Sleep refers to sleep, whose nature is dullness and lightness.

Commentary: This single term encompasses various teachings. This causes the body to be uncomfortable, because one can fall asleep even while sitting. Even to the point that one does not feel being shaken by others, etc. This causes the mind to be extremely dark and light, lacking clarity and being heavy.

Treatise: Its function is to obstruct contemplation (vipassana).

Commentary: That is vipassana (insight, vipassana). This specifically obstructs contemplation, unlike the hindrances that can obstruct elevation, which encompasses both samatha (concentration, samatha) and prajna (wisdom, prajna), causing the mind to rise. The Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma is the same as this.

Treatise: Refers to the state of sleep, because only one door is operating.

Commentary: Explains the 'discomfort' mentioned above. The body is uncomfortable, unable to control oneself. The mind is uncomfortable, the mind is extremely dark and inferior, and only one door is operating, meaning there is only one consciousness, without any of the five senses. Because it operates in a dark and inferior way, there is no clarity. To distinguish it from other minds that also have the five senses, because there is dark and inferior dullness, there is no clarity.

Treatise: Dullness is to distinguish it from the state of meditation, it is not without substance and function.

Commentary: Although focused on subtle things, it is different from meditation, because it is only dullness. Therefore, dullness is to distinguish it from the state of meditation. Other distracted minds, although they also have darkness, are not light, but heavy. Lightness is to distinguish it from the waking state, because the waking state is vast. The eleventh volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra also says that its nature is dullness and lightness. However, in common parlance, people say 'you are asleep,' and they also say asleep when there is no mind. Or there is another explanation, which is also to prevent the Sautrantika (Sutravadin) masters from clinging to the general and specific characteristics.

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上假立故置令言。言有體故方有令身等不自在等用。令顯睡眠非無體用也。

論。有無心位至心相應故。

述曰。世間．聖教有于無心之位亦名睡眠。此假立也。如論說言無心睡眠。此則是也。由眠所引似起眠時故亦名眠。寧知睡眠別有。非即無心。如余蓋故。余蓋必是心所法故。非無體法。言五蓋者。一貪慾蓋。二嗔恚蓋。三惛沉睡眠蓋。四掉舉惡作蓋。五疑蓋。覆蔽其心令善不轉是蓋義。由貪境界障樂出家。由嗔諫犯障覺正行。惛眠障止引沉沒故。掉．悔障舉引散亂故。疑不決定障舍位故。此總五蓋能障三位。初樂出家。次修正行。后入正定。修止．舉．舍如次為障。若言蓋因緣故亦名為蓋。非必是心所者。應如余纏。唯心所故　纏有八種。惛沈．睡眠．掉舉．惡作．嫉．慳．無慚．無愧。數數增盛纏繞其心。于修善品能為障故。初二障止。次二障舉。嫉．慳障舍。于自．他利。吝妒門中數動心故。蓋中障舍與此不同。彼約定心非止非舉平等名舍。疑能障此。此依二利平等名舍。故不相違。無慚．無愧障修尸羅。具此二者。犯諸學處無羞恥故。故此蓋．纏不增不減。

論。有義此二至乃癡分故。

述曰。下總解二。總有四說。此初師說。無別有體體即是癡。何以知者。瑜伽五十五等說是

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 上面只是假設安立，所以才有了『言』這個說法。因為『言』有其自體，所以才有了『令身不自在』等作用。這使得睡眠顯現出來，並非沒有自體和作用。

論：因為有無心位與心相應。

述記：世俗和聖教中，都有一種無心狀態也被稱為睡眠。這是一種假立。如論中所說『無心睡眠』，就是這種情況。由於睡眠所引發的類似清醒時的狀態，所以也被稱為睡眠。憑什麼知道睡眠是獨立的，而不是無心狀態本身呢？就像其他的蓋一樣。其他的蓋必定是心所法，所以不是沒有自體的法。所說的五蓋是：一、貪慾蓋（對貪戀境界的覆蓋），二、嗔恚蓋（對嗔恨惱怒的覆蓋），三、惛沉睡眠蓋（對精神萎靡和睡眠的覆蓋），四、掉舉惡作蓋（對心神不定和後悔的覆蓋），五、疑蓋（對疑惑不定的覆蓋）。它們覆蓋內心，使善法不能生起，這就是蓋的含義。貪慾蓋會障礙快樂的出家，嗔恚蓋會障礙覺悟正行，惛沉睡眠蓋會障礙止息而導致沉沒，掉舉惡作蓋會障礙專注而導致散亂，疑蓋會障礙舍離而無法安住。這總共五蓋能夠障礙三個階段：最初是快樂的出家，其次是修正行，最後是進入正定。修止、舉、舍依次被這些蓋所障礙。如果說蓋是因為因緣而被稱為蓋，不一定是心所法，那麼應該像其他的纏一樣，僅僅是心所法。纏有八種：惛沉（昏昧沉重）、睡眠（昏睡）、掉舉（散亂）、惡作（後悔）、嫉（嫉妒）、慳（吝嗇）、無慚（不感到羞恥）、無愧（不感到慚愧）。它們不斷增長，纏繞內心，對於修習善法能夠造成障礙。最初兩種纏障礙止，其次兩種纏障礙舉，嫉妒和慳吝障礙舍，因為在自利和他利的吝嗇和嫉妒方面，內心經常動搖。蓋中障礙舍與此不同，蓋中是約定心既非止也非舉的平等狀態名為舍，疑能障礙這種舍。而纏是依據自利和他利的平等狀態名為舍，所以不相違背。無慚和無愧障礙修習戒律，具備這兩種纏的人，會違犯各種學處而沒有羞恥之心。所以這些蓋和纏不會增加也不會減少。

論：有義認為這兩種蓋實際上是癡的一部分。

述記：下面總的解釋這兩種蓋。總共有四種說法。這是第一種說法。沒有單獨的自體，其自體就是癡。憑什麼知道呢？《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷等經論中是這樣說的。

【English Translation】 English version: The above is merely a hypothetical establishment, hence the term 'speech' (言, yan). Because 'speech' has its own substance, there are functions such as 'making the body uncomfortable.' This makes sleep manifest, not without substance and function.

Treatise: Because there is a state of no-mind that corresponds to the mind.

Commentary: In both worldly and sacred teachings, there is a state of no-mind that is also called sleep. This is a hypothetical establishment. As the treatise says, 'no-mind sleep' is such a case. Because the state induced by sleep resembles being awake, it is also called sleep. How do we know that sleep is independent and not the state of no-mind itself? It is like the other coverings (蓋, gai). The other coverings must be mental factors (心所法, xin suo fa), so they are not dharmas without substance. The so-called five coverings are: 1. Greed covering (貪慾蓋, tan yu gai) (covering the attachment to desirable objects), 2. Hatred covering (嗔恚蓋, chen hui gai) (covering anger and resentment), 3. Torpor and sleep covering (惛沉睡眠蓋, hun chen shui mian gai) (covering mental dullness and sleepiness), 4. Restlessness and remorse covering (掉舉惡作蓋, diao ju e zuo gai) (covering agitation and regret), 5. Doubt covering (疑蓋, yi gai) (covering doubt and uncertainty). They cover the mind, preventing wholesome dharmas from arising; this is the meaning of covering. The greed covering obstructs the joy of renunciation, the hatred covering obstructs the awakening to right practice, the torpor and sleep covering obstructs cessation and leads to sinking, the restlessness and remorse covering obstructs concentration and leads to distraction, and the doubt covering obstructs relinquishment and prevents dwelling in peace. These five coverings in total can obstruct three stages: first, the joy of renunciation; second, the cultivation of right practice; and third, entering right concentration. Cessation, concentration, and relinquishment are obstructed by these coverings in that order. If it is said that a covering is called a covering because of conditions, and it is not necessarily a mental factor, then it should be like the other fetters (纏, chan), which are only mental factors. There are eight kinds of fetters: torpor (惛沈, hun chen) (dullness), sleep (睡眠, shui mian) (drowsiness), restlessness (掉舉, diao ju) (agitation), remorse (惡作, e zuo) (regret), jealousy (嫉, ji) (envy), stinginess (慳, qian) (miserliness), shamelessness (無慚, wu chan) (lack of shame), and lack of embarrassment (無愧, wu kui) (lack of embarrassment). They constantly increase, entangling the mind, and can obstruct the cultivation of wholesome qualities. The first two fetters obstruct cessation, the next two fetters obstruct concentration, and jealousy and stinginess obstruct relinquishment, because the mind is constantly agitated in the areas of selfishness and envy regarding benefits for oneself and others. The obstruction of relinquishment in the coverings is different from this. In the coverings, the agreed-upon state of mind that is neither cessation nor concentration is called relinquishment, and doubt can obstruct this relinquishment. The fetters are based on the equal state of benefit for oneself and others, which is called relinquishment, so they are not contradictory. Shamelessness and lack of embarrassment obstruct the cultivation of morality. Those who possess these two fetters will violate various precepts without shame. Therefore, these coverings and fetters neither increase nor decrease.

Treatise: Some argue that these two coverings are actually part of ignorance (癡, chi).

Commentary: The following is a general explanation of these two coverings. There are four views in total. This is the first view. There is no separate substance; its substance is ignorance. How do we know this? It is said in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論, Yuqie shidi lun) , volume 55, and other scriptures.

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隨煩惱．並癡分故。對法亦然。言通三性者。隨彼聚多少心．心所為體故通三性。癡唯染中。

論。有義不然至及癡分攝。

述曰。亦通善故。若唯癡者。如何善中乃是心．心所總數為體。應說此二染者以癡為體。善即是無癡。相翻立故。五十五等依染分義邊。說是隨煩惱。及是癡分攝　故對法言通善等者。顯非定癡分。如顯揚第一解惡作。云于善．不善事。若染．不染追戀為體。不言無記。彼是通言故。善．染即以癡．無癡為體。又無記之中是總數故說通無記。

論。有義此說至無癡性故。

述曰。此下第三文有其四。有義不然。對法．及五十五．五十八。皆言通三性故。何故染．凈即依別數。其無記者無別依法。而依總立。又無記之性非癡．無癡。故應別有。

論。應說惡作至所作業故。

述曰。惡作思．惠二法為體。何以惠．思為性者。明瞭知所作故以惠為體。思擇所作故以思為體。不以餘者功能劣故。

論。睡眠合用至夢境相故。

述曰。睡眠思．想二法為體。何以然者。思想種種夢之境故。由此亦有依余上立。

何以知此二各別依。由此二法無別有體。一以理。如前說故。二以教。故知無別體。

論。論俱說為至說為癡分。

述曰。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 隨煩惱，與『癡』（moha，無明）有關。『對法』（Abhidharma）也是如此。說『通三性』，是因為它們以相應的聚合（khandha）中的心和心所為體，因此通於三種性質（善、惡、無記）。而『癡』只存在於染污之中。

論：有觀點認為並非如此，乃至被『癡』所包含。

述曰：因為也通於善。如果僅僅是『癡』，那麼在善中如何以心和心所的總數為體？應該說這兩個染污法以『癡』為體。善就是『無癡』（amoha，智慧），因為它們是相反的。五十五等（指五十五種心所）依據染污的意義，說是隨煩惱，以及被『癡』所包含。因此，『對法』說通於善等，表明並非一定是『癡』的一部分。例如，在《顯揚聖教論》第一卷中解釋『惡作』（kukkritya，追悔）時，說以對善或不善之事的染污或不染污的追憶為體，沒有說無記。那是通用的說法。善和染污分別以『癡』和『無癡』為體。此外，在無記之中，因為是總數，所以說通於無記。

論：有觀點認為此說乃至無『無癡』的性質。

述曰：下面第三段文字有四種觀點。有觀點認為並非如此。『對法』、五十五種心所和五十八種心所，都說通於三種性質。為什麼染污和清凈要依據不同的數量？而無記沒有特別的所依法，而是依據總數而立。此外，無記的性質既不是『癡』也不是『無癡』，因此應該單獨存在。

論：應該說『惡作』以思和慧為體，因為所作之業。

述曰：『惡作』以『思』（cetana，意志）和『慧』（prajna，智慧）兩種法為體。為什麼以『慧』和『思』為體呢？因為明瞭地知道所作之事，所以以『慧』為體；因為思擇所作之事，所以以『思』為體。不以其他法為體，是因為它們的功能較弱。

論：『睡眠』（middha，睡眠）合用，乃至夢境的相。

述曰：『睡眠』以『思』和『想』（samjna，想蘊）兩種法為體。為什麼這樣說呢？因為思想種種夢境。由此也有依據其他法而建立的情況。

如何知道這二者各自依據不同的法？因為這兩種法沒有單獨的自體。一是根據道理，如前所述；二是根據教證，所以知道沒有單獨的自體。

論：論中都說為乃至說為『癡』的一部分。

述曰：

【English Translation】 English version The secondary afflictions are associated with 『Moha』 (ignorance). The 『Abhidharma』 (Doctrine) is also the same. Saying 『pervades the three natures』 (kusala, akusala, avyakrta, wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) is because they take the mind and mental factors in the corresponding aggregates (khandha) as their substance, therefore pervading the three natures. 『Moha』 only exists in defilement.

Treatise: Some argue that it is not so, even to the extent of being included in 『Moha』.

Commentary: Because it also pervades the wholesome. If it were only 『Moha』, then how could it take the total number of mind and mental factors as its substance in the wholesome? It should be said that these two defiled dharmas take 『Moha』 as their substance. Wholesome is 『Amoha』 (non-ignorance, wisdom), because they are opposite. The fifty-five etc. (referring to the fifty-five mental factors) are said to be secondary afflictions and included in 『Moha』 based on the meaning of defilement. Therefore, the 『Abhidharma』 says that it pervades the wholesome etc., indicating that it is not necessarily a part of 『Moha』. For example, in the first volume of the 『Yogacarabhumi-sastra』 when explaining 『Kukkritya』 (regret), it says that it takes the defiled or undefiled recollection of good or unwholesome deeds as its substance, without mentioning neutral. That is a general statement. The wholesome and defiled take 『Moha』 and 『Amoha』 as their substance respectively. Furthermore, in the neutral, because it is a total number, it is said to pervade the neutral.

Treatise: Some argue that this statement does not even have the nature of 『Amoha』.

Commentary: The third passage below has four viewpoints. Some argue that it is not so. The 『Abhidharma』, the fifty-five mental factors, and the fifty-eight mental factors all say that they pervade the three natures. Why should defilement and purity be based on different numbers? And the neutral does not have a special object of reliance, but is established based on the total number. Furthermore, the nature of the neutral is neither 『Moha』 nor 『Amoha』, therefore it should exist separately.

Treatise: It should be said that 『Kukkritya』 takes 『Cetana』 (volition) and 『Prajna』 (wisdom) as its substance, because of the deeds done.

Commentary: 『Kukkritya』 takes the two dharmas of 『Cetana』 and 『Prajna』 as its substance. Why are 『Prajna』 and 『Cetana』 its nature? Because it clearly knows what has been done, therefore it takes 『Prajna』 as its substance; because it deliberates on what has been done, therefore it takes 『Cetana』 as its substance. It does not take other dharmas as its substance because their functions are weaker.

Treatise: 『Middha』 (sleep) is used together, even to the appearance of dream states.

Commentary: 『Middha』 takes the two dharmas of 『Cetana』 and 『Samjna』 (perception) as its substance. Why is this so? Because it thinks of various dream states. Therefore, there are also cases where it is established based on other dharmas.

How do we know that these two each rely on different dharmas? Because these two dharmas do not have a separate self-nature. One is based on reason, as mentioned before; the other is based on scriptural proof, so we know that there is no separate self-nature.

Treatise: The treatise both says that it is even said to be a part of 『Moha』.

Commentary:

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瑜伽五十五說此二為世俗有故。假有自性　彼染污性分與癡相似。是彼等流。如不信等體雖別有仍說他分。即會論言是癡分故名世俗有。顯揚論言夢以欲．想二法為體。彼說增上者此說遍心者。非諸夢心皆有欲故。

論。有義彼說至纏彼性故。

述曰。此下第四。文復有三。上義不然　非思惠想纏彼性故。此合為因。有二分破。初破欲界染思．惠一分為悔。染思．想一分為眠。非為纏性。是思．惠．想故。如餘思．惠．想。即是二界全。及欲界一分凈無記者。或如余染思等。謂除眠．悔余欲界染。及上二界染者。皆非纏故。此即破染分為纏　第二破欲界凈無記一分思．惠為彼惡作。一分思．想為彼眠體。總難云。為惡作等一分非染思．惠．想。非彼惡作等二法性。是思．惠．想故。如余上界思．惠．想等。此量準文有宗具足。取宗中有法思．想．及性故。為因亦得　又解汝染悔．與眠。應非思．惠．想。是纏性故。如無慚等。凈無記悔眠。亦非思．惠．想。是彼悔眠性故。如染悔眠。染悔眠體已成非思等故。得為同喻。因明許故。然此文中有宗中法。謂非思惠想。及因具足如文。此解正可相順總合為量。

論。應說此二至名世俗有。

述曰。此顯正義。各有別體。與餘思等行相別故。如貪等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 瑜伽行派五十五卷說，悔（Kaukṛtya，對已做錯事的後悔）和睡眠（Middha，精神昏沉）這二者是世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理）所承認的「有」，因此它們只是假立的自性（Svabhāva，自身存在的性質）。這種染污的性質與癡（Moha，無明）相似，是癡的等流（Niḥṣyanda，從因產生的果）。如同不信等心所（Āśraddhya，缺乏信心），雖然本體各不相同，但仍然說是癡的一部分。即《會論》說，因為它們是癡的一部分，所以名為世俗諦所承認的「有」。《顯揚論》說，夢（Swapna）以欲（Chanda，願望）和想（Saṃjñā，認知）二法為體。彼論說夢是欲和想的增上緣（Adhipati-pratyaya，起主要作用的條件），此論說夢遍於心（Sarva-citta-sādhāraṇa，與一切心識共同生起），因為不是所有的夢心都有欲。

論：有義說，因為思（Cetanā，意志）、慧（Prajñā，智慧）、想（Saṃjñā，認知）纏繞著那種性質（指悔和睡眠的性質）。

述記：以下是第四部分，文中有三個要點。上面的觀點是不成立的，因為思、慧、想不會纏繞著那種性質。這合起來作為論證的理由。分為兩部分來破斥。首先破斥欲界（Kāmadhātu，欲界）的染污的思和慧的一部分是悔，染污的思和想的一部分是睡眠，但它們不是纏（Paryavasthāna，煩惱的持續存在）的性質。因為它們是思、慧、想，就像其餘的思、慧、想一樣。也就是說，二界（指色界和無色界）全部，以及欲界的一部分清凈和無記的思、慧、想，或者像其餘的染污的思等，即除了睡眠和悔之外的其餘欲界的染污，以及上二界的染污，都不是纏。這即是破斥染污的一部分是纏。第二，破斥欲界的清凈和無記的一部分思和慧是惡作（Kaukṛtya，對已做錯事的後悔），一部分思和想是睡眠的本體。總的來說，反駁說，作為惡作等的一部分，不是染污的思、慧、想，不是惡作等二法的性質。因為它們是思、慧、想，就像其餘的上界的思、慧、想等。這個量（Anumāṇa，推理）根據文義，有宗（Pakṣa，論題）具足。在宗中取有法（Dharmin，具有特定性質的事物）思、想，以及性質，作為理由也可以。又解釋說，你的染污的悔和睡眠，應該不是思、慧、想，因為它們是纏的性質，就像無慚（Āhrīkya，不知恥）等一樣。清凈和無記的悔和睡眠，也不是思、慧、想，因為它們是悔和睡眠的性質，就像染污的悔和睡眠一樣。染污的悔和睡眠的本體已經成立不是思等，所以可以作為同喻（Sapakṣa，與論題具有相同性質的事物）。因明（Hetu-vidyā，邏輯學）允許這樣。然而，這段文字中有宗中的法，即不是思慧想，以及理由具足，就像文中所說的那樣。這種解釋正好可以順應總合為量。

論：應該說這二者（悔和睡眠）各有不同的本體，所以名為世俗諦所承認的「有」。

述記：這顯示了正確的觀點。各有不同的本體，與其餘的思等行相不同，就像貪（Lobha，貪婪）等一樣。

【English Translation】 English version The Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra, chapter fifty-five, states that these two, Kaukṛtya (remorse) and Middha (lethargy), are acknowledged as 'existent' by conventional truth (Saṃvṛti-satya), hence they are merely hypothetical in their self-nature (Svabhāva). This defiled nature is similar to Moha (ignorance) and is a result of it (Niḥṣyanda). Just as Āśraddhya (lack of faith), although distinct in substance, is still said to be a part of it. That is, the Compendium of Topics says that because they are part of Moha, they are called 'existent' by conventional truth. The Exposition of the Scriptures says that dreams (Swapna) have desire (Chanda) and cognition (Saṃjñā) as their substance. That text says that dreams are an Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition) of desire and thought, while this text says that dreams are Sarva-citta-sādhāraṇa (common to all minds), because not all dream-minds have desire.

Treatise: Some say that because Cetanā (volition), Prajñā (wisdom), and Saṃjñā (cognition) are entangled with that nature (referring to the nature of remorse and sleep).

Commentary: The following is the fourth part, and there are three points in the text. The above view is not valid because Cetanā, Prajñā, and Saṃjñā do not entangle with that nature. This is combined as the reason for the argument. It is refuted in two parts. First, refute that a part of the defiled Cetanā and Prajñā of the desire realm (Kāmadhātu) is remorse, and a part of the defiled Cetanā and Saṃjñā is sleep, but they are not the nature of Paryavasthāna (persistence of afflictions). Because they are Cetanā, Prajñā, and Saṃjñā, just like the rest of Cetanā, Prajñā, and Saṃjñā. That is, all of the two realms (referring to the form realm and the formless realm), and a part of the desire realm that is pure and neutral, or like the rest of the defiled Cetanā, etc., that is, the rest of the defiled of the desire realm except for sleep and remorse, and the defiled of the upper two realms, are not Paryavasthāna. This is to refute that a part of the defiled is Paryavasthāna. Second, refute that a part of the pure and neutral Cetanā and Prajñā of the desire realm is Kaukṛtya (remorse), and a part of Cetanā and Saṃjñā is the substance of sleep. In general, it is refuted that as a part of remorse, etc., it is not defiled Cetanā, Prajñā, and Saṃjñā, and it is not the nature of the two dharmas of remorse, etc. Because they are Cetanā, Prajñā, and Saṃjñā, just like the rest of the Cetanā, Prajñā, and Saṃjñā of the upper realms, etc. This inference (Anumāṇa), according to the meaning of the text, has a complete Pakṣa (thesis). In the thesis, take the Dharmin (subject with a specific property) Cetanā, Saṃjñā, and the nature, as the reason is also possible. Also explain that your defiled remorse and sleep should not be Cetanā, Prajñā, and Saṃjñā, because they are the nature of Paryavasthāna, just like Āhrīkya (shamelessness), etc. The pure and neutral remorse and sleep are also not Cetanā, Prajñā, and Saṃjñā, because they are the nature of remorse and sleep, just like the defiled remorse and sleep. The substance of defiled remorse and sleep has already been established as not Cetanā, etc., so it can be used as a Sapakṣa (homologue). Hetu-vidyā (logic) allows this. However, this text has the dharma in the thesis, that is, not Cetanā, Prajñā, and Saṃjñā, and the reason is complete, as stated in the text. This explanation can just conform to the total as a measure.

Treatise: It should be said that these two (remorse and sleep) each have a different substance, so they are called 'existent' by conventional truth.

Commentary: This shows the correct view. Each has a different substance, and the characteristics are different from the rest of Cetanā, etc., just like Lobha (greed), etc.

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法各別有體。惡作悔性等。余法所無故。瑜伽論言世俗有者。以說是癡分。隨癡相說名世俗有。如惛沈等名癡分者。義如前說。

論。尋謂尋求至細轉為性。

述曰。二行相同故一處明　尋謂尋求。即七分別中尋求分別等。以單即複名也。下準可知　令心匆遽者。匆迫。遽急也　意言境者。意即意識。以遍緣故。此有三解。一從喻。即意識及相應法。能取境故。與言說言相似。二從境。言說言是聲性。此言為意之所取性。從言為名。但名意言。三從果。由意能起言等故名意言。意所取境名意言境。亦通一切心所法等。而意是主勝故偏說。今此境者通一切法。大論第五云緣名等境。亦尋言說名等義為所緣。然此中但舉意言之境攝法即盡。不言言說名等故。彼論攝法義有不及。名不目及如涅槃等。伺中可知。

論。此二俱以至所依為業。

述曰。身心若安。徐緩為業。身心不安。匆遽為業。俱通思．惠。或思名安。徐而細故。思量性故。惠名不安。急而粗故。簡擇性故。身．心前後有安．不安。皆依尋．伺故名所依。

論。並用思惠至義類別故。

述曰。不深推度是尋　深推度者是伺。顯揚．五蘊等。皆言意言境。大論第五言名身等境。又不深推度名思。深名惠者。此有二義。一者

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 法各有其自體。『惡作』（kukritya, 後悔）和『悔性』等，是其他法所沒有的特性。瑜伽論中說『世俗有』，是因為這是癡（moha, 愚昧）的一部分。隨著癡的相狀而說，名為『世俗有』。如同『惛沈』（styana, 精神萎靡）等被稱為癡的一部分，道理和之前所說的一樣。

論：尋（vitarka, 粗略的觀察）是指尋求，以細微的轉動為特性。

述曰：尋和伺（vicara, 精細的觀察）兩種行相相同，所以放在一處解釋。『尋』是指尋求，也就是七種分別中的尋求分別等。因為單一名詞即是複合含義，下文可以類推得知。『令心匆遽』，『匆』是匆迫，『遽』是急速的意思。『意言境』，意就是意識，因為意識能普遍緣取。對此有三種解釋：一是比喻，即意識及相應的法，能夠取境，與言說相似。二是就所緣境而言，言說言是聲音的性質，此言為意所取之性質，從言而得名，但名為意言。三是從結果來說，因為意能生起言語等，所以名為意言。意所取之境名為意言境，也通於一切心所法等，而意是主要的，所以偏說。現在這裡所說的境通於一切法。《大毗婆沙論》第五卷說緣名等境，也尋言說名等義為所緣。然而這裡只舉意言之境，所攝之法就完備了，不言言說名等，所以該論在攝法義方面有所不及，名不能涵蓋如涅槃（nirvana, 寂滅）等。這些在伺中可以知道。

論：尋和伺都以身心安穩或不安穩作為所依之業。

述曰：身心如果安穩，則以徐緩為業；身心如果不安穩，則以匆遽為業。尋和伺都通於思（cetanā, 意志）和慧（prajñā, 智慧）。或者說，思名為安穩，因為徐緩而細微，具有思量之性質；慧名為不安穩，因為急速而粗略，具有簡擇之性質。身心前後有安穩和不安穩，都依賴於尋和伺，所以名為所依。

論：尋和伺並用思和慧，是因為義理類別的緣故。

述曰：不深入推度的是尋，深入推度的是伺。《顯揚》、《五蘊》等都說意言境，《大毗婆沙論》第五卷說名身等境。又不深入推度名為思，深入推度名為慧。這有兩種含義：一是...

【English Translation】 English version: Each dharma has its own distinct entity. 'Kukritya' (remorse) and 'repentance-nature' are characteristics not found in other dharmas. The Yogacara-bhumi-sastra says 'conventional existence' because it is a part of moha (delusion). It is called 'conventional existence' according to the aspect of delusion. Just as 'styana' (lethargy) is called a part of delusion, the meaning is as previously stated.

Treatise: Vitarka (initial application of thought) means seeking, with subtle movement as its characteristic.

Commentary: Vitarka and vicara (sustained application of thought) have similar aspects, so they are explained together. 'Vitarka' means seeking, which is the seeking-discrimination among the seven discriminations. Because a single term implies a compound meaning, the following can be inferred analogously. 'Causes the mind to be hurried,' 'hurried' means rushed, 'urgent' means rapid. 'Ideational object,' 'idea' is consciousness, because consciousness can universally cognize. There are three explanations for this: First, from the analogy, it refers to consciousness and its associated dharmas, which can grasp objects, similar to speech. Second, from the object's perspective, speech is the nature of sound, and this speech is the nature grasped by the mind, named after speech, but simply called ideation. Third, from the result, because the mind can generate speech, it is called ideation. The object grasped by the mind is called the ideational object, which also applies to all mental factors, but the mind is primary, so it is specifically mentioned. The object mentioned here applies to all dharmas. The fifth volume of the Maha-Vibhasa-sastra says it cognizes name-objects, and also seeks the meaning of speech-names as objects. However, here only the object of ideation is mentioned, and the dharmas included are complete. Speech-names are not mentioned, so that treatise is incomplete in terms of including dharmas, as names cannot cover things like nirvana (cessation). This can be understood in vicara.

Treatise: Both vitarka and vicara take the stability or instability of body and mind as their dependent activity.

Commentary: If the body and mind are stable, then it is slow and gradual activity; if the body and mind are unstable, then it is hurried activity. Both vitarka and vicara are related to cetana (volition) and prajna (wisdom). Or, cetana is called stability because it is slow and subtle, with the nature of deliberation; prajna is called instability because it is rapid and coarse, with the nature of discernment. The body and mind may be stable or unstable at different times, and both depend on vitarka and vicara, so they are called dependent.

Treatise: Vitarka and vicara both use cetana and prajna because of the different categories of meaning.

Commentary: Not deeply investigating is vitarka, deeply investigating is vicara. The Samgraha, the Five Skandhas, etc., all speak of ideational objects, while the fifth volume of the Maha-Vibhasa-sastra speaks of name-body objects. Not deeply investigating is called cetana, deeply investigating is called prajna. There are two meanings to this: First,...

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謂思全不推度。名不深推度。非為細推度也。翻惠為義故。對法論言不推度故。二云思雖不如惠有深推度。亦淺推度故。前第五卷。證第七無尋．伺中。言淺深推度故。對法言不推度。不深推故。然對法配此。如是次第。即顛倒逆次配。非此相違。

論。若離思惠至不可得故。

述曰。尋．伺離思．及惠二種。若體若用類別無故。即如大論第五．五十五．五十八．顯揚．對法．五蘊皆同。

論。二各二者至二類差別。

述曰。自下第三解二各二。尋．伺后說故。行相同故。尋．伺初二。染．凈后二。文易可知。

論。有義此釋至纏及隨眠。

述曰。初破前師。次申其義。破他可知。申正義者。謂前來貪等．忿等。有是煩惱．及隨煩惱。此為初二。下解后二。各有不善．無記二性　又解或復此二各有現行纏．種子隨眠二。

論。有義彼釋至二謂尋伺。

述曰。第三安惠。謂前不然。不定四後方有此二各二等言故。非解前染法。應言初一二者。顯二種二。一悔．眠二。二尋．伺二。何以知者。梵言特縛炎．特縛曳別。其特縛炎但名為二。即一名身中目一種二。泛言二也。即是一種二。今梵本言特縛曳者。即二名身中目二種二義。故令一種二言顯二種二。與前特縛炎別。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 意思是說，思不是完全沒有推度，也不是沒有深度的推度，並非是細微的推度。這是因為翻轉智慧（惠，Prajna）而賦予了意義，根據《對法論》（Abhidharma）的說法，思沒有推度。另一種說法是，思雖然不如智慧那樣有深度的推度，但也有淺顯的推度。之前在第五卷中，證明第七禪定（無尋無伺定）中，有淺顯和深度的推度。而《對法論》說沒有推度，是因為沒有深度的推度。然而，《對法論》的配對方式是這樣的次序，即顛倒的逆序配對，並非與此相違背。

論：如果離開思和惠，就到了不可得的境地。

述記：尋（Vitarka）、伺（Vicara）離開了思和惠這兩種，無論是本體還是作用，類別上都沒有了。就像《大論》（Mahavibhasa）第五卷、第五十五卷、第五十八卷，《顯揚論》（Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma Views），《對法論》，《五蘊論》（Pancaskandha）都相同。

論：二各二，是指兩種各自有兩種，是兩種類別的差別。

述記：下面第三個解釋是「二各二」。尋和伺在後面說，因為行相相同。尋和伺是最初的兩種，染污和清凈是後面的兩種。文句容易理解。

論：有一種解釋說，這是指纏（Klesha）和隨眠（Anusaya）。

述記：首先破斥前人的觀點，然後闡述自己的意義。破斥他人的觀點容易理解。闡述正義是指，前面所說的貪等、忿等，有的是煩惱，有的是隨煩惱，這是最初的兩種。下面解釋後面的兩種，各有不善和無記兩種性質。又解釋說，或者這兩種各有現行纏和種子隨眠兩種。

論：有一種解釋說，他們解釋說前兩種是悔（Kaukritya）和眠（Middha），后兩種是尋和伺。

述記：第三種是安立智慧（惠）。認為前面的說法不對，不確定在四種之後才有這兩種「各二」等說法。不是解釋前面的染法，應該說最初的「一二」是指顯示兩種「二」，一是悔和眠兩種，二是尋和伺兩種。為什麼知道呢？梵語「特縛炎」（dvyam）和「特縛曳」（dvayam）不同。「特縛炎」只是名為「二」，即一個名身中只說一種「二」，泛泛地說「二」，即是一種「二」。現在梵文字說「特縛曳」，即兩個名身中說兩種「二」的意思。所以用一種「二」的說法來顯示兩種「二」，與前面的「特縛炎」不同。

【English Translation】 English version: It means that smrti (思, thought) is not completely without vitarka (推度, reasoning), nor is it without deep vitarka, and it is not subtle vitarka. This is because the meaning is given by reversing prajna (惠, wisdom), according to the Abhidharma (對法論), smrti has no vitarka. Another saying is that although smrti is not as deep as prajna in vitarka, it also has shallow vitarka. Previously, in the fifth volume, it was proved that in the seventh dhyana (無尋無伺定, ni-vitarka-avicara-samadhi), there are shallow and deep vitarka. However, the Abhidharma says that there is no vitarka because there is no deep vitarka. However, the matching method of the Abhidharma is in this order, that is, the reversed reverse order matching, which is not contrary to this.

Treatise: If you leave smrti and prajna, you will reach the realm of unobtainable.

Commentary: Vitarka (尋) and vicara (伺) are separated from smrti and prajna. Whether in substance or function, there is no difference in category. It is the same as in the fifth, fifty-fifth, and fifty-eighth volumes of the Mahavibhasa (大論), Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma Views (顯揚論), Abhidharma, and Pancaskandha (五蘊論).

Treatise: 'Two each two' means that each of the two has two kinds, which are differences of two categories.

Commentary: The third explanation below is 'two each two'. Vitarka and vicara are said later because their characteristics are the same. Vitarka and vicara are the first two kinds, and defilement and purity are the last two kinds. The sentences are easy to understand.

Treatise: One explanation says that this refers to klesha (纏, affliction) and anusaya (隨眠, latent tendency).

Commentary: First refute the previous people's views, and then elaborate on their own meaning. It is easy to understand to refute other people's views. Elucidating the correct meaning refers to the greed, anger, etc. mentioned earlier, some of which are afflictions and some of which are secondary afflictions. These are the first two kinds. The following explains the latter two kinds, each with two natures of unwholesome and neutral. It is also explained that these two kinds each have two kinds of manifest klesha and seed anusaya.

Treatise: One explanation says that they explain that the first two are kaukritya (悔, regret) and middha (眠, sleepiness), and the last two are vitarka and vicara.

Commentary: The third is to establish prajna. It is believed that the previous statement is incorrect, and it is uncertain that these two 'each two' and other statements are only after the four kinds. It is not an explanation of the previous defilement dharma, it should be said that the initial 'one two' refers to showing two kinds of 'two', one is regret and sleepiness, and the other is vitarka and vicara. How do you know? The Sanskrit words 'dvyam' (特縛炎) and 'dvayam' (特縛曳) are different. 'Dvyam' is only called 'two', that is, only one kind of 'two' is said in one name body, generally speaking 'two', that is, one kind of 'two'. Now the Sanskrit text says 'dvayam', which means that two kinds of 'two' are said in two name bodies. Therefore, the statement of one kind of 'two' is used to show two kinds of 'two', which is different from the previous 'dvyam'.

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不爾有何別因。一種二言目二種二。聲囀別故。

論。此二二種至顯二二種。

述曰。由此理故一二之言。顯二種二。此二二者。如文可知。何以為二二者。以此二種類各別故。云何各別。一系界種類別。二依思．惠種類別。三假．實種類別。四斷時種類別。五上地起．不起種類別。六支．非支種類別故。七纏．蓋性種類別。八語行．非行別。九通定．散門別。十通無漏類別。由此二二別。以一二言顯二種二。

此即解頌中初一二字訖。第二二者。

論。此各有二至隨煩惱故。

述曰。謂此各有二。一染。二不染。謂此四法各染．不染。其二無記隨應配故。何以置此言者。以非如前善．染各唯一性不通染．善故　又解。此言唯為簡染。以瑜伽五十五等。說為隨煩惱。恐同前唯染。故置通二言。

論。為顯不定義至深為有用。

述曰。第三又為顯性不定。故置此中二各二言。故此二言非解以前所辨諸法。深為有用。能別前故。

自下第二諸門分別。初有十二門。后準例指分別。

論。四中尋伺至聖所說故。

述曰。第一假實。尋．伺二假。五十五等定言假故。

論。悔眠有義至世俗有故。

述曰。前四說中初三師義。第一是假。五十五說是

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果沒有這個原因，還有什麼其他的區別原因呢？一種是二言，目標是兩種二（兩種不同的二）。因為聲音的轉變不同。

論：這兩種二，是爲了顯示兩種不同的二。

述記：由於這個道理，一個『二』字，顯示了兩種不同的『二』。這兩種『二』，就像文中所說的那樣可以理解。為什麼說是兩種『二』呢？因為這兩種的種類各不相同。怎樣各不相同呢？一是屬於界（Dhatu，構成要素）的種類不同，二是依于思（Cetanā，意志）和慧（Prajñā，智慧）的種類不同，三是假（假有，概念性的存在）和實（實有，真實的存在）的種類不同，四是斷（消除）的時間不同，五是上地（更高的禪定境界）生起與不生起不同，六是屬於支（構成要素）與不屬於支不同，七是纏（煩惱的束縛）和蓋（障礙）的性質不同，八是語行（語言行為）和非語行不同，九是通於禪定（Samādhi，專注）和散亂（Vikṣepa，心散亂）不同，十是通於無漏（Anāsrava，無煩惱）的種類不同。由於這十種『二二』的不同，所以用一個『二』字來顯示兩種不同的『二』。

這就是解釋頌文中的第一個『二』字完畢。第二個『二』字是：

論：這各自有兩種，一是染污（Kliṣṭa，被煩惱染污），二是不染污。因為這四種法各自有染污和不染污。兩種無記（不善不惡）的法，隨其應配屬。為什麼要設定這個說法呢？因為不像前面所說的善（Kuśala，善的）和染污各自只有一種性質，不互相通達。又一種解釋，這個說法只是爲了簡別染污。因為《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷等，說為隨煩惱（Upakleśa，小煩惱）。恐怕和前面一樣只有染污，所以設定通於兩種的說法。

論：爲了顯示性質不確定，所以設定這個『二』字，各自有兩種說法。所以這個『二』字不是解釋以前所辨別的各種法，而是非常有用，能夠區別前面的說法。

從下面開始，第二部分是各種門類的分別。開始有十二種門類，後面按照例子指示分別。

論：四種之中，尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（Vicāra，細緻的思考）是假有（概念性的存在），《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷等確定說是假有。

論：悔（Kaukṛtya，後悔）、眠（Styāna，睡眠）有義，是世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，世俗的真實）所承認的。

述記：前面四種說法中，最初三種是老師的解釋。第一種是假有，《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷說是假有。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: If there isn't this reason, what other differentiating causes are there? One is 'two words,' aiming at 'two kinds of two' (two different types of two). It's because the transformation of sound is different.

Treatise: These two kinds of 'two' are to reveal two different kinds of 'two'.

Commentary: Because of this principle, one word 'two' reveals two different kinds of 'two.' These two kinds of 'two,' as the text indicates, can be understood. Why are they called two kinds of 'two'? It's because these two kinds are different in their categories. How are they different? First, they belong to different categories of Dhatu (界, elements). Second, they depend on different categories of Cetanā (思, volition) and Prajñā (慧, wisdom). Third, they are different in terms of conventional (假, conceptual existence) and real (實, real existence). Fourth, the time of their elimination (斷) is different. Fifth, their arising or non-arising in higher realms (上地, higher meditative states) is different. Sixth, they are different in terms of being a limb (支, factor) or not being a limb. Seventh, the nature of their being bonds (纏, fetters) and hindrances (蓋, obscurations) is different. Eighth, speech-conduct (語行, verbal action) and non-speech-conduct are different. Ninth, they are different in terms of being common to Samādhi (定, concentration) and Vikṣepa (散, distraction). Tenth, they are different in terms of being common to Anāsrava (無漏, undefiled) categories. Because of these ten kinds of 'two-two' differences, one word 'two' is used to reveal two different kinds of 'two.'

This completes the explanation of the first word 'two' in the verse. The second word 'two' is:

Treatise: Each of these has two aspects: one is Kliṣṭa (染, defiled), and the other is undefiled. Because these four dharmas each have defiled and undefiled aspects. The two indeterminate (無記, morally neutral) dharmas are assigned accordingly. Why is this statement made? It's because, unlike the previously mentioned wholesome (善, virtuous) and defiled, each of which has only one nature and does not interpenetrate, another explanation is that this statement is only to distinguish defilement. Because the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, in its fifty-fifth section, etc., speaks of them as minor defilements (隨煩惱, secondary afflictions). Fearing that they would be the same as only defiled, the statement of being common to both is made.

Treatise: To show that the nature is indeterminate, the word 'two' is placed here, each having two aspects. Therefore, this word 'two' does not explain the various dharmas previously distinguished, but it is very useful, being able to distinguish the previous statements.

From below, the second part is the differentiation of various categories. Initially, there are twelve categories, and later they are differentiated according to the examples.

Treatise: Among the four, Vitarka (尋, gross thought) and Vicāra (伺, subtle thought) are conventional existences (假有, conceptual existences). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, in its fifty-fifth section, etc., definitely says they are conventional existences.

Treatise: Regret (悔, remorse) and sleep (眠, drowsiness) have meaning and are acknowledged by Saṃvṛti-satya (世俗諦, conventional truth).

Commentary: Among the previous four statements, the first three are the teacher's explanations. The first one is a conventional existence. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, in its fifty-fifth section, says it is a conventional existence.

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世俗有故。

問彼何故尋．伺言假。此二言世俗。所對別故。

論。有義此二至定是假有。

述曰。下第二師。其定是實。何以知者。五十五唯說尋．伺假有。不言此二假有。故知實有　若爾何言世俗有　隨他相說。以說為癡分故。非言世俗便顯是假。如惛沈等故。如前已成。

論。又如內種至世俗有故。

述曰。下以喻成。五十二說內法種子。簡麥．豆等。其體實有。彼言世俗。但所對別。非言世俗一切定假。不爾內種即假有失。假法如無非因緣故。非是調然離識有體如心．心所。名為世俗。體仍非假。世親攝論亦有此說。假非因故。

論。四中尋伺至粗細異故。

述曰。自下第二自相應門。尋．伺二法定自不俱。體俱思．惠。類俱推度。不可同體同用。粗細相違之法。而得並生。粗細異故。如上下受等。

問若尋．伺二不得俱生。如何大乘說有三地。有尋有伺等。以起伺時同時心．心所。即欲界有有伺無尋地。若唯起尋時俱時心等。應名有尋無伺等。若俱不起俱時心等。應名無尋無伺地。汝之三地應皆不成。二不俱起無此地故。為答此問故次論云。

論。依于尋伺至故無雜亂。

述曰。此同瑜伽第四卷說。其五十六亦有此文。依有尋．伺二法有染

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 世俗諦中存在尋（vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（vicara，精細的觀察）。

問：為什麼說尋和伺是假有（unreal）的呢？答：因為尋和伺這兩個詞在世俗諦中是相對而存在的，它們的定義是相對於其他概念而言的。

論：有一種觀點認為，尋和伺在禪定（samadhi）中也是假有。

述曰：下面是第二種觀點，認為在禪定中尋和伺是實有（real）的。為什麼這麼說呢？因為《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷只說了尋和伺是假有，並沒有說它們本身是假有。因此，可以知道它們是實有的。如果這樣，為什麼又說它們在世俗諦中存在呢？這是隨順其他宗派的觀點而說的，因為（其他宗派）認為尋和伺是愚癡（moha）的一部分。並非說在世俗諦中存在就一定是假有，就像昏沉（styana）等一樣。正如前面已經論證過的。

論：又比如，內在的種子（bija）是實有的，但在世俗諦中也說它們存在。

述曰：下面用比喻來證明。第五十二卷說，內在的種子，比如麥子、豆子等，它們的本體是實有的。這裡說它們在世俗諦中存在，只是因為它們是相對其他概念而言的。並非說在世俗諦中存在就一定是假有，否則內在的種子就變成假有了，這就不對了。假法就像沒有原因一樣。尋和伺不是像心（citta）和心所（caitta）那樣，完全脫離了識（vijnana）而獨立存在的，所以稱為世俗諦中存在，但它們的本體仍然不是假有的。世親（Vasubandhu）的《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中也有這種說法，因為假法沒有原因。

論：在四禪（dhyana）中，尋和伺不能同時存在，因為它們有粗細之分。

述曰：下面是第二種自相應門。尋和伺這兩種法，它們自身不能同時存在。它們的本體都是思（manaskara）和慧（prajna），類別都是推度（vitarka-vicara），不能是同一個本體，同一個作用。粗細相違的法，不能同時產生，因為它們有粗細之分，就像上下受（vedana）等一樣。

問：如果尋和伺不能同時產生，那麼大乘（Mahayana）經典中為什麼說有三地（bhumi），即有尋有伺地（savitarka-savicara-bhumi）等呢？因為在生起伺的時候，同時生起的心和心所，就是欲界（kama-dhatu）的有伺無尋地。如果只生起尋的時候，同時生起的心等，應該稱為有尋無伺地。如果尋和伺都不生起的時候，同時生起的心等，應該稱為無尋無伺地。如果這樣，你們說的三地就都不能成立了，因為尋和伺不能同時生起，所以沒有這種地。 爲了回答這個問題，所以接下來論述說：

論：依靠尋和伺的差別，所以沒有雜亂。

述曰：這和《瑜伽師地論》第四卷說的一樣。第五十六卷也有這段文字。依靠有尋和伺這兩種法，會有染污（klesha）。

【English Translation】 English version: In conventional truth (samvrti-satya), there exist vitarka (gross thought, initial application of thought) and vicara (subtle thought, sustained application of thought).

Question: Why are vitarka and vicara said to be unreal (asattva)? Answer: Because these two terms, vitarka and vicara, exist relatively in conventional truth; their definitions are relative to other concepts.

Treatise: Some argue that vitarka and vicara are also unreal in samadhi (concentration).

Commentary: The following is a second view, which holds that vitarka and vicara are real in samadhi. How is this known? Because the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, in its fifty-fifth fascicle, only states that vitarka and vicara are unreal, without saying that they themselves are unreal. Therefore, it can be known that they are real. If so, why is it said that they exist in conventional truth? This is said in accordance with the views of other schools, because (other schools) consider vitarka and vicara to be part of ignorance (moha). It is not the case that being said to exist in conventional truth necessarily implies being unreal, just like sloth (styana) and torpor (middha). As has been argued before.

Treatise: Furthermore, just as internal seeds (bija) are real, but are also said to exist in conventional truth.

Commentary: The following uses a metaphor to prove this. The fifty-second fascicle states that internal seeds, such as wheat and beans, have real entities. Saying that they exist in conventional truth is only because they are relative to other concepts. It is not the case that being said to exist in conventional truth necessarily implies being unreal; otherwise, internal seeds would become unreal, which would be incorrect. False dharmas are like having no cause. Vitarka and vicara are not like citta (mind) and caitta (mental factors), which exist independently of vijnana (consciousness), so they are called existing in conventional truth, but their entities are still not unreal. Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana) also has this statement, because false dharmas have no cause.

Treatise: In the four dhyanas (meditative absorptions), vitarka and vicara cannot exist simultaneously because they differ in grossness and subtlety.

Commentary: The following is the second self-corresponding aspect. These two dharmas, vitarka and vicara, cannot exist simultaneously themselves. Their entities are both manaskara (attention) and prajna (wisdom), and their categories are both vitarka-vicara (initial and sustained application of thought). It is impossible for the same entity to have the same function. Dharmas that contradict each other in grossness and subtlety cannot arise simultaneously because they differ in grossness and subtlety, just like upper and lower vedana (feelings).

Question: If vitarka and vicara cannot arise simultaneously, then why do Mahayana sutras say that there are three bhumis (grounds), namely the savitarka-savicara-bhumi (ground with both vitarka and vicara), etc.? Because when vicara arises, the simultaneously arising mind and mental factors are the savitarka-avicara-bhumi (ground with vicara but without vitarka) of the kama-dhatu (desire realm). If only vitarka arises, the simultaneously arising mind, etc., should be called the savitarka-avicara-bhumi (ground with vitarka but without vicara). If neither vitarka nor vicara arises, the simultaneously arising mind, etc., should be called the avitarka-avicara-bhumi (ground without vitarka and vicara). If so, the three bhumis you speak of cannot be established, because vitarka and vicara cannot arise simultaneously, so there is no such ground. To answer this question, the following treatise states:

Treatise: Relying on the difference between vitarka and vicara, there is no confusion.

Commentary: This is the same as what is said in the fourth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. The fifty-sixth fascicle also has this passage. Relying on these two dharmas, vitarka and vicara, there will be klesha (afflictions).

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故。名有尋伺地等。約染以辨立三地別。不依現起。此簡乃至生第四定中。許現起故。不依彼種。此簡乃至生非想定。種猶有故。依染有無說三地別。故此三地無雜亂失　然伏尋染以入中間。有伺無尋。不爾即與欲界無別。欲界無伺等時。伺等染未離故。如身在欲界。雖未離欲一品．或多。作不凈觀亦伏貪慾。后出觀已或退不退。此亦如是。初定．中間雖同一系。要伏尋染方得有伺無尋地定。后出觀時。或退不退起于尋染。亦非離初定一品．或多染方得彼定。少制伏故。非以品離。

其無漏定依於此地。及已離染彼三地法。是此類故亦名此地。不爾即成攝法不盡。更有異釋。如樞要說。

論。俱與前二至互相應義。

述曰。尋．伺與悔．眠。俱得相應前二與自及與后二得相應義。行相不違故。然無四法一時並義。

論。四皆不與至非五法故。

述曰。第三識相應門。七．八如前說。悔．眠唯與第六識俱。非五識俱法故。所以者何。此二皆由強思加行方能起故。非任運生故。大論第一說夢意不共業故。惡作初起必與憂根相應起故。

論。有義尋伺至有尋伺故。

述曰。此第一師。悔．眠雖無有諍。尋．伺二法亦五識俱。亦彼意識故。論說五識有尋．伺故。五十六下說。問生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，名為有尋伺地等。根據染污的有無來區分，設立三種地的差別。不是依據現起（的狀態），這裡是爲了簡別乃至生到第四禪定中的情況，因為第四禪定中允許尋伺現起。也不是依據彼種（子），這裡是爲了簡別乃至生到非想非非想處的情況，因為彼處種子仍然存在。依據染污的有無來說明三種地的差別，因此這三種地沒有雜亂的過失。然而，要先制伏尋伺的染污才能進入中間定，才能達到有伺無尋的狀態。否則，就和欲界沒有區別了，因為欲界沒有無伺等情況的時候，尋伺等染污還沒有斷離。就像身在欲界，即使沒有斷離欲界一品或多品染污，作不凈觀也能制伏貪慾。之後出觀以後，或者退轉或者不退轉。這裡也是如此。初禪定和中間定雖然屬於同一界系，但必須要制伏尋伺的染污才能得到有伺無尋地的禪定。之後出觀的時候，或者退轉或者不退轉，生起尋伺的染污。也不是斷離初禪定一品或多品染污才能得到彼定，因為只是稍微制伏，而不是以斷離品位來獲得。 其無漏定依據此地，以及已經斷離染污的彼三種地之法。因為是同類，所以也名為此地。否則，就成了攝法不盡。還有其他的解釋，如《樞要》所說。 論：尋伺與前二者（悔、眠）乃至互相相應的意思。 述記說：尋伺與悔、眠，都可以相應；前二者（悔、眠）與自身以及與后二者（尋、伺）可以相應。因為行相不相違背。然而，沒有四法同時並起的情況。 論：四者都不與乃至不是五法俱起的原因。 述記說：在第三識相應門中，第七、第八識的相應如前所說。悔、眠只與第六識俱起，不是與前五識俱起的原因。為什麼呢？因為這二者都是由強烈的思惟加行才能生起，不是任運而生的。如《大論》第一卷所說，夢意不共業的緣故。惡作（悔）初起必定與憂根相應而生起。 論：有義認為尋伺乃至有尋伺的緣故。 述記說：這是第一位論師的觀點。悔、眠雖然沒有爭議，但尋、伺二法也與前五識俱起，也與彼意識俱起。論中說前五識有尋、伺的緣故。第五十六卷下說：問生……

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is named the 'Having Initial and Sustained Application Ground' (有尋伺地, Youxunsi Di). Based on the presence or absence of defilements, three grounds are distinguished. This is not based on the state of manifestation (現起, xianqi); this distinction is to differentiate even those born in the Fourth Dhyana (第四禪定, Disi Chanding), because in the Fourth Dhyana, initial and sustained application are allowed to manifest. Nor is it based on their seeds (種子, zhongzi); this distinction is to differentiate even those born in the Realm of Neither Perception nor Non-Perception (非想非非想處, Feixiang Feifeixiang Chu), because the seeds still exist there. The distinction of the three grounds is based on the presence or absence of defilements, so there is no confusion among these three grounds. However, one must subdue the defilements of initial and sustained application to enter the Intermediate Dhyana (中間, Zhongjian), to achieve the state of 'Having Sustained Application but No Initial Application' (有伺無尋, Yousi Wuxun). Otherwise, there would be no difference from the Desire Realm (欲界, Yujie), because in the Desire Realm, when there is no 'no sustained application' etc., the defilements of initial and sustained application have not been abandoned. Just as when one is in the Desire Realm, even if one has not abandoned one or more grades of desire, practicing the contemplation of impurity (不凈觀, bujingguan) can subdue greed. After emerging from the contemplation, one may either regress or not regress. It is the same here. Although the First Dhyana (初定, Chuding) and the Intermediate Dhyana belong to the same realm, one must subdue the defilements of initial and sustained application to attain the Dhyana of the 'Having Sustained Application but No Initial Application Ground'. When emerging from the contemplation later, one may either regress or not regress, giving rise to the defilements of initial and sustained application. It is not that one must abandon one or more grades of defilement of the First Dhyana to attain that Dhyana, because it is only a slight subduing, not an abandonment by grades. The undefiled Samadhi (無漏定, Wulou Ding) is based on this ground, as well as the dharmas of those three grounds that have already abandoned defilements. Because they are of the same kind, they are also called this ground. Otherwise, it would be an incomplete inclusion of dharmas. There are other explanations, as stated in the 'Essentials' (樞要, Shunyao). Treatise: 'Initial and sustained application, together with the former two (remorse and sleep), up to the meaning of mutual correspondence.' Commentary: 'Initial and sustained application can correspond with remorse and sleep; the former two (remorse and sleep) can correspond with themselves and with the latter two (initial and sustained application). Because their characteristics do not contradict each other. However, there is no situation where the four dharmas arise simultaneously.' Treatise: 'The four do not arise together with, up to, it is not because of the five consciousnesses.' Commentary: 'In the third section on the corresponding minds, the correspondence of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses is as previously stated. Remorse and sleep only arise together with the sixth consciousness, not with the first five consciousnesses. Why? Because these two can only arise through strong thought and effort, not spontaneously. As stated in the first volume of the Great Treatise, it is because of the non-common karma of dream-mind. The initial arising of regret (惡作, Ezuo) necessarily arises in correspondence with the root of sorrow (憂根, Yougen).' Treatise: 'Some argue that initial and sustained application, up to, it is because of having initial and sustained application.' Commentary: 'This is the view of the first teacher. Although there is no dispute about remorse and sleep, the two dharmas of initial and sustained application also arise together with the first five consciousnesses, and also with that mind consciousness. The treatise states that the first five consciousnesses have initial and sustained application. As stated in the fifty-sixth volume below: Question: arising...'

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第二定。或生上地。有尋伺眼等識現在前。云何此地無尋無伺。若不現前。云何于彼有色諸根。而能領受彼地境界等。彼論說五識有尋．伺故。

論。又說尋伺至謂五識故。

述曰。大論第五末說。尋．伺即七分別。謂有相．無相．任運．尋求．伺察．染污．不染污。彼以有相為首等故。雜集論第二末後。言任運分別謂五識故。此師分別謂在五識。非五識體即是分別。前以文證。此以理徴。任運分別五識既有。故知尋．伺五識不無。然攝論第二。破上座胸中色物為意根。許五識有自性。雖無自性是尋．伺文。對法說為任運分別。故知五識亦有尋．伺。非直義通大．小。亦理中於是。

論。有義尋伺至不共法故。

述曰。此第二師。文有其四。一標宗。二引證。三會違。四總結。此即標宗。唯在意識。引證有三。一大論第一。說尋求分別。伺察分別等七分別。總十五種意不共業。大論第五言七分別是尋．伺差別。彼第一言是意不共。故知尋．伺唯在意識。

論。又說尋伺至苦樂俱故。

述曰。第二證也。彼第五復說尋．伺相應中。地獄尋．伺唯是戚行。觸非愛境引發苦。與憂俱嬈心業轉。人．天尋．伺多分憂等。少分喜等。初靜慮中所有尋．伺唯喜受俱。彼各別作。今此中總通人

．天等五趣為論。又彼文云唯憂．喜二法相應。曾不說與苦．樂二法俱起。故知五識定無尋．伺。

若爾彼不說舍。尋．伺應不俱。不說苦．樂俱。即言五識定無尋．伺。不言舍受俱。尋．伺俱無舍。

論。舍受遍故至與苦樂俱。

述曰。舍受遍相應。彼論不待言。苦．樂不遍俱。何緣論不說。既不說有苦．樂。故知五識無。

問不說苦俱。即言五識無尋．伺。不說與樂俱。初定無尋．伺。

論。雖初靜慮至總說喜名。

述曰。初定有意樂。而不離喜。即一喜受義說為樂。如對法七．及五十七．顯揚二等說。以此義故總說喜名。即攝彼樂。欲界尋．伺。下地喜．樂。在識各別。體性相離何不別說。

前師問言。汝純受苦處。彼與意苦俱。何緣亦不說。豈以不說即非苦俱。

論。雖純苦處至總說為憂。

述曰。彼意地苦。與憂相似有分別故。總說為憂即攝彼苦。余趣憂．苦各在一處。勢不相似。何緣不說。此即意中有苦受師義。

論。又說尋伺至義為境故。

述曰。第三證也。彼第五卷說。尋．伺二以名身等三法。及所詮義為所緣。非五識以名等。所詮義理為境故。由上教理故知五識定無尋．伺。

論。然說五識至非說彼相應。

述

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於天等五趣的討論。而且那篇文章說只與憂和喜兩種感受相應，從未說過與苦和樂兩種感受同時生起。因此可知五識一定沒有尋和伺（vitarka and vicara，粗略和細緻的心理活動）。

如果這樣，那篇文章沒有說舍受（upeksa，不苦不樂的感受），那麼尋和伺應該不與舍受同時生起。既然沒有說苦和樂同時生起，就說五識一定沒有尋和伺。但沒有說舍受同時生起，尋和伺就都沒有舍受。

論：因為舍受是普遍的，所以與苦和樂同時生起。

述曰：舍受是普遍相應的，那篇文章不需要特別說明。苦和樂不是普遍同時生起的，為什麼那篇文章沒有說？既然沒有說有苦和樂，所以可知五識沒有尋和伺。

問：沒有說與苦同時生起，就說五識沒有尋和伺。沒有說與樂同時生起，初禪（prathama-dhyana，禪定的第一階段）就沒有尋和伺。

論：雖然初禪直到最後都總稱為喜。

述曰：初禪有意樂，但不離喜。就用一種喜受的意義來說明為樂。如《對法》第七品、第五十七品以及《顯揚》第二品等所說。因為這個意義，所以總稱為喜，即包含了那樂。欲界（kama-dhatu，慾望界）的尋和伺，下地的喜和樂，在識中各自不同，體性和性質相離，為什麼不分別說明？

前一位論師問道：在純粹感受苦的地方，那苦與意苦同時生起，為什麼也不說？難道因為沒有說就不是與苦同時生起嗎？

論：雖然純粹的苦處直到最後都總稱為憂。

述曰：那意地的苦，與憂相似，但有分別，所以總稱為憂，即包含了那苦。其他趣的憂和苦各在一處，情況不相似，為什麼不說？這即是意中有苦受的論師的觀點。

論：又說尋和伺以名身等三法，以及所詮釋的意義為境界。

述曰：這是第三個證據。那第五卷說，尋和伺二者以名身等三種法，以及所詮釋的意義為所緣。而五識不以名等所詮釋的義理為境界。由於以上的教義和道理，可知五識一定沒有尋和伺。

論：然而說五識，不是說它們相應。

【English Translation】 English version Regarding the discussion of the five realms such as Devas (heavenly beings). Moreover, that text states that it only corresponds to the two feelings of sorrow and joy, and never mentions that it arises simultaneously with the two feelings of suffering and pleasure. Therefore, it is known that the five consciousnesses definitely do not have vitarka and vicara (initial application of thought and sustained application of thought).

If so, that text does not mention upeksa (equanimity), then vitarka and vicara should not arise simultaneously with upeksa. Since it does not say that suffering and pleasure arise simultaneously, it is said that the five consciousnesses definitely do not have vitarka and vicara. But it does not say that upeksa arises simultaneously, so vitarka and vicara do not have upeksa.

Treatise: Because upeksa is pervasive, it arises simultaneously with suffering and pleasure.

Commentary: Upeksa is universally corresponding, that text does not need to specifically state. Suffering and pleasure do not arise simultaneously universally, why does that text not say? Since it does not say there is suffering and pleasure, it is known that the five consciousnesses do not have vitarka and vicara.

Question: Not saying that it arises simultaneously with suffering, it is said that the five consciousnesses do not have vitarka and vicara. Not saying that it arises simultaneously with pleasure, the first dhyana (first stage of meditation) does not have vitarka and vicara.

Treatise: Although the first dhyana until the end is generally called joy.

Commentary: The first dhyana has mental pleasure, but it is inseparable from joy. It uses the meaning of one feeling of joy to explain it as pleasure. As stated in the seventh and fifty-seventh chapters of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the second chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. Because of this meaning, it is generally called joy, which includes that pleasure. The vitarka and vicara of the kama-dhatu (desire realm), the joy and pleasure of the lower realms, are different in each consciousness, and their nature and characteristics are separate, why not explain them separately?

The previous master asked: In the place of purely experiencing suffering, that suffering arises simultaneously with mental suffering, why is it not mentioned either? Is it because it is not mentioned that it does not arise simultaneously with suffering?

Treatise: Although the purely suffering place until the end is generally called sorrow.

Commentary: The suffering in that mental realm is similar to sorrow, but there are distinctions, so it is generally called sorrow, which includes that suffering. The sorrow and suffering of other realms are each in one place, and the situations are not similar, why not say it? This is the view of the master who believes that there is suffering in the mind.

Treatise: It is also said that vitarka and vicara take the three dharmas such as name-body, etc., and the meaning that is explained as their object.

Commentary: This is the third proof. That fifth volume says that vitarka and vicara both take the three dharmas such as name-body, etc., and the meaning that is explained as their object. But the five consciousnesses do not take the meaning explained by name, etc., as their object. Due to the above teachings and reasons, it is known that the five consciousnesses definitely do not have vitarka and vicara.

Treatise: However, saying the five consciousnesses, it is not saying that they are corresponding.

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曰。此下會違有二。此初也。五十六等。說五識有尋．伺者。顯多由彼起。非說彼相應。謂彼文說生在第二定以上起下識者。顯彼五識。或除率爾心等。定由尋．伺俱意識引故。方可得生。非說五識尋．伺俱也。此即顯五由彼意識起。若在欲界。定中耳識率爾起時。意雖同緣。不藉尋．伺俱意引生。上定亦與地獄耳識俱時起故。五識余時多由彼尋等意識引。起自地五識故。尋．伺亦通初定有故。顯由彼起。多由彼起。二種各別合為一言。其顯由彼言。正會前師所引論文。其多由彼起。傍會設有初定已下。論說有尋．伺文。欲界率爾五識起時。雖意同緣。非必由意引。如定中耳識。大目犍連入無所有處定。聞象等聲。豈彼意識有尋．伺也。若薩婆多。定后聞聲即無是事。如前第五卷中廣解。二禪以上準欲界。亦有率爾五識。不藉尋．伺意識引生。以境強至故。其等流決定由意有染．凈心故。今合為論。故言顯多由彼起。除率爾心故　又解在初定。及欲界起眼等識。自地法故。起時自在。雖由意引五識方生。意識不必要尋．伺俱。多由彼起。生第二定以上。起眼等識非彼法故。必假尋．伺相應意識導引方生。定由彼起。

論。雜集所言至相應尋伺。

述曰。對法第二任運分別謂五識者。與大論第一說別。對法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 答：以下對『會違』（會歸與違背）有兩種情況。這是第一種。『五十六等』（五十六種心所法）說五識有『尋』（粗略的心理活動）和『伺』（精細的心理活動），是爲了顯示五識多由『尋』和『伺』而生起，並非說五識與『尋』和『伺』相應。也就是說，前面引用的經文說，生在第二禪定以上的人，如果生起地獄的五識，是爲了顯示那些五識，或者排除『率爾心』（無意識的剎那念頭）等情況，一定是由於『尋』和『伺』都存在的意識引導，才可以生起。並非說五識本身具有『尋』和『伺』。這正是顯示五識是由意識生起的。如果在欲界，禪定中耳識突然生起時，雖然意識也同時緣取對象，但並不需要『尋』和『伺』都存在的意識引導。因為上界的禪定也可能與地獄的耳識同時生起。五識在其他時候，大多是由具有『尋』等的意識引導而生起，從而生起自身所處層次的五識。『尋』和『伺』也同樣存在於初禪定中。所以說『由彼起』（由那個而生起）和『多由彼起』（大多由那個而生起）是兩種不同的情況，合在一起說。其中『由彼』，正是爲了會合前人所引用的經文。而『多由彼起』，是爲了旁敲側擊地會合即使在初禪定以下，經論中也有關於『尋』和『伺』的說法。在欲界，『率爾』五識生起時，雖然意識也同時緣取對象，但不一定是由意識引導，就像禪定中的耳識一樣。比如，大目犍連（Mahāmaudgalyāyana）進入『無所有處定』（Ākiṃcanyāyatana）時，聽到大象等的聲音，難道那時的意識有『尋』和『伺』嗎？如果按照薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）的觀點，禪定之後聽到聲音，就不會有這種情況，就像前面第五卷中詳細解釋的那樣。二禪以上的情況，可以參照欲界，也有『率爾』五識，不需要具有『尋』和『伺』的意識引導而生起，因為外境強烈地逼近。至於『等流』（性質相似的延續），一定是由於意識具有染污或清凈的心念。現在將這些合在一起討論，所以說『顯示大多由那個而生起』，這是爲了排除『率爾心』的情況。另一種解釋是，在初禪定和欲界生起眼識等五識，因為是自身所處層次的法，所以在生起時是自在的。雖然是由意識引導五識才生起，但意識不必要具有『尋』和『伺』。這屬於『多由彼起』的情況。如果生在第二禪定以上，生起眼識等五識，因為不是自身所處層次的法，所以必須藉助與『尋』和『伺』相應的意識引導才能生起。這屬於『定由彼起』的情況。

論：『雜集』（《雜集論》）所說，乃至『相應尋伺』。

述：對法（《阿毗達磨對法論》）第二，『任運分別謂五識者』（任運分別的五識），與《大論》（《阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論》）第一的說法不同。對法...

【English Translation】 English version: Reply: There are two kinds of 'agreement and contradiction' (harmonization and divergence) below. This is the first. 'Fifty-six, etc.' (the fifty-six mental factors) says that the five consciousnesses have 'Vitarka' (initial application of thought) and 'Vicara' (sustained application of thought), to show that the five consciousnesses mostly arise from 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara', not to say that the five consciousnesses are associated with 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara'. That is to say, the scripture quoted earlier says that if a person born in the second Dhyana (meditative absorption) or above gives rise to the lower realm's five consciousnesses, it is to show that those five consciousnesses, or excluding 'momentary thought' (unconscious instantaneous thought), etc., must be guided by a consciousness that has both 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara' in order to arise. It is not to say that the five consciousnesses themselves have both 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara'. This precisely shows that the five consciousnesses arise from consciousness. If in the desire realm, when the ear consciousness suddenly arises in meditation, although the consciousness also simultaneously apprehends the object, it does not need to be guided by a consciousness that has both 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara'. Because the upper realm's Dhyana may also arise simultaneously with the lower realm's ear consciousness. The five consciousnesses at other times mostly arise guided by a consciousness with 'Vitarka', etc., thereby giving rise to the five consciousnesses of their own level. 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara' are also present in the first Dhyana. Therefore, saying 'arising from that' and 'mostly arising from that' are two different situations, spoken of together. Among them, 'from that' is precisely to harmonize with the scripture quoted by previous scholars. And 'mostly arising from that' is to obliquely harmonize with the fact that even in the first Dhyana and below, there are statements in the scriptures about 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara'. In the desire realm, when 'momentary' five consciousnesses arise, although the consciousness also simultaneously apprehends the object, it is not necessarily guided by consciousness, just like the ear consciousness in meditation. For example, when Mahāmaudgalyāyana (Great Maudgalyayana) enters the Ākiṃcanyāyatana (sphere of nothingness), he hears the sounds of elephants, etc. Does the consciousness at that time have 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara'? If according to the Sarvāstivāda (the doctrine that "all exists") school's view, hearing sounds after meditation would not be the case, as explained in detail in the fifth volume earlier. The situation above the second Dhyana can be referred to the desire realm, there are also 'momentary' five consciousnesses, which do not need to be guided by a consciousness with 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara' to arise, because the external environment strongly approaches. As for 'equal flow' (continuity of similar nature), it must be because the consciousness has defiled or pure thoughts. Now, discussing these together, it is said 'showing that it mostly arises from that', this is to exclude the situation of 'momentary thought'. Another explanation is that when eye consciousness and other five consciousnesses arise in the first Dhyana and the desire realm, because they are the Dharma (teachings) of their own level, they are free when arising. Although the five consciousnesses only arise when guided by consciousness, the consciousness does not necessarily have 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara'. This belongs to the situation of 'mostly arising from that'. If born in the second Dhyana or above, giving rise to eye consciousness and other five consciousnesses, because they are not the Dharma of their own level, they must rely on the guidance of a consciousness associated with 'Vitarka' and 'Vicara' to arise. This belongs to the situation of 'definitely arising from that'.

Treatise: What the 'Compendium' ( Abhidharma-samuccaya) says, up to 'associated Vitarka and Vicara'.

Commentary: The second of Abhidharma, 'the five consciousnesses that spontaneously discriminate' is different from the first statement of the Great Treatise (Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra). Abhidharma...

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說任運即是五識。大論說任運是五俱意相應尋．伺。由此理故。大論說為意不共業。以五識中尋．伺無故。若五識任運即尋．伺者。如何是意不共業也。以五識亦有故。但言尋．伺有七分別。不言七分別皆是尋．伺。故無過也。復應準知　問自性分別。攝論說云五識中有。對法第二說自性是有相。有相即尋．伺。故知有相在於五識。亦非意不共。如何別也　答彼攝論者。隨順理門說在五識。以五識中無尋．伺故。對法說言自性分別是有相收非任運攝。故知五識無自性分別　又解五識亦有。以攝論為正。自性分別亦有二種。一即是五識。二是意識相應尋．伺。意識相應尋．伺故。對法說自性是有相。有相是意不共業。自性不是任運所收。以五識故。說五識有自性分別。是非尋．伺。亦無過也。

論。故彼所引至定無尋伺。

述曰。總非前教為證不成了結上文。由此理故何故五識即是任運。意俱尋．伺方名任運　答意俱分別多起尋伺。尋．伺強故以為任運。五無相應分別法故。五識體是任運分別。自性等亦然　若爾即五俱意無尋．伺相應非任運　設無任運亦復何妨　七分別收法不盡故。或無五俱散意無尋．伺者。解深密．七十三。說五俱有一分別意識故。此違定中聞聲等事。其七分別。對法第二．瑜伽第一．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：如果說任運（ran yun，自然而然的活動）就是五識（wu shi，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）。《大論》（da lun，指《大毗婆沙論》）說任運是與五俱意（wu ju yi，與五識同時生起的意識）相應的尋（xun，粗略的觀察）、伺（si，精細的觀察）。因為這個道理，《大論》才說是意不共業（yi bu gong ye，意識獨有的活動）。因為五識中沒有尋、伺的緣故。如果五識的任運就是尋、伺，那怎麼能說是意識獨有的活動呢？因為五識也有尋、伺的緣故。只是說尋、伺有七種分別，不是說七種分別都是尋、伺，所以沒有過失。還應該依此準則來理解。 問：自性分別（zi xing fen bie，對事物本質的分別）。《攝論》（she lun，指《攝大乘論》）說五識中有自性分別。《對法》（dui fa，指《阿毗達摩》）第二卷說自性是有相（you xiang，有對象的）。有相就是尋、伺。因此可知有相存在於五識中，也不是意識獨有的。這又該如何區分呢？ 答：那部《攝論》是隨順理門（sui shun li men，順應某種道理）而說五識中有自性分別的，因為五識中沒有尋、伺的緣故。《對法》說自性分別是有相所包含，不是任運所包含。因此可知五識沒有自性分別。另一種解釋是五識也有自性分別，以《攝論》為正確的說法。自性分別也有兩種：一種就是五識，另一種是與意識相應的尋、伺。因為是與意識相應的尋、伺，所以《對法》說自性是有相，有相是意不共業。自性不是任運所包含的，因為是五識的緣故。說五識有自性分別，但這種自性分別不是尋、伺，也沒有過失。

論：所以他們所引用的經文，直到『定無尋伺』（ding wu xun si，禪定中沒有尋和伺）為止。

述曰：總的來說，用之前的教義作為證據是不成立的，總結上文。因為這個道理，為什麼五識就是任運呢？與意識同時生起的尋、伺才叫做任運。答：與意識同時生起的分別大多會產生尋、伺。因為尋、伺強烈，所以認為是任運。五識沒有相應的分別法，所以五識的本體就是任運分別，自性等等也是這樣。如果這樣，那麼與五識同時生起的意識沒有尋、伺相應，就不是任運了嗎？即使沒有任運又有什麼妨礙呢？因為七種分別所包含的法不完全。或者沒有與五識同時生起的散亂意識，沒有尋、伺的情況。《解深密經》（jie shen mi jing）第七十三卷說與五識同時生起有一種分別意識。這與禪定中聽到聲音等事情相違背。關於七種分別，《對法》第二卷、《瑜伽師地論》（yu qie shi di lun）第一卷……

【English Translation】 English version Question: If it is said that 'ran yun' (任運, spontaneous activity) is the five consciousnesses (五識, wu shi: eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness). The 'Da Lun' (大論, da lun, referring to the 'Mahavibhasa Sastra') says that 'ran yun' is the 'xun' (尋, rough observation) and 'si' (伺, subtle observation) that are associated with the 'wu ju yi' (五俱意, the consciousness arising simultaneously with the five consciousnesses). Because of this reason, the 'Da Lun' says it is the 'yi bu gong ye' (意不共業, activity unique to consciousness). Because there is no 'xun' or 'si' in the five consciousnesses. If the 'ran yun' of the five consciousnesses is 'xun' and 'si', then how can it be said to be an activity unique to consciousness? Because the five consciousnesses also have 'xun' and 'si'. It is only said that 'xun' and 'si' have seven kinds of distinctions, not that all seven kinds of distinctions are 'xun' and 'si', so there is no fault. It should also be understood according to this principle. Question: 'Zi xing fen bie' (自性分別, discrimination of self-nature). The 'She Lun' (攝論, she lun, referring to the 'Mahayana-samgraha') says that there is 'zi xing fen bie' in the five consciousnesses. The second volume of the 'Dui Fa' (對法, dui fa, referring to the 'Abhidharma') says that self-nature is 'you xiang' (有相, having an object). 'You xiang' is 'xun' and 'si'. Therefore, it can be known that 'you xiang' exists in the five consciousnesses and is not unique to consciousness either. How should this be distinguished? Answer: That 'She Lun' says that there is 'zi xing fen bie' in the five consciousnesses in accordance with the 'li men' (理門, principle), because there is no 'xun' or 'si' in the five consciousnesses. The 'Dui Fa' says that 'zi xing fen bie' is included in 'you xiang', not included in 'ran yun'. Therefore, it can be known that the five consciousnesses do not have 'zi xing fen bie'. Another explanation is that the five consciousnesses also have 'zi xing fen bie', taking the 'She Lun' as the correct statement. There are also two kinds of 'zi xing fen bie': one is the five consciousnesses, and the other is the 'xun' and 'si' associated with consciousness. Because it is the 'xun' and 'si' associated with consciousness, the 'Dui Fa' says that self-nature is 'you xiang', and 'you xiang' is the 'yi bu gong ye'. Self-nature is not included in 'ran yun', because it is the five consciousnesses. Saying that the five consciousnesses have 'zi xing fen bie', but this 'zi xing fen bie' is not 'xun' and 'si', and there is no fault.

Treatise: Therefore, the scriptures they cited, up to 'ding wu xun si' (定無尋伺, there is no 'xun' and 'si' in samadhi).

Commentary: In general, using the previous teachings as evidence is not valid, summarizing the above. Because of this reason, why are the five consciousnesses 'ran yun'? The 'xun' and 'si' that arise simultaneously with consciousness are called 'ran yun'. Answer: The discriminations that arise simultaneously with consciousness mostly produce 'xun' and 'si'. Because 'xun' and 'si' are strong, they are considered 'ran yun'. The five consciousnesses do not have corresponding discriminating dharmas, so the essence of the five consciousnesses is 'ran yun fen bie', and self-nature, etc., are also like this. If so, then the consciousness that arises simultaneously with the five consciousnesses without 'xun' and 'si' is not 'ran yun'? Even if there is no 'ran yun', what harm is there? Because the dharmas included in the seven distinctions are not complete. Or there is no scattered consciousness arising simultaneously with the five consciousnesses, without 'xun' and 'si'. The seventy-third volume of the 'Samdhinirmochana Sutra' (解深密經, Jie Shen Mi Jing) says that there is a discriminating consciousness arising simultaneously with the five consciousnesses. This contradicts things like hearing sounds in samadhi. Regarding the seven distinctions, the second volume of the 'Dui Fa', the first volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (瑜伽師地論, Yu Qie Shi Di Lun)...

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第五。及攝論等。諸門分別。如理應思。同別抄說其自性等攝法不同。並如別抄。

自下第四遍行中五受俱．不俱門。

論。有義惡作至通無記故。

述曰。以此惡作唯戚行轉。故與憂根相應。不與喜．樂相應。通無記性故。與舍根相應。下論說言于無記法亦追悔故。與舍俱也。以非五識俱故無苦　問若善．惡追悔亦通舍不　答曰不然。惡作強思生善．惡。與憂必俱起。若無記追悔。即無記威儀．工巧心中俱。或於善染相續未位方與舍俱。故善．染時俱即無舍受。舍受亦通戚行。但不多分別故名為舍。非無戚行也。故惡作戚行得與舍俱。強思生故。非善．染舍可與俱也。與薩婆多別。彼唯憂俱。故離欲舍。此與舍俱。聖者猶有　此解不然。違下文故。應說惡作多與憂根相應。舍俱起者是彼伴類。若無染．善者。無記亦無故。亦離欲舍。聖者起悔但是惡作。非體是悔。善中是厭。無記即威儀．工巧惠。憂根無故。悔離欲舍。離欲舍者行相粗故。世間離欲其種猶在。有漏離欲退．可起故。非如聖者亦斷種故。

論。睡眠喜憂至中庸轉故。

述曰。睡眠與欲界意識俱一切受相應。以睡行相通歡故喜受俱。通戚故憂受並。中庸故舍受俱。如次第配。

論。尋伺憂喜至意樂俱故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 第五，關於《攝大乘論》等，各種門類的分別，應當如理如實地思考。關於『同』和『異』的抄本中，說明了其自性等所攝之法有所不同，詳細內容參見其他抄本。

接下來是第四遍行中，五種感受（受）同時存在與不同時存在的門類。

論：有觀點認為，惡作（kukkritya，對已做錯事的後悔）乃至通於無記性（avyākrta，非善非惡的狀態），因此與舍受（upekṣā，不苦不樂的感受）相應。

述記：因為這種惡作唯有戚行（苦惱的行相）運轉，所以與憂根（domanassa，憂的根本）相應，不與喜根（saumanasya，喜的根本）、樂根（sukha，快樂的感受）相應。因為它通於無記性，所以與舍根（upekṣhāindriya，舍的根本）相應。下面的論述說，對於無記法也有追悔，所以與舍受同在。因為它不與五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）同時生起，所以沒有苦受（duhkha，痛苦的感受）。 問：如果對於善、惡的追悔也通於舍受嗎？ 答：不是這樣的。惡作是由於強烈的思慮而產生善或惡，必定與憂受同時生起。如果是對於無記的追悔，那麼就與無記的威儀、工巧心中的舍受同在。或者在善染相續的未定階段，才與舍受同在。所以，在善、染的時候，同時生起的就沒有舍受。舍受也通於戚行，只是不多加分別，所以稱為舍受，並非沒有戚行。所以，惡作的戚行可以與舍受同在，因為是強烈的思慮所生。善、染的舍受不能與惡作同在。這與薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）的觀點不同，他們認為惡作只與憂受同在。所以有離欲的舍受，而這裡與舍受同在，聖者仍然有惡作。這種解釋是不對的，與下文相違背。應該說惡作多與憂根相應，與舍受同時生起的是它的伴隨之類。如果沒有染、善，那麼無記也沒有了，所以也有離欲的舍受。聖者生起的後悔只是惡作，其體性是惡作，不是後悔。善中是厭惡。無記就是威儀、工巧的智慧，沒有憂根。後悔是離欲的舍受。離欲的舍受，其行相粗糙，世間的離欲，其種子仍然存在，有漏的離欲，退失后還可以生起，不像聖者那樣斷絕了種子。

論：睡眠與喜受、憂受乃至中庸的舍受運轉，所以都相應。

述記：睡眠與欲界意識同時生起，與一切感受相應。因為睡眠的行相通於歡快，所以與喜受同在；通於苦惱，所以與憂受同在；中庸，所以與舍受同在。像這樣依次配合。

論：尋（vitarka，粗略的思考）伺（vicāra，精細的思考）與憂受、喜受乃至意樂（chanda，意願和快樂）同在，所以都相應。

【English Translation】 English version: Fifth, regarding the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) and other treatises, the distinctions of various categories should be contemplated as they truly are. The 'same' and 'different' copies explain that the nature and other aspects of the included dharmas are different, as detailed in other copies.

Next is the fourth of the pervasive mental factors, concerning the categories of the five feelings (vedanā) being simultaneous or not.

Treatise: Some argue that regret (kukkritya, remorse over misdeeds) extends even to the indeterminate (avyākrta, neither good nor bad) state, therefore it corresponds with indifference (upekṣā, neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling).

Commentary: Because this regret operates only with the mode of affliction, it corresponds with the root of sorrow (domanassa, the root of sadness), and does not correspond with the root of joy (saumanasya, the root of joy) or pleasure (sukha, pleasant feeling). Because it extends to the indeterminate nature, it corresponds with the root of indifference (upekṣhāindriya, the root of equanimity). The following treatise states that there is also regret for indeterminate dharmas, so it is together with indifference. Because it does not occur simultaneously with the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna, eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses), there is no painful feeling (duhkha, unpleasant feeling). Question: If regret for good or bad also extends to indifference? Answer: It is not so. Regret arises from strong thought of good or bad, and necessarily arises simultaneously with sorrow. If it is regret for the indeterminate, then it is together with indifference in the mind of indeterminate deportment or craftsmanship. Or, in the undetermined stage of the continuum of good and defiled, it is together with indifference. Therefore, when good or defiled arises, there is no indifference. Indifference also extends to the mode of affliction, but it is not much distinguished, so it is called indifference, not that there is no mode of affliction. Therefore, the mode of affliction of regret can be together with indifference, because it is born of strong thought. The indifference of good or defiled cannot be together with regret. This differs from the view of the Sarvāstivāda school, which holds that regret is only together with sorrow. Therefore, there is indifference free from desire, while here it is together with indifference, and even saints still have regret. This explanation is incorrect, contradicting the following text. It should be said that regret mostly corresponds with the root of sorrow, and what arises simultaneously with indifference is its associated category. If there is no defiled or good, then there is no indeterminate either, so there is also indifference free from desire. The regret that arises in saints is only regret, its nature is regret, not remorse. In good, it is aversion. The indeterminate is the wisdom of deportment and craftsmanship, without the root of sorrow. Regret is indifference free from desire. Indifference free from desire has a coarse mode. In worldly freedom from desire, its seed still exists. Freedom from desire with outflows can be lost and can arise again, unlike saints who have cut off the seed.

Treatise: Sleep corresponds with joy, sorrow, and even the neutral indifference, so they are all compatible.

Commentary: Sleep arises simultaneously with the consciousness of the desire realm and corresponds with all feelings. Because the mode of sleep is connected to joy, it is together with pleasant feeling; connected to affliction, it is together with sorrow; neutral, it is together with indifference. They are matched in this order.

Treatise: Initial thought (vitarka, gross thought) and sustained thought (vicāra, subtle thought) correspond with sorrow, joy, and even intention (chanda, desire and pleasure), so they are all compatible.

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述曰。尋．伺與四受相應初定意有樂故。然此師說尋．伺五無一向定義。以不言與苦欲界樂俱故。此即意識無苦師義。

論。有義此四至意苦俱故。

述曰。第二師說。此四亦苦受俱。意有苦故。悔增至三眠增至四。極苦之處亦有眠。尋．伺增至五受。俱起尋．伺。大論第五不言與苦．樂俱者。如前已會。此據實理。彼約別義。

論。四皆容與至不相違故。

述曰。第五別境相應門。皆五得俱。能緣行相。及所緣境。不相違故。

論。悔眠但與至輕安俱故。

述曰。自下第六與善俱門。初二唯與十善容俱。欲界無輕安故。前第六卷善中。雖有異解欲有輕安。無是正文。故今據后說。設許亦有亦無輕安。非定引生故。尋．伺十一俱。增輕安故。有人云。三藏言。西方有二說。一云未至定有尋．伺。非根本地者不然。尋．伺支非未至故。論有誠文說初靜慮也。

論。悔但容與至貪等細故。

述曰。自下第七十煩惱俱門。悔行相粗必獨生。染分不與貪等九法並起。唯無明相應。貪等行相細故。此據多分不許余俱。下文邪見悔修定。則說與俱邪見與瞋俱故。悔亦與邪見．瞋俱。此文不盡理。又先行施後生追悔。悔與貪俱。有言我何意作此事。即分別我見亦與悔俱。合瞋．邪

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：尋（Vitarka，粗分別）、伺（Vicara，細分別）與四種感受相應，因為初禪有喜悅之意。然而，這位老師說，尋、伺與五種感受並非一定相關，因為沒有說它們與苦受和欲界樂受同時存在。這表明這位老師認為意識中沒有苦受。

論：有觀點認為，這四者（尋、伺、悔、眠）與意識中的苦受同時存在。

述曰：第二位老師說，這四者也與苦受同時存在，因為意識中有苦受。追悔（Kaukritya）最多與三種感受同時存在，睡眠（Middha）最多與四種感受同時存在。在極度痛苦的地方也有睡眠。尋、伺最多與五種感受同時存在，同時生起。大論第五沒有說它們與苦受、樂受同時存在，如前所述，已經解釋過。這裡是根據實際情況，那裡是根據不同的意義。

論：這四者都可能與五種別境心所（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）同時存在，因為它們不相互違背。

述曰：第五，相應于別境心所之門，這四者都可能與五種別境心所同時存在。因為它們能緣的行相以及所緣的境界，不相互違背。

論：追悔和睡眠只可能與十善心所同時存在，因為欲界沒有輕安（Prasrabdhi）。

述曰：從下面第六個門開始，討論與善心所同時存在的情況。最初的兩種（追悔和睡眠）只可能與十善心所同時存在，因為欲界沒有輕安。之前的第六卷中，關於欲界是否有輕安存在不同的解釋，但這不是正文。所以現在根據後面的說法。假設允許欲界有或沒有輕安，也不是必然產生的。尋、伺與十一種善心所同時存在，因為增加了輕安。有人說，三藏（Tripitaka）說，西方有兩種說法，一種說未至定（Upacarasmadhi）有尋、伺，而不是根本定（Mulasamadhi），這是不對的。因為尋、伺不是未至定的組成部分。論中有明確的文字說明初禪。

論：追悔只可能與無明（Avidya）同時存在，因為貪（Raga）等煩惱很細微。

述曰：從下面第七個門開始，討論與十種煩惱同時存在的情況。追悔的行相粗糙，必定單獨產生。在染污的層面，不與貪等九種法同時生起，只與無明相應。因為貪等煩惱的行相細微。這是根據大多數情況，不允許與其他煩惱同時存在。下文說邪見（Mithyadristi）追悔修定，則說與邪見同時存在，因為邪見與瞋（Dvesha）同時存在，所以追悔也與邪見、瞋同時存在。這段文字不完全合理。又有先行佈施，後生追悔的情況，追悔與貪同時存在。有人說，我為何要做這件事，即分別我見（Satkayadristi）也與追悔同時存在。綜合來看，瞋、邪見

【English Translation】 English version: Statement: Vitarka (initial application of thought, coarse examination) and Vicara (sustained application of thought, subtle examination) are associated with the four feelings because the first Dhyana (meditative absorption) has joy. However, this teacher says that Vitarka and Vicara are not necessarily defined by the five feelings, because it is not said that they exist simultaneously with painful feelings and the pleasure of the desire realm. This indicates that this teacher believes that there is no painful feeling in consciousness.

Treatise: Some argue that these four (Vitarka, Vicara, Kaukritya (regret), and Middha (drowsiness)) exist simultaneously with painful feelings in consciousness.

Statement: The second teacher says that these four also exist simultaneously with painful feelings because there is painful feeling in consciousness. Regret can exist simultaneously with up to three feelings, and drowsiness can exist simultaneously with up to four feelings. There is also drowsiness in places of extreme pain. Vitarka and Vicara can exist simultaneously with up to five feelings, arising simultaneously. The fifth chapter of the Great Treatise does not say that they exist simultaneously with painful and pleasurable feelings, as explained earlier. This is based on the actual situation, and that is based on different meanings.

Treatise: These four can all exist simultaneously with the five Visesa-cetasikas (volition, conviction, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom) because they do not contradict each other.

Statement: Fifth, in the section on association with Visesa-cetasikas, these four can all exist simultaneously with the five Visesa-cetasikas. Because the aspects of what they cognize and the objects they cognize do not contradict each other.

Treatise: Regret and drowsiness can only exist simultaneously with the ten wholesome mental factors because there is no Prasrabdhi (pliancy) in the desire realm.

Statement: Starting from the sixth section below, the discussion is about simultaneous existence with wholesome mental factors. The first two (regret and drowsiness) can only exist simultaneously with the ten wholesome mental factors because there is no pliancy in the desire realm. In the previous sixth chapter, there were different interpretations regarding whether there is pliancy in the desire realm, but this is not the main text. So now it is based on the later statement. Assuming that the desire realm is allowed to have or not have pliancy, it is not necessarily produced. Vitarka and Vicara exist simultaneously with eleven wholesome mental factors because pliancy is added. Some say that the Tripitaka says that there are two views in the West, one saying that Upacarasmadhi (access concentration) has Vitarka and Vicara, but not Mulasamadhi (fundamental concentration), which is incorrect. Because Vitarka and Vicara are not components of Upacarasmadhi. There is clear text in the treatise explaining the first Dhyana.

Treatise: Regret can only exist simultaneously with Avidya (ignorance) because Raga (greed) and other afflictions are very subtle.

Statement: Starting from the seventh section below, the discussion is about simultaneous existence with the ten afflictions. The aspect of regret is coarse and must arise alone. On the contaminated level, it does not arise simultaneously with greed and the other nine dharmas, but only with ignorance. Because the aspects of greed and other afflictions are subtle. This is based on most situations, not allowing simultaneous existence with other afflictions. The following text says that Mithyadristi (wrong view) regrets cultivating concentration, then says that it exists simultaneously with wrong view, because wrong view exists simultaneously with Dvesha (hatred), so regret also exists simultaneously with wrong view and hatred. This passage is not entirely reasonable. There is also the situation of giving alms first and then regretting it later, regret exists simultaneously with greed. Some say, 'Why did I do this?', that is, Satkayadristi (self-view) also exists simultaneously with regret. In summary, hatred, wrong view

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見．貪．我見得俱。此中約粗相不得　又解必不得俱。與悔間起非必相應　問忿等獨頭生許慢等俱起。惡作別頭起。應貪等俱生　答忿等瞋等分。如本得相應。惡作別有體。非與貪俱起。何故忿等各別起耶。于自十中各別起故。

論。睡眠尋伺至不相違故。

述曰。此三與本惑並得俱起。如大論第七染污分別說。設追悔往惡而自邈責。惡作亦不瞋俱。與惡作間生實不俱起。設說俱者間生名俱。后三種十皆俱。所緣．行相俱不違故。

論。悔與中大至皆起彼故。

述曰。下第八隨惑俱轉門。悔中大俱。遍與不善染心俱故。與忿等十不得俱起。各自為主。如忿等十自不相應。眠等三法二十皆俱。于夢等中皆容得起忿等法故。

論。此四皆通至亦追悔故。

述曰。第九三性門。于中初總。后別。四皆通三性。如五十五．五十八。對法等同。此中惡作何以通無記。以于無記業亦追悔故。于無記業雖不定起無記之悔。起無記悔必依無記業故　問何故顯揚第一。惡作染．不染。善．不善。不言無記　彼順小乘故。多分起故。唯說憂俱者故。

論。有義初二至有尋伺故。

述曰。下第二別釋中性門。悔．眠唯生得善。惡作行相粗而體鄙。其方便善體必微細。殊勝法故不通方便。睡

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 見（Dṛṣṭi，邪見），貪（Lobha，貪慾），我見（Ātma-dṛṣṭi，認為有「我」的邪見）都包括在內。這裡指的是粗略的表相，不一定同時生起。另一種解釋是，它們不一定同時生起，因為它們可能與追悔（Kaukṛtya）間隔生起，並非必然相應。問：忿（Krodha，憤怒）等獨頭生起，是否允許與慢（Māna，傲慢）等同時生起？惡作（Kaukṛtya，追悔）是單獨生起的，應該與貪等同時生起嗎？答：忿等屬於瞋（Dveṣa，嗔恨）的一部分，如前所述，它們是相應的。惡作有其獨立的自體，並非與貪同時生起。為什麼忿等各自單獨生起呢？因為在它們各自的十種煩惱中，是各自單獨生起的。

論：睡眠（Styana，睡眠）、尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）、伺（Vicāra，細緻的思考）與根本煩惱不相違背，所以可以同時生起。

述曰：這三種煩惱可以與根本煩惱同時生起。如《大論》第七卷染污分別所說，假設追悔過去的惡行而自我譴責，惡作也不與瞋同時生起。與惡作間隔生起，實際上不是同時生起。如果說同時生起，那是指間隔生起也稱為同時。后三種（睡眠、尋、伺）與二十種煩惱都可以同時生起，因為它們所緣境和行相都不相違背。

論：追悔（Kaukṛtya）與中隨煩惱、大隨煩惱同時生起，因為它們都與不善染污心同時生起。

述曰：在第八隨煩惱俱轉門中，追悔與中隨煩惱、大隨煩惱同時生起，普遍與不善染污心同時生起。不能與忿等十種煩惱同時生起，因為它們各自為主。如同忿等十種煩惱自身不相應一樣。睡眠等三種煩惱與二十種煩惱都可以同時生起，因為在夢中等情況下，都可能生起忿等煩惱。

論：這四種煩惱（追悔、睡眠、尋、伺）都通於三性（善、惡、無記），也可能追悔無記業。

述曰：在第九三性門中，先總說，后別說。四種煩惱都通於三性，如第五十五、五十八卷，《對法》等也是相同的。這裡，惡作為什麼通於無記性？因為也會對無記業產生追悔。雖然不一定會對無記業生起無記性的追悔，但生起無記性的追悔必然是依據無記業。問：為什麼《顯揚》第一卷中，惡作只說染污、不染污、善、不善，而不說無記？因為《顯揚》順應小乘的觀點，而且惡作多半是與憂（Daurmanasya，憂愁）同時生起的。

論：有義認為，最初的兩種（追悔、睡眠）只是生得善，惡作的行相粗糙而本體鄙陋，其方便善的本體必然是微細的。殊勝的法不通於方便。睡眠（Styana，睡眠）

【English Translation】 English version Dṛṣṭi (wrong views), Lobha (greed), and Ātma-dṛṣṭi (the wrong view of 'self') are all included. This refers to the coarse appearances, which do not necessarily arise simultaneously. Another explanation is that they do not necessarily arise simultaneously because they may arise with Kaukṛtya (remorse) in between, and are not necessarily corresponding. Question: Is it permissible for Krodha (anger) and other independently arising afflictions to arise simultaneously with Māna (arrogance) and others? Kaukṛtya (remorse) arises independently; should it arise simultaneously with Lobha and others? Answer: Krodha and others belong to the category of Dveṣa (hatred). As mentioned earlier, they are corresponding. Kaukṛtya has its own independent entity and does not arise simultaneously with Lobha. Why do Krodha and others arise separately? Because within their respective ten afflictions, they arise separately.

Treatise: Styana (sloth), Vitarka (coarse thought), and Vicāra (subtle thought) do not contradict the fundamental afflictions, so they can arise simultaneously.

Commentary: These three afflictions can arise simultaneously with the fundamental afflictions. As stated in the seventh volume of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha, in the section on defiled distinctions, suppose one regrets past misdeeds and blames oneself, Kaukṛtya does not arise simultaneously with Dveṣa. Arising with Kaukṛtya in between, they are not actually simultaneous. If it is said that they are simultaneous, it means that arising with something in between is also called simultaneous. The latter three (sloth, coarse thought, subtle thought) can all arise simultaneously with the twenty afflictions because their objects and characteristics do not contradict each other.

Treatise: Kaukṛtya (remorse) arises simultaneously with the secondary and great secondary afflictions because they all arise simultaneously with unwholesome defiled minds.

Commentary: In the eighth section on the co-arising of secondary afflictions, Kaukṛtya arises simultaneously with the secondary and great secondary afflictions, universally arising simultaneously with unwholesome defiled minds. It cannot arise simultaneously with the ten afflictions such as Krodha because they each take precedence. Just as the ten afflictions such as Krodha do not correspond with each other. The three afflictions of sloth and others can all arise simultaneously with the twenty afflictions because in dreams and other situations, afflictions such as Krodha may arise.

Treatise: These four afflictions (remorse, sloth, coarse thought, subtle thought) all pertain to the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, neutral), and one may also regret neutral actions.

Commentary: In the ninth section on the three natures, first there is a general discussion, then a specific one. The four afflictions all pertain to the three natures, as in volumes fifty-five and fifty-eight. The Abhidharmakośa and others are the same. Here, why does Kaukṛtya pertain to the neutral nature? Because one may also feel remorse for neutral actions. Although one does not necessarily generate neutral remorse for neutral actions, generating neutral remorse is necessarily based on neutral actions. Question: Why, in the first volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, is Kaukṛtya only described as defiled, non-defiled, wholesome, and unwholesome, and not neutral? Because the Abhidharmasamuccaya follows the perspective of the Hīnayāna, and because Kaukṛtya mostly arises simultaneously with Daurmanasya (sadness).

Treatise: Some argue that the first two (remorse, sloth) are only born from wholesome roots. The characteristics of Kaukṛtya are coarse and its essence is base. The essence of its skillful means must be subtle. Superior dharmas do not pertain to skillful means. Styana (sloth)

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眠昧略故非方便起。故於聞．思位中雖有起者。而非加行善。加行善間起故。設睡眠中而緣法義。但生得善非強思生。任運起故尋．伺二種通加行善。于聞．思．修三位皆有尋．伺故。聞所成等者。顯因聞所成諸法皆是此故。若唯言聞惠。即狹劣也。

論。有義初二至有悔眠故。

述曰。聞．思等位悔作諸惡。于眠等位思擇義故。

次應辨染。以見．修等后自有門故先不說。

論。后三皆通至解粗猛故。

述曰。染謂有覆。凈謂無覆。于染．凈二無記。眠等三皆通。即欲界修道二見俱有眠等故。初定有尋．伺故。惡作非染無記。以解粗猛故。不與二見俱。染必不善故。

論。四無記中至非定果故。

述曰。染無記中。無別相故略而不說。凈四無記中。悔唯是威儀．工巧二法。威儀．工巧二法。四無記中是中二故。謂異熟為第一。變化為第四故。以彼惡作行相粗猛。不與業異熟心俱。非定果故。亦不說與變化心俱　此說異熟有二。一謂業果。即此中說。二謂法執。亦通染故。此不說之。前說染無記不通惡作故。其餘無記心。雖不緣威儀等。亦是彼攝。非異熟生。此中說言惡作不通異熟性故　又解彼不緣威儀等。心法執皆異熟無記。亦惡作俱。此中且據業果者說。應勘諸論。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 睡眠昏昧是自然而然發生的，不是通過有意識的努力產生的。因此，在聽聞和思惟的階段，雖然也可能產生睡眠昏昧，但它不是屬於加行善法。因為加行善法是在清醒狀態下產生的。即使在睡眠中偶爾緣于佛法義理，那也是自然而然產生的善，而不是通過努力思惟產生的。因為它是任運而起的。尋和伺這兩種心所，通於加行善法。因為在聽聞、思惟、修習這三個階段，都可能有尋和伺。『聞所成等』，是爲了表明由聽聞所成就的諸法都屬於這種情況。如果只說是聽聞的智慧，那就太狹隘了。

論：有論師認為，最初的聽聞和思惟階段，會因為後悔所作的惡行而產生惡作。而在睡眠等狀態下，則會思擇法義。

述記：在聽聞、思惟等階段，會因為後悔所作的各種惡行而產生惡作。在睡眠等狀態下，則會思擇法義。

接下來應該辨別染污法。因為見道和修道等之後，自然會有相關的章節，所以先不討論。

論：后三種無記法，都通於染污和清凈，因為它們能夠解除粗猛的煩惱。

述記：染污指的是有覆無記，清凈指的是無覆無記。對於染污和清凈這兩種無記法，睡眠等三種狀態都可能出現。也就是說，欲界的修道和二見（有身見和邊見）都可能伴隨睡眠等狀態。初禪有尋和伺。惡作不是染污無記，因為它能夠解除粗猛的煩惱，所以不與二見同時出現。染污必定是不善的。

論：在四種無記法中，惡作不屬於異熟果，因為它不是由業力決定的。

述記：在染污無記中，因為沒有特別的差別相，所以略而不說。在清凈的四種無記法中，惡作只屬於威儀和工巧這兩種。威儀和工巧這兩種法，在四種無記法中屬於中間的兩種。也就是說，異熟是第一種，變化是第四種。因為惡作的行相粗猛，不與業異熟心同時出現，因為它不是由業力決定的。所以也不說它與變化心同時出現。這裡說異熟有兩種，一種是業果，就是這裡所說的。另一種是法執，也通於染污，所以這裡沒有說。前面說染污無記不通於惡作。其餘的無記心，雖然不緣于威儀等，也屬於它們所攝，但不是異熟生。這裡說惡作不通於異熟性。另一種解釋是，那些不緣于威儀等的心和法執，都是異熟無記，也與惡作同時出現。這裡只是根據業果來說的，應該參考各種論典。

【English Translation】 English version Sleep and unawareness arise spontaneously, not through deliberate effort. Therefore, although sleep and unawareness may occur during the stages of hearing and thinking, they are not considered 'exertion-born' wholesome qualities (加行善, jiāxíng shàn). This is because exertion-born wholesome qualities arise in a state of wakefulness. Even if one happens to contemplate the meaning of the Dharma (法, fǎ) during sleep, it is a naturally arising goodness, not one produced through deliberate thought. It arises effortlessly. 'Seeking' (尋, xún) and 'investigation' (伺, sì) are both associated with exertion-born wholesome qualities because they can occur during the stages of hearing, thinking, and cultivation. 'Hearing-originated, etc.' indicates that all phenomena arising from hearing are included here. If we only mentioned 'wisdom from hearing,' it would be too narrow.

Treatise: Some argue that in the initial stages of hearing and thinking, remorse (惡作, èzuò) may arise due to regret over evil deeds. In states like sleep, one may contemplate the meaning of the Dharma.

Commentary: In the stages of hearing, thinking, etc., remorse arises due to regret over various evil deeds. In states like sleep, one contemplates the meaning of the Dharma.

Next, we should distinguish defilements (染, rǎn). Because there will be relevant sections after the stages of seeing and cultivation, we will not discuss them now.

Treatise: The latter three types of neutral (無記, wújì) states are all associated with both defilement and purity because they can resolve coarse and intense afflictions.

Commentary: 'Defilement' refers to 'covered' neutral states, while 'purity' refers to 'uncovered' neutral states. Sleep and the other two states can occur in both defiled and pure neutral states. That is, the path of cultivation in the desire realm and the two views (有身見, yǒushēn jiàn - view of self; 邊見, biān jiàn - extreme views) can be accompanied by sleep, etc. The first dhyana (定, dìng) has 'seeking' and 'investigation'. Remorse is not a defiled neutral state because it can resolve coarse and intense afflictions, so it does not occur simultaneously with the two views. Defilement is necessarily unwholesome.

Treatise: Among the four types of neutral states, remorse does not belong to the 'result of maturation' (異熟果, yìshú guǒ) because it is not determined by karma (業, yè).

Commentary: Among defiled neutral states, there is no distinct characteristic, so it is omitted. Among the four types of pure neutral states, remorse only belongs to 'mannerisms' (威儀, wēiyí) and 'crafts' (工巧, gōngqiǎo). Mannerisms and crafts are the middle two of the four types of neutral states. That is, 'result of maturation' is the first, and 'transformation' is the fourth. Because the characteristics of remorse are coarse and intense, it does not occur simultaneously with the mind of karmic maturation because it is not determined by karma. Therefore, it is also not said to occur simultaneously with the mind of transformation. Here, it is said that there are two types of maturation: one is the result of karma, which is what is being discussed here; the other is attachment to phenomena, which is also associated with defilement, so it is not discussed here. Earlier, it was said that defiled neutral states are not associated with remorse. Although other neutral minds do not focus on mannerisms, etc., they are included in them, but they are not born from maturation. Here, it is said that remorse is not associated with the nature of maturation. Another explanation is that those minds and attachments to phenomena that do not focus on mannerisms, etc., are all neutral states of maturation and also occur simultaneously with remorse. This is only based on the result of karma, and various treatises should be consulted.

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佛地二障中等文。

論。眠除第四至亦得眠故。

述曰。眠非變化心俱。非定引生故。增異熟心俱者。眠中亦有住異熟故。此異熟生心非實異熟。尋．伺亦然。不與第三第八識中文相違也。

論。尋伺除初至名等義故。

述曰。除異熟心。異熟心解微劣。不能尋求伺察名等法故。大論第一七分別中說。不染污分別此有善．凈無記。善謂隨與一信等善法相應。非謂信等別唯起一。此總舉善。隨設與一即名為善。不染分別故。彼說凈無記與此同。此文但說不與業果異熟心俱。非法執類異熟心也。彼可與俱。

自下第十界系門。有三子門第一子門。明界所繫。

論。惡作睡眠至皆靜妙故。

述曰。二唯欲界。所以者何。以餘二界妙故無有。妙者勝義。若身有疲極憂根等故方有眠．悔。彼無此等。故名為妙。其後尋．伺及初定者。以余上地皆是靜故。尋．伺囂繁非靜。非靜故靜處無有。或靜及妙皆通二種。

第二子門上下相起。

論。悔眠生上至亦起下上。

述曰。二法生上不起下者。極粗惡法故。無所用故。不假起故。上不起下。其邪見者悔修定者。是本有位。誹謗涅槃。色界中有無容起悔。此不違下　又解即色界中有起悔。亦是生上起下。今據多分。及生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 佛地二障中等文。

論。眠除第四至亦得眠故。

述曰。眠非變化心俱。非定引生故。增異熟心俱者。眠中亦有住異熟故。此異熟生心非實異熟。尋．伺亦然。不與第三第八識中文相違也。

論。尋伺除初至名等義故。

述曰。除異熟心。異熟心解微劣。不能尋求伺察名等法故。大論第一七分別中說。不染污分別此有善．凈無記。善謂隨與一信等善法相應。非謂信等別唯起一。此總舉善。隨設與一即名為善。不染分別故。彼說凈無記與此同。此文但說不與業果異熟心俱。非法執類異熟心也。彼可與俱。

自下第十界系門。有三子門第一子門。明界所繫。

論。惡作睡眠至皆靜妙故。

述曰。二唯欲界。所以者何。以餘二界妙故無有。妙者勝義。若身有疲極憂根等故方有眠．悔。彼無此等。故名為妙。其後尋．伺及初定者。以余上地皆是靜故。尋．伺囂繁非靜。非靜故靜處無有。或靜及妙皆通二種。

第二子門上下相起。

論。悔眠生上至亦起下上。

述曰。二法生上不起下者。極粗惡法故。無所用故。不假起故。上不起下。其邪見者悔修定者。是本有位。誹謗涅槃（Nirvana）。中有無容起悔。此不違下　又解即中有起悔。亦是生上起下。今據多分。及生

【English Translation】 English version Text on the Two Obstacles in the Buddha-land, Middle Level.

Treatise: Sleep is excluded from the fourth [dhyana] because one can still experience sleep there.

Commentary: Sleep does not occur with minds of transformation, because it is not produced by meditative concentration. It occurs with minds of increased maturation, because there is abiding maturation even in sleep. This mind born of maturation is not a true maturation. The same is true of investigation and analysis. This does not contradict the texts concerning the third and eighth consciousnesses.

Treatise: Investigation and analysis are excluded from the first [dhyana] because of the meaning of names, etc.

Commentary: Excluded are minds of maturation. The understanding of minds of maturation is weak and cannot seek or examine phenomena such as names. The seventeenth section of the Great Treatise states that non-defiled discrimination includes wholesome, pure, and neutral [states]. 'Wholesome' means corresponding to a single wholesome dharma such as faith. It does not mean that faith, etc., arise separately as only one. This is a general statement of wholesomeness. Whatever is established as corresponding to one is called wholesome because it is non-defiled discrimination. It says that pure neutral [states] are the same as this. This text only says that it does not occur with minds of karmic result and maturation, but it does not refer to minds of maturation of the nature of false views. It can occur with those.

From here down is the tenth section on the realms and affiliations. There are three sub-sections; the first sub-section clarifies what is affiliated with the realms.

Treatise: Remorse and sleep... are all serene and wonderful.

Commentary: These two exist only in the desire realm. Why? Because the other two realms are wonderful and do not have them. 'Wonderful' means superior. Sleep and regret only occur when the body is fatigued or there are roots of sorrow, etc. Those [realms] do not have these, so they are called wonderful. As for investigation and analysis, and the initial meditative concentrations, the upper realms are all serene. Investigation and analysis are noisy and not serene. Because they are not serene, they do not exist in serene places. Or, 'serene' and 'wonderful' both apply to both types.

The second sub-section is on arising upwards and downwards.

Treatise: Regret and sleep arise upwards... also arise downwards and upwards.

Commentary: These two dharmas arise upwards but do not arise downwards because they are extremely coarse and evil, and therefore useless and unnecessary. Therefore, they do not arise downwards. Those with wrong views who regret cultivating concentration are in their original position. Slandering Nirvana (Nirvana), there is room for regret in the intermediate state. This does not contradict the following. Another explanation is that regret arises in the intermediate state, which is also arising upwards and downwards. This is according to the majority and arising.

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有故言無也。此二非上地所有。不說下起上　尋．伺通二地。下得起上。上得起下。欲界入初定名下起上。第二定以上至第四定。起初定及欲界邪見。辨無色界起下色慾界潤生心等。故名上起下。

論。下上尋伺能緣上下。

述曰。第三子門。下上尋．伺互得緣上下。境界寬故。欲界者緣上二界。色界者緣上下二界地。

論。有義悔眠至極昧劣故。

述曰。第一師有義。悔．眠不緣上。以此惡作行相粗近。其眠行相極昧略故。無有夢中緣上界故。或緣上名非緣上地。

論。有義此二至所更事故。

述曰。第二師說。亦緣上界。有邪見者悔修定故。悔得緣上。亦通增上慢邪見中有中謗滅而悔修定。即是生上亦起下悔。前文約多分。此據實義　又解彼時極促不容生悔。此據本有位邪見．悔俱故。無生上起下悔失　夢能普緣曾所更事。所更事中通上地法及定等故　上煩惱等皆以三界分別此理。故應生上起下惡作。謂中有中起邪見者。悔先所作事。論不許悔與九本惑俱。故邪見時無容起悔。即是別時起得此悔。非與謗滅心俱。故不相違　又解據實。亦邪見俱。及有嗔俱。論據多分不許與邪見．嗔等俱。許俱義穩。

下第十一學等三門。

論。悔非無學離欲舍故。

述

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有原因地說沒有，這兩種情況不是上地（指色界和無色界）才有的。不能說下地（指欲界）的尋、伺不能生到上地。尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（Vicara，精細的思考）通於二地（指欲界和初禪）。下地可以生到上地，上地也可以回到下地。欲界進入初禪定稱為下起上。從第二禪定以上到第四禪定，生起初禪定以及欲界的邪見。辨別沒有起下，例如界潤生心等，所以稱為上起下。

論：下地和上地的尋、伺能夠緣上下地的境界。

述曰：這是第三個子門。下地和上地的尋、伺可以互相緣上下地的境界，因為境界寬廣的緣故。欲界的尋、伺能夠緣上二界（指色界和無色界）。**者能夠緣上下二界地。

論：有的人認為，悔和睡眠因為極其昧劣的緣故，不能緣上地。

述曰：第一位論師認為，悔（regret）和睡眠（sleep）不能緣上地。因為惡作（Kaukṛtya，追悔）的行相粗糙，睡眠的行相極其昧略。沒有在夢中緣上界的緣故。或者說緣上界的名，不是緣上地。

論：有的人認為，這兩種情況是因為曾經經歷過的事情。

述曰：第二位論師說，悔和睡眠也能緣上界。有邪見（wrong view）的人會因為悔恨而修定，所以悔可以緣上界。也包括增上慢（adhimāna，未得謂得）的邪見者，在中有（antarābhava，中陰身）中誹謗佛法而悔恨修定。這就是生到上界也會生起地獄的悔。前面的說法是大概率的情況，這裡是根據實際情況。又解釋說，那個時候非常短暫，容不下生起悔。這裡是根據本有位（bhava，生命狀態）的邪見和悔恨都存在的情況。沒有生到上界又生起地獄悔恨的過失。夢能夠普遍地緣曾經經歷過的事情。曾經經歷的事情中包括上地的法和禪定等。上地的煩惱等都用三界來分別這個道理。所以應該生到上界又生起地獄的惡作。例如中有中生起邪見的人，會悔恨先前所做的事情。論中不允許悔和九種根本煩惱同時生起，所以在邪見的時候沒有容納生起悔恨的空間。這就是在不同的時候生起這個悔恨，不是和誹謗佛法的心同時生起，所以不矛盾。又解釋說，根據實際情況，也可以和邪見同時生起，以及和嗔恨同時生起。論中說的是大概率的情況，不允許和邪見、嗔恨等同時生起。允許同時生起的說法更穩妥。

下面是第十一學等三個門。

論：悔不是無學（asaikṣa，無學位）和離欲者所捨棄的。

【English Translation】 English version To say 'no' when there is a reason, these two are not exclusive to the higher realms (referring to the Form Realm and Formless Realm). It cannot be said that Vitarka (initial application of thought) and Vicara (sustained application of thought) of the lower realm (referring to the Desire Realm) cannot arise in the higher realms. Vitarka and Vicara are common to two realms (referring to the Desire Realm and the First Dhyana). The lower realm can arise in the higher realm, and the higher realm can also return to the lower realm. Entering the First Dhyana from the Desire Realm is called 'arising from below to above'. From the Second Dhyana upwards to the Fourth Dhyana, one can generate the First Dhyana and the wrong views of the Desire Realm. Discriminating that there is no arising from above to below, such as the mind that moistens life in a realm, is why it is called 'arising from above to below'.

Treatise: The Vitarka and Vicara of the lower and upper realms can cognize the realms above and below.

Commentary: This is the third sub-section. The Vitarka and Vicara of the lower and upper realms can mutually cognize the realms above and below, because the scope of the realms is broad. The Vitarka and Vicara of the Desire Realm can cognize the two upper realms (referring to the Form Realm and Formless Realm). Those can cognize the realms above and below.

Treatise: Some argue that regret and sleep, because they are extremely obscure, cannot cognize the upper realms.

Commentary: The first teacher argues that regret (Kaukṛtya) and sleep (sleep) cannot cognize the upper realms. This is because the characteristics of Kaukṛtya are coarse and close, and the characteristics of sleep are extremely obscure. There is no instance of cognizing the upper realms in dreams. Or it is said that cognizing the name of the upper realm is not cognizing the upper realm itself.

Treatise: Some argue that these two are because of things that have been experienced.

Commentary: The second teacher says that regret and sleep can also cognize the upper realms. Those with wrong views (wrong view) may cultivate samadhi out of regret, so regret can cognize the upper realms. This also includes those with adhimāna (thinking one has attained what one has not) who, in the antarābhava (intermediate state), slander the Dharma and regret cultivating samadhi. This is the case where arising in the upper realm also gives rise to regret in the lower realm. The previous statement was about the majority of cases, while this is based on the actual situation. It is also explained that at that time it is very short and cannot accommodate the arising of regret. This is based on the situation where wrong views and regret both exist in the bhava (state of existence). There is no fault of arising in the upper realm and then giving rise to regret in the lower realm. Dreams can universally cognize things that have been experienced. The things that have been experienced include the dharmas and samadhis of the upper realms. The afflictions of the upper realms are distinguished using the three realms. Therefore, one should arise in the upper realm and then give rise to Kaukṛtya in the lower realm. For example, those who generate wrong views in the antarābhava will regret what they did earlier. The treatise does not allow regret to arise simultaneously with the nine fundamental afflictions, so there is no room for regret to arise at the time of wrong views. This is to say that this regret arises at a different time, not simultaneously with the mind of slandering the Dharma, so there is no contradiction. It is also explained that, according to the actual situation, it can also arise simultaneously with wrong views, as well as with hatred. The treatise speaks of the majority of cases, not allowing it to arise simultaneously with wrong views, hatred, etc. The view that allows simultaneous arising is more stable.

Below are the three sections of the eleventh learning, etc.

Treatise: Regret is not abandoned by those who are non-learners (asaikṣa) and those who have abandoned desire.

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曰。以離欲時要舍彼故。第三果等。于無記事等要不追悔。已審決故。若爾豈無悔先身作惡等耶。此即是厭。非謂悔也。無記設悔。即工巧等惠。悔隨憂根有無。行相同故。如彼雖有愁戚。或是舍受等故。說是學者。順諸有學有為善法皆名學故。

論。睡眠尋伺至皆無學故。

述曰。皆通三種。善法欲以去皆名為學。無學身善法皆名無學。故對法第四。六十六．五十七中皆通此說。不能煩引。

論。悔眠唯通至勢力起故。

述曰。十二見等所斷門。分為二段。初解悔．眠。后解尋．伺。此初也。初二悔．眠。通見．修斷不通不斷。論有唯言。小乘唯修斷。今通見斷者。亦邪見等勢力起故。緣見等生故。

問苦根非無漏。無學成就名不斷。睡眠應亦然。

論。非無漏道親所引生故。

述曰。謂苦根在五識。由無漏后得智位引。或引后時五識等生。非悔．眠二有此義故。

問憂根雖非無學。二十二根中仍名不斷。何惡作等不如是也。

論。亦非如憂深求解脫故。

述曰。其彼憂根。五十七說隨順行相。深求解脫故不同惡作。憂根許為三無漏根故。如對法第十。

論。若已斷故至非所斷攝。

述曰。六十六說。無學身有漏一切法。皆名非所斷。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：因為在離欲時需要捨棄它們嗎？第三果（Anagamin，阿那含果）等，對於無記事等，不需要追悔，因為已經審慎決斷了。如果這樣，難道沒有後悔先前所作惡事等情況嗎？這實際上是厭惡，不是所謂的後悔。無記事如果產生後悔，那就是工巧等智慧。後悔隨著憂根的有無而存在，行為相同。如同他們雖然有愁戚，或許是舍受等原因，所以說是學者。順應各種有學有為的善法，都稱為學。

論：睡眠、尋、伺，都因為是無學（Arhat，阿羅漢）的緣故。

述曰：都通於三種（見道、修道、無學道）。善法想要去除，都稱為學。無學身的善法，都稱為無學。所以《對法》第四，第六十六、五十七中都通此說，不能繁瑣地引用。

論：後悔、睡眠只通于（見、修）二道，因為勢力生起。

述曰：十二見等所斷之門，分為兩段。首先解釋後悔、睡眠，然後解釋尋、伺。這是第一段。最初的後悔、睡眠，通於見斷、修斷，不通於不斷。論中說『唯』，小乘只說是修斷。現在說通於見斷，也是因為邪見等勢力生起，緣于見等而生。

問：苦根不是無漏，無學成就名為不斷，睡眠也應該如此。

論：不是無漏道親自引導生起的緣故。

述曰：意思是苦根在五識中，由無漏后得智位引導，或者引導后時五識等生起。後悔、睡眠二者沒有這種意義。

問：憂根雖然不是無學，在二十二根中仍然名為不斷，為什麼惡作等不是這樣呢？

論：也不是像憂那樣深刻地求解脫的緣故。

述曰：那憂根，《五十七》中說隨順行相，深刻地求解脫，所以不同於惡作。憂根允許作為三種無漏根的緣故，如《對法》第十。

論：如果已經斷除的緣故，不是所斷攝。

述曰：第六十六說，無學身有漏的一切法，都名為非所斷。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: Is it because they need to be abandoned when detached from desire? The third fruit (Anagamin) and others do not need to regret non-specified matters because they have been carefully decided. If so, are there no regrets for past evil deeds? This is actually aversion, not so-called regret. If regret arises in non-specified matters, it is skillful wisdom, etc. Regret exists with or without the root of sorrow, and the behavior is the same. Just as they may have sorrow, perhaps due to equanimity, etc., so they are called learners. All wholesome dharmas that accord with learners and are conditioned are called learning.

Treatise: Sleep, investigation, and analysis are all because of being non-learners (Arhat).

Commentary: All three (paths of seeing, cultivation, and no-more-learning) are included. Wholesome dharmas that one wants to remove are all called learning. Wholesome dharmas of the body of a non-learner are all called non-learning. Therefore, in the fourth, sixty-sixth, and fifty-seventh sections of the Abhidharma, this is said to include all, and it is not possible to quote it in detail.

Treatise: Regret and sleep only pertain to the two paths (of seeing and cultivation) because of the arising of power.

Commentary: The doors of what is severed by the twelve views, etc., are divided into two sections. First, regret and sleep are explained, and then investigation and analysis are explained. This is the first section. The initial regret and sleep pertain to what is severed by seeing and cultivation, but not to what is unsevered. The treatise says 'only,' and the Hinayana only says it is severed by cultivation. Now it is said to pertain to what is severed by seeing, also because the power of wrong views, etc., arises, arising from views, etc.

Question: The root of suffering is not unconditioned, and the attainment of non-learning is called unsevered, so sleep should also be the same.

Treatise: It is not because it is personally led to arise by the unconditioned path.

Commentary: It means that the root of suffering is in the five consciousnesses, led by the wisdom attained after the unconditioned in the position of attainment, or leading to the arising of the five consciousnesses, etc., later. Regret and sleep do not have this meaning.

Question: Although the root of sorrow is not non-learning, it is still called unsevered in the twenty-two roots, so why is remorse, etc., not like this?

Treatise: It is also not because it seeks liberation as deeply as sorrow does.

Commentary: That root of sorrow, in the fifty-seventh section, says it accords with the characteristics of behavior, seeking liberation deeply, so it is different from remorse. The root of sorrow is allowed to be the three unconditioned roots, as in the tenth section of the Abhidharma.

Treatise: If it has already been severed, it is not included in what is to be severed.

Commentary: The sixty-sixth section says that all conditioned dharmas of the body of a non-learner are called not to be severed.

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皆已斷故。何故今眠不言非所斷。以此義故眠亦是非所斷。據求無漏無漏所引即非非斷。惡作雖悔先惡求涅槃等。然不深求。行相淺故。不同於憂故深言簡　又解此據多分不得者。有求出世深生悔故可名不斷。若無漏引名為無漏。眠雖亦然。遠引生故。但非親引。故親言簡。

論。尋伺雖非至非所斷攝。

述曰。下文有二。初總。后別。此文總也。二法雖非無分別智真無漏道相應。名無漏引。或加行時引無漏道故。從后得智之所引生。俱時引故。亦通非斷等。此解即通無漏師義。后解雖非正智。及后得俱真無漏道。而能引彼如憂。從彼引生如苦。亦通非斷。后解即不通無漏師義。

論。有義尋伺至是分別故。

述曰。下別解也。非所斷者。於五法中唯分別攝。唯有漏故。論決判彼是分別故。大論第五說尋．伺抉擇四句云諸尋．伺皆分別。有分別非尋．伺故。今以為證。

論。有義此二至尋求等故。

述曰。于中有三。一證。二理。三會。此初也。亦五法中正智所攝。顯揚第二等說正思惟是無漏故。寧知思惟體即是尋。顯揚第二．大論第二十九。皆云彼正思惟能令心尋求．極尋求．趣入．極趣入等故有等言。尋求者尋也。

論。又說彼是言說因故。

述曰。對法第十

。及十地論第一等。說正思惟是語言因。故知尋通無漏。尋既爾。伺亦然　問既引十地論初卷等。云是語言因。寧不引彼三請中第一。云何故凈覺人念智功德具等。彼論解云覺者覺觀語言因故　答若依梵本。毗咀迦是尋。僧羯臘波是思惟。彼十地論言僧羯臘波。但是思惟。亦無正字。何況是尋。即翻譯家增覺謂觀等也。故引不同。彼但應言凈思惟也。

論。未究竟位至亦通無漏。

述曰。下立理也。此顯在因不在佛果。二乘聖者．十地菩薩。于能治藥。所治之病。俱不能遍了知盡故。於後得智中為他說法。必須假藉尋．伺二法。與佛稍別。佛無功用說故。八地已去雖無功用。果未滿故有任運功用。故不同佛。又功用有二。一自利。二利他。前八地已去皆無。后八地已上猶有。七地已前二用並有。八地已去無功用者。無自利用任運入地。非於利他亦無功用。佛二俱無。故說法時不假功用。有正思惟體即是思。不名為尋　又解十無學中。佛無正思惟支。以無尋故。前解為勝。八地已去無漏觀心既相續轉。無尋伺者由何尋．伺發有漏五識。此亦不爾。如定中聞聲。意無尋．伺亦引耳故。故知如論但說法須　既說尋．伺是語遍行。佛無二法如何能語。此隨轉門說為遍行。大乘不爾。唯心遍行是實遍行。身．語二行

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以及《十地論》第一卷等，都說正思惟是語言的起因。因此可知尋也通於無漏。尋既然如此，伺也是一樣。

問：既然引用《十地論》初卷等，說是語言的起因，為什麼不引用其中三請中的第一請，即『為何清凈覺悟的人念智功德具足』等？該論解釋說，覺者是因為覺觀是語言的起因。

答：如果按照梵文原本，毗咀迦（Vitarka）是尋，僧羯臘波（Samkalpa）是思惟。那部《十地論》所說的僧羯臘波，只是思惟，也沒有『正』字，更何況是尋？這只是翻譯家增加的覺觀等。所以引用的地方不同。那裡應該只說是清凈思惟。

論：未究竟位，乃至也通於無漏。

述曰：下面是立論的依據。這顯示了尋伺的作用在於因位，而不在佛果。二乘聖者、十地菩薩，對於能治療的藥物和所治療的疾病，都不能完全徹底地瞭解，所以在後得智中為他人說法，必須藉助尋和伺這兩種方法，與佛稍有不同。佛沒有功用而說法。八地以上的菩薩雖然沒有功用，但因為果位未圓滿，所以有任運的功用，因此與佛不同。而且功用有兩種：一是自利，二是利他。前八地以上的菩薩都沒有自利，后八地以上的菩薩還有利他。七地以前的菩薩兩種功用都有。八地以上沒有功用，是沒有自利，任運進入各個地，並非對於利他也沒有功用。佛兩種功用都沒有，所以在說法時不需要功用。有正思惟，其體就是思，不稱為尋。又解釋十無學中，佛沒有正思惟支，因為沒有尋的緣故。之前的解釋更好。八地以上的無漏觀心既然相續不斷地運轉，如果沒有尋伺，那麼由什麼尋伺來引發有漏的五識呢？也不是這樣。如同在禪定中聽到聲音，意念沒有尋伺也能引導耳朵。所以可知如論中所說，只是說法需要尋伺。既然說尋伺是語言的普遍行為，佛沒有這兩種方法，如何能說話呢？這是隨順轉變之門，說是普遍行為。大乘不是這樣，唯有心遍行才是真正的遍行，身語二行。

【English Translation】 English version: And the first chapter of the Ten Stages Sutra (Dashabhumika Sutra) states that right thought (samyak-samkalpa) is the cause of language. Therefore, it can be known that vitarka (initial application of thought) also extends to the unconditioned (anasrava). If vitarka is like this, so is vichara (sustained application of thought).

Question: Since you cite the first chapter of the Ten Stages Sutra as saying it is the cause of language, why don't you cite the first of the three requests within it, such as 'Why do perfectly enlightened beings possess complete mindfulness, wisdom, merit, etc.?' That treatise explains that enlightened beings do so because initial and sustained application of thought are the cause of language.

Answer: If based on the original Sanskrit, vitarka is xun (尋, initial application of thought), and samkalpa (思惟, thought) is thinking. The Ten Stages Sutra speaks of samkalpa as simply thinking, without the word 'right' (samyak), let alone vitarka. This is merely the translators adding 'awareness' and 'contemplation', etc. Therefore, the citations are different. It should only say pure thinking.

Treatise: In the stage of non-ultimate attainment, it even extends to the unconditioned.

Commentary: The following establishes the reasoning. This shows that the function of vitarka and vichara lies in the causal stage, not in the fruit of Buddhahood. Arhats of the Two Vehicles and Bodhisattvas of the Ten Stages are unable to fully and completely understand both the medicine that can cure and the disease that is being cured. Therefore, when teaching the Dharma to others in subsequent wisdom, they must rely on the two methods of vitarka and vichara, which is slightly different from the Buddha. The Buddha teaches the Dharma without effort. Although Bodhisattvas above the Eighth Ground are without effort, because the fruit is not yet complete, they have effortless function, so they are different from the Buddha. Moreover, there are two kinds of effort: one is for self-benefit, and the other is for the benefit of others. Bodhisattvas above the first eight grounds have no self-benefit, while Bodhisattvas above the last eight grounds still have the benefit of others. Bodhisattvas before the Seventh Ground have both functions. Those above the Eighth Ground have no effort, meaning no self-benefit, and effortlessly enter each ground, but it is not that they have no effort for the benefit of others. The Buddha has neither function, so he does not need effort when teaching the Dharma. Having right thought, its essence is thought, and it is not called vitarka. Also, in explaining the ten non-learnings, the Buddha does not have the limb of right thought because he does not have vitarka. The previous explanation is better. Since the unconditioned contemplative mind above the Eighth Ground continues to turn without interruption, if there is no vitarka and vichara, then what vitarka and vichara would give rise to the conditioned five consciousnesses? This is also not the case. Just as hearing a sound in meditation, the mind without vitarka and vichara can also guide the ear. Therefore, it can be known that, as the treatise says, only teaching the Dharma requires vitarka and vichara. Since it is said that vitarka and vichara are the universal behavior of language, how can the Buddha speak without these two methods? This is following the gate of transformation, saying it is universal behavior. Mahayana is not like this; only mind-pervasion is the true pervasion, the two behaviors of body and speech.

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非遍行也。故此二種亦通無漏。三行等義如樞要說　十地猶有。初地已去起無漏者。至金剛心時與彼心一時不行。得勝法時劣不行故。唯后得俱。非正智者。以七十三說思惟真如不觀真如等故。四句為證。

論。雖說尋伺至亦有分別故。

述曰。下會違也。雖說尋．伺必是分別。而不定說於五法中唯屬第三分別。以彼五法后得正智中亦有分別故。分別有二種。一有漏心名分別。即五法中分別。二緣事名分別。即后得智亦名分別。或立三分別。二種如前。第三更加遍計心名分別。然大論第五解此二。是三界心．心所法名分別。雖據有漏作論。不言唯故。今於此中第一師說尋．伺體唯有漏。即無漏初靜慮支闕無尋．伺。若準第二師說。十地二乘因中有無漏初靜慮五支。至佛便無。但即思．惠。然無粗細不可說為能治支地。此義應思。于禪支中極須分別。如樞要說。

論。余門準上如理應知。

述曰。緣有無漏．有無事等皆準為之。

就別解六位心所中。上來別解訖。自下第二總料簡之。心所與心為一為異。

論。如是六位至分位差別。

述曰。于中有四。一問。二答。三徴。四釋。此雙問已。

論。設爾何失。

述曰。此論主答。設許二種俱有何失。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 非普遍存在的情況。因此，這兩種情況也可能與無漏（Anasrava，指沒有煩惱的狀態）相關。三行等的含義如《樞要》所說。十地（Dasabhumika，菩薩修行的十個階段）仍然存在。從初地開始產生的無漏，到金剛心（Vajracitta，堅固的心）時，與那個心同時不執行。因為獲得殊勝的法時，低劣的就不執行了。只有后得俱（Prsthalabdha，指獲得根本智后所產生的智慧）。不是正智（Samyagjnana，正確的智慧），因為《七十三》中說思惟真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）而不觀真如等。用四句來證明。 論：雖然說尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）伺（Vicara，精細的思考）也存在分別（Vikalpa，區分）。 述曰：下面會解釋違背之處。雖然說尋和伺必定是分別，但不一定說在五法（Panca Dharma，五種法）中只屬於第三種分別。因為那五法在後得正智中也有分別。分別有兩種：一種是有漏心（Sasrava-citta，有煩惱的心）名為分別，即五法中的分別；另一種是緣事（Dharmadhatu，法界）名為分別，即后得智也名為分別。或者建立三種分別，兩種如前所述，第三種加上遍計心（Parikalpita-citta，虛妄分別的心）名為分別。然而，《大論》第五解釋這兩種，是三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）的心和心所法（Caitasika，心理活動）名為分別。雖然根據有漏來作論，但不說唯一。現在在此中，第一師說尋和伺的體性只有有漏，即無漏的初禪支（Dhyananga，禪定的組成部分）缺少尋和伺。如果按照第二師的說法，十地二乘（Sravaka-yana and Pratyekabuddha-yana，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的因中，有無漏的初禪五支，到佛（Buddha，覺悟者）時便沒有了，但即是思和惠（Prajna，智慧）。然而沒有粗細，不可說為能對治的支地。這個意義應該思考。在禪支中極須分別，如《樞要》所說。 論：其餘方面參照上面，如理應知。 述曰：緣有無漏、有無事等，都參照上面來做。 就分別解釋六位心所（Caitasika，心理活動）中，上面分別解釋完畢。從下面開始第二部分，總的料簡。心所與心（Citta，意識）為一還是為異。 論：像這樣六位，到分位差別。 述曰：其中有四個部分：一問，二答，三征，四釋。這是雙重提問。 論：假設這樣有什麼過失？ 述曰：這是論主的回答。假設允許兩種都有，有什麼過失？ 論

【English Translation】 English version: It is not universally pervasive. Therefore, these two kinds can also be related to Anasrava (absence of defilements). The meanings of the three actions, etc., are as explained in the 'Essentials'. The Ten Bhumis (Dasabhumika, ten stages of a Bodhisattva's practice) still exist. The Anasrava arising from the first Bhumi onwards, when it reaches the Vajracitta (diamond-like mind), does not operate simultaneously with that mind. This is because when a superior Dharma is attained, the inferior one does not operate. It only exists with Prsthalabdha (wisdom attained after the fundamental wisdom). It is not Samyagjnana (right knowledge), because 'Seventy-three' says that one contemplates Tathata (suchness, the true nature of things) without observing Tathata, etc. Use the four phrases as proof. Treatise: Although it is said that Vitarka (initial application of thought) and Vicara (sustained application of thought) also have Vikalpa (discrimination). Commentary: The contradiction will be explained below. Although it is said that Vitarka and Vicara are necessarily Vikalpa, it is not necessarily said that among the Five Dharmas (Panca Dharma, five kinds of dharmas), it only belongs to the third Vikalpa. This is because those Five Dharmas also have Vikalpa in Prsthalabdha-jnana (wisdom attained after the fundamental wisdom). There are two kinds of Vikalpa: one is the Sasrava-citta (defiled mind) called Vikalpa, which is the Vikalpa in the Five Dharmas; the other is the Dharmadhatu (dharma realm) called Vikalpa, which is also called Prsthalabdha-jnana. Or establish three kinds of Vikalpa, two kinds as mentioned before, and the third is adding the Parikalpita-citta (imaginary mind) called Vikalpa. However, the fifth chapter of the 'Great Treatise' explains these two, which are the minds and mental activities (Caitasika, mental activities) of the Three Realms (Trailokya, desire realm, form realm, formless realm) called Vikalpa. Although the treatise is based on the defiled, it does not say only. Now in this, the first teacher says that the nature of Vitarka and Vicara is only defiled, that is, the first Dhyananga (factor of meditation) of the undefiled lacks Vitarka and Vicara. If according to the second teacher, in the cause of the Ten Bhumis, Sravaka-yana and Pratyekabuddha-yana (Hearer Vehicle and Solitary Realizer Vehicle), there are five undefiled factors of the first Dhyana, but when it comes to the Buddha (Buddha, the awakened one), they are gone, but they are namely thought and Prajna (wisdom). However, without coarse and fine, it cannot be said to be the factor-ground that can be treated. This meaning should be considered. In the Dhyana factors, it is extremely necessary to distinguish, as the 'Essentials' says. Treatise: Other aspects should be known reasonably by referring to the above. Commentary: The conditions of having defiled and undefiled, having things and not having things, etc., are all done by referring to the above. Regarding the separate explanation of the six kinds of mental activities (Caitasika, mental activities), the separate explanation above is completed. From below begins the second part, the general consideration. Are mental activities the same as or different from the mind (Citta, consciousness)? Treatise: Like these six positions, to the difference in divisions. Commentary: There are four parts in it: one question, two answers, three inquiries, and four explanations. This is a double question. Treatise: If so, what is the fault? Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. If it is allowed that both kinds exist, what is the fault? Treatise

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。二俱有過。

述曰。下第三徴。初總。后別。此總言過。

論。若離心體至說唯有識。

述曰。下別難也。二關徴此。難離心說有實體。其楞迦師。中百論師等。或經部妙音等亦然。如前第一卷解。彼雖不言一切心所並無。然有少數依心分位立差別故。總為此難。如俱舍解觸支中敘經部計。婆沙等敘妙音等計。說唯有識。即攝論第四所引十地經第六地。楞迦亦有。如前引訖。不說唯有心所故。

論。又如何說心遠獨行。

述曰。攝論第四頌。云遠行及獨行。無身寐于窟。調此難調心。唯說於心不言心所亦遠行故。此略頌也。

論。染凈由心。

述曰。無垢稱經。心垢故眾生垢等。如前第四卷十證中第十證已引訖。彼亦不說心所為有。

論。士夫六界。

述曰。四大．空．識能成有情。不言心所成有情故。五十六說。此密意說。唯色．動．心所三法最勝所依。故唯說六。處處經說。通大．小乘有。

論。莊嚴論說至無別染善法。

述曰。此意難云。許心似二現。謂已成立心現似見．相二。或現似能取。及所取訖。此即牒已成義。

如是似貪等。謂牒指義。故言如是　似貪等者。謂心復變似貪．嗔等一切染法。或似信等一切善法。此中似言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

二者都有過失。

述曰：下面是第三重征難。先總說，后別說。這裡是總說他們的過失。

論：如果離開心體而說只有識。

述曰：下面是分別征難。這是第二關，征難他們。征難離開心而說有實體。如《楞伽經》的論師、《中百論》的論師等，或者經部的妙音等也是這樣。如前面第一卷所解釋的。他們雖然不說一切心所都沒有，但有少數是依心之分位而立差別，所以總的為此征難。如《俱舍論》解釋觸支時敘述經部的觀點，《婆沙論》等敘述妙音等的觀點。說只有識，就是《攝大乘論》第四所引用的《十地經》第六地。《楞伽經》中也有，如前面所引用過的。不說只有心所。

論：又如何說心能遠離獨行？

述曰：《攝大乘論》第四頌說：『遠行及獨行，無身寐于窟，調此難調心。』只說了心，沒說心所也能遠行。這是略頌。

論：染污和清凈由心而生。

述曰：《無垢稱經》說：『心垢故眾生垢』等等。如前面第四卷十證中的第十證已經引用過了。那裡也沒有說心所是存在的。

論：士夫由六界組成。

述曰：四大、空、識能夠成就眾生，沒有說心所能成就眾生。五十六說，這是密意說，只有色、動、心所這三種法是最殊勝的所依，所以只說了六界。處處經中都有說，通於大乘和小乘。

論：《莊嚴論》說乃至沒有別的染污和善良的法。

述曰：這裡的意思是征難說：允許心像二種顯現，就是已經成立了心顯現得像見和相二者，或者顯現得像能取和所取。這即是重複已經成立的意義。

像貪等一樣。是重複指代的意思。所以說像貪等，就是說心又變現得像貪、嗔等一切染污法，或者像信等一切善良法。這裡說的『像』

【English Translation】 English version:

Both have faults.

Commentary: The following is the third refutation. First, a general statement, then a specific one. This is a general statement of their faults.

Treatise: If one separates from the mind-essence and says there is only consciousness (識, vijñāna).

Commentary: The following is a specific refutation. This is the second stage, refuting them. Refuting the idea of separating from the mind and saying there is a real entity. Such as the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra masters, the Madhyamakaśāstra masters, or the Sautrāntika's Svaraśāstra and others. As explained in the first volume. Although they do not say that all mental functions (心所, caitasika) do not exist, there are a few that establish differences based on the divisions of the mind, so this is a general refutation. As the Abhidharmakośa describes the Sautrāntika's view in the explanation of the touch factor, the Mahāvibhāṣā and others describe the Svaraśāstra's view. Saying there is only consciousness is what the Mahāyānasaṃgraha quotes in the fourth section from the sixth ground of the Daśabhūmika Sūtra. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra also has it, as quoted earlier. It does not say there are only mental functions.

Treatise: Moreover, how can it be said that the mind travels far and alone?

Commentary: The fourth verse of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'It travels far and alone, without a body it sleeps in a cave, tame this difficult to tame mind.' It only speaks of the mind, not saying that mental functions also travel far. This is a brief verse.

Treatise: Defilement and purity arise from the mind.

Commentary: The Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra says: 'Because the mind is defiled, beings are defiled,' and so on. As quoted earlier in the tenth proof of the fourth volume. It also does not say that mental functions exist.

Treatise: A person (士夫, puruṣa) is composed of six elements (六界, ṣaṭ dhātava).

Commentary: The four great elements (四大, catvāro mahābhūtāḥ), space (空, ākāśa), and consciousness (識, vijñāna) can accomplish sentient beings, not saying that mental functions can accomplish sentient beings. Fifty-six says, this is a secret meaning, only form (色, rūpa), movement (動, ejana), and mental functions are the most excellent supports, so only six elements are mentioned. It is said everywhere in the sutras, common to both Mahāyāna and Hīnayāna.

Treatise: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, up to there being no separate defiled and virtuous dharmas.

Commentary: The meaning here is to refute by saying: Allow the mind to appear as two kinds of appearances, that is, it has already been established that the mind appears like the seer and the seen, or appears like the grasper and the grasped. This is repeating the already established meaning.

Like greed and so on. It is the meaning of repeating and pointing. Therefore, it says like greed and so on, that is, the mind again transforms to appear like all defiled dharmas such as greed, hatred, and so on, or like all virtuous dharmas such as faith and so on. The 'like' here

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似心外所計實二分等法。故名為似　無別染善法者。謂心變似見．相二分。二分離心無別有法。復言心變似貪．信等故。貪．信等離心之外無別染善法。體即心也。如二分故。言心變似故。故知從心變似貪．信等。非別有心所。初以經證。后以理成　此離心有所難。次離心無所難。

論。若即是心至非自性故。

述曰。若但心分位如覺天．經部等者。如何聖教說與心相應。十卷楞伽頌第九．十卷。皆有相應之言等故。若心所即心。不可言相應。相應者必與他性非自性故。如對法第五相應品等說。自性二體不俱故。及五十六說他性相應非自性等。

論。又如何說至如日與光。

述曰。如日與光意說有異。離日輪外有光明故。如日所放千光明也。此楞伽經十卷成者。第七卷中五法品說。

論。瑜伽論說至與聖教相違。

述曰。五十六說復如何通。彼頌言。五種姓不成者。彼言且說五蘊性不成故。彼覺天等言非別有所。但心前後分位別故說有五者。是諸分位相望。有無皆成失故。有諸分位作用別者。由相異故體亦應異。離體無相故。若無作用別者。如何可言分位別故立五蘊也　分位差過失者。彼論又言。不應謂如六識分位說其差別彼計六識體一。而所依分位別故說六識。此蘊亦爾者。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 類似於心外所設想的實二分等法。所以叫做『似』。沒有另外的染污或善良之法，是指心變現出類似於見分（Dṛṣṭi-bhāga）和相分（Lakṣaṇa-bhāga）的二分。這二分離開心之外，沒有其他的法存在。又說心變現出類似於貪（Lobha）、信（Śrāddha）等，所以貪、信等離開心之外，沒有另外的染污或善良之法，它們的本體就是心。就像二分一樣，說心變現出類似於貪、信等，因此可知是從心變現出類似於貪、信等，而不是另外有心所（Caitta）。起初用經文來證明，後來用道理來成立。這是離開心而有心所的難點。接下來是離開心而無心所的難點。

論：如果心所就是心，那麼如何解釋聖教所說的與心相應呢？因為相應的事物必然和他性相應，而不是自性相應。

述記：如果僅僅是心的分位，就像覺天（Buddhadeva）、經部（Sautrāntika）等所認為的那樣，那麼如何解釋聖教說心所與心相應呢？《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）第十卷的頌文中，都有『相應』的說法。如果心所就是心，就不能說相應。相應的事物必然與他性相應，而不是自性相應。如《對法》（Abhidharma）第五相應品等所說，自性二體不能同時存在。以及第五十六說他性相應而不是自性等。

論：又如何解釋說，心就像太陽，心所就像陽光呢？

述記：就像太陽和陽光，意思是說它們是有區別的。因為離開太陽之外，還有光明存在。就像太陽所放出的千萬道光明。這在《楞伽經》第十卷的成就者，第七卷中的五法品中有所說明。

論：《瑜伽論》（Yoga-śāstra）說心與心所不相應，這與聖教相違背。

述記：第五十六說又如何解釋呢？那裡的頌文說，五種姓（Pañca gotra）不能成立。那裡說的是五蘊（Pañca-skandha）的自性不能成立。覺天等人說，不是另外有所，只是心的前後分位不同，所以說有五蘊。這是各個分位相互比較而言。有無都會造成過失。如果各個分位的作用不同，那麼由於相（Lakṣaṇa）不同，本體（Dravya）也應該不同。因為離開本體就沒有相。如果沒有作用上的區別，又怎麼能說分位不同而成立五蘊呢？分位的差別有過失，那部論又說，不應該像六識（Ṣaḍ-vijñāna）的分位那樣說它們的差別，他們認為六識的本體是一個，只是所依的分位不同，所以說有六識，這個蘊也是這樣。

【English Translation】 English version: It is similar to the imagined reality of two divisions and other dharmas outside the mind. Therefore, it is called 'similar'. There are no separate defiled or virtuous dharmas, meaning that the mind manifests as two divisions similar to the seeing-division (Dṛṣṭi-bhāga) and the characteristic-division (Lakṣaṇa-bhāga). These two divisions, apart from the mind, have no other dharmas. Furthermore, it is said that the mind manifests as similar to greed (Lobha), faith (Śrāddha), etc. Therefore, greed, faith, etc., apart from the mind, have no separate defiled or virtuous dharmas; their essence is the mind itself. Just like the two divisions, it is said that the mind manifests as similar to greed, faith, etc. Thus, it is known that it is from the mind that greed, faith, etc., manifest, and not that there are separate mental factors (Caitta). Initially, this is proven with sutras, and later established with reason. This is the difficulty of having mental factors separate from the mind. Next is the difficulty of not having mental factors separate from the mind.

Treatise: If mental factors are the same as the mind, how can the sacred teachings say that they are associated with the mind? Because associated things must be associated with otherness, not self-nature.

Commentary: If it were merely divisions of the mind, as Buddhadeva and the Sautrāntika school believe, how could the sacred teachings say that mental factors are associated with the mind? The verses in the tenth volume of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra all have the term 'associated'. If mental factors are the same as the mind, it cannot be said that they are associated. Associated things must be associated with otherness, not self-nature. As the Abhidharma's fifth chapter on association says, two entities of self-nature cannot coexist. And the fifty-sixth says that otherness is associated, not self-nature, etc.

Treatise: Furthermore, how can it be said that the mind is like the sun, and mental factors are like sunlight?

Commentary: Like the sun and sunlight, it means that they are different. Because there is light outside of the sun. Like the thousands of rays emitted by the sun. This is explained in the seventh chapter, the chapter on the five dharmas, of the tenth volume of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra.

Treatise: The Yoga-śāstra says that the mind and mental factors are not associated, which contradicts the sacred teachings.

Commentary: How can the fifty-sixth be explained? The verses there say that the five lineages (Pañca gotra) cannot be established. It says that the nature of the five aggregates (Pañca-skandha) cannot be established. Buddhadeva and others say that there is nothing separate, but only different divisions of the mind, so it is said that there are five aggregates. This is in comparison to each division. Having or not having will cause faults. If the functions of each division are different, then because the characteristics (Lakṣaṇa) are different, the essence (Dravya) should also be different. Because without essence, there are no characteristics. If there is no difference in function, how can it be said that the divisions are different and establish the five aggregates? The difference in divisions has faults. That treatise also says that one should not say that the differences are like the divisions of the six consciousnesses (Ṣaḍ-vijñāna). They believe that the essence of the six consciousnesses is one, but only the divisions of the bases are different, so it is said that there are six consciousnesses, and this aggregate is also like that.

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不然。設許六識無別六體。六識依．緣皆各別故可說有六。今此心所所依．所緣一處可得。故成非理。若謂一識有前後轉變說有五者。不然。非色法故。無色無轉變可如乳等前後變異故。色法無依．緣可有轉變。心則不然。如何有轉變。此計前後分位別立　因緣無別故者。謂現在一念。有種種行相不同。既唯一識無心所者。有何差別因緣。令一識有多行相分位差別。此難一念分位變異。設多念變異。根．境相似因緣無別。亦成過失　與聖教相違者。彼論引云。如經說言貪．嗔等法染惱其心。令不解脫等。彼有問答。若起貪心俱時無識。則貪無有所依染心。由此貪心但是能染非所染故。若謂前心是識。後心是貪．染前心者。無差別故。謂前心亦緣此境。後心亦緣此境。無別因緣。如何前是識。后是貪染。又復經言觸俱受．想等。又言如是諸法和合非不和等。如前已引。顯揚第一心所中亦有。又經說燈明喻等。勘楞迦下三卷頌中亦有。然長行如前引。又違三喻。謂乳．酪．蘇等。即彼所說。粗四大種以之為我。此在欲界四大粗故如乳。有色意生。即是色界色化生故。漸勝如酪。無色想生。即無色界轉勝如蘇。如是等經豈唯有色。或唯有心。唯有想也。故六界經等是密意說。種種質彼廣如彼說。以上並是與聖教相違。即五經

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不然。假設六識沒有區別，是六個獨立的實體。因為六識所依賴和緣取的對象都各自不同，所以可以說有六個。現在這些心所（Cittasikharas，心所法）所依賴和緣取的對象都在同一處可以找到，因此這種說法是不合理的。如果說一個識有前後轉變，所以說有五個，那也是不對的。因為它不是色法（Rūpa，物質現象），沒有顏色，沒有轉變，不能像牛奶等那樣前後變異。色法沒有所依和所緣，可以有轉變。心則不然，怎麼會有轉變呢？ 這種認為前後分位不同而建立的說法，是因為因緣沒有差別。也就是說，現在一念之中，有種種行相不同。既然只有一個識，沒有心所，那麼有什麼差別因緣，能讓一個識有多種行相分位的差別呢？這是在質疑一念的分位變異。假設是多唸的變異，根（Indriya，感覺器官）、境（Visaya，感覺對像）相似，因緣沒有差別，也會有過失。 與聖教相違背的地方在於，他們的論點引用說，如經文所說，貪（Lobha，貪婪）、嗔（Dosa，嗔恨）等法染污惱亂其心，使之不能解脫等等。他們有問答。如果生起貪心的時候沒有識，那麼貪就沒有所依來染污心。因此貪心只是能染污，而不是被染污的。如果說前一個心是識，后一個心是貪，染污前一個心，那也沒有差別。因為前一個心也緣取這個境，后一個心也緣取這個境，沒有別的因緣，怎麼能說前一個是識，后一個是貪染呢？ 又經文說，觸（Phassa，接觸）俱生受（Vedanā，感受）、想（Saññā，知覺）等。又說，像這樣諸法和合，不是不和合等等。如前面已經引用過的。顯揚第一心所中也有。又經文說燈明譬喻等等。可以參考楞伽經下三卷的頌文，也有。然而長行如前面引用過的。又違背了三個譬喻，即乳（Dugda，牛奶）、酪（Dadhi，酸奶）、蘇（Ghrita，酥油）等，就是他們所說的。粗四大種（Mahābhūta，四大元素）以之為我，這在欲界（Kāmadhātu，慾望界）四大粗重，就像牛奶。有色意生（Manomayakāya，意生身），即是色化生，逐漸勝妙，就像酸奶。無色想生（Asaññasatta，無想有情），即無色界（Arūpadhātu，無色界），更加殊勝，就像酥油。像這樣的經文，難道只有色，或者只有心，只有想嗎？所以六界經等是密意說，種種質，那裡廣泛地像他們所說的那樣。以上都是與聖教相違背的地方，即五經。

【English Translation】 English version No. Suppose the six consciousnesses are not distinct, but are six separate entities. Because the bases and objects of the six consciousnesses are all different, it can be said that there are six. Now, the bases and objects of these mental factors (Cittasikharas) can be found in the same place, so this statement is unreasonable. If it is said that one consciousness has prior and subsequent transformations, so there are five, that is also incorrect. Because it is not a form (Rūpa), it has no color, no transformation, and cannot be transformed like milk, etc., from beginning to end. Form has no basis or object, and can have transformations. The mind is not like that, how can there be transformations? This statement that is established based on different prior and subsequent divisions is because the causes and conditions are not different. That is to say, in the present moment, there are various different aspects. Since there is only one consciousness and no mental factors, then what different causes and conditions can cause one consciousness to have multiple different aspects and divisions? This is questioning the transformation of divisions in one moment. Suppose it is the transformation of multiple moments, the sense organs (Indriya) and sense objects (Visaya) are similar, and the causes and conditions are not different, there will also be faults. The contradiction with the sacred teachings lies in the fact that their argument quotes, as the scriptures say, greed (Lobha), hatred (Dosa), etc., defile and disturb the mind, causing it to be unable to be liberated, etc. They have questions and answers. If greed arises and there is no consciousness at the same time, then greed has no basis to defile the mind. Therefore, greed is only able to defile, but is not defiled. If it is said that the previous mind is consciousness, and the subsequent mind is greed, defiling the previous mind, then there is no difference. Because the previous mind also grasps this object, and the subsequent mind also grasps this object, there is no other cause or condition, how can it be said that the previous one is consciousness and the subsequent one is greed? Moreover, the scriptures say that contact (Phassa) is accompanied by feeling (Vedanā), perception (Saññā), etc. It also says that such dharmas are combined, not uncombined, etc. As previously quoted. It is also in the first chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. The scriptures also mention the analogy of the lamp, etc. You can refer to the verses in the lower three volumes of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, which also have it. However, the prose is as previously quoted. It also contradicts the three metaphors, namely milk (Dugda), yogurt (Dadhi), ghee (Ghrita), etc., which is what they said. The gross four great elements (Mahābhūta) are taken as the self, which in the desire realm (Kāmadhātu) the four great elements are coarse, like milk. The mind-made body (Manomayakāya) is the form-born, gradually becoming superior, like yogurt. The non-perceptual beings (Asaññasatta) are in the formless realm (Arūpadhātu), even more superior, like ghee. Are such scriptures only about form, or only about mind, only about perception? Therefore, the Six Elements Sutra, etc., are spoken with hidden meaning, various qualities, widely as they say there. The above are all contradictions with the sacred teachings, namely the five sutras.

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也。

此等第二難。今答之云。

論。應說離心至說唯識等。

述曰。下釋有二。初俗。后真。此下俗也。離心有所。何故說唯識．心遠獨行．染．凈由心　六界之中唯說心者。以心勝故說此唯識等。如何勝能為主能為依。行相總恒決定。非如所等有時不定。五十六云。說六界者。唯顯色．動．心所三法勝所依故。色所依謂四大。動所依謂空界。非無為。有情色動必以為依。謂空界色。此在內界不取外者。由內身中有此空界故。所以有動故為動依。心所所依。謂心。故今總言以心勝故唯說於心色．心之身依空動故。又次前引乳等喻經應為返質。

此即通以前第一難中經違訖。次通莊嚴論說似貪等者。

論。心所依心至非即彼心。

述曰。以諸心所依心方起。依心勢力生故。說心似彼貪．信等現。非說彼心所體即謂是心。遂言無別染．善法等。除此心所似貪等法。無別心外實染．善法。非謂所似貪等亦無。似有二義。一無別體。由心生故說之為似。變似二分現者是也。二雖有別體。由心方生為依勝故說之為似。即貪等是。今頌總言似者。通此二故。非一為例。

此則別通第一難經訖。次總通第一難中經等。

論。又識心言至恒相應故。

述曰。言心識者亦攝心

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 也。

此等是第二個難題。現在回答如下：

論：應該說從離心說到唯識等等。

述記：下面的解釋分為兩部分。首先是世俗的解釋，然後是真實的解釋。下面是世俗的解釋。既然離開了心就有所屬，為什麼還要說唯識呢？心遠離而獨自執行，染污和清凈都由心所決定。在六界之中只說心，是因為心最為殊勝，所以才說唯識等等。如何殊勝呢？心能夠作為主體，能夠作為所依。它的行相是總體的、恒常的、決定的，不像色等有時不定。《五十六》中說：『說六界，只是爲了顯示色、動、心所這三種法是殊勝的所依。』色的所依是四大，動的所依是空界。不是無為法，有動一定以空界作為所依。色也是如此。這是在內界中，不取外界，因為內在的身體中有這個空界。所以有動，因此空界是動的所依。心所的所依是心。所以現在總的說，因為心殊勝，所以只說心。色和心都以身體為空界而動。另外，之前引用的乳等譬喻的經文應該用來反駁。

這就可以通解之前第一個難題中經文的違背之處。接下來通解《莊嚴論》中說的類似貪等的情況。

論：心所依靠心才能生起，因為依靠心的勢力而生起，所以說心類似貪、信等顯現。不是說心所的本體就是心，於是就說沒有別的染污、善良的法等。除了心所類似貪等法之外，沒有心外真實的染污、善良的法。不是說所類似的貪等也沒有。類似有兩種含義。一種是沒有別的本體，因為由心生起，所以說它是類似，是變似二分顯現的情況。另一種是雖然有別的本體，但是因為由心才生起，作為所依最為殊勝，所以說它是類似，也就是貪等。現在頌文中總的說類似，是爲了概括這兩種情況，不是隻舉一個例子。

這就分別通解了第一個難題中經文的疑問。接下來總的通解第一個難題中的經文等。

論：又說識心，也包括了心

述記：說心識，也包括了心

【English Translation】 English version Also.

This is the second difficulty. Now, the answer is as follows:

Treatise: It should be said from 'apart from the mind' to 'only consciousness,' etc.

Commentary: The following explanation has two parts. First, the conventional explanation, then the true explanation. The following is the conventional explanation. Since there is something that belongs when apart from the mind, why say 'only consciousness'? The mind travels far and alone; defilement and purity are determined by the mind. Among the six realms, only the mind is mentioned because the mind is the most superior, so 'only consciousness,' etc., is said. How is it superior? The mind can be the subject, can be the basis. Its characteristics are general, constant, and definite, unlike form, etc., which are sometimes indefinite. The Fifty-Six says: 'Saying the six realms is only to show that form, movement, and mental functions are the superior bases.' The basis of form is the four great elements; the basis of movement is the space realm. It is not unconditioned; movement must rely on the space realm. Form is also like this. This is in the inner realm, not taking the outer realm, because there is this space realm in the inner body. Therefore, there is movement, so the space realm is the basis of movement. The basis of mental functions is the mind. So now, in general, because the mind is superior, only the mind is mentioned. Form and mind both move in the body through the space realm. Also, the previously cited sutra with the analogy of milk, etc., should be used to refute.

This can resolve the contradiction in the sutra in the first difficulty. Next, to resolve the statement in the Treatise on Ornamentation about seeming greed, etc.

Treatise: Mental functions arise relying on the mind, because they arise relying on the power of the mind, so it is said that the mind appears similar to greed, faith, etc. It is not said that the substance of the mental function is the mind, and then say that there are no separate defiled and virtuous dharmas, etc. Apart from mental functions similar to greed, etc., there are no real defiled and virtuous dharmas outside the mind. It is not said that what is similar to greed, etc., also does not exist. 'Similar' has two meanings. One is that there is no separate substance; because it arises from the mind, it is said to be similar, which is the case of transformation appearing as two parts. The other is that although there is a separate substance, it arises from the mind and is the most superior basis, so it is said to be similar, which is greed, etc. Now, the verse generally says 'similar' to encompass these two meanings, not just one example.

This separately resolves the doubt in the sutra in the first difficulty. Next, to generally resolve the sutras, etc., in the first difficulty.

Treatise: Also, the words 'consciousness-mind' also include the mind.

Commentary: Saying 'mind-consciousness' also includes the mind.

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所。前經可知。莊嚴論言許心等者。亦攝心所以恒相應故。若爾貪．信等。既入能似心聚之中。所言似貪．信等者是何。總心聚中貪信等法。亦別變似貪．信等現。以義說之總．別聚異。謂總心自能似二現。即心自證分。似自見．相二。俱時貪等自體分。亦現似貪等各二現義。故其總許心聚之中。心所亦在其中。然但說心變似二現。說心所法似貪等現。以心勝故。不過染．凈二位中故。其無記法有順染者有順善者。故此總言亦攝無記。如諸部中執無無記。其山．河等既有所順。即唯善．染。此亦如是　又解心所不離心故。許心自體既似二現。如是心所自體分染者。似貪等二現自體分凈者。似信等二現。離自體．及所似貪等外無別染．善法。

論。唯識等言至皆無有失。

述曰。總結前義無相違失。或此後通但通前經。非解后論。

論。此依世俗至真俗妙理。

述曰。下以真釋。今此所說四世俗中第二道理世俗。若依勝義者。即四種勝義中第二道理勝義。依因果理不即不離。心所為果。心王為因。法爾因果非即非離。又約第三勝義依詮顯旨。若約能詮八依他別。八非定即。若同二無我。八非定離。第四勝義既絕心言。何即何離。且是依第二俗。第一真。以辨八別。若偏對第二勝義。非即．離亦

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

所。前面的經文已經可以知道。[《莊嚴論》]說允許心所等存在，是因為它們也攝屬於心，所以恒常相應。如果這樣，貪、信等既然進入了能相似於心的集合之中，那麼所說的相似於貪、信等的是什麼呢？總的心聚中，貪信等法，也分別變現出相似於貪、信等的顯現。從意義上說，總體和個別的心聚是不同的。所謂總體的心自己能夠相似地顯現出兩種顯現，即心自己的自證分，相似於自己的見分和相分。同時，貪等自體分，也顯現出相似於貪等各自的兩種顯現的意義。所以，總的來說，允許心聚之中，心所也存在於其中。然而，只是說心變現出相似的兩種顯現，說心所法相似於貪等顯現，因為心是主要的。不超過染污和清凈兩種狀態的緣故。那些無記法，有順從染污的，有順從善良的。因此，這裡總的來說也包括無記。如同各個部派中認為沒有無記一樣，山河等既然有所順從，就只有善良和染污。這裡也是這樣。又解釋說，心所不離開心，所以允許心的自體既然相似於兩種顯現，像這樣，心所的自體分，染污的，相似於貪等兩種顯現；自體分清凈的，相似於信等兩種顯現。離開自體以及所相似的貪等之外，沒有其他的染污和善良的法。

論：唯識等所說，都沒有過失。

述曰：總結前面的意義，沒有互相違背的過失。或者這裡之後的內容，只是貫通前面的經文，不是解釋後面的論。

論：這是依據世俗諦來說的，是真俗的微妙道理。

述曰：下面用真諦來解釋。現在這裡所說的四種世俗諦中，是第二種道理世俗諦。如果依據勝義諦來說，就是四種勝義諦中的第二種道理勝義諦。依據因果的道理，不即不離。心所是果，心王是因。法爾如是，因果非即非離。又從第三勝義諦來說，是依據能詮顯現旨意。如果從能詮來說，八識依他起是不同的，八識不是一定等同於依他起。如果和二無我相同，八識不是一定離開依他起。第四勝義諦既然斷絕了心和言語，哪裡還存在即和離呢？暫且是依據第二世俗諦和第一勝義諦，來辨別八識的差別。如果偏重於第二勝義諦，非即非離也是成立的。 English version:

So. The previous sutra already makes it known. The [《Treatise on Ornamentation》] says that allowing mental factors (citta-caitta) etc. is because they are also included within the mind (citta), therefore they are constantly corresponding. If that's the case, since greed (lobha), faith (śraddhā), etc. have entered into the collection that can resemble the mind, then what is it that is said to resemble greed, faith, etc.? Within the total mind collection, the dharmas of greed, faith, etc., also separately manifest appearances similar to greed, faith, etc. In terms of meaning, the total and individual collections are different. The so-called total mind itself can similarly manifest two appearances, namely the self-cognition portion (svasaṃvedana-bhāga) of the mind itself, resembling its own seeing portion (darśana-bhāga) and object portion (nimitta-bhāga). At the same time, the self-nature portion of greed, etc., also manifests the meaning of two appearances each resembling greed, etc. Therefore, in general, it is allowed that within the mind collection, mental factors are also present within it. However, it is only said that the mind manifests two similar appearances, and that mental factor dharmas resemble the appearance of greed, etc., because the mind is primary. It does not exceed the two states of defilement and purity. Those unmarked (avyākṛta) dharmas, some accord with defilement, and some accord with goodness. Therefore, it is generally said here that unmarked is also included. Just as in various schools, they hold that there is no unmarked, since mountains, rivers, etc. have something they accord with, they are only good and defiled. It is the same here. Also, it is explained that mental factors do not leave the mind, so it is allowed that since the self-nature of the mind resembles two appearances, in this way, the self-nature portion of mental factors, the defiled, resembles the two appearances of greed, etc.; the self-nature portion of the pure, resembles the two appearances of faith, etc. Apart from the self-nature and what resembles greed, etc., there are no other defiled and good dharmas.

Treatise: What is said in Consciousness-only (Vijñānavāda) etc., has no fault.

Commentary: Summarizing the previous meaning, there is no fault of mutual contradiction. Or what follows here only connects to the previous sutra, and does not explain the later treatise.

Treatise: This is based on conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), it is the subtle principle of true and conventional.

Commentary: Below, it is explained using ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). What is said here now, among the four conventional truths, is the second, the conventional truth of reasoning. If based on ultimate truth, it is the second, the ultimate truth of reasoning, among the four ultimate truths. Based on the principle of cause and effect, neither identical nor separate. Mental factors are the effect, the mind-king is the cause. It is naturally so, cause and effect are neither identical nor separate. Also, speaking from the third ultimate truth, it is based on the ability to express the meaning. If speaking from the expression, the eight consciousnesses' dependence on others (paratantra) is different, the eight are not necessarily identical to dependence on others. If the same as the two no-selves (dvayanairātmya), the eight are not necessarily separate from dependence on others. Since the fourth ultimate truth has cut off mind and speech, where does identity and separation exist? For the time being, it is based on the second conventional truth and the first ultimate truth, to distinguish the differences of the eight consciousnesses. If biased towards the second ultimate truth, neither identical nor separate is also established.

【English Translation】 English version:

So. The previous sutra already makes it known. The [《Treatise on Ornamentation》] says that allowing mental factors (citta-caitta) etc. is because they are also included within the mind (citta), therefore they are constantly corresponding. If that's the case, since greed (lobha), faith (śraddhā), etc. have entered into the collection that can resemble the mind, then what is it that is said to resemble greed, faith, etc.? Within the total mind collection, the dharmas of greed, faith, etc., also separately manifest appearances similar to greed, faith, etc. In terms of meaning, the total and individual collections are different. The so-called total mind itself can similarly manifest two appearances, namely the self-cognition portion (svasaṃvedana-bhāga) of the mind itself, resembling its own seeing portion (darśana-bhāga) and object portion (nimitta-bhāga). At the same time, the self-nature portion of greed, etc., also manifests the meaning of two appearances each resembling greed, etc. Therefore, in general, it is allowed that within the mind collection, mental factors are also present within it. However, it is only said that the mind manifests two similar appearances, and that mental factor dharmas resemble the appearance of greed, etc., because the mind is primary. It does not exceed the two states of defilement and purity. Those unmarked (avyākṛta) dharmas, some accord with defilement, and some accord with goodness. Therefore, it is generally said here that unmarked is also included. Just as in various schools, they hold that there is no unmarked, since mountains, rivers, etc. have something they accord with, they are only good and defiled. It is the same here. Also, it is explained that mental factors do not leave the mind, so it is allowed that since the self-nature of the mind resembles two appearances, in this way, the self-nature portion of mental factors, the defiled, resembles the two appearances of greed, etc.; the self-nature portion of the pure, resembles the two appearances of faith, etc. Apart from the self-nature and what resembles greed, etc., there are no other defiled and good dharmas.

Treatise: What is said in Consciousness-only (Vijñānavāda) etc., has no fault.

Commentary: Summarizing the previous meaning, there is no fault of mutual contradiction. Or what follows here only connects to the previous sutra, and does not explain the later treatise.

Treatise: This is based on conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), it is the subtle principle of true and conventional.

Commentary: Below, it is explained using ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya). What is said here now, among the four conventional truths, is the second, the conventional truth of reasoning. If based on ultimate truth, it is the second, the ultimate truth of reasoning, among the four ultimate truths. Based on the principle of cause and effect, neither identical nor separate. Mental factors are the effect, the mind-king is the cause. It is naturally so, cause and effect are neither identical nor separate. Also, speaking from the third ultimate truth, it is based on the ability to express the meaning. If speaking from the expression, the eight consciousnesses' dependence on others (paratantra) is different, the eight are not necessarily identical to dependence on others. If the same as the two no-selves (dvayanairātmya), the eight are not necessarily separate from dependence on others. Since the fourth ultimate truth has cut off mind and speech, where does identity and separation exist? For the time being, it is based on the second conventional truth and the first ultimate truth, to distinguish the differences of the eight consciousnesses. If biased towards the second ultimate truth, neither identical nor separate is also established.

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得。又即推入第一真中。亦非即．離。理稍殊勝故。虛幻法故。何有定離。八作用別亦非定即。或是第四勝義所攝。如八識中解。不可定說。如何可言若即。若離。諸識亦然。八識皆應不可定說。至下此卷中彼文自會。

論。已說六識至現起分位。

述曰。問雖但有現起分位　頌中義有所依俱轉。現起相顯。依俱隱故。自前第五卷已來。解第三能變。彼第二頌已后至此已前。明與六位心所俱訖。今明第七門六識共依。第八門六識俱轉。第九門起滅分位。有此二頌。此結前生后寄問徴起。次舉頌正答。后釋本文。

論。頌曰至睡眠與悶絕。

述曰。依止根本識者。此句通下第六識。二俱依止第八識故。顯其共依。然依止有二。一依種子第八識。即是因緣親依。達磨經中無始時來界也。二依現行第八。即是增上緣依。即達磨經中一切法等依也。言六轉識皆依本識種子．現行而得現起。五十一說。由有阿賴耶識故執受五根。乃至由有此識故得有末那。第六意識依之而轉等是也。下長行自解此句。總通六識。或俱．不俱二句。釋俱轉。餘明起滅分位差別。第二頌中及無心之言。通下四位。由下四位不言無心。亂有心故意得起失。

論。曰至生根本故。

述曰。下長行中文分為二。初正解

【現代漢語翻譯】 得。又即使推入第一真如中，也不是即或離的關係，因為理體稍微殊勝的緣故。由於一切都是虛幻的法，哪裡有什麼確定的離呢？八種作用的差別也不是確定的即。或許這屬於第四種勝義所攝，就像在八識的解釋中那樣，不可確定地說。如何能說若即若離呢？各種識也是如此。八識都應該不可確定地說。到下面這卷中，那段文字自然會解釋清楚。

論：已經說了六識到現起分位。

述記說：問雖然只有現起分位，頌中的意義有所依和俱轉。現起相顯，所依和俱轉隱沒的緣故。從前面第五卷以來，解釋第三能變。那第二頌之後到這裡之前，說明與六位心所共同作用完畢。現在說明第七門，六識共同的所依；第八門，六識共同的運轉；第九門，起滅分位。有這兩頌。這是總結前面，引發後面的提問。接下來舉出頌文，正式回答，然後解釋本文。

論：頌說：乃至睡眠與悶絕。

述記說：依止根本識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）者，這句話貫通下面的第六識。因為兩者都依止第八識的緣故，顯示它們共同的所依。然而依止有兩種：一是依種子第八識，這是因緣親依，也就是達磨經中說的無始時來的界；二是依現行第八識，這是增上緣依，也就是達磨經中說的一切法等所依。說六轉識都依靠本識的種子和現行而得以現起。《五十一說》中說，由於有阿賴耶識，所以執受五根，乃至由於有此識，所以有末那（Manas，末那識），第六意識依靠它而運轉等等。下面的長行會自己解釋這句話，總括六識。或者俱、不俱兩句，解釋俱轉。其餘說明起滅分位的差別。第二頌中的及無心之言，貫通下面的四位。由於下面的四位沒有說無心，恐怕有人誤以為有心，所以特意說明。

論：說：乃至生根本的緣故。

述記說：下面的長行文字分為兩部分。首先正式解釋。

【English Translation】 It is obtained. Furthermore, even when pushed into the first True Suchness, it is neither 'identical' nor 'separate,' because the principle is slightly superior. Since all dharmas are illusory, how can there be a fixed separation? The difference in the eight functions is also not a fixed identity. Perhaps this is included in the fourth Supreme Meaning, as explained in the context of the Eight Consciousnesses; it cannot be definitively stated. How can one say 'neither identical nor separate'? The various consciousnesses are also like this. All eight consciousnesses should be considered indefinable. This passage will become clear in the text below in this volume.

Treatise: It has already been discussed the six consciousnesses up to the manifestation division.

Commentary: Although the question only concerns the manifestation division, the meaning in the verse includes both 'that which is relied upon' and 'co-arising.' The manifestation is apparent, while 'that which is relied upon' and 'co-arising' are hidden. From the fifth volume onwards, the third transformation is explained. From after the second verse to before this point, the co-operation with the six mental functions has been clarified. Now, the seventh section explains the common basis of the six consciousnesses; the eighth section explains the co-functioning of the six consciousnesses; and the ninth section explains the divisions of arising and ceasing. These two verses are present. This summarizes the previous and introduces the following questions. Next, the verse is presented for a formal answer, followed by an explanation of the main text.

Treatise: The verse says: up to sleep and fainting.

Commentary: 'Relying on the fundamental consciousness' (Alaya-vijnana, 阿賴耶識) refers to both this and the sixth consciousness below. Because both rely on the eighth consciousness, it shows their common basis. However, there are two types of reliance: first, reliance on the seed eighth consciousness, which is the direct cause and condition, the 'realm' from beginningless time in the Dharma Sutra; second, reliance on the manifest eighth consciousness, which is the supporting condition, the basis of all dharmas in the Dharma Sutra. It is said that the six transforming consciousnesses arise based on the seeds and manifestations of the fundamental consciousness. 'Fifty-One Says' states that because there is the Alaya-vijnana, it grasps the five roots, and because there is this consciousness, there is Manas (末那識), and the sixth consciousness relies on it to function, and so on. The following long passage will explain this sentence itself, encompassing all six consciousnesses. The phrases 'together' and 'not together' explain 'co-arising.' The rest explains the differences in the divisions of arising and ceasing. The words 'and without mind' in the second verse apply to the four states below. Because the four states below do not mention 'without mind,' it is intentionally clarified to avoid the mistaken idea that there is mind.

Treatise: Says: up to the cause of the fundamental.

Commentary: The following long passage is divided into two parts. First, a formal explanation.

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頌文。后是故八識一切有情下。總料簡前三種能變。初中有三。初解所依。次五識者下。解俱．不俱相。後由五轉識下。解起．滅分位。此即初也　根本識者。阿陀那識。以與染．凈識為依故。凈即無漏。至二乘．菩薩等位通故。言阿賴耶者位便局故。言根本者。生之由始。義同大眾部根本識也。

解第一句下三字訖卻解上二字。

論。依止者至為共親依。

述曰。七轉識中前六轉識。除第七也。以第七識緣恒無礙。又于彼文已明依彼轉緣彼故除第七　又解第八．七識並明斷有漏分位此六轉識但明起．滅分位。不言斷有漏分位。第八．七一切時行顯。今六識亦有斷位影顯文也。下轉依中自當解故。此前六識以根本識為共依。即現行本識也。識皆共故。親依者即種子識。各別種故。

即此一句通二頌訖。自下第二解諸識俱不俱相。

論。五識者至故總說之。

述曰。五識者。牒頌也　謂前五轉識。顯是眼等五根所生之識也。何以一處而總言者。種類相似故總說之。一謂俱依色根。二同緣色境。三俱但緣現在。四俱現量得。五俱有間斷。種類相似故總合說。即是第二句上二字。

論。隨緣現言顯非常起。

述曰。隨緣現者。牒指頌也　顯非常起者。顯五識隨緣方能現起

【現代漢語翻譯】 頌文。后是故八識一切有情下。總料簡前三種能變。初中有三。初解所依。次五識者下。解俱．不俱相。後由五轉識下。解起．滅分位。此即初也　根本識者（根本識：根本的意識）。阿陀那識（阿陀那識：執持識，第八識的別名）。以與染．凈識為依故。凈即無漏。至二乘（二乘：聲聞乘和緣覺乘）．菩薩（菩薩：立志成佛的修行者）等位通故。言阿賴耶（阿賴耶：藏識，第八識的別名）者位便局故。言根本者。生之由始。義同大眾部根本識也。 解第一句下三字訖卻解上二字。 論。依止者至為共親依。 述曰。七轉識中前六轉識。除第七也。以第七識緣恒無礙。又于彼文已明依彼轉緣彼故除第七　又解第八．七識並明斷有漏分位此六轉識但明起．滅分位。不言斷有漏分位。第八．七一切時行顯。今六識亦有斷位影顯文也。下轉依中自當解故。此前六識以根本識為共依。即現行本識也。識皆共故。親依者即種子識。各別種故。 即此一句通二頌訖。自下第二解諸識俱不俱相。 論。五識者至故總說之。 述曰。五識者。牒頌也　謂前五轉識。顯是眼等五根所生之識也。何以一處而總言者。種類相似故總說之。一謂俱依色根。二同緣色境。三俱但緣現在。四俱現量得。五俱有間斷。種類相似故總合說。即是第二句上二字。 論。隨緣現言顯非常起。 述曰。隨緣現者。牒指頌也　顯非常起者。顯五識隨緣方能現起

【English Translation】 Verse. Afterwards, 'Therefore, the eight consciousnesses of all sentient beings...' generally explains the first three types of transformations. The first part has three sections. First, it explains the support. Next, 'The five consciousnesses...' explains the simultaneous and non-simultaneous aspects. Later, 'Because of the five transformed consciousnesses...' explains the phases of arising and ceasing. This is the first section. The 'fundamental consciousness' (根本識) is the Ādāna consciousness (阿陀那識, Ādāna-vijñāna: grasping consciousness, another name for the eighth consciousness). It serves as the basis for defiled and pure consciousnesses. 'Pure' means without outflows (無漏). It applies to the stages of the Two Vehicles (二乘, Two Vehicles: Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), Bodhisattvas (菩薩, Bodhisattva: one who aspires to Buddhahood), and so on. The term Ālaya (阿賴耶, Ālaya: storehouse consciousness, another name for the eighth consciousness) is more specific to a certain stage. 'Fundamental' means the origin of arising, with a meaning similar to the fundamental consciousness of the Mahāsāṃghika school. After explaining the last three words of the first sentence, it then explains the first two words. Treatise: 'The support...' to '...as a common and close support'. Commentary: Among the seven transformed consciousnesses, the first six are included, except for the seventh. This is because the seventh consciousness is constantly and unobstructed in its object-referral. Moreover, the text has already clarified that it relies on and is conditioned by that, hence the exclusion of the seventh. Furthermore, the eighth and seventh consciousnesses are explained together to clarify the severance of outflows, while these six transformed consciousnesses only clarify the phases of arising and ceasing. They do not discuss the severance of outflows. The eighth and seventh consciousnesses are manifest as functioning at all times. Now, the text also implicitly reveals the phase of severance for these six consciousnesses. The transformation of the basis will be explained later. These six consciousnesses take the fundamental consciousness as their common support, which is the currently functioning fundamental consciousness. All consciousnesses are common in this sense. The 'close support' refers to the seed consciousness, as each seed is distinct. This one sentence covers two verses. From here onwards, the second part explains the simultaneous and non-simultaneous aspects of the consciousnesses. Treatise: 'The five consciousnesses...' to '...hence they are discussed together'. Commentary: 'The five consciousnesses' is a repetition of the verse. It refers to the first five transformed consciousnesses, which are the consciousnesses arising from the five roots such as the eye. Why are they discussed together in one place? Because they are similar in kind. First, they all rely on the sense organs. Second, they all perceive sense objects. Third, they all only perceive the present. Fourth, they all attain through direct perception. Fifth, they all have interruptions. Because they are similar in kind, they are discussed together. This refers to the first two words of the second sentence. Treatise: 'Manifesting according to conditions' reveals that they do not arise constantly. Commentary: 'Manifesting according to conditions' is a reference to the verse. 'Reveals that they do not arise constantly' means that the five consciousnesses can only manifest when conditions are met.

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。非是常生。緣非恒故。第六雖亦隨緣方現。時緣恒具故不言也。至下當知。由此五識多間斷故。

問何者為緣。

論。緣謂作意根境等緣。

述曰。若小乘五識有三類。即以五．四．三緣而生。今大乘稍別。眼識依肉眼具九緣生。謂空．明．根．境．作意五同小乘。若加根本第八。染．凈第七。分別俱六。能生種子。九依而生。若天眼唯除明．空耳識依八除明。鼻．舌等三依七。復除空。以至境方取故。第六依五緣生。根即第七也。境一切法也。作意。及根本第八。能生即種子五依生第七。八以四緣生。一即第八．七識為俱有依。無根本依。即為俱有依故。二以隨所取為所緣三作意。四種子。故有四緣也　或說第八依四。第七依三。即以所依為所緣故。此據正義　然若取等無間緣。即如次十．九．八．六．五．四緣而生。即所託處皆名為緣。故有此別。故論言等。

論。謂五識身至有頓漸故。

述曰。但由五識內托本識。即種子也。外藉眾緣方得現前。以雖種子恒。外緣合有頓．漸。起五。或四．三．二．一識生故。或五至一生不定故。或俱．不俱。七十六．解深密說。廣惠。阿陀那為依止。為建立故。若於爾時有一眼識生緣現前。即於此時一眼識轉。乃至五緣頓現在前。即于爾時

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：並非是常時存在的，因為因緣不是恒常不變的。第六識雖然也隨著因緣而顯現，但因為時時都具備因緣，所以這裡沒有提及。這一點在下文將會明白。由於這個原因，前五識常常會有間斷。

問：什麼是因緣？

論：因緣指的是作意、根、境等因緣。

述曰：如果按照小乘的觀點，前五識有三種類型，即依靠五種、四種、三種因緣而生起。現在大乘的觀點稍有不同。眼識依靠肉眼，具備九種因緣而生起，即空、明、根、境、作意，這五種與小乘相同。如果加上根本的第八識（Alaya-vijnana），染污的第七識（Manas-vijnana），分別俱六，能生種子的功能，就依靠這九種因緣而生起。如果是天眼，就只除去光明和空間。耳識依靠八種因緣，除去光明。鼻識、舌識等三種識依靠七種因緣，再除去空間，因為要接觸到境界才能獲取。第六識（Mano-vijnana）依靠五種因緣生起，根就是第七識。境是一切法。作意，以及根本的第八識，能生起種子的功能，這五種因緣依靠第七識。第八識依靠四種因緣生起，一是第八識、第七識作為俱有依，沒有根本依，即作為俱有依的緣故。二是隨著所取為所緣，三是作意，四是種子。所以有四種因緣。或者說第八識依靠四種，第七識依靠三種，即以所依作為所緣的緣故。這是根據正義的說法。然而，如果取等無間緣，就依次是十種、九種、八種、六種、五種、四種因緣而生起，即所依託之處都稱為因緣，所以有這種區別。所以論中說『等』。

論：因為前五識的身，有頓時的和漸次的緣故。

述曰：只是因為前五識內在依託根本識，也就是種子，外在憑藉各種因緣才能顯現。因為雖然種子是恒常的，但外在的因緣聚合有頓時的和漸次的，所以生起五識，或者四種、三種、兩種、一種識。或者五識到一識生起是不定的。或者同時生起，或者不同時生起。《七十六》、《解深密經》中說，廣惠、阿陀那（Adana-vijnana）作為依止，作為建立的緣故。如果在那個時候有一種眼識生起的因緣現前，就在這個時候有一種眼識運轉。乃至五種因緣頓然現前，就在這個時候

【English Translation】 English version: It is not constantly arising because the conditions are not permanent. Although the sixth consciousness (Mano-vijnana) also manifests according to conditions, it is not mentioned here because the conditions are always present. This will be understood later. For this reason, the first five consciousnesses are often interrupted.

Question: What are the conditions?

Treatise: Conditions refer to mental activity (作意, zuoyi), roots (根, gen), objects (境, jing), and other conditions.

Commentary: According to the Hinayana view, the first five consciousnesses are of three types, arising from five, four, or three conditions. Now, the Mahayana view is slightly different. The eye consciousness, relying on the physical eye, arises from nine conditions: space, light, root, object, and mental activity, which are the same as in Hinayana. If we add the fundamental eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), the defiled seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana), which are both involved in discrimination, and the ability to generate seeds, it arises from these nine conditions. If it is the divine eye, it only excludes light and space. The ear consciousness relies on eight conditions, excluding light. The nose, tongue, and other three consciousnesses rely on seven conditions, further excluding space, because they must come into contact with the object to obtain it. The sixth consciousness (Mano-vijnana) relies on five conditions to arise, the root being the seventh consciousness. The object is all dharmas. Mental activity, and the fundamental eighth consciousness, which has the ability to generate seeds, these five conditions rely on the seventh consciousness. The eighth consciousness relies on four conditions to arise: first, the eighth and seventh consciousnesses as co-arising supports, without a fundamental support, that is, as co-arising supports. Second, following what is taken as the object. Third, mental activity. Fourth, seeds. Therefore, there are four conditions. Or it is said that the eighth consciousness relies on four, and the seventh consciousness relies on three, that is, taking what is relied upon as the object. This is according to the correct meaning. However, if we take the immediately preceding condition, then it arises from ten, nine, eight, six, five, four conditions in sequence, that is, the place of reliance is called a condition, so there is this difference. Therefore, the treatise says 'etc.'

Treatise: Because the bodies of the first five consciousnesses have both sudden and gradual occurrences.

Commentary: It is only because the first five consciousnesses internally rely on the fundamental consciousness, that is, the seeds, and externally depend on various conditions to manifest. Because although the seeds are constant, the aggregation of external conditions is sudden and gradual, so the five consciousnesses arise, or four, three, two, one consciousness. Or the arising of five to one consciousness is uncertain. Or they arise simultaneously or not simultaneously. The Seventy-six, the Sandhinirmocana Sutra say that Guanghui, Adana-vijnana is the basis, for the sake of establishment. If at that time there is a condition for the arising of one eye consciousness, then at this time one eye consciousness operates. Even if five conditions suddenly appear, then at this time

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五識身轉等。故五識由緣具不具故生有多少。或俱．不俱。

論。如水濤波隨緣多少。

述曰。彼解深密等說。廣惠。如大暴流水。若有一浪生緣現前唯一浪轉。乃至若多浪生緣現前有多浪轉。諸識亦爾。如暴流阿陀那故。乃至諸識得轉等。此以五識喻于濤波。本識喻暴水。

論。此等法喻廣說如經。

述曰。如解深密等言。彼經唯有五識。此論亦已例同彼訖。唯有喻中彼更有一。謂如善凈鏡面。有一影生緣現前唯一影起。乃至多影應知亦然。故此言等等彼鏡喻。今此應言此法喻等。以法中無等故。此通說總致等言。前之七識皆似濤波。獨說五者。五俱定有第六。七恒生故。

自下第三解起滅分位。于中有二。初解意常現起。后解除生無想天等。初中二複次解。將明第六常現起故。卻結解五識由緣故生不生。

論。由五轉識至不起時多。

述曰。即眼等也　行相粗動者　粗者唯取外境。動者浮囂之義　又粗者行相易知。動者由緣外境數加轉易。乃至佛果五識勢與因同　所藉眾緣。如前已說　時多不具。以緣多難辨故。不可恒具故。起時少。不起時多。

論。第六意識至有時不起。

述曰。雖亦粗動亦者。顯不定義。謂亦五識。又顯自識行兼有細。以粗亦細也

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）的生起和轉變等等，因此五識的生起或多或少，取決於所依賴的因緣是否具足，或者同時生起，或者不同時生起。

論：就像水中的波濤，隨著因緣的多少而變化。

述記：窺基在《解深密經》等疏中解釋說，如廣慧菩薩所說，就像洶涌的暴流，如果只有一個波浪生起的因緣出現，就只有一個波浪翻滾；乃至如果有多個波浪生起的因緣出現，就有多個波浪翻滾。諸識也是如此，就像暴流般依賴阿陀那識（阿賴耶識的異名），乃至諸識得以生起和轉變等等。這裡用五識比喻波濤，用本識（阿賴耶識）比喻暴水。

論：這些法和比喻在經典中有詳細的說明。

述記：如《解深密經》等所說，該經只提到五識，此論也已經用類比的方法將其他識包括在內了。只有比喻中，《解深密經》多了一個比喻，即如同一面乾淨明亮的鏡子，如果只有一個影像生起的因緣出現，就只有一個影像顯現；乃至多個影像也應知是同樣的道理。所以這裡說『等等』，就是指《解深密經》中的鏡子比喻。現在這裡應該說『此法喻等』，因為法中沒有『等』。這裡總括地說『等』，是指前面的七識都像波濤。單獨說五識，是因為五識生起時一定有第六識（意識）伴隨，而第七識（末那識）是恒常生起的。

下面第三部分解釋識的生起、滅亡和分位。其中分為兩部分：首先解釋意識的常時現起，然後解釋無想定和無想天的情形。首先又分為兩次解釋，因為要說明第六識是常時現起的，所以先總結解釋五識由於因緣而生起或不生起。

論：由於五轉識（眼識等）……到不起作用的時候多。

述記：即眼識等等。『行相粗動』，『粗』是指五識只取外境，『動』是指浮躁喧囂的意思。又，『粗』是指行相容易被察覺，『動』是指由於外境的因緣而頻繁地轉變。乃至佛果位的五識的勢用與因地相同。所依賴的眾多因緣，如前面已經說過的。『時多不具』，因為因緣繁多難以辨別，所以不可能恒常具足，因此生起的時候少，不起作用的時候多。

論：第六意識……有時不起。

述記：雖然也粗動，『也』字，顯示不確定性。意思是也像五識一樣。又顯示第六識的行相兼有微細的一面，因為粗也是一種細。

【English Translation】 English version: The arising and transformation of the five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, and body-consciousness) etc., therefore, the arising of the five consciousnesses, whether more or less, depends on whether the conditions they rely on are complete, or they arise simultaneously, or they do not arise simultaneously.

Treatise: Like the waves in the water, they change according to the amount of conditions.

Commentary: Kuiji explains in the commentaries on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra) etc., as Guanghui Bodhisattva said, like a turbulent torrent, if only one wave-arising condition appears, only one wave rolls; and if multiple wave-arising conditions appear, multiple waves roll. The consciousnesses are also like this, relying on the Ādāna-vijñāna (another name for Ālaya-consciousness) like a torrent, and the consciousnesses can arise and transform etc. Here, the five consciousnesses are likened to waves, and the original consciousness (Ālaya-consciousness) is likened to a torrent.

Treatise: These Dharma and metaphors are explained in detail in the scriptures.

Commentary: As stated in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra etc., that sutra only mentions the five consciousnesses, and this treatise has already included other consciousnesses by analogy. Only in the metaphor, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra has one more metaphor, that is, like a clean and bright mirror, if only one image-arising condition appears, only one image appears; and it should be known that multiple images are the same. So here it says 'etc.', which refers to the mirror metaphor in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra. Now here it should say 'this Dharma metaphor etc.', because there is no 'etc.' in the Dharma. Here, the 'etc.' is used to summarize that the previous seven consciousnesses are like waves. The reason for mentioning the five consciousnesses separately is that the sixth consciousness (mind-consciousness) must accompany the arising of the five consciousnesses, while the seventh consciousness (Manas-consciousness) is constantly arising.

The third part below explains the arising, extinction, and divisions of consciousness. It is divided into two parts: first, it explains the constant arising of mind-consciousness, and then it explains the situation of the non-perceptual samādhi and the non-perceptual heaven. First, it is explained in two parts, because it is necessary to explain that the sixth consciousness is constantly arising, so first summarize the explanation of the five consciousnesses arising or not arising due to conditions.

Treatise: Because of the five transforming consciousnesses (eye-consciousness etc.) ... to the time when they are mostly not functioning.

Commentary: That is, eye-consciousness etc. 'Appearance coarse and moving', 'coarse' means that the five consciousnesses only take external objects, and 'moving' means frivolous and noisy. Also, 'coarse' means that the appearance is easy to perceive, and 'moving' means that it frequently transforms due to the conditions of external objects. Even the power of the five consciousnesses in the Buddha-fruit position is the same as in the causal ground. The many conditions it relies on have been said before. 'Often incomplete', because the conditions are numerous and difficult to distinguish, so it is impossible to always be complete, so the time of arising is less, and the time of not functioning is more.

Treatise: The sixth consciousness ... sometimes does not arise.

Commentary: Although it is also coarse and moving, the word 'also' shows uncertainty. It means that it is also like the five consciousnesses. It also shows that the appearance of the sixth consciousness also has a subtle aspect, because coarse is also a kind of subtlety.

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。又顯與第七．八識行相異。彼微細沉審故。又所藉緣少易辨故。無時不具　若爾何故不一切時如第七．八相續生耶　答由違緣故有時不起。何者是違緣。即下五位。或厭於心。或異緣礙遮識生起。故名違緣。

論。第七八識至令總不行。

述曰。第七．八識。行相恒內．緣．一類沉審。起藉緣少一切時有。以行相細故無緣礙令總不行。總不行之言。謂第七識無漏．滅定違。染一分不行。非體總無也。又但可令轉變。非總不行。故與前別以第六識粗動故。亦為緣礙。此即第一翻解常現起言。以八識相望不同前五。復異后二名常現起。取次第二翻下文。云由斯頌中。不說此第六隨緣現。於此第一翻解末。亦應說之。彼雙結故。

論。又五識身至現行時少。

述曰。第二翻解也　不能思慮。無尋．伺故。不能自起藉他引故。緣粗事故　唯外門轉。唯緣外境不內緣種．根．理等故。有此所以起藉多緣。境界皆定各有限故。由所依等或闕等時。故斷時多。現行乃少。

論。第六意識至此隨緣現。

述曰。自能思慮。有尋．伺故　內外門轉。緣理．事等故。根．境等法所藉緣少。一切時具無有不足。自能思慮。非如五識起藉引生。不假多緣。唯除五位常能現起。故斷時少。現行乃多。由斯

頌中不說第六意隨緣現。但言常起起時多故。五識起少故。頌中有隨緣現言。此師意者。此頌中但明六識行．不行。何勞對七．八。前師對八．七識。解內外門中。不得約理以為內門。以八．七識與五同故。此第二師內外門以理亦得為內。方第六故。於二解中第二為勝。

自下第二解除生無想天等下三句頌。于中初問。次答。后總料簡。

論。五位云何。

述曰。問生下也。

論。生無想等。

述曰。答中有三。初舉頌總答。次別解五。后總結之。舉第二頌中下之三句以答所問。等言攝故。

論。無想天者至名無想天。

述曰。自下第二別解五位。于中有三。初解無想天。次解二定。后解睡．悶之位。于無想天文中有五。義即有七。一顯得名。二滅識多少。三諍一期有心無心。並出體並性。四顯處所。五顯彼因。此即第一解得名也　厭粗想力者。謂諸外道以想為生死之因。今偏厭之。唯前六識想。非第七．八。故言粗想。細想在故　生彼天中者。生第四禪廣果天中。別有高樓受此果故。前之六識名不恒行。數間斷故。

違不恒行心及心所者。顯六轉識滅全不行。非如七．八無不行故。若六識皆滅。何獨名無想。想滅為首。于加行位唯偏厭之。故言為首。首是頭首。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 頌文中沒有說第六意識隨因緣而顯現，只是說它經常生起，而且生起的時候情況很多，因為前五識生起的情況較少。頌文中有『隨緣現』的說法。這位論師的意思是，這首頌文只是說明第六意識的執行與不執行，何必針對第七、第八識呢？之前的論師針對第八、第七識，解釋內外門的時候，不能以理作為內門，因為第八、第七識與前五識相同。這位第二位論師認為內外門也可以以理作為內門，因為第六意識的緣故。在兩種解釋中，第二種更為優勝。

下面第二部分是解釋關於生於無想天等等的下面三句頌文。其中先是提問，然後是回答，最後是總結。

論：五種狀態是怎樣的？

述曰：這是提問關於生於何處等。

論：生於無想天等。

述曰：回答中有三個部分。首先是引用頌文總括地回答，其次是分別解釋五種狀態，最後是總結。引用第二首頌文中的下面三句來回答所問，因為『等』字包含了其他情況。

論：無想天是指…被稱為無想天。

述曰：下面第二部分是分別解釋五種狀態。其中有三個部分。首先是解釋無想天，其次是解釋二種禪定，最後是解釋睡眠和昏悶的狀態。在無想天的解釋中，有五個方面，實際上有七個方面。一是顯示得名的原因，二是說明滅除意識的多少，三是辯論一期生命中有心還是無心，並說明其體性和性質，四是顯示其處所，五是顯示其原因。這裡是第一方面，解釋得名的原因。『厭粗想力』是指，那些外道認為想是生死的根源，現在特別厭惡它。這裡只是厭惡前六識的想，而不是第七、第八識，所以說是『粗想』，因為細想仍然存在。『生彼天中』是指，生於第四禪的廣果天中，那裡有專門的高樓來承受這種果報。前面的六識被稱為不恒行，因為它們經常間斷。

『違不恒行心及心所者』，顯示第六轉識完全滅除不行，不像第七、第八識那樣沒有不行的時候。如果六識都滅除了，為什麼單單稱為無想呢？因為想的滅除是首要的。在加行位時，只是特別厭惡它，所以說是『為首』。首是頭首。

【English Translation】 English version The verse doesn't mention the sixth consciousness manifesting according to conditions, but only says that it arises frequently, and when it arises, there are many situations, because the first five consciousnesses arise less often. The verse contains the statement 'manifesting according to conditions.' This teacher's intention is that this verse only explains the functioning and non-functioning of the sixth consciousness, so why address the seventh and eighth consciousnesses? The previous teacher, addressing the eighth and seventh consciousnesses, couldn't use principle as the inner gate when explaining the inner and outer gates, because the eighth and seventh consciousnesses are the same as the first five. This second teacher believes that the inner and outer gates can also use principle as the inner gate, because of the sixth consciousness. Among the two explanations, the second is superior.

The following second part explains the following three lines of the verse regarding being born in the Realm of Non-Perception (Asamjnisattva) and so on. Among them, first is the question, then the answer, and finally the summary.

Treatise: What are the five states?

Commentary: This is asking about being born where, etc.

Treatise: Being born in the Realm of Non-Perception, etc.

Commentary: There are three parts to the answer. First, it answers the question by quoting the verse in general, second, it explains the five states separately, and finally, it summarizes. It quotes the following three lines from the second verse to answer the question, because the word 'etc.' includes other situations.

Treatise: The Realm of Non-Perception refers to... is called the Realm of Non-Perception.

Commentary: The following second part separately explains the five states. Among them, there are three parts. First, it explains the Realm of Non-Perception, second, it explains the two Samadhis (meditative states), and finally, it explains the states of sleep and dullness. In the explanation of the Realm of Non-Perception, there are five aspects, actually seven. First, it shows the reason for the name, second, it explains the amount of consciousness eliminated, third, it debates whether there is mind or no mind in a lifetime, and explains its substance and nature, fourth, it shows its location, and fifth, it shows its cause. Here is the first aspect, explaining the reason for the name. 'Disgusting the power of coarse thought' means that those heretics believe that thought is the root of birth and death, and now they particularly dislike it. Here, it only dislikes the thought of the first six consciousnesses, not the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, so it is called 'coarse thought,' because subtle thought still exists. 'Born in that realm' means being born in the fourth Dhyana (meditative absorption) of the Widespread Fruit Realm (Vrihatphala), where there are special high buildings to receive this retribution. The preceding six consciousnesses are called non-constant functioning because they are frequently interrupted.

'Violating the non-constant functioning mind and mental factors' shows that the sixth transforming consciousness is completely eliminated and does not function, unlike the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, which have no time when they do not function. If all six consciousnesses are eliminated, why is it only called Non-Perception? Because the elimination of thought is the primary thing. In the stage of application, it is only particularly disliked, so it is called 'primary.' Primary is the head.

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先首義故。名無想天。

論。故六轉識于彼皆滅。

述曰。此即第二滅於六識。七．八微細彼不能知故不滅也。雖總言六。遠三近一。

論。有義彼天至無轉識故。

述曰。自下第三一期有心無心三解。此第一師。一期生．死俱無六識故言常無。非少有故。常者一切時義。聖教說彼無轉識故者。即對法．顯揚．五蘊皆言無想無心。此中亦說第六意識生無想天竟不起故。雖不定言一期皆無心。然總說生彼無第六識心故。生死無心也。若不爾者論應分別初後有心。中間無心也。

論。說彼唯有有色支故。

述曰。瑜伽第十說言。問於一切生處。及三摩缽底中。皆有一切支現行可得耶。答不可得。謂無想天．滅盡定．無想定中。唯有色支可得。非無色支。生無色界唯無色支可得。非有色支。此依六識。故知彼處一期無心。

論。又說彼為無心地故。

述曰。瑜伽第十三卷。說六種名無心地。謂二無心定．及無想天．睡眠．悶絕．無餘涅槃。既以此天例同二定。明非有心。非有心時名二定故。以此為例明亦無故。此師解五十九。云異生以纏潤生者。據多分說。非謂一切。如說見諦以隨眠潤。初二果者以現行潤。此亦如彼。不應徴詰。又解五十六。云后想等生便從彼沒等者。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為首先捨棄了意識活動，所以叫做無想天（Asaññasatta Deva，沒有思想的境界）。

論：因此，六種轉識（vijñāna，意識）在那裡都滅盡了。

述曰：這指的是第二種情況，即六識滅盡。第七識（末那識，manas）和第八識（阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna）非常微細，他們無法知曉，所以不會滅盡。雖然總的來說是六識，但從遠處看是三種，從近處看是一種。

論：有一種觀點認為，那個天界直到沒有轉識為止。

述曰：從下面開始，第三種解釋是一期中有心、無心三種情況。這是第一位論師的觀點。一期中，生和死都沒有六識，所以說是常無。不是說只有少部分時間沒有，而是所有時間都沒有。聖教說那裡沒有轉識，即《對法》（Abhidharma）、《顯揚》（Abhisamayālaṃkāra）、《五蘊論》（Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa）都說無想無心。這裡也說第六意識（mano-vijñāna）生到無想天后就不再產生，所以雖然不確定說一期中都無心，但總的來說是生到那裡就沒有第六識心，所以生死都沒有心。如果不是這樣，論中應該分別說明開始和結束有心，中間無心。

論：因為經中說那裡只有色支（rūpa-skandha，色蘊）。

述曰：《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第十卷說：『問：在一切生處以及三摩缽底（samāpatti，等至）中，是否一切支（skandha，蘊）都現行可得？』答：『不可得。』所謂無想天、滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti，滅盡等至）、無想定（asaṃjñā-samāpatti，無想定）中，只有色支可得，沒有無色支（arūpa-skandha，無色蘊）。生到無色界只有無色支可得，沒有有色支。』這是依據六識來說的。因此可知，那個地方一期中沒有心。

論：又說那裡是無心地。

述曰：《瑜伽師地論》第十三卷說，有六種名為無心地，即兩種無心定、無想天、睡眠、悶絕、無餘涅槃（nirupadhisesa-nirvana）。既然用這個天界來比同兩種禪定，就說明不是有心。因為沒有心的時候才叫做兩種禪定。用這個來比同，就說明也是沒有心。這位論師解釋第五十九條說，『異生以煩惱潤生』，是根據大多數情況來說的，不是說一切都是這樣。就像說見諦（darśana-mārga，見道）以隨眠（anuśaya，隨眠）潤生，初二果（srota-āpanna，預流果；sakrdāgāmin，一來果）以現行潤生，這裡也像那樣，不應該責難。又解釋第五十六條說，『后想等生便從那裡沒』等等。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of initially abandoning thought, it is called Asaññasatta Deva (the realm of non-perception).

Treatise: Therefore, the six vijñāna (consciousness) are all extinguished there.

Commentary: This refers to the second case, where the six consciousnesses are extinguished. The seventh (manas) and eighth (ālaya-vijñāna) consciousnesses are very subtle, and they cannot be known, so they are not extinguished. Although generally speaking it is six consciousnesses, from a distance it is three, and from nearby it is one.

Treatise: Some argue that that heaven exists until there is no more vijñāna.

Commentary: From below, the third explanation is that there are three situations of having mind and not having mind in one lifetime. This is the view of the first teacher. In one lifetime, there is no six consciousnesses in both birth and death, so it is said to be always without. It is not that it is only without for a short time, but without at all times. The sacred teachings say that there is no vijñāna there, that is, the Abhidharma, Abhisamayālaṃkāra, and Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa all say that there is no thought and no mind. Here it is also said that the sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna) does not arise after being born in the Asaññasatta Deva, so although it is not certain that there is no mind in one lifetime, generally speaking, there is no sixth consciousness mind when born there, so there is no mind in birth and death. If this were not the case, the treatise should separately explain that there is mind at the beginning and end, and no mind in the middle.

Treatise: Because the sutras say that there is only rūpa-skandha (form aggregate) there.

Commentary: The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 10, says: 'Question: In all places of birth and in samāpatti (attainments), are all skandha (aggregates) present and obtainable?' Answer: 'Not obtainable.' In the Asaññasatta Deva, nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment), and asaṃjñā-samāpatti (non-perception attainment), only rūpa-skandha is obtainable, not arūpa-skandha (formless aggregates). Only arūpa-skandha is obtainable when born in the formless realm, not rūpa-skandha.' This is based on the six consciousnesses. Therefore, it can be known that there is no mind in that place in one lifetime.

Treatise: It is also said that that place is a place without mind.

Commentary: Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 13, says that there are six kinds of places called places without mind, namely two kinds of mindlessness samadhi, Asaññasatta Deva, sleep, fainting, and nirupadhisesa-nirvana (nirvana without remainder). Since this heaven is compared to the two samadhi, it shows that it is not with mind. Because it is called two samadhi when there is no mind. Using this as an example, it shows that it is also without mind. This teacher explains the 59th article, saying that 'ordinary beings are born with the moisture of afflictions', which is based on most situations, not that everything is like this. Just like saying that darśana-mārga (path of seeing) is born with the moisture of anuśaya (latent tendencies), and the first two fruits (srota-āpanna, stream-enterer; sakrdāgāmin, once-returner) are born with the moisture of active afflictions, it is like that here, and should not be questioned. It also explains the 56th article, saying that 'later thoughts arise and then disappear from there', etc.

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即說死後中有初心想正生時。名想生已。即后想生時。是死已便從彼天沒。故非未沒時言為便。故異生潤生有唯種子。如此外道命終時等。

論。有義彼天至潤生愛故。

述曰。下第二師。初生無心同前師說。將命終位要起轉識方始命終。所以者何。五十九說異生以纏及隨眠潤生故。故對法第五。說諸異生九種潤生心。必起現愛故。

論。瑜伽論說至從彼沒故。

述曰。瑜伽五十六說。彼謂后想生已是諸有情從彼天沒。故知末後必定起心。起心之時名想正生。至中有位名為生已。生已之時便從彼沒。五十九說異生以現行．種子潤故必起心。便從彼沒者。其想生已方從彼沒。是此意也。非入中有方始起心。中有有心何勞彼說。

論。然說彼無至非謂全無。

述曰。下會論文。對法等說不恒行心及心所滅者。非謂末後位。謂彼但依中間時說。非謂一期全無六識。此即兼解唯有有色支訖。非謂末後無愛支。故雖與無心定為喻。然長時相似。故得為喻。

論。有義生時至潤生煩惱故。

述曰。第三師說。末後有心同前第二所解違論亦如彼說。唯初生有心與前師別。此言初生亦有識故。亦死時也。然上座部等。說彼中有亦無有心。恐此前師亦作此計。故說中有末後有心。大乘

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 當（異生）說死亡之後，中陰身最初生起想要轉生的時候，這被稱為『想生已』。緊接著，當（中陰身）后念生起的時候，就是死亡已經發生，並且立即從那個天界消失的時候。因此，不能說在未消失的時候就說是『便』。所以，異生憑藉（煩惱的）潤生力，只有種子（起作用），就像外道臨終時一樣。

論：有一種觀點認為，（異生）是因為對那個天界的潤生之愛而（死亡）。

述曰：這是第二位論師的觀點。他認為，最初的出生沒有心識，與前一位論師的說法相同。他認為，臨終之際必須生起轉識才能最終死亡。為什麼呢？《五十九》中說，異生憑藉纏縛和隨眠來潤生。因此，《對法》第五中說，諸異生有九種潤生心，必定生起現行之愛。

論：《瑜伽論》說，（后念生起）是諸有情從那個天界消失的時候。

述曰：《瑜伽師地論》第五十六中說，『彼』指的是后念生起之後，是諸有情從那個天界消失的時候。因此，可知臨終之際必定生起心識。生起心識的時候，稱為『想正生』。到達中陰身階段，稱為『生已』。在『生已』的時候，就從那個天界消失了。《五十九》中說，異生憑藉現行和種子來潤生，必定生起心識，然後從那個天界消失。意思是說，在想念生起之後，才從那個天界消失。而不是進入中陰身之後才開始生起心識。如果中陰身有心識，又何必說臨終生起心識呢？

論：然而，（《對法》等）說（臨終）沒有（心識），並不是說完全沒有。

述曰：這是爲了調和經文。《對法》等說不恒行心和心所滅，並不是指臨終的階段，而是指中間的某個時間段。並不是說整個生命週期中完全沒有六識。這同時也解釋了只有有色支的說法。並不是說臨終沒有愛支。因此，雖然用無心定來作比喻，但只是在長時間的相似性上作比喻，所以可以作為比喻。

論：有一種觀點認為，出生的時候（有心識），是因為潤生煩惱的緣故。

述曰：這是第三位論師的觀點。他認為，臨終有心識，與前一位論師的解釋相同，反駁其他觀點的理由也與前一位論師的說法相同。只有最初出生的時候有心識這一點與前一位論師不同。這裡說最初出生的時候也有識，也指死亡的時候。然而，上座部等認為，中陰身也沒有心識。恐怕前一位論師也持這種觀點，所以說中陰身臨終有心識。大乘...

【English Translation】 English version: When (an ordinary being) is said to have died, and the intermediate being (antarabhava) initially desires to be reborn, this is called 'thought of being born' (想生已, xiǎng shēng yǐ). Immediately following this, when the subsequent thought arises (in the intermediate being), it means that death has already occurred, and it immediately disappears from that heavenly realm. Therefore, it cannot be said that 'immediately' (便, biàn) refers to the time before it has disappeared. Thus, ordinary beings rely on the force of 'lubricating' (潤生, rùn shēng) karma, only the seeds (of karma) are at work, just like when non-Buddhists are about to die.

Treatise: One view holds that (the ordinary being dies) because of the 'lubricating' love (潤生愛, rùn shēng ài) for that heavenly realm.

Commentary: This is the view of the second teacher. He believes that the initial birth is without consciousness, similar to the previous teacher's view. He believes that at the moment of death, the transformation consciousness (轉識, zhuǎn shí) must arise for death to occur. Why? The 'Fifty-Nine' states that ordinary beings rely on afflictions (纏, chán) and latent tendencies (隨眠, suí mián) to 'lubricate' rebirth. Therefore, the fifth chapter of the Abhidharma states that ordinary beings have nine types of 'lubricating' minds for rebirth, and they must generate manifest love (現愛, xiàn ài).

Treatise: The Yogacara-bhumi-sastra says that (the subsequent thought arises) is when sentient beings disappear from that heavenly realm.

Commentary: The fifty-sixth chapter of the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra says that 'that' (彼, bǐ) refers to after the subsequent thought has arisen, it is when sentient beings disappear from that heavenly realm. Therefore, it can be known that consciousness must arise at the moment of death. When consciousness arises, it is called 'thought is being born' (想正生, xiǎng zhèng shēng). Reaching the intermediate state (中有, zhōng yǒu) is called 'already born' (生已, shēng yǐ). At the time of 'already born', it disappears from that heavenly realm. The 'Fifty-Nine' states that ordinary beings rely on manifest actions (現行, xiàn xíng) and seeds to 'lubricate' rebirth, and consciousness must arise, and then it disappears from that heavenly realm. The meaning is that after the thought arises, it disappears from that heavenly realm. It is not that consciousness only begins to arise after entering the intermediate state. If the intermediate state has consciousness, why would it be necessary to say that consciousness arises at the moment of death?

Treatise: However, (the Abhidharma, etc.) says that there is no (consciousness at the moment of death), but it does not mean that there is completely none.

Commentary: This is to reconcile the scriptures. The Abhidharma, etc., says that the non-constant minds (不恒行心, bù héng xíng xīn) and mental factors (心所, xīn suǒ) cease, but it does not refer to the moment of death, but rather to some intermediate time. It does not mean that there are completely no six consciousnesses (六識, liù shí) throughout the entire life cycle. This also explains the statement that there is only the 'having form' (有色, yǒu sè) limb. It does not mean that there is no 'love' (愛, ài) limb at the moment of death. Therefore, although the mindless samadhi (無心定, wú xīn dìng) is used as a metaphor, it is only a metaphor based on the similarity in the long duration.

Treatise: One view holds that there is (consciousness) at the time of birth because of the 'lubricating' afflictions.

Commentary: This is the view of the third teacher. He believes that there is consciousness at the moment of death, which is the same as the previous teacher's explanation, and the reasons for refuting other views are also the same as the previous teacher's statement. Only the point that there is consciousness at the initial birth is different from the previous teacher. Here, saying that there is consciousness at the initial birth also refers to the time of death. However, the Theravada school, etc., believes that there is no consciousness in the intermediate state either. Perhaps the previous teacher also held this view, so it is said that there is consciousness at the moment of death in the intermediate state. Mahayana...

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中有生支攝故。彼中有末心。必起潤生煩惱故。無想天亦有心也。彼雲中有彼處攝故。第五對法等說中有末心亦唯染故。

若諍生有有心者今為量云。

論。如餘本有初必有轉識故。

述曰。此意說言。彼天本有初位。必有轉識起。天中本有之初位故。如余天趣本有初位。法爾受生必初有六識。此非生有。謂在本有初位。然非即次生有後第二念時本有之第一念心也。謂一期本有生三分分之。第一位名初位。不爾卵生等本有初念。非必有意識故。攝論無性第三。亦說初生有心。勢與此同。

論。瑜伽論說至從彼沒故。

述曰。第十二卷解無想定中說。若生於彼唯入不起。即證初生有心。其想若生從彼沒故。即證將死有心。

既舉論文。次舉難曰。

論。彼本初至乃名入故。

述曰。彼天本有初若無轉識如何名入。要先有後無乃名入故。非先未有心可言入無心。先已入訖何假言入。又非中有末可起報心。報心滅時名入無心。諸論皆說彼中有必起愛潤生心故。

論。抉擇分言至名無想故。

述曰。此中辨報體並顯性。五十三卷解無想天云。由此因緣所有生得心等滅等　此言顯何義。

論。此言意顯至說名無想。

述曰。此顯彼天本有初位。有六

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為存在中有（antabhava，指死亡和投生之間的過渡期）的生支所攝，所以在中有末期，必定會生起潤生煩惱，因此，無想天（Asamjnasattva，色界天之一，此處眾生沒有粗想）也有心。因為無想天處於中有所攝的範圍內。第五《對法》等論述中說，中有末期之心也只是染污的。

如果有人爭論說生有（upapattibhava，指投生時的存在狀態）有心，現在可以用以下論證來衡量：

論：如同其餘本有（bhavanga，指生命期中的存在狀態）的開始必定有轉識一樣。

述曰：這裡的意思是說，彼無想天本有之初位，必定有轉識生起，因為是天中本有的初位，如同其餘天趣本有的初位一樣，按照法則受生必定最初有六識。這不是生有，而是在本有的初位。然而，並非緊接著生有之後的第二念，而是本有的第一念心。也就是說，一期本有分為生、住、滅三分，第一位名為初位。否則，卵生等眾生本有的初念，並非必定有意識。攝論無性第三也說初生有心，意思與此相同。

論：《瑜伽師地論》說，從彼處死亡故。

述曰：第十二卷解釋無想定（Asamjnasamapatti，一種禪定狀態，在此狀態下心和心所暫時停止）時說，如果生於彼處，唯有入定不起心，就證明初生有心。如果想生起，從彼處死亡，就證明將死有心。

既然舉出了論文，接著提出疑問：

論：彼本有初若無轉識，如何名為入定？

述曰：彼無想天本有的開始如果沒有轉識，如何稱為入定？必須先有後無才能稱為入定。如果先前沒有心，怎麼能說入于無心？如果先前已經入定完畢，又何必說入定？又，中有末期不可能生起報心（vipakacitta，指果報之心）。報心滅時才名為入于無心。諸論都說彼中有必定生起愛潤生心。

論：《抉擇分》說，名為無想。

述曰：這裡辨別報體並顯示其性質。第五十三卷解釋無想天說：『由此因緣，所有生得心等滅等』。這句話顯示什麼意義？

論：這句話的意思是顯示，說名為無想。

述曰：這顯示彼無想天本有的初位，有六識。

【English Translation】 English version: Because it is encompassed by the birth-link of the intermediate existence (antabhava, the transitional state between death and rebirth), in the final moment of the intermediate existence, defilements that moisten rebirth will inevitably arise. Therefore, the Heaven of Non-Perception (Asamjnasattva, a realm in the Form realm where beings lack gross perceptions) also has mind. This is because the Heaven of Non-Perception is within the scope of the intermediate existence. The fifth Abhidharma, and other treatises, state that the final mind of the intermediate existence is also solely defiled.

If someone argues that the existence at the moment of rebirth (upapattibhava) has mind, we can now use the following reasoning to measure:

Treatise: Just as the beginning of the remaining existence (bhavanga, the subconscious flow of consciousness during life) must have consciousness.

Commentary: The meaning here is that in the initial moment of the remaining existence in that heaven, consciousness must arise, because it is the initial moment of the remaining existence in that heaven. Just like the initial moment of the remaining existence in other realms of existence, according to the Dharma, when being born, there must initially be the six consciousnesses. This is not the existence at the moment of rebirth, but rather the initial moment of the remaining existence. However, it is not the second thought immediately following the existence at the moment of rebirth, but the first thought of the remaining existence. That is to say, one lifetime of remaining existence is divided into three parts: birth, duration, and cessation. The first position is called the initial position. Otherwise, the initial thought of the remaining existence of beings born from eggs, etc., would not necessarily have consciousness. The third chapter of She Lun Wu Xing also says that there is mind at the initial moment of rebirth, and the meaning is the same as this.

Treatise: The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says, 'Because of dying from that place.'

Commentary: The twelfth volume, in explaining the Non-Perception Samadhi (Asamjnasamapatti, a state of meditation where mind and mental factors temporarily cease), says, 'If one is born in that place, one only enters the samadhi and does not arise mind,' which proves that there is mind at the initial moment of birth. 'If perception arises, one dies from that place,' which proves that there is mind at the moment of death.

Having cited the treatise, the question is then raised:

Treatise: If there is no consciousness at the beginning of that remaining existence, how can it be called entering samadhi?

Commentary: If there is no consciousness at the beginning of the remaining existence in that Heaven of Non-Perception, how can it be called entering samadhi? It must be that there is first and then there is not, in order to be called entering samadhi. If there was no mind previously, how can it be said to enter non-mind? If one has already entered samadhi completely, why say entering samadhi again? Furthermore, it is impossible for the resultant mind (vipakacitta, the mind of karmic result) to arise at the end of the intermediate existence. Only when the resultant mind ceases is it called entering non-mind. All treatises say that in the intermediate existence, the mind that loves and moistens rebirth will inevitably arise.

Treatise: The Determination Chapter says, 'It is called Non-Perception.'

Commentary: Here, the resultant body is distinguished and its nature is revealed. The fifty-third volume, in explaining the Heaven of Non-Perception, says: 'Because of this cause, all innate minds, etc., cease, etc.' What meaning does this sentence reveal?

Treatise: The meaning of this sentence is to reveal that it is called Non-Perception.

Commentary: This reveals that in the initial moment of the remaining existence in that Heaven of Non-Perception, there are six consciousnesses.

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轉識報心暫起。宿習無心定因緣力故后不復生心。由此生得第六報心滅故。引起異熟無記無心分位之時。名彼無心報。依止本識此轉識滅分位差別說名無想。如前第一卷。雖有二解。今準此文。唯于第六心滅上立無想。

論。如善引生二定名善。

述曰。此以喻成。如二定前善心引生種子名二定。二定名善隨能引心。故此亦隨生得無記心滅故。彼果名無記。

論。不爾轉識至轉識暫起。

述曰。彼處轉識三性不行。若初生時即已不行。如何可言唯生得滅。設非唯無記。三性心生便名生得者。此即仍是初生有心故。對法第四。云生得無記謂無想報。故唯無記　彼本有初位轉識暫起暫起者。四識中起何識。此但言轉識不別出故　有說亦起眼．耳等識。此亦不爾。有何因緣應唯起身識及第六識。受彼果故。暫生即滅。何假起眼等識見色聞聲等。義雖知爾起將為勝。如薩婆多亦許多時故。此雖許有心。即顯報體及無記性。

自下第四處所繫地。

論。彼天唯在至異熟處故。

述曰。此受無想處　第四靜慮。此總言也。即彼凡夫第三天處。下諸天處其想粗動難可滅故。有變異受未可盡故。第四靜慮下二天亦然。非是凡夫下中熏習有色身處。可受殊勝無心果故。下非殊勝故不可生。不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：轉識（Pravrtti-vijnana，指前六識）依報心暫時生起。由於宿習（Purva-vasana，指過去的習氣）的無心定（Asamjnika-samadhi，指無想定）的因緣力，之後不再生起心識。由此，生得的第六報心（Manovijnana-vipaka-citta，指第六意識的果報心）滅盡，從而引起異熟無記（Vipaka-upeksha，指果報性的舍受）的無心分位之時，稱為彼無心報。依止本識（Mula-vijnana，指阿賴耶識），此轉識滅的分位差別，說名為無想（Asamjni，指無想天）。如前第一卷所說，雖有兩種解釋，今依此文，唯在第六心滅上建立無想。

論：如善能引生二定（Dhyana，指禪定），名為善。

述曰：這是用比喻來說明。如二定前的善心能引生種子，名為二定。二定名為善，隨其能引生心。因此，這裡也隨生得的無記心滅盡，所以彼果名為無記。

論：如果不是這樣，轉識（Pravrtti-vijnana，指前六識）乃至轉識暫時生起。

述曰：彼處轉識的三性（善、惡、無記）不行。如果初生時就已經不行，如何能說唯有生得滅？假設並非唯是無記，三性心生便名為生得，那麼這仍然是初生有心。所以《對法》第四卷說，生得無記是指無想報。因此唯是無記。彼本有初位轉識暫時生起，暫時生起者，四識（眼、耳、鼻、舌識）中生起何識？這裡只說轉識，沒有特別指出。有人說也生起眼識、耳識等。這也不對。有什麼因緣應該唯起身識（Kayavijnana，指身識）及第六識（Manovijnana，指意識）？因為受彼果的緣故。暫時生起即滅，何必生起眼識等去見色聞聲等？義雖知如此，但認為生起更好。如薩婆多（Sarvastivada，指說一切有部）也認為有許多時候。這裡雖允許有心，即顯示報體及無記性。

自下第四，處所繫地。

論：彼天唯在乃至異熟處故。

述曰：這是承受無想之處，即第四靜慮（Caturtha-dhyana，指第四禪）。這是總的來說。即彼凡夫第三天處。下諸天處，其想粗動，難以滅盡。有變異受，未可窮盡。第四靜慮下二天也是這樣。不是凡夫下中熏習有色身之處，可以承受殊勝無心果的。下非殊勝，所以不可生。

【English Translation】 English version: The Pravrtti-vijnana (the evolving consciousness, referring to the first six consciousnesses) temporarily arises relying on the Vipaka-citta (resultant consciousness). Due to the causal power of the Asamjnika-samadhi (non-perceptive concentration, referring to the concentration of non-perception) of past habits (Purva-vasana, referring to past tendencies), consciousness does not arise again afterward. Because of this, the Manovijnana-vipaka-citta (the resultant consciousness of the sixth consciousness) that is born ceases, thereby causing the time of the Vipaka-upeksha (resultant indifference, referring to the resultant feeling of equanimity) of the non-perceptive state, which is called that non-perceptive result. Relying on the Mula-vijnana (root consciousness, referring to the Alaya consciousness), the difference in the state of this Pravrtti-vijnana ceasing is called Asamjni (non-perception, referring to the realm of non-perception). As mentioned in the first volume, although there are two explanations, according to this text, non-perception is only established upon the cessation of the sixth consciousness.

Treatise: Just as good can give rise to two Dhyanas (meditative absorptions, referring to the two concentrations), it is called good.

Commentary: This is explained using a metaphor. Just as the good mind before the two Dhyanas can give rise to seeds, it is called two Dhyanas. The two Dhyanas are called good, following their ability to give rise to the mind. Therefore, here also, following the cessation of the born non-perceptive mind, the result is called non-perceptive.

Treatise: If not, the Pravrtti-vijnana (the evolving consciousness, referring to the first six consciousnesses) even the Pravrtti-vijnana temporarily arises.

Commentary: The three natures (good, evil, and neutral) of the Pravrtti-vijnana do not function in that place. If they already do not function at the time of initial birth, how can it be said that only the born ceases? Supposing it is not only neutral, and the mind of the three natures arises and is called born, then this is still having a mind at the time of initial birth. Therefore, the fourth volume of the Abhidharma says that the born neutral refers to the result of non-perception. Therefore, it is only neutral. The Pravrtti-vijnana temporarily arises in the initial position of that original existence, temporarily arising, which consciousness arises among the four consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue consciousnesses)? Here it only says Pravrtti-vijnana, without specifically pointing it out. Some say that eye consciousness, ear consciousness, etc., also arise. This is also incorrect. What reason is there that only Kaya-vijnana (body consciousness) and the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana, mind consciousness) should arise? Because they receive that result. Temporarily arising and then ceasing, why would eye consciousness, etc., need to arise to see forms and hear sounds, etc.? Although the meaning is known to be so, it is considered better to arise. Like the Sarvastivada (the 'All Exists' school), they also consider there to be many times. Although it is allowed here that there is mind, it shows the resultant body and the neutral nature.

From here below is the fourth, the place and the realm to which it belongs.

Treatise: That heaven is only in even the resultant place.

Commentary: This is the place to receive non-perception, which is the Caturtha-dhyana (fourth Dhyana, referring to the fourth concentration). This is a general statement. It is the third heaven of those ordinary beings. In the heavens below, their thoughts are coarse and difficult to extinguish completely. There are changing receptions that cannot be exhausted. The two heavens below the fourth Dhyana are also like this. It is not a place where ordinary beings cultivate colored bodies below and in the middle, where they can receive the supreme non-perceptive result. The lower is not supreme, so it cannot be born there.

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於五凈居．無色生者。上無受無想異熟處故。謂五凈居唯聖者居。非外道所生。彼不知故。無色無身。無似彼涅槃之樂。受色身果處故。

論。即能引發至異熟果故。

述曰。自下第五齣此報因。如前第一卷解。然今即是定前能引無想定思能招彼果。即顯一思感總．別報。同瑜伽五十六說　又解即是能引定思。至無心位為定之時。招彼第六別報異熟。前明利思能感總報。有心．無心二因果別故　又解此說微微心招別報。若前微心明利故招總報。前說即許一思招二報。亦得有心．無心報。一業尚得色．非色報。理不遮故。后解二業各別。欲顯定因感別報。前明利思感於總報。此會前唯有有色支言。此據六識中間多時不行。非謂八識。設云一期此同小乘。彼命終已當生何處。大乘無文。俱舍論云。若從彼沒必生欲界。先修定行勢力盡故。不得生彼自處。及下三禪。不造下三定因。及前勢力無故。于彼不能更修定故。故不生上地。如箭射空力盡便墮。生彼有情必有欲界順后受業。如生北洲者。生天后業等。此義意言。由前在此修定之時。定前必作欲界善業。或謗釋種涅槃故。必生欲界也。今此不同。彼唯生報。可作是言。此通后報。如何必有欲界順后受業。故知生彼既通生．后．不定。明命終已生下三定。及下

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 於五凈居天（Pañcaśuddhāvāsa，色界天的最高層），以及無色界天（Ārūpyadhātu）的眾生，因為他們已經超越了有受（vedanā）和有想（sañjñā）的異熟果報之處。這裡所說的五凈居天，只有聖者居住，不是外道所能生之處，因為外道並不瞭解這些。無色界天的眾生沒有形體，也沒有類似於涅槃的快樂，因為他們仍然承受著色身果報的地方。

論：這指的是能夠引發異熟果報的原因。

述曰：下面第五點闡述了這種果報的因。如同前面第一卷所解釋的。然而，現在指的是在禪定之前，能夠引發無想定（Asañjñāsamāpatti）的思，能夠招感那種果報。這表明一個思能夠感得總報和別報。如同《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第五十六卷所說。另一種解釋是，這指的是能夠引發禪定的思，在進入無心位的時候，招感第六種別報異熟果。前面說明了明利的思能夠感得總報，有心和無心是兩種不同的因果。另一種解釋是，這裡說的是微微的心招感別報。如果前面的微小心思明利，就能招感總報。前面說的是允許一個思招感兩種果報，也可以是有心和無心的果報。一個業尚且可以招感色界和無色界的果報，道理上沒有遮止。後面的解釋是兩種業各不相同，想要表明禪定的因感得別報，前面的明利思感得總報。這裡會合了前面只有有色支的說法，這是根據六識中間很多時候不行，而不是說八識。假設說一期，這和小乘相同。他們命終之後應當生在何處？大乘沒有這樣的說法。《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）說，如果從那裡去世，必定生在欲界（Kāmadhātu），因為先前修習禪定的力量已經用盡，不能生在自己所處的地方，以及下三禪天。因為沒有造下三禪定的因，以及先前的力量已經沒有了，所以在那裡不能再修習禪定。所以不能生在上地，如同箭射向天空，力量用盡就會墜落。生在那裡的有情必定有欲界的順后受業，如同生在北俱盧洲（Uttarakuru）的人。生天之後的業等等。這個意思說，由於先前在此修習禪定的時候，禪定之前必定造作欲界的善業，或者誹謗釋迦族（Śākya）涅槃的緣故，必定生在欲界。現在這不同，他們只是生報，可以這樣說。這通向后報，怎麼必定有欲界的順后受業？所以知道生在那裡既通生報、后報、不定報。說明命終之後生在下三禪天，以及地獄。

【English Translation】 English version Regarding beings in the Five Pure Abodes (Pañcaśuddhāvāsa, the highest level of the Form Realm) and those born in the Formless Realm (Ārūpyadhātu), it is because they have transcended the place of ripened results (vipāka) that involve sensation (vedanā) and perception (saññā). The Five Pure Abodes are inhabited only by sages, not by those born from non-Buddhist paths, as they do not understand these realms. Beings in the Formless Realm have no physical form and lack the joy akin to Nirvāṇa, as they still experience the results of their physical existence.

Treatise: This refers to the cause that can bring about the result of ripened karma.

Commentary: The fifth point below explains the cause of this retribution, as explained in the first volume. However, it now refers to the thought that can induce the Asaññāsamāpatti (Cessation of Perception) before meditation, which can attract that result. This shows that one thought can bring about both general and specific retributions, as stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 56. Another explanation is that it refers to the thought that can induce meditation, attracting the sixth specific retribution when entering the state of no-mind. The previous explanation stated that clear thoughts can attract general retribution, with mind and no-mind being two different causes and effects. Another explanation is that this refers to subtle thoughts attracting specific retribution. If the previous subtle thought is clear, it can attract general retribution. The previous statement allows one thought to attract two retributions, which can also be with or without mind. A single karma can still attract results in the Form Realm and Formless Realm, as there is no logical prohibition. The later explanation is that the two karmas are different, intending to show that the cause of meditation attracts specific retribution, and the previous clear thought attracts general retribution. This converges with the previous statement that only has form elements, which is based on the fact that the six consciousnesses do not function for a long time in between, not referring to the eight consciousnesses. Suppose it is said to be a lifetime, this is the same as the Theravada. Where should they be born after death? The Mahayana does not have such a statement. The Abhidharmakośa says that if they die from there, they must be born in the Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu), because the power of previously practicing meditation has been exhausted, and they cannot be born in their own place or the lower three Dhyana heavens. Because they have not created the cause for the lower three Dhyana heavens, and the previous power is gone, they cannot practice meditation there anymore. Therefore, they cannot be born in the higher realms, just like an arrow shot into the sky will fall when its power is exhausted. Beings born there must have subsequent karma to be reborn in the Desire Realm, like those born in Uttarakuru. The meaning of this is that when practicing meditation here, good deeds in the Desire Realm must be done before meditation, or because of slandering the Nirvāṇa of the Śākya clan, they must be born in the Desire Realm. This is different now, they are only born as retribution, so it can be said. This leads to subsequent retribution, how can there necessarily be subsequent karma to be reborn in the Desire Realm? Therefore, it is known that being born there includes both birth retribution, subsequent retribution, and uncertain retribution. It explains that after death, they are born in the lower three Dhyana heavens, and the lower realms.

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欲界。皆無有失。但不生上未曾修故。生彼定中下三天處。更無失也。

論。及無心至故名無心。

述曰。自下第二解二無心定。于中初總解。后別解。此即總也。解第三句頌及無心二定。謂無心之言通下四位。其睡眠等皆通有心。故無心言簡之。雖牒一句。然先解二定。逐文便故。以四位俱無六識故名無心。不言唯于無想天無心。故知二定無心也。但彼唯有一處。無相類法故不言無心。此下四位有濫有心故須簡也。

自下別解二定為二。

論。無想定者至故亦名定。

述曰。此下別解。文雖分六義有十一　異生者。一顯得人。聖厭之故　遍凈者。謂第三禪天。第四禪以上貪猶未伏。二顯離欲也　出離想者。三顯行相。即作涅槃想也　不恒行等滅者。四顯所滅識多少也　想滅為首等者。五釋定名也。謂有心定令身．心俱平等名安。怡悅名和。今無心定由定前心力。令身平等．和悅如有心定。亦名為定。義與彼等。此體如前第一卷說。依二十二法滅上假立　以上總是第一段文。有五義也。作何伏染而入定者。瑜伽第十二說。問以何方便入此等至。答觀想如病如癰如箭。入第四定修厭背想作意。于所生起種種想中厭背而住。唯謂無想寂靜微妙。于無想中持心而住。如是漸次離諸所緣心便寂

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 在欲界（kāmadhātu，佛教宇宙觀中眾生所居的三界之一，指有情慾和物質慾望的界域）中，一切都不會失去。只是因為沒有修習過更高的禪定，所以無法生到上界。如果生到彼定（指無想定或滅盡定）中的下三天（指色界初禪三天），就不會再有失去。

論：以及沒有心識活動的狀態，所以稱為無心。

述記：下面第二部分解釋兩種無心定。其中先總的解釋，後分別解釋。這裡是總的解釋。解釋第三句頌文『及無心二定』。所謂『無心』這個詞，通用於下面的四種狀態（指睡眠、悶絕、無想天、無想定和滅盡定）。睡眠等狀態也通於有心識活動的狀態，所以用『無心』這個詞來簡別。雖然是解釋一句頌文，但先解釋兩種定，是爲了順應文義的方便。因為這四種狀態都沒有六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）的活動，所以稱為無心。沒有說僅僅在無想天（asaṃjñā-deva，色界天之一，此天眾生滅盡粗想，僅存細想）中無心，所以可知兩種定都是無心的。只是無想天只有一處，沒有相似的法，所以不說無心。下面的四種狀態，有的和有心識活動的狀態相似，所以需要簡別。

下面分別解釋兩種定，分為兩部分。

論：無想定（asaṃjñā-samāpatti，一種禪定狀態，在此狀態下，修行者滅盡一切粗想）是指……所以也稱為定。

述記：下面分別解釋。文雖分為六個方面，但實際上有十一個含義：一、顯示獲得者是異生（pṛthag-jana，指凡夫，未證聖果者）。因為聖者厭離這種定。二、顯示離欲。指遍凈天（Śubhakṛtsna，色界第三禪天）。因為第四禪以上的貪慾還沒有被伏斷。三、顯示行相，即作涅槃想。四、顯示所滅的識有多少。五、解釋定的名稱。有心定使身心都平等，稱為安；怡悅，稱為和。現在無心定由於定前的心的力量，使身體平等、和悅，如同有心定一樣，所以也稱為定，意義與有心定相同。此定的體性如前面第一卷所說，是依二十二法滅而假立的。以上是第一段文字，有五個含義。以什麼來伏斷染污而入定呢？《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第十二卷說：問：以什麼方便進入這種等至（samāpatti，指禪定）？答：觀想如病、如癰、如箭。進入第四禪，修習厭背想作意（manasikāra，即心理活動）。對於所生起的種種想中，厭背而住。唯獨認為無想是寂靜微妙的。在無想中持心而住。這樣逐漸地離開各種所緣，心便寂靜。

【English Translation】 English version: In the Realm of Desire (kāmadhātu, one of the three realms in Buddhist cosmology where beings reside, characterized by sensual desires and material cravings), nothing is ever lost. It's just that because one hasn't cultivated higher meditative states, one cannot be born in the higher realms. If one is born in the lower three abodes within that meditative state (referring to the first three heavens of the Form Realm), there will be no further loss.

Treatise: And because of the absence of mental activity, it is called 'no-mind'.

Commentary: The second part below explains the two 'no-mind' samādhis (meditative states). Among them, first a general explanation, then separate explanations. This is the general explanation. Explaining the third line of the verse, 'and the two no-mind samādhis'. The term 'no-mind' applies to the four states below (referring to sleep, fainting, the Heaven of Non-Perception, and the Non-Perception Samādhi and Cessation Samādhi). States like sleep also apply to states with mental activity, so the term 'no-mind' is used to distinguish them. Although it is explaining one line of the verse, the two samādhis are explained first for the sake of convenience in following the text. Because these four states all lack the activity of the six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness), they are called 'no-mind'. It is not said that 'no-mind' only exists in the Heaven of Non-Perception (asaṃjñā-deva, one of the heavens in the Form Realm, where beings have extinguished coarse thoughts and only subtle thoughts remain), so it can be known that both samādhis are 'no-mind'. It's just that the Heaven of Non-Perception only has one location, without similar phenomena, so 'no-mind' is not mentioned. The four states below have some similarities to states with mental activity, so they need to be distinguished.

Below, the two samādhis are explained separately, divided into two parts.

Treatise: The Non-Perception Samādhi (asaṃjñā-samāpatti, a meditative state in which the practitioner extinguishes all gross perceptions) refers to... therefore it is also called samādhi.

Commentary: Below, the separate explanations. Although the text is divided into six aspects, there are actually eleven meanings: 1. It shows that the one who attains it is an ordinary being (pṛthag-jana, referring to a common person, one who has not attained the fruit of sainthood). Because the saints are disgusted with this samādhi. 2. It shows detachment from desire, referring to the Heaven of All-Pervading Purity (Śubhakṛtsna, the third dhyāna heaven of the Form Realm). Because the greed above the fourth dhyāna has not yet been subdued. 3. It shows the aspect of practice, which is to contemplate Nirvana. 4. It shows how many consciousnesses are extinguished. 5. It explains the name of the samādhi. A samādhi with mind makes the body and mind equal, called peace; joy, called harmony. Now, the no-mind samādhi, due to the power of the mind before the samādhi, makes the body equal and harmonious, just like a samādhi with mind, so it is also called samādhi, and its meaning is the same as a samādhi with mind. The nature of this samādhi, as mentioned in the first volume, is provisionally established based on the extinction of twenty-two dharmas. The above is the first paragraph, with five meanings. How does one subdue defilements and enter samādhi? The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume twelve, says: Question: By what means does one enter this samāpatti (meditative attainment)? Answer: Contemplate as if it were a disease, a boil, an arrow. Enter the fourth dhyāna, cultivate the mind by contemplating aversion. Among the various thoughts that arise, dwell in aversion. Only consider non-perception to be tranquil and subtle. Dwell in the mind in non-perception. In this way, gradually leaving all objects of focus, the mind becomes tranquil.

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滅。顯揚第一亦作此說。即以六行伏惑之法入此定也。此中釋名如第二卷疏。不同俱舍云或無想者定。或定無想名無想定。

論。修習此定至定當中夭。

述曰。下第二文第六義。三品修別。下修必退不能速現前。有即命終者。以論下云通后報故。若不命終而還得者。由許有退進還得故。後生彼天不甚光凈。形色不甚廣大。不甚之言于下通故　定當中夭。不滿五百劫。此果雖受四百劫已來仍此品攝。或多分者是中品攝。少分劫者是此品攝　問若退已生色界彼方坐得。生彼之時光凈等不　答曰不甚如前此品攝故。退性下性故。

論。中品修者至而不決定。

述曰。中品修者與前少別。其文可知。現不必退。不定中夭。設中夭形色量別。此有二解。一據形色量與前別。雖壽量少於前者。仍此品攝。二云或多分壽者。是此品攝。

論。上品修者至後方殞沒。

述曰。其文可知。然約修時。及當來果以辨三品。此約三根為三無失。或根不定。但修有三。如五十三說三品修同。然此受果通立．坐．臥。唯無行者。因修爾故。

論。此定唯屬第四靜慮。

述曰。自下第三文第七地系。彼第四定方便引故唯彼系攝。何故唯在第四靜慮。說此果所以。即說定所由。如前說故。如又毗

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 滅（Nirodha，寂滅）。《顯揚第一》（Xianyang First）也是這麼說的。就是用六行觀伏惑的方法進入這個禪定。這裡面解釋名稱就像第二卷疏文一樣。和《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）說的不同，他們說或者沒有想念的是禪定，或者禪定沒有想念叫做無想定（Asañjñāsamāpatti，無想禪定）。

論：修習這個禪定，在禪定當中夭折。

述曰：下面第二段文字第六個意義，三種品類的修習差別。下面修習必定會退轉，不能快速顯現。有的人會因此命終，因為論中下面說通於后報的緣故。如果沒命終而又重新獲得禪定，因為允許有退轉和進步而重新獲得。後來生到彼天，光凈等不甚光明清凈，形色等不甚廣大。『不甚』這兩個字，在下面也通用。在禪定當中夭折，不滿五百劫。這個果報雖然只受四百劫，仍然屬於這個品類。或者受大部分劫數的，是中品攝。受少部分劫數的，是此品攝。問：如果退轉后已經生到彼方，坐著獲得禪定。生到彼天的時候，光凈等是否光明清凈？答：不甚光明清凈，像前面說的一樣，屬於這個品類。因為退轉的性質是下等的緣故。

論：中品修習的人，到不必退轉而不決定。

述曰：中品修習的人和前面稍微有區別。文中的意思可以知道。現在不必退轉，不一定中途夭折。假設中途夭折，形色量有差別。這裡有兩種解釋。一種是根據形色量和前面不同。雖然壽命比前者少，仍然屬於這個品類。第二種說法是或者壽命大部分的，是中品攝。

論：上品修習的人，到後來才殞沒。

述曰：文中的意思可以知道。然而根據修習的時候，以及當來的果報來分辨三種品類。這是根據三種根器分為三種，沒有缺失。或者根器不一定，但是修習有三種。如五十三說三種品類的修習相同。然而這接受果報，可以站著、坐著、躺著。只有沒有行走的，因為修習是這樣的緣故。

論：這個禪定只屬於第四靜慮（Fourth Dhyana，第四禪）。

述曰：從下面第三段文字第七個意義，屬於哪個地。因為第四禪方便引導的緣故，所以只屬於第四禪。為什麼只在第四靜慮？說明這個果報的原因。就是說明禪定所由來的原因。如前面所說。如又毗（毗奈耶，Vinaya，律藏）

【English Translation】 English version Nirodha (滅, Cessation). The Xianyang First (顯揚第一) also says this. It is to enter this samādhi (定, concentration) by using the method of subduing afflictions with the six aspects. The explanation of the name here is like the commentary in the second volume. It differs from the Abhidharmakośa (俱舍論), which says that either the one without thought is samādhi, or the samādhi without thought is called Asañjñāsamāpatti (無想定, Samadhi of Non-Perception).

Treatise: Cultivating this samādhi, one dies prematurely in the midst of samādhi.

Commentary: The sixth meaning of the second section below concerns the differences in the three grades of cultivation. Cultivation below will inevitably regress and cannot manifest quickly. Some people will die as a result, because the treatise below says that it extends to later retribution. If one does not die but regains samādhi, it is because regression and progress are allowed, and one regains it. Later, being born in that heaven, the light and purity are not very bright and pure, and the form and color are not very vast. The words 'not very' are used generally below. Dying prematurely in the midst of samādhi, not reaching five hundred kalpas (劫, eons). Although this result is only received for four hundred kalpas, it still belongs to this category. Or those who receive most of the kalpas belong to the middle category. Those who receive a small portion of the kalpas belong to this category. Question: If one has already been born in that realm after regressing, and attains samādhi while sitting. When one is born in that heaven, are the light and purity bright and pure? Answer: Not very bright and pure, as mentioned before, belonging to this category. Because the nature of regression is inferior.

Treatise: Those who cultivate the middle grade do not necessarily regress and are not certain.

Commentary: Those who cultivate the middle grade are slightly different from the previous ones. The meaning of the text can be understood. Now, there is no need to regress, and it is not certain to die prematurely. Assuming premature death, the form and color have differences in quantity. There are two explanations here. One is based on the difference in form and color from the previous ones. Although the lifespan is shorter than the former, it still belongs to this category. The second explanation is that those with a longer lifespan belong to the middle category.

Treatise: Those who cultivate the superior grade die only later.

Commentary: The meaning of the text can be understood. However, the three grades are distinguished according to the time of cultivation and the future result. This is based on the three faculties being divided into three, without any deficiency. Or the faculties are not certain, but there are three types of cultivation. As fifty-three says, the three grades of cultivation are the same. However, receiving this result, one can be standing, sitting, or lying down. Only without walking, because the cultivation is like this.

Treatise: This samādhi belongs only to the Fourth Dhyana (第四靜慮, Fourth Dhyana).

Commentary: From the seventh meaning of the third section below, it belongs to which realm. Because it is conveniently guided by the Fourth Dhyana, it belongs only to the Fourth Dhyana. Why only in the Fourth Dhyana? Explaining the reason for this result. That is, explaining the reason for the samādhi. As mentioned before. Such as also the Vinaya (毗奈耶, Vinaya, the collection of monastic rules).

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婆沙一百五十二。有二定依地之義大廣。

論。又唯是善至由前說故。

述曰。第三段中第八義也。善定引故唯善　非在上．下地。與前報說義同也。此釋唯屬第四定因。

論。四業通三除順現受。

述曰。第四段文第九義。四業分別。顯揚等立第五業。此中四業同於對法。彼據別義亦不相違。于不定中報時定不定別出故　通后報者。色界後起方受此報。地地重生后得無失。無文違故。處則不然。前欲界定是何報耶。若欲界退失。一切定皆名不得。即命終此報不受故名不定報。既言通退。與小乘別。故報亦別也。

論。有義此定至極猛利故。

述曰。第五文第十義者。有義雖通后報。唯欲界起。上界無外道說法力故。惠解不如人故。明六天亦不起。此師設上界不起亦成后報。欲界退失復定還得故。若退已生下三定。必不能起。無外緣故。惠解劣故。五十六說先於此起後於色界受報。不言後於色界起定也。

論。有義欲界至究竟故。

述曰。此第二義。欲界先修。色界除受果處餘下一切地。或一切處皆能重引現前。瑜伽五十六說。先於此起者。先起此定也。後於色界者。後起此定也。于第四靜慮當受彼果者。出受果處也。即後於色界受。二師引別。前師屬果。后師屬

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《婆沙論》第一百五十二卷中，有兩種禪定，就其所依止的『地』（bhūmi，指禪定的境界或層次）而言，具有廣大和深遠的意義。

論：又唯有善的禪定才能達到，這是由於前面已經說明過的原因。

述記：這是第三段中的第八個意義。因為是善的禪定所引發，所以唯有善的禪定才能達到，而不是在上地或下地。這與前面關於果報的說法意義相同。這裡解釋的是唯獨屬於第四禪定的原因。

論：四種業（指黑業、白業、黑白業、非黑非白業）通於三界（指欲界、色界、無色界），除了順現受業（指當下受報的業）。

述記：這是第四段文中的第九個意義，關於四種業的分別。顯揚等論典立了第五種業。這裡所說的四種業與《對法論》相同。他們根據不同的意義，並不互相違背。在不定業中，果報的時間有定與不定之分，因此特別提出來。通於后報的意思是，後來才開始接受這種果報。在各個『地』（bhūmi）重生后獲得，沒有缺失。因為沒有經文相違背。但『處』（指受報的地點）則不然。之前在欲界所修的禪定，會帶來什麼樣的果報呢？如果從欲界退失，那麼一切禪定都不能算作獲得。也就是說，如果命終，這種果報就無法接受，所以稱為不定報。既然說通於退失，就與小乘不同，所以果報也有所不同。

論：有一種觀點認為，這種禪定極其猛利。

述記：這是第五段文中的第十個意義。有一種觀點認為，雖然這種禪定通於后報，但只能在欲界發起。因為上界沒有外道說法的力量，智慧和理解力不如欲界的人。因此，六慾天（指欲界的六個天界）也不能發起這種禪定。這位論師認為，即使上界不能發起，也能成就后報，因為從欲界退失后，重新修習禪定也能獲得。如果退失后已經生起下三禪定，那麼必定不能再發起這種禪定，因為沒有外在的因緣，智慧和理解力也較差。《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷說，先在此地發起，然後在地接受果報，並沒有說後來在地發起禪定。

論：有一種觀點認為，欲界先修，才能究竟。

述記：這是第二種觀點。在欲界先修習，除了受果之處，其餘地獄的一切『地』（bhūmi），或者一切『處』（指一切地方），都能重新引發使其現前。《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷說，『先於此起』，是指先發起這種禪定。『後於』，是指後來發起這種禪定。『于第四靜慮當受彼果者』，是指超出受果之處。也就是後來在地接受果報。兩種論師的引用不同。前一位論師指的是果報，后一位論師指的是...

【English Translation】 English version Vibhasa 152. There are two samadhis (定, meditative states) that are vast and extensive in terms of the 'ground' (地, bhūmi, referring to the realm or level of meditative attainment) they rely on.

Treatise: Moreover, only good samadhi can be attained, and this is because of what has been said before.

Commentary: This is the eighth meaning in the third section. Because it is induced by good samadhi, only good samadhi can be attained, not those in higher or lower realms. This is the same meaning as the previous statement about karmic retribution. This explains the reason why it belongs exclusively to the fourth dhyana (定, meditative state).

Treatise: The four karmas (四業, referring to black karma, white karma, black-white karma, and non-black-non-white karma) are common to the three realms (三界, referring to the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm), except for karma that is experienced in the present life (順現受業).

Commentary: This is the ninth meaning in the fourth section, concerning the distinctions of the four karmas. The Xianyang and other treatises establish a fifth karma. The four karmas mentioned here are the same as those in the Abhidharma. They are not contradictory because they are based on different meanings. Among indefinite karmas, the time of retribution is either definite or indefinite, so it is specifically mentioned. 'Common to subsequent retribution' means that one receives this retribution only later. After rebirth in each 'ground' (地, bhūmi), one obtains it without loss, because there is no sutra that contradicts this. However, the 'place' (處, referring to the location of retribution) is not the same. What kind of retribution does the samadhi cultivated in the desire realm bring? If one falls from the desire realm, then all samadhis are considered not attained. That is, if one dies, this retribution cannot be received, so it is called indefinite retribution. Since it is said to be common to falling, it is different from the Hinayana, so the retribution is also different.

Treatise: Some argue that this samadhi is extremely intense.

Commentary: This is the tenth meaning in the fifth section. Some argue that although this samadhi is common to subsequent retribution, it can only be initiated in the desire realm. This is because the higher realms do not have the power of non-Buddhist teachings, and their wisdom and understanding are not as good as those in the desire realm. Therefore, the six desire heavens (六慾天, referring to the six heavens of the desire realm) cannot initiate this samadhi either. This teacher believes that even if it cannot be initiated in the higher realms, it can still achieve subsequent retribution, because after falling from the desire realm, one can still obtain it by re-cultivating samadhi. If one has already generated the lower three dhyanas (定, meditative states) after falling, then one will definitely not be able to initiate this samadhi again, because there are no external conditions, and their wisdom and understanding are also inferior. Yogacarabhumi-sastra 56 says that one first initiates it in this ground and then receives the retribution in ** ground, but it does not say that one later initiates samadhi in ** ground.

Treatise: Some argue that one must first cultivate in the desire realm to achieve ultimate attainment.

Commentary: This is the second view. One must first cultivate in the desire realm, and then all the lower 'grounds' (地, bhūmi) below the place of receiving retribution, or all 'places' (處, referring to all locations), can re-induce it to manifest. Yogacarabhumi-sastra 56 says, 'First initiated here' refers to first initiating this samadhi. 'Later in **' refers to later initiating this samadhi. 'Those who are to receive that fruit in the fourth dhyana' refers to exceeding the place of receiving retribution. That is, later receiving the retribution in ** ground. The citations of the two teachers are different. The former teacher refers to the retribution, and the latter teacher refers to...

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定。故二諍也。然既通后報。即色界重現前為勝。前師云。欲界今生退後生更得。不退前定。即名后報。何勞生彼。故二力齊。後起家不于彼天處者。以至究竟故。第四定中三處為起不起。今此言除無想天。不遮余處故得起也。雖知離染諸地皆然。但由熏修生上諸處別別不同。故下三處亦得此定　又解下處不得。離染齊故。若起下染定不生第四禪。若離下染即得彼定。故下天處無得定義。以退此定必起下染。不爾如何說名為退。

論。此由厭想至非聖所起。

述曰。下第六文第十一漏無漏。雖言凡聖初文已說異生。更無別門。何以唯有漏不通無漏者。厭想欣彼無想之果入此定故。即為六行有所欣．厭。非如滅定為上息想雖厭。而無所欣果故。故唯無漏。五十三說。以無想定無惠現行。此上有勝住及生故。不能證得所未證得諸勝善法。由是稽留誑橫處故。非聖所入。六十二說。無想等至唯有漏。乃至廣說。俱舍云。聖者不執有漏為真涅槃。此中準彼故唯有漏。非聖所起。曾得未曾得加行離染等。並如對法第二抄等解。

論。滅盡定者至故亦名定。

述曰。明二無心定中此第二文。即無心中第三位也。文雖有六。義有十二。第一得人。謂有．無學者。六十六云。即簡二乘非俱脫者。不得入故。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此產生了兩種爭論。然而，既然已經貫通了后報的道理，那麼重視現前的定力就顯得更為重要。之前的論師說，在欲界今生退失了之前的禪定，在後世又重新獲得，這並沒有退失之前的禪定，就可以稱之為后報。又何必勞煩往生到彼處呢？因此，兩種力量是相等的。後起的禪定之家不在彼天處的原因，是因為要達到究竟的緣故。第四禪定中有三個處所可以起定或不起定。現在這裡說除了無想天，並沒有遮止其他處所，所以可以起定。雖然知道離染的各個地都是如此，但由於熏習和修行的不同，往生到上方的各個處所也各有不同。因此，下方的三個處所也可以得到這種禪定。又有一種解釋是下方的處所不能得到這種禪定，因為離染的程度是一樣的。如果生起下方的染污，就不能生起第四禪。如果離開了下方的染污，就可以得到那種禪定。因此，下方的天處沒有得到禪定的定義，因為退失這種禪定必定會生起下方的染污。否則，又怎麼能說名為退失呢？ 論：這種禪定是由厭惡的想念，直到非聖人所能生起的地方而產生的。 述曰：在下方的第六段文字，第十一漏無漏中，雖然說了凡夫和聖人，但第一段文字已經說了異生，沒有其他的門徑。為什麼只有有漏而沒有無漏呢？因為厭惡想念，欣求彼無想天的果報而進入這種禪定。這就是因為六行有所欣求和厭惡。不像滅盡定那樣，爲了止息上方的想念雖然厭惡，但沒有欣求的果報。因此只有無漏。第五十三說，因為無想定沒有智慧現行。這種禪定有殊勝的住處和生處，所以不能證得尚未證得的各種殊勝的善法。因此，稽留于虛誑的處所。不是聖人所能進入的。第六十二說，無想等至只有有漏，乃至廣說。《俱舍論》說，聖人不執著有漏法為真正的涅槃。這裡參照《俱舍論》，所以只有有漏，不是聖人所能生起的。曾經得到或未曾得到，以及加行離染等等，都如《對法》第二抄等所解釋。 論：滅盡定，乃至因此也叫做定。 述曰：闡明二種無心定中的第二種，也就是無心中的第三個位置。文字雖然有六段，但意義有十二種。第一是得到的人，指有學和無學的人。第六十六說，這是簡別二乘中非俱解脫的人，因為他們不能進入滅盡定。

【English Translation】 English version: Hence, two disputes arise. However, since the principle of subsequent retribution (后報, hòubào) has been understood, emphasizing the power of present concentration becomes more important. Previous teachers said that if one loses their previous concentration in this life in the desire realm (欲界, yùjiè), and then regains it in a later life without losing the previous concentration, it can be called subsequent retribution. Why bother to be reborn there? Therefore, the two forces are equal. The reason why the family of subsequent concentration does not reside in that heavenly realm is because they aim to reach ultimate liberation. In the fourth concentration (第四定, dìsìdìng), there are three places where concentration can arise or not arise. Now, it is said here that except for the Realm of Non-Perception (無想天, wúxiǎngtiān), other places are not prohibited, so concentration can arise. Although it is known that all grounds of detachment from defilements are like this, due to different熏習 (xūnxí, habitual influences) and practices, rebirth in the upper places also varies. Therefore, the three lower places can also attain this concentration. Another explanation is that the lower places cannot attain this concentration because the degree of detachment from defilements is the same. If lower defilements arise, the fourth dhyana (禪, chán) cannot arise. If one is detached from lower defilements, one can attain that concentration. Therefore, the lower heavenly realms do not have the definition of attaining concentration, because losing this concentration will inevitably lead to the arising of lower defilements. Otherwise, how can it be called loss? Treatise: This [concentration] arises from the thought of厭 (yàn, aversion) up to the place where non-saints can arise. Commentary: In the sixth passage below, the eleventh漏無漏 (lòu wúlòu, defiled and undefiled), although it speaks of ordinary beings and saints, the first passage has already spoken of異生 (yìshēng, different beings), and there is no other path. Why is it that only the defiled is included and not the undefiled? Because of the thought of aversion, seeking the fruit of the Realm of Non-Perception, one enters this concentration. This is because the six practices have something to seek and to厭 (yàn, be averse to). It is not like the cessation attainment (滅盡定, mièjìndìng), where, in order to stop the thoughts above, although there is aversion, there is no fruit to seek. Therefore, only the undefiled exists. The fifty-third [section] says that because the non-perception attainment does not have wisdom manifesting, this concentration has a superior dwelling place and place of birth, so it cannot attain the various superior good dharmas that have not yet been attained. Therefore, it lingers in a place of deception. It is not something that saints can enter. The sixty-second [section] says that the non-perception attainment only has defilements, and so on. The Kośa says that saints do not cling to defiled dharmas as true Nirvana. Here, according to the Kośa, only the defiled exists, and it is not something that saints can arise. Having attained or not having attained, as well as the practice of detachment from defilements, are all explained in the second copy of the Abhidharma, etc. Treatise: Cessation attainment, and therefore it is also called concentration. Commentary: Clarifying the second of the two non-mind concentrations, which is the third position in non-mind. Although there are six passages, there are twelve meanings. The first is the person who attains it, referring to those who are still learning and those who have completed their learning. The sixty-sixth [section] says that this distinguishes those among the two vehicles (二乘, èrchéng) who are not liberated together, because they cannot enter the cessation attainment.

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中獨覺亦有不得滅定者不。以義今準此文。故有獨覺不得滅定。即部行中。乃至亦有不得通者。獨一者必得故。有學聖者除初二果。唯身證不還。以有學中有異生故。以聖言簡　第二得所以伏斷差別。已伏或離無所有貪。上貪不定者。若上若下皆有伏．斷。如下當辨。以滅定唯依非想定起故。此依初修二乘者離。菩薩不伏離貪。第三與前出離想別。及所滅識　止息想者。謂二乘者。厭患六識有漏勞慮。或觀無漏心粗動。若菩薩等。亦欲發生無心寂靜似於涅槃功德故起。第四滅識多少　令不恒行及恒行染者。謂若二乘即除人空之染。菩薩亦除法空之染。各望自乘說為染故。對法第二．五蘊論。言恒行一分。若說第七唯有漏唯人執者。即第七全不行。望第八是一分故。即以此文為證唯有漏。若說有法執。二乘除人空一分。菩薩雙除。非全無第七。定名同前。

第五釋名。

論。由偏厭受想亦名滅彼定。

述曰。彼心．心所滅名滅定。恒行染污心等滅故。即此亦名滅受想定。義以此定若實總滅為論。即滅盡定。若但從主為名名無心定。前即通約心．心所名。若據增強所厭別名。如此中說滅受想定。如名無想定。以修禪．無色義各勝故。如別立蘊故偏厭之。又以受是根為首等余是根者亦滅。以想非根法為首

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：有沒有一些Pratyekabuddha（獨覺，靠自己領悟佛法的人）不能證得滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti，一種高級禪定狀態）？ 答：根據文中的義理來衡量，確實有一些獨覺不能證得滅盡定。即使在部行（修行階段）中，也有一些獨覺不能證得神通。但如果是一個人獨自修行證悟的獨覺，必定能證得滅盡定。對於有學位的聖者（Saints in training），除了初果和二果的聖者，只有身證的不還者（Anāgāmin，不還果）才能證得滅盡定，因為有學位的人中可能還有異生（凡夫）。用『聖』這個詞是爲了簡別。 第二，證得滅盡定可以調伏和斷除煩惱的差別。已經調伏或脫離了無所有處貪（Ākiñcaññāyatana-rāga，對無所有處的貪著），對於更高層次的貪著則不確定。無論上界還是地獄，都有可能調伏或斷除貪著，具體情況將在後面辨析。因為滅盡定只能依靠非想非非想處定（N'eva Saññā N'asaññāyatana，既非有想也非無想處）而生起。 這裡指的是初修二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的人脫離貪慾。菩薩（Bodhisattva，發願要救度一切眾生的人）不調伏或脫離貪慾。 第三，滅盡定與之前的出離想（Nissarana-saññā，出離的念想）不同，以及所滅的識（Viññāṇa，意識）也不同。 止息想（Nirodha-saññā，止息的念想）指的是二乘修行者厭倦了六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）的有漏（有煩惱）的勞累和思慮，或者觀察到無漏心（無煩惱的心）的粗動。而菩薩等修行者，也希望生起無心寂靜的狀態，類似於涅槃（Nirvāṇa，解脫）的功德，因此修習滅盡定。 第四，滅盡定所滅的識有多少？ 滅盡定能令不恒行（不常生起）和恒行（常生起）的染污心（Klista-citta，煩惱心）止息。對於二乘修行者來說，就是去除人空（Pudgala-śūnyatā，人無我）的染污；對於菩薩來說，就是去除法空（Dharma-śūnyatā，法無我）的染污。各自根據自己所修行的乘（Yāna，道路）來說是染污。對法（Abhidharma，阿毗達摩）的第二和五蘊論（Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa）中說，恒行是一部分。如果說第七識（末那識，Manas）只有有漏和人執，那麼第七識就完全不行了，相對於第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）來說只是一部分。就可以用這段文字來證明第七識只有有漏。如果說有法執，那麼二乘修行者去除人空的一部分，菩薩則雙重去除，並非完全沒有第七識。定的名稱與前面相同。 第五，解釋名稱。 論：由於偏重厭離受（Vedanā，感受）和想（Saññā，念想），因此也稱為滅彼定（Nirodha-samāpatti，滅盡定）。 述曰：彼心（Citta，心）和心所（Caitasika，心所）滅盡，稱為滅盡定。因為恒行的染污心等都滅盡了。因此，這個定也稱為滅受想定（Sañjñā-vedayita-nirodha，滅受想的禪定）。從義理上來說，如果以完全滅盡為論，就是滅盡定。如果只是從主要方面來命名，就稱為無心定（Acitta-samāpatti，無心禪定）。前者是通約心和心所來說的，後者是根據增強的所厭離的方面來特別命名的，就像這裡說的滅受想定。就像無想定（Asaññā-samāpatti，無想禪定）的命名一樣，因為修禪和無色的義理各有側重，所以分別建立蘊（Skandha，五蘊）。又因為受是根（Indriya，根）為首，等等，其餘是根的也滅盡。因為想不是根法為首。

【English Translation】 English version Q: Are there some Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas, those who attain enlightenment on their own) who cannot attain Nirodha-samāpatti (Cessation Attainment, an advanced state of meditation)? A: Judging by the meaning of this text, there are indeed some Pratyekabuddhas who cannot attain Nirodha-samāpatti. Even within the stages of practice, there are some who cannot attain supernormal powers. However, if it is a Pratyekabuddha who attains enlightenment through solitary practice, they will definitely attain Nirodha-samāpatti. For Saints in training (those with learning), excluding the Stream-enterers and Once-returners, only Body-witnessing Non-returners (Anāgāmin) can attain Nirodha-samāpatti, because among those with learning, there may still be ordinary beings. The term 'Saint' is used for distinction. Second, attaining Nirodha-samāpatti can subdue and sever the differences in afflictions. Having subdued or detached from the greed for the Realm of Nothingness (Ākiñcaññāyatana-rāga, attachment to the realm of nothingness), it is uncertain regarding the greed for higher realms. Whether in the higher or lower realms, there is the possibility of subduing or severing greed, which will be discussed later. This is because Nirodha-samāpatti can only arise based on the Neither Perception nor Non-perception Attainment (N'eva Saññā N'asaññāyatana, neither perception nor non-perception). This refers to those who initially practice the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) detaching from greed. Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattva, beings who vow to save all sentient beings) do not subdue or detach from greed. Third, Nirodha-samāpatti is different from the previous thought of renunciation (Nissarana-saññā, thought of renunciation), and the consciousness (Viññāṇa, consciousness) that is extinguished is also different. The thought of cessation (Nirodha-saññā, thought of cessation) refers to practitioners of the Two Vehicles who are weary of the defiled (with afflictions) labor and thoughts of the six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, mind-consciousness), or who observe the coarse movements of the undefiled mind (mind without afflictions). Bodhisattvas and other practitioners also wish to generate a state of mindlessness and tranquility, similar to the merits of Nirvāṇa (Nirvāṇa, liberation), and therefore practice Nirodha-samāpatti. Fourth, how much consciousness is extinguished in Nirodha-samāpatti? Nirodha-samāpatti can cause the non-constant (not always arising) and constant (always arising) defiled mind (Klista-citta, afflicted mind) to cease. For practitioners of the Two Vehicles, it is the removal of the defilement of personal emptiness (Pudgala-śūnyatā, emptiness of self); for Bodhisattvas, it is the removal of the defilement of emptiness of phenomena (Dharma-śūnyatā, emptiness of phenomena). Each is considered defilement according to their respective Vehicle (Yāna, path). In the second book of Abhidharma (Abhidharma, scholastic treatises) and the Treatise on the Five Aggregates (Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa), it is said that the constant is a part. If it is said that the seventh consciousness (Manas, Manas) only has defilement and attachment to self, then the seventh consciousness is completely inactive, and is only a part relative to the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, Ālaya-vijñāna). This passage can be used to prove that the seventh consciousness only has defilement. If it is said that there is attachment to phenomena, then practitioners of the Two Vehicles remove a part of personal emptiness, while Bodhisattvas remove both. It is not that there is no seventh consciousness at all. The name of the samādhi (Samādhi, concentration) is the same as before. Fifth, explaining the name. Treatise: Because of the emphasis on renouncing feeling (Vedanā, feeling) and perception (Saññā, perception), it is also called Nirodha-samāpatti (Cessation Attainment). Commentary: The cessation of the mind (Citta, mind) and mental factors (Caitasika, mental factors) is called Nirodha-samāpatti. Because the constant defiled mind and so on are extinguished. Therefore, this samādhi is also called Sañjñā-vedayita-nirodha (cessation of perception and feeling). From the perspective of meaning, if we consider complete cessation, it is Nirodha-samāpatti. If it is named only from the main aspect, it is called Acitta-samāpatti (mindless attainment). The former is a general term for mind and mental factors, while the latter is named specifically according to the enhanced aspect of what is renounced, as in the case of Sañjñā-vedayita-nirodha mentioned here. Just like the naming of Asaññā-samāpatti (non-perception attainment), because the meanings of meditation and the formless realms each have their emphasis, the aggregates (Skandha, five aggregates) are established separately. Also, because feeling is the head of the faculties (Indriya, faculties), and so on, the rest that are faculties are also extinguished. Because perception is not the head of the Dharma.

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。等余非根法亦滅。如是等無量門　又解二乘．七地以前別觀。修禪．無．色各有偏勝。須別厭之可名滅受想定。自在菩薩．及如來。無有漏第六。無修禪．無色勞慮。何勞偏厭。一由心行以得其名滅受想定。二由內止息故入。即總名無心定。

論。修習此定至畢竟不退。

述曰。自下文第二。義第六。辨三品修。此定有三品如五十三說。滅定許退唯有現不成。後生色界重能現起。準無想定說。下修退者亦爾。亦有現即不成故　問若下品退能引現前者。與中品退人能引現前者何別。又中品不必退者。與上品修者何別　答以修習時有上中下。其此定性類。有可退．不可退種類。必能引現前種類。不能現前種類有別。非以上中下根說有三品。不廢中根上修。上根中修等故　又解即以三品根為三品修。以根別故其修品亦別。若練根已而修習者。即轉成勝品。故有差別。

論。此定初修至最居后故。

述曰。自下文第三。義第七。初修依何地起。初必依有頂遊觀無漏為加行入初修。即二乘。及七地以前等。瑜伽第十二卷說。唯除如來．及出第二僧祇大菩薩。余不能超諸等至。佛等隨欲皆入。故知二乘等名未自在。唯得無所有處心。后超一地無漏入故。顯揚亦同。

言遊觀者。簡無分別智為加行

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：其他的，像『非根法』（非根本之法）也會滅除。像這樣有無量法門。此外，這也能解釋二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）以及七地菩薩以前的『別觀』（有差別的觀法）。修習禪定、『無』（無所有處定）、『色』（色界定）各有偏勝之處，必須特別厭離它們，才能稱為『滅受想定』。自在菩薩和如來（佛），沒有有漏的第六識，沒有修習禪定、無色定所帶來的勞累和憂慮，為何需要特別厭離？一是通過心行而得名『滅受想定』，二是通過內在的止息而入定，總稱為『無心定』。

論：修習此定，直至最終不退轉。

述曰：從下文第二部分開始，是第六個意義，辨別三種品級的修習。此定有三種品級，如《瑜伽師地論》第五十三卷所說。『滅定』（滅盡定）允許退轉，只是現在不能成就，以後生起的力量強大時，能夠再次現起。參照『無想定』（無想定）的說法，下品修習退轉的情況也是如此，也有現在就不能成就的情況。問：如果下品退轉能夠引發先前狀態，那麼與中品退轉能夠引發先前狀態的人有什麼區別？另外，中品不一定退轉的人，與上品修習的人有什麼區別？答：因為修習時有上、中、下之分，此定的性質類別也有可退轉、不可退轉的種類，必定能夠引發先前狀態的種類，與不能引發先前狀態的種類有所區別。不是以上中下根器來說有三種品級，不排除中等根器向上修習，上等根器向下修習等情況。又一種解釋是，直接以三種品級的根器作為三種品級的修習，因為根器不同，所以修習的品級也不同。如果鍛鍊根器之後再修習，就會轉變成殊勝的品級，所以有差別。

論：此定最初修習，因為最居於后。

述曰：從下文第三部分開始，是第七個意義，最初修習依何地而起。最初必定依靠有頂天（色界最高的禪定）遊觀無漏智，作為加行而進入最初的修習，即二乘以及七地以前的菩薩等。《瑜伽師地論》第十二卷說，只有如來以及超出第二阿僧祇劫的大菩薩，其餘人都不能超越各種等至（禪定）。佛等可以隨意進入任何禪定，因此可知二乘等名為未得自在，只能得到無所有處的心，之後超越一地無漏智才能進入。顯揚宗也相同。

所說的『遊觀』，是爲了簡別以無分別智作為加行。

【English Translation】 English version: Other things, like 'non-root dharmas' (non-fundamental dharmas), will also be extinguished. There are countless Dharma gates like this. Furthermore, this can also explain the 'distinctive observations' (differentiated observations) of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) and bodhisattvas before the seventh Bhumi (stage). The practice of dhyana (meditation), 'non-being' (the state of no-thingness), and 'form' (the form realm) each has its own advantages. One must especially renounce them to be called 'cessation of perception and feeling'. Free bodhisattvas and Tathagatas (Buddhas) do not have the afflicted sixth consciousness, nor the labor and worries brought about by practicing dhyana and the form realm. Why would they need to especially renounce them? One is named 'cessation of perception and feeling' through mental activity, and the other is entered through inner cessation, which is generally called 'no-mind samadhi'.

Treatise: Cultivate this samadhi until it is ultimately irreversible.

Commentary: Starting from the second part of the following text, it is the sixth meaning, distinguishing the three grades of cultivation. This samadhi has three grades, as stated in the fifty-third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. 'Cessation samadhi' (nirodha-samāpatti) allows regression, but it cannot be achieved now. When the power arising later is strong, it can manifest again. Referring to the explanation of 'non-perception samadhi' (asaṃjñā-samāpatti), the situation of lower-grade cultivation regressing is also the same. There are also cases where it cannot be achieved now. Question: If lower-grade regression can trigger the previous state, then what is the difference between it and the person whose middle-grade regression can trigger the previous state? Also, what is the difference between a person whose middle grade does not necessarily regress and a person who cultivates the upper grade? Answer: Because there are upper, middle, and lower grades in cultivation, the nature of this samadhi also has types that can regress and types that cannot regress. There are types that can definitely trigger the previous state, and there are differences between types that cannot trigger the previous state. It is not based on the upper, middle, and lower faculties to say that there are three grades. It does not exclude the possibility of a middle-grade person cultivating upwards, or an upper-grade person cultivating downwards, etc. Another explanation is that the three grades of faculties are directly used as the three grades of cultivation. Because the faculties are different, the grades of cultivation are also different. If one cultivates after training the faculties, it will transform into a superior grade, so there are differences.

Treatise: This samadhi is initially cultivated because it is located at the very end.

Commentary: Starting from the third part of the following text, it is the seventh meaning, on what ground does the initial cultivation arise. Initially, one must rely on the peak of existence (highest dhyana of the form realm) to wander and observe the unconditioned wisdom as a preliminary practice to enter the initial cultivation, namely the Two Vehicles and bodhisattvas before the seventh Bhumi, etc. The twelfth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that only the Tathagata and great bodhisattvas who have exceeded the second asamkhya kalpa can surpass various samapattis (meditative attainments). Buddhas, etc., can enter any samadhi at will, so it can be known that the Two Vehicles, etc., are called not yet free, and can only obtain the mind of the state of no-thingness. Only after surpassing one Bhumi of unconditioned wisdom can one enter. The Abhidharmasamuccaya is also the same.

The so-called 'wandering observation' is to distinguish the non-discriminating wisdom as a preliminary practice.

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心。瑜伽第十二說。或依非想非非想而入此定。或依滅盡相而入此定。成業論引摩訶俱瑟恥羅經。二因緣能入此定。謂不思惟一切相。及正思惟無相界故入此定。為有正思惟無想界定故恐濫無分別智。遊觀言簡也　何以唯依非想者。次第定中最居后故。以此定厭心至微微心方入。餘下地心粗不能作此行相故依非想。次第定中粗至細最居后故。又此無心勝定。以下品有心勝定為先。非無心勝定為先。後有心定起。無心必由有心引生故。亦非中間間起。以下定行相。不至微微故。即次第定中。義理最居后故。又教說為最居后故　言微微者。謂定前第二念心等。細于以前心故名之為微。后第一念臨入定之心。復細於前微心故稱為微微。

第八義無漏分別。

論。雖屬有頂而無漏攝。

述曰。以無漏引體即無漏種故。第六十二說。滅盡等至當言無漏。由與煩惱不相應故。非相應故。無所緣故。非煩惱生故。是出世間。異生不能行故。

論。若修此定至亦得現前。

述曰。前言初修唯依非想。后修如何。若得此定已自在者。餘下七地心后亦得現前。即大般若經第一分第三百五十。次第入出諸定名師子顰呻定。若菩薩超禪從一切地心入滅盡定。從滅定於一切地心出。是集散三摩地。第二．三會亦有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 心。瑜伽第十二說。或者依靠非想非非想處（Neither perception nor non-perception）而進入此定（Samadhi，三摩地）。或者依靠滅盡相而進入此定。《成業論》引用《摩訶俱瑟恥羅經》。兩種因緣能夠進入此定。就是不思惟一切相，以及正確思惟無相界，因此進入此定。因為有正確思惟無想界定，所以恐怕和無分別智相混淆。遊觀的說法比較簡略。 為什麼只依靠非想非非想處呢？因為在次第定中，它最靠後。憑藉此定，厭惡心達到微微心，才能進入。其餘下地的心粗糙，不能做這種行相，所以依靠非想非非想處。在次第定中，從粗到細，它最靠後。而且這種無心勝定，以下品有心勝定為先導，而不是以無心勝定為先導。後面的有心定生起，無心必定由有心引導產生。也不是中間間斷生起，因為下定行相，不能達到微微的程度。所以在次第定中，義理上最靠後。而且教義上說它最靠後。 所說的『微微』，是指入定前第二唸的心等等。比以前的心更細微，所以叫做『微』。后第一念，臨近入定的心，又比前面的微心更細微，所以稱為『微微』。 第八義，無漏分別。 論：雖然屬於有頂天（highest realm of existence）但屬於無漏（untainted）的範疇。 述曰：因為無漏引導體，也就是無漏的種子。《第六十二說》：滅盡等至（Cessation attainment）應當說是無漏的。因為它和煩惱不相應，不是相應的，沒有所緣，不是煩惱產生的，是出世間的，異生不能修行。 論：如果修習此定，至（至極）也能夠現前。 述曰：前面說初修只能依靠非想非非想處。后修怎麼樣呢？如果已經得到此定並且自在的人，其餘下七地的心后也可以現前。也就是《大般若經》第一分第三百五十。次第進入和出來各種禪定，叫做師子顰呻定。如果菩薩超越禪定，從一切地的心進入滅盡定，從滅盡定在一切地的心出來。這是集散三摩地（Samadhi，三摩地）。第二、三會也有。

【English Translation】 English version Heart. Yoga Twelfth says: One either relies on Neither perception nor non-perception (Naisaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana) to enter this Samadhi (定, meditative absorption), or relies on the aspect of cessation (滅盡相) to enter this Samadhi. The Cheng Ye Lun (成業論) quotes the Mahākauṣṭhila Sutra. Two conditions enable one to enter this Samadhi: not contemplating all aspects, and correctly contemplating the realm of no-aspect; therefore, one enters this Samadhi. Because there is correct contemplation of the Samadhi of the realm of no-thought, there is fear of confusion with non-discriminating wisdom. Youguan's (游觀) statement is brief. Why rely only on Neither perception nor non-perception? Because it is the last in the sequential Samadhis. By means of this Samadhi, the mind of aversion reaches the subtle mind before entering. The minds of the lower realms are too coarse to perform this practice, so one relies on Neither perception nor non-perception. In the sequential Samadhis, from coarse to fine, it is the last. Moreover, this superior Samadhi of no-mind takes the inferior Samadhi of mind as its precursor, not the superior Samadhi of no-mind. The subsequent arising of the Samadhi of mind is necessarily led by the arising of mind. It also does not arise intermittently, because the practice of the lower Samadhi does not reach the subtle level. Therefore, in the sequential Samadhis, it is the last in terms of meaning. Moreover, the teachings say it is the last. The term 'subtle' refers to the second thought before entering Samadhi, etc. It is more subtle than the previous mind, so it is called 'subtle'. The first thought after, the mind approaching Samadhi, is even more subtle than the previous subtle mind, so it is called 'very subtle'. Eighth meaning: undefiled (無漏) discrimination. Treatise: Although belonging to the Peak of Existence (有頂, highest realm of existence), it is included within the undefiled. Commentary: Because the undefiled guides the substance, which is the seed of the undefiled. The Sixty-second says: Cessation attainment (滅盡等至) should be called undefiled. Because it is not in accordance with afflictions, it is not corresponding, it has no object of focus, it is not produced by afflictions, it is transcendent, and ordinary beings cannot practice it. Treatise: If one cultivates this Samadhi, 'to' (至, utmost) can also manifest. Commentary: The previous statement said that initial cultivation can only rely on Neither perception nor non-perception. What about later cultivation? If one has already attained this Samadhi and is at ease, the minds of the other seven lower realms can also manifest later. That is, the three hundred and fiftieth of the first part of the Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra. Entering and exiting various Samadhis in sequence is called the Lion's Yawn Samadhi. If a Bodhisattva transcends Samadhi, entering the Cessation Samadhi from the minds of all realms, and exiting the Cessation Samadhi in the minds of all realms, this is the Collected and Scattered Samadhi. The second and third assemblies also have it.

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此文。對法第五云。未自在者唯超一間。若得自在超一切地。顯揚十八云。若曾串習能從欲界入無色界心。故知欲界心后越入此定。其瑜伽第十二說。唯自在者方超一切等至。即九等至。謂如來。大菩薩。實無慾界心。有似欲界心實是無漏。隨在何定為加行皆能入。且從極自在。純無漏為語。實十地菩薩．廣惠聲聞．獨覺亦得。如定中聞聲。從無所有處心入欲界故。不爾便違　問既爾此為即是加行心地法。為但非想心地法。若準此義即隨加行心地法。即初定等並有此定。依加行心種上立此定故　不爾對法第十三等說。想受解脫。謂依非想處解脫等。故知唯屬非想。此中亦言屬有頂故　若爾云何名超等至　此有二解。一云謂前起初禪等心已。后一二念起非想處心而入此定。非從初定即入無心。以定隨加行心建立故　第二解云。雖起餘地心鄰即入此定。此定仍非想地為依以極細故。由先串習故今直至無心。非想為依不須起非想心為加行。論言從微微心種上立是初起。多分非約超定者。說超等至即從初定入無心。不言入非想已方入此定故。若不然者即此定所依唯依加行種。加行既初定等故。此定通下地有。既不許然仍言超者。后解為勝。大般若不言從初定等更起非想無漏心方入故。經論皆言滅盡依非想。不言依下地故。言依

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《對法》第五卷說：『未得自在者只能超越一個禪定階段。若得自在，則能超越一切禪定階段。』《顯揚》第十八卷說：『如果曾經串習，就能從欲界直接進入無想定。』因此可知，欲界心之後可以直接進入此定。瑜伽行派的《瑜伽師地論》第十二卷說：『只有得自在者才能超越一切等至（samāpatti，禪定），即九次第定。』例如如來、大菩薩，實際上沒有欲界心，即使有類似欲界的心，實際上也是無漏的。無論在哪個禪定中作為加行，都能進入此定。這裡是從極自在、純無漏的角度來說的。實際上，十地菩薩、廣惠聲聞、獨覺也能做到。例如在禪定中聽到聲音，就是從無所有處心進入欲界。否則就相違背了。 問：既然如此，那麼此定是加行心地法，還是僅僅是非想非非想處心地法？如果按照這個意思，就是隨加行心地法，即初禪等也有此定。因為此定是依加行心種而建立的。 答：不是。《對法》第十三卷等說，想受解脫是依非想非非想處解脫等。因此可知，此定只屬於非想非非想處。這裡也說此定屬於有頂（bhava-agga，三有之頂，即非想非非想處）。 問：如果這樣，為什麼稱作『超等至』？ 答：對此有兩種解釋。第一種解釋是說，先發起初禪等心，然後在一兩念之間發起非想非非想處心，從而進入此定。不是從初禪直接進入無想定，因為禪定是隨加行心而建立的。 第二種解釋是說，雖然發起其他地的心，但緊接著就能進入此定。此定仍然以非想非非想處為所依，因為它極其微細。由於先前的串習，現在可以直接進入無想定。以非想非非想處為所依，不需要發起非想非非想處心作為加行。論中說從微微心種上建立，這是指初起的情況，大部分不是指超越禪定者。說超越等至，就是從初禪進入無想定，沒有說進入非想非非想處之後才進入此定。如果不是這樣，那麼此定所依就僅僅是依加行種。加行既然是初禪等，那麼此定就通於下地。既然不允許這樣，仍然說是『超』，那麼后一種解釋更為合理。《大般若經》沒有說從初禪等再發起非想非非想處無漏心才進入此定。經論都說滅盡定依非想非非想處，沒有說依下地。說依...

【English Translation】 English version: 'Abhidharma V, says: 'Those who have not attained mastery can only transcend one stage. If they attain mastery, they can transcend all stages.' Abhidharmasamuccaya XVIII, says: 'If one has practiced diligently, one can enter the state of non-perception directly from the desire realm.' Therefore, it is known that after the mind of the desire realm, one can directly enter this samadhi. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra XII, states: 'Only those who have attained mastery can transcend all samāpattis (meditative attainments), that is, the nine sequential samāpattis.' For example, the Tathāgata and great Bodhisattvas do not actually have a desire realm mind; even if they have something similar to a desire realm mind, it is actually unconditioned. No matter which samadhi is used as a preliminary practice, they can enter this samadhi. This is spoken from the perspective of extreme mastery and pure unconditionality. In reality, Bodhisattvas of the ten bhūmis, śrāvakas of great wisdom, and Pratyekabuddhas can also do this. For example, hearing a sound in samadhi is entering the desire realm from the mind of the realm of nothingness. Otherwise, it would be contradictory. Question: 'Since this is the case, is this samadhi a mind of preliminary practice, or only a mind of the realm of neither perception nor non-perception? If according to this meaning, it is a mind that follows preliminary practice, that is, the first dhyāna and so on also have this samadhi. Because this samadhi is established based on the seed of the mind of preliminary practice.' Answer: 'No. Abhidharma XIII, and others say that the liberation of perception and feeling is based on the liberation of the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, and so on. Therefore, it is known that this samadhi only belongs to the realm of neither perception nor non-perception. Here it is also said that this samadhi belongs to the peak of existence (bhava-agga, the peak of the three realms, i.e., the realm of neither perception nor non-perception).' Question: 'If this is the case, why is it called 'transcending samāpattis'?' Answer: 'There are two explanations for this. The first explanation is that one first generates the mind of the first dhyāna and so on, and then in one or two moments generates the mind of the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, thereby entering this samadhi. It is not entering the state of non-perception directly from the first dhyāna, because samadhi is established based on the mind of preliminary practice.' The second explanation is that although one generates the mind of another realm, one can immediately enter this samadhi. This samadhi still relies on the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, because it is extremely subtle. Due to previous practice, one can now directly enter the state of non-perception. Relying on the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, it is not necessary to generate the mind of the realm of neither perception nor non-perception as a preliminary practice. The treatise says that it is established from the seed of a subtle mind, which refers to the initial arising, and mostly does not refer to those who transcend samadhi. Saying 'transcending samāpattis' means entering the state of non-perception from the first dhyāna, without saying that one enters the realm of neither perception nor non-perception before entering this samadhi. If this were not the case, then the basis of this samadhi would only be based on the seed of preliminary practice. Since the preliminary practice is the first dhyāna and so on, then this samadhi would be common to the lower realms. Since this is not allowed, and it is still said to be 'transcending,' then the latter explanation is more reasonable. The Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra does not say that one generates the unconditioned mind of the realm of neither perception nor non-perception from the first dhyāna and so on before entering this samadhi. The sūtras and treatises all say that the cessation samadhi relies on the realm of neither perception nor non-perception, and do not say that it relies on the lower realms. Saying 'relying on...'

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加行心上建立者。是非自在次第入者語。以無漏心有所屬故。彼心細故。得自在者不假熏習。及無熏習。何必要依入定心等種子上立　有說大般若第十五會。靜慮中佛呵菩薩入滅定。滅定非利他行。若未自在雖有入者。至自在時皆不令入。但自在成就名超一切。或呵專入。不障時入。佛不起滅定而現威儀故。

論。雖屬道諦至似涅槃故。

述曰。文第四。義第九三學等分別。前言有為善法在學．無學身即名學．無學。滅定實從現行是學．無學。以似涅槃無進趣止息行相。不可說為有學．無學。是非學非無學。雖屬道諦同餘有為。似涅槃故故是非二。不同餘種子。彼非止息故。六十二說正與此同。彼說非所行故。似涅槃故。非二所攝。然此中無進趣止息。不同善身業等亦是學等故。由此義故非二通有為．無為。有為中通有漏．無漏。滅定有為無漏非二攝故。有學．無學中。通有漏．無漏。以苦．憂根等是無學故。

論。此定初起至極猛利故。

述曰。文第五。義第十三界初起。唯在人中。佛及弟子說力起故。上界無此說者。又雖無出家弟子。世俗弟子亦色界有者。以人中惠解極利過彼。故初起位必在人中。六慾天中文亦不說。義即無違。天中豈無身證者也。此中且說人中。近故。勝故。文由未

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於在加行心上建立（禪定），以及是否能自在地按次第進入（禪定）的問題，（以下是）對此的解答。因為（滅盡定）與無漏心相關聯，並且那個心非常微細，所以獲得自在的人不需要通過熏習或不熏習（來達到）。那麼，為什麼一定要依據入定心等種子來建立（滅盡定）呢？ 有人說，《大般若經》第十五會中，佛陀呵斥菩薩進入滅盡定，因為滅盡定不利於利他行為。如果尚未獲得自在，即使有人進入滅盡定，到達自在時也不會再進入。只有自在成就才能超越一切。或者（佛陀）呵斥的是專注于進入滅盡定，而不是阻止在適當的時候進入。佛陀不會一直處於滅盡定，而是會示現威儀。 論：雖然（滅盡定）屬於道諦，但因為它類似於涅槃。 述記：這是第四段文字，第九個意義，關於三學等的分別。前面說有為善法在有學、無學之身，就稱為有學、無學。滅盡定實際上是從現行（狀態）來說是屬於有學、無學，因為它類似於涅槃，沒有進趣和止息的行相，所以不能說是有學、無學，而是非學非無學。雖然它屬於道諦，與其他的有為法相同，但因為它類似於涅槃，所以是非二者。這不同於種子，因為種子不是止息的。六十二見中的說法與此相同，因為它們說（滅盡定）不是所行之處，因為它類似於涅槃，所以不屬於二者。然而，這裡沒有進趣和止息，這不同於善身業等也是有學等。因此，非二既包括有為法，也包括無為法。有為法中既包括有漏法，也包括無漏法。滅盡定是有為無漏法，不屬於二者。有學、無學中，既包括有漏法，也包括無漏法，因為苦、憂根等是無學。 論：此定最初生起，乃至極其猛利。 述記：這是第五段文字，第十三個意義，關於三界最初生起。滅盡定最初只能在人道中生起，因為佛陀和弟子們都說可以通過努力而生起。上界沒有這種說法。而且，即使沒有出家弟子，世俗弟子中也有能夠生起滅盡定的人，因為人道的智慧和理解力極其敏銳，超過了其他道。因此，最初生起滅盡定的位置必定在人道中。六慾天中也沒有相關的說法，但從意義上來說並沒有衝突。天道中難道沒有身證者嗎？這裡只是說人道，因為人道離我們更近，也更殊勝。文字上是因為還沒有...

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the establishment (of Samadhi) on the mind of preparatory practice and whether one can freely enter (Samadhi) in order, (the following is) the answer to this. Because (Nirodha-samāpatti, 滅盡定) is associated with the undefiled mind, and that mind is very subtle, those who have attained freedom do not need to achieve it through cultivation or non-cultivation. Then, why is it necessary to establish (Nirodha-samāpatti) based on the seeds of entering Samadhi, etc.? Some say that in the fifteenth assembly of the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra (大般若經), the Buddha rebuked the Bodhisattvas for entering Nirodha-samāpatti because Nirodha-samāpatti is not conducive to altruistic behavior. If one has not yet attained freedom, even if one enters Nirodha-samāpatti, one will not enter it again when one attains freedom. Only the achievement of freedom can transcend everything. Or (the Buddha) rebuked those who focus on entering Nirodha-samāpatti, rather than preventing entry at the appropriate time. The Buddha does not remain in Nirodha-samāpatti all the time, but manifests dignified behavior. Treatise: Although (Nirodha-samāpatti) belongs to the Path Truth (道諦), it is similar to Nirvana. Commentary: This is the fourth paragraph, the ninth meaning, regarding the distinction between the Three Learnings, etc. It was previously said that wholesome conditioned dharmas in the body of a trainee (有學) or one beyond training (無學) are called trainee or one beyond training. Nirodha-samāpatti is actually said to belong to the trainee or one beyond training from the perspective of present action, because it is similar to Nirvana and does not have the characteristics of progress or cessation, so it cannot be said to be a trainee or one beyond training, but rather neither a trainee nor one beyond training. Although it belongs to the Path Truth, it is the same as other conditioned dharmas, but because it is similar to Nirvana, it is neither of the two. This is different from seeds, because seeds are not cessation. The views of the sixty-two (六十二見) are the same as this, because they say that (Nirodha-samāpatti) is not the place to go, because it is similar to Nirvana, so it does not belong to either of the two. However, there is no progress or cessation here, which is different from wholesome bodily actions, etc., which are also trainees, etc. Therefore, 'neither of the two' includes both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. Conditioned dharmas include both defiled and undefiled dharmas. Nirodha-samāpatti is a conditioned undefiled dharma and does not belong to either of the two. Among trainees and those beyond training, there are both defiled and undefiled dharmas, because suffering, sorrow, etc., are beyond training. Treatise: This Samadhi initially arises, and is extremely vigorous. Commentary: This is the fifth paragraph, the thirteenth meaning, regarding the initial arising in the Three Realms. Nirodha-samāpatti can only initially arise in the human realm, because the Buddha and his disciples all say that it can arise through effort. There is no such statement in the upper realms. Moreover, even if there are no ordained disciples, there are also lay disciples who can generate Nirodha-samāpatti, because the wisdom and understanding of the human realm are extremely sharp, surpassing other realms. Therefore, the initial arising of Nirodha-samāpatti must be in the human realm. There is no relevant statement in the Six Desire Realms (六慾天), but there is no conflict in meaning. Are there no body-witnesses in the heavens? Here, we are only talking about the human realm, because the human realm is closer to us and more superior. The text is because it has not yet...

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盡。對法第九正與此同。

論。後上二界至意成天故。

述曰。若后二界亦得現前。即二界得後起。然無慾界後起。以必不還等方得故。五十六說。起者先於此起。後於色界重現在前。托色所依方得生故。此據未有第八識義。若已建立第八。於一切處皆得。此即據已建立第八教。真實義建立故。鄔陀夷經是此證故。如俱舍第五廣說。鄔陀夷者此名出現。日出時生故以名也。言意成天即超段食。佛說是色界。不爾。既言超段食隨受一處意成天身能入出此定。故知通無色。經不遮彼言隨一故。釋此經者。舍利子說有退者色界後起。出現不了意成天言。謂是非想。然彼不知有第八識。生非想處不可後起此定故。與上座論議。佛知不了舍利子說。所以見訶。非遮無色得入此定。如毗婆沙第一．百五十三卷明其所以。

問生無色者為一切能入為有不能。答。

論。于藏識教至不斷滅故。

述曰。于第八識若未信受。生彼不起。恐無色已后無心。成斷故同無餘依。若已信生彼。非但于下得起。亦得於彼現起此定。知有藏識雖無色身不慮斷滅。前引五十六．對法第十正與此同。然舊諸師謂。未建立教即小乘說。已建立是大乘說者。不然。若大乘說對彼二乘建立第八。已不知有此。設生無色豈不慮斷。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：窮盡。對法第九（Abhidharma IX，論述佛法的第九章）正與此相同。

論：後邊兩個界（指色界和無色界）乃至意成天（Manas-siddha-deva，通過意念成就的天人）的緣故。

述曰：如果后兩個界也能現前，就是說這兩個界可以後起。然而沒有欲界後起的情況，因為必須不還（Anagamin，不再返回欲界）等才能達到。五十六說，『起』是指先在這裡生起，然後在重新現在前。托色所依才能得以產生。』這是根據未有第八識（Alaya-vijñana，阿賴耶識）的意義來說的。如果已經建立第八識，在一切處都可以。這便是根據已經建立第八識的教義。真實義是建立的緣故。鄔陀夷經（Udayi Sutra）是這個的證明。如俱舍第五（Abhidharmakosa V，阿毗達摩俱舍論第五卷）廣說。鄔陀夷（Udayi）這個名字的意思是『出現』，因為他在日出時出生，所以以此為名。『意成天』是指超越段食（kabalikahara，粗糙的食物）。佛陀是這樣說的。不然，既然說超越段食，隨著接受一處意成天的身體，能夠進入和出離此定。所以知道通無色界。經文沒有遮止他們，因為說的是『隨一』。解釋這部經的人，舍利子（Sariputra）說有退轉的人**後起。出現不了意成天的話，指的是非想非非想處天（Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana，既非想也非非想處）。然而他不知道有第八識，生在非想非非想處不可能後起此定。與上座部（Sthavira nikaya）論議。佛陀知道舍利子說得不透徹，所以才訶責。並非遮止無色界的人進入此定。如毗婆沙第一（Vibhasa I，大毗婆沙論第一卷）、百五十三卷說明了其中的原因。

問：生在無色界的人，是所有人都能進入此定，還是有些人不能？答：

論：對於藏識教（Alaya-vijñana，阿賴耶識）乃至不斷滅的緣故。

述曰：對於第八識如果未信受，生在那裡不會生起此定。恐怕無色界以後沒有心，成為斷滅，如同無餘依涅槃（nirupadhisesa-nirvana，無餘涅槃）。如果已經信受，生在那裡，不僅在地獄可以生起，也可以在那裡現起此定。知道有藏識，即使沒有色身，也不用擔心斷滅。前面引用的五十六、對法第十（Abhidharma X，論述佛法的第十章）正與此相同。然而舊時的各位法師認為，未建立教義就是小乘（Hinayana）的說法，已建立教義就是大乘（Mahayana）的說法，這是不對的。如果大乘說對於他們二乘建立第八識，已經不知道有這個。即使生在無色界，難道不擔心斷滅嗎？

【English Translation】 English version: Exhaustion. The ninth chapter of the Abhidharma (Abhidharma IX, the ninth chapter discussing the Dharma) is exactly the same as this.

Treatise: Because of the latter two realms (referring to the Form Realm and the Formless Realm) and even the Manas-siddha-deva (devas who achieve through thought).

Commentary: If the latter two realms can also manifest, it means that these two realms can arise later. However, there is no case of the Desire Realm arising later, because one must attain Anagamin (non-returner) etc. to achieve this. Fifty-six says, 'Arising' means first arising here, and then ** re-manifesting. It is only possible to be born by relying on the basis of form.' This is based on the meaning of not having the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñana, store consciousness). If the eighth consciousness has been established, it is possible in all places. This is based on the doctrine of having established the eighth consciousness. The true meaning is established. The Udayi Sutra is proof of this. As explained in detail in the fifth chapter of the Abhidharmakosa (Abhidharmakosa V). The name Udayi means 'appearance' because he was born at sunrise, hence the name. 'Manas-siddha-deva' refers to transcending coarse food (kabalikahara). The Buddha said this **. Otherwise, since it is said to transcend coarse food, with the body of a Manas-siddha-deva accepting one place, one can enter and exit this samadhi. Therefore, it is known to extend to the Formless Realm. The sutra does not prohibit them because it says 'one of'. Those who interpret this sutra, Sariputra (Sariputra) said that those who regress ** arise later. The words 'appearance of the Manas-siddha-deva' refer to the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana). However, he did not know that there was an eighth consciousness, and it is impossible to arise later in this samadhi when born in the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception. Discussing with the Sthavira nikaya (Theravada school). The Buddha knew that Sariputra's explanation was not thorough, so he rebuked him. It is not to prohibit those in the Formless Realm from entering this samadhi. As explained in the first (Vibhasa I, Mahavibhasa I) and one hundred and fifty-third volumes of the Vibhasa, the reason for this.

Question: For those born in the Formless Realm, can everyone enter this samadhi, or are there some who cannot? Answer:

Treatise: Regarding the doctrine of the Alaya-vijñana (store consciousness), even to the reason of non-cessation.

Commentary: If one has not believed in the eighth consciousness, this samadhi will not arise when born there. It is feared that there will be no mind after the Formless Realm, resulting in annihilation, like nirupadhisesa-nirvana (nirvana without remainder). If one has already believed, then when born there, not only can it arise in the lower realms, but it can also manifest in this samadhi there. Knowing that there is a store consciousness, even without a form body, there is no need to worry about annihilation. The previously cited fifty-six and the tenth chapter of the Abhidharma (Abhidharma X, the tenth chapter discussing the Dharma) are exactly the same as this. However, the old Dharma masters believed that the doctrine not yet established is the teaching of the Hinayana (Small Vehicle), and the doctrine already established is the teaching of the Mahayana (Great Vehicle), which is not correct. If the Mahayana says that the eighth consciousness is established for the two vehicles, they already do not know about this. Even if one is born in the Formless Realm, wouldn't one worry about annihilation?

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故知建立者是信有義。不建立者非信有義。此與彼同　問若爾諸得此定。必是不還已去。生無色聖者。必非不定性聖者。是定性人。聖不下生故。非不定人先根熟時佛不救故。亦非不定性人大根必不熟入無餘。義如第八十無餘依地說。與定性人有何別故。即彼定性人。如何信有第八識也。菩薩又不生彼。若信大乘便非定性不應生彼。若定性者云何信有　答即定性中有愚法者。不信大乘故彼定不起。若不愚法聲聞。雖信大乘不將為究竟。由信有故彼起此定。不為究竟故聖人生彼。如今大乘信小乘教　或此文意與五十六別。此據一分聖者。非謂一切皆爾。不聞大乘人。生彼決定不起此定故。然對法第十云。謂無色多分不安住寂靜異熟故不入此定。非如地獄故。更為此第二解也。約實亦得瑜伽為勝。

論。要斷三界至所引發故。

述曰。文第六義第十一。下文有二。一明見惑。二明修惑。此即初也。要斷何煩惱得起。要斷見惑方起此定。異生不能伏滅有頂見道所斷心心所故。下八地見惑皆不能伏。何但非想。此據最後必須伏斷處言。隨此定所依斷道究竟處說故。非謂下地異生能伏　此定微妙。微妙者殊勝義　要證二空隨應后得所引發故者。謂二乘入唯證人空。后得引菩薩．佛入。二空后得智皆得引入。今顯彼入

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，知道建立（某種觀點）的人是相信有意義的。不建立（某種觀點）的人是不相信有意義的。這和那（種情況）相同。問：如果這樣，所有獲得這種禪定的人，必定是不還果（Anagamin，不再返回欲界受生的聖者）已經離世，並且是生於無色界（Arupaloka，沒有物質的禪定界）的聖者。他們必定不是不定性的聖者，而是定性的人。因為聖者不會下生（欲界），所以不是不定性的人。因為不定性的人在根器成熟時，佛陀不會救度他們。也不是不定性的人，因為大根器的人必定不會成熟而進入無餘涅槃（Parinirvana，完全的涅槃）。這個意義如同第八十卷《無餘依地》所說。那麼，這和定性的人有什麼區別呢？既然如此，那些定性的人，如何相信有第八識（Alaya-vijñana，阿賴耶識）呢？菩薩（Bodhisattva）又不生於彼處。如果相信大乘（Mahayana，大乘佛教），便不是定性的人，不應該生於彼處。如果是定性的人，又如何相信有（第八識）呢？答：在定性的人中，有愚昧於佛法的人，因為他們不相信大乘，所以他們不會生起這種禪定。如果不愚昧於佛法的聲聞（Sravaka，聽聞佛法而證悟的修行者），即使相信大乘，也不會將其視為究竟。因為他們相信有（小乘的教義），所以他們會生起這種禪定。因為不將其視為究竟，所以聖者會生於彼處。如今大乘修行者也相信小乘的教義。或者這段文字的意義與第五十六卷不同。這裡是根據一部分聖者來說的，不是說所有聖者都是這樣。沒有聽聞過大乘佛法的人，生於彼處決定不會生起這種禪定。然而，《對法論》第十卷說：『所謂無色界的大部分眾生不安住于寂靜的異熟果報，所以不進入這種禪定。』不是像地獄（欲界）一樣。這是對此的第二種解釋。從實際情況來說，瑜伽（Yoga，相應的修行）更為殊勝。 論：要斷三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）的煩惱，才能引發（這種禪定）。 述曰：這是第六卷的第十一義。下文有兩部分，一是說明見惑（Dṛṣṭi-hetuka，見道所斷的煩惱），二是說明修惑（Bhāvanā-hetuka，修道所斷的煩惱）。這裡是第一部分。要斷除什麼煩惱才能生起（這種禪定）？要斷除見惑才能生起這種禪定。異生（Prthagjana，凡夫）不能夠伏滅有頂（Bhavagra，三有之頂）的見道所斷的心和心所。下八地的見惑都不能夠伏滅，何況是非想非非想處（Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana，無所有處之上的禪定）。這裡是根據最後必須伏斷之處來說的。是隨著這種禪定所依的斷道究竟之處來說的，不是說下地的異生能夠伏滅（見惑）。這種禪定非常微妙，微妙的意思是殊勝。要證得二空（Dvaishunyata，人空和法空），隨著相應的后得智（Prsthalabdha-jnana，證得根本智后所獲得的智慧）才能引發（這種禪定）。意思是說，二乘（Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的修行者只是證得人空，后得智才能引導菩薩和佛進入（法空）。二空的后得智都能夠引導進入。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, knowing that the establisher (of a certain view) believes there is meaning. The non-establisher (of a certain view) does not believe there is meaning. This is the same as that (situation). Question: If that is the case, all who attain this Samadhi (concentration), must be Anagamin (non-returner, a saint who will not return to the desire realm for rebirth) who have already passed away, and are saints born in the Arupaloka (formless realm, a meditative realm without matter). They must not be saints of uncertain nature, but people of definite nature. Because saints do not descend (to the desire realm), so they are not people of uncertain nature. Because when the faculties of people of uncertain nature mature, the Buddha does not save them. Nor are they people of uncertain nature, because people with great faculties will certainly not mature and enter Parinirvana (complete Nirvana). The meaning is as stated in the eightieth volume of 'No Remainder Basis'. Then, what is the difference between this and people of definite nature? Since this is the case, how do those people of definite nature believe in the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñana, storehouse consciousness)? Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattva) are not born there either. If they believe in Mahayana (Mahayana Buddhism), they are not people of definite nature and should not be born there. If they are people of definite nature, how can they believe in (the eighth consciousness)? Answer: Among people of definite nature, there are those who are ignorant of the Dharma, because they do not believe in Mahayana, so they will not arise this Samadhi. If Sravakas (hearers, practitioners who attain enlightenment by hearing the Dharma) who are not ignorant of the Dharma, even if they believe in Mahayana, they will not regard it as ultimate. Because they believe in (the teachings of Hinayana), they will arise this Samadhi. Because they do not regard it as ultimate, saints will be born there. Now, Mahayana practitioners also believe in the teachings of Hinayana. Or the meaning of this passage is different from the fifty-sixth volume. This is based on a portion of saints, not saying that all saints are like this. People who have not heard the Mahayana Dharma will definitely not arise this Samadhi if they are born there. However, the tenth volume of 'Abhidharma' says: 'So-called most beings in the formless realm do not abide in the quiet Vipaka (result of actions), so they do not enter this Samadhi.' It is not like the lower realm (desire realm). This is the second explanation for this. In reality, Yoga (corresponding practice) is more superior. Treatise: It is necessary to cut off the afflictions of the Trailokya (three realms: desire realm, form realm, formless realm) in order to evoke (this Samadhi). Commentary: This is the eleventh meaning of the sixth volume. There are two parts in the following text, one is to explain the afflictions of view (Dṛṣṭi-hetuka, afflictions severed by the path of seeing), and the other is to explain the afflictions of cultivation (Bhāvanā-hetuka, afflictions severed by the path of cultivation). This is the first part. What afflictions must be cut off in order to arise (this Samadhi)? Afflictions of view must be cut off in order to arise this Samadhi. Ordinary beings (Prthagjana, common people) cannot subdue and extinguish the mind and mental factors severed by the path of seeing in Bhavagra (the peak of existence). The afflictions of view in the lower eight grounds cannot be subdued, let alone the realm of neither perception nor non-perception (Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana, the Samadhi above the realm of nothingness). This is based on the place where it is necessary to subdue and cut off at the end. It is said according to the ultimate place of the path of severance on which this Samadhi depends, not saying that ordinary beings in the lower grounds can subdue (afflictions of view). This Samadhi is very subtle, and subtle means superior. It is necessary to attain the two emptinesses (Dvaishunyata, emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena), and the corresponding Prsthalabdha-jnana (wisdom attained after attaining fundamental wisdom) can evoke (this Samadhi). It means that practitioners of the two vehicles (Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana, Hearer Vehicle and Solitary Buddha Vehicle) only attain the emptiness of self, and Prsthalabdha-jnana can guide Bodhisattvas and Buddhas to enter (the emptiness of phenomena). Prsthalabdha-jnana of the two emptinesses can guide them to enter.

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后得各別故。言隨應后得智所引發故　有言法空必無遊觀能入此定者。不然。此文正故。

上來已明見惑訖。次下明修惑。

論。有義下八地至皆得後起。

述曰。下明修惑有二。初明二乘。后明菩薩。二乘中有二。初異說。后問答。此初師說。唯除非想下八地修惑。要全斷欲界者。余上八地或伏或斷方起此定。以欲界必須斷者。地獄煩惱種。有二性不善．無記。言繁雜者。繁多雜亂義。此俱定障障定強故。上界煩惱一性不多故可伏得。其非想處斷與不斷皆極成。故下七不定。又何不斷六品等初二果人得者。世親攝論第三云。唯說不還等五人得故。即上八地四禪無色皆得後起。欲界初修。故五十三亦說。有學入者謂不還。無學入者謂俱分解脫。故初二果不得入　若爾對法第九四句中第二句。謂聖者已得第四靜慮。不求生無色能入此定。不言已得初定等如何通　答彼不言唯依得第四定。復不遮下三定未斷不得故有何妨。

論。有義要斷至皆得後起。

述曰。此第二師說。下之三定。及欲四地惑。種要須斷盡。余上五地惑伏．或斷方能入此定。下三定等中定障。苦．樂等變異受俱惑種。障定強故。如不動無為不依下地立。說即初起唯欲界。後起除三定通上五地皆得。即以第十對法四句為證

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為隨後獲得了各自不同的緣故。這是說，隨應于（禪定）之後所獲得的智慧所引發的緣故。有人說，如果證得了法空，就一定沒有遊觀的能力，也就不能進入這個禪定。不是這樣的，這個說法是正確的。

上面已經闡明了見惑（通過見解產生的迷惑）的內容。接下來闡明修惑（通過修行產生的迷惑）。

論：有一種觀點認為，從下八地（指欲界、色界和無色界的部分地）開始，都可以獲得後起智。

述曰：下面闡明修惑，分為兩部分。首先闡明二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘），然後闡明菩薩乘。二乘中又分為兩種，首先是不同的說法，然後是問答。這是第一種師的說法，除了無想定之外，下八地的修惑，必須要完全斷除欲界的煩惱，其餘的上八地，或者伏藏或者斷除，才能生起這個禪定。因為欲界必須斷除，地獄的煩惱種子，具有二性，即不善和無記。之所以說繁雜，是因為繁多雜亂的意思。這些都成為禪定的障礙，因為障礙的力量很強。上界的煩惱只有一種性質，數量不多，所以可以伏藏。至於非想處，斷與不斷都是極端的例子。因此，下七地的情況不確定。另外，為什麼不斷除六品等，而只有初果和二果的人才能獲得呢？世親在《攝大乘論》第三卷中說：『只說不還等五種人才能獲得。』也就是說，上八地的四禪和無色定都可以獲得後起智。欲界是初修，所以五十三也這樣說。有學入定指的是不還，無學入定指的是俱分解脫。所以初果和二果不能進入。

如果這樣的話，對法第九卷四句中的第二句，說的是聖者已經獲得了第四靜慮，不求生無色界，能夠進入這個禪定。沒有說已經獲得了初禪等，這該如何解釋呢？回答說，那裡沒有說只能依靠獲得第四禪定，也沒有阻止下三禪沒有斷除就不能獲得，所以有什麼妨礙呢？

論：有一種觀點認為，必須要斷除下三定（初禪、二禪、三禪）以及欲界的四地（四惡趣）的煩惱種子，其餘的上五地（四禪天和無色界）的煩惱，或者伏藏或者斷除，才能進入這個禪定。下三定等中的禪定障礙，苦、樂等的變異感受以及煩惱種子，障礙禪定的力量很強。就像不動無為，不依靠下地而建立一樣。也就是說，最初生起只能在欲界，後起除了三禪定之外，通往上五地都可以獲得。這就是用第十卷《對法》中的四句作為證明。

【English Translation】 English version: It is because of subsequently attaining each difference. It means that it is caused by the wisdom that arises after responding to (the samadhi). Some say that if one has attained the emptiness of phenomena, one certainly does not have the ability to wander and observe, and thus cannot enter this samadhi. That is not the case; this statement is correct.

The above has already clarified the delusions of view (delusions arising from views). Next, it clarifies the delusions of cultivation (delusions arising from practice).

Treatise: One view holds that from the lower eight grounds (referring to parts of the Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm) onwards, one can attain subsequent arising wisdom.

Commentary: Below, the delusions of cultivation are clarified in two parts. First, the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) are clarified, and then the Bodhisattva Vehicle is clarified. Within the Two Vehicles, there are two parts: first, different views, and then questions and answers. This is the first teacher's view: except for the state of 'no perception,' the delusions of cultivation in the lower eight grounds require the complete cutting off of the afflictions of the Desire Realm. The remaining upper eight grounds, either suppressing or cutting off, can then give rise to this samadhi. Because the Desire Realm must be cut off, the seeds of afflictions in the lower realm have two natures: unwholesome and neutral. The reason for saying 'complex' is because it means numerous and chaotic. These all become obstacles to samadhi because the power of the obstacles is strong. The afflictions of the upper realm have only one nature and are not numerous, so they can be suppressed. As for the state of 'neither perception nor non-perception,' whether it is cut off or not is an extreme case. Therefore, the situation in the lower seven grounds is uncertain. Also, why not cut off the six grades, etc., and only those who have attained the first and second fruits can attain it? Vasubandhu says in the third volume of the 'Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle': 'It is only said that those who do not return, etc., can attain it.' That is to say, the four dhyanas and formless samadhis of the upper eight grounds can all attain subsequent arising wisdom. The Desire Realm is the initial cultivation, so fifty-three also say this. Those who enter with learning refer to those who do not return, and those who enter without learning refer to those who are liberated by both divisions. Therefore, those who have attained the first and second fruits cannot enter.

If that is the case, in the second sentence of the four sentences in the ninth volume of 'Abhidharma,' it says that the sage has already attained the fourth dhyana and does not seek to be born in the Formless Realm, and can enter this samadhi. It does not say that one has already attained the first dhyana, etc. How should this be explained? The answer is that it does not say that one can only rely on attaining the fourth dhyana, nor does it prevent one from not being able to attain it if the lower three dhyanas have not been cut off, so what is the obstacle?

Treatise: One view holds that one must cut off the seeds of afflictions of the lower three dhyanas (first dhyana, second dhyana, third dhyana) and the four grounds of the Desire Realm (the four evil destinies). The remaining afflictions of the upper five grounds (the four dhyana heavens and the Formless Realm), either suppressed or cut off, can then enter this samadhi. The obstacles to samadhi in the lower three dhyanas, etc., the changing feelings of suffering, pleasure, etc., and the seeds of afflictions, have a strong power to obstruct samadhi. Just like immobility and non-action, which are not established by relying on the lower grounds. That is to say, the initial arising can only be in the Desire Realm, and the subsequent arising, except for the three dhyanas, can be attained in all the upper five grounds. This is using the four sentences in the tenth volume of 'Abhidharma' as proof.

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。此中第二師為勝。文正證故。亦有理故。有人慾明初二果伏得此定者。不然。論不說故。又粗定障尚未斷盡。如何能入。亦應于彼建立身證。證九定故。如對法第二抄解熏禪難等。

論。若伏下惑至卻斷下失。

述曰。此第二問答分別。薩婆多者。問前二師。若伏隨應何地之惑。后得此定者。將命終之時。不以無漏道斷其種子。而復不退起其煩惱。當既命終生非想上地。卻斷隨應所伏之惑種也。

論。斷亦無失至俱生惑故。

述曰。論主初且理抑橫生異義。卻斷亦無失。如何等。如生上二界。卻斷下第七中惑。以必金剛心方斷故。

后正義解。

論。然不還者至卻斷下失。

述曰。此第三果對治道強。以欲界治道皆圓滿故。非初二果。正潤生位。不起現行煩惱潤生。此第三果但由惑種潤生上地。此意即是所已伏種雖退不退。但必唯以隨眠潤生。而無伏下生上地義。即雖已伏猶有種故。未無漏道斷處受生故。五十九說。以隨眠潤生。謂見諦者。大論第一。對法第五說。初二果亦以現行潤生。唯不還者以種子潤。顯五十九說見諦者唯第三果也。若爾異生應唯種子潤。如對法第三抄。然異生現行潤。六行不伏愛等現有。既得生上聖者種子潤。雖有其種應生上界。以異生潤藉伴

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於這個問題，第二位老師的觀點更勝一籌，因為文正（Wen Zheng）已經證實了這一點，而且也符合邏輯。有人想說明初果（Sotapanna，須陀洹）和二果（Sakadagamin，斯陀含）可以通過伏惑而獲得這種禪定，但這是不對的，因為論典中沒有這樣說。而且，粗重的禪定障礙尚未完全斷除，如何能夠進入這種禪定呢？也應該在他們那裡建立身證（kaya-saksi，以身證得），因為他們證得了九次第定。正如《對法》（Abhidharma）第二抄解中關於熏禪的難題等。

論：如果伏斷地獄之惑，直至斷除地獄之失。

述曰：這是第二個問答，用以分別。薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的學者問前兩位老師，如果通過伏惑而獲得這種禪定，那麼應該伏斷哪個層次的惑？如果有人在臨終時，不以無漏道斷除其惑的種子，而且煩惱也不會退轉生起，那麼當他命終后，生到非想非非想處天（Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana），卻斷除了隨其所伏的惑的種子。

論：斷除也不會有失，因為是俱生惑的緣故。

述曰：論主首先從道理上否定了橫生出來的不同觀點，斷除也不會有失。例如，如果生到上二界（色界和無色界），卻斷除了地獄第七品中的惑，因為必定要用金剛心（vajropama-samadhi，金剛喻定）才能斷除。

之後是正義的解釋。

論：然而，不還果（Anagamin，阿那含）的對治道力強大，直至斷除地獄之失。

述曰：這是第三果（不還果）的對治道力強大，因為對治欲界的道力都已經圓滿了，而不是初果和二果。初果和二果仍然會以煩惱的現行來潤生，而第三果只是通過惑的種子來潤生上界。這個意思是說，即使已經伏斷的種子，退不退轉，但必定只能通過隨眠（anusaya，煩惱的潛在狀態）來潤生，而沒有伏斷地獄之惑而生到上界的道理。也就是說，即使已經伏斷，仍然有種子存在，因為還沒有用無漏道斷除，所以會在那個地方受生。《五十九說》中說，以隨眠潤生，指的是見諦者（dṛṣṭi-satya，證悟真理者）。《大論》（Mahavibhasa）第一卷，《對法》第五卷中說，初果和二果也以現行潤生，只有不還果以種子潤生，這表明《五十九說》中說的見諦者只是指第三果。如果這樣，那麼異生（bāla-pṛthagjana，凡夫）應該只是以種子潤生，正如《對法》第三抄中所說。然而，異生是以現行潤生，因為六行不伏，愛等煩惱仍然存在。既然已經生到上界的聖者是以種子潤生，那麼即使有種子，也應該生到上界，因為異生的潤生需要伴侶。

【English Translation】 English version: In this matter, the second teacher's view is superior, because Wen Zheng has testified to this, and it is also logical. Some people want to explain that the first fruit (Sotapanna) and the second fruit (Sakadagamin) can obtain this samadhi through subduing afflictions, but this is not correct, because the treatises do not say so. Moreover, the coarse samadhi obstacles have not yet been completely cut off, how can one enter this samadhi? It should also be established in them the body-witness (kaya-saksi), because they have attained the nine successive samadhis. As in the second commentary of the Abhidharma, regarding the difficulties of perfuming meditation, etc.

Treatise: If one subdues the afflictions of the lower realm, until one cuts off the faults of the lower realm.

Commentary: This is the second question and answer, used for differentiation. The Sarvastivadins ask the first two teachers, if one obtains this samadhi through subduing afflictions, then which level of afflictions should be subdued? If someone, at the time of death, does not cut off the seeds of their afflictions with the non-outflow path, and the afflictions do not regress and arise, then when they die, they are born in the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (Nevasaññānāsaññāyatana), but cut off the seeds of the afflictions that they have subdued.

Treatise: Cutting off will also not be a loss, because it is due to the co-arisen afflictions.

Commentary: The author of the treatise first refutes the different views that arise horizontally from the perspective of reason, cutting off will also not be a loss. For example, if one is born in the upper two realms (the Form Realm and the Formless Realm), but cuts off the seventh grade of afflictions in the lower realm, because one must use the diamond-like samadhi (vajropama-samadhi) to cut them off.

Afterwards is the explanation of the correct meaning.

Treatise: However, the non-returner (Anagamin) has a strong counteractive path, until they cut off the faults of the lower realm.

Commentary: This is because the counteractive path of the third fruit (Anagamin) is strong, because the counteractive paths for dealing with the desire realm are all complete, and not like the first and second fruits. The first and second fruits still use the active manifestation of afflictions to moisten birth, while the third fruit only uses the seeds of afflictions to moisten birth in the upper realm. This means that even if the seeds that have been subdued regress or do not regress, they must only moisten birth through latent tendencies (anusaya), and there is no principle of subduing the afflictions of the lower realm and being born in the upper realm. That is to say, even if they have been subdued, there are still seeds, because they have not been cut off with the non-outflow path, so they will be born in that place. The Fifty-Nine Sayings says that moistening birth with latent tendencies refers to those who have seen the truth (dṛṣṭi-satya). The first volume of the Mahavibhasa and the fifth volume of the Abhidharma say that the first and second fruits also moisten birth with active manifestations, only the non-returner moistens birth with seeds, which shows that the Fifty-Nine Sayings refers only to the third fruit. If so, then ordinary beings (bāla-pṛthagjana) should only moisten birth with seeds, as stated in the third commentary of the Abhidharma. However, ordinary beings moisten birth with active manifestations, because the six practices are not subdued, and afflictions such as attachment still exist. Since the saints who have been born in the upper realms moisten birth with seeds, then even if there are seeds, they should be born in the upper realms, because the moistening of birth for ordinary beings requires companions.

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。雖有愛等。無餘惑伴得生上。聖潤不藉伴。有種不上生。以聖者善業必決定故唯種子生。異生不然。故通現潤。不爾聖種應強異生。然不還者如處不還。一地之中有三天處等。下處死生上處亦以現行潤。以此生地治道未滿。如初二果。瑜伽但生他地為論。今此若約生他地者必唯種潤。然應四句分別。有在上斷下惑。如二乘者上界得無學斷下第七惑。有在下斷上惑。下地得初果斷上見惑等。餘二句可知　然不動無為。想受滅無為。依斷受建立。擇滅一分。若伏下八地或五地得此定。即不得二無為。非是擇滅故。前來已說二乘定性學無學訖。

論。若諸菩薩至能起此定。

述曰。下文第二明菩薩修惑。隨何者先二乘已得此定。后迴心即得定者。非非身證惠解脫等。即一切地三大劫中能入此定。

論。若不爾者至滅盡定故。

述曰。若頓悟菩薩義即不定。或有一類七地究竟滿心。方伏一切三界六識中煩惱盡已能入。前入住心等猶未能故。雖未永斷欲界修惑。而如已斷者能起此定。即攝論說菩薩后得智中起煩惱者不為過失。如已斷者。論說已入遠地菩薩方起此定。六十二卷說。遠地者即第七遠行地故。

論。有從初地至滅盡定故。

述曰。復有頓悟決定性人。有從初地即能伏一切煩惱

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：即使有愛等煩惱，如果沒有其他迷惑的伴隨，也能往生到上界。聖者往生上界不需要煩惱的伴隨，因為只有善業的種子才能使他們往生。異生（凡夫）則不然，所以需要煩惱的現行和滋潤。否則，聖者的種子應該被異生所影響。然而，不還果（Anāgāmin）的聖者，就像在某個地方不會再回來一樣。在一個地界中，可能有三天等處所。在較低的處所死去，往生到較高的處所，也需要煩惱的現行來滋潤，因為他們在這個生地的修行還沒有圓滿，就像初果（Sotāpanna）和二果（Sakadāgāmin）的聖者一樣。《瑜伽師地論》只討論往生到其他地界的情況，如果這裡也按照往生到其他地界的情況來說，那麼一定只有種子才能滋潤往生。然而，應該用四句來分別：有在上界斷除地獄迷惑的，比如二乘（聲聞和緣覺）的聖者，在上界證得無學果，斷除了地獄第七識的迷惑；有在地獄斷除上界迷惑的，比如在下地證得初果，斷除了上界的見惑等。其餘兩句可以類推得知。然而，不動無為和想受滅無為，是依據斷除受而建立的，是擇滅（Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）的一部分。如果通過降伏下八地或者五地的煩惱而得到這種禪定，就不能得到這兩種無為，因為它們不是擇滅。前面已經說完了二乘的定性有學和無學果位。 論：如果菩薩能夠發起這種禪定。 述曰：下文第二部分說明菩薩如何修習煩惱。無論哪種情況先發生，如果二乘已經得到這種禪定，後來回心轉意成為菩薩，就能得到這種禪定，而不是非身證慧解脫等。也就是說，在一切地界的三大阿僧祇劫中，菩薩都能進入這種禪定。 論：如果不是這樣，就會導致滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti）的定義出現問題。 述曰：如果頓悟的菩薩，意義就不確定了。或者有一類菩薩，在七地究竟圓滿時，才降伏一切三界六識中的煩惱，然後才能進入這種禪定。因為之前入住心等的時候，還不能做到。雖然還沒有永遠斷除欲界的修惑，但是就像已經斷除一樣，能夠發起這種禪定。也就是說，《攝大乘論》說菩薩在後得智中生起煩惱，不是過失，就像已經斷除煩惱一樣。論中說，已經進入遠地（Dūraṅgama-bhūmi）的菩薩才能發起這種禪定。第六十二卷說，遠地就是第七遠行地。 論：有從初地（Pramuditā-bhūmi）就能進入滅盡定的。 述曰：還有頓悟的決定性菩薩，有從初地就能降伏一切煩惱的。

【English Translation】 English version: Even with afflictions like attachment, one can be reborn in higher realms if not accompanied by other delusions. Saints do not need the accompaniment of afflictions to be reborn in higher realms, because only the seeds of wholesome karma enable their rebirth. Ordinary beings (prithagjana) are not like that, so they need the manifestation and nourishment of afflictions. Otherwise, the seeds of saints should be influenced by ordinary beings. However, Anāgāmins (non-returners) are like those who do not return to a certain place. Within one realm, there may be places like the Trayastriṃśa Heaven. Dying in a lower place and being reborn in a higher place also requires the nourishment of manifest afflictions, because their practice in that realm is not yet complete, just like Sotāpannas (stream-enterers) and Sakadāgāmins (once-returners). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra only discusses rebirth in other realms. If we also discuss rebirth in other realms here, then only seeds can nourish rebirth. However, four possibilities should be distinguished: some eradicate lower realm afflictions while in a higher realm, such as Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas who attain Arhatship in higher realms and eradicate the seventh consciousness's afflictions of the lower realm; some eradicate higher realm afflictions while in a lower realm, such as attaining Sotāpanna in a lower realm and eradicating the view-afflictions of the higher realm. The remaining two possibilities can be inferred. However, the immovable unconditioned (āniñjya-asaṃskṛta) and the cessation of perception and feeling unconditioned (saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha-asaṃskṛta) are established based on the cessation of feeling and are a part of Pratisamkhya-nirodha (cessation through wisdom). If one attains this samādhi by subduing the afflictions of the lower eight or five realms, one cannot attain these two unconditioned states because they are not Pratisamkhya-nirodha. We have already finished discussing the fixed-nature learners and non-learners of the Two Vehicles. Treatise: If Bodhisattvas are able to initiate this samādhi. Commentary: The second part below explains how Bodhisattvas cultivate afflictions. Whichever comes first, if the Two Vehicles have already attained this samādhi and later turn their minds to become Bodhisattvas, they can attain this samādhi, not just those who have attained non-body-witnessing wisdom liberation, etc. That is to say, in the three great asaṃkhyeya-kalpas of all realms, Bodhisattvas can enter this samādhi. Treatise: If not, it would cause problems with the definition of Nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment). Commentary: If Bodhisattvas have sudden enlightenment, the meaning becomes uncertain. Or there are some Bodhisattvas who, when the seventh bhūmi is completely fulfilled, subdue all the afflictions in the six consciousnesses of the three realms, and then can enter this samādhi, because they could not do so before when residing in the mind, etc. Although they have not permanently eradicated the afflictions of cultivation in the desire realm, they can initiate this samādhi as if they have already eradicated them. That is to say, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that it is not a fault for Bodhisattvas to generate afflictions in the subsequent wisdom, just like those who have already eradicated afflictions. The treatise says that Bodhisattvas who have already entered the Dūraṅgama-bhūmi (gone afar ground) can initiate this samādhi. The sixty-second fascicle says that the Dūraṅgama-bhūmi is the seventh Dūraṅgama-bhūmi. Treatise: Some can enter Nirodha-samāpatti from the Pramuditā-bhūmi (joyful ground). Commentary: There are also Bodhisattvas of sudden enlightenment with a fixed nature who can subdue all afflictions from the Pramuditā-bhūmi.

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。如前第三卷。引即對法第十四卷說。此菩薩十地中皆能起此定。十卷入楞伽第七入道品初。及十地經第八卷。第九地中。說前六地中亦能入此定故。即十地菩薩。有起煩惱。謂悲增上者。有不起煩惱。謂智增上者　又解或雖悲．智等。而所樂行不同。一怖故伏惑恐為失。一不怖故起利生故。或伏或不伏有此差別　如地前回心入大乘位。有先得此定者。有不得者。有聖者者。有凡夫者故。即成佛者。先已成就故。至佛時由先無始成就滅定種子故。今初成佛即名為得。圓滿成故　若隨二師三乘分別。約地根性或九品定不定者。得定人數皆如理思　又解瑜伽第十二說。入此定有二。一依非想處相。二依無想界相。成業論云。有二因緣能入滅定。謂如前引。楞伽第七云。謂前六地中共聲聞等緣有為行等。乃至廣說能入此定。於七地中能唸唸入此定。能離諸法有無想故。瑜伽四十八同楞伽說。對法第十三等亦說。無想行菩薩。謂住遠行地菩薩。能令諸相不現行故。今準此等經論文。若決定性決定已得。通論位次即十地皆得。如楞伽說。初地等能入此定。共聲聞等緣有為行。即是大論．成業。依非想處相入此定。但厭非想處心故。名緣有為行。若入七地滿心。能唸唸入此定。行無相行緣無相界入此定故。不共前六地。聲聞等行相

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如前文第三卷所引，即《對法》第十四卷所說，此菩薩在十地中皆能入此定（滅盡定，一種甚深的禪定）。《入楞伽經》第七入道品初，以及《十地經》第八卷，第九地中，都說前六地中也能入此定。因此，十地菩薩，有的會生起煩惱，這是因為悲心增上的緣故；有的不會生起煩惱，這是因為智慧增上的緣故。 又有一種解釋，或者雖然悲心和智慧等同，但所樂於修行的不同。一種是因為怖畏而伏藏惑業，恐怕失去；一種是不怖畏而生起利益眾生的心。或者伏藏，或者不伏藏，有這樣的差別。如同從地前回心轉入大乘位，有的先得到此定，有的沒有得到；有的是聖者，有的是凡夫。即將來成佛的人，先前已經成就此定。到了成佛時，由於先前無始以來成就的滅定種子，現在初成佛時就名為得到，因為圓滿成就的緣故。 如果按照二師（指唯識宗的護法和難陀二大論師）和三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）分別，根據地的根性或者九品定不定等情況來分析，得到此定的人數都可以如理思維。 又一種解釋，《瑜伽師地論》第十二卷說，入此定有兩種方式：一是依非想非非想處相（色界頂層天）而入，二是依無想界相（無色界天）而入。《成業論》說，有兩種因緣能夠入滅盡定，如同前面所引。《楞伽經》第七卷說，前六地菩薩與聲聞等共同修習緣有為行等，乃至廣說能夠入此定。在第七地中能夠唸唸入此定，能夠遠離諸法有無之想。瑜伽第四十八卷與《楞伽經》所說相同。《對法》第十三卷等也說，無想行菩薩，即住在遠行地（第五地）的菩薩，能夠令諸相不現行。現在根據這些經文和論典，如果決定性的菩薩決定已經得到此定，通論位次，即十地菩薩都可得到，如《楞伽經》所說，初地等菩薩能夠入此定，與聲聞等共同修習緣有為行，即是大論和《成業論》所說的依非想非非想處相入此定。只是厭離非想非非想處的心，所以名為緣有為行。如果入七地滿心，能夠唸唸入此定，修習無相行，緣無相界入此定，不與前六地聲聞等行相相同。

【English Translation】 English version: As quoted in the previous Volume 3, that is, as stated in the fourteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma), this Bodhisattva can enter this Samadhi (extinction Samadhi, a very deep meditation) in all ten Bhumis (grounds or levels of a Bodhisattva). The beginning of the seventh chapter on entering the path in the Lankavatara Sutra (Descent into Lanka Sutra), and the eighth volume of the Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Grounds Sutra), in the ninth Bhumi, both say that one can enter this Samadhi in the first six Bhumis. Therefore, some Bodhisattvas in the ten Bhumis will generate afflictions, because of the increase of compassion; some will not generate afflictions, because of the increase of wisdom. Another explanation is that, although compassion and wisdom are equal, what they enjoy practicing is different. One is to subdue the afflictions because of fear, fearing loss; one is to generate the mind of benefiting sentient beings without fear. There is such a difference between subduing or not subduing. Just like turning the mind back to enter the Mahayana position from the previous ground, some get this Samadhi first, some do not; some are sages, some are ordinary people. That is, those who will become Buddhas in the future have already achieved this Samadhi. When they become Buddhas, because of the seeds of extinction Samadhi achieved from the beginningless past, it is now called attainment when they first become Buddhas, because of the perfect achievement. If we analyze according to the two masters (referring to the two great masters of the Yogacara school, Dharmapala and Nanda) and the Three Vehicles (Sravaka Vehicle, Pratyekabuddha Vehicle, Bodhisattva Vehicle) separately, according to the nature of the ground or the nine grades of certainty or uncertainty, the number of people who have attained this Samadhi can be reasonably considered. Another explanation is that the twelfth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Stages of Yoga Practice) says that there are two ways to enter this Samadhi: one is to enter based on the aspect of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (the highest heaven in the Realm of Form), and the other is to enter based on the aspect of the Realm of Non-Perception (the Realm of Formlessness). The Cheng Ye Lun says that there are two causes and conditions that can enter the extinction Samadhi, as quoted above. The seventh volume of the Lankavatara Sutra says that the Bodhisattvas in the first six Bhumis practice conditioned actions together with the Sravakas, etc., and so on, and can enter this Samadhi. In the seventh Bhumi, one can enter this Samadhi moment by moment, and can be free from the thought of existence or non-existence of all dharmas. The forty-eighth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says the same as the Lankavatara Sutra. The thirteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, etc., also says that the Bodhisattva who practices non-perception, that is, the Bodhisattva who lives in the Duramgama Bhumi (Fifth Ground), can prevent all appearances from manifesting. Now, according to these sutras and treatises, if the decisive Bodhisattva has definitely attained this Samadhi, generally speaking, all the Bodhisattvas in the ten Bhumis can attain it, as the Lankavatara Sutra says, the Bodhisattvas in the first Bhumi, etc., can enter this Samadhi, and practice conditioned actions together with the Sravakas, etc., that is, as the Great Treatise and the Cheng Ye Lun say, enter this Samadhi based on the aspect of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception. It is only because they are disgusted with the mind of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception that it is called practicing conditioned actions. If one enters the seventh Bhumi with a full mind, one can enter this Samadhi moment by moment, practice the non-appearance practice, and enter this Samadhi based on the Realm of Non-Appearance, which is not the same as the practice of the Sravakas in the first six Bhumis.

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故。即大論六十二。據唸唸能入緣無相涅槃相。不共聲聞等。即說遠行地方能入此定。楞伽據定得。即十地皆得。無相違故。雖瑜伽八十說入無餘依緣無相界入此滅定。此之相分亦有為相。似無相界非真得彼。任運起無違。故大論第十二說。問入此定不分別我當入等。乃至廣說。既無作意云何能入出此定。答先於心善修故。乃至任運能入出。隨其自在未自在者何心皆出。又說出定時觸三種觸。謂不動觸．無所有觸．無相觸。緣三種境。一有境．二境境．三滅境等。如樞要說。此無心二定顯數滅心所多少。唯二十二。一是心王故　問非有漏心別境五皆起。如何唯二十二　答有漏此不俱行相別故。無漏可然。一曾得．未曾得。佛於何時得。謂余分別如對法抄。即楞伽第八．大論十二．五十三．五十六．六十二．八十．對法第二．第五．第十．第十三．顯揚第一．十地論第八卷．五蘊．成業。出定由先期愿。共為此證。

自下第三解重睡．悶。

論。無心睡眠至皆不現行。

述曰。謂有極重睡眠。極重悶絕。即睡是心數。今無此數數不行故名極重睡。有疲極等緣。令睡得有有心之時名為睡眠。此令無心故名極重睡。大論第一說。悶絕是意不共業。即由悶時唯有意識。非悶即心所法。以觸末摩有悶生故。悶

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，根據《大智度論》第六十二卷，（滅盡定）依據唸唸能入緣無相涅槃之相，不與聲聞等（二乘）共通。也就是說，在遠行地（菩薩）才能進入此定。《楞伽經》認為，依據禪定而得（滅盡定），即十地菩薩皆可得（滅盡定），因為沒有相違之處。雖然《瑜伽師地論》第八十卷說，進入無餘依緣無相界才能入此滅定，但此處的相分仍是有為之相，類似無相界，並非真正獲得彼（滅盡定）。任運而起沒有違背。所以《大智度論》第十二卷說，有人問：『入此定不分別我當入等』，乃至廣說。既然沒有作意，如何能入出此定？答：『先前於心善修故』，乃至任運能入出，隨其自在。未自在者，任何心皆可出（此定）。又說，出定時觸三種觸，謂不動觸、無所有觸、無相觸，緣三種境：一有境、二境境、三滅境等，如《樞要》所說。此無心二定（滅盡定和無想定）顯示數滅的心所多少，只有二十二個。一是心王（阿賴耶識），故。 問：非有漏心別境五皆起，如何唯二十二？答：有漏心與此（滅盡定）不俱行，相別故。無漏心可以這樣說。一曾得、未曾得。佛於何時得（滅盡定）？謂余分別如《對法》抄。即《楞伽經》第八卷、《大智度論》第十二、五十三、五十六、六十二、八十卷、《對法》第二、第五、第十、第十三卷、《顯揚》第一卷、《十地論》第八卷、《五蘊》、《成業》。出定由先期愿，共同為此作證。 下面第三部分解釋重睡、悶絕。 論：無心睡眠至皆不現行。 述曰：謂有極重睡眠，極重悶絕。即睡是心數。今無此數，數不行故名極重睡。有疲極等緣，令睡得有有心之時名為睡眠。此令無心故名極重睡。《大智度論》第一卷說，悶絕是意不共業。即由悶時唯有意識，非悶即心所法。以觸末摩有悶生故。悶

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, according to the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra (大智度論) sixty-second fascicle, (the Nirodha-samapatti) relies on the aspect of entering Nirvana without characteristics moment by moment, and is not shared by Sravakas (聲聞) and others (the two vehicles). That is to say, only those on the Far-Going Ground (遠行地) (Bodhisattvas) can enter this Samadhi. The Lankavatara Sutra (楞伽經) believes that it is obtained based on Samadhi, that is, Bodhisattvas of the Ten Grounds can all obtain (Nirodha-samapatti), because there is no contradiction. Although the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) eightieth fascicle says that one can enter this cessation Samadhi only by entering the realm of no remainder based on the characteristicless realm, the aspect here is still a conditioned aspect, similar to the characteristicless realm, and not truly obtaining it. Arising spontaneously without violation. Therefore, the twelfth fascicle of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra says that someone asked: 'Entering this Samadhi does not distinguish 'I am about to enter' etc.', and so on. Since there is no intention, how can one enter and exit this Samadhi? The answer is: 'Because of good cultivation in the mind beforehand', and so on, one can enter and exit spontaneously, freely. Those who are not free can exit (this Samadhi) with any mind. It also says that when exiting Samadhi, one touches three kinds of touch, namely immovable touch, non-existent touch, and characteristicless touch, and is associated with three kinds of realms: one with a realm, two with a realm of realms, and three with a realm of cessation, as stated in the Essentials. These two mindlessness Samadhis (Nirodha-samapatti and Asamjni-samapatti) show the number of extinguished mental factors, only twenty-two. One is the mind-king (Alaya-vijnana), therefore. Question: If the five specific mental factors of afflicted minds all arise, how can there be only twenty-two? Answer: Afflicted minds do not coexist with this (Nirodha-samapatti), because their characteristics are different. This can be said of non-afflicted minds. One has obtained it, one has not obtained it. When did the Buddha obtain (Nirodha-samapatti)? The remaining distinctions are like the notes in the Abhidharma. That is, the eighth fascicle of the Lankavatara Sutra, the twelfth, fifty-third, fifty-sixth, sixty-second, and eightieth fascicles of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra, the second, fifth, tenth, and thirteenth fascicles of the Abhidharma, the first fascicle of the Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma, the eighth fascicle of the Dasabhumika-sastra (十地論), Five Aggregates, and Karma Formation. Exiting Samadhi is due to prior aspiration, which together serves as evidence for this. The third part below explains heavy sleep and fainting. Treatise: Mindlessness sleep to all not manifest. Commentary: It refers to extremely heavy sleep and extremely heavy fainting. That is, sleep is a mental factor. Now there is no such factor, so it is called extremely heavy sleep because the factor does not function. There are causes such as extreme fatigue that allow sleep to exist when there is a mind, which is called sleep. This causes mindlessness, so it is called extremely heavy sleep. The first fascicle of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra says that fainting is a non-common karma of the mind. That is, only consciousness exists during fainting, and non-fainting is a mental dharma. Because fainting arises from touching the marma points. Fainting

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即觸處悶也。然由此觸引身份位。或唯有意名意不共業。或引無心即此中極重悶攝。為簡有心故名極重悶　何故無別悶心所也　答若無風熱等緣而起悶絕。可是心所。既由風熱等緣引身份位故。無悶心所法也。不如睡心所能引分位生。不可為例。

論。疲極等緣至名極重睡眠。

述曰。對法第一云。謂羸瘦．疲倦．身份沉重．思惟闇相。舍諸所作。串習睡眠。或他咒術．神力所引。動扇涼風吹等故起。顯揚．五蘊各說有因緣。此如顯揚第一。故以疲極為首等取餘者。以六識俱不行故名為極重。所引身位者。謂睡無心時。即不自在相．沉重相．無心相。餘位不然。名身份位　問此既無心所眠。何名為眠。而此中。及大論無心地等說為眠也。

論。此睡眠時至故假說彼名。

述曰。此有二解。一由。二似。雖此眠時無彼心所眠體。而由彼加行眠引。或沉重不自在。似有彼眠心所時。以二義故假說無心身之分位。名眠。實非眠也。

論。風熱等緣至名極重悶絕。

述曰。大論第一云。由風熱淡等。他咒術神力所引。寫過量。出血故。故今言等。然此無別數法。不可言由彼似彼。此即悶故。

論。或此俱是觸處少分。

述曰。然悶有身覺．不覺時。謂若有心之時由悶觸故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 即是說，在接觸時會感到昏悶。然而，這種接觸會引發身體的某種狀態（身份位）。或者僅僅是意（mana，意識）所產生的，稱為『意不共業』（與他人不共享的業）。或者引發無心狀態，這其中最嚴重的昏悶也包含在內。爲了區分有心狀態，所以稱為『極重悶』。問題：為什麼沒有單獨的『悶』心所（caitta，心理活動）呢？回答：如果不是因為風、熱等外緣而引起的昏悶，或許可以認為是心所。既然是由風、熱等外緣引發的身體狀態，所以沒有『悶』這種心所法。這不像『睡』心所能夠引發身體狀態的產生，不能作為例子。

論：因為疲勞過度等原因，導致的狀態稱為『極重睡眠』。

述曰：《對法》（Abhidharma）第一卷說：『所謂身體虛弱、疲倦、身體沉重、思緒昏暗，捨棄一切所作，習慣於睡眠，或者被其他咒術、神力所引導，或者因為扇動涼風吹拂等原因而引起的睡眠。』《顯揚》（Yoga-bhumi）和《五蘊論》（Pancaskandha）各自說明了睡眠的因緣。這裡就像《顯揚》第一卷所說的那樣，所以以疲勞過度為首，幷包括其他原因。因為六識（sad-vijnana，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六種意識）都不活動，所以稱為『極重』。所引發的身體狀態是指，睡眠無心時，呈現出不自在相、沉重相、無心相等狀態。其他狀態則不是這樣，這被稱為身體狀態。問題：既然這裡沒有心所『眠』，為什麼稱為『眠』呢？而且在這裡，以及《大論》（Mahavibhasa）的『無心地』等篇章中，都說是『眠』呢？

論：因為睡眠的時間到了，所以假借使用那個名稱。

述曰：對此有兩種解釋。一是『由』，二是『似』。雖然在這個睡眠的時間裡，沒有那個心所『眠』的本體，但是由於那個加行『眠』的引發，或者因為沉重不自在，好像有那個『眠』心所的時候一樣。因為這兩種原因，所以假借稱呼無心的身體狀態為『眠』，實際上並不是真正的『眠』。

論：因為風、熱等原因，導致的狀態稱為『極重悶絕』。

述曰：《大論》第一卷說：『由於風、熱、痰等，或者被其他咒術、神力所引導，或者因為過度書寫、出血等原因。』所以現在說『等』。然而，這沒有單獨的數法（dharma，現象），不能說『由於彼』『相似彼』。這實際上就是昏悶。

論：或者這些都只是觸（sparsa，感覺）處（ayatana，處所）的少部分。

述曰：然而，昏悶有身體感覺和沒有感覺的時候。如果是有心的時候，是因為昏悶的觸覺的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version That is, one feels dullness upon contact. However, this contact induces a certain state of the body (kaya-sthana). Or it is merely produced by mana (mind), called 'mana-asamanya-karma' (karma not shared with others). Or it induces a state of mindlessness, and the most severe dullness is included within this. To distinguish it from the state of having a mind, it is called 'extreme dullness'. Question: Why is there no separate 'dullness' caitta (mental activity)? Answer: If the dullness did not arise from causes such as wind, heat, etc., it could be considered a caitta. Since it is induced by causes such as wind, heat, etc., causing a state of the body, there is no dharma (phenomenon) of 'dullness' as a caitta. It is not like the caitta of 'sleep' which can induce the arising of a bodily state, so it cannot be taken as an example.

Treatise: The state caused by extreme fatigue, etc., is called 'extreme sleep'.

Commentary: The first volume of the Abhidharma says: 'So-called weakness, fatigue, heaviness of the body, dim thoughts, abandoning all actions, habitual sleep, or being induced by other mantras, divine powers, or caused by fanning cool breezes, etc.' The Yoga-bhumi and Pancaskandha each explain the causes and conditions of sleep. Here, as stated in the first volume of the Yoga-bhumi, extreme fatigue is taken as the head, and other causes are included. Because the six vijnanas (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind consciousness) do not function, it is called 'extreme'. The induced bodily state refers to the state of being mindless during sleep, exhibiting the characteristics of discomfort, heaviness, and mindlessness. Other states are not like this, and this is called the bodily state. Question: Since there is no caitta 'sleep' here, why is it called 'sleep'? And here, as well as in the 'mindless state' sections of the Mahavibhasa, it is referred to as 'sleep'?

Treatise: Because the time for sleep has arrived, that name is used provisionally.

Commentary: There are two explanations for this. One is 'by', and the other is 'similar to'. Although there is no substance of that caitta 'sleep' at this time of sleep, it is induced by that preparatory action of 'sleep', or because of heaviness and discomfort, it is as if there is that caitta 'sleep'. Because of these two reasons, the mindless bodily state is provisionally called 'sleep', but it is not actually 'sleep'.

Treatise: The state caused by wind, heat, etc., is called 'extreme fainting'.

Commentary: The first volume of the Mahavibhasa says: 'Due to wind, heat, phlegm, etc., or being induced by other mantras, divine powers, or due to excessive writing, bleeding, etc.' Therefore, it now says 'etc.' However, there is no separate dharma (phenomenon) here, so it cannot be said 'due to that' 'similar to that'. This is actually dullness.

Treatise: Or these are all just a small part of the sparsa (feeling) ayatana (sense base).

Commentary: However, there are times when dullness has bodily sensation and times when it does not. If it is a time of having a mind, it is because of the feeling of dullness.

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引生無心時身之分位。即是悶觸之果體亦悶攝。是觸處少分　或有心之時。疲極等緣引眠起故。無心時身之分位眠。即是觸處疲之果故。體亦是疲。似眠位故名眠。又至無心位。雖有悶．疲二觸。唯第八境。微細不覺。故以為體。即總二言觸處少分。前別解二。即取無心分位隨所應現有色蘊為此二體。第二解以觸處少分為體。由觸引故。

此即別解六識起不起時訖。第三總結。

論。除斯五位意識恒起。

述曰。二無心定．無想天．及睡．悶二。除此五時。第六意恒起。緣恒具故。

論。正死生時至五位不行。

述曰。上來第二答五位訖。自下第三料簡五位有三。一問死生。二釋不說入無餘位。三解誰具。今此第一寄問寬狹攝法不盡。后約凡聖辨五有無。初中先問。后答。此即問也。一切正死生時亦無第六。何故但說五位無第六。應言七位故。

論。有義死生及與言顯。

述曰。第一師云。死生頌中別說。即有七種也。謂及字．與字二字中顯。及．與二言各顯一故。

論。彼說非理至悶絕位故。

述曰。第二師云。不然。以大論第十三但說六時名無心故。謂前五位。及二乘無餘依位。何以不爾。應說八位名無心。故應說死生二位。此五位中即悶絕中攝。以生

死苦逼極悶絕故　若爾頌何故說及與二言。

論。說及與言顯五無雜。

述曰。即一相違釋。間隔義故。

論。此顯六識至入無餘依。

述曰。雖六位說是無心。入無餘依頌中不說。此頌但說斷後復生故。不說彼第六識等入無餘位后永不生。此說生故。

下依凡聖以辨五位。

論。此五位中至無睡悶故。

述曰。異生四具。如文可知。聖唯有後三。除無想定．及天。唯異生得故。此則總說。其聖三中。佛．及第八地以去菩薩。唯得有一定。無睡眠．悶絕二。以惡法故。粗淺法故。現似有睡。實無有故。即二乘無學亦有悶絕也。此中三乘學無學．三界等分別皆如理思。三界皆有死．生悶絕。生．死皆無心故。不爾彼生．死有無心五攝不盡。

論。是故八識至識俱轉義。

述曰。如五十一．七十六說。上來已解三能變本頌訖。自下第二總為分別。于中有三。一明俱轉。二問答分別。三一異分別。此即初也。因辨六俱說八俱轉。文易可知。

論。若一有情至是一有情。

述曰。自下第二問答分別。于中有五問答大意。若別則六。此第一問也　情者識故。既有多識應是多情。即薩婆多等發智本師難。發智論說。云何不現在多識俱轉。答識是情。依識立情

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『死苦逼極悶絕故，若爾頌何故說及與二言。』 論：『說及與言顯五無雜。』 述曰：即一相違釋。間隔義故。 論：『此顯六識至入無餘依。』 述曰：雖六位說是無心。入無餘依頌中不說。此頌但說斷後復生故。不說彼第六識等入無餘位后永不生。此說生故。 下依凡聖以辨五位。 論：『此五位中至無睡悶故。』 述曰：異生四具。如文可知。聖唯有後三。除無想定（nirodha-samjña-samapatti，無想禪定）．及天。唯異生得故。此則總說。其聖三中。佛．及第八地以去菩薩。唯得有一定。無睡眠．悶絕二。以惡法故。粗淺法故。現似有睡。實無有故。即二乘無學亦有悶絕也。此中三乘學無學．三界等分別皆如理思。三界皆有死．生悶絕。生．死皆無心故。不爾彼生．死有無心五攝不盡。 論：『是故八識至識俱轉義。』 述曰：如五十一．七十六說。上來已解三能變本頌訖。自下第二總為分別。于中有三。一明俱轉。二問答分別。三一異分別。此即初也。因辨六俱說八俱轉。文易可知。 論：『若一有情至是一有情。』 述曰：自下第二問答分別。于中有五問答大意。若別則六。此第一問也　情者識故。既有多識應是多情。即薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）等發智本師難。發智論說。云何不現在多識俱轉。答識是情。依識立情

【English Translation】 English version 『Because of death, suffering, oppression, extreme suffocation, and fainting, why does the verse mention only two?』 Treatise: 『Mentioning 'and' reveals that the five are without mixture.』 Commentary: This is a contradictory explanation. Because of the meaning of separation. Treatise: 『This reveals that the six consciousnesses enter the state of no remainder.』 Commentary: Although the six states are said to be without mind, it is not mentioned in the verse on entering the state of no remainder. This verse only speaks of rebirth after cessation. It does not say that the sixth consciousness, etc., will never be reborn after entering the state of no remainder. This speaks of rebirth. Below, the five states are distinguished based on ordinary beings and sages. Treatise: 『Among these five states, there is no sleep or fainting.』 Commentary: Ordinary beings possess all four. As the text indicates. Sages only have the latter three, except for the Nirodha-samjña-samapatti (無想定, cessation of perception and sensation) and the heavens, which are only attained by ordinary beings. This is a general statement. Among the three states of sages, Buddhas and Bodhisattvas from the eighth ground onwards only have a fixed state. There is no sleep or fainting, because of evil dharmas and superficial dharmas. It appears as if there is sleep, but there is actually none. Even the Arhats (無學, those beyond learning) of the two vehicles (聲聞乘 and 緣覺乘) also experience fainting. The distinctions among the three vehicles (三乘), those with and without learning, and the three realms (三界) should be considered rationally. All three realms have death, birth, and fainting. Birth and death are without mind, otherwise, birth and death would not be fully encompassed by the five without mind. Treatise: 『Therefore, the eight consciousnesses have the meaning of simultaneous arising.』 Commentary: As stated in sections 51 and 76. The original verses on the three transformations have been explained above. Below, the second part is a general analysis, which has three parts: 1. Clarifying simultaneous arising; 2. Question and answer analysis; 3. Analysis of oneness and difference. This is the first part. Because of analyzing the six simultaneous arisings, it is said that the eight arise simultaneously. The text is easy to understand. Treatise: 『If one sentient being... is one sentient being.』 Commentary: Below, the second part is a question and answer analysis, which has five main questions and answers. If separated, there are six. This is the first question. Sentient being means consciousness. Since there are multiple consciousnesses, there should be multiple sentient beings. This is a difficulty raised by the Sarvastivada (薩婆多, the 'all exists' school) and others, the original teachers of the Jñānaprasthāna (發智論). The Jñānaprasthāna asks: Why do multiple consciousnesses not arise simultaneously in the present? The answer is that consciousness is sentient being. Sentient being is established based on consciousness.

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。不可一時有二識起故。此論文發智根本薩婆多義。

論主質曰。

論。若立有情至應非有情。

述曰。汝立有情依識多少。入無心定等位應非有情。以無識故。

論。又他分心至自分有情。

述曰。卻難外曰。如欲界有情。若上他界分。他無漏分心現在前位。如何可說自分欲界有情。乃至無色界亦爾。

既雙質已。今為正通。

論。然立有情至唯有一故。

述曰。依命根數順正理師義。情者是識。命根能有識名為有情。設無心時命根尚在能有前後識故。今則不然。能有現在第八情故。如前第一卷解。此共小乘所許為論。或有第八異熟識義。此不共所許。前第三云。唯依第八立有情故。初是種子假立。后是現行實法。依二多少立為有情。俱不違理。以一切時唯有一故。

次第二外難曰。

論。一身唯一至有多識轉。

述曰。一有情身一無間緣。如何俱時有多識轉。不爾一念多無間緣。

論。既許此一至能引多心。

述曰。下答有二。初質。后解。論主卻難云。如汝且許一眼識為緣。能引多心所果生。寧不許此一識為緣。引多異類後心俱起。非大乘中一引多識為無間緣。如前第五卷說。今且抑語。或此是前六識相望為緣師義。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為不可能在同一時間生起兩個識。這段論文闡述了《發智論》的根本，以及薩婆多部（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的教義。

論主質問說：

論：如果根據有情的識的數量來建立有情，那麼進入無心定等狀態的有情，應該不是有情。

述曰：你根據有情所具有的識的數量來建立有情，那麼當有情進入無心定等狀態時，因為沒有識，所以應該不是有情。

論：又，如果其他界分的心，對於自身所屬的有情來說，也算是自身所屬的有情。

述曰：反駁外人說：例如，欲界有情，如果上升到其他界分，其他界分的無漏心在目前生起，怎麼能說這是自身所屬的欲界有情呢？乃至無色界也是如此。

既然已經進行了雙重質問，現在進行正式的解釋。

論：然而，建立有情，是因為命根能夠產生識，所以才是有情，因為在一切時中，只有一個命根。

述曰：依據命根的數量，這是順應正理師的觀點。情，指的是識。命根能夠產生識，所以稱為有情。即使在無心的時候，命根仍然存在，能夠產生前後的識。現在則不然，因為能夠產生現在的第八識（阿賴耶識）。如前面第一卷所解釋的。這與小乘的觀點相同。或者有第八異熟識的說法，這是不共的觀點。前面第三卷說：僅僅依靠第八識來建立有情。最初是種子假立，後來是現行實法。依靠這兩種多少來建立有情，都不違背道理。因為在一切時中，只有一個命根。

接下來是第二個外人的提問：

論：一個身體只有一個無間緣，怎麼會同時有多個識生起？

述曰：一個有情的身體，只有一個無間緣（anantara-pratyaya，直接原因），怎麼會同時有多個識生起呢？否則，一念之間就會有多個無間緣。

論：既然你允許一個眼識作為緣，能夠引發多個心所果的產生。

述曰：下面的回答分為兩部分。先是質問，然後是解釋。論主反駁說：既然你允許一個眼識作為緣，能夠引發多個心所果的產生，為什麼不允許一個識作為緣，引發多個不同類別的後心同時生起呢？在大乘中，一個緣引發多個識作為無間緣是不允許的，如前面第五卷所說。現在只是暫且這樣說。或者這是前六識相互作為緣的說法，是其他老師的觀點。

【English Translation】 English version: It is impossible for two consciousnesses (識, vijnana) to arise simultaneously. This treatise elucidates the foundation of the Jnanaprasthana Shastra (發智論, Treatise on the Exposition of Knowledge) and the doctrines of the Sarvastivada (薩婆多部, the 'All Exists' school).

The treatise master questions:

Treatise: If sentient beings (有情, sattva) are established based on the number of consciousnesses they possess, then those in states of non-mental absorption (無心定, nirodha-samapatti) etc., should not be considered sentient beings.

Commentary: You establish sentient beings based on the number of consciousnesses they possess. Therefore, when sentient beings enter states of non-mental absorption etc., they should not be considered sentient beings because they lack consciousness.

Treatise: Furthermore, if the mind of another realm is considered as belonging to the sentient being of one's own realm...

Commentary: Refuting the outsider: For example, a sentient being in the desire realm (欲界, kama-dhatu). If they ascend to another realm, and the non-outflow (無漏, anasrava) mind of that other realm arises, how can it be said that this belongs to the sentient being of one's own desire realm? The same applies to the formless realm (無色界, arupa-dhatu).

Now that the dual questioning has been done, we will proceed with the formal explanation.

Treatise: However, sentient beings are established because the life-force (命根, jivitendriya) is capable of producing consciousness, and therefore they are sentient beings, because there is only one life-force at all times.

Commentary: According to the number of life-forces, this aligns with the view of the Vaibhashika (順正理師). 'Sentient' (情, sattva) refers to consciousness (識, vijnana). The life-force is capable of producing consciousness, hence the term 'sentient being' (有情, sattva). Even in the absence of mind, the life-force still exists, capable of producing prior and subsequent consciousnesses. This is not the case now, because it is capable of producing the present eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, alaya-vijnana). As explained in the first volume. This is in common with the Hinayana (小乘, Lesser Vehicle) view. Or there is the doctrine of the eighth resultant consciousness (異熟識, vipaka-vijnana), which is not a shared view. The third volume stated: Sentient beings are established solely based on the eighth consciousness. Initially, it is a provisional establishment based on seeds (種子, bija); later, it is an actual dharma (實法, dravya) in manifestation. Establishing sentient beings based on the quantity of these two does not contradict reason. Because there is only one life-force at all times.

Next is the second external question:

Treatise: One body has only one immediately preceding condition (無間緣, anantara-pratyaya). How can multiple consciousnesses arise simultaneously?

Commentary: One sentient being's body has only one immediately preceding condition (無間緣, anantara-pratyaya). How can multiple consciousnesses arise simultaneously? Otherwise, there would be multiple immediately preceding conditions in a single moment.

Treatise: Since you allow one eye-consciousness (眼識, caksu-vijnana) as a condition to give rise to multiple mental factors (心所, caitta) as results...

Commentary: The following answer is in two parts. First, the question; then, the explanation. The treatise master refutes: Since you allow one eye-consciousness as a condition to give rise to multiple mental factors as results, why not allow one consciousness as a condition to give rise to multiple different kinds of subsequent minds simultaneously? In the Mahayana (大乘, Great Vehicle), one condition giving rise to multiple consciousnesses as immediately preceding conditions is not allowed, as stated in the fifth volume. This is just a provisional statement for now. Or this is the view of other teachers, where the preceding six consciousnesses mutually serve as conditions.

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正義解云。

論。又誰定言至許此緣多故。

述曰。下解有五。如文可知。我不定說此無間緣唯有一識現相續生。以我許多識俱者。許現在中此緣多故。自各相望多緣。能引多識果起義。

論。又欲一時至不應理故。

述曰。此返難彼顯多識俱轉相。是五十一等八證中最初生起證。量云。諸緣具眼識起時。余諸緣具耳等識亦應現起。諸緣具故。如現起眼識　此顯六識多境現前寧不頓取。諸根．境等等取空．明等。此和合力齊大勢。六識緣合相似。汝但言識前後生不應理故。

論。又心所性至異類俱起。

述曰。舉心所以例心王。總名心所雖無差別即同心所類。其受．想等功能體類別者。即共許多心所得一念俱生。汝寧不許我心王眼．耳等異類一念俱起。

論。又如浪像至多識俱轉。

述曰。以外喻識。如多波浪．映象。以一大海．一鏡為依。起多浪．多像。故依一本識心多識俱起。此並五十一．七十六．解深密文。然有此文此八證中業用證也。一念之中有四業故。而今有人云。八識不異如浪．像故。今說不然。彼依少分相依道理為喻。非盡理故。

論。又若不許至緣久滅故。

述曰。又難外曰。若不許意與五識俱。第六意識取彼五識所緣之境應不明

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 正義解說： 論：又誰能斷言只有一個識是無間緣，導致出現這麼多情況呢？ 述記：下面的解釋有五點，如原文所述。我沒有斷定說無間緣只有一種識的顯現相續產生。因為我認為許多識可以同時存在，允許在現在這一刻有多種緣起。各自相互觀望，多種緣可以引發多種識果的生起。 論：又如果想要所有識在同一時間生起，這是不合道理的。 述記：這是爲了反駁對方，顯示多種識同時運轉的相狀。這是五十一等八個證據中最初生起的證據。可以這樣比量：當所有緣具足，眼識生起時，其餘所有緣具足的耳識等也應該同時生起。因為緣具足的緣故，就像現在生起的眼識一樣。這顯示了六識面對多種境界時，為何不能同時全部攝取。諸根、境等同時攝取空、明等。這種和合的力量非常強大。六識的緣合非常相似。你只是說識的前後生起是不合道理的。 論：又心所的性質不同，導致不同種類的心所同時生起。 述記：這裡用心所來類比心王（心識的主體）。總稱為心所，即使沒有差別，也屬於心所的類別。其中的受（感受）、想（思維）等功能和體性類別不同的，可以和許多心所一起在一念之間同時生起。你難道不承認我的心王和眼、耳等不同種類的心識在一念之間同時生起嗎？ 論：又如波浪和映象，說明多種識同時運轉。 述記：用外在的事物來比喻識。就像許多波浪和映象，以大海和鏡子為依託，生起許多波浪和映象。所以依靠根本的本識心，多種識可以同時生起。這些都與五十一、七十六、《解深密經》中的內容一致。然而，有這樣的說法，這八個證據中是業用證。因為一念之中有四種業。但是現在有人說，八識沒有差別，就像波浪和映象一樣。現在我說不是這樣的。他們是依據少部分相互依存的道理來做比喻，並非完全符合道理。 論：又如果不允許意與五識同時存在，那麼第六意識攝取五識所緣的境界應該是不清楚的。

【English Translation】 English version: Justice Explanation: Treatise: Moreover, who can definitively say that only one consciousness is the immediate condition (無間緣, anantarya-pratyaya) that leads to so many occurrences? Commentary: The following explanation has five points, as stated in the text. I do not definitively say that the immediate condition is only one type of consciousness's manifestation arising continuously. Because I believe that many consciousnesses can exist simultaneously, allowing for multiple conditions to arise in the present moment. Observing each other, multiple conditions can trigger the arising of multiple consciousness results. Treatise: Furthermore, if one desires all consciousnesses to arise at the same time, it is unreasonable. Commentary: This is to refute the opponent, showing the aspect of multiple consciousnesses operating simultaneously. This is the initial arising proof among the fifty-one, etc., eight proofs. It can be compared thus: When all conditions are complete, when eye-consciousness arises, the ear-consciousness, etc., with all conditions complete, should also arise simultaneously. Because the conditions are complete, just like the eye-consciousness that arises now. This shows that when the six consciousnesses face multiple realms, why can't they all be apprehended simultaneously? The roots, objects, etc., simultaneously apprehend emptiness, clarity, etc. This combined power is very strong. The combination of the six consciousnesses is very similar. You are only saying that the sequential arising of consciousnesses is unreasonable. Treatise: Moreover, the nature of mental factors (心所, caitasika) differs, leading to different types of mental factors arising simultaneously. Commentary: Here, mental factors are used to analogize the mind-king (心王, citta-svamin) (the main consciousness). Generally called mental factors, even if there is no difference, they belong to the category of mental factors. Among them, the functions and natures of feeling (受, vedana), thought (想, samjna), etc., which are different, can arise simultaneously with many mental factors in a single moment. Don't you admit that my mind-king and the eye, ear, etc., different types of consciousnesses arise simultaneously in a single moment? Treatise: Furthermore, like waves and reflections, illustrating that multiple consciousnesses operate simultaneously. Commentary: Using external things to illustrate consciousness. Just like many waves and reflections, relying on the great sea and the mirror, many waves and reflections arise. Therefore, relying on the fundamental alaya-consciousness (本識心, mula-vijnana-citta), multiple consciousnesses can arise simultaneously. These are all consistent with the content in the fifty-one, seventy-six, and the Sandhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經). However, there is such a saying, this among the eight proofs is the proof of karmic function. Because there are four types of karma in a single moment. But now some people say that the eight consciousnesses are no different, just like waves and reflections. Now I say it is not like that. They are using the principle of partial interdependence as an analogy, which is not entirely in accordance with the principle. Treatise: Furthermore, if one does not allow the mind (意, manas) to exist simultaneously with the five consciousnesses, then the sixth consciousness apprehending the objects of the five consciousnesses should be unclear.

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了。彼計五識後方生意識故。今云。緣過去故。如散意識緣久滅事。此簡宿命智非散意識。緣久滅故彼是明瞭。為不定過故。此闕有法余並具足。即八證中第三明瞭也。

論。如何五俱至取一或多。

述曰。第三問答。外人難曰。五俱意唯一。如何取色等多境。此外人難。不許一念意識五識俱生者分明取五境。非彼不許一心所取多境。又除大眾部等諸識俱者。余諸識不許並生者。說五識后一念意識。不得一切時緣五種明瞭境。獨頭者得。

雖為此難令大乘者五俱意識緣五境意亦不明瞭。

論。如眼等識至種種相故。

述曰。論主喻曰。如眼等識各於色等取一或二十種等。既無失者。此意亦然。了一切法是其作用故。以諸識見相二分各有種種相故。見有分明多用。境有為多識所取作用相故。

論。何故諸識同類不俱。

述曰。第四問答。外人難曰。何故諸識中以眼識等自同類識不俱起也。此難即令一念之時有二眼等識義。由許八識俱起故。

論。于自所緣至余無用故。

述曰。論主答曰。如眼識等於自所緣色等。一已能了。余眼識更生便無用故。所以不生。

論。若爾五識至意識了為。

述曰。此用前義為問更不別開。外人問曰。若爾五識已了。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：他們認為意識是在五識之後產生的。現在（經文）說，『緣過去故』，就像散亂意識緣于很久以前滅亡的事物一樣。這可以區分宿命智（Pubbenivasanussati-ñana，回憶過去世的智慧）和散亂意識。宿命智緣于很久以前滅亡的事物，但它是清晰明瞭的，而散亂意識則是不確定的。這裡缺少有法，其餘都具備。這就是八證中的第三個，明瞭。

論：如何五俱（Panca-vijnana-kaya，五識身）同時取一個或多個（境）？

述曰：第三個問答。外人提出疑問：五俱意只有一個，如何能取色等多個境？這是外人的詰難，不承認一念意識與五識同時生起，分明地取五境。並非他們不承認一個心所取多個境。此外，除了大眾部等承認諸識同時生起者，其餘不承認諸識並生的，認為五識之後的一念意識，不能在所有時候都緣五種明瞭境，只有獨頭意識可以。

即使這樣詰難，也使得大乘修行者認為五俱意識緣五境的道理也不夠明瞭。

論：如眼等識，乃至種種相故。

述曰：論主用比喻來說明：如眼識等各自對色等取一個或二十種等，既然沒有過失，那麼五俱意識緣五境也是如此。因爲了一切法是其作用。因為諸識的見分和相分各有種種相，見分有分明的多種作用，境有被多個識所取的作用相。

論：何故諸識同類不俱？

述曰：第四個問答。外人提出疑問：為什麼諸識中，眼識等同類識不能同時生起？這個詰難實際上是說，一念之間可以有兩個眼識等同時存在，因為他們承認八識可以同時生起。

論：于自所緣，乃至余無用故。

述曰：論主回答說：如眼識等對於自己所緣的色等，一個已經能夠了知，其餘眼識再生起就沒有用了，所以不生起。

論：若爾五識，乃至意識了為？

述曰：這裡用前面的意思來提問，沒有另外展開。外人問道：如果這樣，五識已經了知了，（還要）意識來了知做什麼？

【English Translation】 English version: They believe that consciousness arises after the five consciousnesses. Now (the text) says, 'Because of conditions in the past,' just as scattered consciousness is conditioned by things that perished long ago. This distinguishes the Pubbenivasanussati-ñana (knowledge of past lives) from scattered consciousness. The Pubbenivasanussati-ñana is conditioned by things that perished long ago, but it is clear and distinct, while scattered consciousness is uncertain. Here, the subject of the proposition is missing, but the rest is complete. This is the third of the eight proofs, clarity.

Treatise: How can the Panca-vijnana-kaya (group of five consciousnesses) simultaneously apprehend one or many (objects)?

Commentary: This is the third question and answer. An outsider raises the question: The five concurrent minds are only one, how can they apprehend multiple objects such as form? This is the outsider's challenge, not acknowledging that a single moment of consciousness arises simultaneously with the five consciousnesses, distinctly apprehending the five objects. It is not that they do not acknowledge that one mental function can apprehend multiple objects. Furthermore, apart from those who acknowledge that the consciousnesses arise simultaneously, such as the Mahasanghika school, the rest who do not acknowledge that the consciousnesses arise together believe that the single moment of consciousness after the five consciousnesses cannot always be conditioned by five distinct objects; only independent consciousness can.

Even with this challenge, it is still not clear to Mahayana practitioners that the five concurrent consciousnesses are conditioned by five objects.

Treatise: Like the eye consciousness, and so on, up to the various aspects.

Commentary: The author of the treatise uses a metaphor to illustrate: Just as the eye consciousness and so on each apprehend one or twenty kinds of form, and so on, without any fault, so too is it with the five concurrent consciousnesses being conditioned by five objects. Because comprehending all dharmas is its function. Because the seeing-aspect and object-aspect of the consciousnesses each have various aspects, the seeing-aspect has distinct multiple functions, and the object has the aspect of being the function apprehended by multiple consciousnesses.

Treatise: Why do consciousnesses of the same type not arise together?

Commentary: This is the fourth question and answer. An outsider raises the question: Why can't consciousnesses of the same type, such as eye consciousness, arise simultaneously? This challenge actually implies that there can be two eye consciousnesses, and so on, existing simultaneously in a single moment, because they acknowledge that the eight consciousnesses can arise simultaneously.

Treatise: Regarding its own object, up to because the rest is useless.

Commentary: The author of the treatise answers: Just as the eye consciousness and so on, regarding its own object such as form, one has already been able to know, the rest of the eye consciousness arising again would be useless, so it does not arise.

Treatise: If so, the five consciousnesses, up to what is the purpose of consciousness knowing?

Commentary: Here, the previous meaning is used to ask a question, without further elaboration. The outsider asks: If so, the five consciousnesses have already known, what is the purpose of consciousness knowing?

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何用俱意為。

論。五俱意識至五識所緣。

述曰。此論主答。五識俱意助五識令起。由意引五方得生故。非專爲了五所緣故與五同緣者。不同緣者。便不能引眼等識中三性等生故。

論。又于彼所緣至故非無用。

述曰。此第二解。又意識於色等能明瞭取即雖現量。異於眼等識。彼不能明瞭分別深取境之相故。故意助五非無用也　既爾即是五取不明假意明取。何故無二眼識俱明取也　答不然。此中意起言有二義。一明瞭。二助五。設意有明瞭。如定心等取。不能引五故。不可為例。以意識能明瞭取復助五生。

論。由此聖教至五識不爾。

述曰。此總結。意與五相異。解深密說第六識。為眼等識俱一分別意識。不說五識為分別故。雖俱現量作用有異。

論。多識俱轉何不相應。

述曰。第五外人問。

次論主答。

論。非同境故至互不相應。

述曰。謂六．七．八識有寬狹境不同故。設少分同者。眼識等彼此所依根體．數異故。謂五識依四。意識依三等。如前第四說。雖復想應由四義等。合以一義便簡之盡。謂所依根體．數異。此所依根有二異。一體異。眼等根體各別故。二數異。四．三依別故。如依眼等五根之識依體。各異互不相應。以共

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『何用俱意為』是什麼意思？

論：五俱意識與五識所緣相同。

述曰：這是論主的解答。五俱意識幫助五識生起，因為意識引導五識才能產生。並非僅僅爲了與五識所緣相同，才與五識一同緣取對象。如果不同緣取對象，便不能引導眼等識中三性等生起。

論：又因為意識對於所緣境能明瞭地取境，所以並非沒有用處。

述曰：這是第二種解釋。意識對於色等能夠明瞭地取境，即使是現量，也不同於眼等識。眼等識不能明瞭地分別、深入地取境之相，所以意識幫助五識並非沒有用處。既然如此，就是五識取境不明瞭，假借意識來明瞭地取境。為什麼沒有兩個眼識共同明瞭地取境呢？答：不是這樣的。這裡說意識生起，有兩種含義：一是明瞭，二是幫助五識。假設意識有明瞭的作用，如同定心中取境一樣，不能引導五識，所以不能作為例子。因為意識能夠明瞭地取境，又能幫助五識生起。

論：由此聖教說明，意識與五識不同。

述曰：這是總結。意識與五識的相狀不同。《解深密經》說第六識是與眼等識共同的『一分別意識』，沒有說五識是分別識，所以雖然都是現量，作用卻有差異。

論：多種識同時運轉，為什麼不相應呢？

述曰：這是第五個外人的提問。

接下來是論主的解答。

論：因為不是相同的境界，所以互相不相應。

述曰：意思是說，第六識（意識）、第七識（末那識）、第八識（阿賴耶識）的境界有寬有窄，所以不同。假設有少部分相同，眼識等彼此所依的根的體性、數量不同。五識依四根，意識依三根等，如前面第四品所說。即使想蘊相應，也因為四義等而合為一義來簡別，就完全概括了。所依的根的體性、數量不同。所依的根有兩種不同：一是體性不同，眼等根的體性各不相同；二是數量不同，四根、三根所依不同。如同依眼等五根的識，所依的體性各異，互相不相應，因為共同……

【English Translation】 English version What is the meaning of 'Why use the co-arisen mind'?

Treatise: The five co-arisen consciousnesses are the same as the objects cognized by the five consciousnesses.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. The five co-arisen consciousnesses assist the five consciousnesses in arising because the mind guides the five consciousnesses to arise. It is not solely for the purpose of sharing the same objects as the five consciousnesses that it cognizes objects together with them. If they did not cognize the same objects, they would not be able to guide the arising of the three natures, etc., in the eye consciousness and other consciousnesses.

Treatise: Furthermore, because the consciousness can clearly grasp objects in relation to those objects, it is not useless.

Commentary: This is the second explanation. The consciousness can clearly grasp objects such as form, and even though it is direct perception, it is different from the eye consciousness and other consciousnesses. The eye consciousness and other consciousnesses cannot clearly distinguish and deeply grasp the characteristics of objects, so the consciousness assisting the five consciousnesses is not useless. Since this is the case, it means that the five consciousnesses grasp objects unclearly, and rely on the consciousness to grasp them clearly. Why are there not two eye consciousnesses jointly grasping objects clearly? Answer: It is not like that. Here, the arising of consciousness has two meanings: one is clarity, and the other is assisting the five consciousnesses. Suppose the consciousness has the function of clarity, like grasping objects in meditative concentration, it cannot guide the five consciousnesses, so it cannot be taken as an example. Because the consciousness can clearly grasp objects and also help the five consciousnesses arise.

Treatise: From this teaching, it is clear that the consciousness is different from the five consciousnesses.

Commentary: This is a summary. The characteristics of the consciousness and the five consciousnesses are different. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經) says that the sixth consciousness is the 'one discriminating consciousness' that is common to the eye consciousness and other consciousnesses. It does not say that the five consciousnesses are discriminating consciousnesses, so although they are all direct perception, their functions are different.

Treatise: Why are multiple consciousnesses not in accordance when they operate simultaneously?

Commentary: This is the question of the fifth outsider.

Next is the treatise master's answer.

Treatise: Because they are not the same realm, they do not correspond to each other.

Commentary: It means that the realms of the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness), the seventh consciousness (manas consciousness), and the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna consciousness) are wide and narrow, so they are different. Suppose there are a few parts that are the same, the nature and number of the roots on which the eye consciousness and others rely are different. The five consciousnesses rely on four roots, and the consciousness relies on three roots, etc., as mentioned in the fourth chapter earlier. Even if the aggregate of perception corresponds, it is completely summarized by combining the four meanings into one meaning to distinguish them. The nature and number of the roots on which they rely are different. There are two differences in the roots on which they rely: one is that the natures are different, and the natures of the eye and other roots are different; the other is that the numbers are different, and the four roots and three roots rely on different things. Like the consciousness that relies on the five roots such as the eye, the nature of what it relies on is different, and they do not correspond to each other, because they share...

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許不相應為例。

此即第二別問答訖。第三總解能變一異。

論。八識自性至相各異故。

述曰。此三義釋不可定一　行相。謂見分　所依。謂根　緣者。謂所緣。一所字通二處故　相應異故者。即多少別也。如眼識見色為行相。乃至第八變色等為行相等。廣說如前第二卷　第二又若一識滅。餘七等不必滅故　第三又七能熏。八是所熏。如楞伽第七有此言故。七是因。八是果。又三性．異熟生．真異熟等種種相各異故。攝論世親第四。敘唯有一意識菩薩。今不同彼故不可定一。即諸聖教亦說有八識故。

論。亦非定異至無定性故。

述曰。若八識定異者。十卷楞伽第十卷頌。說八識如大海水．波無有差別相。及前所引五十一等。云依一大海．鏡面起多浪．像。無差別故　第二定異應非因果。更互為因果故。法爾因果非定異。如麻不生豆等芽故　第三又一切法如幻事．陽炎．夢影等。故知無定異性。此非一異依四勝義對四世俗皆得。如理應思。

論。如前所說至心言絕故。

述曰。若爾前來所說三能變相是何。此依四俗諦中第二道理世俗。說有八等隨事差別。非四重真諦中第四真勝義諦。勝義諦中窮八識理。分別心與言皆絕故。非一非異。離四句等。前之心所望心一．異。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 以不相應為例。

此即第二別問答結束。第三部分總的解釋能變的識是一還是異。

論：八識的自性到行相各自不同，所以不是一。

述記：這三方面的解釋說明八識不可被確定為一：行相（指見分），所依（指根），所緣（指所緣的對象，『所』字在這裡可以用於兩個地方），相應的不同（即數量上的差別）。例如，眼識見色是行相，乃至第八識變色等作為行相，詳細的解釋如前第二卷所說。第二，如果一個識滅了，其餘七個識不一定滅。第三，七個識能熏習，第八識是被熏習的，如《楞伽經》第七卷有這樣的說法，七個識是因，第八識是果。此外，三性、異熟生、真異熟等種種相狀各自不同。《攝大乘論》世親第四，敘述只有一意識的菩薩，現在我們和他們的觀點不同，所以不可被確定為一。即各種聖教也說有八識。

論：也不是絕對的異，因為一切法沒有固定的自性。

述記：如果八識是絕對的異，那麼《楞伽經》第十卷的頌文說，八識如大海水，波浪沒有差別相，以及前面引用的五十一等經文，說依一大海、鏡面生起許多浪、像，沒有差別。第二，如果是絕對的異，就不應該是因果關係，因為它們是互相為因果的。法爾如是的因果關係不是絕對的異，就像麻不能生出豆芽一樣。第三，一切法如幻事、陽焰、夢影等，所以知道沒有固定的異性。這種非一非異是依據四種勝義，針對四種世俗諦來說的，應該如理思維。

論：如前面所說，到了究竟的真勝義諦，心和言語都無法表達。

述記：如果這樣，那麼前面所說的三種能變相是什麼呢？這是依據四種世俗諦中的第二種道理世俗諦，說有八識等隨事差別，不是四重真諦中的第四種真勝義諦。在勝義諦中窮究八識的道理，分別心和言語都無法表達，既不是一也不是異，超越了四句等。前面所說的心所相對於心來說，是一還是異。

【English Translation】 English version: Take non-correspondence as an example.

This concludes the second separate question and answer. The third part provides a general explanation of whether the transforming consciousnesses are one or different.

Treatise: The self-nature to characteristics of the eight consciousnesses are each different, therefore they are not one.

Commentary: These three aspects of explanation demonstrate that the eight consciousnesses cannot be definitively determined as one: the characteristics (referring to the seeing-portion), the support (referring to the root), the object (referring to the object of perception, the word 'object' can be used in both places here), and the differences in correspondence (i.e., differences in quantity). For example, the eye-consciousness seeing color is a characteristic, and even the eighth consciousness transforming color etc. as characteristics, detailed explanations are as mentioned in the previous second volume. Secondly, if one consciousness ceases, the remaining seven consciousnesses do not necessarily cease. Thirdly, the seven consciousnesses are capable of perfuming, and the eighth consciousness is what is perfumed, as the seventh volume of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra states, the seven consciousnesses are the cause, and the eighth consciousness is the result. Furthermore, the various characteristics such as the three natures, the fruition of maturation, and the true fruition of maturation are each different. Śeṣa-saṃgraha (Compendium of Determinations) Vasubandhu's fourth section, narrates the Bodhisattva with only one consciousness, now our views differ from theirs, so it cannot be definitively determined as one. That is, various sacred teachings also state that there are eight consciousnesses.

Treatise: Nor are they absolutely different, because all dharmas do not have a fixed self-nature.

Commentary: If the eight consciousnesses were absolutely different, then the verse in the tenth volume of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says that the eight consciousnesses are like the water of the great ocean, the waves have no difference in appearance, and the previously cited fifty-one etc. scriptures, say that many waves and images arise depending on a great ocean and mirror surface, without difference. Secondly, if they were absolutely different, they should not be cause and effect, because they are mutually cause and effect. The causal relationship that is naturally so is not absolutely different, just as hemp cannot produce soybean sprouts. Thirdly, all dharmas are like illusions, mirages, dreams, shadows, etc., so it is known that there is no fixed different nature. This non-one and non-different is based on the four supreme meanings, in response to the four mundane truths, one should contemplate accordingly.

Treatise: As previously stated, when it comes to the ultimate true supreme meaning, the mind and language are unable to express it.

Commentary: If so, then what are the three transforming aspects mentioned earlier? This is based on the second mundane truth of reasoning among the four mundane truths, saying that there are differences in the eight consciousnesses etc. according to the matter, not the fourth true supreme meaning among the fourfold true truths. In the supreme meaning, thoroughly investigating the principle of the eight consciousnesses, the discriminating mind and language are unable to express it, it is neither one nor different, transcending the four phrases etc. The previously mentioned mental functions, relative to the mind, are they one or different.

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以第二俗諦第二．第三．第四真諦相對。今以第二俗諦。對第四真諦為論。然前言不可言一．異。已是明第二真諦因果等理訖。此中義顯八識相望如前心所。亦得以第二俗對第二真。心所與心亦得以第二俗對第三真．第四真說。理實俗．真。第一俗俗非真唯粗故。第二俗窮其至實乃有四重。第三俗有三重。第四俗有二重。展轉皆有至絕言故。如別章解。

論。如伽他說至相所相無故。

述曰。即十卷楞伽第十卷頌也。心意識等以理。俗諦隨事差別相故。可說有別。約勝義勝義真故。相無別也。第四勝義理忘言慮。今遮有別但說無別。既曰離言何別不別。以識自效能相無故。能相無故所相亦無。能所二性即依識立。求不可得。識上何者為能相．所相。謂用為能相。體為所相。若俗諦事中有此用．體真勝義理中。即離心言俱不可說。若以初俗執有別。對四真皆有無別理。第一真門如幻事故。第二真門因果性故。第三真門並無我故。第四真門心言絕故。俱無別相。以四真中如計所執實用等為能相。實體等為所相無故。若以第二俗事八識有別。對三真亦爾。依他作用能相。及依他法體所相無故。或以見分為能相。相分為所相。以七識為能相。第八為所相等亦爾。一切應思。以第三俗八與餘七互熏習為因果可別。對

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以第二俗諦（Samvriti-satya，世俗諦）與第二、第三、第四真諦（Paramārtha-satya，勝義諦）相對。現在以第二俗諦對第四真諦進行討論。然而，前面所說的『不可言說的一與異』，已經闡明了第二真諦的因果等道理。這裡的意思是，八識相互觀望，如同之前的心所（Caitasika，心所法）。也可以用第二俗諦對第二真諦。心所與心也可以用第二俗諦對第三真諦、第四真諦進行說明。實際上，俗諦和真諦，第一俗諦只是世俗而非真理，因為它只是粗淺的。第二俗諦窮盡其至極真實之處，有四重含義。第三俗諦有三重含義。第四俗諦有二重含義。輾轉相生，都有達到無法言說的境地，如其他章節所解釋的。

論：如伽他說，直至能相和所相都無自性。

述曰：即是十卷《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）第十卷的偈頌。心、意識等，從理上說，俗諦隨著事物的差別相而存在，所以可以說有差別。從勝義諦（Paramārtha-satya）的角度來說，因為勝義諦是真實的，所以相沒有差別。第四勝義諦的道理超越了言語和思慮。現在遮止說有差別，只說沒有差別。既然說是離開了言語，又有什麼差別不差別呢？因為識的自性是能相和所相都沒有。能相沒有，所以所相也沒有。能相和所相這兩種自性是依識而建立的，尋求而不可得。在識上，什麼可以作為能相、所相呢？用可以作為能相，體可以作為所相。如果在俗諦的事物中有這種用和體，那麼在真勝義諦的道理中，就離開了心和言語，都無法言說。如果以第一俗諦執著認為有差別，那麼對於四種真諦來說，都有沒有差別的道理。第一真諦的門是如幻的事物。第二真諦的門是因果的自性。第三真諦的門是沒有我的存在。第四真諦的門是心和言語都斷絕了。都沒有差別的相。因為在四種真諦中，如計所執的實用等可以作為能相，實體等可以作為所相，但實際上是沒有的。如果以第二俗諦認為八識有差別，那麼對於三種真諦來說也是如此。依他起的作用可以作為能相，以及依他起的法的體可以作為所相，但實際上是沒有的。或者以見分作為能相，相分作為所相。以七識作為能相，第八識作為所相等等，都應該這樣思考。以第三俗諦來說，八識與其餘七識相互熏習，作為因果是可以區分的。對於...

【English Translation】 English version: The second Samvriti-satya (conventional truth) is contrasted with the second, third, and fourth Paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth). Now, we will discuss the second Samvriti-satya in relation to the fourth Paramārtha-satya. However, what was previously said about 'the inexpressible oneness and difference' has already clarified the principles of cause and effect, etc., of the second truth. The meaning here is that the eight consciousnesses observe each other, just like the mental factors (Caitasika) mentioned earlier. The second Samvriti-satya can also be used in relation to the second Paramārtha-satya. Mental factors and the mind can also be explained using the second Samvriti-satya in relation to the third and fourth truths. In reality, regarding conventional and ultimate truths, the first conventional truth is merely conventional and not true, as it is only superficial. The second conventional truth, when its ultimate reality is exhausted, has four layers of meaning. The third conventional truth has three layers of meaning. The fourth conventional truth has two layers of meaning. They arise in succession, all reaching a state beyond words, as explained in other chapters.

Treatise: As the Gatha says, until both the subject and object of perception are without inherent existence.

Commentary: This refers to the verses in the tenth chapter of the ten-volume Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra. Mind, consciousness, etc., from a theoretical perspective, conventional truth exists according to the differentiated appearances of things, so it can be said to have differences. From the perspective of ultimate truth (Paramārtha-satya), because ultimate truth is real, appearances have no difference. The principle of the fourth ultimate truth transcends words and thoughts. Now, we are preventing the assertion of difference, only stating that there is no difference. Since it is said to be beyond words, what difference or non-difference is there? Because the self-nature of consciousness is such that both the subject and object of perception are without inherent existence. When the subject of perception is absent, so too is the object of perception. These two natures of subject and object are established based on consciousness, and cannot be found when sought. On consciousness, what can be taken as the subject and object of perception? Function can be taken as the subject of perception, and substance can be taken as the object of perception. If there is this function and substance in the things of conventional truth, then in the principle of true ultimate truth, it is beyond mind and words, and cannot be spoken of. If one clings to the first conventional truth, believing there to be difference, then with respect to the four truths, there is the principle of no difference. The gate of the first truth is like illusory things. The gate of the second truth is the nature of cause and effect. The gate of the third truth is the absence of self. The gate of the fourth truth is the cessation of mind and words. There are no differentiated appearances. Because in the four truths, such as the practically useful aspects of what is conceptually grasped can be taken as the subject of perception, and the entity, etc., can be taken as the object of perception, but in reality, they are not there. If one believes that the eight consciousnesses are different based on the second conventional truth, then it is also the same with respect to the three truths. The function of dependent arising can be taken as the subject of perception, and the substance of the dependently arisen dharma can be taken as the object of perception, but in reality, they are not there. Or, the seeing-aspect can be taken as the subject of perception, and the appearance-aspect can be taken as the object of perception. The seven consciousnesses can be taken as the subject of perception, and the eighth consciousness can be taken as the object of perception, and so on; all should be considered in this way. In terms of the third conventional truth, the mutual influence of the eight consciousnesses and the remaining seven consciousnesses, as cause and effect, can be distinguished. With respect to...

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二真亦無。以第四俗對第四真亦爾。推入真門理皆無別。真門但是遮別言無別。無別亦無別無不別。一切應思。無所相故能相云何。能相無故所相．亦無。故無八識定不定別。此長行中但對第四勝義為論。頌中理通舊頌云。心意及意識。分別外相義。八無分別相。非能見可見。此頌無有別俗之相。唯說有無差別相也。

成唯識論述記卷第七(本)

成唯識論述記卷第七(末)

沙門基撰

論。已廣分別至二分所依。

述曰。自下一頌正解識變　于中初結前問后。次舉頌答　謂第一卷中頌云。此能變唯三。謂異熟思量。及了別境識。此即略出三種能變自體　第二卷中阿賴耶頌下。廣明三能變自體。及見．相二分。見．相二分是自體分之所變故。是自體分之用故。說自體是二分所依。別成第一卷頌云此能變唯三已下三句頌訖　今此一頌廣。彼依識所變。今結前生后以發論端中。此結前也。

論。云何應知至唯有識耶。

述曰。此問后也。自下牒第一卷初頌上二句由假說我法有種種相轉。彼言依何轉變謂內識所變此能變唯三。上來已別解三能變訖。今解依識所變義以立假我法。云何依識變假立我法無別實有。由依識變一切諸法唯有識耶。即明一切識變之理故唯有識。為此問也。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二取真諦也並不存在。以第四層世俗諦對待第四層真諦也是如此。推演到真諦之門，道理上都沒有差別。真諦之門只是爲了遮止差別而說沒有差別，而『無差別』本身也無差別，也無『無不差別』。一切都應該深思。因為沒有能相，所相又如何存在？能相不存在，所相也就不存在。所以沒有八識（ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識；manas，末那識；vijñāna，識）的定與不定之別。這段長行文字中，只是針對第四勝義諦進行論述。頌文中的道理與舊頌相同，即『心意及意識，分別外相義，八無分別相，非能見可見』。這首頌沒有分別世俗諦和真諦的相，只是說明有無的差別相。

《成唯識論述記》卷第七（本）

《成唯識論述記》卷第七（末）

沙門基 撰

論：已經廣泛地分別了二分（見分和相分）所依。

述曰：下面一頌正式解釋識變，其中先總結前面，引出後面的問題，然後舉出頌文回答。即第一卷中的頌文說：『此能變唯三，謂異熟思量，及了別境識。』這便是簡略地提出了三種能變的自體。第二卷中阿賴耶識頌文之後，詳細地說明了三種能變的自體，以及見分和相分。見分和相分是自體分所變現的，是自體分的作用，所以說自體是二分所依。分別完成了第一卷頌文『此能變唯三』以下三句頌文。現在這一頌是廣說，之前是依識所變。現在總結前面，引出後面的問題，以發起論端，這是總結前面。

論：如何應當知道乃至唯有識呢？

述曰：這是提出後面的問題。下面解釋第一卷初頌的上兩句『由假說我法有種種相轉』，那句話說的是依靠什麼轉變？說是內心識所變。『此能變唯三』，上面已經分別解釋了三種能變完畢。現在解釋依靠識所變的意義，以建立虛假的『我』和『法』。如何依靠識變，虛假地建立『我』和『法』，而沒有別的真實存在？由於依靠識變，一切諸法都只是識的顯現嗎？即說明一切識變的道理，所以說唯有識。這是提出的問題。

【English Translation】 English version The second truth also does not exist. The same applies to treating the fourth conventional truth with the fourth ultimate truth. When deduced into the gate of truth, there is no difference in principle. The gate of truth is only to prevent differences by saying there is no difference, and 'no difference' itself has no difference, nor 'no non-difference'. Everything should be deeply considered. Because there is no capable aspect (nimitta, sign), how can the object aspect exist? If the capable aspect does not exist, the object aspect also does not exist. Therefore, there is no distinction between the fixed and unfixed of the eight consciousnesses (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness; manas, mind consciousness; vijñāna, consciousness). In this long passage, the discussion is only about the fourth ultimate truth. The principle in the verse is the same as the old verse, which says, 'Mind, thought, and consciousness, distinguish the meaning of external appearances, the eight have no distinguishing aspects, neither capable of seeing nor visible.' This verse does not distinguish between conventional truth and ultimate truth, but only explains the difference between existence and non-existence.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Volume 7 (Beginning)

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only, Volume 7 (End)

Composed by Śrāmaṇa (Buddhist monk) Kui Ji

Treatise: It has already been extensively distinguished that the two divisions (the seeing division and the appearance division) are what is relied upon.

Commentary: The following verse formally explains the transformation of consciousness, in which the previous is first summarized, and the following question is introduced, and then the verse is cited to answer. That is, the verse in the first volume says: 'These transformers are only three, namely, the ripening, the thinking, and the perceiving consciousnesses.' This briefly presents the self-nature of the three kinds of transformers. After the verse on the Ālaya consciousness in the second volume, the self-nature of the three transformers, as well as the seeing and appearance divisions, are explained in detail. The seeing and appearance divisions are transformed by the self-nature division, and are the function of the self-nature division, so it is said that the self-nature is what the two divisions rely on. The first volume verse 'These transformers are only three' and the following three lines have been separately completed. Now this verse is an extensive explanation, and before it was what is transformed by consciousness. Now summarize the previous and introduce the following question to initiate the discussion, this is summarizing the previous.

Treatise: How should it be known, even to the point that there is only consciousness?

Commentary: This is raising the following question. Below, the first two lines of the initial verse of the first volume, 'Due to the provisional designation of self and dharma, there are various transformations,' are explained. That sentence says, relying on what transformation? It is said that it is transformed by the inner consciousness. 'These transformers are only three,' the three transformers have already been separately explained above. Now explain the meaning of relying on the transformation of consciousness to establish the false 'self' and 'dharma'. How, relying on the transformation of consciousness, are 'self' and 'dharma' falsely established, without other real existence? Because relying on the transformation of consciousness, are all dharmas only manifestations of consciousness? That is, explaining the principle of all transformations of consciousness, so it is said that there is only consciousness. This is the question raised.

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乃牒初頌發此問端。

論。頌曰至故一切唯識。

述曰。初半釋唯識。後半結唯識。長行自解。不能煩出。

論曰。至立轉變名。

述曰。長行有二。初正釋頌文。后問答廣辨。釋頌文中。初二複次。后總結　是諸識者。解頌初句上之三字。即本識等三能變識並心所法。言王並臣。舉首及末　安惠解云。何名轉變。謂是三識自體皆轉變似見．相二分。識自體分名為轉變。轉變者變現義。即識自體現似二相。實非二相。其實二相即所執故。即遍計所執似依他有。理實無也。或轉變者是變異義。謂一識體變異為見．相二分用起也　護法菩薩解云。又轉變者是改轉義。謂一識體改轉為二相起異於自體。即見有能取之用。相有質礙用等。由識自體轉起能取。及有礙故。或變是現義。如初卷解。今取自體能轉變也。此即解第一句頌訖。

論。所變見分至見所取故。

述曰。護法雲。前所變中以所變見分名為分別。是依他性。能取于所變依他相分故。起種種遍計所執分別。此是識體所變用能分別故名分別。其識體所變依他性相分。似所執相分者名所分別。是前能分別見分之所取相故。非謂我識自體能緣名為分別。起分別見者識之用也。相．見俱依自證起故　安惠云。所變見分．相分皆計所執

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 然後用最初的頌文引出這個問題。

論：頌文說'所以一切都是唯識。'

述記：前半部分解釋'唯識'，後半部分總結'唯識'。長行部分自己解釋，不再贅述。

論：確立轉變的名稱。

述記：長行部分有兩點。首先是正式解釋頌文，然後是問答式的廣泛辨析。在解釋頌文的部分，首先是兩次'複次'，然後總結說'這些識'，解釋頌文第一句上面的三個字，即本識等三種能變識以及心所法。說'王和臣'，是舉出首領和末端。

安慧解釋說：'什麼叫做轉變？'是指三種識的自體都轉變，類似見分和相分。識的自體分叫做轉變。轉變是變現的意思，即識的自體顯現出類似兩種相，實際上不是兩種相，因為這兩種相是所執著的，即遍計所執，類似依他而有，實際上是沒有的。或者轉變是變異的意思，是指一個識體變異為見分和相分，產生作用。

護法菩薩解釋說：'轉變又是改轉的意思，是指一個識體改轉為兩種相，與自體不同。即見分有能取的作用，相分有質礙的作用等。由於識的自體轉起能取，並且有障礙。或者變是顯現的意思，如第一卷所解釋的。現在取自體能夠轉變。'這就是解釋第一句頌文完畢。

論：所變的見分，乃至見所取。

述記：護法說：'前面所變的見分，被稱為分別，是依他性。能夠取于所變的依他相分，因此產生種種遍計所執的分別。這是識體所變的作用，能夠分別，所以叫做分別。識體所變的依他性相分，類似所執著的相分，叫做所分別，是被前面的能分別見分所取的相。不是說我的識自體能夠緣取，叫做分別，產生分別見，是識的作用。相分和見分都依自證而起。'

安慧說：'所變的見分和相分，都是計所執。'

【English Translation】 English version: Then, the initial verse is used to introduce this question.

Treatise: The verse says, 'Therefore, all is only consciousness.' (故一切唯識)

Commentary: The first half explains 'only consciousness' (唯識), and the second half concludes 'only consciousness'. The prose section explains itself and will not be repeated.

Treatise: Establishing the name of transformation (轉變).

Commentary: The prose section has two points. First, it formally explains the verse, and then it provides extensive analysis in a question-and-answer format. In the section explaining the verse, there are first two 'moreover' (複次) statements, and then it concludes with 'these consciousnesses' (是諸識者), explaining the first three words above the first line of the verse, namely the fundamental consciousness (本識) and the three kinds of transforming consciousnesses (能變識), along with mental functions (心所法). Saying 'king and ministers' (王並臣) is to cite the head and the tail.

Anhui explains: 'What is called transformation?' (轉變) refers to the fact that the self-nature of the three consciousnesses all transforms, resembling the appearance-aspect (見分) and the object-aspect (相分). The self-nature aspect of consciousness is called transformation. Transformation means the meaning of manifestation, that is, the self-nature of consciousness manifests resembling two aspects, but in reality, they are not two aspects, because these two aspects are what is clung to, that is, the completely conceptualized (遍計所執), resembling dependence on others (依他), but in reality, they do not exist. Or transformation means the meaning of variation, which refers to one consciousness-entity varying into the appearance-aspect and the object-aspect, producing function.

Dharmapala Bodhisattva explains: 'Transformation is also the meaning of alteration, which refers to one consciousness-entity altering into two aspects, which are different from the self-nature. That is, the appearance-aspect has the function of grasping (能取), and the object-aspect has the function of material obstruction, etc. Because the self-nature of consciousness turns and arises the ability to grasp, and there is obstruction. Or transformation is the meaning of manifestation, as explained in the first volume. Now, we take the self-nature as being able to transform.' This is the end of the explanation of the first line of the verse.

Treatise: The transformed appearance-aspect, up to what is taken by the appearance.

Commentary: Dharmapala says: 'The appearance-aspect of the aforementioned transformation is called discrimination (分別), which is dependent nature (依他性). It is able to grasp the dependent object-aspect of the transformation, thus producing all kinds of completely conceptualized discriminations. This is the function of the transformation of the consciousness-entity, which is able to discriminate, so it is called discrimination. The dependent object-aspect of the transformation of the consciousness-entity, resembling the clung-to object-aspect, is called what is discriminated (所分別), which is the aspect taken by the aforementioned discriminating appearance-aspect. It is not to say that my consciousness-entity is able to grasp, which is called discrimination, producing discriminating views, which is the function of consciousness. The object-aspect and the appearance-aspect both arise depending on self-awareness (自證).'

Anhui says: 'The transformed appearance-aspect and object-aspect are both completely conceptualized.'

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。見似能取相。相似見所取。實無二分。解第二句訖。

論。由此正理至離二相故。

述曰。即結前二句道理釋頌下二句。護法雲。故彼所計心外實我法。離識所變依他二分皆定非有。非謂識變是實我法。似我法故。其外我法離識皆無。以離識體所變能取見分所取相分外無別物故。一切有情所變皆爾。依斯二分施設我法。彼二離此無所依故　問有別實物離能所變。有何所以不許　答非是有一實作用物。離前能分別所分別故。無外我法必有識也。安惠云。彼實我法離識所變二分皆無。離計所執二取無故。即依總無立別無也。識所變者俱計所執。非有實物離二相有。故皆唯識。解第三句訖。

論。是故一切至皆不離識。

述曰。釋頌第四句。有為．無為若實依他有別種生。或常住實法。不相應假法。瓶等假法。一切皆是不離識。有為識所變。無為識之體。皆非識外有。名不離識。非一切體即是一識名為唯識。

論。唯言為遮至心所法等。

述曰。遮離能變等識外實我法名為唯識。非不離識心所．及見．相分．色．真如等。故不離識名唯識也。此護法解第四句。兼釋外難訖。安惠隨應解假．實等。此即第一卷解變謂轉變。二師中第一護法師等．及安惠二師義。變通相．見。仍有有．無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

『見似能取相，相似見所取。實無二分。』——這句話是說，能見的（見分）似乎是能取相的，而相似的（相分）則被認為是所取。實際上，這兩者並沒有分離的二個部分。以上解釋了頌文的第二句。

論：由此正理至離二相故。

述記：這是總結前面兩句的道理，來解釋頌文的下面兩句。護法說：『因此，他們所認為的心外的真實的我法，離開了識所變現的依他起性的能取和所取二分，必定是沒有的。』這並不是說識所變現的就是真實的我法，而是說它類似於我法。離開了識，外在的我法都是不存在的，因為離開了識的本體所變現的能取見分和所取相分，就沒有其他的實物存在。一切有情所變現的都是如此。依據這二分來施設我法，而這二分離開了它們所依據的識，就無所依憑。問：是否存在一個獨立的實物，離開了能變和所變？有什麼理由不承認呢？答：並不存在一個獨立的實作用物，因為它離開了能分別和所分別。沒有外在的我法，必定有識的存在。安慧說：『他們所認為的真實的我法，離開了識所變現的二分，都是不存在的，因為離開了計所執性的能取和所取，就沒有了。』這是依據總體的『無』來建立個別的『無』。識所變現的都是計所執性的，沒有真實的物體可以離開這二相而存在，所以一切都是唯識。以上解釋了頌文的第三句。

論：是故一切至皆不離識。

述記：這是解釋頌文的第四句。有為法和無為法，如果真實地依他而有，有不同的種類產生，或者是常住的實法，或者是不相應的假法，瓶子等等假法，一切都是不離識的。有為法是識所變現的，無為法是識的本體，都不是在識之外存在的，所以說是不離識。但並不是說一切的體性就是一個識，而稱為唯識。

論：唯言為遮至心所法等。

述記：用『唯』字是爲了遮遣離開能變識等等之外的真實的我法，並不是說不離開識的心所法，以及見分、相分、色法、真如等等。所以說不離識，才稱為唯識。這是護法對第四句的解釋，同時也解釋了外人的疑問。安慧隨順著解釋了假法、實法等等。以上是第一卷對『變』（轉變）的解釋。二位論師中，第一位是護法論師等，以及安慧二位論師的意義。變通相分和見分，仍然有有和無的分別。 English version:

'The seeing appears as the aspect of the grasper, the similar appears as the grasped. In reality, there are no two separate parts.' - This means that the seeing (the seeing-aspect) seems to be the grasper, and the similar (the image-aspect) is considered the grasped. Actually, these two do not have separate parts. The above explains the second verse.

Treatise: Therefore, by this correct reasoning, [everything] is without the two aspects.

Commentary: This summarizes the reasoning of the previous two verses to explain the following two verses of the verse. Dharmapāla said: 'Therefore, the real self and dharmas outside the mind that they posit, apart from the dependent nature of the grasper and the grasped, which are transformations of consciousness, are definitely non-existent.' This does not mean that what is transformed by consciousness is the real self and dharmas, but that it is similar to the self and dharmas. Apart from consciousness, the external self and dharmas do not exist, because apart from the grasping-seeing-aspect and the grasped-image-aspect transformed by the essence of consciousness, there are no other real objects. All sentient beings' transformations are like this. Based on these two aspects, the self and dharmas are established, but these two aspects, apart from the consciousness they rely on, have nothing to rely on. Question: Is there an independent real object apart from the transformer and the transformed? What reason is there not to admit it? Answer: There is no independent real functioning object, because it is apart from the discriminator and the discriminated. There are no external self and dharmas, there must be consciousness. Anhui said: 'The real self and dharmas that they posit, apart from the two aspects transformed by consciousness, are non-existent, because apart from the grasping and the grasped of the imputed nature, there is nothing.' This is based on the overall 'non-existence' to establish the individual 'non-existence.' What is transformed by consciousness is all of the imputed nature, and there is no real object that can exist apart from these two aspects, so everything is only consciousness. The above explains the third verse.

Treatise: Therefore, everything is not apart from consciousness.

Commentary: This explains the fourth verse. Conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, if they truly exist dependently, with different kinds arising, or are permanent real dharmas, or non-corresponding false dharmas, such as vases and other false dharmas, all are not apart from consciousness. Conditioned dharmas are transformed by consciousness, and unconditioned dharmas are the essence of consciousness, neither exists outside of consciousness, so it is said that they are not apart from consciousness. But it is not said that the essence of everything is one consciousness, and therefore it is called only consciousness.

Treatise: The word 'only' is to negate mental factors, etc.

Commentary: The word 'only' is used to negate the real self and dharmas that are apart from the transforming consciousness, etc. It does not mean that mental factors, as well as the seeing-aspect, image-aspect, form, Suchness (Tathata), etc., are not apart from consciousness. Therefore, it is said that not being apart from consciousness is called only consciousness. This is Dharmapāla's explanation of the fourth verse, and it also explains the questions of outsiders. Anhui follows and explains false dharmas, real dharmas, etc. The above is the first volume's explanation of 'transformation.' Among the two masters, the first is Dharmapāla, etc., and the meaning of the two masters Anhui. Transformation connects the image-aspect and the seeing-aspect, and there is still a distinction between existence and non-existence.

【English Translation】 'The seeing appears as the aspect of the grasper, the similar appears as the grasped. In reality, there are no two separate parts.' - This means that the seeing (the seeing-aspect) seems to be the grasper, and the similar (the image-aspect) is considered the grasped. Actually, these two do not have separate parts. The above explains the second verse. Treatise: Therefore, by this correct reasoning, [everything] is without the two aspects. Commentary: This summarizes the reasoning of the previous two verses to explain the following two verses of the verse. Dharmapāla said: 'Therefore, the real self and dharmas outside the mind that they posit, apart from the dependent nature of the grasper and the grasped, which are transformations of consciousness, are definitely non-existent.' This does not mean that what is transformed by consciousness is the real self and dharmas, but that it is similar to the self and dharmas. Apart from consciousness, the external self and dharmas do not exist, because apart from the grasping-seeing-aspect and the grasped-image-aspect transformed by the essence of consciousness, there are no other real objects. All sentient beings' transformations are like this. Based on these two aspects, the self and dharmas are established, but these two aspects, apart from the consciousness they rely on, have nothing to rely on. Question: Is there an independent real object apart from the transformer and the transformed? What reason is there not to admit it? Answer: There is no independent real functioning object, because it is apart from the discriminator and the discriminated. There are no external self and dharmas, there must be consciousness. Anhui said: 'The real self and dharmas that they posit, apart from the two aspects transformed by consciousness, are non-existent, because apart from the grasping and the grasped of the imputed nature, there is nothing.' This is based on the overall 'non-existence' to establish the individual 'non-existence.' What is transformed by consciousness is all of the imputed nature, and there is no real object that can exist apart from these two aspects, so everything is only consciousness. The above explains the third verse. Treatise: Therefore, everything is not apart from consciousness. Commentary: This explains the fourth verse. Conditioned and unconditioned dharmas, if they truly exist dependently, with different kinds arising, or are permanent real dharmas, or non-corresponding false dharmas, such as vases and other false dharmas, all are not apart from consciousness. Conditioned dharmas are transformed by consciousness, and unconditioned dharmas are the essence of consciousness, neither exists outside of consciousness, so it is said that they are not apart from consciousness. But it is not said that the essence of everything is one consciousness, and therefore it is called only consciousness. Treatise: The word 'only' is to negate mental factors, etc. Commentary: The word 'only' is used to negate the real self and dharmas that are apart from the transforming consciousness, etc. It does not mean that mental factors, as well as the seeing-aspect, image-aspect, form, Suchness (Tathata), etc., are not apart from consciousness. Therefore, it is said that not being apart from consciousness is called only consciousness. This is Dharmapāla's explanation of the fourth verse, and it also explains the questions of outsiders. Anhui follows and explains false dharmas, real dharmas, etc. The above is the first volume's explanation of 'transformation.' Among the two masters, the first is Dharmapāla, etc., and the meaning of the two masters Anhui. Transformation connects the image-aspect and the seeing-aspect, and there is still a distinction between existence and non-existence.

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。如第一卷解。依所變見分除實能取。所變相分除實所取。隨其所應二取無也。上文安惠說余非佛。護法皆通。或並有漏。說分別故。

論。或轉變者至外境相現。

述曰。下難陀等第二解。初是諸識言。同前師解。故不重述。言轉變者。即前三能變內見分識。能轉依他相分似外境相現。唯有見．相之內識。都無所變之外境。外境通有能取．所取。此依攝論等說唯二義。不說自證分師義。前師別也。即能遍計。及所遍計法。其能取．所取。皆是心所變相分上妄執別有。設執見分為我為法。亦於心所變上執故無非所緣。故。以是諸識有轉似外境之功名為轉變。即解第一句訖。

論。此能轉變至心及心所。

述曰。虛妄分別過失之名。以中邊等說能變識以虛妄分別。為自性故。此即三界心．及心所。以頌初句轉變之言。即第二句分別之體。

論。此所執境至實我法性。

述曰。心外人法名所分別。即牒依他能變分別。遍計所執名所分別訖。即是遍計所執性成。即解第二句。

論。由此分別至已廣破故。

述曰。由能分別變似心外實我法境現。即由分別之心。變作依他相分假我法之相故。彼心外遍計所執所分別實我．法。決定皆無。頌中所言所分別者。是計所執。由分別

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如《解深密經》第一卷所解釋的，根據所變現的見分，可以去除實際的能取（grāhaka，能執取者）；根據所變現的相分，可以去除實際的所取（grāhya，被執取者）。根據具體情況，兩種執取都不存在。上文中安慧（Sthiramati）的說法認為其他人並非佛陀，護法（Dharmapāla）的觀點則認為一切皆可通達，或者都包含有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）之法，因為他們進行了分別（vikalpa）。

論：或者說轉變者，乃至外境的相顯現。

述記：這是難陀（Nanda）等人的第二種解釋。最初的『諸識』，與前一位論師的解釋相同，因此不再重複敘述。『轉變者』，指的是前面所說的三種能變識中的見分識，它能夠轉變依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva）的相分，使其顯現為類似外境的相。只有見分和相分這兩種內在的識，根本沒有被轉變的外境。外境通常包含能取和所取。這裡依據《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）等論典的說法，只講兩種含義，不講自證分論師的觀點，這與前一位論師的觀點不同。能遍計（parikalpita，普遍計度）和所遍計法（parikalpita-dharma），它們的能取和所取，都是在心所變現的相分上，虛妄地執著為真實存在。假設執著見分是『我』（ātman）或『法』（dharma），也是在心所變現的相分上執著，因此沒有不是所緣（ālambana，對像）的。因此，這些識具有轉變並顯現為類似外境的功能，這被稱為『轉變』。以上解釋了第一句話。

論：此能轉變，乃至心及心所。

述記：虛妄分別（abhūta-parikalpa）是過失的名稱。因為《中邊分別論》（Madhyāntavibhāga）等論典說，能變識以虛妄分別作為自性。這裡指的是三界（trayo dhātavaḥ）的心和心所。頌文的第一句是『轉變』，第二句是『分別』的本體。

論：此所執境，乃至實我法性。

述記：心外的人和法被稱為所分別，這是指依他起性的能變分別，遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhāva）被稱為所分別。以上解釋了第二句話。

論：由此分別，乃至已廣破故。

述記：由於能分別變現出類似心外的真實我法之境，也就是由於分別之心，變現出依他起性的相分，虛假的我和法的相。那些心外的遍計所執的所分別的真實我和法，絕對不存在。頌文中所說的『所分別』，指的是計所執（parikalpita）。由於分別

【English Translation】 English version: As explained in the first volume of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, based on the manifested vision-aspect (darśana-bhāga), the actual grāhaka (the grasper) can be removed; based on the manifested appearance-aspect (nimitta-bhāga), the actual grāhya (the grasped) can be removed. Depending on the specific situation, both graspers and grasped do not exist. The statement by Sthiramati in the previous text considers others as not being Buddhas, while Dharmapāla's view is that everything can be comprehended, or that all include āsrava (defiled) dharmas, because they make distinctions (vikalpa).

Treatise: Or the transformer, up to the appearance of external objects.

Commentary: This is the second explanation by Nanda and others. The initial 'the consciousnesses' is the same as the explanation of the previous teacher, so it is not repeated. 'The transformer' refers to the vision-aspect consciousness within the three transforming consciousnesses mentioned earlier, which can transform the appearance-aspect of dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva), making it appear as an external object. There are only the internal consciousnesses of the vision-aspect and appearance-aspect, and there are no transformed external objects at all. External objects generally include the grasper and the grasped. This is based on the explanation in treatises such as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, which only discusses two meanings, and does not discuss the view of the self-awareness aspect teachers, which is different from the previous teacher's view. The parikalpita (universally conceptualized) and parikalpita-dharmas, their grasper and grasped, are all falsely clung to as real on the appearance-aspect transformed by the mind. Even if one clings to the vision-aspect as 'self' (ātman) or 'dharma', it is also clinging to the appearance-aspect transformed by the mind, so there is nothing that is not an object (ālambana). Therefore, these consciousnesses have the function of transforming and appearing as external objects, which is called 'transformation'. The above explains the first sentence.

Treatise: This transformer, up to the mind and mental factors.

Commentary: Abhūta-parikalpa (false discrimination) is the name of a fault. Because treatises such as the Madhyāntavibhāga say that the transforming consciousness takes false discrimination as its nature. This refers to the mind and mental factors of the three realms (trayo dhātavaḥ). The first sentence of the verse is 'transformation', and the second sentence is the substance of 'discrimination'.

Treatise: This grasped object, up to the nature of real self and dharma.

Commentary: People and dharmas external to the mind are called the discriminated, which refers to the transforming discrimination of dependent nature, and the parikalpita-svabhāva (conceptualized nature) is called the discriminated. The above explains the second sentence.

Treatise: Because of this discrimination, up to because it has already been widely refuted.

Commentary: Because the discriminating transforms and manifests as the realm of real self and dharma external to the mind, that is, because of the discriminating mind, it transforms and manifests the appearance-aspect of dependent nature, the appearance of false self and dharma. Those real self and dharma of the discriminated of the parikalpita external to the mind absolutely do not exist. The 'discriminated' mentioned in the verse refers to the conceptualized. Because of discrimination

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心所分別故。體實無也。有何所以。前第一二卷引理教已廣破故。由能變心變似相現。所執心外實境無義。解第三句訖。

論。是故一切至有極成故。

述曰。有為．無為實．假等法皆唯有識。以能轉變虛妄分別。二十部等說體非無。有極成故。

既爾真如。及心所等。不是心能變分別。不是心外所分別法。此為有無。

論。唯既不遮至亦是有性。

述曰。唯言不遮不離識法。其真如。及心所等。亦不離識故體皆有。今此但遮離識所分別有。不遮不離識真如等有。如理應知。即解第四句訖。此意既有能變分別識。及所變境依他相。所分別心外實法等決定皆無。故唯有識。真如。心所等皆不離識。亦是實有。此文但說有漏位故立分別名。

論。由斯遠離至契會中道。

述曰。總結。由此二文三師理故遠離二邊。無心外法故除增益邊。有虛妄心等故離損減邊。離損減邊故。除撥無如空花清辨等說。離增益邊故。除心外有法諸小乘執。唯識義成契會中道。無偏執故。言中道者正智也。理順正智名契會中道。

上來三師已解識所變解頌文訖。自下第二有九問答。並結有十。初唯識所因難。初問答中有五。一問。二答。三徴。四釋。五結。

論。由何教理唯識義成。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為是心所分別的緣故，（心外之）體實際上是沒有的。為什麼這麼說呢？因為前面第一卷和第二卷已經引用理證和教證廣泛地破斥過了。由於能變的心變現出相似的相，所以所執著的心外真實境界是沒有意義的。以上解釋了第三句（『由一切種』）的含義。 論：因此，一切有為法、無為法，實法、假法等，都只是唯有識。因為能轉變虛妄分別。二十部等所說的體不是沒有，是有其成立的依據的。 既然如此，真如（tathata，事物的真實如是之性）以及心所（caitasika，心的附屬作用）等，不是心所能變現分別的，也不是心外所分別的法，那麼這些是有還是沒有呢？ 論：『唯』字既不遮遣不離識之法，其真如以及心所等，也不離識，所以體都是有的。現在這裡只是遮遣離開識所分別的有，不遮遣不離識的真如等的有。應該如理如實地瞭解。以上解釋了第四句（『都無所得』）的含義。這裡的意義是，既有能變現分別的識，以及所變現的境界依他相（paratantra-svabhava，依他起性），所分別的心外實法等，決定都是沒有的，所以才是唯有識。真如、心所等都不離識，也是真實存在的。這段文字只是說有漏位（sasrava-bhumi，有煩惱的階段），所以立名為分別。 論：因此，遠離了兩種邊見，才能契合中道。 述：總結。由於以上兩段文字和三位論師的理證，所以遠離了兩種邊見。因為沒有心外之法，所以排除了增益邊（samaropa-anta，執著實有的極端）。因為有虛妄的心等，所以離開了損減邊（apavada-anta，否認實有的極端）。離開了損減邊，所以排除了撥無一切，如同空花一般的清辨（Bhavaviveka）等的說法。離開了增益邊，所以排除了心外有法的諸小乘的執著。唯識的意義成立，才能契合中道，沒有偏頗的執著。所說的中道，就是正智。道理順應正智，就叫做契會中道。 以上三位論師已經解釋了識所變，解釋頌文完畢。從下面開始是第二部分，有九個問答，加上總結共有十個部分。首先是唯識所依之因的提問，最初的問答中有五個部分：一問，二答，三征，四釋，五結。 論：根據什麼教義和理證，唯識的意義才能成立？

【English Translation】 English version: Because it is discriminated by the mind, the entity (outside the mind) is actually non-existent. Why is this so? Because the first and second volumes have already extensively refuted it with reason and teachings. Because the transforming mind manifests similar appearances, the real realm outside the mind that is clung to is meaningless. The explanation of the third line ('by all means') is now complete. Treatise: Therefore, all conditioned (samskrta) and unconditioned (asamskrta) dharmas, real and unreal dharmas, etc., are only consciousness (vijnana). Because it can transform false discriminations. The Sarvastivadins and other schools say that the entity is not non-existent, because there is evidence to establish it. Since this is the case, is Suchness (tathata, the thusness or suchness of things) and mental factors (caitasika, mental functions), etc., which are not transformed and discriminated by the mind, nor are they dharmas discriminated outside the mind, existent or non-existent? Treatise: The word 'only' does not negate dharmas that are not separate from consciousness. Suchness and mental factors, etc., are also not separate from consciousness, so their entities all exist. Here, it only negates the existence of what is discriminated apart from consciousness, and does not negate the existence of Suchness, etc., that are not separate from consciousness. It should be understood according to reason. The explanation of the fourth line ('nothing is attained') is now complete. The meaning here is that since there is a discriminating consciousness that can transform, and the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava, the nature of dependent origination) of the transformed realm, the real dharmas outside the mind that are discriminated are definitely non-existent, so it is only consciousness. Suchness, mental factors, etc., are not separate from consciousness and are also truly existent. This passage only speaks of the defiled stage (sasrava-bhumi, the stage of affliction), so it is named discrimination. Treatise: Therefore, by distancing oneself from the two extremes, one can accord with the Middle Way. Commentary: Conclusion. Because of the above two passages and the reasoning of the three masters, one is distanced from the two extremes. Because there are no dharmas outside the mind, the extreme of addition (samaropa-anta, the extreme of clinging to existence) is eliminated. Because there are false minds, etc., the extreme of subtraction (apavada-anta, the extreme of denying existence) is abandoned. By abandoning the extreme of subtraction, the assertions of Bhavaviveka and others, who deny everything like empty flowers, are eliminated. By abandoning the extreme of addition, the clinging of the Hinayana schools to dharmas existing outside the mind is eliminated. The meaning of Vijnanavada is established, and one can accord with the Middle Way, without biased clinging. The so-called Middle Way is correct wisdom. Reason accords with correct wisdom, which is called according with the Middle Way. The above three masters have finished explaining the transformation of consciousness and the verses. From below begins the second part, with nine questions and answers, plus a conclusion, totaling ten parts. First is the question of the cause on which Vijnanavada relies. The initial question and answer have five parts: one question, two answers, three inquiries, four explanations, and five conclusions. Treatise: By what teachings and reasoning is the meaning of Vijnanavada established?

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述曰。初外人問。

論。豈不已說。

述曰。此論主答。謂于第一卷至第二卷。初以為理。及第二卷中已引厚嚴經二頌證。故言已說。

論。雖說未了至成此教理。

述曰。第三外人問曰。前雖已略說仍成未了。前雖破我義。然非由破他之義故已義便成。應更確陳成此唯識之教．理。確者至實也。

論。如契經說至唯識所現。

述曰。四論主釋。初答教。后顯理。教中初列六文。後方總指　三界唯心。即十地經第八卷第六地文花嚴所說。世親攝論第四無解。無性第四廣解十地經名．體。言唯心者。心．識是一。唯言為遣所取境義。由彼無故能取亦無。不遮心所。不相離故。如說若無心所心未曾轉。三界唯心之言。即顯三界唯識。即與欲等愛結相應墮在三界。即屬三界貪等結。此唯識言無有橫計所緣。不遣真如所緣。依他所緣。謂道諦攝根本．后得二智所緣。不為愛所執故。非所治故。非迷亂故。非三界攝。亦不離識故不待說。非無無漏。及無為法　若爾欲．色二界可說唯心。是則言二界唯心。何故復言無色唯心。以小乘等多計彼唯識故。有立已成　此不然也。非但色無。亦無貪等能取之心。故亦無餘虛空等識所取義。又經部執無色心等是無色無體。無實所取境義顯現所依

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：這是對外人的初步提問。

論曰：難道不是已經說過了嗎？

述曰：這是論主的回答。意思是說在第一卷到第二卷中，最初已經確立了理，並且在第二卷中已經引用了《厚嚴經》的兩個偈頌作為證明，所以說已經說過了。

論曰：雖然說了，但還沒有完全明白，以至於形成這種教理。

述曰：第三個外人問道：前面雖然已經略微地說了，但仍然沒有完全明白。前面雖然破斥了我的觀點，但並不是因為破斥了別人的觀點，我的觀點就自然成立。應該更確切地陳述，以成就這唯識的教義和道理。『確』的意思是真實。

論曰：如契經所說，乃至唯識所現。

述曰：第四，論主解釋。先回答教義，后闡明道理。教義中先列舉六種經文，然後總括地指出『三界唯心』，即《十地經》第八卷第六地中的經文，也是《華嚴經》所說的。世親的《攝論》第四沒有解釋，無性的第四廣為解釋《十地經》的名稱和體性。說『唯心』，心和識是一樣的。『唯』字是爲了排除所取境的意義，因為沒有所取境，能取也沒有了。但不遮蔽心所法，因為心所法與心不相分離。如經中所說，如果沒有心所，心就不會運轉。『三界唯心』這句話，就顯示了三界唯識，即與慾望等愛結相應而墮落在三界，即屬於三界的貪等煩惱。這個『唯識』的說法，沒有橫計所緣，不排除真如所緣，依他所緣，即道諦所攝的根本智和后得智的所緣。因為不被愛所執著，所以不是所要對治的，不是迷惑的，不是三界所攝的，也不離識，所以不需要特別說明。並非沒有無漏法和無為法。如果這樣，欲界和色界可以說唯心，那麼為什麼又說無色界唯心呢？因為小乘等多數認為無色界只有識。有人認為這已經成立了。但這是不對的。不僅沒有色，也沒有貪等能取之心，所以也沒有其餘虛空等識所取之義。而且經部認為無色界的心等是無色無體的，沒有真實的所取境義顯現的所依。

【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: Initially, an outsider asks.

Treatise: Has it not already been explained?

Commentary: This is the treatise master's response. It means that in the first to second volumes, the principle was initially established, and in the second volume, two verses from the Ghanavyuha Sutra (Thick Array Sutra) were cited as proof. Therefore, it is said to have already been explained.

Treatise: Although explained, it is not yet fully understood, so as to form this doctrine.

Commentary: The third outsider asks: Although it has been briefly explained before, it is still not fully understood. Although my views have been refuted, it does not mean that my views are established simply because others' views have been refuted. It should be more precisely stated to establish this Yogacara (Only-Consciousness) doctrine and principle. 'Precisely' means truly.

Treatise: As the sutras say, up to what is manifested by Only-Consciousness.

Commentary: Fourth, the treatise master explains. First, he answers the teaching, then he clarifies the principle. In the teaching, he first lists six scriptural passages, and then generally points out that 'the Three Realms are Only Mind,' which is the passage in the sixth ground of the eighth volume of the Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Stages Sutra), and also what is said in the Avatamsaka Sutra (Flower Garland Sutra). Vasubandhu's Mahayana-samgraha (Compendium of Mahayana) fourth does not explain, Asanga's fourth extensively explains the name and nature of the Dasabhumika Sutra. Saying 'Only Mind,' mind and consciousness are the same. The word 'Only' is to exclude the meaning of the object of apprehension, because without the object of apprehension, there is no apprehending subject either. But it does not negate mental functions (citta-caitta), because mental functions are inseparable from the mind. As it is said, if there were no mental functions, the mind would not function. The statement 'the Three Realms are Only Mind' reveals that the Three Realms are Only Consciousness, that is, corresponding to desires and attachments, one falls into the Three Realms, that is, belonging to the attachments such as greed in the Three Realms. This statement of 'Only Consciousness' does not have a superimposed object of apprehension, it does not exclude the object of apprehension of Suchness (tathata), the object of apprehension of other-dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava), that is, the object of apprehension of the fundamental wisdom (jnana) and subsequent wisdom (prsthalabdha-jnana) included in the Path Truth (marga-satya). Because it is not clung to by attachment, it is not what needs to be treated, it is not deluded, it is not included in the Three Realms, and it is not separate from consciousness, so it does not need special explanation. It is not that there are no unconditioned (asamskrta) and non-defiled (anashrava) dharmas. If so, the Desire Realm (kama-dhatu) and Form Realm (rupa-dhatu) can be said to be Only Mind, then why is it said that the Formless Realm (arupa-dhatu) is Only Mind? Because many in the Hinayana tradition believe that the Formless Realm is only consciousness. Some think this is already established. But this is not right. Not only is there no form, but there is also no apprehending mind such as greed, so there is also no object of apprehension of consciousness such as the remaining space. Moreover, the Sautrantika school holds that the mind and so on of the Formless Realm are without form and substance, without a real object of apprehension on which manifestation depends.

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。恐彼執為非心等故說三界唯心。此即唯心義意如是。

又前二師有二翻解。此舉能起執虛妄心故但言三界。不爾無漏應非唯識　又說所緣唯識所現者。解深密經文。即七十六說同此意。汝謂識外所緣。我說即是內識上所現無實外法。世親說云。謂識所緣唯識所現無別境義。復舉識者顯我所現定識所行。唯識所現無別有體。乃至佛告慈氏。無有少法能取少法。無作用故。但法生時緣起力大。即一體上有二影生。更互相望不即不離。諸心．心所由緣起力其性法爾如是而生。如質為緣等。此中略舉。

論。又說諸法皆不離心。

述曰。楞伽經文。此文上下非一。不能繁指。

論。又說有情隨心垢凈。

述曰。今無垢稱經。舊維摩云。心凈故眾生凈。心垢故眾生垢。前第四卷已引證第八訖。不言隨色等有垢．凈故是唯心。

論。又說成就至唯識無境。

述曰。文有三。初總舉。次別顯。后結之。此即初也。若成四智慧入唯識現在十地。隨悟入者即是地前。或隨經義而入十地。說四智處名四智經。然是阿毗達磨經。攝論但言如世尊言。不出經處。

論。一相違識相智至此云何成。

述曰。下別顯四智。無性云。更相違返故名相違。相違即境。各有別故。相違之者名相

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：恐怕他們執著于非心等概念，所以佛說三界唯心。這就是唯心主義的意義所在。

另外，前兩位法師有兩種不同的解釋。這裡是因為能生起執著的虛妄心，所以只說三界。否則，無漏法就不應屬於唯識了。又說所緣是唯識所現的，《解深密經》的經文，即第七十六頁所說，與此意相同。你認為是識外的所緣，我說那就是內在的識上所顯現的，沒有真實的外法。世親菩薩說：『所謂識所緣，唯識所現，沒有別境的意義。』又舉出識，是爲了顯示我所顯現的，一定是識所行的。唯識所現，沒有另外的自體。乃至佛告訴慈氏菩薩：『沒有少許的法能夠取少許的法，因為沒有作用的緣故。』只是法生起時，緣起的力量很大，即一體上有兩個影子生起，互相觀望，不即不離。諸心、心所，由於緣起的力量，其自性本來就是這樣生起的。如物質作為因緣等。這裡只是簡略地舉例。

論：又說諸法皆不離心。

述曰：《楞伽經》的經文。此文上下不止一處，不能一一列舉。

論：又說有情隨心垢凈。

述曰：即《無垢稱經》，舊《維摩詰經》云：『心凈故眾生凈，心垢故眾生垢。』前面第四卷已經引用了第八識作為證據完畢。不說隨色等有垢、凈，所以是唯心。

論：又說成就至唯識無境。

述曰：文有三部分。首先是總的舉出，其次是分別顯示，最後是總結。這裡是第一部分。如果成就四智，能夠進入唯識的現在十地。隨順悟入的人，就是在十地之前。或者隨順經義而進入十地。說四智之處，名為四智經。然而這是阿毗達磨經。《攝大乘論》只說如世尊所說，沒有指出經文的出處。

論：一相違識相智至此云何成。

述曰：下面分別顯示四智。無性菩薩說：『互相違背，所以名為相違。』相違就是境，各有區別的緣故。相違的，名為相。

【English Translation】 English version: Fearing that they would cling to notions such as 'non-mind,' the Buddha spoke of the 'Mind-Only' nature of the Three Realms (Trailokya). This is the meaning of the Mind-Only doctrine.

Furthermore, the previous two masters had two different interpretations. Here, it is because of the deluded mind that gives rise to attachment that only the Three Realms are mentioned. Otherwise, the unconditioned (Anasrava) should not belong to Mind-Only. Moreover, it is said that what is perceived (Alambana) is manifested by Mind-Only, as stated in the Sandhinirmocana Sutra (Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra), specifically page seventy-six, which conveys the same meaning. You believe that what is perceived exists outside of consciousness, but I say that it is manifested within the internal consciousness, without any real external phenomena. Vasubandhu (世親) said: 'What is perceived by consciousness is manifested by Mind-Only, without the meaning of a separate realm.' Furthermore, the mention of 'consciousness' (識) is to show that what I manifest is definitely what consciousness acts upon. What is manifested by Mind-Only has no separate entity. Even the Buddha told Maitreya (慈氏): 'There is not the slightest dharma (法) that can grasp another dharma, because there is no function.' It is just that when dharmas arise, the power of dependent origination (Pratītyasamutpāda) is great, that is, two shadows arise on one entity, looking at each other, neither identical nor separate. All minds (Citta) and mental factors (Caitasikas), due to the power of dependent origination, arise naturally in this way. Like matter as a condition, etc. This is just a brief example.

Treatise: It is also said that all dharmas are inseparable from the mind.

Commentary: From the Lankavatara Sutra (楞伽經). This passage appears in multiple places and cannot be exhaustively listed.

Treatise: It is also said that sentient beings (有情) are pure or impure according to the purity or impurity of their minds.

Commentary: This is from the Vimalakirti Sutra (無垢稱經), the old translation of the Vimalakirti Sutra (維摩詰經) says: 'Because the mind is pure, sentient beings are pure; because the mind is impure, sentient beings are impure.' The eighth consciousness has already been cited as evidence in the previous fourth volume. It is not said that purity or impurity depends on form (色) etc., therefore it is Mind-Only.

Treatise: It is also said that the attainment leads to Mind-Only without an external realm.

Commentary: The text has three parts. First, a general statement; second, a separate explanation; and third, a conclusion. This is the first part. If one attains the Four Wisdoms (四智), one can enter the present ten grounds (十地) of Mind-Only. Those who enter according to their understanding are before the ten grounds. Or they enter the ten grounds according to the meaning of the sutras. The place where the Four Wisdoms are discussed is called the Four Wisdoms Sutra. However, this is an Abhidharma (阿毗達磨) sutra. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論) only says 'as the World-Honored One said,' without indicating the source of the sutra.

Treatise: The Wisdom of Conflicting Appearances (一相違識相智) - how is this achieved?

Commentary: The following separately explains the Four Wisdoms. Asanga (無性) said: 'Because they contradict each other, they are called conflicting appearances.' Conflicting appearances are the realm (境), because each is distinct. What is conflicting is called appearance.

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違者。或相違即者。人．境俱別故。相違者識名相違識。生此識因說名為相。菩薩之智了知此相唯是內心。故一切法亦唯心變。鬼等膿河。魚等宅路。天寶嚴地。人清冷水。空定唯空。非一實物互相違返。此雖非有遍計所執。然業類如是各變不同。舊云一境應四心。今言境。非定一故。應言一處。解成差證知唯有識。

論。二無所緣識智至余亦應爾。

述曰。第二緣過．未等無同經部義。如薩婆．多前已破訖。故成無境　智者即菩薩智　無所緣識者。無所緣之識。謂一切緣過．未識。此唯有心。菩薩緣此識。無境得生故名為智。舊云緣無得起慮。今言大乘相分必有。應言境非真。慮起證知唯有識。

論。三自應無倒智至應得解脫。

述曰。若一切凡夫已得實境。由境非妄故。即一切凡夫。應不由功用自成解脫。解脫不成故唯有識。舊云難塵是實有。今言證實智不成。證知唯有識。

已下境隨三惠轉。

論。四隨三智轉智至如何可變。

述曰。第一得心自在者。謂得心調順堪有所作。若勝者唯第八地已去。任運實變大地等。得為金寶令有情用故。境隨智轉所欲皆成。或意解思惟觀雖境亦成。然今取轉換本質不取於此。前解為是。又約得十自在。十地皆得。準此義得定自在即

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 違背者，或者互相違背的事物，是因為人和環境都不同。互相違背的事物，其所產生的『識』（vijñāna，意識）被稱為『相違識』。產生這種『識』的原因被稱為『相』（lakṣaṇa，相狀）。菩薩的智慧了知這些『相』僅僅是內心的顯現，所以一切法也只是心的變現。對於鬼來說是膿血的河流，對於魚來說是棲息的道路，對於天人來說是珍寶莊嚴的土地，對於人來說是清澈寒冷的水，對於空定（śūnyatā-samādhi，證悟空性的禪定）來說唯有空性。這些並非真實存在的事物互相違背，雖然這些並非遍計所執性（parikalpita，虛妄分別），但是業力種類就是這樣，各自變現不同。舊的說法是同一個境界應有四種不同的心識，現在說境界並非固定不變，應該說是在同一個地方。理解成差別，可以證明唯有識。 論：二、無所緣識智，乃至其餘也應如此。 述曰：第二，緣於過去、未來等，沒有與經部宗（Sautrāntika，佛教部派之一）相同的意義。如薩婆多宗（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）之前已經破斥過了，所以成立沒有外境。智者，就是菩薩的智慧。無所緣識，指的是沒有所緣對象的識，即一切緣於過去、未來的識。這些唯有心。菩薩緣于這種識，沒有外境也能產生，所以稱為智。舊的說法是緣于無也能生起思慮，現在說大乘（Mahāyāna，佛教宗派之一）的相分（nimitta-bhāga，心識的影像部分）必定存在。應該說境界並非真實，思慮生起可以證明唯有識。 論：三、自身應無倒智，乃至應得解脫。 述曰：如果一切凡夫已經得到了真實的境界，因為境界並非虛妄，那麼一切凡夫應該不需要通過修行就能自然解脫。因為解脫不能自然成就，所以唯有識。舊的說法是微塵是真實存在的，現在說證實智不能成立，證明唯有識。 以下境界隨著三種智慧而轉變。 論：四、隨著三種智慧轉變，乃至如何可以轉變。 述曰：第一，得到心自在的人，指的是得到調順的心，能夠有所作為。如果是殊勝者，唯有八地菩薩以上，能夠任運自在地將大地等變為金銀珠寶，讓有情眾生使用，所以境界隨著智慧轉變，想要什麼都能實現。或者通過意解思惟觀想，境界也能成就。然而現在取的是轉換本質，不取這些。之前的解釋是正確的。又根據得到十自在，十地菩薩都能得到。按照這個意義，得到定自在就是...

【English Translation】 English version: Those who violate, or things that contradict each other, are because people and environments are different. Things that contradict each other, the 'consciousness' (vijñāna) that arises from them is called 'contradictory consciousness'. The cause of the arising of this 'consciousness' is called 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa). The wisdom of a Bodhisattva knows that these 'characteristics' are merely manifestations of the mind, so all dharmas are also transformations of the mind. For ghosts, it is a river of pus and blood; for fish, it is a dwelling path; for gods, it is land adorned with treasures; for humans, it is clear, cold water; for emptiness-samādhi (śūnyatā-samādhi), there is only emptiness. These things that are not truly existent contradict each other. Although these are not the nature of what is conceptually constructed (parikalpita), the types of karma are just like this, each transforming differently. The old saying was that one realm should have four different minds; now it is said that realms are not fixed, it should be said that it is in the same place. Understanding it as difference can prove that only consciousness exists. Treatise: Two, the wisdom of consciousness without an object, and so on, should also be like this. Commentary: Second, there is no meaning in relating to the past, future, etc., that is the same as the Sautrāntika (a Buddhist school). As the Sarvāstivāda (a Buddhist school) has been refuted before, it is established that there is no external realm. The wise one is the wisdom of a Bodhisattva. Consciousness without an object refers to consciousness without an object, that is, all consciousness related to the past and future. These are only mind. A Bodhisattva relates to this consciousness, and it can arise without an external realm, so it is called wisdom. The old saying was that thoughts can arise from relating to nothing; now it is said that the image-part (nimitta-bhāga) of Mahāyāna (a Buddhist school) must exist. It should be said that the realm is not real, and the arising of thoughts can prove that only consciousness exists. Treatise: Three, one's own should be wisdom without inversion, and so on, one should attain liberation. Commentary: If all ordinary beings have already obtained a real realm, because the realm is not false, then all ordinary beings should be able to attain liberation naturally without cultivation. Because liberation cannot be achieved naturally, only consciousness exists. The old saying was that dust particles are real; now it is said that the wisdom of verifying reality cannot be established, proving that only consciousness exists. The following realms transform according to the three wisdoms. Treatise: Four, transforming according to the three wisdoms, and so on, how can it be transformed? Commentary: First, a person who has attained freedom of mind refers to obtaining a tamed mind that is capable of acting. If it is a superior person, only Bodhisattvas of the eighth bhūmi (stage) and above can effortlessly transform the earth, etc., into gold and jewels for sentient beings to use, so the realm transforms according to wisdom, and whatever one wants can be achieved. Or through mental understanding, thinking, and contemplation, the realm can also be achieved. However, now we are taking the transformation of essence, not these. The previous explanation is correct. Also, according to obtaining the ten freedoms, Bodhisattvas of all ten bhūmis can obtain them. According to this meaning, obtaining freedom of samādhi is...

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初地亦轉。或第三地得定自在。各據勝說。然一切異生能作此者。皆是境隨事惠轉也。

論。二隨觀察。者智轉智至寧隨心轉。

述曰。第二得定者。無性云。謂諸聲聞．獨覺等。所言修者謂空境相應。或四聖諦所緣相應。法觀者。謂此後得觀契經等正法妙惠。隨觀一境之上無常等行眾相顯現。謂一極微觀為無常．苦．空．無我相皆顯故。非一體上有眾多義　義豈非體。若一體者體應非一。若異體者體應非無常等。由境無實故唯心所變。故隨心觀眾相顯現。此意如是。境隨理惠轉也。

論。三隨無分別智轉智至何容不現。

述曰。第三謂起證實無分別智者。即緣真如觀。簡后得智故言證實。非境實有可智觀無。智應成倒。智既非倒。故境非真。境隨真惠轉。

論。菩薩成就至決定悟入。

述曰。此結前也。

論。又伽陀說至唯有識無餘。

述曰。即厚嚴經。心意識所緣。皆非離自性。即緣識之體。或事性即自心法。或理體即義之所依本事。謂第八心。第七意。餘六識所緣。皆自心為境。佛言由如是理故。我說一切有為．無為皆唯有識。無餘實心外境也。

論。此等聖教誠證非一。

述曰。第二總指顯有多故。結上教也。

論。極成眼等識至離自

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 初地菩薩也能做到這種轉變。或者第三地菩薩因為得到禪定而能自在轉變。這些說法各有側重。然而，一切凡夫俗子能夠做到這一點，都是因為他們的智慧隨著外境而轉變。

論：第二種是隨著觀察而轉變。意思是說，智慧隨著智慧而轉變，乃至隨著心而轉變。

述記：第二種得到禪定的人，無性菩薩說，指的是聲聞、獨覺等。所說的『修』，指的是與空性之境相應，或者與四聖諦所緣相應。『法觀』，指的是此後所獲得的智慧，觀察契經等正法。隨著觀察一個境界，無常等行眾多的相狀顯現出來。比如，觀察一個極微，無常、苦、空、無我等相都顯現出來。不是說一個本體上有眾多意義（如果一個本體上有眾多意義，那麼這個本體就不是唯一的；如果本體是不同的，那麼本體就不是沒有無常等）。因為外境沒有實體，所以只是心所變現的。因此，隨著心而觀察，眾多的相狀就顯現出來。這個意思就是這樣。外境隨著理性的智慧而轉變。

論：第三種是隨著無分別智而轉變。意思是說，智慧隨著無分別智而轉變，為什麼不能顯現呢？

述記：第三種是指生起證實的無分別智的人。也就是緣于真如的觀。爲了區別於後得智，所以說是『證實』。不是說外境真實存在，可以被智慧所觀察，如果這樣，智慧就成了顛倒的。智慧既然不是顛倒的，那麼外境就不是真實的。外境隨著真實的智慧而轉變。

論：菩薩成就了以上三種轉變，就能決定悟入。

述記：這是總結前面的內容。

論：又有伽陀說，一切唯有識，沒有其餘。

述記：指的是《厚嚴經》。心、意、識所緣的，都不是離開自性的。也就是緣于識的本體。或者事物的性質就是自心之法。或者理體就是意義所依賴的根本。指的是第八識（阿賴耶識），第七識（末那識），其餘六識所緣的，都是以自心為境界。佛說因為這樣的道理，所以我說一切有為法、無為法都唯有識，沒有其餘真實的離心外境。

論：這些聖教都是真實的證據，不止一個。

述記：第二句總的指出來，顯示有很多證據，總結上面的教義。

論：極其成立的眼等識，離開自

【English Translation】 English version: Even a Bodhisattva in the first ground (初地, prthivi, the first of the ten bhumis or stages on the Bodhisattva path) can accomplish this transformation. Or, a Bodhisattva in the third ground might achieve自在 (vasita, mastery) in samadhi (定, samadhi). These are just different perspectives emphasizing different aspects. However, all ordinary beings (異生, prthag-jana) who can do this, it is because their wisdom (惠, prajna) changes along with the external environment (境, visaya).

Treatise: The second is transformation following observation. This means that wisdom transforms following wisdom, even to the point of transforming following the mind (心, citta).

Commentary: The second type of person who attains samadhi, as Vasubandhu (無性, Asanga) says, refers to Sravakas (聲聞, sravaka), Pratyekabuddhas (獨覺, pratyekabuddha), etc. The 'cultivation' mentioned refers to being in accordance with the realm of emptiness (空境, sunyata-visaya), or being in accordance with the objects of the Four Noble Truths (四聖諦, catvari arya satyani). 'Dharma observation' (法觀, dharma-darsana) refers to the wisdom attained after this, observing the correct Dharma (正法, saddharma) such as the sutras (契經, sutra). As one observes a single realm, the many characteristics of impermanence (無常, anitya), etc., appear. For example, when observing an extremely small particle (極微, paramanu), the characteristics of impermanence, suffering (苦, duhkha), emptiness (空, sunyata), and non-self (無我, anatman) all appear. It is not that there are many meanings on one entity (if there were many meanings on one entity, then that entity would not be unique; if the entities were different, then the entity would not be without impermanence, etc.). Because the external environment has no substance, it is only a transformation of the mind. Therefore, as one observes with the mind, many characteristics appear. This is the meaning. The external environment transforms following rational wisdom.

Treatise: The third is transformation following non-discriminating wisdom (無分別智, nirvikalpa-jnana). This means that wisdom transforms following non-discriminating wisdom; why would it not appear?

Commentary: The third refers to those who give rise to the wisdom of realizing truth (證實, pramana-siddhi) without discrimination. That is, the observation that is based on Suchness (真如, tathata). To distinguish it from subsequent wisdom (后得智, prsthalabdha-jnana), it is said to be 'realizing truth'. It is not that the external environment actually exists and can be observed by wisdom; if that were the case, wisdom would become inverted. Since wisdom is not inverted, then the external environment is not real. The external environment transforms following true wisdom.

Treatise: When a Bodhisattva achieves these three transformations, they can definitely enter into enlightenment (悟入, avatara).

Commentary: This is a conclusion of the previous content.

Treatise: Furthermore, a gatha (伽陀, gatha) says, 'Everything is only consciousness (識, vijnana); there is nothing else.'

Commentary: This refers to the Ghanavyuha Sutra (厚嚴經). What the mind (心, citta), thought (意, manas), and consciousness perceive are not separate from their own nature. That is, they perceive the essence of consciousness. Or, the nature of things is the Dharma (法, dharma) of one's own mind. Or, the principle is the basis upon which meaning relies. This refers to the eighth consciousness (第八識, alaya-vijnana), the seventh consciousness (第七識, manas-vijnana), and what the other six consciousnesses perceive are all the mind as the object. The Buddha said that because of this principle, I say that all conditioned (有為, samskrta) and unconditioned (無為, asamskrta) phenomena are only consciousness; there is no other real external environment separate from the mind.

Treatise: These sacred teachings are all true evidence, and there is more than one.

Commentary: The second sentence generally points out that there is much evidence, summarizing the teachings above.

Treatise: The extremely established eye consciousness (眼識, caksu-vijnana), etc., apart from its own

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色等。

述曰。自下為理。有四比量。第一總云。謂立宗云。極成眼等識。不親緣離自色等。因云。五隨一故。喻云。如余　此中意說。且如五識中取一眼識。極成之眼簡不共許非極成有法故。即大乘他方佛眼識。小乘佛非無漏眼識。最後身菩薩不善眼識。各有自他不極成故。取一極成眼識。不取不極成眼識。不親緣離自眼識之色。此親緣言。簡他身中自心外色。及第八等所變為眼識本質。彼亦疏所緣緣故。此立宗訖。因云五識中隨一攝故。此論文略。如余耳等四識。耳等四識。五識中隨一攝。不親緣離自色。離自色是眼識境故。耳等唯緣不離自聲等故。如是餘四識展轉相望四量亦爾。今總為言故。眼等識如余。離自色等不別指也。

論。余識識故至離自諸法。

述曰。第二量云。余識。亦不親緣離自諸法是識故。如眼等識　謂極成言亦流至此。第七．八識他不成故。謂第六識。五識之餘。若別言第六者。即恐他以七．八二識為不定過。但總言余。別取第六意兼七．八亦在其中。如眼等識亦不親緣離自諸法故以為喻。即是緣不離自識境為境義。

第三量云。

論。此親所緣至如彼能緣。

述曰。此意說言。謂前已言親所緣即是相分。恐他謂非識為體故今成之。前二量已成唯識訖

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 色等（rupa, 等等）。

述曰：以下是推理部分，有四個比量。第一個是總說，即立宗說：『極成的眼等識（caksu-vijnana, 等等），不直接緣離於自身的色等（rupa, 等等）。』因為：『是五識（panca-vijnana）中的一個。』例如：『如同其餘的（耳等識）。』這裡的意思是說，比如在五識中取眼識（caksu-vijnana）。『極成』的眼識是爲了簡別不被共同認可的、不極成的有法，比如大乘（Mahayana）的他方佛的眼識，小乘（Hinayana）佛的非無漏眼識，以及最後身菩薩（bodhisattva）的不善眼識，因為它們各自有自己不極成的部分。取一個極成的眼識，不取不極成的眼識。『不直接緣離於自身的眼識之色』，這裡的『直接緣』，是爲了簡別他身中自身心外的色，以及第八識（Alaya-vijnana）等所變現為眼識的本質，因為它們也是間接的所緣緣。以上是立宗完畢。因為是五識中的一個。這裡論文省略了，如同其餘的耳等四識。耳等四識，是五識中的一個，不直接緣離於自身的色。離於自身的色是眼識的境故，耳等唯緣不離於自身的聲等。像這樣，其餘四識輾轉相望，四個比量也是如此。現在總而言之，眼等識如同其餘的，離於自身的色等，不特別指明。

論：其餘的識是識故，以至於離於自身的諸法。

述曰：第二個比量說：『其餘的識，也不直接緣離於自身的諸法，因為是識。』例如：『如同眼等識。』『極成』這個詞也同樣適用於這裡，因為第七識（manas）和第八識（Alaya-vijnana）他人不認可。這裡說的第六識（mano-vijnana），是五識之外的。如果特別說是第六識，就恐怕他人以第七識和第八識為不定過，但總說是其餘的，特別取第六識的意思，也兼顧了第七識和第八識在其中。如同眼等識，也不直接緣離於自身的諸法，所以用作比喻，即是緣不離於自身識境為境的意思。

第三個比量說：

論：此親所緣，以至於如同彼能緣。

述曰：這裡的意思是說，前面已經說了直接的所緣即是相分（nimitta-bhaga），恐怕他人認為不是識為體，所以現在成立它。前面的兩個比量已經成立了唯識。

【English Translation】 English version: Rupa, etc. (rupa, and so on).

Commentary: The following is the reasoning section, with four inferences. The first is a general statement, namely, the proposition states: 'The perfectly established eye consciousness (caksu-vijnana, etc.) does not directly cognize objects separate from its own rupa, etc. (rupa, and so on).' Because: 'It is one of the five consciousnesses (panca-vijnana).' For example: 'Like the other (ear consciousness, etc.).' The meaning here is, for example, taking eye consciousness (caksu-vijnana) among the five consciousnesses. The 'perfectly established' eye consciousness is to distinguish the unaccepted and non-perfectly established entities, such as the eye consciousness of Buddhas in other realms in Mahayana, the non-undefiled eye consciousness of Buddhas in Hinayana, and the non-wholesome eye consciousness of the last-bodied bodhisattvas (bodhisattva), because they each have their own non-perfectly established aspects. Take a perfectly established eye consciousness, not a non-perfectly established eye consciousness. 'Does not directly cognize objects separate from its own eye consciousness's rupa,' here, 'directly cognize' is to distinguish the rupa outside of one's own mind in another's body, and the essence of eye consciousness transformed by the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), etc., because they are also indirect objective conditions. The above is the completion of the proposition. Because it is one of the five consciousnesses. Here the text is abbreviated, like the other four consciousnesses such as ear consciousness. The four consciousnesses such as ear consciousness are one of the five consciousnesses, and do not directly cognize objects separate from their own rupa. Separating from its own rupa is the object of eye consciousness, so ear consciousness only cognizes sounds, etc., that are not separate from itself. In this way, the other four consciousnesses mutually regard each other, and the four inferences are also like this. Now, in general, eye consciousness, etc., like the others, are separate from their own rupa, etc., without specifically pointing them out.

Treatise: The remaining consciousnesses are consciousnesses, therefore, they are separate from their own dharmas.

Commentary: The second inference states: 'The remaining consciousnesses also do not directly cognize objects separate from their own dharmas, because they are consciousnesses.' For example: 'Like eye consciousness, etc.' The word 'perfectly established' also applies here, because the seventh consciousness (manas) and the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) are not recognized by others. The sixth consciousness (mano-vijnana) mentioned here is in addition to the five consciousnesses. If it is specifically said to be the sixth consciousness, it is feared that others will consider the seventh and eighth consciousnesses as uncertain faults, but generally saying the remaining, the meaning of specifically taking the sixth consciousness also includes the seventh and eighth consciousnesses within it. Like eye consciousness, etc., it also does not directly cognize objects separate from its own dharmas, so it is used as a metaphor, which means that it cognizes objects that are not separate from its own consciousness realm as objects.

The third inference states:

Treatise: This direct object, to the extent that it is like that which can cognize.

Commentary: The meaning here is that it has already been said that the direct object is the appearance aspect (nimitta-bhaga), fearing that others think it is not of the nature of consciousness, so now it is established. The previous two inferences have already established the doctrine of Consciousness-Only.

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。別．有六量。此總為一。謂此六識親所緣緣。定非離此六識。相．見二分中隨一攝故。如彼能緣見分。見分不離識。體即是識故以為喻。

論。所緣法故至心及心所。

述曰。此第二唯識量。又復一切自識所緣。決定不離我之能緣心．及心所。以是所緣法故。如相應法。相應法體所緣性故。有法同前。故此不說。謂一切有．無為但所緣之法定不離識。此中不言即識。以有．無為別故。此中亦有一分相扶極成過。以他心智境等即是心故。此亦不然。今此所成我識之境。定不離我現在識所緣。非謂他心亦即我心。以是法故。即有體法。非是空花。彼無法故不可為因　又解除彼亦得。相應法者謂心．心所。非言與心相應。但總言相應故通心也。

論。此等正理至應深信受。

述曰。此等正理。結上所明　應深信者。勸他信義。

上來別以教．理成訖。次下第五總結以理教證上所明。

論。我法非有至故契中道。

述曰。謂心外所計實我法非有。真如理空．及能緣真識非無。或空即其理。識即俗事。初離有。后離無故契中道。結前所言契會中道也。以理證上所明法已。

論。慈尊依此至是則契中道。

述曰。辨中邊論初卷所說彌勒本頌。虛妄分別有。即有三界虛妄

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：別無其他六種量。這總共算作一種量。也就是說，這六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）直接所緣的緣，必定不離這六識。因為它們被包含在相分（所認識的客觀對像）和見分（能認識的主觀認知）中的一個部分中。就像能緣的見分一樣，見分不離識，它的本體就是識，所以可以作為比喻。

論：因為是所緣的法，所以不離心及心所。

述記：這是第二個唯識量。進一步說，一切自識所緣的，必定不離我能緣的心及心所。因為它們是所緣的法。就像相應法一樣，相應法的本體具有所緣的性質。有法和前面一樣，所以這裡不再贅述。也就是說，一切有為法和無為法都只是所緣的法，必定不離識。這裡不說『即是識』，因為有為法和無為法是不同的。這裡也有一部分互相扶持而極易成立的過失，因為他心智的境界等同於心。但這樣說是不對的，現在這裡所成立的我識的境界，必定不離我現在識所緣的，不是說他人的心就是我的心。因為這是法，即有體之法，不是空花。因為空花沒有實體，所以不能作為原因。又可以解除他們的觀點。相應法指的是心和心所，不是說與心相應，只是總的說是相應，所以也包括心。

論：這些正確的道理，應該深深地信受。

述記：這些正確的道理，總結了上面所闡明的。『應該深深地信』，是勸導他人相信這些道理。

上面分別用教證和理證成立了唯識的觀點。接下來第五部分總結，用理證和教證來證明上面所闡明的。

論：我法不是實有，真如不是實無，所以契合中道。

述記：意思是說，心外所計的實我法不是實有，真如的理體是空性的，以及能緣的真識不是實無。或者說，空就是真如的理體，識就是世俗的事物。前者遠離有，後者遠離無，所以契合中道。總結前面所說的，契會中道。用理證來證明上面所闡明的法。

論：慈尊（彌勒菩薩）依據這個道理，所以契合中道。

述記：辨中邊論第一卷所說的彌勒菩薩的根本頌：虛妄分別有，即有三界的虛妄。

【English Translation】 English version: There are no other six measures. These are all counted as one. That is to say, the conditions directly cognized by these six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness) are definitely not separate from these six consciousnesses. This is because they are included in either the image-component (the objective object being cognized) or the seeing-component (the subjective cognition that cognizes). Just like the seeing-component that can cognize, the seeing-component is not separate from consciousness, and its essence is consciousness, so it can be used as a metaphor.

Treatise: Because it is the object of cognition, it is not separate from the mind and mental factors.

Commentary: This is the second proof of the Consciousness-Only doctrine. Furthermore, everything cognized by one's own consciousness is definitely not separate from my cognizing mind and mental factors. This is because they are the objects of cognition. Just like associated mental factors, the essence of associated mental factors has the nature of being cognized. The existing phenomena are the same as before, so they are not repeated here. That is to say, all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are only objects of cognition and are definitely not separate from consciousness. Here, it is not said 'is consciousness' because conditioned and unconditioned phenomena are different. Here, there is also a fault of mutual support that is very easy to establish, because the realm of others' minds and wisdom is the same as the mind. But this is not correct. Now, the realm of my consciousness that is being established here is definitely not separate from what my current consciousness cognizes. It is not to say that others' minds are my mind. Because this is a phenomenon, that is, a phenomenon with substance, not an empty flower. Because empty flowers have no substance, they cannot be used as a cause. Also, their views can be refuted. Associated phenomena refer to the mind and mental factors. It is not said to be associated with the mind, but generally said to be associated, so it also includes the mind.

Treatise: These correct principles should be deeply believed and accepted.

Commentary: These correct principles summarize what has been explained above. 'Should be deeply believed' is to encourage others to believe these principles.

Above, the views of Consciousness-Only have been established separately using scriptural and logical proofs. Next, the fifth part summarizes, using logical and scriptural proofs to prove what has been explained above.

Treatise: The self and phenomena are not truly existent, and Suchness is not truly non-existent, so it accords with the Middle Way.

Commentary: It means that the truly existent self and phenomena conceived outside the mind are not truly existent, the principle of Suchness is emptiness, and the true consciousness that can cognize is not truly non-existent. Or, emptiness is the principle of Suchness, and consciousness is worldly phenomena. The former is away from existence, and the latter is away from non-existence, so it accords with the Middle Way. Summarizing what was said earlier, it accords with the Middle Way. Using logical proof to prove the phenomena explained above.

Treatise: The Venerable One (Maitreya Bodhisattva) relies on this principle, so it accords with the Middle Way.

Commentary: The fundamental verse of Maitreya Bodhisattva said in the first volume of the Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes: The false discriminations exist, that is, the false discriminations of the three realms exist.

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心也。舊譯同此名分別者即能分別。分別境故。能起執故　於此二都無者。謂能取．所取二。或我．法二。於此妄心之上都無。舊云彼處無有二。處言與于大義相似。以處．于．中字皆第七囀有所依故。今言於此。舊言彼處。凡言此者謂此近法。上來始明妄有。今既于妄心上無二。如何言彼對誰此耶。既于近上有但可言此　此中唯有空者。謂此妄心中唯有真如。真如是空性。依空所顯故。前長行言空．識是有。亦惟此知。梵音但言瞬若即是空。又言多者是性義。今言瞬若多故是空性。依空門所顯故。梵音有性字。順此方言頌中略故。遂除性言頌言唯有空。唯與定有別者。梵音言都。都者不唯是唯。亦是定義。於此都字之上加阿縛馱剌那。即是揩定義。故今應言唯是定義。以依他中決定唯有空故。前已言無有二。此言唯者更何所簡。不可已無更須簡故。唯是定義于理為勝　于彼亦有此者。彼者彼空性中。亦有此者。謂有妄分別。即虛妄分別是俗諦。妄分別有空者。即俗諦中有真諦空。即真諦空中亦有妄分別。即真中亦有俗諦。二諦必相有無。一無時亦無二故相形有也。舊云於此亦有彼。但彼此為異義意大同　下成前義。故說一切法者。謂有為．無為。依此二無名之為空。故此二攝法盡。有為即妄分別。無為即空性。謂般

若經中說一切法。此中但明三界心心法故唯言妄心。是俗諦非無不妄心。舊此頌上三句同此　非空非不空者。謂由空性故。及妄分別故。言非空以二諦有故。非不空者謂所取．能取二。或我．法二。二皆無故非不空也　有無及有故者。有謂妄分別有故。無謂二取我法無故。及有者謂于妄分別中有真空故。于真空中亦有妄分別故。此中應言三故字。謂有故即妄分別。無故即能．所取。及有故即俗．空互有。梵云薩埵是有故。亦云有情義合多故。阿薩埵非有故。或言。無故此中文略但言　一故字　是則契中道者。謂非一向空如清辨。非一向有如小乘故。名處中道。謂二諦有不同清辨。二取無不同小部。故處中道。舊云是名中道義。說此會於中道。非謂詮于彼義。以上並是中邊第一卷長行自解。彼云。如是理趣妙契中道。亦善符順般若等經說一切法非空非有。

論。此頌且依至凈分依他。

述曰。釋前二頌不遮凈分故是有也。今此依三界虛妄生死可斷位證涅槃故不說清凈。

上來已引教．理成訖。自下第二世事乖宗難。即唯識二十外引為難。

論。若唯內識至定不定轉。

述曰。此文第二牒外人難辭也。若唯內識無心外境。如何現見。世間非情物處．時二事決定。世間有情身。及非情用二事

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果經文中說一切法（dharma，宇宙間一切事物和現象），這裡只說明三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）的心和心法（citta-dharma，心理活動和心理現象），所以只說是妄心（bhrānta-citta，虛妄的心）。這是俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦），並非沒有不虛妄的心。舊譯本中這首偈的前三句與此相同。『非空非不空』，意思是由於空性（śūnyatā，萬物皆空的性質）的緣故，以及虛妄分別（kalpana，錯誤的認知）的緣故，說是『非空』，因為二諦（dva-satya，真諦和俗諦）是存在的。說『非不空』，是指所取（grāhya，被認知的事物）和能取（grāhaka，能認知的主體）這二者，或者是我（ātman，自我）和法（dharma，事物）這二者，都是不存在的，所以說『非不空』。『有無及有故』，『有』是指虛妄分別的存在，『無』是指能取和所取、我和法的不存在，『及有』是指在虛妄分別中存在著真空（śūnyatā，空性），在真空中也存在著虛妄分別。這裡應該說『三故』，即『有故』指虛妄分別，『無故』指能取和所取，『及有故』指俗諦和空諦相互存在。梵文薩埵（sattva）是『有故』的意思，也說是『有情』，意思是聚合了很多。阿薩埵（asattva）是『非有故』，或者說是『無故』，這裡文字省略了，只說『一故』。『是則契中道者』，意思是並非像清辨（Bhāvaviveka，中觀學派論師）那樣一概皆空，也並非像小乘（Hīnayāna，早期佛教派別）那樣一概皆有，所以稱為處中道（madhyamā-pratipad，不偏不倚的道路）。意思是二諦是存在的，這與清辨不同；能取和所取是不存在的，這與小乘不同，所以稱為處中道。舊譯本說是『是名中道義』，是說這個會符合中道，並非是詮釋那個意義。以上都是《中邊分別論》（Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya）第一卷長行的自我解釋。其中說：『這樣的理趣巧妙地符合中道，也很好地順應了《般若經》（Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）等經典所說的一切法非空非有。』 論：這首偈頌暫且依據至凈分（atyanta-pariśuddha-bhāga，最清凈的部分）的依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva，依他而起的性質）。 述曰：解釋前面的兩首偈頌，因為不遮蓋清凈的部分，所以說是『有』。現在這是依據三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）虛妄生死的可以斷除的階段來證得涅槃（nirvāṇa，解脫），所以不說清凈。 上面已經引用了教義和道理來論證完畢。下面第二部分是世俗之事與宗義相悖的詰難，即《唯識二十論》（Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi）以外的引證作為詰難。 論：如果只有內識（antarvijñāna，內在的意識），沒有心外的境界，那麼如何能夠現見（pratyakṣa，直接感知）世間非情（無情）之物的處所和時間這兩種事是決定的？世間有情（sentient beings，有感知能力的生命）的身，以及非情（無情）之物的功用這兩種事。

【English Translation】 English version: If the sutras speak of all dharmas (everything in the universe), here it only explains the mind and mental phenomena (citta-dharma) of the three realms (Trailokya), therefore it only speaks of the deluded mind (bhrānta-citta). This is conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya), it is not that there is no non-deluded mind. The first three lines of the old translation of this verse are the same as this. 'Neither empty nor not empty' means that because of emptiness (śūnyatā) and because of false discrimination (kalpana), it is said to be 'not empty', because the two truths (dva-satya) exist. 'Not not empty' refers to the perceived (grāhya) and the perceiver (grāhaka), or the self (ātman) and the dharma (things), both of which do not exist, so it is said to be 'not not empty'. 'Existence, non-existence, and existence' means 'existence' refers to the existence of false discrimination, 'non-existence' refers to the non-existence of the perceiver and the perceived, the self and the dharma, and 'and existence' refers to the existence of true emptiness (śūnyatā) in false discrimination, and the existence of false discrimination in true emptiness. Here it should say 'three reasons', that is, 'existence' refers to false discrimination, 'non-existence' refers to the perceiver and the perceived, and 'and existence' refers to the mutual existence of conventional truth and emptiness. The Sanskrit word sattva means 'existence', and it is also said to be 'sentient being', meaning that many are gathered together. Asattva means 'non-existence', or 'non-existence', but the text is abbreviated here, only saying 'one reason'. 'This is in accordance with the Middle Way' means that it is not entirely empty like Bhāvaviveka, nor is it entirely existent like the Hīnayāna, so it is called the Middle Way (madhyamā-pratipad). It means that the two truths exist, which is different from Bhāvaviveka; the perceiver and the perceived do not exist, which is different from the Hīnayāna, so it is called the Middle Way. The old translation says 'This is called the meaning of the Middle Way', which means that this assembly is in accordance with the Middle Way, not that it is interpreting that meaning. The above are all self-explanations of the long lines of the first volume of the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya. It says: 'Such reasoning subtly accords with the Middle Way, and also well accords with the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra and other sutras which say that all dharmas are neither empty nor existent.' Treatise: This verse is temporarily based on the other-dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva) of the utterly pure aspect (atyanta-pariśuddha-bhāga). Commentary: Explaining the previous two verses, because it does not cover up the pure part, it is said to be 'existent'. Now this is based on the stage of the three realms (Trailokya) of illusory birth and death that can be cut off to attain nirvana (nirvāṇa), so it does not speak of purity. The above has already cited teachings and reasons to complete the argument. The second part below is the difficulty of worldly affairs contradicting the doctrine, that is, the citation outside the Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi as a difficulty. Treatise: If there is only inner consciousness (antarvijñāna) and no external realm outside the mind, how can it be directly perceived (pratyakṣa) that the location and time of inanimate objects in the world are fixed? The bodies of sentient beings (sentient beings) in the world, and the functions of inanimate objects.

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不決定轉。此中言總意顯。處．時．用三是非情。身是有情。此依二十論。據理而言四事皆通。舊真諦論云。處．時悉無定。無相續不定。作事悉不成。若唯識無塵。菩提流支論云。若但心無塵。離外境妄見。處．時定．不定。人及所作事。新翻論云。若識無實境。則處．時決定。相續不決定。作用不應成　言相續者。即是身也。彼長行雲。若離實有色等外法色等識生不緣色等。何因此識有處得生非一切處。此即第一經部師等難處定也。謂外量云。如汝非緣終南山處。緣此識應生。執實山無此心生故。如正緣彼處。此言現識非謂比識。若說比識者。非此處亦生　彼論第二難云。何故此處有時識起非一切時。此難第二時決定也。謂外量云。如汝非緣終南山時。緣此識應起。執實境無此心生故。如緣終南山時　彼論第三難云。同一處時有多相續。何不決定隨一識生。如眩翳人見發．蠅等非無眩翳有此識生。此難第三相續不定。謂外量云。有多相續同一時間於一處所。應定一見余不能見。執唯識故。如多相續同一時間於一空華等有見．不見者　彼論第四難。于中有三。第一云。復有何因諸眩翳者所見發等無發等用。余發等物其用非無。謂外量云。汝之發等。應無彼用。執境非實此心生故。如眩翳者所見發等。又眩翳所見發等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不決定轉。這裡所說的總的意義是顯而易見的。處所（空間）、時間、作用這三者與情識相關聯，身體是有情眾生的體現。這些依據《二十唯識論》而立論。從理性的角度來說，這四件事（處所、時間、作用、相續）都是相互貫通的。舊的真諦論說：『處所、時間都沒有定準，沒有相續也沒有定準，做事都不能成功。』如果只有唯識而沒有塵境，菩提流支論說：『如果只有心而沒有塵境，脫離了外在境界的虛妄見解，處所、時間是定還是不定，人和所做的事都無法確定。』新翻譯的論典說：『如果識沒有真實的境界，那麼處所、時間是決定的，相續是不決定的，作用是不應該成功的。』 所說的相續，就是指身體。那篇長行文中說：『如果離開了真實存在的色等外在法，色等識的產生就不緣於色等，那麼憑什麼這個識可以在這個處所產生而不是在所有處所產生呢？』這實際上是第一類經部師等提出的處所決定的難題。他們用外量來論證說：『就像你沒有緣於終南山這個處所，緣於此的識應該產生。』因為執著真實的終南山，沒有這個心產生。就像真正緣于那個處所一樣，這裡說的是現識，不是比識。如果說是比識，那麼不在這個處所也會產生。 那篇論典的第二個難題是：『為什麼這個處所，有時識會生起而不是所有時間都生起？』這是第二個時間決定的難題。他們用外量來論證說：『就像你沒有緣於終南山這個時間，緣於此的識應該生起。』因為執著真實的境界，沒有這個心產生。就像緣於終南山這個時間一樣。 那篇論典的第三個難題是：『同一個處所、時間，有很多相續，為什麼不決定地隨著一個識產生？就像有眩暈的人看到頭髮、蒼蠅等，沒有眩暈的人沒有這種識產生。』這是第三個相續不定的難題。他們用外量來論證說：『有很多相續在同一時間、同一處所，應該決定地只有一個人能看見，其餘的人不能看見。』因為執著唯識的緣故，就像很多相續在同一時間，對於同一個空花等，有看見和沒看見的人。 那篇論典的第四個難題中，有三個問題。第一個問題是：『又有什麼原因，那些有眩暈的人所看見的頭髮等，沒有頭髮等的作用，而其餘的頭髮等物體，它們的作用不是沒有的？』他們用外量來論證說：『你的頭髮等，應該沒有那些作用。』因為執著境界不是真實的，這個心才產生。就像有眩暈的人所看見的頭髮等。還有眩暈的人所看見的頭髮等。

【English Translation】 English version: It does not determine transformation. The general meaning stated herein is clear. Location (space), time, and function are related to consciousness. The body is the manifestation of sentient beings. These are based on the 'Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only'. From a rational perspective, these four matters (location, time, function, and continuity) are all interconnected. The old Paramārtha's treatise says: 'Location and time are not fixed, continuity is not fixed, and actions cannot be accomplished.' If there is only consciousness-only without dust, Bodhiruci's treatise says: 'If there is only mind without dust, detached from the false views of external realms, whether location and time are fixed or unfixed, people and what they do cannot be determined.' The newly translated treatises say: 'If consciousness has no real realm, then location and time are determined, continuity is not determined, and function should not be accomplished.' The so-called continuity refers to the body. That long passage says: 'If, apart from the real existing external dharmas such as form, the arising of consciousness of form does not depend on form, etc., then why can this consciousness arise in this location and not in all locations?' This is actually the first type of Sautrāntika masters posing the difficulty of fixed location. They use external measure to argue: 'Just as you are not related to the location of Zhongnan Mountain, the consciousness related to it should arise.' Because of clinging to the real Zhongnan Mountain, this mind does not arise. Just like truly being related to that location, here it refers to present consciousness, not inferential consciousness. If it is said to be inferential consciousness, then it will arise even if it is not in this location. The second difficulty in that treatise is: 'Why does consciousness arise in this location sometimes and not all the time?' This is the second difficulty of fixed time. They use external measure to argue: 'Just as you are not related to the time of Zhongnan Mountain, the consciousness related to it should arise.' Because of clinging to the real realm, this mind does not arise. Just like being related to the time of Zhongnan Mountain. The third difficulty in that treatise is: 'In the same location and time, there are many continuities, why doesn't it determinately arise with one consciousness? Just like people with dizziness see hair, flies, etc., people without dizziness do not have this consciousness.' This is the third difficulty of unfixed continuity. They use external measure to argue: 'There are many continuities at the same time and in the same location, it should be determined that only one person can see, and the rest cannot see.' Because of clinging to consciousness-only, just like many continuities at the same time, for the same empty flower, etc., there are people who see and people who do not see. In the fourth difficulty in that treatise, there are three questions. The first question is: 'Also, what is the reason that the hair, etc., seen by those with dizziness do not have the function of hair, etc., while the rest of the hair, etc., objects, their function is not absent?' They use external measure to argue: 'Your hair, etc., should not have those functions.' Because of clinging to the realm not being real, this mind arises. Just like the hair, etc., seen by people with dizziness. Also, the hair, etc., seen by people with dizziness.

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。應有實用。執無實境發等識生故。如余發等　第二云。復有何因夢中所得飲食．刀杖．毒藥．衣等無飲等用。余飲等物其用非無。謂外量云。汝飲食等。應無實用。許體非實此心生故。猶如夢中所見飲等　又夢中飲等。應有實用。執無此境此識生故。如非夢中所有飲等　第三云。復有何因尋香城等無城等用。余城等物其用非無。謂外量云。一切城等。應無城用。許無實城生此心故。如尋香城等　又尋香城等。應有實用。許無實境此識生故。如非尋香所有城等。如上皆有返覆比量。恐繁略也。如是總名外人難意。

論。如夢境等應釋此疑。

述曰。此指解也。真諦論云。定處等義成。如夢。如餓鬼續不定一切同見膿河等。如夢害作事。複次如地獄一切見獄卒。及共受逼害。菩提流支論云。處．時等諸事無色等外法。人夢。及餓鬼依業虛妄見。如夢中無女動身失不凈。獄中種種主為彼所逼惱。新翻論云。處．時定如夢。身不定如鬼同見膿河等。如夢損有用。此之一頌以三事喻釋前四難。彼論云。謂如夢中雖無實境。而或有處見有村園．男女等物非一切處。此答處定難。立量質云。汝夢於是處見有村園等。應非處定。汝許夢境非實有故。如余夢中所不見處。余不見處例所見處比量亦爾。此中雖有世間．自宗二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：應有的實用性。因為執著于沒有真實境界而產生了等同於幻覺的意識。就像其他的幻覺一樣。第二點說，又是什麼原因導致夢中得到的飲食、刀杖、毒藥、衣服等沒有實際的飲用等作用呢？其他的飲用等物品，它們的作用並非沒有。也就是說，外道辯論說：你的飲食等，應該沒有實用性。因為你承認它們的本體不是真實的，而是由心產生的。就像夢中所見的飲用等。另外，夢中的飲用等，應該有實用性。因為執著于沒有這樣的境界，而產生了這樣的意識。就像非夢中所擁有的飲用等。第三點說，又是什麼原因導致尋香城（Gandharva-nagar，海市蜃樓）等沒有城市等的作用呢？其他的城市等物品，它們的作用並非沒有。也就是說，外道辯論說：一切城市等，應該沒有城市的作用。因為你承認沒有真實的城市而產生了這樣的意識。就像尋香城等。另外，尋香城等，應該有實用性。因為你承認沒有真實的境界，而產生了這樣的意識。就像非尋香城所擁有的城市等。以上都有反覆的比量推理，因為過於繁瑣所以省略了。這些總的來說就是外道提出的難題。 論：應該像解釋夢境等一樣來解釋這些疑問。 述曰：這裡指的是解釋。真諦論說：固定的處所等意義成立，就像夢一樣。就像餓鬼持續不斷地共同看到膿河等不確定的事物。就像夢中造成的傷害一樣。再次，就像地獄裡所有眾生都看到獄卒，並且共同遭受逼迫和傷害。菩提流支論說：處所、時間等諸事，以及沒有顏色等外在的法，就像人做夢，以及餓鬼依靠業力虛妄地看到。就像夢中沒有女人移動身體而失去不凈之物。地獄中各種獄卒對他們進行逼迫和惱害。新翻譯的論典說：處所、時間是固定的，就像夢一樣。身體是不固定的，就像餓鬼共同看到膿河等。就像夢中的損害是有用的。這一頌用三件事來比喻解釋前面的四個難題。那部論典說：就像夢中雖然沒有真實的境界，但有時在某個地方看到有村莊、園林、男女等事物，並非所有地方都能看到。這是回答處所不定的難題。建立量式來駁斥：你在某個地方夢見有村莊園林等，這應該不是處所固定的。因為你承認夢境不是真實存在的，就像在其他的夢中沒有見到的地方一樣。其他沒有見到的地方也可以用類似的比量來推理。這裡雖然有世俗和自宗兩種...

【English Translation】 English version: It should have practicality. Because clinging to the absence of a real realm gives rise to consciousness like illusions. Just like other illusions. Secondly, what is the reason that food, staffs, poison, clothes, etc., obtained in dreams have no practical use for drinking, etc.? Other things like drinking have their uses. That is, the heretics argue: Your food, etc., should have no practical use. Because you admit that their substance is not real, but produced by the mind. Just like drinking, etc., seen in dreams. In addition, drinking, etc., in dreams should have practical use. Because clinging to the absence of such a realm gives rise to such consciousness. Just like drinking, etc., that are not possessed in non-dreams. Thirdly, what is the reason that Gandharva-nagar (city of scent-eaters, mirage), etc., have no use as cities, etc.? Other things like cities have their uses. That is, the heretics argue: All cities, etc., should have no use as cities. Because you admit that no real city gives rise to such consciousness. Just like Gandharva-nagar, etc. In addition, Gandharva-nagar, etc., should have practical use. Because you admit that there is no real realm, and this consciousness arises. Just like cities, etc., that are not possessed by Gandharva-nagar. The above all have repeated comparative inferences, which are omitted because they are too cumbersome. These are generally called the difficulties raised by outsiders. Treatise: These doubts should be explained like explaining dream realms, etc. Commentary: This refers to the explanation. The True Meaning Treatise says: The meaning of fixed places, etc., is established, like dreams. Like hungry ghosts continuously seeing uncertain things like pus rivers, etc. Like the harm caused in dreams. Again, like all beings in hell seeing jailers and jointly suffering coercion and harm. The Bodhiruchi Treatise says: Matters such as places, times, and external dharmas without color, etc., are like people dreaming, and hungry ghosts falsely seeing based on karma. Like in dreams, there is no woman moving her body and losing impure things. Various jailers in hell coerce and annoy them. The newly translated treatise says: Places and times are fixed, like dreams. Bodies are not fixed, like hungry ghosts jointly seeing pus rivers, etc. Like the harm in dreams is useful. This verse uses three things to metaphorically explain the previous four difficulties. That treatise says: Just like in dreams, although there is no real realm, sometimes in a certain place one sees villages, gardens, men and women, etc., not all places can be seen. This is answering the difficulty of unfixed places. Establish a measure to refute: You dream of villages and gardens, etc., in a certain place, this should not be a fixed place. Because you admit that the dream realm is not real, just like places not seen in other dreams. Other places not seen can also be inferred with similar comparisons. Although there are both worldly and self-sectarian...

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相違過。置汝言故以簡之也。正解量云。其非夢時境雖無實。而所見事其處亦定。許如是境皆無實故。如夢所見。以因言許。無隨一失。言如是故。無以真如亦不實過。彼論云。即於是處或時見有彼村園等非一切時。此答時定難。立量準前。此以一喻釋處．及時二種定難。彼論云。謂如餓鬼同業異熟多身共集皆見膿河。非於此中定唯一見。此諸餓鬼或見糞等。及見有情執持刀杖遮捍守護不令得食。此答相續不決定難。立量解云。同於一時同於一處相續不定。其理得成。許境無實故。猶如餓鬼見膿河等。經部等小乘及外道等。皆信鬼見膿河等非實仍身不定。故以為喻。彼論云。又如夢中境雖無實。而有損失精血等用。此答作用不決定難。立量解云。有翳無翳所見發等。有用無用其理亦成。許無實境故。如夢失精等　上來一頌以三種喻釋四難訖。彼論次有一頌。以一種喻合釋四難。頌云。一切如地獄。同見獄卒等。能為逼害事。故四義皆成。彼長行雲。謂地獄中雖無真實有情數攝獄卒等事。而彼有情同業異熟增上力故。同處同時眾多相續皆共見有獄卒．狗．鳥．鐵山等物來至其所為逼害事。立量解云。餘位處定等。非不得成。許無實境此識生故。如地獄人等此四事得成。外許非有情故得以為喻。由此雖無離識實境。而處定

等四義皆成。廣如唯識二十中說。今舉一夢境。等余別二喻。及一種喻。應釋汝．疑。

論。何緣世尊說十二處。

述曰。此文第三聖教相違難。外問若無心外實眼．色．等。何緣世尊于契經中說十二處。但應說有意．法處故。舊唯識云有阿含。為至教故引經為難。

論。依識所變非別實有。

述曰。此釋外疑中有二意。一者依識所變眼等色等。故經說有十二種處。非說離識心外別有眼等．色等為十二處。故不違經。二十唯識說頌答言。識從自種生。似境相而轉。為成內外處。佛說彼為十。似色現識從自種子緣合轉變差別而生。佛依彼種。及所現色。如次說為眼處．色處。如是乃至似觸現識。從自種子緣合轉變差別而生。佛依彼種。及所現觸。如次說為身處．觸處。依此密意說色等十。非離識外有眼．色處。釋此如前第四卷內。二者以未建立第八識故。隱五色根不說。說種為根恐離識故。余如前說。今此約本識等申正義。不同彼亦得。並識變故。

論。為入我空說六二法。

述曰。此下第二釋密意說色等十處所有勝利。唯識二十復說頌言。依此教能入數取趣無我。依此所說十二處教受化者。能入數取趣無我。謂若了知從六二法有六識轉。都無見者。乃至知者。應受有情無我教者

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 四種『等』的含義都已完備。（等：相等，相同） 就像《唯識二十論》中廣泛論述的那樣。現在舉一個夢境的例子，來比喻其餘兩種『別』（差別，不同）的含義，以及一種『種』（種子）的含義，應該可以解釋你的疑問。

論：世尊為何宣說十二處？

述曰：這段文字是第三個『聖教相違難』（與聖教相違的詰難）。外人提問，如果沒有心外的真實的眼、色等，那麼世尊為何在契經中宣說十二處？只應該說有意、法處才對。舊唯識宗認為有阿含經，因為阿含經是至高無上的教誨，所以引用經文來作為詰難。

論：依識所變，並非別有實物。

述曰：這段解釋外人疑問的內容包含兩層意思。第一，因為眼等色等是依識所變現的，所以經中宣說有十二種處。並非說離開識，在心外別有眼等、色等作為十二處。所以不違背經義。《二十唯識論》用頌文回答說：『識從自種生，似境相而轉，為成內外處，佛說彼為十。』（識從自身的種子生起，顯現出類似外境的相狀而運轉，爲了成就內外處，佛陀宣說了那十種處。） 類似色法的顯現，是從識的自身種子與外緣聚合，轉變差別而生起的。佛陀依據那些種子，以及所顯現的色法，依次宣說為眼處、色處。像這樣乃至類似觸的顯現，是從識的自身種子與外緣聚合，轉變差別而生起的。佛陀依據那些種子，以及所顯現的觸，依次宣說為身處、觸處。依據這種密意，宣說了色等十處，並非離開識之外有眼、色處。對此的解釋如同前面第四卷的內容。第二，因為尚未建立第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana），所以隱去了五色根（眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根）不說，只說種子作為根，是恐怕離開識的緣故。其餘的如同前面所說。現在這裡是依據本識等來闡述正義，和他們的觀點不同也是可以的，因為都是識的變現。

論：爲了證入我空，宣說六二法。

述曰：下面是第二部分，解釋秘密宣說色等十處所具有的殊勝利益。《唯識二十論》又用頌文說：『依此教能入數取趣無我。』（依據這個教法，能夠證入數取趣無我。） 依據這裡所說的十二處教法，接受教化的人，能夠證入數取趣無我。如果瞭解從六二法（六根、六境）有六識的生起和運轉，根本沒有見者，乃至知者，就應該接受有情無我的教導。

【English Translation】 English version: All four meanings of 'sameness' are complete. (Sameness: equality, similarity) As extensively discussed in the Vijnaptimatrata-vimsatika (Twenty Verses on Representation-Only). Now, let's take the example of a dream to illustrate the remaining two meanings of 'difference,' and one meaning of 'seed,' which should resolve your doubts.

Treatise: Why did the World-Honored One teach the Twelve Ayatanas (Twelve Sense Bases)?

Commentary: This passage is the third 'contradiction with the holy teachings.' An outsider asks, if there are no real eyes, forms, etc., outside of the mind, then why did the World-Honored One teach the Twelve Ayatanas in the sutras? He should only have taught the mind-ayatana and dharma-ayatana. The old Vijnaptimatrata school believed in the Agamas, and because the Agamas are the supreme teachings, they cited the sutras as a challenge.

Treatise: Dependent on consciousness transformation, they are not separately real.

Commentary: This explanation of the outsider's doubt contains two meanings. First, because eyes, forms, etc., are transformations dependent on consciousness, the sutras teach that there are twelve ayatanas. It is not saying that there are separate eyes, forms, etc., outside of consciousness as the twelve ayatanas. Therefore, it does not contradict the sutras. The Vijnaptimatrata-vimsatika answers with a verse: 'Consciousness arises from its own seed, appears as an object, and turns. To establish the internal and external ayatanas, the Buddha taught those ten.' The appearance of form arises from the combination of consciousness's own seed and external conditions, transforming and differentiating. The Buddha, based on those seeds and the forms that appear, sequentially taught them as the eye-ayatana and the form-ayatana. Similarly, the appearance of touch arises from the combination of consciousness's own seed and external conditions, transforming and differentiating. The Buddha, based on those seeds and the touch that appears, sequentially taught them as the body-ayatana and the touch-ayatana. Based on this hidden meaning, he taught the ten ayatanas such as form, not that there are separate eye and form ayatanas outside of consciousness. The explanation of this is as in the fourth volume. Second, because the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) has not yet been established, the five sense organs (eye-organ, ear-organ, nose-organ, tongue-organ, body-organ) are hidden and not mentioned, only the seed is mentioned as the root, for fear of being separated from consciousness. The rest is as previously stated. Now, this is based on the original consciousness, etc., to explain the correct meaning, and it is acceptable to be different from their views, because they are all transformations of consciousness.

Treatise: To enter into selflessness, he taught the six and two dharmas.

Commentary: The following is the second part, explaining the special benefits of secretly teaching the ten ayatanas such as form. The Vijnaptimatrata-vimsatika also says in a verse: 'Relying on this teaching, one can enter into the absence of a self of the aggregates.' Based on the teaching of the twelve ayatanas mentioned here, those who receive the teachings can enter into the absence of a self of the aggregates. If one understands that from the six and two dharmas (six sense organs, six sense objects) there is the arising and functioning of the six consciousnesses, and there is fundamentally no seer, or even knower, then one should accept the teaching of the selflessness of sentient beings.

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。便能悟入有情無我。由破一合實我想故。令入我空說色等十。非說實有眼等．色等離於識也　問據實而言唯有其識。何須別說有十二處。

論。如遮斷見說續有情。

述曰。此顯說彼十二處喻。二十唯識復說頌言。依彼所化生。世尊密意趣。說有色等處。如化生有情。彼自釋言。如佛說有化生有情。彼但依心相續不斷能往後世密意趣說。不說實有化生有情。說無有情我但有法因故。說色等處。契經亦爾。依所化生宜受彼教密意趣說。非別實有。如有外道。計我實有佛說無我。外道謂佛說死已后斷滅無餘。便來問佛。死後既無我寧非斷滅。佛答彼曰。有化生有情續于死後非謂斷滅。實無有情但有如幻化生有情。佛觀彼意恐謂斷滅說有中有化生有情。非許實有化生有情。但隨所宜佛便為說。故說諸處其義亦然。法體離言幻化法故。非十二處。故今引此以為同喻。

問眾生執有我。為破實我說法處。眾生執有法。為破彼法應別說。

論。為入法空至亦非有故。

述曰。此釋外疑。二十唯識復說頌言。所執法無我。復依余教入。彼長行雲。復依此余說唯識教受化者。能入所執法無我。謂若了知唯識現似色等法起。此中都無色等相法。應受諸法無我教者。便能悟入諸法無我。以說唯識除其法見

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 便能領悟並進入有情無我的境界，這是因為破除了認為『一合』（整體）是真實『我』的錯誤觀念。爲了使人進入『我空』的境界，佛才說色等十處（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、色、聲、香、味、觸），並非說眼等、色等真實存在，也並非說它們脫離了識而存在。 問：如果據實而言只有識，為什麼還需要特別說明有十二處（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意、色、聲、香、味、觸、法）呢？ 論：就像爲了遮止斷滅見，而說有相續的有情一樣。 述曰：這顯示了說十二處的一個比喻。《成唯識論》第二十卷又說偈語：『依據所化生的對象，世尊以秘密的意趣，說有色等處，就像化生有情一樣。』 它自己解釋說：『就像佛說有化生有情，那只是依據心識相續不斷，能夠前往後世的秘密意趣而說的，並不是說真的有化生有情。』因為說沒有有情『我』，只有法的因緣，所以才說色等處。契經也是這樣，依據所化生的對象，適合接受那種教導的秘密意趣而說，並非另外真實存在。例如有外道，認為『我』是真實存在的，佛說無我。外道認為佛說死後就斷滅無餘了，便來問佛，死後既然沒有『我』，難道不是斷滅嗎？佛回答他們說：有化生有情相續于死後，並非斷滅。實際上沒有有情，只有如幻化生的有情。佛觀察他們的心意，恐怕他們認為會斷滅，所以說有中有（中陰身）化生有情，並非承認真的有化生有情，只是隨順他們的根器，佛才為他們說。所以說諸處的意義也是這樣，法的本體是離言的，是幻化的法，並非真實的十二處。所以現在引用這個來作為相同的比喻。 問：眾生執著有『我』，爲了破除真實的『我』，所以說了法處。眾生執著有『法』，爲了破除那些『法』，應該另外說明。 論：爲了進入法空，甚至說『有』也是不存在的。 述曰：這是解釋外人的疑問。《成唯識論》第二十卷又說偈語：『所執的法無我，又依據其他的教義進入。』 那裡的長行文說：『又依據這其他的唯識教義，接受教化的人，能夠進入所執的法無我。』意思是說，如果瞭解唯識所現的好像色等法生起，這裡面都沒有色等相的法，應該接受諸法無我教導的人，便能領悟並進入諸法無我的境界。因為說了唯識，就除去了對法的執見。

【English Translation】 English version Then one can awaken and enter the realm of sentient beings without self, because the misconception that 'one aggregate' (the whole) is a real 'self' is broken. In order to lead people into the realm of 'selflessness', Buddha speaks of the ten sense bases (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, form, sound, smell, taste, touch), not saying that the eye, etc., form, etc., truly exist, nor that they exist apart from consciousness. Question: If, in reality, there is only consciousness, why is it necessary to specifically explain that there are twelve sense bases (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, form, sound, smell, taste, touch, dharma)? Treatise: It is like saying there are continuing sentient beings in order to prevent the view of annihilation. Commentary: This illustrates a metaphor for explaining the twelve sense bases. The twentieth volume of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi Treatise also says in a verse: 'According to the beings to be transformed, the World-Honored One, with a secret intention, speaks of the sense bases such as form, just like beings born by transformation.' It explains itself: 'Just as the Buddha speaks of beings born by transformation, that is only said according to the secret intention that the continuous stream of consciousness can go to the next life, not saying that there are truly beings born by transformation.' Because it is said that there is no sentient being 'self', only the causes and conditions of dharmas, therefore the sense bases such as form are spoken of. The sutras are also like this, spoken according to the secret intention that the beings to be transformed are suitable to receive that teaching, not that they truly exist separately. For example, some heretics believe that the 'self' is truly existent, and the Buddha says there is no self. The heretics think that the Buddha says that after death there is annihilation without remainder, and they come to ask the Buddha, since there is no 'self' after death, isn't that annihilation? The Buddha answers them: There are beings born by transformation that continue after death, not annihilation. In reality, there are no sentient beings, only beings born by transformation like illusions. The Buddha observes their minds, fearing that they will think there is annihilation, so he says there are intermediate state (antarabhava) beings born by transformation, not admitting that there are truly beings born by transformation, but only according to their capacities, the Buddha speaks to them. Therefore, the meaning of speaking of the sense bases is also like this, the essence of the dharma is beyond words, it is an illusory dharma, not the real twelve sense bases. So now this is cited as the same metaphor. Question: Sentient beings are attached to the existence of 'self', so to break the real 'self', the dharma bases are spoken of. Sentient beings are attached to the existence of 'dharmas', so to break those 'dharmas', it should be explained separately. Treatise: In order to enter the emptiness of dharmas, even saying 'existence' is also non-existent. Commentary: This explains the doubts of outsiders. The twentieth volume of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi Treatise also says in a verse: 'The dharma-selflessness that is clung to, is entered through other teachings.' The prose there says: 'Also, according to this other Vijnaptimatrata teaching, those who receive the teaching can enter the dharma-selflessness that is clung to.' It means that if one understands that the Vijnapti appears as if dharmas such as form arise, there are no dharma characteristics such as form in it, those who should receive the teaching of dharma-selflessness can awaken and enter the realm of dharma-selflessness. Because Vijnapti is spoken of, the attachment to dharmas is removed.

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令知外法亦非有故。

論。此唯識性豈不亦空。

述曰。此文第四唯識成空難。外人又問。為除法執既說唯識。此唯識性豈不亦空。今問依他名唯識性。即相之性不問真理。唯識二十云。若知諸法一切種無入法無我。是則唯識亦畢竟無。何所安立。

論。不爾。

述曰。此答唯識其性不空。

論。如何。

述曰。此既不空。其如何等。

論。非所執故。

述曰。有為．無為名為有。我．及我所名為無。既非所執故是有也。

論。謂依識變至說為法空。

述曰。此廣非執。謂依識所變見．相分上。妄執有實法。此即法我。理不可得說為法空。非無離遍計所執實有為無漏正體．后得二正智所證唯識性故說為法空。無計所執名法空故。設依他言法體亦離。即是說有依他名唯識性。后得智所緣。知唯識故證其離言。其正體智自證分亦證依他。緣見分故。故今總言。

論。此識若無至而建立故。

述曰。若唯識無。便是無俗諦。俗諦即依他故。俗諦若無。亦無真諦。以真．俗相依建立故。依識俗事有真識理。此二相依互相待故。闕一不可。四重俗諦中。前三是俗諦。俗諦中第四俗諦。是俗中真諦。故俗中定真．俗亦是相依。四重真諦中。前三是俗諦

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 令我們知道外在之法也是不存在的緣故。

論：這唯識之性難道不也是空嗎？

述記：這段文字是第四個關於唯識成空的詰難。外人又問：爲了去除對法的執著，既然說了唯識，那麼這唯識的自性難道不也是空嗎？現在問的是依他起性，也就是相的自性，而不是問真理。在《唯識二十論》中說：『如果知道諸法在一切種類上都是沒有的，從而進入法無我，那麼唯識也畢竟是空的，還安立什麼呢？』

論：不是這樣的。

述記：這是回答唯識的自性不是空。

論：為什麼呢？

述記：既然不是空，那是為什麼呢？

論：因為它不是所執著的。

述記：有為法和無為法被稱為『有』，我以及我所擁有的被稱為『無』。因為它不是所執著的，所以是『有』。

論：所謂依據識的變現而說為法空。

述記：這是廣泛地說明不是執著。所謂依據識所變現的見分和相分上，錯誤地執著有真實的法，這就是法我，從道理上來說是不可得的，所以說為法空。並不是沒有離開遍計所執的真實存在的有為無漏的正體，以及后得智所證的唯識之性，所以說為法空。沒有遍計所執，才稱為法空。即使依據依他起性來說，法的本體也是遠離言說的。這就是說有依他起性，是后得智所緣的。因為知道唯識，所以證明它是遠離言說的。它的正體智的自證分也證得依他起性，因為它緣于見分。所以現在總的來說。

論：如果這個識沒有，那麼俗諦也就沒有了，因為真諦是依據俗諦而建立的。

述記：如果唯識沒有，那麼就沒有俗諦了，因為俗諦就是依他起性。如果俗諦沒有，那麼也沒有真諦了，因為真諦和俗諦是相互依存而建立的。依據識的俗事，才有真實的識理，這兩者相互依存，互相依賴，缺少一個都不可以。在四重俗諦中，前三個是俗諦，俗諦中的第四個俗諦，是俗諦中的真諦。所以俗諦中一定有真諦，俗諦和真諦也是相互依存的。在四重真諦中，前三個是俗諦。

【English Translation】 English version It is known that external dharmas are also non-existent.

Treatise: Is this nature of consciousness-only also empty?

Commentary: This passage is the fourth difficulty regarding the emptiness of consciousness-only. An outsider asks again: To eliminate attachment to dharmas, since consciousness-only is discussed, isn't this nature of consciousness-only also empty? The question now concerns the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava), which is the nature of phenomena, not the ultimate truth. The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only states: 'If one knows that all dharmas are non-existent in every way and enters into the non-self of dharmas, then consciousness-only is also ultimately non-existent. What is there to establish?'

Treatise: It is not so.

Commentary: This answers that the nature of consciousness-only is not empty.

Treatise: How so?

Commentary: Since it is not empty, how is it?

Treatise: Because it is not what is clung to.

Commentary: Conditioned (samskrta) and unconditioned (asamskrta) are called 'existent' (bhava). 'I' and 'mine' are called 'non-existent' (abhava). Because it is not what is clung to, it is 'existent'.

Treatise: It is said to be the emptiness of dharmas (dharma-sunyata) based on the transformations of consciousness.

Commentary: This broadly explains what is not clung to. It means that based on the perceived object-aspect (nimitta-bhaga) and perceiving subject-aspect (darsana-bhaga) transformed by consciousness, there is a false clinging to real dharmas. This is the self of dharmas (dharma-atma), which is logically unattainable, and therefore it is said to be the emptiness of dharmas. It is not that there is no truly existent conditioned, undefiled (anāsrava) essence apart from the completely imputed nature (parikalpita-svabhava), as well as the nature of consciousness-only realized by the subsequent wisdom (prsthalabdha-jnana). Therefore, it is said to be the emptiness of dharmas. The absence of the completely imputed is called the emptiness of dharmas. Even based on the dependent nature, the essence of dharmas is beyond words. This means that there is a dependent nature, which is the object of subsequent wisdom. Because one knows consciousness-only, it proves that it is beyond words. The self-cognition aspect (sva-samvedana-bhaga) of the essential wisdom also realizes the dependent nature because it cognizes the perceived object-aspect. Therefore, it is now stated generally.

Treatise: If this consciousness did not exist, then the conventional truth (samvrti-satya) would not exist, because the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya) is established based on the conventional truth.

Commentary: If consciousness-only did not exist, then there would be no conventional truth, because the conventional truth is the dependent nature. If the conventional truth did not exist, then there would be no ultimate truth, because the ultimate truth and the conventional truth are mutually dependent and established. Based on the conventional matters of consciousness, there is the true principle of consciousness. These two are mutually dependent and rely on each other; lacking one is not possible. Among the four levels of conventional truth, the first three are conventional truth. The fourth conventional truth among the conventional truths is the ultimate truth within the conventional. Therefore, there must be ultimate truth within the conventional, and the conventional and ultimate are also mutually dependent. Among the four levels of ultimate truth, the first three are conventional truth.

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。第四是真諦。即真中真．俗亦是相依。若總四俗真相望。皆真皆俗亦是相依。若無一俗。真對何立。無真亦爾。故二諦須有。

論。撥無二諦至說前二頌。

述曰。若撥無識及性。即撥無二諦。佛說為不可治者。沉淪生死病根深故。即清辨等。應知諸法遍計所執無故有空。依他．圓成有故有不空也。故彌勒說前二頌。即前中邊頌。二十唯識義與此同。

下文第五色相非心難。外人問曰。

論。若諸色處至相續而轉。

述曰。攝論第四亦有此難。無性云。若諸色處亦識為體等者。此問色識堅住相續轉之所以　似色相者。有形礙故　一類者。是相似義。前後一類無有變異。亦無間斷故名堅住。天親云。多時住故。即此說名相續而轉。一類堅住即是相續而轉。是此中問意。

論。名言熏習勢力起故。

述曰。此論主答。妄習色相一類等故有此相現。非真實有無性．天親皆無此解。謂由無始名言熏習住在身中。由彼勢力此色等起相續而轉。

論。與染凈法而依處故。

述曰。此第二解。

如何為依。

論。謂此若無至亦似色現。

述曰。此廣前依。由元迷執色等境故生顛倒等。色等若無。應無顛倒。顛倒即諸識等緣此境色而起妄執名為顛倒。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：第四是真諦（Paramārtha-satya）。即真中之真，俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya）也是依附於真諦而存在。如果總的來看四種俗諦和真諦，它們都是真，也都是俗，並且相互依存。如果沒有俗諦，真諦又依什麼而成立？沒有真諦也是一樣。所以二諦（真諦和俗諦）必須同時存在。

論：駁斥否定二諦的觀點，直到說明前面的兩首偈頌。

述記：如果否定了阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna）和自性，就是否定了二諦。佛說這種觀點是不可救治的，因為沉淪生死的病根太深了。這裡指的是清辨（Bhāvaviveka）等人。應該知道諸法是由於遍計所執性（Parikalpita）的空性而存在空，依他起性（Paratantra）和圓成實性（Pariniṣpanna）的存在而存在不空。所以彌勒（Maitreya）菩薩說了前面的兩首偈頌，也就是《中邊分別論頌》（Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā）中的偈頌。《二十唯識論》（Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi）的意義與此相同。

下文第五個問題是色相併非心識的難題。外道問道：

論：如果諸色處（Rūpa-āyatana）也是識的體性，那麼為什麼色處能夠堅固、持續不斷地運轉？

述記：《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第四卷也有這個難題。無性（Asaṅga）說：『如果諸色處也是識的體性』等等。這裡問的是色識堅固、持續運轉的原因。『相似色相』，是因為有形礙的緣故。『一類』，是相似的意思。前後相似而沒有變異，也沒有間斷，所以叫做堅固。天親（Vasubandhu）說：『長時間存在』，這就是所說的持續運轉。一類堅固就是持續運轉。這是這一段的提問的含義。

論：由於名言熏習的勢力生起。

述記：這是論主的回答。由於虛妄習氣的色相一類等等，所以有這種現象顯現。並非真實存在。無性（Asaṅga）和天親（Vasubandhu）都沒有這種解釋。意思是由於無始以來的名言熏習住在身中，由於這種勢力，這些色等生起並持續運轉。

論：因為是染污法和清凈法的所依之處。

述記：這是第二個解釋。

如何成為所依之處？

論：如果這個不存在，那麼就不會產生對色等境界的虛妄執著，也就不應該有顛倒。顛倒就是諸識等緣于這個境界的色而生起的虛妄執著，叫做顛倒。這裡

【English Translation】 English version: Fourth is the Paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth). That is the truth among truths, and the Saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth) also depends on the Paramārtha-satya. If we look at the four Saṃvṛti-satyas and the Paramārtha-satya as a whole, they are all true and all conventional, and they are interdependent. If there is no Saṃvṛti-satya, what does the Paramārtha-satya rely on to be established? It is the same without the Paramārtha-satya. Therefore, the two truths (Paramārtha-satya and Saṃvṛti-satya) must coexist.

Treatise: Refuting the view of denying the two truths, up to explaining the previous two verses.

Commentary: If you deny the Ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness) and self-nature, you are denying the two truths. The Buddha said that this view is incurable because the root of the disease of being trapped in Saṃsāra (cycle of rebirth) is too deep. This refers to people like Bhāvaviveka. It should be known that all dharmas exist as empty because of the emptiness of the Parikalpita (the fully conceptualized nature), and they exist as not empty because of the existence of the Paratantra (the dependent nature) and the Pariniṣpanna (the fully accomplished nature). Therefore, Maitreya Bodhisattva spoke the previous two verses, which are the verses in the Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā (Verses on Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes). The meaning of the Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi (Twenty Verses on Representation-Only) is the same as this.

The fifth question below is the difficulty that Rūpa-lakṣaṇa (the appearance of form) is not consciousness. An outsider asks:

Treatise: If the Rūpa-āyatana (sphere of form) is also the nature of consciousness, then why can the sphere of form be firm and continuously operate?

Commentary: The fourth volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna) also has this difficulty. Asaṅga said: 'If the Rūpa-āyatana is also the nature of consciousness,' etc. This asks the reason why the form-consciousness is firm and continuously operating. 'Similar to the appearance of form' is because it has shape and obstruction. 'One kind' means similar. It is similar before and after without change or interruption, so it is called firm. Vasubandhu said: 'It exists for a long time,' which is what is called continuous operation. One kind of firmness is continuous operation. This is the meaning of the question in this section.

Treatise: Because of the power of the Vāsanā (habitual energy) of verbal expression arising.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. Because of the appearance of form of false habitual energy being of one kind, etc., this phenomenon appears. It is not really there. Asaṅga and Vasubandhu do not have this explanation. It means that due to the habitual energy of verbal expression from beginningless time residing in the body, these forms, etc., arise and continue to operate due to this power.

Treatise: Because it is the basis of dependence for defiled and pure dharmas.

Commentary: This is the second explanation.

How does it become the basis of dependence?

Treatise: If this does not exist, then there would be no false attachment to the realm of form, etc., and there should be no Viparyāsa (inversions). Viparyāsa is the false attachment that arises from the consciousnesses, etc., being conditioned by the form of this realm, and it is called Viparyāsa. Here

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識等顛倒無故便無雜染雜染即是煩惱．業．生。或顛倒體即是煩惱．業．生。此等無故便無二障雜染。二障雜染無故。無漏凈亦無無所斷故何有清凈。

論。如有頌言至若無餘亦無。

述曰。攝論第四無著頌本。亂相者。相者因也。亂謂心等忘倒。以色識為因起忘心故。說色識為亂相。亂體即是諸識。順結頌法故文隔越。應許為色識即亂相。及與非色識。即是亂體。謂彼難云。若不許有外色。云何似色現。今答由亂相．亂體故。汝應許有色識．及非色識。若無所變似色亂因。能變亂體亦不得有。境因能生心之果故。

論。色等外境至寧撥為無。

述曰。此文第六現量為宗難。外人問曰。色等五外境。分明五識現證。是現量得大．小極成。寧撥為無。唯識二十云。諸法由量刊定有無。一切量中現量為勝。若無外境寧有此覺。我今現證如是境耶。

論。現量證時至妄生外想。

述曰。下論主依自宗答。五識．及同時意識。現量得時不執為外。現量得自相。法體非外故不言外法。無內外故。無計度故　順他宗解。五識緣境現量得時不執為外。五識等后意。妄生心外境想。實無外境。

論。故現量境至說彼為無。

述曰。現量照自體故。是五識等四分之中自相分故。識所變

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 識等顛倒沒有了，自然也就沒有雜染，雜染就是煩惱、業、生。或者說，顛倒的本體就是煩惱、業、生。這些沒有了，自然也就沒有二障雜染。二障雜染沒有了，無漏清凈也就沒有了，因為沒有需要斷除的東西，又怎麼會有清凈呢？

論：就像頌文所說的那樣，如果（亂相和亂體）沒有了，那麼（能變之識）也就沒有了。

述記：在《攝大乘論》第四中，無著菩薩的頌文原本是這樣說的：『亂相』，『相』指的是因。『亂』指的是心等的忘失顛倒。因為以色識為因而生起忘失之心，所以說色識是亂相。亂的本體就是各種識。因為順應頌文的法則，所以文句有些跳躍。應該允許色識就是亂相，以及非色識就是亂體。這是爲了回答對方的提問：如果不承認有外在的色，那麼為什麼會有像色一樣的顯現呢？現在回答說，由於有亂相和亂體，所以你應該承認有色識以及非色識。如果沒有所變的像色一樣的亂因，那麼能變的亂體也就不會存在，因為境是產生心的果的原因。

論：色等外境，分明地被五識所現證，怎麼能說沒有呢？

述記：這段文字是第六識以現量為依據進行辯難。外人問道：色等五種外境，分明地被五識現量所證實，這是現量所得，是大家普遍認可的，怎麼能說沒有呢？《唯識二十論》中說，諸法的有無是由量來決定的，一切量中現量最為殊勝。如果沒有外境，怎麼會有這種感覺呢？我現在明明現證了這樣的境界啊。

論：在現量證知的時候，並不執著為外境，只是後來才妄生外境的想法。

述記：下面論主依據自己的宗派來回答。五識以及同時生起的意識，在現量得到的時候並不執著為外境。現量得到的是自相，法體不是外在的，所以不說外法，因為沒有內外之分，也沒有計度分別。順應對方的宗派來解釋，五識緣取境界，在現量得到的時候並不執著為外境，只是在五識等之後，意識才妄生心外有境的想法，實際上並沒有外境。

論：所以現量所照的境界是自體，是識所變現的，因此說它是沒有的。

述記：現量照的是自體，是五識等四分之中的自相分，是識所變現的。

【English Translation】 English version: When the inversions of consciousness and so on cease, naturally there is no defilement. Defilement is none other than afflictions, karma, and rebirth. Or, the very essence of inversion is afflictions, karma, and rebirth. When these cease, naturally there is no dual-obstacle defilement. When dual-obstacle defilement ceases, unconditioned purity also ceases, because there is nothing to be severed, so how can there be purity?

Treatise: As the verse says, if (the aspects of confusion and the substance of confusion) do not exist, then (the transforming consciousness) also does not exist.

Commentary: In the fourth section of the Treatise on the Compendium of the Great Vehicle, the original verse by Asanga Bodhisattva states: 'Aspects of confusion,' where 'aspect' refers to the cause. 'Confusion' refers to the forgetfulness and inversion of mind and so on. Because the arising of a forgetful mind is caused by form-consciousness (rupa-vijnana), form-consciousness is said to be the aspect of confusion. The substance of confusion is the various consciousnesses. Because it follows the rules of verse, the sentences are somewhat disjointed. It should be accepted that form-consciousness is the aspect of confusion, and non-form-consciousness is the substance of confusion. This is to answer the opponent's question: If one does not admit the existence of external form, then why does it appear like form? Now the answer is, due to the aspect of confusion and the substance of confusion, you should admit the existence of form-consciousness and non-form-consciousness. If there is no cause of confusion that transforms into something like form, then the substance of confusion that transforms also cannot exist, because the object is the cause of the result of the mind.

Treatise: How can external objects such as form, which are clearly witnessed by the five consciousnesses, be denied?

Commentary: This passage is the sixth consciousness arguing based on direct perception (pratyaksha). The outsider asks: External objects such as the five forms are clearly verified by the direct perception of the five consciousnesses. This is obtained through direct perception and is universally acknowledged, both by the great and the small. How can it be denied? The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only states that the existence or non-existence of phenomena is determined by valid cognition (pramana), and among all valid cognitions, direct perception is the most excellent. If there is no external object, how can there be such a feeling? I am now directly perceiving such a realm.

Treatise: At the time of direct perception, there is no attachment to it as external; it is only later that the false idea of an external object arises.

Commentary: Below, the author of the treatise answers based on his own school. The five consciousnesses and the simultaneously arising consciousness do not cling to it as external when directly perceiving it. Direct perception obtains the self-nature (svalaksana), and the essence of the dharma is not external, so it is not called an external dharma, because there is no distinction between internal and external, and there is no conceptual discrimination. Explaining it according to the opponent's school, the five consciousnesses grasp the realm, and at the time of direct perception, they do not cling to it as external. It is only after the five consciousnesses and so on that consciousness falsely generates the idea that there is a realm outside the mind. In reality, there is no external realm.

Treatise: Therefore, the realm illuminated by direct perception is the self-nature, transformed by consciousness, and therefore it is said to be non-existent.

Commentary: Direct perception illuminates the self-nature, which is the self-nature division (svalaksana-bhaga) among the four divisions of the five consciousnesses and so on, and is transformed by consciousness.

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故。今說為有。亦能變識。后時意識所執外為實色等境。妄計情有故。說彼為非有。此明內心變似色等現是心之相分。此但非外妄計所執心外之法是無說彼非有。不稱境故。五識中嗔等。亦親不順本質境。但稱親所變相分故。非遍計所執。唯識二十說此頌言。現覺如夢等。已起現覺時。見及境已無。寧許有現量。正量部等各別破之。正量部師許境相續。諸識剎那。今破之言。五識后意緣現色等時。五識現量能見者已滅非有。此五識后意分別故謂為外也。故非現證。薩婆多等色等亦唸唸滅。后意緣時見及境亦已無。五識及所緣皆已滅故。如何有現覺。此中文總。意含二種。以彼二宗六識不俱故。若大眾部等。及大乘。諸識雖俱。然五識俱現量意識同於五識。此二現量不分明執。后時意識方分別執謂為外境。現量得時不作外解。然今此中據自多分。及就他宗說現量時不執為外。然實五俱亦有意識妄執者也。五識相續緣色等。意與五同緣。若不執者。若聞聲等應不執實。若五識滅方起執者。后五識生何故執斷。然但堅深可說有異。非五識俱無有執也。諸處但說五識俱意識是現量。不言定爾。故不相違。由此亦無有多過失。如別抄中敘諸師說。

此依道理以答外人。下依法體性非內外。遮外橫執妄言為外。

論。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，現在說『有』，也能轉變意識。後來的意識所執著的外部境界，認為是真實的色等境界，這是虛妄的計度而產生的執著，所以說那些是『非有』。這說明內心變現出類似色等境界的現象，是心的相分。這僅僅是否定了外在的虛妄計度所執著的、心外的法，說它是『非有』，因為它不符合真實的境界。五識中的嗔等，也不直接順應本質境，只是符合親所變的相分，所以不是遍計所執。在《唯識二十論》中，有這樣的頌詞：『現覺如夢等，已起現覺時，見及境已無，寧許有現量？』正量部等各自分別破斥它。正量部的論師認為境界是相續的，而各個識是剎那生滅的。現在破斥他們說，五識之後的意識緣取顯現的色等境界時，五識的現量能見的功能已經滅失，不再存在。這是因為五識之後的意識進行了分別，才認為是外境，所以不是現量所證。薩婆多部等認為色等也是念念生滅的，後來的意識緣取時，能見的功能和境界也已經不存在。五識和所緣的對象都已經滅失，怎麼會有現覺呢？這段話總的來說，意含兩種情況，因為他們兩宗的六識不是同時俱起的。如果按照大眾部等，以及大乘的觀點，各個識雖然同時俱起，但是五識同時俱起的現量意識，與五識相同。這兩種現量不能分明地執取，後來的意識才分別執取，認為是外境。現量得到的時候，不認為是外在的。然而，現在這裡是根據自身的大部分情況，以及就他宗的觀點來說，現量的時候不執著為外在。然而，實際上五識同時俱起的時候，也有意識虛妄執著的情況。五識相續緣取色等，意識與五識一同緣取。如果不執著，那麼聽到聲音等，應該不執著為真實。如果五識滅去之後才產生執著，那麼後來的五識產生時，為什麼會執著中斷呢？然而，只是堅固和深刻可以認為是有差異的，並非五識同時俱起時沒有執著。各處只是說五識同時俱起的意識是現量，沒有說一定是這樣，所以不相違背。由此也沒有很多過失，如同別抄中敘述各位論師的說法。

這是依據道理來回答外人。下面依據法體性，不是內在也不是外在，遮止外人橫加執著，虛妄地說它是外在。

論。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, now saying 'existent,' it can also transform consciousness. Later, the external realms grasped by consciousness are considered real realms of form, etc. This is a false calculation and attachment, so it is said that those are 'non-existent.' This explains that the phenomena that appear in the mind, resembling realms of form, etc., are the aspect-division (相分) of the mind. This merely denies the external dharma outside the mind, which is falsely calculated and attached to, saying it is 'non-existent' because it does not conform to the true realm. Anger, etc., in the five consciousnesses also do not directly accord with the essential realm (本質境), but only accord with the aspect-division transformed by what is close, so it is not the conceptually constructed (遍計所執). In the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (唯識二十論), there is this verse: 'Present perception is like a dream, etc.; when present perception has arisen, the seeing and the realm are already non-existent; how can one allow for present awareness (現量)?' The Sautrantika school (正量部), etc., each separately refute it. The teachers of the Sautrantika school believe that the realm is continuous, while the individual consciousnesses are momentary. Now, refuting them, it is said that when the consciousness after the five consciousnesses grasps the appearing realms of form, etc., the function of present awareness of the five consciousnesses has already ceased and is no longer existent. This is because the consciousness after the five consciousnesses makes distinctions, so it is considered an external realm; therefore, it is not proven by present awareness. The Sarvastivadins (薩婆多部), etc., believe that form, etc., also arise and cease momentarily; when later consciousness grasps it, the function of seeing and the realm are also no longer existent. Since the five consciousnesses and the objects they grasp have all ceased, how can there be present perception? This passage, in general, contains two meanings, because the six consciousnesses of those two schools do not arise simultaneously. If according to the views of the Mahasanghika school (大眾部), etc., and the Mahayana, although the individual consciousnesses arise simultaneously, the present awareness consciousness that arises simultaneously with the five consciousnesses is the same as the five consciousnesses. These two kinds of present awareness cannot clearly grasp, and later consciousness then separately grasps, considering it an external realm. When present awareness is obtained, it is not considered external. However, here it is based on the majority of one's own situation, and according to the views of other schools, at the time of present awareness, it is not attached to as external. However, in reality, when the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously, there are also cases of consciousness falsely attaching. The five consciousnesses continuously grasp form, etc., and consciousness grasps along with the five consciousnesses. If one does not attach, then upon hearing sounds, etc., one should not attach to them as real. If attachment arises after the five consciousnesses have ceased, then when the later five consciousnesses arise, why would the attachment be interrupted? However, only firmness and depth can be considered different; it is not that there is no attachment when the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously. In various places, it is only said that the consciousness that arises simultaneously with the five consciousnesses is present awareness; it is not said that it must be so, so there is no contradiction. Therefore, there are not many faults either, as described in the separate notes by various teachers.

This is based on reason to answer outsiders. Below, based on the nature of the dharma-body, it is neither internal nor external, preventing outsiders from arbitrarily attaching and falsely saying it is external.

Treatise.

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又色等境至是實外色。

述曰。依他色等諸境體非遍計色。似遍計所執色。遍計所執色雖無。似彼情計。非外似外。如似夢中所緣諸法。不可執為是實。亦執為心外之色。若小乘等難不說意識現量執為外色。但說五識分別現證外境有耶。今此以理答。前解五識不執為外意執外。今說五識所緣相似外。而體非外。但顯正義。不是破他。

論。若覺時色至不知唯識。

述曰。文當第七。夢．覺相違難。外人問曰。若一切覺時之色。皆如夢中之境。不離於識者。此即牒定他宗。自下為難。初先舉喻。下方起難　如從夢覺知彼唯心。即舉喻也。現覺了時所取之境既如夢境。何故覺時于自色境不知唯識。如夢覺時知彼唯心也。此同攝論第四中難。

論。如夢未覺至色境唯識。

述曰。下論主答中。先舉極成為喻。謂如夢未覺不能自知。要至覺時方能追憶前夢之境而體不實方覺知夢　后釋先難。覺時境色應知亦爾。唯識二十頌云。未覺不能知夢所見非有。謂未真覺恒不能自知。至得無漏真覺之時。亦能追憶生死之夢境。覺知是夢境皆非有。如何生死說為夢耶。未得夢覺恒處夢中。故佛說為生死長夜。惛如夢故。由斯道理未了色等境色唯識。

上來依教設難訖。自下第八外取他心難。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 又，色等境，到這裡確實是外色（指獨立於意識之外的色法）。

述記中說：依他起性的色等諸境，其體性並非是遍計所執的色。它只是相似於遍計所執的色。遍計所執的色雖然沒有實體，但人們的情識卻執著於它，它並非外在，卻被認為外在，就像夢中所緣的諸法一樣。不可執著地認為它是真實的，卻執著地認為它是心外的色。如果小乘等宗派詰難說，難道不說意識現量執著為外色嗎？只是說五識是否分別現量證知外境存在？現在用道理來回答。前面解釋五識不執著為外，是意識執著為外。現在說五識所緣的只是相似於外境，而其體性並非外在。這只是爲了闡明正確的義理，不是爲了破斥其他宗派。

論：如果覺醒時的色，直到不知唯識（唯識觀）。

述記中說：這段經文屬於第七部分，是關於夢境與覺醒狀態相違背的詰難。外人問道：如果一切覺醒時所見的色，都像夢中的境界一樣，不離於識，這即是確定對方的宗義。下面開始詰難。首先舉例，然後提出詰難。如從夢覺知彼唯心，即是舉例。現在覺了時所取之境既然如同夢境，為什麼覺醒時對於自己的色境，卻不能知曉唯識的道理，如同從夢中醒來時知道夢境唯心所現一樣呢？這與《攝大乘論》第四品中的詰難相同。

論：如同夢中未醒，直到色境唯識。

述記中說：下面是論主的回答。首先舉一個極端的例子作為比喻，即如同在夢中未醒來時，不能自己知道夢境，一定要到醒來時才能追憶起之前的夢境，並知道其體性不真實，才能覺知那是夢境。然後解釋先前的詰難。覺醒時的境色，應當知道也是如此。唯識二十頌中說：未覺不能知夢所見非有，即是說未真正覺悟時，恒常不能自己知道。到獲得無漏真覺之時，也能追憶起生死輪迴的夢境，覺知這些夢境都不是真實的。為什麼將生死輪迴說成是夢呢？因為未得到夢的覺悟，就恒常處於夢中。所以佛說生死是漫長的黑夜，昏暗如同夢境。由於這個道理，所以不能了知色等境色是唯識所現。

上面是依據教義設立的詰難完畢。下面是第八部分，關於外人如何取知他人心識的詰難。

【English Translation】 English version Furthermore, objective realms such as form, at this point, are indeed external forms (referring to form-dharmas independent of consciousness).

The commentary states: The entities of dependent-arising realms such as form are not the form of what is thoroughly conceptualized. They are similar to the form of what is thoroughly conceptualized. Although the form of what is thoroughly conceptualized has no substance, people's consciousness clings to it. It is not external, yet it is perceived as external, just like the various dharmas experienced in a dream. One should not cling to it as real, yet one clings to it as form outside of the mind. If Hinayana schools challenge, 'Don't you say that consciousness directly grasps external form?' They are merely asking whether the five consciousnesses separately and directly perceive the existence of external realms. Now, this is answered with reason. The previous explanation was that the five consciousnesses do not grasp as external, but consciousness grasps as external. Now it is said that what the five consciousnesses perceive is similar to external realms, but its entity is not external. This is merely to clarify the correct meaning, not to refute other schools.

Treatise: If the form at the time of awakening, until not knowing only consciousness (the view of only consciousness).

The commentary states: This passage belongs to the seventh section, which is about the challenge of the contradiction between dreams and the awakened state. An outsider asks: 'If all the forms seen at the time of awakening are like the realms in a dream, not separate from consciousness,' this is to establish the other's doctrine. Below begins the challenge. First, an analogy is given, and then the challenge is raised. 'As from dream awakening, one knows that is only mind,' this is giving an analogy. Now that the realms taken at the time of awakening are like dream realms, why is it that at the time of awakening, one cannot know the principle of only consciousness regarding one's own form realm, just as one knows that the dream realm is only a manifestation of the mind when one awakens from a dream? This is the same as the challenge in the fourth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

Treatise: Like not being awake in a dream, until the form realm is only consciousness.

The commentary states: Below is the treatise master's answer. First, an extreme example is given as a metaphor, that is, just as one cannot know the dream realm oneself when one is not awake in a dream, one must wait until one wakes up to recall the previous dream realm and know that its entity is not real, and then one can realize that it is a dream. Then, the previous challenge is explained. The objective form at the time of awakening should be known to be the same. The Twenty Verses on Only Consciousness says: 'Not awake, one cannot know that what is seen in a dream is not real,' that is, one cannot always know oneself when one is not truly awakened. When one attains the unconditioned true awakening, one can also recall the dream realm of samsara and know that these dream realms are not real. Why is samsara said to be a dream? Because one is constantly in a dream without attaining the awakening of the dream. Therefore, the Buddha said that samsara is a long night, dark like a dream. Because of this principle, one cannot understand that objective form, etc., is only a manifestation of consciousness.

The above is the end of the challenge established according to the teachings. Below is the eighth section, about the challenge of how outsiders can know the minds of others.

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論。外色實無至寧非自所緣。

述曰。此外人問。此先成五色境是無。已極成訖故為此難。外色實無。可非內識境。他心實有。寧非自所緣。此意令自心親緣他心著。此中若緣著。即心取外境。若不緣著。何故有而不緣著。何名他心智。二十唯識亦有此難。彼云。若不能知。何謂他心智。若能知者。唯識應不成。

論。誰說他心至是親所緣。

述曰。此論主答。誰說他心非自識境。許有他心亦為我境。所以有他心智。但不說他心是自心親所緣。故成唯識。

論。謂識生時至謂自所變。

述曰。無實作用諸法皆爾。無有作用及作者故。心緣于境。非如手．鉗親執離身之外物。亦非如日月．火光。舒光親照體外之物。心等緣時。但如汝宗鏡等照物。似外境現名了他心。他心之影于自心上現名了他心。非心親能了他心也。親所了者謂自所變之相分。以無作用。及實不能取外境故。

論。故契經言至名取彼物。

述曰。解深密言。無有少法。無少實法能取余法。餘者心外實法也。非自實心能取他實心。但識生時心似彼他心相現名取他心也。

論。如緣他心色等亦爾。

述曰。緣他相分色。自身別識所變色等亦爾。無性第四云。無作用故。如是心生時緣起法不滅力故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：外在的色法（Rūpa，物質現象）實際上並不存在，那麼達到寧靜的狀態難道不是自身所緣（Ālambana，認識對像）嗎？

述曰：這是外道之人提出的問題。他們認為，既然先前已經成立的五色境（Pañca-viṣaya，五種感官對像）是真實存在的，那麼以此來發難：如果外在的色法實際上不存在，那麼它就不應該是內在意識的境界；如果他人的心識是真實存在的，那麼它難道不應該是自身所緣嗎？這意思是想讓自心親身緣取他人的心識。如果自心緣取他人的心識，那就等於心識可以取外境；如果不緣取，那麼為什麼存在卻不緣取呢？又憑什麼叫做他心智（Para-citta-jñāna，瞭解他人心識的智慧）？《二十唯識論》中也有類似的詰難，他們說：『如果不能知曉，那還叫什麼他心智？如果能夠知曉，那麼唯識（Vijñānavāda，唯識宗）的理論就應該不能成立。』

論：誰說他人的心識是親身所緣的？

述曰：這是論主的回答。誰說他人的心識不是自身意識的境界？我們承認有他人的心識，也作為我的境界。所以才會有他心智。但是我們並沒有說他人的心識是自心親身所緣的，所以唯識的理論才能成立。

論：所謂意識生起的時候，只是緣取自身所變現的。

述曰：一切法都沒有真實的作用，因為沒有作用者和作者。心緣取境界，不像手或鉗子那樣親手抓住遠離身體的外物，也不像太陽或火光那樣，舒展光芒親身照耀體外的物體。心等緣取的時候，就像你們宗派的鏡子照物一樣，顯現出類似外境的影像，這叫做了他人的心識。他人的心識的影像在自己的心上顯現，叫做了他人的心識。並不是心能夠親身瞭解他人的心識。親身所瞭解的，是自身所變現的相分（Nimitta-bhāga，影像部分）。因為沒有真實的作用，而且實際上也不能夠取外境。

論：所以《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra）說，沒有任何法，沒有任何真實存在的法能夠取其他的法。

述曰：《解深密經》說，沒有任何少許的法，沒有任何真實存在的法能夠取其他的法。其他的法，指的是心外真實存在的法。不是自身真實的心能夠取他人真實的心，只是意識生起的時候，心識顯現出類似他人心識的相狀，這叫做取了他人的心識。

論：就像緣取他人的心識所變現的色法等一樣。

述曰：緣取他人相分所變現的色法，以及自身別識所變現的色法等也是如此。《無性釋》（Asaṅga's commentary）第四卷說，因為沒有作用的緣故。這樣，心生起的時候，依靠緣起法不滅的力量。

English version: Treatise: If external Rūpa (form, material phenomena) does not truly exist, then is reaching the state of tranquility not self-cognized (Ālambana, object of cognition)?

Commentary: This is a question posed by outsiders. They argue that since the five sense objects (Pañca-viṣaya, five sensory realms) that were previously established are real, they use this to challenge: If external Rūpa does not truly exist, then it should not be the realm of internal consciousness; if the minds of others truly exist, then should it not be self-cognized? The intention is to have one's own mind directly grasp the minds of others. If one's own mind grasps the minds of others, then it is equivalent to consciousness being able to grasp external objects; if it does not grasp, then why does it exist but not grasp? And why is it called Para-citta-jñāna (knowledge of the minds of others)? The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only also has a similar challenge, saying: 'If one cannot know, then what is it called knowledge of the minds of others? If one can know, then the theory of Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-Only) should not be established.'

Treatise: Who says that the minds of others are directly cognized?

Commentary: This is the treatise master's response. Who says that the minds of others are not the realm of one's own consciousness? We acknowledge that there are minds of others, and they also serve as my realm. That is why there is knowledge of the minds of others. But we have not said that the minds of others are directly cognized by one's own mind, so the theory of Consciousness-Only can be established.

Treatise: What is called the arising of consciousness is merely the cognition of what is transformed by oneself.

Commentary: All dharmas do not have real function, because there is no agent or actor. The mind cognizes a realm, not like a hand or tongs that directly grasp external objects away from the body, nor like the sun or firelight that extends rays to directly illuminate objects outside the body. When the mind and so on cognize, it is like a mirror reflecting objects in your school, manifesting an image similar to an external realm, which is called knowing the minds of others. The image of the minds of others appears on one's own mind, which is called the minds of others. It is not that the mind can directly understand the minds of others. What is directly understood is the Nimitta-bhāga (image-aspect) transformed by oneself. Because there is no real function, and in reality, one cannot grasp external realms.

Treatise: Therefore, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經) says that there is no dharma, no truly existing dharma, that can grasp other dharmas.

Commentary: The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra says that there is not the slightest dharma, no truly existing dharma, that can grasp other dharmas. Other dharmas refer to truly existing dharmas outside the mind. It is not that one's own true mind can grasp the true minds of others, but when consciousness arises, the mind manifests an appearance similar to the minds of others, which is called grasping the minds of others.

Treatise: It is the same as cognizing the Rūpa (form) and so on transformed by the minds of others.

Commentary: Cognizing the Rūpa transformed by the image-aspects of others, as well as the Rūpa transformed by one's own separate consciousness, is also the same. Asaṅga's commentary, volume four, says that because there is no function. Thus, when the mind arises, it relies on the power of the non-extinction of dependent origination.

【English Translation】 Treatise: If external Rūpa (form, material phenomena) does not truly exist, then is reaching the state of tranquility not self-cognized (Ālambana, object of cognition)?

Commentary: This is a question posed by outsiders. They argue that since the five sense objects (Pañca-viṣaya, five sensory realms) that were previously established are real, they use this to challenge: If external Rūpa does not truly exist, then it should not be the realm of internal consciousness; if the minds of others truly exist, then should it not be self-cognized? The intention is to have one's own mind directly grasp the minds of others. If one's own mind grasps the minds of others, then it is equivalent to consciousness being able to grasp external objects; if it does not grasp, then why does it exist but not grasp? And why is it called Para-citta-jñāna (knowledge of the minds of others)? The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only also has a similar challenge, saying: 'If one cannot know, then what is it called knowledge of the minds of others? If one can know, then the theory of Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-Only) should not be established.'

Treatise: Who says that the minds of others are directly cognized?

Commentary: This is the treatise master's response. Who says that the minds of others are not the realm of one's own consciousness? We acknowledge that there are minds of others, and they also serve as my realm. That is why there is knowledge of the minds of others. But we have not said that the minds of others are directly cognized by one's own mind, so the theory of Consciousness-Only can be established.

Treatise: What is called the arising of consciousness is merely the cognition of what is transformed by oneself.

Commentary: All dharmas do not have real function, because there is no agent or actor. The mind cognizes a realm, not like a hand or tongs that directly grasp external objects away from the body, nor like the sun or firelight that extends rays to directly illuminate objects outside the body. When the mind and so on cognize, it is like a mirror reflecting objects in your school, manifesting an image similar to an external realm, which is called knowing the minds of others. The image of the minds of others appears on one's own mind, which is called the minds of others. It is not that the mind can directly understand the minds of others. What is directly understood is the Nimitta-bhāga (image-aspect) transformed by oneself. Because there is no real function, and in reality, one cannot grasp external realms.

Treatise: Therefore, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經) says that there is no dharma, no truly existing dharma, that can grasp other dharmas.

Commentary: The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra says that there is not the slightest dharma, no truly existing dharma, that can grasp other dharmas. Other dharmas refer to truly existing dharmas outside the mind. It is not that one's own true mind can grasp the true minds of others, but when consciousness arises, the mind manifests an appearance similar to the minds of others, which is called grasping the minds of others.

Treatise: It is the same as cognizing the Rūpa (form) and so on transformed by the minds of others.

Commentary: Cognizing the Rūpa transformed by the image-aspects of others, as well as the Rūpa transformed by one's own separate consciousness, is also the same. Asaṅga's commentary, volume four, says that because there is no function. Thus, when the mind arises, it relies on the power of the non-extinction of dependent origination.

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即一法體之上有二影生　相．見　更互相望不即不離。諸心．心法由緣起力其性法爾如是而生。如質為緣還見本質。以心為緣還見自心。無別見外心等　唯識二十頌云。他心智云何。知境不如實。如知自心智。不知如佛境。廣說如彼抄解。

下異境非唯難。

論。既有異境何名唯識。

述曰。此下第九外人問曰。唯識之義但心之外更無有物。既有他心異自心之境。何名唯識。許有他色等故。

論。奇哉固執至但說一識。

述曰。此論主答。即毀多疑。豈唯識教但說唯我一人之識更無餘法也。

論。不爾如何。

述曰。此外人問。

論。汝應諦聽至有深意趣。

述曰。此論主解。且初返難。若唯有我一人之識。寧有十方凡聖．尊卑．因果等別。等者等取色．心等別別法。無佛故誰為我說。無眾生故佛為誰說。無涅槃．菩提果故有何法。無法故我何所求　或無行修何法。無涅槃等何所求。故唯識言有深意趣。

意趣如何。

論。識言總顯至所顯真如。

述曰。此釋深意。一切有情各各有八識．遍行等六位心所。各各自體分。及此所變相．見二分。及色．心分位二十四不相應等。及彼二無我空理所顯真如。以空理為門顯真如也。空性即是二無我

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 就像一個法體之上產生兩個影子，相分（相，指所觀察或體驗的對象）和見分（見，指能觀察或體驗的主體）互相觀望，不即不離。各種心和心法，由於因緣生起的力量，其自性本來就是如此而生。如同以物質為因緣，反而能見到物質的本質；以心為因緣，反而能見到自己的心。沒有另外見到外在的心等等。唯識二十頌說：『他心智如何得知？因為所知的境界並不真實，就像知道自己的心智一樣，卻不能知道如佛的境界。』詳細的解釋如同彼處的抄解。

下面說明不同的境界並非只有困難。

論：既然有不同的境界，為何稱為唯識？

述曰：下面第九個外道之人問道：唯識的意義是除了心之外，再沒有其他事物。既然有他人的心，與自己的心境不同，為何稱為唯識？這是因為承認有他人的色法等等。

論：奇怪啊，你真是固執，竟然認為唯識只說一個識。

述曰：這是論主的回答，即駁斥多種疑惑。難道唯識的教義只是說只有我一個人的識，再沒有其他法了嗎？

論：不是這樣的，那又該如何理解呢？

述曰：這是外道之人提問。

論：你應該仔細聽，其中有深刻的意趣。

述曰：這是論主的解釋。首先反駁對方的詰難。如果只有我一個人的識，哪裡會有十方凡夫、聖人、尊貴、卑賤、因果等等差別？等等，包括色法、心法等等各種不同的法。沒有佛，誰來為我說法？沒有眾生，佛又為誰說法？沒有涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）和菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）的果實，又有什麼法？沒有法，我又能求什麼？或者沒有修行，又能修什麼法？沒有涅槃等等，又能求什麼？所以說唯識之言有深刻的意趣。

意趣是什麼呢？

論：識這個詞總括地顯示了八識、遍行等等，以及所顯示的真如（Tathata，事物的真實如是的狀態）。

述曰：這是解釋深刻的意趣。一切有情眾生各自都有八識、遍行等等六位心所，各自的自體分，以及這些所轉變的相分和見分，以及色法、心法、分位、二十四種不相應行等等，以及那二無我（Anatta，無我）空理所顯示的真如。以空理為門來顯示真如。空性就是二無我。

【English Translation】 English version: It's like two shadows arising from one Dharmakaya (Dharmakaya, the body of the Dharma, the ultimate reality), the Nimitta-bhaga (Nimitta-bhaga, the objective aspect of perception) and the Darsana-bhaga (Darsana-bhaga, the subjective aspect of perception) gazing at each other, neither identical nor separate. Various minds and mental factors arise due to the power of causal conditions, their nature being inherently so. Just as with matter as the condition, one can see the essence of matter; with mind as the condition, one can see one's own mind. There is no separate seeing of external minds, etc. The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only state: 'How is the mind of another known? Because the known realm is not real, just as knowing one's own mind, one cannot know the realm of the Buddha.' Detailed explanations are as in the commentaries there.

The following explains that different realms are not only difficult.

Treatise: Since there are different realms, why is it called Consciousness-Only?

Commentary: Here, the ninth non-Buddhist asks: The meaning of Consciousness-Only is that there is nothing other than mind. Since there is the mind of another, which is different from one's own mind, why is it called Consciousness-Only? This is because it admits the existence of the Rupas (Rupas, forms) of others, etc.

Treatise: How strange, you are so stubborn as to think that Consciousness-Only only speaks of one consciousness.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's reply, refuting multiple doubts. Does the teaching of Consciousness-Only merely say that there is only my consciousness and no other Dharmas?

Treatise: It is not like that, then how should it be understood?

Commentary: This is the non-Buddhist's question.

Treatise: You should listen carefully, there is a profound meaning in it.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's explanation. First, he refutes the opponent's challenge. If there were only my consciousness, where would there be the distinctions of the ten directions, ordinary beings, sages, noble, lowly, cause and effect, etc.? 'Etc.' includes various different Dharmas such as Rupas, minds, etc. Without the Buddha, who would speak the Dharma for me? Without sentient beings, for whom would the Buddha speak the Dharma? Without the fruits of Nirvana (Nirvana, liberation) and Bodhi (Bodhi, enlightenment), what Dharma would there be? Without Dharma, what could I seek? Or without practice, what Dharma could I cultivate? Without Nirvana, etc., what could I seek? Therefore, the words 'Consciousness-Only' have a profound meaning.

What is the profound meaning?

Treatise: The word 'Consciousness' comprehensively reveals the eight consciousnesses, the pervasive mental factors, etc., as well as the Tathata (Tathata, the suchness of things, the true state of affairs) that is revealed.

Commentary: This explains the profound meaning. All sentient beings each have eight consciousnesses, the pervasive mental factors, etc., the self-essence of each, as well as the Nimitta-bhaga and Darsana-bhaga transformed from these, as well as Rupas, minds, positions, the twenty-four non-associated formations, etc., and the Tathata revealed by the two Anatta (Anatta, no-self) emptiness principles. The Tathata is revealed by using the emptiness principle as the gateway. Emptiness is the two Anattas.

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理。由此理故便顯真如。

論。識自相故至總立識名。

述曰。所以許有識自體者。識自相故。許心所者。識相應法故。許見．相分者。即心．及心所二體所變故。許不相應者。即前三種分位故。許真如者。即前四種實性故。如是五法皆不離識總名為識。非無心所等。

此即識言所表。下顯唯言所遮。

論。唯言但遮至實有色等。

述曰。此顯但遮。一切愚夫通二乘等。執定離諸識實有色等。為不實故妄顛倒故。此且舉色等取一切。其實亦遮如上所說離識五法皆是有也。

即答理難訖。自下第十總結勸信。

論。若如是知至一切唯識。

述曰。若知存．遣名備資糧。善資糧者。即福．智二嚴。非清辨等惡取空者。能成是事得菩提也。

此頌總明一切唯識。廣彼依識所變訖。次下問答識起之由。即是第三釋諸外難。廣釋前第一頌中由假說我法。有種種相轉。于中有七頌。合為二段。初二頌釋理違。次五頌釋教違。

論。若唯有識至種種分別。

述曰。此外人難。若無心外之緣。由何而生種種分別。分別者即八識等。無外實法此由何生。外境既成無。妄應不起難也。

論。頌曰至彼彼分別生。

述曰。上三句出妄緣。下一句顯分別。下

【現代漢語翻譯】 理。由此理故便顯真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）。

論。識自相故至總立識名。

述曰。所以許有識自體者。識自相故。許心所者。識相應法故。許見．相分者。即心．及心所二體所變故。許不相應者。即前三種分位故。許真如者。即前四種實性故。如是五法皆不離識總名為識。非無心所等。

此即識言所表。下顯唯言所遮。

論。唯言但遮至實有色等。

述曰。此顯但遮。一切愚夫通二乘等。執定離諸識實有色等。為不實故妄顛倒故。此且舉色等取一切。其實亦遮如上所說離識五法皆是有也。

即答理難訖。自下第十總結勸信。

論。若如是知至一切唯識。

述曰。若知存．遣名備資糧。善資糧者。即福．智二嚴。非清辨等惡取空者。能成是事得菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）也。

此頌總明一切唯識。廣彼依識所變訖。次下問答識起之由。即是第三釋諸外難。廣釋前第一頌中由假說我法。有種種相轉。于中有七頌。合為二段。初二頌釋理違。次五頌釋教違。

論。若唯有識至種種分別。

述曰。此外人難。若無心外之緣。由何而生種種分別。分別者即八識等。無外實法此由何生。外境既成無。妄應不起難也。

論。頌曰至彼彼分別生。

述曰。上三句出妄緣。下一句顯分別。下

【English Translation】 理。Therefore, this principle reveals the True Thusness (Tathata, the true nature of things).

Treatise: 'Because consciousness cognizes its own characteristics' to 'generally establish the name of consciousness'.

Commentary: The reason for acknowledging the self-nature of consciousness is that consciousness cognizes its own characteristics. The reason for acknowledging mental functions is that they are the corresponding dharmas of consciousness. The reason for acknowledging the seeing and perceived aspects is that they are transformations of the two entities of mind and mental functions. The reason for acknowledging non-corresponding formations is that they are the aforementioned three divisions. The reason for acknowledging True Thusness is that it is the real nature of the aforementioned four. These five dharmas are inseparable from consciousness and are collectively named consciousness, not without mental functions, etc.

This is what the word 'consciousness' represents. Below, it reveals what the word 'only' negates.

Treatise: 'The word 'only' only negates' to 'the real existence of form, etc.'

Commentary: This reveals what is only negated. All ignorant people, including those of the Two Vehicles, cling to the definite existence of form, etc., as being separate from all consciousness. Because they are unreal and falsely inverted, this is just an example of taking everything as form, etc. In reality, it also negates the five dharmas mentioned above as being separate from consciousness, all of which exist.

This concludes the answer to the difficulty in principle. From here, the tenth section summarizes and encourages faith.

Treatise: 'If one knows thus' to 'everything is only consciousness'.

Commentary: If one knows that existence and negation are fully equipped with the name of provisions, good provisions are the two adornments of merit and wisdom. Those who wrongly grasp emptiness, such as Qingbian, cannot accomplish this matter and attain Bodhi (Enlightenment).

This verse generally clarifies that everything is only consciousness. Having extensively explained the transformations based on consciousness, the following question and answer address the origin of consciousness, which is the third explanation of external difficulties. It extensively explains the first verse, 'Due to the provisional establishment of self and dharma, there are various transformations.' There are seven verses in it, combined into two sections. The first two verses explain the contradiction in principle, and the next five verses explain the contradiction in teachings.

Treatise: 'If there is only consciousness' to 'various discriminations'.

Commentary: This is an external person's difficulty. If there are no external conditions outside the mind, how do various discriminations arise? Discriminations are the eight consciousnesses, etc. If there are no external real dharmas, how do these arise? Since the external realm is established as non-existent, false discriminations should not arise, which is the difficulty.

Treatise: Verse: 'By... to the arising of various discriminations'.

Commentary: The above three lines explain the false conditions, and the last line reveals the discriminations. Below,

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長行中有二。初略。后廣。略中有二。初依頌中解緣生有漏分別。后例生凈法。初中又二。初別解四句。后總結頌意。

論。曰至功能差別。

述曰。此種子識。即本識中能生一切有為法種。各能生自果功能之差別故名一切種。功能有二。一現行名功能。如言谷中功能能生芽等。二種子名功能。即本識中一切種子。此中隨說種子功能。

論。此生等流至名一切種。

述曰。此生等流。謂有二解。一者種子前後自類相生。二者種生現行。雖復同時亦名等流。現行是種之同類故。于因緣中唯除現親能熏之因緣。此明一切種故。余因緣種體皆生等流　問前第二卷末種生現起。如俱有因得士用果。何故此中但言等流果耶　答如前第二初明等流．異熟二因習氣攝諸種盡。彼間等流即此等流。種生現行非士用果。彼卷下但言如小乘俱有因得士用果。不言即是俱有因。然顯揚十八。破俱有因是因緣故。今但是因緣生起因等攝得等流果。此據法體。彼舉譬喻。亦不相違。又互為果名俱有因。種．現即非。若與俱有法為因亦通無妨。如攝論說即義說二因。若別解者唯前後種相望是等流。望現行即士用。或增上果中攝　言異熟者。即善．惡種望諸現．種異熟生無記法。前生等流果種但各自性。即通三性．漏無漏因

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 長行中有二部分。首先是簡略的解釋，然後是詳細的解釋。在簡略的解釋中又有兩部分。首先是依據頌文解釋緣起有漏的分別，然後是類比產生清凈法。在第一部分中又有兩部分。首先是分別解釋四句，然後是總結頌文的意義。

論：從『曰』到『功能差別』。

述記：這裡的種子識，就是本識中能夠產生一切有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma，指由因緣和合而成的法）的種子。各個種子都能產生各自果的功能差別，因此名為『一切種』。功能有兩種：一是現行，名為功能，例如說穀物中的功能能夠產生芽等；二是種子，名為功能，即本識中的一切種子。這裡隨文解說種子功能。

論：從『此生等流』到『名一切種』。

述記：這裡的『此生等流』，有兩種解釋。一是種子前後自類相生；二是種子產生現行。即使是同時產生，也名為『等流』，因為現行是種子同類的緣故。在因緣中，唯獨排除現行親能熏習的因緣。這裡說明是一切種，所以其餘因緣種子本體都產生等流。問：前面第二卷末尾說種子產生現起，如同俱有因（sahabhū-hetu，同時存在的因）得到士用果（puruṣakāra-phala，由人的作用產生的果），為什麼這裡只說是等流果呢？答：如同前面第二卷初明等流、異熟（vipāka，不同性質的成熟）二因習氣（vāsanā，熏習的殘餘）攝盡諸種。那裡說的等流就是這裡說的等流。種子產生現行不是士用果。那一卷下面只說如同小乘俱有因得到士用果，沒有說就是俱有因。然而《顯揚聖教論》第十八卷，破斥俱有因是因緣的緣故。現在只是因緣生起，因等攝得等流果。這是根據法體來說的，那裡是舉譬喻。也不互相違背。又互相為果名為俱有因，種子和現行就不是。如果與俱有法作為因，也通達沒有妨礙。如《攝大乘論》所說，即義說二因。如果分別解釋，唯有前後種子相互觀望才是等流，觀望現行就是士用，或者被攝入增上果（adhipati-phala，增上緣所生的果）中。說到異熟，就是善、惡種子觀望諸現行、種子異熟所生的無記法（avyākṛta，非善非惡）。前面所生的等流果種子只是各自的自性，即通達三性（善、惡、無記）、有漏無漏的因。

【English Translation】 English version: There are two parts in the prose commentary. First, a brief explanation, then a detailed explanation. Within the brief explanation, there are two parts. First, explaining the arising of conditioned and defiled (āsrava) aspects according to the verses; then, drawing an analogy to the arising of pure dharmas. Within the first part, there are again two parts. First, explaining the four sentences separately; then, summarizing the meaning of the verses.

Treatise: From '曰' to 'functional differences'.

Commentary: This seed consciousness (bīja-vijñāna), is the seed within the fundamental consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) that can produce all conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta-dharma). Each seed can produce the functional differences of its own fruit, hence it is called 'all seeds' (sarva-bīja). There are two types of functions: one is manifestation, called function, such as saying that the function in grains can produce sprouts, etc.; the other is seed, called function, which is all the seeds in the fundamental consciousness. Here, the function of the seed is explained according to the text.

Treatise: From 'This arising of equal flow' to 'called all seeds'.

Commentary: This 'arising of equal flow' (niṣyanda-phala) has two explanations. One is that seeds arise from each other in a continuous, similar stream. The other is that seeds give rise to manifestation. Even if they arise simultaneously, it is still called 'equal flow' because the manifestation is of the same kind as the seed. Among the conditions, only the condition of direct and active perfuming by manifestation is excluded. This clarifies that it is all seeds, so the substance of the remaining conditional seeds all produce equal flow. Question: In the end of the second fascicle, it says that the arising of manifestation from seeds is like the co-existent cause (sahabhū-hetu) obtaining the effect of human effort (puruṣakāra-phala). Why is it only called the effect of equal flow here? Answer: As in the beginning of the second fascicle, it clarifies that the two causes of equal flow and dissimilar maturation (vipāka) encompass all seeds through the residual influence (vāsanā). The equal flow mentioned there is the same as the equal flow mentioned here. The arising of manifestation from seeds is not the effect of human effort. The end of that fascicle only says that it is like the co-existent cause in the Lesser Vehicle obtaining the effect of human effort, without saying that it is the co-existent cause. However, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Xiǎn Yáng Shèng Jiào Lùn) in the eighteenth fascicle refutes the co-existent cause as a condition. Now, it is only the arising of conditions, and the cause, etc., obtain the effect of equal flow. This is based on the substance of the dharma. That is using a metaphor. They are not contradictory. Also, mutually being the effect is called the co-existent cause, but seeds and manifestation are not. If it is the cause with co-existent dharmas, it is also unobstructed. As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, it explains the two causes in terms of meaning. If explained separately, only the preceding and following seeds are equal flow in relation to each other. In relation to manifestation, it is the effect of human effort, or it is included in the dominant effect (adhipati-phala). Speaking of dissimilar maturation, it is the unspecified (avyākṛta) dharma produced by the dissimilar maturation of good and evil seeds in relation to all manifestations and seeds. The seeds of the effect of equal flow produced earlier are only their own nature, which encompasses the three natures (good, evil, and unspecified), and the causes of defiled and undefiled.

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緣種。此異熟果因。但是善．惡有漏增上緣種。然約第一解等流。即此二種攝一切種子盡。下士用等隨義于上別立。以俱有為果故。若約后解等流。謂作意種子望心等法是士用因。作動心等生故。若約前解等流。即等流種等生現行法已。令士夫得士用果。此種遠望士夫所作名生士用果　增上果亦有二。若前解等流。即除前三果外皆增上果。若后解等流。種生現行等。亦名增上果。此果稍寬。不能繁述。且依一法說者。如名言種望第八現．及自類種。是同類因。善．惡業望此現．種。是異熟因。作意種子驚覺起故。望此種．現是士用因。第七識種子為俱時依勢力引起。望此現．種是親增上因。第八現．種望此能生。隨其所應即是等流．異熟．士用．增上四果。餘一切法準此應知。然此中前二果親故先說。后二果疏故后說。前二果中。初是因緣稍親故先說。次方異熟。后二果中。士用狹故先說。增上寬故后說。以能生此一切有為果故名一切種。

論。除離系者至斷結得故。

述曰。以是無為非種生故。彼無為可證。非種子果。要現起無漏勝道斷結方得。不由種故。

若爾增上果亦爾。有疏遠非種力所得。亦應不明。

論。有展轉義至分別種故。

述曰。此無為法亦有展轉證得之義。非此所

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 緣種（產生結果的根本原因）。這種異熟果（因果報應的結果）的起因，只是善、惡的有漏增上緣種（能促進和幫助事物產生的條件）。然而，如果按照第一種解釋的等流果（與因相似的結果），那麼這兩種（善、惡）就涵蓋了一切種子。下士用果（通過努力獲得的結果）等，根據意義在上文中分別建立。因為它們都是有為法（受條件限制的事物）的結果。如果按照后一種解釋的等流果，那麼作意種子（注意力的種子）對於心等法來說是士用因，因為它能促使心等法產生。如果按照前一種解釋的等流果，那麼等流種等產生現行法（當下顯現的法）之後，使士夫（修行者）獲得士用果。這種種子從長遠來看，可以被認為是士夫所作，因此被稱為產生士用果。 增上果（增強和支援的結果）也有兩種。如果按照前一種解釋的等流果，那麼除了前三種果（等流果、異熟果、士用果）之外，其餘的都是增上果。如果按照后一種解釋的等流果，那麼種子產生現行等，也可以被稱為增上果。這種果的範圍稍寬，不能詳細敘述。暫且依據一種法來說，比如名言種（語言概念的種子）對於第八識現行（阿賴耶識的當下顯現）以及自類種來說，是同類因。善、惡業對於這種現行和種子來說，是異熟因。作意種子因為驚覺而生起，對於這種種子和現行來說，是士用因。第七識種子（末那識的種子）因為俱時依（同時存在的依賴關係）的勢力而引起，對於這種現行和種子來說，是親增上因。第八識現行和種子對於這種能生之物來說，根據其所應，就是等流果、異熟果、士用果、增上果。其餘一切法都可以參照這個來理解。然而，這裡面，前兩種果（等流果、異熟果）比較親近，所以先說。后兩種果（士用果、增上果）比較疏遠，所以後說。前兩種果中，等流果是因緣中稍微親近的，所以先說。其次是異熟果。后兩種果中，士用果比較狹窄，所以先說。增上果比較寬泛，所以後說。因為它能產生這一切有為果，所以被稱為一切種。

論（論述）。除了離系（脫離束縛）之外，才能斷結（斷除煩惱）而得果。

述曰（解釋）。因為它是無為法（不依賴條件的事物），不是種子所生。這種無為法可以被證悟，但不是種子的結果。必須通過現起無漏勝道（無漏的殊勝之道）才能斷除煩惱。不是通過種子而得到的。

如果這樣，增上果也是如此。有些是疏遠的，不是種子的力量所能得到的，也應該不說明。

論（論述）。有展轉義（有輾轉相生的意義），才能分別種（區分種子）。

述曰（解釋）。這種無為法也有輾轉證得的意義，不是這裡所討論的。

【English Translation】 English version 'Seed-cause'. This is the cause of the ripening result. However, it is only the seed-cause of wholesome and unwholesome contaminated conditioning causes. However, according to the first explanation of the outflowing result (a result similar to the cause), these two types (wholesome and unwholesome) encompass all seeds. The result of effort, etc., is separately established above according to its meaning, because they are both results of conditioned phenomena. If according to the later explanation of the outflowing result, the seed of attention, in relation to mind and other dharmas, is the cause of effort, because it causes the arising of mind and other activities. If according to the former explanation of the outflowing result, after the outflowing seed, etc., produces the manifest dharma, it enables the practitioner to obtain the result of effort. This seed, in the long run, can be considered as what the practitioner has done, hence it is called the result of effort. The conditioning result also has two aspects. If according to the former explanation of the outflowing result, then everything other than the previous three results (outflowing result, ripening result, result of effort) is the conditioning result. If according to the later explanation of the outflowing result, the seed producing the manifest, etc., can also be called the conditioning result. The scope of this result is slightly broader and cannot be described in detail. For the time being, let's take one dharma as an example. For instance, the seed of language (conceptual seed) in relation to the eighth consciousness's manifestation (the present manifestation of the Alaya consciousness) and its own kind of seed, is the cause of the same kind. Wholesome and unwholesome karma, in relation to this manifestation and seed, is the ripening cause. The seed of attention arises because of arousal, and in relation to this seed and manifestation, it is the cause of effort. The seed of the seventh consciousness (the seed of the Manas consciousness) is aroused by the power of simultaneous dependence, and in relation to this manifestation and seed, it is the direct conditioning cause. The eighth consciousness's manifestation and seed, in relation to what it can produce, according to what is appropriate, are the outflowing result, the ripening result, the result of effort, and the conditioning result. All other dharmas should be understood in the same way. However, among these, the first two results (outflowing result, ripening result) are closer, so they are mentioned first. The latter two results (result of effort, conditioning result) are more distant, so they are mentioned later. Among the first two results, the outflowing result is slightly closer in terms of cause and condition, so it is mentioned first. Next is the ripening result. Among the latter two results, the result of effort is narrower, so it is mentioned first. The conditioning result is broader, so it is mentioned later. Because it can produce all these conditioned results, it is called the all-seed.

Treatise: Except for detachment, one can attain the result by severing the bonds.

Commentary: Because it is unconditioned and not produced by seeds. This unconditioned state can be realized, but it is not the result of seeds. One must sever the bonds by manifesting the unsurpassed path of non-outflow. It is not obtained through seeds.

If that's the case, the conditioning result is also the same. Some are distant and cannot be obtained by the power of seeds, so they should not be explained.

Treatise: There is a meaning of mutual transformation in order to distinguish the seeds.

Commentary: This unconditioned dharma also has the meaning of mutual realization, which is not what is being discussed here.

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說。此說能生分別種故。言分別者。有漏三界心．心所法。以妄分別為自體故。隱其無漏有為不論。但染依他對心外法故。下文自例凈法亦爾。由此道理復亦不取無漏有為。一切種子于彼四果攝果不盡。並有能生彼果義故此中說也　又解此文為釋伏難。非成離系。謂有難言。何故頌說種生分別。不說分別能生種耶。今答之言。亦有展轉相生之義。然以前問唯問分別從何而生。其現生種非此所說。此頌但說能生現行分別種故。然前解者順此論文。

既是種子何故名識。

論。此識為體至無別性故。

述曰。種子以識為體故立識名。以種離本識無別性故。種子依本識自體分。亦即名種子識。與識不一．異。若為相分亦識所變。體即是識。非離識外別有體性。故立識名。

論。種識二言至種非識故。

述曰。種．識二言簡非種識。謂有識非種。即現起諸識。非內種子。有種非識即外麥等。非識自體分故。又有識非種。小乘所說諸識。種非識者僧佉所計自性。是諸法因彼體非識。以有識非種。種非識故。不同此種亦種亦識。故俱簡彼立種識言。

論。又種識言至后當說故。

述曰。此中所顯本識中種。非謂持種名為識種第八識也。以第八識后展轉力現助緣攝。非因緣故。或后第四

句。當彼彼分別生中攝故。此中不說。若獨言種。即濫麥等。自性等。若獨言識。即濫現行八識等。故雙言也。即解第一句下四字訖。

論。此識中種至重言如是。

述曰。即解第二句頌也。謂前所明本識中種。由余三緣助故。即便如是如是轉變。謂先未熟名生。如在牽引因位。從此轉變至熟時。如在生起因中為愛水潤。有轉易變熟之相。名為轉變。以種子數眾多。皆有轉變生諸分別故。重言如是。

論。謂一切種至識種盡故。

述曰。言種多者。謂前一切種。即攝三熏習等識種盡故。共．不共等有受盡想等。如前第二卷解。三熏習如下第八卷自解。

論。展轉力者至相助力故。

述曰。上二句明種為因生分別。此句明現行為緣生分別。通三緣。第三句中。且置以．故二字　釋展轉力者。謂八現行識。及八識相應心所。此即識等自證分。及此所變相．見二分。並不相應。及無為法。故復言等。以彼識等皆互有相助力故。謂由真如等故。或生邪見等分別。或生隨順言論分別等也。

論。即現識等至故言彼彼。

述曰。顯所生果。第四句且除生字解餘四字。即現行識。相．見分。相應．不相應。皆名分別。以妄分別為自性故。皆不離識故識為性。以自體．相．見等類眾

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 句。因為它們包含在各種不同的生中，所以這裡沒有提及。如果單獨說『種』（bīja，種子），就會和麥子等混淆。如果單獨說『識』（vijñāna，意識），就會和現行的八識等混淆。所以要雙重說明。這就解釋了第一句下面的四個字完畢。 論：此識中種至重言如是。 述曰：這就解釋了第二句頌文。意思是說，前面所說的本識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）中的種子，由於其餘三種緣的幫助，就會這樣這樣地轉變。所謂先未成熟叫做『生』，如在牽引因位。從此轉變到成熟時，如在生起因中被愛水滋潤，有轉易變熟的相狀，叫做『轉變』。因為種子數量眾多，都有轉變而產生各種分別，所以重複說『如是』。 論：謂一切種至識種盡故。 述曰：說種子多，是指前面所說的一切種，即攝盡三熏習等的識種。共、不共等，有受盡想等，如前面第二卷所解釋。三熏習如下第八卷自會解釋。 論：展轉力者至相助力故。 述曰：上面兩句說明種子作為因產生分別。這句說明現行作為緣產生分別。通於三種緣。第三句中，暫且去掉『以』、『故』二字。解釋『展轉力者』，是指八個現行識，以及八識相應的心所。這就是識等的自證分，以及由此所變的相分、見分。不相應的，以及無為法，所以又說『等』。因為這些識等都互相有相助之力。因為真如（tathatā，如如）等，或者產生邪見等分別，或者產生隨順言論的分別等。 論：即現識等至故言彼彼。 述曰：顯示所產生的果。第四句暫且除去『生』字，解釋其餘四個字。即現行識的相分、見分，相應的、不相應的，都叫做分別。因為以虛妄分別作為自性，都不離識，所以識為自性。因為自體、相、見等種類眾多

【English Translation】 English version: Sentence. Because they are included in various different births, they are not mentioned here. If 'bīja' (seed) is mentioned alone, it will be confused with wheat, etc. If 'vijñāna' (consciousness) is mentioned alone, it will be confused with the currently active eight consciousnesses, etc. Therefore, it must be stated doubly. This concludes the explanation of the four words below the first sentence. Treatise: 'The seeds in this consciousness, up to 'repeatedly thus'.' Commentary: This explains the second verse. It means that the seeds in the previously mentioned ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness), with the help of the other three conditions, will transform in this way, in this way. What is called 'birth' is when it is not yet mature, such as in the causal position of attraction. Transforming from this to the time of maturity, such as being nourished by the water of love in the causal position of arising, having the appearance of changing and ripening, is called 'transformation'. Because the number of seeds is numerous, and all have transformations that produce various discriminations, it is said 'thus' repeatedly. Treatise: 'Meaning all seeds, up to the exhaustion of the seeds of consciousness'. Commentary: Saying that there are many seeds refers to all the seeds mentioned earlier, which include all the seeds of consciousness from the three perfumations, etc. Common, uncommon, etc., having perception of cessation, etc., as explained in the second volume earlier. The three perfumations will be explained in the eighth volume below. Treatise: 'The power of mutual influence, up to mutual assistance'. Commentary: The above two sentences explain that seeds are the cause of the arising of discriminations. This sentence explains that present activity is the condition for the arising of discriminations. It applies to all three conditions. In the third sentence, temporarily remove the words 'by' and 'therefore'. Explaining 'the power of mutual influence' refers to the eight currently active consciousnesses, and the mental functions corresponding to the eight consciousnesses. This is the self-cognition portion of the consciousnesses, etc., and the appearance portion and seeing portion transformed from this. Those that are not corresponding, and unconditioned dharmas, are also included, so it says 'etc.' again. Because these consciousnesses, etc., all have the power of mutual assistance. Because of tathatā (suchness), etc., either wrong views, etc., arise, or discriminations that accord with speech, etc., arise. Treatise: 'That is, the currently active consciousnesses, etc., therefore it is said 'those various''. Commentary: Showing the resulting effect. In the fourth sentence, temporarily remove the word 'birth' and explain the remaining four words. That is, the appearance portion and seeing portion of the currently active consciousnesses, those that are corresponding and those that are not corresponding, are all called discriminations. Because they take false discrimination as their nature, they are not separate from consciousness, so consciousness is their nature. Because the kinds of self-nature, appearance, and seeing are numerous

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多故言彼彼。彼彼者眾多義故。

論。此頌意說至方起分別。

述曰。下欲解第一句中由字。第三句中以．故二字。第四句生字。遂結上頌意因總明之。謂答頌前問言。雖無心外之緣。由識中有一切種者。牒解第一句。及釋其中由字　轉變差別者。牒第二句。及以現行八種識等展轉力故者。牒第三句。並解其中以故二字　彼彼分別而亦得生者。牒第四句。並解生字。如此分別得生。何假外緣分別方起。然此正解頌中染分所明意訖。

論。諸凈法起至為緣生故。

述曰。無漏法生亦如分別。亦以無漏種。及無漏識相．見分等現行．為緣生故。釋本文意。義應兼此。故染．凈法皆不離心。

略解頌文訖。自下廣解頌文。初問。次答。下後解訖略作數科。與此不同。今且隨文遂便科段。學者尋之。

論。所說種現至此緣生相。

述曰。此外人問。前頌上二句說種子．第三句說現行為緣。生於八識相應等分別之法。第四句是。云何應知此緣．生相。

此總問緣及緣生相。答中有二。初廣上三句種．現緣法。后廣生分別相。即第四句。

論。緣且有四。

述曰。辨前緣法。廣上三句中。文中有二。初正解四緣。后傍乘義明十五依處等。緣中有總．別。此即總也。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『多故言彼彼（因為多種原因才說「彼彼」）。彼彼者眾多義故（「彼彼」指的是多種多樣的意義）。』

論：這首偈頌的意思是說，不需要等到外在事物出現才產生分別。

述記：下面想要解釋第一句中的『由』字，第三句中的『以』和『故』兩個字，以及第四句中的『生』字。於是總結上面的偈頌的含義，總括地說明它。就是回答偈頌之前的問題說，即使沒有心外的外緣，因為在識中有一切種子，這是解釋第一句，並解釋其中的『由』字。『轉變差別者』，這是解釋第二句。『及以現行八種識等展轉力故者』，這是解釋第三句，並解釋其中的『以』和『故』兩個字。『彼彼分別而亦得生者』，這是解釋第四句，並解釋『生』字。如此分別能夠產生，何必假借外在事物的分別才產生呢？然而這正是解釋偈頌中染污部分所闡明的含義完畢。

論：各種清凈法產生也和分別一樣，也是以無漏種子，以及無漏識的相分、見分等現行作為因緣而產生。解釋本文的含義，義理上應該包含這些。所以染污法和清凈法都不離心。

簡略地解釋偈頌的文句完畢。從下面開始廣泛地解釋偈頌的文句。先提問，然後回答。下面的解釋完畢后，會大致分成幾個部分，和這裡不同。現在姑且順著文句方便地分段，學者可以自己去尋找。

論：所說的種子和現行，到這裡是因緣生起的狀態。

述記：這是外人提問。前面的偈頌的上兩句說種子，第三句說現行作為因緣，產生八識相應的各種分別之法。第四句是，應該如何知道這種因緣和生起的狀態呢？

這是總括地提問因緣和因緣生起的狀態。回答中有兩個部分。首先廣泛地解釋前面三句中的種子和現行因緣法。然後廣泛地解釋生起分別的狀態，也就是第四句。

論：因緣大概有四種。

述記：辨析前面的因緣法，廣泛地解釋前面三句中的內容。文中有兩個部分。首先正式地解釋四種因緣。然後順便說明十五種依處等。因緣中有總的和別的，這裡是總的。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Because of many reasons, it is said 'that that' (duo gu yan bi bi). 'That that' means many different meanings (bi bi zhe zhong duo yi gu).'

Treatise: The meaning of this verse is that discrimination arises without waiting for external objects to appear.

Commentary: The following intends to explain the word 'by' (you) in the first line, the words 'with' (yi) and 'therefore' (gu) in the third line, and the word 'arise' (sheng) in the fourth line. Thus, it summarizes the meaning of the previous verse and explains it in general. It answers the previous question by saying that even without external conditions outside the mind, because there are all seeds in the consciousness, this explains the first line and the word 'by' in it. 'Transformation and differentiation' (zhuan bian cha bie zhe) explains the second line. 'And with the force of the eight kinds of consciousness and so on in their present activity' (ji yi xian xing ba zhong shi deng zhan zhuan li gu zhe) explains the third line and the words 'with' and 'therefore' in it. 'Those various discriminations also arise' (bi bi fen bie er yi de sheng zhe) explains the fourth line and the word 'arise'. Since such discriminations can arise, why borrow the discriminations of external objects to arise? However, this is precisely the explanation of the meaning clarified in the defiled part of the verse.

Treatise: The arising of all pure dharmas is also like discrimination. It also arises with the non-outflow seeds, as well as the appearance and seeing aspects of the non-outflow consciousness, etc., as conditions. Explaining the meaning of the text, the principle should include these. Therefore, neither defiled nor pure dharmas are apart from the mind.

The brief explanation of the verse's sentences is complete. From below, the sentences of the verse are explained extensively. First, ask a question, then answer it. After the following explanation is complete, it will be roughly divided into several parts, which are different from here. Now, let's just follow the sentences and divide them conveniently, and scholars can look for them themselves.

Treatise: What is said about seeds and present activity, up to here is the state of conditions arising.

Commentary: This is an outsider's question. The first two lines of the previous verse say seeds, and the third line says present activity as conditions, giving rise to various discriminations of the corresponding eight consciousnesses. The fourth line is, how should one know this condition and the state of arising?

This is a general question about the condition and the state of the condition arising. There are two parts in the answer. First, extensively explain the seed and present activity condition dharmas in the previous three lines. Then, extensively explain the state of arising discrimination, which is the fourth line.

Treatise: Conditions are roughly four.

Commentary: Discriminating the previous condition dharmas, extensively explaining the content in the previous three lines. There are two parts in the text. First, formally explain the four conditions. Then, incidentally explain the fifteen dependencies, etc. There are general and specific conditions, and this is the general one.

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以答不盡故有且言。

論。一因緣至親辨自果。

述曰。四緣為四文。因緣宗廣一切種等句。余緣宗廣展轉力句。因緣中有三。初出體。次簡略。后釋妨。出體中有總．別。此為總也。非一切法有為皆是。今取親者。

此即總出體訖。次別出體。

論。此體有二一種子二現行。

述曰。總勒有為因緣體者。不過此二。

論。種子者至功能差別。

述曰。謂善染無記顯通三性　諸界地等者。即界．地等功能各別　等者等取有漏無漏．色非色．報非報等種種各別種子。有說名言種三界無別者。不然。違此文故。界系別故。

此出因緣體。望何為因緣。

論。能引次後至是因緣性。

述曰。謂能引次後自類功能。顯自種相生義。簡善．惡種為異熟種之因緣。彼非自類故。此非間越。間越即間斷不次便非因緣。如現行因變異熟果。現行業法望種及果非因緣故。及起同時自類現果者。亦簡現受現行報異熟之因種。彼非自類故。此中但自類為因緣。異性便非故。即種子所望二種為因緣。

論。現行者至是因緣性。

述曰。謂七轉識。及彼心所。即是各自體分。及此各各所變相．見分。三性．三界．九地．漏．無漏．報．非報等。各別現行但能為能熏者

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為無法窮盡所有，所以只能簡要地說。

論：一個因緣（Hetu-pratyaya，根本原因）對最親近的事物進行辨別，從而產生自身的結果。

述記：四緣（catvāri pratyayāḥ，四種條件）分為四段文字解釋。因緣的範圍廣泛，涵蓋一切種子等等。其餘的緣範圍廣泛，涵蓋展轉力等等。因緣中有三個部分：首先是本體的闡述，其次是簡要說明，最後是解釋疑問。本體的闡述又分為總說和別說，這裡是總說。並非一切有為法都是因緣，現在只取最親近的。

以上是總的闡述本體完畢。接下來是分別闡述本體。

論：這個本體有兩種：一種是種子（bīja，潛能），另一種是現行（vartamāna，顯現）。

述記：總的來說，有為法的因緣本體，不過這兩種。

論：種子是指具有善、染、無記（kuśala, akuśala, avyākṛta，善、惡、非善非惡）三種性質，以及諸界、地（dhātu, bhūmi，構成要素，存在層面）等等的功能差別。

述記：所謂的善、染、無記，普遍貫通三種性質。諸界、地等等，指的是界、地等等的功能各自不同。『等』字包括有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱的）、無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱的）、色（rūpa，物質）、非色（arūpa，非物質）、報（vipāka，果報）、非報（avipāka，非果報）等等各種不同的種子。有人說名言的種子在三界中沒有區別，這是不對的，因為這與經文相違背，因為界系是有區別的。

以上是闡述因緣的本體。相對於什麼而言是因緣呢？

論：能夠引生緊隨其後的同類功能，這就是因緣的性質。

述記：指的是能夠引生緊隨其後的同類功能，顯現自身種子的生起之義。這裡是爲了區分善、惡的種子作為異熟果（vipākaphala，不同性質的果報）的因緣，因為它們不是同類。這裡不是指間隔和超越，間隔和超越就是指間斷和不連續，因此就不是因緣。比如現行因變異成熟果，現行行業法相對於種子和果實來說不是因緣。以及生起的同時，同類的現行果，也是爲了區分現行接受現行報異熟的因種，因為它們不是同類。這裡只有同類才是因緣，異性就不是。也就是說，種子所期望的兩種是因緣。

論：現行是指七轉識（sapta vijñānāni，七種意識）以及它們的心所（caitta，心理活動），也就是各自的體分，以及各自所變的相分（nimitta-bhāga，表象部分）和見分（darśana-bhāga，認知部分）。三性、三界、九地、有漏、無漏、報、非報等等，各種不同的現行只能作為能夠被熏習的。

【English Translation】 English version: Because it is impossible to exhaustively explain everything, I will speak concisely.

Treatise: One Hetu-pratyaya (root cause) discerns the closest things, thereby producing its own result.

Commentary: The four conditions (catvāri pratyayāḥ) are explained in four sections of text. The scope of Hetu-pratyaya is broad, encompassing all seeds, etc. The scope of the remaining conditions is broad, encompassing reciprocal force, etc. There are three parts to Hetu-pratyaya: first, the exposition of the substance; second, a brief explanation; and third, an explanation of objections. The exposition of the substance is divided into general and specific; this is the general exposition. Not all conditioned dharmas are Hetu-pratyaya; we now take only the closest ones.

The above is the completion of the general exposition of the substance. Next is the specific exposition of the substance.

Treatise: This substance has two types: one is seed (bīja, potential), and the other is manifestation (vartamāna, appearance).

Commentary: Generally speaking, the substance of the Hetu-pratyaya of conditioned dharmas is nothing more than these two.

Treatise: Seed refers to the functional differences of the three natures of good, defiled, and neutral (kuśala, akuśala, avyākṛta), as well as the realms, planes (dhātu, bhūmi), etc.

Commentary: The so-called good, defiled, and neutral universally pervade the three natures. The realms, planes, etc., refer to the different functions of the realms, planes, etc. 'Etc.' includes seeds that are different in various ways, such as those that are defiled (sāsrava, with afflictions), undefiled (anāsrava, without afflictions), material (rūpa), immaterial (arūpa), retributive (vipāka), and non-retributive (avipāka). Some say that the seeds of names and words are not different in the three realms, but this is not correct, because it contradicts the text, because the realm systems are different.

The above is the exposition of the substance of Hetu-pratyaya. Relative to what is it Hetu-pratyaya?

Treatise: That which can lead to the immediately following function of the same kind is the nature of Hetu-pratyaya.

Commentary: It refers to the ability to lead to the immediately following function of the same kind, revealing the meaning of the arising of one's own seed. This is to distinguish the seeds of good and evil as the Hetu-pratyaya of the ripening fruit (vipākaphala, fruit of different nature), because they are not of the same kind. This does not refer to intervening and transcending, intervening and transcending refers to interruption and discontinuity, therefore it is not Hetu-pratyaya. For example, the manifest cause transforms into the ripening fruit, the manifest karma dharma is not Hetu-pratyaya relative to the seed and the fruit. And at the same time as arising, the manifest fruit of the same kind is also to distinguish the causal seed of the manifest receiving the manifest retributive ripening, because they are not of the same kind. Here, only those of the same kind are Hetu-pratyaya, those of different natures are not. That is to say, the two types that the seed expects are Hetu-pratyaya.

Treatise: Manifestation refers to the seven consciousnesses (sapta vijñānāni) and their mental factors (caitta), which are their respective substance divisions, as well as the image-division (nimitta-bhāga, representational part) and the seeing-division (darśana-bhāga, cognitive part) transformed by each of them. The various manifestations of the three natures, the three realms, the nine planes, the defiled, the undefiled, the retributive, and the non-retributive, can only serve as that which can be perfumed.

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即是。然此七識等中。除佛果一切善法。余因位中。及二乘無學等所有無漏。皆能熏故。有漏中除極劣無記。此即四無記中除異熟生。異熟生中有餘三不攝無記名異熟生無記。如法執等類。此皆能熏。唯除六識中業所招者。望余無記是極劣故。亦除第八識。但業所招並非能熏。有漏．無漏各除一已。餘一切有漏．無漏現行見．相等。熏本識生自類性．界地漏．無漏各各之種。此現唯望彼種為因緣。此中佛果善。及極劣無記不熏成種。皆如第二卷四義能．所熏中解。

論。第八心品無所熏故。

述曰。自下簡略。簡略有三。此即初也。前能熏中。何故無第八心品。心品之言。即通見．相共有法等　答第八心品更無所熏已即所熏故。餘七並能熏故。

若爾八俱心所應是能熏有心王所熏故。

論。非簡所依獨能熏故。

述曰。非簡去所依之心。而心所獨能熏故　問心王簡心所尚獨為所熏。心所簡心王獨能熏何所妨　答心王有自在。自在獨所熏。心所不自在。非獨即能熏。

論。極微圓故不熏成種。

述曰。又解因中第八。及六識中異熟之心並不熏者。以極微故不能熏。以異熟業生法勢力微劣但任運生。夫能熏者必非無力法故。因中以極微故非能熏。無性之人第七末那亦有勢力。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 是的。然而在這七識等之中，除了佛果（Buddha-phala，成佛的果位）的一切善法之外，其餘因位（hetu-avastha，修行因地的階段）中，以及二乘（Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）無學（aśaikṣa，無學果位）等所有無漏法（anāsrava-dharma，沒有煩惱的法），都能熏習。有漏法（sāsrava-dharma，有煩惱的法）中，除了極劣的無記（avyākṛta，非善非惡的性質）之外，這裡指四種無記中的異熟生（vipāka-ja，由異熟果報所生的無記）。異熟生中，還有其餘三種不包含的無記，名為異熟生無記，如法執（dharma-graha，對法的執著）等。這些都能熏習，唯獨六識（ṣaṭ-vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）中由業力所招感的除外，因為相對於其他無記來說，它是最微弱的。也除去了第八識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識），但由業力所招感的並非能熏習的。有漏和無漏各自除去一種之後，其餘一切有漏和無漏的現行（vartamāna，正在發生）的見分（darśana-bhāga，認識的主體）和相分（nimitta-bhāga，認識的客體）等，熏習本識（mūla-vijñāna，根本識）產生各自的自類性（sajātiya，同類性質）的種子（bīja，潛在的可能性），界地（dhātu-bhūmi，界和地）的漏（āsrava，煩惱）和無漏各自的種子。這個現行僅僅是相對於那個種子而言是因緣（hetu-pratyaya，原因和條件）。這裡，佛果的善法和極劣的無記不能熏習成種子，這些都如第二卷中四義的能熏和所熏的解釋。

論：第八心品沒有被熏習的緣故。

述曰：下面進行簡略。簡略有三種，這是第一種。前面能熏習的之中，為什麼沒有第八心品？心品這個詞，是通用於見分、相分、共有法等。回答：第八心品不再有所熏習的，因為它已經是被熏習的。其餘七識都是能熏習的。

如果這樣，那麼八俱心所（aṣṭa-citta-caitta，與心王同時生起的心所）應該是能熏習的，因為它被心王所熏習。

論：不是簡去所依之心，而是心所獨自能熏習的緣故。

述曰：不是簡去作為所依的心王，而是心所獨自能熏習的緣故。問：心王簡去心所尚且獨自作為所熏習的，心所簡去心王獨自能熏習有什麼妨礙？答：心王有自在力，自在力獨自作為所熏習的。心所沒有自在力，不能獨自作為能熏習的。

論：極微細的緣故，不能熏習成種子。

述曰：又解釋原因中第八識，以及六識中異熟的心不能熏習的原因，是因為它們極其微細，所以不能熏習。因為異熟業所生的法的勢力微弱，只是任運而生。能夠熏習的必定不是沒有力量的法。原因中因為極其微細所以不能熏習。無性（agotraka，沒有成佛的可能性）之人，第七末那識（manas，末那識）也有勢力。

【English Translation】 English version: That is so. However, among these seven consciousnesses, etc., except for all the wholesome dharmas of the Buddhahood (Buddha-phala, the fruit of becoming a Buddha), all the anāsrava-dharmas (dharma without outflows) in the causal stage (hetu-avastha, the stage of practice) and in the aśaikṣa (stage of no more learning) of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna, Hearer Vehicle and Solitary Realizer Vehicle), etc., can all perfumed. Among the sāsrava-dharmas (dharma with outflows), except for the extremely inferior avyākṛta (undetermined nature), which refers to the vipāka-ja (born of resultant maturation) among the four types of avyākṛta. Among the vipāka-ja, there are other three types of avyākṛta that are not included, called vipāka-ja avyākṛta, such as dharma-graha (attachment to dharmas), etc. These can all perfumed, except for those arising from karma in the six consciousnesses (ṣaṭ-vijñāna, the six consciousnesses of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), because they are extremely inferior compared to other avyākṛta. Also excluded is the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness), but what is caused by karma is not capable of perfuming. After excluding one each from sāsrava and anāsrava, all the remaining sāsrava and anāsrava present (vartamāna, currently arising) darśana-bhāga (seeing-aspect) and nimitta-bhāga (object-aspect), etc., perfumed the mūla-vijñāna (root consciousness), giving rise to seeds (bīja, potentiality) of their respective own-nature (sajātiya, same kind), and seeds of āsrava (outflows) and anāsrava of the realm-ground (dhātu-bhūmi, realm and ground). This present is only a hetu-pratyaya (cause and condition) in relation to that seed. Here, the wholesome dharmas of Buddhahood and the extremely inferior avyākṛta cannot perfumed into seeds, as explained in the second volume regarding the four meanings of the perfumer and the perfumed.

Treatise: The eighth consciousness-category is not perfumed.

Commentary: Below is a simplification. There are three simplifications, and this is the first. Among the previous perfumers, why is there no eighth consciousness-category? The term 'consciousness-category' refers to the seeing-aspect, object-aspect, and shared dharmas, etc. Answer: The eighth consciousness-category is no longer perfumed because it is already the perfumed. The remaining seven consciousnesses are all capable of perfuming.

If that is the case, then the eight associated mental factors (aṣṭa-citta-caitta, mental factors arising simultaneously with the mind) should be capable of perfuming because they are perfumed by the mind-king.

Treatise: It is not a simplification of the mind that is the basis, but rather the mental factors alone are capable of perfuming.

Commentary: It is not a simplification of the mind-king as the basis, but rather the mental factors alone are capable of perfuming. Question: If the mind-king excludes the mental factors and is still uniquely the perfumed, what prevents the mental factors from excluding the mind-king and uniquely being the perfumer? Answer: The mind-king has autonomy, and autonomy is uniquely the perfumed. The mental factors do not have autonomy and cannot uniquely be the perfumer.

Treatise: Because they are extremely subtle, they cannot perfumed into seeds.

Commentary: Furthermore, it explains that the eighth consciousness in the cause, as well as the vipāka mind in the six consciousnesses, cannot perfumed because they are extremely subtle. Because the power of the dharmas born from vipāka karma is weak, they only arise spontaneously. Those capable of perfuming must not be powerless dharmas. In the cause, because they are extremely subtle, they cannot perfumed. For those without the potential for Buddhahood (agotraka, without the potential for enlightenment), the seventh manas (manas, mind consciousness) also has power.

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如前已說。佛果上第八。以極圓故不熏成種。佛身善法無增減故。許若更熏便非圓滿。漸漸增故。由此道理。因中第八。及彼心品。皆非能熏。故前論言但說有七。

論。現行同類至自種生故。

述曰。第二簡略　問何故現行同類前望后。如小乘同類因。此非因緣耶　以本識中各自種生故。已有因緣能親辨其體故。前現望后非是因緣。一切外麥等物亦爾。

問何故若同時異時一切種子。望現行異類。種子自望種子異類。現行望彼現行異類。現行望彼種子異類。皆非因緣。

論。一切異類至不親生故。

述曰。第三簡略。如此中說。展轉相望亦非因緣。既言異類。不能親生俱或異時異類果故。

論。有說異類至或隨轉門。

述曰。此下釋妨有二可知。如對法等第四說。異體類．同體類現行展轉為因緣者。彼對法論因緣中。說六因是因緣。即現望現。設更有餘處說。皆假說為因緣。實是增上緣等故。或隨轉門者。隨順薩婆多說俱有等五因為因緣故。顯揚論十八。破彼五因非因緣故。可應敘之。

論。有唯說種至為因緣故。

述曰。又瑜伽第三．第五．五十一．三十八等．顯揚第十八等。皆唯說種子是因緣者。依顯勝說非盡理言。云何顯勝。謂常相續故。勝現行如

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如前文已經說過，佛果位上的第八識（Alaya識，阿賴耶識），因為極其圓滿，所以不再被熏習而產生新的種子。佛的身和善法不會再有增加或減少，如果允許它再被熏習，那就不是圓滿了，因為它會不斷增長。由於這個道理，因地中的第八識以及與它相應的心所法，都不是能熏習的。所以之前的論典只說了有七個識具有熏習的功能。

論：現行同類至自種生故。

述記：這是第二種簡略的解釋。問：為什麼現行同類的前一念對於后一念，就像小乘佛教所說的同類因一樣，不是因緣呢？因為在本識（Alaya識，阿賴耶識）中，各自的種子能夠自己產生。已經有了因緣能夠清楚地辨別它的本體，所以前一念的現行對於后一念來說不是因緣。一切外在的麥子等事物也是如此。

問：為什麼無論是同時還是異時的一切種子，對於現行的異類，種子自己對於種子異類，現行對於現行異類，現行對於種子異類，都不是因緣呢？

論：一切異類至不親生故。

述記：這是第三種簡略的解釋。就像這裡所說的那樣，展轉相望也不是因緣。既然說是異類，就不能直接產生同時或異時的異類果。

論：有說異類至或隨轉門。

述記：下面解釋疑問，有兩種情況需要了解。比如在《對法論》等第四卷中說，異體類和同體類的現行展轉相望是因緣。那是因為《對法論》在因緣中說了六因是因緣，也就是現行對於現行。假設還有其他地方這樣說，都是假說為因緣，實際上是增上緣等。或者說是隨順薩婆多部的說法，認為俱有等五因是因緣。顯揚論第十八卷破斥了他們五因不是因緣的觀點，應該敘述一下。

論：有唯說種至為因緣故。

述記：另外，《瑜伽師地論》第三卷、第五卷、第五十一卷、第三十八卷等，《顯揚聖教論》第十八卷等，都只說種子是因緣，這是依據顯示殊勝的角度來說的，並非完全符合真理。什麼是顯示殊勝呢？就是因為種子是常時相續的，所以比現行殊勝。

【English Translation】 English version: As previously stated, the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) in the fruit stage of Buddhahood, because it is perfectly complete, is no longer subject to being perfumed to produce new seeds. The Buddha's body and virtuous dharmas do not increase or decrease; if it were allowed to be perfumed further, it would not be perfect, as it would be constantly increasing. Due to this principle, the eighth consciousness in the causal stage, as well as its associated mental factors, are not capable of perfuming. Therefore, previous treatises only mentioned that seven consciousnesses have the function of perfuming.

Treatise: 'Manifestation of similar types leads to the arising of its own seed.'

Commentary: This is the second simplified explanation. Question: Why is it that the preceding moment of a manifest similar type in relation to the subsequent moment, like the similar-type cause in Hinayana Buddhism, is not a causal condition? Because within the Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness), each seed is capable of producing itself. There is already a causal condition that can clearly distinguish its essence, so the preceding manifestation is not a causal condition for the subsequent one. The same applies to all external things like wheat, etc.

Question: Why is it that all seeds, whether simultaneous or non-simultaneous, in relation to manifest dissimilar types, seeds in relation to dissimilar-type seeds, manifest phenomena in relation to dissimilar-type manifest phenomena, and manifest phenomena in relation to dissimilar-type seeds, are not causal conditions?

Treatise: 'All dissimilar types do not directly produce.'

Commentary: This is the third simplified explanation. As stated here, reciprocal relations are also not causal conditions. Since it is said to be dissimilar types, it cannot directly produce dissimilar-type results, whether simultaneous or non-simultaneous.

Treatise: 'Some say that dissimilar types... or follow the turning gate.'

Commentary: The following explains the objections, and there are two points to understand. For example, in the fourth volume of the Abhidharma (對法), it is said that the mutual relation of manifest phenomena of different entities and similar entities is a causal condition. That is because the Abhidharma states that the six causes are causal conditions, namely, manifest phenomena in relation to manifest phenomena. If there are other places that say this, they are falsely described as causal conditions; in reality, they are supporting conditions, etc. Or it follows the Sarvastivada school's view that the five causes, such as co-existent cause, are causal conditions. The eighteenth volume of the Xianyang Lun (顯揚論) refutes their view that the five causes are not causal conditions, which should be mentioned.

Treatise: 'Some only say that seeds are causal conditions.'

Commentary: Furthermore, the third, fifth, fifty-first, and thirty-eighth volumes of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論), and the eighteenth volume of the Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (顯揚聖教論), etc., all only say that seeds are causal conditions. This is based on the perspective of showing superiority, and it is not entirely in accordance with the truth. What is meant by showing superiority? It means that because seeds are constantly continuous, they are superior to manifest phenomena.

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谷生芽。相顯于現行故。今言顯勝。以瑜伽第五十一．及攝論。引阿毗達磨經等。說轉識與阿賴耶互為因緣故。非彼自種子。可言轉識更與本識互為因緣。故知現起六．七。與種子本識為因緣。即現行熏成種義故。得以略顯廣。故知一切有漏．無漏前來種子．現行二法為因緣體。

論。二等無間緣至令彼定生。

述曰。此中有三。初出體。次簡略。后釋相。此即初也　八現識及心所者。出緣體。唯見．自證是此緣體總名現識。簡色．不相應．種子．無為非此緣性。以多同類色．不相應．種子俱時轉故。三十八說。等無間緣唯望一切心．心所說。以前生開導所攝受故。開者避義。與后處義。導者招引義。即前法避其處招引后令生。必有緣法方具此二。既知菩薩地有開導之言。明命根．同分。體雖一一而無並生。一者是假。二無緣用。若是緣慮開導之法。又非假者方有此緣。然非唯假義便簡命根等。以不放逸等是假亦有此緣故。命根有等無間義。無有緣義．開導義故　前聚於後者。簡俱時及后為前緣義。非開導故　自類者。顯非他識為緣　無間者。顯雖前無間為後緣。非中有間隔。要無間者。雖經百年等斷。亦是此緣故。對法第五卷言。不爾者入無心定心。望出定心應非此緣。故知準望自類識為緣義。若不爾

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

『谷生芽』，這是因為相（lakshana）顯現於現行（vartamana）的緣故。現在說『顯勝』，是根據《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷以及《攝大乘論》，引用《阿毗達磨經》等，說明轉識（pravrtti-vijnana）與阿賴耶識（alaya-vijnana）互為因緣的緣故。並非轉識自身就是種子。可以說轉識更與本識（mula-vijnana，即阿賴耶識）互為因緣。因此可知，現起的第六識（意識，mano-vijnana）、第七識（末那識，manas-vijnana），與作為種子的本識互為因緣，即現行熏習成為種子的意義。因此可以略顯其廣大的含義。所以可知，一切有漏（sasrava，指有煩惱的）和無漏（anasrava，指沒有煩惱的）的前來種子和現行二法，互為因緣的本體。

論：二等無間緣（samanantara-pratyaya）乃至令彼定生。

述記：這裡面有三層含義。首先是說明本體，其次是簡略說明，最後是解釋相。這裡是第一層含義。八個現識以及心所（caitta）法，是指出等無間緣的本體。只有見分（darsana-bhaga）和自證分（svasamvedana-bhaga）是此緣的本體，總名為現識。簡別色法（rupa）、不相應行法（viprayukta-samskara-dharma）、種子（bija）、無為法（asamskrta-dharma）不是此緣的性質。因為許多同類的色法、不相應行法、種子是同時運轉的。《三十八》中說，等無間緣只是針對一切心和心所法來說的，因為前一生開導和攝受后一生。『開』是避讓的意思，是給後面的讓出位置的意思。『導』是招引的意思。就是前法避開自己的位置，招引后法產生。必須要有緣法才具備這兩種含義。既然知道《菩薩地》中有開導的說法，說明命根（jivitendriya）、同分（nikaya-sabhaga），體雖然是一一存在的，但是沒有並生的現象。一個是假立的，二是沒有緣用的作用。如果是緣慮開導之法，又不是假立的，才具有此緣。然而並非僅僅是假立的含義就能簡別命根等，因為不放逸（apramada）等是假立的，也有此緣的緣故。命根有等無間的含義，但是沒有緣義和開導義。前一聚對於后一聚，是簡別同時以及后一聚作為前一聚的緣的含義，因為沒有開導的作用。自類，是顯示不是他識作為緣。無間，是顯示雖然前一無間作為后一的緣，但是並非中間有間隔。一定要無間，即使經過百年等的間斷，也是此緣的緣故。《對法》第五卷說，如果不是這樣，進入無心定（asamjna-samapatti）的心，對於出定心來說，應該不是此緣。因此可知，準望自類識作為緣的含義。如果不是這樣。

【English Translation】 English version:

'A sprout grows from a seed' because the characteristic (lakshana) manifests in the present moment (vartamana). Now, 'manifestation prevails' is based on the fifty-first volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the Mahayanasamgraha, quoting the Abhidharma Sutra and others, explaining that the evolving consciousness (pravrtti-vijnana) and the alaya-consciousness (alaya-vijnana) are mutual causes and conditions. It is not that the evolving consciousness itself is the seed. It can be said that the evolving consciousness further interacts with the fundamental consciousness (mula-vijnana, i.e., alaya-vijnana) as mutual causes and conditions. Therefore, it can be known that the arising sixth consciousness (mano-vijnana), seventh consciousness (manas-vijnana), and the fundamental consciousness as the seed are mutual causes and conditions, that is, the meaning of the present activity perfuming and becoming the seed. Therefore, its vast meaning can be briefly revealed. Thus, it can be known that all defiled (sasrava) and undefiled (anasrava) past seeds and present activities are the entity of mutual causes and conditions.

Treatise: The immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya) leads to the definite arising of that.

Commentary: There are three meanings here. First, to explain the entity; second, to briefly explain; and third, to explain the characteristics. This is the first meaning. The eight manifest consciousnesses and mental factors (caitta) indicate the entity of the immediately preceding condition. Only the seeing aspect (darsana-bhaga) and the self-awareness aspect (svasamvedana-bhaga) are the entity of this condition, generally called manifest consciousness. Distinguishing form (rupa), non-associated formations (viprayukta-samskara-dharma), seeds (bija), and unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta-dharma) as not being the nature of this condition. Because many similar forms, non-associated formations, and seeds operate simultaneously. Thirty-eight says that the immediately preceding condition is only spoken of in relation to all minds and mental factors, because the previous life opens and receives the subsequent life. 'Opening' means avoiding, giving way to the subsequent. 'Guiding' means attracting. That is, the previous dharma avoids its position and attracts the subsequent dharma to arise. It is necessary to have the causal dharma to possess these two meanings. Since it is known that there is the saying of opening and guiding in the Bodhisattvabhumi, it indicates that the life faculty (jivitendriya) and the class identity (nikaya-sabhaga), although their entities exist individually, do not arise simultaneously. One is a mere designation, and the other has no causal function. If it is the dharma of causal consideration and guidance, and it is not a mere designation, then it possesses this condition. However, it is not merely the meaning of being a mere designation that distinguishes the life faculty, etc., because non-negligence (apramada), etc., are mere designations and also have this condition. The life faculty has the meaning of immediately preceding, but it does not have the meaning of causality and guidance. The previous aggregate in relation to the subsequent aggregate distinguishes the meaning of simultaneous and the subsequent aggregate as the condition of the previous aggregate, because it does not have the function of opening and guiding. 'Of the same class' indicates that it is not another consciousness that serves as the condition. 'Without interval' indicates that although the immediately preceding serves as the condition for the subsequent, there is no interval in between. It must be without interval, even if there is an interruption of hundreds of years, it is still this condition. The fifth volume of Abhidharmakosa says that if it is not so, the mind entering the unconscious samadhi (asamjna-samapatti), in relation to the mind emerging from the samadhi, should not be this condition. Therefore, it can be known that the meaning of considering the consciousness of the same class as the condition is accurate. If it is not so.

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者。出定之心有七．八識引。寧非此緣　等而開導者。顯前滅一心。為後心．心所緣。前一切心．心所。為后一心緣。意即齊等而開導故名等開導。此乃等屬前後通因果也。即簡相似法沙門義。彼一一心所。自望為緣非望余故。又等者。顯此心．心所聚中。唯一心．一所后亦爾。故一法非多故成等。非一聚中如色．不相應有多類起。彼非等故。且一身八識雖名多類。然體用各別名但是等。其色等法體用無別。多類並生故非是等。如草火等喻準此應知。開導者顯緣義　令彼定生者。即顯後果。雖經久遠如經八萬劫。前眼識望后亦為緣。以後後果當定生故。即簡入無餘依最後心。無果定生故非此緣。雖有開義無導引力故。

色法非等世所極成。不相應假是我宗義。無為無前後相他．自共許。今應解種子非此緣相也。

論。多同類種至非互為緣。

述曰。自下簡略。第二文中有三。此簡種非。眼識種子從無始際乃至於今。百千同類俱時轉故。如不相應非此緣攝。正舉喻類兼顯非緣。無等義故。由種．不相應既有多俱轉非為緣理故。八識相望非互為緣。多類並生故。若唯一識自作緣者。非多類並。自唯一故。若許八識俱互為緣。多類並生得為緣者。種子類應爾故。八現識體用別故非是同類。非如種等一類乃

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

這些（心和心所）是（從）禪定中生起之心的七、八識所引導的，難道不是這種緣起嗎？（『等開導』）顯示了前一剎那滅去的心，是后一剎那的心和心所的所緣。前一剎那的一切心和心所，是后一剎那唯一心的緣。意思是齊等而開導，所以叫做『等開導』。這指的是『等』字屬於前後相通的因果關係。這就排除了相似於法沙門的意義，因為他們每一個心所，自身作為緣，而不是以其他的作為緣。另外，『等』字顯示了這些心和心所的聚合中，只有唯一的心和心所，之後也是這樣。所以一個法不是多個法，因此成就了『等』。不像一個聚合中，如色法和不相應行法，有多種類別生起，它們不是『等』。而且，一身的八識雖然名為多種類別，但是體和用各自不同，所以只是『等』。而色法等體和用沒有區別，多種類別同時產生，所以不是『等』。如草和火等的比喻，可以依此理解。『開導』顯示了緣的意義，使那個禪定產生，這顯示了最終的結果。即使經過很久遠的時間，如經過八萬劫，前一剎那的眼識對於后一剎那的眼識也是緣，因為以後的結果必定會產生。這就排除了進入無餘依涅槃的最後的心，因為它沒有果必定產生，所以不是這種緣。雖然有開顯的意義，但是沒有導引的力量。

色法不是『等』，這是世間普遍認可的。不相應行法是假立的，這是我宗的觀點。無為法沒有前後相，這是其他宗派、自己宗派共同認可的。現在應該解釋種子不是這種緣的相。

論：多種同類的種子，乃至不是互相作為緣。

述記：下面是簡略的第二段文字，其中有三點。這裡是簡略說明種子不是緣。眼識的種子從無始以來直到現在，成百上千同類的種子同時運轉，就像不相應行法一樣，不屬於這種緣的範疇。這裡既舉了比喻，又顯示了不是緣，因為它沒有『等』的意義。由於種子和不相應行法既有多種同時運轉，所以不是作為緣的道理。八識相互之間不是互相作為緣，因為多種類別同時產生。如果只有唯一一個識自己作為緣，那麼就不會有多種類別同時產生，因為它只有唯一一個。如果允許八識同時互相作為緣，多種類別同時產生可以作為緣，那麼種子也應該這樣。八個現識的體和用是不同的，所以不是同類，不像種子等是同一類。

【English Translation】 English version:

Are these (mind and mental factors) guided by the seven or eight consciousnesses of the mind arising from Samadhi (concentration)? Isn't this the condition (hetu)? ('Sam-uddeśa' - Equal Guidance) shows that the mind that ceases in the previous moment is the object (ālambana) of the mind and mental factors of the subsequent moment. All the minds and mental factors of the previous moment are the condition for the single mind of the subsequent moment. It means that they are equally guiding, so it is called 'Sam-uddeśa'. This refers to the fact that 'Sama' (equal) belongs to the cause and effect that connects the past and the future. This excludes the meaning of the Śrāmaṇeras (ascetics) who are similar to the Dharma, because each of their mental factors takes itself as the condition, not others. Also, 'Sama' shows that in the aggregation of these minds and mental factors, there is only one mind and one mental factor, and it is the same afterwards. Therefore, one dharma is not many dharmas, thus achieving 'Sama'. Unlike in an aggregation, such as form (rūpa) and non-associated formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra), there are many categories arising, and they are not 'Sama'. Moreover, although the eight consciousnesses of one body are called many categories, their substance (svabhāva) and function (kriya) are different, so they are only 'Sama'. But form and other dharmas have no difference in substance and function, and many categories arise simultaneously, so they are not 'Sama'. The analogy of grass and fire etc. should be understood accordingly. 'Guidance' shows the meaning of condition, causing that Samadhi to arise, which shows the ultimate result. Even after a long time, such as after eighty thousand kalpas (aeons), the previous moment's eye consciousness is still a condition for the subsequent moment's eye consciousness, because the subsequent result will definitely arise. This excludes the last mind that enters Nirupadhisesa-nirvana (Nirvana without remainder), because it has no result that will definitely arise, so it is not this condition. Although it has the meaning of revealing, it does not have the power of guidance.

Form is not 'Sama', this is universally acknowledged in the world. Non-associated formations are hypothetical, this is the view of our school. Unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta dharmas) have no past and future aspects, this is commonly accepted by other schools and our own school. Now it should be explained that seeds (bīja) are not the characteristic of this condition.

Treatise: Many seeds of the same kind, up to not being conditions for each other.

Commentary: Below is a brief second passage, which has three points. Here is a brief explanation that seeds are not conditions. The seeds of eye consciousness, from beginningless time until now, hundreds and thousands of seeds of the same kind operate simultaneously, just like non-associated formations, and do not belong to the category of this condition. This both gives an analogy and shows that it is not a condition, because it does not have the meaning of 'Sama'. Since seeds and non-associated formations have many operating simultaneously, they are not the reason for being conditions. The eight consciousnesses are not conditions for each other, because many categories arise simultaneously. If only one consciousness takes itself as the condition, then there will not be many categories arising simultaneously, because it is only one. If it is allowed that the eight consciousnesses simultaneously act as conditions for each other, and many categories arising simultaneously can be conditions, then seeds should also be like this. The substance and function of the eight manifest consciousnesses are different, so they are not of the same kind, unlike seeds etc. which are of the same kind.

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有百千。

問心與心所既非自類。如八種識恒俱時轉體用各殊。如何俱起望后並得互為緣義。

論。心所與心至等無間緣。

述曰。顯心所是。心所與心雖恒俱轉。而相應故和合似一。同一所緣。及同所依。同一時轉。同一性攝。不可離別令其殊異。不同八識行相．所緣．依各不同故非互為緣。此中簡別如前第五卷開道依中解。

論。入無餘依至故非此緣。

述曰。簡彼末心非。入無餘心極微劣故。無開道用。開道用心必有勢力非微劣故。因勢弱也。又無當起無間之果。故彼末心非此緣攝。第八十說。入無餘心前先入滅定滅六轉識。後方滅余識。有由願力故入滅定而得命終。無漏第六識入定故。第七．八識舍受無記心命終也。前第三卷更有別解。

論。云何知然。

述曰。外人近問。云何知彼末心非緣。遠問意者。云何知彼前心聚望後心聚為緣非一一相望。

論。論有誠說至無間緣故。

述曰。且答近問。如大論第三．及九十三．顯揚第十八與此文同　若此識等無間。謂為緣者　彼識等決定生。此說果有。既論說言決定生故。果定當有方得為緣。亦不定論時節久遠。入無餘心之果非決定生故非此緣　答前遠問者。既言此識等無間。明以識為緣。諸識等決定生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有百千。

問：心和心所（Citta-caitta，心所是伴隨心識生起的心理現象）既然不是同類，比如八種識（Eight Consciousnesses，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）恒常同時運轉，但體性和作用各不相同，如何能夠同時生起，並且相互成為緣（Pratyaya，因緣）呢？

論：心所與心，達到等無間緣（Samanantarapratyaya，無間緣，又稱等無間緣，指心與心所相續生起，前念滅后，立即引發后念）的程度。

述曰：這表明心所是這樣的：心所與心雖然恒常同時運轉，但因為相應（Samprayukta，相應）的緣故，和合得像一個整體。它們具有相同的所緣（Alambana，對像），相同的所依（Asraya，所依賴的基礎），同時運轉，並且被同一自性所攝持。它們不可分離，因此沒有差別。這不同於八識，它們的行相（Akara，表現形式）、所緣、所依各不相同，因此不能互為緣。其中的簡別，如前面第五卷開道依（開道依）中解釋的那樣。

論：進入無餘依（Nirupadhisesa-nirvana，無餘涅槃，指斷盡一切煩惱，不再有任何剩餘的依附）的狀態，因此不是此緣。

述曰：這是爲了排除臨終時的最後心念不是緣。進入無餘依的心念極其微弱，沒有開道（Apavarga，解脫）的作用。開道所用的心念必須具有勢力，不能微弱，因為因的勢力弱。而且，它沒有即將生起的無間之果。因此，臨終時的最後心念不屬於此緣的範圍。第八十卷說，進入無餘依的心念之前，先進入滅盡定（Nirodha-samapatti，滅盡定），滅除六種轉識（Six Vijnanas，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識），然後才滅除其餘的識。有些人因為願力的緣故，進入滅盡定而得以終結生命。無漏（Anasrava，無煩惱）的第六識（意識）進入滅盡定，第七識（末那識）、第八識（阿賴耶識）捨棄了受（Vedana，感受）和無記（Avyakrta，非善非惡）的心念而終結生命。前面第三卷有更詳細的解釋。

論：如何知道是這樣的呢？

述曰：外人（指提問者）近處提問：如何知道臨終時的最後心念不是緣？遠處提問的意思是：如何知道前一剎那的心念集合對后一剎那的心念集合是緣，而不是一一對應相互為緣？

論：論中有明確的說法，達到無間緣的程度。

述曰：先回答近處的提問。如《大論》（Mahavibhasa，大毗婆沙論）第三卷、第九十三卷，《顯揚》（Xianyang，顯揚聖教論）第十八卷與此處的文義相同：『如果這個識是等無間，被稱為緣，那麼這個識等決定會生起。』這裡說的是果的存在。既然論中說『決定生起』，那麼果必定會產生，才能成為緣。但並沒有確定時間的長短。進入無餘依的心念之果不是決定會生起的，因此不是此緣。回答前面遠處的提問：既然說『這個識等無間』，就表明是以識為緣，諸識等決定會生起。

【English Translation】 English version There are hundreds of thousands.

Question: Since the Citta (mind) and Caitta (mental factors, the mental phenomena that arise with consciousness) are not of the same category, such as the Eight Consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness, Manas consciousness, Alaya consciousness) which constantly operate simultaneously but have different natures and functions, how can they arise simultaneously and become Pratyaya (conditions) to each other?

Treatise: Mental factors and the mind reach the level of Samanantarapratyaya (the immediately preceding condition, also known as the contiguous condition, referring to the continuous arising of mind and mental factors, where the previous thought ceases and immediately gives rise to the next thought).

Commentary: This shows that mental factors are like this: although mental factors and the mind constantly operate simultaneously, they are combined as if they were one because of Samprayukta (association). They have the same Alambana (object), the same Asraya (basis of support), operate simultaneously, and are governed by the same nature. They are inseparable, so there is no difference. This is different from the Eight Consciousnesses, whose Akara (manifestations), objects, and bases of support are different, so they cannot be conditions for each other. The distinctions are explained in the fifth volume, in the section on 'Opening the Way'.

Treatise: Entering Nirupadhisesa-nirvana (Nirvana with no remainder, referring to the complete cessation of all afflictions, with no remaining attachments), therefore it is not this condition.

Commentary: This is to exclude the final thought at the time of death from being a condition. The mind entering Nirupadhisesa is extremely subtle and has no function of Apavarga (liberation). The mind used for liberation must have power and cannot be subtle, because the power of the cause is weak. Moreover, it has no immediately arising result. Therefore, the final thought at the time of death does not belong to the scope of this condition. The eightieth volume says that before entering Nirupadhisesa, one first enters Nirodha-samapatti (cessation attainment), eliminating the Six Vijnanas (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness), and then eliminating the remaining consciousnesses. Some people, because of the power of their vows, enter cessation attainment and are able to end their lives. The Anasrava (untainted) sixth consciousness (mind consciousness) enters cessation attainment, and the seventh (Manas consciousness) and eighth (Alaya consciousness) consciousnesses abandon Vedana (feeling) and Avyakrta (neutral) thoughts and end their lives. There is a more detailed explanation in the third volume.

Treatise: How do we know this is so?

Commentary: The questioner asks nearby: How do we know that the final thought at the time of death is not a condition? The meaning of the question from afar is: How do we know that the collection of thoughts in the previous moment is a condition for the collection of thoughts in the next moment, rather than each corresponding to each other as conditions?

Treatise: The treatise has a clear statement, reaching the level of the immediately preceding condition.

Commentary: First answer the nearby question. As in the third and ninety-third volumes of the Mahavibhasa (Great Commentary), and the eighteenth volume of the Xianyang (Compendium of Determinations), the meaning of the text here is the same: 'If this consciousness is immediately preceding, and is called a condition, then this consciousness will definitely arise.' This refers to the existence of the result. Since the treatise says 'definitely arises,' then the result must arise in order to be a condition. But it does not determine the length of time. The result of the mind entering Nirupadhisesa is not certain to arise, so it is not this condition. Answering the previous question from afar: Since it says 'this consciousness is immediately preceding,' it shows that consciousness is the condition, and all consciousnesses will definitely arise.

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．明果通心所。識有等言故。果法既許通一聚法。緣亦應爾。

此即料簡廢立體性也。自下第三八識．三界．九地．漏．無漏．善等三性分別顯此緣相。

論。即依此義至相開導故。

述曰。于中有四。初中復二。初顯相。后問答。

阿陀那言顯位通故。非藏識通。且以異熟無記心。以死生三界容得為緣。

論。有漏無間至必無斷故。

述曰。至佛果時方得無漏故。無無漏生有漏者。

論。善與無記相望亦然。

述曰。二性類漏．無漏亦爾唯無記生善。非善生無記故。

論。此何界后引生無漏。

述曰。外人問。此第八識既言有漏生無漏者。何界有漏後生無漏。

論。或從色界或欲界后。

述曰。此論主答。從二界後有漏生無漏。總舉二人。非無色界無所依故。無利他故。

論。謂諸異生至得菩提故。

述曰。一切異生。即頓悟人得成佛者。定色界後後報利益。摩醯首羅智處生故。以色界中無二乘迴心者。瑜伽第八十云變易生死所留生身即於此洲故也。彼無佛等可教化故。發心留身唯在欲界。必生自在宮。唯異生色界后也。有學等迴心。但于欲界等地。隨多少生死盡。即受變易生。后往自在宮成佛。不往彼生故。其諸異生無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 明果通心所（Mingguo Tongxin Suo）：因為識（shi）有『等言』的說法。如果果法（guofa）被允許與一聚法（yiju fa）相通，那麼緣（yuan）也應該如此。

這實際上是對廢立體性（fei lixing ti）的簡擇。從下面開始，第三部分分別從八識（bashi）、三界（sanjie）、九地（jiudi）、有漏（lou）、無漏（wulou）、善等三性（shan deng sanxing）來顯現這種緣相（yuanxiang）。

論：即依據這個意義來相互開導。

述曰：其中有四部分。第一部分又分為兩部分：先是顯現相（xianxiang），然後是問答。

阿陀那（Atuonuo）這個詞顯示了位置的普遍性，而不是藏識（zangshi）的普遍性。暫且以異熟無記心（yishu wuji xin）為例，以死亡來生於三界（sanjie），可以作為緣（yuan）。

論：有漏（lou）的無間（wujian）直到必定不會斷絕。

述曰：直到佛果（foguoshi）的時候才能得到無漏（wulou），所以沒有無漏（wulou）產生有漏（lou）的情況。

論：善（shan）與無記（wuji）相互比較也是如此。

述曰：二性（erxing）類似於有漏（lou）和無漏（wulou）也是這樣，只有無記（wuji）產生善（shan），而不是善（shan）產生無記（wuji）。

論：這在哪個界（jie）之後引生無漏（wulou）？

述曰：外人提問，既然說這第八識（bashi）是有漏（lou）產生無漏（wulou），那麼在哪個界（jie）的有漏（lou）之後產生無漏（wulou）？

論：或者從（）或者欲界（yujie）之後。

述曰：這是論主的回答。從這兩個界（jie）之後，有漏（lou）產生無漏（wulou）。總共舉出兩個人，不是沒有（），因為沒有所依賴的。因為沒有利益他人。

論：指的是那些異生（yisheng）直到獲得菩提（puti）的緣故。

述曰：一切異生（yisheng），也就是頓悟的人成就佛果（foguoshi）的，一定是（）之後得到后報的利益。因為摩醯首羅（Moheshouluo）的智慧處產生。因為在（）中沒有二乘（ercheng）迴心的人。《瑜伽師地論》（Yujia shidi lun）第八十卷說，變易生死（bianyi shengsi）所留下的生身就在這個洲。因為那裡沒有佛等可以教化，發心留下身體只在欲界（yujie）。必定是異生（yisheng）在（）之後。有學等迴心，只是在欲界（yujie）等地，隨著生死多少而盡，就接受變易生（bianyi sheng）。之後前往自在宮（zizaigong）成佛，不往那裡出生。那些異生（yisheng）沒有

【English Translation】 English version Mingguo Tongxin Suo: Because consciousness (shi) has the saying of 'equal words'. If the fruit dharma (guofa) is allowed to be connected with a collection of dharmas (yiju fa), then conditions (yuan) should also be like this.

This is actually a selection of abolishing the established nature. From below, the third part separately manifests this conditional appearance (yuanxiang) from the eight consciousnesses (bashi), the three realms (sanjie), the nine grounds (jiudi), defilement (lou), non-defilement (wulou), and the three natures of good, etc. (shan deng sanxing).

Treatise: That is, according to this meaning, to enlighten each other.

Commentary: There are four parts in it. The first part is divided into two parts: first, the manifestation of appearance (xianxiang), and then questions and answers.

The word Atuonuo shows the universality of position, not the universality of the store consciousness (zangshi). For the time being, take the mind of differentiated maturation and non-remembering (yishu wuji xin) as an example, to be born in the three realms (sanjie) through death, which can be regarded as a condition (yuan).

Treatise: The defilement (lou) of non-interval (wujian) will certainly not be cut off.

Commentary: Only when the fruit of Buddhahood (foguoshi) is reached can non-defilement (wulou) be obtained, so there is no situation where non-defilement (wulou) produces defilement (lou).

Treatise: The same is true for good (shan) and non-remembering (wuji) in comparison with each other.

Commentary: The two natures (erxing) are similar to defilement (lou) and non-defilement (wulou) as well. Only non-remembering (wuji) produces good (shan), but not good (shan) produces non-remembering (wuji).

Treatise: After which realm (jie) does this lead to the generation of non-defilement (wulou)?

Commentary: An outsider asks, since it is said that this eighth consciousness (bashi) is defilement (lou) producing non-defilement (wulou), then after which realm (jie) of defilement (lou) does non-defilement (wulou) arise?

Treatise: Either from ** (**) or after the desire realm (yujie).

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. From these two realms (jie), defilement (lou) produces non-defilement (wulou). Two people are mentioned in total, not without ** (**), because there is nothing to rely on. Because there is no benefit to others.

Treatise: Refers to those different beings (yisheng) until the reason for obtaining Bodhi (puti).

Commentary: All different beings (yisheng), that is, those who suddenly realize and achieve Buddhahood (foguoshi), must obtain the benefits of later rewards after ** (). Because the wisdom place of Moheshouluo is produced. Because there are no people in the two vehicles (ercheng) who turn their minds in ** (). The eightieth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Yujia shidi lun) says that the life body left behind by the transformation of birth and death (bianyi shengsi) is on this continent. Because there are no Buddhas, etc. there to teach, the determination to leave the body is only in the desire realm (yujie). It must be after the different beings (yisheng) are in ** (**). Those who have learning, etc., turn their minds, only in the desire realm (yujie) and other places, as long as the amount of birth and death is exhausted, they will accept the transformation of birth (bianyi sheng). Afterwards, they go to the Palace of Freedom (zizaigong) to become Buddhas, and do not go there to be born. Those different beings (yisheng) do not

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欲界身受變易生死。變易生死不可死已更生大自在宮故。至第八地身要生第四禪。得勝身已方受殊勝變易身故。大自在宮者。謂凈居上有實凈土。即自受用身初于彼起證。是第十地菩薩宮。舊言摩醯首羅。今應言莫醯伊濕伐羅。即大自在也。此出花嚴經．十地經第十二卷。摩醯首羅智處生也。解深密瑜伽七十八．九．對法第六．顯揚第二．瑜伽第四等中。有大自在宮文。此唯他受用土。十地菩薩報身往彼。然由異熟同一地故。論說為生。據實受變易。在下三天處。未得生凈土。今往故名生。瑜伽第四說超過凈居大自在住處。第十地菩薩極熏修故。得生其中故。既成佛已身充法界。

論。二乘回趣至是欲界故。

述曰。一切二乘有學．無學．欲界發心。定欲界后引生無漏。以願力留身唯欲界故。上界無此迴心聖故。今言唯欲界有初發心。及留身唯欲界。于彼無初發心緣故。亦無地獄發心。死已方生上界留身。故欲界后引生無漏。然成佛時。必要往自在宮成佛。就勝處故。故知受變易已。后往色界。及諸凈土。當知唯此身神通力故得往。非更受生。第八十卷不說變易有更生故。有說勝鬘經即許有多變易生。與此論相違。曾勘經文不見明說。至下第八卷二種生死中會(如余樞要)。

論。有義色界至亦得

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：欲界眾生的身體會經歷變易生死（指菩薩或阿羅漢在修行過程中，隨著修行境界的提升，身體和心識會發生變化，經歷一種微妙的生死），但這種變易生死不會導致死後還能在大自在宮（Mahēśvara，莫醯伊濕伐羅，即大自在天，為色界頂天的天主）重新投生，因為要到第八地菩薩才能在第四禪天獲得殊勝的身體，才能承受殊勝的變易身。所謂大自在宮，指的是凈居天之上的真實凈土，是自受用身（佛的報身）最初證得的地方，是第十地菩薩的居所。舊譯為摩醯首羅，現在應該譯為莫醯伊濕伐羅，即大自在天。這出自《華嚴經》、《十地經》第十二卷，摩醯首羅是智慧的處所。在《解深密經》、《瑜伽師地論》第七十八、九卷、《對法論》第六卷、《顯揚聖教論》第二卷、《瑜伽師地論》第四卷等經論中，都有關於大自在宮的記載。這裡只是他受用土（佛為他人說法而示現的凈土），十地菩薩的報身會前往那裡。然而，由於異熟果報在同一地上，所以經論中說為『生』。實際上，承受變易生死是在下三禪天處。未得生凈土，現在前往，所以名為『生』。《瑜伽師地論》第四卷說，超過凈居天的大自在住處，是第十地菩薩極度熏修才能往生的地方。既然已經成佛，身體就充滿法界。

論：二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）回小向大，最終也會到達欲界。

述曰：一切二乘的有學和無學，在欲界發心，必定在欲界之後才能引生無漏智慧，因為他們以願力留身在欲界。上界沒有這種回小向大的聖者，所以說只有欲界有最初的發心，以及留身在欲界。因為上界沒有最初發心的因緣，也沒有地獄發心，死後才生到上界留身的情況。所以欲界之後才能引生無漏智慧。然而，成佛的時候，必須前往自在宮成佛，因為那裡是殊勝之處。所以知道承受變易生死之後，才能前往兜率天（Tuṣita）以及諸凈土。應當知道，這只是憑藉神通力才能前往，並非再次受生。第八十卷沒有說變易生死有再次受生的情況。有人說《勝鬘經》允許有很多變易生，與此論相違背。曾經考證經文，沒有看到明確的說法。到下第八卷的二種生死中會解釋（如其他樞要）。

論：有義，兜率天（Tuṣita）也能夠...

【English Translation】 English version: Beings in the desire realm experience change-and-decay birth and death (referring to the subtle changes in body and mind experienced by Bodhisattvas or Arhats as they progress in their practice). However, this change-and-decay birth and death does not lead to rebirth in the Great自在 Palace (Mahēśvara,莫醯伊濕伐羅, the lord of the highest heaven in the realm of form), because only Bodhisattvas of the eighth ground can attain a superior body in the fourth dhyana heaven, and only then can they undergo a superior change-and-decay body. The so-called Great自在 Palace refers to the pure land above the Pure Abode Heavens, which is the place where the self-enjoyment body (the Sambhogakaya of the Buddha) is first realized, and is the abode of the tenth-ground Bodhisattvas. It was formerly translated as Mahēśvara, but should now be translated as莫醯伊濕伐羅, which means Great自在. This is from the Avatamsaka Sutra and the Dasabhumika Sutra, volume 12. Mahēśvara is the place of wisdom. The Sandhinirmocana Sutra, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volumes 78 and 79, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, volume 6, the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations, volume 2, and the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 4, all contain records of the Great自在 Palace. This is only a land for the enjoyment of others (a pure land manifested by the Buddha to teach others), and the Sambhogakaya of the tenth-ground Bodhisattvas goes there. However, because the results of karma are on the same ground, the scriptures say 'birth'. In reality, the change-and-decay birth and death is experienced in the lower three dhyana heavens. One has not yet attained birth in the pure land, but now goes there, so it is called 'birth'. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume 4, says that the Great自在 abode beyond the Pure Abode Heavens is a place where tenth-ground Bodhisattvas can be born through extreme cultivation. Since one has already become a Buddha, the body fills the entire Dharma realm.

Treatise: The Two Vehicles (Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana) turn from the small to the great, and will eventually reach the desire realm.

Commentary: All learners and non-learners of the Two Vehicles, who generate the aspiration in the desire realm, must generate the unconditioned wisdom after the desire realm, because they retain their bodies in the desire realm through their vows. The upper realms do not have such sages who turn from the small to the great, so it is said that only the desire realm has the initial aspiration, and retains the body only in the desire realm. Because the upper realms do not have the conditions for the initial aspiration, and there is no situation where one generates the aspiration in the lower realm and is born in the upper realm to retain the body. Therefore, unconditioned wisdom can only be generated after the desire realm. However, when becoming a Buddha, one must go to the自在 Palace to become a Buddha, because that is a superior place. Therefore, it is known that after undergoing change-and-decay birth and death, one can go to Tushita and the pure lands. It should be known that this is only possible through supernatural powers, and not through rebirth. Volume 80 does not say that change-and-decay birth and death involves rebirth. Some say that the Srimala Sutra allows for many change-and-decay births, which contradicts this treatise. I have examined the scriptures and have not seen any clear statement. This will be explained in the two kinds of birth and death in volume 8 (as in other essentials).

Treatise: Some say that Tushita can also...

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現前。

述曰。異生同前第一師說。色界亦有聲聞初發心向大乘者。既與教．理俱不相違。無文遮故。許佛亦往菩薩生彼化故。有所依身故。亦有二乘聖者。色界有漏第八識后無漏現前。由有聲聞于彼發心留身者故。唯除初二果。及獨覺者。于彼發心上界無故。然論雖言留身於此洲。不言唯欲界遮余界無。故非誠證。又但言此洲不言余洲。余洲豈無。故不違理。亦色界后引生無漏。此中雖無評家。取者任意　然無色界必無迴心向大乘者。以此論說唯欲．色界有漏本識後生無漏故。無佛．菩薩勝人生故。又無色身可得留故。一切下色身。得非擇滅故。非定所生色可成身留故。中陰經中說佛處中陰二十年。亦化無色界眾生者。大眾部經。非大乘義。楞伽．般若皆說菩薩不生無色。瑜伽等同。唯色界有許之無失。

論。然五凈居至發大心故。

述曰。此簡色界地有回不回者。由經不說彼五凈居發大心故。以下諸地發理無違。約處為言。唯五凈居全無發者。此言經者大般若說。今第二會。當舊大品第十五卷。今大般若第一會第一百二十六云。複次憍尸迦。若善男子善女人等。書寫如是甚深般若波羅蜜多。種種莊嚴置清凈處。供養恭敬尊重讚歎時。此三千大千世界所有四天王天。乃至他化自在天已發阿耨多羅

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

現前。

述曰：異生與前文第一師的觀點相同。也有聲聞乘修行者最初發心趨向大乘。這既不與教義相悖，也不與理相違背，且沒有經文禁止，所以允許佛也前往菩薩所生的世界去教化，因為佛有所依憑的色身。也有二乘聖者，在有漏的第八識（阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna）之後，無漏的清凈識顯現。因為有聲聞乘修行者在那裡發心並留下色身。唯獨不包括初果、二果的聖者以及獨覺乘的修行者，因為他們在彼處沒有發菩提心，上界也沒有他們留下的色身。然而，論中雖然說留下色身在此洲（ Jambudvīpa），但沒有說只在欲界，從而排除其他界沒有這種情況，所以這並非確鑿的證據。而且，論中只說了此洲，沒有說其他洲，難道其他洲就沒有這種情況嗎？所以這並不違背道理。也可能後來引生無漏。這裡雖然沒有評判者，但採取這種觀點的人可以隨意。然而，並非一定沒有迴心向大乘的修行者，因為此論說只有欲界有有漏的本識，之後才生出無漏的清凈識，所以沒有佛、菩薩這樣殊勝的人出生。而且，也沒有色身可以留下，因為一切地獄的色身，都已通過非擇滅而滅盡，所以並非由禪定所生的色身可以成就並留下。中陰經中說佛在中陰界二十年，也教化沒有色身的眾生，這是大眾部的經典，並非大乘的含義。《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）、《般若經》（Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）都說菩薩不生於無色界，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）等論典也持相同觀點，只有允許這種情況才沒有過失。

論：然而，五凈居天（Śuddhāvāsa）直到發大菩提心。

述曰：這是爲了簡別諸地中存在迴心與不迴心的情況。因為經典沒有說五凈居天會發大菩提心，而以下各地的眾生髮菩提心在道理上沒有衝突。就處所而言，只有五凈居天完全沒有發菩提心的眾生。這裡所說的經典是指《大般若經》（Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra）。現在是第二會，相當於舊《大品般若經》（Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra）第十五卷。現在《大般若經》第一會第一百二十六卷說：『複次，憍尸迦（Kauśika，帝釋天名）。若善男子、善女人等，書寫如是甚深般若波羅蜜多，種種莊嚴置清凈處，供養恭敬尊重讚歎時，此三千大千世界所有四天王天（Cāturmahārājakāyika），乃至他化自在天（Paranirmita-vaśavartin）已發阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心（anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi-citta，無上正等正覺之心）'

【English Translation】 English version:

Present.

Statement: The view of the different beings is the same as that of the first teacher mentioned earlier. There are also Śrāvakas (聲聞, 'hearers' or 'disciples') who initially aspire towards the Mahāyāna (大乘, 'Great Vehicle'). This is not contradictory to either the teachings or the principles, and there is no scriptural prohibition against it. Therefore, it is permissible for Buddhas to go to the realms where Bodhisattvas are born to teach, because Buddhas have a physical body to rely on. There are also Arhats (聖者, 'saints') of the Two Vehicles (二乘, 'Two Vehicles', referring to Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), where the non-defiled consciousness manifests after the defiled eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識, 'storehouse consciousness'). This is because there are Śrāvakas who generate the aspiration for enlightenment there and leave their physical bodies behind. This excludes the first two stages of Arhatship (初二果, 'first two fruits', referring to Srotāpanna and Sakṛdāgāmin) and Pratyekabuddhas (獨覺, 'Solitary Buddhas'), because they do not generate the aspiration for enlightenment in those realms, and there are no physical bodies left behind in the higher realms. Although the treatise states that physical bodies are left behind in this continent (Jambudvīpa, Jambudvīpa), it does not say that it is only in the desire realm (欲界, Kāmadhātu), thus excluding the possibility of other realms having this situation. Therefore, this is not conclusive evidence. Moreover, the treatise only mentions this continent and does not mention other continents. Does this mean that other continents do not have this situation? Therefore, this does not contradict reason. It is also possible that non-defiled consciousness arises later. Although there are no commentators here, those who adopt this view are free to do so. However, it is not necessarily the case that there are no practitioners who turn towards the Mahāyāna, because this treatise states that only the desire realm has defiled fundamental consciousness, and only then does non-defiled consciousness arise. Therefore, there are no Buddhas or Bodhisattvas born there. Moreover, there are no physical bodies that can be left behind, because all physical bodies in the lower realms have been extinguished through non-selective cessation (非擇滅, asaṃkhyāta-nirodha). Therefore, physical bodies that are not born from meditation cannot be formed and left behind. The Intermediate Existence Sutra (中陰經, Antarābhava Sūtra) states that the Buddha spent twenty years in the intermediate existence realm, also teaching beings without physical bodies. This is a scripture of the Mahāsāṃghika (大眾部, 'Great Assembly Sect'), not the meaning of the Mahāyāna. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (楞伽經, Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra) and the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (般若經, Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra) both state that Bodhisattvas are not born in the formless realm (無色界, Arūpadhātu). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) and other treatises hold the same view. Only by allowing this possibility can there be no fault.

Treatise: However, the Pure Abodes (Śuddhāvāsa, 五凈居天) are until the generation of the great aspiration for enlightenment.

Statement: This is to distinguish between those who turn back and those who do not turn back in the various realms. Because the scriptures do not say that the Pure Abodes generate the great aspiration for enlightenment, while the generation of the aspiration for enlightenment in the realms below does not contradict reason. In terms of location, only the Pure Abodes have no beings who generate the aspiration for enlightenment at all. The scriptures mentioned here refer to the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra (大般若經, Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra). This is now the second assembly, equivalent to the fifteenth fascicle of the old Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra (大品般若經, Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra). The one hundred and twenty-sixth fascicle of the first assembly of the current Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra states: 'Furthermore, Kauśika (憍尸迦, Kauśika, name of Indra). If good men and good women write out this profound Prajñāpāramitā (般若波羅蜜多, Prajñāpāramitā, Perfection of Wisdom), adorn it in various ways, place it in a pure place, and offer, respect, revere, and praise it, then all the Cāturmahārājakāyikas (四天王天, Cāturmahārājakāyikas, Heaven of the Four Great Kings) in this three-thousand-great-thousand world, up to the Paranirmita-vaśavartins (他化自在天, Paranirmita-vaśavartin, Heaven of Control Wielded by Others), have already generated the aspiration for Anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi-citta (阿耨多羅三藐三菩提心, anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi-citta, unsurpassed, complete and perfect enlightenment).'

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三藐三菩提心者。恒來是處觀禮讀誦。乃至廣說。合掌而去。所有梵眾天。乃至廣果天已發無上菩提心者。恒來是處。乃至廣說。合掌而去。所有凈居天。謂無繁天。乃至色究竟天。亦恒來此觀禮讀誦如是般若。乃至廣說。合掌而去。爾時十方無邊世界所有四天王天。乃至他化自在天。乃至爾所梵眾天。乃至廣果天已發無上菩提心者。亦恒來此。乃至廣說。合掌而去。爾時十方所有凈居天。謂無繁天。乃至色究竟天。亦恒來此。乃至廣說。合掌而去。余處皆言發菩提心者。于凈居處不說發心。故知色界亦有聖者發向大心。唯除凈居。經不言有發大心者故。若前師解此文者。此言廣果諸以下天說發心者。據異生說。非是有學。不爾凈居有何別因獨無迴心者　第二師云。一以經證。二亦由理。若生凈居必不生上。亦不迴心。取涅槃近。耽寂心堅。化必難得。故無回者。二理既齊。其文共會。諸有智者取捨隨情　問此第二師義若準佛地。及此論等。既許二乘初二果等受變易生雖初則發心。要經多生方受變易。亦應許有欲界發心。至上界生身方受變易者不　今解有二。一云無也。生色界生必非經于欲界生。不還聖者得宿願通知欲業盡。或未得根本定。未得通故不共知。而厭粗身即便急引變易生死。故無上界方受變易。欲界發心

。即于欲界受變易故。不同初二果。彼欲業未盡。雖有知業多少。亦有不知者。業力所牽。或有即發心時受此生死。或有未受至第七生等。不還發心必即受生。業力盡故。道力滿故。厭惡深故。不肯上界更經一生。何況有多。二云既無文遮。如七生者發心留身未必同時。不還者亦爾。欲界發心上界留身。欲界之身業力盡故。未得邊際定可資故業故。欲得依勝身方轉易故。由如是理。或有上地但於一處受一生已。即方受變易。或有二處．三處。或一地．二地．三地．乃至四地。至廣果天受變易身。往自在官而受佛位。或有乃至但于第四禪受一生而受變易。有決定業故於理無違　因論生論。其凈居上有實報土。第十地居。為三界處為不爾耶。佛地論說。此他受用身所居凈土。為第十地諸菩薩等說法處故。即色究竟天攝。以極勝處凈居不知亦不至彼。是故經云有妙凈土出過三界第十地菩薩當生其中是也。

論。第七轉識至生處系故。

述曰。此即末那隨第八系如前已說。故同第八界地互緣。三界有覆得相引也。

論。有漏無漏至得相引故。

述曰。初地智起后還出觀。有漏。無漏故互相生。隨是何系染．不染識。引生何地無漏識起。

論。善與無記相望亦然。

述曰。即此有漏．無漏

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為在欲界承受變易生死，所以與初果、二果不同。他們欲界的業力尚未窮盡，雖然知道業的多少，也有不知道的。被業力牽引，或者有剛發心時就承受這種生死的，或者有未承受直到第七生等的。不還果發心必定立即受生，因為業力已經窮盡，道力已經圓滿，厭惡之心深刻，不肯在上界再經歷一生，更何況是多生。有人說既然沒有經文禁止，就像七生者發心和留下身體未必同時，不還果也是這樣。在欲界發心，在上界留下身體，因為欲界的身體業力已經窮盡，又因為沒有得到邊際定可以資助業力，想要依靠殊勝的身體才轉變容易。由於這樣的道理，或者有在上地只在一個地方受一生之後，就承受變易生死，或者在兩個地方、三個地方，或者在一地、二地、三地，乃至四地，到廣果天承受變易身，前往自在天宮而接受佛位。或者有乃至只在第四禪受一生而承受變易。因為有決定的業力，所以在道理上沒有違背。因論生論說，在凈居天之上，有實報土，第十地菩薩居住。這是在三界之內還是之外呢？《佛地論》說，這是他受用身所居住的凈土，是為第十地諸菩薩等說法的地方，屬於色究竟天所攝。因為極殊勝處，凈居天人不知道，也不到那裡。所以經上說有妙凈土超出三界，第十地菩薩應當生在那裡。 論中說：第七轉識與生處相聯繫。 述記中說：這也就是末那識隨著第八識相聯繫，如前面已經說過的。所以和第八識一樣，界地互相緣起。三界有覆無記性可以互相牽引。 論中說：有漏和無漏互相牽引。 述記中說：初地智生起后又還出觀，所以有有漏和無漏互相生起。隨著是什麼系的染污識或不染污識，牽引生起什麼地的無漏識。 論中說：善和無記相互之間也是這樣。 述記中說：就是這有漏和無漏。

【English Translation】 English version: Because they experience variable births and deaths in the Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu), they are different from the first and second fruits (初果 Srota-āpanna, 二果 Sakridāgāmin). Their karmic forces in the Desire Realm have not been exhausted. Although they know the amount of karma, some do not know. Driven by karmic forces, some experience this cycle of birth and death as soon as they generate the aspiration (發心 Bodhicitta), while others do not experience it until the seventh life, etc. Those who attain the state of Non-Returner (不還果 Anāgāmin) will definitely be reborn immediately after generating the aspiration because their karmic forces have been exhausted, their power of the Path (道力 Mārga-bala) is complete, and their aversion is profound. They are unwilling to experience another life in the higher realms, let alone multiple lives. Some say that since there is no scriptural prohibition, just as the seven-life beings (七生者) may not generate the aspiration and leave the body simultaneously, the Non-Returners are also like that. They generate the aspiration in the Desire Realm and leave the body in the higher realms because the karmic forces of the body in the Desire Realm have been exhausted, and because they have not attained the Borderline Concentration (邊際定) that can support karmic forces. They want to rely on a superior body to transform easily. Due to such reasons, some may experience variable births and deaths after experiencing only one life in one place in the higher realms, or in two places, three places, or in one realm, two realms, three realms, or even four realms, reaching the Abundant Fruit Heaven (廣果天 Bṛhatphala) to receive the transformed body, going to the Palace of the自在天 (Īśvara) and receiving the Buddha position. Or some may even experience only one life in the Fourth Dhyana (第四禪) and then experience transformation. Because there is definite karma, there is no contradiction in principle. The 因論生論 (Hetu-prakaraṇa) says that above the Pure Abodes (凈居天 Śuddhāvāsa), there is a Land of Actual Reward (實報土), where the Tenth Ground Bodhisattvas (第十地菩薩) reside. Is this within or outside the Three Realms? The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra (佛地論) says that this is the Pure Land where the Enjoyment Body (他受用身 Para-saṃbhoga-kāya) resides, a place where the Tenth Ground Bodhisattvas and others are taught the Dharma, belonging to the Realm of the Ultimate Form (色究竟天 Akaniṣṭha). Because it is an extremely superior place, the Pure Abode beings do not know about it and do not go there. Therefore, the sutra says that there is a wonderful Pure Land beyond the Three Realms, where the Tenth Ground Bodhisattvas should be born. The treatise says: The seventh consciousness (第七轉識 Manas) is connected to the place of birth. The commentary says: This is the Manas consciousness following the eighth consciousness (第八識 Ālaya-vijñāna), as previously mentioned. Therefore, like the eighth consciousness, the realms and grounds arise mutually. The obscured and indeterminate nature of the Three Realms can attract each other. The treatise says: Defiled (有漏 Sāsrava) and undefiled (無漏 Anāsrava) mutually attract each other. The commentary says: After the wisdom of the First Ground (初地) arises, it returns to observation, so there is defiled and undefiled arising mutually. Depending on whether it is a defiled or undefiled consciousness of which system, it attracts the arising of undefiled consciousness of which ground. The treatise says: Good (善 Kuśala) and indeterminate (無記 Avyākṛta) are also like this in relation to each other. The commentary says: That is, this defiled and undefiled.

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相生以辨性別。體位即彼。

論。于無記中至得相引故。

述曰。謂此師說有人法執故為此說。染者人執。不染者法執　生空智果者。智者即是無分別智。果者即后得智。及此所引滅定。皆唯不染是此句攝。與非無漏心時染。皆互相生。

論。此欲色界至不生彼故。

述曰。在下二界有漏第七隨染．不染。得生無漏非無色界。地上菩薩不生彼故。與第八識同地系故。對法第十三等皆說與此同。菩薩滅離無色生故。此言染識為緣及果。但在二界。所引無漏平等性智。隨其所應亦通無色。如在因中入滅定位。能引意識是有頂地。所依第七彼地之智。故通無色。未得自在。要由意引方得生故。第六入非想方起無漏。不可言第七是下地者故。

論。第六轉識至更相引故。

述曰。三界九地。有漏望無漏。善望不善等。各得互為緣。如潤生位。三界九地得相引故。然非一切性九地三界得相引。此言三各容故。六十九末有諸心相生。及顯揚第十八．對法第五．大論第十三。皆有如來。第八地已去菩薩。得起一切處心相開導故。勘彼應知。

論。初起無漏至唯色界故。

述曰。然許初起真無漏非餘二界。以能引發第六意識抉擇分善唯色界故。顯揚現觀品第十六．七皆是此證故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相互依存以區分性質。即彼（指前文提及的事物）。

論： 在無記狀態中，直至獲得相互引導的條件。

述曰： 這是因為這位論師認為存在人法二執才這樣說。染者是人執，不染者是法執。生空智果，智者指的是無分別智，果指的是后得智，以及由此引發的滅盡定，都只屬於不染的範疇。與非無漏心同時的染污，都相互依存。

論： 這種慾望，直至不生於彼處。

述曰： 在下方的欲界和色界，有漏的第七識隨著染污或不染污，能夠引發無漏的智慧，而非無因。地上的菩薩不會生於彼處，因為與第八識處於同一地界。對法第十三等都說與此相同。菩薩滅盡了無色界的煩惱而生於其他地方。這裡說的染污識作為緣和果，只存在於欲界和色界。所引發的無漏平等性智，根據情況也通於無色界。例如在因位中進入滅盡定，能夠引發意識，這是有頂地（指非想非非想處天）的境界。所依的第七識是那個地界的智慧，所以通於無色界。因為沒有獲得自在，必須通過意識的引導才能產生。第六識進入非想非非想處天才能生起無漏智慧，不能說第七識是下地的。因此，第七識可以引發上地的無漏智慧。

論： 第六轉識，直至相互引導。

述曰： 三界九地，有漏望向無漏，善望向不善等，各自能夠互為因緣。例如在潤生位，三界九地能夠相互引導。然而並非一切性質的九地三界都能相互引導，這裡說的是三者各自容許。六十九末有諸心相生，以及顯揚第十八、對法第五、大論第十三，都有如來。第八地以上的菩薩，能夠生起一切處的心，相互開導。參考那些經論就應該知道了。

論： 最初生起無漏，因為唯獨如此。

述曰： 允許最初生起真正的無漏，而不是其他二界，因為能夠引發第六意識的抉擇分善，唯獨如此。顯揚現觀品第十六、七都是這個的證明。

【English Translation】 English version They arise together to distinguish characteristics. That itself (refers to the aforementioned things).

Treatise: In the state of non-defilement, until the condition of mutual attraction is obtained.

Commentary: This is because this teacher believes in the two attachments of self and dharma, hence this statement. The defiled is the attachment to self, the undefiled is the attachment to dharma. The fruit of wisdom of emptiness of self, wisdom refers to non-discriminating wisdom, and fruit refers to subsequent wisdom, as well as the cessation attainment induced by this, all belong only to the category of undefiled. Defilement simultaneous with non-undefiled mind are mutually dependent.

Treatise: This desire, until it is not born in that place.

Commentary: In the lower Desire Realm and Form Realm, the seventh consciousness with outflows, whether defiled or undefiled, can give rise to undefiled wisdom, not without cause. Bodhisattvas on the ground do not arise in that place, because they are in the same realm as the eighth consciousness. The thirteenth chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya and others all say the same. Bodhisattvas extinguish the afflictions of the Formless Realm and are born elsewhere. Here, the defiled consciousness as cause and effect exists only in the Desire Realm and Form Realm. The undefiled wisdom of equality induced, according to the situation, also extends to the Formless Realm. For example, entering cessation attainment in the causal stage can induce consciousness, which is the realm of the Peak of Existence (referring to the Heaven of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception). The seventh consciousness on which it relies is the wisdom of that realm, so it extends to the Formless Realm. Because it has not attained freedom, it must be guided by consciousness to arise. The sixth consciousness enters the Heaven of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception to give rise to undefiled wisdom, so it cannot be said that the seventh consciousness is of a lower realm. Therefore, the seventh consciousness can induce the undefiled wisdom of the upper realm.

Treatise: The sixth consciousness, until mutual attraction.

Commentary: The Three Realms and Nine Lands, the outflowing looking towards the outflowing, the good looking towards the non-good, etc., each can be causes and conditions for each other. For example, in the stage of conditioned arising, the Three Realms and Nine Lands can mutually attract. However, not all natures of the Nine Lands and Three Realms can mutually attract, here it is said that the three each allow. At the end of the sixty-ninth, there are various minds arising together, as well as the eighteenth chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the fifth chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and the thirteenth chapter of the Mahayana-samgraha, all have Tathagatas. Bodhisattvas above the eighth ground can generate minds in all places, mutually guiding each other. You should know by referring to those sutras and treatises.

Treatise: The initial arising of the outflowing, because only thus.

Commentary: It is allowed that the initial arising of true outflowing is not in the other two realms, because it can induce the discriminating good of the sixth consciousness, only thus. The sixteenth and seventh chapters of the Samdhinirmocana-sutra are all proofs of this.

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論。眼耳身識至應知亦爾。

述曰。五識中初三識。上下言自類互為緣。后二識但言自類為緣不可言互。唯一界故。此唯有漏。此言善等亦隨所應上地獄地。

論。有義五識至容起彼故。

述曰。第一師計。入地得成所作智故得相生。

論。有義無漏至相分攝故。

述曰。此第二師。唯佛地得。無無漏後起有漏故。無漏五識諸非是佛者皆無故。何以無者。彼非佛已外余身中五根定有漏故。何意彼五根。不許是無漏。以是異熟識相分攝故。第八所緣必同漏．無漏故。

問有漏根生無漏識。有何義違。

論。有漏不共至不相應故。

述曰。謂有漏者。簡無漏根。無漏根發無漏識無違故。不共者。簡有漏第八識。是共故可為無漏識依　必俱者。顯非等無間緣。等無間緣根前後生故。得依有漏　同境者。簡第七為六依。彼雖有前義。非同境故。此有漏根發無漏識。不相應故。

外人復云。如六依七亦依有漏有何不相應。今復量成。

論。此二于境明昧異故。

述曰。同境明識不依闇昧之別根故。此中譬喻如在餘位極成眼等根。應立量云。有漏五根。不發無漏識。有漏色根故。如余因位　若準前師。十地之中得無漏五識。八地已去得變易生死。于理

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：眼識、耳識、身識乃至應知也是如此。

述曰：五識中，前三識（眼識、耳識、身識）上地獄而言，自類可以互為緣。后二識（鼻識、舌識）只能說自類為緣，不能說互相為緣，因為只有一個界。這些都只有有漏。這裡說的善等，也隨所應在上地獄地。

論：有義認為五識若能入地，就能互相生起，因為能成就所作智。

述曰：第一位論師的觀點。進入地才能得到成所作智，所以才能相互生起。

論：有義認為無漏五識不是異熟識的相分所攝。

述曰：這是第二位論師的觀點。只有佛地才能得到。因為沒有無漏識之後又生起有漏識的情況。非佛的眾生都沒有無漏五識。為什麼沒有呢？因為那些非佛的其他身體中的五根必定是有漏的。為什麼那些五根不許是無漏的呢？因為它們是異熟識（第八識）的相分所攝。第八識所緣的必定是同類的有漏或無漏。

問：有漏根生無漏識，有什麼義理上的違背？

論：有漏根和無漏識不共同，而且不相應。

述曰：這裡說『有漏』，是爲了簡別無漏根。無漏根生無漏識沒有違背。『不共』，是爲了簡別有漏第八識，因為第八識是共的，可以作為無漏識的所依。『必俱』，顯示不是等無間緣。因為等無間緣的根是前後生起的，可以依有漏根。『同境』，是爲了簡別第七識作為第六識的所依。第七識雖然有前面的含義，但不是同境。這種有漏根生無漏識的情況，因為不相應。

外人又說：如同第六識依第七識，第七識也依有漏根，有什麼不相應？現在重新用比量來成立。

論：這二者對於境的明昧不同。

述曰：同境的明識不依止於闇昧的差別根。這裡可以用其他位置上已經成立的眼等根作為譬喻。應該立量說：有漏五根，不生髮無漏識，因為是有漏色根。如同其他因位。如果按照前一位論師的觀點，十地之中可以得到無漏五識，八地以上可以得到變易生死，在道理上是講得通的。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: Eye consciousness, ear consciousness, and body consciousness, and so on, should also be understood in the same way.

Commentary: Among the five consciousnesses, the first three (eye, ear, and body consciousnesses), in terms of the upper and lower realms, can mutually be conditions within their own category. The latter two (nose and tongue consciousnesses) can only be said to have their own category as a condition, not mutually, because there is only one realm. These are all only with outflows (leaks). The 'good' etc. mentioned here also follow what is appropriate in the upper and lower realms and grounds.

Treatise: Some argue that if the five consciousnesses can enter the ground, they can arise mutually because they can accomplish the wisdom of accomplished action (kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna).

Commentary: This is the view of the first teacher. Only by entering the ground can one attain the wisdom of accomplished action, and thus they can arise mutually.

Treatise: Some argue that the non-outflow five consciousnesses are not included in the image-component (ākāra-bhāga) of the fruition consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna).

Commentary: This is the view of the second teacher. Only the Buddha-ground can attain this. Because there is no case of non-outflow consciousness arising after outflow consciousness. Those who are not Buddhas do not have non-outflow five consciousnesses. Why not? Because the five roots in the bodies of those who are not Buddhas are necessarily with outflows. Why are those five roots not allowed to be without outflows? Because they are included in the image-component of the fruition consciousness (eighth consciousness). What the eighth consciousness cognizes must be of the same kind, either with or without outflows.

Question: What is the logical contradiction in an outflow root producing a non-outflow consciousness?

Treatise: Outflow roots and non-outflow consciousnesses are not shared and are not corresponding.

Commentary: Here, 'outflow' is to distinguish it from non-outflow roots. There is no contradiction in non-outflow roots producing non-outflow consciousnesses. 'Not shared' is to distinguish it from the outflow eighth consciousness, because the eighth consciousness is shared and can be the basis for non-outflow consciousness. 'Necessarily together' indicates that it is not an immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya). Because the roots of the immediately preceding condition arise before and after, they can rely on outflow roots. 'Same object' is to distinguish the seventh consciousness as the basis for the sixth consciousness. Although the seventh consciousness has the preceding meaning, it is not the same object. In this case of outflow roots producing non-outflow consciousness, it is because they are not corresponding.

An outsider further says: Just as the sixth consciousness relies on the seventh consciousness, and the seventh consciousness also relies on outflow roots, what is the non-correspondence? Now, let's re-establish it with inference.

Treatise: These two differ in the clarity and obscurity of the object.

Commentary: Clear consciousness of the same object does not rely on obscure and different roots. Here, we can use the already established eye and other roots in other positions as an analogy. We should establish the inference: Outflow five roots do not produce non-outflow consciousness because they are outflow color roots. Just like other causal positions. If we follow the view of the previous teacher, we can attain non-outflow five consciousnesses in the ten grounds, and we can attain transformation birth and death (pariṇāma-maraṇa) from the eighth ground onwards, which is logically consistent.

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無違。隨其所應從何界后引生無漏五識。初起雖必在欲界。後起亦通色界。

若第二師。十地之中無無漏五識。異產生佛必是色界第八識后引生無漏。八地已去菩薩。便無鼻．舌識。以所依根是色界系。不可地獄識依上界根。雖知下三識得依上地根。無有地獄識依上界色根者。故鼻．舌識八地已去便無。由是應言。八地等菩薩諸根互用。三識中聞香等。或二根處身根聞香等。于理無違　又解二識依上界根亦無有妨。如下地三識系雖有別仍別地依二識亦爾。諸論但依一切異生。二乘．七地以前菩薩多分為論。不言下二識依上界根。何妨定有。雖有此解由如是義前師解妨。然生無漏隨何界身後即彼引生。若約后師二界皆得初起。二乘等或在欲界后。異產生佛唯在色后。善．無記性多唯善性。有通無記。此合八識入十二心為無間緣。第六意識三界三性心相生無間如別處說。

論。三所緣緣至所慮所託。

述曰。此中有三。一釋出體義。二辨差別。三八識分別。此出所緣緣體相　謂若有法者。謂非遍計所執。此中有二師釋。初或通緣假。次或唯緣實。前師即眼識緣長等。后師即不緣。故此但總言有法。不別定其假實體法。此則明非所執。所執無體不能發生能緣之識故非是緣。緣者必是依他．無為。可有力用

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無違。隨其所應，從何界身後引生無漏五識？初起雖必在欲界，後起亦通色界**。

若第二師（另一位論師）。十地（菩薩修行的十個階段）之中無無漏五識。異產生佛（不同於二乘的成佛方式，指菩薩道的成佛）必是第八識（阿賴耶識）后引生無漏。八地（第八地，不動地）已去菩薩，便無鼻識、舌識。以所依根是繫縛。不可地獄識依上界根。雖知下三識得依上地根，無有地獄識依上界色根者。故鼻識、舌識八地已去便無。由是應言，八地等菩薩諸根互用。三識中聞香等，或二根處身根聞香等，于理無違。又解二識依上界根亦無有妨。如下地三識系雖有別，仍別地依，二識亦爾。諸論但依一切異生（凡夫）。二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）、七地以前菩薩多分為論。不言下二識依上界根，何妨定有。雖有此解，由如是義前師解妨。然生無漏隨何界身後即彼引生。若約后師二界皆得初起。二乘等或在欲界后，異產生佛唯在色界后。善、無記性多唯善性，有通無記。此合八識入十二心為無間緣。第六意識三界三性心相生無間如別處說。

論：三所緣緣至所慮所託。

述曰：此中有三。一釋出體義。二辨差別。三八識分別。此出所緣緣體相。謂若有法者，謂非遍計所執（虛妄分別所執著的）。此中有二師釋。初或通緣假，次或唯緣實。前師即眼識緣長等。后師即不緣。故此但總言有法。不別定其假實體法。此則明非所執。所執無體不能發生能緣之識故非是緣。緣者必是依他（依他起性）、無為（無為法）。可有力用。

【English Translation】 English version: Without contradiction. According to what is appropriate, from what realm and body does the arising of undefiled (anāsrava) five consciousnesses occur? Although the initial arising must be in the desire realm (kāmadhātu), the subsequent arising can also occur in the form realm (rūpadhātu).

According to the second teacher (another commentator), there are no undefiled five consciousnesses in the ten grounds (bhūmi) (the ten stages of a Bodhisattva's practice). The attainment of Buddhahood through a different birth (different from the two vehicles, referring to the Bodhisattva path) must be the arising of undefiled consciousnesses after the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna). Bodhisattvas from the eighth ground (eighth bhūmi, Acalā) onwards no longer have nose consciousness (ghrāṇavijñāna) or tongue consciousness (jihvāvijñāna), because the supporting roots are bound. It is not possible for consciousnesses of a lower realm to rely on the roots of a higher realm. Although it is known that the lower three consciousnesses can rely on the roots of the upper grounds, there is no instance of consciousnesses of a lower realm relying on the form roots of a higher realm. Therefore, nose consciousness and tongue consciousness no longer exist from the eighth ground onwards. Hence, it should be said that Bodhisattvas from the eighth ground onwards mutually use the sense organs. Among the three consciousnesses, smelling fragrance, etc., or the body consciousness smelling fragrance, etc., at the location of two roots, is not contradictory to reason. Furthermore, explaining that the two consciousnesses rely on the roots of the upper realm is also not an obstacle. Although the lower three consciousnesses have differences in their binding, they still rely on different grounds, and the two consciousnesses are also like this. The treatises mostly rely on all ordinary beings (pṛthagjana). The two vehicles (śrāvakayāna and pratyekabuddhayāna), and Bodhisattvas before the seventh ground are mostly discussed. It is not said that the lower two consciousnesses rely on the roots of the upper realm, so what prevents it from definitely existing? Although there is this explanation, the previous teacher's explanation is obstructed by such a meaning. However, the arising of undefiled consciousnesses occurs from whatever realm and body, and is then produced from that. If according to the later teacher, both realms can have the initial arising. Those of the two vehicles, etc., may be after the desire realm, while the attainment of Buddhahood through a different birth is only after the form realm. The nature of wholesome (kuśala) and indeterminate (avyākṛta) is mostly only wholesome, and some are indeterminate. This combines the eight consciousnesses into twelve minds as the immediately preceding condition (anantara-pratyaya). The arising of the sixth consciousness (manovijñāna) of the three realms and three natures is without interruption, as explained elsewhere.

Treatise: The three objective conditions (ālambana-pratyaya) reach what is considered and relied upon.

Commentary: There are three aspects here. First, explaining the meaning of the substance. Second, distinguishing the differences. Third, differentiating the eight consciousnesses. This explains the substance and characteristics of the objective condition. 'If there is a dharma,' means not what is grasped by conceptual construction (parikalpita). There are two teachers explaining this. The first may generally condition the unreal, the second may only condition the real. The former is like eye consciousness conditioning length, etc. The latter does not condition it. Therefore, this only generally says 'there is a dharma.' It does not specifically determine whether it is an unreal or real dharma. This clarifies that it is not what is grasped. What is grasped has no substance and cannot give rise to the consciousness that can condition, so it is not a condition. A condition must be dependent (paratantra) and unconditioned (asaṃskṛta). It can have a powerful function.

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發能緣識名為緣故。即簡經部眼識。緣和合色體是假法。識雖似彼有所緣義。而非是緣以無體故。今此必是有體方緣　是帶已相者。帶有二義若古西方師釋。己者境體。帶者是心似彼境相義。即能緣之心有似所緣之相名帶。相者相狀。小乘是行相。能緣體攝。大乘是相分所攝。以前第二卷中解謂能緣心等帶此色等己之相也。以此理故正量部師般若毬多造謗大乘論。遂破此云。無分別智不似真如相起。應非所緣緣。我之大師戒曰大王為設十八日無遮會時。造制惡見論遂破彼云。汝不解我義。帶者是挾帶義。相者體相。非相狀義。謂正智等生時。挾帶真如之體相起。與真如不一。不異。非相。非非相。若挾帶彼所緣之己以為境相者。是所緣故。若相言體。即有同時心．心所之體相。亦心挾帶而有。雖有所託。然非所慮故非所緣緣故。相者相分義。或體相義。真如亦名為相無相之相。所以經言皆同一相所謂無相　前句是緣。此句是所緣　緣生於誰誰帶己相。謂心。或此相應法。是所緣緣果。非與色．不相應為所緣故。三十八說唯望心．心所為所緣故　若爾古師．大師二釋皆有妨難。謂能為緣生能照法。能照法體若帶己相。說此名彼所緣緣者。即鏡水等所照外質。亦能為緣生鏡中影。鏡中影即是帶己之相。鏡等外質。應是鏡等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『發能緣識名為緣故』，這句話是爲了區分經部的眼識。（經部的）眼識所緣的和合色體是假法。雖然識似乎也有所緣的意義，但它不是真正的緣，因為它沒有實體。現在這裡所說的緣，必定是有實體的才能作為緣。

『是帶已相者』，『帶』有兩種含義。如果按照古代西方的論師解釋，『己』指的是境的本體，『帶』指的是心呈現出類似境的相狀。也就是說，能緣的心具有類似所緣境的相狀，這叫做『帶相』。『相』指的是相狀。在小乘佛教中，這是指行相，屬於能緣的本體。在大乘佛教中，這是指相分所攝。就像之前在第二卷中解釋的那樣，能緣的心等帶著這色等的自己的相。

因為這個道理，正量部的論師般若毬多（Prajñāgupta）造了誹謗大乘的理論，於是反駁說：『無分別智不呈現出類似真如（Tathata）的相狀，因此不應是所緣緣。』我的大師戒賢（Śīlabhadra）在大王設定十八日無遮大會時，製造了《制惡見論》，於是反駁他說：『你不理解我的意思。』『帶』指的是挾帶的意義，『相』指的是體相，不是相狀的意義。也就是說，正智等產生時，挾帶著真如的體相而生起，與真如不一不異，非相非非相。如果挾帶著所緣的『己』作為境相，那就是所緣的緣故。如果『相』指的是本體，那麼同時存在的心、心所的本體，也是心挾帶而有的。雖然有所依託，但並非所慮，因此不是所緣緣。『相』指的是相分的意義，或者體相的意義。真如也叫做『相無相之相』，所以經中說『皆同一相，所謂無相』。

前一句是『緣』，這一句是『所緣』。『緣』生於誰？誰帶著自己的相？指的是心，或者與此相應的心所法，是所緣緣的果。不是與色等不相應作為所緣的緣故。第三十八章說，只是針對心、心所作為所緣的緣故。

如果這樣，那麼古代論師和大師的兩種解釋都有妨難。如果說能作為緣而生起能照之法，能照之法的本體如果帶著自己的相，就說這叫做彼所緣緣，那麼就像鏡子、水等所照的外在物體，也能作為緣而生起鏡中的影像，鏡中的影像就是帶著自己的相。那麼鏡子等外在物體，也應該是鏡子等的所緣緣了。

【English Translation】 English version: 'The ability to generate consciousness is called a condition (緣故)' This is to distinguish the eye-consciousness of the Sautrāntika school. The aggregate of form (和合色體) that the eye-consciousness cognizes is an unreal phenomenon. Although consciousness seems to have the meaning of something cognized, it is not a true condition because it has no substance. Now, the condition spoken of here must have substance in order to be a condition.

'That which bears its own image (是帶已相者)': 'Bearing' has two meanings. According to the interpretation of ancient Western teachers, 'self (己)' refers to the essence of the object (境體), and 'bearing (帶)' refers to the mind appearing as an image similar to that object. That is, the cognizing mind has an image similar to the cognized object, which is called 'bearing an image'. 'Image (相)' refers to the appearance. In Theravada Buddhism, this refers to mental phenomena (行相), which belong to the essence of the cognizer. In Mahayana Buddhism, this refers to what is contained within the image-division (相分所攝). As explained earlier in the second chapter, the cognizing mind, etc., bears the image of this form, etc., as its own.

Because of this reasoning, the Vaibhāṣika master Prajñāgupta (般若毬多) created a theory slandering Mahayana, and then refuted it, saying: 'Non-discriminating wisdom (無分別智) does not arise with an image similar to Suchness (真如), so it should not be a object-condition (所緣緣).' My master Śīlabhadra (戒賢), when the great king established an eighteen-day unobstructed assembly, created the 'Treatise on Restraining Evil Views (制惡見論)', and then refuted him, saying: 'You do not understand my meaning.' 'Bearing (帶)' refers to the meaning of carrying along, and 'image (相)' refers to the essence of the entity, not the meaning of appearance. That is, when correct wisdom (正智) etc. arises, it arises carrying along the essence of Suchness, being neither identical nor different from Suchness, neither image nor non-image. If it carries along the cognized 'self' as the image of the object, then it is the object-condition. If 'image' refers to the essence, then the essence of the mind and mental factors (心．心所) that exist simultaneously is also carried along by the mind. Although there is something relied upon, it is not what is considered, so it is not the object-condition. 'Image' refers to the meaning of the image-division, or the meaning of the essence. Suchness is also called the 'image of no-image (相無相之相)', so the sutra says, 'All are of the same image, which is called no-image (皆同一相所謂無相)'.

The previous sentence is 'condition (緣)', and this sentence is 'object-condition (所緣)'. To whom does the 'condition' give rise? Who bears their own image? It refers to the mind, or the mental factors corresponding to it, which are the result of the object-condition. It is not that which is not corresponding with form, etc., that serves as the object-condition. Chapter 38 says that it is only directed towards the mind and mental factors as the object-condition.

If that is the case, then both the interpretations of the ancient teachers and the master have difficulties. If it is said that what can act as a condition to give rise to the illuminating dharma, and if the essence of the illuminating dharma bears its own image, and this is said to be the object-condition, then just as external objects reflected in mirrors, water, etc., can also act as a condition to give rise to the image in the mirror, and the image in the mirror bears its own image, then the external objects such as mirrors, etc., should also be the object-conditions of the mirrors, etc.

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所緣緣。為解此疑故。次說言所慮．所託。所慮即前所緣義。所託者即前緣義。設此為彼所慮非所託者。不名為緣。如和合假等。設為彼所託彼得生。亦須彼能慮於此方是所緣。謂鏡等不能慮。質非鏡等所慮。故便非鏡等所緣緣。不同心等。雖無分別亦能慮故。慮者緣慮義。佛地論云。若無見分應非能緣。此中意說。若是有體之法。是帶己相之心。及心所法所慮．所託者是所緣緣故。一切有為．無為皆此緣攝。安惠等師既無見分。如何解所緣。

論。此體有二至疏所緣緣。

述曰。自下第二辨其差別。若與見分等體不相離者。簡他識所變。及自八識各各所緣別。唯是見分內所慮托。此有二種一是有為。即識所變名內所慮。二是無為。真如體不離識名所慮托。即如自證緣見分等並是此輩。空等雖是無為所攝。然若假變。即有為攝。若依本體。即是真如故無別說。此有為者四分中相分攝也。此說親已疏所緣緣與能緣心相離法是。謂即他識所變。及自身中別識所變杖為質者是。然雖眼．耳等非眼識親所緣緣。亦非疏所緣緣。不親取故。不杖為質故。要為本質能起內所慮托之相分名疏所緣緣。謂為質起故名緣。見分亦變內相分似本質法故名所緣。親所緣者。即謂見分是帶己相此即疏中。即影像相分是帶本質之相名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所緣緣（Salambana-pratyaya，產生結果的條件之一，指心識所緣的對象）。爲了解除這個疑惑，接下來解釋『所慮』和『所託』。『所慮』就是前面所說的所緣的意義，『所託』就是前面說的緣的意義。假設這個事物是被另一個事物所慮，但不是被它所託，那麼它就不能被稱為緣，比如和合假等（組合而成的虛假事物）。假設這個事物是被另一個事物所託，它因此而產生，也必須是它能夠慮及這個事物，才能成為所緣。比如鏡子等不能慮及，物質不是鏡子等所慮及的，所以物質就不是鏡子等的所緣緣。這與心等不同，心即使沒有分別也能慮及。『慮』就是緣慮的意義。《佛地論》說：『如果沒有見分（心識的認知能力），就不應該能夠緣。』這裡的意思是說，如果是有實體的法，是帶有自身相的心和心所法所慮及、所託付的，那就是所緣緣。一切有為法（因緣和合而成的現象）和無為法（不依賴因緣的永恒存在）都包含在這個緣中。安慧等論師既然沒有見分，如何解釋所緣呢？

論：此體有二至疏所緣緣。

述記：下面第二部分辨別它們的差別。如果與見分等同體而不相分離，就排除了其他識所變現的，以及自身八識各自所緣的差別。僅僅是見分內部所慮及、所託付的。這有兩種：一種是有為法，即識所變現的，稱為『內所慮』。另一種是無為法，真如的本體不離識，稱為『所慮托』。比如自證分緣見分等都屬於此類。空等雖然是無為法所攝，但如果是假變現的，就屬於有為法。如果依據本體，那就是真如，所以沒有特別說明。這個有為法在四分中屬於相分所攝。這裡說的是親所緣緣，與能緣的心相分離的法就是疏所緣緣。也就是其他識所變現的，以及自身中其他識所變現的，以杖為本質的情況。然而，雖然眼、耳等不是眼識的親所緣緣，也不是疏所緣緣，因為它們不是直接取境，也不是以杖為本質。必須是以本質能夠生起內部所慮托的相分，才能稱為疏所緣緣。因為作為本質而生起，所以稱為緣。見分也變現出內部的相分，類似於本質法，所以稱為所緣。親所緣緣，就是指見分是帶有自身相的，而疏所緣緣中，影像相分是帶有本質之相的。

【English Translation】 English version Salambana-pratyaya (the object-condition, one of the conditions for producing a result, referring to the object that the mind cognizes). To resolve this doubt, the following explains 'what is considered' (所慮) and 'what is entrusted' (所託). 'What is considered' is the meaning of what was previously said about the object (所緣), and 'what is entrusted' is the meaning of what was previously said about the condition (緣). Suppose this thing is considered by another thing, but not entrusted to it, then it cannot be called a condition, such as aggregates (和合假, combinations of elements that appear real but are ultimately impermanent). Suppose this thing is entrusted to another thing, and it arises because of this, it must also be able to consider this thing in order to be an object. For example, mirrors etc. cannot consider, and matter is not considered by mirrors etc., so matter is not the object-condition of mirrors etc. This is different from mind etc., because even without discrimination, mind can consider. 'Consideration' (慮) is the meaning of considering an object. The Buddhabhumi Sutra says: 'If there is no seeing-aspect (見分, the cognitive ability of consciousness), then it should not be able to cognize.' The meaning here is that if it is a dharma with substance, that is considered and entrusted by the mind and mental factors that carry their own characteristics, then that is the object-condition. All conditioned dharmas (有為法, phenomena arising from causes and conditions) and unconditioned dharmas (無為法, eternal existences not dependent on causes and conditions) are included in this condition. Since Acharya Anhui and others do not have a seeing-aspect, how do they explain the object?

Treatise: This entity has two [aspects], up to the remote object-condition.

Commentary: The second part below distinguishes their differences. If it is of the same substance as the seeing-aspect and not separate from it, then it excludes the transformations of other consciousnesses, and the differences in what each of the eight consciousnesses cognizes. It is only what is considered and entrusted within the seeing-aspect. This has two types: one is conditioned dharma, that is, what is transformed by consciousness, called 'internal consideration' (內所慮). The other is unconditioned dharma, the essence of Suchness (真如, true reality) is inseparable from consciousness, called 'what is considered and entrusted' (所慮托). For example, the self-awareness aspect cognizing the seeing-aspect etc. all belong to this category. Although emptiness etc. are included in unconditioned dharmas, if they are falsely manifested, then they belong to conditioned dharmas. If based on the essence, then it is Suchness, so there is no special explanation. This conditioned dharma belongs to the object-aspect (相分) in the four aspects. What is said here is the direct object-condition, the dharma that is separate from the cognizing mind is the remote object-condition. That is, what is transformed by other consciousnesses, and what is transformed by other consciousnesses within oneself, in the case of a stick as the essence. However, although the eyes, ears, etc. are not the direct object-condition of eye-consciousness, they are also not the remote object-condition, because they do not directly grasp the object, nor is the stick the essence. It must be that the object-aspect that can give rise to internal consideration and entrustment based on the essence is called the remote object-condition. Because it arises as the essence, it is called a condition. The seeing-aspect also transforms the internal object-aspect, which is similar to the essence-dharma, so it is called the object. The direct object-condition refers to the seeing-aspect that carries its own characteristics, while in the remote object-condition, the image-aspect carries the characteristics of the essence.

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所緣。故名能起內所慮．托。不言起內心。以起是緣義。起相分是所緣義。

論。親所緣緣至亦得生故。

述曰。前親所緣緣。但是能緣之心皆有。離內所慮．托之相分。一切心等必不行故。今大乘中。若緣無法不生心也。疏所緣緣能緣之法或有或無。以是心外法故。如執實我雖無本質。然離彼法心亦生故。余如樞要。

自下第三約識分別親疏有無。

論。第八識品至任運轉故。

述曰。第一師說。唯有親無疏。所以者何。此識由業。及自因力故。任運變境故。無疏所緣緣。疏所緣緣必強思心方可有故。異熟心無。然亦能變他依處者相似名變。不杖他生任運變故。

論。有義亦定有至自方變故。

述曰。第二師亦定有疏所緣緣。亦親所緣也。此第八識要杖他變為本質方能自變故。即種子等亦杖他變。望自身雖為本質。望他即為影像。即是變他根之師。

論。有義二說至為自質故。

述曰。第三說。前二師俱非。此難前第一師也。且如自身．他身自土．他土可互受用故須杖他變。謂前第二卷說。若不變他應無死後屍骸等事。互相受用。即以他所變為己第八之質。由前理故。以中邊文變他為定。

論。自種於他至種皆等故。

述曰。難第二師云。自

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『所緣』，因此被稱為能生起內在所慮、所託之物。這裡沒有說生起內心，因為『起』是緣起的意思，生起相分是所緣的意思。

論：親所緣緣乃至亦得生故。

述記：前面的親所緣緣，只是能緣之心都具有。離開內在所慮、所託的相分，一切心等必然不能執行。現在大乘中，如果緣于無法，心也不會生起。疏所緣緣能緣之法，或者有或者沒有，因為這是心外之法。例如執著實我，雖然沒有本質，但是離開那個法，心也會生起。其餘的如同《樞要》所說。

從下面開始，第三部分是關於識分別親疏有無的討論。

論：第八識品乃至任運轉故。

述記：第一位論師說，第八識只有親所緣緣，沒有疏所緣緣。為什麼呢？因為這個識由業和自身因的力量，任運變現境界，所以沒有疏所緣緣。疏所緣緣必須要有強烈的思慮之心才可能存在，異熟心沒有。然而，它也能變現他依處，這只是相似的變現，不是依靠他力而生，而是任運變現。

論：有義亦定有乃至自方變故。

述記：第二位論師說，第八識也一定有疏所緣緣，也有親所緣緣。這個第八識需要依靠他力變現為本質，才能自己變現。即使是種子等，也是依靠他力變現。從自身來看，雖然是本質，但從他者來看，就是影像。這就是變現他根的論師。

論：有義二說乃至為自質故。

述記：第三位論師說，前兩位論師的說法都不對。這裡是反駁第一位論師的。例如自身、他身、自土、他土可以互相受用，所以需要依靠他力變現。就像《成唯識論》第二卷所說，如果不變現他者，死後的屍骸等事就無法互相受用。這就是以他者所變為自己的第八識的本質。由於前面的理由，根據《中邊分別論》的文句，變現他者是確定的。

論：自種於他乃至種皆等故。

述記：反駁第二位論師說，自己的

【English Translation】 English version: 'Object' (所緣, Suo Yuan), hence it is called that which can give rise to the internal that is thought about and relied upon. It is not said to give rise to the 'inner mind' because 'arising' is the meaning of dependent origination (緣起, Yuan Qi). Giving rise to the image-component (相分, Xiang Fen) is the meaning of 'object'.

Treatise: The immediate objective condition (親所緣緣, Qin Suo Yuan Yuan) even then can arise.

Commentary: The preceding immediate objective condition is something that all minds that are able to cognize possess. Separated from the image-component of the internal that is thought about and relied upon, all minds, etc., necessarily cannot function. Now, in the Mahayana (大乘, Da Cheng), if one cognizes something that is non-existent, the mind will not arise. The remote objective condition (疏所緣緣, Shu Suo Yuan Yuan), the dharma (法, Fa) that is able to cognize, may or may not exist, because it is a dharma external to the mind. For example, clinging to a real self (我, Wo), although it has no essence, the mind will still arise even separated from that dharma. The rest is as explained in the Essentials.

From here below, the third part discusses the discrimination of intimacy and remoteness, existence and non-existence, in relation to consciousness (識, Shi).

Treatise: The eighth consciousness (第八識, Di Ba Shi) until it operates spontaneously.

Commentary: The first teacher says that the eighth consciousness only has the immediate objective condition, and does not have the remote objective condition. Why? Because this consciousness, due to karma (業, Ye) and the power of its own causes, spontaneously transforms into a realm, so it does not have the remote objective condition. The remote objective condition must have a strong mind of deliberation in order to exist, which the resultant consciousness (異熟心, Yi Shu Xin) does not have. However, it can also transform the other-dependent nature (他依處, Ta Yi Chu), but this is only a similar transformation. It does not rely on the power of others to arise, but transforms spontaneously.

Treatise: Some argue that it definitely has even the remote objective condition until it transforms on its own side.

Commentary: The second teacher says that the eighth consciousness definitely has the remote objective condition, and also has the immediate objective condition. This eighth consciousness needs to rely on others to transform into an essence before it can transform itself. Even seeds (種子, Zhong Zi), etc., also rely on others to transform. From its own perspective, although it is an essence, from the perspective of others, it is an image. This is the teacher who transforms the roots of others.

Treatise: Some argue that the two previous views until it becomes its own essence.

Commentary: The third teacher says that the views of the previous two teachers are both incorrect. This is refuting the first teacher. For example, one's own body, another's body, one's own land, another's land can be mutually used, so it is necessary to rely on others to transform. Just as the second volume of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi (成唯識論, Cheng Wei Shi Lun) says, if one does not transform others, then after death, corpses, etc., cannot be mutually used. This is taking what others have transformed as the essence of one's own eighth consciousness. Due to the preceding reasons, according to the text of the Madhyantavibhaga (中邊分別論, Zhong Bian Fen Bie Lun), transforming others is definite.

Treatise: One's own seed in relation to others until all seeds are equal.

Commentary: Refuting the second teacher, saying that one's own

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種子於他身無受用理。他變為此種。不應道理故。非諸有情種皆等故。謂或多。或少。謂有三乘．五姓差別。若此人多。彼人少者。如何相杖。若變多者少不變故。若彼救言等者相緣。不等者不緣。何故不許第八可受用者緣。不可用者不緣。此中且以種子為難。五根亦無受用之義。如何變他。

論。應說此品至有無不定。

述曰。此言品者通心．心所。其第八品此疏所緣緣。若因若果位有無不定。因中變他依處可受用故。不變他根及種。不可受用故。及死後無故。有色界變杖他。無色界無。即因中不定。在佛果位能緣無為．三世等法故有無不定。因中五數。唯托心王所變為質。心王唯能變實法故。佛果五數雖緣去．來等。亦托心王所變為質。自無力故與因相似。此中言品文雖總說。心所不爾。

論。第七心品至無外質故。

述曰。此識因中有漏者。是俱生起任運無力。必杖第八識。以為外質。自方變故。既非業果。體力須藉質起。無漏位不定有。緣真如．虛空．去來。無外質故。緣現在世．有為法等。有外質故。

論。第六心品至有無不定。

述曰。此識因果位能自在轉。或分別起。或是俱生。故一切種所杖本質有無不定。

論。前五心品至無外質故。

述曰。眼

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 種子對於他人來說沒有受用的道理。如果種子能變為其他東西，這是不合理的，因為不是所有有情的種子都是一樣的。種子有多有少，有三乘（Śrāvakayāna，Pratyekabuddhayāna，Bodhisattvayāna，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）、五姓的差別。如果這個人多，那個人少，如何相互依存？如果變得多，少的部分卻沒有變化。如果有人辯解說，相等的部分相互關聯，不相等的部分不關聯，那麼為什麼不允許第八識（Ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）中可受用的部分作為緣，不可受用的部分不作為緣呢？這裡暫且以種子為例進行辯難。五根（眼睛、耳朵、鼻子、舌頭、身體）也沒有受用的意義，如何能轉變他人？

論：應該說這一品直到『有無不定』。

述記：這裡說的『品』，包括心和心所。第八品是此疏所緣緣。無論在因位還是果位，有無都是不定的。在因位，轉變他人的所依之處是可以受用的，不變他人的根和種子，因為不可受用，以及死後就沒有了。有變杖他，無無。這就是因位的不定。在佛果位，能夠緣無為法、三世等法，所以有無不定。因位中的五數，僅僅依託心王所變現的作為本質，因為心王只能變現實法。佛果的五數雖然緣過去、未來等，也依託心王所變現的作為本質，因為自身沒有力量，與因位相似。這裡說的『品』，雖然總的來說，心所不是這樣。

論：第七心品直到『無外質故』。

述記：這個識在因位有漏的時候，是俱生而起，沒有力量，必須依靠第八識作為外在的本質，自身才能變現。既然不是業果，體力必須藉助本質才能生起。無漏位不一定有，緣真如（Tathātā，事物的真實如是性）、虛空、過去未來，沒有外在的本質。緣現在世、有為法等，有外在的本質。

論：第六心品直到『有無不定』。

述記：這個識在因果位能夠自在運轉，或者分別而起，或者是俱生而起，所以一切種子所依靠的本質，有無是不定的。

論：前五心品直到『無外質故』。

述記：眼

【English Translation】 English version The seed has no reason to be of use to others. If the seed can transform into something else, it is unreasonable because not all sentient beings' seeds are the same. Seeds are many or few, with differences in the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna) and the Five Natures. If this person has many and that person has few, how can they rely on each other? If the many transform, the few do not change. If someone argues that equal parts are related and unequal parts are not, then why not allow the usable parts of the eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna) to be conditions, and the unusable parts not to be conditions? Here, we will use the seed as an example for debate. The five roots (eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body) also have no meaning of being used, so how can they transform others?

Treatise: It should be said that this chapter extends to 'uncertainty of existence or non-existence'.

Commentary: The 'chapter' here includes both mind and mental factors. The eighth chapter is the object-condition of this commentary. Whether in the causal stage or the resultant stage, existence or non-existence is uncertain. In the causal stage, the basis for transforming others can be used, but the roots and seeds of others cannot be transformed because they are unusable, and they cease to exist after death. There is transformation relying on others, and there is no no. This is the uncertainty of the causal stage. In the Buddha's fruition stage, it can condition unconditioned dharmas, the three times, etc., so existence or non-existence is uncertain. The five aggregates in the causal stage rely solely on the mind-king's transformations as their essence, because the mind-king can only transform real dharmas. Although the five aggregates of the Buddha's fruition condition the past, future, etc., they also rely on the mind-king's transformations as their essence, because they have no power of their own, similar to the causal stage. Although the word 'chapter' here is a general term, mental factors are not like this.

Treatise: The seventh mind-chapter extends to 'without external essence'.

Commentary: This consciousness, when defiled in the causal stage, arises co-nately and is powerless, it must rely on the eighth consciousness as an external essence for itself to transform. Since it is not karmic result, its power must rely on essence to arise. The undefiled stage does not necessarily exist, conditioning Suchness (Tathātā), space, past and future, without external essence. Conditioning the present world, conditioned dharmas, etc., has external essence.

Treatise: The sixth mind-chapter extends to 'uncertainty of existence or non-existence'.

Commentary: This consciousness can freely operate in the causal and resultant stages, arising either conceptually or co-nately, so the essence relied upon by all seeds is uncertain in existence or non-existence.

Treatise: The first five mind-chapters extend to 'without external essence'.

Commentary: Eye

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等五識。八識之中最居前故。因中一者粗。二者鈍。三者劣故。必杖第八。或第六所變外質方起。余如樞要　得轉依位隨在何處此疏所緣即不定有。或說亦緣真如。有說不得。但緣去．來等故。然今大乘至佛位已一切皆所緣。唯除見分非相所緣。因中五識諸根互用。唯除相應自體。亦是所緣緣故。

論。四增上緣至或順或違。

述曰。此中有三。初出體。次顯用果。后辨勝顯差別。此即初也。若有法亦是有體此簡所執　有勝勢用者。謂為緣義。即有為．無為有勝勢用。此用非是與果等用。但不障力　能于余法者。簡其自體。顯不同前所緣緣故　或順或違。顯與違．順能為緣。與後生異法為緣非前滅法。謂且十因中前九是順。第十是違。亦是此緣故。

論。雖前三緣至差別相故。

述曰。此緣最廣前三亦是。然今此緣。除彼前三取三外之餘法為此緣體。雖無一法非所緣緣。所緣緣外更無增上。然彼正緣時是所緣緣。余不緣者是此緣故。以此別體明四緣故。

論。此順違用至四事別故。

述曰。此顯用．果。其順違用於何處起。即此果法謂於四處轉。謂一法生。生已住及成。即一切有為法得中通有．無為。生者如大論第五。顯揚十八說。自種為先余法色．無色為建立。助伴．所緣為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 等五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）。在八識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、末那識、阿賴耶識、阿陀那識）之中，五識最為靠前。因為在因地（修行階段）中，五識一則粗糙，二則遲鈍，三則低劣，所以必須依賴第八識（阿賴耶識），或者第六識（末那識）所變現的外在物質才能生起作用。其餘的道理如同《樞要》中所說。證得轉依位（轉變煩惱，證得清凈）后，此疏（疏鈔）所緣的境界就不一定存在了。或者說也緣真如（不生不滅的本性），有的說不得緣真如，只能緣過去、未來等。然而現在大乘修行直至佛位，一切都是所緣，唯獨見分（能見的功能）不是相分（所見的境界）所緣。在因地中，五識的諸根可以互相使用，唯獨相應的自體不是所緣緣的緣故。

論：四增上緣（四種增上緣之一）乃至或順或違。

述曰：這裡面有三層意思。首先是說明體性，其次是顯示作用和結果，最後是辨別殊勝和差別。這裡是第一層意思。如果有一個法也是有體性的（這裡是簡別所執著的），具有殊勝的作用的，就稱為緣的含義。即有為法（有生滅變化的法）和無為法（沒有生滅變化的法）具有殊勝的作用。這個作用不是給予果報等作用，而是不障礙的力量。能夠對於其他法產生作用的，是簡別其自體，顯示與前面的所緣緣不同。或者順或者違，顯示順和違都能作為緣。與後生的異法作為緣，而不是與先前滅去的法作為緣。比如十因（十種因緣）中，前九種是順，第十種是違，也是此增上緣的緣故。

論：雖然前三種緣乃至差別相的緣故。

述曰：此增上緣最為廣泛，前三種緣（因緣、所緣緣、等無間緣）也屬於增上緣。然而現在此增上緣，除去前面三種緣，取三種緣之外的其餘法作為此增上緣的體性。雖然沒有一個法不是所緣緣，所緣緣之外也沒有增上緣。然而在作為正緣的時候是所緣緣，其餘不緣的時候是此增上緣的緣故。用此來區別四緣的體性。

論：此順違用乃至四事不同的緣故。

述曰：此顯示作用和結果。順和違的作用在什麼地方生起呢？即此果法在四個地方轉變。即一個法產生，產生后安住以及成就。即一切有為法（有生滅變化的法）在其中普遍具有。無為法（沒有生滅變化的法），如《大論》第五，《顯揚》第十八所說。以自己的種子為先，其餘的色法（物質現象）、無色法（精神現象）作為建立，助伴、所緣作為...

【English Translation】 English version: And so on with the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness). Among the eight consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, manas consciousness, alaya consciousness, and adana consciousness), the five consciousnesses are the most immediate. This is because in the causal stage (the stage of practice), the five consciousnesses are firstly coarse, secondly dull, and thirdly inferior, so they must rely on the eighth consciousness (alaya consciousness), or the external matter transformed by the sixth consciousness (manas consciousness), in order to arise. The remaining principles are as stated in the 'Essentials'. After attaining the state of 'transformation of the basis' (transforming afflictions and attaining purity), the object of this commentary is not necessarily fixed. Some say it also cognizes 'tathata' (suchness, the unchanging essence), while others say it cannot and can only cognize the past, future, etc. However, now in the Mahayana practice up to the Buddha's position, everything is an object of cognition, except that the 'seeing-faculty' (the function of seeing) is not cognized by the 'object-faculty' (the object of seeing). In the causal stage, the faculties of the five consciousnesses can be used interchangeably, except for their corresponding self-nature, which is also a condition of object-support.

Treatise: The fourth dominant condition (one of the four conditions) and even either conforming or opposing.

Commentary: There are three layers of meaning here. First, to explain the substance; second, to show the function and result; and third, to distinguish the superior and the difference. This is the first layer of meaning. If there is a dharma that also has substance (this is to distinguish what is clung to), and has a superior function, it is called the meaning of 'condition'. That is, conditioned dharmas (dharmas that arise and cease) and unconditioned dharmas (dharmas that do not arise and cease) have superior functions. This function is not the function of giving results, but the power of non-obstruction. Being able to act on other dharmas is to distinguish its own nature, showing that it is different from the previous object-support condition. Either conforming or opposing shows that both conforming and opposing can act as conditions. Taking the different dharma that arises later as a condition, not the dharma that has previously ceased. For example, among the ten causes (ten kinds of causes and conditions), the first nine are conforming, and the tenth is opposing, which is also the reason for this dominant condition.

Treatise: Although the previous three conditions and even the reason for the difference in characteristics.

Commentary: This dominant condition is the most extensive, and the previous three conditions (causal condition, object-support condition, and immediately preceding condition) also belong to the dominant condition. However, now this dominant condition, excluding the previous three conditions, takes the remaining dharmas other than the three conditions as the substance of this dominant condition. Although there is no dharma that is not an object-support condition, there is no dominant condition outside of the object-support condition. However, when it is the direct condition, it is an object-support condition, and when it is not cognized, it is the reason for this dominant condition. This is used to distinguish the nature of the four conditions.

Treatise: This conforming and opposing function and even the reason for the difference in the four matters.

Commentary: This shows the function and result. Where does the function of conforming and opposing arise? That is, this resulting dharma transforms in four places. That is, a dharma arises, abides after arising, and is accomplished. That is, all conditioned dharmas (dharmas that arise and cease) are universally present in it. Unconditioned dharmas (dharmas that do not arise and cease), as stated in the fifth chapter of the 'Great Treatise' and the eighteenth chapter of the 'Exposition'. Taking one's own seed as the first, the remaining form dharmas (material phenomena) and formless dharmas (mental phenomena) as the establishment, and the assisting companions and object-support as...

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和合三界法生。住者如對法第五。謂風輪於水輪等。成者大論第五等。云謂成立成辨。即攝彼二。成謂所知勝解愛樂為先。宗．因．譬喻為建立。大眾．敵論者為和合。所立義成。既以宗為能立。便以義為所立。若陳那以後。以因．喻為建立。宗為所成立。成辨者。謂工巧智為先。劬勞為建立。處具為和合。工巧業成辨等。得者彼云。三乘種姓為先。內分力為建立。外分力為和合。證得涅槃。內分如理作意等是也。外分佛興世等也。彼且約無為說。實亦通有為。二十七賢皆名得故。論說得法通三性故。或前三是有為。第四唯是無為。彼論又說何法作用者。今此中意。即此四法更無別法。四體上用也。或唯第三。第四無為無作用故。又彼無住略不說也。此攝法周。彼但影略。今此所說是順所生此緣之果。若違之果一切皆通。令不生不住不成不得故。

論。然增上緣至二十二根。

述曰。下辨勝顯差別。于中有三。一總標。二出體。三例指。此即初也。如大論第五十七．九十已去對法第五等廢立者。偈云取境．續家族。活命．受業果。世間．出世凈。依此量立根。余如樞要說。

論。前五色根至少分為性。

述曰。此出七體色。文可知也。

論。命根但依至而為自性。

述曰。命根

如前第一卷說。五受言隨應者。即遍行中受各別五受配也。或通八識。或不爾故言隨應也。或體各各隨其五別。故言隨應　信等即以信等．及善念等為體者。信等等取精進。取二法全故。言即以信等者也　及善念等者。等取定．惠。此別境中法通三性。此取一分故。言及善念等。

論。未知當知至可當知故。

述曰。體謂體性。位謂五位。體性居位故名體位。根本位者。五十七云。幾不繫。答后三．九少分。三者即三無漏根也。不取前位故。見道中如對法第九有十六心。此除末後心　問何故見道通十六心。此根唯在十五心時　見道據見觀諦行故。即十六心皆是。此根有所未知而當知根。唯前十五心。以第十六無所未知可當知故。此中類忍皆緣前心。其第十五心已緣前心遍成訖。第十六心泛觀類忍。不同小乘證無為故。唯取十五心為此根也　問此相見道在真見道后。真見道中已有無間。及解脫道。解脫道中已得初果。何故相見至十五心猶此根攝。豈預流果亦此根耶　答此不然。其預流果至相見道第十六心。見相諦圓方始建立。非真解脫可名初果。故十五心猶此根攝。而非初果得有初根。義唯菩薩從真見后亦不出觀即入相見。至第二心猶此根攝。至第三心相．見既圓。方極見滿。乃非此根。第二根攝。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如前面第一卷所說。『五受言隨應者』，就是指在遍行心中，各個不同的五種感受（受 vedanā）分別對應的情況。或者通於八識，或者不是這樣，所以說『隨應』。或者本體各不相同，隨著五種感受的差別而不同，所以說『隨應』。『信等』，就是以信等（śraddhādi，信等心所）以及善念等作為本體。『信等』等，取精進（vīrya）。因為取了兩種法的全部，所以說『即以信等者也』。『及善念等者』，等取定（samādhi）、慧（prajñā）。這些別境中的法通於三性（善、惡、無記），這裡只取其中的一部分，所以說『及善念等』。

論：『未知當知至可當知故』。

述曰：『體』是指體性，『位』是指五位。體性居於五位，所以叫做**。『根本位』，在《五十七云》中說：『有幾個不繫？』回答是后三和九少分。『三』就是指三無漏根（anāsrava-indriya，無漏根）。因為不取前面的位。在見道（darśana-mārga）中，如《對法》第九所說，有十六心。這裡除去最後的心。問：為什麼見道通於十六心，而此根只在十五心時？見道是根據見觀諦行（satya-darśana）的緣故，即十六心都是。此根是『有所未知而當知根』，只有前十五心，因為第十六心沒有未知而可以當知的。此中類忍（kṣānti，忍）都緣於前心，其第十五心已經緣於前心遍成完畢。第十六心泛觀類忍，不同於小乘證無為（asaṃskṛta）的緣故，只取十五心作為此根。問：此相見道（ākāra-darśana-mārga）在真見道（tathatā-darśana-mārga）之後，真見道中已經有無間道（anantara-mārga）以及解脫道（vimukti-mārga），解脫道中已經得到初果（srota-āpanna，預流果），為什麼相見道至十五心仍然屬於此根？難道預流果也屬於此根嗎？答：不是這樣。其預流果至相見道第十六心，見相諦圓才開始建立，不是真解脫可以稱為初果。所以十五心仍然屬於此根，而非初果，可以有初根。義唯菩薩從真見后也不出觀即入相見，至第二心仍然屬於此根。至第三心，相、見既然圓滿，才達到見滿，就不是此根，屬於第二根。

【English Translation】 English version: As mentioned in the previous first volume. 'The statement of the five feelings corresponding accordingly' refers to the situation where each of the five different feelings (vedanā) in the pervasive mind corresponds separately. It may apply to the eight consciousnesses, or it may not, hence the term 'accordingly'. Or the entities are different, varying according to the differences in the five feelings, hence the term 'accordingly'. 'Faith, etc.' refers to taking faith, etc. (śraddhādi, mental factors such as faith) and good thoughts, etc., as the entity. 'Faith, etc.' takes vigor (vīrya). Because it takes all of the two dharmas, it is said 'namely, taking faith, etc.'. 'And good thoughts, etc.' includes concentration (samādhi) and wisdom (prajñā). These dharmas in the separate realm are common to the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), and here only a portion of them is taken, hence the term 'and good thoughts, etc.'

Treatise: 'Because the unknown should be known until it can be known.'

Commentary: 'Entity' refers to the nature of the entity, and 'position' refers to the five positions. The nature of the entity resides in the five positions, hence the name **. 'Fundamental position', in the 'Fifty-Seven Clouds' it says: 'How many are unfettered?' The answer is the latter three and a small portion of the nine. 'Three' refers to the three unconditioned roots (anāsrava-indriya, undefiled roots). Because it does not take the previous position. In the path of seeing (darśana-mārga), as mentioned in the ninth of the 'Abhidharma', there are sixteen moments of consciousness. Here, the last moment is excluded. Question: Why does the path of seeing encompass sixteen moments of consciousness, while this root is only present in the fifteen moments? The path of seeing is based on the seeing of the truths (satya-darśana), that is, all sixteen moments. This root is the 'root of the unknown that should be known', only the first fifteen moments, because the sixteenth moment has nothing unknown that can be known. In this, the forbearance of conformity (kṣānti, acceptance) is conditioned by the previous moment, and the fifteenth moment has already been conditioned by the previous moment completely. The sixteenth moment broadly observes the forbearance of conformity, unlike the Theravada's realization of the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta), so only the fifteen moments are taken as this root. Question: This appearance of the path of seeing (ākāra-darśana-mārga) is after the true path of seeing (tathatā-darśana-mārga), and in the true path of seeing there is already the path of immediate consequence (anantara-mārga) and the path of liberation (vimukti-mārga), and in the path of liberation, the first fruit (srota-āpanna, stream-enterer) has already been attained, why does the appearance of the path of seeing up to the fifteenth moment still belong to this root? Does the fruit of stream-enterer also belong to this root? Answer: It is not so. The fruit of stream-enterer up to the sixteenth moment of the appearance of the path of seeing, the appearance of seeing the truths is only established when it is complete, and true liberation cannot be called the first fruit. Therefore, the fifteen moments still belong to this root, and it is not the first fruit, and there can be the first root. The meaning is that only Bodhisattvas, after true seeing, do not leave contemplation and immediately enter the appearance of seeing, and up to the second moment still belong to this root. Up to the third moment, since the appearance and seeing are complete, they reach the fulfillment of seeing, and it is not this root, but belongs to the second root.

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論。二加行位至根本位故。

述曰。此義亦辨抉擇分善。近能引發根本位故。此中加行．資糧之言。不唯取彼亦攝根本。今顯兼取加行等故。但舉加行等也。如五十七云。一色界系．及不繫。一切系．不繫為義。義者境也。此根唯取抉擇分已來。抉擇分善唯色界系故。對法第十亦爾。

論。三資糧位至根本位故。

述曰。此謂大乘者入劫已去。小乘亦爾。于諦現觀發起決定勝善法欲。六現觀中是信現觀也。非無漏信。然大乘者入劫已去于諦決定。不同外道于諦生疑故。乃至未起抉擇分善已前。在順解脫分位。以能遠資益生見道根本位故。五十七說。問未知根何義。答修諦現觀者。從善法欲已去。於一切方便道中。即信等五根義是此義。故此根亦通解脫分位也。此不望涅槃為名者。至下當知。

論。於此三位至故多不說。

述曰。於前三位九根為性。然加行位。及資糧位。於後涅槃勝法。求證未知愁戚。欲證亦有憂根。即以十根為性。安惠菩薩集糅對法。多順同彼。以不通無漏復是戚行。非正根攝。根本位中必憂不起。瑜伽等中故多不說。然解脫．加行分位。非無此憂根。然資助法。非正根法。若入無漏彼漏滅故　然此無漏根通三界地。五十七說。七根入無色。后三有一能入。有一不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：因為二加行位（Adhikara-marga，準備道）直至根本位（Mula-marga，根本道）。

述曰：此義也辨明抉擇分（Nirvedha-bhagiya，抉擇分）的善法，因為它接近且能夠引發根本位。此中『加行』、『資糧』之言，不只是取彼（指加行位、資糧位），也攝取根本位。現在顯示兼取加行等位之義。但舉加行等位為例。如《五十七》所云：『一系（*未知專有名詞，待補充），及不繫。一切系、不繫為義。』義者，境也。此根（指未知根）唯取抉擇分已來。抉擇分善唯系故。《對法》第十亦是如此。

論：因為三資糧位（Sambhāra-mārga，資糧道）直至根本位。

述曰：此謂大乘行者入劫已去，小乘亦然。于諦（Satya，真諦）現觀（Abhisamaya，現觀）發起決定勝善法欲（Chanda，勝妙的善法欲）。六現觀中是信現觀（Śraddhā-abhisamaya，信現觀）也。非無漏信（Anāsrava-śraddhā，無漏之信）。然大乘行者入劫已去于諦決定，不同外道于諦生疑故。乃至未起抉擇分善已前，在順解脫分位（Anuloma-moksha-bhagiya，順解脫分）。以能遠資益生見道（Darśana-mārga，見道）根本位故。《五十七》說：『問：未知根（Ajñāta-indriya，未知根）何義？答：修諦現觀者，從善法欲已去，於一切方便道中，即信等五根義是此義。』故此根亦通解脫分位也。此不望涅槃為名者，至下當知。

論：於此三位，因為故多不說。

述曰：於前三位，九根為性。然加行位及資糧位，於後涅槃勝法，求證未知愁戚，欲證亦有憂根（Dharmadhatūpasthāna-smṛti，憂根），即以十根為性。安惠菩薩集糅《對法》，多順同彼。以不通無漏復是戚行，非正根攝。根本位中必憂不起。《瑜伽》等中故多不說。然解脫、加行分位，非無此憂根。然資助法，非正根法。若入無漏彼漏滅故。然此無漏根通三界地。《五十七》說：七根入無色（Arūpadhātu，無色界）。后三有一能入，有一不能。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: Because the two Adhikara-marga (preparatory stage) extends to the Mula-marga (fundamental stage).

Commentary: This meaning also clarifies the goodness of Nirvedha-bhagiya (decisive part), because it is close to and can induce the Mula-marga. Here, the terms 'Adhikara' and 'Sambhāra' not only refer to them (Adhikara-marga and Sambhāra-marga), but also include the Mula-marga. Now it is shown that it also includes the meaning of Adhikara etc. But take Adhikara etc. as an example. As stated in 'Fifty-Seven': 'One related (unknown proper noun, to be supplemented), and unrelated. All related and unrelated are the meaning.' Meaning refers to the object. This root (referring to the unknown root) only depends on Nirvedha-bhagiya onwards. The goodness of Nirvedha-bhagiya is only related. The tenth of 'Abhidharma' is also the same.

Treatise: Because the three Sambhāra-marga extends to the Mula-marga.

Commentary: This refers to Mahayana practitioners who have entered the kalpa, and so do Hinayana practitioners. In Satya (truth) Abhisamaya (realization), they arouse the Chanda (desire for excellent good Dharma). Among the six Abhisamayas, it is Śraddhā-abhisamaya (faith realization). It is not Anāsrava-śraddhā (untainted faith). However, Mahayana practitioners who have entered the kalpa are determined in Satya, unlike heretics who doubt Satya. Until before the goodness of Nirvedha-bhagiya arises, it is in Anuloma-moksha-bhagiya (compliant liberation part). Because it can remotely benefit the generation of Darśana-mārga (seeing path) Mula-marga. 'Fifty-Seven' says: 'Question: What is the meaning of Ajñāta-indriya (unknown root)? Answer: Those who cultivate Satya Abhisamaya, from the desire for good Dharma onwards, in all expedient paths, the meaning of the five roots, namely faith, etc., is this meaning.' Therefore, this root also extends to the liberation part. The reason why this is not named after Nirvana will be known below.

Treatise: In these three positions, because of this, it is often not mentioned.

Commentary: In the previous three positions, nine roots are the nature. However, in Adhikara-marga and Sambhāra-marga, for the later Nirvana excellent Dharma, seeking proof of the unknown causes worry, and there is also Dharmadhatūpasthāna-smṛti (root of sorrow) for wanting to prove it, that is, ten roots are the nature. Bodhisattva Anhui collected and mixed 'Abhidharma', mostly in accordance with them. Because it does not extend to the untainted and is also a sorrowful practice, it is not included in the correct roots. In the Mula-marga, worry will definitely not arise. Therefore, it is often not mentioned in 'Yoga' etc. However, in the liberation and Adhikara parts, this root of worry is not absent. However, the supporting Dharma is not the correct root Dharma. If one enters the untainted, that leakage is extinguished. However, this untainted root extends to the three realms. 'Fifty-Seven' says: Seven roots enter Arūpadhātu (formless realm). One of the last three can enter, and one cannot.

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能入。彼前文復云。空處等十一根可得。非想地唯八。即三無漏非想皆無。前三無色有此初根。餘二根可知。此相難故所以別說。

論。前三無色至傍修得故。

述曰。謂有菩薩見道。先時曾異生位修習。得彼定已后入見道。傍修彼以前所起世俗智種子故。種子得根名。說彼為有。后亦許起。既非見道起亦無失。對法第十三解真現觀云。又于見道中得現觀邊安立諦世俗智。由出世智增上緣力。長養彼種子故名得此智。而不現前。以見道十六心剎那無有間斷。不容現起世間心故。于修道位此世俗智方現在前。此根非加行．及無漏根現行於彼有。以彼地無四善根故　又解二乘人亦有先修習者。后入見道名勝見道亦傍修彼。然此修道亦得現起。非如小乘三類智邊所修等智畢竟不起。以功德法故須修。此不應爾。以助與力令其殊勝。彼地此種法爾有故。此中說修唯得修修。非行修修。必不起故。唯相見道修。以差別諦觀順世俗智故。非真見道不相順故　又解真見道亦修。以時促無差別所以不說。此中說下亦得修上。先離色界欲。及菩薩得故。云有勝見道。非一切見道皆爾。若依對法第十。上唯修下依決定說。漸離欲說。非實道理　又解菩薩三無色地。亦有無漏見道。但修種增畢竟不起。如下三靜慮見道亦畢竟不起

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 能證入。前面又說，空無邊處等十一根可以獲得，非想非非想處地只有八根。也就是說，三個無漏根在非想非非想處地都沒有。前三個無色界有這最初的根，其餘兩個根可以推知。因為這種相狀難以理解，所以特別說明。

論：前三個無色界（的根）是傍修而得的。

述記：意思是說，有的菩薩在見道之前，曾經在異生位（凡夫位）修習，獲得了那個禪定之後才進入見道。因為傍修了以前所生起的世俗智的種子，所以說有這個種子，就說他們有這個根。後來也允許生起。既然不是在見道時生起，也沒有過失。《對法論》第十三解釋真現觀時說：『又在見道中獲得現觀邊安立諦的世俗智，由於出世智增上緣的力量，增長了那個種子，所以名為獲得此智，但不現前。』因為見道的十六心剎那沒有間斷，不容許生起世間心。在修道位，這個世俗智才現在前。這個根不是加行根和無漏根，現行於彼地。因為那個地方沒有四善根的緣故。又解釋說，二乘人也有先修習，後來進入見道，名為勝見道，也是傍修那個（世俗智）。然而這個修道也可以現起，不像小乘的三類智邊所修的智，畢竟不生起。因為功德法需要修習，這不應該這樣，因為幫助和給予力量使它殊勝，那個地方這種法爾有。這裡說修唯得修修，不是行修修，必定不生起。只有相見道修，因為差別諦觀順應世俗智的緣故，不是真見道不相順應的緣故。又解釋說，真見道也修，因為時間短促沒有差別所以不說。這裡說下地也可以修上地，先離開**欲，以及菩薩獲得（上地）的緣故，說有勝見道，不是一切見道都這樣。如果依據《對法論》第十，上地只修下地是依據決定說的，漸次離欲說的，不是真實的道理。又解釋說，菩薩在三個無色界地，也有無漏見道，但修習種子增長畢竟不生起，如下面三個靜慮見道也畢竟不生起。

【English Translation】 English version: Can enter. The previous text also states that the eleven roots such as the Sphere of Infinite Space can be obtained, while the Sphere of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception only has eight. That is to say, all three un-leaked roots are absent in the Sphere of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception. The first three formless realms have this initial root, and the remaining two roots can be inferred. Because this aspect is difficult to understand, it is explained separately.

Treatise: The roots of the first three formless realms are obtained through collateral cultivation.

Commentary: It means that some Bodhisattvas, before entering the Path of Seeing, had practiced in the position of ordinary beings (worldly position), and only entered the Path of Seeing after obtaining that Samadhi. Because the seeds of worldly wisdom that arose before were cultivated collaterally, it is said that having this seed means they have this root. Later, it is also allowed to arise. Since it does not arise during the Path of Seeing, there is no fault. The thirteenth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa explains true direct perception by saying: 'Also, in the Path of Seeing, one obtains the worldly wisdom that establishes truth on the edge of direct perception, and due to the power of the increasing condition of transcendent wisdom, that seed is grown, so it is called obtaining this wisdom, but it does not manifest.' Because the sixteen moments of thought in the Path of Seeing are uninterrupted, it does not allow worldly thoughts to arise. In the Path of Cultivation, this worldly wisdom then manifests. This root is not the root of application or the un-leaked root, which is currently active in that realm. Because that place does not have the four wholesome roots. It is also explained that some Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas also practice first, and then enter the Path of Seeing, called the Superior Path of Seeing, which is also a collateral cultivation of that (worldly wisdom). However, this Path of Cultivation can also manifest, unlike the wisdom cultivated on the edge of the three types of wisdom of the Hīnayāna, which ultimately does not arise. Because meritorious dharmas need to be cultivated, this should not be the case, because it helps and gives strength to make it superior, and this kind of dharma is naturally present in that place. Here it is said that cultivation only obtains cultivation, not the cultivation of practice, which will definitely not arise. Only the Path of Seeing of characteristics is cultivated, because the differentiated contemplation of truth accords with worldly wisdom, not because the true Path of Seeing does not accord with it. It is also explained that the true Path of Seeing is also cultivated, but because the time is short and there is no difference, it is not mentioned. Here it is said that the lower realm can also cultivate the upper realm, because one first leaves desire, and the Bodhisattva obtains (the upper realm), so it is said that there is a Superior Path of Seeing, but not all Paths of Seeing are like this. If based on the tenth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa, the upper realm only cultivates the lower realm is based on a definite statement, a gradual departure from desire, not a real principle. It is also explained that Bodhisattvas in the three formless realms also have the un-leaked Path of Seeing, but the cultivation of seeds increases and ultimately does not arise, just as the Path of Seeing in the three lower Dhyānas also ultimately does not arise.

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。此義應思修用何為。寧知彼地有其見道。見道何故依唯于定。非惠地故　或說既許善法欲已去名此根者。即菩薩解脫分者亦生於彼。故作此說。二乘人劫數近故。不可說有彼解脫分。

論。或二乘位至此根攝故。

述曰。第二義言。此或是二乘第三果已去回趣大者。為證初地法空。地前亦起九地所攝生空無漏智。九地者六色界．三無色。彼先生空智。為菩薩觀起。順菩薩觀故皆此根攝。說彼有此根非違理也。然二乘人未證法空觀起無漏故。此中不說。

論。菩薩見道至以時促故。

述曰。前言三位皆二乘根。如五十七下說。菩薩三根于勝解行地立初根。十地立第二根。佛地立第三。為釋此疑雲菩薩見道亦有此根。但說勝解行者。以見道中時促不說。謂初地有三。入．住．出地。此唯入地少時故時促也。雖二乘亦爾。以見道前促于菩薩。所以說彼見道亦有。菩薩不然。不可為例。

論。始從見道至故多不說。

述曰。此第二根三乘位同。九根．十根皆如前解。今依此解初二根亦通有漏。此與對法第十同也。

論。諸無學位至具知根性。

述曰。其無學中無漏九根。皆第三根攝。

問何故有頂如入滅定前心亦有無漏。非此三根攝也。

論。有頂雖有至非

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：此處的意義應該如何通過思維修習來運用呢？難道你知道在那個地方有見道嗎？為什麼見道要僅僅依靠禪定呢？因為那裡不是智慧之地。或者有人說，既然已經允許善法欲（Chanda）已經去除，可以稱此為根，那麼菩薩的解脫分（vimoksha-bhāga）也會在那裡產生。所以才這樣說。二乘人（Śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha）的劫數很近，所以不能說他們有那樣的解脫分。

論：或者二乘人的果位達到此根所攝的緣故。

述曰：第二種解釋是說，這或許是二乘的第三果（阿那含，Anāgāmin）及以上回小向大的修行者，爲了證得初地（prathamā-bhūmi）的法空（dharma-śūnyatā）。在初地之前，也會生起九地所攝的生空（pudgala-śūnyatā）無漏智（anāsrava-jñāna）。這九地指的是六慾天（kāma-dhātu）和三無色界（ārūpya-dhātu）。他們先生起生空智，是爲了菩薩的觀修而生起，順應菩薩的觀修，所以都屬於此根所攝。說他們有此根，並非不合道理。然而，二乘人沒有證得法空觀，沒有生起無漏智，所以這裡沒有說。

論：菩薩的見道，是因為時間短暫的緣故。

述曰：前面說三位都是二乘根，如第五十七卷下所說。菩薩的三根，在勝解行地（adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi）建立初根，十地（daśa-bhūmi）建立第二根，佛地（buddha-bhūmi）建立第三根。爲了解釋這個疑問，說菩薩的見道也有此根。但只說勝解行地的，因為在見道中時間短暫，所以沒有說。指的是初地有三個階段：入地、住地、出地。這裡僅僅是入地的時間很短，所以說時間短暫。雖然二乘人也是這樣，但見道前的時間比菩薩更短。所以說他們的見道也有。菩薩的情況不是這樣，不能作為例子。

論：開始從見道，因為多的緣故沒有說。

述曰：這第二根，三乘的果位相同。第九根、第十根都如前面的解釋。現在依照這個解釋，最初的兩個根也通於有漏（sāsrava）。這與《對法論》（Abhidharma）第十卷相同。

論：諸無學位（aśaikṣa）直到完全知曉根性。

述曰：那些無學位的無漏九根，都屬於第三根所攝。

問：為什麼有頂天（abhavāgra）如入滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti）前的心也有無漏，卻不屬於這三根所攝呢？

論：有頂天雖然有，但並非...

【English Translation】 English version: How should this meaning be applied through contemplation and cultivation? Do you know if there is the Path of Seeing (darśana-mārga) in that place? Why does the Path of Seeing rely solely on Samādhi (concentration)? Because that is not a place of wisdom. Or, someone might say that since it is already allowed that the desire for wholesome qualities (Chanda) has been removed, and this can be called a root, then the Bodhisattva's Part of Liberation (vimoksha-bhāga) will also arise there. That is why it is said this way. The kalpa (aeon) of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha) is near, so it cannot be said that they have such a Part of Liberation.

Treatise: Or, because the stage of the Two Vehicles reaches what is included in this root.

Commentary: The second explanation is that this may be practitioners of the Two Vehicles from the third fruit (Anāgāmin) onwards who turn from the Small Vehicle to the Great Vehicle, in order to realize the Dharma-emptiness (dharma-śūnyatā) of the first bhūmi (prathamā-bhūmi). Before the first bhūmi, the uncontaminated wisdom (anāsrava-jñāna) of Person-emptiness (pudgala-śūnyatā) included in the nine bhūmis will also arise. These nine bhūmis refer to the six desire realms (kāma-dhātu) and the three formless realms (ārūpya-dhātu). They first arise the wisdom of Person-emptiness, which arises for the Bodhisattva's contemplation, and in accordance with the Bodhisattva's contemplation, so they all belong to what is included in this root. It is not unreasonable to say that they have this root. However, the people of the Two Vehicles have not realized the Dharma-emptiness contemplation and have not arisen the uncontaminated wisdom, so it is not mentioned here.

Treatise: The Bodhisattva's Path of Seeing is because of the shortness of time.

Commentary: It was said earlier that the three stages are all roots of the Two Vehicles, as mentioned in the lower part of the fifty-seventh volume. The Bodhisattva's three roots establish the first root in the stage of understanding and practice (adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi), establish the second root in the ten bhūmis (daśa-bhūmi), and establish the third root in the Buddha-bhūmi (buddha-bhūmi). To explain this doubt, it is said that the Bodhisattva's Path of Seeing also has this root. But only the stage of understanding and practice is mentioned, because the time in the Path of Seeing is short, so it is not mentioned. It refers to the first bhūmi having three stages: entering the bhūmi, abiding in the bhūmi, and exiting the bhūmi. Here, only the time of entering the bhūmi is very short, so it is said that the time is short. Although it is also like this for the Two Vehicles, the time before the Path of Seeing is shorter than that of the Bodhisattva. Therefore, it is said that their Path of Seeing also has it. The Bodhisattva's situation is not like this, so it cannot be taken as an example.

Treatise: Starting from the Path of Seeing, it is not mentioned because there are many.

Commentary: This second root is the same for the three vehicles. The ninth root and the tenth root are all as explained earlier. Now, according to this explanation, the first two roots also communicate with the contaminated (sāsrava). This is the same as the tenth volume of the Abhidharma.

Treatise: All those in the state of No More Learning (aśaikṣa) until fully knowing the nature of the roots.

Commentary: Those uncontaminated nine roots in the state of No More Learning all belong to what is included in the third root.

Question: Why is it that the mind before entering the cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti) in the Peak of Existence (abhavāgra) also has the uncontaminated, but it is not included in these three roots?

Treatise: Although the Peak of Existence has it, it is not...

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后三根。

述曰。雖有遊觀而不明利。想微細故非后三根。然說彼是已知．具知亦無妨也。不順三根以不明利故不說彼。非彼不攝。若不攝者三無漏根攝無漏根不盡也。

論。二十二根至如論應知。

述曰。此諸門義如五十七等說。

成唯識論述記卷第七(末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

成唯識論述記卷第八(本)

沙門基撰

論。如是四緣至十五處立。

述曰。就答緣中有二。上來已辨四種能生分別緣已。自下傍乘辨緣依處建立十因。此中有三。第一如是四緣依十五處等。顯前四緣依十五處說為十因問起下文。第二正答。第三總結傍論已了應辨正論。此即初也。顯四緣攝法盡義別更立。下答中有四。第一明依十五處立其十因。二辨十因與二因相攝。三明四緣依處等建立。與十因．二因相攝。四明四緣依處等得果多少　又解今此標宗。言四緣義別依十五處立為十因。自下釋中。初依十五處立十因。次四緣依何處立等。后辨得果。其十因．二因相攝。但是因明十因傍義。故非別門。

論。一語依處至所起語性。

述曰。出依處體。言依處者。非是與因別體。語即依處。是持業釋。下皆如是。與因一體。然依者于義。俱

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 后三根。

述曰：即使有遊觀（觀察）但不明確、不敏銳，因為想法微細，所以不是后三根。然而，說它們是已知、具知也沒有妨礙。因為不順應前三根，由於不明確、不敏銳，所以不說它們。並非它們不被包含，如果它們不被包含，那麼三無漏根（未盡知根、已知根、具知根）包含無漏根就不完全了。

論：二十二根乃至如論應知。

述曰：這些門義如同第五十七等所說。

《成唯識論述記》卷第七（末） 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 《成唯識論述記》

《成唯識論述記》卷第八（本）

沙門基撰

論：如是四緣乃至十五處立。

述曰：就回答緣起中有二。上面已經辨明四種能生分別的緣起。從下面開始，順便辨明緣起所依之處，建立十因。這其中有三點：第一，如是四緣依十五處等，顯示前面的四緣依據十五處說為十因，從而引起下文的提問。第二，正式回答。第三，總結，順便討論完畢后，應該辨明正式的論述。這即是第一點，顯示四緣包含一切法的意義，因為意義不同而另外建立。下面的回答中有四點：第一，說明依據十五處建立這十因。第二，辨別十因與二因（能作因、所作因）的相互包含關係。第三，說明四緣依據處等建立，與十因、二因的相互包含關係。第四，說明四緣依據處等得到果報的多少。又解釋現在這裡標明宗旨，說四緣的意義不同，依據十五處建立為十因。從下面解釋中，先依據十五處建立十因，其次四緣依據何處建立等，最後辨別得到果報。其中十因、二因的相互包含關係，只是因明（邏輯學）中十因的順帶意義，所以不是單獨的門類。

論：一語依處乃至所起語性。

述曰：說明所依之處的體性。所說的『依處』，不是與因不同的體性。『語』就是依處，這是持業釋（一種梵文複合詞的解釋方法，主語和謂語是同一事物的不同方面）。下面都像這樣，與因是一體。然而，『依』在於意義上，都是。

【English Translation】 English version: The last three roots.

Commentary: Although there is observation and contemplation, it is not clear or sharp. Because the thoughts are subtle, they are not the last three roots. However, saying that they are already known or fully known is not an obstacle. Because they do not accord with the first three roots, and because they are not clear or sharp, they are not mentioned. It is not that they are not included. If they were not included, then the three non-outflow roots (the root of not-yet-knowing-the-limit, the root of knowing, and the root of full knowing) would not fully encompass the non-outflow roots.

Treatise: The twenty-two roots, up to what should be known according to the treatise.

Commentary: The meanings of these categories are as explained in the fifty-seventh, etc.

Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 7 (End) Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 43, No. 1830, Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only

Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 8 (Beginning)

Composed by the Shramana (Buddhist monk) Kui Ji

Treatise: These four conditions, up to the establishment in the fifteen places.

Commentary: Regarding the answer about conditions, there are two aspects. Above, the four kinds of conditions that can generate discrimination have already been explained. From here on, incidentally, the places where conditions rely are explained, and the ten causes are established. There are three points here: First, these four conditions rely on the fifteen places, etc., showing that the preceding four conditions are said to be the ten causes based on the fifteen places, thus raising the question in the following text. Second, the formal answer. Third, the conclusion. After the incidental discussion is finished, the formal discussion should be explained. This is the first point, showing that the four conditions encompass all dharmas, and are established separately because of different meanings. In the following answer, there are four points: First, explaining that these ten causes are established based on the fifteen places. Second, distinguishing the mutual inclusion relationship between the ten causes and the two causes (the efficient cause and the result cause). Third, explaining that the establishment of the four conditions based on places, etc., is mutually inclusive with the ten causes and the two causes. Fourth, explaining how much result is obtained from the four conditions based on places, etc. Also, explaining that this is now stating the purpose, saying that the meanings of the four conditions are different, and they are established as the ten causes based on the fifteen places. From the following explanation, first the ten causes are established based on the fifteen places, then where the four conditions are established, etc., and finally the results obtained are distinguished. The mutual inclusion relationship between the ten causes and the two causes is only an incidental meaning of the ten causes in Hetu-vidya (logic), so it is not a separate category.

Treatise: One word relies on a place, up to the nature of the word that arises.

Commentary: Explaining the nature of the place of reliance. What is said to be the 'place of reliance' is not a different nature from the cause. 'Word' is the place of reliance. This is a Karmadharaya compound (a type of Sanskrit compound where the subject and predicate refer to the same thing). The following are all like this, being one with the cause. However, 'reliance' is in terms of meaning, they are all.

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第七囀聲。即于語體上。立隨說等因義也。如大論第五．三十八．顯揚十八．對法第四．中邊俱辨此因。然大論三十八。但有三種十因。及五果體無依處攝。對法唯有十因之名。亦非周悉。顯揚十八初有十因。后辨因依處。大論第五辨因依處不別明因。三十八．及顯揚云。隨一切法名為先故想。想為先故說。是彼諸法隨說因。彼論文勢似取詮一切法之名．想．語三法為因體。然今此文正解彼意。但取法．及名．想三法所起語是此因體。所以者何。但言依語依處立此因故。唯語為自性。不爾即應言依名．想．說依處立此因也。此中即以諸法為果。以名．想．與說為所依因。言說正是詮諸法因也。言說是語性。語性總言。即通三性語業為體。唯佛是善。余皆無記。然有表示故語可言善．惡。然實二性。名雖即語之差別。無表示故不如其語。語是業性。以除佛以外名皆無記　或可。大乘離聲無體。故名即通三性。但以三相及得例難同所依故。不可言相是共有因不同於名。大乘共有因義皆通故。

論。即依此處立隨說因。

述曰。此顯說因依語依立。不是異體。依體立義也。

論。謂依此語至說諸義故。

述曰。此釋依語立說因義。謂詮一切法。起名取其相狀。方有言說起。即依此語隨見．聞．覺．

知后。或隨彼所見等事說諸義故。依語立因。

論。此即能說為所說因。

述曰。此釋因義。對何為因。此即能說之語。為所說一切法因。古師云所說一切法是此因體者不然。若爾即以言說為果故。其見．聞等。如九十三．及對法第一．樞要等會。言隨者。是隨逐義。即隨所見．聞等事起語言說。大論等並同此文。然有漏無記隨說因。果通一切有為．無為有漏．無漏法。是持業義。以無記即因故。既以無記為果。詮無記事之說。說與無記為因。即依士釋。若前解因唯有漏．無記。后解即通有漏．無漏三性所攝。其染．凈此因準此可解。

論。有論說此至隨起說故。

述曰。此會相違　是名想見者。集論中說　由如名等。是彼釋文。此因名．想．見三法以為自體。謂想．見二法如能詮名字而取境相。及興執著。想能取相執著由見。如名字起取相執著已隨起說故。即以三法為因所生之說是其果也。

論。若依彼說至是語依處。

述曰。若依彼文。性是三法。三法與語為依處名語依處。語之依處。亦依士釋。若依此解。即顯此名．想．見因。是語之依處。三法為因體故　問何所以二論相違　答二論意別。論雖無會。今意釋言。若大論等。以一切法為果以說為因。約所詮是能詮之果。即

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：得知之後，或者因為隨順他所見到的事物等而宣說各種意義，所以說是依語立因。

論：這就能說是所說之事的因。

述記：這是解釋『因』的含義。對於什麼而言是『因』呢？這能說之語，是所說一切法的因。古師說所說的一切法是此『因』的本體，這是不對的。如果這樣，就成了以言說為果。至於見、聞等，如《九十三》、《對法第一》、《樞要》等所說。『隨』是隨逐的意思，即隨順所見、所聞等事而起語言宣說。《大論》等也與此文相同。然而，有漏無記隨說因，其果通於一切有為、無為有漏、無漏法，這是持業釋，因為無記即是因。既然以無記為果，詮釋無記之事的言說，宣說與無記為因，就是依士釋。如果前一種解釋認為『因』只有有漏、無記，后一種解釋就通於有漏、無漏三性所攝。至於染、凈，此『因』可以依此來理解。

論：有論說此，乃至隨之而起宣說。

述記：這是爲了調和相違之處。『是名想見者』，《集論》中說『由如名等』，是那裡的解釋。此『因』以名、想、見三法作為自體。所謂想、見二法，如同能詮釋的名字一樣，取境之相，並且產生執著。想能取相，執著由見而生。如同名字生起取相執著之後，隨之而起宣說，所以是以三法為因，所產生的宣說是其果。

論：如果依照那裡的說法，乃至是語的依處。

述記：如果依照那裡的文義，『性』是三法。三法與語為依處，名為『語依處』，是語的依處，也是依士釋。如果依照這種解釋，就顯示出此名、想、見『因』，是語的依處。三法是『因』的本體。問：為什麼兩個論典相互違背？答：兩個論典的用意不同。論典雖然沒有會通，現在我來解釋說，如果《大論》等以一切法為果，以宣說為因，是就所詮釋的是能詮釋的果而言。

【English Translation】 English version: After knowing, or because of speaking various meanings according to what one sees, etc., therefore it is said to establish the cause based on language.

Treatise: This can be said to be the cause of what is spoken.

Commentary: This explains the meaning of 'cause'. What is the 'cause' for? This speakable language is the cause of all dharmas that are spoken. The ancient teachers said that all dharmas that are spoken are the substance of this 'cause', which is not correct. If so, then speech becomes the result. As for seeing, hearing, etc., as mentioned in 'Ninety-three', 'Abhidharma First', 'Essentials', etc. 'Following' means following along, that is, arising language and speaking according to what is seen, heard, etc. The 'Great Treatise' and others are the same as this text. However, the defiled and neutral cause of following speech, its result extends to all conditioned and unconditioned, defiled and undefiled dharmas. This is a possessive compound, because the neutral is the cause. Since the neutral is the result, the speech that explains the neutral event, speaking with the neutral as the cause, is a dependent compound. If the former explanation considers the 'cause' to be only defiled and neutral, the latter explanation extends to the defiled, undefiled, and three natures. As for defilement and purity, this 'cause' can be understood accordingly.

Treatise: Some treatises say this, up to following and arising speech.

Commentary: This is to reconcile the contradictions. 'Those who are named, thought, and seen', the 'Collection of Treatises' says 'due to names, etc.', which is the explanation there. This 'cause' takes name, thought, and view as its own substance. The so-called thought and view, like the expressive name, take the characteristics of the object and generate attachments. Thought can take the characteristics, and attachment arises from view. Just as the name arises, taking the characteristics and attachments, and then following and arising speech, so it is that the speech produced by taking the three dharmas as the cause is its result.

Treatise: If according to that saying, up to being the place of reliance of language.

Commentary: If according to that text, 'nature' is the three dharmas. The three dharmas and language are the place of reliance, called 'place of reliance of language', which is the place of reliance of language, also a dependent compound. If according to this explanation, it shows that this name, thought, and view 'cause' is the place of reliance of language. The three dharmas are the substance of the 'cause'. Question: Why do the two treatises contradict each other? Answer: The intentions of the two treatises are different. Although the treatises do not reconcile, I will now explain that if the 'Great Treatise' and others take all dharmas as the result and speech as the cause, it is in terms of what is explained being the result of what can explain.

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能．所二詮解因果。對法無著以生起為因果。即依名．想．見起言說故。亦不相違各據一義。故對法雲。隨說能作。隨說者語也。隨說之能作。名．想．見也。又大論約貫通諸法詮境以說為因。對法唯依染分相生以說為果。不相違也。

論。二領受依處至能所受性。

述曰。觀者對也。待者藉也。即是此因通能．所受。然所假藉能所之受方是余非。然有人云唯三受為體者不然。亦待食等而求啖等。即以所待食為欲因。若待情慾方求飲食。以受為食因。然領受處通能．所受。不可言欲。欲不遍故。非受性故。即觀於此隨是能．所受。領彼所．能受果。或生住成得。此所待與所生等為因也。然大論等皆言待此若求．若取。即所待受為所求等因。三十八等云。觀待足故足為因故有往來業。未必以受為因。所待非受故。又此論云通所受故。然此所待若能所受皆此因攝。有以能受為因。能受為果。如待苦為樂。有以能受為因。所受為果。有以所受為因。所受為果。有以所受為因。能受為果。四句別也。所領受法亦名領受故。今于能受唯取受數。一常遍諸心。二五分位別。別境等法不常遍諸心。作意等四無五分位故。觸雖有爾。然于所受非領屬己。不如於受所以不取　其所受中通一切法。但除種子因緣之法。此因疏故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 能詮釋和所詮釋兩種方式都可以解釋因果關係。在《對法論》（Abhidharma）中，無著（Asanga）以生起作為因果。也就是說，依賴於名（nāma，名稱）、想（saṃjñā，概念）、見（dṛṣṭi，見解）而產生言說，這與上述觀點並不矛盾，因為它們各自依據不同的含義。因此，《對法論》中說：『隨著所說的能作。』『隨著所說』指的是語言。『隨著所說的能作』指的是名、想、見。此外，《大論》（Mahāyāna-sūtra）從貫通諸法、詮釋境界的角度，以『說』作為因；而《對法論》僅僅依據染污部分的相互產生，以『說』作為果。這二者並不矛盾。

論：二、領受的依處，乃至能受和所受的性質。

述記：『觀者』是對的意思，『待者』是憑藉的意思。也就是說，這個因同時包含能受和所受。然而，作為憑藉的能受和所受才是（真正的因），其他的不是。然而，有人說只有三種感受（苦、樂、舍）作為本體，這是不對的。因為也需要憑藉食物等來尋求啖食等行為。也就是說，以所憑藉的食物作為慾望的因。如果憑藉情慾才尋求飲食，那麼就以感受作為食物的因。然而，領受的處所同時包含能受和所受，不能說是慾望，因為慾望並不普遍，也不是感受的性質。也就是說，觀察這裡，無論是能受還是所受，領受彼所受或能受的果，或者生、住、成、得。這個所憑藉的和所生等作為因。然而，《大論》等都說憑藉這個來尋求或獲取。也就是說，所憑藉的感受是所求等的因。《三十八等》中說：『觀待足，所以足為因，所以有往來業。』未必以感受作為因，因為所憑藉的不是感受。而且，這個論中說包含所受。然而，這個所憑藉的，無論是能受還是所受，都包含在這個因中。有以能受作為因，能受作為果，例如憑藉苦來感受樂。有以能受作為因，所受作為果。有以所受作為因，所受作為果。有以所受作為因，能受作為果。這是四句的分別。所領受的法也稱為領受，所以現在在能受中只取感受的數量。一是常遍諸心，二是五種分位差別。別境等法不常遍諸心，作意等四種沒有五種分位，雖然觸也有，但是對於所受來說，並非領屬自己，不如對於感受那樣，所以不取。其所受中包含一切法，但是排除種子因緣的法，因為這個因比較疏遠。

【English Translation】 English version Both the expresser (能詮釋) and the expressed (所詮釋) can be used to explain causality. In the Abhidharma, Asanga explains causality as arising (生起). That is, speech arises dependent on name (nāma, 名稱), thought (saṃjñā, 概念), and view (dṛṣṭi, 見解). This does not contradict the above view, as they each rely on different meanings. Therefore, the Abhidharma says: 'According to what is said, there is the ability to act.' 'According to what is said' refers to language. 'The ability to act according to what is said' refers to name, thought, and view. Furthermore, the Mahāyāna-sūtra explains 'speech' as the cause from the perspective of connecting all dharmas and explaining realms, while the Abhidharma only relies on the mutual arising of defiled parts and explains 'speech' as the result. These two are not contradictory.

Treatise: Two, the basis of reception, up to the nature of the receiver and the received.

Commentary: 'Observer' means 'opposite,' and 'dependent' means 'relying on.' That is, this cause includes both the receiver and the received. However, the receiver and the received that are relied upon are (the true cause), and others are not. However, some say that only the three feelings (suffering, pleasure, and indifference) are the essence, which is not correct. Because one also needs to rely on food, etc., to seek eating, etc. That is, taking the food relied upon as the cause of desire. If one seeks food only by relying on lust, then feeling is taken as the cause of food. However, the place of reception includes both the receiver and the received, and cannot be said to be desire, because desire is not universal and is not the nature of feeling. That is, observing here, whether it is the receiver or the received, one receives the result of the received or the receiver, or arising, abiding, decay, and obtaining. This that is relied upon and that which arises, etc., are the cause. However, the Mahāyāna-sūtras, etc., all say that one relies on this to seek or obtain. That is, the feeling relied upon is the cause of what is sought, etc. The Thirty-Eight, etc., say: 'Because of relying on the foot, the foot is the cause, so there is the karma of going and coming.' It is not necessarily that feeling is the cause, because what is relied upon is not feeling. Moreover, this treatise says that it includes the received. However, this that is relied upon, whether it is the receiver or the received, is included in this cause. There are cases where the receiver is the cause and the receiver is the result, such as relying on suffering to feel pleasure. There are cases where the receiver is the cause and the received is the result. There are cases where the received is the cause and the received is the result. There are cases where the received is the cause and the receiver is the result. These are the distinctions of the four sentences. The dharma that is received is also called reception, so now in the receiver, only the number of feelings is taken. One is constantly pervasive in all minds, and two are the differences in the five divisions. Dharmas such as specific objects are not constantly pervasive in all minds, and the four such as attention do not have the five divisions. Although contact also has them, it is not under one's own control with respect to what is received, unlike with feeling, so it is not taken. What is received includes all dharmas, but excludes the dharmas of seed causes and conditions, because this cause is relatively distant.

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。唯疏相待方是此因。如種望芽。內種望現皆非此因。不爾下應言得等流果。以不得故。唯疏相待者得。即親所待皆是引發．牽引等攝　問何故說因緣是牽引．生起攝故。亦是定異等攝。說觀待因是觀待。復是牽引等攝。竟有何失　答曰不然。以名遠故。名觀待者即要非親。定異等因名相通故　又解若親相待亦是此因。下此果中但據疏遠不言親者故。不說得等流果等也。此解為勝　又解觀待情慾是觀視義。要境待情。情待境方是即能所受性。以種望芽非情能所觀待故非此因　問若爾何故言足為因故有往來業　答亦是內法情所待故。因緣芽等法非情所待。情所待時非因緣故。前說正義。既所受中以所待為因。芽待于種亦可此因。且無記之因。若無記即因唯有漏。無記性果通漏無漏．三性等法。若果是無記。與無記為因。即因通三性．漏．無漏。果唯無記。余染等皆準此知。

論。即依此處立觀待因。

述曰。此顯依處依之立因。

論。謂觀待此至彼觀待因。

述曰。大論等意勢與此同。此顯觀待因果於四處轉。但除親因緣。

論。三習氣依處至遠自果故。

述曰。謂內外種未成熟位。謂有漏．無漏種子內外種子一切。未為善友力等所潤。貪愛等所潤。水．土等所潤。皆名習氣依。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 只有通過疏遠的相互依存關係才能構成這種『因』（hetu，原因）。例如，種子期望發芽的情況。內在的種子期望顯現，都不是這種『因』。否則，下文應該說能獲得『等流果』（nisyanda-phala，等流果），因為沒有獲得，所以只有通過疏遠的相互依存關係才能獲得。也就是說，親近的所依賴關係都屬於引發、牽引等範疇。 問：為什麼說『因緣』（hetu-pratyaya，因緣）是牽引、生起所包含的？它也屬於定異等所包含的。說『觀待因』（apekṣā-hetu，觀待因）是觀待，又是牽引等所包含的，究竟有什麼過失？ 答：不是這樣的。因為『觀待』這個名稱含義較遠。名為『觀待』的，必然不是親近的。而定異等『因』的名稱是相通的。 又一種解釋是，如果親近的相互依存也是這種『因』，下文在討論這種果的時候，只是根據疏遠的關係而不提及親近的關係，所以不說獲得『等流果』等等。這種解釋更好。 又一種解釋是，『觀待』（apekṣā，觀待）是情慾的觀視之義。必須是境待情，情待境，才是能所受的性質。以種子期望發芽的情況來說，不是情能所觀待，所以不是這種『因』。 問：如果這樣，為什麼說腳是『因』（hetu，原因），所以才有往來業？ 答：這也是因為內在的法是情所依賴的。『因緣』（hetu-pratyaya，因緣）中的芽等法不是情所依賴的。情所依賴的時候，不是『因緣』。前面說的才是正義。既然在所受中以所待為『因』（hetu，原因），芽依賴於種子也可以是這種『因』。而且無記的『因』（hetu，原因），如果是無記的『因』，那麼只有有漏。無記性的果，通於有漏、無漏、三性等法。如果果是無記，與無記為『因』，那麼『因』通於三性、有漏、無漏。果只有無記。其餘的染等情況都可以參照這個來理解。

論：即依據此處建立『觀待因』（apekṣā-hetu，觀待因）。

述曰：這顯示了依據處所，依靠它來建立『因』（hetu，原因）。

論：所謂觀待此而至彼，是『觀待因』（apekṣā-hetu，觀待因）。

述曰：大論等的意義和這裡相同。這顯示了『觀待因』（apekṣā-hetu，觀待因）的因果在四個處所運轉，只是排除了親近的『因緣』（hetu-pratyaya，因緣）。

論：三種習氣依處，直至遠離自身果的緣故。

述曰：指的是內外種子未成熟的階段。指的是有漏、無漏種子，內外種子的一切。未被善友的力量等所滋潤，被貪愛等所滋潤，被水、土等所滋潤，都稱為習氣依。

【English Translation】 English version Only through distant interdependence can this 'hetu' (cause) be constituted. For example, the case of a seed expecting to sprout. The inner seed expecting manifestation is not this 'hetu'. Otherwise, it should be said below that one can obtain the 'nisyanda-phala' (result of outflow), because it is not obtained, so only through distant interdependence can it be obtained. That is to say, close dependencies are all included in the categories of initiation and attraction. Question: Why is it said that 'hetu-pratyaya' (cause and condition) is included in attraction and arising? It also belongs to the category of determination and difference. Saying that 'apekṣā-hetu' (dependent cause) is dependence and also included in attraction, what is the fault? Answer: It is not like that. Because the name 'apekṣā' (dependence) has a distant meaning. What is called 'apekṣā' must not be close. And the names of causes such as determination and difference are common. Another explanation is that if close interdependence is also this 'hetu', the following discussion of this result only refers to distant relationships and does not mention close relationships, so it does not say that the 'nisyanda-phala' (result of outflow) is obtained, etc. This explanation is better. Another explanation is that 'apekṣā' (dependence) is the meaning of emotional observation. It must be that the object depends on the emotion, and the emotion depends on the object, in order to be the nature of what is received. Taking the case of a seed expecting to sprout, it is not emotional observation, so it is not this 'hetu'. Question: If so, why is it said that the foot is a 'hetu' (cause), so there is the karma of coming and going? Answer: This is also because the inner dharma is dependent on emotion. The sprout and other dharmas in 'hetu-pratyaya' (cause and condition) are not dependent on emotion. When emotion is dependent, it is not 'hetu-pratyaya'. What was said earlier is the correct meaning. Since in what is received, what is depended on is taken as the 'hetu' (cause), the sprout depending on the seed can also be this 'hetu'. Moreover, the indeterminate 'hetu' (cause), if it is an indeterminate 'hetu', then there is only the defiled. The indeterminate result is common to the defiled, undefiled, and three natures of dharmas. If the result is indeterminate, and the 'hetu' is indeterminate, then the 'hetu' is common to the three natures, defiled, and undefiled. The result is only indeterminate. The remaining defilements and other situations can be understood by analogy.

Treatise: That is, 'apekṣā-hetu' (dependent cause) is established here.

Commentary: This shows that the cause is established based on the place of reliance.

Treatise: The so-called dependence on this to reach that is 'apekṣā-hetu' (dependent cause).

Commentary: The meaning of the Great Treatise and others is the same as here. This shows that the cause and effect of 'apekṣā-hetu' (dependent cause) operate in four places, but excludes close 'hetu-pratyaya' (cause and condition).

Treatise: The three kinds of habitual energy depend on the place, until the cause is far from its own result.

Commentary: This refers to the stage where the internal and external seeds have not yet matured. It refers to all defiled and undefiled seeds, internal and external seeds. Not being nourished by the power of good friends, etc., being nourished by greed and love, etc., being nourished by water, soil, etc., are all called habitual energy dependence.

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以未為潤時。但能牽引遠自果故。不問同異性相稱故名為自果。且凈因中。與能證涅槃清凈之法為遠因。勿見大論等言此因證得涅槃為清凈因。便言此果是無為法。無為疏遠非因生故。論不說得離系果故。今此因親。此三性之因果隨因性。因緣親生增上生故。能引等流．增上果故。或染因中亦與果異性。謂異熟因。果唯無記。因通善．惡也。若無記即因。果唯無記。若無漏即因。果唯無漏。善．不善即因。果通三性。若無記之因。因通三性。果唯無記。如理應思。大論等同。

論。四有潤種子依處至近自果故。

述曰。即前種子為善友等力潤已去名有潤依。以能生起近果。如凈因與近菩提為因緣者是。此中但與前所潤．未潤別。更無別體。果性等並同前。大論等亦同。

論。五無間滅依處至等無間緣。

述曰。即心．心所法之等無間緣。以心．心所法為果也。此緣如前辨。因隨何性果通三性各唯自識。唯以心．心所為體故。

論。六境界依處至所緣緣。

述曰。體通一切法。果唯心．心所。有漏．無漏等。並通因果。若以未來為因。果非現在。非因前而果後者。今亦不然。相分現在義似未來無實未來。故所緣緣無不有果。此三十八說此等無間緣。及所緣緣。唯望一切心．心所故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 以尚未被滋潤時為例。只能牽引遠離自身結果的原因。不問相同或相異，性質和表象是否相稱，因此稱為『自果』。並且，在清凈因中，與能夠證得涅槃（Nirvana，佛教術語，指解脫生死輪迴的境界）清凈之法作為遠因。不要因為《大智度論》等經論中說此因證得涅槃為清凈因，就說此果是無為法（Asamskrta-dharma，佛教術語，指不生不滅、無造作的法）。無為法疏遠，不是因所生。經論沒有說得到離系果的緣故。現在這個因是親近的。這三種性質的因果隨因的性質而定，因為因緣親近產生，增上緣產生。能夠牽引等流果（Nisyanda-phala，佛教術語，指與因相似的果報）、增上果（Adhipati-phala，佛教術語，指由增上緣所產生的果報）。或者在染污因中，也與果的性質不同，比如異熟因（Vipaka-hetu，佛教術語，指能產生異熟果的業因）。果只有無記（Avyakrta，佛教術語，指非善非惡，不可記別的性質），因則通於善和惡。如果是無記的因，果也只有無記。如果是無漏（Anasrava，佛教術語，指沒有煩惱染污的性質）的因，果也只有無漏。善和不善的因，果則通於三種性質。如果是無記的因，因通於三種性質，果只有無記。應該如理思維。《大智度論》等也是相同的。

論：四、有潤種子依處，直至近自果故。

述記：就是之前的種子被善友等力量滋潤后，稱為『有潤依』。因為它能夠生起近果，比如清凈因與接近菩提（Bodhi，佛教術語，指覺悟的智慧）作為因緣就是這樣。這裡只是與之前被滋潤和未被滋潤的種子有所區別，沒有其他的差別。果的性質等都與之前相同。《大智度論》等也是相同的。

論：五、無間滅依處，直至等無間緣。

述記：就是心和心所法（Citta-caitta，佛教術語，指心及其所擁有的各種心理活動）的等無間緣（Samanantara-pratyaya，佛教術語，指前一個心識為后一個心識生起所提供的無間斷的條件）。以心和心所法作為果。這個緣如前面所辨析的。因隨什麼性質，果通於三種性質，各自唯有自己的識。因為唯以心和心所法為體。

論：六、境界依處，直至所緣緣。

述記：體通於一切法。果唯有心和心所。有漏（Sasrava，佛教術語，指有煩惱染污的性質）和無漏等，都通於因果。如果以未來作為因，果不是現在。沒有因在前而果在後的情況。現在也不是這樣。相分（Nimitta-bhaga，佛教術語，指心識所認識的對象）現在，意義上類似於未來，但沒有真實的未來。所以所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya，佛教術語，指心識生起時所攀緣的境界）沒有不產生果的。這三十八種說法，說這個等無間緣和所緣緣，只是針對一切心和心所法而言。

【English Translation】 English version: Taking the case when it is not yet moistened. It can only draw away from the cause of its own result. Without asking whether they are the same or different, whether their nature and appearance are compatible, it is therefore called 'self-result'. Moreover, in the pure cause, the pure dharma that can attain Nirvana (the Buddhist term for the state of liberation from the cycle of birth and death) is the distant cause. Do not, because the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra and other treatises say that this cause attains Nirvana as a pure cause, say that this result is an unconditioned dharma (Asamskrta-dharma, a Buddhist term for the uncreated and unceasing dharma). Unconditioned dharma is distant and not produced by a cause. The treatises do not say that the result of separation is obtained. Now this cause is close. The cause and effect of these three natures follow the nature of the cause, because the causal condition is close and produces, and the dominant condition produces. It can draw the isogenous result (Nisyanda-phala, a Buddhist term for the result similar to the cause), and the dominant result (Adhipati-phala, a Buddhist term for the result produced by the dominant condition). Or in the defiled cause, it is also different from the nature of the result, such as the ripening cause (Vipaka-hetu, a Buddhist term for the karmic cause that produces the ripening result). The result is only neutral (Avyakrta, a Buddhist term for the nature that is neither good nor evil, and cannot be distinguished), while the cause is common to good and evil. If it is a neutral cause, the result is only neutral. If it is a unconditioned cause (Anasrava, a Buddhist term for the nature without the defilement of afflictions), the result is also only unconditioned. Good and non-good causes, the result is common to the three natures. If it is a neutral cause, the cause is common to the three natures, and the result is only neutral. One should think reasonably. The Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra and others are the same.

Treatise: Four, the place where the moistened seed relies, until the near self-result.

Commentary: The previous seed, after being moistened by the power of good friends, is called 'moistened reliance'. Because it can produce a near result, such as the pure cause and approaching Bodhi (the Buddhist term for the wisdom of enlightenment) as the causal condition. Here, it is only different from the previously moistened and unmoistened seeds, there is no other difference. The nature of the result, etc., are the same as before. The Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra and others are also the same.

Treatise: Five, the place where the immediately ceased relies, until the immediately preceding condition.

Commentary: It is the immediately preceding condition (Samanantara-pratyaya, a Buddhist term for the uninterrupted condition provided by the previous consciousness for the arising of the next consciousness) of the mind and mental functions (Citta-caitta, Buddhist terms for the mind and its various mental activities). Taking the mind and mental functions as the result. This condition is as analyzed before. The cause follows what nature, the result is common to the three natures, each only has its own consciousness. Because it only takes the mind and mental functions as its substance.

Treatise: Six, the place where the object relies, until the objective condition.

Commentary: The substance is common to all dharmas. The result is only the mind and mental functions. Defiled (Sasrava, a Buddhist term for the nature with the defilement of afflictions) and unconditioned, etc., are common to cause and effect. If the future is taken as the cause, the result is not the present. There is no situation where the cause is before and the result is after. It is not like this now either. The appearance-aspect (Nimitta-bhaga, a Buddhist term for the object perceived by consciousness) is present, and its meaning is similar to the future, but there is no real future. Therefore, the objective condition (Alambana-pratyaya, a Buddhist term for the object that the mind clings to when it arises) does not fail to produce a result. These thirty-eight kinds of statements, saying this immediately preceding condition and objective condition, are only aimed at all minds and mental functions.

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論。七根依處至所依六根。

述曰。體是六根。即通八識。五根為體。果唯是心．心所。前三果果性皆同。因準可知。然無間緣。謂現在時為緣非在過去。過去無故。即現在有力用。能開導法令未來生故。入過去時其用方顯。果現前故。處所空故。

論。八作用依處至余助現緣。

述曰。謂于所作業作具之作用。如釿斧等有斫伐等用。即除種子余助現緣者。謂除內外種生現。種生種。現生種。及親助緣。餘一切法疏助緣皆是。

論。九士用依處至余作現緣。

述曰。謂于所作業。能作者之作用。即取前所除中正作之士用親助緣者。其果寬狹同前作用。作用．士用必同所作故。不取親者。非因緣故。此二果通漏．無漏三性因亦爾。然此二及前五無記即因。除無間緣。及根依處。余依處果通漏．無漏。彼二果唯有漏。有漏二因是無記故。不生無漏也。此依六識作法。若七．八識無間緣。無記即因。果通無漏。七有漏根。六無漏故。與無記為因。除無間緣。及根。余因通漏．無漏三性。此依六識為論。若依第七識無漏無間有漏可生。無記之因。其無間緣因亦通無漏。根中應分別。色根．意根各有異故。然此中士用作用。唯約有情士夫用等說。故下言唯得士用果。不言得離系等果故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本

論：七根的所依處至所依的六根。 　　述記：本體是六根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意），即通於八識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）。五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）為本體，果實唯是心（Citta）、心所（Caitasikas）。前三果的果性皆相同，因可以類推得知。然而無間緣（Samanantarapratyaya），是指現在時為緣，不是在過去。因為過去已經沒有了，即現在有力量和作用，能開導和法令未來產生。進入過去時，其作用才顯現，因為果已經現前，處所是空性的。 　　論：八作用的所依處至其餘助現緣。 　　述記：是指對於所作業的工具的作用，如斧頭等有砍伐等作用。即除去種子（Bīja），其餘幫助生起現行的緣。種子生種子，現行生種子，以及親近的助緣，其餘一切法疏遠的助緣都是。 　　論：九士用的所依處至其餘作現緣。 　　述記：是指對於所作業，能作者的作用。即取前面所除去的正作的士用（puruṣakāra）親助緣。其果的寬狹與前面的作用相同。作用、士用必定與所作相同，所以不取親近的，因為不是因緣的緣故。這兩種果通於有漏（sāsrava）、無漏（anāsrava）三性，因也是如此。然而這兩種以及前面的五種無記（avyākṛta）即是因，除去無間緣，以及根的所依處。其餘所依處的果通於有漏、無漏。那兩種果唯有有漏，有漏的兩種因是無記的緣故，不生無漏。這是依六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）作法。如果七識（末那識）、八識（阿賴耶識）的無間緣，無記即是因，果通於無漏。七識有有漏根，六識有無漏根的緣故，與無記作為因。除去無間緣，以及根，其餘的因通於有漏、無漏三性。這是依六識來論述。如果依第七識，無漏的無間緣可以生有漏的無記之因，其無間緣因也通於無漏。根中應該分別，色根（rūpendriya）、意根（mana-indriya）各有不同。然而這之中士用作用，只是約有情士夫的用等來說，所以下面說唯得士用的果，不言得離系等果的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version

Treatise: The support of the seven roots to the six roots that are supported. Commentary: The substance is the six roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), which connect to the eight consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness, manas consciousness, and alaya consciousness). The five roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) are the substance, and the result is only mind (Citta) and mental factors (Caitasikas). The nature of the results of the first three results are the same, and the cause can be inferred accordingly. However, the immediately preceding condition (Samanantarapratyaya) refers to the present time as the condition, not the past. Because the past no longer exists, the present has power and function, and can guide and order the future to arise. When it enters the past, its function becomes apparent, because the result has already manifested, and the place is empty. Treatise: The support of the eight functions to the remaining assisting conditions for manifestation. Commentary: This refers to the function of the tools used in the work being done, such as axes having the function of chopping. That is, excluding the seed (Bīja), the remaining conditions that help to bring about manifestation. Seed produces seed, manifestation produces seed, and close assisting conditions, all other dharmas that are distant assisting conditions are included. Treatise: The support of the nine volitions to the remaining conditions for action. Commentary: This refers to the function of the agent in the work being done. That is, taking the close assisting conditions of the volition (puruṣakāra) that was removed earlier. The breadth of its result is the same as the previous function. Function and volition must be the same as what is being done, so close ones are not taken, because they are not the cause and condition. These two results connect to the contaminated (sāsrava), uncontaminated (anāsrava) and neutral (avyākṛta) three natures, and the cause is also the same. However, these two and the previous five neutral are the cause, excluding the immediately preceding condition, and the support of the roots. The results of the remaining supports connect to the contaminated and uncontaminated. Those two results are only contaminated, and the two contaminated causes are neutral, so they do not produce the uncontaminated. This is based on the functioning of the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness). If the immediately preceding condition of the seventh consciousness (manas consciousness) and eighth consciousness (alaya consciousness), the neutral is the cause, and the result connects to the uncontaminated. The seventh consciousness has contaminated roots, and the six consciousnesses have uncontaminated roots, so they take the neutral as the cause. Excluding the immediately preceding condition, and the roots, the remaining causes connect to the contaminated, uncontaminated and neutral three natures. This is discussed based on the six consciousnesses. If based on the seventh consciousness, the uncontaminated immediately preceding condition can produce the contaminated neutral cause, and its immediately preceding condition also connects to the uncontaminated. The roots should be distinguished, the sense organ (rūpendriya) and mind organ (mana-indriya) are different. However, the function of volition here is only discussed in terms of the use of sentient beings, so it is said below that only the result of volition is obtained, and it is not said that the result of detachment is obtained.

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。今亦通取非但內有情也。然作用．士用皆第三囀聲。梵云羯剌拏。是作具作用。羯剌多是士夫作用。故二別也。然大論三十八。說唯除種子所餘諸緣名攝受故。此乃助成攝受。故除因緣。如眼識生。以眼根。及種為士用依。以等無間緣．所緣緣等為作用依。根稍親故。此約法為士用說。若假人為士用非於法。準此應知。人望谷芽。人為士用。地．水等為作用。作用疏於人功故。若依瑜伽三十八無記因中皆有士用。皆以地．水等為士用。日．及鋤治為作用。

論。十真實見依處至能助引證。

述曰。謂一切無漏見。與一切無為有為法為因。除見因果自熏成種以外望余皆是此因。以因緣引發是引發因中攝。于無漏有為俱生法。能助令同所作。或令增長故。於後有為無漏能引。前引后法也。能證即與無為為因也。此顯勝果。

論。總依此六至辨無漏故。

述曰。前六依處是攝受因體。以前五依疏所攝受故。成辨三界有漏諸法。若六合疏所攝受辨無漏法。即第六依不通有漏也。助成因緣名為攝受。故除因緣親能生法。故對法言。如田．水．糞等。望谷生芽等。雖自種所生。然增彼力名攝受因。然隨所應有五．有六。非諸有漏皆具五等。心．心所生皆具五依。非心．心所。即便無故。此中前五通無記

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：現在也普遍採取這種觀點，不僅僅侷限於內在的有情眾生。然而，『作用』(karana)和『士用』(kartṛ)在梵語中是不同的詞彙。梵語中，『羯剌拏』(karana)指的是作具的作用，而『羯剌多』(kartṛ)指的是士夫的作用，因此二者有所區別。然而，《大智度論》第三十八卷說，除了種子之外，其餘的諸緣都稱為『攝受』，因此這只是助成攝受，所以排除了因緣。例如，眼識的產生，以眼根和種子為士用依，以等無間緣和所緣緣等為作用依。因為根比較親近，所以這裡是從法的角度來說士用。如果假設人為士用，而不是法，那麼可以類推得知。人對於谷芽來說，人是士用，地、水等是作用。因為作用比人功疏遠。如果依照《瑜伽師地論》第三十八卷，無記因中都有士用，都以地、水等為士用，日照和鋤耕為作用。 論：十真實見依處乃至能助引證。 述曰：指的是一切無漏見，與一切無為有為法作為因。除了見因果自熏成種以外，其餘的都可以看作是此因。以因緣引發屬於引發因中攝。對於無漏有為俱生法，能夠幫助使其同所作，或者使其增長。對於後來的有為無漏，能夠引發，是前法引發后法。能證就是與無為法作為因。這顯示了殊勝的果報。 論：總依此六乃至辨無漏故。 述曰：前面的六個依處是攝受因的本體。因為前五個依處是疏所攝受的。成就辨別三界有漏諸法。如果六個合起來是疏所攝受，那麼就能辨別無漏法。也就是第六個依處不通於有漏法。助成因緣名為攝受。所以排除了因緣，因為因緣是親能生法。所以《對法論》說，如同田地、水、糞等，對於谷芽的生長等。雖然是自身種子所生，但是增加了它的力量，所以稱為攝受因。然而，根據情況，有的是五個，有的是六個。不是所有的有漏法都具備五個等。心和心所的產生都具備五個依處。如果不是心和心所，就沒有這些依處。這裡面的前五個通於無記。

【English Translation】 English version: Now, this view is also commonly adopted, not limited to sentient beings within. However, 'karana' (instrumental cause) and 'kartṛ' (agent cause) are different terms in Sanskrit. In Sanskrit, 'karana' refers to the function of an instrument, while 'kartṛ' refers to the function of an agent, hence the distinction between the two. However, the thirty-eighth fascicle of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra states that all conditions other than the seed are called 'supportive cause (samgraha-hetu),' thus this is merely assisting support, excluding the direct cause (hetu-pratyaya). For example, in the arising of eye consciousness, the eye faculty and the seed serve as the agent cause, while the immediately preceding condition (samanantara-pratyaya) and the object condition (alambana-pratyaya) serve as the instrumental cause. Because the faculty is closer, this is discussed from the perspective of dharma as the agent cause. If we assume a person as the agent cause, rather than a dharma, then we can infer accordingly. For a sprout of grain, the person is the agent cause, while earth, water, etc., are the instrumental cause, because the function is more distant than human effort. If according to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, thirty-eighth fascicle, all indeterminate causes have agent cause, all use earth, water, etc., as the agent cause, and sunlight and tilling as the instrumental cause. Treatise: The ten bases of true seeing, up to the ability to assist and lead to proof. Commentary: This refers to all undefiled seeing, which serves as the cause for all unconditioned and conditioned dharmas. Except for the self-perfuming seeds of the cause and effect of seeing, the rest can be regarded as this cause. The arising through conditions is included in the arising cause. For co-arisen undefiled conditioned dharmas, it can help them to be the same as what is done, or to increase them. For later conditioned undefiled dharmas, it can lead to them, it is the former dharma leading to the latter dharma. The ability to prove is to serve as the cause for unconditioned dharmas. This reveals the excellent result. Treatise: Generally relying on these six, up to distinguishing the undefiled. Commentary: The preceding six bases are the substance of the supportive cause. Because the first five bases are supported by the distant. Accomplishing the discrimination of the defiled dharmas of the three realms. If the six together are supported by the distant, then they can discriminate the undefiled dharmas. That is, the sixth base does not extend to the defiled dharmas. Assisting and accomplishing conditions are called supportive cause. Therefore, the direct cause is excluded, because the direct cause is the one that directly produces the dharma. Therefore, the Abhidharma says, like fields, water, manure, etc., for the growth of grain sprouts, etc. Although it is born from its own seed, it increases its strength, so it is called the supportive cause. However, depending on the situation, there are five or six. Not all defiled dharmas possess five, etc. The arising of mind and mental factors all possess five bases. If it is not mind and mental factors, then there are no these bases. The preceding five in this are common to the indeterminate.

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因。后一非也。隨其所應三性應思。

論。十一隨順依處至無為法故。

述曰。謂三性法通無漏也。現種諸行能隨順同類勝品諸法。同類言。簡異類為因唯望自性。然勝品言。簡自同類與下品為因。大論第五等。云無記與善．染為因。謂本識中各別自種。然望現行亦性同也。即與涅槃亦為因也。同大論等。現引種。種引現。現引現。種引種。皆是此因。此以性論之則狹。以界論之則寬。隨其所應。顯揚等論云。欲界法與三界無漏為因。色界與色界。無色界。無漏法為因。無色與無色。及無漏為因。無漏與無漏為因。不言與下法為因也。果望自類其性必同。界繫有異。

論。十二差別功能依處至自乘果故。

述曰。此唯自性。設他性唯相稱。謂善業定引人．天第八識非惡趣。以相稱故。故非別性不相稱為因。謂自界法與自界為因。自界中自性與自性為因。自性中色與色為因。色中內與內為因。內中長養與長養為因。如是等。及自乘種子望自乘有為無為果亦爾。即凈因也。以界論之則狹。以性論之則寬。其大論等同。果易故不說。謂于有為因能起果。若於無為因能證彼果。差別勢力自性相稱名定。不共他故名異也。

論。十三和合依處至一事業故。

述曰。以前六因為性。不取言說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因。后一（指和合依處）並非如此。應當根據它們各自相應的性質來思考三性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）。

論：十一、隨順依處，乃至無為法故。

述記：意思是說，三性之法普遍能通於無漏法。現行、種子、諸行能夠隨順同類的殊勝品類的諸法。『同類』一詞，是爲了簡別異類作為因，只針對自性而言。然而，『殊勝品』一詞，是爲了簡別同類中作為下品之因的情況。《大論》第五卷等說，無記法可以作為善法、染污法的因，指的是本識中各自不同的種子。然而，就現行而言，其性質也是相同的。也就是說，（現行）與涅槃也可以互為因。《大論》等也這樣認為。現行引生種子，種子引生現行，現行引生現行，種子引生種子，都是這種因。這種因如果從性質上來說就比較狹窄，如果從界限上來說就比較寬泛。『隨其所應』，《顯揚》等論說，欲界法可以作為三界無漏法的因。與，無**。無漏法可以作為因。無色界法可以作為無色界法以及無漏法的因。無漏法可以作為無漏法的因。這裡沒有說作為下法的因。果望向自類，其性質必定相同，只是界繫有所不同。

論：十二、差別功能依處，乃至自乘果故。

述記：這種因唯指自性。即使有他性，也只是相稱而已。比如，善業必定會引生人、天果報，第八識不會引生惡趣果報，因為它們是相稱的。所以，不是同一性質、不相稱的就不能作為因。也就是說，自界法與自界法互為因，自界中自性與自性互為因，自性中色法與色法互為因，色法中內色與內色互為因，內色中長養色與長養色互為因，等等。以及自乘的種子望向自乘的有為、無為果也是如此，也就是清凈因。如果從界限上來說就比較狹窄，如果從性質上來說就比較寬泛。其《大論》等也是相同的。因為果很容易理解，所以這裡就不說了。也就是說，對於有為法，因能夠生起果；對於無為法，因能夠證得那個果。差別勢力，自性相稱，這叫做『定』。不與他法共通，這叫做『異』。

論：十三、和合依處，乃至一事業故。

述記：前面的六種因都是自性，不取言說。

【English Translation】 English version: Cause. The latter one (referring to the co-operative cause) is not so. One should contemplate the three natures (Parikalpita, Paratantra, and Parinishpanna) according to their respective corresponding characteristics.

Treatise: Eleven, the dependent cause, up to the unconditioned dharma.

Commentary: It means that the dharmas of the three natures universally connect to the unconditioned dharmas. Present actions, seeds, and all activities can follow the same kind of superior dharmas. The term 'same kind' is to distinguish different kinds as causes, only referring to self-nature. However, the term 'superior kind' is to distinguish the same kind as the cause of inferior kinds. The fifth volume of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha states that indeterminate dharmas can be the cause of wholesome and defiled dharmas, referring to the different seeds in the base consciousness. However, in terms of present actions, their nature is also the same. That is to say, (present actions) and Nirvana can also be mutual causes. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha also holds this view. Present actions give rise to seeds, seeds give rise to present actions, present actions give rise to present actions, and seeds give rise to seeds, all of which are this kind of cause. This cause is narrower in terms of nature and broader in terms of realms. 'According to their respective corresponding characteristics,' the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states that the dharmas of the desire realm can be the cause of the unconditioned dharmas of the three realms. With, without **. Unconditioned dharmas can be the cause. The dharmas of the formless realm can be the cause of the dharmas of the formless realm and the unconditioned dharmas. Unconditioned dharmas can be the cause of unconditioned dharmas. It does not say that they are the cause of lower dharmas. If the result looks to its own kind, its nature must be the same, only the realms are different.

Treatise: Twelve, the differentiated functional cause, up to the result of one's own vehicle.

Commentary: This cause only refers to self-nature. Even if there is other-nature, it is only corresponding. For example, wholesome karma will definitely lead to the results of humans and gods, and the eighth consciousness will not lead to the results of evil destinies, because they are corresponding. Therefore, those that are not of the same nature and do not correspond cannot be the cause. That is to say, the dharmas of one's own realm are the cause of the dharmas of one's own realm, the self-nature in one's own realm is the cause of self-nature, the form in self-nature is the cause of form, the internal form in form is the cause of internal form, the nourishing form in internal form is the cause of nourishing form, and so on. And the seeds of one's own vehicle looking to the conditioned and unconditioned results of one's own vehicle are also the same, which is the pure cause. If it is said in terms of realms, it is narrower; if it is said in terms of nature, it is broader. The Mahāyāna-saṃgraha and others are the same. Because the result is easy to understand, it is not mentioned here. That is to say, for conditioned dharmas, the cause can give rise to the result; for unconditioned dharmas, the cause can realize that result. Differentiated power, corresponding self-nature, this is called 'definite'. Not common with other dharmas, this is called 'different'.

Treatise: Thirteen, the cooperative cause, up to one activity.

Commentary: The previous six causes are all self-nature, not taking speech.

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。以疏遠故。言說與法不相和合。勢疏遠故不取為性。因既即前。其果亦爾。于生等果約一事業也。因通漏．無漏。一準於前。

論。十四障礙依處至生等事故。

述曰。此相違．不相違中。因通漏．無漏。果亦爾。令有為無漏不生。無為不顯故。然領受。及此後三因。同瑜伽第五。皆言于生．住等果。不言餘者余因狹故。此四寬故。然大論。顯揚但有後三。有于生等之一果言。觀待中無。此中觀待寬彼論唯望情慾作法。其性狹故。三十八唯依于生以明障礙。據勝顯故。六相違中。唯此勝故。亦不違也。此中無記．染．善皆準應知。大乘滅相雖不待因。相違因與後後法為生因。與前法相違名相違因。非與前法滅為因也。

論。十五不障礙依處至生等事故。

述曰。翻于上障礙依處其相可知。

論。如是十因至方便因攝。

述曰。自下第二二因相攝中。有二師別解。初師中二。初引菩薩地。后引有尋等地文。引菩薩地中有三。一引文。二正釋。三立理。引文訖。能生因親。方便因疏。初解與古來大異。第二大同。

論。此說牽引至名生起種。

述曰。下正解之。初解能生。后解方便。言菩薩地說牽引因。除業習氣。及外無記因。生起因中亦爾。亦除業等。彼非因緣故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為疏遠的緣故，言語表達與佛法不能相互協調一致。由於這種疏遠的關係，所以不將言語表達視為自性。原因既然與之前相同，結果也是如此。對於生等果，是從同一事業的角度來說的。因可以是有漏的，也可以是無漏的，都與之前所說的一致。

論：十四種障礙所依賴的處所，乃至生等事故。

述記：在這種相違和不相違的情況中，因可以是有漏的，也可以是無漏的。果也是如此。這是爲了使有為法中的無漏法不生起，無為法不顯現。然而，領受以及此後的三種因，都與《瑜伽師地論》第五卷相同，都說是對於生、住等果，而不說其他的，是因為其他的因比較狹窄，這四種因比較寬泛。然而，《大論》和《顯揚聖教論》中只有后三種因，有對於生等果之一果的說法。觀待因中沒有，這裡所說的觀待因比那些論典中更寬泛，那些論典只是期望情慾作為造作的方法，其性質比較狹窄。三十八種障礙只是依賴於生來闡明障礙，這是根據殊勝之處來顯示的。六種相違因中，只有這種因最為殊勝，也不相違背。這裡所說的無記、染、善等，都應該參照之前的說法來理解。大乘的滅相雖然不依賴於因，但相違因與後後的法作為生因，與前法相違，稱為相違因，而不是與前法的滅作為因。

論：十五種不障礙所依賴的處所，乃至生等事故。

述記：與上面的障礙所依賴的處所相反，其相狀可以知道。

論：像這樣，十種因乃至方便因所攝。

述記：從下面開始，第二部分是兩種因的相攝，有兩種不同的解釋。第一種解釋中分為兩部分。首先引用《菩薩地持經》，然後引用《有尋有伺地》等經文。引用《菩薩地持經》中分為三部分：一、引用經文；二、正式解釋；三、建立道理。引用經文完畢。能生因是親近的，方便因是疏遠的。最初的解釋與古來的解釋大不相同，第二種解釋大體相同。

論：這裡說牽引因乃至名為生起種。

述記：下面正式解釋。首先解釋能生因，然後解釋方便因。說《菩薩地持經》中的牽引因，排除了業的習氣以及外在的無記因。生起因中也是如此，也排除了業等，因為它們不是因緣的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of estrangement, speech and Dharma cannot harmonize. Due to this estrangement, speech is not taken as its own nature. Since the cause is the same as before, the result is also the same. The fruits of arising, etc., are discussed from the perspective of a single activity. Causes can be defiled or undefiled, consistent with what was said before.

Treatise: The fourteen obstacles rely on places, up to the events of arising, etc.

Commentary: In these cases of contradiction and non-contradiction, causes can be defiled or undefiled. The results are also the same. This is to prevent undefiled dharmas in conditioned dharmas from arising, and unconditioned dharmas from manifesting. However, reception and the three causes after it are the same as in the fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, all referring to the fruits of arising, abiding, etc., and not mentioning others, because other causes are narrower, while these four causes are broader. However, the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha and the Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations only have the latter three causes, with statements about one of the fruits of arising, etc. There is no contemplation cause in them; the contemplation cause mentioned here is broader than those treatises, which only expect desire to be a method of creation, its nature being narrower. The thirty-eight obstacles only rely on arising to clarify the obstacles, which is based on the superior aspect. Among the six contradictory causes, only this cause is the most superior and not contradictory. The unspecified, defiled, and virtuous aspects mentioned here should all be understood by referring to the previous statements. Although the cessation aspect of Mahayana does not rely on causes, the contradictory cause and the subsequent dharmas serve as the cause of arising, and being contradictory to the previous dharma is called the contradictory cause, not taking the cessation of the previous dharma as the cause.

Treatise: The fifteen non-obstacles rely on places, up to the events of arising, etc.

Commentary: The opposite of the places where the above obstacles rely, its characteristics can be known.

Treatise: Like this, the ten causes are included in the expedient cause.

Commentary: From below, the second part is the inclusion of the two causes, with two different interpretations. The first interpretation is divided into two parts. First, the Bodhisattvabhūmi is cited, and then the Vitarkavicārabhūmi and other sutras are cited. The citation of the Bodhisattvabhūmi is divided into three parts: 1. citing the text; 2. formally explaining; 3. establishing the principle. The citation of the text is completed. The productive cause is close, and the expedient cause is distant. The initial interpretation is very different from the ancient interpretations, and the second interpretation is largely the same.

Treatise: Here it says that the pulling cause is even called the arising seed.

Commentary: Below is the formal explanation. First, the productive cause is explained, and then the expedient cause is explained. It is said that the pulling cause in the Bodhisattvabhūmi excludes the karmic habit and the external unspecified cause. The same is true in the arising cause, also excluding karma, etc., because they are not the cause and condition.

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問曰何以得知生起因中有業種也。論文二處皆言此因是能生因。不說有增上緣故　答此謂不爾。今亦有文。謂大論第十。彼問若諸支相望無因緣者。何故說言依因緣立十二支也。答依增上緣所攝牽引．生起．引發三因說非有因緣。故知此生起之中亦有非因緣種也。又理準。若未潤種既有業。亦在牽引中。何故已潤業種。非生起因也。又菩薩地等。誰謂彼言生起因是此因也。如此文是。其引發因取種引自種。種引現行。為因緣者。除現引種。及引現行。異姓種。及涅槃等。彼非因緣故。定異因亦爾。唯取為因緣者。除引自乘。及異熟增上。等流果。或亦取引發中現能熏種為因緣者。亦是引發等二能生因攝。下有二釋故。其同事。不相違攝前因。為自體故。即是合六因中諸因緣種未潤已前。亦未成就皆名牽引種。遠牽自果。即牽引因全四因少分。除生起因故。若被潤已去皆名已熟。即生起因全。四因少分。除牽引因。是此生起因。近能生起果故。

何以知者。

論。彼六因中至二位中故。

述曰。六因之中皆有因緣能生所攝。此二種子既是因緣。故六因中有因緣者皆此所攝。若不爾者。即攝因緣不遍盡故。

問既爾現行熏成種亦因緣收。何故此中不攝。亦非盡理故。

論。雖有現起至此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：如何得知生起因中含有業種（karma-bīja，業的種子）呢？論文中的兩處都說這個因是能生因，沒有提到增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣，起主導作用的條件）的緣故。 答：不能這樣說。現在也有經文提到。比如《大論》第十卷中，有人問：如果諸支（aṅga，十二緣起中的各個環節）之間沒有因緣關係，為什麼說依賴因緣而建立十二支呢？回答是：依據增上緣所攝的牽引因（ākarṣaṇa-hetu，引導因）、生起因（utpāda-hetu，生起因）、引發因（nirhāṇa-hetu，引發因）這三種因來說，並非沒有因緣。因此可知，這生起因中也含有非因緣的種子。而且從道理上講，如果未被滋潤的種子已經具有業，也包含在牽引因中，那麼為什麼已被滋潤的業種，就不能是生起因呢？ 此外，在《菩薩地》等論著中，誰說過生起因就是指這個因呢？就像這些經文所說，引發因取種子以引發同類種子，種子引發現行（pratyutpanna，當下生起的行為），作為因緣。除了現行引發種子，以及引發現行的異性種子，以及涅槃（nirvāṇa，寂滅）等等，這些不是因緣的緣故。決定異因也是如此，只取作為因緣的，除了引導自身，以及異熟增上（vipāka-adhipati，異熟果的增上緣），等流果（niṣyanda-phala，等流果，與因相似的果報）。或者也可以說，引發因中，現行能夠熏習種子作為因緣，也屬於引發等二種能生因所攝。下面有二種解釋的緣故。其同事因（sahakāri-hetu，同事因，共同起作用的因），不與前面的因相違背，作為自體。也就是包含在六因（ṣaṭ-hetu，六種因）中的諸因緣種子，在未被滋潤之前，也未成就，都叫做牽引種，遙遠地牽引自身的結果。也就是牽引因的全部和四因（catvāri-hetu，四種因）的少部分，除了生起因的緣故。如果被滋潤之後，都叫做已成熟，也就是生起因的全部和四因的少部分，除了牽引因。這就是生起因，近距離地能夠生起結果的緣故。 憑什麼知道呢？ 論：在六因之中，都含有因緣能生所攝。 述曰：六因之中都含有因緣，能夠生起所攝的法。這兩種種子既然是因緣，所以六因中含有因緣的，都由此所攝。如果不是這樣，那麼所攝的因緣就不夠普遍和完備。 問：既然如此，現行熏習而成的種子也應該被因緣所攝，為什麼這裡沒有包含呢？也不是完全沒有道理的緣故。 論：雖然有現起，到此為止。

【English Translation】 English version Question: How is it known that the utpāda-hetu (生起因, arising cause) contains karma-bīja (業種, seeds of karma)? The treatises state in two places that this cause is a cause of arising, without mentioning adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition). Answer: It is not so. There are also texts that mention it. For example, in the tenth fascicle of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (大論), it is asked: If the aṅgas (支, limbs) have no causal relationship with each other, why is it said that the twelve aṅgas are established based on conditions? The answer is: It is said based on the three causes—ākarṣaṇa-hetu (牽引因, attracting cause), utpāda-hetu (生起因, arising cause), and nirhāṇa-hetu (引發因, producing cause)—that are included within adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition), not that there are no conditions. Therefore, it is known that this arising cause also contains seeds that are not conditions. Moreover, according to reason, if the unmoistened seeds already have karma and are also included in the attracting cause, why cannot the moistened seeds of karma be the arising cause? Furthermore, in treatises such as the Bodhisattvabhūmi (菩薩地), who has said that the arising cause refers to this cause? As these texts say, the nirhāṇa-hetu (引發因, producing cause) takes the seed to produce its own seed, and the seed produces the pratyutpanna (現行, manifest action) as a condition. Except for the manifest action producing the seed, and the dissimilar seed producing the manifest action, and nirvāṇa (涅槃, cessation), etc., these are not conditions. The determinate dissimilar cause is also like this, only taking what is a condition, except for leading to one's own vehicle, and vipāka-adhipati (異熟增上, dominant condition of maturation), niṣyanda-phala (等流果, result of outflow). Or it can also be said that in the nirhāṇa-hetu (引發因, producing cause), the manifest action that can perfume the seed is taken as a condition, and it is also included within the two producing causes of nirhāṇa-hetu (引發因, producing cause), etc. There are two explanations below. The sahakāri-hetu (同事因, accompanying cause) does not contradict the preceding cause, as it is its own nature. That is, the seeds of all conditions within the ṣaṭ-hetu (六因, six causes), before being moistened and not yet accomplished, are all called attracting seeds, remotely attracting their own result. That is, the entirety of the attracting cause and a small part of the catvāri-hetu (四因, four causes), except for the arising cause. If they have been moistened, they are all called matured, which is the entirety of the arising cause and a small part of the four causes, except for the attracting cause. This is the arising cause, which can closely produce the result. How is this known? Treatise: Among the six causes, all contain what is included in the condition that can produce. Commentary: Among the six causes, all contain conditions that can produce the included dharmas. Since these two seeds are conditions, all that contain conditions among the six causes are included by this. If not, then the included conditions would not be universal and complete. Question: Since this is the case, the seeds perfumed by manifest actions should also be included in the conditions. Why are they not included here? It is not entirely without reason. Treatise: Although there is manifest arising, it ends here.

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略不說。

述曰。此問不然。除牽引．生起二因。以此二因唯種子故。如前六因中引發等四因內。現行能生種為因緣者。以多間斷非如種子性恒相續故。此菩薩地略而不說。此就不盡理據一義為言。

又解。

論。或親辨果至穀麥等種。

述曰。即此現行親辨果故。亦名為種生起種攝。近生果故。何以現行亦名種者。此中有例。如假說現行穀麥等種。彼既然此亦爾。此六因中何因所攝。餘四因攝。

上來已解能生因攝訖。自下明所餘因方便因攝。

論。所餘因謂至方便因攝。

述曰。謂第一言說。第二觀待。第五攝受．第九相違全。及前六因中非因緣法。皆是前說未潤生位。已潤熟位二因種余。即說此四全。六少分為方便因。此方便因亦有等無間．所緣緣二種。今就一總言但是增上緣。非無少別。至下當知。

上來已出因顯數相攝。下出于理。

論。非此二種至有因緣種故。

述曰。非此牽引．生起二種。唯屬彼十因中牽引．生起二因全。所以者何。此二之中有非因緣。攝盡便寬。能生是因緣故。余引發等四因中有因緣種故。若唯攝二不攝便狹。

論。非唯彼八至非因緣種故。

述曰。非唯除生起．牽引外八因全皆名所餘因。所以者何。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 略去不說。

述曰：這種提問是不對的。除了牽引因（kṣepahetu，將種子引向結果的因）和生起因（utpādahetu，使種子生長的因）之外，因為這兩種因僅僅是種子。如同前面六因中引發因等四因內，現行（pratyaya，已顯現的行為或現象）能夠產生種子作為因緣的情況，因為多數是間斷的，不像種子那樣恒常相續。所以《菩薩地》中略而不說。這是就未能完全窮盡理據的一種說法。

又一種解釋：

論：或者直接辨別果，乃至穀物、麥子等種子。

述曰：就是說這種現行直接辨別果，因此也名為種子，屬於生起因所攝。因為它接近產生果。為什麼現行也名為種子呢？這裡有一個例子，比如假說現行的穀物、麥子等是種子。既然它們是，那麼現行也是。這六因中屬於哪種因所攝呢？屬於其餘四因所攝。

上面已經解釋了能生因的攝屬完畢。下面說明其餘因，即方便因的攝屬。

論：其餘因，乃至方便因所攝。

述曰：指第一言說因（vacanahetu，通過語言表達的因），第二觀待因（apekṣāhetu，依賴於其他條件的因），第五攝受因（parigrahahetu，接受和支援的因），第九相違全因（virodhahetu，完全相反的因），以及前面六因中非因緣法（hetupratyaya，非直接因緣的法）。這些都是前面所說的未潤生位（anabhisaṃskṛta，未成熟的狀態）和已潤熟位（abhisaṃskṛta，已成熟的狀態）的兩種因之外剩餘的部分。就是說這四種全因和六種少分因是方便因。這種方便因也有等無間緣（samanantarapratyaya，緊隨前一念的因）和所緣緣（ālambanapratyaya，作為對像或條件的因）兩種。現在就總的來說，它只是增上緣（adhipatipratyaya，起主要作用的因），並非沒有少許差別。到下文自然會明白。

上面已經說明了因的顯數相攝。下面從道理上進行說明。

論：不是這兩種因，乃至有因緣種子之故。

述曰：不是這牽引因和生起因，僅僅屬於那十因中的牽引因和生起因的全部。為什麼呢？因為這兩種因之中有非因緣，攝盡就寬泛。能生因是因緣的緣故。其餘引發因等四因中有因緣種子之故。如果僅僅攝屬這兩種因，不攝屬其他因，就狹隘了。

論：不是僅僅那除生起因、牽引因之外的八因全部都名為所餘因。為什麼呢？

【English Translation】 English version: Omitted for brevity.

Statement: This question is incorrect. Apart from the kṣepahetu (cause of attraction, the cause that draws the seed towards the result) and utpādahetu (cause of arising, the cause that makes the seed grow), because these two causes are solely seeds. Like within the four causes such as the udāharaṇahetu (cause of manifestation) in the previous six causes, the pratyaya (manifested action or phenomenon) that can produce seeds as a hetupratyaya (causal condition), because most are intermittent, unlike the constant continuity of seeds. Therefore, it is omitted in the Bodhisattvabhumi. This is a statement based on a perspective that fails to fully exhaust the rationale.

Another explanation:

Treatise: Or directly distinguish the fruit, even seeds like grains and wheat.

Statement: That is to say, this manifested action directly distinguishes the fruit, therefore it is also called a seed, belonging to the category of utpādahetu. Because it is close to producing the fruit. Why is the manifested action also called a seed? Here is an example, such as hypothetically saying that the manifested grains, wheat, etc., are seeds. Since they are, so is the manifested action. Which cause among these six causes does it belong to? It belongs to the remaining four causes.

The explanation of the inclusion of the cause of production is now complete. Below, the remaining causes, namely the inclusion of the upāyahetu (cause of means), are explained.

Treatise: The remaining causes, up to the inclusion of the upāyahetu.

Statement: Refers to the first vacanahetu (cause of speech, the cause expressed through language), the second apekṣāhetu (cause of dependence, the cause that relies on other conditions), the fifth parigrahahetu (cause of acceptance, the cause of acceptance and support), the ninth complete virodhahetu (cause of complete opposition), and the non-hetupratyaya (non-direct causal condition) among the previous six causes. These are all the remaining parts of the two causes of the previously mentioned anabhisaṃskṛta (unmatured state) and abhisaṃskṛta (matured state). That is to say, these four complete causes and six partial causes are upāyahetu. This upāyahetu also has two types: samanantarapratyaya (immediately preceding condition) and ālambanapratyaya (object condition). Now, generally speaking, it is only adhipatipratyaya (dominant condition), not without slight differences. It will be understood naturally in the following text.

The explicit numerical inclusion of the causes has been explained above. Below, the explanation proceeds from the perspective of reason.

Treatise: It is not these two causes, up to the reason of having hetupratyaya seeds.

Statement: It is not that these kṣepahetu and utpādahetu belong solely to the entirety of the kṣepahetu and utpādahetu among those ten causes. Why? Because there are non-hetupratyaya among these two causes, so the inclusion is broad. The cause of production is a hetupratyaya. Therefore, there are hetupratyaya seeds among the remaining four causes such as the udāharaṇahetu. If only these two causes are included, without including other causes, it would be narrow.

Treatise: It is not that all eight causes excluding the utpādahetu and kṣepahetu are called the remaining causes. Why?

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四中有因緣。攝盡便寬。以方便因非因緣故。彼生起．牽引二因中亦有非因緣種。謂業種等。若唯八因名之。所餘不攝便狹。彼有非因緣。方便不攝故。菩薩地文不是盡理。故於此中皆如我說。

次會第五卷尋伺地文。

論。有尋等地至余方便攝。

述曰。于中有三。一牒文。二正解。三立理。此牒彼文。

有尋等者。等有伺等。次下正解。

論。此文意說至自類果故。

述曰。能生因是因緣故。如前所說。六因中若現若種已潤未潤但互為因緣者。是名生起因。皆能生攝。若現若種潤未潤時。皆能生起自類果故。自類果故言顯是因緣種及現行。簡非因緣種及現者。

論。此所餘因皆方便攝。

述曰。方便疏故。此六因中因緣種外。及餘四因全。皆名方便因。疏體同故。

何以知者。

論。非此生起至有因緣種故。

述曰。下立理也。非此尋．伺文生起因屬十因中第四生起因。若唯一生起因者。生起中非因緣法。攝盡便寬。又即彼牽引等五因中。若現。若種。有因緣故。不攝便狹。

論。非唯彼九至有非因緣故。

述曰。非除生起因外彼九因名所餘因。若唯取九。九中亦有因緣。方便疏故。攝九盡便寬。生起之中有非因緣故。方便攝

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 四種因中有因緣，全部包含就顯得寬泛。因為方便因不是因緣的緣故。在生起因和牽引因這兩種因中，也有非因緣的種子，比如業種等。如果只稱八種因為因，那麼剩餘的沒有包含就顯得狹隘，因為其中有非因緣，方便因沒有包含在內。菩薩地的說法不是完全窮盡真理，所以在這裡我都按照我所說的來解釋。

接下來是第五卷尋伺地的文。

論：有尋等地被其餘方便所包含。

述曰：其中有三點：一、標註文；二、正式解釋；三、確立道理。這裡是標註文。

有尋等者：等同於有伺等。接下來是正式解釋。

論：這段文字的意思是說，能生之因是因緣，如同前面所說。六因中，無論是現行還是種子，已潤或未潤，只要互相作為因緣，就叫做生起因，都能被生起因所包含。無論是現行還是種子，潤或未潤時，都能生起自類果的緣故。『自類果故』這句話顯示了是因緣種子和現行，排除了非因緣種子和現行。

論：其餘的因都被方便因所包含。

述曰：因為方便因比較疏遠。這六因中，除了因緣種子之外，其餘的四因全部，都叫做方便因，因為它們的體性疏遠相同。

憑什麼知道呢？

論：不是這個生起因屬於十因中的第四生起因，如果只有生起因，那麼生起因中非因緣法，全部包含就顯得寬泛。而且在牽引等五因中，無論是現行還是種子，都有因緣的緣故，不包含就顯得狹隘。

論：不是除了生起因之外的九因叫做其餘因，如果只取九因，九因中也有因緣，方便因比較疏遠，包含九因就顯得寬泛，生起因之中有非因緣的緣故，被方便因所包含。

【English Translation】 English version Among the four types of causes, if 'hetu-pratyaya' (因緣, direct cause) encompasses everything, it becomes too broad. This is because 'upaya-hetu' (方便因, indirect cause) is not a 'hetu-pratyaya'. Within the two causes of 'utpāda-hetu' (生起因, arising cause) and 'ākarṣaṇa-hetu' (牽引因, attracting cause), there are also seeds that are not 'hetu-pratyaya', such as 'karma-bīja' (業種, seeds of karma). If only eight causes are named as causes, then what remains unincluded becomes too narrow, because there are non-'hetu-pratyaya' within them, and 'upaya-hetu' is not included. The text of the Bodhisattva-bhūmi (菩薩地, Stages of a Bodhisattva) does not fully exhaust the truth, so here I will explain everything according to what I say.

Next is the text of the Vicāra-bhūmi (尋伺地, Investigation Stage) in the fifth fascicle.

Treatise: The 'savitarka-savicāra' (有尋, with investigation) etc. are encompassed by the remaining 'upaya' (方便, expedient means).

Commentary: There are three points here: 1. Annotating the text; 2. Correctly explaining; 3. Establishing the principle. This is annotating the text.

'Savitarka' etc.: 'Etc.' is equivalent to 'savicāra' (有伺, with analysis) etc. Next is the formal explanation.

Treatise: The meaning of this text is that the cause that can produce is 'hetu-pratyaya', as mentioned earlier. Among the six causes, whether it is 'vartamāna' (現行, present) or 'bīja' (種子, seed), 'siktā' (已潤, moistened) or 'asiktā' (未潤, unmoistened), as long as they mutually act as 'hetu-pratyaya', it is called 'utpāda-hetu', and can be encompassed by 'utpāda-hetu'. Whether it is 'vartamāna' or 'bīja', when moistened or unmoistened, it can produce the 'svajāti-phala' (自類果, fruit of its own kind). The phrase 'svajāti-phala' indicates that it is 'hetu-pratyaya-bīja' and 'vartamāna', excluding non-'hetu-pratyaya-bīja' and 'vartamāna'.

Treatise: The remaining causes are all encompassed by 'upaya'.

Commentary: Because 'upaya' is more distant. Among these six causes, except for 'hetu-pratyaya-bīja', all of the remaining four causes are called 'upaya-hetu', because their nature of being distant is the same.

How is this known?

Treatise: It is not that this 'utpāda-hetu' belongs to the fourth 'utpāda-hetu' among the ten causes. If there is only 'utpāda-hetu', then the non-'hetu-pratyaya-dharma' within 'utpāda-hetu', if everything is included, it becomes too broad. Moreover, within the five causes such as 'ākarṣaṇa', whether it is 'vartamāna' or 'bīja', there is 'hetu-pratyaya', so not including it becomes too narrow.

Treatise: It is not that the nine causes other than 'utpāda-hetu' are called the remaining causes. If only the nine causes are taken, there is also 'hetu-pratyaya' within the nine causes. 'Upaya' is more distant, so including the nine causes becomes too broad. Within 'utpāda-hetu', there is non-'hetu-pratyaya', which is encompassed by 'upaya'.

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便不盡亦太狹。若因緣唯攝生起。即攝增上業種太寬。若不攝餘五因緣。五因緣不盡太狹。若方便定攝九因。即五因中有因緣者。亦方便攝是太寬失。不攝生起業種是太狹失。故知文勢如我所解。此中影略。但以攝不盡。太狹為解而影取寬。上皆準知　問何以菩薩地因緣分二。能生因亦名牽引種。雖有二名猶攝現行因緣不盡。尋伺地一生起因即攝現．種俱盡　答約潤．未潤唯約種論。故須分二。能起于果體是因緣。不分潤與未潤故。尋伺地唯一生起。亦無違也。此第一師辨訖。

論。或菩薩地至即彼餘八。

述曰。第二師中釋二文為二解。一一中又二。初正解。后釋難。此初也。菩薩地所說二種種子。即十因中彼牽引．生起二因如名所攝。所餘諸因。即十因中餘八所攝。

下自釋難。

論。雖二因內至勝顯故偏說。

述曰。牽引．生起二因之內。雖復亦有非能生因。以業種等非能生故。此二因中因緣種子。一親辨體。二受果無盡。勝故偏說是能生因。不說增上業種所攝。

論。雖余因內至多顯故偏說。

述曰。雖八因內四因中有非方便因。謂因緣種等。以四因全四少分中增上多故。論乃偏說是方便因。即前能生因隱增上者。後方便因隱因緣者。俱不明故為不盡理也。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 便不盡亦太狹：如果因緣只包含生起，那麼包含增上業種就太寬泛了。如果不包含其餘五種因緣，那麼五種因緣就不完整，就太狹隘了。如果方便完全包含九因，那麼五因中屬於因緣的，也被方便包含，這太寬泛了，是一種錯誤。不包含生起業種，這又太狹隘了，也是一種錯誤。所以要知道文句的含義就像我所理解的那樣。這裡有所省略，只用『包含不完整』、『太狹隘』來解釋，而省略了『寬泛』。以上情況都可以類推得知。問：為什麼《菩薩地》中因緣分為兩種？能生因也叫做牽引種。雖然有兩個名稱，仍然不能完全包含現行因緣。尋伺地中的一生起因就完全包含了現行和種子。答：根據潤和未潤來區分，只針對種子來討論，所以需要分為兩種。能夠產生果實的本體是因緣，不區分潤和未潤，所以尋伺地只有一生起因，也沒有矛盾。這是第一位論師的辨析。

論：或者《菩薩地》乃至即彼餘八。

述曰：第二位論師將兩段文字解釋為兩種理解，每一種理解又分為兩種。這是第一種。菩薩地所說的兩種種子，就是十因中的牽引因和生起因，正如名稱所包含的。其餘的各種因，就是十因中剩餘的八種所包含的。

下面是自我解釋困難。

論：雖然二因內乃至勝顯故偏說。

述曰：牽引因和生起因之內，雖然也包含非能生因，因為業種等不是能生因。這兩種因中的因緣種子，一是親自辨別本體，二是接受果實沒有窮盡。因為殊勝明顯，所以偏重說是能生因，而不說增上業種所包含的。

論：雖然余因內乃至多顯故偏說。

述曰：雖然八因內，四因中包含非方便因，比如因緣種等。因為在四因全部和四因少部分中，增上佔多數，所以論中偏重說是方便因。前面能生因隱藏了增上，後面方便因隱藏了因緣，都是因為不明顯，所以是不完整的道理。

【English Translation】 English version It would be incomplete and too narrow: If 'hetu-pratyaya' (因緣, cause and condition) only includes arising, then including 'adhipati-karana-bija' (增上業種, dominant causal seed) would be too broad. If it does not include the remaining five 'pratyayas' (因緣, conditions), then the five 'pratyayas' would be incomplete and too narrow. If 'upanaya' (方便, expedient) completely includes the nine 'hetus' (因, causes), then among the five 'hetus', those that belong to 'hetu-pratyaya' are also included in 'upanaya', which is too broad and a mistake. Not including 'utpadaka-karana-bija' (生起業種, arising causal seed) is too narrow and also a mistake. Therefore, one should know that the meaning of the text is as I understand it. There is some omission here, only using 'incomplete inclusion' and 'too narrow' to explain, while omitting 'broad'. The above situations can be inferred analogously. Question: Why are 'hetu-pratyaya' divided into two in the Bodhisattvabhumi (菩薩地, Stages of a Bodhisattva)? 'Nisyanda-hetu' (能生因, outflowing cause) is also called 'karshana-bija' (牽引種, attracting seed). Although there are two names, it still cannot completely include the manifest 'hetu-pratyaya'. The single 'utpada-hetu' (一生起因, single arising cause) in the Vicaraka-bhumi (尋伺地, Investigation Stage) completely includes both the manifest and the seed. Answer: Distinguishing based on moistened and unmoistened is only discussed in relation to the seed, so it needs to be divided into two. The entity that can produce the fruit is 'hetu-pratyaya', without distinguishing between moistened and unmoistened, so the Vicaraka-bhumi only has a single 'utpada-hetu', and there is no contradiction. This is the analysis of the first teacher.

Treatise: Or the Bodhisattvabhumi even includes the remaining eight.

Commentary: The second teacher interprets the two passages as two understandings, each of which is further divided into two. This is the first. The two types of seeds mentioned in the Bodhisattvabhumi are the 'karshana-hetu' and 'utpada-hetu' among the ten 'hetus', as the names imply. The remaining various 'hetus' are included in the remaining eight among the ten 'hetus'.

The following is a self-explanation of the difficulty.

Treatise: Although within the two 'hetus', even the excellent and manifest are particularly mentioned.

Commentary: Within the 'karshana-hetu' and 'utpada-hetu', although there are also non-'nisyanda-hetus', because 'karma-bija' (業種, karma seeds) etc. are not 'nisyanda-hetus'. Among these two 'hetus', the 'hetu-pratyaya-bija' (因緣種子, cause and condition seed), firstly, personally distinguishes the entity, and secondly, receiving the fruit is inexhaustible. Because it is excellent and manifest, it is particularly said to be a 'nisyanda-hetu', and it is not said to be included in the 'adhipati-karana-bija'.

Treatise: Although within the remaining 'hetus', even the many and manifest are particularly mentioned.

Commentary: Although within the eight 'hetus', the four 'hetus' include non-'upanaya-hetus', such as 'hetu-pratyaya-bija' etc. Because 'adhipati' (增上, dominant) occupies the majority in the entirety of the four 'hetus' and a small part of the four 'hetus', the treatise particularly says it is 'upanaya-hetu'. The former 'nisyanda-hetu' hides 'adhipati', and the latter 'upanaya-hetu' hides 'hetu-pratyaya', both are because they are not obvious, so it is an incomplete principle.

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論。有尋等地至即彼餘九。

述曰。下文亦二。準前應知。彼說生起因。即十因中第四生起因攝。余因之言餘九因也。

何以爾者。

論。雖生起中至親顯故便說。

述曰。下釋難云。生起之因雖有業種等非因緣攝。以對牽引因已潤故。是近得果。就自因中名言種子與果同性。以是親顯故偏說之。略牽引因。及自因中業種不說。偏說生起因是能生因。以已潤竟方名生起。故望牽引為近也。

論。雖牽引中至親隱故不說。

述曰。雖知菩薩地牽引因。亦有因緣種是能生因。而望生起是遠。未被潤故。作惡不即受。故疏遠故。即業種顯。親名言種相貌隱故。遂不說其因緣種子。而說業種為牽引故。不說牽引因也。理亦無違。

論。余方便攝準上應知。

述曰。雖餘四因中亦有因緣。而四因全。五因少分。是方便攝。如上增上多故。偏說非能生因。實理亦是文不盡理。

第三以四緣依十五處。及攝十因．二因。

論。所說四緣至十因二因。

述曰。卷初標云四緣依十五處。義差別故立為十因。上來雖有二文。但依十五處立十因。十因．二因相攝。未明依十五處立四緣。及十因．二因相攝。故有此問。于中初問。次答。答中先答緣依處。后辨與因相

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本

論：有尋有伺地等，乃至就是那其餘的九種（因）。 述記：下面的文字也分為兩部分，按照前面的方式理解即可。前面所說的生起因，就是十因中的第四個生起因所包含的。『其餘因』的說法，指的是其餘的九種因。 為什麼這樣說呢？ 論：雖然在生起因中，（名言種子）因為最親近、明顯，所以特別說明。 述記：下面解釋疑問說，生起之因雖然有業種等，但不是因緣所包含的。因為它相對於牽引因來說，已經被滋潤了，是接近獲得果報的。就自身的原因來說，名言種子與果報同性，因為這種親近和明顯，所以特別說明它。省略了牽引因，以及自身原因中的業種沒有說明。偏重說明生起因是能生之因，因為它已經被滋潤完畢才叫做生起。所以相對於牽引因來說，它更近。 論：雖然在牽引因中，（業種）因為最親近但隱晦，所以沒有說明。 述記：雖然知道菩薩地的牽引因，也有因緣種子是能生之因，但是相對於生起因來說，它比較遙遠，因為還沒有被滋潤。作惡不是立刻就受到報應，所以比較疏遠。就是業種顯現，親近的名言種子的相貌隱晦，所以沒有說明其中的因緣種子，而說業種是牽引因。不說牽引因也是沒有違背道理的。 論：其餘的方便所包含的，按照上面的方式理解即可。 述記：雖然其餘的四因中也有因緣，但是四因全部，五因少部分，是方便所包含的。像上面的增上因一樣，因為增上作用多，所以偏重說明它不是能生之因。實際上道理也是文字沒有完全表達出來。 第三，用四緣依靠十五處，以及包含十因、二因。 論：所說的四緣，乃至十因二因。 述記：卷首標明四緣依靠十五處。因為意義差別，所以建立為十因。上面雖然有兩段文字，但是依據十五處建立十因。十因、二因相互包含。沒有明確依據十五處建立四緣，以及十因、二因相互包含。所以有這個提問。其中先提問，然後回答。回答中先回答緣依靠的處所，然後辨析與因的關係。

【English Translation】 English version

Treatise: The plane of existence with initial and sustained application of mind, etc., up to and including the remaining nine (causes). Commentary: The following text is also divided into two parts, to be understood in the same way as before. The previously mentioned cause of arising is included within the fourth cause of arising among the ten causes. The statement 'remaining causes' refers to the remaining nine causes. Why is this so? Treatise: Although within the cause of arising, (the seed of verbal expression) is specifically explained because it is the closest and most evident. Commentary: The following explains the question, saying that although the cause of arising includes karmic seeds, etc., it is not included within the conditions. This is because, relative to the attracting cause, it has already been moistened and is close to obtaining the result. In terms of its own cause, the seed of verbal expression is of the same nature as the result. Because of this closeness and clarity, it is specifically explained. The attracting cause is omitted, and the karmic seeds within its own cause are not mentioned. Emphasis is placed on explaining the cause of arising as the cause that can produce, because it is called arising only after it has been completely moistened. Therefore, it is closer relative to the attracting cause. Treatise: Although within the attracting cause, (the karmic seed) is not explained because it is the closest but obscure. Commentary: Although it is known that the attracting cause of the Bodhisattva ground also has conditional seeds that are the cause that can produce, it is more distant relative to the cause of arising because it has not yet been moistened. Doing evil does not immediately result in retribution, so it is more distant. That is, the karmic seed is manifest, while the appearance of the close seed of verbal expression is obscure. Therefore, the conditional seeds within it are not explained, and the karmic seed is said to be the attracting cause. Not explaining the attracting cause is also not contrary to reason. Treatise: The remaining that are included by expedient means should be understood according to the above. Commentary: Although there are also conditions within the remaining four causes, all of the four causes and a small part of the five causes are included by expedient means. Like the above-mentioned augmenting cause, because the augmenting function is greater, emphasis is placed on explaining that it is not the cause that can produce. In reality, the principle is that the text does not fully express the principle. Third, using the four conditions relying on the fifteen locations, and including the ten causes and two causes. Treatise: The mentioned four conditions, up to the ten causes and two causes. Commentary: The beginning of the volume indicates that the four conditions rely on the fifteen locations. Because of the difference in meaning, they are established as the ten causes. Although there are two passages above, the ten causes are established based on the fifteen locations. The ten causes and two causes are mutually inclusive. It is not clear that the four conditions are established based on the fifteen locations, and that the ten causes and two causes are mutually inclusive. Therefore, this question is asked. Among them, the question is asked first, and then answered. In the answer, the place where the conditions rely is answered first, and then the relationship with the causes is analyzed.

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攝。

論。論說因緣至立增上。

述曰。初中有二。初引文后正解。此引瑜伽第五。顯揚十八皆同。

論。此中種子至因緣種攝。

述曰。下解有二。初解因緣依處。后解中二緣依處。于中各有二師釋之。所言種子是因緣者。即十五依處中第三習氣．第四有潤種子．第十一隨順．十二差別功能．十三和合．十五不障礙．合六依處中。除其現行因緣種攝。即前所說六因依處種子是因緣故。

論。雖現四處至此略不說。

述曰。上解本文。下釋不盡。但言種子不說現故。雖除第三．四兩依處。外餘四依處亦有現行是因緣者。而多間斷。此略不說是因緣攝。但言種子是因緣故。

論。或彼亦能至亦立種名。

述曰。又解除牽引．生起。四中現行能為因緣者。亦是此中種子言攝。親辨自果故。喻如前解。此釋彼文將為盡理。

論。或種子言至取捨如前。

述曰。第二師解。此種子言。唯屬十五依處之中。第四有潤種子依處。以有種子言故。此有潤中不簡去業。不攝習氣中因緣種。及四依處中因緣者。取捨如前攝二因等。此師意解。約生起親近故不說余。因緣種顯不說業等。以牽引等遠疏等別故。略而不說。即以此文為不盡理。

論。言無間滅至二緣義故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 攝（Samgraha）：總括，包含。

論（Shastra）：論述。論述因緣直到建立增上緣。

述曰：最初的部分分為兩部分。首先引用經文，然後正式解釋。這裡引用《瑜伽師地論》第五卷和《顯揚聖教論》第十八卷，內容相同。

論：這裡所說的種子直到因緣種子都屬於攝。

述曰：下面的解釋分為兩部分。首先解釋因緣的依據之處，然後解釋中間兩種緣的依據之處。其中每部分都有兩位論師的解釋。所說的種子是因緣，指的是十五種依處中的第三種習氣（Vasana，業習氣）、第四種有潤種子（Snehana-bija，具有滋潤性的種子）、第十一種隨順（Anuloma，順應性）、第十二種差別功能（Vishesa-karitra，特殊功能）、第十三種和合（Samanvaya，協調性）、第十五種不障礙（Avighata，無障礙性），總共六種依處中，除去現行，都屬於因緣種子所攝。也就是前面所說的六因依處，種子就是因緣。

論：即使是現行四處，這裡也略而不說。

述曰：上面解釋了本文，下面解釋不完全的地方。只是說了種子而沒有說現行。即使除去第三、第四兩種依處，其餘四種依處也有現行是因緣的情況，但因為多有間斷，所以這裡略而不說，認為屬於因緣所攝。只是說種子是因緣。

論：或者它們也能建立種子的名稱。

述曰：又解釋了牽引、生起。四種現行能夠作為因緣的，也屬於這裡種子所包含的範圍，因為它們能夠親自分辨自己的結果。比喻如同前面的解釋。這種解釋將本文視為窮盡真理。

論：或者種子這個詞，取捨如同前面所說。

述曰：第二位論師的解釋。這裡的種子這個詞，僅僅屬於十五種依處中的第四種有潤種子依處。因為有種子這個詞。這種有潤種子不排除業，也不包括習氣中的因緣種子，以及四種依處中的因緣，取捨如同前面所說，包括兩種因等等。這位論師的理解是，考慮到生起的親近性，所以沒有說其他的。因緣種子顯現，所以沒有說業等等。因為牽引等等有遠疏等等的區別，所以省略而不說。也就是認為本文沒有窮盡真理。

論：說到無間滅，是因為兩種緣的意義。

【English Translation】 English version Samgraha: (Samgraha) To summarize, to include.

Shastra: (Shastra) Treatise. Discussing the causes and conditions up to the establishment of Adhipati-pratyaya (Dominant condition).

Commentary: The initial part is divided into two sections. First, quoting the text, and then providing a formal explanation. Here, it cites the fifth volume of 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' and the eighteenth volume of 'Asanga's Compendium of Determinations', which contain the same content.

Treatise: Here, the 'seed' up to the 'seed of cause and condition' are all included in 'Samgraha'.

Commentary: The following explanation is divided into two parts. First, explaining the basis of causes and conditions, and then explaining the basis of the two intermediate conditions. Each part has explanations from two masters. The 'seed' that is referred to as a cause and condition refers to the third Vasana (habitual tendencies), the fourth Snehana-bija (seed with moisture), the eleventh Anuloma (conformity), the twelfth Vishesa-karitra (distinctive function), the thirteenth Samanvaya (coordination), and the fifteenth Avighata (non-obstruction) among the fifteen bases. In total, among the six bases, excluding the present manifestation, all are included in the 'seed of cause and condition'. That is, the six causal bases mentioned earlier, where the seed is the cause and condition.

Treatise: Even the four present manifestations are briefly not mentioned here.

Commentary: The above explains the main text, and the following explains the incomplete parts. It only mentions the seed and does not mention the present manifestation. Even if the third and fourth bases are excluded, the remaining four bases also have present manifestations that are causes and conditions, but because they are often interrupted, they are briefly not mentioned here, considering them to be included in the cause and condition. It only says that the seed is the cause and condition.

Treatise: Or they can also establish the name of the seed.

Commentary: It also explains attraction and arising. The four present manifestations that can serve as causes and conditions are also included in the scope of the seed here, because they can personally distinguish their own results. The analogy is like the previous explanation. This explanation regards the text as exhausting the truth.

Treatise: Or the term 'seed', acceptance and rejection are as mentioned earlier.

Commentary: The explanation of the second master. The term 'seed' here only belongs to the fourth Snehana-bija (seed with moisture) base among the fifteen bases. Because there is the term 'seed'. This 'seed with moisture' does not exclude karma, nor does it include the seed of cause and condition in Vasana (habitual tendencies), as well as the cause and condition in the four bases. Acceptance and rejection are as mentioned earlier, including the two causes, etc. This master's understanding is that, considering the proximity of arising, other things are not mentioned. The seed of cause and condition is manifested, so karma, etc., are not mentioned. Because attraction, etc., have differences in distance, etc., they are omitted and not mentioned. That is, it is considered that the text does not exhaust the truth.

Treatise: Speaking of immediate cessation is because of the meaning of the two conditions.

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。

述曰。上解因緣。下解中二。此即是前第一師義。彼二處言意顯。但是此二緣者。非唯第五無間滅處．第六境界依處所攝。其餘領受．及下和合．不障礙處三依處中。亦皆有此二緣義故。觀待待境心等得生。餘二合前以為體故。即以此文而為盡理。

論。或唯五六至略不說之。

述曰。此即是前第二師說。二緣依處唯彼第五．第六依處。非餘三依處。餘三雖有此二緣依處。以相隱而復少故不說之。此二處全。名亦顯故。論但說二隱余少者略不說也。即以此文為不盡理。依所餘立增上。易故略不說之。隨前所應盡理不盡。除三之餘皆增上故。

論。論說因緣至攝受因攝。

述曰。此下即答四緣．十因．二因相攝。此中合作十因．二因攝也。于中有二。初引文。后正解。三十八說。因緣即是能生因攝。增上緣者即方便因。中間等無間。及所緣緣。此之二緣攝受因攝。此中別疏攝受因攝上二緣。自餘九因二緣所攝理準可成故論不說。但以攝受之中二緣相顯所以偏說。非方便內不攝二緣。觀待．同事．不相違。方便攝故。又已辨二因與十因相攝。但言能生是因緣。方便是增上。中二是攝受。即顯二因中方便攝三緣。能生攝因緣。義亦兼顯十因中六少分是因緣攝。一因少分是中二謂攝受。或

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

窺基法師述曰：上面解釋了因緣，下面解釋了中二緣。這實際上是前面第一位法師的觀點。那兩個地方的含義很明顯。但是這兩個緣，不僅僅是第五無間滅處（指意識的滅盡狀態）和第六境界依處（指意識所依賴的境界）所包含的。其餘的領受，以及下面的和合、不障礙處這三個依處中，也都有這兩個緣的含義。觀待于所待的境界和心等才能產生。其餘兩個緣和前面的緣合在一起作為本體，所以用這段文字作為最徹底的解釋。

玄奘法師論曰：或者只說五、六依處，其餘的就省略不說了。

窺基法師述曰：這實際上是前面第二位法師的說法。兩個緣的依處只有第五和第六依處，不是其餘三個依處。其餘三個依處雖然有這兩個緣的依處，但因為相狀隱蔽而且數量少，所以不說。這兩個依處是完整的，名稱也很明顯，所以論中只說這兩個，而隱蔽且數量少的就省略不說了。就用這段文字作為不徹底的解釋。依靠其餘的依處建立增上緣，容易理解，所以省略不說了。根據前面所說的，應該徹底解釋的就徹底解釋，不徹底的就不徹底解釋。除了三個依處之外，其餘的都是增上緣的緣故。

玄奘法師論曰：論中說因緣是能生因所攝，增上緣是方便因所攝，中間的等無間緣和所緣緣，這兩個緣是攝受因所攝。

窺基法師述曰：下面回答四緣、十因、二因之間的相互包含關係。這裡應該說是十因、二因的包含關係。其中分為兩部分，首先是引用經文，然後是正式解釋。《瑜伽師地論》第三十八卷說，因緣就是能生因所攝，增上緣就是方便因所攝，中間的等無間緣和所緣緣，這兩個緣是攝受因所攝。這裡特別疏解了攝受因包含上面的兩個緣，其餘的九因被兩個緣所包含的道理可以類推得知，所以論中沒有說。只是因為在攝受因中，兩個緣的相狀明顯，所以特別說明。並非方便因不包含兩個緣，觀待、同事、不相違，都是方便因所包含的。又已經辨明了二因和十因之間的相互包含關係，只說能生是因緣，方便是增上緣，中間兩個是攝受緣，就顯明瞭二因中方便因包含三個緣，能生因包含因緣，含義也兼帶顯明瞭十因中六個因的小部分是因緣所攝，一個因的小部分是中間兩個緣，也就是攝受緣。

【English Translation】 English version:

Shu Yue (Commentary): The above explains Hetu-pratyaya (causal condition), and the following explains the two intermediate conditions. This is actually the view of the first teacher mentioned earlier. The meanings in those two places are clear. However, these two conditions are not only included in the fifth Anantaranirodha-sthana (place of cessation without interval, referring to the state of complete cessation of consciousness) and the sixth Alambana-asraya-sthana (place of dependence on the object, referring to the object on which consciousness relies). The remaining Vedana (feeling), and the following Samagree (harmony) and Avighata-sthana (place of non-obstruction), these three Asraya-sthanas (dependent places) also contain the meaning of these two conditions. Dependent on the object and mind, etc., can arise. The remaining two conditions are combined with the previous conditions as the substance, so this passage is used as the most thorough explanation.

Lun Yue (Treatise): Or only the fifth and sixth Asraya-sthanas are mentioned, and the rest are omitted.

Shu Yue (Commentary): This is actually the statement of the second teacher mentioned earlier. The dependent places of the two conditions are only the fifth and sixth Asraya-sthanas, not the remaining three Asraya-sthanas. Although the remaining three Asraya-sthanas have the dependent places of these two conditions, they are not mentioned because their appearances are hidden and their number is small. These two places are complete, and their names are also clear, so the treatise only mentions these two, and omits those that are hidden and small in number. This passage is used as an incomplete explanation. Relying on the remaining places to establish Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition) is easy to understand, so it is omitted. According to what was said earlier, what should be thoroughly explained is thoroughly explained, and what is not thorough is not thoroughly explained. Except for the three places, the rest are all due to Adhipati-pratyaya.

Lun Yue (Treatise): The treatise says that Hetu-pratyaya (causal condition) is included in Janaka-hetu (productive cause), Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition) is included in Upaya-hetu (expedient cause), and the intermediate Samanantaranirodha-pratyaya (immediately preceding condition) and Alambana-pratyaya (object condition), these two conditions are included in Samgraha-hetu (receptive cause).

Shu Yue (Commentary): The following answers the mutual inclusion relationship between the four conditions, ten causes, and two causes. Here it should be said that it is the inclusion relationship between the ten causes and the two causes. It is divided into two parts, first quoting the scriptures, and then formally explaining. The thirty-eighth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that Hetu-pratyaya (causal condition) is included in Janaka-hetu (productive cause), Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition) is included in Upaya-hetu (expedient cause), and the intermediate Samanantaranirodha-pratyaya (immediately preceding condition) and Alambana-pratyaya (object condition), these two conditions are included in Samgraha-hetu (receptive cause). Here, it is specifically explained that Samgraha-hetu (receptive cause) includes the above two conditions, and the principle that the remaining nine causes are included in the two conditions can be inferred, so it is not mentioned in the treatise. It is only because the appearances of the two conditions are clear in Samgraha-hetu (receptive cause), so it is specifically explained. It is not that Upaya-hetu (expedient cause) does not include the two conditions, Pratitya (dependence), Sahakarin (co-worker), and Aviruddha (non-contradiction) are all included in Upaya-hetu (expedient cause). Furthermore, the mutual inclusion relationship between the two causes and the ten causes has already been clarified, only saying that Janaka (productive) is Hetu-pratyaya (causal condition), Upaya (expedient) is Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition), and the two intermediate ones are Samgraha-pratyaya (receptive condition), which shows that Upaya-hetu (expedient cause) in the two causes includes three conditions, and Janaka-hetu (productive cause) includes Hetu-pratyaya (causal condition), and the meaning also implicitly shows that a small part of the six causes in the ten causes is included in Hetu-pratyaya (causal condition), and a small part of one cause is the two intermediate conditions, which is Samgraha-pratyaya (receptive condition).

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兼觀待．同事．不相違亦有二緣。論唯說攝受以顯故。余是增上緣理已成立。文言略也。

論。雖方便內至故此偏說。

述曰。今釋彼文為不盡理。若準方便攝余因盡。有非增上者。以等無間。及所緣緣。是方便攝故。以增上緣攝因多故。謂除觀待．同事．不相違少分余皆增上。偏說方便是增上緣。此約不相亂增上緣體解。若相亂體。以餘二緣亦增上故。皆方便攝。若不爾者。不說能生。是增上故。顯方便中具三緣也。

論。余因亦有至顯故偏說。

述曰。十因之中。則六因內是因緣者。皆能生因。四緣之中因緣所攝。領受．攝受．同事．不相違因中等無間緣。是方便因中等無間緣攝。領受．攝受．同事．不相違中所緣緣。皆方便中所緣緣攝。雖此領受等四因之內。亦有中間等無間緣。及所緣緣。此於四緣位居中故。然攝受中。以有二依處名．體全顯故偏說之。余無名．體依處全二緣者。故略不說。

論。初能生攝進退如前。

述曰。然能生因是因緣者。或說六因。或說二因。且依菩薩地。若通取六名進。若唯取二名退。或取六中唯取種子是能生因。攝現不盡名之為退。若並取現名之為進。依有尋等地。若取六因名之為進。唯取一因名之為退。今此通說。皆如前說。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 兼顧觀待因（hetu-pratyaya，指事物之間相互依存的關係），同事因（sahakāri-hetu，指共同起作用的因），不相違因（avirodha-hetu，指不互相沖突的因），也有兩種緣。論中只說攝受因（parigraha-hetu，指接受和支援的因），是爲了顯明這個道理。其餘的因是增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya，指起主要作用的條件），這個道理已經成立，只是文辭上省略了。

論：雖然方便因（upanaya-hetu，指引導和促成的因）包含內在的因素，所以這裡偏重說明。

述曰：現在解釋這段文字，認為它沒有完全說明道理。如果按照方便因來概括，其餘的因就都包括在內了。有些不是增上緣，因為等無間緣（samanantara-pratyaya，指緊接著前一念而生起的條件）和所緣緣（alambana-pratyaya，指作為認識對象的條件）都屬於方便因。因為增上緣所包含的因很多，除了觀待因、同事因、不相違因這少部分之外，其餘的都是增上緣。偏重說明方便因是增上緣，這是從不相混淆的增上緣的本體來理解的。如果是相混淆的本體，因為其餘兩種緣也是增上緣，所以都屬於方便因。如果不是這樣，不說能生因（janaka-hetu，指能夠產生結果的因）是增上緣，就不能顯明方便因中具備三種緣。

論：其餘的因也有，是爲了顯明這個道理，所以偏重說明。

述曰：在十因之中，六因之內是因緣（hetu-pratyaya）的，都是能生因。在四緣之中，因緣所攝的，領受因（pratilabdhi-hetu，指領受結果的因）、攝受因、同事因、不相違因中的等無間緣，是方便因中的等無間緣所攝。領受因、攝受因、同事因、不相違因中所緣緣，都是方便因中所緣緣所攝。雖然這領受等四因之內，也有中間的等無間緣和所緣緣，這在四緣的位置居於中間，然而在攝受因中，因為有名和體，以及所依據的處所，都完全顯明，所以偏重說明它。其餘沒有名和體，以及所依據的處所都完全具備這兩種緣的，所以簡略地不說。

論：最初的能生因，包含進和退，如同前面所說。

述曰：然而能生因是因緣的，或者說六因，或者說二因。且依據《菩薩地持經》，如果全部取六因，就叫做進；如果只取二因，就叫做退。或者取六因中只取種子是能生因，沒有完全包含現行，就叫做退；如果並取現行，就叫做進。依據有尋有伺地等，如果取六因，就叫做進；只取一因，就叫做退。現在這裡通盤來說，都如同前面所說。

論：

【English Translation】 English version 'Concurrent observation-dependent cause' (apekṣā-hetu), 'co-operative cause' (sahakāri-hetu), and 'non-contradictory cause' (avirodha-hetu) also have two conditions. The treatise only speaks of 'embracing cause' (parigraha-hetu) to make it clear. The remaining are 'dominant condition' (adhipati-pratyaya), the principle has already been established. The text is abbreviated.

Treatise: Although 'expedient cause' (upanaya-hetu) includes internal factors, it is emphasized here.

Commentary: Now, explaining this text, it is considered that it does not fully explain the principle. If according to 'expedient cause' to encompass, the remaining causes are all included. Some are not 'dominant condition', because 'immediately preceding condition' (samanantara-pratyaya) and 'object-condition' (alambana-pratyaya) are included in 'expedient cause'. Because 'dominant condition' includes many causes, except for 'observation-dependent cause', 'co-operative cause', and 'non-contradictory cause', the rest are 'dominant condition'. Emphasizing that 'expedient cause' is 'dominant condition' is understood from the perspective of the unconfused entity of 'dominant condition'. If it is a confused entity, because the other two conditions are also 'dominant condition', they all belong to 'expedient cause'. If not, not saying that 'generative cause' (janaka-hetu) is 'dominant condition' does not reveal that 'expedient cause' possesses three conditions.

Treatise: The remaining causes also exist, to make this principle clear, so it is emphasized.

Commentary: Among the ten causes, within the six causes that are 'causal condition' (hetu-pratyaya), all are 'generative cause'. Among the four conditions, those encompassed by 'causal condition', 'receiving cause' (pratilabdhi-hetu), 'embracing cause', 'co-operative cause', and 'non-contradictory cause', the 'immediately preceding condition' is encompassed by the 'immediately preceding condition' within 'expedient cause'. The 'object-condition' within 'receiving cause', 'embracing cause', 'co-operative cause', and 'non-contradictory cause' are all encompassed by the 'object-condition' within 'expedient cause'. Although within these four causes such as 'receiving cause', there are also intermediate 'immediately preceding condition' and 'object-condition', which are in the middle position of the four conditions, however, in 'embracing cause', because the name and entity, as well as the place of reliance, are all fully revealed, it is emphasized. The remaining ones that do not have the name and entity, as well as the place of reliance, fully possessing these two conditions, are briefly not mentioned.

Treatise: The initial 'generative cause' includes progress and regress, as mentioned before.

Commentary: However, the 'generative cause' that is 'causal condition', either speaks of six causes, or speaks of two causes. And according to the Bodhisattvabhumi, if all six causes are taken, it is called progress; if only two causes are taken, it is called regress. Or taking only the seed from the six causes as the 'generative cause', not fully including the present manifestation, is called regress; if also taking the present manifestation, it is called progress. According to the Vitarka-vicara level, if six causes are taken, it is called progress; only taking one cause, it is called regress. Now, this is a general statement, all as mentioned before.

Treatise:

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。所說因緣至依何處得。

述曰。此為問也。第四辨依處等得果此問。因謂十因。緣即四緣。必應有果。果有幾種。依何處得。問依何處而得何果故。

下文有三。先答果有幾。次答依處得果。后明十因．四緣得果。未明依處等得果。先出果體。

論。果有五種至異熟生無記。

述曰。謂有漏善等所招異熟生無記　有漏善者。簡無漏善　自相續者。簡他．及非情。若但言異熟。即六識中報非真異熟攝。今為總攝彼。故言異熟生。然本識亦名異熟生無記。如前第二卷會。此中即顯古道生法師善不受報論非也。同小乘中。由有漏善亦感報故。此位稍長。至金剛心頓斷。通二乘無學三十八．顯揚．對法第十五皆同。

論。二者等流至後果隨轉。

述曰。謂習善．無記．不善所引同類。不望異類之因為等流果。又同類中如上品與下中品及自上品為果。非下品與中上品為果。果勝而因可劣。非果劣而因勝。三十八等皆言善法增等為自果也。對法唯據善法。論實此果非不通余　或似先業後果隨轉者。三十八等亦同此意。謂如殺生得短命報。是先業之同類。以第八短長分限為等流也。隨順相門。即無記果與自業相似。與善不為同類也。唯此一法。非余法皆是假說。實增上果。然假名等流。非同

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：所說的因緣（hetu-pratyaya，原因和條件）是依據什麼而得到的？

述曰：這是提問。第四部分辨析依據處等得到果報，這是對此的提問。因指的是十因（dasa hetu，佛教解釋原因的十種方式），緣指的是四緣（catvari pratyaya，事物生起的四種條件）。必然會有果報產生。果報有幾種？依據什麼而得到？問的是依據什麼而得到什麼果報。

下文有三個部分。首先回答果報有幾種，其次回答依據處得到果報，最後闡明十因、四緣得到果報。在闡明依據處等得到果報之前，先說明果報的體性。

論：果報有五種，直到異熟生無記（vipaka-ja avyakrta，由異熟產生的非善非惡的果報）。

述曰：指的是由有漏的善等所招感的異熟生無記。『有漏善』是爲了簡別無漏善。『自相續』是爲了簡別他人以及非有情之物。如果只說異熟，那麼六識中的果報就不能被真正的異熟所涵蓋。現在爲了總括它們，所以說異熟生。然而，本識（alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）也名為異熟生無記，如前面第二卷所說。這其中就顯示了古道生法師的『善不受報論』是不正確的。如同小乘佛教中，由於有漏的善也會感得果報。這個階段稍長，直到金剛心頓斷。通於二乘（sravaka-yana and pratyeka-buddha-yana，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的無學（asaiksa，無學果位）三十八品。顯揚（瑜伽師地論的別名）、對法（阿毗達摩論）第十五品都相同。

論：二者是等流果（nisyanda-phala，由先前行為相似的後續結果），直到後果隨之轉變。

述曰：指的是由修習善、無記、不善所引發的同類。不期望異類作為等流果的原因。又在同類中，比如上品與下中品以及自身上品作為果報。不是下品與中上品作為果報。果報可以勝過原因，但果報不能劣於原因。三十八品等都說善法增長等作為自身果報。對法只根據善法。實際上這個果報並非不通於其他。或者類似於先前的業，後果隨之轉變。三十八品等也相同于這個意思。比如殺生得到短命的果報，是先前業的同類。以第八識（阿賴耶識）的短長分限作為等流。隨順相門，就是無記果與自身業相似，與善不作為同類。只有這一法，不是其他法都是假說，實際上是增上果（adhipati-phala，增上果）。然而假名為等流，並非相同。

【English Translation】 English version: What are the causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya) said to be, and upon what are they based?

Statement: This is a question. The fourth part distinguishes the attainment of results based on the place of reliance, etc. This is a question about that. 'Cause' refers to the ten causes (dasa hetu, the ten ways Buddhism explains causes), and 'condition' refers to the four conditions (catvari pratyaya, the four conditions for the arising of things). There must be a result. How many kinds of results are there? Upon what are they based? It asks upon what is one based to attain what result.

The following text has three parts. First, it answers how many kinds of results there are; second, it answers the attainment of results based on the place of reliance; and third, it clarifies the attainment of results through the ten causes and four conditions. Before clarifying the attainment of results based on the place of reliance, etc., it first explains the nature of the results.

Treatise: There are five kinds of results, up to the indeterminate result arising from maturation (vipaka-ja avyakrta).

Statement: This refers to the indeterminate result arising from maturation caused by defiled good deeds, etc. 'Defiled good deeds' are to distinguish them from undefiled good deeds. 'One's own continuum' is to distinguish it from others and non-sentient beings. If only 'maturation' is mentioned, then the retribution in the six consciousnesses cannot be included in the true maturation. Now, in order to encompass them all, it is said to arise from maturation. However, the fundamental consciousness (alaya-vijnana) is also called indeterminate arising from maturation, as mentioned in the second chapter earlier. This shows that the ancient Dao Sheng's theory of 'good deeds not receiving retribution' is incorrect. It is like in the Hinayana (sravaka-yana), because defiled good deeds also cause retribution. This stage is slightly longer, until the sudden cutting off of the vajra-like mind. It is common to the thirty-eight items of the non-learning stage (asaiksa) of the Two Vehicles (sravaka-yana and pratyeka-buddha-yana). The 'Exposition of the Compendium' (a name for the Yogacarabhumi-sastra) and the fifteenth chapter of the 'Abhidharma-samuccaya' are the same.

Treatise: The second is the result of outflow (nisyanda-phala), up to the subsequent transformation of the result.

Statement: This refers to the similar kind induced by the practice of good, indeterminate, and unwholesome deeds. It does not expect a different kind to be the cause of the result of outflow. Also, within the same kind, for example, the superior grade and the lower and middle grades, as well as one's own superior grade, are the results. It is not that the lower grade and the middle and superior grades are the results. The result can be superior to the cause, but the result cannot be inferior to the cause. The thirty-eight items, etc., all say that the increase of good dharmas, etc., is one's own result. The 'Abhidharma-samuccaya' only relies on good dharmas. In reality, this result is not exclusive to others. Or, similar to previous karma, the subsequent result transforms accordingly. The thirty-eight items, etc., also have the same meaning. For example, killing living beings results in a short life, which is the same kind as the previous karma. The limits of short and long in the eighth consciousness (alaya-vijnana) are the result of outflow. Following the aspect of accordance, the indeterminate result is similar to one's own karma, and it is not the same kind as good. Only this one dharma, not all other dharmas, is a provisional explanation, and in reality, it is the result of dominance (adhipati-phala). However, the provisional name is the result of outflow, and it is not the same.

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性果。故。以異性法非同類故。由令他命短自命亦短。相似之義假名等流。實業所感。此果即通有漏．無漏。唯是有為凡聖皆通。亦現望種。種望現亦是。瑜伽等依據前後即通論也。

論。三者離系至善無為法。

述曰。此即無漏斷障所證。八無為中不動．想受滅。擇滅三性真如是。對法雲。隨眠永滅是此果故。瑜伽三十八．顯揚亦云。異生以世俗智滅諸煩惱。不究竟故非此果攝。然此果有義。唯斷煩惱障所得。非所知障。若所知障為言定障亦是。如下第十卷說。有義所知障亦得。此中通說。亦不相違。

論。四者士用至所辨事業。

述曰。謂諸作者假諸作具等所辨事業。然三十八等。皆但云士夫用。乃至占卜等事。由此成辨諸稼穡等。是士用果。不言如俱有因等得俱生．無間．隔越．不生之果。由此故有二說。一者唯士夫為因所得是士用果。因唯假者。非少實法。第二師意。心．心所俱等亦得此果。即不唯士夫假者為因故。文但通言諸作者假作具所辨事。前師唯有為少分為果體。士伕力所辨故。第二師即通無為亦是果體。因法為作者。緣法為作具故。從喻為名。

論。五者增上至余所得果。

述曰。若論別相。除上四果即是此果。寬通有漏．無漏等也。

論。瑜伽等說

{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本", "性果（Sabhavaphala）：因此，以不同性質的法（Dharma）不能產生同類的果。由於使他人的生命縮短，自己的生命也會縮短。相似的意義可以假名為等流果（Nisyandaphala），由實際的業力所感得。這種果既包括有漏（Sāsrava）也包括無漏（Anāsrava），唯是有為法（Saṃskṛta），凡夫和聖人都可以得到。可以是現行望向種子，也可以是種子望向現行。瑜伽師地論等依據前後關係，可以通盤討論。", "", "論：三者，離系果（Visaṃyoga-phala）是達到至善的無為法（Asaṃskṛta-dharma）。", "", "述曰：這指的是無漏的斷除障礙所證得的果。八種無為法中，不動（Āniñjya）、想受滅（Saṃjñā-vedayitanirodha）、擇滅（Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）三種是真如（Tathātā）的性質。《對法論》說：『隨眠（Anuśaya）的永遠滅除是此果。』《瑜伽師地論》第三十八卷、《顯揚聖教論》也說：『異生（Pṛthagjana）以世俗的智慧滅除各種煩惱，因為不究竟，所以不屬於此果的範疇。』然而，此果在某種意義上，僅僅是斷除煩惱障（Kleśāvaraṇa）所得，而非所知障（Jñeyāvaraṇa）。如果說所知障，那麼確定是障礙。如下面的第十卷所說。有的觀點認為所知障也可以得到此果。這裡通盤來說，也不互相矛盾。", "", "論：四者，士用果（Puruṣakāra-phala）是達到所辨別的事業。", "", "述曰：指的是作者藉助各種工具等所辨別的事業。然而，第三十八卷等都只說是士夫用，乃至占卜等事。由此成就辨別各種莊稼等，是士用果。沒有像俱有因等那樣得到俱生果（Sahajāta-phala）、無間果（Samanantaraphala）、隔越果（Viprayukta-phala）、不生果（Aja-phala）。因此有兩種說法。一種說法是隻有士夫作為因所得的才是士用果，因只是假借的，沒有少許真實法。第二種是老師的意見，心、心所俱等也可以得到此果。即不只是士夫假借的作為因。文只是通泛地說各種作者藉助工具所辨別的事。前一種說法只有有為法的一小部分作為果的本體，因為是士夫的力量所辨別的。第二種說法是包括無為法也是果的本體，因法作為作者，緣法作為工具。從比喻而得名。", "", "論：五者，增上果（Adhipati-phala）是其餘所得的果。", "", "述曰：如果討論個別的相，除了以上四種果，就是這種果。寬泛地包括有漏、無漏等。", "", "論：《瑜伽師地論》等說" ], "english_translations": [ "English version", "Sabhavaphala (Nature Result): Therefore, a Dharma (law) of a different nature cannot produce a result of the same kind. Because causing others' lives to be shortened, one's own life will also be shortened. Similar meanings can be nominally called Nisyandaphala (Result of Equivalence), which is felt by actual karma. This result includes both Sāsrava (with outflows) and Anāsrava (without outflows), and is only a Saṃskṛta (conditioned) dharma, which can be obtained by both ordinary people and sages. It can be the present looking towards the seed, or the seed looking towards the present. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and others, based on the context, can be discussed comprehensively.", "", "Treatise: Thirdly, Visaṃyoga-phala (Result of Separation) is the Asaṃskṛta-dharma (unconditioned dharma) of attaining ultimate goodness.", "", "Commentary: This refers to the result attained by the Anāsrava (without outflows) severance of obstacles. Among the eight Asaṃskṛta dharmas, Āniñjya (Immovable), Saṃjñā-vedayitanirodha (Cessation of Perception and Feeling), and Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (Analytical Cessation) are the nature of Tathātā (Suchness). The Abhidharmakośa states: 'The permanent cessation of Anuśaya (latent tendencies) is this result.' The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume 38, and the * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 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至得增上果。

述曰。出果體已。次依處得果。于中有二。初引文。后正解。瑜伽第五。及顯揚十八云。習氣依處得異熟等乃至廣說。

出得果文。已下有二師解。第一解中有二。初正解。后立理。即前解十因．二因攝等初師。

論。習氣處言至一切功能。

述曰。顯異熟果十五依處中五依處所得。謂習氣．有潤．差別功能．和合．不障礙五依處得。以引發唯望自類果為言。觀待性復疏遠。業得果義親故。攝受中據士夫為作用依處等。亦無異熟果。若法作用依處亦得此果。即六依處得也。故前論云。若攝受五辨有漏法。除心．心所餘二依處。攝受一切有漏故。今但總言顯諸依處不別說也。何以知五。準下因得果不說攝受因得此果故。士用果有二說。此亦應爾。

論。隨順處言至一切功能。

述曰。顯等流果即依處中七依所得。謂習氣望自類種。有潤望現行。及自類種。真實見亦望自類現行隨順．差別功能．和合．不障礙七也。此說士夫為士用。有說士用．作用依處亦得此果。以法為士用等故。此師即九得等流果。又解士夫可得。作用依疏未必可得。助現緣故非作現緣。唯八依得。領受唯望有情士夫能．所領受。或疏相望不親望法故不得也。無間滅依所望不同。或以下品后念果故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 獲得增上果。

述記說：闡述了果的本體之後，接下來是依據處所獲得果。其中分為兩部分：首先是引述經文，然後是正式解釋。《瑜伽師地論》第五卷和《顯揚聖教論》第十八卷中說：『習氣依據處所獲得異熟果』等等，並有詳細的說明。

引述了獲得果的經文。下面有兩種不同的解釋。第一種解釋分為兩部分：首先是正式解釋，然後是建立理論。也就是前面解釋十因、二因攝等的第一位論師。

論：『習氣處』是指獲得一切功能。

述記說：顯示異熟果由十五種依處中的五種依處所得。這五種依處是：習氣、有潤、差別功能、和合、不障礙。因為引發僅僅針對同類果而言，觀待性又比較疏遠，業獲得果的意義更為直接。攝受中根據士夫作為作用依處等等，也沒有異熟果。如果法的『作用依處』也能獲得此果，那就是六種依處獲得。所以前面的論述說：『如果攝受五種辨識有漏法，除了心、心所之外，其餘兩種依處攝受一切有漏法。』現在只是總的來說明各種依處，沒有分別說明。為什麼知道是五種呢？根據下面因獲得果的說法，沒有說攝受因獲得此果的緣故。士夫的作用果有兩種說法，這裡也應該如此。

論：『隨順處』是指獲得一切功能。

述記說：顯示等流果由依處中的七種依處所得。這七種依處是：習氣針對同類種子，有潤針對現行以及同類種子，真實見也針對同類現行，隨順、差別功能、和合、不障礙。這裡說士夫作為士用，有人說士用、作用依處也能獲得此果，因為法作為士用等等。這位論師認為有九種依處獲得等流果。另一種解釋是士夫可以獲得，作用依處比較疏遠，未必可以獲得，因為是輔助現行的緣故，不是作為現行的原因。只有八種依處獲得。領受僅僅針對有情士夫的能領受和所領受，或者因為疏遠相望，不直接針對法，所以不能獲得。無間滅依所針對的不同，或者因為是以下品后念果的緣故。 English version: Achieving the superior result.

Commentary: Having explained the substance of the result, next is obtaining the result based on the location. There are two parts to this: first, quoting the text, and then the formal explanation. The fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the eighteenth volume of the Asraya-vijnapti-sastra state: 'Habitual tendencies (vasana) obtain the Vipaka (matured) result based on the location,' and so on, with detailed explanations.

Quoting the text on obtaining the result. Below are two different interpretations. The first interpretation has two parts: first, the formal explanation, and then establishing the theory. This is the first teacher who explained the ten causes, the two causes of inclusion, etc.

Treatise: 'The location of habitual tendencies' refers to obtaining all functions.

Commentary: It shows that the Vipaka result is obtained from five of the fifteen locations. These five locations are: habitual tendencies (vasana), moisture (sneha), differential function (visesa-karitra), combination (samagri), and non-obstruction (anavaranata). Because the origination is only for the result of its own kind, and the dependence is relatively distant, the meaning of karma obtaining the result is more direct. In reception (samgraha), based on the individual (purusa) as the location of function, there is also no Vipaka result. If the 'location of function' of the dharma can also obtain this result, then there are six locations that obtain it. Therefore, the previous treatise stated: 'If reception includes the five discriminations of contaminated dharmas, except for mind and mental factors, the remaining two locations include all contaminated dharmas.' Now it is only a general statement explaining the various locations, without separate explanations. How do we know it is five? According to the statement below about the cause obtaining the result, it is not said that the cause of reception obtains this result. There are two explanations for the result of the individual's function, and it should be the same here.

Treatise: 'The compliant location' refers to obtaining all functions.

Commentary: It shows that the Nisyanda (outflow) result is obtained from seven of the locations. These seven locations are: habitual tendencies (vasana) for its own kind of seed, moisture (sneha) for present action and its own kind of seed, true view (yathabhuta-darsana) also for its own kind of present action, compliance (anuvartana), differential function (visesa-karitra), combination (samagri), and non-obstruction (anavaranata). Here it says that the individual (purusa) is the function of the individual, and some say that the location of the individual's function and the location of function can also obtain this result, because the dharma is the function of the individual, etc. This teacher believes that there are nine locations that obtain the Nisyanda result. Another explanation is that the individual can obtain it, but the location of function is relatively distant and may not be obtained, because it is assisting the present action, not as the cause of the present action. Only eight locations obtain it. Reception (samgraha) is only for the receiver and the received of sentient beings, or because of distant dependence, not directly for the dharma, so it cannot be obtained. The object of the immediately ceasing location is different, or because it is the result of the later thought of the lower quality.

【English Translation】 Achieving the superior result.

Commentary: Having explained the substance of the result, next is obtaining the result based on the location. There are two parts to this: first, quoting the text, and then the formal explanation. The fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and the eighteenth volume of the Asraya-vijnapti-sastra (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only) state: 'Habitual tendencies (vasana) obtain the Vipaka (matured) result based on the location,' and so on, with detailed explanations.

Quoting the text on obtaining the result. Below are two different interpretations. The first interpretation has two parts: first, the formal explanation, and then establishing the theory. This is the first teacher who explained the ten causes, the two causes of inclusion, etc.

Treatise: 'The location of habitual tendencies' refers to obtaining all functions.

Commentary: It shows that the Vipaka result is obtained from five of the fifteen locations. These five locations are: habitual tendencies (vasana), moisture (sneha), differential function (visesa-karitra), combination (samagri), and non-obstruction (anavaranata). Because the origination is only for the result of its own kind, and the dependence is relatively distant, the meaning of karma obtaining the result is more direct. In reception (samgraha), based on the individual (purusa) as the location of function, there is also no Vipaka result. If the 'location of function' of the dharma can also obtain this result, then there are six locations that obtain it. Therefore, the previous treatise stated: 'If reception includes the five discriminations of contaminated dharmas, except for mind and mental factors, the remaining two locations include all contaminated dharmas.' Now it is only a general statement explaining the various locations, without separate explanations. How do we know it is five? According to the statement below about the cause obtaining the result, it is not said that the cause of reception obtains this result. There are two explanations for the result of the individual's function, and it should be the same here.

Treatise: 'The compliant location' refers to obtaining all functions.

Commentary: It shows that the Nisyanda (outflow) result is obtained from seven of the locations. These seven locations are: habitual tendencies (vasana) for its own kind of seed, moisture (sneha) for present action and its own kind of seed, true view (yathabhuta-darsana) also for its own kind of present action, compliance (anuvartana), differential function (visesa-karitra), combination (samagri), and non-obstruction (anavaranata). Here it says that the individual (purusa) is the function of the individual, and some say that the location of the individual's function and the location of function can also obtain this result, because the dharma is the function of the individual, etc. This teacher believes that there are nine locations that obtain the Nisyanda result. Another explanation is that the individual can obtain it, but the location of function is relatively distant and may not be obtained, because it is assisting the present action, not as the cause of the present action. Only eight locations obtain it. Reception (samgraha) is only for the receiver and the received of sentient beings, or because of distant dependence, not directly for the dharma, so it cannot be obtained. The object of the immediately ceasing location is different, or because it is the result of the later thought of the lower quality.

---

亦不說得。余可知也。

論。真見處言至一切功能。

述曰。謂依處中五依處得。謂真見．隨順亦引涅槃故。差別功能各引自乘果故。和合．不障礙處得。此說以士夫為士用。若說法為士用。即士用．作用俱得此果。余不得可知。非觀待因得者。疏遠相待不以證待。又彼約有為法。為清凈觀待因故。又待能證有所證。于生住成得果處轉。如何不得。合七依處得離系果。下文不說觀待因亦得離系故。約清凈有為為果故。

論。士用處言至一切功能。

述曰。即依處中。有說五處得。謂領受依處。亦望士夫為士用為觀待因故。士用．作用．和合．不障礙依處所得。隨順唯望自善法等。定異亦約別別法體。不望士夫。故不得也　第二師說。法亦名士夫。即領受．習氣．有潤．無間滅．士用．作用．真見．隨順．差別功能．和合．不障礙十一依處得　語依處．與法。非士夫用．果。果與因不相密合。說非士夫法故。此果必生。彼語依處顯於法故。以下十因中不言語因得士用果。故知依處準亦應爾。

論。所餘處言至一切功能。

述曰。此即隨前所不攝法並是此體。此據別體。謂語．境界．根．障礙依處全。餘十一小分。若不爾者一切皆是。

依何意故作是說耶。

論。不爾

便應太寬太狹。

述曰。自下立理。若不如前解者。各有太寬．太狹之失。且如習氣唯目第三。即第三中有非業者。亦得異熟果便為太寬。餘四依處有業種不得即太狹也。隨順處言唯目第十一。彼自依處中。亦引涅槃及非同類異界無漏等法故。非等流果故太寬失。余或六．或八．或七依處中亦有不攝即太狹失。真見處言唯目第十亦為太寬。自處亦攝俱時。及后同類諸法非離系果故。餘四處中亦得離系。既為不說即太狹也。士用處言唯目第九。即自依處中。亦引增上．等流果等。若攝彼盡即太寬失。余或四．或十處亦得此果。若不攝者亦太狹失。余依處中亦有太寬。即前四外余依處中。有等流等四果體在。若並是別增上果者即為太寬。唯除前四所攝之外為所餘者。前依處中亦有增上果。如習氣中不得異熟果者。即諸因緣種。隨順中不得等流者。即得涅槃。真見亦有不得離系者。引后自類等。領受中亦有不得士用者。如脛待足等。若不攝彼便為太狹。故知於我所說為正。或此增上唯應難狹。餘四依處得余果故。然此寬狹一準於前得果依處頭數說故也。

論。或習氣者至故此偏說。

述曰。第二師說。五果體性寬狹如前。但釋論文有盡理．不盡為異於前。此習氣言。唯屬十五依處中第三依處。雖此報因余

{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：那麼就應該考慮太寬或太狹的問題。", "", "窺基法師解釋說：以下是建立在理上的分析。如果不如前面的解釋，那麼就會各有太寬或太狹的缺失。例如，習氣果只對應於十五依處中的第三依處，如果第三依處中存在非業的成分，也能得到異熟果，那就顯得太寬泛了。而其餘四個依處中有業的種子卻不能立即產生異熟果，那就顯得太狹隘了。隨順果只對應于第十一依處，但在該依處中，也包含了涅槃以及非同類異界無漏等法，因此說它是等流果就太寬泛了。其餘六個、八個或七個依處中也有未被包含的情況，那就顯得太狹隘了。真見果只對應于第十依處，這也顯得太寬泛了，因為該依處也包含了俱時和後起的同類諸法，並非離系果。而其餘四個依處中也能得到離系果，卻未被提及，那就顯得太狹隘了。士用果只對應于第九依處，但在該依處中，也包含了增上果、等流果等。如果全部包含進去，那就顯得太寬泛了。其餘四個或十個依處也能得到士用果，如果不包含進去，那就顯得太狹隘了。其餘依處中也有太寬泛的情況，即前四個依處之外的其餘依處中，有等流果等四種果的體性存在。如果這些都算是別的增上果，那就顯得太寬泛了。如果只排除前四個依處所包含的，而將剩餘的都算作增上果，那麼前四個依處中也有增上果，比如習氣中沒有得到異熟果的，即諸因緣種子；隨順中沒有得到等流果的，即得到涅槃；真見中也有沒有得到離系果的，即引生後來的自類等；領受中也有沒有得到士用果的，如脛骨依賴足部等。如果不包含這些情況，那就顯得太狹隘了。所以要知道我所說的才是正確的。或者說，這個增上果只應該責難其狹隘，因為其餘四個依處也能得到其餘的果。然而這種寬狹的判斷，是按照前面所說的得到果的依處數量來衡量的。", "", "論中說：或者說習氣果……所以這裡特別說明。", "", "窺基法師解釋說：第二位論師認為，五種果的體性寬狹如前所述。只是解釋論文時，有的窮盡了道理，有的沒有窮盡，這與前面的觀點不同。這裡所說的習氣果，只屬於十五依處中的第三依處。雖然這個報因在其他依處也可能存在", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", 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四處亦有。習氣中亦有非報因者。識等五種生現行是。以異熟因熟時去果相遠。習氣依處望果亦遠故。偏說習氣得異熟果。不言習氣並是報因。余依處中無此因也。

論。隨順處言至故偏說之。

述曰。此隨順處唯屬第十一。得等流果。雖知如前六．七．八依處中。亦得等流果。此處亦得非等流果。如與涅槃為因者是。以等流因必下．等法。與自．上法為其因故。隨順亦爾。招勝有為行相顯故論偏說之。亦不盡理也。

論。真見處言至相顯故偏說。

述曰。此真見處。唯屬第十處。雖如前說餘四依處。或五依處亦得此果。此處亦能引同類等。非皆得離系。以真見之名招離系相顯故論偏說。亦不盡理也。

論。士用處言至是故偏說。

述曰。準上可解。以士用果望于處者。即士用處名顯。及體相亦顯。故偏說之。非餘四或十依處無也。但是士用依處必得士用果。不可同前言此處亦能得非士用果。但有總言亦能招增上等。此士用依所得士用。亦得名增上等故。亦不盡理。

論。所餘唯屬至故此偏說。

述曰。此攝所餘　餘十一處。即除前果依處之外法也。以餘四依處。已顯得餘四果故。不說餘四處亦得增上果故。此十一處亦得餘四果。而增上多顯故偏說之。皆不盡理略

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 其他地方也有（習氣）。在習氣中，也有不是報因（Vipāka-hetu，導致異熟果的因）的情況。識等五種生起現行就是如此。因為異熟因成熟時，與果的相狀相距甚遠，而習氣所依之處，從果的角度來看也很遙遠。所以，偏重說明習氣能得到異熟果，而不是說習氣全部都是報因。因為其餘的所依之處沒有這種因。

論：順應所依之處而言，所以偏重說明。

述記：這裡所說的順應所依之處，僅僅屬於第十一處（指增上果所依處）。能得到等流果（Nisyanda-phala，與因相似的果）。雖然知道如前文所說，第六、第七、第八所依之處，也能得到等流果，而此處也能得到非等流果，比如以涅槃（Nirvana，佛教術語，指解脫）為因的情況。因為等流因必定是下等法，與自身或上等法作為它的因。順應也是如此，因為招感殊勝的有為法行相明顯，所以論中偏重說明。但這樣說並不完全合理。

論：因為真見所依之處而言，相狀明顯，所以偏重說明。

述記：這裡所說的真見所依之處，僅僅屬於第十處（指離系果所依處）。雖然如前文所說，其餘四種或五種所依之處，也能得到這種果。而此處也能引生同類等果，但並非都能得到離系果（Visamyoga-phala，通過智慧斷除煩惱而獲得的果）。因為真見之名，招感離系果的相狀明顯，所以論中偏重說明。但這樣說並不完全合理。

論：因為士用所依之處而言，所以偏重說明。

述記：參照上面的解釋就可以理解。因為士用果（Purusakara-phala，由人的努力而產生的果）相對於所依之處來說，士用所依之處的名稱明顯，並且體相也很明顯，所以偏重說明。並不是說其餘四種或十種所依之處就沒有士用果。只是士用所依之處必定能得到士用果，不能像前面所說的那樣，說此處也能得到非士用果。但可以總的來說，也能招感增上果等。因為士用所依之處所得到的士用果，也可以稱為增上果等。但這樣說並不完全合理。

論：其餘的果僅僅屬於其餘的所依之處，所以這裡偏重說明。

述記：這裡所說的攝取其餘，是指其餘的十一個所依之處，也就是除了前面所說的果所依之處以外的法。因為其餘四種所依之處，已經明顯地得到了其餘四種果，所以不說其餘四處也能得到增上果。這十一個所依之處也能得到其餘四種果，而增上果（Adhipati-phala，通過增上力而產生的果）的相狀更加明顯，所以偏重說明。這些說法都不完全合理，只是簡略地說明。

【English Translation】 English version They also exist in other places. Among the habitual energies (Vāsanā), there are also those that are not the cause of retribution (Vipāka-hetu). The five kinds of consciousness (Vijñāna) arising into manifestation are like this. Because when the cause of different maturation ripens, it is far from the nature of the result, and the place where habitual energies rely is also far from the result. Therefore, it is emphasized that habitual energies can obtain the result of different maturation, but it is not said that all habitual energies are the cause of retribution. Because the remaining places of reliance do not have this cause.

Treatise: Speaking in accordance with the place of conformity, therefore it is emphasized.

Commentary: This place of conformity only belongs to the eleventh place (referring to the place of reliance for the Adhipati-phala). It can obtain the result of outflow (Nisyanda-phala, the result similar to the cause). Although it is known that, as mentioned earlier, the sixth, seventh, and eighth places of reliance can also obtain the result of outflow, this place can also obtain the result of non-outflow, such as taking Nirvana (Nirvana, Buddhist term, referring to liberation) as the cause. Because the cause of outflow must be inferior and equal dharmas, with itself or superior dharmas as its cause. Conformity is also like this, because the aspect of attracting superior conditioned dharmas is obvious, so the treatise emphasizes it. But this statement is not entirely reasonable.

Treatise: Because speaking of the place of true seeing, the characteristics are obvious, therefore it is emphasized.

Commentary: This place of true seeing only belongs to the tenth place (referring to the place of reliance for the Visamyoga-phala). Although, as mentioned earlier, the remaining four or five places of reliance can also obtain this result. And this place can also lead to results of the same kind, but not all can obtain the result of separation (Visamyoga-phala, the result obtained by cutting off afflictions through wisdom). Because the name of true seeing attracts the characteristic of the result of separation, so the treatise emphasizes it. But this statement is not entirely reasonable.

Treatise: Because speaking of the place of effort, therefore it is emphasized.

Commentary: It can be understood by referring to the above explanation. Because the result of effort (Purusakara-phala, the result produced by human effort) in relation to the place of reliance, the name of the place of effort is obvious, and the substance and characteristics are also obvious, so it is emphasized. It is not that the remaining four or ten places of reliance do not have the result of effort. It's just that the place of effort must obtain the result of effort, and it cannot be said, as before, that this place can also obtain the result of non-effort. But it can be generally said that it can also attract the result of increase, etc. Because the result of effort obtained by the place of effort can also be called the result of increase, etc. But this statement is not entirely reasonable.

Treatise: The remaining results only belong to the remaining places of reliance, therefore it is emphasized here.

Commentary: The remaining here refers to the remaining eleven places of reliance, that is, the dharmas other than the places of reliance for the results mentioned earlier. Because the remaining four places of reliance have already clearly obtained the remaining four results, so it is not said that the remaining four places can also obtain the result of increase. These eleven places of reliance can also obtain the remaining four results, but the aspect of the result of increase (Adhipati-phala, the result produced by the power of increase) is more obvious, so it is emphasized. These statements are not entirely reasonable, but only briefly explained.

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說之也。

依處既示。次明十因．四緣多少得果。

論。如是即說至增上緣得。

述曰。此中得果隨文且釋。其理不盡如樞要說。是十因中五因得異熟果。觀待唯望士夫為因。故不取也。若望法為因即取。有十因中六因也。余可知。此中依處得有別者。如前已說。此四緣中增上緣得。大乘報因非因緣故。

論。若等流果至初後緣得。

述曰。等流果七因得如文。此中若種望現等是因緣。余是增上緣。皆應如理知。然依依處有寬狹如前。余不得可知。因緣．增上二種。四緣中居初．后故。

論。若離系果至增上緣得。

述曰。離系果五因得。以望士夫為觀待故不說得之。以望清凈有為牽引故亦不得。余因不得義可知也。然依處寬狹如前可知。此唯增上緣得。

論。若士用果至增上緣得。

述曰。此有二說。初師四因得。以士夫為士用故。余不得者非士夫故。各各是望別法為也。觀待相同故取之也。唯增上緣得。

論。有義觀待至餘三緣故。

述曰。此第二師。通法為士夫。即八因得。唯說因不得。如前處中說。餘者可知。以但能顯非是能生。能生所生者是此果故。既爾即除所緣緣餘三緣得。外法無如士夫之用故。非所緣緣得。無間亦名為士用故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 上面已經講述了這些。接下來闡明十因和四緣在獲得果報上的多少。

論：像這樣，就是說增上緣可以獲得果報。

述記：這裡獲得果報，隨著經文來解釋。其中的道理並不完全像《樞要》所說的那樣。十因中有五因可以獲得異熟果。觀待因只是期望士夫（指修行者）作為因，所以不取。如果期望法作為因，就可以取，那麼十因中就有六因了。其餘的可以類推得知。這裡依據的處所不同，如前面已經說過。這四緣中，增上緣可以獲得果報。大乘的報因不是因緣的緣故。

論：如果是等流果，那麼初緣和後緣可以獲得果報。

述記：等流果七因可以獲得，如經文所說。這裡如果種子期望顯現等是因緣，其餘的是增上緣。都應該如理地瞭解。然而依據的處所有寬有窄，如前面所說。其餘的不得而知。因緣和增上緣這兩種，在四緣中居於最初和最後。

論：如果是離系果，那麼增上緣可以獲得果報。

述記：離系果五因可以獲得。因為期望士夫作為觀待，所以不說獲得。因為期望清凈的有為法牽引，所以也不得。其餘的因不得的意義可以類推得知。然而依據的處所寬窄如前可知。這裡只有增上緣可以獲得果報。

論：如果是士用果，那麼增上緣可以獲得果報。

述記：對此有兩種說法。第一種說法是四因可以獲得。因為士夫作為士用，其餘的不得是因為不是士夫。各自是期望別的法。觀待相同所以取之。只有增上緣可以獲得果報。

論：有一種觀點認為，觀待其餘的三緣。

述記：這是第二種說法。普遍認為法是士夫，就是八因可以獲得。只說因不得，如前面處中說。其餘的可以類推得知。因為只能顯現而不能產生。能產生和所產生的是此果的緣故。既然這樣，就排除所緣緣，其餘的三緣可以獲得。外法沒有像士夫的功用，所以不是所緣緣可以獲得。無間緣也稱為士用，所以可以獲得。

【English Translation】 English version: It has been explained above. Next, it will be clarified how much the ten causes and four conditions contribute to obtaining results.

Treatise: Thus, it is said that the Adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition) can obtain results.

Commentary: Here, the attainment of results is explained according to the text. The principles are not fully explained as in the Key Essentials. Among the ten causes, five causes can obtain the Vipāka-phala (異熟果, result of maturation). The Anukāraka-hetu (觀待因, imitative cause) only expects the Puruṣa (士夫, individual/practitioner) as a cause, so it is not taken. If it expects Dharma as a cause, then it can be taken, and then there are six causes among the ten causes. The rest can be known by analogy. The difference in the basis here has been explained before. Among these four conditions, the Adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition) can obtain results. The retribution cause of Mahāyāna is not a Hetu-pratyaya (因緣, causal condition).

Treatise: If it is the Niṣyanda-phala (等流果, result of outflow), then the initial and final conditions can obtain results.

Commentary: The Niṣyanda-phala (等流果, result of outflow) can be obtained by seven causes, as the text says. Here, if the seed expects manifestation, etc., it is a Hetu-pratyaya (因緣, causal condition). The rest are Adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition). All should be understood according to reason. However, the basis has varying degrees of breadth, as mentioned before. The rest cannot be known. The Hetu-pratyaya (因緣, causal condition) and Adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition) are the first and last among the four conditions.

Treatise: If it is the Visaṃyoga-phala (離系果, result of separation), then the Adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition) can obtain results.

Commentary: The Visaṃyoga-phala (離系果, result of separation) can be obtained by five causes. Because it expects the Puruṣa (士夫, individual/practitioner) as a condition, it is not said to be obtained. Because it expects the pure conditioned Dharma to lead, it is also not obtained. The meaning of the other causes not being obtained can be known by analogy. However, the breadth of the basis can be known as before. Only the Adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition) can obtain results here.

Treatise: If it is the Puruṣakāra-phala (士用果, result of effort), then the Adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition) can obtain results.

Commentary: There are two views on this. The first view is that four causes can obtain results. Because the Puruṣa (士夫, individual/practitioner) acts as the Puruṣakāra (士用, effort), the rest cannot be obtained because they are not the Puruṣa (士夫, individual/practitioner). Each expects a different Dharma. Because the conditions are the same, it is taken. Only the Adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition) can obtain results.

Treatise: Some argue that it depends on the other three conditions.

Commentary: This is the second view. It is generally believed that Dharma is the Puruṣa (士夫, individual/practitioner), which means that eight causes can obtain results. It is only said that the cause cannot be obtained, as mentioned earlier. The rest can be known by analogy. Because it can only manifest and cannot produce. What can produce and what is produced are the causes of this result. In that case, the Ālambana-pratyaya (所緣緣, object condition) is excluded, and the other three conditions can obtain results. External Dharma does not have the function of the Puruṣa (士夫, individual/practitioner), so the Ālambana-pratyaya (所緣緣, object condition) cannot obtain results. The Anantara-pratyaya (無間緣, immediate condition) is also called Puruṣakāra (士用, effort), so it can obtain results.

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依處寬狹如前已說。但無不生之士用也。

論。若增上果至一切容得。

述曰。此增上果據通體者為論。十因．四緣得也　或解不爾。除前所用為四果之因。外余因所得。所望不同。果各別也　然不相違中攝無為。如何得增上。答十因皆得果無不得者。不同小乘無為非六因．五果之果．因也。不言有取．與為因。然與所不障礙為因所不礙。即是此無為之果也。無與．取義不同小乘也。即隨說因是。觀待等亦然。

論。傍論已了應辨正論。

述曰。此有二解。一唯明依十五處說四緣下是名傍論。余已上是正論。以明緣所生法文。應明能生緣故。四緣是正論也　第二四緣已下並傍論攝。雖明緣所生不欲辨緣故。今準此卷次云。既以緣生法相望作緣多少為正論。故知四緣是正論也。若不辨體何以解用也。此等妙焉或舊曾聞。或先所未了。后諸學者宜詳義焉。然據瑜伽等。即以士夫所得為士用果。然理不障余法故二師皆是也。隨用皆得。然此十因有漏無漏。有為無為。三界系不繫。見所斷等。皆如理思。

前問之中問緣及生。雖已明緣而未解生。自下解生。于中有二。初辨現．種生。后總結釋。初中有二。初辨生現。后辨生種。生現中。初辨種生后辨現生。種．現生中各有二。初染。后凈。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

關於所依之處的寬窄，前面已經說過了。但對於不退轉的菩薩來說，這些都不適用。

論：如果從增上果的角度來說，一切都是可以容納的。

述記：這裡所說的增上果，是從整體的角度來討論的。它是由十因、四緣共同作用而產生的。或者另一種解釋是，除了前面所說的四果之因外，其餘的因也能產生果，只是所期望的結果不同，所以果也各有區別。然而，無為法也被攝入到不相違之中，那麼如何得到增上果呢？回答是，十因都能產生果，沒有不能產生果的。這與小乘佛教不同，小乘認為無為法不是六因、五果的果或因。這裡不說有取、與作為因，而是說與所不障礙作為因，所不障礙就是此無為法的果。這裡的無與、取之義與小乘不同。也就是說，隨所說的因就是。觀待等也是如此。

論：旁論已經結束，現在應該辨析正論。

述記：對此有兩種解釋。一種是，只有說明依十五處說四緣以下的內容才叫做旁論，其餘以上的內容是正論。因為正論是說明緣所生法的，所以應該說明能生之緣，因此四緣是正論。第二種解釋是，四緣以下都屬於旁論。雖然說明了緣所生法，但並不想辨析緣本身。現在根據此卷的次第來說，既然以緣生法相望作為緣的多少為正論，那麼就可以知道四緣是正論。如果不辨析體，又如何解釋用呢？這些道理非常微妙，或許以前曾經聽過，或許以前沒有理解，希望後來的學者仔細研究其中的含義。然而，根據《瑜伽師地論》等，士夫所得到的果報就是士用果。但這個道理並不妨礙其他的法，所以兩種說法都是正確的。隨其所用都能得到相應的果報。然而，這十因是有漏還是無漏，是有為還是無為，是屬於三界還是不屬於三界，是見所斷還是修所斷等等，都應該如理思維。

在前面的提問中，問到了緣和生。雖然已經說明了緣，但還沒有解釋生。下面將解釋生。其中分為兩個部分。首先辨析現行和種子生，然後總結解釋。首先辨析現行生，然後辨析種子生。在現行生中，首先辨析種子生，然後辨析現行生。在種子生和現行生中，各有染污和清凈兩種。

【English Translation】 English version:

The breadth and narrowness of the place of reliance have been discussed earlier. However, it is not applicable to Bodhisattvas who do not regress.

Treatise: If considering the Adhipati-phala (增上果, dominant result), everything can be accommodated.

Commentary: This Adhipati-phala (增上果, dominant result) is discussed from the perspective of the whole entity. It is obtained through the ten causes and four conditions. Alternatively, it can be interpreted differently: apart from the causes used for the previous four results, the remaining causes can also produce results, but the desired outcomes are different, so the results are also distinct. However, how can the unconditioned (無為, asaṃskṛta) be included in non-contradiction? The answer is that all ten causes can produce results; there is nothing that cannot produce a result. This is different from the Theravada school, which believes that the unconditioned is not a result or cause of the six causes and five results. Here, we do not say that 'taking' or 'giving' is a cause, but rather that 'being unobstructed' is a cause, and 'being unobstructed' is the result of this unconditioned. The meaning of 'not giving' and 'not taking' is different from that of the Theravada school. That is to say, whatever cause is spoken of is the cause. 'Conditionality' (觀待, apekṣā) and so on are also like this.

Treatise: The digression is finished; now we should discern the main topic.

Commentary: There are two interpretations of this. One is that only the explanation of the four conditions based on the fifteen places is called a digression, and the rest above is the main topic. Because the main topic explains the Dharma (法, dharma) produced by conditions, it should explain the conditions that can produce it. Therefore, the four conditions are the main topic. The second interpretation is that everything below the four conditions is included in the digression. Although it explains the Dharma produced by conditions, it does not intend to discern the conditions themselves. Now, according to the order of this volume, since taking the Dharma produced by conditions as the object of comparison to determine the number of conditions is the main topic, we know that the four conditions are the main topic. If we do not discern the essence, how can we explain the function? These principles are very subtle, perhaps heard before, perhaps not understood before. Later scholars should carefully study their meaning. However, according to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), the result obtained by a person is the Puruṣakāra-phala (士用果, result of effort). But this principle does not obstruct other Dharmas, so both explanations are correct. Whatever is used can obtain the corresponding result. However, these ten causes, whether they are with outflows (有漏, sāsrava) or without outflows (無漏, anāsrava), conditioned (有為, saṃskṛta) or unconditioned (無為, asaṃskṛta), belonging to the three realms (三界, triloka) or not belonging to the three realms, severed by seeing (見所斷, darśana-heya) or severed by cultivation (修所斷, bhāvanā-heya), etc., should all be contemplated according to reason.

In the previous question, the question was about conditions and arising. Although conditions have been explained, arising has not yet been explained. Below, arising will be explained. There are two parts to this. First, the arising of manifestation (現行, vartamāna) and seed (種子, bīja) is discerned, and then a summary explanation is given. First, the arising of manifestation is discerned, and then the arising of seed is discerned. In the arising of manifestation, first the arising of seed is discerned, and then the arising of manifestation is discerned. In the arising of seed and the arising of manifestation, there are two types in each: defiled (染, kliṣṭa) and pure (凈, śuddha).

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論。本識中種至除等無間。

述曰。謂本識中種子總而言之。容作三緣生現分別。分別之言通攝心．心所若見．相分。非唯自體也。除等無間者。唯心．心所相望立此緣故。

論。謂各親種是彼因緣。

述曰。釋為三緣。此簡業種生異熟果及余增上。雖眼識生藉根等種。非親種故。亦非因緣。總而言之。一切相．見等法。皆有此緣而生。無非識種生故。

論。為所緣緣于能緣者。

述曰。謂要能緣種心．心所法。種子方為彼所緣緣。除一切相分。相分不能緣故。及除自體分。不緣種故。然見分中除五七識。不緣種故。但與第八一切時見分。第六有時緣者彼與為緣。今簡爾所不為緣故。言為所緣于能緣者。是簡略言。

論。若種于彼至是增上緣。

述曰。謂有種子于現行法能助與力。如根種于識種。作意種于識等。二又雖無助力但不為障。如異識種子望異現行等。皆是增上緣。然簡無漏種與有漏現行為生等緣。彼能障礙故。雖亦是增上緣不相違因攝。然于生現分別中。非能不障故非也。或亦是此緣。現未為障故。障必不生故。此中但簡障礙現行令不生之緣故。此即種望染現為緣訖。

論。生凈現行應知亦爾。

述曰。然此總言。于見分中通與一切見分為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：本識（Alaya-vijñana，根本識）中的種子，至於除等無間緣（samanantarapratyaya，又稱次第緣或等無間緣）。

述記：總而言之，本識中的種子可以作為三種緣（因緣、所緣緣、增上緣）而生起顯現。『分別』一詞涵蓋了心和心所，包括見分和相分，不僅僅是自體。『除等無間緣』，是因為只有心和心所之間才存在這種緣。

論：所謂的各別親種子，是彼等（現行法）的因緣。

述記：解釋三種緣。這裡是爲了區分業種生異熟果，以及其餘的增上緣。雖然眼識的生起依賴於根等種子，但因為不是親種子，所以不是因緣。總而言之，一切相分、見分等法，都有這種因緣而生起，沒有不是由識種子所生的。

論：作為所緣緣，對於能緣者而言。

述記：指的是能緣的心和心所法的種子，才能成為它們的所緣緣。排除一切相分，因為相分不能緣；也排除自體分，因為自體分不緣種子。然而，在見分中，排除前五識和第七識，因為它們不緣種子。只有第八識的一切時見分，以及第六識有時緣者，才與種子互為緣。現在爲了簡別那些不作為所緣緣的情況，所以說『作為所緣緣，對於能緣者而言』，這是簡略的說法。

論：如果種子對於彼等（現行法）是增上緣。

述記：指的是有些種子對於現行法能夠幫助和助力。例如，根的種子對於識的種子，作意的種子對於識等等。另外，有些種子雖然沒有助力，但也不構成障礙。例如，不同的識種子對於不同的現行等等。這些都是增上緣。然而，要排除無漏種子對於有漏現行作為生等緣的情況，因為它們會互相障礙。雖然它們也是增上緣，但不屬於相違因。然而，在生現的分別中，因為不能不障礙，所以不是因緣。或者，也可以說是增上緣，因為現行和未來會互相障礙，所以障礙必不生。這裡只是簡別障礙現行，使之不能生起的緣故。以上是關於種子對於染污現行作為緣的情況。

論：生起清凈現行，應當知道也是如此。

述記：這裡是總的來說。在見分中，普遍地與一切見分互為緣。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: The seeds in the Alaya-vijñana (storehouse consciousness), up to the samanantarapratyaya (immediately preceding condition).

Commentary: Generally speaking, the seeds in the Alaya-vijñana can act as three kinds of conditions (hetupratyaya, alambanapratyaya, adhipatipratyaya) to give rise to manifestations. The term 'discrimination' encompasses both mind and mental factors, including the seeing-aspect and the object-aspect, not just the self-aspect. 'Excluding the samanantarapratyaya' is because this condition only exists between mind and mental factors.

Treatise: The respective proximate seeds are the hetupratyaya (causal condition) for them (the present phenomena).

Commentary: Explaining the three conditions. This is to distinguish the karmic seeds that produce the maturation result (vipakaphala), and other adhipatipratyaya (dominant condition). Although the arising of eye-consciousness depends on the seeds of the sense organs, etc., they are not the hetupratyaya because they are not proximate seeds. Generally speaking, all object-aspects, seeing-aspects, and other dharmas arise from this hetupratyaya; there is nothing that is not produced by the seeds of consciousness.

Treatise: As the alambanapratyaya (object-condition) for the object-perceiver.

Commentary: This refers to the seeds of the mind and mental factors that are capable of perceiving, which can become the alambanapratyaya for them. Excluded are all object-aspects, because object-aspects cannot perceive; also excluded is the self-aspect, because the self-aspect does not perceive seeds. However, within the seeing-aspect, the first five consciousnesses and the seventh consciousness are excluded, because they do not perceive seeds. Only the eighth consciousness's seeing-aspect at all times, and the sixth consciousness when it sometimes perceives, are mutually conditioned by the seeds. Now, in order to distinguish those cases that do not act as alambanapratyaya, it is said 'as the alambanapratyaya for the object-perceiver,' which is a concise statement.

Treatise: If the seeds are the adhipatipratyaya (dominant condition) for them (the present phenomena).

Commentary: This refers to some seeds that can assist and support the present phenomena. For example, the seeds of the sense organs for the seeds of consciousness, the seeds of volition (manaskara) for consciousness, etc. In addition, some seeds, although they do not provide assistance, do not constitute an obstacle. For example, different seeds of consciousness for different present phenomena, etc. These are all adhipatipratyaya. However, it is necessary to exclude the case where unconditioned seeds act as the condition for the arising of conditioned phenomena, because they obstruct each other. Although they are also adhipatipratyaya, they do not belong to the category of conflicting causes. However, in the distinction between arising and manifestation, because they cannot avoid obstructing each other, they are not hetupratyaya. Alternatively, they can be considered adhipatipratyaya, because the present and future obstruct each other, so obstruction is inevitable. Here, it is only distinguishing the condition that obstructs the present phenomena, preventing them from arising. The above is about the case where seeds act as conditions for defiled present phenomena.

Treatise: The arising of pure present phenomena should be understood in the same way.

Commentary: This is a general statement. Within the seeing-aspect, it universally acts as a condition for all seeing-aspects.

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所緣緣。皆能緣種故。亦與自證分等為所緣緣。佛果識體緣一切法故。與染別也。

總是第一以種望現為緣能生分別。是一切種如是如是變訖。第二以現相望為緣生分別。于中初總。后別。

論。現起分別至無因緣故。

述曰。此文總也。不簡自他識等。相望容作三緣。現望于現非親辨體。無因緣故。

論。謂有情類至除等無間。

述曰。自下別中第一子門。自他身相望。謂自他身份別。展轉容作二緣。因緣有無前總門中已定除訖。下但于餘三緣中取捨。此除等無間。等無間法唯自一識故。此中分別既攝見．相分等故。由他生者皆名分別。但知不唯是見分也。即唯前六識。或亦第八識。許變他處故。

論。自八識聚至或無或有。

述曰。第二子門。自身八識。隨一一八識相應法等見．相分等。總名自識聚。以識為主同聚法故。即下言聚皆如是知。且自八識聚相望。定有增上緣。此緣通故。必無等無間。唯自識相望為此緣故。

此即明簡定有無訖。於四緣中二定無也。謂因緣．等無間。一緣定有。謂增上緣。所緣緣不定。下別辨之。

論。八於七有至所杖質故。

述曰。此謂第八于餘七識有所緣緣義。七于第八無此緣義。以第八相色等為其本質。生五識

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya，指心識所緣的對象）。因為一切心識的種子都具有能緣的作用，所以（阿賴耶識）也和自證分一樣，作為所緣緣。佛果的智慧能夠緣一切法，這與染污的識有所不同。

總的來說，第一種情況是以種子望向現行，作為緣而生起分別。這是一切種子以這種方式不斷變化的結果。第二種情況是以現行相望，作為緣而生起分別。其中，前者是總的說明，後者是分別說明。

論：現起分別乃至無因緣故。

述記：這段文字是總的說明，沒有區分自識和他識等。現行相望可以作為三種緣。現行望向現行，不是親近地辨別其體性，所以沒有因緣。

論：謂有情類乃至除等無間。

述記：從下面開始是分別說明中的第一個子門，即自身和他身相望。自身和他身的分別，可以作為兩種緣。因緣的有無已經在前面的總門中確定排除了。下面只在剩餘的三種緣中取捨。這裡排除了等無間緣（Samanantara-pratyaya，指緊鄰的、無間隔的緣），因為等無間法只有自身一個識。這裡所說的分別，既包括見分（Darshana-bhaga，心識的認知作用）和相分（Nimitta-bhaga，心識所呈現的境相）等，所以由他身所生的都稱為分別，但要知道不只是見分。即只是前六識，或者也有第八識，因為允許第八識變現他處。

論：自八識聚乃至或無或有。

述記：第二個子門，自身八識。隨一一八識相應的法等，見分、相分等，總稱為自識聚。因為以識為主，是同一聚的法，所以下面所說的『聚』都這樣理解。且自身八識聚相望，一定有增上緣（Adhipati-pratyaya，指強有力的影響因素）。因為這種緣是共通的。一定沒有等無間緣，因為只有自識相望才作為這種緣。

這裡明確簡別了一定的有和無。在四種緣中，有兩種是確定的沒有，即因緣和等無間緣。有一種是確定的有，即增上緣。所緣緣是不確定的，下面分別辨析。

論：八於七有乃至所杖質故。

述記：這裡說的是第八識對於其餘七識有所緣緣的意義，而七識對於第八識沒有這種緣的意義。因為第八識的相分，如色等，是其餘五識所依賴的本質。

【English Translation】 English version: Alambana-pratyaya (object-condition). Because all seeds of consciousness have the function of being able to cognize, (Alaya-vijnana) is also, like the self-cognition division, an object-condition. The wisdom of the Buddha-fruit can cognize all dharmas, which is different from defiled consciousness.

Generally speaking, the first case is taking the seed looking towards the present, as a condition to generate discrimination. This is the result of all seeds constantly changing in this way. The second case is taking the present phenomena looking towards each other, as a condition to generate discrimination. Among them, the former is a general explanation, and the latter is a separate explanation.

Treatise: The arising of discrimination up to the reason of no cause-condition.

Commentary: This passage is a general explanation, not distinguishing between self-consciousness and other-consciousness, etc. Present phenomena looking towards each other can be considered as three conditions. Present phenomena looking towards present phenomena do not closely distinguish their nature, so there is no cause-condition.

Treatise: Said sentient beings up to excluding immediate contiguity.

Commentary: From below begins the first sub-section of the separate explanation, that is, self-body and other-body looking towards each other. The discrimination of self-body and other-body can be considered as two conditions. The existence or non-existence of the cause-condition has already been determined and excluded in the previous general section. Below, only the remaining three conditions are selected. Here, the immediate contiguity condition (Samanantara-pratyaya) is excluded, because the immediate contiguity dharma only has one's own consciousness. The discrimination mentioned here includes both the seeing-division (Darshana-bhaga, the cognitive function of consciousness) and the appearance-division (Nimitta-bhaga, the objective appearance presented by consciousness), so what is generated by other bodies is called discrimination, but it should be known that it is not only the seeing-division. That is, only the first six consciousnesses, or also the eighth consciousness, because it is allowed that the eighth consciousness transforms other places.

Treatise: Self eight consciousness aggregates up to sometimes existing, sometimes not.

Commentary: The second sub-section, self eight consciousnesses. According to each of the eight consciousnesses' corresponding dharmas, the seeing-division, appearance-division, etc., are collectively called self-consciousness aggregates. Because consciousness is the main thing, and it is the dharma of the same aggregate, so the 'aggregate' mentioned below should be understood in this way. Moreover, the self eight consciousness aggregates looking towards each other certainly have the dominating condition (Adhipati-pratyaya). Because this condition is common. There is certainly no immediate contiguity condition, because only self-consciousness looking towards each other is considered as this condition.

Here, the certain existence and non-existence are clearly distinguished. Among the four conditions, there are two that are certainly non-existent, that is, the cause-condition and the immediate contiguity condition. There is one that is certainly existent, that is, the dominating condition. The object-condition is uncertain, and will be analyzed separately below.

Treatise: Eight to seven have up to the supported essence.

Commentary: This says that the eighth consciousness has the meaning of object-condition for the remaining seven consciousnesses, while the seven consciousnesses do not have this meaning for the eighth consciousness. Because the appearance-division of the eighth consciousness, such as form, etc., is the essence upon which the other five consciousnesses rely.

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相分色等故。第七亦緣彼見分為境故。第六理通以相．見為境。若無第八定為本質。五．七不生故。雖非親所緣緣。然是疏所緣緣也。第八不託七識而生故。七非八所緣緣也。第八若有七識必有。七但為八定有增上緣。非所緣緣也。

論。第七於六至一切皆無。

述曰。第七于余前之六識。于初五識無此緣義。與一意識為所緣緣。意緣一切法故。五識無者不緣七故。前之六識于第七識。並非彼所緣緣。彼不緣六故。自是一行法故不問八。

論。第六於五無至第八相故。

述曰。其第六識於前五識無此緣義。五識於六有此緣義。五識緣本識所變為境。不待第六識所變色等為自境故。有力生識者方為此緣故。不以五識自相望為所緣緣者以定無故。

論。自類前後至取現境故。

述曰。第三子門。自身八識一一自類前後相望能為幾緣。前第六識聚。容作三緣生后自第六識聚。即除因緣現行相望故。有所緣緣據緣者說故。此中不除阿羅漢末後心等無間緣。據長時故。但說容故。余之七識但有二緣。無因緣．所緣。皆非種子。又不能自緣前念識聚故唯緣現境故。此第一師即長途義。

論。許五后見至亦有三緣。

述曰。自下第二依陳那觀所緣緣論中。說許五識后念見分緣前念

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 相分（Xiangfen，影像部分）和色等（Se Deng，顏色等）的緣故。第七識（第七識，Manas識）也以第八識（第八識，Alaya識）的見分（Jianfen，認知部分）為境界的緣故。第六識（第六識，意識）在理上可以以相分和見分為境界。如果沒有第八識，那麼（第六識所緣的）一定是本質。因為前五識（前五識，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）和第七識不會生起。雖然不是親所緣緣（Qin Suoyuan Yuan，直接的所緣緣），但卻是疏所緣緣（Shu Suoyuan Yuan，間接的所緣緣）。第八識不依賴第七識而生起，所以第七識不是第八識的所緣緣。如果第八識存在，那麼一定有第七識。第七識只是第八識的增上緣（Zengshang Yuan，增上緣），而不是所緣緣。

論：第七識對於第六識乃至一切識都沒有（所緣緣的關係）。

述記：第七識對於其餘前面的六識，對於前五識沒有這種緣的關係。與意識（第六識）是所緣緣的關係，因為意識緣一切法。前五識沒有（這種關係）是因為不緣第七識。前面的六識對於第七識，並非它的所緣緣，因為它不緣六識。自身是一行法（Yixing Fa，單一運作的法），所以不問第八識。

論：第六識對於前五識沒有（所緣緣的關係），乃至第八識的相分。

述記：第六識對於前五識沒有這種緣的關係。前五識對於第六識有這種緣的關係。前五識緣本識（第八識）所變現的境界，不依賴第六識所變現的色等作為自己的境界。有能力生起識者才能成為這種緣，所以不以前五識的自相作為所緣緣，因為（這種情況）是絕對沒有的。

論：自類前後念（的識）乃至取現境的緣故。

述記：第三個子門。自身八識，每一個自類前後相望，能作為幾種緣。前面的第六識聚，可以作為三種緣生起後面的第六識聚，即除去因緣（Yinyuan，因緣），因為現行（Xianxing，現行）相望的緣故。有所緣緣是根據緣者來說的。這裡不除去阿羅漢（Arhat，阿羅漢）末後心等無間緣（Wujian Yuan，無間緣），因為是根據長時間來說的，只是說可以（作為三種緣）。其餘的七識只有兩種緣，沒有因緣和所緣緣，都不是種子（Zhongzi，種子），又不能自己緣前唸的識聚，所以只能緣現境。這是第一位論師的長途義。

論：允許前五識的后念見分也有三種緣。

述記：下面第二個（論師）依據陳那（Dignāga，陳那）的《觀所緣緣論》（Alambana-pratyaya-parīkṣā，觀所緣緣論）中說，允許前五識的后念見分緣前念（的識）。

【English Translation】 English version It is because of the image-portion (Xiangfen) and color, etc. (Se Deng). The seventh consciousness (seventh consciousness, Manas-consciousness) also takes the perception-portion (Jianfen) of the eighth consciousness (eighth consciousness, Alaya-consciousness) as its object. The sixth consciousness (sixth consciousness, consciousness) can logically take both the image-portion and the perception-portion as its object. If there is no eighth consciousness, then (what the sixth consciousness perceives) must be the essence. This is because the first five consciousnesses (first five consciousnesses, eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) and the seventh consciousness do not arise. Although it is not a direct object-condition (Qin Suoyuan Yuan), it is an indirect object-condition (Shu Suoyuan Yuan). The eighth consciousness does not arise relying on the seventh consciousness, so the seventh consciousness is not the object-condition of the eighth consciousness. If the eighth consciousness exists, then there must be the seventh consciousness. The seventh consciousness is only the dominant condition (Zengshang Yuan) of the eighth consciousness, not the object-condition.

Treatise: The seventh consciousness has no (object-condition relationship) with the sixth consciousness and even all consciousnesses.

Commentary: The seventh consciousness, with respect to the remaining preceding six consciousnesses, does not have this condition relationship with the first five consciousnesses. It has an object-condition relationship with the consciousness (sixth consciousness), because the consciousness cognizes all dharmas. The first five consciousnesses do not have (this relationship) because they do not cognize the seventh consciousness. The preceding six consciousnesses, with respect to the seventh consciousness, are not its object-condition, because it does not cognize the six consciousnesses. Since it is a single-functioning dharma (Yixing Fa), the eighth consciousness is not questioned.

Treatise: The sixth consciousness has no (object-condition relationship) with the first five consciousnesses, and even the image-portion of the eighth consciousness.

Commentary: The sixth consciousness does not have this condition relationship with the first five consciousnesses. The first five consciousnesses have this condition relationship with the sixth consciousness. The first five consciousnesses cognize the realm transformed by the fundamental consciousness (eighth consciousness), and do not rely on the color, etc., transformed by the sixth consciousness as their own realm. Only those who have the ability to generate consciousness can become this condition, so the self-nature of the first five consciousnesses is not taken as the object-condition, because (this situation) is absolutely non-existent.

Treatise: The self-category of preceding and succeeding (consciousnesses) and even the reason for taking the present realm.

Commentary: The third sub-section. Each of the eight consciousnesses of oneself, looking at each other in the same category of preceding and succeeding, can serve as how many conditions. The preceding aggregate of the sixth consciousness can serve as three conditions to generate the succeeding aggregate of the sixth consciousness, that is, excluding the causal condition (Yinyuan), because the present activity (Xianxing) looks at each other. The object-condition is based on the one who cognizes. Here, the uninterrupted condition (Wujian Yuan) such as the last mind of an Arhat (Arhat) is not excluded, because it is based on a long period of time, and it is only said that it can (serve as three conditions). The remaining seven consciousnesses only have two conditions, without causal condition and object-condition, and are not seeds (Zhongzi), and cannot cognize the preceding aggregate of consciousness, so they can only cognize the present realm. This is the long-term meaning of the first master.

Treatise: It is allowed that the subsequent perception-portion of the first five consciousnesses also has three conditions.

Commentary: The second (master) below, based on Dignāga's (Dignāga) Examination of the Object Condition (Alambana-pratyaya-parīkṣā), says that it is allowed that the subsequent perception-portion of the first five consciousnesses cognizes the preceding (consciousness).

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相分。彼論言或前為後緣引彼功能故。彼隨經部因果異時。既非現境生五識故。前念五識現行相分為能熏。引相分種子。生於后念五識相分。前念五相有力能生后識見分故是緣義。后念之識帶彼前相生故是所緣義。即以相分為行相。本質為疏所緣緣義。今敘彼意許五識后見緣前念自識相者。五識及第七識前與后亦有三緣。亦者亦第六也。非第八識者。以非能熏不能引種。故前念相非自後識所緣緣也。此師自識前後。異於前義也。

論。前七於八至相見種故。

述曰。若后以前念為所緣緣。自身八識品相望中。前七于第八亦容有所緣緣。以前七識皆能熏成彼第八品相．見種故。謂前五識為能熏。成彼第八相分色等相分種故。是第八見分所緣緣。第七識為能熏。成彼第八見分種故。是自證分所緣緣。自證等種生自證等隨應亦爾。第六識若緣第八見相而熏種。即雙熏彼二分種子。若緣虛空．心心所等以為相分。亦熏彼生空等相種也。非是能熏生彼第八現行相．見分種也。第八不緣虛空等故。此七識中望彼第八相．見分等應作四句。其第六識具后二句如理可知。即是二義與前師別。六望七等準此應知。

論。同聚異體至不相緣故。

述曰。第四子門。就如一眼識中。俱時心．心所。一一別互相望。雖

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 相分（Xiangfen，表象）：該論述說，或者前一刻（的相分）作為后一刻（的相分）的緣，是因為它能引發那種功能。他們（指經部宗）認為，因和果在時間上是不同的。既然（前一念的相分）不是五種感官意識（五識）的直接對象，那麼前一念的五識的顯現的表象部分（相分）就成為能熏習者，引發表象部分（相分）的種子，從而產生后一念的五識的表象部分（相分）。前一念的表象（相分）有力地產生后一念意識的見分（Jianfen，能見），因此具有緣的意義。后一念的意識帶有前一刻的表象而產生，因此具有所緣的意義。也就是說，以表象部分（相分）作為行相（Xingxiang，心理活動），以本質（本質）作為疏所緣緣（Shusoyuanyuan，間接認識的條件）的意義。現在敘述他們的意思，允許五識的后見（Houjian，後來的見解）以先前一念的自身意識的表象（相分）為緣。五識和第七識（末那識，Manas）在前和后也有三種緣。『亦』字也指第六識（意識，Manovijnana）。不是第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）的原因是，因為它不能熏習，不能引發種子。因此，前一念的表象（相分）不是自身後來的意識的所緣緣。這位論師的自身意識的前後，與之前的意義不同。 論：前七識對於第八識，能熏成相見種子。 述曰：如果後來的意識以前一念為所緣緣，那麼在自身八識的品類相互看待中，前七識對於第八識也可能有所緣緣。因為前七識都能熏習形成第八識的表象（相分）和見分（Jianfen）的種子。也就是說，前五識作為能熏習者，形成第八識的表象部分（相分）的色等表象（相分）的種子，是第八識見分（Jianfen）的所緣緣。第七識（末那識，Manas）作為能熏習者，形成第八識見分（Jianfen）的種子，是自證分（Zizhengfen，自我認知）的所緣緣。自證分（Zizhengfen）等的種子產生自證分（Zizhengfen）等，也應如此。第六識（意識，Manovijnana）如果以第八識的見分（Jianfen）和相分（Xiangfen）為緣而熏習種子，就會同時熏習那兩個部分的種子。如果以虛空、心心所等作為表象部分（相分），也會熏習那生空等的表象（相分）的種子。但不是能熏習產生第八識的顯現的表象（相分）和見分（Jianfen）的種子。因為第八識不以虛空等為緣。這七識中，對於第八識的表象（相分）、見分（Jianfen）等，應該作四句分析。第六識具備后兩句，按道理可以知道。這就是兩種意義，與之前的論師不同。第六識對於第七識等，可以依此類推。 論：同一聚合，不同本體，因此不相互為緣。 述曰：第四個子門。就像一個眼識中，同時存在的心和心所，每一個都彼此不同，相互看待。

【English Translation】 English version: Xiangfen (Xiangfen, appearance): This treatise says that the previous moment's (Xiangfen) serves as the condition for the subsequent moment's (Xiangfen) because it can induce that function. They (referring to the Sautrantikas) believe that cause and effect are different in time. Since (the Xiangfen of the previous moment) is not the direct object of the five sense consciousnesses (five vijnanas), then the manifested appearance part (Xiangfen) of the five vijnanas of the previous moment becomes the imprinter, inducing the seed of the appearance part (Xiangfen), thereby producing the appearance part (Xiangfen) of the five vijnanas of the subsequent moment. The appearance (Xiangfen) of the previous moment powerfully produces the seeing part (Jianfen, the seer) of the consciousness of the subsequent moment, thus having the meaning of a condition. The consciousness of the subsequent moment arises with the appearance of the previous moment, thus having the meaning of what is conditioned. That is to say, the appearance part (Xiangfen) is taken as the Xingxiang (mental activity), and the essence (本質) is taken as the meaning of Shusoyuanyuan (indirectly perceived condition). Now, stating their meaning, allowing the subsequent seeing (Houjian, later view) of the five vijnanas to take the appearance (Xiangfen) of the previous moment's own consciousness as a condition. The five vijnanas and the seventh consciousness (Manas) also have three conditions in the past and future. The word '亦' also refers to the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana). It is not the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) because it cannot imprint and cannot induce seeds. Therefore, the appearance (Xiangfen) of the previous moment is not the object-condition of its own subsequent consciousness. The own consciousness of this master, before and after, is different from the previous meaning. Treatise: The first seven consciousnesses, in relation to the eighth consciousness, can imprint seeds of appearance and seeing. Commentary: If the subsequent consciousness takes the previous moment as the object-condition, then in the mutual observation of the categories of the eight consciousnesses themselves, the first seven consciousnesses may also have an object-condition in relation to the eighth consciousness. Because the first seven consciousnesses can all imprint and form the seeds of the appearance (Xiangfen) and seeing (Jianfen) of the eighth consciousness. That is to say, the first five consciousnesses, as the imprinter, form the seeds of the appearance (Xiangfen) of the eighth consciousness's appearance part (Xiangfen), such as form, etc., and are the object-condition of the seeing part (Jianfen) of the eighth consciousness. The seventh consciousness (Manas), as the imprinter, forms the seed of the seeing part (Jianfen) of the eighth consciousness, and is the object-condition of the self-awareness part (Zizhengfen). The seeds of the self-awareness part (Zizhengfen), etc., produce the self-awareness part (Zizhengfen), etc., and so on. If the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana) takes the seeing part (Jianfen) and appearance (Xiangfen) of the eighth consciousness as conditions and imprints seeds, it will simultaneously imprint the seeds of those two parts. If it takes emptiness, mental factors, etc., as the appearance part (Xiangfen), it will also imprint the seeds of the appearance (Xiangfen) of that emptiness, etc. But it is not able to imprint and produce the manifested appearance (Xiangfen) and seeing (Jianfen) seeds of the eighth consciousness. Because the eighth consciousness does not take emptiness, etc., as conditions. Among these seven consciousnesses, for the appearance (Xiangfen), seeing (Jianfen), etc., of the eighth consciousness, four possibilities should be analyzed. The sixth consciousness possesses the latter two possibilities, which can be understood reasonably. These are two meanings, different from the previous master. The sixth consciousness in relation to the seventh consciousness, etc., can be inferred by analogy. Treatise: The same aggregate, different entities, therefore they are not conditions for each other. Commentary: The fourth sub-section. Just like in one eye consciousness, the simultaneously existing mind and mental factors, each being different from each other, observe each other.

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是同聚而是別體。展轉相望唯有增上緣。見分．相分一切皆然。不相緣故。然此心．心所不相緣。相分所杖本質同。若見分．相分不相緣故。非如大眾部緣俱生心．心法故。若許緣者不同一所緣過。受不與心同一緣故。大乘見分不許自緣。亦有此妨。然極相近不緣俱法。說自證分既得自緣。即無前過但有後失　若爾如何名同一所緣　謂所杖質同名同一。非多見分共一親相分名為同也　若爾且如第八心王。不能緣心所之相。即無本質。如何名為同一所緣　同一所緣總有二義。一所杖質同名為同一。如五識等俱心所法。必同本識所變質生故。二相似名同一。即第八俱心．心所法。及第六識緣過．未等。雖或無本質不託他變。各各自變相似名同一。不要心王緣心所之境生名為同一也。此第一義。

論。或依見分至為觸等相質。

述曰。此第二釋。亦許相緣。或依見分同聚心．心所說不相緣。無緣俱時他見分故。此依因位。佛則不然　若依相分有相緣義。謂諸相分互為本質方得起故。如本識中諸法種子。為同時五所觸等相分本質。此顯其事。

論。不爾無色彼應無境故。

述曰。若不爾者。無色界中五種心所應無境故。既彼有境故。必以本識所變為質也。諸心．心所理例並然　然前師意各各緣自所變

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 是同聚而實為不同的個體。輾轉相望，唯有增上緣（指相互增益的條件）。見分（指能見的主觀部分）、相分（指被見的對象部分）一切都是如此，因為它們不互相緣（指相互作用）。然而，這個心和心所（指心理活動）並不互相緣。相分所依賴的本質是相同的。如果見分和相分不互相緣，那就不同於大眾部（佛教部派之一）所說的緣俱生心和心法。如果允許互相緣，就會出現不同一所緣的過失，因為受（指感受）不與心同一緣故。大乘的見分不承認自緣，也會有這種妨礙。然而，極其相近的法也不互相緣。說自證分（指能自我認識的部分）既然能夠自緣，就沒有前面的過失，但有後面的缺失。如果這樣，如何稱之為同一所緣呢？所謂同一所緣，是指所依賴的本質相同，而不是多個見分共同緣一個親相分。如果這樣，比如第八識（阿賴耶識，指儲存一切種子識），不能緣心所的相，就沒有本質，如何稱之為同一所緣呢？同一所緣總共有兩種含義：一是所依賴的本質相同，比如五識等俱心所法，必定與本識所變的本質相同；二是相似，即第八識俱心和心所法，以及第六識（意識）緣過去、未來等，即使沒有本質，不依賴其他變化，各自變化相似，也稱為同一。不需要心王（指主要的心識）緣心所的境而生，才稱為同一。這是第一種含義。 論：或者依據見分，作為觸等相的本質。 述曰：這是第二種解釋，也允許相緣。或者依據見分，與同聚的心和心所說不相緣，因為沒有緣俱時的其他見分。這是依據因位（指修行階段）。佛則不是這樣。如果依據相分，有相緣的含義，是指諸相分互相作為本質才能生起。比如本識中的諸法種子，作為同時五所觸等相分的本質。這是顯明其事。 論：如果不是這樣，無色界中應該沒有境故。 述曰：如果不是這樣，無色界（指沒有物質存在的禪定境界）中五種心所應該沒有境故。既然那裡有境，必定以本識所變為本質。諸心和心所的道理都是這樣。然而，前一位論師的意思是各自緣自己所變。

【English Translation】 English version They are together in assembly but are separate entities. Looking at each other in succession, there is only the 'Adhipati-pratyaya' (增上緣, dominant condition). The 'Dṛśya-bhāga' (見分, the seeing aspect) and 'Lakṣaṇa-bhāga' (相分, the seen aspect) are all like this, because they do not 'pratītyasamutpāda' (相緣, mutually arise). However, this 'citta' (心, mind) and 'caitasika' (心所, mental factors) do not 'pratītyasamutpāda'. The 'svabhāva' (本質, essence) that the 'Lakṣaṇa-bhāga' relies on is the same. If the 'Dṛśya-bhāga' and 'Lakṣaṇa-bhāga' do not 'pratītyasamutpāda', then it is not like what the 'Mahāsāṃghika' (大眾部, one of the early Buddhist schools) says about the 'sahabhūta-citta' (俱生心, co-arisen mind) and 'dharma' (心法, mental phenomena). If it is allowed that they 'pratītyasamutpāda', then there will be the fault of not being the same object, because 'vedanā' (受, feeling) does not arise with the mind from the same condition. The 'Dṛśya-bhāga' of the 'Mahāyāna' (大乘, Great Vehicle) does not admit self-arising, and there will also be this obstacle. However, even extremely close 'dharmas' (法, phenomena) do not 'pratītyasamutpāda' with co-arising 'dharmas'. Saying that the 'Svasaṃvedana-bhāga' (自證分, self-cognizing aspect) is able to self-arise, then there is no previous fault, but there is a later loss. If so, how is it called the same object? The so-called same object means that the 'svabhāva' that is relied upon is the same, and it is not that multiple 'Dṛśya-bhāgas' together arise from one 'Lakṣaṇa-bhāga'. If so, for example, the eighth 'citta-rāja' (心王, mind-king), the 'Ālaya-vijñāna' (阿賴耶識, storehouse consciousness), cannot arise from the 'lakṣaṇa' of the 'caitasikas', and there is no 'svabhāva'. How is it called the same object? The same object has two meanings in total: one is that the 'svabhāva' that is relied upon is the same, such as the 'caitasikas' that arise with the five 'vijñānas' (識, consciousnesses), which must be the same as the 'svabhāva' transformed by the 'Mūla-vijñāna' (本識, root consciousness); the second is similarity, that is, the 'citta' and 'caitasikas' that arise with the eighth 'vijñāna', and the sixth 'vijñāna' (意識, consciousness) that arises from the past and future, etc. Even if there is no 'svabhāva', and it does not rely on other transformations, each transformation is similar, and it is called the same. It is not necessary for the 'citta-rāja' to arise from the object of the 'caitasikas' to be called the same. This is the first meaning. Treatise: Or, according to the 'Dṛśya-bhāga', it is the 'svabhāva' of the 'sparśa' (觸, contact) and other 'lakṣaṇas'. Commentary: This is the second explanation, which also allows 'pratītyasamutpāda'. Or, according to the 'Dṛśya-bhāga', it is said that it does not 'pratītyasamutpāda' with the 'citta' and 'caitasikas' in the same assembly, because there is no other 'Dṛśya-bhāga' that arises at the same time. This is according to the stage of cause (因位, the stage of practice). The Buddha is not like this. If according to the 'Lakṣaṇa-bhāga', there is the meaning of 'pratītyasamutpāda', which means that the 'Lakṣaṇa-bhāgas' must be the 'svabhāva' of each other in order to arise. For example, the seeds of all 'dharmas' in the 'Mūla-vijñāna' are the 'svabhāva' of the 'sparśa' and other 'Lakṣaṇa-bhāgas' that arise at the same time. This shows the matter. Treatise: If not, there should be no object in the 'Arūpadhātu' (無色界, formless realm). Commentary: If not, there should be no object for the five 'caitasikas' in the 'Arūpadhātu'. Since there is an object there, it must be the 'svabhāva' transformed by the 'Mūla-vijñāna'. The principle of all 'citta' and 'caitasikas' is like this. However, the meaning of the previous teacher is that each arises from its own transformation.

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種子。然唯心王所變種子能生現行。非五所變。如眼根等無能生識用也。此師難曰。何故同一所緣分為二義。第八五數無本質也。前師解云。若必有本質。如第六識緣虛空時以何為質。第八心王不託五數境生。如何同本質。有說一切心必托本質方生。如緣虛空託名為本質。第八心王以五數所變相假力故為本質起。名同所緣。

論。設許變色至不同質故。

述曰。此依因位。果亦可然。至下當知。今此後師設許無色界第八亦變地獄之色。五所如。本識亦定緣種。勿第八俱六個見分境不同質故。自證分境許不同緣緣自見故。今依可爾說有本質。非要爾也。此義應思。同一所緣相似名同。各各變故。何要同質方名同也。又唯識之境取心內境。若待外質方生。良恐理乖唯識。是故前師甚可玩矣。

論。同體相分至但有增上。

述曰。第五子門。如一受相分與見同體。相望為緣者為見分二緣。謂所緣．增上。見分于境無所緣緣。但有增上。相與余分但為增上。若約疏所緣緣亦非。見與相分不相似故。或可說得。由相為緣見分生故。

第六子門。

論。見與自證相望亦爾。

述曰。謂見與自證如相與見能為二緣。自證與見但為一緣。如前說故。見與第四亦但一緣。此據親義。若疏所緣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：種子。然而只有心王（Citta-raja，指第八識阿賴耶識）所變的種子才能生出現行（指從潛在狀態變為實際狀態）。不是五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）所變的。比如眼根等沒有產生識別作用的能力。這位論師反駁說：為什麼同一個所緣（Alambana，指對像）要分為兩種意義？第八識和五識沒有本質。之前的論師解釋說：如果一定要有本質，比如第六識（意識）緣虛空時，以什麼作為本質？第八識心王不依賴五識的境界而生，如何能有相同的本質？有人說一切心識必須依賴本質才能產生，比如緣虛空時，把名稱作為本質。第八識心王憑藉五識所變現的相（Nimitta，指影像）的假力作為本質而生起，名為同所緣。 論：假設允許變色乃至不同質的現象存在。 述：這是依據因位的說法。果位也可以這樣理解。到後面會明白。現在這位後來的論師假設允許沒有第八識，也允許變現地獄之色，如同五識所變現的一樣。本識（阿賴耶識）也一定緣種子。不要認為第八識和六個見分（Darsana-bhaga，指能見的功能）的境界不同質。自證分（Svasamvedana-bhaga，指自我認知的功能）的境界允許不同緣，因為緣自見。現在依據可允許的情況說有本質，不是一定要這樣。這個意義應該思考。同一個所緣，相似的稱為同。因為各自變現的緣故。為什麼要相同性質才稱為同呢？而且唯識的境界是取心內的境界。如果等待外在的質才能產生，恐怕道理違背了唯識。所以之前的論師的說法很值得玩味。 論：同體的相分（Nimitta-bhaga，指影像部分）乃至只有增上緣（Adhipati-pratyaya，指增強和支援的條件）。 述：第五個子門。比如一個受（Vedana，指感受）的相分與見分同體。相互作為緣的是見分的兩種緣，即所緣緣和增上緣。見分對於境界沒有所緣緣，只有增上緣。相分與其餘分只是增上緣。如果按照疏所緣緣來說也不對，因為見分與相分不相似。或許可以說得通，因為相分作為緣，見分才產生。 第六個子門。 論：見分與自證分相互之間也是這樣。 述：見分與自證分如同相分與見分，能作為兩種緣。自證分與見分只作為一種緣，如同前面所說。見分與第四分（指證自證分）也只是一種緣。這是根據親近的意義來說。如果是疏所緣緣。

【English Translation】 English version: Seeds. However, only the seeds transformed by the Citta-raja (the eighth consciousness, Alaya-vijnana) can give rise to actual manifestations (from potential to actual states). Not those transformed by the five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses). For example, the eye-organ and others do not have the ability to generate cognitive functions. This master refutes, saying: Why is the same Alambana (object) divided into two meanings? The eighth consciousness and the five consciousnesses have no essence. The previous master explains: If there must be an essence, what serves as the essence when the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness) cognizes emptiness? The eighth consciousness, the Citta-raja, does not arise relying on the realm of the five consciousnesses, so how can it have the same essence? Some say that all consciousnesses must arise relying on an essence, such as when cognizing emptiness, the name is taken as the essence. The eighth consciousness, the Citta-raja, arises by relying on the borrowed power of the Nimitta (image) transformed by the five consciousnesses as its essence, and is called the same Alambana. Treatise: Suppose it is allowed that the transformation of form even leads to differences in substance. Commentary: This is based on the causal stage. The resultant stage can also be understood in this way. This will be understood later. Now, this later master supposes that even without the eighth consciousness, it is allowed to transform the form of the lower realms, just as the five consciousnesses transform. The fundamental consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) must also cognize seeds. Do not think that the realms of the eighth consciousness and the six Darsana-bhaga (seeing functions) are different in substance. The realm of the Svasamvedana-bhaga (self-awareness function) allows for different conditions because it conditions self-seeing. Now, based on what is permissible, it is said that there is an essence, but it is not necessarily so. This meaning should be considered. The same Alambana, similar ones are called the same. Because of the transformations of each. Why must they be of the same nature to be called the same? Moreover, the realm of Vijnanavada (Consciousness-only) takes the internal realm of the mind. If it waits for an external substance to arise, I am afraid the principle goes against Vijnanavada. Therefore, the previous master's statement is very worthy of contemplation. Treatise: The Nimitta-bhaga (image part) of the same entity is only an Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition). Commentary: The fifth sub-section. For example, the Nimitta-bhaga of one Vedana (feeling) is of the same entity as the Darsana-bhaga. Those that act as conditions for each other are the two conditions of the Darsana-bhaga, namely Alambana-pratyaya and Adhipati-pratyaya. The Darsana-bhaga has no Alambana-pratyaya for the realm, only Adhipati-pratyaya. The Nimitta-bhaga and the remaining parts are only Adhipati-pratyaya. If according to the commentary on Alambana-pratyaya, it is also incorrect, because the Darsana-bhaga and the Nimitta-bhaga are not similar. Perhaps it can be said to be valid, because the Darsana-bhaga arises because the Nimitta-bhaga is a condition. The sixth sub-section. Treatise: The Darsana-bhaga and the Svasamvedana-bhaga are also like this in relation to each other. Commentary: The Darsana-bhaga and the Svasamvedana-bhaga, like the Nimitta-bhaga and the Darsana-bhaga, can act as two conditions. The Svasamvedana-bhaga and the Darsana-bhaga only act as one condition, as mentioned earlier. The Darsana-bhaga and the fourth part (the Svasamvedanasamvedana-bhaga) are also only one condition. This is according to the meaning of closeness. If it is a distant Alambana-pratyaya.

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亦得有之。今約親說不相違也。

論。餘二展轉俱作二緣。

述曰。自證。及證自證為二。見分之餘也。展轉為二緣。互得相緣故。二與見．相分但為增上。

論。此中不依至。互為緣故。

述曰。然前相分與見為二緣。不言種子亦為相分得為因緣者。此中不依種子為相分說。以說現行互為緣故。又種為緣生分別者。前第一門以解訖故。此即現行染八識聚說為緣訖。

論。凈八識聚至能遍緣故。

述曰。凈八識聚若自．他身。自．他八識為緣。皆增所緣緣。以凈八識皆得緣他及自身者互得相緣故。即凈八識皆得互緣。同時心．心所。亦得互自緣同時心．心所。以彼功能遍現影故。識自證分與相應法見分同緣緣自見分。余凈心所義例亦然。又或能緣彼相分故。若不現彼影。應非知一切。又有解者。上文所言勿見分境不同質故。即識見分與相應見分定必同緣。如何自證與相應法見分。同緣識之見分不自緣也。若自緣者與自證分何別。若不緣者便違上文。今有二解。一云前依因位非依果說。依果說者見分之境亦不必同。又識等見分與相應法亦定同緣。亦自緣見分。亦緣自證分。與相應法見境齊故。然與自證作用各別。自證唯內緣更不別變。其見分自緣等亦更別變。然相分攝。與相應法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 也可能存在這種情況。現在根據親近關係來說，這並不矛盾。

論：其餘二者輾轉互相作為二緣。

述曰：自證分，以及證明自證分，這是兩種。是見分之外的部分。輾轉互相作為二緣，因為互相能夠成為彼此的緣故。二者與見分、相分都只是作為增上緣。

論：這裡不依據種子，是因為互相作為緣故。

述曰：然而前面說相分與見分是二緣，沒有說種子也可以作為相分的因緣，是因為這裡不依據種子來說相分。因為說的是現行互相作為緣故。而且種子作為緣而產生分別，在前面的第一門中已經解釋過了。這裡是說現行的染污八識聚互相作為緣。

論：清凈的八識聚，乃至能夠普遍地作為緣故。

述曰：清凈的八識聚，無論是自身還是他身，自身的八識還是他身的八識作為緣，都是增上所緣緣。因為清凈的八識都能夠緣他身和自身，互相能夠成為彼此的緣故。也就是說，清凈的八識都能夠互相作為緣。同時存在的心和心所，也能夠互相緣同時存在的心和心所。因為它們的功能普遍顯現影像的緣故。識的自證分與相應的法的見分，共同緣自見分。其餘清凈心所的道理也一樣。又或者能夠緣彼相分。如果不顯現那個影像，就不應該能知曉一切。還有一種解釋是，上面所說的不要認為見分的境界不同質。也就是說，識的見分與相應的見分必定共同緣。那麼自證分與相應的法的見分，共同緣識的見分，難道不自緣嗎？如果自緣，那與自證分有什麼區別？如果不緣，那就違背了上面的說法。現在有兩種解釋。一種說法是，前面是依據因位來說的，不是依據果位來說的。依據果位來說，見分的境界也不一定相同。而且識等的見分與相應的法也必定共同緣。也自緣見分，也緣自證分。與相應的法的境界相同。然而與自證分的作用各自不同。自證分只是向內緣，不再有別的變化。而見分自緣等也有別的變化。然而相分攝。 與相應的法

【English Translation】 English version: It is also possible to have this. Now, speaking in terms of close relationship, it is not contradictory.

Treatise: The remaining two mutually act as two conditions.

Commentary: Self-awareness (自證, svasaṃvedana) and the awareness of self-awareness are two. This is what remains of the seeing-aspect (見分, darśana-bhāga). Mutually acting as two conditions because they can mutually become each other's condition. These two, along with the object-aspect (相分, nimitta-bhāga) and seeing-aspect, only act as adhipati-pratyaya (增上緣, dominant condition).

Treatise: Here, we do not rely on seeds because they mutually act as conditions.

Commentary: However, earlier it was said that the object-aspect and the seeing-aspect are two conditions. It was not said that seeds can also be the hetu-pratyaya (因緣, causal condition) for the object-aspect because here we are not discussing the object-aspect in terms of seeds. Because it is said that the manifest (現行, vartamāna) mutually act as conditions. Moreover, the arising of discriminations from seeds has already been explained in the first section. Here, we are discussing the manifest defiled eight consciousness aggregates (八識聚, aṣṭa vijñāna kāya) acting as conditions.

Treatise: The pure eight consciousness aggregates, up to being able to universally act as conditions.

Commentary: The pure eight consciousness aggregates, whether in one's own body or another's, one's own eight consciousnesses or another's, all act as adhipati-ālambana-pratyaya (增上所緣緣, dominant objective condition). Because the pure eight consciousnesses can all cognize others and themselves, they can mutually become each other's conditions. That is to say, the pure eight consciousnesses can all mutually act as conditions. Simultaneously existing mind (心, citta) and mental factors (心所, caitta) can also mutually cognize simultaneously existing mind and mental factors. Because their function universally manifests images. The self-awareness aspect of consciousness and the seeing-aspect of the corresponding dharmas (法, dharma) commonly cognize the self-seeing-aspect. The meaning of the remaining pure mental factors is similar. Or, they can cognize that object-aspect. If they do not manifest that image, they should not be able to know everything. Another explanation is that what was said above, 'do not consider the realms of the seeing-aspect to be of different substance.' That is to say, the seeing-aspect of consciousness and the corresponding seeing-aspect must commonly cognize. Then, does the self-awareness aspect and the seeing-aspect of the corresponding dharmas, which commonly cognize the seeing-aspect of consciousness, not cognize themselves? If they cognize themselves, what is the difference between them and the self-awareness aspect? If they do not cognize themselves, then it contradicts what was said above. Now there are two explanations. One explanation is that the previous statement was based on the causal stage (因位, hetu-avasthā), not the resultant stage (果位, phala-avasthā). Based on the resultant stage, the realms of the seeing-aspect are not necessarily the same. Moreover, the seeing-aspect of consciousness and the corresponding dharmas must also commonly cognize. They also cognize the seeing-aspect themselves, and they also cognize the self-awareness aspect. They are the same as the realm of the corresponding dharmas. However, their functions are different from the self-awareness aspect. The self-awareness aspect only cognizes internally and does not change in any other way. The seeing-aspect's self-cognition, etc., also changes in other ways. However, the object-aspect includes. And the corresponding dharmas

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同外取故。相應法緣識既不外取別變相分。識之見分例亦應然。亦不違上見分境同。此義雖勝然稍難知。

論。唯除見分至能緣用故。

述曰。若通佛說。非見分等為相分所緣緣。一切相分是親所變名為相分。相分必無能緣用故。如化心等亦爾。化心不緣故。故此第三．四亦非相所緣。見分攝故。文中唯有見分非相分境也。不除同聚心．心所相緣。以得緣故。即顯自證分亦見所緣。現作相分緣故。如無分別智。唯是現量無外境故不緣。不同后得智。后得智見分返緣自證。作影像緣。仍是相分。不爾即與證自證無別。何須四分。由是一切心皆具四分。今緣相應法見分。緣自證分。亦能緣證自證分。證自證分亦能緣見分．相分者。唯在佛位餘者不能。此中但遮見分非相所緣。義遮第三．四分亦非相所緣。意顯餘三分互緣一切法。名遍緣故。雖作此解三分何別。各相似故。如前所得者親得。余新所得影說。故成差別　又解然今但遮相為能緣。及遮見分不緣自證。非顯餘二得緣一切。此不及前解。

論。既現分別至能作幾緣。

述曰。上來第一現起分別緣其種子．現行生訖。自下第二明種子亦應緣其現行．及種子起　此言緣者是緣藉義。非緣慮義。以種亦是分別攝故。今論解言緣生分別。現行．及種

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 同樣，因為是從外部獲取的緣故。既然相應法（Samprayukta-dharma，與心識相應的心理現象）的緣識（法緣識，指作為所緣對象的識）不從外部獲取，沒有別異的相分（Lakshana-bhaga，影像部分），那麼識的見分（Darshana-bhaga，能見部分）也應該如此，這也不違背上面所說的見分的境（Vishaya，對像）是相同的。這個道理雖然很好，但稍微難以理解。 論：唯獨見分不是相分所緣的，因為它具有能緣的作用。 述曰：如果按照佛的說法，不是見分等作為相分所緣的所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya，生起心識的客觀條件），一切相分都是親所變（直接變現）的，稱為相分。相分必定沒有能緣的作用，就像化心（幻化的心識）等也是如此。化心不能緣取，所以這第三、四分也不是相分所緣，因為它們屬於見分。文中只有見分不是相分的境。不排除同聚（同一集合）的心、心所（Caitasika，心理作用）相互緣取，因為它們能夠緣取。這就顯示出自證分（Svasamvedana-bhaga，自我認知部分）也是見分所緣。現在作為相分緣取，就像無分別智（Nirvikalpa-jnana，無分別的智慧），唯獨是現量（Pratyaksha，現前量）沒有外境所以不緣取，不同於后得智（Prsthalabdha-jnana，后得的智慧）。后得智的見分反過來緣取自證分，作為影像緣取，仍然是相分。否則就與證自證（Svasamvedanasamvedana，對自我認知的認知）沒有區別，何須四分。因此一切心都具有四分。現在緣取相應法的見分，緣取自證分，也能緣取證自證分。證自證分也能緣取見分、相分，唯獨在佛的果位才能做到，其餘的人不能。這裡只是遮止見分不是相分所緣，也暗示了第三、四分也不是相分所緣。意思是說其餘三分相互緣取一切法，稱為遍緣。雖然這樣解釋，三分有什麼區別呢？因為它們各自相似。就像前面所得的是親得，其餘新所得的是影像，所以構成差別。又一種解釋是，現在只是遮止相分作為能緣，以及遮止見分不緣取自證，並非顯示其餘二分能夠緣取一切。這種解釋不如前面的解釋。 論：既然現在分別緣取種子、現行，那麼能夠作為幾種緣？ 述曰：上面第一種是現起分別緣取它的種子、現行生起完畢。下面第二種是說明種子也應該緣取它的現行、以及種子生起。這裡說的緣，是緣藉的意思，不是緣慮的意思。因為種子也是分別所攝，現在論中解釋說緣生分別，現行、以及種子。

【English Translation】 English version: Similarly, because it is taken from the outside. Since the Samprayukta-dharma's (associated mental phenomena) Vijnana (consciousness) as Alambana-vijnana (object-consciousness), does not take from the outside, and has no distinct Lakshana-bhaga (image-part), then the Darshana-bhaga (seeing-part) of consciousness should also be the same, which does not contradict the above statement that the Vishaya (object) of the Darshana-bhaga is the same. Although this principle is good, it is slightly difficult to understand. Treatise: Only the Darshana-bhaga is not what the Lakshana-bhaga takes as its object, because it has the function of being able to cognize. Commentary: If according to the Buddha's explanation, it is not that the Darshana-bhaga, etc., are the Alambana-pratyaya (objective condition) of what the Lakshana-bhaga takes as its object. All Lakshana-bhagas are directly transformed, called Lakshana-bhaga. The Lakshana-bhaga certainly has no function of being able to cognize, just like the illusory mind (illusionary consciousness), etc., are also like this. The illusory mind cannot cognize, so these third and fourth parts are also not what the Lakshana-bhaga takes as its object, because they belong to the Darshana-bhaga. In the text, only the Darshana-bhaga is not the Vishaya (object) of the Lakshana-bhaga. It does not exclude the mutual cognition of mind and Caitasika (mental functions) in the same aggregate, because they are able to cognize. This shows that the Svasamvedana-bhaga (self-awareness part) is also what the Darshana-bhaga cognizes. Now it is taken as the Lakshana-bhaga, just like Nirvikalpa-jnana (non-discriminating wisdom), which is only Pratyaksha (direct perception) and has no external object, so it does not cognize, unlike Prsthalabdha-jnana (subsequent wisdom). The Darshana-bhaga of Prsthalabdha-jnana, in turn, cognizes the Svasamvedana-bhaga, taking it as an image, which is still the Lakshana-bhaga. Otherwise, there would be no difference from Svasamvedanasamvedana (self-awareness of self-awareness), so why would there be four parts? Therefore, all minds have four parts. Now the Darshana-bhaga that cognizes the Samprayukta-dharma, cognizes the Svasamvedana-bhaga, and can also cognize the Svasamvedanasamvedana-bhaga. The Svasamvedanasamvedana-bhaga can also cognize the Darshana-bhaga and the Lakshana-bhaga, which can only be done in the Buddha's position, and others cannot. Here, it only prevents the Darshana-bhaga from being what the Lakshana-bhaga cognizes, and also implies that the third and fourth parts are also not what the Lakshana-bhaga cognizes. It means that the remaining three parts mutually cognize all Dharmas (phenomena), called pervasive cognition. Although this explanation is made, what is the difference between the three parts? Because they are each similar. Just like what was obtained earlier is directly obtained, and the rest of what was newly obtained is said to be an image, so it constitutes a difference. Another explanation is that now it only prevents the Lakshana-bhaga from being able to cognize, and prevents the Darshana-bhaga from not cognizing self-awareness, and does not show that the remaining two parts can cognize everything. This explanation is not as good as the previous explanation. Treatise: Since the present discrimination cognizes the seed and the present activity, then how many conditions can it act as? Commentary: The first one above is that the present arising discrimination cognizes its seed and the present activity has finished arising. The second one below is to explain that the seed should also cognize its present activity, and the arising of the seed. The 'cognition' mentioned here means 'relying on', not 'deliberating'. Because the seed is also included in discrimination, now the treatise explains that it cognizes the arising discrimination, the present activity, and the seed.

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望於一種子能作幾緣問也。

論。種必不由至立彼二故。

述曰。種子必無等無間緣．所緣緣起。此之二緣四緣之中位居中故。以此二緣待心．心所為果方能生故。種非心等故非二緣果。

論。現於親種至但為增上。

述曰。今依因位。現行望自親所熏種能為二緣。即因．增上。唯除第八。及六識中極劣無記。非能熏故。與非親種不辨體故。除自種外。但一增上。

論。種望親種至亦但增上。

述曰。於一切位種子望自親種亦具二緣。除中二也。于異性非親種亦一增上。此中鉅細如理應思。準前顯后凈種亦爾。文言略之。與染同故。

此上總解緣生分別訖　次下第二總結有二。初結非。后破小乘心外之緣。

論。依斯內識至何固執為。

述曰。謂依內識若種．若現互為緣起。一切分別若因若果能生所生皆悉成立。汝等小乘所執心外之緣設有無用。況違理．教而固執何為。

論。雖分別言至具廣分別。

述曰。此略指也。下解彼彼分別。此言分別唯是有漏心．心所。中邊論說虛妄分別。謂是三界心．心所故。此非執心。然隨勝者聖教多門顯示。

有二三等者。至此卷下三性之中自當廣解　如餘論中具廣分別者。瑜伽三十八．七十三．七十四

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：一個種子能夠作為幾種緣起？

論：種子必然不通過等無間緣和所緣緣而生起，因為這兩種緣在四緣中位於中間位置。這兩種緣需要依賴心和心所作為結果才能產生。種子不是心或心所，因此不是這兩種緣的結果。

述曰：現在依據因位來說，現行（現起的行為）對於它自身親近所熏習的種子，能夠作為兩種緣：即因緣和增上緣。只有第八識（阿賴耶識）以及第六識（意識）中極其微弱的無記性（非善非惡）除外，因為它們不能熏習。與非親近的種子無法區分本體。除了自身種子之外，只能作為一種增上緣。

論：種子對於親近的種子，也只是作為增上緣。

述曰：在一切位次上，種子對於它自身親近的種子也具備兩種緣，除了等無間緣和所緣緣。對於異性的非親近種子，也只是一種增上緣。其中的細微之處應該如理思維。參照前面的內容，清凈的種子也是如此，這裡文字省略了，因為它與染污的種子相同。

以上總的解釋了緣起分別完畢。接下來第二部分總結，分為兩個部分。首先總結非理，然後破斥小乘宗派認為心外有緣的觀點。

論：依靠這種內在的識，無論是種子還是現行，都互相作為緣起。一切分別，無論是因還是果，能生還是所生，都能夠成立。你們小乘宗派所執著的心外之緣，即使存在也沒有用處，更何況違背道理和教義，為何還要固執呢？

論：雖然有分別的言說，但其中具有廣大的分別。

述曰：這裡是簡略的指代。下面解釋那些分別。這裡所說的分別，只是指有漏的心和心所。《中邊分別論》中說的虛妄分別，指的是三界的心和心所。這裡不是執著於心，而是隨著殊勝者，聖教從多個方面顯示。

有二、三等，到此卷下三性之中自然會詳細解釋。如同其他論中具有廣大的分別，例如《瑜伽師地論》第三十八卷、第七十三卷、第七十四卷。

【English Translation】 English version Question: How many conditions (緣, pratyaya) can a single seed (種子, bīja) act as?

Treatise: A seed definitely does not arise through the immediately preceding condition (等無間緣, samanantarapratyaya) or the object-support condition (所緣緣, ālambanapratyaya), because these two conditions are located in the middle position among the four conditions. These two conditions rely on mind (心, citta) and mental factors (心所, caitasika) as results in order to arise. A seed is not mind or a mental factor, therefore it is not the result of these two conditions.

Commentary: Now, based on the causal position, the manifest action (現行, vartamāna) in relation to the seed that is closely perfumed (熏, vāsanā) by itself can act as two conditions: namely, the causal condition (因緣, hetupratyaya) and the dominant condition (增上緣, adhipatipratyaya). Only the eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, ālayavijñāna) and the extremely weak neutral (無記, avyākrta) states in the sixth consciousness (意識, manovijñāna) are excluded, because they cannot perfume. It cannot be distinguished from non-intimate seeds in substance. Apart from its own seed, it can only act as one dominant condition.

Treatise: A seed in relation to an intimate seed is also only a dominant condition.

Commentary: In all positions, a seed in relation to its own intimate seed also possesses two conditions, excluding the immediately preceding condition and the object-support condition. In relation to a non-intimate seed of a different nature, it is also only one dominant condition. The subtleties within this should be contemplated according to reason. Referring to the previous content, the pure seed is also like this. The text is abbreviated because it is the same as the defiled seed.

The above concludes the general explanation of the differentiation of conditioned arising. Next, the second part is a summary, divided into two parts. First, summarizing the non-reason, and then refuting the view of the Hīnayāna school that conditions exist outside the mind.

Treatise: Relying on this inner consciousness, whether it is a seed or a manifest action, they mutually act as conditioned arising. All differentiations, whether cause or effect, that which can produce or that which is produced, can all be established. The conditions outside the mind that you Hīnayāna schools cling to, even if they exist, are useless. Moreover, they contradict reason and doctrine, so why do you still cling to them?

Treatise: Although there are differentiated statements, they contain vast differentiations.

Commentary: This is a brief reference. The following explains those differentiations. The differentiations mentioned here only refer to the afflicted mind and mental factors. The 'Discrimination Between the Middle and the Extremes' (Madhyāntavibhāga) says that false discrimination refers to the mind and mental factors of the three realms. This is not clinging to the mind, but rather, according to the superior ones, the holy teachings are revealed from many aspects.

Having two, three, etc., will be explained in detail in the section on the three natures later in this volume. As in other treatises, there are vast differentiations, such as in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volumes 38, 73, and 74.

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．顯揚等。並如下解。楞伽第五亦有十分別等也。

上來解此頌中。初依頌釋文。第二廣解。廣解中。初問緣生分別。第二答解。解中初解四緣等。第二解生分別。生分別中。初辨生現．種分別等。后總結　或從前釋中分三。初略解頌。次廣解。后結　或於廣中分三。初解四緣等。次明生分別。第三廣分別　或於此廣生分別分二。初辨生。后辨分別。余解同前　就明唯識相中。初廣分別三能變相。次前前頌明唯識訖　自前頌來解諸妨難。于中有二。初二頌釋違理難。后五頌釋違教難。初二頌解違理難中。上來已一頌訖　自下第二釋諸有情續生死難。前頌所明雖無外境。而諸分別皆緣所生不離內識。外人問曰。

論。雖有內識至生死相續。

述曰。此初寄問以發論端。雖知論主唯有內識。而既無有心外實緣。假說我法一切有情由何法故生死相續。若無心外緣生死不續難。

論。頌曰至復生余異熟。

述曰。上二句答相續所由。下二句正答相續。長行答中有四複次。至文當知。

論。諸業謂福至不善思業。

述曰。初釋中有二。初別解頌文。后總結頌意。別解頌中文分為四。上二句別解為二。下二句合解為一。第四總牒第一句由字。第三句既盡字。第四句復生等字。合解其頌

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：顯揚等論著中也有類似的解釋。例如，《楞伽經》第五卷也有關於十分別（十分類別的詳細區分）的論述。

以上是對這首偈頌的解釋。首先，依據偈頌解釋經文；其次，進行廣泛的解釋。在廣泛的解釋中，首先提問關於緣起和分別的問題；其次，回答解釋。在回答解釋中，首先解釋四緣等；其次，解釋生起和分別。在生起和分別中，首先辨別生起、顯現、種子和分別等；最後，進行總結。或者，從前面的解釋中分為三個部分：首先，簡略地解釋偈頌；其次，廣泛地解釋；最後，進行總結。或者，在廣泛的解釋中分為三個部分：首先，解釋四緣等；其次，闡明生起和分別；第三，廣泛地分別。或者，在此廣泛的生起和分別中分為兩個部分：首先，辨別生起；其次，辨別分別。其餘的解釋與前面相同。在闡明唯識相（唯識的相狀）中，首先廣泛地分別三種能變相（能變現萬法的相狀）；其次，前面的偈頌闡明唯識完畢。從前面的偈頌開始，解釋各種妨難。其中有兩部分：首先，用兩首偈頌解釋違背道理的妨難；其次，用五首偈頌解釋違背教義的妨難。首先，在用兩首偈頌解釋違背道理的妨難中，上面已經完成了一首偈頌的解釋。從下面開始，第二首偈頌解釋諸有情（一切有情眾生）延續生死的妨難。前面的偈頌所闡明的是，雖然沒有外境，但是各種分別都是由因緣所生，不離內在的識。外人問道：

論：『雖有內識至生死相續。』

述曰：這首先是借用提問來引出論端。雖然知道論主（指唯識宗的論師）主張只有內在的識，但是既然沒有心外的實在的因緣，那麼假設所說的我、法和一切有情，是由什麼法而生死相續呢？如果沒有心外的因緣，生死就不會延續，這是個難題。

論：『頌曰至復生余異熟。』

述曰：上面兩句回答相續的由來，下面兩句正式回答相續。長行的回答中有四個『複次』（進一步），到經文時自然會明白。

論：『諸業謂福至不善思業。』

述曰：最初的解釋中有兩個部分：首先，分別解釋偈頌的文字；其次，總結偈頌的意義。分別解釋偈頌的文字分為四個部分：上面兩句分別解釋為兩個部分，下面兩句合併解釋為一個部分。第四部分總括第一句的『由』字，第三句的『既盡』字，第四句的『復生』等字，合併解釋這首偈頌。

【English Translation】 English version: The Xianyang (Comprehensive Exposition) and other treatises also have similar explanations. For example, the fifth volume of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra also discusses the shifenbie (detailed distinctions of ten categories).

The above is the explanation of this verse. First, the sutra text is explained based on the verse; second, a broad explanation is given. In the broad explanation, first, a question is raised about the arising of conditions and discriminations; second, an answer and explanation are given. In the answer and explanation, first, the four conditions, etc., are explained; second, the arising and discriminations are explained. In the arising and discriminations, first, the arising, manifestation, seeds, and discriminations, etc., are distinguished; finally, a summary is made. Alternatively, from the previous explanation, it can be divided into three parts: first, a brief explanation of the verse; second, a broad explanation; and finally, a summary. Alternatively, in the broad explanation, it can be divided into three parts: first, the four conditions, etc., are explained; second, the arising and discriminations are clarified; and third, a broad discrimination is made. Alternatively, in this broad arising and discriminations, it can be divided into two parts: first, the arising is distinguished; and second, the discriminations are distinguished. The remaining explanations are the same as before. In clarifying the vijñaptimātratā (唯識相, the aspect of consciousness-only), first, the three aspects of transformation (三能變相, aspects that can transform and manifest all dharmas) are broadly distinguished; second, the preceding verses complete the clarification of vijñaptimātratā. Starting from the preceding verses, various objections are explained. Among them, there are two parts: first, two verses are used to explain the objections that contradict reason; and second, five verses are used to explain the objections that contradict doctrine. First, in using two verses to explain the objections that contradict reason, the explanation of one verse has already been completed above. Starting from below, the second verse explains the objection of how sentient beings (zhuyouqing, all sentient beings) continue in saṃsāra (生死, the cycle of birth and death). What the preceding verse clarified is that although there are no external objects, all discriminations arise from conditions and do not depart from the internal consciousness. An outsider asks:

Treatise: 'Although there is internal consciousness, up to the continuation of birth and death.'

Commentary: This first borrows a question to introduce the topic of the treatise. Although it is known that the author of the treatise (referring to the masters of the Vijñānavāda school) advocates that there is only internal consciousness, since there are no real external conditions, then assuming that the so-called self, dharma (法, phenomena), and all sentient beings, by what dharma (法, principle) do they continue in saṃsāra? If there are no external conditions, saṃsāra would not continue, which is a difficult problem.

Treatise: 'The verse says, up to again giving rise to other vipāka (異熟, results).'

Commentary: The above two lines answer the origin of the continuation, and the following two lines formally answer the continuation. In the prose answer, there are four 'furthermore' (fùcì, 復次), which will become clear when we reach the sutra text.

Treatise: 'All karma (業, actions), namely merit, up to unwholesome intentional karma.'

Commentary: The initial explanation has two parts: first, the words of the verse are explained separately; second, the meaning of the verse is summarized. The separate explanation of the words of the verse is divided into four parts: the above two lines are explained separately as two parts, and the following two lines are combined and explained as one part. The fourth part summarizes the word 'by' (yóu, 由) in the first line, the word 'already exhausted' (jìjìn, 既盡) in the third line, and the words 'again giving rise' (fùshēng, 復生) etc. in the fourth line, combining to explain this verse.

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。解第一句中。先解諸業。次解習氣。后總解之　以業有三故言諸業。此解業義如第一卷解。福等三業如對法第七．第八．及大論第九．五十三等解。福者勝義。自體及果俱可愛樂相殊勝故。非福者不可愛樂。自體及果俱不可樂。相鄙劣故。不動者不可改轉義。其業多少住一境界不移動故。又復移轉境如生得散善。亦從於定總名不動。對法論說。欲界系善業名福。瑜伽論言。謂感善趣異熟。及順五趣受善業名福。前是人．天總業。后是五趣別業。然說地獄亦有別善業者受等流果。如涼風觸身等。別相似業名為善也。又令地獄諸苦輕微名為善業。如不斷善等。又約六趣為論。除地獄取非天。五趣有善業果也　非福業者。瑜伽論云。謂感惡趣異熟。及順五趣異熟。初是三惡趣總業。后是五趣別業　不動者謂感色．無色界異熟。及順色．無色界受業前是總業。后是別業。對法論說。何故色．無色業名為不動。答如欲界余趣業。遇緣轉得余趣處受。彼業不爾。定於自處受故。問曰何故爾也。定所攝故。非同散業。若爾如何熏禪資下故業生五凈居。故此解非　又定地攝名為不動。以定能住於一境故。且福之名應通三界滿業。以上善業別有勝能名為不動。欲界善業別得總名也。然不動中順受別業瑜伽論少別。如彼抄解。然此三業通

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：現在解釋第一句。首先解釋諸業（各種業力），其次解釋習氣（長期薰染形成的習慣），最後總括地解釋它們。因為業有三種，所以稱為『諸業』。關於業的定義，可以參考第一卷的解釋。福業、非福業和不動業這三種業，可以參考《對法論》第七、第八卷以及《大智度論》第九、第五十三卷等處的解釋。福業是指殊勝的業，其自性和果報都令人喜愛，具有殊勝的相狀。非福業是指不可愛的業，其自性和果報都令人不悅，具有鄙劣的相狀。不動業是指不可改變和轉移的業，其業力多少都停留在同一境界，不會移動。此外，改變境界的業，例如生得的散善，也從屬於禪定，總稱為不動業。《對法論》說，欲界系的善業稱為福業。《瑜伽師地論》說，能夠感得善趣的異熟果，以及順於五趣感受的善業，稱為福業。前者是人、天總體的業，後者是五趣個別的業。然而，也有說地獄也有個別的善業，從而感受等流果，例如涼風吹拂身體等。與此相似的業稱為善業。或者，使地獄的諸苦減輕也稱為善業，例如不斷善根等。又從六趣的角度來說，除去非天，五趣都有善業果報。非福業，《瑜伽師地論》說，能夠感得惡趣的異熟果，以及順於五趣的異熟果。前者是三惡趣總體的業，後者是五趣個別的業。不動業是指能夠感得色界、無色界異熟果的業，以及順於色界、無色界感受的業。前者是總體的業，後者是個別的業。《對法論》說，為什麼色界、無色界的業稱為不動業？回答是，因為像欲界其他趣的業，遇到因緣可能會轉移到其他趣處感受果報，但色界、無色界的業不會這樣，必定在自身所處的境界感受果報。問：為什麼會這樣呢？因為是被禪定所攝持的，不同於散亂的業。如果這樣，為什麼熏修禪定會資助下劣的業，從而生到五凈居天呢？所以這種解釋是不正確的。此外，被禪定所攝持的業稱為不動業，因為禪定能夠安住于同一境界。而且，福業的名稱應該通於三界圓滿的業。以上善業具有特別殊勝的功能，所以稱為不動業。欲界的善業另外得到總體的名稱。然而，不動業中順於感受的個別業，《瑜伽師地論》略有不同，如彼處抄解。然而，這三種業是共通的。

【English Translation】 English version: Now, to explain the first sentence. First, explain the 『various karmas』 (諸業), then explain the 『habitual tendencies』 (習氣), and finally, explain them collectively. Because there are three types of karma, it is called 『various karmas.』 Regarding the definition of karma, refer to the explanation in the first volume. The three types of karma—meritorious karma (福業), non-meritorious karma (非福業), and unwavering karma (不動業)—can be found explained in 《Abhidharma-samuccaya》 (對法論) Volumes 7 and 8, as well as in 《Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra》 (大智度論) Volumes 9 and 53, etc. Meritorious karma refers to karma that is excellent, whose nature and result are pleasing, and possesses excellent characteristics. Non-meritorious karma refers to karma that is unpleasing, whose nature and result are unpleasant, and possesses inferior characteristics. Unwavering karma refers to karma that cannot be changed or transferred, whose karmic force remains in the same realm without moving. Furthermore, karma that changes realms, such as spontaneously arising wholesome deeds, also belongs to meditative concentration and is collectively called unwavering karma. 《Abhidharma-samuccaya》 states that wholesome karma belonging to the desire realm is called meritorious karma. 《Yogacarabhumi-sastra》 (瑜伽師地論) states that karma which can cause good destinies and wholesome karma that accords with the five destinies is called meritorious karma. The former is the general karma of humans and gods, while the latter is the individual karma of the five destinies. However, it is also said that there is individual wholesome karma in hell, thereby experiencing the result of outflow, such as a cool breeze touching the body, etc. Karma similar to this is called wholesome karma. Alternatively, alleviating the sufferings of hell is also called wholesome karma, such as not severing wholesome roots, etc. Moreover, from the perspective of the six destinies, excluding Asuras, the five destinies all have the result of wholesome karma. Non-meritorious karma, 《Yogacarabhumi-sastra》 states, is karma that can cause evil destinies and karma that accords with the results of the five destinies. The former is the general karma of the three evil destinies, while the latter is the individual karma of the five destinies. Unwavering karma refers to karma that can cause results in the form realm and formless realm, and karma that accords with the experiences of the form realm and formless realm. The former is general karma, while the latter is individual karma. 《Abhidharma-samuccaya》 states, why is karma of the form realm and formless realm called unwavering karma? The answer is, because like the karma of other destinies in the desire realm, it may transfer to other destinies to experience the result when encountering conditions, but the karma of the form realm and formless realm does not do this; it must experience the result in its own realm. Question: Why is this so? Because it is upheld by meditative concentration, unlike scattered karma. If this is the case, why does cultivating meditative concentration assist inferior karma, thereby being born in the Pure Abodes (五凈居天)? Therefore, this explanation is incorrect. Furthermore, karma upheld by meditative concentration is called unwavering karma, because meditative concentration can abide in the same realm. Moreover, the name meritorious karma should apply to karma that is complete in the three realms. The above wholesome karma has particularly excellent functions, so it is called unwavering karma. Wholesome karma of the desire realm additionally obtains the general name. However, the individual karma within unwavering karma that accords with experience is slightly different in 《Yogacarabhumi-sastra》, as explained there. However, these three types of karma are common.

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身．語．意。意業通三界。身．語唯二地。有尋．伺故。此體性者。即有漏善．不善二思為此業體。游履身．語身．語動作故名為業。身．語唯無記。非善．惡性故。唯以思為體。

此中為唯以思為業。為復有餘。

論。業之眷屬亦立業名。

述曰。即五蘊性。善．不善律儀實業眷屬故。余則可知。

何意眷屬亦說名業。

論。同招引滿異熟果故。

述曰。以皆與業同招引．滿異熟果故。不同小乘具十隨轉。無過．未世實四相故。此總．別果如第二卷已廣具解。

上來所說謂初作時即現起法。若異熟因非即受果。現既久滅如何感果。非過．未有故。為答此問故次論文。

論。此雖才起至當異熟果。

述曰。下解習氣。現行此業雖才起已更無異問而便即滅。無別義理可如薩婆多雖現用無有過．去體能招當來真異熟果。

若爾如何。

論。而熏本識至說為習氣。

述曰。現行之業當造之時。熏于本識起自業之功能。功能即是頌中所說為習氣者。

何以名習氣。

論。是業氣分至故名習氣。

述曰。是業氣分。解氣　由現熏習所成。解習　此業熏成不同無慚計業皆宿作。並是曾有。化地部等業入過去現皆有體。又此習氣簡薩

婆多等過去有體之曾業也。及簡順世外道說一切果唯現業所得作時即受。今此習氣理則不然。由過去無間滅現行熏習故。種子唸唸前滅後生恒現在有。故簡彼曾世有用於過去世現有業體。即此種子非作時即受果。后時或一生多年或多生等方始受果故。故簡現作業時即受果。由此義故有詮有遮。故名習氣。即解頌中習氣二字。總合此上解第一句下四字訖。

論。如是習氣至勝增上緣。

述曰。此善．不善業能感當來若別若總異熟之果勝增上緣。非同性故。非親能辨果體生故。

次解二取。此有八解。

論。相見名色至皆二取攝。

述曰。一相．見。謂即取彼實能取．實所取名二取。二者取名．色。色者色蘊。名者四蘊。即是執取五蘊為義。前言相中亦通取無為。以為本質故。今此唯顯取親所緣。不能緣得心外法故。又變無為之影相分亦名所攝。不離心等故。三者取心．及心所。一切五蘊法。不離此二故。四者本．末。謂取現果。第八識是諸異熟之根本故名之為本。余識中異熟名之為末。是第八識之末果故。即取二異熟也。謂愛樂執取緣取也。或第八識總報品名本。余識別報品名末。攝一切法盡。唯簡異熟。以極狹故。第五彼取者。即彼上四取也。即一取言。通上四處。是單取。及通彼上

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『婆多』（Bhava，存在）等指的是過去有實體的業。以及簡順世外道（一種外道）認為一切果報唯有現世所作之業才能獲得，即造業之時立即受報。但現在所說的『習氣』（Vāsanā，熏習）的道理並非如此。由於過去無間斷滅的現行熏習的緣故，種子唸唸前滅後生，恒常現在而有。所以簡順世外道認為過去世的業體現在仍然存在是有用的。而這裡的種子並非造業之時立即受果，而是之後或一生、多年，或多生等之後才開始受果。所以簡順世外道認為現世作業之時立即受果。由此意義，有詮釋也有遮止，所以名為『習氣』。以上解釋了頌中的『習氣』二字，總合以上解釋了第一句下的四個字。

論：如此習氣，至勝增上緣。

述曰：這些善業、不善業能夠感得當來的若別報、若總報的異熟果，是殊勝的增上緣。因為它不是同類因，也不能親自辨別果體的產生。

接下來解釋『二取』（Dvitīya，二取）。對此有八種解釋。

論：相、見、名、色，皆二取攝。

述曰：第一種是相、見。即是執取彼實能取、實所取，名為二取。第二種是取名、（此處原文缺失，指色法）。指的是色蘊，名指的是四蘊。即是執取五蘊為義。前面所說的『相』中也通取無為法，因為它是本質。現在這裡只顯示執取親所緣，因為不能緣得心外之法。又變現無為法的影像分也名為所攝，因為它不離心等。第三種是取心、及心所。一切五蘊法，都不離此二者。第四種是本、末。指的是取現果。第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）是諸異熟的根本，所以名為本。其餘識中的異熟名為末，因為它是第八識的末果。即是取二種異熟。指的是愛樂執取緣取。或者第八識的總報品名為本，其餘識的別報品名為末。攝盡一切法，唯獨簡略異熟，因為它極其狹隘。第五種是彼取，即是上面的四種取。即一個『取』字，通指上面的四處，是單取，也通指上面的。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Bhava' (existence), etc., refers to past karma that had substance. And the Jainas (a type of heterodox school) say that all fruits are obtained only from present karma, that is, one receives the retribution at the time of creating the karma. But the principle of 'Vāsanā' (habit energy, perfuming) is not like this. Because of the uninterrupted extinction of past active perfuming, the seeds are extinguished and arise moment by moment, constantly present. Therefore, the Jainas consider it useful that the body of past karma still exists in the present. But these seeds do not receive the fruit immediately upon creation of the karma, but only after a lifetime, many years, or many lifetimes, etc., do they begin to receive the fruit. Therefore, the Jainas believe that one receives the fruit immediately upon creating the present karma. Because of this meaning, there is both explanation and prohibition, so it is called 'Vāsanā'. The above explains the word 'Vāsanā' in the verse, and summarizes the four words below the first sentence.

Treatise: Such habit energy leads to the supreme dominant condition.

Commentary: These good and bad karmas can cause the future fruits of maturation, whether specific or general, and are the supreme dominant condition. Because it is not a homogeneous cause, it cannot personally distinguish the production of the fruit body.

Next, explain 'Dvitīya' (the second grasping). There are eight explanations for this.

Treatise: Appearance, perception, name, and form are all included in the second grasping.

Commentary: The first is appearance and perception. That is, grasping the real grasper and the real grasped is called the second grasping. The second is grasping name and * (the original text is missing here, referring to form). * refers to the form aggregate, and name refers to the four aggregates. That is, grasping the five aggregates as meaning. The 'appearance' mentioned earlier also includes grasping the unconditioned, because it is the essence. Now, this only shows grasping the directly conditioned, because it cannot condition external dharmas. Also, the image part that transforms the unconditioned is also called the grasped, because it is inseparable from the mind, etc. The third is grasping the mind and mental factors. All five aggregates of dharmas are inseparable from these two. The fourth is the root and the branch. It refers to grasping the present fruit. The eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) is the root of all maturation, so it is called the root. The maturation in the other consciousnesses is called the branch, because it is the final fruit of the eighth consciousness. That is, grasping the two types of maturation. It refers to the grasping of love and joy. Or the general retribution aspect of the eighth consciousness is called the root, and the specific retribution aspect of the other consciousnesses is called the branch. It encompasses all dharmas, only briefly mentioning maturation, because it is extremely narrow. The fifth is that grasping, which is the above four types of grasping. That is, the one word 'grasping' refers to the above four places, it is a single grasping, and it also refers to the above.

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。是重取。謂有取取前第一能．所取之取。如重緣心。取下三取亦然。故有八解。此八皆是二取所攝。即是現行之取也。或前四是境。彼取能取。但有四也。

何以名習氣。

論。彼所熏發至名二取習氣。

述曰。即彼八所熏發。親能生彼八。居在第八識上功能名二取習氣。即前八中皆具二義。名為習氣。皆有所生．能生義故。本末若為異熟解者。取為所取故亦具二義。即名言種由取二而生故能生本識。此非善．不善。但是無記親生之種。此中二取通七識所熏。隨其所應生第八識相．見分等。

此二取言欲顯何義。

論。此顯來世至諸因緣種。

述曰。顯當來世異熟果心。及心相應法。各望自果為因緣種子親能生果故。簡前業種。即顯名言種子生果無盡。隨所欲生便能生故。以心為主但言生心。實通五蘊。此當來世言。或一分位三世。或生死三世等可知。解第二句頌上四字訖。

論。俱謂業種至互相助義。

述曰。頌言俱者。謂前諸業。及后二取之種子俱。即是同時感生果也。非如小乘異熟因果必不同世也。作時受時雖世不同。種正受果時。必與果同世。以過．未世無體性故。

問于生果位親者因緣。若論感果力能勝者唯是業種。或二種既俱。何故頌中先說

【現代漢語翻譯】 是重複的『取』（Upadana，執取）。意思是說，在『取』之前，有一個能取和所取的『取』。例如，重複緣起的心。下面的三個『取』也是這樣。所以有八種解釋。這八種都屬於二取所攝，也就是現行運作的『取』。或者，前四個是境界，它們是能取，所以只有四種。

什麼叫做『習氣』（Vāsanā，習氣）？

論：由它們所熏習引發的，叫做二取習氣。

述記：就是由那八種『取』所熏習引發的，直接能夠產生那八種『取』，存在於第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）上的功能，叫做二取習氣。也就是前面的八識中都具有能取和所取的雙重含義，所以叫做習氣，因為它們都有所生和能生的含義。如果從異熟（Vipāka，異熟）的角度來解釋本末，『取』作為所取，也具有雙重含義。也就是說，名言種子（Nāma-rūpa-bīja，名言種子）由二取而生，所以能夠產生本識。這並非善或不善，而是無記（Avyākrta，無記）的直接產生的種子。這裡的二取，貫通七識所熏習，根據各自的情況產生第八識的相分（Nimitta-bhāga，相分）、見分（Darśana-bhāga，見分）等。

這裡說『二取』想要顯示什麼意義？

論：這顯示了未來世的異熟果心，以及與心相應的法，各自以自己的果為因緣種子，直接能夠產生果，所以不同於之前的業種。這顯示了名言種子產生果是無窮無盡的，隨想要產生什麼就能產生什麼。因為以心為主，所以只說產生心，實際上貫通五蘊（Pañca-skandha，五蘊）。這裡所說的未來世，或者是一分位的三世，或者是生死的三世等，可以這樣理解。第二句頌文的前四個字解釋完畢。

論：『俱』的意思是業種和二取種子互相幫助。

述記：頌文中的『俱』字，指的是前面的各種業，以及後面的二取種子，它們同時感生果。不像小乘佛教（Hinayana，小乘）的異熟因果必定不同世。造業的時候和受報的時候，雖然世不同，但是種子真正受果的時候，必定與果同世，因為過去世和未來世沒有自體性。

問：在產生果位的親近因緣中，如果說感果的力量最強大的是業種，或者說兩種都具備，為什麼頌文中先說

【English Translation】 It is the repeated 『grasping』 (Upadana). It means that before 『grasping』, there is a grasping of the grasper and the grasped. For example, a mind that repeatedly arises. The following three 『graspings』 are also like this. Therefore, there are eight explanations. These eight are all included in the two graspings, which are the currently operating 『graspings』. Or, the first four are the objects, and they are the graspers, so there are only four.

What is called 『habit energy』 (Vāsanā)?

Treatise: That which is熏習(xunxi) and developed by them is called the habit energy of the two graspings.

Commentary: That is, what is熏習(xunxi) and developed by those eight 『graspings』 directly produces those eight 『graspings』, and the function residing on the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) is called the habit energy of the two graspings. That is, the preceding eight consciousnesses all have the dual meaning of grasper and grasped, so they are called habit energy, because they all have the meaning of being produced and producing. If we explain the root and branch from the perspective of異熟(Vipāka), 『grasping』 as the grasped also has dual meaning. That is,名言種子(Nāma-rūpa-bīja) are produced by the two graspings, so they can produce the root consciousness. This is neither good nor unwholesome, but a neutral (Avyākrta) seed that is directly produced. Here, the two graspings permeate the熏習(xunxi) of the seven consciousnesses, and according to their respective situations, they produce the image-aspect (Nimitta-bhāga), seeing-aspect (Darśana-bhāga), etc., of the eighth consciousness.

What meaning is intended to be revealed by saying 『two graspings』 here?

Treatise: This reveals the different maturation fruit-mind of the future life, and the dharmas corresponding to the mind, each taking its own fruit as the causal seed, which can directly produce the fruit, so it is different from the previous karma seeds. This shows that the production of fruit by名言種子(Nāma-rūpa-bīja) is endless, and it can produce whatever it wants to produce. Because the mind is the main thing, it only says that it produces the mind, but it actually permeates the five aggregates (Pañca-skandha). The future life mentioned here can be understood as either a partial three periods of time, or the three periods of time of birth and death, etc. The explanation of the first four words of the second verse is completed.

Treatise: 『Together』 means that the karma seeds and the seeds of the two graspings help each other.

Commentary: The word 『together』 in the verse refers to the preceding various karmas and the following seeds of the two graspings, which simultaneously produce the fruit. It is not like the different maturation cause and effect of the Hinayana, which must be in different lifetimes. Although the time of creating karma and the time of receiving retribution are different, when the seed truly receives the fruit, it must be in the same lifetime as the fruit, because the past and future lifetimes have no self-nature.

Question: Among the close causal conditions for producing the fruit, if we say that the karma seeds have the strongest power to produce the fruit, or that both kinds are present, why does the verse first say

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業種。后說因緣。

論。業招生顯故頌先說。

述曰。業招生顯。由業感生勝故。顯故。故頌先說非因緣也。解第二句五個字訖。

論。前異熟者至業異熟果。

述曰。頌中所言前異熟者。謂前前生業異熟果。異熟果者。顯通總別。頌文狹故但言異熟。意亦通也。以過去世多生之業。同於一身得受果。謂前前生業異熟果也。又前前生業之異熟。非唯一生名前前也。又前前異熟體非一故。后亦當爾。

既第三句中不解下二字。解第四句先解下三字。謂余異熟等。將欲解頌既盡等言故。先發言云。

論。雖二取種至性同易感。

述曰。二取種子受果無窮。攝大乘第三說無受盡相。業習氣有盡。彼論說為有受盡相故。所以者何。由異熟果一者性別。與業性殊不多相順。二者難招業雖招得。謂必異世果方熟也。故業習氣有盡。如沉麝穢草有萎歇故。其等流果．及增上果。一者性同。體性相順。二者易感。同時生故。此念熏已即能生果。故二取種易感果也。何者為等流。何者為增上。增上寬。但等流必增上。等流者謂種子與現行及自種。為俱生同類因故也。增上更無別體。即等流性故　又解是等流果故性同。是增上果故易感。以具二果故具二義也。又種望現行是增上。望自類種是等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 業的種類。後面講述因緣。

論：因為業能招感果報，所以偈頌先說業。

述記：業能招感果報，因為由業所感的果報殊勝而明顯。因此偈頌先說業而不是因緣。解釋第二句的五個字完畢。

論：前面所說的異熟，指的是業的異熟果。

述記：偈頌中所說的『前異熟者』，指的是前一前一生所造的業的異熟果。『異熟果者』，顯示了總相和別相。因為偈頌的文字簡略，所以只說了『異熟』，但意思也包括了總相和別相。因為過去世多次所造的業，會在同一身受果報，所以說是前一前一生業的異熟果。而且，前一前一生業的異熟，並非只有一生才稱為前一前一。此外，前一前一異熟的本體並非單一，所以後面的情況也應該如此。

既然第三句中沒有解釋『下二字』，就先解釋第四句的『下三字』，指的是其餘的異熟等。將要解釋偈頌中『既盡』等字，所以先說明如下。

論：雖然二取種子受果無窮，但體性相同，容易感果。

述記：二取種子受果無窮無盡。《攝大乘論》第三說沒有受盡之相。業的習氣有窮盡的時候，該論說為有受盡之相。為什麼呢？因為異熟果一方面在性質上與業的性質不同，不太相順；另一方面難以招感，業雖然能招感，但必須經過不同的世才能成熟。所以業的習氣有窮盡的時候，就像沉香、麝香和穢草一樣，會有衰敗消失的時候。而等流果和增上果，一方面性質相同，體性相順；另一方面容易感果，因為是同時產生的。這個念頭熏習之後就能產生果報。所以二取種子容易感果。什麼是等流果？什麼是增上果？增上果範圍更廣，但等流果一定是增上果。等流果指的是種子與現行以及自類種子，是俱生同類因的緣故。增上果沒有別的本體，就是等流的性質。又解釋說，因為是等流果，所以性質相同；因為是增上果，所以容易感果。因為它具有兩種果報，所以具有兩種含義。此外，種子相對於現行是增上，相對於自類種子是等流。

【English Translation】 English version The types of karma. Later, the causes and conditions will be discussed.

Treatise: Because karma can bring about (generate) results, the verse first speaks of karma.

Commentary: Karma can bring about results because the results produced by karma are superior and evident. Therefore, the verse first speaks of karma and not causes and conditions. The explanation of the five words in the second line is now complete.

Treatise: The previously mentioned 'different maturation' refers to the result of karma's different maturation.

Commentary: The 'previous different maturation' mentioned in the verse refers to the result of the differently matured karma from previous lives. 'Differently matured result' indicates both the general and specific aspects. Because the wording of the verse is concise, it only mentions 'different maturation,' but the meaning also includes the general and specific aspects. Because the karma created in many past lives can be experienced in the same lifetime, it is said to be the differently matured result of karma from previous lives. Moreover, the different maturation of karma from previous lives is not limited to just one lifetime to be called 'previous.' Furthermore, since the substance of previous different maturation is not singular, the same should apply to later situations.

Since the 'following two words' in the third line are not explained, the 'following three words' in the fourth line are explained first, referring to the remaining different maturations, etc. Intending to explain words like 'exhausted' in the verse, the following is stated first.

Treatise: Although the seeds taken from the two (types of karma) produce endless results, they are of the same nature and easily felt.

Commentary: The seeds taken from the two (types of karma) produce endless results. The third chapter of the Saṃgraha Mahāyāna (Compendium of the Great Vehicle) states that there is no aspect of exhaustion of reception. The habitual energy of karma has an end; that treatise says there is an aspect of exhaustion of reception. Why is this so? Because, on the one hand, the result of different maturation differs in nature from the nature of karma and is not very agreeable. On the other hand, it is difficult to bring about; although karma can bring it about, it must mature in a different lifetime. Therefore, the habitual energy of karma has an end, just like agarwood, musk, and foul grass, which wither and disappear. However, the outflowing result (niṣyanda-phala) and the dominating result (adhipati-phala) are, on the one hand, of the same nature and in harmony with the substance; on the other hand, they are easily felt because they arise simultaneously. After this thought is perfumed, it can produce results. Therefore, the seeds taken from the two (types of karma) easily produce results. What is the outflowing result? What is the dominating result? The dominating result has a broader scope, but the outflowing result is definitely a dominating result. The outflowing result refers to the seed, the present action, and the seed of its own kind, because they are the co-arisen causes of the same type. The dominating result has no separate substance; it is the nature of the outflowing result. Furthermore, it is explained that because it is an outflowing result, it is of the same nature; because it is a dominating result, it is easily felt. Because it possesses two types of results, it possesses two meanings. Moreover, the seed is dominating relative to the present action, and it is outflowing relative to the seed of its own kind.

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流。業種望彼現及種皆異性故但是異熟。

上來已別解頌文。下欲解意。並解第一句由字．第三句既盡二字。第四句復生字故。

論。由感餘生至余異熟果。

述曰。由感當來餘生業等種子熟故。於今身中前異熟果受用盡時。即是此身臨終之位。彼所熟業復別能生后余果起。即先果盡時。後果業種熟。其異熟果而復得生。所以生死不斷絕也　由感餘生者。解由字。由者緣由也。前果盡時者。解既盡　復別生果等者。解余異熟復生也。

下結答難。

論。由斯生死至方得相續。

述曰。由此所說業果無斷。生死相續輪轉無窮。何假藉心外之緣。方得生死相續。此結答也。

論。此頌意說至為彼性故。

述曰。總此頌意。由業及二取為緣為因故生死輪迴皆不離識。非心外法令生死續。以業．二取不離心．心所而得相續。為生死因果之體性故也。

論。複次生死相續至總有三種。

述曰。第二複次。解頌答問。于中有三。一總標。二別解。三指例。此初也。今三習氣即攝論第三．第四三種熏習。

論。一名言習氣至各別親種。

述曰。別解有二。初別解三。后配屬頌。但此名言分為二種攝一切法習氣盡也。此是三性諸法因緣。彼論但有言說熏習

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 流（Srota，指生命之流）。業的種類和希望它們顯現的時間以及種類都是不同的，因此只是異熟果（Vipāka，指成熟的果報）。

上面已經分別解釋了頌文。下面想要解釋頌文的意義，並解釋第一句中的『由』字、第三句中的『既盡』二字，以及第四句中的『復生』字。

論：由於感受其餘生的業等。

述曰：由於感受未來其餘生的業等種子成熟的緣故，在今生之中，先前的異熟果受用完畢之時，就是此身臨終之際。那些成熟的業又能夠產生後續的其餘果報生起，即先前的果報結束時，後續的業的種子成熟，其異熟果又能夠產生，所以生死才不會斷絕。『由於感受其餘生』，是解釋『由』字，『由』是緣由的意思。『先前果報結束時』，是解釋『既盡』。『又產生果等』，是解釋其餘異熟果又產生。

下面總結回答疑問。

論：因此生死相續，乃至才能相續。

述曰：由此所說的業果沒有斷絕，生死相續輪轉沒有窮盡，何必假借心外的因緣，才能使生死相續呢？這是總結回答。

論：此頌的意義是說，乃至是它們的體性。

述曰：總而言之，這首頌的意義是，由於業和二取（二取，指能取和所取）作為緣和因的緣故，生死輪迴都不離識。不是心外的法能夠令生死延續，因為業和二取不離心和心所，才能相續，是生死因果的體性。

論：再次，生死相續，乃至總共有三種。

述曰：第二次『再次』。解釋頌文回答提問。其中有三點：一、總標；二、別解；三、指例。這是第一點。現在的三種習氣，就是《攝大乘論》第三、第四中的三種熏習。

論：一名言習氣，乃至各自不同的親因種子。

述曰：分別解釋有二點：首先分別解釋三種習氣，然後配屬頌文。但是這裡的名言分為兩種，涵蓋一切法的習氣都包括在內了。這是三性諸法的因緣。那部論典只有言說熏習。

【English Translation】 English version Srota (stream): The types of karma, the times they are hoped to manifest, and the types are all different; therefore, they are merely Vipāka (mature fruition).

The verses have been explained separately above. Now, the intention is to explain the meaning of the verses, and to explain the word 'by' (由) in the first line, the two words 'already exhausted' (既盡) in the third line, and the word 'again arises' (復生) in the fourth line.

Treatise: Because of experiencing the karma of the remaining lives, etc.

Commentary: Because of experiencing the ripening of the seeds of karma, etc., of the remaining future lives, when the previous Vipāka is exhausted in this present life, it is the time of the end of this body. The matured karma can again produce the subsequent remaining fruits, that is, when the previous fruit ends, the seeds of the subsequent karma mature, and the Vipāka can arise again, so that birth and death are not interrupted. 'Because of experiencing the remaining lives' is to explain the word 'by,' which means the cause. 'When the previous fruit ends' is to explain 'already exhausted.' 'Again produces fruits, etc.' is to explain that the remaining Vipāka arises again.

Below, the doubts are answered in conclusion.

Treatise: Therefore, the continuity of birth and death, until it can continue.

Commentary: From what has been said, the karma and its results are not interrupted, and the cycle of birth and death continues endlessly. Why should we borrow external causes to make birth and death continue? This is the concluding answer.

Treatise: The meaning of this verse is that, even to their nature.

Commentary: In summary, the meaning of this verse is that, because karma and the two graspings (dualistic grasping of grasper and grasped) are the conditions and causes, the cycle of birth and death is inseparable from consciousness. It is not an external dharma that can make birth and death continue, because karma and the two graspings are inseparable from mind and mental factors, and can continue, which is the nature of the cause and effect of birth and death.

Treatise: Furthermore, the continuity of birth and death, until there are three types in total.

Commentary: The second 'furthermore.' Explaining the verses to answer the questions. There are three points: first, a general statement; second, separate explanations; and third, pointing out examples. This is the first point. The current three habitual energies are the three types of perfuming in the third and fourth sections of the Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle.

Treatise: The first is the habitual energy of names and words, even to the seeds of their respective close causes.

Commentary: There are two separate explanations: first, separate explanations of the three habitual energies, and then matching them with the verses. However, the names and words here are divided into two types, covering all the habitual energies of all dharmas. This is the cause and condition of the three natures of all dharmas. That treatise only has the perfuming of speech.

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論。名言有二至音聲差別。

述曰。唯第六識能緣其名能發其名。余皆不緣亦不能發。即唯詮義音聲之差別。簡非詮表聲。彼非名故。名唯無記。瑜伽七十二五法中說故。聲自性唯無記。然聲有表是業性攝。以能表思名為三性。體唯無記。名非業性。故從聲本說為無記。然名是聲屈曲差別。唯無記性。不能熏成色．心等種。然因名故心隨其名變似五蘊三性法等而熏成種。因名起種名名言種。一切熏種皆由心．心所。心．心所熏種。有因外緣。有不依外。不依外者名顯境名。若依外者名錶義名。以分二別。然名自體不能熏種　問曰如緣五境而熏種等亦依外緣。何不別說因義熏習　答境非勝緣。因境而心熏。但是顯境所攝。有能詮之法。令因起執流轉生死。帶此勝用為緣而熏故。立表義名言熏習。又一切法名為先故想。名在於內發詮召法勝。但說依名不說依境。若依無漏名熏種。此唯無漏善。內名為緣熏五蘊種心變似故。雖亦依句等而成熏習。總說為名詮召諸法名最勝故。從勝為目但說名言熏習。名言進退攝句字故。

論。二顯境名言至心心所法。

述曰。即能了境心．心所法。即是一切七識見分等心。非相分心。不能顯境故。此見分等實非名言。如言說名顯所詮法。此心．心所能顯所了境

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：名言有二，在於音聲的差別。

述曰：只有第六識（意識，the sixth consciousness）能夠緣取名相，也能夠發出名相。其他的識都不能緣取，也不能發出。這裡所說的名言，僅僅是能詮釋意義的音聲的差別，排除了不能詮釋表達的音聲，因為那些不是名相。名相本身只有無記性（neither good nor bad）。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第七十二卷的五法中這樣說。音聲的自性也只有無記性。然而，音聲中有能表達意義的部分，屬於業性（karmic nature）所攝。因為能夠表達思慮的音聲被稱為三性（three natures）。其本體只有無記性。名相不是業性。因此，從音聲的根本來說，它是無記性的。然而，名相是音聲的屈曲變化，只有無記性，不能熏習成為色（form）、心（mind）等種子（seed）。然而，因為名相的緣故，心隨著名相變化，類似於五蘊（five aggregates）、三性法等，從而熏習成為種子。因為名相而產生的種子，稱為名言種子。一切熏習的種子都由心和心所（mental factors）產生。心和心所熏習的種子，有依靠外緣的，也有不依靠外緣的。不依靠外緣的，稱為顯境名（manifesting object name）。依靠外緣的，稱為表義名（expressing meaning name）。以此來區分二者。然而，名相本身不能熏習種子。問：如果緣取五境（five sense objects）而熏習種子等，也依靠外緣，為什麼不另外說明因為境界的熏習？答：境界不是殊勝的因緣。因為境界而心熏習，但這只是顯境所攝。有能夠詮釋的法，使得因緣生起執著，流轉生死。帶著這種殊勝的作用作為因緣而熏習，所以建立表義名言熏習。而且，一切法都是以名為先導，想（thought）也是如此。名相在於內在，發出詮釋，召感法的作用殊勝。所以只說依靠名相，而不說依靠境界。如果依靠無漏（without outflows）的名相熏習種子，這隻有無漏善（wholesome without outflows）。內在的名相作為因緣，熏習五蘊的種子，心隨之變化。雖然也依靠語句等而成就熏習，但總的來說，稱為名言熏習，因為名相詮釋諸法的作用最殊勝。從殊勝的角度來說，只說名言熏習。名言的進退包含了語句和文字。

論：二，顯境名言，乃至心心所法。

述曰：即能夠了知境界的心和心所法。即是一切七識（seven consciousnesses）的見分（seeing-portion）等心，不是相分（appearance-portion）心，因為相分心不能顯現境界。這些見分等實際上不是名言。如同言說名相，顯現所詮釋的法，這些心和心所能夠顯現所了知的境界。

【English Translation】 English version Treatise: There are two kinds of verbal expression (nāma-vacana), differing in sound.

Commentary: Only the sixth consciousness (意識, the sixth consciousness) can apprehend names and utter them. The others neither apprehend nor utter them. These verbal expressions are merely the differences in sounds that express meanings, excluding sounds that do not express anything, as those are not names. Names are only neutral (avyākṛta). This is stated in the five dharmas in the seventy-second fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The nature of sound itself is only neutral. However, sound has expressive aspects that are included in karmic nature (karma-svabhāva), because the sound that expresses thought is called the three natures (tri-svabhāva). Its substance is only neutral. Names are not karmic in nature. Therefore, from the root of sound, it is said to be neutral. However, names are the inflections and variations of sound, and are only neutral in nature, unable to imprint seeds of form (rūpa), mind (citta), etc. However, because of names, the mind changes according to the names, resembling the five aggregates (pañca-skandha), the three natures, and other dharmas, thereby imprinting seeds. The seeds that arise because of names are called verbal expression seeds. All imprinted seeds are produced by the mind and mental factors (citta-caitta). The seeds imprinted by the mind and mental factors have causes that rely on external conditions, and some that do not rely on external conditions. Those that do not rely on external conditions are called manifesting object names (顯境名, viṣaya-pratibhāsa-nāma). Those that rely on external conditions are called expressing meaning names (表義名, artha-abhidhāna-nāma). These are distinguished in this way. However, names themselves cannot imprint seeds. Question: If apprehending the five sense objects (pañca-viṣaya) imprints seeds, etc., and also relies on external conditions, why not separately explain the imprinting due to the conditions of the objects? Answer: Objects are not superior conditions. The mind imprints because of the objects, but this is included in manifesting objects. There are dharmas that can express meaning, causing conditions to arise attachment and transmigrate through saṃsāra. Carrying this superior function as a condition, it imprints, therefore establishing the imprinting of expressing meaning verbal expressions. Moreover, all dharmas are preceded by names, and so is thought. Names are internal, and the function of uttering expression and summoning dharmas is superior. Therefore, only relying on names is mentioned, not relying on objects. If relying on undefiled (anāsrava) names imprints seeds, this is only undefiled wholesome (kuśala). The internal name serves as a condition, imprinting the seeds of the five aggregates, and the mind changes accordingly. Although it also relies on phrases, etc., to accomplish imprinting, it is generally called verbal expression imprinting, because the function of names in expressing dharmas is most superior. From the perspective of superiority, only verbal expression imprinting is mentioned. The advancement and retreat of verbal expressions include phrases and words.

Treatise: Second, manifesting object verbal expressions, up to the mind and mental factors.

Commentary: That is, the mind and mental factors that can understand objects. That is, the seeing-portion (darśana-bhāga) of all seven consciousnesses (sapta-vijñāna), etc., not the appearance-portion (nimitta-bhāga) of the mind, because the appearance-portion of the mind cannot manifest objects. These seeing-portions, etc., are actually not verbal expressions. Just as speaking of names manifests the dharmas that are expressed, these minds and mental factors can manifest the objects that are understood.

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如彼故名之為名。體非名也。名體是彼不相應行故。又如四蘊名名體即是名。能顯義故。瑜伽論中第五十六說。順趣種種所緣境義。依言說名分別種種所緣境義。四蘊名名。是通三性見．相分種。境從見說亦名名也。了境心等之所了也。即通三界有漏無漏。即攝一切有為法盡。攝論唯據言說名。唯有漏也。

論。隨二名言至各別因緣。

述曰。隨二為緣相分等中熏五蘊種親辨體故。

論。二我執習氣至我我所種。

述曰。此令自他成其差別通六．七識。非如攝論唯說第七。

論。一俱生我執至自他差別。

述曰。因我執故相分之中亦熏五蘊種。即名言熏習。由熏我執種令自他別故別立之也。初通六．七。后唯第六。其文易解。無勞更釋。

論。三有支習氣至善惡趣別。

述曰。有謂三有。支者因義。分義。即三有因生善．惡趣差別因也。通六識皆有此熏。余文可知。然不善中所言諸者。顯惡多於善。令生厭故。令五趣別由業力也。

論。應知我執至是增上緣。

述曰。此後二種望異熟果是增上緣。以異性故。我執相分所熏成種。雖作因緣親生本識。見分種子令彼自他差別故成增上。此中名言種。與異熟果為因緣親生故。有支為增上緣異性故。我執種子

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 如彼故名之為名。體並非名本身。名和體是彼此不相應的行蘊，所以說體非名。又如受、想、行、識四蘊，名為名，體即是名本身，因為它能顯現意義。《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷中說，順應趣向種種所緣境的意義，依靠言語名相來分別種種所緣境的意義。四蘊名為名，是通於三性（善、惡、無記）的見分、相分種子。境從見分來說，也可以稱為名，是能被了境之心等所了知的。這通於三界（欲界、色界、無色界）的有漏和無漏法，即涵蓋了一切有為法。而《攝大乘論》僅根據言語名相，所以只包含有漏法。

論：隨二名言至各別因緣。

述記：隨二者，即以名言和作意為緣，在相分等中熏習五蘊的種子，從而親自分辨其體性。

論：二我執習氣至我我所種。

述記：這使得自和他者之間形成差別，通於第六識和第七識。不像《攝大乘論》中只說第七識。

論：一俱生我執至自他差別。

述記：因為我執的緣故，在相分之中也熏習五蘊的種子，這就是名言熏習。由於熏習我執的種子，使得自他和他人有所區別，所以特別立出這一條。最初通於第六識和第七識，後來唯有第六識。文句容易理解，無需再做解釋。

論：三有支習氣至善惡趣別。

述記：有，指三有（欲有、色有、無色有）。支，是因的意思，也是分的意思。即三有的因，產生善趣和惡趣的差別因。通於六識都有這種熏習。其餘文句可以理解。然而在不善中所說的『諸』字，顯示惡多於善，令人產生厭惡。令五趣（地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、天）產生差別，是由業力所致。

論：應知我執至是增上緣。

述記：這後面的兩種（我執和有支）望向異熟果（異熟果：由善惡業所招感的果報）來說，是增上緣。因為是異性的緣故。我執相分所熏習而成的種子，雖然作為因緣親生本識，但見分種子令彼自他和他人產生差別，所以成為增上緣。此中名言種，與異熟果為因緣親生。有支作為增上緣，因為是異性的緣故。我執種子

【English Translation】 English version That which is called a name is merely a name. The substance is not the name itself. The name and the substance are non-associated with each other; therefore, the substance is not the name. Furthermore, like the four skandhas (aggregates) of sensation (受, vedanā), perception (想, saṃjñā), mental formations (行, saṃskāra), and consciousness (識, vijñāna), the name is the name, and the substance is the name itself because it can manifest meaning. The fifty-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states that it accords with the meaning of approaching various objects of cognition, relying on verbal names to differentiate the meanings of various objects of cognition. The four skandhas are called names, which are common to the seeds of the seeing-aspect (見分, darśana-bhāga) and the object-aspect (相分, nimitta-bhāga) of the three natures (善, kuśala; 惡, akuśala; 無記, avyākṛta). The object, from the perspective of the seeing-aspect, can also be called a name, which is what is cognized by the mind that cognizes objects. This is common to the conditioned (有漏, sāsrava) and unconditioned (無漏, anāsrava) dharmas of the three realms (欲界, kāmadhātu; 色界, rūpadhātu; 無色界, arūpadhātu), encompassing all conditioned dharmas. However, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha only considers verbal names, so it only includes conditioned dharmas.

Treatise: Following the two verbal expressions, [they lead] to separate causes and conditions.

Commentary: 'Following the two' means that by relying on verbal expressions and attention, the seeds of the five skandhas are perfumed in the object-aspect, etc., thereby personally distinguishing their nature.

Treatise: The habit-energy of the two ego-grasps [leads] to the seeds of 'I' and 'mine'.

Commentary: This causes the distinction between self and others, encompassing the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. It is not like the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, which only speaks of the seventh consciousness.

Treatise: The co-arisen ego-grasp [leads] to the distinction between self and others.

Commentary: Because of the ego-grasp, the seeds of the five skandhas are also perfumed in the object-aspect. This is the verbal expression perfuming. Because the seeds of the ego-grasp are perfumed, causing the distinction between self and others, this is specifically established. Initially, it encompasses the sixth and seventh consciousnesses; later, it is only the sixth consciousness. The text is easy to understand and requires no further explanation.

Treatise: The habit-energy of the three existences [leads] to the distinction between good and evil destinies.

Commentary: 'Existence' refers to the three existences (三有: desire realm, form realm, formless realm). 'Support' means cause or division. That is, the cause of the three existences produces the cause of the distinction between good and evil destinies. All six consciousnesses have this perfuming. The remaining text is understandable. However, the word 'various' in the unwholesome indicates that evil is more than good, causing aversion. The distinction between the five destinies (五趣: hell, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, gods) is caused by the power of karma.

Treatise: It should be known that the ego-grasp [leads] to being a dominant condition.

Commentary: The latter two (ego-grasp and the supports of existence), in relation to the maturation result (異熟果: vipāka-phala), are dominant conditions because they are of a different nature. The seeds formed by the ego-grasp perfuming the object-aspect, although they are the causal condition that directly produces the root consciousness, the seeds of the seeing-aspect cause the distinction between self and others, thus becoming a dominant condition. In this case, the verbal expression seed is the causal condition that directly produces the maturation result. The supports of existence are dominant conditions because they are of a different nature. The seeds of the ego-grasp

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為增上緣。令自他別故。此是見分執種。若相分種亦得親生。文意如此也　第一言說名。唯欲界。及初定。有尋．伺故。此熏習至第四定皆得。依名起熏習故。或通無色。無色諸天佛處聽故　顯境名言通三界九地熏習。有支．我執亦皆通三界。

第二名言熏習通三性。有分熏習唯善．不善。我執熏習通有覆．不善。俱生唯有覆。分別通不善　第三表義名言唯第六識緣之熏習。顯境名言通前七識。第八不熏故。有支通前六識。有善惡性故。我執唯第六．七。七唯俱生。六通分別　第四后二熏習唯有漏。名言熏習通無漏。無漏亦依表義．顯境名言熏成種故。攝論但約有漏表義名說。此說盡理　第五位次。名言熏習唯除佛位。第六識有漏至八地。餘六識。及諸無漏通十地。有支非聖者。聖不造業故。設造別業不名有支。非行支故名言所攝。或類相從亦有支攝。分別我執唯異生資糧位起。聖說不共無明內異生亦無故。俱生我執除二乘無學。八地以去菩薩。及如來。

此即別解三習氣已下配屬頌。

論。此頌所言至有支習氣。

述曰。以三熏習即頌習氣。頌中所言業習氣者。即此三中有支習氣也。

論。二取習氣至皆說名取。

述曰。即取我執。及取名言以為境界。而熏所成二種習氣皆名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 為增上緣（輔助條件）。因為自身和他人的區別。這是見分（認識的主體）執著的種子。如果相分（認識的客體）的種子也能直接產生，文中的意思是這樣的。第一種是言說名言（通過語言表達概念），只存在於欲界和初禪，因為有尋（粗略的思考）和伺（精細的思考）。這種熏習可以達到第四禪。因為是依據名言而產生熏習。或者也通於無色界，因為無色界的諸天也會在佛陀處聽法。顯境名言（直接呈現對像）的熏習通於三界九地。有支（導致輪迴的業力）和我執（對自我的執著）也通於三界。 第二，名言熏習通於三種性質（善、惡、無記）。有分熏習（潛意識的熏習）只有善和不善。我執熏習通於有覆無記（被無明覆蓋的無記）和不善。俱生我執（與生俱來的我執）只有有覆無記，分別我執（通過分別產生的我執）通於不善。第三，表義名言（表達意義的名言）只有第六識（意識）緣取它進行熏習。顯境名言通於前七識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識）。第八識（阿賴耶識）不熏習。有支通於前六識，因為它有善惡的性質。我執只有第六識和第七識。第七識只有俱生我執，第六識通於分別我執。第四，后兩種熏習（有支和我執）只有有漏（有煩惱）的。名言熏習通於無漏（沒有煩惱）。因為無漏也是依據表義和顯境名言熏習而成的種子。《攝大乘論》只是就著有漏的表義名言來說的，這裡說的是窮盡了道理。第五，就位次來說，名言熏習只有佛位除外。第六識的有漏可以到八地（菩薩的第八個階位）。其餘六識以及各種無漏通於十地。有支不是聖者，因為聖者不造業。假設造了別的業，也不能稱為有支，因為它不是行支（導致輪迴的行為）。因為名言所攝，或者按照類別相從，也有有支所攝。分別我執只有異生（凡夫）的資糧位（修行前的準備階段）才會生起。聖者說不共無明（與生俱來的無明）的內在異生也沒有了。俱生我執除了二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的無學（已經證得阿羅漢果位），八地以後的菩薩以及如來。 這也就是分別解釋三種習氣以下的內容，並進行配屬的偈頌。 論：這個偈頌所說的到有支習氣。 述記：用三種熏習來解釋偈頌中的習氣。偈頌中所說的業習氣，就是這三種中的有支習氣。 論：二取習氣到都說名為取。 述記：就是取我執以及取名言作為境界，從而熏習所成的兩種習氣，都叫做取。

【English Translation】 English version It serves as an augmenting condition (a supportive factor). This is because of the distinction between oneself and others. This refers to the seed of attachment in the seeing-consciousness (the subject of cognition). If the seed of the object-consciousness (the object of cognition) can also directly arise, the meaning of the text is like this. The first is verbal expression (expressing concepts through language), which exists only in the Desire Realm and the First Dhyana (meditative state), because there are coarse thought (initial application of thought) and subtle thought (sustained application of thought). This kind of habituation can reach the Fourth Dhyana. Because habituation arises based on verbal expression. Or it also extends to the Formless Realm, because the deities in the Formless Realm also listen to the Dharma at the Buddha's place. Manifesting-object verbal expression (directly presenting objects) extends to the Three Realms and Nine Grounds. Karma leading to rebirth (bhavaṅga) and ego-attachment (ātmagraha) also extend to the Three Realms. Secondly, verbal habituation extends to the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral). Bhavaṅga habituation (habituation in the subconscious) only has wholesome and unwholesome. Ego-attachment habituation extends to obscured-neutral (neutral obscured by ignorance) and unwholesome. Innate ego-attachment (sahaja-ātmagraha) only has obscured-neutral, while conceptual ego-attachment (parikalpita-ātmagraha) extends to unwholesome. Thirdly, meaning-expressing verbal expression (verbal expression that conveys meaning) is only habituated by the sixth consciousness (mind-consciousness). Manifesting-object verbal expression extends to the first seven consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, mind-consciousness, and manas-consciousness). The eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna) does not habituate. Bhavaṅga extends to the first six consciousnesses, because it has wholesome and unwholesome natures. Ego-attachment only has the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. The seventh consciousness only has innate ego-attachment, while the sixth consciousness extends to conceptual ego-attachment. Fourthly, the latter two habituations (bhavaṅga and ego-attachment) are only defiled (with afflictions). Verbal habituation extends to undefiled (without afflictions). Because the undefiled is also habituated based on meaning-expressing and manifesting-object verbal expressions. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha only speaks of defiled meaning-expressing verbal expression, while this speaks of exhausting the principle. Fifthly, in terms of stages, verbal habituation excludes only the Buddha stage. The defiled of the sixth consciousness can reach the Eighth Ground (eighth stage of a Bodhisattva). The remaining six consciousnesses and various undefiled ones extend to the Ten Grounds. Bhavaṅga is not for the sages, because sages do not create karma. Even if they create other karma, it cannot be called bhavaṅga, because it is not the karma leading to rebirth. Because it is included in verbal expression, or following the category, it is also included in bhavaṅga. Conceptual ego-attachment only arises in the accumulation stage (preparatory stage before practice) of ordinary beings (pṛthagjana). The sages say that the inner ordinary being with unshared ignorance (innate ignorance) is also absent. Innate ego-attachment excludes the Arhats of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), Bodhisattvas from the Eighth Ground onwards, and the Tathāgata. This is the separate explanation of the three habituations below, and their allocation to the verses. Treatise: This verse speaks of reaching the bhavaṅga habituation. Commentary: Use the three habituations to explain the habituations in the verse. The karma habituation mentioned in the verse is the bhavaṅga habituation among these three. Treatise: The two-grasping habituation reaches the point where both are called grasping. Commentary: This is grasping ego-attachment and grasping verbal expression as objects, and the two habituations formed by habituation are both called grasping.

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為取。取此二故名之為取。非此二種體自能熏可名取也。此即解頌上二句中三習氣也。

論。俱等余文義如前釋。

述曰。此余俱義。及習氣義果。有前盡而後生義。如前師解。此中同者不別出之。若有異者皆別解也。下準此知。然此熏習。十一識等相攝分齊皆如理知。

第三複次以十二支解頌。

論。複次生死相續由惑業苦。

述曰。于中有二。初泛解惑．業．苦屬釋論文。后以有支釋惑．業．苦。初中有三。初總舉生死由惑．業．苦。次別解惑．業．苦。后指例余文。此則初也。

業．惑．苦者。此應第二方解其惑。以隨發業次第而說故此非倒。

論。發業潤生至眾苦名苦。

述曰。次別解也。能感後有諸業名業。即通一切總報．別報現．后等業。除無記業。及無漏業。皆名為業。能感異熟生故　惑者即是發業潤生煩惱。對法第四一切欲界分別煩惱。皆能發業皆是不善。任運能發惡行者亦是不善。即修道我見．邊見。及此相應貪．慢．無明皆非不善上來數明。然緣起經上捲雲。若由欲愛造諸福行。彼信為依乃造斯行。由於生死起定信故。此愛．及取由信攝伏。我施設為有覆無記。若法欲界有覆無記。于發諸行無勝功能。以此文證。故離我見等俱起法。亦有獨頭

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：名為『取』，是因為它能執取『愛』和『有』這二者。如果不是這兩種自體能夠熏習的，就不能稱為『取』。這裡解釋了頌文上兩句中的三種習氣。

論：『俱』等其餘文字的意義如同前面解釋。

述曰：這裡『俱』的意義，以及習氣所產生的果，具有前滅後生的含義，如同之前的解釋。這裡相同的部分就不再單獨指出。如果有不同的地方，都會單獨解釋。下面的內容可以依此類推。然而，這種熏習，以及十一識等相互攝屬的界限，都應該如理如實地瞭解。

第三，再次用十二因緣來解釋頌文。

論：再次說明，生死的相續是由惑、業、苦造成的。

述曰：其中有兩部分。首先泛泛地解釋惑、業、苦，屬於解釋論文。然後用十二因緣中的各個支來解釋惑、業、苦。首先有三個方面。首先總括生死是由惑、業、苦造成的。其次分別解釋惑、業、苦。最後指出其餘文字可以依此類推。這裡是第一個方面。

業、惑、苦：這裡應該先解釋惑，因為是按照引發業的次第來說的，所以這裡不是顛倒的。

論：引發業、滋潤生命，直到各種痛苦，稱為苦。

述曰：其次是分別解釋。能夠感得後有的各種業稱為業，即包括一切總報、別報、現世報、後世報等業。除了無記業和無漏業，都稱為業，因為它們能夠感得異熟果。惑，就是引發業、滋潤生命的煩惱。《對法》第四中說，一切欲界的分別煩惱，都能夠引發業，都是不善的。任運能夠引發惡行的也是不善的，即修道位的我見、邊見，以及與此相應的貪、慢、無明，都不是不善的，這在前面已經多次說明。然而，《緣起經》上卷說：『如果由於欲愛而造作各種福德行為，那麼這種行為是依靠信心而造作的，因為對於生死產生了堅定的信心。』這種愛和取，是被信心所攝伏的，我將它施設為有覆無記。如果欲界的法是有覆無記的，那麼它在引發各種行為方面沒有強大的功能。』用這段經文來證明，所以離開我見等一起生起的法，也有獨頭

【English Translation】 English version: It is called 'grasping' (取, qu, clinging) because it grasps 'craving' (愛, ai, love/desire) and 'becoming' (有, you, existence). If these two kinds of entities themselves are not capable of being influenced, they cannot be called 'grasping'. This explains the three habitual energies in the first two lines of the verse.

Treatise: The meaning of 'together' (俱, ju) and the remaining words is as explained before.

Commentary: Here, the meaning of 'together', and the result produced by habitual energy, have the meaning of arising after the previous has ceased, as explained before. The parts that are the same here are not pointed out separately. If there are differences, they will be explained separately. Know this by analogy below. However, this influence, and the boundaries of the eleven consciousnesses (十一識, shiyi shi) etc. that mutually encompass each other, should all be understood as they truly are.

Third, again, explain the verse with the twelve links of dependent origination (十二支, shier zhi).

Treatise: Again, the continuation of birth and death is caused by delusion (惑, huo, ignorance), karma (業, ye, action), and suffering (苦, ku, pain).

Commentary: There are two parts to this. First, a general explanation of delusion, karma, and suffering, which belongs to the explanation of the treatise. Then, explain delusion, karma, and suffering with the links of dependent origination. First, there are three aspects. First, summarize that birth and death are caused by delusion, karma, and suffering. Second, explain delusion, karma, and suffering separately. Finally, point out that the remaining words can be understood by analogy. This is the first aspect.

Karma, delusion, and suffering: Delusion should be explained first here, because it is spoken according to the order of causing karma, so this is not reversed.

Treatise: Causing karma, nourishing life, until various sufferings, is called suffering.

Commentary: Next is the separate explanation. The various karmas that can cause future existence are called karma, which includes all general retribution, specific retribution, present retribution, future retribution, etc. Except for neutral karma and non-outflow karma, all are called karma, because they can cause different maturation results. Delusion is the afflictions that cause karma and nourish life. According to the fourth chapter of Abhidharmakośa (對法, Duifa), all the discriminating afflictions of the desire realm (欲界, yujie) can cause karma and are all unwholesome. That which can spontaneously cause evil actions is also unwholesome, namely the self-view (我見, wo jian) and extreme view (邊見, bian jian) of the path of cultivation, and the corresponding greed (貪, tan), pride (慢, man), and ignorance (無明, wuming), are not unwholesome, as has been explained many times before. However, the upper volume of the Sutra on Dependent Origination (緣起經, Yuanqi Jing) says: 'If one performs various meritorious deeds due to desire-love (欲愛, yu ai), then these actions are performed relying on faith, because one has generated firm faith in birth and death.' This love and grasping are subdued by faith, and I establish it as covered and unspecified (有覆無記, youfu wuji). If the dharma of the desire realm is covered and unspecified, then it does not have a strong function in causing various actions.' Use this sutra passage to prove that, therefore, apart from the dharmas that arise together with self-view, there are also independent

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愛等無記。即緣後有起愛潤生愛等。或餘本有位起。此愛等亦是不發業者。及除上界無明等發業者。外餘一切不發業惑。餘者皆是此中發業惑攝。余隨起有覆等是潤生攝。若助發潤即通一切。苦中即攝三苦．八苦。文易可知。

論。惑業苦種皆名習氣。

述曰。前說現行此種。即現之習氣也。

論。前二習氣至親生苦故。

述曰。以三種望果談其親疏。今此三中惑．業二種非異熟性。與果異性。但增上緣。助生苦故。但為勢引。非正親生。若苦種子與生死苦為正因緣。以能辨體親生苦故。

論。頌三習氣如應當知。

述曰。惑．苦種子名為二取。業種可知。故言隨應。

問何故此中惑．苦名取。業不名取。

論。惑苦名取能所取故。

述曰。釋彼得名。惑是能取。染著性故。苦是所取。染所著故。

論。取是著義業不得名。

述曰。此釋唯業不名為取。世間有情多於現果起執著言。今此是我．我所攝故。即能．所執著名為取。世間有情不多於業起執著故。如有執我而為作者我物等故。前說以取是著義故。不多於業而起于著也。

論。俱等余文義如前解。

述曰。一準於前義可知也。然於此中惑．業．苦攝一切惑．業．苦盡。即總門

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『愛』等是無記性（既非善也非惡）的。即是緣於後有而生起『愛』，滋潤生命之『愛』等等。或者是在原本的生命狀態中生起。這些『愛』等也是不引發業力的。以及除了上界的無明等引發業力者之外，其餘一切不引發業力的煩惱。其餘的都是屬於這其中引發業力的煩惱所包含的。其餘隨之生起的有覆等是屬於滋潤生命所包含的。如果助長引發和滋潤，那就貫通一切了。『苦』中就包含了三苦、八苦。文句容易理解。

論：煩惱、業、苦的種子都叫做習氣。

述曰：前面說的現行，就是指這種現行的習氣。

論：前兩種習氣最直接地產生苦果。

述曰：以三種（煩惱、業、苦）來衡量果報的親疏關係。現在這三種中，煩惱和業不是異熟性（性質不同），與果報的性質不同，只是增上緣，幫助產生苦果，所以只是勢力上的牽引，不是直接產生。如果是苦的種子，與生死之苦是正因緣，因為它能辨別本體，直接產生苦果。

論：頌中的三種習氣，應當如實知曉。

述曰：煩惱和苦的種子叫做二取，業的種子可以知道，所以說是隨應。

問：為什麼這裡煩惱和苦叫做『取』，而業不叫做『取』呢？

論：煩惱和苦叫做『取』，是因為能取和所取的關係。

述曰：解釋它們得名的原因。煩惱是能取，因為有染著性。苦是所取，因為是被染著的對象。

論：『取』是執著的意思，業不能叫做『取』。

述曰：這裡解釋只有業不叫做『取』的原因。世間的有情大多對於現前的果報產生執著，說『現在這個是我的』、『我所擁有的』等等。這就是能執和所執著，所以叫做『取』。世間的有情不多對於業產生執著。比如有人執著『我』是作者，『我』是事物等等。前面說『取』是執著的意思，所以不多對於業而生起執著。

論：『俱』等其餘的文句，意義和前面解釋的一樣。

述曰：一律按照前面的意義就可以理解了。然而在這裡，煩惱、業、苦包含了所有的煩惱、業、苦，全部包括在內，是總的綱要。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Attachment' (愛, ai) and the like are indeterminate (無記, wu ji), meaning they are neither good nor evil. Specifically, they arise from the condition of future existence, giving rise to 'attachment,' the 'attachment' that nourishes life, and so on. Or they arise in the original state of existence. These 'attachments' and the like also do not generate karma. And apart from ignorance (無明, wu ming) and the like in the upper realms that generate karma, all other afflictions that do not generate karma are included. The remaining afflictions that arise, such as the obscured (有覆, you fu), are included in those that nourish life. If they assist in generating and nourishing, then they pervade everything. 'Suffering' (苦, ku) includes the three sufferings and the eight sufferings. The text is easy to understand.

Treatise: The seeds of afflictions, karma, and suffering are all called habitual energies (習氣, xi qi).

Commentary: What was previously said about present actions refers to these present habitual energies.

Treatise: The first two habitual energies directly produce the fruit of suffering.

Commentary: The closeness of the relationship to the fruit is discussed in terms of the three (afflictions, karma, and suffering). Among these three, afflictions and karma are not of the nature of dissimilar maturation (異熟性, yi shu xing); they are of a different nature from the fruit. They are merely supporting conditions (增上緣, zeng shang yuan) that help produce suffering, so they are merely influential, not directly productive. If the seed of suffering is the direct cause of the suffering of birth and death, it is because it can discern the substance and directly produce suffering.

Treatise: The three habitual energies in the verse should be understood accordingly.

Commentary: The seeds of afflictions and suffering are called the two graspings (二取, er qu), and the seed of karma can be known, so it is said to be according to what is appropriate.

Question: Why are afflictions and suffering called 'grasping' here, but karma is not called 'grasping'?

Treatise: Afflictions and suffering are called 'grasping' because of the relationship of grasper and grasped.

Commentary: This explains the reason for their names. Afflictions are the grasper because they have the nature of attachment. Suffering is the grasped because it is the object of attachment.

Treatise: 'Grasping' means attachment, so karma is not called 'grasping'.

Commentary: This explains why only karma is not called 'grasping'. Sentient beings in the world mostly become attached to present fruits, saying, 'This is mine,' 'What is possessed by me,' and so on. This is the grasper and the grasped, so it is called 'grasping'. Sentient beings in the world do not often become attached to karma. For example, some are attached to 'I' as the creator, 'I' as the thing, and so on. It was previously said that 'grasping' means attachment, so they do not often become attached to karma.

Treatise: 'Together' and the remaining texts have the same meaning as explained before.

Commentary: The meaning can be understood uniformly according to the previous meaning. However, here, afflictions, karma, and suffering include all afflictions, karma, and suffering, all included, which is the general outline.

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也。

論。此惑業苦至如論廣釋。

述曰。第二別攝十二有支。此中以總復攝於別十二支故　問何以知十二支是別。攝總惑．業．苦不盡耶　答若除此中無明．愛．取餘一切惑。除正感後世行。余別報等行．並別報體。苦聖者身行。及苦等。非十二支故　就解十二支中有三。初以惑．業．苦總攝十二支。即此文是。二廣明十二有支。即論云此十二支略攝為四謂能引支等以下文是。三總結支歸惑．業．苦。即下論云由惑．業．苦即十二支故。此能令生死相續也　今此惑．業．苦總攝十二支中。指如餘論廣釋。即瑜伽第九．第十．第九十三。對法第四。十地論第八。及天親所造十二因緣論等。此為論也。然緣起經中亦甚廣明。至下論中此所無者附文解出　此十二支且略以十門解釋。一列支名辨總別體。二明支總別名義得名。三次第所由。四總．別業用。五因果差別。六支互為緣四句料簡。七能．所引生諸論對釋。八廢立增減釋諸妨難。九定世破邪。十諸門辨釋。論文有四。一能．所引生。二釋妨。三定世。四諸門辨　一列支名辨總．別體者。列名可知。總五事中相及分別。三性之中唯依他性。取蘊．處．界一分為體　別體性者。一無明支者。以行蘊中無明為體。不取余法。何以知者。緣起經云。初無明有十一

【現代漢語翻譯】 也。

論：這些煩惱、業和痛苦，就像在其他論著中廣泛解釋的那樣。

述記：第二部分是分別攝取十二有支。這裡用總相再次攝取各個別的十二支。問：憑什麼知道十二支是別相，不能完全攝取總相的惑、業、苦呢？答：如果除去其中的無明、愛、取，以及其餘一切煩惱；除去能感得後世的正行，以及其餘別的果報等行，以及別的果報之體；苦聖者的身行，以及苦等，這些都不是十二支所包含的。因此，要理解十二支，有三個方面：首先，用惑、業、苦總攝十二支，就是這段文字。其次，廣泛闡明十二有支，也就是論中所說的『這十二支略攝為四，即能引支等』以下的文字。最後，總結十二支歸於惑、業、苦，也就是下文所說的『由惑、業、苦即十二支故。此能令生死相續也』。現在，在這用惑、業、苦總攝十二支的部分，指出像其他論著中廣泛解釋的那樣，即《瑜伽師地論》第九、第十、第九十三卷，《對法論》第四卷，《十地論》第八卷，以及天親菩薩所造的《十二因緣論》等。這些都是論著。然而，《緣起經》中也對此有非常廣泛的闡明。至於下文論中沒有的內容，會附在文中進行解釋。這十二支，暫且用十個方面來解釋：一、列出支名，辨別總相、別相和體性。二、闡明支的總相、別相的名義和得名原因。三、解釋次第的由來。四、說明總相和別相的業用。五、區分因和果的差別。六、用四句來簡擇支與支之間的互為緣關係。七、解釋能引和所引，並對照各論的解釋。八、解釋廢立、增減，以消除各種妨難。九、確定世系，破除邪見。十、辨析各種門類。論文有四個方面：一、能引和所引。二、解釋妨難。三、確定世系。四、辨析各種門類。一、列出支名，辨別總相、別相和體性：列出名稱就可以知道。總相在五事中是相和分別，在三性中唯是依他起性，以取蘊、處、界的一部分為體性。別相的體性：一、無明支，以行蘊中的無明為體性，不取其餘法。為什麼知道是這樣呢？《緣起經》中說：最初的無明有十一

【English Translation】 Also.

Treatise: These afflictions, karma, and suffering are as explained extensively in other treatises.

Commentary: The second part is to separately encompass the twelve links of dependent origination. Here, the general aspect encompasses the individual twelve links again. Question: How do we know that the twelve links are individual aspects and cannot completely encompass the general aspects of affliction, karma, and suffering? Answer: If we remove ignorance (avidya), craving (trsna), and grasping (upadana) from them, as well as all other afflictions; remove the right action that causes future lives, as well as other separate retributive actions, and the separate retributive body; the actions of the noble ones who have attained liberation from suffering, and suffering itself, these are not included in the twelve links. Therefore, to understand the twelve links, there are three aspects: First, to encompass the twelve links with affliction, karma, and suffering, which is this passage. Second, to extensively explain the twelve links of dependent origination, which is the text in the treatise that says, 'These twelve links are briefly encompassed by four, namely, the productive links, etc.' Third, to summarize the twelve links and return them to affliction, karma, and suffering, which is the text below that says, 'Because affliction, karma, and suffering are the twelve links, they cause the continuation of birth and death.' Now, in this part where affliction, karma, and suffering encompass the twelve links, it is pointed out that it is like the extensive explanations in other treatises, namely, the ninth, tenth, and ninety-third volumes of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the fourth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the eighth volume of the Dasabhumika-sutra, and the Treatise on the Twelve Causes composed by Vasubandhu. These are the treatises. However, the Sutra on Dependent Origination also has a very extensive explanation of this. As for the content that is not in the treatise below, it will be explained in the text. These twelve links will be explained in ten aspects: 1. List the names of the links and distinguish the general aspect, individual aspect, and nature. 2. Explain the meaning of the names and the reasons for the names of the general and individual aspects of the links. 3. Explain the origin of the sequence. 4. Explain the functions of the general and individual aspects. 5. Distinguish the differences between cause and effect. 6. Use four sentences to discern the relationship between the links as causes for each other. 7. Explain the productive and produced, and compare the explanations of various treatises. 8. Explain the establishment, abolition, addition, and subtraction to eliminate various obstacles. 9. Determine the lineage and refute wrong views. 10. Analyze various categories. There are four aspects to the treatise: 1. The productive and produced. 2. Explaining obstacles. 3. Determining the lineage. 4. Analyzing various categories. 1. List the names of the links and distinguish the general aspect, individual aspect, and nature: Listing the names will allow us to know. The general aspect is the characteristic and discrimination among the five aggregates, and only the dependent nature among the three natures, taking a part of the aggregates, realms, and spheres as its nature. The nature of the individual aspects: 1. The link of ignorance (avidya), takes ignorance in the aggregate of formations as its nature, and does not take other dharmas. How do we know this? The Sutra on Dependent Origination says: The initial ignorance has eleven

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殊勝非余法故。大論第九云。以七無知等為無明支。故唯取無用不取余法　問若爾何故對法第四云。無明與行得為因緣。無明俱思種名無明支故　答曰不爾。彼非因緣故。此論解云。無明俱思假說為無明。實非此支攝。由假說彼為行因緣。實非取余為此支體。大論第十。及此論下。說為一事故不取余法。又諸論．此論皆言。正發業唯是無明。餘者是助故不取也。非如小乘約分位辨。此有十九．七．五．六種諸無知等。如大論第九等說。此無明支別有實性。何以知者。下十二支假實之中說為實故。大論第十。乃至五十六緣起善巧中皆言實故。又五十五明諸煩惱假實之中。言五見假。此為實故。又緣起經下卷。五十六中。皆廣問答簡諸餘法故名無明。俱舍第十文勢同也。此通現行．及種為體。十地經云。無明有二。謂子時．果時。緣起下捲雲。無明有四。謂隨眠等。又唯發業性。通不善．無記。然發福．非福．不動三無明別。如對法第七　二行支者以身．語．意三行為體。心．心所法為體。謂行體是思。此身．語．意三在欲界名福．非福。身．語在色界。意亦通無色。名為不動。大論第九等同此解。此支亦通現行．種子。十地經說行有二種。謂如無明有子．果時行亦爾故。唯善．不善性　三識支者唯取阿賴耶識親因緣為體

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：殊勝之處在於它不是其他法則（殊勝非余法故）。《大毗婆沙論》第九卷說，以七種無知等作為無明支（無明支：十二因緣中的第一支，指對真理的無知）。因此，只取無明本身，不取其他法（故唯取無用不取余法）。 問：如果這樣，為什麼《阿毗達磨對法論》第四卷說，無明與行可以互為因緣？因為與無明相應的思的種子被稱為無明支（無明俱思種名無明支故）？ 答：不是這樣的。它們並非真正的因緣（答曰不爾。彼非因緣故）。此論解釋說，與無明相應的思只是假名為無明，實際上不屬於此支所攝（無明俱思假說為無明。實非此支攝）。因為是假說它們作為行的因緣，實際上並非取其他法作為此支的本體（由假說彼為行因緣。實非取余為此支體）。《大毗婆沙論》第十卷和此論的下文都說，爲了同一件事，所以不取其他法（大論第十。及此論下。說為一事故不取余法）。而且，各論和此論都說，真正發起業的是無明，其他的只是輔助，所以不取（又諸論．此論皆言。正發業唯是無明。餘者是助故不取也）。 並非像小乘那樣，約分位來辨別。此處的無明有十九種、七種、五種、六種等無知等，如《大毗婆沙論》第九卷等所說（非如小乘約分位辨。此有十九．七．五．六種諸無知等。如大論第九等說）。此無明支有其獨立的真實自性（此無明支別有實性）。為什麼知道呢？因為在下文關於十二支的假與實的討論中，它被認為是真實的（何以知者。下十二支假實之中說為實故）。《大毗婆沙論》第十卷，乃至五十六種緣起善巧中都說是真實的（大論第十。乃至五十六緣起善巧中皆言實故）。而且，在第五十五種辨明諸煩惱的假與實中，說五見是虛假的，而無明是真實的（又五十五明諸煩惱假實之中。言五見假。此為實故）。而且，《緣起經》下卷，第五十六種中，都廣泛地問答，簡別各種其他法，所以稱為無明（又緣起經下卷。五十六中。皆廣問答簡諸餘法故名無明）。《俱舍論》第十卷的文義也相同（俱舍第十文勢同也）。 此無明支包括現行和種子作為其本體（此通現行．及種為體）。《十地經》說，無明有兩種，即子時和果時（十地經云。無明有二。謂子時．果時）。《緣起經》下卷說，無明有四種，即隨眠等（緣起下捲雲。無明有四。謂隨眠等）。而且，只有發起業的性質，通於不善和無記（又唯發業性。通不善．無記）。然而，發起福、非福、不動三種業的無明有所區別，如《阿毗達磨對法論》第七卷所說（然發福．非福．不動三無明別。如對法第七）。 二、行支，以身、語、意三種行為本體（二行支者以身．語．意三行為體）。心和心所法為本體。所謂行支的本體是思（心．心所法為體。謂行體是思）。這身、語、意三種行為在欲界稱為福行和非福行，身語在色界，意也通於無色界，稱為不動行（此身．語．意三在欲界名福．非福。身．語在**。意亦通無色。名為不動）。《大毗婆沙論》第九卷等也作此解釋（大論第九等同此解）。此行支也通於現行和種子（此支亦通現行．種子）。《十地經》說，行有兩種，就像無明有子時和果時一樣，行也是如此（十地經說行有二種。謂如無明有子．果時行亦爾故）。只有善和不善的性質（唯善．不善性）。 三、識支，只取阿賴耶識（阿賴耶識：佛教唯識宗所說的第八識，又稱藏識）的親因緣作為本體（三識支者唯取阿賴耶識親因緣為體）。

【English Translation】 English version: The superiority lies in the fact that it is not other dharmas (殊勝非余法故). The ninth volume of the Mahāvibhāṣā states that the seven kinds of ignorance, etc., are taken as the branch of ignorance (無明支: avidyā, the first of the twelve links of dependent origination, referring to ignorance of the truth). Therefore, only ignorance itself is taken, and not other dharmas (故唯取無用不取餘法). Question: If that is the case, why does the fourth volume of the Abhidharma-dhātu-prakaraṇa say that ignorance and action can be causes and conditions for each other? Because the seed of thought associated with ignorance is called the branch of ignorance (無明俱思種名無明支故)? Answer: That is not the case. They are not true causes and conditions (答曰不爾。彼非因緣故). This treatise explains that the thought associated with ignorance is only nominally called ignorance, but in reality, it is not included in this branch (無明俱思假說為無明。實非此支攝). Because it is nominally said that they are the causes and conditions for action, in reality, other dharmas are not taken as the substance of this branch (由假說彼為行因緣。實非取餘為此支體). The tenth volume of the Mahāvibhāṣā and the following text of this treatise both say that for the same reason, other dharmas are not taken (大論第十。及此論下。說為一事故不取餘法). Moreover, various treatises and this treatise all say that it is ignorance that truly initiates karma, and others are only auxiliary, so they are not taken (又諸論．此論皆言。正發業唯是無明。餘者是助故不取也). It is not like the Theravada school, which distinguishes based on divisions. Here, ignorance has nineteen kinds, seven kinds, five kinds, six kinds, etc., of ignorance, as stated in the ninth volume of the Mahāvibhāṣā, etc. (非如小乘約分位辨。此有十九．七．五．六種諸無知等。如大論第九等說). This branch of ignorance has its own independent real nature (此無明支別有實性). How do we know this? Because in the following discussion of the real and unreal of the twelve links, it is considered real (何以知者。下十二支假實之中說為實故). The tenth volume of the Mahāvibhāṣā, and even in the fifty-six kinds of skillful means of dependent origination, it is said to be real (大論第十。乃至五十六緣起善巧中皆言實故). Moreover, in the fifty-fifth kind of distinguishing the real and unreal of various afflictions, it is said that the five views are false, while ignorance is real (又五十五明諸煩惱假實之中。言五見假。此為實故). Moreover, in the lower volume of the Treatise on Dependent Origination, in the fifty-sixth kind, there are extensive questions and answers, distinguishing various other dharmas, so it is called ignorance (又緣起經下卷。五十六中。皆廣問答簡諸餘法故名無明). The meaning of the text in the tenth volume of the Abhidharma-kośa is the same (俱舍第十文勢同也). This branch of ignorance includes both the manifest and the seed as its substance (此通現行．及種為體). The Daśabhūmika Sūtra says that there are two kinds of ignorance, namely the seed time and the fruit time (十地經云。無明有二。謂子時．果時). The lower volume of the Treatise on Dependent Origination says that there are four kinds of ignorance, namely latent tendencies, etc. (緣起下捲雲。無明有四。謂隨眠等). Moreover, only the nature of initiating karma is common to both unwholesome and indeterminate (又唯發業性。通不善．無記). However, the ignorance that initiates the three kinds of karma—meritorious, demeritorious, and imperturbable—is different, as stated in the seventh volume of the Abhidharma-dhātu-prakaraṇa (然發福．非福．不動三無明別。如對法第七). Second, the branch of action, takes the three actions of body, speech, and mind as its substance (二行支者以身．語．意三行為體). The mind and mental factors are the substance. The substance of the branch of action is thought (心．心所法為體。謂行體是思). These three actions of body, speech, and mind are called meritorious and demeritorious actions in the desire realm. Body and speech are in the form realm, and mind also extends to the formless realm, and are called imperturbable actions (此身．語．意三在欲界名福．非福。身．語在。意亦通無色。名為不動). The ninth volume of the Mahāvibhāṣā, etc., also gives this explanation (大論第九等同此解). This branch of action also extends to both the manifest and the seed (此支亦通現行．種子). The Daśabhūmika Sūtra says that there are two kinds of action, just as ignorance has a seed time and a fruit time, so does action (十地經說行有二種。謂如無明有子．果時行亦爾故). It only has the nature of good and unwholesome (唯善．不善性). Third, the branch of consciousness, only takes the direct cause and condition of the ālaya-vijñāna (阿賴耶識: the ālaya-vijñāna, the eighth consciousness in Yogācāra Buddhism, also known as the storehouse consciousness) as its substance (三識支者唯取阿賴耶識親因緣為體).

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。九十三云。于母胎中因識為緣。續生果識隨轉不絕。任持所有羯剌藍等。非餘七識隨轉不絕能任持故。彼下文云。又即此識當來後有名色等種之所隨逐。非餘七識諸種所隨故。此論又云。所引支者。謂本識內親生當來異熟果攝識等五種。此中識種謂本識因。故知識支不取餘七　問曰若爾何故大論第九卷末。以六識為識支廣解已。云此于欲界具足六種。色界唯四。無色唯一　答曰。九十三中自有會。云行為緣故令識轉變。此識現法但是因性。攝受當生諸識果故。約就一切相續為名說六識身。既有此解故言六識者。是就二乘一切身語。彼不立有第八識故。又一身中約一切識相續為名說言六識。其實唯取阿賴耶也。果報主故。說與名色互為緣故。乃至命終恒隨轉故　此唯種子不取現行。何以知者。大論第十．此論等云胎藏苦故　問若爾何故大論第九云三行所熏發種子六識。及種子所生果時六識名為識支。處處又說行熏于識。識與名色得互為緣識入母胎。非種子時有是義故。十地論云如無明有子時．果時。乃至於生．老死亦爾　答此論下云。此五種子在於因時無有前後。約當生果位中說故有前後也。或於現在是過去世。此生．老死位說識支故。有現行識其實唯種。不爾便違五十六說。彼說五種胎藏苦故。此論所引支中。又言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：九十三云：在母胎中，因為『識』（vijñāna，了別作用）為緣，使得後續出生的果報之『識』（果報識）相續不斷地流轉，任持所有的『羯剌藍』（kalala，胎兒最初的凝滑狀態）等。這是因為其餘七識不能相續不斷地流轉並任持。該文下文說：『又，就是這個識，將來會伴隨有名色等種子。』這是因為其餘七識不能被這些種子伴隨。此論又說：『所引用的支，指的是本識內親生的、屬於未來異熟果的識等五種。』這裡說的識種指的是本識的因。因此，『識』支不取其餘七識。 問：如果這樣，為什麼《大論》第九卷末尾，以六識為『識』支進行廣泛解釋后，說『這在欲界具足六種，色界唯四，無色界唯一』？ 答：九十三中有解釋說：『因為「行」為緣，所以使得「識」轉變。』這個『識』在現在法中只是因的性質，攝受當生諸識的果報。這是就一切相續而言，所以名為六識身。既然有這種解釋，所以說六識，是就二乘的一切身語而言。他們不立有第八識的緣故。又，一身中就一切識的相續而言，所以名為六識。其實只是取阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna，藏識）。因為它是果報的主體。說它與名色互為緣故，乃至命終都恒常隨轉。這裡說的只是種子，不取現行。為什麼知道呢？《大論》第十、《此論》等說有胎藏苦的緣故。 問：如果這樣，為什麼《大論》第九說『三行所熏發的種子六識，以及種子所生的果時六識，名為識支』？處處又說『行』熏于『識』，『識』與『名色』得以互為緣，『識』入母胎。不是種子時有這種意義的緣故。《十地論》說『如無明有子時、果時，乃至生、老死也是這樣』。 答：此論下文說：『這五種種子在因位時沒有前後，是就當生果位中說，所以有前後。』或者在現在是過去世，這是就生、老死位說『識』支的緣故。有現行識，其實只是種子。否則就違背五十六的說法。那裡說了五種胎藏苦的緣故。此論所引用的支中，又說……

【English Translation】 English version: Ninety-three states: In the mother's womb, because 'consciousness' (vijñāna) is the condition, the resulting 'consciousness' (resultant consciousness) of subsequent births continues to flow without interruption, sustaining all the 'kalalas' (the initial gelatinous state of the embryo), etc. This is because the other seven consciousnesses cannot continuously flow and sustain them. The text below states: 'Moreover, it is this consciousness that will be accompanied by the seeds of name and form, etc., in the future.' This is because the other seven consciousnesses cannot be accompanied by these seeds. This treatise also states: 'The limb cited refers to the five kinds of consciousness within the fundamental consciousness that are directly produced and belong to the future resultant fruition consciousness.' Here, the seed of consciousness refers to the cause of the fundamental consciousness. Therefore, the 'consciousness' limb does not include the other seven consciousnesses. Question: If that is the case, why does the end of the ninth volume of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha (Great Treatise) explain the six consciousnesses extensively as the 'consciousness' limb, and then say, 'This is complete with six kinds in the desire realm, only four in the form realm, and only one in the formless realm'? Answer: Ninety-three itself contains an explanation: 'Because 「action」 is the condition, it causes 「consciousness」 to transform.' This 'consciousness' is only causal in nature in the present dharma, encompassing the resultant fruition of all consciousnesses to be born. This is named the six consciousness bodies in terms of all continuity. Since there is this explanation, the term 'six consciousnesses' refers to all actions of body and speech of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna). This is because they do not establish an eighth consciousness. Moreover, within one body, the term 'six consciousnesses' refers to the continuity of all consciousnesses. In reality, it only refers to the ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness). Because it is the master of resultant fruition. It is said to be mutually conditioned with name and form, and constantly follows until the end of life. Here, only the seeds are referred to, not the manifest activity. How do we know this? The tenth volume of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha and this treatise state that there is suffering in the womb. Question: If that is the case, why does the ninth volume of the Mahāyāna-saṃgraha say, 'The six consciousnesses of the seeds perfumed by the three actions, and the six consciousnesses at the time of the fruition produced by the seeds, are called the consciousness limb'? It is also said everywhere that 'action' perfumes 'consciousness', and 'consciousness' and 'name and form' can be mutually conditioned, and 'consciousness' enters the mother's womb. This meaning exists not at the time of the seed. The Daśabhūmika-sūtra (Ten Stages Sutra) says, 'Just as ignorance has a seed time and a fruition time, so too do birth, old age, and death.' Answer: This treatise states below: 'These five seeds have no sequence in the causal stage, but are spoken of as having a sequence in the stage of the fruition to be born.' Or, in the present, it is the past life. This is because the 'consciousness' limb is spoken of in the stage of birth, old age, and death. There is manifest consciousness, but in reality, it is only the seed. Otherwise, it would contradict the statement in fifty-six. There, the five sufferings of the womb are spoken of. In the limb cited in this treatise, it is also said...

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識等五是種故。識既如此說名色入母胎。乃至說受亦有二種。謂境界受為愛緣等。皆準此知。此五體皆唯種子故約當生位。及於生．老死位說故。言有現行實皆無也。此唯無覆無記性攝　四名色支者。有二種體。一者一切有漏五蘊皆是此體。通異熟．非異熟。如九十三說。又五色根。根依大種。根處大種。所生諸色。及余諸名。皆名色攝。大論第九云。受蘊想蘊．行蘊．識蘊．十有色處．法處色等。皆名色支。此論下云。或名色種總攝五因。于中隨勝立餘四種。通取三性以為體也。若準此論及諸論等。通取異熟。及余性故。若約名色不相雜亂說此支者。即除六根．觸．受法種皆名色攝。謂色蘊中除根余色。除受蘊全。除行蘊觸。除識蘊中本識．意根。余想蘊全。三蘊少分。為名色支體。此論下云。此中識種謂本識因。除后三因余因。皆是名色種攝。故此二體寬狹不同。前體即是四蘊名名。色蘊名色。泛爾通釋。即體相濫。后解名色五種各別可有差別稍似分明。不爾如何名五種子。五體即是一名色故。此唯異熟無記性故。第八相應中除觸．及受。六識俱中又除一切異熟觸．受。所餘現在異熟六識。及過．未世所餘異熟心所法種。皆是此體。又九十三云。俱生五根名之為色。無間滅意名之為名。即與六處無別體也。然說六

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『識』等五者是種子狀態的緣故。既然『識』是這樣，就稱為『名色』進入母胎。乃至說『受』也有兩種，即境界受為『愛』的緣等，都參照這個來理解。這五者的本體都只是種子，所以是就當生位，以及生、老、死位來說的緣故。說有現行，實際上都沒有。這唯是無覆無記性所攝。 四、『名色』支，有兩種本體。一是，一切有漏五蘊都是這個本體，通異熟、非異熟。如《九十三》所說。二是，五色根、根所依的大種、根處的大種、所生的諸色，以及其餘諸名，都屬於『名色』所攝。《大論》第九卷說：『受蘊、想蘊、行蘊、識蘊、十有色處、法處色等，都名為名色支。』此論下面說：『或者名色種總攝五因，于中隨勝立餘四種。』通取三性作為本體。如果按照此論及諸論等，通取異熟及余性。如果就名色不相雜亂來說此支，就除去六根、觸、受法種，都名為名色所攝。即色蘊中除去根以外的其餘色，除去受蘊全部，除去行蘊的觸，除去識蘊中的本識、意根，其餘想蘊全部，三蘊少分，為名色支的本體。此論下面說：『此中識種謂本識因，除后三因余因，皆是名色種攝。』所以這兩種本體寬狹不同。前一種本體即是四蘊名為『名』，色蘊名為『色』，泛泛而通釋，即本體和相狀混濫。后一種解釋名色五種各自有別，可以有差別，稍微顯得分明。不然如何名為五種子？五體即是一名色故。這唯是異熟無記性故。第八識相應中除去觸及受，六識俱中又除去一切異熟觸受，其餘現在異熟六識，以及過去、未來世其餘異熟心所法種，都是這個本體。又《九十三》說：『俱生五根名為色，無間滅意名為名。』即與六處沒有別的本體。然說六

【English Translation】 English version: 'Consciousness' and the other five are so because they are in the state of seeds. Since 'consciousness' is like this, it is called 'name and form' entering the womb. Even saying 'feeling' has two types, namely, feeling of the realm as the cause of 'love', etc., all should be understood in this way. The substance of these five are all only seeds, so it is spoken of in terms of the stage of being born, as well as the stages of birth, old age, and death. Saying there is manifestation, in reality, there is none. This is only included in the un-obscured and neutral nature. Four, the 'name and form' branch has two kinds of substance. One is that all contaminated five aggregates are this substance, encompassing both resultant and non-resultant. As stated in 'Ninety-Three'. Two is that the five sense faculties, the great elements on which the faculties rely, the great elements of the sense bases, the various forms produced, and the remaining names, are all included in 'name and form'. The ninth volume of the 'Great Treatise' says: 'The aggregate of feeling, the aggregate of perception, the aggregate of volition, the aggregate of consciousness, the ten sense bases with form, the form of the dharma base, etc., are all called the name and form branch.' This treatise below says: 'Or the name and form seed encompasses all five causes, and among them, the remaining four are established according to the most prominent.' It encompasses the three natures as the substance. If according to this treatise and other treatises, it encompasses the resultant and other natures. If speaking of this branch in terms of name and form not being mixed, then excluding the six faculties, contact, and feeling dharma seeds, all are called included in name and form. That is, in the aggregate of form, excluding the remaining forms other than the faculties, excluding the entire aggregate of feeling, excluding contact from the aggregate of volition, excluding the fundamental consciousness and mind faculty from the aggregate of consciousness, the remaining entire aggregate of perception, and a small portion of the three aggregates, are the substance of the name and form branch. This treatise below says: 'Among these, the consciousness seed refers to the cause of the fundamental consciousness, excluding the remaining causes after the latter three, all the remaining causes are included in the name and form seed.' Therefore, these two kinds of substance differ in breadth. The former kind of substance is that the four aggregates are called 'name', and the aggregate of form is called 'form', a general and broad explanation, that is, the substance and characteristics are mixed. The latter explanation of the five kinds of name and form are each distinct, there can be differences, and it appears slightly clearer. Otherwise, how are they called the five seeds? The five substances are all one name and form. This is only of resultant and neutral nature. In the eighth consciousness, corresponding to it, excluding contact and feeling, and in the six consciousnesses together, also excluding all resultant contact and feeling, the remaining present resultant six consciousnesses, and the remaining resultant mental dharma seeds of the past and future lives, are all this substance. Also, 'Ninety-Three' says: 'The co-born five faculties are called form, and the immediately ceasing mind is called name.' That is, there is no different substance from the six sense bases. However, saying six

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識為識支故。由說與彼互為緣故。偏說六根。非實此支之體唯爾。前解為勝。此約六處與名色支無別體性一義解釋。非謂盡理。無覆無記性　五六處支。唯內六處。此唯取彼異熟種故。即五色根。及前六識若有異熟居過去世說為意也。此約一意二世分別。即義說別。若不爾者名中無識。此約一時俱有五種而為論也。若約當生分位說者。即名色支具足五蘊。初生之位在過去識名為意者亦名中攝。未名六處故。此唯種子。有處亦說為現行者。如名色中說。下至觸．受皆準此知　六觸支者。除第七識取余第八相應觸全。六識之中若異熟觸一切皆是。此約五種同時為論。若分位為言。六處位后所有觸數方是此體。大論第九說六觸身名為觸故　七受支。此亦同前觸應知也。作用分位義皆同故。然論說受為愛緣者。約當來生。及於現在生老位中現起受說。然即彼體是生支攝。今此受支唯在種位。以識等五論皆名為胎藏苦故。九十三云。此五皆是唯種子故　八愛支。唯取愛數一法為體。大論第十初云。愛謂三界愛。亦通現．種。十地論說故。此論下文云。愛支與取得為因緣。非現望現體是因緣故。愛種．現為此支體　九取支。通取一切煩惱。瑜伽論說一切煩惱令生續故。即通見．修所有煩惱令生相續。又下文說。正唯修斷。助潤通見

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『識』之所以是『識支』，是因為經文說它與『名色』互為因緣。這裡偏重於說明六根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意），並非說『識支』的本體僅僅是六根。之前的解釋更為合理。這裡是就『六處』與『名色支』沒有不同的本體性這一意義來解釋，並非窮盡了所有道理。『五六處支』是無覆無記性的（既不屬於善，也不屬於惡，是中性的）。 『六處支』僅僅指內在的六處（眼處、耳處、鼻處、舌處、身處、意處）。這裡只取六處中的異熟種子（由過去業力成熟而產生的果報）。五色根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）和之前的六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識），如果具有異熟果報且存在於過去世，就被稱為『意』。這是從一個『意』在兩個時間段（過去和現在）進行分別。從意義上說，這是不同的。如果不是這樣，那麼『名』（名色中的名）中就沒有『識』了。這是就同一時間存在五種（蘊）進行討論。如果從未來出生的角度來說，『名色支』就具備了五蘊（色、受、想、行、識）。最初出生的階段，在過去的『識』被稱為『意』，也包含在『名』中，因為還沒有形成『六處』。這裡僅僅是種子。有些地方也說是現行（已經發生作用的），就像在『名色』中說的那樣。下至『觸』、『受』，都可以參照這個來理解。 『六觸支』，除了第七識（末那識），取其餘第八識（阿賴耶識）相應的全部『觸』。在六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）中，如果是異熟觸，就全部都是。這是就五種（觸）同時存在進行討論。如果從階段上來說，在『六處』階段之後的所有『觸』才是這個『六觸支』的本體。《大論》第九說六觸身名為觸。 『七受支』，這個也應該和前面的『觸』一樣理解。作用和階段的意義都相同。然而，論典說『受』是『愛』的因緣，是從未來生，以及現在生老階段中現起的『受』來說的。然而，那個本體是『生支』所包含的。現在的這個『受支』僅僅是在種子階段。因為『識』等五支都被稱為胎藏苦，第九十三卷說，這五支都是唯有種子。 『八愛支』，僅僅取『愛』這一種法作為本體。《大論》第十初說，『愛』是指三界（欲界、色界、無色界）的『愛』，也包括現行和種子。《十地論》中這樣說。這個論典下文說，『愛支』與『取支』互為因緣，不是現行望現行是因緣。『愛』的種子和現行都是這個『愛支』的本體。 『九取支』，普遍地取一切煩惱。《瑜伽論》說一切煩惱能令眾生相續不斷。也就是包括見道和修道所斷的所有煩惱，能令生死相續。又下文說，主要是修道所斷的煩惱，輔助潤生的煩惱也包括見道所斷的煩惱。

【English Translation】 English version 'Consciousness' is the 'consciousness limb' because the scriptures say it is mutually conditioned with 'name and form'. Here, the emphasis is on explaining the six sense bases (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind), not that the substance of the 'consciousness limb' is only the six sense bases. The previous explanation is more reasonable. This explains the meaning that 'six sense bases' and 'name and form limb' do not have different substantial natures, not exhausting all the principles. The 'five or six sense bases limb' is of an unconditioned neutral nature (neither good nor evil, but neutral). The 'six sense bases limb' only refers to the internal six sense bases (eye base, ear base, nose base, tongue base, body base, and mind base). Here, only the seeds of fruition (vipaka) in the six sense bases are taken (the result produced by the maturation of past karma). The five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) and the previous six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness), if they have the fruition of karma and exist in the past, are called 'mind'. This is a distinction made from one 'mind' in two time periods (past and present). In terms of meaning, these are different. If not, then there would be no 'consciousness' in 'name' (name in name and form). This is a discussion of the simultaneous existence of five (skandhas). If viewed from the perspective of future birth, the 'name and form limb' possesses the five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness). In the initial stage of birth, the 'consciousness' in the past is called 'mind', which is also included in 'name', because the 'six sense bases' have not yet been formed. Here, it is only the seed. In some places, it is also said to be manifest (already functioning), just as it is said in 'name and form'. Down to 'contact' and 'feeling', this can be understood in the same way. The 'six contacts limb', except for the seventh consciousness (Manas consciousness), takes all the 'contact' corresponding to the remaining eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness). Among the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness), if it is fruition contact, then it is all of it. This is a discussion of the simultaneous existence of five (contacts). If viewed from the stage, all 'contacts' after the 'six sense bases' stage are the substance of this 'six contacts limb'. The ninth volume of the Mahashastras says that the six contact bodies are called contact. The 'seven feelings limb' should also be understood in the same way as the previous 'contact'. The meanings of function and stage are the same. However, the scriptures say that 'feeling' is the cause of 'craving', which is said from the 'feeling' that arises in the future life and in the stages of birth, old age in the present life. However, that substance is included in the 'birth limb'. This 'feeling limb' is now only in the seed stage. Because the five limbs such as 'consciousness' are all called the suffering of the womb, the ninety-third volume says that these five limbs are all only seeds. The 'eight craving limb' only takes 'craving' as its substance. The beginning of the tenth volume of the Mahashastras says that 'craving' refers to the 'craving' of the three realms (desire realm, form realm, formless realm), which also includes manifest and seed. The Ten Stages Sutra says so. The following text of this scripture says that the 'craving limb' and the 'grasping limb' are mutually conditioned, not that the manifest looking at the manifest is the cause. The seed and manifest of 'craving' are both the substance of this 'craving limb'. The 'nine grasping limb' universally takes all afflictions. The Yogacara-bhumi-sastra says that all afflictions can cause sentient beings to continue uninterruptedly. That is, it includes all the afflictions to be severed by the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, which can cause the cycle of birth and death to continue. Furthermore, the following text says that it is mainly the afflictions to be severed by the path of cultivation, and the afflictions that assist in the process of rebirth also include the afflictions to be severed by the path of seeing.

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。論文多據四取為體。在家．出家二諍本故。四取以三見。及貪為體。大論第十．及九十三等云。欲取云何謂欲貪。見取．戒禁取．我語取即三見故也。諸在家者以欲貪為先而興諍故。諸出家者依三見為先而興諍故瑜伽上下四取體三文不同。一唯取四取是四取體。二緣四取貪為四取體。三若能取。若所取。若所為取。皆四取體。今此合取。所說義別故無妨難。勘別抄也　問若爾何故十地經等云愛增名取。　答下自會言。雖取支中攝諸煩惱。而愛潤勝說是愛增。非無餘惑。此通種．現。十地經說故。如愛引證　十有支。即取前行。及五果種為愛．取潤已轉名為有。九十三等云。愛．取和合潤先引因轉名為有。是當生起因所攝故。此有或唯說業等者下文自會。今上來解此唯種子。由前六法種子轉名有故　十一生者。即五果現行。以異熟五蘊為體　十二老死亦然。然老死即前五蘊變滅。然生．老死二名。是於五蘊假立名。即不相應行蘊。今取實體亦前五蘊。此不取種。唯引果故。種即是前五種支故。若約分位未潤已前名識等五種。被潤已去有果起已名生．老死。亦通種子無妨。緣起經說生．引同時。即雖被潤總轉名為有。生果之識等仍名引故。唯取現行至下當悉。薩婆多師一一皆以五蘊為性。如俱舍第九．婆沙第二十二三等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：論文主要依據四取（指欲取、見取、戒禁取、我語取）為根本。因為在家眾和出家眾的爭論都源於此。四取以三種見（有身見、邊見、邪見）以及貪愛為根本。《大智度論》第十卷和第九十三卷等記載，『欲取』指的是對慾望的貪愛。『見取』、『戒禁取』、『我語取』就是三種見。那些在家之人，以對慾望的貪愛為先導而引發爭論；那些出家之人，則以三種見為先導而引發爭論。《瑜伽師地論》上下兩卷中，關於四取的根本有三種不同的說法：第一種說法認為，只有四取本身才是四取的根本；第二種說法認為，以緣於四取的貪愛作為四取的根本；第三種說法認為，無論是能取、所取，還是所為取，都是四取的根本。現在這裡綜合起來看，因為所說的意義不同，所以沒有妨礙和矛盾。（參考《勘別抄》）

問：如果這樣，那麼為什麼《十地經》等經典中說，愛增長就叫做取呢？

答：下面會自己解釋說，雖然取支中包含了各種煩惱，但是因為愛具有滋潤的作用，所以說是愛增長。並非沒有其他的迷惑。這是通於種子和現行的說法。《十地經》是這樣說的。比如用愛來引證。

十有支，就是取支的前行，以及五果的種子，被愛和取滋潤後轉化而成的。第九十三卷等記載，愛和取結合在一起，滋潤先前引發的原因，使其轉化，就叫做有。這是屬於當生起的原因所包含的。這個有，或者只是說業等，下文會自己解釋。現在上面解釋的只是種子。因為前面的六法（無明、行、識、名色、六入、觸）的種子轉化，就叫做有。

十一生支，就是五果的現行。以異熟的五蘊為本體。

十二老死也是這樣。然而，老死就是前面五蘊的變化和滅亡。但是，生和老死這兩個名稱，是對五蘊假立的名稱，是不相應行蘊。現在取其實體，也是前面的五蘊。這裡不取種子，只是引出果報。種子就是前面的五種支（無明、行、愛、取、有）。如果按照分位來說，在沒有被滋潤之前，叫做識等五種。被滋潤之後，有果報生起之後，叫做生和老死。也通於種子，沒有妨礙。《緣起經》說生和引是同時的。也就是說，雖然被滋潤而總體轉化叫做有，但是生果的識等仍然叫做引。只是取現行，到下面會詳細說明。薩婆多部的老師們認為，每一個支都以五蘊為自性。如同《俱舍論》第九卷和《婆沙論》第二十二卷、二十三卷等所說。

【English Translation】 English version: The treatise mainly relies on the four graspings (catvāro ādānāh) as its foundation. This is because disputes among householders and renunciants originate from them. The four graspings are based on the three views (satkāya-dṛṣṭi, anta-grāha-dṛṣṭi, mithyā-dṛṣṭi) and craving (tṛṣṇā). The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (Dà Zhì Dù Lùn) chapters 10 and 93 state that 'sense-desire grasping' (kāma-ādāna) refers to craving for desires. 'View grasping' (dṛṣṭy-ādāna), 'precept and vow grasping' (śīla-vrata-ādāna), and 'self-assertion grasping' (ātmavāda-ādāna) are the three views. Those who are householders initiate disputes primarily due to craving for desires; those who are renunciants initiate disputes primarily based on the three views. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yújiā Shī Dì Lùn), both upper and lower volumes, presents three different perspectives on the essence of the four graspings: first, only the four graspings themselves are the essence of the four graspings; second, craving related to the four graspings is the essence of the four graspings; third, whether it is the grasper, the grasped, or what is grasped for, all are the essence of the four graspings. Now, considering them comprehensively, there is no contradiction because the meanings being discussed are different. (Refer to Kanbie Chao).

Question: If that is the case, then why do scriptures like the Daśabhūmika Sūtra (Shí Dì Jīng) say that the increase of love is called grasping?

Answer: The following will explain itself, although the grasping limb includes various afflictions, because love has a nourishing function, it is said to be the increase of love. It is not without other delusions. This is common to both seed and manifestation. The Daśabhūmika Sūtra speaks in this way. For example, using love as evidence.

The tenth limb, existence (bhava), is the preceding action of the grasping limb, and the seeds of the five results, having been nourished by love and grasping, are transformed. Chapter 93 states that love and grasping combine to nourish the previously induced cause, causing it to transform, which is called existence. This belongs to the causes included in future arising. This existence, or only refers to karma etc., the following text will explain itself. Now, the above explanation is only about the seed. Because the seeds of the preceding six dharmas (ignorance, formations, consciousness, name and form, six entrances, contact) transform, it is called existence.

The eleventh limb, birth (jāti), is the manifestation of the five results. Its essence is the five aggregates of different maturation.

The twelfth, old age and death (jarā-maraṇa), are also like that. However, old age and death are the change and extinction of the preceding five aggregates. However, the two names, birth and old age and death, are names provisionally established for the five aggregates, and are non-associated formations. Now, taking its substance, it is also the preceding five aggregates. Here, the seed is not taken, only the fruit is drawn out. The seed is the preceding five limbs (ignorance, formations, love, grasping, existence). If according to the divisions, before being nourished, they are called the five kinds of consciousness etc. After being nourished, and after the fruit arises, they are called birth and old age and death. It also applies to seeds, without hindrance. The Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra says that birth and drawing out are simultaneous. That is to say, although being nourished and totally transformed is called existence, the consciousness etc. of the birth fruit are still called drawing out. Only the present manifestation is taken, which will be explained in detail below. The teachers of the Sarvāstivāda school believe that each limb has the nature of the five aggregates, as stated in the Abhidharmakośa chapter 9 and the Mahāvibhāṣā chapters 22 and 23.

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解　第二辨支總別名義得名者。初解總名。此名緣起。亦名緣生。五十六云。無有主宰．作者．受者。無自作用不得自在。從因而生托眾緣轉。本無而有。有已散滅。唯法所顯能潤所潤墮相續法名為緣生。大論第十釋云。由煩惱繫縛。往諸趣中數數生起。故名緣起。此依字釋名　又解即依緣字．起字解此名也。唯有漏十二支得此名矣。又依託眾緣速謝滅等。依剎那釋通一切法。又眾緣過去而不捨等。此依義釋名。今依此解。又乃至。於過去世覺緣性已等相續起等。如世尊言我已覺悟正起宣說。展轉傳說故名緣起。此解亦得。合有五釋不能煩引。五十六說。因名緣起。果名緣生。謂此無明隨眠不斷有故彼無明纏有。此纏生故彼諸行轉。如是乃至老死亦爾。然五種果中以前後相望為因緣。為因時非果。為果時非因。據義別故。世親俱舍自意同此。亦得別名。緣起經云。如是諸分各由自緣和合無闕相續而起名緣起義。釋總名已。次辨別名　名義得名者。言無明者非六釋攝。以無別體義可為六釋故。初離無與明別解。后合之總釋。故名離合。舊云六釋者是。謂此六釋依二法簡別。離合方可為解。非如眼等雖有二字名曰斫芻。而體一法無可簡別用此六釋。六釋不遍諸法釋故。如別抄解　行者當體彰名。造作是行義。亦功能得稱　

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 解釋：第二部分，辨析十二緣起的總名、別名以及得名的原因。首先解釋總名。這個名稱的緣起，也叫做緣生。《五十六頌》中說：『沒有主宰者、作者、受者，沒有自身的作用，不能夠自在。從因而生，依託眾多因緣而運轉。本來沒有而產生，產生后又消散滅亡。只有法所顯現，能夠滋潤和被滋潤，墮入相續的法，叫做緣生。』《大智度論》第十卷解釋說：『由於煩惱的繫縛，在各個趣道中多次生起，所以叫做緣起。』這是按照字面來解釋名稱。又可以根據『緣』字和『起』字來解釋這個名稱。只有有漏的十二支才能夠得到這個名稱。又因為依託眾多因緣迅速消逝等，按照剎那的意義來解釋，可以通用於一切法。又因為眾多因緣過去而不捨棄等，這是按照義理來解釋名稱。現在就按照這個來解釋。又乃至，在過去世覺悟緣的性質后等相續生起等。如世尊所說：『我已經覺悟，正確地生起並宣說。』輾轉傳說，所以叫做緣起。這種解釋也可以。總共有五種解釋，不能一一列舉。《五十六頌》說：『因叫做緣起，果叫做緣生。』意思是說，因為這個無明（Avidyā，無知）隨眠不斷，所以有這個無明纏（Kleśa，煩惱）。因為這個纏的產生，所以那些行（Saṃskāra，業）運轉。像這樣乃至老死（Jarā-maraṇa，衰老和死亡）也是如此。然而五種果中，以前後相互看待作為因緣。作為因的時候不是果，作為果的時候不是因，根據意義來區分。世親（Vasubandhu）的《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）的觀點與此相同。也可以有別名。《緣起經》（Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra）中說：『像這樣，各種組成部分各自由於自身的因緣和合，沒有缺失地相續生起，叫做緣起的意義。』解釋了總名后，接下來辨析別名。關於名義得名，『無明』（Avidyā，無知）這個詞不屬於六釋（Śabdavyākaraṇa，古印度的一種語法分析方法）。因為沒有可以進行六釋的獨立的實體意義。首先分開解釋『無』和『明』，然後合起來總的解釋，所以叫做離合。舊的說法是六釋是對的。意思是說，這個六釋依據兩種法來簡別，分開和合才能進行解釋。不像眼睛等雖然有兩個字，叫做『斫芻』（cakṣu，眼睛），但是實體是一個法，無法簡別，所以不能用這個六釋。六釋不能普遍解釋所有法，就像別抄的解釋一樣。行（Saṃskāra，業）是當體彰名。造作是行的意義，也可以用功能來稱呼。

【English Translation】 English version: Explanation: The second part distinguishes the general name, specific names, and reasons for naming the Twelve Nidānas (Dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda). First, explain the general name. The origin of this name is also called Pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination). The Fifty-Six Verses say: 'There is no master, no creator, no receiver, no self-action, and no freedom. It arises from cause, relies on many conditions to turn. Originally there was nothing, but it arises, and after arising, it dissipates and perishes. Only the Dharma manifests, able to moisten and be moistened, falling into the continuous Dharma is called Pratītyasamutpāda.' The tenth volume of the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa (Great Discourse on Wisdom) explains: 'Due to the bondage of afflictions, it arises repeatedly in various destinies, so it is called Pratītyasamutpāda.' This is to explain the name according to the literal meaning. It can also be explained according to the words 'Pratītya' (dependent) and 'Samutpāda' (arising). Only the twelve branches of existence with outflows can get this name. Furthermore, because it relies on many conditions to quickly disappear, etc., according to the meaning of a moment, it can be applied to all dharmas. Also, because many conditions pass but are not abandoned, etc., this is to explain the name according to the meaning. Now, explain it according to this. Furthermore, even to the point of awakening to the nature of conditions in the past, etc., continuously arising, etc. As the World Honored One said: 'I have awakened, correctly arising and proclaiming.' Transmitted from one to another, so it is called Pratītyasamutpāda. This explanation is also acceptable. There are a total of five explanations, which cannot be listed one by one. The Fifty-Six Verses say: 'The cause is called Pratītyasamutpāda, and the effect is called Pratītyasamutpanna.' It means that because this Avidyā (ignorance) is constantly latent, there is this Kleśa (affliction) of Avidyā. Because of the arising of this entanglement, those Saṃskāras (formations) turn. Like this, even to Jarā-maraṇa (old age and death) is also the same. However, among the five kinds of effects, the previous and subsequent are regarded as cause and condition. When it is a cause, it is not an effect, and when it is an effect, it is not a cause, according to the meaning to distinguish. Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakośa has the same view. There can also be a separate name. The Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra says: 'Like this, each component arises in succession due to the combination of its own conditions without any deficiency, which is called the meaning of Pratītyasamutpāda.' After explaining the general name, next distinguish the specific names. Regarding the naming of name and meaning, the word 'Avidyā' (ignorance) does not belong to the six explanations (Śabdavyākaraṇa, a method of grammatical analysis in ancient India). Because there is no independent entity meaning that can be used for the six explanations. First, explain 'A' (not) and 'Vidyā' (knowledge) separately, and then combine them to explain the whole, so it is called separation and combination. The old saying that the six explanations are correct. It means that this six explanations are based on two kinds of dharmas to distinguish, separation and combination can be explained. Unlike the eyes, etc., although there are two words, called 'cakṣu' (eye), but the entity is one dharma, which cannot be distinguished, so this six explanations cannot be used. The six explanations cannot universally explain all dharmas, just like the explanation in the separate copy. Saṃskāra (formations) is the name that manifests the entity. Creation is the meaning of Saṃskāra, and it can also be called by function.

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了別名識　觸境名觸　領納名受　耽染名愛。

追欲名取　有果名有　蘊起名生義。勝鬘經及緣起經等。瑜伽等亦有別釋。皆同於行。不能別引　言名色者是相違釋。名之與色體各別故。如雲能立與能破言。五十六云。何故四無色蘊名名。答順趣種種所緣境義。或依言說名分別種種所緣境義故說為名。何故色蘊名色答于彼彼方所種殖增長義。及變礙義故說為色。變礙有二乃至廣說。既各彰別體。故是相違釋。非名體即色。非是依名之色。名所有色故　六處者帶數釋。處者生長門義。體類不同有其六種。此帶六言故帶數釋　老死者變異義是老義。滅無義是死義。前是異相。后是滅相。各有所表既如名色。故相違釋。不說異相而言老者毀責名也。亦相違釋。老死別故。

第三次第所由者。大論第十有三複次解。初云。諸癡者要先愚于所應知事方起邪行。起邪行。故令心顛倒。心顛倒故結生相續。生相續故諸根圓滿。根圓滿故受用境。受用境故耽著．希求。耽著．希求故煩惱滋長。煩惱滋長故發後有業。業滋長故五趣果生。生已變壞老死生起。故十二支如是次第。此約當生五果為因次第　第二約二緣建立十二有支。前六支內身緣立。后六支境界緣立　第三約由有三有情聚立。一樂出世有情減緣起增白法。二樂世

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：了別名識（了別是識別的意思），觸境名觸（觸境是接觸外境的意思），領納名受（領納是領受和接納的意思），耽染名愛（耽染是沉溺和執著的意思）。 追逐慾望名為取（取是追求和獲取的意思），有果名為有（有是指導致未來結果的業力），蘊起名為生義（蘊起是五蘊生起的意思）。《勝鬘經》和《緣起經》等經典，以及《瑜伽師地論》等論著中也有不同的解釋，但都與『行』類似，這裡不一一引用。言『名色』是相違釋（相違釋是指名和色是相互對立的解釋），因為名和色的本體各不相同。例如，能立和能破的言論。五十六云：『為什麼四無色蘊稱為名？』回答說：『因為它們順應趣向種種所緣境的意義，或者依據言說來命名和分別種種所緣境的意義，所以稱為名。』『為什麼色蘊稱為色？』回答說：『因為它們在各個地方種植和增長的意義，以及變礙的意義，所以稱為色。』變礙有兩種，乃至廣說。既然各自彰顯不同的本體，所以是相違釋。不是名的本體就是色，也不是依附於名的色，而是名所擁有的色。六處是帶數釋（帶數釋是指帶有數字的解釋），處是生長之門的意思，本體和種類不同，共有六種。這裡帶有『六』字，所以是帶數釋。老死是變異的意義是老，滅無的意義是死。前者是變異的相狀，後者是滅亡的相狀。各自有所表達，就像名色一樣，所以是相違釋。不說變異的相狀而說老，是毀責的名稱。也是相違釋，因為老和死是不同的。 第三，關於次第的由來。《大智度論》第十有三種解釋。第一種說：『那些愚癡的人，一定要先愚昧於所應該知道的事情，才會產生邪惡的行為。因為產生邪惡的行為，所以使心顛倒。因為心顛倒，所以結生相續。因為生相續，所以諸根圓滿。因為諸根圓滿，所以受用外境。因為受用外境，所以耽著和希求。因為耽著和希求，所以煩惱滋長。因為煩惱滋長，所以發起後有的業。因為業滋長，所以五趣的果報產生。產生之後，變壞老死生起。』所以十二支是這樣的次第，這是以當來所生的五種果報為因而形成的次第。第二種，以兩種緣建立十二有支。前六支以內身緣而建立，后六支以外境界緣而建立。第三種，由三種有情聚集而建立。第一種是樂於出世的有情，減少緣起，增長白法。第二種是樂於世

【English Translation】 English version: '了別' (liǎo bié, discernment) is named '識' (shì, consciousness); '觸境' (chù jìng, contacting an object) is named '觸' (chù, contact); '領納' (lǐng nà, receiving) is named '受' (shòu, feeling); '耽染' (dān rǎn, indulging) is named '愛' (ài, craving). Pursuing desires is named '取' (qǔ, grasping); having consequences is named '有' (yǒu, becoming); the arising of the aggregates is the meaning of '生' (shēng, birth). The 'Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra' and the 'Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra' and others, as well as the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' and others, also have different explanations, but they are all similar to '行' (xíng, volitional action), so they are not cited one by one here. Saying '名色' (míng sè, name and form) is an '相違釋' (xiāng wéi shì, contradictory explanation), because the substance of '名' (míng, name) and '色' (sè, form) are different. For example, the words of the able to establish and the able to refute. Fifty-six says: 'Why are the four formless aggregates called '名' (míng, name)?' The answer is: 'Because they accord with the meaning of tending towards various objects of perception, or according to speech, they are named and distinguish various objects of perception, so they are called '名' (míng, name).' 'Why is the form aggregate called '色' (sè, form)?' The answer is: 'Because of the meaning of planting and growing in various places, and the meaning of obstruction, so it is called '色' (sè, form).' There are two kinds of obstruction, and so on. Since each manifests a different substance, it is a contradictory explanation. It is not that the substance of '名' (míng, name) is '色' (sè, form), nor is it '色' (sè, form) that depends on '名' (míng, name), but rather '色' (sè, form) that is possessed by '名' (míng, name). The six '處' (chù, sense bases) are a numerical explanation, '處' (chù, sense bases) means the gate of growth, the substance and types are different, there are six kinds. Here it has the word 'six', so it is a numerical explanation. '老死' (lǎo sǐ, old age and death) is the meaning of change is old age, the meaning of extinction is death. The former is the aspect of change, the latter is the aspect of extinction. Each has its own expression, just like '名色' (míng sè, name and form), so it is a contradictory explanation. Not saying the aspect of change but saying old age is a name of reproach. It is also a contradictory explanation, because old age and death are different. Third, regarding the origin of the sequence. The tenth chapter of the 'Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa' has three explanations. The first says: 'Those who are ignorant must first be ignorant of what should be known before they can engage in evil actions. Because they engage in evil actions, they cause the mind to be inverted. Because the mind is inverted, they connect to the continuation of birth. Because of the continuation of birth, the sense faculties are complete. Because the sense faculties are complete, they experience objects. Because they experience objects, they are attached and seek. Because they are attached and seek, afflictions grow. Because afflictions grow, they initiate the karma of future existence. Because karma grows, the fruits of the five destinies arise. After arising, decay, old age, and death arise.' Therefore, the twelve links are in this sequence, which is the sequence formed by taking the five fruits to be born in the future as the cause. Second, the twelve links of existence are established by two conditions. The first six links are established by the condition of the inner body, and the last six links are established by the condition of the external environment. Third, it is established by the gathering of three kinds of sentient beings. The first is sentient beings who are happy to leave the world, reduce the arising of conditions, and increase white dharmas. The second is sentient beings who are happy in the world.

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間有情立前六支。三樂著境界有情立后六支。如彼廣解。故十二支次第如是　此二亦約當生果位說因次第。以識等五因支熏時無次第故。緣起經云。一時而起次第宣說　問若爾何故凈緣起中先觀老死逆觀緣起　答依諦先後道理立故。如余處說。此中染者依鄰次第二世因果說。隔越多身說即不定。思準可知。下亦略辨　第四總別業用者。謂此能令有情生死流轉。生死體者謂生．老死。前十能令生等轉故。此總業用。別業用者。對法雲。無明有二業。一令有情于有愚癡。謂由彼覆故於三際不如實了起過．未疑等。二與行為緣。謂由彼力令後有業得增長故。十地經云。無明有二。一緣中癡令眾生惑。即前于有所知境等不了疑也。二與行作因。同前對法余乃至老死對法二業云。一數令有情時分變異壞少盛故。二數令有情壽命變異壞壽命故。十地云。老有二。一令諸根熟。二與死為因。死有二。一壞五陰身。二以不見知故而令相續不斷。然對法合作法。十地開之。又對法約老死無果終義。十地約死有果為論。故言以不知見故相續不斷等。又以前十二支中十地上下皆同此論。文雖稍別義意大同。不能繁引　問且如行中福．不動。以正簡擇力而起。何故仍說以無明為緣也　答瑜伽第十云由不了知世俗苦故起非福行。由不了達勝義苦故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有些有情眾生基於前六支（無明、行、識、名色、六入、觸）而建立。那些沉溺於三種快樂境界的有情眾生則基於后六支（受、愛、取、有、生、老死）而建立。正如廣泛的解釋所說。因此，十二因緣的次第就是這樣安排的。這兩種情況也是根據當生果位的角度來說明因的次第。因為識等五種因支在熏習時沒有次第。緣起經說：『一時而起，次第宣說。』 問：如果這樣，為什麼在清凈緣起中先觀察老死，然後逆向觀察緣起呢？答：這是根據真諦的先後道理而建立的。正如其他地方所說。這裡所說的染污，是根據相鄰的次第，即第二世的因果來說的。如果間隔多個身體，那麼這種說法就不一定了。可以根據思考來推斷。下面也會略微辨析。 第四，總別業用方面。這是指這些（十二因緣）能夠使有情眾生在生死中流轉。生死的本體是指生、老死。前面的十支能夠使生等流轉。這是總的業用。別的業用方面，《對法論》說：『無明有兩種業。一是使有情眾生對於存在愚癡。這是因為無明的覆蓋，使他們對於過去、未來等三際不能如實了知，從而產生疑惑等。二是與行支作為緣。這是因為無明的力量，使後有的業得以增長。』《十地經》說：『無明有兩種。一是緣中癡，使眾生迷惑。』這與前面所說的對於有所知境等不了知而產生疑惑相同。『二是與行支作為因。』與前面的《對法論》相同。其餘乃至老死，《對法論》中說有兩種業：『一是常常使有情眾生的時分變異，使他們衰敗減少。二是常常使有情眾生的壽命變異，使他們的壽命衰減。』《十地經》說：『老有兩種。一是使諸根成熟。二是與死作為因。』死有兩種。一是壞五陰身。二是以不見知，而使相續不斷。』然而，《對法論》是合作法，《十地經》是分開來說。而且，《對法論》是從老死沒有果終的角度來說的，《十地經》是從死有果的角度來論述的。所以說『以不知見故相續不斷』等。而且，在前面的十二支中，《十地經》上下都與此論相同。雖然文字稍有不同，但意義大體相同，不能一一列舉。 問：比如行支中的福行、不動行，是以正確的簡擇力而產生的。為什麼仍然說以無明為緣呢？答：《瑜伽師地論》第十卷說：『由於不了知世俗的苦，所以產生非福行。由於不了達勝義的苦，所以產生不動行。』

【English Translation】 English version Some sentient beings are established based on the first six limbs (Avidya (ignorance), Samskara (volitional action), Vijnana (consciousness), Namarupa (name and form), Sadayatana (six sense bases), Sparsa (contact)). Those sentient beings who are attached to the three realms of pleasure are established based on the last six limbs (Vedana (feeling), Trsna (craving), Upadana (grasping), Bhava (becoming), Jati (birth), Jaramarana (old age and death)). As explained extensively. Therefore, the order of the twelve Nidanas (links of dependent origination) is arranged in this way. These two situations also explain the order of causes from the perspective of the fruit position in the next life. Because the five causal limbs such as Vijnana (consciousness) do not have an order when they are perfuming. The Sutra of Dependent Origination says: 'Arising simultaneously, explained in order.' Question: If so, why in the pure dependent origination, do we first observe Jaramarana (old age and death) and then observe dependent origination in reverse? Answer: This is established according to the order of truth. As said elsewhere. The defilement mentioned here is based on the adjacent order, that is, the cause and effect of the second life. If there are multiple bodies in between, then this statement is not necessarily true. It can be inferred by thinking. It will also be briefly analyzed below. Fourth, regarding the general and specific functions. This refers to these (twelve Nidanas) that can cause sentient beings to transmigrate in Samsara (cycle of birth and death). The essence of birth and death refers to Jati (birth), Jaramarana (old age and death). The previous ten limbs can cause birth and so on to transmigrate. This is the general function. Regarding the specific functions, the Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical texts) says: 'Avidya (ignorance) has two functions. One is to make sentient beings ignorant of existence. This is because of the covering of Avidya (ignorance), which makes them unable to truly understand the three times (past, present, and future), thus generating doubts and so on. The second is to act as a condition for Samskara (volitional action). This is because of the power of Avidya (ignorance), which allows the karma of future existence to grow.' The Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Stages Sutra) says: 'Avidya (ignorance) has two types. One is ignorance in the middle, which causes sentient beings to be confused.' This is the same as the previous statement that they do not understand the objects of knowledge and generate doubts. 'The second is to act as a cause for Samskara (volitional action).' The same as the previous Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical texts). For the rest, even Jaramarana (old age and death), the Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical texts) says there are two functions: 'One is to constantly change the time of sentient beings, causing them to decline and diminish. The second is to constantly change the lifespan of sentient beings, causing their lifespan to decrease.' The Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Stages Sutra) says: 'Jara (old age) has two types. One is to mature the senses. The second is to act as a cause for Marana (death).' Marana (death) has two types. One is to destroy the five Skandhas (aggregates). The second is to make the continuity unbroken because of not knowing.' However, the Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical texts) is a cooperative method, and the Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Stages Sutra) is to explain it separately. Moreover, the Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical texts) is from the perspective that Jaramarana (old age and death) has no final result, and the Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Stages Sutra) is from the perspective that death has a result. Therefore, it says 'to make the continuity unbroken because of not knowing' and so on. Moreover, in the previous twelve limbs, the Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Stages Sutra) is the same as this treatise both above and below. Although the wording is slightly different, the meaning is largely the same, and cannot be listed one by one. Question: For example, the meritorious action and the immovable action in Samskara (volitional action) are produced by the correct selective power. Why is it still said that Avidya (ignorance) is the condition? Answer: The tenth volume of the Yogacarabhumi Sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) says: 'Because of not knowing the suffering of the mundane world, non-meritorious actions arise. Because of not understanding the ultimate suffering, immovable actions arise.'

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起福．不動行。緣起亦云。又無知故於非對治起對治想。造諸福行。或不動行。故以無明為因生福．不動。世俗勝義苦。非謂苦苦．壞苦名世俗。行苦名勝義。若爾即色．無色無壞苦故。若亦迷彼豈唯發非福也。但可總言。世俗易了知者名世俗苦。即三塗等苦。彼不了故造非福行。難了知者名勝義苦。即人．天善趣。勝義道理體皆是苦。世俗難了謂為善勝。迷之故造福．不動也。是亦有壞苦。名勝義苦也。不可定判三苦分之。如對法第七。大論第十。顯揚破苦品等。別抄說　問如經說諸業以貪．瞋．癡為緣。何故唯說癡　答此中通說福．非福．不動故。貪．瞋．癡緣唯生非福故　問身。語二業思所發起。而行亦緣行。何故唯說無明為緣　答依發一切行緣而說。及依生善．染思緣說故。此行如是既問答已。乃至老死問答皆爾。如大論第十一一廣說。不能繁引。此中且說鄰近。無明與行為緣。若隔越為緣。乃至老死亦爾。然後支非前緣。非為斷前支修后支。但為斷後修前支生故　第五因果差別。此有五種。一等起因果。謂前前支為因。後後支為果。十二支中無明唯因。老死唯果。余亦因亦果。無明無所從。老死無所起故。此約十二支內分別也。故第十云。初一唯因。后一唯果。余通因果　二本末因果。無明．愛．取三體是

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 起福（產生福德的行為），不動行（禪定等不動搖的修行）。緣起（事物相互依存的產生）也是如此。又因為無知，對於非對治法（不能消除煩惱的方法）生起對治法（能夠消除煩惱的方法）的想念，從而造作各種福行（善業）或不動行（禪定）。所以說，以無明（對事物真相的迷惑）為因，產生福（善業）和不動（禪定）。 世俗勝義苦（世俗諦和勝義諦的苦）。並非指苦苦（直接的痛苦）和壞苦（快樂變壞的痛苦）名為世俗（容易理解的），行苦（一切有為法的苦）名為勝義（深刻的）。如果這樣說，那麼色界（物質世界）和無色界（精神世界）就沒有壞苦了。如果也迷惑它們，難道只會引發非福（惡業）嗎？但可以總的說，世俗容易瞭解的稱為世俗苦，即三塗（地獄、餓鬼、畜生）等的苦。因為不瞭解這些，所以造作非福行。難以瞭解的稱為勝義苦，即人界和天界的善趣（好的去處），勝義的道理本質上都是苦。世俗難以瞭解，認為它們是善勝（好的和殊勝的），迷惑於此，所以造作福行和不動行。這些也有壞苦，稱為勝義苦。 不可絕對地將苦分為三類。如《對法》（阿毗達摩）第七，《大論》（大毗婆沙論）第十，《顯揚》（顯揚聖教論）破苦品等。別抄中說：問：如經中所說，諸業以貪（貪婪）、瞋（嗔恨）、癡（愚癡）為緣，為什麼只說癡？答：這裡是通說福、非福、不動，貪、瞋、癡為緣只會產生非福。問：身業和語業由思（思考）所發起，而行（行為）也緣於行，為什麼只說無明為緣？答：這是依據發起一切行的緣而說的，以及依據產生善思和染思的緣而說的。此行（行為）是這樣，既然已經問答完畢，乃至老死（衰老和死亡）的問答也是如此。如《大論》第十一中廣說，不能在此繁瑣地引用。這裡且說鄰近的，無明與行為緣。如果隔越為緣，乃至老死也是如此。然後支（後面的支）並非前緣（前面的緣），不是爲了斷前支而修后支，而是爲了斷後支而修前支而生。 第五，因果差別。這裡有五種：一、等起因果。即前前支（前面的支）為因，後後支（後面的支）為果。十二支（十二因緣）中，無明唯是因，老死唯是果，其餘既是因也是果。無明沒有所從生，老死沒有所起，這是約十二支內部分別來說的。所以第十中說，第一個唯是因，最後一個唯是果，其餘通因果。二、本末因果。無明、愛（貪愛）、取（執取）三者是體。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Qi Fu' (generating meritorious deeds), 'Bu Dong Xing' (immovable practices like meditation). 'Yuan Qi' (dependent origination) is also like this. Furthermore, due to ignorance, one generates the thought of applying antidotes to what are not antidotes, thus creating various meritorious actions or immovable actions. Therefore, it is said that ignorance is the cause of generating merit and immovability. 'Shi Su Sheng Yi Ku' (mundane and ultimate suffering). It does not refer to 'Ku Ku' (suffering of suffering) and 'Huai Ku' (suffering of change) as 'Shi Su' (mundane, easily understood), while 'Xing Ku' (suffering of conditioned existence) is called 'Sheng Yi' (ultimate, profound). If so, then the Form Realm and Formless Realm would not have the suffering of change. If one is also deluded about them, would it only lead to non-meritorious deeds? But generally speaking, what is easily understood is called mundane suffering, such as the suffering of the three lower realms (hell, hungry ghosts, animals). Because one does not understand these, one creates non-meritorious actions. What is difficult to understand is called ultimate suffering, such as the good realms of humans and gods. The essence of ultimate truth is all suffering. The mundane is difficult to understand, and one considers them good and superior, being deluded by this, one creates meritorious and immovable actions. These also have the suffering of change, called ultimate suffering. It is not possible to definitively divide suffering into three categories. As in the seventh chapter of 'Abhidharma', the tenth chapter of 'Mahavibhasa', and the 'Breaking Suffering' chapter of 'Xianyang'. A separate note says: Question: As the sutra says, all karmas are caused by greed (Tan), hatred (Chen), and delusion (Chi), why only mention delusion? Answer: Here, it generally refers to merit, non-merit, and immovability. Greed, hatred, and delusion only cause non-merit. Question: Actions of body and speech are initiated by thought (Si), and action is also conditioned by action, why only mention ignorance as the cause? Answer: This is based on the cause of initiating all actions, and based on the cause of generating good and defiled thoughts. This action is like this, since the questions and answers are finished, even the questions and answers about old age and death are like this. As extensively explained in the eleventh chapter of 'Mahavibhasa', it cannot be quoted here in detail. Here, let's talk about the nearby, ignorance and action are the cause. If separated as the cause, even old age and death are like this. Then the later branch is not the former cause, it is not to cut off the former branch and cultivate the latter branch, but to cut off the latter branch and cultivate the former branch to be born. Fifth, the difference between cause and effect. There are five types here: 1. Equal arising cause and effect. That is, the previous branch is the cause, and the later branch is the effect. Among the twelve branches (twelve links of dependent origination), ignorance is only the cause, old age and death are only the effect, and the rest are both cause and effect. Ignorance has nothing to originate from, and old age and death have nothing to arise from, this is about the internal distinction of the twelve branches. So the tenth says, the first is only the cause, the last is only the effect, and the rest are both cause and effect. 2. Root and branch cause and effect. Ignorance, attachment (Ai), and grasping (Qu) are the substance.

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煩惱。業苦本故唯是因也。生．老死二唯是于果體唯是苦。惑業之果。五種之果故。余亦因亦果。是煩惱之果。生老之因故。第十云。三唯是因。二唯是果。余通因果。又生．老死唯果。末故。前六．及愛．取．有三是因。本故。受通因．果。通本．末等。第十云。前六．愛．取．有三是因分。后二為果分。受通二種。此有二等。廣如彼說　三異熟非異熟因果。即識等五．及生．老死七法是果。識等五種望生．老死雖是苦因。于現亦說五為現行。即在生老位中而說故。七是果異熟法故亦正果體。餘五是因非異熟故。五十六云。又現世果所攝五支。及未來果所攝二支。總名果所攝緣起。當知余支因所攝緣起。故中邊上捲雲。有因雜染．果雜染。因雜染者謂煩惱業分。果雜染者謂所餘分　四熟未熟因果。前七支是因。猶未熟故。后五支是果。名已熟故。謂無明熟成於愛．取。愛．取是前無明增長故。有是行等六法熟故。生老死二正是熟時。熟謂熟變故也。對法雲。于因時有能引所引。于果時有能生．所生。有作是釋。愛．取．有三鄰近果故名之為果。若爾正生果故。即識等五應亦名果。前解為勝　五正熟非正熟因果即前十支是因。二支是果。生．老二支是正熟故。大論第九．第十等皆云。能引．所引俱是引因。引生．老死

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 煩惱是業和苦的根本原因，因此僅僅是因。生（jati，出生）和老死（jarā-maraṇa，衰老和死亡）僅僅是果，是惑和業的結果，是五種果。其餘的既是因也是果，是煩惱的結果，是生和老的因。第十（指《瑜伽師地論》第十卷）說：『三者僅僅是因，二者僅僅是果，其餘的通於因果。』又，生和老死僅僅是果，是最終的結果。前面的六種（無明、行、識、名色、六入、觸），以及愛（trsna，渴愛）、取（upādāna，執取）、有（bhava，存在）這三種是因，是根本的原因。受（vedanā，感受）通於因和果，通於根本和最終等。第十（指《瑜伽師地論》第十卷）說：『前面的六種，愛、取、有這三種是因的部分，後面的兩種（生、老死）是果的部分，受通於兩種。』這有兩種情況，詳細的如彼處所說。 三、異熟和非異熟的因果。即識（vijñāna，意識）等五種，以及生和老死這七法是果。識等五種相對於生和老死，雖然是苦因，但在現在也說五種是現行，即在生老的位置中而說，因此七種是果異熟法，也是真正的果體。其餘五種是因，不是異熟果。五十六（指《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷）說：『又，現世果所攝的五支，以及未來果所攝的二支，總名為果所攝的緣起。應當知道其餘的支是因所攝的緣起。』所以《中邊分別論》上卷說：『有因雜染、果雜染。因雜染者，謂煩惱和業的部分。果雜染者，謂其餘的部分。』 四、成熟和未成熟的因果。前面的七支是因，因為尚未成熟。後面的五支是果，名為已經成熟。意思是無明（avidyā，無明）成熟成為愛和取，愛和取是前面的無明增長的結果。有是行等六法成熟的結果。生老死這兩種正是成熟的時候。成熟是指成熟變化。對法（指《阿毗達磨》）說：『在因的時候有能引和所引，在果的時候有能生和所生。』有人這樣解釋：愛、取、有這三種鄰近果，所以名為果。如果這樣，真正產生果，即識等五種也應該名為果。前面的解釋更為殊勝。 五、正成熟和非正成熟的因果。即前面的十支是因，兩種（生、老死）是果。生和老這兩種是正成熟。大論（指《瑜伽師地論》）第九、第十等都說：『能引和所引都是引因，引生老死。』

【English Translation】 English version Kleshas (kleśa, afflictions) are the root cause of karma and suffering, therefore they are solely causes. Jati (birth) and jarā-maraṇa (aging and death) are solely effects, the result of delusion and karma, the five types of effects. The rest are both causes and effects, the result of kleshas, and the cause of birth and aging. The tenth (referring to the tenth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) says: 'Three are solely causes, two are solely effects, and the rest are common to causes and effects.' Furthermore, birth and aging and death are solely effects, the final result. The preceding six (ignorance, action, consciousness, name and form, the six entrances, contact), as well as the three, trsna (craving), upādāna (grasping), and bhava (becoming), are causes, the fundamental reasons. Vedanā (feeling) is common to cause and effect, common to root and final, etc. The tenth (referring to the tenth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) says: 'The preceding six, craving, grasping, and becoming, these three are the cause part, the latter two (birth, aging and death) are the effect part, feeling is common to both.' There are two situations here, as detailed in that text. Third, the cause and effect of vipāka (different maturation) and non-vipāka. That is, vijñāna (consciousness) and the five, as well as the seven dharmas of birth and aging and death, are effects. Although the five, such as consciousness, are the cause of suffering in relation to birth and aging and death, it is also said in the present that the five are present actions, that is, they are spoken of in the position of birth and aging, therefore the seven are the effects of vipāka, and also the true body of the effect. The remaining five are causes, not vipāka effects. Fifty-six (referring to the fifty-sixth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) says: 'Furthermore, the five branches included in the present world effect, and the two branches included in the future world effect, are collectively called the dependent origination included in the effect. It should be known that the remaining branches are the dependent origination included in the cause.' Therefore, the upper volume of the Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'There is cause contamination and effect contamination. Cause contamination refers to the part of afflictions and karma. Effect contamination refers to the remaining part.' Fourth, the cause and effect of maturation and non-maturation. The preceding seven branches are causes, because they have not yet matured. The latter five branches are effects, called already matured. It means that avidyā (ignorance) matures into craving and grasping, and craving and grasping are the result of the increase of the preceding ignorance. Becoming is the result of the maturation of the six dharmas such as action. Birth and aging and death are precisely the time of maturation. Maturation refers to mature transformation. The Abhidharma says: 'At the time of cause, there is that which leads and that which is led, and at the time of effect, there is that which produces and that which is produced.' Some people explain it this way: the three, craving, grasping, and becoming, are close to the effect, so they are called effects. If so, the true production of the effect, that is, the five, such as consciousness, should also be called effects. The previous explanation is more superior. Fifth, the cause and effect of true maturation and non-true maturation. That is, the preceding ten branches are causes, and the two (birth, aging and death) are effects. Birth and aging are the true maturation. The ninth and tenth, etc., of the Great Treatise (referring to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) all say: 'That which leads and that which is led are both leading causes, leading to birth and aging and death.'

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二種果故。能生是生因。近生生等故。生．老死二二因果故正熟果體。即此論下文等云。此十二支十因二果者也。若約五果當生位說雖亦是果。然今明時分定體不取也。此中因果十二支相望更無增減。其無明望自種雖成因果。非此所明。自支攝故。略此五門攝諸經論為因果義。更無增減　第六支互為緣問答料簡　問若法無明緣彼是行耶。設是行無明為緣耶　應作四句。初句謂無漏。無覆無記行。第二句謂除行所餘支。第三句即行支。第四句謂無漏識等　如是乃至受望愛為四句。第一句者。謂希求解脫。依于善愛而舍余愛。第二句者。謂無明觸所生受為緣。生除愛所餘有支。第三句者即愛支。第四句可知　愛望取作順后句答。謂取皆愛為緣。有愛為緣非取。謂除取余支　如是乃至生望老死。皆順后句答。或生為緣非老死者。謂疾病。怨憎會苦等。余可知。如是一一皆如大論第十廣解　以上六門此論雖有初體性門。然以能引等四義攝故。文勢長遠義理散廣。恐學者難曉。故今此中別束出體。論所明處名能引等。至彼料簡。

成唯識論述記卷第八(本)

成唯識論述記卷第八(末)

沙門基撰

七引．生料簡諸論對釋者。

論。然十二支略攝為四。

述曰。自下乃至老非定有。附死立

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 兩種果的原因。能夠產生的是生因。因為接近產生和生等等原因，生、老、死是兩種二二因果的正熟果體。就像這部論的下文所說的那樣，這十二支是十因二果。如果按照五果的當生位來說，雖然也算是果，但是現在說明時分定體，就不取這種說法。這其中因果十二支相互對應，沒有增減。無明相對於自身來說，雖然也成為因果，但不是這裡所要說明的，因為它被自身所包含。省略這五門，是爲了用因果的意義來概括各種經論，沒有增減。 第六支互為緣的問答料簡：問：如果法是無明為緣，那麼它就是行嗎？假設是行，那麼無明就是它的緣嗎？應該作四句回答。第一句是指無漏、無覆無記的行。第二句是指除了行之外的其餘支。第三句就是指行支。第四句是指無漏識等。像這樣乃至受相對於愛，也作四句回答。第一句是指希望求解脫，依靠善愛而捨棄其餘的愛。第二句是指無明觸所生的受為緣，產生除了愛之外的其餘有支。第三句就是指愛支。第四句可以知道。愛相對於取，作順后句回答，意思是取都是以愛為緣，有愛為緣但不是取，指的是除了取之外的其餘支。像這樣乃至生相對於老死，都作順后句回答。或者說生為緣但不是老死，指的是疾病、怨憎會苦等。其餘的可以知道。像這樣一一都像《大論》第十中廣為解釋的那樣。以上六門，這部論雖然有初體性門，但是因為它被能引等四義所包含，而且文勢長遠，義理散廣，恐怕學者難以理解，所以現在在這裡特別地概括出體。論中所說明的地方叫做能引等，到那裡再進行料簡。 《成唯識論述記》卷第八（本） 《成唯識論述記》卷第八（末） 沙門基撰 七、引、生料簡各種論的對釋： 論：然而十二支略微概括為四。 述：從下面開始乃至老並非一定有，附屬於死而成立。

【English Translation】 English version Two kinds of fruit causes. That which can produce is the cause of birth. Because of the proximity of production and birth, etc., birth, old age, and death are the two sets of two causes and effects that constitute the fully ripened fruit body. Just as the following text of this treatise states, these twelve links are ten causes and two effects. If we speak in terms of the position of the fruits to be born, although they can be considered fruits, we are not considering them now because we are clarifying the fixed nature of the time division. Among these, the twelve links of cause and effect correspond to each other without increase or decrease. Although ignorance (Avidya) in relation to itself becomes a cause and effect, it is not what is being explained here, because it is included within itself. Omitting these five categories is to summarize the various sutras and treatises with the meaning of cause and effect, without increase or decrease. The sixth link is a question-and-answer analysis of mutual conditions: Question: If a dharma is conditioned by ignorance (Avidya), is it then activity (Samskara)? Assuming it is activity (Samskara), is ignorance (Avidya) its condition? The answer should be in four phrases. The first phrase refers to undefiled, un-obscured, and neutral activity (Samskara). The second phrase refers to the remaining links other than activity (Samskara). The third phrase refers to the activity (Samskara) link itself. The fourth phrase refers to undefiled consciousness (Vijnana), etc. Similarly, up to and including feeling (Vedana) in relation to craving (Trsna), there are four phrases in the answer. The first phrase refers to seeking liberation, relying on wholesome craving (Trsna) and abandoning other cravings (Trsna). The second phrase refers to the feeling (Vedana) born of ignorance (Avidya) and contact (Sparsa) as a condition, giving rise to the remaining links of existence (Bhava) other than craving (Trsna). The third phrase refers to the craving (Trsna) link itself. The fourth phrase can be understood. Craving (Trsna) in relation to grasping (Upadana) is answered with a subsequent affirmative phrase, meaning that grasping (Upadana) is always conditioned by craving (Trsna), and that there is craving (Trsna) as a condition but not grasping (Upadana), referring to the remaining links other than grasping (Upadana). Similarly, up to and including birth (Jati) in relation to old age and death (Jara-marana), the answer is always a subsequent affirmative phrase. Or, birth (Jati) is a condition but not old age and death (Jara-marana), referring to illness, the suffering of encountering what is disliked, etc. The rest can be understood. Each of these is explained extensively in the tenth chapter of the Great Treatise. Regarding the above six categories, although this treatise has an initial nature category, it is included within the four meanings of 'capable of leading', etc., and the textual style is lengthy and the meaning is scattered and broad. Fearing that scholars may find it difficult to understand, we now specifically summarize the essence here. The place explained in the treatise is called 'capable of leading', etc., and the analysis will be done there. Commentary on the Establishment of Consciousness-only, Volume 8 (Beginning) Commentary on the Establishment of Consciousness-only, Volume 8 (End) Composed by the Shramana Ji 7. Interpretations of the various treatises through the analysis of 'leading' and 'birth': Treatise: However, the twelve links are briefly summarized into four. Commentary: From below onwards, old age is not necessarily present; it is established as an adjunct to death.

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支以來。是此能所引門。論自有文不假懸解。論所無者。隨文附出。即為四也。第一能引中初正出體釋名。二別重料簡。

論。一能引支至五果種故。

述曰。謂無明行者。出能引體　能引識等五果種故。釋能引名。雖此二支與生老死為引因體。而前十支俱是因故。不可遠望二果為能引支故。但望近所增之種名能引也。

論。此中無明至善惡業者。

述曰。重料簡。

云此中者。是簡持義。如常分別。先解無明故。謂諸無明。如勝鬘經有五住地。即見一處。欲色無色有。及無明住地。前四煩惱障。能發諸業。第五所知障。不能發業。若泛言發身．語。即此亦能。佛地第七若所發業及所得果。皆所知障。此論下言第二地中斷犯戒愚。即所知障。亦能發業。唯望菩薩是染污性。望余不染。非善．不善。不能招生。此無明支取發業者。謂能發起善不善業。故五無明唯取前四。前四之中有能發業。謂見道全。修道一分。不發業者。謂修道一分。于發業中。有能通發總別業者。有但發總報者。有唯發別報者。今取兼發總別。及唯發總報者。不取唯別。于中復有助正發業。為簡助等皆非此支故。此無明唯取能發正感後世善惡業者名無明支。但發感總行所有無明名之為正。于中以見．修無明中何者正

助。乃至何諦相應．不．共等分別。緣起下卷無明有四。皆應準說。

論。即彼所發乃名為行。

述曰。即彼所發感總三業。乃名為行。

論。由此一切至皆非行支。

述曰。此簡非也。由此道理。一切現報業別．助當業皆非行支。一切現業皆唯能感別報果故。亦由此文即證現業不感引果。感當業中。別有一業唯感別報。亦非行支。由此即顯設有一業唯感總報。復有一業通感總．別皆行支攝。緣起經說。聖者不造後有業故。對法第七說。聖不造業。無真實義愚故。又瑜伽第十說有支非學攝故。別報非也。此中有云學是解脫分等為體故。初發心已去皆不造後有引業。此亦不然。所以者何。緣起下說。內法異生不放逸者所有福行．不動行。非無明為緣者。不起現行相應無明而引發故。若放逸者。三種無明之所引發。不放逸者。為簡於此故說彼行非無明發。非彼無明種子不發行也。得成總報。對法第七云。有二種愚。一異熟愚。二真實義愚。由后發福．不動。初發非福故。無有福．不動非無明所發。不爾何故即彼經言我說諸聖有學不造新業。不言內法異生不造新業。由此當知。順解脫分順抉擇分善方便性者。能違背有尚有感總。是無明．行支。彼二位中生得善法故。是行支感總報也　或說彼二方便

善法不感總報。此中所說感總報業方成行。故緣起復云內法不放逸行非無明引故。雖言感報。但別報因。由此道理。既所有業皆非行支。現所有業亦非行體。不爾別報有相例失。以感生死非殊勝故。非正行支非非行攝。若不爾者。於一生中。唯有總行兼總別行。所餘能感異熟別報名色等支。應非行感。由此故知。唯別業果既名名色。別報因體應名行支。若正異熟名色支者。或唯總報。或兼總別。若兼名色支。唯滿果亦是。行支亦爾。正行如報或唯感總。或兼總別。若兼行支唯感別報。諸行亦是。聖不造業。約正行支。別報即名色。兼名色支攝。亦不相違。此論但取正行名行。兼行即非。別不獨能牽後有故。然體是行。不爾即有如前理妨。所以除也。既爾返顯能發彼行所有無明。非緣起中無明支攝。但是有分熏習所收。

論。二所引支至所引發故。

述曰。出所引體兼釋其名。此亦有二。如前可知。謂本識內等者。出體也。即是第八本識之內。為前行等為增上緣。所發名言因緣所熏習氣。親生當來五果之種。是前二支異熟果攝。識等五種是所引體。即顯當果因緣種也。通總別報。即識支全及名色並意處觸．受少分。是總報體。除第八識及相應法余皆別報　是前二支所引發者。釋所引名。此五種子。雖是當果

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 善法不會感得總報。這裡所說的感得總報的業才能成為『行』支（karma formations, 十二緣起之一）。所以緣起中又說，內法的不放逸行不是由無明（ignorance, 十二緣起之一）所引導的。雖然說是感得果報，但只是別報（distinct result）之因。按照這個道理，既然所有的業都不是『行』支，那麼現在所有的業也不是『行』的本體。否則，別報的類比就會失效，因為感得生死並非殊勝。既不是正『行』支，也不是非『行』所攝。如果不是這樣，那麼在一生中，就只有總『行』兼總別『行』，其餘能感得異熟果的別報，如名色（name and form, 十二緣起之一）等支，就不應由『行』所感。因此可知，只有別業的果才稱為名色，別報的因體才應稱為『行』支。如果正異熟果是名色支，那麼或者只是總報，或者兼總別報。如果兼有名色支，那麼只有滿果（complete result）也是，『行』支也是如此。正『行』如報，或者只是感得總報，或者兼總別報。如果兼『行』支，那麼只感得別報，諸『行』也是如此。聖人（arya）不造業，就正『行』支而言，別報即名色，兼名色支所攝，也不相違背。此論只取正『行』名為『行』，兼『行』就不是了，因為別『行』不能單獨牽引後有（future existence）。然而其體是『行』，否則就會有如前所述的道理上的妨礙。所以要排除這種妨礙。既然如此，反過來就顯示出能引發彼『行』的所有無明，不是緣起中的無明支所攝，而是有分（bhavaṅga）熏習所收。

論：二所引支至所引發故。

述曰：說明所引的本體，兼解釋它的名稱。這裡也有兩種情況，如前所述可知。所謂本識內等，是說明本體。即是在第八本識（alaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識）之內，作為前『行』等的增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya），所發出的名言因緣所熏習的氣息，親生當來的五果之種，是前二支（無明和『行』）異熟果所攝。識（consciousness, 十二緣起之一）等五種是所引的本體，即顯示當來果的因緣種。通總別報，即識支全部，以及名色、意處（six sense bases, 十二緣起之一）、觸（contact, 十二緣起之一）、受（feeling, 十二緣起之一）少分，是總報的本體。除去第八識及相應法，其餘都是別報。是前二支所引發的，是解釋所引的名稱。這五種種子，雖然是當來的果。

【English Translation】 English version Good deeds do not induce a general retribution. Only the karma that induces a general retribution, as discussed here, can become a 'karma formations' (saṃskāra, one of the twelve links of dependent origination). Therefore, it is also said in dependent origination that the non-negligent conduct of inner dharma is not guided by ignorance (avidyā, one of the twelve links of dependent origination). Although it is said to induce retribution, it is only the cause of distinct result (viśeṣa-vipāka). According to this principle, since all karma is not a 'karma formations' link, then all present karma is also not the substance of 'karma formations'. Otherwise, the analogy of distinct result would fail, because inducing birth and death is not superior. It is neither a proper 'karma formations' link nor included in non-'karma formations'. If it were not so, then in one lifetime, there would only be general 'karma formations' combined with general and distinct 'karma formations', and the remaining distinct results that can induce maturation, such as the name and form (nāma-rūpa, one of the twelve links of dependent origination) link, should not be induced by 'karma formations'. Therefore, it can be known that only the result of distinct karma is called name and form, and the substance of the cause of distinct retribution should be called the 'karma formations' link. If the proper maturation result is the name and form link, then it is either only general retribution or combined general and distinct retribution. If it includes the name and form link, then only the complete result (pūrṇa-phala) is also, and so is the 'karma formations' link. Proper 'karma formations', like retribution, either only induces general retribution or combined general and distinct retribution. If it includes the 'karma formations' link, then it only induces distinct retribution, and all 'karma formations' are like this. The noble ones (ārya) do not create karma, in terms of the proper 'karma formations' link, distinct retribution is name and form, and it is also not contradictory to be included in the combined name and form link. This treatise only takes proper 'karma formations' as 'karma formations', and combined 'karma formations' is not, because distinct 'karma formations' cannot independently lead to future existence (punarbhava). However, its substance is 'karma formations', otherwise there would be the aforementioned logical obstacle. Therefore, this obstacle must be eliminated. Since this is the case, it conversely reveals that all ignorance that can induce those 'karma formations' is not included in the ignorance link of dependent origination, but is collected by the habitual tendencies of the life-continuum (bhavaṅga).

Treatise: The two links that are drawn in, up to 'because they are induced'.

Commentary: Explains the substance of what is drawn in, and also explains its name. There are also two situations here, as can be known from the previous discussion. The so-called 'within the fundamental consciousness', etc., explains the substance. That is, within the eighth fundamental consciousness (alaya-vijñāna), as the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya) for the previous 'karma formations', etc., the impressions that are induced by the cause and condition of verbal expression, which are the seeds that directly produce the five future results, are included in the maturation result of the previous two links (ignorance and 'karma formations'). The five, such as consciousness (vijñāna, one of the twelve links of dependent origination), are the substance of what is drawn in, which reveals the causal seeds of the future result. It encompasses general and distinct retribution, that is, the entire consciousness link, as well as name and form, the six sense bases (ṣaḍāyatana, one of the twelve links of dependent origination), contact (sparśa, one of the twelve links of dependent origination), and a small portion of feeling (vedanā, one of the twelve links of dependent origination), are the substance of general retribution. Except for the eighth consciousness and its associated dharmas, the rest are all distinct retribution. 'Because they are induced by the previous two links' explains the name of what is drawn in. These five seeds, although they are the future result.

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親因緣性正是引因。然近行熏故。從能熏行說為所引也　言本識者。簡經部師色．心有種。又簡自性。雖生死因。非本識內故　言親生者。簡自業種及薩婆多業為因緣。非親生故　所引發者。有三義釋。謂本有。新熏。二合用也。

論。此中識種至即后三種。

述曰。重料簡也。就中有二。初辨五種離．雜體性。此有二解。一離五種各各別體。五種之中識種。即是本識之因。阿賴耶識因緣種也。除后六根觸受三種。余色。四蘊之因緣種。皆是名色種子所攝。后之六處並觸．受種。如三名是。此中防難及違論文。如出體中已料簡訖。

一雜五種者。

論。或名色種至總別亦然。

述曰。其名色種總攝五因。諸論皆說五蘊性故。前已引訖。于中隨勝立餘四種。執持識勝。生識處勝。觸境觸勝。領納受勝。故別立四。或報主識勝。識依處勝。受因觸勝。受境受勝。或愛因受勝。故別立四。故余想等不別立支。由此六處名為總。攝六識界故。識支是別。意界攝故。亦由義勝總中離別準此亦然。此總第一離．雜二體也。

論。集論說識至名識支故。

述曰。二釋妨難。于中有五。一會集論。若五所引二為能引。何故集論名識能引。三四有異。集論說識亦能引者。亦前二支為第三故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『親因緣性』（直接因緣的性質）正是『引因』（引導因）。然而，由於近距離的熏習，從能熏習的行為來說，它被稱為『所引』（被引導）。 所說的『本識』（根本識），是爲了區別于經量部師所說的色、心有種子，也爲了區別于自性。雖然自性是生死的原因，但它不在本識之內。 所說的『親生』（直接產生），是爲了區別于自業的種子以及薩婆多部所說的業為因緣，因為它們不是直接產生的。 所『引發』（所引導產生）的，有三種解釋：指本有（本來就有的）、新熏（新熏習的），以及二者合用。

論：此中識種至即后三種。

述曰：再次進行辨析。其中有兩點。首先辨別五種離、雜的體性。對此有兩種解釋。第一種是離，五種各自是不同的體性。五種之中，識種，就是本識的因，阿賴耶識的因緣種子。除了後面的六根、觸、受三種，其餘的色、四蘊的因緣種子，都是名色種子所攝。後面的六處以及觸、受的種子，如同三種名一樣。這裡面的防難以及違背論文之處，如同在出體中已經辨析完畢。

一種是雜，五種混合。

論：或名色種至總別亦然。

述曰：這個名色種總攝五因。諸論都說五蘊的性質。前面已經引用完畢。其中根據哪種更勝來建立其餘四種。執持識勝，生識處勝，觸境觸勝，領納受勝，所以分別建立四種。或者報主識勝，識依處勝，受因觸勝，受境受勝。或者愛因受勝，所以分別建立四種。所以其餘的想等不分別建立支。由此六處名為總，總攝六識界。識支是別，意界所攝。也因為意義更勝，總中分離和區別，可以依此準繩。 這是總的第一種離、雜二體。

論：集論說識至名識支故。

述曰：第二種解釋是爲了防止疑問。其中有五點。第一是會合《集論》。如果五所引，二是能引，為什麼《集論》說識能引？三四有差異。《集論》說識也能引導，是因為前兩個支是第三個的原因。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Direct causal nature' (qin yin yuan xing) is precisely the 'leading cause' (yin yin). However, due to close proximity of habitual influence, from the perspective of the influencing action, it is referred to as 'that which is led' (suo yin). The term 'fundamental consciousness' (ben shi) is used to distinguish it from the Sautrantika school's view that form and mind have seeds, and also to differentiate it from self-nature. Although self-nature is a cause of birth and death, it is not within the fundamental consciousness. The term 'directly produced' (qin sheng) is used to distinguish it from the seeds of one's own karma and the Sarvastivada school's view that karma is a causal condition, because they are not directly produced. That which is 'led to arise' (yin fa) has three interpretations: referring to that which is inherently present (ben you), newly habituated (xin xun), and the combination of the two.

Treatise: 'Among these, the seed of consciousness... up to the latter three types.'

Commentary: This is a re-examination. There are two points within this. First, distinguishing the nature of the five types of separation and combination. There are two explanations for this. The first is separation, where each of the five types has a distinct nature. Among the five types, the seed of consciousness is the cause of the fundamental consciousness, the causal seed of Alaya consciousness (a lai ye shi). Except for the latter three types of the six sense organs, contact, and sensation, the causal seeds of the remaining form and four aggregates are all included within the seeds of name and form. The latter six sense bases and the seeds of contact and sensation are like the three names. The defenses and contradictions to the treatise within this have already been analyzed in the section on emerging entities.

One type is combination, where the five types are mixed.

Treatise: 'Or the seed of name and form... the general and specific are also thus.'

Commentary: This seed of name and form encompasses all five causes. All treatises state the nature of the five aggregates. This has already been cited earlier. Among them, the remaining four types are established based on which is more dominant. Holding consciousness is dominant, the arising of the consciousness base is dominant, the touching of the object is dominant, and the reception of sensation is dominant, so four types are established separately. Or the retributive master consciousness is dominant, the base upon which consciousness relies is dominant, the cause of sensation, contact, is dominant, and the object of sensation, sensation, is dominant. Or the cause of love, sensation, is dominant, so four types are established separately. Therefore, the remaining thought, etc., are not established as separate branches. Therefore, the six sense bases are called general, encompassing the six realms of consciousness. The consciousness branch is specific, encompassed by the mind realm. Also, because the meaning is more dominant, separation and distinction within the general can be measured by this standard. This is the first type of separation and combination of the general.

Treatise: 'The Compendium of Determinations says that consciousness... is called the consciousness branch.'

Commentary: The second explanation is to prevent doubts. There are five points within this. The first is to reconcile the Compendium of Determinations. If the five that are led, two are leading, why does the Compendium of Determinations say that consciousness can lead? The three and four are different. The Compendium of Determinations says that consciousness can also lead because the first two branches are the cause of the third.

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遂致亦言。識中業種名識支故。種子識中通有行識。故說行種以為識支。是能引攝。

若爾識種何法所攝。

論。異熟識種名色攝故。

述曰。名色體寬如前已說。

論。經說識支至俱名識故。

述曰。二會契經　問集論可爾。緣起經上卷。說此識支通能所引。此如何通　彼經說通能所引者。業種識種俱名識故。各別義說。非定相違　何故識種不同集論名色所攝。

論。識是名色依非名色攝故。

述曰。經說識種名色所依。非名色故。即于識外別說名色　若全五種名所引支。何故緣起上卷經云一分名色．六處．觸．受亦名所生　答依當現行故作是說。非謂種子即名所生　若爾識種何故不說　已說彼種通能所引。遂略不說識有現行。又說名色入母胎故。但說識支是種子攝　問若爾何故。彼經亦說受支一分名能生支　答現行受有二。一內異熟受。彼經說為所生支攝。約當生位名為能生。二境界受。能生愛等。故彼經說為能生支攝。亦不違理。九十三等說。一領受內果。二領受境界。由迷內果故造諸行。乃至云云。二迷外果故發生貪愛等潤先引因。乃至廣說。由此理證實不相違　問此五種子為前後熏發。為一時熏耶　答一時熏。

問若爾如何說有前後。

論。識等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 於是進一步解釋說。識中的業種子被稱為識支，因為種子識中普遍存在行識（saṃskāra-vijñāna）。因此說行種是識支，因為它能夠引導和攝持。

如果這樣，識種被什麼法所攝？

論：異熟識（vipāka-vijñāna）的種子被名色（nāma-rūpa）所攝。

述曰：名色的體性寬廣，如前已述。

論：經中說識支乃至都名為識。

述曰：二會契經（dvisaṃdhi-sūtra）和《集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）可以這樣說。《緣起經》（Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra）上卷說此識支既能引導，也能被引導。這如何解釋？彼經說通能所引者，是因為業種和識種都名為識，各自的意義不同，並非一定相違。為什麼識種不同於《集論》所說被名色所攝？

論：識是名色所依，不是被名色所攝。

述曰：經中說識種是名色所依，不是名色本身。即在識之外另說名色。如果全部五種都是名所引支，為什麼《緣起經》上卷說一分名色、六處（ṣaḍāyatana）、觸（sparśa）、受（vedanā）也名為所生？答：依據當下的現行而這樣說，不是說種子就是所生。如果這樣，為什麼不說識種？已經說了彼種既能引導，也能被引導。於是省略不說識有現行。又說名色入母胎的緣故，只說識支是被種子所攝。問：如果這樣，為什麼彼經也說受支的一部分是能生支？答：現行受有兩種。一是內異熟受，彼經說為所生支所攝，約當生位名為能生。二是境界受，能生愛（tṛṣṇā）等，所以彼經說為能生支所攝，也不違背道理。《九十三等說》中說，一是領受內果，二是領受境界。由於迷惑內果，所以造作諸行，乃至云云。二是迷惑外果，所以發生貪愛等，潤澤先前的引導因，乃至廣說。由此理證實不相違。問：這五種種子是前後熏發，還是一時熏發？答：一時熏發。

問：如果這樣，如何說有前後？

論：識等

【English Translation】 English version Then it is further explained. The karma seeds in consciousness are called consciousness-factors (vijñāna-aṅga) because active consciousness (saṃskāra-vijñāna) is universally present in seed consciousness. Therefore, it is said that active seeds are consciousness-factors because they can guide and gather.

If so, by what dharma are the consciousness-seeds governed?

Treatise: The seeds of resultant consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna) are governed by name and form (nāma-rūpa).

Commentary: The nature of name and form is broad, as previously stated.

Treatise: The sutra says that the consciousness-factor is entirely called consciousness.

Commentary: The Two Assemblies Sutra (dvisaṃdhi-sūtra) and the Compendium of Abhidharma (Abhidharmasamuccaya) can say this. The first volume of the Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra says that this consciousness-factor can both guide and be guided. How can this be explained? The sutra says that it can both guide and be guided because both karma seeds and consciousness seeds are called consciousness, and their meanings are different, so they are not necessarily contradictory. Why are consciousness seeds not governed by name and form as stated in the Compendium of Abhidharma?

Treatise: Consciousness is the basis of name and form, not governed by name and form.

Commentary: The sutra says that consciousness seeds are the basis of name and form, not name and form themselves. That is, name and form are mentioned separately from consciousness. If all five types are factors guided by name, why does the first volume of the Pratītyasamutpāda-sūtra say that a portion of name and form, the six sense bases (ṣaḍāyatana), contact (sparśa), and feeling (vedanā) are also called produced? Answer: This is said based on the present activity, not that the seeds are what is produced. If so, why are consciousness seeds not mentioned? It has already been said that these seeds can both guide and be guided. Therefore, it is omitted that consciousness has present activity. Also, because it is said that name and form enter the mother's womb, it is only said that the consciousness-factor is governed by seeds. Question: If so, why does that sutra also say that a portion of the feeling-factor is a generating factor? Answer: There are two types of present feeling. One is internal resultant feeling, which the sutra says is governed by the produced factor, and is called generating in terms of the future state. The other is feeling of the environment, which can generate craving (tṛṣṇā), etc. Therefore, the sutra says that it is governed by the generating factor, which is not contrary to reason. The Ninety-Three, etc., say that one is to receive the internal result, and the other is to receive the environment. Because of delusion about the internal result, all actions are created, and so on. The second is delusion about the external result, so greed and love arise, moistening the previous guiding cause, and so on. From this reasoning, it is proven that there is no contradiction. Question: Are these five types of seeds perfumed sequentially or simultaneously? Answer: Simultaneously.

Question: If so, how can it be said that there is a sequence?

Treatise: Consciousness, etc.

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五種至假說前後。

述曰。三釋伏難。伏難如前。此答有二。初識等五種由業熏發。感召之位雖實同時。而依主伴等相異故假說前後。謂本識為主。異熟主故。餘四為伴。非主異熟助伴生故。就彼四中。名色是總。體性寬故。餘三是別。義用狹故。就后三中。六處是勝。受等依故。餘二是劣。依處生故。就后二中。觸是因勝。能生受故。受是果體。觸所生故。由此五支有如是等就各相異故。諸聖教假說前後。體實同時。此中意言。名言熏習發此五種。雖有前後雜亂不定。于生果相。未辨何前何者為后。由行熏識。業力種成。令五種子一時轉變。于生老位能生自果。今說由行增上所發說為一時。非名言熏必一時也。此依實解。

論。或依當來至說有前後。

述曰。二或依當來生起分位。或依現在已起分位。有次第故。說因五種前後不同。非行熏時及實生果有前後也。此依分位。非實體也。

問若實此五但是種子。何故諸聖教說識．名色中。互為緣等。亦說現行。

論。由斯識等至現行義故。

述曰。四會現行難。今答。由此當起理故。識等五支。十地．對法亦說現行。以在因時決定無有現行義故。緣起上說。世尊何緣名色等種。異熟識中同時引發。而復說有先後次第。世尊告曰。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：五種至假說前後。

述曰：三重解釋以消除疑問。疑問如前所述。此回答包含兩點。首先，識等五種是由業力熏習而引發的。雖然在感召果報的階段實際上是同時的，但由於主伴等關係的不同，所以假說有前後順序。也就是說，本識（Alaya-識，the storehouse consciousness）是主要的，因為它是異熟（Vipaka，result of karma）的主體。其餘四種是伴隨的，因為它們不是異熟的主體，而是輔助主體產生。在這四種中，名色（Nama-rupa，name and form）是總括性的，因為其體性寬泛。其餘三種是分別的，因為其意義和作用狹窄。在後三種中，六處（Sadayatana，the six sense bases）是殊勝的，因為受等依存於它。其餘兩種是劣勢的，因為它們依存於六處而生。在後兩種中，觸（Sparsa，contact）是因勝，因為它能產生受（Vedana，feeling）。受是果體，由觸所生。由於這五支有如此等等各自不同的方面，所以諸聖教假說有前後順序，但實際上它們是同時存在的。這裡的意圖是說，名言熏習引發這五種，雖然有前後雜亂不定，但在產生果報的方面，尚未區分哪個在前哪個在後。通過行（Karma，action）熏習識，業力種子形成，使五種子一時轉變，在生老階段能產生各自的果報。現在說由行增上所引發，所以說是一時的，並非名言熏習必定是一時的。這是依據實解。

論：或依當來至說有前後。

述曰：第二種解釋是，或者依據未來生起的分位，或者依據現在已經生起的分位，因為有次第，所以說因五種前後不同。並非行熏習時以及實際產生果報時有前後。這是依據分位，而非實體。

問：若實此五但是種子。何故諸聖教說識．名色中。互為緣等。亦說現行。

論：由斯識等至現行義故。

述曰：第四重解釋是爲了消除關於現行的疑問。現在回答說，由於這種將要生起的道理，識等五支，在《十地經》（Dasabhumika Sutra）和《對法論》（Abhidharma）中也說是現行。因為在因位時，決定沒有現行的意義。在緣起上說，世尊（Bhagavan，the World-Honored One）為何在名色等種子在異熟識中同時引發的情況下，又說有先後次第？世尊回答說：

【English Translation】 English version: The Five Factors and the Provisional Assertion of Sequence.

Commentary: There are three explanations to resolve the difficulty. The difficulty is as previously stated. This answer contains two points. First, the five factors, such as consciousness (Vijnana), are induced by the karmic imprints. Although they are actually simultaneous in the stage of reaping the results, they are provisionally asserted to have a sequence due to the differences in their roles as principal and subordinate. That is, the Alaya-consciousness (the storehouse consciousness) is the principal because it is the subject of the Vipaka (result of karma). The other four are accompanying, because they are not the subject of Vipaka but assist the principal in arising. Among these four, name and form (Nama-rupa) is comprehensive because its nature is broad. The remaining three are distinct because their meaning and function are narrow. Among the latter three, the six sense bases (Sadayatana) are superior because feeling (Vedana) and so on depend on them. The remaining two are inferior because they arise dependent on the six sense bases. Among the latter two, contact (Sparsa) is superior as a cause because it can produce feeling. Feeling is the result, produced by contact. Because these five factors have such different aspects, the holy teachings provisionally assert a sequence, but in reality, they exist simultaneously. The intention here is that verbal imprints induce these five factors, and although there may be a confused and uncertain sequence, in terms of producing results, it has not been distinguished which is before and which is after. Through the action (Karma) of imprinting consciousness, the karmic seeds are formed, causing the five seeds to transform simultaneously, and in the stages of birth and aging, they can produce their respective results. Now it is said that they are induced by the augmentation of action, so it is said to be simultaneous, but verbal imprinting is not necessarily simultaneous. This is based on the real explanation.

Treatise: Or based on the future, to say there is a sequence.

Commentary: The second explanation is that, either based on the future arising stages, or based on the present already arisen stages, because there is a sequence, it is said that the five causal factors are different in sequence. It is not that there is a sequence when action imprints or when the actual results are produced. This is based on the stages, not the substance.

Question: If in reality these five are only seeds, why do the holy teachings say that consciousness and name and form are mutually conditioned, and also speak of manifest activity?

Treatise: Because of this, consciousness and so on have the meaning of manifest activity.

Commentary: The fourth explanation is to resolve the doubt about manifest activity. Now it is answered that, because of this principle of what is about to arise, the five factors such as consciousness are also said to be manifest activity in the Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Stages Sutra) and the Abhidharma. Because in the causal stage, there is definitely no meaning of manifest activity. In the context of dependent origination, why did the World-Honored One (Bhagavan) say that name and form and other seeds arise simultaneously in the Vipaka-consciousness, and yet also say that there is a sequence? The World-Honored One replied:

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彼于當來先後次第而生起故。如是而說。正與此同。

問若初熏時未能現起。如何緣起上卷經說生．引同時。

論。復由此說至必不俱故。

述曰。五會同時難。復由此理經說生引皆是同時　何以得知于當起位方說同時　于初熏時未能現起。潤未潤時必不俱故。謂初熏時愛等未潤。雖八萬劫終不生果。后愛等潤方生現行。若初熏時即能生現。應初熏位便有愛等　若爾如何造潤時異　由潤．未潤必不俱故。于當起位方說生．引許有同時。其體是一。位別說故有引．生別。其潤緣合。可得引．生二義之名。即行等六。別名為引。總名為有。經亦不說定同時故　若爾何故先說其引。后說其生　潤已生時雖無前後。潤．未潤位前後定別。必先有引。後有生故。故說引先生居后也。緣起上說。世尊告曰。此引．生支一時而起次第宣說。要由有引。後有生故。或望所生果近遠故。

論。三能生支至生老死故。

述曰。此中文二。如上所解　愛取有者。出其體也。今以三法為能生體　近生當來生老死者。釋能生名。雖愛．取二亦能潤前六引因體名為能潤。以近當果但說能生。

此釋名也。總為初段。第二重釋。就中有三。初牒於前。

論。謂緣迷內至五果種已。

述曰。是牒前也

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『彼于當來先後次第而生起故。如是而說。正與此同。』——因為它們在未來是按照先後順序生起的，所以這樣說，與此相同。

『問：若初熏時未能現起。如何緣起上卷經說生．引同時？』——如果最初熏習時未能立即顯現，那麼《緣起經》上卷中關於『生』（jati，出生）和『引』（akarshana，牽引）同時發生的說法又該如何解釋呢？

『論。復由此說至必不俱故。』——因此，經文這樣說，是因為潤（arjana，滋潤）和未潤（anarjana，未滋潤）的狀態必然不會同時存在。

『述曰。五會同時難。復由此理經說生引皆是同時　何以得知于當起位方說同時　于初熏時未能現起。潤未潤時必不俱故。謂初熏時愛等未潤。雖八萬劫終不生果。后愛等潤方生現行。若初熏時即能生現。應初熏位便有愛等　若爾如何造潤時異　由潤．未潤必不俱故。于當起位方說生．引許有同時。其體是一。位別說故有引．生別。其潤緣合。可得引．生二義之名。即行等六。別名為引。總名為有。經亦不說定同時故　若爾何故先說其引。后說其生　潤已生時雖無前後。潤．未潤位前後定別。必先有引。後有生故。故說引先生居后也。緣起上說。世尊告曰。此引．生支一時而起次第宣說。要由有引。後有生故。或望所生果近遠故。』——五蘊和合同時發生是很難的。因此，經文說『生』和『引』是同時的。怎麼知道只有在將要生起的位置才說同時呢？因為在最初熏習時未能立即顯現，潤和未潤的狀態必然不會同時存在。也就是說，最初熏習時，愛（trsna，渴愛）等煩惱沒有滋潤，即使經過八萬劫也不會產生結果。後來，愛等煩惱滋潤后才會產生現行。如果最初熏習時就能產生現行，那麼在最初熏習的位置就應該有愛等煩惱。如果這樣，又如何造作滋潤時期的差異呢？因為潤和未潤的狀態必然不會同時存在。只有在將要生起的位置才允許說『生』和『引』是同時的，它們的本體是一樣的。因為位置不同，所以才說有『引』和『生』的區別。當滋潤的因緣聚合時，就可以得到『引』和『生』這兩種意義的名稱。即『行』（samskara，行）等六支，分別名為『引』，總名為『有』（bhava，有）。經文也沒有說一定是同時發生。如果這樣，為什麼先說『引』，后說『生』呢？雖然滋潤已經發生時沒有先後，但是潤和未潤的位置前後一定有區別，必須先有『引』，後有『生』。所以說『引』先生起，『生』后產生。在《緣起經》上說，世尊告訴我們，『引』和『生』這兩個支分一時而起，按照次第宣說，是因為必須先有『引』，後有『生』。或者是因為期望所生的果報有遠近的差別。

『論。三能生支至生老死故。』——三種能生的支分，直到生老死。

『述曰。此中文二。如上所解　愛取有者。出其體也。今以三法為能生體　近生當來生老死者。釋能生名。雖愛．取二亦能潤前六引因體名為能潤。以近當果但說能生。』——這裡分為兩部分，如上面所解釋的。『愛』、『取』（upadana，取著）、『有』，是指出它們的本體。現在以這三種法作為能生的本體。『近生當來生老死』，是解釋能生的名稱。雖然『愛』和『取』也能滋潤前面的六種牽引之因，它們的本體名為能潤。因為接近將來的果報，所以只說能生。

這是解釋名稱。總的來說是第一段。第二重解釋，其中有三部分。首先是引用前面的內容。

『論。謂緣迷內至五果種已。』——意思是說，由於對內在的迷惑，直到五種果報的種子已經...

『述曰。是牒前也』——這是引用前面的內容。

【English Translation】 English version: 『They arise in a sequential order in the future. Thus it is said. It is exactly the same as this.』 – It is said in this way because they arise in a sequential order in the future, which is the same as this.

『Question: If it does not manifest at the time of the initial perfuming, how does the Sutra on Dependent Origination in the upper volume say that 『jati』 (birth) and 『akarshana』 (attraction) occur simultaneously?』 – If it does not manifest immediately at the time of the initial perfuming, how can the statement in the upper volume of the Sutra on Dependent Origination about 『jati』 (birth) and 『akarshana』 (attraction) occurring simultaneously be explained?

『Treatise: Furthermore, this statement is made because 『arjana』 (moistening) and 『anarjana』 (non-moistening) necessarily do not occur simultaneously.』 – Therefore, the scripture says this because the states of 『arjana』 (moistening) and 『anarjana』 (non-moistening) necessarily do not exist simultaneously.

『Commentary: It is difficult for the five aggregates to occur simultaneously. Therefore, the scripture says that 『birth』 and 『attraction』 are simultaneous. How do we know that simultaneity is only spoken of at the position where it is about to arise? Because it does not manifest immediately at the time of the initial perfuming, the states of moistening and non-moistening necessarily do not exist simultaneously. That is to say, at the time of the initial perfuming, 『trsna』 (craving) and other afflictions have not moistened, and even after eighty thousand kalpas, no result will arise. Later, when craving and other afflictions moisten, the present action arises. If it could produce the present action at the time of the initial perfuming, then there should be craving and other afflictions at the position of the initial perfuming. If so, how is the difference in the time of moistening created? Because the states of moistening and non-moistening necessarily do not exist simultaneously. Only at the position where it is about to arise is it permissible to say that 『birth』 and 『attraction』 are simultaneous, and their essence is the same. Because the positions are different, it is said that there is a distinction between 『attraction』 and 『birth』. When the conditions for moistening come together, the names of the two meanings of 『attraction』 and 『birth』 can be obtained. That is, the six branches such as 『samskara』 (formation) are separately called 『attraction』, and collectively called 『bhava』 (becoming). The scripture also does not say that they necessarily occur simultaneously. If so, why is 『attraction』 mentioned first and 『birth』 mentioned later? Although there is no sequence when moistening has already occurred, the positions of moistening and non-moistening are definitely different in sequence. There must be 『attraction』 first, and then 『birth』. Therefore, it is said that 『attraction』 arises first and 『birth』 arises later. In the Sutra on Dependent Origination, the World Honored One said, 『These branches of 『attraction』 and 『birth』 arise at the same time and are explained in sequence because there must be 『attraction』 first, and then 『birth』. Or it is because of the difference in the distance of the fruit to be produced.』

『Treatise: The three productive branches, up to birth, old age, and death.』 – The three productive branches, up to birth, old age, and death.

『Commentary: There are two parts in this text, as explained above. 『Craving』, 『upadana』 (grasping), and 『becoming』 are to bring out their essence. Now, these three dharmas are taken as the productive essence. 『Closely producing future birth, old age, and death』 is to explain the name of the productive. Although 『craving』 and 『grasping』 can also moisten the previous six causes of attraction, their essence is called moistening. Because it is close to the future result, only production is mentioned.』

This is an explanation of the name. Generally, it is the first section. The second re-explanation, which has three parts. First, it quotes the previous content.

『Treatise: It means that due to delusion about the inner, until the seeds of the five fruits have already...』 – It means that due to delusion about the inner, until the seeds of the five fruits have already...

『Commentary: This is quoting the previous content.』 – This is quoting the previous content.

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。此義意言。如次前引受有二種。謂內異熟受外境界受。受內異熟時。由迷內異熟果無明不知二苦。故隨所應造三種行。為增上緣。引起當來生老死位。識等五果因緣種已。

第二正解潤生之相。

論。復依迷外至欲等四取。

述曰。又依迷外增上果愚。以境界受為緣。發起貪愛煩惱。緣愛復生欲等四取。四取者。謂欲取．見取．戒取．我語取。又如樞要。

論。愛取合潤至後有果故。

述曰。此二和合潤能引之中業。及所引因五種轉名為有。何以名有。此六俱能近有生等後有果故。此總意說。受內異熟時。由不了內世俗苦故起非福行。苦相粗顯易可了知。名世俗苦。不能了內勝義苦故。起福．不動。人．天苦果相非粗顯。勝者知苦名勝義苦。為緣引發名言五種已。雖迷二苦不同。總是迷內起業。后受境界時。由不能了所知境故。起染受時愛等增長。合前六種轉名為有。如水潤種。種近果生。此中緣言。是緣藉義．勢力義。由癡故造行。行有勢力故。令名言種可生當果。不爾異熟此名言種。未能生果。后復由起愛等勢力。令前種子近生當果。雖別身起業。別身起愛。隨業勝者。由煩惱力果即近生。勢力令然。非由別義。此中二愚隨增義說。據實迷內亦得潤生。全界煩惱續生死故。迷外

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這段話解釋了『此義意言』（這個意義的言語）。就像前面引用的，『受』（感受）有兩種，即內異熟受（內在的成熟感受）和外境界受（外在境界的感受）。當感受內在的成熟果報時，由於迷惑于內在成熟的果報，被無明（avidyā）所矇蔽，不瞭解兩種苦（duḥkha），因此根據情況造作三種行（karma），作為增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya），引起未來生、老、死階段的識（vijñāna）等五蘊果報的因緣種子。

第二部分，正確解釋了潤生（bhava）的相狀。

論：又依賴於對外在增上果的愚癡，產生欲取（kāma-upādāna）等四取（catvāri upādānāni）。

述曰：又依賴於對外在增上果的愚癡，以境界受為緣，發起貪愛煩惱（tṛṣṇā）。緣于愛又產生欲取等四取。四取指的是欲取、見取（dṛṣṭi-upādāna）、戒取（śīla-vrata-upādāna）、我語取（ātma-vāda-upādāna）。又如《樞要》所說。

論：愛（tṛṣṇā）和取（upādāna）結合，潤澤能引業，導致後有果（punarbhava）。

述曰：這二者結合，潤澤能夠牽引的中業（karma），以及所牽引的因，五種轉變為『有』（bhava）。為什麼稱為『有』？因為這六者都能使後有的生等果報臨近。總的來說，感受內在成熟果報時，由於不瞭解內在的世俗苦（saṃvṛti-duḥkha），所以產生非福行（apuṇya-abhisaṃskāra）。苦的相狀粗顯，容易瞭解，所以稱為世俗苦。由於不能瞭解內在的勝義苦（paramārtha-duḥkha），所以產生福行（puṇya-abhisaṃskāra）和不動行（āniñja-abhisaṃskāra）。人、天的苦果相狀並非粗顯，勝者才能知曉這種苦，所以稱為勝義苦。作為因緣引發名言五種之後，雖然迷惑于兩種苦不同，但總歸是迷惑于內在而產生業。之後感受境界時，由於不能瞭解所知境界，產生染污的感受時，愛等增長。與之前的六種結合，轉變為『有』，就像水潤澤種子一樣，種子臨近果的產生。這裡所說的『緣』，是緣藉義、勢力義。由於愚癡而造作行，行具有勢力，所以使名言種子可以產生未來的果報。否則，異熟的名言種子，不能產生果報。之後又由於產生愛等勢力，使之前的種子臨近產生未來的果報。雖然在不同的身體產生業，在不同的身體產生愛，但隨著業力更強，由於煩惱的力量，果報就會臨近產生，是勢力的作用。並非由於身體不同。這裡所說的兩種愚癡，是隨增義而說的。實際上，迷惑于內在也能潤生，因為整個界的煩惱都在延續生死。迷惑于外在...

【English Translation】 English version: This passage explains 'this meaning of speech'. As previously cited, there are two types of 'reception' (vedanā), namely internal ripening reception (adhyātma-vipāka-vedanā) and external realm reception (bāhya-viṣaya-vedanā). When experiencing internal ripening, due to delusion regarding the internal ripening result, obscured by ignorance (avidyā), one does not understand the two kinds of suffering (duḥkha). Therefore, according to the situation, one creates three kinds of activities (karma), as a dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya), causing the seeds of the five aggregates (skandhas), such as consciousness (vijñāna), to ripen into the future stages of birth, old age, and death.

The second part correctly explains the characteristics of 'becoming' (bhava).

Treatise: Furthermore, relying on ignorance regarding the external dominant result, gives rise to the four graspings (catvāri upādānāni) such as desire-grasping (kāma-upādāna).

Commentary: Furthermore, relying on ignorance regarding the external dominant result, taking realm reception as a condition, gives rise to craving (tṛṣṇā). Based on craving, the four graspings such as desire-grasping arise. The four graspings refer to desire-grasping, view-grasping (dṛṣṭi-upādāna), precept-and-vow-grasping (śīla-vrata-upādāna), and self-assertion-grasping (ātma-vāda-upādāna). As stated in the 'Essentials'.

Treatise: The combination of craving (tṛṣṇā) and grasping (upādāna) moistens the karma that leads to future existence (punarbhava).

Commentary: These two combined moisten the intermediate karma that can lead, and the cause that is led, the five transformations are called 'becoming' (bhava). Why is it called 'becoming'? Because these six can bring the fruits of future existence, such as birth, closer. Generally speaking, when experiencing internal ripening, due to not understanding the internal conventional suffering (saṃvṛti-duḥkha), one generates non-meritorious actions (apuṇya-abhisaṃskāra). The characteristics of suffering are coarse and easily understood, so it is called conventional suffering. Because one cannot understand the internal ultimate suffering (paramārtha-duḥkha), one generates meritorious actions (puṇya-abhisaṃskāra) and imperturbable actions (āniñja-abhisaṃskāra). The characteristics of the suffering of humans and gods are not coarse, only the superior ones can know this suffering, so it is called ultimate suffering. After the conditions give rise to the five kinds of verbal expressions, although there is confusion about the two kinds of suffering, it is always generating karma due to confusion about the internal. Later, when experiencing realms, due to not understanding the known realms, when defiled reception arises, craving and other things increase. Combined with the previous six, it transforms into 'becoming', just like water moistens a seed, and the seed is close to producing fruit. The 'condition' mentioned here means the meaning of relying on and the meaning of power. Because of ignorance, actions are created, and actions have power, so that the verbal expression seeds can produce future results. Otherwise, the ripening verbal expression seeds cannot produce results. Later, due to the power of generating craving and other things, the previous seeds are close to producing future results. Although karma is generated in different bodies, and craving is generated in different bodies, as the power of karma becomes stronger, due to the power of afflictions, the result will be close to arising, it is the effect of power. It is not due to different bodies. The two kinds of ignorance mentioned here are said in terms of increasing. In reality, delusion about the internal can also moisten becoming, because the afflictions of the entire realm continue the cycle of birth and death. Delusion about the external...

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境界愚亦能發業。追求欲境起不善故。以內外二見．修愚別。隨增分二。故下二惑皆通發．潤。

論。有處唯說至異熟果故。

述曰。三會諸論。如瑜伽第十。說此十二支無因緣者。依增上所攝生起因故。彼下又云。取所攝業名勝分有等。諸論非一。此初會彼故。但總言有處。唯說業種名有者。此能正感異熟果故。五種雖正因能生。無力正感。故不名有。故第十說名勝分有。

本地第五．三十八等。說生起因能生因攝因緣為性。即唯五種。不說業支。何故此中亦說業有。次會此文。

論。復有唯說至識等種故。

述曰。識等五種彼名有者。親生當來識等五法之種子故。正因能生故不說業。此皆偏說非謂實體。第十復云全分有者。業及識乃至受所有種子。由取所攝說為有故。此言有處。經論文多故不別出。

論。四所生支至近所生故。

述曰。有二如上　謂生．老．死。出體性也　是愛取有近所生故。釋所生名。雖亦為前能所引得。不名引果者。如五種子不名引因但名所引。此亦應爾。而近為前愛等生故。但名所生不名引果。總是生．引二因之果。但近因生為此名故。總是第一齣體釋名。

論。謂從中有至乃名為死。

述曰。二重解前生等分位。謂從中有初生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 境界愚昧之人也能引發業（karma）。因為追求慾望的境界會產生不善的行為。由於以內外二見（inner and outer views）來區分，修所成愚昧也有差別。隨著（煩惱）增長而分為兩種。因此，下面的兩種迷惑（惑）都能引發和滋潤（業）。

論：有的地方只說到異熟果（vipāka-phala）的緣故。

述曰：三會諸論，如《瑜伽師地論》第十，說這十二支（指十二因緣的各個環節）沒有因緣，是依據增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya）所攝的生起因（utpatti-hetu）的緣故。該論下面又說，取所攝的業名為勝分有（viśeṣa-bhāga-sat）等。諸論說法不一。這是初會（初步解釋），因此只總說有的地方只說業種（karma-bīja）名為有（sat），因為這能直接感得異熟果。五種（指識、名色、六入、觸、受）雖然是正因（hetu）能生，但沒有力量直接感得（異熟果），因此不名為有。所以第十（《瑜伽師地論》第十）說名為勝分有。

《本地分》第五、第三十八等，說生起因以能生因（janaka-hetu）、攝因緣（saṃgraha-pratyaya）為自性，即只有五種，不說業支（karma-aṅga）。為什麼這裡也說業有？這是次會（進一步解釋）此文。

論：又有隻說到識（vijñāna）等種子的緣故。

述曰：識等五種被稱為有，是因為它們能親生當來的識等五法的種子。因為是正因能生，所以不說業。這些都是偏面的說法，不是指實體。第十（《瑜伽師地論》第十）又說全分有（pūrṇa-bhāga-sat），是指業以及識乃至受的所有種子，由於取所攝而說為有。這裡說『有的地方』，是因為經文和論典中有很多這樣的說法，所以不特別指出。

論：四所生支（catvāraḥ pratītyasamutpāda-aṅgāḥ）是愛（tṛṣṇā）、取（upādāna）、有（bhava）、生（jāti），因為是愛、取、有的近所生。

述曰：有兩種，如上面所說，指生、老、死（jarā-maraṇa），是指出它們的體性。因為是愛、取、有的近所生，所以解釋為所生之名。雖然也能為前面的（行為）能引得（結果），但不稱為引果（ākarṣa-phala），如同五種子（指地、水、火、風、空）不稱為引因（ākarṣa-hetu），只稱為所引（ākarṣita）。這裡也應該如此。但因為是近為前面的愛等所生，所以只稱為所生，不稱為引果。總是生因（janaka-hetu）和引因（ākarṣa-hetu）二者的果。但因為是近因所生，所以以此為名。總是第一（種解釋），指出體性並解釋名稱。

論：所謂從中陰（antarābhava）初生，才名為生（jāti）。

述曰：第二重解釋前面的生等分位。所謂從中陰初生

【English Translation】 English version Even the ignorant can initiate karma (業). This is because pursuing desired realms gives rise to unwholesome actions. Due to the distinction based on internal and external views (內外二見), there are differences in ignorance arising from cultivation. As (afflictions) increase, they are divided into two types. Therefore, the two lower delusions (惑) can both initiate and nourish (karma).

Treatise: Because in some places, only the vipāka-phala (異熟果, result of maturation) is mentioned.

Commentary: The various treatises of the three assemblies, such as the tenth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), state that these twelve links (referring to the links of the twelve nidānas) have no cause and condition (因緣) based on the arising cause (utpatti-hetu) included within the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya). The same treatise further states that the karma included within what is taken is called viśeṣa-bhāga-sat (勝分有, superior part existence), and so on. The treatises differ in their statements. This is the initial assembly (initial explanation), therefore it is only generally said that in some places, only the karma-bīja (業種, seed of karma) is called sat (有, existence), because this can directly cause the vipāka-phala. Although the five types (referring to vijñāna, nāmarūpa, ṣaḍāyatana, sparśa, vedanā) are the direct cause (hetu) that can produce, they do not have the power to directly cause (the vipāka-phala), therefore they are not called sat. Therefore, the tenth chapter (of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) calls it viśeṣa-bhāga-sat.

The fifth and thirty-eighth chapters of the Bodhisattvabhūmi (本地分), and others, state that the arising cause has the nature of the janaka-hetu (能生因, producing cause) and the saṃgraha-pratyaya (攝因緣, collecting condition), which are only the five types, and do not mention the karma-aṅga (業支, limb of karma). Why is it said here that karma exists? This is the subsequent assembly (further explanation) of this text.

Treatise: Furthermore, there are only mentions of the seeds of vijñāna (識) and so on.

Commentary: The five types, such as vijñāna, are called sat because they can directly produce the seeds of the five dharmas, such as future vijñāna. Because it is the direct cause that can produce, karma is not mentioned. These are all partial statements, not referring to the entity. The tenth chapter (of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) further states pūrṇa-bhāga-sat (全分有, complete part existence), which refers to all the seeds of karma, as well as vijñāna up to vedanā, which are said to exist because they are included within what is taken. Here it is said 'in some places' because there are many such statements in the sutras and treatises, so they are not specifically pointed out.

Treatise: The four pratītyasamutpāda-aṅgāḥ (四所生支, limbs produced by dependent origination) are tṛṣṇā (愛, craving), upādāna (取, grasping), bhava (有, becoming), and jāti (生, birth), because they are closely produced by craving, grasping, and becoming.

Commentary: There are two types, as mentioned above, referring to jarā-maraṇa (老死, aging and death), which is to point out their nature. Because they are closely produced by craving, grasping, and becoming, they are explained as the name 'produced'. Although they can also be the cause of the preceding (actions) that attract (results), they are not called ākarṣa-phala (引果, attracting result), just as the five seeds (referring to earth, water, fire, wind, and space) are not called ākarṣa-hetu (引因, attracting cause), but only called ākarṣita (所引, attracted). It should be the same here. But because they are closely produced by the preceding craving and so on, they are only called 'produced', not called 'attracting result'. They are always the result of both the janaka-hetu (生因, producing cause) and the ākarṣa-hetu (引因, attracting cause). But because they are produced by the proximate cause, they are named accordingly. This is always the first (explanation), pointing out the nature and explaining the name.

Treatise: What is called jāti (生, birth) is the initial arising from the antarābhava (中陰, intermediate existence).

Commentary: The second interpretation explains the preceding stages such as birth. What is called the initial arising from the antarābhava

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已后至本有中。隨命長短未衰變來。皆生支攝。諸衰變位隨多少時心色俱衰。總名為老。身壞命終入滅相位。方名為死。大乘滅相在過去故。由此正死名為死支。緣起亦云。有下種生．漸增生．出胎生．漸長生．成長生等五位差別。五衰名老。䭮發衰．身相衰．作業衰．受用衰．命根衰壽量將盡鄰近死故。有六種死。一究竟死．二不究竟死．三自相死．四不究竟死分差別相．五究竟死分差別相．六時非時死。此取自相死。謂識離身故。如彼經廣說。大論第十．及八十四別別解釋。不能繁引。此中中有生支攝者。為愛潤已有果起故。此依分位。若說識現行。當亦識所攝。五十六中說識．名色．六處為引因依處。六觸．受為生因依處等。如彼廣解。於此無違　八廢立增減釋諸妨難　問無明以誰為因。無因應有始。有因應無窮　答以不如理作意為因。何故不說。瑜伽第十云。彼唯不斷因。非雜染因故。依染因說支故。又彼無明自性是染。不如理作意自性非染。不能染無明。無明染彼故不說也。又生雜染是業煩惱之所熏發。業復以無明為因故。不說無明以不如理作意為因。緣起上捲雲問若無明亦緣非理作意何故不說。佛言無明亦引非理作意與行為緣。又從無明所生觸．受為緣生愛。是故不說即由無明勝故偏說　問老死有果不。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 已后至本有中（指中陰身）。隨壽命長短，在未衰變之前到來，都屬於生支所攝。各種衰變階段，隨著時間推移，心和色都會衰敗，總稱為老。身體壞滅，壽命終結，進入滅盡的階段，才稱為死。大乘的滅相存在於過去，因此，真正的死亡稱為死支。緣起法中也說，有下種生、漸增生、出胎生、漸長生、成長生等五種階段的差別。五衰稱為老，即頭髮衰、身相衰、作業衰、受用衰、命根衰，壽命將盡，鄰近死亡。有六種死：一、究竟死；二、不究竟死；三、自相死；四、不究竟死的分差別相；五、究竟死的分差別相；六、時非時死。這裡取自相死，指的是識離開了身體。如《瑜伽師地論》中有詳細說明。在《大智度論》第十卷和第八十四卷中也有分別解釋，此處不一一引用。此中，中有（指中陰身）屬於生支所攝，因為有愛來滋潤，已有的果報才會生起。這是依分位而說。如果說識的現行，也應當屬於識所攝。在五十六卷中說，識、名色、六處是引因依處，六觸、受是生因依處等等，如彼處有詳細解釋，與此處沒有衝突。 八、廢立增減，解釋各種妨難： 問：無明以什麼為因？如果無因，就應該有起始；如果有因，就應該無窮無盡。 答：以不如理作意為因。為什麼不說呢？《瑜伽師地論》第十卷說：『它只是不斷的因，不是雜染的因。』因為是依染污的因來說支的。而且，無明自性是染污的，不如理作意自性不是染污的，不能染污無明，是無明染污了它，所以不說。而且，產生雜染是被業和煩惱所熏發，業又以無明為因，所以不說無明以不如理作意為因。』緣起上卷說：『問：如果無明也緣非理作意，為什麼不說？佛說：無明也引導非理作意，與行為緣。又從無明所生的觸、受為緣生愛。所以不說，是因為無明更勝的緣故，所以偏說。』 問：老死有果嗎？

【English Translation】 English version Having already arrived in the intermediate existence (Bardo). Depending on the length of life, arriving before decay, all are included in the birth limb. Various stages of decay, as time passes, both mind and form decay, collectively called aging. When the body is destroyed, life ends, and entering the stage of cessation is called death. The characteristic of cessation in Mahayana exists in the past, therefore, true death is called the death limb. The law of dependent origination also states that there are five stages of difference: seed-sowing birth, gradual increase birth, emerging from the womb birth, gradual growth birth, and full growth birth. The five decays are called aging, namely, hair decay, physical appearance decay, activity decay, enjoyment decay, and life-force decay, with life nearing its end, close to death. There are six types of death: 1. Ultimate death; 2. Non-ultimate death; 3. Self-characteristic death; 4. Differentiated aspects of non-ultimate death; 5. Differentiated aspects of ultimate death; 6. Death at the right time and death at the wrong time. Here, self-characteristic death is taken, referring to the consciousness leaving the body. As explained in detail in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. The tenth and eighty-fourth volumes of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra also explain them separately, which will not be quoted here one by one. Here, the intermediate existence (Antarabhava) is included in the birth limb because with love (Trsna) as the moistening agent, the existing karmic result arises. This is according to the division of stages. If we talk about the manifestation of consciousness, it should also be included in consciousness. In volume fifty-six, it is said that consciousness, name and form (Namarupa), and the six sense bases (ayatana) are the dependent places for the causal factors, and the six contacts (Sparsha) and feelings (Vedana) are the dependent places for the birth factors, etc., as explained in detail there, which does not conflict with this. 8. Explaining various obstacles through abolishment, establishment, addition, and subtraction: Question: What is the cause of ignorance (Avidya)? If there is no cause, there should be a beginning; if there is a cause, it should be endless. Answer: The cause is irrational attention (Asmanasikara). Why is it not mentioned? The tenth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'It is only a continuous cause, not a cause of defilement.' Because the limbs are spoken of based on the cause of defilement. Moreover, the nature of ignorance itself is defiled, and the nature of irrational attention is not defiled, so it cannot defile ignorance; it is ignorance that defiles it, so it is not mentioned. Moreover, the production of defilement is stimulated by karma and afflictions, and karma is caused by ignorance, so it is not said that ignorance is caused by irrational attention.' The upper volume of Dependent Origination says: 'Question: If ignorance also conditions irrational attention, why is it not mentioned? The Buddha said: Ignorance also leads to irrational attention and conditions action. Moreover, love arises from the contact and feeling produced by ignorance. Therefore, it is not mentioned because ignorance is superior, so it is particularly mentioned.' Question: Do aging and death have results?

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若無者生死應有終。有者應無窮。此亦應說　答有。謂憂悲苦惱。十地經第八云。死別離時愚人貪著心熱名憂。發聲啼哭名悲。五根相對名苦。意根相對名憂。憂苦轉多名惱。新翻大般若亦云老死愁嘆苦憂惱　問何故不說　答緣起順生死流趣諸趣義。憂悲離散。行相高舉。不順流趣故不說之。此為舊說。與小乘同。如婆沙第二十三四等。今又解云。立支要須定或遍。此愁嘆苦憂惱。不遍亦不定。是故非支　問非理作意以誰為因。憂悲以誰為果　答此顯輪轉因果已周故不須說。即是影顯已具足故。云何影顯。謂由惑生惑業。從業生於事。從事事惑生。有支理唯此。以五果種依當起說。亦得說有前後。如受事生愛或。顯無明支由前老死生。如愛生取。顯后無明亦由前無明生　問若爾何故不說無明為無明因　答由無明自體雜染。若無餘緣不能增長。不損減故。不說為因。由此亦顯老死有果。謂為無明因。如受生愛。雖知發．潤惑體不同。是彼等流故以為喻。非如小乘無明。以五蘊為緣起支。愛等亦爾。惑等相例。又顯破彼常．斷二愚。謂愚現無因故說前世十。愚現無後果故說未來二。雖更有前前世之因。即知現受生愛等故。知前無明老死所生。未來老死能生無明。因果不斷。唯十二支。故不說無明因及老死果。非彼二法皆無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說沒有憂愁等，那麼生死應該有終結。如果說有憂愁等，那麼生死應該無窮無盡。對此也應該有所說明。回答是：有。指的是憂、悲、苦、惱。《十地經》第八卷說：『死別離時，愚人貪著，心熱名為憂；發聲啼哭名為悲；五根相對名為苦；意根相對名為憂；憂苦轉多名為惱。』新翻譯的《大般若經》也說老、死、愁嘆、苦、憂、惱。 問：為什麼不說憂愁等呢？答：因為緣起順著生死流轉，趨向于各種趣向的意義。憂、悲是離散的，行相高舉，不順著流轉的趣向，所以不說。這是舊的說法，與小乘相同，如《婆沙論》第二十三、四等。現在又解釋說，建立支分必須要確定或者普遍。而愁、嘆、苦、憂、惱，不普遍也不確定，所以不是支分。問：非理作意以誰為因？憂悲以誰為果？答：這顯示了輪轉的因果已經完備，所以不需要再說。也就是暗示已經具足了。如何暗示？就是由惑產生惑業，從業產生於事，從事事惑生。有支的道理只有這些。以五果的種子依據應當生起而說。也可以說有前後，如受事生愛或者惑。顯示無明支由前面的老死產生，如愛生取。顯示後面的無明也由前面的無明產生。問：如果這樣，為什麼不說無明為無明的因？答：因為無明自體雜染，如果沒有其餘的因緣就不能增長，也不會損減，所以不說為因。由此也顯示老死有果，就是作為無明的因，如受生愛。雖然知道發和潤的惑體不同，但因為是彼等的等流，所以用作比喻。不像小乘那樣，無明以五蘊為緣起支，愛等也是如此，惑等可以類比。又顯示破除了常和斷兩種愚癡。說前世十支，是愚昧於現在沒有原因；說未來二支，是愚昧於現在沒有後果。雖然還有更前世的因，但知道現在受生愛等，就知道前面的無明是由老死所生，未來的老死能生無明，因果不斷。只有十二支，所以不說無明因以及老死果。不是說這兩種法都沒有。

【English Translation】 English version: If there were no sorrow etc., then birth and death should have an end. If there were sorrow etc., then birth and death should be endless. This should also be explained. The answer is: There are. It refers to sorrow, grief, suffering, and distress. The eighth volume of the Dasabhumika Sutra says: 'At the time of death and separation, the ignorant are attached and their hearts are hot, which is called sorrow; uttering cries is called grief; the interaction of the five roots is called suffering; the interaction of the mind root is called sorrow; the increase of sorrow and suffering is called distress.' The newly translated Maha Prajna Paramita Sutra also speaks of old age, death, sorrow, lamentation, suffering, grief, and distress. Question: Why are sorrow etc. not mentioned? Answer: Because dependent origination follows the flow of birth and death, tending towards the meaning of various destinies. Sorrow and grief are scattered, and their characteristics are elevated, not following the tendency of the flow, so they are not mentioned. This is the old explanation, which is the same as the Hinayana, such as in the Abhidharma-mahavibhasa-sastra (婆沙論) twenty-third and fourth, etc. Now it is also explained that establishing a branch must be definite or universal. But sorrow, lamentation, suffering, grief, and distress are neither universal nor definite, so they are not branches. Question: What is the cause of irrational attention? What is the result of sorrow and grief? Answer: This shows that the cause and effect of transmigration are already complete, so there is no need to say more. That is, it implies that it is already complete. How is it implied? It is that delusion produces deluded karma, karma produces things, and from things delusion arises. The principle of the branches of existence is only these. It is said based on the seeds of the five fruits that should arise. It can also be said that there is a sequence, such as sensation giving rise to love or delusion. It shows that the branch of ignorance arises from the preceding old age and death, just as love gives rise to grasping. It shows that the subsequent ignorance also arises from the preceding ignorance. Question: If so, why is ignorance not said to be the cause of ignorance? Answer: Because ignorance itself is mixed with defilement, if there are no other conditions, it cannot increase, nor will it decrease, so it is not said to be the cause. From this, it is also shown that old age and death have a result, which is as the cause of ignorance, just as sensation gives rise to love. Although it is known that the bodies of the defilements that give rise to and nourish are different, they are used as metaphors because they are of the same stream. It is not like the Hinayana, where ignorance takes the five aggregates as the branches of dependent origination, and love etc. are also like this, and defilements etc. can be compared. It also shows the breaking of the two kinds of foolishness of permanence and annihilation. Saying the ten branches of the past life is foolishness about the present having no cause; saying the two branches of the future is foolishness about the present having no result. Although there are causes of even earlier lives, knowing that the present sensation gives rise to love etc., it is known that the preceding ignorance is born from old age and death, and the future old age and death can give rise to ignorance, and the cause and effect are continuous. There are only twelve branches, so the cause of ignorance and the result of old age and death are not mentioned. It is not that these two dharmas do not exist.

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果因。由此亦非有無窮失。此等廢立。文外所加。自下敘立依文自有　問生老死支是三相不。若是相者。何故不說住為支耶。又滅在過去其體即無。豈緣起支體通無法。若非相者。既非生等相。此是何生等　答是三相攝　后難善釋。前難如何　以緣起支是流轉義。住不順流轉故。不說為支。又住濫無為。所以不說。言緣起者有為相故。生老即生異。唯死非滅相。滅相是無。有法方是緣起支故。謂緣起支約相續立。即是正死末後之時。及前將死順死之位。總名死支。滅相體無。唯過去立。故不為例　若爾諸論說一期四相謂依相續。死．滅何殊　答一期剎那。時分雖異。依世立相其義乃同。要依過去方立滅相。但表此法后時無故。非一期滅相體即是死支。以此死支顯將正死。雖俱是假。依世不同。然依滅相以立死支。令生厭故。故依三相立三支也　問若生．老等即生等相。此後二支應行蘊攝　答以彼三相顯此三支。非此三支即唯三相。以三支體即現五蘊。名依相立。體實有殊。如觸處死。非即滅相。但將．正死解支節等。是死觸故。豈以名死體即滅相。由此三支雖依三相以立其名而令生厭。體非即彼。三相所攝。

問何故諸支各別而立。唯老與死二合立耶。

論。老非定有附死立支。

述曰。下論廢立

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 果和因。如果這樣，就會有無窮倒退的過失。這些廢除和建立，都是在經文之外新增的。下面敘述的建立是依據經文字身固有的。 問：生、老、死這三個支是否就是三種相？如果是相，為什麼不說『住』也是一個支呢？而且『滅』在過去，它的本體已經不存在了，難道緣起的支體可以通向無法嗎？如果不是相，既然不是生等相，那麼這又是什麼生等呢？ 答：是三種相所包含。 後面的提問容易解釋，前面的提問如何解釋呢？ 因為緣起支是流轉的意義，『住』不順應流轉，所以不說它是一個支。而且『住』容易和無為法混淆，所以不說。說緣起是因為它是有為相的緣故。生、老就是生、異。只有死不是滅相，滅相是無。有法才是緣起支的緣故。所謂緣起支是依據相續而建立的，就是臨死前和正死的那一刻，以及之前將要死亡、順應死亡的階段，總稱為死支。滅相本體是無，只在過去存在，所以不能作為例子。 如果這樣，那麼各論典所說的一期四相（指生、老、病、死四相），說是依據相續，那麼死和滅有什麼區別呢？ 答：一期和剎那，時間劃分雖然不同，但依據世俗建立相的意義是相同的。一定要依據過去才能建立滅相，只是表明這個法在後來的時間裡不存在了。並非一期的滅相本體就是死支。用這個死支來顯示將死和正死。雖然都是假立的，但依據世俗不同。然而依據滅相來建立死支，是爲了讓人產生厭離心。所以依據三種相來建立三個支。 問：如果生、老等就是生等相，那麼這後面的兩個支應該屬於行蘊所包含的？ 答：用那三種相來顯示這三個支，並非這三個支就僅僅是三種相。因為三個支的本體就是現在的五蘊，名為依據相而建立，本體實際上是有區別的。比如觸、處、死，並非就是滅相。只是將死、正死，分解支節等，是死的觸覺的緣故。難道因為名稱是死，本體就是滅相嗎？因此這三個支雖然依據三種相來建立它的名稱，從而讓人產生厭離心，但本體並非就是那三種相所包含的。 問：為什麼各個支分別建立，唯獨老和死兩個合起來建立呢？ 論：老不是一定有的，所以附在死上建立一個支。 述曰：下面的論述是關於廢除和建立的。

【English Translation】 English version Cause and effect. If this were the case, there would be the fault of infinite regression. These abolishments and establishments are added outside the text. The establishment described below is based on the text itself. Question: Are the three links of birth, old age, and death the three characteristics? If they are characteristics, why isn't 'abiding' also mentioned as a link? Moreover, 'cessation' is in the past, and its substance no longer exists. Could the substance of the links of dependent origination extend to non-existence? If they are not characteristics, since they are not characteristics such as birth, then what kind of birth, etc., are these? Answer: They are encompassed by the three characteristics. The later question is easy to explain, but how to explain the former question? Because the links of dependent origination are the meaning of flowing, 'abiding' does not accord with flowing, so it is not mentioned as a link. Moreover, 'abiding' is easily confused with the unconditioned, so it is not mentioned. Saying 'dependent origination' is because it is a conditioned characteristic. Birth and old age are birth and change. Only death is not the characteristic of cessation; the characteristic of cessation is non-existence. Only existing dharmas are the links of dependent origination. The so-called links of dependent origination are established based on continuity, which is the moment before death and the moment of actual death, as well as the stages before death and in accordance with death, collectively called the link of death. The substance of the characteristic of cessation is non-existence, existing only in the past, so it cannot be taken as an example. If so, then what is the difference between death and cessation, as the various treatises say that the four characteristics of a lifetime (referring to the four characteristics of birth, old age, sickness, and death) are based on continuity? Answer: Although the divisions of time are different between a lifetime and a moment, the meaning of establishing characteristics based on convention is the same. The characteristic of cessation must be established based on the past, merely indicating that this dharma does not exist in later times. The substance of the characteristic of cessation in a lifetime is not the link of death. This link of death is used to show impending death and actual death. Although both are conventionally established, they differ based on convention. However, the link of death is established based on the characteristic of cessation in order to generate aversion. Therefore, three links are established based on the three characteristics. Question: If birth, old age, etc., are the characteristics of birth, etc., then should the latter two links be included in the aggregate of formations? Answer: Those three characteristics are used to show these three links, but these three links are not merely the three characteristics. Because the substance of the three links is the present five aggregates, it is called establishment based on characteristics, but the substance is actually different. For example, contact, place, and death are not the characteristic of cessation. Merely impending death, actual death, decomposing limbs, etc., are the cause of the sensation of death. Is it because the name is death that the substance is the characteristic of cessation? Therefore, although these three links are established based on the three characteristics to generate aversion, the substance is not included in those three characteristics. Question: Why are the various links established separately, but only old age and death are established together? Treatise: Old age is not necessarily present, so it is attached to death to establish a link. Commentary: The following discussion is about abolishing and establishing.

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有七。此為第一。雜集論云。所以老死合立支者。為顯離老得有死故。非於胎生身中離名色等得有六處等故。是故各別立支。

論。病何非支。

述曰。此外人問。老支不定。附死合立。病亦不定。應合立支。故論問云病何非支。

論。不遍定故。

述曰。此論主答。謂此病法。非直不遍三界．五趣。隨所應有趣界之中。亦非定有。如尊者薄拘羅。年過八十曾不患小疾故。故不立支。

論。老雖不定遍故立支。

述曰。然此病法非如老法。雖非必定一切有情皆悉有之。遍諸趣界故立為支。病不定遍故不立也。

問何以得知。諸色無色亦有老耶。

論。諸界趣生至衰朽行故。

述曰。界趣生等皆有衰朽非中夭者。臨終異前根．識衰朽。故是遍趣得立為支。除中夭者顯不定故。瑜伽第十三云。問云何應知上界有差。答彼諸行有朽壞腐敗性故。正與此同。

論。名色不遍何故立支。

述曰。此第二問辭也。若由遍故老得立支。病不遍故不立支者。名色不遍。何故立支。謂色界全。欲界化生。六處頓起。云何有名色。即是不遍。何故立支。

論。定故立支至定有名色故。

述曰。此就他意以答此義。謂雖不遍定故立支。隨其趣生所應有處必

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有七種原因。這是第一種。《雜集論》中說，之所以將老和死合併爲一個支，是爲了表明離開老才能有死。而不是在胎生身中，離開名色等才能有六處等。因此，各自獨立設立為支。

論：為什麼病不是支？

述曰：這是外人提出的問題。老這個支不確定，所以附在死上合併設立。病也不確定，應該合併設立為支。所以論中問道：為什麼病不是支？

論：因為不普遍且不確定。

述曰：這是論主的回答。這個病法，不僅不普遍於三界、五趣，在相應的趣界之中，也不是一定有的。例如尊者薄拘羅（Bhakkula），年過八十也沒有患過小病。所以不設立為支。

論：老雖然不確定，但因為普遍所以設立為支。

述曰：然而這個病法不像老法。雖然不是必定一切有情眾生都有，但它普遍於各個趣界，所以設立為支。病因為不確定且不普遍，所以不設立為支。

問：如何得知，諸色界和無色界也有老呢？

論：因為諸界趣生，直至衰朽行故。

述曰：界、趣、生等都有衰朽，不是中途夭折的人。臨終時與之前不同，根和識都會衰朽。所以是普遍於各個趣界，可以設立為支。排除中途夭折的人，是爲了顯示不確定性。《瑜伽師地論》第十三卷說：問：如何知道上界有差別？答：因為那些行有朽壞腐敗的性質。與這裡的意思相同。

論：名色不普遍，為什麼設立為支？

述曰：這是第二個問題。如果因為普遍所以老可以設立為支，因為病不普遍所以不設立為支，那麼名色不普遍，為什麼設立為支？例如**全（此處原文有缺失，無法補全）。欲界化生，六處頓然生起。怎麼會有名色呢？這就是不普遍。為什麼設立為支？

論：因為確定所以設立為支，直至確定有名色故。

述曰：這是就他人的意思來回答這個問題。意思是說，雖然不普遍，但因為確定所以設立為支。隨著所處的趣生，在應該有的地方必定

【English Translation】 English version There are seven reasons. This is the first. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) says: 'The reason why old age and death are combined into one limb is to show that death can only occur after old age. It is not that in a womb-born body, apart from name and form, there can be the six sense bases, etc.' Therefore, each is established as a separate limb.

Question: Why is sickness not a limb?

Commentary: This is a question raised by an outsider. The limb of old age is uncertain, so it is attached to death and established together. Sickness is also uncertain, so it should be combined and established as a limb. Therefore, the treatise asks: 'Why is sickness not a limb?'

Treatise: Because it is not universal and not definite.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. This phenomenon of sickness is not only not universal in the Three Realms and Five Destinies, but also not necessarily present in the corresponding destinies. For example, the Venerable Bhakkula (Bhakkula), even past eighty years of age, never suffered from minor illnesses. Therefore, it is not established as a limb.

Treatise: Although old age is not definite, it is established as a limb because it is universal.

Commentary: However, this phenomenon of sickness is not like the phenomenon of old age. Although it is not necessarily present in all sentient beings, it is universal in all destinies, so it is established as a limb. Sickness is not established because it is not definite and not universal.

Question: How do we know that the Form Realm and Formless Realm also have old age?

Treatise: Because the realms, destinies, and births all have decay and deterioration.

Commentary: Realms, destinies, births, etc., all have decay and deterioration, not just those who die prematurely. At the time of death, unlike before, the roots and consciousness will decay. Therefore, it is universal in all destinies and can be established as a limb. Excluding those who die prematurely is to show the uncertainty. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Discourse on the Stages of Yoga Practice), Volume Thirteen, says: 'Question: How should we know that the upper realms have differences? Answer: Because those phenomena have the nature of decay and corruption.' This is the same meaning.

Treatise: Name and form are not universal, why are they established as a limb?

Commentary: This is the second question. If old age can be established as a limb because it is universal, and sickness is not established because it is not universal, then name and form are not universal, why are they established as a limb? For example, **full (the original text is missing here, unable to complete). Beings born by transformation in the Desire Realm, the six sense bases arise suddenly. How can there be name and form? This is not universal. Why is it established as a limb?

Treatise: Because it is definite, it is established as a limb, until it is definite that there is name and form.

Commentary: This is answering this question from the perspective of others. It means that although it is not universal, it is established as a limb because it is definite. Depending on the destiny in which one is born, in the place where it should be, it is certain that

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定有故。病即不定。不可為例。謂除化生。胎．卵．濕生者。乃至六處未滿已來定有名色故。非此三生有而不定。故此名色亦得立支。故九十三．第九等。云濕．卵二生除在母腹。余如胎生次第皆有。故是定也。有色有情在色．欲界受化生者。于初生時諸根圓滿與余差別。故不遍也　問何故此中說言三生皆有次第。瑜伽第十解生支中。云出現云何。謂于濕．化二生身份頓起。答據實濕生所有諸根。次第生起。九十三說除在母腹如胎生故。此言濕生亦頓起者。即是身支。謂濕．化初生必有手足等。身支頓起與胎．卵異。非謂諸根皆得頓起。故彼此文不相違也。分者支義。

論。又名色支至未名六處故。

述曰。此下第二依正理答。此名色支所以立者。亦遍三界。若爾云何有色化生初生根滿。于有色界化生初位。雖具五根。而此五根猶未有用。但名名色。爾時未名六處支故。謂諸根滿有明利用。能生觸等乃名六處。此雖根滿無明利用。尚未生觸。但名名色不名六處。故名色支亦定亦遍。九十三等雖言化生初生根滿。不言化生無名色支。故作此釋。

問若爾者初生無色但有意處。何有名色。

論。初生無色至未名意處故。

述曰。彼亦初生時名為名色攝。九十三云無色有情識。依于名及色種

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有是確定的緣故。病是不確定的。不可以作為例子。說的是除了化生之外，胎生、卵生、濕生者，乃至六處（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）未圓滿之前，一定是具有名色（精神和物質現象）的緣故。不是說這三種生類具有名色而不確定。因此這名色也可以成立為一『支』（緣起支）。所以《瑜伽師地論》第九十三卷、第九卷等說，濕生、卵生兩種，除了在母胎腹中的情況，其餘都和胎生一樣有次第。所以是確定的。有色有情的眾生，在色界、欲界接受化生的，在初生的時候，諸根圓滿，和其餘的生類有差別。所以不是普遍的。問：為什麼這裡說三種生類都有次第？《瑜伽師地論》第十卷解釋生支中，說出現是怎樣的？說是濕生、化生，身份突然產生。答：根據實際情況，濕生所有的諸根，是次第生起的。《瑜伽師地論》第九十三卷說，除了在母胎腹中，和胎生一樣。這裡說濕生也是突然產生，指的是身支。說的是濕生、化生初生的時候，一定有手足等，身支突然產生，和胎生、卵生不同。不是說諸根都可以突然產生。所以這些經文彼此不相違背。『分』就是『支』的意思。

論：又，名色支，到未稱為六處（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）的緣故。

述記：下面第二，依據正理回答。這名色支之所以成立，也是普遍存在於三界（欲界、色界、無色界）的。如果這樣，為什麼有色界的化生，初生的時候諸根就圓滿？對於有色界的化生，在初生的時候，雖然具有五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身），但是這五根還沒有作用。只是稱為名色。這個時候，還沒有稱為六處支的緣故。說的是諸根圓滿，有明顯的作用，能夠產生觸等，才稱為六處。這雖然諸根圓滿，沒有明顯的作用，尚未產生觸，只是稱為名色，不稱為六處。所以名色支也是確定的，也是普遍的。《瑜伽師地論》第九十三卷等雖然說化生初生的時候諸根圓滿，沒有說化生沒有名色支。所以這樣解釋。

問：如果這樣，初生的無色界眾生，只有意處（意識），為什麼有名色？

論：初生的無色界眾生，到未稱為意處（意識）的緣故。

述記：他們也是在初生的時候，稱為名色所攝。《瑜伽師地論》第九十三卷說，無色界的有情，識，依靠于名和色種。

【English Translation】 English version It is definite because of the reason of existence. Illness is indefinite. It cannot be taken as an example. It refers to those born through womb, egg, and moisture, excluding transformation birth, even before the six sense bases (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) are complete, they definitely have nāmarūpa (name and form, mental and material phenomena). It is not that these three types of birth have nāmarūpa but are indefinite. Therefore, this nāmarūpa can also be established as a 'limb' (of dependent origination). Therefore, the ninety-third and ninth volumes of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra say that moisture-born and egg-born beings, except when in the mother's womb, are all in sequence like womb-born beings. Therefore, it is definite. Sentient beings with form who are born by transformation in the Form Realm and Desire Realm have complete sense faculties at the time of their initial birth, which is different from other types of birth. Therefore, it is not universal. Question: Why does it say here that all three types of birth have a sequence? The tenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, in explaining the limb of birth, says, 'What is appearance?' It says that the bodies of moisture-born and transformation-born beings arise suddenly. Answer: According to the actual situation, all the sense faculties of moisture-born beings arise in sequence. The ninety-third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that except when in the mother's womb, they are like womb-born beings. The statement here that moisture-born beings also arise suddenly refers to the body limbs. It means that moisture-born and transformation-born beings definitely have limbs such as hands and feet at the time of their initial birth, which is different from womb-born and egg-born beings. It does not mean that all the sense faculties can arise suddenly. Therefore, these texts do not contradict each other. 'Part' means 'limb'.

Treatise: Furthermore, the limb of nāmarūpa, until it is called the six sense bases (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind).

Commentary: The second part below answers based on correct reasoning. The reason why this limb of nāmarūpa is established is that it is also universally present in the three realms (Desire Realm, Form Realm, Formless Realm). If so, why do transformation-born beings in the Form Realm have complete sense faculties at the time of their initial birth? For transformation-born beings in the Form Realm, although they have the five sense faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) at the time of their initial birth, these five sense faculties do not yet have any function. They are only called nāmarūpa. At this time, it is not yet called the limb of the six sense bases. It means that when the sense faculties are complete and have clear function, and can produce contact, etc., then it is called the six sense bases. Although these sense faculties are complete, they do not have clear function and have not yet produced contact, they are only called nāmarūpa, not the six sense bases. Therefore, the limb of nāmarūpa is both definite and universal. Although the ninety-third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that transformation-born beings have complete sense faculties at the time of their initial birth, it does not say that transformation-born beings do not have the limb of nāmarūpa. Therefore, this explanation is made.

Question: If so, the beings in the Formless Realm at the time of their initial birth only have the mind base (consciousness), why is there nāmarūpa?

Treatise: The beings in the Formless Realm at the time of their initial birth, until it is called the mind base (consciousness).

Commentary: They are also included in nāmarūpa at the time of their initial birth. The ninety-third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the consciousness of sentient beings in the Formless Realm relies on the seeds of nāma and rūpa.

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子。名及色種依識而轉。故知無色界亦有名色支。意無用故不名六處。

論。由斯論說至上二界有。

述曰。由此瑜伽第十論。說十二有支一切一分上二界有。若無名色非一切故。緣起上云若唯有名都無其色斯有何過。佛言若一生中唯有其名不依色住。相續生起不應理者。依有色身現起色語。或色種子亦名為色。九十三等。云無色界名與色種子為識所依。彼地未滅報色種故。報色種子非彼界系。故此異界色。為異界名依。又彼定色所有種子。亦得為名依。理亦無失。

論。愛非遍有至不愛彼故。

述曰。此第三問。若爾愛非遍有。寧別立支。何謂非遍。生惡趣者不愛彼故。故非遍也。緣起上說。世尊若唯說愛與有為緣。不緣于取斯有何過。世尊告曰。希求名愛。于險惡趣無有希求。然由所作非福行故。雖求善趣而違果生。彼非福果豈緣于愛。又如所說無有愛者希求無有。求無有時。由先造福不動行故。相違果生。此二果生亦不緣愛。

論。定故別立至定有愛故。

述曰。此隨他答。非為盡理。何謂為定。不求無後有。依勝善行生善趣者定有愛故。謂唯除彼求無後有。及生惡趣已外。定有愛生求無有故。不希有起愛。生惡趣故不愛所生處。除此已外愛是定有。

問若爾不還

【現代漢語翻譯】 子（Zǐ，對佛弟子的尊稱）。名（nāma，精神現象）及色（rūpa，物質現象）的種子依識（vijñāna，意識）而轉變。因此可知，即使沒有六入（ṣaḍāyatana，感覺器官），也有名色支（nāmarūpa-aṅga，名色支）。因為意（manas，心意）沒有作用，所以不稱為六處。

論（lùn，論典）。由斯論說至上二界有。

述曰（shù yuē，解釋）。由此《瑜伽師地論》第十論說，十二有支（dvādaśāṅga-bhava，十二有支）的一切或一部分在上二界（上界和無色界）存在。如果無名色，就不是一切有支。緣起（pratītyasamutpāda，緣起）上說，如果只有名而沒有色，會有什麼過失？佛說，如果一生中只有名而不依色住，相續生起是不合理的。依靠有色身才能顯現色語，或者色種子也稱為色。九十三等說，沒有六入，名與色種子為識所依。因為彼地（彼地，指上二界）未滅報色種，報色種子不屬於彼界系，所以此異界色為異界名所依。又彼定色（dhyāna-rūpa，禪定之色）的所有種子，也可以為名所依，道理上也沒有缺失。

論。愛（tṛṣṇā，渴愛）非遍有至不愛彼故。

述曰。這是第三個問題。如果這樣，愛不是普遍存在的，為什麼單獨設立一個支？什麼叫做非普遍？因為生惡趣（durgati，惡道）者不愛彼（惡趣）。所以愛不是普遍存在的。緣起上說，世尊如果只說愛與有（bhava，存在）為緣，而不緣于取（upādāna，執取），會有什麼過失？世尊說，希求名為愛，在險惡趣中沒有希求。然而由於所作的非福行（apuṇya-abhisamskāra，非福業），雖然求善趣（sugati，善道）卻違背果報的產生。彼非福果難道是緣于愛嗎？又如所說，沒有愛者希求無有（vibhava，斷滅），求無有時，由於先前造作的福不動行（āniñjya-abhisamskāra，不動業），產生相反的果報。這兩種果報的產生也不緣于愛。

論。定故別立至定有愛故。

述曰。這是隨順他人的回答，並非完全合理。什麼叫做定？不求無後有（uttarabhava，後有），依靠殊勝的善行而生善趣者，必定有愛。就是說，除了那些求無後有，以及生惡趣者之外，必定有愛產生。因為求無有，所以不希求生起愛。因為生惡趣者不愛所生之處。除了這些之外，愛是必定存在的。

問（梵：praśna）。若爾不還（anāgāmin，不還果）

【English Translation】 Zǐ (a respectful term for a Buddha's disciple). The seeds of nāma (name, mental phenomena) and rūpa (form, material phenomena) transform according to vijñāna (consciousness). Therefore, it can be known that even without ṣaḍāyatana (the six sense organs), there is the nāmarūpa-aṅga (name-and-form limb). Because manas (mind) has no function, it is not called the six places.

Treatise. From this treatise, it is said that the upper two realms exist.

Commentary. This tenth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that all or part of the twelve bhava limbs exist in the upper two realms (the Form Realm and the Formless Realm). If there were no name-and-form, it would not be all the limbs. In pratītyasamutpāda, it says, 'If there is only name and no form, what fault would there be?' The Buddha said, 'If in one life there is only name and it does not rely on form, the continuous arising would be unreasonable.' Relying on a body with form, colored speech can manifest, or the seed of form is also called form. Ninety-three etc. say that without the six entrances, name and the seed of form are what consciousness relies on. Because the resultant form seed has not been extinguished in that realm (referring to the upper two realms), the resultant form seed does not belong to that realm system, so this form from a different realm is what the name from a different realm relies on. Also, all the seeds of that dhyāna-rūpa (meditative form) can also be what name relies on, and there is no fault in principle.

Treatise. Tṛṣṇā (craving) is not universally present, because they do not love that.

Commentary. This is the third question. If that is the case, craving is not universally present, so why establish a separate limb? What is meant by 'not universal'? Because those born in durgati (evil destinies) do not love that (evil destiny). Therefore, craving is not universally present. In pratītyasamutpāda, it says, 'World-Honored One, if you only say that craving and bhava (existence) are the conditions, and not upādāna (grasping), what fault would there be?' The World-Honored One said, 'Seeking is called craving, and there is no seeking in dangerous and evil destinies. However, because of the apuṇya-abhisamskāra (non-meritorious actions) that were done, although they seek good destinies, the arising of the result is contrary. Is that non-meritorious result conditioned by craving?' Also, as it is said, those without craving seek vibhava (non-existence), and when they seek non-existence, because of the āniñjya-abhisamskāra (immovable actions) previously done, the opposite result arises. The arising of these two results is also not conditioned by craving.

Treatise. Because it is definite, it is established separately, because there is definitely craving.

Commentary. This is answering according to others, and it is not completely reasonable. What is meant by 'definite'? Those who do not seek future existence (uttarabhava) and are born in good destinies relying on superior good actions definitely have craving. That is to say, except for those who seek non-existence and those who are born in evil destinies, craving definitely arises. Because they seek non-existence, they do not desire the arising of craving. Because those born in evil destinies do not love the place of birth. Apart from these, craving is definitely present.

Question. If that is the case, the anāgāmin (non-returner)

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果現無愛潤聖教所說。言定有愛豈不相違。

論。不還潤生至定有種故。

述曰。其不還果生他地。潤生雖不現起愛。然如於彼自身取支。定有種故亦名為定。彼不還者。非但無現愛。亦無現取。取種有故。而得潤生。既取名定。愛例應然。故如彼取愛定有種。

自下第二依正理解。

論。又愛亦遍至亦有愛故。

述曰。生惡趣者。雖彼不愛當生處身。于現我身。及現在境亦起愛故。故生惡趣有愛潤生。

論。依無希求至非彼全無。

述曰。會經違也。緣起上卷依無希求當惡趣身之愛。說生惡趣無有愛起。非生彼趣諸愛全無。有現愛故。

論。何緣所生至識等五支。

述曰。此第四問也。何緣果合立生老死。于所引位乃別開立識等五支。雖種現殊而體無別。故相對問。

論。因位難知至別立五支。

述曰。此論主答。初總文也。謂識等五支正在因位。差別之相難以了知。遂依當生之位。別立因支為五。

論。謂續生時至立因為五。

述曰。此廣前也。謂于當來初生之時果識初起。即是因識相顯。以果初生令識種用顯故。名因識相顯也。即初剎那。或說一七日。次識位后五根未滿已來。果名色起。令因名色相貌增長。以果顯時令因增

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說不還果位（Anagamin，佛教修行的一個階段，達到此果位者死後不再返回欲界）的聖者沒有愛慾的滋潤，這與聖教所說的（他們）必定有愛慾不是相互矛盾嗎？

論：不還果位者潤生是因為他們必定有（愛的）種子。

述曰：那些不還果位者會轉生到其他地方。雖然潤生時愛慾可能不會顯現，但就像他們爲了自身而執取（五）蘊一樣，因為必定有（愛的）種子，所以也可以說他們必定有（愛慾）。這些不還果位者，不僅沒有顯現的愛慾，也沒有顯現的執取。因為有執取的種子，所以能夠潤生。既然執取可以被稱作『定』，那麼愛慾也應該如此。因此，就像他們執取一樣，愛慾也必定有（愛的）種子。

自下第二部分是關於依報（所居住的環境）和正報（自身）的理解。

論：而且，愛慾是普遍存在的，即使是生於惡趣（Durgati，不好的輪迴道）的眾生，也有愛慾的滋潤。

述曰：即使是那些將要生於惡趣的眾生，雖然他們不愛他們將要出生的處所和身體，但對於現在的自身和現在的境界，他們也會生起愛慾。因此，生於惡趣的眾生也有愛慾的滋潤。

論：依據（《緣起經》）所說，沒有希求惡趣之身的愛慾，（所以）生於惡趣沒有愛慾生起，這與（實際情況）不符，因為他們並非完全沒有愛慾。

述曰：這與經文相違背。《緣起經》上卷依據沒有希求惡趣之身的愛慾，說生於惡趣沒有愛慾生起。但這並非說生於惡趣的眾生完全沒有愛慾，因為他們有顯現的愛慾。

論：是什麼原因導致（果位的）生、老、死被一起提出，而在所引用的位置卻單獨提出識（Vijnana，意識）、名色（Namarupa，精神和物質的結合）、六入（Sadayatana，感覺的來源）、觸（Sparsha，感官接觸）、受（Vedana，感覺）這五支？

述曰：這是第四個問題。是什麼原因導致果位的生、老、死被一起提出，而在所引用的位置卻單獨提出識等五支？雖然種子和顯現不同，但本體沒有區別，所以相對地提出這個問題。

論：因為因位難以瞭解，所以單獨設立五支。

述曰：這是論主的回答。首先是總體的說明。意思是說，識等五支正處於因位，它們的差別之相難以瞭解，所以依據當生之位，單獨設立因支為五。

論：所謂在延續生命時，（果位的）識最初生起，這就是因位的識相顯現。因為果位的最初生起使得識的種子作用顯現，所以稱作因位的識相顯現。因此設立因支為五。

述曰：這是對前面的擴充套件。意思是在將來的最初生之時，果位的識最初生起，這就是因位的識相顯現。因為果位的最初生起使得識的種子作用顯現，所以稱作因位的識相顯現。也就是最初的剎那，或者說一個七日。其次，在識位之後，五根（Pancendriya，五種感覺器官）未滿之前，果位的名色生起，使得因位的名色相貌增長。因為果位顯現時，使得因位增長。

【English Translation】 English version: If it is said that an Anagamin (non-returner, a stage in Buddhist practice where one does not return to the desire realm after death) does not have the moisture of love, doesn't this contradict what the Holy Teaching says about them certainly having love?

Treatise: The Anagamin's rebirth is moistened because they certainly have the seed (of love).

Commentary: Those Anagamins are reborn in other places. Although love may not manifest during rebirth, just as they grasp at the (five) aggregates for themselves, it can also be said that they certainly have (love) because they certainly have the seed (of love). These Anagamins not only do not have manifest love, but also do not have manifest grasping. Because there is the seed of grasping, they are able to be reborn. Since grasping can be called 'certain,' then love should be the same. Therefore, just as they grasp, love certainly has the seed (of love).

The second part below is about understanding the environment (support) and oneself (the supported).

Treatise: Moreover, love is universal, even beings born in evil destinies (Durgati, bad realms of rebirth) are moistened by love.

Commentary: Even those beings who are about to be born in evil destinies, although they do not love the place and body they are about to be born into, they will still generate love for their current self and current environment. Therefore, beings born in evil destinies are also moistened by love.

Treatise: According to (the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra), there is no love that desires the body of an evil destiny, (so) no love arises in those born in evil destinies, which is inconsistent (with reality) because they are not completely without love.

Commentary: This contradicts the sutra. The upper volume of the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra states that based on the absence of love that desires the body of an evil destiny, no love arises in those born in evil destinies. But this does not mean that beings born in evil destinies are completely without love, because they have manifest love.

Treatise: What is the reason that birth, old age, and death (as results) are presented together, while the five branches of consciousness (Vijnana, awareness), name and form (Namarupa, the combination of mind and matter), the six sense bases (Sadayatana, the sources of sensation), contact (Sparsha, sensory contact), and feeling (Vedana, sensation) are presented separately in the cited position?

Commentary: This is the fourth question. What is the reason that birth, old age, and death of the result are presented together, while the five branches such as consciousness are presented separately in the cited position? Although the seed and manifestation are different, the essence is not different, so this question is raised in relation to that.

Treatise: Because the causal stage is difficult to understand, the five branches are established separately.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. First is the general explanation. It means that the five branches such as consciousness are precisely in the causal stage, and their differences are difficult to understand. Therefore, based on the stage of future birth, the causal branches are established separately as five.

Treatise: So-called, when continuing life, the initial arising of consciousness (as a result) is the manifestation of the aspect of consciousness in the causal stage. Because the initial arising of the result makes the function of the seed of consciousness manifest, it is called the manifestation of the aspect of consciousness in the causal stage. Therefore, the causal branches are established as five.

Commentary: This is an expansion of the previous statement. It means that at the time of the initial birth in the future, the initial arising of consciousness (as a result) is the manifestation of the aspect of consciousness in the causal stage. Because the initial arising of the result makes the function of the seed of consciousness manifest, it is called the manifestation of the aspect of consciousness in the causal stage. That is, the initial moment, or one week. Secondly, after the stage of consciousness, before the five sense organs (Pancendriya, the five faculties) are complete, name and form (as a result) arise, causing the appearance of name and form in the causal stage to increase. Because the result manifests, it causes the cause to increase.

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故。即四七日已前。此中五支皆應有因。但識中說文影通下。次前名色四七日後。五根滿時至缽羅奢佉。因六處明盛。根相利故。依此六處發觸相顯。因觸起受因受相增。爾時乃名受果究竟。依此當起果位次第立因支為五。以因眠伏相難知故。此即因支分五所以。

論。果位易了至以顯三苦。

述曰。當現果位既是現行。易了差別相。故總立生老．死二支。以顯三苦。緣起上說。世尊若生．老死。名色．六處．觸．受為相。於此生身何緣顯示生．老死名。世尊告曰。為顯如是生身之相。有三種苦成苦相故。生顯行苦。老顯壞苦。死顯苦苦。至下當知。此欲界為論。若色．無色界即顯三相。謂生．異．滅。

問若爾果位唯顯三苦但說二支。如何復說于果起時令知分位說識等五也。

論。然所生果至說識等五。

述曰。其所生果。若在未來。為令有情生厭離故。但總相說生老死支。毀責名故。其所生果。若至現在。為令了知分位相生說識等五。互相顯故。以今顯后說五不遮。以後顯今說二無妨。由此前說或依當來現起分位有差別故說有前後。不爾相違。

論。何緣發業至別立愛取。

述曰。此第五問。意謂。諸煩惱皆能發業。何故支內不同愛．取。而總立無明不更別立。又諸

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，在四七日（28天）之前，這其中的五支（識、名色、六入、觸、受）都應該有其原因。但識支中，『文』（指文字、語言）和『影』（指影像、影子）是相通的，在下文會解釋。在名色支之後，四七日之後，五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）圓滿時，到達缽羅奢佉（pasakha，肢體分位），因為六處（眼處、耳處、鼻處、舌處、身處、意處）明盛，根相銳利，依靠這六處而使觸相顯現。因為觸而生受，因為受而使受相增長，這時才稱為受果究竟。依靠這個，應當生起果位的次第，建立因支為五支，因為因的眠伏之相難以知曉。這就是因支分為五支的原因。

論：果位容易瞭解，所以用生、老、死二支來顯示三種苦。

述記：當現行的果位已經是現行，容易瞭解其差別相，所以總共建立生、老、死二支，來顯示三種苦。在緣起上說，世尊說，如果生、老、死是名色、六處、觸、受的相，那麼對於這個生身，為什麼只顯示生、老、死的名字呢？世尊回答說：爲了顯示這樣的生身之相，有三種苦成就苦相的緣故。生顯示行苦，老顯示壞苦，死顯示苦苦。到下文就會知道。這裡是針對欲界來說的。如果是色界、無色界，就顯示三種相，即生、異、滅。

問：如果這樣，果位只顯示三種苦，但只說了生、老二支，為什麼又說在果位生起時，爲了讓人知道分位，而說識等五支呢？

論：然而，所生的果，爲了使有情生起厭離心，所以只總相地說生老死支，這是爲了毀責（果）的緣故。所生的果，如果到了現在，爲了讓人瞭解分位相生，所以說識等五支，這是爲了互相顯現的緣故。用現在來顯現未來，所以說五支並不妨礙；用未來來顯現現在，所以說二支也沒有妨礙。因此，前面所說，或者依據當來現起的分位有差別，所以說有前後。否則就會互相矛盾。

論：為什麼發起業的煩惱有很多，卻要特別建立愛、取二支呢？

述記：這是第五個問題。意思是說，各種煩惱都能發起業，為什麼在支內不同於愛、取，而總共建立無明，不再另外建立呢？又，各種

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, before the four seven days (28 days), these five branches (consciousness, name and form, six entrances, contact, sensation) should all have their causes. However, in the branch of consciousness, 'text' (referring to writing, language) and 'shadow' (referring to image, shadow) are interconnected, which will be explained later. After the branch of name and form, after the four seven days, when the five roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) are complete, reaching pasakha (limb division), because the six entrances (eye entrance, ear entrance, nose entrance, tongue entrance, body entrance, mind entrance) are bright and flourishing, and the root aspects are sharp, relying on these six entrances, the aspect of contact becomes apparent. Because of contact, sensation arises; because of sensation, the aspect of sensation increases, and at this time it is called the ultimate result of sensation. Relying on this, the order of the resultant positions should arise, and the causal branches are established as five, because the dormant aspect of the cause is difficult to know. This is the reason why the causal branches are divided into five.

Treatise: The resultant position is easy to understand, so the two branches of birth, old age, and death are used to show the three sufferings.

Commentary: The resultant position that is currently arising is already manifest, and its differences are easy to understand, so the two branches of birth, old age, and death are established in total to show the three sufferings. In the explanation of dependent origination, the World Honored One said that if birth, old age, and death are the aspects of name and form, six entrances, contact, and sensation, then why only show the names of birth, old age, and death for this arising body? The World Honored One replied: In order to show the aspect of such an arising body, there are three kinds of suffering that accomplish the aspect of suffering. Birth shows the suffering of activity, old age shows the suffering of decay, and death shows the suffering of suffering. This will be known later. This is in reference to the desire realm. If it is the form realm or the formless realm, then three aspects are shown, namely birth, change, and cessation.

Question: If this is the case, the resultant position only shows the three sufferings, but only the two branches of birth and old age are mentioned. Why is it also said that when the resultant position arises, in order to let people know the divisions, the five branches of consciousness, etc., are mentioned?

Treatise: However, the resultant fruit that is produced, in order to make sentient beings generate aversion, only the branches of birth, old age, and death are mentioned in general. This is for the sake of criticizing (the result). If the resultant fruit that is produced has reached the present, in order to let people understand the arising of divisions, the five branches of consciousness, etc., are mentioned. This is for the sake of mutual manifestation. Using the present to manifest the future, so mentioning the five branches does not hinder; using the future to manifest the present, so mentioning the two branches is not an obstacle. Therefore, what was said earlier, or based on the differences in the divisions that will arise in the future, is why there is a before and after. Otherwise, they would contradict each other.

Treatise: Why are there many afflictions that initiate karma, but the two branches of craving and grasping are specifically established?

Commentary: This is the fifth question. The meaning is that various afflictions can initiate karma, so why are they different from craving and grasping within the branches, and why is ignorance established in total without establishing them separately? Also, various

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煩惱皆潤業。何故不同無明亦但立一。而別分愛．取。

論。雖諸煩惱至廣如經說。

述曰。一切煩惱皆能發業。而無明力發業用增勝餘煩惱。以具十一殊勝事故。謂所緣等。此答初問。但說無明為發業惑。如緣起說。十一勝者。一所緣勝。遍緣染凈故。二行相勝。隱真顯妄故。三因緣勝。惑業生本故。四等起勝。等能發起能引所引能生所生緣起法故。五轉異勝。隨眠纏縛相應不共四轉異故。六邪行勝。于諦起增益。及損減行故。七相狀勝。微細自相遍愛非愛共相轉故。八作業勝。作流轉所依事。作寂止能障事故。九障礙勝。障礙勝法及廣法故十隨轉勝。乃至有頂猶隨轉故。十一對治勝。二種妙智所對治故。故不說余惑亦名發業支。

論。于潤業位至能沃潤故。

述曰。答于潤位說愛．取二。雖諸煩惱皆能潤生。于潤業位愛力偏增。何以知者。諸論唯說四愛為集諦。又聖教皆說愛如於水能沃能潤。故不說余。

何意發業但一無明。潤生之惑分愛為取。

論。要數溉灌至立一無明。

述曰。若生有芽必數溉灌。如灌田等。今者且依愛之初後分愛．取二。其實有多現行愛惑。十地第八經云愛增名取。故初名愛后名取也。發業之義不可重發。立一無明。如一芽生不可再生。水沃

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：煩惱都能滋潤業，為什麼不像無明一樣只設立一個，而要另外區分愛（Tanha，渴愛，對感官享受的渴求）和取（Upadana，執取，對存在的執著）呢？

論：雖然各種煩惱非常廣泛，正如經文所說。

述：一切煩惱都能引發業，但無明的力量在引發業方面比其他煩惱更強大，因為它具備十一種殊勝的特性，例如所緣等。這是對第一個問題的回答。只說無明是引發業的惑，就像緣起法所說的那樣。十一種殊勝的特性是：一、所緣殊勝，普遍緣染凈法；二、行相殊勝，隱藏真實，顯現虛妄；三、因緣殊勝，是惑和業產生的根本；四、等起殊勝，能夠發起能引、所引、能生、所生等緣起法；五、轉異殊勝，隨眠、纏縛、相應、不共四種轉異；六、邪行殊勝，對真諦產生增益和損減的行為；七、相狀殊勝，微細的自相普遍在愛與非愛中共相中轉變；八、作業殊勝，作為流轉的所依，作為寂止的障礙；九、障礙殊勝，障礙殊勝的法和廣大的法；十、隨轉殊勝，乃至有頂天仍然隨之運轉；十一、對治殊勝，被兩種妙智所對治。因此，不說其他的惑也叫做發業支。

論：在滋潤業的位置上，愛和取能夠沃潤。

述：回答在滋潤業的位置上說愛和取。雖然各種煩惱都能滋潤生命，但在滋潤業方面，愛的力量特別強大。為什麼知道呢？各種論典只說四愛是集諦。而且聖教都說愛就像水一樣能夠沃潤，所以不說其他的煩惱。

為什麼引發業只有一個無明（Avidya，對事物真相的無知），而滋潤生命的惑卻要分為愛和取呢？

論：需要多次灌溉，所以設立一個無明。

述：如果生命之芽要生長，就必須多次灌溉，就像灌溉田地一樣。現在暫且依據愛的最初和最後階段來區分愛和取。實際上有很多現行的愛惑。《十地經》第八卷說，愛增長就叫做取。所以最初叫做愛，後來叫做取。引發業的意義不能重複引發，設立一個無明，就像一個芽不能再生一樣。用水沃灌。

【English Translation】 English version Question: All afflictions moisten karma. Why not just establish one like ignorance (Avidya, ignorance of the true nature of things), but separately distinguish between craving (Tanha, thirst, craving for sensual pleasures) and grasping (Upadana, clinging, clinging to existence)?

Treatise: Although all afflictions are vast, as the scriptures say.

Commentary: All afflictions can generate karma, but the power of ignorance is more powerful in generating karma than other afflictions because it possesses eleven superior characteristics, such as the object of perception, etc. This is the answer to the first question. Only ignorance is said to be the affliction that generates karma, as stated in the law of dependent origination. The eleven superior characteristics are: 1. Superiority of the object of perception: universally perceiving defiled and pure dharmas; 2. Superiority of characteristics: concealing the truth and revealing falsehood; 3. Superiority of cause and condition: the root of the generation of affliction and karma; 4. Superiority of arising: capable of initiating the arising of dependent origination dharmas such as that which can lead, that which is led, that which can produce, and that which is produced; 5. Superiority of transformation: the four transformations of latent tendencies, bonds, correspondence, and non-correspondence; 6. Superiority of wrong conduct: generating actions of increase and decrease towards the truth; 7. Superiority of characteristics: subtle self-characteristics universally transforming in common characteristics of love and non-love; 8. Superiority of action: acting as the basis of transmigration and as an obstacle to cessation; 9. Superiority of obstruction: obstructing superior dharmas and vast dharmas; 10. Superiority of following: even up to the peak of existence, it still follows; 11. Superiority of antidote: being counteracted by two kinds of wonderful wisdom. Therefore, it is not said that other afflictions are also called branches of generating karma.

Treatise: In the position of moistening karma, craving and grasping can irrigate.

Commentary: The answer is that craving and grasping are mentioned in the position of moistening karma. Although all afflictions can moisten life, the power of craving is particularly strong in moistening karma. How do we know this? Various treatises only say that the four cravings are the cause of suffering (Samudaya Satya). Moreover, the sacred teachings all say that craving is like water that can irrigate, so other afflictions are not mentioned.

Why is there only one ignorance (Avidya, ignorance of the true nature of things) for generating karma, but the afflictions that moisten life are divided into craving (Tanha, thirst, craving for sensual pleasures) and grasping (Upadana, clinging, clinging to existence)?

Treatise: It needs to be irrigated many times, so one ignorance is established.

Commentary: If the sprout of life is to grow, it must be irrigated many times, just like irrigating fields. Now, let's temporarily distinguish between craving and grasping based on the initial and final stages of craving. In reality, there are many manifest afflictions of craving. The eighth volume of the Ten Stages Sutra says that the increase of craving is called grasping. Therefore, the initial stage is called craving, and the later stage is called grasping. The meaning of generating karma cannot be repeatedly generated, so one ignorance is established, just like a sprout cannot be regenerated. Irrigating with water.

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潤時可言得數。

問前出取體通余煩惱。何故此處及十地等。說是愛增。

論。雖取支中至說是愛增。

述曰。據實取支攝諸煩惱。愛潤生勝說是愛增。非無餘惑。故瑜伽八十九云若能取。若所取。若所為取。皆名取故。

問諸緣起支若生此地。為皆此地。亦有他地　設爾何失　若唯此地。緣起上文當云何通。世尊何緣不說愛．取二種能生緣起與行為緣。世尊告曰。愛．取二種自界所行。有分齊故。所以者何。欲界愛．取與彼色界。或無色界諸不動行。為等起緣不應道理。非境界故。又言無明與離欲界或色界類能生緣起。作等起緣。又言如是無明。由此所起非理作意及果為伴。能為彼界不動行緣等。即異界無明為異界行緣等也。若得異界支後起異界支者。五十六說復云何通。諸有隨生何界何地。當知有支即此所攝。

論。諸緣起支至發上地行。

述曰。第六問也。諸緣起支皆依自地。同取五十六文。有所發行依他無明同取緣起。此如何等。應顯其事。為一為多。此唯有一。如下無明發上地行。

論。不爾初伏至猶未起故。

述曰。不許下無明發上地行者。初伏下地染所起未至上定。應非行支。要入彼根本定。離九品欲盡。后時方起彼地無明。爾時彼地無明猶未起故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 潤澤時機可以說已經成熟。 問：前面講到『取』（Upadana，執取）這一支涵蓋了所有煩惱，為什麼這裡以及十地等處，卻說『愛』（Trsna，愛慾）增長？ 論：雖然『取』這一支中……乃至說是『愛』增長。 述記：實際上，『取』這一支涵蓋了所有煩惱。但『愛』能潤澤生命，使其更旺盛，所以說是『愛』增長，並非沒有其他迷惑。因此，《瑜伽師地論》第八十九卷說：『能取、所取、為取』，都叫做『取』。 問：如果緣起支在此地生起，是都屬於此地，還是也有屬於其他地的？如果這樣設定，會有什麼過失？如果都屬於此地，那麼緣起上文該如何解釋？世尊為什麼不說『愛』、『取』這兩種能生的緣起，與『行』（Samskara，行業）為緣？世尊回答說：『愛』、『取』這兩種只在自己的界限內活動，有其侷限性。為什麼呢？因為欲界的『愛』、『取』與彼色界、或無色界的諸不動行，作為等起之緣是不合理的，因為不是同一境界。又說，無明（Avidya，無明）與離開欲界的，或者同類的，能生緣起，作為等起之緣。又說，這樣的無明，由此所起的非理作意以及果報為伴，能為彼界的不動行之緣等等。也就是說，異界的無明是異界的行之緣等等。如果得到異界的支后，又生起異界的支，那麼第五十六卷所說又該如何解釋呢？凡是隨生於何界何地，應當知道有支就屬於那裡。 論：諸緣起支……乃至引發上地之行。 述記：這是第六個問題。各種緣起支都依各自的所在地。同樣採用第五十六卷的說法，有所發行依他無明，同樣採用緣起。這又是什麼情況呢？應該闡明這件事。是一還是多？這裡只有一，如地獄的無明引發上地的行。 論：不是的，最初伏斷……乃至尚未生起之故。 述記：不允許地獄的無明引發上地的行。最初伏斷地獄染污所生，尚未到達上地禪定，應該不是行支。要進入彼根本定，離開九品欲盡之後，才生起彼地的無明。那時彼地的無明尚未生起。

【English Translation】 English version: The time for moistening can be said to have matured. Question: Earlier, it was said that 'Upadana' (grasping) encompasses all afflictions. Why is it said here and in the Ten Grounds (Dasabhumika), etc., that 'Trsna' (craving) increases? Treatise: Although 'Upadana' encompasses... up to saying that 'Trsna' increases. Commentary: In reality, 'Upadana' encompasses all afflictions. However, 'Trsna' moistens life, making it more vigorous, so it is said that 'Trsna' increases, not that there are no other delusions. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Chapter 89, says: 'That which can be grasped, that which is grasped, and that for which grasping is done' are all called 'Upadana'. Question: If a link of dependent origination (Pratityasamutpada) arises in this realm, does it all belong to this realm, or are there also those that belong to other realms? If this is posited, what fault would there be? If they all belong to this realm, then how should the previous text on dependent origination be explained? Why didn't the World-Honored One say that 'Trsna' and 'Upadana', these two productive dependent originations, are the condition for 'Samskara' (volitional formations)? The World-Honored One replied: 'Trsna' and 'Upadana' operate only within their own boundaries and have their limitations. Why? Because it is unreasonable for the 'Trsna' and 'Upadana' of the desire realm to be the conditioning cause for the unwavering actions of the form realm or the formless realm, as they are not the same sphere. Furthermore, it is said that 'Avidya' (ignorance) and those who have left the desire realm, or those of the same kind, can generate dependent origination and serve as the conditioning cause. It is also said that such 'Avidya', accompanied by irrational thinking and its consequences, can be the condition for the unwavering actions of that realm, and so on. That is to say, the 'Avidya' of a different realm is the condition for the 'Samskara' of a different realm, and so on. If, after obtaining a link from a different realm, a link from a different realm arises again, then how should what is said in Chapter 56 be explained? Wherever it arises, in whatever realm or ground, it should be known that the link belongs to that place. Treatise: All links of dependent origination... up to initiating actions in a higher ground. Commentary: This is the sixth question. All links of dependent origination rely on their respective locations. The statement in Chapter 56 is similarly adopted, that what is issued relies on other ignorance, and dependent origination is similarly adopted. What is the situation here? This matter should be clarified. Is it one or many? Here there is only one, such as lower realm ignorance initiating actions in a higher ground. Treatise: No, initially subduing... up to not yet arisen. Commentary: It is not permitted for lower realm ignorance to initiate actions in a higher ground. Initially subduing what is born of lower realm defilements, not yet reaching higher realm samadhi, should not be a link of action. One must enter that fundamental samadhi, and only after leaving the nine grades of desire completely, does the ignorance of that ground arise. At that time, the ignorance of that ground has not yet arisen.

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。彼有漏定應非行支。無無明支故。既名行支。明是無明所發　此意即顯五十六說依多分支說。經意通論。有依他地。亦無違也。此文可顯未至無惑。不得根本。竟不起故。但是下起。初起未至皆如此發。

論。從上下地至而起愛支。

述曰。此第七問。從上生下。從下生上。彼所能潤當生之愛。取其何地受支為緣。為當生地。為現居地。何意有此問。既受緣愛。現起受支與當生愛異地故。應如無明發行許異地成。為此問也。

論。彼愛亦緣至於理無違。

述曰。隨其所應。彼愛亦緣當生地受。若俱時現行受。若前時種子受。于理無違。此中言亦緣當生地受者。明自地死生自地愛定依同地。從異地生異地亦定依同地。故言亦也。又現居處受。亦為愛緣。如彼無明異地緣故。此非受支。有疏緣義　問發業之惑異地為緣。潤生之惑亦應異地　答發業是等起因。疏故通異地。潤生是生起因。親故唯自地　問受緣于愛疏通異地。行緣于識異地為緣　答受緣于愛為遠起因。疏故通異地。行緣于識是異熟因。親故唯自地　問何故識等。生等。開合不同。而行及有俱合為一　答業在引因造作名行。為愛．取潤轉名為有。無別體事。故互不開　問有若唯業如行唯一。有通非業何故不開　答有中雖通業與非業。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：那有漏的禪定不應該是行支（karma-formation, 業）嗎？因為它沒有無明支（ignorance, 無明）啊。既然它被稱為行支，那麼『明』（vidyā, 明）就是由無明所引發的。 答：這個意思就顯示了五十六種說法是依據多種分支來說的。經文的含義是普遍討論的，即使依據『依他起性』（paratantra-svabhāva, 依他起性），也沒有衝突。這段文字可以顯示，未至定（upacāra-samādhi, 近分定）沒有迷惑，因此無法獲得根本定（mūla-samādhi, 根本定），最終無法生起。但如果是從下地生起，最初生起的未至定都是如此引發的。

論：從上地或下地至而生起愛支（craving, 愛）。

述曰：這是第七個問題。從上界生到地獄，或者從地獄生到上界，那所能滋潤當生之愛的，是以哪個地的受支（feeling, 受）為緣？是當生之地，還是現在所居之地？為什麼會有這個問題？既然是受緣于愛，現在生起的受支與當生之愛處於不同地，應該像無明引發行業一樣，允許異地成就。因此有此一問。

論：那愛也緣于（當生地的受），在道理上沒有違背。

述曰：隨其所應，那愛也緣于當生地的受。無論是同時現行的受，還是前時的種子受，在道理上都沒有違背。這裡說『也緣當生地受』，表明從自地死亡而生於自地的愛，一定依據同地；從異地生於異地，也一定依據同地，所以說『也』。另外，現在所居之處的受，也可以作為愛的緣，就像那無明可以作為異地的緣一樣。但這並非受支，有疏遠的緣義。問：引發業的迷惑可以異地為緣，滋潤生的迷惑也應該異地為緣。答：引發業是等起因，關係疏遠，所以可以通於異地；滋潤生是生起因，關係親近，所以只能是自地。問：受緣于愛，關係疏遠，可以通於異地；行緣于識，可以異地為緣。答：受緣于愛是遠起因，關係疏遠，所以可以通於異地；行緣于識是異熟因，關係親近，所以只能是自地。問：為什麼識等、生等，開合不同，而行及有（becoming, 有）卻合併爲一？答：業在引發果報時，造作名為行；為愛、取（grasping, 取）所滋潤而轉變名為有，沒有別的實體，所以互相不分開。問：有如果僅僅是業，就像行一樣唯一，但有也通於非業，為什麼不分開？答：有中雖然包括業與非業。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: Shouldn't that contaminated concentration not be a karma-formation (行支, karma-formation)? Because it doesn't have the ignorance component (無明支, ignorance). Since it's called a karma-formation, then 'clarity' (明, vidyā) is caused by ignorance. Answer: This meaning shows that the fifty-six kinds of statements are based on multiple branches. The meaning of the scriptures is a general discussion, and even based on 'dependent origination' (依他起性, paratantra-svabhāva), there is no conflict. This passage can show that the access concentration (未至定, upacāra-samādhi) does not have delusion, so it cannot obtain the fundamental concentration (根本定, mūla-samādhi), and ultimately cannot arise. But if it arises from a lower realm, the initial access concentration arises in this way.

Treatise: From the upper or lower realms, craving (愛支, craving) arises.

Commentary: This is the seventh question. From the upper realm to the lower realm, or from the lower realm to the upper realm, which realm's feeling component (受支, feeling) is taken as the condition that can nourish the craving of the next life? Is it the realm of the next life, or the realm where one currently resides? Why is there this question? Since feeling is the condition for craving, the feeling component that arises now and the craving of the next life are in different realms, it should be allowed to be accomplished in different realms, just like ignorance causes karma. Therefore, there is this question.

Treatise: That craving is also conditioned by (the feeling of the next life), and there is no contradiction in principle.

Commentary: As appropriate, that craving is also conditioned by the feeling of the next life. Whether it is the feeling that arises simultaneously, or the seed feeling of the previous time, there is no contradiction in principle. Here, saying 'also conditioned by the feeling of the next life' indicates that the craving that dies in one's own realm and is born in one's own realm must be based on the same realm; the craving that is born in a different realm from a different realm must also be based on the same realm, so it is said 'also'. In addition, the feeling of the place where one currently resides can also be a condition for craving, just like that ignorance can be a condition for a different realm. But this is not the feeling component, it has a distant conditional meaning. Question: The delusion that causes karma can be conditioned by a different realm, so the delusion that nourishes birth should also be conditioned by a different realm. Answer: Causing karma is the equational cause, the relationship is distant, so it can be connected to a different realm; nourishing birth is the arising cause, the relationship is close, so it can only be one's own realm. Question: Feeling is conditioned by craving, the relationship is distant, so it can be connected to a different realm; karma-formation is conditioned by consciousness, can it be conditioned by a different realm? Answer: Feeling is conditioned by craving as a distant cause, the relationship is distant, so it can be connected to a different realm; karma-formation is conditioned by consciousness as a result of maturation, the relationship is close, so it can only be one's own realm. Question: Why are consciousness, etc., and birth, etc., opened and closed differently, while karma-formation and becoming (有, becoming) are combined into one? Answer: When karma causes retribution, the creation is called karma-formation; being nourished and transformed by craving and grasping (取, grasping) is called becoming, there is no other entity, so they are not separated from each other. Question: If becoming is only karma, as unique as karma-formation, but becoming also includes non-karma, why not separate it? Answer: Although becoming includes karma and non-karma.

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而俱近有後有果故義勢均平。總名為有。非唯如行無非業性故不開之　問何故未潤名行。潤已名有　答造作名行。初造義彰故。初名為行。有果名有。潤已方著故。后立有名　問何故業有三總合名行．有。惑潤但一愛。而分愛．取二　答一潤果不生。方分愛．取二。一業能感果合。立行．有名。

九定世破邪者。薩婆多等。二因五果。三因二果。定不同世。今此部中。

論。此十二支至各定同世。

述曰。前十支因。與后二支果。定不同世。以總異熟因。非造之身即受果故。亦非現業得果是十二支故。約身死生為世。十因二果決定不同。若約時分。此即不定。如后報業等過去造前七。次後身未熟今身不起愛．取。次身方起。後後生受果。豈非愛．取與生．老死。同在未來。故約大時分以說三世。義即不定今此所說約身生死以為世也　因中前七支。與愛．取．有。或異世。或同世。若順生受業。受初生時。其世必同。第二生已去。乃至后報業等。世不同也。今身造業至後後世將受果時方起愛．取故。薩婆多師愛．取．有三。與前七種中初二。定不同世。與次五種定得同世。於前世生．老死位中起惑造業故。今此中十二支定同世者。謂生．老死二。愛．取．有三。無明等前七。各定同世。由癡發業熏發

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為『俱近有』（kulajiva，臨終時的業）有『後有』（punarbhava，來世）和『果』（phala，結果），所以『義勢均平』（arha-samarthya-samata，意義和力量相等）。總的來說，這些都被稱為『有』（bhava，存在）。不僅僅像『行』（samskara，行為）那樣，沒有不是業的性質，所以沒有分開解釋。 問：為什麼沒有滋潤時稱為『行』，滋潤后稱為『有』？ 答：造作稱為『行』，因為最初造作的意義明顯。最初稱為『行』。有果稱為『有』，因為滋潤后才顯現，所以後來建立『有』這個名稱。 問：為什麼『業』（karma，行為）有三種總合起來稱為『行』和『有』，而『惑』（klesha，煩惱）滋潤卻只有『愛』（trsna，渴愛）？卻又分為『愛』和『取』（upadana，執取）兩種？ 答：只滋潤一次不能產生果，所以才分為『愛』和『取』兩種。一次『業』能夠感生果報，所以合起來建立『行』和『有』的名稱。

『九定世破邪者』（nava-sthavira-vipaksika，九種安立世間的破邪見者），如『薩婆多』（Sarvastivada，一切有部）等宗義。 二因五果，三因二果，『定』（niyata，決定）不同『世』（adhvan，時間）。現在此部中。 論：這十二支（dvadasanga，十二因緣）直到各自決定同『世』。 述曰：前面的十支『因』（hetu，原因），與後面的兩支『果』（phala，結果），決定不同『世』。因為總的『異熟因』（vipaka-hetu，異熟因），不是造作的身體立即就接受果報。也不是現在的業就能得到果報，這是十二支的緣故。以身死和出生作為『世』，十因和二果決定不同。如果按照時間劃分，這就不一定了。例如后報業等，過去造作前七支，下一個身體還沒有成熟，今生不起『愛』和『取』，下一個身體才生起。後後生接受果報。難道不是『愛』和『取』與『生』（jati，出生）、『老死』（jaramarana，衰老和死亡）同在未來嗎？所以按照大的時間劃分來說三世，意義就不一定了。現在這裡所說的是按照身體的生死作為『世』。 『因』中前面的七支，與『愛』、『取』、『有』，或者不同『世』，或者相同『世』。如果是順生受業，在接受初生時，它的『世』必定相同。第二個生以後，乃至后報業等，『世』就不同了。今生造業直到後後世將要接受果報時才生起『愛』和『取』的緣故。『薩婆多』師（Sarvastivada，一切有部）認為『愛』、『取』、『有』三種，與前面七種中的最初兩種，決定不同『世』。與後面的五種決定相同『世』。在前世的『生』、『老死』位中生起『惑』造作『業』的緣故。現在此中十二支決定相同『世』的，是指『生』、『老死』二，『愛』、『取』、『有』三，『無明』（avidya，無明）等前面的七支，各自決定相同『世』。由於愚癡引發『業』熏發。

【English Translation】 English version: Because 『kulajiva』 (俱近有, the karma at the moment of death) has 『punarbhava』 (後有, future existence) and 『phala』 (果, result), therefore 『arha-samarthya-samata』 (義勢均平, meaning and power are equal). Generally, these are all called 『bhava』 (有, existence). It's not just like 『samskara』 (行, formations), which has no nature that is not karma, so it is not explained separately. Question: Why is it called 『samskara』 when it is not moistened, and 『bhava』 when it is moistened? Answer: Creation is called 『samskara』 because the meaning of the initial creation is clear. It is initially called 『samskara』. Having a result is called 『bhava』 because it only appears after being moistened, so the name 『bhava』 is established later. Question: Why are three types of 『karma』 (業, action) combined and called 『samskara』 and 『bhava』, while the moistening of 『klesha』 (惑, affliction) is only 『trsna』 (愛, craving)? Why is it divided into 『trsna』 and 『upadana』 (取, grasping)? Answer: Moistening only once cannot produce a result, so it is divided into 『trsna』 and 『upadana』. One 『karma』 can cause a result, so it is combined to establish the names 『samskara』 and 『bhava』.

『nava-sthavira-vipaksika』 (九定世破邪者, the nine who establish the world and refute wrong views), such as the doctrines of 『Sarvastivada』 (薩婆多, the Sarvastivada school). Two causes and five results, three causes and two results, 『niyata』 (定, fixed) are different from 『adhvan』 (世, time). Now in this school. Treatise: These twelve 『dvadasanga』 (十二支, links of dependent origination) until each is determined to be in the same 『adhvan』. Commentary: The previous ten 『hetu』 (因, causes) are definitely different from the latter two 『phala』 (果, results). Because the general 『vipaka-hetu』 (異熟因, ripening cause) is not that the body that creates immediately receives the result. It is also not that the present karma can obtain the result, this is the reason for the twelve links. Taking the death and birth of the body as 『adhvan』, the ten causes and two results are definitely different. If divided according to time, this is not certain. For example, karma with later retribution, etc., the first seven links are created in the past, the next body has not yet matured, and 『trsna』 and 『upadana』 do not arise in this life, but arise in the next body. The subsequent lives receive the results. Isn't it that 『trsna』 and 『upadana』 are in the future together with 『jati』 (生, birth) and 『jaramarana』 (老死, aging and death)? Therefore, speaking of the three times according to the division of large time, the meaning is not certain. What is said here is taking the birth and death of the body as 『adhvan』. The previous seven links in the 『hetu』, and 『trsna』, 『upadana』, 『bhava』, are either in different 『adhvan』 or in the same 『adhvan』. If it is karma that is received in the order of birth, when receiving the initial birth, its 『adhvan』 must be the same. After the second birth, and even karma with later retribution, etc., the 『adhvan』 is different. Because the karma created in this life does not give rise to 『trsna』 and 『upadana』 until the subsequent lives when the result is to be received. The 『Sarvastivada』 (薩婆多) master believes that the three of 『trsna』, 『upadana』, and 『bhava』 are definitely different 『adhvan』 from the first two of the previous seven types. It is definitely the same 『adhvan』 as the latter five types. Because 『klesha』 arises and 『karma』 is created in the position of 『jati』 and 『jaramarana』 in the previous life. Now, the twelve links in this are definitely the same 『adhvan』, referring to the two of 『jati』 and 『jaramarana』, the three of 『trsna』, 『upadana』, and 『bhava』, and the previous seven links such as 『avidya』 (無明, ignorance), each is definitely the same 『adhvan』. Because ignorance initiates karma and causes it to be perfumed.

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報種必定同世。故前七支不得別世。起煩惱水潤先六種轉名為有。亦非異時。非起能潤隔世異時方成所潤。生及老死同世可知。故二．三．七各定同世。此即定世。十支是因。二支是果。因在過去。果或現在。或在未來。因在現在。果未來世一往而論。二世緣起。道理而言亦三世也。過去十因現在二果。未來二果現在十因。即是二世十二緣起。亦可言三世。一往二世不定故可三世。若前七在過去。愛．取．有三在現在。生．老死二在未來世。即十二支通三世有。即十二支或二世三世。別身造業。別身潤業。故不同小乘二因過去．五果現在．三因現在．二果未來。時分緣起決定如是。十地論第八卷。十二緣生。乃至經三世緣起。同小乘者。此翻譯謬今勘梵本。與瑜伽等同但言三際。謂從初際中際緣起。從中際后際緣起。非謂三世二在過去五現在．三現在．二未來等。彼經之釋世親所造。世親所造十二因緣論亦言三際。如瑜伽等。今三世者。此翻譯人意也。

論。如是十二至便致無窮。

述曰。十因．二果但是一重。因一果一故。非如小乘二世因．二世果．二重因果也。問小乘曰。何勞三世二重因果。小乘答曰。謂有外道撥無過．未說法自然．常我等生。愚三際故說有緣起。無前際故說諸法常。無後際故說諸

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 報種必定是同一世的。所以前面的七支不能是不同的世。生起煩惱之水滋潤先前的六種，轉變名稱為『有』（bhava，存在）。也不是不同的時間。不是生起煩惱的能潤隔了一世不同的時間才成就所潤。生和老死是同一世可以知道的。所以二、三、七各自確定是同一世。這就是確定的世。十支是因，二支是果。因在過去，果或者在現在，或者在未來。因在現在，果在未來世，這是一般的說法。二世的緣起，從道理上來說也是三世。過去的十因是現在的二果，未來的二果是現在的十因。這就是二世的十二緣起。也可以說是三世。一般說來是二世，不確定，所以可以是三世。如果前七支在過去，愛（trsna，渴愛）、取（upadana，執取）、有（bhava，存在）三支在現在，生（jati，生）和老死（jaramarana，老死）二支在未來世，那麼十二支就貫通三世而存在。即十二支或者二世或者三世。不同的身體造業，不同的身體滋潤業，所以不同於小乘的二因在過去、五果在現在、三因在現在、二果在未來。時分的緣起決定是這樣。《十地論》第八卷說，十二緣生，乃至經三世緣起，與小乘相同。這是翻譯的錯誤，現在勘查梵文版本，與《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）等相同，只是說三際，即從初際到中際的緣起，從中際到后際的緣起，不是說三世，二支在過去，五支在現在，三支在現在，二支在未來等。那部經的解釋是世親（Vasubandhu）所造。《世親所造十二因緣論》也說三際，如《瑜伽師地論》等。現在說三世，是翻譯人的意思。

論：像這樣十二支以致無窮。

述曰：十因、二果只是一重，因一果一的緣故。不像小乘的二世因、二世果，是二重因果。問小乘：何必有三世二重因果？小乘回答說：因為有外道否定過去和未來，說法是自然而有的，常我（atman，神我）等產生。愚昧於三際，所以說有緣起。沒有前際，所以說諸法是常。沒有後際，所以說諸

【English Translation】 English version The retribution of seeds must be in the same lifetime. Therefore, the preceding seven limbs cannot be in different lifetimes. The water of afflictions irrigates the preceding six seeds, transforming their name into 『bhava』 (existence). It is also not a different time. It is not that the afflictions that arise as irrigators accomplish what is irrigated after being separated by a different lifetime. Birth and old age and death being in the same lifetime can be known. Therefore, the second, third, and seventh are each determined to be in the same lifetime. This is the determined lifetime. The ten limbs are causes, and the two limbs are effects. The causes are in the past, and the effects are either in the present or in the future. The causes are in the present, and the effects are in the future lifetime; this is the general way of speaking. The dependent origination of two lifetimes, in terms of principle, is also three lifetimes. The ten causes of the past are the two effects of the present, and the two effects of the future are the ten causes of the present. This is the twelve links of dependent origination of two lifetimes. It can also be said to be three lifetimes. Generally speaking, it is two lifetimes, but it is not fixed, so it can be three lifetimes. If the first seven limbs are in the past, the three limbs of trsna (craving), upadana (grasping), and bhava (becoming) are in the present, and the two limbs of jati (birth) and jaramarana (old age and death) are in the future lifetime, then the twelve limbs pervade and exist in the three lifetimes. That is, the twelve limbs are either two lifetimes or three lifetimes. Different bodies create karma, and different bodies irrigate karma, so it is different from the Hinayana's two causes in the past, five effects in the present, three causes in the present, and two effects in the future. The dependent origination of time divisions is definitely like this. The eighth volume of the Dasabhumika-sutra says that the twelve links of dependent origination, and even the sutras on the dependent origination of three lifetimes, are the same as the Hinayana. This is a translation error. Now, examining the Sanskrit version, it is the same as the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, etc., but it only speaks of the three junctures, that is, the dependent origination from the initial juncture to the middle juncture, and the dependent origination from the middle juncture to the later juncture, not saying that the three lifetimes are two limbs in the past, five limbs in the present, three limbs in the present, and two limbs in the future, etc. The explanation of that sutra was created by Vasubandhu. Vasubandhu's Twelve Causes and Conditions Treatise also speaks of the three junctures, like the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, etc. Now, saying three lifetimes is the translator's intention.

Treatise: Thus, the twelve links lead to infinity.

Commentary: The ten causes and two effects are only one layer, because one cause leads to one effect. It is not like the Hinayana's two lifetimes of causes and two lifetimes of effects, which are two layers of cause and effect. Question to the Hinayana: Why bother with three lifetimes and two layers of cause and effect? The Hinayana replies: Because there are externalists who deny the past and future, saying that things arise naturally, and that the atman (self) and so on are produced. They are ignorant of the three junctures, so we say there is dependent origination. Without a prior juncture, they say that all dharmas are permanent. Without a later juncture, they say that all

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法斷。今說二因在過去。有過去世因業而生法。非自然常我等起。體非常住。有因所生。有未來二果。破法后斷。非即解脫。體輪轉故。現五果三因故。非自然起。後有因生。故說二重三世因果。今破之如我十二一重因果。足顯生死輪轉。非我自然等生體自解脫。及離斷．常。施設二重實為無益。說十支因。破法常我自然等生。有二果故非性解脫。過去為因法體非常。未來為果諸法非斷。現果。有因起。現因必招報。足顯輪轉及離斷．常。但說因果一重。即顯三世俱有。言因破常。言果破斷。故設二重實為無用。若言愚前際說過去二因。更有愚於前前際者。二因猶少。更應說因。有愚未來說二果者。更有愚於後后際者。二果未足。更應說果。故論說言或應過此。若但破斷常說一重因果已破常斷訖。即顯過去前前亦爾。今顯未來後後亦爾。何勞有二重說三世因果。若爾應更立便致無窮。既爾過此若更立之有無窮失。故說一重實為有用。

論。此十二支至名生等故。

述曰。自下第十諸門解釋。于中總有十七門釋。一假實門。九實三假。假者謂有．生．老死也。謂為愛．取已所潤行及識等五支。合前六支轉名有故。所潤六中。識等五種至現起時。謂四相中顯生．異．滅三相位別名生老死。體即識等。故有．生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 法斷（Dharma cessation）。現在說過去有兩個原因。有過去世的因業而生法（dharma），不是自然、常、我等產生的。本體不是恒常住的，是有因所生的。有未來二果。破法后斷，不是立即解脫，本體是輪轉的緣故。現在有五果三因，不是自然產生的，後有因生。所以說二重三世因果。現在破斥它，就像我的十二因緣一重因果，足以顯示生死輪轉，不是我、自然等產生，本體自己解脫，以及脫離斷滅和常恒。設定二重實際上沒有用處。說十支因，破斥法（dharma）的常、我、自然等產生。因為有二果，所以不是自性解脫。過去為因，法體不是恒常的。未來為果，諸法不是斷滅的。現在的結果，有因產生。現在的因，必定招致報應。足以顯示輪轉以及脫離斷滅和常恒。只說因果一重，就顯示三世都有。說因破斥常恒，說果破斥斷滅。所以設定二重實際上沒有用處。如果說愚昧於前際，說過去二因，更有愚昧於前前際的人，二因還少，更應該說因。有愚昧於未來，說二果的人，更有愚昧於後後際的人，二果不足，更應該說果。所以論中說，或許應該超過這些。如果只是破斥斷滅和常恒，說一重因果已經破斥了常斷，就顯示過去前前也是這樣。現在顯示未來後後也是這樣。何必有二重來說三世因果。如果這樣，應該再建立，就會導致無窮。既然這樣，超過這些如果再建立，就有無窮的過失。所以說一重實際上是有用的。

論（Treatise）。這十二支到名色（nama-rupa）、生（jati）等為止。

述曰（Commentary）。從下面第十個諸門解釋。其中總共有十七個門來解釋。一是假實門。九個是真實的，三個是虛假的。虛假的是指有（bhava）、生（jati）、老死（jaramarana）。說為愛（trsna）、取（upadana）已經潤澤的行為以及識（vijnana）等五支。合前六支轉名為有（bhava）的緣故。所潤澤的六支中，識（vijnana）等五種到現起的時候，說是四相中顯現生（jati）、異（anyathatva）、滅（nirodha）三個相位的差別，別名為生老死（jaramarana）。本體就是識（vijnana）等。所以有（bhava）、生（jati）

【English Translation】 English version Dharma cessation. Now it is said that there are two causes in the past. There are dharmas arising from past karmic causes, not from nature, permanence, self, etc. The substance is not eternally abiding, but is produced by causes. There are two future effects. Cessation after breaking the dharma is not immediate liberation, because the substance is revolving. Now there are five effects and three causes, not arising naturally, but caused by subsequent causes. Therefore, it is said that there are two layers of causes and effects in the three periods of time. Now refute it, just like my twelvefold single layer of causes and effects, which is sufficient to show the cycle of birth and death, not arising from self, nature, etc., the substance being liberated by itself, and being free from annihilation and permanence. Setting up two layers is actually useless. Saying the ten branches of causes, refutes the dharma's permanence, self, natural arising, etc. Because there are two effects, it is not self-nature liberation. The past is the cause, the substance of the dharma is not permanent. The future is the effect, all dharmas are not annihilated. The present result arises from causes. The present cause will surely bring retribution. It is sufficient to show the cycle and freedom from annihilation and permanence. Only saying one layer of causes and effects shows that all three periods of time exist. Saying cause refutes permanence, saying effect refutes annihilation. Therefore, setting up two layers is actually useless. If it is said that one is ignorant of the past, saying two causes in the past, there are even more ignorant people of the previous past, two causes are still few, more causes should be said. There are those who are ignorant of the future, saying two effects, there are even more ignorant people of the later future, two effects are not enough, more effects should be said. Therefore, the treatise says that perhaps it should exceed these. If only refuting annihilation and permanence, saying one layer of causes and effects has already refuted permanence and annihilation, it shows that the previous past is also like this. Now it shows that the later future is also like this. Why bother having two layers to say the causes and effects of the three periods of time. If so, it should be established again, which would lead to infinity. Since it is like this, exceeding these, if it is established again, there would be the fault of infinity. Therefore, saying one layer is actually useful.

Treatise. These twelve branches up to name-and-form (nama-rupa), birth (jati), etc.

Commentary. From the tenth of the following doors, explanations are given. Among them, there are a total of seventeen doors to explain. One is the door of false and real. Nine are real, and three are false. The false ones refer to becoming (bhava), birth (jati), old age and death (jaramarana). It is said that the actions and consciousness (vijnana) and other five branches that have been moistened by craving (trsna) and grasping (upadana). Combining the previous six branches, it is transformed into becoming (bhava). Among the six branches that are moistened, when the five kinds of consciousness (vijnana) etc. arise, it is said that the differences in the three phases of arising (jati), change (anyathatva), and cessation (nirodha) are manifested in the four characteristics, and are separately named old age and death (jaramarana). The substance is consciousness (vijnana) etc. Therefore, becoming (bhava), birth (jati)

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．老．死三是假也。增上之愛體異名取。更有餘惑為取支體故非是假。第十但云九實三假。五十六與此同。彼皆言有．生等假故。

論。五是一事至余非一事。

述曰。二一事非一事門。五是一事。如文可知。故知無明支唯無明為體。識唯本識　余非一事者。行通色．心故。取通余惑。餘者可知。第十但言五一事余非。此中別顯。有人釋云。五者謂取。不取識支。取唯愛增上故。此解不爾。便違聖教。

論。三唯是染至異熟果故。

述曰。三染不染門。若言染凈。凈唯善故亦通無記故言不染。第十云。于不染中善及無記別。故分二種。通名不染。三唯染謂無明．愛．取。煩惱性故。七唯不染。謂識等五。及生．老死。異熟性故。此約體性而為論也。

問若爾何故瑜伽第十云三染。余通二種。

論。七分位中至余通二種。

述曰。容起染故假說通染。非體染故名為染也　余通二種者。謂行．及有。行通善染。有亦通無記故。

論。無明愛取至余是雜相。

述曰。四獨雜分別門。無明．愛．取三支說名獨相。獨者此體為支。不與余支相交雜故。取中雖愛增上。非轉愛為增上貪故。又別有法故。余是雜相。謂行及識等五轉。名有及生等故。即有．生等亦名為雜。體

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『老』、『死』三種是假立的。增上之愛（Adhikadhipati-trsna，強烈的愛）的本體和異名是『取』（Upadana，執取）。因為還有其他的迷惑作為『取』支的本體，所以不是假立的。第十卷只說九個是真實的，三個是假立的。第五十六卷與此相同。他們都說有『生』（jati，出生）等是假立的。

論：五是一件事，其餘不是一件事。

述記：二、一件事與非一件事之門。五個是一件事，如文可知。所以知道無明支（Avidya，無明）只有無明為本體，識支（Vijnana，識）只有本識為本體。其餘不是一件事，『行』（Samskara，行）通於色（rupa，色蘊）、心（citta，心）。『取』通於其他的迷惑。其餘的可以知道。第十卷只說五個是一件事，其餘不是。這裡特別顯示。有人解釋說，五個是指『取』，不取識支。『取』只是愛的增上。這種解釋不對，就違背了聖教。

論：三個唯是染污，至於異熟果故。

述記：三、染污與不染污之門。如果說是染污與清凈，清凈唯是善，也通於無記，所以說不染污。第十卷說，在不染污中，善和無記有區別，所以分為兩種，統稱為不染污。三個唯是染污，指無明、愛（Trsna，愛）、取，因為是煩惱的性質。七個唯是不染污，指識等五個，以及生、老死，因為是異熟的性質。這是就體性而論。

問：如果這樣，為什麼《瑜伽師地論》第十卷說三個是染污，其餘通於兩種？

論：七個在分位中，至於其餘通於兩種。

述記：因為容許生起染污，所以假說通於染污，不是本體染污，所以名為染污。其餘通於兩種，指『行』以及『有』（bhava，有）。『行』通於善染，『有』也通於無記。

論：無明愛取，至於其餘是雜相。

述記：四、獨相與雜相分別之門。無明、愛、取三支說名為獨相。獨，是指此本體作為支，不與其餘的支相交雜。『取』中雖然愛是增上，不是轉愛為增上貪（lobha，貪）。又別有法故。其餘是雜相，指『行』以及識等五個轉，名為『有』以及『生』等。即『有』、『生』等也名為雜，本體。

【English Translation】 English version: 『Old age』 and 『death』 are three that are false. The essence and different names of Adhikadhipati-trsna (increased love) are 『Upadana』 (grasping). Because there are other delusions as the essence of the 『Upadana』 limb, it is not false. The tenth volume only says that nine are real and three are false. The fifty-sixth volume is the same as this. They all say that 『jati』 (birth) and others are false.

Treatise: Five are one thing, and the rest are not one thing.

Commentary: Two, the gate of one thing and not one thing. Five are one thing, as can be known from the text. Therefore, it is known that the Avidya (ignorance) limb only has ignorance as its essence, and the Vijnana (consciousness) limb only has the basic consciousness as its essence. The rest are not one thing; 『Samskara』 (formation) is connected to rupa (form) and citta (mind). 『Upadana』 is connected to other delusions. The rest can be known. The tenth volume only says that five are one thing, and the rest are not. This is specially revealed here. Some people explain that the five refer to 『Upadana』, not taking the consciousness limb. 『Upadana』 is only the increase of love. This explanation is not correct, and it violates the holy teachings.

Treatise: Three are only defiled, as for the result of different maturation.

Commentary: Three, the gate of defiled and undefiled. If it is said to be defiled and pure, pure is only good, and it is also connected to neutral, so it is said to be undefiled. The tenth volume says that in undefiled, there is a difference between good and neutral, so it is divided into two types, collectively called undefiled. Three are only defiled, referring to ignorance, Trsna (love), and Upadana, because they are of the nature of affliction. Seven are only undefiled, referring to the five of consciousness, etc., and birth, old age, and death, because they are of the nature of different maturation. This is discussed in terms of essence.

Question: If so, why does the tenth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra say that three are defiled, and the rest are connected to two types?

Treatise: Seven are in the division of positions, as for the rest, they are connected to two types.

Commentary: Because it allows the arising of defilement, it is falsely said to be connected to defilement, but it is not essentially defiled, so it is called defiled. The rest are connected to two types, referring to 『Samskara』 and 『bhava』 (existence). 『Samskara』 is connected to good and defiled, and 『bhava』 is also connected to neutral.

Treatise: Ignorance, love, and grasping, as for the rest, are mixed aspects.

Commentary: Four, the gate of distinguishing between unique and mixed aspects. The three limbs of ignorance, love, and grasping are said to be unique aspects. Unique means that this essence is a limb and does not mix with the other limbs. Although love is increased in 『Upadana』, it is not transforming love into increased lobha (greed). Also, there is a separate dharma. The rest are mixed aspects, referring to 『Samskara』 and the five of consciousness, etc., which are transformed and named 『bhava』 and 『birth』, etc. That is, 『bhava』, 『birth』, etc., are also called mixed, the essence.

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無異故。用他成故。第十但云三是獨相行等是雜相。

論。六唯非色至余通二種。

述曰。五色非色門。行通三業。名色五蘊。六處二蘊。六支名有。五蘊現行名生．老死故通二種。

論。皆是有漏至非有支故。

述曰。第六第七有漏有為無漏無為門。皆有漏有為。無漏逆生死斷生死。無為非是緣起義故。彼非起故。此對大眾．化地等說。不爾此門便為無用。

論。無明愛取至亦起善染。

述曰。八三性分別門。無明．愛．取三唯通不善．有覆無記。無明欲界唯是不善。對法雲若欲界系分別起者。唯不善攝。愛．取欲界亦通不善．無記二性。潤生有覆經論誠文。欲界四取說是不善。誠證非一。上界此三皆唯無記　問若爾取中既通四取。如何乃言修道惑正潤。見惑助潤。豈有取支名助閏也　答彼是助潤合名取支　問何妨亦應助發惑者合名無明　答齊解亦得。今此但據正發之惑。論說亦得文影故也。以前準后故。又不齊解。發業無重但一發。唯可舉一正發惑。潤生通明數數。潤是故通取助潤生。行支唯通善惡不通無記。無記不感果故。有通三性。行等六支合為有故。余識等五．生．老死七。唯無記性。異熟性故。分位之中亦起善染。大論第十云。四唯雜染。余通染凈。謂無明．愛．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 沒有其他原因。因為其他原因的緣故。第十（卷）只是說三（支）是單獨起作用的，等等是混合起作用的。

論：六（處）唯獨不是色（蘊），其餘的通於兩種（蘊）。

述曰：五色非色門。（前）五（支）是色（蘊），非色（蘊）門。（十二）行（支）通於三業（身語意）。名色（支）是五蘊（色受想行識）。六處（支）是二蘊（受想）。六支（行、識、名色、六處、觸、受）是名有（支）。五蘊（色受想行識）現行叫做生、老、死，所以通於兩種（蘊）。

論：都是有漏的，乃至不是有支的緣故。

述曰：第六第七（門）是有漏有為、無漏無為門。都是有漏有為。（無漏）逆生死（流轉），斷生死（輪迴）。無為不是緣起的意義，因為它不是（緣）起（的）。這是對大眾部、化地部等說的。不然這個門就沒有用了。

論：無明、愛、取（支），乃至也生起善和染。

述曰：第八（門）是三性分別門。無明（支）、愛（支）、取（支）三者只通于不善、有覆無記。（其中）無明（支）在欲界唯獨是不善。（《對法論》）說如果欲界系（的煩惱）分別生起，唯獨被不善所攝。愛（支）、取（支）在欲界也通於不善、無記二性。潤生（的力量）是有覆（的），經論里有明確的文句。欲界的四取（欲取、見取、戒禁取、我語取）說是（屬於）不善，明確的證據不止一個。（無色）上界這三者都只是無記。（問：）如果這樣，取（支）中既然通於四取，為什麼說修道（所斷的）惑是正潤（生），見惑是助潤（生）？難道有取支叫做助潤（生）嗎？（答：）那是助潤（生）合起來叫做取支。（問：）為什麼不能也把助發惑（煩惱）的（無明）合起來叫做無明（支）？（答：）這樣理解也可以。現在這裡只是根據正發（業）的惑（煩惱）。論里說也可以，是文句的影子。以前面的（解釋）為標準，推斷後面的（情況）。又，不這樣理解也可以。發業（的力量）沒有重複，只（有）一個發（業），只可以說一個正發（業）的惑（煩惱）。潤生（的力量）通於明數數（重複）。潤（生）是這樣，所以通於取（支）助潤生（的力量）。行（支）只通于善惡，不通於無記。因為無記不感果報。有（支）通於三性（善、惡、無記）。行等六支合起來叫做有（支）的緣故。其餘的識等五（支）、生老死七（支），只是無記性，因為是異熟性。在分位之中也生起善和染。《大論》第十（卷）說，四（支）只是雜染，其餘的通於染和凈。所謂無明（支）、愛（支）。

【English Translation】 English version There is no other reason. It is because of other reasons. The tenth (chapter) only says that three (links) act independently, and so on, are mixed in their actions.

Treatise: The six (sense bases) are uniquely not form (skandha), the rest are common to two (skandhas).

Commentary: The five form non-form gate. The (previous) five (links) are form (skandha), the non-form gate. (The twelfth) action (link) is common to the three karmas (body, speech, and mind). Name and form (link) is the five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness). The six sense bases (link) are the two skandhas (feeling, perception). The six links (action, consciousness, name and form, six sense bases, contact, sensation) are called existence (link). The five skandhas (form, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness) manifesting are called birth, old age, and death, so they are common to two (skandhas).

Treatise: All are with outflows, up to the reason of not being an existence link.

Commentary: The sixth and seventh (gates) are the gates of with outflows and conditioned, without outflows and unconditioned. All are with outflows and conditioned. (Without outflows) reverses the flow of birth and death, cuts off birth and death (samsara). The unconditioned is not the meaning of dependent origination, because it does not arise (from conditions). This is said to the Mahasanghika, Haimavata, etc. Otherwise, this gate would be useless.

Treatise: Ignorance, craving, grasping (links), up to also arising good and defiled.

Commentary: The eighth (gate) is the gate of distinguishing the three natures. Ignorance (link), craving (link), grasping (link) are only common to unwholesome, obscured and unspecified. (Among them) ignorance (link) in the desire realm is uniquely unwholesome. (The Abhidharma says) if afflictions of the desire realm arise through discrimination, they are uniquely included in the unwholesome. Craving (link), grasping (link) in the desire realm are also common to unwholesome and unspecified two natures. The power of moistening rebirth is obscured, there are clear statements in the sutras and treatises. The four graspings (desire grasping, view grasping, precept and vow grasping, self-assertion grasping) of the desire realm are said to be (belonging to) unwholesome, there is more than one clear evidence. In the (form and formless) upper realms, these three are all only unspecified. (Question:) If so, since grasping (link) is common to the four graspings, why is it said that the afflictions severed by the path of cultivation are the direct moisteners of rebirth, and the afflictions of views are the assisting moisteners of rebirth? Is there a grasping link called the assisting moistener of rebirth? (Answer:) That is the assisting moistener of rebirth combined is called the grasping link. (Question:) Why can't the (ignorance) that assists in arising afflictions also be combined and called ignorance (link)? (Answer:) Understanding it this way is also acceptable. Now this is only based on the afflictions that directly cause (karma). It can also be said in the treatise, it is a shadow of the text. Use the previous (explanation) as the standard to infer the later (situation). Also, it is also acceptable not to understand it this way. The power of causing karma is not repeated, there is only one causing (karma), only one affliction that directly causes (karma) can be spoken of. The power of moistening rebirth is common to repeated numbers. Moistening rebirth is like this, so it is common to the power of grasping (link) assisting in moistening rebirth. Action (link) is only common to good and evil, not common to unspecified. Because unspecified does not cause karmic results. Existence (link) is common to the three natures (good, evil, unspecified). The reason is that the six links of action, etc., combined are called existence (link). The remaining five links of consciousness, etc., and the seven links of birth, old age, and death, are only of unspecified nature, because they are of the nature of resultant maturation. Within the phases, good and defiled also arise. The tenth (chapter) of the Great Treatise says that four (links) are only mixed defilement, the rest are common to defilement and purity. So-called ignorance (link), craving (link).

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取．老死四唯染。老死起憂悲。假說為染。此中克性。彼唯異熟。故不相違。余通染凈者。此中會云。七分位中。起善．染故。非體性也。五果支約當生處說分位故。老死由二義。一分位中起染。二多起憂悲故也。

論。雖皆通三界而有分有全。

述曰。九三界門。十二皆通三界。雖皆通三界。而有分有全。欲界攝十二全。色．無色界攝十二少分。所以者何。欲界通染凈。名色具五蘊。六處具諸識等。乃至受中具四受等。色．無色界則不如是。染一向無。無色無色等。及無三受等故。以憂受非報。此中不論。故大論第十云。欲界具一切支。和合等起故。色．無色一切一分。彼有老者。如前已說。

論。上地行支至而起彼故。

述曰。十能所治門。上地行支能伏下地。何謂上行支。粗．苦等六種行相。此通色．無色。有求上生而起彼行支故。謂觀地獄十二支為粗．苦．障。觀上界一切為靜．妙．離。即上地行支。下無明所發。故言上行支斷下一切以下一切為境界故。雖緣上一切。能緣行相但是行支。故說依上行斷地獄支　問諸心心所皆有行相。何故六行獨名行相　答行相謂見分。如先已說。即心心所無不有之。然今六行體即惠數。簡擇用增偏言行相。如十六行相。故無有失。此六行相如瑜伽及

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『取』、『老死』這四個支是染污的。『老死』會引起憂愁和悲傷，可以假立為染污。在這四個支中，只有『異熟』是克性的，因此不矛盾。其餘的支既能通於染污，也能通於清凈。這裡會說到，在七個分位中，會生起善和染污，但這不是它們的體性。五果支是就當生之處的分位來說的。『老死』由兩個含義：一是分位中會生起染污，二是多會引起憂愁和悲傷。

論：雖然都通於三界，但有部分和全部的區別。

述曰：在九三界門中，十二支都通於三界。雖然都通於三界，但有部分和全部的區別。欲界包含十二支的全部，色界和無色界包含十二支的少部分。為什麼呢？因為欲界通於染污和清凈，『名色』具足五蘊，『六處』具足諸識等等，乃至『受』中具足四受等等。而色界和無色界則不是這樣，染污一向沒有，無色界沒有色等等，以及沒有三種受等等。因為憂受不是果報，這裡不討論。所以《大論》第十卷說，欲界具足一切支，和合等起。色界和無色界一切都是一部分，他們有老，如前面已經說過。

論：上地所行的支能制伏下地，所以能生起。

述曰：在十能所治門中，上地所行的支能制伏下地。什麼是上行支呢？就是粗、苦等六種行相。這通於色界和無色界。因為有求上生的人，會生起這些行支。就是觀察地獄的十二支為粗、苦、障，觀察上界的一切為靜、妙、離，這就是上地行支。下地的無明所引發的，所以說上行支能斷下地的一切，因為以下地的一切為境界。雖然緣于上地的一切，但能緣的行相只是行支。所以說依靠上行斷地獄支。問：諸心心所都有行相，為什麼六行獨名行相？答：行相是指見分，如先前已經說過。即心心所沒有不具有的。然而現在六行的體性就是慧數（Prajna-samkhya），簡擇的作用增強，所以偏說行相。如十六行相。所以沒有過失。這六行相如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）及

【English Translation】 English version: 'Taking' (Upadana), 'old age and death' (Jara-marana) are the four branches that are defiled. 'Old age and death' give rise to sorrow and grief, and can be hypothetically established as defiled. Among these four branches, only 'resultant feeling' (Vipaka) is definitive, so there is no contradiction. The remaining branches can be both defiled and pure. It is said here that in the seven divisions, good and defiled states arise, but this is not their nature. The five fruit branches are spoken of in terms of the divisions of the place where one is to be born. 'Old age and death' have two meanings: first, defilement arises in the divisions; second, they often give rise to sorrow and grief.

Treatise: Although all penetrate the three realms, there are partial and complete aspects.

Commentary: In the nine three-realm gates, all twelve branches penetrate the three realms. Although all penetrate the three realms, there are partial and complete aspects. The desire realm (Kama-dhatu) includes all twelve branches completely, while the form realm (Rupa-dhatu) and formless realm (Arupa-dhatu) include only a portion of the twelve branches. Why? Because the desire realm is both defiled and pure. 'Name and form' (Nama-rupa) possesses the five aggregates (Skandhas), 'six sense bases' (Sadayatana) possesses the various consciousnesses (Vijnana), and so on, even 'feeling' (Vedana) possesses the four types of feeling. The form and formless realms are not like this; defilement is always absent, the formless realm lacks form, and lacks three types of feeling, and so on. Because sorrowful feeling is not a result, it is not discussed here. Therefore, the tenth volume of the Great Treatise says that the desire realm possesses all the branches, arising in combination. The form and formless realms are all partial; they have old age, as previously stated.

Treatise: The branches practiced in the higher realms can subdue the lower realms, so they can arise.

Commentary: In the ten gates of what can subdue and what is subdued, the branches practiced in the higher realms can subdue the lower realms. What are the higher branches? They are the six aspects of coarseness, suffering, and so on. These penetrate the form and formless realms. Because there are those who seek to be born in the higher realms, they will generate these branches. That is, they observe the twelve branches of the lower realms as coarse, suffering, and obstructive, and observe everything in the higher realms as tranquil, wonderful, and detached. These are the branches of the higher realms. The ignorance of the lower realms gives rise to this, so it is said that the higher branches can cut off everything in the lower realms, because they take everything in the lower realms as their object. Although they are related to everything in the higher realms, the aspects that can be related to are only the branches. Therefore, it is said that relying on the higher practice cuts off the branches of the lower realms. Question: All mental states and mental factors have aspects, why are the six aspects uniquely called aspects? Answer: Aspects refer to the seeing-portion (Darsana-bhaga), as previously stated. That is, all mental states and mental factors possess them. However, the nature of the six aspects is the number of wisdom (Prajna-samkhya), and the function of discernment is enhanced, so they are specifically called aspects, like the sixteen aspects. Therefore, there is no fault. These six aspects are as described in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and

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別抄說。瑜伽論第十說。頗有依支得離支耶。答有。謂依上地支離下地支。此但一分非全。唯暫時非究竟。非十二支各少分能。但一行支能故言一少分。上無明．愛．取惑性。有是所潤業性非現業性。識等．生等異熟無記故。非能治道。既爾唯行說能離支。是有漏故唯暫時。非無漏故非畢竟。

論。一切皆唯至非有支攝。

述曰。十一學等分別門。一切唯非學非無學。有學．無學者。流轉相違故。聖者所起有漏善業。以無漏明而為緣故。違有支故。非有支攝。大論第十云十二皆非有學及無學。唯非學非無學攝。彼論問言。彼所有善有漏支。何故非學。答墮流轉故名為支。若學所有善有漏法。彼與流轉相違。及用明為緣。故非支攝　有人解云。今大乘既取善法欲已去名學故。內法異生髮心已去。皆不發總報業。皆非無明發。皆非行支者。不然。緣起下云。外法異生具四無明發行。內法異生若放逸者。彼除一種不共無明。餘三無明為緣生行。內法異生若不放逸。及聖有學。三無明為緣雖引非福行。此行不能招三惡趣。我不說為無明緣行。卻證前文能引支中。云別助當業皆非行支。又不放逸內法異生。若造福行及不動行。彼是正法如理作意心之所引發。解脫為依。乃至廣云。雖于善趣感殊勝生。而非無明起增上

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 別抄說。《瑜伽師地論》第十說：『是否有依靠某個支分而脫離另一個支分的可能？』 回答是：『有。』即依靠上地（更高層次的境界）的支分而脫離下地（較低層次的境界）的支分。但這只是一部分，不是全部；只是暫時的，不是究竟的；不是十二支各自少分的功能，而只是一行支的功能，所以說是『一少分』。上地沒有無明（avidyā，對事物真相的迷惑和無知）、愛（trsna，渴愛，對感官享受的強烈慾望）、取（upadana，執取，對慾望對象的強烈抓住不放）的惑性，有的是所潤業性（被煩惱滋潤的業力），不是現業性（當下的業力）。識（vijnana，意識）、生（jati，出生）等是異熟無記（異時成熟的非善非惡的果報），所以不能作為能對治的道。既然如此，只有行（samskara，行，意志行為）才能說是脫離支分。因為是有漏（sasrava，有煩惱）的，所以只是暫時的；因為不是無漏（anasrava，無煩惱）的，所以不是畢竟的。

論：『一切都只是至非有支所攝。』

述曰：十一學等分別門。一切唯非學非無學。有學（saiksa，還在學習的聖者）、無學者（asiksa，已經完成學習的聖者）。流轉相違故。聖者所起有漏善業。以無漏明而為緣故。違有支故。非有支攝。大論第十云十二皆非有學及無學。唯非學非無學攝。彼論問言。彼所有善有漏支。何故非學。答墮流轉故名為支。若學所有善有漏法。彼與流轉相違。及用明為緣。故非支攝　有人解云。今大乘既取善法欲已去名學故。內法異生髮心已去。皆不發總報業。皆非無明發。皆非行支者。不然。緣起下云。外法異生具四無明發行。內法異生若放逸者。彼除一種不共無明。餘三無明為緣生行。內法異生若不放逸。及聖有學。三無明為緣雖引非福行。此行不能招三惡趣。我不說為無明緣行。卻證前文能引支中。云別助當業皆非行支。又不放逸內法異生。若造福行及不動行。彼是正法如理作意心之所引發。解脫為依。乃至廣云。雖于善趣感殊勝生。而非無明起增上

【English Translation】 English version: According to the commentary, the tenth section of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Is it possible to rely on one limb to detach from another limb?' The answer is: 'Yes.' That is, relying on the limbs of a higher plane (a higher state of existence) to detach from the limbs of a lower plane (a lower state of existence). But this is only a part, not the whole; it is only temporary, not ultimate; it is not the function of each small part of the twelve limbs, but only the function of one line of limbs, so it is said to be 'one small part.' The higher plane does not have the delusive nature of ignorance (avidyā, delusion and ignorance of the true nature of things), craving (trsna, thirst, intense desire for sensory pleasures), and grasping (upadana, clinging, intense clinging to desired objects), but it has the nature of karma that is nourished (karma that is nourished by afflictions), not the nature of present karma (current karma). Consciousness (vijnana, consciousness), birth (jati, birth), etc., are the result of maturation that is neither good nor evil (vipaka-avyakrta, the result of maturation that is neither good nor evil), so they cannot be used as a means of treatment. Since this is the case, only action (samskara, action, volitional activity) can be said to detach from the limbs. Because it is defiled (sasrava, with afflictions), it is only temporary; because it is not undefiled (anasrava, without afflictions), it is not ultimately so.

Treatise: 'Everything is only included in the non-existence limb.'

Commentary: The eleven trainings and other distinctions. Everything is only neither a learner nor a non-learner. A learner (saiksa, a saint who is still learning) and a non-learner (asiksa, a saint who has completed learning). Because they are contrary to transmigration. The meritorious defiled karma produced by a saint. Because it takes undefiled wisdom as its condition. Because it is contrary to the existence limb. It is not included in the existence limb. The tenth section of the Great Treatise says that all twelve are neither learners nor non-learners. They are only included in neither learners nor non-learners. That treatise asks, 'Why are all the meritorious defiled limbs not learners?' The answer is, 'Because they fall into transmigration, they are called limbs. If all the meritorious defiled dharmas of a learner. They are contrary to transmigration. And they use wisdom as their condition. Therefore, they are not included in the limbs.' Some people explain that the Mahayana now takes the desire for meritorious dharmas as learning. From the time that an ordinary being of the inner dharma generates the mind. They do not generate karma that produces a general retribution. They are not generated by ignorance. They are not action limbs. That is not the case. The section on dependent origination says that ordinary beings of the outer dharma have four kinds of ignorance that generate action. If an ordinary being of the inner dharma is negligent. They exclude one kind of uncommon ignorance. The remaining three kinds of ignorance are the conditions for generating action. If an ordinary being of the inner dharma is not negligent. And a saintly learner. Although the three kinds of ignorance lead to non-meritorious action. This action cannot lead to the three evil destinies. I do not say that action is conditioned by ignorance. But it proves that in the previous text, among the limbs that can lead to it. It says that separate assistance for the karma to be done is not an action limb. And an ordinary being of the inner dharma who is not negligent. If they create meritorious action and immovable action. They are generated by the mind of the right dharma and appropriate attention. Relying on liberation. Even though they experience superior births in good destinies. They are not generated by ignorance.

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緣。乃至諸聖有學。不共無明已永斷故。不造新業。乃至應知內法有學。不緣無明更造諸行。經既唯言聖不造業。不共無明種已斷故。又云內法不放逸者造福．不動。明知善法欲已去。皆猶造行支。然如抉擇分善。雖無別文定釋感總．別報。且同小乘一說唯感別報。可非行支非正引故。雖言不放逸造福行等非無明發。而言聖者不共種斷故不造行。明知不放逸者言無。但是不起現行不共。及現相應發。而有種子不共相應發亦無爽。不爾彼福．不動應不名行。亦不可唯言聖不造業故。對法第七云。未見諦者雖起善等。由彼隨眠所隨縛故。亦名愚癡。由彼勢力。於三界苦。不如實知。便能發起後有因性福．不動行。非已見諦能發此業。無真實義愚故。是故彼業說因於此真實義愚生。

論。由此應知至不迷求故。

述曰。以此證知。聖必不造感後有業　何意不造。於後苦果不迷求故。不迷故知可厭。不求故不欣生。不共無明種已斷故。彼已無漏明為緣故。諸學有漏定非行支。

問若爾雜修五凈居業。豈非行支。若是者聖便造業。若非者。如何生彼感總報也。

論。雜修靜慮至於理無違。

述曰。不還果等。雜修第四靜慮。資下無雲等三天故業。生凈居等。于理無違。此總報業及名言種。凡夫時

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：緣。乃至諸聖者中的有學者（Saints with learning），因為不再與無明（ignorance）相應，已經永遠斷除了無明，所以不再造新的業（karma）。乃至應該知道，內法（inner dharma）中的有學者，不再因為無明而造作諸行（activities）。經文中只說聖者不造業，是因為不再與無明的種子相應，已經斷除了。又說內法中不放逸（non-negligence）的人造福（merit）、不動（immovable）。明確知道善法（wholesome dharma）的慾望已經去除，都仍然在造作諸行。然而，比如抉擇分善（definitive wholesome），雖然沒有特別的經文確定解釋它所感得的總報（general retribution）和別報（specific retribution），但可以和小乘（Hinayana）的一種說法相同，只感得別報，因為它不是諸行的分支，也不是正引（directly leading）。雖然說不放逸造福行等，不是由無明引發，但說聖者不再與無明的種子相應，所以不造作諸行。明確知道不放逸的人所說的沒有，只是不起現行（manifestation），不與不共（uncommon）以及現行相應而引發。而有種子不與不共相應而引發，也沒有什麼不妥。不然的話，那些福、不動就不應該叫做行。也不可以只說聖者不造業。對法（Abhidharma）第七卷說，沒有見諦（seen the truth）的人，即使生起善等，因為被隨眠（latent afflictions）所束縛，也叫做愚癡（ignorance）。由於隨眠的力量，對於三界（three realms）的苦，不如實知（not truly knowing），便能發起後有（future existence）的因性的福、不動行。不是已經見諦的人能夠發起這種業，因為沒有真實義的愚癡。所以說那種業的因，是由於對於真實義的愚癡而生起的。

論：由此應該知道，以至於不迷惑地追求的緣故。

述曰：用這個來證明，聖者必定不造感得後有的業。為什麼不造？因為對於後來的苦果不迷惑地追求。不迷惑，所以知道是可厭惡的。不追求，所以不欣喜于出生。因為不再與無明的種子相應，他們已經以無漏（without outflows）的智慧為緣。所以諸有學者的有漏（with outflows）的禪定不是諸行的分支。

問：如果這樣，雜修（mixed practice）五凈居天（Pure Abodes）的業，難道不是諸行的分支嗎？如果是，那麼聖者就造業了。如果不是，那麼如何生到那裡感得總報呢？

論：雜修靜慮，至於理無違。

述曰：不還果（Anagamin）等，雜修第四靜慮，憑藉下方的無雲等三天（three heavens），因此造業，生到凈居天等，在道理上沒有違背。這種總報的業以及名言種（name and form seeds），是凡夫（ordinary people）的時候。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Condition.' Even the Saints with learning, because they are no longer associated with ignorance, have permanently severed ignorance, therefore they no longer create new karma. Furthermore, it should be known that the learners in the inner dharma no longer create activities due to ignorance. The sutra only says that Saints do not create karma because they are no longer associated with the seeds of ignorance, which have been severed. It also says that those who are non-negligent in the inner dharma create merit and immovability. It is clear that the desire for wholesome dharma has been removed, but they are still creating activities. However, for example, definitive wholesome, although there is no specific sutra that definitively explains the general retribution and specific retribution it brings, it can be the same as one saying in Hinayana, only bringing specific retribution, because it is not a branch of activities, nor is it directly leading. Although it is said that non-negligence creates merit and immovable activities, it is not initiated by ignorance, but it is said that Saints are no longer associated with the seeds of ignorance, so they do not create activities. It is clear that what is said of those who are non-negligent is only that they do not manifest, and are not associated with the uncommon and the manifest. And there is nothing wrong with the seeds being initiated without being associated with the uncommon. Otherwise, those merit and immovable activities should not be called activities. Nor can it only be said that Saints do not create karma. The seventh volume of Abhidharma says that those who have not seen the truth, even if they generate goodness, etc., are also called ignorance because they are bound by latent afflictions. Due to the power of latent afflictions, they do not truly know the suffering of the three realms, and can then initiate the merit and immovable activities that are the cause of future existence. It is not that those who have already seen the truth can initiate this karma, because there is no ignorance of true meaning. Therefore, it is said that the cause of that karma arises from ignorance of true meaning.

Treatise: From this, it should be known that it is because of not being deluded in seeking.

Commentary: Use this to prove that Saints certainly do not create karma that brings future existence. Why do they not create it? Because they are not deluded in seeking the suffering results of the future. Not being deluded, they know it is detestable. Not seeking, they do not rejoice in birth. Because they are no longer associated with the seeds of ignorance, they already have un-outflowed wisdom as their condition. Therefore, the outflowed samadhi of the learners is not a branch of activities.

Question: If so, is the karma of mixed practice of the Five Pure Abodes not a branch of activities? If it is, then the Saints create karma. If it is not, then how do they get to be born there and receive general retribution?

Treatise: Mixed practice of samadhi, as for the principle, there is no contradiction.

Commentary: Anagamin, etc., mixed practice of the fourth samadhi, relying on the three heavens below, such as the Cloudless Heaven, therefore create karma, and are born in the Pure Abodes, etc., in principle there is no contradiction. This karma of general retribution and the seeds of name and form are from when they were ordinary people.

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已造生第四禪下三天業。一地系故。後由無漏資此故業生凈居天。非聖者新造也　既異處受云何名為不動。以定住境名為不動。非不易處受名為不動。對法雖言不可轉令異界地受名為不動。然約多分。除此雜修。及生自在宮者。所餘凡聖皆無此事　又非異界地趣受名不動。彼同地故。前解唯定地名不動即通一切。若不異處受名不動。從多分說。如地獄業不可改轉。仍許轉重為輕。阿羅漢身受。從多分說者。此亦應爾　凈居等者。等取第十地大自在宮。瑜伽第四．對法第六．十地論等說。凈居之上有自在宮。第十地菩薩當生其處感彼第八等。此亦凡時故業。由無漏定有資而得生彼。故致等言。◎

◎論。有義無明至後有業故。

述曰。十二三斷門。此有二義。初師一切發業無明。唯見所斷。要迷諦理之無明。行相增能發行故。此為一因。又經論皆言聖必不造後有業故。是第二因。若無明修所斷。應聖者更造業。對法第七說二種愚皆見斷故。言已見諦。無真實義愚故。不造福．不動行　有人解云。異熟愚修道斷。真實義愚見道斷　此理不然。緣起下云。外道異生由四無明發行。具造非福等三種業。內法異生除不共餘三無明緣行。不放逸者行。非無明為緣。且對法雲。異熟愚發非福行。真實義愚發福。不動行。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：已造作了第四禪以下三天的業，因為屬於同一地界。後來由於無漏智慧資助此故業，而得以往生凈居天（色界第四禪天中的五凈居天），並非聖者新造的業。既然在不同的地方受報，為什麼稱為『不動』呢？因為以禪定住於一境而名為『不動』，並非指不在不同的地方受報而名為『不動』。《阿毗達磨對法論》雖然說不可轉變令在不同的界地受報名為『不動』，然而是就大多數情況而言。除了這種雜修，以及往生自在宮（指色界頂的大自在天宮）的情況，其餘的凡夫和聖者都沒有這種情況。又，並非在不同的界地趣向受報名為『不動』，因為他們屬於同一地界。前面的解釋說只有禪定地才名為『不動』，這可以通用於一切情況。如果不異處受報名為『不動』，那是從大多數情況來說的，就像地獄業不可改變轉變一樣。仍然允許轉重為輕，阿羅漢之身受報，也是從大多數情況來說的。『凈居等』，『等』字包括了第十地的大自在宮。瑜伽師地論第四卷、《阿毗達磨對法論》第六卷、《十地論》等都說，在凈居天之上還有自在宮。第十地菩薩應當往生到那個地方，感受那裡的第八地等。這也是凡夫時期的故業，由於無漏禪定的資助而得以往生到那裡，所以才用『等』字。 論：有義是由於無明而造作了導致後有的業。 述記說：十二緣起和三斷門。這裡有兩種解釋。第一種觀點認為，一切引發業的無明，都是見所斷的。必須是迷惑諦理的無明，其行相增強才能引發業，這是第一個原因。而且經論都說聖者必定不會造作導致後有的業，這是第二個原因。如果無明是修所斷的，那麼聖者就應該會再次造業。《阿毗達磨對法論》第七卷說兩種愚癡都是見所斷的，因為說是已經見諦，沒有真實的意義上的愚癡，所以不造作福業和不動業。有人解釋說，異熟愚是修道所斷的，真實義愚是見道所斷的。這個道理是不對的。緣起下文說，外道異生由於四種無明而引發行為，具足造作非福業等三種業。內法異生除了不共無明之外，其餘三種無明緣於行，不放逸者行，不是以無明為緣。而且《對法論》說，異熟愚引發非福業，真實義愚引發福業和不動業。

【English Translation】 English version: The karma of the lower three heavens of the fourth Dhyana (fourth meditation heaven in the Realm of Form) has already been created, because they belong to the same realm. Later, due to the support of this old karma by Anāsrava-jñāna (non-outflow wisdom), one is able to be reborn in the Śuddhāvāsa heavens (Pure Abodes, the five highest heavens in the Realm of Form), which is not newly created karma by a sage. Since the retribution is received in different places, why is it called 'immovable'? Because it is called 'immovable' due to the samādhi (meditative absorption) abiding in one object, not because the retribution is not received in different places. Although the Abhidharma-kośa (Treasury of Higher Knowledge) says that it is called 'immovable' because it cannot be transformed to be received in different realms, this is in most cases. Except for this mixed practice and those who are born in the palace of freedom (referring to the great palace of freedom at the top of the Realm of Form), the remaining ordinary beings and sages do not have this situation. Furthermore, it is not called 'immovable' because the retribution is received in different realms, because they belong to the same realm. The previous explanation that only the samādhi realm is called 'immovable' can be applied to all situations. If it is called 'immovable' because the retribution is not received in different places, that is from the majority of cases, just like the karma of hell cannot be changed or transformed. It is still allowed to transform the heavy into light, and the body of an Arhat receives retribution, which is also from the majority of cases. 'Śuddhāvāsa etc.', 'etc.' includes the great palace of freedom of the tenth Bhumi (tenth stage of Bodhisattva). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), the Abhidharma-kośa, the Daśabhūmika-sūtra (Ten Stages Sutra), etc., all say that above the Śuddhāvāsa heavens, there is a palace of freedom. The Bodhisattva of the tenth Bhumi should be reborn in that place, experiencing the eighth Bhumi etc. This is also the old karma from the time of ordinary beings, and it is due to the support of Anāsrava-samādhi that one is able to be reborn there, hence the use of 'etc.' Treatise: Some argue that it is due to ignorance that karma leading to future existence is created. The Commentary says: The twelve links of dependent origination and the three doors of severance. There are two explanations here. The first view is that all ignorance that triggers karma is what is severed by seeing. It must be the ignorance that deludes the truth, and its characteristics must be enhanced to trigger karma, which is the first reason. Moreover, the sutras and treatises all say that sages will definitely not create karma that leads to future existence, which is the second reason. If ignorance is what is severed by cultivation, then sages should create karma again. The seventh volume of the Abhidharma-kośa says that both types of ignorance are what is severed by seeing, because it is said that one has already seen the truth, and there is no ignorance in the true sense, so one does not create meritorious karma and immovable karma. Some people explain that the ignorance of Vipāka (result) is severed by the path of cultivation, and the ignorance of true meaning is severed by the path of seeing. This reasoning is not correct. The lower part of the chapter on dependent origination says that non-Buddhist beings trigger actions due to the four types of ignorance, fully creating the three types of karma, such as non-meritorious karma. Buddhist beings, except for non-common ignorance, the remaining three types of ignorance are the conditions for action, and those who are not negligent act, not with ignorance as the condition. Moreover, the Abhidharma-kośa says that the ignorance of Vipāka triggers non-meritorious karma, and the ignorance of true meaning triggers meritorious karma and immovable karma.

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若初愚修斷後愚見斷。豈見道分別之惑。唯發福．不動。修道之惑。發非福耶。五十九說。發三惡趣業。唯分別煩惱。非俱生煩惱。豈發非福行無明。修道斷耶。若言發別報業者。便非行支。即發惡趣總報業愚。實唯見斷。云何乃言異熟愚修道斷。又此中二說。正發業無明。唯見道斷故　彼人復云異熟愚迷前七苦。真實義愚迷第八苦。大論第十云。迷世俗苦起非福。迷勝義苦造福．不動。對法第六云。前七苦是世俗苦。第八苦是勝義苦。故發非福無明。是修道斷。余見斷者　不然。豈以世俗苦言同故。一切處文是一世俗。以易可知故名世俗。唯勝智境故名勝義。言非福果。世俗易知是苦。名世俗苦。福．不動果。勝智方知是苦。名勝義苦。非是分八苦。而論名世俗勝義。彼八苦中。前七易知。名為世俗。第八勝智知。名為勝義。非謂前七是迷發非福行之世俗也。若不爾者。前七苦中。第六．七是壞苦。豈色界等無壞苦耶。彼若有者。迷之何故不造非福。又惡趣豈無第八勝義苦。何故迷之但造福不動行。故知文同非必一義。此中無明唯見所斷。此等徴詰如別章說。

論。愛取二支至見修所斷。

述曰。第一師意。愛．取唯修斷。貪求當生潤生之愛。明非見斷。見斷愛等緣見等起故。對法第五說九種命終心。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果最初的愚昧通過見道斷除，那麼後來的愚昧也應該通過修道斷除。難道見道所斷除的只是分別之惑，而修道所斷除的只是發福、不動（指禪定）的惑嗎？難道發起非福業（指惡業）的愚昧，是修道所斷除的嗎？五十九說認為，發起三惡趣業的，只是分別煩惱，不是俱生煩惱。難道發起非福行的無明，是修道所斷除的嗎？如果說發起的是別報業，那就不是行支（十二因緣中的行），即發起惡趣總報業的愚昧，實際上只是見道所斷除的。為什麼又說異熟愚（對果報的愚昧）是修道所斷除的呢？而且這裡有兩種說法，真正發起業的無明，只有見道才能斷除。那個人又說，異熟愚迷惑前七苦，真實義愚迷惑第八苦。《大論》第十說，迷惑世俗苦會發起非福業，迷惑勝義苦會造福業和不動業。《對法》第六說，前七苦是世俗苦，第八苦是勝義苦。所以發起非福業的無明，是修道所斷除的，其餘的則是見道所斷除的。但這種說法不對。難道僅僅因為世俗苦的說法相同，一切地方的文句就都是一個意思嗎？因為容易知道所以叫做世俗，只有殊勝智慧才能瞭解的境界叫做勝義。說非福的果報，世俗容易知道是苦，所以叫做世俗苦。福業和不動業的果報，只有殊勝智慧才能知道是苦，所以叫做勝義苦。不是把八苦分開，然後討論什麼是世俗，什麼是勝義。這八苦中，前七種容易知道，所以叫做世俗，第八種需要殊勝智慧才能知道，所以叫做勝義。不是說前七種是迷惑而發起非福行的世俗。如果不是這樣，前七苦中，第六、七是壞苦，難道阿羅漢等沒有壞苦嗎？如果他們有壞苦，迷惑壞苦為什麼不造非福業？而且惡趣難道沒有第八種勝義苦嗎？為什麼迷惑勝義苦只會造福業和不動行？所以知道文句相同，不一定是一個意思。這裡的無明只有見道才能斷除。這些辯論在其他章節有詳細說明。

論：愛和取二支，是見道和修道所斷除的。

述記說：第一種觀點認為，愛和取只有修道才能斷除。貪求來世和潤生的愛，明顯不是見道所斷除的。見道所斷除的愛等，是緣于見等而生起的。對法第五說有九種命終心。

【English Translation】 English version: If the initial ignorance is severed by the Path of Seeing (見道, Jiàndào, the first stage of enlightenment), then the subsequent ignorance should also be severed by the Path of Cultivation (修道, Xiūdào, the stage of continuously cultivating the path after the Path of Seeing). Is it that the Path of Seeing only severs the delusion of discrimination, while the Path of Cultivation only severs the delusion of generating merit (福, Fú) and immovability (不動, Bùdòng, referring to meditative states)? Is the ignorance that initiates non-meritorious karma (非福業, Fēifúyè, negative karma) severed by the Path of Cultivation? The fifty-ninth discourse states that what initiates the karma of the three evil realms is only discriminative afflictions, not co-arisen afflictions. Is the ignorance that initiates non-meritorious conduct severed by the Path of Cultivation? If it is said that what is initiated is the karma of separate retribution, then it is not a branch of action (行支, Xíngzhī, one of the twelve links of dependent origination), that is, the ignorance that initiates the general retribution karma of the evil realms is actually only severed by the Path of Seeing. Why then is it said that the ignorance of different maturation (異熟愚, Yìshúyú, ignorance regarding the results of karma) is severed by the Path of Cultivation? Moreover, there are two views here. The ignorance that truly initiates karma is only severed by the Path of Seeing. That person also says that the ignorance of different maturation is deluded about the first seven sufferings, and the ignorance of true meaning is deluded about the eighth suffering. The tenth chapter of the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (大論, Dàlùn) says that being deluded about mundane suffering gives rise to non-merit, and being deluded about ultimate suffering creates merit and immovability. The sixth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法, Duìfǎ) says that the first seven sufferings are mundane sufferings, and the eighth suffering is ultimate suffering. Therefore, the ignorance that initiates non-merit is severed by the Path of Cultivation, and the rest are severed by the Path of Seeing. But this statement is not correct. Is it that just because the term 'mundane suffering' is the same, all the sentences everywhere have the same meaning? Because it is easy to know, it is called mundane (世俗, Shìsú); the realm that only supreme wisdom can understand is called ultimate (勝義, Shèngyì). Saying that the result of non-merit is suffering that is easily known in the mundane world, it is called mundane suffering. The result of merit and immovability is suffering that only supreme wisdom can know, so it is called ultimate suffering. It is not dividing the eight sufferings and then discussing what is mundane and what is ultimate. Among these eight sufferings, the first seven are easy to know, so they are called mundane; the eighth requires supreme wisdom to know, so it is called ultimate. It is not saying that the first seven are the mundane that deludes and initiates non-meritorious conduct. If that were not the case, the sixth and seventh sufferings among the first seven are the suffering of change (壞苦, Huàikǔ). Do Arhats (阿羅漢, Āluóhàn) and others not have the suffering of change? If they have the suffering of change, why do they not create non-merit when they are deluded about it? Moreover, do the evil realms not have the eighth ultimate suffering? Why do they only create merit and immovable conduct when they are deluded about it? Therefore, it is known that the same wording does not necessarily mean the same meaning. The ignorance here can only be severed by the Path of Seeing. These debates are explained in detail in other chapters.

Treatise: The two branches of craving (愛, Ài) and grasping (取, Qǔ) are severed by the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation.

The commentary says: The first view is that craving and grasping can only be severed by the Path of Cultivation. The craving for future lives and the craving that moistens life are clearly not severed by the Path of Seeing. The craving, etc., that is severed by the Path of Seeing arises from seeing, etc. The fifth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that there are nine types of consciousness at the time of death.

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三界三界生。各潤生心各有三故。彼言俱生愛俱無明唯修斷。取支但是愛之增上。不取四取。言四取者。泛解取義非取支攝。餘九通見．修斷。隨業因斷故。其無記法非唯修斷。至下當知。

論。有義一切至無全斷者故。

述曰。第二師中有三。一標宗。二申難。三顯正　皆通二斷。標宗也　論說以下。申兩難。此十二支一切皆通見．修所斷。何意無明亦修道斷。愛．取二支亦見道斷。瑜伽第十說預流果已斷一切一分有支。無全斷者故。

論。若無明支至無全斷者。

述曰。難前師云。若無明支唯見所斷。則預流者初支全斷。寧說預流無全斷者。言斷一切一分有支。

論。若愛取支至一切支一分。

述曰。又難。前師若愛．取支唯修所斷。寧說彼預流已斷一切支一分。愛．取二支見道不斷。非一切故。亦非一分。全未斷故。

彼若救言大論第十但據通言從多分說。

論。又說全界至煩惱能發。

述曰。若爾如何五十九等。復說全界一切煩惱皆能結生。結生之言顯潤生惑。若唯脩潤即有界中見道煩惱不潤生故不名全界。此難愛．取唯修所斷。又說取支通攝四取。見．戒取等非修斷故。下難無明唯見所斷五十九初。復說往惡趣行唯分別起煩惱能發。則應乃言生五

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）中的生命，各自的潤生之心各有三種原因。他們說俱生愛（innate love）和俱生無明（innate ignorance）只能通過修道斷除。取支（grasping）只是愛的增強，不包括四取（four graspings）。所說的四取，只是泛泛地解釋取的含義，不屬於取支所包含的範圍。其餘九支都通於見道和修道斷除，因為隨業因斷除。那些無記法（indeterminate dharmas）並非只能通過修道斷除，這一點在後面會知道。

論：有一種觀點認為，一切支分都通於見道和修道斷除，沒有完全斷除的支分。

述曰：第二位論師的觀點包含三個部分：一、標明宗義；二、提出疑問；三、闡明正義。這些都通於見斷和修斷。標明宗義也在論述中。下面提出兩個疑問：這十二支一切都通於見道和修道所斷，為什麼說無明也屬於修道斷除？愛和取二支也屬於見道斷除？《瑜伽師地論》第十卷說，預流果（Srotapanna-phala，入流果）已經斷除了一切有支的一部分，沒有完全斷除的支分。

論：如果無明支只是見道所斷，那麼預流者一開始就完全斷除了這個支分，為什麼說預流沒有完全斷除的支分，而是斷除了一切有支的一部分？

述曰：這是對前一位論師的質疑。如果無明支只是見道所斷，那麼預流者一開始就完全斷除了無明支，那為什麼還說預流果沒有完全斷除的支分，而是斷除了一切有支的一部分呢？

論：如果愛和取支只是修道所斷，那為什麼說預流果已經斷除了一切支分的一部分？

述曰：這是又一個質疑。如果愛和取支只是修道所斷，那為什麼說預流果已經斷除了一切支分的一部分呢？愛和取二支在見道時沒有斷除，所以不是一切支分，也不是一部分，因為完全沒有斷除。

如果他們辯解說，《大毗婆沙論》第十卷只是根據通常情況而言，是從大部分情況來說的。

論：又說整個界（realm）的一切煩惱都能引發結生（rebirth）。

述曰：如果這樣，那五十九等又該如何解釋呢？又說整個界的一切煩惱都能引發結生，結生之言顯示了潤生的迷惑。如果只是修道潤生，那麼在這個界中，見道煩惱就不潤生，因此不能稱為整個界。這是對愛和取支只是修道所斷的質疑。又說取支通攝四取，見取（view grasping）、戒禁取（moral discipline and vows grasping）等不是修道斷除的。下面質疑無明只是見道所斷，在五十九初，又說前往惡趣的行為只是分別產生的煩惱才能引發，那麼應該說產生五

【English Translation】 English version: The lives in the three realms (Trailokya, desire realm, form realm, formless realm) each have three causes for their life-sustaining minds. They say that innate love (innate love) and innate ignorance (innate ignorance) can only be severed through cultivation. The grasping limb (grasping) is merely an increase of love and does not include the four graspings (four graspings). The so-called four graspings are merely a general explanation of the meaning of grasping and are not included in the scope of the grasping limb. The remaining nine limbs are all connected to the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, because they are severed according to the cause of karma. Those indeterminate dharmas are not only severed through cultivation, as will be known later.

Treatise: There is a view that all limbs are connected to the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, and there are no limbs that are completely severed.

Commentary: The second teacher's view contains three parts: 1. Stating the doctrine; 2. Raising questions; 3. Clarifying the correct meaning. These are all connected to the severance of seeing and cultivation. Stating the doctrine is also in the treatise. Below, two questions are raised: All twelve limbs are connected to the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, so why is it said that ignorance also belongs to the severance of cultivation? The two limbs of love and grasping also belong to the severance of the path of seeing? The tenth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that the Stream-enterer fruit (Srotapanna-phala) has already severed a part of all existing limbs, and there are no limbs that are completely severed.

Treatise: If the ignorance limb is only severed by the path of seeing, then the Stream-enterer would have completely severed this limb from the beginning. Why is it said that the Stream-enterer has no limbs that are completely severed, but rather has severed a part of all existing limbs?

Commentary: This is a question for the previous teacher. If the ignorance limb is only severed by the path of seeing, then the Stream-enterer would have completely severed the ignorance limb from the beginning. Then why is it said that the Stream-enterer fruit has no limbs that are completely severed, but rather has severed a part of all existing limbs?

Treatise: If the love and grasping limbs are only severed by the path of cultivation, then why is it said that the Stream-enterer fruit has already severed a part of all limbs?

Commentary: This is another question. If the love and grasping limbs are only severed by the path of cultivation, then why is it said that the Stream-enterer fruit has already severed a part of all limbs? The two limbs of love and grasping are not severed in the path of seeing, so they are not all limbs, nor are they a part, because they have not been severed at all.

If they argue that the tenth volume of the Mahavibhasa is only speaking according to the usual situation, and is speaking from the majority of cases.

Treatise: It is also said that all afflictions of the entire realm can cause rebirth.

Commentary: If this is the case, then how should the fifty-nine, etc., be explained? It is also said that all afflictions of the entire realm can cause rebirth. The words 'cause rebirth' indicate the delusion that sustains life. If it is only cultivation that sustains life, then in this realm, the afflictions of the path of seeing would not sustain life, so it cannot be called the entire realm. This is a question for the love and grasping limbs being only severed by cultivation. It is also said that the grasping limb includes the four graspings, view grasping (view grasping), moral discipline and vows grasping (moral discipline and vows grasping), etc., which are not severed by cultivation. Below, the question is raised that ignorance is only severed by the path of seeing. At the beginning of the fifty-nine, it is also said that the actions of going to the evil realms can only be caused by afflictions that arise from discrimination, then it should be said that five

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趣行。唯分別起煩惱能發。以見斷煩惱不唯發往惡趣行故。若言人天感別報業。修惑能發。通總別報說故。論不言發人天者。即惡趣別報業。應修道惑不發。惡趣別報行。修惑既能發。故知彼說但論總報。

論。不言潤生至見所斷髮。

述曰。諸聖教中不言潤生之惑唯修所斷。全界煩惱能結生故。亦不說言諸感後有行。皆見所斷髮。唯言惡趣行分別惑發故。

論。由此故知至見修所斷。

述曰。結申正義有二。初結三支。后泛釋斷。此下初也。無明．愛．取三支。亦通見．修所斷。

會對法七云。

論。然無明支至助者不定。

述曰。正發行者唯見所斷。以粗猛故。故說二愚皆見所斷。會五十九云助者不定。以助發人天總報之業亦通修道故。彼但言發惡趣之行。唯分別惑。能助發惡趣總報之行。多唯見斷故。發別報等少亦通修。約多分說。不相違也。會對法第六潤生云。正潤生者唯修所斷。以其微細數現行故。故彼但言俱生愛俱。故助者不定。故言全界一切煩惱皆能結生。四取皆名為取支等。然發業惑唯種子者。如不放逸內法異生。其潤生惑亦唯種者。謂不還者。有說及無想沒。此據正發正潤。若助發助潤起現無失。遠因等起亦有現故。未臨命終起現惑故。

問今

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：只有分別產生的煩惱才能引發（惡趣之）行嗎？ 答：不是的。因為見斷的煩惱不只是引發前往惡趣的行。 如果說人天（善趣）的果報由不同的業感得，修惑也能引發（人天善趣的果報），這是通說總報和別報的緣故。 《論》中沒有說引發人天（善趣果報）的（煩惱），是因為（前面）已經說了惡趣的別報業，那麼修道所斷的煩惱就不應引發惡趣的別報之行。既然修惑能夠引發（人天善趣的果報），所以可知前面的說法只是論述總報。

《論》：沒有說潤生的煩惱只是修所斷，引發（惡趣之）行只是見所斷。

述曰：各種聖教中沒有說潤生的煩惱只是修道所斷，因為整個欲界的煩惱都能結生。也沒有說所有感得後有的行，都是見所斷的煩惱引發的，只是說惡趣之行是由分別惑引發的。

《論》：由此可知，（無明、愛、取）都是見修所斷。

述曰：總結申述正義有兩點。首先總結三支（無明、愛、取），然後泛泛地解釋斷惑。下面是第一點。無明、愛、取這三支，也通於見斷和修斷。

《對法論》第七中說：

《論》：然而無明支，正發行的是見所斷，助發的是不定的。

述曰：正發行者只是見所斷，因為（見斷惑）粗猛的緣故。所以說二愚（俱生和分別的無明）都是見所斷。《對法論》第五十九中說，助發的是不定的，因為助發人天總報之業也通於修道所斷的煩惱。前面只是說引發惡趣之行，只有分別惑才能助發惡趣總報之行，大多是見斷的緣故。引發別報等，少部分也通於修斷，這是就大部分情況來說的，並不矛盾。《對法論》第六中潤生說，正潤生者只是修所斷，因為（修斷惑）微細且常常現行的緣故。所以那裡只是說俱生愛俱。所以助發的是不定的。所以說整個欲界的一切煩惱都能結生。四取都名為取支等。然而引發業的煩惱只是種子，比如不放逸的內法異生。其潤生的煩惱也只是種子，指的是不還果。有人說以及無想定和滅盡定。這是就正引發和正潤生來說的。如果助發和助潤，生起現行也沒有過失。遠因等生起也有現行，因為臨命終時生起現行惑的緣故。

問：現在……

【English Translation】 English version: Question: Is it only afflictions arising from discrimination (Vikalpa) that can initiate (the actions leading to) bad destinies? Answer: No. Because afflictions severed by insight (Darshana-marga) do not only initiate actions leading to bad destinies. If it is said that the rewards of humans and gods (good destinies) are felt due to different karmic actions, and that afflictions severed by cultivation (Bhavana-marga) can also initiate (the rewards of good destinies), this is because it generally speaks of the collective (Samanya) and specific (Vishesha) rewards. The Treatise (Abhidharmakosha) does not mention the afflictions that initiate (the rewards of) humans and gods (good destinies) because it has already discussed the specific rewards of bad destinies. Therefore, afflictions severed by the path of cultivation should not initiate actions leading to the specific rewards of bad destinies. Since afflictions severed by cultivation can initiate (the rewards of good destinies), it is known that the previous statement only discusses collective rewards.

The Treatise: It does not say that the afflictions that moisten rebirth (潤生, Run Sheng) are only severed by cultivation, and that initiating (actions leading to) bad destinies are only severed by insight.

Commentary: In various sacred teachings, it is not said that the afflictions that moisten rebirth are only severed by the path of cultivation, because afflictions from the entire realm of desire (Kama-dhatu) can bind to rebirth. Nor is it said that all actions that lead to future existence are initiated by afflictions severed by insight, but only that actions leading to bad destinies are initiated by afflictions arising from discrimination.

The Treatise: Therefore, it is known that (ignorance, craving, and grasping) are all severed by both insight and cultivation.

Commentary: Summarizing and elaborating on the correct meaning involves two points. First, summarizing the three branches (ignorance, craving, and grasping), and then broadly explaining the severing of afflictions. The following is the first point. These three branches of ignorance (Avidya), craving (Trishna), and grasping (Upadana) are related to both what is severed by insight and what is severed by cultivation.

The seventh chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya says:

The Treatise: However, the branch of ignorance, what directly initiates is severed by insight, and what assists in initiating is uncertain.

Commentary: What directly initiates is only severed by insight because (afflictions severed by insight) are coarse and strong. Therefore, it is said that the two kinds of ignorance (innate and discriminating) are both severed by insight. The fifty-ninth chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya says that what assists in initiating is uncertain because assisting in initiating the collective rewards of humans and gods is also related to afflictions severed by the path of cultivation. The previous statement only says that initiating actions leading to bad destinies, only afflictions arising from discrimination can assist in initiating the collective rewards of bad destinies, mostly because they are severed by insight. Initiating specific rewards, etc., a small part is also related to cultivation, which is speaking in terms of the majority of cases and is not contradictory. The sixth chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya on moistening rebirth says that what directly moistens rebirth is only severed by cultivation because (afflictions severed by cultivation) are subtle and frequently manifest. Therefore, it only speaks of innate craving. Therefore, what assists in initiating is uncertain. Therefore, it is said that all afflictions in the entire realm of desire can bind to rebirth. The four kinds of grasping are all called the branch of grasping, etc. However, the afflictions that initiate karma are only seeds, such as the inner Dharma of an unliberated being who is not negligent. The afflictions that moisten rebirth are also only seeds, referring to those who do not return (Anagamin). Some say as well as those in the state of non-perception (Asamjna-samapatti) and cessation (Nirodha-samapatti). This is speaking in terms of directly initiating and directly moistening rebirth. If assisting in initiating and assisting in moistening rebirth, arising in manifestation is not a fault. Distant causes, etc., also arise in manifestation because afflictions arise in manifestation at the time of death.

Question: Now...

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言十二皆通見．修斷。斷義如何言彼通也。

論。又染污法至彼永斷故。

述曰。以下泛釋一切斷義。此闇法種與彼無漏明法相違。無漏起時闇種便斷。色性非染污。此斷即通諸心．心所。

論。一切有漏至不違道故。

述曰。不染污法。謂善及無覆無記。非性應斷。體非闇法。即通五蘊。不違道故。

論。然有二義至雜彼煩惱。

述曰。然此善．無記。有二義故說之為斷。一離縛斷。謂斷緣彼煩惱。雜彼煩惱。緣彼煩惱。謂有煩惱緣彼有漏而生。隨彼七識所緣有漏善等境是。若斷能緣煩惱。說所緣境名得斷也。

雜彼煩惱者。謂第七識起煩惱時。雖不緣彼六識等法。六識等由之成有漏性。名染污依故。六識等三性位中彼惑恒起。第七煩惱斷時。六識等法名為得斷　又相間起者名之為雜。此解即有平等性智等。間第七識等煩惱生故。然相順者名之為雜。無漏第六．七不順煩惱。正相違故不名為雜。此非因等起。諸無記業非因等起故。但相間生亦有雜義。性順漏故間生名雜。又雜者。謂有漏善業煩惱引故成有漏性。不同無記。后斷彼時善亦名斷　又解相應縛心。及遍行等性非染法。與煩惱俱名煩惱縛。煩惱斷時。彼心王遍行等名為得斷。離相應惑故。名斷雜彼煩惱。心王遍

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：經文中說十二種言語都能通達見到。修斷（xiu duan）的『斷』是什麼含義，為什麼說它們是通達的呢？

答：論中說：因為染污法到達彼處就被永遠斷除了。

解釋：以下泛泛地解釋一切『斷』的含義。這種黑暗之法的種子與彼無漏光明之法是相違背的。無漏之法生起時，黑暗的種子便被斷除。色性不是染污的，所以這種『斷』可以通達諸心和心所（xin suo）。

答：論中說：一切有漏法不違背正道。

解釋：不染污法，指的是善和無覆無記（wu fu wu ji）。這些法本身不應該被斷除，因為它們的體性不是黑暗之法，所以可以通達五蘊（wu yun）。因為它們不違背正道。

答：論中說：然而有兩種含義，可以混雜那些煩惱。

解釋：然而這些善和無記法，因為有兩種含義，所以可以被說成是『斷』。第一種是離縛斷（li fu duan），指的是斷除緣於它們的煩惱，以及混雜於它們的煩惱。緣於它們的煩惱，指的是有煩惱緣于這些有漏法而生起，隨著第七識（di qi shi）所緣的有漏善等境界而生起。如果斷除了能緣的煩惱，那麼所緣的境界也可以被稱為得到了『斷』。

混雜於它們的煩惱，指的是第七識生起煩惱時，雖然不緣于第六識（di liu shi）等法，但第六識等法因此而成為有漏的性質，被稱為染污的所依。第六識等在三種性質的狀態中，那些迷惑恒常生起。第七識的煩惱斷除時，第六識等法可以被稱為得到了『斷』。又或者，相間生起的法可以被稱為『雜』。這種解釋包含了平等性智（ping deng xing zhi）等，因為它們與第七識等的煩惱相間生起。然而，相互順應的法可以被稱為『雜』。無漏的第六識和第七識不順應煩惱，因為它們是正相反對的，所以不能被稱為『雜』。這並非因等生起，因為諸無記業並非因等生起。但相間生起也有『雜』的含義，因為它們的性質順應有漏，所以相間生起可以被稱為『雜』。又或者，『雜』指的是有漏的善業因為煩惱的牽引而成為有漏的性質，這與無記業不同。之後斷除那些煩惱時，善業也可以被稱為『斷』。又或者，可以解釋為相應的束縛之心，以及遍行等性質並非染污之法，但與煩惱一起時，可以被稱為煩惱的束縛。煩惱斷除時，那些心王（xin wang）、遍行等可以被稱為得到了『斷』，因為它們脫離了相應的迷惑，所以可以被稱為斷除了混雜於它們的煩惱。心王遍行等。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: The scriptures say that all twelve languages can be understood and seen. What is the meaning of 'severance' (duan) in 'cultivation and severance' (xiu duan), and why is it said that they are accessible?

Answer: The treatise says: Because defiled dharmas, upon reaching that point, are permanently severed.

Explanation: The following broadly explains the meaning of all 'severance'. The seed of this dark dharma is contrary to the stainless bright dharma. When the stainless dharma arises, the seed of darkness is severed. The nature of form is not defiled, so this 'severance' can be accessible to all minds and mental functions (xin suo).

Answer: The treatise says: All contaminated dharmas do not contradict the right path.

Explanation: Undefiled dharmas refer to good and neutral (wu fu wu ji). These dharmas themselves should not be severed, because their nature is not that of dark dharmas, so they can be accessible to the five aggregates (wu yun). Because they do not contradict the right path.

Answer: The treatise says: However, there are two meanings, which can mix with those afflictions.

Explanation: However, these good and neutral dharmas, because of two meanings, can be said to be 'severed'. The first is severance from bondage (li fu duan), which refers to severing the afflictions that arise from them, as well as the afflictions mixed with them. Afflictions that arise from them refer to afflictions that arise from these contaminated dharmas, arising along with the contaminated good and other realms that the seventh consciousness (di qi shi) cognizes. If the cognizing afflictions are severed, then the cognized realms can also be said to have obtained 'severance'.

Afflictions mixed with them refer to when the seventh consciousness arises with afflictions, although it does not cognize the sixth consciousness (di liu shi) and other dharmas, the sixth consciousness and other dharmas thus become contaminated in nature, and are called the basis of defilement. In the state of the three natures of the sixth consciousness and others, those delusions constantly arise. When the afflictions of the seventh consciousness are severed, the sixth consciousness and other dharmas can be said to have obtained 'severance'. Or, dharmas that arise intermittently can be called 'mixed'. This explanation includes the wisdom of equality (ping deng xing zhi), because they arise intermittently with the afflictions of the seventh consciousness and others. However, dharmas that are mutually compliant can be called 'mixed'. The stainless sixth and seventh consciousnesses do not comply with afflictions, because they are directly opposed, so they cannot be called 'mixed'. This is not caused by co-arising, because neutral karmas are not caused by co-arising. But intermittent arising also has the meaning of 'mixed', because their nature complies with contamination, so intermittent arising can be called 'mixed'. Or, 'mixed' refers to contaminated good karma becoming contaminated in nature due to the influence of afflictions, which is different from neutral karma. Later, when those afflictions are severed, good karma can also be called 'severed'. Or, it can be explained as the mind bound by association, and the pervasive functions, etc., are not defiled dharmas, but when they are together with afflictions, they can be called the bondage of afflictions. When afflictions are severed, those mind-kings (xin wang), pervasive functions, etc., can be said to have obtained 'severance', because they are free from the corresponding delusions, so they can be called severing the afflictions mixed with them. Mind-kings, pervasive functions, etc.

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行等。雖與染法相應。性非應斷法故在此門收此解違下唯修斷文。見道豈無相應縛也。由此應知。前二說善。若說七識名雜煩惱。離欲九品未得無學。欲界善等應不名斷。以雜煩惱猶未斷故。若準此義。離欲之時。但能緣盡說之為斷。非雜煩惱。既爾生上聖者。不斷雜煩惱。亦自然無。如見道煩惱修惑緣縛未盡亦名為斷。斷已永不生。以自性強故。說之為斷。其善等法類亦應然。緣彼煩惱強故。不待斷雜惑亦名為斷。既爾如何由之名有漏此義應思也　問如五見是惠分。惠體是應斷。不應斷也。應斷者。即相應法。無離相應得斷。體皆可斷故。若非可斷者。五見便非漏體。亦非縛體。如是乃至不正知等。亦準此問　答遍行．別境中。是見體者是縛。非見者非。見是能執故。由此此十除惠餘九所有染分。入隨煩惱等中。皆體非漏。假立漏名。不爾便無縛相應法邪作意等。皆大有妨。

論。二不生斷至令永不起。

述曰。依者因也。所依處也。因依無故果必不起。果依無故因亦不生。

論。依．離縛斷至唯修所斷。

述曰。依前離縛斷故。瑜伽六十六說諸有漏善。無覆無記。唯修所斷。五十七說。信等六根此通修斷及與不斷。而緣此縛。此位起縛。皆修道斷故　問見道煩惱豈不緣之　答緣之亦起。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：行等。雖然與染污法相應，但其自性並非應斷之法，因此在此門中收錄此解違背了下文僅修斷的說法。難道見道就沒有相應的束縛嗎？由此應該知道，前兩種說法是正確的。如果說七識名為雜煩惱，那麼離欲界的九品煩惱，在未證得無學果位時，欲界的善法等就不應該被稱為已斷，因為雜煩惱仍然未斷。如果按照這個意義來理解，那麼在離欲界時，只是所緣的境滅盡了，才說之為斷，並非雜煩惱已斷。既然如此，生於上界的聖者，不斷雜煩惱，也自然不會再生起。如同見道所斷的煩惱，修惑的緣縛未盡，也名為斷，斷除后就永遠不再生起，因為其自性強烈，所以說之為斷。其善法等也應該如此，因為所緣的煩惱強烈，所以不必等待斷除雜惑，也名為斷。既然如此，又如何因為這些法而名為有漏呢？這個道理應該仔細思考。問：如五見（薩迦耶見、邊見、邪見、見取見、戒禁取見）是智慧的一部分，智慧的本體是應斷的嗎？不應斷嗎？應斷的，就是與五見相應的法，沒有離開相應而能斷的，本體都可以斷除。如果不是可以斷除的，那麼五見就不是有漏的本體，也不是束縛的本體。像這樣乃至不正知等，也按照這個提問來理解。答：遍行、別境中，是見的本體的，就是束縛；不是見的本體的，就不是束縛。因為見是能執著的。由此，這十種隨煩惱（忿、恨、覆、惱、嫉、慳、誑、諂、憍、害）中，除了智慧以外，其餘九種所有染污的部分，進入隨煩惱等之中，本體都不是有漏的，只是假立有漏之名。否則，就會沒有與束縛相應的法，邪作意等，都會有很大的妨礙。 論：二不生斷乃至令永不起。 述曰：依，是因的意思，是所依之處。因為因和所依之處都沒有了，所以果必然不會生起。因為果所依賴的沒有了，所以因也不會生起。 論：依、離縛斷乃至唯修所斷。 述曰：因為依靠前面的離縛斷，所以《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷說，諸有漏善，無覆無記，唯有修所斷。《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷說，信等六根，此通修斷以及不斷。而緣於此縛，此位生起縛，都是修道所斷。問：見道的煩惱難道不緣於此嗎？答：緣於此也會生起。

【English Translation】 English version: Actions and so on, although corresponding to defiled dharmas, their nature is not something to be severed. Therefore, including this explanation in this section contradicts the statement below that only cultivation severs. Does the path of seeing not have corresponding bonds? From this, it should be known that the first two explanations are correct. If the seventh consciousness is called 'mixed afflictions,' then the nine grades of desire realm afflictions, before attaining the state of no-more-learning (arhatship), the wholesome dharmas of the desire realm should not be called severed, because the mixed afflictions are still not severed. If understood in this sense, then when leaving the desire realm, it is only when the object of focus ceases that it is said to be severed, not that the mixed afflictions are severed. Since this is the case, a sage born in the higher realms, without severing the mixed afflictions, will naturally not arise again. Just as the afflictions severed by the path of seeing, the bonds of delusion from cultivation are not exhausted, yet it is called severed, and after severance, it will never arise again, because its nature is strong, so it is said to be severed. The same should be true of wholesome dharmas, because the afflictions they focus on are strong, so without waiting to sever the mixed delusions, they are also called severed. Since this is the case, how can they be called 'with outflows' (asrava) because of these dharmas? This principle should be carefully considered. Question: For example, the five views (Satkayadrishti - view of self, Antagrahadrishti - extreme view, Mithyadrishti - wrong view, Drstiparamarsa - view of holding views as supreme, Silavrataparamarsa - view of holding precepts and vows as supreme) are part of wisdom. Is the essence of wisdom something to be severed? Should it not be severed? What should be severed are the dharmas corresponding to the five views. There is no severance without correspondence; the essence can all be severed. If it is not something that can be severed, then the five views are not the essence of outflows, nor are they the essence of bonds. Likewise, even incorrect knowledge, etc., should be understood according to this question. Answer: In pervasive and specific objects, what is the essence of view is a bond; what is not the essence of view is not a bond. Because view is what grasps. Therefore, among these ten secondary afflictions (Krodha - anger, Upanaha - resentment, Mraksha - concealment, Pradasha - spite, Irshya - jealousy, Matsarya - avarice, Maya - deceit, Shathya - dishonesty, Mada - conceit, Vihiṃsa - violence), except for wisdom, the defiled parts of the other nine, entering into the secondary afflictions, etc., are not the essence of outflows; the name of outflow is falsely established. Otherwise, there would be no dharmas corresponding to bonds, and incorrect mental activity, etc., would all be greatly hindered. Treatise: The severance of non-arising, up to causing it to never arise. Commentary: 'Relying' means cause, the place of reliance. Because the cause and the place of reliance are gone, the result will certainly not arise. Because what the result relies on is gone, the cause will not arise either. Treatise: Relying on, severing bonds, up to only what is severed by cultivation. Commentary: Because relying on the previous severance of bonds, the sixty-sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that all wholesome dharmas with outflows, neither obscured nor indeterminate, are only severed by cultivation. The fifty-seventh volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that the six faculties of faith, etc., are severed by both cultivation and non-cultivation. And because of this bond, the bond arising in this state is all severed by the path of cultivation. Question: Do the afflictions of the path of seeing not focus on this? Answer: Focusing on this will also arise.

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然未盡故所以不說。今盡處論故唯修斷。

論。依不生斷至唯見所斷。

述曰。依后不生斷。對法第四。瑜伽六十六等。說諸惡趣異熟趣體第八識等。唯見所斷。及無想定等。亦唯見所斷。彼入善．無記門即修道攝。入依亡門即唯見斷。彼等唯是分別煩惱發外道等起故。入見道時。一切分別煩惱皆斷。舍外道等所依身故。彼無想定等故亦不起。等者等取無想天．半擇．二形．北郁單越等。然半擇等。五十三說于見道時得非擇滅。又彼卷說無想天等是非擇滅。今名為斷違此文者。此亦不然。此說不生亦非擇滅攝。斷是舍義。非得對治義。若爾即惡趣惡業果亦無記性例應然。故對法第四。云惡趣業果見道所斷。或與因合說為見道斷。非斷緣縛及種體也。五根見斷亦如此釋　斷有四種。如別抄中義差別說。若道理論。唯有三種。一自性斷。謂染污法。二離縛斷。謂能斷緣雜彼煩惱。善．無記法修道所斷方究竟盡。三不生斷。謂斷彼依令永不起。此有二種。一謂因亡果隨喪。謂三惡趣果名見道斷。由因惑業無故。果永不生故。二果盡因隨斷。謂三惡趣別報善業亦見道斷。所依果無。因隨亡故。無想定等引發煩惱。見位因亡果隨見斷。半擇迦等。多由分別煩惱正發故。入見時因亡果滅余如樞要。

幾通見．修

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為之前沒有完全講完，所以沒有說。現在完全講清楚了，所以只討論修斷。

論：依據不生斷，直至唯見所斷。

述記：依據後來的不生斷。《對法》第四，《瑜伽師地論》第六十六等，說到諸惡趣的異熟果報體，第八識等，唯有見道才能斷除，以及無想定等，也唯有見道才能斷除。它們進入善或無記的範疇，就屬於修道所攝。進入依亡的範疇，就唯有見道能斷。因為它們都是由分別煩惱引發外道等而生起的。進入見道時，一切分別煩惱都被斷除，捨棄了外道等所依止的身體，所以無想定等也不會再生起。『等』字包括無想天、半擇迦（指閹人）、二形（指具有雙重性器官的人）、北郁單越（四大部洲之一，此洲人民沒有痛苦）等。然而，關於半擇迦等，《五十三》中說在見道時得到非擇滅。而且那一卷中說無想天等是非擇滅。現在說它們被斷除，與此文相違背嗎？這也不對。這裡說的不生，也屬於非擇滅所攝。斷是捨棄的意思，不是得到對治的意思。如果這樣，那麼惡趣的惡業果報也應該是無記性，按照這個例子也應該如此。所以《對法》第四說，惡趣的業果是見道所斷。或者與因結合，說是見道所斷，並非斷除緣縛以及種子的自體。五根的見斷也可以這樣解釋。斷有四種，如其他抄本中義理差別所說。如果從道理論來說，只有三種：一是自性斷，指染污法；二是離縛斷，指能夠斷除緣雜彼煩惱的善、無記法，修道所斷才能究竟斷盡；三是不生斷，指斷除它們的所依，使之永遠不再生起。這有二種：一是因亡果隨之喪失，指三惡趣的果報名為見道斷，因為作為原因的惑業沒有了，果報也永遠不會產生。二是果盡因隨之斷，指三惡趣的別報善業也是見道斷，所依止的果報沒有了，作為原因的也隨之消亡。無想定等引發煩惱，在見位時，因為原因消失，果報也隨之在見道時被斷除。半擇迦等，大多由分別煩惱引發，進入見道時，因為原因消失，果報也隨之滅亡，其餘的如同樞要所說。

幾種通於見道和修道？

【English Translation】 English version: Because it wasn't fully explained before, it wasn't discussed. Now that it's fully clarified, we'll only discuss cultivation-severance (xiuduan).

Treatise: Based on non-arising severance (bushengduan), up to exclusively seen-severance (weijiansuoduan).

Commentary: Based on the subsequent non-arising severance. The fourth [chapter] of Abhidharmasamuccaya and the sixty-sixth [chapter] of Yogacarabhumi-sastra, etc., state that the maturation-resultant body of the evil destinies, the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), etc., are severed only by the path of seeing (darśana-mārga), and that the state of non-perception (asaṃjñā-samāpatti), etc., are also severed only by the path of seeing. When they enter the category of wholesome or neutral, they are included in the path of cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga). When they enter the category of dependent-cessation, they are severed only by the path of seeing. This is because they are all caused by discriminative afflictions (vikalpa-kleśa) that give rise to external paths (外道, wàidào, non-Buddhist paths), etc. When entering the path of seeing, all discriminative afflictions are severed, and the body relied upon by external paths, etc., is abandoned, so the state of non-perception, etc., will not arise again. 'Etc.' includes the heaven of non-perception (asaṃjñā-deva), eunuchs (paṇḍaka), hermaphrodites (ubhayavyañjanaka), Uttarakuru (北鬱單越, Běiyùdānyuè, one of the four great continents) etc. However, regarding eunuchs, etc., Fifty-Three says that non-selective cessation (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) is attained at the time of the path of seeing. Moreover, that volume says that the heaven of non-perception, etc., are non-selective cessation. Does the current statement that they are severed contradict this text? This is also not the case. The non-arising mentioned here is also included in non-selective cessation. Severance means abandonment, not obtaining an antidote. If that were the case, then the evil karma results of the evil destinies should also be neutral in nature, and the example should be the same. Therefore, the fourth [chapter] of Abhidharmasamuccaya says that the karma results of the evil destinies are severed by the path of seeing, or combined with the cause, it is said to be severed by the path of seeing, not severing the bonds of conditions and the essence of the seeds. The seen-severance of the five roots (pañcendriya) can also be explained in this way. There are four types of severance, as described in the differences in meaning in other copies. If from the perspective of the theory of the path, there are only three types: first, self-nature severance (svabhāva-prahāṇa), referring to defiled dharmas; second, liberation-bondage severance (visaṃyoga-prahāṇa), referring to wholesome and neutral dharmas that can sever the conditions mixed with those afflictions, and only when severed by the path of cultivation can they be completely exhausted; third, non-arising severance, referring to severing their basis, causing them to never arise again. This has two types: first, the cause is lost and the result is lost accordingly, referring to the results of the three evil destinies, which are called seen-severance, because the afflictions and karma that are the cause are gone, the result will never arise. Second, the result is exhausted and the cause is severed accordingly, referring to the separate reward wholesome karma of the three evil destinies, which is also seen-severance, because the result relied upon is gone, the cause also disappears accordingly. The state of non-perception, etc., gives rise to afflictions. At the stage of seeing, because the cause disappears, the result is also severed in the path of seeing. Eunuchs, etc., are mostly caused by discriminative afflictions, and when entering the path of seeing, because the cause disappears, the result also disappears. The rest is as described in the essentials.

How many are common to the path of seeing and the path of cultivation?

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等。

論。說十二支至如應當知。

述曰。瑜伽等說十二支通二斷者。於二斷中如應當知。若無明．愛．取三是自性斷。然通見．修。離縛．不生等弱故不說。行．有少分通自性．離縛．不生三種。見．修所斷染污者自性斷。非染者通不生．離縛。離縛可知。以無想定等見道所斷故。行．有通不生。識等七支唯離縛．不生。體非染法。非自性斷。惡趣．人．天如應知故　大論第十云。預流．一來。斷一切支一分。無全斷者。雖有七生。於色．無色及第八有皆不更受。然有預流作不還已後生彼故今通作論。不還欲界一切。色．無色不定。阿羅漢一切已斷。正與此同。此中斷義至下自知。此門兼解果斷分齊。

論。十樂舍俱至非受俱故。

述曰。十三三受俱門。依當起位十支與樂受．舍受俱。除受支及老死支。受不與受相應。是自體故此約一識。若依多識得俱起故。此中所辨相應名俱。非謂世併名為俱。故受不與受俱也。及除老死。老死位中。多分無樂及客舍故。非謂第八主舍亦無。十二支中十一支苦受俱。如前加老死。但除于受。非自體俱如前理說。老死多起憂悲等苦。故大論第十但云樂．舍除二與余俱行。若苦受及所除中一。此中別解。其憂．喜受同苦．樂說。此生支位寬故有樂．舍。

【現代漢語翻譯】 論：關於十二支，應當如實了知。 述曰：《瑜伽師地論》等論述十二支通於二斷，即見道所斷和修道所斷。在這二斷中，應當如實了知。無明（Avidyā，無知）、愛（Tṛṣṇā，渴愛）、取（Upādāna，執取）三支是自性斷，但通於見道和修道。因為離縛和不生等力量較弱，所以不說。行（Saṃskāra，行）、有（Bhava，有）少分通於自性斷、離縛和不生三種。見道和修道所斷的染污法屬於自性斷，非染污法則通於不生和離縛。離縛可以了知，因為無想定等是見道所斷。行、有通於不生。識（Vijñāna，識）、名色（Nāmarūpa，名色）、六入（Ṣaḍāyatana，六入）、觸（Sparśa，觸）、受（Vedanā，受）、生（Jāti，生）、老死（Jarā-maraṇa，老死）七支唯是離縛和不生，體性不是染污法，所以不是自性斷。惡趣、人、天應當如實了知。大論第十說，預流（Srotaāpanna，入流者）、一來（Sakṛdāgāmin，一來者）斷一切支的一部分，沒有完全斷除的。雖然有七生，對於色界、無色界以及第八有都不再受生。然而有預流作不還（Anāgāmin，不還者）之後生於彼處，所以現在通作此論。不還者斷欲界的一切，色界和無色界則不一定。阿羅漢（Arhat，阿羅漢）斷除一切。這與此相同。此中斷義在下文自會知曉。此門兼解釋了果斷的界限。 論：十支與樂受、舍受俱生，不是與受支俱生。 述曰：這是十三三受俱生之門。依據當起之位，十支與樂受（Sukha，樂受）、舍受（Upekṣā，舍受）俱生，除去受支和老死支。受不與受相應，因為是自體。這是就一個識而言。如果依據多個識，則可以俱起。這裡所辨別的相應名為俱，不是說世間並存名為俱，所以受不與受俱生。以及除去老死，老死位中，大部分沒有樂受以及客舍受，不是說第八識主舍受也沒有。十二支中十一支與苦受（Duḥkha，苦受）俱生，如前所說加上老死，但除去受支，非自體俱生如前理所說。老死多起憂悲等苦，所以大論第十隻說樂受、舍受除去二支與其餘俱行。如果是苦受以及所除去的其中之一，這裡分別解釋。憂受（Daurmanasya，憂受）、喜受（Pramoda，喜受）與苦受、樂受相同。此生支位寬廣，所以有樂受、舍受。

【English Translation】 Treatise: Regarding the twelve links, it should be known as it should be. Commentary: The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other treatises state that the twelve links are connected to the two severances, namely, what is severed by the Path of Seeing and what is severed by the Path of Cultivation. Within these two severances, it should be known as it should be. Ignorance (Avidyā), Craving (Tṛṣṇā), and Grasping (Upādāna) are severed by their very nature, but they are connected to both the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation. Because detachment and non-arising are weak, they are not mentioned. Formation (Saṃskāra) and Existence (Bhava) are partly connected to the three types: severance by nature, detachment, and non-arising. Defiled dharmas severed by the Path of Seeing and the Path of Cultivation belong to severance by nature, while non-defiled dharmas are connected to non-arising and detachment. Detachment can be understood because the state of non-perception and others are severed by the Path of Seeing. Formation and Existence are connected to non-arising. Consciousness (Vijñāna), Name and Form (Nāmarūpa), Six Sense Bases (Ṣaḍāyatana), Contact (Sparśa), Feeling (Vedanā), Birth (Jāti), and Old Age and Death (Jarā-maraṇa) are only detachment and non-arising. Their nature is not defiled, so they are not severed by nature. The evil destinies, humans, and gods should be known as they should be. The tenth chapter of the Great Treatise states that a Stream-enterer (Srotaāpanna) and Once-returner (Sakṛdāgāmin) sever a portion of all the links; none are completely severed. Although there are seven births, they will no longer be reborn in the Form Realm, Formless Realm, or the eighth existence. However, there are Stream-enterers who, after becoming Non-returners (Anāgāmin), are born there, so this treatise is made in general. Non-returners sever everything in the Desire Realm, while the Form Realm and Formless Realm are uncertain. Arhats (Arhat) have severed everything. This is the same as this. The meaning of this severance will be known below. This section also explains the limits of the severance of the fruit. Treatise: The ten links are concurrent with pleasant feeling and neutral feeling, not concurrent with the feeling link. Commentary: This is the gate of the concurrence of the thirteen three feelings. According to the position that arises, ten links are concurrent with pleasant feeling (Sukha) and neutral feeling (Upekṣā), except for the feeling link and the old age and death link. Feeling is not concurrent with feeling because it is its own nature. This is in terms of one consciousness. If based on multiple consciousnesses, they can arise concurrently. The concurrence distinguished here is called 'together', not that worldly coexistence is called 'together', so feeling is not concurrent with feeling. And excluding old age and death, in the position of old age and death, most do not have pleasant feeling and guest neutral feeling; it is not that the eighth consciousness's main neutral feeling is also absent. Among the twelve links, eleven links are concurrent with painful feeling (Duḥkha), as mentioned before, adding old age and death, but excluding the feeling link; non-self-nature concurrence is as said in the previous principle. Old age and death mostly give rise to sorrow, grief, and other sufferings, so the tenth chapter of the Great Treatise only says that pleasant feeling and neutral feeling, excluding two links, proceed with the rest. If it is painful feeling and one of those excluded, it is explained separately here. Unhappiness (Daurmanasya) and happiness (Pramoda) are the same as painful feeling and pleasant feeling. The position of this birth link is broad, so there are pleasant feeling and neutral feeling.

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論。十一少分至故不說之。

述曰。十四三苦分別門。十一少分壞苦所攝。十二支中除老死一。老死位中多無樂受。十一之中非樂受無。依樂立壞故。不說彼老死支中亦為壞苦。大論第十云謂樂受俱行及非受俱行支一分是壞苦。前說樂受十支俱行除受．老死。受不與受俱。故說受為非受俱支。今壞苦即亦取受。故言及非受俱支。言一分者。十二中通有苦苦．行苦性故。今除于彼故言一分。

論。十二少分至有苦受故。

述曰。十二少分苦苦所攝。有何所以一切支中有苦受故。彼第十云。謂苦受俱行支及非受俱行支一分是苦苦。前苦受俱行中攝十一。除受如前說。今並受亦是苦苦故十二支。言一分者。如壞苦說。

論。十二全分至如壞苦說。

述曰。十二支全分是行苦所攝。據實而論。諸有漏法皆行苦故。又依三受別門。約舍受說行苦。即十一少分。除老死支。多分無舍故。如壞苦說。前舍受俱行與樂受同故。大論第十說。所有二苦支皆行苦攝。有行苦支非二支收。謂不苦樂受俱支及非受俱支一分。與此文同。瑜伽六十六說。據實有漏皆行苦攝。約相顯時舍受位顯。與二受時二苦相顯故。

論。實義如是至所說不定。

述曰。此約實體．相顯二位說支實義。攝苦如是。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：因為只有十一少分與此相關，所以不說全部。

述曰：在十四種三苦的分別中，十一少分屬於壞苦所攝。十二支中除了老死這一支。因為老死的狀態中大多沒有樂受，而十一少分中並非沒有樂受。因為壞苦是依樂而立的，所以不說老死支中也屬於壞苦。《大毗婆沙論》第十卷說，與樂受俱行的，以及與非受俱行的支分中的一部分是壞苦。前面說樂受與十支俱行，除了受和老死。受不與受俱行，所以說受為非受俱支。現在壞苦也包括受，所以說『及非受俱支』。說『一部分』，是因為十二支中普遍有苦苦和行苦的性質，現在排除這些，所以說『一部分』。

論：因為十二少分都有苦受的緣故。

述曰：十二少分屬於苦苦所攝。為什麼呢？因為一切支中都有苦受的緣故。《大毗婆沙論》第十卷說，與苦受俱行的支，以及與非受俱行的支的一部分是苦苦。前面苦受俱行中攝取了十一支，除了受，如前所說。現在連受也都是苦苦，所以是十二支。說『一部分』，如壞苦所說。

論：十二支全分都如壞苦一樣。

述曰：十二支全分都是行苦所攝。就實際情況來說，所有有漏法都是行苦。又依據三受的分別，就舍受來說行苦，即十一少分，除了老死支，因為老死支中大多沒有舍受。如壞苦所說。前面舍受俱行與樂受相同。《大毗婆沙論》第十卷說，所有二苦所攝的支都是行苦所攝。有行苦所攝的支，不是二苦所能包含的，即不苦不樂受俱行的支，以及非受俱行的支的一部分。與此文相同。《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷說，就實際情況來說，所有有漏法都是行苦所攝，就相顯現的時候來說，舍受位顯現。與樂受和苦受同時，二苦的相顯現。

論：實際意義是這樣，所以所說的不一定。

述曰：這是就實體和相顯現的兩種情況來說支的實際意義。攝取苦的道理是這樣。

【English Translation】 English version Treatise: Because only eleven minor parts are related, the whole is not discussed.

Commentary: In the fourteen distinctions of the three sufferings, the eleven minor parts are included in suffering of change (viparinama-duhkha). Among the twelve links (of dependent origination), old age and death are excluded. Because in the state of old age and death, there is mostly no pleasant feeling, while in the eleven minor parts, there is not a lack of pleasant feeling. Because suffering of change is established based on pleasure, it is not said that old age and death are also suffering of change. The Mahavibhasa (Great Commentary) Volume 10 says that a portion of the links that are accompanied by pleasant feeling and those that are not accompanied by feeling are suffering of change. Previously, it was said that pleasant feeling is accompanied by ten links, excluding feeling and old age and death. Feeling does not occur with feeling, so feeling is said to be a link not accompanied by feeling. Now, suffering of change also includes feeling, so it says 'and links not accompanied by feeling.' Saying 'a portion' is because the twelve links universally have the nature of suffering of suffering (duhkha-duhkha) and suffering of conditioning (samskara-duhkha), so these are excluded, hence 'a portion'.

Treatise: Because the twelve minor parts all have painful feeling.

Commentary: The twelve minor parts are included in suffering of suffering. Why? Because all the links have painful feeling. The Mahavibhasa Volume 10 says that the links accompanied by painful feeling and a portion of the links not accompanied by feeling are suffering of suffering. Previously, the eleven links were included in those accompanied by painful feeling, excluding feeling, as mentioned before. Now, even feeling is suffering of suffering, so it is all twelve links. Saying 'a portion' is as said for suffering of change.

Treatise: All twelve links are like suffering of change.

Commentary: All twelve links are included in suffering of conditioning. In reality, all conditioned (with outflows) dharmas are suffering of conditioning. Also, according to the distinction of the three feelings, suffering of conditioning is discussed in relation to neutral feeling, which is the eleven minor parts, excluding the link of old age and death, because there is mostly no neutral feeling in old age and death. As said for suffering of change. Previously, neutral feeling was the same as pleasant feeling. The Mahavibhasa Volume 10 says that all links included in the two sufferings are included in suffering of conditioning. There are links included in suffering of conditioning that are not included in the two sufferings, namely the links accompanied by neither-pleasant-nor-painful feeling and a portion of the links not accompanied by feeling. This is the same as this text. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) Volume 66 says that in reality, all conditioned dharmas are included in suffering of conditioning, but when the characteristics are manifested, the state of neutral feeling is manifested. Simultaneously with pleasant and painful feelings, the characteristics of the two sufferings are manifested.

Treatise: The actual meaning is thus, so what is said is not fixed.

Commentary: This discusses the actual meaning of the links in terms of the two situations of substance and manifestation of characteristics. The principle of including suffering is thus.

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諸經論中。隨彼相增所說不定。此義如何。且此論等中有二。一全體多分攝三苦。即有漏法皆行苦名全。餘二苦名多分。二相顯多分攝三苦。即舍受俱支等名行苦。行苦名相顯。餘二受俱苦名多分。緣起經上捲雲。生顯行苦。老顯壞苦。死顯苦苦。十地第八云。經曰十二因緣分說名三苦相。是中無明．行．識．名色．六入。名為行苦。觸．受名為苦苦。余因緣分名為壞苦。即愛．取．有．生．老死支。彼論無解。皆各隨義增。實無違也。瑜伽等說據遍法體正稱道理。緣起經中但約果時以辨三苦。因多種子隱而不論。或說果時。即顯因故。謂有為法造作名行。生是起義造作義增說為行苦。老是衰義。壞是變義。老壞義增說為壞苦。死是滅義。苦是迫義。死滅迫增說為苦苦。以果三苦。顯因隨應亦有三苦。隨相增說。不違瑜伽。十地經中通因果辨。行是作義。前之七支並引因攝造作義增。當果本故說為行苦。雖觸．受二亦引因收。苦苦義增不說為行。謂受支體多起苦受。諸支苦苦唯受支增。觸近生受與受相順。但說觸．受為苦苦體。欲顯諸受體皆是苦無有少樂。為令生厭故。說觸．受俱為苦苦。雖于死位苦苦亦增。與老相鄰但名壞苦。謂正壞體多是老支。死是滅無。與老相順。故老死支實名壞苦。于當果位生為壞本。故生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 在各種經論中，根據所強調的方面不同，對於三苦（苦苦、壞苦、行苦）的描述也各有側重，這是什麼原因呢？例如，在某些論著中，存在兩種分類方式：一是整體或大部分包含三苦，即所有有漏法都可以稱為行苦（Saṃskāra-duḥkha，一切皆遷流變化之苦），這是從整體上說的；而苦苦（Duḥkha-duḥkha，痛苦之苦）和壞苦（Vipariṇāma-duḥkha，變壞之苦）則只佔有漏法的大部分。二是根據現象的明顯程度來劃分，大部分包含三苦，例如舍受（Upekṣā-vedanā，不苦不樂的感受）及其相關因素被稱為行苦，因為行苦的現象最為明顯；而苦苦和壞苦則只佔大部分。緣起經上卷說，生（Jāti，出生）顯現行苦，老（Jarā，衰老）顯現壞苦，死（Maraṇa，死亡）顯現苦苦。《十地經》第八地中說，經中說十二因緣（Dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda）分別說明了三苦的相狀。其中，無明（Avidyā，無知）、行（Saṃskāra，造作）、識（Vijñāna，意識）、名色（Nāmarūpa，名與色，精神與物質）、六入（Ṣaḍāyatana，六根）被稱為行苦；觸（Sparśa，接觸）、受（Vedanā，感受）被稱為苦苦；其餘的因緣分，即愛（Tṛṣṇā，渴愛）、取（Upādāna，執取）、有（Bhava，存在）、生、老死，被稱為壞苦。這些論述並沒有相互矛盾，只是各自根據所要表達的意義而有所側重。 《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）等論著的說法，是根據普遍的法體和正確的道理來命名的。而《緣起經》中只是從結果的角度來辨析三苦，原因（種子）多種多樣，因此沒有詳細論述。或者說，在描述結果時，也隱含著原因。例如，有為法（Saṃskṛta-dharma，由因緣和合而成的法）的造作稱為行，生是起始的意思，強調造作的意義，所以說是行苦；老是衰敗的意思，壞是變異的意思，強調衰敗和變異的意義，所以說是壞苦；死是滅亡的意思，苦是逼迫的意思，強調死亡、滅亡和逼迫的意義，所以說是苦苦。通過結果的三苦，可以推知原因也相應地有三苦。這種根據所強調的方面不同而進行的描述，與《瑜伽師地論》並不矛盾。《十地經》中則同時從原因和結果的角度來辨析。行是造作的意思，前面的七支（無明、行、識、名色、六入、觸、受）都屬於原因，強調造作的意義，因為它們是未來結果的根本，所以說是行苦。雖然觸和受也屬於原因，但因為苦苦的意義更加明顯，所以沒有說它們是行苦。這是因為受支（Vedanā-aṅga，感受支）本身就容易產生苦受，而各個支中，苦苦的感受在受支中最為強烈。觸（Sparśa，接觸）接近於產生受，並且與受的相狀相順，所以只說觸和受是苦苦的本體，這是爲了顯示所有的感受本質上都是苦，沒有絲毫的快樂，從而使人生起厭離之心。雖然在死亡的階段，苦苦也會增加，但因為它與衰老相鄰，所以只稱為壞苦。這是因為正在變壞的本體主要是老支（Jarā-aṅga，衰老支），死亡是滅亡，與衰老相順，所以老死支實際上是壞苦。在未來的果位中，生是壞苦的根本，所以生...

【English Translation】 English version: Among various sutras and treatises, the descriptions of the three kinds of suffering (Duḥkha-duḥkha, Vipariṇāma-duḥkha, Saṃskāra-duḥkha) vary depending on the aspects being emphasized. What is the reason for this? For example, in some treatises, there are two ways of classification: one is that the entirety or a large part includes the three sufferings, that is, all conditioned dharmas (Saṃskṛta-dharma) can be called Saṃskāra-duḥkha (the suffering of everything being impermanent and changing), which is from an overall perspective; while Duḥkha-duḥkha (the suffering of pain) and Vipariṇāma-duḥkha (the suffering of change) only account for a large part of conditioned dharmas. The second is to classify according to the obviousness of the phenomena, with a large part including the three sufferings, for example, Upekṣā-vedanā (neutral feeling) and its related factors are called Saṃskāra-duḥkha, because the phenomenon of Saṃskāra-duḥkha is the most obvious; while Duḥkha-duḥkha and Vipariṇāma-duḥkha only account for a large part. The first volume of the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra says that Jāti (birth) manifests Saṃskāra-duḥkha, Jarā (aging) manifests Vipariṇāma-duḥkha, and Maraṇa (death) manifests Duḥkha-duḥkha. The eighth Bhūmi of the Daśabhūmika Sūtra says that the sutra states that the twelve links of dependent origination (Dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda) separately explain the characteristics of the three sufferings. Among them, Avidyā (ignorance), Saṃskāra (volitional formations), Vijñāna (consciousness), Nāmarūpa (name and form, mind and matter), and Ṣaḍāyatana (six sense bases) are called Saṃskāra-duḥkha; Sparśa (contact) and Vedanā (feeling) are called Duḥkha-duḥkha; and the remaining links, namely Tṛṣṇā (craving), Upādāna (grasping), Bhava (becoming), birth, aging, and death, are called Vipariṇāma-duḥkha. These statements do not contradict each other, but each emphasizes the meaning it wants to express. The statements in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other treatises are named according to the universal nature of dharmas and correct principles. However, the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra only analyzes the three sufferings from the perspective of the result, and the causes (seeds) are diverse, so it does not elaborate on them. Alternatively, when describing the result, the cause is also implied. For example, the creation of conditioned dharmas is called Saṃskāra, birth is the meaning of beginning, emphasizing the meaning of creation, so it is said to be Saṃskāra-duḥkha; aging is the meaning of decay, change is the meaning of alteration, emphasizing the meaning of decay and alteration, so it is said to be Vipariṇāma-duḥkha; death is the meaning of extinction, suffering is the meaning of oppression, emphasizing the meaning of death, extinction, and oppression, so it is said to be Duḥkha-duḥkha. Through the three sufferings of the result, it can be inferred that the cause also has three sufferings accordingly. This description based on different aspects being emphasized does not contradict the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The Daśabhūmika Sūtra analyzes from both the cause and the result. Saṃskāra is the meaning of creation, and the previous seven links (ignorance, volitional formations, consciousness, name and form, six sense bases, contact, feeling) all belong to the cause, emphasizing the meaning of creation, because they are the root of the future result, so it is said to be Saṃskāra-duḥkha. Although contact and feeling also belong to the cause, because the meaning of Duḥkha-duḥkha is more obvious, it is not said to be Saṃskāra-duḥkha. This is because the Vedanā-aṅga (feeling link) itself easily produces painful feelings, and among the various links, the feeling of Duḥkha-duḥkha is the strongest in the feeling link. Sparśa (contact) is close to producing feeling and is consistent with the characteristics of feeling, so only contact and feeling are said to be the essence of Duḥkha-duḥkha, which is to show that all feelings are essentially suffering, without any happiness, so as to make people generate a sense of aversion. Although Duḥkha-duḥkha also increases in the stage of death, it is only called Vipariṇāma-duḥkha because it is adjacent to aging. This is because the body that is changing is mainly the Jarā-aṅga (aging link), death is extinction, which is consistent with aging, so the aging and death links are actually Vipariṇāma-duḥkha. In the future result, birth is the root of Vipariṇāma-duḥkha, so birth...

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．老死皆壞苦攝。其愛．取．有為能生因。生當果時此三極近。從所生說愛．取．有三亦名壞苦。又此愛等五能所生攝。于熟變時此苦方起。變壞名壞苦。故皆壞苦攝。對法論說。于當果位有能所生。由熟變故說名為果。壞苦亦爾。皆隨相增說此三苦。非為實理。故論會之。余隨相增所說如是。

論。皆苦諦攝至業煩惱性故。

述曰。自下十五四諦門。此十二支皆苦諦攝。以是有漏取蘊性故。逼迫性故。皆果法故。其十二中五亦集諦。招感名集。非為因義。行．有是業。癡．愛．取三煩惱性故。非滅．道者。非無漏故。薩婆多師。苦．集體是一。因果故說二。今大乘不然。苦諦寬。集諦狹。諸集皆苦非苦皆集　問苦諦是果。果義有漏皆苦。集諦是因。因義有漏皆集　答不然。有漏無非苦。苦逼迫義。有漏皆苦諦。有異熟故方名集。集是有報。義非有漏法皆名集。如抉擇第五十五卷說。問道諦非有漏。支非道諦攝。加行．資糧道諦攝。有支亦應道諦收。答順道名為道。二道道諦攝。順生死法名緣起。道諦非緣起。二道克性亦非道諦。今約克性論故。支非道諦。二道有漏故。又二道位有漏二道是緣起支。非道諦攝。無漏二道種。是道諦攝。非緣起支。各據一義亦不相違。大論第十五．十六云。二支是苦諦。現

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：老死都屬於壞苦所包含的範疇。愛（tanha，渴愛）、取（upadana，執取）、有（bhava，存在）是能產生老死的因。當生作為果時，這三者非常接近。從所生的角度來說，愛、取、有這三者也被稱為壞苦。此外，這愛等五支既是能生，也是所生。在成熟變化時，這種苦才產生。變壞稱為壞苦，所以都屬於壞苦所包含的範疇。《對法論》中說，在當果位時，有能生和所生。由於成熟變化，所以被稱為果。壞苦也是如此。都是隨著現象的增強而說這三種苦，並非是真實的道理。所以論中會通說：其餘隨著現象增強所說的也是如此。

論：都屬於苦諦所包含的範疇，乃至屬於業和煩惱的性質。

述記：從下面開始是十五個四諦門。這十二支都屬於苦諦所包含的範疇，因為它們是有漏的取蘊的性質，具有逼迫的性質，都是果法的緣故。這十二支中，有五支也屬於集諦，招感稱為集，不是作為因的意義。行（sankhara，行）和有（bhava，有）是業。癡（moha，無明）、愛（tanha，渴愛）、取（upadana，執取）這三支屬於煩惱的性質。不是滅諦和道諦的原因，是因為它們不是無漏的緣故。薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的老師認為，苦諦和集諦是一體的，因為是因果關係所以說是二諦。現在大乘不這樣認為。苦諦寬泛，集諦狹窄。所有的集都是苦，但不是所有的苦都是集。問：苦諦是果，果的意義是有漏的都是苦。集諦是因，因的意義是有漏的都是集。答：不是這樣的。有漏的沒有不是苦的，苦具有逼迫的意義，有漏的都是苦諦。因為有異熟果的緣故才稱為集，集是有報的意義，不是有漏法都稱為集。如《抉擇》第五十五卷所說。問：道諦不是有漏的，支不是道諦所包含的。加行和資糧道諦所包含的，有支也應該被道諦所收攝。答：順應道才稱為道，二道屬於道諦所包含的。順應生死法稱為緣起。道諦不是緣起。二道的克性也不是道諦。現在是根據克性來論述的，所以支不是道諦。二道是有漏的緣故。又二道位上的有漏二道是緣起支，不屬於道諦所包含的。無漏二道的種子，是道諦所包含的，不是緣起支。各自根據一個意義，也不互相違背。《大論》第十五、十六卷說：二支是苦諦，現在。

【English Translation】 English version: Old age and death are all encompassed by the suffering of decay. Craving (tanha), grasping (upadana), and becoming (bhava) are the causes that can generate old age and death. When birth occurs as a result, these three are very close. From the perspective of what is produced, craving, grasping, and becoming are also called the suffering of decay. Furthermore, these five branches, including craving, are both the producer and the produced. This suffering only arises when maturation and change occur. Decay is called the suffering of decay, so all are encompassed by the suffering of decay. The Abhidharma states that in the position of the future result, there is both the producer and the produced. Because of maturation and change, it is called the result. The suffering of decay is also like this. These three sufferings are spoken of according to the increase in phenomena, not as ultimate truth. Therefore, the treatise reconciles them by saying that the rest, spoken of according to the increase in phenomena, are also like this.

Treatise: All are encompassed by the Truth of Suffering, up to the nature of karma and afflictions.

Commentary: From below are the fifteen doors of the Four Noble Truths. These twelve branches are all encompassed by the Truth of Suffering because they are of the nature of the aggregates of grasping that are defiled, have the nature of oppression, and are all resultant phenomena. Among these twelve branches, five are also encompassed by the Truth of Origin, attraction is called origin, not in the sense of a cause. Action (sankhara) and becoming (bhava) are karma. Ignorance (moha), craving (tanha), and grasping (upadana) are of the nature of afflictions. They are not the Truth of Cessation and the Truth of the Path because they are not unconditioned. The teachers of the Sarvastivada school believe that the Truth of Suffering and the Truth of Origin are one, and they are spoken of as two because of the cause-and-effect relationship. Now, the Mahayana does not think this way. The Truth of Suffering is broad, and the Truth of Origin is narrow. All origins are suffering, but not all suffering is origin. Question: The Truth of Suffering is a result, and in the sense of a result, all that is defiled is suffering. The Truth of Origin is a cause, and in the sense of a cause, all that is defiled is origin. Answer: That is not so. There is nothing defiled that is not suffering. Suffering has the meaning of oppression, and all that is defiled is the Truth of Suffering. It is only called origin because there is a different result. Origin has the meaning of retribution, and not all defiled phenomena are called origin, as stated in the fifty-fifth fascicle of the Decision. Question: The Truth of the Path is not defiled, and the branches are not encompassed by the Truth of the Path. The practices and accumulations are encompassed by the Truth of the Path, and the branches should also be included in the Truth of the Path. Answer: That which accords with the path is called the path, and the two paths are encompassed by the Truth of the Path. That which accords with the phenomena of birth and death is called dependent origination. The Truth of the Path is not dependent origination. The defining characteristic of the two paths is also not the Truth of the Path. Now, we are discussing it according to the defining characteristic, so the branches are not the Truth of the Path. The two paths are defiled. Furthermore, the defiled two paths in the position of the two paths are branches of dependent origination and are not encompassed by the Truth of the Path. The seeds of the undefiled two paths are encompassed by the Truth of the Path and are not branches of dependent origination. Each is based on one meaning, and they do not contradict each other. The fifteenth and sixteenth fascicles of the Great Treatise say that the two branches are the Truth of Suffering, now.

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為苦。生．老死。五支是苦諦。當爲苦。識乃至受。集諦謂所餘。與此文同。

論。諸支相望至有無不定。

述曰。十六四緣門。十二支相望。增上緣定有。以寬故。余之三緣有無不定。以局故。

問若亦有餘。何故緣起下。云唯有一增上。

論。契經依定唯說有一。

述曰。依定有故。唯說有一增上之緣。非遮余也。

又三緣中因緣最狹。

論。愛望于取至有因緣義。

述曰。此二支望後有因緣義。愛增名取。愛種能生取故。識等五種轉名為有。所生現行名為生故。有因緣也。有不望老死隔生支故。今鄰次說。不爾識望名色。乃至展轉亦爾。約當生位得為因緣。緣起經說生引同時故。今約種望種相鄰支體為論。識等未潤故。識等五種。望生等非因緣此即緣起。十地。瑜伽等。不說業為識支。因緣準此。

論。若說識支至亦作因緣。

述曰。如對法說識支是業種者。行望于識亦為因緣。現行行望行種識支故。

論。余支相望無因緣義。

述曰。除此三外余非因緣。不辨體生故。

論。而集論說至實是行種。

述曰。此會違文。集論第四。無明望行有因緣者。依于無明俱時之思業習氣說。無明俱故假說無明。實是行種。非實無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 為苦。生、老死（生、老、死：生命的三個階段）。五支是苦諦（苦諦：佛教四聖諦之一，指世間充滿痛苦的真理）。當爲苦。識（識：佛教術語，指了別作用）乃至受（受：佛教術語，指感受）。集諦（集諦：佛教四聖諦之一，指痛苦的根源在於慾望和執著）謂所餘。與此文同。

論。諸支相望至有無不定。

述曰。十六四緣門。十二支相望。增上緣（增上緣：佛教術語，四緣之一，指強有力的幫助條件）定有。以寬故。余之三緣有無不定。以局故。

問若亦有餘。何故緣起下。云唯有一增上。

論。契經依定唯說有一。

述曰。依定有故。唯說有一增上之緣。非遮余也。

又三緣中因緣（因緣：佛教術語，四緣之一，指直接原因和條件）最狹。

論。愛望于取至有因緣義。

述曰。此二支望後有因緣義。愛增名取（取：佛教術語，指強烈的執取和慾望）。愛種能生取故。識等五種轉名為有（有：佛教術語，指存在和業力）。所生現行名為生故。有因緣也。有不望老死隔生支故。今鄰次說。不爾識望名色（名色：佛教術語，指精神和物質的結合）。乃至展轉亦爾。約當生位得為因緣。緣起經說生引同時故。今約種望種相鄰支體為論。識等未潤故。識等五種。望生等非因緣此即緣起。十地。瑜伽等。不說業為識支。因緣準此。

論。若說識支至亦作因緣。

述曰。如對法說識支是業種者。行（行：佛教術語，指行為和業力）望于識亦為因緣。現行行望行種識支故。

論。余支相望無因緣義。

述曰。除此三外余非因緣。不辨體生故。

論。而集論說至實是行種。

述曰。此會違文。集論第四。無明（無明：佛教術語，指對真理的無知和迷惑）望行有因緣者。依于無明俱時之思業習氣說。無明俱故假說無明。實是行種。非實無

【English Translation】 English version Suffering. Birth, old age, and death. These five branches are the Truth of Suffering (Dukkha Satya: one of the Four Noble Truths in Buddhism, referring to the truth that the world is full of suffering). They should be regarded as suffering. Consciousness (Vijnana: a Buddhist term referring to the function of discernment) and even sensation (Vedana: a Buddhist term referring to feeling). The Truth of Accumulation (Samudaya Satya: one of the Four Noble Truths in Buddhism, referring to the origin of suffering in desire and attachment) refers to the rest. This is the same as the text.

Treatise: The mutual relationship of the branches is uncertain.

Commentary: The sixteen and four conditions. The twelve branches are related to each other. The Adhipati-pratyaya (Adhipati-pratyaya: a Buddhist term, one of the four conditions, referring to a powerful supporting condition) is definitely present because it is broad. The remaining three conditions may or may not be present because they are limited.

Question: If there are also others, why does the text on Dependent Origination say that there is only one Adhipati-pratyaya?

Treatise: The sutras only speak of one based on certainty.

Commentary: Because it is certain, it only speaks of one Adhipati-pratyaya. It does not exclude others.

Furthermore, among the three conditions, the Hetu-pratyaya (Hetu-pratyaya: a Buddhist term, one of the four conditions, referring to the direct cause and condition) is the narrowest.

Treatise: Craving in relation to grasping has the meaning of Hetu-pratyaya.

Commentary: These two branches have the meaning of Hetu-pratyaya in relation to what follows. Increased craving is called grasping (Upadana: a Buddhist term referring to strong attachment and desire). The seed of craving can produce grasping. The five kinds of consciousness, etc., are transformed and called existence (Bhava: a Buddhist term referring to existence and karma). The manifested action that is produced is called birth. Therefore, there is Hetu-pratyaya. Existence does not relate to old age and death because it is separated by the branch of birth. Now it is discussed in sequence. Otherwise, consciousness relates to name and form (Nama-rupa: a Buddhist term referring to the combination of mind and matter), and so on. It can be considered a Hetu-pratyaya in terms of the future birth. The Sutra on Dependent Origination says that birth leads simultaneously. Now, the discussion is about the seed in relation to the adjacent branches. Because the five kinds of consciousness, etc., are not yet moistened. The five kinds of consciousness, etc., in relation to birth, etc., are not Hetu-pratyaya. This is Dependent Origination. The Ten Stages. Yoga, etc., do not say that karma is a branch of consciousness. The Hetu-pratyaya is based on this.

Treatise: If the branch of consciousness is said to also act as a Hetu-pratyaya.

Commentary: As the Abhidharma says that the branch of consciousness is the seed of karma, action (Samskara: a Buddhist term referring to action and karma) in relation to consciousness is also a Hetu-pratyaya. Because present action relates to the seed of action, the branch of consciousness.

Treatise: The remaining branches have no meaning of Hetu-pratyaya in relation to each other.

Commentary: Except for these three, the rest are not Hetu-pratyaya. Because they do not distinguish the production of the entity.

Treatise: However, the Abhidharma-samuccaya says that it is actually the seed of action.

Commentary: This contradicts the text. The fourth chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya. If ignorance (Avidya: a Buddhist term referring to ignorance and delusion about the truth) in relation to action has a Hetu-pratyaya, it is based on the habitual energy of thought and karma simultaneous with ignorance. Because it is simultaneous with ignorance, it is falsely said to be ignorance. It is actually the seed of action. It is not actually non-existent.

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明。無明既爾。余支準知。此依別體。非分位故。彼論以無明為首。例余應亦爾故。彼且以無明作法。此偏會之。

論。瑜伽論說至唯業有說。

述曰。瑜伽第十說有三緣無因緣者。依現行愛．取。不依種愛．取故。依業種為有。不依識等種有說故。不說有因緣。非相違也。彼論但言。無明望色行為增上。望無色行為三緣。謂等無間．所緣．增上。如是余支為緣多少。應如此知。謂有色望有色支。為一增上。望無色支。為二緣。謂所緣．增上。無色望有色。一增上。望無色為三緣。謂等無間．所緣．增上。彼復問言。何故相望無因緣。答因緣者。自體種子緣所顯故。故知依現愛．取及業有說。愛．取依現非依種子。有依業種非自體故。若無此論。難解瑜伽。彼又問言。若無因緣者。何故說言依因果性建立緣起。答依增上緣所攝。引發．牽引．生起因說為因故。既言依增上生起因。明依業有說。即以此文證生起因唯說增上緣。

論。無明望行至有餘二緣。

述曰。增上緣定有。此中更不說。無明望行。愛望于取。生望老死。此之三支有餘二緣。謂等無間。及所緣緣。行望識。乃至觸望受。取望有。無等無間者。其果皆非現心．心所相引生故。非所緣緣者。皆非現行心能緣慮故。

論。有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『明』（Vidya，光明）的反面是『無明』（Avidya，無明）。既然無明是這樣，其餘的支也應該按照這個來理解。這是依據各自獨立的個體，而不是依據不同的階段。因為《瑜伽師地論》以無明為首，那麼其餘的支也應該如此。那裡只是以無明為例，這裡則是全面地理解。

論：如《瑜伽師地論》所說，乃至唯有業的說法。

述曰：《瑜伽師地論》第十卷說，有三種緣是無因緣的。這是依據現行的愛（Trsna，渴愛）、取（Upadana，取著），而不是依據種子中的愛、取。依據業的種子而存在，而不是依據識等的種子而存在。所以說沒有因緣，這並不矛盾。該論只說，無明對於色（Rupa，色蘊）、行（Samskara，行蘊）是增上緣（Adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣），對於無色（Arupa，無色界）的行為是三種緣，即等無間緣（Samanantara-pratyaya，等無間緣）、所緣緣（Alambana-pratyaya，所緣緣）、增上緣。像這樣，其餘的支作為緣的多少，應該這樣理解。即有色對於有色的支，是一種增上緣，對於無色的支，是兩種緣，即所緣緣、增上緣。無色對於有色，是一種增上緣，對於無色是三種緣，即等無間緣、所緣緣、增上緣。那裡又問，為什麼相互之間沒有因緣？回答說，因緣是自體種子所顯現的緣。所以知道是依據現行的愛、取以及業而說的。愛、取是依據現行而不是依據種子，有的是依據業的種子而不是自體。如果沒有這部論，就很難理解《瑜伽師地論》。那裡又問，如果沒有因緣，為什麼說依據因果性建立緣起？回答說，是依據增上緣所攝，引發、牽引、生起的原因說是因。既然說依據增上緣生起因，就說明是依據業而說的。即以此文證明生起因只是說增上緣。

論：無明對於行，乃至有其餘兩種緣。

述曰：增上緣是必然存在的，這裡不再贅述。無明對於行，愛對於取，生對於老死，這三個支有其餘兩種緣，即等無間緣和所緣緣。行對於識，乃至觸對於受，取對於有，沒有等無間緣，是因為它們的結果都不是現行心、心所相互牽引而生起的。不是所緣緣，是因為它們都不是現行心能夠緣慮的。

論：有

【English Translation】 English version: 『Ming』 (Vidya, Brightness) is the opposite of 『Wu Ming』 (Avidya, Ignorance). Since ignorance is like this, the remaining limbs should also be understood accordingly. This is based on their respective independent entities, not based on different stages. Because the Yogacarabhumi-sastra begins with ignorance, the remaining limbs should also be like this. There, it only takes ignorance as an example, while here it is a comprehensive understanding.

Treatise: As stated in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, up to the statement that only karma exists.

Commentary: The tenth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that there are three kinds of conditions that are without a cause condition. This is based on the current craving (Trsna, thirst) and grasping (Upadana, clinging), not based on the seeds of craving and grasping. It exists based on the seeds of karma, not based on the seeds of consciousness, etc. Therefore, it is said that there is no cause condition, which is not contradictory. That treatise only says that ignorance is the dominant condition (Adhipati-pratyaya) for form (Rupa, form aggregate) and action (Samskara, formation aggregate), and for formless (Arupa, formless realm) actions, it is three conditions, namely, the immediately preceding condition (Samanantara-pratyaya), the object condition (Alambana-pratyaya), and the dominant condition. In this way, the number of conditions for the remaining limbs should be understood in this way. That is, form for form limbs is one dominant condition, and for formless limbs, it is two conditions, namely, the object condition and the dominant condition. Formless for form is one dominant condition, and for formless is three conditions, namely, the immediately preceding condition, the object condition, and the dominant condition. There it is also asked, why is there no cause condition between each other? The answer is that the cause condition is the condition manifested by the seed of its own entity. Therefore, it is known that it is based on the current craving, grasping, and karma. Craving and grasping are based on the current, not based on the seeds, and some are based on the seeds of karma, not on the self-entity. Without this treatise, it would be difficult to understand the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. There it is also asked, if there is no cause condition, why is it said that dependent origination is established based on causality? The answer is that it is included in the dominant condition, and the cause of inducing, attracting, and arising is said to be the cause. Since it is said that the cause of arising is based on the dominant condition, it shows that it is based on karma. That is, this text proves that the cause of arising only refers to the dominant condition.

Treatise: Ignorance for action, up to having the remaining two conditions.

Commentary: The dominant condition is inevitable, so it will not be repeated here. Ignorance for action, craving for grasping, birth for old age and death, these three limbs have the remaining two conditions, namely, the immediately preceding condition and the object condition. Action for consciousness, up to contact for sensation, grasping for existence, there is no immediately preceding condition because their results are not generated by the current mind and mental factors attracting each other. It is not the object condition because they are not the current mind that can contemplate.

Treatise: There is

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望于生至有所緣緣。

述曰。有望生受望愛無等無間。有．受皆種。種望于現。非等無間故。有所緣緣者。為彼果所緣故。

論。余支相望二俱非有。

述曰。如前已說。

論。此中且依至如理應思。

述曰。此中所說。前望次後鄰近。非隔越超一。超二．多等。此依順次。非逆次第。依因果前後不相雜亂。各各克體實緣起。而論。不如對法無明望行相雜亂。非實緣起說。異鄰次若越次。異順次若逆次。異不相雜亂實緣起。若相雜亂假緣起者。為緣不定。諸聰惠者如理應思。且隔越者。且如無明。與識等五及有。但一增上。與愛．取．生．老死為二緣。謂所緣．增上。餘一切準可知。若逆次者。亦有鄰次．隔越。今合說老死與生．愛．取．行．無明為二緣。謂所緣．增上。余但增上。若相雜亂有二。一順。二逆。順中有鄰次．隔越。鄰次如對法。隔越與前實緣不殊。亦約識等五種而說。若約當生隨其所應。逆次之中有鄰有間。皆應思準。緣起下說此約增上說。然有遠近。乃至諸支一一廣作。然此中識等五。依當起位。諸支隔越逆次超間相雜為緣。一一思準可解。不煩廣為。

論。惑業苦三至是苦所攝。

述曰。第十七門。惑．業。苦攝支者。無明．愛．取三是惑。行全有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『望于生至有所緣緣。』

述曰：有望生，受望愛，無等無間。有、受皆種。種望于現。非等無間故。有所緣緣者，為彼果所緣故。

論：余支相望二俱非有。

述曰：如前已說。

論：此中且依至如理應思。

述曰：此中所說，前望次後鄰近，非隔越超一，超二、多等。此依順次，非逆次第。依因果前後不相雜亂，各各克體實緣起而論。不如對法無明望行相雜亂，非實緣起說。異鄰次若越次，異順次若逆次，異不相雜亂實緣起，若相雜亂假緣起者，為緣不定。諸聰惠者如理應思。且隔越者，且如無明（Avidyā，無明），與識（Vijñāna，識）等五及有（Bhava，有），但一增上。與愛（Tṛṣṇā，愛）、取（Upādāna，取）、生（Jāti，生）、老死（Jarā-maraṇa，老死）為二緣，謂所緣、增上。餘一切準可知。若逆次者，亦有鄰次、隔越。今合說老死與生、愛、取、行（Saṃskāra，行）、無明為二緣，謂所緣、增上。余但增上。若相雜亂有二，一順，二逆。順中有鄰次、隔越。鄰次如對法。隔越與前實緣不殊。亦約識等五種而說。若約當生隨其所應。逆次之中有鄰有間，皆應思準。緣起下說此約增上說。然有遠近。乃至諸支一一廣作。然此中識等五，依當起位。諸支隔越逆次超間相雜為緣，一一思準可解。不煩廣為。

論：惑業苦三至是苦所攝。

述曰：第十七門。惑、業、苦攝支者，無明、愛、取三是惑。行全有（Bhava，有）。

【English Translation】 English version: 'The hope for birth leads to conditioned origination.'

Commentary: 'Hope for birth' means hope for existence, desire for love, without equality or interruption. 'Existence' and 'reception' are both seeds. The seed hopes for the present. Because it is not equal or uninterrupted, 'conditioned origination' is because it is conditioned by that result.

Treatise: The remaining branches, viewed in relation to each other, are both non-existent.

Commentary: As previously stated.

Treatise: In this context, one should rely on proper reflection.

Commentary: What is said here is that the preceding hopes for the succeeding, which are adjacent and near, not separated or exceeding one, two, or many. This relies on sequential order, not reverse order. It relies on cause and effect, with the preceding and succeeding not mixed up, each individually fulfilling its substance and truly arising. It is not like the Abhidharma (對法), where ignorance (Avidyā, 無明) hopes for action (Saṃskāra, 行) in a mixed-up manner, which is not a true arising. Different adjacent or exceeding orders, different sequential or reverse orders, different non-mixed-up true arisings, or mixed-up false arisings, are due to uncertain conditions. Wise individuals should reflect properly. As for separation, for example, ignorance (Avidyā, 無明), together with consciousness (Vijñāna, 識) and the other five, and existence (Bhava, 有), are only a single dominant condition. With desire (Tṛṣṇā, 愛), grasping (Upādāna, 取), birth (Jāti, 生), and old age and death (Jarā-maraṇa, 老死), they are two conditions, namely, object and dominant condition. Everything else can be inferred accordingly. If it is reverse order, there are also adjacent and separated conditions. Now, collectively speaking, old age and death, together with birth, desire, grasping, action (Saṃskāra, 行), and ignorance, are two conditions, namely, object and dominant condition. The rest are only dominant conditions. If there is mixing, there are two types: sequential and reverse. In the sequential type, there are adjacent and separated conditions. Adjacent conditions are like the Abhidharma. Separated conditions are not different from the previous true conditions. They are also discussed in relation to consciousness and the other five. If it is about future birth, it should be according to what is appropriate. In the reverse order, there are adjacent and separated conditions, which should all be considered accordingly. The discussion below on conditioned origination is about dominant conditions. However, there are near and far conditions. Even each branch is extensively elaborated. However, in this context, consciousness and the other five rely on the position where they arise. The branches are separated, in reverse order, exceeding intervals, and mixed up as conditions, which can be understood by considering each one. There is no need for extensive elaboration.

Treatise: The three categories of delusion, karma, and suffering are all included in suffering.

Commentary: The seventeenth section. Among the branches included in delusion, karma, and suffering, ignorance, desire, and grasping are the three delusions. Action (Saṃskāra, 行) and existence (Bhava, 有) are entirely karma.

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一分。除識等種是業所攝。識等五生等二七全及有一分中已潤識等五種。是苦所攝。

如大論第五十六．及十地第八．中邊上說。行．有是業道。無明．愛．取是煩惱道。餘七是苦道。大論第十雖不別解。今云三是煩惱道。二是業道。余是苦道。舊中邊說道為難。謂煩惱難．業難．苦難。然新翻名雜染。

論。有處說業至業有說故。

述曰。今者會違。此中據實而論。乃言有一分。含識等種故。瑜伽．十地等。說業全攝有者。應知彼論依業有說故。不爾彼論應分別有。

對法第四云。行．識．有三是業。余皆同此。今論會云。

論。有處說識至為識支故。

述曰。識是業者。彼說業種為識支故。彼論問言。何故識支業染所攝。答諸行習氣所顯故。即行種子名識故也。

論。惑業所招至為生厭故。

述曰。此釋外問。若苦體者一切皆是。何故惑．業不名為苦。唯此所招名為苦也。彼唯苦諦。非如惑．業亦集諦故。又為生厭不起惑．業。說此所招獨名為苦。此即論文以十七門。總是第十廣分別門訖。余門如瑜伽第十．九十三．緣起等說。謂七．十九無知廣問答等。

論。由惑業苦至生死相續。

述曰。此等一一如別章抄。不能廣解。后諸講者準此應說。上

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：一部分。除了『識』（Vijnana，了別作用）等種子是屬於『業』（Karma，行為）所攝的。『識』等五種，以及『生』（Jati，出生）等二七種全部，以及一部分中已經滋潤的『識』等五種，是屬於『苦』（Dukkha，痛苦）所攝的。

如《大毗婆沙論》（Mahavibhasa）第五十六卷，以及《十地經》（Dasabhumika Sutra）第八卷，《中邊分別論》（Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya）所說，『行』（Samskara，行蘊）、『有』（Bhava，存在）是『業道』（Karma-patha，業的道路）。『無明』（Avidya，無知）、『愛』（Trsna，渴愛）、『取』（Upadana，執取）是『煩惱道』（Klesa-patha，煩惱的道路）。其餘七種是『苦道』（Dukk-patha，痛苦的道路）。《大毗婆沙論》第十卷雖然沒有分別解釋，現在說三種是煩惱道，兩種是業道，其餘是苦道。舊譯《中邊分別論》說『道』是困難，指煩惱難、業難、苦難。然而新譯名為『雜染』。

論：有的地方說『業』，乃至說『業有』的緣故。

述曰：現在調和矛盾。這裡根據實際情況而論，才說有一部分，包含『識』等種子。瑜伽、《十地經》等，說『業』全部攝『有』，應當知道那些論典是依據『業有』而說的緣故。否則那些論典應該分別說明『有』。

《對法論》（Abhidharma）第四卷說，『行』、『識』、『有』三種是『業』，其餘都與此相同。現在本論會通說：

論：有的地方說『識』，乃至作為『識支』（Vijnana-anga，識支）的緣故。

述曰：『識』是『業』，是說『業』的種子作為『識支』的緣故。那部論典問：為什麼『識支』屬於『業染』（Karma-samklesa，業的雜染）所攝？回答說：因為是『行』的習氣所顯現的緣故。也就是『行』的種子名為『識』的緣故。

論：由『惑』（Klesha，煩惱）、『業』所招感，乃至爲了對『生』（Jati，出生）生起厭離的緣故。

述曰：這是解釋外人的提問。如果『苦』的本體一切都是，為什麼『惑』、『業』不稱為『苦』，唯有『惑』、『業』所招感的才稱為『苦』呢？因為『苦』唯是『苦諦』（Dukkha-satya，苦諦），不像『惑』、『業』也是『集諦』（Samudaya-satya，集諦）的緣故。又爲了對『生』生起厭離，不起『惑』、『業』，所以說『惑』、『業』所招感的單獨稱為『苦』。這即是論文用十七種門，總括第十廣分別門完畢。其餘的門如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第十卷、第九十三卷、緣起等所說。指七種、十九種無知廣問答等。

論：由『惑』、『業』、『苦』，乃至生死相續。

述曰：這些一一如別的章節抄錄。不能廣泛解釋。後來的講者根據這個應該解說。上面。

【English Translation】 English version: A portion. Except for the seeds of 『Vijnana』 (consciousness, the function of distinguishing) and the like, which are included in 『Karma』 (action). The five types of 『Vijnana』 and the full twenty-seven types of 『Jati』 (birth) and the like, as well as the five types of 『Vijnana』 and the like that have already been nourished in a portion, are included in 『Dukkha』 (suffering).

As stated in the Mahavibhasa (Great Commentary) Volume 56, the Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Stages Sutra) Volume 8, and the Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya (Commentary on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes), 『Samskara』 (volitional formations, the aggregate of mental formations) and 『Bhava』 (existence) are the 『Karma-patha』 (path of action). 『Avidya』 (ignorance), 『Trsna』 (craving), and 『Upadana』 (grasping) are the 『Klesa-patha』 (path of affliction). The remaining seven are the 『Dukkha-patha』 (path of suffering). Although Mahavibhasa Volume 10 does not explain them separately, it is now said that three are the path of affliction, two are the path of action, and the rest are the path of suffering. The old translation of Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya says that the 『path』 is difficult, referring to the difficulty of affliction, the difficulty of action, and the difficulty of suffering. However, the new translation is named 『Samklesa』 (defilement).

Treatise: In some places, 『Karma』 is mentioned, even to the extent of saying 『Karma-bhava』 (existence due to karma).

Commentary: Now reconciling the contradictions. Here, based on the actual situation, it is said that there is a portion, including the seeds of 『Vijnana』 and the like. The Yogacara, Dasabhumika Sutra, etc., say that 『Karma』 fully encompasses 『Bhava』. It should be known that those treatises are based on 『Karma-bhava』. Otherwise, those treatises should separately explain 『Bhava』.

The Abhidharma (Treatise on Dharma) Volume 4 says that 『Samskara』, 『Vijnana』, and 『Bhava』 are the three types of 『Karma』, and the rest are the same as these. Now, this treatise reconciles by saying:

Treatise: In some places, 『Vijnana』 is mentioned, even to the extent of being a 『Vijnana-anga』 (limb of consciousness).

Commentary: 『Vijnana』 is 『Karma』 because the seeds of 『Karma』 serve as the 『Vijnana-anga』. That treatise asks: Why is the 『Vijnana-anga』 included in 『Karma-samklesa』 (defilement of karma)? The answer is: Because it is manifested by the habitual energy of 『Samskara』. That is, the seeds of 『Samskara』 are called 『Vijnana』.

Treatise: Caused by 『Klesha』 (affliction) and 『Karma』, even to the point of generating aversion to 『Jati』 (birth).

Commentary: This explains the question from outsiders. If the substance of 『Dukkha』 is everything, why are 『Klesha』 and 『Karma』 not called 『Dukkha』, but only what is caused by 『Klesha』 and 『Karma』 is called 『Dukkha』? Because 『Dukkha』 is only the 『Dukkha-satya』 (truth of suffering), unlike 『Klesha』 and 『Karma』, which are also the 『Samudaya-satya』 (truth of the origin of suffering). Furthermore, in order to generate aversion to 『Jati』 and not arise 『Klesha』 and 『Karma』, it is said that what is caused by 『Klesha』 and 『Karma』 alone is called 『Dukkha』. This is the treatise using seventeen doors, summarizing the completion of the tenth extensive explanation door. The remaining doors are as described in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) Volume 10, Volume 93, the origin of dependent origination, etc. Referring to the seven and nineteen types of extensive questions and answers on ignorance, etc.

Treatise: From 『Klesha』, 『Karma』, and 『Dukkha』, even to the continuous cycle of birth and death.

Commentary: These are all copied from separate chapters. They cannot be extensively explained. Later lecturers should explain based on this. Above.

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來總是第二以十門廣解緣起訖。自下第三結惑．業．苦歸本頌文。由惑．業．苦即十二支故。此惑等能令生死相續不斷。不由外緣生死續也。

上來已三複次解頌文訖。自下第四段釋本頌文。中有三。初釋生死相續頌文。二因解凈法相續。三結歸唯識。初中有三。初總解頌文。生死相續由內因緣等。次別解二死。后屬釋頌文。

論。複次生死相續至故唯有識。

述曰。此即初也。如文可解。

次別解二死。既言內因內緣。何者是也。

論。因謂有漏至故說為因。

述曰。此下第二正解二死。初總舉生死之因緣體性得名所由。二所以者何下。外徴釋出生死體等。初中先出因體。后出緣體。此則初也。有漏業者。謂三界善業。欲不善業。如緣起中。正感後世引滿業是。除順現業別助當業。皆非此攝。非是行支正感生死。故無記業亦非業攝。理如常解。無漏業中。除無分別正體．后得．及此加行。唯取后得有分別者。緣事生故。至下當知。此有無漏業。正感生死故說為因。言正感者。顯由此故生死相續。由此有力生死續生。正牽生死。有漏者異熟因攝。無漏者如異熟因故言正感。

論。緣謂煩惱至起說為緣。

述曰。此釋緣體等。此中二障。助前二業感於生死。故說為緣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：前面已經用十門廣泛地解釋了緣起的始終。從下面開始是第三部分，總結迷惑、業、苦歸於根本的頌文。因為迷惑、業、苦就是十二支，這些迷惑等能夠使生死相續不斷，不是由於外在的因緣使生死延續。 上面已經三次重複解釋了頌文。從下面開始是第四段，解釋本頌文。其中有三部分：首先解釋生死相續的頌文，其次因為解釋清凈法相續，第三總結歸於唯識。第一部分中有三部分：首先總的解釋頌文，生死相續由內在的因緣等；其次分別解釋二死；最後屬於解釋頌文。 論：複次，生死相續乃至故唯有識。 述曰：這就是第一部分，如文可解。 其次分別解釋二死。既然說內在的因、內在的緣，那麼什麼是內在的因、內在的緣呢？ 論：因謂有漏乃至故說為因。 述曰：下面是第二部分，正式解釋二死。首先總的舉出生死的因緣體性，以及得名的由來。其次『所以者何』以下，從外面征問解釋出生死的本體等。第一部分中先說因的本體，后說緣的本體。這是第一部分。有漏業，指的是三界的善業，欲界的不善業，如緣起中所說，正是感得後世的引業和滿業。除了順現業和別助當業，都不屬於這裡所說的範圍。因為它們不是行支，不能直接感得生死。所以無記業也不屬於業的範圍，道理如常理解釋。無漏業中，除了無分別的正體、后得、以及此加行，只取后得的有分別者，因為它緣事而生，到下面會知道。這種有無漏業，直接感得生死，所以說為因。說『正感』，是爲了顯示由於這個原因，生死相續，由於這個原因，有力量使生死繼續產生，直接牽引生死。有漏業屬於異熟因所攝，無漏業如異熟因，所以說『正感』。 論：緣謂煩惱乃至起說為緣。 述曰：這是解釋緣的本體等。這其中的二障，幫助前面的二業感得生死，所以說為緣。

【English Translation】 English version: Previously, the arising of conditions from beginning to end has been extensively explained using the ten gates. From here onwards is the third part, summarizing delusion, karma, and suffering returning to their root in the verses. Because delusion, karma, and suffering are the twelve links, these delusions, etc., can cause the cycle of birth and death to continue without interruption, not due to external conditions causing the continuation of birth and death. The verses have already been repeatedly explained three times above. From here onwards is the fourth section, explaining the original verses. There are three parts within: first, explaining the verses on the continuation of birth and death; second, explaining the continuation of pure Dharma because of the former; and third, concluding with the return to Consciousness-Only. There are three parts within the first part: first, a general explanation of the verses, the continuation of birth and death is due to internal causes and conditions, etc.; second, separate explanations of the two deaths; and third, belonging to the explanation of the verses. Treatise: Furthermore, the continuation of birth and death, up to therefore, is only consciousness. Commentary: This is the first part, as the text can be understood. Next, separately explain the two deaths. Since it is said that there are internal causes and internal conditions, what are the internal causes and internal conditions? Treatise: Cause refers to defiled [karma], up to therefore, it is said to be the cause. Commentary: Below is the second part, formally explaining the two deaths. First, generally cite the nature of the causes and conditions of birth and death, and the origin of the name. Second, 'What is the reason?' below, externally inquire and explain the substance of birth and death, etc. In the first part, first state the substance of the cause, then state the substance of the condition. This is the first part. Defiled karma refers to the wholesome karma of the three realms, and the unwholesome karma of the desire realm, as mentioned in the arising of conditions, which precisely causes the karma that draws and fulfills the subsequent life. Except for karma that accords with the present and karma that separately assists the future, none of these are included here. Because they are not the branch of action, they cannot directly cause birth and death. Therefore, indeterminate karma is also not included in the category of karma, the principle is as commonly understood. Among undefiled karma, except for the non-discriminating true nature, subsequent attainment, and this preparatory practice, only the discriminating subsequent attainment is taken, because it arises from objects, as will be known below. This kind of defiled and undefiled karma directly causes birth and death, so it is said to be the cause. Saying 'directly causes' is to show that due to this reason, birth and death continue, due to this reason, there is the power to make birth and death continue to arise, directly pulling birth and death. Defiled karma is included in the result of maturation, undefiled karma is like the cause of maturation, so it is said to 'directly cause'. Treatise: Condition refers to afflictions, up to arising, it is said to be the condition. Commentary: This explains the substance of the condition, etc. The two obscurations within this help the preceding two karmas to cause birth and death, so it is said to be the condition.

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。非正有力由此生故。煩惱障者。謂一切潤生諸惑。取發業者雖理無違。而今此意取潤生者。所知障者此類雖多。但取緣佛有情起者。或取一切。如煩惱潤。至下當知。

論。所以者何。

述曰。自下第二齣生死體。于中有二。初假外徴。此有二問。生死有幾由二因緣。有何所以由斯二業生死果起。

下答有二。初總答。后別解。

論。生死有二。

述曰。此總答數。

論。一分段生死至粗異熟果。

述曰。此下別解有二。初解分段。后解變易。此解分段中。初體后名。此出體也。用前有漏善不善業為正感因。由前煩惱障緣助勢力。所感三界異熟無記粗異熟果。易可見故。有定限故。易了知故。二乘世間共知有故。名之為粗。五蘊為性。此即正出生死體也。

何名分段。

論。身命短長至故名分段。

述曰。此釋名也。以此異熟身命短長。或一歲一日乃至八萬劫等。隨往業因惑緣之力有爾所時。若身。若命。定齊限故名為分段。可為一分一段等故名分段也。

論。二不思議至細異熟果。

述曰。下解變易有五。初出體。次釋名。因辨得人。次問答。次二死對辨。后總結。此出體也。謂前諸無漏后得有分別業。由前所知障緣助勢力所感殊勝

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：非正因和有力的因由此產生。煩惱障（Klesha-avarana，煩惱的障礙）是指一切能滋潤生命輪迴的迷惑。雖然從道理上說，取能引發業的煩惱並沒有錯，但這裡的意思是取能滋潤生命輪迴的煩惱。所知障（Jnana-avarana，對真理的認知障礙）這類障礙雖然很多，但這裡只取那些緣于佛和有情眾生而產生的障礙，或者取一切能滋潤生命輪迴的障礙，就像煩惱障一樣，這一點在後面會明白。

論：為什麼這樣說呢？

述曰：下面第二部分是闡述生死的本體。其中分為兩部分。首先是假設外來的提問。這裡有兩個問題：生死有幾種？由哪兩種因緣產生？有什麼原因導致由這兩種業產生生死的果報？

下面回答分為兩部分。首先是總的回答，然後是分別解釋。

論：生死有兩種。

述曰：這是總的回答數量。

論：一是分段生死，乃至粗糙的異熟果。

述曰：下面分別解釋，分為兩部分。首先解釋分段生死，然後解釋變易生死。這裡解釋分段生死，先說本體，后說名稱。這是說明分段生死的本體。用之前的有漏善業和不善業作為主要的感生之因，由之前的煩惱障作為助緣，所感得的三界異熟無記的粗糙異熟果。因為容易看見，有固定的期限，容易瞭解，二乘聖者和世間人都知道有這種生死，所以稱為粗糙。以五蘊為體性。這就是真正出生的生死本體。

什麼叫做分段？

論：身命有短有長，乃至因此叫做分段。

述曰：這是解釋名稱。因為這種異熟果的身命有長有短，或者一年一天，乃至八萬劫等等，隨著往昔的業因和煩惱的緣分的力量，有這麼長的時間。無論是身體還是壽命，都有一定的期限，所以叫做分段。可以分為一份一段等等，所以叫做分段。

論：二是不思議，乃至微細的異熟果。

述曰：下面解釋變易生死，分為五個部分。首先是說明本體，其次是解釋名稱，然後辨別證得變易生死的人，接著是問答，然後是兩種生死的對比辨析，最後是總結。這裡是說明變易生死的本體。指的是之前的各種無漏后得的有分別的業，由之前的所知障作為助緣，所感得的殊勝的果報。

【English Translation】 English version: Non-rightful causes and powerful causes arise from this. Klesha-avarana (the obstacle of afflictions) refers to all delusions that nourish the cycle of life and death. Although it is not wrong in principle to take afflictions that trigger karma, here it means taking afflictions that nourish the cycle of life and death. Jnana-avarana (the obstacle to the knowledge of truth), although there are many such obstacles, here it only takes those that arise from the Buddha and sentient beings, or takes all that nourish the cycle of life and death, just like Klesha-avarana, which will be understood later.

Treatise: Why is this so?

Commentary: The second part below explains the substance of birth and death. It is divided into two parts. The first is a hypothetical external question. There are two questions here: How many kinds of birth and death are there? What two kinds of causes and conditions produce them? What reasons lead to the fruits of birth and death arising from these two kinds of karma?

The answer below is divided into two parts. First, a general answer, then separate explanations.

Treatise: There are two kinds of birth and death.

Commentary: This is a general answer to the number.

Treatise: First, segmented birth and death, up to the coarse Vipaka (result of karma).

Commentary: The following is a separate explanation, divided into two parts. First, explain segmented birth and death, then explain transformational birth and death. Here, segmented birth and death is explained, first the substance, then the name. This explains the substance of segmented birth and death. Using the previous contaminated wholesome and unwholesome karma as the main cause of feeling, with the previous Klesha-avarana as an auxiliary condition, the coarse Vipaka of the three realms, which is neither wholesome nor unwholesome, is felt. Because it is easy to see, has a fixed limit, is easy to understand, and is known to both Arhats and worldly people, it is called coarse. Its nature is the five skandhas. This is the true substance of birth and death that arises.

What is called segmentation?

Treatise: The length of life varies, and therefore it is called segmentation.

Commentary: This explains the name. Because the length of life of this Vipaka varies, or one year, one day, or even eighty thousand kalpas, depending on the power of past karma and the conditions of afflictions, there is such a long time. Whether it is the body or the lifespan, there is a fixed limit, so it is called segmentation. It can be divided into segments, so it is called segmentation.

Treatise: Second, inconceivable, up to the subtle Vipaka.

Commentary: The following explains transformational birth and death, divided into five parts. First, explain the substance, second, explain the name, then distinguish the people who attain transformational birth and death, then question and answer, then compare and analyze the two kinds of birth and death, and finally summarize. Here, the substance of transformational birth and death is explained. It refers to the various uncontaminated karma obtained after enlightenment, with the previous Jnana-avarana as an auxiliary condition, the excellent result that is felt.

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細異熟果。此望分段轉凈妙故。轉微細故。轉光潔故。無定限故。非彼世間。及非迴心二乘境故。名為殊勝。唯妙唯細。唯是菩薩。及其自身。並佛境界故名為細。第八十說其諸天等尚不見故。此以異熟無記五蘊為自性。於五果中異熟果攝。此即正出生死體也。何故分段言三界果。此死不言是何界果。此於三界非定何界。如前第七已有二解。故不言三界不同分段死定屬此界業。此變易死不屬。無漏業故。此資行相至下當知。

何名變易死。而言不思議。

論。由悲願力至故名變易。

述曰。下釋名兼辨得人也。略有三名。此第一也。謂由大悲救生大愿得菩提力故。改轉舊鄙惡身命。成今殊勝身命。轉先粗劣身命。成今妙細身命。前有定限齊。謂此業。此洲。此界。此地。定爾所時。今此業。此洲。此界。此地。齊限不定。如資色界廣果天身。過五百由旬。命過五百劫。或減于彼。乃至欲界．人天亦爾。變是改義。易是轉義。改轉舊身命生死。成今身命生死。故名變易。

下何名不思議。

論。無漏定愿至名不思議。

述曰。若無漏定願力正所資生。正所感得。至彼微細妙用難測不可知故。非二乘境故。名不思議。非凡有情二乘言度。名不思議。非謂菩薩．佛亦不知。名不思議也

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 細異熟果（xi yi shu guo）：這種果報相對於分段生死來說，更加清凈微妙，更加微細，更加光潔，沒有固定的期限，不是彼世間（bi shi jian）以及迴心二乘（hui xin er cheng）所能理解的境界，所以稱為殊勝。唯有微妙和微細，唯有菩薩（pu sa）及其自身，以及佛（fo）的境界才能理解，所以稱為細。第八十卷說，諸天（zhu tian）等尚且不能見到。這種果報以異熟無記五蘊（yi shu wu ji wu yun）為自性，在五果（wu guo）中屬於異熟果。這就是真正出生死之體。為什麼分段生死說的是三界（san jie）的果報，而這種死卻不說是什麼界的果報呢？因為它在三界中不固定屬於哪個界。如前面第七卷已經有兩種解釋，所以不說三界。不同的分段生死一定屬於此界的業力，而這種變易生死不屬於無漏業（wu lou ye）。這種資糧行相到下面會知道。

什麼叫做變易死（bian yi si），而說它不可思議呢？

論：由於悲願力（bei yuan li）的作用，所以叫做變易。

述曰：下面解釋名稱，兼辨別得到這種果報的人。大概有三個名稱，這是第一個。就是說，由於大悲心救度眾生的大愿，以及得到菩提（pu ti）的力量，改變轉化舊的鄙陋的身命，成為現在殊勝的身命，轉化先前粗劣的身命，成為現在美妙微細的身命。先前的身命有固定的期限，比如這個業力，這個洲，這個界，這個地，一定有多少時間。現在這個業力，這個洲，這個界，這個地，期限不固定。比如資糧位菩薩（zi liang wei pu sa）和廣果天（guang guo tian）的身軀，超過五百由旬（you xun），壽命超過五百劫（jie），或者少於這個數字，乃至欲界（yu jie）的人天（ren tian）也是這樣。變是改變的意思，易是轉化的意思。改變轉化舊的身命生死，成為現在的身命生死，所以叫做變易。

下面什麼叫做不可思議？

論：無漏定愿（wu lou ding yuan）的作用叫做不可思議。

述曰：如果無漏定愿的力量是真正資助產生，真正感應得到的，到達那種微細妙用難以測度不可知的境界，不是二乘（er cheng）所能理解的境界，所以叫做不可思議。不是凡夫有情和二乘的言語所能衡量的，叫做不可思議。不是說菩薩和佛也不知道，才叫做不可思議。

【English Translation】 English version Subtle Vipāka Result (xi yi shu guo): This result, compared to the Saṃsāric existence of segments, is more pure and wonderful, more subtle, more radiant, and has no fixed limit. It is not the realm of 'that world' (bi shi jian) or the 'Two Vehicles who turn back' (hui xin er cheng), so it is called supreme. Only the subtle and the minute, only Bodhisattvas (pu sa) and their own selves, and the realm of the Buddha (fo) can understand it, so it is called subtle. The eightieth volume says that even the Devas (zhu tian) cannot see it. This result has the nature of Vipāka, indeterminate five aggregates (yi shu wu ji wu yun), and belongs to the Vipāka result among the five results (wu guo). This is the true body of birth and death. Why does the Saṃsāric existence of segments refer to the results of the Three Realms (san jie), but this death does not say which realm's result it is? Because it is not fixed to which realm it belongs in the Three Realms. As the seventh volume has already explained in two ways, the Three Realms are not mentioned. Different Saṃsāric existences of segments must belong to the karma of this realm, but this transformation death does not belong to the un-leaked karma (wu lou ye). The characteristics of this accumulation of practice will be known below.

What is called Transformation Death (bian yi si), and why is it said to be inconceivable?

Treatise: Due to the power of compassion and vows (bei yuan li), it is called transformation.

Commentary: The following explains the name and also distinguishes the people who attain this result. There are roughly three names, and this is the first. That is, due to the great compassion to save sentient beings, the great vow to attain Bodhi (pu ti), the power of Bodhi, changing and transforming the old, base body and life into the present supreme body and life, transforming the previous coarse body and life into the present wonderful and subtle body and life. The previous body and life had a fixed limit, such as this karma, this continent, this realm, this land, a certain amount of time. Now this karma, this continent, this realm, this land, the limit is not fixed. For example, the body of a Bodhisattva in the Accumulation Stage (zi liang wei pu sa) and the Devas of the Abhāsa Heaven (guang guo tian) exceeds five hundred yojanas (you xun), and the lifespan exceeds five hundred kalpas (jie), or less than that number, even the humans and Devas (ren tian) of the Desire Realm (yu jie) are also like this. Transformation means changing, and alteration means transforming. Changing and transforming the old body and life of birth and death into the present body and life of birth and death, so it is called transformation.

What is called inconceivable below?

Treatise: The function of un-leaked Samādhi and vows (wu lou ding yuan) is called inconceivable.

Commentary: If the power of un-leaked Samādhi and vows is truly supported and produced, truly sensed and attained, reaching the realm where subtle and wonderful functions are difficult to measure and unknowable, and it is not the realm that the Two Vehicles (er cheng) can understand, it is called inconceivable. It is not that ordinary sentient beings and the language of the Two Vehicles can measure it, so it is called inconceivable. It is not that Bodhisattvas and Buddhas do not know it, so it is called inconceivable.

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。楞伽第四卷說。大惠聲聞辟支佛。未證法無我。未得離不思議變易生。佛離故得不思議無漏界法身。變易死名與此論同。無漏界法身。如下第十卷解。

論。或名意成身隨意願成故。

述曰。下釋第二名。及顯得名又此生死果。或名意成身。隨大悲願意之所成故。勝鬘經云。生者諸受．根．起。死者諸受．根．滅。乃至云云。如別章解。

釋此一名恐義無由。下引經證。

論。如契經說至三種意成身。

述曰。此成於前意成身名。如勝鬘經說。摩利迦此名鬘者。即末利夫人也。此夫人之女名摩利室羅即勝鬘也。彼說如似。以取為緣。即煩惱障。有漏業因。即正因業。由惑潤故續後有者而生三界之有。此舉分段因果以況變易。如是五住地中無明習地為緣。即所知障。無漏業因。即有分別業。有阿羅漢一。獨覺二。已得自在菩薩三。以彼所知障。及無漏業為因故。生是三種意成身。佛性論云於三界外有三種人受于變易。人雖即此。然非界外。此之三種。皆轉舊粗身。由大悲願力得隨意所成故。彼五住地中無明住地。是法執攝。彼經自云由無明住為依。恒沙煩惱因之而起。如下第十卷中自會。勝鬘經云世尊有如取緣。即是此中如取為緣。彼意說。有一如取為緣。有漏業因等義與此同。而文

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《楞伽經》第四卷說，大慧（Mahamati，菩薩名）認為聲聞（Śrāvaka，聽聞佛陀教誨的弟子）、辟支佛（Pratyekabuddha，不依師自悟的修行者）尚未證得法無我（dharma-nairātmya，諸法皆無自性），未得脫離不可思議的變易生死（parinama-marana，菩薩因願力而示現的生死）。佛陀遠離這些，因此證得不可思議的無漏界法身（anāsrava-dhātu-dharmakāya，清凈無染的法性之身）。變易死（parinama-marana）的名稱與此處的討論相同。無漏界法身（anāsrava-dhātu-dharmakāya）的解釋如下第十卷。

論：或者名為意成身（manomayakāya，由意念所成的身），因為隨其意願而成就。

述記：下面解釋第二個名稱，並闡明其含義。這個生死之果，或者名為意成身（manomayakāya），是隨大悲願力而成就的。《勝鬘經》說：『生』是指諸受（vedanā，感受）、根（indriya，感覺器官）、起（utpāda，生起）；『死』是指諸受（vedanā，感受）、根（indriya，感覺器官）、滅（nirodha，滅盡）。』等等。如其他章節的解釋。

解釋這個名稱，恐怕意義沒有依據。下面引用經文來證明。

論：如契經所說，乃至三種意成身（manomayakāya）。

述記：這成就了前面所說的意成身（manomayakāya）的名稱。如《勝鬘經》所說，摩利迦（Mallika，人名，意為花鬘），此名鬘者，即末利夫人（Mallika Devi）。這位夫人的女兒名叫摩利室羅（Mallisri），即勝鬘（Srimala）。經中說，如以取為緣，即煩惱障（klesavarana，由煩惱產生的障礙），有漏業因（sasrava-karma-hetu，有煩惱的業力作為原因），由惑潤故續後有者而生三界之有（bhava，存在）。這裡舉分段生死（samkhata-marana，凡夫的生死）的因果來比況變易生死（parinama-marana）。像這樣，五住地（panca-vasa-bhumi，五種煩惱的住處）中的無明習地（avidyavasabhumi，無明的習氣）為緣，即所知障（jneyavarana，由知解產生的障礙），無漏業因（anasrava-karma-hetu，無煩惱的業力作為原因），有阿羅漢（Arhat，斷盡煩惱的聖者）一，獨覺（Pratyekabuddha，不依師自悟的修行者）二，已得自在菩薩（Bodhisattva，發菩提心並修行的聖者）三，以彼所知障（jneyavarana）及無漏業（anasrava-karma）為因，故生這三種意成身（manomayakāya）。《佛性論》說，在三界之外有三種人承受變易生死（parinama-marana）。人雖然就是這些人，但並非在三界之外。這三種意成身（manomayakāya），都是轉變舊的粗身，由大悲願力而得到隨意成就的。那五住地（panca-vasa-bhumi）中的無明住地（avidyavasabhumi），是法執（dharma-graha，對法的執著）所攝。那部經自己說，由無明住地（avidyavasabhumi）為依，恒河沙數般的煩惱因此而生起。如下第十卷中會解釋。《勝鬘經》說，世尊，有如取緣，即是此中如取為緣。它的意思是說，有一如取為緣，有漏業因（sasrava-karma-hetu）等意義與此相同，而文字

【English Translation】 English version The Lankavatara Sutra, Volume Four, states that Mahamati (Mahamati, name of a Bodhisattva) believes that Sravakas (Śrāvaka, disciples who hear the Buddha's teachings) and Pratyekabuddhas (Pratyekabuddha, practitioners who attain enlightenment independently without a teacher) have not yet realized dharma-nairatmya (dharma-nairātmya, the selflessness of all dharmas), and have not escaped the inconceivable transformation birth and death (parinama-marana, the birth and death manifested by Bodhisattvas due to their vows). The Buddha is free from these, and therefore attains the inconceivable anasrava-dhatu-dharmakaya (anāsrava-dhātu-dharmakāya, the pure and undefiled Dharma body). The name 'transformation death' (parinama-marana) is the same as the discussion here. The explanation of anasrava-dhatu-dharmakaya (anāsrava-dhātu-dharmakāya) is in Volume Ten below.

Treatise: Or it is called manomayakaya (manomayakāya, body made of mind), because it is accomplished according to one's wishes.

Commentary: Below explains the second name and clarifies its meaning. This fruit of birth and death is also called manomayakaya (manomayakāya), which is accomplished according to the power of great compassion and vows. The Srimala Sutra says: 'Birth' refers to all vedana (vedanā, feelings), indriya (indriya, sense organs), and utpada (utpāda, arising); 'death' refers to all vedana (vedanā, feelings), indriya (indriya, sense organs), and nirodha (nirodha, cessation).' and so on. As explained in other chapters.

Explaining this name, I am afraid that the meaning has no basis. The following quotes scriptures to prove it.

Treatise: As the sutra says, even the three kinds of manomayakaya (manomayakāya).

Commentary: This accomplishes the name of manomayakaya (manomayakāya) mentioned earlier. As the Srimala Sutra says, Mallika (Mallika, a person's name, meaning garland), this name 'garland' refers to Mallika Devi (Mallika Devi). The daughter of this lady is called Mallisri (Mallisri), that is, Srimala (Srimala). The sutra says, such as taking as a condition, that is, klesavarana (klesavarana, obstacles caused by afflictions), sasrava-karma-hetu (sasrava-karma-hetu, afflicted karma as a cause), and due to the moisture of delusion, those who continue to have future existence are born into the three realms of bhava (bhava, existence). Here, the cause and effect of samkhata-marana (samkhata-marana, the birth and death of ordinary people) is used to compare parinama-marana (parinama-marana). In this way, avidyavasabhumi (avidyavasabhumi, the abode of ignorance) in the panca-vasa-bhumi (panca-vasa-bhumi, the five abodes of affliction) is the condition, that is, jneyavarana (jneyavarana, obstacles caused by knowledge), anasrava-karma-hetu (anasrava-karma-hetu, undefiled karma as a cause), there is Arhat (Arhat, a saint who has cut off all afflictions) one, Pratyekabuddha (Pratyekabuddha, a practitioner who attains enlightenment independently without a teacher) two, Bodhisattva (Bodhisattva, a saint who has generated Bodhicitta and is practicing) who has attained freedom three, because of their jneyavarana (jneyavarana) and anasrava-karma (anasrava-karma) as the cause, these three kinds of manomayakaya (manomayakāya) are born. The Treatise on Buddha-nature says that there are three kinds of people outside the three realms who receive transformation birth and death (parinama-marana). Although the people are the same, they are not outside the three realms. These three kinds of manomayakaya (manomayakāya) are all transformed from the old coarse body, and are obtained at will by the power of great compassion and vows. The avidyavasabhumi (avidyavasabhumi) in the panca-vasa-bhumi (panca-vasa-bhumi) is included in dharma-graha (dharma-graha, attachment to dharmas). That sutra itself says that relying on avidyavasabhumi (avidyavasabhumi), countless afflictions arise from it. It will be explained in Volume Ten below. The Srimala Sutra says, 'World Honored One, there is such as taking as a condition,' which is the same as 'taking as a condition' here. It means that there is such as taking as a condition, sasrava-karma-hetu (sasrava-karma-hetu) and other meanings are the same as this, and the text

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有異。翻者失也。舊言無明住地。今言習地。梵本無住。所言習者。由數習故。有此無明等五住地故。名無明習地。所言住是何義。舊云大力菩薩。今言已得自在菩薩。是第八地。于相及土二種之中。已得自在故。故第八地說斷二愚中。有于相土自在愚也。彼言大力。亦是于相於土得大力故。無上依經云大地菩薩。舊云意生身。此言意成身。彼義隨意而生。今意隨意而成。但轉易故。非新生故。不可言生。此即二乘無學回心向大者。及直往菩薩八地以去方受變易生死。此非盡理。但隨經文。佛地第二卷說。聲聞乘或除七生。或除一生。或除上界處處一生。即前三果。雖諸煩惱所潤分段得非擇滅。而由願力受變易生。三無數劫修菩提因。無有過失。非擇滅者眾緣不具。於此時中畢竟不生非永不生。資此身因展轉增勝乃至成佛。第八十說。複次迴向菩提聲聞。或於學位即能棄捨。或無學位方能棄捨。乃至廣說。故知前三果。亦得受變易生。驗知此文非為應理。七地以前決定性者。有受此性故。今此中說二乘無學．八地以去受變易生。決定故說。其前三果及七地前。不決定受變易生死。故不說之。此三種定故說之也。西方有解如前卷末已略解訖。以有菩薩初地。即能伏諸煩惱故初地得。如滅定說。或有乃至八地方得。謂有唯

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有差異。翻譯的人理解有偏差。舊的說法是『無明住地』（Avidyā-sthiti，無明的停留之處），現在說是『習地』（Abhyāsa-bhūmi，習氣之地）。梵文原本沒有『住』這個詞。之所以說『習』，是因為多次熏習的緣故。因為有這種無明等五住地（五種煩惱的停留之處），所以稱為無明習地。所說的『住』是什麼意思呢？舊的說法是『大力菩薩』，現在說是『已得自在菩薩』，指的是第八地（Acalā-bhūmi，不動地）的菩薩。在相和土兩種境界中，已經得到自在的緣故。所以第八地說斷除二種愚癡中，有對於相和土自在的愚癡。他們所說的『大力』，也是因為對於相和土得到大力的緣故。《無上依經》中說『大地菩薩』。舊的說法是『意生身』（Manomaya-kāya，意所化生之身），這裡說是『意成身』（Manonirmita-kāya，意所成就之身）。他們的意思是隨心意而生，現在是隨心意而成。只是轉變容易的緣故，不是新生的緣故，所以不能說是『生』。這裡指的是二乘（Śrāvakayāna，聲聞乘和Pratyekabuddhayāna，緣覺乘）的無學（Aśaikṣa，無學位）之人迴心向大乘（Mahāyāna）者，以及直接修行的菩薩從第八地開始才承受變易生死（Vikārin-maraṇa，變化而生的死亡）。這並非完全符合道理，只是依照經文所說。《佛地經論》第二卷說，聲聞乘或者除去七生，或者除去一生，或者除去上界處處一生，指的是前三果（Srotaāpanna，須陀洹，Sakrdāgāmin，斯陀含，Anāgāmin，阿那含）。雖然各種煩惱所滋潤的分段生死（Bhāga-maraṇa，由業力決定的生死）得到非擇滅（Apratisankhyā-nirodha，非通過智慧力量而滅除），但是由於願力的作用而承受變易生，在三大阿僧祇劫（Asankhyeya-kalpa，無數大劫）中修菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）之因，沒有過失。非擇滅是指眾緣不具足，在這個時候畢竟不生，不是永遠不生。憑藉這個身體的因緣，輾轉增勝，乃至成佛。《瑜伽師地論》第八十卷說，再次迴向菩提的聲聞，或者在有學位（Śaikṣa，有學位）就能捨棄，或者在無學位才能捨棄，乃至廣說。所以知道前三果也能承受變易生。驗證可知這段文字並非完全合理。七地（Dūraṅgama-bhūmi，遠行地）以前的決定性者，有承受這種性質的緣故。現在這裡說二乘的無學、八地以後的菩薩承受變易生，是就決定的情況來說的。前三果以及七地以前的菩薩，不決定承受變易生死，所以不說他們。這三種情況是決定的，所以才說。西方有解釋，如前卷末尾已經略微解釋完畢。因為有菩薩在初地（Pramuditā-bhūmi，歡喜地）就能降伏各種煩惱，所以在初地就能得到，如滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti，滅盡定）所說。或者有乃至第八地才能得到，指的是隻有...。

【English Translation】 English version There are differences. The translator has misunderstood. The old saying is 'Avidyā-sthiti' (the dwelling place of ignorance), now it is said to be 'Abhyāsa-bhūmi' (the ground of habit). The Sanskrit original does not have the word 'sthiti' (dwelling). The reason for saying 'Abhyāsa' (habit) is because of repeated practice. Because there are these five sthiti of ignorance (the dwelling places of the five kinds of afflictions), it is called the Abhyāsa-bhūmi of ignorance. What is the meaning of 'sthiti' (dwelling)? The old saying is 'Mahā-bala Bodhisattva' (Bodhisattva with great power), now it is said to be 'Bodhisattva who has attained自在(Skt: Vasita)' (自在 means mastery, autonomy), referring to the Bodhisattva of the eighth bhūmi (Acalā-bhūmi, the immovable ground). Because in the two realms of characteristics and lands, one has already attained自在. Therefore, the eighth bhūmi says that in the eradication of the two kinds of ignorance, there is the ignorance of自在regarding characteristics and lands. Their saying 'Mahā-bala' (great power) is also because one has attained great power regarding characteristics and lands. The Anuttarāśraya Sūtra says 'Mahā-bhūmi Bodhisattva' (great ground Bodhisattva). The old saying is 'Manomaya-kāya' (mind-made body), here it is said to be 'Manonirmita-kāya' (mind-created body). Their meaning is that it arises according to the mind, now it is that it is accomplished according to the mind. It is only because of the ease of transformation, not because it is newly born, so it cannot be said to be 'born'. This refers to those of the two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) who have turned their minds towards the Mahāyāna, and the Bodhisattvas who directly practice from the eighth bhūmi onwards who undergo Vikārin-maraṇa (transformation death). This is not entirely in accordance with reason, but only according to what the sutra says. The 佛地經論(Buddhabhūmi Sūtra), volume 2, says that the Śrāvaka vehicle either removes seven births, or removes one birth, or removes one birth in each place in the upper realms, referring to the first three fruits (Srotaāpanna, Sakrdāgāmin, Anāgāmin). Although the Bhāga-maraṇa (segmental death) nourished by various afflictions attains Apratisankhyā-nirodha (cessation without wisdom), they undergo Vikārin-maraṇa due to the power of vows, cultivating the cause of Bodhi for three Asankhyeya-kalpas without fault. Apratisankhyā-nirodha means that the conditions are not complete, and at this time it does not arise after all, not that it will never arise. Relying on the cause of this body, it gradually increases and becomes superior, until one becomes a Buddha. The 瑜伽師地論(Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra), volume 80, says that the Śrāvaka who turns towards Bodhi again, either can abandon it in the stage of learning, or can abandon it in the stage of no learning, and so on. Therefore, it is known that the first three fruits can also undergo Vikārin-maraṇa. Verification shows that this passage is not entirely reasonable. Those of definite nature before the seventh bhūmi have the reason to undergo this nature. Now it is said here that the Arhats of the two vehicles and the Bodhisattvas after the eighth bhūmi undergo Vikārin-maraṇa, which is said in terms of certainty. The first three fruits and the Bodhisattvas before the seventh bhūmi do not definitely undergo Vikārin-maraṇa, so they are not mentioned. These three situations are definite, so they are mentioned. There are Western interpretations, as briefly explained at the end of the previous volume. Because there are Bodhisattvas who can subdue various afflictions in the first bhūmi, so they can be obtained in the first bhūmi, as stated in Nirodha-samāpatti. Or there are those who can only obtain it in the eighth bhūmi, referring to those who only...

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受分段非變易。謂諸凡夫。四果定性。或唯受變易非分段。謂二乘無學不定性者。八地以上菩薩。或亦受分段。亦受變易。謂前三果不定性。七地已前。此句由自在故。煩惱未盡故。若依煩惱障有漏業。感生死名分段即粗易知。若由無漏所知障助。所感生死即名變易。細難知故。故七地已前。代諸有情受三塗苦。乃是實身。易可知故。八地以去乃至化身。如佛救生化作身故。大智度論云八地舍蟲身者。舍分段也。若作此釋。此中據定。非無宜往七地已前。前三果。亦得受義故。如對法第十三抄會。彼有異解。初地等既得者。必更無決定分段業。如阿羅漢故。十卷楞伽第四云。大慧說寂靜法。得證清凈無我之相入遠行地。入遠行地已得無量三昧自在如意生身故。即知七地已得此生死。然未一向故此中不說。然勝鬘經與此說同。二乘無學。自在菩薩名意成身。十卷楞伽第五云。大惠有三種意生身。一者得三昧樂三摩跋提意生身。謂第三．第四．第五地中。二者如實覺知諸法相意生身。謂菩薩摩訶薩於八地中。三者種類俱生無作行意生身。謂自內證一切法如實樂相．法相樂故。即七地前皆得變易也。此文不及四卷經者。今會之者。初．二．三．四．五地。皆應名得三昧樂等意生身。但以初．二地中。未得定自在故。略而不說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 受分段生死和變易生死。說的是那些凡夫俗子，四果阿羅漢中已證得果位且不再退轉的（定性）之人。或者只承受變易生死而非分段生死。說的是二乘（聲聞、緣覺）中未證得果位或證得果位后可能退轉的（不定性）之人，以及八地（不動地）以上的菩薩。或者既承受分段生死，也承受變易生死。說的是前三果（須陀洹、斯陀含、阿那含）中未證得果位或證得果位后可能退轉的（不定性）之人，以及七地（遠行地）之前的菩薩。這句經文是因為菩薩有自在力，且煩惱尚未斷盡的緣故。如果依據煩惱障的有漏業力，所感得的生死就叫做分段生死，這種生死是粗顯易知的。如果由無漏的所知障所助長，所感得的生死就叫做變易生死，這種生死是細微難以覺察的。所以七地之前的菩薩，爲了代替眾生承受三惡道的痛苦，用的是真實之身，容易被感知。八地及以上的菩薩，乃至佛的化身，就像佛爲了救度眾生而變化出各種身形一樣。《大智度論》中說八地菩薩捨棄蟲身，捨棄的是分段生死。如果這樣解釋，這裡說的是已證得果位且不再退轉的情況，並非說七地之前的菩薩沒有承受變易生死的可能。就像《對法》第十三卷所記載的那樣，那裡有不同的解釋。初地等菩薩既然已經證得果位，必定不會再有決定性的分段生死之業，就像阿羅漢一樣。十卷本《楞伽經》第四卷說：『大慧菩薩宣說寂靜之法，證得清凈無我之相，進入遠行地。進入遠行地后，獲得無量三昧自在，能夠如意化生。』由此可知，七地菩薩已經證得這種生死，但尚未完全擺脫，所以這裡沒有提及。然而，《勝鬘經》與此處的說法相同，二乘無學（阿羅漢），自在菩薩名為意成身。十卷本《楞伽經》第五卷說：『大慧菩薩有三種意生身。第一種是得三昧樂三摩跋提意生身，指的是第三、第四、第五地中的菩薩。第二種是如實覺知諸法相意生身，指的是八地中的菩薩摩訶薩。第三種是種類俱生無作行意生身，指的是從自身內部證悟一切法如實之樂相、法相之樂的菩薩。』也就是說，七地之前的菩薩都已證得變易生死。這段經文沒有提及四卷本《楞伽經》的內容，現在解釋一下：初地、二地、三地、四地、五地的菩薩，都應該被稱為證得三昧樂等意生身。但因為初地、二地的菩薩尚未獲得真正的自在，所以略而不提。

【English Translation】 English version Suffering from Saṃsāra of segmentation and Saṃsāra of transformation. This refers to ordinary beings, and those of the four Arhat fruits who are determined in their attainment (fixed nature). Or only experiencing Saṃsāra of transformation and not Saṃsāra of segmentation. This refers to the two vehicles (Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha) who are either not yet Arhats or may regress after attaining Arhatship (undetermined nature), and Bodhisattvas of the eighth Bhūmi (immovable ground) and above. Or experiencing both Saṃsāra of segmentation and Saṃsāra of transformation. This refers to those of the first three fruits (Srotaāpanna, Sakṛdāgāmin, Anāgāmin) who are either not yet Arhats or may regress after attaining Arhatship (undetermined nature), and Bodhisattvas before the seventh Bhūmi (far-going ground). This statement is due to the Bodhisattva's power of freedom and the fact that afflictions have not yet been completely exhausted. If based on the contaminated karma of the affliction obstacle, the Saṃsāra experienced is called Saṃsāra of segmentation, which is coarse and easily known. If aided by the uncontaminated knowledge obstacle, the Saṃsāra experienced is called Saṃsāra of transformation, which is subtle and difficult to perceive. Therefore, Bodhisattvas before the seventh Bhūmi, when taking on the suffering of the three evil realms on behalf of sentient beings, use their real bodies, which are easily known. Bodhisattvas of the eighth Bhūmi and above, and even the Nirmāṇakāya (transformation body) of the Buddha, are like the Buddha transforming various forms to save sentient beings. The Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra says that the eighth Bhūmi abandons the insect body, abandoning Saṃsāra of segmentation. If interpreted in this way, this passage refers to those who have attained a fixed state and will not regress, not that Bodhisattvas before the seventh Bhūmi have no possibility of experiencing Saṃsāra of transformation. As recorded in the thirteenth fascicle of the Abhidharmakośa, there are different interpretations there. Since Bodhisattvas of the first Bhūmi and so on have already attained, they will certainly have no more decisive karma for Saṃsāra of segmentation, like Arhats. The fourth fascicle of the ten-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says: 『Mahāmati preaches the Dharma of quiescence, attains the aspect of purity and non-self, and enters the far-going ground. After entering the far-going ground, one obtains immeasurable Samādhi freedom and the ability to manifest bodies at will.』 From this, it can be known that Bodhisattvas of the seventh Bhūmi have already attained this Saṃsāra, but have not completely abandoned it, so it is not mentioned here. However, the Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra says the same thing, the Arhats of the two vehicles, and the free Bodhisattvas are called Manomayakāya (mind-made body). The fifth fascicle of the ten-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says: 『Mahāmati, there are three kinds of Manomayakāya. The first is the Manomayakāya of Samādhi bliss and Samāpatti, referring to Bodhisattvas in the third, fourth, and fifth Bhūmis. The second is the Manomayakāya of truly knowing the aspects of all Dharmas, referring to Bodhisattva-Mahāsattvas in the eighth Bhūmi. The third is the Manomayakāya of co-arising without effort, referring to Bodhisattvas who internally realize the true bliss of all Dharmas and the bliss of the aspects of Dharmas.』 That is to say, Bodhisattvas before the seventh Bhūmi have all attained Saṃsāra of transformation. This passage does not mention the content of the four-fascicle Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, so let's explain it now: Bodhisattvas of the first, second, third, fourth, and fifth Bhūmis should all be called those who have attained the Manomayakāya of Samādhi bliss and so on. However, because Bodhisattvas of the first and second Bhūmis have not yet obtained true freedom, it is omitted.

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。得定自在。於此生死有勝能故。故彼經云。自心寂靜行種種行。大海心波轉識之相三摩跋提樂名意識生。以見自心境界故。如實知有無相故。名初意生身相。三．四．五地中於定自在皆平等故。第六．七地。亦得如實覺知諸法相意生身。六地無相觀多。七地雖得此無相觀。然未能無加行。故不如第八地。今從勝處論但言第八地是第二意生身。故彼經言。謂觀察覺了。得諸法無相如幻等法。悉無所有身心轉變。得如幻三昧。及余無量三摩跋提樂門．無量相力自在神通。乃至是名第二意生身。種類俱生無作行意生身。謂第九．十地。唯行無相。亦無功用。於事及理皆唯內證。故彼經云。謂自內證一切諸法如實樂相法相樂故。此中三名。雖諸地已得。然據增勝地語。非於餘地分不得此。然勝鬘及此中。約通三乘決定受變易生死者語。楞伽約直往菩薩通定不定受變易生死增勝位語。又解直往者八地方得。此說迂會者。雖地前已得。且說勝者故。彼二種三種意生身。名位有異。亦不相違。

論。亦名變化身至故不違理。

述曰。此釋第三名。此變易生死。亦名變化身。無漏定力轉。令異於本分段身。清凈微妙廣大光潔如變化故。從喻為名。然初二名義用彰名。此即從喻　如有論說。引教成名。此顯揚論第十六說　

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 獲得禪定自在，因此對於生死輪迴具有殊勝的能力。所以那部經中說：『自心寂靜，行種種行，大海心波轉識之相，三摩跋提（Samadhi，禪定）之樂，名意識生。』因為見到自心境界的緣故，如實地知曉有無之相的緣故，名為初意生身相。第三、第四、第五地中，對於禪定自在都是平等的緣故。第六、第七地，也能夠如實覺知諸法之相的意生身。第六地無相觀較多，第七地雖然也得到這種無相觀，然而未能達到無加行（無需努力）的程度，所以不如第八地。現在從殊勝之處來說，只說第八地是第二意生身。所以那部經中說：『謂觀察覺了，得諸法無相如幻等法，悉無所有，身心轉變，得如幻三昧（Samadhi，禪定），及余無量三摩跋提（Samadhi，禪定）樂門、無量相力自在神通，乃至是名第二意生身。』種類俱生無作行意生身，是指第九、第十地。唯有行無相，也沒有功用，對於事和理都唯有內證。所以那部經中說：『謂自內證一切諸法如實樂相法相樂故。』這其中三個名稱，雖然各個地都已經得到，然而根據增勝的地來說，並非其餘的地分不得此。然而《勝鬘經》以及這裡，是約通三乘決定受變易生死者來說的。《楞伽經》是約直往菩薩通定不定受變易生死增勝位來說的。又解釋直往者第八地才得到，這裡說迂迴者，雖然地前已經得到，且說殊勝者。所以那兩種三種意生身，名位有差異，也不相違背。

論：也名為變化身，所以不違背道理。

述記：這是解釋第三個名稱。這種變易生死，也名為變化身。無漏定力轉變，使得不同於原本的分段身，清凈微妙廣大光潔如同變化的緣故，從比喻而得名。然而前兩個名稱是用義用彰顯名稱，這則是從比喻。如有論說，引用教義成就名稱。這是《顯揚論》第十六說。

【English Translation】 English version Having attained mastery of Samadhi (禪定, meditative absorption), one possesses superior abilities regarding birth and death. Therefore, that sutra says: 'The mind is tranquil, practicing various practices, the aspect of the mind-ocean's waves transforming consciousness, the joy of Samadhis (禪定, meditative absorption), is called the arising of consciousness.' Because one sees the realm of one's own mind, and because one truly knows the aspects of existence and non-existence, it is called the aspect of the initial Ideation Body. In the third, fourth, and fifth Bhumis (地, stages), one is equal in mastery of Samadhi (禪定, meditative absorption). In the sixth and seventh Bhumis (地, stages), one can also truly realize the Ideation Body of the aspects of all dharmas. In the sixth Bhumi (地, stage), there is more contemplation of non-aspects. Although the seventh Bhumi (地, stage) also attains this contemplation of non-aspects, it has not reached the state of non-exertion (effortlessness), so it is not as good as the eighth Bhumi (地, stage). Now, speaking from the superior perspective, it is only said that the eighth Bhumi (地, stage) is the second Ideation Body. Therefore, that sutra says: 'Through observation and realization, one attains the non-aspect of all dharmas, such as illusion, etc., all being without substance, the transformation of body and mind, attaining the Illusion-like Samadhi (禪定, meditative absorption), and other immeasurable Samadhi (禪定, meditative absorption) gates of joy, immeasurable aspects of power, unhindered supernatural abilities, and so on, this is called the second Ideation Body.' The Co-emergent, Non-active Ideation Body refers to the ninth and tenth Bhumis (地, stages). One only practices non-aspects, and there is no effort, with only internal realization regarding both phenomena and principles. Therefore, that sutra says: 'Through one's own internal realization, all dharmas are truly joyful in aspect and joyful in the aspect of dharma.' Although these three names have already been attained in each Bhumi (地, stage), they are spoken of according to the Bhumi (地, stage) of increasing superiority, not that the other Bhumis (地, stages) do not have a share of this. However, the Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra and this text speak of those who, through the Three Vehicles, are destined to undergo Transformative Birth and Death. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra speaks of the direct-path Bodhisattvas who, through fixed or unfixed states, undergo Transformative Birth and Death in a position of increasing superiority. Furthermore, it is explained that those on the direct path only attain it in the eighth Bhumi (地, stage), while this text speaks of those on the circuitous path, although they have already attained it before the Bhumis (地, stages), it speaks of the superior ones. Therefore, the two types of three types of Ideation Bodies have different names and positions, and are not contradictory.

Treatise: It is also called the Transformation Body, so it does not contradict reason.

Commentary: This explains the third name. This Transformative Birth and Death is also called the Transformation Body. The power of undefiled Samadhi (禪定, meditative absorption) transforms it, making it different from the original Segmented Body, pure, subtle, vast, radiant, and clean like a transformation, hence the name is derived from a metaphor. However, the first two names use meaning and function to manifest the name, while this one is from a metaphor. As some treatises say, it cites teachings to establish the name. This is the sixteenth section of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra.

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聲聞無學等。乃至非業報身。皆彼論文之問答也。亦不違理。故知從喻即變易生也。

此即第二釋名兼辨得人訖。自下第三解諸妨難。有四問答。或分為三。

論。若所知障至無餘涅槃。

述曰。此外人問。如有學凡夫。由煩惱障。助有漏業。能感生死。便不永入無餘涅槃。一切二乘有所知障。既能動無漏業。能感生死。即汝所言定性二乘。應不永入無餘滅界。有所知障及無漏業能感生故。此即小乘諸部共為此難。彼部此障不助感生故。

論。如諸異生拘煩惱故。

述曰。此論主答。若作此解有四問答。若作后二解。但有三文。今以法喻卻解前難。謂如諸異生煩惱所拘礙故。馳流生死不趣涅槃。彼趣寂者心樂趣滅。為此心拘馳流無相。不趣無上正等菩提。如諸異生拘煩惱故。雖有所知障不能成佛。如諸異生雖有無漏種不趣涅槃。第八十說。由種姓別故不能趣。如無種姓人拘煩惱故馳流。生死　又若所知障助無漏業。至此異生拘煩惱文。有義總是難外伏計。謂有伏計。以無漏業正感生死。為生死因如善惡業。今此難彼。若由無漏正感生死所知障助。二乘定性應不永入無餘涅槃。恒起無漏為生死因。有所知障恒為緣助。拘二乘故不得趣寂。如諸異生善惡業因煩惱力。助拘煩惱故不得涅槃。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 聲聞無學等（證得阿羅漢果位的聲聞乘修行者）。乃至非業報身（並非由業力所感召的果報之身），皆是《瑜伽師地論》中的問答內容，也符合道理。因此可知，從譬喻的角度來說，這屬於變易生死。

以上是第二部分，解釋名稱並辨別證得者。下面是第三部分，解釋各種妨難，共有四個問答，或者可以分為三個。

論：如果所知障直至無餘涅槃。

述曰：這是外人提出的問題。如有學凡夫，由於煩惱障的緣故，助長有漏業，能夠感召生死，便不能永遠進入無餘涅槃。一切二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）有所知障，既然能夠動搖無漏業，能夠感召生死，那麼你所說的定性二乘，應該不能永遠進入無餘滅界，因為有所知障和無漏業能夠感召生死。這是小乘各部共同提出的難題，因為他們認為所知障不能助長感召生死。

論：如同各種異生被煩惱所束縛。

述曰：這是論主的回答。如果這樣解釋，就有四個問答。如果按照后兩種解釋，就只有三個問答。現在用比喻來解釋前面的難題。如同各種異生被煩惱所束縛，在生死中流轉，不趨向涅槃。那些趨向寂滅的人，內心樂於寂滅，因此被這種心所束縛，在無相中流轉，不趨向無上正等菩提。如同各種異生被煩惱所束縛，雖然有所知障，也不能成佛。如同各種異生雖然有無漏種子，也不趨向涅槃。《瑜伽師地論》第八十卷說，由於種姓的差別，所以不能趨向涅槃。如同沒有種姓的人被煩惱所束縛，在生死中流轉。又如果說所知障助長無漏業，到『異生拘煩惱』這段文字，有一種觀點認為是總的難外伏計。也就是說，有一種隱藏的計較，認為無漏業正是感召生死的，是生死的因，如同善惡業一樣。現在用這個來反駁他們。如果由於無漏業正是感召生死，所知障助長它，那麼定性二乘應該不能永遠進入無餘涅槃，因為他們恒常生起無漏業作為生死的因，有所知障恒常作為助緣。因為束縛二乘的緣故，所以不能趨向寂滅。如同各種異生的善惡業是因，煩惱的力量助長它，因為被煩惱束縛的緣故，所以不能得到涅槃。

【English Translation】 English version Śrāvaka-arhats (those who have attained the Arhat fruit in the Śrāvakayāna), and even non-karma-result bodies (bodies not caused by karmic retribution), are all questions and answers from the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, and they are also reasonable. Therefore, it can be known that, from the perspective of analogy, this belongs to change-and-transformation birth-and-death (Vikari-Jati).

The above is the second part, explaining the name and distinguishing the attainers. Below is the third part, explaining various obstacles, with four questions and answers, or it can be divided into three.

Treatise: If the knowledge obscuration (jñeyāvaraṇa) continues until the remainderless Nirvāṇa (nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa).

Commentary: This is a question raised by an outsider. If a learner-ordinary person, due to the affliction obscuration (kleśāvaraṇa), assists defiled karma (sāsrava-karma), which can cause birth and death, then they cannot eternally enter remainderless Nirvāṇa. All Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) have knowledge obscurations, which can shake undefiled karma (anāsrava-karma), which can cause birth and death. Then the Two Vehicles of fixed nature that you speak of should not eternally enter the remainderless realm of cessation, because the knowledge obscuration and undefiled karma can cause birth. This is a common difficulty raised by various schools of the Hīnayāna, because they believe that the knowledge obscuration does not assist in causing birth.

Treatise: Like various ordinary beings bound by afflictions.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. If explained in this way, there are four questions and answers. If according to the latter two explanations, there are only three texts. Now, using an analogy, we explain the previous difficulty. Like various ordinary beings bound by afflictions, flowing in birth and death, not heading towards Nirvāṇa. Those who head towards tranquility, their minds are happy with cessation, therefore they are bound by this mind, flowing in the formless, not heading towards unsurpassed complete and perfect enlightenment (anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi). Like various ordinary beings bound by afflictions, although they have knowledge obscurations, they cannot become Buddhas. Like various ordinary beings, although they have undefiled seeds, they do not head towards Nirvāṇa. The eightieth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that due to the difference in lineage, they cannot head towards Nirvāṇa. Like people without lineage bound by afflictions, flowing in birth and death. Furthermore, if it is said that the knowledge obscuration assists undefiled karma, up to the text 'ordinary beings bound by afflictions', one view is that it is a general hidden calculation of the outsider. That is to say, there is a hidden calculation that undefiled karma is precisely what causes birth and death, the cause of birth and death, like good and evil karma. Now, we refute them with this. If it is because undefiled karma precisely causes birth and death, and the knowledge obscuration assists it, then the Two Vehicles of fixed nature should not eternally enter remainderless Nirvāṇa, because they constantly arise undefiled karma as the cause of birth and death, and the knowledge obscuration constantly acts as an assisting condition. Because the Two Vehicles are bound, they cannot head towards tranquility. Like the good and evil karma of various ordinary beings is the cause, and the power of afflictions assists it, because they are bound by afflictions, they cannot attain Nirvāṇa.

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返顯既知有趣寂者。雖有無漏及所知障。不皆迴心。故知無漏非為生死正感因也　又解此文乃至如何道諦實能感苦。總是難文。有二難意。若所知障助無漏業能感生死。二乘定性應不永入無餘涅槃。以所知障招于生死。拘彼二乘不令趣寂。如諸異生拘諸煩惱不得涅槃。第一問也。故下答云。彼所知障無能發業潤生之用。但為緣助感於生死。有種姓者起無漏定愿所知障助有變易生。非正發業潤生能感。故有定性入涅槃者。雖有所知障。不能發業等故。如何道諦實能感苦。第二問也。下文先答此第二問。后答第一問。然雖三解此一段文。初解同瑜伽．佛地俱有此問。其第二解設難伏計亦有此理。第三解下準有答。文勢不違。亦無過失。

論。如何道諦實能感苦。

述曰。此第二外人問。前言無漏為正因感故為此問。

論。誰言實感。

述曰。此論主答。不實感苦。

論。不爾如何。

述曰。此文外問。若非實感。感義如何。

論。無漏定愿至非獨能感。

述曰。由第四禪無漏勝定。資有漏業令所得果相續新生。長時不絕展轉增勝。實有漏業感。但由無漏資力勝故。假得感名。非無漏業實能感苦者。此無漏業如是感時。由所知障為緣。助此無漏之力。非無漏業獨能感果。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 返顯既已知道追求寂滅的樂趣，即使存在無漏業（anāsrava-karma，指沒有煩惱的善業）和所知障（jñeyāvaraṇa，指對真理的認知障礙），也不是所有人都回心轉意。因此可知，無漏業並非導致生死的直接原因。 又解釋這段文字，乃至『如何道諦（mārga-satya，指通往解脫的真理）實際上能導致痛苦』，總是難以理解。這裡有兩個難點：如果所知障幫助無漏業能夠導致生死，那麼二乘（śrāvaka-yāna和pratyekabuddha-yāna，指聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的定性者就不應該永遠進入無餘涅槃（nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa，指完全寂滅的狀態）。因為所知障會招致生死，束縛這些二乘行者，使他們不能趨向寂滅，就像煩惱束縛凡夫，使他們無法獲得涅槃一樣。這是第一個問題。所以下面回答說：『這些所知障沒有引發業力、滋潤生命的作用，只是作為助緣來促成生死的產生。』有種姓（gotra，指具有某種潛能）的人發起無漏定（anāsrava-samādhi，指沒有煩惱的禪定）的願力，所知障會幫助他們產生變易生死（pariṇāma-maraṇa，指菩薩因願力而示現的生死），但所知障並非直接引發業力、滋潤生命，並導致生死的因素。因此，對於那些有定性而進入涅槃的人來說，即使存在所知障，也不能引發業力等作用。『如何道諦實際上能導致痛苦』，這是第二個問題。下面的文字先回答第二個問題，再回答第一個問題。雖然對這段文字有三種解釋，但第一種解釋與《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）和《佛地經論》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra）中的提問相同。第二種解釋假設了難題和反駁，也具有一定的道理。第三種解釋下面有相應的回答，文勢沒有衝突，也沒有過失。

論：如何道諦實際上能導致痛苦？

述曰：這是第二個外人的提問。前面說無漏業是導致痛苦的直接原因，所以有此提問。

論：誰說實際上能導致痛苦？

述曰：這是論主的回答。道諦並非實際上導致痛苦。

論：如果不是這樣，那又如何解釋？

述曰：這是外人的提問。如果道諦並非實際上導致痛苦，那麼『導致』的含義又是什麼？

論：無漏定愿乃至並非獨自能導致痛苦。

述曰：由於第四禪（caturtha-dhyāna，指色界第四禪）的無漏殊勝禪定，資助有漏業（sāsrava-karma，指有煩惱的業力），使所獲得的果報相續不斷地新生，長時間不間斷，並且逐漸增長和殊勝。實際上是有漏業導致痛苦，但由於無漏定的資助力量強大，所以假借『導致』之名。並非無漏業實際上能導致痛苦。這種無漏業在這樣導致痛苦時，由於所知障作為助緣，幫助了無漏業的力量。並非無漏業獨自能夠導致果報。

【English Translation】 English version Having realized the joy of seeking tranquility, even with the presence of anāsrava-karma (karma without outflows, referring to wholesome deeds free from afflictions) and jñeyāvaraṇa (cognitive obscurations, referring to obstacles to the knowledge of truth), not all turn back. Therefore, it is known that anāsrava-karma is not the direct cause of birth and death. Furthermore, interpreting this passage, up to 'How can mārga-satya (the truth of the path, referring to the truth leading to liberation) actually cause suffering,' is always difficult to understand. There are two difficulties here: If jñeyāvaraṇa assists anāsrava-karma in causing birth and death, then those of fixed nature in the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna (the Hearer Vehicle and the Solitary Realizer Vehicle, referring to the vehicles of disciples and solitary Buddhas) should not eternally enter nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa (nirvana without remainder, referring to the state of complete cessation). Because jñeyāvaraṇa invites birth and death, it binds these practitioners of the Two Vehicles, preventing them from tending towards tranquility, just as afflictions bind ordinary beings, preventing them from attaining nirvana. This is the first question. Therefore, the following answers: 'These jñeyāvaraṇa do not have the function of initiating karma or nourishing life; they merely serve as supporting conditions to facilitate the arising of birth and death.' Those with gotra (lineage, referring to having a certain potential) who generate the aspiration of anāsrava-samādhi (samadhi without outflows, referring to meditative concentration free from afflictions), jñeyāvaraṇa will assist them in producing pariṇāma-maraṇa (transformation death, referring to the death manifested by Bodhisattvas due to their vows), but jñeyāvaraṇa is not the direct factor in initiating karma, nourishing life, and causing birth and death. Therefore, for those of fixed nature who enter nirvana, even with the presence of jñeyāvaraṇa, it cannot initiate karma, etc. 'How can mārga-satya actually cause suffering,' this is the second question. The following text first answers the second question, and then answers the first question. Although there are three interpretations of this passage, the first interpretation is the same as the question in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra (Treatise on the Buddha-land Sutra). The second interpretation posits difficulties and refutations, and also has some validity. The third interpretation has corresponding answers below, and the textual flow is not contradictory, nor is there any fault.

Treatise: How can mārga-satya actually cause suffering?

Commentary: This is the second question from an outsider. The previous statement said that anāsrava-karma is the direct cause of suffering, hence this question.

Treatise: Who said it actually causes suffering?

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. Mārga-satya does not actually cause suffering.

Treatise: If not, how is it explained?

Commentary: This is the outsider's question. If mārga-satya does not actually cause suffering, then what is the meaning of 'cause'?

Treatise: The aspiration of anāsrava-samādhi, and so on, does not solely cause suffering.

Commentary: Due to the excellent anāsrava-samādhi of the fourth dhyāna (the fourth meditative absorption, referring to the fourth dhyana of the Form Realm), it supports sāsrava-karma (karma with outflows, referring to karma with afflictions), causing the resulting retributions to be continuously reborn, uninterrupted for a long time, and gradually increasing and becoming excellent. Actually, it is sāsrava-karma that causes suffering, but because the supporting power of anāsrava-samādhi is strong, it is given the name of 'cause' by convention. It is not that anāsrava-karma actually causes suffering. When this anāsrava-karma causes suffering in this way, it is because jñeyāvaraṇa acts as a supporting condition, assisting the power of anāsrava-karma. It is not that anāsrava-karma alone can cause retribution.

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明所知障不同煩惱。故次論言。

論。然所知障至潤生用故。

述曰。若準前第三解。此答第一問。所知障不發業等故。二乘入涅槃。解脫者謂二涅槃。解除縛義。故名解脫。煩惱名縛。能障涅槃。所知障非縛。不障涅槃。涅槃解脫故。既不障解脫。體非縛法。無如無明等。能發有漏業。及如貪等。潤生用故。此所知障。若能發業潤生。縛有情故。可別障解脫。此既不爾。故不障解脫。

論。何用資感生死苦為。

述曰。此第三外人問。佛地論說。二乘無學盡此一身必入永滅。與佛無異。何故引彼趣大菩提長時受苦。彼答變易位中無斯苦受。斯有何過。又問行苦有故是為大過。彼文難意大與此同。

論。自證菩提利樂他故。

述曰。即二利故。更須資生。

論。謂不定姓至無上菩提。

述曰。不定二乘及八地已去菩薩。其二乘者已永斷煩惱障。其菩薩者已永伏煩惱障。故無容復受當分段身。雖諸菩薩願力受生。伏煩惱種。分段之果定不能生。二乘生死非由悲願。若有惑種生死後續。故斷種時生死永盡。菩薩生死但由悲願。必假現惑助愿方生。故伏現時永斷生死。菩薩雖藉煩惱生死受生。不同凡夫．二乘說現及種潤生。由起煩惱利益有情。業勢便能感生死果

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 　　因為所知障與煩惱不同，所以接下來討論它。

論：然而，所知障具有滋潤生命的作用。

述記：如果按照前面第三種解釋，這是回答第一個問題。所知障不引發業等，所以二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）可以進入涅槃（Nirvana，佛教術語，指解脫生死輪迴的狀態）。解脫是指解除束縛的意義，所以稱為解脫。煩惱被稱為束縛，能夠障礙涅槃。所知障不是束縛，不障礙涅槃。因為涅槃是解脫，既然不障礙解脫，其本體就不是束縛之法，不像無明等，能夠引發有漏業，以及像貪等，具有滋潤生命的作用。如果所知障能夠引發業和滋潤生命，束縛有情，就可以單獨障礙解脫。但它既然不是這樣，所以不障礙解脫。

論：為何要用它來資助感受生死之苦呢？

述記：這是第三個外人的提問。《佛地論》說，二乘的無學（Arhat，佛教修行的一個階段）在結束這一生后必定進入永滅，與佛沒有區別。為何要引導他們趣向大菩提（Bodhi，覺悟），長期遭受痛苦？他們的回答是，在變易位中沒有這種痛苦的感受，這有什麼過錯？又問，行苦存在，所以這是很大的過錯。那篇文章的提問意圖與此相同。

論：爲了自我證得菩提，利益安樂他人。

述記：即是爲了自利和利他兩種利益，所以更需要資助生命。

論：指不定性的二乘以及八地以上的菩薩（Bodhisattva，佛教中發願要救度一切眾生的修行者）。

述記：不定性的二乘以及八地以上的菩薩。其中的二乘已經永遠斷除了煩惱障，其中的菩薩已經永遠降伏了煩惱障，所以不可能再承受當分段身（指由業力所感召的生死之身）。雖然諸位菩薩因為願力而受生，降伏煩惱的種子，但分段的果報一定不會產生。二乘的生死不是由於悲願。如果有惑的種子，生死還會延續。所以斷除種子的時候，生死就永遠終結。菩薩的生死只是由於悲願。必須藉助現行的煩惱來幫助願力才能產生。所以降伏現行煩惱的時候，就永遠斷除了生死。菩薩雖然憑藉煩惱和生死來受生，但不同於凡夫和二乘，他們說的是現行和種子滋潤生命。由於生起煩惱來利益有情，業力便能夠感召生死的果報。

【English Translation】 English version Since the Obstruction of Knowledge differs from afflictions, it is discussed next.

Treatise: However, the Obstruction of Knowledge has the function of nourishing life.

Commentary: If based on the third explanation above, this answers the first question. The Obstruction of Knowledge does not initiate karma, etc., therefore the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) can enter Nirvāṇa (the Buddhist term for the state of liberation from the cycle of birth and death). Liberation means the meaning of removing bonds, hence it is called liberation. Afflictions are called bonds, which can obstruct Nirvāṇa. The Obstruction of Knowledge is not a bond, it does not obstruct Nirvāṇa. Because Nirvāṇa is liberation, since it does not obstruct liberation, its essence is not a binding dharma, unlike ignorance, etc., which can initiate contaminated karma, and like greed, etc., which have the function of nourishing life. If the Obstruction of Knowledge could initiate karma and nourish life, binding sentient beings, it could separately obstruct liberation. But since it is not like this, it does not obstruct liberation.

Treatise: Why use it to support experiencing the suffering of birth and death?

Commentary: This is the question of a third outsider. The Buddhabhūmi Sūtra says that the Arhats (a stage of Buddhist practice) of the Two Vehicles will definitely enter eternal extinction after ending this life, without any difference from the Buddha. Why guide them towards Great Bodhi (Enlightenment), enduring suffering for a long time? Their answer is that there is no such suffering in the Transformation Body stage, what fault is there in this? It is also asked, the suffering of change exists, so this is a great fault. The intention of the question in that text is the same as this.

Treatise: For the sake of self-realizing Bodhi and benefiting and bringing joy to others.

Commentary: That is, for the sake of both self-benefit and benefiting others, it is even more necessary to support life.

Treatise: Refers to the Two Vehicles of uncertain nature and Bodhisattvas (Buddhist practitioners who vow to save all sentient beings) above the Eighth Ground.

Commentary: The Two Vehicles of uncertain nature and Bodhisattvas above the Eighth Ground. Among them, the Two Vehicles have already permanently severed the Obstruction of Afflictions, and the Bodhisattvas have already permanently subdued the Obstruction of Afflictions, so it is impossible to receive the corresponding Segmented Body (referring to the body of birth and death caused by karma). Although the Bodhisattvas receive birth due to vows, subduing the seeds of afflictions, the result of segmentation will definitely not arise. The birth and death of the Two Vehicles are not due to compassion and vows. If there are seeds of delusion, birth and death will continue. Therefore, when the seeds are severed, birth and death will end forever. The birth and death of Bodhisattvas are only due to compassion and vows. It is necessary to rely on manifest afflictions to help the vows to arise. Therefore, when subduing manifest afflictions, birth and death are permanently severed. Although Bodhisattvas rely on afflictions and birth and death to receive birth, they are different from ordinary people and the Two Vehicles, who speak of manifest and seed nourishing life. Because of arising afflictions to benefit sentient beings, the power of karma can cause the result of birth and death.

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。煩惱若伏業勢便盡。故須法執助智受生。故已斷伏。無容復受當分段果。既有二利之益。觀知分段報終。恐廢長時修菩薩行。遂入無漏勝定。勝愿之力如阿羅漢延壽之法資現身之因。即資過去感今身業。令業長時與果不絕。即非擇者復更生義。此或先愿後方入定。或先入定後方發願。二理無違但由發願入無漏定。冥資故業令身轉變。不同小乘熏禪等法。無漏有漏更互而起。過去之業不可更起故。如是數數定愿資助。乃至證得無上菩提經三大劫　言勝定者。舊云邊際第四靜慮。今雖無文定何靜慮之邊際定。四定俱得。預流果等皆得此定。理不違故。然多第四。以殊勝故。又佛地云。雖經行苦。今得如來三身功德大喜大樂等。乃至廣說。

論。彼復何須所知障助。

述曰。此外人問。既由無漏資現身先業令果長時。彼復何須所知障助方感此果。

論。既未圓證至猛利悲願。

述曰。既未成佛圓證無相大悲一味平等之解。若不執菩提可求。有情可度。為實有者。無有因由可能發起猛利大悲及猛利愿。以所知障。可求可度執為先故。方能發起無漏業故。說業為因。以是勝故。無明為緣以疏遠故。非如煩惱資有漏業。但緣義同少分相似。

論。又所知障至留身久住。

述曰。第二又解。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果煩惱被降伏，業力的力量就會耗盡。因此，需要法執（Dharma attachment，對佛法的執著）來幫助智慧受生。所以，（菩薩）已經斷除了煩惱並降伏了業力，不應該再承受分段生死的果報。既然有自利利他的益處，（菩薩）觀察到分段生死的報應將要結束，恐怕會荒廢長時間修菩薩行的機會，於是進入無漏的殊勝禪定。憑藉殊勝的願力，就像阿羅漢（Arhat，已證得涅槃的聖者）延續壽命的方法一樣，資助現世之身的因緣，也就是資助過去所感得的今生之業，使業力長時間地給予果報而不中斷。這並非是說（菩薩）像凡夫一樣再次產生新的業力而受生。這或許是先發愿，然後才入定；或許是先入定，然後才發願。這兩種道理沒有衝突，只是由於發願進入無漏禪定，暗中資助過去的業力，使身體轉變，不同於小乘（Hinayana，佛教的一個派別）熏修禪定等方法，無漏業和有漏業交替生起，過去的業力不可能再次生起。像這樣多次通過禪定和願力來資助，乃至證得無上菩提（Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi，無上正等正覺），經歷三大阿僧祇劫。（關於）殊勝禪定，舊說是邊際第四靜慮（Fourth Dhyana，四禪的最高境界）。現在雖然沒有明確的經文說明，但什麼禪定是第四靜慮的邊際禪定呢？四禪都可以得到，預流果（Srotapanna，須陀洹，佛教四果位中的初果）等都可以得到這種禪定，道理上沒有衝突。然而，大多是第四禪，因為它殊勝的緣故。而且，《佛地經》（Buddhabhumi Sutra）中說，雖然經歷了行苦，現在得到了如來（Tathagata，佛的稱號之一）的三身功德、大喜大樂等，乃至廣說。 論：他們又何須所知障（Jnana-avarana，知識上的障礙）的幫助？ 述曰：這是外人提出的問題。既然通過無漏業資助現世之身，並使先前的業力果報延續很長時間，那麼他們又何須所知障的幫助才能感得這種果報呢？ 論：既然還沒有圓滿證得至極猛利的悲願。 述曰：既然還沒有成佛，圓滿證得無相大悲（無分別的慈悲）和一味平等之解，如果不執著于菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）是可以求得的，有情（Sentient beings，眾生）是可以度化的，認為是真實存在的，就沒有理由能夠發起猛利的大悲心和猛利的願力。因為所知障，將可求的菩提和可度的眾生執著為先決條件，才能發起無漏業。說業是（感果的）因，因為它殊勝的緣故；無明（Avidya，無知）是（感果的）緣，因為它疏遠的緣故。不像煩惱資助有漏業，只是在緣起意義上有些相似。 論：又，所知障乃至留身久住。 述曰：第二種解釋。

【English Translation】 English version: If afflictions are subdued, the power of karma will be exhausted. Therefore, Dharma attachment (Dharma attachment, attachment to the Buddha's teachings) is needed to help wisdom take rebirth. Therefore, (the Bodhisattva) has already cut off afflictions and subdued karma, and should no longer bear the fruit of segmented life and death. Since there are benefits for both oneself and others, (the Bodhisattva) observes that the retribution of segmented life and death is about to end, and fears that it will waste the opportunity to practice the Bodhisattva path for a long time, so he enters the uncontaminated and supreme Samadhi. Relying on the power of supreme vows, just like the method of Arhats (Arhat, a saint who has attained Nirvana) extending their lifespan, it supports the causes and conditions of the present body, that is, it supports the karma of the past that has been felt in this life, so that the karma gives fruit for a long time without interruption. This does not mean that (the Bodhisattva) generates new karma again like ordinary people and takes rebirth. This may be making vows first, and then entering Samadhi; or entering Samadhi first, and then making vows. These two principles are not contradictory, but because of making vows and entering uncontaminated Samadhi, it secretly supports the past karma, so that the body transforms, which is different from the methods of Hinayana (Hinayana, a school of Buddhism) cultivating Samadhi, etc. Uncontaminated karma and contaminated karma arise alternately, and the karma of the past cannot arise again. Like this, repeatedly through Samadhi and vows to support, until attaining Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi (Anuttara-samyak-sambodhi, unsurpassed complete enlightenment), experiencing three great Asankhya kalpas. (Regarding) supreme Samadhi, the old saying is the marginal Fourth Dhyana (Fourth Dhyana, the highest state of the four Dhyanas). Although there is no clear scripture now, what Samadhi is the marginal Samadhi of the Fourth Dhyana? All four Dhyanas can be obtained, and Srotapanna (Srotapanna, the first fruit of the four fruits of Buddhism), etc. can obtain this Samadhi, and there is no contradiction in principle. However, most are the Fourth Dhyana, because it is supreme. Moreover, the Buddhabhumi Sutra says that although experiencing the suffering of practice, now obtaining the merits of the three bodies of the Tathagata (Tathagata, one of the titles of the Buddha), great joy and great happiness, etc., and so on. Treatise: Why do they need the help of Jnana-avarana (Jnana-avarana, intellectual obstacles)? Commentary: This is a question raised by outsiders. Since the uncontaminated karma supports the present body and prolongs the retribution of previous karma for a long time, then why do they need the help of Jnana-avarana to feel this retribution? Treatise: Since they have not yet fully attained the extremely fierce compassionate vows. Commentary: Since they have not yet become Buddhas and fully attained the non-dual great compassion (undifferentiated compassion) and the understanding of one taste equality, if they do not cling to the idea that Bodhi (Bodhi, enlightenment) can be sought and sentient beings (Sentient beings, living beings) can be liberated, and consider them to be real, there is no reason to be able to generate fierce compassion and fierce vows. Because of Jnana-avarana, clinging to the idea that Bodhi can be sought and sentient beings can be liberated as a prerequisite, then uncontaminated karma can be generated. Saying that karma is the cause (of feeling the fruit), because it is supreme; Avidya (Avidya, ignorance) is the condition (of feeling the fruit), because it is distant. It is not like afflictions supporting contaminated karma, but only somewhat similar in the meaning of dependent origination. Treatise: Also, Jnana-avarana even keeps the body dwelling for a long time. Commentary: The second explanation.

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此所知障障大菩提正障智故。為永斷除此所知障留身久住。說之為緣為所斷緣故。

論。又所知障至有大助力。

述曰。第三又解。此所知障。能為一切有漏之依。以體寬遍。由有此障。諸俱行法不成無漏。故此所依之障若無。彼能依有漏決定非有。今既留身住由有所知障。為于身住有大助力說為緣也。此中三釋並通三乘。然八地已去。復更願資即無初義無漏相續不起執故但后二義。

以上第三問答分別。以下第四辨二死別。問且如決定姓阿羅漢等。留諸壽行舍衣缽等入邊際定。以修福力資現命業亦得延壽。變易生死有何別耶。

論。若所留身至非彼境故。

述曰。正解此二生死別體。變易生死。第八十說非天眼境。此中說非二乘等境。彼文意說。設定性聲聞。及不定性未迴心者。雖有天眼亦不能見。身極微細非其境故。故此論言二乘．異生所不能見。然迴心已去設預流等亦能見之非天眼。二乘並悉能見得殊妙身。眼亦勝故。然不許下得見上身。非其境故。上得見下　又解以同類故下得見上。

小乘福資入定。通有無漏。今者大乘舍福資身。定唯有漏。此文為證。粗妙既殊。見者亦別。

論。由此應知至是增上果。

述曰。自下第五總結會違。變易生死性是有漏。

望感現業。五果之中異熟果攝。通五蘊性。此果望于無漏業。是增上果。疏緣與力故。

論。有聖教中至隨助因說。

述曰。此會相違。說為無漏出三界者。隨此無漏助業因說。而體實非。是故經言界外生死．有漏生死．無漏生死等也。即十地云。有妙凈土出過三界。十地菩薩當生其中。更勘勝鬘．楞伽二經此等文也。瑜伽第八十．佛地第二說。為住有餘界。無餘界爾耶。答唯有餘界。無餘依中離諸事業故　問若唯有餘界。云何一生便得成佛。彼阿羅漢果尚當無一生等　答由增壽行方能成佛。故世尊說善修神足能住一劫等。此是發趣極成遲鈍。不如初修菩薩。乃至廣說。無上依經有四生死。一方便二因緣．三有有．四無有如別抄會。

論。頌中所言至義如前說。

述曰。以上第二解二死訖。自下第三釋本頌文有二。初正解。后逐難釋。此正解也。頌言諸業習氣。即有漏．無漏二業。業非一故。有身等三故名諸業。二取習氣。即二障種子。俱執著故皆說名取　俱等余文者。等前異熟盡等文。

問變易生死非如分段別死別生。如何可言前異熟既盡等。

論。變易生死至余復生義。

述曰。下逐難解。初解變易難。后釋頌中不說現行等所以。此則初也。雖無如分段別盡別生。而

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：望感現業（指期望感知到現在的業力）。在五果（五種果報）之中，屬於異熟果（vipāka-phala，指不同性質的業因所產生的果報）所攝。通於五蘊（pañca-skandha，構成個體存在的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）的性質。此果相對於無漏業（anāsrava-karma，指沒有煩惱的業力）而言，是增上果（adhipati-phala，指具有增強和影響力的果報），因為它具有疏遠的因緣和力量。

論：在聖教（ārya-śāsana，指佛陀的教法）中，乃至隨助因（anubandha-hetu，指輔助性的原因）的說法。

述曰：這會產生矛盾。說無漏業超出三界（tri-dhātu，指欲界、色界、無色界）的說法，是隨順於無漏業的助業因（指輔助無漏業的原因）而說的，但其本質並非如此。因此，經中說有界外生死、有漏生死（sāsrava-karma，指有煩惱的業力）、無漏生死等等。即十地經（daśa-bhūmi-sūtra，指描述菩薩修行十個階段的經典）中說：有妙凈土（vyūha-kṣetra，指莊嚴清凈的佛土）超出三界，十地菩薩（daśa-bhūmika-bodhisattva，指處於菩薩修行第十個階段的菩薩）應當往生其中。更要考察《勝鬘經》（Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-sūtra）和《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra）中的這些文句。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第八十卷和《佛地經》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra）第二卷說：是住在有餘界（sopadhiśeṣa-dhātu，指還有煩惱殘餘的境界）還是無餘界（nirupadhiśeṣa-dhātu，指沒有煩惱殘餘的境界）呢？回答是隻有有餘界，因為在無餘依中（指沒有煩惱殘餘的涅槃境界）遠離了各種事業。問：如果只有有餘界，為什麼一生就能成佛呢？那阿羅漢果（arhat-phala，指斷盡煩惱的果位）尚且沒有一生就能證得的。答：由於增長壽命的修行才能成佛。所以世尊說，善於修習神足（ṛddhipāda，指通過禪定獲得的超自然能力）能夠住世一劫等等。這是發起極成遲鈍，不如初修菩薩，乃至廣說。《無上依經》（Anuttarāśraya-sūtra）中有四種生死：一、方便生死，二、因緣生死，三、有有生死，四、無有生死，如其他抄本所會。

論：頌中所說的乃至義如前說。

述曰：以上第二種解釋二死（指分段生死和變易生死）完畢。從下面開始第三種解釋本頌文，分為兩部分。首先是正面解釋，然後是逐個難題解釋。這是正面解釋。頌文說諸業習氣（karma-vāsanā，指各種業力的習氣），即有漏業和無漏業兩種業。業不是單一的，因為有身等三業（指身業、口業、意業），所以稱為諸業。二取習氣，即二障（指煩惱障和所知障）的種子。因為都執著，所以都稱為取。俱等余文，等同於前面的異熟盡等文。

問：變易生死（pariṇāma-maraṇa，指菩薩因願力而不斷變化的生死）不像分段生死（saṃsāra-maraṇa，指凡夫因業力而產生的生死）那樣有別死別生。如何能說前異熟既盡等呢？

論：變易生死乃至余復生義。

述曰：下面是逐個難題解釋。首先解釋變易生死的難題，然後解釋頌中不說現行（指目前的行動）等的原因。這是第一部分。雖然沒有像分段生死那樣有別盡別生，但是……

【English Translation】 English version: Hoping to sense present karma. Among the five fruits, it is included in the vipāka-phala (result of maturation). It pervades the nature of the five skandhas (aggregates). This fruit, in relation to anāsrava-karma (non-defiled karma), is an adhipati-phala (dominant result), because it has distant causes and conditions and power.

Treatise: In the ārya-śāsana (holy teachings), even the statement of anubandha-hetu (auxiliary cause).

Commentary: This creates a contradiction. The statement that anāsrava-karma transcends the tri-dhātu (three realms) is made in accordance with the auxiliary cause of anāsrava-karma, but its essence is not so. Therefore, the sutras speak of birth and death outside the realms, sāsrava-karma (defiled karma) birth and death, anāsrava-karma birth and death, and so on. That is, the Daśabhūmika-sūtra (Ten Stages Sutra) says: There is a vyūha-kṣetra (wonderfully pure land) that transcends the three realms, and the daśa-bhūmika-bodhisattvas (bodhisattvas of the tenth stage) should be born there. Further examine these passages in the Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-sūtra (Queen Śrīmālā's Lion's Roar Sutra) and the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra (Lankavatara Sutra). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), volume 80, and the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra (Buddha Land Sutra), volume 2, say: Is it residing in the sopadhiśeṣa-dhātu (realm with remainder of affliction) or the nirupadhiśeṣa-dhātu (realm without remainder of affliction)? The answer is only the sopadhiśeṣa-dhātu, because in nirupadhiśeṣa (nirvana without remainder) one is free from all activities. Question: If there is only the sopadhiśeṣa-dhātu, how can one attain Buddhahood in one lifetime? Even the arhat-phala (fruit of arhatship) is not attained in one lifetime. Answer: Buddhahood can be attained through the practice of increasing lifespan. Therefore, the World-Honored One said that by skillfully cultivating the ṛddhipāda (bases of miraculous power), one can abide for one kalpa (eon), and so on. This is a slow and dull initiation, not like the initial practice of a bodhisattva, and so on. The Anuttarāśraya-sūtra (Supreme Reliance Sutra) has four kinds of birth and death: first, expedient birth and death; second, causal birth and death; third, birth and death with existence; fourth, birth and death without existence, as compiled in other copies.

Treatise: The meaning of what is said in the verse is as previously explained.

Commentary: The second explanation of the two deaths (segmental birth and death and transformation birth and death) is now complete. From here onwards, the third explanation of the verse begins, in two parts. First, the direct explanation, and then the explanation of each difficult point. This is the direct explanation. The verse says 'karma-vāsanā (habitual tendencies of karma),' which refers to both sāsrava-karma and anāsrava-karma. Karma is not singular, because there are the three karmas of body, speech, and mind, so it is called 'karmas.' 'Two grasping habitual tendencies' refers to the seeds of the two obscurations (afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations). Because they are both clung to, they are both called 'grasping.' 'Together with other passages' is equivalent to the previous passage about the exhaustion of vipāka, and so on.

Question: Pariṇāma-maraṇa (transformation birth and death) is not like saṃsāra-maraṇa (segmental birth and death) with separate death and separate birth. How can it be said that the previous vipāka is exhausted, and so on?

Treatise: Pariṇāma-maraṇa, and so on, the meaning of rebirth.

Commentary: Below is the explanation of each difficult point. First, the explanation of the difficulty of pariṇāma-maraṇa, and then the explanation of why the verse does not mention present actions, and so on. This is the first part. Although there is no separate exhaustion and separate birth like in saṃsāra-maraṇa, but...

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以定愿數資助故。改去前惡者。轉生后勝者。亦有前盡后更生義。此即所資業力未盡。為令增勝故改轉也。或有定力。非極長時增勝。但得二十劫等。為令更增。亦有前盡後生之義。

自下第二解頌不說現行所以。

論。雖亦由現至故偏說之。

述曰。雖實亦由諸法現行生死相續。而種子相續一切時有。非如現行多間斷故。頌中偏說種子。云由業習氣等。

論。或為顯爾至故不說現。

述曰。第二解。為顯真異熟因業種子是。果即本識。皆不離本識故。不說現行。其諸種子即種子識。現行不然。各別體故。

論。現異熟因不即與果。

述曰。此諸現行善惡等法。雖亦是異熟因不即與果。熏于種子已。要於後時方與果故。但說種子。

問六識之中。亦有異熟果。何故頌不說前盡後生。六識現行亦不離識。是異熟果故。

論。轉識間斷非異熟故。

述曰。以非是真異熟。不說六現行。頌意偏說第八識也。正是生死相續法故。

上來解頌依染法相續訖。頌言異熟故非無漏。自下第二因解有漏法。例無漏法。

論。前中后際至應知亦然。

述曰。此略例也。

論。謂無始來至相續無窮。

述曰。由法爾種新所熏發。由本願力。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為以決定的願力資助的緣故，改變去除之前的惡業，從而轉生到更好的境界。也有前世業力盡了之後，重新出生的含義。這指的是所資助的業力尚未完全消盡，爲了使其增長殊勝而改變轉化。或者有的是因為禪定之力，並非極長時間的增長殊勝，但能獲得二十劫等的果報，爲了使其更加增長，也有前世業力盡了之後，重新出生的含義。

下面第二部分解釋頌文為什麼不說現行。

論：雖然也因為現行導致，所以偏重說明種子。

述記：雖然實際上也因為諸法現行而生死相續，但是種子相續是任何時候都存在的，不像現行那樣多有間斷，所以頌文中偏重說明種子，說是由業的習氣等。

論：或者爲了顯示真異熟因，所以不說現行。

述記：第二種解釋，爲了顯示真正的異熟因是業的種子，果就是本識（Alaya-識，根本識），都不離本識的緣故，所以不說現行。那些種子就是種子識，現行則不然，因為各有不同的自體。

論：現行的異熟因並不直接產生果報。

述記：這些現行的善惡等法，雖然也是異熟因，但並不直接產生果報，而是在熏習種子之後，要到後來的時侯才產生果報，所以只說種子。

問：在六識之中，也有異熟果，為什麼頌文不說前世業力盡了之後，重新出生？六識的現行也不離識，是異熟果的緣故。

論：因為轉識有間斷，不是異熟的緣故。

述記：因為六識不是真正的異熟，所以不說六識的現行。頌文的意思偏重說明第八識（Alaya-識，根本識）。因為它才是生死相續的根本。

上面解釋頌文是依據染法相續完畢。頌文說因為是異熟，所以不是無漏法。下面第二部分因為解釋有漏法，來類比無漏法。

論：前際、中際、后際，應當知道也是這樣。

述記：這是簡略的類比。

論：所謂從無始以來，直到相續無窮。

述記：由法爾的種子和新的熏習引發，由本願力。

【English Translation】 English version Because of being supported by the determined vows, changing and removing the previous evil deeds, thereby being reborn into a better realm. There is also the meaning of being reborn after the karma of the previous life has been exhausted. This refers to the fact that the supported karma has not been completely exhausted, and it is changed and transformed in order to increase its superiority. Or some are due to the power of meditation, which does not increase superiority for an extremely long time, but can obtain the fruit of twenty kalpas, etc. In order to increase it further, there is also the meaning of being reborn after the karma of the previous life has been exhausted.

The second part below explains why the verse does not mention the manifest actions.

Treatise: Although it is also due to the manifest actions, the emphasis is on explaining the seeds.

Commentary: Although in reality, it is also due to the manifest actions of all dharmas that birth and death continue, the seed continuum exists at all times, unlike the manifest actions which have many interruptions. Therefore, the verse emphasizes the seeds, saying that they are due to the habitual energies of karma, etc.

Treatise: Or to reveal the true Vipaka (異熟, differing maturation) cause, the manifest actions are not mentioned.

Commentary: The second explanation is to show that the true Vipaka cause is the seed of karma, and the result is the Alaya-consciousness (本識, fundamental consciousness), all of which are inseparable from the Alaya-consciousness. Therefore, the manifest actions are not mentioned. Those seeds are the seed consciousness, which is not the case with manifest actions, because each has its own distinct entity.

Treatise: The manifest Vipaka cause does not directly produce the result.

Commentary: These manifest good and evil dharmas, although they are also Vipaka causes, do not directly produce the result. Rather, after perfuming the seeds, they produce the result at a later time. Therefore, only the seeds are mentioned.

Question: Among the six consciousnesses, there are also Vipaka results. Why does the verse not mention being reborn after the karma of the previous life has been exhausted? The manifest actions of the six consciousnesses are also inseparable from consciousness, because they are Vipaka results.

Treatise: Because the transformed consciousness is interrupted, it is not Vipaka.

Commentary: Because the six consciousnesses are not true Vipaka, their manifest actions are not mentioned. The meaning of the verse emphasizes the eighth consciousness (Alaya-識, fundamental consciousness). Because it is the root of the continuous cycle of birth and death.

The above explanation of the verse is based on the completion of the continuum of defiled dharmas. The verse says that because it is Vipaka, it is not unconditioned. The second part below uses the explanation of conditioned dharmas to analogize unconditioned dharmas.

Treatise: The past, present, and future should also be known to be the same.

Commentary: This is a brief analogy.

Treatise: So-called from beginningless time, until the continuum is endless.

Commentary: Caused by the natural seeds and the new perfuming, by the power of the original vows.

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即佛世尊利他無盡。清凈種識皆通現種。皆唯第八能持種故。

自下第三總結上文。

論。由此應知唯有內識。

述曰。由此上來所說染凈道理。應知諸法相續唯有內識也。

成唯識論述記卷第八(末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

成唯識論述記卷第九(本)

沙門基撰

論。若唯有識至說有三性。

述曰。雖有七頌釋外難中而分為二。初二頌答唯有識便違理難。后五頌答唯有識便違經難。

后中有二。初三頌釋無境三自性不成難。后二頌釋有識三無性不成難　於此初中有四。初總問。二略答。三徴。四釋。此即初也　今難意云。若離內識外法無者。但有一性不應說三。經既說三故非唯識。

論。應知三性亦不離識。

述曰。此略答也。非說性有三便非唯有識。即不離識而說三故。

論。所以者何。

述曰。外人詰也。三不離識之所以者何等是耶。

論。頌曰至非不見此彼。

述曰。下廣答也。頌中有三。初二頌辨三性。后一頌初三句明性一．異。第四句明內證時圓成．依他先後證見。初二頌中。初一頌解初性。次半頌解依他。次半頌解圓成。余文可解。

下釋之中文分為二。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：即佛世尊利他的行為是無盡的。清凈的種子識（Bija-vijnana，指含藏一切善凈種子的阿賴耶識）都普遍顯現各種種子。這是因為只有第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana，又稱藏識）能夠執持一切種子。

下面第三部分總結上文。

論：由此應該知道只有內識（Vijnana，指阿賴耶識）。

述曰：由此上面所說的染凈的道理，應該知道諸法相續唯有內識。

《成唯識論述記》卷第八（末） 大正藏第43冊 No. 1830 《成唯識論述記》

《成唯識論述記》卷第九（本）

沙門基 撰

論：如果只有識，到說有三性。

述曰：雖然有七頌解釋外人的提問，但分為兩部分。前兩頌回答『只有識』便違背道理的提問。后五頌回答『只有識』便違背經文的提問。

后一部分中又有兩部分。前三頌解釋沒有外境，三自性（Trisvabhava，指遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）不能成立的提問。后兩頌解釋有識，三無性（Trisvabhava-sunyata，指三自性的空性）不能成立的提問。在此第一部分中有四個部分：第一，總提問；第二，簡略回答；第三，追問；第四，解釋。這裡是第一部分。現在的提問意思是：如果離開內識就沒有外在的法，那麼就只有一種自性，不應該說有三種。經文既然說了三種自性，就不是唯識。

論：應該知道三種自性也不離識。

述曰：這是簡略的回答。不是說自性有三種就不是唯有識，正因為不離識才說有三種。

論：為什麼呢？

述曰：外人追問。三種自性不離識的原因是什麼呢？

論：頌曰，到非不見此彼。

述曰：下面是廣泛的回答。頌文中有三部分。前兩頌辨別三種自性。后一頌的前三句說明自性的一和異。第四句說明內證時圓成實性（Parinispanna，指圓滿成就的真實自性）、依他起性（Paratantra，指依仗其他條件而生起的自性）先後被證見。前兩頌中，第一頌解釋初性（遍計所執性，Parikalpita，指虛妄分別的自性）。接下來半頌解釋依他起性。再接下來半頌解釋圓成實性。其餘的文字可以自己理解。

下面解釋頌文，分為兩部分。

【English Translation】 English version: Namely, the Buddha-World Honored One's altruistic actions are inexhaustible. Pure seed-consciousness (Bija-vijnana, referring to the Alaya-vijnana containing all pure seeds) universally manifests all kinds of seeds. This is because only the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, also known as the storehouse consciousness) can hold all the seeds.

The third part below summarizes the above text.

Treatise: Therefore, it should be known that there is only inner consciousness (Vijnana, referring to Alaya-vijnana).

Commentary: From the above-mentioned principles of defilement and purity, it should be known that the continuity of all dharmas exists only within inner consciousness.

Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 8 (End) Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 43, No. 1830, Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only

Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 9 (Beginning)

Composed by the Shramana (Buddhist monk) Kui Ji

Treatise: If there is only consciousness, up to the point of saying there are three natures.

Commentary: Although there are seven verses explaining the questions from outsiders, they are divided into two parts. The first two verses answer the question that 'only consciousness' contradicts reason. The latter five verses answer the question that 'only consciousness' contradicts the scriptures.

In the latter part, there are again two parts. The first three verses explain the question that without external objects, the three natures (Trisvabhava, referring to Parikalpita, Paratantra, and Parinispanna) cannot be established. The latter two verses explain the question that with consciousness, the three non-natures (Trisvabhava-sunyata, referring to the emptiness of the three natures) cannot be established. In this first part, there are four parts: first, a general question; second, a brief answer; third, further questioning; fourth, explanation. This is the first part. The meaning of the current question is: if there are no external dharmas apart from inner consciousness, then there is only one nature, and it should not be said that there are three. Since the scriptures speak of three natures, it is not consciousness-only.

Treatise: It should be known that the three natures are also not separate from consciousness.

Commentary: This is a brief answer. It is not that saying there are three natures means it is not consciousness-only; it is precisely because they are not separate from consciousness that we speak of three.

Treatise: Why is that?

Commentary: The outsider asks further. What is the reason why the three natures are not separate from consciousness?

Treatise: Verse says, up to 'not not seeing this and that'.

Commentary: Below is a broad answer. There are three parts in the verse. The first two verses distinguish the three natures. The first three lines of the last verse explain the oneness and difference of the natures. The fourth line explains that during internal realization, the Parinispanna (perfected nature, referring to the fully accomplished true nature) and Paratantra (dependent nature, referring to the nature that arises depending on other conditions) are realized sequentially. In the first two verses, the first verse explains the initial nature (Parikalpita, the imputed nature, referring to the nature of false discrimination). The next half-verse explains the Paratantra. The next half-verse explains the Parinispanna. The remaining text can be understood on your own.

Below, the explanation of the verse is divided into two parts.

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初釋頌文。后諸門解釋。解本頌中文復分二。初別解頌文。后此中意說以下。總釋頌意結答所問。別釋頌中文又分三。初辨三性。次辨不異一義。后辨證見先後　別解三性文分為三。或分為二。初釋第一頌遍計所執性。及解次半頌依他起性。相對明故合為一也。后解余半頌圓成實性。初中分二。初但解遍計所執。后合與依他對明。

論。周遍計度故名遍計。

述曰。解所執中二說。此即是前難陀等解。釋初句頌遍計二字。周義釋遍。度義釋計。唯第六識能周遍計度。第七識等是此類故亦名遍計。但可名計而非遍故。今依正義。由此應作四句分別。有遍而非計。謂無漏諸識。有漏善識等能遍廣緣。而不計執者。有計而非遍。謂第七有漏識。有亦遍亦計。謂有漏染污我．法執第六識等。有非遍非計。謂有漏五識。及第八識等。

問此遍計何名彼彼。

論。品類眾多至虛妄分別。

述曰。以此計心品類眾多或二三等。至下當知。說為彼彼。此體是何。謂能遍計虛妄分別。即是一切能起遍計依他性心。

將釋第二句卻解上句。並釋由字。

論。即由彼彼至所遍計物。

述曰。妄分別故遍計種種所遍計物。物者體也。即能計心起所執也。

此體是何。

論。謂所

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 初釋頌文（Verse）：首先解釋頌文。后諸門解釋：然後從各個方面進行解釋。解本頌中文復分二：解釋頌文字身又分為兩部分。初別解頌文：首先分別解釋頌文。后此中意說以下：然後在『此中意說』之後，總結解釋頌文的含義，以回答最初提出的問題。別釋頌中文又分三：分別解釋頌文又分為三個部分。初辨三性：首先辨別三種自性。次辨不異一義：其次辨別『不異』的含義。后辨證見先後：最後辨別證悟的先後順序。別解三性文分為三：分別解釋三種自性的部分分為三個部分，或者可以分為兩個部分。初釋第一頌遍計所執性：首先解釋第一頌，關於遍計所執性（Parikalpita-svabhava，完全虛構的自性）。及解次半頌依他起性：並解釋接下來的半頌，關於依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava，依賴於其他事物而存在的自性）。相對明故合為一也：因為它們是相對而言的，所以合為一部分。后解余半頌圓成實性：然後解釋剩下的半頌，關於圓成實性（Parinispanna-svabhava，完全成就的自性）。初中分二：第一部分又分為兩個部分。初但解遍計所執：首先只解釋遍計所執。后合與依他對明：然後結合依他起性進行對比說明。

論：周遍計度故名遍計。

述曰：解所執中二說：在解釋『所執』時有兩種說法。此即是前難陀等解：這是之前難陀（Nanda）等人的解釋。釋初句頌遍計二字：解釋第一句頌文中的『遍計』二字。周義釋遍：『周』的意思是『遍』。度義釋計：『度』的意思是『計』。唯第六識能周遍計度：只有第六識（Manovijnana，意識）能夠周遍計度。第七識等是此類故亦名遍計：第七識（Manas，末那識）等也是這一類，所以也稱為『遍計』。但可名計而非遍故：但只能稱為『計』，而不是『遍』。今依正義：現在依照正確的含義。由此應作四句分別：因此應該分為四句來分別。有遍而非計：有的是『遍』而不是『計』，比如無漏的各種識，有漏的善識等，能夠廣泛地緣取事物，但不進行計執。有計而非遍：有的是『計』而不是『遍』，比如第七有漏識。有亦遍亦計：有的是既『遍』又『計』，比如有漏染污的我執和法執，以及第六識等。有非遍非計：有的是既不『遍』也不『計』，比如有漏的五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識），以及第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）等。

問：此遍計何名彼彼？

論：品類眾多至虛妄分別。

述曰：以此計心品類眾多或二三等：因為這種計度之心，品類眾多，或者兩種三種等等，至下當知：到後面會知道。說為彼彼：被稱為『彼彼』。此體是何：它的本體是什麼？謂能遍計虛妄分別：就是能夠進行遍計的虛妄分別。即是一切能起遍計依他性心：也就是一切能夠產生遍計的依他起性之心。

將釋第二句卻解上句：將要解釋第二句，卻先解釋上一句。並釋由字：並解釋『由』字。

論：即由彼彼至所遍計物。

述曰：妄分別故遍計種種所遍計物：因為虛妄分別，所以遍計種種所遍計之物。物者體也：『物』就是本體。即能計心起所執也：也就是能計之心所產生的執著。

此體是何？

論：謂所

【English Translation】 English version: Initial Explanation of the Verse. Subsequent Explanations from Various Aspects. Dividing the Explanation of the Verse into Two Parts: First, a separate explanation of the verse. Then, from 'Explanation of the Meaning Hereafter,' a summary explanation of the verse's meaning to answer the initial question. Separately Explaining the Verse Further Divided into Three Parts: First, distinguishing the three natures (trisvabhava). Second, distinguishing the meaning of 'non-duality' (advaita). Finally, distinguishing the order of realization. The section on separately explaining the three natures is divided into three parts, or can be divided into two. First, explaining the first verse regarding the Parikalpita-svabhava (the completely fabricated nature). And explaining the following half-verse regarding the Paratantra-svabhava (the dependently arising nature). Because they are relative, they are combined into one part. Then, explaining the remaining half-verse regarding the Parinispanna-svabhava (the perfectly accomplished nature). The first part is divided into two: First, only explaining the Parikalpita-svabhava. Then, combining it with the Paratantra-svabhava for comparative explanation.

Treatise: 'Because of pervasive conceptualization, it is called Parikalpita.'

Commentary: 'In explaining 'what is grasped,' there are two views. This is the explanation of Nanda and others from before. Explaining the words 'Parikalpita' in the first line of the verse. 'Pari' means 'pervasive.' 'Kalpita' means 'conceptualization.' Only the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana, mind-consciousness) can pervasively conceptualize. The seventh consciousness (Manas, mind) and others are of this type, so they are also called 'Parikalpita.' But they can only be called 'conceptualization' and not 'pervasive.' Now, according to the correct meaning, it should be divided into four categories. There is 'pervasive' but not 'conceptualization,' such as the undefiled consciousnesses, defiled wholesome consciousnesses, etc., which can broadly cognize objects without conceptualizing and grasping. There is 'conceptualization' but not 'pervasive,' such as the seventh defiled consciousness. There is both 'pervasive' and 'conceptualization,' such as the defiled ego-grasping and dharma-grasping, and the sixth consciousness, etc. There is neither 'pervasive' nor 'conceptualization,' such as the defiled five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness), and the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness), etc.'

Question: 'Why are these Parikalpitas called 'this and that'?'

Treatise: 'Because of the numerous categories, up to false discrimination.'

Commentary: 'Because this conceptualizing mind has numerous categories, or two or three, etc., as will be known later. They are called 'this and that.' What is its essence? It is the false discrimination that can pervasively conceptualize. It is all the Paratantra-svabhava minds that can give rise to Parikalpita.'

About to explain the second line, but first explaining the previous line. And explaining the word 'by'.

Treatise: 'Precisely by this and that, up to the objects that are pervasively conceptualized.'

Commentary: 'Because of false discrimination, there is pervasive conceptualization of various objects that are pervasively conceptualized. 'Object' means essence. It is the grasping that arises from the conceptualizing mind.'

What is its essence?

Treatise: 'That which is'

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妄執至自性差別。

述曰。此性即是所虛妄執。蘊．處．界等一切義理。若法若我此二種中自之體性及差別義。此即心外非有法也。即是由有能計心體計有物也。上句遍計之言。出能計心等體。以遍計行相顯其法體。第二句中遍計之言。即能遍計心之行相。前以行相出彼法體。后以行相明起計失　問此所計法自性非有。何故名物及名種種　答隨能計心。故說為物。心多品故說為種種體非種種也。又所計無法亦可名物。有．無二法皆名物故。言種種者。隨能遍計妄分別心計此無物。當情亦有種種相故。

論。此所妄執至所執自性。

述曰。解第三句。此第二句所妄執心外法．我．自性．差別體性非有。如龜毛等體定無故。總名遍計所執自性。

論。如是自性至不可得故。

述曰。次第四句。如是第三句遍計所執。自性都無所有。非少可有故名都無。依他性法少可有故。何以知無。理．教二法子細推徴不可得故。如前第七卷等所引理教。

此即一翻但解初性。下第二師釋。初略但釋初頌。后廣對依他。兼釋次半頌。

論。或初句顯能遍計識。

述曰。義與前同。

論。第二句示所遍計境。

述曰。所依執處。與前師異。此以理言。通彼依他．圓成二性。下

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 妄執至自性差別。

述曰。此性即是所虛妄執的蘊（skandha，構成要素）、處（āyatana，感覺的來源）、界（dhātu，元素）等一切義理。無論是法（dharma，事物）還是我（ātman，自我），在這兩種之中，自之體性及差別之義，這即是心外沒有法。即是由有能計之心體，計有外物。上句『遍計』之言，指出能計之心等的體性，以遍計的行相顯示其法體。第二句中『遍計』之言，即能遍計之心的行相。前以行相出彼法體，后以行相明起計之失。問：此所計之法自性本非實有，為何有名和種種名稱？答：隨能計之心而說為物，心有多種品類，故說為種種，但體性並非種種。又所計的無法也可名為物，有和無二法都可名為物。言『種種』者，隨能遍計的妄分別心，計此無物，當情亦有種種相故。

論。此所妄執至所執自性。

述曰。解釋第三句。此第二句所妄執的心外法、我、自性、差別體性，並非實有，如龜毛等體，必定沒有。總名為遍計所執自性。

論。如是自性至不可得故。

述曰。其次是第四句。如是第三句的遍計所執自性，都無所有，沒有絲毫可有，故名都無。依他性法（paratantra-svabhāva，依他起性）尚且有少許可有。何以知其無？以理和教二法仔細推究，都不可得。如前第七卷等所引的理和教。

此即一翻，但解釋初性。下第二師釋，初略但釋初頌，后廣對依他，兼釋次半頌。

論。或初句顯能遍計識。

述曰。義與前同。

論。第二句示所遍計境。

述曰。所依執之處，與前師不同。此以理而言，通彼依他、圓成二性（parinispanna-svabhāva，圓成實性）。下

【English Translation】 English version Delusion clings to self-nature differentiation.

Commentary: This 'nature' refers to the elements, sources, realms, and all meanings that are falsely clung to. Whether it is a dharma (thing, phenomenon) or an ātman (self), within these two, the self-nature and its differentiations—this means that there is no dharma outside the mind. That is, it is due to the existence of a mind that can conceptualize that external things are conceived to exist. The term 'parikalpita' (completely conceptualized) in the first sentence points out the nature of the conceptualizing mind, etc., revealing the nature of the dharma through the aspect of complete conceptualization. The term 'parikalpita' in the second sentence refers to the aspect of the mind that can completely conceptualize. The former uses the aspect to reveal the nature of that dharma, while the latter uses the aspect to clarify the error of arising conceptualizations. Question: If the self-nature of this conceptualized dharma is not real, why does it have names and various designations? Answer: It is spoken of as a 'thing' according to the conceptualizing mind. Because the mind has many categories, it is said to be 'various,' but its nature is not various. Furthermore, the conceptualized non-existence can also be called a 'thing,' because both existence and non-existence can be called 'things.' The term 'various' means that according to the deluded discriminating mind that completely conceptualizes, even though there is no such thing, there are still various appearances according to the situation.

Treatise: This falsely clung to... to the clung-to self-nature.

Commentary: Explaining the third sentence. The dharma, self, self-nature, and differentiated nature outside the mind that are falsely clung to in the second sentence are not real, just like the substance of turtle hair, which definitely does not exist. Collectively, they are called the completely conceptualized self-nature.

Treatise: Such a self-nature... because it cannot be obtained.

Commentary: Next is the fourth sentence. Such a completely conceptualized self-nature of the third sentence is completely non-existent, not even a little bit existent, hence the name 'completely non-existent.' The paratantra-svabhāva (dependent nature) still has a little bit of existence. How do we know it is non-existent? By carefully examining it with both reason and teachings, it cannot be obtained. As the reason and teachings cited in the previous seventh fascicle, etc.

This is one translation, only explaining the first nature. The second teacher below explains, first briefly explaining the first verse, then broadly addressing the dependent nature, and also explaining the next half verse.

Treatise: Or the first sentence reveals the conceptualizing consciousness.

Commentary: The meaning is the same as before.

Treatise: The second sentence shows the conceptualized object.

Commentary: The place of clinging to what is relied upon is different from the previous teacher. This speaks in terms of reason, encompassing both the dependent and the perfected natures (parinispanna-svabhāva). Below

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自當知。然攝大乘等但說依他。安足處故。稍相近故。凡夫境故。易可知故。理通成實。

論。後半方申至不可得故。

述曰。後半頌即下二句。方申遍計所執性義非有。前第七卷中已廣顯非有故。然如攝論第四．五卷說能遍計。即此初句。所遍計即此第二句。遍計所執自性乃成。即此中下半頌。

上但重解初頌所執。自下廣解初頌。及依他起。下廣解三種為三。然第三句中與依他合解。既言初句是能遍計。故論次問。

論。初能遍計自性云何。

述曰。此問辭也。下先廣遍計。后廣彼彼。

論。有義八識至皆能遍計。

述曰。此安惠等。執即通三性。有漏之心無非執者。五．八識唯有法執。七唯有人。六通二種。

論。虛妄分別為自性故。

述曰。若有漏心有如無漏不起執者。即不應言虛妄分別。若不執心名妄分別。即無漏心應名虛妄分別之心。即以此理明有漏心皆能遍計。楞伽．中邊等文。皆言八識是妄分別。

論。皆似所取能取現故。

述曰。聖教中說二取名執。有漏諸心既似能取．所取相現故皆有執。非有取心不名取故。非無執心似二取故。一切經論皆有此文。攝大乘論第四卷中。及辨中邊皆作是說。

論。說阿賴耶至為所緣故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 自當知曉。然而《攝大乘論》等只說依他起性（paratantra-svabhava，事物相互依存的性質）。因為依他起性是安立之處，稍微相近，是凡夫的境界，容易理解，道理上與成實宗相通。

論：後半部分才闡述遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhava，虛構的性質）的非有性。

述記：後半頌即指下面的兩句。才闡述遍計所執性的意義是虛無的。前面第七卷中已經廣泛地闡明了它的非有性。然而，如《攝大乘論》第四、五卷所說，能遍計（conceptualizer）即是這第一句，所遍計（conceptualized）即是這第二句，遍計所執自性才得以成立，即是這中間的下半頌。

上面只是重新解釋了初頌的所執。從下面開始廣泛地解釋初頌和依他起性。下面廣泛地解釋三種性質分為三部分。然而，第三句中與依他起性合在一起解釋。既然說初句是能遍計，所以論中接著問：

論：最初的能遍計自性是什麼？

述記：這是提問的語句。下面先廣泛地解釋遍計所執性，然後廣泛地解釋彼彼。

論：有的觀點認為八識（eight consciousnesses）都能夠進行遍計。

述記：這是安慧等人所持的觀點，認為遍計所執性貫通三性（three natures）。有漏之心（tainted mind）沒有不是執著的。前五識和第八識只有法執（attachment to phenomena），第七識只有人執（attachment to self），第六識貫通兩種執著。

論：因為虛妄分別（false discrimination）是它的自性。

述記：如果說有漏心中有像無漏心（untainted mind）那樣不生起執著的，那就不應該說虛妄分別。如果不執著的心叫做妄分別，那麼無漏心就應該叫做虛妄分別之心。就是用這個道理來說明有漏心都能夠進行遍計。《楞伽經》、《中邊分別論》等經文中，都說八識是妄分別。

論：因為它們都顯現出相似的所取（object of grasping）和能取（subject of grasping）。

述記：聖教中說二取叫做執著。有漏的各種心既然都顯現出相似的能取和所取之相，所以都有執著。沒有取的心不叫做取，沒有執著的心不顯現出相似的二取之相。一切經論中都有這樣的文句。《攝大乘論》第四卷中，以及《辨中邊論》中都這樣說。

論：說阿賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna，storehouse consciousness）等是所緣（object of cognition）的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version: It should be known by oneself. However, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and others only speak of paratantra-svabhāva (the nature of interdependence, the dependent nature). Because the paratantra-svabhāva is a place of establishment, it is slightly similar, it is the realm of ordinary people, it is easy to understand, and it is logically consistent with the Satyasiddhi school.

Treatise: The latter half explains the non-existence of parikalpita-svabhāva (the nature of imputation, the completely imagined nature).

Commentary: The latter half of the verse refers to the following two lines. It explains that the meaning of parikalpita-svabhāva is non-existent. The non-existence of it has already been extensively explained in the previous seventh chapter. However, as stated in the fourth and fifth chapters of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the conceptualizer is the first line, the conceptualized is the second line, and the nature of parikalpita-svabhāva is then established, which is the latter half of the middle verse.

The above only re-explains the attachment of the initial verse. From below, the initial verse and paratantra-svabhāva are extensively explained. Below, the three natures are extensively explained in three parts. However, in the third line, it is explained together with paratantra-svabhāva. Since it is said that the initial line is the conceptualizer, the treatise then asks:

Treatise: What is the nature of the initial conceptualizer?

Commentary: This is a question. Below, parikalpita-svabhāva is extensively explained first, and then 'those' are extensively explained.

Treatise: Some argue that the eight consciousnesses are all capable of conceptualization.

Commentary: This is the view held by Anhui and others, who believe that parikalpita-svabhāva pervades the three natures. Tainted minds are never without attachment. The first five consciousnesses and the eighth consciousness only have attachment to phenomena, the seventh consciousness only has attachment to self, and the sixth consciousness pervades both types of attachment.

Treatise: Because false discrimination is its nature.

Commentary: If it is said that there are tainted minds that do not give rise to attachment like untainted minds, then it should not be called false discrimination. If a mind without attachment is called false discrimination, then an untainted mind should be called a mind of false discrimination. This is the reason to explain that all tainted minds are capable of conceptualization. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Madhyāntavibhāga, and other texts all say that the eight consciousnesses are false discrimination.

Treatise: Because they all manifest similar objects of grasping and subjects of grasping.

Commentary: The holy teachings say that the two graspings are called attachment. Since all kinds of tainted minds manifest similar aspects of the grasper and the grasped, they all have attachment. A mind without grasping is not called grasping, and a mind without attachment does not manifest similar aspects of the two graspings. All sutras and treatises have such statements. The fourth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, as well as the Madhyāntavibhāga, both say this.

Treatise: It is said that the ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) and others are the object of cognition.

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述曰。所執自性之妄執習氣。即能執心等種子。瑜伽第五十一．及顯揚等。說阿賴耶識以遍計所執自性妄執種為所緣故。若有漏心有不執者。有有漏種第八不緣。何故論說第八緣妄種。瑜伽第七十六．及解深密經。說第八緣相．名．分別習氣。五十一說緣遍計種。故遍計種通有漏一切心。即善心等中許有法執安惠等師義。

下第二護法等師。

論。有義第六至是能遍計。

述曰。下文有三。一標宗。二立證。三會違。此初也。全非五．八識。亦非一切心。執我法者方能計故。

所以者何。

論。唯說意識能遍計故。

述曰。下證有十。十故字是。若能計心通八識者。如何攝論第四但說意耶。

問如第七識亦能遍計。而彼論中唯說意識不言第七。豈七不能。七識既能而不說者。明五．八識亦能不說。

論。意及意識名意識故。

述曰。第七名意。其第六識合而言之。總名意識即是已說。誰言不說。如小乘中業．業道。思但是業而非是道。貪等三法是道非業。身．語二法亦業亦道。總合為言但名業道。第七名意。第六名意識。總合名意識。故無前難　安惠等云。何故不許唯第六識能遍計度。余之七識雖亦能計。不能遍計攝論不說。非余不計。攝論第四

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：所執著的自性之虛妄執著習氣，即是能執著心等的種子。《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷以及《顯揚聖教論》等論典中說，阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子識）以遍計所執自性（Parikalpita-svabhāva，虛構的自性）的虛妄執著種子為所緣。如果說有漏心（Sāsrava-citta，有煩惱的心）有不執著的，或者說有有漏種子第八識不緣的，那麼為什麼論典中說第八識緣虛妄種子呢？《瑜伽師地論》第七十六卷以及《解深密經》中說，第八識緣相（Nimitta，表象）、名（Nāma，名稱）、分別習氣（Vikalpa-vāsanā，分別的習氣）。第五十一卷說緣遍計種子，所以遍計種子通於有漏的一切心，即善心等心中，允許有法執（Dharma-graha，對法的執著），這是安慧（Sthiramati）等論師的觀點。

下面是第二部分，護法（Dharmapāla）等論師的觀點。

論：有義是第六識能遍計。

述曰：下文有三部分：一、標明宗義；二、建立論證；三、會通牴觸。這裡是第一部分。完全不是第五識、第八識，也不是一切心。執著我（Ātman，自我）和法（Dharma，事物）的人才能遍計。

為什麼這樣說呢？

論：唯獨說意識（Manovijñāna，第六識）能遍計。

述曰：下面的論證有十個方面。『十故』二字就是這個意思。如果能遍計的心通於八識，那麼《攝大乘論》第四卷為什麼只說意識呢？

問：如果第七識（Manas，末那識）也能遍計，而那部論中只說意識，不說第七識，難道是第七識不能遍計嗎？第七識既然能遍計而不說，那麼就說明第五識、第八識也能遍計而不說。

論：『意』和『意識』都名為『意識』。

述曰：第七識名為『意』，第六識合起來說，總名為『意識』，這就是已經說了，誰說沒說呢？如同小乘佛教中，業（Karma，行為）和業道（Karma-patha，行為的道路），思（Cetanā，思）只是業而不是道，貪（Lobha，貪婪）等三種法是道而不是業，身（Kāya，身體）、語（Vāc，語言）兩種行為既是業也是道。總合起來說，只名為業道。第七識名為『意』，第六識名為『意識』，總合起來名為『意識』，所以沒有前面的詰難。安慧等人說：為什麼不允許唯獨第六識能遍計度？其餘的七識雖然也能計度，但不能普遍地計度，《攝大乘論》沒有說，並非其餘的識不能計度。《攝大乘論》第四卷

【English Translation】 English version: Statement: The clinging to the habit-energy of falsely imagining self-nature is the seed of the mind that clings, etc. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, section 51, and the Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations state that the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness) takes the seeds of falsely imagining the self-nature of the Parikalpita-svabhāva (the imagined nature) as its object. If there are defiled minds that do not cling, or if there are defiled seeds that the eighth consciousness does not cognize, then why does the treatise say that the eighth consciousness cognizes false seeds? The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, section 76, and the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra state that the eighth consciousness cognizes the habit-energies of Nimitta (appearance), Nāma (name), and Vikalpa (discrimination). Section 51 states that it cognizes the seeds of the Parikalpita. Therefore, the seeds of the Parikalpita pervade all defiled minds, that is, in good minds, etc., it is accepted that there is Dharma-graha (clinging to phenomena), according to the view of teachers such as Sthiramati.

The following is the second part, the view of teachers such as Dharmapāla.

Treatise: Some argue that the sixth consciousness is the one that universally imagines.

Statement: The following text has three parts: 1. Stating the doctrine; 2. Establishing the proof; 3. Reconciling contradictions. This is the first part. It is completely not the fifth or eighth consciousness, nor is it all minds. Only those who cling to Ātman (self) and Dharma (phenomena) can universally imagine.

Why is this so?

Treatise: Only the Manovijñāna (mind consciousness, sixth consciousness) is said to be able to universally imagine.

Statement: The following proof has ten aspects. The words 'ten reasons' indicate this. If the mind that can universally imagine pervades the eight consciousnesses, then why does the fourth section of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha only mention the mind consciousness?

Question: If the Manas (seventh consciousness) can also universally imagine, but that treatise only mentions the mind consciousness and does not mention the seventh consciousness, does that mean the seventh consciousness cannot universally imagine? Since the seventh consciousness can universally imagine but is not mentioned, it shows that the fifth and eighth consciousnesses can also universally imagine but are not mentioned.

Treatise: 'Mind' and 'mind consciousness' are both called 'mind consciousness'.

Statement: The seventh consciousness is called 'mind', and the sixth consciousness, when combined, is generally called 'mind consciousness'. This is already stated, so who says it is not mentioned? Just as in the Theravada tradition, Karma (action) and Karma-patha (path of action), Cetanā (volition) is only Karma and not a path, Lobha (greed) and the other three factors are paths but not Karma, and actions of Kāya (body) and Vāc (speech) are both Karma and paths. When combined, they are only called Karma-patha. The seventh consciousness is called 'mind', the sixth consciousness is called 'mind consciousness', and when combined, they are called 'mind consciousness'. Therefore, there is no previous objection. Sthiramati and others say: Why is it not allowed that only the sixth consciousness can universally imagine? Although the other seven consciousnesses can also imagine, they cannot universally imagine. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha does not mention this, but it does not mean that the other consciousnesses cannot imagine. Mahāyānasaṃgraha, section 4

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本．釋二論皆作此解。云第六識能周遍計度。體順彼名。余不然故彼論不說。又汝如業．業道合說者我亦爾。第七名意。五．八名識。第六名意識。彼論總合為言名意識。亦有何過。故知八識皆能遍計。

論。計度分別能遍計故。

述曰。五．八既無計度。明無分別而不起執。攝論本第四云。當知意識是能遍計。有分別故。乃至是故意識無邊行相而轉。普於一切分別計度故名遍計。非五．八識能普計故。若爾第七不能普計。應非此收。此言不爾。三分別中計度分別。能為七中有相分別乃至不染。非五．八識有此能故。其第七識有計度故可是此收。五．八不爾。無性云。意識有分別者。由能顯示．隨念分別所雜糅故。顯示者即計度。非是自性。余亦有故。此為正解　前師云。計度分別計相粗高五．八即無。自性．任運．有相分別此等細者五．八說有。理亦何爽。雖攝論約粗計度分別為言不言五．八。五．八二識實能遍計。又一切八識簡無漏心故言意識能有分別。非謂唯言第六．七識。世親攝論唯言由此品類能遍計度。不簡何者。無性偏解本論。故以顯示等言簡別。此有何妨。

后難之云。

論。執我法者必是惠故。

述曰。非五．八識恒與惠俱寧容有執。前師云若計度惠粗五．八無細者

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

本（指《成唯識論》的作者之一，護法）和釋（指《成唯識論》的另一位作者，安慧）的二論都這樣解釋。說第六識能夠周遍地計度，其體性符合這個名稱。其餘的識不是這樣，所以他們的論著中沒有這樣說。而且，你如果說業和業道可以合起來說，那麼我也是一樣。第七識名為意，第五識和第八識名為識，第六識名為意識。他們的論著總合起來說，名為意識，又有什麼過錯呢？所以要知道八識都能夠遍計。

論：計度分別能夠遍計，所以這樣說。

述：第五識和第八識既然沒有計度，說明沒有分別就不會產生執著。《攝大乘論》的第四卷說：『應當知道意識是能夠遍計的，因為它有分別。』乃至『所以意識以無邊的行相而運轉，普遍地對一切進行分別計度，所以名為遍計。』第五識和第八識不能普遍地計度。如果這樣，第七識不能普遍地計度，應該不被包含在這裡。這裡說的不是這樣。三種分別中，計度分別能夠為第七識中的有相分別乃至不染污。第五識和第八識沒有這種能力。第七識有計度，所以可以被包含在這裡。第五識和第八識不是這樣，因為它們沒有計度。無性說：『意識有分別，是因為能夠顯示、隨念分別所雜糅。』顯示就是計度，不是自性，其餘的識也有。這是正確的解釋。前一位法師說：『計度分別的計相粗大高顯，第五識和第八識沒有；自性、任運、有相分別這些細微的，第五識和第八識說有。』道理又有什麼衝突呢？雖然《攝大乘論》只說了粗的計度分別，沒有說第五識和第八識，但第五識和第八識實際上能夠遍計。而且，一切八識是爲了簡別無漏心，所以說意識能夠有分別，不是說只有第六識和第七識。世親的《攝大乘論》只說由此品類能夠遍計度，沒有簡別哪些識。無性偏頗地解釋本論，所以用顯示等詞來簡別。這又有什麼妨礙呢？

後來反駁說：

論：執著我法的一定是慧，所以這樣說。

述：第五識和第八識不是恒常與慧俱起，怎麼能有執著呢？前一位法師說如果計度慧粗大，第五識和第八識沒有，細微的

【English Translation】 English version:

Both Ben (referring to one of the authors of Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, Dharmapāla) and Shi (referring to another author of Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, Sthiramati) interpret it this way. They say that the sixth consciousness is capable of pervasive calculation (parikalpana), and its nature corresponds to this name. The other consciousnesses are not like this, so their treatises do not say so. Moreover, if you say that karma and the path of karma can be spoken of together, then I also say the same. The seventh consciousness is called manas, the fifth and eighth are called vijñāna, and the sixth is called manovijñāna. Their treatises combine them all and call them manovijñāna, so what fault is there? Therefore, it should be known that all eight consciousnesses are capable of pervasive calculation.

Treatise: Because calculation and discrimination are capable of pervasive calculation, it is said so.

Commentary: Since the fifth and eighth consciousnesses do not have calculation, it shows that without discrimination, there will be no attachment. The fourth volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'It should be known that consciousness is capable of pervasive calculation because it has discrimination.' And even 'Therefore, consciousness operates with boundless aspects, universally discriminating and calculating everything, so it is called pervasive calculation.' The fifth and eighth consciousnesses are not capable of pervasive calculation. If so, the seventh consciousness is not capable of pervasive calculation and should not be included here. This is not what is said here. Among the three discriminations, calculation and discrimination are capable of being the seventh consciousness's aspect-possessing discrimination and even non-defiled. The fifth and eighth consciousnesses do not have this ability. The seventh consciousness has calculation, so it can be included here. The fifth and eighth consciousnesses are not like this because they do not have calculation. Asaṅga says: 'Consciousness has discrimination because it is mixed with the ability to display and recollect discrimination.' Displaying is calculation, not self-nature, and the other consciousnesses also have it. This is the correct explanation. The previous master said: 'The aspects of calculation and discrimination are coarse and prominent, which the fifth and eighth consciousnesses do not have; self-nature, spontaneous, and aspect-possessing discriminations are subtle, which the fifth and eighth consciousnesses are said to have.' What conflict is there in the reasoning? Although the Mahāyānasaṃgraha only speaks of coarse calculation and discrimination and does not mention the fifth and eighth consciousnesses, the fifth and eighth consciousnesses are actually capable of pervasive calculation. Moreover, all eight consciousnesses are to distinguish them from undefiled minds, so it is said that consciousness is capable of discrimination, not that it only refers to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha only says that this category is capable of pervasive calculation, without distinguishing which consciousnesses. Asaṅga biasedly interprets the original treatise, so he uses terms such as displaying to distinguish them. What harm is there in this?

Later, it is refuted:

Treatise: Those who are attached to self and dharma must be prajñā (wisdom), so it is said.

Commentary: The fifth and eighth consciousnesses are not constantly associated with prajñā, how can they have attachment? The previous master said that if calculation and prajñā are coarse, the fifth and eighth consciousnesses do not have them, but subtle

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亦有。若爾何故惠數非是遍行。

論。二執必與無明俱故。

述曰。我．法二執必無明俱。非善心中有無明故。彼無癡善根性相違故。彼前師言此有何失。我如汝小乘尋．伺俱起。尋．伺性順可許俱起。善心．無明性便相返。

論。不說無明有善性故。

述曰。瑜伽等論皆不說故。下二障中當引彼文。如何善心內而說有無明。

彼若言一切有漏皆名不善。說名為善行相輕故者。

論。癡無癡等不相應故。

述曰。相違之法不相應故。如無慚與慚不得俱起。癡．無癡等例亦應然。

若言有漏皆是不善。無癡與癡非謂相應。癡相輕微名無癡者。

論。不見有執導空智故。

述曰。若無漏心必二空觀隨一現起。若有漏心必有法執。即加行智既有法執。如何能導空智現前。非由於水引火生故。非闇為先導明生故。

論。執有達無不俱起故。

述曰。又加行心隨順聖教作我法空觀名曰達無。既有法執名為執有。如何執有心。與達無之智而俱起也。彼既不俱起。明加行心非有法執。

論。曾無有執非能熏故。

述曰。又若有漏心皆有法執。法執之心必有勢力。應異熟生心亦是能熏。有漏之心有勢用故。如善．惡等。然汝執第八亦非能熏。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：也有這種情況。如果這樣，為什麼慧（prajna，智慧）和數（samkhya，數論）不是普遍存在的？

答：因為兩種執著（我執和法執）必然與無明（avidya，無知）同時存在。

解釋：我執和法執必然與無明同時存在。因為善良的心中沒有無明。因為善良的心與無癡（araga，無貪）的善根的性質相反。之前的老師說這有什麼錯呢？我說，就像你們小乘佛教中尋（vitarka，尋思）和伺（vicara，伺察）同時生起一樣。尋和伺的性質相順，可以允許同時生起。但善良的心和無明的性質相反。

答：因為（經論中）沒有說無明具有善良的性質。

解釋：《瑜伽師地論》等論典都沒有這樣說。在下面的二障（煩惱障和所知障）中，將會引用那些經文。怎麼能在善良的心中說有無明呢？

如果他們說一切有漏（sasrava，有煩惱）都叫做不善，（之所以）說名為善，是因為其行為表現輕微的緣故。

答：因為癡（moha，愚癡）和無癡等不相應。

解釋：因為相互違背的法不相應。例如，無慚（ahrikya，無慚愧）和慚（hri，慚愧）不能同時生起。癡和無癡等也應該如此。

如果他們說有漏都是不善的，無癡和癡不是相應的。癡的相狀輕微，所以叫做無癡。

答：因為沒有見到有執著引導空性的智慧。

解釋：如果無漏心（anasrava-citta，無煩惱的心）必然有二空觀（人空觀和法空觀）中的一個現起。如果有漏心必然有法執。既然加行智（prayoga-jnana，修行智慧）有法執，怎麼能引導空性的智慧現前呢？就像不能用水引發生火一樣，也不能以黑暗為先導而產生光明。

答：因為執著有和通達無不能同時生起。

解釋：此外，加行心隨順聖教（arya-dharma，聖法）而作我法空觀，叫做通達無。既然有法執，就叫做執著有。那麼，執著有的心，怎麼能與通達無的智慧同時生起呢？既然它們不能同時生起，就表明加行心沒有法執。

答：因為從來沒有執著不是能熏習的。

解釋：此外，如果一切有漏心都有法執，那麼法執的心必然有勢力。那麼，異熟生心（vipaka-citta，異熟果報心）也應該是能熏習的。因為有漏心有勢力，就像善和惡等一樣。然而，你們所執著的第八識（阿賴耶識，alayavijnana）也不是能熏習的。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: There are also such cases. If so, why are prajna (wisdom) and samkhya (enumeration) not universally present?

Answer: Because the two attachments (attachment to self and attachment to dharma) necessarily coexist with avidya (ignorance).

Explanation: Attachment to self and attachment to dharma necessarily coexist with avidya. Because there is no avidya in a virtuous mind. Because a virtuous mind is contrary to the nature of the good root of araga (non-attachment). The previous teacher said, 'What is wrong with this?' I say, 'Just as vitarka (initial application of thought) and vicara (sustained application of thought) arise simultaneously in your Hinayana Buddhism. The natures of vitarka and vicara are compatible, so it is permissible for them to arise simultaneously. But the natures of a virtuous mind and avidya are contradictory.'

Answer: Because (the scriptures) do not say that avidya has a virtuous nature.

Explanation: The Yoga-sastra and other treatises do not say this. In the following discussion of the two obscurations (afflictive obscuration and cognitive obscuration), those texts will be cited. How can one say that there is avidya in a virtuous mind?

If they say that all sasrava (defiled) things are called non-virtuous, (and the reason) they are called virtuous is because their actions are slight.

Answer: Because moha (delusion) and non-delusion, etc., are not compatible.

Explanation: Because contradictory dharmas are not compatible. For example, ahrikya (shamelessness) and hri (shame) cannot arise simultaneously. The same should be true for moha and non-delusion.

If they say that all defiled things are non-virtuous, and non-delusion and delusion are not compatible. The aspect of delusion is slight, so it is called non-delusion.

Answer: Because one does not see attachment guiding the wisdom of emptiness.

Explanation: If an anasrava-citta (undefiled mind) necessarily has one of the two emptinesses (emptiness of self and emptiness of dharma) manifest. If a defiled mind necessarily has attachment to dharma. Since prayoga-jnana (applied wisdom) has attachment to dharma, how can it guide the wisdom of emptiness to manifest? Just as one cannot use water to ignite fire, one cannot use darkness to lead to the arising of light.

Answer: Because attachment to existence and understanding of non-existence cannot arise simultaneously.

Explanation: Furthermore, the applied mind, in accordance with the arya-dharma (noble teachings), contemplates the emptiness of self and dharma, which is called understanding non-existence. Since there is attachment to dharma, it is called attachment to existence. So, how can a mind attached to existence arise simultaneously with the wisdom of understanding non-existence? Since they cannot arise simultaneously, it shows that the applied mind does not have attachment to dharma.

Answer: Because there has never been an attachment that is not capable of perfuming.

Explanation: Furthermore, if all defiled minds have attachment to dharma, then the mind of attachment to dharma necessarily has power. Then, the vipaka-citta (resultant mind) should also be capable of perfuming. Because the defiled mind has power, like good and evil, etc. However, the eighth consciousness (alayavijnana) that you hold is also not capable of perfuming.

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是異熟心無勢用故。不見有執勢用之心無能熏者。應第八識亦是能熏。不爾便與比量相違。

若爾何故楞伽。中邊上卷等。言三界八識皆妄分別。顯揚十六說亦同此。

論。有漏心等至虛妄分別。

述曰。下文會違有三。此初會也。為會彼云。雖前位等作二空觀而是假相。不如無漏證實理故。一切八識名妄分別。非妄分別皆是執心。若有漏心有非執者。如何說有二取相現。中邊第一。說虛妄心．心所似二相現故。皆有執也。

論。雖似所取至亦有執故。

述曰。此會第二違有二。一會。二難。此會．及初難。諸有漏心。雖似所取．能取相現。而非一切能遍計心。由依他起善．無記心。雖有二取現非皆起執。非以似二便計一切皆能遍計。有計度分別二取相現之心能遍計故。彼中邊論唯據六．七二識為論。若似二取皆是執者。勿無漏心亦有執故。一切菩薩．二乘后得無漏之智。有二取．相應皆有執。佛地第七。但說二乘無漏有執。準二十釋。菩薩后得亦有法執。與佛地不同。彼但說二乘無漏有執。此但言佛無顯余亦有。

論。如來后得應有執故。

述曰。難前師言。佛應有執。有二取相故。如諸菩薩現二相故。若救言如來后得無二相者。違聖教失。且無相分違佛地經。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為異熟識（Vipāka-citta，指第八識的果報心）沒有作用和勢力，所以看不到有執持作用和勢力的心，也沒有能被熏習者。因此，第八識也應該是能熏習者。如果不是這樣，就與比量（Anumāṇa，推理）相違背。

如果這樣，為什麼《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）、《辨中邊論》（Madhyāntavibhāga）上卷等經典中說，三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）的八識（Aṣṭa-vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）都是虛妄分別（abhūta-parikalpa）呢？《顯揚聖教論》（Abhisamayālaṃkāra）第十六品也這樣說。

論：有漏心（sāsrava-citta）等都是虛妄分別。

述記：下面有三種方式來調和這些矛盾。這是第一種調和。爲了調和上述說法，認為雖然前位等（指菩薩等）作二空觀（dvaya-śūnyatā-darśana，人空觀和法空觀）時，所觀的只是假相，不如無漏智（anāsrava-jñāna）真實證得真理。所以一切八識都名為妄分別，但並非妄分別都是執心（graha-citta）。如果有漏心中有非執心，如何說有二取相（dvaya-grāha-ākāra，能取和所取）顯現呢？《辨中邊論》第一品說，虛妄心和心所（caitasika）顯現出相似的二取相，所以都有執取。

論：雖然相似於所取，但也有執取。

述記：這是第二種調和矛盾的方式，包含一個調和和一個詰難。這裡是調和以及第一個詰難。所有的有漏心，雖然相似於所取和能取相的顯現，但並非一切都是能遍計心（parikalpita-citta）。因為依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva）的善心和無記心（avyākṛta-citta），雖然有二取相的顯現，但並非都生起執取。不能因為相似於二取相，就認為一切都是能遍計。只有具有計度分別（paricchedaka-vikalpa）的二取相顯現的心才是能遍計。因此，《辨中邊論》只是根據第六識（意識）和第七識（末那識）來論述。如果相似於二取相就都是執取，那麼無漏心（anāsrava-citta）也應該有執取。一切菩薩和二乘（Śrāvaka-yāna和Pratyekabuddha-yāna）的后得無漏智（pṛṣṭhalabdha-anāsrava-jñāna），有二取相，相應地也都有執取。在《佛地經論》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra）第七品中，只說二乘的無漏智有執取。根據第二十品的解釋，菩薩的后得智也有法執（dharma-graha）。這與《佛地經論》不同，那裡只說二乘的無漏智有執取，這裡只說佛沒有，但沒有明確說其他也有。

論：如來的后得智應該有執取。

述記：這是詰難前述的觀點，說佛應該有執取，因為有二取相的緣故，就像諸菩薩顯現二取相一樣。如果辯解說如來的后得智沒有二取相，就違背了聖教（ārya-dharma），而且沒有相分（nimitta-bhāga），這與《佛地經》相違背。

【English Translation】 English version: Because the Vipāka-citta (resultant mind, referring to the eighth consciousness) has no function or power, we do not see a mind that holds function and power, nor is there one that can be influenced. Therefore, the eighth consciousness should also be the influencer. If not, it would contradict inference (Anumāṇa).

If so, why do the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, the upper volume of the Madhyāntavibhāga, and other scriptures say that the eight consciousnesses (Aṣṭa-vijñāna, eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness, manas consciousness, and ālayavijñāna) of the three realms (Trailokya, the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm) are all false discriminations (abhūta-parikalpa)? The sixteenth chapter of the Abhisamayālaṃkāra also says the same.

Treatise: Defiled minds (sāsrava-citta) and so on are all false discriminations.

Commentary: There are three ways to reconcile these contradictions below. This is the first reconciliation. To reconcile the above statements, it is argued that although those in previous positions (referring to Bodhisattvas, etc.) cultivate the view of the two emptinesses (dvaya-śūnyatā-darśana, emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena), what they observe are only provisional appearances, not the true realization of reality by undefiled wisdom (anāsrava-jñāna). Therefore, all eight consciousnesses are called false discriminations, but not all false discriminations are grasping minds (graha-citta). If there are undefiled minds among defiled minds, how can it be said that the appearance of dualistic grasping (dvaya-grāha-ākāra, grasper and grasped) manifests? The first chapter of the Madhyāntavibhāga says that false minds and mental factors (caitasika) manifest similar appearances of dualistic grasping, so they all have grasping.

Treatise: Although similar to what is grasped, there is also grasping.

Commentary: This is the second way to reconcile the contradiction, containing a reconciliation and a refutation. This is the reconciliation and the first refutation. All defiled minds, although similar to the appearance of the grasped and the grasper, are not all capable of being the completely conceptualizing mind (parikalpita-citta). Because wholesome and neutral minds (avyākṛta-citta) of dependent origination (paratantra-svabhāva), although having the appearance of dualistic grasping, do not all give rise to grasping. One cannot assume that everything capable of being completely conceptualized is based on the similarity of dualistic grasping. Only minds with the appearance of dualistic grasping that have conceptual discrimination (paricchedaka-vikalpa) are capable of being completely conceptualized. Therefore, the Madhyāntavibhāga only discusses based on the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness) and the seventh consciousness (manas consciousness). If everything similar to dualistic grasping is grasping, then undefiled minds (anāsrava-citta) should also have grasping. The subsequently attained undefiled wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha-anāsrava-jñāna) of all Bodhisattvas and Two Vehicles (Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyekabuddha-yāna) has dualistic grasping, and correspondingly, they all have grasping. In the seventh chapter of the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra, it only says that the undefiled wisdom of the Two Vehicles has grasping. According to the interpretation in the twentieth chapter, the subsequently attained wisdom of Bodhisattvas also has dharma-grasping (dharma-graha). This is different from the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra, where it only says that the undefiled wisdom of the Two Vehicles has grasping. Here, it only says that the Buddha does not have it, but it does not explicitly say that others also have it.

Treatise: The Tathāgata's subsequently attained wisdom should have grasping.

Commentary: This refutes the previous view, saying that the Buddha should have grasping because there is the appearance of dualistic grasping, just like the Bodhisattvas manifest the appearance of dualistic grasping. If one argues that the Tathāgata's subsequently attained wisdom does not have the appearance of dualistic grasping, it would contradict the holy teachings (ārya-dharma), and there would be no image-component (nimitta-bhāga), which contradicts the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra.

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論。經說佛智至如鏡等故。

述曰。第八俗智名大圓鏡也。謂現法樂．聲聞．八部莊嚴道場。即變化聲聞等是。第七識平等。乃至成所作智皆有現能。故佛四智皆有二相。故論說言現身．土等如鏡等故。勿謂余智皆此譬喻。但可現相義可同故。此證無漏有相分也。

論。若無緣用應非智等。

述曰。若如來智無見分者。即無緣用應非智等。此即違理。等者等取余心．心所。難云。如來．菩薩無漏四智品。應非是智品。無見分等故。如虛空等。既成此已翻向上成。謂凡夫．二乘等有漏善及無記智品並無漏心品。應無法執。非染污心有二相故。如佛無漏智品。彼計如來無漏智品非有執故。本業瓔珞經下卷。云明．闇一相善．惡一心等者。是洴沙王國安陀偈師義。故知前師所說非也。

前師難云。若有漏心非皆有執。說藏識緣種何獨遍計。

論。雖說藏識至故非成證。

述曰。此會第三違。更有別釋如第二卷。此中且據有漏強者謂遍計種。不言有漏種皆是遍計。既爾復不言第八唯緣遍計種子。既無唯言。明第八所緣之種更有多也。

次護法論師總結上也。

論。由斯理趣至有能遍計。

述曰。由此如上所說理趣。唯于有漏第六．第七二心之品有能遍計。五．八名

【現代漢語翻譯】 論：經文說佛的智慧就像鏡子一樣。（佛智：Buddha's wisdom）

述記：第八識的俗智名為大圓鏡智（Mahāpariṇāma-jñāna）。意思是能顯現現法樂、聲聞（Śrāvaka）、八部眾莊嚴的道場，即變化出的聲聞等。第七識的平等性智（Samatā-jñāna），乃至成所作智（Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna）都有顯現的功能。所以佛的四智都有二相。因此論中說顯現身、土等就像鏡子一樣。不要認為其他的智慧都可以用這個來比喻，只是顯現相的意義可以相同。這證明了無漏智是有相分的。

論：如果沒有緣用，就不應是智慧等。

述記：如果如來的智慧沒有見分，就沒有緣用，就不應是智慧等。這違背了道理。『等』字包括了其餘的心和心所。可以這樣反駁：如來和菩薩的無漏四智品，不應該是智慧品，因為沒有見分等，就像虛空一樣。既然這個論點成立了，就可以反過來證明：凡夫、二乘等有漏的善和無記智品，以及無漏的心品，應該沒有法執，因為不是染污心有二相，就像佛的無漏智品一樣。他們認為如來的無漏智品沒有執著。本業瓔珞經下卷說，明和暗是一相，善和惡是一心等，這是洴沙王國的安陀偈師的觀點。所以知道之前的說法是不對的。

之前的論師反駁說：如果不是所有的有漏心都有執著，為什麼說藏識（Ālaya-vijñāna）緣種子只是遍計所執（Parikalpita）？

論：雖然說了藏識，所以不能成立證明。

述記：這是爲了調和第三個違背之處。還有其他的解釋，就像第二卷中說的那樣。這裡暫且根據有漏的強者，認為是遍計種子。並不是說所有的有漏種子都是遍計所執。既然這樣，也沒有說第八識只緣遍計種子。既然沒有『唯』字，就說明第八識所緣的種子還有很多。

接下來是護法論師總結上面的內容。

論：由於這些道理，只有有漏的第六識和第七識這兩種心品有能遍計。

述記：由於上面所說的這些道理，只有在有漏的第六識（意識，Mano-vijñāna）和第七識（末那識，Manas-vijñāna）這兩種心品中才有能遍計的作用。第五識（眼耳鼻舌身識，Pañca-vijñāna）和第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna）的名字

【English Translation】 Treatise: The sutra says that the Buddha's wisdom is like a mirror. (佛智: Buddha's wisdom)

Commentary: The mundane wisdom of the eighth consciousness is called the Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom (Mahāpariṇāma-jñāna). It means it can manifest the Dharma bliss, Śrāvakas (Śrāvaka), and the adorned Dharma assembly of the eight kinds of beings, which are the transformed Śrāvakas, etc. The Equality Wisdom (Samatā-jñāna) of the seventh consciousness, and even the Accomplishment Wisdom (Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna), all have the function of manifestation. Therefore, the four wisdoms of the Buddha all have two aspects. Thus, the treatise says that the manifestation of bodies, lands, etc., is like a mirror. Do not think that other wisdoms can be compared to this; only the meaning of manifesting appearances can be the same. This proves that the unconditioned wisdom has an image-component.

Treatise: If there is no object-cognition, it should not be wisdom, etc.

Commentary: If the Tathāgata's wisdom has no seeing-component, then there is no object-cognition, and it should not be wisdom, etc. This violates reason. 'Etc.' includes the remaining minds and mental factors. One can refute: The unconditioned four wisdom qualities of the Tathāgata and Bodhisattvas should not be wisdom qualities, because they do not have a seeing-component, etc., like space. Since this argument is established, it can be reversed to prove: The conditioned good and neutral wisdom qualities of ordinary people and the Two Vehicles, as well as the unconditioned mind qualities, should not have attachment to Dharma, because it is not that defiled minds have two aspects, like the Buddha's unconditioned wisdom qualities. They believe that the Tathāgata's unconditioned wisdom qualities do not have attachment. The lower volume of the Original Vows Garland Sutra says that light and darkness are one aspect, good and evil are one mind, etc.; this is the view of the Āndhra Gāthā master of the Bimbisāra kingdom. Therefore, it is known that the previous statement was incorrect.

The previous teacher refuted: If not all conditioned minds have attachment, why is it said that the Ālaya-vijñāna (Ālaya-vijñāna) conditions seeds only as the Parikalpita (Parikalpita)?

Treatise: Although the Ālaya-vijñāna is mentioned, it cannot establish proof.

Commentary: This is to reconcile the third contradiction. There are other explanations, as mentioned in the second volume. Here, it is temporarily based on the stronger conditioned aspect, which is considered the Parikalpita seed. It is not said that all conditioned seeds are the Parikalpita. Since this is the case, it is not said that the eighth consciousness only conditions the Parikalpita seeds. Since there is no 'only,' it indicates that there are many other seeds conditioned by the eighth consciousness.

Next is the Dharma-protecting master summarizing the above content.

Treatise: Due to these reasons, only the conditioned sixth and seventh consciousness qualities have the ability to universally conceptualize.

Commentary: Due to the reasons mentioned above, only the conditioned sixth consciousness (Mano-vijñāna) and seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñāna) qualities have the function of universal conceptualization. The names of the fifth consciousness (Pañca-vijñāna) and eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna)

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識入意識攝未見文故。故非五．八能遍計也。此等徴逐佛地第七二障中徴。下二障中自當對辨。

此則廣前遍計二字。自下廣前彼彼之言。

論。識品雖二至故言彼彼。

述曰。識品雖二者。第六．七二識也。總名遍計以是一故。更不須論。但言二等　攝大乘第四說。遍計有二。一自性計。二差別計。世親釋云。如於眼等計自性。於此計為常無常等之差別　七十三說一無差別．二有差別。復有二。一名加行。二名施設　顯揚十六說。一文字。二非文字。又有二。一分別自體。二分別所依緣事。攝八分別者是。七十四說。一隨覺。二隨眠　三者謂一我。二法。三用。或自性．隨念．計度分別。如對法第二說　四者攝論說。一自性計。二差別計。三有覺計謂善名言者。四無覺計謂不善名言者。七十三說。一計自相。二計差別。三計所取。四計能取　五者攝論說。一依名計義。二依義計名。三依名計名。四依義計義。五依二計二。顯揚十六。及七十三。說一種五與此同。七十三又有五。一計義自性。此有四謂計自相等。二計名自性。此有二謂無差別等。三計染自性。謂有貪等。四計凈自性。與染相違。五計非染凈自性。謂此色是能．所取等。復有五種。一貪。二嗔。三合會。四別離。五舍隨與等。顯揚十

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為（第八）識將（第七）意識攝入，所以沒有見到文字的緣故。因此，（遍計所執性）不是第五識和第八識能夠普遍計度的。這些征問追逐在《佛地經論》第七識的兩種障礙中征問。下面的兩種障礙中自然會辨析。

這是擴充套件前面『遍計』二字。從下面開始擴充套件前面『彼彼』的言語。

論：識的種類雖然有兩種，所以說『彼彼』。

述記說：識的種類雖然有兩種，指第六識和第七識。總稱為遍計，因為它們是一個整體。不需要再討論。只說兩種等等。《攝大乘論》第四說，遍計有兩種：一是自性計，二是差別計。世親的解釋說：例如對於眼等計度為自性，對於此（自性）計度為常、無常等的差別。《攝大乘論》第七十三說，一為無差別，二為有差別。又有兩種：一名為加行，二名為施設。《顯揚聖教論》第十六說，一為文字，二為非文字。又有兩種：一為分別自體，二為分別所依緣的事。《攝大乘論》說的八種分別就是指這個。第七十四說，一為隨覺，二為隨眠。三種是指一我（ātman），二法（dharma），三用。或者自性、隨念、計度分別。如《對法論》第二說。四種是《攝大乘論》說的：一為自性計，二為差別計，三為有覺計（指善名言者），四為無覺計（指不善名言者）。第七十三說，一為計自相，二為計差別，三為計所取，四為計能取。五種是《攝大乘論》說的：一為依名計義，二為依義計名，三為依名計名，四為依義計義，五為依二計二。《顯揚聖教論》第十六和第七十三說，一種五種與此相同。第七十三又有五種：一為計義自性，此有四種，指計自相等。二為計名自性，此有兩種，指無差別等。三為計染自性，指有貪等。四為計凈自性，與染相違。五為計非染凈自性，指此色是能取、所取等。又有五種：一貪（rāga），二嗔（dveṣa），三合會，四別離，五舍隨與等。《顯揚聖教論》第十

【English Translation】 English version: Because the (eighth) consciousness incorporates the (seventh) consciousness, it does not see the text. Therefore, (the parikalpita-svabhāva) is not universally cognized by the fifth and eighth consciousnesses. These questions are pursued in the questioning of the two obstacles of the seventh consciousness in the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra. The following two obstacles will naturally be distinguished.

This expands the previous two words 'parikalpita'. From below, it expands the previous words 'that and that'.

Treatise: Although there are two types of consciousness, hence the term 'that and that'.

Commentary: Although there are two types of consciousness, referring to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. They are collectively called parikalpita because they are a single entity. There is no need for further discussion. It only mentions two types, etc. The fourth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that there are two types of parikalpita: one is the self-nature conceptualization (svabhāva-kalpana), and the other is the difference conceptualization (viśeṣa-kalpana). Vasubandhu's explanation says: For example, regarding the eye, etc., as self-nature, and regarding this (self-nature) as the difference of permanence, impermanence, etc. The seventy-third chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states that one is without difference, and the other is with difference. There are also two types: one is called application (prayoga), and the other is called establishment (prajñapti). The sixteenth chapter of the Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states that one is verbal, and the other is non-verbal. There are also two types: one is to distinguish the self-entity (ātma), and the other is to distinguish the objects on which it relies. The eight distinctions mentioned in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha refer to this. The seventy-fourth chapter states that one is according to awareness (saṃjñā), and the other is according to latent tendencies (anuśaya). The three refer to one self (ātman), two dharmas (dharma), and three functions. Or self-nature, recollection, and conceptual discrimination. As stated in the second chapter of the Abhidharmakośa. The four are stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: one is self-nature conceptualization, two is difference conceptualization, three is with awareness conceptualization (referring to those with good names), and four is without awareness conceptualization (referring to those with bad names). The seventy-third chapter states that one is to conceptualize self-characteristics, two is to conceptualize differences, three is to conceptualize what is taken, and four is to conceptualize what takes. The five are stated in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: one is to conceptualize meaning based on name, two is to conceptualize name based on meaning, three is to conceptualize name based on name, four is to conceptualize meaning based on meaning, and five is to conceptualize both based on both. The sixteenth and seventy-third chapters of the Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra state that one type of five is the same as this. The seventy-third chapter also has five types: one is to conceptualize the self-nature of meaning, which has four types, referring to conceptualizing self-characteristics, etc. Two is to conceptualize the self-nature of name, which has two types, referring to non-difference, etc. Three is to conceptualize the defiled self-nature, referring to having greed, etc. Four is to conceptualize the pure self-nature, which is contrary to defilement. Five is to conceptualize the non-defiled and non-pure self-nature, referring to this form being the taker and the taken, etc. There are also five types: one is greed (rāga), two is hatred (dveṣa), three is association, four is separation, and five is abandonment, following, and so on. The tenth chapter of the Asaṅga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra

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六與此文同。復有五。一無常計常。二苦計樂。三不凈計凈。四無我計我。五于諸相中遍計所執自性執　六者顯揚十六說。一自性計。謂計色等實有相。二差別計。謂計色等實有色無色等。三覺悟計。謂善言者執。四隨眠計。謂不善言者執。五加行計。此有五謂貪．嗔等。六名遍計。謂此有二。謂文字．非文字所起　七者即七分別。謂有相．無相．任運．尋求．伺察．染污．不染污。如瑜伽第一．對法第二說　八者即八分別生三事顯揚十六等說。八分別者。一自性分別。謂分別色等想事色等自性。二差別分別。三總執分別。四我分別。五我所分別。六愛分別。七不愛分別。八愛不愛俱相違分別。三事者。一謂戲論所依想色事。二見．我慢事。三貪．嗔．癡事。此等廣解八分別生三事。如瑜伽第三十六．顯揚十六說　九者以理為之即緣九品計。執九地亦然。九結俱品執亦是　十者即攝論第四說。對法第十四雖名分別非能遍計。一根本分別。第八識。二緣相分別。色等識。三顯相分別。眼等識並所依。四緣相變異分別。老等變異。五顯相變異分別。變異所有變異。六他引分別。聞不正法類。七不如理分別。外道類。八如理分別。聞正法類。九執著分別。我見類。十散動分別。即十散動。十散動亦為十。此能遍計分別之體。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 第六種與此文相同。還有五種。第一種是于無常中計為常。第二種是于苦中計為樂。第三種是于不凈中計為凈。第四種是于無我中計為我。第五種是在諸相中普遍計度所執的自性執。 第六種是《顯揚聖教論》（Śrāvakabhūmi）中說的十六種計度。第一是自性計，即計度色（rūpa）等實有自相。第二是差別計，即計度色等是有色、無色等。第三是覺悟計，即善於言談者所執著的。第四是隨眠計，即不善於言談者所執著的。第五是加行計，這裡有五種，即貪（rāga）、嗔（dveṣa）等。第六是名遍計，這裡有兩種，即文字和非文字所引起的。 第七種是七種分別。即有相、無相、任運、尋求、伺察、染污、不染污。如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi）第一卷、《阿毗達磨集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第二卷所說。 第八種是八種分別所生的三種事，如《顯揚聖教論》十六種計度等所說。八種分別是指：第一是自性分別，即分別色等想事，色等自性。第二是差別分別。第三是總執分別。第四是我分別。第五是我所分別。第六是愛分別。第七是不愛分別。第八是愛與不愛俱相違的分別。三種事是指：第一是戲論所依的想色事。第二是見、我慢事。第三是貪、嗔、癡事。這些對八種分別所生的三種事的廣泛解釋，如《瑜伽師地論》第三十六卷、《顯揚聖教論》十六種計度所說。 第九種是以理為之，即緣於九品計度。執著九地也是這樣。九結俱品執也是。 第十種是《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第四卷所說。《阿毗達磨集論》第十四卷雖然名為分別，但不能普遍計度。第一是根本分別，即第八識（阿賴耶識，ālayavijñāna）。第二是緣相分別，即色等識。第三是顯相分別，即眼等識以及所依。第四是緣相變異分別，即老等變異。第五是顯相變異分別，即變異所有的變異。第六是他引分別，即聽聞不正法之類。第七是不如理分別，即外道之類。第八是如理分別，即聽聞正法之類。第九是執著分別，即我見之類。第十是散動分別，即十種散動。這十種散動也是十種。這是能普遍計度分別的本體。

【English Translation】 English version: The sixth is the same as the previous text. There are also five more. The first is to regard impermanence as permanence. The second is to regard suffering as pleasure. The third is to regard impurity as purity. The fourth is to regard non-self as self. The fifth is the pervasive imputation of self-nature in all phenomena (saṃskāra). The sixth is the sixteen imputations mentioned in the Śrāvakabhūmi (Hearer's Stage) of the Śrāvakabhūmi. The first is the imputation of self-nature (svabhāva), which is to impute that form (rūpa) and so on have real self-characteristics. The second is the imputation of difference (viśeṣa), which is to impute that form and so on are with form, without form, and so on. The third is the imputation of awakening (bodha), which is what those who are good at speaking are attached to. The fourth is the imputation of latent tendencies (anuśaya), which is what those who are not good at speaking are attached to. The fifth is the imputation of effort (prayogā), which includes five things: greed (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), and so on. The sixth is the pervasive imputation of name (nāma), which has two aspects: those arising from words and those arising from non-words. The seventh is the seven kinds of discrimination (vikalpa). These are with characteristics, without characteristics, spontaneous, seeking, investigating, defiled, and undefiled. As explained in the first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi (Stages of Yoga Practice) and the second volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma). The eighth is the three things arising from the eight kinds of discrimination, as explained in the sixteen imputations of the Śrāvakabhūmi, etc. The eight kinds of discrimination are: first, discrimination of self-nature (svabhāva), which is to discriminate the nature of form and so on. Second, discrimination of difference (viśeṣa). Third, discrimination of general conception (samgraha). Fourth, discrimination of self (ātman). Fifth, discrimination of what belongs to self (ātmanīya). Sixth, discrimination of love (prema). Seventh, discrimination of non-love (aprema). Eighth, discrimination of the mutual contradiction of love and non-love. The three things are: first, the phenomena of thought and form on which discursive thought depends. Second, the phenomena of view and pride. Third, the phenomena of greed, hatred, and delusion. These extensive explanations of the three things arising from the eight kinds of discrimination are as explained in the thirty-sixth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi and the sixteen imputations of the Śrāvakabhūmi. The ninth is to take reasoning as the basis, which is to rely on the ninefold imputation. Attachment to the nine grounds (bhūmi) is also like this. Attachment to the nine categories of fetters (saṃyojana) is also like this. The tenth is as explained in the fourth volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Great Vehicle). Although the fourteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya is called discrimination, it cannot pervasively impute. First, fundamental discrimination (mūla-vikalpa), which is the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness). Second, discrimination of the object (ālambana), which is the consciousness of form and so on. Third, discrimination of the appearance (ākāra), which is the consciousness of the eye and so on, as well as the basis. Fourth, discrimination of the change of the object, which is the change of aging and so on. Fifth, discrimination of the change of the appearance, which is all the changes of change. Sixth, discrimination induced by others, which is the category of hearing incorrect teachings. Seventh, irrational discrimination, which is the category of non-Buddhists. Eighth, rational discrimination, which is the category of hearing correct teachings. Ninth, clinging discrimination, which is the category of self-view. Tenth, distracted discrimination, which is the ten distractions. These ten distractions are also ten. This is the substance of pervasive imputation and discrimination.

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又對法第十二。說于見無見見等十。又十相十八空所除。如七十七說　十一者即十一識。謂身．身者識等。緣此十一生分別名十一分別。如攝論說　十二者十卷楞伽第四說。一言語分別。樂言語故。二可知分別。三相分別。四義分別。五實體分別。六因分別。七見分別。八建立分別。九生分別。十不生分別。十一和合分別。十二縛不縛分別。別緣十二處生分別亦是　十三者無也　十四者十四不可記事分別　十五者亦無　十六者十六空所除。或三空所除。顯揚十五云一根縛．二有情縛等　十七者對法第十二說。謂相．見等　十八者十八空所除。乃至二十句我．我所見。二十空所除。二十五句我．我所見。對法第十二。二十八見．六十二見等。故此論中言十等也。七十四等說。隨依他起爾所份量遍計亦爾。故無量種。此論言等。此一一皆如所引諸論各自廣分別。不別煩引。

上來已廣初行第一句訖。自下廣第二句。

論。次所遍計自性云何。

述曰。若言能遍計已問答訖。言所遍計自性是何。

論。攝大乘說至所緣緣故。

述曰。三性之中是依他起。言所緣緣必是有法。遍計心等以此為緣。親相分者必依他故。不以圓成而為境也。彼不相似故。攝論第四唯說依他性是所遍計。

論。

圓成實性寧非彼境。

述曰。此外人問。七十六說勝義無性。無如所執勝義相也。至下當知。亦以彼為疏所緣緣。非是相分。不相似故。極疏遠故。

論。真非妄執至亦所遍計。

述曰。依他是妄。可計少分為彼相分。此真不然。不相近故。遠亦不遮。

論。遍計所執至故非所遍計。

述曰。所執雖是遍計心境。而非所緣緣故非所遍計。所遍計者據有法故。境義同通無法名境。所緣緣局無法即非。故唯依他是所遍計。七十四說。由何故遍計。由依他起。即是此也。

何故七十四。又說遍計所執非凡．聖智境以無相故言俱非境　似相分者非無法故。無法非所緣緣。所緣緣者必是有法。彼性可言所緣之境。故彼言境而非是緣。以無體故。非不對心說為非境。是故此性說為應知。若非對心云何令知。又說遍計唯凡境故。此即廣前第二句頌訖。佛知無不。若知如何成所緣。若不知如何言遍智。此義應思如第七卷唯識中解。

自下廣前第三四句。並解第二頌中初句。

論。遍計所執其相云何。

述曰。問體相也。

論。與依他起復有何別。

述曰。問二差別合二問也。

論。有義三界至遍計所執。

述曰。此師有二。初立宗。后引證偏答初問

【現代漢語翻譯】 圓成實性（Pariniṣpanna，真實圓滿的自性）難道不是那個境界嗎？

述曰：此外人發問，第七十六節說勝義無自性（Paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā，終極意義上的無自性），沒有像你所執著的勝義相。到下文應當知道，也以它作為疏所緣緣（distant object condition），不是相分（image-portion），因為它不相似，極其疏遠。

論：真實不是虛妄執著，也為遍計所執（Parikalpita，完全虛構的）所遍及。

述曰：依他起（Paratantra，依他而起的自性）是虛妄的，可以把少部分視為它的相分。這個真實不是這樣，因為它不相近。說它疏遠也不排除。

論：遍計所執不是所遍計。

述曰：所執雖然是遍計心的境界，但不是所緣緣（object condition），所以不是所遍計。所遍計是根據有法（existent entity）的緣故。境（object）的意義普遍相通，沒有法稱為境。所緣緣侷限於有法，沒有法就不是。所以只有依他起是所遍計。第七十四節說，由什麼原因遍計？由依他起。就是這個意思。

為什麼第七十四節又說遍計所執不是凡夫和聖人的智慧境界，因為沒有相的緣故，說都是非境界。相似相分不是沒有法，沒有法不是所緣緣。所緣緣必定是有法，那個自性可以說成所緣的境界。所以那裡說境而不是緣，因為沒有實體的緣故。並非不對心說為非境，因此這個自性說是應該知道的。如果不是對心，怎麼能讓人知道？又說遍計只是凡夫的境界。這正是擴充套件了前面第二句偈頌完畢。佛知道沒有不知道的，如果知道，怎麼能成為所緣？如果不知道，怎麼能說是遍智？這個意義應該思考，如第七卷《唯識》中解釋。

下面擴充套件前面第三、四句，並解釋第二頌中的第一句。

論：遍計所執的相是什麼樣的？

述曰：問的是體相。

論：與依他起又有什麼區別？

述曰：問的是二者的差別，合起來是兩個問題。

論：有義說三界都是遍計所執。

述曰：這位論師有兩種說法。先立宗，后引用證據，偏重回答第一個問題。

【English Translation】 Is the Pariniṣpanna (perfected nature) not that realm?

Commentary: Here, someone asks: In section seventy-six, it is said that Paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā (ultimate absence of inherent existence) does not have the appearance of ultimate reality as you conceive it. As will be known below, it is also taken as a distant object condition (疏所緣緣), not an image-portion (相分), because it is dissimilar and extremely distant.

Treatise: The real is not false clinging, and is also pervaded by the Parikalpita (completely constructed).

Commentary: The Paratantra (other-dependent nature) is false, and a small part can be regarded as its image-portion. This real is not like that, because it is not close. Saying it is distant does not exclude it.

Treatise: The Parikalpita is not what is pervaded.

Commentary: Although what is clung to is the realm of the Parikalpita mind, it is not an object condition, so it is not what is pervaded. What is pervaded is based on the existence of a dharma (existent entity). The meaning of 'object' is universally connected; the absence of a dharma is called an object. The object condition is limited to the existence of a dharma; the absence of a dharma is not. Therefore, only the Paratantra is what is pervaded. Section seventy-four says, 'By what cause is it constructed?' 'By the other-dependent nature.' This is the meaning.

Why does section seventy-four also say that the Parikalpita is not the realm of the wisdom of ordinary beings and sages, because it has no appearance, saying that both are non-realms. The similar image-portion is not without a dharma; the absence of a dharma is not an object condition. The object condition must be an existent dharma; that nature can be called the realm of the object. Therefore, it is said there that it is a realm but not a condition, because it has no substance. It is not that it is said to be a non-realm because it is not directed towards the mind; therefore, this nature is said to be knowable. If it were not directed towards the mind, how could it be made known? It is also said that the Parikalpita is only the realm of ordinary beings. This is precisely the completion of the expansion of the second verse above. The Buddha knows everything; if he knew, how could it become an object? If he did not know, how could he be called omniscient? This meaning should be contemplated, as explained in the seventh volume of the Vijñaptimātratā.

Below, the third and fourth lines above are expanded, and the first line in the second verse is explained.

Treatise: What is the appearance of the Parikalpita?

Commentary: It asks about the substance and appearance.

Treatise: What is the difference between it and the Paratantra?

Commentary: It asks about the difference between the two, combining two questions.

Treatise: Some say that the three realms are all Parikalpita.

Commentary: This teacher has two statements. First, he establishes the thesis, then he cites evidence, focusing on answering the first question.

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。諸心．心所雖各體是一自證分。而似依他二分而生。謂見．相分。諸經論中說二取者。是此二也。如是二分雖似體有。理實無也。此之二相中邊等說為計所執。

論。二所依體至緣所生故。

述曰。答第二問顯二差別。此二所依識等體事。實從緣生。此性非無名依他起。從虛妄分別種子緣生故。此師意說。唯自證分是依他有。所取．能取見．相二分是計所執。如龜毛等是無法故。

論。云何知然。

述曰。下引證。云何知彼二分非有。

論。諸聖教說至遍計所執。

述曰。辨二差別。虛妄分別是依他起。舊中邊云虛妄總類者三界心．心所。新翻論云三界心．心所是虛妄分別。顯揚十六云分別體性謂三界心．心所。瑜伽攝論等皆有此言。謂三界心．心所故依他起。從因緣生。其二取名遍計所執。舊中邊頌云。無二有此無。長行雲。無二者謂無所取能取。有此無者有此二取無。新翻無二有無故。攝論．顯揚等此文非一。

今此第一即安惠等多師並說此義。下護法等菩薩方更分別。

論。有義一切至遍計所執。

述曰。第二師說。文中有四。一標宗。二引證。三破斥。四結正。見．相二分因緣生者亦依他起。依此二分妄執定實為有為無亦有亦無非有非無。為一為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：各種心和心所，雖然各自的本體是自證分，但看起來好像是依賴依他起和遍計所執二分而生。這裡說的見分和相分，就是各種經論中所說的『二取』（能取和所取）。像這樣的二分，雖然看起來好像本體是真實存在的，但實際上是沒有的。這二分的『二相』（能取和所取之相），在中邊分別論等論著中，被認為是『遍計所執』（虛妄分別執著的法）。

論：二所依體至緣所生故。

述記：回答第二個問題，闡明二者的差別。這二者所依賴的識等的本體和作用，實際上是從因緣而生。這種性質並非是『無』，而是名為『依他起』（依仗其他條件而生起）。因為是從虛妄分別的種子和因緣而生起的緣故。這位論師的意思是說，只有自證分是依他起而存在的，所取和能取的見分和相分，是遍計所執。就像龜毛兔角一樣，是根本不存在的。

論：云何知然？

述記：下面引用證據。憑什麼知道那二分是不存在的呢？

論：諸聖教說至遍計所執。

述記：辨別二者的差別。虛妄分別是依他起。舊譯《中邊分別論》中說，虛妄分別的總類是三界的心和心所。新譯的論典中說，三界的心和心所是虛妄分別。《顯揚聖教論》第十六卷中說，分別的體性就是三界的心和心所。《瑜伽師地論》、《攝大乘論》等都有這樣的說法。就是說，三界的心和心所是依他起，是從因緣而生的。而『二取』（能取和所取）則被稱為『遍計所執』。舊譯《中邊分別論》的偈頌說：『無二有此無』。長行文中說：『無二』，是指沒有所取和能取；『有此無』，是指有這二取，但實際上是沒有的。新譯本說：『無二有無故』。《攝大乘論》、《顯揚聖教論》等，對此的說法不盡相同。

現在，第一種觀點就是安慧等許多論師共同闡述的意義。下面的護法等菩薩才進一步分別。

論：有義一切至遍計所執。

述記：第二位論師的說法。文中包含四個部分：一、標明宗義；二、引用證據；三、破斥；四、結論歸正。見分和相分由因緣而生，也是依他起。依賴這二分，虛妄地執著為『定實』（真實存在），或者執著為『有』或者『無』，或者執著為『亦有亦無』或者『非有非無』，或者執著為『一』或者『異』，等等，這些都是遍計所執。

【English Translation】 English version: Although each of the various minds (citta) and mental factors (cittasika) has its own self-cognizing aspect (svasaṃvedana), they appear to arise dependent on the other-dependent nature (paratantra) and the completely imputed nature (parikalpita). The perceived aspect (darśana-bhāga) and the appearing aspect (ākāra-bhāga) mentioned here are the 'two graspings' (dvaya-graha) spoken of in various sutras and treatises. These two aspects, though seemingly real in their essence, are in reality non-existent. These 'two characteristics' (dvaya-lakṣaṇa) of these two aspects are referred to as 'completely imputed' (parikalpita) in texts like the Madhyāntavibhāga.

Treatise: 'The entities on which the two depend, are produced by conditions.'

Commentary: Answering the second question, it clarifies the difference between the two. The essence and function of the consciousnesses (vijñāna) etc., on which these two depend, are actually produced from conditions. This nature is not 'non-existent' but is called 'other-dependent arising' (paratantra-utpāda). It arises from the seeds and conditions of false discrimination (vikalpa). This teacher's intention is to say that only the self-cognizing aspect (svasaṃvedana-bhāga) exists as other-dependent, while the perceived and perceiving aspects (darśana-bhāga and ākāra-bhāga) are completely imputed. Like the hair of a tortoise or the horn of a rabbit, they are fundamentally non-existent.

Treatise: 'How is this known?'

Commentary: Below, evidence is cited. How is it known that those two aspects are non-existent?

Treatise: 'All the holy teachings say...completely imputed.'

Commentary: Distinguishing the difference between the two. False discrimination (vikalpa) is other-dependent arising (paratantra). The old translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga says that the general category of false discrimination is the minds and mental factors of the three realms (tridhātu). The new translation of the treatise says that the minds and mental factors of the three realms are false discrimination. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and others all have this statement. That is to say, the minds and mental factors of the three realms are other-dependent arising, arising from conditions. And the 'two graspings' (dvaya-graha) are called 'completely imputed' (parikalpita). The verse in the old translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'Without two, there is this absence.' The prose text says: 'Without two' means without the perceived and the perceiver; 'there is this absence' means that there are these two graspings, but in reality, they are non-existent. The new translation says: 'Without two, there is absence.' The statements in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra are not identical.

Now, the first view is the meaning commonly explained by Ānanda and many other teachers. The bodhisattvas like Dharmapāla below further distinguish.

Treatise: 'Some say that all...completely imputed.'

Commentary: The second teacher's statement. The text contains four parts: 1. Stating the doctrine; 2. Citing evidence; 3. Refuting; 4. Concluding and correcting. The perceived and appearing aspects (darśana-bhāga and ākāra-bhāga) arise from conditions and are also other-dependent arising. Relying on these two aspects, falsely clinging to them as 'definitely real' (niyata-sat), or clinging to them as 'existent' (asti) or 'non-existent' (nāsti), or clinging to them as 'both existent and non-existent' (asty-nāsti) or 'neither existent nor non-existent' (naivāsty-nāsti), or clinging to them as 'one' (eka) or 'different' (nānā), etc., all of these are completely imputed (parikalpita).

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異。為俱不俱等。此以有無為一偏句。一異為二偏句為首。俱不俱通二處。此二見．相方名遍計所執。非因緣生二法名遍計所執。

因會前師次引文證。

論。諸聖教說至依他起故。

述曰。下引證也。攝大乘論第四卷說唯識二種種。彼云唯識此言唯量彼言二者此名唯二。彼自解言。唯量者無境故。唯二者有見．相故。種種者種種行相而生起故。由有相．見得成二種。故見．相分是依他起。佛地經說。現身．土等。及前第二卷所引四至教。皆有二．三．四分故言種種。皆名依他起故。又種種者是見分．相分各有種種行相義。如攝論說。

論。相等四法至依他起攝故。

述曰。又五法中相等前四。唯除真如　十一識者。一身。二身者。三受者。四彼所受。五彼能受。六世。七數。八處。九言說。十自他別。十一善惡趣死生識。眼等五根名身。五識所依意界名身者。第六意識所依意界名受者識。此等三識以六內界為性。色等六塵名彼所受。六識界名能受。似三時影現名世。似一等算名數。似村等現名處。似見．聞等言說相現說名言說。起我．我所執名自他別。似五趣等相現名善惡趣死生識。此等門義如攝論說。此中既言身識．所受識．處識．言說識．善惡趣生死合五識名依他起故。相分亦

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『異』，『為俱不俱等』：這裡以『有』和『無』作為一種偏頗的說法，『一』和『異』作為第二種偏頗的說法開頭，『俱』和『不俱』則貫通於兩種說法。這兩種見解相互對立，被稱為遍計所執（Parikalpita，虛妄分別）。並非由因緣產生的兩種法，也被稱為遍計所執。

因明學者會合之前的論師，接下來引用經文來證明。

論：諸聖教說至依他起故。

述曰：下面是引用的證據。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第四卷講述了唯識的兩種形態。其中說『唯識』，這裡說的是『唯量』，那裡說的是『二』，這裡說的是『唯二』。它自己解釋說：『唯量』是因為沒有外境的緣故；『唯二』是因為有見分（Darśana-bhāga，能見）和相分（Nimitta-bhāga，所見）的緣故。『種種』是因為以種種行相而生起的緣故。由於有相分和見分，才成就了兩種形態。因此，見分和相分是依他起（Paratantra，依他起性）。《佛地經》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra）中說，顯現的身和國土等，以及前面第二卷所引用的四至教，都有二分、三分、四分，所以說是『種種』，都稱為依他起。另外，『種種』是指見分和相分各自有種種行相的意思，如《攝大乘論》所說。

論：相等四法至依他起攝故。

述曰：另外，五法中的相等同於前面的四種，唯獨真如（Tathātā，真如）除外。十一識指的是：一身識，二身者識，三受者識，四彼所受識，五彼能受識，六世識，七數識，八處識，九言說識，十自他別識，十一善惡趣死生識。眼等五根名為身。五識所依的意界名為身者識。第六意識所依的意界名為受者識。這三種識以六內界為體性。色等六塵名為彼所受。六識界名為能受。類似於三時影像顯現的名為世。類似於一等算術的名為數。類似於村落等顯現的名為處。類似於見聞等言說相顯現的，稱為言說。產生我執和我所執的，名為自他別。類似於五趣等相顯現的，名為善惡趣死生識。這些門義如《攝大乘論》所說。這裡既然說身識、所受識、處識、言說識、善惡趣生死合五識名為依他起，那麼相分也是。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Different.' 'Being together or not being together, etc.': Here, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are taken as one-sided statements, and 'one' and 'different' are taken as the beginning of the second type of one-sided statements. 'Together' and 'not together' permeate both statements. These two views, opposing each other, are called Parikalpita (遍計所執, Imaginary Nature). Two dharmas not arising from causes and conditions are also called Parikalpita.

The epistemologist, joining with previous masters, then quotes scriptures to prove it.

Treatise: All holy teachings say, up to being included in Paratantra.

Commentary: The following is the cited evidence. The fourth volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Compendium of the Mahayana) discusses the two forms of Vijñaptimātratā (唯識, Representation-only). It says, 'Vijñaptimātratā,' here it says 'only the measure,' there it says 'two,' here it says 'only two.' It explains itself: 'Only the measure' is because there is no external object; 'only two' is because there are Darśana-bhāga (見分, the seeing aspect) and Nimitta-bhāga (相分, the seen aspect). 'Various' is because it arises with various appearances. Because there are Nimitta-bhāga and Darśana-bhāga, two forms are accomplished. Therefore, Darśana-bhāga and Nimitta-bhāga are Paratantra (依他起, Dependent Nature). The Buddhabhūmi-sūtra (佛地經, Buddha Land Sutra) says that the manifested body and land, etc., and the four teachings cited in the second volume, all have two, three, or four aspects, so it is said to be 'various,' all called Paratantra. Also, 'various' means that the Darśana-bhāga and Nimitta-bhāga each have various appearances, as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says.

Treatise: The four dharmas such as the appearance, up to being included in Paratantra.

Commentary: Also, among the five dharmas, the appearance is the same as the previous four, except for Tathātā (真如, Suchness). The eleven consciousnesses refer to: 1. Body consciousness, 2. Body-possessor consciousness, 3. Experiencer consciousness, 4. That which is experienced consciousness, 5. That which is capable of experiencing consciousness, 6. World consciousness, 7. Number consciousness, 8. Place consciousness, 9. Speech consciousness, 10. Self-other distinction consciousness, 11. Good and evil destinies, death and birth consciousness. The five roots such as the eye are called the body. The mind realm on which the five consciousnesses rely is called the body-possessor consciousness. The mind realm on which the sixth consciousness relies is called the experiencer consciousness. These three consciousnesses have the six internal realms as their nature. The six objects such as form are called that which is experienced. The six consciousness realms are called that which is capable of experiencing. That which resembles the appearance of the three times is called the world. That which resembles arithmetic such as one is called number. That which resembles the appearance of villages, etc., is called place. That which resembles the appearance of speech such as seeing and hearing is called speech. That which gives rise to the attachment to self and what belongs to self is called self-other distinction. That which resembles the appearance of the five destinies, etc., is called good and evil destinies, death and birth consciousness. These meanings are as explained in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Since it is said here that body consciousness, that which is experienced consciousness, place consciousness, speech consciousness, and the combined five consciousnesses of good and evil destinies, death and birth are called Paratantra, then the Nimitta-bhāga is also.

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依他也。瑜伽七十二三。顯揚十二．十六明五法。攝論第四明十一識及相．名等。彼皆說為依他起攝。故知二分非計所執。論言等者等相識等色處等。

論。不爾無漏至遍計所執。

述曰。下破斥中有五過難。此為第一。若諸相分非依他者。佛等無漏后得智品所變二分應名所執。應立量云。有漏非染見．相二分。非計所執。是非染心現二分故。如無漏心現二分等。

論。許應聖智至有漏亦爾。

述曰。若許無漏見．相二分如二乘等亦計所執。則應聖智不緣自依他相分等生。若緣相生便計所執。能緣依他所有智品。應非道諦。有相分故。如有漏心。若不許聖智雖有二分非計所執。應知有漏心亦應爾有二分故。如無漏心。

論。又若二分至體非有故。

述曰。第二難也。若有漏二分皆是計所執者。應非所緣緣。彼言計所執許二非有故。如兔角等。彼計二分非所緣緣。所緣緣者陳那破他就他為論。我既唯識何藉緣生。

論。又應二分至應無二分。

述曰。第三難。所執二分。不熏成種。以無法故。如石女兒。即后識等應無二分。然彼所計。所有二分種生之時。但自證現行是依他起。種生二分便計所執。故為此難。不爾此文是逐他義。非謂極成。

論。又諸習氣至能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 依他也（Paratantra-svabhava，依他起性）。《瑜伽師地論》第七十二卷第三節，《顯揚聖教論》第十二卷、第十六卷闡明五法。《攝大乘論》第四卷闡明十一識及其體相、名稱等。這些都說是依他起性所攝。因此可知見分和相分並非遍計所執性。論中所說的『等』字，包括相識等和色處等。 論：不然，無漏智所變現的見分和相分也應是遍計所執性。 述記：下面破斥中有五個過失和責難。這是第一個。如果諸相分不是依他起性，那麼佛等無漏后得智品所變現的見分和相分就應該稱為遍計所執性。應該建立論式說：有漏的非染見分和相分，不是遍計所執性，因為它們不是染污心所顯現的見分和相分。如同無漏心所顯現的見分和相分等。 論：如果承認無漏智所變現的見分和相分如二乘等也是遍計所執性，那麼聖智就不應該緣自依他起的相分等而生起。如果緣相而生，便是遍計所執性。能緣依他起的所有智品，就不應該是道諦，因為它有相分，如有漏心一樣。如果不承認聖智雖然有見分和相分但不是遍計所執性，那麼應該知道有漏心也應該是這樣，因為它有見分和相分，如無漏心一樣。 論：又如果見分和相分都是遍計所執性，那麼見分和相分就不應該是所緣緣。因為遍計所執性所許的見分和相分並非實有，如兔角等。遍計所執性的見分和相分不是所緣緣。所謂所緣緣，是陳那（Dignāga）破斥他人時所用的論點。我既然是唯識宗，為何要憑藉所緣緣而生起？ 論：又如果見分和相分都是遍計所執性，那麼見分和相分就不應該熏成種子。因為遍計所執性是無法，如石女兒。那麼後來的識等就不應該有見分和相分。然而他們所認為的，所有遍計所執性的見分和相分生起種子的時候，只有自證分現行是依他起性。種子生起的見分和相分便是遍計所執性。所以用這個來責難。不然，這段文字是順著他人的意思說的，不是極成。 論：又諸習氣不能

【English Translation】 English version: According to Ityapi. Yogācāra-bhūmi-śāstra, seventy-second fascicle, section three. Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (Asaṅga's Exposition of the Holy Teaching, Śāsanoddhāra) twelfth and sixteenth fascicles clarify the five dharmas. She Dachenglun (Asaṅga's Compendium of the Mahāyāna, Mahāyānasaṃgraha) fourth fascicle clarifies the eleven consciousnesses and their characteristics, names, etc. These are all said to be included in the Paratantra-svabhava (dependent nature). Therefore, it can be known that the seeing-division (darśana-bhāga) and the object-division (nimitta-bhāga) are not the Parikalpita-svabhāva (completely imputed nature). The 'etc.' mentioned in the treatise includes the consciousness of characteristics, etc., and the sense-fields, etc. Treatise: If not, the seeing-division and object-division transformed by the unconditioned wisdom of the Buddhas, etc., should also be the Parikalpita-svabhāva. Commentary: The following refutation contains five faults and difficulties. This is the first. If the object-divisions are not of the Paratantra-svabhava, then the seeing-division and object-division transformed by the unconditioned subsequent wisdom of the Buddhas, etc., should be called the Parikalpita-svabhāva. The proposition should be established as follows: the contaminated seeing-division and object-division of the afflicted are not the Parikalpita-svabhava, because they are not the seeing-division and object-division manifested by the afflicted mind. Like the seeing-division and object-division manifested by the unconditioned mind, etc. Treatise: If it is admitted that the seeing-division and object-division transformed by the unconditioned wisdom are also the Parikalpita-svabhāva like those of the Two Vehicles, then the holy wisdom should not arise by depending on its own Paratantra object-division, etc. If it arises by depending on the object-division, then it is the Parikalpita-svabhāva. The wisdom that depends on all the Paratantra qualities should not be the Path Truth, because it has an object-division, like the contaminated mind. If it is not admitted that the holy wisdom, although having a seeing-division and an object-division, is not the Parikalpita-svabhāva, then it should be known that the contaminated mind should also be like this, because it has a seeing-division and an object-division, like the unconditioned mind. Treatise: Furthermore, if the seeing-division and object-division are both the Parikalpita-svabhāva, then the seeing-division and object-division should not be the objective condition (ālambana-pratyaya). Because the seeing-division and object-division admitted by the Parikalpita-svabhāva are not real, like the rabbit's horn, etc. The seeing-division and object-division of the Parikalpita-svabhāva are not the objective condition. The so-called objective condition is the argument used by Dignāga to refute others. Since I am a follower of the Consciousness-only school, why should I rely on the objective condition to arise? Treatise: Furthermore, if the seeing-division and object-division are both the Parikalpita-svabhāva, then the seeing-division and object-division should not perfumed to form seeds. Because the Parikalpita-svabhāva is non-existent, like the child of a stone woman. Then the subsequent consciousnesses, etc., should not have a seeing-division and an object-division. However, what they consider is that when the seeds of all the seeing-division and object-division of the Parikalpita-svabhāva arise, only the self-awareness division (sva-saṃvedana-bhāga) is the Paratantra-svabhava. The seeing-division and object-division that arise from the seeds are the Parikalpita-svabhāva. Therefore, this is used as a difficulty. Otherwise, this passage follows the meaning of others, and is not ultimately established. Treatise: Furthermore, all the habitual energies cannot

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作因緣。

述曰。第四難也。有漏習氣是識相分。相分既非有。豈體非有之法能作因緣。假法如無非因緣故。汝執相分體非有故。彼執種子非真有體。自證分緣仍非相分。今說自宗言相分攝故為此難。

論。若緣所生至無異因故。

述曰。第五難也。從緣所生不離於識內之二分非依他起。二分所依依他起識體。例亦應爾。無異所以彼此可別。若心外二分非因緣生可非依他起。然彼師計。能生之種有二。能生所生現行。及計所執。故以自證為例。例之應立量云。因緣所生二分。是依他起。因緣種子生故。如自證分。又唯自證分。如何緣證自證。如何緣種。豈一心中亦量非量。得自緣故。許有見分即無此失。若更立分者。即初自證不自內緣亦見分攝。

論。由斯理趣至皆依他起。

述曰。結正也。解二句為二。若為初性。及依他起合為門者。此初師結。若分三性各別明。以下解依他。由斯理趣眾緣所生心．心所體。及相．見分。異生．二乘有漏．無漏皆依他起。善順聖教不違理故。

解第二頌初句。及遍計所執體性非有答問其相。二師異說有體無體寬狹不同。辨二性別答第二問。總是廣前第一頌訖。並解第二頌初句。因結上文兼生下故。自下解第二頌第二句。

論。依他眾緣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

作因緣。 述曰：這是第四個難點。有漏的習氣是識的相分（現象層面）。相分既然不是實有，那麼作為其本體的法怎麼能作為因緣呢？虛假的法就像『無』一樣，不能作為因緣。你執著于相分的本體不是實有，他們執著于種子不是真實的本體。自證分（自我認知層面）的緣仍然不是相分。現在用我宗的觀點來說，因為相分包含在內，所以提出這個難點。 論：如果從因緣所生，到沒有不同的原因。 述曰：這是第五個難點。從因緣所生不離於識內的二分（見分和相分），不是依他起（緣起性空）。二分所依賴的依他起識體，也應該如此。沒有不同的原因，彼此才能區分。如果心外的二分不是因緣所生，就可以不是依他起。然而，那位老師認為，能生的種子有兩種：能生所生的現行，以及所執著的。所以用自證分作為例子。用這個例子應該建立量式：因緣所生的二分是依他起，因為因緣種子所生，就像自證分。而且，僅僅是自證分，如何緣證自證？如何緣種？難道一個心中既有量又有非量？因為能夠自我緣故。如果承認有見分（認知層面），就沒有這個過失。如果再立一個分，那麼最初的自證分不自我內緣，也包含在見分中。 論：由於這個道理，都依他起。 述曰：這是總結。將兩句話分為兩部分。如果將『初性』和『依他起』合為一個門，這是最初的老師的總結。如果將三性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）分別說明，以下解釋依他起。由於這個道理，眾緣所生的心、心所的本體，以及相分、見分，異生（凡夫）、二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的有漏、無漏，都是依他起。這符合聖教，不違背道理。 解釋第二頌的第一句，以及遍計所執（虛妄分別）的體性非有，回答關於其相的問題。兩位老師的說法不同，有體和無體，寬和窄不同。辨別二種性別，回答第二個問題。總是在擴充套件前面的第一頌完畢。並且解釋第二頌的第一句，因為總結上文，兼生下文。從下面開始解釋第二頌的第二句。 論：依他眾緣

【English Translation】 English version:

'Acting as cause and condition.' Commentary: This is the fourth difficulty. Defiled habitual energies are the appearance aspect (相分, lakṣaṇa-bhāga) of consciousness. Since the appearance aspect is not truly existent, how can the dharma that serves as its substance act as cause and condition? Illusory dharmas, like 'non-existence,' cannot be causes and conditions. You cling to the idea that the substance of the appearance aspect is not truly existent, and they cling to the idea that the seed is not a truly existent substance. The condition of the self-awareness aspect (自證分, sva-saṃvedana-bhāga) is still not the appearance aspect. Now, speaking from the perspective of our school, this difficulty is raised because the appearance aspect is included within it. Treatise: 'If arising from conditions, up to having no different cause.' Commentary: This is the fifth difficulty. Arising from conditions does not depart from the two aspects within consciousness (the seeing aspect and the appearance aspect), and is not dependently arisen (依他起, paratantra-utpāda). The dependently arisen nature of the consciousness-substance upon which the two aspects rely should also be the same. Without a different cause, they can be distinguished from each other. If the two aspects external to the mind do not arise from conditions, they can be non-dependently arisen. However, that teacher believes that there are two kinds of seeds that can produce: the manifest activity that can produce what is produced, and what is clung to. Therefore, the self-awareness aspect is used as an example. Using this example, the following proposition should be established: the two aspects arising from conditions are dependently arisen, because they arise from conditional seeds, like the self-awareness aspect. Moreover, how can only the self-awareness aspect cognize the self-awareness aspect? How can it cognize the seed? Is there both measurement and non-measurement in one mind? Because it can cognize itself. If the seeing aspect (見分, darśana-bhāga) is admitted, there is no such fault. If another aspect is established, then the initial self-awareness aspect, which does not internally cognize itself, is also included in the seeing aspect. Treatise: 'Due to this reasoning, all are dependently arisen.' Commentary: This is the conclusion. Dividing the two sentences into two parts. If the 'initial nature' and 'dependently arisen' are combined into one category, this is the conclusion of the initial teacher. If the three natures (遍計所執性, parikalpita-svabhāva; 依他起性, paratantra-svabhāva; 圓成實性, parinispanna-svabhāva) are explained separately, the following explains the dependently arisen. Due to this reasoning, the substance of mind and mental factors arising from conditions, as well as the appearance aspect and the seeing aspect, the defiled and undefiled of ordinary beings (異生, pṛthagjana) and the two vehicles (二乘, dviyāna) (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), are all dependently arisen. This accords with the holy teachings and does not contradict reason. Explaining the first line of the second verse, and the non-existence of the nature of the completely imputed (遍計所執, parikalpita), answering the question about its appearance. The statements of the two teachers are different, with different views on existence and non-existence, broad and narrow. Distinguishing the two kinds of natures, answering the second question. This is all expanding on the first verse. And explaining the first line of the second verse, because it summarizes the previous text and generates the following text. From below, explaining the second line of the second verse. Treatise: 'Dependent on conditions...'

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而得起故。

述曰。釋頌中緣所生之三字也。釋依他義。

論。頌言分別至亦圓成故。

述曰。釋分別字唯局有漏。兼顯不說凈分所由。或從此下方解第二句。以上總解第一句也。今此頌中應知且說染分依他。謂分別法因緣所生。雜染諸法名為分別。依他因緣之所生故。或染依他為分別緣之所生故。唯雜染故。此中依他唯說染分。凈分依他亦圓成故。顯通二性。明凈依他不名分別。染依他起唯依他故。顯此頌中唯明染分。

論。或諸染凈至依他起攝。

述曰。第二又解。或諸染．凈心．心所法皆名分別。能緣慮故。此中通說。非由凈故便不緣慮。言能緣故。是則一切染．凈依他。是此頌中依他起攝。皆名分別故　若爾染．凈色．不相應。應非此中依他起攝。不能緣慮非分別故　答曰不然。說心等時彼亦此攝。不離心故。唯識門故　問若爾何故致能緣言　答顯能緣心遍諸染凈皆名分別。並能慮故。非緣慮言簡除色等。色等雖不能緣。不離心等故亦此攝。

次下解圓成實性。先解第二頌第三句。

論。二空所顯至名圓成實。

述曰。依二空門所顯真理。一圓滿。二成就。三法實性。具此三義名圓成實。

如何真如具此三義。

論。顯此遍常體非虛謬。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 而能夠生起（故）。

述曰：解釋頌文中的『緣所生』這三個字。解釋『依他』的含義。

論：頌文說『分別』乃至『亦圓成故』。

述曰：解釋『分別』這個字，僅限於有漏法。兼且顯示不說清凈分的原因。或者從這下方解釋第二句。以上總共解釋第一句。現在這個頌文中應當知道且說染分依他。所謂『分別』法是因緣所生。雜染的諸法名為『分別』，因為是依他因緣所生。或者染污的依他為『分別』的緣所生。唯有雜染的緣故。這其中『依他』只說染分，清凈分的依他也是圓成（Parinispanna）的緣故。顯示通於二性。明白清凈的依他不名為『分別』，染污的依他起唯是依他的緣故。顯示這個頌文中唯獨說明染分。

論：或者諸染凈乃至『依他起』所攝。

述曰：第二種解釋。或者諸染、凈心、心所法都名為『分別』，因為能夠緣慮的緣故。這裡是通說的。不是因為清凈的緣故就不緣慮。說『能緣故』，那麼一切染、凈依他，都是這個頌文中『依他起』所攝。都名為『分別』的緣故。如果這樣，染、凈的色、不相應行，應該不屬於這其中的『依他起』所攝。因為不能緣慮，不是『分別』的緣故。回答說：不是這樣的。說心等的時候，它們也包含在這裡面。因為不離心的緣故。因為是唯識（Vijnaptimatrata）的法門。問：如果這樣，為什麼特意說『能緣』這個詞？答：顯示能夠緣的心遍及諸染凈都名為『分別』，並且能夠思慮的緣故。不是用『緣慮』這個詞來簡除色等。色等雖然不能緣，但是因為不離心等，所以也包含在這裡面。

接下來解釋圓成實性（Parinispanna-svabhava）。先解釋第二頌的第三句。

論：『二空』所顯乃至名為『圓成實』。

述曰：依靠二空（Dvai-sunyata）之門所顯示的真理。一、圓滿。二、成就。三、法實性。具備這三種含義，名為『圓成實』。

如何真如（Tathata）具備這三種含義？

論：顯示這個遍常的體不是虛假的錯誤。

【English Translation】 English version: And thus can arise.

Commentary: Explains the three words 'dependent arising' in the verse. Explains the meaning of 'dependent'.

Treatise: The verse says 'discrimination' up to 'also perfectly accomplished'.

Commentary: Explains the word 'discrimination' as limited only to the contaminated. Also reveals the reason for not speaking of the pure aspect. Or, from here below, explains the second line. The above is a general explanation of the first line. Now, in this verse, it should be known that only the contaminated dependent nature is being discussed. The so-called 'discrimination' dharma is that which arises from conditions. The contaminated dharmas are called 'discrimination' because they arise from dependent conditions. Or, the contaminated dependent nature arises from the conditions of 'discrimination'. Only because it is contaminated. Here, 'dependent' only refers to the contaminated aspect, because the dependent nature of the pure aspect is also perfectly accomplished (Parinispanna). Reveals that it encompasses both natures. Clarifies that the dependent nature of the pure is not called 'discrimination', because the arising of the contaminated dependent nature is solely dependent. Reveals that this verse only clarifies the contaminated aspect.

Treatise: Or all contaminated and pure up to 'included in dependent arising'.

Commentary: A second explanation. Or all contaminated and pure mind and mental functions are called 'discrimination' because they are capable of apprehension. This is a general explanation. It is not that because it is pure, it is not capable of apprehension. Saying 'capable of apprehension' means that all contaminated and pure dependent natures are included in the 'dependent arising' of this verse. All are called 'discrimination'. If so, the contaminated and pure form and non-associated formations should not be included in the 'dependent arising' here. Because they are not capable of apprehension, they are not 'discrimination'. The answer is: it is not so. When mind etc. are spoken of, they are also included here because they are inseparable from mind. Because it is the Vijnaptimatrata (Consciousness-only) doctrine. Question: If so, why specifically mention the word 'capable of apprehension'? Answer: To show that the mind capable of apprehension pervades all contaminated and pure and is called 'discrimination', and is capable of deliberation. It is not that the word 'apprehension' excludes form etc. Although form etc. are not capable of apprehension, they are also included here because they are inseparable from mind etc.

Next, explain the Perfectly Accomplished Nature (Parinispanna-svabhava). First, explain the third line of the second verse.

Treatise: 'Revealed by the two emptinesses' up to 'is called Perfectly Accomplished'.

Commentary: The truth revealed by relying on the gate of the two emptinesses (Dvai-sunyata). First, perfect. Second, accomplished. Third, the real nature of dharma. Possessing these three meanings is called 'Perfectly Accomplished'.

How does Suchness (Tathata) possess these three meanings?

Treatise: Reveals that this pervasive and constant substance is not false or erroneous.

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述曰。由此真如一者體遍。無處無故。即是圓滿義。二者體常。非生滅故。即是成就義。三者體非虛謬。諸法真理。法實性故。即此體言貫通三處。論影略故通上常．遍也。

且言體遍欲顯何義。

論。簡自共相虛空我等。

述曰。遍簡自相。諸法自相局法體故。不通於余。若通於余便非自相。故唯真如能遍諸法　常顯何義。常簡共相。諸法無常．空．無我等雖遍諸法。體非實有。謂諸法上無體無用名空．無我。非有實體貫通諸法。唯有觀心無共相體如前已說。既爾不應說彼體性是常法。故言真如常簡彼共相　又非虛謬言。意顯何等義。非虛謬簡虛空．我等。小乘．外道執虛空．我亦體是常。能遍諸法。說彼虛謬非法實性。故非虛言簡異虛空。非謬之言即簡我等。等妄執故。又言等者。等衛世師大有．和合。僧佉自性。雖彼計遍。又體是常。今言彼體是虛謬性非定有體故復言等。即唯真如具此三義。圓成實言如次配屬。

問曰若爾凈分依他體非常．遍。如何亦是圓成實攝。

論。無漏有為至亦得此名。

述曰。凈分有為亦具三義。一者離倒。體非染故。是實義。二者究竟。諸有漏法加行善等。不能斷惑非究竟故。諸無漏法體是無漏。能斷諸染是究竟故。是成義。三者勝用周

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述：由此真如只有一個，其本體周遍一切處，無所不在，這就是圓滿的意義。第二，其本體恒常不變，沒有生滅，這就是成就的意義。第三，其本體不是虛假的謬誤，而是諸法的真實道理，是法的真實本性。這裡所說的『體』字貫通以上三處。因為論述簡略，所以也貫通了上面的『常』和『遍』。

進一步說，強調『體遍』想要顯明什麼意義？

論：爲了簡別自相、共相、虛空、我等。

窺基法師述：『遍』是爲了簡別自相（svalaksana）。諸法的自相侷限於各自的法體，不能與其他法相通。如果與其他法相通，就不是自相了。所以只有真如（tathata）能夠周遍諸法。『常』是爲了顯明什麼意義？『常』是爲了簡別共相（samanya laksana）。諸法中的無常、空、無我等雖然周遍諸法，但其本體並非真實存在。所謂的『空』和『無我』，是指在諸法之上沒有實體和作用，並非有實體貫通諸法。只有觀心沒有共相的本體，如前所述。既然如此，就不應該說它們的體性是常法。所以說真如的『常』是爲了簡別那些共相。『又非虛謬』這句話，想要顯明什麼意義？『非虛謬』是爲了簡別虛空、我等。小乘佛教和外道執著認為虛空、我的本體也是常，能夠周遍諸法，但實際上它們是虛假的謬誤，不是法的真實本性。所以『非虛』是爲了簡別虛空，『非謬』是爲了簡別我等，因為我等是虛妄的執著。另外，『等』字，包括了衛世師（Vaisesika）的大有（Mahasat）、和合（Samavaya），以及僧佉（Samkhya）的自性（Prakrti）。雖然他們認為這些是周遍的，而且本體是常的，但現在說它們的本體是虛假的謬誤，不是真實存在的。所以又用『等』字。只有真如具備這三種意義，『圓成實』（Parinispanna）這個詞依次與這三種意義相配屬。

問：如果這樣，那麼清凈分（凈色）的依他起性（Paratantra）的本體不是常、不是遍，為什麼也屬於圓成實所攝？

論：無漏有為法乃至也得到這個名稱。

窺基法師述：清凈分的有為法也具備這三種意義。第一，遠離顛倒，本體不是染污的，所以是『實』的意義。第二，達到究竟，諸有漏法（包括加行善等）不能斷除迷惑，所以不是究竟的。諸無漏法的本體是無漏的，能夠斷除各種染污，所以是究竟的意義，是『成』的意義。第三，殊勝的作用周遍。

【English Translation】 English version: Master Kuiji states: Because this True Thusness (Tathata) is one, its essence pervades everywhere, without any place where it is not present. This is the meaning of 'perfect'. Second, its essence is constant, without arising or ceasing. This is the meaning of 'accomplishment'. Third, its essence is not false or erroneous, but is the true principle of all dharmas, the real nature of the Dharma. The word 'essence' here connects all three aspects mentioned above. Because the treatise is concise, it also connects to the 'constant' and 'pervasive' mentioned earlier.

Furthermore, what meaning is intended to be revealed by emphasizing 'essence is pervasive'?

Treatise: To distinguish from self-nature (svalaksana), common-nature (samanya laksana), emptiness (sunyata), self (atman), and so on.

Master Kuiji states: 'Pervasive' is to distinguish from self-nature. The self-nature of dharmas is limited to their respective dharma-bodies and cannot communicate with other dharmas. If it could communicate with other dharmas, it would not be self-nature. Therefore, only True Thusness can pervade all dharmas. What meaning is 'constant' intended to reveal? 'Constant' is to distinguish from common-nature. Although impermanence, emptiness, non-self, etc., among dharmas pervade all dharmas, their essence is not truly existent. The so-called 'emptiness' and 'non-self' refer to the absence of substance and function above dharmas, not a substance that pervades all dharmas. Only the mind of contemplation has no common-nature essence, as mentioned earlier. Since this is the case, it should not be said that their nature is a constant dharma. Therefore, the 'constant' of True Thusness is to distinguish from those common-natures. What meaning does the phrase 'and not false or erroneous' intend to reveal? 'Not false or erroneous' is to distinguish from emptiness, self, and so on. Hinayana Buddhism and non-Buddhist schools cling to the idea that the essence of emptiness and self is also constant and can pervade all dharmas, but in reality, they are false and erroneous and not the true nature of the Dharma. Therefore, 'not false' is to distinguish from emptiness, and 'not erroneous' is to distinguish from self, because self is a false clinging. In addition, the word 'and so on' includes the Great Being (Mahasat) and Combination (Samavaya) of the Vaisesika school, and the Nature (Prakrti) of the Samkhya school. Although they believe that these are pervasive and that their essence is constant, it is now said that their essence is false and erroneous and not truly existent. Therefore, the word 'and so on' is used again. Only True Thusness possesses these three meanings, and the term 'Perfected Reality' (Parinispanna) is successively associated with these three meanings.

Question: If this is the case, then the dependent nature (Paratantra) of the pure aspect (purified form) is not constant and not pervasive, so why is it also included in the Perfected Reality?

Treatise: Even the unconditioned conditioned dharmas also obtain this name.

Master Kuiji states: The conditioned dharmas of the pure aspect also possess these three meanings. First, being free from inversion, its essence is not defiled, so it is the meaning of 'real'. Second, reaching the ultimate, all conditioned dharmas (including practices of good conduct, etc.) cannot cut off delusion, so they are not ultimate. The essence of all unconditioned dharmas is unconditioned and can cut off all defilements, so it is the meaning of 'ultimate', which is the meaning of 'accomplishment'. Third, the supreme function is pervasive.

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遍。謂能普斷一切染法。普緣諸境緣遍真如。故言第三勝用周遍。是圓義。由具三義與真如同。故凈依他亦得稱為圓成實性。舊中邊上亦說。無為無變無倒成就入真實性。一切有為皆道所攝。無顛倒成就故。境界品類中無顛倒故。得入真實性。無變者常義。無顛倒非虛謬義。成就者遍義。由上三義真如名成實。凈分依他但有體遍。俱無顛倒。但是此中第一．第三。無究竟義。新翻中邊第二捲雲。真如涅槃無變異故名圓成實。有為總攝一切聖道。于境無倒故亦名圓成實。合此二種但有此中初．三之義。攝論四說。何緣名圓成實。由無變易故。即此常義。清凈所緣。即此遍義。一切善法最勝性故。即此體非虛謬。諸法實性。今彼論中但當真如圓成實性。非凈依他亦圓成攝。義不具故。此中通攝義皆同也。

論。然今頌中說初非后。

述曰。雖有．無為諸凈分法皆圓成實。然今頌中說初真如名圓成實非后凈分。不能簡別自．共相等三義勝故。凈分依他。一非所證。二非法性。故今頌中說初非后。

此解第三句圓成實三字。次解于彼。及第四句。初總。后別。

論。此即于彼至真如為性。

述曰。此總解也。此圓成實於前所說彼依他起上。於一切時常無第一遍計所執。常是恒義。一切時義。遠

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 周遍。謂能普遍斷除一切染污之法。普遍緣取諸境，周遍于真如（tathata，事物的真實如是之性）。所以說第三種殊勝作用是周遍，是圓滿之義。由於具備這三種意義，與真如相同。所以清凈的依他起性（paratantra-svabhava，緣起性）也可以稱為圓成實性（pariniṣpanna-svabhava，圓滿成就的自性）。舊譯《中邊分別論》上也說，無為、無變、無倒，成就入于真實之性。一切有為法都為聖道所攝，沒有顛倒的成就，所以在境界品類中沒有顛倒，得以進入真實之性。無變，是常恒之義。無顛倒，是非虛謬之義。成就，是周遍之義。由於以上三種意義，真如被稱為圓成實性。清凈的依他起性只有體性和周遍，都無顛倒，但只是此中的第一和第三種意義，沒有究竟之義。新譯《中邊分別論》第二卷說，真如涅槃沒有變異，所以名為圓成實。有為法總攝一切聖道，在境界上沒有顛倒，所以也名為圓成實。合此二種說法，只有此中第一和第三種意義。《攝大乘論》第四說，什麼緣故名為圓成實？由於沒有變易，即是此處的常恒之義。清凈所緣，即是此處的周遍之義。一切善法最殊勝的體性，即是此處的體性非虛謬，諸法的真實自性。現在彼論中只將真如作為圓成實性，而非清凈的依他起性也包含在圓成實性中，因為意義不完備。此處通攝的意義都相同。

論：然而現在頌中說的是最初的，而非後來的。

述記：雖然有為法和無為法等清凈部分都屬於圓成實性，然而現在頌中說的是最初的真如名為圓成實性，而非後來的清凈部分。因為不能簡別自體、共相等三種殊勝的意義。清凈的依他起性，一不是所證之境，二不是法性。所以現在頌中說的是最初的，而非後來的。

此解釋第三句『圓成實』三個字。接下來解釋『于彼』以及第四句，先總說，后別說。

論：此即于彼，乃至真如為性。

述記：這是總體的解釋。此圓成實性，對於前面所說的依他起性上，在一切時常無第一遍計所執（parikalpita，遍計所執性）。常是恒常之義，一切時之義。遠離

【English Translation】 English version 』Pervasive』 means being able to universally sever all defiled dharmas. Universally cognizing all realms, pervading Suchness (tathata, the thusness or suchness of things). Therefore, it is said that the third supreme function is pervasive, which is the meaning of completeness. Because it possesses these three meanings, it is the same as Suchness. Therefore, the pure dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava, the dependently arisen nature) can also be called the perfectly accomplished nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhava, the perfectly accomplished nature). The old translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga also says: non-conditioned, non-changing, non-inverted, accomplishing entry into the nature of reality. All conditioned dharmas are encompassed by the path, without inverted accomplishment, so in the category of realms, there is no inversion, and thus one can enter the nature of reality. 『Non-changing』 means permanence. 『Non-inverted』 means non-illusory. 『Accomplishment』 means pervasiveness. Because of the above three meanings, Suchness is called the perfectly accomplished nature. The pure dependent nature only has substance and pervasiveness, both without inversion, but only the first and third of these meanings are present, without ultimate meaning. The second volume of the new translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga says: Because Suchness and Nirvana do not change, they are called the perfectly accomplished nature. Conditioned dharmas encompass all the noble paths, and because there is no inversion in the realm, they are also called the perfectly accomplished nature. Combining these two statements, only the first and third meanings are present here. The fourth [section] of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: Why is it called the perfectly accomplished nature? Because there is no change, which is the meaning of permanence here. The object of pure cognition is the meaning of pervasiveness here. The most supreme nature of all good dharmas is the meaning of substance that is not illusory, the real nature of all dharmas. Now, in that treatise, only Suchness is regarded as the perfectly accomplished nature, and the pure dependent nature is not included in the perfectly accomplished nature, because the meaning is incomplete. Here, the meaning of universal inclusion is the same.

Treatise: However, the verse now speaks of the first, not the latter.

Commentary: Although conditioned and unconditioned dharmas and other pure aspects all belong to the perfectly accomplished nature, the verse now speaks of the first, Suchness, as the perfectly accomplished nature, not the latter, the pure aspects. Because it cannot distinguish the three supreme meanings of self-nature, commonality, and so on. The pure dependent nature, one, is not the object of realization, and two, is not the nature of dharma. Therefore, the verse now speaks of the first, not the latter.

This explains the three words 『perfectly accomplished nature』 in the third line. Next, it explains 『in that』 and the fourth line, first generally, then specifically.

Treatise: This is in that, up to Suchness as its nature.

Commentary: This is a general explanation. This perfectly accomplished nature, with respect to the dependent nature (paratantra, dependent arising) mentioned earlier, at all times is constantly without the primarily imputed nature (parikalpita, the imagined nature). 『Constant』 means permanence, the meaning of all times. Far from

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離無義。離過失義。三性之中所執為初故名前也。此圓成實依他起上無計所執。二我既空。依此空門所顯真如為其自性。梵云瞬若此說為空。云瞬若多此名空性。如名空性不名為空。故依空門而顯此性。即圓成實是空所顯。此即約表詮顯圓成實　問空為門者。為智是空。空為異智　答空是智境。空體非智。智緣彼空之時。顯此真如故。

論。說于彼言至不即不離。

述曰。下重釋第三句于彼二字。即約遮詮顯圓成實。頌第三句言于彼者。顯此與依他不即不離。依他是所于。真如是能于。非即一法有所能于。顯如與依他體非即故。若是即者。真如應有滅。依他應不生。言不離者。即于彼依他上有真如故。非不于彼。不可言離。若全離者如應非彼依他之性。應離依他別有如性。云何言于彼。故於彼言顯不即離。此中唯有空。于彼亦有此也。

論。常遠離言至理恒非有。

述曰。釋第四句常遠離字。謂遍計所執是妄所執。此非暫無。恒時無故名常。此體非有故名遠離。

既遠離言無計所執。更致前言此何所用。

論。前言義顯不空依他。

述曰。遍計所執依他前說。今空于所執不空于依他。

前言顯此頌中但言常遠離前遍計所執已空計所執。更言性者此復何用。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『離』是無意義。『離』是遠離過失的意義。在三種自性中，最初被執著的被稱為遍計所執性（Parikalpita-lakshana）。這圓成實性（Parinishpanna-lakshana）依存於依他起性（Paratantra-lakshana）之上，沒有遍計所執性。二取（兩種執著，能取和所取）既然是空的，依據這空性之門所顯現的真如（Tathata）就是它的自性。梵語『瞬若』（Shunyata）的意思是空。『瞬若多』（Shunyata）的意思是空性。如同名為空性，而不是空。所以依據空性之門來顯現這種自性，也就是圓成實性是被空性所顯現的。這指的是通過表詮來顯現圓成實性。 問：以空性作為門徑，是智慧是空性，還是空性不同於智慧？ 答：空性是智慧的境界。空性的本體不是智慧。當智慧緣于那空性的時候，就顯現出這真如。

論：『說于彼言』到『不即不離』。

述記：下面重新解釋第三句『于彼』二字。這是通過遮詮來顯現圓成實性。頌文第三句說『于彼』，顯示這真如與依他起性不即不離。依他起性是所『于』，真如是能『于』。不是一個法既是所『于』又是能『于』，顯示真如與依他起性的本體不是同一個。如果是一個，真如就應該有生滅，依他起性就不應該產生。說『不離』，就是因為在那依他起性上有真如，不是不『于』它，不能說是分離的。如果完全分離，那麼真如就應該不是那依他起性的自性，應該離開依他起性而另外有真如的自性。怎麼能說『于彼』呢？所以『于彼』二字顯示不即不離。這裡只有空性，在那依他起性上也有這真如。

論：『常遠離言』到『理恒非有』。

述記：解釋第四句『常遠離』二字。所謂遍計所執性是虛妄的執著。這並非暫時沒有，而是恒常沒有，所以稱為『常』。這本體沒有，所以稱為『遠離』。

既然說『遠離』遍計所執性，為什麼還要說『此』？

論：『前言義顯不空依他』。

述記：遍計所執性在依他起性之前說。現在空掉了遍計所執性，但沒有空掉依他起性。

前面說已經空掉了遍計所執性，現在又說『性』，這又有什麼用？

【English Translation】 English version 'Absence' means without meaning. 'Absence' means absence of fault. Among the three natures, that which is initially grasped is called the Parikalpita-lakshana (the completely conceptualized nature). This Parinishpanna-lakshana (the perfectly accomplished nature) relies on the Paratantra-lakshana (the dependent nature), without the Parikalpita-lakshana. Since the two graspers (the grasper and the grasped) are empty, the Tathata (suchness) revealed through this gate of emptiness is its self-nature. The Sanskrit word 'Shunyata' means emptiness. 'Shunyata' means emptiness-nature. It is called emptiness-nature, but not emptiness. Therefore, this nature is revealed through the gate of emptiness, meaning the Parinishpanna-lakshana is revealed by emptiness. This refers to revealing the Parinishpanna-lakshana through expression. Question: Regarding emptiness as a gate, is wisdom emptiness, or is emptiness different from wisdom? Answer: Emptiness is the realm of wisdom. The substance of emptiness is not wisdom. When wisdom is related to that emptiness, this Tathata is revealed.

Treatise: 'Saying 'in that'' to 'neither identical nor separate'.

Commentary: Below, re-explaining the two words 'in that' in the third line. This is revealing the Parinishpanna-lakshana through negation. The third line of the verse says 'in that', showing that this Tathata is neither identical nor separate from the Paratantra-lakshana. The Paratantra-lakshana is the 'in' which something exists, and Tathata is the 'existing'. It is not that one dharma is both the 'in' and the 'existing', showing that the substance of Tathata and the Paratantra-lakshana are not the same. If they were the same, Tathata should have arising and ceasing, and the Paratantra-lakshana should not arise. Saying 'not separate' means that there is Tathata in that Paratantra-lakshana, it is not 'not in' it, it cannot be said to be separate. If it were completely separate, then Tathata should not be the nature of that Paratantra-lakshana, there should be a separate nature of Tathata apart from the Paratantra-lakshana. How can it be said 'in that'? Therefore, the words 'in that' show neither identity nor separation. Here there is only emptiness, and in that Paratantra-lakshana there is also this Tathata.

Treatise: 'Constantly away from' to 'reason is always non-existent'.

Commentary: Explaining the two words 'constantly away from' in the fourth line. The Parikalpita-lakshana is a false grasping. This is not temporarily non-existent, but constantly non-existent, so it is called 'constant'. This substance is non-existent, so it is called 'away from'.

Since it is said to be 'away from' the Parikalpita-lakshana, why is 'this' mentioned again?

Treatise: 'The previous words show that the dependent is not empty'.

Commentary: The Parikalpita-lakshana was mentioned before the Paratantra-lakshana. Now the Parikalpita-lakshana is emptied, but the Paratantra-lakshana is not emptied.

Earlier it was said that the Parikalpita-lakshana has already been emptied, now saying 'nature' again, what is the use of this?

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論。性顯二空至離無性故。

述曰。意言。真如是空之性。非即是空。空為所由如方顯故。

如體空者何所妨也。真如離有。及離無相。若言于空雖離有相非離空相。故此空言非真如體。故致性言深為有用　真如離空名空性。真如離有名有性。病多起有但說空門。若空病生亦立有性。此意總顯圓成實性于依他上無前所執所顯之性。故遮．表門皆有所以。

此解第二頌下二句訖。雖二頌不同。明三性體訖。下明三性異不異相。即第三頌。于中有三。一解法。二解喻。三結之。

論。由前理故至應是無常。

述曰。下解第三頌中初三句。此與依他起非異不異者。攝論等皆對三性明異不異。此中但對依他起者。以此二性有法相對。非計所執以無體故。彼約性對。故三皆對。此約體對。彼一無體。故但對二。此中論言由前不即離理故。若依他起與彼定異。真如應非彼之實性。既與彼異故非彼性。若全不異。此真如性應是無常。依他非常此彼同故。

論。彼此俱應至用應無別。

述曰。又釋一義。依他彼。真如此。既體一俱應是凈非凈境。以體一故。中邊第一云。無二有無故。非有亦非無。非異亦非一。是說為空相。正與此同。七十四說。唯此真如聖智境。依他起凡．聖智境。又依

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：自性顯現為空性，是因為遠離了無自性。

述曰：意思是說，真如是空性的本質，但並非就是空。空是真如顯現的原因，就像方位能夠顯現事物一樣。

如果真如的本體是空，那又有什麼妨礙呢？真如既遠離了有，也遠離了無的相狀。如果說它是空，雖然遠離了有的相狀，卻沒有遠離空的相狀。因此，說它是『性』就顯得非常重要。真如遠離空，名為空性；真如遠離有，名為有性。因為眾生的病多由執著于有而起，所以佛法多說空門。如果執著于空而生病，也可以設立有性。總而言之，這個意思是說，圓成實性在依他起性之上，沒有先前所執著的和所顯現的自性。因此，遮遣和表述都有其道理。

以上解釋了第二頌的后兩句。雖然兩頌不同，但都說明了三性的本體。下面說明三性的異與不異之相，也就是第三頌的內容。其中有三點：一是解釋法，二是解釋比喻，三是總結。

論：由於前面的道理，真如應該不是無常。

述曰：下面解釋第三頌中的前三句。這個『此』和依他起性，既非異也非不異。攝論等經典都是針對三性來闡明異與不異。這裡只針對依他起性，是因為這兩種自性是有法相對的，而遍計所執性沒有本體。攝論等是從自性的角度來闡述，所以三性都針對。這裡是從本體的角度來闡述，遍計所執性沒有本體，所以只針對兩種自性。這裡的論述說，由於前面不即不離的道理，如果依他起性與真如完全不同，那麼真如就不應該是依他起性的真實本質。既然與依他起性不同，就不是依他起性的本質。如果完全沒有差別，那麼真如的自性就應該是無常的，因為依他起性是無常的，真如和依他起性相同。

論：真如和依他起性都應該是清凈或不清凈的境界，因為它們的本體是一樣的。

述曰：又解釋了一種含義。依他是『彼』，真如是『此』。既然本體是一，那麼它們都應該是清凈或不清凈的境界，因為它們的本體是一樣的。《中邊分別論》第一卷說：『沒有二，有和無的緣故，既非有也非無，既非異也非一。』這是在說明空相，與這裡的說法相同。第七十四卷說：『只有真如是聖智的境界，依他起性是凡夫和聖人智慧的境界。』又，依他

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: The nature manifests as emptiness because it is apart from no-nature.

Commentary: The meaning is that Suchness (真如, Zhenru) is the nature of emptiness, but it is not emptiness itself. Emptiness is the reason why Suchness manifests, just as direction reveals things.

If the substance of Suchness is emptiness, what is the problem? Suchness is apart from existence and also apart from the characteristic of non-existence. If it is said to be emptiness, although it is apart from the characteristic of existence, it is not apart from the characteristic of emptiness. Therefore, saying it is 'nature' is very important. Suchness being apart from emptiness is called the nature of emptiness; Suchness being apart from existence is called the nature of existence. Because the illnesses of sentient beings mostly arise from attachment to existence, the Dharma often speaks of the gate of emptiness. If illness arises from attachment to emptiness, the nature of existence can also be established. In short, this meaning reveals that the Perfectly Accomplished Nature (圓成實性, Yuancheng shixing) on the Dependent Nature (依他起性, Yita qixing) does not have the previously grasped and manifested nature. Therefore, both negation and affirmation have their reasons.

The above explains the last two lines of the second verse. Although the two verses are different, they both explain the substance of the three natures. Below, the aspect of difference and non-difference of the three natures is explained, which is the content of the third verse. There are three points: first, explaining the Dharma; second, explaining the analogy; and third, concluding.

Treatise: Because of the preceding reason, Suchness should not be impermanent.

Commentary: Below, the first three lines of the third verse are explained. This 'this' and the Dependent Nature are neither different nor non-different. The Samdhinirmocana Sutra and other scriptures all explain difference and non-difference in relation to the three natures. Here, it is only in relation to the Dependent Nature because these two natures are related to the Dharma, while the Completely Imagined Nature (遍計所執性, Bianji suozhixing) has no substance. The Samdhinirmocana Sutra and others explain it from the perspective of nature, so all three natures are addressed. Here, it is explained from the perspective of substance, and the Completely Imagined Nature has no substance, so only two natures are addressed. The treatise here says that because of the preceding reason of neither being identical nor separate, if the Dependent Nature is completely different from Suchness, then Suchness should not be the true essence of the Dependent Nature. Since it is different from the Dependent Nature, it is not the essence of the Dependent Nature. If there is no difference at all, then the nature of Suchness should be impermanent, because the Dependent Nature is impermanent, and Suchness and the Dependent Nature are the same.

Treatise: Both Suchness and the Dependent Nature should be pure or impure realms, because their substance is the same.

Commentary: Another meaning is explained. The Dependent Nature is 'that,' and Suchness is 'this.' Since the substance is one, then they should both be pure or impure realms, because their substance is the same. The first chapter of the Madhyantavibhaga says: 'There is no duality, because of existence and non-existence, it is neither existence nor non-existence, neither different nor one.' This is explaining the aspect of emptiness, which is the same as what is said here. The seventy-fourth chapter says: 'Only Suchness is the realm of noble wisdom, and the Dependent Nature is the realm of the wisdom of ordinary people and sages.' Also, the Dependent

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他境體不凈。真如境體是凈。二性既一。彼依他境體應亦凈。真如境體應不凈。又依他既通凡．聖境。真如應亦然。既爾即根本無分別智。與后得智應無別體。本智本緣如。亦緣依他故。后得緣依他。亦緣真如故。此約見分以為妨難。故二無別。攝論云。由依他種產生依他。由遍計所緣相故。遍計所遍計故成遍計所執。由即此自性成圓成實。如所遍計不如是有故。故三性非異非不異。世親云。謂意識是遍計。此依他起為所取所緣境效能生遍計。是故亦名遍計所執。即依他起為境生遍計心義名計所執性。即釋遍計所緣相故。是所遍計故者。即彼意識名遍計。緣彼相貌為所取境為所遍計。由此依他亦名計所執性。謂依他起為遍計心之所緣故。亦名計所執。前即為境能生計心名計所執。后為計心之所緣故名計所執。總解本論。是一義也。無性云。非異者。依他起有。計所執無。有望于有可得言異。有望非有非可異故。彼既是無。望何為異。非不異者。有與非有不成一故。依他不凈。圓成凈故。故彼三性非異非不異。此為一解。又由依他是我．色等遍計所執所依止故。依他起名計所執。遍計所緣相故。即是依他為計所執之所依。名計所執也。此與前世親別。又依他起是我．色等意識遍計所遍計故。即依他起為能遍計之所計執名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 他境的體性是不清凈的。真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）境的體性是清凈的。如果二者的體性既然是一樣的，那麼依他起（Paratantra-svabhava，緣起性）境的體性應該也是清凈的。真如境的體性應該也是不清凈的。而且依他起既然能通於凡夫和聖人的境界，那麼真如也應該如此。如果這樣，那麼根本無分別智（Jnana，智慧）與后得智（Post-attainment Wisdom）應該就沒有區別了。本智（Original Wisdom）本來緣于真如，也緣于依他起，所以後得智緣于依他起，也緣于真如。這是從見分（Darshana-bhaga，認識的主體部分）的角度提出的妨難，所以二者沒有區別。《攝大乘論》（Mahayana-samgraha）中說：『由於依他起的種子產生依他起，由於遍計所緣的相，遍計所遍計的緣故，成就遍計所執（Parikalpita-svabhava，虛妄分別性）。由於即此自性成就圓成實（Parinispanna-svabhava，真實圓滿性），如所遍計不如是有故。』所以三性（Three Natures）非異非不異。世親（Vasubandhu）說：『所謂的意識是遍計。此依他起作為所取所緣境的效能生遍計，所以也名遍計所執。』即依他起為境生遍計心的意義，名為計所執性。即解釋遍計所緣相的緣故，是所遍計的緣故，即彼意識名遍計，緣彼相貌為所取境為所遍計。由此依他起也名計所執性，謂依他起為遍計心之所緣故，也名計所執。前即為境能生計心名計所執，后為計心之所緣故名計所執。總的解釋本論，是一個意思。無性（Asanga）說：『非異者，依他起有，計所執無，有望于有可得言異，有望非有非可異故。彼既是無，望何為異。非不異者，有與非有不成一故。依他不凈，圓成凈故。』故彼三性非異非不異。這是一種解釋。又由於依他起是我、色等遍計所執所依止的緣故，依他起名計所執。遍計所緣相故，即是依他起為計所執之所依，名計所執也。這與前世親的解釋不同。又依他起是我、色等意識遍計所遍計的緣故，即依他起為能遍計之所計執名

【English Translation】 English version: The nature of other realms is impure. The nature of the realm of Tathata (the true nature of things) is pure. Since the two natures are the same, the nature of Paratantra-svabhava (the nature of dependence on others) should also be pure. The nature of the realm of Tathata should also be impure. Moreover, since Paratantra-svabhava can be accessed by both ordinary people and sages, so should Tathata. If this is the case, then Fundamental Non-Discriminating Wisdom (Jnana) should be no different from Subsequent Wisdom (Post-attainment Wisdom). Original Wisdom originally arises from Tathata and also arises from Paratantra-svabhava, so Subsequent Wisdom arises from Paratantra-svabhava and also arises from Tathata. This is an objection raised from the perspective of the perceiving aspect (Darshana-bhaga), so the two are not different. The Mahayana-samgraha says: 'Because the seeds of Paratantra-svabhava generate Paratantra-svabhava, because of the characteristics of what is conceived by discrimination, and because of what is conceived by discrimination, Parikalpita-svabhava (the nature of false discrimination) is achieved. Because the nature of this itself achieves Parinispanna-svabhava (the nature of perfect reality), and because what is conceived is not as it is.' Therefore, the Three Natures are neither different nor not different. Vasubandhu said: 'What is called consciousness is discrimination. This Paratantra-svabhava, as the ability of the object taken and the object perceived, generates discrimination, so it is also called Parikalpita-svabhava.' That is, the meaning of Paratantra-svabhava generating discriminating mind as the object is called the nature of what is conceived. That is, explaining the characteristics of what is conceived by discrimination, because it is what is conceived, that consciousness is called discrimination, and perceiving those characteristics as the object taken is what is conceived. Therefore, Paratantra-svabhava is also called the nature of what is conceived, meaning that Paratantra-svabhava is what is perceived by the discriminating mind, so it is also called what is conceived. The former is the object that can generate the discriminating mind, called what is conceived, and the latter is what is perceived by the discriminating mind, called what is conceived. The general explanation of this treatise is the same meaning. Asanga said: 'What is not different is that Paratantra-svabhava exists, and Parikalpita-svabhava does not exist. Looking at existence, it can be said to be different, but looking at non-existence, it cannot be said to be different. Since it is non-existent, what is the difference? What is not not different is that existence and non-existence do not become one. Paratantra-svabhava is impure, and Parinispanna-svabhava is pure.' Therefore, the Three Natures are neither different nor not different. This is one explanation. Also, because Paratantra-svabhava is the basis of what is conceived by discrimination, such as self and form, Paratantra-svabhava is called what is conceived. Because of the characteristics of what is conceived by discrimination, that is, Paratantra-svabhava is the basis of what is conceived, and is called what is conceived. This is different from Vasubandhu's previous explanation. Also, because Paratantra-svabhava is what is conceived by the consciousness of self and form, that is, Paratantra-svabhava is what is conceived by the conceiving mind, called

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計所執。彼云由此意趣假說依他為計所執。

此解第三頌上二句故此與依他非異非不異訖。下釋下第三句。

論。云何二性非異不異。

述曰。此問譬喻。

論。如彼無常無我等性。

述曰。頌言如無常等性。等取無我。及空等故。無我亦復言等。

論。無常等性至非彼共相。

述曰。若定異者。應彼行法非無常等。如青非黃以是異故。不全異者。無常等此應非彼行等之共相。如色非色共相。與色不異故。

論。由此喻顯至相待有故。

述曰。結上文也。由此道理二性不一異。諸法與法性理必應然。依他是法。如是法性。道理應爾。所以者何。勝義．世俗相待立故。謂若有俗理必有真。若無真時待何為俗。非龜毛望兔角可說異一。以體無故。若有真時理必有俗。若無俗者待何為真。由斯道理故前三真亦名為俗。真家俗故。故后三俗亦名為真。俗家真故。如斯勝理故彼二性非異非一。

次第三段釋第四句非不見此彼。

論。非不證見至依他起性。

述曰。下文有二。初總。后別。此初也。今言見者。非謂眼見意識比見。但是無漏親證見也。見者聖惠親所得義。非不見此此即圓成。而能見彼彼依他起。即一見言義通二性。密合巧言故。頌但說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 計所執（Parikalpita，遍計所執性）。他們說，基於這種意趣，假說依他起性為遍計所執性。 這段解釋了第三頌的前兩句，因此遍計所執性與依他起性既非相同也非不同。下面解釋第三句。 論：如何理解二性非異非不異？ 述曰：這是設問一個比喻。 論：比如無常、無我等自性。 述曰：頌文說『如無常等性』，『等』字包括無我以及空等。『無我』也同樣可以用『等』字。 論：無常等自性……並非它們的共相。 述曰：如果完全不同，那麼這些行法就不應是無常等。就像青色不是黃色，因為它們是不同的。如果不完全相同，那麼無常等就不應該是這些行法等的共相，就像顏色不是非顏色的共相，因為它與顏色不相同。 論：由此比喻顯示……因為相互依存而存在。 述曰：總結上文。由此道理，二性非一非異。諸法與法性的道理必然如此。依他起性是法，其法性也應如此。為什麼呢？因為勝義（Paramārtha，勝義諦）和世俗（Saṃvṛti，世俗諦）相互依存而成立。如果存在世俗，那麼必然存在真諦；如果沒有真諦，那麼世俗依賴於什麼呢？不能像龜毛與兔角那樣說它們是一或異，因為它們本體不存在。如果存在真諦，那麼必然存在世俗；如果沒有世俗，那麼真諦依賴於什麼呢？因此，前面的三個真諦也可以稱為世俗，因為它們是真諦中的世俗；後面的三個世俗也可以稱為真諦，因為它們是世俗中的真諦。像這樣的殊勝道理，所以這二性非異非一。 接下來第三段解釋第四句『非不見此彼』。 論：並非不證見……依他起性。 述曰：下文分為兩部分，先總說，后別說。這是總說。這裡說的『見』，不是指眼見或意識比見，而是指無漏的親證之見。『見』是指聖慧親身證得的意義。並非不見此——此即圓成實性（Pariniṣpanna，圓成實性），而能見彼——彼即依他起性（Paratantra，依他起性）。即一個『見』字，義通二性，是巧妙的密合之言，所以頌文只說『見』。

【English Translation】 English version: They assert that, based on this intention, the dependent nature (Paratantra) is hypothetically designated as the imputed nature (Parikalpita). This explains the first two lines of the third verse, thus concluding that the imputed nature and the dependent nature are neither different nor non-different. The following explains the third line. Question: How are the two natures understood as neither different nor non-different? Answer: This poses a metaphor. Statement: Like impermanence, selflessness, and other such natures. Explanation: The verse states 'like impermanence and other natures,' where 'other' includes selflessness and emptiness, etc. 'Selflessness' can also be included using 'etc.' Statement: Impermanence and other natures... are not their common characteristics. Explanation: If they were completely different, then these conditioned phenomena should not be impermanent, etc., just as blue is not yellow because they are different. If they were not completely different, then impermanence, etc., should not be the common characteristics of these conditioned phenomena, just as color is not the common characteristic of non-color, because it is not different from color. Statement: From this metaphor, it is shown... because they exist in dependence on each other. Explanation: Concluding the above. From this reasoning, the two natures are neither one nor different. The principle of phenomena and their nature must be so. The dependent nature is a phenomenon, and its nature should be so. Why? Because the ultimate truth (Paramārtha) and conventional truth (Saṃvṛti) are established in dependence on each other. If there is conventional truth, then there must be ultimate truth; if there is no ultimate truth, then what does conventional truth depend on? One cannot say that they are one or different like turtle hair and rabbit horns, because they do not exist in substance. If there is ultimate truth, then there must be conventional truth; if there is no conventional truth, then what does ultimate truth depend on? Therefore, the previous three truths can also be called conventional, because they are the conventional within the ultimate; the latter three conventional truths can also be called ultimate, because they are the ultimate within the conventional. Because of such a supreme principle, these two natures are neither different nor one. Next, the third section explains the fourth line, 'Not not seeing this and that.' Statement: Not not directly perceiving... the dependent nature. Explanation: The following text is divided into two parts: first, a general statement; second, a specific statement. This is the general statement. The 'seeing' here does not refer to seeing with the eyes or conceptual seeing, but to direct perception through non-outflow wisdom. 'Seeing' refers to the meaning attained through sacred wisdom. It is not not seeing this—this being the perfectly accomplished nature (Pariniṣpanna)—and being able to see that—that being the dependent nature (Paratantra). That is, the single word 'seeing' encompasses the meaning of both natures, a skillful and concise expression, so the verse only mentions 'seeing.'

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非不見此彼　要達真理方了依他。寧說依他是凡夫境。以心上現雖不了達但親所取。若論了達唯聖非凡。若親為境凡夫亦得。故彼此說亦不相違。如世有人親見一物然不能識。凡境亦爾。

論。未達遍計至依他有故。

述曰。釋此所以有二。初釋。后成。此釋也。地前等位未達遍計所執之性體是空無。終不如實知依他有。妄所執力翳彼依他。除彼翳時依他自現。知妄所執無。依此無門證圓成實便了依他。今從所無門說。故言了所執空知依他有。此卻解也。又無分別智。若不先達所執性空真如妙理。其後得智終不實知依他為有。顯無分別智證二性也。

問既要知真方了事俗。為俱為后。

論。無分別智至如幻事等。

述曰。先證真如已后得智中。方能了達依他起性如幻事．陽炎八喻等也。非初見位一時雙見。第五地后。及佛能爾。至下當知。

論。雖無始來至虛妄變現。

述曰。下成前也。一切異生心．心所法。已能緣自相．見分等。雖親得依他。由我．法執恒俱起故。不知自心．心所虛妄顯現。由此不能了依他也。乃至八喻。謂無始來見分緣自相分。自證緣自見分。亦緣自身證自證分。證自證分亦緣自自證故。故言緣自相．見分等。由我．法執第七識等三性之心恒俱行故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果不瞭解『此』和『彼』的虛幻性，就必須通過依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava，事物相互依存的性質）才能達到真理。難道說依賴依他起性是凡夫的境界嗎？因為心識上顯現的現象，即使不能完全理解，也是我們直接感受到的。如果說完全理解，那只有聖者才能做到，凡夫只能直接感受。所以，『此』和『彼』的說法並不矛盾。就像世間有人親眼見到一件東西，卻不能認識它一樣，凡夫的境界也是如此。

論：因為沒有達到遍計所執性（Parikalpita-svabhava，虛構的性質），所以才會有依他起性的存在。

述記：解釋這句話的原因有兩種。第一是解釋，第二是成立。這裡是解釋。在初地之前的菩薩，沒有理解遍計所執性的本體是空無，所以始終不能如實地瞭解依他起性。虛妄的執著遮蔽了依他起性。當除去這種遮蔽時，依他起性自然顯現。知道虛妄的執著不存在，通過這種『無』的途徑，證得圓成實性（Parinispanna-svabhava，圓滿的性質），就能瞭解依他起性。現在是從『無』的途徑來說，所以說了解所執的空性，就知道依他起性的存在。這是反過來解釋。另外，如果沒有無分別智（Nirvikalpa-jnana，無分別的智慧），如果不先通達所執性空的真如妙理，那麼之後獲得的智慧，始終不能真實地瞭解依他起性的存在。這顯示了無分別智慧夠證悟二種性質。

問：既然要了解真如才能明白世俗之事，那麼是同時還是先後？

論：無分別智證得真如之後，才能在後得智（Prsthalabdha-jnana，后得的智慧）中，瞭解依他起性就像幻術、陽焰等。

述記：先證得真如之後，才能在後得智中，瞭解依他起性就像幻術、陽焰等八種比喻。不是在初見時就能同時見到。第五地之後，以及佛才能做到。這在後面會知道。

論：雖然從無始以來，一切眾生的心和心所法，已經能夠緣取自相、見分等，雖然直接獲得了依他起性，但是由於我執和法執始終同時生起，所以不知道自己的心和心所是虛妄的顯現。因此不能瞭解依他起性。乃至八種比喻。

述記：下面是成立前面的觀點。一切凡夫的心和心所法，已經能夠緣取自相（svalaksana，自體的相狀）、見分（dṛśya-bhāga，能見的部分）等。雖然直接獲得了依他起性，但是由於我執（Atma-graha，對自我的執著）和法執（Dharma-graha，對法的執著）始終同時生起，所以不知道自己的心和心所是虛妄的顯現。因此不能瞭解依他起性。乃至八種比喻。意思是說，從無始以來，見分緣取自相分，自證分緣取自見分，也緣取自身證自證分，證自證分也緣取自自證分。所以說緣取自相、見分等。由於我執和法執，第七識等三種性質的心始終一起執行。

【English Translation】 English version: If one does not perceive the illusory nature of 'this' and 'that,' one must rely on Paratantra-svabhava (the nature of interdependence) to attain the truth. Is it to say that relying on Paratantra-svabhava is the realm of ordinary beings? Because the phenomena that appear in consciousness, even if not fully understood, are directly experienced by us. If we talk about complete understanding, only the sages can achieve it, while ordinary beings can only directly experience it. Therefore, the statements of 'this' and 'that' are not contradictory. Just as someone in the world sees something with their own eyes but cannot recognize it, the realm of ordinary beings is also like this.

Treatise: Because the Parikalpita-svabhava (the imagined nature) has not been attained, the Paratantra-svabhava exists.

Commentary: There are two reasons for explaining this statement. The first is explanation, and the second is establishment. This is the explanation. Bodhisattvas before the first ground (Bhumi), not understanding that the essence of Parikalpita-svabhava is emptiness, ultimately cannot truly know the Paratantra-svabhava. False attachments obscure the Paratantra-svabhava. When this obscuration is removed, the Paratantra-svabhava naturally appears. Knowing that false attachments do not exist, through this path of 'non-existence,' one attains the Parinispanna-svabhava (the perfected nature) and can understand the Paratantra-svabhava. Now, it is being discussed from the path of 'non-existence,' so it is said that understanding the emptiness of what is grasped, one knows the existence of Paratantra-svabhava. This is an explanation from the opposite perspective. Furthermore, without Nirvikalpa-jnana (non-discriminating wisdom), if one does not first thoroughly understand the wondrous principle of Suchness (Tathata) of the emptiness of the imagined nature, then the wisdom obtained afterward will ultimately not truly understand the existence of Paratantra-svabhava. This shows that non-discriminating wisdom can realize the two natures.

Question: Since one must understand Suchness to understand worldly matters, are they simultaneous or sequential?

Treatise: After non-discriminating wisdom realizes Suchness, one can understand in the Prsthalabdha-jnana (wisdom gained afterward) that the Paratantra-svabhava is like illusions, mirages, etc.

Commentary: After first realizing Suchness, one can understand in the wisdom gained afterward that the Paratantra-svabhava is like illusions, mirages, and other eight metaphors. It is not that one can see them simultaneously at the first sight. Only after the fifth ground, and the Buddha, can do so. This will be known later.

Treatise: Although from beginningless time, the minds and mental factors of all sentient beings have been able to grasp their own characteristics, the seeing-part, etc., although directly obtaining the Paratantra-svabhava, because the attachment to self and the attachment to phenomena always arise simultaneously, they do not know that their own minds and mental factors are illusory manifestations. Therefore, they cannot understand the Paratantra-svabhava. And so on, the eight metaphors.

Commentary: The following establishes the previous viewpoint. The minds and mental factors of all ordinary beings have been able to grasp their own characteristics (svalaksana), the seeing-part (dṛśya-bhāga), etc. Although directly obtaining the Paratantra-svabhava, because the attachment to self (Atma-graha) and the attachment to phenomena (Dharma-graha) always arise simultaneously, they do not know that their own minds and mental factors are illusory manifestations. Therefore, they cannot understand the Paratantra-svabhava. And so on, the eight metaphors. The meaning is that, from beginningless time, the seeing-part grasps the self-aspect, the self-awareness grasps the seeing-part, and also grasps its own self-awareness, and the self-awareness also grasps its own self-awareness. Therefore, it is said to grasp its own characteristics, the seeing-part, etc. Because of the attachment to self and the attachment to phenomena, the minds of the seventh consciousness and the other three natures always operate together.

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。不如實知自心虛妄如幻事等。

論。猶如幻事至非有似有。

述曰。此顯依他非真實有舉喻以成。如大般若廣說其相。攝大乘說。云何無義而成所行境界。為除此疑說幻事喻。云何無義心．心所轉。為此說陽炎。云何無義有愛．非愛受用差別。為此說夢境。云何無義凈．不凈業愛．非愛果差別而生。為此說映象。彼言影像。云何無義種種識轉。為此說光影。云何無義種種言說戲論相轉。為此說谷響。云何無義而有實取諸三摩地所行境轉。為此說水月。云何無義有諸菩薩無顛倒心。為辨有情諸利樂事故思受生。為此說變化。彼世親．無性第五皆廣解。不能煩引。中邊論中亦有八喻喻計所執。如彼抄會。顯依他性喻如此八。體非實有是虛妄有似彼真有。故說依他非有似有。

論。依如是義至雖有而非真。

述曰。此是厚嚴經頌。雖依他有而非真有。要見真已后見依他。與長行同。

此上文段準義應知。總是別解彼三頌訖也。下第二段今總解彼三頌意也。于中有三。初總。次別。后結。

論。此中意說至心心所法。

述曰。此總也。

論。謂心心所至依他起性。

述曰。此下別也　謂心心所。即自證分　及所變現。即相．見分。眾緣生故如幻事等。非有似有誑惑

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不如實地瞭解自己的心是虛妄的，就像幻術變出來的事物一樣。

論：就像幻術變出來的事物一樣，看起來好像存在，但實際上並不存在。

述記：這表明依他起性並非真實存在，用比喻來加以說明。例如，《大般若經》廣泛地闡述了它的各種相狀。《攝大乘論》中說：『如何無意義地成為所行境界？』爲了消除這個疑問，所以說了幻術的比喻。『如何無意義地使心和心所運轉？』為此說了陽焰的比喻。『如何無意義地有可愛和不可愛受用的差別？』為此說了夢境的比喻。『如何無意義地有清凈和不清凈業的可愛和不可愛果報的差別而產生？』為此說了映象的比喻。那裡說的是影像。『如何無意義地有種種識的運轉？』為此說了光影的比喻。『如何無意義地有種種言說戲論相的運轉？』為此說了谷響的比喻。『如何無意義地而有真實執取諸三摩地所行境的運轉？』為此說了水月的比喻。『如何無意義地有諸菩薩沒有顛倒心，爲了辨別有情眾生的各種利益安樂事故而思受生？』為此說了變化的比喻。世親和無性第五都廣泛地解釋了這些比喻，這裡就不詳細引用了。《中邊分別論》中也有八個比喻，比喻的是遍計所執性，可以參考那裡的抄會。這些比喻顯示了依他起性，它的體性並非真實存在，而是虛妄地存在，看起來好像是真實存在一樣。所以說依他起性並非真實存在，而是看起來好像存在。

論：依據這樣的意義，雖然存在，但並非真實。

述記：這是《厚嚴經》中的偈頌。雖然依他起性存在，但並非真實存在。要見到真如之後才能見到依他起性，與長行的意思相同。

以上文段按照意義應該理解。總是在分別解釋那三頌之後。下面第二段現在總的解釋那三頌的意義。其中有三個部分：首先是總說，其次是別說，最後是總結。

論：這裡的意思是說心和心所法。

述記：這是總說。

論：所謂心和心所，以及所變現的，都是依他起性。

述記：這下面是別說。所謂心和心所，就是自證分；以及所變現的，就是相分和見分。因為是眾緣所生，所以就像幻術變出來的事物一樣，並非真實存在，但看起來好像存在，迷惑眾生。

【English Translation】 English version: Not truly knowing one's own mind to be illusory, like things created by magic.

Treatise: Like things created by magic, they appear to exist but are not actually real.

Commentary: This shows that the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhava) is not truly existent, using metaphors to establish this. For example, the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra extensively explains its various aspects. The Mahayana-samgraha says: 'How does it become an object of experience without meaning?' To dispel this doubt, the metaphor of magic is given. 'How do mind and mental factors function without meaning?' For this, the metaphor of mirage (burning sensation) is given. 'How are there differences in enjoyable and unenjoyable experiences without meaning?' For this, the metaphor of dreams is given. 'How do pure and impure karmas produce different agreeable and disagreeable results without meaning?' For this, the metaphor of a mirror image is given. There, it speaks of images. 'How do various consciousnesses function without meaning?' For this, the metaphor of light and shadow is given. 'How do various verbal fabrications and playful appearances function without meaning?' For this, the metaphor of an echo is given. 'How is there a real grasping of the objects of experience in various samadhis without meaning?' For this, the metaphor of the moon in water is given. 'How do Bodhisattvas, without inverted minds, intentionally take rebirth for the sake of benefiting sentient beings without meaning?' For this, the metaphor of transformation is given. Vasubandhu and Asanga, the fifth, have both extensively explained these metaphors, so I will not quote them in detail here. The Madhyanta-vibhanga also has eight metaphors for the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava), as can be found in its commentaries. These metaphors illustrate the dependent nature, whose essence is not truly existent but falsely existent, appearing as if it were truly existent. Therefore, it is said that the dependent nature is not truly existent but appears to be so.

Treatise: According to this meaning, although it exists, it is not real.

Commentary: This is a verse from the Ghanavyuha Sutra. Although the dependent nature exists, it is not truly existent. One must see the true nature (tathata) before seeing the dependent nature, which is the same as the prose passage.

The above passage should be understood according to its meaning. It is always after separately explaining those three verses. The second section below now explains the meaning of those three verses in general. There are three parts: first, a general statement; second, a specific statement; and third, a conclusion.

Treatise: The meaning here is to speak of mind and mental factors (citta-caitta).

Commentary: This is the general statement.

Treatise: That is, mind and mental factors, as well as what is transformed, are of the dependent nature.

Commentary: Below is the specific statement. 'Mind and mental factors' refers to the self-cognition aspect (svasamvedana); 'and what is transformed' refers to the object-appearance aspect (nimitta-bhaga) and the seeing aspect (darsana-bhaga). Because they arise from various conditions, they are like things created by magic, not truly existent but appearing to be so, deceiving sentient beings.

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愚夫。愚夫等不了謂為實有。故名誑惑。名依他性。

論。愚夫於此至遍計所執。

述曰。於此依他。橫執我法或是有．或是無。或俱．或不俱。或是一．或是異。或俱．或不俱。或是實．或是不實。或俱．或不俱如是等。今此有．無一．異為首。俱．不俱通二處。等者等一切執。但執所執如空華等。若性若相無少是有。一切都無者名遍計所執。此遍計執亦依圓成而起。此中但言依依他者。以心相分影像是依他性。依此執為圓成實故。從實為言但說依他。又依他起是安足處。稍可言說。及擬宜故。但執依他。圓成不爾故不說也。實亦依執。如二乘無常．無我．無樂凈等。

論。依他起上至名圓成實。

述曰。于依他起彼所妄執我．法俱空。此空所顯識．及心所。一切相分等真性。名圓成實。

論。是故此三不離心等。

述曰。此總結也。故此三性不離心．心所．相分等。此即略解三性體相。上來第一廣解三性。第二略解三性訖。

論。虛空擇滅至何性攝耶。

述曰。下諸門釋。于中有二。初以十一門辨。后總指例。今別問答故成十一。于中子細諸門極多。此為第一。論中問意。如無漏有為具二義故。依他．圓成二性所攝。此擇滅等等取不動．想受滅等。有言無漏收

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 愚人。愚人執著于無法恒常存在的事物，認為它們是真實存在的。因此，這種狀態被稱為『誑惑』（kuáng huò，欺騙迷惑），而這種狀態所依賴的性質被稱為『依他性』（yī tā xìng，依存於其他條件而生起的性質）。

論：愚人因此而達到遍計所執性（biàn jì suǒ zhí xìng，由虛妄分別產生的執著）。

述記：對於這依他起性（yī tā qǐ xìng，依存於其他條件而生起的性質），橫生執著，認為『我』（wǒ，自我）和『法』（fǎ，事物）或者存在，或者不存在，或者既存在又不存在，或者既非存在也非不存在；或者是一，或者是異，或者既是一又是異，或者既非一也非異；或者是真實，或者是不真實，或者既是真實又是不真實，或者既非真實也非不真實等等。現在以存在、不存在、一、異為首要，既存在又不存在，既非存在也非不存在，這兩種情況貫通於兩處。『等』字包括一切執著。但所執著的事物如同空中的花朵等，無論是其性質還是其相狀，都沒有絲毫真實的存在，一切都是虛無的，這被稱為遍計所執性。這種遍計所執性也依存於圓成實性（yuán chéng shí xìng，圓滿成就的真實性質）而生起。這裡只說依存於依他起性，是因為心識的相分影像屬於依他性，依此執著為圓成實性。從真實的角度來說，只說依他起性。而且，依他起性是安身立命之處，稍微可以言說，也容易比擬，所以只執著于依他起性，圓成實性則不然，所以不說。實際上，圓成實性也依存於執著，比如二乘（èr shèng，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）所說的無常、無我、無樂、無凈等等。

論：依他起性向上達到圓成實性。

述記：在依他起性上，那些被虛妄執著的『我』和『法』都是空性的。這種空性所顯現的識（shí，意識）以及心所（xīn suǒ，心理活動），一切相分（xiàng fēn，現象的顯現）等等的真實本性，被稱為圓成實性。

論：因此，這三種性質不離心等等。

述記：這是總結。所以這三種性質不離心、心所、相分等等。這便是簡略地解釋了三種性質的體相。以上第一部分廣泛地解釋了三種性質，第二部分簡略地解釋了三種性質完畢。

論：虛空、擇滅（zé miè，通過智慧選擇而達到的寂滅狀態）等等屬於哪種性質所攝？

述記：以下用各種門類來解釋。其中分為兩個部分，首先用十一個門類來辨析，然後總括地指出例子。現在分別問答，所以形成十一個門類。其中細緻的門類極多。這是第一個門類。論中的意思是，如同無漏有為法（wú lòu yǒu wéi fǎ，沒有煩惱的有為法）具有兩種含義，所以被依他起性和圓成實性兩種性質所攝。這裡的擇滅等等，包括不動、想受滅等等。有人說無漏法都屬於圓成實性。

【English Translation】 English version The ignorant. The ignorant cling to what cannot be permanent as if it were real. Therefore, this state is called 'deception' (kuáng huò), and the nature upon which this state depends is called 'dependent nature' (yī tā xìng, the nature that arises dependent on other conditions).

Treatise: The ignorant therefore reach the 'completely conceptualized nature' (biàn jì suǒ zhí xìng, the clinging arising from false discrimination).

Commentary: Regarding this 'dependent arising' (yī tā qǐ xìng, the nature that arises dependent on other conditions), they falsely cling, believing that 'self' (wǒ) and 'dharmas' (fǎ, things) either exist, or do not exist, or both exist and do not exist, or neither exist nor do not exist; or are one, or are different, or are both one and different, or are neither one nor different; or are real, or are unreal, or are both real and unreal, or are neither real nor unreal, and so on. Now, existence, non-existence, oneness, and difference are the primary ones, and both existence and non-existence, and neither existence nor non-existence, apply to both cases. 'Etc.' includes all clingings. But the things clung to are like flowers in the sky, etc., whether their nature or their appearance, there is not the slightest reality, everything is empty, and this is called 'completely conceptualized nature'. This completely conceptualized nature also arises dependent on the 'perfected nature' (yuán chéng shí xìng, the perfected real nature). Here, it is only said to depend on 'dependent arising' because the image of the mind's appearance is of 'dependent nature', and clinging to this is the 'perfected nature'. From the perspective of reality, only 'dependent arising' is mentioned. Moreover, 'dependent arising' is a place to settle down, can be spoken of slightly, and is easy to compare, so only 'dependent arising' is clung to, while 'perfected nature' is not, so it is not mentioned. In fact, 'perfected nature' also depends on clinging, such as the impermanence, non-self, non-bliss, and non-purity, etc., spoken of by the Two Vehicles (èr shèng, Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna).

Treatise: 'Dependent arising' upwards reaches 'perfected nature'.

Commentary: On 'dependent arising', those falsely clung to 'self' and 'dharmas' are all empty. The true nature of the consciousness (shí) and mental activities (xīn suǒ), and all appearances (xiàng fēn), etc., revealed by this emptiness, is called 'perfected nature'.

Treatise: Therefore, these three natures are inseparable from mind, etc.

Commentary: This is a summary. Therefore, these three natures are inseparable from mind, mental activities, appearances, etc. This is a brief explanation of the substance and characteristics of the three natures. Above, the first part extensively explained the three natures, and the second part briefly explained the three natures, completed.

Treatise: Emptiness, 'cessation through discrimination' (zé miè, cessation attained through the wisdom of choice), etc., are included in which nature?

Commentary: Below, various categories are used to explain. Among them, it is divided into two parts, first using eleven categories to distinguish, and then comprehensively pointing out examples. Now, answering separately, so eleven categories are formed. Among them, there are extremely many detailed categories. This is the first category. The meaning in the treatise is that, like unconditioned conditioned dharmas (wú lòu yǒu wéi fǎ, conditioned dharmas without afflictions) have two meanings, so they are included in both 'dependent arising' and 'perfected nature'. The 'cessation through discrimination' here includes immobility, cessation of perception and sensation, etc. Some say that all unconditioned dharmas belong to 'perfected nature'.

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。有論亦言苦諦等攝。

此於三性何性攝耶。

論。三皆容攝。

述曰。此略總答。

論。心等變似至圓成實攝。

述曰。如論可知。即顯。諸論言無漏者。無漏心變。言苦諦等攝者。有漏心變。亦不相違既言苦等。心所變者。依他起攝。此唯定也。不多執空而感生死。略不說集。理亦集攝。不善心執。如勝論等。此說多分故苦諦收。

為顯此義因述上來所說依他義亦不定。故次論云。

論。有漏心等至圓成實。

述曰。有漏心等。及所變空等。定屬依他。以相．與見必同有漏．無漏性故。唯依他起。無漏心等。及所變空等。容二性攝。以有緣起無倒理故。即由二重三性體異。故攝不同。若說空等為無漏者。容二性攝。體不定故。苦諦等收。唯依他起。體即定故。此但分別有體假空等。非計所執。彼無體故。

論。如是三性至相攝云何。

述曰。第二七真如相攝。如解深密。及七十七。顯揚第三。中邊第二。佛地第七等。廣解真如有諸門釋。舊中邊說真如名分破真實。今新翻云差別真實。為七種者從能詮說。非真如體可名差別。論中初問。次答。此為問也。

下答中初出七體。后辨相攝。

論。七真如者至流轉實性。

述曰。一切

【現代漢語翻譯】 有論著也說苦諦等也包含在其中。

這在三種自性中屬於哪種自性所包含？

論：三種自性都可包含。

述記：這是簡略的總回答。

論：心等變現的相似相屬於圓成實性所包含。

述記：如論中所說可知。即是說，諸論中說的『無漏』，指的是無漏心的變現；說的『苦諦等所攝』，指的是有漏心的變現，兩者並不矛盾。既然說是苦等，心所變現的，就屬於依他起性所包含，這唯有是確定的。不多執著于空而感受生死，所以略去不說集諦，但理上也是集諦所包含的，因為是不善心的執著，如勝論等所說。這裡說的是大部分情況，所以歸於苦諦。爲了顯明這個道理，因為敘述上面所說的依他起義也不確定，所以接下來的論說：

論：有漏心等乃至圓成實性。

述記：有漏心等以及所變現的空等，必定屬於依他起性，因為相和見必定具有相同的有漏或無漏的性質。唯有依他起性。無漏心等以及所變現的空等，可以包含兩種自性，因為有緣起無顛倒的道理。即由於二重三性的體性不同，所以包含的情況也不同。如果說空等是無漏的，那麼可以包含兩種自性，因為體性不確定。苦諦等所包含的，唯有依他起性，因為體性是確定的。這裡只是分別有體性的假空等，不是遍計所執性，因為遍計所執性沒有體性。

論：像這樣三種自性，相互包含的情況是怎樣的？

述記：第二部分是關於七種真如的相互包含。如《解深密經》以及第七十七卷，《顯揚聖教論》第三卷，《中邊分別論》第二卷，《佛地經論》第七卷等，廣泛地解釋了真如的各種門類。舊譯的《中邊分別論》說真如名為分破真實，現在的新譯本說為差別真實。說為七種，是從能詮釋的角度說的，不是說真如的體性可以名為差別。論中先問，后答，這裡是提問。

下面的回答中，先列出七種體性，然後辨別相互包含的情況。

論：七種真如是：一切……流轉實性。

述記：一切……

【English Translation】 Some treatises also state that the Truth of Suffering (苦諦, Dukkha-satya) and others are included.

Which of the three natures does this include?

Treatise: All three can be included.

Commentary: This is a brief general answer.

Treatise: The mind and its transformations that appear similar belong to the Perfectly Accomplished Nature (圓成實性, Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva).

Commentary: As can be known from the treatise. That is to say, when the treatises speak of 'untainted' (無漏, anāsrava), they refer to the transformations of the untainted mind. When they speak of 'included in the Truth of Suffering, etc.', they refer to the transformations of the tainted mind, and there is no contradiction between the two. Since it is said to be suffering, etc., and transformed by the mental factors, it belongs to the Dependent Nature (依他起性, Paratantra-svabhāva), and this is certain. Not much attachment to emptiness leads to the experience of birth and death, so the Truth of Accumulation (集諦, Samudaya-satya) is omitted, but in principle, it is also included in the Truth of Accumulation, because it is the attachment of the unwholesome mind, as stated in the Vaiśeṣika school and others. This speaks of the majority of cases, so it is categorized under the Truth of Suffering. To clarify this meaning, because the previously mentioned definition of the Dependent Nature is also uncertain, the following treatise states:

Treatise: Tainted mind, etc., up to the Perfectly Accomplished Nature.

Commentary: Tainted mind, etc., and the emptiness, etc., that it transforms, definitely belong to the Dependent Nature, because the characteristics and perceptions must have the same tainted or untainted nature. Only the Dependent Nature. Untainted mind, etc., and the emptiness, etc., that it transforms, can include two natures, because there is the principle of conditioned arising without inversion. That is, due to the difference in the nature of the twofold three natures, the inclusion is different. If emptiness, etc., is said to be untainted, then it can include two natures, because the nature is uncertain. What is included in the Truth of Suffering, etc., is only the Dependent Nature, because the nature is certain. This only distinguishes between the emptiness, etc., that has substance, not the Imagined Nature (遍計所執性, Parikalpita-svabhāva), because the Imagined Nature has no substance.

Treatise: In this way, what is the relationship of mutual inclusion between the three natures?

Commentary: The second part is about the mutual inclusion of the seven kinds of Suchness (真如, tathatā). As in the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra and the seventy-seventh chapter, the third chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the second chapter of the Madhyāntavibhāga, the seventh chapter of the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra Śāstra, etc., which extensively explain the various aspects of Suchness. The old translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga says that Suchness is named 'division and destruction of reality', while the new translation says 'differentiated reality'. Saying that there are seven kinds is from the perspective of the expresser, not that the nature of Suchness can be named as differentiated. The treatise first asks, then answers; this is the question.

In the following answer, first the seven natures are listed, and then the mutual inclusion is distinguished.

Treatise: The seven kinds of Suchness are: all... the nature of flowing reality.

Commentary: All...

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有為法生滅性。性即真如。約詮名生滅。言性即彼如。約詮為言。下準當知。舊中邊名生起真實。新翻不同。以下準知。七十七．顯揚等。解唯緣起法如。此中通言一切有為法。彼據內法根本流轉唯言緣起。此中通說一切法體。亦不相違。

論。二實相真如至所顯實性。

述曰。因二空門所顯如性。七十七說。即我法性。我法性言我法之性非即我法。我法無故。顯揚．中邊亦同於此。以下同處更不引之。下準應知。舊中邊名相真實。

論。三唯識真如至唯識實性。

述曰。顯揚云。心染眾生染。心凈眾生凈。見識真如便能知此染凈心等。約詮即依他。據理即真如。七十七名了別真如。識了別也。

論。四安立真如至謂道實性。

述曰。下四是四聖諦。舊中邊云。依處．邪行．清凈．正行真實名異。今新翻名。體與此同。諸文無異。此約詮門義別說七。廢詮談體即唯一如。七十七云。由流轉．安立．邪行三真如故。一切有情平等平等。此約除佛餘名有情故。前第三云佛非有情。故不言佛無苦．集故。顯揚又說無始流轉實性。即是緣生故流轉如。亦非佛有。又設一切有為皆是流轉。然佛法身體離生滅亦無流轉。又流轉如雖通有為法。唯約有漏故佛言無。由實相．了別二如故。一切諸

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有為法（saṃskṛta dharma）的生滅性，其本性即是真如（tathatā）。從詮釋的角度來說，稱之為生滅；說到本性，那就是真如。從詮釋的角度來說，以下可以類推得知。舊譯《中邊分別論》中稱為『生起真實』，新譯不同，以下可以類推得知。《顯揚聖教論》等解釋說，只是緣起法（pratītyasamutpāda）如。這裡總說一切有為法，彼論根據內在法的根本流轉，只說緣起。這裡總說一切法的本體，也不互相違背。

論：二、實相真如（bhūtatathatā）至所顯實性。

述記：因二空門（dvaya-śūnyatā）所顯示的如性，《攝大乘論釋》第七十七卷說，即是我法性（ātma-dharma-tathatā）。我法性是指我法的本性，並非就是我法，因為我法本空。 《顯揚聖教論》、《中邊分別論》也與此相同，以下相同之處不再引用，可以類推得知。舊譯《中邊分別論》中稱為『相真實』。

論：三、唯識真如（vijñapti-mātratā-tathatā）至唯識實性。

述記：《顯揚聖教論》說：『心染則眾生染，心凈則眾生凈。』見到識的真如，便能知曉這染凈心等。從詮釋的角度來說，就是依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva）；從理體的角度來說，就是真如。 《攝大乘論釋》第七十七卷中稱為『了別真如』，識具有了別的作用。

論：四、安立真如（sthāpana-tathatā）至謂道實性。

述記：下面四種真如是四聖諦（ārya-satya）。舊譯《中邊分別論》中，依處、邪行、清凈、正行真實，名稱不同。現在的新譯名稱，體性與此相同，諸經文沒有差異。這是從詮釋的角度，義理上分別說了七種真如；如果廢棄詮釋，談論本體，那就是唯一的真如。《攝大乘論釋》第七十七卷說：由於流轉、安立、邪行三種真如的緣故，一切有情（sattva）平等平等。這是因為除了佛以外，其餘都稱為有情。前面第三卷說佛不是有情，所以不說佛沒有苦、集。 《顯揚聖教論》又說了無始流轉實性，也就是緣生，所以是流轉如，也不是佛所具有的。即使一切有為法都是流轉，然而佛的法身本體遠離生滅，也沒有流轉。而且流轉如雖然通於有為法，但只是針對有漏法（sāsrava dharma）而言，所以佛說沒有。由於實相、了別二種真如的緣故，一切諸法……

【English Translation】 English version: The arising and ceasing nature of conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta dharma) is, in its essence, Suchness (tathatā). From the perspective of explanation, it is called arising and ceasing; speaking of its nature, it is Thatness. From the perspective of explanation, what follows can be understood analogously. The old translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga calls it 'the reality of arising'; the new translation differs. What follows can be understood analogously. The Śūnyatāsaptati etc., explain it as only the Suchness of dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda). Here, it speaks generally of all conditioned dharmas; that text, based on the fundamental flow of internal dharmas, speaks only of dependent origination. Here, it speaks generally of the substance of all dharmas, and there is no contradiction.

Treatise: Two, Suchness of Reality (bhūtatathatā) to the reality revealed.

Commentary: The Suchness revealed by the two emptinesses (dvaya-śūnyatā), the seventy-seventh [chapter] says, is the Suchness of self and dharmas (ātma-dharma-tathatā). The Suchness of self and dharmas refers to the nature of self and dharmas, not that it is self and dharmas, because self and dharmas are empty. The Śūnyatāsaptati and Madhyāntavibhāga are also the same as this; the same places below will not be cited again, and it should be understood analogously. The old translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga calls it 'the reality of characteristics'.

Treatise: Three, Suchness of Consciousness-Only (vijñapti-mātratā-tathatā) to the reality of Consciousness-Only.

Commentary: The Śūnyatāsaptati says: 'When the mind is defiled, sentient beings are defiled; when the mind is pure, sentient beings are pure.' Seeing the Suchness of consciousness, one can know this defiled and pure mind, etc. From the perspective of explanation, it is dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva); according to principle, it is Suchness. The seventy-seventh [chapter] calls it 'discriminating Suchness'; consciousness has the function of discrimination.

Treatise: Four, Established Suchness (sthāpana-tathatā) to the reality of the path.

Commentary: The following four are the Four Noble Truths (ārya-satya). The old translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga says that the reality of the basis, wrong practice, purity, and right practice have different names. The new translation names are the same in substance as this, and there is no difference in the texts. This is from the perspective of explanation, and seven kinds of Suchness are spoken of separately in terms of meaning; if explanation is abandoned and the substance is discussed, then it is the one and only Suchness. The seventy-seventh [chapter] says: Because of the three Suchnesses of flowing, establishment, and wrong practice, all sentient beings (sattva) are equal and equal. This is because, except for the Buddha, the rest are called sentient beings. The third [chapter] above says that the Buddha is not a sentient being, so it is not said that the Buddha has no suffering or accumulation. The Śūnyatāsaptati also speaks of the reality of beginningless flowing, which is dependent arising, so it is the Suchness of flowing, which the Buddha does not have. Even if all conditioned dharmas are flowing, the Buddha's Dharma-body is free from arising and ceasing and has no flowing. Moreover, although the Suchness of flowing applies to conditioned dharmas, it only applies to defiled dharmas (sāsrava dharma), so the Buddha says there is none. Because of the two Suchnesses of reality and discrimination, all dharmas...

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法平等平等。一切諸法皆無我．法皆唯識故。由清凈真如故。三乘菩提平等平等。此約滅諦。三乘皆得有餘．無餘二涅槃故。勝鬘經云。聲聞不得涅槃者依別意說。下自當知。以所證涅槃說能證菩提平等。或菩提性境亦名菩提。即舊云智處也。由正行真如故。聽聞正法緣總境界。勝止．觀所攝受平等平等。由有此如方能聽聞正法等故。此如若廢詮談體性。一一皆具無不平等。若談體約詮故此四種道理平等。此中復約二乘行位。證時分齊等。皆如理知。

論。此七實性至二智境故。

述曰。既出體已。次相攝者。七皆圓成攝。二智境故。謂實相．唯識．清凈三如根本智境。餘四真如后得緣故。此約增上。若談如體。一即七如皆根本智境。約詮為論七皆后得境。就約詮顯體三．四境別。顯揚十六說與此同。

論。隨相攝者至妄執雜染故。

述曰。中邊云此三二性攝。所以者何。若妄所執三。皆遍計所執攝。若約詮雜染三。皆依他收。遍計執心唯染依他故。三如之相染依他故。三如之相體雜染攝非圓成實。

論。餘四皆是圓成實攝。

述曰。亦約詮無漏故。中邊云此唯聖境。聖智所顯故　問何故唯識非前二性。正行一種不通依他　答遍計所執多不執唯識。依他起性少能知唯識。故非前

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：法平等，平等。（Dharma is equal, equal.）一切諸法皆無我，因為法皆是唯識的緣故。（All dharmas are without self, because all dharmas are only consciousness.）由於清凈真如的緣故，三乘菩提平等，平等。（Because of pure Suchness, the Bodhi of the Three Vehicles is equal, equal.）這是就滅諦而言。（This is in terms of the cessation of suffering.）三乘皆得有餘涅槃和無餘涅槃的緣故。（The Three Vehicles all attain the Nirvana with remainder and Nirvana without remainder.）《勝鬘經》（Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra）說，聲聞不得涅槃是依別意而說，下文自會明白。（The Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra says that the Śrāvakas do not attain Nirvana is said with a specific intention, which will be understood later.）以所證涅槃說能證菩提平等，或菩提性境也名為菩提，即舊譯所說的智處。（The Nirvana attained is said to be equal to the Bodhi that can be attained, or the realm of Bodhi-nature is also called Bodhi, which is what the old translation calls the realm of wisdom.）由於正行真如的緣故，聽聞正法緣總境界，勝止觀所攝受平等，平等。（Because of the Suchness of right practice, listening to the right Dharma is the total realm of conditions, and the superior calming and insight are equally received.）由於有此真如，才能聽聞正法等。（Because there is this Suchness, one can hear the right Dharma, etc.）此真如若廢詮談體性，一一皆具無不平等。（If this Suchness abandons the explanation and discusses the essence, each one possesses it and is equally without exception.）若談體約詮故，這四種道理平等。（If the essence is discussed in terms of explanation, these four kinds of principles are equal.）這裡又就二乘的行位、證悟時分等，都如理了知。（Here, it also refers to the stages of practice and the time of realization of the Two Vehicles, etc., which are all understood according to reason. 論：此七實性至二智境故。（Treatise: These seven realities reach the realm of two wisdoms.） 述曰：既然已經闡述了體性，接下來是相互包含，七者都為圓成實所攝，因為是二智的境界。（Commentary: Now that the essence has been explained, the next is mutual inclusion. All seven are included in the perfectly accomplished reality, because they are the realm of the two wisdoms.）實相、唯識、清凈這三種真如是根本智的境界，其餘四種真如是后得智所緣的緣故。（The three Suchnesses of reality, only consciousness, and purity are the realm of fundamental wisdom, and the remaining four Suchnesses are the conditions of subsequent wisdom.）這是就增上而言。（This is in terms of enhancement.）如果談論真如的體性，一即是七，都是根本智的境界。（If the essence of Suchness is discussed, one is seven, and all are the realm of fundamental wisdom.）就詮釋而言，七者都是后得智的境界。（In terms of explanation, all seven are the realm of subsequent wisdom.）就約詮顯體而言，三者和四者的境界有區別。（In terms of explaining the essence through explanation, the realms of the three and the four are different.）《顯揚聖教論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）的十六種說法與此相同。（The sixteen sayings in the Abhidharmasamuccaya are the same as this. 論：隨相攝者至妄執雜染故。（Treatise: Those included according to characteristics are due to deluded attachment and defilement.） 述曰：《中邊分別論》（Madhyāntavibhāga）說，這三種二性所攝，為什麼呢？（Commentary: The Madhyāntavibhāga says that these three are included in the two natures. Why?）如果就妄所執而言，三者都為遍計所執所攝。（If it is in terms of what is falsely grasped, all three are included in the conceptual nature.）如果就詮釋雜染而言，三者都為依他起性所收。（If it is in terms of explaining defilement, all three are included in the dependent nature.）遍計執心唯染依他故。（The conceptual mind only defiles the dependent nature.）三如之相染依他故。（The characteristics of the three Suchnesses defile the dependent nature.）三如之相體雜染攝，不是圓成實。（The essence of the characteristics of the three Suchnesses is included in defilement and is not the perfectly accomplished reality. 論：餘四皆是圓成實攝。（Treatise: The remaining four are all included in the perfectly accomplished reality.） 述曰：也是就詮釋無漏而言。（Commentary: It is also in terms of explaining the unconditioned.）《中邊分別論》（Madhyāntavibhāga）說，這唯是聖境，是聖智所顯現的緣故。（The Madhyāntavibhāga says that this is only the realm of the noble ones, because it is manifested by the noble wisdom.）問：為什麼唯識不是前二性？正行一種不通依他？（Question: Why is only consciousness not the first two natures? The one of right practice does not communicate with the dependent nature?）答：遍計所執多不執唯識，依他起性少能知唯識，故非前。（Answer: The conceptually grasped mostly does not grasp only consciousness, and the dependent nature rarely knows only consciousness, so it is not the former.）

【English Translation】 English version: Dharma is equal, equal. All dharmas are without self, because all dharmas are only consciousness. Because of pure Suchness, the Bodhi of the Three Vehicles is equal, equal. This is in terms of the cessation of suffering. The Three Vehicles all attain the Nirvana with remainder and Nirvana without remainder. The 'Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra' says that the Śrāvakas do not attain Nirvana is said with a specific intention, which will be understood later. The Nirvana attained is said to be equal to the Bodhi that can be attained, or the realm of Bodhi-nature is also called Bodhi, which is what the old translation calls the realm of wisdom. Because of the Suchness of right practice, listening to the right Dharma is the total realm of conditions, and the superior calming and insight are equally received. Because there is this Suchness, one can hear the right Dharma, etc. If this Suchness abandons the explanation and discusses the essence, each one possesses it and is equally without exception. If the essence is discussed in terms of explanation, these four kinds of principles are equal. Here, it also refers to the stages of practice and the time of realization of the Two Vehicles, etc., which are all understood according to reason. Treatise: These seven realities reach the realm of two wisdoms. Commentary: Now that the essence has been explained, the next is mutual inclusion. All seven are included in the perfectly accomplished reality, because they are the realm of the two wisdoms. The three Suchnesses of reality, only consciousness, and purity are the realm of fundamental wisdom, and the remaining four Suchnesses are the conditions of subsequent wisdom. This is in terms of enhancement. If the essence of Suchness is discussed, one is seven, and all are the realm of fundamental wisdom. In terms of explanation, all seven are the realm of subsequent wisdom. In terms of explaining the essence through explanation, the realms of the three and the four are different. The sixteen sayings in the 'Abhidharmasamuccaya' are the same as this. Treatise: Those included according to characteristics are due to deluded attachment and defilement. Commentary: The 'Madhyāntavibhāga' says that these three are included in the two natures. Why? If it is in terms of what is falsely grasped, all three are included in the conceptual nature. If it is in terms of explaining defilement, all three are included in the dependent nature. The conceptual mind only defiles the dependent nature. The characteristics of the three Suchnesses defile the dependent nature. The essence of the characteristics of the three Suchnesses is included in defilement and is not the perfectly accomplished reality. Treatise: The remaining four are all included in the perfectly accomplished reality. Commentary: It is also in terms of explaining the unconditioned. The 'Madhyāntavibhāga' says that this is only the realm of the noble ones, because it is manifested by the noble wisdom. Question: Why is only consciousness not the first two natures? The one of right practice does not communicate with the dependent nature? Answer: The conceptually grasped mostly does not grasp only consciousness, and the dependent nature rarely knows only consciousness, so it is not the former.

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二攝。正行約離過義。不言通依他。據實而言。前通前二性。此後通依他。亦無過失。又七皆三性于理不違。所執．心變．如體異故。論中既約隨相而言。亦無過失。

論。三性六法相攝云何。

述曰。三性．六法相攝門。此為問也。

論。彼六法中至緣生理故。

述曰。六法如文。瑜伽第三有此六法。然無相攝。皆具三性者。並可妄所執皆遍計所執。無為所執者有展轉義。如前已說。皆緣生故依他起攝。無為亦心緣變故。如理應知。六法皆有妄執．緣生之道理。理即真如。亦圓成實。此約通義。辨中邊云。色家所執性。色依他性。色圓成性亦名為色故各通三性。若別談者。前五通二性。依他起法通有無漏故。后一唯成實。非生滅故。此除假無為。假無為如前通三性。或通說假亦唯圓成。如上假故。此辨有法。非計所執。

四五事相攝門。有二五事如別抄解。

論。三性五事相攝云何。

述曰。初問可知。

論。諸聖教說相攝不定。

述曰。此總答彼相攝不定。

論。謂或有處至不攝五事。

述曰。初是瑜伽七十四．顯揚第六．及第十六說。前四依他。后一圓成實。三無性論第一卷。佛性論第二卷並同此說。然非此所引。不依彼故　五事。相．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 二攝（兩種收攝）。正行（正確的行為）就遠離過失的意義而言，不涉及通於依他起性（緣起而有的性質）。就實際情況而言，前一種（遍計所執性）通於前兩種性質（遍計所執性和依他起性），后一種（圓成實性）通於依他起性，也沒有過失。又，七種（七識）都具有三種性質，在道理上沒有違背，因為所執著的、心識變現的、如如之體是不同的。論中既然是就隨順現象而言，也沒有過失。

論：三種性質和六種法相如何相互收攝？

述記：三種性質和六種法相相互收攝的門類，這是提問。

論：在六種法中……乃至緣起而生。

述記：六種法如經文所說。《瑜伽師地論》第三卷有這六種法，然而沒有說到相互收攝。都具有三種性質，都可以說妄想所執著的是遍計所執性，無為法所執著的有展轉的意義，如前面已經說過。都是緣起而生的，所以被依他起性所收攝。無為法也是心識緣慮變現的，應該如理了解。六種法都有妄想執著、緣起而生的道理。理就是真如，也是圓成實性。這是就通義而言。《辨中邊論》說：『色法家所執著的性質，色法的依他起性，色法的圓成實性』，也名為色法，所以各自通於三種性質。如果分別來說，前五種通於兩種性質（遍計所執性和依他起性），依他起法通於有漏和無漏，后一種（真如）唯是圓成實性，因為不是生滅法。這裡排除了假無為，假無為如前面所說通於三種性質，或者通說假無為也唯是圓成實性，如上面的假法。這裡辨析有法，不是遍計所執性。

四、五事相攝門。有兩種五事，如另外的抄本所解釋。

論：三種性質和五種事如何相互收攝？

述記：最初的提問可以知道。

論：諸聖教所說的相互收攝是不定的。

述記：這裡總的回答他們相互收攝是不定的。

論：所謂或者有的地方……不收攝五事。

述記：最初是《瑜伽師地論》第七十四卷、《顯揚聖教論》第六卷及第十六卷所說。前四種是依他起性，后一種是圓成實性。《三無性論》第一卷、《佛性論》第二卷也同樣這樣說。然而不是這裡所引用的，因為不依據它們。五事，相（lakṣaṇa）……

【English Translation】 English version: Twofold collection (dve samgraha). Right conduct (samyak-pratipatti) is defined in terms of abandoning faults, without explicitly referring to dependence on others (paratantra-svabhāva). In reality, the former (parikalpita-svabhāva) encompasses the first two natures (parikalpita-svabhāva and paratantra-svabhāva), while the latter (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva) encompasses dependence on others (paratantra-svabhāva), without any contradiction. Furthermore, all seven (seven consciousnesses) possess the three natures without logical inconsistency, because what is grasped, what is transformed by consciousness, and the nature of Suchness (tathatā) are different. Since the treatise speaks in terms of following appearances, there is no fault.

Treatise: How do the three natures and six dharmas mutually encompass each other?

Commentary: This is a question about the category of mutual encompassment between the three natures and six dharmas.

Treatise: Among these six dharmas... up to arising from conditions.

Commentary: The six dharmas are as stated in the text. The third chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra contains these six dharmas, but does not mention their mutual encompassment. All possess the three natures; it can be said that what is grasped by delusion is the completely imputed nature (parikalpita-svabhāva). What is grasped by the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) has a sense of transformation, as previously explained. All arise from conditions, and are therefore encompassed by the dependently arisen nature (paratantra-svabhāva). The unconditioned is also transformed by the mind's contemplation, as should be understood according to reason. All six dharmas have the principles of delusional grasping and arising from conditions. Principle (tattva) is thus Suchness (tathatā), which is also the perfectly accomplished nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). This is in terms of the general meaning. The Madhyāntavibhāga states: 'The nature grasped by the color aggregate, the dependently arisen nature of the color aggregate, the perfectly accomplished nature of the color aggregate,' are also called the color aggregate, so each encompasses the three natures. If discussed separately, the first five encompass two natures (parikalpita-svabhāva and paratantra-svabhāva), the dependently arisen dharma encompasses both defiled (sāsrava) and undefiled (anāsrava), and the last one (Suchness) is only the perfectly accomplished nature, because it is not subject to arising and ceasing. This excludes the imputed unconditioned (prajñapti-asaṃskṛta); the imputed unconditioned, as previously stated, encompasses the three natures, or generally speaking, the imputed is also only the perfectly accomplished nature, like the imputed above. This distinguishes existent dharmas (bhāva-dharma), not the completely imputed.

Four, the category of mutual encompassment of the five matters. There are two sets of five matters, as explained in separate commentaries.

Treatise: How do the three natures and five matters mutually encompass each other?

Commentary: The initial question is understandable.

Treatise: The mutual encompassment spoken of in the various holy teachings is not fixed.

Commentary: This is a general answer that their mutual encompassment is not fixed.

Treatise: That is, in some places... do not encompass the five matters.

Commentary: Initially, it is stated in the seventy-fourth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the sixth and sixteenth chapters of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. The first four are the dependently arisen nature, and the last one is the perfectly accomplished nature. The first chapter of the Trisvabhāva-nirdeśa and the second chapter of the Buddhatā-sūtra say the same. However, it is not cited here, because it does not rely on them. Five matters, characteristic (lakṣaṇa)...

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名．分別．正智．真如。如七十三四等廣解。

論。彼說有漏至皆依他起。

述曰。逐難會也。彼瑜伽等說。有漏心等所變分二。能變為一。能所詮異故。余文可解。有漏有戲論有能所詮。起名．相等故。無漏不爾。此辨有體五事不攝初性。七十四云。問若依他起亦正智攝。何故但說依他緣計所執自性執應知。答彼唯說染分依他非凈分者。若凈分者亦緣無執。許通二性。餘二性易故略不說。

論。或復有處至圓成實攝。

述曰。舊中邊上卷。新第二說。彼有頌文不能煩引。下皆準知。

論。彼說有漏至圓成實攝。

述曰。約見相門。不約詮門。前約詮門。今依見．相。設能詮名亦相中攝。見分相故。余自證．見分等名分別。能緣性故。此二緣生依他起攝。所執都無。為顯非有假說彼性為五法名。謂但有名無實體故。真如．正智二皆無倒。體無漏故。能緣．所緣俱斷漏故。圓成實攝。前依緣生故攝正智。約別義說。故與瑜伽不相違也。

論。或有處說至圓成實攝。

述曰。十卷楞伽第七五法品說。今勘梵本正與此同。然四卷楞伽文勝。十卷者亂。如文易解。無勞重釋。

論。彼說有漏至名相二事。

述曰。余文可知。唯遍計所執相．名二事者。即隨能計

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 名（名稱，概念）。分別（區分，辨別）。正智（正確的智慧）。真如（事物的真實本性）。如七十三、七十四等處有廣泛解釋。

論：他們說有漏法（指有煩惱的法）都依他起（依賴其他條件而生起）。

述曰：這是爲了解釋之前的難題。瑜伽行派等學派說，有漏心等所變現的分為兩部分：能變（能認識的主體）和所變（被認識的客體）。能詮（能表達的）和所詮（被表達的）是不同的。其餘的文字可以理解。有漏法有戲論，有能詮和所詮，因此產生名（名稱）、相等（表象）。無漏法不是這樣。這裡辨析有體的五事（名、相、分別、正智、真如）不包括初性（指自性）。第七十四卷說：『問：如果依他起也屬於正智所攝，為什麼只說依他緣起、遍計所執、自性執應該知道？』答：『他們只說了染分（不清凈的部分）的依他起，而不是凈分（清凈的部分）。如果是凈分，也緣于無執，允許通於二性（依他起性和圓成實性）。』其餘二性（遍計所執性和圓成實性）容易理解，所以略去不說。

論：或者在有些地方說，（正智和真如）屬於圓成實性所攝。

述曰：這是舊《中邊分別論》上卷和新譯本第二卷所說的。那裡有頌文，這裡不方便引用，下面的情況都可以類推得知。

論：他們說有漏法屬於圓成實性所攝。

述曰：這是從見相門（能見和所見的角度）來說的，不是從詮門（能表達和所表達的角度）來說的。前面是從詮門來說的，現在是依據見相。假設能詮的名也屬於相中，因為是見分相的緣故。其餘的自證分、見分等名是分別，因為是能緣性的緣故。這二者（見分和相分）緣生，屬於依他起性所攝。遍計所執性完全沒有，爲了顯示它並非真實存在，假說它的自性為五法名，意思是說只有名稱而沒有實體。真如和正智二者都是沒有顛倒的，因為體是無漏的緣故。能緣和所緣都斷除了煩惱，所以屬於圓成實性所攝。前面依據緣生，所以正智屬於依他起性。這是從不同的意義上說的，所以與《瑜伽師地論》不相違背。

論：或者在有些地方說，（五法）屬於圓成實性所攝。

述曰：這是十卷本《楞伽經》第七五法品所說的。現在勘對梵文字，與這裡相同。然而四卷本《楞伽經》的文字更好，十卷本的比較混亂。文義容易理解，不需要重複解釋。

論：他們說有漏法屬於名相二事。

述曰：其餘的文字可以理解。只有遍計所執的相和名二事，是隨著能計度而產生的。

【English Translation】 English version Name (designation, concept). Discrimination (distinction, differentiation). Correct Wisdom (right knowledge). Suchness (the true nature of things). As explained extensively in sections seventy-three, seventy-four, etc.

Treatise: They say that all conditioned dharmas (dharmas with afflictions) arise dependently (arise relying on other conditions).

Commentary: This is to resolve the previous difficulty. The Yogacara school and others say that the transformations of conditioned minds, etc., are divided into two parts: the transformer (the subject that cognizes) and the transformed (the object that is cognized). The expresser (that which expresses) and the expressed (that which is expressed) are different. The remaining text can be understood. Conditioned dharmas have play of concepts, have expresser and expressed, therefore producing name (designation), and appearance (form). Unconditioned dharmas are not like this. Here, the five things with substance (name, appearance, discrimination, correct wisdom, suchness) are distinguished as not including the initial nature (referring to self-nature). Volume seventy-four says: 'Question: If dependent arising is also included in correct wisdom, why only say that dependent origination, conceptual construction, and self-nature attachment should be known?' Answer: 'They only spoke of the defiled part of dependent arising, not the pure part. If it is the pure part, it also arises from non-attachment, allowing it to be connected to two natures (dependent arising and perfectly accomplished nature).' The other two natures (conceptual construction and perfectly accomplished nature) are easy to understand, so they are omitted.

Treatise: Or in some places it is said that (Correct Wisdom and Suchness) are included in the Perfectly Accomplished Nature.

Commentary: This is what the old upper volume of the Madhyantavibhaga and the new translation's second volume say. There are verses there, which are not convenient to quote here; the following situations can be understood by analogy.

Treatise: They say that conditioned dharmas are included in the Perfectly Accomplished Nature.

Commentary: This is from the perspective of the seeing and appearance aspects (the seer and the seen), not from the perspective of the expressing aspect (the expresser and the expressed). The previous was from the perspective of the expressing aspect, now it is based on seeing and appearance. Suppose the name of the expresser is also included in the appearance, because it is the aspect of the seeing faculty. The remaining names of self-cognition, seeing faculty, etc., are discrimination, because they are the nature of the cognizer. These two (seeing faculty and appearance faculty) arise dependently, and are included in the Dependent Arising Nature. The Conceptual Construction Nature is completely non-existent; to show that it is not truly existent, it is falsely said that its nature is the five dharma names, meaning that there are only names and no substance. Suchness and Correct Wisdom are both without inversion, because the substance is unconditioned. The cognizer and the cognized have both cut off afflictions, so they are included in the Perfectly Accomplished Nature. Previously, based on dependent arising, Correct Wisdom was included in the Dependent Arising Nature. This is said from a different meaning, so it does not contradict the Yogacarabhumi-sastra.

Treatise: Or in some places it is said that (the five dharmas) are included in the Perfectly Accomplished Nature.

Commentary: This is what the seventh chapter, the Five Dharmas chapter, of the ten-volume Lankavatara Sutra says. Now, comparing it with the Sanskrit version, it is the same as here. However, the text of the four-volume Lankavatara Sutra is better, the ten-volume one is more chaotic. The meaning of the text is easy to understand, so there is no need to repeat the explanation.

Treatise: They say that conditioned dharmas belong to the two things of name and appearance.

Commentary: The remaining text can be understood. Only the appearance and name of Conceptual Construction are produced following the conceptualizer.

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依他之心。假立所執而為相．名。由多依名而計于義。依義計名體實都無。實非名．相。七十六說初所執性依于相．名。文同於此。二成實攝正與前同。故論不釋。

論。復有處說至遍計所執。

述曰。世親攝論第五卷文。彼釋。名．義若體相稱即成相違。此中安立名為依他起。義為遍計所執。此意。名者五法中名。義者即相。及分別。名所詮故。能所取故。與彼五法相攝有異。故對舉之。

論。彼說有漏至故說為名。

述曰。等者。等自證分．證自證分。此是依他起性心．心所法。由名能詮勢分力故。隨能詮名緣之起執成所遍計。故說依他是名所攝。所遍計言非計所執。所執之依故依他起。彼世親云。以依他起由名勢力成所遍計故。正與此同。不言圓成者。此體與名極疏遠故。

論。遍計所執至假立義名。

述曰。遍計所執隨於此名橫計于義為實有體。此非實有。於此非有中假名為義者。于非義中假立義稱。謂此但有所執之義。無隨依他之名故也。顯圓成實離名離義。不可為名之所依故成所遍計說之為名。不可隨名執此為實有假立為義故。俱非二攝。楞伽．中邊所說五法。或通有．無。或體實有。遍計所執假亦通有。瑜伽等不然。顯揚十六說。計所執無。五不攝故。即五法體

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 依他之心（依賴於其他條件的心）。虛假地建立所執著的相（現象）和名（名稱）。由於多數依賴於名稱而對意義產生計度，依賴於意義而對名稱產生計度，其本體實際上都不存在。實際上並非名和相。第七十六說中，最初所執著的自性依賴於相和名，文句與此相同。第二，成實宗所攝的正義與前面相同，所以本論不再解釋。

論：又有經文說到了遍計所執。

述記：世親菩薩的《攝大乘論》第五卷中有這樣的文句。他的解釋是：名和義如果本體和現象相稱，就會形成矛盾。這裡安立名稱為依他起（依賴於其他條件而生起），意義為遍計所執（普遍計度而執著）。這個意思是，名稱是五法（名、相、分別、正智、如如）中的名稱，意義就是相和分別，因為名稱所詮釋的是意義，能取的是意義，所以與那五法相互攝持有所不同，因此相對舉出。

論：經文說有漏法等，所以說為名。

述記：等，包括自證分和證自證分。這些是依他起性的心和心所法。由於名稱能夠詮釋其勢力的緣故，隨著能詮釋的名稱，緣起執著，形成所遍計。所以說依他起是被名稱所攝持的。所遍計，不是計所執，而是所執著的所依賴，所以是依他起。世親菩薩說，因為依他起由名稱的勢力而成為所遍計。這與這裡的意思相同。不提圓成實（圓滿成就的真實），是因為它的本體與名稱極其疏遠。

論：遍計所執，隨於此名，橫計于義。

述記：遍計所執，隨著這個名稱，橫加計度意義，認為是真實存在的本體。這並非真實存在。在這非真實存在中，虛假地稱名為義，即在非意義中虛假地建立意義的稱謂。意思是，這裡只有所執著的意義，沒有隨順依他的名稱。顯示圓成實遠離名稱和意義，不能被名稱所依賴，所以成為所遍計，說之為名稱。不能隨著名稱執著這個為真實存在，虛假地建立為意義，所以兩者都不是二者所攝持。《楞伽經》、《中邊分別論》所說的五法，或者通於有和無，或者本體是真實存在的。遍計所執的假，也通於有。瑜伽等不是這樣。顯揚聖教論第十六說，計所執是無，因為五法不攝持它，即五法的本體。

【English Translation】 English version: The mind that depends on others (依他之心). Falsely establishing what is grasped as phenomena (相) and names (名). Because most rely on names to conceptualize meanings, and rely on meanings to conceptualize names, their substance is actually non-existent. In reality, they are neither names nor phenomena. The seventy-sixth statement says that the initially grasped nature depends on phenomena and names; the wording is the same as this. Secondly, the correct meaning included in the Chengshi School (成實宗) is the same as before, so this treatise does not explain it further.

Treatise: There are also scriptures that speak of the parikalpita (遍計所執).

Commentary: In the fifth volume of Vasubandhu's Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle (攝大乘論), there is such a sentence. His explanation is: if the substance and phenomena of names and meanings correspond, it will create contradiction. Here, establishing names is dependent arising (依他起), and meaning is parikalpita (遍計所執). The meaning is that names are the names in the five dharmas (名, 相, 分別, 正智, 如如), and meaning is phenomena and discrimination, because names explain meaning, and meaning is what is grasped, so it is different from the mutual inclusion of those five dharmas, therefore they are mentioned in contrast.

Treatise: The scriptures say that defiled dharmas (有漏法) etc., are therefore called names.

Commentary: 'Etc.' includes self-awareness (自證分) and awareness of self-awareness (證自證分). These are the mind and mental factors of dependent arising nature. Because names can explain their power, following the explanatory names, grasping arises, forming what is universally conceptualized. Therefore, it is said that dependent arising is included in names. 'What is universally conceptualized' is not 'what is conceptualized and grasped', but what is grasped depends on, therefore it is dependent arising. Vasubandhu said that because dependent arising becomes what is universally conceptualized by the power of names. This is the same as the meaning here. Not mentioning the parinispanna (圓成實) is because its substance is extremely distant from names.

Treatise: Parikalpita, following this name, horizontally conceptualizes meaning.

Commentary: Parikalpita, following this name, horizontally conceptualizes meaning, thinking it is a real substance. This is not really existent. In this non-existent, falsely calling it meaning, that is, falsely establishing the term 'meaning' in non-meaning. The meaning is that there is only the meaning that is grasped, without the name that follows dependence. It shows that the parinispanna is far from names and meanings, and cannot be relied upon by names, so it becomes what is universally conceptualized, called a name. It cannot be grasped as real existence following the name, and falsely established as meaning, so neither is included in the two. The five dharmas mentioned in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (楞伽經) and the Madhyāntavibhāga (中邊分別論) either apply to existence and non-existence, or the substance is really existent. The falsity of parikalpita also applies to existence. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) etc. are not like this. The sixteenth statement of the Śikṣāsamuccaya (顯揚聖教論) says that what is conceptualized and grasped is non-existent, because the five dharmas do not include it, that is, the substance of the five dharmas.

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唯是有也。

論。諸聖教中至廣說應知。

述曰。由彼四說文雖有異而理為言。各據一義不相違也。然諸說中不雜亂。如瑜伽論第七十二．七十三四說三性及別章說。諸經相亂者如理應知。中邊以三性與十真實相攝。此皆攝盡。可勘彼文。然有蘊等。此不說者如下當知。

論。又聖教中至相攝云何。

述曰。此下第二五事相攝門也。

論。所詮能詮至能詮相故。

述曰。五相者。一所詮。二能詮。三相屬。四執著。五不執著。若妄所計所詮諸法。能詮諸名。計所執性。前五事中相．名．分別三事之中。取分別全。相．名少分是所詮相。由名亦所詮故。相．名少分是能詮相。由名亦相故。今此三法隨其所應。所詮．能詮屬依他起。唯說染分依他起故。真如全。正智少分是所詮相。正智少分是能詮相。此依無倒釋成實性。故攝正智。隨此所應所詮．能詮屬圓成實。后得正智亦能變似能詮相故。前言離過無漏無能詮。今談法實無漏亦能詮。故所詮相。及能詮相併屬三性。

論。二相屬相至定相屬故。

述曰。第三能詮．所詮二相屬。相唯計所執。妄計名之與義定相屬故。

論。彼執著相至為自性故。

述曰。第四執著相唯依他起。能執著者虛妄分別為自性故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 唯有存在（也）。

論：在所有聖教中，最廣泛的解釋應該瞭解。

述記：由於這四種說法，文字雖然不同，但道理是爲了說明。各自根據一個意義，並不互相違背。然而在各種說法中沒有雜亂。例如《瑜伽師地論》第七十二、七十三中關於三性和其他章節的說明。各種經文相互混淆的，應該如理了解。《中邊分別論》用三性和十種真實來涵蓋，這些都涵蓋窮盡了，可以參考那些經文。然而有蘊等等，這裡沒有說到的，如下面應當知道。

論：又，聖教中，說到相互涵蓋是什麼意思呢？

述記：下面是第二，五事相互涵蓋的方面。

論：所詮（所表達的意義）和能詮（表達意義的語言），直到能詮的相。

述記：五相是：一、所詮；二、能詮；三、相屬；四、執著；五、不執著。如果虛妄分別所計度的所詮諸法，能詮諸名，計度所執的自性。在前五事中，相、名、分別三事之中，取分別的全部，相、名的少部分是所詮相，因為名也是所詮的緣故。相、名的少部分是能詮相，因為名也是相的緣故。現在這三種法，隨其所應，所詮、能詮屬於依他起性（paratantra-svabhava）。只說染污部分的依他起性。真如的全部，正智的少部分是所詮相。正智的少部分是能詮相。這是依據沒有顛倒的解釋來成就真實性（bhūta-tathatā），所以涵蓋正智。隨此所應，所詮、能詮屬於圓成實性（pariniṣpanna-svabhava）。后得正智也能變化類似能詮相的緣故。前面說遠離過失的無漏智沒有能詮，現在說法的實相，無漏智也能詮釋，所以是所詮相。以及能詮相都屬於三性（trisvabhāva）。

論：二、相屬相，直到確定相互關聯的緣故。

述記：第三，能詮、所詮二者相互關聯的相，唯獨是遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhava）。虛妄計度的名和義確定相互關聯的緣故。

論：彼執著相，直到作為自性的緣故。

述記：第四，執著相唯獨是依他起性。能執著者以虛妄分別作為自性的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version: Only existence (is).

Treatise: Among all the holy teachings, the most extensive explanation should be understood.

Commentary: Because of these four statements, although the words are different, the principle is for explanation. Each is based on one meaning and does not contradict each other. However, there is no confusion among the various statements. For example, the explanations of the three natures (trisvabhāva) in the seventy-second and seventy-third sections of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other chapters. Those scriptures that are mutually confused should be understood according to reason. The Madhyāntavibhāga encompasses them with the three natures and the ten realities (daśa-tathatā), which covers everything completely. You can refer to those texts. However, there are aggregates (skandha) and so on, which are not mentioned here, as will be known below.

Treatise: Furthermore, in the holy teachings, what does it mean to say that they encompass each other?

Commentary: The following is the second aspect, the mutual encompassing of the five aspects.

Treatise: The expressed (meaning) and the expressing (language), up to the aspect of the expressing.

Commentary: The five aspects are: 1. The expressed (artha); 2. The expressing (vyañjana); 3. The related (sambandha); 4. Attachment (abhiniveśa); 5. Non-attachment (anabhiniveśa). If the falsely discriminated expressed dharmas, the expressing names, and the self-nature (svabhāva) of what is conceived. Among the first five aspects, from the three aspects of characteristic, name, and discrimination, take the entirety of discrimination, and a small part of characteristic and name is the aspect of the expressed, because name is also expressed. A small part of characteristic and name is the aspect of the expressing, because name is also a characteristic. Now, these three dharmas, as appropriate, the expressed and the expressing belong to the dependent nature (paratantra-svabhāva). Only the defiled part of the dependent nature is spoken of. The entirety of Suchness (tathatā), and a small part of correct knowledge (samyag-jñāna) is the aspect of the expressed. A small part of correct knowledge is the aspect of the expressing. This is based on the non-inverted explanation to accomplish true reality (bhūta-tathatā), so it encompasses correct knowledge. As appropriate, the expressed and the expressing belong to the perfectly accomplished nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). Subsequent acquired correct knowledge can also transform into an aspect similar to the expressing. Previously, it was said that undefiled wisdom (anāsrava-jñāna) free from faults has no expressing, but now the true nature of the Dharma, undefiled wisdom can also express, so it is the aspect of the expressed. And the aspect of the expressing both belong to the three natures (trisvabhāva).

Treatise: Two, the aspect of relatedness, up to the reason for the definite mutual relation.

Commentary: Third, the aspect of the mutual relation between the expressing and the expressed is solely the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhāva). Because the falsely conceived name and meaning are definitely mutually related.

Treatise: That aspect of attachment, up to the reason for being its self-nature.

Commentary: Fourth, the aspect of attachment is solely the dependent nature. Because the one who is able to be attached takes false discrimination as its self-nature.

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。設所執著即所遍計。亦是依他。亦以妄分別為自性故。

論。不執著相至為自性故。

述曰。無漏二智。及俱行品相．見分等。及無為法圓成性故。不執著相是此性攝。此後三種別約三性增勝相語。故顯揚論十六說。此五相中初及第二依三自相。第三依遍計所執相。第四依依他起相。第五依圓成相。正與此同。據實而言。第三亦有後之二性。若執二相屬所執是無。可是計所執性。所執性所依二相屬。二相屬能所執並依他性。若但不執說二相屬。即通后二性攝。今約所執語故唯計所執。彼執著相若是所執著。亦計所執性。所依執著相亦通圓成。今據能執著心語故言唯依他。不執著相即體是無。不可執著亦計所執。若無執著之心依他亦有。今約全非能執著語故唯圓成。然第八十一攝釋分。及顯揚十二云。所詮相謂相等五法。能詮相謂計所執相。二相屬相謂計所執性執所依止。執著相謂自體執。及此隨眠。不執著相即計所執相。及彼隨眠解脫正分別。解云彼所詮相即依他．圓成。有實自體可為詮故。遍計所執既無有體非可詮故。雖諸無法亦是所詮。然無差別可詮之用。非所詮攝。能詮唯計所執非餘二者。彼二論文各自釋言。此是遍計．所執性。亦名和合。乃至亦名唯有音聲。顯彼無體唯有能詮名故。但說能詮

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：假設所執著的事物就是所遍計的事物（Parikalpita，虛妄分別的自性）。它也是依他起性（Paratantra，事物相互依存的性質），因為它以虛妄分別作為其自性。

論：不執著于相，是因為它是圓成實性（Parinispanna，事物真實、圓滿的性質）的自性。

述記：無漏的兩種智慧，以及與其相應的行相、見分等等，還有無為法，都是因為它們是圓成實性。因此，不執著于相屬於這種性質。後面的三種（執著相、二相屬相、不執著相）是分別根據三種自性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）的增勝相來說的。所以，《顯揚聖教論》第十六卷說，這五種相中，第一種（所詮相）和第二種（能詮相）依於三種自相，第三種（二相屬相）依于遍計所執相，第四種（執著相）依于依他起相，第五種（不執著相）依于圓成實相。這與這裡的說法完全相同。但實際上，第三種相也具有後兩種自性。如果執著於二相屬相屬於所執著的事物，那就是不存在的，可以認為是遍計所執性。所執性所依的二相屬相，這二相屬相既能被執著，也依于依他起性。如果只是不執著，那麼二相屬相就通於后兩種自性。現在是根據所執著的事物來說的，所以只說是遍計所執。那個執著相，如果是所執著的事物，也屬於遍計所執性。所依的執著相也通於圓成實性。現在是根據能執著的心來說的，所以只說是依他起性。不執著相，其體性是空無，不可執著，也屬於遍計所執。如果沒有執著的心，依他起性也是存在的。現在是根據完全不是能執著的事物來說的，所以只說是圓成實性。然而，第八十一《攝釋分》以及《顯揚聖教論》第十二卷說，所詮相是指相等五法，能詮相是指遍計所執相，二相屬相是指遍計所執性的執所依止，執著相是指自體執以及由此產生的隨眠（Anusaya，煩惱的潛在傾向），不執著相是指遍計所執相以及由此產生的隨眠的解脫和正確的分別。解釋說，所詮相就是依他起性和圓成實性，因為它們具有真實的自體可以被詮釋。遍計所執既然沒有自體，就不能被詮釋。雖然諸法不存在也是所詮，但沒有差別，不能作為詮釋之用，所以不屬於所詮。能詮只有遍計所執，不屬於其他兩種。這兩篇論文各自解釋說，這是遍計所執性，也叫做和合，乃至也叫做唯有音聲，顯示它們沒有自體，只有能詮的名相，所以只說是能詮。

【English Translation】 English version: Suppose that what is clung to is precisely what is conceptually imputed (Parikalpita, the nature of false discrimination). It is also dependently arisen (Paratantra, the nature of interdependent origination), because it takes false discrimination as its self-nature.

Treatise: Not clinging to characteristics is because it is the self-nature of the perfectly established nature (Parinispanna, the nature of reality, completeness).

Commentary: The two wisdoms without outflows, and the accompanying characteristics, the seeing-aspect, etc., as well as unconditioned dharmas, are all because they are the perfectly established nature. Therefore, not clinging to characteristics belongs to this nature. The latter three (clinging to characteristics, the relationship of two characteristics, not clinging to characteristics) are spoken of separately according to the dominant aspects of the three natures (the nature of what is conceptually imputed, the nature of dependent origination, the nature of the perfectly established nature). Therefore, the sixteenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that among these five aspects, the first (the aspect of what is expressed) and the second (the aspect of what expresses) rely on the three self-natures, the third (the relationship of two characteristics) relies on the conceptually imputed nature, the fourth (clinging to characteristics) relies on the dependently arisen nature, and the fifth (not clinging to characteristics) relies on the perfectly established nature. This is exactly the same as what is said here. But in reality, the third aspect also possesses the latter two natures. If clinging to the relationship of two characteristics belongs to what is clung to, then it does not exist and can be considered the conceptually imputed nature. The relationship of two characteristics that is relied upon by the nature of what is clung to, this relationship of two characteristics can both be clung to and relies on the dependently arisen nature. If there is simply no clinging, then the relationship of two characteristics is common to the latter two natures. Now, it is spoken of according to what is clung to, so it is only said to be conceptually imputed. That clinging to characteristics, if it is what is clung to, also belongs to the conceptually imputed nature. The clinging to characteristics that is relied upon is also common to the perfectly established nature. Now, it is spoken of according to the mind that is capable of clinging, so it is only said to be dependently arisen. Not clinging to characteristics, its essence is emptiness, cannot be clung to, and also belongs to the conceptually imputed. If there is no mind of clinging, the dependently arisen nature also exists. Now, it is spoken of according to what is completely incapable of clinging, so it is only said to be the perfectly established nature. However, the eighty-first Compendium of Explanations and the twelfth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra say that the aspect of what is expressed refers to the five dharmas such as characteristics, the aspect of what expresses refers to the conceptually imputed nature, the relationship of two characteristics refers to the clinging to the support of the conceptually imputed nature, clinging to characteristics refers to clinging to the self and the latent tendencies (Anusaya, the underlying tendencies of afflictions) arising from it, and not clinging to characteristics refers to the conceptually imputed nature and the liberation and correct discrimination from the latent tendencies arising from it. The explanation says that the aspect of what is expressed is the dependently arisen nature and the perfectly established nature, because they have a real self-nature that can be expressed. Since the conceptually imputed has no self-nature, it cannot be expressed. Although the non-existence of dharmas is also what is expressed, it has no difference and cannot be used for expression, so it does not belong to what is expressed. What expresses is only the conceptually imputed, not the other two. These two texts each explain that this is the conceptually imputed nature, also called combination, and even called only sound, showing that they have no self-nature, only the name of what expresses, so it is only said to be what expresses.

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是計所執。非餘二性非能詮攝。此即各據一義。與顯揚十六亦不相違。此二相屬相中。遍計所執自性執所依止。即遍計所執性也。遍計所執自性之執是能計心。執所依止是能計心之所執。所執是依止義。依止所執起計心故。故第四言遍計所執自性執。及彼隨眠是依他起。明知執所依者是遍計所執。第四可知。第五不執著相。謂染依解脫。解脫．了知圓成實攝。遍計所執相。及彼習氣者。故知所執我法都無。唯有依他染分習氣斷之得解脫。解脫即真如。正分別者即無漏智。意言知計所執無。斷依他得解脫．正智。是不執著相。此中五相前二諸論不同。各據一義。后三諸論皆同理不違也。廣如彼說。如是和會諸智者知。

論。又聖教中至相攝云何。

述曰。第五四法相攝門。此問起也。顯揚六說。謂諸世間于諸事中由串習所得悟入智見共施設世俗性。乃至略說者。謂此是此地等。非彼水等。如是等世間有情決定勝解所行。一切世間自昔傳來名言決定自他分別共為真實。非邪思擇觀察所取。是名世間所成真實。謂諸智者有道理義。乃至處異生位者隨觀察者。依現．比．至教極善思擇。決定智所行所知事。以證成道理所建立。是名道理所成真實。以入聖位非此真實。謂一切聲聞．獨覺無漏方便智．無漏正智．無漏

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是計度所執著的。不是其餘二性所能詮釋涵蓋的。這只是各自依據一個含義。與《顯揚聖教論》的十六種相也不相違背。在這二種相屬相中，遍計所執自性的執著所依止的，就是遍計所執性。遍計所執自性的執著是能計度的心，執著所依止的是能計度的心所執著的。所執著的是依止的含義。因為依止所執著而生起計度的心。所以第四句說遍計所執自性的執著，以及它的隨眠是依他起。明確知道執著所依止的是遍計所執。第四句可以知道。第五句是不執著相。說的是染污依他起得到解脫。解脫和了知屬於圓成實性所攝。遍計所執相，以及它的習氣。所以知道所執著的我法都是沒有的。只有依他起的染污部分的習氣斷除它才能得到解脫。解脫就是真如。正確的分別就是無漏智。意思是說知道計度所執著的沒有，斷除依他起就能得到解脫和正智。這就是不執著相。這其中五相的前二種，各個論典不同，各自依據一個含義。后三種各個論典都相同，道理上不違背。詳細的可以參考那些論典的說法。這樣調和，有智慧的人就知道了。

論：又聖教中，至相攝云何？

述曰：第五是四法相攝門。這是提問。 《顯揚聖教論》第六卷說：『世間眾生對於各種事物，由於串習而獲得的悟入智見，共同施設的世俗性。』乃至簡略地說：『這是此地等等，不是彼水等等。』像這樣世間有情決定勝解所行的一切世間自古以來流傳的名言，決定自己和他人分別，共同認為是真實的。不是邪思擇觀察所能取得的。這叫做世間所成真實。 智者有道理的意義，乃至處於異生位的人，隨著觀察者，依據現量、比量、至教，極其善巧地思擇，以決定的智慧所行所知的事物，用證成道理所建立的，叫做道理所成真實。進入聖位就不是這種真實。一切聲聞（Śrāvaka，聽聞佛陀教誨而證悟的修行者）、獨覺（Pratyekabuddha，無師自悟的修行者）的無漏方便智、無漏正智、無漏

【English Translation】 English version: It is what is grasped by conceptual imputation (parikalpita-svabhāva). It cannot be fully explained or encompassed by the other two natures. This is based on a single meaning in each case and does not contradict the sixteen aspects in the Śūnyatā-sampatti. Within these two related aspects, the basis upon which the conceptual imputation nature is grasped is precisely the conceptual imputation nature itself. The grasping of the conceptual imputation nature is the mind that imputes, and what is grasped is what is grasped by the mind that imputes. What is grasped is the meaning of dependence because the imputing mind arises based on what is grasped. Therefore, the fourth statement says that the grasping of the conceptual imputation nature and its latent tendencies (anuśaya) are dependently arisen (paratantra-svabhāva). It is clear that what is grasped is the conceptual imputation. The fourth statement makes this clear. The fifth statement is the non-attachment aspect, which refers to liberation (vimokṣa) from defilement-dependent arising. Liberation and understanding are included within the perfectly established nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). The conceptual imputation aspect and its habitual tendencies (vāsanā) indicate that the grasped self and phenomena are entirely non-existent. Only the habitual tendencies of the defiled aspect of dependent arising need to be severed to attain liberation. Liberation is thusness (tathatā). Correct discrimination is unconditioned wisdom (anāsrava-jñāna). It means knowing that what is grasped by conceptual imputation is non-existent, and that liberation and correct wisdom are attained by severing dependent arising. This is the non-attachment aspect. Among these five aspects, the first two differ in various treatises, each based on a single meaning. The latter three are the same in all treatises, and the principles do not contradict each other. For details, refer to those treatises. Those with wisdom will understand by reconciling them in this way.

Treatise: Furthermore, in the sacred teachings, what is the meaning of 'mutual inclusion'?

Commentary: The fifth section concerns the mutual inclusion of the four dharmas. This is the question being raised. The sixth volume of the Śūnyatā-sampatti states: 'The worldly nature (saṃvṛti-satya) is the wisdom and insight gained by worldly beings through familiarity with various things, which they commonly establish.' And briefly: 'This is this place, etc., not that water, etc.' Thus, all worldly beings firmly believe in the names and conventions passed down from ancient times, determining self and others, and commonly regarding them as real. It is not something obtained through wrong thinking or observation. This is called worldly truth (loka-siddha-satya). The meaning of truth for the wise, and even for those in the position of ordinary beings, is that they rely on direct perception (pratyakṣa), inference (anumāna), and authoritative teachings (āgama), skillfully contemplating and determining the objects of knowledge, establishing them with reasoning. This is called reasoned truth (yukti-siddha-satya). Entering the stage of a noble being is not this kind of truth. All Śrāvakas (listeners), Pratyekabuddhas (solitary realizers), unconditioned skillful means wisdom (anāsrava-upāya-jñāna), unconditioned right wisdom (anāsrava-samyak-jñāna), unconditioned

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后所得世間智等所行境界。是名煩惱障凈智所行真實。由緣此故於煩惱障智得清凈。及后證得無障礙故說為彼真實　問此中何者是真實　答謂苦．集．滅．道名之所顯四種聖諦。由簡擇如是四聖諦故。得入現觀位。于現觀位后真實智生。即四諦理三智所行。四聖諦故名此真實。謂于所知中能礙智故名所知障。若真實性是解脫所知障智所行境界。名所知障凈智所行真實。即是真如。佛假安立名此真實。即世間共許事等名世間真實。三量四道理名道理真實。四聖諦理名煩惱障凈智所行真實。亦取無漏智體是凈法。即是道諦后得世間緣故。不爾便感。真如是所知障凈智所行真實。或初謂一切異生外道。第二在七方便四十心等位。第三通三乘聖位。第四唯大乘位。

論。世間道理至二事攝故。

述曰。瑜伽三十六真實義品。對法十一等說。初二真實依他攝者。七十三說世間．道理所成真實。五事中三事所攝故。有漏心變作道理相故依他收。云三事者。謂相．名．分別。多依異生說道理故。此依三法有漏相故。不取正智等相為相。二障凈智所行真實圓成實攝者。七十三說煩惱所知障凈智所行真實五事中二事所攝故。謂正智．如如。前言后二真實。四聖諦理及取真如。今並智者亦取能緣。以後得世間智等。亦緣無漏諸

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 后所得世間智等所行境界，這被稱為煩惱障凈智所行的真實。由於以此為緣，對於煩惱障智得以清凈，以及之後證得無障礙的緣故，所以說這是它的真實。問：這裡面哪個是真實呢？答：就是苦、集、滅、道這四個名稱所顯示的四種聖諦。由於簡擇這四聖諦的緣故，得以進入現觀位。在現觀位之後，真實的智慧產生，也就是四諦之理的三智所行。因為是四聖諦的緣故，所以稱此為真實。所謂在所知之中能夠障礙智慧的，稱為所知障。如果真實性是解脫所知障智所行的境界，就稱為所知障凈智所行的真實，也就是真如（Tathata）。佛（Buddha）假立安立，稱此為真實。即世間共同認可的事物等，稱為世間真實。三量四道理，稱為道理真實。四聖諦之理，稱為煩惱障凈智所行真實。也取無漏智的本體，這是清凈之法，也就是道諦（Marga-satya）后得世間的緣故。不然就會有所感應。真如是所知障凈智所行真實。或者最初是指一切異生外道，第二是指七方便四十心等位，第三是通於三乘聖位，第四唯獨是大乘位。

論：世間道理乃至二事所攝的緣故。

述記說：瑜伽師地論（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第三十六真實義品，對法論（Abhidharma-samuccaya）第十一等說到。最初的兩個真實，依他起性（Paratantra）所攝的，第七十三說世間、道理所成的真實，是五事中的三事所攝的緣故。有漏心變作道理的相的緣故，被依他起性所攝。所謂的三事，是指相、名、分別。多依異生說道理的緣故。這是依據三法有漏相的緣故，不取正智等的相作為相。二障凈智所行真實，圓成實性（Parinispanna）所攝的，第七十三說煩惱所知障凈智所行真實，是五事中的二事所攝的緣故。是指正智、如如。前面說后兩個真實，四聖諦之理以及取真如，現在連智者也取能緣。以後得世間智等，也緣無漏的諸法。

【English Translation】 English version The realm of activity of worldly wisdom and the like, attained subsequently, is called the reality of the wisdom that purifies the obscuration of afflictions. Because of this condition, the wisdom of the obscuration of afflictions is purified, and because one subsequently attains unobstructedness, it is said to be its reality. Question: Which of these is the reality? Answer: The four noble truths (Arya-satya), manifested by the names of suffering (Duhkha), origin (Samudaya), cessation (Nirodha), and path (Marga). By discerning these four noble truths, one enters the stage of direct realization (Sakshad-karana). After the stage of direct realization, true wisdom arises, which is the activity of the three wisdoms concerning the four truths. Because of the four noble truths, this is called reality. That which obstructs wisdom among the knowable is called the obscuration of knowledge (Jnana-avarana). If reality is the realm of activity of the wisdom that liberates from the obscuration of knowledge, it is called the reality of the wisdom that purifies the obscuration of knowledge, which is Suchness (Tathata). The Buddha (Buddha) provisionally establishes and calls this reality. That which is commonly accepted in the world is called worldly reality. The three proofs and four reasons are called reasoned reality. The principle of the four noble truths is called the reality of the wisdom that purifies the obscuration of afflictions. It also takes the essence of unconditioned wisdom, which is pure Dharma, that is, because of the subsequent attainment of the world of the path truth (Marga-satya). Otherwise, there will be a response. Suchness is the reality of the wisdom that purifies the obscuration of knowledge. Or, initially, it refers to all ordinary beings and non-Buddhists; secondly, it refers to the stages of the seven expediencies and forty minds; thirdly, it is common to the holy positions of the three vehicles; and fourthly, it is only the position of the Mahayana.

Treatise: Worldly reasoning is included in the two matters.

Commentary: The thirty-sixth article on the meaning of reality in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the eleventh in the Abhidharma-samuccaya say. The first two realities, included in the dependent nature (Paratantra), the seventy-third says that the reality formed by the world and reason is included in the three matters of the five matters. Because the defiled mind transforms into the appearance of reason, it is included in the dependent nature. The so-called three matters refer to appearance, name, and discrimination. Because it often relies on ordinary beings to speak of reason. This is based on the defiled appearance of the three dharmas, so it does not take the appearance of correct wisdom as appearance. The reality of the wisdom that purifies the two obscurations, included in the perfectly established nature (Parinispanna), the seventy-third says that the reality of the wisdom that purifies the obscuration of afflictions and knowledge is included in the two matters of the five matters. It refers to correct wisdom and Suchness. The previous statement said that the latter two realities, the principle of the four noble truths and taking Suchness, now even the wise take the able condition. The subsequent attainment of worldly wisdom and the like also conditions the undefiled dharmas.

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事智故。煩惱凈智故不取染依他。依瑜伽等所說同此。

論。辨中邊說至唯屬第三。

述曰。辨中邊說。世間所成唯初性攝。一切世間多共依此一處執故。體即依他假名所執　又解即共所執我法為初真實。世間執實故名初性攝。若約前解體是有法。同瑜伽等四真實皆有法假名所執。后解即通有法．無法。為四真實體亦不相違。第二真實即道理。是三性所攝。道理之法通執．無執。執中有所．能執。所執是初性。能執是染依他。無執中通雜染及清凈。雜染是依他。清凈是成實。后二真實與此等同。前唯約異生為道理真實故唯依他。此通約凡．聖故通三性。初真實中此約有體法故唯依他。彼據無法執所執語。故唯初性不相違也。舊中邊上頌說。一處世俗成。三處道理成。清凈境二種攝在於一處。新翻中邊第二捲雲。世極成依一。理極成依三。凈所行有二。依一圓成實。義皆同也。應取諸論出四實體。及諸門義。

論。三性四諦相攝云何。

述曰。第六四諦門。此為問也。

論。四中一一皆具三性。

述曰。下文有三。初略答。次廣答。后總結。此略答也。

論。且苦諦中至位轉變故。

述曰。下廣有七。唯苦四行各具三性。一無性無常。以體性常無。即初性也。舊中邊

【現代漢語翻譯】 事智的緣故。因為煩惱清凈的智慧，所以不取染污的依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava， dependent nature）。如《瑜伽師地論》等所說，與此相同。

論：在《辨中邊論》中說，唯有第一真實屬於第一性。

述記：在《辨中邊論》中說，世間所成的法，唯有第一性所攝。因為一切世間大多共同執著於此一處。其體性即是依他起性上假名所執。又一種解釋是，共同執著的我法為最初的真實，世間執著為真實，所以名為第一性所攝。如果按照前面的解釋，體是有法，與《瑜伽師地論》等所說的四種真實一樣，都是有法假名所執。後面的解釋則通於有法和無法。作為四種真實的體性也不相違背。第二真實即是道理，是三性所攝。道理之法通於執著和不執著。執著中有所執和能執。所執是第一性，能執是染污的依他起性。不執著中通於雜染和清凈。雜染是依他起性，清凈是圓成實性（Parinispanna-svabhava，perfected nature）。后兩種真實與此相同。前面只就異生凡夫而言，作為道理的真實，所以唯是依他起性。這裡通於凡夫和聖人，所以通於三性。第一真實中，這裡就有的體法而言，所以唯是依他起性。那裡是根據無法執著所執的語言，所以唯是第一性，不相違背。舊譯《辨中邊論》的頌文說：『一處世俗成，三處道理成，清凈境二種，攝在一處。』新譯《辨中邊論》第二卷說：『世極成依一，理極成依三，凈所行有二，依一圓成實。』意義都相同。應當採取諸論中提出的四種實體，以及各種門義。

論：三性與四諦如何相互攝屬？

述記：這是第六個四諦門，是提問。

論：四諦中每一諦都具備三性。

述記：下文有三個部分，首先是簡略回答，其次是詳細回答，最後是總結。這裡是簡略回答。

論：且說苦諦中，乃至位次轉變的緣故。

述記：下面詳細解釋有七個方面，唯有苦諦的四種行相各自具備三性。一是無性無常，以體性常無，即是第一性。

【English Translation】 Because of the wisdom of things. Because of the wisdom of pure afflictions, it does not take the defiled Paratantra-svabhava (dependent nature). As stated in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and others, it is the same as this.

Treatise: The Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya says that only the first reality belongs to the first nature.

Commentary: The Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya says that the phenomena established by the world are only included in the first nature. Because all the world mostly commonly clings to this one place. Its essence is the assumed name clung to in the Paratantra-svabhava. Another explanation is that the self and dharma commonly clung to are the initial reality. The world clings to it as real, so it is called included in the first nature. If according to the previous explanation, the essence is existent dharma, the same as the four realities in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, all are existent dharma assumed names clung to. The latter explanation includes both existent and non-existent dharma. As the essence of the four realities, it is not contradictory. The second reality is reason, which is included in the three natures. The dharma of reason includes clinging and non-clinging. In clinging, there is what is clung to and what can cling. What is clung to is the first nature, and what can cling is the defiled Paratantra-svabhava. In non-clinging, it includes both defiled and pure. Defilement is the Paratantra-svabhava, and purity is the Parinispanna-svabhava (perfected nature). The latter two realities are the same as this. The former only refers to ordinary beings, as the reality of reason, so it is only the Paratantra-svabhava. This includes both ordinary beings and sages, so it includes the three natures. In the first reality, this refers to the existent dharma, so it is only the Paratantra-svabhava. That is based on the language clung to by non-existent clinging, so it is only the first nature, and it is not contradictory. The verses of the old translation of the Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya say: 'One place is established by convention, three places are established by reason, the realm of purity is included in one place.' The second volume of the new translation of the Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya says: 'The world is established by one, reason is established by three, the conduct of purity has two, relying on one Parinispanna-svabhava.' The meanings are all the same. One should take the four entities proposed in the treatises, as well as the meanings of the various doors.

Treatise: How do the three natures and the four noble truths mutually include each other?

Commentary: This is the sixth door of the four noble truths, which is a question.

Treatise: Each of the four truths possesses the three natures.

Commentary: There are three parts below. First, a brief answer, second, a detailed answer, and finally, a summary. This is a brief answer.

Treatise: Moreover, in the truth of suffering, up to the reason for the transformation of positions.

Commentary: The following detailed explanation has seven aspects. Only the four aspects of the truth of suffering each possess the three natures. First, no-nature and impermanence, with the essence being constantly non-existent, is the first nature.

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云無有物。新同此。實非無常假名無常行。觀此性故實是初性假名為諦。二起盡無常。中觀生滅法為無常。三垢凈無常。實是后性。假名為諦。故中邊云有無垢為義。此約詮分位為垢凈。假名無常行。無常行實不緣之。又依一切無常為語。非苦下行。此三性如次。中邊論同。顯揚十四無常有六。或八。六者。一無性無常。二無失壞無常。三轉異無常。乃至六當有無常。八種者。謂剎那．相續．病．老．死．心．器．受用。初二遍一切法。次三在內色。心唯在名。器．受用在外色。彼並約三界分別等。然說六無常三性攝者。無性無常當知遍計所執相攝。余無常依他起攝。圓成實性無無常義。何故此論等言三性俱有無常。垢凈名轉變在圓成實。彼論轉異是依他起。非圓成實。會云。據實無常有二義。一有生滅體之無常。二無他常故名無常。此唯在二性。圓成實性二種俱無。顯揚據此故言一性無無常。此論．中邊約詮為論。圓成實性亦名無常。體是常法非無非有。為但約詮為論故也。又此中垢凈約詮談旨。彼論轉異談詮之體故。二論所說義各不同非相違也。又彼說十五種無常等。如彼廣解。

論。苦有三者至苦相合故。

述曰。一所取苦。為我．及法二能執心之所取故。能執是苦。此無假立故亦名苦。苦實有法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 云沒有實在的自性（云無有物）。新的事物也是如此（新同此）。實際上，無常並非沒有，只是假名為無常的執行（實非無常假名無常行）。觀察這種自性，實際上是最初的自性，假名為真諦（觀此性故實是初性假名為諦）。 二、生起和消滅是無常的。以中觀的觀點來看，生滅法就是無常（二起盡無常。中觀生滅法為無常）。 三、染污和清凈是無常的。實際上是後來的自性，假名為真諦（三垢凈無常。實是后性。假名為諦）。所以《中邊分別論》（中邊論）說，有無垢染的意義（故中邊云有無垢為義）。這是從詮釋的角度，將分位視為染污和清凈。假名的無常執行，實際上並不攀緣它（此約詮分位為垢凈。假名無常行。無常行實不緣之）。 又依據一切都是無常的來說，並非是苦的低劣執行（又依一切無常為語。非苦下行）。這三種自性依次對應。《中邊分別論》的觀點相同（此三性如次。中邊論同）。《顯揚聖教論》（顯揚）第十四卷說，無常有六種或八種。六種是：一、無自性無常（無性無常）；二、無失壞無常（無失壞無常）；三、轉變無常（轉異無常）；乃至六、當有無常（六當有無常）。八種是：剎那（剎那）、相續（相續）、病（病）、老（老）、死（死）、心（心）、器（器）、受用（受用）。最初兩種遍及一切法。接下來三種在於內在的色法。心唯在於名法。器和受用在於外在的色法。它們都大約從三界分別等等來說（顯揚十四無常有六。或八。六者。一無性無常。二無失壞無常。三轉異無常。乃至六當有無常。八種者。謂剎那．相續．病．老．死．心．器．受用。初二遍一切法。次三在內色。心唯在名。器．受用在外色。彼並約三界分別等）。 然而，如果說六種無常被三種自性所攝，那麼無自性無常應當知道是被遍計所執相所攝。其餘的無常被依他起性所攝。圓成實性沒有無常的意義（然說六無常三性攝者。無性無常當知遍計所執相攝。余無常依他起攝。圓成實性無無常義）。 為什麼這部論典等說三種自性都具有無常？染污和清凈的名稱轉變在於圓成實性。那部論典的轉變是依他起性，不是圓成實性（何故此論等言三性俱有無常。垢凈名轉變在圓成實。彼論轉異是依他起。非圓成實）。 解釋說，根據實際情況，無常有兩種含義：一是有生滅本體的無常；二是由於沒有其他的常法，所以名為無常。這隻存在於兩種自性中。圓成實性兩種都沒有。《顯揚聖教論》根據這個，所以說一種自性沒有無常（會云。據實無常有二義。一有生滅體之無常。二無他常故名無常。此唯在二性。圓成實性二種俱無。顯揚據此故言一性無無常）。 這部論典和《中邊分別論》是從詮釋的角度來討論的，圓成實性也名為無常。本體是常法，非無非有。因為只是從詮釋的角度來討論的緣故（此論．中邊約詮為論。圓成實性亦名無常。體是常法非無非有。為但約詮為論故也）。 又，這裡所說的染污和清凈是從詮釋的角度談論的宗旨。《顯揚聖教論》所說的轉變是談論詮釋的本體，所以兩部論典所說的意義各不相同，並非相互違背（又此中垢凈約詮談旨。彼論轉異談詮之體故。二論所說義各不同非相違也）。 又，《顯揚聖教論》說了十五種無常等等，如那部論典的廣釋（又彼說十五種無常等。如彼廣解）。 論：苦有三種，乃至苦相合的緣故（論。苦有三者至苦相合故）。 述記：一、所取苦。因為是我和法兩種能執著的心所取著的緣故。能執著的心是苦。這沒有假立，所以也名為苦。苦是真實存在的法（述曰。一所取苦。為我．及法二能執心之所取故。能執是苦。此無假立故亦名苦。苦實有法）。

【English Translation】 English version Clouds have no inherent existence (云無有物). New things are the same (新同此). In reality, impermanence is not non-existent; it is merely the impermanent functioning of a provisional name (實非無常假名無常行). Observing this nature, it is actually the initial nature, provisionally named truth (觀此性故實是初性假名為諦). Second, arising and ceasing are impermanent. From the perspective of Madhyamaka, the dharma of arising and ceasing is impermanent (二起盡無常。中觀生滅法為無常). Third, defilement and purity are impermanent. In reality, it is the later nature, provisionally named truth (三垢凈無常。實是后性。假名為諦). Therefore, the Madhyāntavibhāga (中邊論) says that there is the meaning of being without defilement (故中邊云有無垢為義). This is from the perspective of explanation, regarding divisions as defilement and purity. The impermanent functioning of provisional names does not actually cling to it (此約詮分位為垢凈。假名無常行。無常行實不緣之). Furthermore, based on the statement that everything is impermanent, it is not the inferior functioning of suffering (又依一切無常為語。非苦下行). These three natures correspond in sequence. The Madhyāntavibhāga has the same view (此三性如次。中邊論同). The fourteenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (顯揚) says that there are six or eight types of impermanence. The six are: first, impermanence of no-self-nature (無性無常); second, impermanence of no loss or destruction (無失壞無常); third, impermanence of transformation (轉異無常); and so on, up to sixth, impermanence of what is to come (六當有無常). The eight are: moment (剎那), continuity (相續), sickness (病), old age (老), death (死), mind (心), vessel (器), and enjoyment (受用). The first two pervade all dharmas. The next three are in internal form. Mind is only in name. Vessel and enjoyment are in external form. They are all roughly discussed from the perspective of the three realms, and so on (顯揚十四無常有六。或八。六者。一無性無常。二無失壞無常。三轉異無常。乃至六當有無常。八種者。謂剎那．相續．病．老．死．心．器．受用。初二遍一切法。次三在內色。心唯在名。器．受用在外色。彼並約三界分別等). However, if it is said that the six types of impermanence are encompassed by the three natures, then the impermanence of no-self-nature should be understood as being encompassed by the imagined nature (parikalpita-lakṣaṇa) (遍計所執相). The remaining impermanence is encompassed by the dependent nature (paratantra-lakṣaṇa) (依他起性). The perfected nature (pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa) (圓成實性) has no meaning of impermanence (然說六無常三性攝者。無性無常當知遍計所執相攝。余無常依他起攝。圓成實性無無常義). Why do these treatises and others say that all three natures possess impermanence? The transformation of the names of defilement and purity lies in the perfected nature. The transformation in that treatise is the dependent nature, not the perfected nature (何故此論等言三性俱有無常。垢凈名轉變在圓成實。彼論轉異是依他起。非圓成實). It is explained that, according to reality, impermanence has two meanings: first, impermanence with a substance of arising and ceasing; second, it is called impermanence because there is no other permanence. This only exists in the two natures. The perfected nature has neither. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is based on this, so it says that one nature has no impermanence (會云。據實無常有二義。一有生滅體之無常。二無他常故名無常。此唯在二性。圓成實性二種俱無。顯揚據此故言一性無無常). This treatise and the Madhyāntavibhāga discuss from the perspective of explanation. The perfected nature is also called impermanent. The substance is a permanent dharma, neither non-existent nor existent. It is because it is only discussed from the perspective of explanation (此論．中邊約詮為論。圓成實性亦名無常。體是常法非無非有。為但約詮為論故也). Also, the defilement and purity mentioned here are the tenets discussed from the perspective of explanation. The transformation mentioned in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra discusses the substance of explanation, so the meanings discussed in the two treatises are different and not contradictory (又此中垢凈約詮談旨。彼論轉異談詮之體故。二論所說義各不同非相違也). Furthermore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra speaks of fifteen types of impermanence, etc., as explained extensively in that treatise (又彼說十五種無常等。如彼廣解). Treatise: There are three types of suffering, up to the combination of suffering (論。苦有三者至苦相合故). Commentary: First, suffering that is taken (所取苦). Because it is taken by the two grasping minds of 'I' and 'dharma'. The grasping mind is suffering. This is not a provisional establishment, so it is also called suffering. Suffering is a truly existent dharma (述曰。一所取苦。為我．及法二能執心之所取故。能執是苦。此無假立故亦名苦。苦實有法).

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。此是無故名為假苦。性實而諦假。非苦諦故。舊中邊云一取苦。新同此論。以下中邊舊文更不敘也。二事相苦。可解。三苦為相故。三和合苦。苦相合故。謂即真如與一切有漏有為苦相合故名苦。體實非也。性實而諦假。如次三性。新中邊同。

論。空有三者至為自性故。

述曰。初空可解。正是空行。二異性空。此即有為有體之法。與計所執體性不同。異於彼無。無無性故說之為空。體實非空緣之為空。空無所執。三自性空。二空所顯為自性故。此三皆是空行所行故名空行。顯揚十五云。一無體空。二遠離空。三除遣空。言遠離者。無所執相義。除遣空者。除遣二我顯此空故。彼十五云。遍計所執等三性如次立三空。

論。無我三者至為自性故。

述曰。一無相無我。我相體無故。二異相無我。與我相異故。三自相無我。義同空釋。

論。集諦三者至假立彼名。

述曰。何因苦諦四行各三。集等三諦總有三種。苦諦諸行義通諸諦故各分三。行相寬故。余諦之下行相局故總為三也。中邊又云四除四倒。苦行各分三。余非除四倒。故不分三也。一習氣集。此諦實而性假。執彼我法之習氣。體是依他。從所因為名。假立遍計所執。或緣此起執名為執彼。作所遍計假所執攝。從能依

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這是無緣無故地被稱為虛假的苦。其自性是真實的，但從諦的角度來說是虛假的，因為它不是苦諦。舊版《中邊分別論》中說『一取苦』，新版與此相同。以下《中邊分別論》的舊文不再贅述。二、事相苦，容易理解。三、以苦為相的緣故，三和合苦，是苦的相狀聚合在一起的緣故。意思是說，真如與一切有漏有為的苦相聚合，因此稱為苦，但其本體實際上不是苦。其自性是真實的，但從諦的角度來說是虛假的，如其次第對應三種自性。新版《中邊分別論》的觀點相同。

論：空有三種，乃至作為自性之故。

述記：第一種空，容易理解，正是空行（Śūnyatācāra）所行。第二種異性空，指的是有為有體的法，與遍計所執（Parikalpita）的體性不同，不同於遍計所執的『無』，因為遍計所執沒有自性，所以說它是空。但其本體實際上不是空，而是因緣而空，空無所執。第三種自性空，是前兩種空所顯現的，作為自性之故。這三種都是空行所行，所以稱為空行。 《顯揚聖教論》第十五卷說：一、無體空，二、遠離空，三、除遣空。所說的『遠離』，是沒有所執著的相的意思。所說的『除遣空』，是除遣二我（人我、法我）而顯現此空。該論第十五卷說，遍計所執等三種自性，如其次第建立三種空。

論：無我三種，乃至作為自性之故。

述記：第一種無相無我，因為我相的體性本無。第二種異相無我，因為與我相不同。第三種自相無我，意義與空性的解釋相同。

論：集諦三種，乃至假立彼名。

述記：為什麼苦諦的四種行相各有三種，而集諦等三種諦總共有三種？因為苦諦的諸行相義理貫通諸諦，所以各自分為三種，因為行相寬泛。其餘諦的行相比較侷限，所以總共只有三種。《中邊分別論》又說，四種去除四種顛倒，苦諦的行相各自分為三種，其餘的不是去除四種顛倒，所以不分為三種。第一種是習氣集，此諦是真實的，但從自性的角度來說是虛假的，是執著彼我之法的習氣。其本體是依他起性（Paratantra），從所因為名，假立遍計所執，或者緣此而生起執著，稱為執彼，作為遍計所執所攝，從能依的角度來說。

【English Translation】 English version: This is falsely called suffering without a cause. Its nature is real, but from the perspective of truth, it is false because it is not the truth of suffering (dukkha satya). The old version of the Madhyāntavibhāga says 'one grasping of suffering,' and the new version agrees with this. The old text of the Madhyāntavibhāga below will not be repeated. Second, suffering of phenomena (vastu-dukkha) is easy to understand. Third, because suffering is the characteristic, the suffering of three combinations (trisamphāsa-dukkha) is because the characteristics of suffering are combined. It means that tathatā (真如, suchness) combines with all conditioned (有為, saṃskṛta) and defiled (有漏, sāsrava) suffering, hence it is called suffering, but its essence is not actually suffering. Its nature is real, but from the perspective of truth, it is false, corresponding to the three natures in order. The new version of the Madhyāntavibhāga has the same view.

Treatise: The three aspects of emptiness, up to being the reason for its own nature.

Commentary: The first emptiness is easy to understand, it is precisely what is practiced in the conduct of emptiness (Śūnyatācāra). The second, emptiness of different nature, refers to conditioned and substantial dharmas, which are different from the nature of the imputed (遍計所執, Parikalpita). It is different from the 'non-existence' of the imputed, because the imputed has no self-nature, so it is said to be empty. But its essence is not actually empty, but empty due to conditions, emptiness without grasping. The third, emptiness of self-nature, is what is revealed by the previous two emptinesses, as it is the reason for its own nature. These three are all practiced in the conduct of emptiness, so they are called the conduct of emptiness. Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (顯揚聖教論) volume fifteen says: first, emptiness of no substance; second, emptiness of separation; third, emptiness of removal. What is called 'separation' means the absence of grasping at characteristics. What is called 'emptiness of removal' is the removal of the two selves (人我, pudgala-ātman; 法我, dharma-ātman) to reveal this emptiness. That treatise, volume fifteen, says that the three natures, such as the imputed, establish the three emptinesses in order.

Treatise: The three aspects of no-self, up to being the reason for its own nature.

Commentary: The first is no-self of no characteristic, because the essence of the characteristic of self is originally non-existent. The second is no-self of different characteristic, because it is different from the characteristic of self. The third is no-self of self-characteristic, the meaning is the same as the explanation of emptiness.

Treatise: The three aspects of the truth of accumulation, up to falsely establishing that name.

Commentary: Why do the four aspects of the truth of suffering each have three, while the three truths of accumulation, etc., have a total of three? Because the meanings of the aspects of the truth of suffering penetrate all truths, they are each divided into three, because the aspects are broad. The aspects of the remaining truths are relatively limited, so there are only three in total. The Madhyāntavibhāga also says that the four remove the four inversions, and the aspects of suffering are each divided into three, while the others do not remove the four inversions, so they are not divided into three. The first is the accumulation of habitual tendencies, this truth is real, but from the perspective of nature, it is false, it is the habitual tendencies of grasping at the self and dharmas. Its essence is dependent origination (依他起性, Paratantra), named from the cause, falsely establishing the imputed, or arising from this grasping, called grasping at that, included as the imputed, from the perspective of the dependent.

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為名假也。

論。二等起集至未離障真如。

述曰。平等而起故。煩惱起業。業起果故。三未離系集。假名為集。性實而諦假。如次三性。彼論皆同。

論。滅諦三者至謂真如故。

述曰。一自性滅滅者。不生義故。性實假名為滅。定非諦攝。二二取滅。能．所取無故。護法．安惠各有別解。從所無得滅依他假名滅。諦實。非依他故性假。中邊云二取不生。三本性滅。中邊云謂擇滅。及真如。與此相違。如彼抄會。如次配三性。

論。道諦三者至圓成實故。

述曰。一遍知道。從所知為名名計所執。諦實而性假。二永斷道。但說染分名曰依他。能斷圓成實攝。從所斷名依他性。諦實而性假。或能斷體即是依他。性．諦俱實。三作證道。或假或實。如依他說。如次配二性。

論。然遍知道亦通后二。

述曰。遍知名寬。故七十四說。三性皆應遍知。顯揚六說。遍計所執唯應遍知。無餘義故別得總名。餘二性皆遍知。由彼別可應斷．應證如次得名。

論。七三三性至如理應知。

述曰。下總結也。此苦諦下有四種三。餘三諦下各三。總七種三。彼與三性如次配屬。中邊第二卷說同。或假或實如理應思。已隨文出訖。此如中邊第二抄解。不能重敘。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『為名假也』（只是名稱是虛假的）。

論：二等起集至未離障真如。

述曰：平等而起故（因為是平等而生起的）。煩惱起業（煩惱生起業力），業起果故（業力生起果報）。三未離系集（第三種是未脫離束縛的集諦），假名為集（只是假名為集諦）。性實而諦假（自性是真實的，但諦是虛假的），如次三性（依次對應三種自性）。彼論皆同（那些論典都相同）。

論：滅諦三者至謂真如故。

述曰：一自性滅滅者（第一種是自性滅的滅），不生義故（因為是不生不滅的意義）。性實假名為滅（自性是真實的，只是假名為滅諦）。定非諦攝（肯定不屬於諦所攝）。二二取滅（第二種是能取和所取的滅），能．所取無故（因為能取和所取都不存在了）。護法．安惠各有別解（護法和安惠對此有各自不同的解釋）。從所無得滅依他假名滅（從所無而得到的滅，是依他起性，假名為滅諦）。諦實（諦是真實的）。非依他故性假（不是依他起性，所以自性是虛假的）。中邊云二取不生（《中邊分別論》說二取不生）。三本性滅（第三種是本性滅）。中邊云謂擇滅（《中邊分別論》說這是指擇滅），及真如（以及真如）。與此相違（與此相反）。如彼抄會（就像那些抄本彙集的一樣）。如次配三性（依次對應三種自性）。

論：道諦三者至圓成實故。

述曰：一遍知道（第一種是遍知道）。從所知為名名計所執（從所知的事物而得名，名為遍計所執）。諦實而性假（諦是真實的，但自性是虛假的）。二永斷道（第二種是永斷道）。但說染分名曰依他（只是說染污的部分，名為依他起性）。能斷圓成實攝（能斷屬於圓成實性所攝）。從所斷名依他性（從所斷的事物而得名，是依他起性）。諦實而性假（諦是真實的，但自性是虛假的）。或能斷體即是依他（或者能斷的本體就是依他起性）。性．諦俱實（自性和諦都是真實的）。三作證道（第三種是作證道）。或假或實（或者虛假或者真實）。如依他說（就像依他起性所說的那樣）。如次配二性（依次對應兩種自性）。

論：然遍知道亦通后二。

述曰：遍知名寬（遍知的名稱寬泛）。故七十四說（所以第七十四說）。三性皆應遍知（三種自性都應該遍知）。顯揚六說（《顯揚聖教論》第六說）。遍計所執唯應遍知（遍計所執性只應該遍知）。無餘義故別得總名（因為沒有其他的意義，所以特別得到總的名稱）。餘二性皆遍知（其餘兩種自性都遍知）。由彼別可應斷．應證如次得名（因為它們分別可以被斷除和證得，所以依次得到名稱）。

論：七三三性至如理應知。

述曰：下總結也（下面是總結）。此苦諦下有四種三（這苦諦下面有四種三）。餘三諦下各三（其餘三種諦下面各有三種）。總七種三（總共有七種三）。彼與三性如次配屬（它們與三種自性依次對應）。中邊第二卷說同（《中邊分別論》第二卷說的相同）。或假或實如理應思（或者虛假或者真實，應該如理思維）。已隨文出訖（已經隨著經文解釋完畢）。此如中邊第二抄解（這就像《中邊分別論》第二卷的抄本解釋一樣）。不能重敘（不能再次敘述）。

【English Translation】 English version '為名假也' (wèi míng jiǎ yě) (The name is merely a designation).

Treatise: The second, arising from equality, up to the unseparated-from-obstruction Suchness.

Commentary: Because it arises from equality. Afflictions arise from karma, and karma arises from results. The third, the collection not yet separated from bondage, is nominally called 'collection'. The nature is real, but the truth is nominal, corresponding to the three natures in order. Those treatises all agree.

Treatise: The three truths of cessation, up to, namely, Suchness.

Commentary: First, cessation of self-nature, meaning non-arising. The nature is real, but it is nominally called 'cessation'. It is definitely not included in the truths. Second, cessation of the two apprehensions (能．所取 néng. suǒ qǔ - the apprehender and the apprehended), because the apprehender and the apprehended are absent. Dharmapala (護法 Hùfǎ) and Anhui (安惠 Ānhuì) each have different interpretations. Cessation obtained from the absence of what is apprehended is dependently arisen, nominally called 'cessation'. The truth is real. Because it is not dependently arisen, the nature is nominal. The Madhyāntavibhāga (中邊 Zhōngbiān) says that the two apprehensions do not arise. Third, cessation of original nature. The Madhyāntavibhāga says that this refers to selective cessation (擇滅 zé miè) and Suchness. This contradicts that. As in those collected commentaries, they correspond to the three natures in order.

Treatise: The three truths of the path, up to the perfectly accomplished reality.

Commentary: First, knowing universally. It is named 'imagined' from what is known. The truth is real, but the nature is nominal. Second, permanently severing the path. Only the defiled aspect is called 'dependently arisen'. The ability to sever is included in the perfectly accomplished reality. It is named 'dependently arisen' from what is severed. The truth is real, but the nature is nominal. Or, the entity of the ability to sever is itself dependently arisen. Both the nature and the truth are real. Third, realizing the path. It is either nominal or real, as said in the dependently arisen nature. They correspond to the two natures in order.

Treatise: However, knowing universally also applies to the latter two.

Commentary: The name 'knowing universally' is broad. Therefore, the seventy-fourth says that all three natures should be known universally. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (顯揚 Xiǎnyáng), section six, says that the imagined nature should only be known universally. Because there is no other meaning, it separately obtains the general name. The other two natures are both known universally. Because they can be separately severed and realized, they obtain their names accordingly.

Treatise: The seven sets of three, the three natures, up to, should be known as they truly are.

Commentary: The following is a summary. Under this truth of suffering, there are four sets of three. Under the remaining three truths, there are three sets each. In total, there are seven sets of three. They correspond to the three natures in order. The second chapter of the Madhyāntavibhāga says the same. They are either nominal or real, and should be contemplated as they truly are. This has been explained according to the text. This is like the commentary on the second chapter of the Madhyāntavibhāga. It cannot be repeated.

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論。三解脫門至相攝云何。

述曰。七三法相攝門。此為問也。

論。理實皆通至如次應知。

述曰。皆通三性。謂緣依他上無計所執。因顯成實。成實因空所顯即為空境。俱不於此起愿求故為無愿境。非緣遍計所執真如起愿求故。如空緣此三為無相故。為無相境。七十二說。相通三種。謂空．無愿．無相。亦三種境。此中既言三解脫門。即唯出世修所生惠以證故說。第七十二．顯揚第二皆言解脫門。言唯出世修惠。既爾有漏．無漏五事中相為三種境。依他．圓成皆通三境。凈分依他屬圓成故。緣之亦為無相。道四行名無相故。顯揚第二云道四行通三解脫門。瑜伽第十二說。若於此處無有彼物觀之為空名空性。即所觀空無可希愿故名無愿。即此遠離一切行相故名無相。即緣遍計所執。為三解脫門故。今總言理實三性皆通三解脫門。隨增別相說。三性．空等如次各一。七十四．顯揚第六說。由初性故立空解脫門。由第二性．故立無愿解脫門。由圓成實性故立無相解脫門。意可知也(如樞要說)。

論。緣此復生至是彼境故。

述曰。忍者智也。證印名忍。第七十四．顯揚第六文皆同此。文意可解。緣此三性生三忍也。遍計所執本體無生。依他緣起無自然生。證圓成時惑苦不起。是名三種

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：三解脫門（空解脫門，無愿解脫門，無相解脫門）如何互相包含和關聯？ 答：實際上，三性（遍計所執性，依他起性，圓成實性）都與三解脫門相通。遍計所執性上沒有實在，因顯現圓成實性。圓成實性因空性而顯現，因此空性是空解脫門的境界。因為對於空性，我們不起任何愿求，所以空性也是無愿解脫門的境界。因為對於並非遍計所執的真如不起愿求，所以真如是無愿解脫門的境界。如同空性緣于這三性而成為無相，所以空性也是無相解脫門的境界。《瑜伽師地論》第七十二卷說，空、無愿、無相三種解脫門互相貫通，也是三種境界。這裡既然說是三解脫門，就是指唯有出世間的修行所生的智慧才能證得，所以這樣說。《瑜伽師地論》第七十二卷和《顯揚聖教論》第二卷都說解脫門，指的就是唯有出世間的修行智慧。既然如此，有漏和無漏的五事中，相是三種境界。依他起性和圓成實性都與三種境界相通。清凈部分的依他起性屬於圓成實性，所以緣於它也是無相。道四行（暖位，頂位，忍位，世第一位）名為無相，所以《顯揚聖教論》第二卷說，道四行貫通三解脫門。《瑜伽師地論》第十二卷說，如果在這個地方沒有那個事物，觀察它為空性，就叫做空性。因為所觀察的空性沒有什麼可以希望和愿求的，所以叫做無愿。因為遠離一切行相，所以叫做無相。這就是緣于遍計所執性而成為三解脫門的原因。現在總的說來，實際上三性都與三解脫門相通。隨著增上的不同，三性、空性等依次各對應一個解脫門。《瑜伽師地論》第七十四卷和《顯揚聖教論》第六卷說，由於初性（遍計所執性）的緣故，建立空解脫門；由於第二性（依他起性）的緣故，建立無愿解脫門；由於圓成實性的緣故，建立無相解脫門。其中的含義是可以理解的（如《瑜伽師地論·樞要》所說）。 緣于這三性，又會生起三種忍（空忍，無愿忍，無相忍），這是它們的境界。 忍者是智慧的意思，證悟的印記叫做忍。《瑜伽師地論》第七十四卷和《顯揚聖教論》第六卷的文字都與此相同。文中的意思是可以理解的。緣于這三性，生起三種忍。遍計所執性的本體沒有生起，依他緣起性沒有自然生起，證悟圓成實性時，惑和苦不會生起，這叫做三種忍。

【English Translation】 English version: Question: How do the three doors of liberation (Śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha [the door of liberation of emptiness], Apranihita-vimokṣa-mukha [the door of liberation of signlessness], and Animitta-vimokṣa-mukha [the door of liberation of wishlessness]) interrelate and encompass each other? Answer: In reality, the three natures (Parikalpita [the nature of imaginary attribution], Paratantra [the nature of dependence], and Pariniṣpanna [the nature of perfect accomplishment]) all connect with the three doors of liberation. On the Parikalpita nature, there is no reality, because it reveals the Pariniṣpanna nature. The Pariniṣpanna nature is revealed through emptiness (Śūnyatā), therefore emptiness is the realm of the door of liberation of emptiness. Because we do not generate any wishes or desires towards emptiness, emptiness is also the realm of the door of liberation of wishlessness. Because we do not generate wishes or desires towards Suchness (Tathatā) which is not Parikalpita, Suchness is the realm of the door of liberation of wishlessness. Just as emptiness becomes signless (Animitta) by being related to these three natures, emptiness is also the realm of the door of liberation of signlessness. The seventy-second book of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the three doors of liberation—emptiness, wishlessness, and signlessness—interpenetrate each other and are also three realms. Since it is said here that there are three doors of liberation, it means that only the wisdom born from supramundane practice can attain them, hence this statement. The seventy-second book of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the second book of the Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations both speak of the doors of liberation, referring to the wisdom of supramundane practice alone. Since this is the case, among the five aspects of defiled and undefiled, sign (Nimitta) is the three realms. The Paratantra nature and the Pariniṣpanna nature both connect with the three realms. The pure part of the Paratantra nature belongs to the Pariniṣpanna nature, so relating to it is also signless. The four aspects of the path (warmth, peak, forbearance, and supreme mundane dharma) are called signless, so the second book of the Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations says that the four aspects of the path penetrate the three doors of liberation. The twelfth book of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that if there is no thing in this place, observing it as emptiness is called emptiness. Because the observed emptiness has nothing to hope for or desire, it is called wishlessness. Because it is far from all signs, it is called signlessness. This is the reason why it becomes the three doors of liberation by being related to the Parikalpita nature. Now, generally speaking, in reality, the three natures all connect with the three doors of liberation. Depending on the different augmentations, the three natures, emptiness, etc., each correspond to one door of liberation in order. The seventy-fourth book of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the sixth book of the Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations say that due to the first nature (Parikalpita), the door of liberation of emptiness is established; due to the second nature (Paratantra), the door of liberation of wishlessness is established; due to the Pariniṣpanna nature, the door of liberation of signlessness is established. The meaning of this is understandable (as stated in the Essentials of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra). Relating to these three natures, three kinds of forbearance (Kṣānti [patience, acceptance]) also arise, and these are their realms. Forbearance (Kṣānti) means wisdom, and the mark of enlightenment is called forbearance. The texts of the seventy-fourth book of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the sixth book of the Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations are the same as this. The meaning of the text is understandable. Relating to these three natures, three kinds of forbearance arise. The essence of the Parikalpita nature does not arise, the Paratantra nature does not arise naturally, and when the Pariniṣpanna nature is realized, afflictions and suffering do not arise. This is called the three kinds of forbearance.

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無生忍別。不說依他因緣亦無名無生忍。顯揚云此三忍在不退地。即初地已去證三性時得此三也。如對法第十一抄引大智度論故。八十六說。一切行苦依無愿。即依此依他。一切法無我依空。即緣此計所執。涅槃寂靜即緣此圓成。此論略而不說。應會諸論三解脫門等義如別抄。

論。此三云何攝彼二諦。

述曰。八二法相攝門。此問起也。

論。應知世俗至即此三性。

述曰。假世俗者。實無體性可名世俗。唯有其名假名世俗。四世俗中第一俗攝。第二體有為行。正體是世俗。簡勝義諦亦世俗故名為行。舊中邊云取行世俗。唯有為依他故。四世俗中第二．第三攝。第三攝者心上變似四諦相理。不離於事依他起攝。三顯了世俗。此三名與彼新中邊論同。謂斷染依他。遍計所執無二空為門顯真如名圓成實。四世俗中第四世俗。或此世俗亦取四中第三。是無漏故。如次配三性。顯揚論亦有此文。

論。勝義有三至圓成實性。

述曰。第一勝義依士釋也。第四勝義收。第二得勝義謂涅槃。持業釋也。第三勝義攝。因證顯故。約得辨故。真如舊成。不說為得。涅槃后顯。故立得名。第三者第二勝義攝。理稍勝故。若隨事者亦初勝義。多財釋也。舊中邊云正行真實。此三新翻名體同此。前二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於無生法忍的區別：如果離開了依他起因緣，也就沒有所謂的無生法忍。 《顯揚聖教論》中說，這三種忍（音響忍、柔順忍、無生法忍）位於不退轉地，也就是初地以上的菩薩在證得三自性時才能獲得。 如《對法論》第十一卷引《大智度論》所說，第八十六卷說，一切行苦都依賴於無愿解脫門，也就是依賴於依他起性。 一切法無我依賴於空性，也就是緣于遍計所執性。 涅槃寂靜則緣于圓成實性。 《瑜伽師地論》對此論述較為簡略，應該結合其他論典，如《別抄》，來理解三解脫門等的含義。

論：這三種自性如何包含二諦（世俗諦和勝義諦）？

述記：這是根據第八十二條法相攝門提出的問題。

論：應當知道，虛假的世俗諦即是依他起性，第二種世俗諦即是遍計所執性，勝義諦即是這三種自性。

述記：虛假的世俗諦，實際上沒有自體可稱為世俗諦，只有其名稱是假名安立的世俗諦，屬於四種世俗諦中的第一種。 第二種世俗諦指有為行，其正體是世俗諦。 爲了區別于勝義諦，也稱為世俗諦，所以名為行。 舊譯《中邊分別論》中說，取行世俗諦，唯有有為的依他起性。 屬於四種世俗諦中的第二和第三種。 第三種世俗諦指心上變現的類似於四諦的相狀和道理，不離於依他起性。 這是三種顯了世俗諦。 這三個名稱與新譯《中邊分別論》相同。 也就是斷除染污所依的依他起性，遍計所執性，以無二空為門徑，顯現真如，名為圓成實性。 屬於四種世俗諦中的第四種世俗諦。 或者這種世俗諦也取四種世俗諦中的第三種，因為它是無漏的。 依次對應於三種自性。《顯揚聖教論》中也有類似的說法。

論：勝義諦有三種，即依他起性、遍計所執性、圓成實性。

述記：第一種勝義諦是依士釋（指依他起性）。 第四種勝義諦包含第二種勝義諦，即涅槃，是持業釋。 第三種勝義諦包含，因為通過因證而顯現。 從證得的角度來說，真如本來就存在，所以不說為證得。 涅槃是後來才顯現的，所以立名為證得。 第三種勝義諦包含于第二種勝義諦，因為道理稍勝一籌。 如果隨順於事相來說，也屬於第一種勝義諦，是多財釋。 舊譯《中邊分別論》中說，正行真實，這三種新譯的名稱和體性與此相同。 前兩種

【English Translation】 English version: Distinction of the Wushengren (無生忍, No-Birth Patience): Without relying on the Yitaki (依他起, Dependent Origination) cause and condition, there is no such thing as Wushengren (無生忍, No-Birth Patience). The Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (顯揚聖教論, Manifestation of the Holy Teaching Treatise) states that these three Ren (忍, Patience) (Yinxiangren (音響忍, Sound Patience), Roushunren (柔順忍, Gentle Patience), and Wushengren (無生忍, No-Birth Patience)) are located in the state of non-retrogression, that is, Bodhisattvas above the first Bhumi (地, Ground) can obtain these three when they realize the three Svabhāva (自性, own-being or nature). As the eleventh volume of the Duifa Lun (對法論, Abhidharma Treatise) quotes the Da Zhidu Lun (大智度論, Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise), the eighty-sixth volume says that all suffering of actions relies on the Wu Yuan (無愿, absence of desire), that is, relying on this Yitaki (依他起, Dependent Origination). All Dharma (法, phenomena) of no-self relies on emptiness, that is, based on this Parikalpita (遍計所執, completely conceptualized). Nirvana (涅槃, liberation) is tranquility, which is based on this Parinispanna (圓成實, perfectly accomplished). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) is relatively brief in its discussion, and one should combine other treatises, such as the Biechao (別抄, Separate Copy), to understand the meaning of the three Vimoksha (解脫, liberations) and so on.

Treatise: How do these three Svabhāva (自性, own-being or nature) encompass the two truths (Samvriti-satya (世俗諦, conventional truth) and Paramārtha-satya (勝義諦, ultimate truth))?

Commentary: This question is raised based on the eighty-second Dharma (法, phenomena) characteristic of the encompassing gate.

Treatise: It should be known that the false Samvriti (世俗, conventional) is Yitaki (依他起, Dependent Origination), the second Samvriti (世俗, conventional) is Parikalpita (遍計所執, completely conceptualized), and the Paramārtha (勝義, ultimate) is these three Svabhāva (自性, own-being or nature).

Commentary: The false Samvriti (世俗, conventional) actually has no self-nature that can be called Samvriti (世俗, conventional); only its name is a provisional Samvriti (世俗, conventional), belonging to the first of the four Samvriti (世俗, conventional). The second Samvriti (世俗, conventional) refers to conditioned actions, whose main body is Samvriti (世俗, conventional). To distinguish it from Paramārtha-satya (勝義諦, ultimate truth), it is also called Samvriti (世俗, conventional), so it is called action. The old translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (中邊分別論, Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes) says that taking action as Samvriti (世俗, conventional) is only the conditioned Yitaki (依他起, Dependent Origination). It belongs to the second and third of the four Samvriti (世俗, conventional). The third Samvriti (世俗, conventional) refers to the appearance and reason of the four noble truths transformed in the mind, which is inseparable from the Yitaki (依他起, Dependent Origination). These are the three manifest Samvriti (世俗, conventional). These three names are the same as those in the new translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (中邊分別論, Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes). That is, cutting off the Yitaki (依他起, Dependent Origination) on which defilements rely, the Parikalpita (遍計所執, completely conceptualized), taking the gate of non-duality and emptiness, manifesting Suchness, is called Parinispanna (圓成實, perfectly accomplished). It belongs to the fourth of the four Samvriti (世俗, conventional). Or this Samvriti (世俗, conventional) also takes the third of the four Samvriti (世俗, conventional), because it is unconditioned. They correspond to the three Svabhāva (自性, own-being or nature) in order. The Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (顯揚聖教論, Manifestation of the Holy Teaching Treatise) also has similar statements.

Treatise: There are three Paramārtha (勝義, ultimate), namely Yitaki (依他起, Dependent Origination), Parikalpita (遍計所執, completely conceptualized), and Parinispanna (圓成實, perfectly accomplished).

Commentary: The first Paramārtha (勝義, ultimate) is Yishi Shi (依士釋, relying on the person to explain) (referring to Yitaki (依他起, Dependent Origination)). The fourth Paramārtha (勝義, ultimate) includes the second Paramārtha (勝義, ultimate), which is Nirvana (涅槃, liberation), which is Chiye Shi (持業釋, holding the action to explain). The third Paramārtha (勝義, ultimate) is included because it is manifested through cause and proof. From the perspective of attainment, Suchness exists originally, so it is not said to be attained. Nirvana (涅槃, liberation) is manifested later, so it is named attainment. The third Paramārtha (勝義, ultimate) is included in the second Paramārtha (勝義, ultimate), because the reason is slightly better. If following the phenomena, it also belongs to the first Paramārtha (勝義, ultimate), which is Duocai Shi (多財釋, explaining with much wealth). The old translation of the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (中邊分別論, Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes) says that Zhengxing Zhenshi (正行真實, correct practice is real), the names and nature of these three new translations are the same as this. The first two

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無變。不生滅故。第三無倒。隨其所應皆圓成實。無漏依他此中說名圓成實故。下自廣明二諦不假預陳。

論。如是三性何智所行。

述曰。九凡．聖智境門。此問起也。

論。遍計所執至唯聖智境。

述曰。初性是無非所緣緣。所緣緣體具二義故。必有體故。若爾佛智應不緣彼。緣與不緣皆有過失。不緣．不知無故。如何復言此應遍知。若緣者如何成所緣緣。解云親所緣緣即不緣彼。非有法故以為本無質別變似無名應知。緣無如緣他心。不爾即違聖教道理。如緣他心。二十唯識說。不知如佛不可思議境。雖爾下言親緣。上來論意不許親緣故。解彼文云。然稱實知。佛親證相故名現量。明凈圓極勝二乘故。乃至緣過．未天眼．宿命亦爾。佛智生時有此相起。佛親證相圓明圓極。勝聲聞等名之為知。非親證也。言不思議者是勝義。圓明圓極義故。非謂親證彼心。心外取故。聖者以此達為無。心外無無故。但見自心之上依他起相。不見心所取上實我．實法。實我．實法都無所有。作此無相故名應知。此護法．義。如二十唯識抄二解。七十四說。初性非凡．聖智行。以無相故。然說應知故此解勝。彼論依他．圓成說境同此。依他然是世間無漏聖智之境。非出世智。有為法故。佛地第七引瑜伽等說。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無變。因為不生不滅的緣故。第三是無倒，隨著它所適應的情況，都是圓成實性。無漏的依他起性，在這裡被稱作圓成實性。下面自然會廣泛闡明二諦，不需要預先陳述。

論：像這樣的三種自性，是哪種智慧所行境？

述曰：是九界凡夫和聖人的智慧境界。這是提問的開始。

論：遍計所執性是無，乃至唯有聖智才能作為其行境。

述曰：初性是無，並非所緣緣。所緣緣的體性具備兩種含義，因為必定有體性。如果這樣，佛的智慧應該不緣此遍計所執性。緣與不緣都有過失。不緣，就不知道遍計所執性是無；如果緣，又如何成為所緣緣？解釋說，親所緣緣是不緣遍計所執性的，因為遍計所執性並非實有法，而是以本無的質別變似無而得名，應該知道。緣無就像緣他人的心。否則就違背了聖教的道理。就像緣他人的心，《二十唯識》中說，不知道就像佛的不可思議境界。雖然如此，下面說親緣。上來的論意是不允許親緣的。解釋那段經文說：『然而稱實知』，佛親證相，所以名為現量，明凈圓滿超過二乘。乃至緣過去、未來，天眼、宿命也是這樣。佛智生起時，有這種相出現。佛親證相，圓明圓滿，勝過聲聞等，所以稱之為知，並非親證。說不可思議，是因為是勝義，圓明圓滿的緣故，不是說親證他的心，因為是從心外取。聖者以此通達遍計所執性是無。心外沒有無，所以只見到自心之上的依他起相，不見心所取的實我、實法。實我、實法都沒有，作此無相，所以名為應知。這是護法、義的觀點。如《二十唯識抄》二解，七十四說。初性不是凡夫和聖人智慧的行境，因為沒有相。然而說應知，所以這種解釋更好。彼論依他、圓成說境同此。依他起性是世間無漏聖智的境界，不是出世智，因為是有為法。佛地第七引《瑜伽師地論》等說。

【English Translation】 English version Unchanging. Because it is neither born nor extinguished. The third is non-inverted, and according to its suitability, all are the nature of Pariniṣpanna (perfected nature). The dependent nature (Paratantra) free from outflows (anāsrava), is here called Pariniṣpanna.

Treatise: What wisdom cognizes these three natures?

Commentary: It is the realm of wisdom of the nine realms of ordinary beings and sages. This is the beginning of the question.

Treatise: The Parikalpita (imagined nature) is non-existent, and only the wisdom of sages can take it as its object.

Commentary: The first nature is non-existent, and it is not an object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya). The nature of the object-condition has two meanings, because it must have a nature. If so, the Buddha's wisdom should not cognize this Parikalpita. Cognizing or not cognizing both have faults. Not cognizing means not knowing that the Parikalpita is non-existent; if cognizing, how can it be an object-condition? The explanation is that the direct object-condition does not cognize the Parikalpita, because the Parikalpita is not a real dharma, but is named as a non-existent transformation with a distinct quality of original non-existence, which should be known. Cognizing non-existence is like cognizing the minds of others. Otherwise, it would violate the teachings of the sages. Like cognizing the minds of others, the Twenty Verses says that not knowing is like the inconceivable realm of the Buddha. Although it is so, it is said below that it is directly cognized. The meaning of the above treatise does not allow direct cognition. Explaining that passage, it says: 'However, it is called true knowledge,' because the Buddha directly witnesses the characteristics, so it is called direct perception (pratyakṣa), clear and perfect, surpassing the two vehicles. Even cognizing the past and future, the divine eye (divyacakṣus), and knowledge of past lives (pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti) are the same. When the Buddha's wisdom arises, this characteristic appears. The Buddha directly witnesses the characteristics, which are clear and perfect, surpassing the Śrāvakas and others, so it is called knowledge, but it is not direct cognition. Saying it is inconceivable is because it is ultimate truth (paramārtha), because it is clear and perfect, not because it directly cognizes his mind, because it is taken from outside the mind. Sages understand that the Parikalpita is non-existent. There is no non-existence outside the mind, so they only see the dependent nature (Paratantra) above their own minds, and do not see the imagined self and dharmas taken by the mind. The imagined self and dharmas do not exist, and making this non-appearance is called should be known. This is the view of Dharmapāla and the meaning. As explained in the two interpretations of the Twenty Verses, seventy-four says. The first nature is not the realm of wisdom of ordinary beings and sages, because it has no appearance. However, it is said that it should be known, so this explanation is better. That treatise says that the dependent and perfected natures have the same realm. The dependent nature is the realm of worldly and unconditioned wisdom of sages, not the wisdom beyond the world, because it is conditioned dharma (saṃskṛta-dharma). The seventh chapter of the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra quotes the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and others.

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初非聖境。后非凡境。中是二境。初性是無非聖所證。復不執故。后性勝義非凡智親緣　若爾聖智不知一切。彼既是無。智何所知　若知為有則成顛倒。若知為無則非初性。心所現無依他起攝。真如理無圓成實攝。是故聖智雖知有．無。而不緣彼初性為境。與前說同。非不證無便非聖智。勿心外法亦能緣故。凡雖緣如不得實故說非彼境。總有三文。一初非凡．聖所行。后非凡所行。二初非聖所行。三通凡．聖智所行。后亦應疏所取故。

論。此三中幾假幾實。

述曰。十假實門。

論。遍計所執至非假非實。

述曰。初性有名無體。妄情安立可說為假。談其法體既無有相非假非實。非兔角等可說假．實。必依有體總別法上立為假．實故。

論。依他起性至而施設故。

述曰。此第二性有實．有假。假有三種。一聚集假。如瓶盆有情等是聚集法。多法一時所整合故。能整合雖實所成是假。二相續假者。如過．未等世唯有因果是相續性。多法多時上立一假法。如佛說言昔者鹿王今我身是。所依五蘊剎那滅者雖體是實。於此多法相續假立一有情。至今猶在故。三分位假者。如不相應行是分位性。故皆是假。一法一時上立。如一色上名有漏可見有對。亦名色等。並是於一法上假施設故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 最初的自性並非聖者的境界，最終的自性並非凡夫的境界，中間的自性是二者的境界。最初的自性是『無』，因為並非聖者所證得，並且不執著於它。最終的自性是勝義諦，並非凡夫的智慧所能直接體驗。 如果這樣，聖者的智慧豈不是不知道一切？既然最初的自性是『無』，智慧又知道什麼呢？如果認為它存在，那就成了顛倒的認知；如果認為它不存在，那就不是最初的自性。心所顯現的『無』屬於依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava，緣起性）。真如的理體屬於圓成實性（Parinispanna-svabhava，真實性）。因此，聖者的智慧雖然知道『有』和『無』，卻不以最初的自性為境界。這與前面的說法相同。並非不證得『無』就不是聖者的智慧，因為心外之法也能緣取。凡夫雖然緣取如，卻因為不能證得真實，所以說這不是他們的境界。總共有三種情況：一是最初的自性非凡夫和聖者所能行；二是最終的自性非凡夫所能行；三是凡夫和聖者的智慧都能行，因為最終的自性也應該被疏解和取用。 論：這三種自性中，哪些是假，哪些是真？ 述曰：有十種假和真的區分。 論：遍計所執性（Parikalpita-svabhava，虛妄分別性）……乃至非假非實。 述曰：最初的自性有名無體，是妄情安立的，可以說它是假的。談論它的法體，既然沒有相狀，就不是假也不是真。不能像兔角等一樣說它是假或真，必須依據有體的總別法上才能安立假和真。 論：依他起性……乃至而施設故。 述曰：這第二種自性有真有假。假的有三種：一是聚集假，如瓶、盆、有情等是聚集法，是多種法一時所整合。能整合的是真實的，所成的是假的。二是相續假，如過去、未來等世，只有因果是相續性，是多種法在多個時間上假立一個法。如佛說：『昔日的鹿王就是我現在的身體。』所依據的五蘊（Skandha，構成個體的五種要素）剎那滅，雖然體是真實的，但於此多種法相續假立一個有情，至今還在。三是分位假，如不相應行是分位性，所以都是假的。一法一時上立，如一個色法上，名有漏、可見、有對，也名色等，都是於一個法上假施設的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version The initial nature is not the realm of the saints; the final nature is not the realm of ordinary beings; the middle nature is the realm of both. The initial nature is 'non-being' because it is not attained by the saints and they do not cling to it. The final nature is the ultimate truth, not directly experienced by the wisdom of ordinary beings. If so, doesn't the wisdom of the saints not know everything? Since the initial nature is 'non-being', what does wisdom know? If it is thought to exist, it becomes a reversed cognition; if it is thought not to exist, it is not the initial nature. The 'non-being' manifested by the mind belongs to the Paratantra-svabhava (dependent nature). The principle of Suchness belongs to the Parinispanna-svabhava (perfected nature). Therefore, although the wisdom of the saints knows 'being' and 'non-being', it does not take the initial nature as its object. This is the same as what was said before. It is not that one is not a saint's wisdom if one does not realize 'non-being', because external dharmas can also be apprehended. Although ordinary beings apprehend Suchness, they are said not to be in its realm because they cannot realize the truth. There are three situations in total: first, the initial nature is not accessible to ordinary beings and saints; second, the final nature is not accessible to ordinary beings; third, the wisdom of ordinary beings and saints can access it, because the final nature should also be explained and utilized. Treatise: Among these three natures, which are false and which are real? Commentary: There are ten distinctions between false and real. Treatise: The Parikalpita-svabhava (imagined nature)... up to neither false nor real. Commentary: The initial nature has a name but no substance. It is established by deluded emotions, so it can be said to be false. Discussing its dharma-substance, since it has no characteristics, it is neither false nor real. It cannot be said to be false or real like rabbit horns, etc. It must be based on the total and separate dharmas of a substance to establish false and real. Treatise: The Paratantra-svabhava (dependent nature)... up to and therefore established. Commentary: This second nature has both real and false aspects. There are three types of false aspects: first, the aggregation-false, such as bottles, pots, sentient beings, etc., are aggregated dharmas, composed of many dharmas at one time. What can be aggregated is real, but what is formed is false. Second, the continuity-false, such as the past and future, only cause and effect are continuous natures. A false dharma is established on many dharmas over many times. For example, the Buddha said: 'The deer king of the past is my present body.' The five Skandhas (aggregates constituting an individual) on which it depends are momentary, although the substance is real, a sentient being is falsely established on this continuity of many dharmas, and it still exists today. Third, the division-false, such as non-associated formations are division natures, so they are all false. It is established on one dharma at one time, such as on one form-dharma, it is called defiled, visible, and having contact, and it is also called form, etc., all of which are falsely established on one dharma.

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若彼實者應有多體。其忿．恨等皆此假攝。心．心所．色從因緣種生故說為實。若清辨等依勝義諦依他等併名假者。依他之中自無實法假法亦無。一種類中假法必依實因而施設故。顯揚十六三性中說。不應宣說諸法唯是假有。何以故。假法必有所依因故。非無實法假法成立。若異此者無實物故假亦應無。即應破壞假．實二法。二法壞故應無雜染。雜染既可得當知必有依他起性。又云依他不如施設決定是有。亦非一切決定是無。故一切種非有非無。然許皆可言說。謂若有若無。亦有亦無。非有非無。此性通假．實。由世俗故說為有。若勝義中非有。非非有。不可說故。對法第三說。待名言故一切皆假。不待名言故一切皆實。真諦三藏解拳論成此三假。陳那菩薩造。如別章說　問第二卷吠世師。難假法必依真事．似事共法而立彼皆破之。何故此中假依實法。無實假無　答彼計真事即實等句義。似事依此真故成。共法是德。又真事是法自相。今破彼實等句義非真事。真事無故似事亦無。德句共法亦無。非於自相有似名起。今於法共相方有似名生。然共相中要須稍有體法。如青．黃心．心所等。方可假說長．短。不相應為假法。非無彼實有此假故。前破他真。真非實故。于彼所執體全無故。今言實事稍擬宜故　問若爾何故說依

他名似我法。我法實事無故　答前言依他似彼妄情能執實我．實法說為假。還是依實說假我法。非依妄情之境說假我法。我法無故。

論。圓成實性至而施設故。

述曰。七十二五法中亦言。唯是實有。勝義攝故。

論。此三為異為不異耶。

述曰。十一三性對辨異．不異門。前論本頌與有體法別自相對明異．不異諸論所無。今此三性對明異．不異攝論等有。

論。應說俱非至真義別故。

述曰。若言異者無別體故。謂妄所執名初。非離依他別有初性體。若彼有體可說異故。圓成實性是依他之實性。不可說三性異也。非不異者妄執是初性。緣起是第二性。真義是第三性。既此三別。不可言非不異。如前所引攝大乘說。

論。如是三性至略示綱要。

述曰。自下第二總結止繁　義類無邊者。顯揚第六第十七．第十三說三性各五業等。三性是三乘菩提方便。三性決了隱密義經。攝大乘說梵問經不得生死．涅槃等是。金．藏．土喻是。一切法常．無常是。通達三性時。行於相行無相耶。悟入遍計性入何性。乃至入圓成實除遣何性。三性依止五事中何事。若無初性有何過。于依他中應無名言執。名言執無故應無染．凈。無第二性有何過。不由功用一切雜染皆應非有。此染無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：他的名字與我的『法』（Dharma，宇宙真理或法則）相似。我的『法』實際上沒有原因嗎？ 答：前面所說的『依他起性』（Paratantra-svabhava，緣起性）類似於那些虛妄的情感，能夠執著于真實的『我』（Atman，靈魂）和真實的『法』，這被說成是虛假的。還是說，是依據真實而說虛假的『我』和『法』？不是依據虛妄情感的境界而說虛假的『我』和『法』。我的『法』沒有原因。

論：因為『圓成實性』（Parinispanna-svabhava，圓滿成就的自性）到達並施設。

述曰：在七十二和五法中也說，只有這個是真實存在的，因為它被包含在『勝義』（Paramartha，勝義諦）中。

論：這三種（三自性）是相異還是不相異呢？

述曰：在十一和三性中，通過對辨『異』和『不異』的門徑。前面的論本頌與有體法分別相對，明確『異』和『不異』，這是其他論著所沒有的。現在這三種自性相對，明確『異』和『不異』，這在《攝大乘論》等中有。

論：應該說既不是異，也不是不異，因為『真義』（真實意義）是不同的。

述曰：如果說是『異』，就沒有不同的本體。所謂的『遍計所執性』（Parikalpita-svabhava，虛妄分別的自性）只是一個名稱，並非離開『依他起性』而有其他的自性本體。如果它有本體，就可以說是『異』。『圓成實性』是『依他起性』的真實自性，不能說三種自性是『異』。如果說不是『不異』，那麼『妄執』是第一種自性，『緣起』是第二種自性，『真義』是第三種自性。既然這三種是不同的，就不能說不是『不異』。如前面所引用的《攝大乘論》所說。

論：像這樣，三種自性是爲了簡略地揭示綱要。

述曰：從下面開始，第二部分總結以停止繁瑣。『義類無邊』指的是，《顯揚聖教論》第六、第十七、第十三說三種自性各有五種作用等。三種自性是三乘菩提的方便。三種自性決斷了隱秘的意義。《攝大乘論》說《梵問經》不得生死、涅槃等就是。金、藏、土的比喻就是。一切法常、無常就是。通達三種自性時，是在相行中行還是在無相行中行呢？悟入『遍計所執性』是進入哪種自性呢？乃至進入『圓成實性』是除遣哪種自性呢？三種自性依止於五事中的哪件事呢？如果沒有第一種自性會有什麼過失呢？在『依他起性』中應該沒有名言執著。名言執著沒有了，就應該沒有染污和清凈。沒有第二種自性會有什麼過失呢？不由功用，一切雜染都應該不是真實存在的。這種染污沒有……

【English Translation】 English version: Question: His name is similar to my 'Dharma' (the universal truth or law). Is my 'Dharma' actually without cause? Answer: What was previously said about 'Paratantra-svabhava' (the nature of dependent origination) is similar to those deluded emotions that can cling to a real 'Atman' (soul) and a real 'Dharma', which is said to be false. Or is it that, based on reality, false 'Atman' and 'Dharma' are spoken of? It is not based on the realm of deluded emotions that false 'Atman' and 'Dharma' are spoken of. My 'Dharma' has no cause.

Treatise: Because 'Parinispanna-svabhava' (the perfectly accomplished nature) arrives and is established.

Commentary: In the seventy-two and five dharmas, it is also said that only this is truly existent, because it is included in 'Paramartha' (ultimate truth).

Treatise: Are these three (three natures) different or not different?

Commentary: In the eleven and three natures, through the method of distinguishing 'difference' and 'non-difference'. The previous treatise's verses are distinct and relative to the entities of phenomena, clarifying 'difference' and 'non-difference', which is not found in other treatises. Now, these three natures are relative, clarifying 'difference' and 'non-difference', which is found in treatises such as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

Treatise: It should be said that they are neither different nor not different, because the 'true meaning' is different.

Commentary: If it is said to be 'different', then there is no different substance. The so-called 'Parikalpita-svabhava' (the nature of imaginary construction) is merely a name, and there is no other nature's substance apart from 'Paratantra-svabhava'. If it has a substance, it can be said to be 'different'. 'Parinispanna-svabhava' is the true nature of 'Paratantra-svabhava', and it cannot be said that the three natures are 'different'. If it is said to be not 'non-different', then 'deluded clinging' is the first nature, 'dependent origination' is the second nature, and 'true meaning' is the third nature. Since these three are different, it cannot be said that they are not 'non-different', as stated in the previously cited Mahāyānasaṃgraha.

Treatise: In this way, the three natures are to briefly reveal the outline.

Commentary: From below, the second part summarizes to stop prolixity. 'Endless categories of meanings' refers to the fact that the sixth, seventeenth, and thirteenth chapters of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra say that each of the three natures has five functions, etc. The three natures are the expedient means for the Bodhi of the three vehicles. The three natures determine the hidden meaning. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that the Brahma-paripṛcchā-sūtra does not attain birth and death, Nirvana, etc. The metaphors of gold, treasury, and earth are examples. All dharmas are permanent and impermanent. When understanding the three natures, does one practice in the aspect of form or in the aspect of formlessness? Which nature does one enter when awakening to 'Parikalpita-svabhava'? And which nature does one eliminate when entering 'Parinispanna-svabhava'? Which of the five things do the three natures rely on? What fault would there be if there were no first nature? There should be no conceptual clinging in 'Paratantra-svabhava'. If there is no conceptual clinging, there should be no defilement and purity. What fault would there be if there were no second nature? Without effort, all defilements should not be truly existent. This defilement has no...

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者應無清凈。無圓成實有何過。一切清凈品皆應不可知。三性粗細．難見．極難了亦爾。幾無體能轉有體等。幾性不生能生生等。三性執．無執相。三性各云何知。三性幾自非染能令他染等。三性各以何為喻。中邊論說。色有三種。一所執義色。色家分別性。二分別義色。色家依他性。三法性色。色家真實性。色通相故。一色通三性。乃至識蘊。乃至十二處亦爾。如是等門義類無盡。皆易知故。恐厭繁文今此論中略示綱要。然此等並收諸經論盡。更無一余。對法第十二別抄有異。應取解之。

成唯識論述記卷第九(本)

成唯識論述記卷第九(末)

沙門基撰

論第九

論。若有三性至皆無自性。

述曰。第二違經失。若言三性亦不離識有三種者。何故世尊說一切法皆無自性。今言有識也。

論。頌曰至即唯識實性。

述曰。顯揚十六說與此同。初二頌正答所問。后一頌明唯識性。即是從初能變后及此二頌。廣前第一初一頌半。宗明世俗諦。今此第三頌。顯前所說唯識真理。宗明勝義諦。總成廣前初分也。若約境．行．果科者。前來及此初二頌廣俗諦境。此第三頌廣真諦境。以上隨應思準。就初二頌中。初一頌總答。次頌別答。

論。即依此前至非性全無。

【現代漢語翻譯】 若這樣，清凈之性就不應該存在了。如果圓成實性沒有過失，那麼一切清凈的品類都應該不可知了。三種自性（三性：遍計所執性 Parikalpita-lakṣaṇa，依他起性 Paratantra-lakṣaṇa，圓成實性 Pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa）的粗顯和微細，難以見到，極難了解也是如此。有多少無體的能轉變為有體等等？有多少不生的能生出生的等等？三種自性的執著和無執著的狀態是怎樣的？三種自性各自應該如何認知？三種自性中，有多少自身並非染污卻能使他者染污等等？三種自性各自用什麼來比喻？《中邊分別論》中說，色有三種：一是所執義（遍計所執性 Parikalpita-lakṣaṇa），二是分別義（依他起性 Paratantra-lakṣaṇa），三是法性（圓成實性 Pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa）。因為色是共通的相，所以一個色通於三種自性。乃至識蘊，乃至十二處也是如此。像這樣的門類和意義無窮無盡，因為都很容易理解，所以恐怕厭煩繁瑣的文字，現在在這部論中略微展示綱要。然而這些都收攝了所有經論的內容，再沒有其他的遺漏。對法第十二的別抄有不同的說法，應該取用它來解釋。

《成唯識論述記》卷第九（本）

《成唯識論述記》卷第九（末）

沙門基 撰

論第九

論：如果存在三種自性，那麼一切法就都不是無自性的。

述記：這是第二個違背經文的過失。如果說三種自性不離於識而存在，那麼為什麼世尊說一切法都是無自性的呢？現在說有識，就與此相矛盾了。

論：頌曰：依識所變至即唯識實性。

述記：《顯揚聖教論》第十六品所說與此相同。最初的兩頌是正面回答所提出的問題，後面一頌是闡明唯識的體性。也就是從最初的能變，到後面的兩頌，都是爲了廣釋前面第一頌的前半部分，宗旨在闡明世俗諦。現在這第三頌，是闡明前面所說的唯識真理，宗旨在闡明勝義諦。總的來說，是廣釋了前面的初分。如果按照境、行、果來劃分，那麼前面以及這裡的最初兩頌是廣釋俗諦的境界，這第三頌是廣釋真諦的境界。以上可以根據情況類推。在最初的兩頌中，第一頌是總的回答，第二頌是分別回答。

論：即依此前至非性全無。

【English Translation】 If that were the case, there should be no purity. If the Pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa (圓成實性, perfected nature) has no fault, then all pure categories should be unknowable. The coarseness and subtlety, the difficulty in seeing, and the extreme difficulty in understanding of the three natures (三性: Parikalpita-lakṣaṇa 遍計所執性, imagined nature; Paratantra-lakṣaṇa 依他起性, dependent nature; Pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa 圓成實性, perfected nature) are also the same. How many non-substantial things can transform into substantial things, and so on? How many unproduced things can produce produced things, and so on? What are the states of attachment and non-attachment to the three natures? How should each of the three natures be known? Among the three natures, how many are not themselves defiled but can cause others to be defiled, and so on? What are the analogies for each of the three natures? The Madhyāntavibhāga (中邊分別論) says that form has three types: first, the imagined meaning (Parikalpita-lakṣaṇa 遍計所執性); second, the dependent meaning (Paratantra-lakṣaṇa 依他起性); and third, the nature of reality (Pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa 圓成實性). Because form is a common characteristic, one form encompasses the three natures. And so on, up to the vijñāna-skandha (識蘊, aggregate of consciousness), and up to the twelve āyatanas (十二處, sense bases) as well. Such categories and meanings are endless. Because they are all easy to understand, I fear tedious writing, so I will now briefly present the outline in this treatise. However, these all encompass the contents of all the sutras and treatises, and there are no other omissions. The separate notes in the twelfth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法) have different interpretations, which should be used to explain it.

Verses from Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-ṭīkā (成唯識論述記), Volume 9 (Beginning)

Verses from Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-ṭīkā (成唯識論述記), Volume 9 (End)

Composed by Śramaṇa (沙門) Kui Ji (基)

Treatise 9

Treatise: If there are three natures, then all dharmas are not without self-nature.

Commentary: This is the second fault of contradicting the scriptures. If it is said that the three natures exist without being separate from consciousness, then why did the Bhagavan (世尊, World-Honored One) say that all dharmas are without self-nature? Now saying that there is consciousness contradicts this.

Treatise: Verse: Based on what is transformed by consciousness, up to, is the true nature of Vijñaptimātratā (唯識).

Commentary: The sixteenth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (顯揚聖教論) says the same thing. The first two verses are a direct answer to the question posed. The last verse clarifies the nature of Vijñaptimātratā (唯識). That is, from the initial transformation to the last two verses, all are to broadly explain the first half of the first verse, with the aim of clarifying the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya 世俗諦). Now, this third verse clarifies the truth of Vijñaptimātratā (唯識) mentioned earlier, with the aim of clarifying the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya 勝義諦). In general, it broadly explains the initial division mentioned earlier. If divided according to object, practice, and result, then the preceding and the first two verses here broadly explain the realm of conventional truth, and this third verse broadly explains the realm of ultimate truth. The above can be inferred accordingly. In the first two verses, the first verse is a general answer, and the second verse is a separate answer.

Treatise: Based on this, up to, the nature is not completely absent.

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述曰。長行有二。初別解三無性。后總釋頌意。就別解頌中分之為二。初解前二頌三無性。后解第三頌唯識真性。就初有二。初解第一頌總答意。次解第二頌三無性。今之後三無性。依前所說遍計所執等三性。立彼三無性。一相。二生。三勝義無性。七十六．解深密經德本菩薩請說佛言。雖有云云一切同此。

論。說密意言至總說無性。

述曰。釋密意言。今論說云謂后二性雖體非無。而有愚夫于彼增益等者。如前所引攝大乘。說依他起性是遍計所緣。圓成實性依展轉說亦所遍計。七十六說。非由別觀三種自性立三無性。然由有情于依他起自性。及圓成實自性上。增益遍計所執自性故。我立三種無自性性。乃至廣說。故依三性有體．無體。總密意說三種無性。三種無性非無後二性。但無計所執。

論。云何依此而立彼三。

述曰。上釋初頌總答意訖。自下將解第二頌中別三無性故先問起。

論。謂依此初至無性所顯。

述曰。初性體無。后二密說。體有法故。余文可知。不煩重釋。勝義但由無性所顯名為無性。依他有緣生。無自然生性。故名為無性。別配釋頌如理應知。

論。雖依他起至故此不說。

述曰。釋依他起亦名勝義無性。此文不說之所由。無之

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：長行分為兩部分。首先分別解釋三種無自性，然後總括解釋頌文的含義。在分別解釋頌文中，又分為兩部分。首先解釋前兩頌的三種無自性，然後解釋第三頌的唯識真性。在第一部分中，又分為兩部分。首先解釋第一頌的總回答的含義，其次解釋第二頌的三種無自性。現在所說的三種無自性，是依據前面所說的遍計所執等三種自性，建立這三種無自性：一是相無自性，二是生無自性，三是勝義無自性。《解深密經》中，德本菩薩請佛解說，佛說：『雖然有云云，一切都與此相同。』 論：『說密意言』至『總說無性』。 述曰：解釋密意之言。現在論中說，所謂的后兩種自性，雖然本體並非沒有，但是有愚夫對它們增益等等。如同前面所引用的《攝大乘論》所說，依他起性是遍計所執的所緣，圓成實性依據展轉的說法，也是遍計所執的。經文說，不是通過分別觀察三種自性來建立三種無自性，而是由於有情在依他起自性和圓成實性上，增益遍計所執自性，所以我才建立三種無自性性，乃至廣說。所以，依據三種自性有體、無體，總括密意來說三種無自性。三種無自性並非沒有後兩種自性，只是沒有遍計所執。 論：『云何依此而立彼三？』 述曰：上面解釋第一頌的總回答的含義完畢。從下面開始將要解釋第二頌中分別的三種無自性，所以先提問。 論：『謂依此初』至『無性所顯』。 述曰：第一種自性本體是無，后兩種是秘密地說明，因為本體是有法的。其餘的文字可以知道，不煩瑣地重複解釋。勝義無自性只是由無自性所顯現，所以名為無自性。依他起有因緣而生，沒有自然而生的自性，所以名為無自性。分別配合解釋頌文，應該如理地理解。 論：『雖依他起』至『故此不說』。 述曰：解釋依他起也名為勝義無自性。這段文字說明了為什麼這裡沒有說。沒有的原因是……

【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: The prose section is divided into two parts. First, it separately explains the three absence of inherent existence (three niḥsvabhāvatā), and then it summarizes the meaning of the verses. Within the separate explanation of the verses, it is further divided into two parts. First, it explains the three absence of inherent existence in the first two verses, and then it explains the true nature of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātratā) in the third verse. In the first part, it is again divided into two parts. First, it explains the meaning of the general answer in the first verse, and then it explains the three absence of inherent existence in the second verse. The three absence of inherent existence now being discussed are established based on the three natures (trisvabhāva) previously mentioned, namely the completely imputed nature (parikalpita), etc. These are: (1) absence of inherent characteristics (lakṣaṇa-niḥsvabhāvatā), (2) absence of inherent origination (utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā), and (3) absence of inherent ultimate reality (paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā). In the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, the Bodhisattva Virtue Root (Guṇākara) requested the Buddha to explain, and the Buddha said, 'Although there are such and such [differences], everything is the same as this.' Treatise: 'Speaking of the secret meaning' to 'generally speaking of absence of inherent existence.' Commentary: Explaining the words of secret meaning. The treatise now says that although the latter two natures are not without substance, foolish people add to them, etc. As mentioned in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, the dependent nature (paratantra) is the object of the completely imputed, and the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna) is also completely imputed according to the explanation of dependent origination. The sutra says that the three absence of inherent existence are not established by separately observing the three natures, but because sentient beings add the completely imputed nature to the dependent nature and the perfected nature, I establish the three absence of inherent existence, and so on. Therefore, based on the three natures having substance and not having substance, the three absence of inherent existence are spoken of in a general secret meaning. The three absence of inherent existence do not mean that the latter two natures are absent, but only that the completely imputed is absent. Treatise: 'How are these three established based on this?' Commentary: The above explanation of the meaning of the general answer in the first verse is completed. From below, the separate three absence of inherent existence in the second verse will be explained, so the question is raised first. Treatise: 'That is, based on this first' to 'manifested by absence of inherent existence.' Commentary: The first nature is without substance, and the latter two are secretly explained because the substance has dharma. The remaining text can be understood, so there is no need to repeat the explanation. Ultimate absence of inherent existence is called absence of inherent existence only because it is manifested by absence of inherent existence. The dependent arises from conditions and does not have the nature of arising naturally, so it is called absence of inherent existence. The separate matching explanation of the verses should be understood reasonably. Treatise: 'Although dependent origination' to 'therefore this is not said.' Commentary: Explaining that dependent origination is also called ultimate absence of inherent existence. This text explains why it is not mentioned here. The reason for the absence is...

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言非。依他雖有體法。而非勝義名勝義無性。所執無故不可為例。又七十六云謂諸法生無自性性故說名無自性。故即緣生法。顯揚云。不遮緣生。遮自然生故。即緣生法亦名勝義無自性性。于諸法中若是清凈所緣境。我顯彼為勝義無性。依他起相亦是清凈所緣境界故。亦說為勝義無性。無漏后得真智名勝。亦緣此依他為境故。此依他亦名清凈所緣。勝之義故。所執既無非為聖境。不得此名。然無彼計所執故。故說勝義無性。乃至廣說。若說依他為勝義無性。此圓成實即為第二勝義無性。今恐依他勝義無性濫第二圓成勝義無性故。此頌中但說圓成勝義無性。不說依他為勝義無性。應如彼經廣說譬喻。

論。此性即是至勝義諦故。

述曰。下第二段解唯識性。別配釋頌如理應知。其圓成實勝義無性。即是諸法勝義諦也。

論。然勝義諦至謂一真法界。

述曰。然二諦義及引論文。如第一卷抄廣樹彼義。此隨淺深以立四種。皆勝之義。或以勝為義。勝即是義。隨其所應皆勝於初世俗諦故。然此初真即十善巧。第二即是四諦因果理等。第三即是依詮顯實。第四廢詮談旨。且一往為論。三乘合明二諦非唯菩薩。如顯揚第二．第六．第十九．瑜伽五十五．五十四．對法第六等說。

論。此中勝義至

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 言非。如果說依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava，緣起性）具有體法，但它並非勝義無性（Paramartha-nihsvabhava，勝義諦的無自性），因為它所執著的自性並不存在，所以不能作為例子。又，《七十六論》中說：『所謂的諸法生起沒有自性，因此被稱為無自性。』所以，緣生法（Pratītyasamutpāda，因緣和合而生的法）本身。《顯揚聖教論》中說：『不遮止緣生，而是遮止自然生。』因此，緣生法也被稱為勝義無自性。在諸法中，如果是清凈的所緣境，我就把它顯示為勝義無性。依他起相也是清凈的所緣境界，所以也被稱為勝義無性。無漏后得智被稱為『勝』，因為它也以依他起性為境界。因此，這個依他起性也被稱為清凈的所緣，具有『勝』的意義。因為所執著的自性不存在，所以它不是聖者的境界，不能得到這個名稱。然而，因為它沒有被計度的自性，所以被稱為勝義無性，乃至廣說。如果說依他起性是勝義無性，那麼圓成實性（Parinispanna-svabhava，圓滿成就的自性）就是第二種勝義無性。現在恐怕依他起性的勝義無性與第二種圓成實性的勝義無性相混淆，所以這首偈頌中只說了圓成實性的勝義無性，沒有說依他起性是勝義無性。應該像那部經中廣泛地講述譬喻一樣。

論：此性即是至勝義諦故。

述曰：下面第二段解釋唯識性，分別配合解釋偈頌，應該如理地瞭解。圓成實性的勝義無性，就是諸法的勝義諦。

論：然勝義諦至謂一真法界。

述曰：關於二諦的意義以及引用的論文，如第一卷抄本中廣泛地闡述了那個意義。這裡根據深淺程度設立了四種，都具有『勝』的意義。或者以『勝』作為意義，『勝』就是意義。根據它們各自的情況，都勝過最初的世俗諦（Samvriti-satya，相對真理）。然而，這最初的真理就是十善巧。第二種就是四諦（Arya-satya，四聖諦）的因果理等。第三種就是依詮顯實。第四種就是廢詮談旨。且暫且這樣論述。三乘（Triyana，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）合起來闡明二諦，並非只有菩薩。如《顯揚聖教論》第二、第六、第十九，《瑜伽師地論》第五十五、五十四，《對法論》第六等所說。

論：此中勝義至

【English Translation】 English version: It is not so. Although the dependent nature (Paratantra-svabhava) has a substantial entity, it is not the ultimate nature of no self (Paramartha-nihsvabhava), because the self that is clung to does not exist, so it cannot be taken as an example. Furthermore, the Seventy-Six Treatise states: 'The so-called arising of all dharmas without self-nature is called no self-nature.' Therefore, the dependent arising (Pratītyasamutpāda) itself. The Exposition of the Holy Teaching states: 'It does not negate dependent arising, but negates natural arising.' Therefore, dependent arising is also called the ultimate nature of no self. Among all dharmas, if it is a pure object of cognition, I reveal it as the ultimate nature of no self. The aspect of dependent arising is also a pure object of cognition, so it is also called the ultimate nature of no self. The non-outflow subsequent wisdom is called 'ultimate' because it also takes dependent arising as its object. Therefore, this dependent arising is also called a pure object of cognition, having the meaning of 'ultimate'. Because the self that is clung to does not exist, it is not the realm of the sages and cannot obtain this name. However, because it does not have the self that is conceived, it is called the ultimate nature of no self, and so on, extensively speaking. If dependent arising is said to be the ultimate nature of no self, then the perfectly established nature (Parinispanna-svabhava) is the second ultimate nature of no self. Now, fearing that the ultimate nature of no self of dependent arising will be confused with the ultimate nature of no self of the second perfectly established nature, this verse only speaks of the ultimate nature of no self of the perfectly established nature, and does not say that dependent arising is the ultimate nature of no self. It should be like the extensive explanation of metaphors in that sutra.

Treatise: 'This nature is the ultimate truth.'

Commentary: The second section below explains the nature of consciousness-only, and the explanation of the verses should be understood accordingly. The ultimate nature of no self of the perfectly established nature is the ultimate truth of all dharmas.

Treatise: 'However, the ultimate truth is the one true realm of reality.'

Commentary: Regarding the meaning of the two truths and the cited texts, the meaning is extensively elaborated in the first volume. Here, four types are established according to the depth, all having the meaning of 'ultimate'. Or, 'ultimate' is taken as the meaning, and 'ultimate' is the meaning. According to their respective situations, they all surpass the initial conventional truth (Samvriti-satya). However, this initial truth is the ten skillful actions. The second is the causal principles of the Four Noble Truths (Arya-satya). The third is revealing reality based on the teachings. The fourth is abandoning the teachings and discussing the essence. And for the time being, let's discuss it this way. The three vehicles (Triyana) together clarify the two truths, not only Bodhisattvas. As stated in the Exposition of the Holy Teaching, the second, sixth, and nineteenth sections, the Yoga Practice Treatise, sections fifty-five and fifty-four, and the Treatise on Dharma, section six.

Treatise: 'Among these ultimate truths...'

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不虛妄義。

述曰。前三非如故言亦也。真簡有漏。有漏妄故。如簡無漏有為。彼體雖真有生滅故。又真簡初性。以妄執故。如簡依他。有生滅故。余文可解。

論。亦言顯此至隨義廣釋。

述曰。謂大般若乃有十二名。如前第二卷說。又對法第二有七名。謂真如．無我性．空性．無相．實際．勝義．法界。此論本頌但有二名。並此釋師但有四號。故言等者等餘三名。如餘論中隨義廣釋。對法解云。體恒無我。無有改轉。名曰真如。性離二我名無我。由緣此故雜染空寂。說之為空。謂色乃至菩提諸相寂滅名無相。無倒究竟無倒所緣名為實際。聖智所行名為勝義。與此解同。三乘妙法所依相故名為法界。界者體義。但妙法依。性者體義。一切法體故名法性。湛然離倒名不虛妄。余隨所應一切當知如體法等。佛地第七有六名。實有與對法別。皆廣解。瑜伽．顯揚雖有名。並不如對法。不能繁引。此解第三頌上三句訖。即是勝鬘．瑜伽等無作四諦如非安立諦也。

次解第四句。

論。此性即是至說實性言。

述曰。初解二性依依他起故。此初解以真如實性簡計所執性。顯其頌意。

論。復有二性至故說實性。

述曰。謂相及性。性者實體。即唯真如。相亦名體。依他體故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不虛妄義。

述曰：前文所說的三種『非』，就像以前所說的那樣，也是如此。『真』簡別『有漏』，因為『有漏』是虛妄的緣故。就像『真』簡別『有漏有為』，雖然它們的體是真實的，但有生滅的緣故。又，『真』簡別『初性』，因為有虛妄執著的緣故，就像『真』簡別『依他起性』，因為有生滅的緣故。其餘的文字可以理解。

論：『亦』字顯示從『隨義廣釋』開始。

述曰：指的是《大般若經》有十二個名稱，如前面第二卷所說。另外，《對法論》第二卷有七個名稱，即真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）、無我性（Anatmata，沒有自我的性質）、空性（Sunyata，空虛的性質）、無相（Animitta，沒有表象）、實際（Bhutakoti，真實的界限）、勝義（Paramartha，最高的真理）、法界（Dharmadhatu，一切法的界限）。此論的本頌只有兩個名稱，並且這位釋師只有四個稱號，所以說『等者』，是等同其餘三個名稱，如在其他論中隨著意義廣泛解釋。《對法論》解釋說：『體恒常無我，沒有改變和轉動，名為真如。性遠離二我，名為無我。由於緣於此，雜染空寂，說之為『空』。所謂色乃至菩提的各種相寂滅，名為無相。無倒究竟，無倒所緣，名為實際。聖智所行，名為勝義。』與此解釋相同。三乘妙法所依之相，名為法界。『界』是體的意思，只是妙法所依。『性』是體的意思，一切法的體，所以名為法性。湛然遠離顛倒，名不虛妄。其餘的應當根據相應的情況，一切都應當知道，如體法等。《佛地論》第七卷有六個名稱，『實有』與《對法論》不同，都廣泛地解釋。《瑜伽師地論》、《顯揚聖教論》雖然有名，但不如《對法論》，不能繁瑣地引用。此解釋第三頌的上三句完畢，即是《勝鬘經》、《瑜伽師地論》等所說的無作四諦，如非安立諦。

接下來解釋第四句。

論：『此性即是』到『說實性言』。

述曰：最初解釋二性，因為依他起性的緣故。此最初解釋用真如實性簡別計所執性（Parikalpita-laksana，遍計所執性），顯示其頌的意義。

論：『復有二性』到『故說實性』。

述曰：指的是相和性。『性』是實體，即唯有真如。『相』也名為體，因為是依他體的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version Non-deceptive meaning.

Commentary: The previous three 'non-' are just as previously stated. 'True' distinguishes 'defiled' (with outflows), because 'defiled' is illusory. Just as 'true' distinguishes 'defiled conditioned phenomena', although their essence is real, they are subject to arising and ceasing. Also, 'true' distinguishes 'original nature', because of illusory attachments, just as 'true' distinguishes 'dependent origination', because it is subject to arising and ceasing. The remaining text can be understood.

Treatise: The word 'also' indicates the broad explanation of meaning from 'according to meaning'.

Commentary: It refers to the fact that the Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra has twelve names, as mentioned in the second chapter earlier. In addition, the second volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya has seven names, namely: Tathata (真如, suchness), Anatmata (無我性, no-self nature), Sunyata (空性, emptiness), Animitta (無相, signlessness), Bhutakoti (實際, the limit of reality), Paramartha (勝義, ultimate truth), and Dharmadhatu (法界, the realm of dharma). The verses of this treatise only have two names, and this commentator only has four titles, so the phrase 'and so on' is equivalent to the remaining three names, as explained broadly according to meaning in other treatises. The Abhidharma-samuccaya explains: 'The essence is eternally without self, without change or alteration, and is called Tathata. The nature is apart from the two selves and is called Anatmata. Because of relying on this, defilements are empty and still, and it is called 'emptiness'. The various characteristics of form and even Bodhi are extinguished and still, and are called signlessness. Without inversion, ultimately, the object of non-inverted perception is called Bhutakoti. What is practiced by holy wisdom is called Paramartha.' This explanation is the same. The characteristic upon which the wonderful Dharma of the Three Vehicles relies is called Dharmadhatu. 'Dhatu' means essence, it is simply what the wonderful Dharma relies on. 'Nature' means essence, it is the essence of all dharmas, so it is called Dharma-nature. Serene and free from inversion is called non-deceptive. The rest should be known according to the corresponding circumstances, such as essence-dharma and so on. The seventh chapter of the Buddhabhumi Sutra has six names, 'real existence' is different from the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and all are explained broadly. Although the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma have names, they are not as good as the Abhidharma-samuccaya, and cannot be cited in detail. This explanation of the first three lines of the third verse is completed, which is the uncreated Four Noble Truths as stated in the Srimala Sutra, Yogacarabhumi-sastra, etc., such as the non-established truth.

Next, explain the fourth line.

Treatise: 'This nature is' to 'saying real nature'.

Commentary: Initially explaining the two natures, because of dependent origination. This initial explanation uses the real nature of Tathata to distinguish the Parikalpita-laksana (遍計所執性, the completely conceptualized nature), revealing the meaning of the verse.

Treatise: 'Again, there are two natures' to 'therefore saying real nature'.

Commentary: It refers to characteristics and nature. 'Nature' is substance, which is only Tathata. 'Characteristic' is also called substance, because it is the essence of dependent origination.

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。有法相對。不明初性。以無體故。

論。三頌總顯至都無自性。

述曰。初一性無。后二定有。余文易了。不煩重解。總釋頌意也。

上來二十五行頌。有二二別判。一云前二十四頌明唯識相。第二十五頌明唯識性。一云二十五行頌中。初之一頌半略明能變識相。第二餘二十三頌半廣明能變相。釋諸妨難訖。自下五頌明唯識所入之位。既說世間假說我法遍計所執諸法皆空。此假我法皆依識變。能變之識略有三種。二十四頌廣為分別。即依他起體虛幻有。此虛妄識必有實體故。次前一頌明識之性。即圓成實。雖知諸法皆是唯識若相．若性。要慚修行證入聖位。故下五頌明所入位。所求大果福智無邊。非少修行即速圓證。非行一行便證多果。必須三劫修無邊因故。三劫者皆因位攝。即前四頌。后之一頌所求果滿。即如來位。初之四頌分三劫者。初之二位是初劫攝。雖行勝行猶未證真。學行千差位有遠近。故以二頌顯明初劫。第三頌全。第四少分解第二劫。初證聖位見．修位差故。唯第三一頌偏明見道。地位雖長證理是等。故第四頌合明二劫。第四頌半明第三劫。就五位中。初結上文彰后所明生下五位。后舉頌文正釋五位。初中有三。一結上為三問。二隨問略為三答。三廣前所答別三問答。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 有『法』（dharma）相對，不明『初性』（primal nature），以『無體』（without substance）故。

論：三頌總顯至都無自性。

述曰：初一性無，后二定有，余文易了，不煩重解，總釋頌意也。

上來二十五行頌，有二二別判。一云前二十四頌明『唯識相』（aspects of consciousness-only），第二十五頌明『唯識性』（nature of consciousness-only）。一云二十五行頌中，初之一頌半略明『能變識相』（aspects of transforming consciousness），第二餘二十三頌半廣明『能變相』（transforming aspects）。釋諸妨難訖。自下五頌明『唯識所入之位』（stages of entering consciousness-only）。既說世間假說我法遍計所執諸法皆空。此假我法皆依識變。能變之識略有三種。二十四頌廣為分別。即『依他起』（dependent origination）體虛幻有。此虛妄識必有實體故。次前一頌明識之性。即『圓成實』（perfected reality）。雖知諸法皆是唯識若相．若性。要慚修行證入聖位。故下五頌明所入位。所求大果福智無邊。非少修行即速圓證。非行一行便證多果。必須三劫修無邊因故。三劫者皆因位攝。即前四頌。后之一頌所求果滿。即『如來位』（Tathagata stage）。初之四頌分三劫者。初之二位是初劫攝。雖行勝行猶未證真。學行千差位有遠近。故以二頌顯明初劫。第三頌全。第四少分解第二劫。初證聖位見．修位差故。唯第三一頌偏明見道。地位雖長證理是等。故第四頌合明二劫。第四頌半明第三劫。就五位中，初結上文彰后所明生下五位。后舉頌文正釋五位。初中有三。一結上為三問。二隨問略為三答。三廣前所答別三問答。

論

【English Translation】 There are relative 'dharmas' (laws/phenomena). Not understanding the 'primal nature' (original essence), because of 'having no substance' (being without inherent existence).

Treatise: The three verses comprehensively reveal that all things lack inherent nature.

Commentary: The first verse negates existence, the latter two affirm existence. The remaining text is easily understood, so there's no need for repeated explanations. This is a general explanation of the verses' meaning.

The preceding twenty-five lines of verses are divided into two sets of two. One says that the first twenty-four verses explain the 'aspects of consciousness-only' (Vijnaptimatrata), and the twenty-fifth verse explains the 'nature of consciousness-only' (Vijnaptimatrata). Another says that among the twenty-five lines of verses, the first one and a half verses briefly explain the 'aspects of transforming consciousness' (parinama-vijnana), and the remaining twenty-three and a half verses extensively explain the 'transforming aspects' (parinama). Having finished explaining the various objections and difficulties, the following five verses explain the 'stages of entering consciousness-only' (Vijnaptimatrata). Since it is said that all phenomena of the world, the falsely asserted self and dharmas, and the 'pervasively conceptualized' (parikalpita) are empty, these false self and dharmas all depend on the transformation of consciousness. The transforming consciousness is roughly of three types. The twenty-four verses extensively distinguish them. That is, 'dependent origination' (paratantra) is illusory existence in nature. This illusory consciousness must have a real substance. Therefore, the preceding verse explains the nature of consciousness, which is 'perfected reality' (parinispanna). Although it is known that all phenomena are consciousness-only, whether aspects or nature, one must humbly cultivate and realize the holy stages. Therefore, the following five verses explain the stages to be entered. The great fruit sought is boundless in blessings and wisdom. It cannot be quickly and completely realized with little cultivation. One cannot realize many fruits by practicing only one practice. One must cultivate boundless causes for three kalpas (aeons). These three kalpas are all included in the stages of cause, which are the preceding four verses. The last verse is the fulfillment of the fruit sought, which is the 'Tathagata stage' (Tathagata-avastha). The first four verses divide the three kalpas. The first two stages are included in the first kalpa. Although one practices superior practices, one has not yet realized the truth. The learning practices differ in thousands of ways, and the stages have distances. Therefore, these two verses clearly explain the first kalpa. The third verse is complete. The fourth verse slightly explains the second kalpa. Because there are differences in the stages of seeing and cultivating when one first realizes the holy stage. Only the third verse specifically explains the path of seeing. Although the stages are long, the realization of the principle is equal. Therefore, the fourth verse combines and explains the two kalpas. The fourth verse and a half explain the third kalpa. Among the five stages, the first concludes the previous text and highlights the following five stages to be explained. Then, it cites the verse text to correctly explain the five stages. The first part has three aspects: first, concluding the previous text with three questions; second, briefly answering the questions accordingly; and third, extensively answering the questions separately.

Treatise

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。如是所成唯識相性。

述曰。結牒上文二十四頌相。末後一頌性也。

論。誰于幾位如何悟入。

述曰。為三問也。誰者問能入人。五乘不同誰能悟入　于幾位者。問所經位。既言悟入幾位入也。凡經時節多少短長　如何悟入。問入方便。雖知唯識如何方便而悟入也。

論。謂具大乘至漸次悟入。

述曰。此略答也　謂具大乘二種種姓答能入人。通定．不定性大根器者。非余乘也　略於五位。答所經時。十三住等略為五也。大果難感故經五位　漸次悟入。答入方便。萬行難修。二果叵證。非頓方便即能入也。

論。何謂大乘二種種姓。

述曰。第三別問。別答。廣前略答。于中分三。如前總釋。

論。一本姓住種姓至無漏法因。

述曰。此即依前種子三義中第三正義答。未聞正法但無漏種無始自成。不曾熏習令其增長名本種姓。性者體也。姓者類也。謂本性來住此菩薩種子姓類差別。不由今有名本性住種姓。三十五菩薩地云。無始法爾六處殊勝名本姓住種。正與此同。即種姓住。

論。二習所成種姓至熏習所成。

述曰。此聞正法以去令無漏舊種增長名習種姓。菩薩地說聞十二分教法界等流平等而流故。謂大定緣如起俱時正智後生后得。后得

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以上所說就是唯識的相和性。

述記說：總結概括了前面二十四頌所說的相，最後一頌是說性。

論：誰在哪些階段，如何領悟並進入唯識的境界？

述記說：這是三個問題。『誰』是問誰能進入，五乘根器不同，誰能領悟並進入？『于幾位』是問所經歷的階段，既然說是領悟進入，那麼要經過哪些階段才能進入？總共要經歷多少時間，是長是短？『如何悟入』是問進入的方法，即使知道唯識，要用什麼方法才能領悟並進入？

論：具有大乘根性的眾生，通過五個階段，逐漸領悟並進入。

述記說：這是簡略的回答。『謂具大乘二種種姓』回答的是能進入的人，包括定性和不定性的大乘根器的人，不是其他乘的人。『略於五位』回答的是所經歷的時間，將十三個住位等概括為五個階段。因為大的果位難以證得，所以要經歷五個階段。『漸次悟入』回答的是進入的方法，因為萬行難以修習，二果難以證得，不是用簡單的方法就能進入的。

論：什麼叫做大乘的兩種種姓？

述記說：這是第三個別問別答，詳細解釋前面的簡略回答。其中分為三部分，如前面總體解釋的那樣。

論：一是本性住種姓（本來就具有的成佛潛質），指本來就具有無漏法（沒有煩惱的清凈之法）的因。

述記說：這是依據前面種子三義中的第三個正義來回答。沒有聽聞正法，但是具有無漏種子，從無始以來自然存在，不曾通過熏習使其增長，這叫做本性住種姓。性是體，姓是類，意思是說，從本性上就具有這種菩薩的種子，姓類有所差別，不是現在才有的，所以叫做本性住種姓。《三十五菩薩地經》說，從無始以來，法爾如是，六處殊勝，叫做本姓住種，與此相同，也就是種姓住。

論：二是習所成種姓（通過後天學習而成就的成佛潛質），指通過熏習而成就。

述記說：這是指聽聞正法以後，使無漏的舊種子增長，叫做習種姓。《菩薩地經》說，聽聞十二分教，法界等流，平等流注，所以說，大定為緣，如起俱時正智後生后得（在獲得根本智之後，由根本智所引發的智慧）。

【English Translation】 English version: Such is the nature and characteristics of Vijñaptimātratā (Consciousness-only).

The commentary states: This concludes and summarizes the twenty-four verses on characteristics mentioned above. The last verse is about nature.

The treatise asks: Who, in which stages, and how does one realize and enter?

The commentary states: These are three questions. 'Who' asks who can enter; with the five vehicles having different capacities, who can realize and enter? 'In which stages' asks about the stages one goes through; since it speaks of realizing and entering, which stages must one go through to enter? How much time does it take, long or short? 'How does one realize and enter' asks about the method of entry; even if one knows Vijñaptimātratā, what method should one use to realize and enter?

The treatise states: Those with the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) nature gradually realize and enter through five stages.

The commentary states: This is a brief answer. 'Those with the Mahāyāna two kinds of nature' answers who can enter, including those with definite and indefinite Mahāyāna capacities, not those of other vehicles. 'Briefly in five stages' answers the time involved, summarizing the thirteen abodes into five stages. Because great fruits are difficult to attain, one goes through five stages. 'Gradually realize and enter' answers the method of entry, because myriad practices are difficult to cultivate, and the second fruit is difficult to attain, one cannot enter with a simple method.

The treatise asks: What are the two kinds of Mahāyāna nature?

The commentary states: This is the third separate question and answer, explaining the previous brief answer in detail. It is divided into three parts, as explained in the general explanation above.

The treatise states: First, the innate nature (本性住種姓, běn xìng zhù zhǒng xìng) refers to the cause of the unconditioned dharma (無漏法, wú lòu fǎ, dharma without defilements) that one inherently possesses.

The commentary states: This answers based on the third correct meaning of the three meanings of seed mentioned earlier. Without having heard the correct dharma, but possessing the unconditioned seed, which has existed naturally since beginningless time, and has not been cultivated to grow, this is called the innate nature. 'Nature' is substance, 'lineage' is category, meaning that from the beginning, one possesses this Bodhisattva seed, with differences in category, not something that exists only now, so it is called the innate nature. The Thirty-Five Bodhisattva Grounds Sutra says, 'From beginningless time, naturally so, the six places are superior,' which is called the innate lineage, which is the same as this, that is, the lineage abode.

The treatise states: Second, the acquired nature (習所成種姓, xí suǒ chéng zhǒng xìng) refers to that which is accomplished through cultivation.

The commentary states: This refers to the growth of the old unconditioned seed after hearing the correct dharma, which is called the acquired nature. The Bodhisattva Grounds Sutra says that hearing the twelve divisions of teachings, the dharma realm flows equally, so it is said that great samādhi is the condition, such as the arising of simultaneous correct wisdom, which arises later and is attained later (after obtaining fundamental wisdom, the wisdom that arises from fundamental wisdom).

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復生大悲。大悲起化身。化身方說此法。此法故名平等流也。又法界性若能悟時。便能斷生死趣大涅槃。此亦如是。又法界性善順惡違具諸功德。此亦如是故名等流。等者相似義。流者出義。從彼所出與彼相似故名等流　聞所成等。即是三惠所成。非必新生方名為成。令種增長亦名成故。若由三惠無漏種增。何故乃言聞所成等。意顯能成非唯有惠。惠俱品法亦能成故。能成既爾所成亦然。故論說言聞所成等。

論。要具大乘至悟入唯識。

述曰。此非唯一乘姓。三乘種姓不定姓者亦是此人。具大乘者方能入故。但言大乘簡彼定性。及無種姓。此是未種解脫分善名本種姓。未聞無漏法令無漏種增。種解脫分善根以去名習種姓。聞無漏教為緣令無漏種增故。菩薩地說正與此同。勘彼應說。此下不解故別出之。然仁王經．及瓔珞等經所說所同者如別抄會。攝論第六說。誰能悟入所應知相。大乘多聞熏習相續。已得逢事諸佛出世。得定勝解。集諸善根善修福智資糧菩薩。彼約有多功能。四種力故方能悟入。然於此中唯言具本性種姓。即彼所言大乘等也。習所成等。即彼所言多聞熏習等。即因力也。彼餘三力。下入位中所須方說。故此與彼廣略不同。至下當知。然具本性猶未能入。具習所成方能入故。即是攝論能入

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 復生大悲（偉大的慈悲）。大悲（偉大的慈悲）生起化身（佛爲了度化眾生而顯現的各種身形）。化身（佛爲了度化眾生而顯現的各種身形）才能宣說此法。此法故名平等流（從佛的智慧流出，平等利益一切眾生的法）。又法界性（宇宙萬法的真實本性）若能悟時（如果能夠領悟），便能斷生死（脫離生死輪迴）趣大涅槃（達到最終的解脫）。此亦如是（此平等流之法也是如此）。又法界性（宇宙萬法的真實本性）善順惡違（順應善行，違背惡行）具諸功德（具備各種功德）。此亦如是（此平等流之法也是如此）故名等流（所以稱為等流）。等者相似義（'等'是相似的意思）。流者出義（'流'是流出的意思）。從彼所出與彼相似故名等流（從法界性流出，與法界性相似，所以稱為等流）。聞所成等（通過聽聞佛法等方式所成就的智慧）。即是三惠（聞、思、修三種智慧）所成。非必新生方名為成（不一定新產生的才叫做成就）。令種增長亦名成故（使種子增長也叫做成就）。若由三惠（聞、思、修三種智慧）無漏種增（使無漏的種子增長），何故乃言聞所成等（為什麼只說聽聞所成就的智慧呢）？意顯能成非唯有惠（意思是說，能夠成就智慧的，不僅僅只有智慧）。惠俱品法亦能成故（與智慧相應的其他法也能成就智慧）。能成既爾所成亦然（能成就智慧的如此，所成就的智慧也是如此）。故論說言聞所成等（所以論中說聽聞所成就的智慧等）。 論（論著）。要具大乘（必須具備大乘佛教的根基）至悟入唯識（才能領悟唯識的道理）。 述曰（解釋說）。此非唯一乘姓（這不僅僅是唯一乘的種姓）。三乘種姓（具有聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘三種根性）不定姓者亦是此人（不確定自己屬於哪一種根性的人也是如此）。具大乘者方能入故（具備大乘根基的人才能進入）。但言大乘簡彼定性（只說大乘，是爲了排除那些已經確定自己根性的人）。及無種姓（以及沒有種姓的人）。此是未種解脫分善名本種姓（這指的是還沒有種下解脫善根，稱為本種姓）。未聞無漏法令無漏種增（還沒有聽聞無漏的佛法，使無漏的種子增長）。種解脫分善根以去名習種姓（種下解脫的善根之後，稱為習種姓）。聞無漏教為緣令無漏種增故（聽聞無漏的教法，作為因緣，使無漏的種子增長）。菩薩地說正與此同（《菩薩地持經》所說的，與此相同）。勘彼應說（應該參考《菩薩地持經》來解釋）。此下不解故別出之（因為下面難以理解，所以特別提出來）。然仁王經（《仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經》）.及瓔珞等經所說所同者如別抄會（《仁王護國般若波羅蜜多經》和《瓔珞經》等經所說的相同之處，可以參考其他的抄本）。攝論第六說（《攝大乘論》第六卷說）。誰能悟入所應知相（誰能夠領悟所應該知道的真相）？大乘多聞熏習相續（大乘佛教中，聽聞佛法，不斷熏習）。已得逢事諸佛出世（已經有幸遇到諸佛出世）。得定勝解（獲得堅定的勝解）。集諸善根善修福智資糧菩薩（積累各種善根，善於修習福德和智慧資糧的菩薩）。彼約有多功能（那裡說的是有很多功能）。四種力故方能悟入（因為有四種力量才能領悟）。然於此中唯言具本性種姓（然而在這裡只說具備本性種姓）。即彼所言大乘等也（就是那裡所說的大乘等）。習所成等（通過熏習所成就的智慧等）。即彼所言多聞熏習等（就是那裡所說的聽聞佛法，不斷熏習等）。即因力也（就是因的力量）。彼餘三力（那裡的其餘三種力量）。下入位中所須方說（在進入下一階段時才需要說明）。故此與彼廣略不同（所以這裡和那裡，廣略不同）。至下當知（到下面就知道了）。然具本性猶未能入（然而具備本性，仍然不能進入）。具習所成方能入故（具備熏習所成就的智慧才能進入）。即是攝論能入（就是《攝大乘論》所說的能夠進入）。

【English Translation】 English version 'Fusheng Great Compassion (great compassion). Great Compassion arises as a manifested body (various forms that the Buddha manifests to liberate sentient beings). Only the manifested body (various forms that the Buddha manifests to liberate sentient beings) can expound this Dharma. Therefore, this Dharma is called Equality Flow (Dharma that flows from the Buddha's wisdom, equally benefiting all sentient beings). Furthermore, if one can realize the nature of Dharmadhatu (the true nature of all phenomena in the universe), one can cut off birth and death (escape the cycle of birth and death) and attain great Nirvana (ultimate liberation). This is also the case (this Dharma of Equality Flow is also like this). Furthermore, the nature of Dharmadhatu (the true nature of all phenomena in the universe) accords with good and opposes evil, possessing all virtues. This is also the case (this Dharma of Equality Flow is also like this), hence it is called Equality Flow (therefore it is called Equality Flow). 'Equality' means similarity. 'Flow' means outflowing. That which flows out from it is similar to it, hence it is called Equality Flow. Accomplishment through hearing, etc. (wisdom accomplished through listening to the Dharma, etc.). This is accomplished through the three wisdoms (wisdom of hearing, thinking, and cultivation). It is not necessarily that only newly arising is called accomplishment. Causing the seed to grow is also called accomplishment. If the seed of non-outflow (anāsrava) increases through the three wisdoms (wisdom of hearing, thinking, and cultivation), why is it said that accomplishment is through hearing, etc.? The intention is to show that what can accomplish is not only wisdom. The Dharma that accompanies wisdom can also accomplish it. Since what can accomplish is like this, what is accomplished is also like this. Therefore, the treatise says accomplishment through hearing, etc.' Treatise (śāstra). 'One must possess the Mahayana (great vehicle) foundation to realize the Vijnaptimatrata (consciousness-only) doctrine.' 'Explanation says. This is not only for those with the One Vehicle (ekayana) lineage. Those with the Three Vehicle (triyāna) lineage (those with the potential for Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) and those with an undetermined lineage are also included. Only those with the Mahayana foundation can enter. Saying only Mahayana excludes those with a fixed lineage and those without a lineage. This refers to those who have not yet planted the roots of liberation, called the original lineage. Those who have not heard the non-outflow Dharma to increase the non-outflow seed. Planting the roots of liberation is called the habitual lineage. Hearing the non-outflow teachings as a condition to increase the non-outflow seed. The Bodhisattva Bhumi (Bodhisattva Grounds) is exactly the same as this. Refer to it for explanation. The following is difficult to understand, so it is explained separately. The similarities in what is said in the Renwang Sutra (the Sutra of Humane Kings) and the Yingluo Sutra (the Garland Sutra), etc., can be found in other copies. The sixth volume of the She Lun (Compendium of Mahayana) says: Who can realize the aspects of what should be known? Bodhisattvas who have continuously cultivated the Mahayana through much hearing and learning, who have had the opportunity to encounter the Buddhas appearing in the world, who have attained firm understanding, and who have accumulated various roots of goodness and skillfully cultivated the resources of merit and wisdom. That refers to having many functions. Only with the four powers can one realize it. However, here it only says possessing the original lineage. That is what is said there as Mahayana, etc. Accomplishment through habituation, etc. That is what is said there as much hearing and learning, etc. That is the power of cause. The other three powers there are needed and explained when entering the next stage. Therefore, this and that are different in scope. It will be known below. However, possessing the original nature still cannot enter. Only possessing accomplishment through habituation can enter. That is what the She Lun (Compendium of Mahayana) says is able to enter.'

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章也。無性云。用．及用具皆待作者。故問入者誰能悟入。由能入者唯是因力。有餘力者是所須具。非正所須。故餘三力此中不說。勝解行地發心已去未入初地名習所成故。

論。何謂悟入唯識五位。

述曰。此為問廣前第二位。

論。一資糧位至順解脫分。

述曰。此在四十心．及已前位。從初發心乃至十回向終。皆名順解脫分。對法等說。暖等已前名解脫分。簡二乘故言大乘也。

論。二加行位至順抉擇分。

述曰。即在暖等四善根中。此在初劫。下文等言勝解行地攝故。

論。二通達位至所住見道。

述曰。即在初地初入地心。

論。四修習位至所住修道。

述曰。即從初地住及出心。乃至金剛無間心位。名為修道。

論。五究竟位至正等菩提。

述曰。金剛心后解脫道中盡未來際。此等五位下各釋名別出體性解三劫攝。無勞預解。攝大乘說。何處悟入。謂即于彼有見似法．似義等。乃至勝解行地見道．修道．究竟道等也。彼說四位。此說五位。合此初二為勝解行地故。即是攝論所入位章。無性云。此所入境。及能入位。

論。云何漸次悟入唯識。

述曰。此問廣前第三入法用。

論。謂諸菩薩至能深信解。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 章也。無性（Vasubandhu的弟子）說：『作用以及作用的工具都依賴於作者。』所以問誰能悟入。由於能悟入的唯有因的力量。有剩餘力量的是所需的工具，並非真正需要的。所以其餘三種力量（加行力、攝受力、成滿力）這裡不說。勝解行地（Adhimukticaryābhūmi）從發心之後到未入初地（Prathamabhūmi）之前，名為習所成故。

論：何謂悟入唯識的五位？

述曰：這是爲了廣泛地解釋前面的第二位。

論：一、資糧位（Saṃbhāra-avasthā）至順解脫分（Anuloma-nirvedha-bhāgīya）。

述曰：這在四十心以及此前的階段。從最初發心乃至十回向（Daśa-pariṇāmanā）結束，都名為順解脫分。《對法》（Abhidharma）等論中說，暖位（Uṣmagata）等之前名為解脫分。爲了區別二乘（Śrāvakayāna和Pratyekabuddhayāna），所以說是大乘（Mahāyāna）。

論：二、加行位（Prayoga-avasthā）至順抉擇分（Anuloma-nirveśa-bhāgīya）。

述曰：即在暖位等四善根（catvāri kuśala-mūlāni）中。這在初劫（kalpa）。下文等說勝解行地所攝故。

論：三、通達位（Darśana-avasthā）至所住見道（Darśanamārga）。

述曰：即在初地（Prathamabhūmi）初入地心。

論：四、修習位（Bhāvanā-avasthā）至所住修道（Bhāvanāmārga）。

述曰：即從初地住以及出心，乃至金剛無間心位（vajropamasamādhi），名為修道。

論：五、究竟位（Niṣṭhā-avasthā）至正等菩提（Sammasambodhi）。

述曰：金剛心后解脫道中盡未來際。此等五位下面各自解釋名稱，分別說明體性，解釋三劫（tri-kalpa）所攝。無需預先理解。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）說，何處悟入？謂即于彼有見似法、似義等，乃至勝解行地見道、修道、究竟道等也。彼說四位，此說五位，合此初二為勝解行地故。即是《攝論》所入位章。無性說：『這是所入境，以及能入位。』

論：云何漸次悟入唯識？

述曰：此問廣泛地解釋前面的第三入法用。

論：謂諸菩薩至能深信解。

【English Translation】 English version: Chapter also. Asaṅga's disciple said: 'Function and the tools of function all depend on the author.' Therefore, it is asked who can realize entry. Because only the power of cause can realize entry. Those with remaining power are the necessary tools, not the truly needed ones. Therefore, the remaining three powers (the power of effort, the power of reception, and the power of fulfillment) are not discussed here. The stage of Adhimukticaryābhūmi, from the arising of the aspiration for enlightenment until not entering the first ground (Prathamabhūmi), is called 'accomplished by practice'.

Treatise: What are the five stages of realizing entry into Vijñaptimātratā (Consciousness-only)?

Commentary: This is to broadly explain the second stage mentioned earlier.

Treatise: First, the stage of accumulation (Saṃbhāra-avasthā) up to the preparatory stage for liberation (Anuloma-nirvedha-bhāgīya).

Commentary: This is in the forty minds and the stages before that. From the initial arising of the aspiration for enlightenment up to the end of the ten dedications (Daśa-pariṇāmanā), all are called the preparatory stage for liberation. As stated in the Abhidharma and other treatises, the stage of warmth (Uṣmagata) and before is called the stage of liberation. To distinguish from the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), it is said to be Mahāyāna.

Treatise: Second, the stage of application (Prayoga-avasthā) up to the preparatory stage for decisive understanding (Anuloma-nirveśa-bhāgīya).

Commentary: This is in the four roots of goodness (catvāri kuśala-mūlāni) such as the stage of warmth. This is in the first kalpa. The following text and others say that it is included in the stage of Adhimukticaryābhūmi.

Treatise: Third, the stage of insight (Darśana-avasthā) up to the path of seeing (Darśanamārga) where one abides.

Commentary: This is in the first ground (Prathamabhūmi), the initial mind of entering the ground.

Treatise: Fourth, the stage of cultivation (Bhāvanā-avasthā) up to the path of cultivation (Bhāvanāmārga) where one abides.

Commentary: This is from the mind of abiding in and emerging from the first ground, up to the vajropamasamādhi (diamond-like concentration), called the path of cultivation.

Treatise: Fifth, the stage of completion (Niṣṭhā-avasthā) up to complete and perfect enlightenment (Sammasambodhi).

Commentary: After the diamond-like mind, in the path of liberation, extending to the end of future time. These five stages are explained below, each with its name, nature, and inclusion in the three kalpas (tri-kalpa). There is no need to understand them in advance. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says, where is realization entered? It is said that there, one sees appearances of Dharma and meaning, etc., up to the path of seeing, the path of cultivation, and the path of completion in the stage of Adhimukticaryābhūmi. It speaks of four stages, while this speaks of five stages, combining the first two into the stage of Adhimukticaryābhūmi. This is the chapter on the stages of entry in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Asaṅga's disciple said: 'This is the object of entry and the stage of being able to enter.'

Treatise: How does one gradually realize entry into Vijñaptimātratā?

Commentary: This question broadly explains the third function of entering the Dharma mentioned earlier.

Treatise: It is said that all Bodhisattvas until they can deeply believe and understand.

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述曰。此初二句亦貫通下。此初二位以道為位。即分出體。后三以分為位。即通出體。資糧位中能深信解。雖亦伏．除未多分故少而不說。信解初增但名信解。至下當知。

論。加行位中至引發真見。

述曰。初伏所取。次伏能取。伏令不起故名為除。非離伏時別名除也。至下當知。

論。在通達位如實通達。

述曰。方起無漏現行二智。證實相．性故。

論。修習位中至伏斷余障。

述曰。十地行多時劫長遠唸唸進習。名數數修伏余煩惱斷余智障。此等位中雖亦修證余行．余法。唯識為本方修余行。故但言唯識。

論。至究竟位至唯識相性。

述曰。全出二障功德智慧無不周備不同小聖故名為圓。無闕少故簡二乘也。其福．智二清凈極勝無有能過。不迷不闇故名為明。此簡菩薩。第十地菩薩雖皆遍有可名為圓未清凈故。如羅網中觀月等故不名為明。能盡未來化導一切。復令悟入唯識相故。顯非自濟成已度人故名法輪。輪者轉義。攝大乘說。由何能入。由善根力所任持故。三種練磨心斷除四處障。無性云。此即入因。謂由何因於此能入。故攝論云由何云何而得悟入等。無性云此能入具。彼在此論資糧位中。彼論四尋思等所作方便．所入．入喻。及下初順解脫

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述：以上最初兩句也貫穿下文。最初的兩個位次以『道』（marga）為位次，即分出『體』（dhatu）。後面的三個位次以『分』為位次，即貫通出『體』。在資糧位（sambhara-marga）中能夠深深地信解，雖然也能夠潛伏和去除，但因為沒有多分，所以很少而不說。信解最初增長，但名為信解，到下文自然會知道。

論：在加行位（prayoga-marga）中，直至引發真見（satya-darsana）。

窺基法師述：最初潛伏所取，其次潛伏能取。潛伏使之不起，所以名為『除』，並非離開潛伏時另外名為『除』。到下文自然會知道。

論：在通達位（darsana-marga）中，如實通達。

窺基法師述：才生起無漏現行二智（jnana），證實相（tathata）、性（svabhava）的緣故。

論：在修習位（bhavana-marga）中，直至潛伏斷除其餘的障礙。

窺基法師述：十地（bhumi）的修行多，時間長遠，唸唸進習，名為數數修，潛伏其餘的煩惱，斷除其餘的智障。這些位次中雖然也修證其餘的行、其餘的法，但以唯識（vijnapti-matrata）為根本才修其餘的行，所以只說唯識。

論：直至究竟位（nistha-marga），直至唯識的相（lakshana）和性（svabhava）。

窺基法師述：完全脫離二障（avarana），功德和智慧沒有不周遍具備的，不同於小乘聖者，所以名為『圓』，沒有缺少，這是爲了簡別二乘。其福德和智慧兩種清凈極其殊勝，沒有能夠超過的，不迷惑不昏暗，所以名為『明』，這是爲了簡別菩薩。第十地菩薩雖然都普遍具有，可以名為『圓』，但未清凈的緣故，如羅網中觀看月亮等，所以不名為『明』。能夠盡未來際化導一切，又使他們悟入唯識的相，所以顯示不是隻自度，而是成就后度人，所以名為法輪（dharma-cakra）。輪是運轉的意思。《攝大乘論》（Mahayana-samgraha）說：由什麼能夠進入？由善根力所任持的緣故。三種練磨心斷除四處障。無性（Asanga）說：這即是入因，謂由何因於此能入？故《攝大乘論》說由何云何而得悟入等。無性說這能入具。彼在此論資糧位中。彼論四尋思等所作方便、所入、入喻，及下文最初的順解脫分（anuloma-nirvedha-bhagiya）。

【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: The first two sentences also connect to what follows. The first two stages take the 'path' (marga) as their stage, thus distinguishing the 'essence' (dhatu). The latter three take 'division' as their stage, thus connecting to the 'essence'. In the stage of accumulation (sambhara-marga), one can deeply believe and understand, although there is also latent suppression and removal, but because it is not a large part, it is rarely mentioned. The initial increase in belief and understanding is only called belief and understanding; this will be known later.

Treatise: In the stage of application (prayoga-marga), up to the generation of true vision (satya-darsana).

Commentary: First, latent suppression of what is grasped, then latent suppression of what grasps. Latent suppression prevents them from arising, so it is called 'removal'; it is not called 'removal' separately from the time of latent suppression. This will be known later.

Treatise: In the stage of insight (darsana-marga), one truly penetrates.

Commentary: Only then do the two wisdoms (jnana) of non-outflow manifest, verifying the suchness (tathata) and nature (svabhava).

Treatise: In the stage of cultivation (bhavana-marga), up to the latent suppression and cutting off of the remaining obstacles.

Commentary: The practice of the ten grounds (bhumi) is extensive, the time is long, and progress is made in every moment, called repeated cultivation, latent suppression of the remaining afflictions, and cutting off the remaining intellectual obscurations. Although other practices and other dharmas are also cultivated and realized in these stages, the cultivation of other practices is based on Consciousness-only (vijnapti-matrata), so only Consciousness-only is mentioned.

Treatise: Up to the final stage (nistha-marga), up to the characteristics (lakshana) and nature (svabhava) of Consciousness-only.

Commentary: Completely free from the two obscurations (avarana), merits and wisdom are fully equipped, unlike the Hearers, so it is called 'perfect', without lack, which is to distinguish the Hearers. Its merit and wisdom, the two purities, are extremely supreme, and nothing can surpass them, without delusion or darkness, so it is called 'bright', which is to distinguish the Bodhisattvas. Although the Bodhisattvas of the tenth ground all universally possess it, it can be called 'perfect', but because it is not pure, like watching the moon in a net, it is not called 'bright'. It can guide all beings to enlightenment in the future, and also enable them to awaken to the characteristics of Consciousness-only, so it shows that it is not only self-liberation, but also liberating others after accomplishment, so it is called the Dharma wheel (dharma-cakra). 'Wheel' means turning. The Mahayana-samgraha says: By what can one enter? Because it is supported by the power of good roots. The three kinds of refining the mind cut off the four kinds of obstacles. Asanga says: This is the cause of entry, meaning by what cause can one enter here? Therefore, the Mahayana-samgraha says, 'By what, how, and how does one attain enlightenment, etc.?' Asanga says this is the equipment for entry. That is in the stage of accumulation in this treatise. That treatise's expedient means, what is entered, the metaphor for entry, such as the four kinds of reflection, and the initial conforming to liberation division (anuloma-nirvedha-bhagiya) below.

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分．名事互為客等．尋思．尋思果．教授二頌。在此加行位中。彼悟入唯識性故悟入三性。入極喜地等。入唯識所須。即此見道。彼論已入于地得見道已入唯識。于修道中雲何修行等。入因果分。修差別分。及三學分。是此修道。彼論果智。果斷分。是此究竟道。然攝論十分所有。並此論有。如前已敘。菩薩地四十七八住品中說有十三住。四十九地品說有七地。皆是此中五位等攝。十三住中前十二住即菩薩位。今此五頌前四頌攝。第十三住是如來住。即如來位。今五頌中第五頌攝。十三住者。一種姓住。是此所言本性住種姓。未入僧祇。四十七說。謂諸菩薩性自仁賢。性自成就菩薩功德菩薩所應眾多善法。于彼現行亦有顯現。由性仁賢逼遣方便令于善轉。非由思擇有所制約。有所防護。住此住中任持一切佛法種子。于自體中已具足有一切佛法一切種子。性不能起上．煩惱纏。造無間業或斷善根。廣如種姓品說　云何菩薩勝解行住。謂諸菩薩從初發心。乃至未得清凈意樂。所有一切諸菩薩行皆此住攝。當知前住于餘十一菩薩住。及如來住。唯有因轉攝受彼因。于余菩薩住。尚未發趣未得未凈。況如來住。住此住中普於一切余菩薩住。及如來住皆名發趣。然未得凈。于自住中名趣。名得。為令清凈而修正行。於前住中雖修

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 分。名事互為客等。尋思。尋思果。教授二頌。在此加行位中，他悟入唯識性，因此悟入三性。進入極喜地等，進入唯識所須。這就是見道。那部論典已經進入于地，得到見道，已經進入唯識。在修道中如何修行等，進入因果分，修差別分，以及三學分，這就是修道。那部論典的果智，果斷分，這就是究竟道。然而《攝大乘論》的十分所有，都與這部論典相同，如前已經敘述。 《菩薩地》四十七、八住品中說有十三住，四十九地品說有七地，都是此中五位等所攝。十三住中前十二住即菩薩位，現在這五頌的前四頌所攝。第十三住是如來住，即如來位，現在五頌中的第五頌所攝。十三住是：一種姓住，就是這裡所說的本性住種姓，未入僧祇。四十七說：『諸菩薩的本性自然仁慈賢良，本性自然成就菩薩功德，菩薩所應有的眾多善法，在他們身上現行也有顯現。由於本性仁慈賢良，逼遣方便，讓他們轉向善，不是由於思擇有所制約，有所防護。』住在此住中，任持一切佛法種子，在自體中已經具足有一切佛法一切種子，本性不能生起上煩惱纏，造無間業或者斷善根，詳細內容如種姓品所說。 『什麼是菩薩勝解行住？』是指諸菩薩從最初發心，乃至未得清凈意樂，所有一切諸菩薩行都屬於此住所攝。應當知道，前住對於其餘十一菩薩住以及如來住，只有因轉攝受彼因，對於其餘菩薩住，尚未發趣，未得未凈，何況如來住。住在此住中，普遍對於一切其餘菩薩住以及如來住都名為發趣，然而未得清凈。在自住中名為趣，名為得，爲了令清凈而修正行。在前住中雖然修

【English Translation】 English version Section. Names and things are mutually subjective, etc. Contemplation. Contemplation of results. Two verses of instruction. Within this stage of application, he realizes the nature of consciousness-only (唯識性, weishi xing), thereby realizing the three natures (三性, san xing). Entering the Joyful Ground (極喜地, ji xi di) etc., entering what is required for consciousness-only. This is the Path of Seeing (見道, jian dao). That treatise has already entered the ground, attained the Path of Seeing, and entered consciousness-only. How to practice in the Path of Cultivation (修道, xiu dao) etc., entering the division of cause and effect, the division of differences in cultivation, and the division of the three learnings (三學, san xue), this is the Path of Cultivation. That treatise's wisdom of fruition, the division of severance of fruition, this is the Ultimate Path (究竟道, jiu jing dao). However, all ten sections of the Compendium of Mahāyāna are the same as this treatise, as previously described. In the forty-seventh and eighth Establishment chapters of the Bodhisattva Grounds, it is said that there are thirteen abodes (十三住, shisan zhu), and in the forty-ninth Grounds chapter, it is said that there are seven grounds (七地, qi di), all of which are included in these five stages etc. Among the thirteen abodes, the first twelve abodes are the Bodhisattva stage, which are included in the first four verses of these five verses. The thirteenth abode is the Tathāgata abode, which is the Tathāgata stage, included in the fifth verse of these five verses. The thirteen abodes are: the lineage abode (種姓住, zhong xing zhu), which is what is referred to here as the inherent nature abode lineage, not yet entered into asaṃkhyeya kalpas (僧祇, seng qi). The forty-seventh says: 'The nature of all Bodhisattvas is naturally benevolent and virtuous, and their nature naturally accomplishes Bodhisattva virtues, and the many good dharmas that Bodhisattvas should have are manifested in their actions. Because of their benevolent and virtuous nature, they compel and direct skillful means to turn towards goodness, not because of deliberation, restriction, or protection.' Abiding in this abode, they uphold all the seeds of the Buddha-dharma, and within themselves, they already possess all the Buddha-dharma and all the seeds. Their nature cannot give rise to upper afflictions, create karmas of immediate retribution, or sever roots of goodness, as described in detail in the Lineage chapter. 'What is the Bodhisattva's Abode of Understanding and Practice (勝解行住, sheng jie xing zhu)?' It refers to all the practices of all Bodhisattvas from the initial aspiration until they have not yet attained pure intention, all of which are included in this abode. It should be known that the previous abode only has the cause of transformation and reception of that cause for the remaining eleven Bodhisattva abodes and the Tathāgata abode. For the remaining Bodhisattva abodes, they have not yet embarked, attained, or purified, let alone the Tathāgata abode. Abiding in this abode, they are universally called embarking for all the remaining Bodhisattva abodes and the Tathāgata abode, but they have not yet attained purity. In their own abode, they are called embarking and attaining, and they cultivate correct practice in order to purify. Although they cultivate in the previous abode,

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諸善。性仁賢故為之非為菩提故作也。未名發趣故不入僧祇。此住所修皆名發趣。故與前別。此位思擇力勝。所作加行以分別惠。未得堅固相續無退菩薩勝修。此說無漏修惠不得。非有漏修此位不得。或此說初發心時。十住菩薩八相成道。既不得修如何得有如是神通。如於勝修于勝修果無礙解．神通．解脫．等持．等至。亦未能得。未超五畏。謂不活畏．惡名畏．死畏．惡趣畏．處眾怯畏。有三處妄失。一失念於五境顛倒。二失念于受生妄前生事。三于所受持法久作久說有所妄失。或具聰惠為他說法勉勵而轉。如闇中射或中不中。或於菩提雖已發趣而復退舍。或時舍戒。或利有情而生厭倦。利益安樂未廣大無量。於一切菩薩學中未能普學。菩薩相中未皆成就。在家．出家二分菩薩正加行中未等顯現。於此所說諸行狀相。下忍轉時上品。中忍轉時中品。上品轉時下品。漸輕微故。入初地時此一切相皆無所有。一切相違白法顯現。乃至廣說。皆第二住攝。即是此中資糧．加行二道。五頌之中初二頌攝。以彼論言從初發心。乃至未得清凈意樂是勝解住。論說清凈意樂菩薩住是初地攝。故知四善根亦初勝解行住攝。既爾即顯是初劫攝。論說此住初劫攝故。至下當知。此與瓔珞經二種姓別。應如別會。中邊中卷對治品中。明念住

等修之分位。即念住等在解脫分。如別應知　第三極歡喜住。亦名凈勝意樂住。即初地攝。此少分是見道。即五頌中第三頌。除住地．出地心故　第四增上戒住。即第二地　第五增上心住。即第三地　第六覺分相應增上惠住。即第四地　第七諸諦相應增上惠住。即第五地　第八緣起流轉止息相應增上惠住。即第五地　第八緣起流轉止息相應增上惠住。即第六地　第九無相有功用住。即第七地。以前第二劫攝　第十無相無功用住。即第八地　第十一無礙解住。即第九地　第十二最上成滿菩薩住。即第十地。即第三劫　四十八說。又即於此一一住中。經多俱胝百千大劫。或過是數方乃證得。及與成滿。然一切住總經於三無數大劫方乃圓證。謂經第一無數大劫。方乃超過勝解行住。次第證得初地。此就恒常勇猛精進。非不勇猛勤精進者。復經第二無數大劫。方過初地乃至有加行有功用無相住。次第證得第八地。此即決定以是菩薩得凈意樂。決定勇猛勤精進故。復經第三無數大劫。方過八地．九地證第十地。故知四善根初劫所攝。未名凈勝意樂地故。攝論第七云。有五補特伽羅經三無數大劫。謂勝解行者經初無數大劫修行圓滿。清凈增上意樂行．及有相行．無相行補特伽羅。於前六地。及第七地。經第二無數大劫修行圓滿。即

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 等修之分位：即念住等在解脫分（指通往解脫的部分）。如別應知，第三極歡喜住，亦名凈勝意樂住（指純凈殊勝的意樂狀態），即初地（菩薩修行階位的第一個階段，歡喜地）所攝。此少分是見道（證悟真理的道路），即五頌中第三頌。除住地、出地心故。第四增上戒住，即第二地（離垢地）。第五增上心住，即第三地（發光地）。第六覺分相應增上慧住，即第四地（焰慧地）。第七諸諦相應增上慧住，即第五地（難勝地）。第八緣起流轉止息相應增上慧住，即第五地（難勝地）。第八緣起流轉止息相應增上慧住，即第六地（現前地）。第九無相有功用住，即第七地（遠行地），以前第二劫所攝。第十無相無功用住，即第八地（不動地）。第十一無礙解住，即第九地（善慧地）。第十二最上成滿菩薩住，即第十地（法雲地），即第三劫。 四十八說。又即於此一一住中，經多俱胝百千大劫，或過是數方乃證得及與成滿。然一切住總經於三無數大劫方乃圓證。謂經第一無數大劫，方乃超過勝解行住，次第證得初地。此就恒常勇猛精進，非不勇猛勤精進者。復經第二無數大劫，方過初地乃至有加行有功用無相住，次第證得第八地。此即決定以是菩薩得凈意樂，決定勇猛勤精進故。復經第三無數大劫，方過八地、九地證第十地。故知四善根初劫所攝，未名凈勝意樂地故。《攝論》第七云：『有五補特伽羅（指人）經三無數大劫，謂勝解行者經初無數大劫修行圓滿。清凈增上意樂行、及有相行、無相行補特伽羅，於前六地及第七地，經第二無數大劫修行圓滿。』即

【English Translation】 English version The divisions of practice such as the abodes of mindfulness are in the part of liberation. As should be known separately, the third abode of extreme joy, also called the abode of pure and superior intention, is included in the first Bhumi (stage of a Bodhisattva's path, Joyful Ground). A small part of this is the path of seeing, which is the third verse in the five verses, excluding the mind of abiding in and emerging from the ground. The fourth, the abode of increased precepts, is the second Bhumi (Immaculate Ground). The fifth, the abode of increased mind, is the third Bhumi (Luminous Ground). The sixth, the abode of increased wisdom corresponding to the factors of enlightenment, is the fourth Bhumi (Radiant Ground). The seventh, the abode of increased wisdom corresponding to the truths, is the fifth Bhumi (Difficult to Conquer Ground). The eighth, the abode of increased wisdom corresponding to the arising, flowing, cessation of dependent origination, is the fifth Bhumi (Difficult to Conquer Ground). The eighth, the abode of increased wisdom corresponding to the arising, flowing, cessation of dependent origination, is the sixth Bhumi (Manifest Ground). The ninth, the abode of formlessness with effort, is the seventh Bhumi (Far Reaching Ground), included in the second Kalpa (an immense period of time) before. The tenth, the abode of formlessness without effort, is the eighth Bhumi (Immovable Ground). The eleventh, the abode of unobstructed understanding, is the ninth Bhumi (Good Intelligence Ground). The twelfth, the abode of the most supreme and complete Bodhisattva, is the tenth Bhumi (Cloud of Dharma Ground), which is the third Kalpa. Forty-eight say. Moreover, in each of these abodes, one attains and completes them after many kotis (a very large number) of hundreds of thousands of great kalpas, or even more than that number. However, all the abodes are fully attained only after three countless great kalpas. That is, after the first countless great kalpa, one surpasses the abode of understanding and practice, and successively attains the first Bhumi. This refers to constant, courageous, and diligent effort, not to those who are not courageous and diligent. Again, after the second countless great kalpa, one surpasses the first Bhumi up to the abode of formlessness with effort and application, and successively attains the eighth Bhumi. This is definitely because this Bodhisattva has pure intention and is determined to be courageous and diligent. Again, after the third countless great kalpa, one surpasses the eighth and ninth Bhumis and attains the tenth Bhumi. Therefore, it is known that the four roots of goodness are included in the first kalpa, and are not yet called the ground of pure and superior intention. The seventh chapter of the 'Compendium of Abhidharma' says: 'There are five pudgalas (individuals) who go through three countless great kalpas, namely, those who practice with understanding and complete their practice after the first countless great kalpa. The pudgalas who practice with pure and increased intention, with form, and without form, complete their practice in the first six Bhumis and the seventh Bhumi after the second countless great kalpa.' That is

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此無功用行補特伽羅。即第八地至第十地。經第三無數大劫修行圓滿。此論下文四善根亦是解行地攝。故知初劫所攝。古人難云。初禪方便非欲界攝。初地方便非初劫攝。應為質言初地方便非初劫者。初地方便非凡夫攝。若言未證真故非聖者攝。應言未證真故非第二劫攝。又彼難言大莊嚴論．對法第十一說。四善根初劫滿已修習故。可非初劫者。應反詰言。且如瓔珞經云百劫修千三昧。千劫學佛威儀。萬劫化現成佛入大寂定。是等覺菩薩。言三大劫滿已。何故不是佛地攝。又此論四善根中。亦言初劫順解脫滿已修。豈即彼非勝解行攝。滿心修相好。亦是劫中收。滿心修四善根。定是初劫所攝。廣成立此如對法第十一抄。四十八說。有二無數大劫。一者日夜月等算數時無量。故說名無數。二如前說超過一切算數。名無數大劫。若說前劫即經無量無數方證菩提。若說后劫但三無數方證菩提不過此量。如瓔珞經下卷說。八百里石凈居天衣拂盡。名一大僧祇劫。若上上精進。或轉眾多中劫。或有轉多大劫。決定無轉無數大劫。即釋迦菩薩所超量中劫也。一小三災劫增咸劫數。釋迦菩薩超九劫由翹足故。或言更超十二劫。報聞雪山偈故。或超十一劫。投身餓獸故。如別抄會　此時長遠何日成佛。處夢謂多年。如攝論廣說。此後九

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 此無功用行補特伽羅（pudgala，人）。即第八地至第十地的菩薩，經歷第三個無數大劫修行圓滿。此論下文所說的四善根也屬於解行地所攝，因此可知初劫所包含的內容。古人提出的疑問：初禪的方便道不屬於欲界所攝，初地的方便道不屬於初劫所攝。應該這樣反駁：初地的方便道不屬於凡夫所攝。如果說因為沒有證得真如，所以不屬於聖者所攝，那麼應該說因為沒有證得真如，所以不屬於第二劫所攝。 又有人反駁說，《大莊嚴論》和《對法論》第十一卷說，四善根是在初劫圓滿后修習的，所以不屬於初劫。應該反問：比如《瓔珞經》說，（等覺菩薩）用一百劫修習一千種三昧，用一千劫學習佛的威儀，用一萬劫化現成佛並進入大寂定，這已經等同於佛的果位了。如果說三大劫圓滿后，為什麼不屬於佛地所攝呢？而且此論在四善根中也說，初劫順解脫圓滿后才開始修習，難道這就不是勝解行所攝嗎？滿心修習相好，也包含在劫數之中。滿心修習四善根，一定是初劫所攝。關於此點的詳細論證，可以參考《對法論》第十一卷的抄本，第四十八頁的說法。 有兩種無數大劫：一種是可以通過日月等算數來計算的，因為數量巨大所以稱為無數；另一種如前所述，超過一切算數，稱為無數大劫。如果說是前一種劫，那麼就需要經歷無量無數的時間才能證得菩提。如果說是后一種劫，那麼只需要三個無數大劫就可以證得菩提，不會超過這個數量。如《瓔珞經》下卷所說，用八百里的大石，用凈居天的天衣拂拭乾凈，所需的時間稱為一大僧祇劫。如果是上上精進，或者會轉變為眾多中劫，或者會轉變為眾多大劫，但絕對不會轉變為無數大劫。這指的是釋迦菩薩所超越的量中劫。一小三災劫增加了咸劫的數量。釋迦菩薩超越了九劫，因為翹足的緣故；或者說超越了十二劫，因為聽聞雪山偈的緣故；或者超越了十一劫，因為投身喂餓獸的緣故。如其他抄本所記載。此時時間漫長，何時才能成佛？在夢中覺得過了很多年，如《攝大乘論》所廣泛闡述。這是之後的九地菩薩的修行。

【English Translation】 English version This is the 'no effort' practitioner (pudgala, person). That is, Bodhisattvas from the eighth to the tenth Bhumi (stage), who perfect their practice after the third asamkhya-kalpa (innumerable great eon). The four roots of goodness mentioned later in this treatise are also included in the stage of understanding and practice. Therefore, it can be known that the initial kalpa includes these practices. The ancients raised the question: the expedient means of the first Dhyana (meditative absorption) are not included in the desire realm, and the expedient means of the first Bhumi are not included in the first kalpa. It should be countered by saying: the expedient means of the first Bhumi are not included in the realm of ordinary beings. If it is said that because one has not attained true suchness, one is not included among the sages, then it should be said that because one has not attained true suchness, one is not included in the second kalpa. Furthermore, some argue that the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra and the eleventh chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya state that the four roots of goodness are cultivated after the first kalpa is completed, so they do not belong to the first kalpa. One should retort: for example, the Brahmajāla Sūtra says that (Bodhisattvas of near-perfect enlightenment) cultivate a thousand Samadhis (meditative concentrations) for a hundred kalpas, learn the Buddha's demeanor for a thousand kalpas, and manifest as Buddhas and enter the Great Quiescence for ten thousand kalpas, which is equivalent to the fruit of Buddhahood. If it is said that after three great kalpas are completed, why are they not included in the Buddha Bhumi? Moreover, this treatise also states in the context of the four roots of goodness that cultivation begins after the initial kalpa of liberation is completed. Does this mean that it is not included in the stage of superior understanding and practice? Cultivating the physical marks and characteristics of a Buddha with a full mind is also included in the kalpas. Cultivating the four roots of goodness with a full mind is definitely included in the first kalpa. A detailed discussion of this point can be found in the commentary on the eleventh chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, on page forty-eight. There are two types of asamkhya-kalpas: one is measurable by calculations of days, nights, months, etc., and is called asamkhya (innumerable) because of its vast quantity; the other, as mentioned earlier, exceeds all calculations and is called asamkhya-mahākalpa (innumerable great eon). If it refers to the former kalpa, then one needs to experience immeasurable and countless time to attain Bodhi (enlightenment). If it refers to the latter kalpa, then only three asamkhya-kalpas are needed to attain Bodhi, and it will not exceed this amount. As the lower volume of the Brahmajāla Sūtra says, the time it takes to clean an 800-li (Chinese mile) stone with the celestial robe of the Pure Abode Heaven is called a great asamkhya-kalpa. If one is of supreme diligence, it may transform into many intermediate kalpas, or it may transform into many great kalpas, but it will never transform into asamkhya-kalpas. This refers to the intermediate kalpas that Shakyamuni Bodhisattva surpassed. One minor three-disaster kalpa increases the number of kalpas. Shakyamuni Bodhisattva surpassed nine kalpas because of raising his foot; or it is said that he surpassed twelve kalpas because of hearing the Snow Mountain Gatha (verse); or he surpassed eleven kalpas because of offering his body to a hungry beast. As recorded in other commentaries. At this time, the time is long, when will one become a Buddha? In a dream, it feels like many years have passed, as extensively explained in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. This refers to the practice of the Bodhisattvas of the nine Bhumis after this.

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地全初地少分是修道。即五頌中第四頌攝。然已前十二住並是因位。第十三最極如來住即究竟道。如來地攝。即五頌中第五頌攝。果位所收。此後十一住下論廣解。不能預述。

有差別者。對菩薩地．及十地經。下自廣解。最初二住雖論有文。然不廣解此行相故。今別出之。種姓住即以一切佛法一切無漏種子為體。未起現行無漏．有漏趣向心故。即通五蘊種子為體。五法中正智。據三性中依他．圓成二性攝。常．無常漏．無漏別故。第二住以一切佛法無漏種子。有漏隨順一切現．種功德為性。起順趣心故。此等引證者如前已說。未證真如唯以有無為體。次十住此論以有為．無為無漏功德為性。證真如故。今亦取一切未曾得世間功德順趣者為體。三十二相等。非皆無漏。正智．分別．真如．及相為體。二性如前。如來住以有．無為無漏功德為體。下十地三身等中自當解釋　辨差別者。勝解行住。于菩薩修所作狹小。有缺不定。所得有退。極歡喜住所作廣大。無缺決定。所得不退。乃至三種增上惠住亦爾。即前六地行相皆同。從初無相住即第七地。乃至成滿菩薩住所作無量。無缺決定。所得終無退轉。又勝解行住。于無相修發趣。六地以前獲得。七地圓證。第八地清凈。第九．十地于無相修果。當知領受得諸功德。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『地全初地少分是修道』，指的是五頌中的第四頌所涵蓋的內容。然而，之前的十二住都屬於因位，第十三『最極如來住』則是究竟道，屬於如來地所涵蓋的內容，即五頌中的第五頌所涵蓋的內容，屬於果位所攝。此後的十一住將在下文中詳細解釋，此處不作預先闡述。

『有差別者』，指的是與菩薩地以及《十地經》的差別，下文將詳細解釋。最初的二住雖然在論中有提及，但因為沒有詳細解釋其行相，所以現在單獨列出。種姓住以一切佛法的一切無漏種子為本體，因為尚未生起現行的無漏、有漏趣向心，所以貫通五蘊種子為本體。五法中屬於正智（正確的智慧），根據三性中的依他性（依他起性）和圓成實性所攝。常、無常、有漏、無漏有所區別。第二住以一切佛法的無漏種子，以及有漏隨順一切現行和種子的功德為性質，因為生起了順趣之心。這些引證如前所述。未證真如時，僅以有無為本體。接下來的十住，此論以有為、無為的無漏功德為性質，因為已經證悟真如。現在也取一切未曾獲得的世間功德順趣者為本體，例如三十二相等，並非都是無漏。以正智、分別、真如以及相為本體。二性如前所述。如來住以有為、無為的無漏功德為本體。下方的十地三身等將在後續解釋。

『辨差別者』，勝解行住（通過勝解而修行的階段），在菩薩修行中所作的狹小、有缺失、不定，所得的成果可能會退轉。而極歡喜住（初地，菩薩道的第一個階段）所作的廣大、無缺失、決定，所得的成果不會退轉。乃至三種增上惠住（第六地）也是如此。即前六地的行相都相同。從初無相住（第七地）開始，乃至成滿菩薩住（第十地），所作的無量、無缺失、決定，所得的成果終究不會退轉。此外，勝解行住對於無相修的發趣，在六地之前獲得，七地圓滿證悟，第八地清凈，第九、十地對於無相修的果，應當知道領受並獲得各種功德。

【English Translation】 English version: 'The entirety of the initial stage [of the ten grounds] and a small portion [of the next] constitute the path of cultivation.' This refers to what is encompassed in the fourth verse of the five verses. However, the preceding twelve abodes all belong to the causal stage. The thirteenth, 'the Utmost Tathāgata Abode,' is the ultimate path, belonging to the Tathāgata Ground, which is encompassed in the fifth verse of the five verses, and is included in the fruition stage. The subsequent eleven abodes will be explained in detail below, and will not be foreshadowed here.

'Those that have differences' refers to the differences with the Bodhisattva Grounds and the Ten Grounds Sutra. These will be explained in detail below. Although the initial two abodes are mentioned in the treatise, they are not explained in detail regarding their characteristics, so they are now presented separately. The Lineage Abode takes all the seeds of all Buddha-dharmas, all unpolluted seeds, as its substance. Because unpolluted and polluted inclinations of mind that are directed towards [Buddhahood] have not yet arisen, it pervades the seeds of the five aggregates as its substance. Among the five dharmas, it is Right Knowledge ( samyag-jñāna). According to the three natures, it is included in the dependent nature (paratantra) and the perfectly accomplished nature (parinispanna). There is a distinction between permanence and impermanence, pollution and non-pollution. The second abode takes the unpolluted seeds of all Buddha-dharmas, and the merits of all manifest and seed-like qualities that accord with pollution, as its nature, because it gives rise to the mind of accordant inclination. These citations have been mentioned previously. When true suchness (tathatā) has not been realized, it takes only existence and non-existence as its substance. The next ten abodes, according to this treatise, take the unpolluted merits of conditioned and unconditioned [dharmas] as their nature, because they have realized true suchness. Now, it also takes as its substance those who accord with all worldly merits that have never been attained, such as the thirty-two marks [of a Buddha], which are not all unpolluted. It takes Right Knowledge, Discrimination, True Suchness, and Characteristics as its substance. The two natures are as before. The Tathāgata Abode takes the unpolluted merits of conditioned and unconditioned [dharmas] as its substance. The three bodies, etc., of the lower ten grounds will be explained later.

'Those that distinguish differences': The Abode of Resolution and Practice (adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi) is narrow, deficient, and uncertain in what is done in the practice of a Bodhisattva, and the gains may regress. The Abode of Utmost Joy (pramudita-bhūmi, first ground) is vast, without deficiency, and certain in what is done, and the gains do not regress. Even the three abodes of increased wisdom (sixth ground) are the same. That is, the characteristics of the preceding six grounds are all the same. From the initial Abode of No-Sign (amala-bhūmi, seventh ground) up to the Abode of the Accomplished Bodhisattva (tenth ground), what is done is immeasurable, without deficiency, and certain, and the gains will never regress. Furthermore, the Abode of Resolution and Practice is attained before the sixth ground in the initiation of the practice of no-sign, the seventh ground is fully realized, the eighth ground is purified, and the ninth and tenth grounds, with respect to the fruit of the practice of no-sign, should be known to receive and attain all kinds of merits.

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乃至廣如彼論等說　言七地者。前六菩薩。第七一種菩薩．如來雜立為地。一種姓地即種姓住。二勝解行地即勝解行住。三凈勝意樂地即極喜住。四行正行地即增上戒。乃至有加行無相住。五決定地即無加行無功用無相住。此地菩薩墮在第三決定中故。六決定行地即無礙解住。七到究竟地即最上成滿菩薩。及如來住。既知地．住而相攝已。地攝五頌準住應知。此等諸義下既廣解。不勞預說。

論。初資糧位其相云何。

述曰。此下別解。然前三問初能入人自．下不解。已略辨故。非本頌故。其所入位。所入法用。下別解釋。然此二種各五不同義意既同。各合解釋總為五也。此中五段不假分科。今初段中。初問。次答。此即問也。

論。頌曰至猶未能伏滅。

述曰。答也。初頌。后解。下逐難解。易處不言。

論。從發深固至資糧位攝。

述曰。此解初位始終分齊。于中有二。初別釋頌文。后此位未證唯識真如等下。顯位修行。初中又二。初略解頌文。后廣二取隨眠。即是二障。初中復二。初釋上二句。后釋下二句。文至當知。攝論云。清凈．增上力．堅固心勝進。名菩薩初修無數三大劫。大菩提心以善根為其自體。以大愿為緣不退屈。為其策發方能發起。故善根力名清凈力。是

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：乃至像那些廣泛的論著所說的那樣，關於『七地』的說法是：前六地是菩薩，第七地是菩薩和如來混合安立的。一種姓地，就是種姓住。二勝解行地，就是勝解行住。三凈勝意樂地，就是極喜住。四行正行地，就是增上戒，乃至有加行無相住。五決定地，就是無加行無功用無相住。此地的菩薩墮在第三決定中。六決定行地，就是無礙解住。七到究竟地，就是最上成滿菩薩以及如來住。既然知道了地和住是相互包含的，那麼地所包含的五頌，按照住也應該知道。這些意義在下面會詳細解釋，所以不在這裡預先說明。

論：最初的資糧位，它的相狀是怎樣的？

述曰：下面分別解釋。然而前面的三個問題，最初的『能入人』，下面不解釋，因為已經簡略地辨析過了，不是根本頌文的內容。『其所入位』，『所入法用』，下面分別解釋。然而這兩種各有五種不同，意義相同，所以合併解釋，總共有五種。這其中五段不需要分科。現在第一段中，先提問，后回答。這就是提問。

論：頌文說：『從發深固至猶未能伏滅。』

述曰：這是回答。先是頌文，后是解釋。下面逐句解釋，容易理解的地方就不說了。

論：『從發深固至資糧位攝。』

述曰：這是解釋最初位的始終分界。其中有兩部分。首先分別解釋頌文，然後『此位未證唯識真如等』以下，顯示此位的修行。首先又分為兩部分。首先簡略解釋頌文，然後廣泛解釋『二取隨眠』，也就是二障（煩惱障和所知障）。首先又分為兩部分。首先解釋上面的兩句，然後解釋下面的兩句。文至『當知』。《攝大乘論》（She Da Cheng Lun）說：『清凈、增上力、堅固心勝進，名為菩薩初修無數三大劫。』大菩提心以善根為其自體，以大愿為緣，不退屈為其策發，才能發起。所以善根力名為清凈力。

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, as those extensive treatises state, regarding the 'Seven Grounds (Bhumi)': the first six grounds are Bodhisattvas, and the seventh ground is a mixed establishment of Bodhisattvas and Tathagatas. The first, Lineage Ground (Zhong Xing Di), is the Lineage Abiding (Zhong Xing Zhu). The second, Understanding-Conduct Ground (Sheng Jie Xing Di), is the Understanding-Conduct Abiding (Sheng Jie Xing Zhu). The third, Pure Superior Intention Ground (Jing Sheng Yi Le Di), is the Utmost Joy Abiding (Ji Xi Zhu). The fourth, Practice-Correct Practice Ground (Xing Zheng Xing Di), is the Increased Precepts, up to the Abiding with Effortless Non-Appearance. The fifth, Determination Ground (Jue Ding Di), is the Abiding with Effortless, Non-Application, Non-Appearance. Bodhisattvas on this ground fall into the third determination. The sixth, Determination-Conduct Ground (Jue Ding Xing Di), is the Unobstructed Understanding Abiding (Wu Ai Jie Zhu). The seventh, Arriving-at-Ultimate Ground (Dao Jiu Jing Di), is the Supreme Accomplishment Bodhisattva, as well as the Tathagata Abiding. Since it is known that the Grounds and Abidings are mutually inclusive, then the five verses included in the Grounds should also be known according to the Abidings. These meanings will be explained in detail below, so there is no need to explain them in advance.

Treatise: What is the characteristic of the initial Provisioning Stage (Zi Liang Wei)?

Commentary: Below, they are explained separately. However, of the previous three questions, the initial 'Person Who Can Enter (Neng Ru Ren)' is not explained below because it has already been briefly analyzed and is not the content of the fundamental verse. 'The Stage Entered (Qi Suo Ru Wei)' and 'The Function of the Dharma Entered (Suo Ru Fa Yong)' are explained separately below. However, these two each have five differences, but the meanings are the same, so they are explained together, totaling five. These five sections do not need to be divided into categories. Now, in the first section, first the question, then the answer. This is the question.

Treatise: The verse says: 'From the arising of deep firmness to still unable to subdue and extinguish.'

Commentary: This is the answer. First the verse, then the explanation. Below, each sentence is explained, and easy-to-understand places are not mentioned.

Treatise: 'From the arising of deep firmness to included in the Provisioning Stage.'

Commentary: This explains the beginning and end boundaries of the initial stage. There are two parts in it. First, explain the verse separately, and then 'This stage has not yet realized the Consciousness-Only True Thusness, etc.' below, showing the practice of this stage. First, it is divided into two parts again. First, briefly explain the verse, and then extensively explain 'Dualistic Grasping Latent Tendencies (Er Qu Sui Mian)', which are the two obscurations (the obscuration of afflictions and the obscuration of knowledge). First, it is divided into two parts again. First, explain the above two sentences, and then explain the below two sentences. The text goes to 'should be known'. The Compendium of Mahayana (She Da Cheng Lun) says: 'Purity, increased strength, firm and advancing mind are called Bodhisattvas initially cultivating countless three great kalpas.' The Great Bodhi Mind takes good roots as its self-nature, takes great vows as conditions, and non-retrogression as its encouragement, and then it can be initiated. Therefore, the power of good roots is called the power of purity.

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因。能降伏所治故。大願力名增上力。是緣。常值善友故堅固心升進者雖遇惡友方便破壞。終不棄捨大菩提心。所修善法運運增長。大菩提心堅固不退。齊此方名初劫之始。此言深者。即清凈．增上力。固即堅心勝進深固即是大菩提心　唯識真勝義性者。簡前三勝義。非勝義勝義故。即是真如。順抉擇位識作唯識觀。求住唯識真勝義性。此位未能伏除識相。未名求住真唯識性。即地前四十心皆是此位。然彼已前或十萬八萬．六萬．四萬．二萬．十千劫等皆不入此位。未名清凈增上力。堅固之心未升進故。

此出初道位分齊已。釋上二句頌訖。此當釋名。

論。為趣無上至勝資糧故。

述曰。初釋資糧之名。望菩提為號。菩提因之初位。資益己身之糧方至彼果故名資糧。此即依自利釋名。為出生死得大智故求菩提也。然前第七末增上緣中。解資糧位亦有未知當知根云。能近資生根本位故者。從久修者鄰近為名。此說初行多求果故。亦不相違。

論。為有情故至順解脫分。

述曰。次解順解脫分名。為有情故勤求解脫。望涅槃為因。涅槃名解脫。如常所談。勤求于彼此行不違故名為順。分者因也。支也。彼順抉擇分言分者。即抉擇是分。即擇法覺分。分者支分義。順彼抉擇分故。名順抉擇

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『因』，是因為能夠降伏所治理的煩惱。『大願力』名為『增上力』。這是因為常能遇到善友，所以能使堅固的心不斷升進。即使遇到惡友，他們用各種方法來破壞，最終也不會放棄大菩提心。所修的善法不斷增長，大菩提心堅固而不退轉。達到這種程度，才稱為初劫的開始。這裡所說的『深』，指的是清凈和增上力；『固』，指的是堅固的心不斷升進；『深固』，指的是大菩提心。『唯識真勝義性』，是爲了區別於前面的三種勝義，因為它不是勝義中的勝義，而是真如（Tathata）。在『順抉擇位』，通過唯識觀，尋求安住于唯識的真勝義性。但在這個階段，還未能降伏和去除識相（Vijnana-lakshana），所以還不能稱為求住真唯識性。也就是地前四十心都屬於這個階段。然而，在此之前的十萬、八萬、六萬、四萬、二萬、一萬劫等等，都不屬於這個階段，因為還沒有達到清凈增上力，堅固的心還沒有升進。

以上解釋了初道位的界限，解釋了前面兩句頌文。下面將解釋名稱。

論：爲了趣向無上至勝的資糧，所以稱為資糧位。

述記：首先解釋『資糧』這個名稱。以菩提（Bodhi）為目標，這是菩提因的最初階段。積累資益自身的力量，才能到達那個果位，所以稱為『資糧』。這是從自利的角度來解釋名稱。爲了脫離生死，獲得大智慧，所以尋求菩提。然而，前面第七末增上緣中，解釋資糧位時也提到『未知當知根』，說它能接近資生根本位。這是從長期修行者鄰近果位的角度來解釋名稱。這裡說的是初行者多求果，兩者並不矛盾。

論：爲了有情（Sattvas）的利益，所以稱為順解脫分。

述記：接下來解釋『順解脫分』這個名稱。爲了有情眾生的利益，勤奮地尋求解脫。以涅槃（Nirvana）為目標，涅槃名為解脫，這是通常所說的。勤奮地尋求，彼此行為不相違背，所以稱為『順』。『分』指的是因，也指支分。前面所說的『順抉擇分』，『分』就是抉擇，也就是擇法覺分。因為順應那個抉擇分，所以稱為『順抉擇分』。

【English Translation】 English version 'Cause' is because it can subdue the afflictions being governed. 'Great aspiration power' is called 'increasing power' (Adhipati-bala). This is because one constantly encounters good friends, so that the steadfast mind can continuously advance. Even if encountering bad friends who use various methods to destroy, one will ultimately not abandon the great Bodhicitta (mind of enlightenment). The virtuous dharmas cultivated constantly increase, and the great Bodhicitta is steadfast and does not regress. Reaching this level is called the beginning of the first kalpa (aeon). What is meant by 'deep' here refers to purity and increasing power; 'steadfast' refers to the steadfast mind continuously advancing; 'deeply steadfast' refers to the great Bodhicitta. 'Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi (the perfection of consciousness-only) true ultimate nature' is to distinguish it from the previous three ultimate truths, because it is not the ultimate of the ultimate truths, but is Tathata (suchness). In the 'stage of accordance with decisive selection' (anulomiki), through the Vijnaptimatrata (consciousness-only) view, one seeks to abide in the true ultimate nature of Vijnaptimatrata. However, at this stage, one has not yet subdued and removed the Vijnana-lakshana (aspects of consciousness), so it cannot yet be called abiding in the true nature of Vijnaptimatrata. That is, the forty minds before the Bhumis (stages) all belong to this stage. However, the hundreds of thousands, eighty thousands, sixty thousands, forty thousands, twenty thousands, ten thousands of kalpas, etc., before this do not belong to this stage, because the purity and increasing power have not yet been reached, and the steadfast mind has not yet advanced.

The above explains the boundaries of the initial path stage, and explains the previous two verses. The following will explain the name.

Treatise: In order to proceed towards the unsurpassed and supreme accumulation of merit, it is called the stage of accumulation.

Commentary: First, explain the name 'accumulation'. Taking Bodhi (enlightenment) as the goal, this is the initial stage of the cause of Bodhi. Accumulating the power to benefit oneself is how one can reach that fruit, so it is called 'accumulation'. This is explaining the name from the perspective of self-benefit. In order to escape from birth and death and obtain great wisdom, one seeks Bodhi. However, in the seventh last increasing condition mentioned earlier, when explaining the stage of accumulation, it was also mentioned that 'unknown roots to be known' can approach and nourish the fundamental stage. This is explaining the name from the perspective of a long-term practitioner approaching the fruit stage. Here it is said that the initial practitioner seeks the fruit, and the two are not contradictory.

Treatise: For the benefit of sentient beings (Sattvas), it is called the stage of accordance with liberation.

Commentary: Next, explain the name 'stage of accordance with liberation'. For the benefit of sentient beings, one diligently seeks liberation. Taking Nirvana (liberation) as the goal, Nirvana is called liberation, as is commonly said. Diligently seeking, and the actions do not contradict each other, so it is called 'accordance'. 'Part' refers to the cause, and also refers to the branches. In the previously mentioned 'stage of accordance with decisive selection', 'part' is decisive selection, which is the branch of Dharma selection. Because it accords with that decisive selection, it is called 'stage of accordance with decisive selection'.

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分。今言分者因支義。是解脫之因。因之一支。故名為分。即順體是分。順彼解脫之分。名順解脫分。此依利他為因。為度有情乃求解脫。然求菩提利他義顯。勤趣解脫自利義增。然于菩提有自利之談。涅槃致利他之義者。蓋欲以彼顯此菩提亦利有情。以此顯彼涅槃亦能自利。文影於此義貫于彼故也　問何故順解脫分分即是順。順抉擇分分體非順　答抉擇體是有為。抉擇可體即分。體有多分故。涅槃體是無為。解脫彼非是分。體非一．多故　又解解脫者即勝解數。緣解脫解脫苦名解脫。因中印境為名乃名勝解。在果出苦為因故名解脫。若依此釋解脫即分名解脫分。分義非順與抉擇分同。然彼望惠為名。此望勝解為號今為此解即無前難。

上來雖出位體分齊。釋位二名不同。總是解釋資糧位訖。此解漸次悟入唯識之時初位漸次。釋頌下二句。

論。此位菩薩至修菩薩行。

述曰。此出四力。攝論第六云誰能悟入中。大乘多聞熏習相續。此乃因力。簡二乘等種姓多聞。即前所說本．習二姓。彼云已得逢事無量諸佛出現於世。即善友力。彼云已得一向決定勝解。非諸惡友所能動壞名作意力。彼云已善積集諸善根故。善修福智資糧菩薩。名資糧力。由前無間所說三因已善積集諸善根等。世親云。第一力為因

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

『分』，這裡所說的『分』，是因支的意義。是解脫的因，因的一個分支，所以稱為『分』。順應于本體的就是『分』，順應于那個解脫的『分』，就叫做『順解脫分』。這依賴於利他作為原因，爲了度化有情眾生才尋求解脫。然而，尋求菩提時，利他的意義更加明顯；勤奮地趨向解脫時，自利的意義增加。然而，對於菩提有自利的說法，對於涅槃有導致利他的意義的說法，大概是想要用它來顯示菩提也能利益有情，用這個來顯示涅槃也能自利。文字的影子在這裡，意義貫穿在那裡，就是這個意思。

問：為什麼順解脫分的分就是順，而順抉擇分的分的本體不是順呢？

答：抉擇的本體是有為法，抉擇可以作為本體，也就是『分』，本體有多個部分。涅槃的本體是無為法，解脫不是它的『分』，因為本體不是單一或多個。

又解釋說，解脫就是殊勝的理解（勝解）的數量。緣于解脫，從解脫中解脫痛苦，叫做解脫。在因地，印證境界作為名稱，才叫做殊勝的理解（勝解）。在果地，脫離痛苦作為原因，所以叫做解脫。如果按照這個解釋，解脫就是『分』，叫做『解脫分』。『分』的意義不是順應，與抉擇分相同。然而，它以智慧（惠）為名稱，這裡以殊勝的理解（勝解）為稱號，現在這樣解釋就沒有之前的疑問了。

上面雖然說明了位、本體、分際，解釋了位的兩個名稱的不同，總的來說是解釋了資糧位完畢。這裡解釋了逐漸悟入唯識的時候的最初的位，漸次。解釋頌文的下面兩句。

論：這個位的菩薩，開始修行菩薩行。

述記：這裡說明了四力。《攝大乘論》第六說，誰能夠悟入其中呢？大乘的廣聞熏習相續，這是因力。簡別二乘等種姓的多聞，就是前面所說的本性姓和習性姓。那裡說，已經得到逢事無量諸佛出現在世的機會，這是善友力。那裡說，已經得到一向決定殊勝的理解（勝解），不是那些惡友所能動搖破壞的，叫做作意力。那裡說，已經很好地積聚了各種善根，很好地修習福德和智慧資糧的菩薩，叫做資糧力。由於前面無間所說的三種原因，已經很好地積聚了各種善根等等。世親說，第一力是因。

【English Translation】 English version:

'Part' (分), the 'part' mentioned here refers to the meaning of a branch of a cause. It is the cause of liberation, a branch of a cause, hence it is called 'part'. That which accords with the substance is the 'part'; that which accords with that 'part' of liberation is called 'sequential liberation part' (順解脫分). This relies on benefiting others as the cause, seeking liberation in order to deliver sentient beings. However, when seeking Bodhi, the meaning of benefiting others is more apparent; when diligently striving towards liberation, the meaning of benefiting oneself increases. Nevertheless, there is talk of self-benefit in relation to Bodhi, and talk of leading to the benefit of others in relation to Nirvana, probably intending to use the former to show that Bodhi can also benefit sentient beings, and to use the latter to show that Nirvana can also benefit oneself. The shadow of the words is here, the meaning pervades there, that is the meaning.

Question: Why is the 'part' of sequential liberation part (順解脫分) sequential, while the substance of the 'part' of sequential ascertainment part (順抉擇分) is not sequential?

Answer: The substance of ascertainment is conditioned (有為). Ascertainment can be the substance, which is the 'part'; the substance has multiple parts. The substance of Nirvana is unconditioned (無為); liberation is not its 'part', because the substance is neither singular nor multiple.

Another explanation is that liberation is the number of excellent understanding (勝解). Conditioned by liberation, liberating from the suffering of liberation is called liberation. In the causal stage, verifying the realm as a name is called excellent understanding (勝解). In the fruition stage, escaping suffering is the cause, hence it is called liberation. If according to this explanation, liberation is the 'part', called 'liberation part'. The meaning of 'part' is not sequential, the same as ascertainment part. However, it is named after wisdom (惠), while this is titled after excellent understanding (勝解); this explanation now has no previous doubts.

Although the position, substance, and boundaries have been explained above, and the differences between the two names of the position have been explained, overall, the explanation of the accumulation stage (資糧位) is completed. Here, the initial position of gradually entering into Consciousness-Only (唯識) is explained, gradually. Explaining the latter two lines of the verse.

Treatise: The Bodhisattva in this position begins to practice the Bodhisattva conduct.

Commentary: Here, the four powers are explained. The sixth section of the Compendium of the Mahayana says, who can enter into it? The continuous hearing and learning of the Mahayana is the power of cause. Distinguishing the hearing and learning of the Two Vehicles (二乘) and other lineages, which are the innate and acquired lineages mentioned earlier. It says there that one has obtained the opportunity to encounter countless Buddhas appearing in the world, which is the power of good friends. It says there that one has obtained a consistently decisive excellent understanding (勝解), which cannot be moved or destroyed by evil friends, called the power of attention. It says there that the Bodhisattva has well accumulated various good roots and well cultivated the merit and wisdom resources, called the power of resources. Due to the three causes mentioned earlier without interruption, various good roots have been well accumulated, and so on. Vasubandhu said that the first power is the cause.

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。第二力為緣。第三力能修正行。第四力由積集善根名資糧菩薩。如是名由作意力。善修福．智二種資糧。能入十地名依持力。此四望二乘性。惡友緣。任運心。下資糧。以皆勝故名四勝力。此位依此四力。于唯識義雖深信解。而未能了二取皆空。一切多住事相散心行諸粗行。名住外門修菩薩行　問華嚴第九十住品頌云。第四生貴真佛子。從諸賢聖正法生。有無諸法無所著。舍離生死出三界。彼經第十又解十住初心菩薩。余住亦爾。頌云。清凈妙法身。應現種種形。猶如大幻師。所樂無不現。或處為眾生究竟菩薩行。或復現初生。出家行學道。或於樹王下自然成正覺。或處為眾生示現入泥洹。如何此文言多住外門修菩薩行　答此第四住菩薩作十種觀法。第七觀業。第八觀果。折伏現纏。不依見道等所有無明。更造惡業令後果起。名為舍離生死出於三界。定當能出非時已出。今依外門修菩薩行。亦不違也。又此十住菩薩。亦有少分依有漏定能現八相度脫有情。以十住初發心住中。分得十力學於十法。第十法者為苦眾生作歸依處。此住已去彼諸菩薩。展轉增勝能行八相。然多起散行。少能入定作真如觀。名多住外門。不說彼菩薩唯住外門也。亦不相違。

論。故於二取至二取現行。

述曰。由此事故二取現行

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：第二種力量是因緣力。第三種力量是能夠修正行為的力量。第四種力量是由於積累善根而得名的資糧菩薩（Bodhisattva who accumulates merit and wisdom）。這些被稱為由作意力（power of intention）所致。善於修習福德和智慧兩種資糧，能夠進入十地（ten bhumis）的菩薩被稱為依持力（power of reliance）。這四種力量相對於聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna）和緣覺乘（Pratyekabuddhayāna）的根性而言，勝過惡友的因緣、任運的心、下等的資糧，因為它們都更加殊勝，所以稱為四勝力（four superior powers）。處於這個階段的菩薩依靠這四種力量，對於唯識（Vijñānavāda）的道理雖然有深刻的信解，但還不能了達能取（subject）和所取（object）都是空性的。他們大多停留在事相上，以散亂的心行持各種粗糙的行為，這被稱為住在外門修菩薩行（practicing the Bodhisattva path while dwelling in the outer court）。 問：在《華嚴經》（Avataṃsaka Sūtra）第九十住品（chapter on the abodes）的偈頌中說：『第四生貴真佛子，從諸賢聖正法生，有無諸法無所著，舍離生死出三界。』而且該經第十品又解釋了十住（ten abodes）初心菩薩（Bodhisattva in the initial abode），其餘的住位也是如此。偈頌說：『清凈妙法身，應現種種形，猶如大幻師，所樂無不現。或處為眾生究竟菩薩行，或復現初生，出家行學道，或於樹王下自然成正覺，或處為眾生示現入泥洹（nirvana）。』為什麼這裡說他們大多住在外門修菩薩行呢？ 答：這裡的第四住菩薩修習十種觀法，第七是觀業（karma），第八是觀果（result）。他們折伏現行的煩惱，不依賴見道（path of seeing）等所擁有的無明（ignorance），不再造作惡業導致未來的苦果產生。這被稱為舍離生死，超出三界（three realms）。他們必定能夠超出，而不是說已經超出。現在說他們依外門修菩薩行，也不相違背。而且，這十住菩薩也有少部分依靠有漏定（contaminated samadhi）能夠示現八相成道（eight aspects of enlightenment），以十住中的初發心住（abode of initial aspiration）為例，他們分得了十力（ten powers），學習十法（ten dharmas），第十法是為受苦的眾生提供皈依之處。從這個住位開始，那些菩薩逐漸增勝，能夠行持八相成道，然而他們大多起散亂的行持，很少能夠入定作真如觀（contemplation of Suchness），所以被稱為大多住在外門，而不是說他們僅僅住在外門，因此並不矛盾。 論：所以說，從二取（duality）到二取現行（duality manifests）。 述曰：因為這個緣故，二取現行。

【English Translation】 English version: The second power is the power of conditions (hetu). The third power is the power to correct conduct. The fourth power is the Bodhisattva of accumulation of merit, named 'accumulation of resources' (zī liáng pú sà - Bodhisattva who accumulates merit and wisdom) due to the accumulation of good roots. These are named the power of intention (zuò yì lì - power of intention). Skillfully cultivating the two resources of merit and wisdom, one who can enter the ten bhumis (shí dì - ten grounds) is named the power of reliance (yī chí lì - power of reliance). These four, in relation to the nature of the Two Vehicles (śrāvakayāna and pratyekabuddhayāna), surpass the conditions of bad friends, the mind that acts spontaneously, and inferior resources. Because they are all superior, they are named the four superior powers (sì shèng lì - four superior powers). In this stage, relying on these four powers, although one has deep faith and understanding in the meaning of Consciousness-only (wéi shí - Vijñānavāda), one is still unable to realize that both the subject (neng qu) and object (suǒ qǔ) are empty. One mostly dwells in phenomena, with a scattered mind engaging in various coarse practices. This is named 'practicing the Bodhisattva path while dwelling in the outer court' (zhù wài mén xiū pú sà xíng). Question: The verse in the ninetieth chapter on the abodes (zhù pǐn) of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra (Huá yán jīng) says: 'The fourth is born as a noble true Buddha-child, born from the correct Dharma of all sages. Unattached to all dharmas, whether existent or nonexistent, abandoning birth and death, emerging from the three realms (sān jiè).' Moreover, the tenth chapter of that sutra explains the Bodhisattva in the initial abode (chū xīn pú sà) of the ten abodes (shí zhù), and the remaining abodes are similar. The verse says: 'Pure and wonderful Dharma-body, manifesting various forms, like a great illusionist, manifesting whatever is desired. Sometimes dwelling to perfect the Bodhisattva path for sentient beings, sometimes manifesting as newly born, leaving home to practice and study the Way, sometimes naturally attaining perfect enlightenment under the Bodhi tree, sometimes dwelling to show sentient beings entering nirvana (ní huán).' How can this text say that they mostly dwell in the outer court practicing the Bodhisattva path? Answer: This Bodhisattva in the fourth abode practices ten kinds of contemplation. The seventh is contemplation of karma (yè), and the eighth is contemplation of result (guǒ). They subdue present afflictions, and without relying on the ignorance (wú míng) possessed by the path of seeing (jiàn dào) and so on, they no longer create evil karma that leads to future suffering. This is named 'abandoning birth and death, emerging from the three realms.' They will definitely be able to emerge, not that they have already emerged. Now, saying that they practice the Bodhisattva path while dwelling in the outer court is not contradictory. Moreover, these Bodhisattvas in the ten abodes also have a small portion who, relying on contaminated samadhi (yǒu lòu dìng), can manifest the eight aspects of enlightenment (bā xiàng chéng dào). Taking the abode of initial aspiration (chū fā xīn zhù) in the ten abodes as an example, they have received a portion of the ten powers (shí lì) and are learning the ten dharmas (shí fǎ). The tenth dharma is to provide a place of refuge for suffering beings. From this abode onwards, those Bodhisattvas gradually increase in superiority and are able to practice the eight aspects of enlightenment. However, they mostly engage in scattered practices and are rarely able to enter samadhi to contemplate Suchness (zhēn rú guān). Therefore, they are named 'mostly dwelling in the outer court,' not that they only dwell in the outer court. Therefore, it is not contradictory. Treatise: Therefore, from duality (èr qǔ) to the manifestation of duality (èr qǔ xiàn xíng). Commentary: Because of this reason, duality manifests.

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為能熏習所引隨眠。猶未有能伏滅此二隨眠之力令彼不起二取現行　問華嚴經第十卷解十住菩薩中。云除滅諸煩惱。永盡無有餘。無礙寂滅觀。是則佛正法。云何此言未伏二取　答彼依伏因邪教．邪師所起不共無明伴煩惱類說盡。非盡一切自分別生煩惱。及俱生煩惱　又說佛法功力能滅一切煩惱。非十住位已能滅一切煩惱　下此論文資糧道中。于分別二取雖漸伏滅。未全伏故。緣起經云內法異生不放逸者。我不說為無明緣行故。

因自分別不共．相應無明見道等者此位能伏。今說不伏謂因邪教所起。及俱生等全分為論　又但總言。多分未能名為未伏。非少亦未。論下文云。于加行位始方能伏分別二取。因邪教者于資糧位亦有起故。瑜伽論說勝解行菩薩。於三處妄失猶起煩惱。或時舍戒。所說諸法如闇中射或中．不中。故此位中自分別煩惱未盡。

正釋下二句頌。

論。此二取言至所取性故。

述曰。頌二取言。顯二取取。非即二取名二取也。但只二取名二取者。有非執二取種。豈亦伏耶。又相分等非必可伏。故執二取為實有等之取方名二取。

論。二取習氣至煩惱障種。

述曰。二情取之種名彼二取。隨眠何義。隨逐有情常在生死。眠伏藏識不現余處。故名隨眠。或隨增過故名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 爲了能夠熏習所引發的隨眠（煩惱的潛在狀態），仍然沒有能夠伏滅這兩種隨眠的力量，使它們不起二取（能取和所取）的現行（顯現活動）。 問：在《華嚴經》第十卷解釋十住菩薩時說：『除滅諸煩惱，永盡無有餘，無礙寂滅觀，是則佛正法。』為什麼這裡說還沒有伏滅二取呢？ 答：那裡是依據降伏因邪教、邪師所引起的，不共無明（與生俱來的無明）伴隨的煩惱種類而說的『盡』，不是指完全斷盡一切由自分別（後天分別）產生的煩惱，以及俱生煩惱（與生俱來的煩惱）。 而且，雖然說佛法的功力能夠滅除一切煩惱，但並不是說十住位的菩薩已經能夠滅除一切煩惱。 下面的論文中說，在資糧道中，對於分別二取雖然逐漸伏滅，但還沒有完全伏滅。因此，《緣起經》說，對於內在修法的異生（凡夫），如果不放逸，我不說他們是無明緣行（十二因緣中的無明導致行）。 因為由自分別、不共、相應的無明，在見道位等才能降伏。現在說沒有降伏，是指因邪教所引起的，以及俱生等等，完全分開來討論。 而且，只是總的來說，大部分未能降伏，才能稱為未伏，不是說少部分也沒有降伏。論文下文說，在加行位才開始能夠降伏分別二取。因為因邪教所引起的二取，在資糧位也有生起。瑜伽論說勝解行菩薩，在三個地方的錯誤認識仍然會生起煩惱，有時甚至會舍戒。所說的諸法就像在黑暗中射箭，有時中，有時不中。所以在這個階段，由自分別產生的煩惱還沒有斷盡。 下面正式解釋後面兩句頌文。 論：『此二取言』乃至『所取性故』。 述記：頌文中的『二取言』，顯示是執取二取，不是說二取本身就叫做二取。如果僅僅是二取就叫做二取，那麼沒有執取二取的種子，難道也要降伏嗎？而且，相分等等不一定可以降伏。所以執取二取為實有等等的執取，才叫做二取。 論：『二取習氣』乃至『煩惱障種』。 述記：兩種情感執取的種子，叫做彼二取。隨眠是什麼意思？隨逐有情，常在生死中，眠伏在藏識中，不顯現在其他地方，所以叫做隨眠。或者隨之增長過患，所以叫做隨眠。

【English Translation】 English version In order to be able to cultivate the latent tendencies (Sleeper) that have been induced, there is still no power to subdue and extinguish these two latent tendencies, preventing them from arising as the active manifestations (manifest activities) of dualistic grasping (grasping subject and grasped object). Question: In the tenth chapter of the Avatamsaka Sutra, when explaining the Ten Abodes of Bodhisattvas, it says: 'Eliminating all afflictions, completely and without remainder, unobstructed and quiescent contemplation, this is the true Dharma of the Buddha.' Why does this say that dualistic grasping has not yet been subdued? Answer: That refers to the 'exhaustion' based on subduing the types of afflictions caused by wrong teachings and evil teachers, accompanied by unshared ignorance (innate ignorance). It does not mean completely eradicating all afflictions arising from self-discrimination (acquired discrimination) and co-arisen afflictions (innate afflictions). Moreover, although it is said that the power of the Buddha's Dharma can eliminate all afflictions, it does not mean that Bodhisattvas in the Ten Abodes have already eliminated all afflictions. The following treatise states that in the Stage of Accumulation, although dualistic grasping is gradually subdued, it is not yet completely subdued. Therefore, the Sutra on Dependent Origination says that for ordinary beings who practice inner Dharma and are not negligent, I do not say that they are 'ignorance conditioning action' (ignorance leading to action in the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination). Because self-discrimination, unshared, and corresponding ignorance can only be subdued in the Stage of Seeing, etc. The statement that it has not been subdued refers to what is caused by wrong teachings, as well as co-arisen factors, discussed entirely separately. Moreover, only when the majority has not been subdued can it be called 'not subdued,' not that even a small part has not been subdued. The treatise later says that it is only in the Stage of Application that one can begin to subdue dualistic grasping arising from discrimination. Because dualistic grasping caused by wrong teachings also arises in the Stage of Accumulation. The Yogacara-bhumi-sastra says that Bodhisattvas in the Stage of Understanding and Conduct still give rise to afflictions due to errors in three areas, and sometimes even abandon their vows. The Dharma spoken is like shooting arrows in the dark, sometimes hitting and sometimes missing. Therefore, in this stage, afflictions arising from self-discrimination have not yet been completely eradicated. The following is the formal explanation of the latter two lines of the verse. Treatise: 'These words of dualistic grasping' up to 'the nature of what is grasped'. Commentary: The words 'dualistic grasping' in the verse indicate the grasping of dualistic grasping. It is not that dualistic grasping itself is called dualistic grasping. If merely dualistic grasping were called dualistic grasping, then would the seeds that do not grasp dualistic grasping also need to be subdued? Moreover, the image-component, etc., cannot necessarily be subdued. Therefore, the grasping of dualistic grasping as truly existent, etc., is what is called dualistic grasping. Treatise: 'The habitual tendencies of dualistic grasping' up to 'the seed of the obstacle of affliction'. Commentary: The seeds of the grasping of two emotions are called 'those two graspings'. What is the meaning of 'latent tendency'? It follows sentient beings, constantly in samsara, lying dormant in the alaya-consciousness, not manifesting elsewhere, therefore it is called 'latent tendency'. Or, it increases faults, therefore it is called 'latent tendency'.

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隨眠。隨逐有情多增過失。故名隨眠。何故眠者乃是增義。如人嗜眠眠即滋多。故過失增是隨眠義。前當性彰名。后從喻為因。與薩婆多別如別抄。即二障種也。

論。煩惱障者至諸隨煩惱。

述曰。上解本頌訖。下第二解二障中。初出體釋名等。二見．修分別。三約人分別。四約有．無漏道伏．斷分別。五結歸頌文。先解煩惱障中。初出體。后釋名。以薩迦耶見為首由我見為本生諸煩惱。我見若無煩惱隨斷。見．修二斷。其義亦然。或雖所生之惑先除我見未滅究竟盡位由我見斷余方斷盡。此依九品雖別斷。斷八品等時不斷我見。煩惱先斷說。以我見無品數。全離欲方斷故　又解既所生惑有多品數。能生之見定然亦有九品。即隨離九品欲我見漸斷故。根本斷時余亦隨斷。此中不言我見言薩迦耶見者。若言我見不攝我所。梵云沒曳達利瑟致。此云我見。梵云薩迦耶。此云不實移轉身見。即攝我所。為顯此中攝我所故言薩迦耶　百二十八根本煩惱者。見道所斷欲界四十。上界各三十六．並修道十六。有一百二十八種。

及彼等流諸隨煩惱者。即二十種。或復更多。如前所引攝事分說。此出自體性。若眷屬及余心．心所等五蘊為性。佛地第七說。若此所發業所得果皆攝在中。皆以煩惱為根本故。彼論通遠

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：隨眠（Anusaya，潛在的煩惱），因為它跟隨有情眾生，增加過失，所以叫做隨眠。為什麼說『眠』是增加的意思呢？就像人貪睡，睡眠就會越來越多。所以，過失增加就是隨眠的含義。『前』是指當體顯現的名稱，『后』是從比喻作為原因。這與薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的觀點不同，就像在其他抄本中記載的那樣。隨眠也就是二障（煩惱障和所知障）的種子。

論：煩惱障，乃至各種隨煩惱。

述曰：上面解釋了本頌的內容。下面第二部分解釋二障，首先是解釋體性和名稱等，其次是見道和修道的分別，再次是從人的角度進行分別，第四是從有漏道和無漏道伏斷的角度進行分別，最後總結歸納到頌文。首先解釋煩惱障，先解釋體性，后解釋名稱。以薩迦耶見（Satkayadristi，有身見，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）為首，由我見（Atmadristi，認為在五蘊中存在常一不變的我）為根本產生各種煩惱。如果我見斷除，煩惱也會隨之斷除，見道所斷和修道所斷的含義也是這樣。或者，即使所生的迷惑先被去除，如果我見沒有滅除，最終在證盡的階段，也會因為我見斷除，其餘的煩惱才能斷盡。這是依據九品惑（煩惱的九個等級）雖然分別斷除，但在斷除八品等的時候，我見並沒有斷除。這裡說煩惱先斷除，是因為我見沒有品數，完全脫離欲界才能斷除。另一種解釋是，既然所生的迷惑有很多品數，那麼能生出這些迷惑的見解，肯定也有九品。也就是隨著脫離欲界的九品，我見逐漸斷除。根本斷除的時候，其餘的煩惱也會隨之斷除。這裡不說我見，而說薩迦耶見的原因是，如果說我見，就不能涵蓋我所（Atmiya，屬於我的事物）。梵語是沒曳達利瑟致（Atmadristi），這裡翻譯為我見。梵語是薩迦耶（Satkaya），這裡翻譯為不實移轉身見，也就是涵蓋我所。爲了顯示這裡涵蓋我所，所以說薩迦耶見。一百二十八種根本煩惱，是指見道所斷的欲界四十種，上界各三十六種，加上修道所斷的十六種，總共有一百二十八種。

以及與它們同類的各種隨煩惱，也就是二十種，或者更多，就像前面所引用的《攝事分》中所說的那樣。這裡說明了自體性。如果是眷屬以及其餘的心、心所等，以五蘊為體性。佛地第七說，如果是這些所引發的業所得到的果報，都包含在其中，因為都是以煩惱為根本。彼論通達深遠。

【English Translation】 English version: Anusaya (latent defilements), is so named because it follows sentient beings and increases faults. Why is 'sleep' said to mean increase? Just as a person who is fond of sleep will sleep more and more. Therefore, the increase of faults is the meaning of Anusaya. 'Before' refers to the name that manifests the entity itself, 'after' is from the metaphor as the cause. This differs from the Sarvastivada (the 'all exists' school), as recorded in other copies. Anusaya is also the seed of the two obstacles (klesavarana and jneyavarana).

Treatise: The obstacle of afflictions, up to the various secondary afflictions.

Commentary: The above explains the content of the verse. The second part below explains the two obstacles, first explaining the substance and name, etc., second the distinction between the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, third the distinction from the perspective of people, fourth the distinction from the perspective of the suppression and cutting off of contaminated and uncontaminated paths, and finally summarizing and returning to the verse. First explain the obstacle of afflictions, first explain the substance, then explain the name. Taking Satkayadristi (view of the real existence of the self, the view that the aggregation of the five skandhas is a real self) as the head, various afflictions arise from Atmadristi (the view of self, the view that there is a permanent and unchanging self in the five skandhas) as the root. If Atmadristi is cut off, afflictions will also be cut off accordingly, and the meaning of what is cut off by the path of seeing and what is cut off by the path of cultivation is also the same. Or, even if the delusions that arise are removed first, if Atmadristi is not extinguished, eventually at the stage of complete realization, the remaining afflictions can only be cut off because Atmadristi is cut off. This is based on the nine grades of delusion (nine levels of afflictions), although they are cut off separately, but when cutting off the eight grades, etc., Atmadristi is not cut off. Here it is said that afflictions are cut off first, because Atmadristi has no grades, and can only be cut off when completely detached from the desire realm. Another explanation is that since the delusions that arise have many grades, then the views that can give rise to these delusions must also have nine grades. That is, as one detaches from the nine grades of the desire realm, Atmadristi is gradually cut off. When the root is cut off, the remaining afflictions will also be cut off accordingly. The reason why Satkayadristi is mentioned here instead of Atmadristi is that if Atmadristi is mentioned, it cannot cover Atmiya (what belongs to me). The Sanskrit is Atmadristi, which is translated here as the view of self. The Sanskrit is Satkaya, which is translated here as the view of the unreal shifting body, which covers what belongs to me. In order to show that what belongs to me is covered here, Satkayadristi is mentioned. The one hundred and twenty-eight fundamental afflictions refer to the forty types of the desire realm cut off by the path of seeing, the thirty-six types of each of the upper realms, plus the sixteen types cut off by the path of cultivation, totaling one hundred and twenty-eight types.

And the various secondary afflictions of the same kind as them, that is, twenty types, or more, as mentioned in the Compendium of Topics quoted earlier. This explains the nature of the entity itself. If it is a retinue and other minds, mental factors, etc., the five skandhas are the nature. The seventh chapter of the Buddha-bhumi Sutra says that if the karmic retributions caused by these are included in it, it is because they are all rooted in afflictions. That treatise is thorough and far-reaching.

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眷屬皆假名障。今此據自性障即不取業．果。若不爾者無明所發．感善三業。及果。應是染性。應是障體。既不爾者故今此文為勝。

論。此皆擾惱至名煩惱障。

述曰。此釋名也。唯障涅槃所障增故。

所知障中初出體性。第二釋名。第三八識分別因破異執。第四三性分別亦遮外計。第五釋外妨難。

論。所知障者至愛恚慢等。

述曰。亦以法我我所執為首生余障故。如前第一卷解。

見疑無明愛恚慢等者。此出體性。此之頭數亦與煩惱障同。若煩惱障俱必有所知障故。然煩惱粗有多品類可易了知。二乘所斷。唯是不善有覆性故以數束顯。今此所知障細下無多品類極難了知。唯菩薩斷。亦是異熟無記所攝故不顯數。其實法執無離無明故必有數。又顯法執無明。五住地中唯一住攝。前障四住地攝。故不顯數　若爾何故不言諸隨煩惱　既言慢等等取隨惑。佛地亦同。此出自性體。若眷屬者。佛地云。諸心．心所。及所發業。所得果。皆攝在中。皆以法執無明為根本故。此中果者謂等流．增上．士用果等。除異熟果。不感執故。

何名所知障。

論。覆所知境至名所知障。

述曰。二釋名也　所知境者。謂有為．無為　無顛倒性。謂真如理。由覆此境令智不生能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：眷屬都是虛假的名稱障礙。現在這裡根據自性障礙，就不包括業和果報。如果不是這樣，無明所引發、感生的善的三業以及果報，就應該是染污的性質，應該是障礙的本體。既然不是這樣，所以現在這段經文更為殊勝。

論：這些都擾亂惱害，稱為煩惱障。

述記：這是解釋名稱。因為唯有障礙涅槃，所障礙的增多。

所知障中，首先闡述體性，第二解釋名稱，第三用八識分別來破除不同的執見，第四用三性分別來遮止外道的計度，第五解釋外來的妨難。

論：所知障，包括見、疑、無明、愛、恚、慢等。

述記：也是以法我、我所執為首，產生其餘的障礙。如前面第一卷所解釋的。

見、疑、無明、愛、恚、慢等：這是闡述體性。這些頭目的數量也和煩惱障相同。如果煩惱障存在，必定有所知障。然而煩惱粗顯，有很多品類容易瞭解，是二乘所斷除的。因為只是不善有覆的性質，所以用數量來概括顯示。現在這個所知障細微隱蔽，沒有很多品類，極難了解，唯有菩薩才能斷除。也是異熟無記所攝，所以不顯示數量。其實法執離不開無明，所以必定有數量。又顯示法執無明，在五住地中只由一個住地所攝。前面的障礙由四個住地所攝，所以不顯示數量。如果這樣，為什麼不說諸隨煩惱？既然說了慢等等，就包括了隨惑。佛地也是一樣。這是出自自性體。如果是眷屬，佛地說：『諸心、心所，以及所發業、所得果，都攝在其中。』都是以法執無明為根本的緣故。這裡說的果，是指等流果、增上果、士用果等，除去異熟果，因為不感生執著。

什麼叫做所知障？

論：覆蓋所知之境，乃至稱為所知障。

述記：這是第二種解釋名稱。所知之境，是指有為法和無為法。無顛倒性，是指真如理。由於覆蓋這個境界，使智慧不能生起，能夠……

【English Translation】 English version: Affiliated factors are all false name obstructions. Now, based on the self-nature obstruction, it does not include karma and its results. If it were not so, the wholesome three karmas and their results arising from ignorance should be of a defiled nature and the very substance of obstruction. Since it is not so, this passage is superior.

Treatise: These all disturb and annoy, and are called the afflictive obstruction (煩惱障, Fánnǎo zhàng).

Commentary: This explains the name. It is because it solely obstructs Nirvana, and what is obstructed increases.

Within the obstruction to knowledge (所知障, Suǒ zhī zhàng), first, the substance is presented; second, the name is explained; third, the differing views are refuted by distinguishing the eight consciousnesses; fourth, external calculations are also prevented by distinguishing the three natures; fifth, external objections are explained and refuted.

Treatise: The obstruction to knowledge includes views (見, jiàn), doubt (疑, yí), ignorance (無明, wúmíng), attachment (愛, ài), hatred (恚, huì), pride (慢, màn), etc.

Commentary: It also takes the attachment to the dharma-self (法我, fǎ wǒ) and what belongs to the self (我所執, wǒ suǒ zhí) as the head, giving rise to other obstructions. As explained in the first volume.

Views, doubt, ignorance, attachment, hatred, pride, etc.: This explains the substance. The number of these heads is also the same as the afflictive obstruction. If the afflictive obstruction exists, the obstruction to knowledge must also exist. However, afflictions are coarse and have many categories that are easy to understand, and are severed by the two vehicles (二乘, èr shèng). Because it is only of an unwholesome and obscured nature, it is summarized and shown with numbers. Now, this obstruction to knowledge is subtle and hidden, does not have many categories, and is extremely difficult to understand, and is only severed by Bodhisattvas. It is also included in the result of maturation (異熟, yìshú) and is neutral (無記, wújì), so the number is not shown. In fact, attachment to dharma cannot be separated from ignorance, so there must be a number. It also shows that attachment to dharma and ignorance are included in only one of the five abodes (五住地, wǔ zhù dì). The previous obstruction is included in four abodes, so the number is not shown. If so, why not speak of all the secondary afflictions (隨煩惱, suí fánnǎo)? Since pride, etc., are mentioned, it includes the secondary惑. The Buddha-ground (佛地, Fó dì) is the same. This comes from the self-nature substance. If it is an affiliated factor, the Buddha says: 'All minds, mental factors, as well as the karma produced and the results obtained, are all included in it.' All are rooted in attachment to dharma and ignorance. The result mentioned here refers to the result of outflow (等流果, děng liú guǒ), the result of increase (增上果, zēng shàng guǒ), the result of effort (士用果, shì yòng guǒ), etc., excluding the result of maturation, because it does not give rise to attachment.

What is called the obstruction to knowledge?

Treatise: Covering the object of knowledge, and so on, is called the obstruction to knowledge.

Commentary: This is the second explanation of the name. The object of knowledge refers to conditioned (有為, yǒu wéi) and unconditioned (無為, wú wéi) dharmas. The non-inverted nature refers to Suchness (真如, zhēn rú). Because this realm is covered, wisdom cannot arise, and is able to...

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障菩提故名所知障。此即釋名。此望所障增者以得名故。下轉依中自當解釋　前煩惱障煩惱即障。此所知障障于所知。前當體彰名。持業釋也。此所障受稱。依士釋也。

論。此所知障至彼微劣故。

述曰。三八識分別因破外執。第八識名異熟識。何以不俱。彼異熟識是微細劣弱故。此法執望彼粗而強故。此是能熏故彼非也。安惠等師執三性心皆有法執。此識唯異熟故。唯異熟性中破之。

論。不與無明惠相應故。

述曰。諸論但說此第八識唯五數俱。法執必惠。及無明俱。惠能計度。無明迷故。佛地論說。有義法執及無明。遍三性。有漏心品。及二乘無漏心品。皆不了達法無我故。皆似相分．見分起故。前卷已說。此障中無。但護法師伏遮彼計。若言法執何藉惠俱。

論。法空智品與俱起故。

述曰。菩薩法空智品。許與此第八識俱起故。第七有法執。法空智起即不行。第八法執有。法空智起此應滅。既八現行與彼俱起。定知第八無法執俱。量云。第八識等。定非法執品。法空觀品與俱起故。如佛第八識　若言因中法空觀起第八許斷。即無漏法無所熏故佛何得成。不可言熏鏡智俱識。非無記故。猶未得故。第八異熟既爾。余識異熟應然。然今七識總合為法。又下異熟心許是法

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：障礙菩提的緣故，稱作所知障（Skt: Jñeyāvaraṇa，阻礙對實相的認知）。這是解釋名稱。相對於所障礙的事物而言，所知障因其得名而顯得更為強大。關於轉依（轉變所依，指轉染成凈的過程）的詳細解釋將在後面進行。之前的煩惱障，煩惱本身即是障礙，而此所知障則是障礙對所知事物的認知。前者直接以本體來彰顯名稱，屬於持業釋（主謂結構）。後者則以所障礙的對象來稱謂，屬於依士釋（領屬結構）。

論：此所知障乃至彼微劣的緣故。

述曰：三八識分別因，是爲了破除外道的執見。第八識名為異熟識（Skt: Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識），為什麼不與法執（Dharma-graha，對法存在的執著）同時生起呢？因為彼異熟識是微細且劣弱的緣故，而此法執相對於彼異熟識而言，顯得粗大而強盛，因此法執是能熏習的，而異熟識則不是。安慧等論師認為三性（善、惡、無記）的心識都具有法執，但此第八識唯是異熟識，因此只能在唯異熟性中破斥他們的觀點。

論：不與無明（Avidyā，對事物真相的無知）和慧（Prajñā，智慧）相應合的緣故。

述曰：諸論典只說此第八識唯與五遍行心所相應。法執必定與慧及無明同時生起，因為慧能夠計度，而無明則使人迷惑。佛地論中說，有觀點認為法執及無明遍於三性，存在於有漏心品以及二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的無漏心品中，因為它們都不能了達法無我（Dharma-nairātmya，諸法無自性），都像是相分（客觀影像）和見分（主觀認知）生起。前卷已經說過，此障中沒有。但護法論師駁斥了他們的觀點。如果說法執需要藉助慧才能生起，那又何必與無明同時生起呢？

論：法空智品（Dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna-prakāra，證悟諸法空性的智慧）與第八識同時生起的緣故。

述曰：菩薩的法空智品，允許與此第八識同時生起。第七識有法執，當法空智生起時，法執便不再起作用。第八識若有法執，當法空智生起時，此法執應該滅除。既然第八識的現行與法空智同時生起，必定可知第八識沒有與法執同時生起。可以這樣比量：第八識等，必定不是法執品，因為法空觀品能與之同時生起，如同佛的第八識一樣。如果說因地（修行階段）中法空觀生起時，第八識允許被斷除，那麼無漏法（Anāsrava-dharma，無煩惱之法）就沒有所熏習之處，佛又如何能夠成就呢？不能說熏習鏡智（Ādarśa-jñāna，如實反映一切的智慧）與第八識同時，因為鏡智不是無記性（不善不惡），而且尚未證得。第八異熟識既然如此，其餘識的異熟識也應如此。然而現在將第七識總合為法。而且下文異熟心也允許是法。

【English Translation】 English version: That which obstructs Bodhi (Enlightenment) is called Jñeyāvaraṇa (Cognitive Obscuration, the obscuration of knowledge). This is an explanation of the name. Relative to what is being obstructed, it is named as such because it is considered stronger. The detailed explanation of Āśraya-parivṛtti (Transformation of the Basis, the process of transforming defilement into purity) will be given later. In the previous Kleśāvaraṇa (Afflictive Obscuration), the afflictions themselves are the obstruction, while this Jñeyāvaraṇa obstructs the cognition of what is to be known. The former directly manifests the name through its essence, belonging to the Karmadhāraya compound (appositional compound). The latter is named based on what is being obstructed, belonging to the Tatpuruṣa compound (dependent determinative compound).

Treatise: This Jñeyāvaraṇa, up to the point that it is subtle and weak.

Commentary: The differentiation of the three eight consciousnesses is to refute the externalist's attachment. The eighth consciousness is called Vipāka-vijñāna (Resultant Consciousness), why does it not arise simultaneously with Dharma-graha (Attachment to the existence of phenomena)? Because that Vipāka-vijñāna is subtle and weak, while this Dharma-graha appears coarse and strong relative to it. Therefore, Dharma-graha is capable of influencing, while Vipāka-vijñāna is not. Teachers like Anhui hold that consciousnesses of the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) all possess Dharma-graha, but this eighth consciousness is only Vipāka-vijñāna, so their view can only be refuted within the context of its solely resultant nature.

Treatise: It does not correspond with Avidyā (Ignorance, unawareness of the true nature of things) and Prajñā (Wisdom).

Commentary: The treatises only state that this eighth consciousness corresponds with the five universal mental factors. Dharma-graha must arise simultaneously with both Prajñā and Avidyā, because Prajñā is capable of conceptualization, while Avidyā causes delusion. The Buddhabhūmi-sūtra states that some argue that Dharma-graha and Avidyā pervade the three natures, existing in the contaminated states of mind and the uncontaminated states of mind of the two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), because they are unable to realize Dharma-nairātmya (the absence of inherent existence of phenomena), and they arise like the objective image (Nimitta-bhāga) and the subjective perception (Darśana-bhāga). It has been said in the previous chapter that this obscuration does not exist in this context. However, the Dharma-pāla refuted their view. If Dharma-graha requires the assistance of Prajñā to arise, then why does it need to arise simultaneously with Avidyā?

Treatise: Because Dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna-prakāra (Wisdom realizing the emptiness of phenomena) arises simultaneously with the eighth consciousness.

Commentary: The Bodhisattva's Dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna-prakāra is allowed to arise simultaneously with this eighth consciousness. The seventh consciousness has Dharma-graha, but when Dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna arises, Dharma-graha ceases to function. If the eighth consciousness has Dharma-graha, when Dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna arises, this Dharma-graha should be eliminated. Since the manifestation of the eighth consciousness arises simultaneously with Dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna, it must be known that the eighth consciousness does not arise simultaneously with Dharma-graha. It can be inferred as follows: the eighth consciousness, etc., is definitely not a product of Dharma-graha, because Dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna can arise simultaneously with it, just like the Buddha's eighth consciousness. If it is said that in the causal stage (the stage of practice), when Dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna arises, the eighth consciousness is allowed to be eliminated, then there would be nothing for the uncontaminated Dharma (Anāsrava-dharma) to influence, and how could the Buddha attain Buddhahood? It cannot be said that the Ādarśa-jñāna (Mirror-like Wisdom) influences the eighth consciousness simultaneously, because the Mirror-like Wisdom is not neutral and has not yet been attained. Since the eighth Vipāka-vijñāna is like this, the Vipāka-vijñāna of the other consciousnesses should also be like this. However, now the seventh consciousness is collectively considered as Dharma. Moreover, the following text allows the Vipāka-citta to be Dharma.

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執故。不可為例。于佛地論此論勝也。

論。七轉識內至如煩惱說。

述曰。無離煩惱別起執故。故數與彼煩惱等同。七識之中根本有四。隨惑有八。及別境惠。有十三法。第六識有一切。五識有根本三．隨惑十。與十三法俱。

何故五識無見．疑等。

論。眼等五識至皆容引起。

述曰。無計度分別故。法見．疑等定不相應。等者等取隨中諸惑。與此五識不俱起故。即忿等十全．餘十少分。計度分別之所生者。五識皆無。非無見道所斷諸惑名無分別。就見道中無緣邪友師。自分別諸惑。而實非無意識所引見道諸惑名無分別。對法等云分別起者見道斷。既許五識中惑通見道斷。則有分別之惑。然非自力生。為意所引生故。故論云余由意力皆容引起。餘者即見．疑等余。佛地論說。五識雖無見等。由意識引有非見所攝愛恚等起二障所攝。今此意說。加彼自力分別惑余。為遮外計執五識中惑唯修道斷故。

論。此障但與至無記性故。

述曰。四三性分別遮外計門。瑜伽第五十九卷說。欲界煩惱一分是不善。及余上二界是無記。即是無明唯通不善．無記性故。不言通善。如何乃言善心中有法執。法執必有無明俱故。對法第四亦言欲界煩惱能發惡行是不善。余是有覆。如何乃言無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 執著於過去的觀點，不能作為例子。在《佛地論》（Buddhabhūmi-śāstra）中，此論點更為殊勝。

論：七轉識（seven consciousnesses）中，如同煩惱所說。

述曰：因為沒有離開煩惱而另外生起執著，所以數量與那些煩惱相同。七識之中，根本煩惱有四種，隨煩惱有八種，加上別境慧（specific object wisdom），共有十三種法。第六識（mano-vijñāna）具有一切。前五識（five sense consciousnesses）有根本煩惱三種，隨煩惱十種，與十三種法共同生起。

為什麼前五識沒有見（wrong view）、疑（doubt）等煩惱？

論：眼等五識，都容許由意識引起。

述曰：因為沒有計度分別（conceptual discrimination），所以法見（view of dharma）、疑等一定不相應。『等』字等同於取隨煩惱中的各種迷惑。因為這些迷惑不與前五識共同生起，即忿（anger）等十種全部，其餘十種少部分。由計度分別所產生的煩惱，前五識都沒有。並非見道（path of seeing）所斷的各種迷惑稱為無分別。就見道中沒有緣邪友師（conditions for wrong friends and teachers），自己分別各種迷惑。但實際上並非沒有意識所引導的見道中的各種迷惑，稱為無分別。對法（Abhidharma）等論典說，分別生起的煩惱是見道所斷。既然允許前五識中的迷惑通於見道所斷，那麼就有分別的迷惑。然而並非自身力量產生，而是由意識所引導產生。所以論中說，其餘由意識的力量都容許引起。『其餘』指見、疑等其餘煩惱。《佛地論》說，前五識雖然沒有見等煩惱，但由意識引導，有非見所攝的愛（attachment）、恚（hatred）等生起，屬於二障（two obscurations）所攝。現在這個意思是說，加上那些自身力量分別的迷惑。爲了遮止外道計執前五識中的迷惑唯有修道（path of cultivation）才能斷除。

論：此障（指無明）只與無記性相應。

述曰：四句三種自性分別，是爲了遮止外道的計度。瑜伽（Yoga）第五十九卷說，欲界（desire realm）的煩惱一部分是不善的，其餘上二界（form and formless realms）是無記的。即是說，無明（ignorance）只通于不善、無記性。不說通於善，如何能說善心中有法執（attachment to dharma）？法執必定有無明伴隨。對法第四也說，欲界的煩惱能引發惡行是不善的，其餘是有覆的。如何能說無記？

【English Translation】 English version Adhering to past views should not be taken as an example. In the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stage of Buddhahood), this argument is superior.

Treatise: Within the seven consciousnesses, as described in relation to afflictions.

Commentary: Because there is no clinging arising separately from afflictions, the number is the same as those afflictions. Among the seven consciousnesses, there are four fundamental afflictions, eight secondary afflictions, and specific object wisdom, totaling thirteen dharmas. The sixth consciousness (mano-vijñāna) possesses all of them. The first five consciousnesses have three fundamental afflictions, ten secondary afflictions, and all thirteen dharmas arise together.

Why do the five consciousnesses not have wrong view (dṛṣṭi), doubt (vicikitsā), etc.?

Treatise: The five consciousnesses, such as the eye consciousness, can all be aroused by the mind consciousness.

Commentary: Because there is no conceptual discrimination (kalpana), the view of dharma, doubt, etc., are definitely not associated. 'Etc.' includes various delusions among the secondary afflictions. Because these delusions do not arise together with the five consciousnesses, i.e., all ten of anger (krodha), etc., and a small portion of the other ten. Afflictions arising from conceptual discrimination are not present in the five consciousnesses. The afflictions severed by the path of seeing (darśana-mārga) are not called non-conceptual. Within the path of seeing, there are no conditions for wrong friends and teachers, and one discriminates various delusions oneself. But in reality, it is not that there are no delusions in the path of seeing that are led by the mind consciousness, which are called non-conceptual. The Abhidharma and other treatises say that afflictions arising from discrimination are severed by the path of seeing. Since it is allowed that the delusions in the five consciousnesses are connected to what is severed by the path of seeing, then there are delusions with discrimination. However, they are not produced by their own power, but are produced by the mind consciousness leading them. Therefore, the treatise says that the rest can all be aroused by the power of the mind consciousness. 'The rest' refers to the remaining afflictions such as wrong view and doubt. The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra says that although the five consciousnesses do not have wrong view, etc., they are led by the mind consciousness, and attachment (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), etc., which are not included in wrong view, arise and are included in the two obscurations (dvi-āvaraṇa). The current meaning is that, in addition to those delusions discriminated by their own power, this is to prevent external views that cling to the idea that the delusions in the five consciousnesses can only be severed by the path of cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga).

Treatise: This obscuration (ignorance) only corresponds to the indeterminate nature.

Commentary: The four sentences and three natures are distinguished to prevent external views. The fifty-ninth fascicle of the Yoga (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) says that a portion of the afflictions in the desire realm (kāmadhātu) are unwholesome, and the remaining two realms above (rūpadhātu and arūpadhātu) are indeterminate. That is to say, ignorance (avidyā) only connects to the unwholesome and indeterminate natures. It does not say that it connects to the wholesome, so how can it be said that there is attachment to dharma in a wholesome mind? Attachment to dharma must be accompanied by ignorance. The fourth fascicle of the Abhidharma also says that the afflictions in the desire realm that can cause evil actions are unwholesome, and the rest are obscured. How can it be said to be indeterminate?

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明通善。

若彼救言生死有漏皆不善攝故必有無明者。

論。癡無癡等不相應故。

述曰。若爾善心既有無癡。此執有癡。癡與無癡不相應故。如何可說善與不善。癡．無癡等定不相應。相違法故。如無貪．貪等。不可言此執心無無明俱。如人執心無明俱故。彼復有執第七識中唯有我執無法執故。如前第五卷解。瓔珞經云。善心有不善是外道義。今遮于彼。

因解二障寬狹。

論。煩惱障中至為所依故。

述曰。煩惱障中此障必有。法執體寬故。煩惱障狹。彼定用此為所依故　何故用此為所依也　答此通粗．細煩惱所緣必是法故。彼唯是粗。有法執時非必有故。勝鬘經說。世尊於此起煩惱剎那心相應等。乃至若復過於恒沙。如來菩提智所應斷法。一切皆是無明住地所持所建立。如諸種子皆依地生建立增長。若地壞者彼亦隨壞。若無明住地斷。諸所應斷皆亦隨斷。瓔珞經下卷說亦同之。由此問言。若有煩惱障皆有所知障耶。應順前句答。若有煩惱障定有所知障。

若爾必俱應二障體各有差別。第七識等應二執體俱。是二執故。如二執用。

論。體雖無異而用有別。

述曰。體不相違可唯一體。用義分故可說有別。同一種生用分成二。如一識體取境用多故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 明通善。

若彼救言生死有漏皆不善攝故必有無明者。

論。癡無癡等不相應故。

述曰。若爾善心既有無癡。此執有癡。癡與無癡不相應故。如何可說善與不善。癡．無癡等定不相應。相違法故。如無貪．貪等。不可言此執心無無明俱。如人執心無明俱故。彼復有執第七識中唯有我執(認為只有對自我的執著)無法執(沒有對法的執著)故。如前第五卷解。瓔珞經云。善心有不善是外道義。今遮于彼。

因解二障寬狹。

論。煩惱障中至為所依故。

述曰。煩惱障中此障必有。法執(對法的執著)體寬故。煩惱障狹。彼定用此為所依故　何故用此為所依也　答此通粗．細煩惱所緣必是法故。彼唯是粗。有法執(對法的執著)時非必有故。勝鬘經說。世尊於此起煩惱剎那心相應等。乃至若復過於恒沙。如來菩提智所應斷法。一切皆是無明住地所持所建立。如諸種子皆依地生建立增長。若地壞者彼亦隨壞。若無明住地斷。諸所應斷皆亦隨斷。瓔珞經下卷說亦同之。由此問言。若有煩惱障皆有所知障耶。應順前句答。若有煩惱障定有所知障。

若爾必俱應二障體各有差別。第七識等應二執體俱。是二執故。如二執用。

論。體雖無異而用有別。

述曰。體不相違可唯一體。用義分故可說有別。同一種生用分成二。如一識體取境用多故。

【English Translation】 English version Clearly understand goodness.

If they argue that all conditioned existence subject to birth and death is not encompassed by goodness, then there must be ignorance.

Treatise: Because ignorance and non-ignorance are incompatible.

Commentary: If that's the case, since a good mind has non-ignorance, this asserts the existence of ignorance. Because ignorance and non-ignorance are incompatible, how can one say good and not good? Ignorance and non-ignorance are definitely incompatible, as they are contradictory. Like non-greed and greed, etc. It cannot be said that this mind holds both no-ignorance and ignorance simultaneously, just as a person's mind holds both ignorance simultaneously. Furthermore, they assert that in the seventh consciousness, there is only ego-grasping (belief in a self) and no dharma-grasping (belief in inherent existence of phenomena), as explained in the previous fifth fascicle. The Ingluo Sutra says, 'A good mind having non-goodness is a heretical view.' Now, this is refuted.

Explaining the breadth of the two obscurations.

Treatise: Within the obscuration of afflictions, this is what it relies on.

Commentary: Within the obscuration of afflictions, this obscuration must exist. Because dharma-grasping (belief in inherent existence of phenomena) is broad, the obscuration of afflictions is narrow. It definitely uses this as its basis. Why does it use this as its basis? Answer: Because it encompasses both coarse and subtle afflictions, and what they grasp are necessarily phenomena. The former is only coarse. When there is dharma-grasping (belief in inherent existence of phenomena), it doesn't necessarily exist. The Shrimala Sutra says, 'The World Honored One, in this, arises afflictions in an instant, corresponding to the mind, etc., even if it exceeds countless sands. All the dharmas that the Tathagata's Bodhi wisdom should sever are all held and established by the ground of ignorance. Just as all seeds rely on the earth to grow, establish, and increase. If the earth is destroyed, they will also be destroyed accordingly. If the ground of ignorance is severed, all that should be severed will also be severed accordingly.' The lower fascicle of the Ingluo Sutra says the same. Therefore, it is asked, 'If there is an obscuration of afflictions, is there also an obscuration of knowledge?' One should answer according to the previous sentence, 'If there is an obscuration of afflictions, there is definitely an obscuration of knowledge.'

If that's the case, then the substance of the two obscurations must be different. The seventh consciousness, etc., should have both grasps. Because they are two grasps, like the function of the two grasps.

Treatise: Although the substance is not different, the function is different.

Commentary: If the substance is not contradictory, it can be one substance. Because the function and meaning are divided, it can be said to be different. The same seed produces two functions. Like one consciousness body taking many realms.

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又何以知者。

論。故二隨眠至斷或前後。

述曰。此中二障隨三乘聖道有勝有劣。斷或前後。若望二障行相相對。即煩惱障粗。所知障細。若望聖道斷即不定。或有先斷煩惱障不斷所知障。如二乘等求涅槃故。或有先斷所知障不斷煩惱障。如住．出初地等十地菩薩。此依種說。不依粗重。趣一切智故。或有亦斷煩惱．所知二障。謂入初地。金剛心菩薩。此依種說。若依粗重十地皆得。得二果故。故須雙斷。俱非謂諸異生。不斷三障粗重．種子故。以上皆由不定前後故復言或。種隨現行體一體異　又煩惱障中自類九地。可有粗．細先斷粗后斷細。其所知障不可依地而立品數。但依所障辨能障粗．細。有初地修道斷有頂所知障而欲未盡。第二地等亦復如是。不可依地而立品類。但由聖道故復言或。

問此既無記中何無記攝。

論。此于無覆至障大菩提故。

述曰。餘三無記勢力薄弱不能覆所知。不障菩提故。若異熟生勢力強厚。通作意生計度所起。能覆所知障菩提故。從異熟起名異熟生。非業果也。雖與不善．有覆俱。不障二乘但名無覆。

此名無覆望何人說。

論。此名無覆至亦是有覆。

述曰。不覆二乘轉依果故。二乘無學可現行故。非彼無學說染現行故名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 　　又根據什麼知道呢？

論：所以兩種隨眠（隨眠指煩惱的潛在狀態），至於斷除，或許有先後。

述記：這裡兩種障礙（煩惱障和所知障）隨著三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）聖道的修證，有殊勝和低劣之分，斷除也有先後。如果從兩種障礙的行相相對比，那麼煩惱障粗重，所知障微細。如果從聖道斷除的角度來看，那就不一定了。或者有先斷除煩惱障，而不先斷除所知障的，比如二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）修行者，因為他們只求涅槃的緣故。或者有先斷除所知障，而不先斷除煩惱障的，比如安住和出離初地（菩薩十地中的第一地）等的十地菩薩。這是依據種子（煩惱的潛在力量）來說的，不是依據粗重（煩惱的顯現狀態）來說的，因為他們趣向一切智（佛的智慧）。或者也有同時斷除煩惱障和所知障的，比如進入初地，金剛心菩薩。這也是依據種子來說的。如果依據粗重來說，十地菩薩都能斷除，因為他們證得了兩種果位（解脫煩惱和智慧增長）。所以必須同時斷除。『俱非』是指諸位異生（尚未證悟的凡夫），因為他們沒有斷除三種障礙（煩惱障、所知障、業障）的粗重和種子。以上都是由於斷除的不定和先後，所以又說『或』。種子隨著現行，本體是一體還是有差異呢？又，煩惱障中，自身分為九地（欲界、色界、無色界各有九品煩惱），可能有粗細之分，先斷除粗的，后斷除細的。而所知障不可以依據地（禪定境界）來建立品數，只是依據所障礙的智慧來辨別能障礙的粗細。有初地修道斷除有頂（三界最高處）的所知障，而慾望還沒有完全斷盡的，第二地等也是這樣。不可以依據地來建立品類，只是由於聖道的力量，所以又說『或』。

問：這既然是無記（非善非惡），屬於哪種無記呢？

論：這屬於無覆無記（不障礙解脫的無記），因為能障礙大菩提（佛的智慧）。

述記：其餘三種無記（威儀心、工巧心、變化心）勢力薄弱，不能覆蓋所知，不障礙菩提的緣故。如果異熟生（由業力產生的果報）勢力強厚，通於作意生（由意識產生的）和計度所起（由分別產生的），能覆蓋所知，障礙菩提的緣故。從異熟（業力成熟）而生，名為異熟生，不是業果。雖然與不善和有覆（能障礙解脫）的煩惱在一起，但不障礙二乘的解脫，所以名為無覆。

這稱為無覆，是針對什麼人說的呢？

論：這稱為無覆，是因為不覆蓋二乘的轉依果（轉變煩惱為智慧的果實），二乘的無學（不再需要學習）可以現行的緣故。不是因為他們的無學說染污現行的緣故，所以稱為無覆。

【English Translation】 English version 　　Furthermore, how is this known?

Treatise: Therefore, the two kinds of anusaya (anusaya refers to the latent state of afflictions), as for their elimination, may be sequential.

Commentary: Here, the two obstructions (the affliction obstruction and the knowledge obstruction) vary in superiority and inferiority according to the holy paths of the Three Vehicles (Sravaka Vehicle, Pratyekabuddha Vehicle, Bodhisattva Vehicle), and their elimination may be sequential. If we compare the two obstructions in terms of their characteristics, then the affliction obstruction is coarse, and the knowledge obstruction is subtle. If we consider the elimination by the holy path, then it is uncertain. There are those who first eliminate the affliction obstruction without eliminating the knowledge obstruction, such as the practitioners of the Two Vehicles (Sravaka Vehicle and Pratyekabuddha Vehicle), because they only seek Nirvana. There are also those who first eliminate the knowledge obstruction without eliminating the affliction obstruction, such as the Bodhisattvas dwelling in and emerging from the first ground (the first of the ten Bodhisattva grounds), and so on, up to the tenth ground. This is based on the seed (the latent power of afflictions), not on the coarse manifestation (the manifest state of afflictions), because they are heading towards all-knowingness (the wisdom of the Buddha). Or there are those who eliminate both the affliction obstruction and the knowledge obstruction simultaneously, such as the Vajra-heart Bodhisattva entering the first ground. This is also based on the seed. If based on the coarse manifestation, all ten grounds can eliminate both, because they have attained two fruits (liberation from afflictions and increase in wisdom). Therefore, both must be eliminated simultaneously. 'Neither' refers to all ordinary beings (those who have not yet attained enlightenment), because they have not eliminated the coarseness and seeds of the three obstructions (affliction obstruction, knowledge obstruction, and karma obstruction). The above is all due to the uncertainty and sequence of elimination, so it is said 'or' again. Does the seed follow the manifest, and is the substance the same or different? Furthermore, within the affliction obstruction, there are nine levels within its own category (the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm each have nine grades of afflictions), and there may be coarse and subtle aspects, with the coarse being eliminated first and the subtle later. The knowledge obstruction cannot be established in terms of levels based on the grounds (meditative states), but only distinguishes the coarseness and subtlety of what can be obstructed based on what is obstructed. There are those in the first ground who eliminate the knowledge obstruction of the peak of existence (the highest point in the three realms) while their desires are not yet completely exhausted, and the second ground and so on are also like this. It is not possible to establish categories based on the grounds, but only due to the power of the holy path, so it is said 'or' again.

Question: Since this is indeterminate (neither good nor evil), which kind of indeterminate does it belong to?

Treatise: This belongs to the unobstructed indeterminate (indeterminate that does not obstruct liberation), because it obstructs great Bodhi (the wisdom of the Buddha).

Commentary: The other three kinds of indeterminate (behavioral mind, skillful mind, transformative mind) are weak and cannot cover knowledge, and do not obstruct Bodhi. If the result of maturation (the result produced by karmic force) is strong and thick, encompassing both intentional arising (arising from consciousness) and conceptual arising (arising from discrimination), it can cover knowledge and obstruct Bodhi. Arising from the maturation of karma is called the result of maturation, not the fruit of karma. Although it is together with unwholesome and obstructed (able to obstruct liberation) afflictions, it does not obstruct the liberation of the Two Vehicles, so it is called unobstructed.

This being called unobstructed, to whom is it referring?

Treatise: This is called unobstructed because it does not cover the fruit of transformation of the Two Vehicles (the fruit of transforming afflictions into wisdom), because the non-learners (those who no longer need to learn) of the Two Vehicles can manifest it. It is not because their non-learners speak of defiled manifestations, so it is called unobstructed.

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無覆。若望菩薩亦是有覆。覆所知境障菩提故。亦彼二乘通無覆攝。故於菩薩乃有亦言。然破計中佛地論說。有執不可導彼空智。異熟心非所熏。能遍計唯意識等。已如前卷遍計中解。此中不說。佛地論說。前師難云。若善．無覆無法執者。何故不能了達法空。后師質云。亦無我執云何不能了達生空。彼言第七識人執俱故。今言我亦爾。第七識法執俱故。二難既齊。然前師不許第七識中有法執不爾。違自比量。法空．我空二難齊故。既有相．見分何故非執者。如前卷解。

此總第四三性破計分別訖。自下第五釋諸違妨。

論。若所知障至無明住地。

述曰。此外人難。何處經說。勝鬘經說。不依瓔珞經。非極成故。以分段生死故。說阿羅漢我生已盡。得有餘果證名梵行已立。凡夫人．天。七種學人所不能辦名所作已辦。所斷煩惱更不受後有。名不受後有。非盡一切煩惱。一切受生說不受後有。有無明住地．變易生故。煩惱有二。謂住地煩惱．及起煩惱。住地有四。謂見一處住地．欲愛住地．色愛住地．有愛住地。起者無始無明住地。此住地一切上煩惱依。若煩惱種。比無明住地。算數譬喻所不能及。五住地中無明住地其力最大。恒沙數上煩惱依。亦令四煩惱久住。二乘智所不能斷。唯如來智之所能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無覆（沒有覆蓋，指一種心理狀態）。如果認為菩薩也有覆，那是因為他們覆蓋了所知境，從而障礙了菩提（覺悟）。同樣，二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）也普遍被認為沒有覆。因此，對於菩薩來說，才會有『也』這個詞。然而，在破斥計度宗的論述中，《佛地經論》說，有些人執著于不可引導的空智。異熟心（果報心）不是所熏習的，能普遍計度的只有意識等等。這些已經在前面的章節中關於遍計所執性的討論中解釋過了。這裡不再贅述。《佛地經論》說，之前的論師反駁說，如果善和無覆的法沒有執著，為什麼不能了達法空？後來的論師質問說，也沒有我執，為什麼不能了達生空？他們說，這是因為第七識（末那識）同時執著於我和法。現在我說，我也是這樣認為的，第七識同時執著於法。這兩個反駁是相同的。然而，之前的論師不承認第七識中有法執，否則就違背了他們自己的比量（推理）。法空和我空這兩個反駁是相同的。既然有相分和見分，為什麼不是執著呢？這已經在前面的章節中解釋過了。

這總體上是第四部分，關於三種自性的破斥計度分別的結束。從下面開始是第五部分，解釋各種違背和妨礙。

論：如果所知障（對知識的障礙）直到無明住地（無明的根本所在地）。

述：這是外人的反駁。哪部經里說過？《勝鬘經》里說過。而不是依據《瓔珞經》，因為《瓔珞經》不是極成（最終成立的）。因為有分段生死，所以說阿羅漢『我生已盡』，得到有餘果的證悟，名為『梵行已立』，凡夫人和天人，七種學人所不能辦到的，名為『所作已辦』，所斷的煩惱不再受後有，名為『不受後有』。這並不是說斷盡了一切煩惱，一切受生，才說不受後有。因為還有無明住地和變易生死。煩惱有兩種，一種是住地煩惱，一種是起煩惱。住地有四種，分別是見一處住地、欲愛住地、色愛住地、有愛住地。起煩惱是無始無明住地。這個住地是一切上煩惱的依據。如果把煩惱的種類和無明住地相比，那麼用算數和譬喻都無法窮盡。五住地中，無明住地的力量最大，是恒河沙數上煩惱的依據，也使得四種煩惱長久存在。二乘的智慧無法斷除，只有如來的智慧才能斷除。

【English Translation】 English version: No 覆 (absence of covering, referring to a mental state). If it is thought that Bodhisattvas also have 覆, it is because they cover the knowable realm, thereby obstructing Bodhi (enlightenment). Similarly, the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) are also generally considered to be without 覆. Therefore, the word 'also' is used for Bodhisattvas. However, in the discussion of refuting the Parikalpita school, the Buddhabhūmi Sūtra Śāstra says that some are attached to unteachable emptiness-wisdom. The Vipāka-citta (resultant consciousness) is not what is cultivated, and only the Manovijñāna (mind consciousness) etc. can universally conceptualize. These have already been explained in the previous chapters on Parikalpita-svabhāva (the nature of what is completely conceptualized). It will not be repeated here. The Buddhabhūmi Sūtra Śāstra says that the previous teacher refuted, saying, if the good and uncovered dharmas have no attachment, why can't they understand dharma-śūnyatā (emptiness of phenomena)? The later teacher questioned, also without self-attachment, why can't they understand self-śūnyatā (emptiness of self)? They said that this is because the seventh consciousness (Manas) simultaneously clings to both self and dharma. Now I say that I also think so, the seventh consciousness simultaneously clings to dharma. These two refutations are the same. However, the previous teacher did not admit that there is dharma-attachment in the seventh consciousness, otherwise it would violate their own syllogism (inference). The two refutations of dharma-śūnyatā and self-śūnyatā are the same. Since there are Nimitta-bhāga (image-component) and Darśana-bhāga (seeing-component), why is it not attachment? This has already been explained in the previous chapters.

This is generally the end of the fourth part, the refutation and differentiation of the three natures. From below is the fifth part, explaining various contradictions and obstacles.

Treatise: If the Jñeyāvaraṇa (obstacle of the knowable) until the Avidyā-bhūmi (ground of ignorance).

Commentary: This is the refutation of outsiders. Which sutra says this? The Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra says this. Instead of relying on the Yingluo Sutra, because the Yingluo Sutra is not ultimately established. Because there is sectional transmigration, it is said that Arhats 'my birth is exhausted', attaining the enlightenment of the remaining fruit, called 'Brahmacarya is established', what ordinary people and gods, the seven types of learners cannot do, is called 'what has been done is done', the afflictions that have been cut off no longer receive future existence, called 'no longer receive future existence'. This does not mean that all afflictions and all rebirths are exhausted before saying that there is no future existence. Because there are still Avidyā-bhūmi and transformation-birth. There are two types of afflictions, one is the afflictions of the ground, and the other is the arising afflictions. There are four types of ground, namely Dṛṣṭi-sthāna-bhūmi (ground of the place of views), Kāma-rāga-bhūmi (ground of desire-attachment), Rūpa-rāga-bhūmi (ground of form-attachment), and Bhava-rāga-bhūmi (ground of existence-attachment). Arising afflictions are beginningless Avidyā-bhūmi. This ground is the basis of all higher afflictions. If the types of afflictions are compared with Avidyā-bhūmi, then arithmetic and metaphors cannot exhaust them. Among the five grounds, the power of Avidyā-bhūmi is the greatest, it is the basis of countless afflictions like the sands of the Ganges, and it also makes the four afflictions exist for a long time. The wisdom of the Two Vehicles cannot cut it off, only the wisdom of the Tathāgata can cut it off.

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斷。即無明種子亦言種類。即五門種類當無明種類也。

即通見等。何故彼經唯說無明為所知障。

論。無明增故至非無見等。

述曰。此論主答。今此住地無明增故總立無明。非無見等所餘煩惱。何以名增。一者體增。雖余煩惱有俱．不俱。無明皆有為此障故。如二乘無學等。非必有餘煩惱俱故。二者用增。迷一切境障一切智不令得佛果非如煩惱故。三難斷增。要上上道方能斷故。故名為增。

論。如煩惱種至慢無明等。

述曰。此以例解。如煩惱種見．修皆有。然分別起者立見一處名。豈分別中更無貪等。修道之中唯說于愛豈無嗔等。然初唯見。后唯說愛。既見所斷見力偏增。分別之首故。修所斷愛力偏增。潤生惑故。法執住地無明力增故。唯說無明非無餘也。此五住中。初唯見道所斷煩惱障。次三修道所斷煩惱障。后一見．修所斷所知障。初迷諦理勝。一處為言一處斷故。次三有品迷事．理惑。約界論之。后一障智總名無明。無品數故。無有別迷諦行相故。地者依止。種子與現行為依。名之為地。此約數．種斷名之為地。品等門分別五住地別可知。總是第一齣二障體。釋二障名訖。古云此五住地如四流體。三界煩惱等。一切無明名無明者。不然。此文為正。

論。如是二

【現代漢語翻譯】 斷，即是說無明種子，也稱為種類。這裡的『五門種類』指的就是無明的種類。

『即通見等』，既然如此，為什麼《瑜伽師地論》只說無明是所知障呢？

論：因為無明增長的緣故，所以這樣說，並非沒有見等煩惱。

述曰：這是論主的回答。現在因為這個住地的無明增長的緣故，總的安立為無明，並非沒有見等其餘的煩惱。為什麼稱為增長呢？一是體增長，雖然其餘煩惱有俱生和不俱生兩種，但無明都有，因為它能障礙菩提。比如二乘的無學等，並非一定有其餘煩惱同時存在。二是作用增長，它能迷惑一切境界，障礙一切智，不讓人證得佛果，不像其他煩惱那樣。三是難斷增長，必須要用上上的道才能斷除。所以稱為增長。

論：比如煩惱的種子，見道和修道都有，然而由分別產生的煩惱，只在見道中安立一個名稱。難道在分別中就沒有貪等煩惱了嗎？修道之中只說愛，難道就沒有嗔等煩惱了嗎？然而最初只說見，後來只說愛，是因為見所斷的煩惱，見的力量偏重增長，是分別的開始。修所斷的愛的力量偏重增長，因為它能滋潤生死。法執住地的無明力量增長的緣故，所以只說無明，並非沒有其餘的煩惱。這五住地中，最初是見道所斷的煩惱障，其次三個是修道所斷的煩惱障，最後一個是見道和修道所斷的所知障。最初迷惑真諦的道理最為嚴重，所以只在一個地方說，在一個地方斷除。其次三個有品類，迷惑事和理的迷惑，約三界來論述。最後一個障礙智慧，總名為無明，因為它沒有品數，沒有分別迷惑真諦的行相。地是指依止，種子和現行互相依止，名為地。這是約數和種類，斷除煩惱而名為地。品等門分別五住地的差別可以知道。總的來說，這是第一科，說明二障的體性，解釋二障的名稱完畢。古人說這五住地如四種流體，三界的煩惱等，一切無明名為無明，是不對的。本文的說法才是正確的。

論：像這樣二障

【English Translation】 『Severance』 means the seed of ignorance (avidyā-bīja), also called categories (prakāra). The 『five categories』 here refer to the categories of ignorance (avidyā).

『Namely, encompassing views, etc.』 If that's the case, why does the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra only mention ignorance (avidyā) as the cognitive obscuration (jñeyāvaraṇa)?

Treatise: Because ignorance increases, hence this is said; it's not that there are no views, etc.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's response. Now, because the ignorance (avidyā) of this stage (bhūmi) increases, it is generally established as ignorance (avidyā). It's not that there are no views (dṛṣṭi) and other afflictions (kleśa). Why is it called increase? First, the substance (dravya) increases. Although other afflictions (kleśa) may be either co-arisen (sahaja) or not co-arisen (asāhaja), ignorance (avidyā) always exists, because it obstructs bodhi. For example, the Arhats of the Two Vehicles (śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha) do not necessarily have other co-arisen afflictions (kleśa). Second, the function (kārya) increases. It deludes all realms (viṣaya), obstructs all-knowing wisdom (sarvajñāna), and prevents one from attaining Buddhahood, unlike other afflictions (kleśa). Third, the difficulty of severance (chedana) increases. It can only be severed by the highest paths (mārga). Therefore, it is called increase.

Treatise: Just like the seeds of afflictions (kleśa), both the path of seeing (darśanamārga) and the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga) have them. However, those that arise from discrimination (vikalpa) are established as one name in the path of seeing (darśanamārga). Does this mean that there are no greed (rāga) and other afflictions (kleśa) in discrimination (vikalpa)? In the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga), only love (prema) is mentioned; does this mean that there are no anger (dveṣa) and other afflictions (kleśa)? However, initially only views (dṛṣṭi) are mentioned, and later only love (prema) is mentioned, because the power of the afflictions (kleśa) severed by seeing (darśana) increases, as it is the beginning of discrimination (vikalpa). The power of love (prema) severed by cultivation (bhāvanā) increases, because it nourishes rebirth. The power of ignorance (avidyā) in the stage of attachment to dharma (dharma-rāga-bhūmi) increases, so only ignorance (avidyā) is mentioned, not that there are no other afflictions (kleśa). Among these five stages (bhūmi), the first is the afflictive obscuration (kleśāvaraṇa) severed by the path of seeing (darśanamārga), the next three are the afflictive obscuration (kleśāvaraṇa) severed by the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga), and the last one is the cognitive obscuration (jñeyāvaraṇa) severed by both the path of seeing (darśanamārga) and the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga). Initially, the delusion of the truth (satya) is the most severe, so it is only spoken of in one place and severed in one place. The next three have categories (prakāra), deluding both phenomena (vastu) and principles (tattva), discussed in terms of the Three Realms (tridhātu). The last one obstructs wisdom (jñāna) and is generally called ignorance (avidyā), because it has no categories (prakāra) and no distinct aspect of deluding the truth (satya). 『Stage』 (bhūmi) refers to reliance (āśraya). Seeds (bīja) and manifestations (vyakti) rely on each other, called 『stage』 (bhūmi). This is named 『stage』 (bhūmi) in terms of number and kind, severing afflictions (kleśa). The distinctions of the five stages (bhūmi) can be known by distinguishing the categories (prakāra), etc. In general, this is the first section, explaining the nature of the two obscurations (āvaraṇa), and the explanation of the names of the two obscurations (āvaraṇa) is completed. The ancients said that these five stages (bhūmi) are like the four currents (ogha), the afflictions (kleśa) of the Three Realms (tridhātu), etc., and that all ignorance (avidyā) is called ignorance (avidyā), which is incorrect. This text is correct.

Treatise: Thus, the two obscurations (āvaraṇa)

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障至修所斷攝。

述曰。明二障中第二見．修分別。俱生分別既通六識。分別起者見道所斷。粗易斷故。六識之中俱生起者修所斷之。細難斷故。前言五識隨意引生。即成分別．俱生之惑。如五識中煩惱障說。無違理失。即初地中斷五識惑二障並得。

論。二乘但能至菩薩俱斷。

述曰。三約人分別。二乘但能斷煩惱障等。求解脫故。所知之障彼故。菩薩俱障。二果別故。由作意故斷有先後。后中定障二乘亦斷。小故不說。

第四有．無漏道伏．斷分別。

論。永斷二障至通有漏道。

述曰。伏煩惱時此俱法執亦不起故名伏法執。非別起伏道。或見道前加行智伏。諸論或說有漏諸道不能斷種。有相縛故。粗重縛故。不證理故。無漏不爾故。

自下第五結歸本頌。

論。菩薩住此至未能伏滅。

述曰。二粗現行雖有伏者。即伏多分分別之粗惑。因邪教思惟者皆伏。自思惟者未盡。下四善根等方盡。而細分別者。及二障中若粗．若細所有隨眠。由能對治止．觀力微未能伏．滅。初起止．觀未勝順心。不如四善根中。能伏二細分別現種。其俱生現．種皆少亦能伏。次加行位。及第十卷皆有此文。此中伏言非為六行。修習勢力制之不起。令彼不自在。是此中伏義。下

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 障至修所斷攝。

述曰。明二障中第二見．修分別。俱生分別既通六識。分別起者見道所斷。粗易斷故。六識之中俱生起者修所斷之。細難斷故。前言五識隨意引生。即成分別．俱生之惑。如五識中煩惱障說。無違理失。即初地中斷五識惑二障並得。

論。二乘但能至菩薩俱斷。

述曰。三約人分別。二乘但能斷煩惱障等。求解脫故。所知之障彼故。菩薩俱障。二果別故。由作意故斷有先後。后中定障二乘亦斷。小故不說。

第四有．無漏道伏．斷分別。

論。永斷二障至通有漏道。

述曰。伏煩惱時此俱法執亦不起故名伏法執。非別起伏道。或見道前加行智伏。諸論或說有漏諸道不能斷種。有相縛故。粗重縛故。不證理故。無漏不爾故。

自下第五結歸本頌。

論。菩薩住此至未能伏滅。

述曰。二粗現行雖有伏者。即伏多分分別之粗惑。因邪教思惟者皆伏。自思惟者未盡。下四善根等方盡。而細分別者。及二障中若粗．若細所有隨眠。由能對治止．觀力微未能伏．滅。初起止．觀未勝順心。不如四善根中。能伏二細分別現種。其俱生現．種皆少亦能伏。次加行位。及第十卷皆有此文。此中伏言非為六行。修習勢力制之不起。令彼不自在。是此中伏義。下

【English Translation】 English version: The obstructions are included within what is severed by cultivation.

Explanation: This clarifies the distinction between the obstructions severed by the path of seeing and the path of cultivation within the two obstructions. The co-arisen (俱生) [innate] aspect of both obstructions operates through the six consciousnesses. The obstructions that arise from discrimination (分別) [conceptual thought] are severed by the path of seeing because they are coarse and easy to cut off. Among the six consciousnesses, the co-arisen obstructions are severed by the path of cultivation because they are subtle and difficult to cut off. The previous statement that the five consciousnesses give rise to afflictions at will refers to both the afflictions of discrimination and the co-arisen afflictions. As explained in the section on the afflictive obstruction (煩惱障) related to the five consciousnesses, there is no contradiction or error in this. Thus, at the first ground (初地) [Bhumis], one severs the afflictions of the five consciousnesses, thereby attaining both obstructions.

Treatise: The two vehicles (二乘) [Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas] can only reach the point where Bodhisattvas sever both.

Explanation: This is a distinction based on individuals. The two vehicles can only sever the afflictive obstruction, etc., because they seek liberation. They abandon the cognitive obstruction (所知障). Bodhisattvas sever both obstructions because the fruits of the two are different. Because of intentional effort, there is a sequence in severing them. Among the later stages, the fixed obstructions are also severed by the two vehicles, but this is not mentioned because they are minor.

Fourth, a distinction between the suppression and severance by defiled (有) [with outflows] and undefiled (無漏) [without outflows] paths.

Treatise: The complete severance of the two obstructions is achieved through undefiled paths.

Explanation: When afflictions are suppressed, this co-arisen attachment to phenomena also does not arise, hence it is called the suppression of attachment to phenomena. It is not a separate path of suppression. Or it is suppressed by the wisdom of preparation (加行智) before the path of seeing. Some treatises say that defiled paths cannot sever the seeds because they are bound by characteristics and coarse burdens, and because they do not realize the truth. Undefiled paths are not like this.

From here onwards is the fifth section, concluding and returning to the original verse.

Treatise: Bodhisattvas abide here until they are unable to suppress and extinguish.

Explanation: Although the two coarse manifest activities are suppressed, this refers to suppressing most of the coarse afflictions of discrimination. Those who contemplate based on wrong teachings are all suppressed. Those who contemplate on their own are not completely suppressed. They are completely suppressed by the four roots of goodness (四善根) [four bases of good conduct]. However, the subtle aspects of discrimination, and all the latent tendencies (隨眠) [anusaya] within the two obstructions, whether coarse or subtle, cannot be suppressed or extinguished because the power of the antidotal calming (止) [samatha] and insight (觀) [vipassana] is weak. The initial arising of calming and insight is not as superior as the mind that accords with the four roots of goodness. It can suppress the manifest seeds of the two subtle discriminations. The co-arisen manifest activities and seeds are few and can also be suppressed. This is also mentioned in the stage of application (加行位) [preparatory stage] and in the tenth fascicle. The term 'suppression' here does not mean that the power of the six practices (六行) [six perfections] is used to restrain them from arising, making them not free. This is the meaning of 'suppression' here. Below...

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準此知。菩薩不斷地獄地惑起定生上故。又約十地分別斷之法用等。下自有文不煩預述。如中邊上卷說此二障諸障相攝。

論。此位未證至解行地攝。

述曰。以上解頌訖。自下第二辨位．修行。此即辨位。后明修行。攝大乘論說五道為四。謂勝解行地。見。修無學地。今以此即彼。四地中何地。十三住中何住。此位依勝解修行。亦解行地攝。論言亦者亦順抉擇分。彼是解行地。此亦是故論有亦言。勝解者即決定義。散心決定意解思惟未證解故。亦言至下當知。

論。所修勝行其相云。

述曰。下辨修行。初問。次答。雖言勝行何者為勝行。

論。略有二種至餘名為福。

述曰。下答。勝行有二。初顯二種行。后明德行。辨二行中。初辨福．智行。后辨二種利行。惠為體者是智。非惠為體名福。此克性出體。即十力．一切智是智。余中有福。五十七二十二根中。雖與諸文不同。且佛十力。惠根．具知根攝。唯是智。四無所畏。五根．具知根攝。通福．智。諸相．隨好。舌根．及四．根依處。謂身根．男根．眼根．舌根依處。合四根所攝。即唯是福。三不護。如無畏。三念住。非根攝。無貪嗔所攝。即唯福。大悲。無嗔癡所攝。無忘失法。如力。一切種妙智亦爾。唯是智攝。永斷

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由此可知，菩薩不斷除地獄（欲界、色界）的迷惑，是因為要發起禪定，以便能夠往生到上界（無色界）。至於關於十地菩薩如何分別斷除煩惱的方法和作用等，後面自有經文敘述，此處不再提前贅述。如《中邊分別論》上卷所說，這兩種障礙（煩惱障、所知障）互相包含。

論：此位（指勝解行地）尚未證得真如，因此屬於解行地所攝。

述曰：以上解釋頌文完畢。從這裡開始，第二部分辨別菩薩的位次和修行。這裡是辨別位次，後面會闡明修行。《攝大乘論》將五道歸為四類，即勝解行地、見道、修道、無學地。現在用這個理論來對應《瑜伽師地論》，那麼這個位次相當於四地中的哪一地？十三住中的哪一住？此位依靠勝解修行，因此也屬於解行地所攝。論中所說的『亦』字，表示也順應抉擇分。抉擇分屬於解行地，此位也屬於解行地，所以論中用了『亦』字。勝解，就是指決定義。散亂心中決定，通過意解思惟，因為尚未證得真如，所以屬於解行地。『亦』字的含義，到下文自然會明白。

論：所修的殊勝之行，它的相狀是怎樣的呢？

述曰：下面辨別修行。先提問，然後回答。雖然說是殊勝之行，但什麼是殊勝之行呢？

論：概括起來有兩種，一種是智慧，一種是福德。不是智慧的，就叫做福德。

述曰：下面回答。殊勝之行有兩種。首先闡明兩種行，然後闡明德行。在辨別兩種行中，先辨別福德行和智慧行，然後辨別兩種利益之行。以智慧為本體的是智慧行，不是以智慧為本體的叫做福德行。這是從體性上進行區分。比如，佛的十力（Tathāgatabalas，如來十種力），一切智（Sarvajnana，對一切法的總體認識）是智慧行。其餘的屬於福德行。在五十七種和二十二種根中，雖然與其它經文有所不同，但佛的十力，屬於慧根和具知根所攝，完全是智慧行。四無所畏（catu-vaiśāradyāni，佛的四種無所畏懼的自信），屬於五根和具知根所攝，通於福德行和智慧行。諸相（lakṣaṇa，佛的三十二相好）和隨好（anuvyañjana，八十種隨形好），舌根以及四根的依處，即身根、男根、眼根、舌根的依處，合起來屬於四根所攝，完全是福德行。三不護（tisro rakṣāḥ，如來沒有需要守護的秘密），如同無所畏。三念住（smṛtyupasthāna，三種憶念的住處），不屬於根所攝，不屬於貪嗔所攝，完全是福德行。大悲（mahākaruṇā，偉大的慈悲），不屬於嗔癡所攝。無忘失法（asammosa-dharma，不忘失正念的功德），如同十力。一切種妙智也是如此，完全是智慧行所攝。永斷（sarva-prahāṇa，永遠斷除煩惱）

【English Translation】 English version: From this, it is known that Bodhisattvas do not cease the afflictions of the lower realms (desire realm, form realm) because they wish to initiate samadhi in order to be reborn in the higher realms (formless realm). As for the methods and functions of how Bodhisattvas of the Ten Bhumis respectively sever afflictions, there will be texts describing them later, so there is no need to elaborate in advance. As the upper volume of the Madhyāntavibhāga says, these two obstructions (affliction obstruction, knowledge obstruction) are mutually inclusive.

Treatise: This stage (referring to the stage of Adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi) has not yet realized Suchness, therefore it is included in the stage of Adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi.

Commentary: The explanation of the verses above is completed. From here, the second part distinguishes the Bodhisattva's stages and practice. This is distinguishing the stages, and later it will clarify the practice. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha classifies the five paths into four categories, namely the stage of Adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi, the path of seeing, the path of cultivation, and the path of no more learning. Now, using this theory to correspond to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, then which of the four stages does this stage correspond to? Which of the thirteen abodes? This stage relies on Adhimukti-caryā for practice, so it is also included in the stage of Adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi. The word 'also' in the treatise indicates that it also accords with the Nirvedha-bhāgīya. Nirvedha-bhāgīya belongs to the stage of Adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi, and this stage also belongs to the stage of Adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi, so the treatise uses the word 'also'. Adhimukti refers to definitive meaning. Deciding in a scattered mind, through conceptual understanding and contemplation, because Suchness has not yet been realized, it belongs to the stage of Adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi. The meaning of the word 'also' will naturally be understood later.

Treatise: What is the appearance of the superior practice that is cultivated?

Commentary: Below, the practice is distinguished. First, a question is raised, and then an answer is given. Although it is said to be superior practice, what is superior practice?

Treatise: Generally speaking, there are two types, one is wisdom, and one is merit. What is not wisdom is called merit.

Commentary: Below is the answer. There are two types of superior practice. First, the two types of practice are explained, and then the virtuous practice is explained. In distinguishing the two types of practice, first, the practice of merit and the practice of wisdom are distinguished, and then the two types of beneficial practice are distinguished. What has wisdom as its essence is the practice of wisdom, and what does not have wisdom as its essence is called the practice of merit. This is distinguished from the perspective of essence. For example, the ten powers of the Buddha (Tathāgatabalas), Sarvajnana (omniscience) is the practice of wisdom. The rest belong to the practice of merit. Among the fifty-seven and twenty-two roots, although it differs from other texts, the ten powers of the Buddha belong to the wisdom root and the root of complete knowledge, and are entirely the practice of wisdom. The four fearlessnesses (catu-vaiśāradyāni) belong to the five roots and the root of complete knowledge, and are common to the practice of merit and the practice of wisdom. The characteristics (lakṣaṇa) and minor marks (anuvyañjana), the root of the tongue and the bases of the four roots, namely the bases of the body root, the male root, the eye root, and the tongue root, together belong to the four roots, and are entirely the practice of merit. The three protections (tisro rakṣāḥ) are like fearlessness. The three establishments of mindfulness (smṛtyupasthāna) do not belong to the roots, and do not belong to greed and anger, and are entirely the practice of merit. Great compassion (mahākaruṇā) does not belong to anger and ignorance. The non-forgetting dharma (asammosa-dharma) is like the ten powers. Sarvākāra-jñāna is also like this, and is entirely included in the practice of wisdom. Eternal severance (sarva-prahāṇa)

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習氣。非根。六根所證。菩提分中。四念住。根．力．覺支．道支少分。是智。四正勤。四神足。根．力．覺支．道支少分。是福。余唯福非智。余應準知　由此諸功德種門總為論中應作四句。唯是智非福。謂十力．一切智．一切種妙智．無忘失法．四念住．愿．智等。有唯是福非智。即諸相．隨好．三念住．大悲．四正勤．四神足等。有亦福亦智。謂四無畏。三不護等。五根．五力．七覺．八道支等。有非福非智。依事分別。或永斷習氣。無為功德等。余差別門功德福．智如理應思。

論。且依六種至通相皆二。

述曰。併名為福。皆名為智。與智俱行助成智業皆名為智。與福俱行助成福業併名為福。此依助伴通相出體。

論。別相前五至第六智惠。

述曰。克性出體者。前五是福非智性故。第六智惠非福性故。正智自體故。

鄰近生起以出體者。

論。或復前三至余通二種。

述曰。前三唯福遠智惠故。第六唯智性是惠故。余通二種即精進．定。鄰近於惠亦起惠故。七十八．解深密經．三十六說亦同於此。彼解云。前三為福。第六是智。餘二通二。若依精進修佈施．持戒．四無量等名福。若依精進修三惠．六善巧。觀四諦．緣生法等名智分。若依靜慮修四無量名福。

{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：習氣（Vāsanā，長期薰染形成的習慣勢力）。非根本。六根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）所證得的。菩提分（Bodhipakṣa，通往覺悟的要素）中，四念住（catuḥsmṛtyupasthāna，四種專注的修行）。根（indriya，五根：信、精進、念、定、慧）。力（bala，五力：信力、精進力、念力、定力、慧力）。覺支（bodhyaṅga，七覺支：念、擇法、精進、喜、輕安、定、舍）。道支（mārgaṅga，八正道：正見、正思惟、正語、正業、正命、正精進、正念、正定）少分。是智。四正勤（catvāri samyakprahāṇāni，斷惡、修善的四種努力）。四神足（catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ，通過愿、精進、心、觀四種途徑獲得神通）。根．力．覺支．道支少分。是福。其餘唯是福而非智。其餘應當準此了知。由此諸功德的種類總括起來，在論中應當作出四句判別：唯是智而非福，指的是十力（daśa balāni，如來所具有的十種智慧力量）、一切智（sarvajñāna，對一切法總相的智慧）、一切種妙智（sarvākārajñāna，對一切法別相的智慧）、無忘失法（asammosadharma，永遠不會忘記教法）、四念住、愿（praṇidhāna，誓願）、智等。有的是唯福而非智，即諸相（lakṣaṇa，佛的三十二相）、隨好（anuvyañjana，佛的八十種好）、三念住（trīṇi smṛtyupasthānāni，三種念住）、大悲（mahākaruṇā，偉大的慈悲）、四正勤、四神足等。有的是既是福也是智，指的是四無畏（catvāri vaiśāradyāni，佛的四種無所畏懼的自信）、三不護（trīṇi ārakṣitāni，如來沒有的三種過失）等。有的是非福非智，根據具體情況分別，或者指永斷習氣，無為功德等。其餘差別方面的功德、福、智應當如理思維。\ \ 論：且依據六種（功德）到通相都是二者（福與智）。\ \ 述曰：都稱為福，都稱為智。與智一起執行，幫助成就智慧事業的都稱為智。與福一起執行，幫助成就福德事業的都稱為福。這是依據助伴的共同相狀來確定體性。\ \ 論：別相是前五種（功德）到第六種是智慧。\ \ 述曰：從克性的角度來確定體性，前五種是福而非智的性質。第六種是智慧而非福的性質。因為是真正的智慧自體。\ \ 鄰近生起以出體者（通過鄰近生起的關係來確定體性）。\ \ 論：或者前三種（功德）到其餘的通於二種（福與智）。\ \ 述曰：前三種唯是福，遠離智慧的緣故。第六種唯是智，性質是智慧的緣故。其餘的通於二種，即精進（vīrya，努力）和定（samādhi，禪定）。因為鄰近於智慧也能生起智慧的緣故。《七十八》（指《雜阿含經》第七十八經）、《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra）、《三十六》（指《菩薩地持經》第三十六品）所說的也與此相同。他們的解釋是：前三種是福，第六種是智，其餘兩種通於二者。如果依據精進修佈施（dāna，慷慨施捨）、持戒（śīla，遵守戒律）、四無量（catasro apramāṇāḥ，慈、悲、喜、舍）等，就稱為福。如果依據精進修三慧（tisraḥ prajñāḥ，聞、思、修所成之慧）、六善巧（ṣaṭ kauśalyāni，六種善巧）、觀察四諦（catvāri āryasatyāni，苦、集、滅、道）、緣生法（pratītyasamutpāda，因緣生法）等，就稱為智分。如果依據靜慮（dhyāna，禪定）修四無量，就稱為福。", "English version: Habitual tendencies (Vāsanā). Not fundamental. What is verified by the six sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind). Among the factors of enlightenment (Bodhipakṣa), the four foundations of mindfulness (catuḥsmṛtyupasthāna). Roots (indriya, five roots: faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom). Powers (bala, five powers: power of faith, power of vigor, power of mindfulness, power of concentration, power of wisdom). Limbs of enlightenment (bodhyaṅga, seven limbs of enlightenment: mindfulness, investigation of dharma, vigor, joy, tranquility, concentration, equanimity). A small portion of the limbs of the path (mārgaṅga, eightfold noble path: right view, right thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration). These are wisdom. The four right efforts (catvāri samyakprahāṇāni). The four bases of spiritual power (catvāra ṛddhipādāḥ). Roots, powers, limbs of enlightenment, a small portion of the limbs of the path. These are merit. The rest are only merit and not wisdom. The rest should be understood accordingly. Therefore, these kinds of merits, in general, should be distinguished into four categories in the treatise: Only wisdom and not merit, referring to the ten powers (daśa balāni, the ten powers of a Tathāgata), all-knowing wisdom (sarvajñāna, wisdom regarding the general characteristics of all dharmas), wisdom of all aspects (sarvākārajñāna, wisdom regarding the specific characteristics of all dharmas), non-forgetfulness of the Dharma (asammosadharma), the four foundations of mindfulness, vows (praṇidhāna), wisdom, and so on. Some are only merit and not wisdom, namely the characteristics (lakṣaṇa, the thirty-two major marks of a Buddha), the minor marks (anuvyañjana, the eighty minor marks of a Buddha), the three foundations of mindfulness (trīṇi smṛtyupasthānāni), great compassion (mahākaruṇā), the four right efforts, the four bases of spiritual power, and so on. Some are both merit and wisdom, referring to the four fearlessnesses (catvāri vaiśāradyāni, the four kinds of fearlessness of a Buddha), the three non-protections (trīṇi ārakṣitāni, the three faults that a Tathāgata does not have), and so on. Some are neither merit nor wisdom, depending on the specific circumstances, or referring to the permanent cutting off of habitual tendencies, unconditioned merits, and so on. Other distinctions regarding merit and wisdom should be contemplated reasonably.\ \ Treatise: Furthermore, based on the six types (of merits), the common characteristics are both (merit and wisdom).\ \ Commentary: All are called merit, all are called wisdom. What operates together with wisdom, helping to accomplish the activities of wisdom, is called wisdom. What operates together with merit, helping to accomplish the activities of merit, is called merit. This is based on the common characteristic of assistance to determine the nature.\ \ Treatise: The distinct characteristics are that the first five (types of merits) are merit, and the sixth is wisdom.\ \ Commentary: Determining the nature from the perspective of definitive characteristics, the first five are of the nature of merit and not wisdom. The sixth is of the nature of wisdom and not merit, because it is the very nature of true wisdom.\ \ Determining the nature through the relationship of proximate arising.\ \ Treatise: Or the first three (types of merits) and the rest are common to both (merit and wisdom).\ \ Commentary: The first three are only merit, because they are far from wisdom. The sixth is only wisdom, because its nature is wisdom. The rest are common to both, namely vigor (vīrya) and concentration (samādhi). Because they are close to wisdom and can also give rise to wisdom. What is said in the 'Seventy-Eighth' (referring to the 78th sutra of the Saṃyukta Āgama), the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, and the 'Thirty-Sixth' (referring to the 36th chapter of the Bodhisattvabhūmi) is also the same as this. Their explanation is: the first three are merit, the sixth is wisdom, and the remaining two are common to both. If, based on vigor, one practices giving (dāna), morality (śīla), the four immeasurables (catasro apramāṇāḥ, loving-kindness, compassion, joy, equanimity), etc., it is called merit. If, based on vigor, one cultivates the three wisdoms (tisraḥ prajñāḥ, wisdom arising from hearing, thinking, and meditation), the six skillful means (ṣaṭ kauśalyāni), observes the four noble truths (catvāri āryasatyāni), dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda), etc., it is called a part of wisdom. If, based on meditative concentration (dhyāna), one cultivates the four immeasurables, it is called merit." ] }

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若依靜慮修六善巧等名智分。謂智有六種一一分別。應知無量等。乃至廣說等。此文唯三。或有前三為福。義如前說后三唯智。近生智故。或有初三．及定是福。后一唯智。精進通二。或有初三．及定為福。精進．及惠為智。策惠勝故。此並有文。后四波羅蜜唯智非福。后得智故。此中且說六。如對法第十二抄會解。上來福智一種二訖。

論。復有二種至自他利行。

述曰。隨意樂力所為一切諸功德等。皆通二利。

論。依別相說至利他行攝。

述曰。菩提分等。等取禪支．十八不共法．諸相．隨好等。自利行攝。然四十三說。六度唯自利。四攝利他故。四種攝事．四無量等。等取神通．大悲．不護．三念住。皆利他行攝。此中所望總聚一向多分為論。非依體性。依體性者應四句分別。或唯自利。謂相．隨好等。或唯利他謂四攝等。或自他利。六波羅蜜等。佈施等中亦俱利故。或俱非利。便非功德。六到彼岸下自廣解　菩提分法。謂四念住．四正斷．四神足．五根．五力。七等覺支。八聖道支三十七種。如對法第十抄　四攝。如大論四十三。謂佈施．愛語．利行．同事。以十門分別。四無量謂慈．悲．喜．舍。如對法第十三等抄。及別抄解。四十九說。從勝解行地。乃至到究竟地。有四種菩

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果依靠靜慮（Dhyana，禪定）來修習六善巧等，這些都屬於名智分。也就是說，智慧有六種，每一種都應該分別瞭解，其意義無量無邊，乃至可以廣泛地解說等等。這段文字只提到了三種情況。或者說，前三種是屬於福德，其含義如前文所說；后三種則僅僅屬於智慧，因為它們是接近於產生的智慧。或者說，最初的三種以及禪定是屬於福德，最後一種僅僅屬於智慧，精進則同時屬於兩者。或者說，最初的三種以及禪定是屬於福德，精進以及智慧是屬於智慧，因為策勵智慧的作用更勝一籌。這些都有經文依據。後面的四種波羅蜜（Paramita，到彼岸）僅僅屬於智慧而非福德，因為它們是后得智。這裡暫且只說這六種情況，可以參考《對法》第十二的抄會解。以上是關於福德和智慧這兩種分類的討論。

論：又有兩種，直至自他利行。

述曰：隨順意樂的力量所做的一切功德等等，都同時包含自利和他利。

論：依據不同的相來說，直至利他行所攝。

述曰：菩提分（Bodhipakshika-dharmas，菩提之分法）等等，這裡『等』字包括禪支、十八不共法、諸相、隨好等等，都屬於自利行所攝。然而，在第四十三卷中說，六度（Paramita，到彼岸）僅僅是自利，四攝（Samgraha-vastu，四攝事）才是利他。四種攝事、四無量（Aparimana，四無量心）等等，這裡『等』字包括神通、大悲、不護、三念住，都屬於利他行所攝。這裡所期望的是總體上多數的情況，並非依據其體性。如果依據體性來分析，應該用四句來分別。或者僅僅是自利，比如諸相、隨好等等。或者僅僅是利他，比如四攝等等。或者既是自利又是利他，比如六波羅蜜等等，因為佈施等等行為同時具有自利和他利的性質。或者既非自利也非利他，那就不是功德了。在六到彼岸的章節中，將會詳細解釋菩提分法，包括四念住（Smrtyupasthana，四念處）、四正斷（Samyak-prahana，四正勤）、四神足（Rddhipada，四神足）、五根（Indriya，五根）、五力（Bala，五力）、七等覺支（Saptabodhyangani，七覺支）、八聖道支（Aryastangika-marga，八正道），總共三十七種。可以參考《對法》第十的抄本。四攝的內容可以參考《大論》第四十三卷，包括佈施、愛語、利行、同事，用十個方面來分別。四無量包括慈、悲、喜、舍，可以參考《對法》第十三等抄本，以及其他抄本的解釋。第四十九卷說，從勝解行地開始，直到究竟地，有四種菩提。

【English Translation】 English version: If one relies on Dhyana (meditative absorption) to cultivate the six skillful means, etc., these belong to the category of 'name-wisdom division'. That is, wisdom has six aspects, each of which should be understood separately, with limitless meanings, and can be extensively explained, and so on. This text only mentions three situations. Alternatively, the first three are considered meritorious, with meanings as previously stated; the latter three belong solely to wisdom, as they are wisdom that is close to arising. Alternatively, the first three and Dhyana are considered meritorious, while the last one belongs solely to wisdom, and effort (Virya) belongs to both. Alternatively, the first three and Dhyana are considered meritorious, while effort and wisdom belong to wisdom, because the function of urging on wisdom is superior. These all have scriptural basis. The latter four Paramitas (perfections) belong solely to wisdom and not to merit, because they are wisdom attained later. Here, we will only discuss these six situations for now, which can be referenced in the copied and compiled explanations of the twelfth chapter of the Abhidharma. The above is the discussion on the two categories of merit and wisdom.

Treatise: Furthermore, there are two types, up to the practice of benefiting oneself and others.

Commentary: All merits and virtues, etc., performed according to the power of one's intention and delight, encompass both self-benefit and other-benefit.

Treatise: According to the distinct characteristics, up to being included in the practice of benefiting others.

Commentary: The Bodhipakshika-dharmas (factors of enlightenment), etc., where 'etc.' includes the limbs of Dhyana, the eighteen unique qualities of a Buddha, the major and minor marks, etc., are included in the practice of benefiting oneself. However, it is said in the forty-third chapter that the six Paramitas (perfections) are solely for self-benefit, while the four Samgraha-vastus (means of conversion) are for benefiting others. The four means of conversion, the four Aparimanas (immeasurables), etc., where 'etc.' includes supernormal powers, great compassion, non-protection, and the three establishments of mindfulness, are all included in the practice of benefiting others. What is intended here is the overall majority, not based on their inherent nature. If analyzed based on their inherent nature, they should be distinguished using four categories. Either solely for self-benefit, such as the major and minor marks, etc. Or solely for benefiting others, such as the four means of conversion, etc. Or both self-benefit and other-benefit, such as the six Paramitas, etc., because acts of giving, etc., have both self-benefiting and other-benefiting qualities. Or neither self-benefit nor other-benefit, in which case it is not a merit. In the chapter on the six perfections, the Bodhipakshika-dharmas will be explained in detail, including the four Smrtyupasthanas (establishments of mindfulness), the four Samyak-prahanas (right exertions), the four Rddhipadas (bases of magical power), the five Indriyas (faculties), the five Balas (powers), the seven Saptabodhyanganis (factors of enlightenment), and the eight Aryastangika-margas (noble eightfold path), totaling thirty-seven. Refer to the tenth chapter of the Abhidharma for reference. The content of the four Samgraha-vastus can be found in the forty-third chapter of the Mahayana-sutra, including giving, kind speech, beneficial action, and cooperation, distinguished using ten aspects. The four Aparimanas include loving-kindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity, which can be referenced in the thirteenth chapter of the Abhidharma, etc., as well as other copied explanations. It is said in the forty-ninth chapter that from the stage of resolution in conduct until the ultimate stage, there are four types of Bodhi.

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薩行。一波羅蜜多。二菩提分法。三者神通四成熟有情行。即彼又說。三十二相．八十隨好在種姓地。唯有種子依身而住。明知種姓住未入僧祇若在勝解行地。始能修彼能得方便。若在清凈增上意樂地中乃名為得。在諸餘地轉勝清凈。在如來地善凈無上　又云。若諸不共佛法。下劣者先菩薩時亦已成就。至佛之時善凈圓滿。又此一切菩提資糧有遠．有近。遠者謂去菩提果遠即未獲得諸相．隨好異熟果時在地前也。近者去菩提近。謂初獲得諸相．隨好異熟果時。從此已上展轉清凈。依此等文故知初劫中修一切菩薩行。一切菩提分法。雖少分得未名為證。未得無漏。未名得異熟果。未凈勝故。

論。如是等行至所修勝行。

述曰。如是一切自他利行。皆是此位勝所修行也。

論。此位二障至勇猛不退。

述曰。此文初總　練謂陶練。磨謂磨瑩。即修治義。

論。一聞無上至修諸勝行。

述曰。攝論第六說入因中。三種練磨心。斷除四處。緣法義境。止．觀恒常殷重。加行無放逸故。此中但有三練磨心。初練磨心中雲。廣者無邊。大者無上。深者難惻。遠者時長。彼既丈夫我亦爾。不應自輕而退屈。第一練磨心廣深退。第二練磨心難修退。文皆可解第三練磨心難證退　引他粗善者。諸

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：薩行（Sā xíng，菩薩的某種行為）。一、波羅蜜多（bō luó mì duō，到達彼岸的方法）。二、菩提分法（pú tí fēn fǎ，通往覺悟的各種方法）。三者，神通（shén tōng，超自然能力）。四、成熟有情行（chéng shú yǒu qíng xíng，使眾產生熟的行為）。即彼又說，三十二相（sān shí èr xiàng，佛陀的三十二種殊勝特徵）、八十隨好（bā shí suí hǎo，佛陀的八十種細微特徵）在種姓地（zhǒng xìng dì，具有成佛潛質的階段）。唯有種子依身而住。明知種姓住未入僧祇（sēng qí，大阿僧祇劫，極長的時間單位），若在勝解行地（shèng jiě xíng dì，通過理解而修行的階段）。始能修彼能得方便。若在清凈增上意樂地中乃名為得。在諸餘地轉勝清凈。在如來地善凈無上。又云，若諸不共佛法（bù gòng fó fǎ，佛陀獨有的教法），下劣者先菩薩時亦已成就。至佛之時善凈圓滿。又此一切菩提資糧有遠、有近。遠者謂去菩提果遠即未獲得諸相、隨好異熟果時在地前也。近者去菩提近。謂初獲得諸相、隨好異熟果時。從此已上展轉清凈。依此等文故知初劫中修一切菩薩行。一切菩提分法。雖少分得未名為證。未得無漏。未名得異熟果。未凈勝故。 論：如是等行至所修勝行。 述曰：如是一切自他利行。皆是此位勝所修行也。 論：此位二障至勇猛不退。 述曰：此文初總。練謂陶練。磨謂磨瑩。即修治義。 論：一聞無上至修諸勝行。 述曰：攝論第六說入因中。三種練磨心。斷除四處。緣法義境。止、觀恒常殷重。加行無放逸故。此中但有三練磨心。初練磨心中雲。廣者無邊。大者無上。深者難惻。遠者時長。彼既丈夫我亦爾。不應自輕而退屈。第一練磨心廣深退。第二練磨心難修退。文皆可解第三練磨心難證退。引他粗善者。諸

【English Translation】 English version: Sā xíng (a certain practice of Bodhisattvas). First, Pāramitā (bō luó mì duō, the method of reaching the other shore). Second, Bodhipākṣika-dharmas (pú tí fēn fǎ, the various methods leading to enlightenment). Third, supernormal powers (shén tōng, supernatural abilities). Fourth, the practice of maturing sentient beings (chéng shú yǒu qíng xíng, actions that mature sentient beings). It is also said that the thirty-two marks (sān shí èr xiàng, the thirty-two auspicious marks of the Buddha) and eighty minor marks (bā shí suí hǎo, the eighty minor marks of the Buddha) reside in the lineage ground (zhǒng xìng dì, the stage of having the potential to become a Buddha). Only the seed dwells in the body. It is clear that the lineage dwells without entering asaṃkhya-kalpas (sēng qí, immeasurable eons, an extremely long unit of time). If one is in the stage of adhimukti-caryā-bhūmi (shèng jiě xíng dì, the stage of practicing through understanding), then one can begin to cultivate and obtain the means. If one is in the ground of pure superior intention, then it is called attainment. In other grounds, it becomes increasingly pure. In the Buddha-ground, it is perfectly pure and unsurpassed. Furthermore, it is said that if the unique Buddha-dharmas (bù gòng fó fǎ, the unique teachings of the Buddha) are inferior, then they have already been accomplished by the Bodhisattva. When one becomes a Buddha, they are perfectly pure and complete. Moreover, all the accumulations for Bodhi are distant and near. Distant means far from the fruit of Bodhi, that is, before obtaining the fruits of the marks and minor marks, one is before the ground. Near means close to Bodhi, that is, when one first obtains the fruits of the marks and minor marks. From then on, it becomes increasingly pure. According to these texts, it is known that in the first kalpa, one cultivates all the practices of a Bodhisattva and all the Bodhipākṣika-dharmas. Although one obtains a small portion, it is not called realization. One has not obtained the unconditioned. It is not called obtaining the fruit of maturation. It is not purely superior. Treatise: Such practices lead to the superior practice being cultivated. Commentary: All such practices of benefiting oneself and others are the superior practices cultivated in this stage. Treatise: In this stage, the two obscurations lead to courageous non-retrogression. Commentary: This passage initially summarizes. 'Lian' means to refine. 'Mo' means to polish. That is, the meaning of cultivation. Treatise: Upon hearing the unsurpassed, one cultivates all superior practices. Commentary: The sixth chapter of the Saṃgrahaṇī says that in the cause of entry, there are three ways to refine the mind, cutting off the four places, focusing on the meaning of the Dharma, and constantly and diligently practicing śamatha and vipaśyanā without negligence. Here, there are only three ways to refine the mind. In the first way to refine the mind, it says: 'Broad is boundless, great is unsurpassed, deep is unfathomable, and far is long in time. Since they are great men, so am I. I should not belittle myself and retreat.' The first way to refine the mind is to retreat from breadth and depth. The second way to refine the mind is to retreat from difficult cultivation. The text can be understood. The third way to refine the mind is to retreat from difficult realization. Leading others to coarse goodness, the various...

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有障善名為粗善。謂行施等。彼于命終即便可愛一切自體圓滿而生。我有妙善無障礙善。云何不得一切圓滿　圓滿佛果者。即轉依也。以深妙故。功德備故。諸佛轉依難可證也。彼皆廣解無別義趣。意與此同故不煩引。初且舉菩提。后且舉轉依。論實皆同　除四處者。一離二乘作意。二者疑離疑。三離所聞思我．我所執。四斷除分別。緣法義境緣似法．似義等。如彼廣說。

論。次加行位其相云何。

述曰。此問起也。

論。頌曰至非實住唯識。

述曰。下答也。

論曰。菩薩至世第一法。

述曰。自下長行有十。第一顯位所由。第二釋位總名。第三齣位所修法。第四釋四法地名。五解本頌文正明此位猶有所得。六此位於彼相。及粗重縛分別．俱生伏．斷解釋。七此位所觀之境。八所依何地。九界趣分別。十七地分別。此第一也。總即結上所已行行。由得見道復修此行。應列其名。然此是初僧祇滿心修習。故云先於初無數劫。乃至廣說對法．莊嚴論亦云。謂諸菩薩已善積集福德．智惠二種資糧已過第一無數大劫。已聞隨順通達真如契經等法。持也。如理作意任也。發三摩地。鏡也。依止定心思惟定中所知影像。觀此影像不異定心。乃至廣說。明也。由行如是。乃至舍離二種能．

【現代漢語翻譯】 有障礙的善行被稱為粗善（指不精妙的善行）。例如佈施等行為。行這種善的人在臨終時，會立即以可愛和一切自體圓滿的狀態轉生。我有精妙的善行，沒有障礙的善行，為什麼不能得到一切圓滿呢？圓滿的佛果，就是轉依（Paravrtti，轉變所依，指通過修行轉變煩惱和業力，達到清凈的境界）。因為深奧精妙的緣故，功德完備的緣故，諸佛的轉依難以證得。他們都廣泛解釋，沒有別的意義，意思與此相同，所以不必繁瑣地引用。開始先舉菩提（Bodhi，覺悟），後來又舉轉依，實際上都是一樣的。除去四種障礙：一是遠離二乘（Sravaka-yana and Pratyeka-buddha-yana，聲聞乘和緣覺乘，小乘佛教的兩種主要形式）的作意（Manaskara，心理活動，意向）。二是疑離疑，即通過修行斷除疑惑。三是遠離所聞思的我、我所執（Atma and Atmiya，對自我和屬於自我的事物的執著）。四是斷除分別，即對法義境（Dharma-artha-visaya，佛法的意義和境界）和相似的法、相似的義等進行分別。這些內容在相關論述中有詳細說明。

論：其次，加行位（Prayoga-marga，修行過程中的一個階段）的相狀是怎樣的？

述記：這是提問。

論：頌詞說：乃至非實住唯識（Vijnapti-matrata，唯識思想，認為一切現象都是意識的顯現）。

述記：這是回答。

論：菩薩乃至世第一法（Laukikagradharma，世間最高的善法）。

述記：下面用長行文（散文形式的經文）分為十個部分。第一部分是顯示加行位的由來。第二部分是解釋加行位的總名稱。第三部分是闡述加行位所修的法。第四部分是解釋四法（暖位、頂位、忍位、世第一位）的名稱。第五部分是解釋本頌文，說明此位仍然有所得。第六部分是解釋此位與彼位（指見道位）的相似之處，以及粗重縛（Sthula-bandhana，粗重的煩惱束縛）的分別、俱生（Sahaja，與生俱來的）的伏斷。第七部分是說明此位所觀的境界。第八部分是說明此位所依的地位。第九部分是分別界趣（Ksetra-gati，所處的境界和趨向）。第十七地分別。這是第一部分。總的來說，就是總結上面已經修行的內容。由於得到見道（Darsana-marga，見道位，證悟真理的階段）后又修習這些行，所以應該列出這些名稱。然而，這是初僧祇（Asamkhyeya，無數劫）圓滿時修習的心，所以說『先於初無數劫』，乃至廣說。《對法》（Abhidharma，阿毗達摩，佛教哲學）和《莊嚴論》（Mahayana-sutralamkara，大乘莊嚴經論）也說，諸菩薩已經很好地積累了福德和智慧兩種資糧，已經度過了第一個無數大劫，已經聽聞了隨順通達真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）的契經等法。『持』，就是受持。『如理作意』，就是如理如實地進行心理活動。『任』，就是安住。『發三摩地』（Samadhi，禪定），就是發起禪定。『鏡』，就是像鏡子一樣反映。依止禪定，思惟禪定中所知的影像，觀察這個影像與定心不異，乃至廣說。『明』，就是明白。由於這樣修行，乃至舍離兩種能（指能取和能捨）。

【English Translation】 Impeded good is called coarse good. This refers to acts of giving and the like. Those who practice this kind of good will, upon death, be reborn immediately in a lovable state with all their faculties complete. I possess subtle good, unobstructed good. Why am I unable to attain complete perfection? The complete Buddha-fruit is Paravrtti (transformation of the basis, referring to the attainment of purity by transforming afflictions and karma through practice). Because of its profound subtlety and the completeness of its merits, the Paravrtti of the Buddhas is difficult to attain. They all explain it extensively without any different meaning, so there is no need to quote them laboriously. Initially, Bodhi (enlightenment) is mentioned, and later Paravrtti is mentioned, but in reality, they are the same. To eliminate the four obstacles: first, to abandon the intention of the Two Vehicles (Sravaka-yana and Pratyeka-buddha-yana, the two main forms of Theravada Buddhism). Second, to dispel doubt by abandoning doubt. Third, to abandon the attachment to 'I' and 'mine' (Atma and Atmiya) in what is heard and thought. Fourth, to eliminate discrimination, that is, to discriminate between Dharma-artha-visaya (the meaning and realm of the Dharma) and similar Dharma, similar meanings, and so on. These contents are explained in detail in the relevant treatises.

Treatise: Next, what is the characteristic of the Prayoga-marga (stage of application, a stage in the path of practice)?

Commentary: This is the question.

Treatise: The verse says: Even Vijnapti-matrata (consciousness-only, the idea that all phenomena are manifestations of consciousness) is not truly established.

Commentary: This is the answer.

Treatise: The Bodhisattva up to the Laukikagradharma (the highest mundane Dharma).

Commentary: Below, the prose section is divided into ten parts. The first part is to show the origin of the Prayoga-marga. The second part is to explain the general name of the Prayoga-marga. The third part is to elaborate on the Dharma practiced in the Prayoga-marga. The fourth part is to explain the names of the four Dharmas (Warmth, Peak, Forbearance, and the Highest Mundane Dharma). The fifth part is to explain the verse, indicating that there is still something to be attained in this stage. The sixth part is to explain the similarities between this stage and that stage (referring to the Darsana-marga, the path of seeing), as well as the distinction of Sthula-bandhana (coarse bonds, gross afflictions), and the suppression and elimination of Sahaja (innate). The seventh part is to explain the realm contemplated in this stage. The eighth part is to explain the ground on which this stage relies. The ninth part is to distinguish the Ksetra-gati (realm and direction). The seventeenth Bhumi (stages of a Bodhisattva). This is the first part. In general, it summarizes what has already been practiced above. Because these practices are cultivated again after attaining the Darsana-marga (path of seeing, the stage of realizing the truth), these names should be listed. However, this is the mind cultivated at the completion of the first Asamkhyeya (countless kalpas), so it is said 'first in the first countless kalpas,' and so on. The Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophy) and the Mahayana-sutralamkara (Ornament of the Mahayana Sutras) also say that the Bodhisattvas have already accumulated well the two accumulations of merit and wisdom, have already passed the first countless great kalpas, and have already heard the sutras and other Dharmas that accord with and penetrate Tathata (the true nature of things). 'Holding' means upholding. 'Appropriate attention' means engaging in mental activity in accordance with reality. 'Dwelling' means abiding. 'Generating Samadhi' (meditative concentration) means generating Samadhi. 'Mirror' means reflecting like a mirror. Relying on Samadhi, contemplate the images known in Samadhi, and observe that this image is not different from the mind in Samadhi, and so on. 'Understanding' means understanding. Because of practicing in this way, even abandoning the two abilities (referring to the ability to grasp and the ability to abandon).

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所取故。證無所得正入見道。舍離一切粗重得清凈轉依。依也。前四是地因。第五是地果。亦言過第一劫滿。已修四善根。即初劫滿心修習。如前已引瓔珞經等為此證訖。伏二取相下文自述。

論。此四總名至抉擇分故。

述曰。此即第二釋順抉擇分名　真實抉擇分。抉擇是智。即擇法也。抉擇即分名抉擇分。決簡疑品。彼猶豫故。擇簡見品。彼不擇故。疑品擇而不決見品決而不擇。故此智品名抉擇分。分是支因義。即擇法覺支。謂在見道。此無漏故名為真實。為有漏者非真實故。此暖等四順趣彼分名順抉擇分。順趣者行相同彼。故名為順。欣求往彼故名為趣。此中行相既與彼同。復求證彼故名順趣。前順解脫分。既初發心求究竟果。故遠從彼以得自名。此順抉擇分鄰近見道。欣遠之心不如始業。故從鄰近以得自名。

論。近見道故至無加行義。

述曰。此釋異名。位名加行道。近見道故。即是見道之加行故。舊言方便道。今言加行。顯與佛果善巧差別。因中行未圓足。所行必須加功求后勝果。果上萬行既滿。所行唯是方便利益有情。顯此二別此名加行。然五道中此獨名加行。以近見道故。非前資糧無加行義。顯前資糧亦名加行。對法八說所有資糧皆加行道。有加行道而非資糧。此四善根非

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所取故：因為所證得的法是無所得的緣故。證無所得正入見道：證悟到沒有可以執取的，才能真正進入見道（Darśanamārga）。舍離一切粗重得清凈轉依：捨棄一切粗重的煩惱，才能獲得清凈的轉依（āśrayaparāvṛtti）。依也：轉依是所依。前四是地因：前面的暖位、頂位、忍位、世第一位是見道的基礎和原因。第五是地果：見道是這些善根的果實。亦言過第一劫滿：也可以說，已經超過了第一個阿僧祇劫的修行。已修四善根：已經修習了四種善根。即初劫滿心修習：也就是在第一個阿僧祇劫圓滿時，內心修習這些善根。如前已引瓔珞經等為此證訖：正如前面引用的《瓔珞經》等經典，已經為此作了證明。伏二取相下文自述：降伏能取和所取二種執相，下文會詳細敘述。 論：此四總名至抉擇分故。 述曰：此即第二釋順抉擇分名真實抉擇分：這是第二個解釋『順抉擇分』這個名稱，實際上是『真實抉擇分』。抉擇是智，即擇法也：抉擇是智慧，也就是選擇法。抉擇即分名抉擇分：抉擇就是分，所以稱為抉擇分。決簡疑品，彼猶豫故：抉擇可以簡別疑惑品，因為疑惑品是猶豫不決的。擇簡見品，彼不擇故：選擇可以簡別見品，因為見品是不選擇的。疑品擇而不決，見品決而不擇：疑惑品是選擇而不決斷，見品是決斷而不選擇。故此智品名抉擇分：所以這個智慧品稱為抉擇分。分是支因義，即擇法覺支：分是分支和原因的意思，也就是擇法覺支（dharmavicaya-saṃbodhyaṅga）。謂在見道，此無漏故名為真實：這是在見道中，因為是無漏的，所以稱為真實。為有漏者非真實故：因為有漏的不是真實的。此暖等四順趣彼分名順抉擇分：這暖位、頂位、忍位、世第一位順應趣向那個分，所以稱為順抉擇分。順趣者行相同彼，故名為順：順應趣向的意思是，修行與那個分相同，所以稱為順。欣求往彼故名為趣：欣求前往那個分，所以稱為趣。此中行相既與彼同，復求證彼故名順趣：這裡面的修行既與那個分相同，又求證悟那個分，所以稱為順趣。前順解脫分，既初發心求究竟果，故遠從彼以得自名：前面的順解脫分，因為最初發心求究竟果，所以從遙遠的地方得到這個名稱。此順抉擇分鄰近見道，欣遠之心不如始業，故從鄰近以得自名：這個順抉擇分鄰近見道，欣求遙遠的心不如最初發心時那麼強烈，所以從鄰近的地方得到這個名稱。 論：近見道故至無加行義。 述曰：此釋異名，位名加行道，近見道故：這是解釋不同的名稱，這個位稱為加行道（prayogamārga），因為它接近見道。即是見道之加行故：也就是見道的加行。舊言方便道，今言加行：以前稱為方便道，現在稱為加行。顯與佛果善巧差別：顯示與佛果的善巧方便的差別。因中行未圓足，所行必須加功求后勝果：在因地修行還沒有圓滿，所以修行必須更加努力，以求得後面的殊勝果報。果上萬行既滿，所行唯是方便利益有情：在果地上，萬行已經圓滿，所以修行只是方便利益有情。顯此二別此名加行：顯示這二者的區別，所以稱為加行。然五道中此獨名加行，以近見道故：然而在五道中，只有這個道稱為加行，因為它接近見道。非前資糧無加行義：不是說前面的資糧道沒有加行的意義。顯前資糧亦名加行：顯示前面的資糧道也稱為加行。對法八說所有資糧皆加行道：對法藏第八卷說，所有的資糧道都是加行道。有加行道而非資糧：有加行道而不是資糧道，這四善根不是。

【English Translation】 English version 『So qu gu』: Because the Dharma that is realized is without attainment. 『Zheng wu suo de zheng ru jian dao』: Only by realizing that there is nothing to grasp can one truly enter the Path of Seeing (Darśanamārga). 『She li yi qie cu zhong de qing jing zhuan yi』: Only by abandoning all coarse afflictions can one attain the pure transformation of the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti). 『Yi ye』: Transformation of the basis is the basis. 『Qian si shi di yin』: The preceding four, the stages of Warmth, Peak, Forbearance, and Highest Worldly Dharma, are the foundation and cause of the Path of Seeing. 『Di wu shi di guo』: The Path of Seeing is the fruit of these wholesome roots. 『Yi yan guo di yi jie man』: It can also be said that one has surpassed the completion of the first asaṃkhyeya-kalpa of practice. 『Yi xiu si shan gen』: One has already cultivated the four wholesome roots. 『Ji chu jie man xin xiu xi』: That is, at the completion of the first asaṃkhyeya-kalpa, one cultivates these wholesome roots in one's mind. 『Ru qian yi yin luo jing deng wei ci zheng qi』: As the previously cited Yingluo Sutra and other scriptures have already proven this. 『Fu er qu xiang xia wen zi shu』: Subduing the appearances of the grasper and the grasped will be described in detail below. Treatise: 『These four are collectively named up to the stage of discrimination.』 Commentary: This is the second explanation of the name 『preparatory stage of discrimination,』 which is actually the 『true stage of discrimination.』 Discrimination is wisdom, that is, the selection of Dharma. Discrimination is a division, hence it is called the stage of discrimination. Discrimination distinguishes the category of doubt, because the category of doubt is hesitant. Selection distinguishes the category of views, because the category of views does not select. The category of doubt selects but does not decide, while the category of views decides but does not select. Therefore, this category of wisdom is called the stage of discrimination. Division means branch and cause, that is, the branch of Dharma selection (dharmavicaya-saṃbodhyaṅga). This is in the Path of Seeing, and because it is unconditioned, it is called true. Because the conditioned is not true. These four, Warmth, Peak, Forbearance, and Highest Worldly Dharma, accord with and move towards that division, hence they are called the preparatory stage of discrimination. 『Accord with and move towards』 means that the practice is the same as that division, hence it is called 『accord with.』 Aspiring to go to that division is called 『move towards.』 Here, the practice is both the same as that division and seeks to realize that division, hence it is called 『accord with and move towards.』 The preceding preparatory stage of liberation, because it initially aspires to the ultimate fruit, obtains its name from afar. This preparatory stage of discrimination is close to the Path of Seeing, and the aspiration for the distant is not as strong as in the initial practice, hence it obtains its name from nearby. Treatise: 『Because it is close to the Path of Seeing, up to the meaning of no additional effort.』 Commentary: This explains the different names. This stage is called the Path of Application (prayogamārga) because it is close to the Path of Seeing. That is, it is the application for the Path of Seeing. The old term was the Path of Means, but now it is called Application. This shows the difference between the skillful means of the Buddha's fruit. Because the practice in the causal stage is not yet complete, the practice must be intensified to seek the superior fruit later. On the fruit stage, the myriad practices are complete, so the practice is only a means to benefit sentient beings. This shows the difference between the two, hence it is called Application. However, among the five paths, only this one is called Application because it is close to the Path of Seeing. It is not that the preceding Path of Accumulation has no meaning of application. It shows that the preceding Path of Accumulation is also called Application. The eighth volume of the Abhidharma-kośa says that all the Paths of Accumulation are Paths of Application. There is a Path of Application that is not a Path of Accumulation; these four wholesome roots are not.

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資糧道。加功而行初位亦名加行。近見道說獨此得加行名　問資益後果己身之糧。唯初獨名資糧。加功而行求果。四善獨名加行　答資糧遠望大果。最初獨名資糧。加行萬行加功故。初亦名加行　問加功而行萬行。初位亦得此名。四善亦望大果資糧亦通此四　答初位發心最猛。四善不名資糧。萬行加力方行。初位亦名加行　問初位心猛獨名資糧。四善近見獨名加行　答以近見道名加行。初位不得此名。加功萬行方行。初位亦名加行。故於五道中。四善獨名加行者。近見道義。故彼初位不得此名。加功而行。初位亦名加行。此不齊解　若齊解者。此四善根果之資糧亦名資糧　而彼論文依多住外行福智行約最初說　若爾見道等亦應名資糧　果之資糧故。從增得名但名見道。不可名資糧。故知從增得名。既名加行不可名資糧。義準成故前解為勝。二釋位名訖。

論。暖等四法至初后位立。

述曰。自下第三位所修法。初二位尋思觀。后二位實智觀。此文總也。此尋思．如實智體性者。對法第十一說推求名等者。推求是觀察義。即唯是惠。無性云。推求行見方便因相說名尋思。了知假有實無所得決定智方便果相名如實智。即唯加行智為體。此約推求行增出體。若並相應增者。五根．五力為體。及俱有者五蘊為性。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 資糧道（Saṃbhāra-mārga）：通過積累資糧而修行的初始階段，也稱為加行位（Prayoga-mārga）。有人認為只有這個階段才能被稱為加行。

問：資糧是資助和利益最終結果的自身食糧，為什麼只有初始階段才被稱為資糧道？加功修行是爲了追求結果，為什麼只有四善根位（暖位、頂位、忍位、世第一位）才被稱為加行位？

答：資糧道是爲了遙望最終的偉大結果，因此最初的階段才被稱為資糧道。加行位是由於在萬行中加功努力，所以初始階段也被稱為加行位。

問：通過加功修行萬行，初始階段也獲得了這個名稱，四善根位也期望獲得偉大的結果，資糧道的概念也適用於這四個階段。

答：初始階段的發心最為猛烈，所以四善根位不被稱為資糧道。只有在萬行中增加力量才能前進，所以初始階段也被稱為加行位。

問：初始階段的心力猛烈，所以只有它才被稱為資糧道。四善根位接近見道位（Darśana-mārga），所以只有它們才被稱為加行位。

答：因為接近見道位才被稱為加行位，所以初始階段不能獲得這個名稱。只有在萬行中加功努力才能前進，所以初始階段也被稱為加行位。因此，在五道（資糧道、加行道、見道、修道、無學道）中，只有四善根位才被稱為加行位，這是因為它們接近見道位的含義。所以初始階段不能獲得這個名稱。通過加功修行，初始階段也被稱為加行位。這種解釋並不完全一致。

如果解釋一致的話，這四善根位也是結果的資糧，也可以被稱為資糧道。但是，那些論文依據的是多住在外行、福智行，大約在最初階段進行說明。如果是這樣，那麼見道等也應該被稱為資糧道，因為它們是結果的資糧。從增益的角度獲得名稱，只能被稱為見道，不能被稱為資糧道。因此，要知道這是從增益的角度獲得名稱。既然被稱為加行，就不能被稱為資糧。義理上可以這樣成立，所以之前的解釋更為優勝。以上是對兩個名稱的解釋。

論：暖位等四法達到初始和最後的位置而確立。

述記：從下面第三個位置開始修習的法，最初的兩個位置是尋思觀（Vitarka-vicāra），後面的兩個位置是如實智觀（Yathābhūta-jñāna）。這段文字是總體的概括。這種尋思，就像如實智的體性一樣，對法第十一說推求名等，推求是觀察的含義，也就是隻有慧。無性說，推求行見方便因相，說名為尋思。了知假有實無所得決定智方便果相，名為如實智。也就是隻有加行智作為體性。這是大約推求行增益而顯現出體性。如果連同相應增益，那麼五根（信根、精進根、念根、定根、慧根）、五力（信力、精進力、念力、定力、慧力）作為體性，以及俱有者五蘊（色蘊、受蘊、想蘊、行蘊、識蘊）作為自性。

【English Translation】 English version The Saṃbhāra-mārga (Path of Accumulation): The initial stage of practice through accumulating merit and wisdom, also known as the Prayoga-mārga (Path of Application). Some argue that only this stage can be called Prayoga.

Question: Saṃbhāra (accumulation) is the nourishment and benefit for the final result, so why is only the initial stage called Saṃbhāra-mārga? Applying effort in practice is to pursue the result, so why are only the four roots of good (warmth, peak, forbearance, and supreme mundane qualities) called Prayoga-mārga?

Answer: The Saṃbhāra-mārga is to look forward to the ultimate great result, so the initial stage is called Saṃbhāra-mārga. The Prayoga-mārga is because of applying effort in myriad practices, so the initial stage is also called Prayoga-mārga.

Question: Through applying effort in practicing myriad deeds, the initial stage also obtains this name. The four roots of good also hope to obtain great results, and the concept of Saṃbhāra-mārga also applies to these four stages.

Answer: The initial stage has the most intense aspiration, so the four roots of good are not called Saṃbhāra-mārga. Only by increasing strength in myriad practices can one advance, so the initial stage is also called Prayoga-mārga.

Question: The initial stage has intense mental strength, so only it is called Saṃbhāra-mārga. The four roots of good are close to the Darśana-mārga (Path of Seeing), so only they are called Prayoga-mārga.

Answer: Because of being close to the Darśana-mārga, they are called Prayoga-mārga, so the initial stage cannot obtain this name. Only by applying effort in myriad practices can one advance, so the initial stage is also called Prayoga-mārga. Therefore, in the five paths (Saṃbhāra-mārga, Prayoga-mārga, Darśana-mārga, Bhāvanā-mārga, and Asaṃskṛta-mārga), only the four roots of good are called Prayoga-mārga, because they are close to the meaning of Darśana-mārga. So the initial stage cannot obtain this name. Through applying effort in practice, the initial stage is also called Prayoga-mārga. This explanation is not entirely consistent.

If the explanation is consistent, then these four roots of good are also the accumulation for the result and can also be called Saṃbhāra-mārga. However, those treatises rely on dwelling mostly in external practice, merit and wisdom practice, and explain approximately in the initial stage. If so, then the Darśana-mārga, etc., should also be called Saṃbhāra-mārga, because they are the accumulation for the result. Obtaining the name from the perspective of augmentation, it can only be called Darśana-mārga and cannot be called Saṃbhāra-mārga. Therefore, know that this is obtaining the name from the perspective of augmentation. Since it is called Prayoga, it cannot be called Saṃbhāra. This can be established in principle, so the previous explanation is superior. The above is the explanation of the two names.

Treatise: The four dharmas of warmth, etc., are established upon reaching the initial and final positions.

Commentary: From the third position below, the dharma practiced, the first two positions are Vitarka-vicāra (conceptual thought and analysis), and the latter two positions are Yathābhūta-jñāna (knowledge of reality as it is). This passage is a general summary. This Vitarka (conceptual thought), like the nature of Yathābhūta-jñāna (knowledge of reality as it is), the eleventh chapter of the Abhidharma says 'seeking names, etc.,' seeking is the meaning of observation, which is only wisdom. Asaṅga says, 'Seeking the causes and conditions of the means of seeing practice is called Vitarka.' 'Knowing the expedient result of the decisive wisdom of the non-existence of the real is called Yathābhūta-jñāna.' That is, only the Prayoga-jñāna (knowledge of application) is the nature. This is approximately revealing the nature by augmenting the seeking practice. If together with the corresponding augmentation, then the five roots (faith, effort, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom), the five powers (power of faith, power of effort, power of mindfulness, power of concentration, and power of wisdom) are the nature, and the co-existent five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness) are the self-nature.

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定俱有戒為色蘊故。七十三云。四尋思者。五事中如理相應分別總攝四種。則唯有漏。四如實智一切皆是正智所攝。即唯無漏。七十二說五事中。相通有漏．無漏。二唯有漏。二唯無漏。真如是真智所緣名無漏。非漏盡相義。正智漏盡對治義故名無漏。攝論第六云。由四尋思．如實智故。于似文義意言。便能悟入唯有識性。彼卷又云。四尋思在暖．頂。實智在忍．第一法中。此論亦同。即如實智亦有漏攝。四十八卷第十住中說。住此住中得無生法忍極清凈。此復云何。謂諸菩薩由四尋思。於一切法正尋思已。先時獲得四如實智。如實了知一切諸法。爾時一切邪分別執皆悉遠離。于現法中隨順一切雜染無生觀等。乃至廣說。此如實智始從勝解行住。乃至有加行有功用住。未極清凈。今此住中已極清凈是故說言無生法忍。即如實智名無生忍體。然今實義。尋思唯有漏。唯加行心推求。非根本．后得智故。如實智通有漏．無漏。通加行．根本．后得智故。此唯忍可是果。彼唯加行是因。七十三中唯依無漏說為無生忍體。不言通有漏。余處據實通有．無漏　未印可位名為尋思起忍印時名如實智。中忍雖亦觀無能取。猶未印可。而前有印亦名實智。非是尋思與尋相應。不爾上地應無暖．頂。三十六說。愚夫於此四如實智。加行闕

故。不現前故。便有八種邪分別。能生三事。能起有情．及器世間。若了知時便除八分別等。此等義門如顯揚論第六卷說。

論。四尋思者至假有實無。

述曰。謂一切法名之與義。既於前位緣法義境。其中似文文名之義唯是意言。依此文名之義亦唯意言。無性第六釋云。此中名者謂色．受等亦攝名因名果等尋思。名因者謂字．字身．多字身．及聲等。名果者句．及名身．多名身．句身．多句身等皆名之果對法第十一云。謂推求諸法名身．句身．文身自相皆不成實。名召法勝。但說尋名。義者如名身等所詮表得蘊．處．界等。若體．若義總名為義。以義寬故不說自體。推求此能詮．所詮定不相應。此中唯觀妄情所執能詮．所詮唯意言性。意言之中依他文義不說無故。即依所取能詮．所詮。今觀唯是意言性也。對法等說。此在暖．頂位。此位唯觀所取無故觀計所執無。非依他也。不爾即成顛倒心故。依他是有觀為無故。無性云。尋思依名所表外事唯意言性。思惟此義似外相轉實唯在內故。不無依他內文義也。此二唯有內法。假名有文義外法故說唯假。此即觀一切有為．無為皆義中攝。此遍一切諸有法也。依此二法觀其自性心外亦無。唯是假立如我．法等體差別亦爾。如無常等義。無性云。證知四種虛妄顯現

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，因為不現前，便有八種錯誤的分別，能夠產生三種事物，能夠發起有情（sentient beings）以及器世間（the physical world）。如果了知這些，便能去除八種分別等等。這些義理門類，如《顯揚論》第六卷所說。

論：四尋思者，乃至假有實無。

述曰：所謂一切法的名與義，既然在前一位緣法義境（object of cognition）。其中相似的文字和文字的意義，僅僅是意言（mental speech）。依靠這文字的意義，也僅僅是意言。《無性釋》第六解釋說：『這裡所說的名，包括色、受等，也包括名的因、名的果等尋思。』名的因，是指字、字身、多字身以及聲音等。名的果，是指句、以及名身、多名身、句身、多句身等，都稱為名的果。《對法》第十一說：『推求諸法的名身、句身、文身，它們的自相都不成實。』名能夠召法殊勝，但只是說尋名。義，如名身等所詮表的蘊（skandha）、處（ayatana）、界（dhatu）等。無論是體還是義，總稱為義。因為義的範圍寬廣，所以不說自體。推求這能詮（signifier）、所詮（signified），必定不相應。這裡僅僅觀察妄情所執著的能詮、所詮，僅僅是意言的性質。意言之中，依靠他（依他起性，dependent nature）的文義，不能說沒有。即是依靠所取的能詮、所詮。現在觀察僅僅是意言的性質。《對法》等說，這在暖位（stage of heat）、頂位（peak stage）。這個階段僅僅觀察所取，因為沒有觀察計所執（parikalpita, the fully imputed nature），不是依靠他。否則就成了顛倒心。依靠他是有，觀察為無。無性說：『尋思依靠名所表示的外事，僅僅是意言的性質。思惟這意義，好像外相在運轉，實際上僅僅在內。』所以不是沒有依他的內文義。這二者僅僅有內法。假名有文義外法，所以說僅僅是假。這即是觀察一切有為（conditioned）、無為（unconditioned），都包含在義中。這遍及一切諸有法。依靠這二法，觀察它們的自性，心外也沒有。僅僅是假立，如我、法等，體的差別也是如此。如無常等義。無性說：『證知四種虛妄顯現。』

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, because of non-presence, there arise eight kinds of erroneous discriminations, which can generate three things and initiate sentient beings and the physical world (器世間, qì shìjiān). If one understands these, one can eliminate the eight discriminations, etc. These doctrinal categories are as explained in the sixth volume of the Xianyang Lun (顯揚論, Xiǎn yáng lùn).

Treatise: The four kinds of seeking (四尋思者, sì xún sī zhě), up to the point of being provisionally existent but ultimately non-existent (假有實無, jiǎ yǒu shí wú).

Commentary: That is to say, the name and meaning of all dharmas, since they are in the previous position of cognizing the object of dharma and meaning. Among them, the similar words and the meaning of the words are merely mental speech (意言, yì yán). Relying on the meaning of these words, it is also merely mental speech. The sixth explanation of the Wuxing Shi (無性釋, Wú xìng shì) says: 'Here, the term 'name' includes form, feeling, etc., and also includes the seeking of the cause of name, the result of name, etc.' The cause of name refers to letters, letter bodies, multiple letter bodies, and sounds, etc. The result of name refers to phrases, name bodies, multiple name bodies, phrase bodies, multiple phrase bodies, etc., all of which are called the result of name. The eleventh chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法, Duì fǎ) says: 'Investigating the name body, phrase body, and literal body of all dharmas, their self-nature is not truly established.' Name can summon the excellence of dharma, but it only speaks of seeking name. Meaning refers to the aggregates (蘊, skandha), sense bases (處, ayatana), realms (界, dhatu), etc., which are signified by the name body, etc. Whether it is the substance or the meaning, it is generally called meaning. Because the scope of meaning is broad, the self-nature is not mentioned. Investigating this signifier (能詮, néng quán) and signified (所詮, suǒ quán), they are certainly not corresponding. Here, only observe the signifier and signified clung to by deluded emotions, which are merely the nature of mental speech. Within mental speech, relying on the literal meaning of other-dependence (依他起性, yī tā qǐ xìng), it cannot be said that there is nothing. That is, relying on the apprehended signifier and signified. Now, observing that it is merely the nature of mental speech. The Abhidharmasamuccaya, etc., says that this is in the stage of heat (暖位, nuǎn wèi) and the peak stage (頂位, dǐng wèi). At this stage, only the apprehended is observed, because there is no observation of the fully imputed nature (計所執, jì suǒ zhí), it is not relying on others. Otherwise, it would become a reversed mind. Relying on others is existent, but observing it as non-existent. Wuxing says: 'Seeking and contemplating external matters expressed by names are merely the nature of mental speech. Thinking about this meaning, it seems that external appearances are revolving, but in reality, it is only within.' Therefore, it is not that there is no internal literal meaning of other-dependence. These two only have internal dharmas. Provisionally, names have external dharmas of literal meaning, so it is said that they are merely provisional. This is observing that all conditioned (有為, yǒu wéi) and unconditioned (無為, wú wéi) things are included in meaning. This pervades all existent dharmas. Relying on these two dharmas, observing their self-nature, there is nothing outside the mind either. It is merely provisionally established, such as self, dharma, etc., and the differences in substance are also like this. Such as the meaning of impermanence, etc. Wuxing says: 'Certifying and knowing the four kinds of illusory appearances.'

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依他起攝。了達四種遍計所執皆不可得。三十六真實義品云。此諸菩薩于彼名．事。或離相觀。或合相觀。成合相觀故通達二種自性．差別二種假立。依離相觀別觀二種之自性故。

既先加行起四尋思。四尋思已必有智果故。次辨智果。

論。如實遍知至名如實知。

述曰。前四尋思觀計所執四境離識非有。唯觀所取無未觀能取。此如實智忍可前境離識非有。所取空已復能遍知能取彼識離識內境決定非有能取亦空。了知內識及所變相互不相離。如幻事等唯識之相。知如幻已此依他上無計所執便謂二空。依此為門觀彼空理入圓成實。此在四善根。唯似三性觀。未證真故。前四尋思無所取時。暖是下位伏除。頂是上位伏除。以初伏除所取難故分上下位。至如實智位。下忍印無所取。中忍順無能取觀伏除能取。上忍起位印無能取。俱是如實智觀下品。以久修習伏能取時但是中忍。上忍便印。世第一法雙印前二空。名如實智觀上品。此于地前位辨上中下。若入地已各有下上。準四十八第八地中說。即入地已去不作尋思觀。唯作如實智觀。已除二取不須唯觀所取假有。二取無故但作如實智觀。七地已前猶未清凈。此體即是無生忍體。初地已得故。不須作四尋思觀。

問何故諸法名．義各別尋求。名．義

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava，事物相互依存的性質）所攝。完全理解四種遍計所執性（Parikalpita-svabhava，虛構的、錯誤的認知）都是不可得的。《三十六真實義品》中說：『這些菩薩對於那些名（Nama，名稱）、事（Artha，事物），或者離相觀察，或者合相觀察。成就合相觀察，因此通達兩種自性（Svabhava，事物本性）：差別自性（Vishesha-svabhava，差異性）和假立自性（Samaropa-svabhava，虛構性）。依靠離相觀察，分別觀察兩種自性。』 既然先前已經通過加行（Prayoga，修行）生起了四尋思（Caturvidha-vitarka，四種尋求真理的思維），四尋思之後必定有智慧的果實，因此接下來辨析智慧的果實。 論：如實遍知（Yathābhūta-parijñāna，如實地、全面地瞭解）乃至名如實知（Nama-yathābhūta-jñāna，如實地瞭解名稱）。 述曰：前面的四尋思觀察遍計所執的四種境界，離開識（Vijnana，意識）並非真實存在。僅僅觀察所取（Grahya，被認知的事物），沒有觀察能取（Grahaka，能認知的主體）。這個如實智（Yathābhūta-jñāna，如實的智慧）認可前面的境界離開識並非真實存在。所取空（Grahya-shunyata，被認知的事物是空性的）之後，又能普遍地瞭解能取，那個識離開識的內在境界，決定不是真實存在，能取也是空性的。瞭解內在的識以及所變現的相互不分離，就像幻術等，只是識的顯現。瞭解如幻之後，在這個依他起性上沒有遍計所執，就認為是二空（Dvaishunyata，人空和法空）。依靠這個作為入門，觀察那個空性的道理，進入圓成實性（Parinishpanna-svabhava，事物真實圓滿的性質）。這在四善根位（Cattāri kuśala-mūlāni，四種善的根本），僅僅相似於三性（Trisvabhava，三種自性）的觀察，因為沒有證得真如（Tathata，真如實性）。前面的四尋思沒有所取的時候，暖位（Ushmagata，暖位）是下位伏除，頂位（Mūrdhan，頂位）是上位伏除。因為最初伏除所取困難，所以分為上下位。到了如實智位，下忍位（Kshanti，忍位）印證沒有所取，中忍位順著沒有能取的觀察，伏除能取，上忍位（Agradharma，勝法位）生起印證沒有能取。都是如實智觀的下品。因為長期修習伏除能取的時候，只是中忍位，上忍位就印證。世第一法位（Laukikāgradharma，世間第一法位）雙重印證前面的二空，名為如實智觀的上品。這在地上之前辨別上下中品。如果進入地上之後，各有上下，參照四十八第八地中的說法。即進入地上之後，不作尋思觀，只作如實智觀。已經除去了二取，不需要僅僅觀察所取假有。二取沒有了，只作如實智觀。七地之前還沒有清凈。這個體性就是無生忍體（Anutpattika-dharma-kshanti，無生法忍）。初地已經得到，所以不需要作四尋思觀。 問：為什麼諸法的名和義各自尋求？名和義

【English Translation】 English version: Included within the Paratantra-svabhava (the nature of interdependence). Completely understanding that the four types of Parikalpita-svabhava (the imputed nature, mistaken cognition) are all unattainable. The 『Thirty-Six Real Meanings』 says: 『These Bodhisattvas, regarding those Nama (name) and Artha (object), either observe them separately or observe them together. Achieving the combined observation, they thus understand the two Svabhavas (natures): Vishesha-svabhava (distinctive nature) and Samaropa-svabhava (fictitious nature). Relying on separate observation, they separately observe the two Svabhavas.』 Since the four Caturvidha-vitarkas (four types of reasoning) have already arisen through Prayoga (practice), and after the four reasonings there must be a fruit of wisdom, therefore, next, the fruit of wisdom is analyzed. Treatise: Yathābhūta-parijñāna (knowing things as they really are) even to Nama-yathābhūta-jñāna (knowing names as they really are). Commentary: The preceding four reasonings observe the four realms of the Parikalpita-svabhava, which are not real apart from Vijnana (consciousness). Only observing the Grahya (the object of cognition), without observing the Grahaka (the subject of cognition). This Yathābhūta-jñāna (knowledge of reality) acknowledges that the preceding realm is not real apart from consciousness. After the Grahya-shunyata (emptiness of the object) is realized, it can also universally understand the Grahaka (the subject), that the inner realm of consciousness apart from consciousness is definitely not real, and the Grahaka is also empty. Understanding that the inner consciousness and what it manifests are not separate from each other, just like illusions, etc., are only manifestations of consciousness. After understanding it as an illusion, there is no Parikalpita-svabhava on this Paratantra-svabhava, and it is considered Dvaishunyata (twofold emptiness). Relying on this as an entry point, observing the principle of that emptiness, entering the Parinishpanna-svabhava (the perfected nature). This is at the stage of the Cattāri kuśala-mūlāni (four roots of goodness), only similar to the observation of the Trisvabhava (three natures), because it has not yet attained Tathata (suchness). When the preceding four reasonings have no Grahya, the Ushmagata (heat stage) is the lower-level subduing, and the Mūrdhan (peak stage) is the upper-level subduing. Because it is difficult to initially subdue the Grahya, it is divided into upper and lower levels. Arriving at the stage of Yathābhūta-jñāna, the lower Kshanti (patience) confirms that there is no Grahya, the middle Kshanti follows the observation of no Grahaka, subduing the Grahaka, and the upper Agradharma (supreme dharma) arises, confirming that there is no Grahaka. All are lower-grade Yathābhūta-jñāna observations. Because of long-term practice in subduing the Grahaka, it is only the middle Kshanti, and the upper Kshanti confirms it. The Laukikāgradharma (supreme mundane dharma) doubly confirms the preceding two emptinesses, called the supreme-grade Yathābhūta-jñāna observation. This distinguishes the upper, middle, and lower grades before reaching the Bhumi (ground). If one enters the Bhumi, each has upper and lower grades, referring to the explanation in the forty-eighth eighth Bhumi. That is, after entering the Bhumi, one does not engage in reasoning observation, but only engages in Yathābhūta-jñāna observation. Having already removed the two graspings, there is no need to only observe the Grahya as provisionally existent. Because the two graspings are gone, one only engages in Yathābhūta-jñāna observation. Before the seventh Bhumi, one is not yet pure. This nature is the Anutpattika-dharma-kshanti (patience with the unarisen dharma). Since the first Bhumi has already been attained, there is no need to engage in the four reasoning observations. Question: Why are the Nama (name) and Artha (meaning) of all dharmas sought separately? Name and meaning

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自性．及與差別即合觀也。

論。名義相異至故合思察。

述曰。謂名．義二種。一自性同。二差別同。故合名．義二種自性。及二差別為合觀也。前二是名．義。后二是自性．差別。名．義舉尋求。顯尋者求也。此二影有思察。自性．差別舉思察。顯思者察也．推也．觀也。此二影有尋求故諸論言推求名．義觀察名．義等是也。前引瑜伽離．合相觀。離觀是名．義觀。合相是自性．差別。

此即第三齣所修法。自下第四釋四地名。

論。依明得定至故亦名暖。

述曰。明得是定。尋思是惠。故名為發。此俱時名發。如世第一法名無間定等。明者無漏惠。初得無漏惠之明相故名明得。明得之定。名明得定。此中創觀四法依他。皆自心變。此乃假施設有名．義．自性．差別。實名義等性都不可得。然依他中名等名假者。法無名。名無義。無實自性．差別義故。今名名．義乃至差別豈非假也。如攝論等說明得．及暖。準此中釋　行之言起。從喻為名。如日初出有前起相。謂明相等　若言惠明前起之行相亦得。今依前解。

論。依明增定至故複名頂。

述曰。頂者極義。文易可知。明相轉盛故名明增。已上名諸論皆同。

論。依印順定至亦順樂忍。

述曰。印前所

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：自性以及差別，應當合起來觀察。

論：因為名和義的相異之處顯現，所以要合起來思察。

述記：這裡說的『名』和『義』兩種，一是自性相同，二是差別相同，所以將名和義兩種的自性以及兩種差別合起來觀察。前面兩種是名和義，後面兩種是自性和差別。名和義側重於尋求，顯示尋求者在探求；這兩種（名、義）包含著思察。自性和差別側重於思察，顯示思者在考察、推敲、觀察。這兩種（自性、差別）包含著尋求，所以各種論典說『推求名義』、『觀察名義』等等。前面引用《瑜伽師地論》的離相觀和合相觀，離觀是名義觀，合相是自性和差別。

這（合觀）就是第三個部分，說明所修的法。從下面開始是第四個部分，解釋四加行位的名稱。

論：依靠明得定，所以也叫做暖位。

述記：明得是定，尋思是慧，所以名為『發』。這是同時具有『明得』和『發』的名稱，如同世第一法名為無間定等等。『明』指的是無漏慧，最初獲得無漏慧的明相，所以叫做明得。明得之定，叫做明得定。這裡開始觀察四法（名、義、自性、差別）依他起性，都是自心變現。這只是假施設，有名、義、自性、差別，實際上名義等的自性都不可得。然而，在依他起性中，名等只是假名，因為法沒有名，名沒有義，沒有真實的自性、差別義。現在說名、義乃至差別，難道不是假的嗎？如《攝大乘論》等說明得以及暖位。按照這裡的解釋，『行』的意思是『起』，從比喻得名，如同太陽初升有向前升起的徵兆，比如明相等。如果說是慧光明的前起之行相也可以。現在按照前面的解釋。

論：依靠明增定，所以又叫做頂位。

述記：『頂』是極點的意思，文義容易理解。明相更加旺盛，所以叫做明增。以上這些名稱，各種論典都相同。

論：依靠印順定，也順於樂忍。

述記：印證前面所修的。

【English Translation】 English version: Self-nature and difference should be observed together.

Treatise: Because the differences between name and meaning become apparent, they should be contemplated together.

Commentary: Here, 'name' and 'meaning' are of two kinds: first, their self-natures are the same; second, their differences are the same. Therefore, the self-natures of both name and meaning, as well as their differences, should be observed together. The first two are name and meaning, and the latter two are self-nature and difference. Name and meaning emphasize seeking, showing that the seeker is exploring; these two (name and meaning) contain contemplation. Self-nature and difference emphasize contemplation, showing that the contemplator is examining, pondering, and observing. These two (self-nature and difference) contain seeking, so various treatises say 'investigating name and meaning,' 'observing name and meaning,' and so on. The previous quote from the Yogacarabhumi-sastra refers to the separate and combined aspects of observation. Separate observation is the observation of name and meaning, and combined aspect is self-nature and difference.

This (combined observation) is the third part, explaining the Dharma being cultivated. From below begins the fourth part, explaining the names of the Four Heats.

Treatise: Relying on the 'Clear Attainment Samadhi' (Ming De Ding), it is also called the 'Warmth Stage'.

Commentary: 'Clear Attainment' is Samadhi, and investigation is wisdom, so it is called 'Arising'. This is a name that simultaneously possesses 'Clear Attainment' and 'Arising', just as the 'Highest Mundane Dharma' is called 'Uninterrupted Samadhi' and so on. 'Clear' refers to non-outflow wisdom; initially obtaining the clear sign of non-outflow wisdom is called 'Clear Attainment'. The Samadhi of Clear Attainment is called 'Clear Attainment Samadhi'. Here, one begins to observe that the four dharmas (name, meaning, self-nature, difference) are dependently originated and are all transformations of one's own mind. This is merely a provisional establishment, with name, meaning, self-nature, and difference, but in reality, the self-nature of name, meaning, etc., is unattainable. However, in dependent origination, names, etc., are merely provisional names because the Dharma has no name, the name has no meaning, and there is no real self-nature or difference. Now, to say name, meaning, and even difference, is it not all false? As the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts explain 'Clear Attainment' and the 'Warmth Stage'. According to this explanation, 'conduct' means 'arising', named from a metaphor, like the initial rising of the sun has a sign of rising forward, such as the clear sign. If it is said that the conduct of wisdom's light arising forward is also acceptable. Now, according to the previous explanation.

Treatise: Relying on the 'Clear Increase Samadhi' (Ming Zeng Ding), it is also called the 'Peak Stage'.

Commentary: 'Peak' means the ultimate. The meaning of the text is easy to understand. The clear sign becomes more flourishing, so it is called 'Clear Increase'. The above names are the same in all treatises.

Treatise: Relying on the 'Acceptance Samadhi' (Yin Shun Ding), it also accords with 'Joyful Endurance'.

Commentary: Confirming what was cultivated previously.

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取無順后能取無名印順定。順通二種。一名樂順。二名印順。若此三品皆名為忍。下上位中皆印忍故立印順名。一印順名通初及后。樂．順之言唯在中忍。故合但言印順定也。又差別者。下品忍名印忍。印所取無故。中品忍名樂順。樂無能取順修彼故。上忍起時但名印順。印能取無順觀彼故。故合三忍名印順定。忍者智也。印順俱定名印順定。初后準此解。于無所取決定印持者。是下忍位。無能取中亦順樂忍者。是中．上忍位。順通中．上。樂唯在中。

論。既無實境至相待立故。

述曰。遍計所執所取既無。彼計所執能取寧有。

論。印順忍時總立為忍。

述曰。攝論云。入真義一分三摩地。即印所取無名一分。對法第八云一分已入隨順三摩地。彼論解云。一分已入者。于無所取一向忍解故。今者即下忍位。一分隨順者。于無能取隨順通達所依處故。今者即后忍位。故彼文勝攝論等名。然不如此中。彼不別分中．上忍二位故。謂中忍但樂順修無能取未印無故。上忍印無能取故與中別。彼論雖有一分順言。不別分樂順．印順故。下中上品印忍．順忍之時合。此三位四善根中總立為忍。故論言印順忍時總立為忍。忍通二處。謂印忍．順忍。故合為論言印．順忍時。此三位總名善根中忍。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『取無順后能取無名印順定』。『順』通兩種：一名『樂順』，二名『印順』。若此三品（下品、中品、上品）皆名為『忍』。下位和上位都印可此『忍』，故立『印順』之名。『印順』之名通於初品及后品，而『樂順』之言只在中品『忍』中。故合起來但說『印順定』。又，差別在於：下品『忍』名為『印忍』，因為印可所取之無故。中品『忍』名為『樂順』，因為樂於無能取，順於修習彼故。上品『忍』生起時，但名『印順』，因為印可了能取之無，順於觀照彼故。故合三『忍』名『印順定』。『忍』者，智也。『印順』俱定，名『印順定』。初品和后品準此解釋。于無所取決定印持者，是下品『忍』位。于無能取中亦順樂忍者，是中品和上品『忍』位。『順』通於中品和上品，『樂』唯在中品。

論：既無實境，至相待立故。

述曰：遍計所執（PariKalpita，虛妄分別）所取既無，彼計所執能取寧有？

論：印順忍時總立為忍。

述曰：攝論云：『入真義一分三摩地（Samadhi，禪定）』，即印所取無名一分。對法第八云：『一分已入隨順三摩地』。彼論解云：『一分已入者，于無所取一向忍解故』，今者即下忍位。『一分隨順者，于無能取隨順通達所依處故』，今者即后忍位。故彼文勝攝論等名。然不如此中，彼不別分中品和上品『忍』二位故。謂中品『忍』但樂順修無能取，未印無故。上品『忍』印無能取故與中品別。彼論雖有一分順言，不別分『樂順』和『印順』故。下品、中品、上品印『忍』、順『忍』之時合。此三位四善根中總立為『忍』。故論言『印順忍時總立為忍』。『忍』通二處，謂『印忍』、『順忍』。故合為論言『印順忍時』。此三位總名善根中『忍』。

【English Translation】 English version 'Taking no-following, after, able-to-take, no-name, acceptance-compliance-determination'. 'Compliance' encompasses two types: the first is 'joyful compliance', the second is 'acceptance compliance'. If these three stages (lower, middle, upper) are all called 'forbearance (Ksanti)', because the lower and upper stages both affirm this 'forbearance', the name 'acceptance-compliance' is established. The name 'acceptance-compliance' applies to both the initial and subsequent stages, while the term 'joyful compliance' only applies to the middle stage of 'forbearance'. Therefore, collectively, it is simply referred to as 'acceptance-compliance-determination'. Furthermore, the distinction lies in: the lower stage of 'forbearance' is called 'acceptance-forbearance', because it affirms the non-existence of what is taken. The middle stage of 'forbearance' is called 'joyful compliance', because it delights in the non-existence of the able-to-take and complies with cultivating it. When the upper stage of 'forbearance' arises, it is only called 'acceptance-compliance', because it affirms the non-existence of the able-to-take and complies with contemplating it. Therefore, the three 'forbearances' together are called 'acceptance-compliance-determination'. 'Forbearance' is wisdom. 'Acceptance and compliance' are both determined, hence the name 'acceptance-compliance-determination'. The initial and subsequent stages are interpreted accordingly. One who decisively affirms and upholds the non-existence of what is taken is in the lower stage of 'forbearance'. One who also complies with and delights in the non-existence of the able-to-take is in the middle and upper stages of 'forbearance'. 'Compliance' applies to both the middle and upper stages, while 'joy' is only in the middle stage.

Treatise: Since there is no real object, it exists only in relation to something else.

Commentary: Since what is taken in the imagined nature (PariKalpita, imputed nature) does not exist, how could the able-to-take, which is also imagined, exist?

Treatise: When acceptance-compliance-forbearance occurs, it is collectively established as forbearance.

Commentary: The Compendium of Abhidharma (Abhidharma-samuccaya) says: 'Entering one part of the true meaning Samadhi (Samadhi, meditative absorption)', which is one part of affirming the non-existence of what is taken. The eighth chapter of the Abhidharma-kosa says: 'One part has already entered compliant Samadhi'. That treatise explains: 'One part has already entered' means 'because one consistently understands and accepts the non-existence of what is taken', which is now the lower stage of forbearance. 'One part is compliant' means 'because one complies with and thoroughly understands the basis of the non-existence of the able-to-take', which is now the later stage of forbearance. Therefore, that text surpasses the Compendium of Abhidharma in name. However, it is not like this text, because it does not separately distinguish the middle and upper stages of forbearance. The middle stage of forbearance only delights in complying with the cultivation of the non-existence of the able-to-take, because it has not yet affirmed its non-existence. The upper stage of forbearance is different from the middle stage because it affirms the non-existence of the able-to-take. Although that treatise has the word 'compliant', it does not separately distinguish between 'joyful compliance' and 'acceptance compliance'. The lower, middle, and upper stages of acceptance-forbearance and compliance-forbearance are combined. These three stages are collectively established as forbearance among the four roots of virtue. Therefore, the treatise says, 'When acceptance-compliance-forbearance occurs, it is collectively established as forbearance'. Forbearance applies to two places, namely acceptance-forbearance and compliance-forbearance. Therefore, it is combined into the statement 'When acceptance-compliance-forbearance occurs'. These three stages are collectively called forbearance in the roots of virtue.

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論。印前順后至故亦名忍。

述曰。名印順者印前所取無。順后能取無。及印能取無故立印順名。此釋三位別名。此三位忍境空．識空故亦名忍然中忍雖不印可。順樂忍可故亦名忍。此中正忍順忍皆名忍故。不可難言頂等位中亦順下忍彼應名忍。初未有忍故。中忍初．后皆有忍故。故立忍名。是彼忍類故亦名忍。不同暖等。

論。依無間定至世第一法。

述曰。與見相鄰雙印二空。其文可解。無間即定。無間之定。二釋皆得。此即別解善根體訖。此上第四釋四位名。

論。如是暖頂至雙印空相。

述曰。自下第五總攝上義釋本頌文。總牒前義。其文易解。中忍之中順樂忍可者。順樂后位上品之忍修無能取。

論。皆帶相故至方實安住。

述曰。心上變如名為少物。此非無相故名帶相。相謂相狀。若證真時此相便滅。相者即是空所執相。有依他相名空有相。謂有．空相是彼唯識真勝義性。真者勝義之異名。第四勝義。簡前三故。由有此相未證真理。滅空．有相即能入真。

論。依如是義至后觸無所得。

述曰。此中頌者。攝大乘說教授二頌。教授菩薩故。此分別瑜伽論頌。彌勒所作。無著故引。古云分別觀論也　菩薩于定位者。顯非散。資糧位中多住外門。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：因為（此位）在印可（真如）之前順應（真如），在印可之後到達（真如），所以也稱為忍（Ksanti，忍）。

述曰：名為印順，是因為在印可（真如）之前所取之無，順應之後能取之無，以及印可（真如）能取之無，所以建立印順之名。這是解釋三位的不同名稱。這三位忍（Ksanti，忍）的境界是空（Sunyata，空性），識（Vijnana，識）也是空（Sunyata，空性），所以也稱為忍（Ksanti，忍）。然而，中忍（Madhyama-ksanti，中忍）雖然不印可（真如），但順應樂忍（Sukha-ksanti，樂忍）的印可，所以也稱為忍（Ksanti，忍）。這其中正忍（Samyak-ksanti，正忍）和順忍（Anuloma-ksanti，順忍）都稱為忍（Ksanti，忍），所以不能質疑說頂位（Murdhan，頂位）等位中也順應下忍（Adhah-ksanti，下忍），它們應該被稱為忍（Ksanti，忍）。因為最初沒有忍（Ksanti，忍），而中忍（Madhyama-ksanti，中忍）的初和后都有忍（Ksanti，忍），所以建立忍（Ksanti，忍）之名。因為它們是忍（Ksanti，忍）的同類，所以也稱為忍（Ksanti，忍），這與暖位（Usma-gata，暖位）等不同。

論：依靠無間定（Anantarya-samadhi，無間定）到達世第一法（Laukikagradharma，世第一法）。

述曰：與見道（Darsana-marga，見道）相鄰，同時印可二空（Dvi-sunyata，二空）。文句可以理解。無間（Anantarya，無間）就是定（Samadhi，定）。無間（Anantarya，無間）之定（Samadhi，定）。兩種解釋都可以。這是分別解釋善根（Kusala-mula，善根）的體性完畢。以上是第四種解釋四位名稱。

論：像這樣，暖位（Usma-gata，暖位）、頂位（Murdhan，頂位）直到同時印可空相（Sunyata-nimitta，空相）。

述曰：從下面第五點開始，總括上面的意義來解釋本頌文。總括前面的意義。文句容易理解。中忍（Madhyama-ksanti，中忍）之中順應樂忍（Sukha-ksanti，樂忍）的印可，是順應后位上品之忍（Ksanti，忍）修無能取。

論：都帶有相（Nimitta，相），直到才能真實安住。

述曰：心上變現的如名（Yatha-nama，如名）稱為少物。這不是無相（Animitta，無相），所以稱為帶相（Sa-nimitta，帶相）。相（Nimitta，相）是指相狀。如果證得真如（Tathata，真如）時，此相（Nimitta，相）便會滅除。相（Nimitta，相）就是空（Sunyata，空性）所執著的相（Nimitta，相）。有依他相（Paratantra-nimitta，依他相）名為空有相（Sunyata-bhava-nimitta，空有相）。所謂有（Bhava，有）和空（Sunyata，空性）之相（Nimitta，相）是彼唯識（Vijnapti-matrata，唯識）的真勝義性（Paramartha-satya，勝義諦）。真（Satya，真）是勝義（Paramartha，勝義）的異名。第四勝義（Paramartha，勝義）。簡別前面的三種。由於有此相（Nimitta，相），所以沒有證得真理（Satya，真理）。滅除空（Sunyata，空性）和有（Bhava，有）之相（Nimitta，相）就能入真（Satya，真）。

論：依靠這樣的意義，直到後來接觸無所得。

述曰：這其中的頌（Gatha，頌）是《攝大乘論》（Mahayana-samgraha，攝大乘論）所說的教授二頌（Gatha，頌）。教授菩薩（Bodhisattva，菩薩）的緣故。這是分別瑜伽論（Yoga-sastra，瑜伽論）的頌（Gatha，頌）。彌勒（Maitreya，彌勒）所作。無著（Asanga，無著）所以引用。古人說是分別觀論。 菩薩（Bodhisattva，菩薩）于定位（Samadhi，定）中：顯示不是散亂。資糧位（Sambhava-sthana，資糧位）中多住在外門。

【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: Because it accords with (Tathata, 真如) before the confirmation and arrives at (Tathata, 真如) after the confirmation, it is also called Ksanti (忍, forbearance).

Commentary: It is named '印順' (In-shun, confirmation-accordance) because of the non-existence taken before the confirmation (of Tathata, 真如), the non-existence that can be taken after according, and the non-existence that can be taken by the confirmation (of Tathata, 真如), hence establishing the name '印順' (In-shun, confirmation-accordance). This explains the different names of the three stages. The realm of these three Ksantis (忍, forbearance) is Sunyata (空性, emptiness), and Vijnana (識, consciousness) is also Sunyata (空性, emptiness), hence they are also called Ksanti (忍, forbearance). However, although Madhyama-ksanti (中忍, middle forbearance) does not confirm (Tathata, 真如), it accords with the confirmation of Sukha-ksanti (樂忍, pleasant forbearance), hence it is also called Ksanti (忍, forbearance). Because both Samyak-ksanti (正忍, correct forbearance) and Anuloma-ksanti (順忍, accordant forbearance) are called Ksanti (忍, forbearance) here, it cannot be questioned that the Murdhan (頂位, peak stage) and other stages also accord with Adhah-ksanti (下忍, lower forbearance), and they should be called Ksanti (忍, forbearance). Because there was no Ksanti (忍, forbearance) initially, while Madhyama-ksanti (中忍, middle forbearance) has Ksanti (忍, forbearance) both initially and subsequently, hence establishing the name Ksanti (忍, forbearance). Because they are of the same kind as Ksanti (忍, forbearance), they are also called Ksanti (忍, forbearance), which is different from Usma-gata (暖位, heat stage) and others.

Treatise: Relying on Anantarya-samadhi (無間定, uninterrupted concentration), one reaches Laukikagradharma (世第一法, the highest mundane dharma).

Commentary: Adjacent to Darsana-marga (見道, the path of seeing), it simultaneously confirms Dvi-sunyata (二空, two emptinesses). The sentences are understandable. Anantarya (無間, uninterrupted) is Samadhi (定, concentration). The Samadhi (定, concentration) of Anantarya (無間, uninterrupted). Both explanations are acceptable. This concludes the separate explanation of the nature of Kusala-mula (善根, roots of goodness). The above is the fourth explanation of the names of the four stages.

Treatise: Like this, Usma-gata (暖位, heat stage), Murdhan (頂位, peak stage) until simultaneously confirming Sunyata-nimitta (空相, the sign of emptiness).

Commentary: Starting from the fifth point below, it summarizes the above meanings to explain the verses of this treatise. It summarizes the previous meanings. The sentences are easy to understand. Among Madhyama-ksanti (中忍, middle forbearance), according with the confirmation of Sukha-ksanti (樂忍, pleasant forbearance) is according with the subsequent stage's superior Ksanti (忍, forbearance) that cultivates non-apprehension.

Treatise: All carry Nimitta (相, signs), until one can truly abide.

Commentary: The Yatha-nama (如名, as-name) transformed on the mind is called a small thing. This is not Animitta (無相, signless), so it is called Sa-nimitta (帶相, with signs). Nimitta (相, sign) refers to the appearance. If one realizes Tathata (真如, suchness), this Nimitta (相, sign) will be extinguished. Nimitta (相, sign) is the Nimitta (相, sign) clung to by Sunyata (空性, emptiness). Having Paratantra-nimitta (依他相, dependent sign) is called Sunyata-bhava-nimitta (空有相, emptiness-existence sign). The so-called signs of Bhava (有, existence) and Sunyata (空性, emptiness) are the Paramartha-satya (勝義諦, ultimate truth) of that Vijnapti-matrata (唯識, consciousness-only). Satya (真, truth) is another name for Paramartha (勝義, ultimate). The fourth Paramartha (勝義, ultimate). Distinguishing from the previous three. Because there is this Nimitta (相, sign), one has not realized Satya (真, truth). Extinguishing the signs of Sunyata (空性, emptiness) and Bhava (有, existence) can lead to entering Satya (真, truth).

Treatise: Relying on such meaning, until later contact with no attainment.

Commentary: The Gatha (頌, verse) here is the two teaching verses spoken in the Mahayana-samgraha (攝大乘論, Compendium of the Mahayana). Because it teaches Bodhisattvas (菩薩, bodhisattvas). This is a verse from the Yoga-sastra (瑜伽論, Yoga Treatise). Made by Maitreya (彌勒, Maitreya). Asanga (無著, Asanga) therefore quotes it. The ancients said it was a treatise on separate contemplation. The Bodhisattva (菩薩, bodhisattva) in Samadhi (定, concentration): shows that it is not distraction. In the Sambhava-sthana (資糧位, stage of accumulation), one mostly dwells in the outer gate.

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此多在定內門修行　觀影唯是心者。觀內心境影離心非有唯是內心。此初位觀即在暖位　遍計所執心外之境。

義相既滅除　審觀唯自相。唯有內心也。即在頂位。以上總是暖．頂二位　如是住內心。知所取非有。此二句下忍位　次能取亦無。中．上忍位。合此俱印二空。即世第一法。以時少故從忍位說　后觸無所得。入真見道。

此上第五釋本頌。明此位中猶有所得。以下第六斷二縛位。

論。此加行位至亦未能斷。

述曰。相縛者。謂相分縛見分等也。如前第五卷證第七識有中說。謂一切有漏善．無記．不善等心。皆有分別相分。此相能縛於心。非謂相縛即是執也。有義八識皆有執故。相縛于見通於八識。有義不然。有漏八識有分別故。分別之相縛于見分名為相縛。非要有執。

若不執之相亦名能縛者。后得智品相分應亦能縛　答曰不然。彼后得智斷漏方得。體非硬澀。非漏所增相分。非分別境。后得見分緣一切相皆為證解。有漏不然。有分別故。漏相俱故。漏所增故。非斷漏證故。緣一切境非皆證解。或比量故。若善．無覆無記心中唯現．比量。其染污心亦通非量。所以相縛能拘礙見。不令明凈。不令證知。故有別也。一切有漏法能縛見分者皆名相縛　若爾自證緣見縛自證耶　

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 此段經文主要講述了修行者在定內門修行，觀察影像皆由心所生的道理。觀察內心所顯現的境界影像，這些影像離心便不存在，完全是內心的顯現。這種最初階段的觀修屬於暖位（Ushmagata，四加行位的第一個階段，指修行者開始感受到智慧之火的溫暖）。修行者執著於心外之境，認為其真實存在，這是遍計所執（Parikalpita，三種自性之一，指虛妄分別）。

當對境的義相（普遍特徵）滅除后，修行者應審視觀照唯有自相（個別特徵）存在，即唯有內心。這便進入了頂位（Murddha，四加行位的第二個階段，指修行者的智慧達到頂峰）。以上所說的都是暖位和頂位。如此安住于內心，了知所取（能被認知的事物）並非真實存在，這兩句描述的是下忍位（Ksanti，四加行位的第三個階段，指修行者對空性的忍可）。接下來，能取（能認知的主體）亦不存在，這描述的是中忍位和上忍位。將這兩種空性（所取空和能取空）合在一起印證，便是世第一法（Laukikagra-dharma，四加行位的最後一個階段，指世間最高的善法）。因為時間關係，這裡從忍位開始講述。之後，當修行者觸證無所得時，便進入了真正的見道位（Darshana-marga，五道之一，指初次證悟空性的階段）。

以上第五部分解釋了本頌，說明在此加行位中，修行者仍然有所得（對境的執著）。以下第六部分講述斷除二縛（相縛和執縛）的階段。

論：此加行位，乃至未能斷。

述記：相縛，指的是相分（認識對像）束縛見分（能認識的主體）等。正如之前第五卷論證第七識存在時所說，一切有漏（有煩惱）的善、無記（非善非惡）、不善等心，都具有分別的相分。這些相分能夠束縛於心。但相縛並非指執著。因為有觀點認為八識都具有執著。相縛見分，通於八識。也有觀點認為並非如此，有漏的八識具有分別，分別之相縛于見分，這被稱為相縛，但並非一定要有執著。

如果說不執著的相也能束縛見分，那麼后得智（證悟后獲得的智慧）的相分是否也能束縛見分呢？回答說並非如此。因為后得智是斷除煩惱后獲得的，其體性並非僵硬澀滯，也不是由煩惱所增長的相分，更不是分別的境界。后得智的見分緣取一切相，都是爲了證悟和理解。而有漏的相則不然，因為有分別，又與煩惱相伴，是由煩惱所增長的，並非斷除煩惱后所證得的，緣取一切境界並非都是爲了證悟和理解，有時是通過比量（推理）的方式。如果是善、無覆無記（不引發煩惱的無記）心中，只有現量（直接感知）和比量。而染污心中，也包括非量（錯誤的認知）。因此，相縛能夠拘礙見分，使其不能明凈，不能證知。所以二者是有區別的。一切有漏法能夠束縛見分，都可以稱為相縛。如果這樣說，那麼自證分緣見分，是否也會束縛自證分呢？

【English Translation】 English version This passage mainly discusses the principle of practitioners cultivating within the gate of Samadhi (定內門), observing that images are all born from the mind. Observing the realm of images manifested by the inner mind, these images do not exist apart from the mind; they are entirely manifestations of the inner mind. This initial stage of contemplation belongs to the Ushmagata (暖位) position (the first stage of the Four Preparatory Practices, referring to when the practitioner begins to feel the warmth of the fire of wisdom). Practitioners cling to external realms, believing them to be real, which is Parikalpita (遍計所執), one of the three natures, referring to false discrimination.

When the general characteristics (義相) of objects are extinguished, the practitioner should carefully observe that only the specific characteristics (自相) exist, that is, only the inner mind. This enters the Murddha (頂位) position (the second stage of the Four Preparatory Practices, referring to when the practitioner's wisdom reaches its peak). The above refers to both the Ushmagata and Murddha positions. Abiding in the inner mind in this way, knowing that what is taken (所取, what can be cognized) does not truly exist, these two sentences describe the Lower Ksanti (下忍位) position (the third stage of the Four Preparatory Practices, referring to the practitioner's acceptance of emptiness). Next, the taker (能取, the subject that can cognize) also does not exist, which describes the Middle and Upper Ksanti positions. Combining these two emptinesses (the emptiness of what is taken and the emptiness of the taker) for confirmation is the Laukikagra-dharma (世第一法) (the last stage of the Four Preparatory Practices, referring to the highest mundane virtue). Due to time constraints, the discussion here starts from the Ksanti position. Afterwards, when the practitioner touches and realizes non-attainment, they enter the true Darshana-marga (見道位) (one of the Five Paths, referring to the stage of first realizing emptiness).

The fifth part above explains the verse, stating that in this preparatory position, the practitioner still has something to attain (clinging to objects). The sixth part below discusses the stage of cutting off the two bonds (the bond of characteristics and the bond of clinging).

Treatise: This preparatory position, up to and including not being able to cut off.

Commentary: The bond of characteristics (相縛) refers to the characteristic-division (相分) binding the seeing-division (見分), etc. As mentioned in the previous fifth volume when proving the existence of the seventh consciousness, all defiled (有漏) good, neutral (無記), and unwholesome minds have discriminating characteristic-divisions. These characteristic-divisions can bind the mind. However, the bond of characteristics does not refer to clinging. Because some argue that all eight consciousnesses have clinging. The bond of characteristics to the seeing-division applies to all eight consciousnesses. Others argue that this is not the case; the defiled eight consciousnesses have discrimination, and the discriminating characteristic-division binds the seeing-division, which is called the bond of characteristics, but it does not necessarily have to have clinging.

If it is said that the characteristic that does not cling can also bind the seeing-division, then can the characteristic-division of the wisdom attained after enlightenment (后得智) also bind the seeing-division? The answer is no. Because the wisdom attained after enlightenment is obtained after cutting off afflictions, its nature is not rigid or astringent, nor is it a characteristic-division increased by afflictions, nor is it a discriminating realm. The seeing-division of the wisdom attained after enlightenment takes all characteristics as its object for the purpose of realization and understanding. However, defiled characteristics are different because they have discrimination, are accompanied by afflictions, are increased by afflictions, and are not attained after cutting off afflictions. Taking all realms as their object is not all for the purpose of realization and understanding, sometimes it is through inference (比量). If it is in a good, non-obscured neutral mind, there are only direct perception (現量) and inference. However, in a defiled mind, it also includes non-perception (錯誤的認知). Therefore, the bond of characteristics can restrain the seeing-division, preventing it from being clear and preventing it from realizing. Therefore, there is a difference between the two. All defiled dharmas that can bind the seeing-division can be called the bond of characteristics. If this is the case, then does the self-awareness-division (自證分) taking the seeing-division as its object also bind the self-awareness-division?

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有義亦縛。有漏類故。有義彼非。不同見分緣于相故。彼外取故。通諸量故。此自證分緣見分時非外取故。唯是現量作證相故　若爾第八識等現量心相分。應非相縛體。由此見分亦縛自證。分別類故。不明凈故。見分漏心增自證故。有漏相貌縛能觀心名為相縛。非謂相者是相分也。經說所取．能取纏者。即是四分互相縛義。不爾見分便非相縛。自證緣時不名相分故　粗重縛者。即一切有漏法。大論五十八說。粗重有二。一漏。二有漏漏者阿羅漢修道煩惱斷時皆悉遠離此。謂有隨眠者有識身中不安隱性。無堪能性有漏粗重者。隨眠斷時從漏所生漏所熏發本所得性。不安隱性。苦依附性。與彼相似無堪能性皆得微薄。文殊問經上卷有習氣品二十四種。彼經頌云。阿羅漢習氣。以有過患故。唯佛獨能度。為眾生歸依。五十八又云。此有漏粗重名煩惱習。二乘所未能斷唯有如來能究竟斷。是故說彼名永斷習氣。是不共佛法。大論第二說。自識中所有有漏種子。若煩惱品所攝名粗重。亦名隨眠。若異熟品。及余無記品所攝。唯名粗重不名隨眠。若信等善法所攝種子。不名粗重亦非隨眠。由此法生時。所依自體唯有堪能非不堪能。粗重所隨所生自性。故佛說為行苦。對法第十說二十四粗重。所知障粗重異熟品攝。異熟粗重亦異熟品

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有『義』也是一種束縛，因為它屬於有漏的範疇。但從另一個角度來說，『義』又不是束縛，因為它不同於見分（Vijnana-bhaga，能見之部分）緣于相分（Nimitta-bhaga，所見之部分）的情況。見分是對外境的執取，並且貫通各種量（Pramana，認識方式）。而自證分（Svasamvedana-bhaga，自我認知之部分）緣見分時，並非對外境的執取，僅僅是作為現量（Pratyaksha，直接感知）來作證。如果這樣說，那麼第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）等現量心的相分，就不應該成為相縛的本體。由此，見分也束縛自證分，因為它們屬於分別的範疇，不夠明凈，並且見分這種有漏心會增長自證分。 有漏的相貌束縛能觀的心，這被稱為相縛，並非說作為『相』的就是相分。經中說的『所取』、『能取』相互纏縛，就是指四分（四種心識作用）互相束縛的含義。否則，見分就不是相縛了，因為自證分緣見分時，見分不被稱為相分。 『粗重縛』指的是一切有漏法。《大智度論》第五十八卷說，粗重有兩種：一是漏（Asrava，煩惱），二是有漏。阿羅漢（Arhat，斷盡煩惱的聖者）在修道斷煩惱時，都能遠離這些。這裡說的『有隨眠者』，是指有識之身中不安穩的性質，沒有堪能性。有漏粗重，是指隨眠斷除時，從漏所生、漏所熏發而產生的本所得的性質，不安穩的性質，苦所依附的性質，以及與這些相似的無堪能性，都會變得微薄。《文殊師利問經》上卷有習氣品，列舉了二十四種習氣。該經的偈頌說：『阿羅漢的習氣，因為有過患，只有佛才能度脫，成為眾生的歸依。』 《大智度論》第五十八卷又說：『這種有漏粗重名為煩惱習，二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）所不能斷，只有如來才能究竟斷除。』所以說，永斷習氣是不共佛法。《大智度論》第二卷說：『自識中所有有漏種子，如果是煩惱品所攝，就名為粗重，也名隨眠；如果是異熟品（Vipaka，果報）以及其他無記品（Avyakrta，非善非惡）所攝，只名為粗重，不名隨眠；如果是信等善法所攝的種子，不名粗重，也不是隨眠。』由此，這些法生起時，所依的自體只有堪能性，沒有不堪能性。粗重所隨、所生的自性，所以佛說為行苦（Samskara-duhkha，行蘊之苦）。《對法論》第十卷說了二十四種粗重，所知障（Jnana-avarana，知識上的障礙）粗重屬於異熟品所攝，異熟粗重也屬於異熟品。

【English Translation】 English version Even 'righteousness' is a form of bondage, because it belongs to the category of that which is tainted (Asrava). However, from another perspective, 'righteousness' is not bondage, because it is different from the way the perceiving aspect (Vijnana-bhaga) relates to the perceived aspect (Nimitta-bhaga). The perceiving aspect grasps external objects and permeates all forms of valid cognition (Pramana). But when the self-awareness aspect (Svasamvedana-bhaga) relates to the perceiving aspect, it does not grasp external objects; it merely serves as direct perception (Pratyaksha) to bear witness. If this is the case, then the perceived aspect of the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) and other directly perceiving minds should not be the essence of the bondage of perception. Therefore, the perceiving aspect also binds the self-awareness aspect, because they belong to the category of discrimination, are not pure enough, and the tainted mind of the perceiving aspect increases the self-awareness aspect. The tainted appearance binds the mind that observes, and this is called the bondage of perception. It does not mean that what is considered 'perception' is the perceived aspect. The sutra says that 'what is grasped' and 'what grasps' are mutually entangled, which refers to the meaning of the four aspects (four functions of consciousness) binding each other. Otherwise, the perceiving aspect would not be the bondage of perception, because when the self-awareness aspect relates to the perceiving aspect, the perceiving aspect is not called the perceived aspect. 'The bondage of coarseness' refers to all tainted dharmas. The fifty-eighth fascicle of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra says that there are two types of coarseness: one is taint (Asrava), and the other is tainted. Arhats (those who have eradicated afflictions) can stay away from these when cultivating the path to cut off afflictions. 'Those with latent tendencies' refers to the unstable nature and lack of capacity in the body with consciousness. Tainted coarseness refers to the inherent nature that arises from taint, is perfumed by taint, and is obtained when latent tendencies are cut off. The unstable nature, the nature of clinging to suffering, and the similar lack of capacity all become subtle. The first fascicle of the Manjushri Questions Sutra has a chapter on habitual tendencies, listing twenty-four types of habitual tendencies. The verse in that sutra says: 'The habitual tendencies of Arhats have faults, so only the Buddha can deliver them and become the refuge of sentient beings.' The fifty-eighth fascicle of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra also says: 'This tainted coarseness is called the habitual tendencies of afflictions, which cannot be cut off by the two vehicles (Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana), but only the Tathagata can completely cut off.' Therefore, it is said that the complete cutting off of habitual tendencies is the unique dharma of the Buddha. The second fascicle of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra says: 'All tainted seeds in one's own consciousness, if they belong to the category of afflictions, are called coarseness and also latent tendencies; if they belong to the category of resultant (Vipaka) and other indeterminate (Avyakrta) categories, they are only called coarseness and not latent tendencies; if they belong to the seeds of good dharmas such as faith, they are not called coarseness and are not latent tendencies.' Therefore, when these dharmas arise, the self-nature on which they rely only has capacity and not incapacity. The nature that is followed and produced by coarseness is why the Buddha called it the suffering of conditioned existence (Samskara-duhkha). The tenth fascicle of the Abhidharma-samuccaya speaks of twenty-four types of coarseness. The coarseness of the obstacle of knowledge (Jnana-avarana) belongs to the category of resultant, and the coarseness of resultant also belongs to the category of resultant.

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攝。領受粗重攝一切有漏受。即善受亦在中。勞倦粗重即威儀無記余無記亦攝。如此等文相違非一。然會此者如別抄說。準五十八文粗重縛即一切有漏法。漏與有漏皆粗重故。由相縛未斷有分別相。故其無堪任粗重縛亦未能斷。顯揚十六說。由相．粗重二縛執二自性。謂執依他。及計所執。若解二縛於二自性。正無所得。及無所見。彼論唯約執心解縛。其非執心彼即不說。據增者故。彼卷又云。此依他起性。以相．及粗重縛為體云何說為依他。由此二種更互為緣而得生故。謂相為緣起粗重。粗重為緣生相縛。相縛即約現行相。粗重約種子語。論時彼體雖復皆同爲緣互得。然今此文以相為現行。粗重為種。有漏相未遣。二障種不除。不爾如何此中言相未滅粗重不斷。前說相縛是執二性。應細勘彼諸文相違。此中言相縛者。一切有漏相。粗重縛者。一切有漏不安隱性。與瑜伽第五十八有漏粗重同。初地分得。第八地中第六識全得一向不起。第七分無。五．八全有。粗重隨應。佛地全無。顯揚十九說。相縛縛眾生。亦由粗重縛。善雙修止．觀。方乃俱解脫。此當彼解。

論。唯能伏除至全未能滅。

述曰。其此位中分別二取全能伏滅。乃至細者自分別起亦不現行。俱生二取未全伏．滅。如前所說。許少伏．滅即

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：攝（攝受）。領受粗重攝一切有漏受（包含煩惱的有感受）。即便是善受也包含在其中。勞倦粗重，即威儀無記（不屬於善或不善的心理活動）以及其餘無記也包含在內。如此等等經文的說法並非沒有矛盾之處。然而，要調和這些矛盾，可以參考其他抄本的說法。按照第五十八卷的說法，粗重縛（煩惱的束縛）即是一切有漏法（包含煩惱的法）。因為漏（煩惱）和有漏（包含煩惱的）都是粗重的緣故。由於相縛（對現象的執著）沒有斷除，所以存在分別相（區分現象的心理活動）。因此，那種無堪任的粗重縛（無法忍受的煩惱束縛）也未能斷除。《顯揚聖教論》第十六卷說，由相縛和粗重縛執著兩種自性（事物自身存在的屬性），即執著依他起性（事物由因緣和合而生）和遍計所執性（虛妄分別所執著的自性）。如果解開這兩種束縛，對於這兩種自性，就真正無所得，也無所見。那部論只針對執心（執著的心理）的解縛進行闡述，對於非執心的情況則沒有涉及，因為它是根據增上的情況而說的。該卷又說，這依他起性，以相縛和粗重縛為體，為什麼說它是依他起呢？因為這兩種（相縛和粗重縛）互相作為緣而產生。意思是說，相縛為緣而生起粗重，粗重為緣而生起相縛。相縛指的是現行相（已經發生的現象），粗重指的是種子語（潛在的語言）。論述的時候，它們的體性雖然相同，互相作為緣而產生，但是現在這段經文以相為現行，粗重為種子。有漏的相沒有去除，二障（煩惱障和所知障）的種子就沒有消除。否則，為什麼這裡說相沒有滅除，粗重就沒有斷除呢？前面說相縛是執著兩種自性，應該仔細研究那些經文的矛盾之處。這裡所說的相縛，指的是一切有漏相（包含煩惱的現象）。粗重縛，指的是一切有漏不安穩的性質。與《瑜伽師地論》第五十八卷所說的有漏粗重相同。初地（菩薩修行的第一個階段）能夠部分獲得，第八地中第六識（意識）完全獲得一向不起作用，第七識（末那識）部分沒有，第五識（眼耳鼻舌身識）和第八識（阿賴耶識）完全有，粗重隨之相應。佛地完全沒有。《顯揚聖教論》第十九卷說，相縛束縛眾生，也由粗重縛束縛眾生。只有同時修行止（禪定）和觀（智慧），才能一起解脫。這可以用來解釋前面的內容。 論（《成唯識論》）。唯能伏除（只能降伏和去除）乃至全未能滅（完全不能滅除）。 述曰（窺基的解釋）。在這個位次中，分別二取（分別心所取的能取和所取）完全能夠降伏和滅除，乃至細微的自分別起（與生俱來的分別）也不再現行。俱生二取（與生俱來的能取和所取）還沒有完全降伏和滅除。如同前面所說，允許少許的降伏和滅除，即...

【English Translation】 English version: 'Śamatha' (tranquility). 'Labdha' (reception of the coarse and heavy) encompasses all contaminated receptions, including even wholesome receptions. Weariness and heaviness, namely, the neutral actions of deportment and other neutral states, are also included. Such textual discrepancies are not uncommon. However, to reconcile them, one may refer to other commentaries, which state, in accordance with the fifty-eighth chapter, that the 'coarse and heavy bond' is equivalent to all contaminated dharmas (phenomena). This is because both 'āsrava' (influxes, defilements) and 'sāsrava' (contaminated) are coarse and heavy. Due to the 'appearance bond' (attachment to appearances) not being severed, there remains the aspect of discrimination. Consequently, the 'unbearable coarse and heavy bond' also cannot be severed. The sixteenth chapter of the 'Śūnyatā-sampatti' states that the 'appearance bond' and 'coarse and heavy bond' grasp at two self-natures, namely, grasping at 'paratantra' (dependent origination) and 'parikalpita' (imagined nature). If these two bonds are untied, then with respect to these two self-natures, there is truly nothing to be attained or seen. That treatise only discusses the untying of bonds related to the grasping mind; it does not address non-grasping minds, as it is based on the predominant case. That chapter also states, 'This dependent origination is said to have the appearance bond and coarse and heavy bond as its essence. How can it be said to be dependent? It is because these two arise mutually as conditions.' That is, the appearance bond arises as a condition for the coarse and heavy, and the coarse and heavy arises as a condition for the appearance bond. The appearance bond refers to manifest appearances, while the coarse and heavy refers to seed-words (latent potential). Although their essence is the same and they mutually serve as conditions, this passage considers appearance as manifest and coarse and heavy as seeds. If contaminated appearances are not eliminated, the seeds of the two obscurations (afflictive and cognitive) will not be removed. Otherwise, how could it be said here that if appearances are not extinguished, the coarse and heavy will not be severed? It was previously stated that the appearance bond is the grasping of two natures; the contradictions in those texts should be carefully examined. The appearance bond mentioned here refers to all contaminated appearances. The coarse and heavy bond refers to the unstable nature of all contaminated things, which is the same as the contaminated coarse and heavy mentioned in the fifty-eighth chapter of the 'Yogācārabhūmi'. It is partially attained in the first 'bhūmi' (stage of bodhisattva practice). In the eighth 'bhūmi', the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness) is fully attained and never arises again. The seventh consciousness (manas consciousness) is partially absent. The fifth (sense consciousnesses) and eighth (ālaya consciousness) are fully present, with the coarse and heavy corresponding accordingly. It is completely absent in the Buddha 'bhūmi'. The nineteenth chapter of the 'Śūnyatā-sampatti' states, 'The appearance bond binds sentient beings, and the coarse and heavy bond also binds sentient beings. Only by cultivating both 'śamatha' (tranquility) and 'vipaśyanā' (insight) can one be liberated together.' This can be used to explain the preceding content. Treatise ('Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi'). 'Can only subdue and remove' up to 'cannot completely extinguish'. Commentary (Kuei-chi's explanation). In this stage, the dualistic grasping of discrimination (the grasper and the grasped taken by the discriminating mind) can be completely subdued and extinguished, and even the subtle self-discrimination (innate discrimination) no longer manifests. The innate dualistic grasping (the innate grasper and grasped) has not been completely subdued and extinguished. As mentioned earlier, allowing for a slight subduing and extinguishing, namely...

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是現行。分別全伏。俱生少伏。若俱生．分別二種種子全未能滅。未得無漏有所得故。有分別故。

此上第六相．及粗重分別。俱生二取伏．斷分別。自下第七明所觀境。

論。此位菩薩至唯觀安立。

述曰。此位菩薩于安立諦．非安立諦皆亦學緣。或總作一實真如。或別作二空別．總三心非安立。不唯作四諦差別觀。勝鬘經說有作．無作四諦。無作四諦即非安立。有差別．名言者名安立。無差別離名言者非安立也。安立者施設義。此位菩薩。若加行不作二種觀者。不能引真．相見二種生故。亦不能伏二乘者故。為入二空觀真如理。正觀非安立為起遊觀起勝進道成熟佛法降伏二乘亦觀安立。然二乘者自宗。唯說作四諦安立觀。菩薩不爾。今說于彼亦作人空非安立觀。然不同菩薩。菩薩二空俱作。為顯彼劣故不說之。又二乘者亦唯作安立。不同菩薩。菩薩行．智深廣。彼不爾故。

自下第八辨所依處。

論。菩薩起此至入見道故。

述曰。六十九中通三乘說。唯依諸靜慮。及初近分．未至。能入聖諦現觀。非無色定。無色定中奢摩他勝。毗缽舍那劣。毗缽舍那劣道。不能入現觀故。顯揚十六說。現觀何所依。答唯依靜慮不依無色。若有於此執中間等六地皆能入現觀。何處有文中間

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 是現行，分別全伏（指通過修行完全降伏分別產生的煩惱）。俱生少伏（指與生俱來的煩惱只是稍微被降伏）。如果俱生和分別這兩種煩惱的種子完全沒有被滅除，因為還沒有證得無漏智慧，仍然有所得的執著，所以還有分別。

以上是第六個階段的修行狀態，以及粗重煩惱的分別和俱生二取的降伏，斷除分別。從下面第七個階段開始，闡明所觀的境界。

論：此位菩薩達到唯觀安立（指菩薩在這個階段只觀察安立諦）。

述曰：此位菩薩對於安立諦（指通過概念和語言建立的真理）和非安立諦（指超越概念和語言的真理）都學習並作為所緣。或者總的將它們視為一個真實的真如（Tathata），或者分別將它們視為二空（指人空和法空）的差別。總而言之，這三種心識都不是安立。不僅僅是作四諦（指苦、集、滅、道）的差別觀。《勝鬘經》說有作四諦和無作四諦。無作四諦就是非安立。有差別、有名言的是安立，沒有差別、脫離名言的則是非安立。安立的意思是施設。此位菩薩，如果加行時不做這兩種觀，就不能引生真見和相見這兩種智慧，也不能降伏二乘（指聲聞乘和緣覺乘）。爲了進入二空觀的真如理，正確地觀察非安立，爲了發起遊觀，發起殊勝的精進之道，成熟佛法，降伏二乘，也觀察安立。然而二乘之人，他們自己的宗派，只說作四諦的安立觀。菩薩不是這樣。現在說菩薩也作人空的非安立觀。然而這和菩薩不同，菩薩二空都修習。爲了顯示二乘的低劣所以不說。而且二乘之人也只作安立觀，和菩薩不同。菩薩的行和智慧深廣，他們不是這樣。

從下面第八個階段開始，辨別所依之處。

論：菩薩發起這種智慧，直到進入見道（指菩薩發起這種智慧，直到進入見道）。

述曰：在六十九種修行方法中，普遍地對三乘（指聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）說，只有依靠諸靜慮（指四禪八定），以及初禪的近分定和未至定，才能進入聖諦的現觀（指親證真理）。不能在無色定中進入現觀。因為在無色定中，奢摩他（止）殊勝，毗缽舍那（觀）低劣。毗缽舍那低劣，就不能進入現觀。顯揚十六說，現觀依靠什麼？回答說，只依靠靜慮，不依靠無色定。如果有人執著于中間定等六地都能進入現觀，哪裡有這樣的經文？

【English Translation】 English version: These are the present practices. 'Distinction-completely subdued' (refers to completely subduing afflictions arising from discrimination through practice). 'Co-born-slightly subdued' (refers to innate afflictions being only slightly subdued). If the seeds of both co-born and discriminative afflictions are not completely extinguished, it is because one has not yet attained non-outflow wisdom and still has attachments to what is obtained, thus there is still discrimination.

The above is the sixth stage of practice, as well as the subduing of the distinction of coarse afflictions and the two graspings of co-born, and the cutting off of distinctions. From the seventh stage below, the object of observation is clarified.

Treatise: Bodhisattvas in this stage reach the point of solely contemplating establishment (referring to Bodhisattvas in this stage only observing the established truth).

Commentary: Bodhisattvas in this stage study and take both established truths (truths established through concepts and language) and non-established truths (truths beyond concepts and language) as their objects of focus. They either regard them as one real Suchness (Tathata) in general, or separately regard them as the difference between the two emptinesses (referring to the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena). In general, these three types of consciousness are not established. It is not just making distinctions in the contemplation of the Four Noble Truths (suffering, accumulation, cessation, and path). The Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra says there are the Four Noble Truths with action and the Four Noble Truths without action. The Four Noble Truths without action are non-established. That which has distinctions and names is established; that which has no distinctions and is apart from names is non-established. 'Establishment' means 'to posit'. If Bodhisattvas in this stage do not perform these two types of contemplation during the stage of application, they cannot bring forth the two types of wisdom: true vision and appearance vision, nor can they subdue the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna). In order to enter the Suchness principle of the two emptinesses, they correctly contemplate the non-established. In order to initiate wandering contemplation, initiate the path of superior progress, mature the Buddhadharma, and subdue the Two Vehicles, they also contemplate the established. However, those of the Two Vehicles, their own schools, only speak of contemplating the established in the Four Noble Truths. Bodhisattvas are not like this. Now it is said that Bodhisattvas also contemplate the non-established of the emptiness of self. However, this is different from Bodhisattvas, who practice both emptinesses. This is not mentioned in order to show the inferiority of the Two Vehicles. Moreover, those of the Two Vehicles only contemplate the established, unlike Bodhisattvas. Bodhisattvas' conduct and wisdom are profound and vast; they are not like this.

From the eighth stage below, the place of reliance is distinguished.

Treatise: Bodhisattvas initiate this wisdom until they enter the Path of Seeing (referring to Bodhisattvas initiating this wisdom until they enter the Path of Seeing).

Commentary: In the sixty-nine types of practice, it is universally said to the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) that only by relying on the various dhyānas (referring to the four dhyānas and eight samāpattis), as well as the preliminary concentration and the unreached concentration of the first dhyāna, can one enter the direct realization of the Noble Truths. One cannot enter direct realization in the formless samādhis. This is because in the formless samādhis, śamatha (calm abiding) is superior, and vipaśyanā (insight) is inferior. If vipaśyanā is inferior, one cannot enter direct realization. The Śrāvakabhūmi sixteen says, what does direct realization rely on? The answer is, it only relies on dhyāna, not on formless samādhi. If someone insists that all six grounds, such as the intermediate dhyāna, can enter direct realization, where is there such a text?

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能入。若六地中能入現觀。六十九中何故但言靜慮。及初未至。又如何七十一六現觀中。云此六幾依未至依。乃至無所有處依可得。答一依非依可得。余依一切依可得。又三依五依生。一種一分亦爾。若中間禪有依入現觀。應言三依六依生。以初生時智諦．及邊．戒三。唯依五依生故。不說六地。明中間禪無入現觀者　問何故不依中間入　答彼無明利無漏故。有明利無漏者能入故。又彼梵王居多散亂故。非純凈地故。瑜伽文言依諸靜慮。及初未至。不言中間入見諦故。此中復言前方便時通諸靜慮。而依第四方得成滿。即最後入時唯依第四。第四禪望余禪最勝。要托最勝依入見道故。不依下地入　有菩薩功德。六十九說。雖諸靜慮皆能引發。多依第四靜慮。不同二乘。其欲界無修惠。無四善根．無漏故不說依入　前說二十二根中。未知當知根通無色。菩薩見道傍修得故。若彼無見道。及四善根。何故說修彼。六十九說。入見道時如先所修諸世俗智種子。由彼熏修皆得清凈亦名為修。此名諦現觀邊諸世俗智。出見道已生起此智。即從發心已去。皆名未知當知根。見道傍修先世俗智故名此根。意顯。先曾起時亦名此根。即世俗智有先時已名此根。入見道已傍修之時故名此根。非謂無色有見道。及四善根也。四善根唯色界系故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 能入。如果六地（指欲界、未至定、中間定、四禪天）中能夠進入現觀（指見道位），為什麼在六十九卷中只說靜慮（指四禪）和初禪未至定？又如果七十一卷和六現觀中說，這六種現觀有幾種是依未至定依，乃至無所有處依可以獲得？回答說，一種依和非依可以獲得，其餘的依一切依可以獲得。又三種依和五種依生起，一種和一分也是這樣。如果中間禪有依入現觀，應該說三種依和六種依生起。因為初生起時，智諦（指苦集滅道四諦）以及邊地、戒律這三種，唯有依靠五種依生起，所以不說六地。這表明中間禪沒有進入現觀的人。 問：為什麼不依靠中間禪進入現觀？答：因為中間禪沒有明利無漏的智慧。有明利無漏智慧的人才能進入現觀。而且中間禪的梵王大多散亂，不是純凈的境界。瑜伽論中說，依靠各種靜慮和初禪未至定，沒有說依靠中間禪進入見諦。這裡又說，前方便時通達各種靜慮，而依靠第四禪才能成就圓滿。也就是說，最後進入時唯有依靠第四禪。第四禪相對於其他禪定最為殊勝，一定要依託最殊勝的依處才能進入見道，所以不依靠下地進入。 有菩薩功德，六十九卷說，雖然各種靜慮都能引發，但大多依靠第四靜慮，不同於二乘（聲聞、緣覺）。欲界沒有修習的智慧，沒有四善根（暖、頂、忍、世第一法），沒有無漏智，所以不說依靠欲界進入。 前面說二十二根中，未知當知根（指預流果向的根）通於無色界，因為菩薩在見道旁邊修習而得到。如果無色界沒有見道和四善根，為什麼說修習無色界？六十九卷說，進入見道時，如同先前所修習的各種世俗智的種子，由於這些種子的熏習而變得清凈，也稱為修習。這指的是諦現觀邊緣的各種世俗智。出見道後生起這些智慧，也就是說，從發心開始，都稱為未知當知根，因為見道旁邊修習先前的世俗智，所以稱為此根。意思是說，先前曾經生起時也稱為此根。也就是說，世俗智在先前就已經稱為此根，進入見道后在旁邊修習的時候才稱為此根。並非說無色界有見道和四善根。四善根唯有**系（此處原文不清晰，無法確定具體含義）的。

【English Translation】 English version One can enter. If one can enter abhisamaya (direct realization of the truth) within the six bhūmi (planes of existence: desire realm, preliminary stage of the first dhyana, intermediate dhyana, and the four dhyanas), why does the sixty-ninth skandha (section) only mention dhyana (meditative absorption, specifically the four dhyanas) and the preliminary stage of the first dhyana? Furthermore, how is it that in the seventy-first skandha and the six abhisamaya, it is said that among these six, how many rely on the preliminary stage of the first dhyana, up to the ākiṃcanyāyatana (sphere of nothingness) for support? The answer is that one kind of reliance and non-reliance can be obtained, while the remaining reliances can all be obtained. Moreover, three kinds of reliance and five kinds of reliance arise, and one kind and one part are also like this. If the intermediate dhyana has reliance to enter abhisamaya, it should be said that three kinds of reliance and six kinds of reliance arise. Because when initially arising, the jñāna-satya (wisdom of the truths, referring to the Four Noble Truths), as well as the border and precepts, these three only rely on five kinds of reliance to arise, therefore the six bhūmi are not mentioned. This indicates that there are no individuals in the intermediate dhyana who enter abhisamaya. Question: Why not rely on the intermediate dhyana to enter? Answer: Because it lacks clear and undefiled wisdom. Those with clear and undefiled wisdom can enter abhisamaya. Moreover, the brahmā (deities) in the intermediate dhyana are mostly distracted and not in a pure state. The Yoga texts state that one relies on various dhyana and the preliminary stage of the first dhyana, and do not mention relying on the intermediate dhyana to enter darśanamārga (the path of seeing). Here it is also said that during the preliminary stages, one is proficient in various dhyana, but only by relying on the fourth dhyana can one achieve fulfillment. That is to say, only the fourth dhyana is relied upon during the final entry. The fourth dhyana is the most superior compared to the other dhyana, and one must rely on the most superior support to enter the path of seeing, therefore one does not rely on the lower bhūmi to enter. The sixty-ninth skandha speaks of the merits of bodhisattva (enlightenment being). Although various dhyana can all give rise to it, it mostly relies on the fourth dhyana, unlike the śrāvaka (hearers) and pratyekabuddha (solitary realizers). The desire realm lacks cultivated wisdom, lacks the four kuśalamūla (roots of goodness: warmth, peak, forbearance, and the highest mundane dharma), and lacks undefiled wisdom, therefore it is not said that one relies on the desire realm to enter. Earlier, among the twenty-two indriya (faculties), the anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya (faculty of 'I shall know the unknown', the root of the stream-enterer path) is connected to the arūpadhātu (formless realm), because bodhisattva attain it by cultivating alongside the path of seeing. If the arūpadhātu lacks the path of seeing and the four kuśalamūla, why is it said that one cultivates the arūpadhātu? The sixty-ninth skandha says that when entering the path of seeing, it is like the seeds of various mundane wisdoms that were previously cultivated. Due to the influence of these seeds, they become purified and are also called cultivation. This refers to the various mundane wisdoms on the edge of satya-abhisamaya (direct realization of the truths). After emerging from the path of seeing, these wisdoms arise, that is to say, from the moment of generating the aspiration, they are all called the anājñātamājñāsyāmīndriya, because one cultivates the previous mundane wisdom alongside the path of seeing, therefore it is called this indriya. It means that when it previously arose, it was also called this indriya. That is to say, mundane wisdom was already called this indriya previously, and it is only called this indriya when one cultivates alongside the path of seeing after entering the path of seeing. It is not to say that the arūpadhātu has the path of seeing and the four kuśalamūla. The four kuśalamūla are only **-related (the original text is unclear here, and the specific meaning cannot be determined).

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。此依一義　若爾修道位應起未知當知根。種子不殊約位．行相二皆有別。今至修皆遍緣但名已知收又六十九云。見道初智生時。諸餘智因由能生緣所攝受故皆說名轉。此時皆不別得。故無色界無漏種子此見道時名修。是此根攝對法第十云。不修上者依二乘．不自在說。若自在先得故。修亦通無色。如類智緣。如六十九說。此即第八所依之地。二乘依五地。菩薩唯依第四。諸論通方便為論。言菩薩亦依五地。此中料簡世第一法．及增上忍唯第四定。余通餘地。

論。唯依欲界至非殊勝故。

述曰。六十九說。非生上地或色界或無色界。能入聖諦現觀。彼處極難生厭故。若厭少者尚不能入現觀。況彼一切厭心少分亦無。即無少厭心色．無色界不入現觀　問若爾如何彼地聖者亦離欲　答無厭見道三界分別惑．及惡趣等厭心名無。非無有漏欣上厭下。及厭自地欣生上心。入見道時必總厭三界一切法。總緣諦方入故。此一向據入現觀為論。非修道．及異生為論此論中釋。余界厭心劣非殊勝故。余趣惠心非殊勝故不入見道。顯揚十六頌云。極戚非惡趣。極欣非上二。處欲界人．天。佛出世現觀。彼說惡趣不入現觀。若受恒隨極憂戚故。不能證得三摩地故。即三惡趣不入也。色．無色界亦無現觀。欣掉重故厭羸劣故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果按照這個觀點，那麼在修道位上應該生起未知當知根（Ajñatakajñāsyāmīndriya，一種無漏根）。種子雖然沒有差別，但就位和行相來說，兩者都有區別。現在到了修道位，都能普遍緣取，但名稱上歸於已知。瑜伽師地論第六十九卷說：『見道初智生起時，其餘智慧的因由，由於能生緣所攝受，所以都說名為轉。』此時都不能分別得到，所以沒有無漏種子。這個見道位時稱為修，是此根所攝。對法論第十卷說：『不修習上地的人，依據二乘（Śrāvakayāna，聲聞乘；Pratyekabuddhayāna，緣覺乘）的不自在而說。』如果自在，先已得到，那麼修也通於無色界。如類智緣。如瑜伽師地論第六十九卷所說。這即是第八識所依止的土地。二乘依止五地，菩薩只依止第四地。各種論典都以方便為論，說菩薩也依止五地。這裡簡擇世第一法（Laukikāgradharma，世間第一法）和增上忍（Kṣānti，忍）只在第四禪定中，其餘則通於其他地。

論：只依止欲界（Kāmadhātu，佛教宇宙觀中的欲界），是因為其他界的厭離心不殊勝的緣故。

述記：瑜伽師地論第六十九卷說：『不是生於上地，或者有貪慾或者沒有貪慾，能夠進入聖諦（Aryasatya，四聖諦）的現觀（Abhisamaya，現觀）。』因為那些地方極難生起厭離心。如果厭離心少的人尚且不能進入現觀，何況那些一切厭離心少分也沒有的人。即沒有少許厭離心的色界（Rūpadhātu，佛教宇宙觀中的色界）、無色界（Arūpadhātu，佛教宇宙觀中的無色界）不能進入現觀。問：如果這樣，那麼那些地的聖者如何也能離欲？答：沒有厭離見道時三界分別的惑，以及惡趣（Durgati，惡道）等的厭離心，名為沒有。並非沒有有漏的欣求上地厭離下地，以及厭離自地欣求生上地的心。進入見道時必定總厭離三界一切法，總緣四諦才能進入。這完全是就進入現觀而論，不是就修道和異生而論。此論中解釋，其餘界的厭離心低劣，不是殊勝的緣故。其餘趣的智慧心不是殊勝的緣故，不能進入見道。顯揚聖教論第十六頌說：『極度憂戚的不是惡趣，極度欣喜的不是上二界。在欲界的人和天，佛出世時才能現觀。』那裡說惡趣不能進入現觀，如果承受恒常伴隨的極度憂戚的緣故，不能證得三摩地（Samādhi，禪定）的緣故。即三惡趣不能進入。色界、無色界也沒有現觀，因為欣喜掉舉嚴重，厭離心羸弱的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version: According to this view, then in the stage of cultivation, the root of 'unknown, about to be known' (Ajñatakajñāsyāmīndriya, an undefiled root) should arise. Although the seeds are not different, there are distinctions in terms of position and characteristics. Now, having reached the stage of cultivation, one can universally cognize, but in name, it is categorized as 'known.' The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Chapter 69, states: 'When the initial wisdom of the path of seeing arises, the causes of other wisdoms, because they are embraced by the productive cause, are all said to be transformed.' At this time, they cannot be separately obtained, so there are no undefiled seeds. This stage of the path of seeing is called cultivation, and it is embraced by this root. The Abhidharmakośa, Chapter 10, states: 'Those who do not cultivate the higher realms are spoken of based on the non-self-mastery of the two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Hearer Vehicle; Pratyekabuddhayāna, Solitary Realizer Vehicle).' If one is self-mastered and has already attained it, then cultivation also extends to the Formless Realm. It is like the object of knowledge of class. As stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Chapter 69. This is the ground upon which the eighth consciousness relies. The two vehicles rely on the five grounds, while Bodhisattvas rely only on the fourth ground. Various treatises discuss it in terms of skillful means, saying that Bodhisattvas also rely on the five grounds. Here, the highest mundane dharma (Laukikāgradharma, Highest Worldly Dharma) and the superior forbearance (Kṣānti, Patience) are only in the fourth dhyana, while the rest extend to other grounds.

Treatise: It only relies on the Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu, the Desire Realm in Buddhist cosmology) because the aversion in other realms is not superior.

Commentary: The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Chapter 69, states: 'It is not possible for those born in the higher realms, whether with desire or without desire, to enter the direct realization (Abhisamaya, direct realization) of the Noble Truths (Aryasatya, Four Noble Truths).' Because it is extremely difficult to generate aversion in those places. If those with little aversion cannot enter direct realization, how much less those who have no aversion at all. That is, the Form Realm (Rūpadhātu, the Form Realm in Buddhist cosmology) and the Formless Realm (Arūpadhātu, the Formless Realm in Buddhist cosmology), which have no aversion, cannot enter direct realization. Question: If so, how can the sages of those realms also be free from desire? Answer: The absence of aversion to the afflictions discriminated in the three realms during the path of seeing, and the aversion to the evil destinies (Durgati, evil destinies) etc., is called absence. It is not the absence of defiled longing for the higher realms and aversion to the lower realms, and the mind of aversion to one's own realm and longing to be born in the higher realms. When entering the path of seeing, one must totally renounce all dharmas of the three realms, and only by universally cognizing the Four Truths can one enter. This is entirely discussed in terms of entering direct realization, not in terms of the path of cultivation or ordinary beings. This treatise explains that the aversion in other realms is inferior and not superior. The wisdom mind in other destinies is not superior, so one cannot enter the path of seeing. The Abhidharmasamuccaya, Verse 16, states: 'Extreme sorrow is not in the evil destinies, extreme joy is not in the upper two realms. In the Desire Realm, humans and gods, the Buddha appears in the world for direct realization.' It says there that the evil destinies cannot enter direct realization, because they constantly endure extreme sorrow, and therefore cannot attain samadhi (Samādhi, concentration). That is, the three evil destinies cannot enter. The Form Realm and the Formless Realm also do not have direct realization, because joy and agitation are severe, and aversion is weak.

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是故二界．三趣不起現觀。唯一欲界人．天二趣。有佛出世能起現觀。末法亦得有。佛出世攝故。無佛世不得。無說法者令生厭故　若爾有佛法世發心。法滅後方成熟久已修訖得入現觀不　準此文不得。無此類者故　又解亦得。此中一向作論。即三論不同合有多解。準理可知。此即第九依何界趣身份別。

論。此位亦是至真勝義故。

述曰。此亦已前資糧位也。此即第十七地分別。在何劫攝如前已說。對法第十三等並有此文。攝論亦言解行地也。此中復修持．任．鏡．明．依五地。如前引對法第十一說。其餘門義如下當說。

論。次通達位其相云何。

述曰。問第三位。下解見道。

論。頌曰至離二取相故。

述曰。舉頌可知。

論曰。若時菩薩至戲論相故。

述曰。下釋有二。初略解本頌。后廣釋此頌。今釋上二句頌　不取種種戲論相者。不取者。無能取執。不取戲論相者。無所取相。觀真勝義名無所得。

論。爾時乃名至戲論現故。

述曰。釋下二句。心．境相稱。如．智冥合。俱離二取。絕諸戲論故。名平等平等　真勝義性。體即真如。此但偏遮有漏。后得智亦有相。此亦離彼相戲論也。

論。有義此智至能取相故。

述曰。此下

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，色界和無色界以及欲界的三惡道（地獄、餓鬼、畜生）不會生起現觀（直接證悟）。只有欲界的人道和天道這兩類眾生，在有佛出世時才能生起現觀。即使在末法時代，也有可能生起現觀，因為有佛的教法存在。如果沒有佛出世，就不會生起現觀，因為沒有說法者使眾生生起厭離心（對輪迴的厭離）。 如果這樣，在有佛法住世時發菩提心，在佛法滅后才成熟，或者已經長期修行完畢的人，是否能進入現觀呢？按照這段經文來看，是不可以的，因為沒有這樣的例子。另一種解釋是可以的。這裡只是從一個方面來論述，三論宗有不同的觀點，綜合起來有多種解釋，可以根據道理來推知。這指的是第九，依何界趣之身來分別。

論：此位也是至真勝義的緣故。

述曰：此也是之前的資糧位。這是指第十七地（無住涅槃地）的分別。在哪個劫攝，如前面已經說過。《對法論》第十三等都有此文。《攝大乘論》也說是解行地。此中又修持、任、鏡、明、依五地，如前面引《對法論》第十一所說。其餘的門義在下面會說到。

論：其次，通達位的相狀是怎樣的？

述曰：問第三位，下面解釋見道。

論：頌曰：乃至遠離二取之相的緣故。

述曰：舉出頌文就可以知道。

論曰：如果菩薩乃至戲論相的緣故。

述曰：下面解釋有兩部分，首先簡略地解釋本頌，然後詳細地解釋此頌。現在解釋上面兩句頌文：『不取種種戲論相』，『不取』是指沒有能取的執著，『不取戲論相』是指沒有所取的相。觀真勝義，名為無所得。

論：爾時才名為乃至戲論現的緣故。

述曰：解釋下面兩句。心和境相互應合，如和智冥然契合，都遠離能取和所取，斷絕各種戲論，所以名為平等平等，真勝義性，體性就是真如。這只是偏重於遮止有漏法，后得智也有相，這裡也是遠離那些相戲論。

論：有義是此智乃至能取相的緣故。

述曰：這下面

【English Translation】 English version Therefore, the Form Realm and the Formless Realm, as well as the three evil destinies (hells, hungry ghosts, and animals) of the Desire Realm, do not give rise to direct realization (現觀, xiàn guān). Only beings in the human and celestial destinies of the Desire Realm can give rise to direct realization when a Buddha appears in the world. Even in the Dharma-ending Age (末法, mò fǎ), it is possible to have direct realization because the Buddha's teachings exist. Without a Buddha appearing in the world, direct realization cannot arise because there is no one to teach and cause beings to develop revulsion (厭離, yàn lí) (revulsion towards samsara). If that is the case, can someone who generates the aspiration for enlightenment (菩提心, pútíxīn) when the Buddha's Dharma is present in the world, but only matures after the Dharma has declined, or someone who has already completed long-term practice, enter into direct realization? According to this text, it is not possible because there is no such example. Another interpretation is that it is possible. This is only discussed from one perspective. The Three Treatise School (三論宗, Sānlùn Zōng) has different views, and combining them, there are multiple interpretations, which can be inferred based on reason. This refers to the ninth, distinguishing based on the body of which realm and destiny.

Treatise: This state is also the ultimate true meaning (至真勝義, zhì zhēn shèngyì) because of this.

Commentary: This is also the previous stage of accumulation (資糧位, zī liáng wèi). This refers to the distinction of the seventeenth ground (無住涅槃地, wú zhù niè pán dì) (ground of non-abiding nirvana). In which kalpa (劫, jié) it is included, as mentioned earlier. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論, Duìfǎ Lùn) thirteenth, etc., all have this text. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Shè Dàchéng Lùn) also says it is the ground of understanding and practice (解行地, jiě xíng dì). Within this, the five grounds of upholding (持, chí), entrusting (任, rèn), mirror (鏡, jìng), illumination (明, míng), and reliance (依, yī) are cultivated, as mentioned earlier in the eleventh of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. The remaining meanings of the doors will be discussed below.

Treatise: Next, what is the appearance of the stage of thorough understanding (通達位, tōng dá wèi)?

Commentary: Asking about the third stage, the following explains the path of seeing (見道, jiàn dào).

Treatise: Verse: Up to the reason for being apart from the appearance of dualistic grasping (二取相, èr qǔ xiāng).

Commentary: It can be known by citing the verse.

Treatise: Statement: If a Bodhisattva up to the reason for the appearance of conceptual proliferation (戲論相, xì lùn xiāng).

Commentary: The following explanation has two parts. First, briefly explain the verse, and then explain this verse in detail. Now explain the above two lines of the verse: 'Not grasping various appearances of conceptual proliferation,' 'not grasping' means there is no grasping of the grasper (能取, néng qǔ), 'not grasping the appearance of conceptual proliferation' means there is no appearance of the grasped (所取, suǒ qǔ). Contemplating the ultimate true meaning is called non-attainment (無所得, wú suǒ dé).

Treatise: At that time, it is called up to the reason for the appearance of conceptual proliferation.

Commentary: Explaining the following two lines. Mind and object correspond to each other, suchness (如, rú) and wisdom (智, zhì) are ineffably united, both are apart from the grasper and the grasped, cutting off all conceptual proliferation, so it is called equality-equality (平等平等, píng děng píng děng), the nature of ultimate true meaning, the essence is thusness (真如, zhēn rú). This only emphasizes the cessation of defiled dharmas (有漏法, yǒu lòu fǎ). Subsequent wisdom (后得智, hòu dé zhì) also has appearances, this is also being apart from those appearances of conceptual proliferation.

Treatise: Some say this wisdom up to the reason for the appearance of the grasper.

Commentary: Below this

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第二廣釋上頌。于中有四。初廣正智。第二解位名。第三解見道真．相差別。第四解得見道時功德有異。然廣正智中。此智二分合有三解。佛地有二說無此第一。然彼一切無漏心合作法。此即不然　說無所取能取相者。識體合如冥然無取。無攀緣也。如攝論第六所引莊嚴論頌。智者了達二皆無。等住二無真法界等。此頌說離二取相等。此類非一不能煩引。

論。有義此智至名聲等智。

述曰。由所緣緣要帶相故。難前師說。無似境相名緣彼者。應此色智等名此聲等智。此色智等上無聲等相故。此難無相分。以色．聲智返覆比量義準可知。如觀所緣說。帶彼相起故名有無分別影像所緣故。如雖無親證。無分別相。與彼極相似。不同余智名曰證如。如對法第十一抄會。

論。若無見分至定有見分。

述曰。以如喻智。以智喻如無能緣相。亦準前解。

論。有義此智至不取相故。

述曰。此第三說。此智見分有。相分無。說無相取不取相故。七十三說也。既言無相取。寧無見分。不取相故可無相分。彼論有數十番難應廣敘之。

論。雖有見分至非取全無。

述曰。解第一師所引教文。相分同初。見分有異。文意易解。

第二師云。所緣論說。識依彼生。帶彼相故名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 第二，廣泛解釋上面的頌文。其中有四個方面：第一，廣泛解釋正智（samyak-jñāna，正確的智慧）；第二，解釋位名（sthāna-nāma，位置的名稱）；第三，解釋見道（darśana-mārga，見道）的真實和表相的差別；第四，解釋證得見道時功德的差異。在廣泛解釋正智中，此智（jñāna，智慧）的兩個部分合起來有三種解釋。佛地（Buddha-bhūmi，佛的境界）有二種說法，認為沒有這第一種解釋。然而，佛地的一切無漏心（anāsrava-citta，沒有煩惱的心）都是共同運作的。這裡的情況並非如此。說沒有所取相（grāhya-nimitta，被取之相）和能取相（grāhaka-nimitta，能取之相）的觀點認為，識（vijñāna，意識）的本體結合起來就像一片黑暗，沒有取，也沒有攀緣。正如《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第六所引用的《莊嚴論》（Alaṃkāra-śāstra）的頌文所說：『智者了達二皆無，等住二無真法界等。』這首頌文說的是遠離能取和所取之相。此類例子很多，不能一一列舉。

論：有義認為，此智是色智（rūpa-jñāna，對色的智慧）等，乃至名聲等智（śabda-jñāna，對名聲的智慧）。

述曰：因為所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya，所緣的條件）一定要帶有相（nimitta，表相），所以反駁前一位論師的說法。如果沒有相似的境相（viṣaya-nimitta，對象的表相）而能緣取它，那麼應該說此色智等是此聲等智。因為此色智等之上沒有聲等相。這個反駁針對的是無相分（nirākāra-bhāga，無相的部分）。對於色和聲的智慧，可以根據觀所緣（ālambanaparīkṣā，對所緣的觀察）的說法，通過反覆的比量（anumāna，推理）來理解。正如《觀所緣論》所說，因為帶著對象的表相而生起，所以稱為有無分別影像所緣（savikalpa-nirvikalpa-pratibimba-ālambana，有分別和無分別的影像所緣）。例如，雖然沒有親證，但無分別相（nirvikalpa-nimitta，無分別的表相）與對像極其相似，不同於其他的智慧，所以稱為證如（tathatā，真如）。正如《對法論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）第十一所抄錄的內容。

論：如果無見分（darśana-bhāga，見的部分），則必定有見分。

述曰：用如（tathatā，真如）來比喻智（jñāna，智慧），用智來比喻如，沒有能緣相（grāhaka-nimitta，能緣的表相）。也可以參照前面的解釋。

論：有義認為，此智沒有所取相，因為不取相。

述曰：這是第三種說法。這種智慧有見分，沒有相分。說沒有相取，因為不取相。《七十三》（指《成唯識論》第七十三卷）中這樣說。既然說沒有相取，怎麼會沒有見分呢？因為不取相，所以可以沒有相分。該論中有數十種反駁，應該廣泛敘述。

論：雖然有見分，但並非完全沒有取。

述曰：解釋第一位論師所引用的教文。相分與第一種說法相同，見分有差異。文意容易理解。

第二位論師說，《所緣論》（指《觀所緣緣論》）說，識（vijñāna，意識）依靠對像而生起，因為帶著對象的表相，所以稱為……

【English Translation】 English version Secondly, a detailed explanation of the verses above. There are four aspects to this: First, a broad explanation of samyak-jñāna (correct wisdom); second, an explanation of sthāna-nāma (the name of the position); third, an explanation of the differences between the truth and appearance of darśana-mārga (the path of seeing); fourth, an explanation of the differences in merit when attaining the path of seeing. In the broad explanation of samyak-jñāna, the two parts of this jñāna (wisdom) together have three interpretations. In Buddha-bhūmi (the realm of the Buddha), there are two views that do not include this first interpretation. However, all the anāsrava-citta (undefiled minds) in Buddha-bhūmi operate together. This is not the case here. The view that there are no grāhya-nimitta (apprehended aspects) and grāhaka-nimitta (apprehending aspects) suggests that the essence of vijñāna (consciousness) combined is like darkness, without apprehension or clinging. As the verse from the Alaṃkāra-śāstra (Ornament Scripture) quoted in the sixth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana) states: 'The wise realize that both are absent, equally abiding in the true dharmadhātu (dharma realm) where both are absent.' This verse speaks of being free from the aspects of the apprehended and the apprehender. There are many such examples, and they cannot all be listed.

Treatise: Some argue that this wisdom is rūpa-jñāna (wisdom of form), and even śabda-jñāna (wisdom of sound).

Commentary: Because the ālambana-pratyaya (object-condition) must carry a nimitta (aspect), it refutes the previous teacher's statement. If one can apprehend something without a similar viṣaya-nimitta (object-aspect), then it should be said that this rūpa-jñāna is this śabda-jñāna. Because there are no sound aspects on this rūpa-jñāna. This refutation targets the nirākāra-bhāga (aspectless part). For the wisdom of form and sound, it can be understood through repeated anumāna (inference) based on the statement of ālambanaparīkṣā (examination of the object). As the ālambanaparīkṣā states, because it arises with the aspect of the object, it is called savikalpa-nirvikalpa-pratibimba-ālambana (conceptual and non-conceptual image-object). For example, although there is no direct realization, the nirākāra-nimitta (non-conceptual aspect) is extremely similar to the object, unlike other wisdoms, so it is called tathatā (suchness). As recorded in the eleventh chapter of the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma).

Treatise: If there is no darśana-bhāga (seeing part), then there must be a seeing part.

Commentary: Use tathatā (suchness) to compare to jñāna (wisdom), and use wisdom to compare to suchness, without a grāhaka-nimitta (apprehending aspect). It can also refer to the previous explanation.

Treatise: Some argue that this wisdom has no apprehended aspect because it does not apprehend aspects.

Commentary: This is the third view. This wisdom has a seeing part but no aspect part. It says there is no aspect apprehension because it does not apprehend aspects. This is stated in the 'Seventy-Three' (referring to the seventy-third volume of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi). Since it says there is no aspect apprehension, how can there be no seeing part? Because it does not apprehend aspects, there can be no aspect part. There are dozens of refutations in that treatise, which should be widely narrated.

Treatise: Although there is a seeing part, it is not completely without apprehension.

Commentary: Explains the teachings quoted by the first teacher. The aspect part is the same as the first view, the seeing part is different. The meaning of the text is easy to understand.

The second teacher says that the ālambanaparīkṣā (Examination of the Object-Condition) states that vijñāna (consciousness) arises depending on the object, and because it carries the aspect of the object, it is called...

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緣于彼。若無真如相。應非是所緣。

論。雖無相分至不離如故。

述曰。此緣真智。挾帶真如之體相起故名所緣。非帶彼相分影像而起名緣于如。不離如故。

論。如自證分至有見無相。

述曰。舉喻顯成。自證分等緣見分等。非帶彼相分起。得名所緣故。此無分別與后得殊。故必無相。如前第七卷四緣中解　若爾心王應名緣所。不現彼影帶彼體相起故　此亦不然。非所慮託故。余文可解。此即第一有見．相分別。

論。加行無間至亦名見道。

述曰。見即是道。體者通也。會者達也。第二釋位．及見道名。

論。然此見道略說有二。

述曰。自下第三解見道真．相差別。于中有二。初辨真．相差別。后與六現觀相攝。初中復二。初總標有二。后依標別解此即初也。

論。一真見道至無分別智。

述曰。漸．頓一心．多心分別。此中初總。后諸師異說真．相二種分別。此出真見道體。以無分別智為體也。唯此證真故。

論。實證二空至總說一心。

述曰。釋其真義剎那多少。經位雖多剎那。以相相似等故總說一心。即三心見道依此為證。即是會五十八等一心見道之文。若一心見道。以無間．解脫．並一勝進。名多剎那總名一心。非無間

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 緣于彼。若無真如相（tathata-lakshana，事物的真實本性）。應非是所緣（alambana，認識的對象）。

論：雖無相分（lakshana-bhaga，客體之相），至不離如故。

述曰：此緣真智（jnana，智慧）。挾帶真如之體相起故名所緣。非帶彼相分影像而起名緣于如。不離如故。

論：如自證分（svasamvedana-bhaga，自我認知），至有見無相。

述曰：舉喻顯成。自證分等緣見分（darsana-bhaga，能見之相）等。非帶彼相分起。得名所緣故。此無分別與后得殊。故必無相。如前第七卷四緣中解。若爾心王（citta-raja，根本識）應名緣所。不現彼影帶彼體相起故。此亦不然。非所慮託故。余文可解。此即第一有見．相分別。

論：加行無間（anantara-nirvikalpa-jnana，無間智）至亦名見道（darsana-marga，見道）。

述曰：見即是道。體者通也。會者達也。第二釋位．及見道名。

論：然此見道略說有二。

述曰：自下第三解見道真．相差別。于中有二。初辨真．相差別。后與六現觀（abhisamaya，現觀）相攝。初中復二。初總標有二。后依標別解此即初也。

論：一真見道至無分別智（nirvikalpa-jnana，無分別智）。

述曰：漸．頓一心．多心分別。此中初總。后諸師異說真．相二種分別。此出真見道體。以無分別智為體也。唯此證真故。

論：實證二空（dvi-sunyata，人空和法空）至總說一心。

述曰：釋其真義剎那多少。經位雖多剎那。以相相似等故總說一心。即三心見道依此為證。即是會五十八等一心見道之文。若一心見道。以無間．解脫．並一勝進。名多剎那總名一心。非無間

【English Translation】 English version Arising from that. If there were no true suchness-aspect (tathata-lakshana, the true nature of things), it should not be the object of cognition (alambana, object of knowledge).

Treatise: Although there is no aspect-division (lakshana-bhaga, objective aspect), it ultimately does not depart from suchness.

Commentary: This true wisdom (jnana, wisdom) arises embracing the substance-aspect of true suchness, hence it is called the object of cognition. It does not arise with the image of that aspect-division, hence it is not said to arise from suchness. It ultimately does not depart from suchness.

Treatise: Like the self-cognition division (svasamvedana-bhaga, self-awareness), it has perception but no aspect.

Commentary: An analogy is given to clearly establish this. The self-cognition division and others cognize the perception-division (darsana-bhaga, subjective aspect) and others. They do not arise with that aspect-division, hence they are called objects of cognition. This non-discrimination is different from the subsequent attainment. Therefore, it necessarily has no aspect. As explained in the four conditions in the seventh volume. If so, the mind-king (citta-raja, fundamental consciousness) should be called the object of cognition. It does not manifest that image but arises embracing that substance-aspect. This is also not the case. It is not what is considered and relied upon. The remaining text can be understood. This is the first distinction between having perception and having aspects.

Treatise: The uninterrupted practice (anantara-nirvikalpa-jnana, immediate non-discriminating wisdom) is also called the path of seeing (darsana-marga, path of seeing).

Commentary: Seeing is the path. 'Substance' means encompassing. 'Meeting' means attaining. This is the second explanation of the stage and the name of the path of seeing.

Treatise: However, this path of seeing, briefly speaking, has two aspects.

Commentary: From here onwards, the third section explains the difference between the true and phenomenal aspects of the path of seeing. There are two parts within this section. The first distinguishes between the true and phenomenal aspects. The second correlates it with the six abisamaya (abhisamaya, direct realization). The first part again has two sections. The first is a general statement of the two aspects. The second explains them separately based on the general statement. This is the first section.

Treatise: One is the true path of seeing, which is non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jnana, non-discriminating wisdom).

Commentary: Gradual and sudden, one mind and many minds are distinguished. This is the initial general statement. Later, various teachers give different explanations of the two types of true and phenomenal aspects. This reveals the substance of the true path of seeing. It takes non-discriminating wisdom as its substance. Only this verifies the truth.

Treatise: Actually realizing the two emptinesses (dvi-sunyata, emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena) is generally called one mind.

Commentary: Explaining the true meaning, whether it is a moment or many moments. Although there are many moments in the stages, because the aspects are similar, they are generally called one mind. That is, the three minds of the path of seeing rely on this for verification. This is the text that combines the fifty-eight or so aspects into one mind of the path of seeing. If it is one mind of the path of seeing, then the uninterrupted, the liberation, and one superior progress are called many moments, generally called one mind. It is not uninterrupted.

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中復有多念。

然於此中有二異說。

論。有義此中至粗細異故。

述曰。二空漸證。二障漸斷。如下三心真見道中解。以五十八．五十九．對法九．顯揚十七說三心文。證此漸也。然五十九文亦說見道三心名頓斷者。不別起觀心。束三界二障合為三品斷名頓。以此三心人．法俱異故名漸斷。理有淺深。障．及智行有粗細故。

論。有義此中至有堪能故。

述曰。第二師說。二空頓證。二障頓斷。或三心究竟。一無間．一解脫．一勝進。從真入相見故。或一無間．一解脫不假勝進。從勝入劣。且為二說。合十一說。如別抄解。五十八．及對法九云。又此見道所緣．能緣平等平等智為其相。說一心文今以為證。然五十五勝。此中互解二文如對法第九抄。此真見道也。前加行時意樂俱斷。故入觀位不別為三。有古德云此有三說者不然。

論。二相見道此復有二。

述曰。下解相有二。初解相。后解后得智。初中又三。初總。次別。后總釋。此初也。

論。一觀非安諦至分別隨眠。

述曰。此中有二。初辨行相相見道。二辨言教相見道。初中有二。初辨三心。次辨十六心。此即初也　內遣者。唯緣內身而遣假故　有情假者。先解有情皆妄所計。但有內心似有情現。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 中復有多少念頭？

然而，對此有兩種不同的說法。

論：有一種觀點認為，這是因為粗細不同。

述記：證悟空性和斷除二障是漸進的，如下面在三心真見道中的解釋。以《五十八》、《五十九》、《對法》第九、《顯揚》第十七中關於三心的論述，來證明這種漸進性。然而，《五十九》中也說見道的三心名為頓斷，不另外生起觀想之心。將三界二障合併爲三品來斷除，名為頓斷。因為這三心在人法上都有不同，所以名為漸斷。道理有深淺，障礙以及智慧和修行有粗細的緣故。

論：有一種觀點認為，這是因為有堪能性。

述記：第二位論師說，證悟空性和斷除二障是頓悟的，或者三心是究竟的，即一無間道、一解脫道、一勝進道，從真如進入現象的見地。或者一無間道、一解脫道，不需要勝進道，從殊勝進入低劣。暫且分為兩種說法，合起來有十一種說法，如其他抄本的解釋。《五十八》以及《對法》第九說：『又此見道所緣、能緣平等平等智為其相。』用一心文作為證明。然而，《五十五勝》中，互相解釋這兩段文字，如《對法》第九抄。這是真見道。之前的加行位時，意樂已經斷除，所以進入觀想位時，不再另外分為三心。有古德說這裡有三種說法，這是不對的。

論：二相見道，這又分為兩種。

述記：下面解釋相有二。首先解釋相，然後解釋后得智。最初的解釋中又有三種。首先是總說，其次是別說，最後是總釋。這是最初的。

論：一觀非安諦，乃至分別隨眠。

述記：這裡有兩種。首先辨別行相相見道，其次辨別言教相見道。最初的辨別中又有兩種。首先辨別三心，其次辨別十六心。這就是最初的。『內遣者』，只是緣于內身而遣除虛假。『有情假者』，首先理解有情都是虛妄的計度，只有內心顯現出類似有情的現象。

【English Translation】 English version: How many thoughts are there in the repetition?

However, there are two different views on this.

Treatise: Some argue that it is because of the difference between coarse and fine.

Commentary: The realization of the two emptinesses and the elimination of the two obscurations are gradual, as explained below in the Three Minds of True Seeing the Path. The discussion of the Three Minds in 'Fifty-eight,' 'Fifty-nine,' 'Abhidharma' Ninth, and 'Exposition' Seventeenth is used to prove this gradualness. However, 'Fifty-nine' also states that the Three Minds of the Seeing Path are called sudden cutting off, without separately arising a mind of contemplation. Combining the two obscurations of the Three Realms into three categories to cut off is called sudden cutting off. Because these Three Minds are different in terms of person and dharma, it is called gradual cutting off. The principles have depth, and the obscurations, as well as wisdom and practice, have coarse and fine aspects.

Treatise: Some argue that it is because of having the ability.

Commentary: The second teacher says that the realization of the two emptinesses and the elimination of the two obscurations are sudden, or the Three Minds are ultimate, namely, one uninterrupted path (anantarya-marga), one liberation path (vimukti-marga), and one superior progress path (visesa-marga), entering the view of phenomena from Suchness. Or one uninterrupted path and one liberation path do not require a superior progress path, entering inferiority from superiority. For now, it is divided into two statements, combined into eleven statements, as explained in other copies. 'Fifty-eight' and 'Abhidharma' Ninth say: 'Moreover, the object and subject of this Seeing Path are characterized by equal and equal wisdom.' Using the One Mind text as proof. However, in 'Fifty-five Superior,' these two passages are interpreted mutually, as in 'Abhidharma' Ninth copy. This is the True Seeing Path. During the previous preparatory stage, the intention and pleasure have already been cut off, so when entering the contemplation stage, it is not separately divided into Three Minds. Some ancient worthies say that there are three statements here, which is not correct.

Treatise: The Two Aspects of the Seeing Path are further divided into two.

Commentary: Below, the aspects are explained in two ways. First, explain the aspects, then explain the wisdom attained after (post-attainment wisdom). In the initial explanation, there are three aspects. First, a general explanation; second, a specific explanation; and third, a general interpretation. This is the first.

Treatise: One contemplation is not based on truth, up to the latent tendencies of discrimination.

Commentary: There are two aspects here. First, distinguish the Seeing Path of the aspect of practice; second, distinguish the Seeing Path of the aspect of verbal teachings. In the initial distinction, there are two aspects. First, distinguish the Three Minds; second, distinguish the Sixteen Minds. This is the first. 'Those who internally dispel' only rely on the internal body to dispel the false. 'The false of sentient beings' first understand that sentient beings are all falsely conceived, but only the mind appears to have the appearance of sentient beings.

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談其無體名之為假　緣智者能緣心。即緣內身為境。遣有情假之緣智也。下皆準知。然今此中人．法二障各分上下。粗者為上。細者為下。合為四類。然二粗者各別除之以智猶弱未雙斷故。若上品智方能雙斷。此則隨智說為耎等。初起名耎。次智名中。勝前劣故。後起名上。于斷見惑此智最上故。以惑隨智說三品也。然初二智未能殊勝。但緣內身除我法假。第三心時其智上品。能廣緣一切內外我法。故三別也。此則說三真見道義若說假者。以法真見有差別故。前二智劣未能廣法。第三智勝能廣法故。此初泛說為相見道　觀非安立諦有三品心者。五十五中說三心緣非安立故。又約決定。相見道中定有三心故。

論。前二名法智至總合緣故。

述曰。總別既殊義名亦別。諸論不同。今會諸論者。一對法三心皆是法智。二此論．瑜伽等前二是法智。第三名類智。三又十六心法忍法智名法。后二名類。四六十九說。若曾上界善取相者。即能以類智了色．無色界。下爾不能。唯法智了。總為三例。一緣如名法。緣智名類。是前類故。十六心名法．類可知。對法約三並緣如。故皆名法。二別緣名法。總緣名類此論等是。不就緣如為論故。三緣下名法。緣上界名類是下類故。六十九文是。各據一義亦不相違。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 談論無實體的存在，稱之為假象，因為有智慧的人能夠認知心。即以對內在身體的認知為對象，去除有情眾生的虛假認知。下面的內容都可以依此類推。然而，現在這裡的人和法兩種障礙，各自又分為上下兩類。粗顯的為上，細微的為下，合起來共有四類。然而，兩種粗顯的障礙需要分別用智慧去除，因為智慧還不夠強大，不能同時斷除。如果具備上品智慧，才能同時斷除。這裡根據智慧的程度，分為下品等。最初生起的智慧稱為下品，第二次的智慧稱為中品，因為它勝過前者但不如後者。最後生起的智慧稱為上品，對於斷除見惑來說，這種智慧最為殊勝。因為迷惑隨著智慧而分為三品。然而，最初的兩種智慧不夠殊勝，只能認知內在身體，去除我法（認為存在『我』和『法』的錯誤觀念）的假象。第三次生起心時，其智慧屬於上品，能夠廣泛地認知一切內外我法。所以分為三種不同的情況。這裡說的是三種真見道的意義，如果說是假象，是因為對法的真實認知有差別。前兩種智慧較弱，不能廣泛地認知法，第三種智慧殊勝，能夠廣泛地認知法。這最初泛泛地說是相見道（初見真理的階段）。觀察非安立諦（不可言說的真理）有三種心，在五十五中說三種心認知非安立，所以這樣說。又根據決定的情況，在相見道中必定有三種心。

論：前兩種心稱為法智（Dharma-jnana），乃至總合認知的原因。

述曰：總別既然不同，意義和名稱也不同。各種論典的說法不同，現在會合各種論典的說法。一是，對法的三種心都是法智。二是，此論、《瑜伽師地論》等認為前兩種是法智，第三種稱為類智（Anvaya-jnana）。三是，又如六十九所說，如果曾經在上界善於取相，就能用類智認知色界和無色界，地獄則不能，只能用法智認知。總共有三種情況。一是，認知如（Tathata）稱為法，認知智稱為類，因為是前一類的緣故。十六心（指見道位的十六剎那心）稱為法、類，可以知道。對法約三並緣如，所以都稱為法。二是，分別認知稱為法，總合認知稱為類，此論等就是這樣。不就認知如來討論。三是，認知地獄稱為法，認知上界稱為類，六十九文就是這樣。各自根據一種意義，也不互相違背。

論

【English Translation】 English version Talking about the non-substantial existence is called illusion, because the wise can perceive the mind. That is, taking the perception of the inner body as the object, removing the false perceptions of sentient beings. The following content can be inferred by analogy. However, the two obstacles of person and dharma here are each divided into upper and lower categories. The coarse is upper, and the subtle is lower, totaling four categories. However, the two coarse obstacles need to be removed separately with wisdom, because wisdom is not strong enough to cut them off simultaneously. If one has superior wisdom, one can cut them off simultaneously. Here, according to the degree of wisdom, it is divided into inferior, etc. The wisdom that arises initially is called inferior, the second wisdom is called medium, because it is better than the former but not as good as the latter. The wisdom that arises last is called superior, and this wisdom is the most superior for cutting off the delusions of views. Because delusion is divided into three grades according to wisdom. However, the first two wisdoms are not superior enough, they can only perceive the inner body and remove the illusion of self and dharma (the false notion that 'self' and 'dharma' exist). When the mind arises for the third time, its wisdom belongs to the superior grade, and it can widely perceive all internal and external self and dharma. Therefore, it is divided into three different situations. Here, we are talking about the meaning of the three true seeing paths, if it is said to be an illusion, it is because there are differences in the true perception of dharma. The first two wisdoms are weaker and cannot widely perceive dharma, the third wisdom is superior and can widely perceive dharma. This is initially generally said to be the Darshana-marga (the stage of first seeing the truth). Observing the non-established truth (the unspeakable truth) has three kinds of minds, and it is said in fifty-five that three kinds of minds perceive the non-established, so it is said. Also, according to the determined situation, there must be three kinds of minds in the Darshana-marga.

Treatise: The first two minds are called Dharma-jnana (Knowledge of Dharma), up to the reason for total combination and cognition.

Commentary: Since the general and the specific are different, the meaning and name are also different. The statements of various treatises are different, and now the statements of various treatises are combined. First, the three minds for Dharma are all Dharma-jnana. Second, this treatise, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, etc., consider the first two to be Dharma-jnana, and the third is called Anvaya-jnana (Knowledge of Inference). Third, as stated in sixty-nine, if one has been good at taking characteristics in the upper realms, one can use Anvaya-jnana to perceive the Form Realm and the Formless Realm, but the lower realms cannot, and can only perceive with Dharma-jnana. There are three situations in total. First, perceiving Tathata (Suchness) is called Dharma, and perceiving wisdom is called Anvaya, because it is the reason of the previous category. The sixteen minds (referring to the sixteen moments of mind in the stage of seeing the path) are called Dharma and Anvaya, which can be known. Dharma is about three and also about Tathata, so they are all called Dharma. Second, perceiving separately is called Dharma, and perceiving in total is called Anvaya, which is the case with this treatise, etc. It does not discuss perceiving Tathata. Third, perceiving the lower realm is called Dharma, and perceiving the upper realm is called Anvaya, which is the case with the sixty-nine text. Each is based on one meaning and does not contradict each other.

Treatise

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。法真見道至名相見道。

述曰。法者法則。放學為義。真見道中有二空見分。雖亦有自證而不法彼。親緣如者即乃放之。就見分中有無間解脫。隨自所斷障有四見分。就無間道中人．法二見分各別法故有初二心。解脫道中人．法二見總法有第三心。但法見分者。見分行相與真如境別故。以自證分與真如境體義無別故不法之。別總法者。顯無間所斷有差別故。顯解脫道所證唯一味故。此師以三心十六心等俱相見道唯緣非安立安立別故。

此有二說。

論。有義此三至緣四諦故。

述曰。第一師說。此是真見道。即前第一漸證斷師義。以相見道不作三心緣四諦故。如對法說。說真見道緣非安立。非相見道中能緣非安立故。此中有別起無間．解脫為六。並勝進入相見道為七心。或除勝進為六心。或后無間即前解脫。即三無間加一第三心解脫。並一勝進入相為五心究竟。菩薩利根不別起解脫道故。或總四心究竟。但除勝進。從勝入劣故。合有四說。如別抄有十四解。然真中言先除耎品人執。次除中品法執等。此初二執皆望第三品俱斷時人法執。為粗細下上故。然諸處皆先除上品后除下品。何意此中先除下品后除上品。前雖已解今又解者。此約易斷名下故。粗人執名下品。彼約實體粗細而言先斷者為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：法真見道到達名相見道。

述曰：法，是法則，放學為義。真見道中有二空見分。雖然也有自證，但不傚法它。親緣如者，就放開它。就見分中，有無間解脫。隨著各自所斷的障礙，有四見分。就在無間道中，人、法二見分各自不同，因此有最初的二心。解脫道中，人、法二見總括為法，有第三心。但法見分，見分行相與真如境不同，因此不傚法它，因為自證分與真如境在體義上沒有差別。別總法，顯示無間所斷有差別，顯示解脫道所證唯一味。這位論師認為，三心、十六心等都是相見道，只緣非安立，因為安立不同。

對此有兩種說法。

論：有義認為這三心緣四諦。

述曰：第一位論師說，這是真見道，就是前面第一位漸證斷師的觀點。因為相見道不作為三心緣四諦。如《對法》所說，說真見道緣非安立，因為相見道中不能緣非安立。這裡有分別生起無間、解脫為六心，加上勝進入相見道為七心。或者除去勝進為六心。或者後面的無間就是前面的解脫，即三個無間加上一個第三心解脫，加上一個勝進入相為五心究竟。菩薩利根，不分別生起解脫道。或者總共四心究竟，只是除去勝進，因為從勝入劣。總共有四種說法。如別抄有十四種解釋。然而真見道中說先除去耎品人執，再除去中品法執等。這最初的二執，都是相對於第三品俱斷時的人法執而言，因為有粗細上下之分。然而各處都是先除去上品，后除去下品。為什麼這裡先除去下品，后除去上品？前面雖然已經解釋過，現在又解釋，這是因為就容易斷而言，稱為下品。粗人執稱為下品，那是就實體粗細而言，先斷的為上品。

【English Translation】 English version: The Dharma-truth seeing path (法真見道) reaches the name-and-form seeing path (名相見道).

Explanation: 'Dharma' (法) means 'rule' or 'law', and 'letting go of learning' is its meaning. In the true seeing path (真見道), there are two aspects of emptiness-seeing (二空見分). Although there is also self-realization (自證), it does not emulate that. Those who are closely related to Suchness (如) should let it go. Within the seeing aspect, there is uninterrupted liberation (無間解脫). Depending on the obstacles that are severed, there are four seeing aspects. In the uninterrupted path (無間道), the two seeing aspects of person (人) and Dharma (法) are distinct, hence there are the initial two minds. In the liberation path (解脫道), the two seeing aspects of person and Dharma are summarized as Dharma, hence there is the third mind. However, the Dharma-seeing aspect is different from the aspect of True Thusness (真如) as its object, so it is not emulated, because the self-realizing aspect and the realm of True Thusness are not different in essence. Differentiating and summarizing Dharma shows that what is severed in the uninterrupted path has differences, and shows that what is realized in the liberation path is of one flavor only. This teacher believes that the three minds, sixteen minds, etc., are all aspects of the seeing path, only related to the non-established (非安立), because the established is different.

There are two views on this.

Treatise: Some argue that these three minds are related to the Four Noble Truths (四諦).

Explanation: The first teacher says that this is the true seeing path, which is the view of the first gradual-realization-severing teacher mentioned earlier. Because the aspect of the seeing path does not act as the three minds related to the Four Noble Truths. As the Abhidharma says, the true seeing path is related to the non-established, because the aspect of the seeing path cannot be related to the non-established. Here, separately arising uninterrupted and liberation is six minds, plus the superior entering aspect of the seeing path is seven minds. Or, removing the superior entering is six minds. Or, the later uninterrupted is the same as the earlier liberation, that is, three uninterrupted plus one third-mind liberation, plus one superior entering aspect is five minds ultimately. Bodhisattvas with sharp faculties do not separately arise the liberation path. Or, a total of four minds ultimately, just removing the superior entering, because it is entering from superior to inferior. In total, there are four views. As the separate copy has fourteen explanations. However, in the true seeing path, it is said that first the subtle person-attachment (人執) is removed, then the medium Dharma-attachment (法執), etc. These initial two attachments are both in relation to the person-and-Dharma attachment when all are severed in the third stage, because there are coarse and fine, lower and upper distinctions. However, in all places, the superior is removed first, then the inferior. Why here is the inferior removed first, then the superior? Although it has been explained before, it is explained again now, because in terms of ease of severance, it is called inferior. Coarse person-attachment is called inferior, that is in terms of the coarseness of the substance, the one severed first is called superior.

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上。此望能治道。彼望當體故。此中所言先斷下品者。諸論皆同。

論。有義此三至不別緣故。

述曰。第二師說。此三是相見道。以真見道但總緣真。諸論共說　何得別緣以為三品。以加行心意樂爾故。入真決然。

論。二緣安立諦至此復有二。

述曰。第二解十六心有二。初總。次別。此總也。對法第九卷．五十五等。皆言此二是安立諦故。

論。一者依觀至十六種心。

述曰。唯對法中有此文也。所取謂諦理。能取謂緣理之智。法忍．法智。緣諦理為境觀所取也。類忍．類智。緣前智品觀能取也。此唯別立無間．解脫。不總合說故名別立有十六心。對法雲法智品道真如為境。類智品道法智為境。正與此同。

論。謂于苦諦至應知亦爾。

述曰。二十八隨眠者。欲界苦下十。上二界除嗔各九。苦者苦諦。法者苦諦教。智者加行道中緣苦法之智。忍者無漏忍。忍前苦法．智。對法第九廣解。忍言智者以決斷故。惠即不然。雖忍．智無別。隨用標名　苦法智者。法謂苦如。能緣苦如之智名苦法智　苦類智忍者。謂后聖法。是此苦智之類名苦類智。緣此之惠名苦類智忍　苦類智。印可緣苦類之智名苦類智。

論。此十六心至八觀正智。

述曰。法品緣如

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 上。此望能證悟真理，彼望能體悟實相，所以這裡所說的先斷除下品煩惱，是各種論典都認同的。

論：有一種觀點認為，這三品（指下品、中品、上品）是相見道，因為真見道只是總的證悟真理，各種論典都這樣說，怎麼能分別證悟而分為三品呢？因為加行位的心的意樂是這樣的，所以能決然地進入真見道。

論：兩種緣安立四諦，到這裡又有兩種說法。

述：第二種解釋是十六心有總和別兩種。開始是總的，然後是別的。這裡說的是總的。對法論第九卷、第五十五頁等，都說這兩種是安立四諦的緣故。

論：一種是依觀四諦，到十六種心。

述：只有對法論中有這段文字。所取是指四諦的道理，能取是指緣四諦道理的智慧。法忍（Dharmanairātmya-jñāna-kṣānti）、法智（Dharmanairātmya-jñāna），緣四諦的道理為境，是觀所取。類忍（Anvayanairātmya-jñāna-kṣānti）、類智（Anvayanairātmya-jñāna），緣前面的智品，是觀能取。這裡只是分別安立無間道（anantara-mārga）、解脫道（vimukti-mārga），不總合起來說，所以名叫別立，有十六心。對法論說，法智品以道諦的真如為境，類智品以法智為境，和這裡說的一樣。

論：所謂于苦諦（duḥkha-satya）乃至應知也是這樣。

述：二十八隨眠（anuśaya）是：欲界苦諦下有十種，上二界除去嗔心各有九種。苦者，指苦諦。法者，指苦諦的教法。智者，指加行道中緣苦諦教法的智慧。忍者，指無漏忍。忍之前是苦法、智。對法論第九卷有詳細的解釋。說忍和智，是因為有決斷的作用，慧就沒有這種作用。雖然忍和智沒有區別，但隨其作用而標示名稱。苦法智（duḥkha-dharma-jñāna）者，法指苦如，能緣苦如的智慧名叫苦法智。苦類智忍（duḥkha-anvaya-jñāna-kṣānti）者，指后得聖法，是此苦智的同類，名叫苦類智。緣此的慧名叫苦類智忍。苦類智（duḥkha-anvaya-jñāna），印可緣苦類之智，名叫苦類智。

論：這十六心乃至八觀正智。

述：法品緣如

【English Translation】 English version Above. This hopes to realize the truth. That hopes to embody the reality. Therefore, what is said here about first cutting off the lower-grade afflictions is agreed upon by all treatises.

Treatise: Some argue that these three grades (referring to the lower, middle, and upper grades) are the Path of Seeing (darśana-mārga), because the True Path of Seeing only generally cognizes the truth. All treatises say this. How can it be separately cognized and divided into three grades? Because the intention of the mind in the preparatory stage (prayoga-mārga) is like this, it can resolutely enter the True Path of Seeing.

Treatise: Two conditions establish the Four Noble Truths (ārya-satya), and here there are two views again.

Commentary: The second explanation is that the sixteen minds have two types: general and specific. Initially, it is general, and then it is specific. Here, it refers to the general. The Abhidharma (Abhidharma-kośa) Volume 9, page 55, etc., all say that these two are the reason for establishing the Four Noble Truths.

Treatise: One is based on contemplating the Four Noble Truths, up to the sixteen types of minds.

Commentary: Only the Abhidharma has this passage. 'What is taken' refers to the principle of the Four Noble Truths. 'What can take' refers to the wisdom that cognizes the principle of the Four Noble Truths. Dharma-kṣānti (Dharmanairātmya-jñāna-kṣānti) and Dharma-jñāna (Dharmanairātmya-jñāna) take the principle of the Four Noble Truths as their object, which is 'what is taken'. Anvaya-kṣānti (Anvayanairātmya-jñāna-kṣānti) and Anvaya-jñāna (Anvayanairātmya-jñāna) take the preceding wisdom as their object, which is 'what can take'. Here, only the Immediate Path (anantara-mārga) and the Liberation Path (vimukti-mārga) are separately established, not combined and discussed, so it is called separate establishment, having sixteen minds. The Abhidharma says that the Dharma-jñāna category takes the Suchness (tathatā) of the Path Truth (mārga-satya) as its object, and the Anvaya-jñāna category takes the Dharma-jñāna as its object, which is the same as what is said here.

Treatise: What is called the Truth of Suffering (duḥkha-satya), and so on, should also be understood in the same way.

Commentary: The twenty-eight latent tendencies (anuśaya) are: in the Desire Realm (kāma-dhātu) under the Truth of Suffering, there are ten types; in the upper two realms, excluding anger, there are nine types each. 'Suffering' refers to the Truth of Suffering. 'Dharma' refers to the teachings of the Truth of Suffering. 'Wisdom' refers to the wisdom in the preparatory path that cognizes the teachings of the Truth of Suffering. 'Kṣānti' refers to the non-outflow forbearance. Before the forbearance are the Suffering Dharma and Wisdom. The Abhidharma Volume 9 has a detailed explanation. Saying 'forbearance' and 'wisdom' is because of the decisive function, which prajñā (慧) does not have. Although forbearance and wisdom are not different, they are named according to their function. 'Duḥkha-dharma-jñāna' means that 'dharma' refers to the Suchness of Suffering, and the wisdom that can cognize the Suchness of Suffering is called Duḥkha-dharma-jñāna. 'Duḥkha-anvaya-jñāna-kṣānti' refers to the subsequent attained holy dharma, which is of the same kind as this Suffering Wisdom, and is called Duḥkha-anvaya-jñāna. The prajñā that cognizes this is called Duḥkha-anvaya-jñāna-kṣānti. 'Duḥkha-anvaya-jñāna' approves the wisdom that cognizes the category of Suffering, and is called Duḥkha-anvaya-jñāna.

Treatise: These sixteen minds, up to the eight contemplations and right wisdom.

Commentary: The Dharma category cognizes Suchness

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。類品緣智。

論。法真見道至名相見道。

述曰。法忍法真無間道見分。法智法真解脫道見分。類忍法無間之自證分。類智法解脫之自證分。印前智故差別立也。又解法忍法無間道。法智法解脫道。此即總法。類忍法無間．解脫之見分。雖緣智．緣如不同。見分是一故合法也。類智合法二道之自證分。前解為本。

論。二者依觀至十六種心。

述曰。五十五說。觀上下二地安立苦等四諦境似法．類智生。是第二現觀位。乃至廣說。謂忍可欲樂智．現觀決定智。是現觀邊智諦現觀。顯揚十七說。法智．類智四諦智不由行差別。然隨所作說其差別。真見道中亦可義說有十六心。十六心既爾。三心亦然。今此約行差別說故。唯是相也。然彼文說下上地十六心者是修道。瑜伽五十五說見道。顯揚說修道。不是相違。然五十五仍說。從見道起有下上十六心生。從三心非安立見道起。作此安立諦觀。非全出見道在修道中方起。彼文稍異。可細尋之。

論。謂觀現前至二現觀智。

述曰。現前界者。謂地獄。即欲界。現於欲界入見道故。上二界名不現前。

論。如其所應至見分觀諦。

述曰。其現觀忍法真見道無間道見分。現觀智法真見道解脫道見分。不法自證分。以於前十六

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 類品緣智。

論。法真見道至名相見道。

述曰。法忍（Dharmanairatmya-jnana-ksanti）法真（Dharmanairatmya-jnana）無間道（anantarya-marga）見分（darsana-bhaga）。法智（Dharma-jnana）法真（Dharmanairatmya-jnana）解脫道（vimukti-marga）見分（darsana-bhaga）。類忍（Anvaya-jnana-ksanti）法無間（Dharmanantarya）之自證分（svasamvedana-bhaga）。類智（Anvaya-jnana）法解脫（Dharmavimukti）之自證分（svasamvedana-bhaga）。印前智故差別立也。又解法忍（Dharmanairatmya-jnana-ksanti）法無間道（anantarya-marga）。法智（Dharma-jnana）法解脫道（vimukti-marga）。此即總法。類忍（Anvaya-jnana-ksanti）法無間（Dharmanantarya）．解脫之見分（darsana-bhaga）。雖緣智．緣如不同。見分是一故合法也。類智（Anvaya-jnana）合法二道之自證分（svasamvedana-bhaga）。前解為本。

論。二者依觀至十六種心。

述曰。五十五說。觀上下二地安立苦等四諦境似法．類智生。是第二現觀位。乃至廣說。謂忍可欲樂智．現觀決定智。是現觀邊智諦現觀。顯揚十七說。法智（Dharma-jnana）．類智（Anvaya-jnana）四諦智不由行差別。然隨所作說其差別。真見道中亦可義說有十六心。十六心既爾。三心亦然。今此約行差別說故。唯是相也。然彼文說下上地十六心者是修道。瑜伽五十五說見道。顯揚說修道。不是相違。然五十五仍說。從見道起有下上十六心生。從三心非安立見道起。作此安立諦觀。非全出見道在修道中方起。彼文稍異。可細尋之。

論。謂觀現前至二現觀智。

述曰。現前界者。謂地獄。即欲界。現於欲界入見道故。上二界名不現前。

論。如其所應至見分觀諦。

述曰。其現觀忍法真見道無間道見分。現觀智法真見道解脫道見分。不法自證分。以於前十六

【English Translation】 English version On Categories, Conditions, Wisdom.

Treatise: From the vision of truth of Dharma to the vision of characteristics.

Commentary: The darsana-bhaga (seeing-aspect) of Dharmanairatmya-jnana-ksanti (acceptance of the non-self of phenomena), Dharmanairatmya-jnana (wisdom of the non-self of phenomena) in the anantarya-marga (path of immediate consequence). The darsana-bhaga (seeing-aspect) of Dharma-jnana (wisdom of Dharma), Dharmanairatmya-jnana (wisdom of the non-self of phenomena) in the vimukti-marga (path of liberation). The svasamvedana-bhaga (self-cognizing aspect) of Anvaya-jnana-ksanti (acceptance of inferential knowledge) of Dharmanantarya (immediate consequence of Dharma). The svasamvedana-bhaga (self-cognizing aspect) of Anvaya-jnana (inferential knowledge) of Dharmavimukti (liberation of Dharma). These are established as distinct because they seal the preceding wisdom. Another explanation: Dharmanairatmya-jnana-ksanti (acceptance of the non-self of phenomena) is the anantarya-marga (path of immediate consequence). Dharma-jnana (wisdom of Dharma) is the vimukti-marga (path of liberation). This is the general Dharma. The darsana-bhaga (seeing-aspect) of Anvaya-jnana-ksanti (acceptance of inferential knowledge) of Dharmanantarya (immediate consequence of Dharma) and liberation. Although the conditions for wisdom and suchness are different, the seeing-aspect is the same, so they are compatible. The svasamvedana-bhaga (self-cognizing aspect) of Anvaya-jnana (inferential knowledge) is compatible with the self-cognizing aspect of the two paths. The previous explanation is the basis.

Treatise: Secondly, based on contemplation, up to the sixteen types of minds.

Commentary: The fifty-fifth [section of Yogacarabhumi-sastra] says: Contemplating the Four Noble Truths, such as suffering, established in the upper and lower realms, is similar to the arising of Dharma-jnana (wisdom of Dharma) and Anvaya-jnana (inferential knowledge). This is the second stage of abhisamaya (direct realization). And so on, extensively explained. Namely, the acceptance of the desire for joy and wisdom, the wisdom of determining direct realization, is the direct realization of the edge of wisdom, the direct realization of the truth. The seventeenth [section of Asanga's Abhidharma-samuccaya] says: The wisdom of the Four Noble Truths of Dharma-jnana (wisdom of Dharma) and Anvaya-jnana (inferential knowledge) does not differ based on practice. However, their differences are explained according to what is done. In the true path of vision, it can also be meaningfully said that there are sixteen minds. Since there are sixteen minds, there are also three minds. Now, this is explained based on the differences in practice, so it is only a characteristic. However, that text says that the sixteen minds of the lower and upper realms are the path of cultivation. The fifty-fifth [section of Yogacarabhumi-sastra] says it is the path of vision. Asanga's Abhidharma-samuccaya says it is the path of cultivation. These are not contradictory. However, the fifty-fifth [section of Yogacarabhumi-sastra] still says that from the path of vision, sixteen minds of the lower and upper realms arise. From the three minds, the path of vision is not established. Making this establishment of the contemplation of truth does not entirely leave the path of vision and only arise in the path of cultivation. That text is slightly different. It can be carefully examined.

Treatise: Namely, contemplating the present, up to the two wisdoms of direct realization.

Commentary: The present realm refers to the lower realm, namely the desire realm. Because one enters the path of vision in the desire realm. The upper two realms are called not present.

Treatise: As appropriate, up to the seeing-aspect contemplating the truth.

Commentary: The acceptance of direct realization is the darsana-bhaga (seeing-aspect) of the Dharmanairatmya-jnana (wisdom of the non-self of phenomena) of the true path of vision in the anantarya-marga (path of immediate consequence). The wisdom of direct realization is the darsana-bhaga (seeing-aspect) of the Dharmanairatmya-jnana (wisdom of the non-self of phenomena) of the true path of vision in the vimukti-marga (path of liberation). It is not the svasamvedana-bhaga (self-cognizing aspect) of Dharma. Because in the previous sixteen

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心後作此觀漸粗心。與前十六心差別觀故。

論。斷見所斷至名相見道。

述曰。欲界四諦四十。上界各三十六。諦各除嗔故一百一十二也。此上皆為觀心純熟。為有情說令見道前亦作得入見道。

論。若依廣佈至有九種心。

述曰。上已辨行相見道。別修作故。此廣佈教道理。即菩薩等在見道等不作此觀。但為佈教說其差別。所以須學。即是依彼假說也。

論。此即依前至止觀別立。

述曰。前相見道安立諦。有二種十六心。今法于彼名二十六種。法彼二個十六種。止．觀二心別立。

論。謂法類品至總說為一。

述曰。五十八末說。忍．智合者。謂八忍合為四。俱忍類故。八智合為四。俱智品故。或法忍．法智八合為四。緣如為境。以類同故。品者品類義。故得為此解。類忍．類智八合為四。緣智為境亦類同故。此依惠別俱定唯一。廣如彼抄說。

論。雖見道中至名相見道。

述曰。釋九所以。此非真．相二見道攝。不作此觀然約佈教相見道攝。

但以十六心三心等。對法．顯揚．瑜伽。如次皆有世第一無間等言故今會云。

論。諸相見道至真已斷故。

述曰。此下第三總釋。于中有三。一會違。二釋頌不說。三智攝。今初也

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 心後作此觀漸粗心。與前十六心差別觀故。

論。斷見所斷至名相見道。

述曰。欲界四諦四十。上界各三十六。諦各除嗔故一百一十二也。此上皆為觀心純熟。為有情（眾生）說令見道前亦作得入見道。

論。若依廣佈至有九種心。

述曰。上已辨行相見道。別修作故。此廣佈教道理。即菩薩等在見道等不作此觀。但為佈教說其差別。所以須學。即是依彼假說也。

論。此即依前至止觀別立。

述曰。前相見道安立諦。有二種十六心。今法于彼名二十六種。法彼二個十六種。止（奢摩他，使心止息）．觀（毗缽舍那，如實觀察）二心別立。

論。謂法類品至總說為一。

述曰。五十八末說。忍（對真理的確認）．智（對真理的智慧）合者。謂八忍合為四。俱忍類故。八智合為四。俱智品故。或法忍（對法的確認）．法智（對法的智慧）八合為四。緣如為境。以類同故。品者品類義。故得為此解。類忍（對類別的確認）．類智（對類別的智慧）八合為四。緣智為境亦類同故。此依惠別俱定唯一。廣如彼抄說。

論。雖見道中至名相見道。

述曰。釋九所以。此非真．相二見道攝。不作此觀然約佈教相見道攝。

但以十六心三心等。對法．顯揚．瑜伽。如次皆有世第一無間等言故今會云。

論。諸相見道至真已斷故。

述曰。此下第三總釋。于中有三。一會違。二釋頌不說。三智攝。今初也

【English Translation】 English version After the mind, one contemplates this, gradually coarsening the mind. This is different from the previous sixteen minds' contemplation.

Treatise: From 'severed by the view of annihilation' to 'the path of seeing names and forms'.

Commentary: Forty for the Four Noble Truths in the Desire Realm. Thirty-six each for the upper realms. Each Truth excludes anger, hence one hundred and twelve in total. All of the above is to make the contemplation of the mind pure and skilled. For sentient beings (beings with consciousness), it is said that even before the Path of Seeing, one can also attain entry into the Path of Seeing.

Treatise: If relying on extensive teaching, there are nine types of minds.

Commentary: The characteristics of the Path of Seeing have already been distinguished above, because they are cultivated separately. This is the principle of extensively spreading the teachings. That is, Bodhisattvas and others do not perform this contemplation in the Path of Seeing, etc., but only explain the differences for the sake of spreading the teachings. Therefore, it is necessary to learn. That is, it is based on their provisional explanation.

Treatise: This is based on the previous, up to the separate establishment of cessation and contemplation.

Commentary: The previous Path of Seeing establishes the Truth. There are two types of sixteen minds. Now, the Dharma has twenty-six types compared to them. The Dharma has those two sixteen types. Cessation (Śamatha, calming the mind) and Contemplation (Vipassanā, seeing things as they are) are established separately as two minds.

Treatise: The Dharma-category-kind, up to being collectively spoken of as one.

Commentary: The fifty-eight ends say that 'acceptance (recognition of truth) and wisdom (wisdom of truth) are combined'. That is, the eight acceptances are combined into four, because they are of the same acceptance category. The eight wisdoms are combined into four, because they are of the same wisdom kind. Or the eight Dharma-acceptances (recognition of Dharma) and Dharma-wisdoms (wisdom of Dharma) are combined into four, taking suchness as their object, because they are of the same category. 'Kind' means the meaning of kind. Therefore, this explanation is obtained. The eight category-acceptances (recognition of categories) and category-wisdoms (wisdom of categories) are combined into four, also taking wisdom as their object, because they are of the same category. This relies on the distinction of wisdom, and both are unique in samādhi. As extensively explained in that commentary.

Treatise: Although in the Path of Seeing, up to the Path of Seeing names and forms.

Commentary: Explaining the reason for the nine. This is not included in the two Paths of Seeing, true and apparent. Although this contemplation is not performed, it is included in the Path of Seeing in terms of spreading the teachings.

But with the sixteen minds, three minds, etc., Abhidharma, Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, and Yoga, in that order, all have the words 'worldly first, uninterrupted', etc. Therefore, now we gather and say:

Treatise: All apparent Paths of Seeing, up to because the true has already been severed.

Commentary: Below is the third general explanation. There are three parts within it. First, reconciling contradictions. Second, explaining what the verse does not say. Third, wisdom is included. This is the first.

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。依真之義假說相見道等為無間等。如前引顯揚十七。正與此同。此有三因。三心相見道真非安立後生故。余如文可解。然非安立因不遍三心相見道義。

論。前真見道至故頌偏說。

述曰。第二釋頌不說二種見道本頌何故但說于真。以證識性觀照如故。即圓成實。自證識相。亦是自心觀于依他故。今依見分說。論說初勝。後者后得攝故不及前。如五十五說。

論。前真見道至后得智攝。

述曰。有相．無相別故。

自下因解后得智。

論。諸后得智至離二取故。

述曰。若依此說。佛不說法。無十五界。大定．智．悲以為體性。悲願增上眾生識上聲．色等相生故。此後得智佛地論第三。雖有三說有相見等。但是此中二師之義第一師說。二分俱無。離二取故。

論。有義此智至有分別故。

述曰。見有．相無。諸聖教說此智有分別故有見分。五十五等說也。

論。聖智皆能親照境故。

述曰。以理為證無相分也。

論。不執著故說離二取。

述曰。經論中言離二取者。不執著二取故。非全無見分。

論。有義此智至真如性故。

述曰。第三師說。二分俱有。七十三說思惟。明有見分。似真如相。不見真實真如性故。成

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 根據真實的意義，假設相見道等是無間等。如前面引用的《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷所說，與此相同。這有三個原因：三心相見道的真實並非安立後生之法。其餘的可以根據文義理解。然而，非安立的原因並不普遍適用於三心相見道的意義。

論：前面的真見道直到後面的后得智才攝取。

述記：第二點解釋頌文，為什麼本頌只說真見道，而不說兩種見道？因為要證明識的自性是觀照如如（Tathata）的緣故，也就是圓成實性（Parinispanna）。自證識相，也是自心觀于依他起性（Paratantra）的緣故。現在依據見分（Drsti-bhaga）來說。論中說初勝，後者被后得智所攝取，所以不及前者，如第五十五卷所說。

論：前面的真見道直到后得智才攝取。

述記：因為有相和無相的差別。

下面因為解釋后得智。

論：各種后得智都遠離能取和所取。

述記：如果按照這種說法，佛陀就不說法了，也沒有十五界（Dhatu）。以大定、智慧、慈悲作為體性。由於悲願的增上，眾生識上產生聲、色等相。這個后得智在《佛地經論》第三卷中，雖然有三種說法，即有相見等，但是這裡是二位論師的意義。第一位論師說，二分都沒有，因為遠離能取和所取。

論：有義認為，這種智慧有分別。

述記：見分是有，相分是無。各種聖教都說這種智慧有分別，所以有見分，如第五十五卷等所說。

論：聖智都能親自照見境界。

述記：以理作為證明，是無相分。

論：不執著，所以說遠離能取和所取。

述記：經論中說遠離能取和所取，是不執著能取和所取，並非完全沒有見分。

論：有義認為，這種智慧不見真如自性。

述記：第三位論師說，二分都有。《瑜伽師地論》第七十三卷說思惟，表明有見分，相似於真如相，但是不見真實的真如自性，所以成就。

【English Translation】 English version: According to the true meaning, the assumption is that the Path of Seeing (Darshana-marga) and so on are uninterrupted (Anantara) and so on. As quoted in the Shurangama Sutra XVII, it is the same as this. There are three reasons for this: the truth of the Path of Seeing of the Three Minds is not a later-born Dharma that is established. The rest can be understood according to the meaning of the text. However, the reason for non-establishment does not universally apply to the meaning of the Path of Seeing of the Three Minds.

Treatise: The preceding True Path of Seeing is only included up to the subsequent Acquired Wisdom (Prsthalabdha-jnana).

Commentary: The second point explains the verse. Why does this verse only mention the True Path of Seeing and not the two Paths of Seeing? Because it is to prove that the nature of consciousness is contemplating Suchness (Tathata), which is the Perfected Nature (Parinispanna). The self-cognized aspect of consciousness is also the mind contemplating the Dependent Nature (Paratantra). Now, it is explained based on the Seeing Aspect (Drsti-bhaga). The treatise says that the former is superior, and the latter is included in the Acquired Wisdom, so it is not as good as the former, as stated in volume 55.

Treatise: The preceding True Path of Seeing is only included up to the subsequent Acquired Wisdom.

Commentary: Because of the difference between the aspected and the un-aspected.

Below, it is because of explaining the Acquired Wisdom.

Treatise: All Acquired Wisdom is far from the grasper and the grasped.

Commentary: If according to this statement, the Buddha would not teach the Dharma, and there would be no fifteen realms (Dhatu). Taking great Samadhi, wisdom, and compassion as the essence. Due to the increase of compassion and vows, the sounds, colors, and other aspects arise on the consciousness of sentient beings. This Acquired Wisdom is in the third volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra. Although there are three statements, namely the aspected seeing and so on, but here are the meanings of the two teachers. The first teacher said that there are no two aspects, because they are far from the grasper and the grasped.

Treatise: Some argue that this wisdom has discrimination.

Commentary: The seeing aspect exists, and the aspect aspect does not exist. Various holy teachings say that this wisdom has discrimination, so there is a seeing aspect, as stated in volume 55 and so on.

Treatise: Holy wisdom can personally illuminate the realm.

Commentary: Using reason as proof, it is the un-aspected aspect.

Treatise: Not being attached, so it is said to be far from the grasper and the grasped.

Commentary: The sutras and treatises say that being far from the grasper and the grasped means not being attached to the grasper and the grasped, not that there is no seeing aspect at all.

Treatise: Some argue that this wisdom does not see the nature of Suchness.

Commentary: The third teacher said that both aspects exist. Volume 73 of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that thinking indicates that there is a seeing aspect, similar to the aspect of Suchness, but it does not see the true nature of Suchness, so it is accomplished.

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有相分。如彼四句廣說。

論。又說此智至而為說故。

述曰。佛地經．攝論等皆說。此智分別諸法觀有情等。此成有見分。破第一師。

論。又說此智至說法等事。

述曰。引經為難　現身立等。皆佛地第三引文為證。不勞此引。此破無相分第二師義。

此上引教。下引理。

論。轉色蘊依至應無受等。

述曰。以五蘊相例。

論。又若此智至應緣聲等。

述曰。既無相分。其他之心他身土等離自己體之法。不帶影像。應非所緣緣。直親照彼不變為相故。不同真如。真如即是智自體故　若爾真如應非所緣緣。無似境相故　答不然。帶如之相起故。離自體法既無影像。不可言帶彼相起。如何說有所緣緣。彼皆離自體故　既不帶相起名所緣緣。緣色等時應緣聲等。緣色等智不帶聲等相故。

論。又緣無法等至無緣用故。

述曰。不變為無相為見所緣故。以無相分直照于無。無非有體。所緣緣義如何得成。由此故知。佛亦不能親緣于無。此文理證也。

論。由斯后得二分俱有。

述曰。總結之也。

出差別已。下諸門解釋。然五十八九等中。皆有見道現觀分別。應如彼知。五十九最勝。大有斷惑法用諸義。未獲廣引。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有相分（Sākāra-bhāga）。如彼四句廣說。

論：又說此智至而為說故。

述曰：佛地經（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra）、攝論（Abhidharma-samuccaya）等皆說。此智分別諸法觀有情等。此成有見分。破第一師。

論：又說此智至說法等事。

述曰：引經為難，現身立等。皆佛地第三引文為證。不勞此引。此破無相分（nirākāra-bhāga）第二師義。

此上引教。下引理。

論：轉色蘊依至應無受等。

述曰：以五蘊相例。

論：又若此智至應緣聲等。

述曰：既無相分。其他之心他身土等離自己體之法。不帶影像。應非所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya）。直親照彼不變為相故。不同真如（tathatā）。真如即是智自體故。若爾真如應非所緣緣。無似境相故。答不然。帶如之相起故。離自體法既無影像。不可言帶彼相起。如何說有所緣緣。彼皆離自體故。既不帶相起名所緣緣。緣色等時應緣聲等。緣色等智不帶聲等相故。

論：又緣無法等至無緣用故。

述曰：不變為無相為見所緣故。以無相分直照于無。無非有體。所緣緣義如何得成。由此故知。佛亦不能親緣于無。此文理證也。

論：由斯后得二分俱有。

述曰：總結之也。

出差別已。下諸門解釋。然五十八九等中。皆有見道現觀分別。應如彼知。五十九最勝。大有斷惑法用諸義。未獲廣引。

論

【English Translation】 English version: There is an aspect with form (Sākāra-bhāga). As explained extensively in those four statements.

Treatise: Moreover, it is said that this wisdom reaches and speaks, therefore...

Commentary: The Buddhabhūmi-sūtra and Abhidharma-samuccaya, among others, all state that this wisdom distinguishes all dharmas and observes sentient beings, etc. This establishes the existence of a seeing aspect, refuting the first teacher.

Treatise: Moreover, it is said that this wisdom reaches such matters as expounding the Dharma...

Commentary: Citing the sutra as a challenge, manifesting bodies, establishing, etc., are all cited by the third section of the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra as proof. There is no need to cite it here. This refutes the second teacher's meaning of the aspect without form (nirākāra-bhāga).

The above cites teachings. The following cites reasoning.

Treatise: Transforming the basis of the form aggregate, it should be without feeling, etc.

Commentary: Using the characteristics of the five aggregates as an analogy.

Treatise: Moreover, if this wisdom reaches, it should cognize sound, etc.

Commentary: Since there is no aspect with form, other minds, other bodies, lands, etc., which are separate from one's own entity, do not carry images. They should not be object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya), because they directly and intimately illuminate them without transforming into aspects. This is different from Suchness (tathatā), because Suchness is the very entity of wisdom. If so, Suchness should not be an object-condition, because it has no similar object-aspect. The answer is no, because it arises with the aspect of Suchness. Since phenomena separate from one's own entity have no images, it cannot be said that they arise with that aspect. How can it be said to be an object-condition? They are all separate from one's own entity. Since it does not arise with an aspect, it is called an object-condition. When cognizing form, etc., it should cognize sound, etc., because the wisdom that cognizes form, etc., does not carry the aspects of sound, etc.

Treatise: Moreover, cognizing non-existence, etc., it reaches the point of having no function of cognition.

Commentary: It does not transform into a non-aspect to be seen as the object. Because the aspect without form directly illuminates non-existence, and non-existence is not an existing entity, how can the meaning of object-condition be established? From this, it is known that even the Buddha cannot directly cognize non-existence. This is a textual and logical proof.

Treatise: Therefore, the subsequently attained wisdom has both aspects.

Commentary: This is a conclusion.

Having explained the differences, the following explains the various gates. However, in the fifty-eighth and fifty-ninth sections, etc., there are distinctions in the direct perception of the path of seeing. One should know them as such. The fifty-ninth is the most excellent, with great meanings of cutting off delusion and the function of the Dharma. It has not been widely cited.

Treatise:

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。此二見道至相攝云何。

述曰。此為問也。第一與六現觀相攝者。對法第十三．顯揚第十七．大論五十五．七十一廣明。對法說十。顯揚說六．或十八。瑜伽說六。攝論第六說十一種三乘現觀各別。然有義．事．所緣三種差別。如別抄說。

論。六現觀者至思所成惠。

述曰。現謂現前。明瞭現前觀此現境故名現觀　最上品者。下．中二品劣故非也　喜受相應者。喜能明利別有分別故。舍即不然。可與下．中品思俱。上品思惠必不俱故。七十一說初一唯與喜受相應故　思所成惠。即因於思所成之惠為體。顯揚．及七十一等同。彼云或此俱行菩提分法為自性。此下現觀並作是說。

論。此能觀察至故非現觀。

述曰。暖等色界系。此觀共相能引暖等。思能生修故。此觀一切行無常等。一切法真如等。故是最勝名觀共相。不言觀自相。自相者下．中攝故。未廣緣故。雖如亦是諸法自相。未證之時但共相故。于見道前此用最猛。猛者利也．勝也。偏說為現觀。暖等不能廣分別法。但觀所取無等。雖亦觀一切法無我等。多分有分齊觀。又三乘通說。在二乘位唯觀四諦別別行相不及於思。謂種種思推．種種觀察名廣分別。暖等無此能。不如於思不立現觀。其見道等雖亦不能廣分別法。緣真理故

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這兩種見道（Dṛṣṭimārga）的現觀（Abhisamaya）是如何相互包含的呢？

述曰：這是提問。第一和第六現觀如何相互包含，在《對法論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第十三品、《顯揚聖教論》（Asaṅga）第十七品、《大毗婆沙論》（Mahāvibhāṣā）第五十五和七十一品中有詳細說明。《對法論》說了十種，《顯揚聖教論》說了六種或十八種，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）說了六種，《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第六品說了十一種，三乘的現觀各有不同。然而，在意義、事相和所緣境上有三種差別，如其他抄本所說。

論：六現觀是指思所成慧（cintāmayī prajñā）。

述曰：現，是指現前。明瞭地現前觀察此現境，所以名為現觀。最上品，是因為下品和中品較差，所以不是。與喜受（sukha-vedanā）相應，是因為喜能明利，並且有分別。舍受（upekṣā-vedanā）則不然，可以與下品和中品的思相應。上品思慧必定不俱。第七十一品說，最初的現觀只與喜受相應。思所成慧，即因為思所成就的智慧為體。《顯揚聖教論》和第七十一品等相同。彼論說，或者此俱行的菩提分法（bodhipakṣa-dharma）為自性。此下現觀都作如是說。

論：此能觀察總相（sāmānya-lakṣaṇa），所以不是現觀。

述曰：暖位（ūṣmagata）等屬於繫念。此觀共相能引生暖位等。思能生修，所以此觀一切行無常等，一切法真如等，所以是最殊勝的，名為觀共相。不說是觀自相（svalakṣaṇa），因為自相被下品和中品所攝，因為沒有廣泛地緣故。雖然如也是諸法自相，但在未證之時只是共相。在見道前，此作用最猛烈。猛烈是指銳利、殊勝。偏說為現觀。暖位等不能廣泛地分別法，只是觀察所取無等。雖然也觀察一切法無我等，但大多有分齊的觀察。而且三乘通說。在二乘位，只觀察四諦（catvāri āryasatyāni）個別的行相，不及於思。所謂種種思推、種種觀察，名為廣泛分別。暖位等沒有這種能力，不如思，所以不立為現觀。其見道等雖然也不能廣泛地分別法，但因為緣真理的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version: How do these two aspects of the Path of Seeing (Dṛṣṭimārga), the Abhisamayas, mutually encompass each other?

Commentary: This is a question. How the first and sixth Abhisamayas encompass each other is extensively explained in the thirteenth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the seventeenth chapter of the Asaṅga, and the fifty-fifth and seventy-first chapters of the Mahāvibhāṣā. The Abhidharmasamuccaya speaks of ten, the Asaṅga speaks of six or eighteen, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra speaks of six, and the sixth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha speaks of eleven, with each of the three vehicles having separate Abhisamayas. However, there are three kinds of differences in meaning, phenomena, and objects of cognition, as explained in other commentaries.

Treatise: The six Abhisamayas refer to wisdom born of thinking (cintāmayī prajñā).

Commentary: 'Abhi' means 'before'. Clearly and directly observing this present object is why it is called Abhisamaya. 'Most superior' is because the inferior and intermediate are inferior, so they are not. 'Corresponding to joyful feeling (sukha-vedanā)' is because joy is clear and sharp and has discrimination. Indifference (upekṣā-vedanā) is not like this; it can be associated with inferior and intermediate thinking. Superior thinking and wisdom are definitely not together. The seventy-first chapter says that the initial Abhisamaya only corresponds to joyful feeling. 'Wisdom born of thinking' means that the essence is wisdom accomplished through thinking. The Asaṅga and the seventy-first chapter are the same. That treatise says, 'Or the factors of enlightenment (bodhipakṣa-dharma) that accompany this are its nature.' The Abhisamayas below are all explained in this way.

Treatise: This can observe the general characteristics (sāmānya-lakṣaṇa), so it is not Abhisamaya.

Commentary: The stage of warmth (ūṣmagata) and so on belong to mindfulness. This observation of general characteristics can lead to the stage of warmth and so on. Thinking can generate cultivation, so this observes all conditioned things as impermanent, all dharmas as suchness, and so it is the most excellent, called observing general characteristics. It is not said to observe specific characteristics (svalakṣaṇa) because specific characteristics are included in the inferior and intermediate, because it is not widely connected. Although suchness is also the specific characteristic of all dharmas, it is only a general characteristic before realization. Before the Path of Seeing, this function is the most intense. Intense means sharp and superior. It is specifically called Abhisamaya. The stage of warmth and so on cannot widely distinguish dharmas, but only observes what is grasped as without equal. Although it also observes all dharmas as without self and so on, it mostly has limited observation. Moreover, it is commonly taught in the three vehicles. In the position of the two vehicles, it only observes the individual aspects of the Four Noble Truths (catvāri āryasatyāni), not reaching thinking. The so-called various thoughts and various observations are called wide discrimination. The stage of warmth and so on does not have this ability, so it is not established as Abhisamaya like thinking. Although the Path of Seeing and so on also cannot widely distinguish dharmas, it is because it is connected to the truth.

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立為現觀。此又不同彼。未證理故。七十一說四善根非現觀是等流故。

論。二信現觀至立現觀名。

述曰。信亦上品。通漏．無漏。現觀者是惠現觀諸法。以信助現觀令不退故亦名現觀。有處但說無漏者。以勝故立為不壞信故。

論。三戒現觀至亦名現觀。

述曰。即道共戒。前第一卷已出體訖。余文可知。

論。四現觀智諦現觀至無分別智。

述曰。謂在何位但緣非安立。即通二智皆是此攝。故言一切種。七十一等說。此緣非安立諦境惠為性。五十五說三心見道等是此現觀故。即一切見．修道二智也。不取無學等二智。與究竟現觀不殊故。

論。五現觀邊智諦現觀至世出世智。

述曰。此通有漏．無漏一切見．修道緣安立智。七十一等說緣安立諦境惠是此自性等故。

論。六究竟現觀至究竟位智。

述曰。即盡智等究竟位中所有諸智　即通十智。然皆無漏。七十一說盡無生智等為自性故。或此俱行菩提分法為自性。六十九說無覺十智皆是無漏。可勘彼文。此等門義可取如上所說諸論廣明。和會增減不同等。

論。此真見道至故不相攝。

述曰。以今見道攝六者。真攝第四少分。第四之中亦有相見道緣非安立諦。亦通修道等故。其相見

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 立為現觀（Abhisamaya，現觀）。這又與之前的不同，因為之前沒有證得真理。第七十一卷說四善根（catvāri kuśala-mūlāni，四種善的根本）不是現觀，因為它們是等流（nisyanda-phala，相似的結果）。

論：二、信現觀（śraddhā-abhisamaya，信的現觀）至立現觀名。

述曰：信也是上品，通於有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱的）和無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱的）。現觀是指智慧現觀諸法。因為信能幫助現觀而不退轉，所以也稱為現觀。有些地方只說無漏，是因為它殊勝，所以被立為不壞信（avaikhalya-śraddhā，堅定的信心）。

論：三、戒現觀（śīla-abhisamaya，戒的現觀）至亦名現觀。

述曰：即道共戒（mārga-sahabhūta-śīla，與道相應的戒）。前面第一卷已經說明了它的體性。其餘的文字可以理解。

論：四、現觀智諦現觀（abhisamaya-jñāna-satya-abhisamaya，現觀智的真諦現觀）至無分別智（nirvikalpa-jñāna，沒有分別的智慧）。

述曰：指在哪個位次，只是緣于非安立（anāsthāpana，非概念性的）。這包括二智（兩種智慧），都是此現觀所攝。所以說一切種。第七十一卷等說，此現觀以緣非安立諦境的智慧為自性。第五十五卷說三心見道等是此現觀。即一切見道和修道二智。不取無學等二智，因為它們與究竟現觀沒有差別。

論：五、現觀邊智諦現觀（abhisamayānta-jñāna-satya-abhisamaya，現觀邊際智的真諦現觀）至世出世智（laukika-lokottara-jñāna，世間和出世間的智慧）。

述曰：此現觀通於有漏和無漏的一切見道和修道緣安立智（āsthāpana-jñāna，概念性的智慧）。第七十一卷等說，緣安立諦境的智慧是此現觀的自性。

論：六、究竟現觀（niṣṭhā-abhisamaya，究竟的現觀）至究竟位智（niṣṭhā-avasthā-jñāna，究竟位的智慧）。

述曰：即盡智（kṣaya-jñāna，知滅盡的智慧）等究竟位中所有的諸智，即通於十智（dasa-jñāna，十種智慧）。然而，這些都是無漏的。第七十一卷說盡智和無生智（anutpāda-jñāna，知不生的智慧）等為自性。或者，與此俱行的菩提分法（bodhipākṣika-dharmāḥ，菩提的組成部分）為自性。第六十九卷說無覺十智都是無漏的。可以參考那些文字。這些門義可以參考上面所說的諸論廣為說明，以及和會增減的不同等。

論：此真見道（satyadarśana-mārga，真實見道）至故不相攝。

述曰：因為現在見道攝六者，真攝第四少分。第四之中也有相見道緣非安立諦，也通於修道等。

【English Translation】 English version It is established as Abhisamaya (現觀, direct realization). This is different from the previous one because the truth has not been realized yet. Volume 71 says that the four kuśala-mūlāni (四善根, roots of virtue) are not abhisamaya because they are nisyanda-phala (等流, results of outflow).

Treatise: Two, śraddhā-abhisamaya (信現觀, realization of faith) to the name of established abhisamaya.

Commentary: Faith is also of the highest quality, encompassing both sāsrava (有漏, with outflows) and anāsrava (無漏, without outflows). Abhisamaya refers to the wisdom that directly realizes all dharmas. Because faith helps abhisamaya not to regress, it is also called abhisamaya. Some places only mention anāsrava because it is superior and is established as avaikhalya-śraddhā (不壞信, indestructible faith).

Treatise: Three, śīla-abhisamaya (戒現觀, realization of morality) to also called abhisamaya.

Commentary: This refers to mārga-sahabhūta-śīla (道共戒, morality that accompanies the path). The nature of it has already been explained in the first volume. The remaining text can be understood.

Treatise: Four, abhisamaya-jñāna-satya-abhisamaya (現觀智諦現觀, realization of truth through the wisdom of direct realization) to nirvikalpa-jñāna (無分別智, non-discriminating wisdom).

Commentary: It refers to whatever stage, it only cognizes the anāsthāpana (非安立, non-established). This includes both jñānas (智, wisdoms), which are all included in this abhisamaya. Therefore, it is said 'all kinds'. Volume 71 and others say that this abhisamaya has the wisdom that cognizes the object of non-established truth as its nature. Volume 55 says that the path of seeing with the three minds is this abhisamaya. That is, all the wisdoms of the paths of seeing and cultivation. The two wisdoms of no-more-learning are not included because they are not different from the ultimate abhisamaya.

Treatise: Five, abhisamayānta-jñāna-satya-abhisamaya (現觀邊智諦現觀, realization of truth through the wisdom at the edge of direct realization) to laukika-lokottara-jñāna (世出世智, worldly and supramundane wisdom).

Commentary: This abhisamaya encompasses all āsthāpana-jñāna (安立智, established wisdom) of the paths of seeing and cultivation, both sāsrava and anāsrava. Volume 71 and others say that the wisdom that cognizes the object of established truth is the nature of this abhisamaya.

Treatise: Six, niṣṭhā-abhisamaya (究竟現觀, ultimate direct realization) to niṣṭhā-avasthā-jñāna (究竟位智, wisdom of the ultimate stage).

Commentary: This refers to all the wisdoms in the ultimate stage, such as kṣaya-jñāna (盡智, wisdom of exhaustion), which encompasses the ten jñānas (十智, wisdoms). However, these are all anāsrava. Volume 71 says that kṣaya-jñāna and anutpāda-jñāna (無生智, wisdom of non-arising) are its nature. Alternatively, the bodhipākṣika-dharmāḥ (菩提分法, factors of enlightenment) that accompany this are its nature. Volume 69 says that the ten wisdoms without perception are all anāsrava. You can refer to those texts. The meaning of these doors can be taken from the extensive explanations in the treatises mentioned above, as well as the differences in agreement, addition, and subtraction.

Treatise: This satyadarśana-mārga (真見道, path of true seeing) to therefore they are not mutually inclusive.

Commentary: Because the path of seeing now includes six, it truly includes a small part of the fourth. Within the fourth, there is also the path of seeing that cognizes the non-established truth, and it also encompasses the path of cultivation, etc.

---

道收第四少分。亦攝真故第五少分亦通修故。余文可知。

論。菩薩得此至生如來家。

述曰。自下第四入地功德。世親第六云。由此能令諸佛種姓無斷絕故。無性云。謂佛法界名如來家。於此證會故名為生。於此所緣勝智生故。轉先所依生余依故。紹繼佛種令不斷絕。乃至般若證真法界。名于中生。名真佛子。由此般若樹自相續故。

論。住極喜地。

述曰。於十地中住極喜地也。下當釋此。四十七說分十王位。多作轉輪聖王。王此洲化果也。

論。善達法界得諸平等。

述曰。無性云。於此法界深作證故　得諸平等者。佛地經說得十平等。攝論第六云。得一切有情．一切菩薩．一切如來三種平等心性故。廣如彼釋。

論。常生諸佛大集會中。

述曰。即常生在他受用土中。如梵網經．十地經說。至下十地中廣說。

論。于多百門已得自在。

述曰。四十七說。一剎那頃證百三摩地。以凈天眼見諸佛國見百如來。動百世界身亦能往彼佛世界放大光等。化為百類普令他見。成熟百種所化有情。若欲留命得百劫住。見前後際百劫中事。智見能入百法明門。化作百身。身皆能現百菩薩眷屬。即於十百自在。名多百門。

論。自知不久至利樂一切。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 道收第四少分。也包含真實的部分，第五少分也通於修行。其餘文字可以類推得知。

論：菩薩得到這個，就能出生在如來家（Tathāgata-kula，指佛的種姓）。

述曰：下面是第四個入地（Bhumi，菩薩修行階位）的功德。世親（Vasubandhu）在《攝大乘論》第六卷中說：『由此能使諸佛的種姓沒有斷絕。』無性（Asanga）說：『佛法界名為如來家。於此證悟，所以名為生。因為於此所緣生起殊勝的智慧，轉變先前所依賴的，生起其餘所依賴的，紹繼佛的種姓使之不斷絕。』乃至般若（Prajna，智慧）證悟真實法界，名為于中出生，名為真佛子。由此般若樹在自身相續。』

論：安住于極喜地（Pramudita-bhumi，歡喜地）。

述曰：在十地（Dasa-bhumi）中安住于極喜地。下面將會解釋這個。第四十七卷說，分得十王位，多是轉輪聖王（Cakravartin，擁有統治世界的理想明君），統治這個洲，是化生的果報。

論：善於通達法界（Dharmadhatu，諸法的本性），得到諸種平等。

述曰：無性說：『因為對這個法界深入地證悟，所以得到諸種平等。』《佛地經》說得到十種平等。《攝大乘論》第六卷說：『得到一切有情、一切菩薩、一切如來三種平等心性。』詳細的解釋如該論所述。

論：常生在諸佛的大**中。

述曰：就是常生在他受用土（Parabhogakaya，佛的報身所居之凈土）中。如《梵網經》、《十地經》所說。到下面十地中詳細說明。

論：對於眾多百種法門已經得到自在。

述曰：第四十七卷說，一剎那間證得一百種三摩地（Samadhi，禪定）。以清凈的天眼見到諸佛的國土，見到一百位如來。震動一百個世界，身體也能前往那些佛的世界，放出大光明等。化現為一百種類別，普遍地讓其他人看見。成熟一百種所化度的有情。如果想要留住壽命，可以活一百劫。見到前後際一百劫中的事情。智慧和見解能夠進入一百種法門。化作一百個身體，每個身體都能顯現一百個菩薩眷屬。這就是一百種自在，名為眾多百門。

論：自己知道不久將利益安樂一切眾生。

【English Translation】 English version: The fourth small portion of the path is inclusive. It also encompasses the true aspect, and the fifth small portion is accessible through practice. The remaining text can be understood by analogy.

Treatise: A Bodhisattva, having attained this, is born into the family of the Tathāgatas (Tathāgata-kula, lineage of the Buddhas).

Commentary: The following is the fourth merit of entering the Bhumi (Bhumi, stages of Bodhisattva practice). Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu) says in the sixth volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha: 'By this, one can ensure that the lineage of all Buddhas is not severed.' Asanga (Asanga) says: 'The Dharmadhatu (Dharmadhatu, the realm of Dharma) is called the family of the Tathāgatas. Being enlightened here is called birth. Because superior wisdom arises from this object of focus, transforming what was previously relied upon, giving rise to other dependencies, continuing the lineage of the Buddhas so that it is not severed.' Even Prajna (Prajna, wisdom) realizing the true Dharmadhatu is called being born within it, called a true child of the Buddha. Because this Prajna tree continues in one's own stream of consciousness.'

Treatise: Abiding in the Pramudita-bhumi (Pramudita-bhumi, the Joyful Ground).

Commentary: Abiding in the Pramudita-bhumi among the ten Bhumis (Dasa-bhumi). This will be explained below. The forty-seventh volume says that one receives ten royal positions, mostly as a Cakravartin (Cakravartin, ideal universal ruler), ruling this continent, which is the result of transformation.

Treatise: Being skilled in understanding the Dharmadhatu (Dharmadhatu, the nature of all phenomena), attaining all equalities.

Commentary: Asanga says: 'Because of deeply realizing this Dharmadhatu, one attains all equalities.' The Buddhabhumi Sutra says that one attains ten equalities. The sixth volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'One attains the three equal natures of mind of all sentient beings, all Bodhisattvas, and all Tathāgatas.' The detailed explanation is as described in that treatise.

Treatise: Constantly being born in the great ** of all Buddhas.

Commentary: That is, constantly being born in the Parabhogakaya (Parabhogakaya, the enjoyment body of a Buddha) land. As stated in the Brahmajala Sutra and the Dasabhumika Sutra. A detailed explanation will be given below in the ten Bhumis.

Treatise: Having already attained mastery over many hundreds of doors.

Commentary: The forty-seventh volume says that in an instant, one realizes a hundred Samadhis (Samadhi, meditative states). With pure divine eyes, one sees the Buddha lands, sees a hundred Tathagatas. One shakes a hundred worlds, and the body can also go to those Buddha worlds, emitting great light, etc. One transforms into a hundred categories, universally allowing others to see. One matures a hundred kinds of sentient beings to be transformed. If one wants to prolong life, one can live for a hundred kalpas. One sees events in the past and future hundred kalpas. Wisdom and insight can enter a hundred Dharma gates. One transforms into a hundred bodies, and each body can manifest a hundred Bodhisattva retinues. This is a hundred kinds of mastery, called many hundreds of doors.

Treatise: Knowing oneself will soon benefit and bring happiness to all.

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述曰。既證真如。便自知證。自利行也。六十九等說預流果尚能自知。況此菩薩。利樂一切利他行也。廣說此相如十地經第三說。彼有十二百。彼加三種。一加知百佛神力。此中即見百佛攝。二加能入百佛世界。即此中動百世界中攝。三加照百佛世界。亦動百世界中攝。彼又少此成熟百類所化有情。論有十百彼翻者失。彼論文中亦合入照百佛界等一處為釋。讀者勘之。如四十九。說此位菩薩有十種發心。如十地。第一地中說十種大愿。如十地第三卷。說十種凈修住法。既見諸佛。聽聞正法。皆如十地第三卷廣說。瑜伽四十七八九等皆並廣解。一一細勘文義差別又作阿賴耶識依他性觀。如五十一三乘差別。

成唯識論述記卷第九(末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1830 成唯識論述記

成唯識論述記卷第十(本)

沙門基撰

論。次修習位其相云何。

述曰。下明修道。前見道者。唯在初地初入地心。今此修道。除初入地心。出相見道已住．出地心。乃至第十地終金剛無間道來。併名修道。此為問已。至下當知。

論。頌曰至便證得轉依。

述曰。此舉頌答。即于初地住出心。后漸至究竟金剛道來。皆斷俱生法執種故。至無學位便證轉依。

論。菩

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：既然已經證得真如（tathata，事物的真實本性），自然就能知道自己已經證得，這是自利的行為。六十九種情況說明預流果（srotapanna-phala，須陀洹果，小乘初果）尚且能夠自知，更何況是菩薩呢？利益安樂一切眾生是利他的行為。關於這種相狀的詳細說明，如同《十地經》（Dasabhumika Sutra）第三品所說。其中有十二百種功德，那裡又增加了三種：一是增加了知百佛神力，這在此處即是見到百佛所包含的內容；二是增加了能入百佛世界，即在此處震動百世界中所包含的內容；三是增加了照百佛世界，也包含在震動百世界中。那裡又缺少了成熟百類所化有情的內容，論中有十百種功德，翻譯者有所遺漏。那裡的論文中也應該合併到照百佛界等一處進行解釋，請讀者仔細查閱。如同第四十九卷所說，此位菩薩有十種發心，如同《十地經》第一地中所說的十種大愿，如同《十地經》第三卷所說的十種凈修住法。既然見到諸佛，聽聞正法，都如同《十地經》第三卷所詳細說明的。瑜伽第四十七、四十八、四十九等卷都有詳細的解釋，一一仔細查閱文義的差別，又作阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，藏識）依他性觀，如同第五十一卷所說的三乘差別。

《成唯識論述記》卷第九（末） 《大正藏》第43冊 No. 1830 《成唯識論述記》

《成唯識論述記》卷第十（本）

沙門基 撰

論：其次，修習位的相狀是怎樣的？

述曰：下面說明修道。前面所說的見道，僅僅在初地初入地心。現在所說的修道，除了初入地心，出相見道之後，已經安住、出離地心，乃至第十地終結，金剛無間道（Vajra-anantara-marga，金剛喻定）到來之前，都稱為修道。這是提問，到下面自然會知道。

論：頌曰：乃至便證得轉依（asraya-paravrtti，轉依）。

述曰：這裡用頌文來回答。即從初地安住、出離地心之後，逐漸到達究竟的金剛道到來之前，都是在斷除俱生法執的種子，到達無學位（asaiksa，無學果）時，便證得轉依。

論：菩

【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: Having realized Suchness (tathata, the true nature of things), one naturally knows that one has realized it; this is a self-benefiting practice. The sixty-nine instances explain that even a Stream-enterer (srotapanna-phala, the first stage of the Four Noble Truths) can know this for themselves, how much more so a Bodhisattva? Benefiting and bringing happiness to all beings is an other-benefiting practice. A detailed explanation of this characteristic is as described in the third chapter of the Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Stages Sutra). There are twelve hundred qualities there, and three more are added: first, the added ability to know the spiritual power of a hundred Buddhas, which here is included in seeing a hundred Buddhas; second, the added ability to enter a hundred Buddha-worlds, which is included here in shaking a hundred worlds; third, the added ability to illuminate a hundred Buddha-worlds, which is also included in shaking a hundred worlds. There, it lacks the content of maturing a hundred kinds of sentient beings to be transformed; the treatise has ten hundred qualities, which the translator missed. The essay there should also be merged into one place to explain the illumination of a hundred Buddha-worlds, etc. Readers should examine it carefully. As stated in the forty-ninth volume, Bodhisattvas in this position have ten kinds of aspiration, like the ten great vows mentioned in the first stage of the Dasabhumika Sutra, and the ten kinds of pure dwelling practices mentioned in the third volume of the Dasabhumika Sutra. Since they see all the Buddhas and hear the Dharma, it is all as explained in detail in the third volume of the Dasabhumika Sutra. The Yoga (Yogacarabhumi-sastra) volumes forty-seven, forty-eight, and forty-nine, etc., all provide detailed explanations. Examine the differences in the meaning of the text carefully, and also contemplate the dependent nature of the Alaya-vijnana (store consciousness), as in the differences between the Three Vehicles mentioned in the fifty-first volume.

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only, Volume Nine (End) Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 43, No. 1830, Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only

Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only, Volume Ten (Beginning)

Composed by the Shramana (Buddhist monk) Kui Ji

Treatise: Next, what is the characteristic of the stage of cultivation?

Commentary: The following explains the path of cultivation. The path of seeing mentioned earlier is only in the initial mind of the first stage. The path of cultivation now refers to everything from after the initial mind of the first stage, after emerging from the aspect of the path of seeing, having already dwelt in and emerged from the mind of the stage, up to the end of the tenth stage, before the arrival of the Vajra-anantara-marga (Diamond Samadhi). This is the question, and it will be known below.

Treatise: Verse: Until one attains the transformation of the basis (asraya-paravrtti).

Commentary: This uses a verse to answer. That is, from the initial dwelling in and emerging from the mind of the first stage, gradually reaching the ultimate arrival of the Vajra Path, all are cutting off the seeds of the co-arisen attachment to the Dharma. When one reaches the state of no-more-learning (asaiksa), one attains the transformation of the basis.

Treatise: Bo

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薩從前至無分別智。

述曰。下釋有二。初以略釋頌文。后廣釋頌義。初中有二初釋上三句正顯位相。后明此修位於究竟位便證轉依。十地修道修無分別智　為斷余障證轉依等。生起下文。然非唯智是修習位體。今從所緣能斷道說略不說余。

論。此智遠離至及不思議。

述曰。遠離所取名為無得。遠離能取說不思議。此即解上初句頌也　即一智體離計所執實所能取說無得等。非無見分等。

論。或離戲論至名不思議。

述曰。即一智體無有分別。有分別者戲論行相。即后得智亦名戲論。或有漏分別說為戲論。偏執增故名為戲論。即后得智不名戲論。若依前解。能斷二障無分別智名為妙用。是不思議。若依后解。即無漏智皆離過失。能違生死名為妙用是不思議。今此文中但約前解。論自顯故。

論。是出世間至無分別智。

述曰。解第二句頌。無分別智具二義釋。謂斷世間。體無漏等。后得不然。不名出世。

論。數修此故至故說為舍。

述曰。解第三句頌。違細名粗。違輕名重。所知障種名粗重者。及非種粗重地地別斷。煩惱障種名粗重者。金剛始除。若論煩惱非種粗重。亦地地斷。今顯由十地修無分別智。至金剛心斷煩惱種。十地等中斷所知障等。總合

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：薩從前至無分別智（nirvikalpa-jñāna，無分別智）。

述曰：下面解釋分為兩部分。首先是簡略地解釋頌文，然後是廣泛地解釋頌義。在第一部分中有兩個方面，首先解釋上面三句，正確地顯示出位次，然後說明這種修行位於究竟位，便證得轉依（āśraya-parāvṛtti，轉依）。十地（daśa-bhūmi，十地）修道，修無分別智，是爲了斷除剩餘的障礙，證得轉依等等，從而引出下文。然而，並非只有智慧才是修習位的本體。現在從所緣（ālambana，所緣）和能斷之道來說，簡略地說，而不說其他的。

論：此智遠離至及不思議。

述曰：遠離所取（grāhya，所取）名為無得（anupalabdhi，無得）。遠離能取（grāhaka，能取）說為不思議（acintya，不思議）。這便是解釋上面頌文的第一句。即一個智慧的本體，遠離計度所執的真實所能取，所以說無得等等。並非沒有見分等等。

論：或離戲論至名不思議。

述曰：即一個智慧的本體，沒有分別。有分別者是戲論（prapañca，戲論）的行相。即后得智（prsthalabdha-jñāna，后得智）也名為戲論。或者有漏的分別說為戲論。偏執增長的緣故名為戲論。即后得智不名為戲論。如果依照前面的解釋，能斷除二障（dvi-āvaraṇa，二障）的無分別智名為妙用，是不思議。如果依照後面的解釋，即無漏智（anāsrava-jñāna，無漏智）都遠離過失，能違背生死，名為妙用，是不思議。現在這篇文章中，只依照前面的解釋，論自會顯現。

論：是出世間至無分別智。

述曰：解釋第二句頌。無分別智具有兩種意義的解釋。所謂斷除世間，本體是無漏等等。后得智不是這樣，不名為出世。

論：數修此故至故說為舍。

述曰：解釋第三句頌。違背細微的名為粗，違背輕微的名為重。所知障（jñeyāvaraṇa，所知障）的種子名為粗重者，以及非種子的粗重，地地分別斷除。煩惱障（kleśāvaraṇa，煩惱障）的種子名為粗重者，金剛喻定（vajropama-samādhi，金剛喻定）開始斷除。如果論述煩惱，非種子粗重，也是地地斷除。現在顯示由於十地修無分別智，直至金剛心斷除煩惱種子，十地等等中斷除所知障等等，總合起來。

【English Translation】 English version: Sa from the past to non-discriminating wisdom (nirvikalpa-jñāna).

Commentary: The following explanation is divided into two parts. The first is a brief explanation of the verse, and the second is a broad explanation of the meaning of the verse. In the first part, there are two aspects: first, explain the above three sentences to correctly show the position; then explain that this practice is located in the ultimate position, and then realize the transformation of the basis (āśraya-parāvṛtti). The ten grounds (daśa-bhūmi) cultivate the path and cultivate non-discriminating wisdom in order to eliminate the remaining obstacles and realize the transformation of the basis, etc., thereby leading to the following text. However, it is not only wisdom that is the body of the practice position. Now, from the perspective of the object of cognition (ālambana) and the path of cutting off, it is briefly said, and nothing else is said.

Treatise: This wisdom is far from reaching and is inconceivable.

Commentary: Being far from what is taken (grāhya) is called non-attainment (anupalabdhi). Being far from what can be taken (grāhaka) is said to be inconceivable (acintya). This is the explanation of the first sentence of the above verse. That is, the body of one wisdom, far from the real that is taken by calculation, is said to be non-attainment, etc. It is not without the seeing aspect, etc.

Treatise: Or being far from playfulness is called inconceivable.

Commentary: That is, the body of one wisdom, without discrimination. Those with discrimination are the appearance of playfulness (prapañca). That is, subsequent wisdom (prsthalabdha-jñāna) is also called playfulness. Or leaky discrimination is said to be playfulness. Because of the increase in prejudice, it is called playfulness. That is, subsequent wisdom is not called playfulness. If according to the previous explanation, the non-discriminating wisdom that can cut off the two obstacles (dvi-āvaraṇa) is called wonderful function, which is inconceivable. If according to the latter explanation, that is, leakless wisdom (anāsrava-jñāna) is far from faults, and can violate birth and death, it is called wonderful function, which is inconceivable. Now in this article, only according to the previous explanation, the theory will show itself.

Treatise: It is transcendental to non-discriminating wisdom.

Commentary: Explain the second sentence of the verse. Non-discriminating wisdom has two meanings of explanation. The so-called cutting off the world, the body is leakless, etc. Subsequent wisdom is not like this, and is not called transcendental.

Treatise: Because of the number of cultivation, it is said to be abandonment.

Commentary: Explain the third sentence of the verse. Violating the subtle is called coarse, and violating the slight is called heavy. The seed of knowledge obstacle (jñeyāvaraṇa) is called coarse and heavy, and the coarse and heavy of non-seeds are cut off separately on each ground. The seed of affliction obstacle (kleśāvaraṇa) is called coarse and heavy, and the diamond-like samadhi (vajropama-samādhi) begins to cut off. If discussing afflictions, non-seed coarse and heavy, it is also cut off on each ground. Now it shows that due to the ten grounds cultivating non-discriminating wisdom, until the diamond mind cuts off the seeds of afflictions, the ten grounds, etc., cut off the knowledge obstacles, etc., in total.

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為言名斷二種。約究竟盡唯在金剛。金剛盡時證轉依果。

論。此能捨彼至廣大轉依。

述曰。由十地修智究竟故。至佛證轉依。解第四句頌。于中有二複次釋。即為二也。

論。依謂所依至二轉依果。

述曰。今第一解。總為別依斷染故無所執。生凈故得二果。余文易了。同攝論果斷分解轉依。無性第九卷等同之。彼文稍廣　言轉依者。轉謂轉舍轉得。依謂所依。即轉之依名為轉依。依士釋　又解此文依他事上邪理執著．正理離倒。轉舍．轉得。事為理依故名轉依也。無性云。二所依止。轉依亦持業釋。然今能依．所依合為轉依。故無持業。今言依他起名轉依者。流轉．還滅依也。即所舍．所得。所得通二果。由所執故起有漏法。有漏法斷所執名舍。非別有體名為舍也。

論。或依即是至之所依故。

述曰。第二師解。依即真如。迷悟依也。

論。愚夫顛倒至斷障證得。

述曰。悟此真如證涅槃者。以涅槃者即是真如離雜染法。又假涅槃依真而立。能所依異。此位斷障金剛心后證得。非此位即證。

論。雖於此位至名法身故。

述曰。其菩提者而非此中頌意所顯。頌意所顯如后頌說安樂．解脫身．大牟尼名法故。牟尼者寂默義。寂止默靜諸雜染故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於言說和名相的斷除有兩種情況。就究竟圓滿而言，唯有在金剛喻定（Vajra-like Samadhi，比喻像金剛一樣堅固的禪定）時才能達到。當金剛喻定達到圓滿時，才能證得轉依果（Āśraya-parāvṛtti-phala，轉變所依的果位）。

論：此能捨棄彼，達到廣大的轉依。

述記：由於十地菩薩修習智慧達到究竟，所以證得佛果的轉依。這是解釋第四句偈頌。其中有兩種解釋，即分為兩種。

論：依，指的是所依，達到二轉依果。

述記：現在是第一種解釋。總的來說，因為斷除染污的所依，所以沒有執著；因為生起清凈的所依，所以得到兩種果報。其餘的文字容易理解。這與《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）中關於果、斷、分解、轉依的說法相同。無性菩薩在第九卷等處也持相同觀點，那裡的文字稍微詳細一些。所說的『轉依』，『轉』指的是轉舍和轉得，『依』指的是所依。即轉變的所依，名為轉依。這是依士釋（指『轉依』一詞的詞性結構）。另一種解釋是，在依他起性（Paratantra，緣起）的事物上，邪理產生執著，正理遠離顛倒。轉舍和轉得，事物是道理的所依，所以名為轉依。無性菩薩說，二所依止，轉依也是持業釋（指『轉依』一詞的詞性結構）。然而，現在能依和所依合為轉依，所以不是持業釋。現在說依他起性名為轉依，指的是流轉和還滅的所依。即所捨棄的和所得到的，所得到的包括兩種果報。由於所執著，所以產生有漏法（Sāsrava-dharma，有煩惱的法）。有漏法斷除所執著，名為捨棄，並非另外存在一個實體名為捨棄。

論：或者，依就是真如（Tathatā，事物的真實如是性），是迷和悟的所依。

述記：這是第二位論師的解釋。依就是真如，是迷惑和覺悟的所依。

論：愚夫顛倒，斷障證得。

述記：領悟這個真如，證得涅槃（Nirvāṇa，寂滅）。因為涅槃就是真如，遠離雜染法。又假設的涅槃是依真如而建立的，能依和所依不同。這個果位是在斷除障礙的金剛心之後證得的，不是在這個果位立即證得。

論：雖於此位，名為法身故。

述記：菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）並非此處偈頌的含義所要顯示的。偈頌的含義所要顯示的是後面的偈頌所說的安樂、解脫身、大牟尼（Mahāmuni，偉大的聖人）名為法身（Dharmakāya，佛的法性之身）。牟尼的意思是寂默，寂止默靜諸雜染的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version There are two kinds of severance regarding speech and names. In terms of ultimate completion, it is only achieved at the Vajra-like Samadhi (Vajra-like Samadhi, a samadhi as firm as a diamond). When the Vajra-like Samadhi is perfected, the result of Transformation of the Basis (Āśraya-parāvṛtti-phala, the fruit of transforming the basis) is realized.

Treatise: This can abandon that and reach the vast Transformation of the Basis.

Commentary: Because the wisdom cultivated by the Ten-Ground Bodhisattvas reaches its ultimate point, they attain the Transformation of the Basis of Buddhahood. This explains the fourth line of the verse. There are two further explanations within it, thus dividing it into two.

Treatise: The 'basis' refers to the object of reliance, reaching the two results of the Transformation of the Basis.

Commentary: Now, this is the first explanation. Generally speaking, because the basis of defilements is severed, there is no attachment; because the pure basis arises, two results are obtained. The remaining text is easy to understand. This is the same as the explanation of result, severance, analysis, and Transformation of the Basis in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana). Asanga in the ninth fascicle, and others, hold the same view; the text there is slightly more detailed. As for the term 'Transformation of the Basis,' 'transformation' refers to abandoning and obtaining, and 'basis' refers to the object of reliance. That which is the basis of transformation is called Transformation of the Basis. This is an 依士釋 (dependent-agent explanation, referring to the grammatical structure of the term). Another explanation is that, on the dependent-arising (Paratantra, dependent origination) nature of things, false reasoning gives rise to attachment, while correct reasoning is free from delusion. Abandoning and obtaining occur, and things are the basis of reason, hence it is called Transformation of the Basis. Asanga says that the two objects of reliance, Transformation of the Basis, is also a 持業釋 (possessive explanation, referring to the grammatical structure of the term). However, now the relying and the relied upon are combined into Transformation of the Basis, so it is not a 持業釋. Now, saying that dependent origination is called Transformation of the Basis refers to the basis of flowing and returning. That is, what is abandoned and what is obtained, and what is obtained includes two results. Because of what is clung to, conditioned dharmas (Sāsrava-dharma, dharmas with afflictions) arise. Severing what is clung to in conditioned dharmas is called abandonment; there is no separate entity called abandonment.

Treatise: Or, the 'basis' is Suchness (Tathatā, the true nature of things), the basis of delusion and enlightenment.

Commentary: This is the explanation of the second teacher. The 'basis' is Suchness, the basis of delusion and enlightenment.

Treatise: Foolish people are deluded, severing obstacles and realizing.

Commentary: Realizing this Suchness, one attains Nirvana (Nirvāṇa, cessation). Because Nirvana is Suchness, it is free from defiled dharmas. Moreover, hypothetical Nirvana is established based on Suchness; the relying and the relied upon are different. This state is attained after the diamond-like mind that severs obstacles, not immediately in this state.

Treatise: Although in this state, it is called Dharmakaya.

Commentary: Bodhi (Bodhi, enlightenment) is not what the meaning of the verse here intends to show. What the meaning of the verse intends to show is what the later verses say about bliss, the body of liberation, and the Great Sage (Mahāmuni, great sage) being called Dharmakaya (Dharmakāya, the body of the Dharma). 'Muni' means silence, because of the cessation and stillness of all defilements.

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非彼菩提是唯識性。在大牟尼名法身故。七十八中說。二乘有此名解脫身。故說三乘平等平等。其第一師菩提亦名轉依者。如后頌中自當解釋。

上來已略釋二文訖。自下廣前頌文有三。初問。次略答。后廣解。

論。云何證得二種轉依。

述曰。問能證之因所得之果。雙為問也。

論。謂十地中至由斯證得。

述曰。次略答也。十地中者。所經位也　修十勝行。所修因也　斷十重障所治斷法。此言重者。如第一卷初解　證十真如。所觀照法。由此四種因故。二種轉依果由斯證得。后證轉依必有經位。位有多種且說小分能證之位修習位也。故此最初先明十地。此無別體。修十勝行。斷十重障。證十如時。名十地也。總釋別位。既知分位必有修行。故次十地明十勝行。即是廣前無得不思議是出世間智。既修此行必有所因。故次乃明斷十重障。即廣頌中舍二粗重。且知所斷十重障法必有所證。故次乃明十種真如。即廣頌中舍二粗重之時轉依。雖已分證未名圓滿。此乃因位。廣前三句。即是漸次悟入　二種轉依由斯證得。明所得果。即廣前頌第四句文。正明悟入。總為第二略答文也。

論。言十地者至生大喜故。

述曰。第三次第廣前答也。初廣因。后廣果。因中有四。初廣十

【現代漢語翻譯】 非彼菩提是唯識性（only-consciousness nature）。在大牟尼（Great Sage，佛陀的別稱）名為法身（Dharmakaya，佛陀的法性之身）的緣故。在《七十八》中說，二乘（Shravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）有此名為解脫身（liberation body）。故說三乘（Triyana，三種成佛的途徑，包括聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）平等平等。其第一師菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）亦名轉依（transformation of the basis）者，如后頌中自當解釋。 上來已略釋二文訖。自下廣前頌文有三。初問。次略答。后廣解。 論：云何證得二種轉依？ 述曰：問能證之因所得之果，雙為問也。 論：謂十地（Ten Bhumis，菩薩修行的十個階段）中至由斯證得。 述曰：次略答也。十地中者，所經位也。修十勝行（Ten Supreme Practices），所修因也。斷十重障（Ten Heavy Obstructions），所治斷法。此言重者，如第一卷初解。證十真如（Ten Suchness），所觀照法。由此四種因故，二種轉依果由斯證得。后證轉依必有經位，位有多種且說小分能證之位修習位也。故此最初先明十地。此無別體。修十勝行，斷十重障，證十如時，名十地也。總釋別位，既知分位必有修行。故次十地明十勝行，即是廣前無得不思議是出世間智。既修此行必有所因，故次乃明斷十重障，即廣頌中舍二粗重。且知所斷十重障法必有所證，故次乃明十種真如，即廣頌中舍二粗重之時轉依。雖已分證未名圓滿，此乃因位。廣前三句，即是漸次悟入。二種轉依由斯證得，明所得果。即廣前頌第四句文，正明悟入。總為第二略答文也。 論：言十地者至生大喜故。 述曰：第三次第廣前答也。初廣因。后廣果。因中有四。初廣十

【English Translation】 This Bodhi is not other than the nature of only-consciousness. Because in the Great Sage (Mahamuni, another name for the Buddha) it is called Dharmakaya (Dharmakaya, the body of the Buddha's Dharma nature). In the 'Seventy-eight', it is said that the Two Vehicles (Shravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana) have this called the liberation body. Therefore, it is said that the Three Vehicles (Triyana, the three paths to Buddhahood, including Shravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, and Bodhisattvayana) are equal and equal. This first teacher, Bodhi (Bodhi, enlightenment), is also called transformation of the basis (transformation of the basis), as will be explained in the later verses. The above has briefly explained the two texts. From here on, the previous verses are expanded in three parts: first, the question; second, the brief answer; and third, the detailed explanation. Treatise: How are the two kinds of transformation of the basis attained? Commentary: Asking about both the cause that enables attainment and the result that is attained, this is a double question. Treatise: It means that within the Ten Bhumis (Ten Bhumis, the ten stages of a Bodhisattva's practice) up to 'by this, it is attained'. Commentary: This is the brief answer. 'Within the Ten Bhumis' refers to the stages passed through. 'Cultivating the Ten Supreme Practices' is the cause cultivated. 'Cutting off the Ten Heavy Obstructions' is the dharma to be treated and cut off. The term 'heavy' is as explained in the beginning of the first volume. 'Realizing the Ten Suchness' is the dharma to be contemplated. Because of these four causes, the result of the two kinds of transformation of the basis is attained by this. Later, the attainment of transformation of the basis must involve passing through stages. There are many kinds of stages, but let's talk about the small part that is the stage of practice that enables attainment. Therefore, initially, the Ten Bhumis are first clarified. This has no separate entity. Cultivating the Ten Supreme Practices, cutting off the Ten Heavy Obstructions, and realizing the Ten Suchness are called the Ten Bhumis. Generally explaining the separate stages, since it is known that there is practice in the separate stages, therefore, following the Ten Bhumis, the Ten Supreme Practices are clarified, which is to expand on the previous 'no attainment is inconceivable' which is transcendent wisdom. Since cultivating this practice must have a cause, therefore, next, the cutting off of the Ten Heavy Obstructions is clarified, which is to abandon the two coarse burdens in the verses. Furthermore, knowing that the dharma of the Ten Heavy Obstructions that are cut off must have something to be realized, therefore, next, the Ten Kinds of Suchness are clarified, which is the transformation of the basis at the time of abandoning the two coarse burdens in the verses. Although partial realization has been attained, it is not yet called complete. This is the causal stage. Expanding on the previous three sentences, it is gradually entering into enlightenment. 'The two kinds of transformation of the basis are attained by this' clarifies the result attained. This is to expand on the fourth sentence of the previous verses, which clearly explains entering into enlightenment. This is the second brief answer in total. Treatise: 'Speaking of the Ten Bhumis' up to 'therefore, great joy arises'. Commentary: This is the third sequential expansion of the previous answer. First, the cause is expanded; then, the result is expanded. There are four parts in the cause. First, the Ten

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地。于中有三。初解十別名。二出地體性。三釋總地義　初獲聖性者。謂初斷凡性得聖性。即依無漏無分別智等俱行五蘊種子。為聖性體。異生性體唯二障種。若此聖性取三乘初智種正能生現功能名為聖性。依分別二種立異生性。俱生二障種雖有。亦非凡夫。依能生初無漏種立聖性故。凡夫時有初無漏種。而非聖性。未能生故。分別之障障聖性者名為凡性。無漏之效能斷凡性者名為聖性　若爾後諸無漏應非聖性。不能斷分別障故。前劣者已舍故　此亦不然。效能斷故。是彼類故。亦名聖性。各隨自乘所治既為凡性。亦隨自乘能治名為聖性。即隨一空二空智種為體。若現行智為體。起世俗心應非聖者。若菩薩是大士夫之聖性非如二乘小人之聖性。二具證二空。簡二乘等唯證一空。今從詮說。說如為空。如非空也。三能益自他。簡彼二乘唯自利也。由獲大士聖性。具證二空。益自他三因故生大喜。此地名極喜地。簡后菩薩非初得聖性不名極喜。及簡二乘無是三勝。初得果時不名極喜　若爾菩薩初果何故不名預流。對法第十四說。何緣菩薩已得超升。而非預流也。由得不住道一向預流行不成就故。預聖之流樂住于道。厭出生死故。何緣亦非一來也。故受諸有無量生故。何緣亦非不還耶。安住靜慮還生欲界故。十地論第五卷說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 地（Bhumi，土地）。其中有三部分。第一，解釋十個不同的名稱。第二，闡述地的體性和性質。第三，解釋總體的地之意義。 首先，『獲聖性』指的是初次斷除凡夫之性而獲得聖者之性。這是依據與無漏無分別智等同時生起的五蘊種子作為聖性的本體。異生之性的本體只有兩種障礙的種子。如果這個聖性取三乘（Sravakayana，聲聞乘；Pratyekabuddhayana，緣覺乘；Bodhisattvayana，菩薩乘）最初的智慧種子，並且能夠真正產生顯現的功能，那麼就稱之為聖性。依據分別的兩種（俱生我執和分別我執）而建立異生性。雖然俱生的兩種障礙的種子也有，但也不是凡夫。因為是依據能夠產生最初無漏種子的而建立聖性。凡夫的時候有最初的無漏種子，但不是聖性，因為還不能產生作用。分別的障礙能夠障礙聖性，所以被稱為凡性。無漏的效能能夠斷除凡性，所以被稱為聖性。 如果這樣說，那麼後來的那些無漏之法應該不是聖性了，因為它們不能斷除分別的障礙。因為之前的比較低劣的障礙已經被捨棄了。 這樣說也是不對的。因為它們具有斷除障礙的效能，而且是同類的，所以也稱為聖性。各自隨著自己所修的乘，所對治的既是凡性，也隨著自己所修的乘，能夠對治的就稱為聖性。也就是隨著一個空或兩個空（人空和法空）的智慧種子作為本體。如果以現行的智慧作為本體，那麼生起世俗之心的人就不應該是聖者了。如果菩薩（Bodhisattva）是大士夫，那麼他的聖性就不是像二乘小乘之人的聖性。菩薩同時證得人空和法空，區別於二乘等人只證得人空。現在是從詮釋上來說，說如是為空，如不是空。 第三，能夠利益自己和他人，區別於二乘只利益自己。由於獲得大士的聖性，同時證得人空和法空，利益自己和他人這三個原因，所以生起大喜。這個地稱為極喜地（Pramudita）。區別於後來的菩薩不是初次獲得聖性，所以不稱為極喜地。也區別於二乘沒有這三種殊勝之處，初次證得果位的時候不稱為極喜地。 如果這樣，那麼菩薩初果為什麼不稱為預流（Srotapanna）呢？《對法》（Abhidharma）第十四品說，什麼原因導致菩薩已經得到超升，但不是預流呢？因為得到不住于涅槃之道，一向趨向于利益眾生的行，不成就預流果的緣故。趣入聖者之流的人，喜歡安住于涅槃之道，厭惡出生死輪迴。什麼原因也不是一來果（Sakrdagamin）呢？因為要接受諸有的無量次生死。什麼原因也不是不還果（Anagamin）呢？因為安住在靜慮中，還會回到欲界受生。《十地論》第五卷說。

【English Translation】 English version Bhumi (land). There are three parts to this. First, explaining the ten different names. Second, elaborating on the substance and nature of the ground. Third, explaining the overall meaning of the ground. First, 'attaining the holy nature' refers to initially cutting off the nature of an ordinary person and attaining the nature of a holy being. This is based on the seeds of the five aggregates (Skandhas) that arise simultaneously with the non-outflow, non-discriminating wisdom, etc., as the substance of the holy nature. The substance of the nature of a different being only has the seeds of two obstacles. If this holy nature takes the initial wisdom seeds of the Three Vehicles (Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, Bodhisattvayana), and can truly produce manifest functions, then it is called the holy nature. Based on the two kinds of discrimination (innate ego-clinging and acquired ego-clinging), the nature of a different being is established. Although the seeds of the two innate obstacles are also present, they are not ordinary beings. Because the holy nature is established based on the ability to produce the initial non-outflow seeds. Ordinary beings have the initial non-outflow seeds, but they are not the holy nature, because they cannot yet produce function. The discrimination that obstructs the holy nature is called the ordinary nature. The non-outflow performance that can cut off the ordinary nature is called the holy nature. If this is the case, then the later non-outflows should not be the holy nature, because they cannot cut off the discrimination obstacle. Because the previous inferior obstacles have already been abandoned. This is also not correct. Because they have the performance of cutting off obstacles, and they are of the same kind, so they are also called the holy nature. Each follows the vehicle they cultivate, and what they counteract is both the ordinary nature, and what they can counteract according to the vehicle they cultivate is called the holy nature. That is, following one emptiness or two emptinesses (emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena) as the substance of wisdom seeds. If the current wisdom is taken as the substance, then those who give rise to worldly minds should not be holy beings. If a Bodhisattva is a great being, then his holy nature is not like the holy nature of the two vehicles of lesser beings. Bodhisattvas simultaneously realize the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena, distinguishing them from the two vehicles who only realize the emptiness of self. Now, from the perspective of interpretation, it is said that suchness is emptiness, and suchness is not emptiness. Third, being able to benefit oneself and others, distinguishing them from the two vehicles who only benefit themselves. Because of obtaining the holy nature of a great being, simultaneously realizing the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena, and the three causes of benefiting oneself and others, great joy arises. This ground is called Pramudita (Joyful Ground). Distinguishing it from later Bodhisattvas who do not initially obtain the holy nature, so it is not called the Joyful Ground. It also distinguishes it from the two vehicles who do not have these three superiorities, and when they initially attain the fruit, it is not called the Joyful Ground. If so, then why is the initial fruit of a Bodhisattva not called Srotapanna (Stream-enterer)? The fourteenth chapter of the Abhidharma says, what causes a Bodhisattva to have already attained transcendence, but not be a Stream-enterer? Because they have attained the path of not dwelling in Nirvana, and always tend towards the practice of benefiting sentient beings, they do not accomplish the fruit of a Stream-enterer. Those who enter the stream of holy beings like to dwell on the path of Nirvana and are disgusted with being born and dying in Samsara. What is the reason that they are also not a Sakrdagamin (Once-returner)? Because they have to accept countless births in all realms of existence. What is the reason that they are also not an Anagamin (Non-returner)? Because they dwell in meditative concentration and still return to be born in the desire realm. The fifth volume of the Dasabhumika Sutra says.

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。菩薩生欲界不退靜慮。對法第十三說。菩薩咸離無色界生。靜慮相應住靜慮樂。而生欲界或色界中。已證得威德菩薩。凡所受生。皆欲利益安樂有情。以無色界非成熟有情處故。彼自解言。住靜慮者。由此菩薩善巧迴轉故。瑜伽．顯揚等此文非一。由此義故不名不還。復還來故。何故不名阿羅漢者。此亦可名。如前第三卷引。至此卷末當知。由此初地菩薩不名預流。預流之果不名極喜。攝論第七唯有具二利故喜。對彼二乘名極喜故。無性云。若初地喜不相應者。自後諸地亦不相應。此為先故。十地論第一卷說。無上二利初證聖處多生歡喜故。即與此二因同。唯證二空此論獨有。四十七說。此地善決定故。四相發心故。發起精進發正愿故。凈修地法故。開曉餘地故。修治善根故。受生故。威力故。如彼及十地經第一．第二．第三卷廣解。瓔珞經下卷雖別釋十地名。然不及此。此地即愿為最勝。有十大愿等。並如彼二論說。

論。二離垢地至煩惱垢故。

述曰。其初地時已離粗犯戒垢。然此二地能全離故。所以說之。望前細故。下十一障中當辨二障攝。

凈尸羅者。謂別解脫．道定共也。即通三種。雖第三地始發定增。能離過時此地已滿故。或依別脫。亦能全離加行．後起．根本罪故。非定道．共能

離加行．後起罪故。世親攝論說。此二地性戒成就。非如初地思擇護戒。性戒成故。諸犯戒垢已極遠離。何故初果已具性戒。極喜地中當言未具。大分已具仍有誤犯微細過失。又論性戒。初地已離。入地菩薩更亦不同初二果者猶有妻孥。性罪必無犯。但于遮罪猶有誤犯今第二地悉能永離。餘論皆同。此下餘論同者更不煩敘。此下諸地並如瑜伽第四十八。十地第四已去各一卷解。不能繁引。

論。三發光地至妙惠光故。

述曰。此地中成勝定。定謂三摩地．三摩缽底。無性云。謂靜慮名等持。諸無色名等至。或等持者。心一境相。言等至者。正受現前。如前已解。陀羅尼此名總持。總持有四。一法。二義。三咒。四能得忍。此地所治遲鈍性。於三惠有忘失障。今此地無忘彼法。名大法之總持。法謂教法。殊勝之教名為大法。此定及總持為因。能發無邊妙惠光。故總持以念．惠為性。謂以聞．思．修三惠照了大乘法故。因得定斷障聞．思轉勝非由定力親能起二。十地云。隨三惠等照法顯現故名明地　問何故十度五地修禪。修三福業　此地修定如下當知。又十一障中自當解釋。

論。四焰惠地至惠焰增故。

述曰。即除第六識等中俱生身見等攝。非謂一切。至下當知。世親云。能燒一切根本煩惱及

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 離加行，後起罪的緣故。《世親攝論》說，第二地（離垢地）的菩薩的自性戒已經成就，不像初地（極喜地）那樣需要思擇才能守護戒律，因為自性戒已經成就。各種犯戒的污垢已經被極度地遠離。為什麼初果（須陀洹果）已經具備自性戒，而極喜地中卻說尚未完全具備呢？這是因為雖然大部分已經具備，但仍然有誤犯微細過失的情況。而且，關於自性戒，初地已經遠離，但入地的菩薩與初果、二果（斯陀含果）不同，後者仍然可能有妻室兒女，但自性罪必定不會再犯，只是對於遮罪（佛所制定的戒律）仍然可能有誤犯。現在第二地能夠永遠地遠離這些。其餘的論述都相同。以下其餘論述相同的地方就不再贅述。以下各地的論述都如同《瑜伽師地論》第四十八卷和《十地經論》第四卷之後各一卷的解釋，不能在此繁瑣地引用。

論：三發光地，因為能生起妙慧之光。

述曰：此地中成就殊勝的禪定。禪定指的是三摩地（Samadhi，定）、三摩缽底（Samapatti，等至）。無性論師說，靜慮（Dhyana，禪那）被稱為等持，諸無色定被稱為等至。或者說，等持是指心專注於一境的狀態，等至是指正受現前的狀態，如前文已經解釋過。陀羅尼（Dharani）此地名為總持，總持有四種：一、法總持，二、義總持，三、咒總持，四、能得忍總持。此地所對治的是遲鈍性，對於聞、思、修三慧有忘失的障礙。現在此地沒有忘失這些法，所以名為大法的總持。法指的是教法，殊勝的教法稱為大法。這種禪定和總持作為因，能夠生起無邊的妙慧之光。所以總持以念和慧為體性，指的是以聞、思、修三慧照亮了大乘佛法。因為得到禪定，所以能斷除障礙，聞、思二慧也更加殊勝，但並非由禪定的力量直接生起。十地經論說，隨著三慧等照亮佛法而顯現，所以稱為明地。問：為什麼十度（十波羅蜜）中第五地修禪，修三種福業？此地修定的情況如下文將要說明。另外，在十一障中會自行解釋。

論：四焰慧地，因為智慧之焰增長。

述曰：即是去除第六識等中俱生的身見等所攝的煩惱，並非指去除一切煩惱，到下文將會知道。世親菩薩說，能夠焚燒一切根本煩惱以及

【English Translation】 English version: It is because of being apart from additional effort and subsequent arising sins. The She Lun (Compendium of Treatises) by Vasubandhu (世親) says that the inherent precepts are accomplished in these two grounds (the second ground, Vimala). It is not like the first ground (Pramudita) where one needs to contemplate to protect the precepts, because the inherent precepts are already accomplished. All defilements of violating precepts have been extremely distanced. Why is it said that the first fruit (Srotaapanna) already possesses inherent precepts, while the Pramudita ground is said to not fully possess them? This is because although most of it is already possessed, there are still subtle faults of accidental violations. Moreover, regarding inherent precepts, the first ground has already departed from them, but the Bodhisattvas who have entered the grounds are different from the first and second fruits (Sakrdagamin), who may still have wives and children. However, inherent sins will definitely not be committed, but there may still be accidental violations of prohibitive precepts (precepts established by the Buddha). Now, the second ground is able to eternally depart from these. The remaining discussions are the same. The following places where the remaining discussions are the same will not be repeated. The discussions of the following grounds are all like the explanations in the forty-eighth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) and the one volume each after the fourth volume of the Dasabhumika-sutra-sastra (十地經論), which cannot be cited here in detail.

Treatise: The third ground, Prabhakari (發光地), is because it generates the light of wonderful wisdom.

Commentary: In this ground, excellent samadhi (三摩地, concentration) is accomplished. Samadhi refers to samadhi and samapatti (三摩缽底, attainment). Asanga (無性) says that dhyana (靜慮, meditation) is called samadhi, and the formless attainments are called samapatti. Or, samadhi refers to the state of the mind focusing on one object, and samapatti refers to the state of correct reception manifesting before one, as explained earlier. Dharani (陀羅尼) is called total retention in this ground. There are four types of total retention: 1. total retention of Dharma (法), 2. total retention of meaning (義), 3. total retention of mantra (咒), 4. total retention of the ability to attain forbearance (忍). What this ground counteracts is dullness, which has the obstacle of forgetting the three wisdoms of hearing, thinking, and cultivation. Now, this ground does not forget these Dharmas, so it is called the total retention of the great Dharma. Dharma refers to the teachings, and the excellent teachings are called the great Dharma. This samadhi and total retention, as causes, can generate the light of boundless wonderful wisdom. Therefore, total retention has the nature of mindfulness and wisdom, which means illuminating the Mahayana Dharma with the three wisdoms of hearing, thinking, and cultivation. Because of obtaining samadhi, one can cut off obstacles, and the wisdoms of hearing and thinking become even more excellent, but it is not directly generated by the power of samadhi. The Dasabhumika-sutra-sastra says that it is called the ground of brightness because the Dharma manifests as the three wisdoms illuminate it. Question: Why does the fifth ground cultivate dhyana among the ten paramitas (十度), and cultivate the three meritorious deeds? The cultivation of samadhi in this ground will be explained below. In addition, it will be explained in the eleven obstacles.

Treatise: The fourth ground, Arcismati (焰慧地), is because the flame of wisdom increases.

Commentary: It removes the afflictions included in the co-arisen self-view, etc., in the sixth consciousness, etc., but not all afflictions, as will be known below. Vasubandhu says that it can burn all fundamental afflictions and

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隨煩惱皆為灰燼。十地云。不忘煩惱薪智火所燒故。以菩提分法為惠者。非皆是惠。惠之焰故。從火喻為名。菩提分法如別章說。

論。五極難勝地至極難勝故。

述曰。世親云。知真諦智是無分別。知諸世間書論等智是有分別。此二相違應修令合。能合難合令相應故。無性云。真俗諦智互相違返。難可引發令共相應。此能和合令不相違。以前不如。名極難勝非望后也。然相應者。謂于真觀為俗令境相入名相應。為一念中二智並起名相應。今令一念二智並生名合亦得。前四地中猶未能故。又境同名相應。以前四地觀二諦境亦有差別。此觀彼境更無差別。令真俗智既不相乖名相應也。前第二識中已有妨難。如彼廣說。知彼二境無差別故。故此真如名無差別。

論。六現前地至令現前故。

述曰。謂觀十二諸緣起支。有最勝智觀無染凈。令現前故名無分別。七地成有。八地成無。世親等同。十地云。般若波羅蜜多行有間。大智現前住。

論。七遠行地至二乘道故。

述曰。世親等云。此地于功用得至究竟。雖一切相不能動搖。而於無相猶名有行。十地云。善修無相行功用究竟。能過世間二乘出世間道故。此地出過世間二乘道者。前六地中雖有緣起染凈無二。猶有所治細相現行障。執

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 隨煩惱皆為灰燼。《十地經》說：『因為不忘記煩惱，所以能用智慧之火焚燒它們。』以菩提分法（bodhipakṣa，證悟的組成部分）為智慧的人，並非所有的智慧都是真正的智慧，因為真正的智慧有火焰般的力量，所以用火來比喻。菩提分法的內容在其他章節有詳細說明。

論：第五極難勝地（Sudurjaya，極難勝地）是因為極難勝而得名。

述曰：世親（Vasubandhu）說：『了知真諦的智慧是無分別的，了知世間書論等知識是有分別的。這兩種智慧相互對立，應該修行使它們融合。』能夠融合難以融合的事物，使它們相應。無性（Asanga）說：『真諦和俗諦的智慧互相違背，難以引發使它們共同相應。』這種智慧能夠調和它們，使它們不互相違背，之前的智慧不如這種智慧，所以稱為極難勝地，而不是指望後面的智慧。所謂的相應，是指在真觀中，爲了俗諦而使境相融入，這稱為相應。或者說，在一念之中，兩種智慧同時生起，這稱為相應。現在使一念之中兩種智慧同時生起，也可以稱為融合。前四地中還不能做到這一點。而且，境相同也稱為相應。因為前四地觀察二諦之境也有差別，而此地觀察彼境不再有差別。使真俗二智既不互相違背，這稱為相應。』在之前的第二識中已經有妨礙和困難，如那裡詳細所說。因為知道那兩個境沒有差別，所以此地的真如（tathatā，如如）稱為無差別。

論：第六現前地（Abhimukhi，現前地）是因為使智慧現前而得名。

述曰：指的是觀察十二因緣（dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda，十二緣起支），用最殊勝的智慧觀察沒有染污和清凈的現象，使這種智慧現前，所以稱為無分別。第七地成就『有』的智慧，第八地成就『無』的智慧。世親等人的觀點相同。《十地經》說：『般若波羅蜜多（prajñāpāramitā，般若波羅蜜）的修行是有間斷的，大智慧現前並安住。』

論：第七遠行地（Dūraṅgama，遠行地）是因為超越二乘道（Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）而得名。

述曰：世親等人說：『此地在功用方面達到究竟。雖然一切相都不能動搖他，但在無相方面仍然稱為有行。』《十地經》說：『善於修習無相行，功用達到究竟，能夠超越世間的二乘和出世間的道。』此地超越世間的二乘道，是因為前六地中雖然有緣起染凈無二的智慧，但仍然有所要對治的細微的現象現行，形成障礙和執著。

【English Translation】 English version All afflictions are reduced to ashes. The Daśabhūmika Sūtra (十地經, Ten Stages Sutra) says: 'Because one does not forget afflictions, the fire of wisdom burns them.' Those who use the bodhipakṣa (菩提分法, wings to awakening) as wisdom, not all wisdom is true wisdom, because true wisdom has the power of a flame, hence the metaphor of fire. The content of the bodhipakṣa is explained in detail in other chapters.

Treatise: The fifth stage, Sudurjaya (極難勝地, Very Difficult to Conquer), is so named because it is extremely difficult to conquer.

Commentary: Vasubandhu (世親) says: 'The wisdom that knows the true reality is non-discriminating, and the wisdom that knows worldly books and treatises is discriminating. These two are contradictory and should be cultivated to be integrated.' It can integrate things that are difficult to integrate, making them correspond. Asanga (無性) says: 'The wisdom of the true and conventional truths contradicts each other, making it difficult to evoke them to correspond together.' This wisdom can harmonize them so that they do not contradict each other. The previous wisdom is not as good as this wisdom, so it is called Sudurjaya, not in anticipation of the later wisdom. The so-called correspondence means that in true contemplation, the realm is integrated for the sake of the conventional truth, which is called correspondence. Or, in one thought, two wisdoms arise simultaneously, which is called correspondence. Now, causing two wisdoms to arise simultaneously in one thought can also be called integration. This cannot be done in the first four stages. Moreover, the identity of the realm is also called correspondence. Because the first four stages also have differences in observing the realms of the two truths, while this stage no longer has differences in observing those realms. Making the two wisdoms of the true and conventional truths not contradict each other is called correspondence.' There have already been obstacles and difficulties in the previous second consciousness, as explained in detail there. Because it is known that those two realms are not different, the tathatā (真如, suchness) of this stage is called non-differentiation.

Treatise: The sixth stage, Abhimukhi (現前地, Face to Face), is so named because it causes wisdom to appear before one.

Commentary: It refers to observing the twelve links of dependent origination (dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda, 十二因緣), observing phenomena without defilement or purity with the most excellent wisdom, causing this wisdom to appear before one, hence it is called non-discriminating. The seventh stage achieves the wisdom of 'being', and the eighth stage achieves the wisdom of 'non-being'. Vasubandhu and others have the same view. The Daśabhūmika Sūtra says: 'The practice of prajñāpāramitā (般若波羅蜜多, perfection of wisdom) is intermittent, and great wisdom appears and abides.'

Treatise: The seventh stage, Dūraṅgama (遠行地, Going Afar), is so named because it transcends the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna (聲聞乘和緣覺乘, Hearer Vehicle and Solitary Realizer Vehicle).

Commentary: Vasubandhu and others say: 'This stage reaches the ultimate in terms of effort. Although all phenomena cannot shake him, it is still called having practice in non-phenomena.' The Daśabhūmika Sūtra says: 'Being good at cultivating non-phenomenal practice, the effort reaches the ultimate, and one can transcend the worldly Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna and the supramundane path.' This stage transcends the worldly Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna because, although the previous six stages have the wisdom of dependent origination, defilement and purity being non-dual, there are still subtle phenomena to be treated, which manifest and form obstacles and attachments.

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有生滅流轉還滅相故。未能空中起有勝行。今此地中遠離彼障。亦能空中起有勝行能治彼障。二乘世間即不能是。

論。八不動地至不能動故。

述曰。相者有相。用者功用無性云。一切有相一切加行。皆不能動此地心故。第七地雖一切相不能動之不現行故。然不自在任運而轉有加行故猶有煩惱。第八地中任運而轉。不依加行。無功用故。亦無煩惱。七．八二地之差別也。十地云。報行純熟無相無間故名不動。此地已去明知無相非有間也。

論。九善惠地至善說法故。

述曰。無性云。得最勝無礙解。于諸智中此為最勝。智即是惠故名善惠。世親云。此惠妙善故名善惠。無性云。由法無礙解自在了知一切法句。由義無礙自在通達一切義理。由辭無礙自在分別一切言辭。由辨無礙遍於十方隨其所宜自在辨說。於此地中。最初證得先未曾得無礙解智故名善惠　能遍十方者。十地云。無礙力說法成就利他行故。

論。十法雲地至充滿法身故。

述曰。無性云。由得總緣一切法智。總緣一切契經等法不離真如。此一切法共相境智譬如大云。陀羅尼門．三摩地門猶如凈水。智慧藏彼如雲含水。有能生彼勝功能故。又如大云覆隱虛空。如是法智覆隱如空廣大無邊惑．智二障。惑．智二障此名

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為有生起、滅亡、流轉、還滅的現象，所以不能在空性中生起殊勝的修行。現在這個階段遠離了那些障礙，也能在空性中生起殊勝的修行，能夠對治那些障礙。二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）和世間凡夫是做不到這一點的。

論：第八不動地，因為不能被動搖。

述記：『相』指的是有相，『用』指的是功用。無性論說，一切有相、一切加行，都不能動搖此地之心。第七地雖然一切相不能動搖它，但不是不顯現，而且不是自在的，是任運而轉，有加行，所以還有煩惱。第八地中，是任運而轉，不依靠加行，沒有功用，所以也沒有煩惱。這是第七地和第八地的差別。十地經說，報行純熟，無相無間，所以叫做不動。從這個階段開始，很明顯知道沒有相，也不是有間斷的。

論：第九善慧地，因為善於說法。

述記：無性論說，得到最殊勝的無礙解，在各種智慧中，這是最殊勝的。智慧就是慧，所以叫做善慧。世親論說，這種智慧微妙而善良，所以叫做善慧。無性論說，由於法無礙解，自在地了知一切法句；由於義無礙解，自在地通達一切義理；由於辭無礙解，自在地分別一切言辭；由於辯無礙解，普遍地在十方隨其所宜自在地辯說。在這個階段中，最初證得先前未曾得到的無礙解智，所以叫做善慧。能夠遍及十方，十地經說，因為無礙力說法，成就利他之行。

論：第十法雲地，因為充滿法身。

述記：無性論說，由於得到總緣一切法智，總緣一切契經等法，不離真如。這總緣一切法的共相境智，譬如大云。陀羅尼門（總持法門的入門）、三摩地門（禪定法門的入門）猶如凈水。智慧藏在其中，猶如雲含水，有能生彼殊勝功能。又如大云覆蓋虛空，如此法智覆蓋如虛空般廣大無邊的惑障和智障。惑障和智障，這叫做...

【English Translation】 English version: Because there are phenomena of arising, ceasing, flowing, and returning to cessation, one cannot generate superior practice from emptiness. Now, in this stage, being far from those obstacles, one can also generate superior practice from emptiness, capable of counteracting those obstacles. The Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) and worldly beings are incapable of this.

Treatise: The Eighth Immovable Ground, because it cannot be moved.

Commentary: 『Aspect』 refers to having aspects, 『function』 refers to utility. The Anālayavijñāna-sūtra states that all aspects and all effort cannot move the mind of this ground. Although the Seventh Ground cannot be moved by all aspects, it is not that they do not manifest, and it is not autonomous, but operates through effort, so there are still afflictions. In the Eighth Ground, it operates autonomously, not relying on effort, without function, so there are no afflictions. This is the difference between the Seventh and Eighth Grounds. The Daśabhūmika Sūtra states that the fruition of actions is pure, without aspects and without interruption, so it is called Immovable. From this stage onwards, it is clearly known that there are no aspects and it is not interrupted.

Treatise: The Ninth Ground of Good Wisdom, because of skillful teaching.

Commentary: The Anālayavijñāna-sūtra states that one obtains the most superior unobstructed eloquence, which is the most superior among all wisdoms. Wisdom is equivalent to prajñā (wisdom), so it is called Good Wisdom. Vasubandhu states that this wisdom is subtle and good, so it is called Good Wisdom. The Anālayavijñāna-sūtra states that due to unobstructed eloquence in Dharma (Dharma-pratisaṃvidā), one freely knows all phrases of the Dharma; due to unobstructed eloquence in meaning (Artha-pratisaṃvidā), one freely understands all meanings; due to unobstructed eloquence in language (Nirukti-pratisaṃvidā), one freely distinguishes all languages; due to unobstructed eloquence in eloquence (Pratibhāna-pratisaṃvidā), one freely expounds in all directions according to what is appropriate. In this ground, one initially attains the unobstructed wisdom that was never attained before, so it is called Good Wisdom. Being able to pervade the ten directions, the Daśabhūmika Sūtra states that it is because of the power of unobstructed eloquence in teaching, accomplishing the practice of benefiting others.

Treatise: The Tenth Dharma Cloud Ground, because it is filled with the Dharmakāya (Dharma Body).

Commentary: The Anālayavijñāna-sūtra states that due to obtaining the wisdom that encompasses all Dharmas, encompassing all sūtras and other Dharmas, without departing from Suchness (Tathatā). This wisdom that encompasses all Dharmas is like a great cloud. Dhāraṇī-mukha (the entrance to the gate of dhāraṇī) and Samādhi-mukha (the entrance to the gate of samādhi) are like pure water. The wisdom stores them within, like a cloud containing water, having the superior function of generating them. Also, just as a great cloud covers the sky, so too does this Dharma wisdom cover the boundless afflictive and cognitive obscurations like the sky. These afflictive and cognitive obscurations are called...

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粗重。彼論又云。又如大云澍清凈水充滿虛空。如是法智出生無量殊勝功德。充滿所證所依身故。世親云。言充滿者是周遍義。十地第一云。得大法身具足自在名法雲地。第十二云。如雲身遍滿故除垢。八相成道度眾生萌芽故。此地如是受法王位。如王太子于諸王子而得自在。但由是處有微智障故不自在。對此障故說后佛地。十地第十二說。此地得受位者有十相。一主相。大寶花王出。二量相。周圓如十阿僧祇百千三千大千世界。三勝相。一切眾寶間錯莊嚴故。四地相。過於一切世界境界故。五因相。出世善根所生等。皆如彼說。又如懷孕在藏。十時菩薩亦爾。彼說十位。不能繁引。瑜伽四十八等中皆廣釋行及德及名。不能繁引。此即第一釋別名已。如十地經。

論。如是十地至以為自性。

述曰。能證．所證以為地體。無性云。法無我智分位名地。以真如無分位智有分位。所以智名地。此論總出地體義。所證亦是地。地是依持生長義故。四十七云。由能攝持菩薩義故名地。能為受用居處義故名住。即真如等亦名為地。能攝持故。即是實法為假者所依等故實法名地。第二齣體也。

論。與所修行至故名為地。

述曰。四十七以能攝持菩薩義名地。彼攝義即是此依生長義。持者即是依義。即通

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 粗重。彼論又云：又如巨大的雲朵降下清凈的水，充滿整個虛空。同樣，法智（Dharma-jnana，對佛法的智慧）產生無量殊勝的功德，充滿所證悟和所依止的身體。世親（Vasubandhu）說：『充滿』的意思是周遍。十地經（Dashabhumika Sutra）第一地中說：『獲得大法身，具足自在，名為法雲地（Dharmamegha-bhumi）。』第十二地中說：『如雲的身遍滿，所以能去除垢染，八相成道（Eight Aspects of Enlightenment）度化眾生的萌芽。』此地如同接受法王之位，如同王子在眾王子中獲得自在，但因為此處有微細的智慧障礙，所以不自在。爲了對治這種障礙，所以說了後來的佛地（Buddha-bhumi）。十地經第十二地中說：『此地獲得受位者有十種相：一是主相，出現大寶花王；二是量相，周圓如十阿僧祇百千三千大千世界；三是勝相，一切珍寶交錯莊嚴；四是地相，超過一切世界境界；五是因相，出世善根所生等。』都如經中所說。又如懷孕在腹中，十時菩薩也是如此。經中說了十位，不能一一引用。瑜伽師地論（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第四十八卷等中都廣泛解釋了行、德和名，不能一一引用。這便是第一種解釋別名完畢。如十地經所說。

論：如是十地，至以為自性。

述曰：能證的智慧和所證的真如，作為地的本體。無性（Asanga）說：『法無我智（Dharma-nairatmya-jnana）的分位名為地。』因為真如沒有分位，而智慧有分位，所以智慧名為地。此論總括地體的意義。所證的真如也是地，地是依持和生長的意思。瑜伽師地論第四十七卷中說：『因為能攝持菩薩的意義，所以名為地。能作為受用和居處，所以名為住。』即真如等也名為地，因為能攝持。即是實法作為假法所依等，所以實法名為地。這是第二種解釋本體。

論：與所修行，至故名為地。

述曰：瑜伽師地論第四十七卷中以能攝持菩薩的意義名為地，彼攝持的意義就是此依止和生長的意義。持就是依止的意義，即通於能證和所證。

【English Translation】 English version: Gross and heavy. This treatise also says: 'It is like a great cloud pouring down pure water, filling the entire space. Similarly, Dharma-jnana (wisdom of the Dharma) produces immeasurable and supreme merits, filling the body that is realized and relied upon.' Vasubandhu says: 'Filling' means pervasive. The Dashabhumika Sutra (Ten Grounds Sutra), in the first ground, says: 'Obtaining the great Dharma body, possessing complete freedom, is called Dharmamegha-bhumi (Cloud of Dharma Ground).' The twelfth ground says: 'Like the body of a cloud pervading and removing defilements, the Eight Aspects of Enlightenment transform the sprouts of sentient beings.' This ground is like receiving the position of Dharma King, like a prince gaining freedom among princes, but because there is subtle wisdom obstruction here, it is not completely free. To counteract this obstruction, the subsequent Buddha-bhumi (Buddha Ground) is spoken of. The twelfth ground of the Dashabhumika Sutra says: 'One who receives the position in this ground has ten characteristics: first, the characteristic of a lord, the emergence of the Great Treasure Flower King; second, the characteristic of measure, round and complete like ten Asankhya hundreds of thousands of three thousand great thousand worlds; third, the characteristic of superiority, adorned with the interweaving of all precious treasures; fourth, the characteristic of ground, surpassing all world boundaries; fifth, the characteristic of cause, arising from supramundane roots of goodness, etc.' All are as described in the sutra. It is also like being pregnant in the womb, so are the Bodhisattvas in the ten stages. The sutra speaks of ten stages, which cannot be cited one by one. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), in the forty-eighth volume, etc., extensively explains the practices, virtues, and names, which cannot be cited one by one. This concludes the first explanation of the different names, as stated in the Dashabhumika Sutra.

Treatise: 'Thus, the ten grounds, up to taking it as their nature.'

Commentary: The wisdom that can realize and the Suchness that is realized are taken as the substance of the ground. Asanga says: 'The divisions of Dharma-nairatmya-jnana (wisdom of the non-self of phenomena) are called grounds.' Because Suchness has no divisions, while wisdom has divisions, therefore wisdom is called ground. This treatise summarizes the meaning of the substance of the ground. The Suchness that is realized is also the ground, as the ground is the meaning of reliance and growth. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, in the forty-seventh volume, says: 'Because it can uphold the meaning of Bodhisattvas, it is called ground. It can serve as enjoyment and dwelling, so it is called abode.' That is, Suchness, etc., is also called ground, because it can uphold. That is, the real Dharma serves as the basis for the provisional Dharma, etc., so the real Dharma is called ground. This is the second explanation of the substance.

Treatise: 'Together with the practices that are cultivated, up to, therefore it is called ground.'

Commentary: The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, in the forty-seventh volume, calls it ground because it can uphold the meaning of Bodhisattvas. The meaning of upholding is the meaning of reliance and growth here. Upholding is the meaning of reliance, which applies to both the wisdom that can realize and the Suchness that is realized.

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真如正智。皆能生長為依持故名地真如何名令得生長。今者不言如為能生。但言行是所生。彼為增上緣。行自從種子生故。即以勝功德與行為攝持功德名地。此約果與因因地功德是行之所得故　然以假者總法為能依。別法功德為地勝然今此文。此即第三解通地名。瓔珞經云。持一切功德名地。產生一切因果名地。無性云。謂諸菩薩於此地中修習現觀。離過。離貪。修菩提分。觀察諸諦。觀察緣起。于無相中。若有功用。若無功用。得勝辨才。逮真灌頂。除滅所知．煩惱障等。故此修位有十地別。何以地有十。斷十障。修十相智。證十真如故。乃至廣說彼地地所修諸行。不能煩引。顯揚第三亦解。小別讀者知之。

論。十勝行者至波羅蜜多。

述曰。第二解勝行。于中有二。初總舉十行。即波羅蜜多。二廣釋。廣釋中有四。至下當知。初以十三門辨釋。

論。施有三種至法施。

述曰。對法第十二同。與十八任持相攝故。財是身任持。無畏是心任持。法施是善法任持。攝論第七。施中以法．財．無畏為次第。二本攝論皆言法資益善根。財益他身。無畏資他心。次第雖復不同義意同此。無性第七云。施性中現有六波羅蜜多。財施．無畏施．法施所攝故對法雲。施度是財施餘五無畏施。一切六法施

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『真如正智』（Tathata True Wisdom）都能生長，作為依靠和支援，因此稱為『地』（Bhumi）。如何使『真如』（Tathata）得以生長？現在不說『真如』（Tathata）是能生者，只說『行』（Practice）是所生者。『真如』（Tathata）是增上緣（Adhipati-pratyaya）。『行』（Practice）從種子生起，因此以殊勝的功德與『行』（Practice）相攝持，功德名為『地』（Bhumi）。這是從果（Phala）與因（Hetu）的角度來說，因地的功德是『行』（Practice）所獲得的。然而，以假立的總法作為能依，別法功德作為殊勝的『地』（Bhumi）。現在這段文字，是第三種解釋，貫通『地』（Bhumi）的名稱。《瓔珞經》（Yingluo Sutra）說：『持一切功德名為地（Bhumi），產生一切因果名為地（Bhumi）。』《無性釋》（Wuxing Shi）說：『菩薩於此地（Bhumi）中修習現觀，遠離過失，遠離貪慾，修習菩提分法，觀察諸諦，觀察緣起，于無相中，或有功用，或無功用，得殊勝辯才，獲得真實灌頂，除滅所知障、煩惱障等。』因此，此修習位有十地（Ten Bhumis）的差別。為何地（Bhumi）有十種？因為要斷除十種障礙，修習十種相智，證得十種真如（Ten Tathatas）。』乃至廣說彼地地所修的諸行，不能煩惱牽引。《顯揚論》（Xianyang Lun）第三也作此解，略有差別，讀者自知。

論：十勝行者，至波羅蜜多（Paramita）。

述曰：第二解釋殊勝的『行』（Practice）。其中有二：首先總舉十種『行』（Practice），即波羅蜜多（Paramita）；其次是廣為解釋。廣為解釋中有四部分，下文將會提到。首先以十三種門來辨別解釋。

論：施有三種，至法施。

述曰：與《對法論》（Abhidharma）第十二相同，與十八界中的任持相攝。財施是身體的任持，無畏施是心的任持，法施是善法的任持。《攝大乘論》（Mahayana-samgraha）第七說，佈施中以法施、財施、無畏施為次第。二本《攝大乘論》（Mahayana-samgraha）都說法施資益善根，財施利益他人身體，無畏施資益他人心。次第雖然不同，但意義相同。無性在第七中說，佈施的自性中現有六波羅蜜多（Six Paramitas），為財施、無畏施、法施所攝。《對法論》（Abhidharma）說，佈施度是財施，其餘五種是無畏施，一切六種都是法施。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Tathata True Wisdom' can all grow and serve as reliance and support, hence it is called 'Bhumi' (Ground). How can 'Tathata' (Suchness) be made to grow? Now it is not said that 'Tathata' (Suchness) is the producer, but only that 'Practice' (Karma) is what is produced. 'Tathata' (Suchness) is the Adhipati-pratyaya (Dominant Condition). 'Practice' (Karma) arises from seeds, therefore it is held together with 'Practice' (Karma) by supreme merit, and merit is called 'Bhumi' (Ground). This is from the perspective of the fruit (Phala) and the cause (Hetu), the merit of the causal ground is what is obtained by 'Practice' (Karma). However, the falsely established general dharma is taken as the reliance, and the merit of the specific dharma is taken as the supreme 'Bhumi' (Ground). Now this text is the third explanation, connecting the name of 'Bhumi' (Ground). The 'Yingluo Sutra' (Garland Sutra) says: 'Holding all merits is called Bhumi (Ground), and generating all causes and effects is called Bhumi (Ground).' The 'Wuxing Shi' (Commentary by Asanga) says: 'Bodhisattvas cultivate direct perception in this Bhumi (Ground), away from faults, away from greed, cultivate the limbs of enlightenment, observe the truths, observe dependent origination, in the absence of characteristics, whether there is effort or no effort, obtain supreme eloquence, obtain true empowerment, eliminate the obscurations of knowledge, afflictions, etc.' Therefore, this cultivation position has the distinction of the Ten Bhumis (Ten Grounds). Why are there ten Bhumis (Grounds)? Because one must cut off ten obstacles, cultivate ten aspects of wisdom, and realize ten Tathatas (Suchness).』 And so on, extensively explaining the practices cultivated in each of the Bhumis (Grounds), which cannot be troubled and led astray. The third chapter of 'Xianyang Lun' (Compendium of Determinations) also gives this explanation, with slight differences, which the reader should understand.

Treatise: The ten supreme practices, up to Paramita (Perfection).

Commentary: The second explains the supreme 'Practice' (Karma). There are two parts to it: first, it generally lists the ten 'Practices' (Karma), which are the Paramitas (Perfections); second, it explains them extensively. There are four parts to the extensive explanation, which will be mentioned below. First, it distinguishes and explains them with thirteen doors.

Treatise: There are three kinds of giving, up to Dharma-dana (Giving of Dharma).

Commentary: It is the same as the twelfth in the 'Abhidharma' (Treatise on Dharma), and is included in the sustaining aspect of the eighteen realms. Material giving is the sustenance of the body, fearlessness giving is the sustenance of the mind, and Dharma-dana (Giving of Dharma) is the sustenance of good dharmas. The seventh chapter of the 'Mahayana-samgraha' (Compendium of Mahayana) says that in giving, Dharma-dana (Giving of Dharma), material giving, and fearlessness giving are in order. Both versions of the 'Mahayana-samgraha' (Compendium of Mahayana) say that Dharma-dana (Giving of Dharma) benefits the roots of goodness, material giving benefits the bodies of others, and fearlessness giving benefits the minds of others. Although the order is different, the meaning is the same. Asanga says in the seventh chapter that the nature of giving has six Paramitas (Perfections), which are included in material giving, fearlessness giving, and Dharma-dana (Giving of Dharma). The 'Abhidharma' (Treatise on Dharma) says that the perfection of giving is material giving, the remaining five are fearlessness giving, and all six are Dharma-dana (Giving of Dharma).

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。此與世親金剛波若論相違。彼云。檀度攝於六。資生．無畏．法。此中一二三。是名修行住。如次配釋。七十八．及三十九初。以財．法．無畏為次。卷下又說財．無畏．法為次同此。此等廣解相。不能煩述。然施財名財施。施他不令豺狼等畏名無畏施。法施可知。

論。戒有三種至饒益有情戒。

述曰。律儀戒是善任持。攝善法戒是菩提任持。是彼因故。饒益有情戒是大悲任持。律者法律。儀者儀式。無性云。于不善能遠離．防護．受持。故名律儀。此即是戒。故名律儀戒。世親．無性。皆言律儀戒是依持戒。為顯建立其餘二戒。是故安住律儀戒者。能建立攝善法戒。集諸佛法后。得益有情無罪利益相。七眾戒是初體。一切佛法是第二戒。濟諸有情是第三戒。七十八云。轉舍不善戒。轉生善戒。轉生利生戒。義亦同此。

論。忍有三種至諦察法忍。

述曰。對法雲。耐怨害忍是不捨有情任持。若不耐怨害。便於彼怨是舍于彼。安受苦忍是舍下劣心任持。心若下劣不能受苦故。諦察法忍是無生法忍任持。世親同此。無性云。初忍是諸有情成熟轉因。安受苦忍是成佛因。寒熱等苦皆能忍受無退轉故。諦察法忍是前二忍所依止處。堪任甚深廣大法故。七十八名同。

論。精進有三至利樂

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這與世親（Vasubandhu）的《金剛般若論》（Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Śāstra）相違背。該論中說：『佈施（Dāna）包含六種：資生（提供生活所需）、無畏（給予安全感）、法（佛法）。這其中的一、二、三，被稱為修行之住處。』 依次對應解釋第七十八頁和第三十九頁的開頭，以財施、法施、無畏施為順序。卷下又說財施、無畏施、法施為順序，與此相同。這些廣泛的解釋在此不便詳細敘述。然而，施捨財物名為財施，施捨使他人不畏懼豺狼等名為無畏施，法施可以理解。

論：戒有三種，乃至饒益有情戒。

述曰：律儀戒是善於任持（Samvara，控制）。攝善法戒是菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）的任持，是菩提之因。饒益有情戒是大悲（Mahākaruṇā，偉大的慈悲）的任持。律是法律，儀是儀式。無性（Asaṅga）說：『對於不善能夠遠離、防護、受持，所以名為律儀。』 這就是戒，所以名為律儀戒。世親、無性都說律儀戒是依持戒，爲了顯示建立其餘二戒。所以安住于律儀戒的人，能夠建立攝善法戒，聚集諸佛法后，得到利益有情無罪的利益之相。七眾戒是最初的體，一切佛法是第二戒，濟度諸有情是第三戒。第七十八頁說：『轉舍不善戒，轉生善戒，轉生利生戒。』 意義也與此相同。

論：忍有三種，乃至諦察法忍。

述曰：《對法》（Abhidharma）中說：『耐怨害忍是不捨有情任持。』 如果不能忍耐怨恨和傷害，那麼對於怨恨就是捨棄了他們。安受苦忍是捨棄下劣心任持。心如果下劣就不能承受痛苦。諦察法忍是無生法忍任持。世親的觀點與此相同。無性說：『初忍是諸有情成熟的轉因。安受苦忍是成佛之因，寒冷炎熱等苦都能忍受，沒有退轉的緣故。諦察法忍是前二忍所依止之處，堪能承受甚深廣大的法。』 第七十八頁的名稱相同。

論：精進有三，乃至利樂

【English Translation】 English version: This contradicts Vasubandhu's Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā Śāstra. It says: 'Dāna (generosity) includes six: sustenance (providing necessities), fearlessness (giving security), Dharma (the teachings). Among these, one, two, and three are called the dwelling places of practice.' It explains sequentially the beginning of pages seventy-eight and thirty-nine, with the order of wealth-giving, Dharma-giving, and fearlessness-giving. The lower section also says the order is wealth-giving, fearlessness-giving, and Dharma-giving, which is the same as this. These extensive explanations cannot be described in detail here. However, giving wealth is called wealth-giving, giving so that others do not fear jackals, etc., is called fearlessness-giving, and Dharma-giving is understandable.

Treatise: There are three types of precepts, up to the precept of benefiting sentient beings.

Commentary: The precept of discipline (Śīla) is good at upholding (Samvara, restraint). The precept of gathering good dharmas is the upholding of Bodhi (enlightenment), because it is the cause of Bodhi. The precept of benefiting sentient beings is the upholding of Mahākaruṇā (great compassion). 'Law' means laws, and 'ceremony' means rituals. Asaṅga said: 'Being able to stay away from, protect against, and uphold non-virtue is called discipline.' This is the precept, so it is called the precept of discipline. Vasubandhu and Asaṅga both say that the precept of discipline is the precept to rely on, in order to show the establishment of the other two precepts. Therefore, one who dwells in the precept of discipline can establish the precept of gathering good dharmas, and after gathering all the Buddha-dharmas, obtain the aspect of benefiting sentient beings without sin. The precepts of the seven assemblies are the initial substance, all Buddha-dharmas are the second precept, and saving all sentient beings is the third precept. Page seventy-eight says: 'Transforming and abandoning non-virtuous precepts, transforming and generating virtuous precepts, transforming and generating precepts that benefit beings.' The meaning is also the same as this.

Treatise: There are three types of patience, up to the patience of examining the Dharma.

Commentary: The Abhidharma says: 'The patience of enduring resentment and harm is the upholding of not abandoning sentient beings.' If one cannot endure resentment and harm, then one is abandoning them to resentment. The patience of accepting suffering is the upholding of abandoning an inferior mind. If the mind is inferior, it cannot endure suffering. The patience of examining the Dharma is the upholding of the non-arising Dharma. Vasubandhu's view is the same as this. Asaṅga said: 'The initial patience is the transforming cause of the maturation of all sentient beings. The patience of accepting suffering is the cause of becoming a Buddha, because one can endure cold, heat, and other sufferings without regression. The patience of examining the Dharma is the place where the first two patiences rely, capable of enduring the profound and vast Dharma.' The names on page seventy-eight are the same.

Treatise: There are three types of diligence, up to benefiting and delighting

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精進。

述曰。攝論等皆云。一被甲精進。即解經中初有勢句。對法雲。善根方便任持。七十八同。攝論等云。二加行精進。即解經中次有勤句。對法雲善根圓證任持。七十八云。轉生善法加行精進。即與此同。名體俱寬。攝論等云。無怯弱。無退轉。無喜足。即經所說有勇．堅猛．不捨善軛句。世親攝論次第廣解稍好。對法雲。饒益有情精進。即善根無盡任持。七十八同對法．及此處。然對法及此論。以二利為度。六度皆有利生之說。所以第三精進名饒益生。即初二精進攝五句盡。攝善寬故。是善根圓證任持故。若方便。若正證。皆此攝故。體寬而名狹。攝論但以自利為精進度故。三精進無利生說。以攝五句加行為狹。唯攝有勤故。攝善精進解經五句。不同對法第十二名狹體寬。復異攝論名義俱狹。由此論意名義俱寬故。利樂有情精進。與對法同然此三勤與四十二解同。彼論初云。被甲精進。勢與此同。餘名無別。然彼廣解。瓔珞經云。一起大誓心。二方便進趣。三勤化眾生。不能繁述。

論。靜慮有三至辨事靜慮。

述曰。攝論等同　安住者。安住現法樂住故。對法名無厭倦任持。無性云。離慢．見等得清凈故　引發者。引六通故。對法雲諸所思事成滿任持　辨事者。彼名成所作事。義與此同

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 精進。

述曰。《攝大乘論》等都說，一、被甲精進（披上盔甲般的精進），即解釋經文中最初的『有勢』句。對法論中說，『善根方便任持』，與《瑜伽師地論》第七十八卷相同。《攝大乘論》等說，二、加行精進（在修行道路上不斷努力的精進），即解釋經文中其次的『有勤』句。對法論中說，『善根圓證任持』。《瑜伽師地論》第七十八卷說，『轉生善法加行精進』，即與此相同，名稱和本體都更寬泛。《攝大乘論》等說，『無怯弱、無退轉、無喜足』，即經文所說的『有勇、堅猛、不捨善軛』句。世親菩薩在《攝大乘論》中次第廣泛地解釋，稍好。對法論中說，『饒益有情精進』，即『善根無盡任持』，《瑜伽師地論》第七十八卷相同。對法論和此論，都以自利利他為尺度，六度都包含利益眾生的說法，所以第三種精進名為饒益有情。即最初兩種精進涵蓋了五句的全部意義，因為攝善的範圍寬廣，是善根圓滿證得的任持，無論是方便還是正證，都包含在此中，本體寬泛而名稱狹窄。《攝大乘論》只以自利作為精進的尺度，三種精進沒有利益眾生的說法，以涵蓋五句的加行為狹窄，只涵蓋『有勤』。攝善精進解釋經文五句，不同於對法論第十二卷的名稱狹窄而本體寬泛，又不同於《攝大乘論》的名稱和意義都狹窄。由此論的意義是名稱和意義都寬泛，利益有情，使眾生快樂的精進，與對法論相同。然而這三種精進與《瑜伽師地論》第四十二卷的解釋相同，該論最初說，『被甲精進』，氣勢與此相同，其餘名稱沒有區別。然而該論廣泛地解釋。《瓔珞經》說，一、發起大誓願心，二、方便進取，三、勤奮教化眾生，不能詳細敘述。

論。靜慮有三：至辨事靜慮。

述曰。《攝大乘論》等相同。安住者，安住于現世的快樂，所以。對法論中名為『無厭倦任持』。無性菩薩說，遠離我慢、邪見等，得到清凈的緣故。引發者，引發六神通的緣故。對法論中說，諸所思之事成就圓滿的任持。辨事者，該論中名為成就所作之事，意義與此相同。

【English Translation】 English version Effort.

Statement: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts all state that the first, 'armored effort' (being armored with effort), explains the initial phrase 'having power' in the sutra. The Abhidharmasamuccaya states, 'sustaining skillful roots with skillful means,' which is the same as in the Yogācārabhūmi chapter seventy-eight. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts state that the second, 'applied effort' (effort in application), explains the subsequent phrase 'having diligence' in the sutra. The Abhidharmasamuccaya states, 'sustaining the complete realization of skillful roots.' Chapter seventy-eight of the Yogācārabhūmi states, 'applied effort that generates skillful dharmas,' which is the same as this, with both name and substance being broader. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts state, 'without timidity, without regression, without contentment,' which are the phrases 'having courage, firmness, not abandoning the yoke of goodness' spoken of in the sutra. Vasubandhu's explanation in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, with its sequential and extensive explanation, is slightly better. The Abhidharmasamuccaya states, 'effort that benefits sentient beings,' which is 'sustaining the inexhaustibility of skillful roots,' the same as in chapter seventy-eight. Both the Abhidharmasamuccaya and this treatise use benefiting oneself and others as the measure. The six perfections all contain the teaching of benefiting beings, so the third effort is called benefiting beings. That is, the first two efforts encompass all five phrases, because the scope of gathering goodness is broad, and it is the sustaining of the complete realization of skillful roots. Whether it is skillful means or correct realization, all are encompassed within this, the substance is broad but the name is narrow. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha only uses benefiting oneself as the measure of effort, so the three efforts do not speak of benefiting beings, and the applied effort that encompasses the five phrases is narrow, only encompassing 'having diligence.' The effort of gathering goodness explains the five phrases of the sutra, differing from the Abhidharmasamuccaya's twelfth chapter, which has a narrow name but a broad substance, and also differing from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, which has both a narrow name and meaning. Therefore, the meaning of this treatise is that both name and meaning are broad, the effort of benefiting and bringing joy to sentient beings is the same as in the Abhidharmasamuccaya. However, these three efforts are the same as the explanation in chapter forty-two of the Yogācārabhūmi. That treatise initially states, 'armored effort,' the momentum is the same as this, and the remaining names are no different. However, that treatise explains extensively. The Yingluo Sutra states, first, 'arising with a great vow mind,' second, 'skillfully advancing,' third, 'diligently transforming sentient beings,' which cannot be elaborated upon.

Treatise: There are three kinds of dhyāna (meditative concentration): up to bhinatti-citta-dhyāna (discriminating-matter dhyāna).

Statement: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other texts are the same. 'Abiding' means abiding in the pleasure of the present dharma. The Abhidharmasamuccaya calls it 'sustaining without weariness.' Asaṅga says, 'Because of being separated from pride, wrong views, etc., one obtains purity.' 'Generating' means generating the six abhijñā (supernormal knowledges). The Abhidharmasamuccaya states, 'sustaining the complete fulfillment of all that is thought of.' 'Discriminating matter' is called 'accomplishing what is to be done' in that treatise, the meaning is the same as this.

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。依此辨利有情事故。以能止息饑儉等故。對法雲御眾業任持。名饒益有情靜慮。從果為名。今此中以定能起辨有情事功能立稱。四十三說。一現法樂住。從果為名。二能引菩薩等持功德靜慮。三饒益有情靜慮。並義同此。七十八亦同。

論。般若有三至俱空無分別惠。

述曰。諸論但明六種度故。攝論等云以加行．正智．后得為三。對法以緣世俗。緣勝義。緣有情。為三。從勝功德說。意同攝論。對法自解。即合第十為第六故。所以俱通二利。此論別開理．事二智各別明故。第六自利。第十通也。所以諸論不同。第四十三云。一證真如惠。二五明處三聚中決定善巧惠。三大悲相應惠。但明六度。亦同對法。雖諸文異義意一也。七十八同此。瓔珞經云。一照有諦。二照無諦。三中道第一義諦。

論。方便善巧至拔濟方便善巧。

述曰。攝論第七解十地中。方便度者。謂以前六度所集善根。共諸有情。回求無上正等菩提。故世親云。此由般若及與大悲。以諸善根回求無上菩提是般若。作諸有情一切義利是大悲。故無性云。不捨生死而求涅槃。大悲故不捨生死。般若故求涅槃。四十九說。如前所說。十二行相方便善巧。當知說名方便善巧度。十二行相者。前四十五說。合有十二種方便善巧。成熟

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：根據辨別利益有情的事，因為能夠止息饑荒等災難的緣故。《對法論》中說，管理大眾的事務，任持（維持）饒益有情的禪定，這是名為饒益有情靜慮。這是從結果來命名的。現在這裡以禪定能夠發起辨別有情事務的功能來立名。第四十三卷說：一、現法樂住（當下獲得快樂的住所），這是從結果來命名的。二、能夠引生菩薩等持功德的靜慮。三、饒益有情的靜慮。意義與此相同。第七十八卷也相同。

論：般若（智慧）有三，即至俱空無分別慧（達到一切皆空，沒有分別的智慧）。

述記：各論只說明六種波羅蜜（度）的緣故。《攝大乘論》等說，以加行（修行）、正智（正確的智慧）、后得（后得智）為三。《對法論》以緣世俗（緣於世俗）、緣勝義（緣于勝義）、緣有情（緣于有情）為三。這是從殊勝的功德來說的，意思與《攝大乘論》相同。《對法論》自己解釋，就是合併第十種波羅蜜為第六種的緣故。所以都通於自利和利他。此論分別開立理智（對真理的智慧）和事智（對事物的智慧），各自說明的緣故。第六種是自利，第十種是通於二利。所以各論不同。第四十三卷說：一、證真如慧（證悟真如的智慧）。二、五明處三聚中決定善巧慧（在五明處和三聚中做出決定的善巧智慧）。三、大悲相應慧（與大悲心相應的智慧）。只說明六度，也與《對法論》相同。雖然各經文不同，但意義是一樣的。第七十八卷與此相同。《瓔珞經》說：一、照有諦（照見有之真諦）。二、照無諦（照見無之真諦）。三、中道第一義諦（中道第一義諦）。

論：方便善巧（善用方法和技巧）乃至拔濟方便善巧（救拔濟助的方便善巧）。

述記：《攝大乘論》第七解釋十地中的方便度時說，用以前六度所集聚的善根，共同迴向給一切有情，迴向求取無上正等菩提。所以世親菩薩說，這是由於般若（智慧）以及大悲（慈悲）。以諸善根迴向求取無上菩提是般若，為一切有情做一切利益的事情是大悲。所以無性菩薩說，不捨棄生死而求涅槃，因為大悲的緣故不捨棄生死，因為般若的緣故求涅槃。第四十九卷說，如前面所說的十二行相方便善巧，應當知道說名為方便善巧度。十二行相，前面第四十五卷說，合起來有十二種方便善巧，成熟有情。

【English Translation】 English version: According to the matter of distinguishing and benefiting sentient beings, because it can stop famine and other disasters. The Abhidharma says, 'Managing the affairs of the masses, upholding the samadhi of benefiting sentient beings,' this is called 'Benefiting Sentient Beings Dhyana (meditative absorption).' This is named from the result. Now, here, it is named by the function of dhyana being able to initiate the matter of distinguishing sentient beings. Volume 43 says: 1. 'Present Life Blissful Abiding,' named from the result. 2. Dhyana that can lead to the merits of samadhi of Bodhisattvas. 3. Dhyana that benefits sentient beings. The meaning is the same as this. Volume 78 is also the same.

Treatise: Prajna (wisdom) has three, namely, the wisdom of reaching complete emptiness and non-discrimination.

Commentary: The treatises only explain the six paramitas (perfections), hence the Mahayana-samgraha etc. say that they are the three of application, correct wisdom, and subsequent attainment. The Abhidharma takes the three of being related to the mundane, related to the ultimate, and related to sentient beings. This is spoken from the perspective of superior merit, and the meaning is the same as the Mahayana-samgraha. The Abhidharma explains itself, which is to combine the tenth paramita into the sixth. Therefore, it encompasses both self-benefit and benefiting others. This treatise separately establishes the wisdom of principle and the wisdom of affairs, explaining them separately. The sixth is for self-benefit, and the tenth encompasses both. Therefore, the treatises differ. Volume 43 says: 1. Wisdom of realizing tathata (suchness). 2. Wisdom of decisive skill in the five sciences and the three aggregates. 3. Wisdom corresponding to great compassion. It only explains the six paramitas, which is also the same as the Abhidharma. Although the texts differ, the meaning is the same. Volume 78 is the same as this. The Inra's Net Sutra says: 1. Illuminating the truth of existence. 2. Illuminating the truth of non-existence. 3. The supreme truth of the Middle Way.

Treatise: Skillful means (expedient methods) up to the skillful means of rescuing and aiding.

Commentary: The seventh volume of the Mahayana-samgraha explains the upaya-paramita (perfection of skillful means) in the ten bhumis (grounds), saying that it uses the roots of goodness accumulated from the previous six paramitas, jointly dedicating them to all sentient beings, dedicating them to seeking unsurpassed complete and perfect bodhi (enlightenment). Therefore, Vasubandhu says that this is due to prajna (wisdom) and great compassion. Dedicating all roots of goodness to seeking unsurpassed bodhi is prajna, and doing all beneficial things for all sentient beings is great compassion. Therefore, Asanga says that not abandoning samsara (cycle of rebirth) while seeking nirvana (liberation), is not abandoning samsara because of great compassion, and seeking nirvana because of prajna. Volume 49 says that, as mentioned before, the twelve aspects of skillful means should be known as the upaya-kausalya-paramita (perfection of skillful means). The twelve aspects, as mentioned in Volume 45, together constitute twelve kinds of skillful means, maturing sentient beings.

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佛法有六。成熟有情有六。合名十二行相。成熟佛法六為般若。成熟有情六為大悲。如彼廣解。對法十四。有四種方便善巧。勘同異。瓔珞有三。一進趣向果。二巧會有文。三一切不捨不受。此中迴向即般若。拔濟即大悲。

論。愿有二種至利樂他愿。

述曰。攝論說。謂發種種微妙大愿。引攝當來波羅蜜多殊勝眾緣。無性云。求到彼岸緣。為利有情故。及為速證佛果涅槃。世親云。此愿即度。名為愿度。愿為當來。此是所為。第七轉聲。為當來故發種種愿四十九說。如前五種大愿名波羅蜜多。五大愿者。四十五說。一發心願。謂初發菩提心。二受生愿。愿當來隨順生諸善趣饒益有情。三所行愿。無倒思擇諸法。愿于境界修習無量等殊勝功德。四正愿。愿當來攝受一切菩提功德若總若別。五大愿此從正愿所出。此復有十種。謂供養無邊佛等。此中初是菩提愿。餘利樂他愿為利有情起此愿故。此中配屬如文可知。瓔珞有三。一自行愿。二神通愿。三外化愿。

論。力有二種至修習力。

述曰。攝論說。由思擇．修習二力。令前六度無間現行。無性云。此中且說二力。其餘諸力亦攝在中。思擇諸法而修習故。四十九云。所有十力加行清凈。名力波羅蜜多。十力加行清凈者。此中何者為思擇為修習

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：佛法有六種，成熟有情（眾生）也有六種，合起來稱為十二行相。成熟佛法的六種是般若（智慧），成熟有情的六種是大悲（慈悲）。具體內容如相關經文廣為解釋。對法（阿毗達磨）有十四種，有四種方便善巧。勘同異（勘察相同和不同之處）。瓔珞（比喻莊嚴）有三種：一是進趣向果（趨向果位的修行），二是巧會有文（巧妙地理解經文），三是一切不捨不受（不執著于任何事物）。其中，迴向（將功德迴向給眾生）即是般若，拔濟（救拔濟度眾生）即是大悲。

論：愿有兩種，即利益自己之愿和利益他人之愿。

述曰：《攝大乘論》說，即發起種種微妙的大愿，引導攝取未來波羅蜜多（到彼岸）殊勝的因緣。無性菩薩說，爲了到達彼岸的因緣，爲了利益有情眾生，以及爲了迅速證得佛果涅槃。世親菩薩說，此愿即是度（度脫），名為愿度（以願力來度脫）。愿是針對未來而言的，這是所要做的。第七轉聲（梵文語法中的一種變格），爲了未來而發起種種愿，四十九說（指《瑜伽師地論》四十九卷）中說，如前五種大愿名為波羅蜜多。五大愿，四十五說（指《瑜伽師地論》四十五卷）中說：一是發心愿，即最初發起菩提心（覺悟之心）；二是受生愿，愿未來隨順生於諸善趣（好的去處），饒益有情；三是所行愿，無倒（沒有顛倒）地思擇諸法，愿于境界修習無量等殊勝功德；四是正愿，愿未來攝受一切菩提功德，無論是總的還是別的；五是大愿，此從正愿所出。此復有十種，即供養無邊佛等。其中，初是菩提愿，其餘是利樂他愿，爲了利益有情而起此愿。此中配屬如文可知。瓔珞有三種：一是自行愿，二是神通愿，三是外化愿。

論：力有兩種，即思擇力（思維抉擇的力量）和修習力（修行的力量）。

述曰：《攝大乘論》說，由思擇、修習二力，令前六度（六種到達彼岸的方法）無間現行。無性菩薩說，此中且說二力，其餘諸力也攝在其中，因為思擇諸法而修習。四十九云（指《瑜伽師地論》四十九卷）說，所有十力（佛的十種力量）加行清凈，名為力波羅蜜多。十力加行清凈者，此中何者為思擇，何者為修習？

【English Translation】 English version: There are six Dharmas (teachings) and six ways to mature sentient beings. Combined, they are called the twelve aspects. The six that mature the Dharma are Prajna (wisdom), and the six that mature sentient beings are Mahakaruna (great compassion). The details are explained extensively in related scriptures. There are fourteen aspects of Abhidharma (higher teachings), with four skillful means. 'Kan Tong Yi' (examining similarities and differences). There are three types of 'Ying Luo' (ornaments, metaphors for adornment): first, 'Jin Qu Xiang Guo' (progressing towards the fruition); second, 'Qiao Hui You Wen' (skillfully understanding the scriptures); and third, 'Yi Qie Bu She Bu Shou' (not clinging to anything). Among them, 'Hui Xiang' (dedicating merit to all beings) is Prajna, and 'Ba Ji' (rescuing and delivering beings) is Mahakaruna.

Treatise: There are two types of vows: vows to benefit oneself and vows to benefit others.

Commentary: The 'Mahayana-samgraha' states that it refers to making various subtle and great vows, guiding and gathering the superior causes and conditions for future Paramitas (perfections). Vasubandhu says that for the sake of reaching the other shore, for the benefit of sentient beings, and for the sake of quickly attaining Buddhahood and Nirvana. 'Shi Qin' (Vasubandhu) says, this vow is 'Du' (deliverance), called 'Vow of Deliverance'. Vows are directed towards the future, and this is what needs to be done. The seventh case (a grammatical term), for the sake of the future, making various vows. 'Si Shi Jiu Shuo' (Yoga-bhumi-sastra, volume 49) says, like the previous five great vows are called Paramitas. The five great vows, 'Si Shi Wu Shuo' (Yoga-bhumi-sastra, volume 45) says: first, the vow of aspiration, which is initially arousing Bodhicitta (the mind of enlightenment); second, the vow of rebirth, wishing to be reborn in good realms in the future, benefiting sentient beings; third, the vow of practice, discerning all Dharmas without inversion, wishing to cultivate immeasurable and excellent merits in all realms; fourth, the proper vow, wishing to receive all Bodhi merits in the future, both general and specific; fifth, the great vow, which comes from the proper vow. Furthermore, there are ten types, such as making offerings to boundless Buddhas. Among them, the first is the Bodhi vow, and the rest are vows to benefit oneself and others, arising from the wish to benefit sentient beings. The allocation here can be understood from the text. There are three types of 'Ying Luo' (ornaments): first, the vow of self-practice; second, the vow of supernatural powers; and third, the vow of external transformation.

Treatise: There are two types of power: the power of discernment (thinking and deciding) and the power of cultivation (practice).

Commentary: The 'Mahayana-samgraha' states that through the power of discernment and cultivation, the previous six Paramitas (six perfections) manifest without interruption. Vasubandhu says that only these two powers are mentioned here, but all other powers are also included, because they are cultivated through discerning all Dharmas. 'Si Shi Jiu Yun' (Yoga-bhumi-sastra, volume 49) says that all ten powers (the ten powers of a Buddha) with pure effort are called the Power Paramita. Those with pure effort of the ten powers, which of these is discernment and which is cultivation?

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。此文義配可知。瓔珞有三。一報通力。二修定通力。三變化通力。

論。智有二種至成就有情智。

述曰。攝論云。謂由前六成立妙智。受用法樂。成熟有情。無性云。由施等六成立此智。復由此智成立六種名受法樂。由此妙智慧正了知此施戒等饒益有情。世親云。由般若波羅蜜多無分別智自性等故。成立后得智。復由此智成立前六波羅蜜多。由此自為與同法者受用法樂成熟有情。四十九說。於一切法如實安立清凈妙智。名智波羅蜜。當知能取勝義惠名惠波羅蜜。能取世俗惠名智波羅蜜。有多複次后四度異門。如彼廣解。雖四十九言於一切法妙智。即后得智。談體故一。今此論等中論用故二。不相違也。瓔珞有三。一無相智。二一切種智。三變化智。雖引此經未可為證。以後四種即第六體。今但有二無有三也。此中十八。或二十六。于地前具幾。乃至佛具幾。初施中財施。攝后余度何者。乃至成熟有情智攝前度何者。皆如對法第十二抄解。總是第一列彼名也。顯揚第三雖亦解十度。無別相故不繁引之。

次第二齣體者。

論。此十性者至三業為性。

述曰。即以無貪及相應思。並彼所發身．語業為體。對法第十一云。施自體者。謂身語意業。然是三業諸度通性故。所以無無貪。如三

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這個文義應該可以理解。瓔珞有三種：一是報得神通力，二是修定神通力，三是變化神通力。

論：智慧有兩種，直到成就利益有情眾生的智慧。

述記：攝論說：『由前面的六度成立妙智，享受法樂，成熟有情。』無性說：『由佈施等六度成立此智，又由此智成立六種，名為享受法樂。』由此妙智慧夠正確了知佈施、持戒等饒益有情。世親說：『由般若波羅蜜多的無分別智自性等，成立后得智。又由此智成立前六波羅蜜多。』由此自己和同修道者享受法樂，成熟有情。四十九說：『於一切法如實安立清凈妙智，名為智波羅蜜（Prajnaparamita，智慧圓滿）。』應當知道，能夠取證勝義的慧名為慧波羅蜜（Prajnaparamita，智慧圓滿），能夠取證世俗的慧名為智波羅蜜（Prajnaparamita，智慧圓滿）。還有多次說后四度是異門，如彼處廣為解釋。雖然四十九說於一切法妙智，即是后得智，談論的是本體，所以說是一個。現在這部論等中，論述的是作用，所以說是兩個，不相違背。瓔珞有三種：一、無相智，二、一切種智，三、變化智。雖然引用這部經，但不能作為證據，因為后四種就是第六度的本體。現在只有兩種，沒有三種。此中十八種或二十六種，在地前具備幾種？乃至佛具備幾種？最初佈施中，財施包含後面的哪些度？乃至成熟有情智包含前面的哪些度？都如對法第十二抄解。總是第一列出那些名稱。顯揚第三雖然也解釋了十度，但沒有特別的相，所以不繁瑣地引用。

其次，第二部分是闡述體性：

論：這十種體性，直到以身、語、意三業為體。

述記：就是以無貪以及相應的思，以及它們所引發的身、語業為體。對法第十一說：『佈施的自體，是指身語意業。』然而這是三業諸度的通性，所以沒有無貪，如三...

【English Translation】 English version: This meaning should be understandable. There are three kinds of 'yingluo' (瓔珞, necklaces/adornments): first, the power of retribution-born supernatural abilities; second, the power of meditative concentration-born supernatural abilities; and third, the power of transformation-born supernatural abilities.

Treatise: There are two kinds of wisdom, up to the wisdom that accomplishes the benefit of sentient beings.

Commentary: The 'She Lun' (攝論, Compendium of Treatises) says: 'The preceding six perfections establish wonderful wisdom, enjoying the bliss of the Dharma, and maturing sentient beings.' 'Wu Xing' (無性, Asanga's disciple) says: 'These six, such as giving, establish this wisdom, and this wisdom establishes six kinds, called enjoying the bliss of the Dharma.' This wonderful wisdom can correctly understand that giving, keeping precepts, etc., benefit sentient beings. 'Shi Qin' (世親, Vasubandhu) says: 'Due to the nature of non-discriminating wisdom of 'Prajnaparamita' (般若波羅蜜多, Perfection of Wisdom), the subsequent acquired wisdom is established. And this wisdom establishes the preceding six 'paramitas' (波羅蜜多, perfections).』 Thus, oneself and those who practice the Dharma together enjoy the bliss of the Dharma and mature sentient beings. 'Si Shi Jiu' (四十九, Forty-nine) says: 'To truly establish pure and wonderful wisdom in all 'dharmas' (法, teachings), is called 'Zhi Boluomi' (智波羅蜜, Wisdom Perfection).' It should be known that the wisdom that can attain the ultimate meaning is called 'Hui Boluomi' (惠波羅蜜, Wisdom Perfection), and the wisdom that can attain the mundane is called 'Zhi Boluomi' (智波羅蜜, Wisdom Perfection). There are also multiple other ways of saying that the latter four perfections are different aspects, as explained extensively there. Although 'Si Shi Jiu' (四十九, Forty-nine) speaks of wonderful wisdom in all 'dharmas' (法, teachings), which is the subsequent acquired wisdom, it speaks of the essence, so it is said to be one. Now, in this treatise, etc., it discusses the function, so it is said to be two, which is not contradictory. There are three kinds of 'yingluo' (瓔珞, necklaces/adornments): first, non-form wisdom; second, all-knowing wisdom; and third, transformation wisdom. Although this 'sutra' (經, scripture) is cited, it cannot be used as evidence, because the latter four are the essence of the sixth. Now there are only two, not three. Among these eighteen or twenty-six, how many are possessed before the ground? And how many are possessed by the Buddha? In the initial giving, which of the latter perfections does material giving include? And which of the preceding perfections does the wisdom of maturing sentient beings include? All are explained in the twelfth copy of 'Dui Fa' (對法, Abhidharma). It is always the first to list those names. Although the third 'Xian Yang' (顯揚, Manifestation of the Teaching) also explains the ten perfections, it does not have separate aspects, so it is not cited extensively.

Next, the second part is to explain the substance:

Treatise: These ten natures, up to taking the three karmas of body, speech, and mind as their substance.

Commentary: That is, taking non-greed and the corresponding thought, and the body and speech karmas that they generate, as their substance. The eleventh 'Dui Fa' (對法, Abhidharma) says: 'The substance of giving refers to the karmas of body, speech, and mind.' However, this is the common nature of the three karmas of all perfections, so there is no non-greed, such as the three...

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十九廣以九門解施。三十九解施自性云。謂諸菩薩于自身．財無所顧惜。能施一切所應施物。無貪俱思。及因此所發能施物身語二業。釋彼文者。一解。唯取三業。同對法取無貪俱思。不取無貪故。今解。亦取無貪。同此論文于財等不貪方能施故。既無別解。即三種施體性皆同。

論。戒以受學至三業為性。

述曰。對法亦以三業同此。四十云。律儀戒以七眾別解脫戒在家出家戒為體。即唯二業。攝善法戒者。謂諸菩薩受律儀后。一切為大菩提由身．語．意積集諸善為體。即通三業。饒益有情戒略有十一種。如彼廣解。亦通三業。此中總論故。以三業為性。以受時學時三業為性故。然菩薩戒自息惡戒。是何戒攝。今欲為前別故。所以且說七眾。其實菩薩戒。亦得是律儀戒。菩薩戒有意業。此中論色為律儀體。所以不說。攝善戒寬故。即令入攝善戒中故。論實亦得。若爾菩薩戒有支無支。如色法不。如別抄會。文殊所問經菩薩有五篇戒。是出世間戒若心分別男女非男女等是波羅夷。以三業乃至於樹葉欲取。犯僧伽婆尸沙。若剔毛剪爪如初月。犯偷蘭遮。如是廣說。然菩薩地四波羅夷復與此別。如第四十．四十一．四十二半廣以九門解之。

論。忍以無嗔至三業為性。

述曰。對法但以三業為性

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 十九，通過九種方式來解釋佈施（Dāna，給予）。第三十九（卷）解釋了佈施的自性，即菩薩不顧惜自己的身體和財產，能夠佈施一切應該佈施的東西，具有無貪的意念，以及由此所引發的能夠佈施事物、身體和語言的兩種行為。解釋這段文字的人認為，第一種解釋只取身、語、意三業，與《阿毗達磨》（Abhidharma）一樣，只取無貪俱生的思，不取無貪本身。現在的解釋也取無貪，與此論文相同，因為對財物等沒有貪戀才能佈施。既然沒有其他的解釋，那麼三種佈施的體性都是相同的。

論：戒（Śīla，道德）以受持和學習乃至身、語、意三業為自性。

述曰：《對法》（Abhidharma）也以身、語、意三業為自性。第四十（卷）說，律儀戒（Prātimokṣa-śīla，別解脫戒）以七眾（在家男女和出家男女等七類僧眾）的別解脫戒為體，即只有身、語二業。攝善法戒（Kuśala-dharma-saṃgraha-śīla，攝善法戒）是指菩薩受持律儀戒后，一切爲了大菩提（Mahābodhi，大覺悟）而通過身、語、意積集諸善，以此為體，即貫通身、語、意三業。饒益有情戒（Sattvārtha-kriyā-śīla，饒益有情戒）略有十一種，如彼處廣為解釋，也貫通身、語、意三業。這裡總的來說，所以以身、語、意三業為自性，因為以受戒時和學習時的身、語、意三業為自性。然而，菩薩戒中的自息惡戒屬於哪種戒呢？現在爲了與前面的戒有所區別，所以暫且只說七眾。其實菩薩戒也可以是律儀戒。菩薩戒有意業，這裡討論的是色法作為律儀戒的體，所以沒有說。攝善戒範圍更寬廣，所以就讓它歸入攝善戒中。實際上也可以這樣。如果這樣，那麼菩薩戒有支無支，就像色法一樣嗎？如其他抄本所記載。《文殊所問經》（Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-sūtra）中，菩薩有五篇戒，是出世間的戒。如果心中分別男女、非男女等，就是波羅夷（Pārājika，斷頭罪）。以身、語、意三業乃至對樹葉有欲取之心，就犯僧伽婆尸沙（Saṃghāvaśeṣa，僧殘）。如果剃毛剪指甲，就像初月一樣，就犯偷蘭遮（Sthūlātyaya，粗罪）。像這樣廣為解說。然而，《菩薩地》（Bodhisattvabhūmi）中的四波羅夷又與此不同。如第四十、四十一、四十二半廣為解釋，通過九種方式來解釋。

論：忍（Kṣānti，忍辱）以無嗔乃至身、語、意三業為自性。

述曰：《對法》（Abhidharma）只以身、語、意三業為自性。

【English Translation】 English version Nineteen, explaining giving (Dāna) through nine approaches. Thirty-nine (sections) explain the self-nature of giving, which means that Bodhisattvas do not care about their own bodies and possessions, and are able to give everything that should be given, with thoughts devoid of greed, and the two actions of body and speech arising from this that enable giving. Those who interpret this passage believe that the first explanation only takes the three karmas of body, speech, and mind, and like the Abhidharma, only takes the co-arisen thought without greed, not taking the absence of greed itself. The current explanation also takes the absence of greed, the same as this treatise, because one can only give if one is not greedy for wealth and so on. Since there is no other explanation, the nature of the three types of giving is the same.

Treatise: Morality (Śīla) takes the receiving and learning, and even the three karmas of body, speech, and mind, as its self-nature.

Commentary: The Abhidharma also takes the three karmas of body, speech, and mind as its self-nature. The fortieth (section) says that the Prātimokṣa-śīla (discipline of individual liberation) takes the individual liberation precepts of the seven assemblies (seven categories of monastics and lay people) as its substance, which is only the two karmas of body and speech. The Kuśala-dharma-saṃgraha-śīla (discipline of gathering wholesome qualities) refers to Bodhisattvas who, after receiving the Prātimokṣa precepts, accumulate all good through body, speech, and mind for the sake of great enlightenment (Mahābodhi), taking this as its substance, which pervades the three karmas of body, speech, and mind. The Sattvārtha-kriyā-śīla (discipline of benefiting sentient beings) has roughly eleven types, as explained extensively there, also pervading the three karmas of body, speech, and mind. Here, in general, it is taken as the self-nature of the three karmas, because it takes the three karmas of body, speech, and mind at the time of receiving and learning the precepts as its self-nature. However, to which precept does the self-cessation of evil precepts in the Bodhisattva precepts belong? Now, in order to distinguish it from the previous precepts, we will only talk about the seven assemblies for the time being. In fact, the Bodhisattva precepts can also be Prātimokṣa precepts. The Bodhisattva precepts have mental karma, but here we are discussing form as the substance of the Prātimokṣa precepts, so it is not mentioned. The scope of gathering wholesome qualities is wider, so it is included in the gathering of wholesome qualities. In reality, it can also be like this. If so, do the Bodhisattva precepts have branches or no branches, like form? As recorded in other copies. In the Mañjuśrīparipṛcchā-sūtra, Bodhisattvas have five categories of precepts, which are transcendent precepts. If one mentally distinguishes between male, female, non-male, etc., it is a Pārājika (defeat). If one has a desire to take even a leaf with the three karmas of body, speech, and mind, one commits a Saṃghāvaśeṣa (formal meeting required). If one shaves hair or cuts nails like the new moon, one commits a Sthūlātyaya (gross offense). Like this, it is explained extensively. However, the four Pārājikas in the Bodhisattvabhūmi are different from this. As explained extensively in the fortieth, forty-first, and forty-second halves, explained through nine approaches.

Treatise: Patience (Kṣānti) takes non-anger, and even the three karmas of body, speech, and mind, as its self-nature.

Commentary: The Abhidharma only takes the three karmas of body, speech, and mind as its self-nature.

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。是通性故。謂三種忍通以三業為性。故不別出。四十二說。云何名忍。自無憤勃。不報他怨。亦不隨眠流注相續。故名為忍。是名菩薩耐怨害忍等。彼廣明此相。耐怨害忍以無嗔及所起三業為性。彼卷又云。遇世法處苦有九種。謂衰．毀．譏．苦．壞法壞．盡法盡．老法老．病法病．死法死。若別若總。不由此緣精進懈廢等。乃至常勤修習。無變易意。無雜染心。是名菩薩安受苦忍。故此以精進．及彼所起三業為性。彼卷又云。云何菩薩法思勝解忍。謂諸菩薩於一切法能正思惟。由善觀察勝覺惠故。能於八事生勝解處。善安勝解故。故諦察法忍。以審惠為性。彼不言此有三業。若定．道俱色可名三業。正與此同。如四十二以九門分別。

論。精進以勤至三業為性。

述曰。對法但以三業為性。從諸度通相出體。四十二云擐甲等。如前說皆通三業精進為體。亦如彼以九門解。

論。靜慮但以等持為性。

述曰。等持者是三摩地。即定數。不通散有不說三業。對法雲。起三業自在用時所有一切種心恒安住。四十三云。即妙善世出世靜慮自性。彼三相雖別。皆以靜慮為體。然二種行相別如前卷。廣九門亦如彼。

論。后五皆以至后得智故。

述曰。對法．及四十三等。同以世出世間

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這是普遍的性質。也就是說，三種忍耐普遍以身、語、意三業為性質，所以不單獨列出。《四十二字門》中說：『什麼叫做忍？自己沒有憤怒怨恨，不報復他人的怨恨，也不隨著煩惱習氣流轉相續，所以叫做忍。』這就是菩薩的耐怨害忍等等。那裡詳細說明了這種相狀。耐怨害忍以沒有嗔恨以及由此產生的身、語、意三業為性質。那一卷又說：『遇到世間法處的痛苦有九種，即衰敗、毀壞、譏諷、痛苦、壞法壞、盡法盡、老法老、病法病、死法死。』無論是分別地還是總體地遇到這些，都不因此而精進懈怠等，乃至常常勤奮修習，沒有改變的心意，沒有雜染的心，這叫做菩薩的安受苦忍。』所以這種忍耐以精進以及由此產生的身、語、意三業為性質。那一卷又說：『什麼叫做菩薩的法思勝解忍？就是諸位菩薩對於一切法能夠正確地思維，由於善於觀察、殊勝覺悟的智慧，能夠對於八事產生殊勝的理解，善於安住于殊勝的理解。』所以諦察法忍以審察的智慧為性質。那裡沒有說這種忍耐有身、語、意三業。如果禪定、道都具有色法，可以稱為身、語、意三業，這與前面所說相同。如《四十二字門》以九種方式分別解釋。 論中說：『精進以勤奮努力的身、語、意三業為性質。』 述記中說：對法論只以身、語、意三業為性質，從諸波羅蜜多的普遍相狀中得出體性。《四十二字門》中說披甲等等，如前面所說，都普遍以身、語、意三業的精進為體性。也如那裡以九種方式解釋。 論中說：『靜慮只以等持為性質。』 述記中說：等持就是三摩地（Samadhi，禪定），也就是定數，不包括散亂，所以沒有說身、語、意三業。《對法論》中說：『在起用身、語、意三業自在運用時，所有一切種類的心都恒常安住。』《四十三字門》中說：『就是微妙善良的世間和出世間的靜慮自性。』這三種相狀雖然不同，都以靜慮為體性。然而兩種行相的差別如前一卷所說。廣九門也如那裡所說。 論中說：『後面的五種波羅蜜多都以達到后得智為原因。』 述記中說：《對法論》以及《四十三字門》等，都同樣以世間和出世間的智慧為基礎。

【English Translation】 English version: This is the common characteristic. That is, the three kinds of forbearance universally take the three karmas of body, speech, and mind as their nature, so they are not listed separately. The Forty-Two Syllable Gate says: 'What is called forbearance? One has no anger or resentment, does not retaliate against others' resentment, and does not follow the flow of afflictions and habits, so it is called forbearance.' This is the Bodhisattva's (Enlightenment Being) forbearance of resentment and harm, etc. It explains this characteristic in detail there. Forbearance of resentment and harm takes the absence of anger and the resulting three karmas of body, speech, and mind as its nature. That volume also says: 'Encountering the suffering in worldly dharmas (teachings, laws) there are nine kinds, namely decline, destruction, ridicule, suffering, destruction of destructible dharmas, exhaustion of exhaustible dharmas, aging of aging dharmas, sickness of sickness dharmas, and death of death dharmas.' Whether encountering these separately or collectively, one does not become diligent or lazy because of them, but constantly cultivates diligently, without a changing mind, without a defiled mind, this is called the Bodhisattva's endurance of suffering.' Therefore, this kind of forbearance takes diligence and the resulting three karmas of body, speech, and mind as its nature. That volume also says: 'What is called the Bodhisattva's forbearance of contemplating the Dharma (teachings, laws) and superior understanding? It is that all Bodhisattvas are able to think correctly about all dharmas, and because of the wisdom of good observation and superior enlightenment, they are able to generate superior understanding in the eight matters, and are good at abiding in superior understanding.' Therefore, the forbearance of examining the Dharma takes discerning wisdom as its nature. It does not say there that this kind of forbearance has the three karmas of body, speech, and mind. If Dhyana (meditation) and the Path both have form, they can be called the three karmas of body, speech, and mind, which is the same as what was said before. As the Forty-Two Syllable Gate explains in nine ways. The Treatise says: 'Diligence takes the diligent effort of the three karmas of body, speech, and mind as its nature.' The Commentary says: The Abhidharma (Buddhist teachings) only takes the three karmas of body, speech, and mind as its nature, deriving its essence from the universal characteristics of the Paramitas (perfections). The Forty-Two Syllable Gate says donning armor, etc., as mentioned before, all universally take the diligence of the three karmas of body, speech, and mind as their essence. It also explains it in nine ways there. The Treatise says: 'Dhyana (meditation) only takes Samadhi (concentration) as its nature.' The Commentary says: Samadhi (concentration) is Samadhi (concentration), which is the number of Samadhi (concentration), not including distraction, so it does not mention the three karmas of body, speech, and mind. The Abhidharma (Buddhist teachings) says: 'When freely using the three karmas of body, speech, and mind, all kinds of minds constantly abide.' The Forty-Three Syllable Gate says: 'It is the subtle and virtuous nature of worldly and supramundane Dhyana (meditation).' Although these three characteristics are different, they all take Dhyana (meditation) as their essence. However, the difference between the two kinds of practices is as mentioned in the previous volume. The extensive nine gates are also as mentioned there. The Treatise says: 'The latter five Paramitas (perfections) are all due to attaining subsequent wisdom.' The Commentary says: The Abhidharma (Buddhist teachings) and the Forty-Three Syllable Gate, etc., all similarly take worldly and supramundane wisdom as their basis.

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加行正智后得為性。下文亦言。十度皆通有漏無漏。此依實義。攝大乘第七解十地中說同此。但依勝法出后五體。非為盡理。彼云。后五應知般若無分別智．后得智攝世親．無性皆解云。若說十種度。即無分別智。是般若波羅蜜多。方便等四后得智攝。若說六度。二智皆第六攝。故分后五二智為性。

論。有義第八至為自性故。

述曰。余義無諍。唯愿不以惠為自性。即以欲．勝解．及信三為性。愿以三法為自性故。說是后得智者。唯后得智中起故初五度則不然。攝大乘等說。或欲．勝解為愿體。或信．勝解為愿。今合言之故云以三法為體。

論。此說自性至功德為性。

述曰。如前所說克性為體。若並眷屬一切功德為性。眷屬出體故。總以五蘊為十度體。即是第二齣體性也。

論。此十相者至波羅蜜多。

述曰。第三明相。云何名相。即成波羅蜜多之相貌。具此七義方名度故。闕者即非。

論。一安住最勝至一切事業。

述曰。一切事業者。謂隨順度所有事業。皆應行之成滿度故。攝論有六。除初種姓。即菩提心中攝故。然無性引頌亦似證有初種姓云。麟角喻無有六波羅蜜多。唯我最勝尊。上品到彼岸。然對法第十一。六度相中有五。安住菩薩種姓。菩提心為依

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 加行正智（修行過程中獲得的正確智慧）和后得智（證悟后獲得的智慧）是其自性。下文也說，十度（佈施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、般若、方便、愿、力、智）都通於有漏（受煩惱影響的）和無漏（不受煩惱影響的）。這是依據真實的意義。在《攝大乘論》第七品解釋十地時也這樣說。只是依據殊勝的法，將后五度單獨列出，並非窮盡其理。該論說，后五度應當知道是由般若無分別智（沒有分別的智慧）和后得智所攝。世親（Vasubandhu）和無性（Asanga）都解釋說，如果說十種度，那麼無分別智就是般若波羅蜜多（Prajnaparamita，到達智慧彼岸），方便等四度是由后得智所攝。如果說六度，那麼兩種智慧都包含在第六度（般若）中。因此，將后五度的自性分為兩種智慧。 論：有義認為第八度（愿）至為自性。 述曰：其餘的意義沒有爭議。只是愿不以智慧為自性，而是以欲（Chanda，意願）、勝解（Adhimoksha，殊勝的理解）和信（Shraddha，信心）這三種法為自性。因為愿是以這三種法為自性，所以說是后得智。只有在后得智中才會生起，而前五度則不然。《攝大乘論》等論典中說，或者欲和勝解是愿的本體，或者信和勝解是愿的本體。現在合起來說，所以說以三種法為本體。 論：此說自性至功德為性。 述曰：如前面所說，克性（特性）是本體。如果加上眷屬（相關聯的），一切功德都是自性。眷屬是從本體中生出的。總而言之，以五蘊（色、受、想、行、識）為十度的本體。這就是第二種解釋本體和自性的方式。 論：此十相者至波羅蜜多。 述曰：第三是說明相。什麼是相？就是成就波羅蜜多（Pāramitā，到達彼岸）的相貌。具備這七種意義才能稱為度，缺少任何一種就不是。 論：一安住最勝至一切事業。 述曰：一切事業，是指隨順於度的一切事業。都應當實行，才能圓滿度。在《攝大乘論》中有六種，去除了最初的種姓（Gotra，根性），因為它包含在菩提心（Bodhicitta，菩提心）中。然而，無性（Asanga）引用的偈頌也似乎證明有最初的種姓，說：『麟角喻無有六波羅蜜多，唯我最勝尊，上品到彼岸。』然而，《對法論》第十一品中，六度的相中有五種，安住于菩薩種姓，以菩提心為依據。

【English Translation】 English version 'Additional practice' (加行, Adhikarana) 'correct wisdom' (正智, Samyak-jnana) and 'subsequent wisdom' (后得智, Prsthalabdha-jnana) are its nature. The following text also says that the ten perfections (十度, Dasa-paramita) (generosity, morality, patience, diligence, concentration, wisdom, skillful means, vow, strength, and knowledge) all connect to the 'contaminated' (有漏, Sasrava) and 'uncontaminated' (無漏, Anasrava). This is based on the true meaning. The seventh chapter of the Mahayanasamgraha (攝大乘論) explains the ten grounds (十地, Dasa-bhumi) in the same way. However, based on the supreme Dharma, the latter five are listed separately, which does not exhaust the principle. That treatise says that the latter five should be known to be included in 'non-discriminating wisdom of prajna' (般若無分別智, Prajna-nirvikalpa-jnana) and 'subsequent wisdom'. Vasubandhu (世親) and Asanga (無性) both explain that if ten perfections are mentioned, then non-discriminating wisdom is the Prajnaparamita (般若波羅蜜多, Perfection of Wisdom), and the four perfections of skillful means etc. are included in subsequent wisdom. If six perfections are mentioned, then both types of wisdom are included in the sixth perfection (wisdom). Therefore, the nature of the latter five perfections is divided into two types of wisdom. Treatise: Some argue that the eighth perfection (vow) is its nature. Commentary: The other meanings are not disputed. It is only wished that the vow is not wisdom as its nature, but rather desire (Chanda, 意願), superior understanding (Adhimoksha, 殊勝的理解), and faith (Shraddha, 信心) as its nature. Because the vow has these three dharmas as its nature, it is said to be subsequent wisdom. It only arises in subsequent wisdom, which is not the case for the first five perfections. The Mahayanasamgraha etc. say that either desire and superior understanding are the essence of the vow, or faith and superior understanding are the essence of the vow. Now, they are combined, so it is said that the three dharmas are its essence. Treatise: This says that the nature is to the nature of merit. Commentary: As mentioned earlier, the specific characteristic is the essence. If the retinue (related aspects) are included, all merits are the nature. The retinue arises from the essence. In summary, the five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness) are the essence of the ten perfections. This is the second way to explain the essence and nature. Treatise: These ten aspects are the Paramita. Commentary: The third is to explain the characteristics. What are the characteristics? They are the characteristics of achieving Paramita (Pāramitā, 到達彼岸, Perfection). Having these seven meanings is called a perfection, and lacking any of them is not. Treatise: One dwells in the most supreme to all activities. Commentary: All activities refer to all activities that accord with the perfection. They should all be practiced to fulfill the perfection. There are six in the Mahayanasamgraha, removing the initial lineage (Gotra, 根性), because it is included in Bodhicitta (Bodhicitta, 菩提心, Mind of Enlightenment). However, the verse quoted by Asanga (無性) also seems to prove that there is an initial lineage, saying: 'Like a unicorn's horn, there are no six perfections, only I am the most supreme, reaching the other shore with the highest quality.' However, in the eleventh chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論), there are five aspects of the six perfections, dwelling in the Bodhisattva lineage, relying on Bodhicitta.

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止。以悲導心。舍一切時。所有三業。即有五義名六度相。然顯揚第三亦有六義成度然別於攝論不能煩引唯此論中具包諸論。

論。五巧便最勝至二障間雜。

述曰。無相智所攝受者。即第六不執三輪清凈等。迴向最勝中與第二別者。彼有道心未必一切迴向菩提。此乃迴向。清凈勝中為離二障行於度也。不為彼雜。謂三時無悔等。

論。若非此七至非到彼岸。

述曰。總結。由七所攝名度。不爾即非。

論。由斯施等至四句分別。

述曰。有是非故。一一皆應四句分別。此一一自望。即種類福為四句。謂施非度。不求菩提等。是度非施。隨喜施等。亦度亦施等可知。若不約種類福。次第修者。施為三句。無是波羅蜜非施故。餘五度得為四句。前有施度得為句故。若非次第者。皆得為四句。此中有三爾四句。

論。此但有十至無增減故。

述曰。第四不增減門。初總解。約地斷障證如釋可解。障者即十地十無明等障。對法十二云。所知障等皆度所治。各依慳吝．犯戒．憎恚．懈怠．散亂．惡惠等障故。就惡惠中復分為后四。故總名為障。離惡惠為五名為十障者非也。下文自別出六障故。

論。複次前六至相違障故。

述曰。下次明說六所以有六義。初明

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：停止（止）。以慈悲引導內心（以悲導心），在任何時候（舍一切時），所有身、口、意三方面的行為（所有三業），就具有五種含義，稱為六度（六波羅蜜，Paramita）的體相（即佈施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、智慧）。然而，《顯揚聖教論》（顯揚第三）中也有六種含義成就波羅蜜，但不同於《攝大乘論》，不能繁瑣地引用，只有這部論中完全包含了各種論述。

論：五種巧妙方便最為殊勝（五巧便最勝），直到兩種障礙相互混雜（二障間雜）。

述記：被無相智慧所攝受的（無相智所攝受者），就是第六波羅蜜（智慧波羅蜜），不執著於三輪清凈等等。在迴向最為殊勝中，與第二波羅蜜（持戒波羅蜜）的區別在於（迴向最勝中與第二別者），後者具有菩提心，但未必一切都回向菩提，而前者是迴向。在清凈殊勝中，是爲了遠離兩種障礙而修行波羅蜜（清凈勝中為離二障行於度也），不與那些（障礙）混雜。所謂三時無悔等等（謂三時無悔等）。

論：如果不是這七種因素所攝受（若非此七），就不能到達彼岸（非到彼岸）。

述記：總結。由七種因素所攝受，才稱為波羅蜜（由七所攝名度），否則就不是。

論：由於這個原因，佈施等等（由斯施等），用四句來分別（四句分別）。

述記：因為有是與非的緣故（有是非故），每一種都應該用四句來分別。這每一種自身來看（此一一自望），就是種類福報分為四句。所謂佈施不是波羅蜜（謂施非度），不求菩提等等。是波羅蜜但不是佈施（是度非施），隨喜佈施等等。既是波羅蜜又是佈施等等，可以知道（亦度亦施等可知）。如果不按照種類福報，次第修習（若不約種類福，次第修者），佈施分為三句，沒有是波羅蜜但不是佈施的情況（施為三句，無是波羅蜜非施故）。其餘五種波羅蜜可以分為四句（餘五度得為四句），因為前面有佈施波羅蜜可以作為一句。如果不是次第修習，都可以分為四句（若非次第者，皆得為四句）。這裡面有三種情況可以分為四句（此中有三爾四句）。

論：這隻有十種（此但有十），沒有增減的緣故（無增減故）。

述記：第四不增減門。首先總的解釋。按照十地斷除障礙，證得真如來解釋就可以理解（約地斷障證如釋可解）。障礙就是十地中的十種無明等等障礙（障者即十地十無明等障）。《對法論》（對法十二）中說，所知障等等都是波羅蜜所對治的（所知障等皆度所治），各自依靠慳吝、犯戒、憎恚、懈怠、散亂、惡慧等等障礙的緣故（各依慳吝．犯戒．憎恚．懈怠．散亂．惡惠等障故）。就惡慧中又分為后四種（就惡惠中復分為后四），所以總的名稱是障礙。離開惡慧分為五種，稱為十種障礙是不對的（故總名為障。離惡惠為五名為十障者非也）。下文自己會分別說出六種障礙的緣故（下文自別出六障故）。

論：再次，前面的六種（複次前六），與相互違背的障礙的緣故（相違障故）。

述記：下次說明六種，所以有六種含義。首先說明（初明）。

【English Translation】 English version: Stop (止). Guiding the mind with compassion (以悲導心), at all times (舍一切時), all actions of body, speech, and mind (所有三業), then have five meanings, called the characteristics of the six perfections (六度, Six Paramitas) (i.e., generosity, discipline, patience, diligence, concentration, and wisdom). However, the 'Exposition of the Holy Teachings' (顯揚第三) also has six meanings that accomplish the perfections, but it is different from the 'Compendium of the Great Vehicle' (攝大乘論), and cannot be cited in detail. Only this treatise fully encompasses all the treatises.

Treatise: The five skillful means are the most supreme (五巧便最勝), until the two obstacles are intermingled (二障間雜).

Commentary: Those embraced by non-dual wisdom (無相智所攝受者), are the sixth perfection (wisdom perfection), not clinging to the purity of the three wheels, etc. The difference between the most supreme in dedication and the second perfection (discipline perfection) (迴向最勝中與第二別者) is that the latter has the mind of Bodhi, but not necessarily dedicates everything to Bodhi, while the former is dedication. In the purity of the supreme, it is to practice the perfections to be free from the two obstacles (清凈勝中為離二障行於度也), not mixed with those (obstacles). So-called no regret in the three times, etc. (謂三時無悔等).

Treatise: If it is not embraced by these seven factors (若非此七), then one cannot reach the other shore (非到彼岸).

Commentary: Conclusion. It is called perfection because it is embraced by seven factors (由七所攝名度), otherwise it is not.

Treatise: Because of this, generosity, etc. (由斯施等), use four sentences to distinguish (四句分別).

Commentary: Because there are yes and no (有是非故), each one should be distinguished by four sentences. Looking at each one itself (此一一自望), that is, the types of blessings are divided into four sentences. So-called generosity is not perfection (謂施非度), not seeking Bodhi, etc. It is perfection but not generosity (是度非施), rejoicing in generosity, etc. It can be known that it is both perfection and generosity, etc. (亦度亦施等可知). If one does not practice in order according to the types of blessings (若不約種類福，次第修者), generosity is divided into three sentences, there is no case where it is perfection but not generosity (施為三句，無是波羅蜜非施故). The remaining five perfections can be divided into four sentences (餘五度得為四句), because there is generosity perfection in front that can be used as a sentence. If it is not practiced in order, all can be divided into four sentences (若非次第者，皆得為四句). There are three cases here that can be divided into four sentences (此中有三爾四句).

Treatise: There are only these ten (此但有十), because there is no increase or decrease (無增減故).

Commentary: The fourth gate of no increase or decrease. First, a general explanation. It can be understood by explaining according to the ten grounds, cutting off obstacles, and attaining Suchness (約地斷障證如釋可解). Obstacles are the ten kinds of ignorance in the ten grounds, etc. (障者即十地十無明等障). The 'Abhidharma Treatise' (對法十二) says that the obstacles to knowledge, etc., are all what the perfections counteract (所知障等皆度所治), each relying on obstacles such as stinginess, breaking precepts, hatred, laziness, distraction, and evil wisdom, etc. (各依慳吝．犯戒．憎恚．懈怠．散亂．惡惠等障故). In evil wisdom, it is further divided into the latter four types (就惡惠中復分為后四), so the general name is obstacles. It is incorrect to divide it into five types by leaving evil wisdom and call it ten obstacles (故總名為障。離惡惠為五名為十障者非也). The following text will separately state the six obstacles (下文自別出六障故).

Treatise: Furthermore, the previous six (複次前六), are due to the obstacles that contradict each other (相違障故).

Commentary: Next, explain the six, so there are six meanings. First explain (初明).

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治六障。對法．攝論所治皆說六蔽。即是六種相違障也。又如攝大乘。說不發趣因等。以上所言說十所以。一十地修行故。二治十障故。三證十真如故。此約十地為論。下依六說十。謂慳吝．犯戒．嗔恚．懈怠．散亂．惡惠。四治相違障故。

論。漸次修行諸佛法故。

述曰。五也。攝大乘說。前四不散動因。令所治無散故。第五不散動成熟。令不散動得圓滿故。第六依此得如實覺。能于所緣正遍知故言佛法者。謂十力等。修謂成辨。

論。漸次成熟諸有情故。

述曰。六也。攝大乘說。由施能攝受。由戒能不害不生惱。由忍雖遭苦能受。由勤助彼所作。由定心未定者令定。由惠已定者令解脫等。

論。此如餘論廣說應知。

述曰。此後三因。如余攝論廣說。應知。

論。又施等三至唯有此二。

述曰。七也。謂施等前三對法第十一說。是諸菩薩增上生道。后三決定勝道。增上生道中施能感大財。戒感大體。忍感眷屬。持戒生善趣中得尊貴身故。能行忍者。一切有情咸歸附故。決定勝道中。精進能伏煩惱。修善方便。靜慮能熟有情方便。依此發通熟有情故。惠是成熟佛法方便。由有惠故佛法成熟。諸菩薩道唯有此二。若闕一種道不成故。

論。又前三種至諸

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 治理六障。對法和《攝論》所說的治理，都是指六蔽，也就是六種相互違背的障礙。又如《攝大乘論》所說的不發趣因等。以上所說的有十個原因：一是修十地（Dashabhumika）的緣故；二是治理十障的緣故；三是證得十真如（Tathata）的緣故。這是根據十地來論述。下面依據六種（波羅蜜多）來說明十種（原因），即慳吝、犯戒、嗔恚、懈怠、散亂、惡慧。四是治理相互違背的障礙的緣故。

論：逐漸修行諸佛法（Buddha-dharma）的緣故。

述記說：這是第五個原因。《攝大乘論》說，前四種（波羅蜜多）是不散動因，使所治理的（煩惱）不會散動。第五種（禪定）是不散動成熟，使不散動得以圓滿。第六種（般若）依靠這個獲得如實覺悟，能夠對所緣境正確而普遍地瞭解。說『佛法』，指的是十力（Dashabala）等。『修』是指成就。

論：逐漸成熟諸有情（Sattvas）的緣故。

述記說：這是第六個原因。《攝大乘論》說，由於佈施（Dana）能夠攝受，由於持戒（Shila）能夠不傷害不生惱，由於忍辱（Kshanti）即使遭遇痛苦也能忍受，由於精進（Virya）幫助他們所做的事情，由於禪定（Dhyana）使心未定者安定，由於智慧（Prajna）使已安定者解脫等。

論：這些如其他論典廣泛解說，應當知道。

述記說：這後面的三個原因，如其他《攝論》廣泛解說，應當知道。

論：又佈施等三種（波羅蜜多）到只有這兩種（道）。

述記說：這是第七個原因。所謂佈施等前三種，《對法》第十一說，是諸菩薩增上生道（Abhyudaya-marga）。后三種是決定勝道（Nihsreyasa-marga）。增上生道中，佈施能感得大財富，持戒感得大身體，忍辱感得眷屬。持戒生於善趣中得到尊貴之身，能夠行忍辱者，一切有情都歸附他。決定勝道中，精進能降伏煩惱，修善方便，靜慮能成熟有情方便，依靠這個發起神通成熟有情。智慧是成熟佛法的方便，由於有智慧，佛法才能成熟。諸菩薩道只有這兩種，如果缺少一種，道就不能成就。

論：又前三種（波羅蜜多）到諸

【English Translation】 English version: Curing the Six Obscurations. The 'Abhidharma' and the 'Compendium of Determinations' both speak of curing the six veils, which are the six kinds of mutually conflicting obstructions. Furthermore, as the 'Mahayana-samgraha' says, the causes of non-engagement, etc. The above-mentioned has ten reasons: first, because of cultivating the ten grounds (Dashabhumika); second, because of curing the ten obstructions; third, because of realizing the ten suchnesses (Tathata). This is discussed in terms of the ten grounds. Below, based on the six (paramitas), ten (reasons) are explained, namely, stinginess, transgression of precepts, anger, laziness, distraction, and evil wisdom. Fourth, it is because of curing mutually conflicting obstructions.

Treatise: Because of gradually cultivating all Buddha-dharmas (Buddha-dharma).

Commentary: This is the fifth reason. The 'Mahayana-samgraha' says that the first four (paramitas) are the causes of non-scattering, so that what is being cured (afflictions) will not scatter. The fifth (dhyana) is the maturation of non-scattering, so that non-scattering can be perfected. The sixth (prajna) relies on this to attain true awakening, and is able to correctly and universally understand the object of focus. 'Buddha-dharma' refers to the ten powers (Dashabala), etc. 'Cultivation' means accomplishment.

Treatise: Because of gradually maturing all sentient beings (Sattvas).

Commentary: This is the sixth reason. The 'Mahayana-samgraha' says that because of giving (Dana), one can gather and receive; because of morality (Shila), one can avoid harming and not cause annoyance; because of patience (Kshanti), one can endure even when encountering suffering; because of diligence (Virya), one helps them in what they do; because of meditation (Dhyana), one stabilizes those whose minds are not yet stable; because of wisdom (Prajna), one liberates those who are already stable, etc.

Treatise: These, as explained extensively in other treatises, should be known.

Commentary: These last three reasons, as explained extensively in other 'Compendium of Determinations', should be known.

Treatise: Furthermore, the first three (paramitas) of giving, etc., to only these two (paths).

Commentary: This is the seventh reason. The first three, such as giving, are said in the eleventh chapter of the 'Abhidharma' to be the path of higher birth (Abhyudaya-marga) for all Bodhisattvas. The latter three are the path of definite excellence (Nihsreyasa-marga). In the path of higher birth, giving can bring great wealth, morality can bring a great body, and patience can bring retinue. Maintaining precepts leads to being born in good realms and obtaining a noble body. Those who can practice patience, all sentient beings will return and rely on them. In the path of definite excellence, diligence can subdue afflictions and provide skillful means for cultivating goodness, meditation can mature sentient beings, and relying on this, one can initiate supernormal powers to mature sentient beings. Wisdom is the skillful means for maturing the Buddha-dharma; because of wisdom, the Buddha-dharma can mature. The path of all Bodhisattvas has only these two; if one is missing, the path cannot be accomplished.

Treatise: Furthermore, the first three (paramitas) to all

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煩惱故。

述曰。八也。七十八．解深密等說。二因緣故六度無增減。一饒益有情。謂前三。由施故。攝受資財饒益於彼。由戒故。不行損惱害等饒益有情。由忍故。彼為損害等堪能忍受。此三皆通有饒益故。二對治煩惱。謂后三。由精進故。雖未永伏煩惱永害隨眠。而能勇猛修諸善品。彼諸煩惱不能傾動善品加行。即是此云雖未伏滅等。乃至諸善加行。由靜慮故。永伏煩惱由般若故。永害隨眠。即是此中永伏滅義此中若加行。若正滅。皆對治諸煩惱。對法十一亦有此解。

論。又由施等至不增不減。

述曰。第九因也。對法論說。由諸菩薩為翻住涅槃故。于生死中攝增上生。為翻住生死故。即于生死而不染污。是故前三是得增上生方便。故此論名不住涅槃。后三是不染污方便。所以論言不住生死。不染方便者。彼自釋云。由勤故修對治。由定故伏煩惱。由惠故永害隨眠由此不住涅槃．生死。故此六為無住處涅槃資糧。此涅槃者謂真如。此六為彼資糧。前三悲故不住涅槃。后三惠故不住生死。四十九說。三學攝故不增不減六也。前四是戒學。后二是二學。如下當知。總由如是論有九種。別義一種合十義故。前之六度無減無增。

前六既爾。后四如何。

論。后唯四者至不增減故。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為煩惱的緣故。

述曰：這是第八個原因。《解深密經》等經典中說，由於兩種因緣，六度不會增加也不會減少。第一種是饒益有情（眾生）。前三種（佈施、持戒、忍辱）就是爲了饒益有情。由於佈施，所以能夠攝取資財，從而饒益他們；由於持戒，所以不會做出損害、惱害等行為來饒益有情；由於忍辱，所以能夠忍受他們所帶來的損害等。這三種都普遍具有饒益有情的功用。第二種是對治煩惱。后三種（精進、靜慮、般若）就是爲了對治煩惱。由於精進，即使沒有永遠降伏煩惱、永遠斷除隨眠（煩惱的潛在狀態），也能勇猛地修習各種善法。那些煩惱不能動搖善法的修行，這就是經文中所說的『雖未伏滅』等。乃至各種善法的修行，由於靜慮，能夠永遠降伏煩惱；由於般若，能夠永遠斷除隨眠。這就是經文中所說的『永伏滅』的含義。這裡無論是修行，還是真正的斷滅，都是爲了對治各種煩惱。《對法論》第十一卷中也有類似的解釋。

論：又由於佈施等，以至於不增加也不減少。

述曰：這是第九個原因。《對法論》中說，由於菩薩爲了翻轉安住于涅槃的狀態，所以在生死輪迴中攝取增上生（更好的生命狀態）；爲了翻轉安住于生死輪迴的狀態，就在生死輪迴中而不被染污。因此，前三種是獲得增上生的方便，所以這部論名為『不住涅槃』。后三種是不被染污的方便，所以論中說『不住生死』。所謂不染污的方便，它自己解釋說：由於精進，所以修習對治；由於禪定，所以降伏煩惱；由於智慧，所以永遠斷除隨眠。由此不住于涅槃和生死。所以這六度是無住處涅槃的資糧。這裡的涅槃指的是真如。這六度是達到真如的資糧。前三種因為悲心而不安住于涅槃，后三種因為智慧而不安住于生死。《四十九》中說，由於被三學所攝，所以六度不會增加也不會減少。前四種是戒學，后兩種是定學和慧學，如下文將會講到。總的來說，由於像這樣的論述，有九種原因，加上一種特別的含義，合起來有十種含義，所以前面的六度不會減少也不會增加。

既然前面的六度是這樣，那麼後面的四度（方便、愿、力、智）又如何呢？

論：後面的只有四種，以至於不會增加也不會減少的緣故。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of afflictions (煩惱, fánnǎo).

Explanation: This is the eighth reason. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經, Jiě Shēn Mì Jīng) and other scriptures state that the six perfections (六度, liùdù) do not increase or decrease due to two causes. The first is benefiting sentient beings (有情, yǒuqíng). The first three (generosity, ethical conduct, and patience) are for the benefit of sentient beings. Because of generosity (佈施, bùshī), one can gather resources to benefit them. Because of ethical conduct (持戒, chíjiè), one does not engage in harmful or annoying actions to benefit sentient beings. Because of patience (忍辱, rěnrǔ), one can endure harm from them. These three all have the function of benefiting sentient beings. The second is counteracting afflictions. The latter three (diligence, meditative concentration, and wisdom) are for counteracting afflictions. Because of diligence (精進, jīngjìn), even if one has not permanently subdued afflictions or permanently eradicated latent tendencies (隨眠, suímián), one can still diligently cultivate various wholesome qualities. Those afflictions cannot shake the progress of wholesome qualities. This is what the text means by 'although not subdued or extinguished,' etc., up to the various wholesome practices. Because of meditative concentration (靜慮, jìnglǜ), one can permanently subdue afflictions. Because of wisdom (般若, bōrě), one can permanently eradicate latent tendencies. This is the meaning of 'permanently subdued and extinguished' here. Here, both practice and true extinction are for counteracting various afflictions. The eleventh volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論, Duìfǎ Lùn) also has a similar explanation.

Treatise: Furthermore, due to generosity, etc., they neither increase nor decrease.

Explanation: This is the ninth reason. The Abhidharmasamuccaya states that because Bodhisattvas want to reverse the state of abiding in Nirvāṇa (涅槃, nièpán), they gather higher rebirths (增上生, zēngshàngshēng) in Saṃsāra (生死, shēngsǐ); and because they want to reverse the state of abiding in Saṃsāra, they remain in Saṃsāra without being defiled. Therefore, the first three are the means to obtain higher rebirths, so this treatise is called 'Non-abiding Nirvāṇa.' The latter three are the means of non-defilement, so the treatise says 'Non-abiding Saṃsāra.' The means of non-defilement is explained as follows: because of diligence, one cultivates antidotes; because of meditative concentration, one subdues afflictions; because of wisdom, one permanently eradicates latent tendencies. Thus, one does not abide in Nirvāṇa or Saṃsāra. Therefore, these six are the provisions for non-abiding Nirvāṇa. This Nirvāṇa refers to Suchness (真如, zhēnrú). These six are the provisions for reaching Suchness. The first three do not abide in Nirvāṇa because of compassion, and the latter three do not abide in Saṃsāra because of wisdom. Forty-nine says that because they are encompassed by the three trainings (三學, sānxué), the six perfections do not increase or decrease. The first four are the training in ethical conduct, and the latter two are the trainings in concentration and wisdom, as will be explained below. In general, due to such discussions, there are nine reasons, plus one special meaning, making a total of ten meanings, so the preceding six perfections do not decrease or increase.

Since the preceding six are like this, what about the latter four (skillful means, vow, power, and knowledge)?

Treatise: The latter are only four, so they do not increase or decrease.

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述曰。此總文也。

云何助六。

論。方便善巧助施等三。

述曰。七十八．解深密等說。於前三種波羅蜜多所攝有情。以諸攝事方便善巧。而攝受之。安置善品。是故我說方便善巧為施等助。謂攝事中佈施等。即此施等行相。相順攝益於彼。故云助也。

論。愿助精進。

述曰。彼文又說。若諸菩薩于現法中煩惱多故。于修無間無有堪能。由羸劣意樂故。地獄勝解故。于內心住無有堪能。乃至為未來煩惱輕微。心生正愿。如是名愿。由此愿故。煩惱微薄能修精進。故說愿助精進。

論。力助靜慮。

述曰。彼經又說。若諸菩薩。親近善士。聽聞正法。如理作意為因緣故。轉劣意樂成勝意樂。亦得上界勝解。名力波羅蜜多。由此力故。于內心住有所堪能。故說力度為定度助。

論。智助般若至廣說應知。

述曰。彼經又說。若諸菩薩。已能聞緣。善修習故。能發靜慮。如是名智。由此智故。堪能引發出世間惠。故說智為惠助　令修滿故者。謂后四助前六令修滿。前六不為后四所助不名滿故。理如上說。故此中指如解深密。中邊第一說十度十障。頌云。障富貴善趣。不捨諸有情。于失德減增。令趣入解脫。障施等諸善。無盡亦無間。所作善決定。受用法成

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：這是總體的說明。

云何助六？（如何幫助其餘六種波羅蜜多？）

論：方便善巧幫助佈施等三種波羅蜜多。

述曰：在《解深密經》等經中說，對於前三種波羅蜜多（Paramita，意為到彼岸）所攝受的有情（Sattva，意為眾生），以各種攝事（Samgraha-vastu，意為四攝法）的方便善巧來攝受他們，安置於善品（Kusala-dharma，意為善法）之中。因此我說方便善巧是佈施等的幫助。所謂攝事中的佈施等，就是這些佈施等的行為方式，與他們相順並攝益他們，所以說是幫助。

論：愿幫助精進。

述曰：該經文中又說，如果菩薩（Bodhisattva，意為覺有情）在現世中煩惱很多，對於無間斷地修行沒有能力，由於羸弱的意樂（Adhyasaya，意為意願）的緣故，對地獄的勝解（Adhimukti，意為殊勝的理解）的緣故，對於內心安住沒有能力，乃至爲了未來煩惱輕微，心中生起正確的願望，這叫做愿。由於這個愿的緣故，煩惱微薄，能夠修行精進，所以說愿幫助精進。

論：力幫助靜慮。

述曰：該經又說，如果菩薩親近善知識，聽聞正法，如理作意（Yoniśo manasikāra，意為如理思維）作為因緣的緣故，轉變低劣的意樂成為殊勝的意樂，也得到上界的殊勝理解，這叫做力波羅蜜多。由於這個力的緣故，對於內心安住有所堪能，所以說力度為禪定度的幫助。

論：智幫助般若，乃至廣說應知。

述曰：該經又說，如果菩薩已經能夠聽聞因緣，善於修習的緣故，能夠發起靜慮（Dhyana，意為禪定），這叫做智。由於這個智慧的緣故，能夠引導發出世間的智慧（Prajna，意為般若），所以說智慧為般若的幫助。『令修滿故者』，是指后四種波羅蜜多幫助前六種波羅蜜多令其修習圓滿。前六種波羅蜜多不為后四種波羅蜜多所幫助，就不能稱為圓滿。道理如上面所說。所以這裡指的是如《解深密經》、《中邊分別論》第一品所說的十度十障。頌中說：『障礙富貴善趣，不捨諸有情，于失德減增，令趣入解脫。障礙佈施等諸善，無盡亦無間，所作善決定，受用法成。』

【English Translation】 English version: Commentary: This is the general explanation.

How do the others assist the six? (How do the other four Paramitas help the other six?)

Treatise: Skillful means (Upaya-kausalya) assists generosity (Dana), morality (Sila), and patience (Kshanti).

Commentary: The Sandhinirmocana Sutra and others state that for sentient beings (Sattva) encompassed by the first three Paramitas, one uses various skillful means (Upaya-kausalya) of the four means of gathering (Samgraha-vastu) to embrace them and place them in wholesome qualities (Kusala-dharma). Therefore, I say that skillful means are an aid to generosity, etc. The generosity, etc., within the means of gathering are the modes of action of these generosity, etc., being in accordance with and benefiting them, hence it is called assistance.

Treatise: Vow (Pranidhana) assists vigor (Virya).

Commentary: That text also states that if Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattva) have many afflictions (Klesha) in the present life and are incapable of continuous practice, due to weak intention (Adhyasaya), due to superior understanding (Adhimukti) of the lower realms, they are incapable of abiding in the mind, and even for the sake of lessening future afflictions, they generate correct vows in their minds, this is called vow. Because of this vow, afflictions are lessened, and one is able to practice vigor, hence it is said that vow assists vigor.

Treatise: Strength (Bala) assists meditative concentration (Dhyana).

Commentary: That sutra also states that if Bodhisattvas associate with virtuous friends, listen to the correct Dharma, and take appropriate reflection (Yoniśo manasikāra) as the cause, they transform inferior intention into superior intention, and also attain superior understanding of the higher realms, this is called the strength Paramita. Because of this strength, they are capable of abiding in the mind, hence it is said that strength assists the meditative concentration Paramita.

Treatise: Wisdom (Jnana) assists wisdom (Prajna), and so on, the extensive explanation should be known.

Commentary: That sutra also states that if Bodhisattvas are already able to hear the causes and conditions, and are skilled in practice, they are able to generate meditative concentration, this is called wisdom. Because of this wisdom, they are capable of eliciting transcendental wisdom, hence it is said that wisdom assists wisdom. 'To cause to be fully cultivated' refers to the latter four Paramitas assisting the former six Paramitas to be fully cultivated. If the former six Paramitas are not assisted by the latter four Paramitas, they cannot be called complete. The principle is as stated above. Therefore, this refers to the ten Paramitas and ten obstacles as stated in the Sandhinirmocana Sutra and the first chapter of the Madhyantavibhaga. The verse says: 'Obstructing wealth and good destinies, not abandoning sentient beings, in loss of virtue, decrease and increase, causing them to enter liberation. Obstructing generosity and other virtues, inexhaustible and uninterrupted, the good deeds done are determined, the use of the Dharma is accomplished.'

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就。故十種度不增不減。

第五次第門。

論。十次第者至持凈前前。

述曰。第一解。謂由前前引發後後。七十八．解深密．對法十一．攝論等說。由佈施等故。引生戒．忍等。廣如彼說。易故不言　第二解。及由後後持凈前前。對法論說。謂戒能持施。乃至惠能持定。謂由具尸羅施得清凈。所以者何。由行佈施攝益有情。由持戒故不為惱害。乃至如伽他說。無有靜慮而不因惠。廣如彼說。

論。又前前粗至次第如是。

述曰。第三解。對法論說。于諸行中施行最粗。戒細于施。故次建立。乃至一切行中惠為最細。故最後立。此三解中初一解。深密．瑜伽．攝論同。餘二解唯此論有。對法同之。四十九有三解。初二同此。謂治障生起。生起即粗細故。第三異熟。如彼廣解。

自下六釋名者。

論。釋總別名如余處說。

述曰。七十八．解深密等解總名云。何緣此等名波羅蜜多。由五緣故。一者無染著。不染著波羅蜜相違事也。二無顧戀。謂此六度諸果異熟。及報恩中心無繫縛。三無罪。謂於六度無間雜法。離非方便行。四無分別。不如言辭執著自相。五正迴向。謂以所行度回求大菩提。攝大乘說。於世間．二乘施等最勝。能得彼岸故。通言波羅蜜多。對法十一說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，這十種波羅蜜（Dasa-paramita，十種達到彼岸的方法）既不增加也不減少。

第五次第門。

論：十種次第是指從持戒之前的前一種到持戒之後的前一種。

述曰：第一種解釋，是指由前一種引發后一種。《解深密經》（Samdhinirmocana Sutra）、《對法論》（Abhidharma Samuccaya）、《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）等經論中說，由於佈施等行為，引生持戒、忍辱等。詳細內容如那些經論所說，因為容易理解所以不再贅述。第二種解釋，是指由后一種持凈前一種。《對法論》中說，持戒能夠支援佈施，乃至智慧能夠支援禪定。也就是說，通過具備戒律，佈施才能得到清凈。為什麼這麼說呢？因為通過佈施來攝受利益眾生，通過持戒而不去惱害他們。乃至如伽陀（Gatha，偈頌）所說，沒有禪定是不依靠智慧的。詳細內容如那些經論所說。

論：而且前一種粗糙，乃至次第就是這樣。

述曰：第三種解釋，《對法論》中說，在各種行為中，佈施最為粗糙，持戒比佈施細膩，所以依次建立。乃至一切行為中，智慧最為細膩，所以最後建立。這三種解釋中，第一種解釋與《解深密經》、《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）、《攝大乘論》相同。其餘兩種解釋只有這部論有，《對法論》與此相同。四十九有三種解釋，前兩種與此相同，是指對治障礙生起，生起即粗細的緣故。第三種是異熟果，如那些經論中詳細解釋。

從下面開始是第六種解釋名稱。

論：解釋總名和別名如其他地方所說。

述曰：《解深密經》等解釋總名說，為什麼這些名稱叫做波羅蜜多（Pāramitā，到達彼岸）？因為五個原因。一是沒有染著，不染著與波羅蜜多相反的事情。二是無顧戀，指對於這六度的各種果報異熟，以及報恩的中心沒有繫縛。三是沒有罪過，指對於六度沒有間雜其他法，遠離非方便的修行。四是沒有分別，不如言辭那樣執著于自相。五是正確迴向，指以所修行的度迴向求取大菩提（Mahābodhi，偉大的覺悟）。《攝大乘論》說，在世間和二乘的佈施等行為中，這是最殊勝的，能夠到達彼岸，所以通稱為波羅蜜多。《對法論》中說。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, these ten Pāramitās (Dasa-paramita, ten perfections or ways to cross over to the other shore) neither increase nor decrease.

Fifth: The Order of Succession.

Treatise: The ten successions refer to the preceding one before holding precepts, and the preceding one after holding precepts.

Commentary: The first explanation is that the former gives rise to the latter. The Samdhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經, Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra), Abhidharma Samuccaya (對法論, Compendium of Abhidharma), Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Summary of the Great Vehicle) and other scriptures say that due to acts of giving, precepts, forbearance, etc., are generated. The details are as described in those scriptures, and are not repeated here because they are easy to understand. The second explanation is that the latter maintains the purity of the former. The Abhidharma Samuccaya says that precepts can support giving, and even wisdom can support meditation. That is, through possessing morality (śīla), giving becomes pure. Why is this so? Because by practicing giving, sentient beings are embraced and benefited, and by upholding precepts, they are not harmed. Even as the Gatha (伽陀, verse) says, there is no meditative absorption (dhyāna) that does not rely on wisdom. The details are as described in those scriptures.

Treatise: Moreover, the former is coarse, and the order is thus.

Commentary: The third explanation, the Abhidharma Samuccaya says that among all actions, giving is the coarsest, precepts are finer than giving, so they are established in sequence. And among all actions, wisdom is the finest, so it is established last. Among these three explanations, the first explanation is the same as the Samdhinirmocana Sutra, Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論, Stages of Yoga Practice), and Mahāyānasaṃgraha. The other two explanations are only found in this treatise, and the Abhidharma Samuccaya agrees with it. Forty-nine has three explanations, the first two are the same as this, referring to counteracting obstacles to arising, and arising is the reason for coarseness and fineness. The third is the Vipāka (異熟, result of action), as explained in detail in those scriptures.

From below begins the sixth explanation of names.

Treatise: Explanations of the general and specific names are as described elsewhere.

Commentary: The Samdhinirmocana Sutra and others explain the general name, saying, why are these names called Pāramitā (波羅蜜多, perfection, reaching the other shore)? Because of five reasons. First, there is no attachment, not being attached to things contrary to the Pāramitā. Second, there is no clinging, referring to the various fruits and Vipāka of these six perfections, and the center of repaying kindness is not bound. Third, there is no fault, referring to the six perfections not being mixed with other dharmas, and being away from non-expedient practices. Fourth, there is no discrimination, not clinging to self-characteristics like words. Fifth, there is correct dedication, referring to dedicating the practiced perfections to seeking great Bodhi (大菩提, great enlightenment). The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that among the acts of giving in the world and the Two Vehicles, this is the most excellent, and can reach the other shore, so it is generally called Pāramitā. The Abhidharma Samuccaya says.

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。由十二最勝相應故。名波羅蜜多。一廣大。不求世樂。又最上故。二長時。三劫積集故。三所為。為利生故。四無盡。迴向大菩提究竟無盡故。五無間。自他平等令他速圓滿施等故。六無難。隨喜他施等令自行速圓滿故。七大自在。由得虛空藏等定。令施等速滿故。八攝受。無分別智所攝受。九發起。謂解行地中上中品忍位所行施等。十證得。初地所行施等。十一等流。餘八地所行施等。十二圓滿。謂十地及如來所有施等。即菩薩滿。如來圓也。若闕一種非波羅蜜多。最勝所至。最勝所作。故名波羅蜜多。波羅。所至義。或所作義。蜜多。能至．能作義。彼論又說。到所知彼岸名波羅蜜多。安住佛性故。又波羅。是所知彼岸義。蜜多。是到義　又解濟度自他最極災橫故名波羅蜜多。合六解總名　釋別名者。攝大乘說。能裂慳吝．貧窮。得廣大財位．福德資糧名施。乃至能除遣一切見趣諸邪惡惠。及能真實品別知法名惠。對法十一說。由大施故。離過故。離垢故。故名施波羅蜜。乃至惠亦由三因故。名惠波羅蜜。如彼廣解。彼論又解。能捨施者當來貧苦。能捨受者現在熱惱故名為施。乃至他所發智故。內證智故。種別智故。得寂靜智故。勝德智故。名為惠。合三解別名。故今總指釋總別名如余處說。余處即攝大乘等也

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由於十二種最殊勝的相應，所以稱為波羅蜜多（pāramitā，到彼岸）。一是廣大，不追求世俗的快樂，而且是最殊勝的。二是長時，因為是經過三大阿僧祇劫積集而成的。三是所為，爲了利益眾生。四是無盡，迴向于大菩提，究竟沒有窮盡。五是無間，自己和他人平等，令他人迅速圓滿佈施等。六是無難，隨喜他人佈施等，令自己迅速圓滿修行。七是大自在，由於得到虛空藏等禪定，令佈施等迅速圓滿。八是攝受，被無分別智所攝受。九是發起，指解行地中上中品忍位所行的佈施等。十是證得，初地菩薩所行的佈施等。十一是等流，其餘八地菩薩所行的佈施等。十二是圓滿，指十地菩薩以及如來所有的佈施等，也就是菩薩的圓滿，如來的究竟圓滿。如果缺少其中任何一種，就不是波羅蜜多。因為是最殊勝的所到達之處，最殊勝的所作之事，所以稱為波羅蜜多。波羅（pāram），是所到達的意思，或者所作的意思。蜜多（itā），是能到達、能作的意思。彼論又說，到達所知之彼岸，名為波羅蜜多，因為安住于佛性。又，波羅（pāram），是所知彼岸的意思。蜜多（itā），是到達的意思。又解釋為救濟自己和他人最極的災難和橫禍，所以稱為波羅蜜多。以上合起來共有六種解釋總名。 解釋別名方面，《攝大乘論》（Śekamahāyānasaṃgraha）說，能夠破除慳吝和貧窮，得到廣大的財位和福德資糧，稱為佈施（dāna）。乃至能夠去除一切見解上的偏頗、邪惡的智慧，以及能夠真實地分辨法，稱為智慧（prajñā）。《對法論》（Abhidharma）第十一卷說，由於大布施的緣故，遠離過失，遠離垢染，所以稱為佈施波羅蜜（dānapāramitā）。乃至智慧也由於三種原因，所以稱為智慧波羅蜜（prajñāpāramitā），如彼論中廣為解釋。彼論又解釋說，能夠捨棄佈施者將來的貧困，能夠捨棄受施者現在的熱惱，所以稱為佈施（dāna）。乃至他人所發起的智慧，內在證悟的智慧，種類差別的智慧，得到寂靜的智慧，殊勝功德的智慧，稱為智慧（prajñā）。以上合起來共有三種解釋別名。所以現在總括地解釋總名和別名，如其他地方所說。其他地方即指《攝大乘論》等。

【English Translation】 English version: It is called Pāramitā (perfection, reaching the other shore) because of the twelve most excellent corresponding factors: 1. Vastness: not seeking worldly pleasures, and being the most supreme. 2. Longevity: accumulated over three asamkhya kalpas (incalculable eons). 3. Purpose: for the benefit of sentient beings. 4. Endless: dedicating towards great Bodhi (enlightenment), ultimately without end. 5. Uninterrupted: equality between oneself and others, enabling others to quickly perfect giving, etc. 6. Without difficulty: rejoicing in others' giving, etc., enabling oneself to quickly perfect practice. 7. Great freedom: due to obtaining samādhi (concentration) such as the Akashagarbha (space treasury), enabling giving, etc., to be quickly perfected. 8. Acceptance: being accepted by non-discriminating wisdom. 9. Initiation: referring to giving, etc., practiced in the superior and middle grades of the forbearance stage in the stage of understanding and practice. 10. Attainment: referring to giving, etc., practiced by Bodhisattvas (enlightenment beings) in the first Bhumi (ground). 11. Equivalence: referring to giving, etc., practiced by Bodhisattvas in the remaining eight Bhumis. 12. Perfection: referring to all giving, etc., of the ten Bhumis Bodhisattvas and the Tathāgata (Buddha), which is the perfection of the Bodhisattva and the ultimate perfection of the Tathāgata. If any one of these is missing, it is not Pāramitā. Because it is the most excellent place to reach, the most excellent thing to do, it is called Pāramitā. Pāram means 'the place to reach' or 'the thing to do.' Itā means 'able to reach' or 'able to do.' That treatise also says that reaching the other shore of what is knowable is called Pāramitā because it abides in Buddha-nature. Also, Pāram means 'the other shore of what is knowable.' Itā means 'to reach.' It is also explained as rescuing oneself and others from the most extreme disasters and calamities, hence it is called Pāramitā. The above combines six explanations of the general name. Regarding the explanation of specific names, the Śekamahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium on the Mahāyāna) says that being able to break through stinginess and poverty, and obtain vast wealth, position, and merit resources, is called Dāna (giving). Furthermore, being able to remove all biased views, evil wisdom, and being able to truly distinguish the Dharma (teachings), is called Prajñā (wisdom). The Abhidharma (collection of Buddhist teachings) eleventh volume says that due to great giving, being free from faults, being free from defilements, it is called Dānapāramitā (perfection of giving). Furthermore, Prajñā is also called Prajñāpāramitā (perfection of wisdom) due to three reasons, as explained extensively in that treatise. That treatise also explains that being able to relinquish the future poverty of the giver, being able to relinquish the present suffering of the receiver, is called Dāna (giving). Furthermore, the wisdom initiated by others, the wisdom of inner realization, the wisdom of different kinds, obtaining the wisdom of tranquility, the wisdom of superior virtue, is called Prajñā (wisdom). The above combines three explanations of specific names. Therefore, now the general name and specific names are explained comprehensively, as mentioned elsewhere. 'Elsewhere' refers to the Śekamahāyānasaṃgraha, etc.

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。

論。此十修者至廣說其相。

述曰。七修門者。此有五修。此指如對法。第十二說　依止任持修者。復有四種。一依因修。由種姓力于度修正行。二依果修。依勝自體力于度修正行。三依愿修。由本願力于度修正行。四依簡擇修。由惠力于度修正行。

二依止作意修。彼說復有四種。一依勝解修。於一切度相應教法起增上勝解。二依愛味修。于已得度多見功德起深愛味。三依隨喜修。于諸世界諸有情所行度深生隨喜。四依喜樂修。于自他當來勝品度中深生愿樂　三依止意樂修。即六意樂。謂一無厭意樂。二廣大。三歡喜。四恩德。五無染。六善好意樂。廣如彼解。然與攝論六意樂名字不同。及攝三作意。一謂愛重。二隨喜。三欣樂。皆如攝論第七．對法第十二抄會。

四依止方便修。對法論說。亦有三種。由無分別智觀察三輪皆清凈故。由此方便故。一切作意所修諸行速成滿故　五依止自在修。亦有三種。對法說有三。一身自在。即自性。受用二身。二行自在。即變化身。三說自在。謂能說六度等無有滯礙。謂緣求依止此故修。無性云。即為彼故修。亦名為修。然攝論說五修。名亦不同義意無別。然此同對法。攝論文略。世親難解。無性易知。此中指同對法．攝論。故言如集論等。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

論：這十種修習如果廣泛地闡述，會涉及到它們的各個方面。

述記說：七種修習門，這裡有五種修習。這裡指的是如《對法論》第十二品所說的：依賴任持修，又有四種。一是依賴因修，由於種姓的力量，對於波羅蜜多的修正行。二是依賴果修，依賴殊勝自體的力量，對於波羅蜜多的修正行。三是依賴愿修，由於本願的力量，對於波羅蜜多的修正行。四是依賴簡擇修，由於智慧的力量，對於波羅蜜多的修正行。

二是依賴作意修。那裡說又有四種。一是依賴勝解修，對於一切與波羅蜜多相應的教法生起增上的勝解。二是依賴愛味修，對於已獲得的波羅蜜多，多見功德，生起深刻的愛味。三是依賴隨喜修，對於諸世界諸有情所行的波羅蜜多，深深地生起隨喜。四是依賴喜樂修，對於自己和他人將來殊勝的波羅蜜多，深深地生起愿樂。三是依賴意樂修，即六種意樂。即一、無厭意樂，二、廣大，三、歡喜，四、恩德，五、無染，六、善好意樂。詳細的解釋如彼論。然而與《攝大乘論》的六種意樂名字不同。以及攝取三種作意，一謂愛重，二隨喜，三欣樂，都如《攝大乘論》第七品、《對法論》第十二品所抄錄的。

四是依賴方便修。《對法論》說，也有三種。由無分別智觀察三輪皆清凈的緣故。由此方便的緣故，一切作意所修的諸行迅速成就圓滿的緣故。五是依賴自在修。也有三種。《對法論》說有三種。一身自在，即自性身、受用身二身。二行自在，即變化身。三說自在，謂能說六度等沒有滯礙。謂緣求依賴此的緣故修。無性說：即爲了那個緣故修，也名為修。然而《攝大乘論》說五種修，名字也不同，意義沒有差別。然而這裡同《對法論》。《攝大乘論》文略。世親難以理解。無性容易理解。此中指同《對法論》、《攝大乘論》。所以說如《集論》等。

【English Translation】 English version:

Treatise: If these ten practices are extensively explained, their aspects will be discussed in detail.

Commentary: The seven practice gates consist of five practices. This refers to what is said in the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) in the twelfth section: Relying on the Sustaining Practice, there are four types. First, relying on the causal practice, due to the power of lineage, one engages in the correct practice of pāramitās (perfections). Second, relying on the resultant practice, relying on the power of one's own excellent nature, one engages in the correct practice of pāramitās. Third, relying on the aspirational practice, due to the power of one's original vows, one engages in the correct practice of pāramitās. Fourth, relying on the selective practice, due to the power of wisdom, one engages in the correct practice of pāramitās.

Second, relying on the mental engagement practice. It is said there are four types. First, relying on the superior understanding practice, one generates increasing superior understanding of all teachings corresponding to the pāramitās. Second, relying on the savoring practice, one sees many merits in the pāramitās already attained and generates deep savoring. Third, relying on the rejoicing practice, one deeply rejoices in the pāramitās practiced by all sentient beings in all worlds. Fourth, relying on the joyful aspiration practice, one deeply generates joyful aspiration for the future excellent pāramitās of oneself and others. Third, relying on the intention practice, which is the six intentions. Namely, one, the intention of non-satiety; two, vastness; three, joy; four, kindness; five, non-contamination; six, the intention of goodness. Detailed explanations are as in that treatise. However, the names of the six intentions in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of Mahāyāna) are different. And it includes three mental engagements: one, love and respect; two, rejoicing; three, delight. All are as copied from the seventh section of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the twelfth section of the Abhidharma-samuccaya.

Fourth, relying on the skillful means practice. The Abhidharma-samuccaya says there are also three types. Because one observes the three wheels (agent, object, and action) as pure through non-conceptual wisdom. Because of this skillful means, all practices cultivated by mental engagement are quickly accomplished and fulfilled. Fifth, relying on the mastery practice. There are also three types. The Abhidharma-samuccaya says there are three. One, mastery of body, which is the Svābhāvikakāya (self-nature body) and the Sāṃbhogikakāya (enjoyment body). Two, mastery of action, which is the Nirmāṇakāya (emanation body). Three, mastery of speech, which means being able to speak of the six pāramitās without hindrance. It means cultivating because of seeking reliance on this. Asaṅga (無性) says: 'It is also called practice because one cultivates for that reason.' However, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says there are five practices, and the names are different, but the meanings are not different. However, this is the same as the Abhidharma-samuccaya. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha is concise. Vasubandhu (世親) is difficult to understand. Asaṅga is easy to understand. Here, it refers to being the same as the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Therefore, it is said like the Abhidharmasamuccaya (集論) etc.

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第八攝門者。

論。此十攝者至互相順故。

述曰。謂十度一一皆攝一切度。十行相資成互相順故。此中對法等說。或真如攝。或惠攝等。然今但以十度相攝。不同彼論。如前財施唯施。無畏通五。法施通六等。是故諸論言。或唯施聲說。乃至或唯智聲說。是此即雜行十度故一攝余。無性云。施性中現有六波羅蜜多。金剛般若論云。檀度攝於六。資生．無畏．法。此中一二三。是名修行住。大般若第三百五十一云。佛言要由般若引施等故。由此前五波羅蜜多。攝在般若波羅蜜多。又對法十二更互抉擇門有三。一方便中廣出其相。

論。依修前行至不待后故。

述曰。前引后度起者。前攝后。后待前方成故。后不攝前。前不待后而成故。對法十二說。此依始業地。所有戒皆是施。有施非戒。謂戒所不攝施。既以寬問狹。故順后句答。然應因敘對法十六中一句二句三句四句順前後句等。

論。依修後行至非持凈故。

述曰。后持凈前者。后攝於前。有施皆戒。有戒非施。謂施所不攝戒。以後戒持凈前施等。故前不攝后。非持凈於後故。即以狹問寬。順前句答。施狹故也。

論。若依純雜至應作四句。

述曰。謂有純修。且如施純修。謂有施非度。不迴向施等是。有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 第八攝門： 論：這十種攝持，是因為它們互相順應。 述記：意思是說，十度（Dasa-paramitas）中的每一種都包含一切度。十種行為互相資助，成就，所以互相順應。這裡對法（Abhidhamma）等論典中說，或者被真如（Tathata）所攝，或者被智慧（Prajna）所攝等等。然而現在只用十度互相攝持，不同於那些論典。例如前面的財施（Dana）只是施捨，無畏施（Abhaya-dana）包含五度，法施（Dharma-dana）包含六度等等。因此，各種論典說，或者只是施捨的聲音，乃至或者只是智慧的聲音。這是因為這包含了雜行的十度，所以一個攝持其餘的。無性（Asanga）說，施捨的性質中現有六波羅蜜多（paramita）。《金剛般若論》（Vajracchedika Prajna Paramita Sutra）說，佈施度（Dana-paramita）攝持六度，資生、無畏、法。這其中一二三，是名為修行住。大般若經第三百五十一卷說，佛說要由般若（Prajna）引導施捨等，因此前面的五波羅蜜多，被攝在般若波羅蜜多中。又對法十二更互抉擇門有三種，一是方便中廣泛地闡述它的相。 論：依靠修習前面的行為，是因為不依賴後面的行為。 述記：前面的引導後面的度生起，是前面的攝持後面的。後面的要依賴前面的才能成就，所以後面的不攝持前面的。前面的不依賴後面的就能成就，所以對法十二說，這是依靠始業地（初學者的階段）。所有的戒都是施捨，有施捨不是戒，說的是戒所不包含的施捨。既然用寬泛的來問狹窄的，所以順著後面的句子回答。然而應該根據對法十六中的一句、二句、三句、四句順著前後句等等。 論：依靠修習後面的行為，是因為不是持戒清凈。 述記：後面的持戒清凈前面的，是後面的攝持前面的。有施捨都是戒，有戒不是施捨，說的是施捨所不包含的戒。因為後面的戒持戒清凈前面的施捨等等，所以前面的不攝持後面的，不是持戒清凈於後面的，所以用狹窄的來問寬泛的，順著前面的句子回答。施捨是狹窄的。 論：如果依靠純粹和雜染，應該作四句分別。 述記：說的是有純粹的修習。比如施捨的純粹修習，說的是有施捨不是度，不迴向的施捨等是。

【English Translation】 English version: The Eighth Inclusion Gate: Treatise: These ten inclusions are because they mutually accord with each other. Commentary: It means that each of the ten perfections (Dasa-paramitas) includes all the perfections. The ten practices mutually support and accomplish each other, thus they mutually accord. Here, the Abhidhamma and other treatises say that they are either included by Suchness (Tathata) or by Wisdom (Prajna), etc. However, now we only use the ten perfections to include each other, which is different from those treatises. For example, the previous material giving (Dana) is only giving, fearlessness giving (Abhaya-dana) includes five perfections, and Dharma giving (Dharma-dana) includes six perfections, etc. Therefore, various treatises say that it is either just the sound of giving, or even just the sound of wisdom. This is because it includes the ten perfections of mixed practices, so one includes the others. Asanga says that the nature of giving inherently contains the six paramitas. The Diamond Sutra (Vajracchedika Prajna Paramita Sutra) says that the perfection of giving (Dana-paramita) includes the six perfections: resources, fearlessness, and Dharma. Among these one, two, and three, are called the dwelling of practice. The Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra, volume 351, says that the Buddha said that it is necessary for wisdom (Prajna) to guide giving, etc. Therefore, the previous five perfections are included in the perfection of wisdom. Furthermore, the Abhidhamma's twelve mutually decisive gates have three aspects: first, to extensively explain its characteristics within skillful means. Treatise: Relying on cultivating the preceding practices is because it does not depend on the subsequent practices. Commentary: The preceding guides the arising of the subsequent perfection, which means the preceding includes the subsequent. The subsequent depends on the preceding to be accomplished, so the subsequent does not include the preceding. The preceding can be accomplished without depending on the subsequent, so the Abhidhamma twelve says that this relies on the initial stage of practice (the stage of beginners). All precepts are giving, but there is giving that is not precepts, referring to giving that is not included in precepts. Since the broad is used to question the narrow, the answer follows the subsequent sentence. However, it should be based on the Abhidhamma sixteen, with one sentence, two sentences, three sentences, four sentences following the preceding and subsequent sentences, etc. Treatise: Relying on cultivating the subsequent practices is because it is not holding precepts purely. Commentary: The subsequent holding precepts purely precedes the former, which means the subsequent includes the preceding. All giving is precepts, but there are precepts that are not giving, referring to precepts that are not included in giving. Because the subsequent precepts hold the preceding giving purely, etc., the preceding does not include the subsequent, and it is not holding precepts purely in the subsequent, so the narrow is used to question the broad, and the answer follows the preceding sentence. Giving is narrow. Treatise: If relying on pure and impure, four possibilities should be made. Commentary: It refers to having pure cultivation. For example, the pure cultivation of giving, which means there is giving that is not a perfection, such as giving without dedication, etc.

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度非施即隨喜他施等是。有俱不俱可知。然此依種類福。如前已說。然不約種類福。不說隨喜他。故但有三句。有施非度。有亦施亦度。有非施非度。除第二句。餘五度皆作四句。前有度故。施前未有度。故為三句。若雜修者有四句成。諸度相間有第二句故。此亦如對法。然彼更有少別。不能煩引。攝大乘雲。此能攝一切善法。是其相故。是隨順故。是等流故。不以六度相攝。乃攝諸功德也。廣如彼說。謂施攝施是相。攝信等是隨順。攝無諍是等流。

論。此實有十至緣世俗故。

述曰。第九問答合六開十門。此義可知。如前已引攝大乘說等。

論。此十果者至除異熟果。

述曰。十五果門。約實而言。有漏有四。無漏亦爾。所除有別。此義可思。此為四果。文易可知。故不繁出。

論。而有處說至或二合說。

述曰。會相違也。對法十二說。永斷自治是離系。攝受自他是士用。于當來增勝生起是等流。大菩提是增上。感大財等是異熟果。即具五果。或無漏資有漏亦得異熟。有漏資無漏亦得離系。故言互相資。或有漏無漏二合說。故得五果。非有無漏體各親能得五果也。七十八．解深密等說。果有六。大財．善趣．無怨壞。為眾生主。無惱害。大枝葉。皆是異熟果中說。非不得

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 度（Pāramitā，波羅蜜多，意為到達彼岸）並非只是佈施，也包括隨喜他人佈施等情況。是否同時具備佈施和度，是可以理解的。然而，這裡是依據種類福報來說的，如前面已經說過的。如果不按照種類福報來說，就不說隨喜他人。所以只有三種情況：有佈施而非度，有既是佈施又是度，有非佈施也非度。除了第二種情況，其餘五度（Pāramitā，波羅蜜多）都可以分為四種情況。因為前面已經有了度，而佈施之前沒有度，所以分為三種情況。如果混合修習，就會有四種情況，因為諸度相互穿插，所以有第二種情況。這也像《對法》（Abhidharma）一樣。然而，《對法》還有一些細微差別，這裡就不詳細引用了。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）說，這能涵蓋一切善法，因為它是善法的體相，是隨順善法的，是善法的等流。它不是用六度（Pāramitā，波羅蜜多）來互相涵蓋，而是涵蓋諸種功德。詳細內容如《攝大乘論》所說。也就是說，佈施涵蓋佈施是體相，涵蓋信心等是隨順，涵蓋無諍是等流。

論：這實際上有十種，乃至緣於世俗的緣故。

述曰：第九個問答合併了六門，展開為十門。這個意義是可以理解的，如前面已經引用的《攝大乘論》所說等。

論：這十種果報，乃至除去異熟果。

述曰：第十五個果門。就實際而言，有漏有四種，無漏也有四種。所除去的有所區別。這個意義可以思考。這是四種果報，文字容易理解，所以不繁瑣地列出。

論：然而，有的地方說，乃至或者兩種合併來說。

述曰：這是爲了調和矛盾。在《對法》中，十二種說法是：永斷煩惱是離系果，攝受自己和他人是士用果，對於未來增勝生起是等流果，大菩提是增上果，感得大財富等是異熟果。也就是具備五種果報。或者無漏資助有漏也能得到異熟果，有漏資助無漏也能得到離系果。所以說互相資助。或者有漏和無漏兩種合併來說，所以得到五種果報。並非有漏和無漏的本體各自親證能得到五種果報。《解深密經》等說，果報有六種：大財富、善趣、沒有怨敵破壞、為眾生之主、沒有惱害、大枝葉。這些都是在異熟果中說的，並非不能得到。

【English Translation】 English version: '度' (Pāramitā, meaning 'to the other shore') is not only giving, but also includes rejoicing in others' giving, etc. Whether both giving and '度' (Pāramitā) are present is knowable. However, this is based on the type of merit, as previously stated. If not based on the type of merit, then rejoicing in others is not mentioned. Therefore, there are only three possibilities: giving without '度' (Pāramitā), both giving and '度' (Pāramitā), and neither giving nor '度' (Pāramitā). Except for the second case, the remaining five '度' (Pāramitā) can be divided into four cases. Because '度' (Pāramitā) already exists before, and giving does not have '度' (Pāramitā) before it, it is divided into three cases. If mixed practice is done, there will be four cases, because the '度' (Pāramitā) interpenetrate each other, so there is the second case. This is also like the 'Abhidharma'. However, the 'Abhidharma' has some subtle differences, which will not be quoted in detail here. The 'Mahāyānasaṃgraha' says that this can encompass all good dharmas, because it is the characteristic of good dharmas, it is in accordance with good dharmas, and it is the outflow of good dharmas. It is not that the six '度' (Pāramitā) encompass each other, but that they encompass all kinds of merits. The details are as described in the 'Mahāyānasaṃgraha'. That is to say, giving encompassing giving is the characteristic, encompassing faith, etc., is in accordance, and encompassing non-contention is the outflow.

Treatise: These actually have ten, even due to worldly causes.

Commentary: The ninth question and answer combines six doors and unfolds into ten doors. This meaning is understandable, as mentioned in the 'Mahāyānasaṃgraha' quoted earlier, etc.

Treatise: These ten fruits, even removing the Vipāka fruit.

Commentary: The fifteenth fruit door. In reality, there are four types of conditioned (with outflows), and four types of unconditioned (without outflows). What is removed is different. This meaning can be considered. These are four fruits, and the text is easy to understand, so it will not be listed in detail.

Treatise: However, some places say, even combining the two to speak.

Commentary: This is to reconcile contradictions. In the 'Abhidharma', the twelve sayings are: permanently cutting off afflictions is the Niḥsyanda fruit, embracing oneself and others is the Puruṣakāra fruit, increasing and arising in the future is the Adhipati fruit, great Bodhi is the Adhipati fruit, and feeling great wealth, etc., is the Vipāka fruit. That is, it has five fruits. Or unconditioned assisting conditioned can also obtain the Vipāka fruit, and conditioned assisting unconditioned can also obtain the Niḥsyanda fruit. Therefore, it is said that they assist each other. Or conditioned and unconditioned are combined to speak, so five fruits are obtained. It is not that the conditioned and unconditioned entities each personally realize and obtain five fruits. The 'Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra', etc., say that there are six fruits: great wealth, good realms, no enemies destroying, being the master of sentient beings, no harm, and great branches and leaves. These are all said in the Vipāka fruit, not that they cannot be obtained.

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余。攝論云。富貴．大生．大朋屬。此三異熟果。廣大業．塵垢薄．知五明處。后三但約增上果中說。亦不違也。菩薩地解六度中。一一度后皆言此得大菩提。此唯于增上果說。若因緣．增上緣皆是增上果。四十三末說。前各九門分別度等得如是果別。不能煩引。讀者知之。

論。十與三學至一切有情。

述曰。十一三學相攝門。于中初出學名體第二五位分別。第三正以學攝度。戒學有三。初以七眾戒為體。二以有為無為無漏善法為體。有漏善法非正應修。體可斷故。三謂正利樂三業為性。如上應知。

論。此與二乘至如余處說。

述曰。然此三學與二乘有共不共等。攝論無性第七．世親第八。各有四殊勝。初一差別勝。即三聚戒。二共不共勝。謂菩薩一切性罪不現行。與二乘共。相似遮罪有現行。與二乘不共等是。三廣大勝。此有四種。一種種無量學處大。二無量福德大。三利生意樂大。四建立菩提大。如彼廣解。四甚深勝。謂菩薩行殺生等十業。而無有罪。生無量福。速證菩提等是。然彼雖有四種殊勝。然初即此三聚戒體。今以第二共不共。第四甚深。第三廣大。合為三種　如余處者。即是彼文。

論。定學有四至之所行故。

述曰。文中可解。然此唯在第四靜慮。諸勝定

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於異熟果，《攝大乘論》中說，富貴、大生、大朋屬（指富裕、長壽、擁有眾多朋友）這三種是異熟果。廣大業、塵垢薄、知五明處（指廣大的善業、較少的煩惱、通曉五明）這三種是增上果。后三種只是從增上果的角度來說，並沒有衝突。《菩薩地持經》在解釋六度時，每一度之後都說『由此獲得大菩提』，這只是從增上果的角度來說。如果因緣和增上緣都是增上果，就像第四十三末尾所說的那樣。前面各用九個方面來分別佈施等，從而獲得這樣的果報差別，這裡不再贅述，讀者可以自己去了解。

論：十與三學乃至一切有情。

述記：第十一是三學相攝門。其中，首先說明學的名稱和體性，其次是五位的分別，第三是正式用學來統攝諸度。戒學有三種。第一種以七眾戒（比丘、比丘尼、式叉摩那、沙彌、沙彌尼、優婆塞、優婆夷所受持的戒律）為體。第二種以有為、無為、無漏的善法為體。有漏的善法不是真正應該修習的，因為它的體性可以被斷除。第三種是指真正利益眾生的身、語、意三業為體性。如上所述，應該瞭解。

論：此與二乘乃至如余處說。

述記：這三種學與二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）有共同和不共同之處。《攝大乘論》無性釋第七品和世親釋第八品，各自有四種殊勝之處。第一是差別勝，即三聚戒（攝律儀戒、攝善法戒、饒益有情戒）。第二是共不共勝，即菩薩的一切性罪（指殺盜淫妄等根本罪）不會現行，這與二乘相同；相似的遮罪（指爲了守護戒律而制定的戒條）會有現行，這與二乘不相同等等。第三是廣大勝，此廣大勝有四種：一是種種無量學處廣大，二是無量福德廣大，三是利生意樂廣大，四是建立菩提廣大，如彼處廣為解釋。第四是甚深勝，即菩薩即使行殺生等十惡業，也不會有罪，反而會產生無量福德，迅速證得菩提等等。雖然那裡有四種殊勝，但第一種就是這三聚戒的體。現在將第二種共不共、第四種甚深、第三種廣大，合併爲三種。『如余處者』，就是指那些經文。

論：定學有四乃至之所行故。

述記：文中的意思可以理解。然而，這種定學只在第四禪定中才有。各種殊勝的禪定

【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the Vipaka-phala (result of maturation), the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that wealth, great birth, and great companionship (referring to being wealthy, long-lived, and having many friends) are the three Vipaka-phala. Extensive karma, thin defilements, and knowledge of the five sciences (referring to extensive good karma, fewer afflictions, and proficiency in the five sciences) are the three Adhipati-phala (result of dominance). The latter three are only discussed from the perspective of Adhipati-phala, and there is no contradiction. The Bodhisattvabhūmi states after each of the six perfections that 'this obtains great Bodhi,' which is only discussed from the perspective of Adhipati-phala. If both Hetu-pratyaya (causal condition) and Adhipati-pratyaya are Adhipati-phala, as stated at the end of the forty-third section. The preceding sections each use nine aspects to differentiate giving, etc., thereby obtaining such different results. I will not elaborate here; readers can understand it themselves.

Treatise: Ten and the three learnings, up to all sentient beings.

Commentary: The eleventh is the section on the mutual inclusion of the three learnings. Among them, first, the names and nature of the learnings are explained; second, the five levels are distinguished; and third, the learnings are formally used to encompass the perfections. There are three types of Śīla-śikṣā (discipline learning). The first takes the seven assemblies' precepts (the precepts held by monks, nuns, śikṣamāṇās, śrāmaṇeras, śrāmaṇerikās, upāsakas, and upāsikās) as its essence. The second takes conditioned, unconditioned, and undefiled good dharmas as its essence. Defiled good dharmas are not truly what should be cultivated because their nature can be severed. The third refers to the body, speech, and mind actions that truly benefit sentient beings as its nature. As mentioned above, it should be understood.

Treatise: This and the two vehicles, up to as said elsewhere.

Commentary: These three learnings have common and uncommon aspects with the two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna). The Mahāyānasaṃgraha by Asaṅga in the seventh chapter and by Vasubandhu in the eighth chapter each have four superiorities. The first is the superiority of difference, which is the three aggregates of precepts (Saṃvara-śīla, Kuśala-dharma-saṃgraha-śīla, and Sattvārtha-kriyā-śīla). The second is the superiority of commonality and uncommonality, which means that Bodhisattvas do not manifest any inherent transgressions (referring to fundamental transgressions such as killing, stealing, adultery, and lying), which is common with the two vehicles; similar prohibitive transgressions (referring to precepts established to protect the precepts) may manifest, which is uncommon with the two vehicles, and so on. The third is the superiority of vastness, which has four types: first, the vastness of various immeasurable training precepts; second, the vastness of immeasurable merit; third, the vastness of the intention to benefit sentient beings; and fourth, the vastness of establishing Bodhi, as explained extensively there. The fourth is the superiority of profundity, which means that even if Bodhisattvas perform the ten non-virtuous actions such as killing, they will not have any fault but will generate immeasurable merit and quickly attain Bodhi, and so on. Although there are four superiorities there, the first is the essence of the three aggregates of precepts. Now, the second, commonality and uncommonality; the fourth, profundity; and the third, vastness, are combined into three types. 'As said elsewhere' refers to those texts.

Treatise: Samādhi-śikṣā (concentration learning) has four, up to because of what is practiced.

Commentary: The meaning in the text can be understood. However, this Samādhi-śikṣā is only in the fourth Dhyāna (meditative absorption). Various superior Samādhis

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者多是彼中。由地勝故唯是無漏。既言聲聞等不得。明非地前已得此四及有漏故。解此四定攝論等唯有名。唯此及佛地論有解。發智光明。通聞．思．修。如第三地除障所得。

論。此四所緣至如余處說。

述曰。攝論第八說有六差別。一所緣別。以大乘法為所緣。二種種別。即四定別。且舉上首者。三對治別。謂總相緣智。即緣真如智速遣阿賴耶中粗重障故。四堪能別。謂住靜慮樂隨欲受生故。五引發別。能引發一切界無礙神通故。六作業別。謂能振動等。即十八變。又能引發十難行等。即自誓難行等。彼雖有六。第二差別即四定體。故除第二。唯有所緣等五。如彼廣解。密語六度等．十惡業道並爾。

論。惠學有三至無分別惠。

述曰。三惠可知。如六度中合五為一。說后得等三智皆第六故。

論。此三自性至如余處說。

述曰。若自性。若所依。若因緣。若所緣。若行相。若任持。若助伴等。合一十六門解三智。除初解自性外餘十五門解之。自性者。彼云。離五種相。以為無分別智性。一離無作意。熟眠醉等非彼智故。二離有尋伺地。第二定以上非故。三離想受滅寂靜故。即智不成定無心等故。四如色自性便非是智。如大種故。五離於真義異計度故。計度是有分別。非無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這些禪定在那些地方是殊勝的。由於地的殊勝，所以只有無漏的禪定。既然說了聲聞（Śrāvaka）等不能得到，就說明不是在見道之前就已經得到了這四種禪定，因為它們是有漏的。解釋這四種禪定的《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）等只有名稱，只有這部論和《佛地經論》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra）有解釋。發智光明，通過聽聞（Śruta）、思惟（Cintā）、修習（Bhāvanā）而得，就像第三地去除障礙所得到的。

論：這四種禪定的所緣，就像其他地方所說的那樣。

述記：在《攝大乘論》第八卷中，說了有六種差別。一是所緣的差別，以大乘佛法為所緣。二是種種的差別，即四種禪定的差別。這裡先舉出最主要的。三是對治的差別，即總相緣智，也就是緣真如（Tathātā）的智慧，迅速去除阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna）中的粗重障礙。四是堪能的差別，即安住于靜慮的快樂，可以隨自己的意願受生。五是引發的差別，能引發一切界無礙的神通。六是作業的差別，即能震動等，也就是十八變。又能引發十難行等，即自誓難行等。那裡雖然有六種差別，但第二種差別就是四種禪定的本體。所以除了第二種差別，只有所緣等五種差別，就像那裡廣泛解釋的那樣。密語六度等、十惡業道也是這樣。

論：慧學有三種，直到無分別慧。

述記：三種智慧是可以知道的。就像六度（Pāramitā）中，把前五種合為一種，說后得智等三種智慧都是第六種智慧。

論：這三種智慧的自性，就像其他地方所說的那樣。

述記：無論是自性，還是所依，還是因緣，還是所緣，還是行相，還是任持，還是助伴等，總共用十六個方面來解釋三種智慧。除了最初解釋自性之外，其餘十五個方面都用來解釋它們。關於自性，那裡說，離開五種相，作為無分別智的自性。一是離開無作意，熟睡、醉酒等不是這種智慧。二是離開有尋伺地，第二禪定以上不是這種智慧。三是離開想受滅的寂靜，即智慧不能成就，禪定沒有心等。四是像色法的自性一樣，便不是智慧，就像大種一樣。五是離開與真義不同的計度，計度是有分別的，不是無分別的。

【English Translation】 English version: These meditations are superior in those places. Because of the superiority of the ground, they are only unconditioned. Since it is said that Śrāvakas (hearers) and others cannot attain them, it is clear that they are not attained before the path of seeing, because they are conditioned. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahāyāna) and other treatises only have the names of these four meditations, only this treatise and the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra (Treatise on the Buddha-land Sutra) have explanations. The light of intelligence is attained through Śruta (hearing), Cintā (thinking), and Bhāvanā (cultivation), just like what is attained by removing obstacles in the third ground.

Treatise: The objects of these four meditations are as described elsewhere.

Commentary: In the eighth chapter of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, it is said that there are six differences. First, the difference in object, taking the Mahāyāna Dharma as the object. Second, the difference in variety, which is the difference in the four meditations. Here, the most important one is mentioned first. Third, the difference in antidotes, which is the wisdom of perceiving the general characteristics, that is, the wisdom of perceiving Suchness (Tathātā), quickly removing the coarse and heavy obstacles in the Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness). Fourth, the difference in capability, that is, dwelling in the bliss of meditative concentration, one can be reborn according to one's wishes. Fifth, the difference in causation, which can cause unobstructed supernatural powers in all realms. Sixth, the difference in function, which is the ability to shake, etc., that is, the eighteen transformations. It can also cause the ten difficult practices, such as the self-vowed difficult practices. Although there are six differences there, the second difference is the essence of the four meditations. Therefore, except for the second difference, there are only five differences such as the object, as explained extensively there. The secret mantras, the six Pāramitās (perfections), and the ten evil karmic paths are also like this.

Treatise: The learning of wisdom has three aspects, up to non-discriminating wisdom.

Commentary: The three kinds of wisdom can be known. Just like in the six Pāramitās, the first five are combined into one, saying that the three kinds of wisdom such as the wisdom attained after meditation are all the sixth wisdom.

Treatise: The nature of these three wisdoms is as described elsewhere.

Commentary: Whether it is the nature, or the basis, or the cause, or the object, or the aspect, or the support, or the companions, etc., a total of sixteen aspects are used to explain the three wisdoms. Except for the initial explanation of the nature, the remaining fifteen aspects are used to explain them. Regarding the nature, it is said there that it is separated from five kinds of characteristics, taking it as the nature of non-discriminating wisdom. First, it is separated from non-attention, because deep sleep, drunkenness, etc., are not this wisdom. Second, it is separated from the ground of initial and sustained thought, because it is not this wisdom above the second meditation. Third, it is separated from the tranquility of the cessation of perception and sensation, that is, wisdom cannot be achieved, and meditation has no mind, etc. Fourth, like the nature of form, it is not wisdom, just like the great elements. Fifth, it is separated from the deliberation that is different from the true meaning, deliberation is discriminating, not non-discriminating.

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分別故。言所依者。智所依。若是心者。心是思量。說智無分別不應正理。若所依非心。能依名智亦不應理。即智所依非心是心。由所依止是心種類。心所引生故是心。非思量故非心。故彼頌言。非心而是心等。言因緣者。彼頌言。諸菩薩因緣有言聞熏習等。即以聞熏習為因緣。言所緣者彼頌言。諸菩薩所緣不可言法性。即真如是。遍計所執法皆不可言。不可言性。謂二無我所顯真如。是即無分別智所緣也。即是三種無分別智所緣也。言行者。彼言行相。彼頌云。諸菩薩行相。復于所緣中是無分別智。彼于所知無相。即此智于所緣中所現無相。能．所二緣平等平等生無異相。如眼取色見青等相。非此青相與色有異故。此中且舉五門。餘十一門如彼論解。總是第一齣體名門。

論。如是三惠至俱已舍故。

述曰。第二五位分別門。加行唯有漏。餘二無漏。故諸位別。此依頓悟及三乘各自初二位說。若迴心者皆通初二位。此文可解。不煩廣解。

論。若自性攝至皆具相攝。

述曰。第三正相攝門。自性攝可知。餘三或七非自性故。眷屬理通三。三具攝十。

論。若隨用攝至遍策三故。

述曰。戒攝前三者。施是戒資糧。戒是戒自性。忍是戒眷屬。由忍不破戒故。餘二可知。精進三學

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 分別故：關於智的所依（所依賴的事物）。智所依賴的是什麼？如果是心，心是思量，說智沒有分別就不合道理。如果所依不是心，能依的就叫做智，也不合道理。那麼智所依賴的，不是心，卻又是心，因為所依止的是心這一種類，由心所引發產生，所以說是心；但它不是思量，所以又不是心。所以那首偈頌說：『非心而是心』等等。 關於因緣：那首偈頌說：『諸菩薩的因緣，有聽聞熏習等等。』就是以聽聞熏習作為因緣。 關於所緣：那首偈頌說：『諸菩薩的所緣是不可言說的法性。』也就是真如（Tathata）(事物的真實如是的狀態)。遍計所執（Parikalpita）(完全由概念和語言建構的虛假存在)的法都是不可言說的，不可言說的性質，就是二無我（Dvatmanairatmya）(人無我和法無我)所顯現的真如，這就是無分別智（Nirvikalpa-jnana）(沒有分別的智慧)所緣的境界。也就是三種無分別智所緣的境界。 關於行：那裡說的是行相。那首偈頌說：『諸菩薩的行相，又在所緣中是無分別智。』它對於所知（Jnana）(被認知的事物)沒有相狀，就是說這個智在所緣中顯現出沒有相狀，能緣（Grahaka）(能認知的主體)和所緣（Grahya）(被認知的客體)二者平等平等，產生沒有差異的相狀，就像眼睛取色，見到青色等相狀，但這個青色相狀與色本身並沒有差異。這裡且舉五門，其餘十一門如那部論的解釋。總的來說，這是第一齣體名門。 論：像這樣三種智慧，到最後都已捨棄。 述曰：第二是五位分別門。加行位（Prayoga-marga）(修行道的預備階段)只有有漏（Sasrava）(受煩惱影響的)，其餘二位是無漏（Anasrava）(不受煩惱影響的)。所以各個位次有區別。這是依據頓悟（突然覺悟）以及三乘（Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, Bodhisattvayana）(聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘)各自最初的兩個位次來說的。如果迴心（改變心意）的人，都通於最初的兩個位次。這段文字可以理解，不需詳細解釋。 論：如果自性攝，到最後都具相攝。 述曰：第三是正相攝門。自性攝可以知道。其餘三種或七種不是自性，所以不是自性攝。眷屬理通三種。三種具攝十種。 論：如果隨用攝，到最後普遍策勵三種。 述曰：戒攝前三種，佈施（Dana）(給予)是戒的資糧，戒是戒的自性，忍（Ksanti）(忍耐)是戒的眷屬，因為忍能不破戒。其餘兩種可以知道。精進（Virya）(努力)策勵三學（Trisiksa）(戒、定、慧)

【English Translation】 English version Separately, therefore: Regarding what the wisdom relies on (the object of reliance). What does wisdom rely on? If it is the mind, the mind is thinking. To say that wisdom has no discrimination is not reasonable. If what it relies on is not the mind, then what relies on it is called wisdom, which is also not reasonable. So, what wisdom relies on is not the mind, yet it is the mind, because what it relies on is the category of mind, produced and generated by the mind, so it is said to be the mind; but it is not thinking, so it is not the mind. Therefore, that verse says: 'Not the mind, yet it is the mind,' and so on. Regarding the causes and conditions: That verse says: 'The causes and conditions of the Bodhisattvas include hearing and熏習 (xunxi, perfuming/habituation) and so on.' That is, taking hearing and 熏習 as the causes and conditions. Regarding the object: That verse says: 'The object of the Bodhisattvas is the inexpressible Dharmata (法性, the nature of reality).' That is, Tathata (真如, the suchness of things). The Parikalpita (遍計所執, the fully conceptualized) dharmas are all inexpressible. The nature of inexpressibility is the Tathata revealed by Dvatmanairatmya (二無我, the two kinds of selflessness: selflessness of persons and selflessness of phenomena), which is the object of Nirvikalpa-jnana (無分別智, non-discriminating wisdom). That is, the object of the three kinds of non-discriminating wisdom. Regarding the practice: There it speaks of the characteristics of practice. That verse says: 'The characteristics of the Bodhisattvas' practice are also non-discriminating wisdom in the object.' It has no characteristics for what is known (Jnana, 所知), that is, this wisdom manifests no characteristics in the object, the grāhaka (能緣, the subject that cognizes) and the grāhya (所緣, the object that is cognized) are equal and equal, producing no different characteristics, just as the eye takes color and sees blue and other characteristics, but this blue characteristic is not different from the color itself. Here, let's mention five aspects, and the remaining eleven aspects are explained in that treatise. In general, this is the first aspect of revealing the substance and name. Treatise: Like these three wisdoms, they are all abandoned in the end. Commentary: The second is the aspect of distinguishing the five stages. The Prayoga-marga (加行位, the stage of preparation) only has Sasrava (有漏, with outflows), and the other two stages are Anasrava (無漏, without outflows). Therefore, the stages are different. This is based on sudden enlightenment and the first two stages of each of the three vehicles (Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, Bodhisattvayana). If those who change their minds, they all pass through the first two stages. This passage can be understood and does not need detailed explanation. Treatise: If it is included in self-nature, then in the end, it is included in all aspects. Commentary: The third is the aspect of including the correct characteristics. Inclusion in self-nature can be known. The other three or seven are not self-nature, so they are not included in self-nature. The retinue generally includes three. The three fully include ten. Treatise: If it is included in accordance with use, then in the end, it universally encourages the three. Commentary: Precepts include the first three, Dana (佈施, giving) is the resource for precepts, precepts are the self-nature of precepts, Ksanti (忍, patience) is the retinue of precepts, because patience does not break precepts. The other two can be known. Virya (精進, diligence) encourages the three learnings (Trisiksa, 三學: Sila, Samadhi, Prajna)

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攝。遍策三學故。七十八．解深密說同此。

論。若隨顯攝至惠攝后五。

述曰。戒攝前四。前三如次前說。以精進守護戒故亦戒攝。余文易知。四十九說。由前四資糧．自性．眷屬．守護修戒學也。由定故圓滿修心學。由惠故圓滿修惠學。同此也。

論。此十位者至俱唯無漏。

述曰。十二五位現種相攝門。此中所說。隨其所應未必十種一一皆爾　修習位中其相最顯者。通有無漏能無邊行故。此中約法爾種子說。通達位言有者。雖無別行義說有故。余文意可知。

論。此十因位至故未究竟。

述曰。十三分位分別門。三劫得名別。一行中修一行。一行中修一切行。一切行中修一切行別。如前已說然未入劫時。同已初入。但名波羅蜜多。已成佛竟亦同。第三劫名大波羅蜜多。解深密．七十八說。勝解行地名波羅蜜多。此中復言初無數劫。明暖等位唯在初劫又四十七八九等說勝解地。對法．攝論等說。從堅固心至極喜地。解行地攝。彼復說解行地是初劫。由多理故。四心唯初劫。對法第十一說持．任．鏡．明．依中。言滿已者。是滿心學非第二劫。如言三劫滿已修相好業。非於劫外方修相好。相好非三劫攝。數如上說。大文上來第一已十三門分別度訖。

論。此十義類至略

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 攝，是普遍策勵三學（戒、定、慧）的緣故。《解深密經》第七十八品也這樣說。

論：如果按照顯攝，到慧攝包含后五位。

述記：戒攝包含前四位。前三位的含義如前所述。因為精進守護戒律，所以也屬於戒攝。其餘文句容易理解。第四十九品說，通過前四位（資糧位、自性位、眷屬位、守護位）修習戒學。通過禪定圓滿修習心學。通過智慧圓滿修習慧學。《解深密經》也是這樣說的。

論：這十個位次，都唯是無漏。

述記：這是十二五位現種相攝門。這裡所說的，根據情況，未必十種都一一具備。修習位中，它的相最明顯。通於有漏和無漏，能夠無邊地修行。這裡是就法爾種子說的。通達位說『有』，雖然沒有別的行，但從意義上說是有。其餘文句的意思可以理解。

論：這十個因位，所以沒有究竟。

述記：這是十三分位分別門。三個阿僧祇劫（Asankhyeya-kalpa）的得名不同。一行中修一行，一行中修一切行，一切行中修一切行，這三種情況有所區別。如前已經說過，但未進入阿僧祇劫時，和剛開始進入時相同，只稱為波羅蜜多（Pāramitā，到彼岸）。已經成佛后也相同。第三個阿僧祇劫稱為**羅蜜多。《解深密經》第七十八品說，勝解行地（Adhimukticaryābhūmi）稱為波羅蜜多。這裡又說初無數劫，說明暖位等只在初劫。又第四十七、八、九等品說勝解地。《對法論》、《攝論》等說，從堅固心到極喜地（Pramuditābhūmi），屬於解行地。它們又說解行地是初劫。因為有很多道理。四心唯在初劫。《對法論》第十一說持、任、鏡、明、依中，說『滿已』，是滿心學，不是第二劫。如說三劫滿已修相好業，不是在劫外才修相好。相好不是三個阿僧祇劫所包含的。數量如上所述。大文到這裡，第一已十三門分別度完畢。

論：這十種義類，簡略。

【English Translation】 English version: 『Śamatha-vipassanā-yuganaddha』 (tranquility and insight) is because it universally encourages the three learnings (śīla, samādhi, prajñā). The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經) chapter seventy-eight says the same.

Treatise: If according to the 『manifestation-collection』, up to 『wisdom-collection』 includes the latter five stages.

Commentary: 『Precept-collection』 includes the first four stages. The meanings of the first three stages are as previously explained. Because of diligently guarding the precepts, it also belongs to 『precept-collection』. The remaining sentences are easy to understand. Chapter forty-nine says that through the first four stages (accumulation stage, nature stage, retinue stage, guarding stage), one cultivates the learning of precepts. Through samādhi, one perfectly cultivates the learning of mind. Through prajñā, one perfectly cultivates the learning of wisdom. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra says the same.

Treatise: These ten stages are all only unconditioned (anāsrava).

Commentary: This is the 『twelve five-stage manifestation-seed collection gate』. What is said here, according to the situation, does not necessarily mean that all ten types are fully present. In the cultivation stage, its characteristic is most obvious. It is common to both conditioned and unconditioned, and can cultivate boundlessly. Here, it is spoken of in terms of the 『dharmatā』 (法爾) seed. The 『penetration stage』 says 『exists』 (有), although there is no other practice, it is said to exist in meaning. The meaning of the remaining sentences can be understood.

Treatise: These ten causal stages are therefore not ultimate.

Commentary: This is the 『thirteen division-stage differentiation gate』. The names of the three Asankhyeya-kalpas (阿僧祇劫) are different. Cultivating one practice within one practice, cultivating all practices within one practice, and cultivating all practices within all practices, these three situations are different. As previously said, but when not yet entering the Asankhyeya-kalpa, it is the same as when just entering, only called Pāramitā (波羅蜜多, perfection). It is the same after becoming a Buddha. The third Asankhyeya-kalpa is called Rāma-Pāramitā. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra chapter seventy-eight says that the Adhimukticaryābhūmi (勝解行地, stage of understanding and practice) is called Pāramitā. Here it is again said that the initial countless kalpas indicate that the 『warmth stage』 (暖位) etc. are only in the initial kalpa. Also, chapters forty-seven, eight, nine, etc. say the Adhimukticaryābhūmi. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論), Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝論), etc. say that from the 『firm mind』 to the Pramuditābhūmi (極喜地, Joyful Ground), it belongs to the 『stage of understanding and practice』. They also say that the 『stage of understanding and practice』 is the initial kalpa. Because there are many reasons. The 『four minds』 are only in the initial kalpa. The Abhidharmasamuccaya chapter eleven says that among 『holding, entrusting, mirror, illumination, reliance』, saying 『already full』 means the full mind learning, not the second kalpa. As it is said that after three kalpas are full, one cultivates the marks and characteristics, it is not that one cultivates the marks and characteristics outside of the kalpa. The marks and characteristics are not included in the three Asankhyeya-kalpas. The quantity is as mentioned above. The main text up to here, the first has finished differentiating the degrees through thirteen gates.

Treatise: These ten types of meanings are brief.

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示網要。

述曰。大文第二指不繁文　義類無邊者。解深密．七十八說。度清凈．度最大．無染．最明盛．不可動．最清凈．度無盡．度威德．度因．果．義利．度攝三性等。皆如彼經論說。不能繁述。

論。十於十地至地地修一。

述曰。大文第三十地修度門。十地經．攝論．顯揚．瑜伽等皆言。初地施為增上。余度隨力隨分非不修習。乃至十地智為增上。余度非不修習。隨力隨分故地地修十　問若第五地修定度者。何故三地名為發光　定障三地除。成熟至五地。

論。雖十地行至十到彼岸。

述曰。大文第四以十攝諸行。六度外更無菩薩道。即由六度攝一切行等故。不以但說十度更不說余行。

論。十重障者至異生性故。

述曰。前答證得轉依等中有四答。一依十地。二修十行。已如前辨。自下第三解十重障。于中有二。初明重障。後重以二障攝總明斷位。明重障中有二。初牒十障者。后別解釋。釋中有十一障者。乘文次對釋二十二愚義。乘文便故因釋佛地障。初文有六。第一齣體。一異生性障。世親攝論名與此同。十地論第一云。凡夫我相障。此名不然。此障之體非唯我故。凡夫名異。如別抄說。此障體性如何等者。謂分別二障。依此種子之上立異生性故。今斷能

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 示網要。

述曰。大文第二指不繁文，義類無邊者。《解深密經》第七十八說：『度清凈、度最大、無染、最明盛、不可動、最清凈、度無盡、度威德、度因、果、義利、度攝三性等。』都如彼經論所說，不能繁述。

論。十於十地至地地修一。

述曰。大文第三十地修度門。《十地經》、《攝大乘論》、《顯揚聖教論》、《瑜伽師地論》等都說，初地以佈施為增上，其餘度隨能力隨分並非不修習，乃至十地以智慧為增上，其餘度並非不修習，隨能力隨分，所以地地修十度。問：若第五地修習禪定度，為何三地名為發光地？答：禪定之障礙在三地除滅，成熟至五地。

論。雖十地行至十到彼岸。

述曰。大文第四以十攝諸行。六度之外更無菩薩道，即由六度攝一切行等故，不以但說十度更不說其餘行。

論。十重障者至異生性故。

述曰。前面回答證得轉依等內容中有四個方面，一是依據十地，二是修習十行，已經如前面辨析。下面第三個方面解釋十重障。其中分為兩部分，首先說明重障，然後用二障概括總明斷除的位次。說明重障中分為兩部分，首先是列舉十障，然後分別解釋。解釋中有十一障，依據文句的順序對應解釋二十二愚的含義。依據文句的方便，順便解釋佛地障。首先第一段文字有六個方面，第一是說明本體，即異生性障。世親菩薩的《攝大乘論》名稱與此相同。《十地經論》第一卷說：『凡夫我相障』，這種說法不對。此障的本體並非只有我相。凡夫的名稱不同，如其他抄本所說。此障的體性如何等？是指分別二障，依據此二障的種子之上建立異生性。現在斷除能

【English Translation】 English version Showing the Essentials of the Net.

Statement: The second major section refers to not being verbose, and the categories of meanings being boundless. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra), section 78, says: 'Purity of the perfection, greatest of the perfection, undefiled, most brilliant and flourishing, immovable, most pure, endless of the perfection, majestic virtue of the perfection, cause, effect, benefit, perfection encompassing the three natures, etc.' All are as the scriptures and treatises say, and cannot be exhaustively described.

Treatise: Ten in the ten grounds, up to each ground cultivating one.

Statement: The third major section is the gate of cultivating perfections in the ten grounds. The Daśabhūmika Sūtra (Ten Grounds Sutra), Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of Mahāyāna), Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Higher Knowledge), Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), etc., all say that in the first ground, generosity is predominant, and the other perfections are cultivated according to one's ability and capacity, not that they are not cultivated. Even in the tenth ground, wisdom is predominant, and the other perfections are not that they are not cultivated, but are cultivated according to one's ability and capacity. Therefore, each ground cultivates the ten perfections. Question: If the fifth ground cultivates the perfection of meditation, why is the third ground called the 'Radiant Ground'? Answer: The obstacles to meditation are removed in the third ground, and mature by the fifth ground.

Treatise: Although the practices of the ten grounds reach the other shore through the ten.

Statement: The fourth major section encompasses all practices with the ten. Outside of the six perfections, there is no Bodhisattva path. That is because the six perfections encompass all practices, etc. Therefore, it is not that only the ten perfections are spoken of, and no other practices are mentioned.

Treatise: The ten heavy obstacles, up to the nature of an ordinary being.

Statement: The previous answer regarding the attainment of the transformation of the basis (āśrayaparāvṛtti) etc., had four aspects: first, based on the ten grounds; second, cultivating the ten practices, as has been discussed previously. From here below, the third aspect explains the ten heavy obstacles. Within this, there are two parts: first, clarifying the heavy obstacles; then, using two obstacles to summarize and clarify the stages of severance. In clarifying the heavy obstacles, there are two parts: first, listing the ten obstacles; then, explaining them separately. In the explanation, there are eleven obstacles, explaining the meanings of the twenty-two foolishnesses in accordance with the order of the text. According to the convenience of the text, the obstacles of the Buddha-ground are explained along the way. First, the first section has six aspects, the first being to state the substance, which is the obstacle of the nature of an ordinary being (pṛthagjana). The name in Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha is the same as this. The first volume of the Daśabhūmika-śāstra says: 'The obstacle of the self-image of an ordinary person.' This name is not correct. The substance of this obstacle is not only the self. The name 'ordinary person' is different, as other copies say. What is the nature of this obstacle, etc.? It refers to distinguishing the two obstacles, establishing the nature of an ordinary being based on the seeds of these two obstacles. Now severing the ability to

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依故說所依斷。即與現本識同地二障種子能生現行者上立此初障。由此凡夫離欲。仍名欲界異生。不伏見惑種故。以準知此性是染污　亦可言。種在本識與識同性。即無覆性　若爾何故對法第四解無記中。但有命根等是自性。不言異生性耶　答由約煩惱種可名染污。約異熟種可名無覆。通二義故不名自性。命根等不然。不可為例。今勘諸文。前釋為善。對法解無記。及六十六立五無記中。不言異生性是五無記等故。既依染種立故。亦唯染別小乘也　問今以二障分別起種名為此性。即二乘聖應名異生。未斷所知分別障故　答隨望自乘見道所斷種上立故。若定性者名已斷此性。自乘障無故。唯依煩惱種子立故。若不定者名為未斷。依二障種立異生故。若不爾者。不定性者應無異生性障　若爾無種性者。既無自乘聖道。說何為異生性　應說但依二障分別種上立異生性。不須別說。望自乘見所斷種上立故。所知未斷雖曰聖者。尚名異生　此何位舍　答不同小乘唯修所斷世第一法與見道合舍。今大乘唯見所斷。見道無間道起時舍。依所斷種立此性故。與種俱舍　問若異生性不定性聖。未全斷盡故。仍得名異生。未全得無漏。應不名聖者　答異生之性通二障。不定之性已分斷。可名分斷異生性。二真見道名為聖。已得小分名為聖。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『依故說所依斷』，即是說，在與現行本識（ālaya-vijñāna，根本識）同地的二障（煩惱障和所知障）種子，能夠產生現行煩惱的人身上，安立這最初的異生性（pṛthag-jana-tva，凡夫性）。因此，凡夫即使離開了欲界的煩惱，仍然被稱為欲界異生，因為他們沒有降伏見惑的種子。由此可以推知，這種異生性的本質是染污的。 也可以說，種子在本識中，與識的性質相同，即是無覆無記性（avyākṛta，非善非惡的性質）。如果這樣，為什麼《對法論》（Abhidharma）第四卷解釋無記時，只說命根等是自性，而不說異生性呢？ 回答是，因為從煩惱種子的角度來說，可以稱為染污；從異熟種子的角度來說，可以稱為無覆無記。因為它兼具兩種含義，所以不稱為自性。而命根等則不然，不能作為例子。現在考察各種文獻，之前的解釋是更好的。《對法論》解釋無記，以及六十六卷建立五種無記中，都沒有說異生性是五種無記等。既然是依據染污種子而安立的，所以也只是染污的，這是小乘的觀點。 問：現在以二障分別生起的種子，稱為這種異生性，那麼二乘聖者（聲聞乘和緣覺乘的聖人）應該也被稱為異生，因為他們沒有斷盡所知分別障。 答：這是隨順他們各自乘的見道所斷的種子而安立的。如果是定性（必定證悟）的聖者，就說他們已經斷除了這種異生性，因為他們已經沒有了自己乘的障礙。異生性只是依據煩惱種子而安立的。如果是不定性（可能證悟也可能不證悟）的聖者，就說他們還沒有斷除，因為異生性是依據二障種子而安立的。如果不是這樣，那麼不定性的聖者應該就沒有異生性障礙了。 問：如果無種性者（沒有證悟潛力的人），既然沒有自己乘的聖道，那麼說什麼異生性呢？ 答：應該說只是依據二障分別種子而安立異生性，不需要另外說明。因為是隨順他們各自乘的見道所斷的種子而安立的。所知障沒有斷盡，即使被稱為聖者，仍然可以稱為異生。 這種異生性在什麼位階捨棄？ 答：不同於小乘，只有修所斷的世第一法與見道結合時才捨棄。現在大乘只有見所斷，在見道的無間道生起時捨棄。因為是依據所斷的種子而安立的這種異生性，所以與種子一同捨棄。 問：如果異生性是不定性的聖者，因為沒有完全斷盡，所以仍然可以稱為異生。那麼，因為沒有完全獲得無漏（anāsrava，沒有煩惱），應該不能稱為聖者？ 答：異生性的範圍包括二障，不定性的聖者已經分斷了異生性，可以稱為分斷異生性。二真見道（兩個真實的見道）可以稱為聖，因為已經獲得了一小部分無漏，所以稱為聖。

【English Translation】 English version 'Based on this, it is said that what is relied upon is severed.' That is, this initial pṛthag-jana-tva (state of being an ordinary person) is established on those who, with seeds of the two obscurations (kleśa-āvaraṇa and jñeya-āvaraṇa, afflictive and cognitive obscurations) in the same ground as the present ālaya-vijñāna (store consciousness), are able to generate manifest afflictions. Therefore, even if an ordinary person is free from desire, they are still called a desire-realm ordinary being because they have not subdued the seeds of the afflictions of wrong views. From this, it can be inferred that the nature of this pṛthag-jana-tva is defiled. It can also be said that the seeds are in the ālaya-vijñāna and have the same nature as the consciousness, that is, avyākṛta (indeterminate, neither wholesome nor unwholesome). If so, why does the fourth chapter of the Abhidharma (Treatise on Higher Knowledge) explain that only life-force, etc., are self-nature in the section on the indeterminate, and not mention pṛthag-jana-tva? The answer is that from the perspective of the seeds of afflictions, it can be called defiled; from the perspective of the seeds of resultant effects, it can be called avyākṛta. Because it encompasses both meanings, it is not called self-nature. Life-force, etc., are not like this and cannot be taken as examples. Now, examining various texts, the previous explanation is better. In the Abhidharma's explanation of the indeterminate and in the establishment of the five indeterminate in the sixty-sixth chapter, pṛthag-jana-tva is not mentioned as being among the five indeterminate, etc. Since it is established based on defiled seeds, it is only defiled, which is the view of the Hīnayāna (Smaller Vehicle). Question: Now, if the seeds that arise from the two obscurations are called this pṛthag-jana-tva, then the Śrāvakas (Disciples) and Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas) should also be called ordinary beings because they have not completely severed the conceptual obscuration of knowledge (jñeya-āvaraṇa). Answer: This is established in accordance with the seeds that are severed by the path of seeing (darśana-mārga) of their respective vehicles. If they are of a definite nature (destined for enlightenment), it is said that they have already severed this pṛthag-jana-tva because they no longer have the obscurations of their own vehicle. Pṛthag-jana-tva is only established based on the seeds of afflictions. If they are of an indefinite nature (not certain to attain enlightenment), it is said that they have not yet severed it because pṛthag-jana-tva is established based on the seeds of the two obscurations. If it were not so, then those of indefinite nature should not have the obscuration of pṛthag-jana-tva. Question: If those without the potential for enlightenment (agotrabhu) do not have the noble path of their own vehicle, then what pṛthag-jana-tva is being referred to? Answer: It should be said that pṛthag-jana-tva is established solely based on the conceptual seeds of the two obscurations, and no separate explanation is needed. Because it is established in accordance with the seeds that are severed by the path of seeing of their respective vehicles. Even if the obscuration of knowledge has not been severed, even if they are called noble ones, they can still be called ordinary beings. At what stage is this pṛthag-jana-tva abandoned? Answer: Unlike the Hīnayāna, where it is only abandoned when the highest mundane dharma (laukika-agradharma) that is severed by cultivation (bhāvanā) is combined with the path of seeing, in the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) only what is severed by seeing is abandoned, at the moment when the immediate path of the path of seeing arises. Because this pṛthag-jana-tva is established based on the seeds that are severed, it is abandoned together with the seeds. Question: If the pṛthag-jana-tva is an indefinite noble one, because it has not been completely severed, it can still be called an ordinary being. Then, because they have not completely attained the unconditioned (anāsrava), should they not be called noble ones? Answer: The scope of pṛthag-jana-tva includes the two obscurations. The indefinite noble one has already partially severed pṛthag-jana-tva and can be called someone who has partially severed pṛthag-jana-tva. The two true paths of seeing can be called noble because they have already attained a small portion of the unconditioned, so they are called noble.

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未全斷盡故不全名為聖。言不定性名異生者。非是全名。分已斷故。言聖應爾分已證故。由此總應四句分別。有異生非聖。如全未得三乘聖道。有聖非異生。大乘者得見諦。有異生亦聖。如不定性聖未至十地中。有非異生非聖如入無餘依涅槃界。

此即文中第一齣障體性。自下第二對三乘明同異。

論。二乘見道至名得聖性。

述曰。此約異生性各望自乘障為論。斷少分名小聖。全斷盡名大聖。第三明障道俱不俱。謂有薩婆多等為伏難言。若異生性是修所斷。見道前舍故。無漏果起。無有凡聖俱成熟失。今既見所斷種上立異生性者。即無間道有惑種俱。此種未舍。異生未斷。如何凡聖無俱起失。由薩婆多惑得俱故。今為此難非就大乘。

論。二真見道至必不成就。

述曰。謂無惑得與聖道俱。唯依分別二障種子立異生性。其種必不與見道俱。如何凡聖有俱成失。

問無間道起惑種不俱。過去已滅。未來未生。如何名斷。

論。猶明與闇至無俱成失。

述曰。由此對法第七等。問從何而得斷耶。答不從過去。已滅故。不從未來。未生故。不從現在。道不俱故。然從諸煩惱粗重而得斷。為斷如是如是品粗重。生如是如是品對治。若此品對治生。此品粗重滅。猶如世間明

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為沒有完全斷盡，所以不完全稱為聖者。說不定性名為異生者，並非是完全的名稱，因為（異生性）一部分已經被斷除了，所以說聖者應該是這樣，因為（聖性）一部分已經被證得了。由此總共應該用四句來分別：有的是異生而非聖者，例如完全沒有得到三乘聖道的人；有的是聖者而非異生，例如大乘修行者得到見諦（dṛṣṭi-satya，見道之真理）的境界；有的是異生也是聖者，例如不定性的聖者還沒有達到十地（daśa-bhūmi，菩薩修行的十個階段）的境界；有的是非異生也非聖者，例如進入無餘依涅槃界（nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu，沒有剩餘煩惱的涅槃境界）。

這便是文中的第一重障礙的體性。下面第二點是針對三乘（triyāna，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）說明相同和不同之處。

論：二乘（dvayāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）見道（darśana-mārga，證悟真理的道路）乃至名為得聖性。

述曰：這是就異生性各自針對自己所修行的乘的障礙來說的。斷除少部分稱為小聖，完全斷盡稱為大聖。第三點說明障礙之道是否同時存在。薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）等人提出疑問說：如果異生性是修所斷（bhāvanā-pahātavya，通過修行斷除的），在見道之前就已經捨棄了，那麼無漏果（anāsrava-phala，沒有煩惱的果報）生起時，就不會有凡夫和聖人同時成熟的過失。現在既然在見所斷（darśana-pahātavya，通過見道斷除的）的種子之上安立異生性，那麼在無間道（anantara-mārga，緊接著解脫道的道路）生起時，就有煩惱的種子同時存在。這個種子沒有捨棄，異生性就沒有斷除，怎麼能說凡夫和聖人沒有同時生起的過失呢？因為薩婆多認為煩惱可以同時存在。現在提出這個疑問，不是針對大乘。

論：二真見道（dvisatya-darśana-mārga，兩種真理的見道）乃至必定不成就。

述曰：意思是說沒有煩惱的獲得與聖道同時存在的情況。只是依靠分別二障（dvi-āvaraṇa，煩惱障和所知障）的種子來安立異生性。這個種子必定不會與見道同時存在。怎麼能說凡夫和聖人有同時成就的過失呢？

問：無間道生起時，煩惱的種子不是同時存在嗎？過去的已經滅了，未來的還沒有生，怎麼能說是斷除呢？

論：猶如光明與黑暗乃至沒有同時成就的過失。

述曰：由此對法（Abhidharma，阿毗達摩）第七等提出疑問：從何處得到斷除呢？回答說：不是從過去，因為已經滅了；不是從未來，因為還沒有生；不是從現在，因為道不同時存在。而是從諸煩惱的粗重而得到斷除。爲了斷除如此如此品類的粗重，生起如此如此品類的對治。如果此品類的對治生起，此品類的粗重就滅了，猶如世間的光明一樣。

【English Translation】 English version: Because it is not completely eradicated, it is not fully called a 'saint'. To say that 'those of undetermined nature' are called 'ordinary beings' (pṛthagjana), is not a complete designation, because a portion (of ordinary being-ness) has already been severed. Therefore, it should be said that 'saints' are such, because a portion (of saintliness) has already been attained. Thus, in total, it should be distinguished by four categories: There are ordinary beings who are not saints, such as those who have not yet attained the holy path of the Three Vehicles (triyāna). There are saints who are not ordinary beings, such as those Mahayana (mahāyāna) practitioners who have attained the vision of truth (dṛṣṭi-satya). There are those who are both ordinary beings and saints, such as saints of undetermined nature who have not yet reached the Tenth Ground (daśa-bhūmi). There are those who are neither ordinary beings nor saints, such as those who have entered the realm of Nirvana without remainder (nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa-dhātu).

This is the nature of the first obstacle mentioned in the text. The second point below clarifies the similarities and differences with respect to the Three Vehicles.

Treatise: The path of seeing (darśana-mārga) of the Two Vehicles (dvayāna) is even called the attainment of saintly nature.

Commentary: This is discussed in terms of the obstacles to each ordinary being-ness with respect to their own vehicle of practice. Severing a small portion is called a 'minor saint', completely severing it is called a 'great saint'. The third point clarifies whether the path of obstacles exists simultaneously or not. The Sarvāstivādins (Sarvāstivāda) and others raise the question: If ordinary being-ness is to be abandoned by cultivation (bhāvanā-pahātavya), and it is abandoned before the path of seeing, then when the unconditioned result (anāsrava-phala) arises, there would be no fault of ordinary beings and saints maturing simultaneously. Now, since ordinary being-ness is established on the seeds of what is to be abandoned by seeing (darśana-pahātavya), then when the path of immediate succession (anantara-mārga) arises, there are seeds of affliction existing simultaneously. If these seeds are not abandoned, then ordinary being-ness is not severed. How can it be said that there is no fault of ordinary beings and saints arising simultaneously? Because the Sarvāstivādins believe that afflictions can exist simultaneously. The question is raised now, not with respect to the Mahayana.

Treatise: The path of seeing of the two truths (dvisatya-darśana-mārga) will certainly not be accomplished.

Commentary: It means that there is no attainment of afflictions existing simultaneously with the holy path. Ordinary being-ness is established solely based on the seeds of the two obstructions (dvi-āvaraṇa). These seeds will certainly not exist simultaneously with the path of seeing. How can it be said that there is a fault of ordinary beings and saints being accomplished simultaneously?

Question: When the path of immediate succession arises, aren't the seeds of affliction existing simultaneously? The past has already ceased, and the future has not yet arisen. How can it be called severance?

Treatise: It is like light and darkness, and there is no fault of simultaneous accomplishment.

Commentary: Therefore, the seventh book of Abhidharma (Abhidharma) and others raise the question: From where is severance obtained? The answer is: Not from the past, because it has already ceased; not from the future, because it has not yet arisen; not from the present, because the path does not exist simultaneously. Rather, severance is obtained from the coarseness of all afflictions. In order to sever the coarseness of such and such a category, the antidote of such and such a category arises. If the antidote of this category arises, the coarseness of this category ceases, just like light in the world.

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生闇滅。由此品離系故。令未來煩惱住不生法中。是名為斷。故非道惑可說為俱　問此言斷者。為斷緣縛。為斷相應縛　答若所知障。唯言斷粗重。體非縛法故。若煩惱障從二說斷。五十九說。對治道生煩惱不起得無生法。是故說名斷彼相應。相應斷已不復緣境。故從所緣亦說名斷　言粗重斷。雖亦通煩惱障。然從二斷唯煩惱中　又所知障種障十地智。是染污性。善薩斷時斷彼種體。如二乘者斷煩惱種。然二乘斷定障等時。但斷粗重令相隨順。不能斷種。不同菩薩　問此言斷者。為總緣智慧斷。為別緣智慧斷　此有何失　總緣之智非自相智。如何共相比量之智慧斷惑耶。若別相智慧斷。即違對法．五十九等文。對法七等說。問何等作意能斷耶。答總緣作意觀一切法皆無我效能斷煩惱。師子覺云。總緣作意者。合緣一切法共相行作意　答如佛地第六說。云何佛能知共相。共相既依比量而立。豈佛知共相是比量耶。彼有三說。有義二量是散心位依二相立。不說定心。若在定心緣一切相皆現量攝。由此總緣智亦現量攝斷惑無失。即由定照共相自體故。說定心為現量也。第二說有義。定心唯緣自相。然由共相方便所引。緣諸共相所顯理者。就方便說名知共相。不如是者名知自相。由此道理。或說真如名空無我諸法共相。或說真

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：生起于無明，止滅于光明。因此，通過修習此品而脫離束縛，使未來的煩惱停留在不生起的法性之中，這被稱為『斷』。所以，不能說『道』與『惑』是同時存在的。 問：這裡所說的『斷』，是斷除緣的束縛，還是斷除相應的束縛？ 答：如果是所知障，只能說是斷除了粗重（沉重、遲鈍的部分），因為其本體並非束縛之法。如果是煩惱障，則從兩種角度來說『斷』。五十九種煩惱的說法是，當對治道生起時，煩惱不再生起，從而獲得無生法。因此，這被稱為斷除與煩惱的相應。相應被斷除后，煩惱不再緣于外境，所以從所緣的角度來說，也稱為『斷』。 說到斷除粗重，雖然也通用於煩惱障，但從兩種『斷』的角度來說，只在煩惱障中適用。 此外，所知障的種子障礙著十地菩薩的智慧，具有染污的性質。菩薩在斷除所知障時，會斷除這些種子的本體，就像二乘修行者斷除煩惱的種子一樣。然而，二乘修行者在斷除禪定障礙等時，只是斷除粗重，使其變得順從，而不能斷除種子，這與菩薩不同。 問：這裡所說的『斷』，是總體緣起的智慧能夠斷除，還是分別緣起的智慧能夠斷除？ 這有什麼過失呢？ 總體緣起的智慧並非自相智（直接認識事物本質的智慧），如何能通過共相比量（通過比較推理認識事物共性的智慧）來斷除迷惑呢？如果分別緣起的智慧能夠斷除迷惑，那就違反了《對法》和《五十九說》等經文。《對法》第七等經文中說：『什麼作意能夠斷除煩惱呢？』回答是：『總體緣起的作意，觀察一切法皆無我效能斷除煩惱。』師子覺說：『總體緣起的作意，是綜合緣起一切法共相的作意。』 答：正如《佛地經論》第六卷所說：『佛如何能知共相？』共相既然是依據比量而建立的，難道佛知道共相是通過比量嗎？對此有三種說法。第一種說法認為，二量（比量和現量）是在散亂心位，依據兩種相而建立的，不是在禪定心中。如果在禪定心中，緣起一切相都是現量所攝。因此，總體緣起的智慧也是現量所攝，斷除迷惑沒有過失。這是因為禪定能夠照見共相的自體，所以說禪定心是現量。第二種說法認為，禪定心只緣起自相，但由於共相的方便引導，緣起諸共相所顯現的真理，就方便而言，稱為知共相。不這樣的話，就稱為知自相。由此道理，或者說真如是空無我諸法的共相，或者說真如是……

【English Translation】 English version: Ignorance arises and ceases with enlightenment. Therefore, by practicing this teaching, one becomes detached from bondage, causing future afflictions to remain in the state of non-arising. This is called 'severance'. Thus, it cannot be said that 'the path' and 'delusion' exist simultaneously. Question: What is meant by 'severance' here? Is it the severance of the bondage of conditions, or the severance of the bondage of association? Answer: In the case of the obscuration of knowledge (jnana-avarana), it is only said to sever the grossness (roughness, heaviness), because its essence is not a binding dharma. In the case of the obscuration of afflictions (klesha-avarana), 'severance' is spoken of from two perspectives. The fifty-nine afflictions are spoken of in terms of when the antidote path arises, afflictions no longer arise, and one attains the dharma of non-arising. Therefore, this is called severing the association with afflictions. Once the association is severed, afflictions no longer cling to objects, so from the perspective of what is clung to, it is also called 'severance'. Speaking of severing grossness, although it also applies to the obscuration of afflictions, from the perspective of the two types of 'severance', it only applies to the obscuration of afflictions. Furthermore, the seed of the obscuration of knowledge hinders the wisdom of the ten bhumis (stages of a Bodhisattva), possessing a defiled nature. When a Bodhisattva severs the obscuration of knowledge, they sever the essence of these seeds, just as the practitioners of the Two Vehicles (Shravakas and Pratyekabuddhas) sever the seeds of afflictions. However, when the practitioners of the Two Vehicles sever the obstructions to samadhi (meditative concentration), they only sever the grossness, making it compliant, but they cannot sever the seeds, unlike Bodhisattvas. Question: Does 'severance' here mean that wisdom arising from the general condition severs, or that wisdom arising from the specific condition severs? What is the fault in this? Wisdom arising from the general condition is not self-nature wisdom (wisdom that directly recognizes the essence of things), how can it sever delusion through comparative inference (wisdom that recognizes the common characteristics of things through comparison and reasoning)? If wisdom arising from the specific condition can sever delusion, then it violates texts such as the Abhidharma and the Fifty-Nine Discourses. The seventh section of the Abhidharma says: 'What kind of attention (manaskara) can sever afflictions?' The answer is: 'Attention arising from the general condition, observing that all dharmas are without self-nature, can sever afflictions.' Simhavyaghra says: 'Attention arising from the general condition is attention that comprehensively arises from the common characteristics of all dharmas.' Answer: As the sixth volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra says: 'How can the Buddha know the common characteristics?' Since common characteristics are established based on inference, does the Buddha know common characteristics through inference? There are three explanations for this. The first explanation is that the two means of knowledge (inference and direct perception) are established based on the two characteristics in the state of distracted mind, not in the state of samadhi. In the state of samadhi, arising from all characteristics is included in direct perception. Therefore, wisdom arising from the general condition is also included in direct perception, and there is no fault in severing delusion. This is because samadhi can illuminate the self-nature of common characteristics, so the mind in samadhi is said to be direct perception. The second explanation is that the mind in samadhi only arises from self-nature, but due to the skillful guidance of common characteristics, arising from the truth revealed by the various common characteristics is called knowing common characteristics in terms of skillfulness. Otherwise, it is called knowing self-nature. For this reason, it is sometimes said that Suchness (tathata) is the common characteristic of the empty, selfless dharmas, or that Suchness is...

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如二空所顯非是共相。由此義故。對法等說緣共相智慧斷惑者依方便說。實自相觀方能斷之。第三說如實義者。彼因明論立自共相。與此少異。彼說一切法上實義皆名自相。以諸法上自相共相。各附已體不共他故。若分別心立一種類能詮所詮。通在諸法如縷貫華名為共相。此要散心分別假立是比量境。一切定心離此分別皆名現量。雖緣諸法苦．無常等。亦一一法各別有故名為自相。真如雖是共相所顯。以是諸法自實性故。自有相故。亦非共相。不可以其與一切法不一不異即名共相。自相亦與一切共相不一異故。是故彼論與此不同。由此義故。對法等說緣共相智慧斷惑者。依分別心於一種類真如之上通在諸法說名共相。或真如體諸法皆有義名共相。緣此之智名共相智。論實真如法實性故非是共相。據實而言。即別相智慧斷惑也。共相假立已如前辨。

論。無間道時至解脫道為。

述曰。第四釋二道別。解脫道所治與小乘不同。小乘難曰。我無間道猶有惑得。可起解脫道與得相違。今汝無間道已無惑種。何用復起解脫道為。用之何作。

論。斷惑證滅期心別故。

述曰。下論主答。由前加行期心別故。謂無間道能斷惑。解脫道能證滅。雖無間道已無惑種。證彼無為。有此用別起解脫道。此一解也

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果說二空（指人空和法空）所顯示的不是共相（普遍的、共同的特徵），這是有道理的。因此，《對法》（Abhidharma）等論典中說，憑藉緣共相的智慧可以斷除煩惱，這只是依方便之說。實際上，只有觀自相（事物自身的獨特特徵）才能斷除煩惱。第三種說法是關於如實義（事物真實本質）的解釋，因明論（邏輯學）中建立的自相和共相與此略有不同。他們認為，一切法上的真實意義都可稱為自相，因為諸法上的自相和共相各自依附於自身的體性，不與他法相混。如果分別心（區分事物的心理活動）設立一種類別，能詮（能表達的）和所詮（所表達的）普遍存在於諸法之中，像用線串聯花朵一樣，這就被稱為共相。這需要散亂的心通過分別假立，是比量（推理）的境界。一切定心（專注的心）遠離這種分別，都稱為現量（直接感知）。雖然緣于諸法的苦、無常等，也是各個法各自具有的，因此稱為自相。真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）雖然是共相所顯，但因為它是諸法自身真實的體性，具有自相，所以也不是共相。不能因為它與一切法不一不異就稱其為共相，因為自相也與一切共相不一不異。因此，他們的論點與此不同。因此，《對法》等論典中說，憑藉緣共相的智慧可以斷除煩惱，這是依據分別心，在一種類別真如之上，普遍存在於諸法之中，稱之為共相。或者說，真如的體性是諸法都具有的意義，因此稱為共相。緣於此的智慧稱為共相智。但實際上，真如是法的真實體性，不是共相。就實際情況而言，是別相智（認識事物獨特特徵的智慧）才能斷除煩惱。共相是假立的，這在前面已經辨析過了。

論：無間道（Anantarya-marga，無間道）時至解脫道（Vimukti-marga，解脫道）為。

述曰：第四解釋二道的區別。解脫道所要對治的與小乘不同。小乘會質疑說：『我們的無間道還有煩惱的余習，可以生起解脫道來對治這些余習。現在你們的無間道已經沒有煩惱的種子了，為什麼還要生起解脫道呢？生起它有什麼用呢？』

論：斷惑證滅期心別故。

述曰：下面論主回答。由於之前的加行（修行）期許的心不同。無間道能夠斷除煩惱，解脫道能夠證得寂滅。雖然無間道已經沒有煩惱的種子了，但爲了證得那個無為法（Nirvana，涅槃），有這種作用上的區別，所以生起解脫道。這是一種解釋。

【English Translation】 English version: That what is revealed by the two emptinesses (twofold emptiness, referring to the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena) is not a common characteristic (samanya-lakshana) is reasonable. Therefore, the Abhidharma and other treatises say that the wisdom that cognizes common characteristics can sever afflictions, but this is based on expedient teaching. In reality, only observing the self-characteristic (sva-lakshana, the unique characteristic of a thing) can sever them. The third explanation concerns the meaning of suchness (tathata, the true nature of things). The Hetu-vidya-sastra (science of logic) establishes self-characteristics and common characteristics, which is slightly different from this. They believe that the real meaning on all dharmas can be called self-characteristic, because the self-characteristics and common characteristics on all dharmas each adhere to their own essence and do not mix with other dharmas. If the discriminating mind (the mental activity of distinguishing things) establishes a category, and what can be expressed and what is expressed are universally present in all dharmas, like stringing flowers with a thread, this is called a common characteristic. This requires a scattered mind to falsely establish through discrimination, and it is the realm of inference (anumana). All concentrated minds (focused minds) are free from this discrimination and are called direct perception (pratyaksha). Although cognizing suffering, impermanence, etc. of all dharmas, they are also possessed by each dharma individually, so they are called self-characteristics. Although suchness is revealed by common characteristics, because it is the real nature of all dharmas and has self-characteristics, it is not a common characteristic. It cannot be called a common characteristic simply because it is neither identical nor different from all dharmas, because self-characteristics are also neither identical nor different from all common characteristics. Therefore, their argument is different from this. Therefore, the Abhidharma and other treatises say that the wisdom that cognizes common characteristics can sever afflictions, which is based on the discriminating mind, on a category of suchness, universally present in all dharmas, called a common characteristic. Or, the essence of suchness is the meaning that all dharmas possess, so it is called a common characteristic. The wisdom that cognizes this is called the wisdom of common characteristics. But in reality, suchness is the real nature of dharmas and is not a common characteristic. In reality, it is the wisdom of specific characteristics (the wisdom of recognizing the unique characteristics of things) that can sever afflictions. Common characteristics are falsely established, as has been analyzed before.

Treatise: The Anantarya-marga (path of immediate consequence) leads to the Vimukti-marga (path of liberation).

Commentary: The fourth explains the difference between the two paths. What the path of liberation aims to counteract is different from that of the Hinayana. The Hinayana would question: 'Our path of immediate consequence still has residual habits of afflictions, which can give rise to the path of liberation to counteract these residual habits. Now that your path of immediate consequence has no seeds of afflictions, why do you still need to generate the path of liberation? What is the use of generating it?'

Treatise: Severing afflictions and realizing cessation are different in aspiration.

Commentary: Below, the author of the treatise answers. Because the aspiration of the previous practice is different. The path of immediate consequence can sever afflictions, and the path of liberation can realize cessation. Although the path of immediate consequence has no seeds of afflictions, in order to realize that unconditioned dharma (Nirvana), there is this difference in function, so the path of liberation is generated. This is one explanation.

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論。為舍彼品粗重性故。

述曰。下第二解。粗重性者。即二障種無堪任性。

論。無間道時至擇滅無為。

述曰。無間道俱雖無惑種。而未舍彼無堪任性。為舍此故起解脫道。解脫道起非唯為此。及證此品擇滅無為。即無堪任與無間道俱滅。證無為得與解脫道俱生故。解脫道雖不違惑得。而亦有用。此後意說。種生現雖同時。菩薩金剛心由有粗重性故不名為佛。明此位第八識猶有漏為粗重所依。不然如何不名為佛。前解但為證無為者。金剛心中第八已無漏。未圓明故不名為佛。后解為勝。依此二解。並前第八識舍位合解有三。加此一說云。金剛道生有漏皆舍。種生現同時故。此中粗重言非謂種子。由種子等令所依無堪任性。此名粗重雖前已說。至下當知　問此義可然。彼十地中地地。斷煩惱障粗重既不斷種子。起無間道時。復不斷粗重。無間道起何所斷耶。若無間道中。有斷煩惱種用。于解脫道位。可說除粗重。無間道中既無所斷。如何說粗重解脫道治耶　答修道十地中斷煩惱粗重者。非離所知障外別起無間道等治。然煩惱粗重障。無始以來與所知障俱。所知障為本。由無間道本障斷故。其未煩惱障粗重。與所知障粗重。解脫道中舍。故無此過。由此煩惱粗重非能受生。但障于地。所

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

論：爲了捨棄那個品類的粗重性。

述記：下面第二種解釋。粗重性，就是二障（煩惱障和所知障）的種子沒有堪能性。

論：在無間道的時候，證得擇滅無為。

述記：無間道雖然沒有惑的種子，但還沒有捨棄那個沒有堪能性。爲了捨棄這個，生起解脫道。解脫道生起不僅僅是爲了這個，以及證得這個品類的擇滅無為。也就是沒有堪能性與無間道一同滅除，證得無為與解脫道一同生起。解脫道雖然不違背惑的證得，但也有用處。這是後面的意思。種子生起和現行雖然同時，菩薩的金剛心因為有粗重性，所以不稱為佛。說明這個位次的第八識還有有漏，作為粗重所依。不然怎麼不稱為佛？前面的解釋只是爲了證得無為的人。金剛心中的第八識已經沒有有漏，因為沒有圓滿明凈所以不稱為佛。後面的解釋更為殊勝。根據這兩種解釋，加上前面第八識捨棄位次的合理解釋，共有三種。再加上這一種說法：金剛道生起時，有漏全部捨棄，因為種子生起和現行是同時的。這裡說的粗重不是指種子，而是指由種子等使得所依沒有堪能性。這個叫做粗重，雖然前面已經說過，到下面會知道。問：這個道理可以成立。但那十地中，每一地斷除煩惱障的粗重，既然不斷除種子，在生起無間道的時候，又不斷除粗重，無間道生起時斷除什麼呢？如果在無間道中，有斷除煩惱種子的作用，在解脫道位次，可以說除掉粗重。無間道中既然沒有斷除什麼，怎麼說粗重由解脫道來對治呢？答：修道十地中，斷除煩惱粗重，不是離開所知障之外另外生起無間道等來對治。而是煩惱粗重障，從無始以來與所知障在一起，以所知障為根本。由於無間道斷除根本的所知障，那些未斷的煩惱障粗重，與所知障的粗重，在解脫道中捨棄，所以沒有這個過失。因此煩惱粗重不能受生，只是障礙於地。所知障則能受生。

【English Translation】 English version:

Treatise: In order to abandon the coarse and heavy nature of that category.

Commentary: The second explanation below. 'Coarse and heavy nature' refers to the seeds of the two obscurations (afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations) lacking the ability to function.

Treatise: At the time of the immediate path (anantarya-marga), one attains cessation through discrimination (pratisankhya-nirodha), which is unconditioned (asamskrta).

Commentary: Although the immediate path does not have the seeds of delusion, it has not yet abandoned that lack of ability to function. To abandon this, the path of liberation (vimukti-marga) arises. The arising of the path of liberation is not only for this purpose, but also to realize the cessation through discrimination of this category, which is unconditioned. That is, the lack of ability to function ceases together with the immediate path, and the attainment of the unconditioned arises together with the path of liberation. Although the path of liberation does not contradict the attainment of freedom from delusion, it is also useful. This is the later meaning. Although the arising of seeds and manifestations is simultaneous, the vajra-like mind of a Bodhisattva is not called a Buddha because it has a coarse and heavy nature. This indicates that the eighth consciousness at this stage still has outflows (asrava) and serves as the basis for the coarse and heavy. Otherwise, why is it not called a Buddha? The previous explanation was only for those who attain the unconditioned. The eighth consciousness in the vajra-like mind no longer has outflows, but it is not called a Buddha because it is not fully clear and bright. The later explanation is more excellent. According to these two explanations, plus the previous combined explanation of the stage of abandoning the eighth consciousness, there are three explanations in total. Adding this one, it is said that when the vajra-like path arises, all outflows are abandoned, because the arising of seeds and manifestations is simultaneous. Here, the term 'coarse and heavy' does not refer to seeds, but rather to the fact that seeds, etc., cause the basis to lack the ability to function. This is called coarse and heavy, which has been mentioned before and will be known below. Question: This reasoning is acceptable. But in the ten bhumis (stages) of the path of cultivation, each bhumi cuts off the coarse and heavy nature of the afflictive obscurations. Since it does not cut off the seeds, and when the immediate path arises, it does not cut off the coarse and heavy nature, what does the immediate path cut off when it arises? If the immediate path has the function of cutting off the seeds of afflictions, then at the stage of the path of liberation, it can be said to remove the coarse and heavy. Since the immediate path does not cut off anything, how can it be said that the coarse and heavy is treated by the path of liberation? Answer: In the ten bhumis of the path of cultivation, the cutting off of the coarse and heavy nature of afflictions does not involve separately arising immediate paths, etc., apart from the cognitive obscurations. Rather, the coarse and heavy nature of the afflictive obscurations has been together with the cognitive obscurations since beginningless time, with the cognitive obscurations as the root. Because the immediate path cuts off the root cognitive obscurations, the uncut coarse and heavy nature of the afflictive obscurations, together with the coarse and heavy nature of the cognitive obscurations, are abandoned in the path of liberation, so there is no such fault. Therefore, the coarse and heavy nature of afflictions cannot receive rebirth, but only obstructs the bhumis. The cognitive obscurations, on the other hand, can receive rebirth.

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以與所知障俱斷而不留之。故無斯咎如身見等。至下當知　問若爾如二乘者唯斷定障不斷種子。無間道生位無粗重。何用復起解脫道為　答無間斷粗重。解脫道中得自在故　問既斷粗重得無為不　答大般若經第三百六十卷說善現問言。若無為法無差別者。佛何故說習氣相續。如來永無。二乘猶有。世尊答言。習氣相續實非煩惱。二乘身中不能引無義。菩薩身中能引無義。如來永無。即由此文。顯斷習氣不得無為。不爾無為應有差別。亦顯所知障斷不得無為。若所知障斷得無為。便顯三乘亦得無為而有差別。

第五以此障即二十二愚。

論。雖見道中至是根本故。

述曰。顯異生障攝法不盡。以是根本不說業等。等者等取惡趣非業及非異熟。及等余增上果等法。及人天趣中分別所起業。及果故。直言惡趣攝不盡故。能起之中但說煩惱。以所知障與之俱故總名煩惱。

論。由斯初地至諸業果等。

述曰。解深密．七十八等說斷於二愚。如文可解　諸業果等者。如次前等字。等取善趣之中分別所起別報業。及果等。直言惡趣。攝不盡故。經中既言惡趣雜染者。雜染之言通善趣分別雜染故。前說無記若斷緣縛修道所斷。今言彼果是不生斷。如緣起中說故。

為此第二解。何故業果亦名為

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為與所知障一同斷除且不留下任何殘餘，所以沒有像身見（認為身體是真實存在的錯誤觀念）等那樣的過失。這一點在下文將會明白。問：如果像二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）那樣，只斷除了定障（禪定中的障礙），而沒有斷除種子（煩惱的潛在力量），那麼在無間道（直接通向解脫的道路）生起時，已經沒有粗重（粗大的煩惱），為什麼還要再次生起解脫道（從煩惱中解脫的道路）呢？答：無間道斷除的是粗重，在解脫道中才能獲得自在。問：既然斷除了粗重，是否就獲得了無為（涅槃）呢？答：《大般若經》第三百六十卷中說，善現（Subhuti，佛陀的弟子）問道：如果無為法沒有差別，佛陀為什麼說習氣（煩惱的殘餘影響）相續，如來（Tathagata，佛陀的稱號）永遠沒有，而二乘仍然有呢？世尊回答說：習氣相續實際上不是煩惱，在二乘的身中不能引發無意義的事情，在菩薩的身中能夠引發無意義的事情，如來永遠沒有。由此可見，斷除習氣並不能獲得無為，否則無為就應該有差別了。這也顯示了斷除所知障並不能獲得無為。如果斷除所知障能夠獲得無為，那麼就顯示了三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）也能夠獲得無為，並且有差別。 第五，因為這個障礙就是二十二愚。 論：即使在見道（證悟真理的道路）中，這也是根本。 述曰：顯示異生（凡夫）的障礙所包含的法不完全，因為這是根本，所以沒有說業等。等者，等同於惡趣（不幸的境界），不是業，也不是異熟（果報）。以及等同於其餘的增上果（由業力增強的結果）等法，以及人天趣（人類和天人的境界）中分別所產生的業，以及果報。所以直接說惡趣包含不完全。在能夠生起（煩惱）的因素中，只說了煩惱，因為所知障與煩惱同時存在，所以總稱為煩惱。 論：因此，初地（菩薩道的第一個階段）斷除了諸業果等。 述曰：《解深密經》、《七十八經》等經中說斷除了二愚，如經文可以理解。諸業果等者，如同前面的等字，等同於善趣（幸福的境界）之中分別所產生的別報業（特殊的果報），以及果報等。所以直接說惡趣包含不完全。經中既然說了惡趣雜染，雜染之言也通用於善趣分別雜染。前面說無記（非善非惡）如果斷除了緣縛（因緣的束縛），是修道所斷的，現在說它的果是不生斷（不再產生），如緣起（因緣生起）中所說。 為此，第二種解釋是，為什麼業果也被稱為...

【English Translation】 English version: Because it is severed together with the Jnana-avarana (cognitive obscurations) and leaves no residue, there are no faults like Satkayadristi (the view of self in what is not self). This will be understood below. Question: If, like the two vehicles (Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana), only the Dhyana-avarana (obscurations in meditation) is severed and not the seeds (potential of afflictions), then when the Anantarya-marga (path of immediate consequence) arises, there is no coarseness. Why is it necessary to generate the Vimukti-marga (path of liberation) again? Answer: The Anantarya-marga severs the coarseness, and one attains freedom in the Vimukti-marga. Question: Since coarseness is severed, is Nirvana attained? Answer: The Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra, in its 360th fascicle, says that Subhuti asked: If Nirvana has no difference, why did the Buddha say that the continuity of habit energy (residual influence of afflictions) exists, the Tathagata never has it, while the two vehicles still have it? The World-Honored One answered: The continuity of habit energy is actually not an affliction. In the bodies of the two vehicles, it cannot cause meaningless things. In the bodies of Bodhisattvas, it can cause meaningless things. The Tathagata never has it. From this, it is evident that severing habit energy does not attain Nirvana, otherwise Nirvana should have differences. It also shows that severing the Jnana-avarana does not attain Nirvana. If severing the Jnana-avarana could attain Nirvana, then it would show that the three vehicles (Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, and Bodhisattvayana) could also attain Nirvana, and there would be differences. Fifth, because this obscuration is the twenty-two kinds of ignorance. Treatise: Even in the Path of Seeing, this is fundamental. Commentary: It shows that the obscurations of ordinary beings do not encompass all Dharmas. Because this is fundamental, it does not mention Karma, etc. 'Etc.' includes the evil destinies (unfortunate realms), which are neither Karma nor Vipaka (result of Karma). And 'etc.' includes other Adhipati-phala (dominant results), etc., and the Karma arising from discrimination in the realms of humans and Devas (gods), and the results. Therefore, it directly says that the evil destinies are not fully encompassed. Among the factors that can arise (afflictions), only afflictions are mentioned, because the Jnana-avarana exists together with afflictions, so it is generally called afflictions. Treatise: Therefore, the first Bhumi (stage of the Bodhisattva path) severs all Karma results, etc. Commentary: The Samdhinirmocana Sutra, the 78th Sutra, etc., say that two kinds of ignorance are severed, as can be understood from the text. 'All Karma results, etc.' are like the previous 'etc.', including the Visesa-vipaka-karma (special resultant Karma) arising from discrimination in the good destinies (fortunate realms), and the results, etc. Therefore, it directly says that the evil destinies are not fully encompassed. Since the Sutra says that the evil destinies are defiled, the term 'defiled' also applies to the discrimination and defilement in the good destinies. What was previously said about the indeterminate (neither good nor evil) being severed if the bondage of conditions is severed, which is severed by the Path of Cultivation, now it is said that its result is non-arising severance, as said in the arising of conditions. For this reason, the second explanation is, why are Karma results also called...

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愚。

論。應知愚品至后準此釋。

述曰。諸業果等雖體非愚。業是愚所起。果是愚所感。愚之品故。亦名為愚。后諸地言愚準於此解。如第二地業趣愚。非體是愚故。又初執著我法障中。亦有貪見等體非是愚。亦愚之品故。下準此知。然分別障中雖有所知障。非能發業感於生死。非縛法故。今此第一所發業果。並言趣者。毀訾言也。如說半擇迦名人中惡趣。

論。或彼唯說至俱起二愚。

述曰。謂第一言執著。明是利障品俱起愚。第二言惡趣雜染。非必業果。但是鈍障品俱起愚。毀責名趣。此中不別言余煩惱。余煩惱但是利鈍障品。俱起之愚即唯無明。此師意說。唯取無明與見非見俱名為利鈍。說十地中斷十無明故。不取余煩惱等也。

論。彼粗重言至無堪任性。

述曰。彼言粗重。粗重者何。顯即是彼二愚之種。前二是現行。粗重是種故　問現行久已滅。如何言斷　答五十九說。諸煩惱斷略有二種。一諸纏斷。二隨眠斷。故二現行亦說斷也　問彼何不是伏現行言斷也　答不然。彼卷次文解二斷言。諸纏斷者。謂貪嗔斷。乃至疑斷五見。斷見苦所斷斷。乃至無色界所繫斷。斷離系是隨眠斷。非伏惑時亦伏見道諸惑。故知二愚是現行。粗重是種子。又解。隨汝意前二是種。粗重

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 愚。

論。應知愚品至后準此釋。

述曰。諸業果等雖體非愚。業是愚所起。果是愚所感。愚之品故。亦名為愚。后諸地言愚準於此解。如第二地業趣愚。非體是愚故。又初執著我法障中。亦有貪見等體非是愚。亦愚之品故。下準此知。然分別障中雖有所知障。非能發業感於生死。非縛法故。今此第一所發業果。並言趣者。毀訾言也。如說半擇迦（不男）名人中惡趣。

論。或彼唯說至俱起二愚。

述曰。謂第一言執著。明是利障品俱起愚。第二言惡趣雜染。非必業果。但是鈍障品俱起愚。毀責名趣。此中不別言余煩惱。余煩惱但是利鈍障品。俱起之愚即唯無明（對事物真相的迷惑和無知）。此師意說。唯取無明（對事物真相的迷惑和無知）與見非見俱名為利鈍。說十地中斷十無明（對事物真相的迷惑和無知）故。不取余煩惱等也。

論。彼粗重言至無堪任性。

述曰。彼言粗重。粗重者何。顯即是彼二愚之種。前二是現行。粗重是種故　問現行久已滅。如何言斷　答五十九說。諸煩惱斷略有二種。一諸纏斷。二隨眠斷。故二現行亦說斷也　問彼何不是伏現行言斷也　答不然。彼卷次文解二斷言。諸纏斷者。謂貪嗔斷。乃至疑斷五見。斷見苦所斷斷。乃至無**所繫斷。斷離系是隨眠斷。非伏惑時亦伏見道諸惑。故知二愚是現行。粗重是種子。又解。隨汝意前二是種。粗重

【English Translation】 English version Ignorance.

Treatise: It should be known that the explanation of the category of ignorance applies similarly to what follows.

Commentary: Although the nature of karmic actions and their results are not inherently ignorance, the actions are caused by ignorance, and the results are felt due to ignorance. Because they belong to the category of ignorance, they are also called ignorance. The references to ignorance in later stages should be understood in this way. For example, in the second stage, the karmic path of ignorance is not ignorance in its essence. Furthermore, in the initial attachment to the obstructions of self and dharma, there are also greed and views whose nature is not ignorance, but they also belong to the category of ignorance. This should be understood accordingly. However, in the discriminating obstructions, although there are obstructions to knowledge, they cannot generate karma that leads to birth and death because they do not bind. Now, the karmic actions and results generated in this first [stage], along with the term 'path,' are words of reproach. As it is said, 'A eunuch is called an evil path among humans.'

Treatise: Or they only speak of the two types of ignorance that arise together.

Commentary: The first statement, 'attachment,' clearly refers to the ignorance that arises together with the category of sharp obstructions. The second statement, 'evil path and defilement,' does not necessarily refer to karmic results but is the ignorance that arises together with the category of dull obstructions. 'Path' is a term of reproach. Here, other afflictions are not mentioned separately. Other afflictions belong to the categories of sharp and dull obstructions. The ignorance that arises together is only ignorance (avidya) [the delusion and ignorance of the true nature of things]. This teacher's intention is to only take ignorance (avidya) [the delusion and ignorance of the true nature of things] together with views and non-views as sharp and dull. It is said that ten ignorances (avidya) [the delusion and ignorance of the true nature of things] are cut off in the ten stages. Therefore, other afflictions are not included.

Treatise: The term 'coarse and heavy' refers to the inability to function.

Commentary: The term 'coarse and heavy.' What is 'coarse and heavy'? It clearly refers to the seeds of those two ignorances. The previous two are manifest actions, while 'coarse and heavy' refers to the seeds. Question: The manifest actions have long ceased, so how can they be said to be cut off? Answer: The fifty-ninth [chapter] says that the cutting off of afflictions is roughly of two types: first, the cutting off of entanglements; second, the cutting off of latent tendencies. Therefore, the two manifest actions are also said to be cut off. Question: Why are they not said to be the subduing of manifest actions? Answer: No, that is not the case. That chapter explains the two types of cutting off. The cutting off of entanglements refers to the cutting off of greed, anger, and even doubt, the five views. The cutting off of what is cut off by seeing suffering, and even the cutting off of what is not connected to [something unclear]. The cutting off of separation is the cutting off of latent tendencies. It is not that when subduing afflictions, one also subdues the afflictions of the path of seeing. Therefore, it is known that the two ignorances are manifest actions, and 'coarse and heavy' refers to the seeds. Another explanation: According to your intention, the previous two are seeds, and 'coarse and heavy'...

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非種。今此乃是二品所起無堪任性。如苦根等說其斷位。

論。如入二定至例此應釋。

述曰。瑜伽論第十一說。第二定斷苦根。苦根種子初定已斷。今者斷彼苦根粗重。說第二禪斷彼苦根故。后諸地粗重準此為二解。

第六以障即無明為同爲異。

論。雖初地所斷至十障品愚。

述曰。此中意說。初地實斷二障。今說異生性障。唯取所知障不取煩惱。以世親攝論第七卷。說十種無明望二乘者非染污故。若取煩惱即十無明通染污故。以無明即是十障品之愚．愚即無明故。

何意不說初地無明許是染污通二障種。

論。二乘亦能至非此所說。

述曰。二乘者亦能斷煩惱障。斷煩惱障是共故。非此所說。彼二乘不能斷所知障。所知障是不共。所以初地無明。但說不染故。世親攝論云。又所治障有其十故立十地別。

論。又十無明至修所斷說。

述曰。說為不染者。即攝論本云。法界中有十不染污無明者。唯依十地修所斷說。即不說異生性是見斷故。何以知者。對法十四云。已得現觀。于彼修道位中。唯修所知障對治道等者。故不說見道所斷為十無明數。以說不染故。若異生性即便染污。由此故知。其異生性非不染污。世親又云。為治十無明立十地別。離十

【現代漢語翻譯】 非種。現在這裡是二品所產生的無堪任性。如同苦根等所說的斷除的階段。

論：如同進入二禪的例子，應該這樣解釋。

述記說：《瑜伽師地論》第十一卷說，第二禪斷除苦根。苦根的種子在初禪時已經斷除。現在斷除的是苦根的粗重部分。所以說第二禪斷除苦根。後面的各個地的粗重也按照這個理解分為兩種解釋。

第六個問題是，障礙，也就是無明（avidyā），是相同還是不同？

論：雖然初地所斷除的，直到十障品中的愚癡（moha）。

述記說：這裡的意思是說，初地實際上斷除了兩種障礙。現在所說的異生性障，只取所知障（jñeyāvaraṇa），不取煩惱障（kleśāvaraṇa）。因為世親（Vasubandhu）的《攝大乘論》第七卷說，十種無明對於二乘（Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna）來說不是染污的。如果取煩惱障，那麼十種無明就都是染污的。因為無明就是十障品中的愚癡，愚癡就是無明。

為什麼不說初地的無明許可是染污的，並且通於兩種障礙的種子？

論：二乘也能斷除，不是這裡所說的。

述記說：二乘也能斷除煩惱障，斷除煩惱障是共通的，所以不是這裡所說的。他們二乘不能斷除所知障，所知障是不共通的。所以初地的無明，只說是不染污的。世親的《攝大乘論》說：『又因為所要對治的障礙有十種，所以設立十地（Daśa-bhūmi）。』

論：又十種無明，是依修所斷說的。

述記說：說為不染污的，就是《攝大乘論》的原文說：『法界中有十種不染污的無明。』只是依據十地修所斷說的，就是不說異生性是見斷的。憑什麼知道呢？《對法論》第十四卷說：『已經得到現觀（abhisamaya），在那個修道位中，只是修所知障的對治道等。』所以不說見道所斷的作為十種無明的數量，因為說是不染污的。如果異生性就是染污的。由此可知，異生性不是不染污的。世親又說：『爲了對治十種無明，設立十地差別。』離開十地

【English Translation】 Not a seed. Now, this is the non-ability arising from the two categories. It's like saying the stage of severance for the root of suffering, etc.

Treatise: As in the example of entering the second dhyana (jhāna), this should be explained.

Commentary: The eleventh chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the second dhyana severs the root of suffering (duḥkha-mūla). The seed of the root of suffering has already been severed in the first dhyana. Now, what is severed is the grossness (audārika) of that root of suffering. Therefore, it is said that the second dhyana severs that root of suffering. The grossness of the subsequent grounds is similarly understood as having two explanations.

Sixthly, are the obstructions, i.e., ignorance (avidyā), the same or different?

Treatise: Although what is severed by the first ground, up to the ignorance (moha) in the ten categories of obstructions.

Commentary: The intention here is to say that the first ground actually severs two obstructions. The 'obstruction of the nature of an ordinary being' (pṛthag-jana-svabhāva-āvaraṇa) that is now being discussed only takes the cognitive obscuration (jñeyāvaraṇa) and does not take the afflictive obscuration (kleśāvaraṇa). This is because the seventh chapter of Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that the ten kinds of ignorance are not defiled with respect to the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna). If the afflictive obscuration is taken, then the ten ignorances would all be defiled. Because ignorance is the ignorance in the ten categories of obstructions, and ignorance is ignorance.

Why is it not said that the ignorance of the first ground is permitted to be defiled and pervades the seeds of the two obstructions?

Treatise: The Two Vehicles can also sever it; it is not what is being discussed here.

Commentary: The Two Vehicles can also sever the afflictive obscuration. Severing the afflictive obscuration is common, so it is not what is being discussed here. Those Two Vehicles cannot sever the cognitive obscuration; the cognitive obscuration is uncommon. Therefore, the ignorance of the first ground is only said to be undefiled. Vasubandhu's Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'Moreover, because there are ten obstructions to be overcome, ten grounds (Daśa-bhūmi) are established.'

Treatise: Moreover, the ten ignorances are said to be severed by cultivation.

Commentary: Saying that they are undefiled is what the original text of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'In the realm of reality (dharmadhātu), there are ten undefiled ignorances.' They are only said to be severed by cultivation on the ten grounds, which means that the nature of an ordinary being is not said to be severed by seeing. How is this known? The fourteenth chapter of the Abhidharmakośa says: 'Having attained direct realization (abhisamaya), in that path of cultivation, only the antidotes to the cognitive obscuration, etc., are cultivated.' Therefore, what is severed by the path of seeing is not said to be among the ten ignorances, because it is said to be undefiled. If it is the nature of an ordinary being, then it is defiled. From this, it is known that the nature of an ordinary being is not undefiled. Vasubandhu also says: 'In order to overcome the ten ignorances, the distinctions of the ten grounds are established.' Apart from the ten grounds

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障外說十無明。故十無明非即十障。彼自有二複次解十無明故。然無性但有一解。亦不別說。

問十地修道亦伏煩惱。斷彼煩惱障粗重。如言二障三處過。是何故不說耶。

論。雖此位中至故此不說。

述曰。十地修道位中。亦伏煩惱斷彼粗重。而非正意。所以者何。不斷隨眠故此不說。攝論本及世親等說。十地菩薩留煩惱障助愿受生故非正意。意趣于智斷所知障。故斷隨眠。不斷煩惱之隨眠也。

問若爾何故初地。但說異生性障。不說更斷修道障也。

論。理實初地至準此應知。

述曰。論主答。雖實初地出見道已。修道位中亦斷俱生所知一分。今十障中從初說故不說修障。初地既從初說。后九地中所說九障準此應知皆從初說。

何以得知初地等入地心出見道等已更斷余惑。

論。住滿地中至道應無別。

述曰。今以理答。住．滿地中時既淹久。謂二僧祇。理更應斷。若不更斷爾者。地三時道既無三品。應無別故。

論。故說菩薩至方頓斷故。

述曰。引對法十四文為證。若住．滿地心更不斷惑。如何論說十地修道。即初地中唯斷見惑。更不斷修惑。地有九故。又攝論第十說。煩惱伏不滅。如毒．咒所害。留惑至惑盡。證佛一切智。世親云。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於障礙之外，經文闡述了十種無明（avidyā，對事物真相的迷惑）。因此，這十種無明並非等同於十種障礙。因為無性（Asaṅga）的《攝大乘論釋》中，對於十種無明有兩種不同的解釋，並且沒有分別說明。而無性（Asaṅga）的解釋只有一種，也沒有特別說明。

問：十地（daśa-bhūmi，菩薩修行的十個階段）的修道過程中也會降伏煩惱，並斷除那些煩惱所造成的障礙和粗重（粗重的煩惱）。正如經文所說『二障三處過』，為什麼這裡沒有提及呢？

論：雖然在那個階段也會這樣做，但因為這不是主要目的，所以這裡沒有提及。

述曰：在十地修道的階段中，也會降伏煩惱，斷除那些粗重的煩惱，但這並非主要目的。原因是什麼呢？因為沒有斷除隨眠（anuśaya，煩惱的潛在狀態），所以這裡沒有提及。《攝大乘論》以及世親（Vasubandhu）等都說，十地菩薩保留煩惱障（kleśāvaraṇa，由煩惱引起的障礙）是爲了幫助他們發願受生，所以這不是主要目的。主要目的是通過智慧斷除所知障（jñeyāvaraṇa，對真理的認知障礙），因此斷除的是隨眠，而不是煩惱的隨眠。

問：如果這樣，為什麼初地（prathamā bhūmi，菩薩修行的第一個階段）只說斷除異生性障（pṛthag-jana-bhūmi-āvaraṇa，凡夫的障礙），而不說進一步斷除修道障（bhāvanā-mārga-āvaraṇa，修道過程中的障礙）呢？

論：實際上，初地已經斷除了見道（darśana-mārga，見真理之道）的障礙，根據這個原則，可以推知其他地的情況。

述曰：論主回答說，雖然實際上初地在證入見道之後，在修道位中也斷除了一部分俱生（sahaja，與生俱來的）所知障，但現在這十種障礙是從最初的階段開始說的，所以沒有說修道障。既然初地是從最初的階段開始說的，那麼後面九地中所說的九種障礙，根據這個原則，可以推知都是從最初的階段開始說的。

如何得知初地等菩薩在入地心（bhūmi-citta，進入菩薩地的狀態）和出見道等之後，還會進一步斷除其他的迷惑呢？

論：因為菩薩住在滿地（pūrṇa-bhūmi，圓滿的菩薩地）的時間非常長久，如果不再進一步斷除迷惑，那麼地的三個階段和三種道就應該沒有區別了。

述曰：現在用道理來回答。菩薩住在滿地的時間非常長久，大約是二僧祇（asaṃkhyeya，極長的時間單位）。從道理上來說，應該會進一步斷除迷惑。如果不進一步斷除迷惑，那麼地的三個階段和三種道既然沒有三種品類，就應該沒有區別了。

論：所以經文說，菩薩要經過很長的時間才能逐漸斷除煩惱，最終才能頓斷煩惱。

述曰：引用《對法論》（Abhidharma）第十四卷的經文作為證據。如果菩薩住在滿地的心中不再進一步斷除迷惑，那麼《對法論》怎麼會說十地修道呢？也就是說，初地中只斷除了見惑（darśana-heya，見道所斷的煩惱），不再進一步斷除修惑（bhāvanā-heya，修道所斷的煩惱），那麼地就有九個了。另外，《攝大乘論》第十卷說，煩惱被降伏但沒有滅除，就像被毒藥或咒語所傷害一樣，保留這些迷惑直到迷惑完全斷盡，才能證得佛的一切智（sarvajñā，對一切事物無礙的智慧）。世親說。

【English Translation】 English version Regarding what is outside of obstacles, it speaks of the ten avidya (ignorance). Therefore, these ten avidya are not the same as the ten obstacles. This is because Asaṅga's commentary on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha has two different explanations for the ten avidya, and it does not explain them separately. However, Asaṅga's explanation has only one, and it is not specifically stated.

Question: In the practice of the ten bhūmi (grounds or levels of a Bodhisattva), afflictions are also subdued, and the obstacles and coarse burdens caused by those afflictions are cut off. As it is said, 'the faults of the two obstacles in three places,' why is this not mentioned here?

Treatise: Although this is done in that stage, it is not mentioned here because it is not the primary intention.

Commentary: In the stage of practicing the ten bhūmi, afflictions are also subdued, and their coarse burdens are cut off, but this is not the primary intention. Why is that? Because the anuśaya (latent tendencies) are not cut off, it is not mentioned here. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha and Vasubandhu and others say that the Bodhisattvas of the ten bhūmi retain the kleśāvaraṇa (afflictive obstacles) to help them fulfill their vows to be reborn, so this is not the primary intention. The intention is to cut off the jñeyāvaraṇa (cognitive obstacles) through wisdom, so it is the anuśaya that is cut off, not the anuśaya of afflictions.

Question: If that is the case, why does the first bhūmi only speak of cutting off the pṛthag-jana-bhūmi-āvaraṇa (obstacle of the ordinary person's level) and not of further cutting off the bhāvanā-mārga-āvaraṇa (obstacle of the path of cultivation)?

Treatise: In reality, the first bhūmi has already cut off the obstacles of the darśana-mārga (path of seeing), and based on this principle, it should be known for the other bhūmi as well.

Commentary: The author of the treatise answers that although in reality, after entering the darśana-mārga, the first bhūmi also cuts off a portion of the sahaja (innate) jñeyāvaraṇa in the stage of cultivation, these ten obstacles are now being discussed from the initial stage, so the obstacle of cultivation is not mentioned. Since the first bhūmi is being discussed from the initial stage, it should be understood that the nine obstacles mentioned in the subsequent nine bhūmi are all being discussed from the initial stage.

How is it known that Bodhisattvas of the first bhūmi, etc., further cut off other delusions after entering the bhūmi-citta (mind of the bhūmi) and emerging from the darśana-mārga, etc.?

Treatise: Because the time spent in the pūrṇa-bhūmi (full bhūmi) is very long, if delusions are not further cut off, then the three stages and three paths of the bhūmi should have no distinction.

Commentary: Now, I will answer with reason. The time spent in the pūrṇa-bhūmi is very long, about two asaṃkhyeya (incalculable eons). Logically, delusions should be further cut off. If delusions are not further cut off, then since the three stages and three paths of the bhūmi do not have three categories, they should have no distinction.

Treatise: Therefore, it is said that Bodhisattvas gradually cut off afflictions over a long period of time, and finally, they can suddenly cut off afflictions.

Commentary: Quoting the text of the fourteenth volume of the Abhidharma as evidence. If Bodhisattvas no longer further cut off delusions in the mind of the pūrṇa-bhūmi, how could the Abhidharma speak of the practice of the ten bhūmi? That is to say, in the first bhūmi, only the darśana-heya (afflictions to be abandoned by seeing) are cut off, and the bhāvanā-heya (afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation) are no longer further cut off, then there would be nine bhūmi. Furthermore, the tenth volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that afflictions are subdued but not eliminated, just like being harmed by poison or a mantra, retaining these delusions until the delusions are completely cut off, one can attain the sarvajñā (omniscience) of the Buddha. Vasubandhu said.

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以留煩惱隨眠故。不如二乘速趣圓寂。故留煩惱助愿受生等。謂諸菩薩由大悲力。意趣一切智故。意趣所知障對治道。不取煩惱對治道。擬於生死助悲願受生故。名留煩惱也。不爾如來大悲最極。應留煩惱隨類化生。由此故知。意不趣斷故名為留。將成佛時方頓斷盡。此等對法十四文也。

論。二邪行障至誤犯三業。

述曰。十地云。邪行於眾生身等障。世親攝論云。于諸有情身等邪行障。義意大同。所知障者簡煩惱障。俱生之言簡分別起。一分之說簡余修斷諸所知障。下準此解　誤犯三業名愚者。愚品故。解如前　問前二種生死中。言所知障不能發業。何故此中言俱生一分所發三業是業趣愚佛地論第七。亦言若所發業所得果皆所知障體　答若發業招生死。所知障即不能。非縛法故。前二生死由此說不發。若障智三業不招惡果。此亦能發。此文所明但是等流．增上業果　問法執既通不善。何故非縛　答不由不善性即是縛。如心王等性即非縛。法執但由煩惱俱故令成不善。非性是縛　既爾何故不感異熟今實義者。雖不善心俱仍名無記。菩薩．二乘所望各別。即通有覆．無覆無記故。不能招異熟果等。故無前難。

論。彼障二地至誤犯三業。

述曰。此業能障第二地凈尸羅故。名趣毀責為名。如

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為要保留煩惱隨眠，所以不如二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）迅速地趨向圓寂。因此，保留煩惱是爲了幫助菩薩發願受生等等。這是說，諸位菩薩由於大悲心的力量，心意趣向一切智（Sarvajna），心意趣向所知障（Jnana-avarana）的對治之道，而不是取煩惱的對治之道，是爲了在生死中幫助大悲願力而受生，所以叫做保留煩惱。如果不是這樣，如來的大悲心最為徹底，應該保留煩惱，隨順各類眾生而化生。由此可知，菩薩的意願不是趣向斷除煩惱，所以叫做保留，將要在成佛的時候才頓然斷盡。這些是對法論第十四卷的文句。

論：兩種邪行能障礙，乃至錯誤地觸犯身、口、意三業。

述記：十地經中說，邪行對於眾生的身等有障礙。世親（Vasubandhu）的《攝大乘論》中說，對於諸有情的身等，邪行有障礙。意義大致相同。『所知障』是爲了區別于煩惱障（Klesha-avarana）。『俱生』這個詞是爲了區別于分別而起的。『一分』的說法是爲了區別于其餘修斷的諸所知障。下面的解釋可以參照這個來理解。錯誤地觸犯身、口、意三業叫做愚者，因為屬於愚品。解釋如前所述。問：在前面兩種生死中，說所知障不能引發業力，為什麼這裡說俱生一分所引發的三業是業趣？《佛地經論》第七卷也說，如果所發之業所得之果都是所知障的本體。答：如果引發業力而招感生死，所知障就不能，因為它不是繫縛之法。前面兩種生死由此說不引發業力。如果障礙智慧的三業不招感惡果，這個就能引發。此文所說明的只是等流果和增上果。問：法執既然通於不善，為什麼不是繫縛？答：不是因為不善的性質就是繫縛，如心王等，性質就不是繫縛。法執只是由於與煩惱俱起，才成為不善，不是性質本身是繫縛。既然這樣，為什麼不感得異熟果？現在說真實的意義，雖然與不善心俱起，仍然叫做無記。菩薩和二乘所希望的各不相同，即通於有覆無記和無覆無記，所以不能招感異熟果等，所以沒有前面的難點。

論：這些業障能障礙二地（第二地菩薩），乃至錯誤地觸犯身、口、意三業。

述記：這種業能障礙第二地菩薩的清凈尸羅（Śīla，戒律），所以叫做趣向毀責。

【English Translation】 English version: Because of retaining the anusaya (latent tendencies) of afflictions, it is not as quick as the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) to attain Parinirvana (complete extinction). Therefore, retaining afflictions is to help Bodhisattvas make vows to be reborn, etc. This means that Bodhisattvas, due to the power of great compassion, direct their minds towards Sarvajna (all-knowing wisdom), and direct their minds towards the path of counteracting Jnana-avarana (cognitive obscurations), rather than taking the path of counteracting afflictions. It is to help the power of great compassion in Samsara (cycle of rebirth) and to be reborn according to vows, so it is called retaining afflictions. If it were not so, the Tathagata's (Buddha's) great compassion would be the most thorough, and he should retain afflictions and be reborn to transform beings according to their types. From this, it can be known that the Bodhisattva's intention is not to eliminate afflictions, so it is called retaining them, and they will be completely eliminated when becoming a Buddha. These are sentences from the fourteenth volume of the Abhidharma.

Treatise: Two kinds of wrong conduct can obstruct, and even mistakenly violate the three karmas of body, speech, and mind.

Commentary: The Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Stages Sutra) says that wrong conduct obstructs the body, etc., of sentient beings. Vasubandhu's Compendium of the Mahayana says that wrong conduct obstructs the body, etc., of all sentient beings. The meanings are roughly the same. 'Jnana-avarana' is to distinguish it from Klesha-avarana (afflictive obscurations). The word 'co-arising' is to distinguish it from those that arise from discrimination. The statement 'a portion' is to distinguish it from the remaining Jnana-avaranas that are severed through cultivation. The following explanations can be understood by referring to this. Mistakenly violating the three karmas of body, speech, and mind is called a fool, because it belongs to the category of fools. The explanation is as mentioned before. Question: In the previous two kinds of Samsara, it was said that Jnana-avarana cannot initiate karma. Why does it say here that the three karmas initiated by a portion of the co-arising are karma-bound? The seventh volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra also says that if the karma initiated and the resulting fruit are all the essence of Jnana-avarana. Answer: If initiating karma leads to birth and death, Jnana-avarana cannot, because it is not a binding dharma. The previous two kinds of Samsara are said not to initiate karma because of this. If the three karmas that obstruct wisdom do not lead to bad consequences, this can initiate karma. What this text explains is only the nisyanda-phala (result of outflow) and adhipati-phala (dominant result). Question: Since attachment to dharma is connected to unwholesome, why is it not binding? Answer: It is not because the nature of unwholesome is binding, such as the mind-king, etc., whose nature is not binding. Attachment to dharma only becomes unwholesome because it arises together with afflictions. It is not that its nature is binding. Since this is the case, why does it not result in vipaka (result of maturation)? Now, speaking of the true meaning, although it arises together with an unwholesome mind, it is still called avyakrta (neutral). The hopes of Bodhisattvas and the Two Vehicles are different, that is, it is connected to both obscured neutral and unobscured neutral, so it cannot lead to vipaka, etc., so there is no previous difficulty.

Treatise: These karmic obscurations can obstruct the second bhumi (stage of a Bodhisattva), and even mistakenly violate the three karmas of body, speech, and mind.

Commentary: This karma can obstruct the pure Śīla (discipline) of the second bhumi Bodhisattva, so it is called tending towards reproach.

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人惡趣。不可言能取趣名趣。不取惡果故　粗重如前。故不別解。餘論中言身等者。即是三業。此言邪行已攝盡故。

論。或唯起業不了業愚。

述曰。第二解。初是起業之愚。后是不了業之愚非所發業。此亦非必能發業也。境用別故。

論。三闇鈍障至修法忘失。

述曰。十地云。闇相於聞．思．修等諸法忘障。世親攝論云。二遲鈍性于聞．思．修而有忘失。

論。彼障三地至便能永斷。

述曰。勝定者。謂等持．等至。隨諸禪．無色無漏定　總持者。四十五及佛地等說。即以念惠為體。彼四十五說。有四陀羅尼。法．義．咒．能得菩薩忍。今即初二攝。即是聞持陀羅尼。及定等所發三惠。定親發修惠。總持親發聞思。故合為文及彼所發殊勝三惠。三惠以惠為體。言修惠因修而得此惠。故言修惠。從因為名。非修即惠。修是定故。

論。由斯三地至及修惠者。

述曰。欲貪愚障勝定及修惠者。即由於五欲起貪多住散亂。障于定及修惠。修惠與定相近故唯說障非不亦障思惠等。

問欲貪者煩惱名。何故所知障中名欲貪。

論。彼昔多與至依彼轉故。

述曰。彼所知障。此第三愚多與煩惱中欲貪俱故名欲貪愚。非所知障體名為欲貪。彼障定．及修

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：人墮入惡趣（apāya）。不能說能取趣（gati）之名趣（gati）。因為不取惡果的緣故。粗重等如前所說。所以不另外解釋。其餘論中說的身等，就是指身、語、意三業。這裡說邪行已經全部包括在內了。

論：或者只是發起業，不瞭解業的愚癡。

述記：第二種解釋。最初是發起業的愚癡，後來是不瞭解業的愚癡，並非所發起的業。這也不一定能發起業。因為境和作用不同。

論：第三種是闇鈍障，導致修法忘失。

述記：《十地經論》說：『闇相』對於聽聞、思惟、修習等諸法產生忘失的障礙。世親《攝大乘論》說：兩種遲鈍的性質，對於聽聞、思惟、修習產生忘失。

論：這種障礙在第三地到第七地之間，便能永遠斷除。

述記：殊勝的禪定，是指等持（samādhi）、等至（samāpatti）。包括各種禪定、無色定、無漏定。總持（dhāraṇī），在四十五地和佛地等經論中有所說明。即以念和慧為體。在四十五地中說，有四種陀羅尼：法陀羅尼、義陀羅尼、咒陀羅尼、能得菩薩忍陀羅尼。現在這裡只包括前兩種，即是聞持陀羅尼，以及禪定等所引發的三種智慧。禪定直接引發修慧。總持直接引發聞慧和思慧。所以合起來說是經文以及它們所引發的殊勝三種智慧。三種智慧以智慧為體。說修慧是因為修習而得到這種智慧，所以說是修慧，是從因得名。並非修習就是智慧，修習是禪定。

論：由於這三種地之間，以及修慧的緣故。

述記：貪慾的愚癡障礙殊勝的禪定和修慧，就是因為對五欲生起貪戀，多住在散亂之中，障礙禪定和修慧。修慧與禪定相近，所以只說障礙禪定和修慧，並非不障礙思慧等。

問：貪慾是煩惱的名稱，為什麼在所知障中也稱為貪慾？

論：因為過去多與煩惱中的貪慾在一起，依靠它而運轉的緣故。

述記：這種所知障，這第三種愚癡多與煩惱中的貪慾在一起，所以稱為貪慾愚。並非所知障的本體名為貪慾。這種障礙禪定和修慧。

【English Translation】 English version: A person falls into the evil destinies (apāya). It cannot be said that it can take the name of destiny (gati) as destiny (gati), because it does not take evil consequences. The grossness and heaviness are as previously described, so there is no separate explanation. The 'body, etc.' mentioned in other treatises refer to the three karmas of body, speech, and mind. Here, 'wrong conduct' has already encompassed everything.

Treatise: Or only arising karma, the ignorance of not understanding karma.

Commentary: The second explanation. The first is the ignorance of arising karma, and the latter is the ignorance of not understanding karma, not the karma that is initiated. This also does not necessarily initiate karma, because the object and function are different.

Treatise: The third is the darkness and dullness that obstructs, leading to the loss of Dharma practice.

Commentary: The Ten Bhūmi Sūtra says: 'The aspect of darkness' creates the obstruction of forgetting for the various Dharmas such as hearing, thinking, and cultivation. Vasubandhu's Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle says: Two kinds of dullness cause forgetting in hearing, thinking, and cultivation.

Treatise: This obstruction, from the third to the seventh bhūmi, can then be permanently severed.

Commentary: Superior samādhi refers to samādhi and samāpatti. Including various dhyānas, formless dhyānas, and undefiled dhyānas. Dhāraṇī is explained in the Forty-Five Bhūmis and Buddha-bhūmi sūtras, etc. It takes mindfulness and wisdom as its essence. In the Forty-Five Bhūmis, it is said that there are four kinds of dhāraṇī: Dharma dhāraṇī, meaning dhāraṇī, mantra dhāraṇī, and the dhāraṇī that can attain the Bodhisattva's patience. Now, only the first two are included here, which are the dhāraṇī of retaining what is heard, and the three kinds of wisdom that are generated by samādhi, etc. Samādhi directly generates cultivation wisdom. Dhāraṇī directly generates hearing wisdom and thinking wisdom. Therefore, it is combined as the text and the superior three kinds of wisdom that they generate. The three kinds of wisdom take wisdom as their essence. It is said that cultivation wisdom is because this wisdom is obtained through cultivation, so it is called cultivation wisdom, named from the cause. Cultivation is not wisdom, cultivation is samādhi.

Treatise: Because of these three bhūmis, and because of cultivation wisdom.

Commentary: The ignorance of desire and greed obstructs superior samādhi and cultivation wisdom, which is because greed arises for the five desires, and one dwells mostly in distraction, obstructing samādhi and cultivation wisdom. Cultivation wisdom is close to samādhi, so it is only said to obstruct samādhi and cultivation wisdom, not that it does not also obstruct thinking wisdom, etc.

Question: Desire and greed are the names of afflictions, why is it also called desire and greed in the obstructions of what is known?

Treatise: Because in the past, it was often together with desire and greed among the afflictions, and it operates relying on it.

Commentary: This obstruction of what is known, this third kind of ignorance is often together with desire and greed among the afflictions, so it is called the ignorance of desire and greed. It is not that the essence of the obstruction of what is known is called desire and greed. This obstructs samādhi and cultivation wisdom.

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惠所知障永斷。說欲貪隨伏。所知為本斷故。煩惱是末便伏。此煩惱無始來依所知障轉故。

論。二圓滿聞持至聞思惠者。

述曰。以聞思與聞持相近故偏說之。非不障修惠。然從勝障故別分二。非一障體義說二障。此以上三地愚。七十八等並不同。

論。四微細煩惱現行障至說名微細。

述曰。十地云解法慢障。譯家名別。即我見慢等是。世親攝論云微細煩惱現行。俱生身見等攝。此最下品故。不作意緣故。遠隨現行故應知是微細。義意大同　此中言第六識俱身見。簡第七識俱。等者等取我所邊見。及我慢．我愛。與見俱者皆是此品。及等取彼定愛法愛。至下當知　如何此名微細　解云。最下品故。謂第六識亦有分別身見等法。彼為粗猛名上品。第六識中獨頭貪等名中品。通不善性故。此望于彼二。最下品故。行相最細唯無記故。又不作意緣故名下品。即是任運生故名下品。非如見斷強思等方生故。又遠隨現行故。即無始來隨逐于身。不捨于身名下品。非如分別起者。逢善友等便舍于彼故。此名下品。由此三義故說名微細。餘論準此釋。

論。彼障四地至便能永斷。

述曰。此等障菩提分法故四地斷　問如何身見等障菩提分　答由有身見等俱愛迷執身故。不得觀身為不凈。觀

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 慧能使人永遠斷除所知障（Jnana-avarana，阻礙智慧的障礙）。（如果）說（通過修行）欲貪可以隨之被降伏，那是因為所知障是根本，煩惱是末端，所以（斷除根本后）煩惱就容易被降伏。這些煩惱從無始以來就依賴於所知障而運轉。

論：二、圓滿的聞持（Dharani，總持）直到聞思慧（Srutamayiprajna，聽聞正法后產生的智慧）的人。

述曰：因為聞思（Srutamayi，聽聞）與聞持（Dharani，總持）相近，所以特別說明它們。並非說（聞思）不能夠障礙修慧（Bhavanamayiprajna，通過禪修產生的智慧）。然而，因為（聞思）是更強的障礙，所以將二者分開。這並不是說一個障礙有兩種體性，才說成兩種障礙。以上所說的愚癡，對於三地（菩薩）來說，七十八等（煩惱）並不相同。

論：四、微細的煩惱現行障（Sukshmaklesa-paryavasthana，細微煩惱的現行障礙）……被稱為微細。

述曰：十地經中說解法慢（Dharmabhimana，對佛法的傲慢）是障礙，譯者的名稱不同。也就是我見慢（Atma-drishti-mana，以自我為中心的傲慢）等。世親（Vasubandhu）的《攝論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）中說，微細的煩惱現行，包括俱生身見（Sahaja-satkayadrishti，與生俱來的我身見）等。這是最下品的煩惱，因為不作意緣（Ayonisomanaskara，不如理作意），並且遠離現行，所以應該知道這是微細的。意義大致相同。這裡說第六識（意識）具有身見，是爲了區別于第七識（末那識）。『等』字包括我所邊見（Atmiya-drishti，認為事物屬於自我的邊見），以及我慢（Atmamana，我慢）、我愛（Atmasneha，我愛）。與見俱生的都屬於這一品。『及等取彼定愛法愛』，到下文會知道。為什麼這被稱為微細呢？解釋說，因為是最下品。第六識也有分別身見等法，那些是粗猛的，屬於上品。第六識中的獨頭貪等屬於中品，因為它們是不善的。相對於那兩種，這個是最下品。行相最細微，僅僅是無記性（不屬於善、惡的性質）。又因為不作意緣，所以稱為下品，也就是任運而生，所以稱為下品。不像見斷（Drishti-heya，通過見道斷除的煩惱）那樣，需要強烈的思考等才能產生。又因為遠離現行，也就是從無始以來就隨逐于身，不捨離於身，所以稱為下品。不像分別產生的（煩惱），遇到善友等就會捨棄。這被稱為下品。因為這三個原因，所以被稱為微細。其他的論著可以參照這個來解釋。

論：這些障礙四地（菩薩）……就能永遠斷除。

述曰：這些障礙菩提分法（Bodhipaksika-dharmas，三十七道品），所以在四地（菩薩）斷除。問：身見等如何障礙菩提分呢？答：因為有身見等，以及隨之而來的愛和迷執于身體，所以不能夠觀身為不凈，不能夠觀察身體。

【English Translation】 English version Wisdom enables the perpetual severance of Jnana-avarana (the obstacle of knowledge). If it is said that desire and greed can be subdued through practice, it is because Jnana-avarana is the root, and afflictions are the branches, so afflictions are easily subdued (after the root is severed). These afflictions have relied on Jnana-avarana since beginningless time to operate.

Treatise: Two, the person with complete Dharani (retention) up to the wisdom of hearing and thinking (Srutamayiprajna).

Commentary: Because hearing and thinking (Srutamayi) are close to Dharani (retention), they are specifically mentioned. It is not that (hearing and thinking) cannot obstruct the wisdom of cultivation (Bhavanamayiprajna). However, because (hearing and thinking) are stronger obstacles, the two are separated. This does not mean that one obstacle has two natures, so it is said to be two obstacles. The ignorance mentioned above, for the three Bhumis (Bodhisattvas), the seventy-eight (afflictions) are not the same.

Treatise: Four, the subtle afflictions manifesting as obstacles (Sukshmaklesa-paryavasthana)... are called subtle.

Commentary: The Ten Bhumi Sutra says that Dharma-abhimana (pride in the Dharma) is an obstacle, the translator's name is different. That is, Atma-drishti-mana (self-view and pride) and so on. Vasubandhu's Abhidharma-samuccaya says that subtle afflictions manifest, including Sahaja-satkayadrishti (innate view of self) and so on. This is the lowest grade of affliction, because it does not arise from Ayonisomanaskara (improper attention), and it is far from manifesting, so it should be known that this is subtle. The meaning is roughly the same. Here it is said that the sixth consciousness (consciousness) has the view of self, in order to distinguish it from the seventh consciousness (Manas). 'Etc.' includes Atmiya-drishti (view of what belongs to self), as well as Atmamana (self-pride), Atmasneha (self-love). Those that arise with the view are all of this grade. 'And so on, taking their attachment to Dharma', will be known below. Why is this called subtle? It is explained that it is because it is the lowest grade. The sixth consciousness also has discriminatory views of self and other dharmas, those are coarse and fierce, belonging to the upper grade. The solitary greed and so on in the sixth consciousness belong to the middle grade, because they are unwholesome. Compared to those two, this is the lowest grade. The appearance is the most subtle, only of an indeterminate nature (neither good nor evil). Also, because it does not arise from Ayonisomanaskara (improper attention), it is called the lower grade, that is, it arises spontaneously, so it is called the lower grade. It is not like the afflictions severed by seeing (Drishti-heya), which require strong thinking and so on to arise. Also, because it is far from manifesting, that is, it has followed the body since beginningless time, not abandoning the body, so it is called the lower grade. It is not like the (afflictions) that arise from discrimination, which are abandoned when encountering good friends and so on. This is called the lower grade. Because of these three reasons, it is called subtle. Other treatises can refer to this for explanation.

Treatise: These obstacles to the fourth Bhumi (Bodhisattva)... can be perpetually severed.

Commentary: These obstacles to the Bodhipaksika-dharmas (thirty-seven factors of enlightenment), so they are severed in the fourth Bhumi (Bodhisattva). Question: How do the views of self and so on obstruct the Bodhipaksika-dharmas? Answer: Because there are views of self and so on, as well as the love and delusion attached to the body, one cannot contemplate the body as impure, one cannot observe the body.

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法為無我等故。障菩提分即通障也。中邊第一有菩提分障。

問既是所知障何故立煩惱名。

論。彼昔多與至亦永不行。

述曰。亦顯以上所知障立煩惱名。雖有別頭生者。皆多分與煩惱同一體而俱起故。立煩惱之名。由所知障斷故。煩惱之末亦永不行。從煩惱名故說為斷　問何故初二三地不斷我見等耶　答非障法故。

論。初二三地至二身見等。

述曰。初地行施二地行戒。三地行修。相同世間。世間有情多作此三福業事故。未能修證菩提分法。今四地修得菩提分法。方名出世。故能永害二身見等。二身見者。謂初見道已離第六識中分別身見。今此後離第六識中俱生身見。盡處總說名二身見。非今離二。如第四定言滅苦樂。又正斷所知障身見等。並永不起煩惱障中身見等。故說二身見名永害。非煩惱身見亦起對治。

論。寧知此與第六識俱。

述曰。問也。

論。第七識俱至為依持故。

述曰。第七識俱身見等法。與無漏道性相違故。七地以前猶有有漏道故。未全伏滅。八地以去無漏相續方永不行。七地以來得現起者。與貪．嗔等余煩惱等為依持故。若此是彼第七識俱。七地以前已許滅者。即貪．嗔等已前應滅無依持故。如八．九．十地。

論。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 法之所以是『無我』等特性，是因為它阻礙了菩提分（bodhi-prakriya，證悟的組成部分），這種阻礙也普遍存在。在中邊分別論的第一部分，提到了菩提分的障礙。

問：既然是所知障（jñeyāvaraṇa，對知識的障礙），為什麼又被稱作煩惱（kleśa，負面情緒）？

論：它過去常常與...同在，並且永遠不會停止。

述曰：這也表明了，之所以將所知障稱為煩惱，是因為雖然有些是單獨產生的，但大部分都與煩惱同體並且同時生起，因此被賦予了煩惱之名。由於所知障被斷除，煩惱的末端也永遠不會再出現。因為是從煩惱的角度來命名的，所以說它被斷除了。問：為什麼初地、二地、三地不能斷除我見（satkāya-dṛṣṭi，認為五蘊為我的邪見）等？答：因為它們不是障礙之法。

論：初地、二地、三地...直到二身見等。

述曰：初地行佈施（dāna），二地行持戒（śīla），三地行禪修（bhāvanā），這與世間的情況相似。世間的眾生大多做這三種福業，因此未能修證菩提分法。現在，四地修得菩提分法，才被稱為出世。因此，能夠永遠斷除二身見等。二身見指的是，初見道時已經離開了第六識（mano-vijñāna，意識）中的分別身見（vikalpa-satkāya-dṛṣṭi，分別產生的我見），現在又離開了第六識中的俱生身見（sahaja-satkāya-dṛṣṭi，與生俱來的我見）。將所有這些地方總括起來，稱為二身見，並非現在離開了兩種。如同第四禪定中說滅苦樂一樣。又，真正斷除所知障中的身見等，並且永遠不再生起煩惱障中的身見等，所以說二身見被永遠斷除，並非煩惱身見也生起對治。

論：怎麼知道這與第六識同在？

述曰：這是提問。

論：與第七識（kliṣṭa-manas，末那識）同在...因為是依持。

述曰：與第七識同在的身見等法，與無漏道（anāsrava-mārga，沒有煩惱的道路）的性質相違背，七地以前還有有漏道（sāsrava-mārga，有煩惱的道路），因此沒有完全降伏和熄滅。八地以後，無漏相續，才永遠不會再出現。七地以來能夠現起的，與貪（rāga，貪慾）、嗔（dveṣa，嗔恨）等其餘煩惱等作為依持。如果這些是與第七識同在的，七地以前已經允許滅除，那麼貪、嗔等也應該在之前就滅除，因為沒有了依持，就像八地、九地、十地一樣。

論：此...

【English Translation】 English version The reason why the Dharma is characterized by 'non-self' etc. is because it obstructs the bodhi-prakriya (components of enlightenment), and this obstruction is also universal. In the first part of the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya, the obstacles to bodhi-prakriya are mentioned.

Question: Since it is a jñeyāvaraṇa (obstacle to knowledge), why is it also called a kleśa (affliction)?

Treatise: It used to be often with... and will never stop.

Commentary: This also shows that the reason why jñeyāvaraṇa is called kleśa is that although some arise separately, most are of the same nature as kleśa and arise simultaneously, so they are given the name of kleśa. Because jñeyāvaraṇa is eliminated, the end of kleśa will never appear again. Because it is named from the perspective of kleśa, it is said to be eliminated. Question: Why can't the first, second, and third bhūmis (grounds) eliminate satkāya-dṛṣṭi (the false view of considering the five skandhas as self) etc.? Answer: Because they are not obstructing dharmas.

Treatise: The first, second, and third bhūmis... until the two kinds of self-view etc.

Commentary: The first bhūmi practices dāna (giving), the second bhūmi practices śīla (morality), and the third bhūmi practices bhāvanā (meditation), which is similar to the situation in the world. Most sentient beings in the world do these three kinds of meritorious deeds, so they have not been able to cultivate and realize the bodhi-prakriya. Now, the fourth bhūmi cultivates and obtains the bodhi-prakriya, which is called transcendence of the world. Therefore, it can permanently eliminate the two kinds of self-view etc. The two kinds of self-view refer to the fact that the vikalpa-satkāya-dṛṣṭi (discriminative self-view) in the sixth mano-vijñāna (consciousness) has already been abandoned at the initial path of seeing, and now the sahaja-satkāya-dṛṣṭi (innate self-view) in the sixth consciousness is also abandoned. All these places are collectively called the two kinds of self-view, not that two kinds are abandoned now. Just as the fourth dhyāna (meditative absorption) says that suffering and joy are extinguished. Also, truly eliminating the self-view etc. in the jñeyāvaraṇa, and the self-view etc. in the kleśāvaraṇa will never arise again, so it is said that the two kinds of self-view are permanently eliminated, not that the kleśa self-view also gives rise to antidotes.

Treatise: How do we know that this is together with the sixth consciousness?

Commentary: This is a question.

Treatise: Together with the seventh consciousness (kliṣṭa-manas)... because it is a support.

Commentary: The self-view etc. dharmas that are together with the seventh consciousness are contrary to the nature of the anāsrava-mārga (path without outflows), and before the seventh bhūmi, there is still the sāsrava-mārga (path with outflows), so they have not been completely subdued and extinguished. After the eighth bhūmi, the anāsrava continues, and it will never appear again. What can arise from the seventh bhūmi onwards is supported by rāga (greed), dveṣa (hatred), and other kleśas. If these are together with the seventh consciousness, and it has been allowed to be eliminated before the seventh bhūmi, then greed, hatred, etc. should also be eliminated before, because there is no support, just like the eighth, ninth, and tenth bhūmis.

Treatise: This...

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粗彼細至第六相應。

述曰。又此第六識俱者粗。彼第七識俱者細故。伏有前後。粗者前伏。細者后伏。故此但是第六相應。解深密．七十八等說。世尊此諸地煩惱隨眠有幾。善男子有三。一者害伴。謂前五地。諸不俱生現行煩惱。是俱生煩惱現行助伴。彼于爾時永不復有。說名害伴隨眠。二者羸劣。謂第六．第七地微細現行。若修所伏不現行故。三者微細。謂于第八地已上。從此已去一切煩惱不復現行。唯有所依所知障在。故知所伏第六非七。問因論生論。如何害伴。如斷障章已廣解訖。

論。身見等言至特違彼故。

述曰。身見等言。非唯貪．癡．慢。及余俱行隨煩惱。亦攝無始定．法二愛。定．法二愛特違菩提分法者。以菩提分法得無漏定。及勝無漏教法。及別別法故。前地照了大乘法教仍生愛著。此地教法及念惠等方名為得。今既于定於教法及念惠等起愛。于彼不得自在故。障菩提分故。名特違也。前地遲鈍障障定忘所聞思等法。此定但障菩提分。故差別也。

論。由斯四地至亦永不行。

述曰。準前應釋。余文易了。無勞重解。

論。五于下乘般至樂涅槃者。

述曰。十地云。身得我慢障。世親攝論與此名同。前地依覺分觀。觀身受等及無漏道等。由所知障令

善心等故有欣厭。此地真如名無差別。故緣彼道名無差別。生死涅槃既無差別。何得有厭復有欣耶。余文可解。

論。六粗相現行障至便能永斷。

述曰。十地云。微煩惱習障。世親攝論云粗相現行。十地望前五地等說為細。世親及此論。望后七地說為粗相。亦不相違。由前地觀四諦故有二染二凈。故障六地無染凈道。此地真如名無染凈。故緣彼道名無染凈。其緣起相望四諦為細。望后障故說此為粗。

論。由斯六地至執有凈者。

述曰。緣苦集行流轉相為障。執有染是　相多現行。即障緣起還滅觀。緣滅道凈相為障。

論。取凈相故至住無相觀。

述曰。由取無漏凈相故相觀多行。未能多時住無相觀。即后得智作有相凈觀也。雖作無相少時能故。解深密雲現前觀察行流轉愚。言現前者。觀現前有漏法染也。

論。七細相現行障至便能永斷。

述曰。十地云細相習障。世親同此。由前六地作緣起觀。流轉還滅尚有生滅微細相故。故名為障。此地真如名種種無別真如。故此道名妙無相道。此細相為障。

論。由斯七地至細滅相故。

述曰。細相現行。執有生者。以行流轉以生為首。實皆有滅。于有漏有生且舉一生。非不執滅。即執流轉相也　純作意求無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因有善心等原因，才會有欣喜和厭惡。此地的真如（Tathata，如實、不變的本性）名為無差別。因此，緣於此的道也名為無差別。既然生死和涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）都沒有差別，又怎麼會有厭惡和欣喜呢？其餘的文字可以自行理解。

論：六種粗相現行之障礙，到達此地便能永遠斷除。

述曰：《十地經》中說，是微細煩惱習氣之障礙。世親（Vasubandhu）的《攝大乘論》中說是粗相現行。《十地經》相對於前五地等，說是微細。世親和此論，相對於后七地，說是粗相，這並不矛盾。由於前地觀察四諦（Four Noble Truths）的緣故，有二種染和二種凈。因此，障礙了第六地沒有染凈之道。此地的真如名為無染凈。因此，緣於此的道也名為無染凈。其緣起之相，相對於四諦來說是微細的，相對於後面的障礙來說，說此為粗。

論：由於這第六地，乃至執著有清凈者。

述曰：緣于苦集（duhkha-samudaya，苦和苦的生起）而行流轉之相，是障礙。執著有染是相多現行。即障礙緣起還滅之觀。緣于滅道（nirodha-marga，滅和滅之道）清凈之相，是障礙。

論：因為執取清凈之相，乃至安住于無相觀。

述曰：由於執取無漏清凈之相，所以有相觀行多。不能長時間安住于無相觀。即后得智（prsthalabdha-jnana，證得根本智后所獲得的智慧）作有相清凈之觀。雖然能做無相觀，但時間很短。解深密經說，現前觀察行流轉愚。說現前者，是觀察現前有漏法之染。

論：七種細相現行之障礙，到達此地便能永遠斷除。

述曰：《十地經》中說是細相習氣之障礙。世親也這樣說。由於前六地作緣起觀，流轉還滅尚有生滅微細之相，所以名為障礙。此地的真如名為種種無別真如。因此，此道名為妙無相道。此細相為障礙。

論：由於這第七地，乃至細微的滅相之故。

述曰：細相現行。執著有生者。以行流轉以生為首。實際上都有滅。對於有漏法有生，且舉一生為例。並非不執著滅。即執著流轉之相也。純粹以作意求無

【English Translation】 English version Because of good intentions and the like, there are joy and aversion. The Tathata (suchness, unchanging nature) of this ground is called 'no difference'. Therefore, the path based on it is also called 'no difference'. Since there is no difference between Samsara (birth and death) and Nirvana (liberation), how can there be aversion and joy? The rest of the text can be understood on your own.

Treatise: The obstruction of the six coarse appearances manifesting is permanently severed upon reaching this ground.

Commentary: The Dasabhumika Sutra (Ten Grounds Sutra) says it is the obstruction of subtle afflictive habit-energies. Vasubandhu's Mahayana-samgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana) says it is the manifestation of coarse appearances. The Dasabhumika Sutra, relative to the first five grounds, speaks of it as subtle. Vasubandhu and this treatise, relative to the latter seven grounds, speak of it as coarse appearances, which is not contradictory. Because the previous grounds observe the Four Noble Truths, there are two kinds of defilement and two kinds of purity. Therefore, it obstructs the sixth ground from having a path of defilement and purity. The Tathata of this ground is called 'no defilement and purity'. Therefore, the path based on it is also called 'no defilement and purity'. Its aspect of dependent origination, relative to the Four Noble Truths, is subtle; relative to the later obstructions, it is said to be coarse.

Treatise: Because of this sixth ground, even those who cling to purity...

Commentary: Clinging to the aspect of suffering and its origination (duhkha-samudaya) as flowing and transmigrating is an obstruction. Clinging to defilement is the frequent manifestation of appearances. This obstructs the contemplation of dependent origination and cessation. Clinging to the pure aspect of cessation and the path (nirodha-marga) is an obstruction.

Treatise: Because of grasping at the aspect of purity, even abiding in the contemplation of no-appearance...

Commentary: Because of grasping at the pure aspect of non-outflow, the contemplation of appearances is frequently practiced. One cannot abide in the contemplation of no-appearance for a long time. This refers to the subsequent wisdom (prsthalabdha-jnana) creating the contemplation of pure appearances. Although one can engage in no-appearance contemplation, it is only for a short time. The Samdhinirmocana Sutra (Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra) says, 'Observing the ignorance of the flow of actions in the present.' Saying 'in the present' refers to observing the defilement of present conditioned dharmas.

Treatise: The obstruction of the seven subtle appearances manifesting is permanently severed upon reaching this ground.

Commentary: The Dasabhumika Sutra says it is the obstruction of subtle habit-energies. Vasubandhu says the same. Because the previous six grounds engage in the contemplation of dependent origination, the flow and cessation still have subtle aspects of arising and ceasing, so it is called an obstruction. The Tathata of this ground is called 'Tathata of various non-differences'. Therefore, this path is called the 'wonderful path of no-appearance'. This subtle appearance is an obstruction.

Treatise: Because of this seventh ground, even the subtle aspect of cessation...

Commentary: Subtle appearances manifest. Those who cling to existence take the flow of actions with arising as the head. In reality, all have cessation. Regarding conditioned dharmas having arising, only one arising is taken as an example. It is not that they do not cling to cessation. This is clinging to the aspect of flow. Purely seeking non-

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相愚。即執有滅。即執還滅相也。

論。純于無相至起有勝行。

述曰。前地尚取還滅細滅相故。純于無相作意勤求。未能空中起有勝行。今此地中既除此障。能于無相不專勤求。乃于空中起有勝行。所言空者。無相空理。于空中作有行。即真觀中起于有觀。冥真俗二境。合本后二智。少用功力即能得故。不同五地。十地第九經云。七地以十種方便智發起殊勝行入。彼論解云。無障礙智現在前時。于無作行中生樂心等。無作行者。即空行也。今言非安立行是。

論。八無相中至不任運起。

述曰。文中有四。一出體。二辨相。三即愚。四顯有。此初也。十地云。于無相有行障。世親攝論云。于無相作行。義意大同。余文易了。

論。前之五地至而有加行。

述曰。二辨相也。前之五地觀心猶劣。無相觀少。第六地中。猶觀染凈平等如故多住無相。第七地中斷微細生滅相故。無相恒續而有加行。與八地等別。

論。由無相中至得二自在。

述曰。未能任運入無相觀者。不自在故。未能任運現相及土。明此地已前亦現相土。未名自在。未能任運現故　言現相者。即是隨欲現何相者即能現之。如現金銀等相珠寶等相。皆能現故。此即寬遍。便於相中別建立土自在　土自在

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 相愚。即執著于『有滅』（bhava-nirodha，存在之滅），也就是執著于『還滅相』（pratisamkhyanirodha-laksana，通過智慧力滅除煩惱后所顯現的寂滅之相）。 論。[《瑜伽師地論》]純于無相至起有勝行。 述曰。前地[指第六地]尚且取『還滅』（pratisamkhyanirodha，擇滅）的細微滅相，因此專注于『無相作意』（animitta-manaskara，不執著于任何相狀的修行），未能從空性中生起殊勝的『有』行。現在此地[指第八地]中，既然已經去除這種障礙，就能在不專門勤求『無相』的情況下，從空性中生起殊勝的『有』行。所說的『空』，指的是『無相』的空性之理。在空性中進行『有』行，就是在真觀中生起『有』觀，冥合真俗二境，結合根本智和后得智這二種智慧，稍微用功就能得到，不同於第五地。十地[《十地經》]第九經說，七地以十種方便智發起殊勝行入。彼論[指《十地經論》]解釋說，無障礙智現在前時，于無作行中生樂心等。『無作行』，就是空行。現在所說的『非安立行』就是這個意思。 論。八無相中至不任運起。 述曰。文中有四部分：一是出體，二是辨相，三是即愚，四是顯有。這是第一部分。《十地經》說，于無相有行障。世親[Vasubandhu]《攝論》說，于無相作行。意義大致相同。其餘文字容易理解。 論。前之五地至而有加行。 述曰。這是第二部分，辨別相狀。前五地觀心還很弱，『無相觀』（animitta-dhyana，不觀任何相狀的禪定）很少。第六地中，仍然觀染凈平等如一，所以多住在『無相』中。第七地中斷除微細的生滅相，所以『無相』恒常持續，並且有加行，與第八地等有所區別。 論。由無相中至得二自在。 述曰。未能任運進入『無相觀』的人，因為不自在的緣故，未能任運顯現相和國土。說明此地[指第八地]以前也顯現相和國土，但未名為自在，因為未能任運顯現。所說『現相』，就是隨心所欲顯現任何相就能顯現。比如現金銀等相、珠寶等相，都能顯現。這是寬泛的說法。便於在相中特別建立『土自在』（ksetra-vasita，對佛土的自在）和『相自在』（rupa-vasita，對相的自在）。『土自在』。

【English Translation】 English version: The ignorant one. That is, clinging to 『bhava-nirodha』 (cessation of existence), which is clinging to the 『pratisamkhyanirodha-laksana』 (aspect of cessation through wisdom, the state of quiescence manifested after eliminating afflictions through the power of wisdom). Treatise. [《Yogacarabhumi-sastra》] Purely in non-perception to arising superior practice of existence. Commentary. The previous ground [referring to the sixth bhumi] still takes the subtle aspect of cessation of 『pratisamkhyanirodha』 (cessation by discrimination), therefore diligently seeking with 『animitta-manaskara』 (non-apprehension of signs), failing to generate superior practice of 『existence』 from emptiness. Now, in this ground [referring to the eighth bhumi], since this obstacle has been removed, one can generate superior practice of 『existence』 from emptiness without exclusively and diligently seeking 『non-perception』. The 『emptiness』 mentioned refers to the principle of emptiness of 『non-perception』. Engaging in the practice of 『existence』 within emptiness means generating the contemplation of 『existence』 within true contemplation, merging the two realms of truth and convention, combining the two wisdoms of fundamental wisdom and subsequent wisdom, which can be attained with little effort, unlike the fifth bhumi. The ninth sutra of the tenth bhumi [《Dasabhumika Sutra》] states that the seventh bhumi initiates superior practice and enters with ten kinds of expedient wisdom. That treatise [referring to 《Dasabhumika-sastra》] explains that when unobstructed wisdom manifests, joy arises in the practice of non-action, etc. 『Practice of non-action』 is the practice of emptiness. What is now referred to as 『non-established practice』 is this. Treatise. In the eighth non-perception to not arising effortlessly. Commentary. There are four parts in the text: first, stating the substance; second, distinguishing the characteristics; third, identifying ignorance; and fourth, revealing existence. This is the first part. The 《Dasabhumika Sutra》 states that there is an obstacle to the practice of existence in non-perception. Vasubandhu's 《Compendium of Treatises》 states that one practices in non-perception. The meanings are largely the same. The remaining text is easy to understand. Treatise. The previous five grounds to and having additional practice. Commentary. This is the second part, distinguishing the characteristics. The contemplation of mind in the previous five grounds is still weak, and 『animitta-dhyana』 (meditation without any signs) is rare. In the sixth ground, one still views defilement and purity as equal, so one mostly dwells in 『non-perception』. In the seventh ground, one cuts off subtle aspects of arising and ceasing, so 『non-perception』 is constantly sustained, and there is additional practice, which distinguishes it from the eighth ground, etc. Treatise. From non-perception to attaining two kinds of mastery. Commentary. Those who cannot effortlessly enter 『non-perception』 cannot effortlessly manifest forms and lands because they are not at ease. This indicates that forms and lands also manifest before this ground [referring to the eighth bhumi], but they are not called effortless because they cannot be manifested effortlessly. 『Manifesting forms』 means being able to manifest any form at will. For example, one can manifest forms of gold and silver, forms of jewels, etc. This is a broad statement. It is convenient to specifically establish 『ksetra-vasita』 (mastery over Buddha-fields) and 『rupa-vasita』 (mastery over forms) within forms. 『Ksetra-vasita』.

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者。隨欲現於大小土等。現金銀等色。即能現故。土即狹也。土是假別能依。相是實別所依。相中別分立故。

論。由斯八地至相一分故。

述曰。三即愚也。其文易了。故不解之。

論。八地以上至不違彼故。

述曰。四顯有。此地以去一切煩惱雖不現行。微所知障猶可現起。此是第七識。以生空無分別智。及果即是滅盡定等。生空后得智。皆可現行。法執末那不違彼故　問若等流后得智法執猶起。八地以上無漏相續。無有一時非此等流。如何可說二觀等流別也　答由無分別智生法二觀近遠勢用所引故得別也。如前已解。

論。九利他中不欲行障至便能永斷。

述曰。此文有四。一出體二所障。三即愚。四總結。即初二也。十地云。不能善利益眾生障。世親云。于饒益有情不作行。義意亦同前八地中得無相樂。耽著寂滅不肯進修。諸佛七勸方能進趣。故唯自利九地之障。四無礙解利他法故。

論。由斯九地至一切音聲故。

述曰。三即愚也。于中有二。初總。后別。別中初標。后釋。解深密．七十八云。一者于無量所說法。即是此中義無礙解。無量法句文字。即是此中法無礙解。彼言法者是名身也。句者句身。文字是字身。此論正之言名句字。彼文少隱。後後惠

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『者』，指的是隨自己的意願顯現於大小國土等等，顯現金銀等顏色。因為能夠顯現的緣故，國土就是狹小的。國土是假立的、能被依靠的事物，『相』是真實的、被依靠的事物，因為在『相』中分別設立的緣故。

論：由於這個原因，從第八地到『相』的一部分。

述記：『三』指的是愚昧。這段文字很容易理解，所以不解釋它。

論：第八地以上直到不違背那些（煩惱）。

述記：『四』顯示存在。從這個地開始，一切煩惱雖然不現行，但細微的所知障仍然可能現起。這是第七識（末那識）。憑藉生空無分別智，以及果，也就是滅盡定等等，生空后得智都可以現行。法執末那不違背那些（智慧）的緣故。問：如果等流后得智的法執仍然生起，第八地以上無漏相續，沒有一時不是這種等流，怎麼能說二觀的等流是不同的呢？答：由於無分別智產生的法、二觀的遠近勢力所引導，所以才有所不同。如前面已經解釋過。

論：第九地在利他中，不希望行動的障礙，就能永遠斷除。

述記：這段文字有四個部分：一是本體，二是所障礙的事物，三是愚昧，四是總結。也就是最初的兩個部分。第十地（佛地）說：不能很好地利益眾生的障礙。世親菩薩說：對於饒益有情眾生不作為。意思也和前面第八地中得到無相樂，貪戀寂滅不肯進修一樣。諸佛七次勸請才能前進。所以只是自利是第九地的障礙。因為四無礙解是利他的方法。

論：由於這個原因，從第九地到一切音聲。

述記：『三』指的是愚昧。其中有兩部分：先是總說，后是分別解說。分別解說中，先是標示，后是解釋。《解深密經》第七十八卷說：一是對於無量所說法，就是這裡說的義無礙解。無量法句文字，就是這裡說的法無礙解。那裡說的『法』是指名身，『句』是指句身，『文字』是指字身。此論正是說的名、句、字。那部經文稍微隱晦。後後慧（越來越增長的智慧）。

【English Translation】 English version: '者' (zhe), refers to manifesting according to one's will in large and small lands, etc., manifesting colors such as gold and silver. Because of the ability to manifest, the land is narrow. The land is a provisional, dependent entity; '相' (xiang, characteristics) is a real, relied-upon entity, because of the separate establishment within '相'.

Treatise: For this reason, from the eighth Bhumi (ground) to a portion of '相' (characteristics).

Commentary: 'Three' refers to ignorance. The text is easy to understand, so it is not explained.

Treatise: From the eighth Bhumi (ground) and above, until not contradicting those (afflictions).

Commentary: 'Four' shows existence. From this ground onwards, although all afflictions do not manifest, subtle obstructions of the known (所知障, suo zhi zhang) may still arise. This is the seventh consciousness (末那識, manas-vijnana). Relying on the wisdom of non-conceptualization of emptiness of self (生空無分別智, sheng kong wu fen bie zhi), and the result, which is the cessation attainment (滅盡定, mie jin ding), etc., the subsequent wisdom of emptiness of self can all manifest. The 法執末那 (dharma-grasping manas) does not contradict those (wisdoms). Question: If the dharma-grasping of the outflow subsequent wisdom still arises, and the uncontaminated continuity from the eighth Bhumi onwards is never without this outflow, how can it be said that the outflows of the two contemplations are different? Answer: Because the dharma and two contemplations produced by the non-conceptual wisdom are guided by the near and far forces, they are different. As explained before.

Treatise: In the ninth Bhumi (ground), in benefiting others, the obstruction of not wanting to act can be permanently severed.

Commentary: This text has four parts: first, the substance; second, what is obstructed; third, ignorance; fourth, the conclusion. That is, the first two parts. The tenth Bhumi (Buddha Bhumi) says: the obstruction of not being able to benefit sentient beings well. Vasubandhu (世親, Shi Qin) says: not acting for the benefit of sentient beings. The meaning is the same as obtaining the formless bliss in the eighth Bhumi, being attached to quiescence and not willing to advance in cultivation. The Buddhas must exhort seven times before one can advance. Therefore, only self-benefit is the obstruction of the ninth Bhumi. Because the four unimpeded understandings are methods for benefiting others.

Treatise: For this reason, from the ninth Bhumi (ground) to all sounds.

Commentary: 'Three' refers to ignorance. There are two parts: first, a general statement; second, a separate explanation. In the separate explanation, first, an indication; second, an explanation. The Samdhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經, Jie Shen Mi Jing), chapter seventy-eight, says: first, regarding the immeasurable teachings, this is the meaning of the unimpeded understanding of meaning. Immeasurable dharma phrases and words, this is the unimpeded understanding of dharma. The 'dharma' mentioned there refers to the name-body, 'phrase' refers to the phrase-body, and 'word' refers to the word-body. This treatise is precisely speaking of name, phrase, and word. That sutra is slightly obscure. Later and later wisdom (increasingly growing wisdom).

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辯等可解。即陀羅尼言貫通三無礙解。隨於一能詮名句文中。現一切能詮名等。是法無礙解。於一方音聲中。現一切方音聲。是詞無礙解。或極少於一方一名等中。現一切方諸法上名。於一方一念聲中。現諸方一切音聲。是二無礙解境差別故。前是假名等攝故。後者是實體即聲故。

論。二辨才自在愚至巧為說故。

述曰。辯無礙解。能為巧便說甚深法。即是七辯。迅辨．應辨．捷辯．無疏謬辯．無斷盡辯．凡所演說豐義味辯．一切世間最勝妙辯。高下清濁小大等是。

論。愚能障此至第九障攝。

述曰。四總結也。其文易了。此四體性諸門。如對法第十四抄。及別抄說。

論。十于諸法至所起事業。

述曰。文有三。一出體。二所障。三即愚。此初二也。餘論名同　大法者。是真如。緣如之智譬于大云故名大法智云　及所含藏者。即陀羅尼門．三摩地門諸功德等。大法智云含眾德水充滿法身故　所含藏。即諸功德　所起事業。謂智所起諸大神通。

論。入十地時至及所含藏者。

述曰。下即愚也。其文易了。準上配取　微細秘密者。所障微細。亦秘密故。十地第十一．十二．菩薩地四十八等。說校量前地后地功德多少。然十障諸論不同略對明訖。

論。此

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 辯才等可以解釋。就是說，『陀羅尼』（Dharani，總持）的語言貫通三種無礙解。隨便在哪一種能表達意義的名句文中，顯現一切能表達意義的名等，這是法無礙解。在一方的音聲中，顯現一切方的音聲，這是詞無礙解。或者極少地在一方一名等中，顯現一切方諸法上的名，在一方一念聲中，顯現諸方一切音聲，這是二種無礙解的境界差別。前面是假名等所攝，後者是實體即聲音。

論：二、辯才自在，因為要為愚笨的人說巧妙的法。

述曰：辯無礙解，能夠巧妙方便地說甚深法，就是七辯：迅辯、應辯、捷辯、無疏謬辯、無斷盡辯、凡所演說豐義味辯、一切世間最勝妙辯。高下清濁小大等就是。

論：愚笨能夠障礙這些，乃至第九種障礙所攝。

述曰：四、總結。文句容易理解。這四種體性的諸門，如《對法》第十四抄，以及其他抄本所說。

論：十、對於諸法，乃至所起的事業。

述曰：文句有三部分。一、指出體性。二、所障礙。三、就是愚笨。這是前兩部分。其餘論的名稱相同。『大法』（Mahadharma）指的是真如（Tathata），緣于真如的智慧譬如大云，所以名為大法智云。以及所含藏的，就是陀羅尼門、三摩地門（Samadhi，禪定）等諸功德。大法智云含藏眾多功德之水，充滿法身，所以說所含藏，就是諸功德。所起事業，指的是智慧所起的諸大神通。

論：進入十地（Dasabhumika）的時候，乃至及所含藏的。

述曰：下面就是愚笨。文句容易理解。按照上面的來配合選取。『微細秘密』，所障礙的微細，也秘密。十地第十一、十二、菩薩地第四十八等，說校量前地后地功德多少。然而十種障礙諸論不同，略微對比說明完畢。

論：這些

【English Translation】 English version Eloquence and so on can be explained. That is to say, the language of 'Dharani' (總持, Total Retention) penetrates the three unobstructed explanations. In any meaningful phrase or sentence, all meaningful names and so on appear; this is the unobstructed explanation of the Dharma. In the sound of one direction, the sounds of all directions appear; this is the unobstructed explanation of language. Or, very rarely, in one name and so on in one direction, the names of all dharmas in all directions appear; in one thought-sound in one direction, all sounds of all directions appear. This is the difference in the realm of the two unobstructed explanations. The former is included in provisional names and so on, while the latter is the entity, which is sound.

Treatise: Two, eloquence is unhindered, because it is to speak skillful Dharma for the foolish.

Commentary: The unobstructed explanation of eloquence can skillfully and conveniently speak profound Dharma, which is the seven kinds of eloquence: swift eloquence, responsive eloquence, quick eloquence, eloquence without errors, eloquence without exhaustion, eloquence with rich meaning in all that is spoken, and the most excellent eloquence in all the world. High and low, clear and turbid, small and large, and so on.

Treatise: Foolishness can obstruct these, and is included in the ninth obstruction.

Commentary: Four, a summary. The sentences are easy to understand. The various aspects of these four natures are as described in the fourteenth chapter of the Abhidharma, and in other commentaries.

Treatise: Ten, regarding all dharmas, up to the activities that arise.

Commentary: The sentences have three parts. One, pointing out the nature. Two, what is obstructed. Three, which is foolishness. These are the first two parts. The names of the other treatises are the same. 'Mahadharma' (大法, Great Dharma) refers to Tathata (真如, Suchness), the wisdom that arises from Tathata is like a great cloud, so it is called the Great Dharma Wisdom Cloud. And what it contains are the Dharani gate, the Samadhi (三摩地, Concentration) gate, and other merits. The Great Dharma Wisdom Cloud contains numerous waters of merit, filling the Dharmakaya (法身, Dharma Body), so it is said that what it contains are all merits. The activities that arise refer to the great supernatural powers that arise from wisdom.

Treatise: When entering the Ten Bhumis (Dasabhumika, 十地), up to and including what is contained.

Commentary: Below is foolishness. The sentences are easy to understand. Match and select according to the above. 'Subtle and secret', what is obstructed is subtle and also secret. The eleventh and twelfth of the Ten Bhumis, the forty-eighth of the Bodhisattva Bhumi, and so on, speak of comparing the merits of the previous and subsequent Bhumis. However, the ten obstructions are different in various treatises, and a brief comparison and explanation is completed.

Treatise: These

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地於法至入如來地。

述曰。第十一段有四。一標。二顯。三即。四證。此初二也。然第十地猶有障在不名為佛。解深密等說。此第十地雖于諸法得自在。即于業自在義。陀羅尼門．三摩地門自在義。總名於法得自在。總持及定並業皆名為法。由總持等名法持故。

論。由斯佛地至煩惱障種。

述曰。三即愚。其文易解無勞重釋。此但言種。亦有粗重。

論。故集論說至大菩提故。

述曰。四引證。此義易了。集論第十四末。說頓斷等言。廣如解深密．七十八等說。菩薩地．十地等一一對諸地。明功德智惠不同。今不能繁述。十地第十一說。第九地菩薩。用法無礙智知諸法自相。以義無礙智知諸法差別相。以辭無礙智知不壞說諸法。以樂說無礙智知諸法次第不斷說也　又解。第一知法無體性。第二知法生滅相。第三知法假名。而不斷假名法說。第四知隨假名不壞無邊法說　又解一知法差別。二知義差別。三隨言音而為說法。第四隨所樂解而為說之。彼有多複次說。不能繁引。應勘瑜伽六十六卷修義不同於此中會。

成唯識論述記卷第十(本)

成唯識論述記卷第十(末)

沙門基撰

解十障中。上來第一已依解深密等釋十一地障。會十障訖。自下第二以十一

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『地於法至入如來地』。

述曰：第十一段有四個部分：一、標示；二、顯明；三、即是；四、證明。這裡是最初的兩個部分。然而，第十地仍然有障礙存在，不能稱為佛。《解深密經》等經典說，這第十地雖然對於諸法得到自在，指的是對於業的自在之義，陀羅尼門（dharani-gate，總持之門）、三摩地門（samadhi-gate，三昧之門）的自在之義，總稱為對於法得到自在。總持以及禪定和業都稱為法，因為總持等名稱為法持的緣故。

論：『由斯佛地至煩惱障種。』

述曰：三、即是愚昧。這段文字容易理解，無需重複解釋。這裡只說了『種』，也有粗重的煩惱。

論：『故集論說至大菩提故。』

述曰：四、引用證明。這個意義容易理解。《集論》第十四末尾，說了頓斷等等的言語，詳細內容如《解深密經》第七十八等所說。《菩薩地》、《十地經》等一一對應各個地，說明功德智慧的不同。現在不能繁瑣地敘述。《十地經》第十一說，第九地菩薩，用『法無礙智』（dharma-pratibhana，於法自在無礙之智慧）知道諸法的自相，用『義無礙智』（artha-pratibhana，于義理自在無礙之智慧）知道諸法的差別相，用『辭無礙智』（nirukti-pratibhana，于言辭自在無礙之智慧）知道不破壞地說諸法，用『樂說無礙智』（pratibhana-pratibhana，於樂說自在無礙之智慧）知道諸法的次第不斷地說。 又解釋說：第一，知道法沒有體性；第二，知道法生滅的相狀；第三，知道法是假名，而不斷絕假名法說；第四，知道隨著假名不破壞無邊法說。 又解釋說：一、知道法的差別；二、知道義的差別；三、隨著言語音聲而為說法；四、隨著所喜好的理解而為說法。那裡有很多重複的說法，不能繁瑣地引用。應該參考《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷，修習的意義與此不同，可以在其中融會貫通。

《成唯識論述記》卷第十（本）

《成唯識論述記》卷第十（末）

沙門基撰

解釋十種障礙中，上面第一部分已經依據《解深密經》等解釋了十一地障礙，會合了十種障礙。從下面第二部分開始，以十一地

【English Translation】 English version: 『When one abides in the Dharma, one reaches and enters the Tathagata's ground.』

Commentary: The tenth section has four parts: 1. Indication; 2. Manifestation; 3. Identification; 4. Proof. These are the first two parts. However, the tenth ground still has obstacles and is not called a Buddha. The Samdhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經) and other scriptures say that although this tenth ground has obtained自在(zizai, mastery) over all dharmas, it refers to the meaning of自在(zizai, mastery) over karma, and the meaning of自在(zizai, mastery) over the dharani-gate (陀羅尼門, gate of dharani) and samadhi-gate (三摩地門, gate of samadhi), which are collectively called自在(zizai, mastery) over the Dharma. Dharani, samadhi, and karma are all called Dharma, because dharani and other names are called Dharma-holder.

Treatise: 『Therefore, from the Buddha-ground, [one reaches] the seed of afflictive obstructions.』

Commentary: 3. Identification with ignorance. The text is easy to understand and does not require repeated explanation. This only speaks of 『seed』; there are also coarse and heavy afflictions.

Treatise: 『Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (集論) says, [one reaches] great Bodhi.』

Commentary: 4. Citation of proof. This meaning is easy to understand. The end of the fourteenth section of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (集論) speaks of sudden cutting off, etc. The detailed content is as described in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經), seventy-eighth section, etc. The Bodhisattvabhumi (菩薩地), Dasabhumika Sutra (十地經), etc., each corresponds to the various grounds, explaining the differences in merit and wisdom. Now, it is not possible to describe them in detail. The eleventh section of the Dasabhumika Sutra (十地經) says that the bodhisattva of the ninth ground uses 『Dharma-pratibhana』 (法無礙智, unimpeded wisdom regarding the Dharma) to know the self-nature of all dharmas, uses 『Artha-pratibhana』 (義無礙智, unimpeded wisdom regarding the meaning) to know the differentiated aspects of all dharmas, uses 『Nirukti-pratibhana』 (辭無礙智, unimpeded wisdom regarding language) to know how to speak of all dharmas without destroying them, and uses 『Pratibhana-pratibhana』 (樂說無礙智, unimpeded wisdom regarding eloquent speech) to know how to speak of all dharmas in a sequential and continuous manner. Another explanation says: First, know that dharmas have no essence; second, know the aspects of the arising and ceasing of dharmas; third, know that dharmas are provisional names, and do not cut off the speaking of provisional name dharmas; fourth, know that following provisional names, one speaks of boundless dharmas without destroying them. Another explanation says: 1. Know the differences of dharmas; 2. Know the differences of meanings; 3. Speak the Dharma according to the sounds of speech; 4. Speak for the sake of what is liked and understood. There are many repeated explanations there, which cannot be cited in detail. One should refer to the sixty-sixth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論), where the meaning of practice differs from this, and can be integrated within it.

Commentary on the Cheng Weishi Lun, Volume 10 (Original)

Commentary on the Cheng Weishi Lun, Volume 10 (End)

Composed by the Shramana Ji

In explaining the ten obstructions, the first part above has already explained the obstructions of the eleven grounds based on the Samdhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經) and others, and has integrated the ten obstructions. From the second part below, with the eleven grounds

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障即彼二障。文勢有三。一總明現種伏斷位次。二明斷頓漸。三釋四道差別。

論。此十一障二障所攝。

述曰。斷位次中。初總即二障后別解釋。此即初也。體性寬狹更無別異。十地所斷雖但所知。俱品不行即通二障。

論。煩惱障中至地前已伏。

述曰。下文有二。初明二障伏斷位次。后釋妨難　初中先明煩惱障。以體性粗三乘共斷易可見故。分別種子不論二乘。說菩薩者于極喜地　見道初斷。以見道位體性稍寬。乃至相見道后得智起位久時猶名見道。今簡于相唯真見道。真見道中唯取無間惑滅智生。故說初斷。非相見道亦能斷故。然此分別煩惱現行。瑜伽五十八等。說世間道唯伏俱生若愛．若恚．鄰近憍慢。不言能伏分別煩惱。此據異生．二乘性等說。若直往菩薩彼障現起地前已伏。故前捲雲唯能伏除分別二取。此在加行位。若資糧位此粗現行亦能伏滅。二細現行即未能伏。至加行位分別細者亦皆能伏。由此菩薩正愿．勝解世間道力。邪見．疑等伏而不行。非以六行。有所欣厭菩薩不為。非此菩薩無此能也。緣起經說。內法異生若放逸者無不共無明故。邪見等未必皆起。即資糧位已不現行唯分別貪等二位不起。故論總言地前已伏　問華嚴經解十住第四心。云真佛子是中永離三界煩惱　

【現代漢語翻譯】 障即是煩惱障和所知障這兩種障礙。從文理結構來看，分為三個部分：一是總的說明現行煩惱和種子煩惱的斷除位次，二是說明斷除是頓悟還是漸悟，三是解釋四種道（加行道、見道、修道、無學道）的差別。

論：這十一種障礙都屬於兩種障礙所包含。

述記：在斷除位次中，首先總的說明是兩種障礙，然後分別解釋。這裡是第一個部分。體性的寬泛和狹窄沒有其他差別。十地所斷的雖然只是所知障，但與其品類相同的煩惱不行，也通於兩種障礙。

論：煩惱障乃至菩薩登地之前就已經被伏藏。

述記：下文分為兩個部分：首先說明兩種障礙的伏藏和斷除的位次，然後解釋妨難。首先說明煩惱障，因為其體性粗糙，三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）共同斷除，容易理解。分別種子不討論二乘，說菩薩是在極喜地（初地，菩薩修行道路上的第一個階段）見道時開始斷除。因為見道位的體性稍微寬泛，乃至在相見道后，后得智生起，經過很長時間仍然稱為見道。現在簡略地說，只是真見道。真見道中只取無間惑滅智生的時候，所以說是初斷。不是說相見道也能斷除。然而，這裡說的是分別煩惱的現行。瑜伽五十八等說，世間道只能伏藏俱生（與生俱來的）的愛、恚（嗔恨）、鄰近的憍慢（驕傲），沒有說能伏藏分別煩惱。這是根據異生（凡夫）、二乘的根性等來說的。如果是一直前進的菩薩，這些障礙現起之前，在登地之前就已經被伏藏。所以前面說只能伏除分別二取。這在加行位。如果在資糧位，這些粗糙的現行也能伏滅，兩種細微的現行就不能伏藏。到了加行位，分別的細微煩惱也都能伏藏。由此，菩薩的正愿、殊勝的理解，憑藉世間道的力量，邪見、疑等伏藏而不現行。不是用六行（佈施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、般若）有所欣喜或厭惡，菩薩不會這樣做。不是說這位菩薩沒有這種能力。緣起經說，內法異生如果放逸，沒有不共無明（與生俱來的無明），邪見等未必都會生起。也就是說，在資糧位已經不現行，只有分別的貪等在兩種位次不生起。所以論總的說，在登地之前就已經被伏藏。問：華嚴經解釋十住第四心時說，真佛子在這裡永遠離開了三界煩惱。

【English Translation】 The 'obstacles' are the two obstacles: the kleśa-āvaraṇa (afflictive obscurations) and the jñeyāvaraṇa (cognitive obscurations). The structure of the text has three parts: first, a general explanation of the stages for eradicating manifest and latent afflictions; second, a clarification of whether eradication is sudden or gradual; and third, an explanation of the differences between the four paths (path of accumulation, path of preparation, path of seeing, and path of cultivation).

Treatise: These eleven obstacles are encompassed by the two obstacles.

Commentary: In the stages of eradication, it first gives a general explanation of the two obstacles, and then explains them separately. This is the first part. There is no other difference in the breadth or narrowness of their nature. Although what is eradicated in the ten bhūmis (ten grounds of a Bodhisattva) is only the jñeyāvaraṇa, if afflictions of the same category do not arise, it also applies to both obstacles.

Treatise: The kleśa-āvaraṇa is already suppressed before reaching the bhūmis.

Commentary: The following text has two parts: first, it explains the stages of suppression and eradication of the two obstacles; then, it explains the objections. First, it explains the kleśa-āvaraṇa, because its nature is coarse, and it is easily understood as it is eradicated in common by the three vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna). The seeds of discrimination are not discussed in the two vehicles. It is said that Bodhisattvas begin to eradicate it in the first bhūmi (pramuditābhūmi, the Joyful Ground) at the path of seeing (darśanamārga). Because the nature of the path of seeing is slightly broad, even after the path of seeing, when the subsequent wisdom arises, it is still called the path of seeing for a long time. Now, to be brief, it is only the true path of seeing. In the true path of seeing, only the moment when ignorance is extinguished and wisdom arises is taken, so it is said to be the initial eradication. It is not that the subsequent path of seeing can also eradicate it. However, this refers to the manifest activity of discriminatory afflictions. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, section 58, etc., says that worldly paths only suppress innate attachment, hatred, and proximate pride. It does not say that they can suppress discriminatory afflictions. This is according to the nature of ordinary beings and the two vehicles. If it is a Bodhisattva who goes straight ahead, these obstacles are already suppressed before they arise, before reaching the bhūmis. Therefore, the previous volume says that it can only suppress discriminatory grasping of duality. This is in the stage of application (prayogamārga). If it is in the stage of accumulation (saṃbhāramārga), these coarse manifest activities can also be suppressed, but the two subtle manifest activities cannot be suppressed. By the time of the stage of application, even the subtle discriminations can be suppressed. Therefore, the Bodhisattva's correct vows and excellent understanding, through the power of worldly paths, suppress and do not manifest wrong views, doubt, etc. It is not that the Bodhisattva uses the six perfections (dāna, śīla, kṣānti, vīrya, dhyāna, prajñā) to have joy or aversion; the Bodhisattva does not do this. It is not that this Bodhisattva does not have this ability. The Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra says that if an ordinary being within the Dharma is negligent, there is no co-emergent ignorance that is not present, so wrong views, etc., do not necessarily arise. That is to say, they do not manifest in the stage of accumulation, and only discriminatory greed, etc., do not arise in the two stages. Therefore, the treatise generally says that they are already suppressed before reaching the bhūmis. Question: The Avataṃsaka Sūtra explains the fourth mind of the ten abodes (daśa-vihāra) and says that a true Buddha-child here is forever free from the afflictions of the three realms.

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如前卷解。

論。修所斷種至畢竟不行。

述曰。修所斷種后皆頓斷。此約種子。不言粗重。粗重者十地中亦斷故。伏俱生現起地前亦能。理無疑故。瓔珞經說三賢菩薩唯伏不斷。正與此同。前卷中雲俱生現起未全伏除也　言暫起者。謂十地中前四。猶起我見等故。七地已前尚起貪．嗔等故　問其在地前所未伏者相貌可知。其已伏者與此何別　答道力猶微不能伏盡。為煩惱制少分自行。即我貪等有失念起。故說地前已能少伏。非有別相地前伏之。入地已去能頓伏盡。如阿羅漢。有不怖者故起煩惱。怖者不然。此中所說見所斷者唯頓悟人。修所斷者通漸有學。漸無學者二種俱無　八地已去亦不故起。任運不行道力勝故。此是對法第十四文。如前第三卷引解。

論。所知障中至地前已伏。

述曰。如前卷解。菩薩加行唯欣于智。見道已前唯伏法執。其煩惱障隨此而伏。然由所知加行伏故說煩惱伏。非前加行故伏煩惱。十地之中與煩惱俱所知障品多分亦爾。非此俱者地地可起。

論。修所斷種至方永伏盡。

述曰。此中斷伏時節等解。如煩惱說。由於地地能為障故。故十地中漸次能斷。乃至十地方永伏盡。由前道力折伏后地所知障現。令其不行名之為伏。

此猶末了。八地以去

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

如前卷的解釋。

論：修所斷的種子直到最終不行。

述記：修所斷的種子在之後都是頓斷的。這裡說的是種子，沒有說粗重。粗重是在十地中也斷除的緣故。在見道之前也能夠調伏俱生現行，因為道理上沒有疑問。瓔珞經說三賢菩薩只是調伏而不斷除，正好與此相同。前卷中說俱生現行還沒有完全調伏斷除。所說的暫時生起，指的是十地中的前四地，仍然會生起我見等。七地之前尚且會生起貪、嗔等。問：在見道之前所沒有調伏的相貌可以知道，已經調伏的與此有什麼區別？答：道力還很微弱，不能完全調伏斷盡，被煩惱所控制，少部分自行生起。即我貪等有失念而生起。所以說見道之前已經能夠稍微調伏，並非有別的相貌。見道之前調伏，入地之後能夠頓然調伏斷盡，如阿羅漢。有不怖畏的緣故生起煩惱，怖畏的就不會這樣。這裡所說的見所斷，只是頓悟的人。修所斷，通於漸悟的有學。漸悟的無學，這兩種都沒有。八地之後也不會故意生起，任運而行，因為道力強盛的緣故。這是對法第十四的文，如前面第三卷引用的解釋。

論：所知障中直到見道之前已經調伏。

述記：如前卷的解釋。菩薩在加行位唯獨欣求智慧，見道之前唯獨調伏法執。其煩惱障隨著這個而調伏。然而由於所知障的加行調伏的緣故，說煩惱被調伏，不是之前的加行調伏煩惱。十地之中與煩惱俱生的所知障品類，大部分也是這樣。不是與此俱生的，地地可以生起。

論：修所斷的種子直到最終才永遠調伏斷盡。

述記：這裡中斷伏的時間等解釋，如煩惱所說。由於地地能夠成為障礙的緣故，所以在十地中漸次能夠斷除，乃至十地方才永遠調伏斷盡。由前面的道力折伏后地所知障的現行，使其不行，名為調伏。

這裡還沒有完結，八地之後

【English Translation】 English version:

As explained in the previous volume.

Treatise: The seeds of what is abandoned by cultivation, until they ultimately do not arise.

Commentary: The seeds of what is abandoned by cultivation are all abruptly cut off thereafter. This refers to the seeds, not mentioning the coarse aspects. The coarse aspects are also cut off in the Ten Grounds. Before the stage of insight, one can also subdue the co-arisen manifestations, because there is no doubt in principle. The Yingluo Sutra says that the Bodhisattvas of the Three Worthies only subdue but do not cut off, which is exactly the same as this. The previous volume said that the co-arisen manifestations have not been completely subdued and eliminated. What is meant by 'arising temporarily' refers to the first four of the Ten Grounds, as they still give rise to views of self, etc. Before the Seventh Ground, they still give rise to greed, anger, etc. Question: The appearances of what has not been subdued before the stage of insight can be known. What is the difference between what has already been subdued and this? Answer: The power of the path is still weak and cannot completely subdue and eliminate them. They are controlled by afflictions, and a small part arises on its own. That is, self-attachment, greed, etc., arise due to loss of mindfulness. Therefore, it is said that before the stage of insight, one can already subdue them slightly, but there is no other appearance. Subduing before the stage of insight, after entering the grounds, one can abruptly subdue and eliminate them, like an Arhat. Because there are those who are not afraid, they give rise to afflictions, but those who are afraid do not. What is said here about what is abandoned by seeing refers only to those who have sudden enlightenment. What is abandoned by cultivation applies to both gradual learners and those who have learning. Those who have gradual non-learning have neither of these two. After the Eighth Ground, they also do not intentionally arise, but act spontaneously, because the power of the path is strong. This is the fourteenth text of the Abhidharma, as explained in the third volume cited earlier.

Treatise: Among the obstructions of what is known, until before the stage of insight, they have already been subdued.

Commentary: As explained in the previous volume. Bodhisattvas in the stage of application only rejoice in wisdom, and before the stage of insight, they only subdue the attachment to phenomena. Their afflictive obstructions are subdued along with this. However, because the application to the obstructions of what is known is subdued, it is said that afflictions are subdued, not that the previous application subdues afflictions. Among the Ten Grounds, the categories of obstructions of what is known that arise together with afflictions are mostly like this. Those that do not arise together with this can arise in each ground.

Treatise: The seeds of what is abandoned by cultivation, until they are finally and permanently subdued and eliminated.

Commentary: Here, the time of interruption and subduing is explained, as with afflictions. Because each ground can become an obstruction, they can be gradually cut off in the Ten Grounds, until they are finally and permanently subdued and eliminated in the Tenth Ground. The manifestation of the obstructions of what is known in the later grounds is subdued by the power of the path in the previous grounds, causing them not to arise, which is called subduing.

This is not yet finished, after the Eighth Ground

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第六．七識何者猶行。

論。八地以上至能違彼故。

述曰。六識俱者八地不行。以二空無漏無分別智心。及此果滅定后得智等。相續不斷能違第六識二執故不行。

論。第七俱者至起位方伏。

述曰。第七識者八地猶行。以法空智及果方違法執第七。生空智及果行相併粗不相違故。

論。前五轉識至障不現起。

述曰。於十地中。前五轉識設未轉依得無漏智。以第六識勝無漏道勝勢力故而伏于彼。治彼二障不令現起。此五識俱若所知障。地地分斷。能障地故。第七識俱金剛方斷。於十地中有伏．有起。五識俱者設是后地所能斷者。於前地中亦能伏之。現行粗于種子違于道故又八地以去。五識俱者雖不得對治。由第六俱無漏伏故令不現起。七地以前猶能現起　第六識者準此應知　亦地地斷亦能伏故。

問俱生煩惱十地不除。何故四十八說二障三住中斷。

論。雖于修道至三住斷義。

述曰。下釋妨難有二。此初也。如彼論說。于極喜住一切惡趣諸煩惱品所有粗重皆悉永斷。一切上中煩惱品皆不現行。于無加行無功用無相住中。一切能障無生法忍。諸煩惱品所有粗重皆悉永斷。一切煩惱皆不現前。于最上成滿菩薩住中。當知一切煩惱習氣．隨眠障礙皆悉永斷入

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 第六，第七識哪個還在執行？

論：八地以上的菩薩能夠違逆它們，所以不行。

述曰：第六識全部（活動）在八地菩薩那裡不行。因為有二空（人空和法空）的無漏無分別智心，以及此果滅定后得智等，相續不斷，能夠違逆第六識的二執（俱生我執和法執），所以不行。

論：第七識全部（活動）要到（金剛喻定）起位才能降伏。

述曰：第七識在八地菩薩那裡仍然執行。因為法空智以及果位才能違逆法執第七識。生空智以及果位的行相併粗糙，不相違背。

論：前五轉識即使轉依，障礙不現起。

述曰：在十地中，前五轉識即使沒有轉依得到無漏智，因為第六識殊勝的無漏道殊勝勢力，所以能降伏它們，治理它們的二障（煩惱障和所知障），不讓它們現起。這五識全部（活動）如果是所知障，就地地分斷，因為能障礙地。第七識全部（活動）要金剛喻定才能斷。在十地中有降伏，有生起。五識全部（活動）如果是后地所能斷的，在前地中也能降伏它們。現行粗糙，與道相違背。又八地以後，五識全部（活動）即使得不到對治，由於第六識全部（活動）的無漏降伏，所以不讓它們現起。七地以前仍然能夠現起。第六識的情況準此應知，也是地地斷，也能降伏。

問：俱生煩惱十地不能去除，為什麼《四十八》說二障在三住中斷？

論：雖然在修道中，三住斷有意義。

述曰：下面解釋妨難有二。這是第一個。如彼論說，在極喜住（初地）一切惡趣諸煩惱品所有粗重都永遠斷除。一切上中煩惱品都不現行。在無加行無功用無相住中，一切能障礙無生法忍的諸煩惱品所有粗重都永遠斷除。一切煩惱都不現前。在最上成滿菩薩住中，應當知道一切煩惱習氣、隨眠障礙都永遠斷除。

【English Translation】 English version Sixth, which of the seventh consciousnesses is still functioning?

Treatise: Bodhisattvas above the eighth ground can counteract them, so they do not function.

Commentary: All activities of the sixth consciousness do not function in the eighth ground. Because there is the mind of non-outflow, non-discrimination wisdom of the two emptinesses (emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena), and the subsequent acquired wisdom of the extinction samadhi of this result, etc., continuously counteracting the two attachments (innate self-attachment and phenomena-attachment) of the sixth consciousness, so it does not function.

Treatise: All activities of the seventh consciousness can only be subdued when the position (Vajra-like Samadhi) arises.

Commentary: The seventh consciousness still functions in the eighth ground. Because the wisdom of emptiness of phenomena and the fruition can counteract the seventh consciousness's attachment to phenomena. The characteristics of the wisdom of emptiness of self and the fruition are coarse and do not contradict each other.

Treatise: Even if the first five transformed consciousnesses are transformed, the obstacles do not arise.

Commentary: In the ten grounds, even if the first five transformed consciousnesses have not been transformed and obtained non-outflow wisdom, because of the superior non-outflow path and superior power of the sixth consciousness, they can be subdued, managing their two obstacles (affliction obstacle and knowledge obstacle), preventing them from arising. If all activities of these five consciousnesses are the knowledge obstacle, they are divided and cut off ground by ground, because they can obstruct the ground. All activities of the seventh consciousness can only be cut off by the Vajra-like Samadhi. In the ten grounds, there is subduing and arising. If all activities of the five consciousnesses can be cut off by the later ground, they can also be subdued in the previous ground. The present activities are coarse and contradict the path. Also, after the eighth ground, even if all activities of the five consciousnesses do not obtain the antidote, because of the non-outflow subduing of all activities of the sixth consciousness, they are prevented from arising. Before the seventh ground, they can still arise. The situation of the sixth consciousness should be known accordingly, it is also cut off ground by ground, and can also be subdued.

Question: Innate afflictions cannot be removed by the ten grounds, why does the Forty-Eight say that the two obstacles are interrupted in the three abodes?

Treatise: Although in the path of cultivation, the three abodes have the meaning of interruption.

Commentary: The following explains the obstacles in two ways. This is the first. As that treatise says, in the Joyful Abode (first ground), all the coarse and heavy qualities of all the afflictions of the evil destinies are permanently cut off. All the upper and middle qualities of afflictions do not arise. In the Abode of No Effort, No Function, and No Appearance, all the coarse and heavy qualities of all the afflictions that can obstruct the forbearance of the non-arising of phenomena are permanently cut off. All afflictions do not appear. In the Abode of the Most Supreme Accomplished Bodhisattva, it should be known that all the habits, latent tendencies, and obstacles of afflictions are permanently cut off.

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如來住。此中意說。金剛心位亦是成滿菩薩住攝故。所知障粗重有三。一在皮。極喜住皆永斷。二在膚。無加行無功用無相住皆永斷。三在肉。如來住中皆悉永斷。得一切障極清凈智。此中意說已斷處故。廣如彼說故此論云由斯故說。即四十八說也。

若煩惱粗重非彼種子。即非唯三住。及所知障地地能斷。何故但說三住斷也。

論。雖諸住中至是故偏說。

述曰。第二釋妨。三劫分齊成滿位故。無漏觀心初起．無間．圓滿別故。現起三障多分．少分．全分無故。一切煩惱分別．俱生。永害．不行．畢竟離故。無生法忍少凈．多凈．極凈別故。初舍異生．分段．變易有差別故。于無漏心未得．有相．無相滿故。

論。斷二障種漸頓云何。

述曰。自下第二斷二障種　漸頓云何。問也。雖已說斷但言菩薩未辨二乘。未明頓．漸故為此問。

論。第七識俱至無粗細故。

述曰。所障有異斷亦有殊。此中障種無粗細者八十一品。亦與非想第九一類品攝。如斷善邪見非無九品故成能熏　又解所障既同斷無前後名無粗細。非九地所攝總是一品。如前第七識中已廣解訖。又唯緣內境自地之境。境無粗細無多品類故名一品非三界中總無粗細。

論。餘六識俱至三界頓斷。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 如來所住的境界。這裡的意思是說，金剛心位也是圓滿菩薩所住的境界所包含的。所知障的粗重有三種：第一種在皮層，極喜地（Pramudita，菩薩十地之第一地，象徵歡喜）時就全部斷除；第二種在面板，無加行、無功用、無相住時就全部斷除；第三種在肌肉，如來住時就全部斷除。獲得一切障礙都極其清凈的智慧。這裡的意思是說已經斷除之處。詳細情況如其他地方所說，因此本論說『由於這個原因而說』，也就是指第四十八說。 如果煩惱的粗重不是那些種子，那就不僅僅是三住，以及所知障在各個地上都能斷除。為什麼只說三住能斷除呢？ 論：雖然在各個住中，直到這裡才特別說明。 述曰：第二是解釋疑問。因為三劫有分界，成就圓滿的地位，無漏觀心的初起、無間、圓滿各有不同，所以現起的這三種障礙有多分、少分、全分之分。一切煩惱，無論是分別的還是俱生的，都有永害、不行、畢竟離的區別。無生法忍有少凈、多凈、極凈的區別。最初捨棄異生、分段生死、變易生死也有差別。對於無漏心，有未得、有相、無相圓滿的區別。 論：斷除兩種障礙的種子，是漸次還是頓悟？ 述曰：下面第二是說斷除兩種障礙的種子，是漸次還是頓悟？這是提問。雖然已經說了斷除，但是隻說了菩薩，沒有說明二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘），沒有說明頓悟和漸悟，所以有此提問。 論：與第七識（末那識，Manas）相應的所知障種子沒有粗細之分。 述曰：所障礙的不同，斷除也有差別。這裡所說的障礙種子沒有粗細，指的是八十一品，也與非想非非想處天的第九品屬於同一類。如同斷除善的邪見，並非沒有九品，所以能夠成為能熏習的。又解釋說，所障礙的既然相同，斷除沒有先後，所以稱為沒有粗細。並非九地所包含，總共是一品。如同前面在第七識中已經詳細解釋過了。又因為只緣于內在的境界，自己所處的地的境界，境界沒有粗細，沒有多種品類，所以稱為一品，並非在三界中總的來說沒有粗細。 論：與其餘六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）相應的煩惱障種子在三界中頓然斷除。

【English Translation】 English version The abode of the Tathagata. The meaning here is that the Vajra-heart position is also included in the abode of the perfectly fulfilled Bodhisattva. The grossness of the Jnana-avarana (所知障, Obstruction of Knowledge) is threefold: the first is in the skin, which is completely cut off in Pramudita (極喜地, the first of the ten Bhumis of a Bodhisattva, symbolizing joy); the second is in the epidermis, which is completely cut off in the non-application, non-effort, and non-form abodes; the third is in the flesh, which is completely cut off in the abode of the Tathagata. One obtains the wisdom of extreme purity from all obstructions. The meaning here is that the place has already been cut off. Details are as described elsewhere, hence this treatise says 'because of this reason it is said,' which refers to the forty-eighth saying. If the grossness of afflictions is not those seeds, then it is not only the three abodes, and the Jnana-avarana can be cut off in each Bhumi. Why is it only said that the three abodes can be cut off? Treatise: Although in each abode, it is only specially mentioned here. Commentary: The second is to explain the doubt. Because the three kalpas have boundaries, the position of perfect fulfillment, the initial arising, the uninterrupted, and the perfect of the Anāsrava (無漏, non-outflow) contemplation-mind are different, so the three obstructions that arise have the distinctions of many parts, few parts, and whole parts. All afflictions, whether conceptual or innate, have the distinctions of perpetual harm, non-functioning, and ultimate separation. The Anutpattika-dharma-kshanti (無生法忍, Acceptance of the Non-arising of Dharmas) has the distinctions of little purity, much purity, and extreme purity. The initial abandonment of ordinary beings, segmented life and death, and variational life and death also have differences. Regarding the Anāsrava mind, there are differences in not yet attained, having form, and non-form perfection. Treatise: How is the cutting off of the seeds of the two obstructions, gradual or sudden? Commentary: The second below is about cutting off the seeds of the two obstructions, is it gradual or sudden? This is a question. Although it has been said to cut off, it only mentioned Bodhisattvas, without explaining the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), without explaining sudden enlightenment and gradual enlightenment, hence this question. Treatise: The seeds of Jnana-avarana associated with the seventh consciousness (Manas, 末那識) have no distinction of grossness. Commentary: The obstructed is different, and the cutting off is also different. The obstruction seeds mentioned here have no grossness, referring to the eighty-one categories, which also belong to the same category as the ninth category of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception. Just like cutting off the evil view of goodness, it is not without nine categories, so it can become a perfuming agent. It is also explained that since the obstructed is the same, the cutting off has no sequence, so it is called no grossness. It is not included in the nine Bhumis, it is a total of one category. As explained in detail in the seventh consciousness earlier. Also, because it only conditions on the internal realm, the realm of one's own Bhumi, the realm has no grossness, no multiple categories, so it is called one category, not that there is no grossness in the Three Realms in general. Treatise: The seeds of Klesha-avarana (煩惱障, Obstruction of Affliction) associated with the remaining six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness) are suddenly cut off in the Three Realms.

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述曰。見道斷名頓者。此是正義。又雖三心。九地總合以為二品。不同修道九品別斷。名之為頓。五十九等有此誠說。此于見道斷六識者。顯此五識有分別障。此之頓．漸如前卷解　修斷有二。然此文中無先伏修后入見時一品斷者。明於見後方起修故。不說超得第二．三果二乘別者。唯對法第十三有此文。廣如彼抄。略解釋者。此中初以九地漸斷。是漸次得果者。得一來果必依未至。其不還亦爾。然必起無漏道方始得果　有入靜慮．無色起對治道亦有何失　此亦不然。五十三說不還者唯五地于欲界有斷對治。不說無色有。又此唯超越。非次第者　第二三界九地合為九品斷者。唯有利根諸預流非余果。余果不能起勝作業。缺煩惱故。指端經．及分別經中說。初果由加行心。能以三界九品同爲一品合為九品斷　準超越不還許依五地。此亦依三無色。斯有何過　然加行心是色界。總緣三界故無間道可起無色上地。如不還於五地有欲界斷對治故。此亦應爾。應說此義理不違也。但非以下道能斷上惑。由意樂力別故應作四句。不爾但以五地得第三果。無色于下無斷對治故。尚不許九無間道入根本定得次第第三果。況預流者得四靜慮．及三無色證超果也。于修道中未得下斷惑道。不能起上斷惑道故。遊觀可爾。今依集論第十三說。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論述說：『見道斷惑為頓悟』，這是正確的解釋。雖然有三心（無間道、解脫道、勝進道），九地（欲界、未至定、初禪、二禪、三禪、四禪、空無邊處、識無邊處、無所有處）總合起來分為兩類（見道位斷和修道位斷），不同於修道位分為九品漸次斷惑，所以稱之為『頓』。五十九種情況中有這樣的真實說法。這裡所說的見道位斷六識，顯示了這五識具有分別的障礙。這種頓悟和漸悟的區別，如同前面卷中所解釋的那樣。 修道位的斷惑有兩種情況。然而，這段文字中沒有先通過修行來伏惑，然後在入見道時一次性斷除一品惑的情況。這表明在見道之後才開始修行斷惑。這裡沒有說超越獲得第二果（一來果）、第三果（不還果）的二乘人，是因為《對法論》第十三卷中有這樣的說法，詳細內容可以參考該論的註釋。簡要解釋是，這裡最初以九地漸次斷惑，是指漸次獲得果位的人。獲得一來果必定依賴於未至定，獲得不還果也是如此。然而，必須生起無漏道才能開始獲得果位。 有人問：『進入靜慮（禪定）、無色定，生起對治道，又有什麼過失呢？』 回答說：『這樣是不對的。《五十三經》中說，獲得不還果的人只在五地（欲界、未至定、初禪、二禪、三禪）對欲界有斷除對治，沒有說在無色界有。而且，這只是超越，不是次第。』 第二種情況是，將三界（欲界、色界、無色界）九地合為九品斷惑，這隻適用於利根的預流果（初果），不適用于其他果位。因為其他果位不能生起殊勝的作業，因為缺少煩惱。在《指端經》和《分別經》中說，初果可以通過加行心，將三界九品惑同時作為一品，合併爲九品來斷除。 有人問：『按照超越不還果允許依賴五地的情況，這裡也依賴三個無色定，這有什麼過錯呢？』 回答說：『然而，加行心是**（此處原文有缺失，應為「總相」），總緣三界，所以無間道可以生起于無色界上地。如同不還果在五地對欲界有斷除對治一樣，這裡也應該如此。應該這樣解釋，義理上沒有違背。但不能以下地的道來斷除上地的惑，因為意樂的力量不同，應該分為四句來討論。否則，僅僅以五地獲得第三果，無色界在下地沒有斷除對治，尚且不允許以九個無間道進入根本定來獲得次第的第三果，更何況預流果獲得四禪定和三個無色定來證得超越的果位呢？在修道位中，沒有獲得下地的斷惑之道，就不能生起上地的斷惑之道。遊觀可以這樣，現在依據《集論》第十三卷的說法。』

【English Translation】 English version: The commentary states: 'Seeing the path and cutting off defilements is sudden,' which is the correct interpretation. Although there are three minds (the immediate path, the liberation path, and the superior progress path) and the nine grounds (desire realm, the state before entering meditation, first dhyana, second dhyana, third dhyana, fourth dhyana, realm of infinite space, realm of infinite consciousness, realm of nothingness) are combined into two categories (the cutting off of defilements in the path of seeing and the path of cultivation), it is different from the gradual cutting off of defilements in the nine grades of the path of cultivation, so it is called 'sudden.' There are such true statements in the fifty-nine cases. The statement here about cutting off the six consciousnesses in the path of seeing shows that these five consciousnesses have the obstacle of discrimination. The difference between this sudden and gradual is as explained in the previous volume. There are two situations for cutting off defilements in the path of cultivation. However, there is no situation in this text where one subdues defilements through practice first, and then cuts off one grade of defilements all at once when entering the path of seeing. This indicates that cultivation to cut off defilements begins after seeing the path. The reason why it does not mention the Arhats who transcendently attain the second fruit (once-returner) and the third fruit (non-returner) is because there is such a statement in the thirteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and the detailed content can be found in the commentary on that treatise. A brief explanation is that the initial gradual cutting off of defilements in the nine grounds refers to those who gradually attain the fruits. Attaining the once-returner fruit necessarily relies on the state before entering meditation, and the same is true for attaining the non-returner fruit. However, one must generate the undefiled path to begin attaining the fruits. Someone asks: 'What is wrong with entering dhyana (meditative absorption) and the formless realms, and generating the antidote path?' The answer is: 'That is not correct. The Fifty-Three Suttas state that those who attain the non-returner fruit only have the antidote to cut off defilements in the desire realm in the five grounds (desire realm, the state before entering meditation, first dhyana, second dhyana, third dhyana), and it does not say that it exists in the formless realms. Moreover, this is only transcendence, not sequential.' The second situation is that combining the nine grounds of the three realms (desire realm, form realm, formless realm) into nine grades to cut off defilements only applies to sharp-witted stream-enterers (first fruit), not to other fruits. This is because other fruits cannot generate superior actions because they lack defilements. It is said in the Fingertip Sutra and the Differentiation Sutra that the stream-enterer can, through the mind of effort, simultaneously treat the nine grades of defilements in the three realms as one grade, combining them into nine grades to cut off. Someone asks: 'According to the case of transcendently attaining the non-returner fruit allowing reliance on the five grounds, what is wrong with relying on the three formless realms here?' The answer is: 'However, the mind of effort is a (missing word in the original text, should be 'general characteristic'), generally focusing on the three realms, so the immediate path can arise in the upper grounds of the formless realm. Just as the non-returner has the antidote to cut off defilements in the desire realm in the five grounds, it should be the same here. It should be explained in this way, and there is no contradiction in the meaning. But one cannot use the path of the lower ground to cut off the defilements of the upper ground, because the power of intention is different, and it should be discussed in four categories. Otherwise, merely attaining the third fruit with the five grounds, and the formless realm not having the antidote to cut off defilements in the lower ground, it is not even allowed to enter the fundamental concentration with the nine immediate paths to attain the sequential third fruit, let alone the stream-enterer attaining the four dhyanas and the three formless realms to realize the transcendent fruit? In the path of cultivation, without attaining the path to cut off defilements in the lower ground, one cannot generate the path to cut off defilements in the upper ground. Wandering and observing may be like this, but now it is based on the statement in the thirteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya.'

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頓出離者入諦現觀已。依未至定發出世間道。頓斷三界一切煩惱。品品別斷唯立二果。故依四靜慮．三無色。不得超二果及次第得第二三果。又取前解彼文說多分不能得根本定等。非必一切皆悉不得。不說唯依未至地故。不爾受變易生起無漏者。豈不許得上靜慮耶。故依上根本四靜慮亦得。此以下道能斷上惑由意樂別故。余文可解。

論。所知障種至有眾多故。

述曰。所以六識俱所知障。諸地漸斷不同者。以通緣內外境．內身．外身皆能起故。又彼境中各通粗細。非如第七識唯緣內故。前之六識通粗細境。第七唯細境。三界行相唯一類等。所以金剛心斷。六識中者行相有九品故。品類差別有眾多故。所以諸地分分別斷。五識由六引。所以通二障。如前二障中說。

論。二乘根鈍至或總或別。

述曰。自下第三辨三乘四道同異。二乘加行．勝進可有別別起九品為九品加行．及勝進者。或但一加行．及但一勝進。故加行．勝進二道總．別不決定也。此依容預勝進道說。不爾便違對法九說。其無間．解脫必各別起。如起無間道斷一品已。即起第二念解脫。此第二念解脫。不得望第二品為無間道。其第二品要別起無間．解脫。以根鈍故乃至九品亦爾。次第．超越並然。由有九品漸能斷者故。加行．

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：頓悟出離的人在進入諦現觀之後，依靠未至定發出世間道，頓然斷除三界一切煩惱。由於品類不同而分別斷除，只設立二果。因此，依靠四靜慮（色界四禪定）和三無色定（空無邊處定、識無邊處定、無所有處定），不能超越二果，也不能次第獲得第二果和第三果。另外，引用前文解釋，那篇文章說，大多數情況下不能得到根本定等等，並非必定一切都不能得到，因為沒有說只能依靠未至地。如果不是這樣，接受變易而生起無漏的人，難道不允許他得到上靜慮嗎？所以，依靠上面的根本四靜慮也是可以的。這以下的道能夠斷除上面的惑，是因為意樂不同的緣故。其餘的文字可以自己理解。

論：所知障的種子有很多。

述曰：為什麼六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）都具有所知障，並且在各個地（三界九地）逐漸斷除的情況不同呢？因為六識能夠普遍緣取內外境、內身、外身，都能生起所知障。而且在這些境界中，又都貫通粗細。不像第七識（末那識）只緣取內在的緣故。前面的六識貫通粗細境界，第七識只緣取細微境界。三界的行相只有一類等等。所以用金剛心斷除。六識中的行相有九品，品類差別有很多，所以各個地分別斷除。五識由六識引導，所以貫通二障（煩惱障和所知障），如前面二障中所說。

論：二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）根器遲鈍，或者總或者別。

述曰：從下面第三點辨別三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）四道（加行道、勝進道、無間道、解脫道）的同異。二乘的加行、勝進可以有分別生起九品，作為九品加行和勝進的情況，或者只有一種加行，或者只有一種勝進。所以加行道和勝進道是總還是別，是不一定的。這裡是依據容預勝進道說的。如果不是這樣，就違背了《對法》中關於九品的說法。其無間道和解脫道必定各自別起。比如生起無間道斷除一品之後，立即生起第二念解脫。這第二念解脫，不能期望它對於第二品來說是無間道。其第二品一定要分別生起無間道和解脫道。因為根器遲鈍的緣故，乃至九品也是這樣。次第和超越都是這樣。因為有九品逐漸能夠斷除的緣故，加行道、勝進道是總還是別，是不一定的。

【English Translation】 English version: Those who suddenly attain liberation, having entered the realization of truth (Satyadarshana), rely on the preliminary concentration (Anantarya-samadhi) to generate the supramundane path (Lokottara-marga), and abruptly sever all afflictions (Kleshas) of the three realms (Tridhatu). Because of the different categories, they are severed separately, and only two fruits (Phalas) are established. Therefore, relying on the four meditative absorptions (Dhyanas) of the form realm (Rupadhatu) and the three formless absorptions (Arupadhatu) – the sphere of infinite space (Akasanantyayatana), the sphere of infinite consciousness (Vijnananantyayatana), and the sphere of nothingness (Akincanyayatana) – one cannot transcend the two fruits, nor can one attain the second and third fruits in sequence. Furthermore, quoting the previous explanation, that text says that in most cases, one cannot attain the fundamental concentration (Mula-samadhi), etc., but it is not necessarily the case that one cannot attain anything at all, because it does not say that one can only rely on the preliminary stage (Anantarya-bhumi). If this were not the case, would those who accept transformation and arise with the unconditioned (Anasrava) not be allowed to attain the higher meditative absorptions (Dhyanas)? Therefore, relying on the above fundamental four meditative absorptions is also possible. The path below can sever the afflictions above because of the difference in intention (Adhyashaya). The rest of the text can be understood on its own.

Treatise: The seeds of the knowledge obscurations (Jneyavarana) are numerous.

Commentary: Why do the six consciousnesses (Vijnanas) – eye consciousness (Caksur-vijnana), ear consciousness (Srotra-vijnana), nose consciousness (Ghrana-vijnana), tongue consciousness (Jihva-vijnana), body consciousness (Kaya-vijnana), and mind consciousness (Mano-vijnana) – all have knowledge obscurations, and why is the gradual severance different in each realm (Bhumi) (the nine realms of the three realms)? Because the six consciousnesses can universally grasp internal and external objects, internal body, and external body, and can all generate knowledge obscurations. Moreover, within these objects, they all penetrate coarse and subtle aspects, unlike the seventh consciousness (Manas), which only grasps internally. The preceding six consciousnesses penetrate coarse and subtle objects, while the seventh consciousness only grasps subtle objects. The characteristics of the three realms are only of one type, etc. Therefore, they are severed with the diamond-like mind (Vajra-citta). Among the six consciousnesses, the characteristics have nine grades, and the differences in categories are numerous, so they are severed separately in each realm. The five consciousnesses are guided by the sixth consciousness, so they penetrate the two obscurations (Avaranas) – the affliction obscuration (Klesavarana) and the knowledge obscuration (Jneyavarana), as mentioned in the previous discussion of the two obscurations.

Treatise: The two vehicles (Yanas) – the Hearer Vehicle (Sravakayana) and the Solitary Realizer Vehicle (Pratyekabuddhayana) – have dull faculties, either collectively or separately.

Commentary: From the third point below, distinguish the similarities and differences of the three vehicles (Yanas) – the Hearer Vehicle (Sravakayana), the Solitary Realizer Vehicle (Pratyekabuddhayana), and the Bodhisattva Vehicle (Bodhisattvayana) – and the four paths (Marga) – the path of preparation (Prayoga-marga), the path of progress (Vishesha-marga), the path of immediate consequence (Anantarya-marga), and the path of liberation (Vimukti-marga). The paths of preparation and progress of the two vehicles can separately arise with nine grades, as the nine grades of the path of preparation and the path of progress, or there may be only one path of preparation, or only one path of progress. Therefore, whether the paths of preparation and progress are collective or separate is not fixed. This is based on the path of progress that allows for anticipation. If this were not the case, it would contradict the explanation of nine grades in the Abhidharma. The paths of immediate consequence and liberation must each arise separately. For example, after the path of immediate consequence arises and severs one grade, the second moment of liberation immediately arises. This second moment of liberation cannot be expected to be the path of immediate consequence for the second grade. The second grade must separately arise with the paths of immediate consequence and liberation. Because the faculties are dull, even up to the ninth grade, it is the same. Sequential and transcendent are both like this. Because there are nine grades that can be gradually severed, whether the paths of preparation and progress are collective or separate is not fixed.

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勝進各別別起。若一觀中隨斷幾品。即總一加行．后一勝進。故加行．勝進或總．或別易故。若九品漸斷出觀。若不出觀斷九品者。無間．解脫必各別起難故。此說修道。非見道中有如是事。以其根鈍即證無為時。不容斷惑故。設先世道伏后入見時。亦總一品與見同斷不為別道。

論。菩薩利根至皆容具有。

述曰。若菩薩利根。如初品無間至第二念。即為解脫。此初品無間望第二念。即為加行。此解脫道望自第二品。即為無間。望初為解脫。望后為加行。至第三無間道望第一為勝進。與第二品為解脫。自品為無間。與第四為加行。第二無間望前即非勝進。但是解脫。此是菩薩十地位中斷所知障時分品類排次斷法若別別斷一一別起。由能印證．及能斷惑．復能容豫．復能欣求故具四道。不爾便無四義具足。對法第九說。勝進道者謂為斷余品所有加行．無間．解脫道名勝進道。望此品是勝進故。即是別別望前有也。又云。或棄捨斷煩惱加行思惟諸法等。即是別起勝進行相。即二乘也。或總通三乘。今此既論二乘勝進或別．或總。不遮后品所有諸道是前勝進故。其加行不爾。為趣求故。前所有無間解脫非後加行。又今此約別起行相故言總．別。若望此品后道名勝進者此中不說。若不爾即無不起勝進．及總勝進

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 勝進各別別起：如果在一個觀想中隨順斷除了幾品惑，那麼就總合為一個加行，之後再進行一次勝進。因此，加行和勝進，或者總合，或者分別，都比較容易。如果九品惑漸次斷除，在出觀之後，或者不出觀就斷除九品惑，那麼無間道（Anantarya-marga，無間道，直接、無間隔地斷除煩惱的道）和解脫道（Vimukti-marga，解脫道，從煩惱中解脫的道）必定各自別別生起，這是困難的緣故。這裡說的是修道位（Bhavana-marga，修道位，通過修行來斷除煩惱的階段），而不是見道位（Darshana-marga，見道位，初次證悟真理的階段），在見道位中沒有這樣的情況。因為根器遲鈍的人，即使證得無為法（Asamskrta-dharma，無為法，不生不滅的真理），也不允許斷除煩惱的緣故。假設前世通過修道伏住了煩惱，之後進入見道位時，也總合為一品，與見道位一同斷除，不作為單獨的修道。

論：菩薩利根至皆容具有。

述曰：如果菩薩是利根，比如初品無間道之後，第二念就是解脫道。這初品無間道相對於第二念來說，就是加行道（Prayoga-marga，加行道，為進入無間道所做的準備階段）。這解脫道相對於自身的第二品來說，就是無間道；相對於第一品來說，就是解脫道；相對於後面的品來說，就是加行道。到第三無間道時，相對於第一品來說，就是勝進道（Vishesha-marga，勝進道，比之前的修行更進一步的道）；與第二品來說，是解脫道；自身這一品是無間道；與第四品來說，是加行道。第二無間道相對於前面來說，就不是勝進道，而是解脫道。這是菩薩在十地（Bhumi，菩薩修行的十個階段）位中斷除所知障（Jnana-avarana，所知障，對真理的認知障礙）時，分品類依次斷除的方法。如果分別斷除，那麼每一個都分別生起。因為能夠印證真理，並且能夠斷除煩惱，又能夠容許停頓，又能夠欣求進步，所以具備四道。否則就沒有四種意義都具備。對法（Abhidharma，阿毗達磨，佛教的論藏）第九卷說，勝進道是指爲了斷除剩餘品類煩惱的所有加行道、無間道、解脫道，都叫做勝進道。相對於這一品來說，是勝進道。也就是分別相對於前面而有的。又說，或者捨棄斷除煩惱的加行，思維諸法等等，這就是分別生起勝進行相，這是二乘（Shravaka-yana and Pratyekabuddha-yana，聲聞乘和緣覺乘，追求自我解脫的兩種修行方式）的修行方式。或者總合貫通三乘（Triyana，三乘，聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）。現在這裡討論的是二乘的勝進，或者分別，或者總合。不排除後面的品類所有的道是前面的勝進道。加行道不是這樣，爲了趣求目標的緣故。前面所有的無間道和解脫道不是後面的加行道。而且現在這裡是就分別生起的行相來說的，所以說總合或者分別。如果相對於這一品，後面的道叫做勝進道，那麼這裡就不說了。如果不這樣，就沒有不生起勝進道，以及總合勝進道的情況。

【English Translation】 English version 『Superior Progress Arising Separately』: If, within a single contemplation, several categories [of defilements] are severed in accordance, then they are collectively considered one 『application』 [Prayoga-marga], followed by one 『superior progress』 [Vishesha-marga]. Therefore, 『application』 and 『superior progress』 are either collective or separate, as they are easily [accomplished]. If the nine categories are gradually severed and one emerges from contemplation, or if the nine categories are severed without emerging from contemplation, then the 『immediate path』 [Anantarya-marga] and the 『liberation path』 [Vimukti-marga] must each arise separately, as it is difficult [otherwise]. This refers to the 『path of cultivation』 [Bhavana-marga], not the 『path of seeing』 [Darshana-marga], where such a thing occurs. This is because, for those with dull faculties, even when realizing the 『unconditioned』 [Asamskrta-dharma], it is not permissible to sever defilements. Supposing that in a previous life, defilements were subdued through the path, and then one enters the 『path of seeing』, it is also collectively considered one category, severed together with the 『path of seeing』, and not as a separate path.

Treatise: Bodhisattvas with sharp faculties can all possess [these four paths].

Commentary: If a Bodhisattva has sharp faculties, such that after the first category of the 『immediate path』, the second moment is the 『liberation path』. This first category of the 『immediate path』, in relation to the second moment, is the 『application path』. This 『liberation path』, in relation to its own second category, is the 『immediate path』; in relation to the first category, it is the 『liberation path』; in relation to the subsequent category, it is the 『application path』. By the time of the third 『immediate path』, in relation to the first category, it is the 『superior progress』; in relation to the second category, it is the 『liberation path』; its own category is the 『immediate path』; in relation to the fourth category, it is the 『application path』. The second 『immediate path』, in relation to the preceding one, is not 『superior progress』, but rather 『liberation』. This is the method by which Bodhisattvas, in the ten stages [Bhumi], sever the 『cognitive obscurations』 [Jnana-avarana] by dividing them into categories and severing them sequentially. If they are severed separately, then each arises separately. Because they are capable of verifying [truth], severing defilements, allowing for pauses, and eagerly seeking progress, they possess the four paths. Otherwise, the four meanings would not be fully present. The ninth volume of the Abhidharma states that the 『superior progress path』 refers to all the 『application path』, 『immediate path』, and 『liberation path』 that are for severing the remaining categories [of defilements], and is called the 『superior progress path』. In relation to this category, it is 『superior progress』. That is, it exists separately in relation to what precedes it. It also says, 『Or abandoning the application of severing defilements, contemplating all dharmas, etc.』, this is the aspect of separately arising superior progress, which is the practice of the Two Vehicles [Shravaka-yana and Pratyekabuddha-yana]. Or it collectively encompasses the Three Vehicles [Triyana]. Now, this discusses the 『superior progress』 of the Two Vehicles, either separately or collectively. It does not preclude that all the paths of the subsequent categories are the 『superior progress』 of the preceding ones. The 『application path』 is not like this, because of the pursuit of the goal. All the preceding 『immediate path』 and 『liberation path』 are not the subsequent 『application path』. Moreover, this is now discussed in terms of the aspect of separately arising practices, hence the mention of collective or separate. If, in relation to this category, the subsequent path is called 『superior progress』, then it is not discussed here. If it were not so, there would be no situation where 『superior progress』 does not arise, and no collective 『superior progress』.

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者故。廣如彼論及彼抄解。此四道通三乘。二乘有學及無學。通有漏及無漏。遮加行智通無漏。不遮加行道故。菩薩金剛心亦有加行道。任運加行非加行智。佛唯有解脫道。是前勝進道自望無勝進。勝進有者佛應有勝劣。有漏攝四道通上二界十地皆有。欲界唯有加行．勝進。無漏四道除有頂皆通四道。彼處唯有勝進。解脫道類名解脫亦有。非次無間后之解脫。亦不見許有加行道。中間稍勝有無間等無失。有頂闇昧加行等不成。對法第十四說。于諸現觀位證得後後勝品道時。舍前所得下劣品道。如證此果所攝道時。即舍此向所攝道。以不復現前故。如菩薩雖不言向．果亦得勝。舍劣劣不現前。如得果故。今約此文。即轉齊義三品種子各各別有。不用下品以為中上品也。若約轉滅義一種子轉為中上者。即下成中下不復起名舍劣也。

論。十真如者至而不在故。

述曰。解能證得有四。上來已明三訖　自下第四明所證如。于中有四。一總牒如。二別解。三釋難。四廢立　此中真如約詮辨體。若不爾者。且如初如非先不遍今者方遍。亦非真如可說遍故。若不約詮說遍何法　遍行如者。攝論第七十地中說。世親菩薩解云。謂此法界遍一切行。以無少法非無我故。無性云。此即法空。無有少法而非空故。彼約詮說一無

【現代漢語翻譯】 因此。如同彼論及其抄解所廣說。此四道（加行道、勝進道、無間道、解脫道）通於三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）。二乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘）中的有學和無學都可修習。通於有漏和無漏。遮加行智通於無漏，但不遮加行道。菩薩的金剛心也有加行道。任運加行並非加行智。佛唯有解脫道，是前道勝進，自此以後沒有勝進。如果勝進還有，佛就應該有勝劣之分。有漏攝四道，通於上二界（色界、無色界）十地都有。欲界唯有加行道和勝進道。無漏四道除了有頂天，都通於四道。彼處唯有勝進道。解脫道類似解脫，也有，並非次第無間后的解脫。也不見允許有加行道。中間稍勝，有無間等，沒有缺失。有頂天昏昧，加行等不能成就。《對法》第十四說，在諸現觀位證得後後勝品道時，舍前所得下劣品道。如證此果所攝道時，即舍此向所攝道，以不復現前故。如菩薩雖不言向果，亦得勝，舍劣劣不現前，如得果故。今約此文，即轉齊義，三品種子各各別有，不用下品以為中上品也。若約轉滅義，一種子轉為中上者，即下成中，下不復起，名舍劣也。 論：十真如者，至於而不在故。 述曰：解能證得有四。上來已明三訖，自下第四明所證如。于中有四：一總牒如，二別解，三釋難，四廢立。此中真如約詮辨體。若不爾者，且如初如非先不遍今者方遍，亦非真如可說遍故。若不約詮說遍何法？遍行如者，《攝論》第七十地中說。世親菩薩解云：『謂此法界遍一切行，以無少法非無我故。』無性云：『此即法空，無有少法而非空故。』彼約詮說一無我。

【English Translation】 Therefore, as extensively discussed in that treatise and its commentary. These four paths (preparatory path, progressive path, immediate path, and liberation path) are common to the Three Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna). Both learners and non-learners in the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) can practice them. They are common to both defiled and undefiled states. The 'obstructing' preparatory wisdom is common to the undefiled, but it does not obstruct the preparatory path. The Vajra-like mind of a Bodhisattva also has a preparatory path. Effortless practice is not preparatory wisdom. Only the Buddha has the path of liberation, which is a progression from the previous paths, and there is no further progression beyond it. If there were further progression, the Buddha would have superior and inferior distinctions. The defiled encompasses the four paths, and all ten grounds in the upper two realms (Form Realm and Formless Realm) have them. The Desire Realm only has the preparatory path and the progressive path. The undefiled four paths, except for the Peak of Existence, are common to all four paths. Only the progressive path exists there. The path of liberation is similar to liberation and also exists, but it is not the liberation immediately following the sequential order. The preparatory path is not allowed there either. There is no loss if there is slight superiority in the middle, such as the immediate path. The Peak of Existence is obscure, and preparatory practices cannot be accomplished. The fourteenth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya states that when one attains successively superior paths in the stages of direct perception, one abandons the inferior paths previously attained. For example, when one attains the path included in the fruit, one abandons the path included in the path leading to that fruit, because it no longer manifests. Just as a Bodhisattva, even without speaking of the path or the fruit, attains superiority and abandons the inferior, just as one attains the fruit. According to this text, the three types of seeds each have their own distinct existence in terms of transformation, and the inferior is not used as the middle or superior. If, in terms of transformation and extinction, one seed transforms into the middle or superior, then the inferior becomes the middle, and the inferior no longer arises, which is called abandoning the inferior. Treatise: The ten Suchnesses, reaching but not abiding. Commentary: There are four aspects to understanding and attaining. The above has already clarified three, and from here onwards, the fourth clarifies the Suchness that is attained. Within this, there are four parts: first, a general statement of Suchness; second, a separate explanation; third, a clarification of difficulties; and fourth, an establishment and refutation. Here, Suchness is discussed in terms of its essence through explanation. If not, then, for example, the initial Suchness was not previously pervasive, but is now pervasive. It cannot be said that Suchness is pervasive. If not explained through explanation, what dharma is pervasive? The pervasive Suchness is discussed in the seventh ground of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. Vasubandhu explains: 'This Dharmadhātu pervades all practices, because there is no dharma that is not without self.' Asaṅga says: 'This is the emptiness of dharmas, because there is no dharma that is not empty.' He explains the non-self through explanation.

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我．一空理皆不足。體．用別故。今此所論二空如。是總包彼也。無有一法非二空故。新中邊第一云。由通達此證得自他平等法性。舊論通云證得一分。猶有後地不名全得故　因論生論。何名二空之所對治二行相別　答執法有體。執法有用。二所治別也。有主宰．任持行相別故。故能治道亦有別也。

論。二最勝真如至最為勝故。

述曰。由離犯戒證此真如德莊嚴故。世親等云。一切法中最為殊勝今出勝因謂具無邊德。新中邊云。由通達此作是思惟。是故我今于同出離一切行相應遍修治。是為勤修相應出離。舊論難解故不引之。下引別處。同處不說。

論。三勝流真如至極為勝故。

述曰。由得三惠照大乘法。觀此法教根本真如名勝流如。無性云。由所流教勝故舍身命求此善說。新中邊云。設有火坑等三千界。為求此法投身而取。不以為難。意同無性。

論。四無攝受真如至所依取故。

述曰。世親云。於此中無計我所。無攝我所。如北洲人無有系屬無性云。謂契經等法愛斷故不計我所。觀此非自他攝。新中邊云。由通達此乃至法愛亦皆斷滅。又解今此中說。彼皆不盡理。應說此如無系屬。非我執．我慢．我愛．無明．邊見．我所見等所依取故。但言我所即性狹故。由緣法愛無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：我，認為一切法皆是空性的道理是不充分的，因為體和用是不同的。現在這裡所討論的二空（人空和法空）是總括了前面所說的空性。沒有一種法不是二空的範疇。新《中邊分別論》第一卷說：『由於通達此二空，證得自他平等的法性。』舊論中說『證得一分』，意思是還有後面的地沒有證得，不能稱為完全證得。因此，由論而生論，什麼是二空所要對治的，它們的兩種行相有什麼區別？回答是：執著於法有自體，執著於法有作用，這是二空所要對治的差別。有主宰、任持的行相不同，所以能對治的道也有差別。

論：二、最殊勝的真如，是因為最為殊勝的緣故。

述曰：由於遠離犯戒，證得此真如的功德莊嚴。世親等人說：『一切法中最為殊勝。』現在提出殊勝的原因，是因為具備無邊的功德。新《中邊分別論》說：『由於通達此二空，作這樣的思惟：因此我現在對於同於出離的一切行，相應地普遍修治。』這是勤奮修行相應的出離。舊論難以理解，所以不引用。下面引用別處，同一處沒有說。

論：三、勝流真如，是因為極為殊勝的緣故。

述曰：由於獲得三慧（聞慧、思慧、修慧）照耀大乘法，觀察此法教的根本真如，名為勝流如。無性說：『由於所流傳的教法殊勝，所以捨棄身命去求此善說。』新《中邊分別論》說：『即使有火坑等三千大千世界，爲了求此法，投身進去取，也不認為是困難的。』意思與無性相同。

論：四、無攝受真如，是因為沒有所依取之處。

述曰：世親說：『於此真如中，沒有計度為我所，沒有攝受我所。』如同北俱盧洲的人，沒有系屬。無性說：『因為契經等的法愛斷絕的緣故，不計度為我所。』觀察此真如，不是自他所攝。新《中邊分別論》說：『由於通達此二空，乃至法愛也全部斷滅。』又解釋說，現在這裡所說的，他們都沒有完全窮盡道理。應該說此真如沒有系屬，不是我執、我慢、我愛、無明、邊見、我所見等所依取之處。只說我所，就顯得性質狹隘了。由於緣於法愛，沒有

【English Translation】 English version: I. The principle that all dharmas are empty is insufficient because the 'essence' (體) and 'function' (用) are different. The two emptinesses (二空, two kinds of emptiness: emptiness of self and emptiness of dharmas) discussed here encompass the former. There is no dharma that is not within the scope of the two emptinesses. The first volume of the new Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (中邊分別論) says: 'By understanding these two emptinesses, one attains the dharma-nature of equality between oneself and others.' The old treatise says 'attaining a portion,' meaning that there are still later stages that have not been attained, so it cannot be called complete attainment. Therefore, from treatise to treatise, what are the objects to be counteracted by the two emptinesses, and what are the differences in their two aspects? The answer is: clinging to dharmas as having inherent existence (自體), and clinging to dharmas as having a function. These are the differences in what the two emptinesses counteract. The aspects of having a master (主宰) and maintaining (任持) are different, so the paths that can counteract them are also different.

Treatise: Two, the most excellent Suchness (真如, tathata), because it is the most excellent.

Commentary: Because of being free from violating precepts, one attains the adornment of the merits of this Suchness. Vasubandhu (世親) and others say: 'Among all dharmas, it is the most excellent.' Now, the reason for its excellence is that it possesses boundless merits. The new Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya says: 'By understanding these two emptinesses, one thinks like this: Therefore, I now cultivate and purify all practices that are in accordance with liberation.' This is diligent practice in accordance with liberation. The old treatise is difficult to understand, so it is not quoted. The following quotes another place, not the same place.

Treatise: Three, the Suchness of excellent flow, because it is extremely excellent.

Commentary: Because of obtaining the three wisdoms (三慧, śruta-mayī prajñā, cinta-mayī prajñā, bhāvanā-mayī prajñā: wisdom of hearing, wisdom of thinking, wisdom of meditation) illuminating the Mahayana dharma, observing the fundamental Suchness of this dharma teaching is called the Suchness of excellent flow. Asaṅga (無性) says: 'Because the dharma that is transmitted is excellent, one abandons body and life to seek this well-spoken teaching.' The new Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya says: 'Even if there are three thousand great thousand worlds of fire pits, in order to seek this dharma, one throws oneself in to take it, and does not consider it difficult.' The meaning is the same as Asaṅga.

Treatise: Four, the Suchness of non-acceptance, because there is no place to rely on.

Commentary: Vasubandhu says: 'In this Suchness, there is no measuring as 'mine,' and no accepting as 'mine'.' Like the people of Uttarakuru (北俱盧洲), there is no attachment. Asaṅga says: 'Because the love of dharma in the sutras and so on is cut off, one does not measure as 'mine'.' Observing this Suchness, it is not accepted by self or others. The new Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya says: 'By understanding these two emptinesses, even the love of dharma is completely cut off.' Also, it is explained that what is said here is not completely exhaustive. It should be said that this Suchness has no attachment, and is not relied upon by self-grasping (我執, ātma-graha), self-conceit (我慢, ātma-māna), self-love (我愛, ātma-sneha), ignorance (無明, avidyā), extreme views (邊見, anta-grāha), the view of 'mine' (我所見, mamata), etc. Saying only 'mine' seems narrow in nature. Because of being attached to the love of dharma, there is no

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故。我見等不依如取之。謂此真如但為境故名為我所。餘論說之。此中但說我境聚故。如不離彼法。我執起時亦取如故。今不于彼起我等執。但言我見即不攝所。但言我所即不攝見。今言我執通見及所。上準此釋。

論。五類無別真如至類有異故。

述曰。由生死涅槃二皆平等故無差別。攝論云相續無別如。世親云。謂於此中體無有異。非如眼等隨諸有情相續差別各各有異。即如不同身各各有異。相續即身故。故如自他無別。無性云。非如色等相續差別。或與世親同或與此論同亦得。謂唯一物。非如眼等有別類故。中邊云。此名相續無差別義。由通達此得十意樂平等凈心。

論。六無染凈真如至後方凈故。

述曰。世親等同。舊中邊云因第六地十二緣生因處觀。於四諦染凈因果。無有一法可染可凈。新中邊云。由通達此知緣起法無染無凈。非謂如也。由真如故法無染凈。名真如為無染凈。此論等談如體。中邊因如體談法。非相違也。

論。七法無別真如至而無異故。

述曰。由離生滅細相現行故。雖多教安立真如無別。世親同。謂教安立為勝義法界善不善等。此無別也。新中邊云。由通達此知法無相。不行契經等種種法相中。此依教談如無異。彼依如談教無異。綺互一邊亦不違

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，我見等不依賴於如而取用它，認為這個真如只是作為所緣境，所以稱為『我所』。其他的論述也是這樣說的。這裡只是說我境的聚集。例如，不離開那個法，我執生起時也會取用如。現在不于那個法生起我等執，只是說『我見』，就不包括『所』；只是說『我所』，就不包括『見』。現在說『我執』，就包括見和所。以上可以參照這個解釋。

論：五類無別真如，到類有異故。

述曰：由於生死和涅槃二者都是平等的，所以沒有差別。《攝大乘論》說相續沒有差別，如。世親菩薩說：『這是說，在這個（真如）中，體性沒有差異。不像眼等，隨著有情相續的差別，各自有差異。』就像不同的身體，各自有差異。相續就是身體。所以，如在自身和他身沒有差別。無性菩薩說：『不像色等有相續的差別。』或者與世親菩薩的觀點相同，或者與此論的觀點相同，也可以。意思是說，真如是唯一的，不像眼等有不同的類別。』《中邊分別論》說：『這叫做相續無差別的意義。』由於通達這個道理，可以得到十種意樂的平等凈心。

論：六無染凈真如，到後方凈故。

述曰：世親菩薩等人的觀點相同。《舊中邊分別論》說，因為在第六地，通過十二緣生因處觀，對於四諦的染凈因果，沒有一個法是可以被染污或可以被凈化的。《新中邊分別論》說：『由於通達這個道理，知道緣起法沒有染污，沒有清凈。』不是說如是這樣。由於真如的緣故，法沒有染污沒有清凈。稱真如為無染凈。』此論等談論的是如的體性，《中邊分別論》因為如的體性而談論法。這並不矛盾。

論：七法無別真如，到而無異故。

述曰：由於遠離生滅的細微相的現行，所以雖然很多教法安立真如沒有差別。世親菩薩的觀點相同。意思是說，教法安立為勝義法界，善不善等，這些沒有差別。《新中邊分別論》說：『由於通達這個道理，知道法沒有相，不行於契經等種種法相中。』這是依據教法談論如沒有差異，那是依據如談論教法沒有差異。互相補充，一邊也不違背。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, 'I-view' etc., do not rely on Suchness (真如, Zhenru - True Thusness) to take it, thinking that this True Thusness is only taken as an object, so it is called 'mine'. Other treatises also say this. Here, it only speaks of the gathering of 'I-object'. For example, without leaving that dharma, when 'I-attachment' arises, it also takes Suchness. Now, 'I-attachment' etc., do not arise in that dharma, only saying 'I-view', then it does not include 'mine'; only saying 'mine', then it does not include 'view'. Now saying 'I-attachment', it includes both view and mine. The above can refer to this explanation.

Treatise: The True Thusness of the five categories is not different, up to 'because the categories are different'.

Commentary: Because both Samsara (生死, Shengsi - birth and death) and Nirvana (涅槃, Niepan - extinction of suffering) are equal, there is no difference. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, She Dachenglun - Compendium of the Mahayana) says that the continuity has no difference, Suchness. Vasubandhu (世親, Shiqin) says: 'This means that in this (Suchness), the essence has no difference. It is not like the eyes etc., which have different continuities according to the differences of sentient beings.' Just like different bodies, each has differences. Continuity is the body. Therefore, Suchness has no difference in oneself and others. Asaṅga (無性, Wuxing) says: 'It is not like form etc., which have differences in continuity.' Or it is the same as Vasubandhu's view, or it is the same as this treatise's view, which is also possible. It means that Suchness is unique, not like the eyes etc., which have different categories.' The Madhyāntavibhāga (中邊分別論, Zhongbian Fenbie Lun - Discourse on Discrimination between Middle and Extremes) says: 'This is called the meaning of continuity without difference.' Because of understanding this principle, one can obtain the equal and pure mind of the ten kinds of joy.

Treatise: The True Thusness of the six is without defilement or purity, up to 'only pure later'.

Commentary: Vasubandhu and others have the same view. The Old Madhyāntavibhāga says that because in the sixth ground, through the contemplation of the twelve links of dependent origination, for the defiled and pure causes and effects of the Four Noble Truths (四諦, Sida - Four Noble Truths), there is not a single dharma that can be defiled or purified. The New Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'Because of understanding this principle, one knows that the dharma of dependent origination has no defilement and no purity.' It is not that Suchness is like this. Because of Suchness, the dharma has no defilement and no purity. Suchness is called without defilement and purity.' This treatise etc., discusses the essence of Suchness, and the Madhyāntavibhāga discusses the dharma because of the essence of Suchness. This is not contradictory.

Treatise: The True Thusness of the seven dharmas is not different, up to 'but there is no difference'.

Commentary: Because it is far from the manifestation of the subtle aspects of arising and ceasing, although many teachings establish that Suchness has no difference. Vasubandhu's view is the same. It means that the teachings establish the ultimate reality (勝義, Shengyi - ultimate reality) dharma realm, good and not good etc., these have no difference. The New Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'Because of understanding this principle, one knows that the dharma has no aspect, and does not practice in the various dharma aspects of the sutras etc.' This is based on the teachings to talk about Suchness having no difference, and that is based on Suchness to talk about the teachings having no difference. They complement each other, and neither side contradicts.

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也。由達此如即空方便智。發起有中殊勝行。

論。八不增減真如至俱自在故。

述曰。無性云。謂法外無用所以不增。諸法不壞所以不減。此即離遍計所執增．餘二性減解。又一解與世親同。云染法減時而無有減。凈法增時而無有增。即斷染不減。得凈不增。今此復別。離增減執故。新中邊云。由通達此證得無生法忍。于諸清凈雜染品中。不見一法有減增故。即依如說法無增減也。二自在依。如前已解。如文可解。然無性云。前諸地中雖亦得此無差別住。然作功用后乃得成。於此地中能無功用。隨用即成故名自在。新中邊云。有四自在。一名無分別自在。二凈土自在。三智自在。四業自在。第八地中唯達。初二名無增減差別如故。其相自在名無分別。如彼疏解。

論。九智自在至得自在故。

述曰。中邊云。由智自在圓滿證得無礙解故。餘論解同　問此地已得智自在者何故十度十地修智　答無性云。謂此地中得無礙辨所依止故。分得智波羅蜜多。於一切法不隨其言。善能了知諸意趣義。如實成就一切有情受勝法樂。非謂全得智波羅蜜。

論。十業自在等所依真如至皆自在故。

述曰。業即神通。及陀羅尼．三摩地三種自在。業即身等三業。中邊云。隨欲化作種種利樂有情事故

【現代漢語翻譯】 也。由於通達此真如，就能以空性的方便智慧，發起在有為法中的殊勝行持。

論：八、不增不減的真如，直至獲得俱自在的境界。

述記：無性論師說：『所謂法外無用，所以不增；諸法不壞，所以不減。』這是遠離了遍計所執的增益，以及其餘二性的減損之見。又有一種解釋與世親論師相同，說：『染法減少時，實際上並沒有減少；凈法增多時，實際上並沒有增多。』也就是斷除染污並不減少，獲得清凈並不增加。現在這裡又有一種不同的解釋，是遠離了增減的執著。新《中邊分別論》說：『由於通達此真如，證得無生法忍，對於各種清凈和雜染的品類，不見有一法有減增。』這就是依據真如的說法，法無增減。二自在的依據，如前文已經解釋過，可以按照原文理解。然而無性論師說：『前面的各個地中，雖然也能夠獲得這種無差別的安住，但是需要通過作意功用之後才能成就。而在此地中，能夠無需功用，隨用即成，所以名為自在。』新《中邊分別論》說：有四種自在：一名無分別自在，二名凈土自在，三名智自在，四名業自在。第八地中唯能通達初二，名為無增減差別如故。其相自在，名為無分別，如彼論疏的解釋。

論：九、智慧自在等，所依的真如，直至一切都自在的境界。

述記：《中邊分別論》說：『由於智慧自在圓滿，證得無礙解。』其餘論典的解釋相同。問：此地已經獲得智慧自在，為何十度、十地還要修習智慧？答：無性論師說：『這是說在此地中，獲得無礙辯才所依止的基礎，所以分得智慧波羅蜜多。對於一切法，不隨順其言語，善於了知各種意趣和意義，如實成就一切有情，享受殊勝的法樂。』並非說完全獲得了智慧波羅蜜多。

論：十、業自在等所依的真如，直至一切都自在的境界。

述記：業就是神通，以及陀羅尼（Dharani，總持）、三摩地（Samadhi，禪定）三種自在。業就是身等三業。《中邊分別論》說：『隨心所欲地化作種種事物，利益安樂有情眾生。』

【English Translation】 Also, by understanding this Suchness, one can use the expedient wisdom of emptiness to initiate the supreme practice in conditioned existence.

Treatise: Eight, the Suchness of neither increase nor decrease, until the state of being completely at ease is attained.

Commentary: Vasubandhu said: 'What is outside the Dharma is useless, so there is no increase; all Dharmas are indestructible, so there is no decrease.' This is to be free from the increase of the Parikalpita (completely conceptualized) and the decrease of the other two natures. Another explanation is the same as that of Vasubandhu, saying: 'When defiled Dharmas decrease, there is actually no decrease; when pure Dharmas increase, there is actually no increase.' That is, eliminating defilement does not decrease, and attaining purity does not increase. Now there is another different explanation here, which is to be free from the attachment to increase and decrease. The new Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'Because of understanding this, one attains the tolerance of the non-origination of Dharmas, and in the various pure and defiled categories, one does not see a single Dharma that has increase or decrease.' This is based on the saying of Suchness that Dharmas have no increase or decrease. The basis of the two freedoms has been explained earlier, and can be understood according to the text. However, Vasubandhu said: 'Although in the previous stages one can also attain this non-differential abiding, it can only be achieved after intentional effort. In this stage, one can be without effort, and it is achieved as soon as it is used, so it is called freedom.' The new Madhyāntavibhāga says: There are four freedoms: one is the freedom of non-discrimination, two is the freedom of pure land, three is the freedom of wisdom, and four is the freedom of karma. In the eighth stage, only the first two can be understood, called the difference of no increase or decrease as before. Its appearance of freedom is called non-discrimination, as explained in that commentary.

Treatise: Nine, the freedom of wisdom, etc., the Suchness on which it depends, until everything is in a state of freedom.

Commentary: Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'Because the freedom of wisdom is complete, one attains unobstructed liberation.' The explanations of the other treatises are the same. Question: Since this stage has already attained the freedom of wisdom, why do the ten perfections and ten stages still cultivate wisdom? Answer: Vasubandhu said: 'This means that in this stage, one obtains the basis on which unobstructed eloquence depends, so one obtains a share of the wisdom pāramitā (perfection). Regarding all Dharmas, one does not follow their words, but is good at understanding various intentions and meanings, and truly accomplishes all sentient beings, enjoying the supreme Dharma bliss.' It does not mean that one has completely attained the wisdom pāramitā.

Treatise: Ten, the Suchness on which the freedom of karma, etc., depends, until everything is in a state of freedom.

Commentary: Karma is supernatural power, as well as the three freedoms of Dharani (total retention), Samadhi (meditative concentration). Karma is the three karmas of body, etc. Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'Transforming various things at will to benefit and bring happiness to sentient beings.'

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。總持中有文．義二持。持一切法文．義。等至能持．能斷。隨所欲虛空藏等而能現前。此無性解。余義同此。

論。雖真如性至假立十種。

述曰。此即第三釋其妨難。真如一味何容分十。真如實無別。隨其所證．所生．能證勝德假立十種。

論。雖初地中至後後建立。

述曰。第四廢立。初地中於十真如非不皆達。未圓滿故後後建立。故立十種。行．位有十故。圓滿真如名。乃至如來十皆能了。如中邊釋且廣分別。

就解本頌中。初略。后廣。就廣中有二。一明證得因。二明所證得。上來雖有四段不同。謂十地．十勝行．十障．十真如訖。總是第一明證得因。自下第二明所證果。于中有二。初牒前生下以發論端。第二正解所證得果。

論。如是菩薩至便能證得。

述曰。是初牒前。起下所證二轉依果　二轉依者。菩提．涅槃。

就正明所證中有二。初約位辨證。二正明轉依。初中有三。初總舉。次別解。后料簡。

論。轉依位別略有六種。

述曰。初總舉所證位也。此中資糧位初說。略開五位。地前為二。十地為二。如來為一。下應當知。

論。一損力益能轉至亦名為轉。

述曰。初二位者。在地前第一第二位。此位漸伏亦名為轉。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：總持（Dharani，一種記憶和保持佛法的方法）中有文持和義持兩種。文持是保持一切法的文字，義持是保持一切法的意義。等至（Samadhi，一種高度集中的冥想狀態）能夠保持和斷除（煩惱）。隨修行者所愿，虛空藏（Akasagarbha，菩薩名）等菩薩能夠顯現。這是無性解（對事物無自性的理解）。其餘意義與此相同。

論：雖然真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）的本性只有一個，但爲了方便起見，假立了十種。

述曰：這即是第三種解釋來消除妨難。真如只有一個味道，怎麼能分成十種呢？真如實際上沒有區別，只是隨著所證得的、所產生的、能夠證得的殊勝功德，而假立了十種。

論：雖然在初地（菩薩道的第一個階段）中，並非不能全部通達十種真如，但因為沒有圓滿，所以在後后的階段才建立。

述曰：這是第四種關於廢立的解釋。在初地中，對於十種真如並非不能全部通達，但因為沒有圓滿，所以在後后的階段才建立。所以建立了十種。因為行和位有十種的緣故。圓滿的真如之名，乃至如來十種都能了達。如同《中邊分別論》的解釋，且廣泛地分別。

就解釋本頌（根本頌）中，開始是略說，後面是廣說。就廣說中有兩種，一是說明證得的原因，二是說明所證得的。上面雖然有四段不同，即十地、十勝行、十障、十真如結束。總是第一種說明證得的原因。從下面開始是第二種說明所證得的果。其中有兩種，一是引用前面的話來引發論端，二是正式解釋所證得的果。

論：像這樣，菩薩便能證得。

述曰：這是首先引用前面的話，來引出下面所說的二轉依果（兩種轉化所依的果報），二轉依指的是菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）和涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）。

就正式說明所證得的果報中有兩種，一是約位來辨別證得，二是正式說明轉依。其中有三種，一是總的舉出，二是分別解釋，三是簡要分析。

論：轉依的位別，略有六種。

述曰：這是總的舉出所證得的位次。這裡在資糧位（菩薩道的準備階段）的開始說，略開了五位。地前為二，十地為二，如來為一。下面應當知道。

論：一是損力益能轉，也名為轉。

述曰：最初的兩個位次，是在地前的第一第二位。這個位次逐漸降伏（煩惱），也名為轉。

【English Translation】 English version: In Dharani (總持, a method of remembering and retaining the Dharma), there are two types of retention: textual retention and meaning retention. Textual retention is retaining the text of all Dharmas, and meaning retention is retaining the meaning of all Dharmas. Samadhi (等至, a highly concentrated state of meditation) is able to retain and sever (afflictions). According to the practitioner's wishes, Bodhisattvas such as Akasagarbha (虛空藏, name of a Bodhisattva) can manifest. This is the understanding of no-self-nature (無性解, understanding of the absence of inherent existence). The remaining meanings are the same as this.

Treatise: Although the nature of Tathata (真如, the true nature of things) is only one, for the sake of convenience, ten types are provisionally established.

Commentary: This is the third explanation to eliminate obstacles. Tathata has only one flavor, how can it be divided into ten types? Tathata actually has no difference, but according to the superior merits that are attained, produced, and able to be attained, ten types are provisionally established.

Treatise: Although in the first Bhumi (初地, the first stage of the Bodhisattva path), it is not that all ten types of Tathata cannot be fully understood, but because they are not complete, they are established in the later stages.

Commentary: This is the fourth explanation regarding abolishment and establishment. In the first Bhumi, it is not that all ten types of Tathata cannot be fully understood, but because they are not complete, they are established in the later stages. Therefore, ten types are established. Because there are ten types of practices and stages. The name of complete Tathata, even the Tathagata can fully understand all ten. Like the explanation in the Madhyantavibhaga, and extensively distinguish.

Regarding the explanation of the root verses, the beginning is brief, and the latter is extensive. In the extensive explanation, there are two types: one is to explain the cause of attainment, and the other is to explain what is attained. Although there are four different sections above, namely the ten Bhumis, ten superior practices, ten obstacles, and ten Tathatas, it is always the first type that explains the cause of attainment. From below, it is the second type that explains the result of what is attained. Among them, there are two types: one is to quote the previous words to initiate the discussion, and the other is to formally explain the result of what is attained.

Treatise: In this way, the Bodhisattva can attain.

Commentary: This is to first quote the previous words to introduce the two transformed-basis results (二轉依果, the results of the two transformations) mentioned below. The two transformed-bases refer to Bodhi (菩提, enlightenment) and Nirvana (涅槃, liberation).

Regarding the formal explanation of the result of what is attained, there are two types: one is to distinguish the attainment according to the stages, and the other is to formally explain the transformation of the basis. Among them, there are three types: one is to generally list them, the second is to explain them separately, and the third is to briefly analyze them.

Treatise: The distinctions of the transformed-basis stages are roughly six types.

Commentary: This is to generally list the stages of what is attained. Here, at the beginning of the stage of accumulation (資糧位, the preparatory stage of the Bodhisattva path), five stages are briefly opened up. Two before the Bhumis, two in the ten Bhumis, and one as the Tathagata. It should be known below.

Treatise: One is the transformation of diminishing power and increasing ability, which is also called transformation.

Commentary: The first two stages are the first and second stages before the Bhumis. In this stage, gradually subduing (afflictions) is also called transformation.

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轉之因故能伏轉故。實證得位謂通達位．修習位等。故此非真。世親．無性攝論並第九云有勝解者。是勝解行地。故在初二位。

及慚愧故者。即二位中。世親等解云。有慚．愧故令諸煩惱少分現行或不現行。煩惱現行即深慚．愧。則慚．愧者是勝解行之勝相故。今又解。由習勝解者是初位。初位信唯識增故名勝解。未能伏唯識想。第二位能伏唯識想少伏煩惱。名有慚．愧。如前二位中解。又勝解者。勝解數。得決定故。信數初增久不增故。由慚．愧故崇善拒惡。有二勝德。並通二位故為能轉體。此與攝論不同。不可一準。余文可知。

論。二通達轉至真實轉依。

述曰。即通達位。在見道中已證一分轉依。未圓滿故。

論。三修習轉至真實轉依。

述曰。謂十地中。即除初地見道。余初地及九地即修道十地中也。

論。攝大乘中至現不現故。

述曰。以有相無相觀通達真俗間雜現前。或真現非真不現。謂入觀時。或非真現真不現。謂出觀時。令真非真現不現故。又未能即空而觀于有。有相觀現真不現。無相觀現非真不現。由此理故說通達轉在前六地。我今此論。約初通達分別二障遍行真如故說初地為通達轉。世親攝論云。前六地真如為真俗觀現不現因。故說通達轉在前

六地。亦不相違。

論。說修習轉至不顯現故。

述曰。攝論。又說修習轉在後四地。由純無相觀長時現前。勇猛修習斷余粗重。多令非真不顯現故。四十八說。由第七地猶名為雜煩惱。未名不雜煩惱。非真猶有現時。但無相觀長時故。說多令非真不現。非八．九．十地非真有現時。得無相觀長時種類同故。說后四地為修習轉。我以十地斷俱生二障粗重漸證真如義等。說修習轉在十地中。亦不違也。然此論中乃言多令非真不現者。為簡七地。二攝論釋皆言唯有真實現非真不現。從長時說。然攝論本通得二解。不言非真定不現故。

論。四果圓滿轉至利樂無盡。

述曰。第四可解。彼此論同。

論。五下劣轉至名下劣轉。

述曰。第五亦同。通有．無學。一唯自利。二有欣．厭。三唯達生空。四唯斷煩惱。五唯證真擇滅。六無勝能。真擇滅者謂真如。由慧擇得此滅故　無勝堪能者。無一切智等故。

論。六廣大轉至名廣大轉。

述曰。攝大乘說。即諸菩薩能趣證轉故。如來已轉。故彼不說。此六翻前準前應悉　生死涅槃俱無欣厭者。大悲．般若常廣起故。具一切智等名有勝堪能。

論。此中意說至而證得故。

述曰。第三料簡。頌中所取轉依體者。唯廣

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 六地（第六地，指般若現前地）。亦不相違。

論：說修習轉至不顯現故。

述曰：《攝大乘論》又說修習轉在後四地（第八、九、十、十一地）。由純無相觀長時現前，勇猛修習斷余粗重，多令非真不顯現故。《四十八品釋》說，由第七地猶名為雜煩惱，未名不雜煩惱，非真猶有現時。但無相觀長時故，說多令非真不現。非八、九、十地非真有現時，得無相觀長時種類同故。說后四地為修習轉。我以十地斷俱生二障粗重漸證真如義等，說修習轉在十地中，亦不違也。然此論中乃言多令非真不現者，為簡七地。二《攝大乘論釋》皆言唯有真實現非真不現，從長時說。然《攝大乘論》本通得二解，不言非真定不現故。

論：四果圓滿轉至利樂無盡。

述曰：第四可解。彼此論同。

論：五下劣轉至名下劣轉。

述曰：第五亦同。通有學、無學。一唯自利，二有欣、厭，三唯達生空，四唯斷煩惱，五唯證真擇滅，六無勝能。真擇滅者謂真如（事物本來的樣子）。由慧擇得此滅故。無勝堪能者，無一切智等故。

論：六廣大轉至名廣大轉。

述曰：《攝大乘論》說，即諸菩薩能趣證轉故。如來已轉，故彼不說。此六翻前準前應悉。生死涅槃俱無欣厭者，大悲、般若常廣起故。具一切智等名有勝堪能。

論：此中意說至而證得故。

述曰：第三料簡。頌中所取轉依體者，唯廣大。

【English Translation】 English version Sixth ground (Sixth Bhumi, referring to the manifestation of Prajna). There is no contradiction.

Treatise: It is said that cultivation transforms to non-manifestation.

Commentary: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha also says that cultivation transforms in the last four grounds (eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh Bhumis). Because pure non-conceptual observation manifests for a long time, and vigorous cultivation cuts off the remaining coarse burdens, it mostly causes the unreal to not manifest. The Commentary on the Forty-Eight Chapters says that because the seventh ground is still called mixed afflictions, and is not yet called unmixed afflictions, the unreal still has a present time. But because non-conceptual observation is for a long time, it is said that it mostly causes the unreal to not manifest. The unreal does not have a present time in the eighth, ninth, and tenth grounds, because they obtain the same kind of non-conceptual observation for a long time. It is said that the last four grounds are the transformation of cultivation. I say that the transformation of cultivation is in the ten grounds, because the ten grounds cut off the coarse burdens of the two co-arisen obstacles and gradually realize Suchness, etc. There is no contradiction. However, this treatise says that it mostly causes the unreal to not manifest in order to distinguish the seventh ground. The two Commentaries on the Mahāyānasaṃgraha both say that only the real manifests and the unreal does not manifest, speaking from the perspective of a long time. However, the original Mahāyānasaṃgraha can be understood in two ways, because it does not say that the unreal definitely does not manifest.

Treatise: The perfection of the four fruits transforms to endless benefit and joy.

Commentary: The fourth can be understood. The two treatises are the same.

Treatise: The five inferiorities transform to the name of inferior transformation.

Commentary: The fifth is also the same. It applies to both those with learning and those without learning. First, only benefiting oneself; second, having joy and aversion; third, only understanding the emptiness of birth; fourth, only cutting off afflictions; fifth, only realizing true cessation through discernment; sixth, without superior abilities. True cessation through discernment refers to Suchness (the true nature of things). It is obtained through discernment by wisdom. Without superior abilities means without omniscient wisdom, etc.

Treatise: The six vastnesses transform to the name of vast transformation.

Commentary: The Mahāyānasaṃgraha says that it is because all Bodhisattvas can approach and realize the transformation. The Tathagata has already transformed, so it is not mentioned there. These six reverse the previous ones, and everything should be understood accordingly. Having neither joy nor aversion towards Samsara and Nirvana is because great compassion and Prajna constantly arise extensively. Having omniscient wisdom, etc., is called having superior abilities.

Treatise: The intention here is to say that it is realized.

Commentary: The third is a brief explanation. The transformed basis taken in the verse is only vast.

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大轉。舍二粗重而證得故。不言圓滿轉者。圓滿轉對菩薩說。廣大轉對二乘說　又圓滿轉唯如來。廣大轉在菩薩　今明十地取廣大轉。要地地中舍二粗重方證得故　又解既言取廣大轉。明圓滿轉亦在其中。略舉一隅故。即六轉依中第一假立轉。未得真故。餘五真名轉。真實證得故。

第一約位解轉依訖。下第二正解轉依。于中有三。第一總解轉依。第二雖轉依義總有四種。而今但取二所轉得。等者簡別本頌所說轉依之言。第三辨此修習位能證非已證。

論。轉依義別略有四種。

述曰。第一總解轉依名所目義。初總標。后別解。此為初也。

論。一能轉道至漸頓伏彼。

述曰。下別解也為四。能伏道通有漏無漏。三智中通加行．根本．后得三智。有漏道六行。無漏者且如因第三地無分別智斷定法愛俱所知障勢力。令煩惱亦不現行名伏煩惱障。非別起道名伏煩惱。所知障可知。又如離第三靜慮欲。伏四定以上惑入滅定。即是以後得智伏二障也　或加行道能漸伏。根本．后得智頓伏　或根本后得亦能漸伏。無加行道能頓伏者故　問加行智通無漏不　答不通。八地以上無加行智。亦無有漏心故　問若爾對法第十等如何通。金剛心有二。一加行道攝。二無間道攝　答無違也。以無漏心任運趣入

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 大轉變。因為捨棄了兩種粗重（二粗重：指煩惱障和所知障）而證得的緣故。不說圓滿轉變的原因是，圓滿轉變是對菩薩說的，廣大轉變是對二乘（聲聞和緣覺）說的。而且圓滿轉變唯有如來才能做到，廣大轉變在菩薩才能做到。現在說明十地菩薩取得廣大轉變，是因為必須在每一地中捨棄兩種粗重才能證得。另一種解釋是，既然說取得廣大轉變，就表明圓滿轉變也包含在其中，只是略舉一隅而已。這指的是六種轉依中的第一種假立轉，因為還沒有得到真實的緣故。其餘五種是真名轉，因為真實證得的緣故。

第一，從果位方面解釋轉依完畢。下面第二，正式解釋轉依。其中有三點。第一，總的解釋轉依。第二，雖然轉依的意義總共有四種，但現在只取兩種所轉得的。『等』字是簡別本頌所說的轉依之言。第三，辨別這種修習的果位是能證得而非已經證得。

論：轉依的意義差別，略有四種。

述記：第一，總的解釋轉依名稱所指代的意義。先總標，后別解，這是開始。

論：一、能轉之道，有漸次和頓悟兩種方式來調伏它們。

述記：下面分別解釋，共有四種。能調伏之道，通於有漏和無漏。三智（根本智、后得智、加行智）中，包括加行智、根本智、后得智三種智慧。有漏道有六行觀。無漏道，比如在第三地，以無分別智斷除定法愛俱生的所知障勢力，使煩惱也不現行，這叫做調伏煩惱障。不是另外生起道來調伏煩惱。所知障可以類推得知。又比如離開第三禪靜慮的慾望，調伏四禪定以上的迷惑而進入滅盡定，這就是以後得智調伏二障。或者加行道能漸次調伏，根本智、后得智頓悟調伏。或者根本、后得智也能漸次調伏，沒有加行道能頓悟調伏。問：加行智通於無漏嗎？答：不通。八地以上沒有加行智，也沒有有漏心。問：如果這樣，對法第十等如何貫通？金剛心有兩種，一種是加行道所攝，一種是無間道所攝。答：沒有矛盾。因為無漏心自然而然地趣入。

【English Translation】 English version: A great transformation. It is attained by abandoning the two coarse burdens (two coarse burdens: referring to the afflictive obscurations and the cognitive obscurations). The reason for not mentioning the perfect transformation is that the perfect transformation is spoken of in relation to Bodhisattvas, while the vast transformation is spoken of in relation to the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas). Moreover, the perfect transformation can only be achieved by the Tathāgata, while the vast transformation can be achieved by Bodhisattvas. Now, it is explained that the Bodhisattvas of the Ten Bhūmis (ten grounds) attain the vast transformation because they must abandon the two coarse burdens in each Bhūmi to attain it. Another explanation is that since it is said to attain the vast transformation, it indicates that the perfect transformation is also included within it, only a corner is mentioned briefly. This refers to the first imputed transformation among the six transformations, because it has not yet attained the truth. The remaining five are true name transformations because they are truly attained.

First, the explanation of transformation from the perspective of the stage is completed. Below, secondly, the formal explanation of transformation. There are three points in it. First, a general explanation of transformation. Second, although there are four kinds of transformation in general, only the two that are transformed and attained are taken now. The word 'etc.' distinguishes the words of transformation mentioned in the verse. Third, it distinguishes that this stage of practice is capable of attaining but has not yet attained.

Treatise: The differences in the meaning of transformation are roughly four kinds.

Commentary: First, a general explanation of the meaning referred to by the name of transformation. First, a general statement, then a separate explanation, this is the beginning.

Treatise: One, the path that can transform, there are gradual and sudden ways to subdue them.

Commentary: Below are separate explanations, there are four kinds. The path that can subdue, is common to defiled and undefiled. Among the three wisdoms (fundamental wisdom, subsequent wisdom, and preparatory wisdom), it includes the three wisdoms of preparatory wisdom, fundamental wisdom, and subsequent wisdom. The defiled path has six aspects of contemplation. The undefiled path, for example, in the third Bhūmi, using non-discriminating wisdom to cut off the power of the cognitive obscurations that are born together with the love of fixed Dharma, so that afflictions do not manifest, this is called subduing the afflictive obscurations. It is not separately arising a path to subdue afflictions. The cognitive obscurations can be inferred. Also, for example, leaving the desire of the third dhyāna (meditative absorption) of the realm of form, subduing the delusions above the four dhyānas and entering cessation, this is the subsequent wisdom subduing the two obscurations. Or the preparatory path can gradually subdue, the fundamental wisdom and subsequent wisdom suddenly subdue. Or the fundamental wisdom and subsequent wisdom can also gradually subdue, without the preparatory path can suddenly subdue. Question: Does the preparatory wisdom extend to the undefiled? Answer: It does not extend. Above the eighth Bhūmi, there is no preparatory wisdom, and there is no defiled mind. Question: If so, how does the tenth, etc. of the Abhidharma (collection of Buddhist philosophical texts) connect? There are two kinds of Vajra-like mind, one is included in the preparatory path, and one is included in the path of immediate succession. Answer: There is no contradiction. Because the undefiled mind naturally enters.

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根本智故。如前已說。名加行道非加行智。加行智者有趣求彼。但是前加行道。而非趣求。故加行智不通無漏。或復對法據二乘等通說金剛心有二。非謂菩薩金剛心中有加行道。故加行智不通無漏　或說亦通無漏。八地等無者。無有漏加行智別深趣求者。八地以去有任運趣求故。今此初說加行唯有漏。如對法說金剛心有加行道。不簡菩薩故。

論。二能斷道至未成辨故。

述曰。以有漏心加行智。及有漏后得智。一是曾習。二相執所引。三未能泯伏滅此相故不能斷惑。四或加行智是能趣求所證真如。趣求所引無分別智。未成辨故不能斷惑。由無分別智是加行所引。真如是加行所趣求證。即由所引無分別智。能證所證真如成辨故。能斷二障非加行智　問若加行智不通無漏。言有漏心已攝加行。更言加行復何所須。若加行智通無漏。不須作此問答分別　答以三智中加行智亦無分別。此有漏道亦有加行．無間．解脫。前言有漏攝彼三道。後言加行為簡三智中根本．后得智別故復重說。

自下明其無漏心及根本后得智。

論。有義根本至故非斷道。

述曰。此中初說唯無分別智慧斷二障隨眠。后得不然。設作無相觀。相分境相仍有故不能斷。唯無分別智有此斷能。諸經論中無說后得能斷隨眠。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 根本智（Mūla-jñāna）的緣故，如前面已經說過的，名為加行道（Prayoga-mārga），而非加行智（Prayoga-jñāna）。加行智是有意趣去尋求那個（真如），但只是前加行道，而非趣求。所以加行智不通於無漏（Anāsrava）。或者，對法（Abhidharma）根據二乘（Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna）等通說金剛心（Vajra-citta）有二種，並非說菩薩（Bodhisattva）的金剛心中有加行道。所以加行智不通於無漏。或者說也通於無漏，八地（Aṣṭamī-bhūmi）等沒有（有漏加行智）是因為沒有有漏加行智特別深刻的趣求。八地以後有任運（Anābhoga）的趣求的緣故。現在這裡最初說加行唯有漏，如對法說金剛心有加行道，不簡別菩薩的緣故。

論：二者能斷道，直至未成辦的緣故。

述曰：以有漏心（Sāsrava-citta）的加行智，以及有漏的后得智（Pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna），一是曾經串習，二是相執（Nimitta-graha）所引發，三是未能泯伏滅除此相的緣故，不能斷惑（Kleśa）。四或者加行智是能趣求所證的真如（Tathatā），趣求所引的無分別智（Nirvikalpa-jñāna），未成辦的緣故不能斷惑。由於無分別智是加行所引發，真如是加行所趣求證得。即由所引的無分別智，能證所證的真如成辦的緣故，能斷二障（Dvi-āvaraṇa），而非加行智。問：如果加行智不通於無漏，說有漏心已經攝取了加行，再說加行又有什麼必要？如果加行智通於無漏，就不需要作此問答分別。答：以三智（Tri-jñāna）中加行智也無分別。此有漏道也有加行、無間（Anantara）、解脫（Vimukti）。前面說有漏攝取了彼三道，後面說加行是爲了簡別三智中根本智、后得智的差別，所以又重複說。

自下說明其無漏心以及根本智、后得智。

論：有義根本智，直至故非斷道。

述曰：此中最初說唯有無分別智才能斷二障的隨眠（Anuśaya），后得智不然。假設作無相觀（Animitra-dṛṣṭi），相分（Nimitta-bhāga）的境相仍然存在，所以不能斷。唯有無分別智有此斷除的能力。諸經論中沒有說后得智慧夠斷除隨眠。

【English Translation】 English version Because of the Fundamental Wisdom (Mūla-jñāna), as previously stated, it is called the Path of Application (Prayoga-mārga), not the Wisdom of Application (Prayoga-jñāna). The Wisdom of Application has an interest in seeking that (Tathatā), but it is only the preceding Path of Application, not the seeking itself. Therefore, the Wisdom of Application does not extend to the Unconditioned (Anāsrava). Alternatively, the Abhidharma, according to the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), generally states that the Vajra Mind (Vajra-citta) has two aspects, not that the Bodhisattva's Vajra Mind has the Path of Application. Therefore, the Wisdom of Application does not extend to the Unconditioned. Or it is said that it also extends to the Unconditioned, but the Eighth Ground (Aṣṭamī-bhūmi) and beyond do not have (conditioned Wisdom of Application) because there is no particularly profound seeking with conditioned Wisdom of Application. From the Eighth Ground onwards, there is effortless (Anābhoga) seeking. Now, here it is initially stated that application is only conditioned, as the Abhidharma says that the Vajra Mind has the Path of Application, without distinguishing Bodhisattvas.

Treatise: The two are able to sever the path, until it is not accomplished.

Commentary: With the conditioned mind's (Sāsrava-citta) Wisdom of Application, and the conditioned Subsequent Wisdom (Pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna), one is previously practiced, two are induced by the attachment to characteristics (Nimitta-graha), and three, because they are unable to subdue and extinguish these characteristics, they cannot sever afflictions (Kleśa). Four, or the Wisdom of Application is able to seek the attained Suchness (Tathatā), the Non-Discriminating Wisdom (Nirvikalpa-jñāna) induced by seeking, because it is not accomplished, it cannot sever afflictions. Because the Non-Discriminating Wisdom is induced by application, and Suchness is sought and attained by application. That is, because the induced Non-Discriminating Wisdom is able to realize the attained Suchness, it is able to sever the Two Obscurations (Dvi-āvaraṇa), not the Wisdom of Application. Question: If the Wisdom of Application does not extend to the Unconditioned, and it is said that the conditioned mind has already included application, what is the need to mention application again? If the Wisdom of Application extends to the Unconditioned, there is no need to make this question and answer distinction. Answer: Among the Three Wisdoms (Tri-jñāna), the Wisdom of Application also has no distinction. This conditioned path also has application, immediate (Anantara), and liberation (Vimukti). The previous statement that the conditioned includes those three paths, the later statement of application is to distinguish the difference between the Fundamental Wisdom and the Subsequent Wisdom among the Three Wisdoms, so it is repeated.

From below, it explains the unconditioned mind and the Fundamental Wisdom and Subsequent Wisdom.

Treatise: Some say that the Fundamental Wisdom, until then, is not the path of severance.

Commentary: Here, it is initially stated that only Non-Discriminating Wisdom can sever the latent tendencies (Anuśaya) of the Two Obscurations, not Subsequent Wisdom. Even if one practices formless contemplation (Animitra-dṛṣṭi), the object of the characteristic aspect (Nimitta-bhāga) still exists, so it cannot sever. Only Non-Discriminating Wisdom has this ability to sever. In various sutras and treatises, it is not said that Subsequent Wisdom can sever latent tendencies.

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非諸菩薩見．修二道前斷所知用無分別。后斷煩惱用后得智故。

論。有義后得至迷事隨眠。

述曰。后得無力能斷迷理見．疑等隨眠。而於安立．非安立諦相。明瞭現前無倒證故。亦能永斷迷事隨眠。迷理隨眠行相深遠。要證彼理方能斷之。迷事隨眠行相淺近。雖實有相觀亦能斷之。

論。故瑜伽說至相執引故。

述曰。第五十五說。修道位中有二種道。初即無分別智。后即后得智。后得智名世出世。如前數解此名。以有漏道是純世間故。無純世間道能永害隨眠。以有二因。如文可解。

論。由斯理趣至俱能正斷。

述曰。諸見所斷雖有迷事忿等十法。見斷頓斷故。迷事之隨眠隨理觀一品斷此。及修所斷無明．二見。及此俱根本及隨迷理隨眠。無分別智斷。余有貪．恚．慢．無明。及此俱隨惑迷事者。后得智亦能斷。行相淺近故　問何為亦是根本斷。亦是后得斷　不違理故。此唯二乘非菩薩。菩薩修道不斷迷事隨眠故。即唯所知障是根本智斷　煩惱障中通二智斷。然為迷理身．邊見等。各于自地第九品道時方頓斷。而前八品既先斷余煩惱。可起后得智斷。第九品道時起無分別智斷。以迷理惑故。此約九品別無間道斷者。若不出觀即斷九品。唯無分別智斷八品中迷事煩惱。不可

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：並非所有菩薩都是如此。在修習二道時，無分別智用於斷除所知障，后得智用於斷除煩惱障。

論：有觀點認為，后得智可以斷除迷於事相的隨眠。

述記：后得智的力量不足以斷除迷於理性的見、疑等隨眠。但對於安立諦和非安立諦的體相，后得智慧夠明瞭現前，無顛倒地證知，因此也能永遠斷除迷於事相的隨眠。迷於理性的隨眠，其行相深遠，必須證得那個理性才能斷除。迷於事相的隨眠，其行相淺近，即使只是觀想其事相，也能斷除。

論：所以《瑜伽師地論》中說，修道位中有兩種道，最初是無分別智，之後是后得智。后得智又名世出世智，如前文所解釋的，因為它既有有漏道，也有純世間道。沒有純粹的世間道能夠永遠損害隨眠，因為有兩個原因，如經文所說。

論：由於這個道理，諸見所斷的煩惱，雖然有迷於事相的忿等十法，但見斷是頓斷的。迷於事相的隨眠，隨理觀想，一品一品地斷除。以及修所斷的無明、二見，以及與此相關的根本和隨迷理隨眠，由無分別智斷除。其餘的有貪、嗔、慢、無明，以及與此相關的隨惑，迷於事相的，后得智也能斷除，因為其行相淺近。問：什麼既是根本斷，又是后得斷？答：不違背道理。這只是針對二乘，不是菩薩。菩薩修道不斷迷於事相的隨眠。也就是說，只有所知障是根本智斷。煩惱障中，通於二智斷。然而，對於迷於理性的身見、邊見等，各自在自地的第九品道時才頓斷。而前八品已經先斷除了其餘的煩惱，可以生起后得智來斷除。第九品道時，生起無分別智來斷除，因為是迷於理性的惑。這是指九品別無間道斷除的情況。如果不從觀中出來，就斷除九品，只有無分別智斷除八品中的迷於事相的煩惱，這是不可能的。

【English Translation】 English version: It is not the case for all Bodhisattvas. When cultivating the two paths, non-discriminating wisdom (無分別智, wu fenbie zhi) is used to sever the obstructions to knowledge, while subsequent wisdom (后得智, hou de zhi) is used to sever the afflictions.

Treatise: Some argue that subsequent wisdom can sever the latent tendencies (隨眠, suimian) that are deluded about phenomena.

Commentary: Subsequent wisdom lacks the power to sever the latent tendencies such as views and doubts that are deluded about principles. However, regarding the characteristics of established truths and non-established truths, subsequent wisdom can clearly and directly realize them without any inversion, and therefore can also permanently sever the latent tendencies that are deluded about phenomena. The latent tendencies that are deluded about principles have profound and far-reaching characteristics, and can only be severed by realizing those principles. The latent tendencies that are deluded about phenomena have shallow and near characteristics, and can be severed even by contemplating their phenomena.

Treatise: Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Yuqie shidi lun) states that in the stage of cultivation, there are two types of paths: the first is non-discriminating wisdom, and the second is subsequent wisdom. Subsequent wisdom is also called mundane and supramundane wisdom, as explained earlier, because it has both defiled paths and purely mundane paths. No purely mundane path can permanently harm the latent tendencies, because there are two reasons, as stated in the text.

Treatise: Due to this reasoning, although the afflictions severed by views include the ten dharmas such as anger that are deluded about phenomena, the severance of views is sudden. The latent tendencies that are deluded about phenomena are severed one by one through contemplation of principles. And the ignorance and dualistic views that are severed by cultivation, as well as the fundamental and associated latent tendencies that are deluded about principles, are severed by non-discriminating wisdom. The remaining greed, hatred, pride, and ignorance, as well as the associated secondary afflictions that are deluded about phenomena, can also be severed by subsequent wisdom, because their characteristics are shallow and near. Question: What is both a fundamental severance and a subsequent severance? Answer: It does not contradict reason. This is only for the Two Vehicles (二乘, er cheng), not for Bodhisattvas. Bodhisattvas do not sever the latent tendencies that are deluded about phenomena during cultivation. That is to say, only the obstructions to knowledge are severed by fundamental wisdom. Among the afflictions, both types of wisdom can sever them. However, for the views of self and extremes that are deluded about principles, they are suddenly severed at the ninth stage of the path in their respective grounds. And the previous eight stages have already severed the remaining afflictions, so subsequent wisdom can be generated to sever them. At the ninth stage of the path, non-discriminating wisdom is generated to sever them, because they are delusions about principles. This refers to the case of severing the nine stages of the path separately and without interruption. If one does not emerge from contemplation, one severs all nine stages. Only non-discriminating wisdom can sever the afflictions that are deluded about phenomena in the eight stages, which is impossible.

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一觀道中前八是后得。第九是根本智故。即第六識中我見等俱生者。要第九品道方斷。雖無品數非如七識金剛心斷　問彼金剛方斷有何妨耶　答即有色．無色界有學聖者。起無漏道卻斷下地我見等種過。若許爾者。即不還聖人應以現行潤生妨。既許不還聖者種子潤生故。先離下地欲時。其身見等並須斷訖。不同第七識。不潤生故。由此應作四句。有依下地斷上隨眠。如下地得聖。斷上一切種識中隨眠。有在上地斷下隨眠。如在上地取無學果。斷下地第七識中煩惱種子。瑜伽等說要金剛心彼方斷故。第三句可知。第四句者除上三相。或謂斷所知障。不可說上下自他地斷故。然約緣縛．相應縛故可說地斷。此即在下斷上。在上斷下。於五．六．七識皆不能遮。不違理故。非潤生故。非縛法故　又解用后得智斷菩薩亦能。十地斷所知障中有執．非執。非執者亦名迷事。故亦許斷。以障智故。雖未斷本堅執之者。何妨先斷。如煩惱障俱生者。以我見為首故。先斷時未能斷本。先迷事者亦可斷故。斷所知障類亦應爾。此等分別妙絕古今。于諸論師實未聞也。即二障六．七識合各得為四句　問有漏曾習。未泯相故不能斷隨眠。后得亦有相。如何斷隨眠。又此二智並各有相。此二何別　答后得雖有相。非執所引。非縛所緣。又非曾得

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 在《一觀道》中，前八個是后得智（指證悟后獲得的智慧）。第九個是根本智（指直接證悟實相的智慧），因此，在第六識（意識）中與我見（認為有『我』的錯誤觀念）等同時產生的煩惱，需要到第九品道（指菩薩修行的第九個階段）才能斷除。雖然沒有品數的差別，但它不像第七識（末那識）那樣需要金剛心（指最堅固的智慧）才能斷除。 問：如果需要金剛心才能斷除，那有什麼妨礙呢？ 答：即使是有色界、無色界的有學聖者（指還在學習的聖人），生起無漏道（指沒有煩惱的修行道路）也可以斷除下地（指欲界、色界）的我見等煩惱的種子。如果允許這樣，那麼不還果的聖人（指斷除了欲界煩惱的聖人）就應該以現行的煩惱來潤生（指以煩惱推動輪迴），這是有妨礙的。既然允許不還果的聖人以種子來潤生，那麼在最初離開下地慾望的時候，他的身見（認為身體是『我』的錯誤觀念）等都必須斷除乾淨，這與第七識不同，因為它不潤生。由此應該作出四句判斷：有的是依靠下地斷除上地的隨眠（指潛在的煩惱），如下地獲得聖果，斷除上地一切種子識中的隨眠；有的是在上地斷除下地的隨眠，如在上地證得無學果（指不再需要學習的阿羅漢果位），斷除下地第七識中的煩惱種子，因為《瑜伽師地論》等經論說要金剛心才能斷除；第三句可以類推得知；第四句是排除以上三種情況。或者說斷除所知障（指對真理的認知障礙），不能說上下自他地斷除，但可以從緣縛（指被外境束縛）和相應縛（指與煩惱相應）的角度來說明地斷。這也就是在下地斷除上地的煩惱，在上地斷除下地的煩惱，對於第五識（眼耳鼻舌身識）、第六識、第七識都不能禁止，因為不違背道理，不是潤生的原因，也不是束縛的法。 又有一種解釋是用后得智（指證悟后獲得的智慧）斷除，菩薩也能做到。十地菩薩斷除所知障中有執著和非執著兩種。非執著的也叫做迷事（指對事物的迷惑），所以也允許斷除，因為它障礙智慧。即使沒有斷除根本的堅固執著，又有什麼妨礙先斷除迷事呢？就像煩惱障（指由煩惱引起的障礙）中與生俱來的煩惱，以我見為首，所以在先斷除的時候未能斷除根本，但先斷除迷事也是可以的。斷除所知障的種類也應該如此。這些分別非常精妙，超越古今，在各位論師那裡實在沒有聽說過。也就是說，二障（指煩惱障和所知障）在第六識和第七識中可以各自組合成四句。 問：有漏的習氣（指煩惱的殘留影響）因為沒有消除相狀，所以不能斷除隨眠。后得智也有相狀，如何斷除隨眠？而且這兩種智慧都有相狀，這兩種智慧有什麼區別？ 答：后得智雖然有相狀，但不是執著所引起的，不是束縛所緣的，也不是曾經獲得的。

【English Translation】 English version: In the 'One Contemplation Path,' the first eight are subsequent wisdom (referring to the wisdom gained after enlightenment). The ninth is fundamental wisdom (referring to the wisdom of directly realizing reality), therefore, the afflictions arising simultaneously with the 'I'-view (the mistaken notion of a 'self') in the sixth consciousness (consciousness) need to be cut off only in the ninth stage of the path (referring to the ninth stage of a Bodhisattva's practice). Although there is no difference in stages, it is not like the seventh consciousness (Manas consciousness), which requires Vajra-like Mind (referring to the most firm wisdom) to cut off. Question: If Vajra-like Mind is needed to cut off, what is the hindrance? Answer: Even if they are learners of the holy path in the realms of form and formlessness (referring to saints who are still learning), arising the un-leaked path (referring to the path of practice without afflictions) can also cut off the seeds of afflictions such as the 'I'-view of the lower realms (referring to the desire realm and the form realm). If this is allowed, then the non-returner saint (referring to the saint who has cut off the afflictions of the desire realm) should use the current afflictions to fuel rebirth (referring to using afflictions to drive reincarnation), which is a hindrance. Since it is allowed for the non-returner saint to use seeds to fuel rebirth, then when initially leaving the desires of the lower realms, his body-view (the mistaken notion that the body is 'self') and so on must be completely cut off, which is different from the seventh consciousness, because it does not fuel rebirth. From this, four statements should be made: Some rely on the lower realms to cut off the latent afflictions of the upper realms, such as obtaining the holy fruit in the lower realms, cutting off the latent afflictions in all seed consciousnesses of the upper realms; some cut off the afflictions of the lower realms in the upper realms, such as attaining the fruit of no-more-learning (referring to the Arhat fruit that no longer needs to learn) in the upper realms, cutting off the seeds of afflictions in the seventh consciousness of the lower realms, because the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' and other scriptures say that Vajra-like Mind is needed to cut off; the third statement can be inferred; the fourth statement is to exclude the above three situations. Or, cutting off the knowledge obscurations (referring to the obstacles to the cognition of truth), it cannot be said that the upper and lower, self and other realms cut off, but the realm-cutting can be explained from the perspective of the bondage of conditions (referring to being bound by external circumstances) and the bondage of correspondence (referring to corresponding to afflictions). That is, cutting off the afflictions of the upper realms in the lower realms, and cutting off the afflictions of the lower realms in the upper realms, cannot be prohibited for the fifth consciousness (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body consciousness), the sixth consciousness, and the seventh consciousness, because it does not violate reason, is not the cause of fueling rebirth, and is not a binding dharma. Another explanation is to use subsequent wisdom (referring to the wisdom gained after enlightenment) to cut off, which Bodhisattvas can also do. The knowledge obscurations cut off by the Bodhisattvas of the ten stages have two types: attachment and non-attachment. Non-attachment is also called delusion of things (referring to the delusion of things), so it is also allowed to cut off, because it obstructs wisdom. Even if the fundamental firm attachment has not been cut off, what is the hindrance to cutting off the delusion of things first? Just like the afflictions born together in the affliction obscurations (referring to the obstacles caused by afflictions), with the 'I'-view as the head, so when cutting off first, the root cannot be cut off, but it is also possible to cut off the delusion of things first. The types of cutting off knowledge obscurations should also be like this. These distinctions are very subtle, surpassing ancient and modern times, and have not been heard of in the various masters. That is to say, the two obscurations (referring to affliction obscurations and knowledge obscurations) can each be combined into four statements in the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. Question: The habits of leakage (referring to the residual effects of afflictions) cannot cut off latent afflictions because the appearance has not been eliminated. Subsequent wisdom also has appearance, how can it cut off latent afflictions? And these two wisdoms have appearance, what is the difference between these two wisdoms? Answer: Although subsequent wisdom has appearance, it is not caused by attachment, it is not the object of bondage, and it is not something that has been obtained.

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。取境相時分明親證。有漏不爾。故不能斷。如五通等異生．聖者所證有異。凈與不凈明與不明各有別故。由如是等種種理故。亦即是彼二智差別。

論。二所轉依至故此不說。

述曰。前說依他總名轉依。今取持種故唯第八。

論。二迷悟依至故此不說。

述曰。依他起性雖亦此依。非根本故此中不說。然無性等二攝論等。但以阿賴耶為轉依。對法第十一。轉依有三。一心轉即真如。二道轉即前能轉道。三粗重即阿賴耶故。此轉依略有二種。體寬攝論。彼無真如故。狹于對法無彼道故。然道是此能轉道中攝故。亦不狹于彼。余文可知　持種依中體。唯在二乘．及大乘有學位唯有漏。若並佛說即通無漏。此唯約現行。種子識不能持種故。又是所棄捨中攝故。

論。三所轉舍至妄執我法。

述曰。謂二障種者。此出體。舍在何時。真無間道現在前位。言真者有二義。一簡有漏。不能斷種故。二簡后得相見道等　障治相違。如明與闇　說之為舍者。此即染中名舍依他起性。由依他種斷故。不復能生現行之心妄執我法現行。由此斷故說現行及種依他為斷。依他既斷已。

論。所執我法至遍計所執。

述曰。實我實法自性本無。但對妄情妄似於有。今妄情斷無境對心。假說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

當取境相時，能分明地親自體證。有漏的智慧則不能這樣，所以不能斷除煩惱。例如，五神通等，異生（指凡夫）和聖者所證得的境界有所不同，清凈與不清凈、明瞭與不明瞭各有區別。由於這些種種原因，這也是兩種智慧的差別所在。 論：二、所轉依至故此不說。 述記：前面說依他起性總名為轉依，現在取能持種子這一點，所以只說是第八識（阿賴耶識）。 論：二、迷悟依至故此不說。 述記：依他起性雖然也是迷悟所依，但不是根本的所依，所以這裡不說。然而，無性菩薩等的《攝大乘論》等，只以阿賴耶識為轉依。《對法論》第十一卷說，轉依有三種：一是心轉，即真如；二是道轉，即前面的能轉之道；三是粗重轉，即阿賴耶識。此處的轉依略有二種。從本體寬廣的角度來說，是《攝大乘論》的觀點，因為其中沒有真如。從狹窄的角度來說，是對法論的觀點，因為其中沒有道。然而，道是此處能轉之道所攝，所以也不比對法論狹窄。其餘文句可以自己理解。持種的本體，只在二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）以及大乘的有學位中是有漏的。如果加上佛，就通於無漏。這裡只說現行，因為種子識不能持種，而且是所要棄捨的。 論：三、所轉舍至妄執我法。 述記：所說的二障種子，這是指出其本體。捨棄在什麼時候呢？在真無間道現在前的時候。說『真』有二個含義：一是簡別有漏，因為有漏不能斷除種子；二是簡別后得智、相見道等。障礙和對治是相互違背的，就像光明與黑暗一樣。說之為『舍』，這是在染污中名為捨棄依他起性。由於依他起性的種子斷了，不再能生起現行的心，妄執我法現行。由於斷除了這些，所以說現行和種子依他起性被斷除。依他起性既然斷了， 論：所執我法至遍計所執。 述記：真實的我、真實的法，自性本來就沒有，只是對於虛妄的情識，虛妄地好像存在。現在虛妄的情識斷了，沒有境界可以對應於心，只能假說。

【English Translation】 English version:

When taking hold of objective appearances, one can clearly and personally verify them. Leaky (afflicted) wisdom cannot do this, therefore it cannot sever afflictions. For example, the five supernormal powers (five abhijñās), the realms attained by ordinary beings (prthagjana) and sages (ārya) are different; purity and impurity, clarity and obscurity, each have their distinctions. Due to these various reasons, this is also the difference between the two wisdoms. Treatise: Secondly, the basis of transformation (āśraya-parivrtti) is not discussed here. Commentary: Earlier, it was said that dependent origination (paratantra-svabhāva) is generally called the basis of transformation. Now, taking the aspect of holding seeds, only the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) is mentioned. Treatise: Secondly, the basis of delusion and enlightenment is not discussed here. Commentary: Although dependent origination is also the basis of delusion and enlightenment, it is not the fundamental basis, so it is not discussed here. However, Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha and other treatises only consider ālaya-vijñāna as the basis of transformation. The eleventh chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya states that there are three types of transformation: first, the transformation of mind, which is Suchness (tathatā); second, the transformation of the path, which is the aforementioned path of transformation; and third, the transformation of coarse burdens, which is ālaya-vijñāna. The basis of transformation here is briefly of two types. From the perspective of the breadth of the entity, it is the view of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, because it does not include Suchness. From a narrow perspective, it is the view of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, because it does not include the path. However, the path is included in the path of transformation mentioned here, so it is not narrower than the Abhidharmasamuccaya. The remaining text can be understood on your own. The entity that holds seeds is only leaky (afflicted) in the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) and in the stages of learning (śaikṣa) in the Mahāyāna. If we include the Buddha, it encompasses the unconditioned (anāsrava). This only refers to the manifest (present) activity, because the seed consciousness cannot hold seeds, and it is also included in what is to be abandoned. Treatise: Thirdly, what is transformed and abandoned is the false clinging to self and phenomena. Commentary: The so-called seeds of the two obstructions (twofold hindrances), this points out their entity. When is the abandonment? It is when the true immediate path (anantarya-marga) is present. Saying 'true' has two meanings: first, to distinguish it from the leaky (afflicted), because the leaky cannot sever the seeds; second, to distinguish it from subsequent acquired wisdom (prsthalabdha-jnana), the vision of the path (darśana-marga), etc. Obstacles and antidotes are mutually opposed, like light and darkness. Saying it is 'abandoned' means that in defilement, it is called abandoning dependent origination. Because the seeds of dependent origination are severed, they can no longer give rise to the manifest mind, falsely clinging to the manifest activity of self and phenomena. Because these are severed, it is said that the manifest activity and the seeds of dependent origination are severed. Since dependent origination is severed, Treatise: The self and phenomena that are clung to are merely conceptually imputed (parikalpita-svabhāva). Commentary: A real self and real phenomena do not inherently exist. They only appear to exist falsely to deluded consciousness. Now that deluded consciousness is severed, there is no object to correspond to the mind, so we can only speak of it figuratively.

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此境亦名為斷。由此道理名舍所執。諸有處言斷遍計所執者。義在於此。然三性中皆有舍義。一遍計所執。如此所言不對情名舍。二有漏依他。此有二種。一障法。如此中言障．治相違名舍。二非障法。下所棄捨中攝。三圓成實。此有二種。一劣法亦所棄捨中攝。二勝法唯此不捨。故總言三性皆有舍義。

論。二所棄捨至皆永棄捨。

述曰。謂余有漏者。即二障余。謂有漏善。三無記法全．異熟生少分。除法執一分故　劣無漏種。即十地中所生現行。及此種類中下品種。由金剛道轉　極圓者。異前菩薩所依未圓滿故　極明者。行相分明。異前菩薩智。彼不明故　或極圓。簡一切有學。極明。簡二乘無學　純凈本識者。凈者無漏。純者無雜。非如因位七識等善凈而不純。本識純而不凈。今此第八無漏相續故名純凈。此現行識非余有漏劣無漏種依。故皆永棄捨。

論。彼種舍已至生死劣法。

述曰。此種舍已現行彼法亦永不生。由此道理名捨生死法及劣法。此乃總言。不簡何念能捨。此同對法十四說得勝無漏亦舍劣法。如得果時即舍于向。如前已說。

既言余有漏法及劣無漏金剛心舍。為此前舍。為此俱舍。

論。有義所餘至俱時舍故。

述曰。第一師前舍。與二障種俱時舍

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這種境界也叫做『斷』（Duàn，斷除）。由於這個道理，稱為『舍所執』（shě suǒ zhí，捨棄所執著的）。有些地方說『斷遍計所執』（duàn biàn jì suǒ zhí，斷除遍計所執），意思就在於此。然而，在三種自性（sān xìng，三種自性）中，都有『舍』（shě，捨棄）的含義：第一，遍計所執（biàn jì suǒ zhí，遍計所執），就像這裡所說的，不符合實情的稱為『舍』。第二，有漏依他（yǒu lòu yī tā，有漏依他），這有兩種情況：一是障礙正法的，就像這裡所說的，障礙和對治相互違背稱為『舍』；二是非障礙正法的，包含在下面所說的『棄捨』之中。第三，圓成實（yuán chéng shí，圓成實），這也有兩種情況：一是低劣的法，也包含在所『棄捨』之中；二是殊勝的法，只有這個不捨棄。所以總的來說，三種自性都有『舍』的含義。

論：第二，所棄捨，直到全部永遠棄捨。

述記說：所說的其餘有漏法，就是指兩種障礙之外剩餘的，指有漏的善法，以及全部的無記法和少分的異熟生法。因為除去了法執的一部分。低劣的無漏種子，就是指十地（shí dì，十地）中所產生的現行，以及這類種子中低劣的品種，被金剛道（jīn gāng dào，金剛道）所轉變。『極圓』，是相對於之前菩薩所依的未圓滿而言。『極明』，是指行相分明，不同於之前菩薩的智慧，因為菩薩的智慧不夠分明。或者說，『極圓』是爲了簡別一切有學，『極明』是爲了簡別二乘無學。『純凈本識』，『凈』是指無漏，『純』是指沒有雜染，不像因位的七識等，雖然善凈但不純粹，本識雖然純粹但不清凈。現在這個第八識是無漏相續的，所以稱為純凈。這個現行識不是其餘有漏和低劣無漏種子的所依，所以全部永遠棄捨。

論：這些種子捨棄之後，直到生死低劣的法。

述記說：這些種子捨棄之後，現行的這些法也永遠不會產生。由於這個道理，稱為捨棄生死法和低劣的法。這只是總的來說，沒有簡別哪一念能夠捨棄。這和《對法》第十四中說，得到殊勝的無漏法也能捨棄低劣的法一樣，比如得到果位時就捨棄了向位，就像前面已經說過的。

既然說其餘有漏法和低劣的無漏法被金剛心捨棄，那麼是此前捨棄，還是此時俱舍？

論：有義是其餘的，直到同時捨棄的。

述記說：第一位老師認為是此前捨棄，與兩種障礙的種子同時捨棄。

【English Translation】 English version: This state is also called 'Cessation' (Duàn). Due to this principle, it is called 'Abandoning Attachments' (shě suǒ zhí). Some places say 'Cessation of the Conceptual Constructions' (duàn biàn jì suǒ zhí), and the meaning lies in this. However, in the three natures (sān xìng), there is the meaning of 'Abandonment' (shě): First, the Conceptual Constructions (biàn jì suǒ zhí), as it is said here, that which does not conform to reality is called 'Abandonment'. Second, Dependent Origination with Afflictions (yǒu lòu yī tā), which has two situations: one is that which obstructs the Dharma, as it is said here, that which obstructs and that which cures are mutually contradictory and are called 'Abandonment'; the other is that which does not obstruct the Dharma, which is included in the 'Rejection' mentioned below. Third, Perfected Nature (yuán chéng shí), which also has two situations: one is the inferior Dharma, which is also included in 'Rejection'; the other is the superior Dharma, which is the only one not abandoned. Therefore, in general, the three natures all have the meaning of 'Abandonment'.

Treatise: Secondly, what is rejected, until all is eternally rejected.

Commentary says: What is said about the remaining afflicted dharmas refers to the remainder besides the two obstructions, referring to afflicted virtuous dharmas, as well as all of the unspecified dharmas and a small portion of the resultant dharmas, because a portion of the attachment to dharmas has been removed. The inferior non-afflicted seeds refer to the present actions produced in the ten grounds (shí dì), as well as the inferior types within these seeds, which are transformed by the Vajra Path (jīn gāng dào). 'Extremely Complete' refers to the incompleteness of the previous basis relied upon by the Bodhisattva. 'Extremely Clear' refers to the distinctness of the characteristics, which is different from the previous wisdom of the Bodhisattva, because the Bodhisattva's wisdom was not clear enough. Or, 'Extremely Complete' is to distinguish it from all those still learning, and 'Extremely Clear' is to distinguish it from the Arhats of the Two Vehicles. 'Pure Consciousness-Basis' means that 'Pure' is non-afflicted, and 'Unmixed' means without impurities, unlike the seven consciousnesses in the causal stage, which are virtuous and pure but not unmixed, and the Consciousness-Basis, which is pure but not non-afflicted. Now, this eighth consciousness is a non-afflicted continuum, so it is called pure. This present action consciousness is not the basis relied upon by the remaining afflicted and inferior non-afflicted seeds, so all are eternally rejected.

Treatise: After these seeds are abandoned, until the inferior dharmas of birth and death.

Commentary says: After these seeds are abandoned, these present action dharmas will also never arise. Due to this principle, it is called abandoning the dharmas of birth and death and inferior dharmas. This is just a general statement, without distinguishing which thought can abandon. This is the same as what is said in the fourteenth chapter of the Abhidharma, that obtaining superior non-afflicted dharmas can also abandon inferior dharmas, such as abandoning the path when obtaining the fruit, as has been said before.

Since it is said that the remaining afflicted dharmas and inferior non-afflicted dharmas are abandoned by the Vajra Mind, is it abandoned before, or abandoned simultaneously?

Treatise: Some say that the remaining, until simultaneously abandoned.

Commentary says: The first teacher believes that it is abandoned before, and simultaneously abandoned with the seeds of the two obstructions.

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故。由有二種有餘有漏及劣無漏。種既亡已。余有漏法．及劣無漏如何得在。又種生現。既俱時生。種隨障已亡。現如何猶有。又三惡趣果與惑業俱亡。何故余有漏法不隨惑俱舍。有漏既前舍。及劣無漏亦應然。由此理故。金剛道生有漏等滅。如明與闇不俱時生。此師意說。金剛心中已得鏡智。仍未名佛。未起解脫道證於滅故。諸無漏初起鄰近有漏未名為佛。如見道舍惡趣因果同時。此師之意。即說粗重無間道生舍。解脫道生但為證滅。

論。有義爾時至應無用故。

述曰。第二師說。金剛心生猶未舍彼。猶余有漏與無間道不相違故。粗重違轉依。豈違無間道。又金剛心即劣無漏。如何此位劣無漏已無。又若此位彼已舍者。菩薩應無諸生死法。生死法者謂有漏法。誰言菩薩生死法無。生死法無何名菩薩。又無有漏應無所熏識。非善無漏可所熏故。若此位菩薩已無所熏識。即住無間道應名為佛。若此位已名佛。解脫道生應無有用。解脫道生證極殊勝轉依圓滿。無所熏識故。無生死法。無劣無漏。能斷粗重。與無間道別。如前已論。故無間道非佛。解脫道名佛。汝今既金剛心已有是事。用解脫道何為。次解前師之理云。若由二障種有餘有漏等。所以二乘．菩薩非無漏圓。以所知障種有故等者。今難云。應由無

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：既然有兩種『有』，即『有餘有漏』（sa-upādisesa-kleśa，仍有煩惱殘餘的有漏之法）和『劣無漏』（hīna-anāsrava，低劣的無漏之法）。當『種』（bīja，種子）滅亡后，剩餘的『有漏法』和『劣無漏』怎麼可能還存在？而且，『種』和『現』（pratyakṣa，現行）是同時產生的，如果『種』隨著障礙（āvaraṇa）的消失而滅亡，那麼『現』怎麼可能還存在？此外，三惡趣（tri-apāya，地獄、餓鬼、畜生）的果報與煩惱和業力同時消失，為什麼其餘的『有漏法』不隨著煩惱一起捨棄？如果『有漏』在前捨棄，那麼『劣無漏』也應該如此。基於這個道理，『金剛道』（vajropama-samādhi，金剛喻定）生起時，『有漏』等法滅亡，就像光明與黑暗不能同時存在一樣。這位論師的意思是說，在『金剛心』（vajra-citta，金剛心）中已經獲得了『鏡智』（ādarśa-jñāna，如鏡子般反映一切的智慧），但仍然不能稱為佛，因為還沒有生起『解脫道』（vimukti-mārga，解脫之道），證得滅盡。當諸『無漏』（anāsrava，無漏之法）初起，鄰近『有漏』（sāsrava，有漏之法）時，也不能稱為佛，就像見道（darśana-mārga，見道位）捨棄惡趣的因果是同時發生的一樣。這位論師的意思是說，生起『粗重無間道』（audārika-nirantara-mārga，能斷除粗重煩惱的無間道）時就捨棄了，而生起『解脫道』只是爲了證得滅盡。

論：有義爾時至應無用故。

述曰：第二位論師說，生起『金剛心』時，仍然沒有捨棄那些（有漏法），因為剩餘的『有漏』與『無間道』（anantara-mārga，無間道）並不相違背。『粗重』（audārika，粗重的煩惱）違背『轉依』（āśraya-parivṛtti，轉依），難道會違背『無間道』嗎？而且，『金剛心』就是『劣無漏』，怎麼可能在這個階段『劣無漏』已經不存在了？此外，如果在這個階段已經捨棄了那些（有漏法），那麼菩薩（bodhisattva）就不應該有諸生死法（saṃsāra-dharma，輪迴之法）。所謂的『生死法』就是『有漏法』。誰說菩薩沒有生死法？如果沒有生死法，還叫什麼菩薩？而且，如果沒有『有漏』，就不應該有被熏習的識（vijñāna，心識）。因為非善的『無漏』不能被熏習。如果在這個階段菩薩已經沒有被熏習的識，那麼住在『無間道』就應該被稱為佛。如果在這個階段已經被稱為佛，那麼生起『解脫道』就應該沒有用處了。生起『解脫道』是爲了證得極其殊勝的『轉依圓滿』（āśraya-parivṛtti-pariṇāma，轉依的圓滿）。因為沒有被熏習的識，所以沒有生死法，沒有『劣無漏』，能夠斷除『粗重』，與『無間道』不同，正如前面已經論述過的。所以『無間道』不是佛，『解脫道』才被稱為佛。你現在既然在『金剛心』中已經有了這些事，還要『解脫道』做什麼呢？接下來解釋前一位論師的道理說，如果因為兩種障礙（dvi-āvaraṇa，二障）的『種』，所以有剩餘的『有漏』等法，因此二乘（śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha-yāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）和菩薩不是『無漏圓滿』（anāsrava-pariṇāma，無漏的圓滿），因為有所知障（jñeyāvaraṇa，所知障）的『種』存在等等。現在反駁說，應該因為沒有……

【English Translation】 English version Question: Since there are two types of 'existence' (bhava): 'existence with remainder of affliction' (sa-upādisesa-kleśa), which refers to the contaminated dharmas with remaining afflictions, and 'inferior uncontaminated' (hīna-anāsrava), which refers to the inferior uncontaminated dharmas. Once the 'seed' (bīja) is extinguished, how can the remaining 'contaminated dharmas' and 'inferior uncontaminated' still exist? Moreover, since 'seed' and 'manifestation' (pratyakṣa) arise simultaneously, if the 'seed' is extinguished along with the disappearance of the obstacle (āvaraṇa), how can the 'manifestation' still exist? Furthermore, the retribution of the three evil destinies (tri-apāya: hell, hungry ghost, and animal) disappears simultaneously with afflictions and karma. Why don't the remaining 'contaminated dharmas' also abandon along with the afflictions? If the 'contaminated' is abandoned first, then the 'inferior uncontaminated' should also be abandoned in the same way. Based on this reasoning, when the 'vajra-like samādhi' (vajropama-samādhi) arises, the 'contaminated' and other dharmas are extinguished, just like light and darkness cannot exist simultaneously. This teacher's intention is that in the 'vajra mind' (vajra-citta), one has already attained the 'mirror-like wisdom' (ādarśa-jñāna), but still cannot be called a Buddha, because the 'path of liberation' (vimukti-mārga) has not yet arisen, and extinction has not been realized. When the various 'uncontaminated' (anāsrava) first arise, being close to the 'contaminated' (sāsrava), one cannot be called a Buddha, just as the abandonment of the cause and effect of the evil destinies in the path of seeing (darśana-mārga) occurs simultaneously. This teacher's intention is that abandonment occurs when the 'coarse and heavy uninterrupted path' (audārika-nirantara-mārga) arises, while the arising of the 'path of liberation' is only for realizing extinction.

Treatise: 'At that time...' to '...should be useless.'

Commentary: The second teacher says that when the 'vajra mind' arises, those (contaminated dharmas) are still not abandoned, because the remaining 'contaminated' is not contradictory to the 'uninterrupted path' (anantara-mārga). Does the 'coarse and heavy' (audārika) contradict the 'transformation of the basis' (āśraya-parivṛtti), or does it contradict the 'uninterrupted path'? Moreover, the 'vajra mind' is the 'inferior uncontaminated', how can it be that at this stage the 'inferior uncontaminated' no longer exists? Furthermore, if those (contaminated dharmas) have already been abandoned at this stage, then the bodhisattva (bodhisattva) should not have the various dharmas of samsara (saṃsāra-dharma). The so-called 'dharmas of samsara' are the 'contaminated dharmas'. Who says that the bodhisattva has no dharmas of samsara? If there are no dharmas of samsara, what is called a bodhisattva? Moreover, if there is no 'contaminated', there should be no consciousness (vijñāna) that is being perfumed. Because the non-wholesome 'uncontaminated' cannot be perfumed. If at this stage the bodhisattva no longer has consciousness that is being perfumed, then residing in the 'uninterrupted path' should be called a Buddha. If one is already called a Buddha at this stage, then the arising of the 'path of liberation' should be useless. The arising of the 'path of liberation' is to realize the extremely supreme 'perfection of the transformation of the basis' (āśraya-parivṛtti-pariṇāma). Because there is no consciousness that is being perfumed, there are no dharmas of samsara, there is no 'inferior uncontaminated', which can cut off the 'coarse and heavy', which is different from the 'uninterrupted path', as has been discussed before. Therefore, the 'uninterrupted path' is not a Buddha, the 'path of liberation' is called a Buddha. Now that you already have these things in the 'vajra mind', what do you need the 'path of liberation' for? Next, explain the reasoning of the previous teacher, saying that if because of the 'seeds' of the two obstacles (dvi-āvaraṇa), there are remaining 'contaminated' and other dharmas, therefore the two vehicles (śrāvaka-pratyekabuddha-yāna) and the bodhisattva are not 'perfectly uncontaminated' (anāsrava-pariṇāma), because the 'seed' of the 'obstacle of knowable objects' (jñeyāvaraṇa) exists, and so on. Now refuting, saying that it should be because there is no...

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漏未滿足有漏猶在故不名佛。此無間道位已無有漏。無漏圓生何不名佛。又種生現必俱時生。如何種亡其現猶有。誰言此位余有漏等其種已亡。我若種．現異時。可如所難。我亦種．現同時。但不違無間道故。所以不與無間俱時舍。故汝所難非預我意。由種．現異時前已破故。此中不說。此師意亦種．現同時。若亦說者應成三說。今此許熏。明種生現同時。金剛心中猶有熏故。又三惡趣果與業惑俱亡。如何此位斷有前後者。前十一障中已言粗重違解脫道即惡趣果與惑滅異時。何得今時率情為難。

論。由此應知至非彼依故。

述曰。余有漏等解脫道起方棄捨之。以解脫道位第八凈識非劣無漏．余有漏依故。前師欲釋后難。思準可知。然此二師俱不違理。所斷舍中煩惱一分。所棄捨中劣無漏一分。通二乘有。余唯大乘。又由前能轉道中能斷道證所轉依中迷悟依。方有所斷舍．所棄捨少分。除劣無漏。劣無漏但由得勝舍劣。

論。四所轉得至清凈法界。

述曰。下別解中。二果別故即分為二。涅槃中有二。初總出體。次別解釋四種涅槃。初總出體即此文是。此簡菩提名所顯得。文意可解。言真聖道者。謂聖所起道名聖道。妙觀察智為能斷道。解脫道位正證涅槃。有加行心為希求故。若非斷道印證

名得。通三智品除成所作。若言證真理之聖道。于中唯正體智非后得。此依大位。若通三乘隨其所應。由此涅槃在纏未顯。離障方顯。故體一如。約顯成別。

第二別解四種涅槃。于中有二。初總舉數。次廣解。

論。涅槃義別略有四種。

述曰。此舉數也。

論。一本來自性至故名涅槃。

述曰。下廣解也。于中有三。初出四體。次三乘辨。后總結簡。此即出體。初涅槃中文意可解　謂一切法相真如理者。此出體也。即七真如中實相真如理。彼云二空所顯約詮所辨。涅槃依得顯故以相即。如前第八卷解。此如佛地第三卷清凈法界解　雖有客染等者。釋本來自性。有十種義　具功德者。以能順生諸功德故。功德性故名為具德。凝寂湛然故無生滅。眾生真性故平等有。法性與法理非一異。如前第八已解釋訖　離一切相者。離所取相　離一切分別者。離能取相　尋思路絕。顯唯內證非粗心境名言道斷者顯真自相非假名言所安足處。非言依故異有為法　唯真聖者自內所證者。顯能證者必唯勝人　其性本寂者。釋涅槃名。以圓寂義是涅槃故。下三中出體義釋名等準此解。

論。二有餘依至故名涅槃。

述曰。顯其因盡苦依未盡。異熟猶在名有餘依。依者身也。就實出體故是真如出

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 名得（Nama-datta）。通三智品（Tong San Zhi Pin）中，除了成所作智（cheng suo zuo zhi）以外。如果說證悟真理的聖道，其中只有正體智（zheng ti zhi）而非后得智（hou de zhi）。這是依據大菩薩的果位而言。如果通於三乘（san cheng），則隨其所應。由此可知，涅槃（Nirvana）在眾生煩惱纏縛時未顯現，離開障礙才能顯現。所以本體是同一如常的，從顯現的角度來說則有差別。

第二，分別解釋四種涅槃（si zhong Nirvana）。其中分為兩部分：首先總括地列舉數目，然後廣泛地解釋。

論：涅槃的意義差別，略有四種。

述曰：這是列舉數目。

論：一、本來自性清凈涅槃（ben lai zi xing qing jing Nirvana），直至故名涅槃。

述曰：下面廣泛地解釋。其中分為三部分：首先說明四種涅槃的本體，其次辨析三乘的涅槃，最後總結並簡要說明。這裡是說明本體。首先，涅槃中的文字意義可以理解——指的是一切法相的真如理（zhen ru li）。這是說明本體。即七種真如（qi zhong zhen ru）中的實相真如理（shi xiang zhen ru li）。那裡說二空（er kong）所顯現，是依據詮釋所辨明的。涅槃是依據證得而顯現的，所以用『相』來表示。如前面第八卷所解釋的。這如同《佛地經論》（Fo Di Jing Lun）第三卷中清凈法界（qing jing fa jie）的解釋——雖然有客塵染污等。這是解釋本來自性清凈。有十種意義。『具功德者』，因為能夠順應產生各種功德，具有功德的性質，所以稱為『具德』。凝定寂靜，湛然不動，所以沒有生滅。因為是眾生的真性，所以平等存在。法性與法理並非完全相同也並非完全相異，如前面第八卷已經解釋完畢。『離一切相者』，是遠離所取之相。『離一切分別者』，是遠離能取之相。尋思路絕，顯示唯有內在證悟，不是粗淺心識的境界。名言道斷，顯示真實的自性，不是虛假名言所能安立的地方。因為不是言語所能依賴的，所以不同於有為法（you wei fa）。『唯真聖者自內所證者』，顯示能證悟者必定是殊勝之人。『其性本寂者』，解釋涅槃的名稱。因為圓滿寂靜是涅槃的含義。下面三種涅槃中，說明本體、意義、解釋名稱等，可以參照這個來理解。

論：二、有餘依涅槃（you yu yi Nirvana），直至故名涅槃。

述曰：顯示其煩惱之因已盡，但苦果所依之身尚未消盡。異熟果報仍然存在，所以名為有餘依。『依』指的是身體。就真實而言，說明本體是真如（zhen ru）。

【English Translation】 English version Nama-datta. In the chapter on the Three Wisdoms (Tong San Zhi Pin), except for Accomplishment Wisdom (cheng suo zuo zhi). If we speak of the holy path of realizing the truth, within it, only the Wisdom of True Entity (zheng ti zhi) is present, not the Acquired Wisdom (hou de zhi). This is based on the position of a great Bodhisattva. If it applies to the Three Vehicles (san cheng), then it is according to what is appropriate. From this, it can be known that Nirvana is not manifest when beings are bound by afflictions; it only manifests when free from obstacles. Therefore, the essence is one and unchanging, but from the perspective of manifestation, there are differences.

Second, to separately explain the four types of Nirvana (si zhong Nirvana). This is divided into two parts: first, a general enumeration, and then a broad explanation.

Treatise: The differences in the meaning of Nirvana are roughly four types.

Commentary: This is an enumeration.

Treatise: First, Original Self-Nature Purity Nirvana (ben lai zi xing qing jing Nirvana), hence the name Nirvana.

Commentary: Below is a broad explanation. It is divided into three parts: first, explaining the essence of the four types of Nirvana; second, distinguishing the Nirvana of the Three Vehicles; and third, summarizing and briefly explaining. Here, the essence is being explained. First, the meaning of the words in Nirvana can be understood—referring to the True Suchness Principle (zhen ru li) of all phenomena. This is explaining the essence. That is, the Reality True Suchness Principle (shi xiang zhen ru li) among the Seven True Suchnesses (qi zhong zhen ru). It is said there that what is revealed by the Two Emptinesses (er kong) is based on what is clarified by interpretation. Nirvana is manifested based on attainment, so 'form' is used to represent it. As explained in the previous eighth volume. This is like the explanation of Pure Dharma Realm (qing jing fa jie) in the third volume of the Treatise on the Buddha-Land (Fo Di Jing Lun)—although there are defilements of adventitious dust, etc. This is explaining the Original Self-Nature Purity. There are ten meanings. 'Possessing Merits' (ju gong de zhe), because it can accord with the generation of various merits, and has the nature of merit, it is called 'Possessing Merits'. Being still and tranquil, clear and unmoving, it has no arising or ceasing. Because it is the true nature of beings, it exists equally. Dharma-nature and Dharma-principle are neither completely the same nor completely different, as explained in the previous eighth volume. 'Separated from all forms' (li yi qie xiang zhe), is being separated from the form of what is taken. 'Separated from all discriminations' (li yi qie fen bie zhe), is being separated from the form of what is able to take. The path of seeking and thinking is cut off, showing that it is only internal realization, not the realm of coarse consciousness. The path of names and words is cut off, showing the true self-nature, not a place where false names and words can be established. Because it is not what words can rely on, it is different from conditioned dharmas (you wei fa). 'Only the true sage personally realizes it internally' (wei zhen sheng zhe zi nei suo zheng zhe), showing that the one who can realize it must be a superior person. 'Its nature is originally still' (qi xing ben ji zhe), explaining the name of Nirvana. Because perfect stillness is the meaning of Nirvana. In the following three types of Nirvana, the explanation of the essence, meaning, and explanation of the name, etc., can be understood by referring to this.

Treatise: Second, Nirvana with Remainder of Basis (you yu yi Nirvana), hence the name Nirvana.

Commentary: Showing that the cause of afflictions is exhausted, but the body on which the suffering results depend has not yet disappeared. The results of differentiated maturation still exist, so it is called Nirvana with Remainder of Basis. 'Basis' refers to the body. In terms of reality, explaining the essence is True Suchness (zhen ru).

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煩惱障。此中有餘約二乘說。以言唯有微苦依故。依謂依身。以其所離顯此涅槃。以大乘中難見相貌。從易處言。

論。三無餘依至故名涅槃。

述曰。有漏苦果所依永盡。由煩惱盡果亦不生名得涅槃。亦就實出體。通三乘釋。

論。四無住處涅槃至故名涅槃。

述曰。所知障者。顯唯菩薩得非二乘。二乘不能出所知障故　大悲般若常所輔翼者。顯緣此涅槃生．智．悲故。或由智．悲緣證如故。于生死．涅槃二俱不住。緣此雖起悲．智二用。體性恒寂故名涅槃。

此即第一齣涅槃體。自下第二三乘分別涅槃具不具。于中有二。初三乘具不具。二問答分別。

論。一切有情至可言具四。

述曰。一切有情若凡．若聖皆有初一。由此經說一切有情本來涅槃。凡夫二乘有學未證后三涅槃。二乘無學不定性未入地者有初二。定性者有初三。直往入地菩薩。有初．及第四。無學回心入地菩薩。有初二．及第四。如來具四種。有此六位差別故。若斷縛得。及得位次。同時異時。各應廣說。餘者如文可解。即三乘具不具也。

自下第二問答分別。于中有三。一問答佛有餘依。二問答二乘有無餘依。三問答斷所知障得涅槃等。

論。如何善逝有有餘依。

述曰。善逝者

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『煩惱障』（Klesha-avarana，煩惱的障礙）。這裡說的『有餘』是針對二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）而言的，因為他們認為只有微小的痛苦還存在，而這些痛苦所依賴的是身體。通過他們所斷離的，可以顯現出這種涅槃（Nirvana，寂滅）。因為在大乘（Mahayana）中，這種涅槃的相貌難以見到，所以從容易理解的角度來說。

論：『三、無餘依』（Nirupadhisesa-nirvana，無剩餘依涅槃）乃至『故名涅槃』。

述曰：有漏（帶業）的苦果所依賴的徹底滅盡，由於煩惱滅盡，苦果也不再產生，這叫做獲得涅槃。這也是從真實的本體出發，通用於三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘）的解釋。

論：『四、無住處涅槃』（Apratisthita-nirvana，無住涅槃）乃至『故名涅槃』。

述曰：『所知障』（Jnana-avarana，智慧的障礙）的說法，表明只有菩薩（Bodhisattva）才能獲得，而不是二乘。因為二乘不能斷除所知障。『大悲』（Maha-karuna，偉大的慈悲）和『般若』（Prajna，智慧）常常輔助和護佑著菩薩，這表明緣于這種涅槃，菩薩會生起智慧和慈悲。或者由於智慧和慈悲緣于證悟真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）。對於生死（Samsara，輪迴）和涅槃，菩薩都不會執著。緣于這種涅槃，雖然會生起慈悲和智慧這兩種作用，但其體性始終是寂靜的，所以叫做涅槃。

以上是第一部分，闡述涅槃的本體。下面第二部分，分別說明三乘是否都具備涅槃的各個方面。其中分為兩點：一是三乘是否具備，二是問答分別。

論：『一切有情』乃至『可言具四』。

述曰：一切有情，無論是凡夫還是聖者，都具有第一種涅槃（自性涅槃）。因此經中說一切有情本來就具有涅槃的本性。凡夫和二乘中的有學者（還在修學的修行者）尚未證得后三種涅槃。二乘中的無學者（已經證得阿羅漢果的修行者）和不定性者（根基不確定者，可能修學大乘）尚未入地（菩薩的果位）的，具有前兩種涅槃。定性者（根基確定者，只修學小乘）具有前三種涅槃。直接趣入菩薩果位的菩薩，具有第一種和第四種涅槃。無學回心（從二乘轉向大乘）入地的菩薩，具有第一種、第二種和第四種涅槃。如來（Tathagata，佛）具足四種涅槃。由於有這六種位次的差別，所以斷除煩惱的束縛而獲得涅槃，以及獲得位次的早晚，都應該詳細說明。其餘的內容如原文所示，可以理解。這就是三乘是否具備涅槃的各個方面。

下面第二部分是問答分別。其中分為三點：一是問答佛是否有『有餘依』（Sopadhisesa-nirvana，有剩餘依涅槃），二是問答二乘是否有『無餘依』，三是問答斷除『所知障』而獲得涅槃等。

論：『如何善逝（Sugata，佛的稱號）有有餘依？』

述曰：『善逝』是指佛。

【English Translation】 English version 『Klesha-avarana』 (Obstruction of Afflictions). The 『with remainder』 here is spoken with reference to the Two Vehicles (Shravaka-yana and Pratyekabuddha-yana), because they believe that only slight suffering remains, and what these sufferings rely on is the body. Through what they have severed, this Nirvana (Extinction) can be manifested. Because in the Mahayana (Great Vehicle), the appearance of this Nirvana is difficult to see, it is spoken from an easily understood perspective.

Treatise: 『Three, Nirupadhisesa-nirvana』 (Nirvana with no remainder of clinging) up to 『therefore it is called Nirvana.』

Commentary: The dependence on the leaking (with karma) suffering results is completely exhausted. Because afflictions are exhausted, suffering results are also no longer produced, this is called obtaining Nirvana. This is also explained from the perspective of the real entity, applicable to the Three Vehicles (Shravaka-yana, Pratyekabuddha-yana, and Bodhisattva-yana).

Treatise: 『Four, Apratisthita-nirvana』 (Non-abiding Nirvana) up to 『therefore it is called Nirvana.』

Commentary: The statement of 『Jnana-avarana』 (Obstruction of Knowledge) indicates that only Bodhisattvas (Enlightenment Beings) can obtain it, not the Two Vehicles. Because the Two Vehicles cannot eliminate the Obstruction of Knowledge. 『Maha-karuna』 (Great Compassion) and 『Prajna』 (Wisdom) often assist and protect the Bodhisattvas, which indicates that due to this Nirvana, Bodhisattvas will generate wisdom and compassion. Or because wisdom and compassion are related to the realization of Tathata (Suchness, the true nature of things). Bodhisattvas are not attached to either Samsara (Birth and Death) or Nirvana. Although compassion and wisdom arise from this Nirvana, its essence is always tranquil, so it is called Nirvana.

The above is the first part, explaining the essence of Nirvana. The second part below explains whether the Three Vehicles all possess the various aspects of Nirvana. It is divided into two points: first, whether the Three Vehicles possess them; second, question and answer analysis.

Treatise: 『All sentient beings』 up to 『can be said to possess four.』

Commentary: All sentient beings, whether ordinary people or sages, possess the first type of Nirvana (Self-nature Nirvana). Therefore, the sutra says that all sentient beings inherently possess the nature of Nirvana. Ordinary people and learners (practitioners still in training) in the Two Vehicles have not yet attained the latter three types of Nirvana. Arhats (practitioners who have attained the fruit of Arhatship) in the Two Vehicles and those of uncertain nature (those whose foundations are uncertain and may practice Mahayana) who have not yet entered the Bhumi (Bodhisattva stage) possess the first two types of Nirvana. Those of definite nature (those whose foundations are definite and only practice Hinayana) possess the first three types of Nirvana. Bodhisattvas who directly enter the Bodhisattva stage possess the first and fourth types of Nirvana. Bodhisattvas who turn their minds from the Two Vehicles to the Mahayana and enter the Bhumi possess the first, second, and fourth types of Nirvana. Tathagatas (Buddhas) possess all four types of Nirvana. Because there are these six different stages, the liberation from the bonds of afflictions and the attainment of Nirvana, as well as the timing of attaining the stages, should all be explained in detail. The rest of the content is as shown in the original text and can be understood. This is whether the Three Vehicles possess the various aspects of Nirvana.

The second part below is the question and answer analysis. It is divided into three points: first, question and answer about whether the Buddha has 『Sopadhisesa-nirvana』 (Nirvana with remainder of clinging); second, question and answer about whether the Two Vehicles have 『Nirupadhisesa-nirvana』; third, question and answer about attaining Nirvana by eliminating 『Jnana-avarana,』 etc.

Treatise: 『How can the Sugata (Well-gone, an epithet of the Buddha) have Sopadhisesa-nirvana?』

Commentary: 『Sugata』 refers to the Buddha.

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佛。有餘三者理可知故。為此問者。若佛有有餘依。應苦依未盡。

論。雖無實依而現似有。

述曰。此答。雖無真實苦依未盡之有餘涅槃。而現為苦諦等。似有有餘涅槃。此即相同二乘者解。

論。或苦依盡至可言具四。

述曰。又解與二乘別。約苦依盡故名佛無餘依。有非苦所依身在故名有餘依。以佛世尊具有無漏所依蘊在。是故世尊可言具四。如來亦有有餘可爾。

論。若聲聞等至說彼非有。

述曰。下第二問答二乘有無餘依。此外人問。若二乘有無餘依涅槃。如何有處說彼非有。即勝鬘經說無無餘依故。彼言世尊二乘有餘生法不盡故有生。有餘梵行不成故不純。事不究竟故當有所作等。乃至說言去涅槃界遠。是故彼言無無餘依。

論。有處說彼至彼亦非有。

述曰。此中論主先卻質也。謂勝鬘經說彼二乘都無涅槃。豈有餘依涅槃。彼二乘亦非有。彼經如何言彼都無涅槃。彼云唯有如來成就一切功德故得涅槃。阿羅漢等不成就一切功德故言不得。言得涅槃是佛方便。乃至廣說。彼經說二乘不得涅槃。彼經不簡無何涅槃。既有餘依二乘亦得。明知彼言有別意趣。

論。然聲聞等至不依前三。

述曰。依無性者二解經文。此中論文義意可解。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 佛：（如果）還有剩餘的三種道理可以知道的緣故，因此提問者（會這樣問）：如果佛有有餘依（upadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa，還有煩惱殘餘的涅槃），那麼（佛的）苦依（duḥkha-āśraya，痛苦的依存）應該沒有窮盡。

論：雖然沒有真實的依存，但顯現出好像有的樣子。

述曰：這是回答。（佛）雖然沒有真實苦依沒有窮盡的有餘涅槃，但（佛）顯現為苦諦（duḥkha-satya）等，好像有有餘涅槃。這與小乘的解釋相同。

論：或者（說佛的）苦依窮盡，以至於可以說具備四種功德。

述曰：又一種解釋，與二乘（śrāvaka-yāna和pratyekabuddha-yāna）不同。因為（佛的）苦依窮盡，所以稱為佛的無餘依（anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa，沒有煩惱殘餘的涅槃）。因為有非痛苦所依存的身體存在，所以稱為有餘依。因為佛世尊具有無漏（anāsrava，沒有煩惱）所依存的蘊（skandha，構成存在的要素）存在，所以世尊可以說具備四種功德。如來（tathāgata，佛的稱號）也有有餘依，也可以這樣說。

論：如果聲聞（śrāvaka，聽聞佛法而證悟者）等有無餘依，（為什麼）有（經典）說他們沒有（無餘依）呢？

述曰：下面第二段問答，討論二乘有沒有無餘依。這是外人提問。如果二乘有無餘依涅槃，為什麼有些地方說他們沒有（無餘依涅槃）呢？就是《勝鬘經》（Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-sūtra）說沒有無餘依的緣故。那部經說，世尊，二乘有剩餘的生法沒有窮盡，所以有生（輪迴）。有剩餘的梵行（brahmacarya，清凈的修行）沒有完成，所以不純粹。事情沒有究竟，所以應當有所作為等等。乃至說（二乘）距離涅槃界（nirvāṇa-dhātu）很遠。所以那部經說沒有無餘依。

論：有些地方說他們（二乘）都（沒有涅槃），他們（二乘）也不是有（涅槃）。

述曰：這裡論主首先駁斥對方的質問。說《勝鬘經》說二乘都沒有涅槃，哪裡來的有餘依涅槃？他們二乘也不是有（涅槃）。那部經怎麼說他們都沒有涅槃呢？那部經說只有如來成就一切功德，所以得到涅槃。阿羅漢（arhat，斷盡煩惱的聖者）等沒有成就一切功德，所以說沒有得到（涅槃）。說得到涅槃是佛的方便說法。乃至廣說。《勝鬘經》說二乘沒有得到涅槃。那部經沒有區分沒有哪種涅槃。既然有有餘依，二乘也得到（涅槃）。明明知道那部經的說法有別的意趣。

論：然而聲聞等（的涅槃）不依據前面的三種（涅槃）。

述曰：依據無性（Asaṅga）的觀點，有兩種解釋經文的方法。這段論文的意義可以理解。

【English Translation】 English version Buddha: If there are still three remaining aspects (of existence) that can be understood, hence the questioner (would ask): If the Buddha has upadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa with remainder, i.e., with residual afflictions), then the duḥkha-āśraya (the basis of suffering) should not be exhausted.

Treatise: Although there is no real dependence, it appears as if there is.

Commentary: This is the answer. Although the Buddha does not have a real upadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa where the basis of suffering is not exhausted, the Buddha appears as the duḥkha-satya (the truth of suffering) and so on, as if there is upadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa. This is the same as the explanation of the Śrāvakas.

Treatise: Or (it can be said that) the Buddha's basis of suffering is exhausted, to the extent that it can be said to possess four qualities.

Commentary: Another explanation, different from the two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna). Because the Buddha's basis of suffering is exhausted, it is called the Buddha's anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa without remainder). Because there is a body that is not dependent on suffering, it is called upadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa. Because the Buddha, the World-Honored One, possesses the anāsrava (without outflows, i.e., without afflictions) skandhas (aggregates, the elements constituting existence) on which to rely, the World-Honored One can be said to possess four qualities. The Tathāgata (the title of the Buddha) also has upadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa, and it can also be said in this way.

Treatise: If the Śrāvakas (those who attain enlightenment by hearing the Buddha's teachings) and others have anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa, (why) do some (scriptures) say that they do not (have anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa)?

Commentary: The second question and answer below discusses whether the two vehicles have anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa. This is a question from an outsider. If the two vehicles have anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa, why do some places say that they do not (have anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa)? It is because the Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-sūtra (Lion's Roar of Queen Śrīmālā Sūtra) says that there is no anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa. That sutra says, 'World-Honored One, the two vehicles have remaining dharmas of birth that are not exhausted, so there is birth (saṃsāra). There is remaining brahmacarya (pure conduct) that is not completed, so it is not pure. The matter is not ultimately resolved, so there should be something to be done,' and so on. It even says that (the two vehicles) are far from the nirvāṇa-dhātu (realm of nirvāṇa). Therefore, that sutra says that there is no anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa.

Treatise: Some places say that they (the two vehicles) all (do not have nirvāṇa), and they (the two vehicles) also do not have (nirvāṇa).

Commentary: Here, the author of the treatise first refutes the opponent's question. Saying that the Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-sūtra says that the two vehicles do not have nirvāṇa, where does upadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa come from? They, the two vehicles, also do not have (nirvāṇa). How does that sutra say that they all do not have nirvāṇa? That sutra says that only the Tathāgata achieves all merits, so they attain nirvāṇa. Arhats (those who have exhausted afflictions) and others do not achieve all merits, so it is said that they do not attain (nirvāṇa). Saying that they attain nirvāṇa is the Buddha's expedient teaching. And so on. The Śrīmālādevī-siṃhanāda-sūtra says that the two vehicles do not attain nirvāṇa. That sutra does not distinguish which kind of nirvāṇa is not attained. Since there is upadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa, the two vehicles also attain (nirvāṇa). It is clear that the statement in that sutra has a different intention.

Treatise: However, the nirvāṇa of the Śrāvakas and others does not rely on the previous three (nirvāṇas).

Commentary: According to the view of Asaṅga, there are two ways to interpret the sutra. The meaning of this passage can be understood.

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論。又說彼無至與佛有異。

述曰。下依不定性。第二解申正義。余文易了　謂有二乘者。簡不定姓。身智滅位。爾時雖無二乘身智。而由二乘能證此滅。可說二乘有無餘依。非有身智在時可說二乘名有無餘依。依實真如說三乘無別。依菩提說三乘差別。亦可依無住處說三乘有異。然今且說菩提差別。

論。諸所知障至得無住處。

述曰。下第三問答所知障得涅槃等。此中有三。一問應不得涅槃。二問應得擇滅。三問菩提障。此外人問。諸所知障既不感生。如何斷彼得無住處。無住處者是涅槃。涅槃者體解脫縛。其所知障既不能發業潤生。如何斷彼得無住處。前言斷所知障得涅槃故。第二地犯戒愚是所知障雖亦發業但障所知。不招生故今為此難。若全不發業。即無犯毀三業。非於爾時斷煩惱障故。勿以佛地論第七。說及所發業果是所知障。便謂發業能感於生。

論。彼能隱覆至俱不住故。

述曰。此是正答。其文可解　令不發生大悲般若者。真如為所證緣起后得智。后得智即般若。般若能起大悲故。于生死．涅槃二俱不住。如既不證悲．智不生。

論。若所知障至不得擇滅。

述曰。下第二問應得擇滅。于中初問后答。答中有二。初答非。后答是。初中有五。一答。二

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：又說他們（二乘）沒有窮盡，與佛（的境界）有差異。

述記：下面依據不定性（的觀點）。第二種解釋闡述正義。其餘文字容易理解。所謂有二乘，是簡別不定性的眾生。在身智滅盡的階段，雖然那時沒有二乘的身智，但由於二乘能夠證得這種滅，可以說二乘有無餘依涅槃。並非在有身智的時候可以說二乘名為有無餘依涅槃。依據真實的真如來說，三乘沒有差別。依據菩提來說，三乘有差別。也可以依據無住處涅槃來說三乘有差異。然而現在且說菩提的差別。

論：諸所知障（一切對實相的無明和誤解）乃至得到無住處（涅槃）。

述記：下面第三段問答關於所知障得到涅槃等。這裡面有三個問題。一問：應不應該得到涅槃？二問：應不應該得到擇滅？三問：菩提的障礙。這是外人提出的問題：諸所知障既然不感果報，如何斷除它們而得到無住處涅槃？無住處就是涅槃。涅槃的體性是解脫束縛。所知障既然不能引發業力來潤生，如何斷除它們而得到無住處涅槃？前面說斷除所知障得到涅槃。第二地犯戒的愚癡是所知障，雖然也引發業力，但障礙所知，不招生死果報，現在為此提出疑問。如果完全不引發業力，就沒有犯毀三業。不是在那個時候斷除煩惱障。不要因為《佛地論》第七說及所發業果是所知障，就認為引發業力能夠感生。

論：它們（所知障）能夠隱蔽覆蓋，乃至二者都不住。

述記：這是正面回答。文句可以理解。使（菩薩）不發生大悲般若，真如是所證的緣起，后得智。后得智就是般若。般若能夠生起大悲，所以在生死和涅槃二者都不住。如果既不證得真如，悲智就不生起。

論：如果所知障乃至不能得到擇滅。

述記：下面第二問：應不應該得到擇滅。其中先問后答。回答中有兩種。先回答『非』，后回答『是』。先回答『非』，其中有五點。一答，二……

【English Translation】 English version Treatise: Furthermore, it is said that they (the Two Vehicles) have no ultimate attainment and differ from the Buddha (in their state).

Commentary: The following relies on the indeterminate nature (view). The second explanation elucidates the correct meaning. The remaining text is easily understood. The so-called Two Vehicles are distinguished from beings of indeterminate nature. In the stage of the cessation of body and wisdom, although there is no body and wisdom of the Two Vehicles at that time, because the Two Vehicles can attain this cessation, it can be said that the Two Vehicles have Nirupadhisesa-nirvana (Nirvana with no remainder). It cannot be said that the Two Vehicles are named as having Nirupadhisesa-nirvana when they have body and wisdom. According to the real Suchness, the Three Vehicles have no difference. According to Bodhi, the Three Vehicles have differences. It can also be said that the Three Vehicles have differences according to Non-abiding Nirvana. However, now let's talk about the difference of Bodhi.

Treatise: All the Jnana-avarana (cognitive obscurations) until obtaining Non-abiding Nirvana.

Commentary: The following is the third question and answer regarding Jnana-avarana obtaining Nirvana, etc. There are three questions here. First question: Should one not obtain Nirvana? Second question: Should one obtain Nirodha-satya (cessation)? Third question: Obstacles to Bodhi. This is a question raised by outsiders: Since Jnana-avarana does not cause karmic retribution, how can one obtain Non-abiding Nirvana by eliminating them? Non-abiding Nirvana is Nirvana. The nature of Nirvana is liberation from bondage. Since Jnana-avarana cannot initiate karma to moisten rebirth, how can one obtain Non-abiding Nirvana by eliminating them? It was previously said that one obtains Nirvana by eliminating Jnana-avarana. The ignorance of violating precepts in the second Bhumi (stage of Bodhisattva) is Jnana-avarana, although it also initiates karma, it obstructs knowledge and does not cause rebirth, so this question is raised. If it does not initiate karma at all, there is no violation of the three karmas. It is not at that time that one eliminates Klesha-avarana (afflictive obscurations). Do not think that the seventh chapter of the Buddhabhumi Sutra says that the karma and its results are Jnana-avarana, and then think that initiating karma can cause rebirth.

Treatise: They (Jnana-avarana) can conceal and cover, until neither abides in either.

Commentary: This is the direct answer. The sentences can be understood. Causing (the Bodhisattva) not to generate great compassion and prajna, Suchness is the condition for the enlightened dependent origination, the wisdom attained after enlightenment. The wisdom attained after enlightenment is prajna. Prajna can generate great compassion, so one does not abide in either Samsara or Nirvana. If one does not attain Suchness, compassion and wisdom will not arise.

Treatise: If Jnana-avarana, until one cannot obtain Nirodha-satya.

Commentary: The following is the second question: Should one obtain Nirodha-satya? It first asks and then answers. There are two kinds of answers. First answer 'no', and then answer 'yes'. The first answer 'no' has five points. First answer, second...

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徴。三釋。四難。五通。此又外問。涅槃即以擇滅為性故。

論。擇滅離縛彼非縛故。

述曰。此答。由惠簡擇縛斷得滅名擇滅故。由所知障不縛有情招生死苦故。斷彼已不得擇滅。

論。既爾斷彼寧得涅槃。

述曰。外人又問。涅槃亦是解脫縛故。

論。非諸涅槃至中二擇滅攝。

述曰。此論主答。非一切涅槃體皆擇滅。此若不爾一切涅槃皆擇滅者。即性凈涅槃應非涅槃。體性非是擇滅攝故。能縛有情住生死者斷得擇滅。此既不爾故不得擇滅等。余文易解。不勞煩釋。此中意說。涅槃性寬。擇滅體狹。非諸涅槃皆擇滅故。由此涅槃與彼擇滅應作四句。有是擇滅非是涅槃。謂斷煩惱障因中所得滅。有是涅槃非是擇滅。謂本來性凈。及無住處。或六行得滅。是彼乃分涅槃。非擇滅故。有俱者。謂有．無餘依涅槃。俱非可解。故四涅槃初．后二種。謂性凈．無住處。即體于真如上立。中間有餘．無餘依二擇滅攝。斷縛得故。所依縛盡初得果時名為擇滅。所依后無方顯涅槃。后依無時由前擇力。故對法等說惡趣果名見道斷。瑜伽說是非擇滅攝。

論。若唯斷縛至四中誰攝。

述曰。第四外人復問。謂前說言所知障非縛斷不得擇滅。不動無為．想受滅無為。亦非斷縛得於四

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：征。三釋。四難。五通。這又是外人的提問。涅槃（Nirvana，佛教術語，指解脫生死輪迴的境界）的自性就是擇滅（Pratisamkhya-nirodha，通過智慧選擇而達到的滅盡狀態）。

論：擇滅是遠離束縛，因為彼者（所知障）並非束縛。

述曰：這是回答。由於智慧簡擇，斷除束縛而得到的滅，名為擇滅。由於所知障（Jnana-avarana，對真理的認知障礙）不束縛有情（Sattva，有情眾生）招致生死苦難。斷除彼者后，不能得到擇滅。

論：既然如此，斷除彼者怎能得到涅槃？

述曰：外人又問。涅槃也是解脫束縛。

論：並非所有涅槃都屬於中間的兩種擇滅。

述曰：這是論主的回答。並非一切涅槃的本體都是擇滅。如果不是這樣，一切涅槃都是擇滅的話，那麼性凈涅槃（Prakrti-parisuddha-nirvana，本性清凈的涅槃）就不應是涅槃。因為其體性不是擇滅所攝。能夠束縛有情，使其停留在生死輪迴中的，斷除后才能得到擇滅。既然不是這樣，所以不能得到擇滅等。其餘文字容易理解，不需煩勞解釋。這裡的意思是說，涅槃的性質寬泛，擇滅的本體狹窄。並非所有涅槃都是擇滅。由此，涅槃與擇滅應作四句：有的是擇滅，不是涅槃，指的是斷除煩惱障（Klesha-avarana，煩惱造成的障礙）因中所得到的滅。有的是涅槃，不是擇滅，指的是本來性凈，以及無住處涅槃（Apratisthita-nirvana，不住于生死和涅槃的涅槃），或者通過六行觀（Sad-akara，觀察無常、苦等六種行相）得到的滅，是彼分涅槃，不是擇滅。有的是兩者都是，指的是有餘依涅槃（Saupadisesa-nirvana，還有殘餘煩惱的涅槃）和無餘依涅槃（Nirupadisesa-nirvana，沒有殘餘煩惱的涅槃）。兩者都不是可以理解。所以四種涅槃中，最初和最後兩種，即性凈涅槃和無住處涅槃，其本體建立在真如（Tathata，事物的真實如是的狀態）之上。中間的有餘依涅槃和無餘依涅槃屬於擇滅所攝，因為斷除束縛而得到。所依的束縛斷盡，初果（Srota-apanna，須陀洹）位得到時，名為擇滅。所依的後有消失，才顯現涅槃。後有消失是由於之前的簡擇之力。所以對法等論說惡趣果報名為見道（Darsana-marga，見道的修行階段）所斷。瑜伽論說是非擇滅所攝。

論：如果僅僅是斷除束縛，那麼不動無為等四種無為法中，屬於哪一種？

述曰：第四個外人又問。前面說所知障不是束縛，斷除不能得到擇滅。不動無為（Acala-asamskrta，不動的無為法）、想受滅無為（Samjna-vedayita-nirodha-asamskrta，想和感受滅盡的無為法），也不是斷除束縛而得到的。那麼這四種

【English Translation】 English version: Question. Three explanations. Four difficulties. Five understandings. This is another question from an outsider. Nirvana (Nirvana, a Buddhist term referring to the state of liberation from the cycle of birth and death) is characterized by Pratisamkhya-nirodha (Pratisamkhya-nirodha, cessation attained through wise selection).

Treatise: Cessation by discrimination is the separation from bondage, because that (the obstacle of knowledge) is not bondage.

Commentary: This is the answer. Because of the wise discrimination and the cutting off of bondage, the attainment of cessation is called cessation by discrimination. Because the Jnana-avarana (Jnana-avarana, the obstacle to the knowledge of truth) does not bind sentient beings (Sattva, sentient beings) to cause the suffering of birth and death. After cutting off that, one cannot attain cessation by discrimination.

Treatise: If that is the case, how can one attain Nirvana by cutting off that?

Commentary: The outsider asks again. Nirvana is also the liberation from bondage.

Treatise: Not all Nirvanas belong to the two kinds of cessation by discrimination in the middle.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. Not all Nirvanas have the nature of cessation by discrimination. If this were not the case, if all Nirvanas were cessation by discrimination, then Prakrti-parisuddha-nirvana (Prakrti-parisuddha-nirvana, Nirvana that is pure in nature) should not be Nirvana. Because its nature is not included in cessation by discrimination. That which can bind sentient beings and keep them in the cycle of birth and death can only be attained by cutting off cessation by discrimination. Since this is not the case, one cannot attain cessation by discrimination, etc. The rest of the text is easy to understand and does not need to be explained. The meaning here is that the nature of Nirvana is broad, and the nature of cessation by discrimination is narrow. Not all Nirvanas are cessation by discrimination. Therefore, Nirvana and cessation by discrimination should be made into four sentences: Some are cessation by discrimination but not Nirvana, referring to the cessation obtained in the cause of cutting off the Klesha-avarana (Klesha-avarana, the obstacle caused by afflictions). Some are Nirvana but not cessation by discrimination, referring to the original purity of nature, and Apratisthita-nirvana (Apratisthita-nirvana, Nirvana that does not abide in birth and death or Nirvana), or the cessation obtained through the six aspects (Sad-akara, observing the six aspects of impermanence, suffering, etc.), which is that part of Nirvana, not cessation by discrimination. Some are both, referring to Saupadisesa-nirvana (Saupadisesa-nirvana, Nirvana with remaining afflictions) and Nirupadisesa-nirvana (Nirupadisesa-nirvana, Nirvana without remaining afflictions). Neither can be understood. Therefore, among the four types of Nirvana, the first and last two, namely Prakrti-parisuddha-nirvana and Apratisthita-nirvana, are based on Tathata (Tathata, the true suchness of things). The Saupadisesa-nirvana and Nirupadisesa-nirvana in the middle belong to cessation by discrimination, because they are obtained by cutting off bondage. When the bondage on which one relies is completely cut off, and the Srota-apanna (Srota-apanna, the first stage of enlightenment) is attained, it is called cessation by discrimination. Nirvana is revealed only when the subsequent existence on which one relies disappears. The disappearance of the subsequent existence is due to the power of the previous discrimination. Therefore, the Abhidharma and other treatises say that the result of evil destinies is called the cutting off of the Darsana-marga (Darsana-marga, the stage of the path of seeing). The Yoga treatise says that it is included in non-cessation by discrimination.

Treatise: If it is only the cutting off of bondage, then which of the four unconditioned dharmas does the immovable unconditioned, etc., belong to?

Commentary: The fourth outsider asks again. It was said earlier that the obstacle of knowledge is not bondage, and cutting it off does not lead to cessation by discrimination. The Acala-asamskrta (Acala-asamskrta, the immovable unconditioned dharma), and the Samjna-vedayita-nirodha-asamskrta (Samjna-vedayita-nirodha-asamskrta, the unconditioned dharma of the cessation of perception and feeling) are also not obtained by cutting off bondage. So these four

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無為中是誰攝耶。四無為者。五蘊論說。一虛空。二擇滅。三非擇滅。四真如。百法論．瑜伽等說六。加不動．想受滅對法．顯揚論說八加三性真如。因此則廣．明無為義者。如前第二卷．別抄等解。

論。非擇滅攝至非永滅故。

述曰。下論主答。此二於四中非擇滅攝。顯揚論第十八說此二無為暫時離系。非究竟離系故　問諸非擇滅云何暫離不復生故　答擇滅無為唯究竟滅。永害隨眠故。非擇滅中瑜伽第五十三說。非擇滅法非一向決定。一向決定者學見聖蹟。于卵．濕二生．北拘盧洲．無想天．女身．扇𢮎．半擇．無形．二形等生。及於後有若愛．若取所得非擇滅一向決定。余則不定。以伏種子令不生現名非擇滅。種若遇緣便能生現故更生也。由此非擇有定不定。故此中言有永滅者有永不滅者。故此二既非是永滅攝說暫離言。明非擇滅。擇滅之中有唯言者。顯不通暫離義。非擇滅中有非永言顯不定義。對法第二說。有二應斷法。謂諸煩惱。及所依受變易．不變易。如其次第當知煩惱斷建立擇滅。二受滅建立不動．及想受滅。此二受不生亦名斷。不言二無為擇滅中分出。不可為難　問既言無間道等如何是非擇。擇者惠也。無間生等豈非惠也　答起無間道。若有漏亦非擇。若無漏不斷漏種子者定非擇滅。有

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是什麼包含在『無為』（asaṃskṛta，不生不滅的境界）之中呢？有四種『無為』。《五蘊論》（Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa）中說：一是『虛空』（ākāśa，空無），二是『擇滅』（pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha，通過智慧選擇而達到的滅盡），三是『非擇滅』（apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha，非通過智慧選擇而達到的滅盡），四是『真如』（tathatā，事物的真實本性）。《百法論》（Śata-dharma-prakāśa）、《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）等論典中說有六種，增加了『不動』（āniñjya，禪定中的不動狀態）和『想受滅』（saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha，滅盡知覺和感受的狀態）。《對法論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）、《顯揚聖教論》（Abhisamayālaṃkāra）中說有八種，增加了三性真如（trisvabhāva-tathatā）。因此，範圍就更廣了。關於『無為』的意義，如前面第二卷和其他抄本中的解釋。

論：『非擇滅』包含……直到『非永滅』的緣故。

述曰：下面論主回答。這二者在四種『無為』中屬於『非擇滅』。 《顯揚聖教論》第十八卷說，這兩種『無為』是暫時脫離束縛，不是究竟的脫離束縛。問：所有的『非擇滅』，為什麼說是暫時脫離，而不是不再產生呢？答：『擇滅』這種『無為』，唯有究竟的滅盡，因為永遠斷除了隨眠（anuśaya，煩惱的潛在傾向）。在『非擇滅』中，《瑜伽師地論》第五十三卷說，『非擇滅』法不是一向決定的。一向決定的是通過學習見到聖蹟（ārya-mārga）。對於卵生、濕生這兩種生命形式，以及北俱盧洲（Uttarakuru，四大部洲之一）、無想天（Asañjñā-deva，無知覺天）、女身、扇搋（paṇḍaka，無性人）、半擇迦（napuṃsaka，閹人）、無形、二形等生命形式的產生，以及對於後有（punarbhava，來世）的愛和取（upādāna，執取）所獲得的『非擇滅』是一向決定的。其餘則是不定的。因為只是伏藏了種子，使之不生起顯現，所以稱為『非擇滅』。如果種子遇到因緣，便能生起顯現，所以會再次產生。由此，『非擇滅』有決定和不決定兩種情況。因此，這裡說有的會永遠滅盡，有的不會永遠滅盡。所以，這二者既然不是永遠滅盡，就說是暫時脫離，表明是『非擇滅』。『擇滅』之中有『唯』這個詞，表明不包含暫時脫離的含義。『非擇滅』中有『非永』這個詞，表明不決定的意義。《對法論》第二卷說，有兩種應該斷除的法，即各種煩惱，以及作為煩惱所依的感受，分為變易和不變易兩種。按照次第，應當知道斷除煩惱建立『擇滅』，斷除兩種感受建立『不動』和『想受滅』。這兩種感受不生起也稱為斷除，不能說這兩種『無為』是從『擇滅』中分出來的，不能以此來責難。問：既然說是無間道（anantarya-mārga，直接通往解脫的道路）等，為什麼是『非擇滅』呢？『擇』是智慧的意思，無間生起等，難道不是智慧嗎？答：生起無間道，如果有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）也不是『擇滅』。如果無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱）但沒有斷除煩惱的種子，那一定不是『擇滅』。有的。

【English Translation】 English version: What is included within 'Asaṃskṛta' (unconditioned)? There are four types of 'Asaṃskṛta'. The 'Pañcaskandha-prakaraṇa' (Treatise on the Five Aggregates) states: first, 'Ākāśa' (space); second, 'Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' (cessation through discernment); third, 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' (cessation without discernment); and fourth, 'Tathatā' (suchness, the true nature of things). The 'Śata-dharma-prakāśa' (Treatise on One Hundred Dharmas), 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), and other treatises state that there are six, adding 'Āniñjya' (immovability, a state of stillness in meditation) and 'Saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha' (cessation of perception and feeling). The 'Abhidharma-samuccaya' (Compendium of Abhidharma) and 'Abhisamayālaṃkāra' (Ornament of Clear Realization) state that there are eight, adding the three natures of 'Tathatā' (trisvabhāva-tathatā). Therefore, the scope is broader. Regarding the meaning of 'Asaṃskṛta', refer to the explanations in the second volume and other commentaries.

Treatise: 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' includes... up to the reason of 'non-eternal cessation'.

Commentary: The treatise master answers below. These two are included within 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' among the four 'Asaṃskṛta'. The eighteenth volume of the 'Abhisamayālaṃkāra' states that these two 'Asaṃskṛta' are temporarily detached from bondage, not ultimately detached from bondage. Question: Why is it said that all 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' is a temporary detachment, and not that it no longer arises? Answer: 'Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha', this 'Asaṃskṛta', only has ultimate cessation, because it permanently eliminates the 'anuśaya' (latent tendencies of afflictions). Within 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha', the fifty-third volume of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' states that 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' is not always definite. What is always definite is seeing the noble path (ārya-mārga) through learning. For the arising of the two forms of life, oviparous and viviparous, as well as Uttarakuru (one of the four great continents), Asañjñā-deva (the heaven of non-perception), female bodies, paṇḍaka (eunuchs), napuṃsaka (castrated men), those without form, those with two forms, etc., and for the 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' obtained from love and grasping (upādāna) in the future existence (punarbhava), it is always definite. The rest are indefinite. Because it only subdues the seeds, causing them not to arise and manifest, it is called 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha'. If the seeds encounter conditions, they can arise and manifest, so they will arise again. Therefore, 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' has both definite and indefinite cases. Therefore, it is said here that some will be eternally extinguished, and some will not be eternally extinguished. So, since these two are not eternally extinguished, it is said that they are temporarily detached, indicating 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha'. The word 'only' in 'Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' indicates that it does not include the meaning of temporary detachment. The word 'non-eternal' in 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' indicates the meaning of indefiniteness. The second volume of the 'Abhidharma-samuccaya' states that there are two types of dharmas that should be eliminated, namely, various afflictions, and the feelings that are the basis of afflictions, divided into changeable and unchangeable. In order, it should be known that establishing 'Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' is to eliminate afflictions, and establishing 'Āniñjya' and 'Saṃjñā-vedayita-nirodha' is to eliminate the two types of feelings. The non-arising of these two types of feelings is also called elimination. It cannot be said that these two 'Asaṃskṛta' are separated from 'Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha', and this cannot be used as a criticism. Question: Since it is said that it is the anantarya-mārga (path of immediate liberation), etc., why is it 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha'? 'Pratisaṃkhyā' means wisdom, so isn't the immediate arising, etc., wisdom? Answer: If the anantarya-mārga arises and is still sāsrava (with afflictions), it is not 'Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha'. If it is anāsrava (without afflictions) but has not eliminated the seeds of afflictions, then it is definitely not 'Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha'. Some are.

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何妨也。又此應徴薩婆多師不染無知起無間道斷而非是擇滅者。有何意不同有漏道。有漏道彼宗亦得擇滅故　或復今大乘起無間道別斷惑種。余縛因此方永不生故。是非擇滅攝亦有何爽。既爾定知無餘先得。所依永無方顯先滅名得涅槃故擇滅攝。如想受滅無為后時顯故。實得在前。無餘亦爾。或由先擇斷惑復永不生故。此義應思。

下第二解。

論。或無住處至擇滅所攝。

述曰。此體雖非縛。由真擇力滅障得故寧非擇滅。滅障得故如煩惱滅。即二無為是擇滅攝。次會顯揚十八文。彼說暫伏滅者。謂說伏惑得。及無漏心滅惑位時說故。此若約無間道斷．解脫道得。即對法第二等文為正。是擇滅攝。若約伏滅得滅定等上建立。即非擇滅。如顯揚等。如前第二卷抄．及對法第二卷抄解。不動義如前說。

論。既所知障至是菩提障。

述曰。下第三問菩提障外人問。此師說所知障亦障涅槃等。可解。

論。說煩惱障至為菩提障。

述曰。下此師答。初卻質。以煩惱障亦障菩提少分智故名障菩提。又為有此菩提不起故亦為障。何得以所知為難。文意可解。

若爾如何諸聖教說二障障別。

論。應知聖教至通障二果。

述曰。諸聖教中依勝用說。此義不違。實各

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有什麼妨礙呢？另外，這位應證薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的論師認為，不染污的無知，通過無間道（anantarya-marga，直接證入解脫的道路）斷除，而不是通過擇滅（pratisamkhya-nirodha，通過智慧選擇而達到的滅盡）來斷除。這有什麼不同於有漏道（sasrava-marga，仍然受煩惱影響的道路）呢？因為在有漏道中，他們宗派也認為可以獲得擇滅。或者，現在大乘（Mahayana）通過無間道來特別斷除煩惱的種子，因為其餘的束縛因此而永遠不再產生。這即使被歸類為非擇滅（apratisamkhya-nirodha，非通過智慧選擇而達到的滅盡），又有什麼妨礙呢？既然如此，必定知道無餘涅槃（nirupadhisesa-nirvana，無餘依涅槃）是先獲得的，因為所依賴的永遠消失，才能顯示先滅，這才能被稱為獲得涅槃，因此屬於擇滅的範疇。就像想受滅（samjna-vedayita-nirodha，想和感受的滅盡）的無為法（asamskrta，非造作的），在之後才顯現一樣，實際上獲得在先。無餘涅槃也是如此。或者，由於先通過選擇斷除了煩惱，並且永遠不再產生，這個道理應該思考。

下面是第二種解釋。

論：或者，沒有住處，直到擇滅所攝。

述曰：這個本體雖然不是束縛，但由於通過真實的擇滅力量滅除了障礙而獲得，怎麼就不能是非擇滅呢？因為滅除了障礙而獲得，就像煩惱的滅除一樣。這兩種無為法都屬於擇滅的範疇。接下來會解釋《顯揚聖教論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）中的十八個條目。其中所說的暫時伏滅，是指伏惑而得，以及無漏心（anasrava-citta，沒有煩惱的清凈心）滅惑的階段所說的。如果這是根據無間道斷除、解脫道（vimukti-marga，通往解脫的道路）獲得來說，那麼就與《對法論》（Abhidharma）第二卷等經文相符，屬於擇滅的範疇。如果是根據伏滅而獲得滅盡定（nirodha-samapatti，滅盡一切心識活動的禪定）等之上建立來說，那麼就是非擇滅，就像《顯揚聖教論》等所說。如同前面第二卷的抄寫，以及《對法論》第二卷的抄寫解釋。不動的含義如前所述。

論：既然所知障（jneyavarana，對所知事物的障礙）直到是菩提障（bodhyavarana，對菩提的障礙）。

述曰：下面第三個問題是菩提障外人提出的問題。這位論師說，所知障也障礙涅槃等，可以這樣理解。

論：說煩惱障（klesavarana，煩惱的障礙）直到是菩提障。

述曰：下面是這位論師的回答。首先反駁對方的質問，因為煩惱障也障礙菩提的部分智慧，所以被稱為障礙菩提。又因為有了這種煩惱障，菩提就無法生起，所以也是一種障礙。為什麼要用所知障來為難呢？文中的意思可以理解。

如果這樣，為什麼各種聖教都說兩種障礙的障礙作用不同呢？

論：應該知道聖教是根據殊勝的作用來說的，普遍障礙兩種果報。

述曰：各種聖教中是根據殊勝的作用來說的，這個意思並不矛盾。實際上，它們各自...

【English Translation】 English version: What harm is there? Furthermore, this teacher of the Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, school asserting the existence of all dharmas), who responds, holds that undefiled ignorance is severed by the anantarya-marga (anantarya-marga, path of immediate liberation) and not by pratisamkhya-nirodha (pratisamkhya-nirodha, cessation through wisdom). How is this different from the sasrava-marga (sasrava-marga, path influenced by afflictions)? Because in the sasrava-marga, their school also attains pratisamkhya-nirodha. Or, now the Mahayana (Mahayana) severs the seeds of affliction specifically through the anantarya-marga, because the remaining bonds therefore never arise again. Even if this is categorized as apratisamkhya-nirodha (apratisamkhya-nirodha, cessation not through wisdom), what harm is there? Since this is so, it must be known that nirupadhisesa-nirvana (nirupadhisesa-nirvana, nirvana without remainder) is attained first, because the basis of dependence is forever gone, revealing the prior cessation, which is called attaining nirvana, therefore belonging to the category of pratisamkhya-nirodha. Just as the asamskrta (asamskrta, unconditioned) of samjna-vedayita-nirodha (samjna-vedayita-nirodha, cessation of perception and feeling) manifests later, the actual attainment is prior. Nirupadhisesa-nirvana is also like this. Or, because afflictions are first severed through choice and then never arise again, this meaning should be considered.

The second explanation follows.

Treatise: Or, there is no abiding place, up to being included in pratisamkhya-nirodha.

Commentary: Although this entity is not a bond, because it is attained by extinguishing the obstruction through the power of true choice, how can it not be pratisamkhya-nirodha? Because it is attained by extinguishing the obstruction, like the extinction of afflictions. These two asamskrta are included in pratisamkhya-nirodha. Next, the eighteen articles in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Abhidharmasamuccaya) will be explained. What it says about temporary suppression refers to attaining the suppression of afflictions, and it is said at the time of the extinction of afflictions by the anasrava-citta (anasrava-citta, pure mind without afflictions). If this is based on severance by the anantarya-marga and attainment by the vimukti-marga (vimukti-marga, path to liberation), then it is correct according to the second volume of the Abhidharma (Abhidharma) and belongs to the category of pratisamkhya-nirodha. If it is established based on attaining suppression and extinction, such as nirodha-samapatti (nirodha-samapatti, samadhi of cessation), then it is apratisamkhya-nirodha, as stated in the Abhidharmasamuccaya and others. The explanation is as in the previous second volume and the second volume of the Abhidharma. The meaning of immovability is as previously stated.

Treatise: Since the jneyavarana (jneyavarana, obscuration of knowledge) up to being a bodhyavarana (bodhyavarana, obscuration of enlightenment).

Commentary: The third question below is asked by an outsider regarding the bodhyavarana. This teacher says that the jneyavarana also obstructs nirvana, etc., which can be understood.

Treatise: Saying that the klesavarana (klesavarana, obscuration of afflictions) up to being a bodhyavarana.

Commentary: The following is the teacher's answer. First, refuting the opponent's question, because the klesavarana also obstructs a portion of the wisdom of bodhi, it is called obstructing bodhi. Also, because with this klesavarana, bodhi cannot arise, it is also an obstruction. Why use the jneyavarana to make it difficult? The meaning of the text can be understood.

If so, why do the various sacred teachings say that the obstructive functions of the two obscurations are different?

Treatise: It should be known that the sacred teachings speak according to the superior function, universally obstructing the two fruits.

Commentary: In the various sacred teachings, it is spoken according to the superior function, and this meaning is not contradictory. In reality, they each...

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雙障。如第一卷初抄解。此解涅槃中第二段文。別解涅槃訖。

論。如是所說至名所顯得。

述曰。第三總結。以三涅槃名所顯得以自性涅槃不由顯故方得。本來寂故。唯有後三名所顯得。障滅顯故。

論。二所生得至相應心品。

述曰。下第二明所生得。于中有三。初出體。次別釋。后總結。初出體。文可知。

論。云何四智相應心品。

述曰。此問起也。第二別解菩提。菩提既四智。

四智者何。

論。一大圓鏡智至現眾色像。

述曰。于中有九。第一齣體辨四智差別。佛地論第三解此諸名有少差別。對法復解。余可知也。圓鏡即智。持業釋　相應心品言。通相應法。

離諸分別者。佛地云離我．我所執。一切所取．能取分別。境及行相二俱叵測名為微細。諸不愚者不迷闇義。由此如來名一切種智．及一切智。若不忘者恒現前義。由此如來成不忘失法。自性明善名為清凈。有漏永亡離諸雜染　純凈圓德者。純者無雜。凈者離染。圓者滿義。純簡因無漏。凈簡一切有漏。圓簡二乘無學功德。現種依持者。現行功德之依。種子功德之持。持功德種故　能現能生身土智影者。自心．心所不緣著本質。如現餘三智影等名為能現。余色根等身．土等德名能生

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 雙障。如第一卷初抄解。此解《涅槃經》（Nirvana Sutra）中第二段文。別解《涅槃經》訖。

論：如是所說至名所顯得。

述曰：第三總結。以三涅槃名所顯得，以自性涅槃不由顯故方得，本來寂故。唯有後三名所顯得。障滅顯故。

論：二所生得至相應心品。

述曰：下第二明所生得。于中有三。初出體，次別釋，后總結。初出體。文可知。

論：云何四智相應心品？

述曰：此問起也。第二別解菩提（Bodhi）。菩提既四智。

四智者何？

論：一大圓鏡智至現眾色像。

述曰：于中有九。第一齣體辨四智差別。《佛地論》（Buddhabhumi Sutra）第三解此諸名有少差別。《對法》（Abhidharma）復解。余可知也。圓鏡即智，持業釋。相應心品言，通相應法。

離諸分別者。《佛地》（Buddhabhumi）云離我、我所執，一切所取、能取分別。境及行相二俱叵測名為微細。諸不愚者不迷闇義。由此如來（Tathagata）名一切種智、及一切智。若不忘者恒現前義。由此如來成不忘失法。自性明善名為清凈。有漏永亡離諸雜染。純凈圓德者。純者無雜，凈者離染，圓者滿義。純簡因無漏，凈簡一切有漏，圓簡二乘無學功德。現種依持者。現行功德之依，種子功德之持。持功德種故。能現能生身土智影者。自心、心所不緣著本質。如現餘三智影等名為能現。余色根等身、土等德名能生。

【English Translation】 English version Double Obstructions. As in the initial transcription and explanation of the first volume. This explains the second section of the Nirvana Sutra. The separate explanation of the Nirvana Sutra is complete.

Treatise: As it is said, 'that which is manifested by name'.

Commentary: Third, a summary. That which is manifested by the name of the three Nirvanas is obtained because the Svabhava-Nirvana (Self-Nature Nirvana) is not manifested, and is originally quiescent. Only the latter three are manifested by name because the obstructions are extinguished and manifested.

Treatise: The two obtained by birth, up to the mental states associated with them.

Commentary: Second, explaining what is obtained by birth. There are three parts: first, presenting the substance; second, explaining separately; and third, summarizing. First, presenting the substance. The text is understandable.

Treatise: What are the mental states associated with the four wisdoms?

Commentary: This is the question that arises. Second, separately explaining Bodhi. Bodhi is the four wisdoms.

What are the four wisdoms?

Treatise: The Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom, up to the manifestation of various forms and images.

Commentary: There are nine parts. First, presenting the substance and distinguishing the differences between the four wisdoms. The Buddhabhumi Sutra explains these names with slight differences in the third section. The Abhidharma also explains. The rest is understandable. The Perfect Mirror is wisdom, a possessive compound. The term 'associated mental states' refers to all associated dharmas.

Those who are free from all discriminations. The Buddhabhumi says, 'free from the attachment to self and what belongs to self, all that is taken and that takes, discriminations.' The realm and its characteristics are both unfathomable, called subtle. Those who are not foolish do not err in the meaning of darkness. Therefore, the Tathagata is called 'Omniscient Wisdom' and 'All-Knowing Wisdom'. If one does not forget, it is always present. Therefore, the Tathagata achieves the Dharma of non-forgetfulness. The nature of brightness and goodness is called purity. Leaks are forever gone, free from all defilements. 'Pure and Perfect Virtue' means pure without mixture, pure means free from defilement, and perfect means complete. Pure simplifies the cause of non-leakage, pure simplifies all that is leaky, and perfect simplifies the merits of the Arhats of the Two Vehicles. 'Manifesting and Supporting Seeds' means the reliance on the merits of present actions and the support of the merits of seeds. Supporting the seeds of merit. 'Able to manifest and generate the body, land, and shadows of wisdom' means that the self-mind and mental states do not cling to the essence. Like manifesting the shadows of the other three wisdoms, it is called 'able to manifest'. The virtues of the remaining sense organs, body, land, etc., are called 'able to generate'.

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。親照本質故。又身．土等法親緣之境。于識上現名為能現。三智等法親緣不著。但從此生名為能生。又自第八識上別種所生諸法如自色．心等名能生。依第八別有種故。若現他身諸趣等影名能現。無別種生但有識種。唯于識上現名能現。智為性故　無間。就時　無斷。就方。一切時能現一切處影故　如大圓鏡現眾色像。佛地經云如依圓鏡眾像影現。依佛智鏡諸處．境．識眾像影現平等平等。故以為喻。

論。二平等性智至窮未來際。

述曰。此據正義七通無漏　平等性。真如理。智緣於此故言平等。此在因中有我執故自他差別。今無我故自他平等　大慈悲等恒共相應。此攝十平等中幾性者慈．悲等攝八德　隨諸有情所樂示現者。隨十地菩薩所宜現也　無住涅槃之所建立者。由緣無住涅槃故。此識恒共悲．智相應。涅槃名能立。悲．智是所立。名為建立。或由此悲．智所顯真如名無住處。即是建立無住涅槃。佛地論云。建立佛地無住涅槃。更無轉易名為一味。無間斷故名為相續。余文易了。

論。三妙觀察智至皆獲利樂。

述曰。神用莫方稱之為妙　具緣諸法自共相等名為觀察。籌量境相妙用勝故　攝觀無量總持定門者。總持門者陀羅尼門。定門者三摩地門。雖餘三智非無此德。入出諸禪總

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為親自體證了本質的緣故。此外，身、土等法作為親近的因緣之境，在識上顯現，被稱為『能現』。三智等法作為親近的因緣，卻不執著於此，只是從此產生，被稱為『能生』。另外，從第八識上的個別種子所生的諸法，如自身的色、心等，稱為『能生』，因為依賴於第八識的個別種子。如果顯現他身、諸趣等影像，則稱為『能現』，沒有個別種子產生，只有識的種子，僅僅在識上顯現，所以稱為『能現』。因為智慧是其體性，所以沒有間斷，就時間而言沒有斷絕，就空間而言沒有阻礙，一切時間都能顯現一切處的影像，就像大圓鏡顯現各種色像。《佛地經》說：『如依圓鏡，眾像影現；依佛智鏡，諸處、境、識眾像影現，平等平等。』所以用這個來比喻。

論：二、平等性智，直至窮盡未來際。

述記：這是根據正義，七轉識都通於無漏。平等性，指的是真如理，智慧緣於此，所以說平等。這在因地時有我執，所以有自他的差別。現在沒有我執，所以自他平等。大慈悲等恒常共同相應。這裡攝取了十平等中的幾種性質呢？慈、悲等攝取了八種功德。隨順諸有情所喜好的而示現，是隨順十地菩薩所適宜的而顯現。無住涅槃之所建立，是因為緣于無住涅槃的緣故。這個識恒常與悲、智相應。涅槃是能立，悲、智是所立，稱為建立。或者由此悲、智所顯現的真如，名為無住處，也就是建立無住涅槃。《佛地論》說：『建立佛地無住涅槃，更無轉易，名為一味，無間斷故，名為相續。』其餘的文字容易理解。

論：三、妙觀察智，使一切眾生都獲得利益和快樂。

述記：神妙的作用無法衡量，稱之為妙。具足因緣諸法的自相、共相等，名為觀察。籌量境界的相狀，妙用殊勝的緣故。攝取觀察無量的總持定門，總持門指的是陀羅尼門（Dharani-門，總持），定門指的是三摩地門（Samādhi-門，三昧）。雖然其餘三智並非沒有這種功德，但入出各種禪定總

【English Translation】 English version: Because it directly witnesses the essence. Furthermore, the Dharmas of body, land, etc., as objects of close affinity, manifest on consciousness and are called 'manifesting' (能現). The Dharmas of the Three Wisdoms (三智) etc., as close affinities, are not attached to, but arise from this, and are called 'producing' (能生). Moreover, the Dharmas produced from the individual seeds on the eighth consciousness (第八識), such as one's own form and mind, are called 'producing,' because they rely on the individual seeds of the eighth consciousness. If the images of other bodies, various destinies, etc., are manifested, they are called 'manifesting,' without individual seeds being produced, but only seeds of consciousness, merely manifesting on consciousness, hence called 'manifesting.' Because wisdom is its nature, there is no interruption, no cessation in time, and no obstruction in space. It can manifest images of all places at all times, just like a great round mirror reflects various forms. The Buddhabhūmi Sūtra (佛地經) says: 'Just as various images appear reflected in a round mirror, so too, relying on the mirror of the Buddha's wisdom, the images of all places, realms, and consciousnesses appear equally.' Therefore, this is used as a metaphor.

Treatise: Second, the Wisdom of Equality (平等性智), extends to the exhaustion of the future.

Commentary: This, according to the correct meaning, refers to the seven consciousnesses all being connected to the unconditioned (無漏). Equality refers to the Truth of Suchness (真如理), wisdom is conditioned by this, hence it is called equality. In the causal stage, there is attachment to self, so there is differentiation between self and others. Now, without attachment to self, self and others are equal. Great compassion (大慈悲) etc., are constantly in mutual correspondence. Which qualities among the ten equalities are included here? Compassion etc., include eight virtues. Manifesting according to what sentient beings delight in, is manifesting according to what is suitable for the Bodhisattvas of the Ten Grounds (十地). The establishment of Non-Abiding Nirvana (無住涅槃), is because it is conditioned by Non-Abiding Nirvana. This consciousness is constantly in correspondence with compassion and wisdom. Nirvana is the establisher, compassion and wisdom are the established, and this is called establishment. Or, the Suchness manifested by this compassion and wisdom is called the Non-Abiding Place, which is the establishment of Non-Abiding Nirvana. The Buddhabhūmi Śāstra (佛地論) says: 'Establishing the Non-Abiding Nirvana of the Buddha-ground, without further transformation, it is called one flavor, without interruption, hence it is called continuous.' The remaining text is easy to understand.

Treatise: Third, the Wonderful Observing Wisdom (妙觀察智), enables all beings to obtain benefit and happiness.

Commentary: The divine function is immeasurable, hence it is called wonderful. Possessing the self-characteristics, common characteristics, etc., of Dharmas with conditions, is called observation. Because the measuring of the characteristics of realms and the wonderful function are superior. Gathering and observing the immeasurable gates of total retention and concentration, the gate of total retention refers to the Dhāraṇī-gate (陀羅尼門, Dhāraṇī), the gate of concentration refers to the Samādhi-gate (三摩地門, Samādhi). Although the other three wisdoms are not without this virtue, entering and exiting various meditations in total

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持差別勝餘三智。此智慧攝藏故名為攝亦常觀察此總持定門故名為觀　功德珍寶者。謂六度．道品．十力等法　作用差別者。謂現通等。

論。四成所作智至所應作事。

述曰。所作之成。成所作即智故。佛地論第七說。變化三業者。瑜伽第九十八說。不能化根．心。言三業者似意業轉。如后當知名似心故。以上並是第一齣智體。以作用顯體故辨差別門。

論。如是四智至以智名顯。

述曰。第二釋相應多少門。得智名非識所以　二十二法者。遍行．別境善法並取心故。準前尋．伺因通無漏。即妙觀察二十四法。今從因果二位通論故二十二。此二十二者體。能變者是見分。所變者是相分。或識自體名能變。相．見二分名所變　或能變是種。因能變故。所變謂現。果能變故　智者。決斷了達之義。彼位決斷了達相顯。故智用增。

論。故此四品至功德皆盡。

述曰。第三以體攝用。故佛地論第三卷初具明功德相攝。故此四智總攝佛地一切有為功德皆盡。智為主故說智用增。諸餘功德智差別故。

論。此轉有漏至而得此四智。

述曰。第四轉何識得何智門。八．七．六．五等如次而得。無性菩薩．及莊嚴論說。且觀智轉五識等。此中唯轉第六識得。佛地論中有二師說。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 持差別勝餘三智：此智慧能夠包含和攝取其他三種智慧，因此被稱為『攝』，也經常觀察總持（Dharani）和禪定之門，因此被稱為『觀』。 功德珍寶：指的是六度（Paramita）、道品（Bodhipaksa-dharma）、十力（Dasabala）等佛法。 作用差別：指的是顯現神通等。

論：四成所作智乃至所應作事。

述曰：所作之成就，成就所作即是智慧。如《佛地論》第七所說，變化三業。《瑜伽師地論》第九十八說，不能變化根和心。說到三業，似乎是意業的轉變。如後面將會知道，名義上類似心。以上都是第一種智慧的本體，因為通過作用來顯示本體，所以辨別差別的方面。

論：如是四智乃至以智名顯。

述曰：第二解釋相應多少的方面。獲得智慧之名並非是識的作用。二十二法：包括遍行（Sarvatraga）、別境（Visesa）善法，並且包含心。按照前面的說法，尋（Vitarka）、伺（Vicara）因為通於無漏，就是妙觀察智的二十四法。現在從因果兩個方面來通盤論述，所以是二十二法。這二十二法是本體。能變的是見分（Darsana-bhaga），所變的是相分（Nimitta-bhaga）。或者識的自體名為能變，相分和見分二者名為所變。或者能變是種子，因為因能變。所變指的是顯現，因為果能變。智慧：是決斷和了達的意義。在那個位置上，決斷和了達的相狀顯現，所以智慧的作用增強。

論：故此四品乃至功德皆盡。

述曰：第三是以本體來包含作用。所以《佛地論》第三卷開頭詳細說明功德相互包含。因此這四種智慧總共包含佛地的一切有為功德都完盡了。因為智慧是主要的，所以說智慧的作用增強。其餘的功德都是智慧的差別。

論：此轉有漏乃至而得此四智。

述曰：第四是轉變什麼識而得到什麼智慧的方面。第八識（Alaya-vijnana）、第七識（Manas-vijnana）、第六識（Mano-vijnana）、前五識等依次而得。無性菩薩以及《莊嚴論》說，且觀察智慧轉變五識等。這裡面只有轉變第六識才能得到。在《佛地論》中有兩位論師的說法。

【English Translation】 English version Holding the difference surpassing the other three wisdoms: This wisdom can contain and gather the other three wisdoms, therefore it is called 'Gathering'. It also constantly observes the Dharani (總持) and the gate of Samadhi (禪定), therefore it is called 'Observing'. Merit and virtue treasures: Refers to the Six Perfections (Paramita, 六度), the factors of enlightenment (Bodhipaksa-dharma, 道品), the Ten Powers (Dasabala, 十力), and other Buddhist teachings. Differences in function: Refers to manifesting supernormal powers, etc.

Treatise: The Fourth, the Wisdom of Accomplishing Activities, up to the things that should be done.

Commentary: The accomplishment of what is done, accomplishing what is done is wisdom. As stated in the seventh volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra (佛地論), transforming the three karmas. The ninety-eighth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) states that it cannot transform the roots and the mind. Speaking of the three karmas, it seems to be the transformation of mental karma. As will be known later, it is nominally similar to the mind. The above is the substance of the first wisdom, because the substance is revealed through function, so it distinguishes the aspects of difference.

Treatise: Thus, the Four Wisdoms, up to manifesting by the name of wisdom.

Commentary: The second explains the aspect of how much corresponds. Obtaining the name of wisdom is not the function of consciousness. Twenty-two dharmas: including pervasive (Sarvatraga, 遍行), specific object (Visesa, 別境) wholesome dharmas, and also includes the mind. According to the previous statement, Vitarka (尋) and Vicara (伺) because they are common to the unconditioned, are the twenty-four dharmas of the Wonderful Observing Wisdom. Now, from the two aspects of cause and effect, a comprehensive discussion is made, so there are twenty-two dharmas. These twenty-two dharmas are the substance. What can transform is the seeing-aspect (Darsana-bhaga, 見分), what is transformed is the image-aspect (Nimitta-bhaga, 相分). Or the self-nature of consciousness is called what can transform, the image-aspect and the seeing-aspect are called what is transformed. Or what can transform is the seed, because the cause can transform. What is transformed refers to manifestation, because the effect can transform. Wisdom: is the meaning of decisive judgment and thorough understanding. In that position, the appearance of decisive judgment and thorough understanding manifests, so the function of wisdom increases.

Treatise: Therefore, these four qualities, up to all merits and virtues are exhausted.

Commentary: The third is to include function with substance. Therefore, the beginning of the third volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra (佛地論) explains in detail the mutual inclusion of merits and virtues. Therefore, these four wisdoms totally include all conditioned merits and virtues of the Buddha-ground are completely exhausted. Because wisdom is the main thing, it is said that the function of wisdom increases. The remaining merits and virtues are the differences of wisdom.

Treatise: This transforms the contaminated, up to obtaining these four wisdoms.

Commentary: The fourth is the aspect of transforming what consciousness to obtain what wisdom. The eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, 第八識), the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana, 第七識), the sixth consciousness (Mano-vijnana, 第六識), the first five consciousnesses, etc., are obtained in order. Asanga Bodhisattva (無性菩薩) and the Ornament of the Mahayana Sutras (莊嚴論) say, and observe the wisdom transforming the five consciousnesses, etc. In this, only transforming the sixth consciousness can be obtained. In the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra (佛地論), there are two teachers' statements.

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彼非次故。說法斷疑非五用故。廣如佛地。不能繁引。與此無違　轉識得智所以。此中有二複次。初釋可解。第二釋中。識是分別有漏位強。智為決斷無漏位勝。轉強得強故言得智。此中因解舍識得智因更成名智所由。

論。大圓鏡智至凈種識故。

述曰。第五轉識得智位次。此第八識初說可解。若金剛心無無漏識有漏已舍。無漏未生應無能持凈種之識。如前所轉舍中諍。

論。有義此品至不相違故。

述曰。無間道與異熟識等俱滅故。既非障法故不相違。又對法第十解金剛喻定無間盡智等生。不言金剛心時盡智等起。如何說無間道位圓鏡智生。此唯正義。種現同時．種現異時復有別釋。

論。非障有漏至令不生故。

述曰。即前所言余有漏是。謂善．無記體非障有漏之法。無間生已四智圓明無所熏識。諸無漏法更不增長應成佛故。悲．智無窮故盡未來際。前師解對法盡智生時文云。彼言無間位后盡智等圓滿而生。不言此時此盡智等未起。又無間者是俱無間義隔越尚稱無間。俱時寧非無間。如異念言俱有等。佛地論中無此二說。彼不分辨何位心生故。

論。平等性智至盡未來際。

述曰。見道初位現在前者。真見道中此智即起。第六引生非自力起。二障頓斷妙觀察

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『彼非次故』：因為它們不是依次產生的。『說法斷疑非五用故』：因為說法和斷除疑惑不是五種識的作用。詳細內容見《佛地經論》，此處不繁瑣引用。與此沒有衝突。這是關於轉識如何獲得智慧的解釋。這裡有兩種解釋。第一種解釋容易理解。第二種解釋中，識在分別事物方面，于有漏位時力量強大；智在決斷事物方面，于無漏位時更為殊勝。轉變強大的識而獲得強大的智，所以說是『得智』。這裡解釋了捨棄識而獲得智的原因，以及智是如何得名的。

『論。大圓鏡智至凈種識故。』

述曰：第五轉識得智的位次。關於第八識（Alaya識，阿賴耶識）的最初解釋是可以理解的。如果金剛心（Vajra heart）沒有無漏識，而有漏識已經捨棄，無漏識尚未產生，那麼應該沒有能夠持有清凈種子的識。如同前面所說的在捨棄過程中產生的爭議。

『論。有義此品至不相違故。』

述曰：無間道（Anantarya-marga）與異熟識（Vipaka-vijnana）等同時滅亡。既然不是障礙之法，所以不相違背。而且，《對法論》第十品解釋金剛喻定（Vajropama-samadhi）的無間，盡智（Ksaya-jnana）等產生。沒有說金剛心時盡智等生起。如何說在無間道位圓鏡智（Adarsa-jnana）生起？這才是正確的解釋。種子和現行同時，種子和現行不同時，還有其他的解釋。

『論。非障有漏至令不生故。』

述曰：就是前面所說的其餘有漏法。意思是說，善和無記的體性不是障礙有漏的法。無間道產生后，四智圓滿明亮，沒有所薰染的識。如果諸無漏法不再增長，就應該成佛了。因為悲心和智慧是無窮盡的，所以會持續到未來際。之前的解釋是，《對法論》中盡智生起時，經文說：『彼言無間位后盡智等圓滿而生。』沒有說此時此盡智等未起。而且，無間的意思是俱無間，即使有間隔也稱為無間。同時發生怎麼能不是無間呢？如同不同的念頭說是同時存在等。《佛地經論》中沒有這兩種說法。因為他們沒有分辨哪個位次心生起。

『論。平等性智至盡未來際。』

述曰：在見道（Darshana-marga）的最初位次，現在前者。在真見道中，這種智慧就生起了。第六識（意識，Manovijnana）的引發不是依靠自身的力量生起。二障（煩惱障和所知障）頓然斷除，妙觀察智（Pratyaveksana-jnana）生起。

【English Translation】 English version: 'Because they are not sequential.' 'Because expounding the Dharma and resolving doubts are not the functions of the five consciousnesses.' Details can be found in the Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra, so I will not quote them extensively here. There is no contradiction with this. This explains how the transformation of consciousness leads to the attainment of wisdom. There are two explanations here. The first explanation is easy to understand. In the second explanation, consciousness is strong in discriminating things in the realm of conditioned existence (Samsara), while wisdom is superior in making decisions in the realm of unconditioned existence (Nirvana). Transforming the strong consciousness to obtain strong wisdom is why it is called 'attaining wisdom.' This explains the reason for abandoning consciousness and attaining wisdom, and how wisdom gets its name.

'Treatise: The Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom... up to the pure seed consciousness.'

Commentary: The fifth stage of transforming consciousness to attain wisdom. The initial explanation of the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) is understandable. If the Vajra heart (Vajra heart) does not have unconditioned consciousness, and the conditioned consciousness has already been abandoned, and the unconditioned consciousness has not yet arisen, then there should be no consciousness capable of holding the pure seeds. This is like the dispute that arises in the aforementioned process of abandonment.

'Treatise: Some argue that this section... is not contradictory.'

Commentary: The Anantarya-marga (path of immediate consequence) and the Vipaka-vijnana (resultant consciousness) etc., are extinguished simultaneously. Since it is not an obstructing dharma, it is not contradictory. Moreover, the tenth chapter of the Abhidharma explains that in the immediate aftermath of the Vajropama-samadhi (diamond-like samadhi), Ksaya-jnana (knowledge of exhaustion) etc., arise. It does not say that Ksaya-jnana etc., arise at the time of the Vajra heart. How can it be said that the Adarsa-jnana (Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom) arises in the stage of the Anantarya-marga? This is the correct explanation. There are other explanations regarding the simultaneous occurrence of seeds and manifestations, and the non-simultaneous occurrence of seeds and manifestations.

'Treatise: Non-obstructing conditioned existence... so that it does not arise.'

Commentary: This refers to the remaining conditioned dharmas mentioned earlier. It means that the nature of good and neutral is not a dharma that obstructs conditioned existence. After the Anantarya-marga arises, the four wisdoms are perfectly clear, and there is no consciousness to be influenced. If the unconditioned dharmas no longer increase, one should become a Buddha. Because compassion and wisdom are inexhaustible, they will continue into the future. The previous explanation was that when Ksaya-jnana arises in the Abhidharma, the text says: 'It says that after the stage of the Anantarya-marga, Ksaya-jnana etc., arise completely.' It does not say that Ksaya-jnana etc., have not yet arisen at this time. Moreover, 'Anantarya' means 'co-Anantarya'; even with an interval, it is called 'Anantarya.' How can simultaneous occurrence not be Anantarya? Like different thoughts being said to exist simultaneously, etc. The Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra does not have these two explanations. Because they do not distinguish which stage the mind arises in.

'Treatise: Equality Wisdom... up to the end of the future.'

Commentary: In the initial stage of the Darshana-marga (path of seeing), the present precedes. In the true Darshana-marga, this wisdom arises immediately. The sixth consciousness (Manovijnana) is induced to arise, not relying on its own power. The two obscurations (klesha-avarana and jneya-avarana) are suddenly severed, and the Pratyaveksana-jnana (Wonderful Discriminating Wisdom) arises.

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智．平等性智起必同時。若漸次斷平等後起。然諸見道．十地間起如上數明。法雲地后盡未來故。第八決定與一俱故。自力既勝不由六引。六入生空七恒法空。平等轉故。亦不同地。不同因位一切皆同。

論。妙觀察智至皆容現起。

述曰。此即初解生空觀品　漸悟入者至解行地終　頓悟者至無學位　或至上位者。謂至菩薩十地位中頓．漸皆爾。既不障法空。明法空觀必帶生觀。加行入心雖獨法空。入必細故帶其粗意。此非有漏及無心通上諸位。

論。法空觀品至皆容現起。

述曰。法空觀品要菩薩見道位方初起。法空觀品準前應釋。若至佛位唯生空觀。或唯理非事。有唯事非理。或二俱觀。皆自在故。余文可解。

論。成所作智至亦得初起。

述曰。如前四緣中已解。第一師云。菩薩修道位中。第六意識后得引故亦得初起。于凈土中起五識故。佛地論等亦有此義。雖言初地即亦得起然非見道。見道已后修道得智方起。真相見道中不緣外事起粗識故。

論。有義成佛至作意起故。

述曰。第二師說。如前四緣中已解。無別文義故不敘之。此中比量。簡過及釋妨難具如前解。佛地論有評。義取后解。

論。此四種姓至勝后佛故。

述曰。第六種性本有始

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 智（Jnana，智慧）。平等性智（Samatajnana，平等性智）生起時必然同時。如果漸次斷除，平等性智後起。然而諸見道（Darshana-marga，見道）、十地（Bhumi，菩薩修行的十個階段）之間生起如上面所說的數量明確。法雲地（Dharma-megha-bhumi，第十地）之後，因為直到未來都窮盡。第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）決定與一俱起。因為自力已經勝過，不由六識引導。六入（Ayatana，感覺器官）生空，第七識（Manas-vijnana，末那識）恒常法空。因為平等轉故。也不同於地。不同於因位，一切都相同。

論：妙觀察智（Pratyavekshana-jnana，妙觀察智）乃至都容許現起。

述曰：這最初解釋生空觀品。漸悟入者，到解行地終結。頓悟者，到無學位（Asaiksha，無學）。或者到上位者。說到菩薩十地位中，頓悟、漸悟都是這樣。既然不障礙法空，說明法空觀必然帶有生觀。加行入心，雖然單獨法空。進入必然細微，帶有粗略的意思。這不是有漏（Sasrava，有煩惱的）以及無心通（無心神通）以上諸位。

論：法空觀品乃至都容許現起。

述曰：法空觀品，要菩薩見道位才開始生起。法空觀品，按照前面應該解釋。如果到佛位，只有生空觀。或者只有理非事。有隻有事非理。或者二者都觀。都自在的緣故。其餘的文字可以解釋。

論：成所作智（Krityanushthana-jnana，成所作智）乃至也得初起。

述曰：如前面四緣中已經解釋。第一位老師說，菩薩修道位中。第六意識（Mano-vijnana，意識）后得引故，也得初起。在凈土中生起五識的緣故。《佛地論》等也有這個意義。雖然說初地，也就是也得生起，然而不是見道。見道以後，修道得智才生起。真相見道中，不緣外事生起粗識的緣故。

論：有義成佛乃至作意（Manasikara，作意）起故。

述曰：第二位老師說。如前面四緣中已經解釋。沒有別的文義，所以不敘述它。這其中的比量，簡別過失以及解釋妨難，都如前面解釋。佛地論有評判。義理採取後面的解釋。

論：此四種姓乃至勝過后佛的緣故。

述曰：第六種性本來有開始。

【English Translation】 English version Jnana (智，Wisdom). Samatajnana (平等性智，Wisdom of Equality) arises necessarily simultaneously. If gradually severed, Samatajnana arises later. However, the arising between the Darshana-marga (見道，Path of Seeing) and the ten Bhumis (十地，Ten Stages of a Bodhisattva's Practice) is as clearly stated in the numbers above. After the Dharma-megha-bhumi (法雲地，Cloud of Dharma Stage, the tenth Bhumi), because it is exhausted until the future. The eighth consciousness, Alaya-vijnana (阿賴耶識，Store Consciousness), is determined to arise together with one. Because self-power has already surpassed, it is not guided by the six consciousnesses. The six Ayatana (六入，Sense Organs) are empty of self, the seventh consciousness, Manas-vijnana (末那識，Manas Consciousness), is constantly empty of dharma. Because of equal transformation. It is also different from the Bhumi. Different from the causal position, everything is the same.

Treatise: Pratyavekshana-jnana (妙觀察智，Wonderful Observing Wisdom) and even all are allowed to arise.

Commentary: This initially explains the chapter on the contemplation of emptiness of self. Those who gradually awaken enter until the end of the stage of understanding and practice. Those who awaken suddenly reach the stage of no-more-learning (Asaiksha, 無學). Or those who reach a higher position. Speaking of the ten Bhumis of a Bodhisattva, both sudden and gradual awakening are like this. Since it does not obstruct the emptiness of dharma, it indicates that the contemplation of emptiness of dharma necessarily carries the contemplation of emptiness of self. When effort enters the mind, although it is solely the emptiness of dharma. Entering is necessarily subtle, carrying the rough meaning. This is not the case for those above the positions of the contaminated (Sasrava, 有漏) and those with non-mind supernormal powers.

Treatise: The chapter on the contemplation of emptiness of dharma and even all are allowed to arise.

Commentary: The chapter on the contemplation of emptiness of dharma requires the Bodhisattva's stage of the Path of Seeing to initially arise. The chapter on the contemplation of emptiness of dharma should be explained according to the previous. If one reaches the Buddha's position, there is only the contemplation of emptiness of self. Or only principle without phenomena. There are only phenomena without principle. Or both are contemplated. All are because of being at ease. The remaining text can be explained.

Treatise: Krityanushthana-jnana (成所作智，Accomplishing Action Wisdom) and even also can initially arise.

Commentary: As explained in the previous four conditions. The first teacher said, in the Bodhisattva's stage of cultivation. Because the sixth consciousness (Mano-vijnana, 意識) is guided by subsequent attainment, it can also initially arise. Because the five consciousnesses arise in the Pure Land. The Buddhabhumi Sutra and others also have this meaning. Although it is said to be the first Bhumi, that is, it can also arise, but it is not the Path of Seeing. After the Path of Seeing, the wisdom attained through cultivation arises. In the Path of Seeing of true appearance, it does not rely on external matters to arise coarse consciousness.

Treatise: Some say that becoming a Buddha and even because of Manasikara (作意，Attention) arising.

Commentary: The second teacher said. As explained in the previous four conditions. There is no other textual meaning, so it is not narrated. The analogy in this, distinguishing faults and explaining obstacles, are all as explained before. The Buddhabhumi Sutra has a commentary. The meaning takes the later explanation.

Treatise: These four lineages and even because they surpass the subsequent Buddhas.

Commentary: The sixth lineage originally has a beginning.

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起門。地前種增。入地二增。地前用增。入地體增。現起別故。余文可解。唯護法義。

論。大圓鏡智至不可知故。

述曰。第七所緣何境界門。初師可解。所以如文。

論。有義此品至亦緣俗故。

述曰。莊嚴論說於一切境皆不愚迷故。有俗不知非不愚故。余文可知　言諸處者。謂內六處。境者六境。識者六識。此十八界。或十二處。六根．六識併名識故。身．及土定須緣故　會不可知言行緣微細者。行相．所緣也。因既微細果亦難知。非不緣俗。

論。緣真如故至準此應知。

述曰。言二智者。體是一用為二。何故俱生緣俗名后得者。了俗由證真。證真為先緣俗智生。故名后得。佛地論又說。或似后得名后得。后得不證真故。或如后得因中緣俗真觀後生故。下準此解。余所引文勘佛地論。因有二類種。果恒唯一種生二用現行。

論。平等性智至於理無違。

述曰。此中三說。所以如文。緣十平等故通緣真俗。第三說也。

論。妙觀察智至二智所攝。

述曰。文義易了。

論。成所作智至后得智攝。

述曰。引論文等皆勘卷數如前已顯。同類境故說緣五境。不定唯爾故不違也。五識皆能緣六境不違理故。行相淺近緣事智故。但遮無為如

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 起門：在『地』（指心識的層面）之前，『種』（指種子）會增長。進入『地』（心識層面）后，『二』（指二取，能取和所取）會增長。在『地』（心識層面）之前，『用』（指作用）會增長。進入『地』（心識層面）后，『體』（指本體）會增長。這是因為『現起』（顯現）是不同的緣故。其餘的文字都可以理解，只有護法的意義需要特別注意。

論：大圓鏡智（Ādarśa-jñāna）乃至不可知故。

述曰：第七識所緣的境界是什麼？最初的老師可以解釋，所以就像文字所說的那樣。

論：有義，此品乃至亦緣俗故。

述曰：《莊嚴論》說，對於一切境界都不愚昧迷惑。有些人對於世俗的事情不知道，並非不愚昧。其餘的文字都可以理解。所說的『諸處』，指的是內六處（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）。『境』指的是六境（色、聲、香、味、觸、法）。『識』指的是六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）。這十八界，或者十二處，六根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）、六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）合起來稱為識。身和土必定需要緣故。會通『不可知』，說『行緣微細』，指的是行相和所緣。因為因微細，所以果也難以知曉，並非不緣世俗。

論：緣真如故，乃至準此應知。

述曰：所說的『二智』，體是一個，作用分為二。為什麼俱生緣俗的稱為『后得』呢？因爲了達世俗是通過證悟真如實現的。證悟真如是先，緣俗智是後生，所以稱為『后得』。《佛地論》又說，或者類似后得，所以稱為后得，因為后得不證悟真如。或者像后得一樣，在因中緣世俗，真觀後生。下面參照這個來理解。其餘引用的文字可以參考《佛地論》。因有兩類種子，果恒常只有一種，生起兩種作用現行。

論：平等性智（Samatā-jñāna）至於理無違。

述曰：這裡有三種說法，所以就像文字所說的那樣。因為緣十平等，所以通緣真俗。這是第三種說法。

論：妙觀察智（Pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna）至二智所攝。

述曰：文字和意義很容易理解。

論：成所作智（Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna）至后得智攝。

述曰：引用的論文等都可以參考之前的卷數，已經很明顯了。因為是同類境，所以說緣五境。不一定只有這些，所以不違背道理。五識都能緣六境，不違背道理。行相淺近，緣事智，所以只是遮止無為法。

【English Translation】 English version: Beginning Door: Before the 'ground' (referring to the level of consciousness), the 'seed' (referring to the seed) increases. Upon entering the 'ground' (level of consciousness), 'two' (referring to the two graspings, grasper and grasped) increases. Before the 'ground' (level of consciousness), 'function' (referring to action) increases. Upon entering the 'ground' (level of consciousness), 'essence' (referring to the substance) increases. This is because the 'manifestation' (appearance) is different. The remaining text can be understood, only the meaning of Dharmapāla needs special attention.

Treatise: The Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom (Ādarśa-jñāna) even to the point of being unknowable.

Commentary: What is the object of the seventh consciousness? The initial teacher can explain, so it is as the text says.

Treatise: Some say, this section even relates to the mundane.

Commentary: The Treatise on Ornamentation says that one is not deluded regarding all realms. Some people do not know about mundane matters, which does not mean they are not deluded. The remaining text can be understood. The 'places' mentioned refer to the six internal places (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind). 'Objects' refer to the six objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch, dharma). 'Consciousness' refers to the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness). These eighteen realms, or twelve places, the six roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind) and the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness) are collectively called consciousness. The body and the earth necessarily need to be related to. Reconciling 'unknowable', saying 'the characteristics and objects are subtle', refers to the characteristics and the object. Because the cause is subtle, the result is also difficult to know, but it is not that it does not relate to the mundane.

Treatise: Because it relates to Suchness, accordingly, this should be known.

Commentary: The 'two wisdoms' mentioned, the substance is one, the function is divided into two. Why is it that the co-arisen relating to the mundane is called 'subsequent attainment'? Because understanding the mundane is achieved through realizing Suchness. Realizing Suchness comes first, and the wisdom relating to the mundane arises later, so it is called 'subsequent attainment'. The Buddha-bhūmi Sūtra also says that it is called 'subsequent attainment' because it is similar to subsequent attainment, because subsequent attainment does not realize Suchness. Or, like subsequent attainment, in the cause, it relates to the mundane, and true contemplation arises later. Understand the following in accordance with this. The remaining cited texts can be referenced in the Buddha-bhūmi Sūtra. There are two types of seeds in the cause, but the result is always only one type, giving rise to two functions in manifestation.

Treatise: Equality Wisdom (Samatā-jñāna) is not contrary to reason.

Commentary: There are three explanations here, so it is as the text says. Because it relates to the ten equalities, it universally relates to the true and the mundane. This is the third explanation.

Treatise: Wonderful Discriminating Wisdom (Pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna) is included in the two wisdoms.

Commentary: The text and meaning are easy to understand.

Treatise: Accomplishment Wisdom (Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna) is included in Subsequent Attainment Wisdom.

Commentary: The cited treatises can be referenced to the previous volumes, which is already clear. Because they are similar realms, it is said that it relates to the five realms. It is not necessarily only these, so it is not contrary to reason. The five consciousnesses can all relate to the six realms, which is not contrary to reason. The characteristics are shallow and close, and it relates to the wisdom of affairs, so it only prevents the unconditioned.

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文證成。

論。此四心品至利樂有情。

述曰。第八緣境作用門。成事智通現凈穢土。妙觀察智通二土說法。

論。如是等門差別多種。

述曰。第九指例門有多。如是等門差別多種。佛地有四分心緣境。如前第二解。諸智相．見分別門。即前第九卷解訖。相應心所多少門。如前第三卷解第八識。第四卷第七識。第七卷解六識中。及次前二十二法中解。善無漏門。如隨識中辨。假實分別門。及攝諸功德門。此論雖無總明處。然隨諸識已明訖。故不繁敘其間。智依何定起。何受相應。轉何界后識后智生等。佛地雖無。如前已解。

上來總是第二別解所生菩提訖。自下第三即結是所生得。

論。此四心品名所生得。

述曰。此為結也。就解所轉得有三。初總舉所轉得出數。二別解所顯所生訖。三總結故。

論。此所生得至名所轉得。

述曰。總結前也。

就解轉依中有三。上來第一解轉依訖。自下第二明本頌所說轉依之言。

論。雖轉依義至轉依言故。

述曰。總有四種。而今但取二所轉得。餘三轉依不可證故。設有真如．及無漏道。不是證義故不說之。

論。此修習位至因位攝故。

述曰。自下第三明此十地能證二轉依。非已

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 文證成。

論：此四心品至於利益安樂一切有情。

述曰：第八緣境作用門，成就事智通達顯現清凈和染污的國土。妙觀察智通達在兩種國土說法。

論：像這樣等門類差別多種。

述曰：第九指例門有很多。像這樣等門類差別多種。佛地有四分心緣境，如前面第二卷所解釋。諸智的相、見分別門，即前面第九卷已經解釋完畢。相應心所多少門，如前面第三卷解釋第八識，第四卷解釋第七識，第七卷解釋六識中，以及次前面的二十二法中解釋。善無漏門，如隨識中辨別。假實分別門，以及攝取諸功德門。此論雖然沒有總體的說明之處，然而隨著諸識已經說明完畢，故不繁瑣地敘述其間。智依何定而起，與何受相應，轉何界后識后智生等，佛地雖然沒有，如前面已經解釋。

總而言之，以上是第二別解所生菩提完畢。從下面開始第三部分，即總結這是所生得。

論：此四心品名為所生得。

述曰：這是總結。就解釋所轉得有三個部分。首先總舉所轉得出的數量，其次分別解釋所顯現的所生，最後是總結。

論：此所生得至於名為所轉得。

述曰：總結前面所說。

就解釋轉依中有三個部分。上面是第一部分解釋轉依完畢。從下面開始第二部分，說明本頌所說的轉依之言。

論：雖然轉依的意義至於轉依之言的緣故。

述曰：總共有四種。而現在只取兩種所轉得。其餘三種轉依不可證得。即使有真如以及無漏道，也不是證得的意義，所以不說。

論：此修習位至於因位所攝的緣故。

述曰：從下面開始第三部分，說明這十地能夠證得兩種轉依，不是已經……

【English Translation】 English version: Textual evidence established.

Treatise: These four categories of mind extend to benefiting and bringing joy to all sentient beings.

Commentary: The eighth gate, the function of object-cognition, the Accomplishment-of-Action Wisdom (Chengshi zhi) universally manifests pure and impure lands. The Wonderful-Observing Wisdom (Miaoguancha zhi) universally teaches the Dharma in both types of lands.

Treatise: Such gates and other distinctions are manifold.

Commentary: The ninth gate, the gate of pointing out examples, has many. Such gates and other distinctions are manifold. The Buddha-ground has the fourfold mind cognizing objects, as explained in the second fascicle earlier. The characteristics and aspects of the various wisdoms, the gate of discrimination, were already explained in the ninth fascicle earlier. The gate of the number of associated mental functions was explained earlier in the third fascicle regarding the eighth consciousness, the fourth fascicle regarding the seventh consciousness, and the seventh fascicle regarding the six consciousnesses, as well as in the twenty-two dharmas preceding that. The gate of wholesome and unconditioned (Wu Lou) is distinguished as in the 'Following Consciousness' section. The gate of distinguishing between the false and the real, and the gate of gathering all merits. Although this treatise does not have a general explanation, it has already been explained along with the various consciousnesses, so there is no need to elaborate in between. Upon what Samadhi does wisdom arise, with what feeling does it correspond, after the transformation of what realm do subsequent consciousnesses and wisdoms arise, etc.? Although the Buddha-ground does not have these, they have already been explained earlier.

In summary, the above concludes the second separate explanation of the Bodhi that is produced. From below begins the third part, which summarizes that this is what is obtained through production.

Treatise: These four categories of mind are called 'obtained through production'.

Commentary: This is the conclusion. Regarding the transformation that is obtained through explanation, there are three parts. First, a general enumeration of the number of transformations obtained. Second, a separate explanation of what is manifested as produced. Finally, a summary.

Treatise: This 'obtained through production' extends to being named 'obtained through transformation'.

Commentary: Summarizing what was said earlier.

Regarding the explanation of the transformation of the basis, there are three parts. The above is the first part, the explanation of the transformation of the basis, completed. From below begins the second part, explaining the words 'transformation of the basis' as spoken in the original verse.

Treatise: Although the meaning of 'transformation of the basis' extends to the reason for the words 'transformation of the basis'.

Commentary: In total, there are four types. But now only two types of 'obtained through transformation' are taken. The remaining three types of 'transformation of the basis' cannot be realized. Even if there is Suchness (Zhenru) and the Unconditioned Path (Wu Lou Dao), they are not the meaning of realization, so they are not discussed.

Treatise: This stage of cultivation extends to being included in the causal stage.

Commentary: From below begins the third part, explaining that these ten grounds are able to realize the two types of 'transformation of the basis', not already...

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證得要成佛方證故。此十地無間道斷障為因。解脫道方證於彼故。

上來解五位中第四頌。雖有廣略不同。總是解十地修習位訖。

論。后究竟位其相云何。

述曰。自下解第五位。謂究竟道。于中初問。次答。此即問也。

論。頌曰至大牟尼名法。

述曰。頌中有三。初一句出位體。次七字顯勝德。餘八字簡二乘顯三乘別。

論。曰前修習位至究竟位相。

述曰。初解頌文。后諸門分別。初釋四句文即為四段。義乃為三。如判頌意。初中有二。初正解頌初句出體。后問答分別解本頌中。初總判。次出體。后別釋。此顯位相也。

論。此謂此前至無漏界攝。

述曰。此下出體　無漏界攝。即菩提．涅槃二轉依果是究竟位　言究竟者。略有二義。一簡前四位名究竟。二簡二乘名究竟。二乘雖得菩提．涅槃。非究竟義。非高勝故。此略釋第一句頌中上此即字。兼解無漏界訖。

論。諸漏永盡至故名無漏。

述曰。下釋無漏義　諸漏永盡者。能除漏義。能證．所證皆能除漏。此即離彼相應縛義　非漏隨增者。即是顯非所緣縛義　又諸漏永盡者。顯離雜彼煩惱　非漏隨增。離二縛義。又初是染法自性斷。后是離縛斷。初性唯染。后通一切有漏　言性凈者

。簡二乘無學善有漏等蘊。雖亦離二縛。而性非凈。前有漏類故。有第七所知障漏俱非性凈故　言圓者。簡一切有學無漏。因未圓故　明者簡二乘無學無漏。顯彼雖圓果之極故而非是明。非勝妙故　又凈簡有漏。圓簡二乘。明簡菩薩無漏。具五義性名無漏界余無漏等雖亦名無漏。非究竟無漏。此中雖解無漏之言。長讀尚字。意乃為遠也。

論。界是藏義至利樂事故。

述曰。界者藏義。無為功德涅槃所藏。有為功德菩提所含。或是因義。或為所緣。或為增上。展轉傳說為利益等。謂體能生五乘世出世間利樂事業。或為緣生他利樂事　何故經云在纏名如來藏。出纏名法身。此中出纏方名為藏　彼約位此約體。或彼依有障．無障以辨法門。此明本末故不相違。即是總解第一句訖。

論。清凈法界至如何唯無漏。

述曰。下明問答中有二問答。此為初問。外人問云。清凈法界可唯無漏。是理法故。四智心品如何唯無漏。豈如來身皆唯無漏。此除大眾部等余小乘難。法界理法既同擇滅可許無漏。非佛身中有為功德皆無漏攝。如何唯言是無漏也。

論。道諦攝故至已永舍故。

述曰。此論主答。六十六說。佛智．通等一切功德道諦所攝。前已成立大乘聖教。所以為量。

論。雖有示

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：簡別二乘（聲聞和緣覺）的無學善有漏等五蘊。雖然也離開了兩種束縛（煩惱障和所知障），但自性並非清凈，因為屬於之前的有漏範疇。有第七識的所知障，有漏和無漏都不是自性清凈的。所說的『圓』，是簡別一切有學的無漏，因為因地尚未圓滿。『明』是簡別二乘的無學無漏，顯示他們雖然圓滿了果位的極致，但並非是『明』，因為不是最殊勝微妙的。另外，『凈』是簡別有漏，『圓』是簡別二乘，『明』是簡別菩薩的無漏。具備這五種意義的自性，才稱為無漏界。其他的無漏等，雖然也名為無漏，但並非究竟的無漏。這裡雖然解釋了『無漏』這個詞，但應該長讀『尚』字，意思是『遠』。

論：界是藏的意思，乃至利益安樂事故。

述記：『界』是藏的意思，無為功德是涅槃所藏，有為功德是菩提所含藏。或者說是因的意思，或者說是所緣，或者說是增上。輾轉相傳是爲了利益等，意思是說，體效能產生五乘（人天乘、聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘、佛乘）世間和出世間的利益安樂事業，或者作為緣而產生利他安樂之事。為什麼經中說在纏時名為如來藏（Tathāgatagarbha），出纏時名為法身（Dharmakāya）？這裡說出纏才名為藏？那是從位（階段）上說的，這裡是從體性上說的。或者彼處是依據有障和無障來分辨法門，這裡是說明根本和末端，所以不相違背。這就是總的解釋第一句話完畢。

論：清凈法界，乃至如何唯無漏？

述記：下面說明問答，其中有兩次問答。這是第一次提問。外人提問說：清凈法界可以只是無漏，這是理法。四智心品（大圓鏡智、平等性智、妙觀察智、成所作智）如何只是無漏？難道如來身都是無漏？這是爲了排除大眾部等其餘小乘的詰難。法界是理法，既然和擇滅（Nirvāṇa）相同，可以允許是無漏。但佛身中的有為功德並非都是無漏所攝，為什麼只說是無漏呢？

論：道諦所攝故，乃至已永舍故。

述記：這是論主的回答。六十六種說法，佛智、神通等一切功德都是道諦（Mārgasatya）所攝。之前已經成立了大乘聖教，所以以大乘聖教為衡量標準。

論：雖有示

【English Translation】 English version: It distinguishes the Arhats (Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas) with their non-learning good contaminated aggregates. Although they are also free from the two bonds (afflictive and cognitive obscurations), their nature is not pure because they belong to the previous contaminated category. The cognitive obscuration of the seventh consciousness, neither contaminated nor uncontaminated, is not pure in nature. The term 'complete' distinguishes all non-Arhats with their uncontaminated qualities because the causal stage is not yet complete. 'Bright' distinguishes the non-learning uncontaminated qualities of the two vehicles (Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas), showing that although they have completed the ultimate fruit, they are not 'bright' because they are not the most excellent and subtle. Furthermore, 'pure' distinguishes the contaminated, 'complete' distinguishes the two vehicles, and 'bright' distinguishes the uncontaminated qualities of Bodhisattvas. The nature possessing these five meanings is called the uncontaminated realm. Other uncontaminated qualities, although also called uncontaminated, are not ultimately uncontaminated. Although the word 'uncontaminated' is explained here, the word 'still' should be read longer, meaning 'far'.

Treatise: 'Realm' means 'store', up to the reason of benefiting and bringing happiness.

Commentary: 'Realm' means 'store'. Unconditioned merits are stored in Nirvāṇa, and conditioned merits are contained in Bodhi. Or it means 'cause', or it means 'object of focus', or it means 'enhancement'. It is transmitted from one to another for the sake of benefits, etc., meaning that the essence can generate the beneficial and joyful activities of the five vehicles (human and celestial vehicle, Śrāvaka vehicle, Pratyekabuddha vehicle, Bodhisattva vehicle, Buddha vehicle) in both mundane and supramundane realms, or it can generate altruistic and joyful events as a condition. Why does the sutra say that when entangled, it is called the Tathāgatagarbha (如來藏), and when disentangled, it is called the Dharmakāya (法身)? Here, it is said that only when disentangled is it called 'store'? That is from the perspective of the stage, while this is from the perspective of the essence. Or, that place distinguishes the Dharma gates based on whether there are obscurations or not, while this explains the root and the branch, so they are not contradictory. This is the end of the general explanation of the first sentence.

Treatise: The pure Dharma realm, up to how can it only be uncontaminated?

Commentary: Below explains the questions and answers, with two sets of questions and answers. This is the first question. An outsider asks: The pure Dharma realm can only be uncontaminated, as it is the Dharma of principle. How can the four wisdom mind-qualities (Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom, Equality Wisdom, Wonderful Observing Wisdom, Accomplishing Wisdom) only be uncontaminated? Could it be that the Tathāgata's body is entirely uncontaminated? This is to exclude the objections of the Mahāsāṃghika school and other smaller vehicles. Since the Dharma realm is the Dharma of principle and is the same as Nirvāṇa, it can be allowed to be uncontaminated. However, the conditioned merits in the Buddha's body are not all included in the uncontaminated, so why is it only said to be uncontaminated?

Treatise: Because it is included in the Truth of the Path, up to because it has been permanently abandoned.

Commentary: This is the treatise master's answer. According to the sixty-six statements, all merits such as the Buddha's wisdom and supernormal powers are included in the Truth of the Path (Mārgasatya). It has already been established that the Mahāyāna teachings are sacred, so the Mahāyāna teachings are used as the standard of measurement.

Treatise: Although there are demonstrations

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現至道諦所攝。

述曰。如來示現叱呵身．語。現起入滅。現有背痛。似苦集諦而實無漏。

論。集論等說至五外界等。

述曰。外人問云。集論第三等說十五界．十色處等唯是有漏。今言佛身唯並無漏。既爾如來豈無五根．五識．五外界等　等者等取十有色處．法處少分等。今論主言如來一切皆是無漏。論說十五界有漏攝相違故難。

論。有義如來至理不相違。

述曰。答有三義。此第一說。如來身．土離能所分別．三七分別。絕名言戲論。非蘊處界有情等所攝。不可言此五根．此五境等。今大般若大有此文。今三論諸師多為此解。故不可以十五界等有漏為問。彼言有漏明非佛身。佛地第一卷說。此師當第三義。彼亦無評。

論。有義如來至性散亂故。

述曰。此第二說。文中有五。一申宗。二外詰。三釋難。四重問。五解徴。第三段中有二解。初解中有五。一外問。二復徴。三又解。四復問。五復釋。如來根．境皆以意識妙定為先方變。本識隨變。設第八變妙定生故法界所攝。非佛以外所餘菩薩．及異生等。雖依此佛所變上變為佛身．土。然佛變細。余變者粗。佛變細者非五境攝。他之所變義有二途。一色或定收。如來第八勝定所引住故。何故第八定所引即彼五識不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：現在講到道諦所包含的內容。

述曰：如來示現呵斥的身語行為，示現生起和入滅，示現有背痛等現象，這些看似苦集二諦，但實際上都是無漏的。

論：在《集論》等論著中提到五外界等。

述曰：有人提問說，《集論》第三卷等處說十五界（五根、五境、意識界、法界），十色處等都只是有漏法。現在說佛身完全是無漏的。既然如此，如來難道沒有五根、五識、五外界等嗎？（'等'字包括十有色處、法處少分等）。現在論主說如來的一切都是無漏的，而論中說十五界是有漏所攝，這兩種說法是矛盾的，所以提出疑問。

論：有種觀點認為，如來的一切都是無漏的，與經論的道理並不矛盾。

述曰：這裡有三種解釋。這是第一種解釋：如來的身和國土，遠離了能取和所取的分別，也遠離了三七（三十七道品）的分別，超越了名言戲論，不被蘊、處、界、有情等所包含。所以不能說這是五根，這是五境等。《大般若經》中有大量這樣的經文。現在三論宗的很多法師都這樣解釋。所以不能用十五界等有漏法來提問。他們所說的有漏，指的是非佛身。佛地論第一卷中也提到了。這位法師的觀點屬於第三種解釋，那裡也沒有評論。

論：有種觀點認為，如來的根和境，不是由自性散亂所生。

述曰：這是第二種解釋。這段文字包含五個部分：一是提出宗義，二是外人詰難，三是解釋困難，四是重新提問，五是解答疑問。在第三部分中有兩種解釋。第一種解釋包含五個部分：一是外人提問，二是再次質問，三是再次解釋，四是再次提問，五是再次解釋。如來的根和境，都是以意識妙定為先導而轉變的，本識（阿賴耶識）隨之轉變。假設第八識（阿賴耶識）轉變，是因為妙定所生，所以屬於法界所攝。除了佛以外，其餘的菩薩和異生等，雖然也依靠佛所轉變的境界而轉變為佛身和佛土，但是佛的轉變是精細的，其餘人的轉變是粗糙的。佛的精細轉變不屬於五境所攝。他人所轉變的境界有兩種情況：一是色法，二是禪定所攝。如來第八識是由殊勝的禪定所引導而安住的。為什麼第八識的禪定所引導的五識不是五境所攝呢？

【English Translation】 English version: Now, regarding what is encompassed by the Truth of the Path (Dukkha-nirodha-gamini-patipada-ariya-sacca, the truth of the path leading to the cessation of suffering).

Commentary: The Tathagata (Tathagata, 'Thus Gone One', Buddha) manifests scolding actions of body and speech, manifests arising and entering into extinction (Nirvana), manifests having back pain, which seems like the Truth of Suffering (Dukkha-sacca) and the Truth of the Cause of Suffering (Samudaya-sacca), but in reality, they are all without outflows (Anasrava, free from defilements).

Treatise: The Samuccaya-lakshana (Abhidharma-samuccaya, 'Compendium of Abhidharma') and other texts mention the five external realms (five sense objects) etc.

Commentary: An outsider asks: The Samuccaya-lakshana, in its third volume, etc., states that the fifteen realms (fifteen Dhatus: the five sense organs, the five sense objects, the mind-consciousness element, and the element of Dharma), the ten sense bases of form (ten Rupa-ayatanas) etc., are only with outflows (Sasrava, subject to defilements). Now it is said that the Buddha's body is entirely without outflows. If that is the case, does the Tathagata not have the five roots (five Indriyas), the five consciousnesses (five Vijnanas), the five external realms (five Visayas) etc.? ('Etc.' includes the ten sense bases of form, a small portion of the Dharma-ayatana, etc.). Now the author of the treatise says that everything of the Tathagata is without outflows, but the treatise says that the fifteen realms are included in the with-outflow category, which is contradictory, hence the question.

Treatise: Some argue that everything of the Tathagata is without outflows, and it does not contradict the principles.

Commentary: There are three explanations here. This is the first explanation: The Tathagata's body and land are free from the distinction of the grasper and the grasped (subject-object duality), and also free from the distinctions of the thirty-seven factors of enlightenment (Bodhipaksika-dharmas), transcending verbal constructs and conceptual proliferation, not included in the aggregates (Skandhas), sense bases (Ayatanas), realms (Dhatus), sentient beings (Sattvas), etc. Therefore, it cannot be said that these are the five roots, these are the five objects, etc. The Maha-prajnaparamita Sutra (Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra) has many such passages. Many teachers of the Three Treatise School (Sanlun School) interpret it this way. Therefore, one cannot use the fifteen realms etc., which are with outflows, to question. What they mean by 'with outflows' refers to non-Buddha bodies. The first volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra (Buddha-bhumi-sutra, Sutra on the Buddha Land) also mentions this. This teacher's view belongs to the third explanation, and there is no comment there.

Treatise: Some argue that the Tathagata's roots and objects are not born from self-nature's distraction.

Commentary: This is the second explanation. This passage contains five parts: first, stating the thesis; second, external refutation; third, explaining the difficulty; fourth, re-questioning; fifth, answering the question. In the third part, there are two explanations. The first explanation contains five parts: first, external questioning; second, re-questioning; third, re-explaining; fourth, re-questioning; fifth, re-explaining. The Tathagata's roots and objects are all transformed by first having the wonderful concentration of consciousness (Vijnana), and the base consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) transforms accordingly. Suppose the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) transforms because it is born from wonderful concentration, therefore it belongs to the Dharma-dhatu (realm of Dharma). Apart from the Buddha, the remaining Bodhisattvas and ordinary beings, although they also rely on the Buddha's transformed realm to transform into Buddha bodies and Buddha lands, the Buddha's transformation is subtle, and the transformation of others is coarse. The Buddha's subtle transformation is not included in the five objects. The realms transformed by others have two possibilities: one is form (Rupa), and the other is included in concentration (Samadhi). The Tathagata's eighth consciousness is led and abides by the superior concentration. Why are the five consciousnesses led by the concentration of the eighth consciousness not included in the five objects?

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爾。五稱散五常緣故。理亦少難熟思之也。根．境既無如來五識亦非五識界。根雖非實似其根相故佛現有。他不變根但變似境。以相粗故。或可受用故。無垢稱經．及十八不共法中。如來之心恒在定故。大眾部計亦恒在定。對法第一說五識身性散亂故。

論。成所作智何識相應。

述曰。此外人問。既無五識。成所作智何識相應。

論。第六相應起化用故。

述曰。論主答。第六識相應。能起化用故。非余識俱。

論。與觀察智性有何別。

述曰。此外人問。既與六識相應。與觀察智體性有何別。不可一識二智生故。

論。彼觀諸法至故有差別。

述曰。此論主答。彼觀察智慧觀諸法自相．共相。此成事智唯起化用故二智別。

論。此二智品至不俱起故。

述曰。外人復問。此二智品應不併起。餘論等說無處無容同身同類一身二識許俱時生。今既一類第六識者應不俱起。

論。許不併起至俱亦無失。

述曰。此論主答。許不併起于理無違。前後剎那別異起故。然行迅速似二用俱。第二解。同一識體義用分二。說二智俱亦無有失。如一意識見色．聞聲。一體義分。此亦應爾。此第一解成事智品與第六俱。

論。或與第七至成事品攝。

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 爾。五稱散五常緣故：因為五種稱頌是散亂的，違背了五常的緣故。理亦少難熟思之也：這個道理稍微有些難懂，需要仔細思考。根．境既無如來五識亦非五識界：既然根（indriya，感覺器官）和境（viṣaya，感覺對像）都不是真實的，那麼如來的五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）也不是五識的境界。根雖非實似其根相故佛現有：根雖然不是真實的，但因為有類似根的表相，所以佛會顯現。他不變根但變似境：他（指佛）不會改變根，但會改變類似境的東西。以相粗故：因為表相是粗糙的緣故。或可受用故：或許可以被接受和使用。無垢稱經．及十八不共法中：在《維摩詰經》（Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra）和十八不共法（āvenika-dharma，佛獨有的十八種功德）中。如來之心恒在定故：如來的心總是處於禪定之中。大眾部計亦恒在定：大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）也認為（如來的心）總是處於禪定之中。對法第一說五識身性散亂故：《阿毗達摩》（Abhidharma）的第一義說五識的身性是散亂的緣故。 論。成所作智何識相應：論：成所作智（kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna，為樂一切眾生而起作用的智慧）與哪個識相應？ 述曰。此外人問。既無五識。成所作智何識相應：述曰：這是外人提問。既然沒有五識，成所作智與哪個識相應？ 論。第六相應起化用故：論主回答：與第六識（manovijñāna，意識）相應，因為能生起化用的緣故。不是與其他的識一起。 論。與觀察智性有何別：論：與觀察智（pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna，觀察諸法自相和共相的智慧）的體性有什麼區別？ 述曰。此外人問。既與六識相應。與觀察智體性有何別。不可一識二智生故：述曰：這是外人提問。既然與第六識相應，與觀察智的體性有什麼區別？不可能一個識同時生起兩種智慧的緣故。 論。彼觀諸法至故有差別：論主回答：觀察智慧觀察諸法的自相（svalakṣaṇa，事物自身獨有的特性）和共相（sāmānyalakṣaṇa，事物普遍具有的特性），而成所作智只生起化用，所以這兩種智慧是有區別的。 論。此二智品至不俱起故：論：這兩種智慧的品類應該不能同時生起。其他的論典等說沒有地方、沒有可能同一個身體、同一類別的一個身體生起兩種識同時生起。現在既然是同一類別的第六識，應該不能同時生起。 述曰。此論主答。許不併起于理無違。前後剎那別異起故。然行迅速似二用俱。第二解。同一識體義用分二。說二智俱亦無有失。如一意識見色．聞聲。一體義分。此亦應爾。此第一解成事智品與第六俱：述曰：論主回答：允許不一起生起，在道理上沒有違背。因為前後剎那有差別而生起。然而執行迅速，看起來像是兩種作用同時發生。第二種解釋，同一個識的體性，從意義和作用上分為兩種。說兩種智慧同時生起也沒有過失。例如一個意識可以同時看到顏色和聽到聲音。一個體性，意義上分開。這裡也應該這樣。這是第一種解釋，成所作智的品類與第六識一起。 論。或與第七至成事品攝：論：或者與第七識（kliṣṭa-manas，末那識）一起，乃至被成所作智的品類所攝。

【English Translation】 English version: Er. The reason why the five praises are scattered and violate the five constants is that the five praises are scattered and violate the five constants. The principle is also a little difficult to think about carefully. Since the root (indriya, sense organ) and the object (viṣaya, sense object) are not real, the Tathagata's five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna, eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) are not the realm of the five consciousnesses. Although the root is not real, it is similar to the appearance of the root, so the Buddha appears. He does not change the root but changes something similar to the object. Because the appearance is rough. Perhaps it can be accepted and used. In the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa-sūtra and the eighteen unshared dharmas (āvenika-dharma, the eighteen unique merits of the Buddha). Because the Tathagata's mind is always in samadhi. The Mahāsāṃghika also believes that (the Tathagata's mind) is always in samadhi. The first meaning of Abhidharma says that the nature of the five consciousnesses is scattered. Treatise: Which consciousness does the kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna (the wisdom that arises to delight all beings) correspond to? Commentary: This is a question from an outsider. Since there are no five consciousnesses, which consciousness does the kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna correspond to? Treatise: It corresponds to the sixth consciousness (manovijñāna, mind consciousness) because it can generate transformation. It is not with other consciousnesses. Treatise: What is the difference between it and the pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna (the wisdom that observes the self-nature and common nature of all dharmas)? Commentary: This is a question from an outsider. Since it corresponds to the sixth consciousness, what is the difference between it and the pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna? It is impossible for one consciousness to generate two wisdoms. Treatise: It observes all dharmas, so there is a difference. The pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna can observe the self-nature (svalakṣaṇa, the unique characteristics of things) and common nature (sāmānyalakṣaṇa, the universal characteristics of things) of all dharmas, while the kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna only generates transformation, so these two wisdoms are different. Treatise: These two types of wisdom should not arise at the same time. Other treatises say that there is no place, no possibility for the same body, the same category of one body to generate two consciousnesses at the same time. Now that it is the same category of the sixth consciousness, it should not arise at the same time. Commentary: The treatise master answers: It is permissible not to arise together, and there is no violation of reason. Because they arise differently in successive moments. However, the operation is rapid, and it seems that two functions occur simultaneously. The second explanation is that the same consciousness nature is divided into two in terms of meaning and function. It is not a mistake to say that two wisdoms arise at the same time. For example, one consciousness can see colors and hear sounds at the same time. One nature, separated in meaning. It should be like this here too. This is the first explanation, the category of kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna is with the sixth consciousness. Treatise: Or with the seventh consciousness (kliṣṭa-manas, manas-consciousness), and even be included in the category of kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna.

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述曰。此第二解。或成事智與第七俱。依根緣境是平等智差別用故。此平等智既能變起受用．變化二身。能為根．境而依之故。依此化他根．境之識唯平等用。起化用粗化異生類名成事智。起化用細化地上類名平等智。

論。豈不此品轉五識得。

述曰。此外人難。豈不今此成事智品轉五識得。何言七俱。

論。非轉彼得至不應為難。

述曰。今者但以彼生死滅涅槃得顯。名轉生死而得涅槃。非涅槃性即是生死。今此亦爾。由轉去因五識滅已。此緣粗事境識品生。說成事智轉五識得。不以因中五識轉。作果中成事智品。成事智品即是五識。此師若謂轉五識得成事智品。便違莊嚴．攝論等說。即是第二師解。佛唯三界是實余虛。十五界等文為正也。

論。有義如來至有漏無漏。

述曰。有三。一標宗。二會違。三結正。此初也。第三師說。彼蘊．處．界等皆通有漏．無漏。故佛蘊．處．界等三法皆唯無漏。

論。集論等說至所知境攝。

述曰。以下會違有二。初會第一師。二會第二師。會初師文。集論第三等說十五界唯有漏者。且依粗惡之境體淺識智之境體說。或粗境體。淺是識用。即二乘等．及十地菩薩之身十五界唯有漏非說一切凡．聖有情十五界等皆唯

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 窺基法師述：這是第二種解釋。或說成所作智（Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna，能成就一切事之智慧）與第七識（末那識，Manas-vijñāna）同時存在。因為依根（indriya，感覺器官）、緣（pratyaya，條件）境（viṣaya，對像）是平等性智（Samatā-jñāna）的差別作用的緣故。此平等性智既能變現受用身（saṃbhoga-kāya，報身）、變化身（nirmāṇa-kāya，應化身）二身，能作為根、境而依止的緣故。依此化度他人的根、境之識唯是平等性智的作用。生起化度作用，化度異生之類，名為成所作智。生起化度作用，化度地上菩薩之類，名為平等性智。

論：難道不是此品由轉五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）而得？

窺基法師述：這是外人的提問。難道不是現在此成所作智品由轉五識而得？為何說與第七識同時存在？

論：並非轉彼而得，所以不應以此為難。

窺基法師述：現在只是以彼生死滅、涅槃（nirvāṇa，解脫）得來顯現。名為轉生死而得涅槃，並非涅槃的體性就是生死。現在這裡也是如此。由於轉去因中的五識滅已，此緣粗事境的識品生起，說成所作智由轉五識而得。不是以因中的五識轉變為果中的成所作智品。成所作智品就是五識。此師如果說轉五識而得成所作智品，便違背了《莊嚴經論》、《攝大乘論》等的說法。這就是第二種師的解釋。佛唯有三界（trayo dhātavaḥ，欲界、色界、無色界）是真實的，其餘是虛妄的。《十五界經》等經文是正確的。

論：有義是如來（Tathāgata，佛的稱號之一）的蘊（skandha，五蘊）、處（āyatana，十二處）、界（dhātu，十八界）等，皆通有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱）。

窺基法師述：有三個部分。一是標明宗旨，二是調和矛盾，三是總結正確觀點。這是第一部分。第三種師說，彼蘊、處、界等都通於有漏、無漏。所以佛的蘊、處、界等三法都唯是無漏。

論：《集論》等說十五界唯有漏，是依粗惡之境體，淺識智之境體，或粗境體，淺是識用，即二乘（śrāvaka-yāna，聲聞乘）等及十地菩薩（daśa-bhūmi-bodhisattva，證得十地果位的菩薩）之身，十五界唯有漏，並非說一切凡夫、聖人有情的十五界等都唯是。

【English Translation】 English version: Śāstri Kīrti stated: This is the second explanation. Or it is said that the Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna (wisdom of accomplishing all deeds) exists simultaneously with the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñāna). This is because relying on the indriya (sense organs), pratyaya (conditions), and viṣaya (objects) is the differentiated function of the Samatā-jñāna (wisdom of equality). This Samatā-jñāna can manifest both the saṃbhoga-kāya (enjoyment body) and the nirmāṇa-kāya (transformation body), and can serve as the basis for the indriya and viṣaya. The consciousness that relies on this to transform others' indriya and viṣaya is solely the function of Samatā-jñāna. The arising of transformative actions to transform different kinds of beings is called Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna. The arising of transformative actions to transform bodhisattvas on the ground is called Samatā-jñāna.

Treatise: Isn't this category obtained by transforming the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna)?

Śāstri Kīrti stated: This is an outsider's question. Isn't the current category of Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna obtained by transforming the five consciousnesses? Why say it exists simultaneously with the seventh consciousness?

Treatise: It is not obtained by transforming them, so it should not be questioned.

Śāstri Kīrti stated: Now it is only manifested by the extinction of saṃsāra (birth and death) and the attainment of nirvāṇa (liberation). It is called transforming saṃsāra to attain nirvāṇa, but the nature of nirvāṇa is not saṃsāra. It is the same here. Because the five consciousnesses in the cause of transformation have ceased, this category of consciousness that conditions coarse objects arises, and it is said that Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna is obtained by transforming the five consciousnesses. It is not that the five consciousnesses in the cause are transformed into the category of Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna in the result. The category of Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna is the five consciousnesses. If this teacher says that the category of Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna is obtained by transforming the five consciousnesses, then it contradicts the statements in the Śūraṅgama Sūtra and the Mahāyānasaṃgraha. This is the explanation of the second teacher. Only the three realms (trayo dhātavaḥ) are real, and the rest are illusory. The texts such as the Fifteen Elements Sutra are correct.

Treatise: Some say that the Tathāgata's skandha (aggregates), āyatana (sense bases), and dhātu (elements) are all connected to both sāsrava (with outflows) and anāsrava (without outflows).

Śāstri Kīrti stated: There are three parts. First, stating the purpose; second, reconciling contradictions; and third, concluding the correct view. This is the first part. The third teacher says that the skandha, āyatana, and dhātu are all connected to both sāsrava and anāsrava. Therefore, the Buddha's three dharmas of skandha, āyatana, and dhātu are all only anāsrava.

Treatise: The Abhidharmasamuccaya and others say that the fifteen dhātu are only sāsrava, based on the coarse and evil object-essence, the shallow consciousness-wisdom object-essence, or the coarse object-essence. 'Shallow' refers to the function of consciousness, that is, the bodies of śrāvaka-yāna (hearer vehicle) and bodhisattvas of the ten bhūmi (ten grounds) are only sāsrava, not that all ordinary and noble sentient beings' fifteen dhātu are only sāsrava.

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有漏。

論。然余處說至理必應爾。

述曰。大般若經及處處經說。顯非如彼界等相故。表非下智所知境故。

論。所以者何至解脫身等。

述曰。有為皆蘊。說一切法皆處界攝諸論通文。說十九界等無垢稱經之所遮故。非如來根．境非十八界等攝。此遮第一師計如來根．境非界處攝。若絕戲論故非界等者。亦不應此頌說如來功德即無漏界．是善．是常．亦是安樂。亦不應名解脫身等。解脫身等既可名者故。蘊．處．界理應可名。

論。又處處說至是密意說。

述曰。又涅槃經．莊嚴論等說。轉無常蘊獲得常蘊。勝鬘等說。如來妙色身等。故諸經中說為非色等是密意說。密意說者。顯非粗淺智境界故。以上皆是破前第一師計。

論。又說五識至非佛所成。

述曰。文意可解。破前第二師。

論。故佛身中至而純無漏。

述曰。三結宗義。三師說中此義為正。

次解眾德有四。一不思議。二善。三常。四安樂。先解第二句。解不思議有三釋。攝論第九．世親等解同無異見。

論。此轉依果至言議道故。

述曰。此第一解。智之與境皆具此義。

論。微妙甚深自內證故。

述曰。別解不思。又智微妙。性相甚深。所緣境自

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有漏（Sāsrava，指受煩惱影響的事物）。

論：然而其他地方說至高的真理必定是這樣的。

述曰：《大般若經》以及各處經文都說，這表明它不像彼界等相那樣，也表明它不是下等智慧所能瞭解的境界。

論：為什麼這樣說呢？（因為如來具有）解脫身等。

述曰：有為法都包含在蘊（Skandha）中，（經文）說一切法都包含在處（Āyatana）和界（Dhātu）中，各種論著都貫通經文的意義。說十九界等被《無垢稱經》（Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra）所遮止，所以如來的根（Indriya，指感覺器官）和境（Viṣaya，指感覺對像）不被十八界等所包含。這遮止了第一位論師的觀點，即如來的根和境不屬於界和處。如果因為斷絕了戲論（Prapañca，指虛妄分別）就不是界等，那麼這首偈頌也不應該說如來的功德就是無漏界，是善，是常，也是安樂。也不應該稱之為解脫身等。既然解脫身等可以被稱呼，那麼蘊、處、界的道理也應該可以被稱呼。

論：而且各處經文都說（如來具有常蘊），這是密意說。

述曰：而且《涅槃經》（Nirvana Sutra）、《莊嚴論》（Alaṃkāra-śāstra）等都說，轉變無常蘊而獲得常蘊。《勝鬘經》（Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra）等說，如來具有妙色身等。因此，各種經文中說（如來）不是色等，這是密意說。密意說，是表明它不是粗淺智慧所能瞭解的境界。以上都是爲了破斥前面第一位論師的觀點。

論：又說五識（Pañca-vijñāna，指眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）不是佛所成就的。

述曰：文意可以理解。這是爲了破斥前面第二位論師的觀點。

論：所以佛身中（的功德）是純粹無漏的。

述曰：這是總結宗義。在三位論師的說法中，這個義理是正確的。

接下來解釋眾德有四個方面：一是不思議（Acintya），二是善（Kuśala），三是常（Nitya），四是安樂（Sukha）。先解釋第二句。解釋不思議有三種解釋。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第九品、世親（Vasubandhu）等的解釋相同，沒有不同意見。

論：此轉依果（Parāvṛtti，指轉變所依而獲得的果）超越了言語表達的範圍。

述曰：這是第一種解釋。智慧和所緣境都具有這種意義。

論：微妙甚深，只能通過自身內在的證悟才能瞭解。

述曰：這是另一種解釋不思議。智慧微妙，自性與現象都非常深奧，所緣境自身

【English Translation】 English version Sāsrava (Defiled; possessing outflows).

Treatise: However, other places say that the ultimate truth must be like this.

Commentary: The Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra and various other sutras say that it shows that it is not like the characteristics of those realms, etc., and it also shows that it is not a realm knowable by inferior wisdom.

Treatise: Why is this so? (Because the Tathāgata possesses) the liberation body, etc.

Commentary: All conditioned phenomena are included in the Skandhas (aggregates), (the scriptures) say that all dharmas are included in the Āyatanas (sense bases) and Dhātus (elements), and various treatises connect the meaning of the scriptures. It is said that the nineteen Dhātus, etc., are negated by the Vimalakīrti-nirdeśa Sūtra, so the Indriyas (faculties) and Viṣayas (objects) of the Tathāgata are not included in the eighteen Dhātus, etc. This refutes the view of the first teacher that the Indriyas and Viṣayas of the Tathāgata do not belong to the Dhātus and Āyatanas. If it is not a Dhātu, etc., because it is free from Prapañca (conceptual proliferation), then this verse should not say that the merits of the Tathāgata are the undefiled Dhātu, are good, are permanent, and are also blissful. Nor should it be called the liberation body, etc. Since the liberation body, etc., can be named, then the principles of Skandhas, Āyatanas, and Dhātus should also be able to be named.

Treatise: Moreover, various scriptures say (that the Tathāgata possesses permanent Skandhas), this is a statement with a hidden meaning.

Commentary: Moreover, the Nirvana Sutra, Alaṃkāra-śāstra, etc., say that impermanent Skandhas are transformed to obtain permanent Skandhas. The Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra, etc., say that the Tathāgata possesses a wonderful form body, etc. Therefore, the scriptures say that (the Tathāgata) is not form, etc., this is a statement with a hidden meaning. A statement with a hidden meaning shows that it is not a realm knowable by crude and shallow wisdom. The above is all to refute the view of the first teacher.

Treatise: Moreover, it is said that the five Vijñānas (consciousness) are not accomplished by the Buddha.

Commentary: The meaning of the text can be understood. This is to refute the view of the second teacher.

Treatise: Therefore, the (merits) in the Buddha's body are purely undefiled.

Commentary: This is a summary of the doctrinal meaning. Among the statements of the three teachers, this meaning is correct.

Next, there are four aspects to explain the multitude of virtues: first, Acintya (inconceivable); second, Kuśala (wholesome); third, Nitya (permanent); and fourth, Sukha (blissful). First, explain the second phrase. There are three explanations for Acintya. The explanations of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, ninth chapter, Vasubandhu, etc., are the same, with no different opinions.

Treatise: The result of this Parāvṛtti (transformation) transcends the scope of verbal expression.

Commentary: This is the first explanation. Both wisdom and the object of cognition possess this meaning.

Treatise: Subtle and profound, it can only be understood through one's own inner realization.

Commentary: This is another explanation of Acintya. Wisdom is subtle, and both its nature and phenomena are very profound. The object of cognition itself

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內證故。又境微妙。唯甚深智慧內證故。又二皆通。攝論唯有內證之言。唯解緣真如故。

論。非諸世間喻所喻故。

述曰。別解不議。絕比無方故不思議。如攝論中以三義解不思議。顯揚十七有不思議品。亦不出此三。瑜伽等亦然。所以不述。

論。此又是善至俱說為善。

述曰。次二明善。頌言善者白法性故。體白故異不善．及無記。能斷黑名白　若爾此與有漏善何別　以法界遠離生滅極安穩故。四智品妙用無方比。及極巧便故。無為．有為二皆順益。與有漏善差別。並違不善。以下合其四義故名善。前第六卷已解善訖。

論。論說處等至五根三境。

述曰。此為外難。四智心品既唯是善。對法論第四說八唯無記。謂五根．三境。如來豈無五根等也。

論。此中三釋廣說如前。

述曰。今論主答。此中三釋。廣說如前。如前有漏等三解。

論。一切如來至無漏善攝。

述曰。真如等五法皆滅道攝。滅道攝者諸經論中說既唯無漏故此唯善。又對法第六．瑜伽等說有清凈法界非苦．集故。攝論亦然。此二解並前四合則六解。既爾即佛所有眼等。皆是無漏善。似有漏善．及無記等。及似有漏善故。名之為善等非實然也。

論。此又是常至無斷無盡

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 內證的緣故。而且境界微妙，唯有甚深的智慧才能通過內證瞭解的緣故。而且二者皆共通。 《攝大乘論》（She Lun）中只有內證的說法，只是解釋緣于真如（Tathata）的緣故。

論：不是世間的比喻所能比喻的緣故。

述曰：不做特別解釋。因為絕比無方所以不可思議。如《攝大乘論》（She Lun）中以三種意義解釋不可思議。《顯揚聖教論》（Xianyang Shengjiao Lun）第十七品有《不思議品》，也沒有超出這三種。 《瑜伽師地論》（Yujia Shidi Lun）等也是這樣。所以不作敘述。

論：這又是善，乃至都說為善。

述曰：下面兩個說明善。頌文說善是因為白法性的緣故。體性是清白的，所以不同於不善和無記。能夠斷除黑業，名為白。如果這樣，這與有漏善有什麼區別？因為法界遠離生滅，極其安穩的緣故。四智品（Sizhi Pin）的妙用沒有可以比擬的，而且極其巧妙方便的緣故。無為和有為二者都順益，與有漏善有差別。並且違背不善。以下結合它的四種意義，所以名為善。前面第六卷已經解釋完善。

論：論中說處等到五根三境。

述曰：這是爲了駁斥外人的提問。四智心品既然只是善，而《對法論》（Duifa Lun）第四說八種唯是無記，即五根、三境。如來難道沒有五根等嗎？

論：這其中有三種解釋，詳細的如同前面所說。

述曰：現在論主回答。這其中有三種解釋，詳細的如同前面所說。如同前面有漏等三種解釋。

論：一切如來乃至無漏善所攝。

述曰：真如等五法都屬於滅道所攝。屬於滅道所攝的，諸經論中說既然只是無漏，所以這只是善。而且《對法論》（Duifa Lun）第六、《瑜伽師地論》（Yujia Shidi Lun）等說有清凈法界不是苦、集的緣故。《攝大乘論》（She Lun）也是這樣。這兩種解釋與前面的四種合起來就是六種解釋。既然這樣，那麼佛所擁有的眼等，都是無漏善。像是是有漏善以及無記等，以及像是是有漏善的緣故。名為善等，並非是實際如此。

【English Translation】 English version Because of internal realization. Moreover, the realm is subtle, and only profound wisdom can understand it through internal realization. Furthermore, both are interconnected. The 'She Lun' (Compendium of Mahayana, 攝大乘論) only mentions internal realization because it solely explains the connection to Tathata (真如, suchness).

Treatise: It cannot be described by worldly metaphors.

Commentary: No separate explanation is given. Because it is beyond comparison and without direction, it is inconceivable. As in the 'She Lun' (Compendium of Mahayana, 攝大乘論), inconceivability is explained with three meanings. The seventeenth chapter of the 'Xianyang Shengjiao Lun' (Manifestation of the Holy Teaching Treatise, 顯揚聖教論) has a chapter on 'Inconceivability,' which does not go beyond these three. The 'Yujia Shidi Lun' (Yoga Teacher's Treatise, 瑜伽師地論) and others are also the same. Therefore, it is not elaborated upon.

Treatise: This is also good, even to the point of saying it is good.

Commentary: The following two explain goodness. The verse says goodness is due to the nature of white dharma. Its essence is pure, so it is different from unwholesome and neutral. It can cut off black karma, and is called white. If so, what is the difference between this and wholesome with outflows? Because the Dharmadhatu (法界, realm of dharma) is far from birth and death, and is extremely stable. The wonderful function of the Four Wisdoms (Sizhi Pin, 四智品) is incomparable, and it is extremely skillful and convenient. Both unconditioned and conditioned benefit, which is different from wholesome with outflows. And it goes against unwholesome. The following combines its four meanings, so it is called good. The sixth volume has already explained goodness.

Treatise: The treatise speaks of places, etc., up to the five roots and three realms.

Commentary: This is to refute external questions. Since the Four Wisdoms mind-category is only good, and the fourth of the 'Duifa Lun' (Treatise on Counterparts, 對法論) says that eight are only neutral, namely the five roots and three realms. Does the Tathagata (如來, thus-gone one) not have the five roots, etc.?

Treatise: There are three explanations here, as explained in detail before.

Commentary: Now the treatise master answers. There are three explanations here, as explained in detail before. Like the three explanations of wholesome with outflows, etc., before.

Treatise: All Tathagatas are included in the unconditioned wholesome.

Commentary: The five dharmas such as Tathata (真如, suchness) are all included in cessation and the path. Those included in cessation and the path are said in the sutras and treatises to be only unconditioned, so this is only wholesome. Moreover, the sixth of the 'Duifa Lun' (Treatise on Counterparts, 對法論), the 'Yujia Shidi Lun' (Yoga Teacher's Treatise, 瑜伽師地論), etc., say that there is a pure Dharmadhatu (法界, realm of dharma) that is not suffering or accumulation. The 'She Lun' (Compendium of Mahayana, 攝大乘論) is also the same. These two explanations combined with the previous four make six explanations. Since this is the case, then the eyes, etc., possessed by the Buddha are all unconditioned wholesome. They seem like wholesome with outflows and neutral, etc., and seem like wholesome with outflows. They are called wholesome, etc., but are not actually so.

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述曰。次三解常。此又是常。五法俱無盡期故。又真如無生滅故常。無變易故常。皆自性常故。四智心品所依真如常故常。其四智品體。無斷及無盡故說常。無斷常者。是不斷常義。報身也。無盡常者。是化身。相續常義。莊嚴論說三種常故。如常施食受樂等事。四智非自性常義。從因所生者。謂明從種生故。若初唯生后不滅者。便違佛說。一向記言生者皆滅故。又若色．心是自性常者。不見說故。違比量故。獲得常色等者。由願力化有情。是不斷相續常義。七十八．解深密說化身有生起相故　窮未來際。亦釋不斷．無盡常義。願力常故。余文可解。

論。此又安樂至俱名安樂。

述曰。次四解安樂。無逼無惱諸有情故。非如有漏善逼逐處生死。惱亂有情類不令趣涅槃。又有漏法皆是行苦。逼迫性故。增煩惱故。故非安樂。二轉依果俱名安樂。樂謂五樂。安謂五安。各有多種。安之與樂差別云何。謂諸有漏樂受者。樂而不安。粗動轉故。有漏輕安安而不樂。不能順益得涅槃故。此安樂者如第一卷疏解差別。

論。二乘所得至但名解脫身。

述曰。次解解脫身。于中有二。初略。后廣。二乘所得此二轉依果。但名解脫身。解脫生死．及縛法故。以彼轉依無十力等殊勝法所莊嚴故。不

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 述曰：接下來解釋常。這裡又是常。因為五法（指法身、報身、應身、自性身、變化身）都沒有窮盡的時候。又因為真如沒有生滅所以是常。沒有變易所以是常。都是自性常的緣故。四智心品所依的真如是常，所以四智品體，沒有斷絕也沒有窮盡，所以說是常。沒有斷絕的常，是不間斷的常的意義，指的是報身。沒有窮盡的常，是化身相續不斷的意義。《莊嚴論》說了三種常的緣故。例如經常佈施食物，眾生享受快樂等事。四智不是自性常的意義，是從因緣所生的，意思是光明從種子生出來的緣故。如果開始生起，之後不滅，就違背了佛所說的一切有生者都會滅的教義。又如果色、心是自性常，就沒有人會這樣說，違背了比量。獲得常色等，是由願力化生有情，是不間斷相續常的意義。《解深密經》第七十八卷說化身有生起相。窮未來際，也是解釋不斷、無盡常的意義。因為願力是常的緣故。其餘的文字可以理解。

論：這裡又是安樂，直到都叫做安樂。

述曰：接下來解釋安樂。因為沒有逼迫、沒有惱亂一切有情。不像有漏的善會逼迫眾生處於生死輪迴，惱亂有情眾生，不讓他們趣向涅槃。又有漏法都是行苦，因為有逼迫的性質，會增長煩惱，所以不是安樂。二轉依果都叫做安樂。樂指的是五樂，安指的是五安，各有多種。安和樂的差別是什麼？指的是那些有漏的樂受，是樂而不安，因為粗糙、動搖的緣故。有漏的輕安是安而不樂，因為不能順益得到涅槃的緣故。這裡的安樂，如第一卷疏解的差別。

論：二乘所得，直到只叫做解脫身。

述曰：接下來解釋解脫身。其中有兩部分。先是簡略的解釋，然後是詳細的解釋。二乘所得的這兩種轉依果，只叫做解脫身。因為解脫了生死和束縛的法。因為他們的轉依沒有十力等殊勝的法所莊嚴的緣故，不

【English Translation】 English version: Shu Yue: Next, explain 'constancy'. This is also 'constancy'. Because the five dharmas (Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya, Svabhavikakaya, and Transformation Body) have no end. Also, because Suchness (真如, Zhenru) has no birth or death, it is constant. Because it has no change, it is constant. All are constant by nature. The Suchness on which the four wisdom mind qualities rely is constant, so the essence of the four wisdom qualities has no cessation and no end, so it is said to be constant. 'No cessation constancy' means uninterrupted constancy, referring to the Sambhogakaya (報身). 'No end constancy' means the continuous constancy of the Nirmanakaya (化身). The Ornament of the Mahayana Sutras (莊嚴論) speaks of three kinds of constancy. For example, constantly giving food, sentient beings enjoying happiness, etc. The four wisdoms are not constant by nature, but are born from causes, meaning that light is born from seeds. If it arises at the beginning and does not perish later, it would contradict the Buddha's teaching that all that is born will perish. Also, if form and mind were constant by nature, no one would say so, contradicting inference. Obtaining constant form, etc., is the transformation of sentient beings by the power of vows, which is the meaning of uninterrupted continuous constancy. The seventy-eighth section of the Samdhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經) says that the transformation body has the appearance of arising. Exhausting the future, it also explains the meaning of uninterrupted and endless constancy. Because the power of vows is constant. The rest of the text can be understood.

Treatise: This is also bliss, until all are called bliss.

Shu Yue: Next, explain 'bliss'. Because there is no oppression and no disturbance to all sentient beings. Unlike the defiled good that oppresses sentient beings in the cycle of birth and death, disturbing sentient beings and preventing them from approaching Nirvana. Also, all defiled dharmas are the suffering of conditioning, because they have the nature of oppression and increase afflictions, so they are not bliss. The two fruits of transformation are both called bliss. 'Bliss' refers to the five kinds of bliss, and 'peace' refers to the five kinds of peace, each with many kinds. What is the difference between peace and bliss? It refers to those defiled sensations of bliss, which are blissful but not peaceful, because they are coarse and moving. Defiled tranquility is peaceful but not blissful, because it cannot benefit the attainment of Nirvana. This bliss is like the difference explained in the commentary of the first volume.

Treatise: What is attained by the Two Vehicles, until it is only called the Liberation Body.

Shu Yue: Next, explain the Liberation Body. There are two parts to it. First, a brief explanation, and then a detailed explanation. The two fruits of transformation attained by the Two Vehicles are only called the Liberation Body. Because they are liberated from birth and death and the binding dharmas. Because their transformation does not have the adornment of the ten powers and other excellent dharmas, it is not

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名法身。殊勝法者。斷所知障得無量功德依故。解深密經．七十八等說真如為解脫身言。世尊二乘所得轉依名法身不。善男子不名法身當名何身。名解脫身。由解脫身故。說二乘與佛平等平等。由法身故說有差別。無量最勝功德。算數譬喻所不能及。故彼名真如是二乘解脫身。非五分法身中解脫身。五分法身中解脫身。體唯勝解數故。此無為解脫故。彼菩提果是五分法身中解脫知見身。不名法身。菩提．及涅槃俱離縛故。但名解脫身。

論。大覺世尊至所莊嚴故。

述曰。次解在牟尼名法身　成就無上寂默法者。梵言牟尼此言寂默。寂默法者離言法也。或離過故。故名為寂默。通三乘解。成一切法性相離言不二法門名為寂默。唯我世尊大牟尼尊二轉依果。亦名法身．亦解脫也。言法身者。非三身中之法身也。佛得二名。離煩惱故名解脫身。離所知障具無邊德名為法身。此中意說。有為．無為各于自身功德法依名法身故。

論。體依聚義至皆此攝故。

述曰。何故名身。體性義．依止義．眾德聚義。具三義故名為身故。故通三身。若別．若總離名相義。此亦佛地論有。余文可解。

論。如是法身至所依止故。

述曰。自下諸門分別有七。初三身別相門。初總出法身中。復有勝義別

立身名自性　離相者。無十相也　寂然者。尋思路絕也　絕諸戲論者。離語言也。諸佛自性名自性身。有為．無為功德法依名曰法身。

論。二受用身至廣大法樂。

述曰。及極圓凈常遍色身者。眾相咸備名極圓。體離眾患名極凈。無間無斷名極常。無所不在名極遍。積集有礙之體名色身。此即功德之所依身。一是常不斷常故。二是遍量同空故。

相續湛然者。言相續者簡自性身。有生滅故。言湛然者簡他受用。及簡化身。彼時斷故。

論。二他受用至諸利樂事。

述曰。他受用中現身．土由平等智。現通說法等由觀察智。自他受用法樂等者名受用身。變化不爾。

論。以五法性至皆有實智。

述曰。第二五法攝三身門。第一師。經說真如是法身者。佛地經說。論說轉第八得自性者。攝論第九說。轉去藏識得圓鏡智亦智殊勝　說平等智于純凈土為諸菩薩現佛身者。佛地論云如餘論說。竟不出何論。莊嚴論說。然須勘抄　說觀察智大集會中等者。佛地亦言如餘論說。亦在莊嚴論。須勘抄諸文　亦有轉諸轉識得受用身者。是攝論智品說　說成事智於十方土現難思化故者。佛地論說莊嚴論說。又攝論智殊勝具攝三身。

論。有義初一至非色心故。

述曰。第二師說

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『立身名自性，離相者』：意思是說沒有十種相狀（十相）。 『寂然者』：意思是說尋伺思路斷絕。 『絕諸戲論者』：意思是說遠離語言。 諸佛的自性稱為自性身（Svabhavikakaya）。有為、無為的功德法所依止的稱為法身（Dharmakaya）。

論：二受用身至廣大法樂。

述曰：『及極圓凈常遍色身者』：眾多的相好都具備稱為『極圓』；本體遠離各種患難稱為『極凈』；沒有間斷稱為『極常』；無所不在稱為『極遍』；積聚有障礙的形體稱為『色身』。這也就是功德所依止的身。一是常，因為不斷絕；二是遍，因為量同虛空。

『相續湛然者』：說『相續』是爲了區別自性身（Svabhavikakaya），因為它有生滅；說『湛然』是爲了區別他受用身（Sambhogakaya）以及變化身（Nirmanakaya），因為它們有時斷滅。

論：二他受用至諸利樂事。

述曰：在他受用身（Sambhogakaya）中，顯現身和佛土是由於平等性智（Samatajnana）；顯現神通說法等是由於觀察智（Pratyavekshanajnana）。自受用和他受用的法樂等稱為受用身（Sambhogakaya），變化身（Nirmanakaya）不是這樣。

論：以五法性至皆有實智。

述曰：第二，用五法來概括三身之門。第一位老師說，經中說真如是法身（Dharmakaya），《佛地經》中這樣說。論中說轉第八識得到自性身（Svabhavikakaya），《攝大乘論》第九中這樣說。轉去藏識得到圓鏡智（Adarshajnana），也是智慧殊勝。 說平等性智（Samatajnana）在純凈土為諸菩薩顯現佛身，《佛地論》中說如其他論中所說，但最終沒有指出是哪部論。 《莊嚴論》中說，但需要勘查抄錄。說觀察智（Pratyavekshanajnana）在大**中等，《佛地論》也說如其他論中所說，也在《莊嚴論》中，需要勘查抄錄這些文句。也有轉諸轉識得到受用身（Sambhogakaya）的，這是《攝大乘論》智品中所說。說成所作智（Krityanushthanajnana）在十方國土顯現難以思議的變化，這是《佛地論》和《莊嚴論》中所說。而且《攝大乘論》智殊勝具足概括了三身。

論：有義初一至非色心故。

述曰：第二位老師說

【English Translation】 English version 'Establishing oneself is called self-nature, being apart from characteristics': This means there are no ten characteristics (Dasalakshana). 'Being silent': This means that the searching and thinking paths are cut off. 'Cutting off all frivolous discussions': This means being apart from language. The self-nature of all Buddhas is called Svabhavikakaya (self-nature body). The meritorious Dharmas that are conditioned and unconditioned are relied upon and called Dharmakaya (Dharma body).

Treatise: The two Sambhogakayas (enjoyment bodies) lead to great Dharma bliss.

Commentary: 'And the extremely complete, pure, constant, and pervasive form body': Having all the numerous characteristics is called 'extremely complete'; the essence being apart from all suffering is called 'extremely pure'; being without interruption is called 'extremely constant'; being omnipresent is called 'extremely pervasive'; accumulating the obstructed form is called 'form body'. This is the body upon which merit relies. First, it is constant because it is uninterrupted; second, it is pervasive because its measure is the same as space.

'Continuous and serene': Saying 'continuous' is to distinguish it from Svabhavikakaya (self-nature body), because it has birth and death; saying 'serene' is to distinguish it from Sambhogakaya (enjoyment body) and Nirmanakaya (transformation body), because they sometimes cease.

Treatise: The two others' enjoyment leads to all beneficial and joyful matters.

Commentary: In the Sambhogakaya (enjoyment body) of others, the manifestation of the body and Buddha-land is due to Samatajnana (equality wisdom); the manifestation of supernatural powers, Dharma teaching, etc., is due to Pratyavekshanajnana (discriminating wisdom). The Dharma bliss of self-enjoyment and others' enjoyment is called Sambhogakaya (enjoyment body); the Nirmanakaya (transformation body) is not like this.

Treatise: With the five Dharmata (nature of Dharma) to all having real wisdom.

Commentary: Second, using the five Dharmata (nature of Dharma) to encompass the three bodies' gate. The first teacher said that the Sutra says that Tathata (suchness) is Dharmakaya (Dharma body), as stated in the Buddhabhumi Sutra. The Treatise says that transforming the eighth consciousness to obtain Svabhavikakaya (self-nature body) is stated in the ninth chapter of the Mahayanasamgraha. Transforming the Alaya-vijnana (store consciousness) to obtain Adarshajnana (mirror-like wisdom) is also a superior wisdom. Saying that Samatajnana (equality wisdom) manifests the Buddha body for all Bodhisattvas in the pure land, the Buddhabhumi Sutra says as other treatises say, but ultimately does not point out which treatise. The Alamkara Sutra says, but it needs to be checked and copied. Saying that Pratyavekshanajnana (discriminating wisdom) is in the great ** etc., the Buddhabhumi Sutra also says as other treatises say, also in the Alamkara Sutra, it needs to be checked and copied these sentences. There is also transforming the transformed consciousnesses to obtain Sambhogakaya (enjoyment body), which is stated in the wisdom chapter of the Mahayanasamgraha. Saying that Krityanushthanajnana (accomplishing wisdom) manifests inconceivable transformations in the ten directions' lands, this is stated in the Buddhabhumi Sutra and the Alamkara Sutra. Moreover, the superior wisdom of the Mahayanasamgraha fully encompasses the three bodies.

Treatise: Some meanings, the first one to not being form and mind.

Commentary: The second teacher said

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有二。初自性。后余身。自性文有四。一標。二引證。三解違。四釋　自性身本常者。莊嚴論說三種常。如佛地論第七等引　說佛法身無生滅者。佛地云。贊佛論說。然七十八．解深密亦有此言。法身無生滅。化身有起盡故　說證因得非生因者。世親菩薩金剛般若論說　又說法身諸佛共有等者。佛地論云諸經論說。即對法第一．攝大乘智品等中亦有此說。

論。然說轉去至彼實性故。

述曰。然說轉去藏識得者。會第一師引攝論文。今以斷粗重顯真如故。智殊勝文者亦可解。以法身是智依止。彼智之實性故。

論。自性法身至得受用故。

述曰。四智品中下解余身中有二。初標智攝。后解釋相。相中有二。初自受用。后他受用。自受用中有三。一引證。二解違。三說相。平等智品現他受用。以得妙理自他平等。別為化上機現身．土等。成事智品隨類化身．土。妙觀察智于中說法。據實二身四智俱現。豈圓鏡智緣於二身不能親益。今但相似后智用。說圓鏡智是受用佛。此莊嚴論文。然前師如何解此文意　轉諸轉識得受用者。攝論文。此文即證四智皆受用身。

論。雖轉藏識至屬何身攝。

述曰。亦得受用等者。解攝大乘不說轉藏識得受用身。所以說為法身者。如前已解。圓鏡智品

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有兩種身。第一是自性身（Svabhavikakaya，佛的自性之身），第二是其餘身（指報身和化身）。 自性身的內容有四點：一、標示；二、引證；三、解釋矛盾；四、解釋。 關於『自性身本來是常住的』：在《莊嚴論》（Mahayana-sutralamkara）中說了三種常住。如《佛地論》（Buddhabhumika-sastra）第七卷等處引用說明。 關於『說佛的法身（Dharmakaya，法性之身）沒有生滅』：《佛地論》中說，贊佛的論著中說。而且《解深密經》（Samdhinirmocana-sutra）第七十八卷、《解深密經》中也有這種說法。法身沒有生滅，而化身（Nirmanakaya，應化之身）有起始和終結。 關於『說證得因而不是生因』：世親（Vasubandhu）菩薩的《金剛般若論》（Vajracchedika-prajnaparamita-sastra）中說。 關於『又說法身是諸佛共有的』：《佛地論》中說，許多經論中都這樣說。即《對法論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第一卷、《攝大乘論》（Mahayanasamgraha）智品等中也有這種說法。

論：然而說轉變去除，到達那個真實自性。

述記：然而說轉變去除藏識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）而證得，這是會第一師引用《攝大乘論》的文句。現在因為斷除了粗重的煩惱，顯現了真如（Tathata，如如）的緣故。『智殊勝文』也可以這樣解釋，因為法身是智慧所依止的，是那個智慧的真實自性。

論：自性法身，乃至獲得受用。

述記：在四智品中，下面解釋其餘身，其中有兩點：第一是標示智慧所包含的，第二是解釋相狀。相狀中有兩種：第一是自受用（Sva-sambhogakaya，自受用身），第二是他受用（Para-sambhogakaya，他受用身）。自受用身中有三點：一、引證；二、解釋矛盾；三、說明相狀。平等性智（Samatajnana，平等性智）品中顯現他受用，因為證得了微妙的道理，自他平等。特別為化身上的根機顯現身和國土等。成所作智（Krtyanusthanajnana，成所作智）品中，隨順不同種類化現身和國土。妙觀察智（Pratyaveksanajnana，妙觀察智）在其中說法。實際上，二身和四智都同時顯現。難道圓鏡智（Adarsajnana，大圓鏡智）緣於二身就不能親自利益嗎？現在只是相似於后智的作用。說圓鏡智是受用佛，這是《莊嚴論》的文句。然而前代的法師如何解釋這段文字的含義呢？ 『轉變各種轉識（Pravrtti-vijnana，轉識）而獲得受用』，這是《攝大乘論》的文句。這段文字就證明了四智都是受用身。

論：即使轉變藏識，乃至屬於哪個身所包含？

述記：『也獲得受用』等等，這是解釋《攝大乘論》沒有說轉變藏識而獲得受用身。之所以說它是法身，如前面已經解釋過的。圓鏡智品。

【English Translation】 English version There are two kinds of bodies. First, the Svabhavikakaya (self-nature body of the Buddha). Second, the remaining bodies (referring to the Sambhogakaya and Nirmanakaya). The content of the Svabhavikakaya has four points: 1. Indication; 2. Citation; 3. Explanation of contradictions; 4. Explanation. Regarding 'The Svabhavikakaya is originally permanent': In the 'Mahayana-sutralamkara' (Treatise on the Ornament of the Great Vehicle Sutras), three kinds of permanence are mentioned. As cited in the seventh volume of the 'Buddhabhumika-sastra' (Treatise on the Stages of Buddhahood) and other places. Regarding 'Saying that the Dharmakaya (body of the Dharma) of the Buddha has no birth or death': The 'Buddhabhumika-sastra' says, as do treatises praising the Buddha. Moreover, the 78th volume of the 'Samdhinirmocana-sutra' (Explanations of the Profound Secrets Sutra) and the 'Samdhinirmocana-sutra' also have this statement. The Dharmakaya has no birth or death, while the Nirmanakaya (transformation body) has a beginning and an end. Regarding 'Saying that it is the cause of attainment rather than the cause of birth': Vasubandhu Bodhisattva says in the 'Vajracchedika-prajnaparamita-sastra' (Diamond Sutra Treatise). Regarding 'Also saying that the Dharmakaya is shared by all Buddhas': The 'Buddhabhumika-sastra' says, as do many sutras and treatises. That is, the first volume of the 'Abhidharmasamuccaya' (Compendium of Abhidharma), the chapter on Wisdom in the 'Mahayanasamgraha' (Compendium of the Great Vehicle), and others also have this statement.

Treatise: However, it says that transformation and removal reach that true self-nature.

Commentary: However, saying that transformation and removal of the Alaya-vijnana (store consciousness) is attained, this is the sentence quoted by the first teacher from the 'Mahayanasamgraha'. Now, because the coarse and heavy afflictions are cut off, the Tathata (suchness) is manifested. The 'text on the superiority of wisdom' can also be explained in this way, because the Dharmakaya is what wisdom relies on, and it is the true self-nature of that wisdom.

Treatise: The Svabhavikakaya, up to obtaining enjoyment.

Commentary: In the chapter on the Four Wisdoms, the following explains the remaining bodies, which has two points: First, indicating what is contained by wisdom; second, explaining the characteristics. There are two kinds of characteristics: First, Sva-sambhogakaya (self-enjoyment body); second, Para-sambhogakaya (other-enjoyment body). There are three points in the self-enjoyment body: 1. Citation; 2. Explanation of contradictions; 3. Explanation of characteristics. The Samatajnana (wisdom of equality) chapter manifests other-enjoyment, because it has attained the subtle principle, and self and others are equal. It especially manifests bodies and lands for the faculties on the transformation bodies. In the Krtyanusthanajnana (wisdom of accomplishing actions) chapter, bodies and lands are transformed according to different kinds. The Pratyaveksanajnana (wisdom of wonderful observation) speaks the Dharma within them. In reality, the two bodies and four wisdoms all manifest simultaneously. Could it be that the Adarsajnana (great mirror wisdom) cannot personally benefit by being related to the two bodies? Now it is only similar to the function of the later wisdom. Saying that the Adarsajnana is the Buddha of enjoyment, this is the sentence from the 'Treatise on Ornament'. However, how did the previous teachers interpret the meaning of this text? 'Transforming various Pravrtti-vijnana (active consciousness) to obtain enjoyment', this is the sentence from the 'Mahayanasamgraha'. This text proves that the four wisdoms are all enjoyment bodies.

Treatise: Even if the Alaya-vijnana is transformed, to which body does it belong?

Commentary: 'Also obtaining enjoyment' and so on, this is explaining that the 'Mahayanasamgraha' does not say that transforming the Alaya-vijnana obtains the enjoyment body. The reason for saying that it is the Dharmakaya is as explained earlier. The chapter on the Adarsajnana.

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是實色．心。與此非色．心違。

論。又受用身至實智為體。

述曰。此以理解難。

解他化身中有三。初立理。次解違。后說相。

論。雖說化身至體實非智。

述曰。釋前所引攝論智殊勝攝三身文。然以自受用實智為體。準他受用身等。不說實無漏智。

論。但說平等至自受用攝。

述曰。釋前所引平等智現受用。成事智現三業化文。但明二智現二身。體非二身也。

第三他化二身相。于中有四。一標舉。二立理。三引證。四會違。

論。然變化身至無形質法。

述曰。是化現心心所。佛地論說。此實相分。似見分現。佛地第七有二說。如彼。不能繁引。

論。若不爾者至尚不知故。

述曰。下立理引證。

論。由此經說至化作三業。

述曰。下引證。

化無量類皆令有心者。化無量化人之類。皆令有心為引他故。此涅槃經。下佛地經。

論。又說變化至相分現故。

述曰。此解深密經文。七十八同。

論。雖說變化至故不說有。

述曰。會違。即九十八說。於四事不能化。一根。二心。三心所。四業．及業果報等。又無根等用。不如色．聲等故說不化。不爾香等亦應然。如五十四．及

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『是實色心』，與『此非色心』相違背。

論：又受用身以實智為體。

述曰：這是用理來理解難題。

解釋他化身中有三點：首先確立理，其次解釋相違之處，最後說明其相。

論：雖說化身，但其體實非智。

述曰：解釋前面所引用的《攝論》中關於智殊勝攝三身的文句。然而以自受用實智為體，比照他受用身等，不說實無漏智。

論：但說平等智現受用，成事智現三業化。

述曰：解釋前面所引用的平等智現受用，成事智現三業化的文句。只說明二智顯現二身，體並非二身。

第三，他化二身的相。其中有四點：一、標舉；二、立理；三、引證；四、會違。

論：然而變化身乃至無形質法。

述曰：這是化現的心和心所。在《佛地論》中說，這是實相分，類似見分顯現。《佛地論》第七有二種說法，如彼處所說，不能在此繁瑣地引用。

論：若不這樣，乃至尚且不知道。

述曰：下面確立理並引用證據。

論：由此經說，乃至化作三業。

述曰：下面引用證據。

『化無量類皆令有心者』，化無量化人之類，皆令有心，爲了引導他人。這是《涅槃經》。下面是《佛地經》。

論：又說變化乃至相分現故。

述曰：這是《解深密經》的經文，第七十八頁相同。

論：雖說變化乃至故不說有。

述曰：會合相違之處。即第九十八頁所說，對於四件事不能變化：一、根（indriya，感覺器官）；二、心（citta，意識）；三、心所（caitta，心理活動）；四、業（karma，行為）及業果報等。又沒有根等作用，不如色（rupa，顏色）、聲（shabda，聲音）等，所以說不能變化。不然的話，香（gandha，氣味）等也應該如此。如第五十四頁及……

【English Translation】 English version 'It is real form-mind' contradicts 'This is non-form-mind'.

Treatise: Moreover, the Enjoyment Body takes Real Wisdom as its essence.

Commentary: This uses reason to understand a difficult point.

There are three points in explaining the Other-Transformation Body: first, establish the principle; second, explain the contradictions; and third, explain its characteristics.

Treatise: Although it is said to be a Transformation Body, its essence is not wisdom.

Commentary: Explains the passage from the Samgraha-shastra (Compendium of Topics) previously cited regarding the Three Bodies being encompassed by the Superiority of Wisdom. However, it takes the Real Wisdom of Self-Enjoyment as its essence, in comparison to the Other-Enjoyment Body, etc., without mentioning Real Non-Outflow Wisdom.

Treatise: It only says that Equality Wisdom manifests Enjoyment, and Accomplishment Wisdom manifests the transformation of the three karmas.

Commentary: Explains the passage previously cited regarding Equality Wisdom manifesting Enjoyment, and Accomplishment Wisdom manifesting the transformation of the three karmas. It only explains that the two wisdoms manifest the two bodies, but their essence is not the two bodies.

Third, the characteristics of the two Other-Transformation Bodies. There are four points: 1. Identification; 2. Establishing the principle; 3. Citing evidence; 4. Reconciling contradictions.

Treatise: However, the Transformation Body extends to formless dharmas.

Commentary: This is the manifested mind and mental factors. The Buddhabhumi-sutra (Discourse on the Buddha-Land) says that this is the Reality Aspect, appearing similar to the Perception Aspect. The seventh section of the Buddhabhumi-sutra has two explanations, as mentioned there, which cannot be elaborately cited here.

Treatise: If not, then even they would not know.

Commentary: Below, establish the principle and cite evidence.

Treatise: Therefore, the sutra says, even transforming into the three karmas.

Commentary: Below, cite evidence.

'Transforming countless beings, all causing them to have minds,' transforming countless kinds of transformed people, all causing them to have minds, in order to guide others. This is from the Nirvana Sutra. Below is from the Buddhabhumi Sutra.

Treatise: It also says that transformation is due to the manifestation of the Aspect Division.

Commentary: This is a passage from the Samdhinirmocana Sutra (Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra), the same as page seventy-eight.

Treatise: Although it says transformation, therefore it is said not to exist.

Commentary: Reconciling contradictions. That is, as stated on page ninety-eight, there are four things that cannot be transformed: 1. Indriya (sense organs); 2. Citta (mind/consciousness); 3. Caitta (mental factors); 4. Karma (actions) and karmic retributions, etc. Moreover, there is no function of the sense organs, etc., unlike rupa (form/color), shabda (sound), etc., therefore it is said that they cannot be transformed. Otherwise, gandha (smell), etc., should also be the same. As on page fifty-four and...

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五十三末．及前第二卷抄。因明化中化為何法等。

論。如是三身至化相功德。

述曰。第三三身功德各異門。法身應以木．石為難。彼亦不能起貪．恚等。應名具功德。此順生善法故不得為例。常樂我凈等應分別　離染簡有漏　眾善所依。簡有為無漏　無為功德。顯無生滅。余如樞要。並取佛地第七。

論。又自性身至為他現故。

述曰。第四三身二利門。可解。

論。又自性身至遍一切處。

述曰。第五三身所依土分別門。如樞要說。即法身亦名自性身。法性土者。以屬佛．法相．性異故。以佛義是相。謂有為功德法所依故。眾德聚義故。二身自體故。法是性義。功德自性故。能持自性故。諸法自性故。體為土義為身。

論。自受用身至亦無定現。

述曰。還隨自受用土。下二身隨自土亦爾。非離身別有土名故。如樞要說。然此功德隨所依身．智慧。隨所證如法。亦可說言遍一切處　隨住十地菩薩宜者。十地經說。十地各有份量大小。廣如彼說。唯見百佛見百葉化佛。見百三千大千世界變化身土　凈穢佛土因緣成就者。以化土中有凈有穢。非他受用土故言凈穢。他受用法樂增同自受用俱名受用。化土雖復說法。神通增故立變化名。法樂義劣。此佛地論廣說大精

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 五十三末，以及前第二卷的抄本。因明化中化為何法等？

論：如是三身至化相功德。

述曰：第三，三身功德各異門。法身應以木、石為難。彼亦不能起貪、恚等。應名具功德。此順生善法故不得為例。常樂我凈等應分別：離染簡有漏，眾善所依。簡有為無漏，無為功德。顯無生滅。余如樞要。並取佛地第七。

論：又自性身至為他現故。

述曰：第四，三身二利門。可解。

論：又自性身至遍一切處。

述曰：第五，三身所依土分別門。如樞要說。即法身亦名自性身。法性土者，以屬佛、法相、性異故。以佛義是相，謂有為功德法所依故。眾德聚義故。二身自體故。法是性義，功德自性故。能持自性故。諸法自性故。體為土義為身。

論：自受用身至亦無定現。

述曰：還隨自受用土。下二身隨自土亦爾。非離身別有土名故。如樞要說。然此功德隨所依身、智慧，隨所證如法。亦可說言遍一切處：隨住十地菩薩宜者，《十地經》說，十地各有份量大小。廣如彼說。唯見百佛見百葉化佛。見百三千大千世界變化身土：凈穢佛土因緣成就者，以化土中有凈有穢，非他受用土故言凈穢。他受用法樂增同自受用俱名受用。化土雖復說法，神通增故立變化名，法樂義劣。此《佛地論》廣說大精。

【English Translation】 English version Fifty-three end, and the copy of the previous second volume. What Dharma (teachings, laws) does the transformation within the transformation of Hetu-vidya (logic, reasoning) become?

Treatise: Thus, the Trikaya (three bodies of Buddha) reaches the merits of manifested forms.

Commentary: Third, the merits of the Trikaya (three bodies of Buddha) differ in each aspect. The Dharmakaya (body of essence) should be challenged with wood and stone. They also cannot give rise to greed, hatred, etc. It should be called possessing merits. This accords with the arising of wholesome Dharmas (teachings, laws), so it cannot be taken as an example. 'Eternal, Blissful, Self, Pure' etc., should be distinguished: 'Separation from defilement' simplifies the contaminated (with outflows), 'reliance on all good'. 'Simplifies the conditioned uncontaminated', 'unconditioned merit'. Reveals no arising and ceasing. The rest is as in the 'Essentials'. Also, take the seventh of 'Buddhabhumi' (Buddha-land).

Treatise: Moreover, the Svabhavikakaya (self-nature body) reaches the point of manifesting for others.

Commentary: Fourth, the Trikaya (three bodies of Buddha) has two aspects of benefit. Understandable.

Treatise: Moreover, the Svabhavikakaya (self-nature body) reaches the point of pervading all places.

Commentary: Fifth, the Trikaya (three bodies of Buddha) distinguishes the lands they rely on. As the 'Essentials' say. That is, the Dharmakaya (body of essence) is also called the Svabhavikakaya (self-nature body). The Dharmata-dhatu (Dharma-nature realm) is because it belongs to the Buddha, Dharma (teachings, laws), characteristics, and nature, which are different. The meaning of Buddha is characteristic, referring to the reliance on conditioned meritorious Dharmas (teachings, laws). It is the meaning of the gathering of all virtues. It is the self-nature of the two bodies. Dharma (teachings, laws) is the meaning of nature, the self-nature of merit. It can uphold self-nature. It is the self-nature of all Dharmas (teachings, laws). The essence is the meaning of land, and the meaning of body.

Treatise: The Sambhogakaya (enjoyment body) reaches the point of also having no fixed manifestation.

Commentary: It still follows the Sambhoga-dhatu (enjoyment land). The lower two bodies also follow their own lands. It is not that there is a separate land name apart from the body. As the 'Essentials' say. However, these merits follow the body and wisdom they rely on, and follow the Dharma (teachings, laws) they realize. It can also be said to pervade all places: Those who dwell in the ten Bhumis (grounds) of Bodhisattvas (enlightenment beings) are suitable. The 'Ten Bhumi Sutra' says that each of the ten Bhumis (grounds) has its own size and extent. It is extensively described there. Only seeing a hundred Buddhas (enlightened beings), seeing a hundred leaf-transformation Buddhas (enlightened beings), seeing a hundred three-thousand great thousand world transformation bodies and lands: Those whose pure and impure Buddha-lands are accomplished by causes and conditions, because there are pure and impure things in the transformation land, it is not a land enjoyed by others, so it is called pure and impure. The increase of Dharma (teachings, laws) bliss enjoyed by others is the same as self-enjoyment, both are called enjoyment. Although the transformation land also preaches Dharma (teachings, laws), the increase of supernatural powers establishes the name of transformation, and the meaning of Dharma (teachings, laws) bliss is inferior. This 'Buddhabhumi-sastra' (Treatise on the Buddha-land) extensively explains great diligence.

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。

論。自性身土至一切生故。

述曰。第六三身諸佛身土所化同異門。須勘佛地。此文一往。佛地甚好。共中其實是多。見者謂於一土有一佛身故。不共中佛地論引彌勒菩薩根熟后等。又勘別抄。彌勒發心劫數長短乃至廣說。

論。此諸身土至俱善無漏。

述曰。第七門。于中有二。初明身．土能．所變。二因解唯識見．相同異。此即初門　第八雖實皆通緣染．凈土。然約增勝現所得者。自受用者唯凈無漏識之變。既唯佛能知變。非余所知變故。他受用身．土體唯是凈。然能變者通有．無漏。如來．及十地中菩薩無漏后得所變。即純凈無漏。若十地第八識並五識。及七地以前有漏散心。及有漏后得所變。即純凈有漏。無他受用土體是穢者。非有穢心之所變故　問既許有漏識亦能變土。他受用土云何必唯凈　答本質佛所變者非穢故。能變之者無煩惱穢故。無穢識故。所以所變之土唯凈通有．無漏。此據相似。若變化土本質通凈．穢唯無漏。若隨彼二乘等無漏心所變即無漏。然彼無此事。彼無漏狹不能緣身．土等。若隨彼二乘有漏心．並異生所變即有漏。皆通凈．穢。或二乘等后得不能緣。即唯有漏。通染．凈。如螺髻梵王．舍利弗等所見異故。今此文中總約三法．一切有情為論。

論

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：

論：自性身土能利益一切眾生。

述記：第六門討論三身諸佛的身土所化現的相同與不同之處。需要參考《佛地經論》。這段文字初看之下，《佛地經論》的內容非常好。但實際上其中有很多深奧之處。有些人認為在一片佛土中只有一尊佛身。但在『不共』的方面，《佛地經論》引用了彌勒菩薩在根基成熟之後等等的例子。還需要參考其他的抄本，其中詳細說明了彌勒菩薩發心的劫數長短等等。

論：這些身土都是清凈無漏的。

述記：第七門，其中包含兩部分。首先闡明身和土的能變和所變關係，其次解釋唯識宗的見解、相同與不同之處。這裡是第一部分。第八識實際上可以通於緣染凈土，但就增勝的顯現所得而言，自受用身土唯有清凈無漏識的變現。既然只有佛才能知曉這種變現，就不是其他人所能知曉的變現。他受用身土的體性唯有清凈，然而能變現者則通於有漏和無漏。如來和十地菩薩的無漏后得智所變現的，就是純凈無漏的。如果是十地菩薩的第八識以及五識，還有七地以前的有漏散心，以及有漏后得智所變現的，就是純凈有漏的。沒有他受用土的體性是污穢的，因為不是由污穢的心所變現的。問：既然允許有漏識也能變現佛土，為什麼他受用土必定是清凈的？答：本質是佛所變現的，不是污穢的。能變現者沒有煩惱污穢。沒有污穢的識。所以所變現的佛土唯有清凈，通於有漏和無漏。這是根據相似的情況來說的。如果是變化土，本質通於清凈和污穢，但唯有無漏。如果隨順二乘等無漏心所變現的，就是無漏的。然而二乘沒有這種能力，他們的無漏智慧狹隘，不能緣身土等。如果隨順二乘的有漏心以及異生所變現的，就是有漏的，都通於清凈和污穢。或者二乘等的后得智不能緣，就唯有有漏，通於染污和清凈。例如螺髻梵王、舍利弗等所見不同。現在這段文字中，總的來說是就三法和一切有情來討論的。

論：

【English Translation】 English version:

Treatise: The self-nature body and land benefit all sentient beings.

Commentary: The sixth section discusses the similarities and differences in the manifested bodies and lands of the Three Bodies of Buddhas. It is necessary to refer to the 'Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra' (佛地經論). At first glance, the content of the 'Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra' seems excellent. However, there are actually many profound aspects within it. Some people believe that there is only one Buddha body in one Buddha land. But in terms of 'non-commonality,' the 'Buddhabhumi Sutra Shastra' cites examples of Maitreya Bodhisattva (彌勒菩薩) after his roots have matured, and so on. It is also necessary to refer to other transcripts, which detail the length of kalpas (劫數) for Maitreya Bodhisattva's initial aspiration, and so on.

Treatise: These bodies and lands are all pure and without outflows (無漏).

Commentary: The seventh section contains two parts. First, it clarifies the relationship between the ability to transform (能變) and the transformed (所變) of the body and land. Second, it explains the views, similarities, and differences of the Consciousness-Only school. This is the first part. Although the eighth consciousness actually connects to conditioned and pure lands, in terms of the superior manifestation obtained, the self-enjoyment body and land are only transformations of pure, outflow-free consciousness. Since only the Buddha can know this transformation, it is not a transformation that others can know. The nature of the other-enjoyment body and land is only pure, but the transformer connects to both with outflows and without outflows. The transformations by the Tathagata (如來) and the post-attainment wisdom (后得) without outflows of the Ten-Ground Bodhisattvas (十地菩薩) are purely without outflows. If it is the eighth consciousness and the five consciousnesses of the Ten-Ground Bodhisattvas, as well as the scattered minds with outflows before the Seventh Ground, and the post-attainment wisdom with outflows, then the transformations are purely with outflows. There is no nature of other-enjoyment land that is defiled, because it is not transformed by a defiled mind. Question: Since it is allowed that consciousness with outflows can also transform Buddha lands, why must the other-enjoyment land be pure? Answer: The essence is transformed by the Buddha, and it is not defiled. The transformer has no defilements of afflictions. There is no defiled consciousness. Therefore, the transformed Buddha land is only pure, connecting to both with outflows and without outflows. This is according to similar situations. If it is a transformation land, the essence connects to both pure and defiled, but only without outflows. If it is transformed according to the outflow-free mind of the Two Vehicles (二乘), then it is without outflows. However, the Two Vehicles do not have this ability; their outflow-free wisdom is narrow and cannot connect to bodies and lands, etc. If it is transformed according to the mind with outflows of the Two Vehicles and ordinary beings, then it is with outflows, connecting to both pure and defiled. Or the post-attainment wisdom of the Two Vehicles, etc., cannot connect, then it is only with outflows, connecting to defilement and purity. For example, the views of the Brahma King with a Conch Hair-knot (螺髻梵王), Shariputra (舍利弗), etc., are different. Now, in this passage, generally speaking, it is discussing the Three Dharmas and all sentient beings.

Treatise:

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。純善無漏至非苦集故。

述曰。此無漏相分同能變識一向是善無漏。相不離見同非系故。以能緣心變似自境故。縛與不縛理必須同。凈與不凈理必須同。無漏心等順益義勝。悲力廣大。相分與見必同善性。一切無漏法爾必善故性必同。其性相必皆順理故。故性必同。非如有漏心相．見性有別。言因緣者。是種子也。

論。蘊等識相至雜引生故。

述曰。以蘊．處．界三法因緣雜引生故。謂見分是心。相分非心。如第八相中根．境等。及六識所緣色等。以與見分非一類種生故。色．心等別。以不相違故。無漏所變相分法中有五蘊。亦如根等。即是相分純種。與見分無漏及性同也。與見雜種故。色．心蘊等亦各有異。乃至相應法相分相望亦然。由識起相等同不繫法。純種。唯無漏。作用法不同。雜種生色．心。不可有漏同無漏難。

論。有漏識上至非滅道故。

述曰。純從有漏種子生故。同是系法。所以言純。故唯有漏　問何故界系見．相許別系。有漏．無漏必同耶　答見．相雖界系別。仍相順故。

論。善等識相至五十二等。

述曰。善等三性識之相分不必皆同。性相別故。有漏名等勢分轉故。不順理故。不能引相與見分相必能令同。如鼻．舌．身識見與彼相分非必同性

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：純粹的善且沒有煩惱的法是不會導致痛苦和集諦的。

述記中說：這種無漏的相分（客觀存在的部分）和能變識（能認知的主觀意識）一樣，始終是純善且沒有煩惱的。因為相分不離見分（認知），它們同屬于非繫縛（解脫）的。因為能緣之心（能認知的心）變現出類似自身境界的相，所以繫縛與非繫縛在道理上必須相同，清凈與不清凈在道理上也必須相同。無漏的心等具有順益的殊勝意義，並且具有廣大的悲憫力量。相分與見分必然具有相同的善性，一切無漏法自然而然必然是善的，所以它們的性質必然相同。它們的性質和現象必然都符合真理，所以性質必然相同。不像有漏的心，相分和見分的性質有所不同。這裡所說的因緣，指的是種子（潛在的可能性）。

論：蘊、處、界等是識的相分，因為它們是各種因緣混合產生的。

述記中說：因為蘊（五蘊：色、受、想、行、識）、處（十二處：眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意 及其對應的色、聲、香、味、觸、法）、界（十八界：眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意 及其對應的色、聲、香、味、觸、法，以及眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）這三種法是因緣混合產生的。見分是心，相分不是心，例如第八識（阿賴耶識）的相分中的根（六根：眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）和境（六境：色、聲、香、味、觸、法）等，以及六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）所緣的色等，因為它們與見分不是同一類種子所生，所以色和心等是不同的。因為它們不互相違背，所以無漏所變現的相分法中也有五蘊，就像根等一樣，是相分純粹的種子，與見分無漏且性質相同。因為與見分是混合的種子，所以色、心等蘊也各有不同，乃至相應法（與心相應的心理活動）的相分也同樣如此。由識所產生的相，其性質等同於不被束縛的法，是純粹的種子，只有無漏。作用法不同，混合的種子產生色和心。不能將有漏和無漏混為一談。

論：有漏識上的相分，不是滅諦和道諦。

述記中說：因為它們純粹是從有漏的種子所生，所以同屬于繫縛的法。之所以說是純粹的，所以只有有漏。問：為什麼在界系中，見分和相分允許屬於不同的界系，而有漏和無漏卻必須相同呢？答：見分和相分雖然界系不同，但仍然是相互順應的。

論：善、惡等三性的識的相分，不一定都相同，因為性質和現象是不同的。

述記中說：善、惡等三性的識的相分不一定都相同，因為性質和現象是不同的。有漏的名等隨著勢力而轉變，不符合真理，不能引導相分與見分必然相同。例如鼻識、舌識、身識的見分與它們的相分不一定具有相同的性質。

【English Translation】 English version: Purely virtuous and undefiled dharmas do not lead to suffering and its origination (苦集, duhkha-samudaya).

The commentary states: This undefiled aspect (相分, nimitta-bhāga) is, like the transforming consciousness (能變識, pariṇāma-vijñāna), always purely virtuous and undefiled. Because the aspect does not separate from the perception (見分, darśana-bhāga), they both belong to the unconditioned (非繫縛, asaṃyojana). Because the perceiving mind (能緣之心, alambana-citta) transforms into an image similar to its own realm, bondage and non-bondage must be the same in principle, and purity and impurity must be the same in principle. Undefiled minds and the like have the superior meaning of benefiting and possess great compassionate power. The aspect and perception must have the same virtuous nature; all undefiled dharmas are naturally virtuous, so their nature must be the same. Their nature and phenomena must all conform to truth, so their nature must be the same, unlike the aspect and perception of defiled minds, which have different natures. The term 'cause and condition' (因緣, hetu-pratyaya) refers to seeds (種子, bīja).

Treatise: The aggregates (蘊, skandha), bases (處, āyatana), and realms (界, dhātu) are aspects of consciousness because they are produced by a mixture of various causes and conditions.

The commentary states: Because the three dharmas of aggregates, bases, and realms are produced by a mixture of causes and conditions. The perception is the mind, and the aspect is not the mind, such as the roots (根, indriya) and objects (境, viṣaya) in the aspect of the eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, ālayavijñāna), and the forms (色, rūpa) and the like that are the objects of the six consciousnesses (六識, ṣaḍ-vijñāna). Because they are not born from the same kind of seed as the perception, form and mind are different. Because they do not contradict each other, the aspect dharmas transformed by the undefiled also contain the five aggregates, just like the roots, which are pure seeds of the aspect and are undefiled and of the same nature as the perception. Because they are mixed seeds with the perception, the aggregates of form and mind are also different from each other, and so on, the aspects of associated dharmas (相應法, samprayukta-dharma) are also the same. The nature of the aspects produced by consciousness is the same as that of unconditioned dharmas, which are pure seeds and only undefiled. The functioning dharmas are different, and mixed seeds produce form and mind. It is difficult to equate the defiled with the undefiled.

Treatise: The aspects on defiled consciousness are not cessation (滅諦, nirodha-satya) and the path (道諦, marga-satya).

The commentary states: Because they are purely born from defiled seeds, they belong to the conditioned dharmas. The reason for saying 'purely' is that they are only defiled. Question: Why are the perception and aspect allowed to belong to different realms in the realm system, while the defiled and undefiled must be the same? Answer: Although the perception and aspect belong to different realms, they are still mutually compliant.

Treatise: The aspects of consciousness with the three natures of virtuous, etc., are not necessarily the same, because their nature and phenomena are different.

The commentary states: The aspects of consciousness with the three natures of virtuous, etc., are not necessarily the same, because their nature and phenomena are different. The names of the defiled change with power and do not conform to truth, and cannot lead the aspect to necessarily be the same as the perception. For example, the perception of nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses does not necessarily have the same nature as their aspects.

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。故與見分非必性同。見．相分中三性因緣雜引生故。不可同性。作用別故。性不可同。如無漏緣使等相分唯有漏。虛空等能緣心通三性。相分唯無記。香等三境唯無記。能緣之識通三性等。若皆純種唯一性者。三境唯無記。等言應不成失。不可說約第八所變唯說無記。三識所變通三性。二境亦爾。以三識所變三處攝故。應言通三性。諸論無文故。虛空．非擇例亦應然。故相分．見分不必同性。性別既爾。蘊等識相或相．見分同。或相．見分異類此應知。亦不定故。若相分與見分蘊等亦同。便無五蘊．十二處．十八界別。既有三科別。明知相．見分等不必皆同。佛地論說。三身生滅門。化自．他．身色俱非等。化心亦爾。三身相對四句門。生法二身攝三身門。十佛攝三身門。如彼第七。

因解身．土能變．所變。即釋唯識相．見異同。上來已依略．廣．及位等。明能變識等訖。自下解相．見分或異同中。即明能變之識相．見同異。第七門中。自下第二因解唯識義。

論。然相分等至俱實有故。

述曰。一解云。等取心所所變現。所變名為行相。依識變現等者。唯難陀二分義。小分有異親疏所緣二皆不實故。以疏所緣等取親相。不為行相。此所疏知。如識變故　又立三分並下有二複次解　依識變現等

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，見分（jian fen，能見之主體）不一定與相分（xiang fen，被見之客體）性質相同。因為見分和相分中，三性（san xing，三種性質，即善、惡、無記）的因緣交雜引生，所以不可能性質相同。作用不同，性質也不可能相同。例如，無漏緣使等相分只有有漏（you lou，有煩惱），虛空等能緣之心通於三性，相分只有無記（wu ji，非善非惡），香等三種境只有無記，能緣之識通於三性等等。如果都是純粹的種子，只有一種性質，那麼三種境就應該只有無記，等等的說法就不成立了。不能說只就第八識（第八識，阿賴耶識 alaya-vijnana）所變現的才說是無記，前三識（前三識，眼識、耳識、鼻識）所變現的通於三性，兩種境也是這樣。因為前三識所變現的包含在這三處之中，應該說通於三性。各種論典中沒有這樣的說法。虛空、非擇滅（fei ze mie，通過智慧抉擇而達到的滅）的例子也應該如此。所以相分、見分不一定性質相同。性質不同，蘊（yun，構成要素）、識（shi，意識）的相或者相分、見分相同，或者相分、見分不同，應該這樣理解，因為也是不定的。如果相分與見分的蘊等也相同，就沒有五蘊（wu yun，色、受、想、行、識）、十二處（shi er chu，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意、色、聲、香、味、觸、法）、十八界（shi ba jie，六根、六境、六識）的區別了。既然有這三科的區別，明顯知道相分、見分等不一定都相同。《佛地論》（Fo Di Lun）說，三身（san shen，法身、報身、應身）的生滅門，化身（hua shen，應化身）的自、他身色都不等，化心也是這樣。三身相對的四句門，生身和法身包含三身門，十佛包含三身門，如《佛地論》第七卷所說。 因為解釋身（shen，佛身）、土（tu，佛土）的能變（neng bian，能轉變）和所變（suo bian，所轉變），就是解釋唯識（wei shi，唯識學）的相分、見分的異同。上面已經依照略說、廣說以及位等，說明了能變之識等。下面解釋相分、見分或者異同中，就是說明能變之識的相、見同異。第七門中，下面第二點是解釋唯識的意義。 論：然而相分等都是真實存在的。 述記：一種解釋是，『等』包括心所（xin suo，心所法）所變現的。所變現的名為行相（xing xiang，行為的表象）。依據識變現等，只有難陀（Nan陀）的二分義（er fen yi，二分理論）。小分有異，親疏所緣二者都不真實。因為疏所緣等同於親相，不作為行相。這是所疏遠知道的，如識變現一樣。又建立三分（san fen，三分理論），並且下面有兩次補充解釋。依據識變現等。

【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, the seeing-division (jian fen, the subject of seeing) is not necessarily of the same nature as the object-division (xiang fen, the object of being seen). Because in the seeing-division and object-division, the conditions of the three natures (san xing, the three natures, namely good, evil, and non-committal) are mixed and arise, so it is impossible for them to be of the same nature. Because the functions are different, the natures cannot be the same. For example, the object-division such as outflows and causes of outflows only has outflows (you lou, with afflictions), the mind that can cognize such as space pervades the three natures, the object-division only has non-committal (wu ji, neither good nor evil), the three realms such as smells only have non-committal, the consciousness that can cognize pervades the three natures, and so on. If they were all pure seeds with only one nature, then the three realms should only have non-committal, and so on, and the statement would not be established. It cannot be said that only what is transformed by the eighth consciousness (eighth consciousness, alaya-vijnana) is said to be non-committal, and what is transformed by the first three consciousnesses (first three consciousnesses, eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness) pervades the three natures, and the two realms are also like this. Because what is transformed by the first three consciousnesses is included in these three places, it should be said to pervade the three natures. There is no such statement in various treatises. The examples of space and non-selective cessation (fei ze mie, cessation achieved through wisdom) should also be like this. Therefore, the object-division and seeing-division are not necessarily of the same nature. Since the natures are different, the characteristics of aggregates (yun, constituting elements), consciousness (shi, consciousness), or the object-division and seeing-division are the same, or the object-division and seeing-division are different, this should be understood, because it is also uncertain. If the aggregates of the object-division and seeing-division are also the same, there would be no distinction between the five aggregates (wu yun, form, feeling, perception, volition, consciousness), the twelve entrances (shi er chu, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, form, sound, smell, taste, touch, dharma), and the eighteen realms (shi ba jie, six sense organs, six sense objects, six consciousnesses). Since there are these three categories of distinctions, it is clear that the object-division, seeing-division, etc., are not necessarily all the same. The Buddhabhumi Sutra (Fo Di Lun) says that in the gate of arising and ceasing of the three bodies (san shen, Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya), the manifested body (hua shen, Nirmanakaya) of oneself and others are not equal in form, and the manifested mind is also like this. The four-sentence gate relative to the three bodies, the gate of the Sambhogakaya and Dharmakaya including the three bodies, the gate of the ten Buddhas including the three bodies, as stated in the seventh volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra. Because explaining the transforming (neng bian, that which transforms) and the transformed (suo bian, that which is transformed) of the body (shen, Buddha body) and land (tu, Buddha land), is to explain the similarities and differences of the object-division and seeing-division of Vijnanavada (wei shi, Vijnanavada). Above, according to brief explanations, extensive explanations, and positions, etc., the transforming consciousness, etc., have been explained. Below, in explaining the object-division, seeing-division, or similarities and differences, it is to explain the similarities and differences of the object and seeing of the transforming consciousness. In the seventh gate, the second point below is to explain the meaning of Vijnanavada. Treatise: However, the object-division, etc., are all truly existent. Commentary: One explanation is that 'etc.' includes what is transformed by mental factors (xin suo, mental factors). What is transformed is called the appearance of action (xing xiang, appearance of action). According to the transformation of consciousness, etc., only the two-division theory (er fen yi, two-division theory) of Nanda (Nan陀) is valid. The small divisions are different, and neither the close nor distant objects are real. Because the distant object is the same as the close appearance, it is not regarded as the appearance of action. This is what is known distantly, just like the transformation of consciousness. Furthermore, establish the three divisions (san fen, three-division theory), and there are two more supplementary explanations below. According to the transformation of consciousness, etc.

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者。相分等言等取見分。識自體之所變故。此相．見分雖體是依他。識自體之用故。非如識性依他中實。識是根本自體故。彼是末是用故。如日．及輪。如燈．及光。實．虛異故。若不爾應不言唯識。應言唯境唯見分等。以許相．見與識自體　俱實有故。此義應思。設緣色等見．相亦俱不實。不及於識。如緣過未虛空等識相分。雖有非稍實法。見分非無。仍緣虛境。虛境行相是不實心。故見不及識自體分。識自體分唯緣于識。是根本故。證自體故。體性是實有。其變似色等亦並不實。此師意也　若爾無分別智境相如何　彼內證故此所不論。如緣自體。余是外境故不同如。設緣真如自體實有。非識所變故。真如體實。今論所變故相．見假。又縱真如是實。以于境中少實有故。但言唯識不言唯境。今以內證是故不可例同於外。佛地第三有此師義。許有三分依他性義。

論。或識相見至虛實如識。

述曰。第二師說。識與相．見分等。皆從緣生因緣法故。此二與識虛實皆同。雖有緣去．來等。相是依他故。與識不多別。又此師意。但有相分與識一種是實。不遮緣過．未但得假法。此是正義。前師相．見即識種生。此師相分與識別種。見分與識同種生故。

若爾應言諸法唯境。何言唯識。

論。唯言

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 再說，相分（Xiangfen，影像部分）等同於見分（Jianfen，認知部分），因為它們都取自見分。這是因為它們都是識（Shi，意識）自體所變現的。雖然相分和見分的本體是依他起性（Yitaqixing，緣起性），但它們是識自體的作用，不像識性那樣在依他起性中是真實的。識是根本的自體，而相分和見分是末端的作用，就像太陽和輪子，燈和光一樣，真實和虛幻是不同的。如果不是這樣，就不應該說『唯識』（Weishi，唯有意識），而應該說『唯境』（Weijing，唯有外境）或『唯見分』等，因為你們承認相分、見分與識自體都是真實存在的。這個道理應該仔細思考。 假設緣於色等，見分和相分都不真實，但它們不及於識。就像緣於過去、未來、虛空等的識相分，雖然有並非完全真實的法，但見分並非沒有，仍然緣于虛幻的境界。虛幻境界的行相是不實的心，所以見分不及識自體分。識自體分只緣于識，因為它是根本，是證自體。體性是真實存在的，而它所變現的類似色等並不真實。這是這位論師的觀點。 如果這樣，無分別智（Wu fenbie zhi，無分別的智慧）的境界相如何？那是因為它是內證的，這裡不討論。就像緣于自體一樣，其餘的是外境，所以不同。假設緣于真如（Zhenru，真如），自體是真實存在的，但不是識所變現的，所以真如的本體是真實的。現在討論的是識所變現的，所以相分和見分是虛假的。又縱使真如是真實的，因為它在境界中稍微真實存在，所以只說『唯識』，不說『唯境』。現在因為是內證，所以不能像外境一樣類比。佛地第三有這位論師的觀點，承認有三分依他性義。

論：或者識的相分、見分等，虛實與識相同。

述曰：第二位論師說，識與相分、見分等，都是從因緣而生，是因緣法，所以這二者與識的虛實相同。雖然有緣於過去、未來等相，但相分是依他起性，與識沒有太多區別。又這位論師的意思是，只有相分與識是一種真實，不遮止緣於過去、未來，但得到的是假法。這是正義。前一位論師認為相分、見分是從識的種子生起，這位論師認為相分與識是別種，見分與識是同種生起。

如果這樣，應該說諸法唯境，為什麼說唯識？

論：唯言

【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, the image-portion (Xiangfen) is equivalent to the cognition-portion (Jianfen), because they are both derived from the cognition-portion. This is because they are both transformations of the self-nature of consciousness (Shi). Although the substance of the image-portion and cognition-portion is dependent origination (Yitaqixing), they are functions of the self-nature of consciousness, and are not truly real within dependent origination like the nature of consciousness. Consciousness is the fundamental self-nature, while the image-portion and cognition-portion are terminal functions, like the sun and the wheel, the lamp and the light; reality and illusion are different. If this were not the case, it should not be said 'Consciousness-only' (Weishi), but rather 'Object-only' (Weijing) or 'Cognition-portion-only,' etc., because you admit that the image-portion, cognition-portion, and the self-nature of consciousness are all truly existent. This principle should be carefully considered. Suppose that when conditioned by form, etc., the cognition-portion and image-portion are both unreal, but they are inferior to consciousness. Like the image-portion of consciousness conditioned by the past, future, emptiness, etc., although there are dharmas that are not entirely real, the cognition-portion is not absent, and still conditions illusory realms. The characteristics of illusory realms are unreal minds, so the cognition-portion is inferior to the self-nature portion of consciousness. The self-nature portion of consciousness only conditions consciousness, because it is fundamental, and is the proof of self-nature. The substance is truly existent, while the appearances it transforms into, like form, etc., are not real. This is the view of this master. If so, what is the realm-appearance of non-discriminating wisdom (Wu fenbie zhi)? That is because it is internally realized, and is not discussed here. Like conditioning the self-nature, the rest are external realms, so they are different. Suppose that when conditioned by Suchness (Zhenru), the self-nature is truly existent, but it is not transformed by consciousness, so the substance of Suchness is real. Now we are discussing what is transformed by consciousness, so the image-portion and cognition-portion are false. Furthermore, even if Suchness is real, because it is slightly real in the realm, we only say 'Consciousness-only,' and do not say 'Object-only.' Now because it is internal realization, it cannot be compared to external realms. The third chapter of the Buddhahood Treatise contains the view of this master, admitting the meaning of the three-part dependent nature.

Treatise: Or the image-portion, cognition-portion, etc., of consciousness, are the same in reality and illusion as consciousness.

Commentary: The second master says that consciousness, the image-portion, the cognition-portion, etc., are all produced from conditions, and are conditioned dharmas, so these two are the same in reality and illusion as consciousness. Although there are appearances conditioned by the past, future, etc., the image-portion is dependent origination, and is not much different from consciousness. Furthermore, the meaning of this master is that only the image-portion and consciousness are a kind of reality, not preventing conditioning by the past, future, but obtaining false dharmas. This is the correct meaning. The previous master thought that the image-portion and cognition-portion arise from the seeds of consciousness, this master thinks that the image-portion and consciousness are different seeds, and the cognition-portion and consciousness arise from the same seed.

If so, it should be said that all dharmas are object-only, why say consciousness-only?

Treatise: The word 'only'

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遣外至亦應非實。

述曰。論答。唯言遣心外遍計所執。不遮內識所變之相分等。若不作此解真如應非實有。真如既實境即實成。能緣如心寧容是假。若是假者應不緣真如。若非假者見便是實。故非心．境一向非實。以境是虛言唯識故。若境是實。遣心外境名唯識。即真如不離識故。非心外法故。亦唯識攝。

論。內境與識至唯識非境。

述曰。外人難。內境與識既並非虛。如何可言唯識非境。

論。識唯內有至但言唯識。

述曰。答有二。初云識唯內有。境亦通外。即境相分內是依他。外是遍計所執。以非心所變法說之為外。非體實有名外。恐心內之境濫心外之境故但言唯識。又疏所緣緣亦是外。若言唯境恐取心外之法故此不論。所執之心亦是心外法故。是故設不慮濫。言唯境亦得。為簡外故但言唯識。

論。或諸愚夫至如外都無。

述曰。一謂所執為實。二謂親取心外境。依此故言迷執于境。此意可解。此第二師解唯識佛地所無。為破執故雖為愚夫。非心之理豈佛非有。即前二師許有相見分義。

第三師解。

論。或相分等至定相應故。

述曰。此師不許有相．見義。唯一識性。由前妄熏習力似多分生似有相見。即佛后得智無別相．見分。有漏善

心因后得智有相．見者。有法執故。佛似見．相凈穢土等。不作二解故非所執。余作二解故是所執。又佛自在了妄執故。設變見．相皆非所執。由往因中熏習力故。今果亦爾。佛證諸法不可言故。余即不爾。見．相皆執。不證不可言境故。今此依余說故言無別。或佛不現餘人自見。若爾真如非妄習生。應非唯識。識之實性故言唯識。故除識性無別有法。

論。此論三分至成唯識論。

述曰。此下大段第三釋結施愿分。即第二師解論文謂。初一頌半略明能變識相。中有二十三頌半廣明唯識。後有五頌明唯識位。以佛說法初中后。善．純一．圓滿．清白．梵行。今同彼教。故言三分。如第一卷抄釋。余文可解。此中言成。即以教成教。即以教成理。理實俱通。然依境．行一解成如前解。理體分別唯識性．相義。

論。亦說此論至極明凈故。

述曰。言凈者。謂從喻顯。如真如性雖本性凈。若不修習凈無以彰顯教．理俱得。如珠寶等性雖光潔。若不磨瑩無以出光故也。如蘇迷盧雖寶所集。無日輪迴照何以顯光。此論亦爾。如前第九卷初抄故。

論。此本論名至登無上覺。

述曰。初二句結牒上。后二句正回施發願。由三十頌顯唯識理非增減者。依三義配釋。皆有非增減義。

成

【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：心識由於後天習得的智慧而產生的表象，會被有法執的人所執著。佛陀所見的表象，如清凈或污穢的國土等，因為不作二元對立的理解，所以不是執著的對象。其他人因為作二元對立的理解，所以是執著的對象。而且，佛陀因為自在，不會有虛妄的執著，所以即使示現變化的表象，也不是執著的對象。由於過去世的因中熏習的力量，現在的果也是如此。佛陀證悟到諸法不可言說，而其他人則不然，他們所見的表象都是執著的對象，因為沒有證悟到不可言說的境界。現在這裡是依據其他人而說的，所以說沒有差別。或者佛陀不顯現，而是其他人自己見到。如果是這樣，那麼真如就不是由虛妄的習氣所生，應該不是唯識。因為這是識的真實體性，所以說是唯識。因此，除了識性之外，沒有其他的法存在。

論：這部論分為三分，最終成就《成唯識論》。

述記：下面這一大段是第三部分，解釋總結並施愿。也就是第二位論師解釋論文說，最初一頌半簡略地說明能變識的體相，中間有二十三頌半廣泛地闡明唯識，後面有五頌說明唯識的位次。因為佛陀說法，初善、中善、后善，純一、圓滿、清白、梵行，現在與佛陀的教導相同，所以說是三分。如同第一卷的抄釋。其餘的文字可以理解。這裡說『成』，就是以教義成就教義，以教義成就真理，真理和實際都貫通。然而，依據境、行一種解釋成就，如同前面的解釋。真理的體性分別唯識的體性、相狀的意義。

論：也說這部論達到了極其明凈的境界。

述記：說到『凈』，是用比喻來顯明。如同真如的體性雖然本來清凈，如果不修習，清凈就無法彰顯，教義和真理都是如此。如同珠寶等，體性雖然光潔，如果不打磨，就無法發出光芒。就像須彌山雖然是寶物聚集的地方，如果沒有太陽的輪迴照耀，又怎麼能顯現光芒呢？這部論也是如此。如同前面第九卷的最初抄寫。

論：這部論的名稱，最終能夠登上無上覺悟的境界。

述記：最初兩句總結並承接上文，後面兩句正式地迴向並施愿。由三十頌顯明唯識的道理，沒有增加也沒有減少，依據三種意義來配合解釋，都有沒有增加也沒有減少的意義。

成

【English Translation】 English version: The appearances that arise from the mind due to wisdom acquired later are clung to by those who have attachment to dharma (法, elements of existence). The appearances seen by the Buddha, such as pure or impure lands, are not objects of attachment because they are not understood in a dualistic way. Others, because they understand in a dualistic way, are objects of attachment. Moreover, the Buddha, because of being at ease and without deluded attachments, even if manifesting changing appearances, does not cling to them. Due to the power of the past causes and conditions, the present result is also like this. The Buddha realizes that all dharmas (法) are inexpressible, while others are not; the appearances they see are all objects of attachment because they have not realized the inexpressible realm. Now, this is said according to others, so it is said that there is no difference. Or the Buddha does not appear, but others see it themselves. If so, then Suchness (真如, true thusness) is not born from false habits and should not be only consciousness (唯識, vijnapti-matra). Because this is the real nature of consciousness, it is said to be only consciousness. Therefore, apart from the nature of consciousness, there is no other dharma (法) existing.

Treatise: This treatise is divided into three parts, ultimately accomplishing the 'Cheng Weishi Lun' (成唯識論, Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only).

Commentary: The following major section is the third part, explaining the conclusion and making vows. That is, the second teacher explains the treatise by saying that the first one and a half verses briefly explain the characteristics of the transforming consciousness, the middle twenty-three and a half verses extensively explain consciousness-only, and the last five verses explain the stages of consciousness-only. Because the Buddha's teachings are good in the beginning, good in the middle, and good in the end, pure, complete, clear, and practicing the pure life, now it is the same as the Buddha's teachings, so it is said to be three parts. Like the copied explanation in the first volume. The rest of the text can be understood. Here it says 'accomplishing', that is, accomplishing doctrine with doctrine, and accomplishing truth with doctrine, truth and reality are both connected. However, according to the explanation of realm and practice, it is accomplished as in the previous explanation. The nature of truth distinguishes the meaning of the nature and characteristics of consciousness-only.

Treatise: It is also said that this treatise has reached an extremely clear and pure state.

Commentary: Speaking of 'purity', it is revealed through metaphor. Like the nature of Suchness (真如), although it is inherently pure, if it is not cultivated, purity cannot be manifested, both doctrine and truth are like this. Like jewels, etc., although their nature is bright and clean, if they are not polished, they cannot emit light. Just like Mount Sumeru (蘇迷盧), although it is a place where treasures gather, without the rotation of the sun, how can it show light? This treatise is also like this. Like the initial copying in the ninth volume.

Treatise: The name of this treatise can ultimately ascend to the state of unsurpassed enlightenment.

Commentary: The first two sentences summarize and connect to the previous text, and the last two sentences formally dedicate and make vows. The thirty verses reveal the principle of consciousness-only, without increase or decrease, and according to the three meanings to match the explanation, there is the meaning of neither increase nor decrease.

Accomplished

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