T43n1832_成唯識論了義燈
大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1832 成唯識論了義燈
No. 1832 [cf. Nos. 1585, 1830]
成唯識論了義燈卷第一(本)
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼述
將釋此論四門分別。一論起所因。二明同異。三明歸在。四釋本文就初起因復分為四。一明部分之處。二明部分之年。三明部分所由。四明造論因．主 如來說教體一真如。平等利生實無差異。然隨根性悟解不同。漸．頓有殊說教為異。故法華云。雖一地所生一雨所潤。而諸草木生長各異。寶性論中猶如一河三獸渡水得淺深異。攝大乘論如一寶珠隨求雨異。無量義經常說一相。悟解不同得諸果異。故如來教隨機說別。初對外道等。說我為無談法為有。次對小乘。破執法有說法亦無。后令趣實方為顯說非空非有。故瑜伽釋云。諸有情類無始時來。於法實相無知僻執。起惑發業輪迴五趣。如來出世隨宜為說處中妙理。令諸有情了達諸法非空非有。遠離疑執起處中行。隨應滅障各自修滿。得三菩提證寂滅樂等 佛涅槃后大迦葉波。及婆師波。雖分二處結集三藏。然一百年中佛法一味。時有舶主之子名摩訶提婆 真諦三藏部執疏云阿逾阇國。慈恩法師宗輪疏雲中天竺國 出家學道遍通三藏 然準部執．宗輪疏等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第一(本)
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼 述
將要解釋這部論典，分為四個方面：一、論典產生的因緣；二、說明相同與不同之處；三、說明歸宿所在；四、解釋本文。首先，關於產生因緣，又分為四個方面：一、說明分部的處所；二、說明分部的年份；三、說明分部的原因；四、說明造論的因和主。如來說教的本體是唯一的真如（tathata），平等利益眾生，實際上沒有差異。然而，隨著眾生的根性和領悟理解的不同，漸悟和頓悟有所不同，所以說教也因此而不同。《法華經》中說：『雖然生長在同一土地，受到同一雨水的滋潤，但各種草木的生長卻各不相同。』《寶性論》中說：『就像一條河流，三種動物渡水，得到的深淺程度不同。』《攝大乘論》中說：『就像一顆寶珠，隨著所求的不同而下雨不同。』《無量義經》經常說一個相，但領悟理解不同，得到的果報也不同。所以，如來（Tathagata）的教法隨機宜而說不同。最初，對外道等，說『我』為無，談『法』為有；其次，對小乘，破除執『法』為有，說『法』也為無；最後，爲了使眾生趨向真實，才顯說非空非有。所以，《瑜伽師地論》解釋說：『各種有情眾生，從無始以來，對於法的真實相狀無知而產生偏頗的執著，由此生起迷惑，造作惡業，在五趣中輪迴。如來出世，隨順眾生的根機，為他們宣說處中妙理，使各種有情眾生了達諸法非空非有，遠離疑惑和執著，修行處中之道，隨應消除障礙，各自修習圓滿，獲得三菩提（bodhi），證得寂滅之樂。』等等。佛陀涅槃后，大迦葉波（Mahakasyapa）和婆師波（Vasubandhu），雖然在兩個地方結集三藏，但在一百年中，佛法保持著同一種味道。當時，有一位船主的兒子，名叫摩訶提婆（Mahadeva）。真諦（Paramārtha）三藏的《部執疏》中說是阿逾阇國（Ayodhya），慈恩法師的《宗輪疏》中說是中天竺國。他出家學道，遍通三藏。但根據《部執》、《宗輪疏》等
【English Translation】 English version 《Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-ullikhita-artha-dīpa》Volume 1 (Original)
Commentary by Bhiksu Huizhao of Dayun Temple in Zizhou
To explain this treatise, it will be divided into four aspects: 1. The causes and conditions for the arising of the treatise; 2. Clarifying the similarities and differences; 3. Clarifying where it ultimately leads; 4. Explaining the text itself. First, regarding the causes for its arising, it is further divided into four aspects: 1. Explaining the location of the division; 2. Explaining the year of the division; 3. Explaining the reasons for the division; 4. Explaining the cause and the main figure behind the creation of the treatise. The essence of the Tathagata's teaching is the one and only True Thusness (tathata), equally benefiting all beings, with no actual difference. However, due to the different natures and understandings of beings, there are gradual and sudden enlightenments, so the teachings are also different. As the Lotus Sutra says, 'Although growing in the same soil and nourished by the same rain, the growth of various plants and trees differs.' The Ratnagotravibhāga states, 'Like a river, three animals crossing the water obtain different depths.' The Mahāyānasaṃgraha states, 'Like a wish-fulfilling jewel, it rains differently according to what is requested.' The Infinite Meaning Sutra often speaks of one aspect, but different understandings lead to different fruits. Therefore, the Tathagata's teachings vary according to the occasion. Initially, to the heretics and others, it was said that 'self' is non-existent and 'dharma' is existent; secondly, to the Hinayana, the attachment to the existence of 'dharma' was refuted, and it was said that 'dharma' is also non-existent; finally, in order to lead beings towards reality, it was explicitly stated that it is neither empty nor existent. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra explains, 'All sentient beings, from beginningless time, are ignorant of the true nature of dharmas and have biased attachments, thereby giving rise to delusion, creating evil karma, and transmigrating in the five realms. The Tathagata appears in the world, according to the capacities of beings, and expounds the middle way, enabling all sentient beings to understand that all dharmas are neither empty nor existent, to be free from doubt and attachment, to practice the middle way, to eliminate obstacles accordingly, to cultivate to perfection, to attain the three Bodhis (bodhi), and to realize the bliss of Nirvana.' etc. After the Buddha's Nirvana, Mahakasyapa (Mahakasyapa) and Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu), although they compiled the Tripitaka in two different places, the Dharma maintained the same flavor for a hundred years. At that time, there was a ship owner's son named Mahadeva (Mahadeva). Paramārtha (Paramārtha) Tripiṭaka's 'Commentary on the Sectarian Disputes' says it was in Ayodhya (Ayodhya), while Dharma Master Ci'en's 'Commentary on the Schools' says it was in Central India. He renounced the world to study the Way and became proficient in the Tripitaka. However, according to the 'Sectarian Disputes', 'Commentary on the Schools', etc.
。說其五事與慈恩法師瑜伽抄中說少有別。應大小乘說之各異。此具如彼三處所說 于百年外在波吒[利/里]子城雞園寺內 說此城由具如大唐西域傳及真諦部執疏說 十五日夜次。大天說戒經。說戒經了遂說五事頌云。余所誘無知。猶預他令入。道因聲故起。是名真佛教。耆年聖者咸不許之。即翻彼說第四句。云汝言非佛教因此小乘部分為二。諸聖者眾。遂以根本結集之時大迦葉波。以為其師云上坐部。大天徒侶以婆師波。為其所師。云大眾部。后二百年內。于大眾部復分成九。三百年內。于上坐部分成十一。如宗輪論並文殊所問般若具說。若部分緣由真諦三藏部執疏中一一廣說 昔者阿難將入涅槃唸曰。佛記罽賓新云迦葉彌羅。當有比丘名末田提。于彼國土。流佈法眼。即便法付末田尊者。欲此國中立寺弘法。此國有山四面高峻中間極廣．唯有一門。龍王所居中滿其水。尊者運通從空而下。向龍王言。意乞一坐具許地。龍王許之。便以通力令坐具寬侵水將盡。龍王從乞愿留週迴十五里水為龍所居。因即立寺僧從既多凈人復眾。后僧漸少奴漸群強。自立為王。因號奴國。后此國王號迦葉利師。極甚敬信。每請眾徒入宮說法。中間諸部而共雜居。前後說法各各有異。王問所以。具說其由。王曰今者取誰部定。時迦延
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：關於這五件事的說法，與慈恩法師在《瑜伽師地論》中的記載略有不同，這可能是因為大乘和小乘對此的解釋各不相同。具體內容可以參考他們三處所說的記錄。一百年後，在波吒[利/里]子城（Pataliputra，古印度城市）的雞園寺內，發生了關於『大天五事』的爭論。關於這座城市，可以參考《大唐西域記》和真諦三藏的《部執異論疏》。在十五日夜晚，大天宣講《說戒經》，講完后，他說了五事頌，內容是：『由於我的誘導，無知的人猶豫不決，讓其他人得以進入。道的產生是由於聲音的緣故。』他稱這為真正的佛教。但耆年聖者們都不認可他的說法，於是將他所說的第四句改為：『你說的不是佛教』。因此，小乘佛教分裂為二。諸位聖者以根本結集時的大迦葉波（Mahakasyapa，佛教第一次結集的領導者）為老師，稱為上座部。而大天的追隨者則以婆師波（Vasubandhu，印度佛教論師，此處存疑，因為婆藪盤陀是後世之人）為老師，稱為大眾部。後來的兩百年內，大眾部又分裂為九個部派。三百年內，上座部又分裂為十一個部派。這些內容在《宗輪論》和《文殊所問般若經》中都有詳細記載。關於部派分裂的緣由，真諦三藏在《部執異論疏》中也有詳細的闡述。 過去，阿難（Ananda，佛陀的十大弟子之一，以記憶力超群著稱）將要進入涅槃時，想到佛陀曾經預言，在罽賓（Kashmir，古印度地區名，今克什米爾地區）新云迦葉彌羅（Kashmir，克什米爾）地方，將會有一位名叫末田提（Madhyantika，古印度佛教僧侶）的比丘，在那裡傳播佛法。於是阿難將佛法託付給末田提尊者，希望他能在該國建立寺廟，弘揚佛法。這個國家四面環山，中間非常廣闊，只有一個入口。那裡住著龍王，中間充滿了水。尊者運用神通，從空中降落，對龍王說，想要借用一塊坐具大小的地方。龍王答應了他。尊者便用神通讓坐具不斷擴大，水幾乎要被排干。龍王請求留下週圍十五里的水作為龍的居所。於是就在那裡建立了寺廟，僧人越來越多，凈人（Upasaka，在家佛教徒）也很多。後來，僧人逐漸減少，奴隸逐漸強大，他們自立為王，因此被稱為奴國。後來，這個國家的國王名叫迦葉利師（Kasyaparsi，人名），非常敬信佛教，經常邀請僧眾入宮說法。由於中間各部派雜居，前後說法各不相同，國王詢問原因，他們便詳細地說明了緣由。國王說，現在應該以哪個部派的說法為準呢？這時，迦延（Katyayana，人名）...
【English Translation】 English version: The accounts of these five matters differ slightly from those recorded by Master Ci'en in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, possibly due to differing interpretations between Mahayana and Hinayana. For specific details, refer to their respective records in those three sources. A hundred years later, at the Kukutarama Monastery in Pataliputra (an ancient Indian city), a dispute arose regarding the 'Five Points of Mahadeva'. Details about this city can be found in the Great Tang Records on the Western Regions and the Commentary on the Doctrines of Different Schools by Paramartha. On the night of the fifteenth, Mahadeva recited the Pratimoksha Sutra, and after finishing, he spoke the verses of the Five Points, which stated: 'Due to my enticement, the ignorant hesitate, allowing others to enter. The arising of the path is due to sound.' He called this the true Buddhism. However, the elder saints did not approve of his statement, so they changed the fourth line of his saying to: 'What you say is not Buddhism.' Thus, Hinayana Buddhism split into two. The saints took Mahakasyapa (the leader of the first Buddhist council) as their teacher, calling themselves the Sthavira school. Mahadeva's followers took Vasubandhu (an Indian Buddhist philosopher, questionable here as Vasubandhu lived later) as their teacher, calling themselves the Mahasanghika school. Within the next two hundred years, the Mahasanghika school further split into nine sub-schools. Within three hundred years, the Sthavira school split into eleven sub-schools. These details are fully described in the Samayabhedoparacanacakra and the Prajnaparamita Sutra Questioned by Manjushri. The reasons for the divisions are elaborated upon by Paramartha in the Commentary on the Doctrines of Different Schools. In the past, as Ananda (one of the Buddha's ten great disciples, known for his exceptional memory) was about to enter Nirvana, he remembered the Buddha's prediction that in Kashmir (an ancient Indian region, now the Kashmir region), specifically in Nava-Kashmira (Kashmir), there would be a bhikkhu named Madhyantika (an ancient Indian Buddhist monk) who would propagate the Dharma there. Therefore, Ananda entrusted the Dharma to Venerable Madhyantika, hoping that he could establish temples and promote the Dharma in that country. This country was surrounded by mountains on all sides, with a vast expanse in the middle and only one entrance. A Naga king lived there, and the middle was filled with water. The Venerable One used his supernatural powers to descend from the sky and said to the Naga king that he wished to borrow a piece of land the size of a sitting mat. The Naga king agreed. The Venerable One then used his supernatural powers to continuously expand the sitting mat, almost draining all the water. The Naga king requested that fifteen li (a Chinese unit of distance) of water around be left as the Naga's residence. Thus, a temple was established there, and the number of monks increased, as did the number of lay followers (Upasaka). Later, the number of monks gradually decreased, and the slaves became powerful, establishing themselves as kings, hence the name Slave Country. Later, the king of this country was named Kasyaparsi (a personal name), who was very devout and often invited the Sangha to the palace to preach the Dharma. Because different schools resided together, the teachings differed from time to time. The king asked the reason, and they explained the details. The king said, 'Which school's teachings should we take as the standard now?' At this time, Katyayana (a personal name)...
子依薩婆多造發智論以示于王。王可弘之(此上傳說未見正文)。依天親傳。佛滅度后三百年中。有阿羅漢名迦旃延子。母性迦旃延。從母為名。先於薩婆多部出家。本是中天竺人。后往罽賓國。罽賓國在西天竺。與五百阿羅漢．五百菩薩。共撰集薩婆多部阿毗達磨秘不流出。經于多時五天不睹。后東天竺阿逾阇國有一法師。名婆須跋陀羅。聰明大智。往彼習學誦得流外。廣如彼說。后鳩摩邏多．室利邏多皆廣造論。弘初有教眾生著有。大乘法教多皆隱沒 二百年外有南天竺龍猛菩薩．提婆菩薩俱出於世。龍猛菩薩造大智度論釋大品般若。造無畏論。滿十萬頌。中論出於無畏部中有五百偈。十二門論等。龍猛弟子提婆菩薩造百論等。廣如付法藏傳及龍樹等傳說。為破小乘及諸外道執我執法說之為空。時多著空 后九百年北天竺境富婁沙富羅。此云丈夫國。有國師婆羅門。姓憍尸迦。有三子同名婆藪盤豆。此雲天親。今云筏蘇畔度。此云世親。雖同一名復立別號。第三天親于薩婆多部出家得羅漢果。別名比鄰持跋婆。比鄰持是其母名。跋婆譯為子亦云兒。長兄是菩薩根性。亦亦于薩婆多部出家。后得離欲思惟空義。不能得入欲自殺身。有賓頭盧阿羅漢。在東毗提訶觀見此事。從彼方來為說小乘空觀意猶未安謂理不應爾。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 據說，有人根據一切有部（Sarvastivada）的教義撰寫了《發智論》，並將其獻給國王，希望國王能夠弘揚它（這個傳說未見於正文）。根據天親（Vasubandhu）的說法，佛陀涅槃后三百年，有一位阿羅漢名為迦旃延子（Katyayaniputra），因其母親姓迦旃延（Katyayani）而得名。他最初在一切有部出家，是中天竺人，後來前往罽賓國（Kashmir）。罽賓國位於西天竺。他與五百位阿羅漢、五百位菩薩共同編纂了一切有部的《阿毗達磨》，此教義秘而不宣，很長時間裡五天竺都未曾得見。後來，東天竺阿逾阇國（Ayodhya）有一位法師，名為婆須跋陀羅（Vasubhadra），聰明且具有大智慧，前往罽賓國學習，背誦並帶回了這些教義。詳情可見相關記載。之後，鳩摩邏多（Kumaralata）、室利邏多（Srilata）都廣泛地撰寫論著，弘揚最初的有教，眾生執著于有。大乘的法教大多隱沒不顯。二百年後，南天竺的龍猛菩薩（Nagarjuna）、提婆菩薩（Aryadeva）相繼出世。龍猛菩薩撰寫了《大智度論》，解釋《大品般若經》，還撰寫了《無畏論》，共計十萬頌。《中論》出自《無畏論》中，有五百偈。《十二門論》等也是他的著作。龍猛的弟子提婆菩薩撰寫了《百論》等。詳情可見《付法藏傳》以及龍樹（Nagarjuna）等人的傳說。他們爲了破斥小乘以及各種外道執著於我法，宣說空性。當時很多人執著于空。 九百年後，北天竺境內的富婁沙富羅（Purushapura），意為丈夫國，有一位國師婆羅門，姓憍尸迦（Kausika），有三個兒子同名婆藪盤豆（Vasubandhu），意為天親，現在也稱筏蘇畔度（Vasubandhu），意為世親。雖然名字相同，但又分別立了別號。第三個天親在一切有部出家，證得阿羅漢果，別名比鄰持跋婆（Vibhinnatvatsa），比鄰持是其母親的名字，跋婆譯為子，也譯為兒。他的長兄具有菩薩根性，也在一切有部出家，後來證得離欲，但思惟空義卻無法證入，想要自殺。有一位賓頭盧阿羅漢（Pindola），在東毗提訶（Purva-Videha）觀察到此事，從那裡趕來，為他說小乘的空觀，但他的心意仍然不安，認為道理不應如此。
【English Translation】 English version: It is said that someone composed the Jñānaprasthāna based on the Sarvastivada teachings and presented it to the king, hoping that the king would propagate it (this legend is not found in the main text). According to Vasubandhu, three hundred years after the Buddha's Nirvana, there was an Arhat named Katyayaniputra (Kātyāyanīputra), named after his mother's gotra, Katyayani (Kātyāyanī). He initially renounced the world in the Sarvastivada school, being a native of Central India, and later went to Kashmir (Kāśmīra). Kashmir is located in Western India. Together with five hundred Arhats and five hundred Bodhisattvas, he compiled the Sarvastivada Abhidharma, which was kept secret and not circulated. For a long time, the five regions of India did not see it. Later, in Ayodhya (Ayodhyā) in Eastern India, there was a Dharma master named Vasubhadra (Vasubhadra), who was intelligent and possessed great wisdom. He went to Kashmir to study, memorized, and brought back these teachings. Details can be found in relevant records. Later, Kumaralata (Kumāralāta) and Srilata (Śrīlāta) extensively composed treatises, propagating the initial teaching of existence, and sentient beings became attached to existence. The Mahayana Dharma teachings were mostly hidden and not apparent. Two hundred years later, Nagarjuna (Nāgārjuna) and Aryadeva (Āryadeva) of Southern India appeared in the world one after another. Nagarjuna composed the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, explaining the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra, and also composed the Akutobhaya, totaling one hundred thousand verses. The Mūlamadhyamakakārikā comes from the Akutobhaya, containing five hundred verses. The Dvādaśanikāyaśāstra and others are also his works. Nagarjuna's disciple, Aryadeva, composed the Śataśāstra and others. Details can be found in the Samgharaksa, as well as the legends of Nagarjuna and others. They refuted the Hinayana and various heretics who were attached to self and phenomena, proclaiming emptiness. At that time, many people became attached to emptiness. Nine hundred years later, in Purushapura (Puruṣapura), meaning 'Land of Men,' in North India, there was a Brahmin national teacher named Kausika (Kauśika), who had three sons all named Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu), meaning 'Heavenly Kinsman,' now also called Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu), meaning 'Worldly Kinsman.' Although they had the same name, they were given different epithets. The third Vasubandhu renounced the world in the Sarvastivada school, attained the fruit of Arhatship, and was given the epithet Vibhinnatvatsa (Vibhinnatvatsa), Vibhinnatvatsa being his mother's name, and Vatsa translating to 'son' or 'child.' His eldest brother had the nature of a Bodhisattva and also renounced the world in the Sarvastivada school. Later, he attained detachment from desire, but was unable to enter into the contemplation of emptiness and wanted to commit suicide. An Arhat named Pindola (Piṇḍola), observing this from Purva-Videha (Pūrva-Videha), came from there and explained the Hinayana contemplation of emptiness to him, but his mind was still uneasy, believing that the principle should not be so.
因此乘通往睹史天咨問。彌勒菩薩。為說大乘空觀。還下思惟即便得悟。因名阿僧伽。此云無著。爾後數往兜率陀天。咨問彌勒大乘經義。為餘人說聞多不信。即自發愿。請彌勒菩薩下說大乘。令眾生見皆得信受。即如其愿于夜下時。放大光明集有緣眾。于逾阇國說十七地論。隨所誦出隨解其義。經四月夜十七論竟。雖同一堂唯有無著得近彌勒菩薩。餘人但得遙聞。或有見異。時無著師更為余說。因此餘人方始信受大乘法義。第二子亦于薩婆多部出家。博學多聞遍通墳藉。神才雋朗無可為儔。戒行清高難以為匹。兄弟既有別名。故法師但稱婆藪盤豆。所餘因緣廣如本傳所說。依瑜伽論廣造諸論。解釋大乘弘非空有。及造此論。十師之釋合糅翻譯皆如樞要。然護法菩薩千一百年後方始出世。造此論釋及廣百論釋。清辨菩薩亦同時出造掌珍論。此時大乘方諍空．有。上來總辨四門之義。智者知之。此即論之起因。
二明同異者。復分為四。一教益有殊。二時．利差別。三詮宗各異。四體性不同。具如法苑總聊簡說。問前說輪益．義益二理何殊 答義約所詮之理為稱。輪據斷道為言。二義各約一途。故云輪．義二益 問以教對機教有三時之別。未審輪體為別為同 答根性既差輪體有別。約初有教說體如常。空教之中體
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，阿僧伽（Asaṅga，無著）乘神通往睹史多天（Tuṣita Heaven），向彌勒菩薩（Maitreya Bodhisattva）請教，彌勒菩薩為他說解大乘空觀。阿僧伽返回后思惟，立即開悟，因此得名阿僧伽，意為『無著』。此後，他多次前往兜率陀天（Tuṣita Heaven），請教彌勒菩薩關於大乘經義。因為他為其他人解說時，很多人不相信，所以他發願，請彌勒菩薩降臨人間宣說大乘，讓眾生親眼見到，都能信受。於是，彌勒菩薩如他所愿，在夜晚降臨，放出大光明，聚集有緣眾生，在逾阇國（Ayodhya）宣說《十七地論》。彌勒菩薩隨口誦出，阿僧伽隨之解釋其義。經過四個月的夜晚，十七論宣講完畢。雖然在同一個講堂，只有阿僧伽能夠靠近彌勒菩薩，其他人只能遙遠地聽聞，或者看到不同的景象。當時，阿僧伽又為其他人解說，因此，其他人這才開始信受大乘法義。阿僧伽的第二個兒子也在薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）出家，博學多聞，精通各種典籍，才華橫溢，無人能比，戒行清高，難以匹敵。因為兄弟二人有不同的名字，所以人們只稱法師為婆藪盤豆（Vasubandhu）。其餘的因緣，詳細記載在本傳中。婆藪盤豆依據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）廣造諸論，解釋大乘，弘揚非空非有之理，以及撰造此論。十位論師的解釋合糅翻譯，都如同樞要。然而，護法菩薩（Dharmapāla Bodhisattva）在一千一百年後才出世，撰造此論的註釋以及《廣百論釋》。清辨菩薩（Bhāviveka Bodhisattva）也同時出世，撰造《掌珍論》。此時，大乘才開始爭論空與有。以上總共辨析了四門之義，智者自能明瞭。這就是此論的起因。
二、說明同異之處，又分為四點：一、教益不同；二、時節利益的差別；三、所詮宗義各異；四、體性不同。具體內容如《法苑珠林》所說，這裡簡單說明。問：前面所說的輪益和義益，這兩種道理有什麼不同？答：義益是就所詮釋的道理而言，輪益是就斷除煩惱的道路而言。兩種意義各自側重一方面，所以說是輪益和義益兩種利益。問：以教法來適應根機，教法有三個時期的差別，不知道輪體的差別還是相同？答：根性既然有差別，輪體也就有差別。就最初的教法來說，體性如常。在空教之中，體性...
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, Asaṅga (Asaṅga, 'the unattached') traveled by supernatural power to Tuṣita Heaven (Tuṣita Heaven) to consult Maitreya Bodhisattva (Maitreya Bodhisattva), who explained the Mahāyāna view of emptiness to him. Asaṅga returned and contemplated, immediately attaining enlightenment, hence the name Asaṅga, meaning 'the unattached'. Thereafter, he frequently went to Tuṣita Heaven (Tuṣita Heaven) to consult Maitreya Bodhisattva about the meaning of the Mahāyāna scriptures. Because many people did not believe him when he explained it to others, he made a vow, requesting Maitreya Bodhisattva to descend to the human world to expound the Mahāyāna, so that all beings who saw it could believe and accept it. Thus, Maitreya Bodhisattva, as he wished, descended at night, emitting great light, gathering sentient beings with affinity, and expounding the Seventeen Bhūmis (Seventeen Stages) in Ayodhya (Ayodhya). Maitreya Bodhisattva recited it spontaneously, and Asaṅga explained its meaning accordingly. After four months of nights, the seventeen treatises were completed. Although in the same hall, only Asaṅga could approach Maitreya Bodhisattva, while others could only hear from afar or see different visions. At that time, Asaṅga further explained it to others, and therefore, others began to believe and accept the meaning of the Mahāyāna Dharma. Asaṅga's second son also became a monk in the Sarvāstivāda (Sarvāstivāda) school, being learned and well-versed, proficient in various scriptures, with outstanding talent, unmatched, and with pure precepts, difficult to equal. Because the two brothers had different names, people only referred to the Dharma Master as Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu). The remaining causes and conditions are recorded in detail in his biography. Vasubandhu, based on the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra), extensively composed various treatises, explaining the Mahāyāna, propagating the principle of neither emptiness nor existence, as well as composing this treatise. The explanations of the ten masters, combined and translated, are all like essential points. However, Dharmapāla Bodhisattva (Dharmapāla Bodhisattva) did not appear until one thousand one hundred years later, composing the commentary on this treatise and the commentary on the Vidyāmātrasiddhi Triṃśikā. Bhāviveka Bodhisattva (Bhāviveka Bodhisattva) also appeared at the same time, composing the Tarkajvālā. At this time, the Mahāyāna began to argue about emptiness and existence. The above is a total analysis of the meaning of the four doors, which the wise will understand.
- Explaining the similarities and differences, it is further divided into four points: 1. Different benefits of the teachings; 2. Differences in time and benefits; 3. Different doctrines explained; 4. Different natures. The specific content is as described in the Fayuan Zhulin, which will be briefly explained here. Question: What is the difference between the benefits of the wheel and the benefits of meaning mentioned earlier? Answer: The benefits of meaning refer to the doctrine being explained, while the benefits of the wheel refer to the path of cutting off afflictions. The two meanings each focus on one aspect, so they are called the two benefits of the wheel and meaning. Question: Adapting the teachings to the faculties, the teachings have three periods of difference, I wonder if the bodies of the wheels are different or the same? Answer: Since the faculties are different, the bodies of the wheels are also different. As for the initial teachings, the nature is as usual. In the emptiness teachings, the nature is...
少有別。以八空聖道為體。證空理智為體。以說空教為因。以證空加行智為因。所緣空為境。余覺支等空為助伴。以道．定戒空為眷屬。以菩提．涅槃空為果。若第三時法輪體者。雙合前二亦得非正。正者如瑜伽論．及法華疏第四卷明 問說此密語有何益 答準攝論第八有十果。謂令說法者易可安立總括義故。乃至於智者前論義抉擇入聰慜數。為斯十利說秘密言 問義益之中有了．不了。輪中亦輪．非輪不 答大．小相形隱．顯相對二並得有 又解不例。詮理有顯．密。義中了．不了。對機皆滅障。皆輪無不輪 又問要集敘解深密。云了義者清辨等云。說了義者結集家語非正佛說者不爾。彼非善通。應云清辨等言。此對俗諦說最為勝名爲了義不望勝義。若以有違云非佛語。便令聖教皆不可信 了．不了義法苑分四。今要集云。更加一門。執著名字名為不了。不著名了。故自在王菩薩經上云。了義經者一切諸經皆是了義。以依義故。一切諸法不可說故。菩薩如是名爲了義。若人於一切經。不能如是依義是名不了義。何故名不了。是人不了義故。準此經文云。是人不了義故名不了義。不判經為不了義。又經云。自在王菩薩依如是義趣法者。一切諸經皆是了義。不如是依者。一切經皆是不了義。準此意。能不執著一切經皆是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 少有差別。以八空聖道（arya ashtanga marga，八正道與空性結合）為體性，以證悟空性之理的智慧為體性，以宣說空性的教法為因，以證悟空性的加行智為因，以所緣的空性為境界，以其餘覺支等空性為助伴，以道、定、戒等空性為眷屬，以菩提（bodhi，覺悟）和涅槃（nirvana，寂滅）的空性為果。如果說第三時法輪的體性，雙合前二者也可以，但並非完全正確。正確的說法如《瑜伽師地論》以及《法華經疏》第四卷所闡明。 問：宣說這些密語有什麼益處？ 答：依據《攝大乘論》第八卷，有十種果報。即令說法者容易安立總括的意義，乃至在智者面前論義抉擇，進入聰敏之列。爲了這十種利益才說秘密之言。 問：意義的解釋中有了義（nitartha，究竟真實之義）和不了義（neyartha，非究竟真實之義）之分，在法輪中也有了義法輪和不了義法輪，以及非法輪的情況嗎？ 答：大和小相互比較，隱和顯相對照，這兩種情況都可能存在。又可以解釋為不一概而論。詮釋道理有顯說和密說，意義上有明確和不明確。對於根機成熟者都能滅除業障，都是法輪，沒有不是法輪的情況。 又問：《要集》敘述《解深密經》，說清辨（Bhavaviveka，中觀論師）等人說，說了義是結集者的說法，不是真正的佛說。不是這樣的。他們的理解並不圓滿。應該說清辨等人所言，是對俗諦（samvriti-satya，世俗諦）而言最為殊勝，稱爲了義，但不是針對勝義諦（paramartha-satya，勝義諦）。如果因為有所違背就說不是佛語，就會導致整個聖教都不可信。 了義和不了義，《法苑珠林》分為四種。現在《要集》說，更加一門，執著于名字稱為不了義，不執著名字稱爲了義。所以《自在王菩薩經》上說：『了義經，一切諸經皆是了義，以依義故，一切諸法不可說故。菩薩如是，名爲了義。若人於一切經，不能如是依義，是名不了義。』為什麼稱爲了義？是人不了義的緣故。不判別經文爲了義或不了義。又經文說：『自在王菩薩依如是義趣法者，一切諸經皆是了義。不如是依者，一切經皆是不了義。』依據這個意思，能夠不執著一切經都是。
【English Translation】 English version There are slight differences. Its essence is the Eightfold Noble Path of Emptiness (arya ashtanga marga, the Eightfold Path combined with emptiness), its essence is the wisdom that realizes the principle of emptiness, its cause is the teaching of emptiness, its cause is the wisdom of the preparatory practice of realizing emptiness, its object is the emptiness that is the object of focus, the other limbs of enlightenment, etc., are emptiness as companions, the emptiness of the path, samadhi (concentration), and precepts are its retinue, and the emptiness of bodhi (enlightenment) and nirvana (liberation) are its fruit. If one speaks of the essence of the Third Turning of the Wheel of Dharma, combining the previous two is also acceptable, but not entirely correct. The correct explanation is as clarified in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the fourth volume of the Commentary on the Lotus Sutra. Question: What is the benefit of expounding these secret words? Answer: According to the eighth volume of the Mahayana-samgraha, there are ten fruits. Namely, it makes it easy for the expounder to establish the meaning of the summary, and even in front of wise people, to resolve arguments and enter the ranks of the intelligent. It is for these ten benefits that secret words are spoken. Question: In the interpretation of meaning, there is a distinction between nitartha (definitive meaning) and neyartha (provisional meaning). In the Wheel of Dharma, are there also Wheels of Definitive Meaning and Wheels of Provisional Meaning, as well as cases of non-Wheels? Answer: Comparing the large and the small, contrasting the hidden and the manifest, both situations can exist. It can also be explained as not being uniform. The interpretation of principles has explicit and secret teachings, and the meaning has clear and unclear aspects. For those with mature faculties, they can all eliminate karmic obstacles. They are all Wheels of Dharma; there is no non-Wheel. Furthermore, the Compendium narrates the Samdhinirmocana Sutra, saying that Bhavaviveka (Madhyamaka philosopher) and others say that the definitive meaning is the statement of the compilers, not the true words of the Buddha. This is not the case. Their understanding is not complete. It should be said that what Bhavaviveka and others said is most excellent in relation to conventional truth (samvriti-satya), and is called definitive meaning, but it is not directed at ultimate truth (paramartha-satya). If one says it is not the Buddha's words because there is some contradiction, it would cause the entire Holy Teaching to be untrustworthy. Definitive and provisional meanings are divided into four types in the Fa Yuan Zhu Lin. Now the Compendium says that one more category is added: attachment to names is called provisional meaning, and non-attachment to names is called definitive meaning. Therefore, the Sutra of King Free Will Bodhisattva says: 'The sutra of definitive meaning, all sutras are sutras of definitive meaning, because they rely on meaning, and all dharmas are unspeakable. Bodhisattvas are thus called definitive meaning. If a person cannot rely on meaning in this way in all sutras, it is called provisional meaning.' Why is it called provisional meaning? It is because the person does not understand the meaning. It does not distinguish the sutra as definitive or provisional meaning. Furthermore, the sutra says: 'King Free Will Bodhisattva, relying on such meaning to approach the Dharma, all sutras are sutras of definitive meaning. If one does not rely on it in this way, all sutras are sutras of provisional meaning.' According to this meaning, one can not be attached to all sutras.
所了義。若執著者一切經皆是所不了義。不得約人自不能了。便判聖教亦為不了。要集解云。能令生過或生功德。說了．不了。此通一切大小乘經 此判不爾。若由不了即生過失名為不了。亦應名不善。亦應名有漏。便非稱實。有多過故。今者正解應云。依法分四。如法苑明。又加依人。對解了不執名爲了義。對執著者名不了義。如似二諦 辨時利中 問何故如來初說有教。中談空教。后演不空不有教耶 答據不定姓。未發趣時。且令慚悟所執我無。唯有蘊．處．界等諸法。名為有教。為已發趣得小果者。令趣于大次悟法空觀彼所執界處等無。名為空教。后為發趣一切乘者。顯所執無。非執是有。非一向空。亦非皆有。為不空不有教。為對慚悟說教三時。若對頓悟無三時別。又所說教非定如是前後次第判為三時。並約所說義類相從。望不定姓當第三時。不爾華嚴第二七日世尊即說。可對慚悟在般若等后。方始演說判屬第三此有二義。一約前後。二約義類。約前後亦有二義。初說生空。次說法空。二者初說生空密詮法有。次說法空密詮法無。後方顯明生．法二執所取不有。若離二執真俗不無。故經說云。有為無為名為有。我及我所說為空 問若據漸入此等諸教是第三時。第三時教普為發趣一切乘者。今此一論正被何乘。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所了義（完全理解的意義）。如果執著於此，那麼一切經文都成了不了義（不能完全理解的意義）。不能因為人們自己不能理解，就判斷聖教也是不了義。要集解說：『能讓人產生過失或產生功德，說了義和不了義，這適用於一切大乘和小乘經文。』 這種判斷是不對的。如果因為不了義就產生過失，就稱為不了義，那麼也應該稱為不善，也應該稱為有漏，便不符合實際情況，因為有過多的過失。現在的正確解釋應該是：依法分為四種，如《法苑》所說，又加上依人。對於理解而不執著的人來說，稱爲了義；對於執著的人來說，稱為不了義。就像二諦（真諦和俗諦）一樣。 辨時利中：問：『為什麼如來最初說有教（存在之教），中間談空教（空性之教），後來演說不空不有教（非空非有之教）呢？』 答：『根據不定姓（根性不確定的人），在他們還沒有發起修行的興趣時，先讓他們慚愧醒悟所執著的我（自我）是虛無的，只有蘊（五蘊）、處（十二處）、界（十八界）等諸法是存在的，這稱為有教。對於已經發起修行興趣並獲得小乘果位的人，讓他們趣向大乘，進而領悟法空（諸法皆空）的道理，明白他們所執著的界、處等也是虛無的，這稱為空教。後來，爲了發起一切乘（大乘、小乘）的修行者，顯示所執著的是虛無的，並非執著于存在，也並非一概皆空，也不是完全存在，這稱為不空不有教。爲了使人慚愧醒悟而說教有三個階段。如果對於頓悟的人來說，就沒有三個階段的區別。而且，所說的教義並非一定是按照這樣的前後次第來判斷為三個階段，而是根據所說義理的類別來歸屬。對於不定姓的人來說，應當屬於第三個階段。否則，《華嚴經》中，世尊在第二個七日就說了，可以針對慚愧醒悟的人，在《般若經》等之後，才開始演說，判斷屬於第三個階段。這有兩種意義：一是根據前後，二是根據義理類別。根據前後也有兩種意義：最初說生空（眾生皆空），其次說法空（諸法皆空）；二者，最初說生空，暗含法有（諸法存在），其次說法空，暗含法無（諸法皆空），後來才顯明生執（對眾生存在的執著）和法執（對諸法存在的執著）所執取的是不有（非有）。如果離開這兩種執著，真諦和俗諦並非不存在。所以經中說：『有為（有為法）和無為（無為法）稱為有，我和我所（我所擁有之物）說是空。』 問：『如果根據漸入（逐漸進入），這些教義是第三個階段的，第三個階段的教義普遍爲了發起一切乘的修行者，那麼現在這部論（指正在討論的論著）主要針對哪個乘呢？』
【English Translation】 English version The meaning of 'completely understood' (了義). If one is attached to it, then all sutras become 'not completely understood' (不了義). One cannot judge the sacred teachings as 'not completely understood' simply because people themselves cannot understand them. Yao Jijie (要集解) says: 'That which can cause faults or generate merits, 'completely understood' and 'not completely understood,' applies to all Mahayana and Hinayana sutras.' This judgment is incorrect. If 'not completely understood' leads to faults, it is called 'not completely understood,' then it should also be called 'unwholesome' and 'defiled,' which would not be in accordance with reality because there would be too many faults. The correct interpretation now should be: according to the Dharma, it is divided into four types, as explained in the Fa Yuan (法苑), and also based on the person. For those who understand without attachment, it is called 'completely understood'; for those who are attached, it is called 'not completely understood,' just like the Two Truths (二諦, Satya-dvaya, conventional truth and ultimate truth). In Bian Shi Li (辨時利): Question: 'Why did the Tathagata (如來, Thus Come One) initially teach the 'existence teaching' (有教), then discuss the 'emptiness teaching' (空教) in the middle, and later expound the 'neither empty nor existent teaching' (不空不有教)?' Answer: 'Based on those of 'undetermined nature' (不定姓), before they have developed an interest in practice, first let them be ashamed and awaken to the fact that the 'self' (我) they are attached to is illusory, and only the skandhas (蘊, five aggregates), ayatanas (處, twelve sense bases), and dhatus (界, eighteen elements) are existent. This is called the 'existence teaching.' For those who have already developed an interest in practice and have attained the fruits of the Hinayana, let them turn towards the Mahayana and further realize the principle of 'emptiness of phenomena' (法空), understanding that the ayatanas and dhatus they are attached to are also illusory. This is called the 'emptiness teaching.' Later, in order to inspire practitioners of all vehicles (大乘, 小乘, Mahayana and Hinayana), it is shown that what is clung to is illusory, not clinging to existence, nor completely empty, nor completely existent. This is called the 'neither empty nor existent teaching.' Teaching in three stages is for the sake of causing shame and awakening. If it is for those who have sudden enlightenment, there is no distinction of three stages. Moreover, the teachings spoken are not necessarily judged as three stages according to this order of before and after, but are classified according to the category of the meaning spoken. For those of 'undetermined nature,' it should belong to the third stage. Otherwise, in the Avatamsaka Sutra (華嚴經), the World Honored One (世尊) spoke on the second seven days, which can be directed at those who are ashamed and awakened, and only after the Prajna Sutra (般若經) and others did he begin to expound, judging it to belong to the third stage. There are two meanings to this: one is according to before and after, and the other is according to the category of meaning. According to before and after, there are also two meanings: initially speaking of 'emptiness of beings' (生空), and then 'emptiness of phenomena' (法空); secondly, initially speaking of 'emptiness of beings,' implicitly containing 'existence of phenomena,' and then speaking of 'emptiness of phenomena,' implicitly containing 'non-existence of phenomena,' and later clearly revealing that what is grasped by the attachment to beings (生執) and the attachment to phenomena (法執) is 'not existent' (不有). If these two attachments are abandoned, the conventional truth and ultimate truth are not non-existent. Therefore, the sutra says: 'Conditioned (有為, samskrta) and unconditioned (無為, asamskrta) are called existent, and 'I' and 'what belongs to me' (我及我所) are said to be empty.' Question: 'If according to gradual entry (漸入), these teachings belong to the third stage, and the teachings of the third stage are universally for inspiring practitioners of all vehicles, then which vehicle is this treatise (指正在討論的論著) mainly aimed at now?'
若為三乘如何破彼。若唯被大非第三時 答破我之文通入三乘。破二乘處令唯入大。又破彼執不破彼乘。故通為三 若爾法華既亦云破乘應第二時 答對不定姓約理說一。破執理別令其趣大。若其定姓觀行不同說如藥草。乘即有別故得通被。然多為不定故說此經。唯說一乘為諸聲聞所作事故等 若爾既第三時普為一切。何故解深密雲我于凡愚不開演。阿毗達磨云勝者我開示 答大分三時云爲一切。不言一一文各各為三乘故。今此論．解深密等上下文中可通被三。故不相違 問既對漸悟說教三時。即第三時亦為漸悟趣大者說。只是為大何得說言普為一切 答為根熟惠悟既通故。為顯說三乘所觀空．有諸法雲為一切。般若經中雖有三乘各各得益。未分明說法非空．有。故屬第二。若約頓悟可立一時 問若立一時與古何別法苑不許 答古立一時。約佛一時能頓說。故名為一時。據能雖示對機不然。以眾生機熟有前後。寧得一時說法名為一時。今立一時約理是一。對究竟果名為一時。又約被于頓悟之人。隨說何教而能頓悟一會所說二空之理。雙除二執故名一時。所以鹿苑初說四諦法輪。無量菩薩入于初地等。若聞四諦不悟法空。云何得入初極喜等。不定一會名為一時。約頓悟者隨所聞教。常悟空．有及以二空始終一化名為一時
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果存在聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna，聽聞佛陀教誨而修行的乘）、緣覺乘（Pratyekabuddhayāna，通過自身觀察因緣而覺悟的乘）和菩薩乘（Bodhisattvayāna，發菩提心，以利益眾生為目標的乘）這三乘，如何破除它們呢？如果只是針對菩薩乘，而非第三時（指佛陀說法第三個時期，通常指《法華經》時期）的教法，該如何解釋？ 答：破除『我』的經文可以通用於三乘。在破除二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的觀點時，使其唯一進入菩薩乘。並且，破除的是他們的執著，而不是破除他們所修行的乘。因此，可以通用於三乘。 問：如果是這樣，《法華經》（Lotus Sūtra）既然也說破除乘，是否應該屬於第二時（指佛陀說法第二個時期，通常指般若經典時期）？ 答：對於根性不定的眾生，從理上來說是歸於一乘（Ekayāna，唯一的成佛之道）。破除他們對理的執著，使他們趨向于菩薩乘。如果他們的根性已定，觀行（Vipaśyanā，內觀）不同，就像藥草一樣，乘就有所區別，因此可以通用於三乘。然而，因為多數眾生根性不定，所以說這部經（《法華經》）只是爲了聲聞所作的事情等等，而宣說一乘。 問：如果是這樣，既然第三時是普遍爲了所有眾生，為什麼《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra）說『我不為凡夫愚人開演』，《阿毗達磨》（Abhidharma，論藏）說『我為殊勝者開示』？ 答：從大的方面來說，三時說是爲了所有眾生，但並不是說每一段經文都是爲了三乘。現在這部論（指《瑜伽師地論》，Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）、《解深密經》等，從上下文來看，可以通用於三乘，因此並不矛盾。 問：既然是針對漸悟（逐漸覺悟）的眾生而說教法的三時，那麼第三時也是為那些漸悟而趨向菩薩乘的眾生說的。既然只是爲了菩薩乘，為什麼說普遍爲了所有眾生？ 答：因為根機成熟、智慧開悟是相通的。爲了顯明宣說三乘所觀的空（Śūnyatā，空性）、有（Bhava，存在）諸法，所以說是爲了所有眾生。般若經中雖然三乘各自得到利益，但沒有明確說法是非空非有，所以屬於第二時。如果從頓悟（瞬間覺悟）的角度來看，可以建立一時（指佛陀說法只有一個時期）。 問：如果建立一時，與古人的觀點有什麼區別？法苑（指唐代法苑義林，佛教著作）不是不允許嗎？ 答：古人建立一時，是從佛陀一時能夠頓說的角度來說的，所以稱為一時。從能說的佛陀來說，雖然是針對不同根機的眾生，但實際上並非如此。因為眾生的根機成熟有先後，怎麼能說一時說法稱為一時呢？現在建立一時，是從理上來說是一，對於究竟果（最終的佛果）來說稱為一時。又是針對頓悟之人，無論說什麼教法，都能頓悟一會所說的二空（人空和法空）之理，同時去除兩種執著（我執和法執），所以稱為一時。所以，在鹿野苑（Sarnath）初轉四諦法輪（Dharmacakra，佛陀的教法），無量菩薩證入初地（Prathamā bhūmi，菩薩修行的第一個階段）等等。如果聽聞四諦（catvāri āryasatyāni，苦、集、滅、道）而不悟法空，怎麼能證入初極喜地等等？不定於一會，稱為一時。對於頓悟者來說，無論聽聞什麼教法，常常悟空、有以及二空，始終一化，稱為一時。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If there are the Three Vehicles – Śrāvakayāna (the Vehicle of Hearers, those who practice by listening to the Buddha's teachings), Pratyekabuddhayāna (the Vehicle of Solitary Buddhas, those who awaken through their own observation of conditions), and Bodhisattvayāna (the Vehicle of Bodhisattvas, those who aspire to benefit all beings) – how are they refuted? If it is only directed at the Bodhisattva Vehicle and not the teachings of the Third Period (referring to the time of the Lotus Sutra), how should it be explained? Answer: The texts that refute 『self』 can be applied to all Three Vehicles. When refuting the views of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), it leads them solely into the Bodhisattva Vehicle. Moreover, it refutes their attachments, not the Vehicle they practice. Therefore, it can be applied to all three. Question: If that's the case, since the Lotus Sūtra also speaks of refuting vehicles, shouldn't it belong to the Second Period (referring to the time of Prajñāpāramitā sutras)? Answer: For beings with undetermined natures, from the perspective of principle, it returns to the One Vehicle (Ekayāna, the single path to Buddhahood). Refuting their attachment to principle leads them towards the Bodhisattva Vehicle. If their natures are determined, and their contemplations (Vipaśyanā, insight meditation) differ, like medicinal herbs, the Vehicles are distinct, thus it can be applied to all three. However, because most beings have undetermined natures, this sutra (the Lotus Sutra) speaks of the One Vehicle, solely for the sake of what Śrāvakas do, and so on. Question: If that's the case, since the Third Period is universally for all beings, why does the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra say, 『I do not expound for foolish ordinary people,』 and the Abhidharma (collection of philosophical texts) say, 『I reveal to the superior ones』? Answer: Broadly speaking, the Three Periods are said to be for all beings, but it doesn't mean that every passage is for all Three Vehicles. Now, this treatise (referring to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra), the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, and others, from their context, can be applied to all Three Vehicles, thus there is no contradiction. Question: Since the teachings of the Three Periods are spoken for beings who awaken gradually (gradual enlightenment), then the Third Period is also spoken for those who gradually awaken and move towards the Bodhisattva Vehicle. Since it is only for the Bodhisattva Vehicle, why is it said to be universally for all beings? Answer: Because mature faculties and enlightened wisdom are interconnected. To clearly explain the emptiness (Śūnyatā, the state of being devoid of inherent existence) and existence (Bhava, the state of being) of all dharmas (phenomena) contemplated by the Three Vehicles, it is said to be for all beings. Although the Three Vehicles each benefit in the Prajñāpāramitā sutras, it doesn't explicitly state that dharmas are neither empty nor existent, so it belongs to the Second Period. If viewed from the perspective of sudden enlightenment (instantaneous awakening), one period (referring to the Buddha's teachings having only one period) can be established. Question: If one period is established, what is the difference from the views of the ancients? Doesn't the Fayuan (referring to Fayuan Zhulin, a Buddhist text from the Tang Dynasty) disallow it? Answer: The ancients established one period from the perspective that the Buddha could expound everything at once, so it is called one period. From the perspective of the Buddha who can speak, although it is directed at beings of different capacities, it is not actually so. Because the maturation of beings' faculties has a sequence, how can it be said that teaching at one time is called one period? Now, establishing one period is from the perspective that principle is one, and it is called one period in relation to the ultimate fruit (the final Buddhahood). It is also for those who have sudden enlightenment, no matter what teaching is spoken, they can suddenly awaken to the principle of the two emptinesses (emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena) spoken in one assembly, simultaneously removing the two attachments (attachment to self and attachment to phenomena), so it is called one period. Therefore, in Sarnath, when the Four Noble Truths (catvāri āryasatyāni, suffering, origin, cessation, path) were first taught, countless Bodhisattvas entered the first bhūmi (Prathamā bhūmi, the first stage of a Bodhisattva's path), and so on. If one hears the Four Noble Truths and does not awaken to the emptiness of dharmas, how can one enter the first Joyful Ground, and so on? Not fixed in one assembly, it is called one period. For those who have sudden enlightenment, no matter what teaching they hear, they constantly realize emptiness, existence, and the two emptinesses, from beginning to end, as one transformation, it is called one period.
辨時之中劉虬立五時教。設云據漸悟理亦不然。為提謂等說五戒本行經時。通得諸乘聖道。不得云初唯人天教。正為價人不得云兼。又設對漸不得約定年月前後以立五時。又無教文故為過也。又漸頓教。若以一會所說二諦理盡名之為頓。即不應說華嚴．勝鬘等為頓。法華．般若等為漸。俱一會中明理盡故。若云對大不由小起即說為頓。亦不應定說華嚴等為其頓教。判法華等為其漸教。俱有漸頓機在會故。不障立漸．頓。不許定判教。法苑本意應如是知。
又辨時意以解深密說三時教。今此論等何時教收 然要集等云。約此等以辨教時名為教依 今謂不爾。不約說於半滿二教。有作無作．生法二空．人天言教。此等法時以為所依。若依此等各自是時。說唯識教說唯識時。何須更辨是何時教。若約半滿．有作無作．生法空等法門別辨。法門無量何只爾許。又隨別法而以辨者。即亦如名說唯識法教。何須對辨。若云諸教所說不同。諸師立時明教各別。此何所攝者。亦不應爾。說一．二．四．五時教等無聖教文。並不可依何云教依。既不準定空設劬勞。然瑜伽論說時為依。依三世辨不約教時。取此誤也 又因論生論。聖教之中一音說法有二不同。一詞。二法。如無垢稱經。皆謂世尊同其語詞。或生厭離。或歡喜等法。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：劉虬在辨別時教中創立了五時教。假設說依據漸悟的道理，也是不對的。因為為提謂（Trapusa）等人宣說五戒本行經時，都能通達諸乘的聖道，不能說最初只是人天教。正因為價人（those of value）不能說是兼帶的。又假設針對漸悟，就不能約定年月前後以建立五時教，又沒有相應的經文依據，所以這是不對的。又說漸教和頓教，如果以一次法會所說的二諦道理都完備，就稱之為頓教，那麼就不應該說《華嚴經》、《勝鬘經》等是頓教，而《法華經》、《般若經》等是漸教，因為都在一次法會中闡明了完備的道理。如果說針對大乘不由小乘生起就說是頓教，也不應該確定說《華嚴經》等是頓教，判《法華經》等是漸教，因為都有漸頓的根機在法會中。不阻礙建立漸教和頓教，但不允許確定地判別教義。法苑的本意應該這樣理解。 又辨別時教的意義，以《解深密經》所說的三時教為例，現在這些論著等應該歸入哪個時教呢？然而《然要集》等書說，依據這些來辨別教時，稱之為教依。我認為不是這樣。不依據所說的半滿二教，有作無作、生法二空、人天言教，這些法門的時機作為依據。如果依據這些，各自都是一個時教，說唯識教就說唯識時，何須再辨別是哪個時教？如果依據半滿、有作無作、生法空等法門來分別辨別，法門無量，為何只有這些？又隨著個別的法門來辨別，也就如同命名說唯識法教一樣，何須相對辨別。如果說諸教所說的不同，諸位法師建立時教，闡明教義各有不同，這些應該歸屬於哪個時教呢？也不應該是這樣。說一、二、四、五時教等，沒有聖教的經文依據，都不可依據，為何說是教依？既然不準確定論，就不要白費力氣。然而《瑜伽師地論》說時教作為依據，是依據三世來辨別，不是依據教時，這是理解錯誤了。又因為論著而產生論著，聖教之中，佛陀以一個聲音說法，有兩種不同：一是語詞，二是法義。如《維摩詰經》（Vimalakirti Sutra）所說，都說世尊（The World-Honored One）使用相同的語詞，有人因此產生厭離，有人因此歡喜等法。
【English Translation】 English version: Liu Qiu established the Five Periods Teaching in 'Distinguishing the Times of Teaching'. Assuming it's based on the principle of gradual enlightenment is also incorrect. Because when the Five Precepts Fundamental Practice Sutra was preached to Trapusa (提謂), they could all attain the holy path of various vehicles, it cannot be said that it was initially only the human and heavenly teaching. Precisely because those of value (價人) cannot be said to be incidental. Furthermore, assuming it's aimed at gradual enlightenment, one cannot stipulate the order of months and years to establish the Five Periods Teaching, and there is no corresponding scriptural basis, so this is incorrect. Furthermore, regarding the gradual and sudden teachings, if the two truths expounded in one assembly are complete, it is called the sudden teaching, then it should not be said that the Avatamsaka Sutra (華嚴經), the Srimala Sutra (勝鬘經), etc., are sudden teachings, while the Lotus Sutra (法華經), the Prajna Sutra (般若經), etc., are gradual teachings, because they all elucidate complete principles in one assembly. If it is said that the sudden teaching arises from the great vehicle and not from the small vehicle, it should not be definitively said that the Avatamsaka Sutra, etc., are the sudden teaching, and the Lotus Sutra, etc., are the gradual teaching, because there are both gradual and sudden capacities in the assembly. It does not hinder the establishment of gradual and sudden teachings, but it is not allowed to definitively distinguish the teachings. The original intention of Fa Yuan (法苑) should be understood in this way. Furthermore, to distinguish the meaning of the times of teaching, taking the Three Periods Teaching mentioned in the Samdhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經) as an example, into which period of teaching should these treatises, etc., be categorized? However, the Ran Yao Ji (然要集) and other books say that distinguishing the times of teaching based on these is called the 'teaching basis'. I think this is not the case. It does not rely on the two teachings of partial and complete, the active and inactive, the two emptinesses of existence and dharma, and the teachings of humans and heavens, taking the timing of these dharmas as the basis. If based on these, each is a period of teaching, when the Consciousness-Only teaching is spoken, it is the time of Consciousness-Only, why is it necessary to distinguish which period of teaching it is? If distinguishing based on the dharma gates of partial and complete, active and inactive, emptiness of existence and dharma, etc., the dharma gates are countless, why only these? Furthermore, distinguishing according to individual dharma gates is like naming and saying the Consciousness-Only dharma teaching, why is it necessary to distinguish relatively? If it is said that the teachings spoken by the various teachings are different, and the masters establish the times of teaching and elucidate the teachings differently, to which period of teaching should these be attributed? It should also not be like this. Saying one, two, four, five periods of teaching, etc., there is no scriptural basis in the holy teachings, and they are all unreliable, why is it said to be the teaching basis? Since it is not allowed to make a definitive conclusion, do not waste effort. However, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) says that the times of teaching are the basis, and it distinguishes based on the three times, not based on the times of teaching, this is a misunderstanding. Furthermore, because of treatises, treatises are produced. In the holy teachings, the Buddha (世尊, The World-Honored One) speaks the Dharma with one voice, there are two differences: one is the words, and the other is the meaning of the Dharma. As the Vimalakirti Sutra (維摩詰經) says, they all say that the Buddha uses the same words, and some therefore generate aversion, while others generate joy and other dharmas.
如涅槃經二十四云演說一法若界若入。一切眾生各隨本解而得聞之。是法．詞合說。一名．句中現多名句。一音聲中現多音聲。故各隨本解攝假從聲。以諸名．句隨生有別。然不離聲故總名聞。又梵網上云。一音中說無量法品。又云苦．空．無常．無我一諦之音。並法．詞合 或但舉法。如華嚴云。若多貪恚等八萬四千垢各聞對治法 又云。一音說法。或有眾生學聲聞乘。聞佛說法即知聲聞藏。此等即但明法無礙。亦得通詞。聞即聞聲 又無量義經云。能以一音普應眾聲。即但是詞 又如婆沙七十三云。一音者梵音 若支那人來在會坐。謂佛為說支那音義。此通法．詞 又云。貪行者來在會坐。聞佛為說不凈觀等。此即唯法。雖各有義且辨一音不說所餘 問隨能聞現聲各有殊。若據所詮法各差別。何名一音 答或一剎那。或一無漏。或且隨一所詮之法。或隨於一所化之生。或從於如。總得名一 問若爾何故毗婆沙云一音者。梵音。若支那人來在會坐。謂佛為說支那音義 答不以小乘而為定量。既如如意隨求雨寶。故隨生感各各現聲。或聲清凈名為梵音。非必唯同一梵音聲 問佛說一音具諸法門為不具耶 答有四解(要集所敘)。一云如來無相圓音。以無相故佛說一音。以圓滿故普應眾生。此答不了說不具故 一云如來
但出一音。未知何以為名。而眾生心中聞無量法門(此答不正。不答問故。亦同外道老莊說故) 一云如來隨所化者。一時具有無邊法門。隨正所為故云一音。此意一音具諸法門。隨正所為一別有情名為一音。然答不明。應云隨所化生方類不同。於一時中現一切音。一一音中具諸法門。且隨一生或正所為故名一音。非一音言唯詮一法。雖然答問亦不分明 一云如來所出一音聲體自在難思。與彼無邊名等相應為眾生說故。經云。如來所出一語中。演說無邊契經海。此釋雖勝亦未盡理。言一音者。為一梵音。為一剎那。為名等各別。為一名中此現多名等。今謂一一聲．一剎那聲．一一名等．各能現多。或一聲現多名。或多聲現一名。或一名現多名。或多名現一名。句．義準知。隨義皆得名為一音 要集云。菩提流支云一音教。法苑廣破然恐不當 此亦不了破意。彼云一音頓說名為頓教者。非一音中即頓說教盡。根性前後不一時故。何得一音頓說教盡。又復設爾不應別判華嚴等為頓。又以一音名為一時無教定判 又云半．滿而為二時。法苑所破亦恐不當。經云爲聲聞說半字者。豈不約逗機。故恐不爾。亦不解彼法苑說意。彼意不障逗機而說名為半．滿。但不許判為漸頓機。說於半．滿名漸．頓教。為定姓人亦說半滿故 詮宗
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 但發出一音，不知該如何命名。而眾生心中卻能聽聞無量的法門（這個回答不正確，因為它沒有回答問題，也類似於外道老莊的說法）。 一種說法是，如來隨著所教化對象的不同，一時之間具備無邊的法門，隨著當下所應做的而說，所以稱為一音。這個意思是說，一音具備各種法門，隨著當下所應做的而針對不同的有情眾生，稱為一音。然而這個回答不夠明確，應該說，隨著所教化的眾生的種類不同，在同一時間顯現一切音聲，每一種音聲中都具備各種法門，並且隨著某一類眾生或者當下所應做的，所以稱為一音。並非一音之言只詮釋一種法。雖然這個回答問題也不夠分明。 一種說法是，如來所發出的一音聲體自在，難以思議，與那無邊的名相等相應，為眾生說法。經中說：『如來所發出的一句話中，演說無邊的契經海。』這種解釋雖然好，但也沒有完全窮盡道理。說一音，是指一個梵音嗎？還是指一個剎那？還是指名等各自不同？還是指一個名中顯現多個名等？現在認為是，一聲一聲、一剎那聲、一個一個名等，各自都能顯現多個。或者一聲顯現多個名，或者多個聲顯現一個名，或者一個名顯現多個名，或者多個名顯現一個名。句和義可以類推得知。隨著意義都可以稱為一音。 《要集》中說，菩提流支（Bodhiruci，人名）說一音教。法苑（Fayuan，人名）廣泛地駁斥，但恐怕不恰當。 這也是不瞭解駁斥的用意。他說一音頓說，稱為頓教，並非一音之中就頓然說完所有的教法，因為眾生的根性有先後不同的時候。怎麼能說一音頓然說完所有的教法呢？而且如果這樣，就不應該另外判定華嚴等為頓教。又用一音稱為一時無教來判定。 又說半字、滿字而分為二時。法苑（Fayuan，人名）所駁斥的恐怕也不恰當。經中說為聲聞說半字，難道不是爲了適應他們的根機嗎？恐怕不是這樣。也沒有理解法苑（Fayuan，人名）所說的意思。他的意思是不妨礙適應根機而說，稱為半字、滿字。但不允許判定為漸機、頓機，說對於半字、滿字稱為漸教、頓教。因為對於定性的人也說半字、滿字。 詮宗
【English Translation】 English version It emits a single sound, and it is unknown what to call it. Yet, in the minds of sentient beings, countless Dharma (teaching) doors are heard (this answer is incorrect because it does not answer the question and is similar to the doctrines of Taoism and Lao-Zhuang). One explanation is that the Tathagata (如來, another name for Buddha) possesses boundless Dharma doors at once, according to the beings being transformed, and speaks according to what is appropriate at the time, hence it is called 'one sound'. This means that one sound possesses all Dharma doors, and it is called 'one sound' for different sentient beings according to what is appropriate at the time. However, this answer is not clear enough. It should be said that according to the different types of beings being transformed, all sounds are manifested at the same time, and each sound possesses all Dharma doors, and it is called 'one sound' according to a certain type of being or what is appropriate at the time. It is not that the words of one sound only explain one Dharma. Although this answer to the question is also not clear enough. One explanation is that the sound-body emitted by the Tathagata (如來, another name for Buddha) is free and inconceivable, corresponding to those boundless names and so on, and speaks Dharma for sentient beings. The sutra says: 'In one word emitted by the Tathagata (如來, another name for Buddha), countless sutra oceans are expounded.' Although this explanation is good, it does not fully exhaust the principle. Saying 'one sound', does it refer to one Brahma sound? Or does it refer to one kshana (剎那, an extremely short period of time)? Or does it refer to names and so on being different from each other? Or does it refer to one name manifesting multiple names and so on? Now it is considered that each sound, each kshana (剎那, an extremely short period of time) sound, each name, and so on, can each manifest many. Or one sound manifests many names, or many sounds manifest one name, or one name manifests many names, or many names manifest one name. The meaning of phrases and meanings can be known by analogy. According to the meaning, all can be called 'one sound'. The 'Essentials Collection' says that Bodhiruci (菩提流支, a person's name) speaks of the One Sound Teaching. Fayuan (法苑, a person's name) refutes it extensively, but it is feared that it is not appropriate. This is also not understanding the intention of the refutation. He says that one sound is spoken suddenly, called the sudden teaching, not that all the teachings are suddenly finished in one sound, because the roots of sentient beings have different times. How can it be said that one sound suddenly finishes all the teachings? Moreover, if this is the case, it should not be separately judged that the Avatamsaka Sutra (華嚴經) and others are sudden teachings. Also, it is judged by calling one sound as no teaching at one time. Also, it is said that half-word and full-word are divided into two times. Fayuan's (法苑, a person's name) refutation is also feared to be inappropriate. The sutra says that half-words are spoken for the Shravakas (聲聞, disciples of Buddha who attained enlightenment through listening to his teachings), is it not to adapt to their roots? It is feared that it is not so. Also, the meaning of what Fayuan (法苑, a person's name) said is not understood. His meaning is that it does not hinder adapting to the roots and speaking, called half-word and full-word. But it is not allowed to judge as gradual or sudden roots, saying that half-word and full-word are called gradual teaching and sudden teaching. Because half-word and full-word are also spoken for people with fixed nature. Explaining the Doctrine
各異者。敘外道如下破明及法師瑜伽論抄明。敘小乘計如法師異部疏具解。煩不具引。明自宗者。別宗即唯識章是。然疏略解名成唯識故。此即以唯識為宗。識有非空境無非有。以為宗也。雖具明諸法皆不離識也 西明云。總相分別唯識為宗。別即境．行．果三 此釋不異法苑。然樞要中釋名科文廣明宗意 體性不同者。于中分三。一辨本釋如法苑。于中復三。一總出體。二別出教體。三明聚集 二敘異釋。敘異釋中。初敘異。次詮簡。三敘自釋。自釋者至下當辨 先敘異釋者。有釋五門。一攝妄歸真。二攝相歸識。三以假從實。四三法定體。五法數出體 又云三藏開為八門。於前三門各開二門。謂一攝妄歸真。二真妄差別門。餘二準此 有解六門。一五法自性體(心心所等五法)。二三相差別(三科法門)。三攝義歸名(名言所熏攝一切法)。四攝假歸實。五攝劣歸勝(心識)。六攝相歸性 舊攝論師四門。一隨名義別體。二攝義歸名體。三攝塵歸識體。四攝事歸理體 要集為三。一離能所詮教。入楞伽第二云。法佛說法者離心相應體。故內證聖行境界故。四卷亦同。謂佛法身真如理。生正智解名說法 二通能所詮教。瑜伽八十一云。謂契經體略有二種。一文。二義 三唯局能詮教。十地云。說者聽者二事究竟 依
【現代漢語翻譯】 各異者。敘述外道的觀點，如破明及法師《瑜伽論》抄所闡明。敘述小乘的觀點，如法師《異部疏》中有詳細解釋。內容繁雜，此處不一一引用。闡明本宗（唯識宗）的觀點，即在《唯識章》中。然而，《疏》中只是簡略地解釋了『成唯識』，因此這裡以唯識為宗。認為識是存在的，不是空無；境是虛幻的，不是真實存在的，以此作為宗義。雖然也詳細闡明了諸法皆不離識的道理。 西明法師說：『總的來說，唯識宗以分別唯識為宗。具體來說，則分為境、行、果三方面。』 這種解釋與法苑的觀點沒有不同。然而，《樞要》中解釋名稱的科文則更廣泛地闡明了宗義。 體性不同，其中分為三點。第一點是辨別本釋，如法苑所說。其中又分為三點：一是總的說明體性，二是分別說明教體，三是說明聚集。 第二點是敘述不同的解釋。在敘述不同的解釋中，首先敘述不同的觀點，其次詮釋並進行簡別，然後敘述自己的解釋。自己的解釋將在下文辨析。 首先敘述不同的解釋，有五種解釋：一是攝妄歸真，二是攝相歸識，三是以假從實，四是三法定體，五是法數出體。 又有人說三藏可以分為八門。在前三門中各開二門，即一是攝妄歸真，二是真妄差別門。其餘兩門也依此類推。 有人解釋為六門：一是五法自性體（心、心所等五法），二是三相差別（三科法門），三是攝義歸名（名言所熏習的一切法），四是攝假歸實，五是攝劣歸勝（心識），六是攝相歸性。 舊《攝論》師有四門：一是隨名義別體，二是攝義歸名體，三是攝塵歸識體，四是攝事歸理體。 《要集》歸納為三點：一是離能所詮教。《楞伽經》第二卷說：『法佛說法者，離心相應體。』因此內證聖行境界。四卷本也相同，認為佛法身真如理，生正智解，名為說法。 二是通能所詮教。《瑜伽師地論》第八十一卷說：『契經的體性略有二種：一是文，二是義。』 三是唯局能詮教。《十地經》說：『說者聽者二事究竟。』 依據以上觀點。
【English Translation】 Differing views. The views of externalists are described as elucidated in 'Po Ming' and the copy of Dharma Master's 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra'. The views of the Hīnayāna are described in detail in Dharma Master's 'Different Schools Commentary'. The content is complex, so it is not quoted one by one here. Clarifying the views of our own school (Vijñānavāda), that is, in the 'Vijñaptimātratā Chapter'. However, the 'Commentary' only briefly explains 'Cheng Weishi (establishing consciousness-only)', so here Vijñaptimātratā is taken as the doctrine. It is believed that consciousness exists, it is not empty; the objective world is illusory, it is not real, and this is taken as the doctrine. Although it also explains in detail the principle that all dharmas are inseparable from consciousness. Ximing Dharma Master said: 'Generally speaking, the Vijñaptimātratā school takes distinguishing Vijñaptimātratā as its doctrine. Specifically, it is divided into three aspects: object, practice, and result.' This explanation is no different from the views of 'Fayuan'. However, the section explaining the name in 'Shuyao' more broadly elucidates the meaning of the doctrine. The nature of the substance is different, which is divided into three points. The first point is to distinguish the original explanation, as stated in 'Fayuan'. Among them, it is divided into three points: one is the general explanation of the substance, the second is the separate explanation of the teaching substance, and the third is the explanation of the aggregation. The second point is to describe different explanations. In describing different explanations, first describe different views, then interpret and distinguish, and then describe one's own explanation. One's own explanation will be analyzed below. First, describe different explanations, there are five explanations: one is to subsume delusion to truth, the second is to subsume phenomena to consciousness, the third is to take the false as the real, the fourth is to establish the substance with the three laws, and the fifth is to derive the substance from the number of dharmas. Someone also said that the Tripiṭaka can be divided into eight gates. In the first three gates, two gates are opened in each, that is, one is to subsume delusion to truth, and the second is the gate of difference between truth and delusion. The remaining two gates are inferred in the same way. Some people explain it as six gates: one is the substance of the five dharmas (the five dharmas such as mind, mental factors, etc.), the second is the difference between the three characteristics (the three categories of dharma), the third is to subsume meaning to name (all dharmas that are influenced by name and language), the fourth is to subsume the false to the real, the fifth is to subsume the inferior to the superior (consciousness), and the sixth is to subsume phenomena to nature. The old 'Saṃgraha' masters have four gates: one is to distinguish the substance according to the meaning of the name, the second is to subsume the meaning to the name substance, the third is to subsume the dust to the consciousness substance, and the fourth is to subsume the matter to the principle substance. 'Yaoji' summarizes it into three points: one is to leave the teaching that can be expressed by the subject and object. The second volume of the 'Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra' says: 'The Dharma Buddha who speaks the Dharma is separated from the body corresponding to the mind.' Therefore, the inner proof of the realm of holy practice. The four-volume version is the same, believing that the Dharma body of the Buddha is the principle of Suchness, and the generation of correct wisdom and understanding is called speaking the Dharma. The second is the teaching that can be expressed by both the subject and object. The eighty-first volume of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' says: 'The nature of the sūtras is roughly of two kinds: one is the text, and the other is the meaning.' The third is only the teaching that can be expressed by the subject. The 'Daśabhūmika Sūtra' says: 'The speaker and the listener are two things that are ultimately accomplished.' Based on the above views.
三藏八門作四漸略。一攝妄歸真門。二真妄差別門。真妄差別門中。一攝相歸識門。二識相差別門。此識相差別教中有本無本。佛地兩說。由斯四句。如有釋說 差別相中。一攝假從實門。二假實差別門。假實差別門中。一三法定體門。二法數出體門。法數出體門中。初法數出體。后聚集顯現。法數中有三漸略。謂內外相對。內中大小相對。大中中邊相對 次詮簡者。有釋五門名中有濫。緣生名妄。此則可爾。若約五法相．名．分別．正智．如如。攝彼前四總歸如如。正智非妄。總云攝妄故即有過。又辨中邊頌云。虛妄分別有。乃至是則契中道。故不可說無漏名妄 二攝相歸識。此亦有過。若識性名識不異前門。若即歸八識識亦是相。亦不可說心王所變相分名相。以不離識所有五法皆名識故。若以五法總名為識。如非相故。離五無法可攝歸故。若云約教體說所變相分。同時心所亦變名等為相緣故 攝假從實。即本第三。三法法數合是第四性用門攝 又攝不盡。既約三法。何不約於五法三性。若云從略應依四門。何假分五。分為八門得失準前。有解六門后之三門。即本前三。前之三門即本第四性用別門。雖更開三猶廣略失。準同有釋 然彼意辨先寬得后狹。又攝義歸名亦少有失。非一切義皆是名攝。因名言故名名言熏習
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 三藏八門分為四個漸略的階段：一、攝妄歸真門（將虛妄攝歸於真如之門）；二、真妄差別門（區分真如與虛妄之門）。 在真妄差別門中，又分為：一、攝相歸識門（將現象攝歸於識之門）；二、識相差別門（區分識與現象之門）。關於這個識相差別教，有本有本無的兩種說法，因此有這四句。 如有解釋說，在差別相中，分為：一、攝假從實門（將虛假攝歸於真實之門）；二、假實差別門（區分虛假與真實之門）。在假實差別門中，又分為：一、三法定體門（確定三種法之體性的門）；二、法數出體門（從體性中產生法數的門）。在法數出體門中，首先是法數出體，然後是聚集顯現。法數中有三個漸略的階段，即內外相對、內中大小相對、大中中邊相對。 其次是詮釋和簡別。有人解釋說，五門的名義中有混淆之處，認為緣生是虛妄的，這或許可以接受。但如果按照五法（相（lakṣaṇa），名（nāman），分別（vikalpa），正智（samyagjñāna），如如（tathatā））來說，將前四種總歸於如如，正智並非虛妄，所以總稱為『攝妄』就有了過失。而且《辨中邊論頌》中說：『虛妄分別有，乃至是則契中道』，所以不能說無漏法是虛妄的。 二、攝相歸識門，這也有過失。如果識的自性名為識，那就和前面的門沒有區別。如果直接歸於八識，識也是一種相。而且也不能說心王所變的相分是相，因為不離識的所有五法都名為識。如果以五法總名為識，那就不是相了，因為沒有離開五法可以攝歸的。如果說按照教義的體性來說所變的相分，同時心所也變現名等作為相的緣故。 攝假從實門，實際上是原本的第三門。三法和法數合起來是第四性用門所攝。 而且攝取不完全。既然是按照三法，為什麼不按照五法和三性呢？如果說是爲了簡略，就應該按照四門，為什麼還要假分為五門？分為八門，得失和前面一樣。有人解釋說，六門中後面的三門是原本的前三門，前面的三門是原本第四性用門中的別門。雖然又分開了三門，但仍然有廣略的缺失，和前面的解釋一樣。 然而他們的意思是先寬后窄，而且攝義歸名也有一些缺失，並非一切義都是名所攝，因為有名言的緣故，才有名言熏習。
【English Translation】 English version The Three Collections and Eight Gates are divided into four gradual and abbreviated stages: 1. The Gate of Subsuming Illusion to Truth (Saṃgraha-mithyā-gamana-satya-dvāra); 2. The Gate of Differentiating Truth and Illusion (Satya-mithyā-viśeṣa-dvāra). Within the Gate of Differentiating Truth and Illusion, there are further divisions: 1. The Gate of Subsuming Phenomena to Consciousness (Saṃgraha-lakṣaṇa-gamana-vijñāna-dvāra); 2. The Gate of Differentiating Consciousness and Phenomena (Vijñāna-lakṣaṇa-viśeṣa-dvāra). Regarding this teaching on the differentiation of consciousness and phenomena, there are two views: with a basis (with root) and without a basis (without root), hence these four statements. If someone explains that within the differentiated phenomena, there are: 1. The Gate of Subsuming the False to the Real (Saṃgraha-asat-gamana-satya-dvāra); 2. The Gate of Differentiating the False and the Real (Asat-satya-viśeṣa-dvāra). Within the Gate of Differentiating the False and the Real, there are further divisions: 1. The Gate of Establishing the Essence of the Three Dharmas (Tri-dharma-svabhāva-sthāpana-dvāra); 2. The Gate of Deriving Numbers of Dharmas from the Essence (Dharma-saṃkhyā-utpāda-svabhāva-dvāra). Within the Gate of Deriving Numbers of Dharmas from the Essence, first is the derivation of numbers of dharmas from the essence, and then the aggregation and manifestation. Within the numbers of dharmas, there are three gradual and abbreviated stages, namely, inner and outer relativity, large and small relativity within the inner, and middle and edge relativity within the large. Next is the explanation and distinction. Someone explains that there is confusion in the names of the five dharmas, considering conditioned arising (pratītyasamutpāda) to be illusory, which may be acceptable. However, if according to the five dharmas (lakṣaṇa (characteristic), nāman (name), vikalpa (discrimination), samyagjñāna (right knowledge), tathatā (suchness)), the first four are subsumed under suchness, and right knowledge is not illusory, so calling it 『subsuming illusion』 is a mistake. Moreover, the Treatise on Distinguishing the Middle and the Extremes (Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā) says: 『Illusory discrimination exists, and thus it accords with the Middle Way』, so it cannot be said that unconditioned dharmas are illusory. 2. The Gate of Subsuming Phenomena to Consciousness, this is also a mistake. If the nature of consciousness is called consciousness, then it is no different from the previous gate. If it is directly subsumed under the eight consciousnesses (aṣṭa vijñāna), consciousness is also a phenomenon. And it cannot be said that the image-aspect (nimitta-bhāga) transformed by the mind-king (citta-rāja) is a phenomenon, because all five dharmas that are not separate from consciousness are called consciousness. If the five dharmas are collectively called consciousness, then it is not a phenomenon, because there is nothing apart from the five dharmas that can be subsumed. If it is said that according to the nature of the teaching, the transformed image-aspect, and simultaneously the mental factors (caitasika) also transform names etc. as the cause of the phenomenon. The Gate of Subsuming the False to the Real is actually the original third gate. The three dharmas and the numbers of dharmas together are subsumed under the fourth gate of nature and function. Moreover, the subsumption is incomplete. Since it is according to the three dharmas, why not according to the five dharmas and the three natures (tri-svabhāva)? If it is said to be for brevity, it should be according to the four gates, why falsely divide it into five gates? Dividing it into eight gates has the same gains and losses as before. Someone explains that the last three of the six gates are the original first three gates, and the first three gates are the separate gates within the original fourth gate of nature and function. Although three gates are further divided, there is still a lack of breadth and brevity, the same as the previous explanation. However, their intention is to go from broad to narrow, and there are also some shortcomings in subsuming meaning to name, because not all meanings are subsumed by name, because there are verbal expressions (nāman), hence there is verbal conditioning (vāsanā).
。非即是名 舊攝論師后二門體。亦本初初二二合是性用別論。闕本第三攝假從實。亦廣略失 要集三門離能所詮。即攝相歸性。推功歸本復是無分別智所緣之境。因境起智。言法佛說法。寄詮談之。云離心相應故。內證聖行境界故。是名法佛說法之相。非是真智正證如時。能證所證有此行解名為說法。后之二門亦即性用別論門攝 要集云。依三藏八門作四漸略。一攝妄歸真。二真妄差別門。真妄差別門中。一攝相歸識門等 此意從寬漸向于狹名之為略。然攝妄歸真即以一法。乃至法數出體。以聲．名．句．文。即有多法何得名略。不解所以 今為漸略即有二意。一從通向別略。即從初向後是。二從多向少以末就本略。且就教體辨漸略者。以性用別論中能所詮異。由能詮文義得顯現。略所詮義但取能詮。故十地論說者聽者俱以二事而得究竟。一者聲。二者善字。能詮之中有聲．名．句文。即假實別。攝假從實以聲為體。故集論等云成所引聲而為教體。于能詮聲能所變別。攝從能變以識為體。就識之中性相有別。攝相歸性。引文可知。聚集顯現中雲。五心中前三唯無記。后二通善．染者。此義有餘。與唯識第五解五心違。彼許定中有初二心故。約識分別文多不敘。要集云。有說得新境故名為率爾。有釋不作意緣名為率爾
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『非即是名』，這是舊《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha，大乘論）師對后二門（指唯識思想中的兩種觀點或修行階段）的理解，認為它們在本質上是性用（svabhāva-prayoga，自性與作用）的分別論。而《攝大乘論》本身最初的兩個部分，實際上是將自性與作用合二為一進行討論。缺少了《攝大乘論》第三部分中攝假從實（將虛假現象歸於真實本體）的內容，也存在著廣略上的缺失。《要集》（可能是指《瑜伽師地論·攝事品》的註釋）的三門（可能指三種修行方法或觀點）脫離了能詮（表達者）和所詮（被表達者）的對立，實際上是將現象攝歸於自性。將功勞歸於根本，這又是無分別智（nirvikalpa-jñāna，不帶分別的智慧）所緣的境界。因為境界而生起智慧，所以說法佛（dharma-buddha，法身佛）說法，是藉由詮釋來談論的。說『離心相應故』，是因為內在證悟聖行的境界，這被稱為法佛說法的相狀。並非是真智（真實智慧）真正證悟如實之際，能證（能證悟的主體）和所證（被證悟的客體）存在著這樣的行解，才稱為說法。後面的兩個門，實際上也包含在性用分別論門中。 《要集》中說，依據三藏（tripiṭaka，佛教經典的總稱）八門（可能指八種修行方法或觀點）來做四種漸略（逐步簡略的方法）。一是攝妄歸真（將虛妄歸於真實），二是真妄差別門（區分真實與虛妄）。在真妄差別門中，有一攝相歸識門（將現象攝歸於識）等。這種意思是說，從寬泛逐漸走向狹窄，稱之為略。然而，攝妄歸真實際上是以一法（一種法）乃至法數（法的數量）來顯現本體，以聲（聲音）、名（名稱）、句（句子）、文（文字）來說，就有很多法，怎麼能稱為略呢？這是不理解其中的道理。 現在解釋漸略，實際上有兩種含義。一是，從普遍向個別簡略，也就是從最初向最後發展。二是，從多向少，以末端歸於根本來簡略。且就教體（教義的本體）來辨別漸略，在性用分別論中，能詮和所詮是不同的，通過能詮的文義才能顯現。簡略所詮的意義，只取能詮。所以《十地論》（Daśabhūmika Sūtra，解釋菩薩十地的經典）說，說者和聽者都通過兩件事而得到究竟：一是聲，二是善字。在能詮之中有聲、名、句、文，這就有了假和實的區別。攝假從實，以聲為本體。所以《集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya，阿毗達摩集論）等說，成就所引之聲作為教體。在能詮的聲中，能變和所變有所區別，攝從能變，以識為本體。在識之中，自性和現象有所區別，攝相歸性。引用原文就可以知道。聚集顯現中說，五心中前三種只有無記（既非善也非惡），后兩種通於善和染，這個說法是有問題的，與《唯識》（Vijñānavāda，唯識宗）第五解五心相違背，因為《唯識》允許定中有最初的兩種心。關於識的分別，文中有很多，這裡不再贅述。《要集》中說，有人說因為得到新的境界，所以稱為率爾（突然），有人解釋說不作意緣（不加以注意地緣取）稱為率爾。
【English Translation】 English version: 『Non-identity is name,』 this is how the old Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium on the Great Vehicle, 大乘論) masters understood the latter two doors (referring to two viewpoints or stages of practice in the Vijñānavāda school), considering them to be essentially discussions on the distinction between svabhāva (self-nature, 自性) and prayoga (function, 作用). The first two parts of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha itself actually discuss self-nature and function as a unified whole. The absence of the content of 『gathering the false into the real』 (攝假從實, reducing the false phenomena to the real essence) from the third part of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha also represents a deficiency in terms of breadth and conciseness. The three doors of Yaoji (要集, possibly a commentary on the Śrāvakabhūmi section of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) depart from the opposition between the nengquan (that which expresses, 能詮) and the suoquan (that which is expressed, 所詮), and in reality, it is gathering phenomena back to self-nature. Attributing merit to the root is again the realm of nirvikalpa-jñāna (non-discriminating wisdom, 無分別智). Because wisdom arises from the realm, the Dharma-Buddha (法身佛) speaks the Dharma by means of interpretation. Saying 『because it is apart from mental association,』 is because of the realm of internal realization of holy practice, which is called the appearance of the Dharma-Buddha speaking the Dharma. It is not that when true wisdom truly realizes reality, the nengzheng (that which can realize, 能證) and the suozheng (that which is realized, 所證) exist with such understanding and practice, that it is called speaking the Dharma. The latter two doors are also included in the door of distinguishing self-nature and function. Yaoji says that based on the tripiṭaka (three baskets, 三藏) and eight doors (possibly referring to eight methods or viewpoints of practice), four gradual abbreviations are made. First, gathering the false into the real (攝妄歸真); second, the door of distinguishing between the real and the false (真妄差別門). Within the door of distinguishing between the real and the false, there is the door of gathering phenomena into consciousness (攝相歸識門), etc. This means that gradually moving from broad to narrow is called abbreviation. However, gathering the false into the real actually uses one dharma (一種法) or even the number of dharmas (法的數量) to manifest the essence. In terms of sound (聲音), name (名稱), sentence (句子), and text (文字), there are many dharmas, so how can it be called abbreviation? This is not understanding the principle. Now, explaining gradual abbreviation actually has two meanings. First, abbreviating from the universal to the particular, which is from the beginning to the end. Second, abbreviating from many to few, with the end returning to the root. Moreover, distinguishing gradual abbreviation based on the essence of the teachings, in the theory of distinguishing self-nature and function, the nengquan and suoquan are different, and the meaning of the nengquan can be manifested through the meaning of the text. Abbreviating the meaning of the suoquan only takes the nengquan. Therefore, the Daśabhūmika Sūtra (Ten Stages Sutra, 十地論) says that both the speaker and the listener attain ultimate completion through two things: first, sound; second, good words. Within the nengquan, there are sound, name, sentence, and text, which have the distinction between the false and the real. Gathering the false into the real takes sound as the essence. Therefore, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma, 集論) and others say that the sound that is produced is taken as the essence of the teachings. Within the sound of the nengquan, there is a distinction between that which can transform and that which is transformed, gathering from that which can transform takes consciousness as the essence. Within consciousness, there is a distinction between self-nature and phenomena, gathering phenomena into self-nature. Quoting the original text can make this clear. The Jujixianxian (聚集顯現) says that the first three of the five minds are only indeterminate (neither good nor evil), and the latter two are common to both good and defiled. This statement is problematic and contradicts the fifth explanation of the five minds in Vijñānavāda (唯識宗), because Vijñānavāda allows the first two minds to be present in meditation. There are many distinctions about consciousness in the text, so I will not elaborate here. Yaoji says that some say it is called shuai'er (率爾, suddenly) because a new realm is obtained, and some explain that not attending to the conditions (not paying attention to the conditions) is called shuai'er.
。以何為正。解云論唯任運。若言新境不見其文。然準道理合有二義。今謂不爾。瑜伽第三云。又意識任運散亂緣不串習境時。無慾等生名率爾。既云緣不串習即是新境。若唯任運散亂緣境不與欲俱即名率爾。除第六外餘一切時。但名率爾應無餘心。未轉依位皆唯任運散亂緣故。更有同異繁不具述 言聚集顯現者。如說諸行無常。有釋云。西方三解。一云說諸字時率爾現量。尋求前境不緣名等但得聲相。至決定心具現三相。謂聲．名．字。說行現六。說無現九。說常字時現十二相。並句．所詮合十四法。經十六心乃具聚集。謂四字中各有四心。謂耳．意各四率爾。並意尋求．決定各四。一云尋求是非量故。亦緣名等故。于尋求亦得聚集。四尋求心如其次第。得三．六．九及以十四。準前應知經十二心具足聚集。一云耳識同緣意識亦緣名等。此有二說。一云四率爾心各唯得三。不緣過去現量得故不說聚集。至尋求心方名教體。一云耳識同時意識。容非現故得緣過去。即八心中具足聚集。今謂有餘。且初釋中所經心多聚集法少。何者意識上聚集何故經耳識四率爾心耶。豈許意識不取本質但緣耳識所變聲耶。既許意識．耳識同時自緣本質。但經意識十二心現。不應十六。若取耳率爾。應取耳緣聲。應成十八法。若以聲相似但
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 以什麼為『正』（zhen 正確的）？解釋說，論述只在于『任運』（ren yun 自然而然）。如果說有新的境界，卻找不到相關的文字。然而按照道理，應該有兩種含義。現在說不是這樣。《瑜伽師地論》第三卷說：『又意識任運散亂地緣取不熟悉的境界時，沒有貪慾等產生，稱為『率爾』（cu er 突然的）。』既然說緣取不熟悉的境界，那就是新的境界。如果只是任運散亂地緣取境界，不與貪慾等同時產生，就稱為『率爾』。除了第六識（末那識）之外，其餘一切時候，都只是稱為『率爾』，應該沒有其他心識。在沒有轉依（zhuan yi 轉變所依靠的）的階段，都是任運散亂地緣取境界的緣故。還有更多相同和不同的地方，繁多不一一敘述。 說到『聚集顯現』（ju ji xian xian 聚集顯現），例如說『諸行無常』（zhu xing wu chang 諸行無常）。有一種解釋說，西方有三種解釋。一種說法是，說『諸』字時，是『率爾現量』（cu er xian liang 突然的現量）。尋求前面的境界，不緣取名稱等，只得到聲音的相。到『決定心』（jue ding xin 決定心）時，才具足顯現三種相，即聲音、名稱、文字。說『行』字時，顯現六種相。說『無』字時，顯現九種相。說『常』字時，顯現十二種相。加上句子和所詮釋的含義，共有十四種法。經過十六個心識才具足聚集，即四個字中各有四個心識，即耳識和意識各有四個『率爾』，加上意識的尋求和決定各有四個。一種說法是，尋求是非量（shi fei liang），也緣取名稱等，所以在尋求時也得到聚集。四個尋求心按照次第，得到三、六、九以及十四。按照前面的說法，經過十二個心識就具足聚集。一種說法是，耳識同時緣取，意識也緣取名稱等。對此有兩種說法。一種說法是，四個『率爾』心各自只得到三種，因為不緣取過去的現量，所以不說聚集。到尋求心時才稱為教體。一種說法是，耳識同時意識，可能不是現量，所以可以緣取過去。即八個心中具足聚集。現在認為還有剩餘。且說第一種解釋中，所經過的心識多，聚集的法少。為什麼意識上的聚集，要經過耳識的四個『率爾』心呢？難道允許意識不取本質，只緣取耳識所變的聲音嗎？既然允許意識和耳識同時各自緣取本質，那麼只經過意識的十二個心識就顯現，不應該十六個。如果取耳識的『率爾』，應該取耳識緣取聲音，應該成為十八種法。如果以聲音相似但
【English Translation】 English version What is considered 『right』 (zheng, correct)? The explanation says that the discussion lies solely in 『Ren Yun』 (任運, natural and spontaneous). If one speaks of a new realm, the text does not show it. However, according to reason, there should be two meanings. Now, it is said that it is not so. The third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) says: 『Furthermore, when consciousness spontaneously and distractedly grasps an unfamiliar object without the arising of desire, etc., it is called 『Cu Er』 (率爾, suddenly).』 Since it is said to grasp an unfamiliar object, then that is a new realm. If one merely spontaneously and distractedly grasps an object without the accompaniment of desire, etc., it is called 『Cu Er』. Except for the sixth consciousness (Manas-vijnana 末那識), at all other times, it is only called 『Cu Er』; there should be no other consciousnesses. In the stage before 『transformation of the basis』 (zhuan yi 轉依), it is all due to spontaneously and distractedly grasping objects. There are more similarities and differences, too numerous to describe in detail. Speaking of 『gathering manifestation』 (ju ji xian xian 聚集顯現), for example, saying 『all conditioned things are impermanent』 (zhu xing wu chang 諸行無常). One explanation says that there are three Western interpretations. One says that when saying the word 『all』 (zhu), it is 『Cu Er Xian Liang』 (率爾現量, sudden present perception). Seeking the preceding object, not grasping names, etc., only obtaining the sound aspect. When it comes to 『determining mind』 (jue ding xin 決定心), then three aspects are fully manifested, namely sound, name, and word. When saying the word 『conditioned』 (xing), six aspects are manifested. When saying the word 『impermanent』 (wu), nine aspects are manifested. When saying the word 『constant』 (chang), twelve aspects are manifested. Adding the sentence and the meaning being explained, there are fourteen dharmas in total. After sixteen consciousnesses, gathering is fully complete, that is, each of the four words has four consciousnesses, namely the ear consciousness and the mind consciousness each have four 『Cu Er』, plus the mind consciousness's seeking and determining each have four. One says that seeking is non-measuring (shi fei liang), and also grasps names, etc., so gathering is also obtained in seeking. The four seeking minds, in order, obtain three, six, nine, and fourteen. According to the previous statement, gathering is fully complete after twelve consciousnesses. One says that the ear consciousness simultaneously grasps, and the mind consciousness also grasps names, etc. There are two statements about this. One says that each of the four 『Cu Er』 minds only obtains three, because it does not grasp past present perception, so gathering is not mentioned. It is only when it comes to the seeking mind that it is called the teaching body. One says that the ear consciousness simultaneously with the mind consciousness may not be present perception, so it can grasp the past. That is, gathering is fully complete in the eight minds. Now it is thought that there is still a remainder. Moreover, in the first explanation, the number of consciousnesses that have passed is large, and the number of dharmas gathered is small. Why does the gathering on the mind consciousness have to go through the four 『Cu Er』 minds of the ear consciousness? Is it allowed that the mind consciousness does not take the essence, but only grasps the sound transformed by the ear consciousness? Since it is allowed that the mind consciousness and the ear consciousness simultaneously each grasp the essence, then it only takes twelve consciousnesses of the mind consciousness to manifest, it should not be sixteen. If the 『Cu Er』 of the ear consciousness is taken, the ear consciousness grasping the sound should be taken, it should become eighteen dharmas. If the sound is similar but
說十四法。亦應心相似但說十二心 如實說者除耳四率爾。但經意識十二心現。所集之法 四剎那聲．四個字．四個名．名所詮四。即四自性。又有一句並句所詮一差別義。合十八法聚集顯現。此據一相。若於一字等現無量字等。法則不定。說五心中諸識．三性至下第五明其是非 又本所說於行．常二方有決定決定知諸詮遷流行無于彼常。有釋四字皆有決定 要集云。若無此釋于理有闕。雖有諸釋仍未盡理。謂立論者欲成無常。對敵論等即立量云諸行無常。其敵論等雖聞前三。而於所立未生定解。說常字時方生定解。故前三字未有決定。乃至云。若依此釋。立因．喻後方生決定。亦準此理此意立宗。若未解時未有決定。因．喻．已後方生決定 此義應思。且西明釋於四字上皆決定者。且聞諸字知目於何。既未知諸諸於何法。豈生決定。若言決定知是諸聲有決定心。說行字時應有三決定。決定知行復決定知諸言目行。若不定知諸言目行不生解故。餘二準此。即合念六決定。不應但有四故亦增減．失 要集所說亦不盡理。對敵立量可如所說或但說法不立比量可無決定。故法苑意通約說法。決定知彼諸言所目生決定心。說有七心或十二等。故即無過。不唯據悟所說義旨以判多少。余既重說何不盡言 要集云。法苑云諸惡者莫
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：現在來說說十四法。也應該心領神會，實際上只說了十二心。如果如實宣說，就要去除耳朵的四種率爾（指聽覺的四種錯誤）。只有通過意識才能顯現十二心。所聚集的法包括：四剎那聲、四個字、四個名、名所詮釋的四種含義，即四自性。另外還有一句以及句子所詮釋的一個差別義。總共十八法聚集顯現。這只是根據一個相來說的。如果一個字等顯現出無量字等，法則就不確定了。關於五心中諸識、三性等問題，將在下文第五部分說明其是非。 另外，原本所說的是，在『行』（saṃskāra，諸行）和『常』（nitya，常）這兩個方面有決定。決定知道諸詮遷流，在『常』那裡沒有。有解釋說四個字都有決定。要集（Yaoji，書名）中說，如果沒有這種解釋，在道理上會有缺失。雖然有各種解釋，仍然沒有完全窮盡道理。意思是說，立論者想要成立無常，針對敵論等就立論說『諸行無常』。他們的敵論等雖然聽到了前面的三個字，但是對於所立的論點沒有產生確定的理解。說到『常』字的時候才產生確定的理解。所以前面的三個字沒有決定。乃至說，如果按照這種解釋，在立因、喻之後才產生決定。也按照這個道理來立宗。如果沒有理解的時候就沒有決定。因、喻之後才產生決定。這個道理應該思考。 而且西明的解釋說，在四個字上都有決定。如果聽到『諸』字，知道是指什麼。既然不知道『諸』是指什麼法，怎麼會產生決定？如果說決定知道是『諸』聲有決定心。說『行』字的時候應該有三種決定。決定知道『行』，又決定知道『諸』字是指『行』。如果不能確定知道『諸』字是指『行』，就不會產生理解。其餘兩個字也按照這個來理解。這樣總共有六種決定。不應該只有四種，所以也有增減、缺失。要集所說的也沒有完全窮盡道理。針對敵論立論可以像所說的那樣，或者只是說法而不立比量，可以沒有決定。所以法苑（Fayuan，人名）的意思是通約說法。決定知道那些字所指的目標，產生決定心。說有七心或者十二心等，這樣就沒有過失。不要僅僅根據領悟所說的意義來判斷多少。其餘的既然重複說了，為什麼不全部說出來？要集說，法苑說諸惡者莫...
【English Translation】 English version: Now let's talk about the fourteen dharmas. One should also understand in one's heart that actually only twelve minds are spoken of. If speaking truthfully, one must remove the four kinds of 'sudden' (referring to four errors of hearing) of the ear. Only through consciousness can the twelve minds manifest. The dharmas that are gathered include: four kṣaṇa (momentary) sounds, four words, four names, and the four meanings explained by the names, which are the four self-natures. In addition, there is one sentence and one difference in meaning explained by the sentence. A total of eighteen dharmas are gathered and manifested. This is only according to one aspect. If one word, etc., manifests countless words, etc., then the rules are uncertain. Regarding the various vijñānas (consciousness) and three natures in the five minds, the rights and wrongs will be explained in the fifth section below. Furthermore, what was originally said is that there is certainty in the two aspects of 'saṃskāra' (conditioned things) and 'nitya' (permanence). It is certain that one knows the flow of all explanations, but there is no such thing in 'permanence'. Some explanations say that all four words have certainty. The Yaoji (name of a book) says that if there is no such explanation, there will be a deficiency in the reasoning. Although there are various explanations, they still do not fully exhaust the reasoning. It means that the proponent wants to establish impermanence, and against the opponent, they establish the proposition 'all conditioned things are impermanent'. Their opponents, although they hear the first three words, do not have a definite understanding of the established proposition. Only when the word 'permanence' is spoken do they have a definite understanding. Therefore, the first three words are not definite. It even says that if according to this explanation, certainty only arises after establishing the reason and the example. The establishment of the thesis should also follow this principle. If there is no understanding, there is no certainty. Certainty only arises after the reason and the example. This principle should be considered. Moreover, the explanation of Ximing (name of a person) says that there is certainty in all four words. If one hears the word 'all', one knows what it refers to. Since one does not know what 'all' refers to, how can certainty arise? If one says that it is certain that the sound 'all' has a definite mind. When the word 'saṃskāra' is spoken, there should be three certainties. It is certain that one knows 'saṃskāra', and it is also certain that the word 'all' refers to 'saṃskāra'. If one cannot be certain that the word 'all' refers to 'saṃskāra', then understanding will not arise. The remaining two words should also be understood in this way. Thus, there are a total of six certainties. There should not only be four, so there are also additions, subtractions, and omissions. What the Yaoji says also does not fully exhaust the reasoning. Establishing a proposition against an opponent can be as said, or simply speaking the Dharma without establishing a syllogism, there may be no certainty. Therefore, the meaning of Fayuan (name of a person) is a general agreement on speaking the Dharma. It is certain that one knows the target referred to by those words, and a definite mind arises. Saying that there are seven minds or twelve minds, etc., then there is no fault. Do not merely judge the amount based on the meaning of what is said in enlightenment. Since the rest has been repeated, why not say it all? The Yaoji says, Fayuan says that all evil ones should not...
作依婆沙作法。字．字身．多字身．名．名身．多名身等。聞一句時即有五十一法。令謂聞經一句義中。生解之心必無如是多法現前者 此不善得法苑之意。且據一句作法如是。如說五字。或有一字名即名．名身有十五等。言五十一聚集顯現不決定言。聞一句時有許聚集。如第五卷五別境中作法之類 要集云。由此理故有字非名攝。一字字不成句。字為二依故於此中有十八法。謂字有十五。字有五。字身四。多字身六。準作法知 此亦不爾。應言字及字身等有十五。下準知之。一句一名一所詮義。此亦不爾。依字成名依名成句諸處通說。豈可莫作不是名耶。不爾苦．空等亦應非名攝。又下自判諸行無常二名為正。何故此處即但一名。又不應言一所詮義。如瑜伽論等云。所立有二。一自性。二差別。又名詮自性。句詮差別。自性差別豈不二義。說一義耶。又云。若不依識相準義作法。非唯五十合七十一法。字有十五。名有三十五。句有二十。及所詮義故。此意或有二名成句。三名成句。四名成句。五名成句故。三十五名有二十句。此意一字成名有五個名。二名成句有四。二二合。三名成句有三。三三合。四名成句有二。四四合。五名成句有一。五合說。即有十個句 二字成名作句中名既有四。二名成句有三。三名成句有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於『作依婆沙作法』的解釋。字（字母），字身（字母的組成部分），多字身（多個字母的組合），名（名稱），名身（名稱的組成部分），多名身（多個名稱的組合）等等。當聽到一句時，就會有五十一法（種現象）。有人說，當聽聞經文一句的含義時，心中生起理解，必定不會有如此多的法顯現。這是不善於理解《法苑珠林》的含義。且僅根據一句的作法就是如此。如果說五個字，或者有一個字是名，那麼名和名身就有十五種等等。說五十一聚集顯現是不確定的說法。當聽到一句時，會有許多聚集。例如第五卷五別境中的作法之類。 《要集》中說，由於這個道理，所以有字不是名所包含的。一個字不能構成句子。字是二依（兩種依靠），因此這裡面有十八法。即字有十五種，字有五種，字身有四種，多字身有六種，按照作法可知。 這種說法也不對。應該說字和字身等有十五種，下面按照這個標準來理解。一句是一個名，一個所詮義（所表達的意義）。這種說法也不對。依靠字構成名，依靠名構成句子，這是普遍的說法。難道可以不作為名嗎？如果不是這樣，苦、空等也應該不是名所包含的。而且下面自己判斷『諸行無常』這兩個名為正名。為什麼這裡就只有一個名呢？ 而且不應該說一個所詮義。例如《瑜伽師地論》等說，所立（所建立的）有兩種：一是自性（自身性質），二是差別（不同之處）。而且名詮釋自性，句詮釋差別。自性和差別難道不是兩種意義，而只說一種意義嗎？又說，如果不依靠識相（認識的相狀）來按照意義作法，不僅僅是五十種，而是七十一種法。字有十五種，名有三十五種，句有二十種，以及所詮義。這個意思是或者有兩個名構成一個句子，三個名構成一個句子，四個名構成一個句子，五個名構成一個句子。因此，三十五個名有二十個句子。這個意思是一個字構成名有五個名，兩個名構成句子有四個（二二結合），三個名構成句子有三個（三三結合），四個名構成句子有兩個（四四結合），五個名構成句子有一個（五五結合）。總共有十個句子。 兩個字構成名，在構成句子的名中，名既然有四個，兩個名構成句子有三個，三個名構成句子有
【English Translation】 English version Explanation of 'Zuoyi Posha Zuofa' (the method of relying on Vibhasha). Zi (letter), Zishen (component of a letter), Duo Zishen (combination of multiple letters), Ming (name), Mingshen (component of a name), Duo Mingshen (combination of multiple names), etc. When hearing a sentence, there will be fifty-one dharmas (phenomena). Someone says that when hearing the meaning of a sentence in a scripture, understanding arises in the mind, and there will definitely not be so many dharmas appearing. This is not good at understanding the meaning of the 'Fa Yuan Zhu Lin' (Forest of Gems in the Dharma Garden). Moreover, based only on the Zuofa (method of creation) of a sentence, it is like this. If saying five words, or if one word is a name, then the name and Mingshen have fifteen kinds, etc. Saying that the manifestation of fifty-one aggregates is an uncertain statement. When hearing a sentence, there will be many aggregates. For example, the Zuofa in the five separate realms in the fifth volume. The 'Yao Ji' (Essentials Collection) says that due to this reason, there are words that are not included in the name. One word cannot form a sentence. A word is two dependencies, so there are eighteen dharmas in it. That is, there are fifteen kinds of words, five kinds of characters, four kinds of Zishen, and six kinds of Duo Zishen, which can be known according to the Zuofa. This statement is also incorrect. It should be said that Zi and Zishen, etc., have fifteen kinds, and understand according to this standard below. A sentence is a name, a meaning to be expressed. This statement is also incorrect. Relying on words to form names, and relying on names to form sentences, this is a common saying. Can it not be regarded as a name? If not, suffering, emptiness, etc., should also not be included in the name. Moreover, below, it is judged that 'impermanence of all phenomena' are two correct names. Why is there only one name here? Moreover, it should not be said that there is one meaning to be expressed. For example, the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and others say that there are two things to be established: one is self-nature (own nature), and the other is difference (difference). Moreover, the name explains self-nature, and the sentence explains difference. Are self-nature and difference not two meanings, but only one meaning is said? It is also said that if one does not rely on the appearance of consciousness to create dharmas according to meaning, it is not only fifty kinds, but seventy-one kinds of dharmas. There are fifteen kinds of words, thirty-five kinds of names, twenty kinds of sentences, and the meaning to be expressed. This means that either two names form a sentence, three names form a sentence, four names form a sentence, or five names form a sentence. Therefore, thirty-five names have twenty sentences. This means that one word forms a name with five names, two names form a sentence with four (two two combinations), three names form a sentence with three (three three combinations), four names form a sentence with two (four four combinations), and five names form a sentence with one (five five combinations). There are a total of ten sentences. Two words form a name, and in the name that forms a sentence, since there are four names, two names form a sentence with three, and three names form a sentence with
二。四名成句有一。復有六句 三字成名作句中。二名成句有二。三名成句有一 四字成名作句中。有一句。總二十句 五字成名名既唯一。一名無句。並一詮義。合七十一 此亦不爾。何者若論字有五。名有十五。一字所成名有五。二字所成名四。三字所成名三。四字所成名二。五字所成名一。若字身．名身即重合彼。非更有別名之與字。並句二十合三十五所詮之義。足字．字身十五。名．名身三十五句有二十。合一百五。若更句．句身並所依聲即更有多故。今但言為七十一有增減過。法苑本意且約能詮粗作法爾。復既細論不盡故過 問準何得知以字成名以名成句 答解深密經第五云。即於一切名聚集中 又百論第八云。然諸世間隨自心變。謂有眾字和合為名。復謂眾名和合為句。故知如是 后敘自釋者。本末合有十二門。于本四門又復加二。即后四門取無相．因緣。並前成六。七三性出體。即依遍計．依他．此及圓成實八依顯揚等四真實。並依辨中邊四真實。九依五相。即瑜伽等能詮相所詮相等。十依五法。即相．名等復四不同。一瑜伽。二辨中邊。三楞伽經。四攝大乘論。並如唯識第八明其所以。十一約瑜伽八十一云。經體有二。一能詮文。二所詮義。文義二中各有多法併爲經體。十二約百法。若三科五法通三
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二。四個字組成名稱的句子有一個。又有六個句子，三個字組成名稱在句子中。兩個名稱組成句子的有兩個。三個名稱組成句子的有一個。四個字組成名稱在句子中，有一個句子。總共二十個句子。五個字組成名稱，名稱是唯一的。一個名稱沒有句子。加上一個詮釋意義，總共七十一個。這也不是這樣。為什麼呢？如果說字有五個，名稱有十五個。一個字所組成的名稱有五個，兩個字所組成的名稱有四個，三個字所組成的名稱有三個，四個字所組成的名稱有兩個，五個字所組成的名稱有一個。如果字身和名身重複，那就不是另外有名和字的區別了。加上句子二十個，總共三十五個所詮釋的意義。字、字身十五個，名、名身三十五個，句子有二十個，總共一百零五個。如果再加上句子、句身以及所依賴的聲音，那就更多了。現在只說是七十一個，有增加或減少的錯誤。《法苑》的本意只是粗略地按照能詮來做法則。如果仔細討論，就不能完全表達，所以有過失。問：根據什麼得知用字組成名稱，用名稱組成句子？答：《解深密經》第五卷說：『即於一切名聚集中』。又《百論》第八卷說：『然諸世間隨自心變，謂有眾字和合為名，復謂眾名和合為句。』所以知道是這樣。後面敘述自己的解釋。從頭到尾共有十二個門。在原本的四個門上又增加了兩個，就是後面的四個門取無相、因緣，和前面的四個門組成六個。七，三性出體，就是依據遍計所執性、依他起性，此及圓成實性。八，依據《顯揚聖教論》等四種真實，以及依據《辨中邊論》四種真實。九，依據五相，就是《瑜伽師地論》等能詮相、所詮相等等。十，依據五法，就是相、名等等，又有四種不同。一，《瑜伽師地論》。二，《辨中邊論》。三，《楞伽經》。四，《攝大乘論》。都如《唯識論》第八卷所說明的那樣。十一，根據《瑜伽師地論》第八十一卷說，經的體有兩個：一，能詮的文字；二，所詮釋的意義。文字和意義中各有多種法，共同構成經的體。十二，根據《百法明門論》，如果三科五法貫通三世。
【English Translation】 English version Two. There is one sentence formed by four names (si ming) [four words]. There are also six sentences where three words form a name within the sentence. There are two sentences formed by two names. There is one sentence formed by three names. There is one sentence among those formed by four words. There are twenty sentences in total. When five words form a name, the name is unique. One name has no sentence. Adding one meaning being explained, there are seventy-one in total. This is also not the case. Why? If we consider that there are five characters (zi) [words] and fifteen names (ming) [names]. There are five names formed by one character, four names formed by two characters, three names formed by three characters, two names formed by four characters, and one name formed by five characters. If the character-body (zi shen) [the essence of the word] and the name-body (ming shen) [the essence of the name] overlap, then there is no separate distinction between name and character. Adding the twenty sentences, there are thirty-five meanings being explained in total. There are fifteen characters/character-bodies, thirty-five names/name-bodies, and twenty sentences, totaling one hundred and five. If we further include sentences, sentence-bodies, and the sounds they rely on, there would be even more. Now, we only say seventy-one, which has errors of addition or subtraction. The original intention of Fa Yuan is to roughly establish the norm based on the expressing aspect. If we discuss it in detail, it cannot be fully expressed, so there is error. Question: How do we know that characters form names and names form sentences? Answer: The fifth volume of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra [解深密經] says: 'In the collection of all names.' Also, the eighth volume of the Śataśāstra [百論] says: 'However, all worldly beings change according to their own minds, saying that many characters combine to form a name, and further saying that many names combine to form a sentence.' Therefore, we know it is like this. The following narrates one's own explanation. From beginning to end, there are twelve doors. Two more are added to the original four doors, which are the latter four doors taking non-appearance (wu xiang) [無相] and conditions (yin yuan) [因緣], combining with the previous four to form six. Seven, the three natures (san xing) [三性] emerge as the substance, which is based on the parikalpita-svabhāva (bian ji suo zhi xing) [遍計所執性] (the completely imputed nature), the paratantra-svabhāva (yi ta qi xing) [依他起性] (the dependent nature), this, and the pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (yuan cheng shi xing) [圓成實性] (the perfectly accomplished nature). Eight, based on the four realities of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra [顯揚聖教論] etc., and based on the four realities of Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya [辨中邊論]. Nine, based on the five aspects, which are the expressing aspect and the expressed aspect of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra etc. Ten, based on the five dharmas (wu fa) [五法], which are aspect, name, etc., and there are four differences. One, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Two, Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya. Three, Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra [楞伽經]. Four, Mahāyānasaṃgraha [攝大乘論]. All are explained in the eighth volume of Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi [唯識論]. Eleven, according to the eighty-first volume of Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the essence of a sutra has two aspects: one, the expressing words; two, the meaning being expressed. There are many dharmas in both words and meaning, which together constitute the essence of the sutra. Twelve, according to the Hundred Dharmas [百法明門論], if the three categories and five dharmas penetrate the three times.
乘故。雜小不說。唯取大乘。又略即二。一總出體有四。真如．唯識．無相．因緣。別即有八。通體性故。別別法故。略舉大意。繁不細述。
三歸在者。復分為四。一歸藏。二歸分。三歸乘。並如法苑藏．分．乘章。四歸名者。初辨。后歸。辨有三。一辨六釋。亦如法苑總聊簡章得名懸隔辨然有解六釋中依士依主作四句辨云。有依士非依主。如取之蘊。以取是所非心王故。有依主非依士。如蘊之取。此不應爾。若依士依主二不相攝應有七釋。有解六釋勒為三例。一同體非別。持業．帶數。二別體非同相違．鄰近。三亦同亦別。依主．有財。思之理有相濫。若所釋法通即不障。據六釋體即不必然。且如四斷斷者是勤心所。四者是數。即不相應。云何同體。又如相違五識身相應地意地。以二法別合一處說據體各異。如五識身相應地自是地。不是用彼意相應之五識為地。亦非以五即意地等。既言五識身相應地。此豈別體 要集云。三藏相傳約分為四。一用自非他。二用他非自。三自他俱用。四自他俱不用。持業唯初句。依主唯第三。有財唯第二。相違唯第四。鄰近通二．三。帶數初及三。乃至帶數三句如四正斷即初句。四即正斷故。如四神足即第三句。四屬欲等非神足故。如說三藏法師亦是第三句。若但言三藏是第
二句。三即是藏俱非人故。彼釋極廣。恐煩不具。然準此釋有相雜亂。六釋簡濫應可思之。二辨四名。謂教．理．行．果。然真帝三藏有五種名。一義。二相。三方便。四果。五極清凈。極清凈者是阿含凈故即是教。然義．相二大意不別。以所詮正有實道理名義清凈。遠離增減名相清凈。故今合之為所詮理總立四名 于中分二。初立名不同。后立名意 立名不同者。一依教有三名。一無義言。如四吠陀論。婆羅門誦之音聲有上中下甚自可愛。但尋聲求理都無義趣。故名無義言。如吠陀論云。我已飲甘露。成就不復死我已入火光。愿諸天知識。謂鉆乳海以為甘露。飲之則得不死。誦此等言甚好音聲。而都無義故云無義。二邪妄言。如九十六種外道。亦說因果但明乖僻故名邪妄三如義言如佛法說因果道理。苦．集為世間因果。滅．道為出世因果。如名真實故名如義言 依理亦有三名者。一增益義。如外道說有漏之法為常樂我凈。故名增益義。二損減義。如斷見說斷邪見謗無善．惡因果等。名損減義。三順體義。如佛所說有說為有無說為無稱法體故名順體義 依行亦三名。一順世因。如依俗典事君盡忠文朋存信等。二邪僻因。謂諸外道妄計諸邪戒等。三處中因者。謂依佛教行處中行離苦．樂邊等 依果三名者。一諂誑果。如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二句。三即是藏俱非人故。彼釋極廣。恐煩不具。然準此釋有相雜亂。六釋簡濫應可思之。二辨四名。謂教（教義）．理（真理）．行（修行）．果（結果）。然真帝三藏有五種名。一義（意義）。二相（表相）。三方便（方法）。四果（結果）。五極清凈（最純凈）。極清凈者是阿含凈故即是教（教義）。然義（意義）．相（表相）二大意不別。以所詮正有實道理名義清凈。遠離增減名相清凈。故今合之為所詮理總立四名 于中分二。初立名不同。后立名意 立名不同者。一依教（教義）有三名。一無義言。如四吠陀論（four Vedas）。婆羅門誦之音聲有上中下甚自可愛。但尋聲求理都無義趣。故名無義言。如吠陀論（Vedas）云。『我已飲甘露（amrita）。成就不復死我已入火光。愿諸天知識。』謂鉆乳海以為甘露（amrita）。飲之則得不死。誦此等言甚好音聲。而都無義故云無義。二邪妄言。如九十六種外道。亦說因果但明乖僻故名邪妄三如義言如佛法說因果道理。苦．集為世間因果。滅．道為出世間因果。如名真實故名如義言 依理（真理）亦有三名者。一增益義。如外道說有漏之法為常樂我凈。故名增益義。二損減義。如斷見說斷邪見謗無善．惡因果等。名損減義。三順體義。如佛所說有說為有無說為無稱法體故名順體義 依行（修行）亦三名。一順世因。如依俗典事君盡忠文朋存信等。二邪僻因。謂諸外道妄計諸邪戒等。三處中因者。謂依佛教行處中行離苦．樂邊等 依果（結果）三名者。一諂誑果。如
【English Translation】 English version Two sentences. 'Three' means it is neither a collection nor a non-human. That explanation is extremely broad, and I fear it would be too cumbersome to include in full. However, based on this explanation, there is a mixture of confusion. The six explanations to simplify the excess should be considered. Second, distinguishing the four names: teaching (Dharma), principle (Truth), practice (Conduct), and result (Fruit). However, the True Treasure Tripitaka has five names: 1. Meaning (Artha), 2. Appearance (Lakshana), 3. Expedient (Upaya), 4. Result (Phala), 5. Utmost Purity (Param-visuddhi). 'Utmost Purity' refers to the purity of the Agamas, which is the teaching (Dharma). However, the two great meanings of 'Meaning' and 'Appearance' are not different in essence. Because what is explained correctly has the true principle, it is called the purity of meaning. Being far from increase or decrease is called the purity of appearance. Therefore, now combining them into the principle to be explained, we establish four names in total. Among them, divide into two: first, the establishment of names is different; second, the intention of establishing names. The establishment of names is different: first, according to the teaching (Dharma), there are three names: 1. Meaningless words, such as the four Vedas. The sound of the Brahmins reciting them has high, middle, and low tones, which are very lovely. But seeking the principle from the sound has no meaning at all. Therefore, it is called meaningless words. As the Vedas say, 'I have drunk amrita (nectar), and I have achieved immortality and no longer die. I have entered the light of fire. May all the gods know.' It refers to churning the milk ocean to obtain amrita (nectar). Drinking it will lead to immortality. Reciting these words has a very good sound, but there is no meaning at all, so it is called meaningless. 2. False and deluded words, such as the ninety-six kinds of heretics. They also speak of cause and effect, but their explanations are perverse, so they are called false and deluded. 3. Words according to meaning, such as the Buddhist Dharma speaking of the principle of cause and effect. Suffering and accumulation are the causes and effects of the world. Extinction and the path are the causes and effects of transcending the world. Like the name, it is true, so it is called words according to meaning. According to the principle (Truth), there are also three names: 1. Increasing meaning, such as heretics saying that the defiled dharmas are permanent, blissful, self, and pure. Therefore, it is called increasing meaning. 2. Decreasing meaning, such as annihilationists saying that annihilation is a false view, slandering and denying good and bad causes and effects, etc. It is called decreasing meaning. 3. Meaning according to the nature, such as what the Buddha said, saying 'is' when there is, and saying 'is not' when there is not, according to the nature of the Dharma, so it is called meaning according to the nature. According to the practice (Conduct), there are also three names: 1. Cause according to the world, such as serving the ruler with loyalty and maintaining trust among friends according to secular classics. 2. Perverse cause, referring to the heretics' false calculations of various evil precepts, etc. 3. Middle cause, referring to practicing the middle path according to Buddhism, being away from the extremes of suffering and pleasure, etc. According to the result (Fruit), there are three names: 1. Flattering and deceiving result, such as
臣從君命以取叨榮等。二虛妄果者。謂諸外道妄計無想及有頂等。以為涅槃等。三出世果者。如佛所說三乘所得菩提涅槃 立名意者。為得四清凈故立此四名。為得教清凈故立如義言。言教無雜一切莫過如義而立不可破壞可得悟理。教詮不正易可破壞。不得悟理故立如義言為得理清凈故立順體義名。理有增減正智觀之理則不可入。順體而說正智觀之理則易入。故立順體義名為得行清凈故立處中因名。以處中行對彼順世及邪僻因彼俱可轉。此處中行則不可轉。以處中行內觀界．處等。望僻因行僻因可轉。觀蘊．界等則不可轉。以四諦因果所有觀行對觀蘊等。蘊等可轉。以二空行望四諦行。四諦可轉。二空之行則不可轉。以二空智既不可轉。證真之智亦不可轉。以不可轉。即此真智及后得智為正行體。能令所得果不可轉。即名方便清凈正行。正行有二能。一出惡入善。二出有為入無為。故此正行即處中因。為得果清凈故立出世果名。果清凈者是無餘涅槃。一切患累皆已盡故名果清凈。有漏有四失。即無常．苦．空．無我。無為有四德。即常．樂．我．凈。既離過失故名出世果。此意由依正教觀正理。起正行得聖果。若教有邪不顯正理。故依起行即皆顛倒。行既顛倒便獲惡果。故為得此四種清凈立此四名。又為依正教生聞惠
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 臣遵從您的命令，以求獲得叨榮等果報。二、虛妄果：指的是那些外道，他們虛妄地認為無想天和有頂天等境界是涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）。三、出世果：指的是如佛陀所說的，聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘所證得的菩提（Bodhi，覺悟）和涅槃。 設立這些名稱的目的是爲了獲得四種清凈：爲了獲得教清凈，所以設立『如義言』這個名稱。言教沒有雜染，一切都不能超過『如義』，因此設立這個不可破壞、可以領悟真理的名稱。如果言教詮釋不正，就容易被破壞，不能領悟真理，所以設立『如義言』。 爲了獲得理清凈，所以設立『順體義』這個名稱。如果道理有增減，那麼以正智來觀察，就難以契入。順應本體來說，以正智來觀察，就容易契入。所以設立『順體義』。 爲了獲得行清凈，所以設立『處中因』這個名稱。因為這種處中之行，相對於那些順世俗和邪僻的因，都可以轉變它們。而這種處中之行是不可轉變的。因為這種處中之行，內觀界（Dhatu，構成要素）、處（Ayatana，感官領域）等，相對於邪僻的因行，邪僻的因行可以被轉變。而觀察蘊（Skandha，五蘊）、界等，則不可轉變。以四諦（Arya Satya，四聖諦）的因果所包含的觀行，相對於觀蘊等，蘊等可以被轉變。以二空（Dvaishunyata，兩種空性）之行，相對於四諦之行，四諦可以被轉變。二空之行則不可轉變。因為二空的智慧既然不可轉變，那麼證真的智慧也不可轉變。因為不可轉變，所以這真智和后得智就是正行的本體，能夠使所獲得的果報不可轉變，這就叫做方便清凈的正行。正行有兩種作用：一是出惡入善，二是出有為入無為。所以這種正行就是處中因。 爲了獲得果清凈，所以設立『出世果』這個名稱。果清凈指的是無餘涅槃（Nirvana，無餘涅槃），一切的患累都已經窮盡，所以叫做果清凈。有漏法有四種過失，即無常（Anitya，無常）、苦（Dukkha，苦）、空（Shunyata，空）、無我（Anatma，無我）。無為法有四種功德，即常（Nitya，常）、樂（Sukha，樂）、我（Atma，我）、凈（Subha，凈）。既然遠離了過失，所以叫做『出世果』。 這個意思就是說，由於依靠正確的教法，觀察正確的道理，發起正確的行為，才能獲得聖果。如果教法有邪謬，就不能彰顯正確的道理，所以依此而起的行為就都是顛倒的。行為既然顛倒，便會獲得惡果。所以爲了獲得這四種清凈，才設立這四種名稱。又爲了依靠正確的教法而生起聞慧（Shruta-prajna，聽聞之慧）。
【English Translation】 English version: I follow your command to seek the rewards of praise and honor, etc. Second, 'illusory fruits' refer to those non-Buddhist paths that falsely consider realms like the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception and the Realm of No Thought, etc., to be Nirvana (Nirvana, liberation). Third, 'transcendental fruits' refer to the Bodhi (Bodhi, enlightenment) and Nirvana attained by the three vehicles—Shravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, and Bodhisattvayana—as taught by the Buddha. The reason for establishing these names is to attain the four purities: To attain purity of teaching, the term 'words according to meaning' is established. The teachings are free from impurities, and nothing surpasses 'according to meaning.' Therefore, this indestructible name is established, allowing for the realization of truth. If the teachings are interpreted incorrectly, they are easily destroyed and one cannot realize the truth. Hence, the term 'words according to meaning' is established. To attain purity of reason, the term 'meaning conforming to reality' is established. If reason has additions or subtractions, it is difficult to penetrate with correct wisdom. Speaking in accordance with reality makes it easier to penetrate with correct wisdom. Therefore, the term 'meaning conforming to reality' is established. To attain purity of practice, the term 'middle path cause' is established. Because this middle path practice can transform those worldly and perverse causes. This middle path practice is untransformable. Because this middle path practice internally observes the Dhatu (Dhatu, elements), Ayatana (Ayatana, sense fields), etc., perverse causes can be transformed. Observing the Skandha (Skandha, aggregates), Dhatu, etc., is untransformable. The contemplations contained in the causes and effects of the Four Noble Truths (Arya Satya, Four Noble Truths) can transform the aggregates, etc. The practice of the Two Emptinesses (Dvaishunyata, two emptinesses) can transform the Four Noble Truths. The practice of the Two Emptinesses is untransformable. Since the wisdom of the Two Emptinesses is untransformable, the wisdom of realizing truth is also untransformable. Because it is untransformable, this true wisdom and subsequent wisdom are the essence of correct practice, enabling the attained results to be untransformable. This is called pure expedient correct practice. Correct practice has two functions: first, to leave evil and enter goodness; second, to leave the conditioned and enter the unconditioned. Therefore, this correct practice is the middle path cause. To attain purity of result, the term 'transcendental fruit' is established. Purity of result refers to Nirvana without remainder (Nirvana, Nirvana without remainder), where all afflictions have been exhausted, hence it is called purity of result. Conditioned dharmas have four faults: Anitya (Anitya, impermanence), Dukkha (Dukkha, suffering), Shunyata (Shunyata, emptiness), and Anatma (Anatma, no-self). Unconditioned dharmas have four virtues: Nitya (Nitya, permanence), Sukha (Sukha, happiness), Atma (Atma, self), and Subha (Subha, purity). Since it is free from faults, it is called 'transcendental fruit'. This means that by relying on correct teachings, observing correct principles, and initiating correct actions, one can attain the holy fruit. If the teachings are flawed, they cannot reveal correct principles, so actions based on them are all inverted. Since actions are inverted, one obtains evil results. Therefore, these four names are established to attain these four purities. Furthermore, it is to generate the wisdom of hearing (Shruta-prajna, wisdom of hearing) by relying on correct teachings.
。依正理起思惠。依正行得修惠。三惠既圓當得聖果。故攝論云。聞等熏習無果生非道理故立四名 三依人法二。立其名目。于中有二。一立意。二差別。初立意者凡有兩義。一依善意二依惡意。若依善意即立恭敬名。若依惡意即立毀訾名。如呼為法師法主等是恭敬人名。呼為過人賤人此毀訾人名。若呼為正法勝法是恭敬法名。呼為邪法惡法是毀訾法名。如弊魔經等是毀人名。須達拏大子經等是恭敬人名。十八泥梨經等是毀訾法名。大般若經等是恭敬法名。于中復雙單名別。如佛藏經菩薩藏經等雙恭敬二。有雙毀訾人法如魔逆經等。有於人處亦毀亦敬。如未生怨王經。有於法處亦敬亦毀如辨中邊論。中是所敬。邊是所毀。有於人．法俱敬俱毀。如舊云部執異論。部執是恭敬名。異是毀訾名。部是眾義。名聖弟子為部。執是取義。皆取佛說三藏之中所說法義。然執名乃通能所。正以所執之法為執。能執之人是聖弟子。所執之法皆是佛法。今以部名目聖弟子眾。以執名目佛所說法。故部執是恭敬名。所恭敬者不過人之與法。部是人名。執是法名。分破是異義。人．法皆分破故名為異。聖弟子眾各相朋黨即是人異。取執之義又各不同。即是法異人相儻故。人起諍執法不同故。法相非斥故立異名。故異是毀訾名 然今此論是恭
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：依靠正確的道理生起思慧（Sihui，通過思考獲得的智慧），依靠正確的行為得到修慧（Xihui，通過修行獲得的智慧）。聞慧（Wenhui，通過聽聞獲得的智慧）、思慧、修慧三種智慧圓滿，就能證得聖果。所以《攝大乘論》（She Dasheng Lun）說，如果聽聞等熏習不能產生結果，那是不合道理的，因此設立四種名稱。 三依人法二者，建立名稱。其中有兩點：一是建立意義，二是區分差別。首先說建立意義，凡有兩層含義：一是依據善意，二是依據惡意。如果依據善意，就建立恭敬的名稱；如果依據惡意，就建立毀訾的名稱。例如，稱呼為法師、法主等，這是恭敬的人名；稱呼為『過人』，這是毀訾的人名。如果稱呼為正法、勝法，這是恭敬的法名；稱呼為邪法、惡法，這是毀訾的法名。例如，《弊魔經》（Bi Mo Jing）等是毀訾人名，《須達拏太子經》（Xudana Taizi Jing）等是恭敬人名，《十八泥犁經》（Shiba Nili Jing）等是毀訾法名，《大般若經》（Da Banruo Jing）等是恭敬法名。其中又有雙名和單名之別。例如，《佛藏經》（Fo Zang Jing）、《菩薩藏經》（Pusa Zang Jing）等是雙恭敬人法。有雙毀訾人法的，如《魔逆經》（Mo Ni Jing）等。有對人既毀又敬的，如《未生怨王經》（Weisheng Yuanwang Jing）。有對法既敬又毀的，如《辨中邊論》（Bian Zhongbian Lun），『中』是所敬，『邊』是所毀。有對人法俱敬俱毀的，如舊譯的部執異論。『部執』是恭敬名，『異』是毀訾名。『部』是眾義，稱聖弟子為『部』。『執』是取義，都是取佛所說的三藏之中的法義。然而『執』這個名稱既包括能執，也包括所執，主要以所執之法為『執』，能執之人是聖弟子，所執之法都是佛法。現在用『部』來稱呼聖弟子眾，用『執』來稱呼佛所說法，所以『部執』是恭敬名。所恭敬的不過是人和法，『部』是人名，『執』是法名。『分破』是『異』的含義，人和法都被分破，所以稱為『異』。聖弟子眾各自結黨營私，這就是人異；取執的意義又各自不同，這就是法異。人互相傾軋，人就產生爭端；執持的法義不同，法就互相排斥，所以建立『異』這個名稱。所以『異』是毀訾名。然而現在這部論是恭敬名。
【English Translation】 English version: Relying on correct reasoning, one generates Sihui (思惠, wisdom gained through thinking). Relying on correct practice, one obtains Xihui (修惠, wisdom gained through cultivation). When the three wisdoms—Wenhui (聞惠, wisdom gained through hearing), Sihui, and Xihui—are perfected, one attains the holy fruit. Therefore, the She Dasheng Lun (攝大乘論, Compendium of the Mahayana) states that if learning and other practices do not produce results, it is unreasonable, hence the establishment of four names. The three dependencies—person and Dharma—establish their names. Within this, there are two aspects: first, establishing the meaning; second, differentiating the distinctions. First, regarding establishing the meaning, there are two senses: one based on good intention, and the other based on malicious intention. If based on good intention, a name of respect is established; if based on malicious intention, a name of disparagement is established. For example, calling someone a Dharma master or Dharma lord is a respectful name for a person; calling someone an 'overachiever' is a disparaging name for a person. If calling something the True Dharma or the Supreme Dharma, it is a respectful name for the Dharma; calling something a heretical Dharma or an evil Dharma is a disparaging name for the Dharma. For example, the Bi Mo Jing (弊魔經, The Scripture of the Ruined Demon) is a disparaging name for a person; the Xudana Taizi Jing (須達拏太子經, The Scripture of Prince Sudana) is a respectful name for a person; the Shiba Nili Jing (十八泥犁經, The Scripture of the Eighteen Narakas) is a disparaging name for the Dharma; the Da Banruo Jing (大般若經, The Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra) is a respectful name for the Dharma. Among these, there are also distinctions between double names and single names. For example, the Fo Zang Jing (佛藏經, The Buddha-Store Sutra) and the Pusa Zang Jing (菩薩藏經, The Bodhisattva-Store Sutra) are double respects for both person and Dharma. There are double disparagements for both person and Dharma, such as the Mo Ni Jing (魔逆經, The Scripture of the Demonic Rebellion). There are those who are both disparaged and respected, such as the Weisheng Yuanwang Jing (未生怨王經, The Scripture of King Ajatasatru). There are those who are both respected and disparaged in relation to the Dharma, such as the Bian Zhongbian Lun (辨中邊論, Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes), where 'middle' is what is respected and 'extreme' is what is disparaged. There are those who are both respected and disparaged in relation to both person and Dharma, such as the old translation of the treatise on differing views of schools. 'School adherence' is a respectful name, while 'differing' is a disparaging name. 'School' means assembly, referring to the holy disciples as a 'school'. 'Adherence' means taking, all taking the Dharma meanings within the Three Baskets spoken by the Buddha. However, the name 'adherence' encompasses both the one who adheres and what is adhered to, primarily with the adhered-to Dharma as 'adherence'. The one who adheres is the holy disciple, and the adhered-to Dharma is all the Buddha's Dharma. Now, 'school' is used to refer to the assembly of holy disciples, and 'adherence' is used to refer to what the Buddha spoke, so 'school adherence' is a respectful name. What is respected is nothing more than person and Dharma; 'school' is a name for a person, and 'adherence' is a name for the Dharma. 'Division and breaking' is the meaning of 'differing'; both person and Dharma are divided and broken, so it is called 'differing'. The holy disciples each form factions, which is the difference in people; the meanings they take and adhere to are also different, which is the difference in Dharma. People slander each other, so disputes arise; the Dharma meanings they hold are different, so the Dharmas reject each other, hence the establishment of the name 'differing'. Therefore, 'differing' is a disparaging name. However, this treatise is a respectful name.
敬名。成立世尊聖教所說唯識教理故 或毀訾名。令依于智不依識故 或此識言雖是所厭。恭敬世尊。所起教理故名成唯識論 問何故於此人法二處立此等名 答依佛滅諍法故。滅諍有二。一滅外諍。二滅內諍。外諍即滅人諍。內諍即滅法諍。毀人滅人諍。毀法滅法諍。滅人諍令修六和敬。此彼同持戒。同見諦。同用財。戒．見．財三彼我不隔故和合無諍。身．語．意三各修慈悲。拔苦與樂以攝前人故和合不諍。二滅內諍者。所說法有二。黑說．大說。如次內．外對。大．小對。了．不了對。說惡．說善對。傳聞前人說黑說法及大說法。不得便信依。約三藏相應則應信受。若不與相應則應棄捨。若依此而執義。法則和無諍 問何故須滅二諍 答修悲智習成佛德。由佛有般若及以慈悲。以般若故攝正法令和。以慈悲故攝生令和。諸造論釋亦依學佛般若．慈悲。攝法攝生故。又有多解如部執疏廣解 二辨差別者。諸經論中亦有依法依喻為名。或單或雙。諸經之中有依處時事法立名並在法攝。依法喻者。為利鈍根故。為顯法明凈故。亦為贊毀故。依三寶立亦人．法收。上無不盡廣說此人．法差別攝彼諸名。並舉教顯並如法華義決。上辨名訖 第二歸名者。復分為四。一總解釋成唯識論。二別辨能所成號。三明立名之意。四通
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 敬名：爲了成立世尊（釋迦牟尼佛）聖教所說的唯識教理，所以名為『成唯識論』。 或毀訾名：爲了使人依靠智慧而不依靠意識，所以（有時）也稱為『毀識論』。 或者，雖然『識』這個詞令人厭惡，但因為（此論）恭敬世尊所闡述的教理，所以名為『成唯識論』。 問：為什麼在人和法這兩個方面都設立這些名稱？ 答：因為要依據佛陀滅度后平息爭論的教法。平息爭論有兩種：一是平息外在的爭論，二是平息內在的爭論。外在的爭論就是平息人與人之間的爭論，內在的爭論就是平息對佛法的爭論。譭謗他人可以平息人與人之間的爭論，破斥錯誤的佛法可以平息對佛法的爭論。平息人與人之間的爭論，要修習六和敬：彼此在持戒上相同，在見解上相同，在利益上相同。戒律、見解、利益這三方面彼此沒有隔閡，所以能夠和合無諍。身、語、意三方面各自修習慈悲，拔除他人的痛苦，給予他人快樂，以此來攝受他人，所以能夠和合不諍。平息內在的爭論，所說的法有兩種：黑說（負面之說）和大說（正面之說），分別對應于內在和外在、大乘和小乘、了義和不了義、說惡和說善。對於傳聞前人所說的黑說法和大說法，不能輕易相信，要依據三藏（經、律、論）來判斷，如果與三藏相應，就應該信受；如果不與三藏相應，就應該捨棄。如果依據三藏來理解義理，那麼佛法就能和諧無諍。 問：為什麼需要平息這兩種爭論？ 答：因為要修習悲智，成就佛陀的功德。佛陀具有般若（智慧）以及慈悲。因為有般若，所以能夠攝受正法，使之和諧；因為有慈悲，所以能夠攝受眾生，使之和諧。諸位造論者和註釋者，也是依據學習佛陀的般若和慈悲，來攝受佛法和攝受眾生。此外還有多種解釋，如《部執疏》中有詳細的解釋。 二、辨別差別： 在各種經論中，也有依據法或依據比喻來命名的，或者單獨使用，或者兩者並用。在各種經典中，有依據處所、時間、事件、法來命名的，都包含在『法』的範疇內。依據法和比喻來命名，是爲了利益鈍根和利根之人，爲了彰顯佛法的明凈，也是爲了讚揚或貶低。依據三寶（佛、法、僧）來命名，也包含在『人』和『法』的範疇內。以上沒有窮盡地廣泛說明了『人』和『法』的差別，涵蓋了各種名稱，並且舉出教義來顯明，如同《法華義決》中所說。以上辨別了名稱。 第二，歸納名稱，又分為四點：一、總的解釋『成唯識論』；二、分別辨別能成和所成的含義；三、說明立名的意義；四、貫通。
【English Translation】 English version Respectful Name: It is named 'Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi' (Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only) because it establishes the Vijñaptimātra (Consciousness-Only) doctrine taught by the World-Honored One (Śākyamuni Buddha). Or Derogatory Name: It is (sometimes) called 'Destruction of Consciousness' because it leads people to rely on wisdom (prajñā) rather than consciousness (vijñāna). Or, although the word 'consciousness' (vijñāna) is disliked, it is named 'Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi' (Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only) because (this treatise) respects the doctrine expounded by the World-Honored One. Question: Why are these names established in relation to both persons and Dharma? Answer: Because it is based on the teachings that quell disputes after the Buddha's Parinirvana. There are two types of quelling disputes: one is quelling external disputes, and the other is quelling internal disputes. External disputes are disputes between people, and internal disputes are disputes about the Dharma. Criticizing others can quell disputes between people, and refuting erroneous Dharma can quell disputes about the Dharma. To quell disputes between people, one must cultivate the Six Harmonies: sharing the same precepts (śīla), sharing the same views (dṛṣṭi), and sharing the same benefits (lābha). Because there is no separation in precepts, views, and benefits, they can be harmonious and without disputes. Each cultivates loving-kindness (maitrī) and compassion (karuṇā) in body, speech, and mind, removing the suffering of others and giving them happiness, thereby embracing others, so they can be harmonious and without disputes. To quell internal disputes, there are two types of Dharma spoken: 'black speech' (negative speech) and 'great speech' (positive speech), corresponding to internal and external, Mahayana and Hinayana, definitive and provisional, speaking of evil and speaking of good, respectively. One should not easily believe the 'black speech' and 'great speech' said by predecessors, but should judge according to the Three Baskets (Tripitaka: Sutra, Vinaya, Abhidharma). If it corresponds to the Tripitaka, then it should be accepted; if it does not correspond, then it should be discarded. If one understands the meaning according to the Tripitaka, then the Dharma will be harmonious and without disputes. Question: Why is it necessary to quell these two types of disputes? Answer: Because one must cultivate compassion and wisdom to achieve the virtues of the Buddha. The Buddha has prajñā (wisdom) and compassion. Because of prajñā, he can embrace the correct Dharma and make it harmonious; because of compassion, he can embrace sentient beings and make them harmonious. The authors and commentators of treatises also rely on learning the Buddha's prajñā and compassion to embrace the Dharma and embrace sentient beings. There are also many other explanations, such as detailed explanations in the 'Commentary on Doctrinal Positions'. 2. Discriminating Differences: In various sutras and treatises, there are also names based on Dharma or based on metaphors, either used alone or in combination. In various sutras, there are names based on place, time, event, and Dharma, all included in the category of 'Dharma'. Naming based on Dharma and metaphors is for the benefit of those with dull and sharp faculties, to highlight the clarity of the Dharma, and also for praise or criticism. Naming based on the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha) is also included in the categories of 'person' and 'Dharma'. The above has extensively explained the differences between 'person' and 'Dharma' without exhausting them, covering various names, and illustrating them with teachings, as stated in the 'Meaning Determination of the Lotus Sutra'. The above has discriminated the names. Second, summarizing the names, it is further divided into four points: 1. General explanation of 'Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi' (Establishment of the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only); 2. Separate discrimination of the meanings of what establishes and what is established; 3. Explanation of the meaning of establishing the name; 4. Connecting.
釋情疑 初總解釋如樞要辨釋能所成樞要十解。今又加之。言唯識者。從粗至細總有五重。如唯識章辨。即以所詮既有五重。能詮之教亦有五別。或以世親五理成佛五教。或以五教成彼五理。或以五教成五教。或以五理成五理。或以五理成佛五理教。或以五教成佛五教理。或以五教理成佛五教。或以五理教成佛五理。或以五教理成佛五教理。且以世親望佛所說。為四十五釋。又護法等釋雙望彼二亦成四十五。合九十釋。復以天親．護法等教成境．行．果三。以理成三複有六釋。足前樞要。有一百六釋。復以教．理等綺互單雙乃更有多。思準可悉 明立意者。樞要廣說 四通釋情疑者。樞要云。問準下正宗或分為二。一因二果。已下文是。雖次下云上立成唯識名之意。即問此立意故為釋疑 又問何故經說唯心。論言唯識 答一云心．意．識了體一名殊。各舉一名亦無妨也。二云心積集法勝。識即了別境強。如瑜伽論五十一云。據勝道理建立心．意．識差別。即心謂第八識。雜染．還滅之根本故。經據初名論依后義。三云心．意通果。識。但在因。經依通稱論約局名。四者論從所厭為名。經依體義為目。
四科釋本文者。有三。一辨年．主如疏所明。二明支分者。謂諸菩薩所造論意。非但為弘佛經。亦為廣顯瑜伽中
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 釋情疑：首先總的解釋就像《樞要》那樣，辨析能和所成就的《樞要》十解。現在又加上一些。說到『唯識』，從粗到細總共有五重，就像《唯識章》所辨析的那樣。既然所詮釋的內容有五重，那麼能詮釋的教義也有五種區別。或者用世親（Vasubandhu）的五理成就佛的五教，或者用五教成就那五理，或者用五教成就五教，或者用五理成就五理，或者用五理成就佛的五理教，或者用五教成就佛的五教理，或者用五教理成就佛的五教，或者用五理教成就佛的五理，或者用五教理成就佛的五教理。暫且以世親期望佛所說的，作為四十五種解釋。又護法（Dharmapala）等人的解釋雙重期望他們兩個，也成就四十五種。合起來有九十種解釋。再用天親（Vasubandhu）、護法等人的教義成就境（object）、行（practice）、果（result）三者。用理成就三者又有六種解釋。加上之前的《樞要》，有一百零六種解釋。再用教、理等交錯單雙，就更多了，可以思考推斷得知。 說明立意：在《樞要》中廣泛說明。 四通解釋情疑：在《樞要》中說：『問：按照下面的正宗，或許可以分為二，一是因，二是果。』以下的文章就是。雖然接下來提到『上面建立成就唯識名稱的意義』，就是問這個立意是爲了解釋疑惑。 又問：為什麼經書說『唯心』，論典說『唯識』？ 答：一說，心、意、識，了別的體性，只是名稱不同，各自舉一個名稱也沒有妨礙。二說，心積聚法勝，識了別境界強。如《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷說：『根據殊勝的道理建立心、意、識的差別。』心指的是第八識（Alaya-vijñāna），是雜染、還滅的根本。經書根據最初的名稱，論典依據後面的意義。三說，心、意通於果位，識只在因位。經書依據通稱，論典約定區域性的名稱。四說，論典從所厭惡的方面作為名稱，經書依據體性的意義作為目標。 四科解釋本文：有三種。一是辨別年代、作者，如疏中所說明的。二是說明支分，就是說諸位菩薩所造論的用意，不僅僅是爲了弘揚佛經，也是爲了廣泛地顯揚《瑜伽師地論》中的
【English Translation】 English version Explaining Doubts: First, a general explanation is given, similar to that in the 'Essentials,' analyzing the 'able' and 'that which is accomplished,' as in the ten explanations of the 'Essentials.' Now, some are added. When speaking of 'Vijñapti-mātra' (Consciousness-only), there are five levels in total, from coarse to subtle, as analyzed in the 'Treatise on Consciousness-only.' Since the content being explained has five levels, the teachings that explain it also have five distinctions. Alternatively, one can use Vasubandhu's five principles to accomplish the Buddha's five teachings, or use the five teachings to accomplish those five principles, or use the five teachings to accomplish five teachings, or use the five principles to accomplish five principles, or use the five principles to accomplish the Buddha's five principles and teachings, or use the five teachings to accomplish the Buddha's five teachings and principles, or use the five teachings and principles to accomplish the Buddha's five teachings, or use the five principles and teachings to accomplish the Buddha's five principles, or use the five teachings and principles to accomplish the Buddha's five teachings and principles. For now, taking what Vasubandhu hoped the Buddha would say as forty-five explanations. Furthermore, Dharmapala's and others' explanations, with a double expectation of those two, also accomplish forty-five. Combined, there are ninety explanations. Then, using the teachings of Vasubandhu, Dharmapala, and others to accomplish the three: object (viṣaya), practice (caryā), and result (phala). Using principle to accomplish the three, there are six more explanations. Adding the previous 'Essentials,' there are one hundred and six explanations. Furthermore, using teachings, principles, etc., intertwined singly and doubly, there are even more, which can be understood through contemplation and inference. Explaining the Intention: Explained extensively in the 'Essentials.' Four General Explanations of Doubts: The 'Essentials' says: 'Question: According to the following main section, perhaps it can be divided into two, one is cause, and the other is result.' The following text is about that. Although it is mentioned next that 'the meaning of establishing the name of Accomplishing Consciousness-only above,' it is asking about this intention to explain doubts. Also asked: Why do the sutras say 'Mind-only,' and the treatises say 'Consciousness-only'? Answer: One says, 'Mind, Intellect, Consciousness, the nature of discernment, are just different names; using each name does not hinder.' Two says, 'Mind accumulates dharma excellently, Consciousness discerns objects strongly.' As the fifty-first volume of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' says: 'According to the superior principle, the differences of Mind, Intellect, and Consciousness are established.' Mind refers to the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñāna), which is the root of defilement and cessation. The sutras are based on the initial name, and the treatises are based on the later meaning. Three says, 'Mind and Intellect are common to the fruit stage, Consciousness is only in the causal stage.' The sutras are based on the general term, and the treatises are based on the specific name. Four says, 'The treatises take the disliked aspect as the name, and the sutras take the meaning of the nature as the goal.' Four Categories Explaining the Text: There are three. One is to distinguish the year and author, as explained in the commentary. Two is to explain the branches, which means that the intention of the treatises created by the Bodhisattvas is not only to promote the Buddhist scriptures but also to widely reveal the contents of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra.'
義。詮教不同略有十支。支謂支分。並是瑜伽所有支分。言十支者。一百法論(名略陳名數論)。二五蘊論(名粗釋體義論又名依名釋義論)。此上二論天親菩薩之所作也。三顯楊論名總苞眾義論。此論無著菩薩造。四攝大乘(名廣苞大義論)。此論本無著菩薩造。釋論天親及無性等造。五雜集論(名分別名數論。亦名廣陳體義論)。此論本是無著等造。今盛行者唯覺師子釋。安惠菩薩糅。六辨中邊論(名離僻彰中論)。此論本頌是慈氏菩薩造。釋論天親菩薩造。七二十唯識論(名摧破邪山論)。八三十唯識論(名高建法幢論)。此之二論本頌並天親造。三十唯識釋是護法菩薩等造。二十唯識天親菩薩釋。九大莊嚴論(名莊嚴體義論)。此論本頌慈氏菩薩造。釋天親菩薩造。十分別瑜伽論(名攝散歸觀論)。此是慈氏菩薩之所造也。今又助解。或十支中除攝大乘。彼論別釋阿毗達摩經。非瑜伽論支分之義。應加正理門論。以論緣起中雲案達羅國王請陳那菩薩證無學果。菩薩撫之慾遂王請文殊師利於虛空中彈指警曰。何舍大心而期小果。可制因明以弘慈氏所造瑜伽論。菩薩敬受指誨奉以周旋。遂造正理門論。故應取此以為一支。集量．因明皆此支攝。正理門論。名建正摧邪論。或可。舊釋為正。雖釋阿毗達摩。瑜伽亦是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 意義。詮釋教義的不同之處略有十個分支（支謂支分，指分支）。這些都是《瑜伽師地論》所包含的分支。所說的十個分支是： 一、《百法明門論》（Bǎifǎ Míngmén Lùn）（名稱簡略陳述名相的論著）。 二、《五蘊論》（Wǔyùn Lùn）（名稱粗略解釋體性的論著，又名依名釋義論）。以上兩部論著是天親菩薩（Vasubandhu）所作。 三、《顯揚聖教論》（Xiǎnyáng Shèngjiào Lùn）（名稱總括包含眾多意義的論著）。這部論著是無著菩薩（Asanga）所造。 四、《攝大乘論》（Shè Dàchéng Lùn）（名稱廣泛包含大乘意義的論著）。這部論著原本是無著菩薩所造，釋論由天親及無性（Asvabhava）等菩薩所造。 五、《雜集論》（Zájí Lùn）（名稱分別解釋名相的論著，也名廣泛陳述體性的論著）。這部論著原本是無著等菩薩所造，現在盛行的是覺獅子（Buddhasimha）的解釋，安慧（Sthiramati）菩薩加以糅合。 六、《辨中邊論》（Biàn Zhōngbiān Lùn）（名稱遠離偏頗彰顯中道的論著）。這部論著的頌文是彌勒菩薩（Maitreya）所造，釋論是天親菩薩所造。 七、《二十唯識論》（Èrshí Wéishì Lùn）（名稱摧破邪山的論著）。 八、《三十唯識論》（Sānshí Wéishì Lùn）（名稱高高建立法幢的論著）。這兩部論著的頌文都是天親菩薩所造，《三十唯識釋》是護法（Dharmapala）菩薩等所造，《二十唯識論》由天親菩薩解釋。 九、《大莊嚴論》（Dà Zhuāngyán Lùn）（名稱莊嚴體性的論著）。這部論著的頌文是彌勒菩薩所造，釋論是天親菩薩所造。 十、《分別瑜伽論》（Fēnbié Yújiā Lùn）（名稱攝取散亂迴歸觀想的論著）。這是彌勒菩薩所造。現在又有輔助解釋。 或者在十個分支中除去《攝大乘論》，因為該論分別解釋《阿毗達摩經》（Abhidharma Sutra），不屬於《瑜伽師地論》分支的意義。應該加上《正理門論》（Nyayapravesa）。因為該論的緣起中說，案達羅（Andhra）國王請陳那菩薩（Dignaga）證明無學果位。菩薩安撫他，想要滿足國王的請求，文殊師利（Manjusri）在虛空中彈指警示說：『為何捨棄大心而期望小果？應該製作因明（hetuvidya），以弘揚彌勒菩薩所造的《瑜伽師地論》。』菩薩恭敬地接受教誨並遵照執行，於是造了《正理門論》。所以應該取此作為其中一個分支。《集量論》（Pramanavarttika）和因明都包含在這個分支中。《正理門論》的名稱是建立正理摧毀邪說的論著。 或者，舊的解釋是正確的，雖然解釋的是《阿毗達摩》，但也是《瑜伽師地論》的內容。
【English Translation】 English version Meaning. The differences in interpreting the teachings are roughly divided into ten branches (where 'branch' refers to a division). These are all branches contained within the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice). The ten branches are: 1. 'Hundred Dharmas Treatise' ('Bǎifǎ Míngmén Lùn') (A treatise that briefly states the names and categories). 2. 'Treatise on the Five Aggregates' ('Wǔyùn Lùn') (A treatise that roughly explains the nature and meaning, also known as the treatise that explains the meaning based on the names). The above two treatises were composed by Vasubandhu (Tiānqīn Púsà). 3. 'Exposition of the Holy Teaching' ('Xiǎnyáng Shèngjiào Lùn') (A treatise that comprehensively encompasses many meanings). This treatise was composed by Asanga (Wúzhe Púsà). 4. 'Compendium on the Great Vehicle' ('Shè Dàchéng Lùn') (A treatise that broadly encompasses the meaning of the Mahayana). This treatise was originally composed by Asanga, and the commentaries were composed by Vasubandhu and Asvabhava (Wúxìng) and others. 5. 'Collection of Categories' ('Zájí Lùn') (A treatise that separately explains the names and categories, also known as a treatise that broadly explains the nature and meaning). This treatise was originally composed by Asanga and others. Currently, the most prevalent commentary is by Buddhasimha (Jué Shīzi), which was synthesized by Sthiramati (Ānhuì Púsà). 6. 'Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes' ('Biàn Zhōngbiān Lùn') (A treatise that distinguishes the middle way from extremes). The verses of this treatise were composed by Maitreya (Císhì Púsà), and the commentary was composed by Vasubandhu. 7. 'Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only' ('Èrshí Wéishì Lùn') (A treatise that destroys the mountain of wrong views). 8. 'Thirty Verses on Consciousness-Only' ('Sānshí Wéishì Lùn') (A treatise that highly erects the banner of Dharma). The verses of these two treatises were both composed by Vasubandhu. The 'Commentary on the Thirty Verses' was composed by Dharmapala (Hùfǎ Púsà) and others, and the 'Twenty Verses' was commented on by Vasubandhu. 9. 'Great Adornment Treatise' ('Dà Zhuāngyán Lùn') (A treatise that adorns the nature and meaning). The verses of this treatise were composed by Maitreya, and the commentary was composed by Vasubandhu. 10. 'Discriminating Yoga Treatise' ('Fēnbié Yújiā Lùn') (A treatise that gathers scattered thoughts and returns to contemplation). This was composed by Maitreya. Now there are also supplementary explanations. Alternatively, the 'Compendium on the Great Vehicle' could be removed from the ten branches because that treatise separately explains the 'Abhidharma Sutra' (Āpídámó Jīng), which does not belong to the meaning of a branch of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra'. The 'Nyayapravesa' (Zhènglǐ Mén Lùn) should be added. Because the origin of that treatise states that the Andhra (Àndáluó) king requested Dignaga (Chénnà Púsà) to prove the fruit of non-learning. The Bodhisattva comforted him, wanting to fulfill the king's request, and Manjusri (Wénshū Shīlì) snapped his fingers in the empty sky as a warning, saying: 'Why abandon the great mind and expect a small fruit? You should create epistemology (hetuvidya) to promote the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' composed by Maitreya.' The Bodhisattva respectfully accepted the teaching and followed it, and then created the 'Nyayapravesa'. Therefore, this should be taken as one branch. The 'Pramanavarttika' (Jíliàng Lùn) and epistemology are all included in this branch. The name of the 'Nyayapravesa' is a treatise that establishes the correct principle and destroys the wrong views. Or, the old explanation is correct, although it explains the 'Abhidharma', it is also the content of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra'.
廣釋諸經。唯識即是華嚴等說既是彼支。故取攝論亦復無妨。若爾因明何支所攝。答義門少故略不名支。故此唯識即十支中之一支也 三正科解如疏具辨 西明云。然諸釋中所宗各異。護法．難陀等多述宗旨會釋違文。火辨．親勝正釋本頌以標論意。安惠菩薩建立比量斥他宗失。由斯諸本別行攝義皆不周悉者 今意未詳。撿論上下未見安惠偏多破斥。準本疏釋廣頌上兩句破我法已下云多護法文。親承三藏執筆綴文糅唯識人。傳定不謬。余非執筆。縱時咨問多意定之。所有判文論大綱紀非可為定。合譯意者如樞要說。
初頌稽首二字。辨能歸敬相。廣如法苑。且釋名者。有解云。稽者古文為稽今別為稽。白虎通曰。稽者至也。首者頭也。言下拜上頭至地也。又鄭玄雲。稽者稽也。以頭至地稽少時也。
出體之中。法苑敬禮即以三業為體 西明以慚．愧為體 要集云。今取前解三業為正 有云。依教十法為體。一思。二慚。三敬。四愛。五信。六無慢。七舍。八色蘊。九識蘊。十智今謂不爾。若言十法敬．愛．不慢百法是何。所餘非理如要集辨煩不具錄。要集云。言稽首者顯勝身業。然由於德．有德等境發勝解俱決定思已即起凈信。思此起慚崇重賢善。因斯能發清凈身．語。是故此中意通三業慚為敬體。信等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：廣泛地解釋各種經典。《唯識論》就是《華嚴經》等所說的內容，既然是它們的支分，那麼採用《攝大乘論》也沒有妨礙。如果這樣，因明學屬於哪個支分呢？回答是：因為義理門類較少，所以略而不稱為支分。因此，這個《唯識論》就是十支中的一支。關於正科的解釋，如疏文中詳細辨析。西明法師說：『然而各家註釋所宗不同。護法、難陀等大多闡述宗旨，會通解釋有違背之處。火辨、親勝直接解釋本頌，以此標明論的意旨。安慧菩薩建立比量，駁斥其他宗派的過失。因此，各家版本單獨流行，對《攝大乘論》的意義都不夠全面。』現在的意思還不清楚。查閱論著上下，沒有看到安慧特別多地進行駁斥。按照本疏的解釋，在廣泛解釋頌文的上兩句『破我法』之後，說『多護法文』。親勝親自執筆撰寫文章，融合唯識學人的觀點，傳承確定沒有錯誤。其他人並非親自執筆，即使有時諮詢，也大多是確定自己的想法。所有的判文和論的大綱，都不能作為定論。綜合翻譯的意思，就像《樞要》所說的那樣。 最初的頌文『稽首』二字，辨別能歸敬的相狀，詳細內容如《法苑珠林》所說。且解釋名稱，有一種解釋說：『稽』字古文寫作『稽』，現在另外寫作『稽』。《白虎通》說：『稽，是至的意思。首，是頭的意思。』意思是下拜時頭至地。又鄭玄說：『稽，是稽留的意思。』是用頭至地稽留少時。 在出體之中，《法苑珠林》認為敬禮以三業（身、語、意）為體。西明法師以慚、愧為體。《要集》說：『現在採用前一種解釋，以三業為正。』有人說：『依據教義，以十法為體：一是思，二是慚，三是敬，四是愛，五是信，六是無慢，七是舍，八是色蘊（rupa-skandha），九是識蘊（vijnana-skandha），十是智。』現在我認為不是這樣。如果說十法，那麼敬、愛、不慢等百法是什麼呢？其餘不合理的說法，如《要集》辨析的那樣，因為繁瑣而不全部記錄。《要集》說：『說稽首，是顯示殊勝的身業。然而由於對德、有德等境界產生殊勝的理解，同時決定思考之後，就生起清凈的信心。思考這些，就生起慚愧，崇尚賢善。因此能夠發出清凈的身語。所以這裡意通三業，以慚為敬的體性。』信等（其餘的功德）也是如此。
【English Translation】 English version: Broadly explaining various sutras, the Vijnaptimatrata (Consciousness-only) doctrine is what the Avatamsaka Sutra (Flower Garland Sutra) and others speak of. Since it is a branch of them, there is no harm in adopting the Mahayana-samgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana). If so, to which branch does Hetuvidya (logic) belong? The answer is: because there are fewer categories of meaning, it is omitted and not called a branch. Therefore, this Vijnaptimatrata is one of the ten branches. As for the explanation of the proper divisions, it is fully discussed in the commentary. The Ximing master said: 'However, the various commentaries differ in their doctrines. Dharmapala, Nanda, and others mostly expound the tenets and reconcile conflicting passages. Fire-wisdom and Kirti directly explain the verses themselves to indicate the meaning of the treatise. Bodhisattva Anhui establishes inferences to refute the faults of other schools. Therefore, the separate editions of these texts do not fully cover the meaning of the Mahayana-samgraha.' The current meaning is not yet clear. Examining the text above and below, I have not seen Anhui refuting particularly much. According to the explanation of this commentary, after broadly explaining the first two lines of the verse 'refuting self and dharma,' it says 'mostly Dharmapala's text.' Kirti personally wrote the article, incorporating the views of Vijnaptimatrata practitioners, and the transmission is definitely not mistaken. Others did not write it themselves, and even if they sometimes consulted, it was mostly to confirm their own ideas. All the judgments and outlines of the treatise cannot be taken as definitive. The combined meaning of the translation is as the Essentials say. The initial verse, the two words 'Kế Shǒu (prostration),' distinguish the aspect of being able to pay homage. The detailed content is as described in the Dharma Forest Pearl Garden. And explaining the name, there is an explanation that says: 'The character 'Kế' was written as '稽' in ancient texts, and now it is written separately as '稽'. The Baihutong (Comprehensive Discussions in the White Tiger Hall) says: 'Kế means to arrive. Shǒu means head.' It means that when bowing down, the head reaches the ground. Also, Zheng Xuan said: 'Kế means to linger.' It means to linger for a short time with the head on the ground. Among the ways of expressing the substance, the Dharma Forest Pearl Garden considers that reverence takes the three karmas (body, speech, and mind) as its substance. The Ximing master takes shame and remorse as its substance. The Essentials says: 'Now we adopt the former explanation, taking the three karmas as correct.' Someone says: 'According to the teachings, it takes the ten dharmas as its substance: first is thought, second is shame, third is reverence, fourth is love, fifth is faith, sixth is non-arrogance, seventh is giving, eighth is the rupa-skandha (form aggregate), ninth is the vijnana-skandha (consciousness aggregate), and tenth is wisdom.' Now I think it is not like this. If we talk about the ten dharmas, then what are the hundreds of dharmas such as reverence, love, and non-arrogance? The remaining unreasonable statements, as the Essentials analyzes, are not fully recorded because they are cumbersome. The Essentials says: 'Saying Kế Shǒu (prostration) is to show the supreme bodily karma. However, due to generating a supreme understanding of the realms of virtue and the virtuous, and at the same time deciding to think, pure faith arises. Thinking about these, shame arises, and one reveres the virtuous and good. Therefore, one can emit pure body and speech. Therefore, the meaning here connects the three karmas, taking shame as the substance of reverence.' Faith and so on (the remaining merits) are also like this.
諸法是敬之因。身．語二業是敬之果。意通因果。法苑所說三業及愧以為敬體理亦難成。三業體思。思即造作。敬相微隱。故大婆沙三十四云。敬慚為體。崇重賢善是敬相故者 今詳。此釋理未必然。且自不定。先敘法苑思為體性。有釋以慚。自斷取前三業為正。今復取慚為能敬體從何為正 復不可說前後義別。同解稽首敬禮義故 又若以慚為自正義者。理必不然。何者若發勝解俱決定思已即起凈信。理且不然。思非信因。第六卷云忍謂信因樂欲為果 不言信俱思為因起信。若遍行故。應說作意。不應說思 又云由此起慚崇重賢善。因斯能發清凈身．語。是故此中意通三業慚為敬體者 此亦不爾。為取三業為歸敬體。為但取慚 若但取慚。何須說云意通三業慚為敬體。慚性非是三業體故 若通三業即不唯慚。何故復云信等諸法是敬之因。身．語敬果。意通因果。即三業但是敬之因果。非自體故 若唯說慚為敬體者。理亦不然。此唯明敬可但是慚。既云敬禮。明是三業。三業致禮由敬慚因。無處說慚亦為業體。又不說慚是發業故。又攝大乘論云。故我至誠身．語．思頻修無倒歸命禮。又瞿波論師云。三業禮者欲顯大師有天眼故以身業禮等。律中雲在明處近已身業禮等。故但是思不可說慚。為因可爾。如以貪等而為加行方
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 諸法是恭敬的原因。身（身體行為）、語（言語行為）二業是恭敬的結果。意（意念）貫通因果。法苑所說的身、語、意三業以及慚愧作為恭敬的本體，這個道理也難以成立。三業的本體是思（思考、意圖）。思即是造作。恭敬的相狀是微細隱蔽的。所以《大婆沙論》第三十四卷說，恭敬以慚愧為本體，崇尚尊重賢善是恭敬的相狀。現在詳細考察，這個解釋道理未必正確。而且自相矛盾，先敘述法苑以思為體性，又有解釋以慚愧為體性，自己斷定取前三業為正，現在又取慚愧作為能恭敬的本體，從何處作為正確呢？又不能說前後意義不同，因為都解釋稽首、敬禮的意義。又如果以慚愧作為自身正確的意義，道理必定不成立。為什麼呢？如果發起殊勝的理解，同時決定思考，之後立即生起清凈的信心，這個道理且不成立。因為思不是信的原因。《第六卷》說忍是信的原因，樂欲是結果，沒有說與信同時的思是生起信的原因。如果是普遍存在的，應該說作意，不應該說思。又說由此生起慚愧，崇尚尊重賢善，因此能夠發起清凈的身、語。所以這裡說意貫通三業，慚愧作為恭敬的本體，這也是不對的。是取三業作為歸敬的本體，還是隻取慚愧？如果只取慚愧，何必說意貫通三業，慚愧作為恭敬的本體。慚愧的性質不是三業的本體。如果貫通三業，就不只是慚愧。為什麼又說信等諸法是恭敬的原因，身、語是恭敬的結果，意貫通因果，即三業只是恭敬的因果，不是自體。如果只說慚愧是恭敬的本體，道理也不成立。這只是說明恭敬可以只是慚愧。既然說敬禮，明顯是三業。三業致禮由恭敬慚愧的原因。沒有地方說慚愧也是業的本體。又沒有說慚愧是發起業的原因。又《攝大乘論》說，所以我至誠地以身、語、思頻繁地修習沒有顛倒的歸命禮。又瞿波論師說，三業禮是爲了顯示大師有天眼，所以用身業禮等。《律》中說在明亮的地方靠近後用身業禮等。所以只是思可以，不能說慚愧。作為原因可以，如以貪等作為加行。
【English Translation】 English version All dharmas are the cause of reverence. Actions of body and speech are the result of reverence. Mind connects cause and effect. The statement in Fa Yuan that the three karmas (body, speech, and mind) and shame are the substance of reverence is also difficult to establish. The substance of the three karmas is thought (intention). Thought is creation. The appearance of reverence is subtle and hidden. Therefore, the thirty-fourth chapter of the Maha-Vibhasa says that reverence takes shame as its substance, and respecting the virtuous and good is the appearance of reverence. Now, upon detailed examination, this explanation is not necessarily correct. Moreover, it is self-contradictory. First, it states that Fa Yuan takes thought as its substance, and then there is an explanation that takes shame as its substance. It determines to take the previous three karmas as correct, and now it takes shame as the substance of reverence. From where is it taken as correct? Furthermore, it cannot be said that the meanings are different before and after, because they both explain the meaning of bowing and paying homage. Also, if shame is taken as the meaning of self-correction, the reasoning must not be established. Why? If a superior understanding is aroused, and at the same time a decisive thought is made, then pure faith immediately arises. This reasoning is not established. Because thought is not the cause of faith. The Sixth Volume says that forbearance is the cause of faith, and desire is the result. It does not say that thought simultaneous with faith is the cause of arising faith. If it is universally present, it should be said to be attention, not thought. It also says that from this arises shame, respecting the virtuous and good, and therefore one can generate pure body and speech. Therefore, it is said here that mind connects the three karmas, and shame is the substance of reverence, which is also incorrect. Is it taking the three karmas as the substance of refuge, or only taking shame? If only shame is taken, why say that mind connects the three karmas, and shame is the substance of reverence? The nature of shame is not the substance of the three karmas. If it connects the three karmas, it is not only shame. Why then say that dharmas such as faith are the cause of reverence, and body and speech are the result of reverence, and mind connects cause and effect, that is, the three karmas are only the cause and effect of reverence, not the substance itself. If only shame is said to be the substance of reverence, the reasoning is also not established. This only clarifies that reverence can only be shame. Since it says reverence, it is clearly the three karmas. The three karmas pay homage due to the cause of reverence and shame. There is nowhere that says shame is also the substance of karma. Also, it does not say that shame is the cause of generating karma. Furthermore, the Mahayana-samgraha says, 'Therefore, I sincerely and frequently cultivate the faultless prostration of refuge with body, speech, and mind.' Also, Gopala said, 'The three karmas of prostration are to show that the master has divine eyes, so he uses body karma prostration, etc.' The Vinaya says, 'In a bright place, after approaching, use body karma prostration, etc.' Therefore, only thought is acceptable, shame cannot be said. As a cause, it is acceptable, such as using greed, etc., as an auxiliary condition.
起三業。雖復論云斷命名嗔等。終不說貪等以為業體。雖說于慚敬德．有德。論歸敬體即是三業。此理決定勿更別解。又法苑中但說三業。無文說愧以為敬體。波錯看文應更審讀 前約克性出稽首體但說是思。若義說者。凡論歸敬有其二種。謂顯相及不顯相。若就顯相所謂身．語二業。由身敬禮定發殷重令他見故。俱舍據此偏言身業。雖身不禮但發語宣揚。由名．句等表詮內心令他聽故。無垢稱頌中說是偏取語業 若依不顯相唯取意業。內發殷誠雖極是重他人不了。諸論不說。此論具以三業歸敬。通顯．不顯二種盡故 若就別者三業有異。若其身業實即慚等相應動發勝思。通假即兼表色。語業亦用慚等相應動發勝思。假亦通聲 若薩婆多有實善．惡色。即依報色有業色生。即長．短色以此為體。復眾賢師別有長等極微。正量部師別有動色。譬喻論師別有動色非顯非形。並如下說 今大乘中若在佛果身．語色聲可許是善非歸依體。若就因中即是無記。約表心邊假通善．惡。故身．語業假．實為體 于意業中有二。一就業。二約勤治。就業有二。謂自性．助伴。言自性者。唯取遍行數中緣三寶為境慚等相應思為體。思有三種。謂審慮．決定．動發。論文雖說前二思唯在意地。后一思是身．語二業。今據道理意亦得有動發勝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 發起身、語、意三業（karma）。雖然論中說斷除命名、嗔怒等，但始終沒有說貪婪等是業的本體。雖然說了慚（hri，羞恥）敬德、有德，論中歸敬的本體就是三業。這個道理是確定的，不要再做別的解釋。而且《法苑珠林》中只說了三業，沒有文章說慚愧是恭敬的本體。請仔細閱讀《波錯》中的文字。 前面從克性（specific characteristic）出發，說稽首（bowing）的本體只是思（thought）。如果從義理上說，凡是論述歸敬有兩種，即顯相和不顯相。如果就顯相而言，就是身、語二業。因為身體恭敬禮拜必定發出殷重（sincere）之意，讓別人看到。因此，《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）據此偏重於身業。即使身體不禮拜，但發出語言宣揚，通過名、句等表達內心的想法，讓別人聽到。《維摩詰所說經》（Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra）的頌中說是偏重於語業。 如果依據不顯相，只取意業。內心發出殷誠之意，即使非常鄭重，別人也無法瞭解，所以各種論典沒有提及。這個論典用三業來歸敬，包含了顯相和不顯相兩種情況。 如果就個別而言，三業有差異。如果身業實際上就是與慚等相應的動發勝思（superior thought）。通假來說，也兼有表色（manifestation of form）。語業也是用與慚等相應的動發勝思。假來說，也通於聲音。 如果薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）有真實的善、惡色，就是依據報色（resultant form）有業色（karmic form）產生，即長、短色以此為本體。另外，眾賢師（various teachers）有長等極微（extremely small particles of length, etc.）。正量部（Saṃmitīya）的老師有動色（moving form）。譬喻論師（Dṛṣṭāntavādin）有動色，既非顯色也非形色，具體如下所述。 現在大乘（Mahāyāna）中，如果在佛果（Buddha-fruit）位，身、語的色聲可以認為是善的，但不是歸依的本體。如果就因地（causal ground）而言，就是無記（avyākṛta，neutral）。從表達心意的角度來說，假通於善、惡。所以身、語業以假、實為本體。 在意業中有兩種，一是就作業（action），二是就勤治（effort）。就作業而言，有兩種，即自性（nature）和助伴（accompaniment）。所謂自性，就是隻取遍行數（pervasive mental factors）中緣三寶（Three Jewels）為境，與慚等相應的思為本體。思有三種，即審慮（deliberation）、決定（determination）、動發（initiation）。論文雖然說前兩種思只在意地（mind-consciousness），后一種思是身、語二業。現在根據道理，意也可能有動發勝思。
【English Translation】 English version: Initiating the three karmas (karma): body, speech, and mind. Although the treatises discuss cutting off naming, anger, and so on, they never say that greed, etc., are the substance of karma. Although they speak of shame (hri, modesty) and respect, and virtuous qualities, the substance of reverence in the treatises is precisely the three karmas. This principle is definitive; do not interpret it differently. Moreover, the Fa Yuan Zhu Lin only speaks of the three karmas; there is no text that says shame is the substance of reverence. Those who read the Bo Cuo text should examine it more carefully. Earlier, based on specific characteristics, the substance of bowing (kēishǒu) was said to be simply thought (si). If speaking in terms of meaning, there are two types of reverence: manifest and non-manifest. Regarding the manifest aspect, it refers to the karmas of body and speech. Because physical reverence and bowing necessarily generate sincere intention, making it visible to others, the Abhidharmakośa emphasizes bodily karma based on this. Even if the body does not bow, but speech is uttered to proclaim, through names, phrases, etc., expressing inner thoughts and allowing others to hear, the verses in the Vimalakīrti Nirdeśa Sūtra emphasize verbal karma. If relying on the non-manifest aspect, only mental karma is taken. Inner sincerity, even if extremely profound, cannot be understood by others, so various treatises do not mention it. This treatise uses the three karmas for reverence, encompassing both manifest and non-manifest aspects. Individually, the three karmas have differences. Bodily karma is actually the superior thought (śreṣṭha-citta) of initiation that corresponds with shame, etc. Generally speaking, it also includes the manifestation of form. Verbal karma also uses the superior thought of initiation that corresponds with shame, etc. Hypothetically speaking, it also includes sound. If the Sarvāstivāda school has real good and bad forms, it is based on resultant form (vipāka-rūpa) that karmic form (karma-rūpa) arises, i.e., long and short forms are taken as the substance. Furthermore, various teachers have extremely small particles of length, etc. The teachers of the Saṃmitīya school have moving form (cala-rūpa). The Dṛṣṭāntavādin have moving form that is neither visible nor shaped, as described below. Now, in Mahāyāna, if in the state of Buddhahood (Buddha-fruit), the form and sound of body and speech can be considered good, but they are not the substance of refuge. If based on the causal ground, it is neutral (avyākṛta). From the perspective of expressing intention, it hypothetically includes good and bad. Therefore, bodily and verbal karmas have hypothetical and real substances. In mental karma, there are two aspects: action and effort. Regarding action, there are two types: nature and accompaniment. The so-called nature is only the thought (citta) that corresponds with shame, etc., taking the Three Jewels as the object among the pervasive mental factors. There are three types of thought: deliberation, determination, and initiation. Although the text says that the first two types of thought are only in the mind-consciousness, the last type of thought is in the bodily and verbal karmas. Now, according to reason, the mind can also have superior thought of initiation.
思。云作動意故發無貪等故。若約助伴即此思俱四遍行。五別境。散地善十。定加輕安。心王．尋．伺二十三法 次約對治復有二種。謂自性．相應。自性唯取緣於三寶能治輕慢慚．愧為體。此有二義。一體勝。二義順 言體勝者。顯揚論云。慚者謂依自增上法增上羞恥過惡為體。愧者顯揚云。謂依世間增上羞恥過惡為體。唯識．對法文引可知 第二義順者。俱舍云無慚．無愧差別云何。答無慚．無愧乃至云。于諸功德及有德者。無敬無崇無所忌難無所隨屬說名無慚。準能治此故正是慚。由斯理順故約對治說歸敬體即慚．愧也。克實即非。若直取慚慚五識俱。豈五相應亦是歸敬。說慚行相崇重賢善。五識不能別緣三寶。若云不取行相何別。故正三業為歸敬體。不得約思雖遍五識。業非五思何妨慚通敬唯在意。何者論辨業體自簡擇訖。無處辨歸敬說慚為體者。助伴準前。
第二五法出體者。于中有二。依瑜伽論云。五法者謂相．名．分別．正智．如如。若有漏敬者以名．相．分別三法為體。身．語二業假即相收。名依聲立。雖非名等。雖復非是語業。以假從實聲由名錶故得通名。若取無表即思種上假無表是。若就實業體即分別。若無漏者正智為體。若色若心俱名智故 第二五法即心．心所．色．不相應．無為。準
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：思。因為產生意念活動而發起，因為沒有貪婪等念頭而發起。如果從助伴的角度來說，這個『思』與四種遍行心所（作意、觸、受、想）同時生起。還有五種別境心所（欲、勝解、念、定、慧）。在散亂的狀態下，是善的十一種心所（信、精進、慚、愧、無貪、無嗔、無癡、輕安、不放逸、行舍、不害）。在禪定中，加上輕安。心王（識）、尋、伺，總共二十三種法。 其次，從對治的角度來說，又有兩種：自性和相應。自性只取緣於三寶（佛、法、僧）能夠對治輕慢的慚、愧作為本體。這有兩層含義：一是本體殊勝，二是義理順應。 所謂本體殊勝，如《顯揚論》所說：『慚』是指依靠自身增上，對於過錯感到羞恥。『愧』是指依靠世間增上，對於過錯感到羞恥。《唯識論》、《對法論》中的文句可以參考。 第二層含義是義理順應。《俱舍論》中說：『無慚、無愧有什麼差別？』回答是：『無慚、無愧乃至說，對於各種功德以及有德之人，沒有敬重、沒有崇尚、沒有顧忌、沒有隨順，這叫做無慚。』因此，能夠對治這種無慚的正是慚。由於這個道理順應，所以從對治的角度來說，歸敬的本體就是慚、愧。但嚴格來說並非如此。如果直接取慚，慚與五識同時生起，難道五種相應的也都是歸敬嗎？說慚的行相是崇重賢善，五識不能分別緣於三寶。如果說不取行相，那又有什麼區別呢？所以，真正的三業（身、語、意）才是歸敬的本體。不能因為『思』遍於五識，就說業也是五思。即使慚通於五識，但敬只在意業。為什麼呢？因為論中辨析業的本體時已經自行簡擇完畢。沒有地方辨析歸敬，說慚為本體。助伴參照前面所說。 第二，五法出體。其中有兩種情況。依據《瑜伽師地論》所說：五法是指相、名、分別、正智、如如。如果有漏的敬，以名、相、分別三種法為本體。身、語二業可以假借地歸於相。名依聲音而立，雖然不是名等，雖然也不是語業，但因為假借于真實，聲音由名來表達，所以可以通名為名。如果取無表業，那就是在思的種子上假立的無表業。如果就真實業的本體來說，那就是分別。如果是無漏的敬，以正智為本體。無論是色還是心，都可以稱為智。 第二種五法，即心、心所、色、不相應行、無為。參照前文。
【English Translation】 English version: Thought (思). It arises because of the activity of intention, and because of the absence of greed and other thoughts. If considered from the perspective of accompanying factors, this 'thought' arises simultaneously with the four pervasive mental factors (作意-attention, 觸-contact, 受-feeling, 想-perception). There are also the five object-oriented mental factors (欲-desire, 勝解-conviction, 念-mindfulness, 定-concentration, 慧-wisdom). In a scattered state of mind, there are eleven wholesome mental factors (信-faith, 精進-diligence, 慚-shame, 愧-embarrassment, 無貪-non-greed, 無嗔-non-hatred, 無癡-non-ignorance, 輕安-ease, 不放逸-non-negligence, 行舍-equanimity, 不害-non-harming). In meditative concentration, ease (輕安) is added. Mind (識), seeking (尋), and investigation (伺), totaling twenty-three dharmas. Next, from the perspective of antidotes, there are two types: self-nature and corresponding. Self-nature only takes shame (慚) and embarrassment (愧), which are rooted in the Three Jewels (佛-Buddha, 法-Dharma, 僧-Sangha) and can counteract disrespect, as its essence. This has two meanings: first, the essence is superior; second, the meaning is in accordance. The so-called superior essence, as stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (顯揚論): 'Shame (慚)' refers to relying on oneself for enhancement, feeling ashamed of one's faults. 'Embarrassment (愧)' refers to relying on the world for enhancement, feeling ashamed of one's faults. The sentences in Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (唯識論) and Abhidharmasamuccaya (對法論) can be referred to. The second meaning is that the principle is in accordance. In the Abhidharmakośa (俱舍論), it says: 'What is the difference between shamelessness (無慚) and lack of embarrassment (無愧)?' The answer is: 'Shamelessness and lack of embarrassment, even to the point of saying that towards various merits and virtuous people, there is no respect, no reverence, no fear, no adherence, this is called shamelessness.' Therefore, what can counteract this shamelessness is precisely shame. Because this principle is in accordance, from the perspective of antidotes, the essence of reverence is shame and embarrassment. But strictly speaking, this is not the case. If we directly take shame, shame arises simultaneously with the five consciousnesses, are all five corresponding ones also reverence? It is said that the characteristic of shame is to revere the virtuous and good. The five consciousnesses cannot separately be rooted in the Three Jewels. If it is said that the characteristic is not taken, then what is the difference? Therefore, the true three karmas (身-body, 語-speech, 意-mind) are the essence of reverence. It cannot be said that because 'thought' pervades the five consciousnesses, karma is also five thoughts. Even if shame is common to the five consciousnesses, reverence is only in mental karma. Why? Because the analysis of the essence of karma in the treatise has already been self-selected. There is no place to analyze reverence, saying that shame is the essence. The accompanying factors refer to what was said earlier. Second, the emergence of the five dharmas. There are two situations. According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論), the five dharmas refer to appearance (相), name (名), discrimination (分別), right knowledge (正智), and suchness (如如). If there is contaminated reverence, it takes the three dharmas of name, appearance, and discrimination as its essence. Bodily and verbal karmas can be hypothetically attributed to appearance. Name is established based on sound, although it is not name, etc., and although it is not verbal karma, because it is hypothetical to reality, and sound is expressed by name, it can be generally called name. If unmanifested karma is taken, it is the unmanifested karma hypothetically established on the seed of thought. If we consider the essence of true karma, it is discrimination. If it is uncontaminated reverence, it takes right knowledge as its essence. Whether it is form or mind, it can be called wisdom. The second type of five dharmas, namely mind (心), mental factors (心所), form (色), non-associated formations (不相應行), and unconditioned (無為). Refer to the previous text.
法可知。蘊．處．及界．三性．百法皆可準知 問答分別。問出體中長等依於色是假。假身業名等依聲假。名等為語業 答長等表於心。故得名身業。名等詮所轉。不得名語業 二問五逆業中破和合僧。即是妄語重。三罰業中意業重。五僻見中邪見重。曾無處說身業為重。何故此說偏舉身業 答邪見斷善勝。破僧損處大。意殺嫌恨深。所以各偏舉。此中身業且據世間從事制戒。細犯多發身業為重。所以偏舉 又解身業是總。餘二是別。舉總攝別。並在其中 三問二乘歸依得通無漏以不 答一解許得。以自在者在定之中得起五識。何故無漏不得歸依。一云不得。三乘真智總不歸依。二乘后智多緣帝理。無別功能不能起發身．語等業。無勝用故。此解為正 四問意通三界理顯不疑。身．語歸依通何界地 答身．語二業通欲．色界。若準九地語業唯初禪。身業通五地。二定已上雖起語業及以身業。若起語業借下尋．伺。故隨尋．伺是初定系。又是無記。上地不造下地業故。設無漏者亦屬下故。或不繫故。身業通四定。以出入息非是遍行上得起身 又解。通上。若上不得作下地善業。四靜慮王俱受別脫。豈許無記心得戒耶。既許善心方始得戒。故於上地得有語業。多由尋．伺未必一切皆尋．伺起。又復尋．伺非語遍行。如出入
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 法可知：可以通過學習佛法來了解一切事物。 蘊（五蘊，構成人身心的五種要素：色、受、想、行、識）、處（十二處，即六根和六塵）、及界（十八界，六根、六塵、六識的總稱），三性（善、惡、無記），百法（唯識宗所立的百種法），都可以依據佛法來衡量和了解。以下是問答形式的分別解釋： 問：在色法（物質現象）的本體中，長、短等形狀是依附於色法而存在的假象。假借身體做出的行為，比如身業，是依附於聲音而存在的假象。那麼，名相等概念是否可以被認為是語業呢？ 答：長短等形狀可以表達內心的狀態，因此可以被認為是身業。而名相等概念只是用來詮釋所表達的內容，因此不能被認為是語業。 問：在五逆罪（殺父、殺母、殺阿羅漢、出佛身血、破和合僧）中，破壞僧團的和合等同於嚴重的妄語。在三種懲罰性的業中，意業（思想上的行為）最為嚴重。在五種不正見中，邪見最為嚴重。從未聽說過身業（身體上的行為）最為嚴重。為什麼這裡特別強調身業呢？ 答：邪見斷絕善根的力量最強，破壞僧團造成的損害最大，意業中的殺害行為所產生的嫌恨最深，所以各有側重。這裡強調身業，是因為從世俗的角度來看，制定戒律是爲了約束人們的行為，而細微的違犯行為大多通過身業表現出來，所以認為身業最為重要。因此特別強調。 另一種解釋是，身業是總稱，而其他兩種（語業和意業）是別稱。提及總稱就包含了別稱，都在其中。 問：二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的修行者皈依三寶后，是否能夠獲得通向無漏（沒有煩惱）的智慧？ 答：一種解釋認為可以。因為有自在力的修行者在禪定中可以生起五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識），那麼為什麼無漏的智慧不能夠皈依三寶呢？另一種觀點認為不可以。三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的真智總體上不皈依三寶。二乘的后得智（證悟后的智慧）大多關注于帝理（真諦），沒有其他特殊的功能，不能夠引發身業、語業等行為，因為沒有殊勝的作用。這種解釋是正確的。 問：意業通達三界（欲界、色界、無色界），從道理上來說沒有疑問。那麼，身業和語業的皈依通達哪個界和哪個地（禪定層次）？ 答：身業和語業通達欲界和色界。如果按照九地（四禪八定加上有頂天）來劃分，語業只通達初禪。身業通達五地（欲界、初禪、二禪、三禪、四禪）。二禪以上的禪定雖然可以產生語業和身業，但如果產生語業，需要藉助下層的尋（粗略的思考）、伺（精細的思考）。因此，語業隨著尋、伺屬於初禪的範疇。而且是無記業（非善非惡）。因為上層的禪定不會造作下層的業。即使是無漏的語業，也屬於下層。或者是不屬於任何界。 身業通達四禪。因為出入息（呼吸）不是普遍存在的，所以在上層的禪定中可以產生身業。 另一種解釋是，身業通達上層禪定。如果上層禪定不能造作下層的善業，那麼四靜慮王（色界四禪天的天王）都接受別解脫戒（比丘戒），難道允許以無記心來受戒嗎？既然允許以善心才能受戒，那麼在上層禪定中就可以有語業。大多是由尋、伺引起的，但未必一切都是由尋、伺引起的。而且尋、伺並非語業普遍存在的因素，比如出入息。 English version The Dharma can be known: Everything can be understood by studying the Buddha's teachings. Skandhas (five aggregates, the five elements that constitute the human mind and body: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness), Ayatanas (twelve sense bases, namely the six sense organs and the six sense objects), and Dhatus (eighteen realms, the totality of the six sense organs, six sense objects, and six consciousnesses), the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), and the hundred dharmas (the hundred types of phenomena established by the Consciousness-only school) can all be measured and understood according to the Dharma. The following are explanations in the form of questions and answers: Question: In the essence of form (material phenomena), shapes such as length and shortness are illusions that depend on form. Actions performed through the body, such as bodily karma, are illusions that depend on sound. Then, can concepts such as names be considered verbal karma? Answer: Shapes such as length and shortness can express the state of mind, so they can be considered bodily karma. However, concepts such as names are only used to explain what is being expressed, so they cannot be considered verbal karma. Question: Among the five heinous crimes (killing one's father, killing one's mother, killing an Arhat, shedding the blood of a Buddha, and creating schism in the Sangha), disrupting the harmony of the Sangha is equivalent to serious false speech. Among the three types of punitive karma, mental karma (actions in thought) is the most serious. Among the five wrong views, wrong view is the most serious. It has never been said that bodily karma (actions of the body) is the most serious. Why is bodily karma particularly emphasized here? Answer: Wrong view has the strongest power to cut off wholesome roots, disrupting the Sangha causes the greatest harm, and the hatred generated by killing in mental karma is the deepest, so each has its emphasis. The emphasis on bodily karma here is because, from a worldly perspective, the precepts are established to restrain people's behavior, and subtle violations are mostly manifested through bodily karma, so bodily karma is considered the most important. Therefore, it is particularly emphasized. Another explanation is that bodily karma is a general term, while the other two (verbal karma and mental karma) are specific terms. Mentioning the general term includes the specific terms, all are within it. Question: After practitioners of the Two Vehicles (Sravaka Vehicle and Pratyekabuddha Vehicle) take refuge in the Three Jewels, can they attain wisdom that leads to the unconditioned (without afflictions)? Answer: One explanation is that they can. Because practitioners with the power of mastery can generate the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) in meditation, then why can't unconditioned wisdom take refuge in the Three Jewels? Another view is that they cannot. The true wisdom of the Three Vehicles (Sravaka Vehicle, Pratyekabuddha Vehicle, and Bodhisattva Vehicle) generally does not take refuge in the Three Jewels. The subsequent wisdom (wisdom after enlightenment) of the Two Vehicles mostly focuses on the ultimate truth, and has no other special functions, and cannot initiate actions such as bodily karma and verbal karma, because it has no superior function. This explanation is correct. Question: Mental karma penetrates the Three Realms (Desire Realm, Form Realm, Formless Realm), and there is no doubt about it in principle. Then, which realm and which level (level of meditation) do the refuge of bodily karma and verbal karma penetrate? Answer: Bodily karma and verbal karma penetrate the Desire Realm and the Form Realm. If divided according to the Nine Grounds (the four dhyanas and the eight samadhis plus the Peak of Existence), verbal karma only penetrates the first dhyana. Bodily karma penetrates the five grounds (Desire Realm, first dhyana, second dhyana, third dhyana, fourth dhyana). Although verbal karma and bodily karma can arise in dhyanas above the second dhyana, if verbal karma arises, it needs to borrow the lower levels of Vitarka (rough thought) and Vicara (subtle thought). Therefore, verbal karma follows Vitarka and Vicara and belongs to the category of the first dhyana. And it is neutral karma (neither wholesome nor unwholesome). Because the upper dhyanas do not create the karma of the lower dhyanas. Even if it is unconditioned verbal karma, it belongs to the lower level. Or it does not belong to any realm. Bodily karma penetrates the four dhyanas. Because inhalation and exhalation (breathing) are not universally present, bodily karma can arise in the upper dhyanas. Another explanation is that bodily karma penetrates the upper dhyanas. If the upper dhyanas cannot create the wholesome karma of the lower dhyanas, then the Four Great Kings of the Pure Abodes (the kings of the four dhyana heavens in the Form Realm) all receive the Pratimoksha vows (Bhikkhu vows), would it be permissible to take the vows with a neutral mind? Since it is permissible to take the vows only with a wholesome mind, then there can be verbal karma in the upper dhyanas. It is mostly caused by Vitarka and Vicara, but not everything is caused by Vitarka and Vicara. Moreover, Vitarka and Vicara are not universally present factors in verbal karma, such as inhalation and exhalation.
【English Translation】 The Dharma can be known: Everything can be understood by studying the Buddha's teachings. Skandhas (five aggregates, the five elements that constitute the human mind and body: form, feeling, perception, mental formations, consciousness), Ayatanas (twelve sense bases, namely the six sense organs and the six sense objects), and Dhatus (eighteen realms, the totality of the six sense organs, six sense objects, and six consciousnesses), the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), and the hundred dharmas (the hundred types of phenomena established by the Consciousness-only school) can all be measured and understood according to the Dharma. The following are explanations in the form of questions and answers: Question: In the essence of form (material phenomena), shapes such as length and shortness are illusions that depend on form. Actions performed through the body, such as bodily karma, are illusions that depend on sound. Then, can concepts such as names be considered verbal karma? Answer: Shapes such as length and shortness can express the state of mind, so they can be considered bodily karma. However, concepts such as names are only used to explain what is being expressed, so they cannot be considered verbal karma. Question: Among the five heinous crimes (killing one's father, killing one's mother, killing an Arhat, shedding the blood of a Buddha, and creating schism in the Sangha), disrupting the harmony of the Sangha is equivalent to serious false speech. Among the three types of punitive karma, mental karma (actions in thought) is the most serious. Among the five wrong views, wrong view is the most serious. It has never been said that bodily karma (actions of the body) is the most serious. Why is bodily karma particularly emphasized here? Answer: Wrong view has the strongest power to cut off wholesome roots, disrupting the Sangha causes the greatest harm, and the hatred generated by killing in mental karma is the deepest, so each has its emphasis. The emphasis on bodily karma here is because, from a worldly perspective, the precepts are established to restrain people's behavior, and subtle violations are mostly manifested through bodily karma, so bodily karma is considered the most important. Therefore, it is particularly emphasized. Another explanation is that bodily karma is a general term, while the other two (verbal karma and mental karma) are specific terms. Mentioning the general term includes the specific terms, all are within it. Question: After practitioners of the Two Vehicles (Sravaka Vehicle and Pratyekabuddha Vehicle) take refuge in the Three Jewels, can they attain wisdom that leads to the unconditioned (without afflictions)? Answer: One explanation is that they can. Because practitioners with the power of mastery can generate the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) in meditation, then why can't unconditioned wisdom take refuge in the Three Jewels? Another view is that they cannot. The true wisdom of the Three Vehicles (Sravaka Vehicle, Pratyekabuddha Vehicle, and Bodhisattva Vehicle) generally does not take refuge in the Three Jewels. The subsequent wisdom (wisdom after enlightenment) of the Two Vehicles mostly focuses on the ultimate truth, and has no other special functions, and cannot initiate actions such as bodily karma and verbal karma, because it has no superior function. This explanation is correct. Question: Mental karma penetrates the Three Realms (Desire Realm, Form Realm, Formless Realm), and there is no doubt about it in principle. Then, which realm and which level (level of meditation) do the refuge of bodily karma and verbal karma penetrate? Answer: Bodily karma and verbal karma penetrate the Desire Realm and the Form Realm. If divided according to the Nine Grounds (the four dhyanas and the eight samadhis plus the Peak of Existence), verbal karma only penetrates the first dhyana. Bodily karma penetrates the five grounds (Desire Realm, first dhyana, second dhyana, third dhyana, fourth dhyana). Although verbal karma and bodily karma can arise in dhyanas above the second dhyana, if verbal karma arises, it needs to borrow the lower levels of Vitarka (rough thought) and Vicara (subtle thought). Therefore, verbal karma follows Vitarka and Vicara and belongs to the category of the first dhyana. And it is neutral karma (neither wholesome nor unwholesome). Because the upper dhyanas do not create the karma of the lower dhyanas. Even if it is unconditioned verbal karma, it belongs to the lower level. Or it does not belong to any realm. Bodily karma penetrates the four dhyanas. Because inhalation and exhalation (breathing) are not universally present, bodily karma can arise in the upper dhyanas. Another explanation is that bodily karma penetrates the upper dhyanas. If the upper dhyanas cannot create the wholesome karma of the lower dhyanas, then the Four Great Kings of the Pure Abodes (the kings of the four dhyana heavens in the Form Realm) all receive the Pratimoksha vows (Bhikkhu vows), would it be permissible to take the vows with a neutral mind? Since it is permissible to take the vows only with a wholesome mind, then there can be verbal karma in the upper dhyanas. It is mostly caused by Vitarka and Vicara, but not everything is caused by Vitarka and Vicara. Moreover, Vitarka and Vicara are not universally present factors in verbal karma, such as inhalation and exhalation.
息四定。雖無得有身業。以有思故。語業應同此。引證如下第七論記 要集云。俱舍．正理皆說。愛敬以法為緣雖通三界。此中唯緣補特伽羅故唯欲．色。若依大乘。中陰經說佛入中陰。無色有情郁頭藍等亦入中陰禮拜聽法。故知雖緣有情亦通無色。問已入中陰非無色攝。如何說云彼有敬耶。解云經意難尋。今且一解。無生中間所有諸蘊名為中陰。此意不說中有名中陰。以在生死中間名為中陰。如說世間以在世間故。此釋不爾。若以生死中間名為中陰。何須云郁頭藍子入先在彼故。又云。依定果色變現似身。依下地定發天眼．耳。借下地識見佛聞法者 此亦不爾。若依有部。眼不下於身。如何色界。眼依無色界身。無色界身非實身根。既無身根眼等何依。若依大乘此亦不許。雜集第二十八界四句中雲。有眼非眼界。謂最後蘊。有眼界非眼。謂在卵．胎．無色異生。有亦眼亦眼界。謂欲．色界現得眼等。有非眼非眼界。謂無色聖及無餘依。郁頭若凡成界非眼。如何現起。現起即眼。非唯是界。若是聖者眼及眼界二俱不成。復如何起。若云是化。如彼定果所變似身。所起眼．耳亦似眼．耳。何須起下 故正解者。佛既不滅現彼中陰。郁頭不死亦入中陰。故是化現非實中陰。
疏解六十二有情。在家等四。一謂在家。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 息四定（指四種禪定，即空無邊處定、識無邊處定、無所有處定、非想非非想處定）。雖然沒有獲得身體的業，但因為有思慮的緣故，語言的業應該與此相同。引證如下第七論記：《要集》中說，《俱舍論》和《正理經》都說，愛敬以法為因緣，雖然通於三界（欲界、色界、無色界），但此處只緣于補特伽羅（人），所以只在欲界和色界。如果依照大乘佛教，《中陰經》說佛會進入中陰（死亡和投生之間的過渡期）。無色界的有情，比如郁頭藍（一種禪定修行者），也會進入中陰禮拜聽法。因此可知，即使緣于有情，也通於無色界。問：已經進入中陰，不是無色界所攝，如何說他們有敬意呢？答：經文的意義難以尋覓，現在且解釋一種：無生和中間所有的諸蘊（構成個體的要素）名為中陰。這個意思不是說中陰中有個叫中陰的東西，而是因為在生死中間，所以名為中陰。如同說世間是因為在世間中。這種解釋不對。如果以生死中間名為中陰，為何要說郁頭藍子進入？因為他先前就在那裡。又說：依靠定果色變現出類似身體的樣子，依靠下地（較低層次）的禪定，發出天眼、天耳，借用下地的識見佛聞法。這種說法也不對。如果依照有部（佛教部派），眼根不能低於身體，如何？眼根依靠沒有的身體。沒有的身體不是真實的身體根，既然沒有身體根，眼等依靠什麼？如果依照大乘佛教，這也不允許。《雜集》第二十八界四句中說：有眼非眼界，指的是最後蘊。有眼界非眼，指的是在卵生、胎生、無色界的異生。有既是眼又是眼界，指的是欲界、界現得眼等。有非眼非眼界，指的是無色界的聖者以及無餘依（涅槃）。郁頭藍如果還是凡夫，成就了界，不是眼，如何現起？現起就是眼，不僅僅是界。如果是聖者，眼和眼界二者都不成立，又如何生起？如果說是化現，如同定果所變現的類似身體，所生起的眼、耳也類似眼、耳，何須生起下地的眼耳？所以正確的解釋是：佛既然不滅，就顯現在中陰中。郁頭藍沒有死，也進入中陰。所以是化現，不是真實的中陰。 疏解六十二有情，在家等四。一謂在家。
【English Translation】 English version: The four formless attainments (referring to the four dhyanas: the sphere of infinite space, the sphere of infinite consciousness, the sphere of nothingness, and the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception). Although there is no karma of the body attained, because there is thought, the karma of speech should be the same. The following is cited from the seventh commentary: The Yaoji says that both the Abhidharmakośa and the Nyāyānusāra state that love and respect, with the Dharma as the cause, although common to the three realms (desire realm, form realm, and formless realm), here only relate to pudgala (person), so they are only in the desire and form realms. If according to Mahayana Buddhism, the Antarabhava Sutra says that the Buddha enters the antarabhava (the intermediate state between death and rebirth). Sentient beings in the formless realm, such as Uddalaka (a practitioner of meditation), also enter the antarabhava to prostrate and listen to the Dharma. Therefore, it is known that even if related to sentient beings, it also extends to the formless realm. Question: Having already entered the antarabhava, it is not included in the formless realm, so how can it be said that they have reverence? Answer: The meaning of the sutra is difficult to find, so let's explain one way for now: all the skandhas (elements constituting an individual) that exist between no-birth and the middle are called antarabhava. This meaning does not say that there is something called antarabhava in the antarabhava, but because it is in the middle of birth and death, it is called antarabhava. Just as it is said that the world is because it is in the world. This explanation is not correct. If the middle of birth and death is called antarabhava, why say that Uddalaka enters? Because he was already there before. It is also said: Relying on the color of the result of meditation, a body-like appearance is transformed, and relying on the lower level (lower level) of meditation, divine eyes and ears are emitted, and the lower level of consciousness is borrowed to see the Buddha and hear the Dharma. This statement is also incorrect. If according to the Sarvastivada school (a Buddhist school), the eye root cannot be lower than the body, how can it ? The eye root relies on the body without . The body without ** is not a real body root, since there is no body root, what do the eyes, etc., rely on? If according to Mahayana Buddhism, this is also not allowed. The twenty-eighth realm of Samuccaya, in the four sentences, says: There is an eye but not an eye realm, referring to the last skandha. There is an eye realm but not an eye, referring to different beings in the egg-born, womb-born, and formless realms. There is both an eye and an eye realm, referring to the eyes, etc., that are currently obtained in the desire realm and the ** realm. There is neither an eye nor an eye realm, referring to the saints in the formless realm and those without remainder (Nirvana). If Uddalaka is still an ordinary person, and has achieved the realm, but is not an eye, how can it arise? Arising is the eye, not just the realm. If it is a saint, neither the eye nor the eye realm is established, so how can it arise? If it is said to be a transformation, like the body-like appearance transformed by the result of meditation, the eyes and ears that arise are also like eyes and ears, so why is it necessary to generate the eyes and ears of the lower realm? Therefore, the correct explanation is: Since the Buddha does not perish, he appears in the antarabhava. Uddalaka did not die, and also entered the antarabhava. Therefore, it is a transformation, not a real antarabhava. A detailed explanation of the sixty-two sentient beings, including the four of householders, etc. One refers to householders.
二出家。三苦行。四非苦行 習斷等十九者。一習斷者。二習誦者。三凈施人。四宿年。五中年。六少年。七軌範師。八親教師。九共住．及近住弟子。十賓客。十一營僧事者。十二貪利養供敬者。十三厭舍者。十四多聞者。十五大福智者。十六法隨法行者。十七持經者。十八持律者。十九持論者 異生等者。謂異生．見諦．有學．無學。餘者可知。故頌云。五．四．三．三．四。三．二．及三．七十九．四．四．一。故有情名諸。
造論緣起者。真諦三藏解云。凡有六義。一為令法義增長。二為有有情于所造論應得解脫。三為所迷失義令更明瞭。四為攝分散法義集在一處。五為分別甚深之義令淺易解。六為莊嚴言辭令義可愛。即疏所述作論六因 令增長者。眾生根欲性各不同。或樂多說。或樂少說。樂處中說。故造論者。適眾生意集諸法義。或多。或少。或復處中。適生所欲正法則得久住。此處雖滅彼處猶有。故使法義增長。即疏云欲令法義當廣流佈 二為眾生於所造論而得悟者。或有眾生厭舊樂新。或樂此說不樂彼說。只是一理有悟．不悟。猶如一金作種種物賣令生樂。前是為法。此是為人。即疏云。為令有情隨入正法 三為所迷失義令更明瞭者。若說未了。令學者迷須更明說。或說有脫誤令學者不解。又
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 二、出家（成為僧侶）。三、苦行（嚴格的修行）。四、非苦行（不那麼嚴格的修行）。 習斷等十九種人：一、習斷者（習慣於斷除煩惱的人）。二、習誦者（習慣於背誦經典的人）。三、凈施人（樂於佈施且心地清凈的人）。四、宿年（年長的僧侶）。五、中年（中年的僧侶）。六、少年（年輕的僧侶）。七、軌範師（行爲規範的老師）。八、親教師（直接教導的老師）。九、共住及近住弟子（一起居住或住在附近的弟子）。十、賓客（來訪的僧侶）。十一、營僧事者（負責僧團事務的人）。十二、貪利養供敬者（貪圖利益供養和尊敬的人）。十三、厭舍者（厭倦修行想要捨棄的人）。十四、多聞者（博學多聞的人）。十五、大福智者（具有大福報和大智慧的人）。十六、法隨法行者（依照佛法如法修行的人）。十七、持經者（背誦和研習經典的人）。十八、持律者（遵守戒律的人）。十九、持論者（研究論藏的人）。 異生等：指異生（凡夫）、見諦（證悟真理者）、有學（正在學習修行的人）、無學（已經完成學習修行的人）。其餘的含義可以根據字面理解。所以頌文說：五、四、三、三、四，三、二、及三、七、十九、四、四、一。因此，有情眾生被稱為諸。 造論的緣起：真諦三藏解釋說，總共有六個原因。一是爲了使佛法義理增長。二是爲了讓某些有情眾生能夠通過所造的論著得到解脫。三是爲了使那些被迷失的義理更加明瞭。四是爲了將分散的法義彙集在一處。五是爲了將甚深的義理分解得淺顯易懂。六是爲了用優美的言辭來莊嚴義理，使之更令人喜愛。這就是疏文中提到的造論的六個原因。 令增長：眾生的根器、慾望和習性各不相同，有些人喜歡多說，有些人喜歡少說，有些人喜歡折中。所以造論的人，要適應眾生的心意，彙集各種法義，或多、或少、或折中，適應眾生的需求，正法才能長久住世。即使在這個地方滅絕了，在其他地方仍然存在。所以能使法義增長。也就是疏文中說的，想要讓佛法義理廣泛流傳。 二、爲了讓眾生通過所造的論著而得到覺悟：有些眾生喜新厭舊，或者喜歡這種說法而不喜歡那種說法。其實只是一個道理，有的人能領悟，有的人不能領悟。就像用一塊金子做成各種各樣的東西來賣，讓人們感到快樂一樣。前面是爲了佛法，這裡是爲了眾生。也就是疏文中說的，爲了讓有情眾生隨順進入正法。 三、爲了使那些被迷失的義理更加明瞭：如果說法不夠透徹，會讓學習的人感到迷惑，需要進一步明確說明。或者說法有脫漏錯誤，讓學習的人不理解。
【English Translation】 English version: Two, renunciation (becoming a monk). Three, ascetic practices (strict practices). Four, non-ascetic practices (less strict practices). The nineteen types of people such as those who practice cessation: One, those who practice cessation (those who are accustomed to ceasing afflictions). Two, those who practice recitation (those who are accustomed to reciting scriptures). Three, those who give purely (those who are happy to give and have pure hearts). Four, senior monks (elderly monks). Five, middle-aged monks (middle-aged monks). Six, young monks (young monks). Seven, preceptors (teachers of conduct). Eight, close teachers (teachers who teach directly). Nine, co-residents and nearby disciples (disciples who live together or nearby). Ten, guests (visiting monks). Eleven, those who manage monastic affairs (those who are responsible for the affairs of the sangha). Twelve, those who are greedy for profit, offerings, and respect (those who are greedy for benefits, offerings, and respect). Thirteen, those who are weary and want to renounce (those who are tired of practice and want to give up). Fourteen, the learned (those who are learned and knowledgeable). Fifteen, those with great merit and wisdom (those who have great merit and great wisdom). Sixteen, those who practice the Dharma in accordance with the Dharma (those who practice the Dharma in accordance with the Dharma). Seventeen, those who uphold the sutras (those who recite and study the sutras). Eighteen, those who uphold the precepts (those who abide by the precepts). Nineteen, those who uphold the treatises (those who study the treatises). 'Different beings' etc.: refers to 'different beings' (ordinary people), 'those who have seen the truth' (those who have realized the truth), 'those who are learning' (those who are learning and practicing), 'those who have no more to learn' (those who have completed learning and practicing). The remaining meanings can be understood literally. Therefore, the verse says: five, four, three, three, four, three, two, and three, seven, nineteen, four, four, one. Therefore, sentient beings are called 'all'. The causes and conditions for writing treatises: The Tripitaka Master Paramārtha explains that there are six reasons in total. One is to increase the meaning of the Dharma. Two is to enable certain sentient beings to attain liberation through the treatises that are written. Three is to make those lost meanings clearer. Four is to gather scattered Dharma meanings in one place. Five is to break down the profound meanings into easy-to-understand terms. Six is to adorn the meanings with beautiful words to make them more pleasing. These are the six reasons for writing treatises mentioned in the commentary. To cause growth: The faculties, desires, and habits of sentient beings are different. Some people like to say a lot, some people like to say a little, and some people like to compromise. Therefore, those who write treatises must adapt to the minds of sentient beings, gather various Dharma meanings, either more, less, or compromise, adapt to the needs of sentient beings, and the true Dharma can abide in the world for a long time. Even if it becomes extinct in this place, it still exists in other places. Therefore, it can cause the meaning of the Dharma to grow. That is, the commentary says, 'wanting to make the meaning of the Dharma widely spread'. Two, to enable sentient beings to attain enlightenment through the treatises that are written: Some sentient beings like the new and dislike the old, or like this saying and dislike that saying. In fact, it is just one principle, some people can understand it, and some people cannot understand it. It's like making all kinds of things out of a piece of gold to sell, making people happy. The former is for the Dharma, and this is for sentient beings. That is, the commentary says, 'in order to allow sentient beings to follow and enter the true Dharma'. Three, to make those lost meanings clearer: If the explanation is not thorough enough, it will make the learners feel confused and need further clarification. Or if the explanation has omissions and errors, it will make the learners not understand.
須明說 又眾生有三種煩惱。一無明。二疑。三顛倒。由疑及倒故迷。由無明故不解。為除眾生此煩惱等令迷失義得明瞭故。故須造論。即疏云。令失沒義重得開顯 四為攝分散義集在一處者。佛法諸義不出三解脫門。攝分散義集在三解脫門中。以除眾生三種煩惱。一貪慾。二諸見。三無明。貪是修斷。見是見斷。無明通二。又是習氣 以無愿門除貪。以空門除見。以無相門除無明。聲聞所以不得一切智。為不能斷無明習故。為斷無明轉鈍成利故。說無相解脫門除故。攝分散義所以造論。即疏云。為欲略攝廣散義故 五為分別深義令淺易解者。甚深有三。一所通達是境界。即如如理。以世智觀之不能通達故名甚深。分別令易解。二修行甚深。二邊之解易得。中道之行難生。偏見之心不能生得中道之解。故為辨說中道之解。為修行深所以造論 三微妙甚深。即無餘涅槃果。生死有可度義故非甚深。極果一得永不可度。于不得者則為甚深。分別開示令易得之故須造論。即疏云。為欲顯發甚深義故 六為莊嚴言詞令義可愛者。義由言顯。若不莊嚴言詞則義不可愛。義不可愛則眾生不能信受。猶如真金若不為镮釧等則不足可愛。故須造論。即疏云。為欲巧妙文詞莊嚴法義令起愛樂生凈信故 又造論意。義雖有六不出兩種。一為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 須明確說明，眾生有三種煩惱：一、無明（avidyā，對事物真相的迷惑）；二、疑（vicikicchā，猶豫不決）；三、顛倒（viparyāsa，錯誤的認知）。由於懷疑和顛倒，所以產生迷惑；由於無明，所以不能理解。爲了消除眾生這些煩惱，使他們對迷失的意義能夠明瞭，所以需要造論。就像疏文中說的：『使失去的意義重新得以開顯。』 四、爲了將分散的意義集中在一處。佛法諸義不出三解脫門（trini vimoksa-mukha）：空解脫門（śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha）、無相解脫門（animitta-vimokṣa-mukha）、無愿解脫門（apraṇihita-vimokṣa-mukha）。將分散的意義集中在三解脫門中，以消除眾生的三種煩惱：一、貪慾（rāga）；二、諸見（dṛṣṭi，各種錯誤的見解）；三、無明（avidyā）。貪慾是修所斷，諸見是見所斷，無明通於二者，又是習氣（vāsanā）。 以無愿門去除貪慾，以空門去除諸見，以無相門去除無明。聲聞（śrāvaka）之所以不能得到一切智（sarvajñāna），是因為不能斷除無明習氣。爲了斷除無明，使遲鈍轉為敏銳，所以說用無相解脫門去除。攝集分散的意義，所以要造論。就像疏文中說的：『爲了簡略地攝集廣為分散的意義。』 五、爲了分別甚深的意義，使之淺顯易懂。甚深有三種：一、所通達的境界甚深，即如如理（tathatā），用世俗的智慧觀察不能通達，所以稱為甚深。分別開解使之容易理解。二、修行甚深，二邊的理解容易得到，中道的修行難以產生，偏頗的見解不能產生中道的理解。所以要辨說中道的理解，爲了修行甚深所以要造論。 三、微妙甚深，即無餘涅槃果（nirvāṇa）。生死有可以度過的意義，所以不是甚深；極果一旦得到就永遠不可度過，對於沒有得到的人來說就是甚深。分別開示使之容易得到，所以需要造論。就像疏文中說的：『爲了顯發甚深的意義。』 六、爲了莊嚴言辭，使意義可愛。意義由言辭顯現，如果不莊嚴言辭，那麼意義就不可愛。意義不可愛，那麼眾生就不能信受。猶如真金如果不做成環釧等飾品，就不夠可愛。所以需要造論。就像疏文中說的：『爲了用巧妙的文辭莊嚴法義，使人產生喜愛，生起清凈的信心。』 又，造論的意義，意義雖有六種，但不超出兩種：一、爲了...
【English Translation】 English version: It must be clearly stated that sentient beings have three kinds of afflictions (kleśa): 1. Ignorance (avidyā, delusion about the true nature of things); 2. Doubt (vicikicchā, indecision); 3. Inversion (viparyāsa, incorrect cognition). Because of doubt and inversion, confusion arises; because of ignorance, there is no understanding. In order to eliminate these afflictions of sentient beings and enable them to understand the lost meaning clearly, it is necessary to create treatises. Just as the commentary says: 'To make the lost meaning reappear and become manifest.' 4. To gather scattered meanings in one place. The meanings of the Buddha's teachings do not go beyond the three doors of liberation (trini vimoksa-mukha): the door of emptiness (śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha), the door of signlessness (animitta-vimokṣa-mukha), and the door of wishlessness (apraṇihita-vimokṣa-mukha). Gathering the scattered meanings in the three doors of liberation is to eliminate the three afflictions of sentient beings: 1. Greed (rāga); 2. Views (dṛṣṭi, various incorrect views); 3. Ignorance (avidyā). Greed is abandoned through cultivation, views are abandoned through seeing, and ignorance is common to both and is also a habitual tendency (vāsanā). The door of wishlessness is used to eliminate greed, the door of emptiness is used to eliminate views, and the door of signlessness is used to eliminate ignorance. The reason why śrāvakas (śrāvaka) cannot attain all-knowing wisdom (sarvajñāna) is because they cannot eliminate the habitual tendencies of ignorance. In order to eliminate ignorance and turn dullness into sharpness, it is said that the door of signlessness is used to eliminate it. Gathering the scattered meanings is why treatises are created. Just as the commentary says: 'In order to briefly gather the widely scattered meanings.' 5. To distinguish profound meanings and make them easy to understand. There are three kinds of profound meanings: 1. The realm to be penetrated is profound, that is, suchness (tathatā), which cannot be penetrated by worldly wisdom, so it is called profound. Distinguishing and explaining it makes it easy to understand. 2. Practice is profound. Understanding the two extremes is easy to obtain, but the practice of the Middle Way is difficult to generate, and biased views cannot generate the understanding of the Middle Way. Therefore, it is necessary to explain the understanding of the Middle Way. The reason for creating treatises is that practice is profound. 3. Subtlety is profound, that is, the fruit of nirvana without remainder (nirvāṇa). Birth and death have the meaning of being able to be crossed over, so they are not profound; once the ultimate fruit is obtained, it can never be crossed over, which is profound for those who have not obtained it. Distinguishing and explaining it makes it easy to obtain, so it is necessary to create treatises. Just as the commentary says: 'In order to reveal profound meanings.' 6. To adorn words and make the meaning lovable. Meaning is revealed by words. If the words are not adorned, then the meaning is not lovable. If the meaning is not lovable, then sentient beings cannot believe and accept it. Just as real gold is not lovable enough if it is not made into bracelets and other ornaments. Therefore, it is necessary to create treatises. Just as the commentary says: 'In order to adorn the meaning of the Dharma with skillful words, so that people will develop love and generate pure faith.' Furthermore, the meaning of creating treatises, although there are six meanings, does not go beyond two kinds: 1. For...
攝持正法。二為成就眾生 為持攝正法者。六種緣起從後向前次第相生。名．句．文是法。所詮是義。以義顯行。以行顯果。法是言辭。若言辭有詮次。句．味．名合理。則義趣可觀。故造論意為嚴言辭令義可愛。言辭既合於理。義趣遂令可愛。則使深義易解。即從第六義生第五義。深義既顯現易解。則義有途徹。分散者便得集在一處。即從第五生第四義。義既不散所迷失者則更分明。即從第四生第三義。所迷失者既更明瞭。依于了義得入正位。入正位故解脫繫縛。即從第三生第二義。既解脫惑障。則能受能說。既能聽受。又能解說。義則弘多。即從第二生第一義 又為令眾產生就增上般若故須造論。成般若體有前三義。成般若事有後三義。故造論緣合有六義 成般若體有三義者。有三種煩惱障于般若。一無明。二疑。三慢 為令眾生生解脫除無明障。須令法義增長。故第一義成般若初分 雖已解法及義。但於四諦猶有疑惑。以疑惑故障四諦解不得成聖。須釋四諦令得正解除斷疑惑。疑惑既除成聖之時即得解脫。故第二義成般若中分 雖已成聖斷除疑惑。猶起我慢於六塵境而生愛著。起我所心於無我理猶有迷失義。須更分明說所迷失義。令進入修道除我慢等。故第三義成般若後分 般若事。事者業用有三種。一通真實
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 攝持正法。二是爲了成就眾生。爲了護持攝受正法的人，六種緣起從後向前依次相生。名（名稱）、句（語句）、文（文章）是法（佛法），所詮釋的是義（意義）。用意義來彰顯修行，用修行來彰顯結果。法是言辭，如果言辭有條理，語句、文辭、名稱合理，那麼意義和旨趣就清晰可見。所以造論的目的是爲了使言辭嚴謹，使意義令人喜愛。言辭既然合乎道理，意義和旨趣就令人喜愛，就能使深刻的意義容易理解，也就是從第六義產生第五義。深刻的意義既然顯現且容易理解，那麼意義就有了途徑可以通達，分散的就能聚集在一起，也就是從第五義產生第四義。意義既然不分散，所迷惑的就能更加分明，也就是從第四義產生第三義。所迷惑的既然更加明瞭，依靠明瞭的意義就能進入正確的地位，進入正確的地位就能解脫束縛，也就是從第三義產生第二義。既然解脫了迷惑和障礙，就能接受和宣說，既然能聽受，又能解說，意義就弘揚廣大，也就是從第二義產生第一義。 又爲了使眾產生就增上般若（prajna，智慧），所以需要造論。成就般若的本體有前三種意義，成就般若的事業有後三種意義，所以造論的因緣合起來有六種意義。成就般若的本體有三種意義：有三種煩惱障礙般若，一是無明（ignorance），二是疑（doubt），三是慢（arrogance）。 爲了使眾生生起理解，去除無明障，需要使法義增長，所以第一義成就般若的最初部分。雖然已經理解了法和義，但對於四諦（Four Noble Truths）仍然有疑惑，因為疑惑的緣故，四諦的理解不能成就聖果，需要解釋四諦，使得到正確的理解，解除疑惑。疑惑既然解除，成就聖果之時就能得到解脫，所以第二義成就般若的中間部分。雖然已經成就聖果，斷除了疑惑，仍然會生起我慢，對於六塵（six sense objects）的境界而產生愛著，生起『我所』之心，對於無我的道理仍然有迷惑。需要更加分明地說出所迷惑的意義，使進入修道，去除我慢等，所以第三義成就般若的最後部分。般若的事業，事業就是業用，有三種，一是通達真實。
【English Translation】 English version Upholding the True Dharma. Secondly, it is for the accomplishment of sentient beings. For those who uphold and embrace the True Dharma, the six causes arise in reverse order. Name (nama), sentence (vakya), and word (pada) are Dharma. What is explained is the meaning (artha). Use meaning to reveal practice, and use practice to reveal the result. Dharma is speech. If speech is orderly, sentences, flavors, and names are reasonable, then the meaning and purpose are clearly visible. Therefore, the purpose of writing treatises is to make speech rigorous and meaning delightful. Since speech is in accordance with reason, meaning and purpose become delightful, making profound meanings easy to understand, that is, the fifth meaning arises from the sixth meaning. Since profound meanings are revealed and easy to understand, then meaning has a path to reach, and those who are scattered can be gathered together, that is, the fourth meaning arises from the fifth meaning. Since meaning is not scattered, what is lost becomes clearer, that is, the third meaning arises from the fourth meaning. Since what is lost becomes clearer, relying on the clear meaning, one can enter the correct position, and entering the correct position, one can be liberated from bondage, that is, the second meaning arises from the third meaning. Since one is liberated from delusion and obstacles, one can receive and speak. Since one can listen and receive, and also explain, the meaning is greatly expanded, that is, the first meaning arises from the second meaning. Furthermore, in order to enable sentient beings to achieve increasing prajna (wisdom), it is necessary to write treatises. Achieving the essence of prajna has the first three meanings, and achieving the activities of prajna has the last three meanings. Therefore, the causes for writing treatises combine to have six meanings. Achieving the essence of prajna has three meanings: there are three kinds of afflictions that obstruct prajna, namely, ignorance (avidya), doubt (vicikitsa), and arrogance (mana). In order to enable sentient beings to generate understanding and remove the obstacle of ignorance, it is necessary to increase the meaning of the Dharma. Therefore, the first meaning achieves the initial part of prajna. Although the Dharma and its meaning have been understood, there are still doubts about the Four Noble Truths (catvāri āryasatyāni). Because of doubt, the understanding of the Four Noble Truths cannot achieve sainthood. It is necessary to explain the Four Noble Truths so that one can obtain correct understanding and remove doubt. Once doubt is removed, one can attain liberation at the time of achieving sainthood. Therefore, the second meaning achieves the middle part of prajna. Although one has achieved sainthood and removed doubt, one still arises arrogance and attachment to the realm of the six sense objects (sadāyatana), giving rise to the mind of 'mine' and still being deluded about the principle of no-self. It is necessary to explain the meaning of what is lost more clearly, so that one can enter the path of cultivation and remove arrogance, etc. Therefore, the third meaning achieves the final part of prajna. The activities of prajna, that is, the functions, are of three kinds, the first is penetrating reality.
義。二為他說。三安立真實義。此三即是八支聖道中正見．正思惟．正精進也 自能通達真實義即正見 又能為他解說之時必動尋．伺。故第二事即正思惟 他既得解欲令不退。故須安立真實之義。安立之時須作功力。故第三事即正精進 若義無途轍散而不集不可通達。故須攝分散義集在一處則能通達。故第四義成第一事 若為他說須分別深義令其易解。故第五義成第二事 若欲令他所解不退。須嚴言詞令義可愛便解心堅明。故第六義成第三事 又為成就眾生毗缽舍那．奢摩他故須造論。前三義成毗缽舍那。后三義成奢摩他 生死根本有二煩惱。一無明。二貪愛。如次障二。即見．修惑。入見破無明。在修破貪愛 毗缽有三德。一速疾智。二決定智。三微細智 於一時中能達多法義為速疾智。猶如帝釋名為千眼非有千眼。以能一時見於千法故名千眼。疾智亦爾。故第一義為成疾智 于境不決定解則不生。鬚生決定解除疑惑心。故第二義成決定智 智雖決定若是粗解唯解粗境。不能通達甚深之義。又鬚生微細智達甚深境。若有迷失則智不微細。若所迷失明了則得微細智。故第三善為成第三智 若遂三惠分之。如次即聞．思．修惠。或唯就修．惠義分前．中．后 奢摩他亦有三位。一在定中。二出世。三不退。在定中離散
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 意義。第二是為他人解說。第三是安立真實的意義。這三者就是八支聖道中的正見、正思惟、正精進。自己能夠通達真實的意義就是正見。又為他人解說的時候必定要尋、伺（Vitarka-Vicara，尋和伺）。所以第二件事就是正思惟。他人既然得到理解，想要讓他不退轉，所以需要安立真實的意義。安立的時候需要花費功力，所以第三件事就是正精進。如果意義沒有途徑，分散而不集中，就無法通達。所以需要攝取分散的意義，集中在一處，才能通達。所以第四個意義成就了第一件事。如果為他人解說，需要分別深奧的意義，使他容易理解。所以第五個意義成就了第二件事。如果想要他人所理解的不退轉，需要嚴謹言辭，使意義可愛，便能堅定明瞭解。所以第六個意義成就了第三件事。又爲了成就眾生的毗缽舍那（Vipassanā，內觀）和奢摩他（Śamatha，止觀），需要造論。前三個意義成就毗缽舍那，后三個意義成就奢摩他。生死根本在於兩種煩惱：一是無明（Avidyā，無知），二是貪愛（Tṛṣṇā，渴愛）。依次障礙見惑和修惑。入見道破除無明，在修道破除貪愛。毗缽舍那有三種功德：一是速疾智，二是決定智，三是微細智。在同一時間中能夠通達多種法義，是為速疾智。猶如帝釋（Indra，天帝）名為千眼，並非真有千眼，而是因為能一時見到千法，所以名為千眼。速疾智也是這樣。所以第一個意義成就速疾智。對於境界不確定地理解，就不會產生智慧。需要產生決定性的理解，消除疑惑之心。所以第二個意義成就決定智。智慧即使是決定性的，如果是粗略的理解，只能理解粗略的境界，不能通達甚深的意義。又需要產生微細的智慧，通達甚深的境界。如果有所迷失，那麼智慧就不微細。如果所迷失之處明瞭，就能得到微細的智慧。所以第三個善巧成就第三種智慧。如果按照三種智慧來劃分，依次就是聞慧、思慧、修慧。或者僅僅就修慧的意義來劃分前、中、后。奢摩他也有三個階段：一是在定中，二是出世，三是不退。在定中，心是離散的。
【English Translation】 English version: Meaning. Second is explaining it to others. Third is establishing the true meaning. These three are the Right View, Right Thought, and Right Effort in the Noble Eightfold Path. Being able to understand the true meaning oneself is Right View. And when explaining it to others, one must use Vitarka-Vicara (Initial Application of Thought and Sustained Application of Thought). Therefore, the second thing is Right Thought. Since others have gained understanding, wanting to prevent them from regressing, it is necessary to establish the true meaning. Establishing it requires effort, so the third thing is Right Effort. If the meaning has no path, is scattered and not concentrated, it cannot be understood. Therefore, it is necessary to gather the scattered meanings and concentrate them in one place in order to understand. So the fourth meaning accomplishes the first thing. If explaining to others, it is necessary to distinguish the profound meaning to make it easy to understand. So the fifth meaning accomplishes the second thing. If you want to prevent others' understanding from regressing, you need to be rigorous in your words, making the meaning lovely, so that understanding is firm and clear. So the sixth meaning accomplishes the third thing. Furthermore, in order to accomplish Vipassanā (Insight Meditation) and Śamatha (Tranquility Meditation) for sentient beings, it is necessary to create treatises. The first three meanings accomplish Vipassanā, and the last three meanings accomplish Śamatha. The root of birth and death lies in two afflictions: first, Avidyā (Ignorance); second, Tṛṣṇā (Craving). They respectively obstruct the afflictions of view and the afflictions of cultivation. Entering the path of seeing breaks through ignorance, and cultivating the path breaks through craving. Vipassanā has three virtues: first, quick wisdom; second, decisive wisdom; third, subtle wisdom. Being able to understand multiple Dharma meanings at the same time is quick wisdom. Like Indra (Lord of the Gods) is called Thousand-Eyed, not because he truly has a thousand eyes, but because he can see a thousand Dharmas at once, so he is called Thousand-Eyed. Quick wisdom is also like this. So the first meaning accomplishes quick wisdom. If understanding of an object is uncertain, wisdom will not arise. It is necessary to generate decisive understanding and eliminate doubts. So the second meaning accomplishes decisive wisdom. Even if wisdom is decisive, if it is a rough understanding, it can only understand rough realms and cannot penetrate deep meanings. It is also necessary to generate subtle wisdom to penetrate deep realms. If there is confusion, then wisdom is not subtle. If what is confused is clear, then subtle wisdom can be obtained. So the third skillful means accomplishes the third wisdom. If divided according to the three kinds of wisdom, they are, in order, the wisdom of hearing, the wisdom of thinking, and the wisdom of cultivation. Or, only in terms of the meaning of cultivation wisdom, divide it into the beginning, middle, and end. Śamatha also has three stages: first, in meditation; second, transcendence; third, non-regression. In meditation, the mind is scattered.
亂。有漏定猶非勝。又令得無漏定出世間故。雖得出世定有退失者猶非勝。又令得無退定 若法義分散難得在定。故第四義攝分散法義集在一處成第一德 若深義隱昧則無漏定不生。深義顯了勝定得起。故第五義成第二德 言說是修定本。若言說合理信受師教憶持不忘。則所修定無退。故第六義成定第三德也 又為破為立故造論也。為破者破四種煩惱。一為破迷真．俗無明。亦名迷生滅處無明。二破九十六種外見。三破障解脫見。四破迷因果無明 為破迷真俗無明者。苦．集是俗。於此不了名迷俗無明。滅．道是真。於此不了名迷真無明。苦．集是生處。滅．道是滅處。故為令通達四諦理故破此無明。所以造論 二破九十六見者。是九十六種外道各有所報。為令眾生識于正理破此諸見 三為破障解脫見。即六十二見。由斷．常見生六十二見。此見正與解脫相違。為令眾生離斷．常見執。及破此諸見。
四為破迷因果無明者。十二緣生是因果。欲示生死依因得立無因不立。令離他作等見達生死因果。二為立者為立如方便不動。此有三義。一立如。二立方便。三令不動 如者真實理也。方便者達如智也。不動者若得此方便正見不可動也。
如首羅長者性甚慳貪。有人就其求乞無有得者。佛知根熟得道時至故往
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：混亂的、有煩惱的禪定仍然不是殊勝的。又使人得到無煩惱的禪定，從而脫離世間。即使得到了脫離世間的禪定，但如果會退失，仍然不是殊勝的。又使人得到不退失的禪定。如果法的意義分散，就難以進入禪定。所以第四個意義是將分散的法的意義集中在一處，成就第一種功德。如果深刻的意義隱晦不明，那麼無煩惱的禪定就不會產生。深刻的意義顯現明瞭，殊勝的禪定才能生起。所以第五個意義成就第二種功德。言說是修習禪定的根本。如果言說合乎道理，信受師長的教導，憶持不忘，那麼所修習的禪定就不會退失。所以第六個意義成就禪定的第三種功德。 又，造論是爲了破除和建立。爲了破除，即破除四種煩惱：一是破除迷惑真諦和俗諦的無明（Avidya）。也稱為迷惑生滅之處的無明。二是破除九十六種外道邪見。三是破除障礙解脫的邪見。四是破除迷惑因果的無明。 爲了破除迷惑真俗的無明，苦（Dukkha）、集（Samudaya）是俗諦，對此不瞭解就稱為迷惑俗諦的無明。滅（Nirodha）、道（Marga）是真諦，對此不瞭解就稱為迷惑真諦的無明。苦、集是生起之處，滅、道是寂滅之處。所以爲了使人通達四諦的道理，破除這種無明，因此造論。 二是破除九十六種邪見，這九十六種外道各有其所執著的見解。爲了使眾生認識到正確的道理，破除這些邪見。 三是爲了破除障礙解脫的邪見，即六十二見。由於斷見（Ucchedavada）和常見（Sassatavada）而產生六十二見。這種見解與解脫完全相反。爲了使眾生遠離斷見和常見的執著，以及破除這些邪見。 四是爲了破除迷惑因果的無明，十二緣起（Dvadasanga-pratityasamutpada）就是因果。想要顯示生死是依靠因緣而成立的，沒有因緣就不能成立。使人遠離由他所作等邪見，通達生死的因果。二是爲了建立，即建立如（Tathata）、方便（Upaya）、不動（Acala）。這裡有三種意義：一是建立如，二是建立方便，三是使之不動。 如，就是真實的道理。方便，就是通達如的智慧。不動，就是如果得到這種方便正見，就不可動搖。 如首羅（Surya）長者（長者）的本性非常慳吝貪婪。有人向他乞討，沒有能夠得到的。佛（Buddha）知道他得道的時機已經成熟，所以前往。
【English Translation】 English version: Confused and defiled samadhi (Dhyana) is still not superior. Furthermore, it enables one to attain undefiled samadhi, thus transcending the world. Even if one attains supramundane samadhi, it is still not superior if it is subject to regression. Furthermore, it enables one to attain non-regressing samadhi. If the meaning of the Dharma is scattered, it is difficult to enter samadhi. Therefore, the fourth meaning is to gather the scattered meanings of the Dharma in one place, achieving the first virtue. If the profound meaning is obscure, then undefiled samadhi will not arise. When the profound meaning is clear and manifest, superior samadhi can arise. Therefore, the fifth meaning achieves the second virtue. Speech is the foundation of cultivating samadhi. If speech is reasonable, one believes and accepts the teacher's instructions, and remembers them without forgetting, then the samadhi cultivated will not regress. Therefore, the sixth meaning achieves the third virtue of samadhi. Moreover, treatises are composed for the purpose of refutation and establishment. For refutation, it is to refute four types of afflictions (Kleshas): first, to refute ignorance (Avidya) that is deluded about the true and conventional truths. It is also called ignorance that is deluded about the place of arising and ceasing. Second, to refute the ninety-six types of external views. Third, to refute views that obstruct liberation. Fourth, to refute ignorance that is deluded about cause and effect. To refute ignorance that is deluded about the true and conventional truths, suffering (Dukkha) and accumulation (Samudaya) are conventional truths; not understanding this is called ignorance that is deluded about conventional truths. Cessation (Nirodha) and the path (Marga) are true truths; not understanding this is called ignorance that is deluded about true truths. Suffering and accumulation are the place of arising, cessation and the path are the place of cessation. Therefore, in order to enable people to understand the principles of the Four Noble Truths, this ignorance is refuted, and therefore treatises are composed. Second, to refute the ninety-six types of views, these ninety-six types of external paths each have their own attachments. In order to enable sentient beings to recognize the correct principles, these views are refuted. Third, to refute views that obstruct liberation, which are the sixty-two views. The sixty-two views arise from eternalism (Sassatavada) and annihilationism (Ucchedavada). These views are directly opposed to liberation. In order to enable sentient beings to be free from the attachment to eternalism and annihilationism, and to refute these views. Fourth, to refute ignorance that is deluded about cause and effect, the twelve links of dependent origination (Dvadasanga-pratityasamutpada) are cause and effect. The intention is to show that birth and death are established based on conditions, and cannot be established without conditions. To enable people to be free from views such as 'caused by another', and to understand the cause and effect of birth and death. Second, for establishment, it is to establish suchness (Tathata), skillful means (Upaya), and immovability (Acala). There are three meanings here: first, to establish suchness; second, to establish skillful means; third, to make it immovable. Suchness is the true principle. Skillful means is the wisdom that understands suchness. Immovability is that if one obtains this skillful means and correct view, it cannot be shaken. The elder (長者) Surya (如首羅) was by nature very stingy and greedy. When people asked him for alms, no one was able to receive anything. The Buddha (佛) knew that the time for him to attain the path was ripe, so he went.
化之。佛為說佈施法。聞大驚怖問世尊言。唯有此法更無餘法。佛答彼云。我唯以佈施為法。如不殺生是施。即是他不怖。及令不盜即施他財。次第為其說十善法。其聞不損己財而成佈施。生大歡喜讚歎如來。令人取兩粗衣施佛。佛福德感好不感粗。令人取粗只得好者。其意惜好自起取之出粗還復得好。擇之不得。乃以好者持用施佛。佛受之竟為說四諦。長者及眷屬皆得初果。取諸財寶悉以施佛。佛去後魔王欲壞其正見。作佛形像至長者所。長者見喜。魔為長者倒說四諦。又說苦為樂。長者思惟正見不轉。知非是佛語魔王言。汝定非佛。猶如雞鳴作拘翅羅聲 此即是如．方便．不動。為安立如．方便令其不動故造論也。為破破繫縛方便。為立顯解脫方便。為令離縛得解脫故 又為令得十種智慧故造論也 一斷背正法意智慧。有向邪法斷。令不背正法向邪法也 二入正法智慧。有舍心者雖不背正向邪。而處中住令入正法 三令成熟智慧。已入正法令其善根成熟 四令得解脫智慧。善根既熟又化之令得解脫也 五令得五明智慧。所以令得五明智慧。為破邪論制伏他故 六觀罪過智慧。自觀三業有過無過。用法律約之為令得現樂。若無過失則現世得恭敬供養等 七正愿智慧。愿勝好事為令未來一切所求皆具足故 八通達聲聞
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 然後佛陀為他說了佈施的方法。長者聽后非常驚恐，問世尊說：『只有這種佈施的方法，沒有其他方法了嗎？』佛陀回答他說：『我只以佈施作為一種方法。』例如，不殺生就是佈施，這樣就不會使他人感到恐懼；以及不偷盜，就是佈施他人的財物。佛陀依次為他說了十善法。長者聽到不損害自己的財物也能成為佈施，生起了極大的歡喜，讚歎如來。他讓人拿兩件粗布衣服來佈施給佛陀。佛陀的福德感應到的是好的，而不是粗糙的。讓人拿粗布衣服，結果卻只得到好的。長者心疼好的衣服，自己起身去拿，拿出粗的，結果又變成了好的。他挑選來挑選去，沒法選出粗的，於是就拿著好的衣服來佈施給佛陀。佛陀接受后，為他說了四諦。長者和他的眷屬都證得了初果（Sotapanna，須陀洹）。長者拿出所有的財寶來佈施給佛陀。佛陀離開后，魔王（Mara）想要破壞他的正見，就變化成佛陀的形象來到長者那裡。長者見到后非常歡喜。魔王為長者顛倒地講解四諦，又說苦是樂。長者思惟后，正見沒有動搖，知道這不是佛陀的語言，就對魔王說：『你一定不是佛陀，就像雞鳴一樣發出拘翅羅（Kukkuta）的聲音。』 這就是『如』（Tathata，真如）、『方便』（Upaya，善巧）、『不動』（Acala，堅定）。爲了安立『如』和『方便』，使他們不動搖，所以造這部論。 爲了破除繫縛的方便，爲了建立顯現解脫的方便，爲了使眾生脫離束縛而得到解脫。 又爲了使眾生得到十種智慧，所以造這部論。 一、斷除背離正法的意念的智慧。對於那些傾向於邪法的人，斷除他們背離正法、傾向邪法的意念。 二、進入正法的智慧。對於那些捨棄了邪法，雖然不背離正法也不傾向邪法，而是處於中間狀態的人，引導他們進入正法。 三、令善根成熟的智慧。對於那些已經進入正法的人，使他們的善根成熟。 四、令得到解脫的智慧。善根已經成熟后，再教化他們，使他們得到解脫。 五、令得到五明（Panca-vidya，聲明、工巧明、醫方明、因明、內明）的智慧。之所以要使他們得到五明的智慧，是爲了破斥邪論，制伏其他宗派。 六、觀察罪過的智慧。自己觀察身、口、意三業，有沒有過失。用法律來約束自己，是爲了得到現世的安樂。如果沒有過失，那麼現世就能得到恭敬供養等。 七、正愿智慧。發願成就殊勝的好事，是爲了使未來一切所求都能具足。 八、通達聲聞（Sravaka，阿羅漢）
【English Translation】 English version: Then the Buddha spoke to him about the Dharma of giving (Dana). The elder, hearing this, was greatly alarmed and asked the World Honored One, 'Is this the only Dharma, and is there no other Dharma?' The Buddha replied to him, 'I only use giving as a Dharma.' For example, not killing is giving, which prevents others from being afraid; and not stealing is giving to others their wealth. The Buddha then spoke to him about the Ten Virtuous Dharmas in order. The elder, hearing that not harming one's own wealth can also be giving, felt great joy and praised the Tathagata. He asked someone to bring two coarse garments to give to the Buddha. The Buddha's merit caused him to receive good garments, not coarse ones. When someone brought coarse garments, they only received good ones. The elder, feeling sorry for the good garments, got up himself to take them, took out the coarse ones, but they turned into good ones again. He chose and chose, but could not find the coarse ones, so he took the good ones to give to the Buddha. After the Buddha received them, he spoke to him about the Four Noble Truths. The elder and his family all attained the first fruit (Sotapanna). The elder took all his treasures to give to the Buddha. After the Buddha left, Mara (the demon king) wanted to destroy his right view, so he transformed into the Buddha's image and came to the elder. The elder was very happy to see him. Mara spoke to the elder about the Four Noble Truths in a reversed way, and said that suffering is happiness. After the elder thought about it, his right view did not waver, and he knew that this was not the Buddha's words, so he said to Mara, 'You are definitely not the Buddha, just like a rooster crowing with a Kukkuta sound.' This is 'Suchness' (Tathata), 'Skillful Means' (Upaya), and 'Immovability' (Acala). This treatise is created to establish 'Suchness' and 'Skillful Means' and make them unshakeable. It is to break the skillful means of bondage, to establish the skillful means of revealing liberation, and to liberate beings from bondage. It is also to create this treatise to enable beings to obtain ten kinds of intelligence. 1. The intelligence of cutting off the intention of turning away from the Right Dharma. For those who are inclined to evil dharmas, cut off their intention of turning away from the Right Dharma and turning to evil dharmas. 2. The intelligence of entering the Right Dharma. For those who have abandoned evil dharmas, although they do not turn away from the Right Dharma or turn to evil dharmas, but remain in the middle state, guide them to enter the Right Dharma. 3. The intelligence of maturing good roots. For those who have already entered the Right Dharma, make their good roots mature. 4. The intelligence of attaining liberation. After the good roots have matured, teach them to attain liberation. 5. The intelligence of attaining the Five Vidyas (Panca-vidya: Sabdavidya, Silpasthanavidya, Cikitsavidya, Hetuvidya, Adhyatmavidya). The reason for enabling them to obtain the Five Vidyas is to refute heretical theories and subdue other schools. 6. The intelligence of observing faults. Observe one's own three karmas of body, speech, and mind, whether there are faults or not. Using the law to restrain oneself is to obtain present happiness. If there are no faults, then one can receive respect and offerings in this life. 7. The intelligence of right aspiration. Vowing to accomplish excellent good deeds is to ensure that everything one seeks in the future is fulfilled. 8. Thoroughly understanding the Sravaka (Arhat)
乘。九通達獨覺乘。十通達佛乘。此三智慧。為稱眾生根性說法。眾生根性不同。隨其所宜以三乘法化之 復有論師說造論意凡為四事。一為斷眾生於四諦疑惑。二為令出惡道。三為向正法。四為斷下愿。下愿即是二乘愿。此四次第相生之意思之可悉 又明得造論及不得造論人。凡有四種四人。第一四人者。一無智。二疑惑。三顛倒。四已度。
無智。即鈍根凡夫。於法及義悉皆不解故名無智 二疑惑者。是聰明凡夫。雖解法義。而於四諦理猶有疑惑未得入聖 三顛倒者。有初果人已通四諦但有顛倒。顛倒有三種。一時節。二相。三處所。時節者無常是時節。于無常時計有常故。二相者于無我中計有我故。三處者于不凈處及於苦處計為凈樂。初果雖除常．我二例。修惑未除。緣外塵境猶起后二故行非梵行。即猶計不凈為凈。無樂謂樂 四已度者即已度前三煩惱。是無學人。前三人初人是不肯知。第二人是迷路。第三人是僻路。此四人中唯第四人得造于論。若就事為語。凡夫菩薩亦是第四人。故得造論 又四種。一依言殊勝。但能誦文而不解義。譬如鸚鵡唯能誦語而不解意。不能得道最為下劣 二依他勝。附依善人則能行善。依惡人即唯行惡。譬如畫人隨畫師意。若畫為坐終日坐。若畫為立即恒常立。雖爾可化。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 乘。九、通達獨覺乘（Pratyekabuddha-yana，獨自覺悟者的道路）。十、通達佛乘（Buddha-yana，通往佛陀果位的道路）。這三種智慧，是爲了適應眾生的根性而宣說的。眾生的根性不同，根據他們各自適合的，用三乘法來教化他們。 又有論師說，造論的意義在於四件事：一是爲了斷除眾生對四諦（Four Noble Truths，苦、集、滅、道）的疑惑；二是令眾生脫離惡道；三是引導眾生走向正法；四是斷除下劣的願望。下劣的願望就是二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的願望。這四件事是次第相生的，其中的意思可以詳細瞭解。 又說明可以造論和不可以造論的人。總共有四種人。第一種四人是：一、無智；二、疑惑；三、顛倒；四、已度。 無智，就是鈍根的凡夫。對於佛法和義理完全不理解，所以叫做無智。二、疑惑的人，是聰明的凡夫。雖然理解佛法義理，但是對於四諦的道理仍然有疑惑，沒有證入聖位。三、顛倒的人，是有初果（Sotapanna，須陀洹）的人，已經通達四諦，但是還有顛倒。顛倒有三種：一時節，二相，三處所。時節，指的是無常。在無常的時候卻認為有常。二相，指的是在無我之中卻認為有我。三處，指的是在不凈的地方和痛苦的地方卻認為是清凈和快樂。初果雖然已經去除常、我兩種顛倒，但是修惑（修道所斷之惑）還沒有去除，緣于外在的塵境仍然會生起后兩種顛倒，所以行為不是梵行（清凈的行為），也就是仍然會認為不凈是凈，無樂是樂。四、已度的人，就是已經度脫了前面三種煩惱的人，是無學（Arahant，阿羅漢）的人。前面三種人，第一種人是不肯知，第二種人是迷路，第三種人是走入了邪路。這四種人中只有第四種人可以造論。如果就事相來說，凡夫菩薩也是第四種人，所以可以造論。 又有四種人：一、依言殊勝，只能誦讀經文卻不理解其中的含義。譬如鸚鵡只能誦讀語言卻不理解意思，不能得道，最為下劣。二、依他殊勝，依附善人就能行善，依附惡人就只會作惡。譬如畫人隨著畫師的意願，如果畫成坐著就整天坐著，如果畫成立著就一直站著。雖然如此，還是可以被教化的。
【English Translation】 English version: Yana. Nine, penetrating the Pratyekabuddha-yana (the path of solitary Buddhas). Ten, penetrating the Buddha-yana (the path to Buddhahood). These three kinds of wisdom are taught to suit the dispositions of sentient beings. Sentient beings have different dispositions, and they are transformed by the three vehicles according to what is suitable for them. Furthermore, some teachers say that the purpose of writing treatises is for four things: first, to cut off the doubts of sentient beings about the Four Noble Truths (Dukkha, Samudaya, Nirodha, Magga); second, to enable them to escape from the evil paths; third, to guide them towards the right Dharma; and fourth, to cut off inferior aspirations. Inferior aspirations are the aspirations of the two vehicles (Sravaka-yana and Pratyekabuddha-yana). These four things arise in sequential order, and their meaning can be understood in detail. It also explains who can and cannot write treatises. There are four kinds of people in total. The first four are: one, without wisdom; two, with doubts; three, inverted; four, already liberated. Without wisdom refers to ordinary people with dull faculties. They do not understand the Dharma or its meaning, so they are called without wisdom. Two, those with doubts are intelligent ordinary people. Although they understand the Dharma and its meaning, they still have doubts about the principles of the Four Noble Truths and have not entered the stage of a sage. Three, those who are inverted are people who have attained the first fruit (Sotapanna), who have already understood the Four Noble Truths but still have inversions. There are three kinds of inversions: one, time; two, characteristics; three, place. Time refers to impermanence. They consider permanence in impermanence. Characteristics refer to considering self in non-self. Place refers to considering purity and happiness in impure and painful places. Although the first fruit has removed the inversions of permanence and self, the delusions to be eliminated through cultivation (Bhavana-heya-klesa) have not yet been removed. They still give rise to the latter two inversions due to external objects, so their behavior is not pure conduct (Brahmacarya), that is, they still consider impurity as purity and no-pleasure as pleasure. Four, those who are already liberated are those who have already liberated themselves from the previous three afflictions, who are non-learners (Arahant). Among the previous three people, the first does not want to know, the second is lost, and the third has entered a wrong path. Among these four people, only the fourth can write treatises. If we speak in terms of phenomena, ordinary Bodhisattvas are also the fourth type of people, so they can write treatises. There are also four kinds of people: one, superior in words, who can only recite the scriptures but does not understand their meaning. For example, a parrot can only recite words but does not understand their meaning, cannot attain the Way, and is the most inferior. Two, superior in dependence, who can do good by relying on good people, and only do evil by relying on evil people. For example, a painter follows the painter's intention. If he paints sitting, he sits all day long. If he paints standing, he stands constantly. Even so, they can still be transformed.
以值善友可化入道猶勝初人 三依分別勝。有聞他說一往不解。得解方悟須為分別。如言諸行無常。是生滅法。是生必滅。寂滅為樂。如雖聞諸行無常未解所以。是生滅故釋彼無常。未來是生。過去是滅。現在是生滅。諸行既有三世故是無常。是生必滅者。更釋未來是無常之意。若未來唯生不滅則應是常 又釋云。待過去滅故名未來為生。是生必有滅故未來是無常。前三句是生死。第四句是涅槃。作此分別第三人方解 四開智勝者。智惠自能開通見理不待分別。如舍利弗聞阿悅耆說半偈義。於半偈中解千種義即得聖道。此等即是開智勝也。譬如毒蛇傷身如發以毒勢力須臾遍身。此人又勝。此第四人正得造論。餘三人不應。舍利．目連．迦葉等類皆獨覺性。由見佛故方作聲聞。故在第四 第三有四種人者。一自惱。二惱他。三自他俱惱。四自他俱不惱。如常見外道為未來報。自苦其身坐臥荊棘等是自惱。如斷見外道不見未來果於現世中為自身安樂或奪他財食等。皆是惱他。常見外道行自苦行為自惱。殺牛．羊等縛不與食用祭天等是惱他。俱不惱者得理之人知慚愧故。知惱他得罪。自惱無福。為欲離罪生福俱不為惱。不惱他故。離斷見。不自惱故離常見。唯第四人可得造論 第四四種人者。一向下道人。即一闡提必入惡道
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 憑藉良善的朋友引導而入道，勝過最初自己摸索的人。在『三依』（指依法不依人，依義不依語，依智不依識）的辨別上更為優勝。有些人聽聞佛法，一時不能理解，必須經過解釋才能領悟。例如，說『諸行無常，是生滅法，是生必滅，寂滅為樂』。如果有人雖然聽聞『諸行無常』，卻不明白其中的道理，是因為『生滅』的緣故才解釋那『無常』。未來是生，過去是滅，現在是生滅。諸行既然有過去、現在、未來三世，所以是無常。『是生必滅』，進一步解釋未來是無常的含義。如果未來只有生而不滅，那就應該是常。又解釋說，等待過去滅去，所以稱未來為生，既然是生，必定有滅，所以未來是無常。前三句是生死，第四句是涅槃。經過這樣的分別解釋，第三種人才能理解。 第四種是開智殊勝的人。智慧能夠自然開通，見到真理，不需要等待別人的解釋。例如，舍利弗（Śāriputra，佛陀十大弟子之一，以智慧著稱）聽聞阿說示（Aśvajit，五比丘之一）說半偈的義理，從半偈中理解了千種義理，立即證得聖道。這些人就是開智殊勝的人。譬如毒蛇咬傷身體，毒性迅速蔓延全身。這種人又勝過前面的人。這第四種人才能真正地造論，其餘三種人不應該造論。舍利弗、目犍連（Mahāmaudgalyāyana，佛陀十大弟子之一，以神通著稱）、迦葉（Kāśyapa，佛陀十大弟子之一，以頭陀行著稱）等都屬於獨覺的根性，因為見到佛陀的緣故，才成為聲聞。所以在第四種人之中。 第三種有四種人：第一種是自惱，第二種是惱他，第三種是自他俱惱，第四種是自他俱不惱。常見外道爲了未來的果報，自己折磨身體，或坐或臥在荊棘之中，這是自惱。如斷見外道，不相信未來有果報，在現世中爲了自身的安樂，或者奪取他人的財物食物等，都是惱他。常見外道，既進行自我折磨的行為，是自惱，又殺牛羊等，捆綁起來不給它們食用，用來祭祀天神等，是惱他。自他俱不惱的人，是懂得道理的人，因為知道慚愧的緣故，知道惱害他人會得到罪過，自我折磨沒有福報，爲了想要遠離罪過，產生福報，所以自他都不惱害。不惱害他人，所以遠離斷見；不自我惱害，所以遠離常見。只有第四種人可以造論。 第四種有四種人：第一種是向下道人，即一闡提（Icchantika，斷善根的人），必定墮入惡道。
【English Translation】 English version To be guided into the path by a virtuous friend is superior to the initial self-exploration. It is even more superior in the discernment of the 'Three Refuges' (referring to relying on the Dharma, not the person; relying on the meaning, not the words; relying on wisdom, not consciousness). Some people, upon hearing the Buddha's teachings, cannot understand them immediately and must have them explained to comprehend. For example, it is said, 'All conditioned things are impermanent, they are subject to arising and ceasing, having arisen they cease, their cessation is bliss.' If someone hears 'All conditioned things are impermanent' but does not understand the reason, it is because of 'arising and ceasing' that impermanence is explained. The future is arising, the past is ceasing, and the present is arising and ceasing. Since all conditioned things have the three times of past, present, and future, they are impermanent. 'Having arisen they cease' further explains the meaning of the future being impermanent. If the future only arose and did not cease, then it should be permanent. It is also explained that waiting for the past to cease is why the future is called arising, and since it arises, it must cease, so the future is impermanent. The first three phrases are about birth and death, and the fourth phrase is about Nirvana. After such a distinction and explanation, the third type of person can understand. The fourth type is the person with superior wisdom. Wisdom can naturally open up, seeing the truth without waiting for others' explanations. For example, Śāriputra (one of the Buddha's ten great disciples, known for his wisdom) heard Aśvajit (one of the five bhikkhus) speak half a verse of meaning, and from that half verse, he understood a thousand meanings and immediately attained the holy path. These people are those with superior wisdom. It is like a poisonous snake biting the body, with the poison quickly spreading throughout. This person is superior to the previous ones. This fourth type of person can truly create treatises, while the other three types should not. Śāriputra, Mahāmaudgalyāyana (one of the Buddha's ten great disciples, known for his supernatural powers), Kāśyapa (one of the Buddha's ten great disciples, known for his ascetic practices), and others all belong to the nature of Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas), and it is because they saw the Buddha that they became Śrāvakas (Hearers). Therefore, they are in the fourth type. The third type has four kinds of people: the first is self-tormenting, the second is tormenting others, the third is tormenting both self and others, and the fourth is not tormenting either self or others. Common heretics, for the sake of future rewards, torment their bodies, sitting or lying on thorns, which is self-torment. Like nihilistic heretics, not believing in future rewards, in the present world, for their own pleasure, they seize others' wealth and food, which is tormenting others. Common heretics, both engaging in self-tormenting practices, which is self-torment, and killing cows and sheep, tying them up and not giving them food, using them to sacrifice to the gods, which is tormenting others. Those who do not torment either self or others are those who understand the principles, because they know shame, they know that harming others will bring sin, and self-torment brings no merit. In order to want to be free from sin and generate merit, they do not torment either self or others. Not tormenting others, they are therefore free from nihilistic views; not self-tormenting, they are therefore free from eternalistic views. Only the fourth type of person can create treatises. The fourth type has four kinds of people: the first is the downward-bound person, that is, an Icchantika (one who has severed their roots of goodness), who will certainly fall into evil realms.
。二向生死道。即出家外道起見戒取等故迴轉六道。三向自利者即是二乘。二乘之人乃識出離。但自怖苦疲極化他。速求解脫故言向自利。四向利他者即是菩薩。菩薩以兼濟為懷。恒欲利物故言向利他。唯第四人可得造論 四種第四人即是四德。若其一人具此四德方堪造論。一已度德。離一闡提。闡提貪生死。若已度三則識正道故離闡提。二自他俱不惱德。離外道執斷．常二見。以得理故。離斷常見故。不惱自他離外道見。三開智勝德。離聲聞乘。聲聞乘人依他得悟不能自達。大利根人於一切法中能通達無量義故離聲聞。四向利他德。離獨覺獨覺根雖利。而無濟物之懷大行之人常欲利物故離獨覺 又云。攝決定論又明無四失人則堪造論。一不顯自德。二無我慢。三于同行中有利他心。四于眾生有慈悲心 若無顯自德心則離闡提失。離闡提失得已度德。無我慢心則離外道失。離外道失得自他俱不惱德。若見同行無利他方便。為其說他利方便者。離聲聞行失。離聲聞行失得向開智德。若於眾生有拔苦與樂心。則離獨覺行失。離獨覺行失得利他德。既離四失。具足四德。即是菩薩志求佛果。佛果有四德。為求四德故行四德因。離一闡提行凈德因。離外道即行我德因。離聲聞即行樂德因。離獨覺即行常德因。既行四德因欲自利
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二、向生死道：指那些因為對外道的見解、戒律的執取等原因，在六道中輪迴的人。 三、向自利者：指二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）。二乘之人知道要出離生死，但因為害怕痛苦，疲於度化他人，只想快速求解脫，所以說是向自利。 四、向利他者：指菩薩。菩薩以兼顧救濟為懷，總是想要利益眾生，所以說是向利他。只有第四種人可以造論。 四種第四人即是四德：如果一個人具備這四種德行，才能夠造論。 一、已度德：遠離一闡提（斷善根的人）。一闡提貪戀生死，如果已經度過三界，就能認識正道，所以遠離一闡提。 二、自他俱不惱德：遠離外道執著的斷見和常見。因為得到了真理，所以遠離斷見和常見，不惱害自己和他人，遠離外道的見解。 三、開智勝德：遠離聲聞乘。聲聞乘的人依靠他人才能覺悟，不能自己通達。大利根的人在一切法中能夠通達無量的意義，所以遠離聲聞。 四、向利他德：遠離獨覺（辟支佛）。獨覺的根器雖然銳利，但沒有救濟眾生的心懷，大乘修行的人總是想要利益眾生，所以遠離獨覺。 又說，攝決定論又闡明沒有四種過失的人，才能夠造論： 一、不顯揚自己的德行。 二、沒有我慢。 三、在同修道的人中有利他的心。 四、對眾生有慈悲心。 如果沒有顯揚自己德行的心，就遠離了一闡提的過失。遠離一闡提的過失，就得到了已度德。 沒有我慢的心，就遠離了外道的過失。遠離外道的過失，就得到了自他俱不惱德。 如果看到同修道的人沒有利益他人的方便，就為他們說利益他人的方便，就遠離了聲聞乘的過失。遠離聲聞乘的過失，就得到了開智德。 如果對於眾生有拔除痛苦、給予快樂的心，就遠離了獨覺乘的過失。遠離獨覺乘的過失，就得到了利他德。 既然遠離了四種過失，具備了四種德行，就是菩薩立志追求佛果。佛果有四德，爲了追求四德，所以修行四德的因。 遠離一闡提，修行清凈德的因。遠離外道，修行我德的因。遠離聲聞，修行樂德的因。遠離獨覺，修行常德的因。既然修行四德的因，想要自利
【English Translation】 English version 2. Turning towards the path of birth and death: This refers to those who, due to their views and adherence to precepts arising from external paths, revolve within the six realms of existence. 3. Turning towards self-benefit: This refers to the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna). Those of the Two Vehicles know to escape from birth and death, but because they fear suffering and are weary of transforming others, they only seek quick liberation, hence they are said to turn towards self-benefit. 4. Turning towards benefiting others: This refers to Bodhisattvas. Bodhisattvas cherish the thought of benefiting and saving all, and always desire to benefit beings, hence they are said to turn towards benefiting others. Only the fourth type of person is qualified to compose treatises. The four types of fourth persons are the four virtues: If a person possesses these four virtues, then they are qualified to compose treatises. 1. Virtue of having crossed over: Being apart from Icchantikas (those who have severed their roots of goodness). Icchantikas are attached to birth and death. If one has crossed over the three realms, then they can recognize the right path, hence they are apart from Icchantikas. 2. Virtue of not troubling oneself or others: Being apart from the external paths' attachment to the views of annihilation and permanence. Because one has attained the truth, they are apart from the views of annihilation and permanence, not troubling oneself or others, and are apart from the views of external paths. 3. Virtue of superior wisdom: Being apart from the Śrāvakayāna. Those of the Śrāvakayāna rely on others to attain enlightenment and cannot understand on their own. People of great faculties can understand limitless meanings in all dharmas, hence they are apart from the Śrāvakas. 4. Virtue of turning towards benefiting others: Being apart from Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas). Although the faculties of Pratyekabuddhas are sharp, they do not have the aspiration to save beings. Those who practice the Great Vehicle always desire to benefit beings, hence they are apart from Pratyekabuddhas. Furthermore, the Saṃgraha-viniscaya Sūtra also clarifies that those without four faults are qualified to compose treatises: 1. Not displaying one's own virtues. 2. Without arrogance. 3. Having a mind to benefit others among fellow practitioners. 4. Having compassion for sentient beings. If one does not have the mind to display one's own virtues, then they are apart from the fault of Icchantikas. Being apart from the fault of Icchantikas, one attains the virtue of having crossed over. Without arrogance, one is apart from the fault of external paths. Being apart from the fault of external paths, one attains the virtue of not troubling oneself or others. If one sees that fellow practitioners do not have the means to benefit others, and explains to them the means to benefit others, then they are apart from the fault of the Śrāvakayāna. Being apart from the fault of the Śrāvakayāna, one attains the virtue of superior wisdom. If one has the mind to remove suffering and give happiness to sentient beings, then they are apart from the fault of the Pratyekabuddhayāna. Being apart from the fault of the Pratyekabuddhayāna, one attains the virtue of benefiting others. Since one is apart from the four faults and possesses the four virtues, they are Bodhisattvas who aspire to the fruit of Buddhahood. The fruit of Buddhahood has four virtues, and in order to seek the four virtues, one practices the causes of the four virtues. Being apart from Icchantikas, one practices the cause of the virtue of purity. Being apart from external paths, one practices the cause of the virtue of self. Being apart from the Śrāvakayāna, one practices the cause of the virtue of bliss. Being apart from Pratyekabuddhas, one practices the cause of the virtue of permanence. Since one practices the causes of the four virtues, desiring self-benefit
利他。心不為煩惱所染。常能亡懷益物。若是此人方堪造論 世親菩薩雖住地前。具前四德亦堪造論。又復世尊說唯識教名為作者。教之主故。世親等師釋佛所說唯識之理名為述者。依教起故。此經．論相對 若世親等造三十頌名為作者。護法等釋名為述者。此論．釋相對。今者此中但經．論相對。以護法等釋彼頌故恭敬二師。故說諸論諸義之前。須說兩師名也。恭敬作者即恭敬法。恭敬述者即恭敬義。法是句．味．名。義是句．味．名所顯之理。作者先說句．味．名言教在世。作者若已入涅槃。後人於此言教不能得解。述者更造論解之義意方顯。故恭敬作者應敬法。恭敬述者應敬義 又眾生根有利有鈍。鈍者有信根。利者有智根。有信根者識人不識法。有智根者識法不識人。信根粗而多。智根細而少。故信前智后。五根之內定．念．精進成就三惠。隨前信根隨後智根 言成三惠者。若心散亂則聽聞不入。必須斂心方生聞惠。即以定根成就聞惠。思惠思擇善之與惡簡惡取善。若不繫念則思惠不生。即以念根成就思惠。修惠正滅惡生善。若不勤加功力則惡法不滅。善法不生。即以進根成就修惠。言隨前後者。隨有信根此三成之。隨有智根三亦成之。信根識人不識法。其根既鈍不能思擇理之是非。若聞聖人及聰明人說。為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：利他（為他人著想）。心不被煩惱所污染。常常能夠忘記自己，利益他人。如果是這樣的人，才能夠撰寫論著。世親菩薩即使還在初地之前，具備前面所說的四種德行，也能夠撰寫論著。而且世尊宣說唯識教義，被稱為『作者』，因為他是教義的主導者。世親等論師解釋佛陀所說的唯識道理，被稱為『述者』，因為他們是依據教義而闡發的。這是經和論的相對關係。如果世親等菩薩造《三十頌》，被稱為『作者』，護法等論師解釋《三十頌》，被稱為『述者』，這是論和釋的相對關係。現在這裡只是經和論的相對關係，因為護法等論師解釋了《三十頌》，所以要恭敬這兩位論師。因此在講述各種論著和各種義理之前，必須先說明這兩位論師的名字。恭敬作者就是恭敬法，恭敬述者就是恭敬義。法是語句、滋味、名相，義是語句、滋味、名相所顯現的道理。作者先說語句、滋味、名相，使言教流傳於世。作者如果已經入涅槃，後人對於這些言教就不能理解。述者再造論來解釋，義理才能顯現。所以恭敬作者就是應該恭敬法，恭敬述者就是應該恭敬義。此外，眾生的根器有利有鈍。根器遲鈍的人有信根，根器敏銳的人有智根。有信根的人認識人而不認識法，有智根的人認識法而不認識人。信根粗淺而多，智根精細而少。所以信在前，智在後。在五根之內，定、念、精進成就三種智慧。跟隨前面的信根，隨後是智根。說到成就三種智慧，如果心散亂，那麼聽聞就不能進入內心。必須收攝心神，才能產生聞慧。也就是用定根成就聞慧。思慧是思考選擇善與惡，捨棄惡而選擇善。如果不繫念，那麼思慧就不會產生。也就是用念根成就思慧。修慧是真正地滅除惡，生起善。如果不勤加努力，那麼惡法就不會滅除，善法就不會生起。也就是用精進根成就修慧。說到跟隨前後，跟隨有信根，這三種智慧就能成就。跟隨有智根，這三種智慧也能成就。信根認識人而不認識法，他的根器遲鈍，不能思考辨別道理的是非。如果聽到聖人以及聰明人說，為 了引導
【English Translation】 English version: Altruism (thinking of others). A mind unpolluted by afflictions. Constantly able to forget oneself and benefit others. Only such a person is qualified to compose treatises. Bodhisattva Vasubandhu (世親菩薩), even before reaching the Bhumi (住地, a stage of bodhisattva path), possessing the aforementioned four virtues, is also qualified to compose treatises. Moreover, the World Honored One (世尊) expounds the Vijnaptimatrata (唯識, Consciousness-only) doctrine and is called the 'Author' because He is the master of the doctrine. Teachers like Vasubandhu (世親) explain the Vijnaptimatrata (唯識) principles spoken by the Buddha and are called 'Commentators' because they arise based on the doctrine. This is the relative relationship between the Sutra (經) and the Treatise (論). If Vasubandhu (世親) and others compose the 'Thirty Verses' (三十頌), they are called 'Authors'. Dharmapala (護法) and others explain the 'Thirty Verses' and are called 'Commentators'. This is the relative relationship between the Treatise (論) and the Commentary (釋). Here, it is only the relative relationship between the Sutra (經) and the Treatise (論), because Dharmapala (護法) and others explain those verses, so we should respect these two teachers. Therefore, before discussing various treatises and various meanings, it is necessary to first state the names of these two teachers. Respecting the Author is respecting the Dharma (法), and respecting the Commentator is respecting the Meaning (義). Dharma (法) is sentences, flavors, and names. Meaning (義) is the principles revealed by sentences, flavors, and names. The Author first speaks of sentences, flavors, and names, so that the teachings are transmitted in the world. If the Author has already entered Nirvana (涅槃), later people will not be able to understand these teachings. The Commentator then creates treatises to explain them, so that the meaning can be revealed. Therefore, respecting the Author is respecting the Dharma (法), and respecting the Commentator is respecting the Meaning (義). Furthermore, sentient beings have sharp and dull faculties. Those with dull faculties have the root of faith (信根), and those with sharp faculties have the root of wisdom (智根). Those with the root of faith (信根) recognize people but do not recognize the Dharma (法), and those with the root of wisdom (智根) recognize the Dharma (法) but do not recognize people. The root of faith (信根) is coarse and abundant, while the root of wisdom (智根) is fine and scarce. Therefore, faith comes before wisdom. Within the five roots, Samadhi (定, concentration), Mindfulness (念), and Diligence (精進) accomplish the three wisdoms. Following the preceding root of faith (信根), then comes the root of wisdom (智根). Speaking of accomplishing the three wisdoms, if the mind is scattered, then listening will not enter the mind. One must collect the mind to generate the wisdom of hearing (聞慧). That is, using the root of Samadhi (定根) to accomplish the wisdom of hearing (聞慧). The wisdom of thinking (思慧) is to contemplate and choose between good and evil, abandoning evil and choosing good. If one does not maintain mindfulness, then the wisdom of thinking (思慧) will not arise. That is, using the root of Mindfulness (念根) to accomplish the wisdom of thinking (思慧). The wisdom of cultivation (修慧) is to truly extinguish evil and generate good. If one does not diligently exert effort, then evil dharmas will not be extinguished, and good dharmas will not arise. That is, using the root of Diligence (精進根) to accomplish the wisdom of cultivation (修慧). Speaking of following before and after, following the root of faith (信根), these three wisdoms can be accomplished. Following the root of wisdom (智根), these three can also be accomplished. The root of faith (信根) recognizes people but does not recognize the Dharma (法). Their faculties are dull and cannot contemplate and discern the right and wrong of principles. If they hear the words of sages and intelligent people, it is for guidance.
信能說人故。即信此人所說之法。既依人取信故。名識人不識法。鈍根者既依人信法故。說論之前須先說作者及述者名。令恭敬兩師。恭敬兩師即恭敬法．義。智根識法不識人。其根既利尋文求理。自知理之是非。不依人取信故。名識法不識人。利根者既識法。則應謂此正法是聖人及聰明人說。故須為此人說作者及述者名。令恭敬兩師。既恭敬能說人。于所說法義彌生殷重。◎
成唯識論了義燈卷第一(本終)
成唯識論了義燈卷第一(末)
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼述
◎論今造此論下有三段文。西明云。如次安惠．難陀．護法。本疏有等。要集云。二不同者所承有異。然彼有說皆有等言。意或不違 今謂。西明若云唯安惠等如次配者定是不當。十師俱釋本頌。豈餘七師不明本師造論意耶。本疏主是糅論文人。故定說是。既不言唯不違本疏。等言定是。何須言或。
言有迷謬者。疏有二解。初約人。后約法。人即據能迷說。起癡．邪見攝屬於人。約法者據無明不解名迷。邪見不正解名謬。據惑分二。然總是法。俱約能迷說。
西明云。問二空即是我法二無。如何說無為迷悟依。解云誰言說無為迷悟境。此說二空所顯理性是迷悟境 此未必爾。何者于空執有何非迷境。達此空無可非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為相信能說法的人的緣故，就相信這個人所說的法。既然是依靠人來取得信任，所以叫做只認識人而不認識法。對於根器遲鈍的人來說，既然是依靠人來相信法，所以在宣講論著之前，必須先說明作者以及闡述者的名字，使人恭敬這兩位老師。恭敬這兩位老師，也就是恭敬法和義理。智慧深厚的人認識法而不認識人，他們的根器既然銳利，就通過研讀經文來尋求義理，自己能夠辨別義理的是非，不依靠人來取得信任，所以叫做只認識法而不認識人。對於根器銳利的人來說，既然認識法，就應該認為這正法是聖人以及聰明人所說，所以必須為此人說明作者以及闡述者的名字，使人恭敬這兩位老師。既然恭敬能說法的人，對於所說的法義就更加產生殷切重視。 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第一（本終） 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第一（末） 淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼 述 ◎論中現在要造的這部論著，下面有三段文字。西明（地名，也指西明寺）說，依次是安慧（Anhui，人名，唯識學論師）、難陀（Nanda，人名，佛陀的堂弟）和護法（Dharmapala，人名，印度佛教論師）。本疏（《成唯識論述記》）中有『等』字。要集（《成唯識論演秘》）說，兩種不同的說法是因為所依據的傳承有所差異。然而他們的說法都有『等』字，意思或許沒有衝突。現在我認為，西明如果說只有安慧等人依次對應，那肯定是不對的。十位論師都解釋了本頌，難道其餘七位論師不明白本師造論的意圖嗎？本疏的作者是糅合論文的人，所以肯定這樣說。既然沒有說『只有』，就沒有違背本疏，『等』字肯定是有的，何必說『或許』呢？ 說到有迷惑錯誤的地方，疏中有兩種解釋。第一種是就人而言，第二種是就法而言。就人而言，是根據能使人迷惑來說的，生起愚癡、邪見都歸屬於人。就法而言，是根據無明不理解叫做迷惑，邪見不正當的理解叫做謬誤。根據迷惑分為兩種，然而總歸都是法，都是根據能使人迷惑來說的。 西明說，問：二空（Dvikūnya，佛教術語，人空和法空）就是我法二無，如何說無為是迷惑和覺悟的依據？解答說：誰說無為是迷惑和覺悟的境界？這裡說二空所顯現的理性是迷惑和覺悟的境界。這未必如此。為什麼呢？對於空執著為有，難道不是迷惑的境界嗎？通達這空，無可非議。
【English Translation】 English version: Because of believing in the person who can speak the Dharma, one believes in the Dharma spoken by that person. Since trust is obtained by relying on the person, it is called 'knowing the person but not knowing the Dharma.' For those with dull faculties, since they believe in the Dharma by relying on the person, before explaining the treatise, it is necessary to first state the names of the author and the commentator, so that people will respect these two teachers. Respecting these two teachers is also respecting the Dharma and its meaning. Those with sharp wisdom know the Dharma but not the person. Since their faculties are sharp, they seek the meaning by studying the scriptures, and they can distinguish the right and wrong of the meaning themselves. They do not rely on the person to obtain trust, so it is called 'knowing the Dharma but not knowing the person.' For those with sharp faculties, since they know the Dharma, they should think that this correct Dharma is spoken by sages and intelligent people. Therefore, it is necessary to state the names of the author and the commentator for this person, so that people will respect these two teachers. Since they respect the person who can speak the Dharma, they will have more earnest regard for the meaning of the Dharma spoken. 《Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-vyākhyā-laṁkāra》 Volume 1 (End of the Volume) 《Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-vyākhyā-laṁkāra》 Volume 1 (End) Commented by Bhiksu Huizhao of Dayun Temple in Zizhou ◎In the treatise, regarding the treatise that is now being composed, there are three sections of text below. Ximing (place name, also refers to Ximing Temple) said that they are Anhui (Anhui, personal name, Yogācāra master), Nanda (Nanda, personal name, Buddha's cousin), and Dharmapala (Dharmapala, personal name, Indian Buddhist master) in that order. The original commentary (Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-ṭīkā) has the word 'etc.' The Essential Collection (Vijñāptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-yanmi) says that the two different statements are due to the different traditions they rely on. However, their statements all have the word 'etc.,' and the meaning may not be in conflict. Now I think that if Ximing said that only Anhui and others correspond in order, then it is definitely wrong. Ten masters have explained the original verse, how could the other seven masters not understand the intention of the original master in composing the treatise? The author of the original commentary is a person who mixes the texts of the treatises, so he definitely says so. Since he did not say 'only,' he did not violate the original commentary, and the word 'etc.' definitely exists, so why say 'perhaps'? Speaking of places with confusion and errors, the commentary has two explanations. The first is in terms of people, and the second is in terms of Dharma. In terms of people, it is based on what can confuse people, and generating ignorance and wrong views are attributed to people. In terms of Dharma, it is based on ignorance and misunderstanding called confusion, and wrong views and improper understanding called errors. According to confusion, it is divided into two types, but in general, they are all Dharma, and they are all based on what can confuse people. Ximing said, question: The two emptinesses (Dvikūnya, Buddhist term, emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena) are the absence of self and phenomena, how can it be said that non-action is the basis of confusion and enlightenment? The answer is: Who said that non-action is the realm of confusion and enlightenment? Here it is said that the rationality revealed by the two emptinesses is the realm of confusion and enlightenment. This is not necessarily the case. Why? Is it not a state of confusion to cling to existence in emptiness? To understand this emptiness, there is nothing wrong with it.
悟境。若非為境。違下第八云愚夫執有聖者達無。亦得說為凡聖智境。又下第十云。余雖亦得作迷悟依。而非根本故此不說。非謂全非。今解。此據根本迷悟之境故說真如。由要證真方了俗故。加行緣空不斷惑故。故說若證二空彼障隨斷。據實二空及二空性俱迷悟境。
問若證二空彼障隨斷。本疏中解通約余師。此初段文不唯安惠。故總相說。若據安惠樞要中有三解。第三云所知障中種．習為重。現行名輕。由二障種．習余現行得生。若斷種．習現行永滅 要集云。執．障有現．種。如何習．種說名為執。現名余障。稍乖此文 此意執．障俱有種．現。不應執種．習獨得執名。現行不名執但名余障 今謂無過。不說現行不名為執。但是種．習重執之餘名為余障。以其現行輕而易伏有不行時。若論種子不妨現在。若斷種子現行必無。故現行輕名為余障。故由有種二障具生文極相符。何處乖反。
西明釋云。安惠煩惱執狹障寬。所知障體即與法執體無寬狹。今約別煩惱說故不相違 要集云。順文義者有釋為正。此意以煩惱障別頭貪等我執斷時彼亦隨斷故。云彼障隨斷故順文義 今謂不爾。前云由我法執二障具生。若證二空彼障隨斷。若但煩惱。何須云二障具生若證二空彼障隨斷。即應云若證生空彼障隨斷。又
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 悟境。如果真如不是作為迷悟之境，就違背了下文第八卷所說的『愚夫執著于有，聖者通達于無』。也可以說真如是凡夫和聖人的智慧境界。另外，下文第十卷說：『其他雖然也可以作為迷悟的所依，但不是根本，所以這裡不說。』並非完全否定。現在的解釋是，這裡是根據根本的迷悟之境來說真如。因為必須要證悟真如才能瞭解世俗的緣故。因為在加行位時，緣于空性，惑仍然沒有斷除。所以說如果證悟了人空和法空，那麼這些障礙就會隨之斷除。實際上，人空、法空以及人空性和法空性都是迷悟的境界。
問：如果證悟了人空和法空，那麼這些障礙就會隨之斷除。本疏中的解釋是通用於其他論師的說法。這段文字不僅僅是安慧（Anhui）的觀點，所以是總體的說法。如果根據安慧（Anhui）的觀點，《樞要》中有三種解釋。第三種解釋是：所知障（Jnana-avarana）中，種子和習氣是重的，現行是輕的。由於兩種障礙的種子和習氣，其他的現行才能產生。如果斷除了種子和習氣，現行就會永遠滅除。《要集》中說：執著和障礙有現行和種子，為什麼習氣和種子被稱為執著，而現行被稱為其他障礙？這稍微違背了本文的意思。這裡的意思是執著和障礙都有種子和現行。不應該認為只有種子和習氣才能被稱為執著，而現行不能被稱為執著，只能被稱為其他障礙。我的看法是沒有過失。並不是說現行不能被稱為執著，但是種子和習氣所執著的剩餘部分被稱為其他障礙。因為現行是輕微的，容易被降伏，有不行的時候。如果討論種子，不妨礙現在。如果斷除了種子，現行必然沒有。所以現行是輕微的，被稱為其他障礙。所以由於有種子，兩種障礙都會產生，文字非常相符，哪裡有違背呢？
西明（Ximing）的解釋是：安慧（Anhui）認為煩惱執（Klesha-vasana）是狹隘的，所知障（Jnana-avarana）是寬廣的。所知障（Jnana-avarana）的本體和法執（Dharma-vasana）的本體沒有寬狹之分。現在是根據個別的煩惱來說的，所以不相違背。《要集》中說：順從文義的人解釋為正確。這個意思是，當煩惱障（Klesha-avarana）中個別的貪等我執（Atma-graha）斷除時，那些障礙也會隨之斷除，所以說那些障礙隨之斷除，所以順從文義。我的看法不是這樣。前面說由於我執（Atma-graha）和法執（Dharma-graha），兩種障礙都會產生。如果證悟了人空和法空，那麼這些障礙就會隨之斷除。如果只是煩惱障（Klesha-avarana），何須說兩種障礙都會產生？如果證悟了人空和法空，那麼這些障礙就會隨之斷除，就應該說如果證悟了生空，那麼這些障礙就會隨之斷除。另外
【English Translation】 English version: The realm of enlightenment. If 'suchness' (Tathata) is not considered as the realm of delusion and enlightenment, it contradicts the eighth chapter below, which states, 'The ignorant cling to existence, while the enlightened realize non-existence.' It can also be said that 'suchness' is the realm of wisdom for both ordinary beings and sages. Furthermore, the tenth chapter below states, 'Although others can also serve as the basis for delusion and enlightenment, they are not fundamental, so they are not mentioned here.' This does not mean a complete denial. The current explanation is that 'suchness' is spoken of here based on the fundamental realm of delusion and enlightenment because one must realize 'suchness' to understand the mundane. Because during the stage of application (Prayoga-marga), one contemplates emptiness, afflictions are not yet severed. Therefore, it is said that if one realizes the emptiness of self (Atma-sunyata) and the emptiness of phenomena (Dharma-sunyata), then these obstacles will be severed accordingly. In reality, the emptiness of self, the emptiness of phenomena, and the nature of both are all realms of delusion and enlightenment.
Question: If one realizes the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena, then these obstacles will be severed accordingly. The commentary in the original treatise explains this in a way that is applicable to other teachers. This initial passage is not solely the view of Anhui, so it is a general statement. According to Anhui's view, there are three explanations in the 'Essentials'. The third explanation is: In the knowledge obscurations (Jnana-avarana), the seeds and habitual tendencies are heavy, while the manifest actions are light. Due to the seeds and habitual tendencies of the two obscurations, other manifest actions can arise. If the seeds and habitual tendencies are severed, the manifest actions will be extinguished forever. The 'Essential Collection' states: Clinging and obscurations have manifest actions and seeds. How can habitual tendencies and seeds be called clinging, while manifest actions are called other obscurations? This slightly contradicts the meaning of this text. The meaning here is that both clinging and obscurations have seeds and manifest actions. It should not be thought that only seeds and habitual tendencies can be called clinging, while manifest actions cannot be called clinging but are only called other obscurations. My view is that there is no fault. It is not said that manifest actions cannot be called clinging, but the remainder of what is clung to by the seeds and habitual tendencies is called other obscurations. Because the manifest actions are light and easily subdued, there are times when they do not occur. If one discusses the seeds, it does not hinder the present. If the seeds are severed, manifest actions will certainly not exist. Therefore, manifest actions are light and called other obscurations. So, because there are seeds, both obscurations arise, and the text is extremely consistent. Where is the contradiction?
Ximing's explanation is: Anhui believes that the afflictive clinging (Klesha-vasana) is narrow, while the knowledge obscurations (Jnana-avarana) are broad. The essence of the knowledge obscurations (Jnana-avarana) and the essence of the phenomenal clinging (Dharma-vasana) do not differ in breadth. Now it is spoken of according to individual afflictions, so there is no contradiction. The 'Essential Collection' states: Those who follow the meaning of the text explain it as correct. This means that when individual self-grasping (Atma-graha) such as greed in the afflictive obscurations (Klesha-avarana) is severed, those obscurations will also be severed accordingly. Therefore, it is said that those obscurations are severed accordingly, so it follows the meaning of the text. My view is not like this. It was previously said that due to self-grasping (Atma-graha) and phenomenal clinging (Dharma-graha), both obscurations arise. If one realizes the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena, then these obscurations will be severed accordingly. If it were only the afflictive obscurations (Klesha-avarana), why would it be said that both obscurations arise? If one realizes the emptiness of self and the emptiness of phenomena, then these obscurations will be severed accordingly, it should be said that if one realizes the emptiness of existence, then these obscurations will be severed accordingly. Furthermore,
所知障障．執相似。何須言二重。一障有重故 今又助釋。安惠有障非執者。如佛地論障所得果亦名為障。即所知障所起三業。並所得果。及見．相分。雖此所執亦名隨斷。如於遍計說斷之義。
又二障體。佛地論云。煩惱障體。一根本煩惱及隨煩惱。二所發業。三所得果 若此論下一百二十八根本煩惱及隨煩惱以為體性 西明云。如此二論障體不同者。護法就正障說根本．等流以為障體。親光通據障及眷屬故障．業．果為障體性 若準此釋亦未盡理。護法初出障體且據勝說。非不取業及果。以不說唯故。又下明十障中說斷惡趣雜染愚。云應知愚品總說為愚。明知障品亦說為障。又此據自性斷故。但說根本及隨煩惱。佛地論等據三斷故。若所發業並所得果。故不相違。若根本．隨惑名自性斷。若所發業名相應斷。據不善業作如是說。若其善業亦緣縛斷。若所得果名離縛斷。由自性．相應斷顯有餘涅槃。由緣縛斷．及不生故顯無餘涅槃。
問言彼障隨斷者。要待執除。彼非執障隨彼說斷可不如是。若不如是便違論文。若說言爾即有二難。一問如二乘漸斷修道九品惑時。前八品道斷迷事惑。第九品道斷迷理惑。準此即是非執先除。是執后遣。如何可言由我法生彼障隨斷等。我執斷時惑方遣。可說末障依執生。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：所知障的障礙在於執著于相似的事物。為什麼還要說有雙重障礙呢？一種障礙已經足夠嚴重了。現在進一步解釋，安慧認為存在障礙但並非執著，就像《佛地論》中，障礙所產生的結果也被稱為障礙。也就是由所知障所引發的身、口、意三業，以及所獲得的結果，還有見分和相分。雖然這些執著也可以說是隨之斷除的，就像在遍計所執性中談論斷除的意義一樣。
另外，關於兩種障礙的本體，《佛地論》中說：煩惱障的本體包括：一、根本煩惱和隨煩惱；二、由煩惱所引發的業；三、所獲得的結果。如果按照此論（指《成唯識論》），一百二十八種根本煩惱和隨煩惱是其體性。西明法師說：這兩部論典關於障礙本體的說法不同，是因為護法菩薩是從真正的障礙出發，認為根本煩惱和等流煩惱是障礙的本體。親光菩薩則從障礙及其眷屬的角度出發，認為障礙、業和果是障礙的體性。如果按照這種解釋，也未能完全窮盡道理。護法菩薩最初提出障礙的本體，只是從最主要方面來說，並非不包括業和果，因為他並沒有說『唯』。而且，在下面解釋十種障礙時，說到斷除惡趣的雜染愚昧，說『應該知道，愚昧品總的來說就是愚昧』，這表明障礙品也可以說是障礙。而且，這裡是從自性斷的角度來說的，所以只說了根本煩惱和隨煩惱。《佛地論》等是從三種斷的角度來說的，包括所發之業和所得之果，所以兩者並不矛盾。根本煩惱和隨煩惱稱為自性斷，所發之業稱為相應斷（這裡是不善業的情況），如果是善業，也屬於緣縛斷。所得之果稱為離縛斷。通過自性斷和相應斷，可以顯現有餘涅槃；通過緣縛斷以及不再產生新的業，可以顯現無餘涅槃。
有人問：『所知障是隨之斷除的，必須要等到執著消除。如果它不是執著性的障礙，那麼說它隨之斷除，難道不是不合理的嗎？』如果不是這樣，就違背了經文。如果說是這樣，就會有兩個難題：第一，比如二乘人在漸次斷除修道位的九品惑時，前八品道斷除的是迷於事相的惑，第九品道斷除的是迷於理的惑。按照這個說法，就是非執著先被斷除，執著后被遣除。怎麼能說『由我法生，彼障隨斷』等等呢？只有在我執斷除時，惑才能被遣除，才能說最後的障礙是依執著而生的。
【English Translation】 English version: The obstruction of the jñeyāvaraṇa (所知障, obstruction of knowledge) lies in clinging to things that appear similar to reality. Why speak of a double obstruction? One obstruction is already significant enough. Now, to further explain, Ānanda (安慧) believes that there are obstructions that are not necessarily clinging, just as in the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra (佛地論), the result of an obstruction is also called an obstruction. That is, the three karmas of body, speech, and mind arising from the jñeyāvaraṇa, as well as the results obtained, and the darśana-bhāga (見分, the seeing aspect) and ākāra-bhāga (相分, the appearing aspect). Although these clingings can also be said to be severed along with it, just as the meaning of severance is discussed in the context of parikalpita-svabhāva (遍計所執性, the completely imputed nature).
Furthermore, regarding the substance of the two obstructions, the Buddhabhūmi-śāstra states: The substance of the kleśāvaraṇa (煩惱障, obstruction of afflictions) includes: 1. The fundamental afflictions and secondary afflictions; 2. The karma generated by the afflictions; 3. The results obtained. If according to this treatise (referring to the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra (成唯識論)), the one hundred and twenty-eight fundamental afflictions and secondary afflictions are its substance. The Ximing (西明) school says: The difference in the substance of the obstructions between these two treatises is because Dharmapāla (護法) speaks from the perspective of the actual obstruction, considering the fundamental afflictions and their outflows as the substance of the obstruction. Jñānaprabha (親光) speaks from the perspective of the obstruction and its retinue, considering the obstruction, karma, and result as the substance of the obstruction. If according to this explanation, it still does not fully exhaust the reasoning. Dharmapāla initially presented the substance of the obstruction based on the most important aspect, not excluding karma and result, because he did not say 'only'. Moreover, in explaining the ten obstructions below, when discussing the severance of the defiled ignorance of the evil destinies, it is said, 'It should be known that the category of ignorance is generally referred to as ignorance,' indicating that the category of obstruction can also be referred to as obstruction. Moreover, this is based on severance from the perspective of self-nature, so only the fundamental afflictions and secondary afflictions are mentioned. The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra, etc., is based on the three severances, including the karma generated and the results obtained, so there is no contradiction. The fundamental afflictions and secondary afflictions are called severance of self-nature; the karma generated is called corresponding severance (this is in the case of unwholesome karma); if it is wholesome karma, it also belongs to severance by conditioned bondage. The results obtained are called severance from bondage. Through severance of self-nature and corresponding severance, the Nirvāṇa with remainder is manifested; through severance by conditioned bondage and the non-arising of new karma, the Nirvāṇa without remainder is manifested.
Someone asks: 'The jñeyāvaraṇa is severed along with it, requiring the elimination of clinging. If it is not an obstruction of clinging, then saying it is severed along with it, is that not unreasonable?' If it is not like this, it would contradict the scriptures. If it is said to be like this, there would be two difficulties: First, for example, when the Śrāvakas (聲聞, Hearers) of the Two Vehicles gradually sever the nine grades of afflictions in the path of cultivation, the first eight grades of the path sever the afflictions that are deluded about phenomena, and the ninth grade of the path severs the afflictions that are deluded about principle. According to this, the non-clinging is severed first, and the clinging is eliminated later. How can it be said, 'Arising from self and dharma, that obstruction is severed along with it,' etc.? Only when the clinging to self is severed can the afflictions be eliminated, and only then can it be said that the final obstruction arises from clinging.
執未斷時惑已除。此應不由於執起 第二問大乘菩薩第四地中方斷身．邊。至第五地方斷害伴。若害伴四地斷。諸障隨執生。害伴五地除。如何隨執斷 答云。若證二空彼障隨斷者。據依見道及究竟說。彼非見道等故不相違。
證真解脫者。聲聞．菩薩各別簡之。且簡聲聞者。具足三事乃名大般。今二乘人不能證彼真如理體。但能悟此真理體上離煩惱障染覆義邊名證解脫。以二乘人不能證悟法空真理。但能悟得生空一分。雖得生空又不知親證。但名解脫非真解脫。
簡菩薩者。十地菩薩雖能具證二空真理。變易生死猶未離故是真非解脫 又二乘得無餘之時身智永無故是解脫而非真。
菩薩證二理煩惱未盡是真非解脫 如來雙異故真解脫。
得大菩提者。二乘生空智是菩提非大。凡夫有漏智等雖通緣一切法。行相雖寬大非菩提。非正覺故。佛具二故名大菩提。
問有餘涅槃．無餘涅槃．體俱是擇滅。起金剛心斷煩惱時即證二理。何故乃言身智無時方顯無餘涅槃耶 又問無餘涅槃是所證理。今言二乘證得涅槃必須能證。身智既亡說誰證得 答初問云。據實此二涅槃。金剛心后解脫道時即已證得。然無餘顯要身智無。非是已前曾未證得 答第二問。談實得滅身知不無。可言二乘得無餘滅。由
身．智在無餘不顯不言彼得。身．智無時無餘方顯。雖無身．智今于果談因。從因談說故不相違 問菩薩得無住處涅槃已不 答得。何以得知。攝論智殊勝中雲。菩薩遠離如是處所。般若．大悲皆具足故。能正安住無住涅槃 又辨菩薩．聲聞智差別中雲。謂無住涅槃為所住故 若爾亦云菩薩四畢竟差別者。謂住無餘依涅槃界無斷滅故 答此非成難。下論釋中又若諸菩薩得成佛時所證法身。窮生死際無斷盡故。無住處中真云菩薩住。不言成佛故。又雜集論．及大莊嚴第九解大悲云。是故得不住涅槃亦不住生死。
西明云。本業經說。金剛三昧名為等覺。此意既云等覺與如來等。如何得云佛果智勝解深密經第五說。由解脫身故。彼二乘與諸如來平等平等。由法身故說有差別 準此等文二皆非勝。如何總言二勝果耶。解云解脫實無差別。同斷煩惱所證得。而說勝者從能證智故不相違 此解不然。若從能證智者應名菩提。菩提斷俱名菩提。又此意說真解脫者。簡二乘人所得擇滅。不得障盡所顯真如真實涅槃。故涅槃經云。聲聞之人有苦有諦而無真實。勝鬘經云。言得涅槃者去涅槃界近 明知不得真實涅槃。今者說此真實涅槃名為解脫。故名勝果。又復解脫二乘。得或障解脫未斷習氣。故非勝果。大乘斷習並所知障。故名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 身（rupa, 色蘊）和智（jnana, 智慧）在無餘涅槃（nirvana without remainder）中並非完全不顯現或不可言說。身和智在任何時候、任何情況下都會顯現。即使沒有身和智，現在也可以從結果來談論原因。因為是從原因來談論，所以並不矛盾。問：菩薩（bodhisattva）是否已經證得無住涅槃（non-abiding nirvana）？答：已經證得。如何得知？《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）的『智殊勝』中說：『菩薩遠離這樣的處所，因為般若（prajna, 智慧）和大悲（karuna, 慈悲）都具足，所以能夠安住于無住涅槃。』又在辨別菩薩和聲聞（sravaka, 阿羅漢）的智慧差別中說：『因為以無住涅槃為所住之處。』如果這樣說，也說菩薩有四種畢竟差別，即安住于無餘依涅槃界（nirvana realm without remainder）而沒有斷滅。答：這不能構成詰難。下文的解釋中又說，如果諸菩薩成就佛果時所證得的法身（dharmakaya），窮盡生死之際也不會斷盡。在無住處中，確實說菩薩安住，而不是說成就佛果。而且，《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）以及《大莊嚴經論》（Mahālamkāra）第九品解釋大悲時說：『因此，證得不住涅槃，也不住生死。』 西明法師說，《梵網經》（Brahmajāla Sūtra）說，金剛三昧（vajra-samadhi）名為等覺（samantabuddha）。這個意思既然說等覺與如來（tathagata）相等，為何又說佛果智勝？《解深密經》（Samdhinirmocana Sutra）第五品說：『由於解脫身（vimuktikaya）的緣故，二乘（sravaka and pratyekabuddha）與諸如來平等平等；由於法身的緣故，說有差別。』按照這些經文，二者都不是殊勝的，為何總說二者是殊勝的果位呢？解釋說，解脫（vimukti）實際上沒有差別，都是斷除煩惱所證得的。而說殊勝，是從能證的智慧（jnana）來說的，所以不矛盾。這個解釋不對。如果從能證的智慧來說，應該名為菩提（bodhi, 覺悟）。菩提和斷除煩惱都名為菩提。而且，這個意思說的是真正的解脫，區別於二乘人所得的擇滅（pratisamkhyanirodha），而不是指障盡所顯的真如（tathata）真實涅槃。所以《涅槃經》（Nirvana Sutra）說：『聲聞之人有苦有諦（satya, 真諦）而無真實。』《勝鬘經》（Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra）說：『說證得涅槃，是接近涅槃界。』明明知道他們沒有證得真實的涅槃。現在所說的這個真實涅槃名為解脫，所以名為殊勝的果位。而且，二乘的解脫，或者證得障解脫而未斷習氣（vasana），所以不是殊勝的果位。大乘斷除習氣並所知障（jneyavarana），所以名為殊勝。
【English Translation】 English version: The body (rupa) and wisdom (jnana) are not entirely unmanifest or unspeakable in nirvana without remainder. The body and wisdom manifest at all times and in all circumstances. Even without the body and wisdom, we can now discuss the cause from the result. Because we are discussing from the cause, there is no contradiction. Question: Has the Bodhisattva attained non-abiding nirvana? Answer: Yes, they have. How do we know? The 'Superiority of Wisdom' section in the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'Bodhisattvas are far from such places, because they are complete with both prajna (wisdom) and karuna (compassion), they are able to abide in non-abiding nirvana.' Furthermore, in distinguishing the difference between the wisdom of Bodhisattvas and Sravakas, it states: 'Because they take non-abiding nirvana as their dwelling place.' If that is the case, it is also said that Bodhisattvas have four ultimate differences, namely, abiding in the nirvana realm without remainder without cessation. Answer: This does not constitute a challenge. The explanation below further states that if the Dharmakaya attained by the Bodhisattvas when they achieve Buddhahood will not be exhausted throughout the cycle of birth and death. In the non-abiding place, it is indeed said that Bodhisattvas abide, but it is not said that they achieve Buddhahood. Moreover, the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the ninth chapter of the Mahālamkāra explain great compassion by saying: 'Therefore, they attain non-abiding nirvana and do not abide in samsara.' The Western Bright Master said, the Brahmajāla Sūtra says that the vajra-samadhi is called samantabuddha. Since this means that samantabuddha is equal to the tathagata, why is it said that the wisdom of the Buddha-fruit is superior? The fifth chapter of the Samdhinirmocana Sutra says: 'Because of the vimuktikaya, the two vehicles (sravaka and pratyekabuddha) are equal to all the tathagatas; because of the Dharmakaya, it is said that there is a difference.' According to these texts, neither is superior, so why is it generally said that the two are superior fruits? The explanation is that there is actually no difference in vimukti, as both are attained by cutting off afflictions. The reason for saying it is superior is from the wisdom that can realize it, so there is no contradiction. This explanation is incorrect. If it is from the wisdom that can realize it, it should be called bodhi. Both bodhi and the cutting off of afflictions are called bodhi. Moreover, this means that true vimukti is different from the pratisamkhyanirodha attained by the two vehicles, and does not refer to the tathata true nirvana manifested by the exhaustion of obstacles. Therefore, the Nirvana Sutra says: 'Sravakas have suffering and satya (truths) but no reality.' The Śrīmālādevī Siṃhanāda Sūtra says: 'Saying that they have attained nirvana means they are close to the nirvana realm.' It is clear that they have not attained true nirvana. The true nirvana now spoken of is called vimukti, so it is called a superior fruit. Moreover, the vimukti of the two vehicles, either they attain obstacle-vimukti but have not cut off vasana, so it is not a superior fruit. The Mahayana cuts off vasana and jneyavarana, so it is called superior.
勝果。故入大乘論云。如來解脫勝於二乘。斷習氣故 法華經云。但離虛妄名為解脫。其實未得一切解脫。解深密雲解脫等者。據斷煩惱假解脫說。故不相違。然次論文別斷障得者。據勝顯說。前且總說。亦約離所知障故解脫勝 西明云。三藏解。等覺者。無間．解脫同斷一障。故言等覺。非謂解齊名之為等 今又助解。約所證理后更無障障所證理。故見分明。不同此前猶有微障見不了了不云等覺。此云等覺但約根本。非據后得。今此菩提意說。后得一切種智不同前故。名為勝果。
西明云。至千二百年清辨菩薩。依諸般若及龍樹宗。造般若燈論．掌珍論等。破無著等有相大乘。當時護法依深密等成立有宗破彼空義 今謂不爾。清辨三性總說為無。可得云空。護法三性非皆說有。何名有教。又若名有與初何殊。由此應說護法依彼瑜伽等論成非空有。依圓有故非空。遍計無故非有。如中邊頌等 西明仁王般若經疏中雲。破瑜伽師全立有故。護法釋廣百論中明不空有。廣如彼辨 亦不應爾。豈可護法解過彌勒破瑜伽師。但彼論中雲破瑜伽師者。破余後人學瑜伽者。一向執有乖瑜伽故。名破瑜伽師。非破彌勒菩薩所說瑜伽。如理門論云破古因明師者破古余師。非破彌勒．無著等師 又假敘清辨立識空量云。內識非有。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：勝果。所以《入大乘論》說：『如來的解脫勝過二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）。』因為斷除了習氣（煩惱的殘餘勢力）。《法華經》說：『僅僅離開虛妄，名為解脫，其實並未得到一切解脫。』《解深密經》說解脫相等，是根據斷除煩惱的假解脫說的，所以不相違背。然而，後面的論文中分別論述斷除障礙和獲得果實，是根據殊勝的方面來說的。前面只是總的來說，也約等於離開了所知障（對客觀世界的錯誤認識），所以解脫殊勝。西明法師說：『三藏的解釋是，等覺（菩薩果位）的無間道（證悟前一剎那）和解脫道（證悟后一剎那）同時斷除一種障礙，所以說等覺，不是說他們的理解程度相等才稱為等。』現在我再補充解釋，從所證悟的真理來說，後面再也沒有障礙能夠阻礙所證悟的真理，所以見地分明。不同於此前還有微細的障礙，見地不夠明瞭，所以不稱為等覺。這裡說的等覺只是從根本智（證悟真如的智慧）來說的，不是根據后得智（證悟后所獲得的智慧）。現在這裡的菩提（覺悟）的意思是說，后得一切種智（對一切事物和道理的智慧）不同於以前，所以名為勝果。 西明法師說：『到了一千二百年的時候，清辨菩薩（Bhāviveka），依據諸部《般若經》（Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra）以及龍樹（Nāgārjuna）的宗義，造了《般若燈論》（Prajñāpradīpa）、《掌珍論》等，破斥無著（Asaṅga）等的有相大乘（認為一切法實有）。當時護法（Dharmapāla）依據《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra）等成立有宗（認為某些法實有），破斥清辨的空義（認為一切法皆空）。』我認為不是這樣。清辨將三性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）總的來說是無，可以稱為空。護法的三性並非都說是實有，怎麼能稱為有教呢？又如果稱為有，和最初的說法有什麼區別呢？因此應該說護法依據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）等論成立非空有，因為依圓成實性（Pariniṣpanna）是實有，遍計所執性（Parikalpita）是虛無，如《中邊分別論頌》（Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā）等所說。西明法師在《仁王般若經疏》中說：『破斥瑜伽師完全立有。』護法在解釋《廣百論》中說明不空有，詳細的論述在其中。也不應該是這樣。難道護法的理解能超過彌勒（Maitreya），破斥瑜伽師嗎？只是護法在論中說破斥瑜伽師，是破斥其餘後人學習瑜伽的人，一味執著于有，違背了瑜伽的宗旨，所以稱為破斥瑜伽師，不是破斥彌勒菩薩所說的瑜伽。如《理門論》說破斥古因明師，是破斥古代其餘的因明師，不是破斥彌勒、無著等大師。又假設敘述清辨建立識空的量式說：『內識非有。』
【English Translation】 English version: Supreme Fruit. Therefore, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'The Tathāgata's (如來) liberation surpasses that of the Two Vehicles (二乘) (Śrāvakayāna (聲聞乘) and Pratyekabuddhayāna (緣覺乘)),' because it severs the residual habits (習氣) (the remaining force of afflictions). The Lotus Sūtra (法華經) states: 'Merely being apart from illusion is called liberation, but in reality, one has not attained complete liberation.' The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經) states that 'liberations are equal' refers to a provisional liberation based on severing afflictions, so there is no contradiction. However, the subsequent text discussing the separate severing of obstacles and attainment of fruits refers to the superior and manifest aspect. The former was a general statement, also referring to liberation from the obstacle of the knowable (所知障) (wrong understanding of the objective world), hence the superiority of liberation. The Ximing (西明) commentary states: 'The Tripiṭaka (三藏) explains that 'Equal Enlightenment' (等覺) refers to the uninterrupted path (無間道) (the moment before enlightenment) and the path of liberation (解脫道) (the moment after enlightenment) simultaneously severing one obstacle, hence the term 'Equal Enlightenment,' not that their levels of understanding are equal.' Now, I offer a supplementary explanation: in terms of the truth realized, there are no further obstacles hindering the realized truth, hence the clarity of vision. This differs from the previous state where subtle obstacles remained, and the vision was not clear, so it is not called 'Equal Enlightenment.' This 'Equal Enlightenment' refers only to the fundamental wisdom (根本智) (wisdom of realizing Suchness), not to the subsequent acquired wisdom (后得智). The meaning of Bodhi (菩提) (enlightenment) here is that the subsequent acquired wisdom of all kinds (一切種智) (wisdom of all things and principles) differs from the previous, hence it is called the Supreme Fruit. The Ximing (西明) commentary states: 'By the time of Bhāviveka (清辨菩薩) around 1200 years [after the Buddha's Parinirvana], relying on the various Prajñāpāramitā Sūtras (般若經) and Nāgārjuna's (龍樹) tenets, he composed the Prajñāpradīpa (般若燈論), Tarkajvālā (掌珍論), etc., refuting the Mahāyāna (大乘) with characteristics (有相大乘) of Asaṅga (無著) and others (who believed all dharmas are real). At that time, Dharmapāla (護法), relying on the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經) and others, established the school of existence (有宗) (believing some dharmas are real), refuting Bhāviveka's doctrine of emptiness (空義) (believing all dharmas are empty).' I disagree. Bhāviveka generally considers the three natures (三性) (Parikalpita (遍計所執性), Paratantra (依他起性), and Pariniṣpanna (圓成實性)) as non-existent, which can be called emptiness. Dharmapāla does not consider all three natures as existent, so how can it be called the school of existence? Furthermore, if it is called existence, how does it differ from the initial statement? Therefore, it should be said that Dharmapāla, relying on the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) and other treatises, established the non-empty existence, because the Pariniṣpanna (圓成實性) is existent, and the Parikalpita (遍計所執性) is non-existent, as stated in the Madhyāntavibhāga-kārikā (中邊分別論頌) and others. The Ximing commentary in the Renwang Prajñā Sūtra (仁王般若經疏) states: 'Refuting the Yogācārins (瑜伽師) for completely establishing existence.' Dharmapāla, in his commentary on the Vimśatikā, clarifies the non-empty existence, as explained in detail therein. This should not be the case either. Could Dharmapāla's understanding surpass Maitreya's (彌勒), refuting the Yogācārins? Dharmapāla's statement of refuting the Yogācārins only refers to refuting later followers of Yoga who clung to existence, deviating from the principles of Yoga, hence the term 'refuting the Yogācārins,' not refuting the Yoga taught by Maitreya Bodhisattva. As the Hetuvidyā-nyāya-dvāra-tarka-śāstra (理門論) states, refuting ancient logicians refers to refuting other ancient logicians, not refuting masters like Maitreya and Asaṅga. Furthermore, let us hypothetically present Bhāviveka's establishment of the emptiness of consciousness with the following syllogism: 'Internal consciousness is non-existent.'
宗。能所取中隨一攝故。因。猶如外境 又量云。真性有為空等如掌珍論。此如后辨 今謂。前量若以緣生內識為有法。因即有他隨一不成過。護法不許內緣生識能取外境故。若立實能取識。即有相符極成之過。故第二云若執唯識是實有者。亦是法執。既云執實有亦是法執。明無實能取識。今以能．所取因。立同外境無故是相符。既有此過。不得與論主作比量相違過。
論。或執諸識用別體。同西明云。有說八識為一。有說但執六識為一不說七．八。雖有二解取此為正。所以者何。世親釋云。唯除別有第八。故彼論云。非離意識別有餘識。唯除別有阿賴耶識。故知別有第八自體。雖無正文。準理第七離意別有 要集三解。第三同此。亦判為正 今謂不爾。若無唯言可如所會。既說唯除別有第八。更許離六別有第七。乖論唯言 要集又會。如深密經文唯顯說第八與六。意中合說第六．七故。彼意唯信有第八識。本未信有第七末那。故世親述彼唯除第八不除第七 若爾那知世親不依楞伽所說第八與七如水起浪。執七為一。唯除第八。又復無性但言此中無別余識。那知不依一類諸師。依楞伽經如水起浪。八識體一 此論但云諸識體同。諸言無簡 又無著攝論云。有一類師說一意識。彼彼依轉得彼彼名。如意思業名身．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 宗（paksha，論題）。因為能取（grahaka，主觀認知）和所取（grahya，客觀對像）中任何一個被包含在內。因（hetu，理由）。就像外境一樣。又一個量式（pramana，有效的認知手段）說：真性（tathata，事物的真實本性）是有為（saṃskṛta，有條件的）等等，就像《掌珍論》（Tattvaratnāvalī，寶性論）所說。這將在後面辨析。 現在我們說，如果之前的量式以緣生（pratītyasamutpāda，依賴於條件而生）的內識（antarvijñāna，內在意識）作為有法（dharmin，具有屬性的主體），那麼因就存在他隨一不成過（anyatarāsiddha，理由對其中一方不成立的謬誤）。因為護法（Dharmapāla，一位佛教論師）不承認內緣生識能夠取外境。如果立實能取識（sat-grahaka-vijñāna，真實能取識），那麼就存在相符極成之過（siddhasādhana，論證已成立之事的謬誤）。所以第二點說，如果執著唯識（vijñānavāda，唯識宗）是實有（sat，真實存在）的，這也是法執（dharma-graha，對法的執著）。既然說執著實有也是法執，就表明沒有實能取識。現在以能取和所取作為理由，立同外境無（bāhyārtha-śūnya，外境不存在），這是相符。既然有這個過失，就不能與論主（ācārya，論師）作比量相違過（pramāṇavirodha，與有效認知相違的謬誤）。 論（śāstra，論典）。或者執著諸識（vijñāna，各種意識）的用（kārya，功能）和體（svabhāva，自性）是不同的。如同西明（Ximing，西明寺）所說：有人說八識（aṣṭa vijñāna，八種意識）是一個，有人說只執著六識（ṣaṭ vijñāna，六種意識）是一個，不說七識（saptama vijñāna，第七意識，末那識）和八識（aṣṭama vijñāna，第八意識，阿賴耶識）。雖然有兩種解釋，但取這種說法為正確。為什麼呢？世親（Vasubandhu，一位佛教論師）解釋說：唯除別有第八（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）。所以那部論說：非離意識別有餘識（vijñāna，意識），唯除別有阿賴耶識。所以知道別有第八自體（svabhāva，自性）。雖然沒有正文，但根據道理，第七（末那識）離開意識（manovijñāna，意識）是別有的。《要集》（Yaoji，一部佛教著作）有三種解釋，第三種與此相同，也判斷為正確。 現在我們說不是這樣。如果沒有『唯』字，可以按照所理解的來解釋。既然說『唯除別有第八』，又允許離開六識別有第七識，就違背了論中的『唯』字。《要集》又解釋說，如同《深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra，解深密經）的經文只明顯地說第八識與六識，意思中合說了第六識和第七識。他們的意思是隻相信有第八識，本來不相信有第七末那（manas，末那識）。所以世親敘述他們只除第八識而不除第七識。 如果這樣，怎麼知道世親不依據《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra，楞伽經）所說的第八識與第七識如水起浪，執著第七識為一，只除第八識呢？又無性（Asaṅga，無性菩薩）只說此中無別余識，怎麼知道不依據一類諸師，依據《楞伽經》如水起浪，八識體一呢？這部論只說諸識體同，『諸』字沒有簡別。 又無著（Asaṅga，無著菩薩）的《攝論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha，攝大乘論）說：有一類師說一意識（ekavijñāna，一種意識）。它在不同的情況下轉變，得到不同的名稱。如意思業（manaskarma，意業）名為身（kāya，身體）。
【English Translation】 English version: Paksha (thesis): Because either the grāhaka (subject, perceiver) or the grāhya (object, perceived) is included. Hetu (reason): Just like external objects. Another pramāṇa (valid means of cognition) says: Tathatā (suchness, the true nature of things) is saṃskṛta (conditioned), etc., as stated in the Tattvaratnāvalī (Jewel Garland of Truth). This will be discussed later. Now we say, if the previous pramāṇa takes the pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination) of antarvijñāna (inner consciousness) as the dharmin (subject possessing attributes), then the hetu has the fallacy of anyatarāsiddha (unestablished for either party). This is because Dharmapāla (a Buddhist commentator) does not admit that inner-born consciousness can grasp external objects. If one establishes sat-grahaka-vijñāna (truly grasping consciousness), then there is the fallacy of siddhasādhana (proving what is already established). Therefore, the second point says that if one clings to vijñānavāda (the doctrine of consciousness-only) as sat (truly existent), this is also dharma-graha (clinging to phenomena). Since it is said that clinging to what is truly existent is also dharma-graha, it shows that there is no sat-grahaka-vijñāna (truly grasping consciousness). Now, using the grāhaka and grāhya as the reason, establishing bāhyārtha-śūnya (external objects are non-existent) is siddhasādhana. Since there is this fallacy, one cannot commit the fallacy of pramāṇavirodha (contradiction with valid cognition) against the ācārya (teacher, author of the treatise). Śāstra (treatise): Or one clings to the kārya (function) and svabhāva (nature) of the various vijñāna (consciousnesses) as being different. As Ximing (Ximing Temple) says: Some say that the aṣṭa vijñāna (eight consciousnesses) are one, and some say that they only cling to the ṣaṭ vijñāna (six consciousnesses) as one, and do not speak of the saptama vijñāna (seventh consciousness, manas) and aṣṭama vijñāna (eighth consciousness, ālayavijñāna). Although there are two interpretations, this one is taken as correct. Why? Vasubandhu (a Buddhist commentator) explains: 'Except for the separate existence of the eighth (ālayavijñāna)'. Therefore, that treatise says: 'There is no other vijñāna (consciousness) separate from consciousness, except for the separate existence of ālayavijñāna.' Therefore, it is known that there is a separate svabhāva (nature) of the eighth. Although there is no direct text, according to reason, the seventh (manas) is separate from manovijñāna (mind consciousness). The Yaoji (Essentials Collected, a Buddhist text) has three interpretations, the third of which is the same as this, and is also judged to be correct. Now we say it is not so. If there were no word 'only', one could interpret it as understood. Since it says 'only except for the separate existence of the eighth', and also allows for the separate existence of the seventh consciousness apart from the six consciousnesses, it contradicts the word 'only' in the treatise. The Yaoji also explains that, like the text of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra), it only clearly speaks of the eighth consciousness and the six consciousnesses, and implicitly combines the sixth and seventh consciousnesses in its meaning. Their meaning is that they only believe in the existence of the eighth consciousness, and originally do not believe in the seventh manas (mind consciousness). Therefore, Vasubandhu narrates that they only exclude the eighth consciousness and do not exclude the seventh consciousness. If so, how do we know that Vasubandhu does not rely on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (Descent into Lanka Sutra), which says that the eighth and seventh consciousnesses are like waves arising from water, clinging to the seventh consciousness as one, and only excluding the eighth consciousness? Also, Asaṅga (a Buddhist philosopher) only says that there is no other separate consciousness here, how do we know that he does not rely on a class of teachers, relying on the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra that the eight consciousnesses are one like waves arising from water? This treatise only says that the nature of the various consciousnesses is the same, and the word 'various' does not distinguish. Also, Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana) says: 'There is a class of teachers who say that there is one ekavijñāna (single consciousness). It transforms in different situations and gets different names. For example, manaskarma (mental karma) is called kāya (body).'
語業 依彼論文即云說一意識。明不許多 又云如意思業。只說意思分為三業。非別二思。若許余識。喻不相似。不名一意。是故無性但總說言無別余識。世親攝論唯除第八。更別師義。如古因明師立能所成。多少各別非皆相似故。古一意師亦應如是。非可違論說六為一將作正敘。
或執離心無別心所。本疏云。經部師云。唯三心所。又云。受．想．行信．思等心所 要集云。如何得知立三．四等 見不引文即云如何得知。如彼西明所引。何知本疏不見彼文。恐煩不引。徒設徴責。
疏言依大般若八囀聲中釋世間云是世間出故名世間者。以五蘊體即是世間。非是五蘊別從世間而出。以五蘊體是世間故。五蘊自現之時名世間出。如世說言聖人出故。準八囀聲即體聲也 造世間故者。以從蘊上起諸煩惱。煩惱生業造作當果名造世間。即業聲也。由世間者。以煩惱等是五蘊具。能造五蘊蘊從彼具故名由世間。即具聲也 為世間者。以為蘊體墮在世間故名世間。即為聲也 因世間故者。過去惑業體是世間。從彼招感因於彼故名因世間。即從聲也 屬世間故者。系屬世間故。即屬聲也 依世間者。以剎那生滅后依於前而得起故名依世間。一切諸法皆七轉聲之所目故。第八呼聲以召彼故。更無別義故略不說。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於語業，依據他們的論文，就是說一個意識。明確表示不多。又說，如意思業，只說意思分為三種業，並非另外的兩種思。如果允許有其他的識，比喻就不相似，不能稱為一個意識。因此，無性只是總的說沒有其他的識。世親的《攝大乘論》只排除了第八識，還有其他不同的師承的意義。例如古代因明師建立能成立和所成立，多少各不相同，並非都相似。古代的一意識師也應該這樣。不可違背論文，說六識合一作為正確的敘述。
或者有人認為離開心就沒有其他的心所。本疏說，經部師說，只有三種心所。又說，受、想、行、信、思等心所。《要集》說，如何得知建立三種、四種等？見到不引用經文就說如何得知。如同西明所引用的。為何本疏沒有見到那段經文？恐怕麻煩所以不引用。徒勞地設定征問。
疏文中說，依據《大般若經》八囀聲中解釋世間，說『是世間出故名世間』，是因為五蘊的本體就是世間，不是五蘊另外從世間而出。因為五蘊的本體就是世間，五蘊自身顯現的時候名為世間出。如同世俗所說，聖人出現。按照八囀聲，就是體聲。『造世間故』，是因為從五蘊上生起各種煩惱，煩惱產生業，造作未來的果報，名為造世間，就是業聲。『由世間者』，因為煩惱等是五蘊所具有的，能夠造作五蘊，五蘊從那些所具有的產生，所以名為由世間，就是具聲。『為世間者』，因為五蘊的本體墮落在世間，所以名為世間，就是為聲。『因世間故者』，過去的惑業的本體是世間，從那裡招感，因為那個緣故名為因世間，就是從聲。『屬世間故者』，系屬於世間，就是屬聲。『依世間者』，因為剎那生滅，后一個剎那依靠前一個剎那才能生起，所以名為依世間。一切諸法都是七轉聲所指代的，第八呼聲用來召喚它們，沒有其他的意義，所以省略不說。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding karma of speech, according to their treatises, it refers to speaking with a single consciousness. It clearly indicates that there are not many. It also says, like karma of thought, it only states that thought is divided into three karmas, not two separate thoughts. If other consciousnesses are allowed, the analogy would not be similar, and it could not be called a single consciousness. Therefore, Wu Xing (無性) only generally says that there are no other separate consciousnesses. Vasubandhu's (世親) Treatise on the Compendium of Mahayana (攝大乘論) only excludes the eighth consciousness, and there are other different meanings from other teachers. For example, ancient logicians established the provable and the proven, which differ in quantity and are not all similar. Ancient teachers of one consciousness should also be like this. It is not permissible to contradict the treatise by saying that the six consciousnesses are unified as a correct narrative.
Or some may hold that there are no mental factors separate from the mind. The commentary says, the Sautrantika (經部師) school says that there are only three mental factors. It also says, mental factors such as feeling (受), perception (想), volition (行), faith (信), and thought (思). The Essentials Collected (要集) says, how can we know that three or four are established? Seeing that no scripture is cited, it says, how can we know? As cited by Ximing (西明). Why did the original commentary not see that passage? Fearing trouble, it is not cited. It is futile to set up inquiries.
The commentary says that according to the explanation of lokam (世間, world) in the eight inflections of the Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra (大般若經), 'it is called lokam because it comes out of lokam', because the substance of the five aggregates (五蘊) is lokam, not that the five aggregates separately come out of lokam. Because the substance of the five aggregates is lokam, when the five aggregates manifest themselves, it is called coming out of lokam. As the world says, a sage appears. According to the eight inflections, it is the nominative case. 'Because it creates lokam', because various afflictions arise from the five aggregates, afflictions generate karma, creating future consequences, called creating lokam, which is the instrumental case. 'By lokam', because afflictions and so on are possessed by the five aggregates, and can create the five aggregates, and the aggregates arise from those possessions, it is called by lokam, which is the ablative case. 'For lokam', because the substance of the aggregates falls into lokam, it is called lokam, which is the dative case. 'Because of lokam', the substance of past delusions and karma is lokam, and from there it is attracted, because of that reason it is called because of lokam, which is the genitive case. 'Belonging to lokam', belonging to lokam, which is the possessive case. 'Depending on lokam', because of momentary arising and ceasing, the later moment depends on the former moment to arise, it is called depending on lokam. All dharmas are indicated by the seven inflections, and the eighth vocative case is used to summon them, and there is no other meaning, so it is omitted.
又難有五。一為不了義得顯了故。如言此文有何義耶。二語相違故。如言何故世尊先說與今說異。三由道理相違故。如有顯示四種道理相違之義。四不決定故。於一種義于彼彼處種種異門說故。五者究竟非現見故。如言內我有何體性。而言常恒無有變易如是正住等。今此設難即第二三。
由假說我法。此之頌文科判。如疏及樞要說。釋此頌文雖有十師大類分三。謂安惠菩薩就依他中唯立一分。難陀．親勝等立於二分。陳那等師立於三分。護法準下雖立四分。然隨於古釋依三分 且安惠云。相．見無體。能所取故。故經云。有為無為名為有。我及我所說為無。此說有為及以無為二種為有更無餘法。佛能證知離虛妄故。以自證分緣真如時。更無見．相分。無能．所取故。緣自證時為后得智。無二取故亦無見．相。猶此相．見既是虛妄。即遍計收。依他之中唯自證分。既有二分皆是妄心。故三性心皆許有執。除佛已外並皆有執。何以得知。準多經論。第五地中斷于下乘般涅槃障。求涅槃者既是善心。若其無執何須說斷。八地已上除加行心。加行心善。既說言除。故知有執 又復世親造緣起論許三性心並無明俱。故並有執 問既除佛外皆悉有執。十地無漏心有執不 答有二解。一云有執。二十唯識云。他心智云何。知境
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 還有五種難以理解的情況。第一種是由於不了義的教法被當作了了義的教法來解釋。例如，有人會問：『這段經文有什麼意義呢？』 第二種是由於說法前後矛盾。例如，有人會問：『為什麼世尊先前所說的和現在所說的不同呢？』 第三種是由於與道理相違背。例如，有人會顯示四種道理相違背的意義。 第四種是不確定，因為對於同一種意義，在不同的地方用各種不同的方式來表達。 第五種是究竟的真理並非可以通過現見而證得。例如，有人會問：『內在的「我」（ātman）有什麼體性呢？』然後回答說：『它是常恒不變，如是安住的。』現在提出的這些疑問，就屬於第二種和第三種情況。
以下是對『由假說我法』這句頌文的科判。正如疏和樞要所說。解釋這句頌文，雖然有十位論師，但大致可以分為三類。安慧菩薩（Sthiramati）認為在依他起性（paratantra）中只建立一部分。難陀（Nanda）、親勝（Priyamkara）等人建立了二分。陳那（Dignāga）等論師建立了三分。護法（Dharmapāla）雖然根據下文建立了四分，但仍然遵循古老的解釋，採用三分。安慧菩薩說：『相分（nimitta-bhāga）和見分（darśana-bhāga）沒有實體，因為它們是能取和所取。』所以經中說：『有為法（saṃskṛta）和無為法（asaṃskṛta）被稱為「有」，而「我」（ātman）和「我所」（ātmanīya）被稱為「無」。』這說明有為法和無為法這兩種是「有」，除此之外沒有其他法。佛能夠證知，遠離虛妄。因為以自證分（sva-saṃvedana-bhāga）緣真如（tathātā）時，就沒有見分和相分，沒有能取和所取。緣自證分時是后得智（pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna），沒有二取，因此也沒有見分和相分。就像這樣，相分和見分既然是虛妄的，就被歸入遍計所執性（parikalpita）。在依他起性中只有自證分。既然有二分都是妄心，所以三自性心（trisvabhāva-citta）都允許有執著。除了佛以外，所有人都存在執著。如何得知呢？根據許多經論，第五地斷除了下乘般涅槃的障礙。追求涅槃的人是善心，如果他們沒有執著，為什麼要說斷除呢？八地以上，除了加行心（prayoga-citta），加行心是善的，既然說要「除」，就知道有執著。而且世親（Vasubandhu）所造的《緣起論》允許三自性心都與無明（avidyā）俱生，所以都有執著。問：既然除了佛以外，所有人都存在執著，那麼十地無漏心（anāsrava-citta）有執著嗎？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是有執著。《二十唯識論》說：『他心智（paracitta-jñāna）如何得知境界？』
【English Translation】 English version Furthermore, there are five difficulties. The first is due to the provisional teachings (neyārtha) being taken as definitive (nītārtha). For example, one might ask: 'What is the meaning of this passage?' The second is due to contradictory statements. For example, one might ask: 'Why are the World-Honored One's (Bhagavan) earlier teachings different from the current ones?' The third is due to contradictions with reason. For example, someone might display the meaning of four kinds of contradictions with reason. The fourth is due to uncertainty, because for the same meaning, it is expressed in various different ways in different places. The fifth is that ultimate truth cannot be attained through direct perception. For example, one might ask: 'What is the nature of the inner 'self' (ātman)?' And then answer: 'It is constant, unchanging, and abiding as such.' The questions raised now belong to the second and third situations.
The following is a classification of the verse 'Based on the provisional, I speak of the Dharma'. As the commentaries and essential texts say. Although there are ten masters who explain this verse, they can be roughly divided into three categories. Sthiramati (安慧菩薩) believes that only one part is established in the dependent nature (paratantra). Nanda (難陀), Priyamkara (親勝), and others establish two parts. Dignāga (陳那) and other masters establish three parts. Although Dharmapāla (護法) establishes four parts according to the following text, he still follows the ancient explanation and adopts three parts. Sthiramati says: 'The image-component (nimitta-bhāga) and the seeing-component (darśana-bhāga) have no substance, because they are the grasper and the grasped.' Therefore, the sutra says: 'Conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta) and unconditioned phenomena (asaṃskṛta) are called 'existent', while 'self' (ātman) and 'what belongs to self' (ātmanīya) are called 'non-existent'.' This explains that these two, conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, are 'existent', and there are no other dharmas besides these. The Buddha (Buddha) is able to realize this, being free from delusion. Because when the self-awareness component (sva-saṃvedana-bhāga) cognizes Suchness (tathātā), there is no seeing-component or image-component, no grasper or grasped. When cognizing the self-awareness component, it is subsequent wisdom (pṛṣṭhalabdha-jñāna), without dualistic grasping, therefore there is no seeing-component or image-component either. Just like this, since the image-component and the seeing-component are illusory, they are categorized as the completely imputed nature (parikalpita). In the dependent nature, there is only the self-awareness component. Since there are two components that are both deluded minds, all three natures of mind (trisvabhāva-citta) are allowed to have attachment. Except for the Buddha, everyone has attachment. How is this known? According to many sutras and treatises, the fifth ground cuts off the obstacles to the Nirvana of the lower vehicle. Those who seek Nirvana have a virtuous mind, if they have no attachment, why is it said to be cut off? Above the eighth ground, except for the applying mind (prayoga-citta), the applying mind is virtuous, since it is said to be 'excepted', it is known that there is attachment. Moreover, Vasubandhu's (世親) Treatise on Dependent Arising allows the three natures of mind to arise together with ignorance (avidyā), so they all have attachment. Question: Since everyone except the Buddha has attachment, does the stainless mind (anāsrava-citta) of the tenth ground have attachment? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that it has attachment. The Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only says: 'How does the mind-reading wisdom (paracitta-jñāna) know the object?'
不如實。如知自心智。不知如佛境。既云不知如佛境。明無漏心亦是有執 問既許無漏複名為善。何有無明 答簡余重故。如有漏樂受亦名為苦。行苦攝故。如有漏善亦名不善。勝義不善故。故名為善及無漏者。亦簡重故 二云雖通三性無漏心無。故下第八云八識心．心所有漏所攝皆有執故。既簡無漏心故不說有 問豈無二分耶 答準下第九解真見道。敘異說中不立二分即安惠等。故無漏心不許有執。然二十唯識云不知如佛境者據有漏說。或非明瞭不得如佛。相傳二解 準此唯佛不有二分。故知我法不依佛說。無二分故。證不可言故。執習斷盡故。施設我法唯在於余 除佛已外于計所執總無之上。別執為我及以實法。世尊除此虛妄執故。于總無上假施設為聖教我法。故經頌云如愚所分別。頌證余妄執。為對遺愚夫所執實我法。頌證佛說意。世尊離執故。無相．見分故。故不依佛施設我法 若爾何故名如來等 答為對遣余執實如來故施假號。如對法論說我之義 問佛無相．見誰能說耶 答準此應同無性等釋聞者識上聚集顯現佛實不說 然安惠釋。假我假法。世間愚夫。于自證分上妄生相．見。相．見本無。不了此空執有我法。我法別無 或執相．見別二。以為若我若法。故名別無 相．見總無為別我法作所依止。以此我
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不如實。如果瞭解自己的心智，卻不瞭解如來佛的境界。既然說不了解如來佛的境界，那麼說明無漏心也是有執著的。問：既然允許有無漏，又稱之為善，怎麼會有無明呢？答：這是爲了簡別其餘的重疊部分。如有漏的樂受也稱為苦，因為它被行苦所包含。如有漏的善也稱為不善，因為它在勝義上是不善的。所以稱之為善以及無漏，也是爲了簡別重疊部分。二云：雖然貫通三性，但無漏心沒有。所以下面的第八識說：『八識心、心所有法，被有漏所攝，都有執著。』既然簡別了無漏心，所以不說有執著。問：難道沒有二分嗎？答：參照下面的第九識解釋真見道。敘述異說中不立二分，就是安惠等人。所以無漏心不允許有執著。然而，《二十唯識論》說『不瞭解如來佛的境界』，是根據有漏來說的。或者說，並非明瞭，不能像佛一樣。這是相傳的兩種解釋。按照這個說法，只有佛沒有二分。所以知道我法不依據佛的說法，因為沒有二分。因為證悟不可言說。因為執著的習氣斷盡了。施設我法只在于其餘的人。除了佛以外，對於計所執總無之上，特別執著為我和實在的法。世尊爲了去除這種虛妄的執著，在總無之上假施設為聖教的我法。所以經中的偈頌說：『如愚人所分別。』偈頌證明其餘的虛妄執著。爲了對治遺忘的愚夫所執著的實在的我法。偈頌證明佛說的意圖。世尊遠離執著，因為沒有相、見分。所以不依據佛施設我法。如果這樣，為什麼稱作如來等？答：爲了對治其餘執著實在的如來，所以施設假名。如對法論說我的意義。問：佛沒有相、見，誰能說呢？答：按照這個說法，應該和無性等人一樣解釋，聽聞者意識上聚集顯現，佛實際上沒有說。然而安惠解釋說：假我和假法，世間的愚夫，在自己的證分上虛妄地產生相、見。相、見本來沒有。不瞭解這個空性，執著有我和法。我和法另外沒有。或者執著相、見是不同的二者，以為是我或法。所以說另外沒有。相、見總無，為別的我和法作所依止。用這個我 English version: Not truly real. If one understands one's own mind and intellect, yet does not understand the realm of the Tathagata (Thus Come One, meaning Buddha). Since it is said that one does not understand the realm of the Tathagata, it indicates that even the uncontaminated mind has attachments. Question: Since it is admitted that there is uncontamination and it is called good, how can there be ignorance? Answer: This is to distinguish the remaining overlapping parts. For example, contaminated pleasurable feelings are also called suffering because they are included in the suffering of change. For example, contaminated good is also called not good because it is not good in the ultimate sense. Therefore, calling it good and uncontaminated is also to distinguish the overlapping parts. The second statement says: Although it pervades the three natures, the uncontaminated mind does not have it. Therefore, the eighth consciousness below says: 'The eight consciousnesses and mental functions, being included in the contaminated, all have attachments.' Since the uncontaminated mind is distinguished, it is not said to have attachments. Question: Are there no two aspects? Answer: Refer to the explanation of True Seeing the Path in the ninth consciousness below. In narrating different views, not establishing two aspects refers to Anhui and others. Therefore, the uncontaminated mind is not allowed to have attachments. However, the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only states that 'not understanding the realm of the Tathagata' is based on the contaminated. Or it means not being clear and not being like the Buddha. These are two interpretations passed down. According to this, only the Buddha does not have two aspects. Therefore, it is known that the self and dharma (teachings) are not based on the Buddha's teachings because there are no two aspects. Because enlightenment is inexpressible. Because the habits of attachment are completely eradicated. The establishment of self and dharma only lies in others. Apart from the Buddha, regarding the completely non-existent imagined nature, there is a special attachment to self and real dharmas. The World-Honored One (Buddha) removed this false attachment and provisionally established the self and dharma of the holy teachings on top of the completely non-existent. Therefore, the verse in the sutra says: 'As discriminated by the foolish.' The verse proves the remaining false attachments. It is to counter the real self and dharma that the forgotten fools are attached to. The verse proves the intention of the Buddha's teachings. The World-Honored One is free from attachment because there are no image and perception aspects. Therefore, the establishment of self and dharma is not based on the Buddha. If so, why are they called Tathagata, etc.? Answer: It is to counter the remaining attachments to the real Tathagata that provisional names are established. As the Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical texts) discusses the meaning of self. Question: The Buddha has no image or perception, who can speak of it? Answer: According to this, it should be explained in the same way as Non-Self and others, that the accumulation and manifestation in the consciousness of the listener is what appears, but the Buddha does not actually speak. However, Anhui explains: False self and false dharma. Worldly fools falsely generate image and perception on their own self-awareness. Image and perception are originally non-existent. Not understanding this emptiness, they are attached to the existence of self and dharma. Self and dharma are separately non-existent. Or they are attached to image and perception as two different things, thinking they are either self or dharma. Therefore, it is said to be separately non-existent. The total non-existence of image and perception serves as the basis for the separate self and dharma. With this self
【English Translation】 Not truly real. If one understands one's own mind and intellect, yet does not understand the realm of the Tathagata (Thus Come One, meaning Buddha). Since it is said that one does not understand the realm of the Tathagata, it indicates that even the uncontaminated mind has attachments. Question: Since it is admitted that there is uncontamination and it is called good, how can there be ignorance? Answer: This is to distinguish the remaining overlapping parts. For example, contaminated pleasurable feelings are also called suffering because they are included in the suffering of change. For example, contaminated good is also called not good because it is not good in the ultimate sense. Therefore, calling it good and uncontaminated is also to distinguish the overlapping parts. The second statement says: Although it pervades the three natures, the uncontaminated mind does not have it. Therefore, the eighth consciousness below says: 'The eight consciousnesses and mental functions, being included in the contaminated, all have attachments.' Since the uncontaminated mind is distinguished, it is not said to have attachments. Question: Are there no two aspects? Answer: Refer to the explanation of True Seeing the Path in the ninth consciousness below. In narrating different views, not establishing two aspects refers to Anhui and others. Therefore, the uncontaminated mind is not allowed to have attachments. However, the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only states that 'not understanding the realm of the Tathagata' is based on the contaminated. Or it means not being clear and not being like the Buddha. These are two interpretations passed down. According to this, only the Buddha does not have two aspects. Therefore, it is known that the self and dharma (teachings) are not based on the Buddha's teachings because there are no two aspects. Because enlightenment is inexpressible. Because the habits of attachment are completely eradicated. The establishment of self and dharma only lies in others. Apart from the Buddha, regarding the completely non-existent imagined nature, there is a special attachment to self and real dharmas. The World-Honored One (Buddha) removed this false attachment and provisionally established the self and dharma of the holy teachings on top of the completely non-existent. Therefore, the verse in the sutra says: 'As discriminated by the foolish.' The verse proves the remaining false attachments. It is to counter the real self and dharma that the forgotten fools are attached to. The verse proves the intention of the Buddha's teachings. The World-Honored One is free from attachment because there are no image and perception aspects. Therefore, the establishment of self and dharma is not based on the Buddha. If so, why are they called Tathagata, etc.? Answer: It is to counter the remaining attachments to the real Tathagata that provisional names are established. As the Abhidharma (Buddhist philosophical texts) discusses the meaning of self. Question: The Buddha has no image or perception, who can speak of it? Answer: According to this, it should be explained in the same way as Non-Self and others, that the accumulation and manifestation in the consciousness of the listener is what appears, but the Buddha does not actually speak. However, Anhui explains: False self and false dharma. Worldly fools falsely generate image and perception on their own self-awareness. Image and perception are originally non-existent. Not understanding this emptiness, they are attached to the existence of self and dharma. Self and dharma are separately non-existent. Or they are attached to image and perception as two different things, thinking they are either self or dharma. Therefore, it is said to be separately non-existent. The total non-existence of image and perception serves as the basis for the separate self and dharma. With this self
法依相．見故。名別無依總無。而假立為世間我法。以無依無假立聖教所說我法。雖迷．悟異俱依于無 又此安惠以外似內以無似有。相．見體無似內心執有故。法準同。聖教我法以有似無 若護法釋具如疏辨。然疏判云。此上二解。第一解云。我．法二假乃屬於說。唯假言說以為我法。彼體都非者 此意釋云。世間我法說所執相以為我法。我法本無唯只言說聖教雖說所緣見．相蘊等諸法以為我法。蘊等實非若我若法。但唯有言故云乃屬於說 第二解云。以所說為若我若法者。此意解云。所執外我法無。世說我法者。隨自情執我法之解說為我法。無彼所執我法可說。以我法無依內情故。以無依有假。故但說情。聖教所設依識等上有我法義。義依于體。即義是別。識體是總。以別依總。故說別義以為我法名義依體。此既說義以為我法。故不在言。有彼體義為所說故 又護法釋。以內似外以有似無。向外似故。相．見是有似外我法我法是無。此意聖教所說相．見而體雖有。愚夫所執實相．見無。以執實有能緣所緣為見．相故。今護法意相．見緣生假名相．見分。從彼愚夫所執二分故。云以有似無。
論。及了別境識。要集敘。有說下一識字通三能變。有云。前云彼依識所變。三變通名。此云識者。唯屬第三了別能變
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『法』（Dharma）和『依相』（Ālambana-ākāra，所緣行相）的顯現，是由於『見』（Darśana，能見）的緣故。名為『別』（Vikalpa，分別）是無所依，『總』（Sāmānya，總相）也是無所依。因此，才假立為世間的『我』（Ātman）和『法』（Dharma）。而聖教所說的『我』和『法』，是無所依，沒有虛假的安立。雖然迷和悟不同，但都依賴於『無』（Śūnyatā，空性）。 此外，安慧（Sthiramati）的觀點是，內在的看起來像外在的，因為『無』（Śūnyatā，空性）看起來像『有』（Bhāva，有）。『相』（Ākāra，行相）和『見』（Darśana，能見）的體性是『無』（Śūnyatā，空性），但內心執著為『有』（Bhāva，有），所以『法』（Dharma）的準則相同。聖教所說的『我』和『法』（Dharma），是以『有』（Bhāva，有）看起來像『無』（Śūnyatā，空性）。 如果想了解護法（Dharmapāla）的解釋，可以詳細參考疏文的辨析。然而，疏文判斷說：以上兩種解釋，第一種解釋說，『我』（Ātman）和『法』（Dharma）這兩種假立，是屬於言說的，僅僅是虛假的言說，才有了『我』和『法』。它們的體性都不是真實的。 這個意思解釋說，世間的『我』和『法』，是說所執著的『相』（Ākāra，行相）作為『我』和『法』。『我』和『法』（Dharma）本來就沒有，僅僅是言說而已。聖教雖然說所緣的『見』（Darśana，能見）、『相』（Ākāra，行相）、『蘊』（Skandha）等諸法作為『我』和『法』，但『蘊』（Skandha）等實際上既不是『我』也不是『法』，但僅僅是有言說，所以說是屬於言說。 第二種解釋說，以所說的作為『我』或『法』。這個意思解釋說，所執著的外在的『我』和『法』（Dharma）是沒有的。世間所說的『我』和『法』，是隨著自己的情執，對『我』和『法』的解釋作為『我』和『法』。沒有他們所執著的『我』和『法』可以述說，因為『我』和『法』沒有所依，是內在的情感。因為沒有所依而虛假地存在，所以只是述說情感。聖教所設立的，是依據識等上面有『我』和『法』的意義。意義依賴於體性，即意義是『別』（Vikalpa，分別），識的體性是『總』（Sāmānya，總相）。因為『別』（Vikalpa，分別）依賴於『總』（Sāmānya，總相），所以說『別』（Vikalpa，分別）的意義作為『我』和『法』，名義依賴於體性。這既然是說意義作為『我』和『法』，所以不在於言說，有那個體性的意義作為所說。 此外，護法（Dharmapāla）的解釋是，內在的看起來像外在的，以『有』（Bhāva，有）看起來像『無』（Śūnyatā，空性）。向外看起來相似的緣故，『相』（Ākāra，行相）和『見』（Darśana，能見）是『有』（Bhāva，有），看起來像外在的『我』和『法』（Dharma），『我』和『法』是『無』（Śūnyatā，空性）。這個意思是，聖教所說的『相』（Ākāra，行相）和『見』（Darśana，能見），它們的體性雖然是『有』（Bhāva，有），但愚夫所執著的真實『相』（Ākāra，行相）和『見』（Darśana，能見）是『無』（Śūnyatā，空性）的。因為執著真實『有』（Bhāva，有）能緣和所緣作為『見』（Darśana，能見）和『相』（Ākāra，行相）的緣故。現在護法（Dharmapāla）的意思是，『相』（Ākāra，行相）和『見』（Darśana，能見）是緣起而生的，假名為『相』（Ākāra，行相）和『見』（Darśana，能見）的分位。是從那些愚夫所執著的二分而來的，所以說以『有』（Bhāva，有）看起來像『無』（Śūnyatā，空性）。 論中說，以及了別境的識，要集合敘述。有一種說法是，下面的『識』（Vijñāna，識）字，貫通三種能變。有一種說法是，前面說『彼依識所變』，三種變都通稱為『變』。這裡說『識』（Vijñāna，識），僅僅屬於第三種了別能變。
【English Translation】 English version The appearance of 『Dharma』 and 『Ālambana-ākāra』 (object-aspect) is due to 『Darśana』 (seeing). What is called 『Vikalpa』 (discrimination) is without support, and 『Sāmānya』 (generality) is also without support. Therefore, 『Ātman』 (self) and 『Dharma』 are falsely established in the world. However, the 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 spoken of in the Holy Teachings are without support and without false establishment. Although delusion and enlightenment are different, they both rely on 『Śūnyatā』 (emptiness). Furthermore, Sthiramati's view is that the internal appears like the external because 『Śūnyatā』 (emptiness) looks like 『Bhāva』 (existence). The nature of 『Ākāra』 (aspect) and 『Darśana』 (seeing) is 『Śūnyatā』 (emptiness), but the mind clings to it as 『Bhāva』 (existence), so the principle of 『Dharma』 is the same. The 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 spoken of in the Holy Teachings are like 『Bhāva』 (existence) appearing as 『Śūnyatā』 (emptiness). If you want to understand Dharmapāla's explanation, you can refer to the detailed analysis in the commentary. However, the commentary judges that: In the above two explanations, the first explanation says that the two false establishments of 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 belong to speech, and only false speech creates 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』. Their nature is not real at all. This means that the worldly 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 refer to the aspects that are clung to as 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』. 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 originally do not exist, but are merely speech. Although the Holy Teachings say that the objects of perception, such as 『Darśana』 (seeing), 『Ākāra』 (aspect), 『Skandha』 (aggregate), etc., are 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』, the 『Skandha』 (aggregate), etc., are actually neither 『Ātman』 nor 『Dharma』, but there is only speech, so it is said to belong to speech. The second explanation says that what is spoken of is 『Ātman』 or 『Dharma』. This means that the external 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 that are clung to do not exist. The worldly 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 are based on one's own emotional attachments, and the explanation of 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 is taken as 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』. There is no 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 that they cling to that can be described, because 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 have no support and are internal emotions. Because there is no support and it exists falsely, only emotions are described. What the Holy Teachings establish is that there is the meaning of 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 based on consciousness, etc. The meaning depends on the nature, that is, the meaning is 『Vikalpa』 (discrimination), and the nature of consciousness is 『Sāmānya』 (generality). Because 『Vikalpa』 (discrimination) depends on 『Sāmānya』 (generality), the meaning of 『Vikalpa』 (discrimination) is said to be 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』, and the name and meaning depend on the nature. Since this is saying that the meaning is 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』, it is not in speech, and there is that nature of meaning as what is said. Furthermore, Dharmapāla's explanation is that the internal appears like the external, with 『Bhāva』 (existence) appearing like 『Śūnyatā』 (emptiness). Because it looks similar outwardly, 『Ākāra』 (aspect) and 『Darśana』 (seeing) are 『Bhāva』 (existence), and they look like the external 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』, while 『Ātman』 and 『Dharma』 are 『Śūnyatā』 (emptiness). This means that the 『Ākāra』 (aspect) and 『Darśana』 (seeing) spoken of in the Holy Teachings, although their nature is 『Bhāva』 (existence), the real 『Ākāra』 (aspect) and 『Darśana』 (seeing) clung to by fools are 『Śūnyatā』 (emptiness). Because they cling to the real 『Bhāva』 (existence) as the grasper and the grasped as 『Darśana』 (seeing) and 『Ākāra』 (aspect). Now Dharmapāla means that 『Ākāra』 (aspect) and 『Darśana』 (seeing) arise from conditions, and the false names are the divisions of 『Ākāra』 (aspect) and 『Darśana』 (seeing). They come from the two divisions clung to by those fools, so it is said that 『Bhāva』 (existence) looks like 『Śūnyatā』 (emptiness). The treatise says, and the consciousness that distinguishes objects should be collected and narrated. One saying is that the word 『Vijñāna』 (consciousness) below pervades the three transformations. One saying is that it was said earlier that 『it is transformed by consciousness』, and the three transformations are all generally called 『transformation』. Here, 『Vijñāna』 (consciousness) is said to belong only to the third distinguishing transformation.
。以心．意．識名體別故(要集但敘而不決斷)。今謂。釋非。所以者何前標我法依識所變。次辨能變識體一多本欲釋前。不擬別解心．意．識號。故下釋云此三皆名能變識故。又心．意．識了名之通故。隨增立名。余處說別。此處據通識之名體不得云別。
法謂軌持。本疏釋云。軌為軌範可生物解。持謂任持不捨自相。此意能有屈曲軌範表彰差別生物解者隨增名軌。不為屈曲表彰但直生解即名為持。持自性故。緣無為等生解之時通得名法。不是定說無及真如不能生解故名為持。今于總一法名分為軌持。不爾軌持二言何別。又以軌持疏有四對。不是如次配前軌持。但隨所應為其四對。準義配取。並樞要中聖教世間對 樞要解云。此中皆依增上義說。前四解通世間聖教。第五別配 若解此釋。西明引立無亦名軌。如因明論立我為無。亦得名軌。徒設劬勞 有解不得本疏主意救此義。云以我體無為疏所緣緣以無體故不能生解。親緣有體生解名軌。亦是徒施 有云。復引瑜伽論軌通有法．無法．有為．無為．若有．若無俱名論軌。亦應自息 要集復云。有說四對辨持．軌異。無為．無法唯持非軌。義即難尋。復引楞伽真智緣如。乃至云后得智緣遠從本質生解名論軌亦無有失者 此不異前何煩廣說 又引瑜伽五十二云。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為心、意、識的名稱和本體有所區別（《要集》只是敘述而沒有決斷）。現在認為，《成唯識論》的解釋並非如此。為什麼呢？因為前面標明『我』和『法』是依識所變現的。接著辨析能變識的本體是一還是多，原本是爲了解釋前面的內容，並沒有打算分別解釋心、意、識的名稱。所以下面的解釋說：『這三者都名為能變識。』而且，心、意、識是了別的通稱，隨著作用的增加而建立不同的名稱。其他地方有不同的說法，這裡是根據通用的識的名稱和本體，不能說是區別的。
法，指的是軌範和任持。窺基的《成唯識論述記》解釋說：『軌』是軌範，可以使眾生產生理解；『持』是任持，不捨棄自身的相狀。』這個意思是說，能夠有屈曲的軌範，表彰差別，使眾生產生理解的，隨著作用的增加而稱為『軌』；不作屈曲的表彰，只是直接產生理解的，就稱為『持』，因為它持有自身的體性。緣無為法等產生理解的時候，都可以稱為『法』。不是說無和真如不能產生理解，所以稱為『持』。現在對於總體的『法』這個名稱，分為『軌』和『持』。否則，『軌』和『持』這兩個詞有什麼區別呢？而且，用『軌』和『持』，《述記》中有四種對應關係，不是依次對應前面的『軌』和『持』，而是根據情況，分為四種對應關係，按照意義來選取。並且在《樞要》中，有聖教和世間的對應關係。《樞要》解釋說：『這裡都是依據增上義來說的。』前面的四種解釋，通用於世間和聖教。第五種是特別對應的。如果理解這個解釋，西明寺引用說，『無』也可以稱為『軌』。如因明論中，立『我』為『無』，也可以稱為『軌』。這是徒勞無功的。
有人解釋說，沒有理解《述記》的主旨，來挽救這個意義，說因為『我』的體性是無為法，是疏所緣的緣，因為以無為法為體性，所以不能產生理解。親緣有為法的體性，產生理解，稱為『軌』。這也是徒勞無功的。
有人說，又引用《瑜伽師地論》，『軌』通於有法、無法、有為法、無為法，若有、若無都稱為論軌。也應該自己停止爭論。
《要集》又說，有人說四種對應關係辨別『持』和『軌』的區別，無為法、無法只有『持』而不是『軌』，意義難以理解。又引用《楞伽經》，真智緣如，乃至說后得智緣遠，從本質產生理解，稱為論軌，也沒有什麼過失。這和前面說的沒有什麼不同，何必多說呢？
又引用《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說。
【English Translation】 English version: Because the names and entities of Citta (mind), Manas (intellect), and Vijnana (consciousness) are different (Yaoji only narrates without making a judgment). Now it is said that the explanation in the Cheng Weishi Lun (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-only) is not so. Why? Because it was previously stated that 'I' (self) and 'Dharma' (law/phenomena) are transformed by Vijnana. Then, the discussion of whether the entity of the transforming Vijnana is one or many was originally intended to explain the previous content, not to separately explain the names of Citta, Manas, and Vijnana. Therefore, the following explanation says: 'These three are all called transforming Vijnana.' Moreover, Citta, Manas, and Vijnana are common names for discernment, and different names are established according to the increase in function. There are different statements elsewhere, but here it is based on the common name and entity of Vijnana, and it cannot be said to be different.
Dharma refers to standard and upholding. Kuiji's Commentary on the Cheng Weishi Lun explains: 'Standard' is a standard that can cause beings to generate understanding; 'Upholding' is upholding, not abandoning its own characteristics.' This means that what can have a curved standard, manifest differences, and cause beings to generate understanding is called 'standard' as the function increases; what does not make curved manifestations, but directly generates understanding, is called 'upholding', because it upholds its own nature. When understanding arises from conditioning unconditioned dharmas, it can be called 'Dharma'. It is not that non-being and Suchness cannot generate understanding, so it is called 'upholding'. Now, for the overall name of 'Dharma', it is divided into 'standard' and 'upholding'. Otherwise, what is the difference between the two words 'standard' and 'upholding'? Moreover, in the Commentary, there are four pairs of 'standard' and 'upholding', which do not correspond to the previous 'standard' and 'upholding' in order, but are divided into four pairs according to the situation, and selected according to meaning. And in the Essentials, there is a correspondence between sacred teachings and worldly teachings. The Essentials explain: 'Here, everything is said according to the meaning of increase.' The previous four explanations are common to both worldly and sacred teachings. The fifth is a special correspondence. If you understand this explanation, Ximing Temple quotes that 'non-being' can also be called 'standard'. For example, in Hetu-vidya (logic), establishing 'I' as 'non-being' can also be called 'standard'. This is a futile effort.
Someone explained that they did not understand the main idea of the Commentary to save this meaning, saying that because the nature of 'I' is unconditioned dharma, it is the condition that the Commentary relies on, because it takes unconditioned dharma as its nature, so it cannot generate understanding. Directly conditioning the nature of conditioned dharma to generate understanding is called 'standard'. This is also a futile effort.
Someone said that, quoting the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), 'standard' applies to existent dharmas, non-existent dharmas, conditioned dharmas, unconditioned dharmas, whether existent or non-existent, all are called treatise standards. One should also stop arguing.
The Yaoji also says that someone says that the four pairs distinguish the difference between 'upholding' and 'standard', unconditioned dharmas and non-existent dharmas only have 'upholding' but not 'standard', the meaning is difficult to understand. It also quotes the Lankavatara Sutra, true wisdom conditions Suchness, and even says that subsequent wisdom conditions from afar, generating understanding from the essence, is called treatise standard, and there is nothing wrong with it. This is no different from what was said before, why bother to say more?
It also quotes the fifty-second volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra.
由二種緣諸識得生。乃至意．法。答由能軌持諸五識身所不行義故。佛世尊假說名法。五識不行通為．無為既欲證無及如名軌復引通語如無軌言。不解本釋徒為證據。應尋前解。經論無違。
釋我謂有情命者等具如樞要。十種生中。一生云何。謂胎．卵二生初託生時(謂初入胎)。等生云何(謂住胎卵內)趣生。謂從彼出(謂出胎卵)。
樞要我差別有十七。今又加之。大莊嚴論第十一云。見者．聞者．覺者．識者．食者．知者．說者．作者。此雖說八。見者．知者．作者與前說同。聞．覺．識．食．說者五別。前十七上更加此五有二十二。雖未見文準大般若等。既有使作．使受者等。加使聞者等成二十七。理亦不違。
聖教中我有凡聖別。且聖教中施設凡我。即三界．四生．四姓．四有等是 施設聖者我差別者。且辨聲聞廣有二十七賢聖。集總頌曰。信．見．身．惠．俱。向．果各有四。七返．家．並種。中．生．有．無上。退．思．護．住法。堪達．並不動 二十七賢聖(若方便有二。謂隨信行．隨法行。若果差別有二十七)。一信解(此是隨信行人修行至果位。即鈍根之人)。二見至(此是隨法行人至果住亦是利根之人)。三身證(此是不還得滅定者)。四惠解脫(羅漢未得滅定者。唯斷煩
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：兩種因緣使諸識產生，乃至意和法。回答：因為能夠規範和保持諸五識身所不能行使的意義，所以佛世尊假借安立名稱為『法』。五識不能行使的範圍包括有為法和無為法，既然想要證明無和如的名稱規範，又引用通用的語言，例如『無軌』的說法，這是不理解原本的解釋，徒勞地作為證據。應該尋找之前的解釋，這樣經論之間才沒有衝突。
解釋『我』，包括有情、命者等，具備如《樞要》所說的十種生。一生是什麼？指的是胎生和卵生最初託生的時候（即最初入胎）。等生是什麼（指住在胎卵內）？趣生，指從那裡出來（指從胎卵中出來）。
《樞要》中關於『我』的差別有十七種，現在又增加了一些。《大莊嚴論》第十一卷說：『見者、聞者、覺者、識者、食者、知者、說者、作者。』雖然說了八種，但見者、知者、作者與前面說的相同。聞者、覺者、識者、食者、說者這五種是不同的。在之前的十七種基礎上加上這五種，就有二十二種。雖然沒有看到原文，但參照《大般若經》等，既然有使作者、使受者等，加上使聞者等，就成了二十七種，道理上也是沒有衝突的。
聖教中，『我』有凡夫和聖者的區別。先說聖教中安立的凡夫之『我』，即三界（Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, Arūpadhātu 欲界、色界、無色界）、四生（Andaja, Jarāyuja, Aṇḍaja, Opapātika 卵生、胎生、濕生、化生）、四姓（Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, Śūdra 婆羅門、剎帝利、吠舍、首陀羅）、四有等。安立聖者之『我』的差別，先辨別聲聞（Śrāvaka）乘，廣義上有二十七種賢聖。總集頌說：『信、見、身、惠、俱，向、果各有四，七返、家、並種，中、生、有、無上，退、思、護、住法，堪達、並不動。』這二十七種賢聖（如果從方便法門來說，有隨信行、隨法行兩種。如果從果位的差別來說，有二十七種）。一是信解（Śraddhādhimukta，這是隨信行人修行至果位，即鈍根之人）。二是見至（Dṛṣṭiprāpta，這是隨法行人至果位，也是利根之人）。三是身證（Kāyasākṣin，這是不還得滅盡定者）。四是慧解脫（Prajñāvimukta，阿羅漢（Arhat）未得滅盡定者，唯斷煩惱障者）。
【English Translation】 English version: Two kinds of conditions cause the arising of consciousnesses, even mind and dharma. Answer: Because it can regulate and maintain the meanings that the aggregates of the five consciousnesses cannot perform, the Buddha-Bhagavan provisionally establishes the name 'dharma'. The scope of what the five consciousnesses cannot perform includes conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. Since one wants to prove the normative names of 'non-existence' and 'suchness', and also cites common language, such as the saying 'without regulation', this is not understanding the original explanation and is futile as evidence. One should seek the previous explanation, so that there is no conflict between the sutras and treatises.
Explaining 'self', including sentient beings, life-possessors, etc., possessing the ten kinds of birth as mentioned in the 'Essentials'. What is one birth? It refers to the initial moment of conception in womb-born and egg-born beings (i.e., the initial entry into the womb). What is 'equal birth' (referring to residing within the womb or egg)? 'Proceeding birth' refers to emerging from there (i.e., emerging from the womb or egg).
In the 'Essentials', there are seventeen differences regarding 'self', and now some are added. The eleventh chapter of the Mahāvyutpatti states: 'Seer, hearer, feeler, cognizer, eater, knower, speaker, doer.' Although eight are mentioned, seer, knower, and doer are the same as previously mentioned. Hearer, feeler, cognizer, eater, and speaker are five different ones. Adding these five to the previous seventeen, there are twenty-two. Although I have not seen the original text, referring to the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra etc., since there are causers and receivers, adding causer-hearers etc., it becomes twenty-seven, which is logically consistent.
In the Holy Teachings, there is a distinction between ordinary and holy 'self'. First, let's talk about the ordinary 'self' established in the Holy Teachings, which is the Three Realms (Kāmadhātu, Rūpadhātu, Arūpadhātu), Four Births (Andaja, Jarāyuja, Aṇḍaja, Opapātika), Four Castes (Brāhmaṇa, Kṣatriya, Vaiśya, Śūdra), Four Existences, etc. To establish the differences of the holy 'self', first distinguish the Śrāvaka vehicle, which broadly has twenty-seven worthy and holy ones. The summary verse says: 'Faith, Vision, Body, Wisdom, Together, Each of the paths and fruits has four, Seven Returns, Family, and Seed, Intermediate, Birth, Existence, and Supreme, Regression, Thought, Protection, Abiding in Dharma, Capable of Attainment, and Non-moving.' These twenty-seven worthy and holy ones (if from the perspective of expedient means, there are two: follower of faith and follower of dharma. If from the perspective of the differences in fruits, there are twenty-seven). One is Faith-Released (Śraddhādhimukta, this is the follower of faith who cultivates to the fruit position, i.e., a person of dull faculties). Two is Vision-Attained (Dṛṣṭiprāpta, this is the follower of dharma who reaches the fruit position, also a person of sharp faculties). Three is Body-Witness (Kāyasākṣin, this is one who does not attain cessation). Four is Wisdom-Liberated (Prajñāvimukta, an Arhat who has not attained cessation, only severing afflictive obscurations).
惱障未離定障故。通利．鈍二人)。五俱解脫(得滅定羅漢定惠二障俱解脫故。亦通利．鈍二人)。四向四果者(此八俱通利．鈍二人)。此八前五為十三 十四七返有。謂初果極多七生人．天。然後得無學果。或亦不定 十五家家者。即預流果進斷修道三四品惑入一來向而經生者。或天上家至人中家。或於人家至天上家。于欲界中天．人二趣。決定往來極二．三返。得無學果故名家家。若不經生俱名一來向不名家家 十六一種子者。唯有一生之業名一種子。亦名一間。即一來果進斷欲界修所斷惑。至七．八品入不還向而經生者。或人或天唯受一生即般涅槃故。唯有一隙容此一生名為一間。若不經生但名不還向不名一種子 十七中般者。于欲界身得那含果。命終後生色界中有得般涅槃故名中般。以生結已盡起結未亡。以生結盡故不受生有。以起結未亡故但受中有 生結者。能潤生有之惑。此已盡故名生結已盡 起結者。能潤中有之惑 云何名起以于現身起此煩惱潤中有身故名起結 或令此中有起名為起結。此未盡故名起結未亡 此有三種。一上界中有才起即得聖果而般涅槃。二中有起已為往生有才起思惟聖果現起即般涅槃。三思已欲往生有。即得極果而般涅槃 十八生般者。生色界已便般涅槃故名生般 十九有行般者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『惱障未離定障故。通利．鈍二人』（因為煩惱的障礙沒有離開，還有禪定的障礙。包括根器敏銳和遲鈍的兩種人）。 『五俱解脫』（因為證得滅盡定的阿羅漢，禪定和智慧兩種障礙都解脫了。也包括根器敏銳和遲鈍的兩種人）。 『四向四果者』（這八種都包括根器敏銳和遲鈍的兩種人）。 『此八前五為十三』，『十四七返有』。指的是初果最多經歷七次在人界和天界的輪迴，然後證得無學果。或者情況也不一定。 『十五家家者』，指的是預流果（Sotapanna）進一步斷除修道位的三四品惑，進入一來向（Sakadagami-magga）並且經歷生死的人。或者從天上人家到人間，或者從人間到天上。在欲界中，天和人這兩類生命形式之間，最多往返兩三次，就證得無學果，所以叫家家。如果不經歷生死，就只叫一來向，不叫家家。 『十六一種子者』，只有一生之業的叫做一種子，也叫一間。指的是一來果（Sakadagami-phala）進一步斷除欲界修所斷的迷惑，達到七八品，進入不還向（Anagami-magga）並且經歷生死的人。或者在人間或者在天上只受一次生命就般涅槃，所以只有一道縫隙容納這一生，叫做一間。如果不經歷生死，就只叫不還向，不叫一種子。 『十七中般者』，在欲界身證得阿那含果（Anagami），命終後生于中有（Antarabhava，指死亡和投生之間的過渡狀態）而般涅槃，所以叫中般。因為生結已經斷盡，起結還沒有斷盡。因為生結斷盡，所以不再受生有；因為起結未斷盡，所以只受中有。 『生結者』，能夠滋潤生有的迷惑，這些已經斷盡，所以叫生結已盡。 『起結者』，能夠滋潤中有的迷惑。 『云何名起以于現身起此煩惱潤中有身故名起結』，或者使這個中有生起，叫做起結，這些還沒有斷盡，所以叫起結未亡。 『此有三種』，第一種是在上界中有才生起就證得聖果而般涅槃；第二種是中有生起后，爲了往生而生起思惟，聖果現前就般涅槃；第三種是思惟后想要往生，就證得極果而般涅槃。 『十八生般者』，生於有（Bhava，存在）以後就般涅槃，所以叫生般。 『十九有行般者』
【English Translation】 English version: 'Obstruction of Afflictions not Separated, Hence Obstruction of Samadhi. Both Keen and Dull Individuals' (Because the obstruction of afflictions has not been separated, and there is still the obstruction of Samadhi. Includes both individuals with keen and dull faculties). 'Five Liberations Together' (Because the Arhat who attains Nirodha-samapatti (滅盡定, Cessation Attainment), both the obstructions of Samadhi and Wisdom are liberated. Also includes both keen and dull individuals). 'The Four Paths and Four Fruits' (All eight of these include both keen and dull individuals). 'These Eight, the First Five are Thirteen', 'Fourteen, Seven Returns'. Refers to the Sotapanna (預流果, Stream-enterer) who experiences a maximum of seven rebirths in the realms of humans and devas, and then attains the fruit of No-More-Learning (無學果, Arahantship). Or the situation may not be fixed. 'Fifteen, Family-to-Family' (家家者, Kula-kula). Refers to the Stream-enterer who further severs the third and fourth grades of delusion in the Path of Cultivation, enters the Sakadagami-magga (一來向, Once-returning Path) and experiences rebirth. Either from a family in the heavens to a family in the human realm, or from a human family to a heavenly family. In the Desire Realm, between the two life forms of devas and humans, they return a maximum of two or three times, and then attain the fruit of No-More-Learning, hence called Family-to-Family. If they do not experience rebirth, they are only called Once-returning Path, not Family-to-Family. 'Sixteen, One-Seeder' (一種子者, Eka-bija). Only those with the karma of one lifetime are called One-Seeder, also called One-Interval. Refers to the Once-returner (Sakadagami-phala, 一來果) who further severs the delusions severed by cultivation in the Desire Realm, reaching the seventh and eighth grades, enters the Anagami-magga (不還向, Non-returning Path) and experiences rebirth. Either in the human realm or in the heavens, they only receive one lifetime and then attain Parinirvana, so there is only one gap to accommodate this one lifetime, called One-Interval. If they do not experience rebirth, they are only called Non-returning Path, not One-Seeder. 'Seventeen, Intermediate Parinirvana' (中般者, Antara-parinibbāyin). Attains the Anagami-phala (阿那含果, Non-returner Fruit) in the Desire Realm body, and after death is born in the intermediate existence (Antarabhava, 中有, the intermediate state between death and rebirth) and attains Parinirvana, hence called Intermediate Parinirvana. Because the bond of existence has been exhausted, but the bond of arising has not yet been exhausted. Because the bond of existence is exhausted, they no longer receive existence; because the bond of arising has not been exhausted, they only receive intermediate existence. 'The Bond of Existence' (生結者, Bhava-samyojana). The delusions that can moisten existence, these have been exhausted, hence called the Bond of Existence Exhausted. 'The Bond of Arising' (起結者, Upapatti-samyojana). The delusions that can moisten intermediate existence. 'How is it called Arising? Because in the present body, these afflictions arise and moisten the intermediate existence body, hence called the Bond of Arising.' Or causing this intermediate existence to arise is called the Bond of Arising, these have not been exhausted, hence called the Bond of Arising Not Exhausted. 'There are Three Types of This'. The first type is that in the intermediate existence of the upper realms, they attain the holy fruit as soon as it arises and attain Parinirvana; the second type is that after the intermediate existence arises, in order to be reborn, they give rise to thought, and the holy fruit manifests and they attain Parinirvana; the third type is that after thinking, they want to be reborn, and they attain the ultimate fruit and attain Parinirvana. 'Eighteen, Existence Parinirvana' (生般者, Upapatti-parinibbāyin). After being born in existence (Bhava, 有), they attain Parinirvana, hence called Existence Parinirvana. 'Nineteen, With Effort Parinirvana' (有行般者, Sasaṅkhāra-parinibbāyin).
。生色界已數數起行。斷惑得般名有行般 二十無行般者。生色界已不數起行。由串習力能斷隨眼得般涅槃名無行般 二十一上流般者。從初禪生乃至非想名上流般。于中有二。若樂惠上流極至色究竟。由五品熏禪生五凈居得無學果而般涅槃。不生無色。若樂定上流即極至非想非非想不生五凈居。上至無色得無學果而般涅槃。此二俱定性二乘 二十二退法者。鈍根之中極下者遇緣即退名為退法。謂鈍根性。若游散若不游散。若思惟若不思惟。皆必退失現法樂住。即是世間靜慮樂。非退聖法 二十三思法者。恐退失現法樂住。常思惟聖道故。若不思惟即失。思即不失 二十四護法者。作意護持。恐失現法樂住。若游散．放逸不護即失。若不游散不放逸護即不失。
二十五住不動者。若游散若不游散。若持刀若不持刀。皆不退失現法樂住。亦不能轉鈍根成利名住不動 言持刀者。謂有聖者厭患身故。自手持刀欲自害身故。不持刀者不為此事故 二十六必勝進者。若散不散皆不退失現法樂住。必能轉根至不動故名必勝進。亦名堪達。謂堪能轉根至不動故 二十七不動者。既成利根若散．不散終不退失現法樂住。畢竟不為煩惱所動故名不動 問云何名身證 答言身證者。薩婆多雲。以得此定六識不行。唯有色根及命。于
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 生般（Saṃskṛta）：已經多次開始修行。通過斷除迷惑而獲得涅槃，被稱為有行般。 二十、無行般：生般（Saṃskṛta）：不再需要多次開始修行。由於串習的力量，能夠斷除隨眼產生的迷惑而獲得涅槃，被稱為無行般。 二十一、上流般：從初禪天開始，一直到非想非非想處天，被稱為上流般。其中有兩種情況：如果喜歡智慧，上流般最終到達色究竟天，通過五品禪的熏修，在五凈居天獲得無學果而入涅槃，不會轉生到無色界。如果喜歡禪定，上流般最終到達非想非非想處天，不會轉生到五凈居天，一直到無色界獲得無學果而入涅槃。這兩種情況都是定性二乘。 二十二、退法者：在鈍根的人中，最下等的人遇到因緣就會退失，被稱為退法者。指的是鈍根的性質。無論是游散還是不游散，無論是思惟還是不思惟，都一定會退失現法樂住，也就是世間的靜慮之樂，但不是退失聖法。 二十三、思法者：因為害怕退失現法樂住，所以經常思惟聖道。如果不思惟就會退失，思惟就不會退失。 二十四、護法者：通過作意來守護和保持，害怕失去現法樂住。如果游散、放逸而不守護就會失去，如果不游散不放逸地守護就不會失去。 二十五、住不動者：無論是游散還是不游散，無論是持刀還是不持刀，都不會退失現法樂住，也不能將鈍根轉變為利根，被稱為住不動者。這裡說的『持刀』，是指有些聖者厭惡自己的身體，所以自己拿著刀想要自殺。『不持刀』指的是沒有做這種事。 二十六、必勝進者：無論是散亂還是不散亂，都不會退失現法樂住，必定能夠轉變根器達到不動的境界，所以稱為必勝進。也稱為堪達，意思是堪能轉變根器達到不動的境界。 二十七、不動者：已經成為利根的人，無論是散亂還是不散亂，最終都不會退失現法樂住，畢竟不會被煩惱所動搖，所以稱為不動。 問：什麼叫做身證？ 答：身證，根據薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda）的說法，是指獲得這種禪定后，六識不再活動，只有色根和命根存在。
【English Translation】 English version: Saṃskṛta (生般): One who has repeatedly begun practicing. By severing delusions and attaining Nirvana, they are called 'With Effort Nirvana'. Twenty, Without Effort Nirvana: Saṃskṛta (生般): One who no longer needs to repeatedly begin practicing. Due to the power of habituation, they can sever delusions arising from the eye and attain Nirvana, called 'Without Effort Nirvana'. Twenty-one, Upstream Nirvana: From the first Dhyana heaven up to the Heaven of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception, they are called 'Upstream Nirvana'. There are two cases: If one delights in wisdom, the Upstream Nirvana ultimately reaches the Akanishtha Heaven (色究竟天). Through the cultivation of the fivefold meditation, they attain the fruit of non-learning in the Pure Abodes (五凈居天) and enter Nirvana, without being reborn in the Formless Realm. If one delights in Samadhi, the Upstream Nirvana ultimately reaches the Heaven of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception, without being reborn in the Pure Abodes, and attains the fruit of non-learning in the Formless Realm and enters Nirvana. Both of these cases are those of the fixed Two Vehicles (定性二乘). Twenty-two, One Who Declines: Among those of dull faculties, the lowest will decline upon encountering conditions, called 'One Who Declines'. This refers to the nature of dull faculties. Whether wandering or not wandering, whether thinking or not thinking, they will inevitably lose the pleasure of dwelling in the present Dharma, which is the worldly pleasure of meditative absorption, but not the loss of the holy Dharma. Twenty-three, One Who Thinks: Fearing the loss of the pleasure of dwelling in the present Dharma, they constantly contemplate the holy path. If they do not contemplate, they will lose it; if they contemplate, they will not lose it. Twenty-four, One Who Protects: Through intentional effort, they protect and maintain, fearing the loss of the pleasure of dwelling in the present Dharma. If they wander and are negligent without protecting, they will lose it; if they do not wander and are not negligent in protecting, they will not lose it. Twenty-five, One Who Dwells Unmoved: Whether wandering or not wandering, whether holding a knife or not holding a knife, they will not lose the pleasure of dwelling in the present Dharma, nor can they transform dull faculties into sharp faculties, called 'One Who Dwells Unmoved'. 'Holding a knife' refers to some holy ones who are disgusted with their bodies, so they hold a knife themselves, wanting to kill themselves. 'Not holding a knife' refers to not doing this. Twenty-six, One Who Will Surely Advance: Whether scattered or not scattered, they will not lose the pleasure of dwelling in the present Dharma, and will surely be able to transform their faculties to the state of immovability, so they are called 'One Who Will Surely Advance'. They are also called 'Capable of Reaching', meaning capable of transforming their faculties to the state of immovability. Twenty-seven, One Who Is Unmoved: Having already become one with sharp faculties, whether scattered or not scattered, they will ultimately not lose the pleasure of dwelling in the present Dharma, and will ultimately not be moved by afflictions, so they are called 'One Who Is Unmoved'. Question: What is called 'Body Witness'? Answer: 'Body Witness', according to Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多), refers to when, having attained this Samadhi, the six consciousnesses no longer function, and only the physical sense organs and the life force remain.
此身邊有得得此滅定故云身證 問何不依命根 答以非色非心不可還依非色非心。若大乘師不言身邊有別得得。但顯得滅定者得理更親。如身根取境。從喻為名名為身證 問如有部欲．色有身根。依此得滅名身證 答無色雖實無身根不入滅定無身證。大乘既別。無色亦得證有身證。
增生損生者。欲界修道煩惱分為九品。將此九品以潤七生。初上品惑以增盛故獨潤二生。斷此品時二生便減。上中．上下此之兩品共潤二生。斷此惑時二生永絕。通前二生減四生也。中上一品能潤一生。若減損此一品五生已退。下五品在名為家家。中中．中下共招一有。若斷此二下三品在名為一往來不名家家。下上一品唯感半生。斷此一品即名一間。以有下中．下下惑在故。下中．下下亦增半生故名一間。初果極有無越七生。余不定者七中不說 已上據大生說。人天兩報合名一生。若論中有人．天別說乃有十四。一一生中皆有中有人天各七。若兼本有二八生。此上略舉未細尋文。如有誤處當可正之。上依隨轉。大乘無文。據大乘宗未必如彼分品潤生。何以故。瑜伽云全界一切煩惱皆能潤生 若如彼說上上品惑能受二生。預流果人余惑誰遮不令共潤。但上品潤故應總潤。猶斷一品余惑但能潤於五生。力勢漸微。餘者準此(當更撿文)。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為此身存在而能夠獲得滅盡定，所以稱為身證（通過身體的證悟）。問：為什麼不依賴命根（jīnmìnggēn，生命之根）呢？答：因為命根非色（fēisè，非物質）非心（fēixīn，非精神），不可依止，不能作為獲得滅盡定的依據。如果大乘（Dàchéng，Mahayana）的論師不認為身體之外有單獨的『得』，但認為能夠顯現滅盡定的人更接近真理。就像身根（shēngēn，身體的感官）取境一樣，從比喻的角度命名為『身證』。問：如果說有部（Yǒubù，Sarvastivada）的欲界（yùjiè，desire realm）、色界（sèjiè，form realm）有身根，依靠這個獲得滅盡定，稱為身證，可以嗎？答：無色界（wúsèjiè，formless realm）雖然確實沒有身根，但如果不進入滅盡定，就沒有身證。大乘既然有所不同，無色界也能證得，也有身證。 增生損生（zēngshēngsǔnshēng，增加或減少生命）是指：欲界修道（yùjièxiūdào，cultivation in the desire realm）的煩惱分為九品。用這九品煩惱來滋潤七次生命。最初的上上品惑（shàngshàngpǐnhuò，highest level of affliction）因為最為強烈，獨自滋潤兩次生命。斷除這一品煩惱時，兩次生命便會減少。上中品（shàngzhōngpǐn，upper-middle level）和上下品（shàngxiàpǐn，upper-lower level）這兩品共同滋潤兩次生命。斷除這些煩惱時，兩次生命便會永遠斷絕。連同之前的兩次生命，總共減少四次生命。中上品（zhōngshàngpǐn，middle-upper level）能夠滋潤一次生命。如果減少或損失這一品煩惱，五次生命已經退減。剩下的下五品煩惱存在時，稱為家家（jiājiā，one who is reborn into the same family）。中中品（zhōngzhōngpǐn，middle-middle level）和中下品（zhōngxiàpǐn，middle-lower level）共同招感一次有（yǒu，existence）。如果斷除這兩品，剩下的下三品煩惱存在時，稱為一往來（yīwǎnglái，once-returner），不再稱為家家。下上品（xiàshàngpǐn，lower-upper level）只感得半次生命。斷除這一品煩惱就稱為一間（yījiān，one interval）。因為還有下中品（xiàzhōngpǐn，lower-middle level）和下下品惑（xiàxiàpǐnhuò，lower-lower level）存在。下中品和下下品也增加半次生命，所以稱為一間。初果（chūguǒ，first fruit of stream-entry）最多不會超過七次生命。其餘不確定的情況，在這七次生命中沒有說明。以上是根據大生（dàshēng，major rebirth）來說的。人天兩報（réntiānliǎngbào，rebirth as human and deva）合起來稱為一生。如果討論中有人（zhōngyǒurén，intermediate being）和天（tiān，deva）分別來說，就會有十四次。每一次生命中都有中有人和天各七次。如果加上本有（běnyǒu，original existence），就有二十八次生命。以上只是簡略地列舉，沒有仔細地查閱原文。如果有錯誤的地方，應當可以糾正。以上是依據隨轉（suízhuǎn，following the teachings）而說。大乘沒有這樣的說法。根據大乘的宗義，未必像他們那樣分品滋潤生命。為什麼呢？瑜伽（Yújiā，Yoga）說，整個界（jiè，realm）的一切煩惱都能滋潤生命。如果像他們所說，上上品惑能夠招感兩次生命，那麼預流果（yùliúguǒ，stream-enterer）的人，其餘的煩惱誰來阻止它們不共同滋潤生命呢？但因為上上品惑滋潤，所以應該全部滋潤。就像斷除一品煩惱后，其餘的煩惱只能滋潤五次生命一樣，力量逐漸減弱。其餘的情況可以依此類推（應當再查閱原文）。
【English Translation】 English version: Because one can attain cessation through this body, it is called 'body-witness' (身證, śarīra-sākṣin, attainment through the body). Question: Why not rely on the life-faculty (命根, jīnmìnggēn, life-faculty)? Answer: Because the life-faculty is neither form (非色, fēisè, non-material) nor mind (非心, fēixīn, non-mental), it cannot be relied upon; it cannot serve as the basis for attaining cessation. If the Mahayana (大乘, Dàchéng, Great Vehicle) masters do not believe that there is a separate 'attainment' outside of the body, but consider that one who can manifest cessation is closer to the truth. Just as the body-sense (身根, shēngēn, body sense) takes objects, it is named 'body-witness' from a metaphorical perspective. Question: If the Sarvastivadins (有部, Yǒubù, 'those who assert all exists') of the desire realm (欲界, yùjiè, realm of desire) and form realm (色界, sèjiè, realm of form) have body-senses, can one rely on this to attain cessation and call it 'body-witness'? Answer: Although the formless realm (無色界, wúsèjiè, realm of no-form) truly has no body-sense, if one does not enter cessation, there is no body-witness. Since the Mahayana is different, the formless realm can also attain and have body-witness. 'Increasing life' and 'decreasing life' (增生損生, zēngshēngsǔnshēng, increasing or decreasing rebirths) refer to: the afflictions of the path of cultivation (欲界修道, yùjièxiūdào, cultivation in the desire realm) in the desire realm being divided into nine grades. These nine grades of afflictions are used to moisten seven lives. The highest of the highest grade of affliction (上上品惑, shàngshàngpǐnhuò, the highest level of affliction) alone moistens two lives because it is the strongest. When this grade of affliction is cut off, two lives are reduced. The upper-middle grade (上中品, shàngzhōngpǐn, upper-middle level) and upper-lower grade (上下品, shàngxiàpǐn, upper-lower level) together moisten two lives. When these afflictions are cut off, two lives are permanently severed. Together with the previous two lives, a total of four lives are reduced. The middle-upper grade (中上品, zhōngshàngpǐn, middle-upper level) can moisten one life. If this grade of affliction is reduced or lost, five lives have already regressed. When the remaining lower five grades of afflictions exist, it is called 'family-to-family' (家家, jiājiā, one who is reborn into the same family). The middle-middle grade (中中品, zhōngzhōngpǐn, middle-middle level) and middle-lower grade (中下品, zhōngxiàpǐn, middle-lower level) together attract one existence (有, yǒu, existence). If these two grades are cut off, and the remaining lower three grades of afflictions exist, it is called 'once-returner' (一往來, yīwǎnglái, once-returner), and no longer called 'family-to-family'. The lower-upper grade (下上品, xiàshàngpǐn, lower-upper level) only experiences half a life. Cutting off this grade of affliction is called 'one interval' (一間, yījiān, one interval), because the lower-middle grade (下中品, xiàzhōngpǐn, lower-middle level) and lower-lower grade of affliction (下下品惑, xiàxiàpǐnhuò, lower-lower level) still exist. The lower-middle and lower-lower grades also increase half a life, so it is called 'one interval'. The first fruit (初果, chūguǒ, first fruit of stream-entry) at most will not exceed seven lives. The remaining uncertain situations are not explained within these seven lives. The above is explained according to major rebirth (大生, dàshēng, major rebirth). Rebirth as human and deva (人天兩報, réntiānliǎngbào, rebirth as human and deva) together are called one life. If we discuss the intermediate being (中有人, zhōngyǒurén, intermediate being) and deva (天, tiān, deva) separately, there will be fourteen. In each life, there are seven intermediate beings and seven devas. If we add the original existence (本有, běnyǒu, original existence), there will be twenty-eight lives. The above is just a brief listing, without carefully examining the original text. If there are any errors, they should be corrected. The above is based on following the teachings (隨轉, suízhuǎn, following the teachings). The Mahayana does not have such a saying. According to the Mahayana doctrine, it is not necessarily the case that they divide the grades to moisten life in that way. Why? The Yoga (瑜伽, Yújiā, Yoga) says that all the afflictions of the entire realm (界, jiè, realm) can moisten life. If, as they say, the highest of the highest grade of affliction can attract two lives, then for a stream-enterer (預流果, yùliúguǒ, stream-enterer), who will prevent the remaining afflictions from not jointly moistening life? But because the highest grade of affliction moistens, it should all moisten. Just as after cutting off one grade of affliction, the remaining afflictions can only moisten five lives, the power gradually weakens. The rest can be inferred by analogy (the original text should be checked again).
若大乘中或說五補特伽羅．七地．十三住．或四十二賢聖等。
法種種相謂蘊處界等。此說善巧諸論不問。依瑜伽論二七說有五善巧。加處非處．及緣起善巧。如般若心經或說為六。於此論中加緣起．諦．及無智．亦無得。即四善根中能．所取觀善巧。此約三乘 或無智得但約大乘作唯識觀 若瑜伽五十七說六。於前五上加根善巧 顯揚十四說七善巧。於此六上加諦善巧。故彼頌云。于諸蘊．界．處。及眾緣起法。處非處．根．諦。善巧事應知。若辨中邊有十善巧。頌云。蘊．處．界．緣起。處．非處．根．世。諦．乘．為．無為。是名十善巧。
論。此中識言亦攝心所。本疏意云。外問我法所依內能變相豈無心所。此意難言。心能變見相。依此上立我法。心所變相．見。何不依彼立我法。今答此難。此中識言亦攝心所。何以故。定相應故。心起之時非定有所。如貪．信等心起之時隨與一俱。非一切時恒貪．信並。故舉心王攝於心所。不舉心所攝於心王。西明云答外難。難色等依心變。攝本名唯識。心所非心變。心所非唯識。故今釋言。此中識言亦攝心所 此未必然。何者乘前為難。前云如是諸相若由假說依何得成。答云彼相皆依識所轉變。乘此即難。識轉變見．相。依之立我法。心所變見．相。何不依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果在大乘佛教的經典中，有時會提到五種補特伽羅（pudgala，人或有情）、七地（bhumi，菩薩修行的階段）、十三住（菩薩的修行位階）或者四十二賢聖等。
所謂的『法』的種種相狀，指的是五蘊（skandha，構成個體經驗的要素）、十二處（ayatana，感覺器官和對像）和十八界（dhatu，蘊、處的擴充套件）等。這裡所說的善巧，各個論典的說法不盡相同。根據《瑜伽師地論》，有五種善巧，即處非處善巧（瞭解可能性與不可能性）、以及緣起善巧（瞭解事物相互依存的產生）。如《般若心經》中，有時會說有六種善巧。在這個論典中，增加了緣起、諦（satya，真理）、以及無智亦無得（沒有智慧也沒有獲得），也就是四善根（暖、頂、忍、世第一法）中能取和所取觀的善巧。這是從三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的角度來說的。或者說，無智亦無得只從大乘的角度，以唯識觀（一切唯心造）來看。如果按照《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷的說法，有六種善巧，在前五種的基礎上增加了根善巧（瞭解根器）。《顯揚聖教論》第十四卷說有七種善巧，在這六種的基礎上增加了諦善巧。所以那裡的偈頌說：『對於諸蘊、界、處，以及眾緣起法，處非處、根、諦，應該瞭解這些善巧。』如果按照《辨中邊論》，有十種善巧。偈頌說：『蘊、處、界、緣起，處非處、根、世（間），諦、乘（乘法）、有為（有為法）、無為（無為法），這就是所謂的十善巧。』
論：這裡所說的『識』（vijnana，意識），也包括心所（citta-caitta，心理活動）。本疏的含義是說：外人問，我法（atma-dharma，自我和事物）所依賴的內在能變現的相，難道沒有心所嗎？這個意思很難說清楚。心能變現見相（能見之相），依此建立我法。心所變現相和見，為什麼不依此建立我法呢？現在回答這個疑問：這裡所說的『識』也包括心所。為什麼呢？因為它們是定相應（同時生起）的。心生起的時候，並非一定有所伴隨，比如貪、信等心生起的時候，只會與其中一個同時生起，並非所有時候都同時生起貪和信。所以舉心王（主要的心識）來涵蓋心所，而不舉心所來涵蓋心王。西明說這是爲了回答外人的疑問。外人質疑說，色等（色法）依賴心變現，所以稱為唯識。心所不是心變現的，所以心所不是唯識。所以現在解釋說：這裡所說的『識』也包括心所。這未必是必然的。為什麼呢？因為前面是提出了疑問。前面說，像這樣的諸相，如果是通過假說而成立的，那麼是依靠什麼而成立的呢？回答說，這些相都是依靠識所轉變而來的。緊接著就提出了疑問：識轉變見相，依靠它來建立我法。心所變現見相，為什麼不依靠它呢？
【English Translation】 English version: If, within the Mahayana teachings, there are sometimes references to the five pudgalas (persons or sentient beings), the seven bhumis (stages of a Bodhisattva's practice), the thirteen abodes (levels of a Bodhisattva's practice), or the forty-two virtuous and holy ones, etc.
The various aspects of 'dharma' (teachings, phenomena) refer to the five skandhas (aggregates constituting individual experience), the twelve ayatanas (sense bases), and the eighteen dhatus (elements), etc. The skillful means mentioned here vary across different treatises. According to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, there are five skillful means: the skillful means of possibilities and impossibilities, and the skillful means of dependent origination. As in the Heart Sutra, there are sometimes said to be six skillful means. In this treatise, dependent origination, satya (truth), and 'no wisdom, also no attainment' are added, which are the skillful means of the observer and the observed within the four roots of goodness (warmth, peak, forbearance, and the highest mundane dharma). This is from the perspective of the Three Vehicles (Sravakayana, Pratyekabuddhayana, Bodhisattvayana). Alternatively, 'no wisdom, also no attainment' is only viewed from the Mahayana perspective, with the perspective of vijnanavada (consciousness-only). According to the 57th fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, there are six skillful means, adding the skillful means of faculties to the previous five. The 14th fascicle of the Xianyang Shengjiao Lun says there are seven skillful means, adding the skillful means of truth to these six. Therefore, the verse there says: 'Regarding the aggregates, sense bases, elements, and the laws of dependent origination, one should understand the skillful means of possibilities and impossibilities, faculties, and truths.' According to the Madhyantavibhaga, there are ten skillful means. The verse says: 'Aggregates, sense bases, elements, dependent origination, possibilities and impossibilities, faculties, the world, truths, vehicle, conditioned, and unconditioned, these are called the ten skillful means.'
Commentary: The term 'consciousness' (vijnana) here also includes mental factors (citta-caitta). The meaning of the original commentary is: An outsider asks, 'The internal transformative aspects upon which the self and phenomena (atma-dharma) rely, are there no mental factors?' This meaning is difficult to explain clearly. The mind can transform into the aspect of seeing (the aspect of the seer), and based on this, the self and phenomena are established. Mental factors transform into aspects and seeing, why not establish the self and phenomena based on them? Now, to answer this question: The term 'consciousness' here also includes mental factors. Why? Because they are in constant association (arising simultaneously). When the mind arises, it is not necessarily accompanied by everything; for example, when greed or faith arises, it only arises simultaneously with one of them, not always with both greed and faith. Therefore, the main consciousness is mentioned to encompass mental factors, rather than mentioning mental factors to encompass the main consciousness. Ximing said that this was to answer the outsider's question. The outsider questioned, 'Form, etc., relies on the mind's transformation, so it is called consciousness-only. Mental factors are not transformed by the mind, so mental factors are not consciousness-only.' Therefore, the current explanation is: The term 'consciousness' here also includes mental factors. This is not necessarily the case. Why? Because the previous part raised a question. The previous part said, 'If such aspects are established through hypothetical designation, then what do they rely on to be established?' The answer is, 'These aspects all rely on the transformation of consciousness.' Immediately following this, the question is raised: Consciousness transforms into the aspect of seeing, and relying on it, the self and phenomena are established. Mental factors transform into the aspect of seeing, why not rely on them?
彼立。此下即答。此中識言亦攝心所。文勢相連 如西明釋終有此難應更須通。又未釋變義及以唯識。何有斯難 或可。外難。相．見識所變。依之立我法。心所非識變。應非立我法。故答。此中識言亦攝心所。定相應故 此亦不然。若前言依識立我法者。可言識攝所。言所變非變為難不齊。故本疏解正 要集云。二疏意同 讀不審細 要集又云。言定相應故下釋所以。謂彼心所雖非識變。而定相應亦得識名。又問云。色等心所變攝相明唯識。心所定相應。攝所辨唯識 解云非倒。色等唯一分。隨彼能變說唯識。心所具三分。不隨彼識名唯識。謂彼心所見等三分具足成故。受等各各自成唯識 此釋不然。以具三分故名為識。心所具足三得識名者。何故但云識有八種。又違下第七不離識故釋于唯識。
論。相見俱依自證起故。問相．見二分為同種生。為別種起 答有三師不同。一師云。見相同種生起名唯識。若別種起既與識殊何名唯識。此有二類。一三法同種生。謂本質．影像．及見分三。二兩法同種生。謂相．見分 三法同種者。且眼識起時緣於色境熏成種子。種子有三功能。一能生本質。二生自相分。三生自見分。兩法同種者。但自相．見。不生本質(謂緣過未．龜毛．無等)。或雖有質。質本有生。不能熏
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 彼立（對方提出觀點）。此下即答（接下來是回答）。此中識言亦攝心所（這裡所說的『識』也包括了心所）。文勢相連（文意是連貫的）。如西明釋終有此難應更須通（就像西明的解釋最終有這個難題，應該進一步解釋）。又未釋變義及以唯識（而且沒有解釋『變』的含義以及『唯識』的含義），何有斯難（怎麼會有這樣的難題呢）？或可（或許可以這樣理解）：外難（外人的質疑）。相（自相分，現象）．見識所變（見分，認知是識所變現的），依之立我法（依靠它們建立我法）。心所非識變（心所不是識所變現的），應非立我法（那麼心所不應該能建立我法）。故答（所以回答說）：此中識言亦攝心所（這裡所說的『識』也包括了心所），定相應故（因為它們是必定相應的）。 此亦不然（這種說法也不對）。若前言依識立我法者（如果前面說依靠識來建立我法），可言識攝所（可以說識包含了心所）。言所變非變為難不齊（說心所變現和識變現是不同的，這個難題並不成立）。故本疏解正（所以原本的疏解是正確的）。要集云（《要集》中說）：二疏意同（兩種疏解的含義是相同的）。讀不審細（只是你沒有仔細審閱）。要集又云（《要集》中又說）：言定相應故下釋所以（『因為它們是必定相應的』這句話解釋了原因）。謂彼心所雖非識變（意思是說，那些心所雖然不是識所變現的），而定相應亦得識名（但是因為它們必定與識相應，也可以得到『識』的名稱）。又問云（又有人問）：色等心所變攝相明唯識（色等心所變現的現象說明了唯識），心所定相應（心所必定與識相應），攝所辨唯識（說明了什麼唯識）？解云非倒（解釋說，這並不是顛倒的）。色等唯一分（色等只是一部分），隨彼能變說唯識（隨著它們能變現的能力來說明唯識）。心所具三分（心所具有三分），不隨彼識名唯識（不隨著那個識的名稱來說明唯識）。謂彼心所見等三分具足成故（意思是說，那些心所的見分等三分都具足成就）。受等各各自成唯識（受等各自成就唯識）。此釋不然（這種解釋不對）。以具三分故名為識（因為具有三分所以稱為識），心所具足三得識名者（如果心所具足三分就能得到識的名稱），何故但云識有八種（為什麼只說有八種識）？又違下第七不離識故釋于唯識（又違背了下面第七識不離識的解釋）。 論（正文）：相見俱依自證起故（自相分和見分都依靠自證分而生起）。問（提問）：相（自相分，現象）．見二分為同種生（見分，認知這兩種分是同一種子生起），為別種起（還是不同的種子生起）？答（回答）：有三師不同（有三種不同的說法）。一師云（第一種說法認為）：見相同種生起名唯識（見分和自相分是同一種子生起，這叫做唯識）。若別種起既與識殊何名唯識（如果是由不同的種子生起，既然和識不同，為什麼還叫做唯識）？此有二類（這種情況有兩種）：一三法同種生（第一種是三種法同一種子生起），謂本質（客觀事物）．影像（影像）．及見分三（和見分這三種）。二兩法同種生（第二種是兩種法同一種子生起），謂相（自相分，現象）．見分（和見分）。三法同種者（三種法同一種子生起的情況是）：且眼識起時緣於色境熏成種子（比如眼識生起時，緣於色境熏習形成種子）。種子有三功能（種子有三種功能）：一能生本質（第一種是能生起本質，即客觀事物）。二生自相分（第二種是生起自相分，即現象）。三生自見分（第三種是生起見分，即認知）。兩法同種者（兩種法同一種子生起的情況是）：但自相．見（只有自相分和見分）。不生本質(謂緣過未．龜毛．無等)（不生起本質，比如緣於過去、未來、龜毛、虛無等）。或雖有質（或者即使有本質），質本有生（本質本來就存在），不能熏（不能熏習）。
【English Translation】 English version: He establishes [a point]. The following is the answer. Here, the term 'consciousness' also includes mental factors. The meaning of the text is connected. As the explanation of Ximing [Temple] ultimately has this difficulty, it should be further clarified. Moreover, the meaning of 'transformation' and 'Vijñāptimātratā' [Consciousness-only] have not been explained. How can there be such a difficulty? Perhaps [it can be understood as]: an external difficulty. The self-image [phenomena] and perception [cognition] are transformed by consciousness. Based on them, the self and dharma are established. Mental factors are not transformed by consciousness. Therefore, they should not be able to establish the self and dharma. Hence the answer: Here, the term 'consciousness' also includes mental factors, because they are invariably associated. This is also not correct. If it was previously said that the self and dharma are established based on consciousness, it could be said that consciousness includes mental factors. Saying that what is transformed [by mental factors] is different from transformation [by consciousness] is an uneven difficulty. Therefore, the original commentary is correct. The Essential Collection says: The meanings of the two commentaries are the same. [You] did not read carefully. The Essential Collection also says: The phrase 'because they are invariably associated' explains the reason. It means that although those mental factors are not transformed by consciousness, because they are invariably associated, they can also be called 'consciousness'. Someone also asks: The phenomena transformed by mental factors such as form, etc., explain Vijñāptimātratā [Consciousness-only]. Mental factors are invariably associated [with consciousness]. What Vijñāptimātratā does this explain? The explanation says it is not inverted. Form, etc., are only one part. Following their ability to transform, we speak of Vijñāptimātratā [Consciousness-only]. Mental factors possess three aspects. We do not speak of Vijñāptimātratā [Consciousness-only] following that consciousness's name. It means that the perception, etc., of those mental factors are fully accomplished with the three aspects. Feelings, etc., each individually accomplish Vijñāptimātratā [Consciousness-only]. This explanation is not correct. Because they possess three aspects, they are called consciousness. If mental factors that possess three aspects can obtain the name of consciousness, why is it only said that there are eight types of consciousness? It also contradicts the explanation below that the seventh [consciousness] is not separate from consciousness, hence explaining Vijñāptimātratā [Consciousness-only]. Treatise: Because both the self-image [phenomena] and perception [cognition] arise relying on self-awareness. Question: Are the self-image [phenomena] and perception [cognition] two aspects produced from the same seed, or do they arise from different seeds? Answer: There are three different masters [with different views]. One master says: Perception and the self-image arising from the same seed are called Vijñāptimātratā [Consciousness-only]. If they arise from different seeds, since they are different from consciousness, why are they called Vijñāptimātratā [Consciousness-only]? There are two types of this: One is that three dharmas arise from the same seed, namely the objective reality, the image, and the perception aspect. The second is that two dharmas arise from the same seed, namely the self-image [phenomena] and the perception aspect. In the case of three dharmas arising from the same seed: For example, when eye-consciousness arises, it conditions the seed by perceiving the object of form. The seed has three functions: First, it can produce the objective reality. Second, it produces the self-image aspect [phenomena]. Third, it produces the perception aspect [cognition]. In the case of two dharmas arising from the same seed: There are only the self-image [phenomena] and perception [cognition]. It does not produce the objective reality (such as when perceiving the past, future, tortoise hair, non-existence, etc.). Or even if there is an objective reality, the objective reality originally exists and cannot be conditioned.
故 問前三法同種生者。有二過失。一第八相例失。眼識親緣色相．見同種生。本識親緣色亦應同種起 答眼識自能熏相．見同種起。第八不能熏見．相各別起 問若爾眼不緣八見。八見．相別起。六既通能同。八見．相同種 答第八見．相亦同一種 若爾二諸法雜亂失。如第六識一剎那中緣十八界。質與見．相既同種生。故十八種成雜亂失 亦有三界雜亂過失 若依第二不生本質本質唯舊。亦有二失。一違教失。若前轉識不熏成彼第八本識種。違阿毗達磨經云諸法于識藏。識於法亦爾。更互為因性。亦常為果性 二者界雜亂失。又若見分與相同種。如在下地起上天眼。既許本識緣彼二根以為相分。即欲界本識與彼二根同一種生。上界眼根與地獄識同一種過 若言第八不能熏故相見別種。一前言不簡。二違理失。八俱有相何有不同 第二師云。見．相別種 若爾亦有三過。一假法種生失。如緣極微極微無體。但假想惠折為極微。唯識下云非謂極微有實自體。又瑜伽五十四云。建立極微非由有體。是故極微無生無滅。若此相分別熏成種後生現行。極微有體亦有生滅。緣不相應過亦同此二違聖教失。顯揚十八云。謂諸極微但假想立。自體實無 瑜伽五十四非由有體。若別種生即成有體。故違聖教 三假法能熏失。既假想惠
安立極微。相分是假許能熏種。即違第二假法如無非因緣故 第三師云。見．相二分隨其所應種或同．異。如緣龜毛．菟角等。相與見同種。以無自體相分復假。不別熏種。但隨見力帶同熏種。如緣五根有為實體。相與見分即別種生。以十八界定異因故不相雜亂 然相與質。一云同種。一云別種。雖有二義相．質種別理亦應好。以親．疏緣種各別故 如緣第八相．質同種。即許一種生慮．非慮 亦有二身根等俱失。以相與質既同種生。何不二身根等 若六緣時相分是假。即有一種生假實失 此言假者非如瓶等。以能熏故。但無根用不發識故名之為假。由此相．質或說同．別。然於此義應設劬勞 又解若相與質同種生者。如眼等根第八所變是因緣故實有根用。若起相分因第六生。雖與本質同一種生。以第六見為緣起故。分別變攝故無實用。非無體假故無假實同一種失。
然同別種 復有種別性與見同 或復性同而系．種別 或復相分性隨見質判性不定 或雖有質。相．見同生不生本質。由此不定故。三藏法師以為一頌顯此差別云。性境不隨心。獨影唯從見。帶質通情本。性種等隨應。釋此頌文如樞要說。以義稍難故更廣之 先定性境后顯不隨 何名性境。從實種生。有實體用。能緣之心得彼自相名為性境 如身在
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 安立極微（Anli Jiwei）：相分是假設的，能夠熏習種子。這與第二種假法相違背，因為沒有非因緣的緣故。第三位論師說：見分和相分，根據它們各自的情況，種子可能相同或不同。例如，緣于龜毛、兔角等，相分與見分同種，因為沒有自體，相分又是假設的，不單獨熏習種子，只是隨著見分的力量，帶著一起熏習種子。如果緣於五根等有為實體，相分與見分就是不同種子所生，因為十八界決定了不同的因，所以不會相互混淆。然而，相分與質（本質），一種說法是同種，一種說法是別種。雖然有兩種說法，相分與質的種子不同，這個道理也應該成立，因為親疏的緣起種子各自不同。例如，緣于第八識，相分與質同種，就允許一種種子產生思慮和非思慮。也有兩種身體的根等同時失去的情況，因為相分與質既然是同一種子所生，為什麼不是兩種身體的根等同時失去呢？如果六根緣于外境時，相分是假設的，就有一種種子產生假和實同時失去的情況。這裡說的『假』，不是像瓶子等那樣，因為能夠熏習。只是沒有根的作用，不能引發識，所以稱為『假』。因此，相分與質，有時說同種，有時說別種。然而，對於這個意義，應該努力研究。
又有一種解釋，如果相分與質同種所生，例如眼等根是第八識所變現，是因緣所生，所以確實有根的作用。如果生起相分是第六識所生，雖然與本質是同一種子所生，因為第六識的見分作為緣起，通過分別變現攝取，所以沒有實際作用。因為不是沒有本體的假，所以沒有假和實同一種子失去的過失。
然而，同種和別種，又有種子的類別，自性與見分相同，或者自性相同而繫縛和種子不同，或者相分的自性隨著見分和質來判斷，自性不確定，或者雖然有質，相分和見分同生，但不生本質。因為這種不確定性，三藏法師用一首偈頌來顯示這種差別：『性境不隨心，獨影唯從見，帶質通情本，性種等隨應。』解釋這首偈頌就像《樞要》所說。因為意義稍微困難，所以更加詳細地解釋。先確定什麼是性境，然後顯示它不隨心。什麼叫做性境？從真實的種子所生，有實體作用，能緣之心得到它的自相，叫做性境。例如身體在…… English version: Establishing the Ultimate Particle (Anli Jiwei): The appearance-division (xiangfen) is a provisional establishment, capable of perfuming seeds. This contradicts the second type of provisional dharma, as there is no non-causal condition. The third teacher says: The seeing-division (jianfen) and appearance-division, according to their respective situations, may have the same or different seeds. For example, when cognizing turtle hair, rabbit horns, etc., the appearance and seeing-divisions have the same seed, because there is no self-nature, and the appearance-division is provisional, not perfuming seeds separately, but perfuming seeds together with the power of the seeing-division. If cognizing conditioned entities such as the five roots, the appearance and seeing-divisions are born from different seeds, because the eighteen realms determine different causes, so they do not mix. However, regarding the appearance-division and the substance (essence), one view is that they have the same seed, and another view is that they have different seeds. Although there are two views, the principle that the seeds of the appearance-division and the substance are different should also hold, because the seeds of close and distant conditions are different. For example, when cognizing the eighth consciousness, the appearance-division and the substance have the same seed, which allows one seed to produce thought and non-thought. There are also cases where the roots of two bodies are lost simultaneously, because since the appearance-division and the substance are born from the same seed, why aren't the roots of the two bodies lost simultaneously? If the appearance-division is provisional when the six senses cognize external objects, then there is a case where one seed produces the loss of both the provisional and the real. The 'provisional' here is not like a vase, etc., because it can perfume. It just doesn't have the function of a root and cannot generate consciousness, so it is called 'provisional'. Therefore, the appearance-division and the substance are sometimes said to have the same seed, and sometimes said to have different seeds. However, one should diligently study this meaning.
Another explanation is that if the appearance-division and the substance are born from the same seed, for example, the eye and other roots are transformations of the eighth consciousness, born from conditions, so they do have the function of a root. If the arising of the appearance-division is born from the sixth consciousness, although it is born from the same seed as the essence, because the seeing-division of the sixth consciousness acts as a condition, through discriminating transformations and grasping, it has no practical function. Because it is not a provisional without substance, there is no fault of the provisional and the real losing the same seed.
However, regarding same and different seeds, there are also categories of seeds, the nature being the same as the seeing-division, or the nature being the same while the bondage and seeds are different, or the nature of the appearance-division being determined by the seeing-division and the substance, the nature being uncertain, or although there is substance, the appearance and seeing-divisions are born together, but do not produce the essence. Because of this uncertainty, the Tripitaka Master used a verse to show this difference: 'The nature-realm does not follow the mind, the single shadow only comes from seeing, the substance-bearing connects with emotion and essence, the nature and seeds are equal and follow accordingly.' Explaining this verse is like what is said in the 'Essentials'. Because the meaning is slightly difficult, it is explained in more detail. First determine what the nature-realm is, and then show that it does not follow the mind. What is called the nature-realm? Born from a real seed, having substantial function, the mind that can cognize obtains its self-nature, which is called the nature-realm. For example, the body is at...
【English Translation】 Establishing the Ultimate Particle (Anli Jiwei): The appearance-division (xiangfen) is a provisional establishment, capable of perfuming seeds. This contradicts the second type of provisional dharma, as there is no non-causal condition. The third teacher says: The seeing-division (jianfen) and appearance-division, according to their respective situations, may have the same or different seeds. For example, when cognizing turtle hair, rabbit horns, etc., the appearance and seeing-divisions have the same seed, because there is no self-nature, and the appearance-division is provisional, not perfuming seeds separately, but perfuming seeds together with the power of the seeing-division. If cognizing conditioned entities such as the five roots, the appearance and seeing-divisions are born from different seeds, because the eighteen realms determine different causes, so they do not mix. However, regarding the appearance-division and the substance (essence), one view is that they have the same seed, and another view is that they have different seeds. Although there are two views, the principle that the seeds of the appearance-division and the substance are different should also hold, because the seeds of close and distant conditions are different. For example, when cognizing the eighth consciousness, the appearance-division and the substance have the same seed, which allows one seed to produce thought and non-thought. There are also cases where the roots of two bodies are lost simultaneously, because since the appearance-division and the substance are born from the same seed, why aren't the roots of the two bodies lost simultaneously? If the appearance-division is provisional when the six senses cognize external objects, then there is a case where one seed produces the loss of both the provisional and the real. The 'provisional' here is not like a vase, etc., because it can perfume. It just doesn't have the function of a root and cannot generate consciousness, so it is called 'provisional'. Therefore, the appearance-division and the substance are sometimes said to have the same seed, and sometimes said to have different seeds. However, one should diligently study this meaning. Another explanation is that if the appearance-division and the substance are born from the same seed, for example, the eye and other roots are transformations of the eighth consciousness, born from conditions, so they do have the function of a root. If the arising of the appearance-division is born from the sixth consciousness, although it is born from the same seed as the essence, because the seeing-division of the sixth consciousness acts as a condition, through discriminating transformations and grasping, it has no practical function. Because it is not a provisional without substance, there is no fault of the provisional and the real losing the same seed. However, regarding same and different seeds, there are also categories of seeds, the nature being the same as the seeing-division, or the nature being the same while the bondage and seeds are different, or the nature of the appearance-division being determined by the seeing-division and the substance, the nature being uncertain, or although there is substance, the appearance and seeing-divisions are born together, but do not produce the essence. Because of this uncertainty, the Tripitaka Master used a verse to show this difference: 'The nature-realm does not follow the mind, the single shadow only comes from seeing, the substance-bearing connects with emotion and essence, the nature and seeds are equal and follow accordingly.' Explaining this verse is like what is said in the 'Essentials'. Because the meaning is slightly difficult, it is explained in more detail. First determine what the nature-realm is, and then show that it does not follow the mind. What is called the nature-realm? Born from a real seed, having substantial function, the mind that can cognize obtains its self-nature, which is called the nature-realm. For example, the body is at...
欲界第八所變五塵之境。以實種生復因緣變。名為性境。眼等五識及俱第六。現量緣時得境自相。即此相分亦是性境。相從質故。余法準知 如此相分有四不隨。一不隨能緣同善．染性。二不從能緣同一界系。三不隨能緣同一種生。四不隨能緣是異熟等 于中雖有與能緣心同界．同姓是境自性。不由能緣心力是此性．界地等。名性境不隨心。且如五識通三性。相．質俱無記。不從於五亦通三性。余準知之。雖五識身無記性者。緣五塵境其性雖同。而相．見分各守自性。不是隨彼能緣心故方成無記性。余皆準知 若獨散意識緣自界五塵等。但是彼境自住自性非得自性。然性．種等亦同五緣。
釋第二句。謂能緣心但獨變相。無別本質第二。雖有本質。然彼相分不生本質。以彼本質是不生法等。此等相分。及第六識緣第八識相應五數所現相分。但與能緣同一種生故。名獨影唯從見。如獨意識緣彼空花．及無為等。皆與見分同一種起 或無為緣是第三句 或是第四 緣第八識相應五數。或第四句 緣空華等此等影像有四從見。一從見分同是善．染。二同一界。三同一種。四同異熟及非異熟。以不生本質但意識所變。此之相分由能緣心。故是此界性等。攝相從見故。名獨影唯從見 問如空花相分為色為心。若是色者何得
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：欲界第八識所變現的五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）之境，以真實的種子生起，又因緣和合而變現，這被稱為『性境』。眼識等前五識以及與之相應的第六意識，在現量（直接感知）緣取外境時，所得到的境界的自相，也就是相分，也是性境。因為相分是從本質而來。其他法類可以依此類推。這樣的相分有四種『不隨』的特性：一、不隨能緣之心同爲善或染的性質；二、不隨能緣之心同屬於一個界系（欲界、色界、無色界）；三、不隨能緣之心同一種子所生；四、不隨能緣之心是異熟果報等。其中，雖然有與能緣之心同界、同性的境界自性，但此境界的自性、界地等，不是由能緣之心的力量所決定，所以稱為『性境不隨心』。例如，前五識通於善、惡、無記三性，而相分和質俱為無記性，並不隨於前五識也通於三性。其餘情況可以依此類推。即使前五識本身是無記性的，當它們緣取五塵境時，其性質雖然相同，但相分和見分各自保持自己的自性，不是因為隨順能緣之心才成為無記性。其餘情況都可以依此類推。如果獨頭散亂的意識緣取自界（欲界）的五塵等，這只是那些境界自己安住于自己的自性，並非得到自性。然而，其性質、種子等也與前五緣相同。 解釋第二句。所謂能緣之心只是單獨變現相分，沒有另外的本質作為第二重。即使有本質，但那個相分不是從本質生起的，因為那個本質是不生法等。這些相分，以及第六意識緣取第八識（阿賴耶識）相應的五遍行心數（作意、觸、受、想、思）所顯現的相分，只是與能緣之心同一種子所生，所以稱為『獨影唯從見』。例如，獨頭意識緣取虛空中的花朵，以及無為法等，都與見分同一種子生起。或者無為法是第三句，或者屬於第四句。緣取第八識相應的五遍行心數，或者屬於第四句。緣取空花等，這些影像有四種『從見』的特性：一、從見分同是善或染；二、同屬於一個界；三、同一種子；四、同是異熟果報或非異熟果報。因為不生本質，只是意識所變現，所以這些相分由能緣之心所決定，因此是此界、此性等。攝相從見的緣故，稱為『獨影唯從見』。問：如空花相分，是色法還是心法？如果是色法，為何能……
【English Translation】 English version: The realm of the five dusts (form, sound, smell, taste, touch) transformed by the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) in the Desire Realm, arising from real seeds and transforming through conditions, is called 'Svabhava-vishaya' (nature realm). When the five sense consciousnesses, such as eye-consciousness, and the corresponding sixth consciousness directly perceive objects, the self-nature of the obtained realm, which is the image-aspect (nimitta-bhaga), is also Svabhava-vishaya. This is because the image-aspect comes from the substance. Other dharmas can be understood analogously. Such an image-aspect has four characteristics of 'non-conformity': 1. It does not conform to the nature of the perceiving mind, whether it is wholesome or defiled; 2. It does not conform to the perceiving mind in belonging to the same realm (Desire Realm, Form Realm, Formless Realm); 3. It does not conform to the perceiving mind in being born from the same seed; 4. It does not conform to the perceiving mind in being a result of Vipaka (karmic retribution) etc. Among them, although there is a self-nature of the realm that is of the same realm and nature as the perceiving mind, the nature, realm, and ground of this realm are not determined by the power of the perceiving mind, so it is called 'Svabhava-vishaya does not conform to the mind'. For example, the five consciousnesses are related to the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, neutral), while the image-aspect and substance are both neutral, and do not conform to the five consciousnesses also being related to the three natures. The rest can be understood analogously. Even if the five consciousnesses themselves are of neutral nature, when they perceive the five dust realms, although their nature is the same, the image-aspect and the seeing-aspect (darshana-bhaga) each maintain their own self-nature, and do not become neutral because they conform to the perceiving mind. The rest can be understood analogously. If the independent and scattered consciousness perceives the five dusts etc. of its own realm (Desire Realm), these are merely those realms abiding in their own self-nature, and not obtaining self-nature. However, their nature, seeds, etc. are the same as the five conditions. Explanation of the second sentence. The so-called perceiving mind only transforms the image-aspect alone, without another substance as a second layer. Even if there is a substance, that image-aspect does not arise from the substance, because that substance is an unarisen dharma etc. These image-aspects, and the image-aspects manifested by the sixth consciousness perceiving the five universal mental functions (manaskara (attention), sparsha (contact), vedana (feeling), samjna (perception), chetana (volition)) corresponding to the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), are only born from the same seed as the perceiving mind, so they are called 'Eka-bimba-vishaya' (single-image realm) 'solely from the seeing'. For example, the independent consciousness perceives flowers in the sky, and unconditioned dharmas etc., all arise from the same seed as the seeing-aspect. Or unconditioned dharmas are the third sentence, or belong to the fourth sentence. Perceiving the five universal mental functions corresponding to the eighth consciousness, or belong to the fourth sentence. Perceiving sky-flowers etc., these images have four characteristics of 'conformity to the seeing': 1. They conform to the seeing-aspect in being wholesome or defiled; 2. They belong to the same realm; 3. They are of the same seed; 4. They are the same Vipaka (karmic retribution) or non-Vipaka. Because they do not arise from a substance, but are only transformed by consciousness, these image-aspects are determined by the perceiving mind, and therefore are of this realm, this nature, etc. Because the image-aspect is included as conforming to the seeing, it is called 'Eka-bimba-vishaya solely from the seeing'. Question: Is the image-aspect of sky-flowers form or mind? If it is form, why can it...
同性。若是心者本意緣色。云何變心相分緣耶 答虛妄計者。是遍計色。泛爾緣者。雖非遍計是彼類故。亦彼所收。以彼同種故同識性 又遍計名是分別義。非唯執心。不爾攝法有不盡失 如似熱病壞眼等故非黃見黃。非黃見黃是第六識。非是眼識得自相故。此雖非是法執之心。亦得名為遍計起色。然所熏種隨本質收 問如后得智緣諸無為自共二相。及緣凡夫所緣空華菟角等相。是何法收 答緣無為等所有相分．法同分收。以體是假。法同分寬故。不同有漏非妄緣故 或緣空花等亦是遍計所起色攝。遍計之言是分別故。二解任取 問如身在上界以上天眼緣欲界色。此色相分為何類收 答一云。雖非獨影相亦從見。以彼定色不生於下。地系別故。此從於見同一界系非同一種 若爾云何緣自相境耶 答親杖本質名得自性 若爾後得緣無為等相．見應別 答雖得自性。元不生故 二云。性境不隨心。以杖自八所變之色為本質故。別成種故。性自無記不由心故。又既通果實是上界似地獄故。以天眼通作用勝故。上得似下。不同緣上要引通果及定果相同彼方緣 又解所起相分而是業果。雖天眼通眼識所起非通果色。以緣欲界業果色故。但由通果心所變起是彼識緣。如業果眼所起眼識帶定通果色之相分。何妨通果心帶于業果色 前
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：", "問：如果是心，其本意是緣於色（Rupa，物質現象）。為什麼變現出的心相部分也緣於色呢？", "答：虛妄計度者，是指遍計所執的色（Parikalpita-rupa，完全由概念構想出的色）。泛泛地緣取色，雖然不是遍計所執，但因為與遍計所執的色屬於同一類，所以也被遍計所執所包含。因為它們是同一種類，所以具有相同的識性。", "而且，『遍計』這個名稱是分別的意思，不僅僅是執著於心。否則，攝取法（Dharma，佛法）就會有不完全的缺失。如同熱病損壞眼睛等情況，不是因為黃色而看到黃色，而是因為非黃色而看到黃色，這是第六識（末那識，Manas）的作用。不是眼識（Caksu-vijnana，視覺意識）能夠獲得自相（Svalaksana，事物獨特的性質）的緣故。雖然這並非是執著於法的『法執』之心，也可以被稱作是遍計所起的色。然而，所熏習的種子（Bija，潛在的影響力）是隨著本質（Svabhava，事物內在的性質）而收攝的。", "問：如果后得智（Prsthalabdha-jnana，證悟后獲得的智慧）緣于諸無為法（Asamskrta，非因緣和合的法）的自相和共相（Samanya-laksana，事物普遍的性質），以及緣于凡夫所緣的空花（Alikakusuma，虛幻的花朵）、兔角（Sasavisana，兔子頭上不存在的角）等相，這是被什麼法所收攝的呢？", "答：緣于無為法等的所有相分，是被法同分（Dharma-sadharana-bhaga，法所共有的部分）所收攝的。因為其體性是虛假的，法同分範圍寬廣，所以不同於有漏法（Sasrava，有煩惱的法），也不是虛妄的緣取。或者，緣于空花等也是遍計所起的色所攝。『遍計』這個詞是分別的意思。兩種解釋任你選擇。", "問：如果身體在上界（Urdhva-dhatu，更高的存在領域）以上，天眼（Divyacaksu，天眼通）緣于欲界（Kama-dhatu，慾望領域）的色，這個色相部分屬於哪一類呢？", "答：一種說法是，雖然不是獨影相（Niralambana-pratibhasa，沒有外部對象的影像），也是從見（Darsana，見識）而來的。因為上界的定色（Samadhi-rupa，禪定中產生的色）不會在地獄產生，因為地界系統是不同的。這從見而來，屬於同一界系，但不是同一種類。", "如果這樣，如何緣于自相境（Svalaksana-visaya，具有獨特性質的境界）呢？", "答：親近依靠本質，就叫做獲得自性（Svabhava，事物內在的性質）。", "如果這樣，后得智緣于無為法等相，見解應該有所不同。", "答：雖然獲得了自性，但原本沒有產生。", "另一種說法是，性境（Svabhava-visaya，事物本性的境界）不隨心而轉移，因為依靠第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）所變現的色作為本質。因為各自形成種子，所以本性是無記（Avyakrta，非善非惡），不由心所決定。而且，既然貫通果實，就是上界類似於地獄。因為天眼通的作用殊勝，上界能夠類似於地獄。不同於緣于上界一定要引導神通果（Abhijnaphala，神通的果報）以及定果（Samapattiphala，禪定的果報），相同于彼方才能緣取。", "又一種解釋是，所起的相分是業果（Karma-phala，業的果報）。雖然天眼通是眼識所起，但不是神通果色。因為緣于欲界的業果色，只是由神通果的心所變現而起，是那個識所緣取的。如同業果眼所起的眼識，帶有定通果色的相分，為什麼神通果的心不能帶有業果色呢？", "前...", "", "english_translations": [ "English version:", "Question: If it is the mind, its original intention is to be conditioned by Rupa (form, material phenomena). Why does the manifested image-part of the mind also condition Rupa?", "Answer: The falsely discriminating one refers to the Parikalpita-rupa (completely conceptualized form). Vaguely conditioning form, although not Parikalpita, is included because it belongs to the same category as Parikalpita-rupa. Because they are of the same kind, they have the same nature of consciousness.", "Moreover, the name 'Parikalpita' means discrimination, not just attachment to the mind. Otherwise, the inclusion of Dharma (teachings, laws) would have incomplete omissions. Just as in cases like fever damaging the eyes, seeing yellow is not because of yellow itself, but because of non-yellow. This is the function of the sixth consciousness (Manas). It is not that the eye consciousness (Caksu-vijnana) can obtain the Svalaksana (unique characteristics) of its own. Although this is not the 'Dharma-attachment' mind that clings to Dharma, it can also be called the form arising from Parikalpita. However, the seeds (Bija) that are perfumed are collected according to their essence (Svabhava).", "Question: If the wisdom gained after enlightenment (Prsthalabdha-jnana) conditions the Svalaksana and Samanya-laksana (general characteristics) of all unconditioned Dharmas (Asamskrta), as well as the images of empty flowers (Alikakusuma), rabbit horns (Sasavisana), etc., which ordinary people condition, what Dharma includes this?", "Answer: All image-parts that condition unconditioned Dharmas, etc., are included in the Dharma-sadharana-bhaga (the part shared by Dharmas). Because its essence is false, and the Dharma-sadharana-bhaga is broad, it is different from the contaminated Dharmas (Sasrava) and is not a false conditioning. Alternatively, conditioning empty flowers, etc., is also included in the form arising from Parikalpita. The word 'Parikalpita' means discrimination. Choose either explanation.", "Question: If the body is above the upper realms (Urdhva-dhatu), and the divine eye (Divyacaksu) conditions the form of the desire realm (Kama-dhatu), to which category does this image-part of form belong?", "Answer: One explanation is that although it is not a Niralambana-pratibhasa (image without an external object), it also comes from Darsana (seeing). Because the Samadhi-rupa (form produced in Samadhi) of the upper realms does not arise in the lower realms, because the realm systems are different. This comes from seeing, belongs to the same realm system, but is not of the same kind.", "If so, how does it condition the Svalaksana-visaya (realm with unique characteristics)?", "Answer: Closely relying on the essence is called obtaining Svabhava (intrinsic nature).", "If so, the views of the wisdom gained after enlightenment conditioning the images of unconditioned Dharmas, etc., should be different.", "Answer: Although it obtains Svabhava, it did not originally arise.", "Another explanation is that the Svabhava-visaya (realm of the nature of things) does not follow the mind, because it relies on the form transformed by the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) as its essence. Because each forms seeds, its nature is indeterminate (Avyakrta), not determined by the mind. Moreover, since it penetrates the fruit, the upper realm is similar to the lower realm. Because the function of the divine eye is superior, the upper realm can be similar to the lower realm. It is different from conditioning the upper realm, which must guide the Abhijnaphala (fruit of supernatural powers) and the Samapattiphala (fruit of Samadhi), which can only be conditioned if they are the same as that side.", "Another explanation is that the image-part that arises is Karma-phala (result of karma). Although the divine eye is produced by the eye consciousness, it is not the form of the fruit of supernatural powers. Because it conditions the Karma-phala form of the desire realm, it is only transformed and arises from the mind associated with the fruit of supernatural powers, which is what that consciousness conditions. Just as the eye consciousness arising from the Karma-phala eye carries the image-part of the Samadhi-fruit form, why can't the mind of the supernatural power fruit carry the Karma-phala form?", "Previous..." ] }
二解勝義難更思 問如有無漏更互相緣。及不相應相分何攝 答亦二解。一云法同分。二云遍計色。前釋為正 問既色中立遍計。心等中何無 答色聚非緣慮。遍計同彼立遍計。心法唯能緣。遍計非緣故不立。不相應法可許立之。言二十四且隨勝立。如諸心所隨勝立故。又隨其所應。亦屬彼能緣心 問上地散眼耳緣下地不。若不緣下。云何上得見下。若緣于下相分何收。答散不緣下。以極遠故。言上見下據通果故 又解散眼．耳識亦可緣下。如見下三災生異想等 杖自他質二解不定。系從見分上地所收。有漏異界不隨增故 有說下系。托下地相熏成下故。非漏自性故不隨增。然難思之。
解第三句。謂能緣心緣所緣境。有所杖質而不得自性。此之相分判性不定。或從能緣心。或從所緣境。種亦不定。或質同種。或見同種。或復別種。名帶質通情本。如第七緣第八。是攝相從見有覆性。從質無覆性 問影依于質起。從本名無覆。影依于質生。從質名異熟。答無覆是性類。影．本俱無覆。異熟據酬業。影像非異熟 問異熟據業引。影像非異熟。無覆是報體。影像非無覆 答性類是寬。本影像俱無覆。異熟性局。唯本不通影 問五識緣五境。相即不兩判。七杖第八生。相不兩性判 答五緣之境但境性。唯是性境不隨心
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二解勝義難更思：問：如果無漏法之間也互相為緣，以及不相應行法和相分應該歸屬於哪裡？答：也有兩種解釋。一種說法是歸屬於法同分。另一種說法是歸屬於遍計所執色。前一種解釋是正確的。 問：既然在色法中安立遍計所執性，為什麼在心法等中沒有？答：因為色聚不是緣慮的對象，遍計所執性與色聚相似，所以安立在色法中。而心法只能緣慮，遍計所執性不是緣慮的對象，所以不安立在心法中。不相應行法可以允許安立遍計所執性。說二十四種不相應行法只是隨其主要者而安立。就像諸心所法隨其主要者而安立一樣。又隨其所應，也屬於能緣的心法。 問：上地（指色界、無色界）的散亂眼識、耳識是否能緣下地（指欲界）？如果不能緣下地，那麼上地眾生如何能看見下地眾生？如果能緣下地，那麼所緣的相分應該歸屬於哪裡？答：散亂心不能緣下地，因為距離太遠了。說上地眾生能看見下地眾生，是根據神通果報而言的。 另一種解釋是，散亂的眼識、耳識也可以緣下地，例如看見地獄的三災而產生不同的想法等。杖（所依託之物）是自身之質還是他身之質，兩種解釋不定。系（系屬）是從見分（能見之心）上地所攝。因為有漏法在不同界中不會隨之增長。有的人說屬於下地所繫，依託下地之相熏習而成為下地之相，因為不是有漏法的自性，所以不會隨之增長。但這很難思議。 解釋第三句：能緣的心緣所緣的境，有所依託之質，而不得自性。此相分（所緣境的影像）的判性不定，或者從能緣的心，或者從所緣的境。種子也不定，或者與質同種，或者與見同種，或者又是別種。名為帶質通情本。例如第七識緣第八識，是攝相從見分，具有覆性（有覆無記性），從質分，則無覆性（無覆無記性）。 問：影像依于質而生起，從本（質）來說是無覆性的。影像依于質而生，從質來說是異熟果。答：無覆是性類，影像和本（質）都是無覆性的。異熟是根據酬償業力而言，影像不是異熟果。 問：異熟是根據業力所引，影像不是異熟果。無覆是報體，影像不是無覆性。答：性類是寬泛的，本（質）和影像都是無覆性的。異熟性是侷限的，只有本（質）才是異熟果，影像不是。 問：五識緣五境，相分和見分不作兩種判別。第七識依託第八識而生，相分和見分不作兩種性質的判別。答：五識所緣的境只是境性，只是性境，不隨心而變。
【English Translation】 English version The second explanation of ultimate truth is difficult to further contemplate. Question: If even among non-outflow (Anasrava) dharmas there is mutual conditionality, and where should non-associated formations (Citta-viprayukta-samskara) and image-divisions (Nimitta-bhaga) be categorized? Answer: There are two explanations. One says they belong to the 'dharma-samana-bhaga' (category of similar dharmas). The other says they belong to 'parikalpita-rupa' (imagined form). The former explanation is considered correct. Question: Since 'parikalpita' (imagined nature) is established within form (Rupa), why isn't it established within mind (Citta) and other things? Answer: Because aggregates of form (Rupa-skandha) are not objects of thought. 'Parikalpita' is similar to them, so it is established within form. Mental dharmas (Citta-dharmas) can only be objects of thought. 'Parikalpita' is not an object of thought, so it is not established within mind. Non-associated formations can be allowed to have 'parikalpita' established within them. The mention of twenty-four is just based on what is predominant. Just as mental factors (Caitasikas) are established based on what is predominant. Also, according to what is appropriate, they also belong to the mind that can cognize. Question: Can the scattered eye-consciousness (Caksur-vijnana) and ear-consciousness (Srotra-vijnana) of the higher realms (i.e., the Form Realm and Formless Realm) cognize the lower realms (i.e., the Desire Realm)? If they cannot cognize the lower realms, how can beings in the higher realms see beings in the lower realms? If they can cognize the lower realms, where should the image-division that is cognized be categorized? Answer: Scattered minds cannot cognize the lower realms because they are too far away. The statement that higher realms can see lower realms is based on the power of karmic retribution. Another explanation is that scattered eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness can also cognize the lower realms, such as seeing the three calamities (Tri-vidha-utpata) in the lower realm and generating different thoughts. Whether the 'staff' (support) is one's own substance or another's substance is uncertain according to the two explanations. The connection (Sambandha) is collected from the seeing-division (Darsana-bhaga) of the higher realms because outflows (Asrava) do not increase along with different realms. Some say it belongs to the lower realms, relying on the impressions of the lower realms to form the lower realms. Because it is not the nature of outflows, it does not increase along with them. However, this is difficult to contemplate. Explaining the third sentence: The cognizing mind cognizes the cognized object, relying on a support (Alambana), but does not attain its own nature. The determination of the nature of this image-division (Nimitta-bhaga) is uncertain, either from the cognizing mind or from the cognized object. The seed (Bija) is also uncertain, either of the same kind as the support, or of the same kind as the seeing-division, or of a different kind. It is called 'possessing-support-common-nature'. For example, the seventh consciousness (Manas) cognizing the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) is the collection of the image from the seeing-division, possessing covered nature (Klista). From the support, it possesses uncovered nature (Aklista). Question: The image arises relying on the substance. From the original (substance), it is said to be uncovered. The image arises relying on the substance. From the substance, it is called 'vipaka' (result of maturation). Answer: Uncovered is the nature-category. Both the image and the original (substance) are uncovered. 'Vipaka' is based on repaying karma. The image is not 'vipaka'. Question: 'Vipaka' is based on karma. The image is not 'vipaka'. Uncovered is the reward-body. The image is not uncovered. Answer: Nature-category is broad. Both the original (substance) and the image are uncovered. 'Vipaka' nature is limited. Only the original (substance) is 'vipaka', not the image. Question: The five consciousnesses (Panca-vijnana) cognize the five objects (Panca-visaya). The image-division and seeing-division are not distinguished into two. The seventh consciousness arises relying on the eighth consciousness. The image-division and seeing-division are not distinguished into two natures. Answer: The object cognized by the five consciousnesses is only the nature of the object. It is only 'svarupa-siddha' (self-established object), not changing with the mind.
。七緣之境。境通慮．非慮。具二義故隨兩判 問因五但緣色。唯是性境。境非兩判。互用通緣於六境。相分應通情．本判 答互用緣雖稱境相。既通多法即隨應。未互用但緣于自塵。故說五緣于性境。若獨頭意識緣境寬通亦第四句 有云。帶質通情本中。如現相分離質離見即法同分攝 問若爾同分應通實有 答計亦無過。如名色支唯種無記。不妨第七亦在名收 又解不爾。第七在名色據現假非支。同分不相應。唯假不通實。若以現相不能緣。非心非色法同分。一切相分不能緣。種子等應法同分。彼既不爾此云何然。故不可說離見．質判。定隨一故。非法同分。此釋為正。故判第七相離見．質法同分收。此非正說 今又助釋。言帶質通情本者。如有無漏互相緣相。如第七緣八。無漏相分從見是善無漏從質即是無記。余準此知。故云帶質通情本。又設有質。相與見分或隨不定。為無為．漏無漏。準義思之。若依本釋。漏無漏等互相緣時。即第四句。
性種等隨應者。通釋前三句。謂前三句中。隨其所應判性．種等不可一例。有性．界隨心種不隨。有性．種隨心界不隨。有界．種隨心性不隨。有三俱隨。有俱不隨。且如第八緣天眼．耳。性隨種．界俱不隨 問五．六無記緣五塵境得自相時。性不隨心。云何第八性隨
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：七緣之境（指心識生起時所依賴的七種條件）。境通慮（境可以通於有分別的慮知）．非慮（也可以通於無分別的非慮知）。因為它具有兩種含義，所以隨著這兩種情況來判斷。問：五識（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）的因緣只緣於色（指色塵），僅僅是性境（直接呈現的境），境不是兩種判斷。互用（指五識互相作用）通緣於六境（色、聲、香、味、觸、法）。相分（心識所呈現的影像）應該通於情（有情眾生）．本（根本）。答：互用緣雖然稱為境相，既然通於多種法，就隨著所應的情況而定。未互用（指五識各自獨立運作）只緣于自己的塵境，所以說五識只緣于性境。如果獨頭意識（不依賴五根而獨立生起的意識）緣境寬廣，也屬於第四句（非安立諦）。 有人說，帶質（指心識緣取對像時，對像作為心識的質料）通於情本中，如果現相（心識的顯現）分離，質（作為質料的對象）離開見（能見的心識），就屬於法同分（指心識共同擁有的法）。問：如果這樣，同分應該通於實有（真實存在的事物）？答：這樣計算也沒有過錯。比如名色支（五蘊中的名蘊和色蘊）僅僅是種子無記（指種子是無記性的），不妨礙第七識（末那識）也在名蘊中。又解釋說不是這樣，第七識在名色中是根據現假（指現在是假有的），不是支。同分不相應，僅僅是假有，不通於實有。如果以現相不能緣，非心非色法同分（指既不是心也不是色的法），一切相分不能緣，種子等應該是法同分。既然不是這樣，那怎麼能這樣說呢？所以不可說離開見．質來判斷，一定是隨於其中一種，不是法同分。這種解釋是正確的。所以判斷第七識的相分離見．質屬於法同分，這種說法是不正確的。 現在再輔助解釋，說帶質通情本，比如有無漏（指有煩惱和沒有煩惱）互相緣相，比如第七識緣第八識（阿賴耶識），無漏的相分從見來說是善的無漏，從質來說就是無記。其餘的可以類推得知。所以說帶質通情本。又假設有質，相與見分或者隨於不定，為有為（有生滅變化的）．無為（沒有生滅變化的），漏（有煩惱的）無漏（沒有煩惱的），根據意義來思考。如果依照本來的解釋，漏無漏等互相緣時，就屬於第四句。 性種等隨應，是通用的解釋前三句。說前三句中，隨著它所應的情況來判斷性（指心識的體性）、種（指心識的種子）等，不可以一概而論。有性．界（指心識的界限）隨心，種不隨。有性．種隨心，界不隨。有界．種隨心，性不隨。有三者都隨。有三者都不隨。比如第八識緣天眼．耳（指天人的眼識和耳識），性隨心，種．界都不隨。問：五．六識（意識）無記緣五塵境（色、聲、香、味、觸）得到自相（指各自的體性）時，性不隨心，為什麼第八識的性隨心？
【English Translation】 English version: The realm of seven conditions (referring to the seven conditions upon which consciousness arises). 'Jing tong lu' (The realm can extend to discriminative thought) and 'fei lu' (it can also extend to non-discriminative thought). Because it possesses two meanings, it is judged according to these two situations. Question: The causes and conditions of the five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) only pertain to 'se' (form, referring to the object of form), and are merely 'xing jing' (the directly presented realm). The realm is not judged in two ways. 'Huyu' (mutual interaction, referring to the interaction of the five consciousnesses) universally connects to the six realms (form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma). The 'xiang fen' (image component, the image presented by consciousness) should universally connect to 'qing' (sentient beings) and 'ben' (fundamental). Answer: Although 'huyu yuan' (mutual interaction condition) is called 'jing xiang' (realm image), since it connects to multiple dharmas, it is determined according to the appropriate situation. 'Wei huyu' (non-mutual interaction, referring to the independent operation of the five consciousnesses) only pertains to its own object of sense, so it is said that the five consciousnesses only pertain to 'xing jing'. If the 'du tou yi shi' (independent consciousness, the consciousness that arises independently without relying on the five roots) has a broad scope of conditions, it also belongs to the fourth phrase (non-established truth). Some say that 'dai zhi' (bearing substance, referring to when consciousness grasps an object, the object serves as the material of consciousness) universally connects to 'qing ben' (sentient beings' fundamental nature). If the 'xian xiang' (manifest appearance, the manifestation of consciousness) separates, and the 'zhi' (substance, the object serving as material) leaves the 'jian' (seeing, the consciousness that can see), it belongs to 'fa tong fen' (dharma common share, referring to the dharmas that consciousnesses commonly possess). Question: If this is the case, 'tong fen' (common share) should universally connect to 'shi you' (real existence, things that truly exist)? Answer: There is no fault in calculating it this way. For example, 'ming se zhi' (the branches of name and form, the name skandha and form skandha in the five skandhas) are merely seed 'wu ji' (unspecified, referring to seeds being of an unspecified nature). It does not hinder the seventh consciousness (Manas consciousness) from also being in the name skandha. Another explanation says it is not like this. The seventh consciousness in name and form is based on 'xian jia' (presently provisional, referring to being provisionally existent now), not a branch. 'Tong fen' (common share) is not corresponding, it is merely provisional, and does not connect to real existence. If the manifest appearance cannot be conditioned, the 'fei xin fei se fa tong fen' (dharma common share that is neither mind nor form, referring to dharmas that are neither mind nor form), all image components cannot be conditioned, and seeds etc. should be 'fa tong fen' (dharma common share). Since it is not like this, how can it be said like this? Therefore, it cannot be said to judge by separating 'jian' (seeing) and 'zhi' (substance). It must follow one of them, and is not 'fa tong fen' (dharma common share). This explanation is correct. Therefore, judging the seventh consciousness's image separating seeing and substance as belonging to 'fa tong fen' (dharma common share) is incorrect. Now, to further assist in the explanation, saying 'dai zhi tong qing ben' (bearing substance universally connects to sentient beings' fundamental nature), for example, there are 'you wu lou' (with afflictions and without afflictions) mutually conditioning appearances, such as the seventh consciousness conditioning the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness). The 'wu lou' (without afflictions) image component is 'shan wu lou' (good without afflictions) from the perspective of seeing, and is 'wu ji' (unspecified) from the perspective of substance. The rest can be inferred accordingly. Therefore, it is said 'dai zhi tong qing ben' (bearing substance universally connects to sentient beings' fundamental nature). Also, assuming there is substance, the image and seeing component either follow the unspecified, or are 'you wei' (conditioned, subject to birth and death) and 'wu wei' (unconditioned, not subject to birth and death), 'lou' (with afflictions) and 'wu lou' (without afflictions), think about it according to the meaning. If following the original explanation, when 'lou wu lou' (with afflictions and without afflictions) etc. mutually condition each other, it belongs to the fourth phrase. 'Xing zhong deng sui ying' (nature, seed, etc. follow accordingly) is a universal explanation of the previous three phrases. Saying that in the previous three phrases, judge the 'xing' (nature, the inherent nature of consciousness), 'zhong' (seed, the seed of consciousness), etc. according to the appropriate situation, and cannot generalize. There are 'xing jie' (nature and boundary, the boundary of consciousness) that follow the mind, and the seed does not follow. There are 'xing zhong' (nature and seed) that follow the mind, and the boundary does not follow. There are 'jie zhong' (boundary and seed) that follow the mind, and the nature does not follow. There are all three that follow. There are all three that do not follow. For example, the eighth consciousness conditions the 'tian yan er' (heavenly eye and ear, referring to the eye and ear consciousnesses of heavenly beings), the nature follows the mind, and the seed and boundary do not follow. Question: When the five and six consciousnesses (mind consciousness) 'wu ji' (unspecified) condition the five sense objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch) and obtain their own characteristics, the nature does not follow the mind, why does the nature of the eighth consciousness follow the mind?
心耶 答八本余末。又五．六識體通三性。八識因位唯無記故。如因七緣八。性同不同。通情．本故。界同種不同。如斯等類思之可悉 又七緣八以相從質是無覆。不得從八是異熟。故云隨應 又作四句分別。有性境不隨心亦獨影唯從見者。謂第六散意與五同緣。即於此時緣菟角等。及第八識心王。性境不隨心。心所獨影唯從見。相分是假無別種故 問如第六緣第八心所相不緣彼見。此所帶相為同別耶 答從能緣心同一種起 問緣彼見相。即許與六見分別種。此緣彼相云何同種 答以相分假從能緣起。與見同種 有性境不隨心亦帶質通情本。謂散意識與五同緣。即於此時並緣第八等 有性境不隨心亦獨影唯從見及通情本。謂散意識頓緣十八界。望與五識同緣五塵。名性境不隨心。緣七心界即通情本。望不相應等即唯從見 問后得緣如相是何攝 答或通情本。從質名無為。從見名有為。以許無為依識假立。或復約性隨境隨心。有漏緣如亦可準此。若約種辨。即唯從見 或第四句 無分別智緣真如時性境不隨。質善無為。智善有為。見獨成種。無相可熏。得性境故名不隨心 問初禪眼等識依彼上根緣彼地色相分是何 答有兩解。如前上地識緣下。一云上地系。緣彼色故 應有隨增 不是隨增非漏性故 起染如何 若生上者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 心耶（心嗎）？答：第八識是根本的，其餘的都是末。而且前五識和第六識的體性通於三種性質（善、惡、無記）。第八識在因位時只有無記性。比如第七識緣第八識，以相從質，這是無覆無記性。不能說從第八識是異熟果，所以說是『隨應』。而且第七識和第八識的界相同，種類不同。像這些等等，思考一下就可以明白了。 第七識緣第八識，以相從質，因為是無覆無記，所以不是從第八識的異熟果而來，所以說是『隨應』。又可以作四句來分別：有的是性境不隨心，也是獨影境，唯從見分而來。說的是第六意識散亂時與前五識一同緣取外境，就在這個時候緣取兔角等。以及第八識心王，是性境不隨心。心所是獨影境，唯從見分而來，因為相分是假立的，沒有別的種子。 問：如果第六意識緣第八識的心所相分，但不緣第八識的見分，那麼第六意識所帶的相分是和第八識同類還是不同類呢？答：從能緣的心來看，是同一種子生起的。 問：緣第八識的見分相，就允許和第六意識的見分分別種子相同，那麼第六意識緣第八識的相分，為什麼說是同一種子呢？答：因為相分是假立的，從能緣的心生起，所以和見分是同一種子。 有的是性境不隨心，也是帶質境，通於情本。說的是散亂的意識與前五識一同緣取外境，就在這個時候也緣取第八識等。 有的是性境不隨心，也是獨影境，唯從見分及通情本。說的是散亂的意識一下子緣取十八界。從與前五識一同緣取五塵的角度來說，叫做性境不隨心。緣取第七識心界，就是通情本。從不相應的角度來說，就是唯從見分。 問：后得智所緣的真如相是什麼性質的呢？答：或者通情本，從質的角度來說是無為法，從見的角度來說是有為法。因為允許無為法依識假立。或者也可以按照體性，隨境隨心。有漏的緣如也可以按照這個來類比。如果從種子的角度來辨別，那就是唯從見分。 或者屬於第四句（非性境亦非獨影）。無分別智緣真如的時候，是性境不隨心。質是善的無為法，智是善的有為法，見分單獨成就種子，沒有相可以熏習。因為得到性境，所以叫做不隨心。 問：初禪的眼識等，依靠彼上根，緣彼地色相分，是什麼性質的呢？答：有兩種解釋。如同前面的上地識緣下地。一種說法是上地所繫，因為緣取彼地色法。 應該有隨增的情況吧？不是隨增，因為不是有漏的性質。那麼如何生起染污呢？如果生到上界的話……
【English Translation】 English version: Is it the mind? Answer: The eighth consciousness is the root, and the rest are branches. Moreover, the bodies of the first five consciousnesses and the sixth consciousness are connected to the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral). The eighth consciousness only has neutral nature in the causal stage. For example, the seventh consciousness conditions the eighth consciousness, with the image following the substance, which is neutral and unobscured. It cannot be said that it comes from the eighth consciousness as a result of different maturation, so it is said to be 'accordingly'. Moreover, the realms of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are the same, but the types are different. Like these and so on, you can understand by thinking about them. The seventh consciousness conditions the eighth consciousness, with the image following the substance, because it is neutral and unobscured, so it does not come from the eighth consciousness as a result of different maturation, so it is said to be 'accordingly'. Furthermore, it can be distinguished by four sentences: Some are objective realms that do not follow the mind, and are also solitary shadows, only coming from the seeing aspect. This refers to the sixth consciousness being scattered and connecting with the first five consciousnesses to grasp external objects, and at this time grasping rabbit horns, etc. And the eighth consciousness mind-king, which is an objective realm that does not follow the mind. The mental functions are solitary shadows, only coming from the seeing aspect, because the image aspect is provisional and has no other seeds. Question: If the sixth consciousness conditions the image aspect of the eighth consciousness's mental functions, but does not condition the seeing aspect of the eighth consciousness, then is the image aspect carried by the sixth consciousness of the same type or a different type as the eighth consciousness? Answer: From the perspective of the conditioning mind, it arises from the same type of seed. Question: Conditioning the seeing aspect of the eighth consciousness, it is allowed that it is the same as the distinguishing seed of the seeing aspect of the sixth consciousness, so why is it said that the sixth consciousness conditioning the image aspect of the eighth consciousness is the same type of seed? Answer: Because the image aspect is provisional and arises from the conditioning mind, so it is the same type as the seeing aspect. Some are objective realms that do not follow the mind, and are also substantial images, connecting to both the emotional and original. This refers to the scattered consciousness connecting with the first five consciousnesses to grasp external objects, and at this time also grasping the eighth consciousness, etc. Some are objective realms that do not follow the mind, and are also solitary shadows, only coming from the seeing aspect and connecting to both the emotional and original. This refers to the scattered consciousness suddenly grasping the eighteen realms. From the perspective of connecting with the first five consciousnesses to grasp the five dusts, it is called an objective realm that does not follow the mind. Grasping the seventh consciousness mind-realm is connecting to both the emotional and original. From the perspective of non-correspondence, it is only from the seeing aspect. Question: What is the nature of the suchness image conditioned by subsequent wisdom? Answer: Or connecting to both the emotional and original, from the perspective of substance it is unconditioned dharma, from the perspective of seeing it is conditioned dharma. Because it is allowed that unconditioned dharma is provisionally established based on consciousness. Or it can also be based on the nature, following the realm and following the mind. The contaminated conditioning of suchness can also be analogized to this. If distinguished from the perspective of seeds, then it is only from the seeing aspect. Or it belongs to the fourth sentence (neither objective realm nor solitary shadow). When non-discriminating wisdom conditions true suchness, it is an objective realm that does not follow the mind. The substance is wholesome unconditioned dharma, the wisdom is wholesome conditioned dharma, the seeing aspect alone accomplishes the seed, and there is no image that can be perfumed. Because it obtains the objective realm, it is called not following the mind. Question: The eye consciousness, etc., of the first dhyana (meditative absorption), relying on the superior roots of that realm, conditioning the image aspect of the form of that realm, what is its nature? Answer: There are two explanations. Like the previous higher realm consciousness conditioning the lower realm. One explanation is that it is bound to the higher realm, because it conditions the form of that realm. Should there be cases of incidental increase? It is not an incidental increase, because it is not of a contaminated nature. Then how does defilement arise? If one is born into the higher realm...
已離下染故。若在下地緣上色等。眼．耳通果亦伏染故 俱生可伏見惑如何 設縱不伏起退定故 一云隨心下地系故。以能熏心是下地故 如何緣上變下相分。又應不得彼自性故 由定通引任運緣上故得自性 二俱難。解 問既在下識云何上緣 答惑由他定通力引故 問梵天來下其事云何 解云。以地獄色粗不為上依。自變為上地自身依之。即上地器依下地器為增上緣 問既來地獄豈不緣下。如馬勝往上。許緣上故 答亦緣下 問既爾相分是何所收 答上界所攝。以欲界無通果色故。準薩婆多即欲界攝。有通果故 問地獄緣彼上界身器。是何句收 答性境不隨心。由彼所引起定通果色為相分。屬彼本質性界及種皆不隨心 問第八可爾。既許眼等亦得緣上。相屬上地豈非有漏異界隨增 答色相不是漏自性故。或約業力異界不增。定通等引互增不障 又解但由上引第八通果。眼等杖之所起相分自是業果。屬於地獄無隨增失。如通力變為魚米等。引第六識通果之色為第八質。或雖即杖他八為質。即業果色是欲界系。第四卷云香．味．觸三而為段食。唯欲界系故。二解任情。道理亦難。應可思擇 問地獄第八緣定通色。同時心所相分是何 答隨能緣心所業果。同種同下界系。不別體故 問獨頭散意緣過去境及於五根相分是何
答是隨其所應。準前義釋。
釋獨影唯從見中。西明云。緣極微空花等所有相分皆熏成種。問既從種起。云何極微等說之為假。解云。以不生質故說為假。據有種生相分成實 今難。若云不生本質即為假者。異熟心．心法等應假非實。以各不能熏成種故。若云彼猶緣慮等故是實非假。即不由成種生質不生名為假實。又五識異熟心緣五境相。一非緣慮。二不能熏應假非實。此既非假彼云何然。若以獨相分無質礙用名為假者。即法處中自在生色。論說無礙應假非實。若許爾者。八地已上自在所變金銀乳等應非實有。又復且如色等之中。若質若相有假有實而色聚攝。如無為緣相分何攝。若無為攝現有生滅。若言色法現緣無為云何名色。若云心法為難亦爾。若云同分。豈有同分從種生耶。又若極微別熏種起復有五失。三失如前一向別種說。第四不如理思失。五十四云。由五相知。名不如理思惟極微。謂於色聚中有諸極微自性而住。應知名初一不如理思。既從種生即自性而住。五違正理失。論云以假想慧于粗色相。漸次除折至不可折。假說極微。本無微質。但以假想立為極微。即熏成種有極微色。應實無我妄計遍空。相熏成種生遍空相名遍滿我。許即違教。有遍滿我。不許違理。俱心假想。何不成種 要集又云。雜集所說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：回答是根據他們各自的情況而定。這與之前的解釋相同。
解釋『獨影』僅僅是從『見』（darśana，視覺）中產生。西明（Ximing，地名，也可能指西明寺）說：『緣于極微（paramāṇu，最小的物質單位）、空花（illusory flowers，虛幻的花朵）等所有的相分（nimitta-bhāga，影像部分）都熏習成種子（bīja）。』問：既然是從種子生起，為什麼極微等又被說成是『假』（unreal）的呢？解釋說：『因為它們不產生本質（dravya，實體），所以說是『假』。』根據有種子生起相分是真實的。
現在提出疑問：如果說不產生本質就是『假』的，那麼異熟心（vipāka-citta，果報心）、心法（caitta，心所法）等應該是『假』而非『實』（real），因為它們各自不能熏習成種子。如果說它們仍然緣慮（ālambana，所緣）等，所以是『實』而非『假』，那麼『假』和『實』的區分就不是由是否形成種子和產生本質來決定的。此外，五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）的異熟心緣於五境（pañca-viṣaya，色、聲、香、味、觸），一是並非緣慮，二是不能熏習，應該為『假』而非『實』。既然這個不是『假』的，那麼那個怎麼會是呢？如果因為獨相分（ekalakṣaṇa-nimitta-bhāga，獨一相分）沒有質礙作用（pratighāta，阻礙）就說是『假』的，那麼法處（dharmāyatana，法處）中自在生色（svatantra-utpāda-rūpa，自在產生的色），論中說沒有阻礙，應該為『假』而非『實』。如果允許這樣，那麼八地（aṣṭamī-bhūmi，第八地）以上的自在所變的金銀乳等應該不是真實存在的。
而且，比如在色（rūpa，顏色、形態）等之中，質（dravya，實體）和相（lakṣaṇa，相狀）有『假』有『實』，而色聚（rūpa-skandha，色蘊）包含它們。比如無為（asaṃskṛta，非造作）緣相分（nimitta-bhāga，影像部分）屬於哪裡呢？如果屬於無為，那麼現在有生滅（utpāda-vyaya，生起和滅去）。如果說色法（rūpa-dharma，色法）現在緣于無為，怎麼能稱為色呢？如果說心法（citta-dharma，心法）也這樣提問。如果說是同分（sabhāga，同類），難道有同分是從種子生起的嗎？而且，如果極微分別熏習種子生起，就會有五種過失。三種過失如前所述，傾向於分別的種子。第四個過失是不如理思（ayoniśo-manaskāra，不如理作意）的過失。五十四（數字）說：『通過五種相知道，名為不如理思惟極微。』意思是說在色聚中有各種極微以自性而住，應該知道最初一個不如理思。既然是從種子生起，就是以自性而住。
第五個過失是違反正理（viruddha-yukti，違背正確的道理）的過失。論中說：『以假想慧（kalpanā-prajñā，虛妄分別的智慧）對於粗色相（sthūla-rūpa-lakṣaṇa，粗大的色相），逐漸地去除和折斷，直到不可折斷，假說為極微。』本來沒有微細的物質，只是以假想建立為極微。即熏習成種子有極微色，應該是真實無我（nairātmya，無我），虛妄地計度遍空（sarva-ākāśa，一切虛空）。相熏習成種子生起遍空相，名為遍滿我（vyāpaka-ātman，遍滿的自我）。如果允許這樣，就違背了教義，有遍滿的我。如果不允許，就違背了道理。都是心的假想，為什麼不能成為種子呢？《要集》（Yaoji，書名）又說：雜集（Za Ji，書名）所說
【English Translation】 English version: The answer depends on their respective circumstances. This is the same as the previous explanation.
The explanation of 'sole image' (獨影, dú yǐng) arises solely from 'seeing' (見, jiàn) [darśana]. Ximing (西明, Xīmíng) [a place name, possibly referring to Ximing Temple] says: 'All image-portions (相分, xiāng fēn) [nimitta-bhāga] such as those of ultimate particles (極微, jí wēi) [paramāṇu], illusory flowers (空花, kōng huā) etc., are all perfumed into seeds (種, zhǒng) [bīja].' Question: Since they arise from seeds, why are ultimate particles etc. said to be 'unreal' (假, jiǎ)? The explanation is: 'Because they do not produce substance (質, zhì) [dravya], they are said to be 'unreal'.' According to the existence of seeds arising, the image-portions are real.
Now a question is raised: If saying that not producing substance is 'unreal', then resultant consciousness (異熟心, yì shú xīn) [vipāka-citta], mental factors (心法, xīn fǎ) [caitta] etc. should be 'unreal' rather than 'real' (實, shí), because they each cannot perfume into seeds. If it is said that they are still objects of thought (緣慮, yuán lǜ) [ālambana] etc., so they are 'real' rather than 'unreal', then the distinction between 'unreal' and 'real' is not determined by whether or not they form seeds and produce substance. Furthermore, the resultant consciousness of the five consciousnesses (五識, wǔ shí) [pañca-vijñāna] cognizes the five objects (五境, wǔ jìng) [pañca-viṣaya]. Firstly, it is not an object of thought, and secondly, it cannot perfume, so it should be 'unreal' rather than 'real'. Since this is not 'unreal', how can that be? If it is said that because the sole image-portion (獨相分, dú xiāng fēn) [ekalakṣaṇa-nimitta-bhāga] has no obstructive function (質礙用, zhì ài yòng) [pratighāta], it is said to be 'unreal', then the self-produced form (自在生色, zì zài shēng sè) [svatantra-utpāda-rūpa] in the dharma-sphere (法處, fǎ chù) [dharmāyatana], which the treatise says has no obstruction, should be 'unreal' rather than 'real'. If this is allowed, then the gold, silver, milk etc. transformed by the self-mastery of the eighth ground (八地, bā dì) [aṣṭamī-bhūmi] and above should not be truly existent.
Moreover, for example, within form (色, sè) [rūpa] etc., substance (質, zhì) [dravya] and image (相, xiāng) [lakṣaṇa] have 'unreal' and 'real', and the aggregate of form (色聚, sè jù) [rūpa-skandha] contains them. For example, where does the unconditioned (無為, wú wéi) [asaṃskṛta] object-image-portion (緣相分, yuán xiāng fēn) [nimitta-bhāga] belong? If it belongs to the unconditioned, then it now has arising and ceasing (生滅, shēng miè) [utpāda-vyaya]. If it is said that form-dharma (色法, sè fǎ) [rūpa-dharma] now cognizes the unconditioned, how can it be called form? If it is said that mental-dharma (心法, xīn fǎ) [citta-dharma] is also questioned in this way. If it is said to be of the same category (同分, tóng fēn) [sabhāga], then is there a same category that arises from seeds? Moreover, if ultimate particles separately perfume and seeds arise, there will be five faults. The three faults are as mentioned before, tending towards separate seeds. The fourth fault is the fault of irrational thinking (不如理思, bù rú lǐ sī) [ayoniśo-manaskāra]. Fifty-four (五十四, wǔ shí sì) [number] says: 'Knowing through five characteristics is called irrational thinking about ultimate particles.' It means that in the aggregate of form, there are various ultimate particles abiding in their own nature, and it should be known that the first one is irrational thinking. Since it arises from seeds, it abides in its own nature.
The fifth fault is the fault of contradicting correct reasoning (違反正理, wéi fǎn zhèng lǐ) [viruddha-yukti]. The treatise says: 'With conceptual wisdom (假想慧, jiǎ xiǎng huì) [kalpanā-prajñā], towards the coarse form-image (粗色相, cū sè xiāng) [sthūla-rūpa-lakṣaṇa], gradually removing and breaking until it cannot be broken, it is falsely said to be an ultimate particle.' Originally there is no subtle matter, but it is falsely established as an ultimate particle. That is, perfuming into seeds has ultimate particle form, it should be truly without self (無我, wú wǒ) [nairātmya], falsely calculating pervasive space (遍空, biàn kōng) [sarva-ākāśa]. The image perfuming into seeds gives rise to the image of pervasive space, called pervasive self (遍滿我, biàn mǎn wǒ) [vyāpaka-ātman]. If this is allowed, it contradicts the teachings, there is a pervasive self. If it is not allowed, it contradicts reason. They are all mental conceptions, why can't they become seeds? The 'Essentials Collected' (要集, Yào jí) [Yaoji, book title] also says: What the 'Miscellaneous Collection' (雜集, Zá Jí) [Za Ji, book title] says
十八界種各各不同。必無意識不從二緣。緣無為影似無為故。于百法中無為所攝。他界緣．無漏緣。雖異地無系而不離色等。緣一切無法。定必有所無不離色等。故與見相必不同體。強分別心得緣無等。所現相分具四緣義故是能熏。既得自熏何用見種。故依西明不依樞要。此等過失準前應知。恐煩不述 又云。然所變相能熏不熏總有三解。初二解非。要集自斷。第一解云。緣菟角等獨影從見。然異熟無記劣不能熏。勝者能熏。例圓鏡．成事。以觀察．平等杖因八．五緣他身土及佛說緣亦得成種。第二說緣無。一向影從見。如樞要解 第三解云。有質．無質．他界．有漏．無漏．無為．無法。所現相分除劣無記。餘一切法具四義者。皆是能熏。云此說勝。不違教故。理遍通故。前之二說有力不熏成過失故 今謂此判不應正理。若已相分除劣無記皆別熏種。如緣假法不相應等。既有相分能熏成種。種何法收。若不相應攝。即各有體非三分位。從種生故。若非此攝覆在何收。成種義齊。非是彼法不應道理。又他界緣散非他引。相別成種是何界攝。若他界攝不應異地心熏成他界種。不應正理。若自界攝緣他根心成種何攝。若根心攝不應正理。何以故。生心應慮根起發識。若不能爾何名根心。若在余攝亦多過故。又過如前恐煩且
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 十八界（十八種感官領域）的種子各不相同。一定沒有意識不是從兩種緣（條件）產生的。因為緣（條件）的無為（非因果關係）就像無為的影子一樣，所以在百法（一百種法）中被歸為無為所攝。他界緣（其他領域的條件）、無漏緣（沒有煩惱的條件），即使在不同的地方，也與色等（物質等）不分離。緣（條件）一切無法（不存在的事物），一定有所無（不存在的事物），並且不離色等（物質等）。因此，與見相（所見之相）必然不是同一個本體。勉強分別的心才能緣（條件）無等（不存在的事物等）。所現的相分（顯現的表象部分）具備四緣（四種條件）的意義，所以是能熏（能夠產生影響的）。既然已經能夠自我熏習，為什麼還需要見種（見的種子）？所以依據西明（西明寺的觀點），而不依據樞要（樞要的觀點）。這些過失，參照前面所說的應該知道。恐怕繁瑣，所以不詳細敘述。 又說：『然而所變的相（表象）能夠熏習還是不能熏習，總共有三種解釋。前兩種解釋是不正確的。要集（《成唯識論要集》）自己判斷。第一種解釋說，緣（條件）兔角等（不存在的事物）的獨影（孤立的影像）是從見（見分）產生的。然而異熟無記（異熟果報的無記性）弱小，不能熏習。殊勝的能夠熏習，例如圓鏡（圓鏡的比喻）、成事（成就事業）。以觀察（觀察智）、平等杖因（平等性的原因）八（八識）、五緣（五種條件）他身土（其他眾生的身和國土）以及佛說緣（佛陀所說的條件）也能成就種子。』第二種說法認為緣（條件）無（不存在的事物），一向影從見（影像總是從見分產生），如樞要（《成唯識論樞要》）的解釋。 第三種解釋說，有質（有實體的）、無質（沒有實體的）、他界（其他領域的）、有漏（有煩惱的）、無漏（沒有煩惱的）、無為（非因果關係的）、無法（不存在的事物），所顯現的相分（表象部分），除了劣無記（低劣的無記性），其餘一切具備四種意義的法，都是能熏（能夠產生影響的）。說這種說法殊勝，因為不違背教義。道理普遍通行。前面的兩種說法有力卻不能熏習，成為過失。 現在認為這種判斷不應該正確。如果相分（表象部分）除了低劣的無記性都分別熏習種子，例如緣（條件）假法（虛假的法）、不相應等（不相應法等）。既然有相分（表象部分）能夠熏習成為種子，種子應該歸於什麼法？如果不歸於不相應（不相應法），那麼各自有本體，不是三分位（三分的地位），因為是從種子產生的。如果不是歸於此，又應該歸於何處？成為種子的意義相同。不是那些法，不應該有道理。又他界緣（其他領域的條件）散亂，不是被其他引導。相（表象）分別成為種子，是哪個界（領域）所攝？如果是他界（其他領域）所攝，不應該在不同的地方，心熏習成為他界的種子。不應該有道理。如果是自界（自身領域）所攝，緣（條件）其他根心（其他眾生的根和心）成為種子，應該歸於何處？如果是根心（根和心）所攝，不應該有道理。為什麼呢？產生心應該考慮根（感官）發起意識。如果不能這樣，怎麼能稱為根心（根和心）？如果在其他所攝，也有很多過失。又過失如前，恐怕繁瑣，暫且不說了。
【English Translation】 English version The seeds of the eighteen realms (eighteen sense fields) are each different. There must be no consciousness that does not arise from two conditions. Because the unconditioned (non-causal) of conditions is like the shadow of the unconditioned, it is categorized under the unconditioned among the hundred dharmas (one hundred types of phenomena). Conditions from other realms, conditions free from outflows (afflictions), even in different locations, are not separate from form, etc. (matter, etc.). Conditions for all non-existent things must involve something non-existent and are not separate from form, etc. Therefore, they are necessarily not the same entity as the perceived image. A mind that forcibly distinguishes can condition non-existent things, etc. The manifested image-portion possesses the meaning of the four conditions, so it is capable of perfuming (exerting influence). Since it can perfume itself, why is a seed of perception (seeing) needed? Therefore, rely on the view of Ximing (Ximing Temple) and not the essential points (of the Yogācāra school). These faults should be understood by referring to what was said earlier. Fearing tediousness, I will not elaborate. Furthermore, it is said: 'However, regarding whether the transformed image can perfume or not, there are three interpretations in total. The first two interpretations are incorrect. Yaoji (Essentials of the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only) judges this itself. The first interpretation says that the solitary image of things like rabbit horns (non-existent things) arises from seeing (the seeing-portion). However, the resultant, neutral (neither good nor bad) is weak and cannot perfume. The superior can perfume, like a round mirror (the analogy of a round mirror), accomplishing things. Using observation (observational wisdom), the cause of equality (the cause of equanimity), the eight (eight consciousnesses), the five conditions for the bodies and lands of others, and the conditions spoken of by the Buddha can also accomplish seeds.' The second interpretation says that conditioning non-existence, the image always arises from seeing, as explained in the essential points (of the Yogācāra school). The third interpretation says that with substance, without substance, other realms, with outflows (afflicted), without outflows (unafflicted), unconditioned (non-causal), non-existent things, the manifested image-portion, except for the inferior neutral, all dharmas that possess the four meanings are capable of perfuming (exerting influence). It is said that this interpretation is superior because it does not contradict the teachings. The reasoning is universally applicable. The previous two interpretations have the fault of being powerful but not perfuming. Now, it is thought that this judgment should not be correct. If the image-portion, except for the inferior neutral, all separately perfume seeds, such as conditioning false dharmas, non-associated things, etc. Since the image-portion can perfume and become a seed, to what dharma should the seed be assigned? If it is not assigned to non-associated (non-associated dharmas), then each has its own entity, not a three-part position, because it arises from the seed. If it is not assigned to this, then where should it be assigned? The meaning of becoming a seed is the same. It is not those dharmas, which should not be reasonable. Also, conditions from other realms are scattered and not guided by others. The image separately becoming a seed, to which realm is it assigned? If it is assigned to other realms, it should not be that in different places, the mind perfumes and becomes a seed of other realms. It should not be reasonable. If it is assigned to one's own realm, conditioning the roots and minds of others to become a seed, where should it be assigned? If it is assigned to the roots and minds, it should not be reasonable. Why? The arising of the mind should consider the roots (senses) initiating consciousness. If it cannot be like this, how can it be called roots and minds? If it is assigned to others, there are also many faults. Also, the faults are as before, fearing tediousness, I will not discuss it for now.
止。
西明云。此三分二分以釋變言。自有三說。一云初三分安惠等八師釋。除親勝．火辨。世親同時唯立二分。二云三分除安惠釋。變似二言是依他故。余如上說。三云二分諸師共釋。唯除安惠。三分更除火辨．親勝。三藏意存后釋。此釋不爾。若以後釋為正。三分非安惠文。二分亦無安惠。豈許安惠不釋此頌。又準本疏。二分正是難陀等文。今云二分諸師同釋。唯除安惠。三分復除火辨．親勝者。豈可難陀亦立三分。根本疏主親承三藏翻糅論人。豈可不知妄為此斷。故取本疏科判為正。余定妄傳。非三藏釋也。
論。如患夢等。西明釋云。對經部．薩婆多。薩婆多夢境雖實。而非父母執為父母。故得成喻。要集救斷此亦為正 今謂不爾。既云正理五十云。夢緣過去曾所緣法。而有夢中見菟角者。曾於異處見菟見角。今于夢中由心惛倒。謂於一處和合追憶。或大海中有此形獸。曾見聞故今夢追憶。婆沙三十七大同正理。既有父母夢見父母。何不許夢緣實父母。不得引智度論外雲實有人頭余實有角救。彼自破云雖實有人實有角。但人頭生角者妄。又外救云世界廣大。或有國人有角等。亦破云若余國人有角可爾。但夢見此國所識人有角。則不可得破 何以故。大乘許夢緣虛妄故。作此破他。非他外人許緣妄
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 止。
西明說，這裡的三分和二分是爲了解釋『變』這個詞。關於這一點有三種說法。第一種說法是，最初的三分由安慧（Anhui）等八位論師解釋，除了親勝（Qin Sheng）和火辨（Huo Bian）。世親（Shi Qin）同時只建立了二分。第二種說法是，三分不包括安慧的解釋，因為『變似』這兩個詞是依他的緣故。其餘的與上述說法相同。第三種說法是，二分由各位論師共同解釋，唯獨不包括安慧。三分則進一步排除了火辨和親勝。玄奘三藏（Xuanzang Sanzang）的意圖在於后一種解釋，但這裡的解釋並非如此。如果以後一種解釋為正確，那麼三分就不是安慧的原文，二分也沒有安慧的參與。怎麼能允許安慧不解釋這個偈頌呢？而且，根據根本疏，二分正是難陀（Nanda）等人的原文。現在說二分由各位論師共同解釋，唯獨不包括安慧，三分又排除了火辨和親勝，難道難陀也建立了三分嗎？根本疏的作者親自接受了玄奘三藏翻譯和糅合的論著，怎麼可能不知道而妄下此斷言呢？所以，採用根本疏的科判才是正確的，其餘的肯定是妄傳，不是玄奘三藏的解釋。
論中說，『如患夢等』。西明解釋說，這是針對經部（Jing Bu）和薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）。薩婆多部認為夢境雖然是真實的，但並非父母卻執著為父母，所以可以作為比喻。要集救斷也認為這是正確的。但我認為不是這樣。既然正理五十中說，夢是緣於過去曾經經歷過的法，所以夢中才會見到兔角。曾經在不同的地方見過兔子和角，現在在夢中由於心識昏倒，認為是在同一個地方和合追憶。或者大海中有這種形狀的野獸，曾經見過或聽過，所以現在夢中追憶。《婆沙》（Vibhasa）三藏與正理相同。既然有父母夢見父母的情況，為什麼不允許夢緣于真實的父母呢？不得引用《智度論》（Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra）以外的說法，說確實有人頭，確實有角來辯解。他們自己反駁說，雖然確實有人頭，確實有角，但人頭生角是虛妄的。又有人辯解說，世界廣大，或許有國家的人有角等等。也反駁說，如果其他國家的人有角還可以，但夢見這個國家所認識的人有角，則是不可能的。為什麼呢？因為大乘（Mahayana）允許夢緣于虛妄，所以才這樣反駁他人。並非其他外人允許緣于虛妄。
【English Translation】 English version: Stop.
Ximing says that these three parts and two parts are to explain the word 'transformation'. There are three views on this. The first view is that the initial three parts were explained by Anhui (Anhui) and eight other masters, excluding Qinsheng (Qin Sheng) and Huobian (Huo Bian). Shiqin (Shi Qin) at the same time only established two parts. The second view is that the three parts do not include Anhui's explanation, because the words 'transformation-like' are dependent on others. The rest is the same as above. The third view is that the two parts were jointly explained by various masters, except for Anhui. The three parts further exclude Huobian and Qinsheng. The intention of Xuanzang Sanzang (Xuanzang Sanzang) lies in the latter explanation, but the explanation here is not like that. If the latter explanation is taken as correct, then the three parts are not Anhui's original text, and Anhui is not involved in the two parts either. How can it be allowed that Anhui does not explain this verse? Moreover, according to the fundamental commentary, the two parts are precisely the original text of Nanda (Nanda) and others. Now it is said that the two parts were jointly explained by various masters, except for Anhui, and the three parts further exclude Huobian and Qinsheng. Could it be that Nanda also established three parts? The author of the fundamental commentary personally accepted the translations and collations of Xuanzang Sanzang, how could he not know and make this assertion rashly? Therefore, adopting the classification of the fundamental commentary is correct, and the rest must be false transmissions, not the explanation of Xuanzang Sanzang.
The treatise says, 'Like suffering from dreams, etc.' Ximing explains that this is directed against the Sautrantika (Jing Bu) and Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada) schools. Although the Sarvastivada school believes that dream states are real, they are not parents but are clung to as parents, so they can be used as a metaphor. Yaoji Jiuduan also believes this is correct. But I don't think so. Since the Zhengli Fifty says that dreams are caused by dharmas that have been experienced in the past, that's why rabbit horns are seen in dreams. Rabbits and horns have been seen in different places in the past, and now in dreams, due to mental confusion, it is thought that they are combined and recalled in the same place. Or there are beasts of this shape in the ocean, which have been seen or heard, so they are recalled in dreams now. The Vibhasa (Vibhasa) Tripitaka is the same as Zhengli. Since there are cases of parents dreaming of parents, why not allow dreams to be caused by real parents? It is not permissible to cite explanations outside the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra (Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra), saying that there are indeed human heads and indeed horns to argue. They themselves refute that although there are indeed human heads and indeed horns, it is false that horns grow on human heads. Others argue that the world is vast, and perhaps there are people in some countries who have horns, etc. It is also refuted that if people in other countries have horns, that's possible, but it is impossible to dream of people in this country who are known to have horns. Why? Because Mahayana (Mahayana) allows dreams to be caused by falsehood, that's why they refute others in this way. It is not that other outsiders allow dreams to be caused by falsehood.
法。今薩婆多自許緣實。何得以大乘義顯成彼宗亦許緣妄。破彼可爾。立彼不成。故如本疏除其有部但對經部。
論云。我法分別熏習力故至變似我法者。問六．七有分別。后識生時有我法。五．八無分別。后識生時無我法 答今約分別解。我法五．八可得無。由他染熏成。識生似我法 問執心有分別。由彼故有似我法。無執無分別。非一切時似我法 答地上菩薩獨作生觀。七法執行。故心起時恒有我法 問有漏位有執。漏位似我法。無漏位無執。起無似我法 答前依執說。分別熏習。后似二生。執為我法不依無漏。無漏之心雖有二現。不執我法。但隨假說 問執位分別有似二生。無漏不執應無相．見 答心二緣起。故有相．見。不由於執方見．相生。
論。境依內識唯世俗識是假境依亦勝義者。有四解。一云。有無對。遍計虛妄。唯世俗有。依他是緣生。境依亦勝義。二相見對。相分是假依見起。假境依識唯俗有。見分是實能起相。是假境依勝義有。第三勝劣對。世間世俗唯世俗有。后三形前亦勝義有。第四凡聖對。凡境唯世俗。聖境亦勝義。雖有四解。此中文意但依初對 問依凡聖緣。遍計亦應名勝義諦 答許亦無過。下第八云。亦可說為凡聖智境。既為聖緣亦名勝義。但不名有今。依有無諦攝故爾
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 法（Dharma）。現在薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）自己承認緣起是真實的。為什麼可以用大乘（Mahayana）的義理來顯示併成立他們的宗派也承認緣起是虛妄的呢？破斥他們是可以的，但成立他們卻不行。所以如《本疏》所說，排除了有部（Sarvastivadins），只是針對經部（Sautrantika）。
論中說：『由於我法（Atman and Dharma）分別的熏習力，導致變現出相似的我法。』問：第六識和第七識有分別，后識產生時有我法；第五識和第八識沒有分別，后識產生時沒有我法？答：現在根據分別來解釋，我法在第五識和第八識中可以沒有，由其他的染污熏習而成。識產生時，顯現出相似的我法。問：執著心有分別，因為執著心的緣故，才有相似的我法；沒有執著就沒有分別，不是所有時候都有相似的我法？答：地上菩薩（Bodhisattva）獨自修作生觀，以七法來執行，所以心生起時，恒常有我法。問：有漏位有執著，有漏位有相似的我法；無漏位沒有執著，生起時沒有相似的我法？答：前面是依據執著來說的，分別熏習，後來相似的二者產生。執著為我法不依賴於無漏。無漏的心雖然有二種顯現，但不執著我法，只是隨順假說。問：執著位分別有相似的二者產生，無漏不執著，應該沒有相分和見分？答：心是二緣起，所以有相分和見分。不是由於執著才見分和相分產生。
論中說：『境依于內識，只有世俗識是假境，依于勝義。』對此有四種解釋。第一種說法是：有和無的對立。遍計所執（Parikalpita）是虛妄的，只有世俗諦（Samvriti-satya）有。依他起（Paratantra）是緣生，境依也是勝義諦（Paramartha-satya）。第二種說法是：相分和見分的對立。相分是虛假的，依于見分而生起，假境依識只有世俗諦有。見分是真實的，能夠生起相分，是假境依，勝義諦有。第三種說法是：殊勝和低劣的對立。世間世俗只有世俗諦有。后三種形於前，也是勝義諦有。第四種說法是：凡夫和聖人的對立。凡夫的境界只有世俗諦。聖人的境界也是勝義諦。雖然有四種解釋，但這裡的文意只是依據第一種對立。問：依據凡夫和聖人的緣，遍計所執也應該名為勝義諦？答：允許也沒有過失。下面的第八識說：『也可以說是凡夫和聖人智慧的境界。』既然是聖人所緣，也名為勝義。但不名為有，現在依據有和無的諦來攝取，所以這樣說。
【English Translation】 English version: Dharma. Now, the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins) themselves admit that dependent origination (緣起) is real. Why can the meaning of Mahayana be used to show and establish that their sect also admits that dependent origination is false? It is permissible to refute them, but it is not possible to establish them. Therefore, as stated in the Commentary, the Sarvastivadins are excluded, and only the Sautrantika (經部) is addressed.
The treatise says: 'Due to the force of the habituation of the discrimination of self and Dharma (Atman and Dharma), it leads to the transformation of something similar to self and Dharma.' Question: The sixth and seventh consciousnesses have discrimination, and when the subsequent consciousness arises, there is self and Dharma; the fifth and eighth consciousnesses have no discrimination, and when the subsequent consciousness arises, there is no self and Dharma? Answer: Now, according to the explanation of discrimination, self and Dharma may not exist in the fifth and eighth consciousnesses, but are formed by the habituation of other defilements. When consciousness arises, it manifests something similar to self and Dharma. Question: The clinging mind has discrimination, and because of the clinging mind, there is something similar to self and Dharma; without clinging, there is no discrimination, and not all the time there is something similar to self and Dharma? Answer: Bodhisattvas (菩薩) on the ground cultivate the contemplation of arising alone, and execute it with the seven Dharmas, so when the mind arises, there is always self and Dharma. Question: In the position of outflows, there is clinging, and in the position of outflows, there is something similar to self and Dharma; in the position of no outflows, there is no clinging, and when it arises, there is nothing similar to self and Dharma? Answer: The previous statement was based on clinging, discrimination habituation, and later the similar two arise. Clinging to self and Dharma does not depend on no outflows. Although the mind of no outflows has two manifestations, it does not cling to self and Dharma, but only follows the provisional saying. Question: In the position of clinging, discrimination has similar two arising, and no outflows do not cling, so there should be no image-component (相分) and seeing-component (見分)? Answer: The mind is the arising of two conditions, so there are image-component and seeing-component. It is not because of clinging that the seeing-component and image-component arise.
The treatise says: 'The object depends on the inner consciousness, only the conventional consciousness is the false object, depending on the ultimate meaning.' There are four explanations for this. The first saying is: the opposition of existence and non-existence. The completely conceptualized (Parikalpita) is false, and only the conventional truth (Samvriti-satya) exists. The dependent arising (Paratantra) is the arising of conditions, and the object dependence is also the ultimate truth (Paramartha-satya). The second saying is: the opposition of image-component and seeing-component. The image-component is false, arising from the seeing-component, and the false object depends on the consciousness, only the conventional truth exists. The seeing-component is real, able to generate the image-component, is the false object dependence, and the ultimate truth exists. The third saying is: the opposition of superior and inferior. The worldly convention only exists in the conventional truth. The latter three forms are before, and the ultimate truth also exists. The fourth saying is: the opposition of ordinary people and sages. The realm of ordinary people is only the conventional truth. The realm of sages is also the ultimate truth. Although there are four explanations, the meaning of the text here is only based on the first opposition. Question: According to the conditions of ordinary people and sages, the completely conceptualized should also be named the ultimate truth? Answer: Allowing it is not a fault. The following eighth consciousness says: 'It can also be said to be the realm of the wisdom of ordinary people and sages.' Since it is the object of sages, it is also named the ultimate meaning. But it is not named existence, and now it is based on the truth of existence and non-existence to include it, so it is said.
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成唯識論了義燈卷第一(終末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1832 成唯識論了義燈
成唯識論了義燈卷第二(本)
淄洲大云寺沙門惠沼撰
敘數論等我中雲汝所執我等。敘宗立量及出彼過如疏．樞要。然樞要中與第一量作有法差別相違因過。失解亦有有法自相相違因過。執我有法正所諍故。虛空非我故 量云。汝所執我。應非是我。許無初后故。如空 又解。雖對敵立諍我有無。猶無同喻。故方便顯我常．遍等。若許常．遍即離識有。準此即有有法自相相違之過。余皆準思 第三量中樞要云。隨身之因隨一不成。于同喻空上不有即不共不定。常．遍之宗空為同喻。瓶為異喻。隨身造業等因。于同異喻二俱非有 要集云。此不共不定其相難解。共許虛空體遍．常故。不可難令以為異喻 彼由不識草瓶字。謂是草難字。即謂樞要難彼虛空還為異喻。即難樞要云不可將空為同喻。復難為異喻 又二喻不併。如何說言二俱無。故應云此是喻中能立不成。以此為定 此不曾思。不知字錯故枉劬勞 又云。或可。虛空同喻。余色等法以為異喻。隨身作受因。異品有非有。故成相違 今謂不爾。若望數論。應云隨處受苦樂。不得言作業。他宗不許故。除我已外余非受苦樂。若勝論師唯我
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第一（終末） 大正藏第43冊 No. 1832 《成唯識論了義燈》
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第二（本）
淄洲大云寺沙門惠沼 撰
敘述數論等關於『我』(ātman)的觀點中說，『你所執著的我』等等。敘述宗派的立論、量式以及指出他們的過失，如同疏文和《樞要》所說。然而《樞要》中，對於第一個量式，由於有法（dharmin）的差別，造成自相矛盾的因過失。失解也存在有法自相矛盾的因過失，因為執著的『我』是有法，正是所爭論的對象，而虛空不是『我』。量式說：『你所執著的我，應該不是我，因為你承認它沒有初始和終結，就像虛空一樣。』又一種解釋是，即使針對敵方立論爭論『我』的有無，仍然沒有共同的譬喻。所以方便地顯示『我』是常、遍等等。如果承認『我』是常、遍，那就是離開了識而存在的。按照這個標準，就存在有法自相矛盾的過失。其餘的都可以參照思考。在第三個量式中，《樞要》說：『隨身之因，隨一不成。』在同喻虛空上不存在，就是不共不定。常、遍的宗義，虛空是同喻，瓶子是異喻。隨身造業等因，在同喻和異喻上都不存在。《要集》說：『這種不共不定的相狀難以理解，因為普遍承認虛空的體性是遍、常的，所以不能用它來為難，讓它成為異喻。』他們因為不認識草瓶字，以為是草難字，就說《樞要》用虛空作為異喻來為難。就反駁《樞要》說不能將虛空作為同喻，又反駁說作為異喻。而且兩個譬喻不能並列，怎麼能說兩個都不存在呢？所以應該說這是譬喻中能立不成，以此來確定。這是不曾思考，因為不知道字寫錯了，所以白費力氣。又說：『或許可以，虛空是同喻，其餘的色等法作為異喻。隨身作受因，在異品中有非有，所以構成相違。』現在我認為不是這樣。如果針對數論，應該說『隨處受苦樂』，不能說『作業』，因為其他宗派不承認。除了『我』以外，其餘的不能感受苦樂。如果是勝論師，只有『我』
【English Translation】 English version:
Cheng Weishi Lun Liaoyi Deng, Scroll 1 (End) Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 43, No. 1832, Cheng Weishi Lun Liaoyi Deng
Cheng Weishi Lun Liaoyi Deng, Scroll 2 (Original)
Composed by Shramana Huizhao of Dayun Temple in Zizhou
In the discussion of 'self' (ātman) by the Samkhya school and others, they say, 'The self that you adhere to,' and so on. The establishment of tenets, logical arguments, and the refutation of their faults are as described in the commentary and the 'Essentials.' However, in the 'Essentials,' regarding the first logical argument, due to the difference in the subject of the argument (dharmin), there is a fault of contradictory nature. The misunderstanding also contains the fault of contradictory nature in the subject of the argument, because the adhered-to 'self' is the subject of the argument, which is precisely the point of contention, while space is not 'self.' The logical argument states: 'The self that you adhere to should not be a self, because you admit that it has no beginning or end, just like space.' Another explanation is that even if the argument against the opponent is about the existence or non-existence of 'self,' there is still no common analogy. Therefore, it is expedient to show that the 'self' is permanent, pervasive, and so on. If it is admitted that the 'self' is permanent and pervasive, then it exists apart from consciousness. According to this standard, there is a fault of contradictory nature in the subject of the argument. The rest can be considered accordingly. In the third logical argument, the 'Essentials' says: 'The cause related to the body, any one of them is not established.' It does not exist in the common analogy of space, which is non-common and uncertain. The tenet of permanence and pervasiveness, space is the common analogy, and a pot is the dissimilar analogy. The cause of creating karma related to the body, etc., does not exist in either the common or dissimilar analogy. The 'Important Collection' says: 'The characteristic of this non-common uncertainty is difficult to understand, because it is universally acknowledged that the nature of space is pervasive and permanent, so it cannot be used to make it difficult, making it a dissimilar analogy.' They, because they do not recognize the characters for 'grass' and 'bottle,' thinking it is the character for 'difficult,' then say that the 'Essentials' uses space as a dissimilar analogy to make it difficult. They then refute the 'Essentials,' saying that space cannot be used as a common analogy, and again refute it as a dissimilar analogy. Moreover, the two analogies cannot be juxtaposed, how can it be said that neither exists? Therefore, it should be said that this is the inability to establish the proposition in the analogy, and this should be used to determine it. This has not been considered, because they do not know that the character is written incorrectly, so they waste their efforts. It is also said: 'Perhaps it is possible, space is the common analogy, and the remaining phenomena such as form are the dissimilar analogy. The cause of experiencing suffering and pleasure related to the body, in the dissimilar category, there is both existence and non-existence, so it constitutes contradiction.' Now I think it is not like this. If it is directed at the Samkhya school, it should be said 'experiencing suffering and pleasure everywhere,' and it cannot be said 'creating karma,' because other schools do not admit it. Apart from the 'self,' the rest cannot experience suffering and pleasure. If it is the Vaisheshika school, only the 'self'
造業及受苦樂。色等亦非。如何說是異有非有 又云。前樞要說有法差別。雖是一師。若依別師所說稍異。謂若法．有法言顯宗者。俱名自相。意許宗中相通余法名法差別。唯在一法不通余法者。名有法差別。且如護法對難陀等。意許欲成第八用第七識為俱有依。而不言顯第七為依。方便立云。阿賴耶識必有俱生別依。是識性故。猶如六識。此因是有法差別。差別量云。阿賴耶識應不受熏持種。以識性故。猶如第六。受熏持種唯在第八。故是有法差別 今謂不爾。且作有緣性量。是有法差別。為唯取作有有緣性為差別。為亦取非有有緣性為差別。若亦取非有有緣性為差別。非有有緣性不唯有法上。若唯取作有有緣性為差別。差別于誰。誰為相違 又作非有有緣性。亦非言顯。何非差別。若云取所差別唯在一法。如真他用。亦唯一法。應非法差別 又如數論立思是我。我是言顯。名為自相。受果我．不受果我。意中所許。此名有法差別。為法差別耶。若云法差別。相不通余。若云有法差別。即現在法上。復不得云數論唯得立我為思。不得立思為我。無別所以。又理門云。觀彼所立立法．有法非德．有德 此意即許諸法自性及與差別。隨所立者名法．有法。非定自性恒名有法。諸法差別恒名為法。又六識喻亦違自相。非賴
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於造業和承受苦樂的問題，以及色等法並非實有，那麼如何解釋說是『異有非有』呢？ 又說，之前的樞要之處在於說明『有法』（dharmin，具有某種性質的事物）的差別。即使是同一位老師，如果依據其他老師的說法，也會稍有不同。如果『法』（dharma，性質）和『有法』這兩個詞語都明確地表達了宗（paksha，論題），那麼它們都被稱為『自相』（svalaksana，自身獨有的特徵）。意思是，在論題中，與其他法相通的法被稱為『法差別』（dharma-visesa，性質的差別）。唯獨在一個法上存在，而不與其他法相通的，被稱為『有法差別』（dharmin-visesa，具有性質的事物的差別）。例如，護法（Dharmapala）論師針對難陀（Nanda）等人，意圖成立第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）以第七識（末那識，Manas-vijnana）為俱有依（sahabhavi-asraya，共同存在的所依），但沒有明確地說第七識是所依。爲了方便起見，假設說：『阿賴耶識必定有俱生的別依，因為它是識的性質，就像六識一樣。』這個因是『有法差別』。差別量（visesa-anumana，特殊的推論）是：『阿賴耶識不應該接受熏習和持有種子，因為它具有識的性質，就像第六識一樣。』接受熏習和持有種子只存在於第八識中，所以這是『有法差別』。 現在我們認為不是這樣。姑且做一個『作有緣性』（krta-hetuka，由作為原因的事物所生）的量。這是『有法差別』。是僅僅取『作有有緣性』作為差別，還是也取『非有有緣性』作為差別？如果也取『非有有緣性』作為差別，那麼『非有有緣性』不僅僅存在於『有法』上。如果僅僅取『作有有緣性』作為差別，那麼差別于誰？誰是相違的？ 而且，『作非有有緣性』也沒有明確地說出來，為什麼不是差別呢？如果說所取的差別僅僅在一個法上，就像『真他用』（satya-parapravrtti，真實的由他力所生）一樣，也僅僅是一個法，那麼應該不是『法差別』。 又如數論派（Samkhya）建立『思是我』（ahamkara atma，我-意識是靈魂），『我是』明確地說出來，被稱為『自相』。『受果我』（bhoktr atma，享受果報的靈魂）和『不受果我』（abhoktr atma，不享受果報的靈魂）是意中所允許的，這被稱為『有法差別』，是『法差別』嗎？如果說是『法差別』，那麼相不與其他相通。如果說是『有法差別』，那麼就在現在的法上。又不能說數論派只能成立『我為思』，不能成立『思為我』，沒有別的理由。 又《理門論》（Nyayapravesa）說，觀察他們所建立的『立法』（sadhana，能立，證明）和『有法』，是否是『非德』（aguna，無屬性）或『有德』（saguna，有屬性）。 這個意思是，允許諸法的自性以及差別，隨所立者被稱為『法』或『有法』。並非一定的自性總是被稱為『有法』，諸法的差別總是被稱為『法』。而且，六識的比喻也違背了自相，並非阿賴耶識。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding the creation of karma and the experiencing of suffering and happiness, as well as the fact that form and other dharmas are not truly existent, how can it be explained as 'different existence and non-existence' (bhava-abhava)? Furthermore, it is said that the previous key point was to explain the difference in 'dharmin' (that which possesses a quality). Even if it is the same teacher, if based on the teachings of other teachers, there will be slight differences. If the terms 'dharma' (quality) and 'dharmin' both explicitly express the paksha (thesis), then they are both called 'svalaksana' (own-characteristic). The meaning is that, within the thesis, a dharma that is common to other dharmas is called 'dharma-visesa' (difference in quality). That which exists only in one dharma and is not common to other dharmas is called 'dharmin-visesa' (difference in that which possesses a quality). For example, Dharmapala, in response to Nanda and others, intends to establish the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) as having the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana) as its co-existent support (sahabhavi-asraya), but does not explicitly say that the seventh consciousness is the support. For the sake of convenience, it is hypothesized that: 'The Alaya-vijnana must have a co-born separate support, because it is of the nature of consciousness, just like the six consciousnesses.' This reason is a 'dharmin-visesa'. The visesa-anumana (special inference) is: 'The Alaya-vijnana should not receive熏習 (xunxi, perfuming) and hold seeds, because it has the nature of consciousness, just like the sixth consciousness.' Receiving 熏習 and holding seeds only exist in the eighth consciousness, so this is a 'dharmin-visesa'. Now, we think it is not so. Let's make a 量 (anumana, inference) of 'krta-hetuka' (caused by something that acts as a cause). This is a 'dharmin-visesa'. Is it only taking 'krta-hetuka' as the difference, or is it also taking 'non-krta-hetuka' as the difference? If it is also taking 'non-krta-hetuka' as the difference, then 'non-krta-hetuka' does not only exist on 'dharmin'. If it is only taking 'krta-hetuka' as the difference, then what is it differentiating from? What is contradictory? Moreover, 'making non-krta-hetuka' is also not explicitly stated, why is it not a difference? If it is said that the difference taken only exists in one dharma, just like 'satya-parapravrtti' (true other-powered nature), it is also only one dharma, then it should not be a 'dharma-visesa'. Furthermore, for example, the Samkhya school establishes 'ahamkara atma' (I-consciousness is the soul), 'I am' is explicitly stated, and is called 'svalaksana'. 'bhoktr atma' (the soul that enjoys the results) and 'abhoktr atma' (the soul that does not enjoy the results) are what is allowed in the mind, and this is called 'dharmin-visesa', is it a 'dharma-visesa'? If it is said to be 'dharma-visesa', then the characteristic is not common to other characteristics. If it is said to be 'dharmin-visesa', then it is on the present dharma. Also, it cannot be said that the Samkhya school can only establish 'I as consciousness', and cannot establish 'consciousness as I', there is no other reason. Also, the Nyayapravesa says, observe whether the 'sadhana' (means of proof) and 'dharmin' that they establish are 'aguna' (without qualities) or 'saguna' (with qualities). The meaning is that the own-nature of dharmas and the differences are allowed, and what is established is called 'dharma' or 'dharmin'. It is not that a certain own-nature is always called 'dharmin', and the differences of dharmas are always called 'dharma'. Moreover, the analogy of the six consciousnesses also violates the own-characteristic, and is not Alaya-vijnana.
耶故。應是違二。不唯差別 又云。如大乘師對小乘師。意許欲立第七識故。而不言顯有第七識。方便立云。極成意識。必有俱生增上別依。極成六識隨一攝故。猶如五識。此因是法差別相違。相違量云。極成意識。不用第七為俱有別依。極成六識隨一攝故。如五識。不以第七為別依。通第八故。是法差別 若準因明為他用難。此亦不成。應云以非第七識為俱有別依。眼等五根非第七識故。若云不用第七識為俱有別依。但遮非表。無有別法與七相違。與誰為因。熟思方解。
破我中。云執我常．遍。量同虛空。應不隨身受苦樂等。此若共量。宗．因俱有隨一不成佛法不許有我常．遍。若佛法自比量。宗有自違。因有自隨一不成。亦有自所依不成。虛空無體。無俱不成。取虛空無為依如可爾。今是他量。就破他故。簡過如疏。
西明云。破勝論我中。云應無動轉自問云。彼宗許我亦無動轉。今成無轉豈不相符。解云。有二說。一云體用俱無動轉。二云用有動轉。是故前量有二義。一若依初說。論主將破先定他比量。謂汝宗我體及用應無動轉。體常．遍故。如虛空 今謂不然。彼計體用俱無動轉。何須量立。此乃徒施。以彼自許。只可但定於宗。無勞立量 二若依用動轉者。是釋論主述彼宗量顯彼自違。量云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 耶故（因此）。應是違二（應是違反二種原則）。不唯差別（不僅是差別），又云（又說）。如大乘師對小乘師（例如大乘的老師對小乘的老師），意許欲立第七識故（心中允許想要建立第七識的緣故），而不言顯有第七識（卻不公開說有第七識）。方便立云（方便地建立說），『極成意識（被普遍認可的意識），必有俱生增上別依（必定有與生俱來的增上別依）』。極成六識隨一攝故（被普遍認可的六識包含其中一個的緣故），猶如五識（就像前五識）。此因是法差別相違（這個原因在法上是差別相違的）。相違量云（相違的量式說），『極成意識（被普遍認可的意識），不用第七為俱有別依（不以第七識作為與生俱來的別依），極成六識隨一攝故（被普遍認可的六識包含其中一個的緣故），如五識（就像前五識）。不以第七為別依（不以第七識作為別依），通第八故（因為通於第八識）。』是法差別（這是法上的差別）。若準因明為他用難（如果按照因明的標準，為他人使用則難以成立），此亦不成（這個量式也不成立）。應云（應該說），『以非第七識為俱有別依（以不是第七識作為與生俱來的別依），眼等五根非第七識故（眼等五根不是第七識的緣故）。』若云（如果說），『不用第七識為俱有別依（不以第七識作為與生俱來的別依），但遮非表（只是遮止，不是表述），無有別法與七相違（沒有其他的法與第七識相違），與誰為因（以什麼作為原因）？』熟思方解（仔細思考才能理解）。
破我中（在破斥『我』的觀點中），云執我常．遍（說執著『我』是常恒、普遍的）。量同虛空（量式如同虛空）。應不隨身受苦樂等（應該不隨身體感受苦樂等）。此若共量（如果這是共同認可的量式），宗．因俱有隨一不成（宗和因都存在其中一個不成立的情況）。佛法不許有我常．遍（佛法不允許有『我』是常恒、普遍的說法）。若佛法自比量（如果佛法自身進行比量），宗有自違（宗存在自相矛盾）。因有自隨一不成（因存在其中一個不成立的情況），亦有自所依不成（也存在自身所依不成立的情況）。虛空無體（虛空沒有實體），無俱不成（沒有都不成立的情況）。取虛空無為依如可爾（取虛空的『無』作為所依，或許可以）。今是他量（現在這是他人的量式），就破他故（就是爲了破斥他人）。簡過如疏（簡要說明過失如同疏文）。
西明云（西明法師說），破勝論我中（在破斥勝論派的『我』的觀點中），云應無動轉（說『我』應該沒有動轉）。自問云（自己提問說），彼宗許我亦無動轉（他們的宗派也允許『我』沒有動轉），今成無轉豈不相符（現在成立沒有動轉，豈不是相符嗎）？解云（解釋說），有二說（有兩種說法）。一云體用俱無動轉（一種說法是本體和作用都沒有動轉）。二云用有動轉（另一種說法是作用有動轉）。是故前量有二義（因此前面的量式有兩種含義）。一若依初說（如果依照第一種說法），論主將破先定他比量（論主將要破斥，首先確定他人的比量），謂汝宗我體及用應無動轉（說你們宗派的『我』，本體和作用應該都沒有動轉），體常．遍故（因為本體是常恒、普遍的），如虛空（如同虛空）。今謂不然（現在認為不是這樣），彼計體用俱無動轉（他們認為本體和作用都沒有動轉），何須量立（何須建立量式）？此乃徒施（這只是徒勞）。以彼自許（因為他們自己承認），只可但定於宗（只能確定宗），無勞立量（無需建立量式）。二若依用動轉者（如果依照作用有動轉的說法），是釋論主述彼宗量顯彼自違（這是解釋論主陳述他們的宗派的量式，顯示他們自身的矛盾）。量云（量式說）
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore (耶故), it should be contrary to two principles (應是違二). Not only difference (不唯差別), it is also said (又云): For example, a Mahayana teacher to a Hinayana teacher (如大乘師對小乘師), intending to establish the seventh consciousness (意許欲立第七識故), but not explicitly stating the existence of the seventh consciousness (而不言顯有第七識). Conveniently establishing it as (方便立云), 'The well-established consciousness (極成意識), must have co-arisen, dominant, and separate basis (必有俱生增上別依).' Because the well-established six consciousnesses are included in one of them (極成六識隨一攝故), like the five consciousnesses (猶如五識). This reason is contradictory in terms of the difference in dharma (此因是法差別相違). The contradictory inference states (相違量云): 'The well-established consciousness (極成意識), does not use the seventh as a co-arisen separate basis (不用第七為俱有別依), because the well-established six consciousnesses are included in one of them (極成六識隨一攝故), like the five consciousnesses (如五識). It does not use the seventh as a separate basis (不以第七為別依), because it is connected to the eighth (通第八故).' This is a difference in dharma (是法差別). If according to Hetu-vidya (因明) it is difficult to use for others (若準因明為他用難), this also does not hold (此亦不成). It should be said (應云), 'Using something other than the seventh consciousness as a co-arisen separate basis (以非第七識為俱有別依), because the five roots such as the eye are not the seventh consciousness (眼等五根非第七識故).' If it is said (若云), 'Not using the seventh consciousness as a co-arisen separate basis (不用第七識為俱有別依), it only negates and does not affirm (但遮非表), there is no other dharma that contradicts the seventh (無有別法與七相違), what is the cause (與誰為因)?' Think carefully to understand (熟思方解).
In refuting the 'self' (破我中), it is said that clinging to the self as permanent and pervasive (云執我常．遍). The inference is like space (量同虛空). It should not follow the body to experience suffering and joy, etc. (應不隨身受苦樂等). If this is a commonly accepted inference (此若共量), the subject and reason both have one that is not established (宗．因俱有隨一不成). Buddhism does not allow the self to be permanent and pervasive (佛法不許有我常．遍). If Buddhism uses its own inference (若佛法自比量), the subject has self-contradiction (宗有自違). The reason has one that is not established (因有自隨一不成), and also has its own basis that is not established (亦有自所依不成). Space has no substance (虛空無體), there is no 'both not established' (無俱不成). Taking the 'non-existence' of space as a basis may be acceptable (取虛空無為依如可爾). Now this is another's inference (今是他量), it is to refute others (就破他故). Briefly explaining the faults is like the commentary (簡過如疏).
Ximing (西明) said, in refuting the 'self' of the Vaisheshika school (破勝論我中), it is said that it should have no movement (云應無動轉). He asked himself (自問云), their school also allows the self to have no movement (彼宗許我亦無動轉), now establishing no movement, isn't it consistent (今成無轉豈不相符)? He explained (解云), there are two views (有二說). One view is that both the essence and function have no movement (一云體用俱無動轉). The other view is that the function has movement (二云用有動轉). Therefore, the previous inference has two meanings (是故前量有二義). One, if according to the first view (一若依初說), the author will refute, first establishing the other's inference (論主將破先定他比量), saying that the self of your school, both essence and function should have no movement (謂汝宗我體及用應無動轉), because the essence is permanent and pervasive (體常．遍故), like space (如虛空). Now it is considered not so (今謂不然), they believe that both essence and function have no movement (彼計體用俱無動轉), why establish an inference (何須量立)? This is just in vain (此乃徒施). Because they themselves admit it (以彼自許), it can only determine the subject (只可但定於宗), no need to establish an inference (無勞立量). Two, if according to the view that the function has movement (二若依用動轉者), it is the author of the commentary stating their school's inference, showing their own contradiction (是釋論主述彼宗量顯彼自違). The inference states (量云)
。汝執我用應無動轉。體常．遍故。如空 此亦不爾。以常．遍為因。應有兩俱不成。彼既許用動體不動。即許體常．遍用非常遍。準下論云用不離體用應常有。故知彼許用有動轉非常非遍。故常遍因於用非有。如何以體常．遍為因違彼計耶。若應如論立。應云汝之我用亦應常遍。不離體故。猶如於體。何得用彼常．遍為因。故應依本疏主所明。正此論云汝所執我應不隨身能造諸業。汝許無動轉故。如太虛空 以此文中有三比量。因有三故。一常．二遍．三無動轉。文言如何意是不義。上說應字。合在如何二字之上。文言便故在因上安。所以不次。不得本意余浪釋之 亦如因明論文。云此中宗者。謂極成有法極成能別差別性故。隨自樂為所成立性。是名為宗。後文軌法師輒改論文云差別為性。為之言作。言以差別為宗體性。若爾前標此中宗者。釋云差別為性即顯宗訖。何須更說是名為宗。文言煩重。元本論云差別性故有其二義。何以故。以差別故宗體。隨自下簡過。今言故者。意簡古師以有法及法俱名為宗。今簡古師義。以差別性故。互相乖反是其宗體。若言為性無簡古失 二云古師宗過有五。今陳那菩薩更加后四。以極成有法．及法俱極成。可為宗依。以差別性是宗體故。依彼有法及法上立是名為宗。方始結之。
又所執我為一為異。若言異者其體應相雜。要集敘量云。天授真我。與祠授我體應相雜。更相遍故。如祠授我 今謂。此說理亦稍難。彼許祠授我體相雜。天授應然。有相符過。不許相雜。喻闕所立。何成比量 西明云。因云更相遍故。無有過失。天授．祠授二人我。皆有與他更遍義故。如所作性因 集云。有說常遍為因。必望二法方名更遍者 此亦非理。違論文故 有解一我相似義說更遍 此亦非理。一體不可說更遍故。違道理故 集云。有釋為正。以天授等我即有與他我更相遍義。如所作因必望能作。雖不顯唯舌等緣。而所作因成 今謂不爾。何者若雲天授等我。即有與他更相遍義。即有與他相雜。以不。若云相雜相符之過。若不相雜喻闕所立。喻即不成。本疏意云。祠授我常．遍。而體是一。故立量云。天授我與祠授我。是有法。應體成一。是法。以常．遍故。因如祠授我。祠授我一。復是常遍。喻具二立得成比量。此得論意。智者當信。余皆不審 又如前量云。且如余祠授等。于天授作諸業時亦應作業。我是一故。如天授等。餘人不解此之比量。謂將余祠授等於天授作業時總為有法。便即難云。如何復取有法為喻。由不解意。意云。如余祠授。是有法。於他天授作業之時亦作業。是法。標舉天授作業之
時。祠授亦應作業。以我體一。若不言于天授作業時亦應作業。天授未作破僧等業。可令祠授等亦作破僧業。即同喻無所立。為簡此過。云于天授作業之時亦應作業。喻具二立。
問外人依同處不相離色作不定失。立量云。我所執我體定非是一。許更相遍故。如汝大乘同處不相離色。此有何過。答此量有二過。一有有法自相相違因過。我亦所諍。同處不相離色體非我故。此更相遍因。以同處色為同法故。即是唯於我異喻轉。更無遍是我同喻故。二有有法差別相違因過。有法之我。正是言顯。假我實我。即是意許。有法差別。以大乘宗同處不相離色。即是假我。復更相遍。喻具二立。更無實我。更遍同喻。故立量云。汝所執我。應是假我非實我。許更遍故。如同處不相離色 要集云。三藏有三說。一云同處不相離。瑜伽論隨經部轉門。非大乘正義。二云亦大乘正義。然識所變是假非實。皆不離心故得涉入。不同彼宗眼等實有不相涉入。三云七物別類同處不雜。我類無別同處應雜。三藏意存第二。集云。今尋初釋有他不定。依第二釋。雖識變假。七非成一故亦不定。依第三釋。外器類同一處不雜成一故亦不定。故今因云同類無增減更相遍故。無不定失。同類簡七物。無增減簡外器。外器有增減。我即不爾 或可。因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當時，如果天授正在進行某種行為，祠授也應該做同樣的行為，因為我和天授的身體是一體的。如果我不說天授在做某種行為時，祠授也應該做同樣的行為，那麼如果天授沒有做出破僧等惡業，卻允許祠授做出破僧的惡業，那就等同於這個比喻沒有任何意義。爲了避免這個過失，所以說在天授做某種行為的時候，祠授也應該做同樣的行為，這樣這個比喻就具備了兩個成立的條件。
外道根據『在同一處所不互相分離的色』來建立量式，犯了不確定的過失。他們立論說：『我所執著的我體，一定不是唯一的，因為允許互相周遍，就像你們大乘宗所說的在同一處所不互相分離的色一樣。』這有什麼過失呢？回答是：這個量式有兩個過失。第一，有『有法自相矛盾因』的過失，因為『我』也是所爭論的對象，而『在同一處所不互相分離的色』的體性不是『我』。這個『互相周遍』的因，因為以『在同一處所的色』作為共同的法，所以只是在與『我』不同的例子中成立，而沒有周遍於『我』的相同例子。第二，有『有法差別相違因』的過失。『有法』中的『我』，正是言語所顯示的，無論是假我還是實我，都是意許的。『有法』的差別在於，大乘宗所說的『在同一處所不互相分離的色』，是假我，並且互相周遍，這個比喻具備了兩個成立的條件。沒有真實的我，更沒有周遍的相同例子。所以可以立論說：『你所執著的我，應該是假我而不是實我，因為允許互相周遍，就像在同一處所不互相分離的色一樣。』《要集》中說，三藏有三種說法：第一種說法認為，『在同一處所不互相分離』是瑜伽論跟隨經部的觀點，不是大乘的正義。第二種說法認為，這也是大乘的正義，然而識所變現的是假象而不是真實的，都不離心，所以可以涉入，不同於他們宗派的眼等是真實存在，不能互相涉入。第三種說法認為，七種事物類別不同，在同一處所不混雜，我的類別沒有差別，在同一處所應該混雜。三藏的意圖在於第二種說法。《集》中說，現在探尋最初的解釋，有『他不定』的過失。依據第二種解釋，雖然識所變現的是假象，但七者不能成為一體，所以也是不確定的。依據第三種解釋，外在器物的類別在同一處所不混雜，不能成為一體，所以也是不確定的。所以現在的因是『同類沒有增減，互相周遍』，沒有不確定的過失。『同類』是爲了簡別七種事物，『沒有增減』是爲了簡別外在器物，外在器物有增減，而『我』不是這樣。或者可以，因...
【English Translation】 English version: At that time, if Tirthika (a follower of a non-Buddhist religious tradition) was performing some action, then Devadatta (name of a Buddhist monk) should also perform the same action, because my body and Devadatta's are one. If I do not say that when Tirthika is performing some action, Devadatta should also perform the same action, then if Tirthika has not committed evil deeds such as breaking the Sangha (Buddhist monastic community), but allows Devadatta to commit the evil deed of breaking the Sangha, then it is equivalent to this analogy having no meaning. In order to avoid this fault, it is said that when Tirthika is doing something, Devadatta should also do the same thing, so that this analogy has two conditions for establishment.
The outsider, based on 'color that is in the same place and not separated', commits the fault of uncertainty by establishing a proposition, saying: 'The self that I hold is definitely not one, because it is permissible to be mutually pervasive, like the color that is in the same place and not separated in your Mahayana (Great Vehicle Buddhism) school.' What is the fault in this? The answer is: this proposition has two faults. First, there is the fault of 'the subject having a self-contradictory reason', because 'I' is also the object of dispute, and the nature of 'color that is in the same place and not separated' is not 'I'. This reason of 'mutual pervasiveness', because it takes 'color in the same place' as a common dharma (teaching), only holds true in examples different from 'I', and there is no similar example that pervades 'I'. Second, there is the fault of 'the subject having a contradictory reason of difference'. The 'I' in 'subject' is exactly what is shown by language, whether it is a false self or a real self, it is intentionally permitted. The difference in 'subject' lies in the fact that the 'color that is in the same place and not separated' in the Mahayana school is a false self and is mutually pervasive, and this analogy has two conditions for establishment. There is no real self, and even less a pervasive similar example. Therefore, it can be argued: 'The self that you hold should be a false self and not a real self, because it is permissible to be mutually pervasive, like color that is in the same place and not separated.' The Yaoji says that the Tripitaka (the three baskets of Buddhist scriptures) has three sayings: The first saying is that 'being in the same place and not separated' is the view of the Yogacara (a school of Buddhist philosophy) following the Sutra school, and is not the correct meaning of Mahayana. The second saying is that this is also the correct meaning of Mahayana, but what is transformed by consciousness is an illusion and not real, and is inseparable from the mind, so it can be involved, unlike their school's eyes, etc., which are real and cannot be involved with each other. The third saying is that the seven kinds of things are different categories, and they are not mixed in the same place. My category has no difference, and it should be mixed in the same place. The intention of the Tripitaka lies in the second saying. The Ji says that now exploring the initial explanation, there is the fault of 'other uncertainty'. According to the second explanation, although what is transformed by consciousness is an illusion, the seven cannot become one, so it is also uncertain. According to the third explanation, the categories of external objects are not mixed in the same place, and cannot become one, so it is also uncertain. Therefore, the current reason is 'the same kind has no increase or decrease, and is mutually pervasive', and there is no uncertain fault. 'Same kind' is to distinguish the seven kinds of things, and 'no increase or decrease' is to distinguish external objects. External objects have increase or decrease, but 'I' is not like this. Or it can be, because...
雲天授．祠授二我隨一攝更相遍故。亦無不定 今謂此釋不稱正理。添足論文。本疏云應言常遍。即難云有違論失。今加五字豈不為過 又云。或可。云二我隨一攝更相遍故 亦加論文。又二解中同喻皆闕所立法故。過如前顯。又有比量相違決定因過。應依本疏 問敘后三類所計我中。瑜伽六十四等總有四類。然但前二不攝第三 若爾何故彼論說云依我分別計為有者。皆攝在此四種計中。除此更無。如何不收 答彼據我執自性不越彼四。今據情解妄謂為我故敘破之。實是法執 問若爾如何下生空斷 答彼文總說非別別屬。文總意別。斯文大例。又樞要中更有一解。如彼不錄。
西明云。第一即蘊者。是殊徴伽外道。彼計諸蘊皆有蘊性。如內宗說一切諸法以如為性。彼計蘊性以為實我。即當大婆沙所說二十句薩迦耶見 今謂此解理稍難詳。二十句身見等執。即色等五蘊為我。彼執色性。云何言即二十句耶。今且解者。雖俱即蘊而執有別。一執色等即為其我。一執色性以為其我。性雖非即色然是蘊收。以蘊性故。或執蘊性非即蘊攝。如大乘如雖諸蘊性非是蘊攝。應是第二異蘊而住蘊中句收 或執蘊性。性者體。執此蘊體即是其我。以他不立有五蘊故。言五蘊者佛法談故。更撿婆沙。
西明又云。后三之中何故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 雲天授的觀點是，祠授（一種祭祀行為）和二我（兩種不同的『我』的觀念）隨一攝（一種統攝方式）而更相遍故（互相普遍存在），因此沒有不確定的情況。現在認為這種解釋不符合正理，是添足論文。本疏說應該說『常遍』，這樣就難以避免違背論點的過失。現在加上五個字，難道不是太過分了嗎？又說，或者可以，說二我隨一攝而更相遍故，這也是新增了論文。而且兩種解釋中的比喻都缺少所要成立的法，所以過失和前面一樣明顯。還有比量相違的決定因過失，應該依據本疏。問：敘述后三類所計的『我』中，《瑜伽師地論》六十四等總共有四類，然而只有前兩類不包括第三類。如果這樣，為什麼那部論典說『依我分別計為有者』，都包括在這四種計度中，除此之外再沒有其他的了，為什麼不收攝呢？答：那是根據我執的自性不超過那四種。現在是根據情理來解釋，錯誤地認為那是『我』，所以敘述並破斥它。實際上是法執。問：如果這樣，如何下生空斷（如何證悟空性）？答：那段文字是總的來說，不是分別屬於哪一種。文字是總的，意思是有區別的。這是文章中的一個大例子。而且樞要中還有一種解釋，這裡沒有收錄。
西明的觀點是，第一種『即蘊者』，是殊徴伽外道（一種外道）。他們認為諸蘊都有蘊性，就像內宗說一切諸法以『如』為性一樣。他們認為蘊性就是實我，相當於《大婆沙論》所說的二十句薩迦耶見（二十種身見）。現在認為這種解釋在理上稍有難以詳盡的地方。二十句身見等執，就是執著色等五蘊為我。他們執著色性，怎麼能說是二十句呢？現在且這樣解釋：雖然都是『即蘊』，但執著有所區別。一種是執著色等就是我，一種是執著色性以為我。性雖然不是色，但屬於蘊所攝，因為是蘊性。或者執著蘊性不是蘊所攝，就像大乘的『如』雖然是諸蘊的性，但不是蘊所攝。應該屬於第二種『異蘊而住蘊中』句所收。或者執著蘊性，『性』就是體，執著這個蘊的體就是我。因為他們不立有五蘊，說五蘊是佛法的說法。需要再查閱《婆沙論》。
西明又說，后三種之中為什麼...
【English Translation】 English version Yuntian Shou's view is that Cishi Shou (a type of sacrificial act) and the two Atmans (two different concepts of 'self') follow Yi She (a method of integration) and are mutually pervasive, so there is no uncertainty. Now it is believed that this explanation does not conform to the correct principle and is an addition to the thesis. The original commentary says that it should be said 'constant and pervasive', which makes it difficult to avoid the fault of violating the argument. Now adding five words, isn't that too much? It also says, 'Or it could be,' saying that the two Atmans follow Yi She and are mutually pervasive, which is also adding to the thesis. Moreover, the metaphors in both explanations lack the Dharma to be established, so the fault is as obvious as before. There is also the fault of contradictory determination in the analogy, which should be based on the original commentary. Question: In the description of the Atmans conceived by the latter three categories, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and sixty-four others have a total of four categories, but only the first two categories do not include the third category. If so, why does that treatise say 'Those who discriminate and conceive based on the Atman' are all included in these four types of conceptions, and there is nothing else besides this, so why not include them? Answer: That is based on the nature of attachment to the Atman not exceeding those four. Now it is based on reason to explain, mistakenly thinking that it is the 'self', so it is described and refuted. In reality, it is attachment to Dharma. Question: If so, how does one achieve the cessation of suffering by realizing emptiness? Answer: That passage is a general statement, not specifically belonging to any one type. The words are general, and the meaning is different. This is a great example in the text. Moreover, there is another explanation in the essentials, which is not included here.
Ximing's view is that the first type, 'those who identify with the Skandhas (aggregates)', are the Samkhya (a school of Indian philosophy) heretics. They believe that all Skandhas have Skandha-nature, just like the inner school says that all Dharmas have 'Suchness' as their nature. They believe that Skandha-nature is the real self, which is equivalent to the twenty sentences of Satkayadrishti (view of self-existence) mentioned in the Mahavibhasa (Great Commentary). Now it is believed that this explanation is somewhat difficult to be exhaustive in reason. The twenty sentences of Satkayadrishti, etc., are clinging to the five Skandhas such as form as the self. They cling to the nature of form, how can it be said to be twenty sentences? Now let's explain it this way: although both are 'identifying with the Skandhas', the clinging is different. One is clinging to form, etc., as the self, and the other is clinging to the nature of form as the self. Although nature is not form, it is included in the Skandhas because it is Skandha-nature. Or clinging to Skandha-nature is not included in the Skandhas, just like the 'Suchness' of Mahayana (Great Vehicle) is the nature of all Skandhas, but it is not included in the Skandhas. It should belong to the second sentence 'residing in the Skandhas while being different from the Skandhas'. Or clinging to Skandha-nature, 'nature' is the substance, clinging to the substance of this Skandha as the self. Because they do not establish the existence of the five Skandhas, saying that the five Skandhas are the teachings of Buddhism. It is necessary to further examine the Vibhasa.
Ximing also said, among the latter three types, why...
唯三而無亦即亦離。解云非即非離即是亦即非離。故不別說。其義如何。若表即離成第三句。若遮即離成第四句。謂即故非離。離故非即。故顯揚．婆沙等皆作是說。第三．四句由義有異而體無別。然此第三與第四句。或有同體。或有異體。隨所應知 今謂未必皆為四句。如說邊見但有斷常不立四句。思非思量等句皆然。何故此我獨嘖四句。又復計我據有體說。第三．四句既無別體。故無此計。
西明又云。三與四句展轉相攝。此論第三即彼前二。所以者何。以非即故當彼離蘊。以非離故當彼即蘊。故此論云許依蘊立。若不爾者。便違瑜伽一切計我不過四種 今謂不爾。若準此釋。但只第三一類計我。即攝瑜伽四種之計。何得說言或三．或四。又即前二。論何別說以為第三。設此煩辨有何所益。故應依取本疏．樞要說之為正。
要集云。有解瑜伽四計唯分別。此中第三俱生收。任運我執不計即．離。故下具說二見依蘊。不緣我生。若敘計破不通二執。不應通示二執緣蘊。集云。今謂瑜伽唯說分別。此論通二。此義可爾。此論第三如何得知唯是俱生而無分別。唯內非外。三藏傳說。犢子計我似犢子外道計。既爾如何不破外道分別唯彼小乘俱生。又彼犢子卻談未得聖時計者。如何不計異生身中起分別見。由此
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『唯三而無亦即亦離』，解釋說『非即非離』就是『亦即非離』，所以不再單獨說明。這其中的含義是什麼呢？如果表達『即』和『離』，就成了第三句；如果遮止『即』和『離』，就成了第四句。意思是，因為『即』所以『非離』，因為『離』所以『非即』。所以《顯揚》、《婆沙》等都這樣說。第三句和第四句因為意義不同而本體沒有區別。然而這第三句和第四句，或者有相同的本體，或者有不同的本體，應該根據情況瞭解。 現在認為未必都是四句。例如，關於邊見的說法，只有斷見和常見，不成立四句。『思非思量』等句都是這樣。為什麼唯獨關於『我』要建立四句呢？而且，計度『我』是根據有實體的『我』來說的，第三句和第四句既然沒有不同的實體，所以沒有這種計度。 西明又說，第三句和第四句互相包含。此論中的第三句就是彼論中的前兩句。為什麼這樣說呢？因為『非即』，所以相當於彼論中的『離蘊』；因為『非離』，所以相當於彼論中的『即蘊』。所以此論說允許依蘊而立。如果不是這樣，就違背了《瑜伽師地論》中一切計度『我』不超過四種的說法。現在認為不是這樣。如果按照這種解釋，那麼僅僅第三句這一類計度『我』，就包含了《瑜伽師地論》中的四種計度。怎麼能說或者三種或者四種呢？而且，既然是前兩種，此論為什麼還要另外說明，作為第三種呢？即使這樣煩瑣地辨析，又有什麼好處呢？所以應該依據本疏和樞要的說法才是正確的。 《要集》中說，有一種解釋認為《瑜伽師地論》中的四種計度都只是分別。此論中的第三句包含了俱生我執。任運的我執不計度『即』和『離』，所以下面具體說明兩種見解是依蘊而生，不是緣『我』而生。如果敘述計度和破斥不包括兩種執著，就不應該普遍地顯示兩種執著是緣蘊而生。《要集》中說，現在認為《瑜伽師地論》只說了分別我執，此論則包括了兩種我執。這種說法是可以的。此論中的第三句，怎麼知道僅僅是俱生我執而沒有分別我執呢？僅僅是內在的，而不是外在的。三藏的傳說，犢子部計度『我』類似於犢子外道的計度。既然如此，為什麼不破斥外道的分別我執，而僅僅破斥小乘的俱生我執呢？而且，那些犢子部卻談論沒有證得聖位時所計度的『我』，怎麼能不計度在異生身中生起的分別見呢？由此可見。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Only the third, without being either identical or different.' The explanation is that 'neither identical nor different' is the same as 'both identical and different,' so it is not explained separately. What is the meaning of this? If it expresses 'identical' and 'different,' it becomes the third statement. If it negates 'identical' and 'different,' it becomes the fourth statement. It means that because of 'identical,' it is 'not different,' and because of 'different,' it is 'not identical.' Therefore, the Xianyang and Vibhasa and others all say this. The third and fourth statements are different in meaning but not different in essence. However, these third and fourth statements may have the same essence or different essences, as appropriate. Now it is thought that it is not necessarily always four statements. For example, regarding views of extremes, there are only annihilationism and eternalism, and four statements are not established. The statements such as 'thinking and non-thinking' are all like this. Why is it only about 'self' that four statements are established? Moreover, the calculation of 'self' is based on a 'self' that has substance. Since the third and fourth statements do not have different substances, there is no such calculation. Ximing also said that the third and fourth statements mutually encompass each other. The third statement in this treatise is the same as the first two in that treatise. Why is this so? Because of 'not identical,' it corresponds to 'different from the aggregates' in that treatise. Because of 'not different,' it corresponds to 'identical with the aggregates' in that treatise. Therefore, this treatise says that it is permissible to establish based on the aggregates. If it were not so, it would contradict the statement in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra that all calculations of 'self' do not exceed four types. Now it is thought that this is not so. If according to this explanation, then only the third type of calculation of 'self' encompasses the four types of calculation in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. How can it be said that it is either three or four? Moreover, since it is the first two, why does this treatise explain it separately as the third? Even if such a tedious analysis is made, what benefit is there? Therefore, it should be based on the original commentary and the essentials as being correct. The Yaoji says that one explanation is that the four calculations in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra are only conceptual. The third statement in this treatise includes the innate self-grasping. The spontaneous self-grasping does not calculate 'identical' and 'different,' so it is specifically explained below that the two views arise based on the aggregates, not based on 'self.' If the narration of calculation and refutation does not include the two attachments, it should not universally show that the two attachments arise based on the aggregates. The Yaoji says that now it is thought that the Yogacarabhumi-sastra only speaks of conceptual self-grasping, while this treatise includes both. This statement is acceptable. How is it known that the third statement in this treatise is only innate self-grasping and not conceptual self-grasping? It is only internal, not external. The tradition of the Tripitaka is that the calculation of 'self' by the Vatsiputriyas is similar to the calculation of the heretical Vatsiputriyas. Since this is the case, why not refute the conceptual self-grasping of the heretics, but only refute the innate self-grasping of the Hinayana? Moreover, those Vatsiputriyas discuss the 'self' calculated when one has not attained sainthood, how can they not calculate the conceptual views that arise in the body of an ordinary being? From this it can be seen.
第三通敘通破分別．俱生。于理為勝 今謂不爾。若唯分別可順論文。彼立五藏我在第五不可說藏。豈俱生見作是計耶。又不得言犢子部計卻談昔計非據現計理亦不爾。宗輪論中現敘彼等同計我故。正量部等本非外道亦計我故。又俱舍二十九引經為難犢子部云。經說起我見墮惡見趣同諸外道。乃至廣說。彼部通云。此經非量。於我部中曾不誦故 若爾無學如何更起我執見耶 答如前解。或可。得言唯有學．凡作如是計。文無簡故。
破俱非我量中。疏云若破俱句他宗亦說我非俱句。犯相符過。又無同喻。此意他立非即離我。亦不得說為我非我俱句。以不可說故。如大乘說真如之體非亦有亦無俱句所攝等。今若破他云應不可說為我非我。故犯相符。又無同喻。如龜毛等雖不得說為我。得說為非我故非同喻。有為無為為喻亦爾。又若雙取我非我為法。有無為中隨舉一法亦得為喻。何須雙舉為無為耶 今助解云。彼意雖不得說為我非我。然許我在不可說藏。不可說藏中我不得說為我非我 今難。欲令既不可說為我非我。亦應不得說有不可為我非我聚我在聚義中。何以故。如有為無為。汝我不得說作有為無為。即不說有不可說有為無為。為不可說藏。汝我既不得說作我非我。如何即立有不可說我非我聚為不可說藏。故舉
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 第三種是同時通過敘述、通達和破斥來分別俱生我執（Sahaja-ātmagrāha，與生俱來的我執）。有人認為，在理證上，俱生我執勝過分別我執。但現在我們認為並非如此。如果僅僅是分別我執，還可以順應經論文的說法。但犢子部（Vātsīputrīya）主張有五蘊藏，而『我』存在於第五種不可說的藏中。難道俱生我見會做出這樣的推論嗎？而且，也不能說犢子部只是在討論過去的觀點，而不是基於現在的觀點，因為理證上並非如此。《宗輪論》（Samayasamuccaya）中現在敘述的，是他們共同主張有『我』。正量部（Saṃmitīya）等本來不是外道，也主張有『我』。此外，《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośabhāṣya）第二十九卷引用經文來責難犢子部，說：『經中說，生起我見，就會墮入惡見趣，與外道相同。』等等，並廣泛地論述。犢子部辯解說：『這部經不是量，因為在我們的部派中，從未誦讀過。』 如果這樣，無學（Arhat，阿羅漢）之人如何還會生起我執見呢？回答是，如前所述解釋。或者，可以說只有有學（Śaikṣa，還在學習的人）和凡夫才會做出這樣的推論，因為經文中沒有簡別。 破斥『我』既非『我』亦非『非我』的量中。《疏》中說，如果破斥『俱』句，其他宗派也說『我』並非『俱』句，就犯了相符的過失，而且沒有同喻。這裡的意思是，他人所立的『非』並非是離開『我』。也不能說這是『我』和『非我』的『俱』句，因為這是不可說的。例如大乘說真如的本體，並非『亦有亦無』的『俱』句所能涵蓋。現在如果破斥他人說，應該說『我』和『非我』是不可說的，就犯了相符的過失，而且沒有同喻。例如龜毛等雖然不能說是『我』，但可以說成是『非我』，所以不是同喻。有為法和無為法作為比喻也是如此。而且，如果同時取『我』和『非我』作為法，那麼在有為法和無為法中，隨便舉出一個法也可以作為比喻，何必同時舉出有為法和無為法呢？ 現在我來幫助解釋說，他們的意思是，雖然不能說成是『我』和『非我』，但允許『我』存在於不可說的藏中。在不可說的藏中，『我』不能說成是『我』和『非我』。 現在我來責難：想要讓『我』既不可說成是『我』和『非我』，也應該不能說有不可說成是『我』和『非我』的聚集，『我』存在於聚集的意義中。為什麼呢？例如有為法和無為法，你我不能說成是有為法和無為法，即不說有不可說成是有為法和無為法的，作為不可說的藏。你我既然不能說成是『我』和『非我』，如何就能建立有不可說成是『我』和『非我』的聚集，作為不可說的藏呢？所以舉出
【English Translation】 English version: The third is the simultaneous distinction of the Sahaja-ātmagrāha (innate self-grasping) through narration, understanding, and refutation. Some argue that, in terms of reasoning, the Sahaja-ātmagrāha is superior to the Vikalpa-ātmagrāha (conceptual self-grasping). However, we now disagree. If it were only the Vikalpa-ātmagrāha, it could align with the statements in the scriptures. But the Vātsīputrīya school posits five skandha (aggregates), with the 'self' existing in the fifth, inexpressible skandha. Would the Sahaja-ātmagrāha make such an inference? Furthermore, it cannot be said that the Vātsīputrīya school is merely discussing past views rather than basing it on present views, as the reasoning does not support this. The Samayasamuccaya (Compendium of Doctrines) currently narrates that they commonly assert the existence of a 'self'. The Saṃmitīya school and others, who were not originally heretics, also assert the existence of a 'self'. Moreover, the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (Treasury of Metaphysics) in its 29th volume, quotes scriptures to challenge the Vātsīputrīya school, saying: 'The scriptures state that arising self-grasping leads to falling into evil views, similar to heretics,' and elaborates extensively. The Vātsīputrīya school defends itself by saying: 'This scripture is not authoritative because it has never been recited in our school.' If that's the case, how can an Arhat (one who has attained enlightenment) still generate self-grasping? The answer is as explained previously. Alternatively, it can be said that only Śaikṣa (those still in training) and ordinary beings make such inferences, as the scriptures do not differentiate. In the refutation of the proposition that the 'self' is neither 'self' nor 'non-self'. The commentary states that if the 'both' clause is refuted, other schools also say that the 'self' is not a 'both' clause, which commits the fault of agreement and lacks a similar example. The meaning here is that the 'non' posited by others is not separate from the 'self'. It cannot be said to be a 'both' clause of 'self' and 'non-self' because it is inexpressible. For example, Mahayana says that the essence of Suchness (Tathātā) is not encompassed by the 'both existence and non-existence' clause. Now, if one refutes others by saying that 'self' and 'non-self' should be inexpressible, it commits the fault of agreement and lacks a similar example. For example, turtle hair, although it cannot be said to be 'self', can be said to be 'non-self', so it is not a similar example. Using conditioned and unconditioned phenomena as metaphors is also similar. Moreover, if one simultaneously takes 'self' and 'non-self' as the dharma (teaching), then randomly citing one dharma from conditioned and unconditioned phenomena can also serve as a metaphor, so why simultaneously cite conditioned and unconditioned phenomena? Now, I will help explain that their meaning is that although it cannot be said to be 'self' and 'non-self', they allow the 'self' to exist in the inexpressible skandha. In the inexpressible skandha, the 'self' cannot be said to be 'self' and 'non-self'. Now, I will challenge: wanting to make the 'self' neither expressible as 'self' nor 'non-self', it should also not be possible to say that there is an aggregation that cannot be expressed as 'self' and 'non-self', with the 'self' existing in the meaning of aggregation. Why? For example, conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, you and I cannot say are conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, that is, not saying there is something inexpressible as conditioned and unconditioned phenomena, as an inexpressible skandha. Since you and I cannot be said to be 'self' and 'non-self', how can one establish an aggregation that cannot be said to be 'self' and 'non-self' as an inexpressible skandha? Therefore, citing
有無為以為同喻。又亦應雖不可說為我非我然許執為我。亦應不可說作為無為執作為無為。然疏意云。彼宗計我雖不說作我非我．常無常．為無為。然執為我。故云且以我非我為例。不說所餘。量云汝所執我應不可說是我者據本執說。雖不得說為我非我。然執作我。故今偏破。又量云汝所執我於我非我聚義亦應不可說等者。應立量云。汝我於我非我聚應不得說在彼中。以不可說故。因。如有為無為。此意云。不可說者。不是離言故不可說。但取於我上不可說作為無為．我非我之不可說以為因。如有為無為是喻。此意取我上不可說作為無為之義為喻。不取別為無為體以為同喻。此意總說。不得說在我非我聚義中。如不得說在為無為中。以不可說故。不取其體。不爾我是有法。更有何法名為我非我聚。故此量正。
西明．要集俱取樞要所非量為正。所非量者量云。汝所執我。不應說是我我非他我。許不可說故。如有為無為。以之為正 且西明云。汝所說我。應不可說是自我非他我。不可說有為無為故。猶如空華。如樞要非不取為正。又彼本計雖執有我。不得說為我非我。攝在不可說藏。若言說為自我非他。何名不可說。若云不可說作有為無為故在不可說。彼有為法亦不可說作無為及我。應在不可說藏 要集云。云自
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有為（Samskrta，指有生滅變化的事物）和無為（Asamskrta，指沒有生滅變化的事物）可以作為同喻（Dṛṣṭānta，例子）。同樣，即使不能說『我』（Ātman，靈魂）是『我』或『非我』，但也應該允許執著于『我』。同樣，也不應該說『有為』是『無為』，並執著于『無為』。然而，疏意（對經文的解釋）說，他們的宗派認為『我』，即使不說成是『我』或『非我』，『常』或『無常』，『有為』或『無為』，但仍然執著于『我』。所以說，暫且以『我』和『非我』為例，不說其餘的。論式（Nyāya，推理形式）說：『你所執著的『我』，不應該被說成是『我』，這是根據你原本的執著來說的。』雖然不能說成是『我』或『非我』，但仍然執著于『我』，所以現在特別破斥這一點。另外，論式說：『你所執著的『我』，在『我』和『非我』的集合中，也不應該被說成是……』應該建立論式說：『你的『我』，在『我』和『非我』的集合中，不應該被說成是在其中，因為是不可說的。』因（Hetu，理由）是：『如有為和無為。』這裡的意思是說，『不可說』，不是因為離開了言語才不可說，只是取『我』之上不可說作為『無為』，『我』和『非我』的不可說作為因。『如有為和無為』是喻（Upamā，比喻）。這裡的意思是取『我』之上不可說作為『無為』的意義作為比喻，不取另外的『無為』的本體作為同喻。總的來說，這是說，不能說在『我』和『非我』的集合意義中，就像不能說在『有為』和『無為』中一樣，因為是不可說的。不取它的本體。否則，『我』是有法（Dharmin，具有屬性的事物），還有什麼法可以稱為『我』和『非我』的集合呢？所以這個論式是正確的。 西明（地名，寺名）和要集（書名）都取樞要（書名）所否定的論式作為正確的。所否定的論式是：『你所執著的『我』，不應該被說成是『我』，『我』不是『他我』（Parātman，其他的我），因為允許是不可說的。』如有為和無為，以此作為正確的。而且西明說：『你所說的『我』，不應該被說是『自我』（Svātman，自己的我），不是『他我』，因為不可說『有為』和『無為』，就像虛空中的花朵一樣。』樞要並非不取這個作為正確的。而且他們原本的觀點是，雖然執著于有『我』，但不能說成是『我』或『非我』，被攝在不可說的藏（不可言說的範疇）中。如果說成是『自我』不是『他我』，那還叫什麼不可說？如果說因為不可說作為『有為』和『無為』，所以在不可說中，那麼『有為』法也不能說成是『無為』以及『我』，也應該在不可說的藏中。要集說：……云自
【English Translation】 English version: Are the conditioned (Samskrta, things subject to arising and ceasing) and the unconditioned (Asamskrta, things not subject to arising and ceasing) to be taken as a similar example (Dṛṣṭānta, example)? Also, although it should not be said that the 'self' (Ātman, soul) is 'self' or 'non-self', it should be permissible to adhere to the 'self'. Similarly, it should not be said that the 'conditioned' is 'unconditioned', and adhere to the 'unconditioned'. However, the commentary (explanation of the scripture) says that their sect considers the 'self', even if it is not said to be 'self' or 'non-self', 'permanent' or 'impermanent', 'conditioned' or 'unconditioned', they still adhere to the 'self'. Therefore, it is said, let's take 'self' and 'non-self' as an example for now, without mentioning the rest. The argument (Nyāya, form of reasoning) says: 'The 'self' that you adhere to should not be said to be 'self', according to your original adherence.' Although it cannot be said to be 'self' or 'non-self', they still adhere to the 'self', so now this point is specifically refuted. Also, the argument says: 'The 'self' that you adhere to, in the collection of 'self' and 'non-self', should also not be said to be...' The argument should be established as: 'Your 'self', in the collection of 'self' and 'non-self', should not be said to be in it, because it is unspeakable.' The reason (Hetu, reason) is: 'Like the conditioned and the unconditioned.' The meaning here is that 'unspeakable' is not unspeakable because it is apart from words, but only takes the unspeakable above the 'self' as 'unconditioned', and the unspeakable of 'self' and 'non-self' as the reason. 'Like the conditioned and the unconditioned' is a metaphor (Upamā, metaphor). The meaning here is to take the meaning of the unspeakable above the 'self' as 'unconditioned' as a metaphor, and not to take another 'unconditioned' entity as a similar example. In general, this is saying that it cannot be said in the collective meaning of 'self' and 'non-self', just as it cannot be said in the 'conditioned' and 'unconditioned', because it is unspeakable. Do not take its entity. Otherwise, the 'self' is the subject (Dharmin, the thing that has attributes), what other dharma (law, principle) can be called the collection of 'self' and 'non-self'? So this argument is correct. Ximing (place name, temple name) and Yaoji (book name) both take the argument denied by Shunya (book name) as correct. The denied argument is: 'The 'self' that you adhere to should not be said to be 'self', 'self' is not 'other-self' (Parātman, other self), because it is permissible to be unspeakable.' Like the conditioned and the unconditioned, take this as correct. Moreover, Ximing said: 'The 'self' you speak of should not be said to be 'own-self' (Svātman, one's own self), not 'other-self', because it is unspeakable 'conditioned' and 'unconditioned', just like flowers in the sky.' Shunya does not fail to take this as correct. Moreover, their original view is that although they adhere to the existence of 'self', it cannot be said to be 'self' or 'non-self', and is included in the unspeakable store (unspeakable category). If it is said to be 'own-self' not 'other-self', what is called unspeakable? If it is said that because it is unspeakable as 'conditioned' and 'unconditioned', it is in the unspeakable, then the 'conditioned' dharma cannot be said to be 'unconditioned' and 'self', and should also be in the unspeakable store. Yaoji says: ... Yunzi
我非他我。但破一師一我非謂一切 若爾何者外道計我是他我者。數論受果我是自非他。勝論計作受我皆爾。說三藏量云自我非他我者是餘人立。三藏敘他非自正釋。論文既云又既不可說有為無為。亦應不可說是我非我。此是舉喻。不取為因。若取為因。云何言亦應不可說為是我非我。言亦亦誰。故本疏正。
問大般若中亦說五藏。謂三世為三。有為為一名有為藏。無為為一亦名不可說藏。與此何別 答論有別準可知。
論云。又諸我見不緣實我等。要集云。廣百論立量云。我見決定不緣實我。男女等相所雜糅故。如緣身等起男等相所雜糅心。又我見不緣實我。有所緣故。如余心等。又我見境非是實我。男等相心之所緣故。猶如身等。由此故知。一切我見皆無實我以為境界。唯緣虛妄身等為境。隨自妄想覺惠生故。如緣闇繩顛倒蛇解 承本釋云。又諸我見不緣實我者。此非作我解之我見。若約我見不緣。即相扶之失。今云不緣者。約緣我之見是其染惠。約此為見難令不緣故無相扶。
疏云其實亦有非無本質是俱生故。故此所言五取蘊等。皆起影像。言亦者。以相分亦本質。無有無相計為我者。故言起自心相。亦有非無本質者。故言緣五取蘊。
后修道中數數修習方能斷者。若約伏現於大乘中
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：我不是『他我』（Tāwǒ，與自身不同的『我』）。但破斥一個『師一我』（Shīyīwǒ，由師父傳授的唯一的『我』）並非意味著破斥一切『我』。如果這樣，那麼外道所計執的『我是他我』（Wǒ shì tāwǒ，『我』是他者的『我』）是什麼呢？數論派認為，承受果報的『我』是自身的，而非他者的。勝論派認為，造作業和承受果報的『我』都是如此。按照三藏的衡量標準來說，認為『自我非他我』（Zìwǒ fēi tāwǒ，『自我』不是他者的『我』）是其他人所設立的。三藏敘述他者的觀點，並非正確的解釋。論文中說，既然有為法和無為法都不可說，那麼也應該不可說『是我非我』（Shì wǒ fēi wǒ，是『我』還是非『我』）。這只是一個比喻，不應作為論證的原因。如果作為論證的原因，怎麼能說『也應該不可說為是我非我』呢？『也』字又指誰呢？所以本疏的解釋是正確的。 問：大般若經中也說了五藏（Wǔ zàng，五種蘊藏）。即以三世（Sānshì，過去、現在、未來）為三藏，有為法（Yǒuwéi fǎ，由因緣和合而生的事物）為一藏，名為有為藏（Yǒuwéi zàng），無為法（Wúwéi fǎ，不生不滅的事物）為一藏，也名不可說藏（Bùkě shuō zàng）。這與此處的說法有什麼區別？答：論中有區別，可以參照理解。 論中說：『又各種我見（Wǒ jiàn，對『我』的錯誤見解）不緣于真實的我等。』要集云：廣百論（Guǎng bǎi lùn）設立論證說：『我見絕對不緣于真實的我，因為與男女等相（Nánnǚ děng xiàng，男女等表象）混合雜糅。如同緣于身體等，生起與男女等表象混合雜糅的心。』又，『我見不緣于真實的我，因為有所緣。如同其他心等。』又，『我見的境界不是真實的我，因為是男女等相之心所緣的。猶如身體等。』由此可知，一切我見都沒有真實的我作為境界，只是緣于虛妄的身體等作為境界，隨著自己的妄想覺悟而產生，如同在黑暗中將繩子顛倒地看成蛇一樣。承本釋（Chéngběn shì）解釋說：『又各種我見不緣于真實的我』，這並非是作為『我』來理解的『我見』。如果按照『我見不緣』來解釋，就會有互相矛盾的過失。現在說『不緣』，是說緣于『我』的見解是染污的智慧。因為對於這種見解來說，很難讓它不緣于『我』，所以沒有互相矛盾的過失。 疏中說：『其實也有非無本質，因為是俱生（Jùshēng，與生俱來）的。』所以這裡所說的五取蘊等（Wǔ qǔyùn děng，色、受、想、行、識五種蘊），都生起影像。說『也』，是因為相分（Xiàng fēn，認識的對象）也是本質。沒有不以無相（Wú xiàng，沒有表象）來計執為『我』的。所以說生起自心相（Zìxīn xiàng，自己內心的表象）。『也有非無本質』，所以說緣於五取蘊。 後面修道中，需要數數修習（Shù shù xiūxí，反覆修習）才能斷除。如果是關於伏藏和現藏，在大乘中...
【English Translation】 English version: I am not 'Tāwǒ' (other-self). But refuting a 'Shīyīwǒ' (teacher-one-self, the unique 'self' taught by a teacher) does not mean refuting all 'selves'. If so, then what is the 'I am other-self' (Wǒ shì tāwǒ, 'I' is the other's 'self') that the heretics cling to? The Samkhya school believes that the 'self' that receives the results of karma is its own, not another's. The Vaisheshika school believes that the 'self' that creates karma and receives the results is the same. According to the measure of the Tripitaka, the view that 'self is not other-self' (Zìwǒ fēi tāwǒ, 'self' is not the other's 'self') is established by others. The Tripitaka's description of others' views is not a correct explanation. The treatise says that since conditioned and unconditioned dharmas cannot be spoken of, then it should also not be said 'is self or not self' (Shì wǒ fēi wǒ, is 'self' or 'not self'). This is just a metaphor and should not be taken as a reason for argument. If it is taken as a reason, how can it be said 'it should also not be said to be self or not self'? Who does 'also' refer to? Therefore, the commentary's explanation is correct. Question: The Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra also speaks of five treasuries (Wǔ zàng, five kinds of repositories). That is, the three times (Sānshì, past, present, and future) are three treasuries, conditioned dharma (Yǒuwéi fǎ, things arising from causes and conditions) is one treasury, called the conditioned treasury (Yǒuwéi zàng), and unconditioned dharma (Wúwéi fǎ, things that do not arise or cease) is one treasury, also called the unspeakable treasury (Bùkě shuō zàng). What is the difference between this and what is said here? Answer: The treatise has a distinction, which can be understood by reference. The treatise says: 'Moreover, all views of self (Wǒ jiàn, incorrect views about 'self') do not relate to the real self, etc.' The Yaoji says: The Guang Bai Lun (Guǎng bǎi lùn) establishes the argument: 'The view of self definitely does not relate to the real self, because it is mixed with the appearances of male and female, etc. (Nánnǚ děng xiàng, appearances of male and female, etc.). Just as relating to the body, etc., gives rise to a mind mixed with the appearances of male and female, etc.' Also, 'The view of self does not relate to the real self, because it has an object. Just like other minds, etc.' Also, 'The object of the view of self is not the real self, because it is what the mind of the appearances of male and female, etc., relates to. Just like the body, etc.' From this, it can be known that all views of self do not have a real self as their object, but only relate to the false body, etc., as their object, arising with one's own deluded awareness, just like mistakenly seeing a rope as a snake in the dark.' The Chengben Shi (Chéngběn shì) explains: 'Moreover, all views of self do not relate to the real self,' this is not the 'view of self' understood as 'self'. If explained according to 'the view of self does not relate', there will be the fault of mutual contradiction. Now saying 'does not relate' means that the view relating to 'self' is defiled wisdom. Because for this kind of view, it is difficult to make it not relate to 'self', so there is no fault of mutual contradiction. The commentary says: 'In fact, there is also non-absence of essence, because it is co-born (Jùshēng, born together).』 Therefore, what is said here about the five aggregates, etc. (Wǔ qǔyùn děng, the five aggregates of form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness), all give rise to images. Saying 'also' is because the object-aspect (Xiàng fēn, the object of cognition) is also the essence. There is no one who does not cling to 'self' without appearance (Wú xiàng, without appearance). Therefore, it is said to give rise to the mind-image (Zìxīn xiàng, the image of one's own mind). 'There is also non-absence of essence,' therefore it is said to relate to the five aggregates. In the later stages of the path, one needs to cultivate repeatedly (Shù shù xiūxí, repeatedly cultivate) in order to eliminate them. If it is about latent and manifest, in Mahayana...
又悲．智兩增。又怖不怖煩惱有別。又第六識俱生我執。見非見斷總有五釋。如樞要辨。又約總別緣蘊生者。次第得果斷之差別亦作五釋 一若總若別皆非想第九品斷。若爾即有卻斷下失 二云總者非想第九品斷別者地地九品斷。此過有二。若總卻斷下失。若別後得不斷惑失 三者翻前第二釋亦同前過俱有二失 四云總別地地各各九品別斷。若爾即有後得不斷惑失 五云總別各于自地第九品斷。此釋為正。無前二失。修斷數不數準知說之 問次第聲聞其義何耶 答小乘諸部互說不同。且依大乘談小果者。謂有聲聞性通利．鈍。于見道前不伏修惑。唯伏見惑入見道時。頓斷三界見道煩惱得預流果。于見道中斷即離蘊所有我見。三心見道斷之。前後如樞要說。從此見道十六心。后在修道中。次第斷其三界九地八十一品修所斷惑。如其所應。得后三果名次第得。斷迷理事五釋如前。數斷數修亦準五說。
言細故難斷者。細有四義。一品類對。九品之中第九品攝。望余迷事此同第九。若自類言亦有九品。二分別俱生對。此任運起故。三見修對。此唯修斷故。四上下道對。唯上道斷故名為細。數修斷中聲聞．緣覺二乘有殊 聲聞之中次第．超越復有二別。前約次第得果人說 若超越人復有三類。一唯超初果。二超初二果。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 又悲傷和智慧都增長。 又對恐懼和不恐懼的煩惱有所區別。 又第六識與俱生我執同時產生。見道所斷和修道所斷總共有五種解釋，如《樞要》所辨析。 又根據總相和別相的緣起蘊生，次第證果和斷惑的差別也有五種解釋： 一、如果總相和別相都在非想非非想處天的第九品斷除。如果這樣，就會有反而斷除了較低層次的煩惱的過失。 二、有人說總相在非想非非想處天的第九品斷除，別相在各個地（指欲界、色界、無色界）的九品中分別斷除。這種說法有兩個過失：如果總相卻斷除了較低層次的煩惱，如果別相在後得位（證果后）無法斷除煩惱。 三、顛倒前面的第二種解釋，也和前面的過失相同，都有兩個過失。 四、有人說總相和別相在各個地的九品中分別斷除。如果這樣，就會有後得位無法斷除煩惱的過失。 五、有人說總相和別相各自在自己的地的第九品斷除。這種解釋是正確的，沒有前面兩種過失。修斷是數斷還是不數斷，可以參照以上說法來理解。 問：什麼是次第聲聞（Sravaka，聽聞佛法而悟道的修行者）的含義呢？ 答：小乘（Hinayana）的各個部派說法不同。暫且依據大乘（Mahayana）的觀點來談論小乘的果位，指的是聲聞的根性有通利和遲鈍之分。在見道（Darshana-marga，證悟真理的道路）之前，不能夠伏住修惑（Bhavana-klesha，修道所斷的煩惱），只能伏住見惑（Darshana-klesha，見道所斷的煩惱），進入見道時，頓然斷除三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）的見道煩惱，得到預流果（Srotapanna，入流果）。在見道中斷除，就脫離了蘊（Skandha，構成個體的要素）所包含的我見（Atma-drishti，認為有「我」存在的錯誤觀念）。以三心見道來斷除，前後過程如《樞要》所說。從此見道十六心之後，在修道中，次第斷除三界九地八十一品修所斷惑，根據情況，得到后三果，名為次第得。斷除對事和理的迷惑的五種解釋如前所述。數斷和數修也參照以上五種說法。 說到因為細微而難以斷除，細微有四種含義：一、品類的對比。在九品之中屬於第九品。相對於其餘對事的迷惑，這和第九品相同。如果就自身來說，也有九品。二、分別生和俱生（Sahaja，與生俱來的）的對比。這是任運而起的緣故。三、見道和修道的對比。這僅僅是修道所斷的緣故。四、上下道的對比。僅僅是上道所斷的緣故，所以稱為細微。在數修斷中，聲聞和緣覺（Pratyekabuddha，通過自身努力覺悟的修行者）二乘（二種乘，指聲聞乘和緣覺乘）有所不同。聲聞之中，次第和超越又有兩種區別。前面是就次第得果的人來說的。如果是超越的人，又有三種類型：一、僅僅超越初果。二、超越初果和二果。
【English Translation】 English version Moreover, both sorrow and wisdom increase. Furthermore, there is a distinction between afflictions that are fearful and not fearful. Also, the sixth consciousness arises simultaneously with innate ego-grasping (Sahaja-atma-graha). There are five explanations in total regarding what is severed by the path of seeing (Darshana-marga) and what is severed by the path of cultivation (Bhavana-marga), as discussed in the 'Essentials' (樞要). Moreover, based on the arising of aggregates (Skandha) from general and specific conditions, there are also five explanations regarding the differences in attaining fruits in sequence and severing afflictions: 1. If both general and specific aspects are severed in the ninth level of the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana). If so, there would be the fault of prematurely severing lower-level afflictions. 2. Some say that the general aspect is severed in the ninth level of the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception, while the specific aspects are severed in the nine levels of each realm (referring to the Desire Realm (Kama-dhatu), Form Realm (Rupa-dhatu), and Formless Realm (Arupa-dhatu)) individually. This view has two faults: if the general aspect prematurely severs lower-level afflictions, and if the specific aspects cannot be severed in the subsequent attainment (after attaining the fruit). 3. Reversing the second explanation above also shares the same faults as before, having both faults. 4. Some say that the general and specific aspects are severed individually in the nine levels of each realm. If so, there would be the fault of not being able to sever afflictions in the subsequent attainment. 5. Some say that the general and specific aspects are severed in the ninth level of their respective realms. This explanation is correct and does not have the previous two faults. Whether the severance through cultivation is counted or uncounted can be understood based on the above explanations. Question: What is the meaning of 'sequential Sravaka' (Sravaka, a practitioner who attains enlightenment by hearing the Buddha's teachings)? Answer: The various schools of the Hinayana (Hinayana, the 'Smaller Vehicle') differ in their explanations. For now, based on the Mahayana (Mahayana, the 'Greater Vehicle') perspective, when discussing the fruits of the Hinayana, it refers to Sravakas whose faculties are either sharp or dull. Before the path of seeing, they cannot subdue the afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation (Bhavana-klesha), but can only subdue the afflictions to be abandoned by seeing (Darshana-klesha). Upon entering the path of seeing, they suddenly sever the afflictions of the path of seeing in the Three Realms (Trailokya, Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm), attaining the fruit of Stream-enterer (Srotapanna). Severance occurs in the path of seeing, thus detaching from the self-view (Atma-drishti, the mistaken belief in the existence of a 'self') contained within the aggregates (Skandha, the elements that constitute an individual). Severance occurs with the three minds in the path of seeing, the process before and after is as described in the 'Essentials'. From this point, after the sixteen minds of the path of seeing, in the path of cultivation, they sequentially sever the eighty-one levels of afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation in the nine levels of the Three Realms, as appropriate, attaining the latter three fruits, called 'sequential attainment'. The five explanations for severing delusion regarding phenomena and principle are as described earlier. Counted and uncounted cultivation also refer to the above five explanations. Regarding the statement that it is difficult to sever because it is subtle, 'subtle' has four meanings: 1. Comparison of categories. Among the nine levels, it belongs to the ninth level. Compared to other delusions regarding phenomena, this is the same as the ninth level. If considering itself, there are also nine levels. 2. Comparison of conceptual and innate (Sahaja) afflictions. This arises spontaneously. 3. Comparison of the path of seeing and the path of cultivation. This is only severed by cultivation. 4. Comparison of the upper and lower paths. It is only severed by the upper path, hence it is called subtle. In counted cultivation and severance, there are differences between Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas (Pratyekabuddha, a practitioner who attains enlightenment through their own efforts), the two vehicles (two vehicles, referring to the Sravaka Vehicle and the Pratyekabuddha Vehicle). Among Sravakas, there are two distinctions: sequential and surpassing. The previous discussion was about those who attain fruits sequentially. If it is a surpassing person, there are three types: 1. Only surpassing the first fruit. 2. Surpassing the first and second fruits.
三超中二果 且超初果者。謂有聲聞性是利根。先凡夫時欣求上生以苦．粗等六行世道。伏于欲界六識俱生迷事粗惑前之六品。乃於後時逢緣回趣求聲聞果。修七方便以為加行入見道時。一剎那中見．修合斷得第二果。以彼六品先已伏故見道能斷。迷理之惑雖先不伏。伏彼伴類入見道時亦一時斷。道．斷數數準之可解 二超初二果得第三者。謂有聲聞性是利根。先凡夫時曾以六行。伏欲修惑九品迷事。乃至無所有所九品事惑。后入見道先已伏者。及以不伏。亦與見惑。合一時斷。修．斷數數準可知之 問前二類人何故不伏迷理之惑 答以彼不解修理觀故。迷理之惑不違事觀故不能伏 問何不能伏有頂地惑 答以彼細故無上可欣不為六行故不能伏。又彼惑細不障有學。故唯斷爾超初二果。前依正義傍說不正煩不能敘 有言相見道斷者不應正理。瑜伽但說世出世道斷迷事惑不除迷理。復不可說迷理真見除。迷事惑相見斷。亦不得說相見道后別起道斷。對法論說超前二果及次第人。皆第十六心建立聖果不別起道。又瑜伽五十七云。問未知欲知根誰所依處。答證得初．第二．第三沙門果之所依處。問已知根誰所依處。答乃至金剛喻定無學沙門果證之所依處 故第十六心得初三果 又五十七云。問幾根得預流果。答或一或八。幾
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 三超中二果（超越初果而證得第二果）。且說超越初果者，是指具有聲聞根性且是利根的人。他們在還是凡夫的時候，欣求上生，以苦、粗等六行觀修世間道，伏住了欲界六識俱生（與生俱來的）的迷事粗惑（對事相的迷惑）中的前六品。然後在之後因緣成熟，回心轉意尋求聲聞果，修習七方便（七種修行方法）作為加行（輔助修行），進入見道位時，在一剎那間，見道和修道同時斷除並證得第二果。因為他們先前已經伏住了前六品惑，所以見道時能夠斷除。雖然先前沒有伏住迷理之惑（對真理的迷惑），但在伏住其伴隨種類時，進入見道位時也同時斷除。道和斷的次數可以依此類推理解。 二超初二果得第三者（超越初果和第二果而證得第三果）。是指具有聲聞根性且是利根的人。他們在還是凡夫的時候，曾經以六行觀修，伏住了欲界修惑（修道所斷的迷惑）的九品迷事，乃至無所有處（禪定的一種境界）的九品事惑。之後進入見道位時，先前已經伏住的，以及沒有伏住的，都與見惑（見道所斷的迷惑）一起同時斷除。修道和斷除的次數可以依此類推理解。 問：前面兩類人為什麼沒有伏住迷理之惑？ 答：因為他們不理解修習理觀（對真理的觀修），迷理之惑不違背事觀（對事相的觀修），所以不能伏住。 問：為什麼不能伏住有頂地惑（最高禪定境界的迷惑）？ 答：因為有頂地惑非常細微，沒有比它更高的境界可以欣求，所以不能用六行觀修來伏住。而且這種迷惑非常細微，不會障礙有學（還在學習的人），所以只是斷除它而已，從而超越初果和第二果。前面是依據正義（正確的觀點）來說的，順便說了不正的煩惱，不能詳細敘述。 有人說相見道（見道的開始）斷惑是不合道理的。《瑜伽師地論》只說世間道和出世間道斷除迷事惑，不除迷理惑。又不能說迷理惑用真見（真實的見解）來斷除。迷事惑用相見（相似的見解）來斷除。也不能說在相見道之後另外生起道來斷除。對法論（阿毗達磨論）說超越前二果以及次第證果的人，都是在第十六心（第十六個心念）建立聖果，而不是另外生起道。而且《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷說：『問：未知欲知根（想要知道但還不知道的根）所依之處在哪裡？答：證得初果、第二果、第三果的所依之處。問：已知根（已經知道的根）所依之處在哪裡？答：乃至金剛喻定（像金剛一樣堅固的禪定）的無學沙門果（阿羅漢果）所證得的所依之處。』 所以第十六心證得初果、二果、三果。 又《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷說：『問：有幾種根證得預流果（初果）？答：或者一種，或者八種。』
【English Translation】 English version The 'three surpassing' refers to surpassing the first fruit to attain the second fruit. Specifically, surpassing the first fruit refers to someone with the disposition of a Śrāvaka (listener/disciple) who is of sharp faculties. In their previous ordinary state, they aspired to higher rebirths, using the six aspects of worldly paths such as suffering and coarseness to subdue the first six of the nine categories of delusion in the desire realm. Later, due to circumstances, they turned their minds to seeking the fruit of a Śrāvaka, cultivating the seven expedients as preparatory practices. Upon entering the path of seeing (Darśanamārga), in a single moment, they simultaneously sever and attain the second fruit through the combined power of seeing and cultivation. Because they had previously subdued the first six categories, they are able to sever them during the path of seeing. Although they had not previously subdued the delusions of principle (delusions concerning the nature of reality), they are severed simultaneously upon entering the path of seeing, along with the subduing of their associated categories. The number of paths and severances can be understood by analogy. The 'two surpassing' refers to surpassing the first and second fruits to attain the third fruit. This refers to someone with the disposition of a Śrāvaka who is of sharp faculties. In their previous ordinary state, they had used the six aspects to subdue the nine categories of delusion in the desire realm, up to the nine categories of delusion in the realm of 'nothingness'. Later, upon entering the path of seeing, those previously subdued, as well as those not subdued, are severed simultaneously along with the delusions of seeing. The number of cultivations and severances can be understood by analogy. Question: Why did the previous two types of people not subdue the delusions of principle? Answer: Because they did not understand the cultivation of the contemplation of principle. The delusions of principle do not contradict the contemplation of phenomena, so they could not be subdued. Question: Why could they not subdue the delusions of the peak of existence (Bhavāgra)? Answer: Because those delusions are subtle, and there is no higher state to aspire to, so they could not be subdued using the six aspects. Moreover, those delusions are subtle and do not obstruct those still learning (Śaikṣa), so they are only severed, thus surpassing the first and second fruits. The preceding is based on the correct meaning; the incorrect afflictions are mentioned incidentally and cannot be described in detail. Some say that severing delusions in the path of seeing is not reasonable. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra only states that worldly and supramundane paths sever delusions of phenomena, not delusions of principle. Furthermore, it cannot be said that delusions of principle are severed by true seeing, while delusions of phenomena are severed by similar seeing. Nor can it be said that a separate path arises after the path of seeing to sever them. The Abhidharmakośa states that those who surpass the first two fruits, as well as those who attain the fruits in order, all establish the holy fruit in the sixteenth moment of consciousness, without a separate path arising. Moreover, the fifty-seventh fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states: 'Question: Where is the basis of the unknown-to-be-known faculty (Ajñātājñāsyāmīndriya)? Answer: The basis for attaining the first, second, and third Śrāmaṇa fruits. Question: Where is the basis of the known faculty (Ajñendriya)? Answer: The basis for attaining the non-learning Śrāmaṇa fruit (Arhatship) through the Vajropamasamādhi (diamond-like samādhi).' Therefore, the first, second, and third fruits are attained in the sixteenth moment of consciousness. Furthermore, the fifty-seventh fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states: 'Question: How many faculties attain the stream-enterer fruit (Srotāpanna)? Answer: Either one or eight.'
得第二。或二或九得一來果。問幾根得不還果。答或十一或二。初果或一。謂未知當知根。或八加信等五．及意．舍根。此依決定次第人說。一來或二或九。依超越者如初果說。次第者即已知根。二隨一得。不定二得。故云或二九。信等七定。未知等二隨一不定。容九根得。非定九俱。猶不定故置此或言。已依初近分故但舍根 問幾根得不還果 答或十一或二。超越人如初果說。次第人依已知根。二隨一得故云或二。或十一者。於前九上。加其喜樂。隨應所依靜慮入見。初禪近分及第四定即是依舍。初二根本喜。第三即樂。三受隨一故云或十一。非三受俱 或可。三受隨一。加命根一。女．男隨一。故成十一。若加喜樂三受不俱何成十一。前解為正 有解八者除未知根加命。九者更加喜。十一加樂．憂 此釋不正。五十七初果文內云。憂根雖道所依非道攝故此中不取。不還果中又云憂根道理如前應知。故不取憂。依初根本次第亦入。依上三禪唯超果入 問幾根得阿羅漢果 答或一或十者。一謂已知根。十謂十一中除未知當知根。此說能得。非說已得。故除具知。余廣破斥徒設煩辭 超中二果得第四者。謂有聲聞性是利根。先於凡時不伏修惑。於七方便但伏見惑入見道時。斷其三界見道惑盡得初果已更未斷修。由意樂力
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 獲得第二果（Sakadagami，一來果）。或者用兩種根，或者用九種根，可以獲得一來果。問：需要幾種根才能獲得不還果（Anagami，不來果）？答：或者十一種，或者兩種。初果（Sotapanna，須陀洹）或者用一種根，指的是未知根和當知根。或者用八種根，加上信等五根，以及意根、舍根。這是依據決定次第的人來說的。一來果或者用兩種根，或者用九種根。依據超越者，如同初果所說。次第者，就是已知根。兩種根隨一種獲得，不定根兩種獲得，所以說或者兩種或者九種。信等七種根是決定的，未知等兩種根隨一種是不定的，容許用九種根獲得，但不是一定同時具備九種根。因為不確定，所以用『或』字。已經依據最初的近分定，所以只有舍根。 問：需要幾種根才能獲得不還果？答：或者十一種，或者兩種。超越者如同初果所說。次第者依據已知根，兩種根隨一種獲得，所以說或者兩種。或者十一種，在前九種根的基礎上，加上喜根和樂根，隨所依的靜慮而入見。初禪近分定和第四禪就是依據舍根。初禪和二禪根本是喜根，第三禪是樂根。三種感受隨一種，所以說或者十一種。不是三種感受同時具備。或者可以，三種感受隨一種，加上命根一種，女根和男根隨一種，所以成為十一種。如果加上喜根和樂根，三種感受不俱全，怎麼能成為十一種？前面的解釋是正確的。有人解釋八種根，除去未知根，加上命根。九種根是更加喜根。十一種是加上樂根和憂根。這種解釋不正確。《五十七初果文》中說：『憂根雖然是道所依，但不是道所攝，所以這裡不取。』不還果中又說：『憂根的道理如前應知。』所以不取憂根。依據最初的根本次第也入，依據上三禪只有超果入。 問：需要幾種根才能獲得阿羅漢果（Arahat）？答：或者一種，或者十種。一種指的是已知根。十種指的是十一種根中除去未知根和當知根。這是說能夠獲得，不是說已經獲得。所以除去具知根。其餘的廣泛破斥只是徒勞的言辭。超越者中二果獲得第四果，指的是有聲聞性是利根的人，先在凡夫時沒有降伏修惑，在七方便中只是降伏了見惑，入見道時，斷盡三界見道惑，獲得初果后，沒有再斷修惑，由於意樂的力量。
【English Translation】 English version Obtaining the second fruit (Sakadagami, once-returner). Either with two roots or with nine roots, one can attain the once-returner fruit. Question: How many roots are needed to attain the non-returner fruit (Anagami)? Answer: Either eleven or two. The first fruit (Sotapanna, stream-enterer) is attained with either one root, referring to the unknown root and the root of knowing. Or with eight roots, adding the five roots of faith, etc., as well as the mind-faculty and the faculty of indifference. This is said according to those who progress in a determined sequence. The once-returner fruit is attained with either two or nine roots. According to the transcendent, it is as said for the first fruit. For those who progress sequentially, it is the known root. Two roots are obtained with one of them, and two uncertain roots are obtained. Therefore, it is said either two or nine. The seven roots of faith, etc., are determined, while the two roots of the unknown, etc., are uncertain, allowing for the attainment with nine roots, but not necessarily all nine simultaneously. Because it is uncertain, the word 'either' is used. Having already relied on the initial proximate concentration, there is only the faculty of indifference. Question: How many roots are needed to attain the non-returner fruit? Answer: Either eleven or two. The transcendent is as said for the first fruit. The sequential relies on the known root, and two roots are obtained with one of them, so it is said either two. Or eleven, adding the faculties of joy and pleasure to the previous nine roots, entering into insight according to the dhyana (meditative absorption) relied upon. The proximate concentration of the first dhyana and the fourth dhyana rely on the faculty of indifference. The first and second dhyanas fundamentally rely on the faculty of joy, and the third dhyana relies on the faculty of pleasure. One of the three feelings is present, so it is said either eleven. Not all three feelings are present simultaneously. Or it could be that one of the three feelings is present, plus one life-faculty, and either the female or male faculty, thus becoming eleven. If joy and pleasure are added, and the three feelings are not all present, how can it be eleven? The previous explanation is correct. Some explain eight roots, removing the unknown root and adding the life-faculty. Nine roots are adding the faculty of joy. Eleven are adding the faculties of pleasure and sorrow. This explanation is incorrect. In the 'Fifty-Seven First Fruit Text,' it says: 'Although the faculty of sorrow is that upon which the path relies, it is not included within the path, so it is not taken here.' In the non-returner fruit, it is also said: 'The principle of the faculty of sorrow should be known as before.' Therefore, the faculty of sorrow is not taken. Relying on the initial fundamental sequence also enters, and relying on the upper three dhyanas, only the transcendent fruit enters. Question: How many roots are needed to attain the Arhat fruit? Answer: Either one or ten. One refers to the known root. Ten refers to the eleven roots, excluding the unknown root and the root of knowing. This is saying what can be attained, not what has already been attained. Therefore, the root of complete knowledge is excluded. The rest of the extensive refutations are just futile words. Among the transcendent, the second fruit attains the fourth fruit, referring to those with the disposition of a Shravaka (listener) who are of sharp faculties. First, as ordinary beings, they have not subdued the afflictions of cultivation. In the seven expedients, they have only subdued the afflictions of view. When entering the path of seeing, they completely sever the afflictions of the path of seeing in the three realms. After attaining the first fruit, they have not further severed the afflictions of cultivation, due to the power of intention.
有堪能故。依初近分已未得根本。故總相三界六識修惑九地之中束為九品。如欲初品乃至有頂初品之惑合為一品。餘八準此。若第六識迷理細惑。地地之中雖各九品。今並第七識俱煩惱總為一品。與第九品迷事之惑同時頓斷成阿羅漢。道斷數數準亦可知 問既為九品斷欲六品修惑之時。何不得第二果。斷欲九品何不得第三 答欲六斷時並上二界各斷六品故。復不息求未出觀故不得第二。斷欲九品時。並有頂惑亦皆斷盡。即得第四故不取中二 問為唯初果人未進斷惑得超中二。為斷余品亦能超耶 答準對法論引指端經。唯未斷余能辨聖旨不說余能。由得果已有勝堪能。若少進斷即非此類。無勝能故。
獨覺之人有二類別。一麟角喻。一三千界唯獨一出故。此是利根。先凡位時六行伏彼無所有已下惑。百劫練根入見道時。八地已下伏彼類故。與見惑同時斷。出見道已別起九無間．九解脫。斷非想地九品煩惱。成此麟角喻人。不滿百劫練。及從聲聞決釋位中未定生時。此等已去作辟支者皆為眾出。雖不待師而自悟道名獨覺人。許有多出故名部行。更有一解如第十記。通定．不定姓。若百劫練根得辟支者即唯定性。余義準前。
問何以得知。身見有二見道斷一 答準四卷楞伽經第二云。身見有二種。謂俱生及妄想
。乃至云。及先二身見妄想斷故疑法不生。準此經文。既云及先二身見妄想斷故疑法不生。即分明說身見有二。初果唯斷妄想身見不斷俱生。不煩廣釋。
問頗有斷非想前六品惑已。然後方斷欲界后三耶 答有如超中二果人取第四果者。即其事也 又如斯陀含人住自果者。已斷欲界六品惑已方迴心取緣覺果者。不可漸斷所餘未斷取緣覺果。以緣覺果三十四心成菩提故。又與次第四果無別。設今得二果已。不更兼前合為三十四心。三十四心但據從凡即作者說。此第二果但於此后。起九無間．九解脫道斷所餘惑。即欲界中后三品惑。及無所有處已下煩惱以世道伏 起六無間．解脫。斷非想非非想等前六品已。方斷下欲先所伏者。不同見道。一品道故 或前諸地所伏之者。與非想地上上品惑一時頓斷。先已伏故。但前說超第四果人。是斷無色前六品已。方斷下地后諸品者。未見正文二說任取 問準小乘說。三十四心得成菩提。大乘雲何 答準大乘說有五十四心。兩種十六心並九無間．九解脫道。成五十心。三心見道中唯有二心。但分惑障為上下斷。不斷智障故並真見二。無間一解脫一 或五十二。除三心見道中上下二心。以二乘人不作非安立觀故 問趣聲聞果見諦第十六心即建立果。何故趣緣覺而不立耶 答以不住道
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：乃至（經文）說，『以及先前二種身見（薩迦耶見，認為五蘊和合的身體為真實自我）的妄想斷除，所以疑法（對佛法教義的懷疑）不會產生。』 依照這段經文，既然說『以及先前二種身見的妄想斷除，所以疑法不會產生』，就分明說明身見有兩種。初果（須陀洹果）只是斷除妄想的身見，不斷除俱生（與生俱來）的身見，不需要過多解釋。
問：是否有人先斷除非想處定（四禪八定中的最高境界）之前的六品惑，然後才斷除欲界（眾生居住的世界，充滿各種慾望）的后三品惑？ 答：有，例如超越次第的二果（斯陀含果）人，直接證得第四果（阿羅漢果）的情況，就是如此。又如斯陀含果的人安住于自己的果位，已經斷除欲界的六品惑，然後才回心轉意，修證緣覺果（辟支佛果）的情況。不可能漸次斷除剩餘未斷的惑而證得緣覺果，因為緣覺果需要三十四心（三十四剎那的智慧）才能成就菩提（覺悟）。又與次第證得第四果沒有區別。假設現在已經證得二果，不再兼修之前的，合為三十四心。三十四心只是根據從凡夫直接修證的情況來說的。這個第二果只是在此之後，生起九無間道（斷除煩惱的智慧）和九解脫道（從煩惱中解脫的智慧），斷除剩餘的惑，即欲界中的后三品惑，以及無所有處定（四禪八定中的第七個境界）以下的煩惱，用世間道（世俗的修行方法）來伏住。生起六無間道和解脫道，斷除非想非非想處定（四禪八定中的最高境界）等之前的六品惑之後，才斷除地獄（欲界）先前所伏住的惑，這與見道（證悟真理的最初階段）不同，因為見道是一品道（一次只能斷除一種煩惱）。或者先前諸地（各個禪定境界）所伏住的惑，與非想處定地上品惑一時頓斷，因為先前已經伏住。但前面所說超越次第證得第四果的人，是斷除無色界（沒有物質的禪定境界）的前六品惑之後，才斷除下地（欲界、色界）的后諸品惑，沒有看到明確的經文，兩種說法任取。
問：依照小乘（聲聞乘）的說法，三十四心可以成就菩提，大乘（菩薩乘）怎麼說？ 答：依照大乘的說法，有五十四心。兩種十六心，加上九無間道和九解脫道，成就五十心。三心見道中只有二心，只是把惑障分為上下斷，不斷智障（對真理的障礙），所以加上真見二（真實的見解），無間一（無間道），解脫一（解脫道）。或者五十二心，除去三心見道中的上下二心，因為二乘人（聲聞乘和緣覺乘的修行者）不作非安立觀（不作錯誤的觀念）。
問：趣向聲聞果（阿羅漢果）的見諦（證悟真理）第十六心就建立果位，為什麼趣向緣覺果而不建立果位？ 答：因為不住道（不執著于修行的方法）。
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, it says, 'And because the delusions of the previous two forms of self-view (Sakkaya-ditthi, the view that the aggregate of the five skandhas is a real self) are severed, the doubt about the Dharma (teachings of Buddhism) does not arise.' According to this sutra passage, since it says, 'And because the delusions of the previous two forms of self-view are severed, the doubt about the Dharma does not arise,' it clearly states that there are two forms of self-view. The first fruit (Sotapanna) only severs the delusional self-view, not the innate (co-arising) self-view, and no further explanation is needed.
Question: Is there anyone who first severs the six grades of delusion before the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (the highest state in the Four Dhyanas and Eight Samadhis), and then severs the last three grades of delusion in the Desire Realm (the realm where beings live, full of various desires)? Answer: Yes, such as the person who transcends the stages of the second fruit (Sakadagami) and directly attains the fourth fruit (Arhat). This is the case. Also, like the Sakadagami who abides in their own fruit, having already severed the six grades of delusion in the Desire Realm, and then turns their mind to cultivate the Pratyekabuddha fruit (Paccekabuddha). It is impossible to gradually sever the remaining unsevered delusions and attain the Pratyekabuddha fruit, because the Pratyekabuddha fruit requires thirty-four minds (thirty-four moments of wisdom) to achieve Bodhi (enlightenment). It is also no different from attaining the fourth fruit in sequence. Suppose one has already attained the second fruit, and no longer combines the previous ones to make thirty-four minds. The thirty-four minds are only based on the situation of directly cultivating from an ordinary person. This second fruit only arises after this, generating nine uninterrupted paths (wisdom to sever afflictions) and nine liberation paths (wisdom to liberate from afflictions), severing the remaining delusions, that is, the last three grades of delusion in the Desire Realm, and the afflictions below the Realm of Nothingness (the seventh state in the Four Dhyanas and Eight Samadhis), subduing them with worldly paths (mundane practices). Generating six uninterrupted paths and liberation paths, after severing the six grades of delusion before the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (the highest state in the Four Dhyanas and Eight Samadhis), then severing the previously subdued delusions of the lower realm (Desire Realm), which is different from the Path of Seeing (the initial stage of realizing the truth), because the Path of Seeing is a one-grade path (only one affliction can be severed at a time). Or the delusions subdued in the previous realms (various meditative states) are severed simultaneously with the highest grade of delusion in the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception, because they were previously subdued. But the previous statement about the person who transcends the stages and attains the fourth fruit, is that after severing the six grades of delusion in the Formless Realm (meditative states without matter), then severing the later grades of delusion in the lower realms (Desire Realm, Form Realm), there is no clear sutra passage seen, and either of the two statements can be chosen.
Question: According to the Theravada (Sravakayana) saying, thirty-four minds can achieve Bodhi, what does the Mahayana (Bodhisattvayana) say? Answer: According to the Mahayana saying, there are fifty-four minds. Two types of sixteen minds, plus nine uninterrupted paths and nine liberation paths, achieve fifty minds. In the three minds of the Path of Seeing, there are only two minds, only dividing the afflictive obscurations into upper and lower to sever, without severing the cognitive obscurations (obstacles to truth), so adding the two true views (real views), one uninterrupted path, and one liberation path. Or fifty-two minds, removing the upper and lower two minds in the three minds of the Path of Seeing, because the practitioners of the Two Vehicles (Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana) do not make non-establishment views (do not make wrong conceptions).
Question: The sixteenth mind of seeing the truth (realizing the truth) when approaching the Sravaka fruit (Arhat) establishes the fruit position, why does it not establish the fruit position when approaching the Pratyekabuddha fruit? Answer: Because it does not abide in the path (not attached to the methods of practice).
故。期心別故 問準大談小不見真見。以粗故但知相見。何故修道之中即見真無間．解脫 答彼自將作真無間．解脫。大乘談彼但見前加行 問大談小乘有真．相見道。何不說小有真．相修道 答見道之前加行廣故。長時學觀故。初入難故。以初得故。所以重觀有相見道。修道之中不作長時廣多行相。以其九地品別斷故。又曾得故。故不重觀。所以不說有相修道 問大乘如何 答既有後得無漏之智重觀前如。有亦無失。位不決定須更重觀故不別立 問初果即于相第十六方始建立果。后三云何于解脫立 答初得入見須重觀諦。第十六心事方究竟始得立果。修道后得不須重觀。于解脫道事得究竟故得立果 問如聲聞人得無學已回趣緣覺。后練根時入何觀道斷何等障 答如極果人趣緣覺時。但起九無間．九解脫擬儀無間．解脫。非真無間等。但緣事觀。不入生空觀。以更無惑可斷可證。但行解心作無間．解脫道。數數思惟令彼極果信等五根漸漸明利。更不斷惑而即得果 二云。設入生空除其根障為無間等道。理亦無妨。令智明利無惑可斷故 問無學回趣斷根障時。別得無為不 答得與不得俱有何失 二俱有過。若言得者云何言三乘同坐解脫床耶 答此義不同。同得解脫者同得惑不生解脫。不說無為亦同 若言不得者。云何雜
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：因為期心（期望之心）的差別，所以大乘談論和小乘談論，對於『見』的理解並不相同，不能見到真實的『見』。因為粗略的緣故，只能知曉表相之『見』。為什麼在修道之中，就能見到真實無間（anantara，無礙）和解脫（vimoksha，脫離）呢？ 答：那是他們自己將（加行位的智慧）作為真實無間和解脫。大乘談論認為，他們（小乘）所見的只是前加行位（purva-prayoga，預備階段）。 問：大乘談論小乘有真實的相見道（darsana-marga，見道）嗎？為什麼不說小乘有真實的相修道（bhavana-marga，修道）呢？ 答：因為見道之前的加行位非常廣大，長時間地學習觀行，最初進入時非常困難，因為是初次獲得，所以重視觀行有相見道。修道之中不作長時間、廣大、多種行相的觀行，因為（已經）在九地（bhumi，菩薩修行的階段）中分別斷除了（煩惱），又因為曾經獲得過（見道的智慧），所以不重視觀行。因此，不說有相修道。 問：大乘如何呢？ 答：既然有後得無漏之智（prsthalabdha-nirvana-jnana，證悟后獲得的智慧）重新觀照之前的『如』（tathata，真如），有（重觀）也沒有過失。因為位階不決定，必須重新觀照，所以不另外建立（修道）。 問：初果（srota-apanna，須陀洹）在相第十六心（剎那）時才開始建立果位，后三果（斯陀含、阿那含、阿羅漢）為什麼在解脫道上建立果位呢？ 答：初次獲得入見（見道）需要重新觀照四諦（satya，真理），在第十六心時事情才究竟，才能建立果位。修道后得（的智慧）不需要重新觀照，在解脫道上事情就能夠究竟，所以能夠建立果位。 問：如果聲聞人（sravaka，聽聞佛法而修行的人）證得無學（asaiksa，不再需要學習）之後，回小向大趣向緣覺（pratyeka-buddha，獨覺），後來修習利根時，進入什麼觀道，斷除什麼障礙呢？ 答：如果極果（arhat，阿羅漢）之人趣向緣覺時，只是生起九無間、九解脫的擬儀無間、解脫，不是真正的無間等。只是緣事觀，不進入生空觀（sunyata-darsana，對空性的觀察），因為沒有更多的迷惑可以斷除和證得。只是進行解心，作為無間、解脫道，數數思惟，使他們的極果信等五根（panca-indriya，五種增上能力）漸漸明利，不再斷除迷惑，就能獲得果位。 第二種說法認為，即使進入生空觀，去除他們的根障，作為無間等道，道理也沒有妨礙。使智慧明利，沒有迷惑可以斷除的緣故。 問：無學回小向大斷除根障時，另外獲得無為（asamskrta，不生不滅的境界）嗎？ 答：獲得與不獲得，都有什麼過失呢？ 兩種說法都有過失。如果說獲得，為什麼說三乘（triyana，三種不同的修行道路）同坐解脫床呢？ 答：此義不同。同得解脫是指同得惑不生之解脫，不是說無為也相同。 如果說不獲得，為什麼雜（……）
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Because of the difference in 'expectation mind' (期心, qi xin), the discussions of Mahayana and Hinayana differ in their understanding of 'seeing,' and they cannot see the true 'seeing.' Because of the grossness, they can only know the appearance of 'seeing.' Why is it that in the midst of cultivation, one can see true 'non-obstruction' (無間, anantara) and 'liberation' (解脫, vimoksha)? Answer: That is because they themselves take (the wisdom of the preparatory stage) as true 'non-obstruction' and 'liberation.' Mahayana argues that what they (Hinayana) see is only the preliminary practice stage (前加行, purva-prayoga). Question: Does Mahayana argue that Hinayana has a true 'path of seeing' (相見道, darsana-marga)? Why not say that Hinayana has a true 'path of cultivation' (相修道, bhavana-marga)? Answer: Because the preliminary practice stage before the path of seeing is very vast, and they study contemplation for a long time, and it is very difficult to enter at the beginning, and because it is the first time to obtain it, they attach importance to contemplating the path of seeing with characteristics. In the midst of cultivation, they do not engage in long-term, vast, and diverse aspects of contemplation, because (the afflictions) have been separately cut off in the nine grounds (九地, bhumi), and because they have already obtained (the wisdom of the path of seeing), they do not emphasize contemplation. Therefore, they do not say there is a path of cultivation with characteristics. Question: What about Mahayana? Answer: Since there is 'post-attainment non-outflow wisdom' (后得無漏之智, prsthalabdha-nirvana-jnana) that re-contemplates the previous 'suchness' (如, tathata), there is no fault in having (re-contemplation). Because the stage is not fixed, it is necessary to re-contemplate, so it is not established separately (as a path of cultivation). Question: The 'first fruit' (初果, srota-apanna) is established only at the sixteenth moment of thought, so how are the latter three fruits (斯陀含, 阿那含, 阿羅漢) established on the path of liberation? Answer: The first attainment of entering seeing (the path of seeing) requires re-contemplation of the 'Four Noble Truths' (四諦, satya), and only at the sixteenth moment of thought is the matter completed, and the fruit can be established. The 'post-attainment' (的智慧) of cultivation does not require re-contemplation, and the matter can be completed on the path of liberation, so the fruit can be established. Question: If a 'hearer' (聲聞人, sravaka) attains 'no-more-learning' (無學, asaiksa) and then turns towards the 'solitary Buddha' (緣覺, pratyeka-buddha), what path of contemplation does he enter when cultivating sharper faculties, and what obstacles does he cut off? Answer: If a person of the 'ultimate fruit' (極果, arhat) turns towards the 'solitary Buddha,' he only generates the 'nine non-obstructions' and 'nine liberations' of the 'imitation non-obstruction' and 'liberation,' not the true 'non-obstruction' and so on. He only contemplates things, and does not enter the 'contemplation of the emptiness of existence' (生空觀, sunyata-darsana), because there are no more delusions that can be cut off and attained. He only engages in the 'understanding mind,' acting as the path of 'non-obstruction' and 'liberation,' repeatedly contemplating, so that their 'ultimate fruit' 'five roots' (五根, panca-indriya) gradually become clear and sharp, and without cutting off delusions, they can attain the fruit. The second view is that even if they enter the 'contemplation of the emptiness of existence,' removing their root obstacles as the path of 'non-obstruction' and so on, there is no obstacle in principle. Because it makes wisdom clear and sharp, there are no delusions that can be cut off. Question: When a 'no-more-learner' turns towards the Great Vehicle and cuts off root obstacles, does he separately attain 'unconditioned' (無為, asamskrta)? Answer: What fault is there in either attaining or not attaining? Both views have faults. If you say they attain it, why do you say that the 'three vehicles' (三乘, triyana) sit on the same bed of liberation? Answer: This meaning is different. 'Same attainment of liberation' means the same attainment of liberation from the non-arising of delusions, not that the 'unconditioned' is also the same. If you say they do not attain it, why (…)
集論云斷下劣受得二無為 答彼約永斷。唯在大乘非二乘者。以不斷故。但伏得定故。約煩惱滅已解脫不別。如第十卷疏解十障中明 問聲聞取自果轉成利根。為事．理觀耶 答但作事觀不作理觀。以其練根無惑可斷故。更不得果故。但為事觀不別得無為。若大乘菩薩練根。入法空觀斷所知障故。即與彼別 問法觀是細生觀粗。法觀必帶于生觀。生執是粗法執細。斷法之時生必斷 答設爾何失 若爾何故論第九。三心見道之中。第二內遣諸法假智。唯斷法執不斷生耶。耶 答據實斷法必能斷生。以彼加行期心別故。亦不違理 問以見望于修。即許見道之中法觀斷法不斷人。亦以修望于見。修道之中斷人不斷法 答思可知 難二障障見道。入見之時前後斷。二障障無學。金剛之位二心斷 答見道初智劣。二障前後斷。金剛道力強。二障俱時斷 問定障是所知障收。許二乘人生空觀斷。可不如是 答爾 問所知障細生空粗。即許生空斷細障。亦應生空是粗法空細。生空起時帶法空 有解不例。且生執望法執。法執是細。若以生執望所知障。所知障即粗。何以故。以迷理是細迷事是粗故。證生理斷我執時。兼能斷彼迷事定障。然法觀細。必帶生觀。生觀是粗。不帶法觀 此答意取迷理俱者。此釋不正。定障既與迷理煩惱俱起
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：集論說斷除下劣的受，可以獲得二無為（指擇滅無為和非擇滅無為），這是什麼意思？ 答：那是就永斷來說的。這種情況只存在於大乘，而不存在於二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘），因為二乘沒有斷除煩惱，只是通過禪定來降伏煩惱。所以，就煩惱滅盡而言，解脫並沒有什麼區別。正如第十卷疏中解釋十障時所闡明的那樣。 問：聲聞乘人證得自己的果位后，轉而成為利根者，是通過事觀還是理觀？ 答：只是作事觀，不作理觀。因為他們已經修習純熟，沒有疑惑可以斷除，所以不能再證得更高的果位。因此，只是作事觀，並不能額外獲得無為法。如果大乘菩薩修習純熟，進入法空觀，斷除所知障，就與聲聞乘人不同了。 問：法觀是細微的，生觀是粗糙的。法觀必然伴隨著生觀。生執是粗糙的，法執是細微的。斷除法執的時候，生執必然也被斷除。 答：假設是這樣，又有什麼過失呢？ 如果這樣，為什麼《瑜伽師地論》第九卷中說，三心見道（苦法智忍、苦法智、苦類智）中，第二內遣諸法假智，只是斷除法執，而不是斷除生執呢？ 答：就實際情況而言，斷除法執必然能夠斷除生執。因為他們所修的加行，其用心是不同的，這並不違背道理。 問：以見道來衡量修道，就允許在見道中，法觀斷除法執，而不是斷除人執。那麼，也可以用修道來衡量見道，在修道中，斷除人執，而不是斷除法執嗎？ 答：仔細思考就可以明白。 難：二障（煩惱障和所知障）障礙見道，在進入見道的時候，是前後斷除的。二障障礙無學道（阿羅漢果），在金剛喻定（一種堅固的禪定）的階段，是同時斷除的。 答：見道初期的智慧比較弱，所以二障是前後斷除的。金剛喻定的力量強大，所以二障是同時斷除的。 問：定障（由禪定引起的障礙）被歸入所知障。如果允許二乘人生空觀斷除定障，那就可以不這樣認為。 答：是的。 問：所知障是細微的，生空是粗糙的。如果允許生空斷除細微的障礙，那麼也應該認為生空是粗糙的，法空是細微的。生空生起的時候，伴隨著法空。 有人解釋說，這不能類比。暫且以生執來衡量法執，法執是細微的。如果以生執來衡量所知障，所知障就是粗糙的。為什麼呢？因為迷於理是細微的，迷於事是粗糙的。證悟生理（勝義諦）斷除我執的時候，也能夠斷除迷於事的定障。然而，法觀是細微的，必然伴隨著生觀。生觀是粗糙的，不伴隨著法觀。 這個回答的意思是，取迷理和迷事兩者都具備的情況。這種解釋是不正確的。定障既然與迷理的煩惱同時生起，就不能這樣解釋。
【English Translation】 English version Question: The Samgraha states that by severing inferior feelings, one obtains two unconditioned states (Nirodha-satya and Apratisankhya-nirodha). What does this mean? Answer: That refers to permanent severance. This only exists in the Mahayana, not in the Two Vehicles (Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana), because the Two Vehicles do not sever afflictions, but merely subdue them through meditation. Therefore, in terms of the extinction of afflictions, there is no difference in liberation. This is explained in the commentary on the Ten Obstructions in the tenth fascicle. Question: When a Sravaka attains their own fruit and then becomes a sharp-witted person, is it through contemplation of phenomena or contemplation of principle? Answer: They only engage in contemplation of phenomena, not contemplation of principle. Because they have already refined their faculties and have no more doubts to sever, they cannot attain higher fruits. Therefore, they only engage in contemplation of phenomena and do not additionally obtain the unconditioned. If a Mahayana Bodhisattva refines their faculties and enters the contemplation of the emptiness of phenomena, severing the knowledge obscurations, then they are different from the Sravakas. Question: Contemplation of phenomena is subtle, while contemplation of existence is coarse. Contemplation of phenomena necessarily accompanies contemplation of existence. Attachment to existence is coarse, while attachment to phenomena is subtle. When severing attachment to phenomena, attachment to existence is necessarily severed as well. Answer: Supposing that is the case, what is the fault? If that is so, why does the ninth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra state that among the three minds of the path of seeing (Ksatrantijnana-dharma-ksanti, Ksatrantijnana-dharma, Ksatrantijnana-anvaya), the second, the internal rejection of the false wisdom of all dharmas, only severs attachment to phenomena and not attachment to existence? Answer: In reality, severing attachment to phenomena necessarily enables the severance of attachment to existence. Because the intention of their practice is different, it is not contrary to reason. Question: If we measure the path of cultivation by the path of seeing, we allow that in the path of seeing, contemplation of phenomena severs attachment to phenomena but not attachment to self. Then, can we also measure the path of seeing by the path of cultivation, so that in the path of cultivation, attachment to self is severed but not attachment to phenomena? Answer: It can be understood through reflection. Objection: The two obscurations (klesavarana and jneyavarana) obstruct the path of seeing, and they are severed sequentially when entering the path of seeing. The two obscurations obstruct the path of no more learning (Arhatship), and they are severed simultaneously by the two minds of the Vajra-like Samadhi (a firm meditation). Answer: The initial wisdom of the path of seeing is weak, so the two obscurations are severed sequentially. The power of the Vajra-like path is strong, so the two obscurations are severed simultaneously. Question: The obscuration of meditation (dhyana-avarana) is included in the knowledge obscurations. If we allow the Two Vehicles to sever it through the contemplation of the emptiness of self, then we cannot think of it this way. Answer: That is correct. Question: The knowledge obscurations are subtle, while the emptiness of self is coarse. If we allow the emptiness of self to sever subtle obscurations, then we should also consider the emptiness of self to be coarse and the emptiness of phenomena to be subtle. When the emptiness of self arises, it accompanies the emptiness of phenomena. Some explain that this cannot be compared. For the time being, if we measure attachment to phenomena by attachment to existence, attachment to phenomena is subtle. If we measure the knowledge obscurations by attachment to existence, the knowledge obscurations are coarse. Why? Because being deluded about principle is subtle, while being deluded about phenomena is coarse. When realizing the true principle (paramartha-satya) and severing attachment to self, one is also able to sever the obscuration of meditation, which is delusion about phenomena. However, contemplation of phenomena is subtle and necessarily accompanies contemplation of existence. Contemplation of existence is coarse and does not accompany contemplation of phenomena. The meaning of this answer is to take the case where both delusion about principle and delusion about phenomena are present. This explanation is incorrect. Since the obscuration of meditation arises simultaneously with the afflictions of delusion about principle, it cannot be explained in this way.
。亦隨煩惱俱迷於理耶。準第六云。貪嗔見．疑俱起之者。亦迷於理同一緣故。準知定障亦應同彼。俱起同迷是煩惱障攝。斷得擇滅。別起定障是下劣受。二乘伏而不斷。所知障攝故。故二乘人伏此定障。得二定時得非擇滅不得擇滅。故不可難生空是粗能斷細障。令生觀起帶於法空。
問分別我執粗故易斷。初見道時即能除滅。大乘既有三心見道。二乘有幾 答以義準之。大乘為斷二障各分二品。別總斷之即立三心。以第二心但斷下品分別法執。若二乘人但有二心。唯斷我執分二品故 問二障分上下。下品二心除。兩障分細粗。斷細亦分二 答初道力猶劣。下品二心除。后道有勝能。故合一心斷。
問前俱生執因七緣八不言取簡。間斷我見即言取蘊 答七唯緣第八。狹不須簡。第六通緣余。故取言簡 問總緣蘊計。蘊通無漏。云何但云緣五取蘊 答約相分說云緣取蘊。
取者。準集論等。即四種取皆唯說貪。云取有四種。謂欲取．見取．或取我語取。執取諍根執取後有是取義故。乃至云。由貪著欲繫縛沈染為因。諸在家者以為諍根。由貪著諸見繫縛耽染為因。諸出家者以為諍根。故取緣此四貪名取。同唯識論愛增名取 唯識又云。雖取支中攝諸煩惱。而愛潤勝說是愛增。準此諸惑皆名為取。若準瑜
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：那麼，（定障）也是和隨煩惱一起，迷惑于真理嗎？根據《瑜伽師地論》第六卷所說，貪、嗔、見、疑同時生起的人，也是迷惑于真理，因為是同一個原因。由此可知，定障也應該和它們一樣。同時生起並一同迷惑于真理，這是煩惱障所攝，可以通過修習而斷除，得到擇滅。單獨生起的定障是下劣的感受，二乘人只是伏住它而不徹底斷除，因為它是所知障所攝。所以，二乘人伏住這種定障，得到二定時可以得到非擇滅，但得不到擇滅。因此，不能用生空觀是粗略的，能夠斷除細微的障礙，從而生起觀想，並帶有法空觀來反駁。
問：分別我執（Vikalpa Atmagraha）（通過分別產生的對自我的執著）粗顯，所以容易斷除，在初見道時就能除滅。大乘既然有三心見道，二乘有幾心？答：根據道理來推斷，大乘爲了斷除二障（煩惱障和所知障）各自分為二品（上品和下品），分別和總括地斷除它們，所以立為三心。因為第二心只是斷除下品的分別法執（Vikalpa Dharmagraha）（通過分別產生的對法的執著）。如果二乘人只有二心，只是斷除我執，分為二品。問：二障分為上下品，下品用二心除滅。兩障分為細和粗，斷除細微的也分為二嗎？答：初見道的力量還很弱，所以下品用二心除滅。後面的道有殊勝的能力，所以合為一心斷除。
問：前面說俱生執（Sahaja）（與生俱來的執著）的原因是七緣八識，沒有說取蘊（Upadana Skandha）（執取之蘊）來簡化。間斷的我見（Atma-dṛṣṭi）（對自我的錯誤見解）就說取蘊。答：七緣只是緣第八識（阿賴耶識，Ālaya-vijñāna），範圍狹窄，不需要簡化。第六識（意識，Manas-vijnana）普遍緣其他，所以用『取』字來簡化。問：總括地緣蘊計度，蘊通於無漏（Anasrava）（沒有煩惱），為什麼只說緣五取蘊（Panca Upadana Skandha）（被執取的五蘊）？答：這是從相分（Lakshana-bhaga）（心識所呈現的外部現象）上來說，說是緣取蘊。
『取』的意思，根據《集論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）等，就是四種取都只是說貪（Lobha）（貪慾）。說取有四種，即欲取（Kama Upadana）（對慾望的執取）、見取（Drsti Upadana）（對不正見解的執取）、戒禁取（Silavrata Upadana）（對錯誤戒律和苦行的執取）、我語取（Atmavada Upadana）（對自我言論的執取）。執取是諍論的根源，執取後有，這就是取的意義。乃至說，由於貪著慾望，被束縛和沉溺，這是在家者爭論的根源。由於貪著各種見解，被束縛和耽溺，這是出家者爭論的根源。所以，取緣于這四種貪，名為取。如同《唯識論》（Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi）所說，愛增長就叫做取。《唯識論》又說，雖然取支中包含各種煩惱，但愛是最滋潤的，所以說是愛增長。根據這些，各種迷惑都可以稱為取。如果根據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra），
【English Translation】 English version: Then, is the fixed obstruction also confused about the truth along with the accompanying afflictions? According to the sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, those who simultaneously generate greed, hatred, views, and doubt are also confused about the truth for the same reason. From this, it can be known that fixed obstructions should also be the same. Simultaneously arising and being confused together is included in the affliction obstruction, which can be eliminated through cultivation and obtaining cessation through discrimination (nirodha). The fixed obstruction that arises separately is an inferior feeling, which the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) subdue but do not completely eliminate, because it is included in the knowledge obstruction. Therefore, the Two Vehicles subdue this fixed obstruction, and when they obtain the two samadhis, they can obtain non-cessation through discrimination, but cannot obtain cessation through discrimination. Therefore, it cannot be refuted that the view of emptiness of self is coarse and can eliminate subtle obstructions, allowing the arising of contemplation and carrying the view of emptiness of phenomena.
Question: The discriminated self-grasping (Vikalpa Atmagraha) is coarse and easy to eliminate, and can be eliminated at the time of the initial path of seeing. Since the Mahayana has three minds in the path of seeing, how many minds do the Two Vehicles have? Answer: According to the principle, the Mahayana divides each of the two obstructions (affliction obstruction and knowledge obstruction) into two categories (superior and inferior) in order to eliminate them, and establishes three minds to eliminate them separately and comprehensively. Because the second mind only eliminates the inferior discriminated dharma-grasping (Vikalpa Dharmagraha). If the Two Vehicles only have two minds, they only eliminate self-grasping, dividing it into two categories. Question: The two obstructions are divided into superior and inferior categories, and the inferior categories are eliminated with two minds. The two obstructions are divided into subtle and coarse, is the elimination of the subtle also divided into two? Answer: The power of the initial path is still weak, so the inferior categories are eliminated with two minds. The later path has superior abilities, so it is combined into one mind to eliminate.
Question: Earlier, it was said that the cause of the innate grasping (Sahaja) is the seven conditions and eight consciousnesses, and the term 'grasping aggregates' (Upadana Skandha) was not used to simplify. The intermittent self-view (Atma-dṛṣṭi) is referred to as grasping aggregates. Answer: The seven conditions only condition the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), which is narrow in scope and does not need simplification. The sixth consciousness (Manas-vijnana) universally conditions the others, so the word 'grasping' is used to simplify. Question: Comprehensively conditioning the aggregates, the aggregates are common to the unconditioned (Anasrava), why is it only said to condition the five grasping aggregates (Panca Upadana Skandha)? Answer: This is spoken from the perspective of the characteristic division (Lakshana-bhaga), saying that it conditions the grasping aggregates.
The meaning of 'grasping', according to the Abhidharma-samuccaya and others, is that all four types of grasping only refer to greed (Lobha). It is said that there are four types of grasping, namely, desire-grasping (Kama Upadana), view-grasping (Drsti Upadana), vow and precept-grasping (Silavrata Upadana), and self-assertion-grasping (Atmavada Upadana). Grasping is the root of disputes, and grasping future existence, this is the meaning of grasping. It is even said that due to greed for desires, being bound and immersed, this is the root of disputes for householders. Due to greed for various views, being bound and immersed, this is the root of disputes for renunciants. Therefore, grasping conditions these four types of greed, and is called grasping. As the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi says, the increase of love is called grasping. The Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi also says that although the grasping limb includes various afflictions, love is the most nourishing, so it is said to be the increase of love. According to these, various delusions can be called grasping. If according to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra,
伽八十九說。即通一切有漏之法皆名為取。故彼云。當知此中若所取．若能取．若所為取如是一切總說名取。問何所取。答欲．見．戒禁．我語是所取。何能取。四種欲貪是能取。何所為取。為得諸欲及為受用故等。準此諸文。若取唯愛據增上說。若據能取有及有具通余煩惱。若相從者所取．能取．及所為取取境．取體．取因皆取。各據一義並不相違。諸說不同準此應會。今言取蘊。隨其所應取所生．生於取所取．能取．及所為取皆得名取蘊。
問何故法執通緣處．界。我但緣蘊 答法執通無為得緣界．處。我緣有為不得通界．處。又我執多一常。不緣于界．處。法執非一常。故通界處 又解依影略說。此解為正 辨中邊論說蘊．處．界。皆為破我。故知我執通緣三科。此緣蘊等據佛法談。外道不立蘊．處．界等。
初見道時即能除滅。有四解。一見修對。見在初。二真相對。真在初。三四道對。非勝進。四無間解脫對。在無間故言初見道。
言世間沙門．婆羅門等者。等取剎帝利等四姓。又等幢摩(此云不共死)補羯婆(典獄)旃荼羅(云嚴熾亦屠)篾戾車(云樂垢穢)達滑(淫女家沽酒家)羯恥羅(云斷獄官)。
論若無實我云何得有憶識等事。西明廣引大婆沙第十一有八論者釋憶所作
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：伽八十九說，就是說通達一切有漏之法都可稱為『取』。所以經文中說：『應當知道，這裡面所取、能取、以及所為取，所有這些總括起來都叫做取。』問：什麼是所取？答：欲（指各種慾望） 、見（指各種錯誤的見解）、戒禁（指錯誤的戒律和禁忌）、我語（指關於『我』的言論）是所取。什麼能取？四種欲貪是能取。什麼所為取？爲了獲得各種慾望以及爲了享受等等。』根據這些經文，如果說『取』僅僅是愛，那是就其增上來說的。如果根據能取來說，有（指存在）以及存在的工具，則通於其他的煩惱。如果從相隨的角度來說，所取、能取、以及所為取，取境、取體、取因，都是『取』。各自根據一個意義，並不互相違背。各種不同的說法，應該根據這個原則來理解。現在說的『取蘊』，根據其所應，取所生、生於取、所取、能取、以及所為取，都可以叫做『取蘊』。
問：為什麼法執（對法的執著）可以普遍緣于處（十二處）、界（十八界），而我執（對『我』的執著）只能緣于蘊（五蘊）？答：法執可以普遍緣于無為法，所以能夠緣于界、處。而我執緣于有為法，不能普遍緣于界、處。而且我執多是認為『我』是單一的、常恒的，所以不緣于界、處。法執不是單一的、常恒的，所以能夠通於界、處。』又有一種解釋是依據《影略說》，這種解釋是正確的。《辨中邊論》說蘊、處、界，都是爲了破除我執。所以知道我執可以普遍緣於三科（蘊、處、界）。這裡說緣于蘊等等，是根據佛法來說的。外道不建立蘊、處、界等等。
初見道時就能除滅（煩惱），有四種解釋。一是見道和修道相對，見道在最初。二是真道和相道相對，真道在最初。三是四道相對，不是勝進道。四是無間道和解脫道相對，因為在無間道，所以說是初見道。
經文里說的世間沙門（出家修道者）、婆羅門（祭司）等等，『等』包括剎帝利（武士）等四個種姓。又『等』包括幢摩（Candala，此云不共死）、補羯婆（Pukkasa，典獄）、旃荼羅（Candala，云嚴熾，也指屠夫）、篾戾車（Mleccha，云樂垢穢）、達滑（Dhakkala，**家沽酒家）、羯恥羅（Kaccara，云斷獄官）。
論：如果沒有真實的我，怎麼會有憶識等事？西明廣泛引用《大婆沙論》第十一卷，有八位論者解釋憶識所作。
【English Translation】 English version: The Gāthā Eighty-Nine states that understanding all conditioned (with outflows) dharmas is called 'grasping' (upādāna). Therefore, it says: 'It should be known that here, what is grasped, what is capable of grasping, and what is grasped for, all these together are called grasping.' Question: What is grasped? Answer: Desires (various cravings), views (various wrong views), precepts and prohibitions (wrong precepts and prohibitions), and statements about 'self' are what is grasped. What is capable of grasping? The four types of desire-attachment are what is capable of grasping. What is grasped for? It is for obtaining various desires and for enjoyment, etc.' According to these texts, if 'grasping' is said to be only love, it is in terms of its predominance. If it is in terms of what is capable of grasping, existence (bhava) and the means of existence extend to other afflictions. If it is from the perspective of association, what is grasped, what is capable of grasping, and what is grasped for, the object of grasping, the nature of grasping, and the cause of grasping, are all 'grasping.' Each is based on one meaning and does not contradict each other. The various different statements should be understood according to this principle. Now, the 'aggregates of grasping' (upādānakkhandha), according to what is appropriate, what is born of grasping, born in grasping, what is grasped, what is capable of grasping, and what is grasped for, can all be called 'aggregates of grasping'.
Question: Why can the dharma-attachment (attachment to dharmas) universally condition the sense bases (āyatana, twelve sense bases) and realms (dhātu, eighteen realms), while the self-attachment (attachment to 'self') can only condition the aggregates (skandha, five aggregates)? Answer: The dharma-attachment can universally condition unconditioned dharmas, so it can condition the realms and sense bases. The self-attachment conditions conditioned dharmas and cannot universally condition the realms and sense bases. Moreover, the self-attachment mostly considers 'self' to be singular and permanent, so it does not condition the realms and sense bases. The dharma-attachment is not singular or permanent, so it can extend to the realms and sense bases.' Another explanation is based on the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and this explanation is correct. The Madhyāntavibhāga says that the aggregates, sense bases, and realms are all for breaking down the self-attachment. Therefore, it is known that the self-attachment can universally condition the three categories (aggregates, sense bases, and realms). Here, saying that it conditions the aggregates, etc., is according to the Buddha's teachings. Non-Buddhists do not establish aggregates, sense bases, realms, etc.
At the time of the initial seeing of the path (darśanamārga), one can eliminate (afflictions). There are four explanations. First, relative to the path of seeing and the path of cultivation (bhāvanāmārga), the path of seeing is at the beginning. Second, relative to the true path and the path of appearance, the true path is at the beginning. Third, relative to the four paths, it is not the path of superior progress. Fourth, relative to the path of immediate succession (anantaryamārga) and the path of liberation (vimuktimārga), it is in the path of immediate succession, so it is said to be the initial seeing of the path.
The text says worldly śrāmaṇas (renunciates) and Brahmins (priests), etc., 'etc.' includes the four castes such as Kṣatriyas (warriors). Also 'etc.' includes Caṇḍāla (this means 'death not in common'), Pukkasa (jailer), Caṇḍāla (meaning 'fierce and blazing', also refers to butchers), Mleccha (meaning 'fond of filth'), Dhakkala (distiller), and Kaccara (judge).
Argument: If there is no real self, how can there be memory and recognition, etc.? Ximing extensively quotes the eleventh volume of the Mahāvibhāṣā, where eight commentators explain the function of memory.
今謂不然。即前所敘兩三類計外道等問。何要別敘顯有差別可作是說。
敘自義中由熏習力後方憶者。異熟無記自不能熏后應不憶。答不要自熏後方能憶。何以故。以善惡心雖能熏種。不廢有不能憶。又佛圓鏡智豈由因中曾見能熏后智起憶。若要由熏佛不能憶。以在因中諸劣無漏一切有漏皆悉已舍不熏成種。於此已後用何能憶。故知不由自類熏已後方能憶。但說由熏。令彼增明後起現行即便能憶。此異熟心由善惡心熏令彼憶 問三性相間由善惡熏異熟能憶。多念異熟后如何憶 答設不能憶亦復何過。非一切心皆能憶故 或從本有種生能憶。又如樞要 西明法師如彼疏明 要集云。泛論憶事即有二種。一者能憶心。二所憶境。若能憶心唯第六識。與念相應故能憶之。故唯識二十論云。與念相應意識能憶。過去諸識所受之境雖滅無體。前念諸識領彼境界熏成種子不失等也。于所憶境即有二義。謂憶曾受境。或憶曾能受心。此心即由自證分力故今能憶等 今謂此釋未能盡理。何者有異熟心不能熏種。由誰為因后時能憶。又宿住智所緣之境非皆曾受。佛果八識皆能憶前。不唯第六故義不盡。
今釋。能憶有其二位。一佛。二餘。余有自在未自在位。未自在位有二。一現。二種。現中有四。一自體分。二想勢力。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：現在說不是這樣。即使是前面敘述的兩三類計度外道等提出的問題，為什麼要另外敘述，顯示出差別，才能這樣說呢？
敘述從自身意義中由於熏習的力量後來才回憶起來的情況：異熟無記（Vipāka-avyākrta，指異熟果報，既非善也非惡的心理狀態）自身不能熏習，後來應該不能回憶。回答：不一定要自身熏習，後來才能回憶。為什麼呢？因為善惡心雖然能夠熏習種子，但不能因此就廢除有不能回憶的情況。又如佛的圓鏡智（Ādarśa-jñāna，如明鏡般照見一切的智慧）難道是因為因地中曾經見過，能夠熏習，後來智慧生起回憶嗎？如果一定要通過熏習，佛就不能回憶。因為在因地中，各種低劣的無漏（anāsrava，指沒有煩惱的）和一切有漏（sāsrava，指有煩惱的）都已經捨棄，不能熏習成種子。在此之後，用什麼來回憶呢？所以知道不是通過自身熏習之後才能回憶。只是說通過熏習，使它更加明亮，後來生起現行，就能回憶。這個異熟心通過善惡心的熏習，使它能夠回憶。問：三性（善、惡、無記）相間，通過善惡熏習，異熟能夠回憶。多念異熟之後，如何回憶？答：即使不能回憶，又有什麼過失呢？因為不是一切心都能回憶。或者從本有種子生起，能夠回憶。又如樞要（Shūyào，佛教典籍名）。西明法師（Xīmíng Fǎshī，唐代僧人）如他的疏中說明。要集（Yàojí，佛教典籍名）中說：泛泛而論回憶之事，即有兩種。一是能回憶的心，二是所回憶的境。如果能回憶的心只有第六識（mano-vijñāna，意識），與念相應，所以能夠回憶。所以《唯識二十論》（Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi-viṃśatikā）中說：『與念相應，意識能憶。』過去諸識所接受的境雖然滅無體，前念諸識領受那個境界，熏習成種子，不失等等。對於所憶境，即有兩種意義。一是回憶曾經接受的境，二是回憶曾經能接受的心。這個心即由於自證分（svasaṃvedana-bhāga，唯識學中識的自我認知部分）的力量，所以現在能夠回憶等等。現在認為這種解釋未能窮盡道理。有什麼異熟心不能熏習種子，由誰作為原因，後來能夠回憶？又宿住智（pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna，回憶前世的智慧）所緣的境並非都是曾經接受的。佛果（Buddha-phala，成佛的果位）的八識（aṣṭa vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意、末那、阿賴耶識）都能回憶以前的事情，不只是第六識，所以意義不全面。
現在解釋：能回憶有兩種地位。一是佛，二是其餘。其餘有自在和未自在兩種地位。未自在的地位有兩種，一是現行，二是種子。現行中有四種，一是自體分（sva-bhāga，唯識學中識的自體部分），二是想勢力。
【English Translation】 English version: Now, it is said that it is not so. Even with the questions raised by the two or three types of Tirthikas (Tīrthika, non-Buddhist ascetics) mentioned earlier, why narrate them separately, showing differences, to be able to say this?
Narrating the situation where one recalls later from one's own meaning due to the power of habituation: the Vipāka-avyākrta (Vipāka-avyākrta, the result of karma, a mental state that is neither good nor evil) itself cannot habituate; it should not be able to recall later. Answer: It is not necessary for it to habituate itself to be able to recall later. Why? Because although good and evil minds can habituate seeds, this does not negate the possibility of not being able to recall. Furthermore, does the Ādarśa-jñāna (Ādarśa-jñāna, mirror-like wisdom that reflects everything) of the Buddha arise from having seen it in the causal stage, being able to habituate, and then recalling it later? If it must be through habituation, the Buddha would not be able to recall. Because in the causal stage, all inferior anāsrava (anāsrava, free from defilements) and all sāsrava (sāsrava, with defilements) have been abandoned, unable to habituate into seeds. After this, what would be used to recall? Therefore, it is known that it is not through habituating oneself that one can recall later. It is only said that through habituation, making it brighter, and then arising into manifestation, one can recall. This Vipāka mind, through the habituation of good and evil minds, enables it to recall. Question: With the intermingling of the three natures (good, evil, and neutral), through the habituation of good and evil, the Vipāka can recall. After many Vipāka thoughts, how does one recall? Answer: Even if one cannot recall, what fault is there? Because not all minds can recall. Or, it can recall from the original seed. Also, like the Shūyào (Shūyào, name of a Buddhist text). The Xīmíng Fǎshī (Xīmíng Fǎshī, a Tang Dynasty monk), as explained in his commentary. The Yàojí (Yàojí, name of a Buddhist text) says: Generally speaking about the matter of recollection, there are two types. One is the mind that can recall, and the other is the object that is recalled. If the mind that can recall is only the mano-vijñāna (mano-vijñāna, the sixth consciousness), it can recall because it is in accordance with mindfulness. Therefore, the Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi-viṃśatikā (Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi-viṃśatikā, Twenty Verses on Representation-Only) says: 'The consciousness that accords with mindfulness can recall.' Although the objects received by the past consciousnesses have ceased and are without substance, the previous consciousnesses perceive that realm, habituating it into seeds without loss, and so on. Regarding the object that is recalled, there are two meanings. One is recalling the realm that was once received, and the other is recalling the mind that was once able to receive. This mind is able to recall now due to the power of its own sva-bhāga (svasaṃvedana-bhāga, the self-awareness portion of consciousness in Yogācāra), and so on. Now, it is thought that this explanation does not fully exhaust the principle. What Vipāka mind cannot habituate seeds, and what is the cause by which it can recall later? Furthermore, the realms cognized by the pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna (pūrva-nivāsānusmṛti-jñāna, the wisdom of recalling past lives) are not all those that were once received. The eight consciousnesses (aṣṭa vijñāna, the eight consciousnesses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, manas, and ālaya) of the Buddha-phala (Buddha-phala, the fruit of Buddhahood) can all recall previous things, not just the sixth consciousness, so the meaning is not comprehensive.
Now explaining: There are two positions for being able to recall. One is the Buddha, and the other is the rest. The rest have two positions: free and not free. The position of not being free has two types: manifestation and seed. There are four types in manifestation: one is sva-bhāga (sva-bhāga, the self-nature portion of consciousness in Yogācāra), and the other is the power of thought.
三與念相應第六意識。四總聚心心所。據自後念能憶前心偏說自證。據其分限所憶差別偏說想力。約未自在但追過去。偏說念俱分別意識。盡理言之。第六相應諸心．心所此總能憶。 若種子者即上能熏。唯除異熟所熏成種為后憶因。或第六識與念想俱相應心所所熏成種。生現能憶 若得自在復有二位。謂定及散。定據有漏．無漏生空。唯第六識 若依法空通第七識。七隨六引與彼同緣憶亦無失 若在散位諸根既許皆得互用。故應五識亦緣過去。或雖互用但緣現在 若在佛果八識俱能。但由因熏。果無新種。故論但云由熏習力得有憶識。不說各各自熏能憶。
釋作業受果。大乘八識以辨有無。前六具二。第七俱無。無記故不作業。染污故非受果。第八受果是異熟異熟故。不能作業。無記性故。犢子．正量．本經．賢胄．密林山等五部。同說五識不能作業受果。第六並能。大眾部等。同說六識並能作業受果。薩婆多等五識受果而不作業。第六俱能(此釋傳聞未見正教)。
敘數論計中。問以觸為風大。風大成皮根。皮根得觸而不得風。若爾觸體是何 答以堅濕癢饑等而造風大。與風體別。如勝論等 問皮不得風。風何根得 答心平等根。不必皮得。
準上所說言數論者。本即應是劫比羅仙造。后諸門
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：第六意識與念相應。總括心和心所。根據自身后念能夠回憶前唸的特點，側重說是自證。根據其分限所回憶的差別，側重說是想力。就尚未自在的情況而言，只能追憶過去，側重說是與念俱生的分別意識。從究竟的道理來說，第六意識相應的各種心和心所都能回憶。如果是種子，就是上面所說的能熏。只有異熟所熏成的種子，才能作為以後回憶的原因。或者第六識與念想俱生的相應心所所熏成的種子，產生現在能夠回憶的能力。如果獲得自在，又有兩種情況：一是禪定，一是散亂。禪定就有漏和無漏的生空而言，只有第六識。如果依法空，則也包括第七識。第七識跟隨第六識的引導，與第六識同緣，回憶也沒有缺失。如果在散亂狀態，既然允許諸根可以互相使用，那麼五識也應該能夠緣過去。或者雖然互相使用，但只能緣現在。如果在佛果位，八識都能回憶。但這是由因地的熏習所致，果地沒有新的種子產生。所以論中只說由熏習力而有憶識，沒有說各自熏習就能回憶。 解釋作業和受果。大乘用八識來辨別有無。前六識具有作業和受果兩種能力。第七識則都沒有。因為第七識是無記性，所以不作業；因為第七識是染污性，所以不受果報。第八識受果報，是異熟果，因為是異熟果，所以不能作業，因為是無記性。犢子部（Vatsiputriya）、正量部（Sammitiya）、本經、賢胄部（Bhadrāyanika）、密林山部（Ṣaṇṇagarika）等五個部派，都認為五識不能作業和受果報。第六識則都能作業和受果報。大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）等部派，認為六識都能作業和受果報。薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）等認為五識受果報，但不作業，第六識則都能（這種解釋是傳聞，沒有見到正教的依據）。 敘述數論的觀點。問：為什麼以觸為風大（Vāyu-dhātu），風大形成皮根（tvak-indriya），皮根得到觸覺卻得不到風？如果這樣，觸的本體是什麼？答：以堅、濕、癢、饑等造作風大，與風的本體不同，如勝論（Vaiśeṣika）等所說。問：皮根得不到風，那麼風由哪個根得到？答：由心平等根得到，不一定是皮根得到。 根據上面所說，數論的作者，本來應該是劫比羅仙（Kapila）所造，後來的各種門派...
【English Translation】 English version: The sixth consciousness corresponds with memory (smṛti). It encompasses all mental factors (citta-caitasika). Based on its ability to recall previous thoughts from subsequent ones, it is primarily described as self-cognition (svasaṃvedana). Based on the differences in what is recalled within its limits, it is primarily described as the power of conception (saṃjñā). Regarding those who have not yet attained freedom, it only traces back to the past, and is primarily described as the discriminating consciousness (vikalpa-vijñāna) that arises together with memory. Speaking comprehensively, all the mental factors associated with the sixth consciousness are capable of remembering. If it is a seed (bīja), it is the aforementioned capacity to imprint (vāsanā). Only the seeds formed by the maturation (vipāka) of imprints become the cause for later recollection. Alternatively, the seeds imprinted by the mental factors associated with the sixth consciousness, together with memory and conception, give rise to the present ability to remember. If one attains freedom, there are two states: meditative concentration (samādhi) and distraction (vikṣepa). In terms of the emptiness of existence (śūnyatā) in both conditioned (sāsrava) and unconditioned (anāsrava) states, only the sixth consciousness is involved. If it is the emptiness of phenomena (dharma-śūnyatā), then the seventh consciousness is also included. The seventh consciousness follows the guidance of the sixth, sharing the same objects, so there is no loss in recollection. In a state of distraction, since the faculties (indriya) are allowed to be used interchangeably, the five consciousnesses should also be able to perceive the past. Or, although they are used interchangeably, they can only perceive the present. In the state of Buddhahood, all eight consciousnesses are capable of remembering, but this is due to the imprints from the causal stage (hetu). No new seeds are produced in the fruition stage (phala). Therefore, the treatises only state that the ability to remember arises from the power of imprints, and do not say that each consciousness individually imprints and remembers. Explanation of action (karma) and result (phala). In Mahayana, the eight consciousnesses are used to distinguish between existence and non-existence. The first six possess both the ability to perform actions and to experience results. The seventh consciousness possesses neither. Because the seventh consciousness is neutral (avyākṛta), it does not perform actions; because it is defiled (kliṣṭa), it does not experience results. The eighth consciousness experiences results, being the result of maturation (vipākaphala). Because it is the result of maturation, it cannot perform actions; because it is neutral. The Vatsiputriya, Sammitiya, the original sutras, the Bhadrāyanika, and the Ṣaṇṇagarika schools all agree that the five consciousnesses cannot perform actions or experience results. The Mahāsāṃghika school and others agree that the six consciousnesses can both perform actions and experience results. The Sarvāstivāda school and others believe that the five consciousnesses experience results but do not perform actions, while the sixth consciousness can do both (this explanation is based on hearsay and lacks support from authoritative teachings). Narrating the views of the Samkhya school. Question: Why is touch considered the element of wind (Vāyu-dhātu), and the element of wind forms the skin sense organ (tvak-indriya), and the skin sense organ obtains touch but does not obtain wind? If so, what is the substance of touch? Answer: The element of wind is created by solidity, moisture, itching, hunger, etc., which are different from the substance of wind, as stated in the Vaisheshika school and others. Question: If the skin sense organ does not obtain wind, then which sense organ obtains wind? Answer: The mind-equanimity sense organ (citta-upekṣā-indriya) obtains it, not necessarily the skin sense organ. According to the above, the author of the Samkhya school should originally be Kapila, and the later various schools...
徒分成十八部。雨外道者即一部主。金七十論或雨眾中別人所造。何以故。準天親菩薩傳說云。佛滅后一千一百餘年有外道。頻阇訶婆娑。頻阇訶是山名。婆娑名住。以此外道住此山中因即為名。有一龍王名毗梨沙伽那。住此山下大池之中善僧佉論。此外道知欲就龍學。龍變其身作仙人狀住葉窟中。外道就學。成已求論欲決是非。到逾阇國聲王論鼓求覓論議。因金造論。欲至已期往住山所。以誦咒力召夜叉女。名曰稠林。從其乞愿。令我死後變身為石永不毀壞。神女許之。在石窟中捨命之後身變為石。因何此愿。其先龍王欲破滅此數論師義。從龍王乞持我身壞方使法滅。龍王心謂。身詎能久。因即許之。故今變身為石令久。是以數論法流至今。后陳那菩薩破斥其義作于比量書斯石上。流汗出聲不能救得。因此陳那所造因明。盛行四主聲振五天。蓋為於此。
有云劫此羅仙作金七十論。留身為石住余甘林似其誤也。然傳云千一百年後此外道出造七十論。天親出時外道已滅。即說天親亦千年后出。此傳似誤。何以故。真諦三藏中邊疏序九百年出。外道亦九百年前。不爾如何得釋彼論 有云涅槃經云。上古有仙名阇提首那。彼仙造論名三彌叉。此云觀察。廣明二十五諦。準此觀察即是智惠。與數論名同。數是智惠故。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：將佛弟子分成了十八個部派。『雨外道者』（不知道是誰）是一個部派的首領。《金七十論》或許是『雨』部中的其他人所著。為什麼這麼說呢？根據天親菩薩的傳說記載：佛陀滅度后一千一百多年，出現了一個外道，名叫『頻阇訶婆娑』（Pinjiahaposa，頻阇訶是山名，婆娑是居住的意思），因為這個外道居住在這座山中，所以就以此為名。有一條龍王名叫『毗梨沙伽那』（Vilisagana），住在這座山下的大池之中，精通僧佉論。這個外道知道后，想要去向龍王學習。龍王就變化身形，變成仙人的模樣，住在樹葉搭成的洞穴中。外道前去學習，學成之後，想要通過辯論來決斷是非。他到達逾阇國，敲響聲王論鼓，尋求辯論。因為用黃金來造論，想要到約定的日期前往山中。他用誦咒的力量召喚夜叉女，名叫『稠林』（Choulin），向她乞求願望，讓他死後變成石頭，永遠不會毀壞。神女答應了他。他在石窟中捨棄生命之後，身體就變成了石頭。為什麼要許下這樣的願望呢？因為之前的龍王想要破滅這個數論師的義理，所以從龍王那裡乞求，讓他持有自己的身體，毀壞它才能使數論的法滅亡。龍王心想，身體怎麼能長久存在呢？因此就答應了他。所以現在他變成石頭，是爲了讓數論的法能夠長久流傳至今。後來陳那菩薩駁斥了他的義理，在石頭上寫下比量書，石頭流汗發出聲音，也不能自救。因此陳那所造的因明，盛行四方，聲名遠播五天，大概就是因為這件事。 有人說『劫此羅仙』（Jieciluoxian）創作了《金七十論》，留下身體變成石頭，住在余甘林，這似乎是錯誤的。然而傳說中說一千一百年後，這個外道出現，創作了七十論。天親菩薩出現的時候，外道已經滅亡了。就說天親菩薩也是一千年后出現。這個傳說似乎是錯誤的。為什麼這麼說呢？真諦三藏的《中邊疏序》中說九百年後出現。外道也在九百年前。不然怎麼能夠解釋他的理論呢？有人說《涅槃經》中說，上古有一位仙人名叫『阇提首那』（Shetishouna），這位仙人創作了一部論，名叫『三彌叉』（Sanmixa，這裡翻譯為觀察），廣泛闡明了二十五諦。按照這個說法，觀察就是智慧，與數論的名字相同。數就是智慧的緣故。
【English Translation】 English version: The disciples of the Buddha were divided into eighteen schools. 'Yu Waidào Zhě' (雨外道者, meaning 'Rain Heretic', unknown person) was the leader of one of these schools. The 'Jin Qīshí Lùn' (金七十論, The Seventy Golden Treatises) was perhaps written by someone else within the 'Yu' school. Why is this so? According to the legends of Bodhisattva Vasubandhu: More than 1100 years after the Buddha's Parinirvana, there appeared a heretic named 'Pinjiahaposa' (頻阇訶婆娑, Pinjiahā is the name of a mountain, and Posa means 'dwelling'). Because this heretic lived in this mountain, he was named after it. There was a Dragon King named 'Vilisagana' (毗梨沙伽那) who lived in a large pond beneath this mountain and was well-versed in Samkhya philosophy. When this heretic learned of this, he wanted to study with the Dragon King. The Dragon King transformed himself into the form of an immortal and lived in a leaf-covered cave. The heretic went to study, and after completing his studies, he wanted to resolve right and wrong through debate. He arrived at the country of Yusha, struck the Sound King's debate drum, and sought debate. Because he used gold to create his treatise, he wanted to go to the mountain on the appointed date. He used the power of chanting mantras to summon a Yaksha woman named 'Choulin' (稠林), and asked her to grant him a wish: that after his death, he would transform into a stone and never be destroyed. The goddess agreed. After he gave up his life in the stone cave, his body turned into stone. Why did he make such a wish? Because the previous Dragon King wanted to destroy the meaning of this Samkhya philosopher, he begged the Dragon King to hold his body and destroy it to extinguish the Dharma of Samkhya. The Dragon King thought, 'How can a body last forever?' Therefore, he agreed. So now he has turned into stone so that the Dharma of Samkhya can be passed down for a long time. Later, Bodhisattva Dignāga refuted his meaning and wrote a treatise of inference on the stone. The stone sweated and made sounds, but could not save itself. Therefore, the Hetu-vidya (因明, science of logic) created by Dignāga flourished in all directions, and his fame spread throughout the five regions, probably because of this event. Some say that 'Jieciluoxian' (劫此羅仙) created the 'Jin Qīshí Lùn' (金七十論, The Seventy Golden Treatises), leaving his body as a stone and living in the Yu Gan Forest, which seems to be a mistake. However, the legend says that 1100 years later, this heretic appeared and created the seventy treatises. When Bodhisattva Vasubandhu appeared, the heretic had already perished. It is said that Bodhisattva Vasubandhu also appeared 1000 years later. This legend seems to be a mistake. Why is this so? The preface to the 'Madhyānta-vibhāga-bhāsya' (中邊疏序) by Paramārtha says that it appeared 900 years later. The heretic was also 900 years ago. Otherwise, how could he explain his theory? Some say that the 'Nirvana Sutra' says that in ancient times there was an immortal named 'Shetishouna' (阇提首那), who created a treatise called 'Sanmixa' (三彌叉, here translated as 'observation'), which extensively explained the twenty-five Tattvas (諦, truths). According to this statement, observation is wisdom, which is the same as the name of Samkhya. Number is the cause of wisdom.
即是本論。言阇提首那仙者。音訛異耳。即迦毗羅仙。
論。又三是別大等是總。下合破二十四諦有五段。如疏所科。一體相相例破。二變時如本破。三體隨相失破。四總別相例應非一三破。五各具三體破 第五段中初牒計。后破。破復有五。一總相應三破。二三事不殊破。三一德能成破。四體應非一破。五多種相違破。如次配疏次第科文。
論云既有三相寧見為一者。大乘自宗能所造色皆同一處。應體相別。云何見一。又如一境多生同變。亦應見異。云何見一 答不同彼。以非實故。自體虛疏。同業招故。故似於一。
問論云即應一根得一切境以三德成故者。佛法五根俱四大造凈色為體。何不一根得一切境 答各自種生四大疏造。不同於彼皆三德成。
敘勝論計中疏云以德顯地者。但為色．香．味．觸所依。以彼能依之德顯此地體。若闕少德即不名地。余水．火等準此應知。
以其神我能為覺．樂．苦等九法和合因緣。既和合已能起智相名我。亦以彼和合等相顯此神我。意實義同 問覺等九德不和合因緣名意者。豈彼意實。不是彼意根。若是意根。心起依之。何得說言不和合因緣耶 解云意望九德疏故。非能為彼和合因緣故名不和合因緣。不是合彼九德不和。
眼所取一依名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這就是本論所說的。提到阇提首那仙（Jatisurasena，一位仙人的名字）只是音譯上的差異，實際上指的就是迦毗羅仙（Kapila，數論的創始人）。 論中說，『三』指的是別相，『大』指的是總相。下面將結合疏文的科判，分五個部分來破斥二十四諦的觀點：第一，從體相和相例上進行破斥；第二，按照原本的方式破斥變異的時間；第三，破斥本體隨著現象而消失；第四，破斥總相和別相的相例，說明不應該是一和三；第五，破斥各自具備三種本體。在第五段中，首先陳述對方的觀點，然後進行破斥。破斥又分為五個方面：第一，破斥總相與三者的相應關係；第二，破斥三件事物沒有區別；第三，破斥一種德性就能成就；第四，破斥本體不應該是一；第五，破斥多種相違。按照順序對應疏文的科判。 論中說：『既然有三種相，怎麼能看作是一個呢？』大乘自宗認為，能造作和所造作的色法都在同一處，應該本體和現象是不同的，怎麼能看作是一個呢？又比如，同一個境界，很多眾生共同變現，也應該看到不同，怎麼能看作是一個呢？』回答說：『這和他們不同，因為不是真實的緣故，自體虛幻空疏，因為共同的業力招感，所以看起來像一個。』 問：論中說：『就應該一個根就能得到一切境界，因為由三種德性構成。』佛法認為，五根都是由四大造作的清凈色法為本體，為什麼不是一個根就能得到一切境界呢？答：『各自由不同的種子產生，四大疏遠地造作，和他們都由三種德性構成不同。』 敘述勝論派的觀點，疏文中說：『通過德性來顯示地，只是作為色、香、味、觸所依賴的基礎，通過這些能依賴的德性來顯示地的本體。如果缺少德性，就不能稱為地。其餘的水、火等，可以參照這個來理解。』 因為神我能夠作為覺、樂、苦等九種法和合的因緣，既然和合了，就能產生智相，稱為我。也通過這些和合等相來顯示這個神我。意思實際上是相同的。問：『覺等九種德性不和合的因緣稱為意，難道那個意是真實的嗎？不是那個意根嗎？如果是意根，心生起依賴它，怎麼能說是不和合的因緣呢？』解釋說：『意對於九種德性來說是疏遠的，不能作為它們和合的因緣，所以稱為不和合的因緣。不是說和合那九種德性是不和合。』 眼所取的一個所依被稱為...
【English Translation】 English version: This is what the present treatise discusses. The mention of Jatisurasena (Jatisurasena, the name of a sage) is merely a phonetic variation; it actually refers to Kapila (Kapila, the founder of Samkhya). The treatise states, 'The 'three' refers to the specific aspects, and 'great' refers to the general aspect.' Below, following the structure outlined in the commentary, we will refute the twenty-four categories (tattvas) in five sections: First, refutation based on the nature of reality and analogy; second, refutation of the changing times as originally presented; third, refutation of the disappearance of the substance along with the phenomena; fourth, refutation of the analogy between general and specific aspects, arguing that it should not be one and three; fifth, refutation of each possessing three substances. In the fifth section, the opponent's view is first stated, and then refuted. The refutation is further divided into five aspects: First, refutation of the correspondence between the general aspect and the three; second, refutation of the lack of distinction between the three things; third, refutation of one quality being able to accomplish everything; fourth, refutation of the substance not being one; fifth, refutation of various contradictions. These correspond to the structure of the commentary in order. The treatise states, 'Since there are three characteristics, how can they be seen as one?' The Mahayana school holds that the form (rupa) that creates and is created are in the same place. The substance and phenomena should be different. How can they be seen as one? Furthermore, if many beings jointly manifest the same realm, they should also be seen as different. How can they be seen as one?' The answer is, 'It is different from them because it is not real. Its own nature is illusory and sparse. Because of shared karma, it appears to be one.' Question: The treatise states, 'Then one sense organ should be able to perceive all objects because it is composed of three qualities.' In Buddhism, the five sense organs are all composed of pure form created by the four great elements. Why can't one sense organ perceive all objects? Answer: 'Each is produced from different seeds, and the four great elements create them sparsely. This is different from them, which are all composed of three qualities.' Describing the view of the Vaisheshika school, the commentary states, 'The earth is manifested through its qualities, serving only as the basis for color, smell, taste, and touch. The substance of earth is manifested through these qualities that depend on it. If a quality is lacking, it cannot be called earth. The same principle applies to water, fire, and so on.' Because the self (atman) can be the cause of the combination of the nine qualities such as awareness, pleasure, and suffering, once combined, it can produce the appearance of intelligence, which is called 'I'. This self is also manifested through these combinations. The meaning is actually the same. Question: 'The cause of the non-combination of the nine qualities such as awareness is called mind (manas). Is that mind real? Isn't it the root of mind? If it is the root of mind, the mind arises depending on it. How can it be said to be the cause of non-combination?' The explanation is, 'The mind is distant from the nine qualities and cannot be the cause of their combination, so it is called the cause of non-combination. It is not that the combination of those nine qualities is non-combination.' That which is taken by the eye, the one basis, is called...
色者。一極微之色依地大等。即為眼取故名為色。所餘準此。以彼五根即是五大。極微之色依根類大。為眼取。之名一依名色。
一微量唯二微果上者。以彼父母二微合生子微之上有此微量。以為根取最細之色。不與父母合者。以非根境故。
合之與離。但取初合名合。初離名離。已后即非。
遠覺所待為彼性者。以能取心勢遠取之名彼。
和合句者。令彼地等與德和合。與彼我別。我但令彼覺．樂．苦等九德和合。
取。謂先合後離據上下論。行即約在地等。
問何不立眼等識耶。答即覺等是。餘外道計亦多準此。
諸門分別中。一多分別者。四多五一。以我及意依一人說名之為一。若約多人即多數故。空．時．方三一切共有。更無多體名之為一。
言香唯地有準因門說故唯無常者。是彼本論因果門中辨故。
重性通常無常。若爾如何唯現量耶。唯父母微是常非現故。答論無文解。義準云通現．比無妨 又香唯無常。如何通非現。答香雖無常不廢但在子上。故通非現。
敘計中言多實有者。今更助解。實句之中軍林等假如論說。破彼實有為同喻故。此等少假。余多實故。
科文如疏 今助一科總分為二。初破實有。照彼實等非緣離識下。破現
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『色』（Rūpa）：一個極微之色（paramāṇu-rūpa）依賴於地大（pṛthivī-dhātu）等而存在，並且能夠被眼睛所感知，因此被稱為『色』。其餘的（香、味、觸）可以依此類推。因為這五根（indriya）即是五大（pañca mahābhūta）。極微之色依賴於與根相應的地大等，被眼睛所感知，這被稱為『依名色』（nāmarūpa）。
一個微量（aṇutva）只存在於兩個微果（aṇu-phala）之上，因為父母的兩個微塵結合產生子微塵，這個微量存在於子微塵之上。這個微量可以作為根（indriya）來感知最細微的色。不與父母微塵結合的微量，因為它不是根的境界。
『合』（saṃyoga）與『離』（viyoga）：只取最初的結合稱為『合』，最初的分離稱為『離』，之後的狀態就不是了。
『遠覺所待為彼性』（dūra-pratyaya-apekṣā tat-svabhāvatā）：以能夠取境的心（citta）的勢力遙遠地取境，這被稱為『彼』（tat）。
『和合句』（sāmagrī-vākya）：使地大等與德（guṇa）和合，與『我』（ātman）區分開來。『我』只是使覺（buddhi）、樂（sukha）、苦（duḥkha）等九德（nava guṇa）和合。
『取』（grahaṇa）：指的是先結合後分離，這是從上下關係來說的。『行』（gamana）指的是在地大等之中。
問：為什麼不建立眼識（cakṣu-vijñāna）等呢？答：因為覺等就是（識）。其餘外道的計度也可以依此類推。
在諸門分別中，『一多分別』（ekatva-anekatva vibhāga）：四多五一。因為『我』（ātman）和『意』（manas）依於一個人而說，所以稱為『一』。如果從多人的角度來說，就是多數。空（ākāśa）、時（kāla）、方（dik）三者一切共有，沒有多個實體，所以稱為『一』。
說香（gandha）只有地大（pṛthivī-dhātu）才有，這是根據因門（hetu-dvāra）的說法，所以說香是無常（anitya）的。這是在彼本論的因果門（hetu-phala-dvāra）中辨析的。
重性（gurutva）通常是無常的。如果是這樣，為什麼只是現量（pratyakṣa）呢？因為只有父母微塵是常（nitya）的，不是現量。答：論中沒有明確的解釋，但可以根據義理推斷，認為通於現量和比量（anumāna）沒有妨礙。又，香只是無常的，為什麼通於非現量（aparatyakṣa）呢？答：香雖然是無常的，但不妨礙它存在於子微塵之上，所以通於非現量。
在敘述計度中說『多實有』（bahutva satyam asti）的觀點，現在進一步解釋。在『實句』（satya-vākya）中，像軍隊、森林等只是假設的說法，是爲了破斥他們認為實有的觀點，作為同喻（sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta）的緣故。這些只是少部分是假設的，其餘大部分是真實的。
科文如疏（註釋），現在輔助一個科判，總分為二。首先是破斥實有（satyam asti），照應『彼實等非緣離識下』（tat satyam ādi apratyaya virahita vijñāna adhah）破斥現量（pratyakṣa）。
【English Translation】 English version 'Rūpa' (Form): A paramāṇu-rūpa (ultimate particle of form) depends on pṛthivī-dhātu (earth element) etc., and is perceived by the eye, hence it is called 'rūpa'. The rest (smell, taste, touch) can be inferred similarly. Because these five indriya (sense faculties) are the five mahābhūta (great elements). The ultimate particle of form depends on the earth element etc. corresponding to the sense faculty, and is perceived by the eye, this is called 'nāmarūpa' (name and form).
Aṇutva (minuteness) exists only on the two aṇu-phala (atomic results), because the two particles of the parents combine to produce the child particle, and this minuteness exists on the child particle. This minuteness can be used as an indriya (sense faculty) to perceive the finest form. The minuteness that does not combine with the parent particles, because it is not the realm of the sense faculty.
'Saṃyoga' (combination) and 'viyoga' (separation): Only the initial combination is called 'saṃyoga', and the initial separation is called 'viyoga', the subsequent states are not.
'Dūra-pratyaya-apekṣā tat-svabhāvatā' (depending on distant perception, that is its nature): Because the power of the mind (citta) that can grasp the object grasps the object remotely, this is called 'tat' (that).
'Sāmagrī-vākya' (aggregate sentence): To make the earth element etc. combine with guṇa (quality), and to distinguish it from 'ātman' (self). 'Ātman' only makes the nava guṇa (nine qualities) such as buddhi (cognition), sukha (pleasure), duḥkha (suffering) combine.
'Grahaṇa' (grasping): Refers to combining first and then separating, this is from the perspective of the upper and lower relationship. 'Gamana' (going) refers to being in the earth element etc.
Question: Why not establish cakṣu-vijñāna (eye-consciousness) etc.? Answer: Because buddhi (cognition) etc. are (consciousness). The calculations of other heretics can also be inferred similarly.
In the differentiation of all doors, 'ekatva-anekatva vibhāga' (differentiation of one and many): Four many and five one. Because 'ātman' (self) and 'manas' (mind) are spoken of based on one person, so it is called 'one'. If speaking from the perspective of many people, then it is many. Ākāśa (space), kāla (time), and dik (direction) are all shared, and there is no multiple entity, so it is called 'one'.
Saying that gandha (smell) only exists in pṛthivī-dhātu (earth element) is based on the statement of hetu-dvāra (causality), so it is said that smell is anitya (impermanent). This is distinguished in the hetu-phala-dvāra (causality-result) of that original treatise.
Gurutva (heaviness) is usually impermanent. If so, why is it only pratyakṣa (perception)? Because only the parent particles are nitya (permanent), not perception. Answer: There is no clear explanation in the treatise, but it can be inferred from the meaning that it is not an obstacle to be common to perception and anumāna (inference). Also, smell is only impermanent, how does it pass to aparatyakṣa (non-perception)? Answer: Although smell is impermanent, it does not prevent it from existing on the child particle, so it passes to non-perception.
In the narration of calculations, saying that 'bahutva satyam asti' (multiplicity is real), now further explain. In the 'satya-vākya' (real sentence), like the army, the forest, etc. are just hypothetical statements, in order to refute their view that it is real, as a sādharmya-dṛṣṭānta (example of similarity). These are only a small part of the hypothesis, and the rest are mostly real.
The section headings are like the commentary, now assist with a section judgment, divided into two in total. The first is to refute satyam asti (reality exists), corresponding to 'tat satyam ādi apratyaya virahita vijñāna adhah' (that reality etc. is not without cause, consciousness below) to refute pratyakṣa (perception).
量得。依敘計中故作二科。
論。又彼所執地水火風應非有礙實句義攝身根所觸故等者。要集云。有說地水火風父母極微非現量得。子微已上是現量得。下破順世及勝論中雲。極微聚集足成根境何用果為。故知爾也。有釋實等五句是現量境。和合非現。故下破云。彼許實等現量所得以理推徴尚非實有。況彼自許和合句義非現量得。而可實有。由此證知。父母極微亦現量得 有解云。今謂二微所生子微亦非現量得。十句論說。三微所生子方粗得合。下說粗色量德合。為故乃色根得 集曰。今謂有釋為正。謂彼宗中不云色根所取方是現量境。有現量境未必色根得。乃至云。有說引破順世中。多因極微合應非細足成根境。何用果為。由此證知。子微已上是色根境。父母非者此破色根境。未說現量。引非色根境證非現量得。于理太疏。
今詳此意。云有說疏未悟至理。何者彼十句論云。謂至實色等根等合時有了相生名為現量。既雲根等合時有了相生名為現量。明知子微已上方與根合。故子微已上名為現量是彼宗計。引下破順世等救。云由果多分合故成粗。多因極微合應非細足成根境。意取多果合故成粗為色根境。故取此證子微已上是現量境。於何理疏。妄說為過。若以有釋為正。五句現得彼此極成。說父母微是我
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
量得。依照敘述和計算，故分為兩科。
論：又他們所執著的地、水、火、風，應不是有礙的實體，因為它們是身根所觸及的。正如《要集》所說：『有人說，地、水、火、風的父母極微不是現量所得，子微以上才是現量所得。』下面破斥順世派和勝論派時說：『極微聚集就足以形成根和境，哪裡還需要果呢？』由此可知也是這個意思。有人解釋說，實體等五句是現量之境，和合不是現量。所以下面破斥說：『他們承認實體等是現量所得，但用理智推測尚且不是實有，何況他們自己承認和合句義不是現量所得，又怎麼能是實有呢？』由此可以證明，父母極微也是現量所得。有人解釋說，現在認為二微所生的子微也不是現量所得。《十句論》說：『三微所生的子微才粗大，可以結合。』下面說粗色、量、德的結合，是因為色根才能得到。』《要集》說：『現在認為這個解釋是正確的。』因為他們的宗派中沒有說色根所取才是現量境，有現量境未必是色根所得。』乃至說：『有人引用破斥順世派的觀點，認為多數極微的結合不應該是細微的，足以形成根和境，哪裡還需要果呢？』由此可以證明，子微以上是色根之境，父母極微不是色根之境。這裡破斥的是色根之境，並沒有說現量。引用非色根之境來證明不是現量所得，在道理上太疏遠了。
現在詳細考察這個意思，認為『有人說』的疏解沒有領悟到至理。為什麼呢？因為《十句論》說：『當實體、色等與根等結合時，有了相的產生，就叫做現量。』既然說根等結合時有了相的產生，就叫做現量，那麼很明顯子微以上才能與根結合。所以子微以上叫做現量，是他們的宗派的觀點。引用下面破斥順世派等的觀點來救助，說因為果的大部分結合所以形成粗大，多數極微的結合不應該是細微的，足以形成根和境。意思是取多數果的結合所以形成粗大，作為色根之境。所以取這個來證明子微以上是現量境，在什麼道理上疏遠了呢？妄加評論為過失。如果以『有人解釋』為正確，五句是現量所得，彼此都認可。說父母極微是我的
【English Translation】 English version:
Measurable. According to narration and calculation, it is therefore divided into two categories.
Treatise: Furthermore, what they hold to be earth, water, fire, and wind should not be obstructive entities, because they are touched by the body's senses. As the 'Yaoji' (Essentials Collection) says: 'Some say that the parent atoms (parents ji wei) of earth, water, fire, and wind are not obtained by direct perception (xian liang), but the child atoms (zi wei) and above are obtained by direct perception.' Below, when refuting the Shunshi (Materialist) and Sheng Lun (Vaisheshika) schools, it says: 'The aggregation of atoms is sufficient to form the root and the object, so what need is there for the result?' From this, it can be known that this is also the meaning. Some explain that the five sentences of entity (shi) etc. are the realm of direct perception, and combination (he he) is not direct perception. Therefore, the following refutation says: 'They admit that entities etc. are obtained by direct perception, but even with rational deduction, they are not actually existent. How much more so since they themselves admit that the meaning of the combination sentence is not obtained by direct perception, how can it be actually existent?' From this, it can be proven that the parent atoms are also obtained by direct perception. Some explain that now it is considered that the child atoms produced by two atoms are also not obtained by direct perception. The 'Ten Sentence Treatise' says: 'The child atoms produced by three atoms are coarse enough to be combined.' Below it says that the combination of coarse color, quantity, and quality is because the color sense (se gen) can obtain it.' The 'Yaoji' says: 'Now it is considered that this explanation is correct.' Because in their sect, it is not said that what is taken by the color sense is the realm of direct perception, and what is in the realm of direct perception is not necessarily obtained by the color sense.' And even says: 'Some quote the refutation of the Shunshi school, believing that the combination of many atoms should not be subtle, and is sufficient to form the root and the object, so what need is there for the result?' From this, it can be proven that the child atoms and above are the realm of the color sense, and the parent atoms are not the realm of the color sense. Here, what is refuted is the realm of the color sense, and direct perception is not mentioned. Quoting what is not the realm of the color sense to prove that it is not obtained by direct perception is too far-fetched in reasoning.
Now, examining this meaning in detail, it is considered that the commentary of 'some say' has not understood the ultimate truth. Why? Because the 'Ten Sentence Treatise' says: 'When entities, colors, etc. combine with the senses etc., the arising of a characteristic is called direct perception.' Since it is said that when the senses etc. combine, the arising of a characteristic is called direct perception, then it is obvious that only the child atoms and above can combine with the senses. Therefore, calling the child atoms and above direct perception is the view of their sect. Quoting the refutation of the Shunshi school etc. to help, saying that because the majority of the result combines, it becomes coarse, and the combination of many atoms should not be subtle, and is sufficient to form the root and the object. The meaning is to take the combination of the majority of the result to form coarseness as the realm of the color sense. Therefore, taking this to prove that the child atoms and above are the realm of direct perception, in what reasoning is it far-fetched? Falsely commenting as a fault. If 'some explain' is considered correct, the five sentences are obtained by direct perception, and are mutually recognized. Saying that the parent atoms are mine
現境準何文說。十句論中但說覺德為現比故。又云根等合時有了相生名為現量。不說神我為現量體。復無文說父母極微我現量得。若據總相有釋不違。若委細論有說為好。
論。彼所執有至如實德等。疏及樞要俱云法自相相違因過。以彼本量云我宗有性。定離實句有別自性許非無故如德．業等。此量不定。實為異喻許非無因於實轉故。更有餘過。思準可知。今且與作法自相相違云。汝有性。離實句外無別自性。許非無故。猶如實句 此量之中雖有他不定。德．業句等他許非無。因於彼轉非自．共許。故非不定 又就破他於他不定亦可為過。故樞要判但是比量相違過攝。若準疏判云。應離實等八句之外無別自性。即無不定 要集云準相違量云有性。離實外無別自性。許非無故。猶如實句者。當比量相違。此意樞要自已判訖。要集出過云既別用喻如何相違同前不定 此說亦非。何者設別用喻亦是相違。如因明論法自相相違因外。立聲常。所作性故。猶如虛空。作相違云。聲是無常。所作性故。譬如瓶等。此因用舊同喻改之。今者此量因亦用舊但改同喻。與因明同。云既別用喻如何相違者。是妄出過。不善因明也。
論云。若離實等至如畢竟無等。樞要云。是有法自相相違過 又云。今舉無法為喻亦成決定相違
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：現量（Pratyaksha，直接認知）應該如何解釋？《十句論》（Dashapadartha-shastra）中只說覺德（Buddhi-guna，知覺屬性）是現量，因為它是直接的。又說，根（indriya，感官）等結合時，有了相（lakshana，表象）產生，這叫做現量。沒有說神我（Atman，靈魂）是現量的本體。也沒有文獻說父母的極微（paramanu，最小微粒）能被我的現量所認知。如果根據總相（samanya-lakshana，普遍特徵）來解釋，就不違背。如果詳細討論，有其他說法會更好。
論：他們所執著的有（bhava，存在），乃至如實德（yathartha-guna，真實屬性）等。《瑜伽師地論略纂》（Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika）和《瑜伽師地論略纂樞要記》（Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-khyapanika）都說這是法自相相違因（dharma-svabhava-virodhi-hetu，自性矛盾的理由）的過失。因為他們的本量（pramana，論證）說：『我宗（svasiddhanta，自宗）有性（bhavatva，存在性），一定與實句（dravya-padartha，實體範疇）分離，有別的自性（svabhava，自性），因為允許不是沒有，如德（guna，屬性）、業（karma，活動）等。』這個量（pramana，論證）是不定的（anaikantika，不確定）。實（dravya，實體）是異喻（vaidharmya-drshtanta，反例），允許不是沒有，因為在實（dravya，實體）上轉變。還有其他的過失，思考推斷可知。現在且與他們作法自相相違（dharma-svabhava-virodha，自性矛盾）的論證：『汝（你們的）有性（bhavatva，存在性），在實句（dravya-padartha，實體範疇）之外沒有別的自性（svabhava，自性），因為允許不是沒有，猶如實句（dravya-padartha，實體範疇）。』這個量（pramana，論證）之中，雖有他不定（anya-anaikantika，對他不定）的過失，德（guna，屬性）、業（karma，活動）等句（padartha，範疇），他們允許不是沒有，因為在它們上面轉變，不是自（svayam，自己）、共（ubhaya，共同）許的，所以不是不定（anaikantika，不確定）。又就破他（parapaksha-dusana，破斥他人）來說，對他不定（anya-anaikantika，對他不定）也可以作為過失。所以《瑜伽師地論略纂樞要記》（Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-khyapanika）判斷說，這只是比量相違（anumana-virodha，推理矛盾）的過失所攝。如果按照《瑜伽師地論略纂》（Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika）的判斷說，應該在離開實（dravya，實體）等八句（ashta-padartha，八種範疇）之外沒有別的自性（svabhava，自性），就沒有不定（anaikantika，不確定）的過失。《瑜伽師地論略纂要集》（Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-sangraha）說，按照相違量（virodha-pramana，矛盾論證）說：『有性（bhavatva，存在性），離開實（dravya，實體）之外沒有別的自性（svabhava，自性），因為允許不是沒有，猶如實句（dravya-padartha，實體範疇）。』這應當是比量相違（anumana-virodha，推理矛盾）。這個意思《瑜伽師地論略纂樞要記》（Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-khyapanika）自己已經判斷完畢。《瑜伽師地論略纂要集》（Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-sangraha）指出過失說，既然分別使用比喻，如何相違？如同之前的不定（anaikantika，不確定）。』這種說法也是不對的。為什麼呢？假設分別使用比喻，也是相違（virodha，矛盾）的。如因明論（Hetu-vidya-shastra，因明學）中，法自相相違因（dharma-svabhava-virodhi-hetu，自性矛盾的理由）之外，立聲常（shabda-nitya，聲音常住），所作性故（krtakatva，人為性故），猶如虛空（akasha，虛空）。作相違（virodha，矛盾）的論證說：『聲是無常（shabda-anitya，聲音無常），所作性故（krtakatva，人為性故），譬如瓶等。』這個因（hetu，理由）使用舊的，同喻（sadharmya-drshtanta，同例）改之。現在這個量（pramana，論證）因（hetu，理由）也使用舊的，但改同喻（sadharmya-drshtanta，同例），與因明（Hetu-vidya，因明學）相同。說『既然分別使用比喻，如何相違』，是妄出過失，不善於因明（Hetu-vidya，因明學）啊。
論說：如果離開實（dravya，實體）等，乃至如畢竟無（atyanta-abhava，絕對不存在）等。《瑜伽師地論略纂樞要記》（Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-khyapanika）說：是有法自相相違（asti-dharma-svabhava-virodha，存在屬性自相矛盾）的過失。又說：現在舉無法（abhava，不存在）為比喻，也成為決定相違（niscita-virodha，確定矛盾）。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: How should 'Pratyaksha' (direct cognition) be explained in the present context? The 'Dashapadartha-shastra' (Treatise on Ten Categories) only states that 'Buddhi-guna' (the attribute of intellect, i.e., cognition) is 'Pratyaksha' because it is direct. It also says that when 'indriya' (sense organs) and others combine, and a 'lakshana' (characteristic, appearance) arises, it is called 'Pratyaksha'. It does not say that 'Atman' (the self, soul) is the entity of 'Pratyaksha'. Nor is there any text stating that the 'paramanu' (ultimate particles) of parents can be cognized by my 'Pratyaksha'. If explained according to 'samanya-lakshana' (general characteristics), it is not contradictory. If discussed in detail, other explanations would be better.
Treatise: Their asserted 'bhava' (existence), up to 'yathartha-guna' (true qualities) and so on. Both the 'Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika' (Concise Commentary on the Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and the 'Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-khyapanika' (Elucidation of the Concise Commentary on the Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) state that this is the fault of 'dharma-svabhava-virodhi-hetu' (reason contradicting its own nature). Because their 'pramana' (proof) states: 'My school (svasiddhanta) asserts that 'bhavatva' (the state of existence) is necessarily separate from 'dravya-padartha' (the category of substance), having a distinct 'svabhava' (nature), because it is permissible that it is not non-existent, like 'guna' (qualities), 'karma' (actions), etc.' This 'pramana' (proof) is 'anaikantika' (uncertain). 'Dravya' (substance) is a 'vaidharmya-drshtanta' (negative example), it is permissible that it is not non-existent, because it transforms in 'dravya' (substance). There are other faults that can be understood through reasoning. Now, let us present them with an argument contradicting its own nature ('dharma-svabhava-virodha'): 'Your 'bhavatva' (state of existence) has no distinct 'svabhava' (nature) outside of 'dravya-padartha' (the category of substance), because it is permissible that it is not non-existent, just like 'dravya-padartha' (the category of substance).' Although there is the fault of 'anya-anaikantika' (uncertainty for others) in this 'pramana' (proof), the categories ('padartha') of 'guna' (qualities), 'karma' (actions), etc., are admitted by them as not non-existent, because they transform in them, and are not admitted by self ('svayam') or both ('ubhaya'), so it is not 'anaikantika' (uncertain). Furthermore, in refuting others ('parapaksha-dusana'), 'anya-anaikantika' (uncertainty for others) can also be taken as a fault. Therefore, the 'Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-khyapanika' (Elucidation of the Concise Commentary on the Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) judges that this is only included in the fault of 'anumana-virodha' (contradiction of inference). If judged according to the 'Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika' (Concise Commentary on the Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), there should be no distinct 'svabhava' (nature) outside of the eight categories ('ashta-padartha') such as 'dravya' (substance), and there would be no fault of 'anaikantika' (uncertainty). The 'Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-sangraha' (Compendium of the Concise Commentary on the Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) states, according to the contradictory proof ('virodha-pramana'): ''Bhavatva' (state of existence) has no distinct 'svabhava' (nature) outside of 'dravya' (substance), because it is permissible that it is not non-existent, just like 'dravya-padartha' (the category of substance).' This should be a contradiction of inference ('anumana-virodha'). The 'Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-khyapanika' (Elucidation of the Concise Commentary on the Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) has already judged this meaning. The 'Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-sangraha' (Compendium of the Concise Commentary on the Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) points out the fault, saying, 'Since different metaphors are used, how can it be contradictory? Like the previous uncertainty ('anaikantika').' This statement is also incorrect. Why? Even if different metaphors are used, it is still contradictory ('virodha'). For example, in 'Hetu-vidya-shastra' (the science of logic), outside of the reason contradicting its own nature ('dharma-svabhava-virodhi-hetu'), it is established that sound is eternal ('shabda-nitya'), because of being produced ('krtakatva'), like space ('akasha'). The contradictory ('virodha') argument states: 'Sound is impermanent ('shabda-anitya'), because of being produced ('krtakatva'), like a pot, etc.' This reason ('hetu') uses the old one, and the positive example ('sadharmya-drshtanta') is changed. Now, this 'pramana' (proof) also uses the old reason ('hetu'), but changes the positive example ('sadharmya-drshtanta'), which is the same as in 'Hetu-vidya' (the science of logic). Saying 'Since different metaphors are used, how can it be contradictory?' is a false fault, and not skilled in 'Hetu-vidya' (the science of logic).
The treatise states: If separated from 'dravya' (substance), up to 'atyanta-abhava' (absolute non-existence), etc. The 'Yogacharyabhumi-sutrabhashya-laghutika-khyapanika' (Elucidation of the Concise Commentary on the Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) states: It is the fault of contradicting the nature of existence ('asti-dharma-svabhava-virodha'). It also states: Now, taking non-existence ('abhava') as a metaphor also becomes a definite contradiction ('niscita-virodha').
。即如論說。
言若離有法至有別無性。樞要云。第三第四俱比量相違。如疏文述。要集云。有說量云。汝第十句無法之外。應別立性。因云除大有等六句之外有無二法互相違故。如實．德．業。欲簡不定因云除大有等六句 有釋量云。五種無句應別有性宗。有無二中隨一攝故。如實．德等 又量汝說實等。應無別性。有無二中隨一攝故。如畢竟無。要集但舉二家不知得失 準有釋前量有不定過。五種無句為如實等三句外應別有性。為如大有等三外不別有性 要集又云。有說並云無性體非有。無上不立無性。有法體非無。何須別立有性。彼若救言。有法雖非無不自有故須有有。亦應無法不自無無法之外別立無(此即相望)。集今解云。有法體非無。有故有有性。無法體非有。無故無無性。或可。反對云。有．無以相反。無法無無性。有．無以相對。有法有有性。此答恒別。如何破他。故今論中但立量破。非要須並 今謂設並亦能破他。且如集解不能離過。何者若云無法體非有。無故無無性。亦應有法體自有。有故無有性。有法體自有。有故立有性。無法體是無。無故立無性。反對之中有。無以相對。有法立有性。無有以相違。無法立無性。恒不離過。
論云。勿此亦非實德業性者。作有法自相相違因破。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
正如論述所說。
如果說離開『有法』（dharmin，具有屬性的事物）就有了『有別無性』（事物沒有獨特的自性）。《樞要》中說，第三和第四種情況都與比量（anumāna，推理）相違背，就像疏文中所述。《要集》中說，有人提出量式：你的第十句『無法』（abhāva，不存在）之外，應該另外建立一個『性』（svabhāva，自性）。因為除了『大有』（mahābhāva，絕對存在）等六句之外，『有』（bhāva，存在）和『無』（abhāva，不存在）兩種法互相違背，就像『實』（dravya，實體）、『德』（guṇa，屬性）、『業』（karma，活動）。爲了簡別不定因，所以說除了『大有』等六句。
有人解釋量式說：五種『無』的語句應該另外具有『性』，因為它們被『有』和『無』中的任何一個所包含，就像『實』、『德』等。又一個量式說：你所說的『實』等，應該沒有獨特的『性』，因為它們被『有』和『無』中的任何一個所包含，就像『畢竟無』（atyantābhāva，絕對不存在）。《要集》只是列舉了兩家的觀點，不知道它們的得失。
按照另一種解釋，前面的量式有不定過的錯誤。五種『無』的語句，對於『如實』等三句之外，應該另外具有『性』；對於『如大有』等三句之外，不應該另外具有『性』。《要集》又說，有人還說『無性』的體不是『有』，因為無上不建立『無性』；『有法』的體不是『無』，為什麼需要另外建立『有性』？如果他們辯解說，『有法』雖然不是『無』，但不自己存在，所以需要『有有』（bhāva-bhāva，存在的存在）；也應該說『無法』不自己『無』，所以在『無法』之外另外建立『無』（這是一種相對的觀點）。《集》現在的解釋是，『有法』的體不是『無』，因為『有』所以有『有性』；『無法』的體不是『有』，因為『無』所以沒有『無性』。或者可以反駁說，『有』和『無』是相反的，『無法』沒有『無性』；『有』和『無』是相對的，『有法』有『有性』。這種回答總是存在差別，如何駁倒他人？所以現在的論中只是建立量式來駁斥，不一定要全部採用。
現在我認為，即使全部採用也能駁倒他人。例如《集解》不能避免過失。為什麼呢？如果說『無法』的體不是『有』，因為『無』所以沒有『無性』，也應該說『有法』的體自己存在，因為『有』所以沒有『有性』。『有法』的體自己存在，因為『有』所以建立『有性』；『無法』的體是『無』，因為『無』所以建立『無性』。在反駁之中，『有』和『無』是相對的，『有法』建立『有性』；『有』和『無』是相違的，『無法』建立『無性』。總是不能避免過失。
論中說：不要認為這也不是『實』、『德』、『業』的『性』。這是用『有法』的自相矛盾作為因來駁斥。
【English Translation】 English version:
As the discussion states.
If it is said that apart from 'dharmin' (that which possesses attributes), there is 'having a distinct non-nature' (things do not have a unique self-nature). The 'Essentials' says that the third and fourth cases both contradict inference (anumāna), as described in the commentary. The 'Collection' says that some propose the following argument: Your tenth statement, 'non-existence' (abhāva), should have a separate 'nature' (svabhāva) established. Because apart from the six statements such as 'absolute existence' (mahābhāva), the two dharmas, 'existence' (bhāva) and 'non-existence' (abhāva), are mutually contradictory, like 'substance' (dravya), 'quality' (guṇa), and 'action' (karma). To distinguish the uncertain reason, it is said that it excludes the six statements such as 'absolute existence'.
Some explain the argument as: The five types of 'non-existence' statements should have a separate 'nature', because they are included in either 'existence' or 'non-existence', like 'substance', 'quality', etc. Another argument says: What you say about 'substance', etc., should not have a distinct 'nature', because they are included in either 'existence' or 'non-existence', like 'absolute non-existence' (atyantābhāva). The 'Collection' only lists the views of the two schools, without knowing their merits and demerits.
According to another explanation, the previous argument has the fault of being an uncertain reason. For the five types of 'non-existence' statements, apart from the three statements such as 'like substance', they should have a separate 'nature'; apart from the three statements such as 'like absolute existence', they should not have a separate 'nature'. The 'Collection' also says that some also say that the entity of 'non-nature' is not 'existence', because the unsurpassed does not establish 'non-nature'; the entity of 'dharmin' is not 'non-existence', why is it necessary to separately establish 'existence-nature'? If they argue that although 'dharmin' is not 'non-existence', it does not exist by itself, so it needs 'existence-existence' (bhāva-bhāva); it should also be said that 'non-existence' does not itself 'not exist', so apart from 'non-existence', 'non-existence' is separately established (this is a relative view). The 'Collection' now explains that the entity of 'dharmin' is not 'non-existence', because of 'existence' there is 'existence-nature'; the entity of 'non-existence' is not 'existence', because of 'non-existence' there is no 'non-existence-nature'. Or it can be countered that 'existence' and 'non-existence' are opposite, 'non-existence' has no 'non-existence-nature'; 'existence' and 'non-existence' are relative, 'dharmin' has 'existence-nature'. This answer always has differences, how to refute others? So the current treatise only establishes arguments to refute, not necessarily adopting all of them.
Now I think that even if all are adopted, others can be refuted. For example, the 'Collected Explanations' cannot avoid faults. Why? If it is said that the entity of 'non-existence' is not 'existence', because of 'non-existence' there is no 'non-existence-nature', it should also be said that the entity of 'dharmin' exists by itself, because of 'existence' there is no 'existence-nature'. The entity of 'dharmin' exists by itself, because of 'existence' 'existence-nature' is established; the entity of 'non-existence' is 'non-existence', because of 'non-existence' 'non-existence-nature' is established. In the refutation, 'existence' and 'non-existence' are relative, 'dharmin' establishes 'existence-nature'; 'existence' and 'non-existence' are contradictory, 'non-existence' establishes 'non-existence-nature'. Faults can never be avoided.
The treatise says: Do not think that this is also not the 'nature' of 'substance', 'quality', and 'action'. This is refuted by using the self-contradiction of 'dharmin' as the reason.
云非實．德．業性者。意云。非實．德等同異生。以異實等故。如德．業。德．業異實不是同異性故。
論云。又緣實智下。破能緣智。疏有二解假合生故。初解緣多法。后解智起假藉多緣。不障能緣緣彼一多。若依初解。但破總緣不破別緣。后解通破。所緣之境雖有一多。能緣之智要藉多緣云假合生 要集云。今謂初師后解亦有不定。緣實現智為如有．和合智假合生故是緣實智。為如緣德．業．同異智。假合生故非緣實智 今詳此說妄出彼過。何者若約總緣。緣有．和合即亦緣實。即在法中正是所破無不定過。若破別緣緣有．和合。雖假合生即不緣實亦無不定。作兩解者前約境多智方得起名假合生。后約因多智方得生名假合生。非避不定。
疏云。其眼識等。雖緣色等亦假合生。非緣實等無不定過 有云。亦有自違。緣色等智應非色智。假合生。故如聲等智 集云。此亦非過。謂內破外實．德等攝四大色等。故非自違蘊等所攝色等之法。若外人作此比量破者。彼即有違世間．現量．自教等過。故不得立也 今謂不爾。設執緣于離識蘊等亦同此破。今此論意但破離識實有諸法。若外難云緣離識色等智應非現量。即犯相符。若但云緣色等智應。非緣色等現量智攝。亦有一分相符及自違失。若別作量即非前量
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『云非實．德．業性者』，意思是說，『非實』、『德』等概念的產生，與實體（實）的產生方式不同。因為『德』、『業』與實體不同，它們不具有與實體相同或相異的性質。就像『德』和『業』一樣，它們與實體不同，因此不具有與實體相同或相異的性質。
論中說：『又緣實智下』，這是爲了破斥能緣之智。疏中有兩種解釋，認為能緣之智是假合而生。第一種解釋認為，能緣之智緣于多種法；第二種解釋認為，智的生起是假借多種因緣。這兩種解釋都不會妨礙能緣之智緣於一個或多個對象。如果按照第一種解釋，那麼只是破斥了總的緣，而沒有破斥個別的緣；第二種解釋則全部破斥。即使所緣之境有一個或多個，能緣之智也需要藉助多種因緣，所以說是假合而生。要集說：現在我認為，第一種解釋和第二種解釋都存在不確定的情況。緣于實體和智的結合，就像緣于有和合之智，因為是假合而生，所以是緣于實體之智；又像緣于『德』、『業』、『同異』之智，因為是假合而生，所以不是緣于實體之智。現在詳細分析這種說法，是妄加指責對方的過失。為什麼呢？如果從總的緣來說，緣于『有』和『和合』，也就是緣于實體，這正是對方所要破斥的，不存在不確定的過失。如果破斥個別的緣，緣于『有』和『和合』，即使是假合而生，也不是緣于實體，也不存在不確定的情況。之所以有兩種解釋，是因為前一種解釋認為，只有當境多的時候，智才能生起，才能稱為假合而生；后一種解釋認為，只有當因多的時候，智才能生起，才能稱為假合而生。這並不是爲了避免不確定性。
疏中說：『其眼識等，雖緣色等亦假合生，非緣實等無不定過』。有人說：這也存在自相矛盾的情況，緣於色等的智，應該不是色智，因為是假合而生，就像緣于聲等的智一樣。集說：這也不是過失。因為內部破斥外部的實體、『德』等，包含了四大色等，所以不存在自相矛盾的情況。蘊等所包含的色等之法，如果外人以此比量來破斥，那麼他們就犯了違背世間常識、現量、自教等過失，所以不能成立。現在我認為不是這樣。假設執著于緣于離識的蘊等，也會遇到同樣的破斥。現在這篇論的意圖只是破斥離開識而實有的諸法。如果外人提出質疑說，緣于離識的色等之智，應該不是現量，那就犯了相符的錯誤。如果只是說，緣於色等的智，應該不是緣於色等的現量智所包含的，也存在一部分相符和自相矛盾的缺失。如果另外作比量，那就不是前面的比量了。
【English Translation】 English version 'Yun fei shi. De. Ye xing zhe' means that the emergence of concepts such as 'fei shi' (non-entity), 'de' (virtue), etc., is different from the way entities ('shi') arise. Because 'de' and 'ye' (karma) are different from entities, they do not possess the same or different properties as entities. Just like 'de' and 'ye', they are different from entities and therefore do not have the same or different properties as entities.
The treatise states: 'You yuan shi zhi xia' (Furthermore, regarding the wisdom that cognizes reality), this is to refute the wisdom that can cognize. The commentary has two interpretations, considering that the wisdom that can cognize arises from a false combination. The first interpretation believes that the wisdom that can cognize cognizes multiple dharmas; the second interpretation believes that the arising of wisdom is borrowed from multiple causes and conditions. Neither of these interpretations prevents the wisdom that can cognize from cognizing one or more objects. If according to the first interpretation, then only the general cognition is refuted, and the individual cognition is not refuted; the second interpretation refutes all. Even if the object of cognition has one or more, the wisdom that can cognize also needs to rely on multiple causes and conditions, so it is said to arise from a false combination. Yao Ji (Essentials Collected) says: Now I think that both the first and second interpretations have uncertain situations. Cognizing the combination of entity and wisdom, like cognizing the wisdom of existence and combination, because it arises from a false combination, it is the wisdom that cognizes the entity; also like cognizing the wisdom of 'de', 'ye', 'sameness and difference', because it arises from a false combination, it is not the wisdom that cognizes the entity. Now, analyzing this statement in detail, it is falsely accusing the other party of faults. Why? If from the general cognition, cognizing 'existence' and 'combination' is also cognizing the entity, which is exactly what the other party wants to refute, and there is no uncertain fault. If refuting individual cognition, cognizing 'existence' and 'combination', even if it arises from a false combination, it is not cognizing the entity, and there is no uncertain situation. The reason why there are two interpretations is because the former interpretation believes that only when there are many objects can wisdom arise and be called arising from a false combination; the latter interpretation believes that only when there are many causes can wisdom arise and be called arising from a false combination. This is not to avoid uncertainty.
The commentary states: 'Qi yan shi deng, sui yuan se deng yi jia he sheng, fei yuan shi deng wu bu ding guo' (The eye consciousness, etc., although cognizing form, etc., also arises from a false combination, not cognizing reality, etc., without uncertain faults). Someone says: This also has self-contradictory situations, the wisdom that cognizes form, etc., should not be form wisdom, because it arises from a false combination, just like the wisdom that cognizes sound, etc. Ji says: This is also not a fault. Because the internal refutation of external entities, 'de', etc., includes the four great forms, etc., so there is no self-contradictory situation. The dharmas of form, etc., contained in the skandhas, etc., if outsiders use this analogy to refute, then they commit the faults of violating worldly common sense, direct perception, self-teaching, etc., so it cannot be established. Now I think it is not like this. Suppose clinging to cognizing the skandhas, etc., that are separate from consciousness, will also encounter the same refutation. Now the intention of this treatise is only to refute the dharmas that are real and exist separately from consciousness. If outsiders raise questions saying that the wisdom that cognizes form, etc., that is separate from consciousness, should not be direct perception, then they commit the error of being consistent. If only saying that the wisdom that cognizes form, etc., should not be included in the direct perception wisdom that cognizes form, etc., there is also a part of consistency and self-contradictory defects. If another analogy is made, then it is not the previous analogy.
過。
論云。若法能生必非常故者。問若許余法為能生因。違彼宗計。執一因故。無餘能生即闕同喻 其如何等能生無常 答天是親能生因。余是助緣故得為喻 若爾云何得為因耶。因生緣生二種別故 答準因明法。因不應分別。如所作性。此因及緣俱能生故。西明釋云。唯一常因能生諸法。更無餘常能為因生。云一因論。不障無常能生諸法。如勝論師許六句實。不妨于中軍林等假 二解俱有違文之失。執一因故。下轉計中雲待欲或緣。難云待欲或緣方能生者違一因論若他許有餘緣能生及無常因。如何可得作斯難耶。此中但是以彼世間共許能生之法以為同喻 又解本執自在體是一．常能生諸法。不假余法助方能生名為一因。不障余法亦能為因。今論主難云。體既常．遍應一切處時能生諸法。遂轉計云。自在待余或欲及緣方能生果。論主云。若爾即違本一．常因猶能生果。待欲．緣故違一因論。
破順世中雲。若有方分應假非實。若無方分如心．心所。準彼本計。唯有四大而亦造心。云如心．心所闕無同喻。外云清妙四大造心無礙。粗大造色故礙。二云雖唯造色。準理亦合有心．心所。如數論師。三約勝論有心．心所說為同喻。
疏云。此但應言如二極微量以三微果等因非極微故。此意以第三子微果
量等於因。然是粗色不是極微。
破小乘中初破色聚。色聚中復三。一障礙有對。二境界有對。三所緣有對 言障礙有對者。謂五根．五塵而相對礙 言境界有對者。謂十二界及法界少分。十二界者謂七心界及五根界。法界少分皆有能取境功能故。而為境相所拘令根及心不餘轉故名境界有對 言所緣有對者。謂七心界及法界少分。所緣者。謂此心法能有所緣故名所緣。有對以境拘心令不餘轉名所緣有對 問所緣．境界二對何別 答所緣約心等體能緣慮深了于境。能于境中分明了別。即疏云。心．心所法執彼而起彼於心等故名所緣。境界有對並根。根但能照而不能緣行相便淺。以根取境與識俱起。不取深了但取照境功能。以同根照故即疏言。若於彼法此有功能。即說彼為此法境界。故二對別。然俱舍論具解。當更檢文勘此定之 問境界．障礙同時何別 答相．對礙邊名障礙有對。根取境時礙不餘轉。非此礙彼令不得生名境界有對 問薩婆多法處色中有障礙有對不 答無。所以者何。以無表色非極微成。但以四大懸能造之。且如現在作法受戒之時。雖無無表。已有四大懸造彼未來無表之色。非即四大及極微故非有對色。
問新古二薩婆多極微成粗有何差別 答且古薩婆多以七極微成其粗色。由彼相近似成一相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：量等於因。然而這是粗色，不是極微（最小的物質單位）。
破斥小乘宗義，首先破斥色聚（物質的集合）。色聚中又分三種：一、障礙有對；二、境界有對；三、所緣有對。
所謂障礙有對，是指五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）和五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）相互對礙。
所謂境界有對，是指十二界（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意、色、聲、香、味、觸、法）以及法界（一切事物）的少部分。十二界指的是七心界（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識）和五根界。法界少部分都具有能取境的功能，因為被境相所拘束，使得根和心不能轉向其他，所以稱為境界有對。
所謂所緣有對，是指七心界以及法界少部分。所緣，是指此心法能夠有所緣慮，所以名為所緣。有對，是指以境拘束心，使心不能轉向其他，名為所緣有對。
問：所緣有對和境界有對有什麼區別？
答：所緣有對是從心等本體能夠緣慮，深刻明瞭于境的角度來說的，能夠在境中分明了別。就像疏文中說的：『心、心所法執取彼境而生起，彼境對於心等來說就是所緣。』境界有對包括根。根只能照見而不能緣慮，行相就比較淺。因為根取境時與識一同生起，不取深刻明瞭，只取照境的功能。因為同根照見，所以疏文中說：『如果對於彼法，此法具有功能，就說彼法是此法的境界。』所以這兩種有對是有區別的。然而《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）中有詳細解釋，應當再查閱原文來確定。
問：境界有對和障礙有對同時存在時有什麼區別？
答：相和對礙的方面稱為障礙有對。根取境時，阻礙其不轉向其他。並非此礙彼，使彼不得生起，稱為境界有對。
問：薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）的法處色中，有障礙有對嗎？
答：沒有。為什麼呢？因為無表色（不可見之色）不是由極微構成，而是憑藉四大（地、水、火、風）懸造而成。比如現在作法受戒的時候，即使沒有無表色，已經有四大懸造彼未來無表之色。並非就是四大和極微，所以不是有對色。
問：新薩婆多部和古薩婆多部在極微成粗色方面有什麼差別？
答：姑且說古薩婆多部認為七個極微構成一個粗色，由於它們彼此相似，近似成為一個相狀。
【English Translation】 English version: Quantity is equal to cause. However, this is coarse matter, not the ultimate minute particle (the smallest unit of matter).
Refuting the Hinayana (Small Vehicle) doctrines, first refuting the aggregation of matter (rūpa-skandha). Within the aggregation of matter, there are three types: 1. Obstructional opposition (āvaraṇa-pratighāta); 2. Object opposition (viṣaya-pratighāta); 3. Object of cognition opposition (ālambana-pratighāta).
Obstructional opposition refers to the mutual obstruction between the five sense organs (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) and the five sense objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch).
Object opposition refers to the twelve āyatanas (spheres of sense) and a small portion of the dharma-dhātu (realm of all phenomena). The twelve āyatanas are the seven mind-spheres (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, mind-consciousness, manas-consciousness) and the five sense-organ spheres. The small portion of the dharma-dhātu has the function of grasping objects, and because it is constrained by the characteristics of the object, the sense organs and mind cannot turn to other objects, hence it is called object opposition.
Object of cognition opposition refers to the seven mind-spheres and a small portion of the dharma-dhātu. 'Object of cognition' (ālambana) means that this mind-dharma is capable of cognizing, hence it is called 'object of cognition'. 'Opposition' (pratighāta) means that the object constrains the mind, preventing it from turning to other objects, hence it is called 'object of cognition opposition'.
Question: What is the difference between object of cognition opposition and object opposition?
Answer: Object of cognition opposition is from the perspective of the mind's ability to deeply and clearly cognize the object, distinguishing it clearly within the object. As the commentary says: 'The mind and mental factors arise grasping that object, and that object is the object of cognition for the mind.' Object opposition includes the sense organs. The sense organs can only perceive but not cognize, so the characteristics are shallower. Because the sense organs grasp the object simultaneously with consciousness, they do not grasp deeply and clearly, but only grasp the function of perceiving the object. Because they are perceived by the same sense organ, the commentary says: 'If this dharma has a function in relation to that dharma, then that dharma is said to be the object of this dharma.' Therefore, these two oppositions are different. However, the Abhidharmakośa provides a detailed explanation, and the original text should be consulted to confirm this.
Question: What is the difference between object opposition and obstructional opposition when they exist simultaneously?
Answer: The aspect of mutual obstruction is called obstructional opposition. When the sense organ grasps the object, it obstructs it from turning to other objects. It is not that this obstructs that, preventing it from arising, which is called object opposition.
Question: In the Sarvāstivāda school's (Sarvāstivāda) dharma-sphere matter, is there obstructional opposition?
Answer: No. Why? Because unmanifested matter (aviññatti-rūpa) is not composed of ultimate minute particles, but is created by the four great elements (mahābhūta) (earth, water, fire, wind). For example, when performing rituals and receiving precepts now, even if there is no unmanifested matter, the four great elements are already creating that future unmanifested matter. It is not the four great elements and ultimate minute particles themselves, so it is not oppositional matter.
Question: What is the difference between the new Sarvāstivāda school and the old Sarvāstivāda school in terms of ultimate minute particles forming coarse matter?
Answer: Let's just say that the old Sarvāstivāda school believed that seven ultimate minute particles constitute a coarse matter, because they are similar to each other, they approximate becoming one appearance.
。據實七微各各自成粗色不說相資。若新薩婆多師其七極微同聚。相近相資與力各各成其大相。不以相似合相方始成粗。又如長．短等色。有長極微相。有短極微相 然此宗中長色中得有短色。不如輕重法。重必無輕。輕必無重。不作相形以成輕重。但言不可稱之謂輕。可稱之物即名為重。故今者此中且破經部師．薩婆多有對色。先破能成次破所成 且有宗云以七極微成一拏色。照不涉入各各相去一微。能所俱實。即從拏色始五識得。若一一微唯意識得。非五識境。經部所緣五識境同有部說。照能成七微是實。所成拏色是假 問此二部七微何處攝耶。答若言意境合法處攝。今者有宗攝細從粗同色處收。若經部師攝實從假攝體從相亦色處攝 問既許四大造極微。一微中已有四微。若準七微各有其四合二十八。何故但言七成拏。並四大合有百四十 答據實而論理有二十八。但為意境非五識得。今者唯取五識緣境。故各七微不說能造理亦無失。若說假部極微能成．所成俱通實．假 又極微假實作四句分別。一粗假細實。經部師。二粗實細假。大乘極微。法處所攝。是假想立故。三粗細俱實。薩婆多。四粗細俱假。一說．說假等 又有四句。一粗細二俱假。一說部。俱實有部。俱句說假．及出世。俱非即清辨勝義諦 又論微聚
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 他們認為，七個極微各自獨立形成粗色，彼此之間沒有相互作用。而新薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的老師們則認為，七個極微聚集在一起，彼此相鄰，相互作用，共同產生力量，各自形成大的相。不是通過相似的組合才形成粗色。又比如長、短等顏色，有長的極微相，有短的極微相。然而，在這個宗派中，長色中可以有短色，不像輕重法那樣，重的一定沒有輕的，輕的一定沒有重的。不是通過相互比較來形成輕重，而是說不可稱量的東西叫做輕，可以稱量的東西就叫做重。所以現在這裡先破斥經部師（Sautrantika，經量部）和薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）關於有對色的觀點，先破斥能成，再破斥所成。 而且，有的宗派認為，七個極微形成一個拏色（anu，原子），光照不涉入，彼此相距一個極微。能成和所成都是真實的。從拏色開始，五識才能感知到。如果是一個個極微，只有意識才能感知到，不是五識的境界。經部所緣的五識境界與有部的說法相同。光照能成七個極微是真實的，所成的拏色是虛假的。 問：這兩部的七個極微屬於哪裡？答：如果說是意境，屬於合法處所攝。現在有宗認為，攝取細微的從粗大的，與色處一同收攝。如果是經部師，攝取真實的從虛假的，攝取本體的從相，也屬於色處。 問：既然允許四大（四大元素：地、水、火、風）造極微，一個極微中已經有四個極微。如果按照七個極微各有其四，合起來是二十八個。為什麼只說七個形成拏，加上四大合起來有一百四十個？答：根據實際情況來說，理論上有二十八個。但因為是意境，不是五識所能感知到的。現在只取五識所緣的境界，所以只說各個七個極微，不說能造，理論上也沒有缺失。如果說假部，極微的能成和所成都通於實和假。 而且，極微的假實可以作四句分別：一是粗假細實，這是經部師的觀點。二是粗實細假，這是大乘極微的觀點，法處所攝，是假想設立的。三是粗細俱實，這是薩婆多的觀點。四是粗細俱假，這是一說部（Ekavyavaharikas，一說部）、說假等（Prajnavadins，說假部）的觀點。還有四句：一是粗細二者都假，這是一說部的觀點。俱實是有部的觀點。俱句說假以及出世。俱非就是清辨（Bhavaviveka）的勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，勝義諦）。 又論微聚
【English Translation】 English version: They hold that the seven subtle particles (paramāṇu) each independently form gross matter, without mutual interaction. However, the teachers of the new Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, 'the doctrine that everything exists') believe that the seven ultimate particles gather together, close to each other, interacting and contributing force, each forming a large characteristic. It is not through similar combinations that gross matter is formed. Furthermore, like long and short colors, there are subtle particles with long characteristics and subtle particles with short characteristics. However, in this school, short colors can exist within long colors, unlike the law of lightness and heaviness, where heavy cannot exist without light, and light cannot exist without heavy. Lightness and heaviness are not formed through mutual comparison, but rather, that which cannot be weighed is called light, and that which can be weighed is called heavy. Therefore, here we first refute the views of the Sautrantika (Sautrantika, 'those who rely on the sutras') and Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, 'the doctrine that everything exists') regarding matter with resistance (sa-pratigha-rupa), first refuting the cause, then refuting the effect. Moreover, some schools believe that seven subtle particles form one anu (anu, atom), where light does not penetrate, and they are separated by one subtle particle. Both the cause and the effect are real. From the anu onwards, the five consciousnesses can perceive it. If it is individual subtle particles, only the mind consciousness can perceive it, not the realm of the five consciousnesses. The realm of the five consciousnesses perceived by the Sautrantika is the same as the Sarvastivada's view. The light that forms the seven subtle particles is real, and the formed anu is false. Question: Where do the seven subtle particles of these two schools belong? Answer: If it is said to be the realm of the mind, it belongs to the realm of dharmas. Now, the Sarvastivada believes that the subtle is included in the gross, and it is collected together with the realm of color. If it is the Sautrantika, the real is included in the false, and the substance is included in the characteristic, also belonging to the realm of color. Question: Since the four great elements (mahābhūta, the four great elements: earth, water, fire, wind) are allowed to create subtle particles, and there are already four subtle particles in one subtle particle. If according to the seven subtle particles each having four, adding up to twenty-eight. Why is it only said that seven form an anu, and adding the four great elements together there are one hundred and forty? Answer: According to the actual situation, theoretically there are twenty-eight. But because it is the realm of the mind, it cannot be perceived by the five consciousnesses. Now, only the realm perceived by the five consciousnesses is taken, so only the seven subtle particles are mentioned, and the cause is not mentioned, and there is no theoretical deficiency. If the false school says that the cause and effect of the subtle particles both apply to the real and the false. Moreover, the reality and falsity of subtle particles can be distinguished by four statements: First, gross is false and subtle is real, which is the view of the Sautrantika. Second, gross is real and subtle is false, which is the view of the Mahayana subtle particles, included in the realm of dharmas, and is a hypothetical establishment. Third, both gross and subtle are real, which is the view of the Sarvastivada. Fourth, both gross and subtle are false, which is the view of the Ekavyavaharikas (Ekavyavaharikas, 'the school of one expression'), Prajnavadins (Prajnavadins, 'those who assert falsity'), etc. There are also four statements: First, both gross and subtle are false, which is the view of the Ekavyavaharikas. Both are real is the view of the Sarvastivada. Both statements say false and supramundane. Both are non-existent is the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya, ultimate truth) of Bhavaviveka (Bhavaviveka). Again, on the aggregation of particles
準俱舍頌云。欲微聚無聲。無根有八事。有身根九事。十事有餘根。此意若有身根必即九事。餘四隨一即成十事。俱舍云。若依體說八．九．十等便為太少。若依處說八．九．十等便為太多 答云無過。所言事者一分依體說。謂所依大種。一分依處說。謂能依造色 又難云若爾大種事應成多。造色各別依一四大種故 答云應知此中依體類說。諸四大種類無別故。
作用薩婆多者。婆沙中問過去法多耶。未來法多耶。一師云過去法多。已無初際故。流入過去故。二云未來法多。以未來無盡故。三云相似。佛云法無去來故。云何三世。以其一法。若正作用名現在。已作用名過去。未作用名未來 俱舍師破云。應有三世雜過。汝云作用名現在故。以生用及光明苦法忍皆未來有用。又等無間緣落在過去方始有用。皆應是現在。以有作用故 正理救云。我現在者是作用。過未是功能。安惠菩薩造俱舍釋復破云。汝作用之與功能有何別也。
論必有上下四方差別。計彼本宗理無方分。今以量逼令有方分。上下六方各相擬儀。若無方分應相涉入。故婆沙中尊者大德說。極微無方分而不相至。流至現在相近名至。謂此極微在未來世二各相離。流至現世方始相近。而隔鄰虛中無間故名至。非合名至。世友菩薩非彼說云。若如
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《準俱舍頌》說：『欲界微塵聚集無聲，無根的有八事，有身根的有九事，十事是有餘根。』 這意思是如果具有身根，必定是九事。其餘四者中任一加入，就成為十事。《俱舍論》說：『如果依據自體來說，八、九、十等就顯得太少；如果依據處所來說，八、九、十等就顯得太多。』 回答說：沒有過失。所說的事，一部分依據自體來說，指的是所依賴的四大種；一部分依據處所來說，指的是能依賴的造色。 又有人提問：如果這樣，四大種的事應該變得很多，因為各種造色各自依賴於一個四大種。 回答說：應該知道這裡是依據體類來說的，因為各種四大種類沒有區別。
作用方面，薩婆多（Sarvastivada，一切有部）的觀點是：在《婆沙論》中有人問，過去法多還是未來法多？一位論師說過去法多，因為已經沒有初始的邊際，流入過去。第二位說未來法多，因為未來沒有窮盡。第三位說相似。佛說，法沒有過去和未來，那麼什麼是三世呢？因為一個法，如果正在作用，就叫做現在；已經作用，就叫做過去；未作用，就叫做未來。 《俱舍論》的論師反駁說：應該有三世混雜的過失。你說作用叫做現在，那麼生用以及光明、苦法忍都未來有用，又等無間緣落在過去才有用，都應該是現在，因為有作用的緣故。 正理論師辯護說：我所說的現在是作用，過去和未來是功能。安慧菩薩造《俱舍釋》又反駁說：你所說的作用和功能有什麼區別呢？
論中必定有上下四方的差別。有人認為他們的本宗理論沒有方位的區分。現在用論證來逼迫他們承認有方位的區分。上下六方各自相對。如果沒有方位的區分，應該相互涉入。所以《婆沙論》中尊者大德說：極微沒有方位的區分，所以不能相互到達。流轉到現在的狀態，相互靠近叫做到達。意思是這個極微在未來世時，彼此分離，流轉到現世才開始靠近。因為被相鄰的虛空隔開，所以叫做到達，而不是合併叫做到達。世友菩薩不同意這種說法，說：
【English Translation】 English version: The Jnanakosha-karika says: 'Desire realm aggregates of subtle dust are without sound; those without roots have eight aspects; those with body-roots have nine aspects; ten aspects have remaining roots.' This means that if one possesses body-roots, it must be nine aspects. Adding any one of the remaining four makes it ten aspects. The Abhidharmakosha says: 'If based on the self-nature, eight, nine, or ten, etc., seem too few; if based on location, eight, nine, or ten, etc., seem too many.' The answer is: there is no fault. What is referred to as 'aspects' is partly based on self-nature, referring to the dependent great elements (Mahabhuta); partly based on location, referring to the dependent derived matter (rupadhatu). Furthermore, someone asks: If that's the case, the aspects of the great elements should become many, because each derived matter depends on one of the four great elements. The answer is: it should be understood that here it is spoken of according to the category of self-nature, because the categories of the four great elements are not distinct.
Regarding function, the Sarvastivadins' view is: In the Vibhasha, someone asked whether past dharmas are more numerous or future dharmas are more numerous. One teacher said that past dharmas are more numerous because there is no initial boundary, flowing into the past. The second said that future dharmas are more numerous because the future is endless. The third said they are similar. The Buddha said that dharmas have no past or future, so what are the three times? Because one dharma, if it is currently functioning, is called the present; if it has already functioned, it is called the past; if it has not yet functioned, it is called the future. The Abhidharmakosha master refutes this, saying: There should be the fault of mixing the three times. You say that function is called the present, then origination-function, light, suffering-dharma-patience are all useful in the future, and the immediately preceding condition only becomes useful in the past; they should all be the present because they have function. The Nyayanusara master defends this, saying: What I call the present is function; the past and future are potential. Acharya Anhui, in his commentary on the Abhidharmakosha, further refutes this, saying: What is the difference between what you call function and potential?
The treatise must have distinctions of up, down, and the four directions. Some believe that their fundamental doctrine has no directional distinctions. Now, we use reasoning to compel them to admit that there are directional distinctions. The six directions, up, down, and the four cardinal directions, are each relative to each other. If there were no directional distinctions, they should interpenetrate each other. Therefore, in the Vibhasha, the venerable great master said: Extremely subtle particles have no directional distinctions, so they cannot reach each other. Flowing to the present state, being close to each other is called reaching. This means that these extremely subtle particles are separated from each other in the future, and only begin to be close to each other when they flow to the present. Because they are separated by adjacent space, it is called reaching, not merging that is called reaching. Master Vasumitra disagrees with this view, saying:
爾者應前極微住至后念。彼宗自計一剎那住便入過去。若至現在方始相近名為至者。即二剎那。應此落謝之微流至現世。以住現世方相近故。世友解云。謂諸極微同在現在者。各去鄰虛中無間隙名之為至。俱舍論中天親破云。何緣能礙令中間隙。然此方分四句分別。一經部實極微有方分。二薩婆多實極微無方分。三大乘假極微亦有方分亦無方分。所以照者。大假色中無極微故云無方分。然約假拆粗至極微可說有方分。方分有二。一方之分。是彼大色之分。不是更拆此微為分。二方即分。瑜伽論言有方無分更無細分故者。以相擬宜名有方。而更不可拆故云無分。若更拆之即意作空解故變似空相。闕第四句。
論五識豈無所依緣者。問二十五種色中五識緣假為緣實色 答有二解。一云五識緣實不緣于假。假並意識得 難曰實色五識緣。此中色處收。假色唯意取。對根法處攝 解云據論意緣假此可法處收。以攝假隨真從明色處攝 又問五識不緣假。長．短等色非眼得。澀．滑等觸既是假。亦應不為身識得 答長．短之色相待疏。是以不為眼識得。澀等諸觸分位假親故所以身根得 或同假色唯意所得。二解通緣假．實。五識緣實之時假必依實。所以緣實之時亦緣假 若爾與經部何殊。而破彼計 答一解五識取長．短之時
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果極微從最初的生滅處持續到後來的念頭，按照他們宗派的說法，一個剎那的停留就進入了過去。如果到達現在才開始接近，這就被稱為『至』，也就是兩個剎那。應該說，這種衰落的微小流動到達現世，因為停留在現世才能相互接近。世友的解釋是，那些同時存在於現在的極微，各自去除與相鄰虛空之間的間隙，這被稱為『至』。《俱舍論》中，世親（Vasubandhu）駁斥說，是什麼原因能夠阻礙中間的間隙呢？ 然而，對於『方分』（directionality），這裡有四句分別：一、經部（Sautrāntika）認為真實的極微有方分；二、薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda）認為真實的極微沒有方分；三、大乘（Mahāyāna）認為假立的極微既有方分也沒有方分。之所以這樣說，是因為在假立的色法中沒有極微，所以說沒有方分。然而，如果從假立的角度拆分粗大的色法到極微，可以說有方分。方分有兩種：一是『方之分』，是彼大色之分，不是進一步拆分此微為分；二是『方即分』。《瑜伽論》說，『有方無分，更無細分故』，這是因為相互擬議適宜，所以說『有方』，而不能再拆分，所以說『無分』。如果再拆分，就會在意念中產生空解，因此變得類似空相。這裡缺少第四句。 論：五識（five consciousnesses）難道沒有所依緣嗎？ 問：在二十五種色法中，五識緣假立的還是真實的色法？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，五識緣真實的色法，不緣假立的色法。假立的色法由意識（mind consciousness）緣取。 難：真實的色法由五識緣取，這包含在色處（rūpa-dhātu）中。假立的色法只能由意識取，包含在對根法處（pratyaya-dhātu）中。 解：根據論的意義，緣假立的色法可以包含在法處中。因為包含假立的色法是隨著真實的色法，所以從明色處（clarity of form element）包含。 又問：五識不緣假立的色法，那麼長、短等色不是由眼識（eye consciousness）得到的嗎？澀、滑等觸既然是假立的，也應該不為身識（body consciousness）得到。 答：長、短之色是相互對待而顯得疏遠，因此不為眼識得到。澀等諸觸是分位假立，比較親近，所以身根可以得到。或者，它們與假立的色法相同，只能由意識得到。 第二種解釋是，五識既緣假立的也緣真實的。五識緣真實色法的時候，假立的色法必然依附於真實色法。所以緣真實色法的時候也緣假立的色法。 若果真如此，那和經部（Sautrāntika）有什麼區別呢？為什麼要破斥他們的觀點呢？ 答：一種解釋是，五識取長、短的時候。
【English Translation】 English version: If a subtle particle (paramāṇu) dwells from its initial moment of arising until the subsequent thought, according to their school's reckoning, dwelling for a single kṣaṇa (moment) enters the past. If it is only upon reaching the present that it begins to approach, this is called 'reaching,' which is two kṣaṇas. It should be said that this subtle flow of decline reaches the present world because it is by dwelling in the present world that they can approach each other. Vasumitra explains that those subtle particles that exist simultaneously in the present, each removing the gap between itself and the adjacent space, is called 'reaching.' In the Abhidharmakośa, Vasubandhu refutes this, saying, 'What reason could there be to obstruct the gap in between?' However, regarding 'directionality' (方分), there are four distinctions made here: 1. The Sautrāntika school believes that real subtle particles have directionality; 2. The Sarvāstivāda school believes that real subtle particles do not have directionality; 3. The Mahāyāna school believes that conventionally established subtle particles both have and do not have directionality. The reason for this is that there are no subtle particles in conventionally established forms, so it is said that they do not have directionality. However, if one analyzes conventionally established gross forms down to subtle particles, it can be said that they have directionality. There are two types of directionality: one is 'direction of division,' which is a division of that gross form, and it is not a further division of this subtle particle; the other is 'direction is division.' The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, 'Having direction but no division, because there is no further subtle division,' this is because they are mutually considered suitable, so it is said to 'have direction,' but they cannot be further divided, so it is said to 'have no division.' If one were to further divide them, one would generate an understanding of emptiness in the mind, thus becoming similar to the appearance of emptiness. The fourth distinction is missing here. Objection: Do the five consciousnesses (五識) not have objects of reliance? Question: Among the twenty-five types of form, do the five consciousnesses cognize conventionally established or real forms? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that the five consciousnesses cognize real forms and do not cognize conventionally established forms. Conventionally established forms are cognized by mind consciousness (意識). Challenge: Real forms are cognized by the five consciousnesses, which are included in the form element (色處, rūpa-dhātu). Conventionally established forms can only be taken by mind consciousness and are included in the element of conditions (對根法處, pratyaya-dhātu). Explanation: According to the meaning of the treatise, cognizing conventionally established forms can be included in the dharma element. Because including conventionally established forms follows real forms, it is included from the clarity of form element (明色處). Further question: If the five consciousnesses do not cognize conventionally established forms, then are long, short, etc., not obtained by eye consciousness (眼識)? Since rough, smooth, etc., touches are conventionally established, should they also not be obtained by body consciousness (身識)? Answer: The colors of long and short appear distant due to mutual comparison, therefore they are not obtained by eye consciousness. Rough and other touches are conventionally established by division and are relatively close, so the body sense can obtain them. Alternatively, they are the same as conventionally established forms and can only be obtained by mind consciousness. The second explanation is that the five consciousnesses cognize both conventionally established and real forms. When the five consciousnesses cognize real forms, conventionally established forms necessarily rely on real forms. Therefore, when cognizing real forms, they also cognize conventionally established forms. If that is the case, what is the difference between this and the Sautrāntika (經部) school? Why refute their views? Answer: One explanation is that the five consciousnesses cognize long and short when...
。不離青等實色。以假．實合。彼唯假色故非五境 又解經部所執心外之塵。故唯是假。不為緣故。大乘既不離識。兩宗自殊。大乘望自實色長等非真。形彼外色而還是實。故五識取理亦不遮 若爾云何名五識得自相境耶 答自相有三。一處自相。謂十二處各各不同。二事自相。於一處中眾色各別故。三自相自相。謂于青色拆至極一微。今據處自相為言故不相違 若爾如何五識得自性境唯言性境不隨心耶 亦緣自性境思之 問五識若緣假者。何故耳識不緣教耶。若許緣者。應以根對境。名．句不應在法處攝。若不緣者。眼識亦應不緣長等。俱是假故。又長．短等若非眼識境。應在法處收 答長．短等色雖意識緣。以假從實不在法處 又解名等依聲假非即離聲耳不緣。長等依色即是色。雖是假色眼識取 問名等依聲假與聲非即．離。長等依色假何故非即．離 答長等相形待依色即不離。名等不相形重假故即離。以依屈曲假聲之上假立名等。是重假故不同長等。此解違下第二中說。彼處說語即是能詮。此亦不爾。彼文遮異。言語即能詮據自宗說。法．詞處別。
又色根見非見四句分別。一識見根非見。大眾．一說．說出世．雞胤等部說。五色根不能見色。薩婆多師等。根見識不見。大乘師等。根．識二俱見。四根．
識俱不見。謂在胎藏等位。
五根義以五門分別。一辨諸宗。二出體性。三釋名字。四類異有殊。五問答差別 一辨諸宗者。如法苑及疏明。然敘小乘少說別者。大眾等部以所造四塵為五根體。雖無別凈色然通漏．無漏。佛果及因二位別故。宗輪論說如來之身一切無漏故。若薩婆多四大造四塵。有別清凈色塵為體。是實非假。唯漏．無記。若經部師以四大造凈色為體。是假非實。若成實師四塵造四大。四大成五根。既說大成非色塵也。但是四大以經所說各別堅等為五根故。成實論者師子胄造。此師子胄本是數論部中出家。今雖歸佛猶敘本義。故非正說。經部如章。說出世部能造所造俱通假實。世間者假。以虛妄故。出世者實。非妄生故。準此即通漏與無漏。說假如章。一說部師一切諸法但有其名都無其體。不說假實．漏與無漏。前辨諸宗 大乘出體。三類不同。一難陀等唯說種子名為五根。此有四解如章及疏。二安惠師即以遍計所起相分為五根體。以能所取虛妄起故。然十八界種子各別。如論第四。三護法等師是依他起。種子各別。然有二說。一云唯現。二通種．現。如法苑說 釋名類異及問答中立通差別。並如法苑中說 疏云眼等根非他心智及凡夫六識現量所得意。不障二乘．凡夫定心緣之是現量得 問五根
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『識俱不見』，指的是在胎藏等位（指眾生在母胎中的狀態）。
五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）的意義從五個方面來分別闡述：一、辨別各宗派的觀點；二、說明五根的體性；三、解釋五根的名稱；四、區分五根的類別和差異；五、通過問答來辨析五根的差別。
一、辨別各宗派的觀點：如《法苑義林章》及其疏解所闡明的那樣。然而，敘述小乘佛教時，較少提及其他宗派的觀點。大眾部等部派認為，由四大（地、水、火、風）所造的四塵（色、聲、香、味）是五根的體性。雖然沒有特別的清凈色，但四塵通於有漏和無漏。佛果位（成佛的果位）和因位（修行的階段）有所不同。根據《異部宗輪論》的說法，如來的身體一切都是無漏的。如果薩婆多部認為，四大造作四塵，存在特別的清凈色塵作為五根的體性，這是真實的，不是虛假的，僅僅是有漏和無記（非善非惡的狀態）。如果經部師認為，四大造作清凈色作為五根的體性，這是虛假的，不是真實的。如果成實師認為，四塵造作四大，四大成就五根。既然說是四大成就，就不是色塵。但是四大根據經典所說的各自的堅硬等特性作為五根。成實論的作者是師子胄。這位師子胄本來是數論部（古印度哲學流派）出家。現在雖然歸於佛門，仍然敘述他原來的觀點，所以不是正確的說法。經部的觀點如《法苑義林章》所說。說出世部（佛教部派）能造作和所造作都通於假和實。世間的是假的，因為是虛妄的。出世間的是真實的，不是虛妄產生的。按照這個說法，就通於有漏和無漏。說假的情況如《法苑義林章》所說。一說部師認為，一切諸法只有名稱，都沒有實體。不說是假是實，是有漏是無漏。以上是辨別各宗派的觀點。
大乘佛教闡述五根的體性，分為三種不同觀點。一、難陀等只說種子（阿賴耶識中的潛在力量）名為五根。對此有四種解釋，如《法苑義林章》及其疏解所說。二、安慧師認為，遍計所執（虛妄分別）所產生的相分（認識的對象）是五根的體性，因為能取（能認識的主體）和所取（被認識的客體）都是虛妄產生的。然而，十八界（六根、六塵、六識）的種子各不相同，如《成唯識論》第四卷所說。三、護法等師認為是依他起性（由因緣和合而生），種子各不相同。然而有兩種說法：一種認為只有現行（已經顯現的狀態），一種認為通於種子和現行。如《法苑義林章》所說。
解釋名稱、區分類別和差異以及通過問答來辨析差別，都如《法苑義林章》中所說。
疏解中說，眼等根不是他心智（能夠了解他人心思的智慧）以及凡夫的第六識（意識）現量（直接的、不經過推理的認識）所能得到的。不障礙聲聞乘、緣覺乘的修行者和凡夫的定心緣取，是現量所能得到的。 問：五根……
【English Translation】 English version: '識俱不見 (shì jù bù jiàn)' means that the consciousness is not apparent in the state of being in the womb (referring to the state of sentient beings in the mother's womb).
The meaning of the Five Roots (五根, wǔ gēn) (the five sense organs: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) is explained from five aspects: 1. Discriminating the views of various schools; 2. Explaining the nature of the Five Roots; 3. Explaining the names of the Five Roots; 4. Distinguishing the categories and differences of the Five Roots; 5. Analyzing the differences of the Five Roots through questions and answers.
- Discriminating the views of various schools: As explained in the 'Fa Yuan Yi Lin Zhang (法苑義林章)' and its commentary. However, when describing Theravada Buddhism, there is less mention of the views of other schools. The Mahāsāṃghika (大眾部, Dàzhòng bù) and other schools believe that the four dusts (四塵, sì chén) (form, sound, smell, taste), which are created by the Four Great Elements (四大, sì dà) (earth, water, fire, wind), are the nature of the Five Roots. Although there is no special pure form, the four dusts are common to both contaminated (with outflows) and uncontaminated (without outflows). The Buddha-fruit position (the state of becoming a Buddha) and the causal position (the stage of practice) are different. According to the 'Samayabhedoparacanacakra (異部宗輪論, Yìbù Zōnglún Lùn)', the body of the Tathagata (如來, Rúlái) is entirely uncontaminated. If the Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多部, Sàpóduō bù) school believes that the Four Great Elements create the four dusts, and there is a special pure form dust as the nature of the Five Roots, this is real, not false, and only contaminated and neutral (neither good nor evil). If the Sautrāntika (經部, Jīngbù) school believes that the Four Great Elements create pure form as the nature of the Five Roots, this is false, not real. If the Satyasiddhi (成實師, Chéngshí shī) school believes that the four dusts create the Four Great Elements, and the Four Great Elements accomplish the Five Roots. Since it is said that the Four Great Elements accomplish, it is not form dust. However, the Four Great Elements, according to the characteristics of hardness, etc., described in the scriptures, serve as the Five Roots. The author of the Satyasiddhi Śāstra (成實論, Chéngshí lùn) is Śīlavarman (師子胄, Shīzi Zhòu). This Śīlavarman was originally a renunciate from the Samkhya (數論部, Shùlùn bù) school (an ancient Indian philosophical school). Although he has now returned to Buddhism, he still describes his original views, so it is not a correct statement. The views of the Sautrāntika school are as described in the 'Fa Yuan Yi Lin Zhang'. The Ekavyāvahārika (一說部, Yīshuō bù) school believes that both the creating and the created in the supramundane are common to both false and real. The mundane is false because it is illusory. The supramundane is real because it is not produced from illusion. According to this statement, it is common to both contaminated and uncontaminated. The situation of falsity is as described in the 'Fa Yuan Yi Lin Zhang'. The Ekavyāvahārika school believes that all dharmas (諸法, zhū fǎ) only have names and no substance. It does not say whether it is false or real, contaminated or uncontaminated. The above is the discrimination of the views of various schools.
Mahayana Buddhism explains the nature of the Five Roots, divided into three different views. 1. Nanda (難陀, Nánduó) and others only say that the seeds (potential forces in the Alaya Consciousness (阿賴耶識, Ālāyéshì)) are called the Five Roots. There are four explanations for this, as described in the 'Fa Yuan Yi Lin Zhang' and its commentary. 2. Anhui (安慧, Ānhuì) believes that the perceived aspect (認識的對象, rènshí de duìxiàng) produced by the Parikalpita (遍計所執, Biànjì suǒ zhí) (imaginary discrimination) is the nature of the Five Roots, because the grasper (能取, néng qǔ) (the subject that can recognize) and the grasped (所取, suǒ qǔ) (the object being recognized) are both produced from illusion. However, the seeds of the Eighteen Realms (十八界, shíbā jiè) (six roots, six objects, six consciousnesses) are different, as described in the fourth volume of the 'Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (成唯識論, Chéng Wéishì Lùn)'. 3. Dharmapala (護法, Hùfǎ) and others believe that it is dependent origination (依他起性, yī tā qǐ xìng) (arising from the combination of causes and conditions), and the seeds are different. However, there are two views: one believes that there is only manifestation (已經顯現的狀態, yǐjīng xiǎnxiàn de zhuàngtài), and one believes that it is common to both seeds and manifestation. As described in the 'Fa Yuan Yi Lin Zhang'.
Explaining the names, distinguishing the categories and differences, and analyzing the differences through questions and answers are all as described in the 'Fa Yuan Yi Lin Zhang'.
The commentary says that the roots of the eye, etc., cannot be obtained by the mind-reading wisdom (能夠瞭解他人心思的智慧, nénggòu liǎojiě tārén xīnsī de zhìhuì) and the direct perception (直接的、不經過推理的認識, zhíjiē de, bù jīngguò tuīlǐ de rènshì) of the sixth consciousness (意識, yìshì) of ordinary people. It does not hinder the meditative focus of the Śrāvakas (聲聞乘, Shēngwén chéng), Pratyekabuddhas (緣覺乘, Yuánjué chéng), and ordinary people, and can be obtained by direct perception. Question: The Five Roots...
及能依識身各得何境 答且眼識依根緣境之中假實不同如次前辨。余之四識唯眼識知。然五境中辨其假．實。如五境義林辨 問眼．鼻．耳根何故各二。舌．身二根何各但一。問舌．身根一可各一處。三根各二何故各名一界處。問何故先說眼．耳等耶。問取境離合與識同．別等。此余問答並如界處義林中辨。
明大造義。大造之中有親．疏造。親造者謂同界地．同有漏等名為親造。若異界地．有漏無漏即名疏造。如身在上界變起金．銀等。思惟欲色而起定果色等。此即欲界大疏造也。然有漏得造無漏。無漏不造有漏。何以故。若第八緣自具大．造。第六獨緣唯從見也。此之相分非實色故。不得名無漏造有漏 問又今助釋。無漏亦得疏造有漏。如緣佛身親相分等。若親造中薩婆多師大種能造唯無記唯有漏。唯以觸處四大能造。法處之中更不別立有餘色故。唯有無表不是極微。所造通三性。謂色．聲二塵。若大乘假名善．惡。無記大種為說名造。據體大．造親者。無記造無記。善造善。無漏亦爾。以其大及色俱通無漏。觸處．法處俱有能造。以定通果色親所依起四大亦定通起故。然通假實。能造思之。若出體者。能造唯有四大。所造謂五塵色．法處色中自在所生及遍計所起．受所引色。若取無表即非大造。依思種．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：五種識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）各自依賴識身，能得到什麼樣的境界？ 答：且說眼識，它所依賴的根和所緣的境，其中有虛假的，也有真實的，這些都已在前面辨析過了。其餘的四識（耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）只有眼識才能知曉。然後在五境（色、聲、香、味、觸）中辨別它們的虛假和真實，這些都已在《五境義林》中辨析過了。 問：為什麼眼根、鼻根、耳根各有兩個？而舌根、身根卻各只有一個？ 問：舌根和身根各一個，可以各在一個處所。但眼根、鼻根、耳根各有兩個，為什麼又各被稱為一個界處？ 問：為什麼先說眼根、耳根等？ 問：取境的離合，與識的相同和不同等等。這些其餘的問答，都已在《界處義林》中辨析過了。
闡明大種造色的意義。大種造色中，有親近的造作，也有疏遠的造作。親近的造作，是指同一界的地、同一有漏等，這被稱為親近的造作。如果屬於不同的界地、有漏或無漏，就稱為疏遠的造作。例如，身體在上界變化出金、銀等物。思惟欲界或色界的事物，而產生禪定的果報色等，這就是欲界的大種疏遠的造作。 然而，有漏可以造作無漏，無漏卻不能造作有漏。這是為什麼呢？如果第八識（阿賴耶識）的緣自具足大種和造作的能力，第六識（意識）單獨緣取，只能從見分而來。因為這些相分不是真實的色法，所以不能稱為無漏造作有漏。 問：現在再來輔助解釋。無漏也可以疏遠地造作有漏，例如緣取佛身的親近相分等。如果是親近的造作，薩婆多部的師父認為，大種能造作的只有無記性和有漏性，只有觸處（觸覺）的四大才能造作。在法處（法塵）中，不再另外設立其餘的色法，所以只有無表色不是極微，所造作的則通於三性（善、惡、無記），即色塵和聲塵。 如果大乘假名為善、惡、無記的大種，是爲了說明造作的名稱。就體性而言，大種和造作親近的，無記造作無記，善造作善，無漏也是如此。因為大種和色法都通於無漏，觸處和法處都具有能造作的能力。因為禪定通於果報色，親近所依而生起的四大，也一定通於生起果報色。然而，通於假和實，能造作的要仔細思量。如果超出體性，能造作的只有四大，所造作的則是五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）的色法，法處色中自在所生，以及遍計所起、受所引的色法。如果取無表色，就不是大種造作，而是依思惟的種子。
【English Translation】 English version Question: What kind of realms can each of the five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) obtain by relying on their respective sense bases? Answer: Let's talk about eye-consciousness first. The root it relies on and the object it perceives have different degrees of reality and illusion, as discussed earlier. The other four consciousnesses (ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) are only known by eye-consciousness. Then, among the five objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch), distinguish their reality and illusion, as discussed in the 'Meaning Forest of the Five Objects'. Question: Why do the eye-root, nose-root, and ear-root each have two? But the tongue-root and body-root each only have one? Question: The tongue-root and body-root, each having one, can each be in one place. But the eye-root, nose-root, and ear-root each have two, why are they each called one realm-place? Question: Why are the eye-root, ear-root, etc., mentioned first? Question: The separation and combination of grasping objects, and the similarities and differences of consciousness, etc. These remaining questions and answers have all been discussed in the 'Meaning Forest of Realms and Places'.
Clarifying the meaning of the great elements' (Mahabhuta) production of form. Among the great elements' production of form, there are close productions and distant productions. Close production refers to those of the same realm, the same contaminated (with outflows), etc., which are called close productions. If they belong to different realms, contaminated or uncontaminated, they are called distant productions. For example, the body in the upper realm transforms into gold, silver, etc. Thinking about things in the desire realm or form realm, and producing the color of the result of samadhi, etc., this is the distant production of the great elements in the desire realm. However, the contaminated can produce the uncontaminated, but the uncontaminated cannot produce the contaminated. Why is this? If the eighth consciousness (Alaya-consciousness)'s conditions inherently possess the great elements and the ability to produce, the sixth consciousness (mind-consciousness) alone only arises from the seeing aspect. Because these appearance aspects are not real form, they cannot be called uncontaminated producing contaminated. Question: Now, let's further explain. The uncontaminated can also distantly produce the contaminated, such as perceiving the close appearance aspect of the Buddha's body, etc. If it is a close production, the Sarvastivada masters believe that the great elements can only produce the indeterminate and the contaminated, and only the four great elements of the touch-element can produce. In the dharma-element, no other form is established separately, so only unmanifested form is not an ultimate particle, and what is produced is common to the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, indeterminate), namely form-dust and sound-dust. If the Mahayana provisionally names the wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate great elements, it is to explain the name of production. In terms of essence, the great elements and production that are close, the indeterminate produces the indeterminate, the wholesome produces the wholesome, and the uncontaminated is also the same. Because the great elements and form are both common to the uncontaminated, the touch-element and dharma-element both have the ability to produce. Because samadhi is common to the color of the result, the four great elements that arise from the close basis also certainly commonly arise from the color of the result. However, it is common to the false and the real, and the producer should carefully consider it. If it exceeds the essence, the producer is only the four great elements, and what is produced is the form of the five dusts (form, sound, smell, taste, touch), what is freely produced in the dharma-element, and the form that arises from conceptual construction and is drawn by feeling. If unmanifested form is taken, it is not the production of the great elements, but relies on the seed of thought.
現故非大所造。若據疏緣亦可大造。又約依他．圓成而辨體性。不言遍計者非妄所起。從種生故。諸師明異且取正義 若常無常唯依他。大造有為無常法故。此約常無常門。又若有漏依他起。若無漏通圓成。無漏離倒用周遍故。此約漏無漏門 五法分別者。大造通相．名。通分別．正智。以通漏．無漏故。不通如如。以相性故。若攝相歸性亦通如如 三性分別者。在凡夫唯無記。若佛果唯性。二乘及菩薩通無記及善性。不律儀惡身．語業等隨轉門通不善。據實義者大種．造唯無記。律儀善身．語業等。若有漏位假通善性。據體無記。實善性者約思而立。若初地已上通漏．無漏及善．無記。若薩婆多大種唯無記。造色通三性 大種造色有多解不同。一者唯從自種造名大造。故二十唯識云。識上色功能名五根應理。功能謂種子也。五根者所造色也。二者唯取四大種名大造色。所依名造非辨體也。謂色種子要依大種。大種起時方能得起。由他挾帶故名大造色。增上與力名為造也。三者二種俱取 今者雖三師不同。唯第二師勝。何以故。依瑜伽論第三云大種於色種有五種功能故。所以知勝 其五者何。一為生起因。謂由大種恒將帶生故。二依因。謂此造色依大種故。三安立因。謂此色種及大種同安危故。大種壞故造色亦壞。四
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：現在說『造色』不是『大種』所造。如果根據疏釋的因緣關係，也可以說是『大種』所造。又從『依他起性』和『圓成實性』來辨別體性，不說『遍計所執性』是因為它不是虛妄分別所產生的，而是從種子生起的緣故。各家學者的解釋不同，這裡取其正確的意義。 如果說『常』或『無常』，那隻能是『依他起性』。『大造色』是有為法，所以是無常的。這是從『常』和『無常』的角度來說的。如果說『有漏』，那就是『依他起性』；如果說『無漏』，那就通於『圓成實性』，因為無漏的智慧遠離顛倒，作用周遍。這是從『有漏』和『無漏』的角度來說的。 關於五法的分別：『大種』通於『相』（Lakshana）和『名』（Nama），通於『分別』（Parikalpana）和『正智』（Samyagjnana），因為它通於『有漏』和『無漏』。但不通於『如如』（Tathata），因為它是相的性質。如果把相歸於性，也通於『如如』。 關於三性的分別：在凡夫位，只有『無記』（Avyakrta，中性）；在佛果位，只有『性』（自性）。二乘（Sravaka and Pratyekabuddha）和菩薩通於『無記』和『善性』（Kusala）。不合律儀的惡身語業等，隨順流轉門，通於『不善』（Akusala）。從真實的意義上說，『大種』和『造色』只有『無記』。合乎律儀的善身語業等，如果在有漏位，可以假地說通於『善性』，但就其體性來說是『無記』。真正的『善性』是根據思擇而建立的。如果從初地（Prthivi）以上，就通於『有漏』、『無漏』以及『善』、『無記』。如果按照薩婆多部（Sarvastivada），『大種』只有『無記』，『造色』通於三性。 關於『大種』和『造色』，有多種不同的解釋。第一種是，只有從自身種子所造的才稱為『大造』。所以《二十唯識論》（Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi）說，識上的色功能稱為五根，這是合理的。功能指的是種子，五根指的是所造色。第二種是，只取四大種（Mahabhuta）稱為『大造色』，所依的是『造』，而不是辨別體性。意思是說，色的種子要依靠大種，大種生起時才能生起。由於其他夾帶，所以稱為『大造色』。增上與力稱為『造』。第三種是，兩種都取。 現在，雖然三家學者的說法不同，但只有第二種說法更勝一籌。為什麼呢？因為依據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第三卷所說，大種對於色種有五種功能，所以知道第二種說法更勝一籌。 這五種功能是什麼呢？一是為生起因，意思是說，由於大種恒常將帶而生起。二是依因，意思是說，這種造色依靠大種。三是安立因，意思是說，這種色種和大種同安危。大種壞了，造色也壞。四...
【English Translation】 English version: Now it is said that 'Rupa-nirmita' (derived matter) is not created by 'Mahabhuta' (the great elements). If based on the commentary's causal relationship, it can also be said to be created by 'Mahabhuta'. Furthermore, the nature of reality is distinguished from the perspective of 'Paratantra' (dependent nature) and 'Parinispanna' (perfected nature). It is not said that 'Parikalpita' (imputed nature) is not produced by false discrimination, but rather arises from seeds. The interpretations of various teachers differ, and here we adopt the correct meaning. If speaking of 'eternal' or 'impermanent', it can only be 'Paratantra'. 'Mahabhuta-nirmita' is a conditioned dharma, therefore it is impermanent. This is from the perspective of 'eternal' and 'impermanent'. If speaking of 'with outflows' (Sāsrava), it is 'Paratantra'; if speaking of 'without outflows' (Anāsrava), it is connected to 'Parinispanna', because the wisdom without outflows is free from inversion and its function is pervasive. This is from the perspective of 'with outflows' and 'without outflows'. Regarding the distinction of the five dharmas: 'Mahabhuta' is connected to 'Lakshana' (characteristic) and 'Nama' (name), connected to 'Parikalpana' (discrimination) and 'Samyagjnana' (right knowledge), because it is connected to 'with outflows' and 'without outflows'. But it is not connected to 'Tathata' (suchness), because it is the nature of characteristics. If the characteristics are attributed to nature, it is also connected to 'Tathata'. Regarding the distinction of the three natures: In the position of ordinary beings, there is only 'Avyakrta' (indeterminate); in the position of Buddhahood, there is only 'nature' (Svabhava). Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas are connected to 'Avyakrta' and 'Kusala' (wholesome). Unwholesome physical and verbal actions that do not conform to the precepts, following the flow of transmigration, are connected to 'Akusala' (unwholesome). From the perspective of the true meaning, 'Mahabhuta' and 'Rupa-nirmita' are only 'Avyakrta'. Wholesome physical and verbal actions that conform to the precepts, if in the position of with outflows, can be falsely said to be connected to 'Kusala', but in terms of their nature, they are 'Avyakrta'. True 'Kusala' is established based on reflection. If from the first Bhumi (stage) onwards, it is connected to 'with outflows', 'without outflows', and 'Kusala', 'Avyakrta'. If according to Sarvastivada, 'Mahabhuta' is only 'Avyakrta', 'Rupa-nirmita' is connected to the three natures. Regarding 'Mahabhuta' and 'Rupa-nirmita', there are various different interpretations. The first is that only what is created from its own seed is called 'Mahabhuta-nirmita'. Therefore, the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi says that the function of Rupa on consciousness is called the five roots, which is reasonable. Function refers to the seed, and the five roots refer to the derived matter. The second is that only the four great elements are taken as 'Mahabhuta-nirmita', what is relied upon is 'nirmita' (created), not distinguishing the nature. It means that the seed of Rupa must rely on Mahabhuta, and it can only arise when Mahabhuta arises. Because of other accompanying factors, it is called 'Mahabhuta-nirmita'. Augmentation and assistance are called 'nirmita'. The third is that both are taken. Now, although the statements of the three teachers differ, only the second statement is superior. Why? Because according to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the Mahabhuta has five functions for the seed of Rupa, so it is known that the second statement is superior. What are these five functions? First, it is the cause of arising, meaning that it arises because Mahabhuta constantly brings and carries it. Second, it is the dependent cause, meaning that this derived matter relies on Mahabhuta. Third, it is the establishing cause, meaning that this seed of Rupa and Mahabhuta share the same safety and danger. If Mahabhuta is destroyed, the derived matter is also destroyed. Fourth...
持因。謂此色于大種中各相遍故。故瑜伽論云。一和雜不相離。二同處不相離。五長養因。謂色根等依大種事得增長故 問色種依大起。即說大種為生因。五識由根發。亦說根體為起因。二問色種由大生。即說大種為起因。無表由表起。應說表色為生因 解初難。色種從大起親故名生因。五識雖根發。疏故不名因 又解能生．所生俱具質礙。即說大種為生因。所生心法非是礙。不說根法為生因。又生義寬通。心．色併名生。大造是狹。生心非造因 解第二難。大種令色起實故名生因。無表假表起。從假說假因 如佛身無表色亦非造因。日輪光等亦爾 解云要由彼得起故日光亦名造。佛身無表色遠妨惡故亦名造因 難第二。色種從大起大起說依因。孤行之香由質起離質。由何得說依因。二欲．色兩界從大起可使有依因。無色妙定非大起。如何說彼有五因 解云。據彼依質說五事。是故四大具五因。不言諸色皆具五。孤行．妙色無依因 又難色界定．道依大起。說此大種為生因。無色定．道無大種。應說彼處無生因 解色界定．道非實色。假說為色假造因。無色定．道假色名。從假說有假造因 難第三。帶質之色同安危。可得說為安立因。無色．孤行無本質。如何說有安立因 解云大造造彼具五義。不言所造要五因。故亦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 持因（Chiyin）：意思是說這種色在大種（Dazhong，四大元素：地、水、火、風）中各自普遍存在。所以《瑜伽論》（Yujialun）說：『一是和合雜糅不相分離，二是同處一地不相分離。』 五、長養因（Zhangyangyin）：意思是說色根（segen，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五根）等依靠大種（Dazhong）的事物才能得到增長。 問：色種（sezhong，由四大產生的色法）依靠大種（Dazhong）而生起，就說大種是生因（sheng yin）。五識（wushi，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）由根（gen，五根）而生髮，也說根的本體是起因（qi yin）。二問：色種由大種而生，就說大種是起因。無表色（wubiao se，無法表示的色法）由表色（biao se，可以表示的色法）而生起，應該說表色是生因。 解：第一個難題，色種從大種生起，因為關係親近所以稱為生因。五識雖然由根生髮，但關係疏遠所以不稱為生因。 又解釋說，能生（neng sheng）和所生（suo sheng）都具有質礙（zhi ai，物質的阻礙性），所以說大種是生因。所生的心法（xin fa，精神現象）不是質礙，所以不說根法（gen fa，五根）是生因。而且『生』的意義寬泛，心和色都可以稱為生。『大造』的意義狹窄，生心不能稱為造因（zao yin）。 解釋第二個難題，大種使色法生起是真實不虛的，所以稱為生因。無表色依靠表色生起，是從假說的假因。 例如佛身（Fo shen）的無表色也不是造因，太陽的光芒等等也是如此。 解釋說，一定要依靠它才能生起，所以日光也稱為造。佛身的無表色因為能遠離妨礙惡事，所以也稱為造因。 第二個難題，色種從大種生起，大種生起說是依因（yi yin）。孤行之香（guxing zhi xiang，獨立存在的香氣）由物質生起，離開物質。由什麼可以說成是依因？二、欲界（yujie）、色界（sejie）兩界從大種生起，可以說有依因。無色界（wusejie）的妙定（miao ding，殊勝的禪定）不是從大種生起，如何說它們有五因（wu yin）？ 解釋說，根據它們依靠物質而存在的情況來說五事，所以四大（sida，地、水、火、風）具備五因，不是說所有的色法都具備五因。孤行之香和妙色沒有依因。 又問：定（ding，禪定）、道（dao，修行之道）依靠大種生起，說這種大種是生因。無色界的定、道沒有大種，應該說那裡沒有生因。 解釋說，定、道不是真實的色法，假說是色法，假說是造因。無色界的定、道假借色法的名稱，從假說有假造因。 第三個難題，帶質之色（dai zhi zhi se，帶有本質的色法）同安危，可以稱為安立因（anli yin）。無色、孤行沒有本質，如何說有安立因？ 解釋說，大造（dazao，四大所造的色法）造彼（zao bi，造作其他色法）具備五種意義，不是說所造的都要具備五因，所以也
【English Translation】 English version Hetu of Sustaining (Chiyin): This means that this form is universally present in each of the Great Elements (Dazhong, the four elements: earth, water, fire, and wind). Therefore, the Yoga-shastra (Yujialun) says: 'First, they are mixed and inseparable; second, they are in the same place and inseparable.' Fifth, Hetu of Nourishing (Zhangyangyin): This means that the sense organs (segen, the five roots: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) and other things rely on the Great Elements (Dazhong) to grow. Question: Form-seeds (sezhong, forms produced by the four elements) arise relying on the Great Elements (Dazhong), so it is said that the Great Elements are the Hetu of Production (sheng yin). The five consciousnesses (wushi, eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, and body consciousness) arise from the roots (gen, the five roots), so it is also said that the substance of the roots is the Hetu of Arising (qi yin). Second question: Form-seeds arise from the Great Elements, so it is said that the Great Elements are the Hetu of Arising. Unmanifest form (wubiao se, form that cannot be expressed) arises from manifest form (biao se, form that can be expressed), so it should be said that manifest form is the Hetu of Production. Answer: To the first difficulty, form-seeds arise from the Great Elements, so they are called the Hetu of Production because of their close relationship. Although the five consciousnesses arise from the roots, they are not called the Hetu of Production because of their distant relationship. Another explanation is that both the producer (neng sheng) and the produced (suo sheng) have material obstruction (zhi ai, material impediment), so it is said that the Great Elements are the Hetu of Production. The produced mental phenomena (xin fa, mental phenomena) are not material obstructions, so it is not said that the root-dharmas (gen fa, the five roots) are the Hetu of Production. Moreover, the meaning of 'production' is broad, and both mind and form can be called production. The meaning of 'Great Creation' is narrow, and the production of mind cannot be called the Hetu of Creation (zao yin). Explanation of the second difficulty: The Great Elements cause form to arise truly and without falsehood, so they are called the Hetu of Production. Unmanifest form relies on manifest form to arise, which is a false cause based on a false assumption. For example, the unmanifest form of the Buddha's body (Fo shen) is also not the Hetu of Creation, and neither is the light of the sun, and so on. The explanation is that it must rely on it to arise, so sunlight is also called creation. The unmanifest form of the Buddha's body is also called the Hetu of Creation because it can prevent evil. Second difficulty: Form-seeds arise from the Great Elements, and the arising of the Great Elements is said to be the Hetu of Dependence (yi yin). Solitary fragrance (guxing zhi xiang, independently existing fragrance) arises from matter, separate from matter. How can it be said to be the Hetu of Dependence? Second, the Desire Realm (yujie) and the Form Realm (sejie) arise from the Great Elements, so it can be said that there is a Hetu of Dependence. The subtle samadhi (miao ding, excellent concentration) of the Formless Realm (wusejie) does not arise from the Great Elements, so how can it be said that they have five hetus (wu yin)? The explanation is that the five things are spoken of based on their reliance on matter, so the Four Great Elements (sida, earth, water, fire, and wind) possess five hetus, but it is not said that all forms possess five hetus. Solitary fragrance and subtle form do not have a Hetu of Dependence. Another question: Samadhi (ding, meditation) and the Path (dao, the path of practice) arise relying on the Great Elements, so it is said that these Great Elements are the Hetu of Production. The samadhi and the Path of the Formless Realm do not have the Great Elements, so it should be said that there is no Hetu of Production there. The explanation is that samadhi and the Path are not real forms, but are falsely said to be forms, and falsely said to be the Hetu of Creation. The samadhi and the Path of the Formless Realm borrow the name of form, and falsely say that there is a false Hetu of Creation. Third difficulty: Forms with substance (dai zhi zhi se, forms with essence) share safety and danger, so they can be called the Hetu of Establishment (anli yin). Formlessness and solitary existence have no essence, so how can it be said that there is a Hetu of Establishment? The explanation is that the Great Creation (dazao, forms created by the four elements) creates them (zao bi, creates other forms) with five meanings, but it is not said that all created things must have five hetus, so also
無妨。 難第四同 難第五。四大能資色即說四大長養因。飲食亦資根亦得名為長養因 解大種資義寬。是故四大名長因。飲食內資其義狹。是故不名長養因 又問若爾何故眠．夢．梵行．等持說四為養。不說大種為長養耶 解云眠等長養通內外。故只說四長養因。大造養色不自養。但是別養非長因。然有三義。一異熟。二長養。三等流。等流中有四。一異熟。二長養。三變壞。四自性等流。將前所造於此三門。幾具三乃至一．二等。諸法皆然。一切法有二。謂有為．無為。無為常住非依大造。有為法中有三。謂心．色．不相應。不相應者即前二位假所建立。更不別明。前二之中初明心法。於三門中而聊簡之。心法具異熟。異熟有二。一總。二別。若第八心．心所有總。若後起者即是別。前六識中異熟但有別。若據初起名總。並得具二。長養之中但相增盛而無處寬遍。等流之中無變異等流。心法分別義準細明思之 二明色法。色法分四。五根色．法處色．內五塵色．外五塵色。若五根色具異熟．長養。等流之中但有初二。內扶塵中得有第四等流。而無第三。雖有衰變而亦異熟。非名變異。外塵之中但有變異及自性等流。而無長養．異熟。疏增上故非異熟。非內色故非長養。法處色中若定果。有相增盛．處寬遍。準瑜伽
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 無妨。難第四同難第五。四大（地、水、火、風四種基本元素）能夠資助色蘊（物質現象），所以說四大是長養因（增長和滋養的原因）。飲食也能資助根（感覺器官），因此也可以被稱為長養因。 解答：大種（四大）資助的意義寬泛，所以四大被稱為長因。飲食在內部資助，其意義狹窄，所以不被稱為長養因。 又問：如果這樣，為什麼睡眠、夢、梵行（清凈的行為）、等持（專注的狀態）等四種被說成是養分，而不說大種是長養呢？ 解答：睡眠等長養既包括內在的也包括外在的，所以只說四種長養因。大種造作和滋養色蘊，但不能自我滋養，只是個別的滋養，不是長養因。然而有三種意義：一、異熟（果報）；二、長養；三、等流（相似的流變）。等流中有四種：一、異熟；二、長養；三、變壞；四、自性等流。將先前所造的業，放在這三個門類中，看哪些具備三種，哪些具備一、二種等等。一切法都是這樣。 一切法有兩種，即有為法（因緣和合而成的法）和無為法（不生不滅的法）。無為法是常住的，不依賴於大造（四大）。有為法中有三種，即心法（精神現象）、色法（物質現象）、不相應行法（既非物質也非精神的現象）。不相應行法是前兩種現象的假立，不再單獨說明。在前兩種之中，先說明心法，在三種門類中略作簡別。心法具備異熟。異熟有兩種：一、總異熟；二、別異熟。如果是第八識（阿賴耶識）和心所法，就是總異熟。如果是後起的，就是別異熟。前六識中的異熟只有別異熟。如果根據最初生起，可以稱為總異熟，那麼就具備兩種異熟。在長養之中，只是互相增盛，而沒有處所的寬遍。在等流之中，沒有變異等流。心法的分別意義，仔細思考就能明白。 二、說明色法。色法分為四種：五根色（五種感覺器官的物質形態）、法處色（意識所緣的物質形態）、內五塵色（內在的五種感覺對像）、外五塵色（外在的五種感覺對像）。如果五根色具備異熟、長養。等流之中只有前兩種。內扶塵（支援感覺器官的物質）中可以有第四種等流（自性等流），而沒有第三種（變壞等流）。雖然有衰變，但也是異熟，不稱為變異。外塵之中只有變異和自性等流，而沒有長養和異熟。因為疏遠增上，所以不是異熟。因為不是內色，所以不是長養。法處色中，如果是定果（禪定之果），有互相增盛、處所寬遍，參照《瑜伽師地論》的說法。
【English Translation】 English version 'No matter. Difficulty Fourth is the same as Difficulty Fifth. The four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) can support form (material phenomena), so it is said that the four great elements are the cause of growth and nourishment. Food and drink can also support the roots (sense organs), so they can also be called the cause of growth and nourishment.' 'Answer: The meaning of the support of the great elements (the four great elements) is broad, so the four great elements are called the long cause. Food and drink support internally, and its meaning is narrow, so it is not called the cause of growth and nourishment.' 'Question: If so, why are sleep, dreams, pure conduct (virtuous behavior), and samadhi (concentrated state) said to be the four nutrients, and not the great elements?' 'Answer: The growth and nourishment of sleep, etc., include both internal and external aspects, so only the four causes of growth and nourishment are mentioned. The great elements create and nourish form, but cannot nourish themselves, it is only individual nourishment, not the cause of growth and nourishment. However, there are three meanings: first, Vipaka (retribution); second, growth and nourishment; third, Nisyanda (similar flow). Among the Nisyanda, there are four types: first, Vipaka; second, growth and nourishment; third, change and decay; fourth, Svabhava Nisyanda (self-nature flow). Place the previously created karma into these three categories to see which ones have three, which ones have one or two, and so on. All dharmas are like this.' 'All dharmas have two types, namely conditioned dharmas (dharmas arising from causes and conditions) and unconditioned dharmas (dharmas that do not arise or cease). Unconditioned dharmas are permanent and do not depend on the great creation (the four great elements). Among conditioned dharmas, there are three types: mind (mental phenomena), form (material phenomena), and non-associated formations (phenomena that are neither material nor mental). Non-associated formations are the hypothetical establishment of the previous two phenomena and will not be explained separately. Among the previous two, first explain the mind, and briefly distinguish it in the three categories. The mind possesses Vipaka. There are two types of Vipaka: first, general Vipaka; second, specific Vipaka. If it is the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness) and mental factors, it is general Vipaka. If it arises later, it is specific Vipaka. The Vipaka in the first six consciousnesses is only specific Vipaka. If based on the initial arising, it can be called general Vipaka, then it possesses both types of Vipaka. In growth and nourishment, it only increases each other and does not have the pervasiveness of location. In Nisyanda, there is no change Nisyanda. The meaning of the distinction of the mind can be understood by careful consideration.' 'Second, explain form. Form is divided into four types: the form of the five roots (the material form of the five sense organs), the form of the dharma realm (the material form perceived by consciousness), the internal five dusts (the internal five sense objects), and the external five dusts (the external five sense objects). If the form of the five roots possesses Vipaka and growth and nourishment. Among the Nisyanda, there are only the first two types. In the internal supporting dust (the material supporting the sense organs), there can be the fourth type of Nisyanda (Svabhava Nisyanda), but not the third type (change and decay Nisyanda). Although there is decay, it is also Vipaka and is not called change. Among the external dusts, there are only change and Svabhava Nisyanda, but no growth and nourishment or Vipaka. Because it is distant and increasing, it is not Vipaka. Because it is not internal form, it is not growth and nourishment. In the form of the dharma realm, if it is the result of samadhi, there is mutual increase and pervasiveness of location, refer to the explanation in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra.'
文非是異熟。等流之中除初及第三。無表色得有相增長養。而無處寬遍也。非業果故非異熟。等流之中無異熟等流及變異等流。極略．極迥大乘觀心中起。但有長養相增盛。非異熟．等流。如無表色說。若小乘．外道異熟心起。非業親感。非異熟故。執積微成地。即具后三等流后應更詳 塵大互造四句。一唯能造非所造。一切有部四大唯能造。二唯所造非能造。謂眼等色根。諸部皆同唯所造。三亦能造亦所造。即師子宗四大。及數論五大。闕第四句。
釋法處色。西明問云。大乘法處實色是有礙不。解云諸法處色皆是無對。如無色界諸宮殿等皆是無對以法處故。問變大地為金。水為蘇．酪等。如何無對耶。解云定所變色有其二種。一者有對。二者無對。若法處色即是無對。變為色等即是有對者 未詳此釋。且定通起色等五塵。對五識別即此色等名為有對者。何故諸論不說色等中有定等起色耶。又設五取名為色等。根．境相例應俱無礙。何者大論中說。等心諸天變身萬億。共立毛端空量地等。既云共立毛端空量地等。即同一處互不相礙。豈名有礙。不同同處不相離色由相隨順。一因所引同是一根等故。大小同許如五根境。若自若他大小同許體為有對。今既共立毛端。並有自他根境。如何不礙。又亦不同外器世界許
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 文（Vipāka）並非是異熟（Vipāka）。在等流果（Nisyanda-phala）之中，除了最初和第三個，無表色（Avijñapti-rūpa）可以有相增長和滋養，但沒有處所的寬廣和普遍性。因為它不是業果（Karma-phala），所以不是異熟。在等流果之中，沒有異熟等流果和變異等流果。在極其簡略、極其遙遠的大乘觀心中生起，只有長養相的增盛，不是異熟果和等流果。如同無表色的說法。如果小乘（Hinayana）、外道（Tirthika）的異熟心生起，不是業力親身感受，因為它不是異熟果。執著積微成地，就具備后三等流果，之後應該更詳細地探討。塵大互相構造有四種情況：一是隻能構造而不能被構造，一切有部（Sarvāstivāda）的四大（Mahābhūta）只能構造。二是隻能被構造而不能構造，指的是眼等色根（Rūpa-indriya），各部派都相同，只能被構造。三是既能構造也能被構造，指的是師子宗的四大，以及數論（Sāṃkhya）的五大（Pañca-mahābhūta）。缺少第四種情況。
解釋法處色（Dharmāyatana-rūpa）。西明（Xi Ming）問道：『大乘（Mahāyāna）法處實色是有礙（Sapratiha）的嗎？』解答說：『諸法處色都是無對（Apratigha）的。』如同無**的諸宮殿等，都是無對，因為是法處。問道：『將大地變為黃金，水變為酥油、乳酪等，如何是無對呢？』解答說：『定（Samādhi）所變之色有兩種，一種是有對，一種是無對。如果是法處色，就是無對；變為色等，就是有對。』未詳細探討這個解釋。且定通（Samādhi-siddhi）能生起色等五塵（Pañca-viṣaya），對五識別（Pañca-vijñāna）來說，這些色等名為有對。為什麼諸論中不說色等中有定等起色呢？又假設五取（Pañca-upādānaskandha）名為色等，根（Indriya）、境（Viṣaya）相互類比，應該都無礙。』何者大論中說：『等心諸天（Deva）變身萬億，共同建立毛端空量地等。』既然說共同建立毛端空量地等，即同一處互相不相妨礙，豈能稱為有礙？不同於同處不相離的色，因為互相隨順，一因所引導，同是一根等，所以大小相同，如同五根境。如果自己或他人大小相同，體為有對。現在既然共同建立在毛端上，並且有自己和他人的根境，如何不相妨礙？又不同於外器世界（Bhājana-loka）的許可。
【English Translation】 English version: Vipāka (Vipāka) is not the same as heterogenous maturation. Among the outflowing results (Nisyanda-phala), except for the first and third, non-manifest form (Avijñapti-rūpa) can have growth and nourishment, but it does not have the breadth and universality of a place. Because it is not a karmic result (Karma-phala), it is not heterogenous maturation. Among the outflowing results, there are no heterogenous maturation outflowing results or transformation outflowing results. It arises in the extremely brief and extremely distant Mahāyāna contemplation mind, and only has the increase of the nourishing aspect; it is not heterogenous maturation or outflowing result. It is like the saying about non-manifest form. If the heterogenous maturation mind of the Hinayana or Tirthika arises, it is not personally felt by karmic force, because it is not heterogenous maturation. Holding onto the accumulation of minute particles to form the earth, it possesses the latter three outflowing results, which should be discussed in more detail later. There are four situations for the mutual construction of the great elements of dust: first, only able to construct but not be constructed, the four great elements (Mahābhūta) of the Sarvāstivāda can only construct. Second, only able to be constructed but not construct, referring to the sense organs of sight, etc. (Rūpa-indriya), which are the same in all schools, only able to be constructed. Third, both able to construct and be constructed, referring to the four great elements of the Simha school, and the five great elements (Pañca-mahābhūta) of the Sāṃkhya. The fourth situation is missing.
Explaining the form of the Dharma-āyatana (Dharmāyatana-rūpa). Xi Ming asked: 'Is the real form of the Dharma-āyatana in Mahāyāna obstructive (Sapratiha)?' The answer is: 'All forms of the Dharma-āyatana are non-resistant (Apratigha).' Like the palaces without **, etc., they are all non-resistant because they are Dharma-āyatana. Asked: 'How is it non-resistant to transform the earth into gold, and water into ghee and cheese, etc.?' The answer is: 'The form transformed by Samādhi has two types, one is obstructive, and the other is non-resistant. If it is the form of the Dharma-āyatana, it is non-resistant; if it is transformed into form, etc., it is obstructive.' This explanation has not been explored in detail. Moreover, Samādhi-siddhi can generate the five dusts of form, etc. (Pañca-viṣaya), and for the five consciousnesses (Pañca-vijñāna), these forms are called obstructive. Why do the treatises not say that there are forms arising from Samādhi among the forms, etc.? Also, assuming that the five aggregates (Pañca-upādānaskandha) are called forms, etc., the sense organs (Indriya) and objects (Viṣaya) are analogous to each other, and should all be unobstructed.' What the great treatise says is: 'The gods (Deva) with equal minds transform into hundreds of millions of bodies, and jointly establish the space of a hair tip, etc.' Since it is said that they jointly establish the space of a hair tip, etc., that is, they do not hinder each other in the same place, how can they be called obstructive? It is different from the form that is not separated in the same place, because they follow each other, guided by one cause, and are the same sense organ, etc., so the size is the same, like the five sense objects. If the size of oneself or others is the same, the body is obstructive. Now that they are jointly established on the tip of a hair, and there are the sense organs and objects of oneself and others, how can they not hinder each other? It is also different from the permission of the external world (Bhājana-loka).
共業感同處不礙。根非共感如何不礙。由此準知。定等起色是無質礙。論自說故 若爾定等準論所說是法處攝。豈許五識緣法處耶 答許亦何過 違諸論說根．境相對五識所緣是五塵故。此論復云勿粗相識緣細相境故 答亦無違。前據自力故作此說。若他力引則不決定。故第二云。定通等力則不決定 又問法處有實色不 答許有實。即唯定等所起之色。非餘四種。余皆假故 既定等生許有實色何無質礙 答亦無違。以定等因自在起故。不同業色。說質礙故名為色者。據業所生五根境說。非據定等所生色說 又釋實色亦是有礙。說法處色為無礙者據假色說。此義亦難。幾識緣礙非礙當更尋文。
論云眼等識外所緣緣理非有故。疏云總非十八者。何也。若云除根本部。即應十七。以一說部無實境故。應除一說及出世部。出世部說世間皆妄故。此雖可爾出世如何。故本意說隨古人說云總非十八。據實二十 若爾一說云何破耶 執有虛妄外所緣緣故今破之。不爾一說豈知唯識。
論云勿第二月等能生五識故。準瞿波師二十唯識釋。一云唯意識得。此中為五識喻。非緣義等故無有過。以五識是有法收。同喻無有無所立過。此意若以和合為有法。於五識設所緣非緣為法。即喻中有所立不成過。以經部師亦不許五緣第二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
共業所感的眾生即使處在同一地方，也不會互相妨礙。如果根不是共同感受的，又如何能不互相妨礙呢？由此可以推知，由禪定等產生的色法是沒有質礙的，這是論著自己說的。如果這樣，禪定等所產生的色法按照論著所說，應屬於法處所攝。難道允許五識緣法處嗎？回答是：允許，又有什麼過錯呢？這違反了各種論著所說，根和境相對，五識所緣的是五塵。此論又說，不要讓粗糙的相識緣細微的相境。回答是：也沒有違背。前面是根據自力而這樣說的。如果是他力引導，則不一定。所以第二種說法是，禪定等的力量相同，則不一定。又問：法處有真實的色法嗎？回答是：允許有真實的色法，就是唯有禪定等所產生的色法，不是其餘四種。其餘四種都是虛假的。既然禪定等產生，允許有真實的色法，為什麼沒有質礙呢？回答是：也沒有違背。因為禪定等是因自在而產生的，不同於業力所生的色法。說質礙的緣故而稱為色法，是根據業力所生的五根和境來說的，不是根據禪定等所生的色法來說的。又解釋說，真實的色法也是有礙的。說法處色為無礙，是根據假色來說的。這個意義也很難理解。哪些識緣有礙，哪些識緣無礙，應當更深入地研究經文。
論中說，眼等識之外的所緣緣，道理上是不存在的。疏中說，總的來說不是十八界，是什麼意思呢？如果說是除去根本部，就應該是十七界。因為一說部沒有真實的境。應該除去一說部和出世部。出世部說世間都是虛妄的。這樣說也可以，但出世部如何解釋呢？所以本意是說，按照古人的說法，總的來說不是十八界，實際上是二十界。如果這樣，一說部如何破斥呢？因為他們執著有虛妄的外所緣緣，所以現在破斥他們。不然的話，一說部怎麼會知道唯識呢？
論中說，不要讓第二個月亮等產生五識。按照瞿波師的《二十唯識釋》，一種說法是隻有意識才能緣。這裡用五識來比喻，不是緣的意思等，所以沒有過失。因為五識是有法所包含的，相同的比喻沒有無所立的過失。這個意思是，如果以和合為有法，對於五識設立所緣非緣為法，那麼比喻中就有所立不成之過。因為經部師也不允許五識緣第二月亮。 English version:
Co-arising karma does not obstruct even when beings are in the same place. If the roots are not co-experienced, how can they not obstruct each other? From this, it can be inferred that the form arising from Samadhi (定) and the like is without material obstruction. This is stated in the treatise itself. If that is the case, then according to the treatise, the form arising from Samadhi and the like should be included in the 'Dharma-sphere' (法處). Is it permissible for the five consciousnesses to perceive the Dharma-sphere? The answer is: Yes, what fault is there in that? This contradicts the various treatises which state that when roots and objects are in relation, the five consciousnesses perceive the five sense objects (五塵). Furthermore, this treatise states, 'Do not let the coarse consciousness perceive the subtle object.' The answer is: There is no contradiction. The former statement was made based on one's own power. If guided by external power, it is not definite. Therefore, the second statement is, 'If the power of Samadhi and the like is equal, it is not definite.' Furthermore, it is asked: Does the Dharma-sphere have real form? The answer is: It is permissible to have real form, which is only the form arising from Samadhi and the like, not the other four types. The others are all false. Since it is permissible to have real form arising from Samadhi and the like, why is there no material obstruction? The answer is: There is no contradiction. Because Samadhi and the like arise from unconditioned causes, they are different from the form arising from karma. The reason why form is called 'material obstruction' is based on the five roots and objects arising from karma, not based on the form arising from Samadhi and the like. Furthermore, it is explained that real form is also obstructive. The statement that the form of the Dharma-sphere is unobstructed is based on false form. This meaning is also difficult to understand. Which consciousnesses perceive obstruction, and which perceive non-obstruction, should be further investigated in the scriptures.
The treatise states, 'The object-condition (所緣緣) outside of the eye consciousness and the like does not exist in principle.' The commentary states, 'In general, it is not the eighteen realms, what does this mean?' If it means excluding the fundamental school, then it should be seventeen realms. Because the Ekavyāvahārika (一說部) school does not have real objects. The Ekavyāvahārika school and the Lokottaravāda (出世部) school should be excluded. The Lokottaravāda school says that the world is all illusory. This may be acceptable, but how to explain the Lokottaravāda school? Therefore, the original intention is to say that according to the ancients, in general, it is not the eighteen realms, but in reality, it is twenty realms. If that is the case, how does one refute the Ekavyāvahārika school? Because they cling to the existence of illusory external object-conditions, we now refute them. Otherwise, how would the Ekavyāvahārika school know about Consciousness-only (唯識)?
The treatise states, 'Do not let the second moon (第二月亮) and the like produce the five consciousnesses.' According to Guṇamati's (瞿波師) commentary on the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (二十唯識釋), one view is that only consciousness can perceive it. Here, the five consciousnesses are used as a metaphor, not in the sense of perception, so there is no fault. Because the five consciousnesses are included in the 'possessor of the property' (有法), the same metaphor does not have the fault of 'unestablished property' (無所立). The meaning of this is that if co-arising is taken as the 'possessor of the property', and the perceived/non-perceived object is established as the 'property' (法) for the five consciousnesses, then there is the fault of 'unestablished property' in the metaphor. Because the Sautrāntika (經部師) school also does not allow the five consciousnesses to perceive the second moon.
【English Translation】 English version:
Co-arising karma does not obstruct even when beings are in the same place. If the roots are not co-experienced, how can they not obstruct each other? From this, it can be inferred that the form arising from Samadhi (定) and the like is without material obstruction. This is stated in the treatise itself. If that is the case, then according to the treatise, the form arising from Samadhi and the like should be included in the 'Dharma-sphere' (法處). Is it permissible for the five consciousnesses to perceive the Dharma-sphere? The answer is: Yes, what fault is there in that? This contradicts the various treatises which state that when roots and objects are in relation, the five consciousnesses perceive the five sense objects (五塵). Furthermore, this treatise states, 'Do not let the coarse consciousness perceive the subtle object.' The answer is: There is no contradiction. The former statement was made based on one's own power. If guided by external power, it is not definite. Therefore, the second statement is, 'If the power of Samadhi and the like is equal, it is not definite.' Furthermore, it is asked: Does the Dharma-sphere have real form? The answer is: It is permissible to have real form, which is only the form arising from Samadhi and the like, not the other four types. The others are all false. Since it is permissible to have real form arising from Samadhi and the like, why is there no material obstruction? The answer is: There is no contradiction. Because Samadhi and the like arise from unconditioned causes, they are different from the form arising from karma. The reason why form is called 'material obstruction' is based on the five roots and objects arising from karma, not based on the form arising from Samadhi and the like. Furthermore, it is explained that real form is also obstructive. The statement that the form of the Dharma-sphere is unobstructed is based on false form. This meaning is also difficult to understand. Which consciousnesses perceive obstruction, and which perceive non-obstruction, should be further investigated in the scriptures.
The treatise states, 'The object-condition (所緣緣) outside of the eye consciousness and the like does not exist in principle.' The commentary states, 'In general, it is not the eighteen realms, what does this mean?' If it means excluding the fundamental school, then it should be seventeen realms. Because the Ekavyāvahārika (一說部) school does not have real objects. The Ekavyāvahārika school and the Lokottaravāda (出世部) school should be excluded. The Lokottaravāda school says that the world is all illusory. This may be acceptable, but how to explain the Lokottaravāda school? Therefore, the original intention is to say that according to the ancients, in general, it is not the eighteen realms, but in reality, it is twenty realms. If that is the case, how does one refute the Ekavyāvahārika school? Because they cling to the existence of illusory external object-conditions, we now refute them. Otherwise, how would the Ekavyāvahārika school know about Consciousness-only (唯識)?
The treatise states, 'Do not let the second moon (第二月亮) and the like produce the five consciousnesses.' According to Guṇamati's (瞿波師) commentary on the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (二十唯識釋), one view is that only consciousness can perceive it. Here, the five consciousnesses are used as a metaphor, not in the sense of perception, so there is no fault. Because the five consciousnesses are included in the 'possessor of the property' (有法), the same metaphor does not have the fault of 'unestablished property' (無所立). The meaning of this is that if co-arising is taken as the 'possessor of the property', and the perceived/non-perceived object is established as the 'property' (法) for the five consciousnesses, then there is the fault of 'unestablished property' in the metaphor. Because the Sautrāntika (經部師) school also does not allow the five consciousnesses to perceive the second moon.
月故。今既和合於五識名有法。設所緣非緣為法。五識既在有法。第二月是第六所緣。以無體故不是緣義。故得為喻。無所立不成過。具解如疏 有釋云。瞿波二解一許五識緣第二月。護法不許。評二說中瞿波順文違理。以緣月故順文。而現量識緣非量境故違于義 今謂理難。若現量識緣非量境。即違理者。遍計所執聖者達無。得說遍計為凡聖境。五緣非量境違何正理。設許非理亦非順文。觀所緣云。設所緣非緣。明非實許。故護法勝。
破經部宗中所緣緣義者。有云。如聚實微以成假色。即以實微為緣。假相為所緣。別起行相攝屬見分。即當大乘相分所攝。他攝此相為行相故說為見分。十九部同。今者經部取彼假相故離識取。若爾假相非五識緣。實微是緣。云何破彼雲和合相應非五緣。彼已自許假相非緣。今者破他相符之失 今解云。泛說所緣緣即如彼解。據實和合能生識故即為緣也。所以破之 問如經部說積微為粗攬多法故是假非實。依大乘宗且如眼識及同時心所所帶相分。皆各熏成本質之種後生現行。為從一起。為多共成。若從一起熏習同時勢力復等。有生不生不應道理。若許皆生即各各別。心王心所不同一所緣。若多共生如何非假 答不同彼許不以種體和合成一。以別別種共生一現。以本同緣於一質故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
月亮是虛幻的。現在既然和合於五識，名為有法（具有性質的事物）。假設所緣非緣為法（作為一種法則）。五識既然在有法中，第二個月亮是第六識所緣。因為沒有實體，所以不是緣的意義。所以可以作為比喻。沒有所立不成（沒有成立的根據）的過失。詳細解釋如疏（註釋）。
有一種解釋說，瞿波（Gopa，人名）有兩種解釋，一種是允許五識緣第二個月亮，護法（Dharmapala，佛教論師）不允許。評論這兩種說法，瞿波順從字面意思但違背道理。因為緣月亮所以順從字面意思，而現量識緣非量境（不是真實存在的境界）所以違背義理。
現在認為這個道理難以成立。如果現量識緣非量境，就違背道理，那麼遍計所執（普遍計度的執著）聖者通達為無，就可以說遍計為凡聖境。五緣（五種緣）非量境違背了什麼正理？假設允許不合道理，也不是順從字面意思。觀察所緣說，假設所緣非緣，表明並非真實允許。所以護法更勝一籌。
破斥經部宗（Sautrantika，佛教部派）中所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya，四緣之一，指認識對像）的意義。有人說，如聚集實微（真實的微塵）以形成假色（虛假的顏色），即以實微為緣，假相為所緣。別起行相（不同的行為狀態）攝屬見分（認識的主體部分）。即相當於大乘（Mahayana）的相分（認識的客體部分）所攝。他攝此相作為行相，所以說為見分。十九部（佛教的十九個部派）都相同。現在經部取彼假相所以離識取（離開意識去獲取）。如果這樣，假相不是五識所緣，實微是緣。如何破斥他們說和合相應不是五緣？他們已經自己承認假相不是緣。現在破斥他們有自相矛盾的過失。
現在的解釋是，泛泛地說所緣緣就像他們解釋的那樣。根據實際情況，和合能夠產生意識，所以就是緣。所以要破斥他們。
問：如經部所說，積累微塵成為粗大之物，因為包含多種法所以是假而不是真。依照大乘宗，比如眼識以及同時的心所（citta-caitta，心理活動）所帶的相分，都各自熏成本質的種子，然後產生現行（實際的活動），是從一起產生，還是多個共同形成？如果從一起熏習，同時勢力又相等，有產生不產生是不應道理的。如果允許都產生，即各各不同，心王（主要的意識）心所不同一所緣。如果多個共同產生，如何不是虛假的？
答：不同於他們的觀點，不以種子的本體和合成為一個。以不同的種子共同產生一個現象。因為本來共同緣於一個本質。
【English Translation】 English version:
The moon is illusory. Now that it is combined with the five consciousnesses, it is called 'having dharma' (something possessing qualities). Suppose the object of cognition is not a condition, considering it as a principle. Since the five consciousnesses are within 'having dharma', the second moon is the object of cognition for the sixth consciousness. Because it has no substance, it is not the meaning of a condition. Therefore, it can be used as a metaphor. There is no fault of 'unestablished probandum' (lack of a basis for the argument). Detailed explanation is as in the commentary.
One explanation says that Gopa (a person's name) has two interpretations: one allows the five consciousnesses to cognize the second moon, while Dharmapala (a Buddhist philosopher) does not allow it. Commenting on these two views, Gopa follows the literal meaning but violates the principle. Because he cognizes the moon, he follows the literal meaning, but the direct perception consciousness cognizes a non-veridical object, thus violating the principle.
Now, it is argued that this principle is difficult to establish. If the direct perception consciousness cognizes a non-veridical object, which violates the principle, then the 'imaginarily constructed' (parikalpita, one of the three natures) is realized as non-existent by the sages, and it can be said that the 'imaginarily constructed' is the object for both ordinary beings and sages. What valid reasoning does the 'five conditions' (five types of conditions) violating a non-veridical object contradict? Even if we allow it to be unreasonable, it is not following the literal meaning. Observing the object of cognition, it says, 'Suppose the object of cognition is not a condition,' indicating that it is not truly allowed. Therefore, Dharmapala is superior.
Refuting the Sautrantika (a Buddhist school) school's meaning of 'object condition' (ālambana-pratyaya, one of the four conditions, referring to the object of cognition). Some say that just as the aggregation of real atoms forms an unreal color, the real atoms are the condition, and the unreal appearance is the object of cognition. Different modes of activity arise, belonging to the 'seeing-part' (the subjective aspect of cognition). This is equivalent to what is included in the 'image-part' (the objective aspect of cognition) in Mahayana (the Great Vehicle). The 'other' takes this appearance as the mode of activity, so it is called the 'seeing-part'. All nineteen schools (of Buddhism) agree on this. Now, the Sautrantika takes that unreal appearance, so it apprehends it separately from consciousness. If that is the case, the unreal appearance is not the object of the five consciousnesses, and the real atoms are the condition. How can they refute them by saying that combination and correspondence are not the five conditions? They have already admitted that the unreal appearance is not a condition. Now, refuting them has the fault of self-contradiction.
The current explanation is that, generally speaking, the 'object condition' is as they explain it. According to the actual situation, combination can generate consciousness, so it is a condition. That is why they are refuted.
Question: As the Sautrantika says, the accumulation of atoms becomes a coarse object, and because it contains many dharmas, it is unreal rather than real. According to the Mahayana school, for example, the image-part brought about by the eye consciousness and simultaneous mental factors (citta-caitta, mental activities) each individually perfumed the seed of the essence, and then produces the manifest activity. Does it arise from one, or is it formed by many together? If it is perfumed from one, and the simultaneous forces are equal, it is unreasonable for it to sometimes arise and sometimes not. If it is allowed that they all arise, then they are all different, and the 'mind-king' (the main consciousness) and mental factors do not have the same object of cognition. If many jointly produce it, how is it not unreal?
Answer: It is different from their view; it does not combine the essence of the seeds into one. Different seeds jointly produce one phenomenon. Because they originally share the same object in one essence.
。種在一識所生之色一體密合。故不是假。又復彼許離實無別和合相故。故相是假。大乘種．現不定一故。所以是實。又設許假非無體假故五識緣。彼無體假故非五緣。
破古薩婆多雲。非諸極微共和合位可與五識各作所緣此識上無極彼相故者要集云。本末二計婆沙俱舍及正理論自有識證。第二粗相曾未見教。有說一一各發粗相不異和集。此難準知 今謂不爾。何者準此論文。新薩婆多既云展轉相資有粗相生。故知古師七極微聚雖不相資有粗相起。然由七聚有似粗相。不爾寧許為五識緣。等極微故。又新翻古。既說相資有粗相起。明知古師雖有粗相不由相資。故本末異 彼云。第二粗相曾未見教。即此論說可非教耶。故慈恩．西明所說不謬。又云有說一一各發粗相不異和集。此亦難知 今謂極顯。前文古師共和合位。可與五識各作所緣。即有粗相但不相資。新薩婆多后更正解展轉相資。有粗相生為五識境。在文極顯何謂難知。
問破薩婆多雲。瓶甌等物極微等者。緣彼相識應無差別者。為五識緣為不緣耶。若非五識緣。云何破五根境中說。若五識緣。彼宗不許五識緣假。若瓶等非假。云何前破能成極微。取以為喻破非實有耶 西明云瓶等是假。是意識緣。若爾彼救。瓶．甌極微體雖無異。而妄意識生覺解
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由一識所生的色法，其種子與現行是一體且緊密結合的，因此不是假法。而且，他們認為離開實法就沒有其他的和合相，所以和合相是假法。大乘認為種子和現行不一定是同一的，所以是實法。又假設是假法，也不是沒有自體的假法，所以五識可以緣取。因為沒有自體的假法，所以五識不能緣取。
破斥古薩婆多部的觀點：『不是所有的極微在共和合位時都可以作為五識的所緣，因為五識上沒有極微的相狀。』《要集》中說：『本末二計、婆沙、俱舍以及正理論都有識的證明，第二粗相從未在教典中見過。』有人說：『每一個極微各自生起粗相，與和合的粗相沒有區別。』這個說法難以理解。現在我認為不是這樣。根據此論文，新薩婆多部既然說展轉相資才能生起粗相，就知道古師認為七個極微聚集在一起，即使不互相資助也能生起粗相。如果不是這樣，怎麼能允許作為五識的所緣呢？因為它們與極微相同。而且新譯的古義，既然說互相資助才能生起粗相，就說明古師認為即使有粗相也不是互相資助產生的。所以本末不同。他們說：『第二粗相從未在教典中見過。』難道此論的說法就不是教典嗎？所以慈恩和西明所說沒有錯誤。又說：『有人說每一個極微各自生起粗相，與和合的粗相沒有區別。』這個說法也很難理解。現在我認為非常明顯。前文古師認為共和合位可以作為五識的所緣，就是有粗相但不互相資助。新薩婆多部後來更正解釋為展轉相資，生起粗相作為五識的境界。在文中非常明顯，為什麼說難以理解？
問：破斥薩婆多部說：『瓶子、甌子等物體都是極微組成的，緣取它們的相的識應該沒有差別。』那麼，五識是緣取還是不緣取呢？如果不是五識緣取，為什麼要在破斥五根境中說？如果是五識緣取，他們宗派不承認五識緣取假法。如果瓶子等不是假法，為什麼前面破斥能成極微，用它們作為比喻來破斥不是實有呢？西明說瓶子等是假法，是意識緣取的。如果是這樣，他們辯解說：『瓶子、甌子的本體雖然沒有差別，但是虛妄的意識會產生覺解。』
【English Translation】 English version: The seed and manifestation of form produced by one consciousness are integrated and closely combined, therefore it is not a false phenomenon. Moreover, they believe that there is no other combined aspect apart from the real phenomenon, so the combined aspect is a false phenomenon. Mahayana believes that the seed and manifestation are not necessarily the same, so it is a real phenomenon. Furthermore, assuming it is a false phenomenon, it is not a false phenomenon without substance, so the five consciousnesses can perceive it. Because it is a false phenomenon without substance, the five consciousnesses cannot perceive it.
Refuting the view of the ancient Sarvastivadins: 'Not all atoms in the state of combination can be the object of the five consciousnesses, because there is no appearance of atoms on the five consciousnesses.' The Yaoji says: 'The two accounts of the original and the end, the Vibhasa, the Kosa, and the Nyayanusara, all have the proof of consciousness. The second coarse aspect has never been seen in the teachings.' Some say: 'Each atom individually produces a coarse aspect, which is no different from the combined coarse aspect.' This statement is difficult to understand. Now I think it is not so. According to this thesis, since the new Sarvastivadins say that coarse aspects can only arise through mutual support, it is known that the ancient teachers believed that even if seven atoms gathered together without mutual support, coarse aspects could arise. If not, how could they be allowed to be the object of the five consciousnesses? Because they are the same as atoms. Moreover, the newly translated ancient meaning says that coarse aspects arise through mutual support, which shows that the ancient teachers believed that even if there were coarse aspects, they were not produced by mutual support. Therefore, the original and the end are different. They say: 'The second coarse aspect has never been seen in the teachings.' Is the statement in this treatise not a teaching? Therefore, what Ci'en and Ximing said is not wrong. It is also said: 'Some say that each atom individually produces a coarse aspect, which is no different from the combined coarse aspect.' This statement is also difficult to understand. Now I think it is very clear. In the previous text, the ancient teachers believed that the state of combination could be the object of the five consciousnesses, that is, there are coarse aspects but they do not support each other. The new Sarvastivadins later corrected the interpretation to say that coarse aspects arise through mutual support as the object of the five consciousnesses. It is very clear in the text, so why is it said to be difficult to understand?
Question: Refuting the Sarvastivadins, saying: 'Objects such as bottles and bowls are all composed of atoms, and the consciousnesses that perceive their appearances should be no different.' Then, do the five consciousnesses perceive them or not? If they are not perceived by the five consciousnesses, why is it said in the refutation of the five sense objects? If they are perceived by the five consciousnesses, their sect does not admit that the five consciousnesses perceive false phenomena. If bottles and the like are not false phenomena, why did the previous refutation use them as metaphors to refute that atoms are not real? Ximing said that bottles and the like are false phenomena, which are perceived by the consciousness. If so, they argue: 'Although there is no difference in the substance of bottles and bowls, the deluded consciousness will produce perception and understanding.'
故。如大乘師意亂生解 此亦不爾。大乘亂意所緣境無。如空花等。彼有體故 又問若見意境何故五境中破。意境應是法處收故 答如大乘宗長短等色亦色處故 今又助解。瓶．甌等假五雖不緣。彼計長等依瓶等有。體實有故是五識境。故觀所緣云。非形別故別。故知正難長等形色。舉長等色所依瓶．甌。以因瓶．甌顯長．短等。非正為喻。如舉空．瓶為常．無常二喻依等。然不障依亂不亂識緣境虛實故。有引瞿波論師云。五識及根亂不亂故引三種意生。既言識．根俱亂不亂。明五亦緣第二月也 有人改三為二。意緣于假及實二境故 西明云。三種意識緣三境別。故云三意。謂一緣假。二緣實。三緣二。故云三意 此非薩婆多義。不可為證 今更解云。彼許五識緣瓶等假。以有體故。不爾何故在五境破。
成唯識論了義燈卷第二(本)
成唯識論了義燈卷第二(末)
言非粗相識緣細相境。集云。有說汝緣瓶粗相之識。即是緣微細相之識。若許爾者。量云。汝緣色之識。亦應緣聲。計相違法得俱緣故。如粗細境者。此量喻中所立不成過。緣粗細心非緣聲等故不成喻。彼粗細境非聲等故者 此破不爾。敘量不依本疏所說。本疏量云。汝餘聲等境。其緣余色境之識應亦得緣。許相違法得俱緣故。此量以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，如果像大乘的老師那樣，由於心意混亂而產生錯誤的理解，這裡的情況並非如此。大乘的混亂心意所緣的境界是不存在的，比如空中的花朵等。因為它們沒有實體。又有人問：如果意識能夠見到意境，為什麼要在五境中破斥意境呢？意境應該被歸類為法處所攝。回答：就像大乘宗派認為長短等顏色也是色處一樣。現在進一步解釋，瓶子、甌子等假立之物，雖然五識不能直接緣取，但他們認為長短等是依附於瓶子等而存在的。因為它們有真實的體性，所以是五識的境界。因此，《觀所緣論》說：『並非因為形狀不同而不同。』由此可知，真正要駁斥的是長短等形狀顏色。舉出長短等顏色所依附的瓶子、甌子，是爲了通過瓶子、甌子來顯現長短等，並非真正作為比喻。就像舉出虛空、瓶子作為常、無常二者的比喻所依一樣。然而，這並不妨礙依附於混亂或不混亂的識來緣取境界的虛實。有人引用瞿波論師的觀點說：『五識和根是混亂或不混亂的。』因此引用三種意生。既然說識和根都是混亂或不混亂的，就說明五識也能緣取第二個月亮。有人將三種改為兩種，認為意識緣取假和實兩種境界。西明法師說：『三種意識緣取三種不同的境界，所以稱為三種意。』即一種緣取假境，一種緣取實境，一種緣取假實二境。所以稱為三種意。這並非薩婆多部的觀點，不能作為證據。現在進一步解釋，他們承認五識緣取瓶子等假立之物，因為它們有實體。否則，為什麼要在五境中破斥它們呢？ 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第二（本） 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第二（末） 說不是粗相的識緣取細相的境。《集論》中說：『有人說你緣取瓶子粗相的識，就是緣取微細相的識。』如果允許這樣，那麼可以這樣推論：『你緣取顏色的識，也應該緣取聲音，因為承認相違的事物可以同時緣取。就像粗細境一樣。』這個量式中的比喻所立不成過失，因為緣取粗細的心不是緣取聲音等，所以不成比喻。他們說：『粗細境不是聲音等。』這樣破斥是不對的。敘述量式沒有依據本疏所說。本疏中的量式是：『你緣取聲音等境界，那麼緣取顏色境界的識也應該能夠緣取聲音等，因為承認相違的事物可以同時緣取。』這個量式以...
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, if, like the teachers of Mahayana, erroneous understanding arises due to mental confusion, this is not the case here. The object of the confused mind in Mahayana does not exist, such as flowers in the sky, etc., because they have no substance. Furthermore, someone asks: If consciousness can see the object of mind, why is the object of mind refuted in the five objects? The object of mind should be categorized as being included in the sphere of Dharma. The answer is: Just as the Mahayana school believes that colors such as long and short are also within the sphere of color. Now, to further explain, although the five consciousnesses cannot directly grasp fabricated things such as bottles and bowls, they believe that length, etc., exist dependent on bottles, etc. Because they have a real nature, they are the realm of the five consciousnesses. Therefore, the Guan Suo Yuan Lun (Treatise on the Observed Object) says: 'It is not different because of different shapes.' From this, it can be known that what is truly being refuted is the shape and color of length, etc. Mentioning the bottles and bowls on which the colors of length, etc., depend is to reveal length, etc., through the bottles and bowls, and is not truly used as a metaphor. It is like mentioning emptiness and a bottle as the basis for the two metaphors of permanence and impermanence. However, this does not prevent relying on confused or unconfused consciousness to grasp the reality or unreality of the object. Someone quotes the view of the teacher Gopa, saying: 'The five consciousnesses and roots are confused or unconfused.' Therefore, three kinds of mind-born (consciousness) are cited. Since it is said that both consciousness and roots are confused or unconfused, it shows that the five consciousnesses can also grasp the second moon. Someone changes the three kinds to two, believing that consciousness grasps two kinds of objects, false and real. The master Ximing said: 'The three kinds of consciousness grasp three different realms, so they are called three kinds of mind.' That is, one grasps the false realm, one grasps the real realm, and one grasps both the false and real realms. Therefore, they are called three kinds of mind. This is not the view of the Sarvastivada school and cannot be used as evidence. Now, to further explain, they admit that the five consciousnesses grasp fabricated things such as bottles because they have substance. Otherwise, why would they be refuted in the five objects? Cheng Weishi Lun Liaoyi Deng (Commentary on the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra) Volume 2 (Beginning) Cheng Weishi Lun Liaoyi Deng (Commentary on the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra) Volume 2 (End) It is said that the consciousness of non-coarse characteristics does not grasp the object of subtle characteristics. The Samgraha says: 'Someone says that the consciousness of you grasping the coarse characteristics of the bottle is the consciousness of grasping the subtle characteristics.' If this is allowed, then it can be inferred: 'The consciousness of you grasping color should also grasp sound, because admitting that contradictory things can be grasped simultaneously, like coarse and subtle objects.' The fault of the established subject not being proven exists in the metaphor of this syllogism, because the mind grasping coarse and subtle is not grasping sound, etc., so the metaphor is not established. They say: 'Coarse and subtle objects are not sound, etc.' This refutation is incorrect. The description of the syllogism does not rely on what is said in the original commentary. The syllogism in the original commentary is: 'If you grasp the realm of sound, etc., then the consciousness grasping the realm of color should also be able to grasp sound, etc., because admitting that contradictory things can be grasped simultaneously.' This syllogism uses...
餘聲等境是有法。其緣余色境之心為法。色境非法．有法。標境取心緣色之心。是違緣聲之心。此相違心應亦得緣。正是其法。許相違法得俱緣故因。如粗細喻。有二立故得成比量。
勿余境識緣余境故。西明云。勿之言莫。莫即緣粗亦緣細境。有雜亂過故。若不許緣圓細相境。本圓細相應非五境。若許違宗。一識應緣一切境者。若緣粗識亦得緣細相者。緣青等心應緣聲等。即眼等識通緣十八界 集云。有說后量。有解二量。皆有過失。由此有釋但以理破。非立量破 此亦不爾。立量破彼何過不得。且立量云。汝聲境。應為余相違識緣。許相違法得俱緣故。如粗細境。此聲亦有粗細。相違識得緣故。因有三相。
釋所緣緣。瑜伽七十二復有餘二相。一本性相。二影像相。云何本性相。謂先分別所生。及相所生。共所成相。云何影像相。謂遍計所起．勝解所現。非住本性 集云。共所成者。增上緣用。謂能熏見分力故。相分能熏賴耶見．相種子。非如異熟心心等。不能熏故。相亦不熏。故言先分別等 今釋。彼七十二所言相者。非唯色相。若名所詮總名為相。如前七識亦名本性相。俱為第六緣為質故。先分別所生即本有種。及相所生新熏之種。共生本質故。云共所成相。不爾本質據現行說。后種生現見分久
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『餘聲等境是有法』，意思是說，聲音等境界是存在的法（dharma，事物、現象）。那麼，以聲音等境界為所緣的心識是法嗎？色境（rūpadhātu，視覺對像）不是法，而是存在的法。標立境界，取以心緣色（rūpa，顏色、形狀）之心，這是與緣聲（śabda，聲音）之心相違背的。這種相違的心識也應該能夠緣取（alambana，對像），這正是它的法。因為你承認相違的法可以同時緣取同一個對象，就像粗細的例子一樣。因為有兩個立宗（pakṣa，論點），所以可以成立比量（anumāna，推理）。
不要因為其他境界的識緣取其他境界的緣故。西明（地名，或指西明寺）說：『勿』的意思是『不要』。不要就是說，緣取粗的也緣取細的境界，這樣會有雜亂的過失。如果不允許緣取圓和細的相境，那麼原本的圓和細的相應就不是五境（pañcaviṣaya，五種感官對像）。如果允許，就違背了宗義（siddhānta，教義），一個識應該緣取一切境界。如果緣取粗的識也能緣取細的相，那麼緣取青色等的心識也應該緣取聲音等，也就是說，眼識等可以普遍緣取十八界（aṣṭādaśa dhātu，十八種元素）。集註（可能是指某種註釋）說，有人說後面的量（pramāṇa，認知方式），有人解釋為兩個量，都有過失。因此，有人解釋說，只是用道理來破斥，而不是用立量來破斥。這也不對。用立量來破斥對方有什麼不可以的？姑且立量說：你的聲音境界，應該被其他相違的識所緣取，因為你承認相違的法可以同時緣取同一個對象，就像粗細境界一樣。這個聲音也有粗細，相違的識可以緣取，所以因（hetu，理由）有三相（trilakṣaṇa，三個特徵）。
解釋所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya，對像緣）。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第七十二卷還有另外兩種相：一是本性相（svabhāva-lakṣaṇa），二是影像相（pratibimba-lakṣaṇa）。什麼是本性相？就是先由分別（vikalpa，區分）所生，以及由相（lakṣaṇa，特徵）所生，共同成就的相。什麼是影像相？就是由遍計所起（parikalpita，虛構的），勝解（adhimokṣa，確信）所顯現的，不住于本性的相。集註說，『共同成就』是指增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣）的作用，就是說，能夠熏習見分（darśana-bhāga，能見部分）的力量，所以相分（nimitta-bhāga，所見部分）能夠熏習阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）的見、相種子（bīja，種子），不像異熟心（vipāka-citta，異熟心）心所（caitta，心所）等，不能熏習。相也不能熏習，所以說『先分別等』。現在解釋，那第七十二卷所說的相，不僅僅是色相，凡是用名稱所詮釋的，都總稱為相。像前面的七識（sapta vijñānāni，七種識）也稱為本性相，都以第六識（manovijñāna，意識）為緣，作為本質。先由分別所生，就是本有的種子，以及由相所生，就是新熏的種子，共同產生本質，所以說是『共同成就相』。否則，本質是根據現行（vartamāna，當下）來說的，後來的種子產生現行的見分很久。
【English Translation】 English version: 'The remaining sound and other realms are existing dharmas (dharma, things, phenomena).' Does the mind that cognizes the remaining sound realm as its object also constitute a dharma? The color realm (rūpadhātu, visual object) is not a dharma, but an existing dharma. Establishing the realm, taking the mind that cognizes color (rūpa, color, shape) as its object, this is contrary to the mind that cognizes sound (śabda, sound). This contradictory mind should also be able to cognize (alambana, object), and this is precisely its dharma. Because you admit that contradictory dharmas can simultaneously cognize the same object, just like the example of coarse and fine. Because there are two positions (pakṣa, thesis), a valid inference (anumāna, inference) can be established.
Do not [argue] that because one realm's consciousness cognizes another realm. Ximing (place name, or referring to Ximing Temple) said: 'Do not' means 'do not'. 'Do not' means that cognizing the coarse also cognizes the fine realm, which would lead to the fault of confusion. If it is not allowed to cognize the round and fine aspect realms, then the original round and fine correspondence would not be the five sense objects (pañcaviṣaya, five sense objects). If it is allowed, it would violate the doctrine (siddhānta, doctrine), and one consciousness should cognize all realms. If the consciousness that cognizes the coarse can also cognize the fine aspect, then the mind that cognizes blue, etc., should also cognize sound, etc., meaning that eye consciousness, etc., can universally cognize the eighteen elements (aṣṭādaśa dhātu, eighteen elements). The Collected Commentary (possibly referring to a certain commentary) says that some say the later proof (pramāṇa, means of cognition), and some explain it as two proofs, both of which have faults. Therefore, some explain that it is only refuted with reason, not with establishing a proof to refute. This is also not right. What is wrong with establishing a proof to refute the other party? Let's establish a proof: your sound realm should be cognized by other contradictory consciousnesses, because you admit that contradictory dharmas can simultaneously cognize the same object, just like coarse and fine realms. This sound also has coarse and fine, and contradictory consciousnesses can cognize it, so the reason (hetu, reason) has three characteristics (trilakṣaṇa, three characteristics).
Explaining the object condition (ālambana-pratyaya, object condition). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) volume seventy-two also has two other aspects: one is the intrinsic nature aspect (svabhāva-lakṣaṇa), and the other is the image aspect (pratibimba-lakṣaṇa). What is the intrinsic nature aspect? It is the aspect that is first produced by discrimination (vikalpa, discrimination), and produced by characteristics (lakṣaṇa, characteristics), jointly accomplished. What is the image aspect? It is the aspect that is arisen from imputation (parikalpita, imagined), manifested by conviction (adhimokṣa, conviction), and does not abide in the intrinsic nature. The Collected Commentary says that 'jointly accomplished' refers to the function of the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya, dominant condition), which means that it is the power that can perfume the seeing-portion (darśana-bhāga, seeing-portion), so the object-portion (nimitta-bhāga, object-portion) can perfume the seeing and object seeds (bīja, seed) of the ālayavijñāna (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness), unlike the resultant mind (vipāka-citta, resultant mind) and mental factors (caitta, mental factors), which cannot perfume. The aspect also cannot perfume, so it says 'first discrimination, etc.'. Now explaining, the aspect mentioned in that volume seventy-two is not only the color aspect, but everything that is explained by name is generally called aspect. Like the previous seven consciousnesses (sapta vijñānāni, seven consciousnesses) are also called intrinsic nature aspects, all taking the sixth consciousness (manovijñāna, mind consciousness) as the condition, as the essence. First produced by discrimination is the original seed, and produced by the aspect is the newly perfumed seed, jointly producing the essence, so it is said to be 'jointly accomplished aspect'. Otherwise, the essence is based on the present (vartamāna, present), and the later seed produces the present seeing-portion for a long time.
滅。何得云共所成相。亦不可云據增上說。論云先分別所生及相所生。若據增上。應云先分別及相所生。及是合義。既各言生。明各別種。
有說瑜伽之師即依士釋。師有瑜伽師即有財釋 此亦依主。而非有財如前分別。后思 集云。心．境相應義且難了。若云心起必托境。心趣此境。境順彼心。故名相應者。境應皆通三性．定散心中。若言隨心所樂其境必現。于彼自在故名相應者。以假想惠分析聚色。雖作微解而不現微。如何得名瑜伽師也。若言心即不違境界諸法自性故名相應者。于本聚色先無極微。作極微解。如何相應。壞法相故。集自解云。觀心所緣境界不障觀心。令彼觀心種種行解。或青黃等極微等相得自在轉。是故說名心境相應。非謂境相隨心現故名為相應者 此亦不爾。空花雖無。亦不障心作空花解。如病損眼非黃見黃遍計我等境。皆不障心邪妄解生。豈得說名心境相應。故知言相應者。心稱境知名為相應。相符順義。聚雖無微。以托聖教假想觀之順入無我。無我理境及名教境。與心相應。此為善釋。當撿瑜伽釋．及顯揚二十明瑜伽抄。
問于粗色相漸次除析變極微時。何不別熏成種。答以無本質故 若爾名言熏習。及緣過境熏成種時。豈有質耶 答如名言熏及緣過境。以現曾有彼境可生。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 滅盡。怎麼能說是共同形成的相呢？也不能說是根據增上緣來說的。《瑜伽師地論》中說，先分別所生和相所生。如果根據增上緣，應該說先分別和相所生。『及』是合在一起的意思。既然各自說『生』，就說明是各自不同的種子。 有人說瑜伽師就是依士釋（一種梵文語法結構，表示『擁有瑜伽的人』）。師有瑜伽，師即有財釋（一種梵文語法結構，表示『擁有財富的人』）——這也是依主釋（一種梵文語法結構，表示『屬於主人的』），而不是有財釋，如前面所分別的。後來的《集論》說，心和境相應的意義難以理解。如果說心生起必定依託于境，心趨向于這個境，境順應那個心，所以叫做相應，那麼境應該都能通於三性（善、惡、無記）、定心和散心中。如果說隨著心所喜好的，那個境必定顯現，對於那個境自在，所以叫做相應，那麼用假想的智慧分析聚集的色法，即使稍微分解，也不顯現極微（物質的最小單位），怎麼能叫做瑜伽師呢？如果說心不違背境界諸法的自性，所以叫做相應，那麼對於原本聚集的色法，先沒有極微，而作極微的分解，如何相應呢？因為破壞了法的自相。《集論》自己解釋說，觀察心所緣的境界不障礙觀察心，使那個觀察心種種行解，或者青黃等極微等相得到自在運轉，所以說名叫心境相應，不是說境相隨著心顯現，所以叫做相應——這也是不對的。空花雖然沒有，也不障礙心作空花的理解，如同病眼看見黃色的東西，遍計所執的我等境，都不障礙心邪妄的理解產生，怎麼能說名叫心境相應呢？所以知道說相應，是心稱合境界的知，名叫相應，是相符順的意思。聚集的色法雖然沒有極微，因為依託聖教假想觀察它，順入無我，無我的理境以及名教境，與心相應，這是好的解釋。應當檢查《瑜伽師地論》的解釋，以及《顯揚二十明瑜伽抄》。 問：在粗色相漸次去除分析變化為極微時，為什麼不另外熏習成為種子？答：因為沒有本質的緣故。如果這樣，名言熏習以及緣過境熏習成為種子時，難道有本質嗎？答：如名言熏習以及緣過境，因為現在曾經有那個境可以產生。
【English Translation】 English version: Extinction. How can it be said to be a jointly formed characteristic? Nor can it be said to be based on the condition of Adhipati (dominant condition). The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, 'First, distinguish between what is produced and what is produced by characteristics.' If based on Adhipati, it should say, 'First, distinguish between what is produced and what is produced by characteristics.' 'And' implies a combined meaning. Since each says 'produced,' it indicates separate seeds. Some say that a Yogin is based on the possessive compound (tat-puruṣa) interpretation (a type of Sanskrit grammatical structure, indicating 'the person who possesses Yoga'). 'A master has Yoga,' meaning the master has wealth (another type of Sanskrit grammatical structure, indicating 'the person who possesses wealth')—this is also a dependent determinative compound (tat-puruṣa), not a possessive compound, as distinguished earlier. The later Abhidharma-samuccaya says, 'The meaning of the correspondence between mind and object is difficult to understand. If it is said that the mind arises necessarily relying on an object, the mind inclines towards this object, and the object complies with that mind, therefore it is called correspondence, then the object should be able to pervade the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral), and the minds in meditative and scattered states. If it is said that according to what the mind delights in, that object necessarily appears, and one is free with respect to that object, therefore it is called correspondence, then using imagined wisdom to analyze aggregated matter, even if slightly decomposed, the ultimate particles (smallest units of matter) do not appear. How can one be called a Yogin? If it is said that the mind does not contradict the self-nature of the dharmas of the object, therefore it is called correspondence, then for the originally aggregated matter, there were no ultimate particles to begin with, and making an analysis of ultimate particles, how can it correspond? Because it destroys the characteristics of the dharma.' The Abhidharma-samuccaya itself explains, 'Observing the object that the mind focuses on does not obstruct the observing mind, allowing that observing mind to have various understandings, or the aspects of blue, yellow, etc., ultimate particles, etc., to be freely transformed. Therefore, it is said to be called correspondence between mind and object, not that the aspects of the object appear according to the mind, therefore it is called correspondence'—this is also incorrect. Although empty flowers do not exist, they do not obstruct the mind from making an understanding of empty flowers, just as diseased eyes see yellow things, and the objects of the self, etc., that are completely imputed, do not obstruct the arising of the mind's incorrect understandings. How can it be said to be called correspondence between mind and object? Therefore, knowing that correspondence means the mind matching the knowledge of the object is called correspondence, which is the meaning of conformity and compliance. Although aggregated matter does not have ultimate particles, because it relies on the holy teachings to imagine and observe it, it enters into non-self, the object of the principle of non-self, and the object of nominal teachings, correspond with the mind. This is a good explanation. One should examine the explanation in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the Xianyang Ershi Ming Yoga Chao. Question: When gradually removing and analyzing coarse matter into ultimate particles, why not separately imprint it to become a seed? Answer: Because it lacks essence. If so, when verbal imprints and imprints from objects of past experiences become seeds, do they have essence? Answer: Like verbal imprints and imprints from objects of past experiences, because there was a past object that can arise.
即熏成種。空花非有雖緣不能別熏成種。極微亦爾。元無彼質故不別熏 問空花無質可不熏種。極微托色何不種生 答雖於色相。如執我等故不成種 不爾彼執。觀微非執。何以為例 答雖非執心。無質義等故不為例。若準西明法師即許成種。如前辨非。
論破正量部云。有為法滅不待因故 問何以得知大乘滅相不待因耶 答大莊嚴論云。又如煎水至極少位后水不生。亦非火合水方無體故。量云。許是滅故。如無為滅。準此似將有法為因。有法為因即無有法。應所依不成過。解云滅有多滅。取有為動滅為宗。以余滅為因。隨取少分。故亦無過 問無為滅可同有為耶 答但總云許是滅故。不須分別體滅相滅。無為既不待因。有為亦應不待。故因不得分別。又如聲無常。無常即滅。然言無常。不唯詮滅相。顯揚十四云。無常性者。謂三有為相共相應故。一生相。二滅相。三住異相。三相總名無常。說生復為因性。此滅亦爾 要集云。有抄量。有為法滅應不待因。以名滅故。猶如擇滅。有說量云。汝滅應不待因。許是滅故。如無為滅。集云。此二師量喻有所立不成之失。即三無為雖無生義。待因顯故俱名待因。宗中應云不待滅因滅之 此亦不爾。無為體滅。不待因顯方名為滅。性是滅故名之為滅。故云應不待因故喻得
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 即熏成種（通過熏習形成種子）。空花（虛幻的花朵）並非真實存在，即使有因緣也不能熏習成種子。極微（物質的最小單位）也是如此，原本沒有那種性質，所以不能熏習。問：空花沒有實體，所以不能熏習成種子，可以理解。極微依託於色（物質），為什麼不能產生種子？答：雖然對於色相，如同執著於我等，所以不能形成種子。問：如果不是執著的心，觀察極微並非執著，用什麼作為例子？答：即使不是執著的心，沒有實體的道理相同，所以不能作為例子。如果按照西明法師的觀點，就允許形成種子，如前面所辨析的錯誤。
論破正量部（一個佛教部派）的觀點說：有為法（因緣和合而生的事物）的滅亡不需要依靠因緣。問：怎麼知道大乘佛教所說的滅相不需要依靠因緣呢？答：《大莊嚴論》中說：又如煎水，到水量極少的時候，水就不再生了，也不是因為火的作用水才消失的。量（論證）說：因為是滅亡，所以不需要因緣，就像無為法（不依賴因緣的事物）的滅亡一樣。按照這個說法，好像是將有為法作為因，有法作為因，就沒有有法了，應該有過失。解釋說：滅有多種滅，取有為法的動滅作為宗（論點），以其他的滅作為因，隨便取少部分，所以也沒有過失。問：無為法的滅可以和有為法的滅相同嗎？答：只是總的說『因為是滅亡』，不需要分別體滅和相滅。無為法既然不依賴因緣，有為法也應該不依賴因緣，所以因不能分別。又如聲音是無常的，無常就是滅亡。然而說無常，不只是詮釋滅相。《顯揚聖教論》第十四卷說：無常性，是指與三有為相共同相應，一是生相，二是滅相，三是住異相。這三個相總名為無常。說生又作為因性，這個滅也是如此。《要集》中說：有抄錄的量說：有為法的滅亡應該不依賴因緣，因為名為滅亡，猶如擇滅（通過智慧選擇而達到的滅）。有的人說量說：你的滅亡應該不依賴因緣，因為是滅亡，就像無為法的滅亡一樣。《集》中說：這兩位法師的量，比喻有所立不成之失，即三種無為法雖然沒有生義，但依靠因緣顯現，所以都名為待因。宗中應該說不依賴滅因滅之。這也不對，無為法的體滅，不依賴因緣顯現才名為滅，性質是滅所以名為滅，所以說應該不依賴因緣，所以比喻成立。
【English Translation】 English version That is, 'perfumed into a seed' (熏成種, xūn chéng zhǒng, to be perfumed and become a seed). Empty flowers (空花, kōng huā, illusory flowers) are not real, and even with conditions, they cannot be perfumed into seeds. The same is true for extremely small particles (極微, jí wēi, the smallest unit of matter). Originally, they do not have that nature, so they cannot be perfumed. Question: Empty flowers have no substance, so they cannot be perfumed into seeds, which is understandable. Extremely small particles rely on form (色, sè, matter), why can't they produce seeds? Answer: Although regarding form, it is like being attached to 'self' and so on, so it cannot form seeds. Question: If it is not an attached mind, observing extremely small particles is not attachment, what can be used as an example? Answer: Even if it is not an attached mind, the principle of having no substance is the same, so it cannot be used as an example. If according to the view of Dharma Master Ximing, it would be allowed to form seeds, as refuted earlier.
The argument refutes the view of the Sautrāntika school (正量部, Zhèngliàng bù, a Buddhist school): The cessation of conditioned dharmas (有為法, yǒu wéi fǎ, conditioned phenomena) does not depend on causes. Question: How do we know that the cessation aspect in Mahayana Buddhism does not depend on causes? Answer: The Mahā-alaṃkāra-sūtra (大莊嚴論, Dà zhuāngyán lùn, a Buddhist scripture) says: 'Also, like boiling water, when the amount of water reaches a very small level, the water no longer arises, and it is not because of the fire that the water disappears.' The argument says: 'Because it is cessation, it does not need causes, just like the cessation of unconditioned dharmas (無為法, wú wéi fǎ, unconditioned phenomena).' According to this statement, it seems to be taking conditioned dharmas as the cause. If conditioned dharmas are the cause, then there are no conditioned dharmas, and there should be a fault. The explanation says: There are many kinds of cessation. Take the cessation of movement of conditioned dharmas as the thesis (宗, zōng, the main point of argument), and take other cessations as the cause. Take a small portion at random, so there is no fault. Question: Can the cessation of unconditioned dharmas be the same as the cessation of conditioned dharmas? Answer: It is only generally said 'because it is cessation,' there is no need to distinguish between the cessation of essence and the cessation of aspect. Since unconditioned dharmas do not depend on causes, conditioned dharmas should also not depend on causes, so the cause cannot be distinguished. Also, like sound is impermanent (無常, wú cháng, impermanence), impermanence is cessation. However, saying impermanence does not only explain the aspect of cessation. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (顯揚聖教論, Xiǎnyáng shèngjiào lùn, a Yogacara text), volume fourteen, says: 'The nature of impermanence refers to the common correspondence with the three conditioned aspects, one is the aspect of arising (生相, shēng xiāng), two is the aspect of cessation (滅相, miè xiāng), and three is the aspect of duration and change (住異相, zhù yì xiāng). These three aspects are collectively called impermanence.' Saying arising is also taken as the causal nature, and this cessation is also the same. The Yaoji (要集, Yàojí, Essentials Collected) says: There is a copied argument saying: The cessation of conditioned dharmas should not depend on causes, because it is called cessation, like nirodha-satya (擇滅, zé miè, cessation through wisdom). Some say the argument says: Your cessation should not depend on causes, because it is cessation, like the cessation of unconditioned dharmas. The Ji (集, jí, Collected) says: The analogy in the arguments of these two Dharma masters has the fault of not being established, that is, although the three unconditioned dharmas do not have the meaning of arising, they depend on causes to manifest, so they are all called dependent on causes. In the thesis, it should be said that it does not depend on the cause of cessation to cease. This is also not correct. The cessation of the essence of unconditioned dharmas does not depend on the manifestation of causes to be called cessation. The nature is cessation, so it is called cessation, so it is said that it should not depend on causes, so the analogy is established.
成。非無所立。
論非顯香味。量云。汝顯色及香．味。應非是表。唯無記故。如地．水．火。雖自宗有香．味通表。而是假表。不通善．惡。意為破他實表業色復是善．惡。彼自許香．味．觸三唯無記故。又準論疏應云汝此表色。亦非是顯及與香．味。無表示故如觸 是彼許故。
論一剎那聲無詮表故者。薩婆多計。此表是實。今且問。汝聲生名等。為初一剎那聲生名等為實詮表。為后一剎那聲生名等方實詮表。若初能。后無用。若后能。即量云。汝后一剎那聲。除佛心外應不能詮表。以是聲故。如初一剎那聲。若云相續。即如后破。由彼本計除佛餘人一剎那聲。不是能詮。故婆沙第十五云。聲聞多剎那聲能說一字。佛一剎那聲能說一字。一字聲中仍未有名．句聚集。故不能詮 問何故色中別立表色。聲中何故不立表聲 答色法顯現故別立表。聲相難知故不別立。方．圓．長．短類亦可知 又解色中形色有非表。於色之中別立表。聲中情名必是表。無非表故不別立 問身表色依身。從彼所依名身表。語表亦依身。從依名身表 答形色不離身。隨彼所依名身表。聲性發離質疏。故非身表 又解身表在初。從依名身表。語表后說。恐濫非身表。
論然依思愿善惡分限。下申正義。分之為三。初道．定
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 成就。並非沒有所依據。
關於非顯香味的論述。量論說：『你所顯現的顏色以及香、味，應該不是表色，因為它們都是無記性的。』就像地、水、火一樣。雖然在自宗（薩婆多宗）中，香、味也通於表色，但那是假立的表色，不通於善、惡。這樣說是爲了破斥他人認為實表業色既可以是善，也可以是惡的觀點。他們自己承認香、味、觸三種都只是無記性的。又根據論疏，應該說：『你的這種表色，也不是顯色以及香、味，因為它沒有表示作用。』就像觸一樣，這是他們所承認的。
關於『一剎那聲沒有詮表作用』的論述。薩婆多宗認為，這種表色是真實的。現在且問：你的聲生名等，是最初一剎那的聲生名等是真實的詮表，還是后一剎那的聲生名等才是真實的詮表？如果最初的能詮表，那麼後來的就沒有用了；如果後來的能詮表，那麼就用量論來說：『你后一剎那的聲音，除了佛的心之外，應該不能詮表，因為它是聲音。』就像最初一剎那的聲音一樣。如果說是相續的，那就如同後面所破斥的那樣。由於他們本來認為除了佛之外，其餘人的一剎那聲音，不是能詮表。所以《婆沙論》第十五卷說：『聲聞的多剎那聲音能說一個字，佛的一剎那聲音能說一個字。』一個字的聲音中仍然沒有名、句的聚集，所以不能詮表。問：為什麼在色法中特別設立表色，而在聲音中為什麼不設立表聲？答：色法顯現，所以特別設立表色；聲音的相狀難以知曉，所以不特別設立。方、圓、長、短等形狀也可以知道。又解釋說：色法中的形色有非表色，所以在色法中特別設立表色；聲音中的情名必定是表色，沒有非表色，所以不特別設立。問：身表色依于身體，從它所依之處命名為身表；語表也依于身體，從所依之處命名為身表。答：形色不離身體，隨著它所依之處命名為身表；聲音的性質發出后離開實體而疏遠，所以不是身表。又解釋說：身表在最初，從所依之處命名為身表；語表在後面說，恐怕混淆為非身表。
關於『然而依據思愿善惡的分限』，下面申述正義，分為三種。最初是道、定。
【English Translation】 English version: Accomplishment. It is not without a basis.
Regarding the discussion on non-manifested fragrance and taste. The argument states: 'Your manifested color, fragrance, and taste should not be representative forms (biao se), because they are all indeterminate (wu ji xing).』 Like earth, water, and fire. Although in your own school (Sarvastivada), fragrance and taste also pertain to representative forms, they are merely provisional representative forms, not pertaining to good or evil. This is to refute others who believe that real representative karmic forms can be both good and evil. They themselves admit that fragrance, taste, and touch are only indeterminate. Furthermore, according to the commentary, it should be said: 'Your representative form is also not manifested color, fragrance, or taste, because it has no expressive function.』 Like touch, which they admit.
Regarding the discussion on 'a single moment of sound has no expressive function.' The Sarvastivada school believes that this representative form is real. Now, let's ask: Are your sound-generated names, etc., truly expressive in the first moment of sound generation, or are they truly expressive only in the later moment of sound generation? If the first moment can express, then the later moment is useless; if the later moment can express, then the argument states: 'Your sound in the later moment should not be able to express anything except through the mind of the Buddha, because it is sound.』 Like the sound in the first moment. If it is said to be continuous, then it is like what is refuted later. Because they originally believed that, except for the Buddha, the sound of a single moment from other people is not expressive. Therefore, the fifteenth volume of the Vibhasa states: 'The sound of many moments from a Sravaka (sheng wen) can speak one word; the sound of one moment from the Buddha can speak one word.』 Within the sound of one word, there is still no gathering of names and sentences, so it cannot express. Question: Why is representative form specifically established in form (rupa), but representative sound not established in sound? Answer: Because form is manifest, representative form is specifically established; the characteristics of sound are difficult to know, so it is not specifically established. Shapes like square, round, long, and short can also be known. Another explanation is that among the forms in form, there are non-representative forms, so representative form is specifically established within form; the emotional names in sound are necessarily representative forms, with no non-representative forms, so it is not specifically established. Question: Bodily representative form relies on the body, and is named bodily representative form from what it relies on; vocal representative form also relies on the body, and is named bodily representative form from what it relies on. Answer: Shape and form do not leave the body, and are named bodily representative form according to what they rely on; the nature of sound, once emitted, leaves the substance and becomes distant, so it is not bodily representative form. Another explanation is that bodily representative form comes first, and is named bodily representative form from what it relies on; vocal representative form is spoken of later, lest it be confused with non-bodily representative form.
Regarding 'However, based on the limits of thought, intention, good, and evil,' the correct meaning is stated below, divided into three. The first is the path (dao) and samadhi (ding).
俱律．不律儀．處中之總句。佛身無表之別句 次謂此或依下。是余別解．處中之別句 或依定中下。定．道之別句。以佛無增長故。除佛余別解等增長故。定．道依現故。
問無表之色依表種立。表有多念依何念立 答于初剎那正發身．語之思。或俱時發。或前後發。俱時同一種。前後各別種。皆于初上立。第二剎那已去。非因等起。但名剎那等起。非根本故 問定中許起身．語二業。表依何立。若動發思即現在定。是定俱無表 答既是假立通二何妨。然薩婆多隨心轉者道．定二戒。有心即有。無心即無。舍此定取余定。即舍此無表得彼無表。道亦同然。皆別有實色名為無表。不取定．道二相應思。又定唯有漏。無漏即名道。若大乘師隨轉義同。然立有別。依定．道俱現行思立。定通無漏。雖是一思望義有別。薩婆多八戒要從他具支。唯一日夜。大乘皆通。從不從師。支具不具。一日多日。俱亦不違。以依思愿分限立故。佛隨轉門且言一日夜。令易學故。大乘五戒．十善。亦許少時闕支而受。唯出家眾依師具支盡壽方得。然闕支者皆據未說三歸已前。有祈願別故得闕也 若三聚十無盡等。及依文殊所問波若經。受十戒者。即同沙彌十戒。然亦盡未來受。又此得戒有四分別 一有心得。謂發祈願增上善心者 二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 俱律（Kulu，戒律）·不律儀（Avrata，非戒律）·處中之總句。佛身無表（Avijñapti-rūpa，無表色）之別句。其次，這或許是依據下文，是其餘不同的解釋，是處中之別句。或者依據定中（Samadhi，禪定中），是定（Samadhi，禪定）·道（Marga，道）之別句。因為佛沒有增長的緣故。除去佛以外，其餘不同的解釋等同於增長的緣故。定·道依賴於顯現的緣故。 問：無表之色依賴於表種（Vijñapti-bīja，表業之種子）而建立。表（Vijñapti，表業）有多念，依賴於哪個念而建立？答：在最初的剎那，正確地發起身·語之思（Cetanā，思）。或者同時發起，或者前後發起。同時發起的是同一種子，前後發起的是各別的種子。都在最初的剎那上建立。第二個剎那以後，不是因等起（Hetu-samutthāna，因生），但名為剎那等起（Kṣaṇika-samutthāna，剎那生），不是根本的緣故。問：定中允許起身·語二業。表依賴於何而建立？如果動發思（Cetanā，思）即現在定（Samadhi，禪定），是定俱無表（Avijñapti-rūpa，無表色）。答：既然是假立，貫通二者有什麼妨礙？然而，薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）認為隨心轉者是道·定二戒。有心即有，無心即無。捨棄此定而取其餘的定，即捨棄此無表而得到彼無表。道也同樣如此。都是另外有真實的色法名為無表。不取定·道二者相應的思。而且定只有有漏（Sāsrava，有煩惱），無漏（Anāsrava，無煩惱）即名為道。如果大乘（Mahāyāna）的法師認為隨轉的意義相同，然而建立有所區別，依賴於定·道都現行之思而建立。定貫通無漏。雖然是一個思，但望其意義有所區別。薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）的八戒要從他處獲得具足的戒條，只有一日一夜。大乘（Mahāyāna）都貫通，無論是否從師，戒條是否具足，一日或多日，都並不違背，因為依賴於思愿來劃分期限而建立的緣故。佛隨順隨轉之門，且說一日夜，是爲了容易學習的緣故。大乘（Mahāyāna）的五戒·十善，也允許暫時缺少戒條而受持。只有出家眾依賴於師父，具足戒條，盡其一生才能獲得。然而，缺少戒條的情況都是指未說三歸（Triśaraṇa，皈依三寶）之前，因為有祈願的差別，所以可以缺少。如果是三聚十無盡等，以及依據文殊（Mañjuśrī）所問的般若經（Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra），受持十戒的人，就等同於沙彌（Śrāmaṇera，沙彌）的十戒。然而也是盡未來際受持。又，這得戒有四種分別：一、有心得，是指發起祈願增上善心的人；二
【English Translation】 English version Kulu (Kulu, Discipline), Avrata (Avrata, Non-discipline), the general statement of the middle ground. The separate statement of Buddha's Avijñapti-rūpa (Avijñapti-rūpa, Unmanifested Form). Secondly, this may be based on the following text, which is another different explanation, and is a separate statement of the middle ground. Or based on Samadhi (Samadhi, Concentration), which is a separate statement of Samadhi (Samadhi, Concentration) and Marga (Marga, Path). Because the Buddha has no increase. Except for the Buddha, the remaining different explanations are equivalent to increase. Samadhi and Marga rely on manifestation. Question: The unmanifested form is established based on the seed of expression. Expression has multiple thoughts, on which thought is it based? Answer: In the first moment, correctly generate the thought of body and speech. Or generate them simultaneously, or generate them before and after. Simultaneous generation is of the same seed, and generation before and after is of different seeds. They are all established on the first moment. After the second moment, it is not caused by co-arising, but is called momentary co-arising, because it is not fundamental. Question: In Samadhi, it is permissible to generate the actions of body and speech. On what is expression based? If the thought of movement arises, it is the present Samadhi, which is Samadhi together with unmanifested form. Answer: Since it is a provisional establishment, what harm is there in connecting the two? However, the Sarvāstivāda (Sarvāstivāda, the "All Exist" school) believes that those who follow the mind are the two precepts of the Path and Samadhi. If there is mind, there is, and if there is no mind, there is not. Abandoning this Samadhi and taking another Samadhi means abandoning this unmanifested form and obtaining that unmanifested form. The Path is also the same. There are other real forms called unmanifested forms. Do not take the thoughts corresponding to Samadhi and the Path. Moreover, Samadhi only has defilements, and the undefiled is called the Path. If the Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna) masters think that the meaning of following is the same, the establishment is different, and it is established based on the thoughts of Samadhi and the Path that are both present. Samadhi connects to the undefiled. Although it is one thought, there is a difference in meaning. The eight precepts of the Sarvāstivāda (Sarvāstivāda, the "All Exist" school) must be obtained from others with complete precepts, only for one day and one night. The Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna) connects to all, whether or not it is from a teacher, whether or not the precepts are complete, one day or many days, it does not violate, because it is established based on the division of the limit of thought and wish. The Buddha follows the gate of following and says one day and one night for the sake of easy learning. The five precepts and ten virtues of the Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna) also allow temporary lack of precepts to be received. Only the Sangha relies on the teacher, with complete precepts, to obtain them for the rest of their lives. However, the lack of precepts refers to before the Three Refuges (Triśaraṇa, taking refuge in the Triple Gem) have been spoken, because there is a difference in prayer, so it can be lacking. If it is the Three Aggregates and Ten Inexhaustibles, etc., and according to the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra) asked by Mañjuśrī (Mañjuśrī), those who receive the ten precepts are the same as the ten precepts of the Śrāmaṇera (Śrāmaṇera, novice monk). However, they are also received for the future. Also, there are four distinctions in obtaining these precepts: First, obtaining with the mind, which refers to those who generate the increased good mind of prayer; second
有心不得。謂不發起祈願。設起祈願受出家眾別脫戒者。但少時分限缺支意願皆不得戒 三無心得。謂那含沙彌起心求戒作白已后便入無心定。此無心時作羯摩竟。祈願滿故亦得具戒 四無心不得。謂無祈心餘無心位 問別脫無表依于動發思種上立。如入見道得別脫戒。既不起身．語依何思立 答入見道前有祈願心動發身謂。后入見道依此種立。不爾即無 問定．道無表依審．決思。起身．語時依何思上立身．語業 答若在余定起身．語者即是通果。亦定前加行有祈願心欲起身．語。依定引通雖不在散不正在定。亦動發思起于身．語 問起加行時只審．決思未起發動。如何依立 答據實定中起動發思。如八地已上常在定心。即義說之不同散位。
意業之中十善．十惡發無表不 章中二解。然要集云。有釋三藏解云。五十三文唯約現行說意表業。準此無表依種子立。今尋三藏意。身．語表示他。故名為表業。思種不表示。是故說無表。意業唯自表。故得說為表。種子不表自。故亦名無表。云法苑二云。一云發無表。一云不發。云后說為正。三藏意存前解 此說不然。法苑二說云任意為用。不斷後說義為決定。今者意準定發無表。既菩薩戒具防三業。勝於二乘盡未來際。云何不發殊勝無表。前二說者據處中說。非約
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有心不得：指的是沒有發起祈願。假設發起祈願，接受出家眾的別解脫戒（Pratimoksha，佛教戒律），但因為少時分限或缺少支分意願，都不能得戒。 三無心得：指的是那含（Anagamins，不還果）沙彌（Sramanera，沙彌）起心求戒，作法已后便進入無心定。此時無心時作羯磨（Karma，業），因為祈願圓滿，也能得到具足戒（Bhikkhu，比丘戒）。 四無心不得：指的是沒有祈願心，其餘無心位都不得戒。 問：別解脫無表（Avijñapti-rūpa，無表色）依于動發思種上建立。如進入見道（Darśana-mārga，見道）得到別解脫戒，既然不起身、語，依何思立？ 答：進入見道前有祈願心動發身語。后入見道依此種子建立。不然就沒有。 問：定（Samadhi，禪定）、道（Marga，道）無表依審、決思（Cetanā，思）。起身、語時依何思上立身、語業？ 答：若在余定起身、語者，即是通果（Abhijnā-phala，神通果）。也是定前加行有祈願心欲起身、語。依定引通雖不在散（Vikshepa，散亂），不正在定。也動發思起于身、語。 問：起加行時只審、決思未起發動。如何依立？ 答：據實定中起動發思。如八地（Aṣṭamī-bhūmi，第八地）已上常在定心。即義說之不同散位。 意業之中十善（Daśa-kuśala-karmāṇi，十善業）、十惡（Daśa-akuśala-karmāṇi，十惡業）發無表不？章中二解。然要集云：有釋三藏解云：五十三文唯約現行說意表業。準此無表依種子立。今尋三藏意：身、語表示他，故名為表業。思種不表示，是故說無表。意業唯自表，故得說為表。種子不表自，故亦名無表。云法苑二云：一云發無表，一云不發。云后說為正。三藏意存前解。此說不然。法苑二說云任意為用。不斷後說義為決定。今者意準定發無表。既菩薩戒具防三業，勝於二乘盡未來際。云何不發殊勝無表。前二說者據處中說。非約
【English Translation】 English version 'Having intention' is not permissible: This refers to not initiating a prayer. Suppose one initiates a prayer and receives the Pratimoksha (Buddhist precepts) of an ordained Sangha (community), but due to a short time limit or lacking the intention of fulfilling the precepts, one cannot obtain the precepts. 'Three without intention' is permissible: This refers to an Anagamins (non-returner) Sramanera (novice monk) who initiates the intention to seek precepts and enters a state of no-mind Samadhi (meditative absorption) after making the declaration. When Karma (action) is performed during this state of no-mind, one can obtain the full Bhikkhu (monk) precepts because the prayer is fulfilled. 'Four without intention' is not permissible: This refers to not having the intention to pray; all other states of no-mind are not permissible. Question: Avijñapti-rūpa (non-revealing form) of Pratimoksha is established based on the seed of motivating thought. For example, when entering the Darśana-mārga (path of seeing) and obtaining the Pratimoksha precepts, since there is no action of body or speech, upon what thought is it established? Answer: Before entering the path of seeing, there is the intention to pray, motivating body and speech. After entering the path of seeing, it is established based on this seed. Otherwise, it would not exist. Question: The non-revealing form of Samadhi (meditation) and Marga (path) relies on deliberation and decisive thought (Cetanā). When arising body and speech, upon what thought are the actions of body and speech established? Answer: If one arises body and speech while in another Samadhi, it is the result of Abhijñā-phala (supernatural power). Also, the preliminary practice before Samadhi has the intention to pray to arise body and speech. Although relying on the supernatural power induced by Samadhi is not in Vikshepa (distraction) and not exactly in Samadhi, it also motivates thought to arise in body and speech. Question: When arising preliminary practice, only deliberation and decisive thought have not yet arisen and been motivated. How is it established? Answer: In reality, motivating thought arises in Samadhi. For example, those above the Aṣṭamī-bhūmi (eighth ground) are always in a state of Samadhi. This is different from the state of distraction in terms of meaning. Regarding whether the Daśa-kuśala-karmāṇi (ten wholesome actions) and Daśa-akuśala-karmāṇi (ten unwholesome actions) of mental Karma generate non-revealing form, there are two interpretations in the chapter. However, the Essentials Collection says: Some explain according to the Tripitaka (Three Baskets) that the fifty-three texts only discuss the revealing Karma of intention in the present moment. According to this, non-revealing form is established based on the seed. Now, examining the meaning of the Tripitaka: body and speech reveal to others, therefore they are called revealing Karma. The seed of thought does not reveal, therefore it is called non-revealing. Mental Karma only reveals to oneself, therefore it can be called revealing. The seed does not reveal to oneself, therefore it is also called non-revealing. The Dharma Garden says two things: one says it generates non-revealing form, one says it does not generate. It says the latter is correct. The meaning of the Tripitaka retains the former interpretation. This statement is not correct. The Dharma Garden says two things, saying to use arbitrarily. It does not break the meaning of the latter statement as decisive. Now, the intention is to generate non-revealing form according to Samadhi. Since the Bodhisattva precepts fully guard the three Karmas, surpassing the two vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) for the entire future, how can it not generate superior non-revealing form? The former two statements are based on a neutral position, not about
律儀 又集云。又能起律儀體非律儀以生律儀。從果為名說名律儀。故無無表何所相違。故今取不發無表 今者不然。既取不發。何故云能起律儀體非律儀。若設云能起身．語律儀非意律儀者。望二乘意無律儀。約大乘說。十善戒等亦是律儀。如何得云體非律儀。從果為名故無無表。故為不可 要集問。定．道意無表依何法立。解雲表依現思。無表依種。故具二種。不同定道身．語無表。問若爾出定心后。既有種子應立無表。解云不例。是隨心戒出定用微。故不立無表。或於一現思有表無表。于理無違 今謂。定．道意俱無表。決定取現。不得云惑。即定道戒是隨心故。種有心無非隨心故。
然依思愿善惡分限等者。西明云。愿雖有多。然於此中說思為愿。定．道二戒是思非愿。別解脫戒亦思亦愿。為攝定．散二位無表故說思愿。此亦不定。何以得知此愿唯思非依欲．勝解等。由有希欲方起祈心。說愿唯思即為太局。集云。散心無表有要期故。說依思愿。定．道無表無期愿故但思非愿。然有說云。愿者顯成無表之相。此言少局不通定．道 今謂無過。是總說故。意顯別脫與定．道殊。隨愿分限。不爾依種種子現有。何緣戒舍。又諸說愿皆不通定．道。今說此愿顯成散無表。何獨言局 西明解無表云。於七種上假
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 律儀：又《集論》說：『能夠生起律儀之體的非律儀，以果為名，稱作律儀。』所以沒有無表，這有什麼相違背的呢？所以現在取不發無表。 現在的說法不對。既然取不發，為什麼說能生起律儀之體的非律儀呢？如果說能生起身、語律儀而非意律儀，那麼在二乘看來，意沒有律儀。如果按照大乘來說，十善戒等也是律儀，怎麼能說體非律儀呢？以果為名，所以沒有無表，這是不可取的。 《要集》問：『定、道意的無表依什麼法建立？』解答說：『表依現思，無表依種子，所以具備兩種。不同於定道身、語無表。』問：『如果這樣，出定心后，既然有種子，應該建立無表。』解答說：『不能類比。這是隨心戒，出定後作用微弱，所以不立無表。或者在一個現思中有表無表，在道理上沒有違背。』 現在我認為，定、道意都有無表，決定取現行。不能說是迷惑。即定道戒是隨心的緣故，種子有心無心不是隨心的緣故。 然而依據思愿善惡分限等，西明說：『愿雖然有很多種，然而在這裡說思為愿。定、道二戒是思而非愿，別解脫戒既是思也是愿。爲了攝取定、散二位的無表，所以說思愿。』這種說法也不確定。怎麼知道這種愿只是思而不是依據欲、勝解等呢？由於有希求慾望才發起祈求之心，說愿只是思就太侷限了。《集論》說：『散心無表有要期，所以說依據思愿。定、道無表沒有期愿，所以只是思而不是愿。』然而有人說：『愿是顯現成就無表之相。』這種說法有些侷限，不適用于定、道。 現在我認為沒有過失，這是總的說法。意在顯示別解脫與定、道的不同。隨愿有分限。否則，依據種子，種子現行，為什麼戒會捨棄呢？而且各種關於愿的說法都不適用于定、道。現在說這種愿是顯現成就散心的無表，為什麼只說是侷限呢？ 西明解釋無表說：『在七種上假立。』
【English Translation】 English version Precepts: Furthermore, the Samgraha states: 'That which can give rise to the substance of precepts, yet is not itself a precept, is called a precept based on its result.' Therefore, there is no non-manifestation (wu-biao), so what contradiction is there? Therefore, we now take the non-arising non-manifestation. The current view is incorrect. Since it takes the non-arising, why say that it can give rise to the substance of precepts, yet is not itself a precept? If it is said that it can give rise to the precepts of body and speech, but not the precepts of mind, then in the view of the Two Vehicles (er-cheng), the mind has no precepts. If speaking according to the Mahayana (da-cheng), the ten wholesome precepts (shi-shan-jie) and others are also precepts, how can it be said that the substance is not a precept? Taking the result as the name, therefore there is no non-manifestation, which is unacceptable. The Yaoji asks: 'Upon what dharma are the non-manifestations of meditative concentration (ding) and the path (dao) of mind established?' The answer is: 'Manifestations rely on present thought (xian-si), non-manifestations rely on seeds (zhong-zi), therefore they possess both. This is different from the non-manifestations of body and speech in meditative concentration and the path.' The question is: 'If that is so, after emerging from meditative concentration, since there are seeds, non-manifestations should be established.' The answer is: 'It cannot be compared. These are precepts that follow the mind; after emerging from meditative concentration, their function is weak, so non-manifestations are not established. Or, within one present thought, there can be both manifestation and non-manifestation, which is not contradictory in principle.' Now I believe that both meditative concentration and the path of mind have non-manifestations, and they definitely take the present. It cannot be said to be delusion. That is, the precepts of meditative concentration and the path are because they follow the mind; seeds with or without mind do not follow the mind. However, based on the limits of thought, aspiration, good, and evil, etc., Ximing says: 'Although there are many kinds of aspiration, here we speak of thought as aspiration. The two precepts of meditative concentration and the path are thought but not aspiration, while the Pratimoksha (bie-jie-tuo-jie) precepts are both thought and aspiration. In order to encompass the non-manifestations of both meditative concentration and scattered states, we speak of thought and aspiration.' This statement is also uncertain. How do we know that this aspiration is only thought and not based on desire, superior understanding, etc.? Because only with the desire for hope does the mind of prayer arise; to say that aspiration is only thought is too limited. The Samgraha states: 'Scattered mind non-manifestations have a fixed period, so it is said to rely on thought and aspiration. Meditative concentration and the path non-manifestations have no fixed aspiration, so they are only thought and not aspiration.' However, some say: 'Aspiration manifests the appearance of accomplishing non-manifestation.' This statement is somewhat limited and does not apply to meditative concentration and the path. Now I believe there is no fault, as this is a general statement. It intends to show the difference between the Pratimoksha and meditative concentration and the path. Aspiration has limits. Otherwise, based on seeds, the seeds are present, so why would the precepts be abandoned? Moreover, all statements about aspiration do not apply to meditative concentration and the path. Now we say that this aspiration manifests the non-manifestations of the scattered mind, so why only say it is limited? Ximing explains non-manifestation as: 'Falsely established upon the seven kinds.'
立七支。以彼止用有七種故。問若爾眼識緣青等時應成多種。許亦無失。如正體．后得體是一惠熏成二故 今者未詳。既一現行雲何種二。若功能別。后得見分功能無量。自證．第四皆應種別。功能別故種應更多。何但二種。又設熏多。後生一現為生於多。若生多現即多心並起。若前後生不應理故。若共生一既能熏體一所生亦一。何故隨見熏成多種。隨體成一理應為長。
慈恩法師立散無表。且如苾芻律儀於何時得。依何種五 于第三羯摩竟。隨能受者有心．無心．或三性心。皆許得成別脫無表。以依發於身．語二業期心受思所熏成種為戒所依。正發身．語動發之思。非於第三羯摩時起。此時但在師前默故。以彼期心今時得暢故。于種上功能倍增名得無表。雖有多解疏自判取用增非體 然白馬法師為作五過。一例現不成過。二無熏種增過。三佛果增減過。四違害自教過。五朋助異宗過。廣如疏述 法師乃橫智舟于苦海。開惠日于昏城。指妙寶之前途。暢明珠之後說。五愆星舉。七辯霞張。引學者之珠知。啟後進之法目。遂緣茲義覺解便生。兼曾濫廁學流頗承餘論。法歸分別寶貴斫磨。故依五過略為十失。雖知爝火無旋于曦耀。懸露詎擬於清飆。然妙高始起於一微。大海創興于數渧。故勿輕於末學。為獎後生之勝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：確立七支，是因為用七種方式來止息（惡行）。問：如果這樣，眼識緣于青色等境時，應該成為多種（識）。答：允許這樣，也沒有過失。就像正體和后得體，是一個智慧熏習成為二種一樣。現在還不清楚，既然只有一個現行（識），為什麼熏習成兩種種子？如果說是功能不同，那麼后得見分的功能是無量的，自證分和第四分都應該有不同的種子，因為功能不同，種子應該更多，為什麼只有兩種？又假設熏習很多，後生起一個現行，是生起多個現行，還是生起一個？如果生起多個現行，就是多個心同時生起。如果是前後生起，就不合道理。如果共同生起一個，既然能熏的體是一個，所生的也應該是一個。為什麼隨著所見熏習成多種，隨著體成為一個，這個道理應該更強。
慈恩法師主張散無表。例如，比丘的律儀在什麼時候獲得？依據哪種五蘊？在第三次羯摩（羯摩指佛教僧團中的一種議事程式）結束時，隨能受戒者有心、無心，或三性心（三性指善性、惡性、無記性），都允許成就別解脫無表（別解脫無表指一種無形的戒體）。因為是依據發起于身、語二業的期心（期心指希望獲得戒體的心）和受思（受思指領納和思惟）所熏習成的種子作為戒的所依。真正發起身、語行動的思，不是在第三次羯摩時生起，此時只是在師父面前默然。因為那個期心現在得以暢達，所以在種子上功能倍增，名為獲得無表。雖然有很多解釋，疏鈔自己判斷取用增益而非本體。然而白馬法師提出了五種過失：一、類比現行不成過；二、無熏習種子增益過；三、佛果增減過；四、違害自己教義過；五、幫助異宗過。詳細內容如疏鈔所述。
慈恩法師就像苦海中的橫渡之舟，昏暗之城中的智慧之日，指明妙寶的前途，暢說明珠的後事。五種愆星被舉出，七種辯才如彩霞般張開。引導學者認識珍珠，開啟後進者的法眼。於是，因為這個義理，覺悟和理解便產生了。加上曾經混跡于學者的行列，頗為承蒙其他論述。佛法歸於分別，寶貴在於琢磨。所以依據五種過失，略微提出十種缺失。雖然知道小火把無法與太陽爭輝，懸掛的露珠無法與清風相比。然而妙高山（妙高山指須彌山）開始於一微塵，大海開始於幾滴水。所以不要輕視末學，爲了獎掖後來的優秀人才。
【English Translation】 English version: The seven branches are established because there are seven ways to cease (evil deeds). Question: If that's the case, when eye consciousness cognizes blue, etc., it should become multiple (consciousnesses). Answer: Allowing that, there is no fault. Just like the 'correct entity' (正體) and 'subsequent obtained entity' (后得體) are one wisdom's (惠)熏習 (xunxi, influence by habit) becoming two. Now it's not clear, since there is only one present consciousness, how does it熏習 into two seeds? If it's said that the functions are different, then the functions of the 'subsequent obtained perception-portion' (后得見分) are limitless. The 'self-awareness portion' (自證) and the 'fourth portion' (第四) should all have different seeds, because the functions are different, the seeds should be even more numerous. Why are there only two? Furthermore, supposing there are many熏習s, does the subsequent arising of one present consciousness give rise to multiple present consciousnesses, or does it give rise to one? If it gives rise to multiple present consciousnesses, then multiple minds arise simultaneously. If they arise sequentially, it's unreasonable. If they arise together as one, since the entity that can熏習 is one, what is produced should also be one. Why does it熏習 into multiple kinds according to what is seen, while becoming one according to the entity? This principle should be stronger.
Master Ci'en (慈恩法師) advocates 'scattered unmanifestation' (散無表). For example, when does a Bhiksu (苾芻, Buddhist monk) obtain the precepts? Based on which five skandhas (五蘊, five aggregates)? At the end of the third Karma (羯摩, a formal act of the Sangha), whether the receiver has mind, no mind, or a mind of the three natures (三性, good, evil, and neutral), it is allowed to achieve 'separate liberation unmanifestation' (別解脫無表, a type of unmanifested form related to vows). Because it is based on the seeds熏習ed by the 'intention of expectation' (期心, the intention to receive the precepts) and 'reception-thought' (受思, the feeling and thought) arising from the actions of body and speech as the basis of the precepts. The thought that truly initiates the actions of body and speech does not arise at the time of the third Karma; at this time, one is merely silent before the teacher. Because that 'intention of expectation' is now fulfilled, the function on the seed is doubled, and it is called obtaining 'unmanifestation'. Although there are many explanations, the commentary itself judges to take the increase as an addition, not the substance. However, Master Baima (白馬法師) puts forward five faults: 1. The fault of the analogy of the present not being established; 2. The fault of increasing without熏習ing seeds; 3. The fault of increasing or decreasing the Buddha-fruit; 4. The fault of violating one's own teachings; 5. The fault of assisting other schools. Details are as described in the commentary.
Master Ci'en is like a boat crossing the sea of suffering, the sun of wisdom in a dark city, pointing out the future of the wonderful treasure, and eloquently speaking of the aftermath of the bright pearl. The five inauspicious stars are raised, and the seven kinds of eloquence are spread out like colorful clouds. Guiding scholars to recognize pearls, and opening the Dharma-eye of those who come later. Therefore, because of this meaning, awakening and understanding arise. In addition, having once mingled in the ranks of scholars, and having received much from other discourses. The Dharma returns to discrimination, and preciousness lies in polishing. Therefore, based on the five faults, ten shortcomings are briefly put forward. Although it is known that a small torch cannot compete with the sun, and a hanging dewdrop cannot compare with the clear breeze. However, Mount Sumeru (妙高山, Sumeru) begins with a single mote of dust, and the great ocean begins with a few drops of water. Therefore, do not despise the later learners, in order to encourage the excellence of those who come later.
識。聊因希法之研潭。粗述此科之云爾。余多得失且置不言。其十者何。一不知邪正失。二現用不增失。三妄謂種增失。四佛應無戒失。五妄為違教失。六假實不分失。七違于當教失。八妄謂朋異失。九應同異宗失。十種子防非失 一不知邪正者。言種體增假為此解。疏自斷云定．道無表既不體增。別脫無表例亦應爾。故斷取彼功能倍增以為正義。今復重破。破已破失。若將為正不了本解。謂不正為正。即不知邪正 二現用不增失者。云一例現不成過。定．道俱思亦名無表。但有唸唸能防無別倍體用。然得成無表律儀者。體無倍增自他共許。不許定．道唸唸用增。則后定．道不能斷於後后品惑。以此定．道功用不增同前定．道故。不能斷後后品惑。若許能斷違比量失。後後定．道應不伏斷後后品惑。以無勝能故。以功能等故。如前定．道。具有文證繁不能引。下皆準知。三妄謂種增失者。云無熏種增過。於此大乘一切種子不問新舊皆因熏發。乃至不由熏發。種子體用倍倍增廣。若無熏倍增即違此理者。正解用增不取體增。妄同前失。若論功能。無表之體增不由熏。但由作法。作法事了。暢本邀期。發身．語思所熏之種故成無表。功能倍增。故彌勒所問經論第三云。如施主施物。依受用功德力故。雖施主異心。而依本心
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 識。姑且因為希望研究佛法之深奧之處，粗略地敘述這個科目的內容。至於其他的得失，暫且不談。這十種過失是什麼呢？一是不知道什麼是邪什麼是正的過失；二是現行作用不增長的過失；三是錯誤地認為種子會增長的過失；四是佛陀的應化身沒有戒律的過失；五是錯誤地認為違背了教義的過失；六是假和實不分的過失；七是違背了當下的教義的過失；八是錯誤地認為同伴是異類的過失；九是應該相同卻異於宗派的過失；十是種子防止過失的過失。 一、不知道什麼是邪什麼是正的過失。說的是種子本體的增長是真是假，對此進行解釋。《疏》自己斷言說，『定』（禪定）、『道』（修行之道）的無表色既然不是本體增長，那麼別解脫戒的無表色也應該如此。所以斷定採取那種功能倍增作為正確的意義。現在再次進行破斥。破斥已經破斥過的過失。如果將它作為正確的，就是不瞭解原本的解釋，把不正當的當作正當的，這就是不知道什麼是邪什麼是正。 二、現行作用不增長的過失。說的是用一個例子來說明現行作用不能成就的過失。『定』（禪定）、『道』（修行之道）都經過思慮，也稱為無表色。但是隻有唸唸能夠防止，沒有其他倍增的本體作用。然而能夠成就無表律儀，本體沒有倍增，這是大家共同認可的。不允許『定』（禪定）、『道』（修行之道）唸唸作用增長，那麼後面的『定』（禪定）、『道』（修行之道）就不能斷除後面的品類迷惑。因為這個『定』（禪定）、『道』（修行之道）的功用不增長，和前面的『定』（禪定）、『道』（修行之道）一樣。如果允許能夠斷除，就違背了比量（推理）的過失。後面的『定』（禪定）、『道』（修行之道）應該不能夠降伏斷除後面的品類迷惑，因為沒有更強的能力。因為功能相等，如同前面的『定』（禪定）、『道』（修行之道）。具有文字證據，太多了不能引用。下面的情況都可以參照理解。 三、錯誤地認為種子會增長的過失。說的是沒有熏習種子增長的過失。對於這個大乘的一切種子，不論是新的還是舊的，都因為熏習而生髮，乃至不是因為熏習而生髮，種子的本體作用都倍倍增長擴大。如果沒有熏習就倍增，就違背了這個道理。正確的解釋是用增長，不取本體增長。錯誤地和前面的過失相同。如果討論功能，無表色的本體增長不是因為熏習，只是因為作法。作法的事情完畢了，暢通原本的邀約期限，生髮身、語思所熏習的種子，所以成就無表色，功能倍增。所以彌勒菩薩所問的經論第三說，『如同施主佈施物品，依靠受用功德力的緣故，即使施主改變了心意，還是依靠原本的心意』。
【English Translation】 English version Consciousness. I will discuss this subject briefly, hoping to explore the profound aspects of the Dharma. As for other gains and losses, I will leave them aside for now. What are these ten faults? First, the fault of not knowing what is wrong and what is right; second, the fault of the current function not increasing; third, the fault of falsely believing that seeds increase; fourth, the fault of the Buddha's manifested body not having precepts; fifth, the fault of falsely believing that the teachings are violated; sixth, the fault of not distinguishing between false and real; seventh, the fault of violating the current teachings; eighth, the fault of falsely believing that companions are different; ninth, the fault of being different from the sect when they should be the same; tenth, the fault of seeds preventing faults. 1. The fault of not knowing what is wrong and what is right. It refers to explaining whether the increase of the seed's substance is true or false. The 『Commentary』 itself asserts that since the unmanifested form of 『Dhyana』 (meditation) and 『Path』 (path of practice) does not increase in substance, the unmanifested form of Pratimoksha precepts should also be the same. Therefore, it concludes that taking the doubling of that function as the correct meaning. Now, it is refuted again. Refuting the fault that has already been refuted. If it is taken as correct, it means not understanding the original explanation, and taking what is incorrect as correct, which is not knowing what is wrong and what is right. 2. The fault of the current function not increasing. It refers to using an example to illustrate the fault that the current function cannot be achieved. 『Dhyana』 (meditation) and 『Path』 (path of practice) are both contemplated and are also called unmanifested form. However, only moment-to-moment prevention is possible, and there is no other doubling of the substantial function. However, those who can achieve unmanifested ethical conduct, the substance does not double, which is commonly acknowledged. It is not allowed for 『Dhyana』 (meditation) and 『Path』 (path of practice) to increase in function moment by moment, then the later 『Dhyana』 (meditation) and 『Path』 (path of practice) cannot eliminate the later categories of delusion. Because the function of this 『Dhyana』 (meditation) and 『Path』 (path of practice) does not increase, it is the same as the previous 『Dhyana』 (meditation) and 『Path』 (path of practice). If it is allowed to be eliminated, it violates the fault of inference (reasoning). The later 『Dhyana』 (meditation) and 『Path』 (path of practice) should not be able to subdue and eliminate the later categories of delusion, because there is no stronger ability. Because the functions are equal, like the previous 『Dhyana』 (meditation) and 『Path』 (path of practice). There is textual evidence, too much to quote. The following situations can be understood by reference. 3. The fault of falsely believing that seeds increase. It refers to the fault of not cultivating the increase of seeds. For all the seeds of this Mahayana, whether new or old, they are generated because of cultivation, and even if they are not generated because of cultivation, the substance and function of the seeds are doubled and expanded. If there is no cultivation and doubling, it violates this principle. The correct explanation is to use increase, not to take substance increase. Erroneously the same as the previous fault. If discussing function, the substance increase of unmanifested form is not because of cultivation, but only because of the act of creation. When the act of creation is completed, the original agreed-upon time is opened up, and the seeds cultivated by body, speech, and thought are generated, so the unmanifested form is achieved, and the function is doubled. Therefore, the third of the Sutra on the Questions of Maitreya says, 『Like a donor giving things, relying on the power of the merit of receiving and using, even if the donor changes his mind, he still relies on the original mind』.
念修相續體細細轉勝。以轉勝故於未來世。而得成就多福德果。乃至云。我依於心身業．口業。有善惡功德。依本心作不失本心。有相續體。顛狂．睡等常得增長。既云顛狂睡等常得增長。豈有能熏方增長耶 四佛應無戒失者。云佛果增減過。以若七支唸唸倍增。即久成佛戒則增多。后成佛者戒則減少。何名等覺。若許因增佛果無增。則小果第四亦應無增。自位究竟故。此義不然。佛果可無增。小果有勝劣。若執小第四位滿德無增。則不應分惠俱脫等。又以因例果增。果例因不增者。滿與不滿殊。何得互相例。若見因位增方名別脫戒。難果位無增佛應無戒者。則應由現熏增方得根本。佛位無熏復無加行。則應方便根本俱無。故解倍增據因位說。得戒多種。廣如余辨 五妄為違教失者。云違自教者大乘教門要由現行熏發。新熏種子勢力強盛。決定感果名增長故。乃至云今立種子不由熏發唸唸位增。豈不乖于大乘諸教者。此不應理。不言種子體念念增將為正義。此假敘釋。如前已明。若戒功能皆由熏增決定感果。即舍戒已應不感果。舍功能故。若功能不捨。則命終等猶成律儀不名舍戒。有功能故。故由動發期愿。現思熏成種已作白等訖。種子之上由期願力。遮防諸惡無表功能。倍倍增長。由此令思有感果用。功能決定。非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 念修相續的本體會逐漸變得更加精細殊勝。因為這種殊勝，在未來世，就能成就更多的福德果報。乃至說，我依靠身、口、意三業，有善惡功德。依靠本心而作，不失去本心，就有相續的本體。即使是顛狂、睡眠等狀態，（善惡功德）也會不斷增長。既然說顛狂、睡眠等狀態也會不斷增長，難道需要熏習才能增長嗎？ 如果說四佛（指過去、現在、未來諸佛）沒有戒律上的缺失，那麼佛果就會有增減的過失。如果說七支（指受戒的七個方面）唸唸倍增，那麼早就成佛的佛的戒律就會增多，後來成佛的佛的戒律就會減少，那還叫什麼等覺（指佛的果位）？如果承認因地增長而佛果沒有增長，那麼小果第四位（指聲聞四果中的第四果，阿羅漢果）也應該沒有增長，因為已經達到自身位置的究竟。這個說法是不對的。佛果可以沒有增長，但小果有殊勝和低劣之分。如果認為小果第四位圓滿后功德沒有增長，那麼就不應該有惠俱脫等（指阿羅漢的不同型別）。而且，用因地增長來類比果地增長，用果地不增長來類比因地不增長，這是因為圓滿和不圓滿有區別，怎麼能互相類比呢？如果認為只有見到因位增長才叫做別脫戒（指戒律），那麼難果位沒有增長，佛就應該沒有戒律嗎？那麼就應該由現行的熏習增長才能得到根本戒。佛位沒有熏習，也沒有加行，那麼方便和根本都應該沒有。所以，解釋倍增是根據因位來說的，得到戒律有很多種方式，詳細的可以參考其他論述。 如果說妄為違背教義有缺失，那麼違背自己教義的人，大乘教門（指大乘佛教的教義）需要通過現行的熏習引發，新熏習的種子勢力強盛，決定感果，所以叫做增長。乃至說，現在建立種子不由熏習引發，唸唸位增，豈不是違背了大乘的各種教義嗎？這個說法是不合理的。不認為種子本體念念增長是正確的意義，這只是假設的解釋，就像前面已經說明的那樣。如果戒律的功能都由熏習增長，決定感果，那麼舍戒之後就不應該感果，因為捨棄了功能。如果功能不捨棄，那麼命終等狀態仍然是律儀，不能叫做舍戒，因為有功能。所以，通過動發期愿，現行思惟熏成種子，已經做了白等（指受戒儀式）之後，在種子之上，由期愿的力量，遮防各種惡業的無表功能，倍倍增長。由此讓思惟有感果的作用，功能是決定的，不是……
【English Translation】 English version The substance of continuous mindfulness and practice becomes increasingly refined and superior. Because of this superiority, in future lives, one will attain the fruit of abundant merit. It is even said that I rely on the karma of body, speech, and mind, and have meritorious deeds of good and evil. Acting in accordance with the original mind, without losing the original mind, there is a continuous substance. Even in states of madness, sleep, etc., (meritorious deeds of good and evil) will constantly increase. Since it is said that even madness, sleep, etc., constantly increase, does it require cultivation to increase? If it is said that the Four Buddhas (referring to the Buddhas of the past, present, and future) have no faults in precepts, then the Buddha-fruit would have the fault of increase and decrease. If the seven branches (referring to the seven aspects of taking precepts) increase exponentially in every moment, then the precepts of a Buddha who attained Buddhahood long ago would increase, and the precepts of a Buddha who attained Buddhahood later would decrease. What is called Equal Enlightenment (referring to the fruit of Buddhahood)? If it is admitted that the cause increases but the Buddha-fruit does not increase, then the fourth stage of the Lesser Fruit (referring to the fourth fruit of the Hearers, the Arhat fruit) should also not increase, because it has already reached the ultimate of its own position. This statement is incorrect. The Buddha-fruit may not increase, but the Lesser Fruit has superior and inferior distinctions. If it is believed that after the fourth stage of the Lesser Fruit is complete, merit does not increase, then there should be no distinctions such as Wisdom-Liberation, etc. (referring to different types of Arhats). Moreover, using the increase of the cause to analogize the increase of the fruit, and using the non-increase of the fruit to analogize the non-increase of the cause, is because completeness and incompleteness are different; how can they be analogized to each other? If it is believed that only seeing the increase of the causal stage is called Pratimoksha (referring to precepts), then the difficult fruit stage has no increase, so the Buddha should have no precepts? Then it should be through the cultivation of present actions that the fundamental precepts are obtained. The Buddha-position has no cultivation and no additional practices, so both skillful means and the fundamental should be absent. Therefore, the explanation of exponential increase is based on the causal stage. There are many ways to obtain precepts, and detailed information can be found in other discussions. If it is said that falsely acting against the teachings has faults, then for those who violate their own teachings, the Mahayana teachings (referring to the doctrines of Mahayana Buddhism) require the cultivation of present actions to initiate. The newly cultivated seed has strong power and will definitely bear fruit, so it is called increase. It is even said that now establishing the seed without being initiated by cultivation, increasing in every moment, is it not contrary to the various teachings of Mahayana? This statement is unreasonable. It is not considered correct to believe that the substance of the seed increases in every moment; this is just a hypothetical explanation, as has been explained earlier. If the functions of precepts are all increased by cultivation and will definitely bear fruit, then after abandoning the precepts, one should not bear fruit, because the function has been abandoned. If the function is not abandoned, then states such as death are still precepts and cannot be called abandoning precepts, because there is function. Therefore, through initiating aspiration, the present thought cultivates the seed, and after having done the white, etc. (referring to the precept-taking ceremony), on top of the seed, by the power of aspiration, the non-manifest function of preventing various evil deeds increases exponentially. This allows thought to have the effect of bearing fruit, and the function is definite, not...
即無表假能感果。故下論云。假法如無非因緣故。若舍戒已。因循住舊勢力萎歇。期愿盡故。而五十四云。由不律儀思數數現行。是故非福運運增者。是說業道。以初要期但得不律無表。未成業道故。又別脫無表由受發故。住法竟得。不律非受。要作方得。故說不律儀思數數現行非福增長。律．不律別。又有別釋。如大師表無表章辨。成業論中雲。由思差別所熏成種。謂從此後不作因生。不作因生即是功能。設余說種以假從實。故不相違 六假實不分失者。以引雜集第七云。后二故思若作若增必受異熟者。是說業道種實感異熟能。非無表色。若業道功能與無表不別者。無表如業應行蘊攝。攝處既別。明假實殊。今引實能難假功能者。即假實不分失 七違于當教失者。云受戒者于大眾前發身口心乞戒已訖。乃至第三羯摩未終。唸唸起心。常得熏成方便戒種。至第三羯摩終時。能緣心識若起現前。便即熏成根本戒種者。論不應言或依發勝身．語思種增長位立。以禮師乞受。有動勝思要期分限所熏成種。作法竟已無表遂生。言初但方便。第三羯摩竟所熏種上。立根本律儀無表者。爾時但起緣心不發身語。依此種立與論相違。故為不可。然約業道。方便根本及以後起。從第三白至羯摩竟。成根本業道及無作戒。已后即名三業眷
【現代漢語翻譯】 即是說，如果沒有表色（無表：指一種不可見的戒體或業力），虛假的表色也不能感得果報。所以下文的論述說：『虛假的法就像不存在一樣，因為它不是因緣所生。』如果捨棄了戒律，因為因循守舊的勢力衰竭，期愿也已經結束。而《五十四》中說：『由於不律儀（不律儀：指違背戒律的行為）的思緒不斷地現行，所以非福（非福：指不好的業力）會不斷增長。』這是在說業道（業道：指造業的途徑）。因為最初的要期只能得到不律的無表，還未成就業道。而且，別解脫戒的無表是因為受戒而生髮的，在住法（住法：指安住于佛法）結束后才能得到。不律儀不是通過受戒得到的，而是必須要通過實際的造作才能得到。所以說不律儀的思緒不斷現行會導致非福增長。律儀和不律儀是有區別的。也有其他的解釋，比如大師在《表無表章》中的辨析。成業論中說：『由思緒的差別所熏習而成的種子，指的是從此以後不造作惡因也會產生果報。』不造作惡因也會產生果報，這就是功能。假設其他人說種子是從虛假中產生，那也是爲了順應真實的情況。所以這並不矛盾。 六、假和實不分導致過失。引用《雜集》第七卷說：『后兩種思緒，無論是造作還是增長，必定會承受異熟果報（異熟果報：指不同性質的果報）。』這是在說業道的真實種子能夠感得異熟果報，而不是無表色。如果業道的功能和無表沒有區別，那麼無表就應該像業一樣被攝入行蘊（行蘊：指心理活動）。既然攝入之處不同，就說明虛假和真實是有區別的。現在用真實的功能來反駁虛假的功能，這就是假和實不分的過失。 七、違背了本教的過失。論中說，受戒的人在大眾面前發起身口意，乞求戒律完畢，乃至第三次羯磨（羯磨：指佛教的儀式）還沒有結束，唸唸之間生起的心，常常能夠熏成方便戒種（方便戒種：指有助於生起真實戒體的種子）。到第三次羯磨結束時，能夠緣取心識如果生起現前，便立即熏成根本戒種（根本戒種：指真實戒體的種子）。論不應該說或者依據發起殊勝的身語思的種子增長的階段來建立。因為禮拜師父乞求受戒，有能動勝思的要期分限所熏成的種子。作法完畢后，無表就產生了。說最初只是方便，第三次羯磨結束后所熏成的種子上，建立根本律儀無表。那時只是生起緣取的心，沒有發起身語。依據這種種子來建立，與論相違背。所以是不可取的。然而，從業道的角度來說，方便、根本以及以後生起的，從第三次白到羯磨結束，成就根本業道以及無作戒（無作戒：指不作惡的戒體）。以後就叫做三業眷屬（三業眷屬：指身口意三業的附屬行為）。
【English Translation】 That is to say, if there is no Avijñapti (無表: invisible form; non-revealing form), the false Avijñapti cannot cause results. Therefore, the following discussion says: 'False dharmas are like non-existence because they are not produced by causes and conditions.' If one abandons the precepts, because the old forces of following the old ways are exhausted, and the aspirations have also ended. And the Fifty-four says: 'Because the thoughts of non-restraint (不律儀: immoral conduct) constantly manifest, therefore non-merit (非福: demerit) will continue to increase.' This is talking about the path of karma (業道: path of karma). Because the initial commitment can only obtain the Avijñapti of non-restraint, and has not yet achieved the path of karma. Moreover, the Avijñapti of Prātimokṣa (別解脫戒: precepts of individual liberation) is generated by receiving the precepts, and can only be obtained after abiding in the Dharma (住法: abiding in the Dharma). Non-restraint is not obtained through receiving precepts, but must be obtained through actual actions. Therefore, it is said that the constant manifestation of thoughts of non-restraint will lead to the increase of non-merit. There is a difference between restraint and non-restraint. There are also other explanations, such as the master's analysis in the 'Chapter on Manifest and Non-manifest'. The Treatise on the Completion of Karma says: 'The seeds that are cultivated by the differences in thoughts refer to the fact that from now on, not creating evil causes will also produce results.' Not creating evil causes will also produce results, this is the function. If others say that the seeds are produced from falsehood, that is also to conform to the real situation. So this is not contradictory. 6. The fault of not distinguishing between false and real. Quoting the seventh volume of the Saṃgraha, it says: 'The latter two kinds of thoughts, whether they are created or increased, will definitely bear the Vipāka-phala (異熟果報: result of different nature).' This is saying that the real seeds of the path of karma can cause the Vipāka-phala, not the Avijñapti-rūpa (無表色: non-revealing form). If the function of the path of karma is no different from Avijñapti, then Avijñapti should be included in the Saṃskāra-skandha (行蘊: aggregate of mental formations) like karma. Since the places of inclusion are different, it shows that there is a difference between false and real. Now, using the real function to refute the false function, this is the fault of not distinguishing between false and real. 7. The fault of contradicting the teachings of this school. The treatise says that the person receiving the precepts initiates body, speech, and mind in front of the assembly, and after requesting the precepts, until the third Karma (羯磨: Buddhist ritual) has not ended, the mind that arises between thoughts can often cultivate the Upāya-śīla-bīja (方便戒種: seed of expedient precepts). When the third Karma ends, if the mind that can grasp consciousness arises in the present, it will immediately cultivate the Mūla-śīla-bīja (根本戒種: seed of fundamental precepts). The treatise should not say that it is established based on the stage of growth of the seeds of superior body, speech, and thought that are initiated. Because worshiping the teacher and requesting to receive the precepts have the seeds cultivated by the limited period of time of the superior thought that can move. After the ritual is completed, Avijñapti is produced. Saying that it is only expedient at first, and the fundamental Prātimokṣa-Avijñapti is established on the seeds cultivated after the third Karma ends. At that time, only the mind that grasps arises, and body and speech are not initiated. Establishing based on this kind of seed is contrary to the treatise. So it is not acceptable. However, from the perspective of the path of karma, the expedient, the fundamental, and what arises later, from the third announcement to the end of the Karma, the fundamental path of karma and the Asaṃvara-śīla (無作戒: non-action precepts) are accomplished. Afterwards, it is called the retinue of the three karmas (三業眷屬: retinue of the three karmas).
屬。非別解戒。雖別脫戒第三羯摩竟時初得。后亦名戒。非於后時不名為戒。但名後起。猶如業道 八妄謂朋異失者。之於異宗等。初念唯有一具七支。至第二念更生七支。乃至云若體若用亦令唸唸七支倍增。便是乖自熏習附邪宗者。此亦不爾。元不熏種猶有功能。尚假實殊。無朋彼失。況先熏種至羯摩了。因緣法備功能方起。依思種立豈同彼耶。不障后熏增。但不許依羯摩了時意業思種。立根本無表。
九應同異宗失者。以立種子緣備之時功能倍增。即云朋邪宗過。小乘立無表。大乘令亦立。小乘立蘊等。今大乘亦立。皆應同彼過。若謂由熏假實有異無同彼失。今依種上功能倍增無過亦爾 十種子防非失者。云若從自宗即道．定．俱思。若現行者。或名為表。以有現表顯故。或名無表。以無如色表顯故。其所成種子。仍有遮防勢力。唯名無表者。是何無表。若隨心轉無表。現定道心無。若別脫無表。豈起定道時。即得別解脫耶。又若泛無所表顯。名為無表。即於一切種。皆應立無表。若云定．道無表戒種得名無表。應無現道定種子勢防非。若爾即應前三小果人惑永不行。以種能防同現行故。若非無表戒。立無表何為。
表無表小大二宗所立不同。且薩婆多定．道二戒。于根本．前．隨唯防根本。不防前
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
關於『屬於非別解戒』的說法。即使通過別解脫戒的第三羯摩（Karma，業）完成時最初獲得戒體，之後也可以稱之為戒。並非在之後的時間就不再稱之為戒，而是稱之為『後起』。這就像業道一樣。
關於『八妄』中所謂的『朋異失』，指的是對於異宗等。最初一念只有七支，到第二念又生出七支，乃至如果體和用也讓唸唸七支倍增，那就是違背自身熏習而附和邪宗。但這種情況並非如此，原本沒有熏習種子，即使有功能，尚且有假和實的區別，不存在附和彼宗而喪失自身的情況。更何況是先熏習種子，直到羯摩完成，因緣法具備，功能才產生。依據思種而建立，怎麼能和那種情況相同呢？這不會妨礙之後的熏習增長，只是不允許在羯摩完成時，依據意業思種來建立根本無表（Avijñapti-rūpa，無表色）。
關於『九應同異宗失』的說法。如果說在建立種子、因緣具備的時候，功能會倍增，那就等同於附和邪宗的過失。小乘（Hīnayāna）建立無表，大乘（Mahāyāna）也應該建立。小乘建立蘊等，現在大乘也建立，都應該有相同的過失。如果說因為熏習的假和實有所不同，所以沒有附和彼宗的過失，那麼現在依據種子上功能倍增，沒有過失也是一樣的。
關於『十種子防非失』的說法。如果說是從自宗來說，即道、定、俱思。如果是現行，或者稱為表，因為有現表顯現的緣故；或者稱為無表，因為沒有像色表那樣顯現的緣故。其所成就的種子，仍然有遮防的勢力，只稱為無表。那麼，這是什麼無表呢？如果是隨心轉的無表，現定道心中沒有。如果是別脫無表，難道在起定道的時候，就能得到別解脫嗎？又如果泛指沒有所表顯的，稱為無表，那麼對於一切種，都應該建立無表。如果說定、道的無表戒種可以稱為無表，那麼就不應該有現道定種子勢力來防止過非。如果這樣，那麼前三果的小果人，惑就永遠不會現行，因為種子能夠防止，和現行一樣。如果不是無表戒，建立無表有什麼用呢？
表無表在小乘和大乘二宗所建立的不同。且薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda）宗的定、道二戒，對於根本、前、隨，只防止根本，不防止前。
【English Translation】 English version
Regarding the statement that it 『belongs to non-Prātimokṣa vows』. Even if the vow is initially obtained when the third Karma (action) of Prātimokṣa vows is completed, it can still be called a vow afterward. It is not that it is no longer called a vow at a later time, but rather it is called 『subsequently arising』. This is like the path of karma.
Regarding the so-called 『fault of siding with other schools』 in the 『eight delusions』, it refers to those who adhere to other schools, etc. The initial thought has only seven branches, and by the second thought, seven more branches arise. Furthermore, if the essence and function also cause the seven branches to double with each thought, then it is deviating from one's own cultivation and siding with heretical schools. However, this is not the case here. Originally, there was no cultivation of seeds, and even if there is function, there is still a distinction between the provisional and the real, so there is no situation of siding with another school and losing oneself. Moreover, the seeds are cultivated first, and only when the Karma is completed and the conditions are met does the function arise. Established based on the seed of thought, how can it be the same as that situation? This does not hinder subsequent cultivation and growth, but it is not allowed to establish fundamental Avijñapti-rūpa (non-revealing form) based on the seed of mental action at the time of Karma completion.
Regarding the statement that 『nine should have the fault of being the same as other schools』. If it is said that when establishing seeds and when conditions are met, the function will double, then it is equivalent to the fault of siding with heretical schools. Hīnayāna (Small Vehicle) establishes Avijñapti-rūpa, and Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) should also establish it. Hīnayāna establishes Skandhas (aggregates) etc., and now Mahāyāna also establishes them, all should have the same fault. If it is said that because the provisional and real of cultivation are different, there is no fault of siding with other schools, then it is the same that there is no fault in doubling the function based on the seeds now.
Regarding the statement that 『ten seeds prevent the fault of non-virtue』. If it is said that from one's own school, it is the path, Samādhi (concentration), and simultaneous thought. If it is manifest, it is called expression because there is a manifest expression; or it is called non-expression because there is no expression like form. The seeds that are accomplished still have the power to prevent non-virtue and are only called non-expression. Then, what is this non-expression? If it is the non-expression that follows the mind, there is none in the present Samādhi and path mind. If it is Prātimokṣa non-expression, how can one obtain Prātimokṣa when arising in Samādhi and the path? Furthermore, if generally referring to that which has no expression, it is called non-expression, then Avijñapti-rūpa should be established for all seeds. If it is said that the non-expression vow seed of Samādhi and the path can be called non-expression, then there should be no power of the present path and Samādhi seeds to prevent non-virtue. If so, then the small fruit people of the first three fruits will never have delusions manifest because the seeds can prevent them, just like the manifest. If it is not a non-expression vow, what is the use of establishing non-expression?
The establishment of expression and non-expression differs between the Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna schools. Moreover, the two vows of Samādhi and the path of the Sarvāstivāda school only prevent the fundamental for the fundamental, previous, and subsequent, and do not prevent the previous.
方便及后所起。通防過．未。若爾何故不防前．隨。已未有心時定．道不起。若舉心已。即能遮惡不假加行。若出定已。不能遮惡。所以不防前．隨。若別解脫不防過．未唯現在時。根本．前．隨並皆防護。若明戒得。道．定得俱通三世。若其無表同。別解脫但有俱．后無法前得。以色性鈍故。若舍戒時。后戒落謝更無得得。謂無法后得。然屬行者身。且如舍戒。雖無得得。由自屬身。然能后時招異熟果。若大乘師道．定．別解。並防三世及防三時。若舍之時。有先熏種能招後果。不別說有法前．后得。若約種子義說前後。雖亦可得。然無文說。若身．語表業惡色方成。雖不能言等。然運動等令他得解故。表無表色十門分別如章廣辨。
就第五得舍門中。初明得。后明舍。明得中分二。先表后無表。表戒不從他受。然須對他。以起身．語即名為表故。然薩婆多要從他受。以第三羯磨時。與無表戒一時得故 無表通二。又且佛及獨覺。不從他受。一向自然受 問獨覺有二。初眾出亦見於佛故。經云釋迦成道五百辟支來至佛所。如何不從他處受耶 答眾出雖至佛所不樂為資。不如聲聞樂事于佛。所以一向自受非他 問如須陀洹人入見諦時。得別解脫戒。為從他受。為是自受 答此從遠說亦是從他 問若從他受別解脫
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 方便以及其後所產生的（戒體），能夠同時防止過去、未來和現在的（惡行）。如果這樣，為什麼不能防止先前的和隨後的（惡行）呢？因為在沒有生起意念的時候，道和定力不起作用。如果已經生起意念，就能遮止惡行，不需要額外的努力。如果出定之後，不能遮止惡行，所以不能防止先前的和隨後的（惡行）。如果別解脫戒不能防止過去和未來的（惡行），只能防止現在的（惡行），那麼根本戒就能防護先前、隨後以及現在的（惡行）。如果通過明戒而獲得（戒體），道和定力都能通於三世。如果其無表戒與別解脫戒相同，只有同時獲得和之後獲得，沒有先前獲得，因為色法的性質遲鈍。如果舍戒的時候，先前的戒體消退，不再有獲得，即沒有之後獲得。然而，這屬於行者自身。比如舍戒，雖然沒有獲得，但由於自身具有，仍然能在以後招感異熟果報。如果大乘的師道、定、別解脫，都能防止三世的（惡行），以及防止三種時間的（惡行）。如果舍戒的時候，有先前熏習的種子能夠招感後果，不特別說有法先前獲得和之後獲得。如果從種子的意義上說先前和之後，雖然也可以，但沒有經文這樣說。如果身語的表業惡色才形成，雖然不能說相等，但運動等使他人理解，所以表業和無表色的十種門分別，如章節中廣泛辨析。 關於第五得舍門中，先說明獲得，后說明捨棄。說明獲得中分為兩種，先說表戒，后說無表戒。表戒不是從他人處接受，但必須面對他人，因為起身語就稱為表業。然而，薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）認為必須從他人處接受，因為在第三次羯磨（Karma，業）時，與無表戒同時獲得。無表戒通於兩種情況。而且佛和獨覺（Pratyekabuddha，辟支佛）不從他人處接受，一向是自然獲得。問：獨覺有兩種，最初出家也見過佛，所以經中說釋迦（Sakyamuni，能仁）成道時，五百辟支佛來到佛所，為什麼不是從他處接受呢？答：眾出的獨覺雖然來到佛所，但不樂於作為資助，不如聲聞（Sravaka，聲聞）樂於侍奉佛陀，所以一向是自己獲得，而不是從他人處獲得。問：如果須陀洹（Srotapanna，入流果）在見諦（Darshana-marga，見道）時，獲得別解脫戒，是從他人處接受，還是自己獲得？答：這從長遠來說也是從他人處接受。問：如果是從他人處接受別解脫戒。
【English Translation】 English version: Convenience and what arises thereafter can prevent past, future, and present (evil deeds) simultaneously. If so, why not prevent prior and subsequent (evil deeds)? Because when thoughts have not arisen, the path and samadhi (concentration) do not function. If thoughts have already arisen, one can prevent evil deeds without additional effort. If one is out of samadhi, one cannot prevent evil deeds, so one cannot prevent prior and subsequent (evil deeds). If Pratimoksha (individual liberation vows) cannot prevent past and future (evil deeds), but only present (evil deeds), then the root vows can protect prior, subsequent, and present (evil deeds). If one obtains (the precepts) through clear precepts, both the path and samadhi can encompass the three times. If its non-revealing precepts are the same as Pratimoksha, there is only simultaneous obtaining and subsequent obtaining, but no prior obtaining, because the nature of form is dull. If one abandons the precepts, the prior precepts fade away, and there is no longer any obtaining, i.e., no subsequent obtaining. However, this belongs to the practitioner himself. For example, abandoning the precepts, although there is no obtaining, because it belongs to oneself, it can still bring about different ripening results in the future. If the Mahayana (Great Vehicle) teacher's path, samadhi, and Pratimoksha can all prevent the three times (of evil deeds), and prevent the three times (of evil deeds). If one abandons the precepts, there are priorly cultivated seeds that can bring about consequences, and there is no special mention of prior and subsequent obtaining of the Dharma. If one speaks of prior and subsequent in terms of the meaning of seeds, although it is also possible, there is no textual support for it. If the physical and verbal revealing actions of evil form, although one cannot say they are equal, the movement, etc., causes others to understand, so the ten aspects of revealing and non-revealing forms are analyzed extensively in the chapter. Regarding the fifth gate of obtaining and abandoning, first explain obtaining, then explain abandoning. Explaining obtaining is divided into two, first explaining revealing precepts, then explaining non-revealing precepts. Revealing precepts are not received from others, but must be faced towards others, because the arising of body and speech is called revealing action. However, the Sarvastivadins (Sarvastivadins, school of "everything exists") believe that it must be received from others, because at the time of the third Karma (Karma, action), it is obtained simultaneously with the non-revealing precepts. Non-revealing precepts encompass two situations. Moreover, Buddhas and Pratyekabuddhas (Pratyekabuddha, solitary Buddhas) do not receive from others, but always obtain naturally. Question: There are two types of Pratyekabuddhas, the first one who left the household also saw the Buddha, so the sutra says that when Sakyamuni (Sakyamuni, the able sage) attained enlightenment, five hundred Pratyekabuddhas came to the Buddha, why not receive from others? Answer: Although the Pratyekabuddhas who left the household came to the Buddha, they are not happy to be assisted, unlike the Sravakas (Sravaka, hearers) who are happy to serve the Buddha, so they always obtain it themselves, not from others. Question: If a Srotapanna (Srotapanna, stream-enterer) obtains Pratimoksha precepts when seeing the truth (Darshana-marga, path of seeing), is it received from others, or obtained by oneself? Answer: This is also received from others in the long run. Question: If it is received from others, Pratimoksha precepts.
已。得聖迴心后經多時以受變易。乃至成佛方捨本身戒。豈不從他所受耶。又只如十地已前得戒亦爾 答且小乘薩婆多雲。三十三心前佛身所有別解脫猶名未曾得。第三十四心后前之所有皆舍。以得勝舍劣故。別有一新無作別解脫生。然亦是色。大乘二解。一轉滅舍。謂無漏種子有三品心。謂見道初得下品。修道中得中品。佛時得上品。舍前劣品唯有上品。此之上品豈從他受。二有轉齊舍。如入修道轉下品得中。若得上品轉中得上。此之上品豈亦從他。故佛．辟支皆不從他。又別解脫明得．不得分二。謂大小乘。具如章辨 然二十部中。西山住．北山住．制多山三部同云。和上不清凈亦得戒。故律云但牒僧眾乞戒不雲和上。因何此之三部作此計耶。以三先是外道之侶。見無利養皆來共僧同住。后時俗人由欲簡擇。在後皆剃頭。又被國王皆欲簡擇不受戒者。皆不許住。此諸人皆云我受戒。眾僧同責。於何人邊受。自指同類以為和上。眾人即云。汝和上不清凈。云何得戒耶。遂起此計。餘十七部皆不許之。要須清凈 明舍中。然毗尼母律中雲。犯重失戒。涅槃等云。若言失戒不解我意。若不失戒亦不解我意。
其義云何。答有二解。一犯重不失戒。如十輪經等 若爾何故律云如斷人頭折石等 答然準瑜伽解。菩薩戒
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：已經獲得了聖人的心境之後，經過很長時間才會發生轉變。乃至成佛之後，才捨棄最初受的戒律。難道不是從他人那裡接受的嗎？又比如十地菩薩之前獲得的戒律也是如此嗎？ 答：且不說小乘薩婆多部的觀點，在三十三個心念之前，佛陀身所具有的別解脫（prātimokṣa，防止惡行的戒律）仍然可以稱為『未曾獲得』。在第三十四個心念之後，之前的（別解脫）全部捨棄。因為獲得了更殊勝的，所以捨棄了低劣的。另外產生一種新的無作別解脫（asaṃskṛta-prātimokṣa，不需努力自然成就的戒律）。然而這也是色法（rūpa，物質）。大乘有兩種解釋。第一種是轉變滅舍。意思是說，無漏種子（anāsrava-bīja，沒有煩惱的種子）有三種品級的心。在見道（darśana-mārga，證悟真理的道路）之初獲得下品，在修道（bhāvanā-mārga，通過修行來培養智慧的道路）中獲得中品，成佛時獲得上品。捨棄之前的低劣品級，只留下上品。這上品難道是從他人那裡接受的嗎？第二種是有轉變齊舍。比如進入修道時，轉變下品獲得中品，如果獲得上品，就轉變中品獲得上品。這上品難道也是從他人那裡接受的嗎？所以佛和辟支佛（pratyekabuddha，緣覺）都不從他人那裡接受戒律。另外，別解脫分為明得和不得兩種情況，也就是大小乘的區別。具體內容如章節中所辨析的那樣。 然而在二十部派中，西山住部、北山住部、制多山部這三個部派都認為，如果和尚（upādhyāya，戒師）不清凈，也可以得戒。所以律典中說，只要按照僧眾的程式請求戒律，沒有說一定要和尚。為什麼這三個部派會有這種說法呢？因為他們最初是外道（tīrthika，佛教以外的修行者）的同伴，看到沒有利益，就都來和僧人一起居住。後來世俗之人想要進行篩選，就把他們都剃了頭。又因為國王想要進行篩選，不允許沒有受戒的人居住。這些人就都說自己受了戒。僧眾一起責問他們，是從誰那裡受的戒？他們就指著同類的人作為和尚。眾人就說：『你的和尚不清凈，怎麼能得戒呢？』於是就產生了這種說法。其餘十七個部派都不允許這種情況，一定要清凈。 關於捨棄戒律的問題。然而《毗尼母律》（Vinaya-mātṛkā）中說，犯了重罪就會失去戒律。《涅槃經》（Nirvāṇa Sūtra）等經典中說，如果說失去戒律，就沒有理解我的意思；如果不失去戒律，也沒有理解我的意思。 這其中的含義是什麼呢？答：有兩種解釋。第一種是犯了重罪也不會失去戒律，如《十輪經》（Daśacakra Sūtra）等經典所說。如果這樣，為什麼律典中說，如同砍斷人頭、折斷石頭等？答：按照《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）的解釋，菩薩戒（bodhisattva-śīla）……
【English Translation】 English version: Question: After attaining the mind of a saint, it takes a long time for changes to occur. Even after becoming a Buddha, one abandons the precepts initially received. Isn't that received from someone else? And what about the precepts obtained before the Tenth Ground (Daśabhūmi) Bodhisattva, is it the same? Answer: Let's not even mention the view of the Sarvāstivāda school of Hinayana. Before the thirty-third thought, the Prātimokṣa (individual liberation), which the Buddha's body possesses, can still be called 'not yet obtained.' After the thirty-fourth thought, all the previous (Prātimokṣa) are abandoned. Because one has obtained something more superior, the inferior is abandoned. Another new Asaṃskṛta-Prātimokṣa (unconditioned liberation) arises. However, this is also Rūpa (form). There are two explanations in Mahayana. The first is transformation and extinction. It means that the Anāsrava-bīja (seed of non-outflow) has three grades of mind. At the beginning of the Path of Seeing (Darśana-mārga), the lower grade is obtained, the middle grade is obtained in the Path of Cultivation (Bhāvanā-mārga), and the upper grade is obtained at the time of Buddhahood. The previous inferior grade is abandoned, leaving only the upper grade. Was this upper grade received from someone else? The second is transformation and simultaneous abandonment. For example, when entering the Path of Cultivation, the lower grade is transformed to obtain the middle grade, and if the upper grade is obtained, the middle grade is transformed to obtain the upper grade. Was this upper grade also received from someone else? Therefore, Buddhas and Pratyekabuddhas (Solitary Buddhas) do not receive precepts from others. In addition, Prātimokṣa is divided into two situations: clearly obtained and not obtained, which is the difference between Hinayana and Mahayana. The specific content is as analyzed in the chapter. However, among the twenty schools, the Haimavata, Uttarapathaka, and Caitika schools all believe that if the Upādhyāya (preceptor) is not pure, one can still obtain precepts. Therefore, the Vinaya says that as long as one requests precepts according to the procedures of the Sangha, it does not say that an Upādhyāya is necessary. Why do these three schools have this view? Because they were originally companions of Tīrthikas (non-Buddhists), and when they saw no benefit, they all came to live with the monks. Later, secular people wanted to screen them, so they shaved their heads. Also, because the king wanted to screen them, he did not allow those who had not received precepts to live there. These people all said that they had received precepts. The Sangha questioned them together, from whom did you receive the precepts? They pointed to people of the same kind as their Upādhyāya. The crowd then said, 'Your Upādhyāya is not pure, how can you obtain precepts?' Thus, this view arose. The remaining seventeen schools do not allow this situation, purity is necessary. Regarding the issue of abandoning precepts. However, the Vinaya-mātṛkā says that committing a serious offense will cause one to lose the precepts. The Nirvāṇa Sūtra and other scriptures say that if you say that you lose the precepts, you have not understood my meaning; if you do not lose the precepts, you have not understood my meaning. What is the meaning of this? Answer: There are two explanations. The first is that committing a serious offense does not cause one to lose the precepts, as stated in the Daśacakra Sūtra and other scriptures. If so, why does the Vinaya say that it is like cutting off a person's head, breaking a stone, etc.? Answer: According to the explanation of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, Bodhisattva-śīla (Bodhisattva precepts) ...
增上品纏犯方始舍戒。中．下不捨。大論前據上品。十輪據中．下。故涅槃經云。我諸弟子言犯重舍戒不解我意。又諸弟子言犯重不失戒亦不解我意。必若實舍言舍解佛意。若實不捨言不捨解佛意。既言並不解我意。故知言舍約上品心。不捨約下中犯。故一向言舍不捨者不解佛意 第二解云。犯重舍戒。何以故。瑜伽但云。菩薩戒約上中下不言別解脫。故知舍戒。何故十輪經言不捨戒。約化相言。若云犯者。便無植善因。不敬出家眾故云不犯。涅槃約化相故。言舍不解我意。約實言不捨不解我意 第一師難云。若爾何故大方廣陀羅尼云。若有犯重。猶在伽藍者名賊住。及受他施一果子。必墮地獄。文殊問言。云何得生無罪耶。佛為說咒。誦此咒者戒還清凈。若總舍者何言還清凈。故知犯重有輕重。不可全判皆為舍．不捨。所以戒經言。如前後亦如是。應具檢上引所有經文。
無漏律儀。小乘若見斷對治。唯色界六地。若次第人。唯初近分。若超越人。於六地中俱得入見。修道無漏。雖通九地。然于無色不立無漏及定律儀。以隔界故。無防欲非故不立也。
若大乘中見道無漏。色界通五地入。大乘見道依第四靜慮。獨覺亦爾。此俱無表亦亦隨所應。若修道治道無漏。通無色下三地。若非想地雖有無漏而非斷
道。若言無漏法亦防七支非。非想亦有無漏律儀。定亦許爾。
論不撥為無但言非色。云何非色。涅槃第十八六念中解。念戒者云。雖無形色而可護持。雖無觸對而可修習。第三十六諍論中雲無作戒者非異色因。不作異色因果。是名無作戒。言非異色因者。非諸大造為因親造。不作異色因果者。非是大造因許果。故知無作但依思立。應撿彼文。
又業及業道應作四句分別。假實二業及通生游履思準可知。然薩婆多唯以游履名為業道。即意思是業。而不是道。大乘但業即皆是道。
言得非得等下破不相應行。除經量部及一說部但破所餘。何以故。經部得等皆是假有。如俱舍論破有部。明一說部者。既說諸法但有能詮無實所詮一切法體。故亦不立不相應行。故此說除 然要集云。此中大乘．經部共破薩婆多師者。理必不爾。豈可小乘共護法等造唯識耶。雖可與彼俱舍論中破義相似。此非共造。今此下破但依比量破。彼所立無有現量及至教量破。彼實有故。正理十三云。又此諸相豈如瓶等有現比量。或至教量證體假有。既遮實有故彼定應許生等相體是假有。第三法有理必無故。此意不許生等實有。即應定說生等假有以必不許有第三法。亦實亦假故廣如彼說。由此二家現量．至教都無誠證。但可比量各為立
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果說無漏法也能防止七支錯誤，那麼非想非非想處天也應該有無漏律儀，禪定也應該允許有無漏律儀。
答：論中並沒有否定無作戒是存在的，只是說它不是色法。什麼叫做非色法呢？在《涅槃經》第十八品和六念中有所解釋。念戒的人說：『雖然無作戒沒有形色，但是可以守護和保持；雖然沒有觸對，但是可以修習。』第三十六品《諍論品》中說：『無作戒不是異色之因，不產生異色的因果，這叫做無作戒。』說『非異色之因』，是指它不是由四大所造的色法為因直接產生；說『不作異色因果』，是指它不是以四大所造的色法為因而產生果報。因此，可以知道無作戒只是依思心所而建立的。應該仔細查閱那些經文。
此外，業和業道應該作四句分別：真實的業、虛假的業，以及通於生得和游履的思業，可以參照前面的內容來理解。然而，薩婆多部只把游履稱為業道，意思是思業是業，而不是業道。大乘認為所有的思業都是業道。
『言得非得等』以下是破斥不相應行法。除了經量部和一說部之外，這裡只破斥其餘的部派。為什麼呢？因為經量部認為得等都是假有的。正如《俱舍論》破斥有部一樣。說明一說部，是因為他們認為諸法只有能詮的語言文字，而沒有真實的所詮的法體，所以也不建立不相應行法。因此，這裡要排除這兩個部派。然而，《要集》中說：『這裡大乘和經量部共同破斥薩婆多部的觀點』，這在理上是不可能的。難道小乘會和護法等人一起造唯識學嗎？雖然可以和《俱舍論》中破斥的意義相似，但這並不是共同造作。現在這裡以下的破斥只是依據比量來破斥，而他們所立的觀點沒有現量和至教量的證明。因為他們認為是實有的。正理十三中說：『又這些諸相難道像瓶子等一樣，有現量、比量或者至教量來證明它的體是假有的嗎？』既然遮止了實有，那麼他們必定應該承認生等相的體是假有的。第三種法在理上必定沒有，因此，這裡的意思是不承認生等是實有的，就應該肯定地說生等是假有的，因為必定不承認有第三種法，既是實有又是假有。詳細的內容可以參考那裡的說法。由此可見，這兩家在現量和至教量上都沒有可靠的證據，只能各自用比量來建立自己的觀點。
English version: Question: If it is said that undefiled (anāsrava) dharmas can also prevent the seven branches of wrong conduct, then the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana) should also have undefiled precepts (śīla), and meditative absorption (dhyāna) should also be allowed to have undefiled precepts.
Answer: The treatise does not deny the existence of non-performing precepts (asaṃvara), but only says that it is not a form (rūpa). What is meant by 'not a form'? It is explained in the 18th chapter of the Nirvana Sutra and in the Six Recollections. Those who recollect precepts say: 'Although non-performing precepts have no form, they can be guarded and maintained; although there is no contact, they can be cultivated.' The 36th chapter, Dispute, says: 'Non-performing precepts are not the cause of different forms, and do not produce the cause and effect of different forms. This is called non-performing precepts.' Saying 'not the cause of different forms' means that it is not directly caused by the four great elements (mahābhūta). Saying 'not producing the cause and effect of different forms' means that it does not produce results based on the four great elements as the cause. Therefore, it can be known that non-performing precepts are only established based on thought (cetanā). Those texts should be carefully examined.
Furthermore, karma (karma) and the path of karma (karmapatha) should be distinguished by four categories: real karma, false karma, and volitional karma (思業) that is common to both innate (生得) and acquired (游履). This can be understood by referring to the previous content. However, the Sarvāstivāda school only calls acquired volitional karma the path of karma, meaning that volitional karma is karma, not the path of karma. In Mahayana, all volitional karma is the path of karma.
'The statement 'attainment and non-attainment, etc.' below refutes non-associated formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra). Except for the Sautrāntika and the Ekavyāvahārika schools, only the remaining schools are refuted here. Why? Because the Sautrāntika school considers attainment, etc., to be nominally existent (prajñapti-sat). Just as the Abhidharmakośa refutes the Vaibhāṣika school. Explaining the Ekavyāvahārika school, because they believe that dharmas only have the expressing words (能詮), and no real expressed entities (所詮), they also do not establish non-associated formations. Therefore, these two schools should be excluded. However, the Yaoji says: 'Here, Mahayana and the Sautrāntika school jointly refute the views of the Sarvāstivāda school.' This is logically impossible. How could the Hinayana jointly create the Consciousness-Only (Vijñānavāda) with Dharmapāla and others? Although it may be similar to the meaning refuted in the Abhidharmakośa, this is not a joint creation. The refutation below is only based on inference (anumāna), and their established views have no proof from direct perception (pratyakṣa) or scriptural authority (āgama). Because they consider them to be truly existent. The Nyāyasūtra XIII says: 'Also, are these characteristics like a pot, etc., proven to be nominally existent by direct perception, inference, or scriptural authority?' Since real existence is denied, then they must admit that the nature of arising, etc., is nominally existent. The third kind of dharma is logically impossible. Therefore, the meaning here is not to admit that arising, etc., is truly existent, and it should be definitely said that arising, etc., is nominally existent, because it is definitely not admitted that there is a third kind of dharma that is both truly existent and nominally existent. Detailed content can be found in that explanation. From this, it can be seen that these two schools have no reliable evidence from direct perception and scriptural authority, and can only establish their own views using inference.
【English Translation】 Modern Chinese Translation: Question: If it is said that undefiled (anāsrava) dharmas can also prevent the seven branches of wrong conduct, then the Realm of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception (naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana) should also have undefiled precepts (śīla), and meditative absorption (dhyāna) should also be allowed to have undefiled precepts.
Answer: The treatise does not deny the existence of non-performing precepts (asaṃvara), but only says that it is not a form (rūpa). What is meant by 'not a form'? It is explained in the 18th chapter of the Nirvana Sutra and in the Six Recollections. Those who recollect precepts say: 'Although non-performing precepts have no form, they can be guarded and maintained; although there is no contact, they can be cultivated.' The 36th chapter, Dispute, says: 'Non-performing precepts are not the cause of different forms, and do not produce the cause and effect of different forms. This is called non-performing precepts.' Saying 'not the cause of different forms' means that it is not directly caused by the four great elements (mahābhūta). Saying 'not producing the cause and effect of different forms' means that it does not produce results based on the four great elements as the cause. Therefore, it can be known that non-performing precepts are only established based on thought (cetanā). Those texts should be carefully examined.
Furthermore, karma (karma) and the path of karma (karmapatha) should be distinguished by four categories: real karma, false karma, and volitional karma (思業) that is common to both innate (生得) and acquired (游履). This can be understood by referring to the previous content. However, the Sarvāstivāda school only calls acquired volitional karma the path of karma, meaning that volitional karma is karma, not the path of karma. In Mahayana, all volitional karma is the path of karma.
'The statement 'attainment and non-attainment, etc.' below refutes non-associated formations (citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra). Except for the Sautrāntika and the Ekavyāvahārika schools, only the remaining schools are refuted here. Why? Because the Sautrāntika school considers attainment, etc., to be nominally existent (prajñapti-sat). Just as the Abhidharmakośa refutes the Vaibhāṣika school. Explaining the Ekavyāvahārika school, because they believe that dharmas only have the expressing words (能詮), and no real expressed entities (所詮), they also do not establish non-associated formations. Therefore, these two schools should be excluded. However, the Yaoji says: 'Here, Mahayana and the Sautrāntika school jointly refute the views of the Sarvāstivāda school.' This is logically impossible. How could the Hinayana jointly create the Consciousness-Only (Vijñānavāda) with Dharmapāla and others? Although it may be similar to the meaning refuted in the Abhidharmakośa, this is not a joint creation. The refutation below is only based on inference (anumāna), and their established views have no proof from direct perception (pratyakṣa) or scriptural authority (āgama). Because they consider them to be truly existent. The Nyāyasūtra XIII says: 'Also, are these characteristics like a pot, etc., proven to be nominally existent by direct perception, inference, or scriptural authority?' Since real existence is denied, then they must admit that the nature of arising, etc., is nominally existent. The third kind of dharma is logically impossible. Therefore, the meaning here is not to admit that arising, etc., is truly existent, and it should be definitely said that arising, etc., is nominally existent, because it is definitely not admitted that there is a third kind of dharma that is both truly existent and nominally existent. Detailed content can be found in that explanation. From this, it can be seen that these two schools have no reliable evidence from direct perception and scriptural authority, and can only establish their own views using inference.
破。故彼小乘雖引聖教。今此論主云經不說異色．心等有實體用為證不成。但比量破。于中本說此文有三。初難實有別舉體相及作用因。二此定非異下合難體用。三或心心所下別難實有 西明釋云。此定非異下。初量釋上體用非實。次後二量重釋前失。初破實有。后立假有者 此不應爾。文自立量直是破他。何須釋上及重釋失。既言重釋。何故復言初破實有後立假有。又后二量準文破實。未是立假。但且破他。以他立云不相應行異色．心等有實體用。故今對破遮他為論。未即反成不相應假。下述正中方立假故 集云此定非異色．心．心所有實體用。許蘊攝故。如色．心等者 此與外宗作比量相違。然此比量即有過失。若別立二量各有不定。謂不相應行異色無實體用。許蘊攝故。如色異心無體量可準知。此即不定。若合立者。即法自相相違失。及法差別相違因失。自相相違云。不相應行異色．心等有實體用。許蘊攝故。如色．心等。此喻有二義。一色外無別色體。心外無別心體。二色外有別心體。心外有別色體。如色心等。言含二義。故論主取前義。外人取后義 又法差別相違量云。不相應行。定是實有。詳蘊攝故。如色．心等。直言定實有體。不言異色心等。故非言顯差別中收。且前云有法自相相違過者不爾。既合立
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
破斥。因此，即使彼小乘宗派引用聖教，此論主也認為，以經中未說異色（與顏色不同的事物）、心等有實體作用為證是不成立的。只是通過比量來破斥。其中，原本說此文有三部分。第一，從實有角度出發，分別舉出體相和作用作為原因進行反駁。第二，『此定非異下』，綜合反駁體和用。第三，『或心心所下』，分別反駁實有。西明的解釋是，『此定非異下』，第一個比量解釋了上面體和用並非實有。其次，後面的兩個比量重新解釋了之前的過失。首先破斥實有，然後建立假有。這不應該這樣。文章本身立比量直接是爲了破斥他人，何須解釋上面的內容以及重新解釋過失。既然說是重新解釋，為何又說先破斥實有後建立假有。而且後面的兩個比量按照文義破斥實有，還未到建立假有的階段，只是破斥他人。因為他人立論說不相應行異色、心等有實體作用，所以現在針對性地破斥，以此遮止他人的觀點。還不能反過來成立不相應的假有。下面敘述正宗時才建立假有。集論中說，『此定非異色、心、心所有實體用，因為被蘊所攝，如色、心等』。這與外宗作比量是相違背的。而且這個比量本身就有過失。如果分別立兩個比量，則各自有不確定性。即不相應行異色沒有實體作用，因為被蘊所攝，如色異心沒有體量可以衡量，可知這是不確定的。如果合併立比量，則有法自相相違的過失，以及法差別相違的原因的過失。自相相違是指，不相應行異色、心等有實體作用，因為被蘊所攝，如色、心等。這個比喻包含兩種含義：一是色外沒有別的色體，心外沒有別的心體；二是色外有別的心體，心外有別的色體。如色心等，言語中包含兩種含義，所以論主取第一種含義，外人取第二種含義。另外，法差別相違的比量說，不相應行一定是實有的，因為被蘊所攝，如色、心等。直接說一定是實有體，沒有說異色心等，所以不是在言語顯示差別中包含的。而且前面說有法自相相違的過失是不對的，既然是合併立論。
【English Translation】 English version:
Refutation. Therefore, even if the Śrāvakayāna (Hearer Vehicle) cites the sacred teachings, this treatise master believes that it is not valid to argue that the scriptures do not say that visamprayukta-samskaras (dissociated formations), citta (mind), etc., have substantial functions. It is only refuted through inference. Among them, it was originally said that this text has three parts. First, from the perspective of sat (existence), the lakshana (characteristics) and kriya (functions) are separately cited as reasons for refutation. Second, 『idam na nanya (this is not different)』 below, comprehensively refutes the rupa (form) and kriya. Third, 『citta-caitta (mind and mental factors)』 below, separately refutes sat. The interpretation of Ximing is that 『idam na nanya』 below, the first inference explains that the above rupa and kriya are not sat. Secondly, the following two inferences re-explain the previous faults. First refute sat, then establish kalpana (provisional existence). This should not be the case. The article itself establishes inference directly to refute others, why explain the above content and re-explain the faults. Since it is said to be re-explained, why is it said that first refute sat and then establish kalpana. Moreover, the following two inferences refute sat according to the meaning of the text, and have not yet reached the stage of establishing kalpana, but only refute others. Because others argue that visamprayukta-samskaras, citta, etc., have substantial functions, so now specifically refute them to stop others' views. It cannot be reversed to establish the visamprayukta-samskaras. The kalpana is established only when describing the orthodox view below. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) says, 『idam na nanya visamprayukta-samskaras citta-caitta sat kriya, skandha-samgraha, rupa-citta (this is not different visamprayukta-samskaras citta-caitta sat kriya, because it is included in the skandha (aggregate), like rupa citta)』. This is contrary to the paravadin (opponent) making inferences. Moreover, this inference itself has faults. If two inferences are established separately, each has uncertainty. That is, visamprayukta-samskaras rupa does not have substantial functions, because it is included in the skandha, such as rupa citta has no pramana (valid cognition) to measure, it can be known that this is uncertain. If the inferences are combined, there will be the fault of svabhava-viruddha (self-contradictory) and the fault of dharma-visesa-viruddha (contradictory to the specific characteristics of the law). Svabhava-viruddha refers to visamprayukta-samskaras rupa, citta, etc., have substantial functions, because they are included in the skandha, such as rupa, citta, etc. This metaphor contains two meanings: one is that there is no other rupa outside of rupa, and there is no other citta outside of citta; the other is that there is another citta outside of rupa, and there is another rupa outside of citta. Such as rupa citta, the language contains two meanings, so the treatise master takes the first meaning, and the outsider takes the second meaning. In addition, the inference of dharma-visesa-viruddha says that visamprayukta-samskaras must be sat, because they are included in the skandha, such as rupa, citta, etc. Directly saying that it must be sat, without saying visamprayukta-samskaras etc., so it is not included in the language showing the difference. Moreover, it is incorrect to say that there is a fault of svabhava-viruddha in the front, since it is a combined argument.
量雙為因．喻若外人云異色．心等有實體用。即色．心等是異法喻。許蘊攝因既于異轉。是彼自成法自相相違過。何得云論主相違。論主既云定不異色．心有體。即心．色等為同法喻。因於彼轉。色．心等不異色．心等有實體用。乃正同喻。是故無過。又法差別過亦不成。既云定實有許蘊攝故。心．色為喻。大乘心．色通有假實。有他不定。瓶盆等假亦蘊所攝。有共不定。不可說瓶等非蘊所攝故。以非無為復非全無。定蘊所攝。又如眼等必為他用。意含真假。成真他用名法差別。今云不相應行必定異色心等有實體用。即言中顯立彼意許不相應行異色．心等有實體用。與誰為差別。又復必定不異色．心．心等有實體用。合名為法。今但別取定實有體為法差別。豈得成過。又因不定。故此分別徒設劬勞。余準可知。
言十無學法。名如疏列體。八聖支道。正見謂后得智。有宗見道超。大乘修道超。故是后智。中邊論云分別支故 若爾既法輪體亦見道中何但后得 答為二解。一云諸無漏法皆名法輪。不唯八道故。于見道雖無八道亦名法輪。二雲中邊據顯勝說在於修道。瑜伽論說在見道故。若依前解。瑜伽隨轉說在見道。二說任情 正思惟者。以思為體。準十地論云凈覺人即謂覺者是尋。撿梵本不以尋．伺為體。如第七
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為量和雙重原因，可以打個比方，如果外人說顏色不同，認為心等有實體作用。那麼，顏色、心等就是不同的法，這是一種比喻。如果允許蘊包含原因，並且在不同的地方轉化，那就是他們自己形成的法，與自己的體性相違背。怎麼能說論主相違背呢？論主既然說一定不異於顏色，心有實體，那麼心、色等就是相同的法，這是一種比喻。原因在於它們之間的轉化。顏色、心等不異於顏色，心等有實體作用，這才是真正的相同比喻。所以沒有過失。另外，法的差別過失也不能成立。既然說一定是真實存在的，並且被蘊所包含，心、色可以作為比喻。大乘的心、色既有假也有真。有他不定，比如瓶子、盆子等是假的，也被蘊所包含。有共同不定，不能說瓶子等不是蘊所包含的，因為它不是無為法，也不是完全沒有，一定是蘊所包含的。又比如眼睛等一定是為他人所用，意念包含真假，成為真實的他用，這叫做法的差別。現在說不相應行一定異於顏色，心等有實體作用，這句話中明顯地表明瞭他們的意思是允許不相應行異於顏色，心等有實體作用。與誰有差別呢？又必定不異於顏色，心、心等有實體作用，合起來叫做做法。現在只是分別選取一定真實存在的實體作為法的差別，怎麼能構成過失呢？另外，原因不確定，所以這種分別只是徒勞。其餘的可以類推得知。
關於十無學法，名稱如疏中列出的體，即八聖支道（Eightfold Noble Path）。正見（Right View）是指后得智（wisdom attained after initial enlightenment）。有宗認為見道（path of seeing）超越，大乘認為修道（path of cultivation）超越，所以是后智。中邊論（Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya）說因為分別支的緣故。如果這樣，既然法輪（Wheel of Dharma）的體也是見道中的，為什麼只是后得智呢？回答有兩種解釋。一種說法是，所有無漏法（unconditioned dharmas）都叫做法輪，不只是八道，所以在見道中即使沒有八道，也叫做法輪。另一種說法是，中邊論是根據顯勝來說的，在於修道。瑜伽論（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）說在見道中。如果按照前一種解釋，瑜伽隨轉說在見道中。兩種說法可以根據情況選擇。正思惟（Right Thought），以思為體。根據十地論（Daśabhūmika Sūtra）的說法，凈覺人（purely awakened person）就是覺者（awakened one），就是尋（initial application of mind）。檢查梵文字，不以尋、伺（sustained application of mind）為體，如第七。
【English Translation】 English version: Because of quantity and duality, it can be compared to an outsider saying that colors are different, believing that mind and so on have substantial functions. Then, color, mind, and so on are different dharmas, which is a metaphor. If it is allowed that aggregates contain causes and transform in different places, then it is their own formed dharma, contradicting their own nature. How can it be said that the proponent contradicts? Since the proponent says that it is definitely not different from color, and the mind has substance, then mind, color, and so on are the same dharma, which is a metaphor. The reason lies in the transformation between them. Color, mind, and so on are not different from color, mind, and so on having substantial functions, which is the true same metaphor. Therefore, there is no fault. Furthermore, the fault of dharma difference cannot be established either. Since it is said that it must be truly existent and contained by the aggregates, mind and color can be used as metaphors. In Mahayana, mind and color are both false and true. There is other uncertainty, such as bottles, basins, etc., which are false and also contained by the aggregates. There is common uncertainty, and it cannot be said that bottles, etc., are not contained by the aggregates, because it is not an unconditioned dharma, nor is it completely non-existent, it must be contained by the aggregates. Furthermore, like the eyes, etc., they must be used by others, and intention contains truth and falsehood, becoming a true other-use, which is called dharma difference. Now, saying that non-associated formations must be different from color, mind, etc., having substantial functions, this sentence clearly indicates that their intention is to allow non-associated formations to be different from color, mind, etc., having substantial functions. With whom is there a difference? Furthermore, it is definitely not different from color, mind, mind, etc., having substantial functions, which together are called dharma. Now, only separately selecting a certain truly existent substance as the dharma difference, how can it constitute a fault? Furthermore, the cause is uncertain, so this distinction is just a waste of effort. The rest can be inferred by analogy.
Regarding the ten non-learning dharmas, the names are like the bodies listed in the commentary, which are the Eightfold Noble Path. Right View refers to the wisdom attained after initial enlightenment (后得智). The Sarvastivadins believe that the path of seeing (見道) transcends, and Mahayana believes that the path of cultivation (修道) transcends, so it is later wisdom. The Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (中邊論) says it is because of the distinction of the branches. If so, since the body of the Wheel of Dharma (法輪) is also in the path of seeing, why is it only later wisdom? There are two explanations. One explanation is that all unconditioned dharmas (無漏法) are called the Wheel of Dharma, not just the eight paths, so even if there are no eight paths in the path of seeing, it is also called the Wheel of Dharma. The other explanation is that the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya is based on the manifestation of superiority, which is in the path of cultivation. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽論) says it is in the path of seeing. If according to the former explanation, the Yogācāra's subsequent transformation says it is in the path of seeing. The two explanations can be chosen according to the situation. Right Thought, takes thought as its body. According to the Daśabhūmika Sūtra (十地論), a purely awakened person (凈覺人) is the awakened one (覺者), which is the initial application of mind (尋). Checking the Sanskrit text, it does not take the initial application of mind (尋) and sustained application of mind (伺) as its body, like the seventh.
卷論疏辨 無嗔癡所發身．語名正語．正業。無貪所發名為正命 解脫者勝解數。智者緣無為智。余體如名 雜集第十云。十無學法依無學戒蘊。乃至智見蘊。無學正語．業．命是戒蘊。正念．正定是定蘊。正見．正思惟．精進是惠蘊。此二依自性及眷屬說。正解脫是解脫蘊。正智是無學解脫智見蘊。
論亦說輪王成就七寶豈即成就他身非情。西明云。有部許爾即違自宗。外難云。大乘假得如何一立一不立。例同所破。解云非例。實得有用應通內外皆有實得。我立假得。故王成寶假亦不成非自身故 今謂此釋不爾。大乘得等既是假立。通情非情自他何過。以經說有成就言故。不爾同他不能離難 問若爾殊輪可說成就。自識變故。余有情等依何假立說成就耶。答亦許變他扶塵受用故亦自識。又由業感依業假立亦復不違。
言未得已失應永不生者。未得可知。已失之法。未來應生闕緣不起。亦名已失。此定不生。得非擇滅故。如易界地等已舍之法。名為已失。即許可生。此無前得。今約此類既無前得應永不起。
言若待余因得便無用者。有解心待四緣。色待二緣足得生法。何繁得起。故得無用。此破不爾。可非增上法得生起。然要集云。得非四因及生等五其理易知者。當撿俱舍引文具注 又具善惡無記
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 《卷論疏辨》中說：『無嗔癡所發的身、語稱為正語、正業。無貪所發稱為正命。』解脫是指殊勝的勝解之數量。智者所緣的是無為之智。其餘的體性如同名稱所表達的。《雜集》第十中說：『十無學法依賴於無學戒蘊，乃至智見蘊。無學正語、業、命屬於戒蘊。正念、正定屬於定蘊。正見、正思惟、精進屬於慧蘊。』這兩種蘊是依據自性以及眷屬來說的。正解脫是解脫蘊。正智是無學解脫智見蘊。
論中也說，輪王成就七寶，難道就是成就了他身（其他眾生的身體）和非情（無情之物）嗎？西明說：『有部（Sarvastivada）如果承認這一點，就違背了自己的宗義。』外人的詰難說：『大乘（Mahayana）假立的「得」，為什麼一個可以成立，一個不可以成立？』這和所破斥的例子相同。解釋說：『並非相同例子。』真實獲得的「得」是有用的，應該內外都承認有真實的「得」。我方所立的是假立的「得」，所以輪王成就寶物，這種假立的「得」也不能成立，因為寶物不是輪王自身之物。現在我認為這種解釋不對。大乘的「得」等既然是假立的，那麼通於有情和非情、自身和他身又有什麼過失呢？因為經中說有成就之說。不然的話，就和他人的說法一樣，不能擺脫詰難。問：『如果這樣，殊輪（cakra-ratna）可以說成就是輪王成就，因為是自識所變現的緣故。其餘的有情等，依據什麼假立說成就是輪王成就的呢？』答：『也承認是變現他人的扶塵根（prasada-rupa），讓他人受用，所以也是自識。又由於業力所感，依據業力假立，也不違背。』
說『未得而已經失去的，應該永遠不會再生起』，未得是可以知道的。已經失去的法，未來應該生起，但缺少因緣而不能生起，也叫做已經失去。這種法必定不會生起，因為已經獲得了非擇滅（pratisamkhya-nirodha）的緣故。如同易界地等已經捨棄的法，叫做已經失去，但仍然可以生起。這種法沒有先前的獲得，現在就按照這類情況來說，既然沒有先前的獲得，就應該永遠不會生起。
說『如果等待其他的因才能獲得，那麼「得」就沒有用了』，有人解釋說，心等待四緣，色法等待二緣，就足以使法生起，何必繁瑣地需要「得」才能生起？所以「得」沒有用。這種破斥是不對的。或許可以認為非增上緣的法，其生起不需要「得」。然而《集論》說：『「得」不是四因以及生等五因。』其中的道理容易知道。應當查閱《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakosa）引用的經文，其中有詳細的註釋。又有具足善、惡、無記。
【English Translation】 English version: The Kuan Lun Shu Bian states: 'Body and speech arising from non-anger and non-ignorance are called Right Speech and Right Action. That arising from non-greed is called Right Livelihood.' Liberation refers to the number of excellent adhimukti (conviction). What the wise cognize is the wisdom of the unconditioned (asamskrta). The remaining entities are as their names express. The tenth chapter of the Samuccaya states: 'The ten asiksa-dharmas (practices of no-more-learning) rely on the asiksa-sila-skandha (aggregate of no-more-learning morality), and so on, up to the jnanadarsana-skandha (aggregate of knowledge and vision). Asiksa Right Speech, Action, and Livelihood belong to the sila-skandha. Asiksa Right Mindfulness and Right Concentration belong to the samadhi-skandha (aggregate of concentration). Asiksa Right View, Right Thought, and Right Effort belong to the prajna-skandha (aggregate of wisdom). These two aggregates are spoken of based on their nature and retinue. Right Liberation is the vimukti-skandha (aggregate of liberation). Right Knowledge is the asiksa-vimuktijnanadarsana-skandha (aggregate of knowledge and vision of no-more-learning liberation).'
The treatise also says, if a cakravartin (wheel-turning king) achieves the Seven Treasures, does that mean he achieves other beings' bodies and non-sentient things? Xi Ming says: 'If the Sarvastivada school admits this, it contradicts its own tenets.' An external objection states: 'In Mahayana, the hypothetical attainment of 'prapti' (acquisition) – why is one established and the other not?' This is the same as what is being refuted. The explanation is: 'They are not the same. Real attainment is useful, and both internal and external schools should admit real attainment. What we establish is hypothetical attainment, so the king's achievement of treasures through hypothetical attainment cannot be established, because the treasures are not the king's own body.' Now, I say this explanation is incorrect. Since Mahayana's 'prapti,' etc., are hypothetical, what fault is there in applying them to sentient and non-sentient beings, self and others? Because the sutras speak of achievement. Otherwise, like others' views, it cannot escape the objection. Question: 'If so, the cakra-ratna (wheel jewel) can be said to be achieved because it is a transformation of one's own consciousness. What does the achievement of other sentient beings rely on?' Answer: 'It is also admitted that it is a transformation of others' prasada-rupa (sense faculties), allowing others to use it, so it is also one's own consciousness. Also, due to karmic influence, it is hypothetically established based on karma, which is not contradictory.'
The statement 'What has not been attained and has already been lost should never arise again' – what has not been attained can be known. A dharma (phenomenon) that has already been lost, should arise in the future, but it does not arise due to a lack of conditions, and is also called already lost. This dharma will definitely not arise because it has already attained pratisamkhya-nirodha (cessation through discrimination). Like the dhatus (elements) of the easy realm, etc., dharmas that have been abandoned are called already lost, but they can still arise. This dharma has no prior attainment. Now, according to this kind of situation, since there is no prior attainment, it should never arise.
The statement 'If attainment depends on other causes, then prapti is useless' – some explain that the mind depends on four conditions, and rupa (form) depends on two conditions, which is sufficient for a dharma to arise. Why is it necessary to have prapti to arise? Therefore, prapti is useless. This refutation is incorrect. Perhaps it can be considered that the arising of dharmas that are not adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition) does not require prapti. However, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'Prapti is not one of the four causes or the five causes such as arising.' The reason for this is easy to understand. One should check the sutra verses cited in the Abhidharmakosa, which have detailed commentaries. Also, possessing good, evil, and neutral.
得者。此中總難。過去已舍雖無後得。有法俱得。未來已失及無前得。並有俱得。難令得生亦得。然準本意。唯難不失現成前得。三性之法應頓現前。所以下云。若待余因得便無用。若難已舍及未來世緣闕不生。雖有俱得。他許無用不能生故。便成相符故難不失現成得者。此雖二說。準俱舍云。誰言此得作法生因。正理論中。唯有不失無能生因。故彼論云。由所許得是已得法不失因故。婆沙二說。正義亦唯為不失因。
論。故得於法俱為無用。二云識所變不離有情。即非情法亦不離有情。無法名離有情法。初說有得。后即無得。問既說無法即是無體。復說何法得名為離 答以彼無法假名為離。非有無體名離有情。談無本性不約識變為無名離。
釋三種成就。且法有二。一者有體。二者無體但于有法立於成就不于無法。無法無體無可成故 有法之中復有二種。一有為。二無為 且有為中復有二種。一者自識變。二者他識變 自識變中復有二種。一者種子。二者現行。種子隱而難知。所以分之為二。一種子成就。二自在成就。現行顯而易了。所以總合為一。名現行成就 種子之中復有三種。一者善。二不善。三無記 善中有二。一無漏。二有漏。有漏善中復有二種。一方便。二生得。前無漏善及方便併名自在
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
關於『得』（prāpti，獲得）的討論，這裡有一個總體的難題：過去已經捨棄的法，雖然沒有後續的『得』，但有些法是同時獲得的。未來已經失去的法，以及沒有先前獲得的法，也都有同時獲得的。要讓『得』生起也是一種『得』。然而，根據本來的意思，只是難以捨棄現在已經獲得的前得。三性的法應該立即顯現。所以下面說，如果等待其他因緣才能獲得，那就沒有用處了。如果難以捨棄已經捨棄的，以及未來世因緣缺失而不能生起，即使有同時獲得的，對方也認為沒有用處，因為不能生起。這樣就符合了，所以難以捨棄現在已經獲得的『得』。雖然有兩種說法，但根據《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）所說：誰說這個『得』是作為法生起的因？《正理論》（Nyāyānusāra）中，只有不失去，沒有能生起的因。所以該論說，由於所允許的『得』是已經獲得的法不失去的因。婆沙（Vibhāṣā）有兩種說法，但正義也只是作為不失去的因。
論：所以『得』對於法來說都是沒有用的。另一種說法是，識所變現的不離有情（sattva，眾生），即使是非有情法也不離有情。沒有法可以稱為離開有情的法。最初說有『得』，後來就說沒有『得』。問：既然說沒有法就是沒有實體，又說什麼法可以稱為離開？答：用那個無法假名為離開，不是沒有實體名為離開有情。談論無本性，不涉及識的變現，就稱為無名離開。
解釋三種成就（siddhi，成就）。法有兩種：一種是有體的，一種是無體的。但對於有體的法建立成就，不對無體的法建立成就，因為無法沒有實體，無可成就。有體的法中又有兩種：一種是有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma，有生滅變化的法），一種是無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma，無生滅變化的法）。有為法中又有兩種：一種是自識變現的，一種是他識變現的。自識變現的法中又有兩種：一種是種子（bīja，潛在的），一種是現行（vartamāna，顯現的）。種子隱藏難以知曉，所以分為兩種：一種是種子成就，一種是自在成就。現行顯現容易瞭解，所以總合為一種，名為現行成就。種子之中又有三種：一種是善（kuśala，好的），一種是不善（akuśala，不好的），一種是無記（avyākṛta，非善非惡的）。善法中有兩種：一種是無漏（anāsrava，沒有煩惱的），一種是有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱的）。有漏善法中又有兩種：一種是方便（upāya，通過修行獲得的），一種是生得（jāti，天生的）。前面的無漏善法和方便都稱為自在。
【English Translation】 English version:
Regarding the discussion of 'prāpti' (得, attainment), there is an overall difficulty here: Although past abandoned dharmas do not have subsequent 'prāpti', some dharmas are attained simultaneously. Future lost dharmas, as well as those without prior attainment, also have simultaneous attainment. Causing 'prāpti' to arise is also a kind of 'prāpti'. However, according to the original intention, it is only difficult to abandon the currently attained prior attainment. Dharmas of the three natures should immediately manifest. Therefore, it is said below that if one waits for other causes and conditions to attain, then it is useless. If it is difficult to abandon what has already been abandoned, and future world conditions are lacking and cannot arise, even if there is simultaneous attainment, the other party considers it useless because it cannot arise. This is consistent, so it is difficult to abandon the currently attained 'prāpti'. Although there are two views, according to the Abhidharmakośa (俱舍論), who says that this 'prāpti' is the cause of the arising of dharmas? In the Nyāyānusāra (正理論), there is only non-loss, and no cause that can arise. Therefore, that treatise says that because the allowed 'prāpti' is the cause of the non-loss of already attained dharmas. The Vibhāṣā (婆沙) has two views, but the correct meaning is also only as a cause of non-loss.
Treatise: Therefore, 'prāpti' is useless for dharmas. Another view is that what is transformed by consciousness is not separate from sentient beings (sattva, 有情), and even non-sentient dharmas are not separate from sentient beings. No dharma can be called a dharma separate from sentient beings. Initially, it is said that there is 'prāpti', and later it is said that there is no 'prāpti'. Question: Since it is said that no dharma is the same as no entity, what dharma can be called separate? Answer: That non-dharma is falsely called separate, not that having no entity is called separate from sentient beings. Discussing no inherent nature, not involving the transformation of consciousness, is called nameless separation.
Explanation of the three kinds of siddhi (成就, accomplishment). There are two kinds of dharmas: one is with entity, and the other is without entity. But accomplishment is established for dharmas with entity, and not established for dharmas without entity, because dharmas without entity have no entity and cannot be accomplished. Among dharmas with entity, there are two kinds: one is conditioned dharma (saṃskṛta-dharma, 有為法), and the other is unconditioned dharma (asaṃskṛta-dharma, 無為法). Among conditioned dharmas, there are two kinds: one is transformed by one's own consciousness, and the other is transformed by others' consciousness. Among dharmas transformed by one's own consciousness, there are two kinds: one is seed (bīja, 種子), and the other is manifestation (vartamāna, 現行). Seeds are hidden and difficult to know, so they are divided into two kinds: one is seed accomplishment, and the other is self-mastery accomplishment. Manifestations are obvious and easy to understand, so they are combined into one kind, called manifestation accomplishment. Among seeds, there are three kinds: one is wholesome (kuśala, 善), one is unwholesome (akuśala, 不善), and one is neutral (avyākṛta, 無記). Among wholesome dharmas, there are two kinds: one is unconditioned (anāsrava, 無漏), and the other is conditioned (sāsrava, 有漏). Among conditioned wholesome dharmas, there are two kinds: one is acquired through practice (upāya, 方便), and the other is innate (jāti, 生得). The former unconditioned wholesome dharmas and acquired dharmas are both called self-mastery.
。以成就此者必于生死當得自在。又當引生必加功用方始起故即通本．始。余義準思。生得善者生便即得。因循而生。無勝功能所有種子但名生得。不善之法亦但名為種子成就。以有此法沈于生死。于解脫分無勝堪能故。雖解深密經云十地菩薩所起煩惱。勝二乘人所起無漏。彼由菩薩無漏悲智。非彼煩惱自堪能。故不名為自在成就 無記法中復有二種。一者有覆。二者無覆。有覆性者同煩惱說。無覆無記復有四種。一異熟。二威儀。三工巧。四變化。異熟無記唯種子成就。威儀．工巧各具二種。如象行鹿驟。營田織薄等。名種子成就。若象王行。鵝王步。雕文廁畫等。名自在成就。加功始得非因循起故。變化無記唯自在成。必功用起故。又成此者得自在故。故瑜伽論云。若加行所生善。及一分無記增盛種子。名自在成。對法亦云。加行善法。謂世出世一切功能。一分無記。謂工巧處變化心等 故上說自識變亦通非情。有說成七寶故。若他識變準第二中。變他根塵。論自二說。第七卷中解所緣緣。亦許緣他所變之種。復說輪王成就七寶。雖他所變不得名成。自識杖變。亦可假說三種成就 然西明云。準揚論云。一諸行種子所攝相續差別性。二自在生起相續差別性。三自相生起相續差別性云。與瑜伽別。種但立一。現即分
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 成就此（成就這種狀態）者，必定在生死輪迴中獲得自在。並且，這種成就的引發必定要通過後天的努力才能開始，因此貫通了本有和始有。其他的含義可以類推思考。生得善者，一出生就能立即獲得（善法）。因循而生的，沒有殊勝功能的那些種子，只能稱為生得。不善之法也只能稱為種子成就，因為有了這些不善之法，就會沉溺於生死輪迴，對於解脫沒有殊勝的能力。雖然《解深密經》中說，十地菩薩所產生的煩惱，勝過二乘人所產生的無漏功德，但那是因為菩薩有無漏的悲心和智慧，並非是那些煩惱本身具有殊勝的能力，所以不能稱為自在成就。 無記法中又有兩種：一是有覆無記，二是無覆無記。有覆無記的性質和煩惱相同。無覆無記又有四種：一是異熟，二是威儀，三是工巧，四是變化。異熟無記只有種子成就。威儀和工巧各有兩種成就，例如大象行走和鹿奔跑，耕田和織蓆等，稱為種子成就。如果是象王行走和鵝王邁步，雕刻花紋和繪畫等，稱為自在成就，因為這些是後天努力才能獲得的，不是因循而生的。變化無記只有自在成就，因為必定要通過功用才能產生。並且，成就這種變化的人能獲得自在。所以《瑜伽師地論》中說，通過加行所產生的善法，以及一部分無記法增盛的種子，稱為自在成就。《對法論》也說，加行善法，指的是世間和出世間的一切功能，一部分無記法，指的是工巧處的技藝和變化心等。 因此，上面所說的自識變現也包括非情之物。有人說，這是爲了成就七寶的緣故。如果是他識變現，可以參照第二種情況，變現他人的根塵。論中對於自識和他識有兩種說法。第七卷中解釋所緣緣時，也允許緣他所變現的種子。又說轉輪王成就七寶，即使是他人所變現的，也不能稱為成就。自己的意識變現的杖，也可以假說有三種成就。 然而，西明法師說，根據揚論的說法：一是諸行種子所攝的相續差別性，二是自在生起相續差別性，三是自相生起相續差別性。這和《瑜伽師地論》有所不同，《瑜伽師地論》中種子隻立一種，現行則分為兩種。
【English Translation】 English version Those who accomplish this (achieve this state) will surely attain freedom in the cycle of birth and death. Moreover, the arising of this accomplishment must begin through effort, thus connecting the inherent and acquired. Other meanings can be inferred analogously. Those born with goodness immediately attain (virtuous qualities) at birth. Seeds that arise passively, without superior function, are merely called 'born with.' Unwholesome dharmas are also merely called 'seed accomplishment,' because with these unwholesome dharmas, one is submerged in the cycle of birth and death, lacking the superior ability for liberation. Although the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra states that the afflictions arising from the tenth-ground Bodhisattvas surpass the non-outflow (anāsrava) arising from the Two Vehicles, this is because Bodhisattvas possess non-outflow compassion and wisdom, not because those afflictions themselves have superior ability, so they are not called 'self-mastery accomplishment.' Among indeterminate (avyākṛta) dharmas, there are two types: those that are obscured (with affliction) and those that are unobscured. The nature of the obscured is the same as that of afflictions. Unobscured indeterminate dharmas have four types: (1) resultant (vipāka), (2) deportment (iryāpatha), (3) craftsmanship (śilpakarma), and (4) transformation (nirmāṇa). Resultant indeterminate dharmas are only seed accomplishment. Deportment and craftsmanship each have two types of accomplishment. For example, the walking of an elephant and the running of a deer, cultivating fields and weaving mats, are called seed accomplishment. If it is the walking of an elephant king and the gait of a goose king, carving patterns and painting, these are called self-mastery accomplishment, because they are acquired through effort, not arising passively. Transformation indeterminate dharmas are only self-mastery accomplishment, because they must arise through effort. Furthermore, those who accomplish this transformation attain self-mastery. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states that wholesome dharmas produced through effort, and a portion of indeterminate dharmas with increasing seeds, are called self-mastery accomplishment. The Abhidharmasamuccaya also states that effort-based wholesome dharmas refer to all worldly and supramundane functions, and a portion of indeterminate dharmas refers to skills in craftsmanship and transformative mind, etc. Therefore, the above-mentioned transformations of one's own consciousness also include non-sentient objects. Some say this is for the sake of accomplishing the seven treasures. If it is a transformation by another's consciousness, one can refer to the second case, transforming the sense bases and objects of others. The treatise has two views regarding transformations by one's own consciousness and another's consciousness. In the seventh fascicle, when explaining object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya), it is also permissible to condition on seeds transformed by others. Furthermore, it is said that a Cakravartin (wheel-turning king) accomplishes the seven treasures, but even if they are transformed by others, they cannot be called accomplishment. The staff transformed by one's own consciousness can also be hypothetically said to have three types of accomplishment. However, the Western Bright (Ximing) Master said that according to the Yang Lun (likely referring to a commentary by Yangui): (1) the continuous differentiation of phenomena encompassed by the seeds of all actions, (2) the continuous differentiation of phenomena arising from self-mastery, and (3) the continuous differentiation of phenomena arising from self-nature. This differs from the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, where only one type of seed is established, and manifestation is divided into two types.
二。加行善等。名自在生起相。非加行生起。但名自相生起 今又解云。與瑜伽同。云二自在生起相續差別性者。以加行等善法種子。有勝功能起現行已而得自在名自在生起。若二現行名自相生起。以起現行名自相起。無為之法立成就者。如本疏說。又助解云。準第二云。無為有二。一依識變。二依如立。並立得不。亦有三不。答既假立得二種俱有。亦有種子自在等別。且依識變無為立得。各依彼見種子上立。種為能起無為相故。或依現見以心起時變彼相故。三差別者。方便善心變熏成種名自在成。現行心變即現成就。所餘心變種子成就。不名自在。若依如立據能證說。依種即自在。現證即現行。若后得緣。即同前依識所變者說。然非擇滅雖非智證。若暫伏惑得非擇滅。同后得智說。若非伏惑但緣闕顯。依不起種義說得彼。自在種等準性可知。
又辨于得所依之中。大小不同。如本疏述。然言二屬所依。謂第八識。如畢竟得非擇滅法。及佛身中邪理不生等 問既云畢竟邪理不生。應名擇滅。何名非擇 答若由智斷畢竟不生。即名擇滅。佛身邪理不由智斷。但由斷彼無明等故。邪理不生。如入見道。北洲等身。得非擇故 又解此等現行雖復畢竟不生。種子猶在。亦障所攝。鏡智生時方始種子滅。即得擇滅。得屬鏡
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 二、加行善等，名為自在生起相。非加行生起，但名自相生起。現在又解釋說，與瑜伽相同。所說的『二自在生起相續差別性』，是指以加行等善法種子，具有殊勝功能而生起現行，因此獲得自在，名為自在生起。如果兩個現行，則名為自相生起。因為生起現行，名為自相起。對於無為法建立成就，如本疏所說。又有輔助解釋說，依照第二卷所說，無為法有兩種：一是依識變，二是依如立。都可以建立獲得嗎？也有三種不能建立的情況嗎？回答是，既然是假立，兩種情況都存在。也有種子自在等差別。且依識變無為法建立獲得，各自依據他們所見的種子上建立。因為種子是能夠生起無為之相的緣故。或者依據現見，以心生起時變現那個相的緣故。三種差別是：方便善心變現熏習成為種子，名為自在成就。現行心變現即是現成就。其餘心變現是種子成就，不名為自在。如果依據如立，根據能證悟的智慧來說，依據種子就是自在，現證悟就是現行。如果是后得智所緣，就如同前面所說的依據識所變現的情況。然而非擇滅雖然不是智慧證得，如果暫時伏住煩惱而得到非擇滅，就如同后得智一樣來說明。如果不是伏住煩惱，只是因緣缺少而顯現，依據不起種子的意義來說明獲得那個非擇滅。自在種子等，可以參照自性來理解。
又辨析在獲得所依之中，大小不同。如本疏所述。然而說二者屬於所依，指的是第八識（阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna）。如畢竟得非擇滅法，以及佛身中邪理不生等。問：既然說畢竟邪理不生，應該名為擇滅（pratisamkhyā-nirodha），為什麼名為非擇滅（apratisamkhyā-nirodha）？答：如果由智慧斷除而畢竟不生，就名為擇滅。佛身中的邪理不是由智慧斷除，只是因為斷除了無明（avidyā）等，所以邪理不生。如進入見道（darśana-mārga），北俱盧洲等身，得到非擇滅的緣故。又解釋說，這些現行雖然畢竟不生，種子仍然存在，也屬於障礙所攝。鏡智（ādarśa-jñāna）生起時才開始滅除種子，即得到擇滅。獲得屬於鏡智。
【English Translation】 English version: II. Performing good deeds, etc., is called the 'aspect of arising freely'. Arising without performance is only called 'arising of self-nature'. Now it is also explained as being the same as yoga. The so-called 'difference in the continuity of the two aspects of arising freely' refers to the seeds of good deeds such as performance, which have the superior ability to give rise to manifestation, and thus attain freedom, called 'arising freely'. If there are two manifestations, it is called 'arising of self-nature', because giving rise to manifestation is called 'arising of self-nature'. Establishing accomplishment for unconditioned dharmas (asaṃskṛta-dharma) is as stated in the commentary. There is also a supplementary explanation that, according to the second volume, there are two kinds of unconditioned dharmas: one is based on consciousness transformation, and the other is based on suchness. Can both be established as attainable? Are there also three cases where they cannot be established? The answer is that since it is hypothetical, both cases exist. There are also differences such as the freedom of seeds. Moreover, the establishment of attainment of unconditioned dharmas based on consciousness transformation is established on the seeds seen by each of them, because the seeds are the cause of arising the aspect of unconditioned dharmas. Or, based on direct perception, it is because the mind transforms that aspect when it arises. The three differences are: the transformation of skillful mind through expedient means, which is cultivated into seeds, is called 'accomplishment of freedom'. The transformation of the manifesting mind is immediate accomplishment. The transformation of the remaining minds is the accomplishment of seeds, and is not called 'freedom'. If it is based on suchness, it is based on the wisdom that can realize it. Based on the seeds, it is freedom; immediate realization is manifestation. If it is the object of subsequent wisdom, it is the same as the aforementioned case based on consciousness transformation. However, although cessation through non-discrimination (apratisamkhyā-nirodha) is not attained through wisdom, if afflictions are temporarily subdued and cessation through non-discrimination is attained, it is explained in the same way as subsequent wisdom. If afflictions are not subdued, but only the conditions are lacking and it manifests, it is explained based on the meaning of the seeds not arising. The freedom of seeds, etc., can be understood by referring to self-nature.
Furthermore, it is analyzed that within the basis of attainment, there are differences in size, as described in the commentary. However, it is said that the two belong to the basis, referring to the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna). Such as the dharma of ultimately attaining cessation through non-discrimination, and the non-arising of wrong views in the Buddha's body, etc. Question: Since it is said that wrong views ultimately do not arise, it should be called cessation through discrimination (pratisamkhyā-nirodha), why is it called cessation through non-discrimination (apratisamkhyā-nirodha)? Answer: If it is through the cutting off by wisdom that it ultimately does not arise, it is called cessation through discrimination. The wrong views in the Buddha's body are not cut off by wisdom, but only because ignorance (avidyā), etc., are cut off, so wrong views do not arise. Such as entering the path of seeing (darśana-mārga), the bodies of Uttarakuru, etc., attain cessation through non-discrimination. It is also explained that although these manifestations ultimately do not arise, the seeds still exist and are also included in the obstructions. Only when mirror wisdom (ādarśa-jñāna) arises do the seeds begin to be extinguished, which is the attainment of cessation through discrimination. Attainment belongs to mirror wisdom.
智。若爾鏡智應能離染。如實義者鏡智起時非彼所依。有漏皆舍。非作意斷。不名擇滅。亦不可說觀察智斷。非無間故。名妙覺故。若猶斷染。應同無間名為等覺。既不如是。故鏡智生彼等自滅得非擇滅。得屬鏡智。然疏言屬第八識。據所依王。通因果說。若在佛果即依鏡智。此釋親聞故抄記也。
又辨大小得所屬別。且薩婆多得有二種。一有為法得。二無為法得。若有為法得。定屬所得。若所得是三性。能得亦三性。三界．九地．色．心．不相應。亦隨所得判屬界地等 無為得者。無為有三。如本疏判 然通漏無漏。若六行道得唯有漏。見道得唯無漏。修道通二。許于修道亦有漏斷故。無學無漏。斷非想惑唯無漏道。得果舍向故。舍前漏起無漏得。所得無為一向無漏。非擇滅得唯是異熟無記性攝。以為．無為二有體法。若起得得屬行者。以有體故。隨其所應。得屬所得及能得道。今此非擇闕緣不生。法既不生。故不可屬所不生法。非有情故。但屬所依眾同分也。若其非得。唯屬所依眾同分立。定唯異熟無記性也。然若得擇滅法。猶可重生也。如退果者。若得非擇。畢竟不生。以闕緣故 若依大乘。有為法得。亦同薩婆多定屬所得。諸性界地。若色若心。及漏無漏種子現行。隨其所應。皆隨所得判屬彼法。以依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 智：如果這樣，鏡智（Ādarśa-jñāna）應當能夠遠離染污。對於如實之義，鏡智生起時並非依附於染污。所有有漏之法都捨棄，不是通過作意斷除，因此不稱為擇滅（Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）。也不可說是觀察智（Pratyavekṣaṇā-jñāna）斷除，因為它不是無間道（Anantarya-mārga）。被稱為妙覺（Samantaprabhāsa）。如果仍然斷除染污，應當和無間道一樣被稱為等覺（Samantabuddha）。既然不是這樣，所以鏡智生起時，染污等自然滅盡，獲得非擇滅。獲得（Prāpti）屬於鏡智，然而疏文中說屬於第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna），是根據所依之王，通因果而說。如果在佛果位，就依于鏡智。這個解釋是親自聽聞的，所以記錄下來。
又辨別大小乘的獲得（Prāpti）所屬不同。且薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）的獲得有兩種：一是有為法（Saṃskṛta dharma）的獲得，二是無為法（Asaṃskṛta dharma）的獲得。如果是有為法的獲得，一定屬於所得之法。如果所得之法是三性（Tri-svabhāva），能得之法也是三性。三界（Tridhātu）、九地（Navabhūmi）、色法（Rūpa）、心法（Citta）、不相應行法（Citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra dharma），也隨著所得之法來判斷屬於哪個界地等。無為法的獲得，無為法有三種，如本疏所判。然而通於有漏和無漏。如果六行道（Ṣaḍ-ākāra-mārga）的獲得只有有漏，見道（Darśana-mārga）的獲得只有無漏，修道（Bhāvanā-mārga）通於二者，允許在修道中也有有漏的斷除。無學道（Aśaikṣa-mārga）是無漏的。斷除非想非非想處（Naiva-saṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana）的惑只有無漏道。獲得果位時捨棄向位，所以捨棄之前的有漏，生起無漏的獲得。所得的無為法一向是無漏的。非擇滅的獲得只是異熟無記性（Vipāka-avyākṛta）所攝。認為有為、無為二者都有體法。如果生起獲得，獲得屬於修行者，因為它有體性。隨著情況，獲得屬於所得之法以及能得之道。現在這個非擇滅缺少因緣不生起，法既然不生起，所以不可屬於所不生之法，因為它不是有情。但屬於所依的眾同分（Nikāya-sabhāgatā）。如果是非獲得，只屬於所依的眾同分而立，一定是異熟無記性。然而如果獲得擇滅法，仍然可以重生，如退果者。如果獲得非擇滅，畢竟不生，因為缺少因緣。如果依于大乘，有為法的獲得也和薩婆多部一樣，一定屬於所得之法。諸性、界、地，無論是色法還是心法，以及有漏無漏的種子現行，隨著情況，都隨著所得之法來判斷屬於那個法。因為依于
【English Translation】 English version: Intelligence: If that's the case, Ādarśa-jñāna (Mirror-like Wisdom) should be able to be free from defilements. Regarding the meaning of reality, when Ādarśa-jñāna arises, it does not rely on defilements. All contaminated dharmas are abandoned, not through intentional effort, so it is not called Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha (Cessation through discrimination). It also cannot be said that Pratyavekṣaṇā-jñāna (Discriminating Wisdom) eliminates them, because it is not Anantarya-mārga (Path of immediate consequence). It is called Samantaprabhāsa (Universal Light). If it still eliminates defilements, it should be called Samantabuddha (Universal Enlightenment) like Anantarya-mārga. Since it is not like that, when Ādarśa-jñāna arises, defilements naturally cease, and one obtains Prāpti (Attainment) of non-selective cessation. Prāpti belongs to Ādarśa-jñāna. However, the commentary says it belongs to the eighth consciousness, Ālaya-vijñāna (Storehouse Consciousness), based on the king of dependence, speaking generally of cause and effect. If it is in the state of Buddhahood, it relies on Ādarśa-jñāna. This explanation was heard personally, so it is recorded here.
Also, distinguish the differences in what the Prāpti (Attainment) belongs to in the Mahayana and Hinayana. Furthermore, the Sarvāstivāda school has two types of Prāpti: one is the Prāpti of Saṃskṛta dharma (conditioned dharmas), and the other is the Prāpti of Asaṃskṛta dharma (unconditioned dharmas). If it is the Prāpti of Saṃskṛta dharma, it definitely belongs to the dharma attained. If the dharma attained is of the three natures (Tri-svabhāva), the dharma that attains is also of the three natures. The three realms (Tridhātu), the nine grounds (Navabhūmi), Rūpa (form), Citta (mind), and Citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra dharma (non-associated formations), are also judged to belong to which realm, ground, etc., according to the dharma attained. The Prāpti of Asaṃskṛta dharma, there are three types of Asaṃskṛta dharma, as judged in the commentary. However, it is common to both contaminated and uncontaminated. If the Prāpti of the six-aspect path (Ṣaḍ-ākāra-mārga) is only contaminated, the Prāpti of the Darśana-mārga (path of seeing) is only uncontaminated, the Bhāvanā-mārga (path of cultivation) is common to both, allowing for the elimination of contamination in the path of cultivation. The Aśaikṣa-mārga (path of no more learning) is uncontaminated. Only the uncontaminated path eliminates the delusion of Naiva-saṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana (neither perception nor non-perception). When attaining the fruit, one abandons the path, so one abandons the previous contamination and generates the uncontaminated Prāpti. The Asaṃskṛta dharma attained is always uncontaminated. The Prāpti of non-selective cessation is only included in Vipāka-avyākṛta (resultant indeterminate). It is considered that both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas have substance. If Prāpti arises, the Prāpti belongs to the practitioner, because it has substance. Depending on the situation, Prāpti belongs to the dharma attained and the path of attainment. Now, this non-selective cessation lacks conditions and does not arise. Since the dharma does not arise, it cannot belong to the dharma that does not arise, because it is not sentient. But it belongs to the Nikāya-sabhāgatā (community of beings) on which it depends. If it is non-attainment, it only belongs to the Nikāya-sabhāgatā on which it depends, and it must be of the nature of Vipāka-avyākṛta. However, if one attains the dharma of selective cessation, one can still be reborn, such as those who regress from the fruit. If one attains non-selective cessation, one will not be reborn after all, because of the lack of conditions. If one relies on Mahayana, the Prāpti of conditioned dharmas is also the same as in Sarvāstivāda, and it definitely belongs to the dharma attained. All natures, realms, grounds, whether it is form or mind, and the seeds and manifestations of contaminated and uncontaminated, depending on the situation, are judged to belong to that dharma according to the dharma attained. Because it relies on
此等諸法之上假建立故。若擇滅得。同彼有部屬能得道。然唯無漏。不許六行是斷道故。唯依聖道永害種子。得擇滅故。又六行道唯依未至。非根本地。伏惑非斷。種子在故。得非擇滅 又約道起得擇滅時分。大小不同。如薩婆多。苦法智忍為無間道。雖斷煩惱與惑得俱。未斷得繩未名得擇滅。苦法智起。為解脫道方斷得繩雖未緣證擇滅無為。依斯解脫立擇滅得。懸起于得得彼擇滅。故擇滅得屬能得道。以苦忍智但緣苦諦而未緣滅。以此擇滅是滅諦故。證此無為唯滅下智。雖滅下智。滅法智忍正無間道。亦未起得得彼無為。滅法智時斷彼迷滅煩惱惑得。始得無為時方起得得。以解脫道重即證故。余皆準知 若大乘宗。苦法智忍無間道中未立擇得。雖正斷惑證未曾得。本斷惑種。于解脫道方起得得。依斯假立擇滅得故。故下云。斷惑證滅期心別故。或依無間亦假立得。以證滅故。下約期心今據實得。然大乘宗苦等四諦。四諦皆有事理實三。實雖無多。依詮施設故言四也。初苦法智忍。即于苦諦事理別證。然所證如四諦無別。何不即名證於滅諦。以于滅諦事理兩證未別證故。法智解脫證彼二障不生解脫。非是此位方始證真。自後諸心類此準知。此上相見擬真見道義談四別。據實真見四諦俱時證無前後。
翻此假立不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這些諸法都是在假立的基礎上建立的。如果（通過）擇滅獲得（涅槃），（那麼）就如同有部宗派所主張的，（擇滅）屬於能得道。然而，（擇滅）唯有通過無漏智才能獲得，因為他們不承認六行觀是斷除煩惱的道路。只有依靠聖道才能永遠斷除煩惱的種子，從而獲得擇滅。而且，六行觀僅僅依賴於未至定，而不是根本定。它只能伏住煩惱，而不能斷除，因為煩惱的種子仍然存在，所以只能獲得非擇滅。 此外，從證得擇滅的時機來看，各個宗派的觀點大小不同。例如，薩婆多宗認為，苦法智忍（Kufazhiren，對苦諦的忍）是無間道（wujiandao，直接斷除煩惱的道路）。雖然它能斷除煩惱，並且與煩惱的獲得同時發生，但由於尚未斷除『得繩』（desheng，獲得煩惱的力量），所以不能稱為獲得擇滅。只有當苦法智（Kufazhi，對苦諦的智）生起，成為解脫道（jiedao，通往解脫的道路）時，才能斷除『得繩』。雖然此時尚未緣證（yuanzheng，直接體驗）擇滅無為（zemiiewuwei，通過擇滅而獲得的無為法），但可以依據這個解脫道來建立擇滅的獲得。這種獲得是懸起于『得』（de，獲得）之上的，從而獲得那個擇滅。因此，擇滅的獲得屬於能得道。因為苦忍智（kurenzhi，對苦諦的忍和智）僅僅緣于苦諦，而沒有緣于滅諦，而這個擇滅正是滅諦。只有滅下智（miexiaozhi，對地獄滅諦的智慧）才能證得這個無為法。即使滅下智生起，作為滅法智忍（Miefazhiren，對滅諦的忍）的正無間道，也尚未獲得那個無為法。只有當滅法智（Miefazhi，對滅諦的智）生起時，才能斷除對滅諦的迷惑和煩惱的獲得，才能開始獲得無為法，此時才真正獲得『得』。這是因為解脫道是重複證悟的緣故。其餘情況可以依此類推。 如果按照大乘宗的觀點，在苦法智忍的無間道中，並不立即建立擇滅的獲得。雖然此時已經斷除了煩惱，並且證得了從未證得的境界，但斷除煩惱的種子，要到解脫道生起時，才能真正獲得『得』。因此，是依據這個解脫道來假立擇滅的獲得。所以下文說：『斷惑證滅期心別故』（duanhuozhengmieqixinbiegu，斷除迷惑和證得寂滅的期望不同）。或者也可以依據無間道來假立獲得，因為已經證得了寂滅。下文是根據期望，而現在是根據實際的獲得。然而，在大乘宗中，苦等四諦（sikudengsidi，苦集滅道四聖諦），每個諦都包含事、理、實三個方面。雖然實際上沒有那麼多，但爲了方便詮釋而施設，所以才說有四個諦。最初的苦法智忍，就是對苦諦的事和理分別進行證悟。然而，所證悟的境界與四諦並沒有區別，為什麼不直接稱為證悟了滅諦呢？因為對於滅諦的事和理的證悟還沒有分別進行。法智解脫（fazhijietuo，法智的解脫）證悟了那兩種障礙，從而不再產生解脫，而不是在這個階段才開始證悟真如。之後的各種心念都可以依此類推。以上是根據相見（xiangjian，現象的顯現）來比擬真見道（zhenjiandao，真實的見道）的意義，討論了四種區別。但實際上，真正的見道是同時證悟四諦，沒有先後之分。 翻譯這種假立是不正確的。
【English Translation】 English version: These dharmas are established upon a false foundation. If one attains Nirodha-samāpatti (Zemiie, cessation attainment) through selective cessation (Zemie, Nirodha), it is like the Sarvāstivāda school's (Youbu) assertion that it belongs to the path of attainment (Nengdedao). However, it is only attained through undefiled wisdom (Wulou). They do not accept the six aspects of contemplation (Liuhangguan) as the path to severing afflictions. Only by relying on the Noble Path (Shengdao) can one permanently destroy the seeds of affliction, thereby attaining selective cessation. Moreover, the six aspects of contemplation rely solely on the preliminary stage of concentration (Weizhi), not the fundamental stage. They can only subdue afflictions, not sever them, because the seeds of affliction remain. Therefore, one can only attain non-selective cessation (Feizemie). Furthermore, regarding the timing of attaining selective cessation through the arising of the path, the views of various schools differ in scope. For example, the Sarvāstivāda school believes that the forbearance of the knowledge of suffering (Kufazhiren, Ksanti-jnana of suffering) is the immediate path (Wujiandao, Anantarya-marga). Although it can sever afflictions and occurs simultaneously with the attainment of afflictions, it cannot be called the attainment of selective cessation because the 'rope of attainment' (Desheng, bandhana-prapti) has not yet been severed. Only when the knowledge of suffering (Kufazhi, Jnana of suffering) arises, becoming the path of liberation (Jiedao, Vimukti-marga), can the 'rope of attainment' be severed. Although one has not yet directly experienced (Yuanzheng) the unconditioned state of selective cessation (Zemiiewuwei, Nirodha-asamksrta-dharma), the attainment of selective cessation can be established based on this path of liberation. This attainment is suspended upon the 'attainment' (De, Prapti), thereby attaining that selective cessation. Therefore, the attainment of selective cessation belongs to the path of attainment. Because the forbearance and knowledge of suffering (Kurenzhi, Ksanti-jnana of suffering) only focus on the truth of suffering (Kudi, Dukkha-satya) and not on the truth of cessation (Miedi, Nirodha-satya), and this selective cessation is precisely the truth of cessation, only the lower knowledge of cessation (Miexiaozhi, lower Nirodha-jnana) can realize this unconditioned state. Even if the lower knowledge of cessation arises, as the immediate path of the forbearance of the knowledge of cessation (Miefazhiren, Nirodha-ksanti-jnana), one has not yet attained that unconditioned state. Only when the knowledge of cessation (Miefazhi, Nirodha-jnana) arises can one sever the delusion and affliction of the truth of cessation, and only then can one begin to attain the unconditioned state, at which point one truly attains 'attainment'. This is because the path of liberation is repeatedly realized. The remaining situations can be inferred accordingly. According to the Mahāyāna school's view, the attainment of selective cessation is not immediately established in the immediate path of the forbearance of the knowledge of suffering. Although one has severed afflictions and realized a state never before realized, the seeds of affliction are severed only when the path of liberation arises, at which point one truly attains 'attainment'. Therefore, the attainment of selective cessation is falsely established based on this path of liberation. Hence, the following says: 'The expectation of severing afflictions and realizing cessation is different' (Duanhuozhengmieqixinbiegu). Alternatively, one can falsely establish attainment based on the immediate path, because one has already realized cessation. The following is based on expectation, while the present is based on actual attainment. However, in the Mahāyāna school, the Four Noble Truths (Sikudengsidi, Arya-satya), such as suffering, each truth contains three aspects: event, principle, and reality. Although there are not actually so many, they are established for the convenience of explanation, hence the saying that there are four truths. The initial forbearance of the knowledge of suffering is the separate realization of the event and principle of the truth of suffering. However, the realized state is no different from the Four Noble Truths, so why is it not directly called the realization of the truth of cessation? Because the realization of the event and principle of the truth of cessation has not been separately performed. The liberation of the knowledge of dharma (Fazhijietuo, Dharma-jnana-vimukti) realizes those two obstacles, thereby no longer producing liberation, rather than only beginning to realize Suchness at this stage. Subsequent thoughts can be inferred accordingly. The above is based on appearance (Xiangjian) to compare the meaning of true seeing of the path (Zhenjiandao, Satya-darsana-marga), discussing the four differences. But in reality, the true seeing of the path is the simultaneous realization of the Four Noble Truths, without any sequence. It is incorrect to translate this false establishment.
成就者。于染法中略為六對。依雜集論。若伏功能亦名不成。種子體在。亦即名成。一見修對。二世間出世對。三現行種子對。四六識七識對。五煩惱所知對。六種子習氣對。初見修對者。三乘見道三界分別所有二障。隨其所應。若種若現名不成就。三界修斷隨其所應名成不成。二乘見道隨先所伏。修道煩惱斷名不成。未伏不斷即亦名成。非對治故。不障見故。修道準知。
二世間出世對者。世道但伏俱生迷事別頭所起貪．嗔．癡．慢令不現起。名為不成。迷理及細並非所伏。即名成就。出世如前。
現行種子對者。一切現行若未生起皆名不成。若生起時即名成就。二障種子若未損伏即名為成。若已斷除即名不成。若在凡位體在名成。或有伏者損伏用故亦名不成。若在二乘所知種成。菩薩隨應有成不成 六七識對者。且煩惱障如二乘人在於見道。六相應惑分別不成。俱生通二。第七名成。設起果者不斷七惑。修道之中八十一品隨其所應有成不成。若第七惑成。斷八十一方名不成。斷前八十猶名為成。據有種說。若約功能世道名成。出世不成。若約菩薩六識分別見道不成。俱生名成。無超果故。在修道中第六識身見等四地永伏名為不成。已前名成。據功能說。若約種子體在名成第七我見。金剛無間名為不成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：成就者。于染法中略為六對：依據《雜集論》，如果只是暫時壓制（煩惱的）功能也叫做『不成』，（煩惱的）種子體仍然存在，也可以叫做『成』。一是見道與修道之對，二是世間道與出世道之對，三是現行與種子之對，四是六識與七識之對，五是煩惱障與所知障之對，六是種子與習氣之對。 首先是見道與修道之對：三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的見道位，對於三界（欲界、色界、無色界）分別所產生的兩種障礙（煩惱障、所知障），根據情況，如果是種子或現行，都叫做『不成就』。三界修道所斷的（煩惱），根據情況，叫做『成就』或『不成就』。二乘的見道位，對於先前所壓制的，修道位所斷的煩惱，叫做『不成就』；未壓制、未斷除的，也叫做『成就』，因為不是對治的對象，不障礙見道。修道位的情況可以類推得知。 二是世間道與出世道之對：世間道只是壓制俱生（與生俱來）的、迷惑事相的、個別產生的貪、嗔、癡、慢，使它們不現行，叫做『不成就』。對於迷惑真理以及細微的（煩惱），不是世間道所能壓制的，就叫做『成就』。出世道的情況如前所述。 三是現行與種子之對：一切現行，如果尚未生起，都叫做『不成就』；如果已經生起，就叫做『成就』。兩種障礙的種子，如果尚未損害、壓制，就叫做『成就』；如果已經斷除，就叫做『不成就』。如果在凡夫位，種子體仍然存在，叫做『成就』；或者有壓制的情況，因為損害、壓制了它的作用，也可以叫做『不成就』。如果在二乘位，所知障的種子是『成就』。菩薩根據情況，有『成就』，也有『不成就』。 六七識之對：暫且說煩惱障，比如二乘人在見道位，與六識相應的迷惑，分別產生的（煩惱）是『不成就』，俱生（的煩惱）則通於六識和七識。第七識（末那識）是『成就』。假設（二乘人）生起（阿羅漢）果，不斷除第七識的迷惑。在修道位中，八十一品（煩惱），根據情況，有『成就』，有『不成就』。如果第七識的迷惑是『成就』，斷除八十一品（煩惱）叫做『不成就』，斷除前面的八十品仍然叫做『成就』，這是根據還有種子存在來說的。如果從功能上說，世間道叫做『成就』，出世道叫做『不成就』。如果從菩薩的角度說，六識分別產生的見道（煩惱）是『不成就』，俱生的（煩惱）叫做『成就』，因為沒有超越（二乘）果位。在修道位中，第六識（意識）的身見等四地（的煩惱）永遠壓制，叫做『不成就』，在此之前叫做『成就』，這是根據功能上說的。如果從種子體存在來說叫做『成就』。第七識的我見，在金剛喻定（金剛無間三昧）時叫做『不成就』。
【English Translation】 English version: The Accomplisher. Briefly, there are six pairs concerning defiled dharmas. According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Topics in the Abhidharma), if the function is merely suppressed, it is also called 'non-accomplishment'; if the seed-essence remains, it is also called 'accomplishment'. The first is the pair of the path of seeing and the path of cultivation; the second is the pair of worldly path and supramundane path; the third is the pair of manifestation and seed; the fourth is the pair of the six consciousnesses and the seventh consciousness; the fifth is the pair of afflictive obscurations (kleśāvaraṇa) and cognitive obscurations (jñeyāvaraṇa); the sixth is the pair of seeds and habitual tendencies. First, the pair of the path of seeing and the path of cultivation: For the three vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) in the path of seeing, the two obscurations (afflictive and cognitive) that arise from the distinctions of the three realms (desire realm, form realm, and formless realm), depending on the situation, whether they are seeds or manifestations, are called 'non-accomplishment'. What is severed in the path of cultivation in the three realms, depending on the situation, is called 'accomplishment' or 'non-accomplishment'. For the two vehicles in the path of seeing, what was previously suppressed, the afflictions severed in the path of cultivation, is called 'non-accomplishment'; what was not suppressed or severed is also called 'accomplishment', because it is not an object of antidote and does not obstruct the path of seeing. The situation in the path of cultivation can be inferred. Second, the pair of worldly path and supramundane path: The worldly path only suppresses the innate, the deluded about phenomena, and the individually arising greed, hatred, delusion, and pride, preventing them from manifesting, which is called 'non-accomplishment'. What deludes about the truth and is subtle is not suppressed, which is called 'accomplishment'. The situation of the supramundane path is as described above. Third, the pair of manifestation and seed: All manifestations, if they have not yet arisen, are called 'non-accomplishment'; if they have already arisen, they are called 'accomplishment'. The seeds of the two obscurations, if they have not yet been damaged or suppressed, are called 'accomplishment'; if they have already been eliminated, they are called 'non-accomplishment'. If one is in the position of an ordinary being, the seed-essence still exists, which is called 'accomplishment'; or if there is suppression, because its function is damaged or suppressed, it can also be called 'non-accomplishment'. If one is in the position of the two vehicles, the seeds of cognitive obscurations are 'accomplishment'. Bodhisattvas, depending on the situation, have both 'accomplishment' and 'non-accomplishment'. The pair of the six and seventh consciousnesses: Let's first talk about afflictive obscurations. For example, for those in the two vehicles in the path of seeing, the delusions corresponding to the six consciousnesses, which arise from discrimination, are 'non-accomplishment', while the innate (afflictions) are common to both the six and seventh consciousnesses. The seventh consciousness (Manas) is 'accomplishment'. Suppose (those in the two vehicles) attain the (Arhat) fruit without eliminating the delusions of the seventh consciousness. In the path of cultivation, the eighty-one categories (of afflictions), depending on the situation, have both 'accomplishment' and 'non-accomplishment'. If the delusions of the seventh consciousness are 'accomplishment', eliminating the eighty-one categories (of afflictions) is called 'non-accomplishment', while eliminating the previous eighty categories is still called 'accomplishment', which is based on the existence of seeds. If speaking from the perspective of function, the worldly path is called 'accomplishment', while the supramundane path is called 'non-accomplishment'. If speaking from the perspective of Bodhisattvas, the path of seeing (afflictions) arising from the discrimination of the six consciousnesses is 'non-accomplishment', while the innate (afflictions) are called 'accomplishment', because there is no surpassing (the fruit of the two vehicles). In the path of cultivation, the four levels (of afflictions) such as the view of self in the sixth consciousness (consciousness) are permanently suppressed, which is called 'non-accomplishment', while before that is called 'accomplishment', which is based on the function. If speaking from the perspective of the existence of seed-essence, it is called 'accomplishment'. The view of self in the seventh consciousness, at the time of the Vajra-like Samadhi (Vajropama Samadhi), is called 'non-accomplishment'.
。已前名成。據種子體不約用說。約用說者有成不成且略說爾 煩惱所知對者。所知之障。二乘名成。菩薩成不成。以彼二乘雖斷定障。現行不起種子在故。地上菩薩二障分別。見道不成。修道俱生煩惱障種。金剛無間已前名成。不斷種故。若所知障所攝。種現俱成不成。金剛無間二障種現俱名不成 種習對者。二乘習氣二障俱成。不斷習故。菩薩之人煩惱種子俱生名成。二障習氣及所知種。名成不成。以十地中隨分斷故。解脫道位二障種習俱名不成。略說如是。細辨恐煩。
無記法中。且異熟無記約界分別。隨所生處種現俱成就。余不生處種成現不成 無有起于異地異熟。又若斷者若是人天異熟無記。至金剛無間或解脫道方名不成。餘位名成。據成佛說。若二乘人無餘不成。若約緣縛。隨其所應。金剛無間斷盡惑故名為不成。若是三途．黃門．女人．及長壽天．無想天等。入見道已畢竟不生。名為不成。已前名成。前據現行及功能說。若論種體。三途異熟入見不成體亦無故。女人等種體有名成。威儀無記心通欲．色界隨生二界。種子．現行俱得名成。生無色界種成現不成。佛果不成。緣縛隨應。若泛起威儀．他受．變化所起威儀亦得名成。緣縛不成。假心說有。無實能發。若實威儀八地已上現亦不成。恒無漏
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 以前已經稱為成就。根據種子自體不從作用上說，從作用上說有成就和不成就，這裡簡略地說一下。煩惱障和所知障相對而言，所知障，二乘（聲聞和緣覺）稱為成就。菩薩成就還是不成就呢？因為二乘雖然斷除了定障，但現行不起，種子還在的緣故。地上菩薩的二障分別來說，見道位不成就，修道位的俱生煩惱障種子，在金剛無間道之前稱為成就，因為沒有斷除種子的緣故。如果是所知障所攝，種子和現行都是成就和不成就。金剛無間道時，二障的種子和現行都稱為不成就。種子和習氣相對而言，二乘的習氣，二障都稱為成就，因為沒有斷除習氣的緣故。菩薩之人，煩惱種子和俱生煩惱稱為成就，二障的習氣和所知障種子，稱為成就和不成就，因為在十地中隨分斷除的緣故。解脫道位，二障的種子和習氣都稱為不成就。簡略地說就是這樣，詳細辨析恐怕繁瑣。
無記法中，先說異熟無記，從界來分別，隨著所生的地方，種子和現行都成就。其餘不生的地方，種子成就，現行不成就。沒有從異地生起異熟的。又如果斷除了，如果是人天異熟無記，到金剛無間道或者解脫道才稱為不成就，其餘位稱為成就。這是根據成佛來說的。如果二乘人無餘涅槃就不成就。如果從緣縛來說，隨著情況而定。金剛無間道斷盡了惑，所以稱為不成就。如果是三途（地獄、餓鬼、畜生）、黃門（閹人）、女人、以及長壽天、無想天等，入了見道之後，畢竟不生，稱為不成就，以前稱為成就。前面是根據現行和功能來說的。如果從種體來說，三途異熟入了見道，不成就，體也沒有了。女人等的種體，有名為成就。威儀無記，心通欲界、色界，隨著所生的二界，種子和現行都可稱為成就。生無色界，種子成就，現行不成就。佛果不成就。緣縛隨著情況而定。如果泛起的威儀、他受、變化所起的威儀，也可以稱為成就。緣縛不成就。假借心來說有，沒有真實能引發的。如果真實的威儀，八地以上現行也不成就，恒常是無漏的。
【English Translation】 English version Previously, it was called 'accomplished'. According to the seed-essence, it is not discussed from the perspective of function. From the perspective of function, there are accomplishment and non-accomplishment, which will be briefly discussed here. Regarding the opposition between afflictive obscurations (煩惱障, fánnǎo zhàng) and cognitive obscurations (所知障, suǒ zhī zhàng), the cognitive obscurations are considered 'accomplished' by the Two Vehicles (二乘, èr shèng) [Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas]. Are Bodhisattvas 'accomplished' or 'not accomplished'? Because although the Two Vehicles have severed the fixed obscurations, the active manifestations do not arise, but the seeds remain. Regarding the two obscurations of Bodhisattvas on the grounds, the path of seeing (見道, jiàn dào) is 'not accomplished'. The innate afflictive obscuration seeds on the path of cultivation are called 'accomplished' before the diamond-like samādhi (金剛無間, jīn gāng wú jiàn), because the seeds have not been severed. If it is included in the cognitive obscurations, the seeds and active manifestations are both 'accomplished' and 'not accomplished'. At the diamond-like samādhi, the seeds and active manifestations of the two obscurations are both called 'not accomplished'. Regarding the opposition between seeds and habitual tendencies, the habitual tendencies of the Two Vehicles for both obscurations are 'accomplished', because the habitual tendencies have not been severed. For Bodhisattvas, the afflictive seeds and innate afflictions are called 'accomplished'. The habitual tendencies of the two obscurations and the cognitive seeds are called 'accomplished' and 'not accomplished', because they are severed partially in the ten grounds (十地, shí dì). At the path of liberation, the seeds and habitual tendencies of the two obscurations are both called 'not accomplished'. This is a brief explanation; detailed analysis would be tedious.
Among the indeterminate (無記, wú jì) dharmas, let's first discuss the resultant indeterminate, distinguishing by realm. Wherever one is born, the seeds and active manifestations are both 'accomplished'. In other places where one is not born, the seeds are 'accomplished', but the active manifestations are 'not accomplished'. There is no arising of resultant effects from a different location. Furthermore, if they are severed, if they are human or heavenly resultant indeterminate, they are called 'not accomplished' only at the diamond-like samādhi or the path of liberation; other stages are called 'accomplished'. This is according to the attainment of Buddhahood. If the Two Vehicles enter nirvana without remainder, they are 'not accomplished'. If according to conditioned bondage, it depends on the situation. The diamond-like samādhi severs all defilements, so it is called 'not accomplished'. If it is the three evil destinies (三途, sān tú) [hell, hungry ghosts, animals], eunuchs (黃門, huáng mén), women, long-lived heavens, or non-perceptual heavens (無想天, wú xiǎng tiān), etc., after entering the path of seeing, they will definitely not be born there, so it is called 'not accomplished'; before that, it is called 'accomplished'. The former is according to active manifestations and function. If discussing the seed-essence, the resultant effects of the three evil destinies are 'not accomplished' upon entering the path of seeing, and the essence is also gone. The seed-essence of women, etc., is nominally 'accomplished'. Behavioral indeterminate, mind connecting to the desire realm and form realm, in the two realms where they are born, the seeds and active manifestations can both be called 'accomplished'. Being born in the formless realm, the seeds are 'accomplished', but the active manifestations are 'not accomplished'. Buddhahood is 'not accomplished'. Conditioned bondage depends on the situation. If general behavior, behavior received from others, or behavior arising from transformation, can also be called 'accomplished'. Conditioned bondage is 'not accomplished'. It is said to exist by borrowing the mind; there is no real ability to initiate. If it is real behavior, above the eighth ground, the active manifestations are also 'not accomplished'; it is always unconditioned (無漏, wú lòu).
善非無記故 工巧無記唯在欲界種．現名成。若生上二。種成現不成。彼雖有語據身巧說。二乘俱成。佛俱不成。八地已上種成現不成。若約緣心威儀．工巧。隨應準知 通果無記。欲．色界成。地法色界。下持彼種及現行故。隨其所應名成不成。若至佛果種方不成。若據緣縛。二乘無學亦名不成。八地種成。
有漏善中生得分別。方便善中三惠分別。約其界地。現行種子成不成等。皆應思準。無漏善者。凡夫之中無性不成。有性種成。三乘聖者。種．現俱成。二乘無餘種．現不成。餘人善根涅槃時盡故。
問前明得依。非得依何。答有為非得現行不成。即依種立 又解依第八識翻彼成就立不成就。現行成就不依種子。非得翻彼。何故依種 又解依種。若以翻彼現成不依種。即不成亦不依。如種成依種立。不成復依何。據體不成。即無體故。二解任情 若自在及種子。體在無能名為非得。亦依種立。若爾與現非得何別。此據無能。彼約未起。故有差別。若據體無名為非得同擇．非擇二種得說 就依種中。如聖性非得有二義。一相違非得。即異生性。依二障種。二者相順。依功能說。邪見斷善。或未入見。設有種子。未起功能亦名不成。即依無漏種子假立。現行不成亦依種立。無為非得。擇滅無為。無種姓
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 善性（善）不是無記性（既非善也非惡）的，工巧（技藝）的無記性只在欲界（kāmadhātu）中，種子、現行、名言都成立。如果生到色界（rūpadhātu）和無色界（arūpadhātu），種子成立，現行和名言不成立。雖然他們有語言，但依據身體的巧妙表達。聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna）和緣覺乘（Pratyekabuddhayāna）都成立，佛（Buddha）都不成立。八地（Aṭṭhamaka-bhūmi）以上的菩薩，種子成立，現行不成立。如果依據緣心（攀緣的心）的威儀和工巧，根據情況類推可知。普遍的果報是無記性，在欲界成立，地法（禪定之法）成立，因為地獄持有上界的種子和現行。根據情況，名言成立或不成立。如果達到佛果，種子才不成立。如果依據緣縛（因緣的束縛），聲聞乘和緣覺乘的無學（Arhat）也名不成立。八地菩薩的種子成立。 有漏善（有煩惱的善）中，生得善和分別善不同。方便善（通過修行獲得的善）中，聞慧（śruta-mayī prajñā）、思慧（cintā-mayī prajñā）、修慧（bhāvanā-mayī prajñā）不同。依據其界地，現行和種子成立或不成立等，都應該思考類推。無漏善（沒有煩惱的善）方面，凡夫中沒有無漏善的自性，所以不成立。有無漏善自性的，種子成立。聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘的聖者，種子和現行都成立。聲聞乘和緣覺乘進入無餘涅槃（nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa）時，種子和現行都不成立，因為其他人的善根在涅槃時窮盡。 問：前面說明了得依（獲得的所依），非得依（未獲得的所依）是什麼？答：有為法（saṃskṛta dharma）的非得現行不成立，就依據種子而建立。又解釋為：依據第八識（阿賴耶識，ālayavijñāna）翻轉彼成就而建立不成就。現行成就（已經生起的行為）不依據種子，非得翻轉彼，為什麼依據種子？又解釋為：依據種子，如果以翻轉彼現行成就，不依據種子，那麼不成就也不依據。如同種子成就依據種子而建立，不成就又依據什麼？依據體性不成就，就是因為沒有體性。兩種解釋任憑選擇。如果自在和種子，體性存在但沒有能力，名為非得，也依據種子而建立。如果這樣，與現行的非得有什麼區別？這是依據沒有能力，那是依據沒有生起，所以有差別。如果依據體性沒有，名為非得，如同選擇滅（pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）和非選擇滅（apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha）兩種得說。就依據種子中，如同聖性（āryatva）的非得有兩種含義：一是相違非得，即異生性（pṛthag-jana-tva），依據二障（煩惱障 kleśāvaraṇa 和所知障 jñeyāvaraṇa）的種子；二是相順，依據功能說。邪見（mithyā-dṛṣṭi）斷善，或者未入見道（darśana-mārga），即使有種子，未起功能也名不成立，即依據無漏種子假立。現行不成立也依據種子而建立。無為法（asaṃskṛta dharma）的非得，擇滅無為，沒有種姓（gotra）。
【English Translation】 English version 'Good' (śubha) is not 'unspecified' (avyākṛta), and the 'unspecified' nature of crafts (kāruka) exists only in the desire realm (kāmadhātu), where the seed, manifestation, and name are all established. If one is born in the form realm (rūpadhātu) or the formless realm (arūpadhātu), the seed is established, but the manifestation and name are not. Although they have language, it relies on skillful bodily expression. The Śrāvakayāna (Vehicle of Hearers) and Pratyekabuddhayāna (Vehicle of Solitary Buddhas) are both established, but the Buddhas (Buddha) are not. For Bodhisattvas above the eighth ground (Aṭṭhamaka-bhūmi), the seed is established, but the manifestation is not. If based on the demeanor and crafts of the mind that grasps at conditions, it should be understood accordingly. The universal result is 'unspecified'; it is established in the desire realm, and the 'dhyāna-dharmas' (meditative states) are established because the lower realm holds the seeds and manifestations of the upper realms. Depending on the case, the name is established or not. Only when one attains Buddhahood does the seed cease to be established. If based on the bonds of conditions, the Arhats (arahant) of the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna are also said to be not established. The seed of the eighth ground is established. Among 'wholesome with outflows' (sāsrava-kuśala), the innately acquired and the conceptually constructed are different. Among 'wholesome through skillful means' (upāya-kuśala), the wisdom of hearing (śruta-mayī prajñā), the wisdom of thinking (cintā-mayī prajñā), and the wisdom of cultivation (bhāvanā-mayī prajñā) are different. Regarding their realms and grounds, whether the manifestation and seed are established or not should be considered and inferred accordingly. In terms of 'wholesome without outflows' (anāsrava-kuśala), among ordinary beings (pṛthagjana), there is no nature of 'without outflows', so it is not established. For those who have the nature of 'without outflows', the seed is established. For the saints of the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna, both the seed and manifestation are established. When the Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas enter nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa (nirvāṇa without remainder), both the seed and manifestation are not established, because the roots of goodness of others are exhausted at the time of nirvāṇa. Question: Earlier, you explained the 'basis of attainment' (prāpti-āśraya). What is the 'basis of non-attainment' (aprāpti-āśraya)? Answer: The non-attainment of the manifestation of conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta dharma) is not established, and it is established based on the seed. Another explanation is that it is established based on the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna) by reversing the accomplishment of that. The accomplishment of manifestation (actions that have arisen) does not rely on the seed; if non-attainment reverses that, why does it rely on the seed? Another explanation is that it relies on the seed; if it reverses the accomplishment of manifestation, it does not rely on the seed. Then, what does non-accomplishment rely on? Based on the nature of non-accomplishment, it is because there is no nature. Choose either explanation as you wish. If the inherent nature and the seed exist, but there is no ability, it is called non-attainment, and it is also established based on the seed. If so, what is the difference between this and the non-attainment of manifestation? This is based on the lack of ability, while that is based on not having arisen, so there is a difference. If based on the absence of nature, it is called non-attainment, similar to the two kinds of cessation: 'cessation through discrimination' (pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha) and 'cessation without discrimination' (apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha). Regarding relying on the seed, the non-attainment of 'noble nature' (āryatva) has two meanings: one is 'opposing non-attainment', which is the nature of an ordinary being (pṛthag-jana-tva), based on the seeds of the two obscurations (kleśāvaraṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa); the other is 'conforming', based on the function. 'Wrong view' (mithyā-dṛṣṭi) cuts off goodness, or not having entered the path of seeing (darśana-mārga), even if there is a seed, if the function has not arisen, it is also called non-establishment, which is falsely established based on the 'without outflows' seed. The non-establishment of manifestation is also established based on the seed. The non-attainment of 'unconditioned dharmas' (asaṃskṛta dharma), cessation through discrimination, has no lineage (gotra).
人。及未入見道。皆依二障種子而立。入見已去。隨所未斷二障俱生。立擇非得。以非得彼所證擇滅故。非擇非得隨應。依彼諸有為法種現而立。以成彼法。不得非擇故。
論假立非得名異生性者。此異生性三門分別。一釋名。二出體。三明差別。言釋名者。先離后合。異者有二。一別異名異。謂聖唯生人天二趣。此通五趣。不同於聖。此約趣異。亦攝四生。四生不同。二變異名異。此轉變為邪見等故。聖者皆同有正見故。此約見異。此亦攝境緣境有別。生謂生起生類。即趣見類別異生起。性者體性。由此性故令趣．見異。上離釋也。異聖之生類名為異生。生者是總。性者是別。異生之性名異生性。並依主釋．又新婆沙四十五大同此說。故彼尊者世友作如是說。能令有情起異類見。異類煩惱。造異類業。受異類果。異類生故。名為異生 二出體者。初敘異說。后敘大乘。敘異說者。犢子部說。欲界見道所斷十煩惱以為體性。一切有部別有體性唯是無記。通三界系。不相應。經部不立有別體性。但于曾未生聖法相續分位差別。假立名異生性。大乘雖亦在不相應。非異色．心有別體性。但於是斷二障種上未永斷位。假立異生性。不是唯約能障自乘所有聖法不生現位立異生性。無種姓人無別障故。但約未斷見惑種立。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 人和未進入見道（見道：佛教修行的一個階段，指初次直接體悟真理）的人，都依賴於二障（二障：煩惱障和所知障）的種子而存在。進入見道之後，隨著尚未斷除的二障同時生起，建立『擇非得』（擇非得：通過智慧選擇而獲得的解脫）。因為『非得』是他們所證悟的『擇滅』（擇滅：通過智慧選擇而達到的涅槃）的緣故。『非擇非得』（非擇非得：未經選擇自然而然獲得的解脫）則根據情況，依賴於那些有為法（有為法：因緣和合而生的事物）的種子和顯現而存在，因為成就那些法，而不能獲得『非擇滅』（非擇滅：未經選擇自然而然達到的涅槃）的緣故。
關於假立『非得』名為『異生性』（異生性：凡夫的性質）的討論，這個『異生性』從三個方面進行分析：一是解釋名稱，二是闡述本體，三是說明差別。解釋名稱方面，先分開解釋，然後合起來解釋。『異』有兩種含義：一是『別異』之『異』，指聖者只會在人道和天道這兩趣（趣：生命輪迴的去處，包括地獄、餓鬼、畜生、人、阿修羅、天）中產生，而凡夫則通於五趣。這與聖者不同，這是從趣的角度來說的。也包括四生（四生：卵生、胎生、濕生、化生），四生各不相同。二是『變異』之『異』，指凡夫會轉變為邪見等等，而聖者都具有正見。這是從見的角度來說的。這也包括境（境：認識的對象）和緣境（緣境：認識的條件）的不同。『生』是指生起、生類，即趣、見、類別的異生起。『性』是指體性。因為這種體性，使得趣和見有所不同。以上是分開解釋。『異於聖者的生類』稱為『異生』。『生』是總稱，『性』是別稱。『異生之性』名為『異生性』。這是依主釋（依主釋：一種梵文複合詞的構成方式）。新婆沙（新婆沙：佛教論書）第四十五大品也同樣這樣說。所以尊者世友（世友：佛教論師）這樣說：『能夠使有情（有情：一切有情識的生命）生起異類見、異類煩惱，造異類業，受異類果，產生異類生，所以稱為異生。』
二是闡述本體方面，先敘述其他學派的觀點，然後敘述大乘的觀點。敘述其他學派的觀點：犢子部（犢子部：佛教部派之一）認為，欲界（欲界：佛教三界之一，指有情慾求的世界）見道所斷的十種煩惱（十煩惱：貪、嗔、癡、慢、疑、身見、邊見、邪見、見取見、戒禁取見）是異生性的本體。一切有部（一切有部：佛教部派之一）認為，異生性有單獨的本體，是無記（無記：非善非惡的狀態），通於三界（三界：欲界、色界、無色界），不相應（不相應：不與心識相應的法）。經部（經部：佛教部派之一）不認為有單獨的本體，只是在曾經未生起聖法的相續分位差別上，假立名為異生性。大乘（大乘：佛教流派之一）雖然也認為異生性屬於不相應法，但並非異於色法和心法有單獨的本體，只是在斷除二障種子的尚未永斷的階段，假立為異生性。不是僅僅根據能夠障礙自身所修聖法不生起的顯現狀態來建立異生性。無種姓人（無種姓人：沒有成佛可能性的人）沒有特別的障礙，只是根據尚未斷除的見惑（見惑：見道時斷除的煩惱）種子來建立。
【English Translation】 English version: Beings, and those who have not yet entered the Path of Seeing (Darśanamārga: a stage in Buddhist practice, referring to the first direct realization of truth), all rely on the seeds of the two obscurations (two obscurations: Kleśāvaraṇa and Jñeyāvaraṇa). After entering the Path of Seeing, along with the simultaneous arising of the two obscurations that have not yet been severed, the 'Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-aprāpti' (Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-aprāpti: cessation attained through wisdom) is established, because 'Aprāpti' (non-attainment) is the 'Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' (cessation through wisdom, i.e., Nirvana) that they have realized. 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-aprāpti' (Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha-aprāpti: cessation attained without choice) is established accordingly, relying on the seeds and manifestations of those conditioned dharmas (conditioned dharmas: phenomena arising from causes and conditions), because of accomplishing those dharmas and not attaining 'Apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' (cessation without choice).
Regarding the discussion of nominally establishing 'Aprāpti' as 'Pṛthagjana-tva' (Pṛthagjana-tva: the nature of an ordinary being), this 'Pṛthagjana-tva' is analyzed from three aspects: first, explaining the name; second, elucidating the substance; and third, clarifying the differences. Regarding explaining the name, first explain separately, then combine the explanations. 'Pṛthag' (different) has two meanings: first, 'distinction' of 'difference,' referring to the fact that the noble ones only arise in the human and heavenly realms (Gati: destinations of rebirth, including hell, hungry ghosts, animals, humans, Asuras, and gods), while ordinary beings are common to the five realms. This is different from the noble ones, and this is from the perspective of realms. It also includes the four births (four births: from eggs, from wombs, from moisture, from transformation), which are different from each other. Second, 'transformation' of 'difference,' referring to the fact that ordinary beings transform into wrong views, etc., while the noble ones all have right views. This is from the perspective of views. This also includes the differences in objects (Viṣaya: objects of cognition) and conditions for objects (Alambana-pratyaya: conditions for cognition). 'Jana' refers to arising, kinds of beings, that is, the different arising of realms, views, and categories. 'Tva' refers to the nature. Because of this nature, the realms and views are different. The above is the separate explanation. 'The kinds of beings different from the noble ones' are called 'Pṛthagjana' (ordinary being). 'Jana' is the general term, 'Tva' is the specific term. 'The nature of Pṛthagjana' is called 'Pṛthagjana-tva.' This is a possessive compound (Tatpuruṣa). The New Vibhāṣā (New Vibhāṣā: Buddhist treatise), chapter 45, also says the same. Therefore, Venerable Vasumitra (Vasumitra: Buddhist master) said: 'That which enables sentient beings (sentient beings: all beings with consciousness) to generate different kinds of views, different kinds of afflictions, create different kinds of karma, receive different kinds of results, and produce different kinds of births, is called Pṛthagjana.'
Second, regarding elucidating the substance, first narrate the views of other schools, then narrate the views of the Mahāyāna (Mahāyāna: a major branch of Buddhism). Narrating the views of other schools: The Vātsīputrīyas (Vātsīputrīyas: a Buddhist school) believe that the ten afflictions (ten afflictions: greed, hatred, delusion, pride, doubt, view of self, extreme views, wrong views, holding to wrong views, holding to wrong precepts) severed in the Path of Seeing in the Desire Realm (Desire Realm: one of the three realms in Buddhism, referring to the world of beings with desires) are the substance of Pṛthagjana-tva. The Sarvāstivādins (Sarvāstivādins: a Buddhist school) believe that Pṛthagjana-tva has a separate substance, which is neutral (avyākṛta: neither good nor bad), common to the three realms (three realms: Desire Realm, Form Realm, Formless Realm), and non-associated (viprayukta: not associated with consciousness). The Sautrāntikas (Sautrāntikas: a Buddhist school) do not believe that there is a separate substance, but only nominally establish the name Pṛthagjana-tva on the difference in the continuum of moments where holy dharmas have never arisen. Although the Mahāyāna also believes that Pṛthagjana-tva belongs to non-associated dharmas, it does not have a separate substance different from form and mind, but only nominally establishes it as Pṛthagjana-tva in the stage where the seeds of the two obscurations have not yet been permanently severed. It is not merely based on the manifested state that can obstruct the arising of the holy dharmas cultivated by oneself that Pṛthagjana-tva is established. Those without the potential for enlightenment (Icchantika: those without the potential for enlightenment) have no special obstacles, but only establish it based on the seeds of the afflictions of view (Darśana-heya: afflictions severed in the Path of Seeing) that have not yet been severed.
由不成就於聖法故。若用若體。俱得云不成。有種姓人不成功用。無種姓者亦不成體。故瑜伽五十二說。三界見所斷種子。唯未永害量名異生性 即通二障種上假立。此論亦云。而於三界見所斷種未永害位。假立非得名異生性。亦不言各障自聖種現。但云于諸聖法未成就故 差別者。一五乘差別有二。初立差別。后問答辨。且決定大乘。具依二障未永斷位分別種。立大乘異生性。若所知障畢竟不可害非煩惱者。依此煩惱。一分立為聲聞定性異生性。一分立為獨覺定性異生性。以樂觀諦．十二因緣。悟證．依待二性別故。若俱不可斷。依斯立為無性乘異生性 不定者。若有具待觀諦．緣起得出世者。依此所有分別煩惱立為不定二乘異生性。若有觀待四諦．六度得出世者。依此立為不定聲聞異生性。若有觀待緣起．六度得出世者。依此立為不定緣覺異生性。若具觀待有下中上無漏根性者。立為不定聲聞．緣覺異生性 以楞伽說五種乘姓入法。瑜伽復云立為不般涅槃性．聲聞性等。故相翻立有此差別 準此義為四句分別。有唯有異生性不成聖性。謂無性人。有唯成聖性非異生性者。大乘見道已去。有亦成聖性亦成異生性者。據種三乘見道前。有無漏種亦成聖性。已未起現名為不成。不據種說。或唯依彼能生現用立為聖性。以
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由於沒有成就聖法，所以無論是作用還是本體，都可以說是不成就。有種姓的人不能成就作用，沒有種姓的人也不能成就本體。因此，《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說，三界見所斷的種子，只是在沒有永遠斷除的階段，才假名為異生性（凡夫的性質），即通於二障（煩惱障和所知障）的種子上假立。此論也說，在三界見所斷的種子沒有永遠斷除的階段，假立非得名為異生性。也不說各個障礙各自的聖種顯現，只是說對於諸聖法沒有成就的緣故。差別在於：一是五乘的差別，有二方面，首先建立差別，然後問答辨析。且決定大乘，具足依靠二障沒有永遠斷除的階段，分別種子，建立大乘異生性。如果所知障畢竟不可斷除，不是煩惱，就依靠此煩惱的一部分，建立為聲聞定性異生性，一部分建立為獨覺定性異生性。因為觀察四諦（苦、集、滅、道）和十二因緣，悟證和依待二種性別的緣故。如果都不可斷除，就依靠此建立為無性乘異生性。不定者，如果有具足觀待四諦、緣起得出世者，依靠此所有分別煩惱建立為不定二乘異生性。如果有觀待四諦、六度得出世者，依靠此建立為不定聲聞異生性。如果有觀待緣起、六度得出世者，依靠此建立為不定緣覺異生性。如果具足觀待有下中上無漏根性的人，建立為不定聲聞、緣覺異生性。因為《楞伽經》說五種乘姓入法，《瑜伽師地論》又說建立為不般涅槃性、聲聞性等，所以互相翻轉建立有此差別。準此義可以四句分別：有唯有異生性不成聖性，比如無性人。有唯成聖性非異生性者，大乘見道位以後。有亦成聖性亦成異生性者，根據種子來說，三乘見道位之前。有無漏種子也成就聖性，已經但未起現行，名為不成。不根據種子說，或者只是依靠彼能生現用，建立為聖性。
【English Translation】 English version: Because of not accomplishing the holy Dharma, both in terms of function and essence, it can be said to be unaccomplished. Those with the potential (gotra) cannot accomplish the function, and those without the potential cannot accomplish the essence. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) chapter 52 says that the seeds of the afflictions severed by seeing in the three realms are only provisionally named 'alien-being nature' (異生性, prthag-jana-prakrti), when they have not been permanently eliminated, which is provisionally established on the seeds of the two obscurations (煩惱障 and 所知障, klesavarana and jneyavarana). This treatise also says that in the position where the seeds of the afflictions severed by seeing in the three realms have not been permanently eliminated, the non-attainment is provisionally named 'alien-being nature'. It does not say that each obscuration manifests its own holy seed, but only says that it is because of not accomplishing the holy Dharmas. The difference lies in: first, the difference of the five vehicles, there are two aspects, first establishing the difference, and then questioning and answering to distinguish. And determining the Mahayana, fully relying on the stage where the two obscurations have not been permanently eliminated, distinguishing the seeds, and establishing the Mahayana alien-being nature. If the obscuration of knowledge (所知障, jneyavarana) is ultimately impossible to eliminate and is not an affliction, then relying on a portion of this affliction, it is established as the Sravaka (聲聞) determinate alien-being nature, and a portion is established as the Pratyekabuddha (獨覺) determinate alien-being nature. This is because of observing the Four Noble Truths (四諦, arya-satyani) and the Twelve Links of Dependent Origination (十二因緣, dvadasanga-pratitya-samutpada), and realizing and relying on the two kinds of natures. If both are impossible to eliminate, then relying on this, it is established as the Gotra-less (無性) vehicle alien-being nature. Those who are indeterminate, if there are those who fully rely on the Four Noble Truths and Dependent Origination to attain liberation, then relying on all the discriminating afflictions, it is established as the indeterminate Two-Vehicle alien-being nature. If there are those who rely on the Four Noble Truths and the Six Perfections (六度, sat-paramita) to attain liberation, then relying on this, it is established as the indeterminate Sravaka alien-being nature. If there are those who rely on Dependent Origination and the Six Perfections to attain liberation, then relying on this, it is established as the indeterminate Pratyekabuddha alien-being nature. If there are those who fully rely on having inferior, intermediate, and superior unconditioned roots, it is established as the indeterminate Sravaka and Pratyekabuddha alien-being nature. Because the Lankavatara Sutra (楞伽經) says that the five kinds of vehicle potentials enter the Dharma, and the Yogacarabhumi-sastra also says that it is established as the non-Parinirvana nature, Sravaka nature, etc., so there is this difference in mutually reversing the establishment. According to this meaning, it can be distinguished by four sentences: There are those who only have alien-being nature and do not accomplish holy nature, such as those without potential. There are those who only accomplish holy nature and are not alien-being nature, such as those after the Mahayana Path of Seeing. There are those who both accomplish holy nature and accomplish alien-being nature, according to the seeds, before the Path of Seeing of the Three Vehicles. Having unconditioned seeds also accomplishes holy nature, already existing but not yet manifesting, is called unaccomplished. Not according to the seeds, or only relying on that which can generate manifestation, it is established as holy nature.
相翻故。不爾唯種異產生聖。若唯現說。聖者無漏不起現時。應非異生亦非聖者。若依此說。三乘定性見道已前。亦是唯成異生性句。二乘得聖及回趣大乘未入初地。名亦成異生亦成聖性。二乘無餘是俱非句 問答辨者 問定性大乘及不定效能趣大者。依二障種立異生性。定性二乘為依二不 答有二解。一云但依煩惱種立。以彼不斷及不障故 問若不障斷即不依立。無性之人二障不斷不障彼乘應不依立 答極重障故 若爾二乘定性之人不得趣大。彼所知障亦名極重不。若名極重亦應依立。若不名重以不障彼自乘果故。無姓亦爾。答定姓可得聖。雖有所知不名重。無姓不得聖故二障名重 問煩惱可斷得自乘。煩惱不名重。所知非斷不得大。所知之障亦名重。若以所知不障小。二障不障凡 答但有聖法名聖性。定性所知不障輕。無姓畢竟無聖法故。彼二障名為重 問若望一切聖法名聖性。以不障故得名輕。亦應一切障法名異生。隨獲聖性應皆舍 答二智俱能證於理。但有聖法名聖性。所知定姓無斷時。不障聖法非異生。若依彼立得聖許斷。即違諸論說所知障唯大獨斷。若不能斷既許障在寧得聖性。由此故知。但依一立。如所知障在二乘身不名為障。不礙彼果名無覆故 若爾無性所有二障。亦不障彼應不名染 答人天同異生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為互相轉變的緣故。否則，只有通過不同的因緣才能成為聖者。如果只是現在這樣說，聖者沒有煩惱，不會在現在生起。那麼，應該說不是凡夫也不是聖者。如果按照這種說法，三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）中已決定根性，在見道之前，也只是屬於凡夫的範疇。二乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘）獲得聖果，以及回小向大，但未進入初地（菩薩修行階位），也可以說是凡夫，也可以說是聖者。二乘進入無餘涅槃（佛教修行的最終目標）的狀態，屬於既非凡夫也非聖者的範疇。 問答辨析： 問：已決定根性的大乘行者，以及未決定根性但能趣向大乘的行者，是依據兩種障礙（煩惱障、所知障）的種子而安立為凡夫的。那麼，已決定根性的二乘行者，是依據兩種障礙，還是不依據兩種障礙呢？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，只依據煩惱障的種子而安立，因為他們不斷除煩惱障，並且煩惱障也不障礙他們。 問：如果不斷除，或者不障礙，就不依據它來安立。那麼，沒有佛性（無性）的人，兩種障礙既不斷除，也不障礙他們趣向大乘，那麼，是否也不應該依據兩種障礙來安立他們為凡夫呢？ 答：因為他們的障礙極其嚴重。 問：如果這樣，已決定根性的二乘行者不能趣向大乘，他們的所知障也應該被認為是極其嚴重的吧？如果認為是極其嚴重的，也應該依據所知障來安立他們為凡夫。如果不認為是極其嚴重的，因為所知障不障礙他們獲得自身的果位。那麼，沒有佛性的人也應該如此。答：已決定根性的人可以獲得聖果，雖然有所知障，但不被認為是嚴重的。沒有佛性的人不能獲得聖果，所以他們的兩種障礙被認為是嚴重的。 問：煩惱障可以斷除，從而獲得自身的果位，所以煩惱障不被認為是嚴重的。所知障不能斷除，從而不能獲得大乘的果位，所以所知障被認為是嚴重的。如果認為所知障不障礙小乘，那麼，兩種障礙就不障礙凡夫。 答：只有具備聖法才能被稱為聖性。已決定根性的所知障不能斷除，所以不障礙聖法，因此不被認為是嚴重的。沒有佛性的人，畢竟沒有聖法，所以他們的兩種障礙被認為是嚴重的。 問：如果從一切聖法的角度來看待聖性，因為不障礙聖法，所以可以被認為是輕微的。那麼，也應該從一切障礙法的角度來看待凡夫，那麼，隨著獲得聖性，就應該捨棄凡夫的身份。 答：兩種智慧（真智、俗智）都能證悟真理。只有具備聖法才能被稱為聖性。已決定根性的所知障沒有斷除的時候，不障礙聖法，所以不是凡夫。如果依據所知障來安立，那麼獲得聖果就允許斷除所知障，這就違背了諸論典所說的所知障只有大乘才能斷除的說法。如果不能斷除，既然允許障礙存在，怎麼能獲得聖性呢？由此可知，只能依據一種障礙來安立。例如，所知障存在於二乘行者的身上，不被稱為障礙，因為不阻礙他們獲得自身的果位，所以被稱為無覆。 問：如果這樣，沒有佛性的人所具有的兩種障礙，也不障礙他們，那麼，是否也不應該被稱為染污呢？ 答：人和天人都是凡夫。
【English Translation】 English version Because of mutual transformation. Otherwise, only through different causes can one become a 'arya' (聖者, noble one). If only said as it is now, the 'arya' (聖者, noble one) has no defilements and does not arise in the present. Then, it should be said that they are neither ordinary beings nor 'arya' (聖者, noble one). If according to this statement, those of the three vehicles (聲聞乘, Śrāvakayāna; 緣覺乘, Pratyekabuddhayāna; 菩薩乘, Bodhisattvayāna) with fixed natures, before the path of seeing, are also only within the category of ordinary beings. The two vehicles (聲聞乘, Śrāvakayāna; 緣覺乘, Pratyekabuddhayāna) who attain 'arya' (聖者, noble one) and those who turn from the small to the great vehicle but have not entered the first 'bhumi' (初地, bodhisattva stage), can be said to be both ordinary beings and 'arya' (聖者, noble one). The two vehicles entering 'nirvana' (無餘涅槃, cessation of suffering) without remainder belong to the category of neither ordinary beings nor 'arya' (聖者, noble one). Question and Answer Analysis: Question: Those of the Mahayana (大乘) with fixed natures and those with unfixed natures who can turn to the Mahayana (大乘) are established as ordinary beings based on the seeds of the two obscurations (煩惱障, klesha-avarana; 所知障, jneya-avarana). Then, are those of the two vehicles (聲聞乘, Śrāvakayāna; 緣覺乘, Pratyekabuddhayāna) with fixed natures based on the two obscurations or not? Answer: There are two explanations. One says that they are only established based on the seeds of the afflictive obscurations (煩惱障, klesha-avarana), because they do not cut them off and these obscurations do not hinder them. Question: If not cutting off or not hindering, then it is not established based on them. Then, those without Buddha-nature (無性), who neither cut off the two obscurations nor hinder them from turning to the Mahayana (大乘), should they also not be established as ordinary beings based on the two obscurations? Answer: Because their obscurations are extremely heavy. Question: If so, those of the two vehicles (聲聞乘, Śrāvakayāna; 緣覺乘, Pratyekabuddhayāna) with fixed natures cannot turn to the Mahayana (大乘). Their cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana) should also be considered extremely heavy, right? If considered extremely heavy, they should also be established as ordinary beings based on the cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana). If not considered extremely heavy, because the cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana) do not hinder them from attaining their own fruit. Then, those without Buddha-nature (無性) should also be the same. Answer: Those with fixed natures can attain 'arya' (聖者, noble one). Although they have cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana), they are not considered heavy. Those without Buddha-nature (無性) cannot attain 'arya' (聖者, noble one), so their two obscurations are considered heavy. Question: Afflictive obscurations (煩惱障, klesha-avarana) can be cut off, thereby attaining one's own vehicle. So, afflictive obscurations (煩惱障, klesha-avarana) are not considered heavy. Cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana) cannot be cut off, thereby not attaining the Mahayana (大乘). So, cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana) are considered heavy. If cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana) do not hinder the Hinayana (小乘), then the two obscurations do not hinder ordinary beings. Answer: Only having 'arya' (聖者, noble one) dharmas is called 'arya' (聖者, noble one) nature. The cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana) of those with fixed natures cannot be cut off, so they do not hinder 'arya' (聖者, noble one) dharmas, therefore they are not considered heavy. Those without Buddha-nature (無性) ultimately have no 'arya' (聖者, noble one) dharmas, so their two obscurations are considered heavy. Question: If viewing 'arya' (聖者, noble one) nature from the perspective of all 'arya' (聖者, noble one) dharmas, because they do not hinder 'arya' (聖者, noble one) dharmas, they can be considered light. Then, all hindering dharmas should also be viewed as ordinary beings. Then, upon attaining 'arya' (聖者, noble one) nature, one should abandon the status of ordinary beings. Answer: Both wisdoms (真智, ultimate wisdom; 俗智, conventional wisdom) can realize the truth. Only having 'arya' (聖者, noble one) dharmas is called 'arya' (聖者, noble one) nature. The cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana) of those with fixed natures have no time to be cut off, do not hinder 'arya' (聖者, noble one) dharmas, so they are not ordinary beings. If establishing based on the cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana), then attaining 'arya' (聖者, noble one) allows cutting off the cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana), which contradicts the statements in the treatises that cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana) can only be cut off by the Mahayana (大乘) alone. If they cannot be cut off, since allowing the obscurations to exist, how can one attain 'arya' (聖者, noble one) nature? Therefore, it is known that one can only establish based on one obscuration. For example, the cognitive obscurations (所知障, jneya-avarana) exist in the bodies of those of the two vehicles (聲聞乘, Śrāvakayāna; 緣覺乘, Pratyekabuddhayāna), but are not called obscurations, because they do not hinder them from attaining their own fruit, so they are called 'uncovered'. Question: If so, the two obscurations possessed by those without Buddha-nature (無性) also do not hinder them, so should they also not be called defiled? Answer: Humans and 'devas' (天人, gods) are both ordinary beings.
。不障可不染。對聖名異生。不得故名染 又解雖不障人夫。感生故名染。所知不障小。不招生不染 又解定姓二乘亦依二障立異生性。文無簡故。能障于大必不得故。如無姓障必不得聖依二立故 若爾二乘斷此所知異生性不 答有二解。一云亦斷 若爾即應斷所知障 答許亦無過。如斷定障 此亦不爾。定障除現不斷于種。此依種故 答雖依種立。不即取種。依種假立。言不斷所知者據種體說。言斷異生姓者據假功能。假實既殊故不相反。若依此解不定二乘但亦名聖。以異生性得聖舍故 一云不斷。望自乘說名得聖性。所知未斷彼姓猶存 若爾應名亦凡亦聖 許亦何過 有雜亂過 答若以聖性為異生性可有雜亂。二性各別何成雜亂 二性雖不雜。凡聖是相雜 答望義有別。亦不為過。如不定性二乘聖者。未至初地亦名異小。故后釋為正 問何不通依俱生障立 答約全能障見．修無漏。俱生立全障二無漏故不依立故。瑜伽論五十六云。依未生起一切出世聖法分位。建立異生性。此論亦言見所斷種未永害位。假立非得名異生性 問依見斷種立異生性為。總依三界見斷種立為。不爾耶 答有二解。一云唯取第八現行。同地見斷種立。不依一切分別種立。不爾一界成三界。應名三界異生。若取生現行種。即已得上定起上地惑
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不障蔽，因此不會被污染。對於聖者來說，『異生』（異類眾生）這個名稱是不同的，不能因此就說它是被污染的。另一種解釋是，雖然它不障礙人，但因為它能感生，所以稱為『染』（污染）。所知障不會障礙小乘，不招生，因此不被認為是『染』。 另一種解釋是，已決定聲聞乘果位的二乘人，也依據二障（煩惱障和所知障）來建立『異生性』。經文中沒有簡化，能障礙大乘，必定不能證得果位。就像沒有佛性的人，障礙必定不能證得聖果，是依據二障來建立的。 如果這樣，二乘人斷除這種所知異生性嗎？回答有兩種解釋。一種說法是也斷除。如果這樣，那就應該斷除了所知障。回答說，允許這樣也沒有過失，就像斷除定障一樣。但這樣也不對，定障只是除去了現行，沒有斷除種子，這裡是依據種子而建立的。 回答說，雖然是依據種子而建立，但不是直接取種子，而是依據種子假立。說不斷所知障，是根據種子的本體來說的。說斷除異生性，是根據假立的功能來說的。假和實既然不同，所以不相反。如果依據這種解釋，不定性的二乘人也只是被稱為聖者，因為異生性被聖性捨棄了。 另一種說法是不斷除。相對於自己的乘來說，稱為證得聖性，所知障沒有斷除，異生性仍然存在。如果這樣，應該稱為亦凡亦聖。允許這樣又有什麼過失呢？會有雜亂的過失。回答說，如果以聖性作為異生性，可能會有雜亂。兩種性質各自不同，怎麼會成為雜亂呢？ 兩種性質雖然不雜亂，但凡和聖是相雜的。回答說，從意義上來說有區別，也不算過失。就像不定性的二乘聖者，沒有達到初地也稱為異小。所以後面的解釋是正確的。問：為什麼不通過俱生障來建立呢？ 回答說，是就完全能障礙見道和修道無漏法來說的。俱生障完全障礙了二種無漏法，所以不依據它來建立。瑜伽論第五十六卷說：『依據未生起一切出世聖法的階段，建立異生性。』此論也說：『在見所斷的種子沒有永遠斷除的階段，假立非得，名為異生性。』 問：依據見斷的種子來建立異生性，是總共依據三界見斷的種子來建立，還是不是這樣？回答有兩種解釋。一種說法是隻取第八識的現行，同地的見斷種子來建立。不依據一切分別的種子來建立。否則，一界會成為三界，應該稱為三界異生。如果取生起現行的種子，就已經得到了上地的禪定，生起了上地的迷惑。
【English Translation】 English version: It does not obstruct, therefore it is not tainted. For the saints, the name 'Īśvara' (different beings) is different, and it cannot be said that it is tainted. Another explanation is that although it does not obstruct people, it is called 'tainted' because it can produce life. The obstacle of what is known does not hinder the Hinayana, does not cause life, so it is not considered 'tainted'. Another explanation is that the Arhats (those who have attained the fruit of the Two Vehicles) who have determined the Śrāvakayāna (Voice-Hearer Vehicle) also establish 'Īśvaratva' based on the two obstacles (the obstacle of afflictions and the obstacle of what is known). There is no simplification in the scriptures, and those who can hinder the Mahayana will definitely not be able to attain the fruit. Just like those who have no Buddha-nature, the obstacle will definitely not be able to attain the holy fruit, which is established based on the two obstacles. If so, do the Arhats cut off this obstacle of what is known? There are two explanations. One says that it is also cut off. If so, then the obstacle of what is known should be cut off. The answer is that it is permissible and there is no fault, just like cutting off the fixed obstacle. But this is not right, the fixed obstacle only removes the present behavior, but does not cut off the seed, which is established based on the seed. The answer is that although it is established based on the seed, it does not directly take the seed, but establishes it based on the seed. Saying that the obstacle of what is known is not cut off is based on the body of the seed. Saying that the obstacle of what is known is cut off is based on the function of the false establishment. Since the false and the real are different, they are not contradictory. According to this explanation, the uncertain Arhats are only called saints, because the Īśvaratva is abandoned by the holy nature. Another saying is that it is not cut off. Relative to one's own vehicle, it is called attaining the holy nature. If the obstacle of what is known is not cut off, the Īśvaratva still exists. If so, it should be called both ordinary and holy. What is wrong with allowing this? There will be the fault of confusion. The answer is that if the holy nature is regarded as the Īśvaratva, there may be confusion. The two natures are different, how can they become confused? Although the two natures are not mixed, the ordinary and the holy are mixed. The answer is that there is a difference in meaning, and it is not a fault. Just like the uncertain Arhats, those who have not reached the first ground are also called different small. So the later explanation is correct. Question: Why not establish it through the innate obstacle? The answer is that it is said that it can completely hinder the path of seeing and the path of cultivation of the unlearned Dharma. The innate obstacle completely hinders the two kinds of unlearned Dharma, so it is not established based on it. Yogaśāstra Volume 56 says: 'According to the stage of not arising all the holy Dharma of leaving the world, establish Īśvaratva.' This theory also says: 'In the stage where the seeds of what is cut off by seeing are not permanently cut off, the false establishment is called Īśvaratva.' Question: Is the establishment of Īśvaratva based on the seeds of what is cut off by seeing, based on the seeds of what is cut off by seeing in the three realms, or is it not? There are two explanations. One says that only the present behavior of the eighth consciousness is taken, and the seeds of what is cut off by seeing in the same ground are established. It is not established based on all the seeds of discrimination. Otherwise, one realm will become three realms, and it should be called Īśvara of the three realms. If the seeds that arise in the present behavior are taken, then the samadhi of the upper ground has been obtained, and the confusion of the upper ground has arisen.
。亦名三界異生。一云通依三界見所斷種。文無簡故。同是異生。故無雜亂。不同界．趣．生等體性。界．趣．生等顯界．趣別。此異於聖故不雜亂。前釋為正。瑜伽五十六云三界異生性故。性屬生故。生既界別。故生亦別 問以聖望于凡。無漏皆聖性。以凡望于聖。有漏皆凡性 答有漏聖猶起。但漏非異生。無漏準凡皆無。故總名聖性 二對小乘辨差別。且對有部六門差別 一依處差別。有部唯依于眾同分及與命根。大乘即依二障種立 二假實差別可知 三舍位差別。有部三說。一云世第一法舍。一云苦法智忍生相時舍。即彼滅時斷煩惱故。一云二種共舍。如斷煩惱無間。解脫二道斷惑。若大乘師真見無間起時正滅。即苦法智忍有相見道假說為舍。實真見道。依障種立故 四能得差別。有部別立得得非得。以異生性是非得故。別有得得。大乘即此異生之性望于聖性名為非得。據異生性即名為得。如三成就不異於三別立成就 五性差別。有部唯是無覆無記。大乘通三。不善有覆及以無覆。以定性二乘所知望彼是無覆故。通三界故。依二障故 六非得差別。有部非得望一切聖法。俱舍第四云。不獲何聖法名異生性。謂不獲一切。不別說故。此不獲言表離於獲若異此者諸佛世尊亦不成就聲聞．獨覺種姓聖法應名異生 若爾
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：也稱為三界異生（指在欲界、色界、無色界這三個世界中，與聖者不同的眾生）。有一種說法是，它普遍依存於三界中見所斷煩惱的種子。因為經文中沒有詳細區分，所以都屬於異生，因此沒有混雜。它與界（世界）、趣（輪迴的去處）、生（生命形式）等的體性不同。界、趣、生等顯示了世界和去處的區別。這種異生與聖者不同，所以不會混雜。之前的解釋是正確的。《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷說，因為是三界異生性，而性屬於生，所以生也有區別。 問：以聖者的角度來看凡夫，所有無漏法都是聖者的體性；以凡夫的角度來看聖者，所有有漏法都是凡夫的體性。 答：有漏的聖者仍然會生起（煩惱），但有漏法不是異生。無漏法對於凡夫來說完全沒有，所以總稱為聖者的體性。 二、從小乘的角度來辨別差別。首先，針對有部的六種差別： 一、依處差別：有部只依存於眾同分（眾生的共業）以及命根。大乘則依存於二障（煩惱障和所知障）的種子而建立。 二、假實差別：可以理解。 三、舍位差別：有部有三種說法。一種說法是在世第一法（指修行者在即將證悟時所生起的智慧）捨棄時捨棄。一種說法是在苦法智忍（指見道位最初的智慧）生起時捨棄，也就是在它滅的時候斷除煩惱。一種說法是兩種共同捨棄，就像斷除煩惱的無間道和解脫道斷除迷惑一樣。如果大乘的論師認為，在真見（指真實的智慧）無間生起時才真正滅除。也就是苦法智忍的有相見道只是假說為捨棄，實際上是真見道。因為是依存於二障的種子而建立的。 四、能得差別：有部另外設立了得、得非得（獲得的獲得和未獲得）。因為異生性是非得，所以另外有得得。大乘認為，這種異生之性相對於聖者的體性來說就是非得。但就異生性本身來說，就是得。就像三成就（指信成就、戒成就、聞成就）不異於三別立成就（指成就的建立）。 五、性差別：有部認為異生性只是無覆無記（指不障礙解脫的中性狀態）。大乘則認為通於三種，包括不善、有覆（指障礙解脫的染污狀態）以及無覆。因為對於定性二乘（指聲聞乘和緣覺乘）所知來說，異生性是無覆的。因為它通於三界，並且依存於二障。 六、非得差別：有部認為非得是指未獲得一切聖法。《俱舍論》第四卷說：『未獲得什麼聖法才稱為異生性？』答：『未獲得一切聖法。』因為沒有特別說明。這種未獲得表示脫離了獲得。如果不是這樣，那麼諸佛世尊也不應該成就聲聞、獨覺的種姓聖法，而應該被稱為異生。 若果真如此...
【English Translation】 English version: It is also called 'Sānjiè Yìshēng' (三界異生) [Different beings in the Three Realms, referring to beings in the Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm who are different from the sages]. One explanation is that it universally relies on the seeds of afflictions severed by view in the Three Realms. Because the text does not provide detailed distinctions, they all belong to 'Yìshēng', so there is no confusion. It differs from the nature of 'Jiè' [realms], 'Qù' [destinations of rebirth], and 'Shēng' [forms of life]. 'Jiè', 'Qù', and 'Shēng' show the distinctions between realms and destinations. This 'Yìshēng' is different from the sages, so it will not be confused. The previous explanation is correct. Chapter 56 of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' states that because it is the nature of 'Sānjiè Yìshēng', and nature belongs to birth, therefore birth is also different. Question: From the perspective of a sage looking at ordinary beings, all uncontaminated dharmas are the nature of a sage; from the perspective of an ordinary being looking at a sage, all contaminated dharmas are the nature of an ordinary being. Answer: A contaminated sage can still arise (afflictions), but contaminated dharmas are not 'Yìshēng'. Uncontaminated dharmas are completely absent for ordinary beings, so they are generally called the nature of a sage. Two, distinguishing differences from the perspective of the Hinayana. First, regarding the six differences according to the Sarvāstivāda: One, difference in reliance: The Sarvāstivāda only relies on 'Pudgala-sādhāraṇa' [common karma of beings] and the life force. The Mahayana establishes it based on the seeds of the two obscurations [kleśāvaraṇa (affliction obscuration) and jñeyāvaraṇa (cognitive obscuration)]. Two, difference between provisional and real: Understandable. Three, difference in abandonment: The Sarvāstivāda has three explanations. One explanation is that it is abandoned when 'Lokāgradharma' [the highest mundane dharma, referring to the wisdom that arises when a practitioner is about to attain enlightenment] is abandoned. One explanation is that it is abandoned when 'Kṣānti-jñāna-kṣānti' [the initial wisdom of the path of seeing] arises, that is, when it ceases, afflictions are severed. One explanation is that both are abandoned together, just as the uninterrupted path and the path of liberation sever delusions when afflictions are severed. If Mahayana masters believe that it is truly extinguished when true seeing [true wisdom] arises without interruption. That is, the conditioned path of seeing of 'Kṣānti-jñāna-kṣānti' is only provisionally said to be abandoned, but in reality, it is the true path of seeing. Because it is established based on the seeds of the two obscurations. Four, difference in attainment: The Sarvāstivāda separately establishes attainment, attainment of non-attainment [what is attained and what is not attained]. Because the nature of 'Yìshēng' is non-attainment, there is separate attainment of attainment. The Mahayana believes that this nature of 'Yìshēng' is non-attainment relative to the nature of a sage. But in terms of the nature of 'Yìshēng' itself, it is attainment. Just like the three accomplishments [faith, discipline, and learning] are not different from the establishment of the three separate accomplishments [the establishment of accomplishment]. Five, difference in nature: The Sarvāstivāda believes that the nature of 'Yìshēng' is only 'Anivṛtāvyākṛta' [neutral state that does not hinder liberation]. The Mahayana believes that it encompasses three, including unwholesome, 'Sākliṣṭa' [contaminated state that hinders liberation], and 'Anivṛta'. Because for the 'Niyata-yāna' [Fixed Vehicle, referring to the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna], the nature of 'Yìshēng' is 'Anivṛta'. Because it encompasses the Three Realms and relies on the two obscurations. Six, difference in non-attainment: The Sarvāstivāda believes that non-attainment refers to not attaining all holy dharmas. The fourth chapter of the 'Abhidharmakośa' says: 'What holy dharma is not attained that is called the nature of 'Yìshēng'?' Answer: 'Not attaining all holy dharmas.' Because it is not specifically stated. This non-attainment indicates detachment from attainment. If it were not so, then the Buddhas and World Honored Ones should not attain the holy dharmas of the Śrāvaka and Pratyekabuddha lineages, but should be called 'Yìshēng'. If that were the case...
彼論應說純言 不要須說。此一句中含純義故。如說此類食水食風。又得聖已更不迴心作余乘故。故望一切。大乘不爾。望不能得二空智說。以聲聞等雖名聖者。望迴向大未入見道亦名異生。以未得法空所知在故。至於初地又云得聖性故。又彼有部三乘唯斷煩惱障故。若所知障小不斷故。既依障立。入初地時斷二分別。雖不得成二乘聖性。而不名異生。已斷二障故。獲二空智故。且略辨此。
破同分中。敘外救云。外法非趣生故不立同分者。應難云。趣是趣向義。外法可非趣不以趣向解同分。何得以趣例同分。趣是趣向義。外法無同分。同分相似義。外法相似立同分。又難汝本云。內法是趣生。有情立同分。外法非情趣。外法無同分。汝本以有同智故。內法有同分。外法有同智。何得無同分。何得救言外法非趣生故不立同分。此上難古。下難正理師。余轉難救皆如疏述 述正中。問大乘同分依外非情立不 答據相似義假立同分故通內外。十門分別如樞要說 問若通一切立同分者。何故所引經云此天同分此人同分。不云余耶 答經據顯勝且說有情。既約相似假施。通外立有何失。準此既破於他。翻彼故外假立。
論。又若命根異識實有應如受等非實命根。比量如文 問既以異識為因。難非實命根。他以不離
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於他們的論述，應該只說純粹的言辭，不需要多說。因為這一句話中已經包含了純粹的意義。例如，說這類食物是用水做的，或者用風做的。而且，已經證得聖果的人，不會再改變心意去修習其他的乘，所以才說『望一切』。大乘不是這樣，不能期望得到二空智（人空和法空）才說。因為聲聞等雖然被稱為聖者，但如果期望迴向大乘，還沒有進入見道位，也可以稱為異生，因為還沒有證得法空，所知障仍然存在。到了初地菩薩，又說得到了聖性。而且，有部宗認為三乘只斷煩惱障，所知障斷得很少。既然依據障礙來建立，那麼在進入初地時，雖然斷除了二種分別（俱生分別和分別起分別），雖然不能成就二乘的聖性，但也不能稱為異生，因為已經斷除了二障，獲得了二空智。這裡只是簡略地辨析一下。
在破斥同分的時候，敘述外道的辯解說：『外法不是趣生的，所以不能建立同分。』應該反駁說：『趣』是趣向的意思，外法可以不是趣生的，但不能用趣向來解釋同分。為什麼可以用『趣』來類比同分呢？『趣』是趣向的意思，外法沒有同分；同分是相似的意思，外法相似就可以建立同分。』又反駁他們的根本觀點說：『內法是趣生的，所以有情可以建立同分；外法不是有情趣向的，所以外法沒有同分。』你們的根本觀點是有相同的智慧，所以內法有同分；外法沒有相同的智慧，為什麼不能有同分呢？為什麼還要辯解說外法不是趣生的，所以不能建立同分呢？』以上是反駁古人的觀點，下面是反駁正理師的觀點。其餘的轉難和辯解，都如疏文中敘述的那樣。在《述正》中，問：『大乘的同分，是依據外法和非情來建立的嗎？』回答說：『根據相似的意義，假立同分，所以內外都包括。』十門分別，如《樞要》中所說。問：『如果一切都可以建立同分，為什麼所引用的經文中說『此天同分』、『此人同分』，而不說其他的呢？』回答說：『經文是根據顯勝的原則，只說了有情。既然是根據相似而假立的，那麼包括外法來建立同分，又有什麼過失呢？』根據這個道理，既然破斥了他人，那麼反過來，外法也可以假立同分。
論：『而且，如果命根和異識是實有的，那麼應該像受等一樣，不是真實的命根。』比量的論證就像原文所說。問：『既然用異識作為原因，來反駁非實有的命根，那麼對方可以用不分離來反駁。』
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding their arguments, one should only speak purely, without needing to say more. This is because the sentence itself contains the pure meaning. For example, saying that this kind of food is made with water or with wind. Moreover, those who have already attained sainthood will not change their minds to practice other vehicles, hence the saying 'looking towards everything'. The Mahayana is not like this; one cannot expect to attain the two emptinesses (emptiness of self and emptiness of phenomena) before speaking. Because although the Shravakas and others are called saints, if they expect to turn towards the Mahayana and have not yet entered the path of seeing, they can also be called ordinary beings, because they have not yet attained the emptiness of phenomena, and the cognitive obscurations still exist. When one reaches the first Bhumi (stage of a Bodhisattva), it is said that one has attained the nature of a saint. Moreover, the Sarvastivadins believe that the Three Vehicles only sever the afflictive obscurations, and the cognitive obscurations are severed very little. Since it is based on obscurations that it is established, then when entering the first Bhumi, although the two kinds of discriminations (innate discrimination and acquired discrimination) are severed, although one cannot achieve the sainthood of the Two Vehicles, one cannot be called an ordinary being, because one has already severed the two obscurations and attained the two emptinesses. This is just a brief analysis.
In refuting the commonality, narrating the externalist's defense, saying: 'External phenomena are not 'qu sheng' (inclined to be born), so commonality cannot be established.' One should refute by saying: ''Qu' means inclination. External phenomena may not be 'qu sheng', but one cannot use inclination to explain commonality. Why can one use 'qu' to analogize commonality? 'Qu' means inclination; external phenomena have no commonality. Commonality means similarity; external phenomena can establish commonality based on similarity.' Also refute their fundamental view, saying: 'Internal phenomena are 'qu sheng', so sentient beings can establish commonality; external phenomena are not inclined to by sentient beings, so external phenomena have no commonality.' Your fundamental view is that there is the same wisdom, so internal phenomena have commonality; external phenomena have no same wisdom, why can't there be commonality? Why do you still defend by saying that external phenomena are not 'qu sheng', so commonality cannot be established?' The above is refuting the views of the ancients, and the following is refuting the views of the logicians. The remaining turning difficulties and defenses are as described in the commentary. In 'Shu Zheng', ask: 'Is the Mahayana's commonality established based on external phenomena and non-sentient beings?' Answer: 'According to the meaning of similarity, commonality is provisionally established, so both internal and external are included.' The ten-fold distinction is as described in the 'Key Essentials'. Ask: 'If everything can establish commonality, why does the quoted sutra say 'this deva commonality', 'this human commonality', and not say others?' Answer: 'The sutra is based on the principle of showing the superior, and only speaks of sentient beings. Since it is provisionally established based on similarity, then including external phenomena to establish commonality, what fault is there?' According to this principle, since others have been refuted, then conversely, external phenomena can also be provisionally established.
Treatise: 'Moreover, if the life force (jīvanendriya) and the differing consciousness (vijñāna) are truly existent, then they should be like feeling (vedanā) and so on, not truly existent life force.' The argument by analogy is as stated in the text. Question: 'Since the differing consciousness is used as the cause to refute the non-truly existent life force, then the other party can refute by non-separation.'
識因。難非假命根者。何理能遣 答大乘命根非如名定。縱將生等難非假命亦是相符。以大乘立但假名字有此功能故 又有釋云。與他為違教失。說住滅定等壽不離識者 亦不成難。他亦許壽不離識故。由此論文但云異識實有應非命根 西明云。他若難大乘雲。論主所說受等應非實受等。離識實有故。如相等。解云外違教失。彼許受等是實有故者 不爾。以離識實有故因兩俱不成過。小大同許受等不離識故。喻無能立過。上雖云應比離識無別命根者。是設遮破。非他所許命離色．心有實自體。他只言異色．心有體。不言離故 西明又云。薩婆多量云。命根實有。能持身故。如業者 不爾。此因有他隨一不成過。以大乘師不許命根能持身故。若許持身。下破經部識類受熏。假不能持。有不定過 要集云。應云汝命離識不能持身。即無違宗。大乘命根許持身故。共許同分不持身故者 亦不爾。同前過故。諸論但說能令相續住時決定。於此分位假立命根。不說能持故。設有處言能持識者。由業引種能生現識相續不斷功能差別能建持義假名命持。非是攝受執持之持。亦不即取正能生用。下破假持據攝受執持。今他云命能持身者。即攝持義。故住前破。
論。如四正斷義別說三者。如四正斷約義說四體是精進命等雖三約義
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 辨識『因』（hetu，原因）。如果難以否定『假命根』（kalpa-jīvita，虛假的命根），那麼用什麼道理能夠駁斥呢？回答：大乘（Mahāyāna）所說的『命根』並非像名稱那樣固定不變。即使以生等來否定『假命』，也與大乘的觀點相符。因為大乘認為，僅僅是假立名字，就具有這樣的功能。還有一種解釋說，這會與他宗（指小乘，Hinayana）產生違背教義的過失，因為他們說安住在滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti）等狀態時，壽命不離識。但這也不能構成駁難，因為他們也承認壽命不離識。因此，論文中只是說，如果『異識』（vijñāna，不同的識）真實存在，就不應該是『命根』。西明（Ximing，人名或地名）說，如果他宗反駁大乘說：『論主所說的受等不應該是真實的受等，因為它們離開了識而真實存在，就像相等一樣。』解釋說，這是外宗違背教義的過失，因為他們承認受等是真實存在的。』這不對，因為以『離開了識而真實存在』作為原因，兩方面都不能成立。大小乘都承認受等不離識。比喻沒有能成立的作用。上面雖然說應該比照『離開了識就沒有別的命根』，這只是假設性的遮破，並非他宗所承認的『命』離開了色、心而有真實的自體。他們只是說異於色、心而有體，沒有說離開。西明又說，薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）量論說：『命根是真實存在的，因為它能夠維持身體，就像業一樣。』這不對，這個原因有他宗隨一不能成立的過失，因為大乘師不承認命根能夠維持身體。如果承認能夠維持身體，那麼下面破斥經部（Sautrāntika）的觀點，即識的種類接受熏習，虛假的事物不能維持，就有不確定的過失。要集（Yaoji，書名或人名）說，應該說『你的命離開了識就不能維持身體』，這樣就沒有違背宗義的過失，因為大乘的命根承認能夠維持身體，共同承認的『同分』（sabhāga，同類）不能維持身體。這也不對，與前面的過失相同。諸論只是說能夠使相續住留的時間決定，在這個分位上假立命根，沒有說能夠維持。即使有地方說能夠維持識，也是由於業力引導種子，能夠產生現識相續不斷的功能差別，這種能夠建立和維持的意義，只是假名為『命持』，並非是攝受和執持的『持』。也不是直接取用正能生用的意思。下面破斥虛假的『持』，是根據攝受和執持的意義。現在他宗說命能夠維持身體，就是攝持的意義。所以住在前面的破斥中。
論：就像四正斷（catvāri samyakprahānāni，四正勤）的意義不同，說成三種。就像四正斷，從意義上說有四種體性，是精進、命等，雖然只有三種，但從意義上來說是四種。
【English Translation】 English version: Identifying the 『hetu』 (cause). If it is difficult to negate the 『kalpa-jīvita』 (illusory life-faculty), then what reasoning can refute it? Answer: The 『jīvita』 (life-faculty) in Mahāyāna is not as fixed as its name suggests. Even if one uses birth, etc., to negate 『illusory life,』 it aligns with the Mahāyāna view. Because Mahāyāna posits that merely establishing a name has such a function. Another explanation says that it would create a fault of contradicting other schools (referring to Hinayana), because they say that when abiding in states like nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment), life is inseparable from consciousness. But this cannot constitute a refutation, because they also admit that life is inseparable from consciousness. Therefore, the treatise only says that if 『vijñāna』 (distinct consciousness) truly exists, it should not be the 『jīvita』 (life-faculty). Ximing (person or place name) says, if other schools refute Mahāyāna by saying: 『The vedanā (feeling), etc., spoken of by the treatise master should not be real vedanā, etc., because they exist independently of consciousness, just like form, etc.』 The explanation says that this is a fault of external schools contradicting the doctrine, because they admit that vedanā, etc., are real.』 This is incorrect, because using 『existing independently of consciousness』 as the reason, both sides cannot establish it. Both Mahāyāna and Hinayana admit that vedanā, etc., are inseparable from consciousness. The analogy has no ability to establish. Although it was said above that one should compare 『without consciousness, there is no other life-faculty,』 this is only a hypothetical refutation, not what other schools admit, that 『life』 exists independently of rūpa (form) and mind and has a real self-nature. They only say that it is different from rūpa and mind and has a substance, but they do not say it is independent. Ximing also says, the Sarvāstivāda (school) reasoning says: 『The jīvita (life-faculty) is real, because it can maintain the body, just like karma.』 This is incorrect, this reason has the fault that other schools cannot establish either one, because Mahāyāna teachers do not admit that the life-faculty can maintain the body. If one admits that it can maintain the body, then the following refutes the view of the Sautrāntika (school), that the types of consciousness receive impressions, and false things cannot maintain, there is an uncertain fault. Yaoji (book or person name) says, one should say 『your life cannot maintain the body independently of consciousness,』 so there is no fault of contradicting the doctrine, because the Mahāyāna life-faculty admits that it can maintain the body, the commonly admitted 『sabhāga』 (homogeneous class) cannot maintain the body. This is also incorrect, the fault is the same as before. The treatises only say that it can determine the time for the continuation to abide, and on this division, the life-faculty is falsely established, and it does not say that it can maintain. Even if there are places that say it can maintain consciousness, it is because the power of karma guides the seed, which can produce the functional difference of the continuous stream of manifest consciousness, and this meaning of being able to establish and maintain is only falsely named 『life-maintenance,』 and it is not the 『maintenance』 of embracing and holding. Nor is it directly taking the meaning of the function of truly producing. The following refutation of false 『maintenance』 is based on the meaning of embracing and holding. Now other schools say that life can maintain the body, which is the meaning of embracing and holding. Therefore, abide in the previous refutation.
Treatise: Just as the meaning of the catvāri samyakprahānāni (Four Right Exertions) is different, it is said to be three. Just like the Four Right Exertions, from the perspective of meaning, there are four natures, which are exertion, life, etc., although there are only three, from the perspective of meaning, there are four.
差別體是一識者 外難云。壽等約義說。一體分三蘊。正斷據義分。一進通多蘊 答命根約義別有別勝故三處分。正斷約義分無別勝故一處攝。又雖不全相似取少分喻。
論云彼滅轉識非阿賴耶者。外難云。厭心入無心。別有于細心。厭色入無色。別有于細色 答細心非所厭。滅定心不無。定色非所厭。無色界中有 難。厭色入無色別有于細色。厭依入無依別有于細依 答有舍無常色獲得常色 難二乘俱厭粗心．色入無心色同大有。二乘厭依入無依。應同於佛非不有 答菩薩厭粗不厭細。有悲智故有細身。二乘粗細俱所厭。無悲入寂身非有。更有兩番。如樞要說。
命根述正。大乘諸教有六不同 一唯說第八識種。如此論是 二通說現。瑜伽抉擇云。八根種．現定成。命根在中 三唯內六處。顯揚第一云。命根者謂先業所引異熟六處住時決定性 四通五蘊。集論第一云。何等命根。謂于眾同分業引決定。雜集論釋云。同分者於一生中諸蘊相續等 五者依總相說。瑜伽五十二說。云何命根。根于彼彼處所生自體所有住時限量勢分說名為壽 六依異熟說。五十六云。于業所引異熟住時決定位建立命根 會顯揚文如疏中解。抉擇八根如樞要會。自余諸文不違前三 然顯揚文更有解云。雖相．見別不離識故。此識
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 差別體是一識者（指阿賴耶識）。外難云：『壽』（命根）等是約義理上說的。一體（指命根）分三蘊（色、受、想）。正斷（指斷滅）是據義理上分的。一進（指命根）通多蘊。答：命根是約義理上說，各有各的殊勝之處，所以在三處分說。正斷是約義理上分，沒有特別殊勝之處，所以在一處攝受。而且，即使不完全相似，也可以取少部分來比喻。
論中說『彼滅轉識非阿賴耶』。外難云：厭心入無心（指滅盡定），另外有微細的心存在。厭色入無色（指無色界），另外有微細的色存在。答：微細的心不是所厭惡的。滅盡定並非沒有心。定中的色不是所厭惡的。無**中有（指無所有處定中仍然有色法）。難：厭色入無色，另外有微細的色存在。厭依入無依（指捨棄有依靠的處所進入無依靠的處所），另外有微細的依靠存在。答：有捨棄無常色，獲得常色（指轉依）。難：二乘（聲聞、緣覺）都厭惡粗糙的心和色，進入無心和無色，和（大乘）一樣是有。二乘厭惡有依靠的處所進入無依靠的處所，應該和佛一樣不是沒有（依），答：菩薩厭惡粗糙的，但不厭惡微細的，因為有悲心和智慧，所以有微細的身。二乘粗糙的和微細的都厭惡，沒有悲心進入寂滅，所以身是沒有的。更有兩種說法，如《樞要》所說。
命根的闡述和正解。《大乘》的各種教義有六種不同：一、只說第八識（阿賴耶識）的種子，如此論（《成唯識論》）就是這樣。二、通說現行（指種子和現行都說）。《瑜伽師地論·抉擇分》說：八根的種子和現行必定成就，命根就在其中。三、只說內六處。《顯揚聖教論》第一說：命根是指先前的業所牽引的異熟六處住留的時間和決定性。四、通五蘊。《集論》第一說：什麼是命根？是指在眾生共同的類別中，由業所牽引的決定。雜集論解釋說：同分是指在一生中諸蘊相續等。五、是依總相來說。《瑜伽師地論》第五十二說：什麼是命根？根在各個處所生起的自體所有，住留的時間和**勢分，說名為壽。六、依異熟來說。第五十六說：在業所牽引的異熟住留的時間和決定的位置，建立命根。會通《顯揚聖教論》的文句，如疏中解釋。抉擇八根，如《樞要》會通。其餘的文句不違背前三種。然而《顯揚聖教論》的文句還有一種解釋說：雖然相分和見分有差別，但不離開識的緣故，這個識（指阿賴耶識）。
【English Translation】 English version 'Difference in entities is one consciousness' (referring to Ālaya-vijñāna (阿賴耶識)). An external objection states: 'Lifespan' (jīvitendriya (命根)) etc., are spoken of in terms of meaning. One entity (lifespan) is divided into three skandhas (蘊 - rūpa (色), vedanā (受), saṃjñā (想)). 'Complete cessation' (正斷) is divided according to meaning. 'One progression' (lifespan) encompasses multiple skandhas. Answer: Lifespan is spoken of in terms of meaning, each having its own distinct superiority, hence it is divided into three aspects. 'Complete cessation' is divided according to meaning, without any particular superiority, hence it is encompassed in one aspect. Moreover, even if not entirely similar, a small part can be taken as an analogy.
The treatise states, 'The cessation of the transformed consciousness is not Ālaya.' An external objection states: 'Rejecting the mind to enter non-mind (referring to nirodha-samāpatti (滅盡定)), there exists a subtle mind separately. Rejecting form to enter formlessness (referring to the Arūpadhātu (無色界)), there exists a subtle form separately.' Answer: The subtle mind is not what is rejected. Nirodha-samāpatti is not without mind. The form in samādhi is not what is rejected. 'Existence within non-existence' (無**中有 - referring to Ākiṃcanyāyatana (無所有處定) still has form). Objection: Rejecting form to enter formlessness, there exists a subtle form separately. Rejecting reliance to enter non-reliance (referring to abandoning dependent places to enter non-dependent places), there exists a subtle reliance separately. Answer: There is abandoning impermanent form to attain permanent form (referring to Parāvṛtti (轉依)). Objection: Both the Two Vehicles (Śrāvaka (聲聞) and Pratyekabuddha (緣覺)) reject coarse mind and form to enter non-mind and non-form, which is the same as (Mahāyāna (大乘)) having existence. The Two Vehicles reject reliance to enter non-reliance, they should be the same as the Buddha, not without (reliance). Answer: Bodhisattvas reject the coarse but not the subtle, because they have compassion (karuṇā (悲)) and wisdom (prajñā (智)), so they have a subtle body. The Two Vehicles reject both the coarse and the subtle, without compassion entering quiescence, so the body is non-existent. There are two more explanations, as stated in the 'Essentials'.
Statement and correct interpretation of Jīvitendriya (命根). The various teachings of Mahāyāna have six differences: 1. Only the seed of the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) is spoken of, as in this treatise (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (成唯識論)). 2. Both seed and manifestation are spoken of. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, chapter on Determination, states: The seeds and manifestations of the eight faculties are definitely established, and Jīvitendriya is among them. 3. Only the six internal āyatanas (處) are spoken of. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (顯揚聖教論), first chapter, states: Jīvitendriya refers to the time and certainty of the six āyatanas of Vipāka (異熟) led by previous karma. 4. Encompassing the five skandhas. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (集論), first chapter, states: What is Jīvitendriya? It refers to the determination led by karma in the common category of beings. The Abhidharmasamuccaya commentary explains: 'Common category' refers to the continuity of the skandhas in one lifetime, etc. 5. Based on the general characteristic. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, fifty-second chapter, states: What is Jīvitendriya? The root of the self-nature that arises in each place, the time of dwelling, and the power and division are called lifespan. 6. Based on Vipāka. The fifty-sixth chapter states: In the time of dwelling and the determined position of Vipāka led by karma, Jīvitendriya is established. The interpretation of the Abhidharmasamuccaya text is as explained in the commentary. The determination of the eight faculties is as explained in the 'Essentials'. The remaining texts do not contradict the first three. However, there is another interpretation of the Abhidharmasamuccaya text: Although the image-aspect (nimitta-bhāga (相分)) and the seeing-aspect (darśana-bhāga (見分)) are different, they do not depart from consciousness, hence this consciousness (referring to Ālaya-vijñāna).
相分總名此識 又云彼意根能持。五根所持。能所別說云六處。此論能．所合說名此識種亦不相違 雖有諸釋。疏斷唯取識見分種名為命根。不取相分。此釋為正。
釋應無色時至此云何然。疏自往覆乃至云。我義心法通能厭。即說心法名無色。色法唯所厭。故說心種名無心。此所加答應云。心法通能厭故。說心種名無心。色法唯所厭。即說心法名無色。即是心法通能厭。唯有心種名無心。色法唯所厭。唯有心法名無色。此更次述重顯前文 更助解。厭色入無色。心為能厭名無色。厭心入無心。能厭心種名無心。汝既厭心入無心。不于能厭名無心。別立非色非心名無心。厭色入無色。不于能厭立無色。別有非色非心名無色。厭色入無色。即于能厭之心名無色。厭心入無心。即于能厭心種。名無心。
論。微微心時熏異熟識成厭心種。何不即於此位立無心定。待后剎那方名無心定。前後等故 西明云。真諦三藏但云依種立。不離前難。今說二定依種假立。故雖成種緣未具故。不立二定。要待心滅方立二定。如律儀無表初成種時。緣未具故不成無表 今謂真諦解亦無難。無心依種。初有能熏未是無心故云依種。本為厭心。有心未立。后位方立。
論。無想定前求無想果故所熏成種招彼異熟識。本疏二解
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『相分』（Nimitta-bhāga，表象部分）總的名稱就是這個『識』（Vijñāna，意識）。又說，『意根』（Manas，末那識）能夠執持『五根』（Pañca-indriya，五種感覺器官）所執持的事物。能執持和所執持分別來說就是『六處』（Saḍ-āyatana，六種感官）。此論中能執持和所執持合起來說，也稱為這個『識種』（Vijñāna-bīja，意識種子），這並不矛盾。雖然有各種解釋，但疏文斷定只取『識』的『見分種』（Darśana-bhāga-bīja，見分種子）作為『命根』（Jīvita-indriya，生命力），不取『相分』。這個解釋是正確的。
解釋在進入『無色界』（Arūpadhātu，沒有物質的境界）時，到這裡應該如何呢？疏文自己反覆論證，乃至說：『我的意思是，心法普遍能夠厭離。』這就是說，『心法』（Citta-dharma，精神現象）稱為『無』，法只是被厭離的對象。所以說，『心種』（Citta-bīja，心識種子）稱為『無心』。這裡所補充的回答應該說：因為心法普遍能夠厭離，所以說心種稱為無心；色法只是被厭離的對象，所以說心法稱為『無色』。這就是說，心法普遍能夠厭離，只有心種稱為無心；色法只是被厭離的對象，只有心法稱為無色。這裡是再次陳述，重新顯明前面的文義。更進一步解釋，厭離色而進入無色界，心作為能厭離的主體，稱為無色；厭離心而進入無心界，能厭離的心種稱為無心。你既然厭離心而進入無心界，不在能厭離的主體上稱為無心，另外設立一個非色非心的東西稱為無心。厭離色而進入無色界，不在能厭離的主體上設立無色，另外有一個非色非心的東西稱為無色。厭離色而進入無色界，就在能厭離的心上稱為無色；厭離心而進入無心界，就在能厭離的心種上，稱為無心。
論：在『微微心』（Sūkṣma-citta，微細的心）的時刻，熏習『異熟識』（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識）而成為厭離心的種子，為什麼不就在這個階段設立『無心定』（Asaṃjñā-samāpatti，無想定），而要等到後面的剎那才稱為無心定呢？前後應該是一樣的。西明（地名，或指西明寺）說：真諦三藏（Paramārtha，古印度僧人）只是說依靠種子而設立，沒有離開前面的難題。現在說二定（指無想定和滅盡定）是依靠種子假立的，所以雖然成了種子，但因緣還不具足，所以不設立二定。要等到心滅了才能設立二定。如同律儀的『無表』（Avijñapti，無表色），最初成為種子的時候，因緣不具足，所以不能成為無表。我認為真諦的解釋也沒有難題。無心是依靠種子，最初有能熏習的力量，但還不是無心，所以說是依靠種子。本來是爲了厭離心，有心存在就不能設立無心定，要等到後面的階段才能設立。
論：在『無想定』（Asaṃjñā-samāpatti，無想定）之前，因為追求『無想果』（Asaṃjñā-phala，無想的果報），所以所熏習成的種子招感那個異熟識。本疏有兩種解釋。
【English Translation】 English version The general name for 『Nimitta-bhāga』 (the image-aspect) is this 『Vijñāna』 (consciousness). It is also said that 『Manas』 (the root of mind) can hold what is held by the 『Pañca-indriya』 (five sense organs). Speaking separately of the holder and the held refers to the 『Saḍ-āyatana』 (six sense bases). In this treatise, combining the holder and the held is also called this 『Vijñāna-bīja』 (seed of consciousness), which is not contradictory. Although there are various interpretations, the commentary asserts that only the 『Darśana-bhāga-bīja』 (seed of the seeing-aspect) of 『Vijñāna』 is taken as 『Jīvita-indriya』 (life-faculty), not the image-aspect. This interpretation is correct.
Explaining how it should be when entering the 『Arūpadhātu』 (formless realm), how should it be here? The commentary argues back and forth, even saying: 『My meaning is that mental phenomena universally can be厭離 (be weary of).』 This is to say that 『Citta-dharma』 (mental phenomena) is called 『無』 (without ), and * phenomena are only objects to be厭離 (wearied of). Therefore, it is said that 『Citta-bīja』 (seed of mind) is called 『無心』 (without mind). The added answer here should say: Because mental phenomena universally can be weary of, therefore it is said that the seed of mind is called without mind; material phenomena are only objects to be weary of, therefore it is said that mental phenomena are called 『無色』 (without form). This is to say that mental phenomena universally can be weary of, only the seed of mind is called without mind; material phenomena are only objects to be weary of, only mental phenomena are called without form. This is a restatement, re-emphasizing the previous text. Further explaining, wearying of form to enter the formless realm, the mind as the subject that can weary is called without form; wearying of mind to enter the mindlessness realm, the seed of mind that can weary is called without mind. Since you weary of mind to enter the mindlessness realm, not on the subject that can weary is it called without mind, but a separate non-form, non-mind thing is established as called without mind. Wearying of form to enter the formless realm, not on the subject that can weary is formlessness established, but there is a separate non-form, non-mind thing called without form. Wearying of form to enter the formless realm, it is on the mind that can weary that it is called without form; wearying of mind to enter the mindlessness realm, it is on the seed of mind that can weary that it is called without mind.
Treatise: At the moment of 『Sūkṣma-citta』 (subtle mind), the 『Vipāka-vijñāna』 (resultant consciousness) is熏習 (perfumed) to become the seed of wearying of mind, why not establish 『Asaṃjñā-samāpatti』 (the attainment of non-perception) at this stage, but wait until the later moment to call it the attainment of non-perception? The front and back should be the same. Ximing (place name, or referring to Ximing Temple) said: Paramārtha (an ancient Indian monk) only said that it is established based on the seed, without leaving the previous difficulty. Now it is said that the two attainments (referring to the attainment of non-perception and the cessation attainment) are provisionally established based on the seed, so although the seed is formed, the conditions are not yet complete, so the two attainments are not established. It is necessary to wait until the mind is extinguished before the two attainments can be established. Just like the 『Avijñapti』 (non-revealing form) of the precepts, when it first becomes a seed, the conditions are not complete, so it cannot become non-revealing form. I think Paramārtha's explanation also has no difficulty. Mindlessness relies on the seed, initially there is the power to perfume, but it is not yet mindlessness, so it is said to rely on the seed. Originally it was to weary of the mind, the existence of the mind cannot establish the attainment of non-perception, it is necessary to wait until the later stage to establish it.
Treatise: Before the 『Asaṃjñā-samāpatti』 (attainment of non-perception), because of pursuing the 『Asaṃjñā-phala』 (fruit of non-perception), the seed that is熏習 (perfumed) attracts that resultant consciousness. The commentary has two explanations.
。自斷前正。雖無想異熟假非實感。然為求彼果修無想定。若有心時是能感彼無想果者。修有心定何假無心。以無心定前微微心所熏成種。防心不起方名無心定。即說假法能防實心。后得果時彼雖是假。然由厭心功能力故。想等不起假說為感。于理何違。若俱實種為能感者。應同第八不名無心。又復此論但云故所熏成種招彼異熟識。依之粗動想等不行假立無想。不言成種招彼無想。又復是假。如何種感 問得果之時微微心種即久已滅。但有相續無心種子。無二種種。如何可說有心感有心 答雖無別種。即最後心與種俱時修。有能感彼總異熟力。以未熟故果不得起。后熟生果時將現就種。望得果時說有心感。故亦不違 西明云。準知此因加行時種微及微微。皆感總果有心異熟。正無心位根本實種招無心別果。無心定力遮心不生其理決然。無勞致惑 此雖異釋據時能感不越本解。然復有過。何者自許彼天非所生果假無別體。故不應說為實種感。若許實感。何故復言無心定力遮心不生。其理決然。徒設劬勞 要集云。有說二解后說違五十六者 本疏自判后釋非正。何煩重述 然云彼天總報第八。及彼生得心等。必為微微有心種感。若無現思。種不能獨取果。彼假異熟無想別報。即隨所依一時說感。不可分拆有心無心二位種子
別感二果者 既一時感如何一有心一無心。又俱時感即應無心與總異熟俱時而得。何故前後 若云誰說前後。即違論說心．心所滅。既言心．心所滅。明知初起現行。亦不可云。伽五十六既云起者謂能引發無想定思。能感彼異熟果。明是一時。不更別分總別二果 此亦不爾。若直執論說。亦應但現思不得通種子。彼云謂能引發無想定思。能引即現思。復不說種子。若云以義通種子者。亦以義取說感總報。依此總報六識不行假立無想。故此論云。故所熏成種招彼異熟識。依之粗動想等不行假立無想。
論云無想定前至招彼異熟識。明所依。依之粗動至假立無想。明能依 問無想異熟滅幾識立 答滅一識立。以鼻．舌二識但在欲界。眼．耳．身三識但在初定。在第四定粗但第六。不可起于下地異熟眼等三識。故唯第六 問出彼異熟心緣何地 答隨所生地以為所緣。以潤生愛必與所生同一地故。不說異地愛潤異地生故 問無想異熟即依所厭以立。二定何故依能厭立 答異熟是所求故。于所求立異熟。一定亦所求。即於二定之上立二定。故無過難。
成唯識論了義燈卷第二(末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1832 成唯識論了義燈
成唯識論了義燈卷第三(論第二)
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼
述
論。有三有為之有為相。具如疏解。然準婆沙三十八云。如譬喻者諸有為相。是不相應行蘊所攝。少同大乘。即經部本師。然通離識．不離識別在下例破。分別論者說此能相皆是無為。法密部說三相有為滅相無為。立無為者非此所破。下無為中方始例破。此等雖立作有為相非不相應。以論文中標．結但破不相應故 有言已他破竟故此不破 今謂不爾。非他已破今此不破。諸不相應經部已破。今復破故。或雖無為然為能相。今破能相義。下破無為義。二段俱破理亦不違 相似相續沙門所說色法生住老無常體還是色。乃至識法生老住無常體還是識。此下例破不別破之。不爾色．心之體即色心故有相符失。經部師立準婆沙說。同大乘立一期四相。薩婆多師云。唯是眾同分相。非有為相。此意說云。一期四相但與同分而為能相。非諸有為相。以諸有為剎那剎那皆具四相故。即薩婆多不許依經立一期四相。依世俗諦理即不遮。婆沙三十八多複次解故。諸餘門義如諸論辨。
言非第六聲便表異體等者。外立量云。有為相言。定別有體。有第六囀言故。如天授之衣等 準此量中有其三過。一宗中比量相違過。過云有為相言。非定別有體。以有第六囀言故。如地之堅等。宗不言定無別體。但違于彼定別有故。無不定過
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論述：關於『有三有為之有為相』，詳細內容已在疏解中說明。然而，根據《婆沙論》第三十八卷的說法，譬喻者所說的『諸有為相』屬於不相應行蘊所攝，這與大乘的觀點略有相同，即經部的根本主張。但無論是否脫離識，都將在後面的例子中進行破斥。分別論者認為這些能相都是無為法。法密部認為三相是有為法，而滅相是無為法。主張無為法者，並非此處所要破斥的對象，而將在後面的無為法中進行破斥。這些人雖然認為『作』是有為相，但並非不相應，因為論文中明確標明只破斥不相應。有人說，因為其他論述已經破斥過，所以此處不再破斥。我認為不然。並非因為其他論述已經破斥過，此處就不再破斥。經部已經破斥過不相應，現在再次破斥。或者，即使是無為法，但作為能相，現在破斥的是能相的意義，而下面破斥的是無為法的意義，兩段破斥在道理上並不矛盾。相似相續的沙門所說的色法生、住、老、無常的本體還是色法，乃至識法生、老、住、無常的本體還是識法。以下用例子破斥，不再單獨破斥。否則，色、心的本體就是色、心，因此會有相符的過失。經部師的立論依據《婆沙論》，與大乘立一期四相相同。薩婆多師認為，這只是眾同分相，而非有為相。這個意思是說，一期四相只是與同分作為能相，而非諸有為相，因為諸有為剎那剎那都具有四相。也就是說，薩婆多不承認依據經典建立一期四相，但在世俗諦的層面上並不否定。因為《婆沙論》第三十八卷有很多重複的解釋，所以其他方面的意義可以參考各論的辨析。 關於『非第六聲便表異體』等說法，外人立論說：『有為相』這個詞，一定有不同的本體，因為有第六囀言（表示領屬關係的語法形式），就像天授的衣服等。按照這個論證，其中有三個過失。一是宗中比量相違的過失。過失在於說：『有為相』這個詞，並非一定有不同的本體，因為它有第六囀言，就像地的堅硬等。宗派並非說一定沒有不同的本體，只是反對他們所說的『一定有不同的本體』，因此沒有不定的過失。
【English Translation】 English version Statement: Regarding 'the characteristics of the conditioned arising from the three conditioned,' the details are explained in the commentary. However, according to Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosha-bhasya, Volume 38, the 'characteristics of the conditioned' as described by the exemplifiers are included in the non-associated formations aggregate, which is somewhat similar to the Mahayana view, i.e., the fundamental assertion of the Sautrantikas. However, whether or not it is separate from consciousness will be refuted in the examples below. The Samkhya school believes that these characterizing aspects are all unconditioned dharmas. The Dharmagupta school believes that the three characteristics are conditioned dharmas, while cessation is an unconditioned dharma. Those who advocate unconditioned dharmas are not the object of refutation here, but will be refuted in the section on unconditioned dharmas below. Although these people believe that 'action' is a conditioned characteristic, it is not non-associated, because the text clearly states that only non-associated characteristics are refuted. Some say that because other treatises have already refuted it, it will not be refuted here. I disagree. It is not because other treatises have already refuted it that it will not be refuted here. The Sautrantikas have already refuted non-associated characteristics, and now they are refuted again. Or, even if it is an unconditioned dharma, but as a characterizing aspect, what is being refuted now is the meaning of the characterizing aspect, while what is being refuted below is the meaning of the unconditioned dharma. The two refutations are not contradictory in principle. The Sramanas who advocate similar continuity say that the substance of arising, abiding, decay, and impermanence of form is still form, and so on, the substance of arising, abiding, decay, and impermanence of consciousness is still consciousness. The following uses examples to refute, without refuting separately. Otherwise, the substance of form and mind would be form and mind, so there would be a fault of correspondence. The Sautrantika's argument is based on the Abhidharmakosha-bhasya, which is the same as the Mahayana's establishment of the four characteristics of a lifetime. The Sarvastivadins believe that it is only the characteristic of commonality, not the characteristic of the conditioned. This means that the four characteristics of a lifetime are only the characterizing aspect for commonality, not for all conditioned dharmas, because all conditioned dharmas have the four characteristics in every moment. That is to say, the Sarvastivadins do not recognize the establishment of the four characteristics of a lifetime based on the scriptures, but they do not deny it on the level of conventional truth. Because Vasubandhu's Abhidharmakosha-bhasya, Volume 38, has many repeated explanations, the meanings of other aspects can be referred to the analyses in various treatises. Regarding the statement 'the sixth case ending does not necessarily indicate a different entity,' etc., an outsider argues: 'The term 'characteristic of the conditioned' must have a different entity, because it has a sixth case ending (a grammatical form indicating possession), like Devadatta's clothes, etc.' According to this argument, there are three faults. One is the fault of contradiction in the proposition within the inference. The fault lies in saying: 'The term 'characteristic of the conditioned' does not necessarily have a different entity, because it has a sixth case ending, like the hardness of the earth, etc.' The school does not say that there is definitely no different entity, but only opposes their claim that 'there is definitely a different entity,' so there is no uncertain fault.
。二者彼量有不定過。如文可解。三者亦有有法自相相違過。此量不但立別有體。即顯離所相。而是有為能相耶若之衣等。非有為能相。故成相違。離此四相之外。更無同喻。余皆非有為相。即成異法。第六囀言。因於異轉故。如入正理論立有非實．德．業等量。
論若有為相異所體等者。量云。汝無為相。應離體別有。說之相言故。如有為相。然有解云。此量有他不定失云。堅等異品。說之相言。是不定過。此亦無過。在宗中故。以許有之言。總難令別有此。又云汝無自違過 西明量云。無為相體。應異所相。為無為中隨一攝故。如有為相 有解云。此量有兩俱不成。以為無為中隨一攝因。于所相有于能相無 此亦不爾。有為能相是有為。無為能相亦是無為。豈無為能相在有為中雲于能相。無要集隨此。云有解勝。又破他言。汝有為相體。不異所相。或應無別實相為相。為無為相中隨一攝故。如無為相 要集云。有說有釋但為此量。此量因中有法差別相違過。量云。有為相體。應非假不相應。為無為中隨一攝故。如無為相。由此但以道理例破。不應立量者 此說非理。所以者何。以立宗言汝有為相體。即就他宗破他比量。不立自故。如何得與論主。作法差別相違。又假不異所相。實不異所相。別實有。不別實
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：二者彼量存在不定過失，如同文字可以解釋的那樣。三者也存在有法自相矛盾的過失。這個量式不僅要確立另外存在一個『體』（svabhāva），而且還顯示出它與『所相』（lakṣaṇa）相分離。如果是有為法的『能相』（samartha-lakṣaṇa）嗎？比如衣服等，不是有為法的『能相』，因此構成相違。除了這四種『相』（lakṣaṇa）之外，再沒有相同的比喻，其餘都不是有為法的『相』，這就構成了『異法』（vaidharmya）。第六種是『囀言』（vivarta），因為因發生了轉變。例如，在《入正理論》中，確立『有』（bhāva）、『非實』（asat）、『德』（guṇa）、『業』（karma）等的量式。 論：如果『有為相』（kṛta-lakṣaṇa）與『所體』（svabhāva）等不同，那麼量式是：你的『無為相』（akṛta-lakṣaṇa），應該與『體』（svabhāva）相分離，因為它是被說的『相』（lakṣaṇa），如同『有為相』（kṛta-lakṣaṇa）。然而，有一種解釋說，這個量式存在『他不定』（anya-anaikāntika）的過失，比如堅硬等異品，是被說的『相』（lakṣaṇa），是不定的過失。這個過失也不存在，因為它在宗中。因為允許『有』（bhāva）這個詞，總的來說是難以區分的。又說，你的『無自違』（asvavirodha）過失。西明的量式是：『無為相』（akṛta-lakṣaṇa）的『體』（svabhāva），應該與『所相』（lakṣaṇa）不同，因為它被包含在『無為』（akṛta）中的任何一個之中，如同『有為相』（kṛta-lakṣaṇa）。有一種解釋說，這個量式存在『兩俱不成』（ubhayāsiddha），因為『無為』（akṛta）中包含的任何一個『因』（hetu），在『所相』（lakṣaṇa）中存在，在『能相』（samartha-lakṣaṇa）中不存在。這也不對，『有為』（kṛta）的『能相』（samartha-lakṣaṇa）是『有為』（kṛta），『無為』（akṛta）的『能相』（samartha-lakṣaṇa）也是『無為』（akṛta），難道『無為』（akṛta）的『能相』（samartha-lakṣaṇa）會在『有為』（kṛta）中嗎？說在『能相』（samartha-lakṣaṇa）中不存在，一定要聚集並隨順這個。說有一種解釋是正確的。又駁斥他人說，你的『有為相』（kṛta-lakṣaṇa）的『體』（svabhāva），不與『所相』（lakṣaṇa）不同，或者應該沒有不同的真實『相』（lakṣaṇa）作為『相』（lakṣaṇa），因為它被包含在『無為相』（akṛta-lakṣaṇa）中的任何一個之中，如同『無為相』（akṛta-lakṣaṇa）。《要集》說，有人說有一種解釋僅僅是爲了這個量式。這個量式的『因』（hetu）中存在『有法差別相違』（dharma-bheda-viruddha）的過失。量式是：『有為相』（kṛta-lakṣaṇa）的『體』（svabhāva），應該不是虛假的、不相應的，因為它被包含在『無為』（akṛta）中的任何一個之中，如同『無為相』（akṛta-lakṣaṇa）。由此僅僅用道理來舉例駁斥，不應該確立量式。這種說法是不合理的。為什麼呢？因為確立宗的時候說，你的『有為相』（kṛta-lakṣaṇa）的『體』（svabhāva），就是針對他宗駁斥他人的比量，不是確立自己的觀點，怎麼能與論主產生『法差別相違』（dharma-bheda-viruddha）呢？又虛假的不異於『所相』（lakṣaṇa），真實的不異於『所相』（lakṣaṇa），不同的真實存在，不不同的真實存在。
【English Translation】 English version: Secondly, that inference has the fallacy of uncertainty, as the text can explain. Thirdly, it also has the fallacy of the subject contradicting its own nature. This inference not only establishes that there is a separate 'essence' (svabhāva), but also shows that it is separate from the 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa). Is it the 'effective characteristic' (samartha-lakṣaṇa) of conditioned phenomena? For example, clothes, etc., are not the 'effective characteristic' of conditioned phenomena, thus constituting a contradiction. Apart from these four 'characteristics' (lakṣaṇa), there is no similar example; the rest are not characteristics of conditioned phenomena, thus constituting 'dissimilarity' (vaidharmya). Sixth is 'transformation of speech' (vivarta), because the reason has changed. For example, in the Nyāyapraveśa, inferences are established for 'existence' (bhāva), 'non-reality' (asat), 'quality' (guṇa), 'action' (karma), etc. Argument: If the 'characteristic of conditioned phenomena' (kṛta-lakṣaṇa) is different from the 'essence' (svabhāva), etc., then the inference is: Your 'characteristic of unconditioned phenomena' (akṛta-lakṣaṇa) should be separate from the 'essence' (svabhāva), because it is a 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa) that is spoken of, like the 'characteristic of conditioned phenomena' (kṛta-lakṣaṇa). However, one explanation says that this inference has the fallacy of 'uncertainty for others' (anya-anaikāntika), for example, hardness, etc., in dissimilar instances, is a 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa) that is spoken of, which is an uncertain fallacy. This fallacy does not exist because it is in the subject. Because the word 'existence' (bhāva) is allowed, it is generally difficult to distinguish this separately. It is also said that you have the fallacy of 'non-self-contradiction' (asvavirodha). The inference of Ximing is: The 'essence' (svabhāva) of the 'characteristic of unconditioned phenomena' (akṛta-lakṣaṇa) should be different from the 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa), because it is included in any one of the 'unconditioned' (akṛta), like the 'characteristic of conditioned phenomena' (kṛta-lakṣaṇa). One explanation says that this inference has 'both unestablished' (ubhayāsiddha), because any one of the 'reasons' (hetu) included in the 'unconditioned' (akṛta) exists in the 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa) but does not exist in the 'effective characteristic' (samartha-lakṣaṇa). This is also incorrect; the 'effective characteristic' (samartha-lakṣaṇa) of the 'conditioned' (kṛta) is 'conditioned' (kṛta), and the 'effective characteristic' (samartha-lakṣaṇa) of the 'unconditioned' (akṛta) is also 'unconditioned' (akṛta). How could the 'effective characteristic' (samartha-lakṣaṇa) of the 'unconditioned' (akṛta) be in the 'conditioned' (kṛta)? Saying that it does not exist in the 'effective characteristic' (samartha-lakṣaṇa), one must gather and follow this. Saying that one explanation is correct. Also refuting others, your 'essence' (svabhāva) of the 'characteristic of conditioned phenomena' (kṛta-lakṣaṇa) is not different from the 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa), or there should be no different real 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa) as a 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa), because it is included in any one of the 'characteristic of unconditioned phenomena' (akṛta-lakṣaṇa), like the 'characteristic of unconditioned phenomena' (akṛta-lakṣaṇa). The Yaoji says that some say that one explanation is only for this inference. In the 'reason' (hetu) of this inference, there is the fallacy of 'contradiction of the difference of the subject' (dharma-bheda-viruddha). The inference is: The 'essence' (svabhāva) of the 'characteristic of conditioned phenomena' (kṛta-lakṣaṇa) should not be false and non-corresponding, because it is included in any one of the 'unconditioned' (akṛta), like the 'characteristic of unconditioned phenomena' (akṛta-lakṣaṇa). Therefore, only using reason to refute by example, one should not establish an inference. This statement is unreasonable. Why? Because when establishing the thesis, saying that your 'essence' (svabhāva) of the 'characteristic of conditioned phenomena' (kṛta-lakṣaṇa) is directed at refuting others' inferences in other schools, not establishing one's own view, how can there be 'contradiction of the difference of the subject' (dharma-bheda-viruddha) with the proponent? Also, the false is not different from the 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa), the real is not different from the 'characteristic' (lakṣaṇa), different reality exists, not different reality exists.
有。是差別故。然準作違。即是有法差別。即應脫一有字。若作有法差別。是差別故。又設若爾彼立違量亦有此過。以實有不相應。非實有不相應。是差別意。立量實有不相應。今與作有法差別違量云。汝實有為相。應非實有不相應。為無為中隨一攝故。如無為相。故不得成有法及法差別違。即顯彼立異有為外別立能相。如耶若之衣等。量有法自相相違決定。及法差別相違決定。又過如前。由此有說．有釋無愆。
論。又生等相若體俱有等者。本云。初破古師相用前後。又住異滅下。破新薩婆多三相用俱 西明科云。並通新舊。有解取前為正 要集云。取西明為正。以婆沙文義有兩釋。初云作用時異。即三相前後 又云。婆沙云滅時老．滅方有作用。故即同時 今謂不爾。前引婆沙三十九云。顯一剎那具有三相。問若爾應一法亦生．老．滅。作用時異故不相違。謂法生時生有作用。滅時老．滅方有作用。體雖同時用有先後。此意即答三相作用皆有前後。不別云滅與老同時。
論云爲止他宗顯正義故。如譬喻師一剎那中有三相者。即應一法一時亦生．亦老．亦滅。然無此理。互相違故。應說諸行初起名生。后盡名滅。中衰名老。為遮彼執顯一剎那具有三相。問若如是者。則應一法一時亦生．老．滅。答作用
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有，這是因為有差別。然而，如果按照『作違』（zùo wéi，一種邏輯上的錯誤）來衡量，那就是『有法』（yǒu fǎ，具有某種性質的事物）的差別。這樣就應該去掉一個『有』字。如果理解為『有法差別』，那就是因為有差別。而且，如果那樣的話，對方所立的『違量』（wéi liáng，一種錯誤的推理）也會有這個過失。因為『實有』（shí yǒu，真實存在的事物）不相應，『非實有』（fēi shí yǒu，非真實存在的事物）不相應，這是差別的意思。立量為『實有不相應』，現在用『作有法差別違量』來反駁說：『你實有為相，應該非實有不相應，因為包含在有為或無為中的一個，就像無為相一樣。』所以不能成立『有法』以及『法差別』的相違。這就顯示了對方在有為之外，另外建立能相，就像耶若（Yē ruò）的衣服等。量有法自相相違決定，以及法差別相違決定，又像前面的過失一樣。因此，有人說，有人解釋沒有過失。
論：又，生等相，如果本體同時具有等，原本說：『最初破斥古師的相用前後。』又在『住異滅』（zhù yì miè，事物存在的不同階段）之後，破斥新薩婆多（Xīn Sà pó duō，一個佛教派別）的三相用俱。西明（Xī míng）科說：『並通新舊。』有人解釋說以前面的為正確。要集（Yào jí）說：『以西明為正確。』因為婆沙（Pó shā，《阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論》的簡稱）的文義有兩種解釋。最初說作用時不同，就是三相前後。又說：婆沙說滅時老、滅才有作用，所以是同時。現在認為不是這樣。前面引用的婆沙第三十九卷說：顯示一剎那具有三相。問：如果這樣，那麼一個法也應該一時生、老、滅。答：作用時不同，所以不相違。意思是法生的時候，生有作用；滅的時候，老、滅才有作用。本體雖然同時，作用有先後。這個意思就是回答三相作用都有先後，不另外說滅與老同時。
論說爲了阻止其他宗派，顯示正確的意義。如果像譬喻師（Pì yù shī，一個佛教派別）那樣認為一剎那中有三相，那麼就應該一個法一時也生、也老、也滅。然而沒有這個道理，因為互相違背。應該說諸行（zhū xíng，一切有為法）初起名叫生，后盡名叫滅，中間衰敗名叫老。爲了遮止他們的執著，顯示一剎那具有三相。問：如果這樣，那麼就應該一個法一時也生、老、滅。答：作用。
【English Translation】 English version: Yes, it is because of differences. However, if measured according to 'zuo wei' (作違, a logical fallacy), then it is a difference of 'you fa' (有法, a thing with a certain property). In that case, one 'you' (有, to have/exist) should be removed. If understood as 'you fa cha bie' (有法差別, difference in things with properties), it is because of differences. Moreover, if that were the case, the 'wei liang' (違量, a faulty inference) established by the opponent would also have this fault. Because 'shi you' (實有, real existence) is not corresponding, and 'fei shi you' (非實有, unreal existence) is not corresponding, this is the meaning of difference. Establishing the inference as 'shi you bu xiang ying' (實有不相應, real existence is not corresponding), now using 'zuo you fa cha bie wei liang' (作有法差別違量, establishing a fallacy by differentiating things with properties) to refute, saying: 'Your real existence as a characteristic should be unreal existence not corresponding, because it is included in either conditioned or unconditioned, just like the characteristic of unconditioned.' Therefore, the contradiction of 'you fa' (有法, things with properties) and 'fa cha bie' (法差別, differences in properties) cannot be established. This shows that the opponent, outside of conditioned existence, separately establishes a capable characteristic, like the clothes of Yē ruò (耶若). The inference has a definite contradiction in the self-characteristic of 'you fa' (有法, things with properties), and a definite contradiction in the difference of properties, and is like the previous fault. Therefore, some say, some explain that there is no fault.
Treatise: Furthermore, if the characteristics of arising, etc., have the same substance simultaneously, the original text says: 'Initially refuting the ancient teachers' sequence of characteristics and functions.' And after 'zhù yì miè' (住異滅, the different stages of existence), refuting the simultaneous use of the three characteristics of the new Sarvastivadins (Xīn Sà pó duō, 新薩婆多, a Buddhist school). The Xī míng (西明) commentary says: 'Including both the old and the new.' Some explain that the former is correct. The Yào jí (要集) says: 'Taking Xī míng as correct.' Because the meaning of the Pó shā (婆沙, short for Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra, 《阿毗達磨大毗婆沙論》) text has two explanations. Initially, it says that the time of function is different, which is the sequence of the three characteristics. It also says: The Pó shā says that aging and cessation only have function at the time of cessation, so they are simultaneous. Now it is considered not to be so. The previously cited thirty-ninth volume of the Pó shā says: Showing that one kṣaṇa (剎那, instant) has three characteristics. Question: If so, then one dharma (法, phenomenon) should also arise, age, and cease at the same time. Answer: The time of function is different, so they are not contradictory. The meaning is that when a dharma arises, arising has a function; when it ceases, aging and cessation have a function. Although the substance is simultaneous, the functions have a sequence. This meaning is answering that the functions of the three characteristics all have a sequence, and it is not separately said that cessation and aging are simultaneous.
The treatise says that it is to prevent other schools and show the correct meaning. If, like the Sautrāntikas (Pì yù shī, 譬喻師, a Buddhist school), it is thought that there are three characteristics in one kṣaṇa (剎那, instant), then one dharma (法, phenomenon) should also arise, age, and cease at the same time. However, there is no such reason, because they contradict each other. It should be said that the initial arising of all saṃskāras (zhū xíng, 諸行, all conditioned dharmas) is called arising, the final exhaustion is called cessation, and the intermediate decay is called aging. In order to prevent their attachment, it is shown that one kṣaṇa (剎那, instant) has three characteristics. Question: If so, then one dharma (法, phenomenon) should also arise, age, and cease at the same time. Answer: Function.
時異故不相違。乃至云。體雖同時用有先後。一法生滅作用究竟名一剎那。故無有失。或生．滅位非一剎那。然一剎那具有三體故。說三相同一剎那(已上論文)。云滅時老．滅方有作用者。以老衰法滅時方顯。云滅時老．滅方有作用。故下總結。體雖同時用有先後。又不說住與滅同時。故知古師相用前後。不應分為二說。文無別故 又俱舍第五破薩婆多雲。又住等三用俱現在。應一法體一剎那中。即有安住．衰異．壞滅。若時住相能住此法。為名安住。為名衰異。為名滅壞。諸說住等用不同時。彼說便違剎那滅義。他既自說相用前後。約俱時難古薩婆多。即有相符難新薩婆多相用前後。亦是相符。故依本正。
論。所待因緣應非本有者。疏答外難云。虛疏之法雖現有種。便無外緣即不能起。以劣弱故。汝之實法何得相例 要集云。此釋未能盡理 今謂種體雖恒。所待因緣本無今有。展轉無窮。非恒具足。故非常生。故瑜伽五十一云。諸行雖有各別生因。然必待緣方得生長。乃至故此論云。不同外道緣恒非無故不頓生者。今將此釋無異於本更待外緣。外緣即是親種之外。外緣未合即不能生。即緣非恒有故即前因。何勞別說 今更設難。如我識外有外緣。不具不頓生。大乘唯自心。不假識外法頓起 答所緣親境唯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：時間不同，所以並不矛盾。乃至說：『本體雖然同時存在，但作用有先後。』一個法的生滅作用完成，稱為一個剎那。所以沒有錯誤。或者說，生、滅的階段不是一個剎那。但一個剎那具有三種本體，所以說三種相同於一個剎那（以上是論文）。說滅的時候，衰老、滅亡才有作用，是因為衰老衰敗的法滅亡的時候才顯現。說滅的時候，衰老、滅亡才有作用，所以下面總結說：本體雖然同時存在，但作用有先後。又沒有說住和滅同時發生。所以知道古師認為相和用有先後。不應該分為兩種說法，因為文中沒有區別。另外，《俱舍論》第五破斥薩婆多部時說：『又住等三種作用同時存在於現在，應該一個法的本體在一個剎那中，就有安住、衰異、壞滅。如果住相能夠使此法安住，是名為安住，還是名為衰異，還是名為滅壞？』那些說住等作用不同時的人，他們的說法就違背了剎那滅的意義。』他既然自己說相和用有先後，用俱時來為難古薩婆多部，就相當於用相符來為難新薩婆多部相和用有先後。所以依據根本才是正確的。 論中說：『所依賴的因緣應該不是本來就有的。』疏中回答外來的責難說：『虛疏的法雖然現在有種子，但沒有外緣就不能生起，因為它們弱小。你們的實法怎麼能相比呢？』《要集》說：『這種解釋未能完全合理。』現在我認為種子的本體雖然恒常存在，但所依賴的因緣本來沒有現在才有，輾轉無窮，並非恒常具足，所以不是恒常生起。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷說：『諸行雖然有各自的生因，但必須等待因緣才能生長。』乃至因此論說：『不同於外道認為因緣恒常存在，所以不會頓然生起。』現在將這種解釋與原本沒有區別，仍然需要等待外緣。外緣就是親種子之外的。外緣沒有結合就不能生起，也就是說因緣不是恒常存在的，也就是前因，何必另外說明呢？現在我再設一個難題。比如我的識外有外緣，不具足就不能頓然生起。大乘唯有自心，不依賴識外的法就能頓然生起。』回答說：『所緣的親境唯有'
【English Translation】 English version: Time is different, so there is no contradiction. It even says: 'Although the substance exists simultaneously, the function has a sequence.' The completion of a dharma's arising and ceasing function is called a kshana (moment). So there is no mistake. Or, the stages of arising and ceasing are not one kshana. But one kshana has three substances, so it is said that the three are the same as one kshana (above is the thesis). Saying that when ceasing, aging and destruction have a function, is because the dharma of aging and decay only appears when it ceases. Saying that when ceasing, aging and destruction have a function, so the following concludes: Although the substance exists simultaneously, the function has a sequence. Also, it is not said that abiding and ceasing occur simultaneously. So it is known that the ancient teachers believed that the substance and function have a sequence. It should not be divided into two statements, because there is no difference in the text. In addition, the fifth chapter of the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya refutes the Sarvāstivāda (a Buddhist school) by saying: 'Also, the three functions of abiding, etc., exist simultaneously in the present, so the substance of a dharma should have abiding, decay, and destruction in one kshana. If the characteristic of abiding can make this dharma abide, is it called abiding, or is it called decay, or is it called destruction?' Those who say that the functions of abiding, etc., are not simultaneous, their statement contradicts the meaning of kshana-destruction.' Since he himself said that the substance and function have a sequence, using simultaneity to challenge the ancient Sarvāstivāda is equivalent to using consistency to challenge the new Sarvāstivāda's substance and function having a sequence. So relying on the fundamental is correct. The treatise says: 'The dependent conditions should not be originally existent.' The commentary answers the external difficulty by saying: 'Although the empty and sparse dharmas now have seeds, they cannot arise without external conditions, because they are weak. How can your real dharmas be compared?' Yaoji says: 'This explanation is not completely reasonable.' Now I think that although the substance of the seeds is constant, the dependent conditions originally did not exist but now do, endlessly transforming, not constantly complete, so they do not constantly arise. So the fifty-first chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Although the saṃskāras (conditioned phenomena) have their own causes of arising, they must wait for conditions to grow.' Even to this treatise saying: 'Different from the tīrthikas (non-Buddhist schools) who think that the conditions are constantly existent, so they do not arise suddenly.' Now this explanation is no different from the original, still needing to wait for external conditions. External conditions are outside the immediate seed. If the external conditions are not combined, they cannot arise, that is to say, the conditions are not constantly existent, that is, the previous cause, why bother to explain it separately? Now I will set another difficult problem. For example, my vijñāna (consciousness) has external conditions outside, and if they are not complete, it cannot arise suddenly. Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) only has its own mind, and does not rely on dharmas outside of vijñāna to arise suddenly.' The answer is: 'The immediate object of what is cognized is only'
自識。不能緣外說唯心。不無增上他有情。此外不具非頓起。外又救云。汝種雖現有。虛疏待假緣。我法體實有。還待實外緣。若爾即執二生便為無用。
論。所相恒有而生等合者。問此破與前理有何別 答前以彼宗不離無為別立能相。例破有為不令別立。今以有為體恒有。說生等合。例彼無為體亦恒有。應生等合。故二文別。
云俱舍云。即前異不成。異前非一法。若所異之法。即前住所住者。異義不成。非前所住是別法者。即非一法。
論。表此後無為相何失。本疏云。即現在法於後無時。名之為滅。假言過去。過去體無實非彼世 西明釋云。滅相是假。行蘊所攝。假依現實。實在過去。若說現在應依異世。此意滅相。論說后一是無故是過去。若說依現。異世相依。自釋難云。若依過去便無所依。答云如比量中立法無者。彼因依無亦得成立。非如有量因必有依。滅相是無。依無何失。有解取前本疏為正。后說雖無異世相依。而有異世相表。又已滅無。如龜毛等非有為故 要集意取后說為正 五十二云。依生已壞滅分位。建立無常。又四十六云。依于有分建立一種有為之相。依于無分建立一種有為之相。又此論云。無時名滅。此中所說時分位者。不可無時說有分位。亦非有時說無分位。由此準知
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『自識』（自我的認知）。如果不能以外在事物為緣由來說明『唯心』（一切唯心所造），那麼就不能避免增上『他有情』（其他有情眾生）的觀點。此外，如果認知不完備，就不能頓悟。有人反駁說：『即使你的種子現在存在，也是虛弱稀疏，需要依賴外緣。我的法體是真實存在的，也需要依賴真實的外緣。』如果這樣，那麼執著於二元對立的『生』（產生）就變得毫無意義。
論：如果所相（被觀察的對象）恒常存在，並且與『生』等（產生等現象）結合，那麼，請問這種破斥與之前的理論有什麼區別？答：之前的破斥是因為他們的宗派不離『無為』（不依賴因緣的永恒狀態）而另外設立『能相』（能觀察的主體），以此為例來破斥『有為』（依賴因緣的生滅現象），不讓他們另外設立。現在因為『有為』的本體恒常存在，所以說『生』等結合。以此為例，他們的『無為』本體也應該恒常存在，也應該與『生』等結合。所以這兩段文字有所區別。
有人引用《俱舍論》說：『如果所異之法（被區分的事物）與之前相同，那麼異義（區分的意義）就不能成立。如果不是之前所住的別法，那就不是一個法。』
論：這表明了後來的『無為相』（無為的相狀）有什麼缺失？《本疏》說：『即現在法在後來沒有時間，稱之為滅。假名為過去。過去體無，實際上不是那個時代。』西明的解釋是：『滅相是假立的，屬於行蘊所攝（五蘊之一，指心理活動）。假借現實而存在，實際上存在於過去。如果說是現在，就應該依賴於不同的時代。』這個意思是說，滅相，論中說是后一（後來的）是無，所以是過去。如果說是依賴於現在，那麼不同的時代相互依賴。有人自己解釋困難說：『如果依賴於過去，那麼就沒有所依賴。』回答說：『就像比量（一種推理方式）中，即使立法（被證明的對象）不存在，那個因（原因）依賴於不存在也可以成立。並非像有量（可以度量的對象）一樣，因必須有所依賴。滅相是無，依賴於無有什麼缺失？』有人認為應該以前面的《本疏》為正確，後面的說法雖然沒有不同的時代相互依賴，但是有不同的時代相互表述。而且已經滅亡的事物，就像龜毛等，不是有為法。』《要集》的觀點是以後面的說法為正確。五十二說：『依賴於生已壞滅的分位，建立無常。』又四十六說：『依賴於有分（存在的部分）建立一種有為的相，依賴於無分（不存在的部分）建立一種有為的相。』又此論說：『沒有時間稱為滅。』這裡所說的時間分位，不可能沒有時間而說有分位，也不是有時而說無分位。由此可以推知。
【English Translation】 English version 'Self-awareness'. If one cannot explain 'Mind-Only' (everything is created by the mind) based on external things, then one cannot avoid the view of increasing 'other sentient beings'. Furthermore, if the cognition is incomplete, one cannot have a sudden enlightenment. Someone retorted: 'Even if your seed exists now, it is weak and sparse, and needs to rely on external conditions. My Dharma body is real and also needs to rely on real external conditions.' If so, then clinging to the duality of 'birth' (arising) becomes meaningless.
Treatise: If the object of observation is constantly present and combined with 'birth' and so on, then, what is the difference between this refutation and the previous theory? Answer: The previous refutation was because their sect did not depart from 'unconditioned' (eternal state independent of conditions) and separately established 'observer', using this as an example to refute 'conditioned' (phenomena of arising and ceasing dependent on conditions), not allowing them to establish it separately. Now, because the essence of 'conditioned' is constantly present, it is said that 'birth' and so on are combined. Using this as an example, their 'unconditioned' essence should also be constantly present and should also be combined with 'birth' and so on. Therefore, these two passages are different.
Someone quoted the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya saying: 'If the differentiated Dharma (the thing being distinguished) is the same as before, then the meaning of differentiation cannot be established. If it is not a separate Dharma that dwells before, then it is not one Dharma.'
Treatise: What shortcomings does this indicate in the later 'unconditioned aspect'? The Original Commentary says: 'That is, the present Dharma has no time in the future, which is called cessation. It is nominally called the past. The past essence is non-existent and is not actually that era.' Ximing's explanation is: 'The aspect of cessation is nominally established and is included in the saṃskāra-skandha (one of the five aggregates, referring to mental activities). It exists by borrowing from reality and actually exists in the past. If it is said to be present, it should rely on different eras.' This means that the aspect of cessation, the treatise says that the later one is non-existent, so it is the past. If it is said to rely on the present, then different eras rely on each other. Someone explained the difficulty themselves, saying: 'If it relies on the past, then there is nothing to rely on.' The answer is: 'Just like in inference (a method of reasoning), even if the pakṣa (the object to be proven) does not exist, that hetu (reason) can be established by relying on non-existence. It is not like a measurable object, where the hetu must have something to rely on. The aspect of cessation is non-existent, what shortcomings are there in relying on non-existence?' Some people think that the previous Original Commentary should be correct, and although the later statement does not have different eras relying on each other, there are different eras expressing each other. Moreover, things that have already ceased, like tortoise hair, are not conditioned Dharmas.' The view of the Essentials Collection is that the later statement is correct. Fifty-two says: 'Relying on the division of birth, destruction, and cessation, establish impermanence.' Also, forty-six says: 'Relying on the existing part, establish one kind of conditioned aspect; relying on the non-existing part, establish one kind of conditioned aspect.' Also, this treatise says: 'No time is called cessation.' The time division mentioned here cannot be said to have a division without time, nor can it be said to have no division with time. From this, it can be inferred.
。已滅分位建立過去。更多雲云 今謂。本疏所說為正。何者且論立世。世依法立。雖云過．未。過．未無體。還依現法。觀待曾．當立過．未世。滅相在過去。過去既依現法假立。滅相理實依于現在。故佛地論第一說。有為法上假立分位。或是心上分位影像。此所說時通於三世。但于現在假立三故。
雜集第二云。時者謂于因果相續流轉假立為時 又第三云。依止現在假立去．來。故約當得假立未來。約曾得假立過去 又此論云。表此後無 又云滅表有法后是無。若不依現法觀曾有義。唯取法無已。立過去世及滅相者。既論云無時名滅。過去實無。滅相及世即俱是實。何得名假。又何得雲表此後無。應雲表前法已無故。復違雜集第三依止現在假立三世。彼約諸法因果曾當。通一切故 又顯揚第一云。心不相應不可施設與心等法若一若異。滅相既依過去無立。與現在法時體俱乖。云何不可施設為異。又若唯無。何故五十二云。問如世尊言有過去行。乃至云。此何密意。答過去諸行與果故有。未來諸行攝因故有。不爾過．未體既是無。如何可說與果攝因。故依現法與果攝因。假名過．未。又如何言于諸蘊中隨觀生滅。滅依過去。過去是無。無非蘊法。
問既依現法假立過去。云何得言無時名滅 又四十六云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：已滅的分位建立在過去。更多內容不贅述。現在說，本疏所說的才是正確的。為什麼呢？且說建立世界，世界依法而立。雖然說過去、未來，但過去、未來沒有實體，還是要依靠現在的法。觀待曾經、將有而建立過去、未來世。滅的相狀在過去，過去既然依靠現在的法假立，滅的相狀理應依于現在。所以《佛地論》第一說，在有為法上假立分位，或者是在心上的分位影像。這裡所說的時間貫通三世，但因為在現在假立三世的緣故。
《雜集論》第二說，時間是指在因果相續流轉中假立為時間。又第三說，依靠現在假立過去、未來。所以依據將要得到而假立未來，依據曾經得到而假立過去。又此論說，表示此後沒有。又說滅表示有法之後是無。如果不依靠現法觀察曾經有的意義，只取法已經沒有，來建立過去世和滅相，既然論中說沒有時間名為滅，過去實際沒有，滅相和世就都是真實的，怎麼能叫假立？又怎麼能說表示此後沒有？應該說表示之前的法已經沒有了。又違背了《雜集論》第三中依靠現在假立三世的說法，那裡是就諸法的因果曾經將有，貫通一切的緣故。
又《顯揚論》第一說，心不相應的法，不可設施與心等法若一若異。滅相既然依靠過去沒有而立，與現在的法在時間體性上都相違背，怎麼能不可設施為異？又如果只有沒有，為什麼第五十二說，問：如世尊所說有過去行（Samskrta, 指有為法，即由因緣和合而成的法），乃至說：這是什麼密意？答：過去的諸行與果的緣故而有，未來的諸行攝因的緣故而有。不然的話，過去、未來的體性既然是沒有，如何能說與果攝因？所以依靠現在的法與果攝因，假名過去、未來。又如何說在諸蘊（Skandha, 構成個體的五種要素，即色、受、想、行、識）中隨觀生滅？滅依靠過去，過去是沒有，沒有不是蘊法。
問：既然依靠現在的法假立過去，怎麼能說沒有時間名為滅？又第四十六說
【English Translation】 English version: The extinguished division is established in the past. More details are omitted. Now, it is said that what is stated in the original commentary is correct. Why? Let's discuss the establishment of the world; the world is established according to the law. Although it speaks of the past and future, the past and future have no substance; they still rely on the present dharma (法, Dharma). Depending on what was and what will be, the past and future ages are established. The characteristic of cessation is in the past. Since the past is provisionally established based on the present dharma, the characteristic of cessation should logically rely on the present. Therefore, the first chapter of the Buddhabhumi Sutra (佛地論) states that divisions are provisionally established on conditioned dharmas (有為法, Samskrta), or they are images of divisions on the mind. The time mentioned here encompasses the three times, but it is because the three times are provisionally established in the present.
The second chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論) states that time is provisionally established as time in the continuous flow of cause and effect. Furthermore, the third chapter states that the past and future are provisionally established based on the present. Therefore, the future is provisionally established based on what will be obtained, and the past is provisionally established based on what was obtained. Furthermore, this treatise states that it indicates there is nothing after this. It also states that cessation indicates that after a dharma exists, there is non-existence. If one does not rely on the present dharma to observe the meaning of what once existed, and only takes the dharma as already non-existent to establish the past age and the characteristic of cessation, since the treatise says that the absence of time is called cessation, and the past is actually non-existent, then the characteristic of cessation and the age are both real. How can they be called provisional? And how can it be said that it indicates there is nothing after this? It should be said that it indicates that the previous dharma is already non-existent. Furthermore, it contradicts the statement in the third chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya that the three times are provisionally established based on the present, where it refers to the cause and effect of all dharmas, encompassing everything.
Furthermore, the first chapter of the Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma (顯揚論) states that non-corresponding mental formations cannot be established as either the same as or different from mental formations. Since the characteristic of cessation is established based on the absence of the past, it contradicts the present dharma in terms of temporal essence. How can it be impossible to establish as different? Furthermore, if there is only non-existence, why does the fifty-second chapter say, 'Question: As the World Honored One (世尊, Śākyamuni Buddha) said, there are past actions (過去行, Samskrta, referring to conditioned dharmas, i.e., dharmas formed by the aggregation of causes and conditions),' and even say, 'What is the secret meaning of this?' Answer: Past actions exist because they are related to the result, and future actions exist because they include the cause. Otherwise, since the nature of the past and future is non-existence, how can it be said that they are related to the result and include the cause? Therefore, relying on the present dharma, they are related to the result and include the cause, provisionally named past and future. Furthermore, how can it be said that one observes arising and ceasing in the aggregates (蘊, Skandha, the five aggregates that constitute an individual, namely form, feeling, perception, mental formations, and consciousness)? Cessation relies on the past, and the past is non-existence; non-existence is not an aggregate dharma.
Question: Since the past is provisionally established based on the present dharma, how can it be said that the absence of time is called cessation? Furthermore, the forty-sixth chapter says
。過去行已生已滅。由彼諸行無因可得。亦無自性。又云。即此已生諸行剎那。自性滅壞正觀為滅。答即觀現法有酬前相。假說曾因名為過去。名為已生自性滅壞。非無現法獨說過去。故五十二云。若已與果種子相續名過去界 既稱種子相續名過去界。明種子體非是已滅 問現法未滅如何立滅。又諸現行可無滅相 答且據種子顯過去界。影彰于現。如未與果。種子相續名現在界。不唯種子獨名現在。如十八界通三世故。或但說種。以恒相續因名界增。或復現行亦得名種。能生果故。如第八會十因二因種子之言。故實種現皆有滅相。由觀現法有酬前用。假說曾滅故。說滅相在過去世。以法謝已。滅相方顯。據實于現由有當滅。亦名為滅。即如論文表此後無假立滅相猶如壞苦樂滅方有。然說樂受亦名壞苦。謂壞時苦故。現法亦爾。當必滅故說過去者。此時顯故。異他宗故約世分故。故五十二云。何故世尊但說三種。一生。二滅。三住異。答由一切行三世所顯故。從未來世本無而生。是故世尊由未來世。于有為法說生有為相。乃至由過去世。于有為法說滅有為相。現在世法二相所顯。謂住及異。既于現立住．異二相。明生未來。滅在過去。約世義分。據實假義得通三世。不爾四相不遍有為。現．未無滅應非無常。五十二云。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 過去的行為已經產生並且已經滅亡。由於這些行為沒有原因可以獲得，也沒有自性。又說，就是這些已經產生的行為的每一個剎那，觀察其自性滅壞，這才是真正的『滅』。回答說，這是觀察現在的法，有酬報之前的現象的作用，所以假借地說曾經的原因叫做『過去』，叫做『已生』和『自性滅壞』。並不是沒有現在的法而單獨說過去。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說：『如果已經給予果報的種子相續，就叫做過去界。』既然稱為種子相續叫做過去界，就說明種子的本體並不是已經滅亡的。 問：現在的法沒有滅亡，如何安立『滅』呢？又，各種現在的行為可能沒有滅亡的現象。 答：暫且根據種子來顯示過去界，影子顯現在現在。比如沒有給予果報，種子相續叫做現在界。不只是種子單獨叫做現在。比如十八界貫通三世。或者只是說種子，因為恒常相續的原因，所以叫做『界』增加。或者現在的行為也可以叫做『種子』，因為它能夠產生果報。比如《瑜伽師地論》第八會中說的十因和二因的種子。所以實際上種子和現在的行為都有滅亡的現象。因為觀察現在的法有酬報之前的現象的作用，所以假借地說曾經滅亡。所以說滅亡的現象在過去世，因為法已經消逝，滅亡的現象才顯現。實際上，就現在來說，因為有將要滅亡的，所以也叫做『滅』。就像論文中表明的，之後沒有了，假立滅亡的現象，就像壞苦和樂滅亡之後才有。然而說樂受也叫做壞苦，說的是壞的時候是苦。現在的法也是這樣，因為必定會滅亡，所以說過去，是因為這個時候顯現。不同於其他宗派，是按照世來劃分的。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說：『為什麼世尊只說三種相？一生，二滅，三住異。』回答說：『因為一切行為都是由三世所顯示的。』從未來世本來沒有而產生，所以世尊從未來世，對於有為法說生有為相。乃至從過去世，對於有為法說滅有為相。現在世的法由兩種相所顯示，就是住和異。既然在現在安立住和異兩種相，就說明生在未來，滅在過去。按照世的意義來劃分。實際上，假借的意義可以貫通三世。不然的話，四相就不能遍及有為法，現在和未來沒有滅，應該不是無常。《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說：
【English Translation】 English version Past actions have already arisen and ceased. Because these actions have no cause to be obtained, nor do they have self-nature (svabhava). Furthermore, it is said that the very moment these actions have arisen, observing their self-nature's destruction is the true 'cessation' (nirodha). The answer is that this is observing the present dharma (phenomena), which has the function of repaying previous phenomena. Therefore, it is figuratively said that the former cause is called 'past,' called 'already arisen,' and 'destruction of self-nature.' It is not that the past is spoken of alone without the present dharma. Therefore, the fifty-second fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'If the seed (bīja) that has already given its result continues, it is called the past realm (atīta-dhātu).' Since it is called the past realm because the seed continues, it shows that the substance of the seed is not already destroyed. Question: If the present dharma has not ceased, how is 'cessation' established? Also, various present actions may not have the appearance of cessation. Answer: For the time being, the past realm is shown based on the seed, and the shadow appears in the present. For example, if the result has not been given, the continuation of the seed is called the present realm (pratyutpanna-dhātu). It is not just the seed alone that is called the present. For example, the eighteen realms (aṣṭādaśa dhātavaḥ) pervade the three times (tryadhva). Or it may just be said that the seed, because of the constant continuation of the cause, is called the 'realm' increase. Or the present action can also be called a 'seed' because it can produce a result. For example, the seeds of the ten causes (daśa hetu) and two causes (dvi hetu) mentioned in the eighth assembly of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Therefore, in reality, both the seed and the present action have the appearance of cessation. Because observing the present dharma has the function of repaying previous phenomena, it is figuratively said that it has ceased. Therefore, it is said that the appearance of cessation is in the past, because the dharma has disappeared, and the appearance of cessation then appears. In reality, as for the present, because there is something that will cease, it is also called 'cessation.' Just as the treatise shows, there is no more after this, and the appearance of cessation is falsely established, just as there is after the destruction of painful suffering (duḥkha) and pleasure (sukha). However, it is also said that pleasurable feeling (vedanā) is also called destructive suffering, which means that it is suffering when it is destroyed. The present dharma is also like this, because it will surely cease, so it is said to be past, because it appears at this time. It is different from other schools, and it is divided according to the world (loka). Therefore, the fifty-second fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Why did the World-Honored One (Bhagavān) only speak of three characteristics? First, arising (utpāda); second, cessation; third, duration (sthiti) and change (anyathātva).' The answer is: 'Because all actions are manifested by the three times.' From the future time (anāgata-adhva) originally not existing and arising, therefore the World-Honored One, from the future time, speaks of the arising of conditioned phenomena (saṃskṛta dharma) for conditioned phenomena. And even from the past time, speaks of the cessation of conditioned phenomena for conditioned phenomena. The dharma of the present time is manifested by two characteristics, namely duration and change. Since duration and change are established in the present, it shows that arising is in the future and cessation is in the past. It is divided according to the meaning of the world. In reality, the figurative meaning can pervade the three times. Otherwise, the four characteristics (caturlakṣaṇa) would not pervade conditioned phenomena, and the present and future would not have cessation, and should not be impermanent (anitya). The fifty-second fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says:
複次無常差別亦有多種。謂壞滅無常．生起無常．變易無常．散壞無常．當有無常．現墮無常。若一切行生已尋滅名壞滅無常。本無今有名生起無常。異相行起名變易無常。離散退失名散壞無常。即四無常在未來時名當有無常。正現前時。名現墮無常 準此故知得通三世。以重釋前四相差別故 又釋唯現以無別過．未。依現立三故。雖實依現。義通三世。無不遍失。
然有為法因緣力故下。申正。準文五門分別。一說相意。二相相狀即亦辨名。三約世分。四釋妨難。五顯差別。科段如疏。今加出體。出體有二。初辨異宗者。婆沙三十八云。如譬喻者說。有為相是不相應。行蘊所攝。不相應行蘊無有實體。故有為相非實有體。然末經部不別說在不相應中。分別論者說。有為相皆是無為。若是有為性羸．劣故。則不應能生法住法異法滅法。以有為相體是無為性強盛故。便能生法乃至滅法。
法密部說。三相有為。滅相無為。若無常相體是有為。性羸劣故不能滅法。以是無為性強盛故。便能滅法 相似相續沙門所說。色法生住老無常體還是色。乃至識法亦爾。此意四相不異色等。隨五蘊體相即彼攝。非不相應 經部師說。五蘊出胎時名生。相續時名住。衰變時名異。命終時名滅。然婆沙說。顯彼唯是眾同分相非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 此外，無常的差別也有多種。包括壞滅無常、生起無常、變易無常、散壞無常、當有無常、現墮無常。如果一切行產生后隨即消滅，這稱為壞滅無常。原本沒有現在有了，這稱為生起無常。不同狀態的行產生，這稱為變易無常。離散退失，這稱為散壞無常。以上四種無常在未來時，稱為當有無常。正在顯現的當下，稱為現墮無常。依照這個準則可知，無常通於過去、現在、未來三世。這是爲了重新解釋前面四種相的差別。又解釋說只存在於現在，是因為沒有過去和未來的差別。依據現在而建立三種無常，所以雖然實際上是依據現在，但意義上貫通三世，沒有不普遍喪失的情況。
然而有為法是由於因緣的力量。下面申述正義。依照文義，從五個方面來分別：一是說明相的意義，二是相的相狀，也就是辨別名稱，三是按照世來劃分，四是解釋妨難，五是顯示差別。科段如同疏文。現在加上出體。出體有兩種。首先是辨別不同宗派的觀點。在《婆沙論》第三十八卷中說，譬喻者認為，有為相是不相應行蘊所攝。不相應行蘊沒有實體，所以有為相不是真實存在的。然而末派經部不特別說明它屬於不相應行中。分別論者認為，有為相都是無為。如果是有為，那麼它的性質就虛弱，不應該能夠產生法、住法、異法、滅法。因為有為相的本體是無為，性質強盛，所以能夠產生法乃至滅法。
法密部說，生、住、異三相是有為，滅相是無為。如果無常相的本體是有為，那麼它的性質就虛弱，不能夠滅法。因為它是無為，性質強盛，所以能夠滅法。相似相續的沙門所說，色法的生、住、老、無常的本體還是色。乃至識法也是這樣。這個意思是說，四相與色等五蘊沒有差別，隨著五蘊的本體，相就屬於五蘊所攝，而不是不相應行。經部師說，五蘊出胎時稱為生，相續時稱為住，衰變時稱為異，命終時稱為滅。然而《婆沙論》說，這只是顯示了眾同分的相，而不是真正的相。
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, the differences in impermanence are also manifold. They include cessation-impermanence, arising-impermanence, change-impermanence, disintegration-impermanence, future-impermanence, and present-falling-impermanence. If all formations arise and immediately cease, this is called cessation-impermanence. Originally non-existent, now existent, this is called arising-impermanence. The arising of formations in different states is called change-impermanence. Separation and loss are called disintegration-impermanence. The above four types of impermanence in the future are called future-impermanence. The very moment of manifestation is called present-falling-impermanence. According to this principle, it can be known that impermanence pervades the three times: past, present, and future. This is to re-explain the differences of the previous four characteristics. It is also explained that it exists only in the present because there is no difference between past and future. Establishing the three impermanences based on the present, although it is actually based on the present, its meaning pervades the three times, and there is no case of not universally losing.
However, conditioned dharmas (phenomena) are due to the power of causes and conditions. The following elaborates on the correct meaning. According to the text, it is distinguished from five aspects: first, to explain the meaning of the characteristics; second, the appearance of the characteristics, that is, to distinguish the names; third, to divide according to time; fourth, to explain the obstacles and difficulties; and fifth, to show the differences. The sections are like the commentary. Now add the substance. There are two types of substance. The first is to distinguish the views of different schools. In the 38th volume of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra it is said that the Sautrāntikas (those who follow the sutras) believe that the conditioned characteristics are included in the non-associated formations aggregate (viprayukta-saṃskāra-skandha). The non-associated formations aggregate has no substance, so the conditioned characteristics are not truly existent. However, the later Sautrāntikas do not specifically state that it belongs to the non-associated formations. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) argues that all conditioned characteristics are unconditioned. If it is conditioned, then its nature is weak and should not be able to produce arising (utpāda), abiding (sthiti), change (anyathātva), and cessation (nirodha) of dharmas. Because the substance of the conditioned characteristics is unconditioned, its nature is strong, so it can produce arising and even cessation of dharmas.
The Dharmaguptaka (a Buddhist school) says that arising, abiding, and change are conditioned, and cessation is unconditioned. If the substance of impermanence is conditioned, then its nature is weak and cannot extinguish dharmas. Because it is unconditioned, its nature is strong, so it can extinguish dharmas. What the Sāṃkhya (a school of Hindu philosophy) ascetics say is that the substance of arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of form (rūpa) is still form. And so on for consciousness (vijñāna). This means that the four characteristics are not different from the five aggregates (skandha), and along with the substance of the five aggregates, the characteristics belong to them, and are not non-associated formations. The Sautrāntika masters say that when the five aggregates emerge from the womb, it is called arising; when they continue, it is called abiding; when they decline, it is called change; and when life ends, it is called cessation. However, the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra says that this only shows the characteristics of the commonality of beings (nikāya-sabhāga), and not the true characteristics.
有為相此意即說唯依有情眾同分上立此四相。不遍有為。以經部師一剎那法不許立住。時中之極名剎那。由諸法剎那故。準俱舍論第五。經部亦立剎那四相。彼論說云。又一剎那諸有為法。離執實有物四相亦成。謂一一念本無今有名生。有已還無名滅。後後剎那嗣前前起名為住。即彼前後有差別故名住異。此意本無今有體起名生。有已還無無時名滅。能引後後剎那嗣前前起名住。即彼住相。或與前念。或與后念。有差別故名住異。約住辨異故云住異。雖是假立不離所相。俱舍第五云。此中何用生等別物。又如大士相不異大士。又如堅等地等界相非異地等。故雖假立不離所相。薩婆多說。異所相法別實有體。是不相應行蘊所攝。已辨小乘。大乘所說四相假有。與所相法不一不異。是不相應行蘊所攝。理皆極成故不引證。
二說意者。先辨小乘。婆沙三十九云。問何故作此論。答為欲分別契經義故。複次為止他宗顯正義故。複次標別有為名有為相。雖釋經中說三所以。亦說相意。相實有四。經中說三。釋此經意有多複次。亦說相意如疏略辨 次顯大乘者。準顯揚十八。為起屬主相應言論故說相等。故彼論云。屬主言論者。謂諸言論配屬於主。方解其相非不屬主。如說生相此誰之生。觀所屬主起此言論。所謂色之生。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『有為相』的意義是指，僅僅依據有情眾生的共同之處而建立這四種相（生、住、異、滅）。這並不普遍適用於所有有為法。因為經部師認為，一剎那的法不應設立『住』相。時間中的最小單位稱為『剎那』。由於一切法都是剎那生滅的，所以參照《俱舍論》第五卷，經部也設立剎那四相。《俱舍論》中說：『又一剎那的有為法，離開執著實有的事物，四相也能成立。』意思是說，每一念本來沒有，現在有了，這叫做『生』；有了之後又消失了，這叫做『滅』；後後的剎那繼承前前的剎那而生起，這叫做『住』；即此『住』相，由於前後有差別，所以叫做『住異』。』 這裡的意義是，本來沒有現在有了，本體生起，這叫做『生』；有了之後又消失了，沒有的時候叫做『滅』；能夠引導後後的剎那繼承前前的剎那而生起，這叫做『住』；即此『住』相，或者與前念，或者與后念，有差別，所以叫做『住異』。』 依據『住』來辨別『異』，所以叫做『住異』。雖然是假立的，但不離開所相。 《俱舍論》第五卷說：『這裡為什麼要用生等別的物體呢？』又如大士（菩薩）的相不異於大士（菩薩），又如堅硬等地（earth）的界相不異於地（earth）。所以雖然是假立的，但不離開所相。薩婆多（一切有部）說，異於所相的法是別有實體的，是不相應行蘊所攝。 以上辨析了小乘的觀點。大乘所說的四相是假有的，與所相的法不一不異，是不相應行蘊所攝。這些道理都非常明確，所以不再引用經文來證明。
第二種說法的意思是，先辨析小乘的觀點。《婆沙論》第三十九卷說：『問：為什麼要作這部論？答：爲了分別契經的意義。』『其次，爲了阻止其他宗派，彰顯正確的意義。』『其次，標明有為法，名為有為相。』雖然解釋經文時說了三個原因，也說了『相』的意義。『相』實際上有四種，經文中說了三種。解釋這部經的意義有很多種，也說了『相』的意義，如疏文中略微辨析的那樣。 其次闡明大乘的觀點，參照《顯揚論》第十八卷，爲了發起屬於主體的相應言論，所以說『相』等。所以該論中說：『屬於主體的言論是指，各種言論配合屬於主體，才能理解它的相，如果不屬於主體就不能理解。』例如說『生相』，這是誰的生？觀察所屬的主體，發起這樣的言論，所謂色（rupa）的生。
【English Translation】 English version: The meaning of 'conditioned characteristics' is that these four characteristics (birth, duration, decay, and extinction) are established solely based on the commonality of sentient beings. This does not universally apply to all conditioned phenomena, because the Sautrāntikas (Sūtra School) do not allow the establishment of 'duration' for a dharma (phenomenon) that lasts only for a kṣaṇa (instant). The smallest unit of time is called a 'kṣaṇa'. Because all dharmas are momentary, referring to the fifth volume of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya, the Sautrāntikas also establish the four characteristics of a kṣaṇa. The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya states: 'Furthermore, for a conditioned dharma in a single kṣaṇa, the four characteristics can be established without clinging to a real substance.' This means that each thought, originally non-existent, now exists, which is called 'birth'; having existed, it then disappears, which is called 'extinction'; subsequent kṣaṇas succeeding preceding kṣaṇas arise, which is called 'duration'; that is, this 'duration' has differences between before and after, so it is called 'change'. The meaning here is that originally non-existent, now existent, the entity arises, which is called 'birth'; having existed, it then disappears, the time of non-existence is called 'extinction'; able to lead subsequent kṣaṇas to succeed preceding kṣaṇas and arise, which is called 'duration'; that is, this 'duration' characteristic, either with the preceding thought or with the subsequent thought, has differences, so it is called 'change'. 'Differentiating 'change' based on 'duration', so it is called 'change'. Although it is provisionally established, it does not depart from the characterized. The fifth volume of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya says: 'Why use separate entities such as birth here?' Also, like the characteristic of a Bodhisattva (mahāsattva) is not different from the Bodhisattva (mahāsattva), and like the characteristic of the element of hardness of earth (prthivi) is not different from earth (prthivi). Therefore, although it is provisionally established, it does not depart from the characterized. The Sarvāstivādins (the 'All Exists' school) say that the dharma that is different from the characterized is a separate real entity, which is included in the non-associated formations aggregate (viprayukta-saṃskāra-skandha). The above analyzes the views of the Hīnayāna (Smaller Vehicle). The four characteristics spoken of in the Mahāyāna (Greater Vehicle) are provisionally existent, neither one nor different from the characterized dharma, and are included in the non-associated formations aggregate (viprayukta-saṃskāra-skandha). These principles are all extremely clear, so there is no need to cite scriptures to prove them.
The meaning of the second explanation is to first analyze the views of the Hīnayāna (Smaller Vehicle). The thirty-ninth volume of the Vibhāṣā (Mahāvibhāṣā) says: 'Question: Why was this treatise written? Answer: To distinguish the meaning of the sūtras.' 'Secondly, to stop other schools and manifest the correct meaning.' 'Thirdly, to mark conditioned dharmas, called conditioned characteristics.' Although three reasons were given when explaining the sūtras, the meaning of 'characteristics' was also explained. There are actually four types of 'characteristics', but the sūtras mention three. There are many ways to explain the meaning of this sūtra, and the meaning of 'characteristics' is also explained, as briefly analyzed in the commentary. Next, to clarify the views of the Mahāyāna (Greater Vehicle), referring to the eighteenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), 'characteristics' and so on are spoken of in order to initiate corresponding speech belonging to the subject. Therefore, that treatise says: 'Speech belonging to the subject refers to various speeches that are matched to the subject in order to understand its characteristics; if it does not belong to the subject, it cannot be understood.' For example, when speaking of 'the characteristic of birth', whose birth is this? Observe the subject to which it belongs and initiate such speech, such as the birth of form (rūpa).
受．想．行．識之生。非說色時此誰之色。觀所屬主起此言論。如生如是住異無常等心不相應行。類如其所應盡當知。是名屬主相應言論。瑜伽四十六有多複次。一令觀無常。二觀行是苦。三知法無我。四令證涅槃。廣如彼釋 雜集說觀生老住意亦同此。若此論文表異無為。假立四相者。意．亦同彼觀無常證涅槃等 相狀如文 約世分者。小乘如常。大乘多說。一說三相現在。一相過去。如此論文后一是無故在過去。此約二世。同瑜伽論五十二說。或約一世。論云生表有法先非有。滅表有法后是無。既表后無故在現在。不爾應云滅表有法生已無。若隨初解。應雲表生已后即體還無。非現立滅表已后無。二解任取。義意如前 又五十二約三世顯。論云由一切行三世所顯故。從未來世本無而生。是故世尊由未來世。于有為法說生有為相。彼既生已落謝過去。是故世尊由過去世。于有為法說滅有為相。現在世法二相所顯。謂住及異。所以者何。唯現在時有住可得。前後變異亦唯現在 準此論意。既于現在唯有住．異明生未來。滅居過去。此亦義說。道理無違。或復四相俱通三世。雖無全文說通三世。以約前後互相準例義則可通。約三世分。生在未來。剎那分別。生即在現。差別分別。亦通未來。五十二云。若依墮世界生說。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 受、想、行、識的生起，如果不是在說色（rupa，物質）的時候，那麼這是誰的色呢？觀察所屬的主體而產生這種言論。如同生一樣，住、異、無常等心不相應行（citta-viprayukta-samskara，與心不相應的行），都應當按照它們各自的類別來了解。這被稱為屬於主體的相應言論。《瑜伽師地論》第四十六卷中還有：第一，令觀無常（anitya，impermanence）；第二，觀行是苦（duhkha，suffering）；第三，知法無我（anatman，non-self）；第四，令證涅槃（nirvana，liberation）。詳細的解釋如同該論所述。《雜集論》說，觀察生、老、住的意義也與此相同。如果這篇論文表達了與無為法（asamskrta，unconditioned dharma）的差異，假立四相（caturlaksana，four characteristics）的話，那麼它的意義也與觀察無常、證涅槃等相同。相狀如同文中所述。如果從世俗諦（samvrti-satya，conventional truth）的角度來分，小乘（hinayana，lesser vehicle）的觀點如常。大乘（mahayana，greater vehicle）多說，一說三相（trilaksana，three characteristics）是現在的，一相是過去的。如此篇論文，最後一個是『無』，所以在過去。這是從二世（two times）的角度來說的，與《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷所說相同。或者從一世（one time）的角度來說，該論說，『生』表示有法（samskrta dharma，conditioned dharma）先前沒有。『滅』表示有法後來是『無』。既然表示後來的『無』，所以是在現在。否則應該說『滅』表示有法生起后就『無』了。如果按照最初的解釋，應該說表示生起之後，它的本體就立即消失了，而不是現在才設立『滅』來表示已經『無』了。兩種解釋任取，意義如前所述。另外，《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷從三世（three times）的角度來顯現。該論說：『由於一切行（sarva samskara，all conditioned phenomena）由三世所顯現，所以從未來世（anagata-adhvan，future time）本來沒有而生起。因此，世尊（bhagavan，the Blessed One）從未來世，對於有為法（samskrta dharma，conditioned dharma）說『生』是有為相（samskrta-laksana，conditioned characteristic）。它既然生起之後，就衰落謝去到過去（atita-adhvan，past time），因此，世尊從過去世，對於有為法說『滅』是有為相。現在世（pratyutpanna-adhvan，present time）的法由二相所顯現，即『住』和『異』。為什麼呢？只有現在時才有『住』可以得到，前後變異也只有現在才有。』根據此論的意義，既然在現在只有『住』和『異』，那麼『生』就表明未來，『滅』就位於過去。這也是義理上的說法，道理上沒有違背。或者四相都貫通三世。雖然沒有全文說貫通三世，但從前後互相參照的例子來看，義理上是可以貫通的。從三世的角度來分，『生』在未來，剎那（ksana，instant）分別，『生』就在現在，差別分別，也貫通未來。《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說：『如果依據墮落世界的生來說，』
【English Translation】 English version The arising of sensation (vedana), perception (samjna), volition (samskara), and consciousness (vijnana). If it is not when speaking of form (rupa), whose form is this? Observing the belonging subject, this kind of speech arises. Like arising, abiding, change, impermanence, and other mind-unrelated formations (citta-viprayukta-samskara), should all be known according to their respective categories. This is called speech corresponding to the belonging subject. In the forty-sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, there is also: first, to contemplate impermanence (anitya); second, to contemplate that existence is suffering (duhkha); third, to know that phenomena are without self (anatman); fourth, to realize nirvana (liberation). The detailed explanation is as described in that treatise. The Abhidharmasamuccaya says that observing the meaning of birth, aging, abiding is also the same as this. If this treatise expresses the difference from the unconditioned (asamskrta), falsely establishing the four characteristics (caturlaksana), then its meaning is also the same as contemplating impermanence, realizing nirvana, and so on. The characteristics are as described in the text. If dividing from the perspective of conventional truth (samvrti-satya), the view of the Hinayana (lesser vehicle) is as usual. The Mahayana (greater vehicle) mostly says that one view is that the three characteristics (trilaksana) are present, and one characteristic is past. As in this treatise, the last one is 'non-existence', so it is in the past. This is from the perspective of two times, the same as what is said in the fifty-second volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. Or from the perspective of one time, the treatise says, 'Birth' indicates that a conditioned dharma (samskrta dharma) was not there before. 'Cessation' indicates that a conditioned dharma is 'non-existent' later. Since it indicates later 'non-existence', it is in the present. Otherwise, it should be said that 'cessation' indicates that a conditioned dharma is 'non-existent' after arising. If according to the initial explanation, it should be said that it indicates that after arising, its substance immediately disappears, rather than now establishing 'cessation' to indicate that it is already 'non-existent'. Either of the two explanations can be chosen, the meaning is as described before. Also, the fifty-second volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra reveals it from the perspective of the three times. The treatise says: 'Because all conditioned phenomena (sarva samskara) are revealed by the three times, therefore they arise from the future time (anagata-adhvan) where they originally did not exist. Therefore, the Blessed One (bhagavan) speaks of 'birth' as a conditioned characteristic (samskrta-laksana) for conditioned dharmas (samskrta dharma) from the future time. Since it declines and fades into the past (atita-adhvan) after arising, therefore, the Blessed One speaks of 'cessation' as a conditioned characteristic for conditioned dharmas from the past time. The phenomena of the present time (pratyutpanna-adhvan) are revealed by two characteristics, namely 'abiding' and 'change'. Why? Only in the present time can 'abiding' be obtained, and changes before and after are also only in the present.' According to the meaning of this treatise, since there are only 'abiding' and 'change' in the present, then 'birth' indicates the future, and 'cessation' is located in the past. This is also a statement in terms of principle, and there is no contradiction in reason. Or all four characteristics pervade the three times. Although there is no full text saying that they pervade the three times, from the examples of mutual reference before and after, it can be pervaded in terms of principle. Dividing from the perspective of the three times, 'birth' is in the future, and in terms of momentary (ksana) distinction, 'birth' is in the present, and in terms of differential distinction, it also pervades the future. The fifty-second volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'If based on the arising of the fallen world, '
始從欲界。乃至無所有處生。名有上生。此意雖說現生之法。更有勝上。如有為法名為有上。義意亦顯未來更有上法當生名有上生 無常之中。五十二云。壞滅無常．生起無常．變易無常．散壞無常．當有無常．現墮無常。若一切行生已尋滅。名壞滅無常。若一切行本無今有。名生起無常。當有無常者。即四無常在未來世時。名當有無常。此文如次過去．現在．未來三世是三無常。住．異文中。以影略故論文不說。此論總明生等四相。通情．非情．剎那．相續。假立四相 釋難如論 外難過去體是無。於過去世立滅相。未來體亦無。于未來世亦立相。答過去體曾有。曾有立滅相。未來體本無。未來不立相 又難過去曾有。曾有立相。未來當有。當有立相。答滅相體是無。依已滅無立無相。生等體是有。未來體無不立相 又難表法后是無。依無立滅相表法后當有。未來立生相。答表法后是無。可得依無立無相表法后是有。不得依無立有相。更多妨難略不能舉 顯差別者。經部立二種。謂剎那．一期。有部亦爾。上座．化地部．正量部。如樞要明 就大乘辨。有多差別。一常無常差別。克性無常。相從是常。攝相歸性常。相用別論無常。故涅槃二十二云。善男子有為之法。生亦是常。以住無常生亦無常。住亦是常。以生生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 從欲界開始，乃至無所有處天（Akasanantyayatana）的眾生，稱為『有上生』。這個意思雖然說的是現世的法則，但還有更殊勝的。如有為法被稱為『有上』，其意義也顯示未來還有更殊勝的法將要產生，稱為『有上生』。 在『無常』之中，《五十二》中說：『壞滅無常、生起無常、變易無常、散壞無常、當有無常、現墮無常。』如果一切行產生后立刻消滅，稱為『壞滅無常』。如果一切行本來沒有現在有了，稱為『生起無常』。『當有無常』，就是指四種無常在未來世的時候，稱為『當有無常』。這段文字依次說明過去、現在、未來三世是三種無常。『住』、『異』的文字中，因為省略的緣故，論文沒有說。這個論總共闡明生等四相，貫通有情和非有情，剎那和相續，假立四相。 解釋疑問如論中所說：外人提問，過去的體性是無，在過去世設立滅相；未來的體性也是無，在未來世也設立相。回答說，過去的體性曾經存在過，曾經存在過所以設立滅相；未來的體性本來沒有，未來不設立相。 又有人提問，過去曾經存在過，曾經存在過所以設立相；未來將要存在，將要存在所以設立相。回答說，滅相的體性是無，依靠已經滅去的無設立無相；生等相的體性是有，未來體性是無，所以不設立相。 又有人提問，表法之後是無，依靠無設立滅相；表法之後將要存在，未來設立生相。回答說，表法之後是無，可以依靠無設立無相；表法之後是有，不可以依靠無設立有相。更多的妨難省略不能全部列舉。 顯示差別：經部設立兩種，即剎那和一期。有部也是這樣。上座部、化地部、正量部，如《樞要》所闡明。 就大乘佛法辨析，有很多差別。一是常與無常的差別。從克制（Klesha）的體性來說是無常，從相隨（Samudaya）來說是常。攝取相歸於體性是常，相和作用分別討論則是無常。所以《涅槃經》第二十二卷說：『善男子，有為法，生也是常，因為住是無常，生也是無常；住也是常，因為生生（生起）……』
【English Translation】 English version Beginning from the Desire Realm (Kama-dhatu), up to the beings in the Realm of Nothingness (Akasanantyayatana), is called 'Superior Birth' (有上生). Although this meaning speaks of the laws of the present life, there is something even more superior. If conditioned dharmas (有為法) are called 'Superior' (有上), it also shows that in the future there will be even more superior dharmas to be born, called 'Superior Birth'. Within 'Impermanence' (無常), the Fifty-Two states: 'Destruction-Impermanence (壞滅無常), Arising-Impermanence (生起無常), Change-Impermanence (變易無常), Dissipation-Impermanence (散壞無常), Future-Impermanence (當有無常), Present-Falling-Impermanence (現墮無常).' If all actions (行) immediately cease after arising, it is called 'Destruction-Impermanence'. If all actions originally did not exist but now do, it is called 'Arising-Impermanence'. 'Future-Impermanence' refers to the four types of impermanence in the future, called 'Future-Impermanence'. This passage sequentially explains that the past, present, and future are three types of impermanence. The texts on 'Duration' (住) and 'Difference' (異) are not mentioned in the treatise due to omission. This treatise generally clarifies the four characteristics of arising, etc., encompassing sentient and non-sentient beings, momentary and continuous, provisionally establishing the four characteristics. Explaining the difficulties is as stated in the treatise: An outsider asks, 'The substance of the past is non-existent, so why establish the characteristic of cessation in the past? The substance of the future is also non-existent, so why establish a characteristic in the future?' The answer is, 'The substance of the past once existed, so the characteristic of cessation is established because it once existed. The substance of the future originally did not exist, so no characteristic is established in the future.' Someone also asks, 'The past once existed, so a characteristic is established because it once existed. The future will exist, so a characteristic is established because it will exist.' The answer is, 'The substance of the characteristic of cessation is non-existent, so a non-characteristic is established based on the non-existence of what has ceased. The substance of the characteristics of arising, etc., exists, but the future substance is non-existent, so no characteristic is established.' Someone also asks, 'After the expression of the Dharma (表法), it is non-existent, so the characteristic of cessation is established based on non-existence. After the expression of the Dharma, it will exist, so the characteristic of arising is established in the future.' The answer is, 'After the expression of the Dharma, it is non-existent, so a non-characteristic can be established based on non-existence. After the expression of the Dharma, it exists, so an existent characteristic cannot be established based on non-existence.' More objections are omitted and cannot all be listed. Showing the differences: The Sautrantika school (經部) establishes two types, namely momentary (剎那) and a lifetime (一期). The Sarvastivada school (有部) is also like this. The Theravada (上座部), Dharmaguptaka (化地部), and Vatsiputriya (正量部) schools are as clarified in the Essentials (樞要). Discussing from the perspective of Mahayana Buddhism (大乘佛法), there are many differences. One is the difference between permanence and impermanence. From the nature of affliction (Klesha, 克制), it is impermanent; from the aspect of arising (Samudaya, 相隨), it is permanent. Taking the characteristics and returning to the nature is permanent, but discussing the characteristics and functions separately is impermanent. Therefore, the Nirvana Sutra (涅槃經), volume twenty-two, says: 'Good man, conditioned dharmas (有為法), arising is also permanent, because duration is impermanent, arising is also impermanent; duration is also permanent, because arising arises (生生)…'
故住亦無常。異亦是常。以住無常異亦無常。壞亦是常。以本無今有故壞亦無常 二遍計依他差別。若遍計性體若空花。不可說作有為之相。常無常亦爾。若依他性依緣有故。是無常相。故中論第一三相品云。如是三相為是有為能作有為相。為是無為能作有為相。二俱不然。何以故。若生是有為。即應有三相。若生是無為。何名有為相等 三體類差別。如五十二云。複次生差別。謂剎那生．相續生．增長生．心差別生．不可愛生．可愛生．下劣生．處中生．勝妙生．有上生．無上生。老差別者。謂身老．心老．壽老．變壞老．自體轉變老。住差別者。謂剎那住．相續住．緣相續住．不散亂住．建立軌範住。無常差別如次前列。又有剎那．一期．經劫．窮生死。如顯差別中釋。披文可知。此即時節差別 四五名同體差別。如緣生中生老死支。觸中生老死觸等 何以差別。答緣生支生。據從中有至本有中未衰變來五蘊實體名為生支。老據發白或復衰朽未死已前。死據臨終將死正死。俱通五蘊實法為體。以彼相名顯緣生支。假實．分位差別不同。一期四相位雖可同。假實有別。又一期滅據已滅名死。緣生支死將死正死。已滅非支故 觸中老死。五十四云。由時分變異不平等立老。由命根變異不平等故立死。此意老死是果。由
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，安住也是無常的。變異是常，因為安住是無常的，所以變異也是無常的。 壞滅也是常，因為原本沒有現在才有，所以壞滅也是無常的。二、遍計所執性（Parikalpita，虛妄分別的自性）、依他起性（Paratantra，依仗其他條件而生起的自性）的差別：如果遍計所執性的本體就像空中的花朵一樣，就不能說它是有為法的相狀，常與無常也是如此。如果依他起性是依仗因緣而生起的，那就是無常的相狀。所以《中論》第一三相品說：『像這樣生、住、滅三種相，是有為法能夠作為有為法的相狀呢？還是無為法能夠作為有為法的相狀呢？』兩者都不對。為什麼呢？如果生是有為法，就應該有三種相。如果生是無為法，那怎麼能稱為有為法的相狀呢？』三、體類差別：如《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷所說：『其次，生的差別，有剎那生、相續生、增長生、心差別生、不可愛生、可愛生、下劣生、處中生、勝妙生、有上生、無上生。老的差別，有身老、心老、壽老、變壞老、自體轉變老。住的差別，有剎那住、相續住、緣相續住、不散亂住、建立軌範住。無常的差別，如前面所列。又有剎那、一期、經劫、窮生死。』如《顯揚聖教論》的差別中解釋，查閱原文可知。這就是時節的差別。四、五名同體差別：如緣起支中的生、老、死支，觸中生老死觸等。為什麼有差別呢？回答：緣起支的生，是根據從中有（Antarabhava，中陰身）到本有（Upapadyamana，投生）中，還沒有衰變時的五蘊實體，稱為生支。老是根據頭髮變白或者衰老，但還沒有死亡之前。死是根據臨終將死和正在死亡的時候。都以五蘊實法為體。用那些相的名字來顯示緣起支。假立和真實、分位差別不同。一期中的四個相位雖然可以相同，但假立和真實是有區別的。又一期的滅是根據已經滅亡而稱為死。緣起支的死是將死和正在死亡。已經滅亡的不是支。觸中的老死，第五十四卷說：『由於時分變異不平等而立為老。由於命根變異不平等而立為死。』這個意思是老死是果，由於……
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, abiding is also impermanent. Change is permanent, because abiding is impermanent, so change is also impermanent. Decay is also permanent, because it originally did not exist but now it does, so decay is also impermanent. Second, the difference between Parikalpita (the nature of imaginary discrimination) and Paratantra (the nature of dependent origination): If the substance of Parikalpita is like a flower in the sky, it cannot be said to be the characteristic of conditioned phenomena, and so are permanence and impermanence. If Paratantra arises from conditions, then it is the characteristic of impermanence. Therefore, the first chapter of the Madhyamakakarika on the Three Characteristics says: 'Are these three characteristics, arising, abiding, and ceasing, conditioned phenomena that can act as the characteristics of conditioned phenomena? Or are they unconditioned phenomena that can act as the characteristics of conditioned phenomena?' Neither is correct. Why? If arising is a conditioned phenomenon, then it should have three characteristics. If arising is an unconditioned phenomenon, then how can it be called the characteristic of conditioned phenomena?' Third, the difference in categories: As stated in the fifty-second volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra: 'Furthermore, the differences in birth include momentary birth, continuous birth, increasing birth, birth due to mental differences, unlovable birth, lovable birth, inferior birth, middling birth, excellent birth, superior birth, and unsurpassed birth. The differences in aging include aging of the body, aging of the mind, aging of lifespan, aging of decay, and aging of self-transformation. The differences in abiding include momentary abiding, continuous abiding, abiding due to continuous conditions, abiding without distraction, and abiding that establishes norms. The differences in impermanence are as listed previously. There are also moment, lifetime, kalpa, and exhaustion of birth and death.' As explained in the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations, it can be found by consulting the original text. This is the difference in time. Fourth, the difference between five names with the same substance: such as the birth, aging, and death branches in the twelve links of dependent origination, and the birth, aging, and death touch in contact, etc. Why are there differences? Answer: The birth branch of dependent origination, according to the five aggregates' substance from the intermediate existence (Antarabhava) to the coming-to-be (Upapadyamana) without decay, is called the birth branch. Aging is according to the hair turning white or decaying, but before death. Death is according to the time of impending death and the moment of death. All take the five aggregates' real dharma as their substance. Use those characteristic names to show the dependent origination branch. The difference between the provisional and the real, and the difference in divisions. Although the four phases in a lifetime can be the same, there is a difference between the provisional and the real. Also, the cessation of a lifetime is called death according to what has already ceased. The death of the dependent origination branch is impending death and the moment of death. What has already ceased is not a branch. The aging and death in contact, the fifty-fourth volume says: 'Aging is established due to the unequal change in time. Death is established due to the unequal change in the life force.' This means that aging and death are the result, due to...
依觸分位有彼老死故。因立果名。如飢渴觸體即四大分位假立。唯在色蘊。四相老死通依五蘊。取上別義。四嗢拖南中。通說五蘊體及四相。俱名無常。無彼常故。四十六云。如是諸行常不可得。故名無常。與雜集同。經中亦云。諸行無常。是生滅故。因明論中所立無常。即唯取滅。然通體相。數論相滅。對聲論等即立體滅。若通生滅名無常者。即宗．因無別過類所攝 六體同名差別。或名生住異滅。或名生老住無常。或名生住住異無常。或名起盡等 七遍不遍差別。一期四相約有情辨。剎那四相遍有為法。八十八云。如是三相依二種行流轉安立。一依生身。二依剎那。依初流轉者。謂于彼彼有情眾同分中。初生名生。終歿名滅等。
破名句文中雲。若名句文異聲實有。此破外計 要集假敘外人反難云。假不相應名等。應非能詮。以是假故 或云許異聲處不相應假法處攝故。如余假法 西明釋云。汝名句等實體不成。義如前破。若不許聲是能詮者。便有量中闕至教量失。此不成釋。前未破故。又復大乘諸師計別。陳那不立至教量故。他許實故。要集云。外人作比量相違。然彼量有宗相符失故 今謂不爾。量中雲非實能詮可相符失。但云非能詮何名相符 今云彼量是因中相違決定失。以假實因及異聲處法處所攝各
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為依賴於觸的分位而有老死，所以根據原因而建立結果的名稱。例如飢渴的觸覺，其本體就是四大分位的假立，僅僅存在於色蘊之中。四相（生、老、病、死）中的老死普遍依賴於五蘊。這裡取的是特別的意義。在四嗢拖南（綱要）中，普遍地說明了五蘊的本體以及四相，都叫做無常，因為沒有常的緣故。《瑜伽師地論》第四十六卷說：『像這樣的諸行，常是不可得的，所以叫做無常。』這與《雜集論》相同。經中也說：『諸行無常，是生滅的緣故。』因明論中所建立的無常，僅僅取滅。然而，普遍地包括本體和相。數論所說的相滅，是針對聲論等而建立的體滅。如果將生滅都叫做無常，那麼就屬於宗（命題）、因（理由）沒有區別的過失。《六體同名差別》：或者叫做生、住、異、滅，或者叫做生、老、住、無常，或者叫做生、住、住異、無常，或者叫做起盡等。《七遍不遍差別》：一期四相是就有情來辨別的，剎那四相普遍存在於有為法中。《瑜伽師地論》第八十八卷說：『像這樣的三相（生、住、滅），依賴於兩種行而流轉安立，一是依賴於生身，二是依賴於剎那。依賴於最初的流轉，是指在彼彼有情眾同分中，最初的出生叫做生，最終的死亡叫做滅等。』
在《破名句文》中說：『如果名、句、文與聲音不同，並且是實在的，』這是爲了破斥外道的計執。《要集》中假設地敘述外人的反駁和責難說：『假的不相應于名等，應該不是能詮（表達意義）的，因為是假的緣故。』或者說：『允許在異聲處不相應的假法處所攝，例如其餘的假法。』西明的解釋說：『你的名、句等實體不能成立，意義如同前面所破斥的。』如果不允許聲音是能詮的，那麼在量（ प्रमाण ）中就會缺少至教量（ āgamapramāṇa ），導致至教量失效。這個解釋不能成立，因為前面沒有破斥過。而且大乘的諸位論師有不同的計執，陳那（ Dignāga ）不建立至教量。因為他們允許是實在的。《要集》中說：外人作比量是相違的，然而那個量有宗相符的過失。現在認為不是這樣。量中說非實在的能詮可以有相符的過失，但只說非能詮，怎麼能說相符呢？現在說那個量是因中相違決定的過失，因為假實因以及異聲處法處所攝各自不同。
【English Translation】 English version: Because old age and death exist dependent on the division of contact, the name of the result is established based on the cause. For example, the feeling of hunger and thirst, its substance is the provisional establishment of the four great elements, existing only within the form aggregate (rūpa-skandha). Old age and death among the four characteristics (birth, aging, sickness, and death) universally rely on the five aggregates (pañca-skandha). Here, a specific meaning is taken. In the four Uddānas (summaries), the substance of the five aggregates and the four characteristics are universally explained, all called impermanent (anitya), because there is no permanence. The forty-sixth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Such conditioned phenomena are always unattainable, therefore they are called impermanent.' This is the same as the Abhidharma-samuccaya. The sutras also say: 'Conditioned phenomena are impermanent, because they are subject to arising and ceasing.' The impermanence established in the Hetu-vidyā (science of reasoning) only takes cessation. However, it universally includes substance and characteristics. The cessation of characteristics mentioned in the Sāṃkhya school is the establishment of the cessation of substance in response to the Śabda school and others. If both arising and ceasing are called impermanent, then it belongs to the fault of no distinction between the thesis (pakṣa) and the reason (hetu). The Difference in Six Bodies with the Same Name: They are either called birth, abiding, change, and cessation; or birth, aging, abiding, and impermanence; or birth, abiding, abiding-change, and impermanence; or arising and extinction, etc. The Difference in Seven Pervasions and Non-Pervasions: The four characteristics of a lifetime are distinguished in relation to sentient beings; the four characteristics of a moment pervade conditioned phenomena. The eighty-eighth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Such three characteristics (birth, duration, and decay) are established and flow dependent on two kinds of activities: one dependent on the body at birth, and the other dependent on a moment. Dependent on the initial flow, it refers to the initial birth called birth, and the final death called death, etc., within the commonality of sentient beings.'
In Refuting Name, Sentence, and Word, it says: 'If name, sentence, and word are different from sound and are real,' this is to refute the views of externalists. In the Yaoji, the externalists' refutation and criticism are hypothetically narrated: 'False things are not corresponding to names, etc., and should not be expressive of meaning, because they are false.' Or it says: 'It is allowed that false things that do not correspond in different sounds are included in the realm of dharmas, like other false things.' Ximing's explanation says: 'Your name, sentence, etc., cannot establish substance, and the meaning is as refuted before.' If it is not allowed that sound is expressive of meaning, then the āgamapramāṇa (scriptural testimony) will be missing in the pramāṇa (means of valid cognition), leading to the failure of the āgamapramāṇa. This explanation cannot be established, because it has not been refuted before. Moreover, the various masters of Mahāyāna have different views, and Dignāga does not establish the āgamapramāṇa. Because they allow it to be real. The Yaoji says: The externalists' inference is contradictory, but that inference has the fault of the thesis being consistent. Now it is considered not like this. The pramāṇa says that non-real expressive things can have the fault of being consistent, but only saying non-expressive, how can it be said to be consistent? Now it is said that that pramāṇa is the fault of contradictory determination in the reason, because the false and real reasons and the realms of dharmas included in different sounds are each different.
自許故。大乘無過。外人若云假名句文非假能詮。為相違者。此亦非過。何以故。大乘量破彼云。汝名．句．文定不能詮。以異聲故。如色等。今與大乘作量。云假名．句．文非假能詮。于因明相違中是何相違。望大乘量總非是過。又大乘名等不異聲故。以假從實即聲能詮。外難不詮。違世間故。故下文云語不異能詮人天共了。
論。謂聲能生等者。破他可知 問大乘自許假名等詮。言何用名等豈不自違。答外許名等定異於聲。由聲生顯。此聲必有音韻屈曲不爾不生。大乘能詮雖在名等依屈曲聲。非定一異。對破定異。攝假從實云聲能詮。何用名等。故無有過。
論。若謂聲上等者。牒破可知。然本疏量云。聲之屈曲應非離所依別有實體法處所收。色蘊上屈曲故。或色．聲二色之上隨一屈曲故。如色處長等 要集云此量有法差別。法差別量云。聲之屈曲應非離聲處假法處攝。因．喻同前 此亦不爾。誰許聲體在法處收。以許名等在法處故。名等依聲不即聲故。今對破他計屈曲聲即是名等。異聲別有法處所攝。故舉長等以為量破。然西明云。汝色上長．短應異色處別有法處自性。有屈曲故。如聲上屈曲 此量亦過。應云汝色上長短等。應異色處法處所攝。色上屈曲故。如聲上屈曲 今言長短應異色處。別有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 自許的緣故。大乘沒有過失。外道如果說假名（Jiaming，概念名稱）、句（Ju，句子）、文（Wen，文字）不是假法，不能詮釋意義，認為這是相違背的說法。這也不是過失。為什麼呢？大乘的論證可以駁斥他們說：『你們的名、句、文一定不能詮釋意義，因為它們是不同的聲音，就像顏色等。』現在用大乘的論證來衡量，說『假名、句、文不是假法，不能詮釋意義』，在因明（Yinming，因明學）的相違中屬於哪種相違呢？相對於大乘的論證來說，總的來說都不是過失。而且大乘的名等不異於聲音，因為假法依附於實法，所以聲音能夠詮釋意義。外道的責難說不能詮釋意義，是違背世間常識的。所以下文說，語言不異於能詮釋意義，是人和天人都共同瞭解的。
論：『所謂聲音能夠產生等』，是爲了駁斥他人可知的主張。問：大乘自己承認假名等能夠詮釋意義，說什麼名等有什麼用呢？難道不是自相矛盾嗎？答：外道認為名等一定異於聲音，由聲音產生顯現。這種聲音一定有音韻屈曲，否則就不能產生顯現。大乘認為能詮釋意義雖然在於名等，但依附於屈曲的聲音，並非一定是一或異。針對駁斥他們認為名等一定異於聲音的觀點，從假法歸於實法的角度來說，聲音能夠詮釋意義，說什麼名等有什麼用呢？所以沒有過失。
論：『如果說聲音之上等』，這是爲了記錄並駁斥他人可知的主張。然而本疏的論證說：『聲音的屈曲不應該離開所依，另外有實體法處所收攝，因為它是色蘊（Se Yun，色蘊）上的屈曲。』或者說，『它是顏色、聲音兩種顏色之上的任一種屈曲，就像色處（Se Chu，色處）的長等。』要集說，這個論證有法差別。法差別論證說：『聲音的屈曲不應該離開聲處（Sheng Chu，聲處），被假法處所收攝。』原因和比喻與前面相同。這也不對。誰承認聲音的本體被法處（Fa Chu，法處）所收攝呢？因為承認名等被法處所收攝。名等依附於聲音，但不等同於聲音。現在針對駁斥他人認為屈曲的聲音就是名等，異於聲音，另外有法處所收攝的觀點，所以舉長等作為論證來駁斥。然而西明說：『你的顏色上的長、短應該異於色處，另外有法處的自性，因為有屈曲。就像聲音上的屈曲。』這個論證也有過失。應該說：『你的顏色上的長短等，應該異於色處，被法處所收攝，因為顏色上有屈曲。就像聲音上的屈曲。』現在說長短應該異於色處，另外有
【English Translation】 English version It is due to self-admission. The Mahayana (Da Cheng, Great Vehicle) has no fault. If the outsiders say that nominal designations (Jiaming, conceptual names), sentences (Ju, sentences), and words (Wen, words) are not unreal and cannot express meaning, considering this a contradiction, this is also not a fault. Why? The Mahayana's argument can refute them by saying: 'Your names, sentences, and words certainly cannot express meaning because they are different sounds, like colors, etc.' Now, using the Mahayana's argument to measure, saying 'nominal designations, sentences, and words are not unreal and cannot express meaning,' what kind of contradiction is this in the Hetu-vidya (Yinming, logic)? Relative to the Mahayana's argument, it is not a fault at all. Moreover, the Mahayana's names, etc., are not different from sounds because the unreal depends on the real, so sound can express meaning. The outsiders' criticism that it cannot express meaning contradicts worldly knowledge. Therefore, the following text says that language is not different from what can express meaning, which is understood by both humans and gods.
Treatise: 'The so-called sound can produce, etc.,' is to refute others' knowable claims. Question: The Mahayana itself admits that nominal designations, etc., can express meaning, so what is the use of saying names, etc.? Isn't this self-contradictory? Answer: Outsiders believe that names, etc., are definitely different from sounds, produced and manifested by sounds. This sound must have tonal inflections; otherwise, it cannot produce manifestation. The Mahayana believes that what can express meaning lies in names, etc., but depends on inflected sounds, and is not necessarily the same or different. In response to refuting their view that names, etc., are definitely different from sounds, from the perspective of returning the unreal to the real, sound can express meaning, so what is the use of saying names, etc.? Therefore, there is no fault.
Treatise: 'If it is said that above sound, etc.,' this is to record and refute others' knowable claims. However, the commentary's argument says: 'The inflection of sound should not be separate from what it depends on, and should not be collected by a separate entity Dharma-sphere (Fa Chu, Dharma-sphere), because it is an inflection on the Skandha of Form (Se Yun, Skandha of Form).' Or, 'It is any inflection on the two forms of color and sound, like length, etc., in the sphere of form (Se Chu, sphere of form).' Yaoji says that this argument has a difference in Dharma. The Dharma difference argument says: 'The inflection of sound should not be separate from the sphere of sound (Sheng Chu, sphere of sound) and should be collected by the unreal Dharma-sphere.' The reason and metaphor are the same as before. This is also incorrect. Who admits that the substance of sound is collected by the Dharma-sphere? Because it is admitted that names, etc., are collected by the Dharma-sphere. Names, etc., depend on sound but are not the same as sound. Now, in response to refuting others' view that inflected sound is the same as names, etc., different from sound, and collected by a separate Dharma-sphere, length, etc., are cited as an argument for refutation. However, Ximing says: 'Your length and shortness on color should be different from the sphere of form and have the nature of a separate Dharma-sphere because there is inflection. Like the inflection on sound.' This argument also has a fault. It should be said: 'Your length, shortness, etc., on color should be different from the sphere of form and be collected by the Dharma-sphere because there is inflection on color. Like the inflection on sound.' Now it is said that length and shortness should be different from the sphere of form, and there is
法處自性。即長．短上生等諸法。法處所攝。即是長等異於色處。有此生等法處自性此言過失也 又量云。聲上屈曲。應無別體法處自性。以即屈曲故。如色上屈曲 此量言過同前應知。若即準言復有法自相相違過也 問若云聲上屈曲能顯義故。有教性。故。意識所得故。法處收假立名等。他云我宗亦爾。大乘通云。不唯依聲假立名等。通依多法故法處攝。長等不然者。問此據緣假為緣實者。若據五識唯緣實宗。長等意得。應法處收。若云雖唯意得。依眼明取故非法處。屈曲之聲明取亦爾。應在聲處。若據緣假。屈曲之聲亦耳識得。應聲處攝。又應耳識亦緣名等。即屈曲故 今正解者云。大乘師聲上屈曲。雖體非實。仍法處收說為名等者。據攝假從實。非即正取屈曲聲體以為名等。取屈曲上有能詮用說為名等。如無心定等。但取種上能防心用非即種體。相等亦爾。故法處攝。長．短之色無能詮用如屈曲聲。自體性邊俱自處攝。非大許彼屈曲聲體在不相應。彼非色．心。此是色故。設五緣假。耳識但取屈曲聲體不取詮用。故攝處別。疏中但以屈曲之聲。長．短等相例者。且隨他宗為不正釋。及攝假從實云聲能詮。非是克體性用別門。取聲體為名．句．文等。故下正解。然依語聲分位差別。而假建立名．句．文身。更多有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『法處自性』，指的是長、短等生滅諸法。如果說『法處』所包含的，就是長、短等不同於『色處』的事物，並且具有這些生滅等『法處自性』，那麼這種說法就是錯誤的。此外，如果用量式論證說：『聲音上的屈曲，應該沒有獨立的法處自性，因為它就是屈曲本身，就像顏色上的屈曲一樣。』這種量式的說法也和前面的錯誤一樣。如果按照這種準則來說，還會犯自相矛盾的過失。 有人問：『如果說聲音上的屈曲能夠顯現意義，所以具有表述性，所以是意識所獲得的，所以被法處所收攝，是假立的名等。』對方回答說：『我的宗派也是這樣。』大乘普遍認為，不僅僅是依靠聲音假立名等，也普遍依靠多種法，所以被法處所收攝。長、短等不是這樣。有人問：『這是根據緣假還是緣實來說的？』如果根據五識只緣實的宗派，長、短等可以被意識所獲得，應該被法處所收攝。如果說：『雖然只是意識獲得，但依靠眼識來辨別，所以不是法處。』那麼，屈曲的聲音也是通過聽覺來辨別的，也應該在聲處。如果根據緣假，屈曲的聲音也是耳識所獲得的，應該被聲處所收攝。而且，耳識也應該緣名等，因為它就是屈曲本身。 現在正確的解釋是：大乘的觀點認為，聲音上的屈曲，雖然本體不是真實的，但仍然被法處所收攝，被說為名等，這是根據攝假從實的原則。並不是直接取屈曲的聲音本體作為名等，而是取屈曲上所具有的能詮釋作用，說為名等。例如無心定等，只是取種子上的能夠防止心識活動的作用，而不是直接取種子本體。相等也是這樣，所以被法處所收攝。長、短等顏色沒有能詮釋的作用，就像屈曲的聲音一樣，自體和性質都各自被各自的處所收攝。大乘不認為屈曲的聲音本體存在於不相應行法中，因為它不是色法和心法，而長短等是色法。即使是五緣假，耳識也只是取屈曲的聲音本體，不取詮釋作用，所以收攝的處所不同。疏中只是用屈曲的聲音、長、短等相來類比，這只是隨順他宗的不正確的解釋。以及攝假從實的觀點認為聲音能夠詮釋，而不是嚴格地從體性作用的角度來區分，取聲音本體作為名、句、文等。所以下面的正確解釋是：然而，依靠語聲的分位差別，而假立名、句、文身，還有更多。
【English Translation】 English version: 'The self-nature of Dharmadhatu' refers to all phenomena such as long, short, arising, and ceasing. If it is said that what is contained in 'Dharmadhatu' is different from 'Rupadhatu' (form realm), such as long and short, and possesses these 'Dharmadhatu self-natures' like arising and ceasing, then this statement is incorrect. Furthermore, if one argues using a logical statement: 'The curvature on sound should not have an independent Dharmadhatu self-nature because it is the curvature itself, just like the curvature on color.' This logical statement has the same error as before. If one follows this principle, one would also commit the fault of self-contradiction. Someone asks: 'If it is said that the curvature on sound can manifest meaning, therefore it has expressiveness, therefore it is obtained by consciousness, therefore it is included in Dharmadhatu, and is a provisionally established name, etc.' The other party replies: 'My school also holds this view.' Mahayana universally believes that it is not only relying on sound to provisionally establish names, etc., but also universally relying on multiple dharmas, so it is included in Dharmadhatu. Long, short, etc., are not like this. Someone asks: 'Is this based on provisional or real conditions?' If based on the school that the five consciousnesses only perceive reality, long, short, etc., can be obtained by consciousness and should be included in Dharmadhatu. If it is said: 'Although it is only obtained by consciousness, it relies on eye consciousness to distinguish, so it is not Dharmadhatu.' Then, the curvature of sound is also distinguished through hearing, and should also be in the sound realm (Shabdadhatu). If based on provisional conditions, the curvature of sound is also obtained by ear consciousness, and should be included in the sound realm. Moreover, ear consciousness should also perceive names, etc., because it is the curvature itself. Now, the correct explanation is: The Mahayana view is that although the essence of the curvature on sound is not real, it is still included in Dharmadhatu and is said to be names, etc. This is based on the principle of including the provisional from the real. It is not directly taking the essence of the curved sound as names, etc., but taking the expressive function that the curvature possesses and calling it names, etc. For example, in the state of no-mind samadhi, one only takes the function of preventing mental activity on the seed, not directly taking the seed essence. The same applies to characteristics, so it is included in Dharmadhatu. Colors like long and short do not have the expressive function like the curved sound. Their essence and nature are each included in their respective realms. Mahayana does not consider the essence of the curved sound to exist in non-associated formations because it is not form or mind, while long and short are forms. Even if it is five provisional conditions, ear consciousness only takes the essence of the curved sound, not the expressive function, so the realms of inclusion are different. The commentary only uses the curved sound, long, short, etc., as analogies, which is only following the incorrect explanation of other schools. And the view of including the provisional from the real considers that sound can express, rather than strictly distinguishing from the perspective of essence and function, taking the sound essence as names, sentences, and syllables, etc. Therefore, the correct explanation below is: However, relying on the differences in the divisions of speech sounds, names, sentences, and syllable bodies are provisionally established, and there is much more.
問答及以異釋。恐煩不述。
論。若謂聲上等者。外救量云。聲上音韻屈曲。不能詮。聲屈曲故。如絃管聲 聲上音韻屈曲是有法。不能詮是法 樞要云。論主為作有法差別相違。內聲屈曲能生名等。不生名等。是差別故。故論云。此應如彼聲不別生名等。先舉同喻后舉宗法。故作量云。汝內聲屈曲。不能生名等。聲屈曲故。如絃管聲 此就他宗。彼絃管聲不生名等故。以內聲如彼絃管聲 有解作法差別相違因。破云。內聲屈曲不能別生實名等。即聲屈曲故。如絃管聲 此說不爾。準外量文。屈曲是有法非法。何名法差別 要集云。此破末計屈曲有二。法差別相違因者。別生名等非詮。不別生名等非詮。故法差別 此亦不爾。他宗說聲不是能詮。名等能詮。別生名等不生名等。在聲不在非詮。何得言別生名等非詮。不別生名等非詮故。若以非詮為法差別。論應云此如彼能詮。不別生名等。何故云如彼聲 西明云。雜心許有因俱聲如絃管等。俱舍論破。正理論救云。誰言一極微二大所造。但約助緣說因俱聲。此中正破雜心所說 不詳此說。雜心因俱即絃管等。似有能詮非實能詮。正理亦同。何故但言偏破雜心。不云兼破正理何也。疏云我亦不說弦上屈曲非不能詮。但如汝化人身．語二業非善惡性。今我因俱故者。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問答以及其他的解釋，恐怕過於繁瑣，在此不贅述。
論：如果認為聲音具有『上』等屬性，外道可以提出以下論證：聲音的音韻是彎曲的，因此不能表達意義。因為聲音是彎曲的，就像絃樂器發出的聲音一樣。聲音的音韻彎曲是『有法』（paksha，論題的載體），不能表達意義是『是法』（dharma，論題的屬性）。
《樞要》中說：論主製造了『有法』的差別相違，即內在的聲音彎曲，既能產生名稱等，也能不產生名稱等，這就是差別的原因。所以論中說：『這應該像那些聲音一樣，不能分別產生名稱等。』先舉出相同的比喻，后舉出宗法（pakshadharma，論題的屬性存在於論題的載體中），所以可以這樣論證：你內在的聲音彎曲，不能產生名稱等，因為聲音是彎曲的，就像絃樂器發出的聲音一樣。這是就對方的宗派而言的，因為絃樂器發出的聲音不能產生名稱等，所以內在的聲音就像那些絃樂器發出的聲音一樣。
有一種解釋認為這是『法』（dharma）的差別相違因，反駁說：內在的聲音彎曲，不能分別產生真實名稱等，因為聲音是彎曲的，就像絃樂器發出的聲音一樣。這種說法不對。按照外道的論證，彎曲是『有法』還是『非法』？什麼叫做『法』的差別？
《要集》中說：這是爲了破斥末派計度的彎曲具有兩種『法』的差別相違因，即分別產生名稱等不是表達意義，不分別產生名稱等也不是表達意義，所以是『法』的差別。這種說法也不對。對方宗派認為聲音不是能表達意義的，名稱等才能表達意義。分別產生名稱等和不產生名稱等，是在聲音上，而不是在非表達意義上，怎麼能說分別產生名稱等不是表達意義，不分別產生名稱等也不是表達意義呢？如果以非表達意義作為『法』的差別，論證應該說『這像那些能表達意義一樣，不能分別產生名稱等』，為什麼說『像那些聲音一樣』？
西明說：《雜心論》允許有因俱的聲音，如絃樂器等。《俱舍論》破斥了這種說法，《正理論》辯護說：『誰說一個極微是由兩個大種所造？只是就助緣來說因俱的聲音。』這裡主要是破斥《雜心論》所說的。
這種說法不詳細。《雜心論》的因俱就是絃樂器等，似乎具有表達意義的能力，但實際上不能表達意義。《正理論》也是同樣的觀點，為什麼只說偏袒地破斥《雜心論》，而不說兼帶破斥《正理論》呢？疏中說：『我也不是說弦上的彎曲不能表達意義，只是像你化人身、語二業不是善惡的性質一樣，現在我因為是因俱的緣故。』
【English Translation】 English version: Questions and answers, along with other explanations, are feared to be too verbose and will not be elaborated upon here.
Treatise: If it is argued that sound possesses attributes such as 'above,' externalists may present the following argument: The intonation of sound is curved, therefore it cannot convey meaning. Because sound is curved, like the sound produced by stringed instruments. The curved intonation of sound is the 'paksha' (subject of the argument), and the inability to convey meaning is the 'dharma' (property of the argument).
The Essentials states: The proponent creates a contradictory difference in the 'paksha,' namely that the inner sound is curved, both producing names, etc., and not producing names, etc., which is the reason for the difference. Therefore, the treatise states: 'This should be like those sounds, unable to separately produce names, etc.' First, a similar analogy is given, then the pakshadharma (the property of the argument existing in the subject of the argument) is given, so it can be argued: Your inner sound is curved, unable to produce names, etc., because sound is curved, like the sound produced by stringed instruments. This is in terms of the opponent's school, because the sound produced by stringed instruments cannot produce names, etc., so the inner sound is like those sounds produced by stringed instruments.
One interpretation considers this a contradictory cause of difference in 'dharma,' refuting it by saying: The inner sound is curved, unable to separately produce real names, etc., because sound is curved, like the sound produced by stringed instruments. This statement is incorrect. According to the externalist's argument, is curvature the 'paksha' or 'non-paksha'? What is meant by the difference in 'dharma'?
The Essential Collection states: This is to refute the late school's calculation that curvature possesses two contradictory causes of difference in 'dharma,' namely that separately producing names, etc., is not expressive of meaning, and not separately producing names, etc., is also not expressive of meaning, therefore it is a difference in 'dharma.' This statement is also incorrect. The opposing school believes that sound is not capable of expressing meaning, but names, etc., are capable of expressing meaning. Separately producing names, etc., and not producing names, etc., are on the sound, not on the non-expressive meaning, so how can it be said that separately producing names, etc., is not expressive of meaning, and not separately producing names, etc., is also not expressive of meaning? If non-expressive meaning is taken as the difference in 'dharma,' the argument should say 'This is like those capable of expressing meaning, unable to separately produce names, etc.,' why say 'like those sounds'?
Ximing says: The Abhidharmasamuccaya allows for co-arisen sounds, such as stringed instruments, etc. The Abhidharmakosha refutes this, and the Nyayapravesha defends it by saying: 'Who says that one ultimate particle is created by two great elements? It is only in terms of auxiliary conditions that co-arisen sounds are spoken of.' Here, the main point is to refute what the Abhidharmasamuccaya says.
This statement is not detailed. The co-arisen sounds of the Abhidharmasamuccaya are like stringed instruments, etc., seemingly capable of expressing meaning, but in reality, they cannot express meaning. The Nyayapravesha also holds the same view, so why only say that it partially refutes the Abhidharmasamuccaya, and not say that it also refutes the Nyayapravesha? The commentary says: 'I am not saying that the curvature on the string is not capable of expressing meaning, but just like your transformation body and speech karma are not of the nature of good or evil, now I am because of being co-arisen.'
此意前隨汝宗。屈曲之聲云如絃管不生名等非善．惡性。亦如汝說化人身．語二業非善．惡性。我絃管聲是因俱故。假通善．惡。亦許能詮。如林聲說法。離質化等。皆通善等。
論。名詮自性句詮差別者。辨自性差別如因明斷。
本疏成立他方有佛云。除此三千界外他方。亦應時有佛出教化眾生有人天眾生故。猶如此土。不言定有恒有。以有劫中無佛出故。復除成．壞非時有故。簡不定過。有解改因云。彼有所化人天故。意避成．壞。雖有人天而非所化。根性未成故 要集云。前量有不定過。為如成．壞劫有人天故無佛出世 今謂不爾。于無過中妄生過想。前量不言恒定有故。自許不定故。今為不定云。有人天眾生故佛定不出。如成壞等劫。此意余方定無佛出。以有人天眾生故。如此成．壞劫。此量不定破前定量亦令不定。即似理門似共不定。故理門云。由用不定同法等因。成立自宗。方便說他亦有此法。由是便成似共不定。今所立量雖非即彼。然似於彼。又無共同喻。以成壞劫大乘亦許有佛出故。前云時有不簡報化。如法華經眾生見劫盡大火所燒時。我此土安穩等。
又彼自立量云。他方世界人天有根性成器者。以住劫減時人天有情故。如此土住劫減時 令謂此量是真不定。為如此有佛住劫減
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『此意前隨汝宗』，意思是說，前面的觀點是跟隨你們宗派的觀點。『屈曲之聲云如絃管不生名等非善．惡性』，意思是說，像絃樂管樂發出的聲音，本身不產生『名』（Nāma，名稱，概念）等，也沒有善惡的性質。『亦如汝說化人身．語二業非善．惡性』，也像你們所說的，變化出來的人的身業和語業，也沒有善惡的性質。『我絃管聲是因俱故。假通善．惡。亦許能詮。如林聲說法。離質化等。皆通善等』，我的意思是，絃樂管樂的聲音是因緣和合而產生的，所以可以通於善惡，也可以用來詮釋佛法，就像林中的聲音也可以說法一樣，離開了實體和變化等，都可以通於善等。
『論。名詮自性句詮差別者。辨自性差別如因明斷』，論中說，『名』（Nāma，名稱，概念）詮釋事物的自性，『句』詮釋事物的差別。辨別自性和差別，就像因明（Hetu-vidyā，古印度邏輯學）的判斷一樣。
『本疏成立他方有佛云。除此三千界外他方。亦應時有佛出教化眾生有人天眾生故。猶如此土。不言定有恒有。以有劫中無佛出故。復除成．壞非時有故。簡不定過』，本疏爲了成立他方世界有佛，說：除了這個三千大千世界之外的其他地方，也應該有時有佛出現教化眾生，因為那裡有人天眾生，就像我們這個世界一樣。這裡並沒有說一定是恒常存在，因為有的劫中沒有佛出現。並且排除了成劫和壞劫這種非正常時期的情況，避免了不確定的過失。 『有解改因云。彼有所化人天故。意避成．壞。雖有人天而非所化。根性未成故』，有一種解釋修改了原因，說：因為他方世界有可以被教化的人天，意思是避免成劫和壞劫的情況，雖然成劫和壞劫中也有人天，但是他們不是可以被教化的對象，因為根性還沒有成熟。 『要集云。前量有不定過。為如成．壞劫有人天故無佛出世』，《要集》中說，前面的論證有不確定的過失，因為像成劫和壞劫中有人天，但是沒有佛出世。 『今謂不爾。于無過中妄生過想。前量不言恒定有故。自許不定故。今為不定云。有人天眾生故佛定不出。如成壞等劫。此意余方定無佛出。以有人天眾生故。如此成．壞劫。此量不定破前定量亦令不定。即似理門似共不定。故理門云。由用不定同法等因。成立自宗。方便說他亦有此法。由是便成似共不定。今所立量雖非即彼。然似於彼。又無共同喻。以成壞劫大乘亦許有佛出故。前云時有不簡報化。如法華經眾生見劫盡大火所燒時。我此土安穩等』，現在我認為不是這樣，你們在沒有過失的地方妄生過失的想法。前面的論證並沒有說一定是恒常存在，自己也承認是不確定的。現在爲了說明它是不確定的，可以說：因為有人天眾生，所以佛一定不會出現，就像成劫和壞劫一樣。這個意思是說，其他地方一定沒有佛出現，因為有人天眾生，就像成劫和壞劫一樣。這個論證的不確定性破壞了前面的論證，也使它變得不確定，這就像因明中的『似共不定』。所以因明中說：由於使用不確定的同法等因，來成立自己的宗派，方便地說對方也有這種法，由此就變成了『似共不定』。現在所立的論證雖然不是完全相同，但是很相似。並且沒有共同的比喻，因為成劫和壞劫中，大乘佛教也承認有佛出現。前面說『時有』，並沒有區分應身佛和報身佛，就像《法華經》中說，眾生看到劫盡時大火燃燒，我的國土卻安穩等等。
『又彼自立量云。他方世界人天有根性成器者。以住劫減時人天有情故。如此土住劫減時』，另外，他們自己建立論證說：他方世界的人天有根性成熟可以被教化的人，因為在住劫減少的時候有人天有情，就像我們這個世界的住劫減少的時候一樣。 『令謂此量是真不定。為如此有佛住劫減』，我認為這個論證是真正的不確定，因為像這樣有佛的住劫減少的時候。
【English Translation】 English version: 『This meaning previously followed your school.』 This means that the previous viewpoint follows the viewpoint of your school. 『The sound of twists and turns, like strings and pipes, does not produce names, etc., and is neither good nor evil in nature.』 This means that the sounds produced by stringed and wind instruments do not inherently produce 『names』 (Nāma, names, concepts), etc., and do not have the nature of good or evil. 『It is also like you say that the two karmas of body and speech of a transformed person are neither good nor evil in nature.』 It is also like what you say, that the body and speech karmas of a person who is transformed do not have the nature of good or evil. 『My meaning is that the sounds of strings and pipes are caused by the combination of causes and conditions. They can be connected to good and evil. They can also be used to interpret the Dharma, just like the sounds in the forest can also preach the Dharma. Apart from substance and transformation, etc., they can all be connected to good, etc.』
『Treatise: Names explain self-nature, sentences explain differences. Discriminating self-nature and differences is like the judgment of Hetu-vidyā (ancient Indian logic).』 The treatise says that 『names』 (Nāma, names, concepts) explain the self-nature of things, and 『sentences』 explain the differences of things. Discriminating self-nature and differences is like the judgment of Hetu-vidyā (ancient Indian logic).
『The original commentary establishes that there are Buddhas in other realms, saying: Apart from this triple thousand world, there should also be Buddhas appearing at times in other places to teach sentient beings, because there are humans and devas there, just like in this world. It is not said that they are definitely and constantly present, because there are kalpas in which no Buddhas appear. Furthermore, it excludes the periods of formation and destruction, which are not normal times, thus avoiding the fault of uncertainty.』 The original commentary, in order to establish that there are Buddhas in other realms, says: Apart from this triple thousand great thousand world, there should also be Buddhas appearing at times in other places to teach sentient beings, because there are humans and devas there, just like in our world. It is not said here that they are necessarily constantly present, because there are kalpas in which no Buddhas appear. And it excludes the periods of formation and destruction, which are not normal times, thus avoiding the fault of uncertainty. 『Some explanations change the cause, saying: Because there are humans and devas in those places who can be transformed. The intention is to avoid the periods of formation and destruction. Although there are humans and devas in the periods of formation and destruction, they are not objects that can be transformed, because their roots have not yet matured.』 One explanation modifies the cause, saying: Because there are humans and devas in other realms who can be taught, the intention is to avoid the periods of formation and destruction, although there are humans and devas in the periods of formation and destruction, they are not objects that can be transformed, because their roots have not yet matured. 『Yaoji says: The previous argument has the fault of uncertainty, because there are humans and devas in the periods of formation and destruction, but no Buddhas appear in the world.』 The Yaoji says that the previous argument has the fault of uncertainty, because there are humans and devas in the periods of formation and destruction, but no Buddhas appear in the world. 『Now I say it is not so. You falsely create the idea of a fault where there is no fault. The previous argument did not say that it is constant and definite. You yourself admit that it is uncertain. Now, to show that it is uncertain, you can say: Because there are humans and devas, Buddhas will definitely not appear, just like in the periods of formation and destruction. This means that there are definitely no Buddhas appearing in other places, because there are humans and devas, just like in the periods of formation and destruction. The uncertainty of this argument undermines the previous argument and also makes it uncertain. This is like the 『similar common uncertainty』 in Hetu-vidyā. Therefore, Hetu-vidyā says: Because of using uncertain causes such as similar common dharmas to establish one's own school, it is convenient to say that the other party also has this dharma, and this becomes 『similar common uncertainty.』 Although the argument now established is not exactly the same, it is very similar. And there is no common metaphor, because in the periods of formation and destruction, Mahayana Buddhism also admits that Buddhas appear. The previous statement 『at times』 did not distinguish between Nirmāṇakāya (transformation body) and Sambhogakāya (reward body), just like the Lotus Sutra says, when sentient beings see the kalpa ending and the great fire burning, my land is peaceful, etc.』
『Also, they themselves establish the argument, saying: The humans and devas in other worlds have mature roots and can be taught, because there are sentient beings in the periods of abiding and decline, just like in the periods of abiding and decline in this world.』 In addition, they themselves establish the argument, saying: The humans and devas in other worlds have mature roots and can be taught, because there are sentient beings in the periods of abiding and decline, just like in the periods of abiding and decline in this world. 『I think this argument is truly uncertain, because there are Buddhas in the periods of abiding and decline like this.』 I think this argument is truly uncertain, because there are Buddhas in the periods of abiding and decline like this.
時人天有根性成器。為如此無佛住劫減時人天無根性成器。故成不定 要集又于本第二量。作決定相違量云。光明等上。定無名等。以非聲故。如虛空等。此亦不爾。無共同喻。大乘亦許名等依空。雖不依如。依識變故。無文障故。
問言便繕那此云扇．相好．根形．味。此即是鹽。能顯物中味故。味即是文 準此解意。文即能顯。云何前言而體不能顯耶 答顯有二義。一顯名．句。二能顯義。文能顯名．句。名句由文有故。名．句能顯義。文從名．句能顯體。非顯義故。前後義亦不相違 問字型非能顯。從彼名．句說為顯。聲性非能詮。從名說能顯 答名．句依文近。字從名說顯。句等望聲疏。聲不從名顯 問文體非能詮。為因從果顯。字型非能表。為果從因表 答名．句必帶文。文從名等顯。聲不必有字。字不從聲表 問名．句為攬字成。為別有體。若別有體豈可離聲。一剎那聲必有字故。若即攬成。名．句與文體性何別 答有二解。一云各別。一剎那聲多屈曲故。二云攬成。總別有異故。三體別。后釋為正。如前第一卷已辨。
論。有執隨眠等者。薩婆多師隨眠是纏。即現行法。成實論師無表雖依思立。然是不相應攝。
論。如是二法等者。緣瓶等心。等取衣食車等心。是何量攝 答本云非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當時的人和天神具有成器的根性。為什麼在沒有佛陀住世的劫數和衰減時期，人和天神就沒有成器的根性呢？因此，成就具有不確定性。《要集》又在本第二量中，作出了一個決定性的相違量，說：『光明等上，一定沒有名稱等，因為它不是聲音的緣故，就像虛空等。』這種說法也不對，因為沒有共同的比喻。大乘佛教也承認名稱等是依于空性的，雖然不依于如如（Tathata，真如），但依于識的變現，所以沒有文句上的障礙。
問：『便繕那』（Bhyanjana）在這裡的意思是扇子、相好、根形、味道。這就像鹽，能夠顯現事物中的味道。味道就是文（Vyanjana，字、語）。按照這個意思來理解，文就是能夠顯現的。為什麼前面說文的本體不能顯現呢？答：顯現有兩種含義。一是顯現名稱、語句，二是能夠顯現意義。文能夠顯現名稱、語句，因為名稱、語句是由文產生的。名稱、語句能夠顯現意義。文是從名稱、語句來顯現本體的，而不是顯現意義的，所以前後的意思並不矛盾。問：字型不是能顯現的，是從它所產生的名稱、語句來說它是顯現的。聲音的性質不是能詮釋的，是從名稱來說它是能顯現的。答：名稱、語句靠近文，字型是從名稱來說是顯現的。語句等相對於聲音來說比較疏遠，聲音不是從名稱來顯現的。問：文的本體不是能詮釋的，是因為因顯現了果。字型不是能表達的，是因為果表達了因。答：名稱、語句必定帶有文，文是從名稱等來顯現的。聲音不一定有字，字不是從聲音來表達的。問：名稱、語句是聚集字而成的，還是另外有本體？如果另外有本體，怎麼可以離開聲音呢？因為一剎那的聲音必定有字。如果就是聚集字而成的，那麼名稱、語句與文的本體在性質上有什麼區別？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是各自不同，因為一剎那的聲音有很多曲折變化。另一種說法是聚集字而成的，總體和部分有差異。三種本體不同。后一種解釋是正確的，就像前面第一卷已經辨析過的那樣。
論：『有執隨眠等者』，薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）的論師認為隨眠（Anusaya，潛在的煩惱）就是纏（Paryavasthana，纏縛），是現行法。成實論師（Satyasiddhi School）認為無表色（Avijnapti-rupa，無表業）雖然依于思（Cetanā，意志）而建立，但屬於不相應行法（Citta-viprayukta-samskara）所攝。
論：『如是二法等者』，緣于瓶子的心，『等』字包括緣于衣服、食物、車等的心。這是什麼量（Pramana，量度）所攝？答：本論說不是。
【English Translation】 English version: At that time, humans and devas (gods) had the root nature to become vessels (for Dharma). Why is it that during the kalpa (aeon) when no Buddha dwells in the world and during times of decline, humans and devas do not have the root nature to become vessels? Therefore, attainment is uncertain. The Yaoji also makes a definitive contradictory argument in the second Pramana (means of valid cognition), saying: 'On light, etc., there are definitely no names, etc., because it is not sound, like space, etc.' This statement is also incorrect because there is no common example. The Mahayana also acknowledges that names, etc., rely on emptiness (Sunyata), although they do not rely on Suchness (Tathata), but rely on the transformations of consciousness (Vijnana), so there is no textual obstacle.
Question: 'Bhyanjana' here means fan, auspicious marks, root forms, taste. It is like salt, which can manifest the taste in things. Taste is Vyanjana (letter, word). According to this understanding, Vyanjana is what can manifest. Why did the previous statement say that the substance of Vyanjana cannot manifest? Answer: Manifestation has two meanings. One is to manifest names and sentences, and the other is to be able to manifest meaning. Vyanjana can manifest names and sentences because names and sentences are produced by Vyanjana. Names and sentences can manifest meaning. Vyanjana manifests the substance from names and sentences, but it does not manifest meaning, so the previous and subsequent meanings are not contradictory. Question: The form of a letter is not what can manifest; it is said to manifest from the names and sentences it produces. The nature of sound is not what can express; it is said to be able to manifest from the name. Answer: Names and sentences are close to Vyanjana, and the form of a letter is said to manifest from the name. Sentences, etc., are relatively distant from sound, and sound is not said to manifest from the name. Question: The substance of Vyanjana is not what can express; is it because the cause manifests the effect? The form of a letter is not what can express; is it because the effect expresses the cause? Answer: Names and sentences must be accompanied by Vyanjana, and Vyanjana manifests from names, etc. Sound does not necessarily have a letter, and a letter does not express from sound. Question: Are names and sentences formed by gathering letters, or do they have a separate substance? If they have a separate substance, how can they be separated from sound? Because a moment of sound must have a letter. If they are formed by gathering letters, then what is the difference in nature between names and sentences and the substance of Vyanjana? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that they are different because a moment of sound has many twists and turns. The other explanation is that they are formed by gathering letters, and there are differences between the whole and the parts. The three substances are different. The latter explanation is correct, as has been analyzed in the first volume.
Treatise: 'Those who hold to latent defilements, etc.' The Sarvastivada school believes that Anusaya (latent defilements) are Paryavasthana (entanglements), which are currently active dharmas. The Satyasiddhi School believes that Avijnapti-rupa (unmanifested form), although established based on Cetana (volition), is included in Citta-viprayukta-samskara (non-associated formations).
Treatise: 'Such two dharmas, etc.' The mind that is conditioned by a pot, the word 'etc.' includes minds that are conditioned by clothes, food, carts, etc. What Pramana (means of valid cognition) does this belong to? Answer: The treatise says it does not.
量收。不親緣得法自體故。非比度故。非量所收。非量不要唯豎執故。西明意同。有解似現。即比量攝。故理門云。彼聲．喻等攝在此中故唯二量 有云。若開現．比．及非量三法不同。能緣之心可通三量 然要集斷云。假立瓶等義同名等。雖非法數。然定散意皆得緣瓶。故前三師皆不應理。取第四正 今謂。初二義即如實。后二非理。所以者何。且第三師云。緣瓶之心是似現量。即比量攝理且不然。現．比二量是正智攝。似現．比量迷亂所收。何名比量。若以緣共相故比量收。諸迷亂心及以妄執似比量心。應比量攝。若許爾者真似何別。似比量等非真比量收。似現亦應爾。又理門解比量智云。從現量生。或比量生。緣瓶心是似現所攝。何得說是比量收耶。然理門論云。彼聲喻等攝在此中 故唯二量者。據得法體無謬者說。非似現．比亦許二攝。何能自悟。若二皆攝何能自悟。若第四師緣瓶之心．若二皆攝。何能自悟 若第四師緣瓶之心通三量者。違理門說。彼云。如是一切世俗有中瓶等輿等皆似現量。于實有中作余行相。假合余義分別轉故 八正理論亦云。謂諸有智了瓶衣等分別而生。由彼于義不以自相為境界故。名似現量。非比如前。所說非理 問若爾定心諸佛菩薩。豈不緣瓶 答不障緣瓶。但心不作實有瓶解。
得瓶所依四塵自相。于實有中不作余行相。假合余義分別轉故。以能了知世間緣彼作實瓶解故現量境。如遍計性聖者達無亦為聖境。非同凡執說為聖境。本疏云緣瓶之心是非量者。據作實瓶解說。非約了瓶假。亦是非量收。設復緣瓶作比量解。亦似比量。非真比量。無實瓶體故亦非量。非似現比是非量攝。不稱境故邪謬智故。
論。無為非世等。本云汝宗無為應非無為是無常法。許有用故。如眼．耳等 要集云。有違自宗 今謂非過。宗言汝故 又云若取他宗因有不定。為如識變無為有作用故是無為耶 此亦不爾。識變無為假名無為。非實無為。前言汝宗無為。即實無為。故無不定。量既無過。何故不得立量以破。云但理破耶。
論。又諸無為許無因果故等者。舊俱舍云。無為非因果者。錯翻無字以為非字。若言非者。即不是六因五果。他宗自許六因之內為能作因。五果之中是離系等。今言無因果者。雖為能作因。無取與果用故。無有力能令果生故云無果。雖擇滅無為是離系等果。不從因生故云無因。不礙他生為能作因。由離縛得。擇滅是離系。餘二增上。俱通士用。大乘所說如樞要辨。
疏云有漏一識因。無漏二識果。無漏三智。或說八識者。七地已前有漏變熏唯第六識。故一識因。在無漏位第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『得瓶所依四塵自相』（構成瓶子的地、水、火、風四種元素的各自特性），是指在實際上存在的物體中，不產生其他形態的顯現，而是通過各種因緣條件的聚合，以及人們的分別念而產生瓶子的概念。因為人們能夠通過現量（直接感知）的方式，瞭解到世間上所認為的瓶子，並因此認為它是真實存在的，所以它是現量的境界。如同遍計所執性（錯誤認知）一樣，聖者所證悟的『無』也是聖境，但不同於凡夫的執著，不能說凡夫的執著也是聖境。《本疏》中說，緣于瓶子的心不是量（正確的認知），這是根據人們認為瓶子是真實存在而說的，而不是根據了知瓶子是假有的角度說的，因此也不能歸入非量。假設緣于瓶子而產生比量（推理認知），也只是相似於比量，而不是真正的比量，因為沒有真實存在的瓶子本體，所以也不是量。非似現量、比量，都屬於非量所攝，因為不符合真實的境界，是邪謬的智慧。
『無為非世等』。《本》中說：『你們宗派的無為法，應該不是無為法，而是無常法，因為你們承認它有作用，就像眼、耳等一樣。』《要集》中說：『這違背了你們自己的宗派。』現在認為這並不是過失，因為宗派是『你們』的宗派。又說：『如果採用其他宗派的因，就會有不定。例如，因為識的變現，無為法有作用，所以是無為法嗎？』這也不對。識的變現和無為法只是假名安立的無為法，不是真實的無為法。前面說的『你們宗派的無為法』，指的是真實的無為法，所以沒有不定。既然量沒有過失，為什麼不能立量來破斥呢？難道只能用理來破斥嗎？
『又諸無為許無因果故等者』。舊《俱舍論》中說：『無為法不是因果』，這是錯誤的翻譯，把『無』字翻譯成了『非』字。如果說是『非』，就不是六因五果。其他宗派自己承認在六因之中有能作因，在五果之中有離系果等。現在說『無因果』，雖然有能作因，但沒有取果和與果的作用，沒有力量能夠使果產生，所以說是無果。雖然擇滅無為是離系果等，但不是從因產生的，所以說是無因。不障礙其他法產生，作為能作因，因為離開了束縛而得到。擇滅是離系果，其餘兩種是增上果，都通於士用。大乘所說的，如《樞要》中所辨析的。
《疏》中說：『有漏一識因，無漏二識果，無漏三智，或者說八識。』七地以前的有漏變現熏習只有第六識，所以說一識因。在無漏位第
【English Translation】 English version: 'The self-characteristics of the four elements relied upon by the pot' (the individual characteristics of earth, water, fire, and wind that constitute a pot) refer to the fact that within actually existing objects, no other forms of appearance arise. Instead, the concept of a pot arises through the aggregation of various causal conditions and the discriminations of people's minds. Because people can understand the pot as it is perceived in the world through direct perception (present moment awareness) and therefore consider it to be real, it is the realm of direct perception. Just like the imputed nature (erroneous cognition), the 'non-existence' realized by the sages is also a sacred realm, but it is different from the attachments of ordinary people. One cannot say that the attachments of ordinary people are also sacred realms. The commentary states that the mind that focuses on the pot is not a valid cognition, because it is based on the understanding that the pot is real, rather than understanding that the pot is a conceptual construct. Therefore, it cannot be categorized as non-valid cognition. If one focuses on the pot and generates inferential cognition, it is only similar to inferential cognition, but not true inferential cognition, because there is no real pot entity, so it is not a valid cognition. Neither seeming direct perception nor seeming inference are included in non-valid cognition, because they do not conform to the true realm and are erroneous wisdom.
'Non-conditioned phenomena are not worldly, etc.' The original text states: 'Your school's non-conditioned phenomena should not be non-conditioned phenomena, but impermanent phenomena, because you admit that they have a function, just like the eyes, ears, etc.' The 'Essential Collection' states: 'This contradicts your own school.' Now it is considered that this is not a fault, because the school is 'your' school. It also says: 'If you adopt the cause of other schools, there will be uncertainty. For example, because of the transformation of consciousness, do non-conditioned phenomena have a function, and therefore are they non-conditioned phenomena?' This is also incorrect. The transformation of consciousness and non-conditioned phenomena are merely nominally established non-conditioned phenomena, not real non-conditioned phenomena. The previous statement 'your school's non-conditioned phenomena' refers to real non-conditioned phenomena, so there is no uncertainty. Since the valid cognition has no faults, why can't one establish a valid cognition to refute it? Can one only use reason to refute it?
'Furthermore, all non-conditioned phenomena are admitted to be without cause and effect, etc.' The old 'Abhidharmakośa' says: 'Non-conditioned phenomena are not cause and effect.' This is a wrong translation, translating the word 'non-' as 'not'. If it is said to be 'not', then it is not the six causes and five effects. Other schools themselves admit that among the six causes there is the efficient cause, and among the five effects there are the separation-from-defilements effect, etc. Now it is said to be 'without cause and effect', although there is the efficient cause, there is no function of taking the effect and giving the effect, and there is no power to cause the effect to arise, so it is said to be without effect. Although cessation-of-suffering non-conditioned phenomena are the separation-from-defilements effect, etc., they do not arise from a cause, so it is said to be without cause. It does not hinder other phenomena from arising, acting as the efficient cause, because it is obtained by separating from bondage. Cessation-of-suffering is the separation-from-defilements effect, and the other two are the dominant effect, both of which are related to human effort. What the Mahayana says is as analyzed in the 'Essential Pivot'.
The commentary states: 'The contaminated one-consciousness cause, the uncontaminated two-consciousness effect, the uncontaminated three wisdoms, or it is said to be eight consciousnesses.' Before the seventh ground, the contaminated transformations and habitual tendencies are only the sixth consciousness, so it is said to be the one-consciousness cause. In the uncontaminated state, the
七創緣虛空．非擇滅未有漏熏。但由第六。故二識果。無漏三智。或除成事。不說緣理。或通八識。智遍緣故。
然識變者。獨影唯從見。無別種生 西明即許識變無為別熏成種 今謂不爾。若許成種。且有漏心緣虛空等。許別成種。即他界緣．無漏緣。應皆成種。若許成種。后應生現。亦可為質。何得說云但緣名境。若云雖生他界及無漏質。非真實故說緣名境。若爾應假。假法如無非因緣故。若許彼緣不別生種。變無為等例亦應然。
六八等無為假實分別。識變皆假。依如立者。本及西明說。六中五假。真如是實。八中三實。即三種如。余皆是假 今為二解。一云皆假。故此論云。此五皆依真如假立。真如亦是假施設名。又前標中雲。二依法性假設。又下結諸言無簡。云故諸無為非定實有。
二云真如無為。一三是實。論但說云真如。亦假施設名。非體假設。云非定實有者。總結非他。離色．心外非定實有。不言不離色．心者非定實有。未見文斷任意取捨。
增減不同者。依大般若立一。真如無為。約廢詮談旨故 依瑜伽五十三立二。謂虛空及非擇。約世共知故。又世于空但識其義而不識體。但言空常住。不知是無為。于非擇滅。識體而不識義。謂知此法緣闕不生。法體滅無。而不知是無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 第七能變識（Manas-vijnana）所緣的虛空（Akasa，無色界），以及非擇滅（Apratisamkhya-nirodha，通過智慧抉擇而達到的滅盡）並非由有漏的習氣所薰染。這僅僅是由於第六意識（意識，Mano-vijnana）的作用。因此，前二識（眼識、耳識等）所產生的果報，以及無漏的三智（三種智慧）——或者排除成事智（Krtyanusthana-jnana）——都不說是緣于理（事物之理）。或者說，這可以通於八識（八種識），因為智慧是普遍緣取的。
然而，關於識所變現的境相，獨影境（Svabhavabhasa）僅僅是從見分（Darsana-bhaga）產生，沒有其他的種子生起。西明（古代一位法師）就認為識所變現的無為法（Asamskrta-dharma）不是通過熏習而形成種子。但我們認為不是這樣。如果允許形成種子，那麼有漏的心緣取虛空等，如果允許另外形成種子，那麼緣取他界（其他世界）以及無漏法（Anasrava-dharma）也應該都能形成種子。如果允許形成種子，那麼之後應該能夠生起現行（Vartamana），也可以作為本質（質礙），怎麼能說僅僅是緣取名言境（Nama-artha）呢？如果說雖然生起他界和無漏的本質，但因為不是真實的，所以說是緣取名言境。如果這樣，那麼就應該是假法（Kalpana-dharma）。假法如無，不是因緣的緣故。如果允許彼緣不另外生起種子，那麼變現無為法等也應該如此。
關於第六識、第八識等對於無為法是假是實的分別，識所變現的都是假，依如（Tathata，真如）而建立的說法，是本（古代論師）和西明所說的。第六識中，五種是假，真如是實。第八識中，三種是實，即三種真如。其餘都是假。現在有兩種解釋。一種說法是都為假。所以此論說，這五種都是依真如假立的。真如也是假施設的名。又前面標宗中說，二依法性假設。又下面總結諸言沒有簡別，說所以諸無為法不是決定實有。
另一種說法是真如無為，一三是實。論中只是說真如，也是假施設的名，不是體是假設。說非決定實有，是總結非他，離開色（Rupa，物質）和心（Citta，精神）外，不是決定實有。沒有說不離色心者非決定實有。沒有見到經文斷句就任意取捨。
增減不同在於，依據《大般若經》（Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra）立一種，真如無為，是約廢詮談旨的緣故。依據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第五十三卷立二種，即虛空和非擇滅，是約世間共知故。而且世間對於虛空只是認識其義而不認識其體，只是說空常住，不知道是無為法。對於非擇滅，認識其體而不認識其義，認為知道此法因緣闕而不生，法體滅無，而不知道是無為法。
【English Translation】 English version The Akasa (space, in the formless realm) and Apratisamkhya-nirodha (cessation through discernment) that are objects of the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana) are not perfumed by defiled (with outflows) habits. This is solely due to the function of the sixth consciousness (Mano-vijnana). Therefore, the resultant effects of the first two consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, etc.), and the three unconditioned wisdoms—or excluding Krtyanusthana-jnana (wisdom of accomplishing tasks)—are not said to be based on principle (the principle of things). Alternatively, this can apply to all eight consciousnesses, because wisdom universally apprehends.
However, regarding the appearances transformed by consciousness, the Svabhavabhasa (self-appearing image) arises solely from the seeing-aspect (Darsana-bhaga), without any other seed arising. Ximing (an ancient Dharma master) considered that the unconditioned dharmas (Asamskrta-dharma) transformed by consciousness are not formed into seeds through habituation. But we disagree. If forming seeds is allowed, then when the defiled mind apprehends Akasa, etc., if forming seeds separately is allowed, then apprehending other realms and unconditioned dharmas should also be able to form seeds. If forming seeds is allowed, then they should be able to give rise to present manifestation later, and can also serve as substance (matter). How can it be said that they only apprehend the name-meaning realm (Nama-artha)? If it is said that although the substance of other realms and unconditioned dharmas arise, they are not real, so it is said to apprehend the name-meaning realm. If so, then it should be a conceptual dharma (Kalpana-dharma). Conceptual dharmas are like non-existence, not due to causes and conditions. If it is allowed that this apprehension does not separately generate seeds, then the transformation of unconditioned dharmas, etc., should also be the same.
Regarding the distinction between the sixth and eighth consciousnesses, etc., concerning whether unconditioned dharmas are conceptual or real, all transformations by consciousness are conceptual. The statement that they are established based on Suchness (Tathata, true thusness) is what 'Ben' (an ancient commentator) and Ximing said. In the sixth consciousness, five are conceptual, and Suchness is real. In the eighth consciousness, three are real, namely the three kinds of Suchness. The rest are all conceptual. Now there are two interpretations. One interpretation is that all are conceptual. Therefore, this treatise says that these five are all provisionally established based on Suchness. Suchness is also a provisionally designated name. Also, in the initial proposition, it says that the two are provisionally established based on the nature of Dharma. Furthermore, the concluding remarks below do not make distinctions, saying that therefore all unconditioned dharmas are not definitely real.
Another interpretation is that Suchness as an unconditioned dharma, one or three, is real. The treatise only says that Suchness is also a provisionally designated name, not that its essence is provisional. Saying 'not definitely real' is a conclusion that it is not other, that apart from form (Rupa, matter) and mind (Citta, spirit), it is not definitely real. It does not say that what is not apart from form and mind is not definitely real. We have not seen the sutra text punctuated in this way, so it is arbitrary to take or discard.
The difference in increase or decrease lies in that, according to the Mahaprajnaparamita Sutra (Great Perfection of Wisdom Sutra), one is established, Suchness as an unconditioned dharma, because it is about abandoning expression to discuss the meaning. According to the fifty-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice), two are established, namely Akasa and Apratisamkhya-nirodha, because it is about what is commonly known in the world. Moreover, the world only recognizes the meaning of Akasa but does not recognize its substance, only saying that space is permanent, not knowing that it is an unconditioned dharma. Regarding Apratisamkhya-nirodha, they recognize its substance but do not recognize its meaning, thinking that they know that this dharma does not arise when conditions are lacking, and that the substance of the dharma is extinguished, but not knowing that it is an unconditioned dharma.
為云不識義 若準此論亦得云二。一依識變。二非識變。假實異故。依識變者。似非真故。
或有立三。謂隨小乘。又為世出世故。虛空．非擇世間。未離縛故。擇滅出世 或有立四。掌珍．五蘊論。為對他宗及於自義辨假實故。虛空．擇．非擇是共他立。真如無為是自義。前三是假。后一實故 此論立六。依于擇滅分出二種。由依智．定二障別故。不動滅．想受滅。斷定障故。于定難知。又分二種。或由定．不定。不動．想受。永斷擇滅。暫伏非擇。能所依異故立真如。或假實別。
對法立八。于真如中約詮分三。謂善．不善．及無記法。此論約旨故但立一。若據約詮。乃至眾多假立無失。
種類不同有三種無為。一依如立。實是無為。二依識立。相似無為。少分似彼體實有為。三別義立。謂諸無漏。非煩惱作故名無為。從因緣起故有為攝。初非染凈因緣為。次或二為。或非染為。以三性心俱得變故。后非染為。然若克體。即是有為。從因生故 略問答者。何故斷煩惱障所顯真如。名為擇滅。斷所知障。不名擇滅但名為滅 答由不定故。下第十云。不動等二暫伏滅者。非擇滅攝。究竟滅者。擇滅所攝。與顯揚同 問煩惱亦爾。何名擇．非擇 答煩惱易而共許與擇等名。所知難而非共故但名滅。或
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 對於『云不識義』（Yun Bu Shi Yi，云沒有識別意義），如果按照這個理論，也可以說是兩種無為。第一種是依識變（Yi Shi Bian，依賴於意識的轉變）而立的無為，第二種是非識變（Fei Shi Bian，不依賴於意識的轉變）而立的無為。這是因為假和實不同。依賴於意識轉變的無為，看起來不是真實的。 或者有人建立三種無為，這是隨順小乘（Xiao Cheng，小乘佛教）的觀點。也是爲了區分世間（Shi Jian，世俗世界）和出世間（Chu Shi Jian，超越世俗世界）而設立的。虛空無為（Xu Kong Wu Wei，虛空無為）和非擇滅無為（Fei Ze Mie Wu Wei，非擇滅無為）屬於世間，因為還沒有脫離束縛。擇滅無為（Ze Mie Wu Wei，擇滅無為）屬於出世間。 或者有人建立四種無為，比如《掌珍論》（Zhang Zhen Lun）和《五蘊論》（Wu Yun Lun）。這是爲了針對其他宗派以及辨別自己宗義中的假和實。虛空無為、擇滅無為和非擇滅無為是共同建立的，真如無為（Zhen Ru Wu Wei，真如無為）是自己宗義所立。前三種是假，后一種是實。 此論建立六種無為，依據擇滅無為分出兩種，因為依賴於智慧和禪定兩種障礙的差別。不動滅（Bu Dong Mie，不動滅）和想受滅（Xiang Shou Mie，想受滅），是斷除禪定障礙所致，在禪定中難以知曉。又分為兩種，或者因為禪定和非禪定，不動滅和想受滅，是永遠斷除擇滅，暫時降伏非擇滅。能依和所依不同，所以建立真如。或者因為假和實的區別。 《對法論》（Dui Fa Lun）建立八種無為，在真如中，根據詮釋的不同分為三種，即善法（Shan Fa，善的行為）、不善法（Bu Shan Fa，不善的行為）和無記法（Wu Ji Fa，非善非惡的行為）。此論根據宗旨，所以只建立一種。如果根據詮釋，乃至可以假立很多種，也沒有過失。 種類不同，有三種無為。第一種是依如（Yi Ru，依據真如）而立，是真實的無為。第二種是依識（Yi Shi，依據意識）而立，是相似的無為，少部分相似於真如，但體性實際上是有為。第三種是特別定義的無為，指各種無漏法（Wu Lou Fa，沒有煩惱的法），因為不是煩惱所造作，所以稱為無為。但因為是從因緣（Yin Yuan，條件）生起，所以屬於有為。第一種不是染污和清凈的因緣所為。第二種或者兩者都是，或者不是染污所為，因為三種性質的心都可以轉變。第三種不是染污所為。然而如果嚴格按照體性來說，就是有為，因為是從因生起。 簡略的問答：為什麼斷除煩惱障（Fan Nao Zhang，煩惱的障礙）所顯現的真如，稱為擇滅？斷除所知障（Suo Zhi Zhang，知識的障礙），不稱為擇滅，只稱為滅？ 回答：因為不定。下文第十品說，不動滅等兩種暫時降伏的滅，不屬於擇滅所攝。究竟的滅，屬於擇滅所攝，與《顯揚論》（Xian Yang Lun）相同。 問：煩惱也是這樣，為什麼稱為擇滅和非擇滅？ 答：煩惱容易理解，並且大家普遍認可，所以和擇滅等同。所知障難以理解，並且不被普遍認可，所以只稱為滅。或者。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding 'Yun Bu Shi Yi' (Clouds do not recognize meaning), if we follow this theory, we can also say there are two types of Asamskrta (unconditioned). The first is Asamskrta established based on Vijnanaparinama (transformation of consciousness), and the second is Asamskrta established not based on Vijnanaparinama. This is because the false and the real are different. Asamskrta based on the transformation of consciousness appears not to be real. Alternatively, some establish three types of Asamskrta, which aligns with the view of Hinayana (Small Vehicle). It is also established to differentiate between Lokadhatu (the world) and Lokottara (beyond the world). Akasa Asamskrta (space Asamskrta) and Apratisankhyanirodha Asamskrta (non-deliberate cessation Asamskrta) belong to the world because they have not yet escaped bondage. Pratisankhyanirodha Asamskrta (deliberate cessation Asamskrta) belongs to Lokottara. Alternatively, some establish four types of Asamskrta, such as in the 'Adhidharmaratna-pitaka' (Palm Jewel Treatise) and the 'Pancaskandha' (Five Aggregates Treatise). This is to address other schools and to distinguish between the false and the real in one's own doctrine. Akasa Asamskrta, Pratisankhyanirodha Asamskrta, and Apratisankhyanirodha Asamskrta are commonly established, while Tathata Asamskrta (suchness Asamskrta) is established by one's own school. The first three are false, and the last one is real. This treatise establishes six types of Asamskrta, based on dividing Pratisankhyanirodha Asamskrta into two types, due to the difference in the two obstacles of wisdom and Samadhi (meditative concentration). Aninjya (immovability) and Samjnanirodha-veditanirodha (cessation of perception and feeling) are caused by cutting off the obstacles of Samadhi, which are difficult to know in Samadhi. They are further divided into two types, either because of Samadhi and non-Samadhi, Aninjya and Samjnanirodha-veditanirodha, which permanently cut off Pratisankhyanirodha and temporarily subdue Apratisankhyanirodha. Because the supported and the supporting are different, Tathata is established. Or because of the difference between the false and the real. The 'Abhidharma' (Treatise on Dharma) establishes eight types of Asamskrta. Within Tathata, it is divided into three types based on the difference in expression, namely Kusala Dharma (wholesome actions), Akusala Dharma (unwholesome actions), and Avyakrta Dharma (neutral actions). This treatise establishes only one type based on its purpose. If based on expression, even if many types are falsely established, there is no fault. There are three types of Asamskrta with different categories. The first is established based on Tathata, which is the real Asamskrta. The second is established based on Vijnana (consciousness), which is similar Asamskrta, a small part of which is similar to Tathata, but its nature is actually Samskrta (conditioned). The third is specially defined Asamskrta, referring to various Anasrava Dharmas (undefiled dharmas), because they are not created by Klesas (afflictions), so they are called Asamskrta. However, because they arise from Hetu-pratyaya (causes and conditions), they belong to Samskrta. The first is not caused by defiled or pure causes and conditions. The second is caused by both, or not caused by defilement, because the minds of the three natures can transform. The third is not caused by defilement. However, if strictly according to nature, it is Samskrta, because it arises from causes. Brief question and answer: Why is the Tathata revealed by cutting off the Klesavarana (obstacle of afflictions) called Pratisankhyanirodha? Why is cutting off the Jneyavarana (obstacle of knowledge) not called Pratisankhyanirodha, but only called Nirodha (cessation)? Answer: Because it is uncertain. The tenth chapter below says that the cessation of Aninjya and others, which are temporarily subdued, are not included in Pratisankhyanirodha. The ultimate cessation is included in Pratisankhyanirodha, which is the same as the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice). Question: Afflictions are also like this, why are they called Pratisankhyanirodha and Apratisankhyanirodha? Answer: Afflictions are easy to understand and are generally recognized, so they are equated with Pratisankhyanirodha. The obstacle of knowledge is difficult to understand and is not generally recognized, so it is only called Nirodha. Or.
互影顯。或隨應立名。不可齊責 問擇．非擇滅。隨擇．非擇不生處得。不動．想受何故不然 答據究竟斷故作是說。不障分無亦立彼二。據顯如齊解。或約二定所顯真如。餘地未得彼二定故。約得智．定不齊解。隨斷何煩惱必得智故。若苦樂受及想受未滅。未得彼定故 問煩惱不障定。唯約所知分。煩惱亦障定。應通二障說 答實俱障定。但據勝論。以異熟受領下劣定。障于勝定勝餘染法故。偏據所知。不約煩惱說 問識變無為。及緣無為所起相分。何法攝耶 答攝相從見。即四蘊收。見．相別說。法同分攝。或準論文無為有二。一依識變。雖實有為亦無為攝。以相從質以假隨實故。更多問答如余廣辨。
此二法執細故難斷。要集三解。一云六．七法執從無始來。與彼我見唯同種起。離我見外無別法執。彼說此正。云由此法執唯有一百二十八種。與煩惱同 今謂不爾。從無始來執法為有。即執為我。可如所說。涅槃見等雖執法有。不執作我。豈非法執。此等既法執。豈恒我執俱。又小無學我執已斷。豈不起法執。法執若起。許熏種不。若不熏種。何闕不能。若許熏種。可不生現。此既生現。豈與我執恒同種耶。雖說頭數百二十八。不說各各與惑同種 問斷第六識俱生法執。有于漸頓次及超不 答唯漸斷次第不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 互影顯（互相影響而顯現）。或隨應立名（或者根據相應的條件來建立名稱）。不可齊責（不能一概而論） 問：擇滅（通過智慧選擇而達到的寂滅）、非擇滅（不通過智慧選擇而自然達到的寂滅）。隨擇（跟隨智慧選擇）、非擇不生處得（不通過智慧選擇而達到的不生之處）。不動（不動地）、想受（想和感受）何故不然（為什麼不是這樣）？ 答：據究竟斷故作是說（根據究竟斷除煩惱的緣故這樣說）。不障分無亦立彼二（不障礙一部分的缺失也成立那兩種寂滅）。據顯如齊解（根據顯現如同齊一的理解）。或約二定所顯真如（或者依據兩種禪定所顯現的真如）。餘地未得彼二定故（因為其他地方沒有得到那兩種禪定）。約得智．定不齊解（依據獲得智慧和禪定不齊一的理解）。隨斷何煩惱必得智故（隨著斷除什麼煩惱必定獲得智慧的緣故）。若苦樂受及想受未滅（如果苦樂的感受以及想和感受沒有滅除），未得彼定故（就沒有得到那種禪定）。 問：煩惱不障定（煩惱不障礙禪定），唯約所知分（只是依據所知障的部分）。煩惱亦障定（煩惱也障礙禪定），應通二障說（應該貫通煩惱障和所知障兩種障礙來說）。 答：實俱障定（實際上都障礙禪定）。但據勝論（但根據殊勝的理論）。以異熟受領下劣定（因為異熟果報的感受會引導到低劣的禪定），障于勝定勝餘染法故（障礙殊勝的禪定和殊勝的其他染污法）。偏據所知（偏重依據所知障）。不約煩惱說（不依據煩惱障來說）。 問：識變無為（意識轉變的無為法），及緣無為所起相分（以及緣于無為法所生起的相分），何法攝耶（被什麼法所攝）？ 答：攝相從見（攝取相分跟隨見分）。即四蘊收（就是被色、受、想、行四蘊所攝）。見．相別說（見分和相分分別來說）。法同分攝（被法同分所攝）。或準論文無為有二（或者依據論文，無為法有兩種）。一依識變（一種是依據意識轉變）。雖實有為亦無為攝（雖然實際上是有為法也被無為法所攝）。以相從質以假隨實故（因為相分跟隨本質，虛假跟隨真實的緣故）。更多問答如余廣辨（更多的問答如同其他地方廣泛辨析）。 此二法執細故難斷（這兩種法執細微所以難以斷除）。要集三解（需要集合三種理解）。一云六．七法執從無始來（一種說法是第六識和第七識的法執從無始以來），與彼我見唯同種起（與我見只是同一種子生起）。離我見外無別法執（離開我見之外沒有其他的法執）。彼說此正（他們的說法是正確的）。云由此法執唯有一百二十八種（說由此法執只有一百二十八種）。與煩惱同（與煩惱相同）。 今謂不爾（現在認為不是這樣）。從無始來執法為有（從無始以來執著法為實有），即執為我（就是執著為我）。可如所說（可以像他們所說的那樣）。涅槃見等雖執法有（涅槃見等雖然執著法為實有），不執作我（但不執著作為我）。豈非法執（難道不是法執嗎）？此等既法執（這些既然是法執），豈恒我執俱（難道總是和我執一起嗎）？又小無學我執已斷（又小乘無學果位我執已經斷除），豈不起法執（難道不生起法執嗎）？法執若起（法執如果生起），許熏種不（允許熏習種子嗎）？若不熏種（如果不熏習種子），何闕不能（缺少什麼而不能熏習呢）？若許熏種（如果允許熏習種子），可不生現（難道不生起現行嗎）？此既生現（這既然生起現行），豈與我執恒同種耶（難道和我執總是同一種子嗎）？雖說頭數百二十八（雖然說總共有128種），不說各各與惑同種（沒有說每一種都和煩惱同一種子）。 問：斷第六識俱生法執（斷除第六識俱生的法執），有于漸頓次及超不（有漸修、頓悟、次第和超越嗎）？ 答：唯漸斷次第不（只有漸修斷除，沒有次第和超越）。
【English Translation】 English version 'Mutual shadows manifest' (manifesting through mutual influence). Or names are established according to corresponding conditions. One cannot apply the same standard to all. Question: 'Cessation through choice' (Nirodha-samāpatti, cessation attained through wisdom), 'cessation without choice' (cessation attained naturally without wisdom). 'Following choice' (following wisdom), 'attaining a place of non-arising without choice' (attaining a state of non-arising naturally without wisdom). 'Immovable' (immovable state), 'thought and feeling' (saṃjñā and vedanā), why are they not so? Answer: It is said based on the ultimate cutting off (of afflictions). Not obstructing partial absence also establishes those two (cessations). It is understood based on manifestation as uniformity. Or it refers to the Suchness (Tathatā) manifested by the two samādhis (meditative states). Because other places have not attained those two samādhis. It is understood based on the non-uniformity of attaining wisdom and samādhi. Because with the cessation of any affliction, wisdom is necessarily attained. If suffering, pleasure, feeling, thought, and feeling have not ceased, then that samādhi has not been attained. Question: Afflictions do not obstruct samādhi, only pertaining to the aspect of the knowable. Afflictions also obstruct samādhi, so both obscurations (affliction obscuration and knowledge obscuration) should be discussed. Answer: In reality, both obstruct samādhi. But it is based on the superior theory. Because the feeling of differentiated maturation (vipāka-vedanā) leads to inferior samādhi, obstructing superior samādhi and superior other defiled dharmas. It leans towards the knowable. It does not discuss based on afflictions. Question: The unconditioned (asaṃskṛta) that is the transformation of consciousness, and the image-aspect (nimitta-bhāga) arising from the conditioned, what dharma encompasses them? Answer: Encompassing the image-aspect follows the seeing-aspect (darśana-bhāga). That is, it is collected by the four aggregates (skandhas) of form, feeling, thought, and volition. The seeing-aspect and image-aspect are discussed separately. They are encompassed by the dharma-sameness-aspect. Or according to the treatise, there are two types of unconditioned. One relies on the transformation of consciousness. Although it is actually conditioned, it is also encompassed by the unconditioned. Because the image-aspect follows the substance, and the false follows the real. More questions and answers are extensively discussed elsewhere. These two attachments to dharma are subtle and difficult to cut off. It is necessary to gather three understandings. One says that the attachments to dharma of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses, from beginningless time, arise only from the same seed as the view of self. Apart from the view of self, there is no other attachment to dharma. Their saying is correct. It is said that there are only one hundred and twenty-eight types of attachment to dharma. They are the same as afflictions. Now it is said that this is not so. From beginningless time, holding to dharma as existent is the same as holding to it as self. It can be as they say. Although the view of Nirvana, etc., holds to dharma as existent, it does not hold to it as self. Is it not an attachment to dharma? Since these are attachments to dharma, are they always together with the attachment to self? Also, the attachment to self has already been cut off by the Arhat of the Small Vehicle, so does he not generate attachment to dharma? If attachment to dharma arises, is it allowed to perfume seeds or not? If it does not perfume seeds, what is lacking that it cannot perfume? If it is allowed to perfume seeds, can it not manifest? Since it manifests, is it always the same seed as the attachment to self? Although it is said that there are a total of one hundred and twenty-eight, it is not said that each one is the same seed as the afflictions. Question: In cutting off the innate attachment to dharma of the sixth consciousness, are there gradual, sudden, sequential, and transcendent methods? Answer: Only gradual cutting off, not sequential or transcendent.
超。無頓得果及超地故 若爾何故二乘斷惑障。先伏后成超。菩薩斷所知。后超先亦伏 答二乘得果易。先伏后成超。大乘證地難。無超可得伏 問大乘難得果。唯次不言超。飼虎及掩泥。如何說超劫 答大乘無超地。據此不言超。由精進促生。何妨得超劫。
論。緣用必依實有體故者。問若無體法雖無緣義。得有所緣者。何故前第一。云非諸極微共和合位。可與五識各作所緣 答五識不能緣細境故說非所緣。不障第六緣無變相成所緣義 若爾何故觀所緣。云極微於五識設緣非所緣 答意破所緣。設縱緣義。無實體法望於六識皆不成緣 問假法及無皆不成緣。大乘第六緣兔角等。此相分假。得成緣不。若許成緣。何故破他。若不成緣。豈無親所緣緣耶 答小乘等執識外之法。假實皆無。非所緣緣。故前破之。大乘所緣是不離識。簡遍計故。皆得名實。成所緣緣。
論。如非所緣他聚攝故者。此或無同喻。五七等緣有不遍故。云如非所緣。第六遍緣十八界故。何非所緣 答據別緣說。他共許故 問佛智遍緣自他同許。何非所緣 答約因說故。又他許佛心能非一切時恒遍緣故。
論。現在彼聚等者。量破於他準文可知。然二十唯識論云。他心智云何。知境不如實。如知自心智。不知如佛境。此文有徴有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 超。無頓得果及超地故：沒有立即獲得果位和超越階位的說法，是因為修行需要積累。 若爾何故二乘斷惑障。先伏后成超。菩薩斷所知。后超先亦伏：如果這樣，為何聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna）和緣覺乘（Pratyekabuddhayāna）斷除煩惱障時，是先降伏后成就，從而超越？菩薩（Bodhisattva）斷除所知障時，是先超越后降伏？ 答二乘得果易。先伏后成超。大乘證地難。無超可得伏：回答是，聲聞乘和緣覺乘容易證得果位，所以是先降伏煩惱后成就，從而超越。而大乘菩薩證得菩薩地（Bhūmi）非常困難，沒有可以超越的階段，只能逐步降伏。 問大乘難得果。唯次不言超。飼虎及掩泥。如何說超劫：提問：大乘菩薩很難立即獲得果位，只能按部就班，沒有超越的說法。就像喂老虎和掩蓋泥土一樣，如何能說超越無數劫（Kalpa）呢？ 答大乘無超地。據此不言超。由精進促生。何妨得超劫：回答：大乘菩薩沒有超越菩薩地的說法，所以不提超越。但是由於精進修行可以縮短時間，為何不能說超越無數劫呢？
論。緣用必依實有體故者：論：認識作用必須依賴真實存在的本體。 問若無體法雖無緣義。得有所緣者。何故前第一。云非諸極微共和合位。可與五識各作所緣：提問：如果無實體的法，雖然沒有認識作用的意義，但可以被認識。那麼，為何前面第一義中說，不是所有的極微（Paramāṇu）的共和合位，都可以作為五識（Pañcavijñāna）各自的所緣（Ālambana）？ 答五識不能緣細境故說非所緣。不障第六緣無變相成所緣義：回答：因為五識不能認識微細的境界，所以說不是所緣。但這並不妨礙第六識（意識，Manovijñāna）認識沒有變相的法，從而成為所緣的意義。 若爾何故觀所緣。云極微於五識設緣非所緣：如果這樣，為何在觀察所緣時說，極微對於五識來說，即使假設是所緣，也不是真正的所緣？ 答意破所緣。設縱緣義。無實體法望於六識皆不成緣：回答：這是爲了破除所緣的觀點。即使假設是所緣，沒有實體的法對於六識來說，都不能成為真正的所緣。 問假法及無皆不成緣。大乘第六緣兔角等。此相分假。得成緣不。若許成緣。何故破他。若不成緣。豈無親所緣緣耶：提問：如果假法和不存在的事物都不能成為所緣，那麼大乘的第六識可以認識兔角等。這些相分是虛假的，可以成為所緣嗎？如果允許成為所緣，為何要破斥其他宗派的觀點？如果不能成為所緣，難道就沒有親所緣緣（Upādānahetupratyaya）了嗎？ 答小乘等執識外之法。假實皆無。非所緣緣。故前破之。大乘所緣是不離識。簡遍計故。皆得名實。成所緣緣：回答：小乘等宗派認為，在識之外的法，無論是真是假，都是不存在的，所以不是所緣緣。因此前面破斥了他們的觀點。大乘所緣是不離識的，是爲了簡別遍計所執性（Parikalpita），所以都可以稱為真實，從而成為所緣緣。
論。如非所緣他聚攝故者：論：如同不是所緣，被其他聚合所攝。 此或無同喻。五七等緣有不遍故。云如非所緣。第六遍緣十八界故。何非所緣：這或許沒有相同的比喻，因為五識和第七識（末那識，Manas）的所緣不是普遍的。說「如同不是所緣」，是因為第六識普遍地認識十八界（Dhātu），為何說不是所緣？ 答據別緣說。他共許故：回答：這是根據個別的所緣來說的，是其他宗派共同認可的。 問佛智遍緣自他同許。何非所緣：提問：佛的智慧普遍地認識一切，這是自宗和他宗都認可的，為何說不是所緣？ 答約因說故。又他許佛心能非一切時恒遍緣故：回答：這是從因的角度來說的。而且其他宗派也認為，佛的心識不能在所有時間都普遍地認識一切。
論。現在彼聚等者：論：現在、彼等聚合。 量破於他準文可知。然二十唯識論云。他心智云何。知境不如實。如知自心智。不知如佛境。此文有徴有：用量來破斥其他宗派，可以參照原文理解。《二十唯識論》（Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi）中說：『他心智（Paracittajñāna）如何能如實地瞭解境界？就像瞭解自己的心智一樣，卻不能瞭解佛的境界。』這段文字是有疑問的。
【English Translation】 English version Super. There is no sudden attainment of fruit or transcendence of stages because cultivation requires accumulation. If so, why do the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna cut off the afflictive obscurations (Kleśāvaraṇa), first subduing and then achieving transcendence? When Bodhisattvas cut off the cognitive obscurations (Jñeyāvaraṇa), do they first transcend and then subdue? The answer is that it is easy for the Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna to attain the fruit, so they first subdue afflictions and then achieve transcendence. It is difficult for Mahāyāna Bodhisattvas to realize the Bhūmis (stages), and there is no stage to transcend, so they can only gradually subdue. Question: It is difficult for Mahāyāna Bodhisattvas to attain the fruit immediately, and they can only proceed step by step, without transcendence. Like feeding a tiger and covering mud, how can one speak of transcending countless Kalpas? Answer: There is no transcendence of Bhūmis in Mahāyāna, so transcendence is not mentioned. However, because diligent practice can shorten the time, why can't one speak of transcending countless Kalpas?
Treatise: The function of cognition must rely on a truly existing entity. Question: If a non-substantial dharma, although without the meaning of cognitive function, can be cognized, then why does the first meaning above say that not all aggregates of Paramāṇus can serve as the respective Ālambanas (objects of cognition) for the five consciousnesses (Pañcavijñāna)? Answer: Because the five consciousnesses cannot cognize subtle realms, it is said that they are not objects of cognition. This does not prevent the sixth consciousness (Manovijñāna) from cognizing dharmas without transformations, thereby becoming the meaning of an object of cognition. If so, why does the observation of objects of cognition say that even if Paramāṇus are assumed to be objects of cognition for the five consciousnesses, they are not true objects of cognition? Answer: This is to refute the view of objects of cognition. Even if they are assumed to be objects of cognition, dharmas without substance cannot become true objects of cognition for the six consciousnesses. Question: If false dharmas and non-existent things cannot become objects of cognition, then the sixth consciousness of Mahāyāna can cognize rabbit horns, etc. These image-aspects (Nimitta) are false, can they become objects of cognition? If it is allowed to become an object of cognition, why refute the views of other schools? If it cannot become an object of cognition, then is there no Upādānahetupratyaya (the cause of grasping)? Answer: The Śrāvakayāna and other schools believe that dharmas outside of consciousness, whether true or false, do not exist, so they are not Upādānahetupratyaya. Therefore, their views were refuted earlier. The object of cognition in Mahāyāna is inseparable from consciousness, in order to distinguish the Parikalpita (imagined nature), so they can all be called real, thereby becoming Upādānahetupratyaya.
Treatise: Like what is not an object of cognition, being included in other aggregates. This may not have the same analogy, because the objects of cognition of the five and seventh consciousnesses are not universal. Saying 'like what is not an object of cognition' is because the sixth consciousness universally cognizes the eighteen Dhātus (realms), why say it is not an object of cognition? Answer: This is according to individual objects of cognition, which is commonly recognized by other schools. Question: The Buddha's wisdom universally cognizes everything, which is recognized by both our school and other schools, why say it is not an object of cognition? Answer: This is from the perspective of cause. Moreover, other schools also believe that the Buddha's consciousness cannot universally cognize everything at all times.
Treatise: The present, those aggregates, etc. Using inference to refute other schools can be understood by referring to the original text. However, the Viṃśatikāvijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Twenty Verses on Representation-Only) says: 'How can Paracittajñāna (knowledge of others' minds) truly understand the realm? Just like understanding one's own mind, but not understanding the Buddha's realm.' This passage has questions.
解有遂有答。初二句外徴。以前答他除佛已外。雖知他心。然不如實。以他為質。相分少似。不能稱實。與本質異。故不如實故今外徴。他心智云何知境不如實 如知自心智。論主為解。不取見分緣自見分。已除佛外皆不能緣。據一剎那非前後量故。如實知故亦非自證。取前後緣。及緣別識。亦變相故不如實知 他復遂云。云何知自他。俱不能如實 頌第四句不知二字。是論主答。若他心智除佛已外。由法執蔽。若現行若種子。有此無知覆心及境故不能知。即由此覆。不知如佛凈智所行離言說境。一不知言通答前遂。並顯不知如佛所由。準此論意。頌不知言。無知不知合名不知通遂及答。
疏云。然上座等計。同聚心相應之法亦互能緣。婆沙第九云。如法密部彼作是說。惠等能了相應受等。此意不說各能自緣。俱互相緣 婆沙復云。或復有執。心．心所法能了俱有。如化地部。彼作是說。惠有二種俱時而生。一相應。二不相應。相應惠知不相應者。不相應惠知相應者 俱舍法師釋云。言相應者。與同時起心聚相應。不相應者。即前後念。不與同時心聚相應。此之二惠更互相知。今猶未了緣俱有法言。及西方師義待后檢文。今又釋云。言相應者即四蘊。不相應者即是色蘊。及前後四蘊。與四蘊俱。不緣自相應。能
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 解有遂有答。前兩句是外在的徵詢。因為之前回答過，除了佛以外，即使知道他人心，也不如實。因為以他人為質，相似之處很少，不能稱為真實，與本質不同，所以不如實。因此現在從外部徵詢：他心智如何得知境界不如實？就像知道自己的心智一樣。論主爲了解釋，不取見分緣自見分，因為除了佛以外，都不能緣。根據一剎那，不是前後衡量的緣故。因為如實知，所以也不是自證。取前後緣，以及緣別識，也因為變相的緣故，不如實知。 他人又問：如何知道自己和他人都不能如實？頌的第四句『不知』二字，是論主的回答。如果他心智除了佛以外，由於法執的遮蔽，無論是現行還是種子，有這種無知覆蓋心和境，所以不能知。即由此覆蓋，不知如佛凈智所行的離言說境。『一不知』這句話，既可以回答之前的提問，又可以顯示不知如佛的原因。按照這個理論的意思，頌中的『不知』，無知和不知合起來叫做『不知』，可以同時回答提問和解釋。 疏中說：然而上座部等人認為，同聚的心相應之法也能互相緣。婆沙第九卷說：如法密部他們這樣說，慧等能夠了解相應的受等。這個意思不是說各自能夠自己緣，而是互相緣。婆沙又說：或者有人認為，心和心所法能夠了解俱有。如化地部。他們這樣說，慧有兩種同時產生，一種是相應的，一種是不相應的。相應的慧知道不相應的慧，不相應的慧知道相應的慧。俱舍法師解釋說：所說的相應，是與同時生起的心聚相應。不相應，就是前後的念頭，不與同時的心聚相應。這兩種慧互相知道。現在還不明白緣俱有法這句話的意思。以及西方師的意義，等待以後檢查文獻。現在又解釋說：所說的相應，就是四蘊。不相應，就是色蘊，以及前後的四蘊。與四蘊俱，不能緣自己的相應。
【English Translation】 English version: The explanation follows the question. The first two lines are an external inquiry. Because it was previously answered that, apart from the Buddha (Buddha: The Awakened One), even if one knows the minds of others, it is not truly real. Because it takes others as its basis, the similarities are few, and it cannot be called real, differing from the essence, so it is not truly real. Therefore, now it is inquired from the outside: How does the mind-reading wisdom (他心智: the ability to know the minds of others) know that the realm is not truly real? It is like knowing one's own mind-wisdom. The author, in order to explain, does not take the seeing-aspect (見分: the aspect of consciousness that perceives) as conditioning its own seeing-aspect, because apart from the Buddha, no one can condition it. According to a single moment (剎那: an extremely short period of time), it is not measured by before and after. Because it knows truly, it is also not self-awareness. Taking the before and after conditions, as well as conditioning other consciousnesses (別識: other consciousnesses), also because of the transformed appearance, it is not truly real. The other person then asks: How do you know that both oneself and others cannot know truly? The word '不知' ('not knowing') in the fourth line of the verse is the author's answer. If the mind-reading wisdom, apart from the Buddha, is obscured by attachment to the Dharma (法執: attachment to the teachings), whether it is manifest or a seed, there is this ignorance (無知: ignorance) covering the mind and the realm, so it cannot know. That is, because of this covering, it does not know the realm beyond words that is practiced by the Buddha's pure wisdom (凈智: pure wisdom). The phrase '一不知' ('one does not know') can both answer the previous question and show the reason for not knowing like the Buddha. According to the meaning of this theory, the '不知' ('not knowing') in the verse, combining ignorance (無知: ignorance) and not knowing (不知: not knowing) is called '不知' ('not knowing'), which can simultaneously answer the question and explain. The commentary says: However, the Sthavira school (上座部: a early Buddhist school) and others believe that the mind-associated dharmas (心相應之法: mental factors that arise together with consciousness) in the same group can also condition each other. The ninth volume of the Vibhasa (婆沙: a commentary) says: Like the Dharmaguptaka school (法密部: a Buddhist school), they say that wisdom (慧: wisdom) and others can understand the corresponding feeling (受: feeling) and others. This meaning is not that each can condition itself, but that they condition each other. The Vibhasa also says: Or some believe that the mind (心: mind) and mental factors (心所法: mental factors) can understand what exists together. Like the Sarvastivadins (化地部: a Buddhist school). They say that there are two kinds of wisdom (慧: wisdom) that arise simultaneously, one associated and one not associated. The associated wisdom knows the non-associated wisdom, and the non-associated wisdom knows the associated wisdom. The Kosa master (俱舍法師: a master of Abhidharma-kosa) explains: What is called associated is associated with the mind-group that arises simultaneously. Non-associated is the previous and subsequent thoughts, not associated with the simultaneous mind-group. These two wisdoms know each other. Now I still do not understand the meaning of the phrase 'conditioning co-existing dharmas'. And the meaning of the Western masters, wait for later examination of the literature. Now it is explained again: What is called associated is the four aggregates (四蘊: the four aggregates of existence). Non-associated is the form aggregate (色蘊: the aggregate of form), and the previous and subsequent four aggregates. Together with the four aggregates, it cannot condition its own association.
緣俱起不相應蘊。名了俱有。智相應蘊前後智知。前後起智。即是不與此智相應。能知此智相應四蘊。即前後相應智更互相知 大眾部說。智等能了為自性故。能了自他。如燈能照為自性故。能照自他。
論。如有真火等者。本云。依他之中有似法無似我。法謂軌持。依他中有。我謂主宰。依他中無。法別種起。我無別種。不障名似。但有無別。余多不了。異釋云云。要集中說人類猛等及緣自共相等皆不得意。設難失宗。煩不能敘。
問疏中立量。如第六識緣張人時。張人身中餘一切法皆應緣著。雖就他宗為此比量。大乘自宗定心緣時。得張人身一切法不。若不得者應非現量。不得自相故。若許得者。人是假法。共相無體。現量證智如何得緣 答現量心緣。得自相者。各附己體而分明得知和合法假說為人。非作一解名得自相。
釋燒心口。外人返難。如汝定心及五．八識得法自相。緣火之時何不燒心 答宗計有別。汝執言說得自相者。如似身根得火自相。即覺燒熱。火以燒熱為自相故。心等亦然。既得自相何不燒熱。此就外道難。非大乘宗。大乘宗者根非所燒。而言得自相者。各附己體分明而得。非分別貫通余法名得自相。不同外道。若外道余乘。各執言說得法自相亦同身根。故作此難。大乘不爾
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：緣俱起不相應蘊（指與因緣共同生起但不相應的蘊），名為『了俱有』。與智慧相應的蘊，通過前後的智慧來認知。前後生起的智慧，就是不與這個智慧相應的。能夠認知這個智慧相應的四蘊，就是前後相應的智慧互相認知。 大眾部（佛教部派之一）認為，智慧等以能了別為自性，因此能了別自身和他物。就像燈以能照亮為自性，因此能照亮自身和他物。
論：如有真火等。原本說：『在依他起性（佛教術語，指事物依賴其他條件而生起）中，有相似的法但沒有相似的我。』法指軌持（軌範和保持），在依他起性中有。我指主宰，在依他起性中沒有。法有不同的種子生起，我沒有不同的種子。不障礙名稱相似，只是有無的區別。其餘大多不明白。不同的解釋是這樣說的。要集中說明人類的猛烈等以及緣自共相等，都不得要領。如果設難，就會失去宗旨，煩瑣不能詳述。
問：疏中立量（佛教邏輯中的一種論證方式），如第六識（意識）緣張人（假設的人名）時，張人身上其餘一切法都應該被緣著。雖然就其他宗派為此比量，大乘自宗（大乘佛教自身宗派）在定心緣時，能得到張人身上的一切法嗎？如果得不到，應該不是現量（直接的認知），因為沒有得到自相（自身的特性）。如果允許得到，人是假法（虛假的法），共相（共同的特性）沒有實體，現量證智（通過現量獲得的智慧）如何能夠緣到？ 答：現量心緣，得到自相，各自依附自己的本體而分明地得知，和合法假說為人。不是作一種解釋叫做得到自相。
釋燒心口：外人反駁，如果你們的定心以及五、八識（佛教中的識）得到法的自相，緣火的時候為什麼不燒心？ 答：宗派的見解有區別。你們認為言說得到自相，就像身體的根得到火的自相，就感覺到燒熱。火以燒熱為自相。心等也是這樣，既然得到自相為什麼不燒熱？這是就外道（佛教以外的學說）來設難，不是大乘宗的觀點。大乘宗認為根不是被燒的，說得到自相，是各自依附自己的本體分明地得到，不是分別貫通其餘的法叫做得到自相，不同於外道。如果外道或其他乘，各自認為言說得到法的自相，也像身體的根一樣，所以這樣設難。大乘不是這樣。
【English Translation】 English version: The aggregates that arise together with conditions but are not corresponding are called 'simultaneous co-existence'. The aggregates corresponding to wisdom are known through the wisdom that precedes and follows. The wisdom that arises before and after is not corresponding to this wisdom. Being able to know the four aggregates corresponding to this wisdom means that the wisdom corresponding before and after mutually knows each other. The Mahasanghika school (one of the early Buddhist schools) believes that wisdom, etc., takes the ability to discern as its nature, therefore it can discern itself and others. Just as a lamp takes the ability to illuminate as its nature, therefore it can illuminate itself and others.
Treatise: As in the case of real fire, etc. The original text says: 'In dependent origination (a Buddhist term referring to the arising of things dependent on other conditions), there is a likeness of dharma but no likeness of self.' Dharma refers to the principle of upholding and maintaining, which exists in dependent origination. Self refers to mastery, which does not exist in dependent origination. Dharma has different seeds arising, while self has no different seeds. This does not hinder the similarity of names, but only the difference between existence and non-existence. Most of the rest is not understood. Different interpretations say so. To focus on explaining the fierceness of humans, etc., and the characteristics of self and commonality, etc., is not to grasp the essence. If one raises difficulties, one will lose the main point, and it is too tedious to describe in detail.
Question: Establishing a measure (a form of argument in Buddhist logic) in the commentary, such as when the sixth consciousness (consciousness) cognizes Zhang Ren (a hypothetical person's name), all other dharmas on Zhang Ren's body should be cognized as well. Although this comparison is made for other schools, does the Mahayana school (the Mahayana Buddhist school itself) obtain all the dharmas on Zhang Ren's body when the mind is in concentration? If not, it should not be direct perception (immediate cognition), because it has not obtained the self-characteristic (its own characteristics). If it is allowed to be obtained, a person is a false dharma (illusory dharma), and the common characteristic (common characteristics) has no substance, how can direct perception wisdom (wisdom obtained through direct perception) cognize it? Answer: Direct perception mind cognizes, obtains the self-characteristic, and each relies on its own essence to clearly know, and the combination of dharmas is conventionally called a person. It is not making one explanation called obtaining the self-characteristic.
Explanation of burning the heart and mouth: Outsiders retort, if your concentrated mind and the five and eight consciousnesses (consciousnesses in Buddhism) obtain the self-characteristic of dharma, why doesn't it burn the heart when cognizing fire? Answer: The views of the schools are different. You believe that speech obtains the self-characteristic, just like the root of the body obtains the self-characteristic of fire, and then feels the burning heat. Fire takes burning heat as its self-characteristic. The mind, etc., is also like this, since it obtains the self-characteristic, why doesn't it burn with heat? This is posing a difficulty based on external paths (doctrines outside of Buddhism), not the view of the Mahayana school. The Mahayana school believes that the root is not burned, and saying that it obtains the self-characteristic means that each relies on its own essence to clearly obtain it, not that distinguishing and connecting with other dharmas is called obtaining the self-characteristic, which is different from external paths. If external paths or other vehicles each believe that speech obtains the self-characteristic of dharma, it is also like the root of the body, so this difficulty is posed. Mahayana is not like this.
故自無過。
言今緣青作青解者。此比量知不稱前法。如眼識緣色。稱自相故不作色解。後起意識緣色共相作青等解 問前言緣瓶雖不堅執是非量收。非青青解何名比量 答瓶依多法作一解。不稱法體非量收。青不依多順法體。由有分別比量攝 若爾定心作青等解不。若不作解 云何遍處勝處作青等觀。若作青等解。定心應比量 答雖作青解各附自體不貫通余。得是現量。不凈觀等準此可知。
問言假智詮依共相轉。為緣故名轉。為行解名轉。若緣故名轉。共相體無。智緣何起 答共相雖依本質自相增益似有。假智緣時還依本質以變相分。質．相俱無彼共相體。智但緣相。不能緣著彼之共相。義說共相以為所緣。顯詮緣不著。名依共轉。或於行解亦得名轉。但生行解。無彼共相 若爾何故名依共相轉 答依共相解轉 若爾行解．緣用有何差別 答如我執心所緣無我。而自執情妄作我解。即緣妄解能執心生。故論云。起自心相分別許度執為實我起自心相。疏有兩解。此依后解。法執亦然。此假智．詮雖非堅執。行相似彼 若爾行解所取及以共相。俱無體性。何得成緣 答假智緣時。隨其所應必定質．相心方得生。故成緣義。非無相．質而心獨起 問既論色體實非青．黃。然假智詮詮緣青時。為遮為表。若但
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，本身並沒有過失。
關於『現在因為緣于青色而理解為青色』的說法，這是通過比量來了解，並不符合之前的法。比如眼識緣於色，符合其自相，因此不將其理解為色。後起的意識緣於色的共相，將其理解為青色等等。問題：之前說緣于瓶子，雖然沒有堅固地執著是非，屬於非量所攝，但如果不是青色的理解，又怎麼能稱為比量呢？回答：瓶子依賴於多種法而形成一種理解，不符合法的本體，因此不屬於量所攝。青色不依賴於多種法，順應法的本體，因此由有分別的比量所攝。如果這樣，那麼在禪定中的心是否會產生青色等的理解呢？如果不產生理解，那麼如何在遍處、勝處中進行青色等的觀想？如果產生青色等的理解，那麼禪定中的心就應該屬於比量。回答：雖然產生了青色的理解，但各自附著于自體，不貫通其他，因此是現量。不凈觀等可以參照這個來理解。
問題：假智詮（假想的智慧詮釋）依賴於共相而運轉，是因為緣故而稱為運轉，還是因為行解（行為理解）而稱為運轉？如果是緣故而稱為運轉，那麼共相本身並不存在，智慧緣于什麼而生起呢？回答：共相雖然依賴於本質自相增益，看起來好像存在。假智緣于共相時，還是依賴於本質，以變相的部分。質（本質）、相（現象）都不存在，那個共相的本體也不存在。智慧只是緣于相，不能緣著那個共相。從意義上說，共相可以作為所緣，顯示詮釋緣起時不執著，稱為依賴於共相運轉。或者在行解上也可以稱為運轉，但只是產生行解，沒有那個共相。如果這樣，為什麼稱為依賴於共相運轉呢？回答：依賴於共相的理解而運轉。如果這樣，行解和緣用有什麼差別呢？回答：比如我執的心所緣的是無我，但自己的執著卻妄想地理解為我，這就是緣于虛妄的理解，能夠產生執著的心。所以論中說：『生起自心相，分別許度，執著為真實的我，生起自心相。』疏中有兩種解釋，這裡採用后一種解釋。法執也是這樣。這種假智詮雖然不是堅固的執著，但行為上類似於那種執著。如果這樣，行解所取以及共相，都沒有本體，怎麼能成為緣呢？回答：假智緣于共相時，根據情況，必定要有本質和現象，心才能產生，所以才能成為緣。不是沒有現象和本質，心就能獨自生起。問題：既然說色的本體實際上不是青色或黃色，那麼假智詮在詮釋緣于青色時，是爲了遮止還是爲了表述？如果只是
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, there is no fault in itself.
Regarding the statement 'now, because of being conditioned by blue, it is understood as blue,' this is known through inference (Pramana), and it does not conform to the previous Dharma. For example, eye consciousness is conditioned by color (rupa), conforming to its own characteristic (svalaksana), and therefore does not understand it as color. Subsequent consciousness, arising from the common characteristic (samanya-laksana) of color, understands it as blue, etc. Question: Previously, it was said that being conditioned by a pot, although there is no firm attachment to right or wrong, it is included in non-valid cognition (a-pramana). If it is not the understanding of blue as blue, how can it be called inference? Answer: A pot relies on multiple dharmas to form one understanding, which does not conform to the essence of the dharma, and therefore is not included in valid cognition. Blue does not rely on multiple dharmas, but conforms to the essence of the dharma, and therefore is included in inference with discrimination (savikalpa-pramana). If this is the case, does the mind in meditation (samadhi) produce the understanding of blue, etc.? If it does not produce understanding, then how can one contemplate blue, etc., in the all-encompassing spheres (kasina) and the stages of mastery (abhibhayatana)? If it produces the understanding of blue, etc., then the mind in meditation should belong to inference. Answer: Although the understanding of blue arises, it is attached to its own self-nature (svabhava) and does not connect with others, therefore it is direct perception (pratyaksha). The contemplation of impurity (asubha-bhavana), etc., can be understood in the same way.
Question: The imagined wisdom-explanation (kalpita-jnana-vyakhyana) relies on the common characteristic (samanya-laksana) to operate. Is it called 'operate' because of the condition (pratyaya), or because of the action-understanding (karma-jnana)? If it is called 'operate' because of the condition, then the common characteristic itself does not exist. What does wisdom arise from? Answer: Although the common characteristic relies on the essence (vastu) and self-characteristic (svalaksana) to increase and seems to exist, when imagined wisdom is conditioned by it, it still relies on the essence, with the part of the transformed appearance (vikara-rupa). The essence and appearance do not exist, and the essence of that common characteristic does not exist either. Wisdom is only conditioned by the appearance and cannot be attached to that common characteristic. In terms of meaning, the common characteristic can be regarded as the object of cognition (alambana), showing that the explanation does not cling when arising, and it is called relying on the common characteristic to operate. Or it can also be called 'operate' in terms of action-understanding, but only action-understanding arises, and that common characteristic does not exist. If this is the case, why is it called relying on the common characteristic to operate? Answer: It relies on the understanding of the common characteristic to operate. If this is the case, what is the difference between action-understanding and the function of condition? Answer: For example, the mind of self-grasping (atma-graha) is conditioned by non-self (anatma), but one's own clinging falsely understands it as self. This is being conditioned by a false understanding, which can produce the clinging mind. Therefore, the treatise says: 'Arising from one's own mind-appearance (citta-rupa), discriminating and allowing measurement, clinging to it as the real self, arising from one's own mind-appearance.' There are two explanations in the commentary, and this uses the latter explanation. The clinging to dharma (dharma-graha) is also like this. This imagined wisdom-explanation, although not a firm clinging, is similar to that clinging in action. If this is the case, the object taken by action-understanding and the common characteristic both have no essence, how can they become a condition? Answer: When imagined wisdom is conditioned, according to the situation, there must be essence and appearance for the mind to arise, so it can become a condition. It is not that the mind can arise alone without appearance and essence. Question: Since it is said that the essence of color is actually not blue or yellow, then when imagined wisdom-explanation explains being conditioned by blue, is it for negation or for expression? If it is only
是遮。應無所詮緣。如何實色等說有青．黃等。若亦有表。即詮緣青等。如何說言不得自相 答如似色言依法假立。非體如言即實是色。青等亦爾。但遮于余。意欲表此。說通遮．表。非以有表即得自相。五．八緣時。不作色非色青非青等解。但證相緣故得自相。
問無色界無聲。假智依何起。答有三解。一依多分說。二亦有聲。依定果說。三曾下二界數聞于彼。以串習故假智亦起。
問論云能詮所詮俱非自相。若能所詮俱非自相。可依共轉。能緣所緣不言非自相。應不依共轉 答能緣假智亦非自相。有分別故言假智 何故不說 答影略故舉境顯心。
論。似謂增益。本云。自相之上增益共相 西明云。且如眼識得青自相。名實有相。后尋求心重緣青等。非自相青將為自相。故云似謂增益非實有相 集云。有釋尋求心等。于非自相將為自相故名增益。此非共相。尋求非量故 今謂不爾。若尋求心所緣非共。離自共相應有第三相。第三相無非共何攝。又尋求心是假智不。若是假智者。前言假智及詮。唯依諸法共相而轉。若非共相違彼唯言。又復定中亦許尋求。豈是非量 問假智及詮俱非自相。依似事轉。似事非實。即假法如無。如何得有表義名言之所熏種 答若彼本質是可生法。相分似彼。由此名言
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：是遮（Śeṣa， शेष），應無所詮緣（hetu）。如何實色等說有青、黃等？若亦有表，即詮緣青等。如何說言不得自相？ 答：如似色言依法假立，非體如言即實是色。青等亦爾，但遮于余，意欲表此，說通遮、表。非以有表即得自相。五、八緣時，不作色非色青非青等解，但證相緣故得自相。
問：無**無聲，假智依何起？ 答：有三解。一依多分說。二亦有聲，依定果說。三曾下二界數聞于彼，以串習故假智亦起。
問：論云能詮所詮俱非自相。若能所詮俱非自相，可依共轉。能緣所緣不言非自相，應不依共轉？ 答：能緣假智亦非自相，有分別故言假智。何故不說？答：影略故舉境顯心。
論：似謂增益。本云：自相之上增益共相。 西明云：且如眼識得青自相，名實有相。后尋求心重緣青等，非自相青將為自相，故云似謂增益非實有相。 集云：有釋尋求心等，于非自相將為自相故名增益。此非共相，尋求非量故。 今謂不爾。若尋求心所緣非共，離自共相應有第三相。第三相無非共何攝？又尋求心是假智不？若是假智者，前言假智及詮，唯依諸法共相而轉。若非共相違彼唯言。又復定中亦許尋求，豈是非量？ 問：假智及詮俱非自相，依似事轉。似事非實，即假法如無。如何得有表義名言之所熏種？ 答：若彼本質是可生法，相分似彼，由此名言。
【English Translation】 English version Question: Is Śeṣa (शेष, remainder)? There should be no object as the cause of expression (hetu). How can real colors, etc., be said to have blue, yellow, etc.? If there is also indication, then it indicates blue, etc. How can it be said that it does not attain its own-nature (svalakṣaṇa)? Answer: Like the term 'similar color,' it is provisionally established based on the law, not that the substance is actually color as the term suggests. Blue, etc., are also like this, but they negate the rest, intending to indicate this, speaking of both negation and indication. It is not that having indication immediately attains its own-nature. At the time of the five or eight causes, it is not understood as color/non-color, blue/non-blue, etc., but only because the characteristic cause is verified, it attains its own-nature.
Question: Without , without sound, on what does the false wisdom (假智, kalpita-jñāna) arise? Answer: There are three explanations. First, it is based on the majority view. Second, there is also sound, based on the result of samadhi. Third, one has heard it in the lower two realms, and due to familiarity, false wisdom also arises.
Question: The treatise says that both the expressing (能詮, abhidhāna) and the expressed (所詮, abhidheya) are not their own-nature. If both the expressing and the expressed are not their own-nature, they can rely on the common aspect (共相, sāmānyalakṣaṇa) to function. The treatise does not say that the object of cognition (所緣, ālambana) and the cognizing subject (能緣, ālambana) are not their own-nature, so should they not rely on the common aspect to function? Answer: The cognizing false wisdom is also not its own-nature; it is called false wisdom because it has discrimination. Why is it not said? Answer: It is omitted for brevity, so the object is mentioned to reveal the mind.
Treatise: 'Similar' means superimposition. The original text says: 'Superimposing the common aspect on top of the own-nature.' Xi Ming says: 'For example, eye consciousness obtains the own-nature of blue, which is real in name and has an object. Later, the seeking mind repeatedly cognizes blue, etc., taking the non-own-nature blue as its own-nature, so it is said that 'similar' means superimposition, not a real object.' Ji says: 'Some explain that the seeking mind, etc., takes the non-own-nature as its own-nature, hence it is called superimposition. This is not the common aspect, because seeking is not a valid cognition.' Now we say it is not so. If the object of the seeking mind is not common, then apart from the own-nature and the common aspect, there should be a third aspect. If there is no third aspect, where is the non-common aspect included? Also, is the seeking mind false wisdom or not? If it is false wisdom, then the previous statement that false wisdom and expression only function based on the common aspect of all dharmas is contradicted if it is not the common aspect. Furthermore, seeking is also permitted in samadhi, so how can it be non-valid cognition? Question: False wisdom and expression are both not their own-nature, and they function based on similar things. Similar things are not real, that is, false dharmas are like non-existence. How can the seeds of expressive terms be perfumed? Answer: If that essence is a dharma that can be produced, the image-component (相分, ākāra-bhāga) is similar to it, hence the terms.
意解之力。令此相分熏成彼種。相分非假故亦無過。
論。能變有二謂因及果。有多解釋。且準論文及本疏意。因變但種子。果變唯現行。設現熏種不名因變。何以故。論但云一因能變。謂第八識中等流．異熟二因習氣。既言第八識中二因習氣。七現能熏非在八中。亦非習氣。不同三相。三相諸文互說不定。二變更無異文說故 若爾現熏種是何變收 答是果變。或非二變。何以故。若言因非習氣。若言果五七不能現彼種相故 問若爾二變攝義不盡 答不盡何過。二變據勝故。然樞要中作句數者以義說之。或現熏種亦因能變。若說為果。五七所熏豈是現相。此中意說自證所現名種種相故 若爾云何不說能熏亦為因變 答準下第八現亦名種。然說習氣勝顯相續。現因間絕隱略不說。
論。此中且說我愛執藏等 西明約引．滿異熟果簡。不異本釋 有解別簡。我愛執藏目阿賴耶。持雜染種即目陀那。最初能變異熟果識名為異熟 今謂不爾。陀那通佛。非持雜染故 要集云。謂我法所依能變。於二位中別簡六識至第七地顯我執位真執藏處。八地已上除金剛位。持雜染種顯法執位俱唯第八。故頌偏說第八異熟。今謂不爾。若兼法執依。即初能變非最先舍。違下文故。今本釋意有二種簡。一簡他。謂餘六識非真異熟。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 意解之力。令此相分熏成彼種。相分並非虛假，因此也沒有過失。
論：能變有二種，即因能變和果能變。對此有多種解釋。暫且按照論文和本疏的意義，因能變只是指種子，果能變只是指現行。假設現行熏習種子不稱為因能變。為什麼呢？論文只說『一因能變』，指的是第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）中的等流因（Nisyanda-hetu）和異熟因（Vipaka-hetu）兩種習氣（Vasanas）。既然說是第八識中的兩種因的習氣，那麼五、六、七識的現行熏習就不在第八識中，也不是習氣，這與三相（生、住、滅，Three characteristics of conditioned existence）不同。三相的各種說法互相不定，而二能變沒有不同的說法。如果這樣，現行熏習種子屬於哪種能變呢？回答是果能變，或者不是二能變。為什麼呢？如果說是因，就不是習氣；如果說是果，五、六、七識不能顯現那種種相。問：如果這樣，二能變的攝義不完全。答：不完全也沒有過失，二能變是根據殊勝之處而說的。然而，《樞要》中計算句數的人，是用義理來解釋的。或者現行熏習種子也是因能變。如果說是果，五、六、七識所熏習的怎麼會是現相呢？這裡的意思是說自證分（Svasamvedana）所顯現的稱為種種相。如果這樣，為什麼不說能熏也是因能變呢？回答是按照下面的說法，第八識的現行也稱為種。然而，說習氣是爲了更明顯地顯示相續，現行作為因是間斷的，所以隱略不說。
論：這裡暫且說我愛執藏等。西明用引滿異熟果來簡別，與本釋沒有不同。有解釋是分別簡別。我愛執藏指的是阿賴耶識，持雜染種指的是末那識（Manas）。最初的能變異熟果識稱為異熟識。現在認為不是這樣，末那識也通於佛，不是持雜染種。要集說：指的是我法所依的能變，在二位中分別簡別六識到第七地，顯示我執位的真執藏處。八地以上，除了金剛位（Vajra），持雜染種顯示法執位，都只有第八識。所以頌文偏說第八異熟。現在認為不是這樣，如果兼顧法執所依，就是最初的能變，不是最先捨棄的，與下文相違背。現在本釋的意義有兩種簡別：一是簡別他，指的是其餘六識不是真正的異熟。
【English Translation】 English version: The power of intentional understanding causes this aspect of phenomena to be熏成 (xun cheng, imbued/perfumed) into that seed. Since the aspect of phenomena is not false, there is no fault.
Treatise: There are two kinds of transformation: causal transformation and resultant transformation. There are many explanations for this. For now, according to the meaning of the treatise and its commentary, causal transformation refers only to seeds, and resultant transformation refers only to present activity. Suppose the present activity熏習 (xun xi, perfuming/influencing) the seed is not called causal transformation. Why? The treatise only says 'one causal transformation,' referring to the two kinds of habitual energies (Vasanas) of the 等流因 (Nisyanda-hetu, cause of outflow) and 異熟因 (Vipaka-hetu, cause of different maturation) within the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana). Since it is said that the two kinds of habitual energies are within the eighth consciousness, the present activity of the five, six, and seventh consciousnesses is not within the eighth consciousness, nor is it a habitual energy, which is different from the three characteristics (生、住、滅, Three characteristics of conditioned existence). The various statements about the three characteristics are mutually uncertain, while there are no different statements about the two transformations. If so, to which transformation does the present activity熏習 (xun xi, perfuming/influencing) the seed belong? The answer is resultant transformation, or neither of the two transformations. Why? If it is said to be a cause, it is not a habitual energy; if it is said to be a result, the five, six, and seventh consciousnesses cannot manifest that variety of phenomena. Question: If so, is the meaning encompassed by the two transformations incomplete? Answer: It is not a fault that it is incomplete; the two transformations are spoken of according to their superior aspects. However, those who calculate the number of sentences in the Essential Points explain it in terms of meaning. Or, the present activity熏習 (xun xi, perfuming/influencing) the seed is also a causal transformation. If it is said to be a result, how can what is熏習 (xun xi, perfuming/influencing) by the five, six, and seventh consciousnesses be a present phenomenon? The meaning here is that what is manifested by the self-awareness (Svasamvedana) is called the variety of phenomena. If so, why is it not said that the熏習 (xun xi, perfuming/influencing) is also a causal transformation? The answer is that, according to the following statement, the present activity of the eighth consciousness is also called a seed. However, speaking of habitual energy is to more clearly show continuity; the present activity as a cause is intermittent, so it is implicitly not spoken of.
Treatise: Here, let us temporarily speak of attachment to self, clinging to the storehouse, etc. Ximing uses the 引滿異熟果 (yin man yi shu guo, drawing full different maturation result) to distinguish, which is no different from the original explanation. Some explanations are to distinguish separately. Attachment to self and clinging to the storehouse refer to the Alaya-vijnana, while holding the seeds of defilement refers to the Manas (末那識). The initial transforming different maturation result consciousness is called the different maturation consciousness. Now it is thought that this is not the case; the Manas is also common to the Buddhas, and does not hold the seeds of defilement. The Essential Collection says: It refers to the transformation that is relied upon by self and phenomena, distinguishing the six consciousnesses up to the seventh ground in the two positions, revealing the true clinging place of the attachment to self in the position of attachment to self. Above the eighth ground, except for the Vajra (金剛位) position, holding the seeds of defilement reveals the position of attachment to phenomena, which is only the eighth consciousness. Therefore, the verse speaks only of the eighth different maturation. Now it is thought that this is not the case; if it also takes into account what is relied upon by the attachment to phenomena, it is the initial transformation, not the first to be abandoned, which contradicts the following text. Now the meaning of the original explanation has two kinds of distinctions: one is to distinguish others, referring to the other six consciousnesses that are not true different maturation.
二簡自。八地已去雖真異熟。非是我執恒愛著處。已舍我執故。故下釋云。初能變識大小乘教名阿賴耶 又云。此識自相分位雖多。藏初過重。是故偏說。若以異熟取法執依。攝此果相而為自相。何得藏初過重。又下辨舍。先阿賴耶非異熟識。故今此文顯簡自他。但取我執所依。持雜染種異熟果識。名為能變。非皆攝盡故云且說。頌分或為十一門。以不可知唯此識有。余識所無故別為門。別離受俱故有十一。或受攝入心所門中即為十門。若不可知即二行相不別為門。即離說受故但十門。
論。能藏所藏等。西明三釋。第一八現望余現。第二以雜染種為能藏。種能持果故。第三現．種俱能藏。意取第二 要集亦取第二為正云。雜染品種望本識體但是所依。無因緣義。現行七識望第八現亦無因緣故。第二釋是彼宗也。然三相中因相。與此義意稍異 今謂諸論說能所藏不唯說種。且無性云。證阿賴耶識名阿賴耶。能攝藏諸法者。謂是所熏是習氣義。既云證阿賴耶識名阿賴耶。復云攝藏諸法謂是所熏。明說第八。非諸法種。若雜染種名為能藏。便證種子名阿賴耶。經部種子亦應如是。何關第八 彼論又云。是故復言一切種子識。與一切種子。俱生俱滅故。阿賴耶識與諸轉識互為緣故。展轉攝藏 若即說種名種子識。豈可
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 二簡自：第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）已超越了八地菩薩的境界，雖然它具有真實的異熟果報，但並非是我執（Atma-graha，對自我的執著）恒常愛著之處，因為它已經捨棄了我執。因此，下面的解釋說：最初能轉變的識，在大乘和小乘的教義中被稱為阿賴耶識。又說：此識的自相和分位雖然很多，但藏識最初的過失最為嚴重，所以偏重於說明這一點。如果以異熟果報來執取法執（Dharma-graha，對法的執著）的所依，將此果報之相攝入作為自相，又怎麼能說藏識最初的過失最為嚴重呢？下面的辨析捨棄，首先說明阿賴耶識並非異熟識。所以，現在的這段文字明顯地簡別了自他和他的觀點，只是取我執所依，持有雜染種子（Samklista-bija，不清凈的種子）的異熟果報識，名為能變識，並非全部都攝盡，所以說是『且說』。頌文可以分為十一個門，因為不可知性只有這個識才有，其餘的識所沒有，所以特別分為一個門。由於別離、受和俱生，所以有十一個門。或者將受攝入心所門中，就只有十個門。如果不可知性即是二種行相，不特別分為一個門，即是分離來說受，所以只有十個門。
論：能藏、所藏等。西明（地名，西明寺）有三種解釋。第一種是第八現行識相對於其餘現行識而言。第二種是以雜染種子作為能藏，因為種子能夠持有果報。第三種是現行和種子都能夠藏。意圖採取第二種解釋。要集也採取第二種解釋作為正確的觀點，說：雜染種子相對於本識的體性來說，只是所依，沒有因緣的意義。現行的七識相對於第八識的現行來說，也沒有因緣的意義。第二種解釋是他們的宗派的觀點。然而，三相中的因相，與此義理稍有不同。現在認為，諸論所說的能藏和所藏，不僅僅是說種子。而且無性（菩薩名）說：證明阿賴耶識名為阿賴耶，能夠攝藏諸法，是指被熏習的，是習氣的意義。既然說證明阿賴耶識名為阿賴耶，又說攝藏諸法是指被熏習的，明顯地說的是第八識，而不是諸法的種子。如果雜染種子名為能藏，那麼就證明種子名為阿賴耶，經部（Sautrantika，佛教部派之一）的種子也應該如此，與第八識有什麼關係？
彼論又說：所以又說一切種子識，與一切種子，俱生俱滅。因為阿賴耶識與諸轉識（Pravrtti-vijnana，轉變識）互為因緣，輾轉攝藏。如果直接說種子名為種子識，怎麼可以呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Er Jian Zi: The eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) has surpassed the stage of the eighth Bhumi (Bodhisattva stage), although it possesses the true Vipaka (result of actions), it is not the place where Atma-graha (attachment to self) is constantly cherished, because it has abandoned Atma-graha. Therefore, the following explanation says: The consciousness that can initially transform is called Alaya-vijnana in both Mahayana and Hinayana teachings. It also says: Although the self-nature and divisions of this consciousness are many, the initial faults of the storehouse consciousness are the most serious, so it is emphasized to explain this point. If one takes the Dharma-graha (attachment to phenomena) based on Vipaka, incorporating this aspect of result as self-nature, how can it be said that the initial faults of the storehouse consciousness are the most serious? The following analysis of abandonment first explains that Alaya-vijnana is not Vipaka consciousness. Therefore, this passage clearly distinguishes between self and other's views, only taking the basis of Atma-graha, holding the Vipaka consciousness of Samklista-bija (impure seeds), called the transforming consciousness, not all are included, so it is said 'for now'. The verse can be divided into eleven doors, because unknowability is only possessed by this consciousness, which other consciousnesses do not have, so it is specially divided into one door. Due to separation, reception, and co-arising, there are eleven doors. Or, if reception is included in the mental function door, there are only ten doors. If unknowability is the two aspects, not specially divided into one door, that is, separating to speak of reception, so there are only ten doors.
Treatise: 'The able to store, the stored,' etc. Ximing (place name, Ximing Temple) has three explanations. The first is that the eighth manifest consciousness is relative to the other manifest consciousnesses. The second is to take Samklista-bija as the able to store, because the seeds can hold the results. The third is that both manifest and seeds can store. The intention is to take the second explanation. Yaoji also takes the second explanation as the correct view, saying: Samklista-bija relative to the nature of the original consciousness, is only the basis, without the meaning of cause and condition. The manifest seven consciousnesses relative to the manifest of the eighth consciousness, also have no meaning of cause and condition. The second explanation is the view of their sect. However, the causal aspect in the three aspects is slightly different from this meaning. Now it is believed that the able to store and the stored mentioned in the treatises are not only referring to seeds. Moreover, Wuxing (Bodhisattva name) said: Proving Alaya-vijnana is named Alaya, which can collect and store all dharmas, refers to being perfumed, which is the meaning of habit energy. Since it is said that proving Alaya-vijnana is named Alaya, and it is also said that collecting and storing all dharmas refers to being perfumed, it is clearly saying the eighth consciousness, not the seeds of all dharmas. If Samklista-bija is named the able to store, then it proves that the seeds are named Alaya, the seeds of Sautrantika (one of the Buddhist schools) should also be like this, what does it have to do with the eighth consciousness?
That treatise also says: Therefore, it is also said that all seed consciousness, with all seeds, arise and cease together. Because Alaya-vijnana and the Pravrtti-vijnana (evolving consciousnesses) are causes and conditions for each other, mutually collecting and storing. If directly saying that seeds are named seed consciousness, how can it be?
種子復與種子俱生俱滅。名為展轉攝藏 又若以世親以第二句釋第一句。即證種子名為能藏。何故無著論云。復何緣故此識說名阿賴耶識。謂一切有生雜染品法。於此攝藏。又即此識于彼攝藏。既言此識于彼攝藏。即應種子在現法藏。若如是者。何故復云或諸有情攝藏此識為自我故。豈可執雜染種現以為我。故種子識言不目種子。由現第八能攝種子。名種子識。故諸名中雲或名種子識。能遍住持諸種子故。是故世親以第二句釋第一句。又無性云。於此攝藏者。顯能持習氣。由非唯習氣名阿賴耶識。要能持習氣。如彼說意識。此意即顯現第八識。能持習氣得賴耶名。以能持習氣。如經部師第六意識。若取諸種即唯習氣名阿賴耶識。舉意識喻亦不相似。此種彼現。有差別故 又此論第三正釋彼頌云。由此本識具諸種子故能攝藏諸雜染法。依此建立阿賴耶名。準此豈可但證種子攝藏果法名為本識阿賴耶名 又云亦為有情執藏為我。若說種子。豈可執種以為我耶。若執現識不應言亦。既說亦言。明說現八為能攝藏。復執為我。故說于亦。此論又言。此即顯示初能變識所有自相。攝持因果為自相故 又解因相云。此識因相雖有多種。持種不共故偏說之 若爾現八但為種依不生雜染。何名彼因 答種是識用。不一異故。攝用歸體說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 種子和種子一同產生，一同滅亡，這叫做輾轉攝藏。如果世親菩薩用第二句解釋第一句，就證明種子被稱為能藏。為什麼無著菩薩的論中說：『又是什麼緣故，這個識被稱為阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna，藏識）？』因為一切有生雜染品法，都由此識攝藏。而且這個識也被那些法攝藏。既然說這個識被那些法攝藏，就應該種子在現法藏中。如果這樣，為什麼又說『或者有些有情攝藏這個識作為自我』呢？難道可以執著雜染的種子和現行作為我嗎？所以，『種子識』這個詞不是指種子，而是因為現行的第八識能夠攝藏種子，所以稱為『種子識』。因此，在各種名稱中說『或者名為種子識』，因為它能夠普遍地住持各種種子。所以，世親菩薩用第二句解釋第一句。而且無性菩薩說：『由此攝藏』，顯示能夠持習氣。因為不僅僅是習氣被稱為阿賴耶識，而是要能夠持習氣。就像他們說意識一樣。這個意思就是顯示現行的第八識，能夠持習氣而得到賴耶（Ālaya，藏）這個名稱。因為它能夠持習氣，就像經部師的第六意識一樣。如果取諸種子，就只有習氣被稱為阿賴耶識。用意識來比喻也不相似，因為種子和現行有差別。 而且，這個論的第三部分正確地解釋了那首偈頌，說：『由於這個本識具有各種種子，所以能夠攝藏各種雜染法。依靠這個，建立了阿賴耶（Ālaya，藏）這個名稱。』按照這個，難道可以只證明種子攝藏果法，被稱為本識阿賴耶（Ālaya，藏）嗎？而且說『也為有情執藏作為我』。如果說是種子，難道可以執著種子作為我嗎？如果執著現行識，就不應該說『也』。既然說了『也』，就明確說明現行的第八識是能夠攝藏，並且被執著為我的。所以說了『也』。這個論又說：『這顯示了最初能變識的所有自相，攝持因果作為自相。』而且解釋因相說：『這個識的因相雖然有多種，但因為持種是不共的，所以偏偏說這個。』如果這樣，現行的第八識只是種子的依處，不產生雜染，怎麼能說是雜染的因呢？回答是：種子是識的作用，不是一也不是異。把作用歸於本體來說。
【English Translation】 English version Seeds arise and perish together with seeds. This is called 'mutual retention and storage'. Furthermore, if Vasubandhu (世親) uses the second phrase to explain the first, it proves that seeds are called 'that which can store'. Why does Asaṅga's (無著) treatise say: 'Moreover, for what reason is this consciousness called Ālayavijñāna (阿賴耶識, store consciousness)?' It is because all conditioned defiled dharmas are stored within it. And this consciousness is also stored within those dharmas. Since it is said that this consciousness is stored within those dharmas, then seeds should be in the present dharma store. If that is the case, why is it also said, 'Or some sentient beings store this consciousness as self'? How can one cling to defiled seeds and present phenomena as self? Therefore, the term 'seed consciousness' does not refer to seeds, but because the manifest eighth consciousness can store seeds, it is called 'seed consciousness'. Thus, among the various names, it is said, 'Or it is called seed consciousness' because it can universally sustain all seeds. Therefore, Vasubandhu (世親) uses the second phrase to explain the first. Moreover, Vasubuddhi (無性) says, 'Stored within this' indicates the ability to hold habits. Because it is not only habits that are called Ālayavijñāna (阿賴耶識, store consciousness), but it must be able to hold habits, just as they speak of consciousness. This means that the manifest eighth consciousness can hold habits and obtain the name Ālaya (阿賴耶, store). Because it can hold habits, like the Sautrāntika's (經部師) sixth consciousness. If one takes all seeds, then only habits are called Ālayavijñāna (阿賴耶識, store consciousness). Using consciousness as an analogy is also dissimilar because there is a difference between seeds and manifest phenomena. Moreover, the third part of this treatise correctly explains that verse, saying: 'Because this fundamental consciousness possesses all seeds, it can store all defiled dharmas. Based on this, the name Ālaya (阿賴耶, store) is established.' According to this, can it only be proven that seeds store resultant dharmas and are called fundamental consciousness Ālaya (阿賴耶, store)? Furthermore, it says, 'Also stored by sentient beings as self.' If it is said to be seeds, how can one cling to seeds as self? If one clings to manifest consciousness, one should not say 'also'. Since 'also' is said, it clearly indicates that the manifest eighth consciousness is able to store and is clung to as self. Therefore, 'also' is said. This treatise also says: 'This shows all the self-characteristics of the initial transforming consciousness, holding causes and effects as self-characteristics.' Moreover, explaining the causal aspect, it says: 'Although there are many causal aspects of this consciousness, it is specifically mentioned because holding seeds is unique.' If that is the case, the manifest eighth consciousness is only the basis for seeds and does not produce defilements, how can it be said to be the cause of defilements? The answer is: seeds are the function of consciousness, neither one nor different. Attributing the function to the essence is what is being said.
為法因。無漏法種能所治別。故不說之。若直取種。無漏應取 又識顯現。種子沉隱。以識能持彼種子故。說識為因。義顯種子。如說聞熏為出世種。義顯本有無漏為因。說雜染法與阿賴耶為因緣者。應知亦爾 又親因緣及增上緣。皆名因名緣。經頌俱名因。論釋俱名緣。設就增上名互為因。亦復無妨。持彼熏彼之種子故 又云。三相中因相。與此稍異者 此亦不爾。準此論文。與法為因即是因相。如文具顯。煩不能引。釋賴耶名三藏之義。至下當辨。
問賴耶三相為是體相為是義相 答本疏釋云。自相是體。餘二是義相 西明二解。一云自相是體相。餘二是相狀相。二云三俱體相。故下結云體相 又無性云。略有三者。分折此識自相應相 今詳此釋。雖無文判。然本疏為正。何者若說識中諸法種子以為因相。體相有二。果離自相更無別體。但望酬因義分果相。況此論文說能持種以為因相。故下論云。持種不共故偏說之。離自相體豈有別體為能持種。說為三相不同二障。二障用殊。障性伏斷各各差別。經論誠說二障體別。無文說此三相別體。設有文說。猶有前過。若云相狀體相合說有三。自相有體此即極成。因果狀相為有別體為無別體。若有別體。過即同前。若無別體。即是義相名為相狀。此即前因。何勞別說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為法的緣故。（阿賴耶）無漏法的種子在能治和所治上有所區別，所以不直接說明。（如果）直接取種子，就應該取無漏的種子。而且，識是顯現的，種子是沉隱的。因為識能夠執持那些種子，所以說識是因，這樣就顯明瞭種子。例如說聞熏是出世的種子，就顯明瞭本有的無漏法是因。說雜染法與阿賴耶識互為因緣，也應該知道是同樣的道理。而且，親因緣和增上緣，都可以稱為因，也可以稱為緣。經文和偈頌都稱為因，論的解釋都稱為緣。即使就增上緣來說，互相稱為因，也沒有妨礙，因為（阿賴耶識）執持那些被熏習的種子。又有人說：『三相中的因相，與此（指阿賴耶識的因相）稍有不同。』這也是不對的。按照這篇論文，與法為因就是因相，就像經文清楚顯示的那樣，不必再多加引申。解釋阿賴耶識名稱的三藏含義，將在下文辨析。 問：阿賴耶識的三相是體相還是義相？答：本疏解釋說：『自相是體，其餘二相是義相。』西明有兩種解釋：一種認為自相是體相，其餘二相是相狀相；另一種認為三者都是體相，所以下面總結說『體相』。又無性說：『略有三者，是分析此識的自相應相。』現在詳細考察這些解釋，雖然沒有明確的判決，但本疏的解釋是正確的。為什麼呢？如果說識中的諸法種子是因相，體相有兩種。果離開了自相就沒有別的體，只是從酬因的角度來區分果相。況且這篇論文說能持種是因相，所以下面的論說：『執持種子是不共的，所以特別說明。』離開了自相的體，哪裡還有別的體來執持種子呢？說為三相，不同於二障。二障的作用不同，障的性質和伏斷各有差別，經論確實說了二障的體是不同的。沒有經文說這三相的體是不同的。即使有經文這樣說，仍然有前面的過失。如果說相狀和體相合起來說有三種，自相有體，這是極其明顯的。因果的狀相是有別的體，還是沒有別的體？如果有別的體，過失就和前面一樣。如果沒有別的體，就是義相，稱為相狀。這就是前面的原因，何必另外說明呢？
【English Translation】 English version: Because of the Dharma. The seeds of undefiled (Anasrava) Dharma in Alaya are different in terms of what can be cured and what is to be cured, so it is not directly stated. If one directly takes the seeds, then one should take the undefiled seeds. Moreover, consciousness (Vijnana) is manifest, while seeds are latent. Because consciousness can hold those seeds, it is said that consciousness is the cause, thus revealing the seeds. For example, saying that hearing and perfuming are the seeds of transcending the world reveals that the inherent undefiled Dharma is the cause. It should also be understood that the statement that defiled Dharmas and Alaya consciousness are mutual causes and conditions is the same principle. Furthermore, both direct causes and conditions (Hetu-pratyaya) and supporting causes and conditions (Adhipati-pratyaya) can be called causes and conditions. Sutras and verses are both called causes, while commentaries are called conditions. Even if they are mutually called causes in terms of supporting causes, there is no harm, because (Alaya consciousness) holds those perfumed seeds. Someone also said: 'The cause aspect (Hetu-laksana) in the three aspects is slightly different from this (referring to the cause aspect of Alaya consciousness).' This is also incorrect. According to this treatise, being the cause of Dharma is the cause aspect, just as the text clearly shows, and there is no need to elaborate further. The meaning of the three collections (Tripitaka) in explaining the name Alaya will be discussed below. Question: Are the three aspects of Alaya consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) its essential aspects (Svarupa-laksana) or its functional aspects (Vishesha-laksana)? Answer: The original commentary explains: 'The self-aspect (Svalaksana) is the essence, and the other two aspects are functional aspects.' Ximing has two interpretations: one believes that the self-aspect is the essential aspect, and the other two aspects are the aspect of characteristics; the other believes that all three are essential aspects, so the conclusion below says 'essential aspects.' Furthermore, Asanga said: 'There are briefly three, which are the analysis of the self-responding aspect of this consciousness.' Now, after a detailed examination of these interpretations, although there is no clear judgment, the interpretation of the original commentary is correct. Why? If it is said that the seeds of all Dharmas in consciousness are the cause aspect, there are two essential aspects. The result has no other essence apart from the self-aspect, but the aspect of the result is distinguished from the perspective of repaying the cause. Moreover, this treatise says that the ability to hold seeds is the cause aspect, so the following treatise says: 'Holding seeds is unique, so it is specifically stated.' Apart from the essence of the self-aspect, where else is there another essence to hold seeds? Saying that there are three aspects is different from the two hindrances (avarana). The functions of the two hindrances are different, and the nature and subduing of the hindrances are different. The sutras and treatises indeed say that the essence of the two hindrances is different. There is no text saying that the essence of these three aspects is different. Even if there is a text saying so, there is still the previous fault. If it is said that the combination of the aspect of characteristics and the essential aspect has three, and the self-aspect has an essence, this is extremely obvious. Does the aspect of characteristics of cause and effect have a separate essence, or does it not have a separate essence? If it has a separate essence, the fault is the same as before. If it does not have a separate essence, it is a functional aspect, called the aspect of characteristics. This is the previous cause, why bother to explain it separately?
又自答云。於一體上義說三體。故於自相義說極成。
論。此識因相雖有多種。十因幾因。如樞要辨非聲性故非隨說因。是現行故非牽引．生起。若種因相八。除隨說及相違因。種非聲故。是無記故 六因之中能作幾因 雖顯揚論破破薩婆多。離第八識余現等法非因緣故。雜集論中。依第八識持諸法種。說有六因皆因緣性。且現行識望彼諸法為能作因。能作因寬 又對法雲。依因自性建立能作因故。當知一切因皆能作因所攝。雖現行識非諸法種。據能持種說為因相。攝大乘雲。因相者。謂即如是一切種子阿賴耶識。於一切時與彼雜染品類諸法現前為因。此雖說現識。亦得攝用歸體名因。望七轉識既同生滅即俱有因。望自心所即相應因。故攝論云。俱有因者。即阿賴耶與諸轉識。若離如是俱有因攝內外種子阿賴耶識。所餘因緣定不可得 問俱有．相應二因何別 答俱有通七識。相應自心所。若自心所俱時而生為俱有因 所緣．體等即相應因。望自後念即同類因。通生諸法即遍行因。故無性云。因相即是增盛作用。熏習功能能為因性。現前能生雜染法故 若薩婆多但說苦下五見．疑．癡。集諦下四二見．疑．癡。除三見故。此能遍生五門雜染。名為遍因。
雜集通說四諦諸惑能為遍因。故雜集云。此遍行因
非唯令相似煩惱增長。所以者何。若有隨習貪等煩惱。皆令嗔等一切煩惱相續．增長．堅固等 無性攝論即通說一切。故彼論云。即異門說阿賴耶識同類．遍行．異熟三因。若離任持熏習因性不相應故。既說賴耶由能任持熏習因性為三因性即任持習氣。不別說染故通諸法。或雖總言意但取染。亦得望后自異熟識為異熟因。即此前引。攝論為證 若據克性體用別論。現識望余但能作因。是增上故。若種因相為六因性。能作因通 俱有因者種生于現。既與果俱名俱有因。下云如俱有因者自俱有因。如薩婆多通持業．依主 相應因者。但依主釋 種子前後自類相生即同類因。下云如同類者義同前會。諸名言種生于現行亦同類因。種子．現行性皆同故。故下論云。因果俱是善等性故亦名善等。雜集論云。謂由彼長養諸種子故。于未來世即彼種類增勝而生。乃至云立同類因 遍行因者。自種望余非因緣性。俱為增上由隨轉故假說因緣。異熟因性亦復如是。或可能與遍行為因。以現貪等緣余嗔等熏種生彼名遍行因種是此因亦名遍行因 如似生因因故亦名生因。異熟因亦爾。現行善等為方便因。能感異熟名異熟因。種子能與此異熟因為因亦名異熟因。或能有異熟立異熟名。與此為因名異熟因。現行善等是能有異熟。然雜集論舉果顯彼
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 不僅會令相似的煩惱增長。這是什麼原因呢？如果有人隨順習氣貪婪等煩惱，都會令嗔恨等一切煩惱相續、增長、堅固等。《無性攝論》即通說一切。所以該論說：『即以不同的方式說明阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna，儲存一切種子識）具有同類因、遍行因、異熟因三種因。』如果離開任持熏習的因性，就不相應了。既然說阿賴耶識由於能夠任持熏習的因性而具有三種因性，即任持習氣，不特別說染污，所以通於諸法。或者雖然總的來說是『意』，但只取染污，也可以望向後來的自異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna，果報識）作為異熟因。即此前引用的《攝論》為證。如果根據克性體用分別討論，現識（現在的意識）望向其餘的只能作為增上因（Adhipati-hetu，增強和支援作用的因），是增上的緣故。如果種因相為六因性，能作因（Kāraṇa-hetu，產生結果的直接原因）貫通。 俱有因（Sahabhū-hetu，同時存在的因）是指種子生出現行，既然與果同時存在，就名為俱有因。下文說『如俱有因者自俱有因』，如薩婆多宗（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）貫通持業釋、依主釋。相應因（Samprayuktaka-hetu，相互關聯的因）只是依主釋。種子前後自類相生即同類因（Sabhāga-hetu，同類因）。下文說『如同類者義同前會』。諸名言種生于現行也是同類因，種子、現行性質都相同。所以下論說：『因果都是善等性質，所以也名為善等。』《雜集論》說：『謂由彼長養諸種子故，于未來世即彼種類增勝而生。』乃至說立同類因。 遍行因（Sarvatraga-hetu，普遍存在的因）是指自種望向其餘並非因緣性，都作為增上，由於隨轉的緣故假說因緣，異熟因性也是如此。或者可能與遍行作為因，以現貪等緣其餘嗔等熏種生彼，名為遍行因種，是此因也名為遍行因。如似生因因的緣故也名為生因，異熟因也是這樣。現行善等作為方便因，能夠感得異熟，名為異熟因。種子能夠與此異熟作為因，也名為異熟因。或者能夠有異熟，立異熟名，與此作為因，名為異熟因。現行善等是能夠有異熟的。然而《雜集論》舉果顯示彼。
【English Translation】 English version It not only causes similar afflictions to increase. Why is that? If someone follows the habit of greed and other afflictions, it will cause anger and all other afflictions to continue, increase, and become firm, etc. The Wu Xing She Lun (Treatise on the Absence of Nature) generally explains everything. Therefore, that treatise says: 'It explains in different ways that the Ālayavijñāna (storehouse consciousness) has three causes: the cause of the same kind, the pervasive cause, and the resultant cause.' If it is separated from the causal nature of upholding and perfuming, it will not be corresponding. Since it is said that the Ālayavijñāna has three causal natures because it can uphold and perfume, that is, upholding the habit-energy, it does not specifically mention defilement, so it applies to all dharmas. Or, although it generally refers to 'intention,' it only takes defilement, and it can also look to the later self-Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness) as the resultant cause. That is, the previously cited She Lun (Compendium of Abhidharma) is the proof. If discussed separately according to the nature and function of the Kāraṇa-hetu (efficient cause), the present consciousness can only act as the Adhipati-hetu (dominant cause) in relation to the rest, because it is dominant. If the seed cause is in the form of six causes, the Kāraṇa-hetu (direct cause) is pervasive. The Sahabhū-hetu (co-existent cause) refers to the seed giving rise to the present manifestation. Since it exists simultaneously with the result, it is called the co-existent cause. The following says 'like the co-existent cause, the self-co-existent cause,' such as the Sarvāstivāda (the doctrine that 'all exists') school, which connects the possessive and dependent interpretations. The Samprayuktaka-hetu (associated cause) is only interpreted as dependent. The seeds arising from each other in the same category before and after are the Sabhāga-hetu (cause of the same kind). The following says 'like the cause of the same kind, the meaning is the same as the previous meeting.' The seeds of all names and words giving rise to the present manifestation are also the cause of the same kind, because the nature of the seeds and the present manifestation are the same. Therefore, the following treatise says: 'The cause and effect are both of good nature, so they are also called good, etc.' The Za Ji Lun (Compendium of Categories) says: 'It is said that because they nourish the seeds, in the future, those kinds will be born with increased superiority.' And even establish the cause of the same kind. The Sarvatraga-hetu (pervasive cause) refers to the fact that the self-seed is not the cause and condition of the rest, and all act as dominant, and the cause and condition are falsely said because of the following transformation, and the nature of the resultant cause is also the same. Or it may be possible to take the pervasive as the cause, and the present greed, etc., cause the rest of the anger, etc., to perfume the seeds and give birth to them, which is called the pervasive cause seed, and this cause is also called the pervasive cause. Like the cause of the similar birth cause, it is also called the birth cause, and the resultant cause is also the same. The present good, etc., act as the expedient cause, and can sense the resultant, which is called the resultant cause. The seed can be the cause of this resultant, and it is also called the resultant cause. Or it can have the resultant, establish the name of the resultant, and take this as the cause, which is called the resultant cause. The present good, etc., can have the resultant. However, the Za Ji Lun (Compendium of Categories) cites the result to show it.
能有異熟云。能攝受自體故。即是異熟因。名與小同。義意有別 又此三相文義意殊。準樞要中一云此論三相唯現。然曾聞釋三相俱通種．現二法。且對他宗舉顯勝者。又據前總標此中且說我愛執藏持雜染種能變果識。名為異熟以辨三相。故但說現。理實俱通以爲了義 因果分別云。在因具三相。佛果唯二無其果相。非異熟故者 若爾自相亦應非有。以攝因果而為自相。既無果相。攝何為自 答從舊因生為果。攝諸法種為因。包此二種名攝二相 若爾自相中果相。應與果相別 答果相據勝顯。簡他但異熟。自相談其體。果非唯異熟。但云與雜染法互為緣故。由他能熏第八識起亦即果故 或但攝因以體能持諸法種子。即體攝用而為自相。若親因生即是自相。若離因生無自相故。望他業感方名為果。故佛位無。故攝論云。果相者謂即依彼雜染品法。無始時來所有熏習。阿賴耶識相續而生。此論復說異熟為果 若爾因相佛位亦無。攝論說云因相者。乃至阿賴耶識。於一切時與彼雜染品類諸法現前為因。復云聞熏非賴耶攝 答攝論據染。此論即通。但此能持諸法種子。不但雜染。下文又云一切種相應更分別。通一切故。攝論但以種為因相者。性．用別論。親生諸法。現行不爾。余準可知。
論。又諸有情等。本疏云。唯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『能有異熟云』（Neng You Yishu Yun）：因為它能夠攝受自體，所以是異熟因（yìshú yīn，成熟之因）。名稱和小乘相同，但意義和意圖有所區別。 此外，這三種相的文義和意圖各不相同。根據《樞要》（Shūyào）中的一種說法，此論中的三種相只顯現於現行法（xiànxíng fǎ，當下生起的法）。然而，我曾聽說解釋說三種相都貫通種子法（zhǒngzǐ fǎ，潛在的法）和現行法兩種法。這是針對其他宗派，舉出最顯著的例子。此外，根據前面的總標，這裡且說我愛執藏（wǒ ài zhí zàng，對自我的愛和執著所儲藏之處）持有雜染種子（zázhǎn zhǒngzǐ，不清凈的種子）能夠變成果識（guǒshí，結果的意識），名為異熟，以此來辨別三種相。因此只說現行法，但實際上理應貫通種子法和現行法，以達到究竟的意義。 關於因果的分別說：在因位時，具備三種相；佛果位時，只有兩種相，沒有果相（guǒxiàng，結果的相）。因為佛果不是異熟果。如果這樣，那麼自相（zìxiàng，自性之相）也應該不存在。因為它既包含因也包含果而作為自相，既然沒有果相，那麼包含什麼作為自相呢？ 回答：從舊因產生作為果，包含諸法種子作為因，包含這兩種就叫做包含兩種相。如果這樣，那麼自相中的果相，應該和果相有所區別。回答：果相是根據殊勝之處來顯現，簡別其他只是異熟。自相談論它的本體，果不只是異熟。只是說和雜染法互為緣故，由於其他能夠熏習第八識（第八識，阿賴耶識）生起，也就是果的緣故。或者只是包含因，因為本體能夠持有諸法種子，也就是本體包含作用而作為自相。如果是親因所生，就是自相；如果是離因所生，就沒有自相。相對於其他業感來說，才稱為果，所以佛位沒有。所以《攝論》（Shèlùn）說：『果相是指依靠那些雜染品法，從無始以來所有的熏習，阿賴耶識相續而生。』此論又說異熟作為果。 如果這樣，那麼因相（yīnxiàng，原因之相）在佛位也沒有。《攝論》說：『因相，乃至阿賴耶識，在一切時和那些雜染品類的諸法現前作為因。』又說聞熏不是阿賴耶識所包含的。回答：《攝論》是根據染法來說的，此論則貫通凈染。但是此論能夠持有諸法種子，不只是雜染。下文又說一切種相應更分別，貫通一切。攝論只是以種子作為因相，是根據性用分別來說的。親身產生諸法，現行不是這樣，其餘可以類推得知。 《論》（lùn）：又諸有情等。《本疏》（Běnshū）說：唯
【English Translation】 English version 'Neng You Yishu Yun' (能有異熟云): Because it can embrace its own nature, it is the cause of Vipāka (異熟因, the cause of maturation). The name is the same as in the Hinayana, but the meaning and intention are different. Furthermore, the meaning and intention of these three characteristics are different. According to one statement in the 'Shūyào' (樞要), the three characteristics in this treatise only manifest in the present dharma (現行法, the dharma that arises in the present moment). However, I have heard it explained that the three characteristics all penetrate both the seed dharma (種子法, potential dharma) and the present dharma. This is in response to other schools, citing the most prominent examples. In addition, according to the general statement above, here we will say that the 'I-love-clinging-store' (我愛執藏, the place where love and attachment to the self are stored) holds impure seeds (雜染種子, impure seeds) that can transform into result consciousness (果識, consciousness of result), called Vipāka, in order to distinguish the three characteristics. Therefore, only the present dharma is mentioned, but in reality, it should penetrate both the seed dharma and the present dharma in order to achieve the ultimate meaning. Regarding the distinction between cause and effect, it is said: In the causal stage, all three characteristics are present; in the Buddha's fruition stage, there are only two characteristics, without the characteristic of result (果相, characteristic of result). Because the Buddha's fruition is not a Vipāka result. If so, then the self-characteristic (自相, self-nature characteristic) should also not exist. Because it encompasses both cause and effect as the self-characteristic, and since there is no characteristic of result, then what does it encompass as the self-characteristic? Answer: Arising from the old cause is the result, and encompassing the seeds of all dharmas is the cause. Encompassing these two is called encompassing the two characteristics. If so, then the characteristic of result in the self-characteristic should be different from the characteristic of result. Answer: The characteristic of result is manifested according to its superiority, distinguishing it from others as merely Vipāka. The self-characteristic discusses its essence, and the result is not merely Vipāka. It is only said that they are mutually conditioned with impure dharmas, because others can influence the arising of the eighth consciousness (第八識, Ālaya consciousness), which is also the result. Or it only encompasses the cause, because the essence can hold the seeds of all dharmas, which means the essence encompasses the function as the self-characteristic. If it is born from the direct cause, it is the self-characteristic; if it is born from the indirect cause, there is no self-characteristic. Relative to other karma-induced results, it is called the result, so it does not exist in the Buddha's stage. Therefore, the 'Shèlùn' (攝論) says: 'The characteristic of result refers to the influence of all impure dharmas from beginningless time, arising continuously in the Ālaya consciousness.' This treatise also says that Vipāka is the result. If so, then the characteristic of cause (因相, characteristic of cause) also does not exist in the Buddha's stage. The 'Shèlùn' says: 'The characteristic of cause, up to the Ālaya consciousness, is the cause of all impure dharmas manifesting at all times.' It also says that the influence of hearing is not encompassed by the Ālaya consciousness. Answer: The 'Shèlùn' is based on impure dharmas, while this treatise encompasses both pure and impure. However, this treatise can hold the seeds of all dharmas, not just impure ones. The following text also says that all seeds should be further distinguished, encompassing everything. The 'Shèlùn' only takes seeds as the characteristic of cause, which is based on the distinction between nature and function. The direct cause produces all dharmas, but the present action does not. The rest can be inferred. 'Lùn' (論): Also, all sentient beings, etc. 'Běnshū' (本疏) says: Only
引無漏。初引三文。后結。一引楞伽五姓。皆是有性故。第二瑜伽三無漏根。第三地持等性種姓文。皆唯無漏。然疏中並明無上依等者。通舉諸教意取法爾無漏種子故。疏云。故應定有法爾無漏種子不由熏生。言通證者。是得錯本。又見通舉。謂證二種者不得疏意。
本姓住姓。有人解釋。或取真如。或云住自乘性名本性住姓。又說五姓皆新熏生。又釋真如所緣緣種生 並會五姓文失。並如能顯中邊惠日論。併成立五種姓皆是本有。有漏不能生無漏種。真如不能親生諸法。亦如彼辨。
攝大乘說阿賴耶識等者。彼論第二引瑜伽論第五十一云。何建立互為緣性轉相。謂阿賴耶識與諸轉識作二緣性。一為彼種子故。二為彼依故。為種子者。謂所有善．不善．無記轉識轉時。一切皆用阿賴耶識為種子故因緣也。為所依者。由執色根五識依轉等增上緣也 諸轉識與阿賴耶識作二緣性。一于現法中能長養彼種子故。二於後法中為彼得生攝殖彼種子故。長養種子者。謂如如依止阿賴耶識。善．不善．無記轉識轉時。同生同滅熏習阿賴耶識。後後轉識轉更增長。轉更熾盛。轉明瞭轉。此因緣也。準此但似與後後轉識為因緣。不言與賴耶而作因緣 今解此意言長養彼種子故。謂同生滅熏習阿賴耶識。即熏八識義。且此意望
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
引用無漏種子。首先引用三段經文，最後總結。第一段引用《楞伽經》的五種姓（pañca gotra）（指聲聞、緣覺、菩薩、不定種姓和無種姓五種根性），說明它們都是本有自性。第二段引用《瑜伽師地論》的三無漏根（trīṇi anāsravāṇi mūlāni）（正見、正思惟、正語），第三段引用《地持經》的等性種姓文，都只講無漏。然而，疏文中同時說明無上依（anuttarāśraya）等，是通盤考慮各教派的觀點，採取法爾本具的無漏種子之說。疏文說：『所以應當確定有法爾本具的無漏種子，不是通過熏習產生的。』說『通證』是錯別字，又見『通舉』，認為『證二種』是不理解疏文的意思。 本性住姓（prakṛti-sthita-gotra）有人解釋，或者取真如（tathatā），或者說安住于自身乘性稱為本性住姓。又有人說五種姓都是新熏習產生的。又有人解釋真如所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya）生，這樣會與五種姓的說法相矛盾。這些都如《能顯中邊慧日論》所說，成立五種姓都是本有的，有漏（sāsrava）不能產生無漏（anāsrava）種子，真如不能直接產生諸法，也如該論所辨析。 《攝大乘論》說阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna）等，該論第二卷引用《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷說：『如何建立互為緣性的轉變相？』意思是說，阿賴耶識與諸轉識（pravṛtti-vijñāna）之間存在兩種緣性：一是作為它們的種子，二是作為它們的所依。作為種子，是指所有善、不善、無記的轉識生起時，都以阿賴耶識為種子故，是因緣。作為所依，是指依靠色根（rūpa-indriya），五識（pañca-vijñāna）依之而轉等，是增上緣。諸轉識與阿賴耶識之間也存在兩種緣性：一是在現法中能夠長養阿賴耶識的種子，二是在後法中為阿賴耶識的產生攝取和積累種子。長養種子，是指如實地依止阿賴耶識，善、不善、無記的轉識生起時，同時生滅熏習阿賴耶識，後後的轉識生起時更加增長，更加熾盛，更加明瞭。這是因緣。』按照這個說法，似乎只是與後後的轉識作為因緣，沒有說與阿賴耶識作為因緣。現在解釋這個意思說，『長養彼種子故』，是指同時生滅熏習阿賴耶識，也就是熏習八識（aṣṭa vijñāna）的意思。暫且這樣理解。
【English Translation】 English version:
It cites the Anāsrava (untainted) seed. First, it quotes three texts, and then concludes. The first quote is from the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra regarding the five gotras (pañca gotra) (referring to the five natures of Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas, Bodhisattvas, the uncertain gotra, and those without gotra), stating that they all have inherent nature. The second quote is from the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra regarding the three Anāsrava roots (trīṇi anāsravāṇi mūlāni) (right view, right thought, right speech). The third quote is from the Bodhisattvabhūmi regarding the Samatā-gotra text, all of which only speak of the Anāsrava. However, the commentary also explains the Anuttarāśraya (supreme reliance), etc., which is a comprehensive consideration of the views of various schools, adopting the doctrine of the naturally inherent Anāsrava seed. The commentary says: 'Therefore, it should be determined that there is a naturally inherent Anāsrava seed, which is not produced through conditioning.' The term 'common proof' is a mistake, and seeing 'general mention' and thinking it 'proves two kinds' does not understand the meaning of the commentary. The Prakṛti-sthita-gotra (inherently abiding gotra) is interpreted by some as taking it to mean the Tathatā (suchness), or saying that abiding in one's own vehicle nature is called the Prakṛti-sthita-gotra. Others say that the five gotras are all newly conditioned. Still others explain that the Ālambana-pratyaya (object-condition) of the Tathatā gives rise to them, which contradicts the statement of the five gotras. These are all as explained in the Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā, establishing that the five gotras are all inherent, that the Sāsrava (tainted) cannot produce the Anāsrava seed, and that the Tathatā cannot directly produce all dharmas, as also analyzed in that treatise. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha speaks of the Ālayavijñāna (store consciousness), etc. The second chapter of that treatise quotes the fifty-first chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, saying: 'How is the mutually conditioning transformation established?' It means that there are two kinds of conditioning between the Ālayavijñāna and the Pravṛtti-vijñāna (active consciousnesses): one is as their seed, and the other is as their support. As a seed, it means that when all good, non-good, and neutral active consciousnesses arise, they all use the Ālayavijñāna as their seed, hence it is the cause-condition. As a support, it means relying on the Rūpa-indriya (sense organ of sight), the Pañca-vijñāna (five consciousnesses) rely on it to transform, etc., hence it is the Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition). There are also two kinds of conditioning between the active consciousnesses and the Ālayavijñāna: one is that in the present dharma, they can nourish the seed of the Ālayavijñāna, and the other is that in the subsequent dharma, they gather and accumulate seeds for the production of the Ālayavijñāna. Nourishing the seed means that truly relying on the Ālayavijñāna, when good, non-good, and neutral active consciousnesses arise, they simultaneously arise and cease, conditioning the Ālayavijñāna, and when the subsequent active consciousnesses arise, they increase even more, become even more intense, and become even clearer. This is the cause-condition.' According to this statement, it seems that it is only as a cause-condition with the subsequent active consciousnesses, and it does not say that it is as a cause-condition with the Ālayavijñāna. Now, explaining this meaning, 'nourishing that seed' means that simultaneously arising and ceasing, conditioning the Ālayavijñāna, which is the meaning of conditioning the Aṣṭa vijñāna (eight consciousnesses). Let's understand it this way for now.
種子賴耶為因緣性。言與賴耶為因緣性。影顯生現持諸熏習令轉識生 不爾與前轉識轉時。一切皆用阿賴耶識為種何別 又是轉識與轉識為因。非賴耶因也 又前賴耶且望與現轉識為因。影顯亦與彼種為因。此中轉識且望賴耶種子為因。影顯亦與現行為因。何故如是。生轉識種現能熏勝。隱八不言。生現第八種子因勝。隱現不言。故但說言于現法中。能長養彼種子故。即現熏種。現是種因 於後法中為彼得生攝殖彼種子者。謂彼熏習種類。能引攝當來異熟無記阿賴耶識者。此約業種引當異熟為增上緣 言謂彼熏習種類者。業種是彼名言種類。為彼得生攝殖彼種子。即顯由業彼方得生。不爾異熟不能生故。
論。如炷與焰展轉生燒等者。初喻三法。后喻因果。俱喻因緣 西明釋云。三法喻能生因。后喻依持因 要集云。無性釋意。燈喻互為因緣生緣。束蘆喻更互依持令住不倒。亦順瑜伽五十一文。彼彼明建立緣性及俱轉相故 今謂無性蘆喻依持。此喻俱有因。故頌前問。若唯本有。轉識不應與阿賴耶為因緣性。釋頌復云。於一切時展轉相生互為因果。結云唯依此二建立因緣。又下云。三法展轉因果俱時。如炷生焰焰生爝炷。亦如束蘆更互相依。因果俱時理不傾動 又云能熏生種種起現行如俱有因。故雖云相依。意
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：種子賴耶（Ālaya，阿賴耶識，藏識）是作為因緣性的。那麼，現行轉識與賴耶識之間是如何構成因緣性的呢？是現行轉識的影顯作用生起、顯現並保持著各種熏習，從而使轉識得以產生。如果不是這樣，那麼在之前的轉識轉起時，一切都以阿賴耶識為種子，這又有什麼區別呢？而且，是轉識與轉識之間互為因，而不是賴耶識作為因。此外，之前的賴耶識且看作是與現行轉識互為因，影顯作用也與彼種子互為因。這裡所說的轉識且看作是與賴耶識的種子互為因，影顯作用也與現行互為因。為什麼會這樣呢？因為生起轉識的種子和現行具有更強的熏習能力，所以隱去了第八識（阿賴耶識）而不提。生起現行時，第八識的種子作為因的力量更強，所以隱去了現行而不提。因此，只說在現行法中，能夠長養彼種子，即現行熏習種子，現行是種子的因。在後來的法中，爲了使彼種子得以生起，攝取並滋養彼種子，指的是彼熏習的種類，能夠引攝當來的異熟無記阿賴耶識。這指的是業種作為增上緣，引生當來的異熟果報。 論：如燈炷與火焰展轉相生、燃燒等，最初的比喻是三種法，後面的比喻是因果，都比喻了因緣。西明的解釋說，三種法比喻能生之因，後面的比喻是依持之因。要集的解釋說，無性的解釋是，燈的比喻是互為因緣的生緣，捆紮的蘆葦的比喻是互相依持，使之能夠站立不倒。這也符合《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷的文義，其中闡明了建立緣性和共同運轉的相狀。現在我認為，無性用蘆葦比喻依持，這個比喻是俱有因。所以針對前面的提問，如果只有本有的種子，那麼轉識就不應該與阿賴耶識構成因緣性。解釋頌文又說，在一切時展轉相生，互為因果。結論說，唯有依靠這二者才能建立因緣。又在下文說，三種法展轉因果同時，如燈炷生火焰，火焰生燈炷，也如捆紮的蘆葦互相依靠，因果同時，道理不會傾斜動搖。又說，能熏生起種種現行，如同俱有因。所以雖然說是相依，但意思是俱有因。
【English Translation】 English version: The seed Ālaya (Ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) is of the nature of conditionality. How does the present active consciousness relate to Ālaya-vijñāna in terms of conditionality? It is the manifestation of the present active consciousness that arises, appears, and maintains various habitual energies, thereby enabling the arising of consciousness. If this were not the case, then when the previous consciousness arises, everything would use Ālaya-vijñāna as the seed. What would be the difference? Moreover, it is consciousness relating to consciousness that serves as the cause, not Ālaya-vijñāna. Furthermore, the previous Ālaya-vijñāna is regarded as the cause in relation to the present active consciousness, and the manifestation also serves as the cause in relation to that seed. Here, the consciousness is regarded as the cause in relation to the seed of Ālaya-vijñāna, and the manifestation also serves as the cause in relation to the present activity. Why is this so? Because the seed and present activity that give rise to consciousness have a stronger capacity for habitual energy, the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) is hidden and not mentioned. When present activity arises, the seed of the eighth consciousness has a stronger causal power, so the present activity is hidden and not mentioned. Therefore, it is only said that in the present dharma, it can nourish that seed, that is, the present activity habitually influences the seed, and the present activity is the cause of the seed. In the subsequent dharma, in order to enable that seed to arise, to gather and nourish that seed, it refers to the type of habitual energy that can attract and gather the future resultant neutral Ālaya-vijñāna. This refers to the karma seed as a dominant condition, leading to the arising of the future resultant retribution. Treatise: 'Like the wick and flame arising and burning in succession,' the initial metaphor is of three dharmas, and the latter metaphor is of cause and effect, both illustrating conditionality. Ximing explains that the three dharmas are a metaphor for the cause of arising, and the latter is a metaphor for the cause of support. Yaoji explains that the meaning of Non-Self is that the metaphor of the lamp is the cause of arising through mutual conditionality, and the metaphor of bundled reeds is mutual support, enabling them to stand upright and not fall. This also accords with the meaning of the fifty-first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, which clarifies the nature of establishing conditionality and the aspect of co-functioning. Now, I believe that Non-Self uses the metaphor of reeds to illustrate support, and this metaphor is a co-existent cause. Therefore, in response to the previous question, if there were only inherent seeds, then consciousness should not constitute conditionality with Ālaya-vijñāna. Explaining the verse again, it says that they arise in succession at all times, mutually as cause and effect. The conclusion says that conditionality can only be established by relying on these two. Furthermore, it says below that the three dharmas are simultaneously cause and effect, like the wick giving rise to the flame, and the flame giving rise to the wick, and also like bundled reeds relying on each other, cause and effect are simultaneous, and the principle will not be tilted or shaken. It also says that the habitual energy gives rise to various present activities, like a co-existent cause. Therefore, although it is said to be interdependent, the meaning is co-existent cause.
取俱時喻于因果。簡他前後為因緣性。不以相依之言證依持因。又解無性亦證因緣同時不倒。簡余持種以為因緣。別時因緣皆悉顛倒。故彼論云。又如束蘆互相依持同時不倒。應觀此中更互為因道理亦爾。不言依持。瑜伽論中識俱轉相。別複次明。非互為緣同處而辨。
論。非熏令長可名因緣等者。本疏云。現業增果種 西明云。善．惡業與異熟果應成因緣。能增長異熟果故 要集云。現業熏有支種。此種能增長現異熟果故。應是因緣 今謂不爾。阿賴耶識隨先業轉。種生現已。更若為增。若至現增。應至后念非剎那滅。又生已方增。不見此理。若未生增。現無果故。故但增種令有力生現異熟果以為正義 然現善惡即增果種。非種增種。現以增故。若現不增。應非行支。唯種是支。既爾何故說行支體通現．種耶。又不應言於後法中。為彼得生攝殖彼種子。業種現在與現果力。何名后法 若言初未與力後方與力名為后法。行應不與識等為緣。以未與力故。若許與力何不生現者。理亦不然。愛未潤故。業未熟故。緣未具故。
言分別論者。或大乘異師。有種子故。或小乘諸部皆名分別。不定一部。故攝論中分別論者傳釋是化地部 婆沙中分別傳說是正量部。此論下文分別論者云是說假部故。今此文略有三釋。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
以『俱時喻』來比喻因果關係，是爲了區分其他將前後相續視為『因緣性』的觀點。不使用『相依』的說法來證明『依持因』。進一步解釋『無性』，也是爲了證明『因緣』是同時發生，不會顛倒。這是爲了區分那些認為『持種』是『因緣』的觀點，因為別時的因緣都是顛倒的。所以《瑜伽師地論》中說：『又如束蘆，互相依持，同時不倒。應觀此中更互為因，道理亦爾。』這裡沒有提到『依持』。在《瑜伽師地論》中，關於『識俱轉相』，又進一步說明，不是互相為緣，而是在同一處所辨析。
論：『非熏令長可名因緣等者』，本疏解釋說：『現業增果種』。西明解釋說：『善、惡業與異熟果應成因緣，能增長異熟果故』。要集解釋說：『現業熏有支種，此種能增長現異熟果故，應是因緣』。我認為不是這樣。阿賴耶識隨著先前的業力運轉，種子產生了現行之後，還需要什麼來增長它呢？如果到了現行才增長，那麼應該到后一念才滅，而不是剎那間就滅了。而且是先生起后增長，看不出這個道理。如果還沒有生起就增長，那麼現在就沒有果，所以只是增長種子，使它有力量生起現行的異熟果，這才是正確的解釋。然而，現在的善惡業會增長果報的種子，而不是種子增長種子，因為現行會增長種子。如果現行不增長種子，那麼就不應該是行支，只有種子才是行支。既然這樣，為什麼說行支的本體包括現行和種子呢？也不應該說在後來的法中，爲了使它能夠生起，就攝取它的種子。業的種子現在就與現行的果報力相關聯，怎麼能說是後來的法呢？如果說最初沒有給予力量，後來才給予力量，這叫做後來的法，那麼行就不應該與識等作為緣，因為沒有給予力量。如果允許給予力量，為什麼不生起現行呢？這個道理也是不成立的，因為愛還沒有滋潤，業還沒有成熟，因緣還沒有具足。
說到『分別論者』，可能是大乘的異師，因為他們有種子；或者小乘的各個部派都可以稱為『分別』，不一定是某一個部派。所以在《攝大乘論》中，『分別論者』的傳釋是化地部。在《婆沙論》中，分別的傳說是正量部。此論的下文說『分別論者』是說假部。所以，現在這段文字大概有三種解釋。
【English Translation】 English version:
The analogy of 'simultaneous occurrence' is used to illustrate the relationship between cause and effect, in order to distinguish it from other views that consider the continuity of past and future as 'the nature of cause and condition'. The term 'mutual dependence' is not used to prove the 'dependent cause'. Further explaining 'non-self-nature' is also to prove that 'cause and condition' occur simultaneously and are not reversed. This is to distinguish those who believe that 'holding the seed' is 'cause and condition', because the causes and conditions at different times are all reversed. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'It is like a bundle of reeds, supporting each other, standing upright simultaneously. One should observe that the principle of mutual causation is also like this.' Here, 'mutual dependence' is not mentioned. In the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, regarding the 'co-arising aspects of consciousness', it is further explained that they are not mutually conditioned, but are analyzed in the same place.
Treatise: 'That which is not ripened by perfuming cannot be called cause and condition, etc.' The original commentary explains: 'Present karma increases the seed of the result.' The Ximing commentary explains: 'Good and evil karma should become the cause and condition for the different-ripening result, because it can increase the different-ripening result.' The Yaoji commentary explains: 'Present karma perfumes the seed of the branch. This seed can increase the present different-ripening result, so it should be the cause and condition.' I think it is not like this. The Alaya consciousness turns according to the previous karma. After the seed has produced the present manifestation, what else is needed to increase it? If it is increased when it reaches the present manifestation, then it should cease in the next moment, not in an instant. Moreover, it is first produced and then increased, and this principle is not seen. If it is increased before it is produced, then there is no result now, so it is only increasing the seed, making it powerful to produce the present different-ripening result, which is the correct explanation. However, present good and evil karma will increase the seed of the result, not the seed increasing the seed, because the present manifestation will increase the seed. If the present manifestation does not increase the seed, then it should not be a branch of action, only the seed is the branch of action. Since this is the case, why is it said that the substance of the branch of action includes both the present manifestation and the seed? It should also not be said that in the later dharma, in order to enable it to arise, it takes in its seed. The seed of karma is now related to the power of the present result, how can it be said to be the later dharma? If it is said that it did not give power at first, and only gave power later, this is called the later dharma, then action should not be the condition for consciousness, etc., because it did not give power. If it is allowed to give power, why does it not produce the present manifestation? This principle is also not established, because love has not yet moistened it, karma has not yet matured, and the conditions have not yet been fulfilled.
Speaking of 'the debaters', they may be heretical teachers of Mahayana, because they have seeds; or all the schools of Hinayana can be called 'debating', not necessarily a certain school. Therefore, in the Mahayanasamgraha, the transmission and explanation of 'the debaters' is the Hwa-di school. In the Mahavibhasa, the transmission of debate is the Sautrantika school. The following text of this treatise says that 'the debaters' are the Prajnaptivada school. Therefore, there are probably three explanations for this passage now.
一云即大眾等四部 若爾何故下云何故汝論說有異生唯得成就無漏種子 答下因便破大乘異師 二云始終俱是破大乘師 三云始終俱是破小乘師。大眾部等以本凈心能為因生名為種子。非許有種 或復彼師許有種子。破不相應中雲有執隨眠。即大眾等故。樞要三解。
論。若唯始起無因緣故應不得生。西明云。三乘初生見道無漏。應不得生。以無現行無漏熏故 今謂此解不依論文。又復因有自不定過。為如汝初生見道無漏。無現行而得生耶 亦有兩俱不成。三乘見道初無漏心。皆不許有現無漏心為能熏生 又亦自違。自初生見道無漏。亦不由現無漏熏方始生故。
論。不善應為善法等種。云小乘可爾者。假設許之。非小乘許。又六因中小乘許為同類因故。
論。若有漏心性是無漏等。量云。汝無漏心。應有餘相違性。以漏無漏心隨一攝故。如有漏心性。若言無漏心性。是有漏。漏無漏中隨一攝故。猶如有漏心者。此同喻中無所立過。以有漏心性非有漏故。若云取染心性以為同喻。即因有不定。為如染心性是有漏。為如凈心性是無漏。
資糧等位有漏熏習感總別報。如法華義決略明 然要集斷。若感總報。然無性釋即為無用。又緣起經我不說彼無明行起。故依無性教理相應 今謂不爾。無性論
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一說，『云』指的是大眾部等四部派。（若果真如此，）那麼為什麼下文說『為什麼你的理論說只有異生才能成就無漏種子』呢？回答是，下文的『因』是爲了駁斥大乘的異議。另一種說法是，始終都是爲了駁斥大乘的論師。還有一種說法是，始終都是爲了駁斥小乘的論師。大眾部等認為本凈心能夠作為生起的原因，稱之為『種子』，並非認可存在實在的『種』。或者，那些論師認可存在『種子』。在駁斥不相應行法時說『有執隨眠』，指的就是大眾部等。這是樞要的三種解釋。
論：如果僅僅是最初生起，因為沒有因緣的緣故，應該不能生起。（西明法師）說：三乘最初生起見道無漏，應該不能生起，因為沒有現行的無漏熏習的緣故。現在我認為這種解釋不符合論文的本意。而且，『因』有自不定過的過失。比如像你最初生起見道無漏，沒有現行（的無漏）卻能夠生起嗎？也有兩方面都不成立的情況。三乘見道最初的無漏心，都不認可有現行的無漏心作為能夠熏習生起的原因。而且，這也自相矛盾。因為你最初生起見道無漏，也不是由於現行的無漏熏習才開始生起的。
論：不善應該作為善法等的種子。（有人說）小乘可以這樣認為。這是假設允許這種情況，並非小乘認可的觀點。而且，在六因中，小乘認可同類因。
論：如果說有漏心的自性是無漏等（的自性）。量式如下：你的無漏心，應該有與（有漏心）相反的自性，因為有漏心和無漏心屬於其中之一，就像有漏心的自性一樣。如果說無漏心的自性是有漏的，因為（有漏和）無漏（心）中屬於其中之一，就像有漏心一樣。這個同喻中沒有所立的過失，因為有漏心的自性不是有漏的。如果說取染污心的自性作為同喻，那麼『因』就有不定的過失。是像染污心的自性是有漏的，還是像清凈心的自性是無漏的？
在資糧位等階段，有漏的熏習能夠感得總報和別報，正如《法華義決》中略微闡明的那樣。然而，必須要加以總結判斷。如果感得總報，那麼無性（菩薩）的解釋就變得沒有用了。而且，《緣起經》中說『我不說彼無明行起』，所以依據無性（菩薩）的教理是相應的。現在我認為不是這樣。無性論（的觀點）...
【English Translation】 English version One explanation is that 'cloud' refers to the four schools including the Mahāsaṃghika (Great Assembly School). (If that's the case,) then why does the following text say, 'Why does your theory state that only ordinary beings can achieve seeds of the unconditioned (anāsrava-bīja)?' The answer is that the 'cause' in the following text is to refute the dissenting views of the Mahāyāna. Another explanation is that it consistently refutes the Mahāyāna teachers. Yet another explanation is that it consistently refutes the Hīnayāna teachers. The Mahāsaṃghika and others believe that the inherently pure mind (prakṛti-citta) can serve as the cause of arising, which is called 'seed,' but they do not acknowledge the existence of a real 'seed.' Alternatively, those teachers acknowledge the existence of 'seeds.' When refuting non-associated formations (viprayukta-saṃskāra), it says 'there are latent afflictions (anusaya),' which refers to the Mahāsaṃghika and others. These are the three essential explanations.
Treatise: If it only arises initially, because there is no cause or condition (hetu-pratyaya), it should not be able to arise. (Master Ximing) says: The initial arising of the path of seeing (darśana-mārga) in the Three Vehicles (triyāna) should not be able to arise, because there is no currently active unconditioned (anāsrava) perfuming (vāsanā). Now, I believe this explanation does not adhere to the meaning of the text. Moreover, the 'cause' has the fault of being self-undetermined. For example, like your initial arising of the path of seeing unconditioned, can it arise without being currently active (unconditioned)? There is also a situation where both sides are not established. The initial unconditioned mind of the path of seeing in the Three Vehicles does not acknowledge that there is a currently active unconditioned mind as the cause of perfuming and arising. Moreover, this is also self-contradictory. Because your initial arising of the path of seeing unconditioned does not arise only because of the perfuming of the currently active unconditioned.
Treatise: Unwholesome (akuśala) should serve as the seed of wholesome (kuśala) dharmas, etc. (Someone says) the Hīnayāna may think so. This is hypothetically allowing this situation, not a view that the Hīnayāna acknowledges. Moreover, in the six causes (ṣaṭ-hetu), the Hīnayāna acknowledges the homogenous cause (sabhāga-hetu).
Treatise: If the nature of conditioned (sāsrava) mind is unconditioned, etc. The logical formula is as follows: Your unconditioned mind should have a contrary nature, because conditioned and unconditioned minds belong to one of them, just like the nature of conditioned mind. If it is said that the nature of unconditioned mind is conditioned, because (conditioned and) unconditioned (minds) belong to one of them, just like the conditioned mind. In this analogy, there is no fault of what is to be established, because the nature of conditioned mind is not conditioned. If it is said that taking the nature of defiled mind (kliṣṭa-citta) as the analogy, then the 'cause' has the fault of being undetermined. Is it like the nature of defiled mind being conditioned, or like the nature of pure mind being unconditioned?
At the stage of accumulation (saṃbhāra-mārga), etc., conditioned perfuming can cause the general and specific retributions (vipāka), as briefly explained in the 'Meaning Decisions of the Lotus Sūtra.' However, it is necessary to summarize and judge. If it causes the general retribution, then the explanation of Asaṅga (無性) becomes useless. Moreover, the 'Sūtra on Dependent Arising' says, 'I do not say that ignorance (avidyā) and action (saṃskāra) arise,' so relying on the teachings of Asaṅga is consistent with reason. Now, I think it is not like this. The view of the Asaṅga's treatise...
中據無分別。故前問云。未得佛果已來無分別智。當於何處感異熟果。釋云。非異熟因能對治彼故。即增上果假立彼名者 此無分別種．現通說。見道前種。見道后現。故說對治有漏果法。若是有漏豈為對治。言由此資熏余有漏業令感異熟者。是無漏余。此同雜集資糧．加行是道諦攝 然緣起經云。又不放逸內法異生。若造福行及不動行。彼是正法如理作意相應善心之所引發。雖于善趣感殊勝生。而非無明起增上緣者據勝者說彼是正法如理作意。非無相應．纏．及隨眠為緣起行。若不如是。即應說言內法異生不放逸者不造新業。何故但云諸聖有學不共無明已永斷故不造新業。此論復言有漏性者是修所斷感勝異熟 又解攝論據無分別不感異熟。不障有分別者感異熟果。緣起經中增上品如理作意所起聞熏。云而非無明起增上緣。不妨亦有中下品等因我執心所起聞熏。為順解脫能感異熟。不得說言因我心起非解脫分對法等云。學人身中有為善法皆是學法。既名學法即解脫分等 此釋應好。至第八卷更當廣解。
論。然諸種子略有六種者。準瑜伽第五種子七義。何故二論多少不同 答開合有異。如樞要辨。今更助釋第三．第五 第三云。又雖與他性為因。及與后念自性為因。然已生未滅方能為因。非未生已滅。即此第二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 由於沒有分別，所以前面問到：『未證得佛果之前，沒有分別智，將在何處感受異熟果？』 回答說：『不是異熟因能夠對治它。』 也就是說，增上果只是假立的名稱。這裡指的是無分別的種子和現行，普遍來說，見道前是種子，見道后是現行。因此說對治有漏果法。如果是有漏，怎麼能是對治呢？ 說『由此資助熏習其餘有漏業，使之感受異熟果』，指的是無漏的剩餘。這與《雜集論》中資糧位、加行位屬於道諦的說法一致。然而，《緣起經》中說：『又不放逸的內法異生，如果造作福行和不動行，那是與正法如理作意相應的善心所引發的。』 雖然在善趣感受殊勝的果報，但並非無明生起增上緣。這是根據殊勝者來說的，他們是正法如理作意，並非沒有相應、纏和隨眠作為緣起行。如果不是這樣，就應該說內法異生不放逸者不造作新的業。為什麼只說諸聖有學不共無明已經永遠斷除，所以不造作新的業？ 此論又說，有漏性的是修所斷，感受殊勝的異熟果。又解釋《攝論》說，根據無分別不感受異熟，不障礙有分別者感受異熟果。《緣起經》中增上品如理作意所產生的聞熏，說『並非無明生起增上緣』，不妨礙也有中下品等因我執心所產生的聞熏，爲了順向解脫，能夠感受異熟。不能說因我心生起就不是解脫分。對法等論說，學人身中的有為善法都是學法，既然名為學法，就是解脫分等。這個解釋應該很好，到第八卷時再詳細解釋。
論：『然而，諸種子略有六種』，是根據《瑜伽師地論》第五卷中種子的七種含義。為什麼這兩部論典的數量不同？ 回答說：開合有所不同，如《樞要》所辨。現在進一步解釋第三種和第五種。第三種說：『又雖然與他性作為因，以及與后念自性作為因，但已生未滅才能作為因，不是未生已滅。』 這就是第二種。
【English Translation】 English version: Because there is no discrimination, the previous question asked: 'Before attaining Buddhahood, without non-discriminating wisdom, where will one experience the Vipaka (異熟, result of actions) ?' The answer is: 'It is not the cause of Vipaka that can counteract it.' That is to say, the Adhipati-phala (增上果, dominant result) is merely a provisional name. This refers to the seeds and manifestations of non-discrimination. Generally speaking, before the Path of Seeing (見道), it is a seed; after the Path of Seeing, it is a manifestation. Therefore, it is said to counteract the conditioned (有漏) result. If it is conditioned, how can it be a counteraction? Saying 'By this, the remaining conditioned karma is aided and perfumed, causing it to experience the Vipaka,' refers to the unconditioned remainder. This is consistent with the statement in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論) that the stages of accumulation (資糧位) and application (加行位) belong to the Truth of the Path (道諦). However, the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra (緣起經) says: 'Also, the non-negligent ordinary beings with inner Dharma, if they perform meritorious deeds and unwavering deeds, are those initiated by virtuous minds corresponding to the Dharma-oriented proper attention.' Although they experience excellent rebirth in good realms, it is not that ignorance does not give rise to the dominant condition. This is according to the superior ones, who are the Dharma-oriented proper attention, not without association, entanglements, and latent tendencies as the condition for arising. If it were not so, it should be said that the non-negligent ordinary beings with inner Dharma do not create new karma. Why does it only say that the noble ones with learning (有學) have permanently severed the ignorance that is not shared, so they do not create new karma? This treatise also says that those with conditioned nature are what is severed by cultivation, experiencing excellent Vipaka. Also, explaining the Compendium of Abhidharma (攝論), it says that based on non-discrimination, one does not experience Vipaka, and it does not hinder those with discrimination from experiencing Vipaka. In the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra, the hearing-induced perfuming arising from the superior proper attention says 'it is not that ignorance does not give rise to the dominant condition,' which does not prevent the hearing-induced perfuming arising from the medium and inferior grades of ego-clinging, which, in order to accord with liberation, can experience Vipaka. It cannot be said that what arises from ego-clinging is not a part of liberation. The Abhidharma and other treatises say that the conditioned virtuous dharmas in the body of a learner are all learning dharmas. Since they are called learning dharmas, they are parts of liberation, etc. This explanation should be good; it will be explained in more detail in the eighth volume.
The treatise says: 'However, there are roughly six types of seeds,' which is based on the seven meanings of seeds in the fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論). Why are the numbers different in these two treatises? The answer is: There are differences in opening and closing, as explained in the Essentials (樞要). Now, further explain the third and fifth types. The third type says: 'Also, although it is a cause for other nature and a cause for the self-nature of subsequent thoughts, only what has arisen and not yet ceased can be a cause, not what has not arisen and has ceased.' This is the second type.
果俱有義。此言俱有為因為果俱是現有。瑜伽簡他未生已滅為因之者故開為二。此論據因同時為一。故云雖因與果有俱不俱。而現在時可有因用 第五又雖得余緣然成變異方能為因非未變異。亦此第五。彼約得緣熟未熟別。未熟非種是種類故開之為二。此待緣同故合為一。故此云自眾緣合功能殊勝。殊勝即變異 西明釋云。彼第三相成前俱有隨轉。第五變異成待眾緣 今疑所以。余何不成獨成二耶。又若成前更無別義。何故瑜伽云又建立因有七種相。故應思擇。
一無常法是因。本疏云。亦簡真如受熏為種 要集云。如雖受熏不為法因。但所持種為法因故 此不識意。攝論云。此中攝持種子相應。謂有生法俱生俱滅故成熏習。如是熏習攝持種子應正道理 真如常法不是持種故非法因。又下受熏遮無為故。
論。二果俱有至俱現和合。本疏三義名現 西明云。種與現行果俱在現在故名為現。有解二義。現在．現有。破初顯現。破次非有次非有者。西明說中不簡假法。假法非有。云現有破 未詳決云唯簡第七狹而無文。亦破初說 有云二義。一種．果俱現在。二俱在現在一身和合 要集云。有釋．有云于理為勝 今謂有釋不簡假法如有解破。若云護法宗假法如無非因緣故。不相應行假實門簡故此不遮。亦應常
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說果和因是同時存在的，那麼『俱有』（Sahabhu Hetu，共同存在的因）的意思就是說，作為原因和結果的事物都是現在存在的。瑜伽行派（Yogacara）區分了未生和已滅的事物作為原因，因此將『俱有』分為兩種。此論點認為，原因和結果同時存在，是一個整體。因此說，雖然原因和結果可能同時存在，也可能不同時存在，但在現在這個時間點，原因是可以發揮作用的。第五，即使獲得了其他條件，也只有在發生變化之後才能成為原因，未發生變化的事物不能成為原因。這也是第五種情況。他們根據獲得的條件是否成熟來區分，未成熟的不是種子，而是種類，因此將其分為兩種。這裡因為所依賴的條件相同，所以合併爲一種。因此這裡說，自身和眾多條件結合，功能變得殊勝。殊勝就是指變異。西明（Ximing，人名或地名）解釋說，第三種相成就了之前的『俱有隨轉』（Sahabhava-anuvrtti，共同存在的隨轉），第五種變異成就了『待眾緣』（Apeksha-pratyaya，依賴眾多條件）。現在疑惑的是，為什麼其他的不能成就，唯獨成就這兩種呢？又如果成就了之前的，就沒有其他的意義了。為什麼《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）說，又建立原因有七種相呢？所以應該仔細思考。 無常法是因。本疏（根本的疏解）說，也簡別了真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）接受熏習作為種子。要集（Yaoji，書名或術語）說，比如雖然接受了熏習，但不能作為法的因，只有所持有的種子才能作為法的因。這是不理解意思。攝論（She Lun，書名）說，這裡攝持種子相應，指的是有生法（有生滅變化的法）同時生起同時滅去，因此形成了熏習。這樣的熏習攝持種子是正確的道理。真如是常法，不是持種，所以不是法的因。而且下面的受熏遮止了無為法（Asamskrta，非造作的法），所以不是法的因。 論：二、果俱有至俱現和合。本疏三種含義名為『現』。西明說，種子和現行果（Vartamanaphala，當下產生的果）都在現在，所以名為『現』。有一種解釋是兩種含義：現在、現有。破斥第一種含義，是顯現；破斥第二種含義，是非有。西明的說法中沒有區分假法（Kalpana-dharma，虛構的法）。假法不是真實存在的，說『現有』是破斥假法。未詳決（Weixiangjue，人名或術語）說，只是簡別了第七識（末那識，Manas），範圍狹窄而且沒有文獻支援，也是破斥了第一種說法。有人說有兩種含義：一種是種子和果都在現在；二是都在現在一身和合。要集說，有一種解釋，有人說在理上更勝一籌。我認為這種解釋沒有區分假法，比如『有解破』（Youjie Po，術語或人名）。如果說護法宗（Dharmapala School）認為假法如同不存在一樣，不是因緣，所以不相應行（Citta-viprayukta-samskara，心不相應行）在假實門（Kalpana-satya，虛構的真實）中進行了簡別，所以這裡不遮止。也應該常常思考。
【English Translation】 English version: If it is said that the result and the cause exist simultaneously, then 'Sahabhu Hetu' (the co-existent cause) means that the things that are the cause and the result are existing in the present. The Yogacara distinguishes between the unborn and the extinguished as causes, therefore dividing 'Sahabhu' into two types. This argument holds that the cause and the result exist simultaneously as a whole. Therefore, it is said that although the cause and the result may or may not exist simultaneously, at this present moment, the cause can function. Fifth, even if other conditions are obtained, it can only become a cause after a change has occurred; things that have not changed cannot be a cause. This is also the fifth case. They distinguish based on whether the obtained conditions are mature or not; the immature is not a seed but a category, therefore dividing it into two types. Here, because the conditions relied upon are the same, they are combined into one. Therefore, it is said here that oneself and numerous conditions combine, and the function becomes superior. Superiority refers to transformation. Ximing explains that the third aspect accomplishes the previous 'Sahabhava-anuvrtti' (co-existent following transformation), and the fifth transformation accomplishes 'Apeksha-pratyaya' (dependent on numerous conditions). Now the doubt is, why can't the others be accomplished, but only these two? Also, if the previous one is accomplished, there is no other meaning. Why does the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' say that there are seven aspects of establishing a cause? Therefore, it should be carefully considered. Impermanent dharmas are causes. The original commentary says that it also distinguishes the Tathata (the true nature of things) receiving熏習(xunxi, influence) as a seed. Yaoji says that although it receives熏習(xunxi, influence), it cannot be a cause of dharma; only the seed held can be a cause of dharma. This is not understanding the meaning. The She Lun says that here, the holding of the seed corresponds, referring to the arising and ceasing of dharmas simultaneously, thus forming熏習(xunxi, influence). Such熏習(xunxi, influence) holding the seed is the correct principle. Tathata is a constant dharma and does not hold seeds, so it is not a cause of dharma. Moreover, the熏習(xunxi, influence) below prevents the Asamskrta (unconditioned dharma), so it is not a cause of dharma. Treatise: Two, the result and cause exist simultaneously to the extent that they are both present and harmonized. The original commentary says that three meanings are called 'present'. Ximing says that the seed and the Vartamanaphala (present result) are both in the present, so it is called 'present'. One explanation is two meanings: present, existing. Refuting the first meaning is manifestation; refuting the second meaning is non-existence. The statement of Ximing does not distinguish between Kalpana-dharma (imaginary dharmas). Kalpana-dharma is not real, saying 'existing' is refuting Kalpana-dharma. Weixiangjue says that it only distinguishes the seventh consciousness (Manas), which is narrow and has no textual support, also refuting the first statement. Some say there are two meanings: one is that the seed and the result are both in the present; the second is that they are both harmonized in one body in the present. Yaoji says that there is an explanation, and some say that it is superior in principle. I think this explanation does not distinguish between Kalpana-dharma, such as 'Youjie Po'. If the Dharmapala School believes that Kalpana-dharma is like non-existence, not a cause, so Citta-viprayukta-samskara (mind-unrelated formations) are distinguished in Kalpana-satya (imaginary truth), so it is not prevented here. It should also be constantly considered.
法及諸轉識不須遮簡 出體門中簡轉識訖。四分門中顯是相分。常法轉識非第八相。此何須簡。云親生自果即引自果。既云及所生果不一不異。即與果俱后何須簡。故諸門中具義多少。亦須簡假 又云。簡無性第七。諸七轉識有力能熏。皆成種果。亦不顯現應此中簡。其義等故如何留在第三方簡。故於此中但簡前後若種若現。及他相離無和合者 此亦不得疏之本意。以無性人第七恒轉亦具七義。但種果沉隱以此簡之。余非恒轉故後門簡。
論。三恒隨轉。西明云。世親且約染說治道。無性通約三性名言。隨所生果恒相續轉。不說治道。今此論中或隨同一。或雙同二故。言至究竟位不說治道生者。名言無記非有治道故。若說隨果轉者。非正生時應非種子。故今但言至究竟位 今疑此釋。若言非果生時亦名種子者。即非六義方為種子。不假果俱故。若云名言無治道者。自性治道善等可無。緣縛治道善等亦有。不爾不應說通修斷等。故本疏正。
問能引自果方名種者。極微既是見分種生。何名引自。以從心種生於色故。若自有種。微何名假。若許微實違諸論說 答無別微種。但由想惠作極微解。假無實體假名為色。行相當心假說種生。不望極微名引自果。對實名皆引自心果 問四無記心。為是一種逢緣起別。為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 法以及各種轉識不需要遮簡。在出體門中已經簡擇了轉識。在四分門中顯示是相分。常法轉識不是第八識的相分，這有什麼需要簡擇的呢？說『親生自果』就是引生自果。既然說『以及所生果不一不異』，即與果同時，之後又何必簡擇？所以在各種門中，所包含的意義有多少，也需要簡擇真假。又說，簡擇無性的第七識。各種第七轉識有力能夠熏習，都成為種果，也不顯現，應該在這裡簡擇。因為意義相同，為什麼留在第三方簡擇？所以在這裡只簡擇前後，無論是種子還是現行，以及其他相離沒有和合的。這也沒有理解疏的本意。因為無性人的第七識恒常運轉，也具備七義，只是種果沉隱，因此用這個來簡擇。其餘不是恒常運轉的，所以在後面的門中簡擇。
論：三種恒隨轉。西明說：世親只是就染污來說明治理之道。無性通用於三種自性的名言，隨著所生果恒常相續運轉，不說治理之道。現在這個論中，或者隨同一種，或者雙同兩種，所以說到了究竟位不說治理道生起，因為名言是無記性，沒有治理之道。如果說隨著果轉，那麼在非正生時就不應該是種子。所以現在只說到究竟位。現在懷疑這種解釋。如果說非果生時也叫種子，那麼就不是六義才成為種子，不需要與果同時。如果說名言沒有治理之道，自性治理之道善等可以沒有，緣縛治理之道善等也有。否則不應該說通修斷等。所以本疏是正確的。
問：能夠引生自果才叫種子，那麼極微既然是見分的種子所生，為什麼叫引自？因為是從心種生於色。如果自有種，極微為什麼叫假？如果承認極微是實，就違反了各種論的說法。答：沒有別的極微種。只是由於想惠作用極微的理解，假立沒有實體的假名叫做色。行相當於心，假說種生。不期望極微叫做引自果。對實名來說，都叫做引自心果。問：四種無記心，是一種逢緣起別，還是
【English Translation】 English version The Dharma and various transforming consciousnesses do not need to be excluded. Transforming consciousnesses have already been excluded in the 'Emergence of Entity' section. In the 'Four Aspects' section, it is shown to be the appearance aspect. The constant Dharma transforming consciousness is not the appearance aspect of the eighth consciousness, so what is there to exclude? To say 'directly producing its own result' is to say 'leading to its own result'. Since it is said 'and the result produced is neither one nor different', that is, simultaneous with the result, why exclude it later? Therefore, in various sections, the amount of meaning contained also needs to be distinguished between true and false. Furthermore, it is said to exclude the seventh consciousness of the non-natured. The various seventh transforming consciousnesses have the power to influence and all become seed-results, but they do not manifest, so they should be excluded here. Because the meaning is the same, why leave it to be excluded in the third section? Therefore, here we only exclude before and after, whether seeds or manifestations, and others that are separate and not combined. This also does not understand the original intention of the commentary. Because the seventh consciousness of the non-natured person constantly revolves and also possesses the seven meanings, but the seed-result is hidden, so it is excluded by this. The rest are not constantly revolving, so they are excluded in the later section.
Treatise: The three constantly follow and revolve. Ximing says: Vasubandhu only speaks of the path of governance in relation to defilement. Asaṅga applies the term to the three natures of language, constantly and continuously revolving with the results produced, not speaking of the path of governance. Now in this treatise, it either follows the same one, or doubly follows two, so it is said that reaching the ultimate position does not speak of the arising of the path of governance, because language is neutral and has no path of governance. If it is said to revolve with the result, then it should not be a seed when it is not being directly produced. Therefore, now it only speaks of reaching the ultimate position. Now there is doubt about this explanation. If it is said that it is also called a seed when it is not being produced as a result, then it is not the six meanings that constitute a seed, and it does not need to be simultaneous with the result. If it is said that language has no path of governance, then the self-natured path of governance, such as goodness, may not exist, but the conditioned path of governance, such as goodness, also exists. Otherwise, it should not be said to include cultivation and cessation, etc. Therefore, the original commentary is correct.
Question: Only that which can lead to its own result is called a seed, so since the ultimate particle (paramāṇu) is produced from the seed of the seeing aspect, why is it called 'leading to itself'? Because it is produced from the mind-seed into form. If it has its own seed, why is the ultimate particle called false? If it is admitted that the ultimate particle is real, it contradicts the various treatises. Answer: There is no separate ultimate particle seed. It is only due to the understanding of the ultimate particle made by thought and wisdom that a false name without substance is called form. Action corresponds to the mind, and it is falsely said to be seed-produced. Not expecting the ultimate particle is called 'leading to its own result'. In relation to the real name, it is all called 'leading to its own mind-result'. Question: Are the four neutral minds one kind that arises differently depending on conditions, or
各有種。若是一種逢緣起別。何名引自果。若各別種。何故瑜伽五十五。于異熟蘊及加行別。皆世俗有 答有二解。一云有同別種。若是異熟無記心種逢緣引別分成三心。除變化心即是同種。由逢緣。別分成三心故名世俗。以變化心不通異熟故。若自力能熏。即各別種。便非世俗。即自在成就攝者。但言是世俗。不說唯世俗故。據性各別心色不同名引自果 二云三各定別。設自不熏由他緣熏。所緣境別故各成種。言世俗者有緣．發別。發威儀等名威儀等。即是實有。緣威儀等名威儀等。即是世俗。以是異熟由緣此等名威儀等故 問異熟．威儀等各定何性 答若云四無記如名取義。若但云異熟威儀等。初三通三性。變化唯二性 準何得知 答五十五云。又異熟．生一向無記。二三可得。一有二種。若依伎樂以染污心發起威儀是染污性。若依寂靜即是善性。若依染著發起工巧是染污性。若善加行所起工巧即是善性。為引導他。或為利益而起變化當知是善。此無染．污。染污言通不善．有覆。今取不善故云二三可得。
論。此種勢力等。此解生．引通於內外。準二攝論皆亦同此。然世親論果有正．殘。因分生．引。無性論文但云若外種子親望于芽為能生因。傳望莖等為能引因。識望名色為能生因。傳望六處乃至老死為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 各有各的種子。如果說是一種種子遇到因緣而產生差別，那又怎麼能稱之為『引自果』（從結果中引出）呢？如果說是各種不同的種子，那為什麼《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷中，對於異熟蘊（Vipāka-skandha，由業力成熟而產生的蘊）以及加行差別，都說是世俗諦（Saṃvṛti-satya，相對真理，方便施設的真理）所安立的呢？ 回答是：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，有相同和不同的種子。如果是異熟無記心（Vipāka-avyākṛta-citta，由業力成熟的，既非善也非惡的心）的種子，遇到因緣而引生出不同的三種心，除了變化心（Nirmita-citta，變化所作的心）之外，都可說是同一種子。因為遇到因緣，而差別分成三種心，所以說是世俗諦。因為變化心不屬於異熟果，如果說是自力能夠熏習的，那就是各種不同的種子，那就不是世俗諦，而是屬於自在成就（Īśvara-siddha，自然成就）所攝的。但這裡只是說是世俗諦，並沒有說唯有世俗諦，所以根據自性各別，心和色法不同，而稱之為『引自果』。 另一種說法是，這三種心各自決定不同。假設自己不能熏習，而是由其他因緣熏習，因為所緣的境界不同，所以各自成為種子。說『世俗諦』，是指有因緣和發起上的差別。發起威儀等，名為威儀等，這是實有的。緣于威儀等，名為威儀等，這是世俗諦。因為這是異熟果，由於緣于這些而名為威儀等。 問：異熟、威儀等各自決定屬於什麼性質？ 答：如果說是四種無記性（Avyākṛta，非善非惡），那就如字面意思理解。如果只說是異熟、威儀等，最初的三種通於三種性質（善、惡、無記）。變化心只有兩種性質。 根據什麼得知？ 答：《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷說：『又異熟生一向是無記性，二三性是可以得到的。』一是有一種情況，若依據伎樂，以染污心（Kliṣṭa-citta，煩惱染著的心）發起威儀，就是染污性。若依據寂靜，那就是善性。若依據染著，發起工巧，就是染污性。若是善加行（Kuśala-prayoga，善的努力）所產生的工巧，那就是善性。爲了引導他人，或者爲了利益他人而起變化，應當知道這是善性。這裡沒有染污。染污一詞通於不善和有覆（Sāvaraṇa，被覆蓋的），現在取不善，所以說二三性是可以得到的。 論：這種子勢力等。這種解釋，生和引通於內外。根據《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）和《攝大乘論釋》（Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya），也都是如此。然而世親（Vasubandhu）的論典中，果有正和殘，因分為生和引。無性（Asaṅga）的論文中只說，如果外在的種子親近於芽，是能生因（Janaka-hetu，產生的原因），傳遞到莖等，是能引因（Ākarṣaṇa-hetu，引導的原因）。識（Vijñāna，意識）對於名色（Nāmarūpa，精神和物質）是能生因，傳遞到六處（Ṣaḍāyatana，六根），乃至老死（Jarāmaraṇa，衰老和死亡）是能引因。
【English Translation】 English version: Each has its own seeds. If it is said that one type of seed encounters conditions and gives rise to differences, then how can it be called 'derived from the result' (引自果)? If they are different types of seeds, then why does the fifty-fifth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) say that both the Vipāka-skandha (異熟蘊, aggregate of results) and the differences in effort are established by Saṃvṛti-satya (世俗諦, conventional truth)? The answer is: there are two explanations. One explanation is that there are both similar and different seeds. If it is a seed of Vipāka-avyākṛta-citta (異熟無記心, resultantly indeterminate mind), encountering conditions and giving rise to three different types of minds, except for Nirmita-citta (變化心, mind of transformation), they can all be said to be the same type of seed. Because it encounters conditions and is differentiated into three types of minds, it is said to be Saṃvṛti-satya. Because Nirmita-citta does not belong to the result of Vipāka, if it is said that it can be cultivated by its own power, then they are different types of seeds, and it is not Saṃvṛti-satya, but belongs to what is included in Īśvara-siddha (自在成就, naturally accomplished). But here it is only said to be Saṃvṛti-satya, and it is not said to be only Saṃvṛti-satya, so according to the individual nature, the mind and form are different, and it is called 'derived from the result'. Another explanation is that these three minds are each definitely different. Suppose that one cannot cultivate oneself, but is cultivated by other conditions, because the objects of focus are different, so each becomes a seed. Saying 'Saṃvṛti-satya' refers to the differences in conditions and arising. Arising deportment, etc., is called deportment, etc., which is real. Focusing on deportment, etc., is called deportment, etc., which is Saṃvṛti-satya. Because this is the result of Vipāka, it is called deportment, etc., because it is focused on these. Question: What is the nature of Vipāka, deportment, etc.? Answer: If it is said to be the four types of Avyākṛta (無記性, indeterminate), then understand it literally. If it is only said to be Vipāka, deportment, etc., the first three are common to the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate). Nirmita-citta only has two natures. According to what is this known? Answer: The fifty-fifth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Moreover, the birth of Vipāka is always indeterminate, and the two or three natures can be obtained.' One is that in one situation, if deportment is initiated with a Kliṣṭa-citta (染污心, defiled mind) based on music, it is a defiled nature. If it is based on tranquility, then it is a wholesome nature. If it is initiated with attachment, initiating craftsmanship is a defiled nature. If the craftsmanship produced by Kuśala-prayoga (善加行, wholesome effort) is wholesome. If it is to guide others, or to initiate transformation for the benefit of others, it should be known that this is wholesome. There is no defilement here. The term defilement is common to unwholesome and Sāvaraṇa (有覆, covered), now taking unwholesome, so it is said that the two or three natures can be obtained. Treatise: This seed power, etc. This explanation, birth and attraction are common to both internal and external. According to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Compendium of the Mahayana) and the Mahāyānasaṃgrahabhāṣya (攝大乘論釋, Commentary on the Compendium of the Mahayana), it is also the same. However, in the treatise of Vasubandhu (世親), the result has correct and residual, and the cause is divided into birth and attraction. In the treatise of Asaṅga (無性), it only says that if the external seed is close to the sprout, it is the Janaka-hetu (能生因, generating cause), and passing to the stem, etc., it is the Ākarṣaṇa-hetu (能引因, attracting cause). Vijñāna (識, consciousness) is the generating cause for Nāmarūpa (名色, name and form), and passing to the Ṣaḍāyatana (六處, six sense bases), and even Jarāmaraṇa (老死, old age and death) is the attracting cause.
能引因。因雖分生．引。果中不名殘．正遠．近。二論名即可同但果取有寬狹。二論內外各別作法。此論總明。雜集但望十二緣生不說于外。與瑜伽第九．第十同。第五但說雜染十因。菩薩地文即說三性十因。俱分生．引。果中不云殘．正遠．近。廣略不同義皆無違。又伽論．雜集。但于因中去果遠近分于生．引。果中不說。此即影顯。又緣生支有總通現。瑜伽第十云。要先愚于所應知事即起邪行。起邪行令心顛倒。心顛倒結生相續。結生相續諸根圓滿等 此即假說。非正緣起。故不於此別分生．引 然有解云。本疏無性唯說正．殘。違無性者是不尋疏 要集云。有說世親說近．遠。無性云正．殘 亦途聽耳 問此生．引因且緣生中為行支。是為亦通余 答既云能所引俱名為引因。復許通內外故不唯行 問屍骸既許前生力引應通四生。化生何故不有屍骸 答三生漸死。前生有力引遠殘果。化生頓滅。無力引果。問若取老死而為引因。由頓滅故無力引果。此由生支而為引因。何關頓滅不引殘果 答屍骸望生即為殘果。望于老死即為正果。故生望為引。老死望為生。三生有生．引。死後有屍骸。化生闕能生。死後無屍骸 問化生無老死。闕能生故無屍骸。雖化亦具支何得生因闕 答老死位漸死。可能作生因。化生死頓無。
不能作生因 問攝論但云。若二種子唯作生因非引因者。收置倉等麥等種子不應久續。死後尸等分位隨轉亦不應有。此即一因義分生．引。何故今說有引無生 答攝論因望近遠果。一法分二因。瑜伽果望近遠因。兩因位有別。此亦互顯。今者此釋且據瑜伽 問準依此論及瑜伽等。但說能所引以為引因。能生為生因。何處說生等。以為生．引因 答論中作法且舉一偶。義準展轉作亦無失。若定如論不應說別。又據增上支支皆緣。不爾如何生緣老死。既說生與老死為緣。為生為引。若非二攝。豈可二因攝因不盡。由此故知。漸次第作于理無爽。是故此論但總說云。此種勢力生近正果名生因等。不爾設據能所引因為引因。如何三生漸成。有力而為引因 問何故瑜伽等約因位別分生．引。攝大乘等據果位殊分生．引 答因有熟．未熟。未熟遠引近即生。果中有正．殘。近．正稱生。殘．遠名引。各據一義互相影顯。
所熏四義。第一義簡西明二解。一同本疏。一云不簡七轉心所。第三門簡 要集斷云。此釋為勝 今謂不爾。心王自在尚非所熏。心所依王何獨所熏。故第三門但簡第八相應心所。具前二義故第三簡 要集云。第七未轉此中不簡簡已轉依。若非一類即簡七識。第八亦轉應不受熏。故初但簡前六轉識。非相續故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：『不能作生因』，問《攝大乘論》但說：『若二種子唯作生因非引因者，收置倉等麥等種子不應久續，死後尸等分位隨轉亦不應有。』此即一因義分生、引。何故今說有引無生？ 答：《攝大乘論》因望近遠果，一法分二因。《瑜伽師地論》果望近遠因，兩因位有別。此亦互顯。今者此釋且據《瑜伽師地論》。 問：準依此論及《瑜伽師地論》等，但說能所引以為引因，能生為生因。何處說生等，以為生、引因？ 答：論中作法且舉一偶，義準展轉作亦無失。若定如論不應說別。又據增上支支皆緣，不爾如何生緣老死？既說生與老死為緣，為生為引？若非二攝，豈可二因攝因不盡？由此故知，漸次第作于理無爽。是故此論但總說云：『此種勢力生近正果名生因等。』不爾設據能所引因為引因，如何三生漸成，有力而為引因？ 問：何故《瑜伽師地論》等約因位別分生、引，《攝大乘論》等據果位殊分生、引？ 答：因有熟、未熟。未熟遠引近即生。果中有正、殘。近、正稱生，殘、遠名引。各據一義互相影顯。 所熏四義。第一義簡西明二解。一同本疏。一云不簡七轉心所。第三門簡。《要集》斷云：『此釋為勝。』 今謂不爾。心王自在尚非所熏，心所依王何獨所熏。故第三門但簡第八相應心所。具前二義故第三簡。《要集》云：『第七未轉此中不簡簡已轉依。若非一類即簡七識。第八亦轉應不受熏。』故初但簡前六轉識，非相續故。
【English Translation】 English version Question: 'Cannot be the cause of production.' Questioning the She Lun (Compendium of Mahayana Abhidharma), it only says: 'If two seeds only act as the cause of production and not the cause of leading, then the seeds of wheat and other grains stored in warehouses should not continue for long, and the successive transformations of the corpse after death should also not occur.' This means that the meaning of one cause is divided into production and leading. Why is it now said that there is leading without production? Answer: The She Lun (Compendium of Mahayana Abhidharma) considers the near and far effects of the cause, and one dharma is divided into two causes. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Discourse on the Stages of Yoga Practice) considers the near and far causes of the effect, and the positions of the two causes are different. This also mutually clarifies. This explanation now relies on the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Discourse on the Stages of Yoga Practice). Question: According to this treatise and the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Discourse on the Stages of Yoga Practice), it is only said that what can be led and what is led are considered the cause of leading, and what can produce is considered the cause of production. Where does it say that production, etc., are considered the cause of production and leading? Answer: The treatise only mentions one example in its method, and it is not wrong to infer that it can also be done in reverse. If it is fixed as in the treatise, there should be no other explanation. Moreover, according to the supporting branches, all branches are conditions. Otherwise, how can birth be the condition for old age and death? Since it is said that birth and old age and death are conditions, are they for production or leading? If they are not included in the two, how can the two causes not fully encompass the causes? From this, it is known that gradual and sequential action is logically sound. Therefore, this treatise only generally says: 'The power of this seed produces the near and direct effect, which is called the cause of production, etc.' Otherwise, if it is based on what can be led and what is led as the cause of leading, how can the three births gradually form, and have the power to be the cause of leading? Question: Why do the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Discourse on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and others distinguish production and leading according to the position of the cause, while the She Da Cheng Lun (Compendium of the Great Vehicle) and others distinguish production and leading according to the difference in the position of the effect? Answer: Causes have matured and immatured. Immature causes lead from afar, and near causes produce. Effects have direct and residual. Near and direct are called production, and residual and far are called leading. Each relies on one meaning to mutually reflect and clarify. The four meanings of what is perfumed. The first meaning simplifies the two explanations of Xi Ming. One is the same as the original commentary. One says that it does not simplify the seven transformed mental states. The third gate simplifies. Yao Ji decisively says: 'This explanation is superior.' Now we say it is not so. The mind-king itself is not perfumed, so why should the mental states that depend on the king be perfumed alone? Therefore, the third gate only simplifies the mental states corresponding to the eighth consciousness. Because it has the first two meanings, the third simplifies. Yao Ji says: 'The seventh consciousness has not been transformed, so this does not simplify what has been transformed. If it is not of the same kind, then the seven consciousnesses are simplified. The eighth consciousness is also transformed and should not be perfumed.' Therefore, the first only simplifies the first six transformed consciousnesses, because they are not continuous.
。第二義中方簡第七未轉依位 此亦不爾。但言相續不簡第七。既言一類即簡第七。以漏無漏性非一類。不同第八未無漏位一類受熏。若無漏位即不受熏。故不相例。第七已轉既在初簡。未轉何故即第二簡。若非無記。已轉第七豈無記耶。
問第八具義說為所熏。三相熏何 答或云熏果報識。即當果相。或云熏自相。是自體故。二解后正。義依體立。無別性故。但以自相酬因邊名果相。持種邊名因相。故唯自相是正所熏。
能熏義中二有勝用。西明云。業感異熟心心所等。護法無異分別。門人分成兩釋。一云業感定不能熏。唯法爾起必用業助。若依此說。異熟心心所等。取六識滿業所感心心所等。一云業感有二。強者能熏。劣即不熏。若依此說等取劣者。三藏意取后解為勝 又云初釋不許影像熏本質種 今謂。此說俱不應理。何者初釋本質非影熏成。轉識不應與阿賴耶為因緣性。違護法釋。第二解若是業招名為異熟。雖復引．漏二果有別。為業引同俱名異熟。並不能熏。俱異熟故。論不簡故。無文證故。俱是滿果。何獨等劣。應勝劣俱等。若非業引但分別生。即是能熏。性非異熟。是異熟生。異熟生寬。業非業感。俱異熟生。此簡異熟是業感者。性微劣故不是能熏。不假業力強分別起者。此異熟生及威儀
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：第二種意義中，才區分第七識（末那識，Manas-vijnana，意為『意』）尚未轉依（Paravrtti，指從虛妄分別轉為真實智慧）的階段，這種情況並非如此。這裡只是說相續不斷，不區分第七識。既然說是一類，就區分了第七識，因為有漏和無漏的性質不是一類。這不同於第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana，意為『藏識』）在未達到無漏位時，可以接受同類的熏習，如果達到無漏位，就不再接受熏習，所以不能相提並論。第七識已經轉依，所以在第一種區分中。未轉依的第七識為什麼在第二種區分中？如果不是無記性（不善不惡），已經轉依的第七識難道是無記性嗎？
問：第八識具備意義，可以被稱為所熏，那麼三相（生、住、滅）熏習的是什麼？答：有人說是熏習果報識，也就是當果相。也有人說是熏習自相，因為是自體。第二種解釋是正確的，意義是依附於體而建立的，沒有其他的自性。只是用自相來對應因的一面，稱為果相；保持種子的一面，稱為因相。所以只有自相才是真正被熏習的。
在能熏的意義中，有兩種殊勝的作用。西明法師說：『由業力感生的異熟心和心所等。』護法（Dharmapala）沒有不同的分別，他的門人分成兩種解釋。一種說法是，由業力感生的心識一定不能熏習，只有法爾（Dharmata，事物本來的樣子）生起的心識才需要業力的幫助。如果按照這種說法，異熟心和心所等，指的是第六識（意識，Manovijnana，意為『意識』）的圓滿業力所感生的心和心所等。另一種說法是，由業力感生的心識有兩種，強盛的能夠熏習，弱小的就不能熏習。如果按照這種說法，『等』字指的是弱小的。三藏（Tripitaka）的意圖是以後一種解釋為好。又有人說，第一種解釋不允許影像熏習本質的種子。現在認為，這種說法都不合理。為什麼呢？因為第一種解釋中，本質不是由影像熏習而成的，轉識（Vijnana，各種識的總稱）不應該與阿賴耶識成為因緣性，這違反了護法的解釋。第二種解釋中，如果是業力招感的，名為異熟，即使引果和漏果有所區別，因為是業力所引，都名為異熟，都不能熏習，因為都是異熟的緣故。論中沒有區分，也沒有經文可以證明。都是圓滿的果報，為什麼只有弱小的才能被『等』字包括？應該強盛和弱小都包括在內。如果不是業力所引，只是分別產生的，就是能熏的，性質不是異熟，而是異熟生。異熟生的範圍更寬泛，業力和非業力感生的，都是異熟生。這裡區分異熟是業力感生的，因為性質微弱，所以不是能熏。不需要業力，由強盛的分辨產生的，這種異熟生以及威儀（Irya，行為舉止）……'
【English Translation】 English version: In the second meaning, it only distinguishes the stage where the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana, meaning 'mind') has not yet undergone Paravrtti (transformation, referring to the transformation from false discrimination to true wisdom). This is not the case here. It only says that the continuity is unbroken, without distinguishing the seventh consciousness. Since it is said to be of one kind, it distinguishes the seventh consciousness, because the nature of defiled and undefiled is not of one kind. This is different from the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, meaning 'storehouse consciousness') which, before reaching the undefiled state, can receive the same kind of熏習 (xunxi, influence), but if it reaches the undefiled state, it will no longer receive 熏習 (xunxi, influence), so they cannot be compared. The seventh consciousness has already undergone transformation, so it is in the first distinction. Why is the untransformed seventh consciousness in the second distinction? If it is not of an indeterminate nature (neither good nor evil), is the transformed seventh consciousness of an indeterminate nature?
Question: The eighth consciousness has meaning and can be called the '熏習 (xunxi, influenced)'. What do the three characteristics (arising, abiding, ceasing) influence? Answer: Some say it influences the resultant consciousness, which is the resultant aspect. Others say it influences the self-aspect, because it is the self-nature. The second explanation is correct, because meaning is established based on the substance, and there is no other self-nature. It is just that the self-aspect is used to correspond to the cause side, called the resultant aspect; the side that holds the seed is called the causal aspect. Therefore, only the self-aspect is truly influenced.
In the meaning of the 'able to influence', there are two kinds of superior functions. The Ximing Master said: 'The differentiated mind and mental factors, etc., that are produced by karma.' Dharmapala did not have different distinctions, and his disciples divided it into two explanations. One explanation is that the consciousness produced by karma definitely cannot influence, only the consciousness that arises naturally needs the help of karma. According to this explanation, the differentiated mind and mental factors, etc., refer to the mind and mental factors, etc., produced by the complete karma of the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana, meaning 'consciousness'). Another explanation is that there are two kinds of consciousness produced by karma, the strong can influence, and the weak cannot influence. According to this explanation, 'etc.' refers to the weak. The intention of the Tripitaka is that the latter explanation is better. Some also say that the first explanation does not allow the image to influence the seed of the essence. Now it is believed that neither of these explanations is reasonable. Why? Because in the first explanation, the essence is not formed by the influence of the image, and the transformed consciousness (Vijnana, the general term for various consciousnesses) should not become the causal nature with the Alaya-vijnana, which violates Dharmapala's explanation. In the second explanation, if it is summoned by karma, it is called differentiated result, even if there is a difference between the leading result and the leaking result, because it is led by karma, it is called differentiated result, and it cannot influence, because it is all differentiated result. There is no distinction in the treatise, and there is no scripture to prove it. They are all complete results, why can only the weak be included in 'etc.'? Both the strong and the weak should be included. If it is not led by karma, but only produced by discrimination, it is able to influence, and its nature is not differentiated result, but differentiated result born. The scope of differentiated result born is wider, and both karma and non-karma produced are differentiated result born. Here, the differentiated result is distinguished as being produced by karma, because its nature is weak, so it is not able to influence. It does not need karma, and is produced by strong discrimination, this kind of differentiated result born and Irya (behavior) ...'
工巧非業引者。亦能熏攝。
論。云此遮異熟心心所等者。舉異熟無記。等取威儀．工巧業所感者心心所法。及此等心心所心所帶相分。俱不能熏。為非業感心心所法。緣變影熏一切不遮。故言第二解勝異熟能熏但等取劣道理無據。
論。俱生俱滅熏習義成者。無性論亦識中種名為熏習。無著本論云。複次何等名為熏習。熏習能詮。何為所詮。謂依彼法俱生俱滅。釋熏習體。此中有能生彼因性。是謂所詮。釋熏習義。既云此中有能生彼因性。是謂所詮。明是種子名為熏習。舉喻復云。如苣勝中有花熏習。乃至云。是諸苣勝帶能生彼香因而生。無性釋依字云。如言依云而有雨等。舉其因性為顯此中有能隨順生果因體。此意依云有雨。喻因有果。云喻因雨喻果。即本識中種子如雲。亦同無著般若論中釋其云喻。故知熏習不目能熏。據實能所俱名熏習。
論。設名因緣應知假說。本疏但會。雜集第四說十二緣皆名因緣應知假說。有非因故 西明釋云。會彼六因 要集云。勝 今謂不爾。顯揚論中具破五因存異熟因。無性許五依異門說。以影互明故此不會。但會緣起 又且會緣起略不舉六因。若言六中有非因緣不會故劣。亦十二支有非因緣。不會亦劣。六因余有會。緣起未有會。本疏會未會。故本疏為勝。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『工巧非業引者，亦能熏攝。』意思是說，由工巧技藝等非屬於業所直接引發的事物，也能產生熏習作用。 論中說：『此遮異熟心心所等者』，是指遮止異熟無記（異熟：由善惡業產生的果報；無記：非善非惡的性質）。這裡舉出異熟無記，是包括由威儀、工巧等業所感得的心心所法，以及這些心心所法所帶的相分，都不能產生熏習作用。因為它們不是由業所感的心心所法。但是，由緣所變的影像，則不在此限，都可以產生熏習作用。所以說，第二種解釋比認為只有異熟才能熏習，而其他只能類推的說法更為合理，因為後者沒有依據。 論中說：『俱生俱滅熏習義成者』，意思是說，同時產生同時滅亡的法也能成立熏習的意義。無性論中也認為阿賴耶識中的種子就叫做熏習。無著的《攝大乘論》中說：『什麼是熏習？熏習的能詮是什麼？所詮又是什麼？』 所謂熏習，是指依靠某種法而同時產生同時滅亡的現象。解釋熏習的體性。這裡面有能夠產生其他事物的因性，這就是所詮，解釋熏習的意義。既然說『這裡面有能夠產生其他事物的因性，這就是所詮』，就說明種子就叫做熏習。舉例說，就像苣勝（一種香草）中有花的香氣熏習一樣，乃至說：『這些苣勝帶有能夠產生那種香氣的因，因而產生香氣。』 無性解釋『依』字說：『就像說依靠云而有雨一樣』，舉出因性是爲了顯示其中有能夠隨順產生果的因體。這個意思是說，依靠云而有雨，比喻因能生果。云比喻因，雨比喻果。也就是說，本識中的種子就像云一樣。這也和無著在《般若論》中解釋云的比喻一樣。所以說，熏習不僅僅指能熏，實際上能熏和所熏都可以叫做熏習。 論中說：『設名因緣應知假說』，意思是說，假設名為因緣，應當知道這是一種假說。本疏只是會通《雜集論》第四卷中說的十二緣都名為因緣，應當知道這是一種假說，因為其中有不是因的緣故。西明的解釋說：會通那六因。要集的觀點是勝妙的。我認為不是這樣。顯揚論中詳細破斥了五因，只保留了異熟因。無性允許五依異門而說。因為用影子互相說明，所以這裡不作會通，只是會通緣起。而且會通緣起時，省略了六因。如果說六因中有不是因緣的，所以不能會通，因此是劣的，那麼十二支中也有不是因緣的，不能會通也是劣的。六因還有會通的餘地，而緣起還沒有會通的。本疏會通了未會通的，所以本疏是殊勝的。
【English Translation】 English version:
'Those induced by skillful crafts and non-karma activities can also be influenced and gathered.' This means that things not directly caused by karma, such as skillful crafts, can also produce the effect of熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation). The commentary states: 'This excludes the 心心所 (xinxinsuo, mental functions) of 異熟 (yishu, Vipaka or fruition)'. This refers to excluding the 心心所 (xinxinsuo, mental functions) of 異熟無記 (yishu wuji, neutral fruition), where 異熟 (yishu, Vipaka or fruition) refers to the result of good and evil karma, and 無記 (wuji, neutral) refers to the nature of being neither good nor evil. It specifically mentions the 心心所法 (xinxinsuofa, mental functions) arising from activities like demeanor and skillful crafts, as well as the 相分 (xiangfen, image-component) associated with these 心心所法 (xinxinsuofa, mental functions), all of which cannot produce 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation) because they are not 心心所法 (xinxinsuofa, mental functions) caused by karma. However, images transformed by conditions are not excluded and can all produce 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation). Therefore, the second interpretation, which considers that only 異熟 (yishu, Vipaka or fruition) can produce 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation) while others can only be inferred, is more reasonable because the latter lacks a basis. The commentary states: 'The meaning of simultaneous arising and ceasing of 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation) is established'. This means that phenomena that arise and cease simultaneously can also establish the meaning of 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation). The Vasubandhu's Commentary also considers the seeds in 阿賴耶識 (Alaya-識, store consciousness) to be called 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation). Asanga's Compendium of Mahayana states: 'What is called 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation)? What is the 能詮 (nengquan, expressing aspect) of 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation)? And what is the 所詮 (suoquan, expressed aspect)?' 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation) refers to the phenomenon of arising and ceasing simultaneously, relying on a certain dharma. This explains the nature of 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation). Within this, there is the causal nature that can produce other things, which is the 所詮 (suoquan, expressed aspect). This explains the meaning of 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation). Since it says, 'Within this, there is the causal nature that can produce other things, which is the 所詮 (suoquan, expressed aspect)', it illustrates that seeds are called 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation). For example, just as there is the fragrance of flowers in Eruca sativa, and even saying: 'These Eruca sativa carry the cause that can produce that fragrance, and thus produce fragrance.' Sthiramati explains the word 'relying' by saying: 'Just as it is said that rain comes from relying on clouds', citing the causal nature to show that within this, there is the causal body that can accordingly produce the result. This means that rain comes from relying on clouds, which is a metaphor for cause producing effect. Clouds are a metaphor for cause, and rain is a metaphor for effect. That is to say, the seeds in the 本識 (ben shi, root consciousness) are like clouds. This is also the same as Asanga's Prajna-論 (Prajna-sutra) explanation of the metaphor of clouds. Therefore, 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation) does not only refer to the 能熏 (nengxun, influencing aspect); in reality, both the 能熏 (nengxun, influencing aspect) and 所熏 (suoxun, influenced aspect) can be called 熏習 (xunxi, influence or impregnation). The commentary states: 'Assuming the name 因緣 (yin yuan, cause and condition), it should be known as a provisional designation'. This means that assuming the name 因緣 (yin yuan, cause and condition), it should be known as a provisional designation. The original commentary only harmonizes with the fourth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, which says that the twelve 因緣 (yin yuan, cause and condition) are all called 因緣 (yin yuan, cause and condition), and it should be known that this is a provisional designation because there are conditions that are not causes. The 西明 (Ximing) explanation says: Harmonize with those six causes. The view of 要集 (Yaoji) is superior. I don't think so. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra thoroughly refutes the five causes and only retains the 異熟因 (yishu yin, Vipaka cause). Sthiramati allows the five to be explained based on different aspects. Because shadows are used to explain each other, there is no harmonization here, only harmonization of 緣起 (yuanqi, dependent origination). Moreover, when harmonizing 緣起 (yuanqi, dependent origination), the six causes are omitted. If it is said that there are non-因緣 (yin yuan, cause and condition) among the six causes, so they cannot be harmonized, and therefore it is inferior, then there are also non-因緣 (yin yuan, cause and condition) among the twelve branches, and not being able to harmonize is also inferior. There is still room for harmonizing the six causes, but there has been no harmonization of 緣起 (yuanqi, dependent origination). The original commentary harmonizes what has not been harmonized, so the original commentary is superior.
此難他語。據實疏意舉此例余。余但會六因不例餘者失。
三法展轉。難云。新現從種起。現行即能熏。種新由現生。新種即起現 答現行逢勝緣。新現即能熏。新種闕勝緣。未即能生現 又解新現勢用增。才起即熏種。新種無勝用。故不即生現 又解種子不相違。起現即熏種。現果體相返。種未即生現 難受與受等違種不即生現。色多得並起。應新種即生 答新現由緣具。種子得從生。新種未具緣。現色未即起。
問論本頌中具有不可知．執受處．了。何但問處．了。不問不可知。釋中即具明不可知．處．了 答有二解。一雲影略說。二云總依于別故但問別。釋中具辨故通總．別 又問但據體 答並顯用。故不相違。
論。識以了別為行相故 本釋云。識自體分以了別為行相。故行相見分也。類體亦然。此意見分名行相者。行應平聲讀。以見分能行於境相。故此見分得行相名。評取初解云。然本但是行於相義 類體亦然者。以行相不可知。類體亦然 然西明疏並顯同一所緣不同一行相。總為三釋評取第三。第三釋行相言者。即了別領納等各不同故。名不同一行相。此意行者即去聲讀。正是能緣之行解也 又解云。行於相故帶相行故名行相。此即平聲。相通影．質。即同本釋。然要集評取第三釋同
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 此難他語。據實疏意舉此例余。余但會六因不例餘者失。
三法展轉。難云：『新現從種起，現行即能熏，種新由現生，新種即起現。』答：『現行逢勝緣，新現即能熏，新種闕勝緣，未即能生現。』又解：『新現勢用增，才起即熏種，新種無勝用，故不即生現。』又解：『種子不相違，起現即熏種，現果體相返，種未即生現。』難：『受與受等違種不即生現，色多得並起，應新種即生。』答：『新現由緣具，種子得從生，新種未具緣，現色未即起。』
問：論本頌中具有不可知（anupalabdhi，無法感知的事物）、執受處（ādāna-sthāna，儲存業力的地方）、了（vijñāna，意識）。何但問處、了，不問不可知？釋中即具明不可知、處、了。答：有二解。一雲影略說。二云總依于別故但問別。釋中具辨故通總、別。又問但據體。答：並顯用。故不相違。
論：識以了別為行相故。本釋云：識自體分以了別為行相。故行相見分也。類體亦然。此意見分名行相者，行應平聲讀。以見分能行於境相，故此見分得行相名。評取初解云：然本但是行於相義。類體亦然者。以行相不可知，類體亦然。然西明疏並顯同一所緣不同一行相。總為三釋評取第三。第三釋行相言者。即了別領納等各不同故。名不同一行相。此意行者即去聲讀。正是能緣之行解也。又解云：行於相故帶相行故名行相。此即平聲。相通影、質。即同本釋。然要集評取第三釋同。
【English Translation】 English version This is difficult to explain to others. Based on the commentary's intention, this example is given for the rest. I only understand the six causes; those who don't follow this example are mistaken.
The three dharmas (trayas-dharmas) revolve. Objection: 'The newly arisen (nava-utpāda) arises from the seed (bīja); the present action (vartamāna-karma) immediately conditions (vāsanā); the new seed arises from the present; the new seed immediately gives rise to the present.' Reply: 'The present action meets favorable conditions (pratyaya); the new present immediately conditions; the new seed lacks favorable conditions and cannot immediately give rise to the present.' Another explanation: 'The power of the new present increases; as soon as it arises, it conditions the seed; the new seed has no superior power, so it does not immediately give rise to the present.' Another explanation: 'The seeds are not contradictory; when the present arises, it immediately conditions the seed; the nature of the present result is reversed; the seed does not immediately give rise to the present.' Objection: 'Reception (vedanā) and similar things contradict, so the seed does not immediately give rise to the present; many forms (rūpa) can arise together, so the new seed should immediately give rise to the present.' Reply: 'The new present arises from complete conditions; the seed can arise from this; the new seed lacks complete conditions, so the present form does not immediately arise.'
Question: In the verse of the treatise (śāstra), there are 'unknowable' (anupalabdhi), 'place of appropriation' (ādāna-sthāna), and 'consciousness' (vijñāna). Why only ask about 'place' and 'consciousness,' and not about 'unknowable'? The explanation fully clarifies 'unknowable,' 'place,' and 'consciousness.' Answer: There are two explanations. One says it is an abbreviated explanation. The other says it relies on the specific, so only the specific is asked about. The explanation fully distinguishes, so it covers both the general and the specific. Another question: Is it only based on the essence (svabhāva)? Answer: It also reveals the function (kārya). Therefore, they are not contradictory.
Treatise: Consciousness (vijñāna) has discernment (pariccheda) as its characteristic (ākāra). The commentary says: The self-cognition section (svasaṃvedana-bhāga) of consciousness has discernment as its characteristic. Therefore, the characteristic is the seeing-section (darśana-bhāga). The similar entity is also like that. This opinion that the seeing-section is called characteristic should be read with a level tone. Because the seeing-section can act on the object (viṣaya), this seeing-section obtains the name 'characteristic.' The commentary adopts the first explanation, saying: However, the original is only the meaning of acting on the object. 'The similar entity is also like that' means that because the characteristic is unknowable, the similar entity is also like that. However, the Ximing commentary reveals that the same object is cognized with different characteristics. In total, there are three explanations, and the third is adopted. The third explanation of 'characteristic' means that discernment, reception (grahaṇa), and so on are different, so they are called different characteristics. This meaning of 'acting' should be read with a departing tone. It is precisely the explanation of the action of the cognizer (grahaka). Another explanation says: Because it acts on the object, it is called 'characteristic' because it carries the object. This is with a level tone. 'Object' includes both shadow (chāyā) and substance (dravya). This is the same as the original explanation. However, the Yaoyao collection adopts the third explanation as the same.
。世親．無性俱行解相貌以為行相。此論亦云了別領納等作用各異故。若取行於相故名行相者。恐非論意。又不應言行相不同。違教及理。以心．心所行於境相無差別故。何得言不同 今謂錯評。何者泛言行相有三。一境名行相。即十六行諦。二能緣行相。即十二行法輪。三行於相名行相。即無分別智等。前二是局。后一即通。今此了言雖能緣行。釋從通解。第三能變即依局辨。云了境相粗故。般若經云。彼識不能了故。不通無分別智。第二能變亦從通解。恒審思量無我相故。或相影顯。隨其所應在因在果。故攝論本頌云。諸菩薩行相。復于所緣中。是無分別智。彼所知無相。無性釋云。于所緣中相似而行。故名行相。此釋初句行相。既言相似而行故名行相。明作平聲。不作去聲而讀行相 然次論云。所知無相者。謂說此智于真如境所作行相。此意說言。無分別智緣真如境。離一切相作意行相以為行相者。是釋第四句。重顯無分別智行相。行於境相中時。不作行解相狀。不是正釋行相之言 問相者是境。行者是心。如何說了名為行相 答能行於相名為行相。有財釋。或相之行。依主釋。不得難云若取行於境相名行相即違教理。及心．心所行於境相無差別故者 此意難云。論說識．受．想等作用各別故違教。心及心所作
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：世親（Vasubandhu）、無性（Asanga）都認爲了別境相的相貌是行相。此論也說，了別、領納等作用各有不同。如果認為『行』是作用於『相』，所以稱為『行相』，恐怕不符合本論的意旨。而且不應該說『行相』不同，這違背了教義和道理。因為心和心所作用於境相沒有差別。怎麼能說不同呢？ 現在我認為這是錯誤的評論。為什麼呢？泛泛地說，『行相』有三種：一是境名為『行相』，即十六行諦；二是能緣的『行相』，即十二行法輪；三是行於相而名為『行相』，即無分別智等。前兩種是區域性的，后一種是普遍的。現在這裡所說的，雖然是能緣的『行』，但解釋是從普遍的意義上理解的。第三能變，是依據區域性的意義來辨別的，說它了別境相粗糙。般若經說：『彼識不能了故』，不包括無分別智。第二能變，也是從普遍的意義上理解的，它恒常審察思量無我之相。或者相的影子顯現，無論是在因位還是在果位。所以《攝大乘論》的頌文說：『諸菩薩行相，復于所緣中，是無分別智，彼所知無相。』無性解釋說：『于所緣中相似而行，故名行相。』這個解釋的第一句『行相』，既然說是相似而行，所以稱為『行相』，說明應該讀作平聲，不讀作去聲。 然而，次論說：『所知無相者』，是說此智對於真如境所作的行相。這個意思是說，無分別智緣真如境，離開一切相，以作意行相作為行相。這是解釋第四句，重新顯示無分別智的行相。行於境相中時，不作行解相狀，不是正解釋『行相』這個詞。 問：『相』是境，『行』是心，為什麼說了別境相的相貌名為『行相』？ 答：能行於相名為『行相』，這是有財釋。或者『相』之行，這是依主釋。不得反駁說，如果認為『行』作用於境相而名為『行相』，就違背了教義和道理，以及心和心所作用於境相沒有差別。 這個意思是反駁說，論中說識、受、想等作用各別，所以違背了教義。心和心所的作用
【English Translation】 English version: Vasubandhu and Asanga both consider the appearance of distinguishing objects as '行相' (ākāra, aspect). This treatise also states that the functions of '了別' (pariccheda, discernment), '領納' (vedanā, feeling), etc., are different. If it is considered that '行' (gamana, action) acts on '相' (lakṣaṇa, characteristic), so it is called '行相' (ākāra, aspect), I am afraid it does not conform to the intention of this treatise. Moreover, it should not be said that '行相' (ākāra, aspect) are different, which violates the teachings and reason. Because the mind and mental factors act on the objective characteristics without any difference. How can it be said that they are different? Now I think this is a wrong comment. Why? Generally speaking, there are three types of '行相' (ākāra, aspect): First, the object is called '行相' (ākāra, aspect), that is, the Sixteen Aspects of the Four Noble Truths; second, the '行相' (ākāra, aspect) of the able-to-cognize, that is, the Twelve Aspects of the Wheel of Dharma; third, acting on the characteristics is called '行相' (ākāra, aspect), that is, non-discriminating wisdom, etc. The first two are local, and the latter is universal. What is said here now, although it is the '行' (gamana, action) of the able-to-cognize, the explanation is understood from the universal meaning. The third transformation is distinguished according to the local meaning, saying that it distinguishes the rough objective characteristics. The Prajna Sutra says: '彼識不能了故' (parijñā, complete understanding), does not include non-discriminating wisdom. The second transformation is also understood from the universal meaning, it constantly examines and contemplates the characteristic of no-self. Or the shadow of the characteristic appears, whether it is in the causal position or the resultant position. Therefore, the verse of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'The aspects of the Bodhisattvas, again in the object, are non-discriminating wisdom, and what they know is without characteristics.' Asanga explains: 'Acting similarly in the object, so it is called '行相' (ākāra, aspect).' The first sentence of this explanation, '行相' (ākāra, aspect), since it is said to act similarly, so it is called '行相' (ākāra, aspect), indicating that it should be read in the even tone, not in the departing tone. However, the next treatise says: 'What is known is without characteristics', which means that this wisdom is the aspect made by the Tathatā (真如, suchness) realm. This means that non-discriminating wisdom is related to the Tathatā (真如, suchness) realm, leaving all characteristics, and taking the aspect of intention as the aspect. This is to explain the fourth sentence, re-displaying the aspect of non-discriminating wisdom. When acting in the objective characteristics, it is not regarded as the state of understanding the action, it is not the correct explanation of the word '行相' (ākāra, aspect). Question: '相' (lakṣaṇa, characteristic) is the object, '行' (gamana, action) is the mind, why is the appearance of distinguishing objects called '行相' (ākāra, aspect)? Answer: Being able to act on the characteristics is called '行相' (ākāra, aspect), this is a possessive explanation. Or the action of '相' (lakṣaṇa, characteristic), this is a dependent explanation. It should not be refuted that if it is considered that '行' (gamana, action) acts on the objective characteristics and is called '行相' (ākāra, aspect), it violates the teachings and reason, and the mind and mental factors act on the objective characteristics without any difference. This means to refute that the treatise says that the functions of consciousness, feeling, thought, etc., are different, so it violates the teachings. The function of the mind and mental factors
用各別。若取行於境相王．所同緣。如何各別 此難不然。論云了別領納等作用各異者。據能行說不約所行。識即能了行於境相。受即領納行於境相。云作用各異。約取境用異。不取緣境之時取諸境相行解用異。以無分別智不作諸境別行相故。雖后得智及分別心。緣境之時作諸行解。不取此釋識之行相。以不遍故。今本論意但取心起行於境相名為行相。即通一切。不取行解名為行相。不通一切故。又此正釋本識了言。若以行解相貌以為行相。深乖論旨。本識任運無行解故。若局后得及分別心釋行相者。得約行解名為行相。
論。所緣相似行相各別。本疏引瑜伽第一同一所緣不同一行相有三解 西明三釋。第三釋云。同一有二。一一故名同一。此即本疏約質故。二相似名同一。即本疏約影。樞要五釋。後人多釋不出於此。諸家不解執取一釋。于中出過 要集復斷有解破本疏。若就本質名同一。無質意識應非相應。云此破有理。此論唯影不通無漏故。以論云然有漏識自體生時。似能所相現故。瑜伽第一通漏．無漏者 此亦不然。雖言有漏生似二現。下即通余。故引經頌云。一切唯有覺。成三分中雲。然心．心所一一生時。各有三分故不唯有漏。若以前支但云有漏識生。即證唯依有漏識。亦應瑜伽論中。言同一所緣非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『用各別』（作用各異）。如果理解為『取行於境相王，所同緣』（在所緣境上相同），那麼『如何各別』（如何體現作用各異）？ 這種質疑是不成立的。《瑜伽師地論》中說，『了別領納等作用各異』，這是從能行的角度說的，不是從所行的角度說的。識能夠了別，並作用於境相；受能夠領納，並作用於境相。說『作用各異』，是指取境的作用不同，而不是指緣境時對諸境相的行解作用不同。因為無分別智不作諸境的差別行相。 雖然後得智和分別心在緣境時會產生各種行解，但這裡不採用這種解釋識的行相，因為它不普遍。現在本論的意思只是取心生起並作用於境相，這叫做行相，這可以通用於一切情況。不取行解作為行相，因為它不通用於一切情況。而且，這正是解釋本識了別之言。如果以行解相貌作為行相，就大大違背了本論的宗旨，因為本識是任運而無行解的。如果侷限於后得智和分別心來解釋行相，可以把行解作為行相。
論：『所緣相似，行相各別』（所緣境相似，行相各異）。本疏引用《瑜伽師地論》第一卷，關於『同一所緣不同一行相』有三種解釋。西明的三種解釋中，第三種解釋說：『同一』有兩種含義，一是本質相同，所以稱為『同一』，這符合本疏從本質角度的解釋；二是相似，所以稱為『同一』，這符合本疏從影像角度的解釋。樞要的五種解釋，後人大多沒有超出這些範圍。各家不理解，執著於一種解釋，因此出現錯誤。 《要集》又斷言有解釋破壞了本疏。如果從本質上說是『同一』，那麼無質的意識就不應該相應。這種駁斥是有道理的，因為此論只講影像，不涉及無漏，因為論中說：『然有漏識自體生時，似能所相現』（然而有漏識自體產生時，似乎有能取和所取之相顯現）。《瑜伽師地論》第一卷是通於有漏和無漏的。 這種說法也是不對的。雖然說有漏識產生時似乎顯現二相，但下面就通於其他情況。所以引用經頌說：『一切唯有覺』（一切都只是覺性）。《成唯識論》的三分中說：『然心心所一一生時，各有三分』（然而心和心所每一個生起時，各有三分），所以不只是有漏。如果以前面的論支只說有漏識生起，就證明只依賴於有漏識，那麼《瑜伽師地論》中說『同一所緣』就不對了。
【English Translation】 English version: '用各別' (yòng gèbié) [Different functions]. If understood as '取行於境相王，所同緣' (qǔ xíng yú jìng xiàng wáng, suǒ tóng yuán) [Taking action on the realm of objects, sharing the same object], then '如何各別' (rúhé gèbié) [how are they different]? This objection is not valid. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states, '了別領納等作用各異' (liǎobié lǐngnà děng zuòyòng gèyì) [Discernment, reception, and other functions are different], which is from the perspective of the actor, not the object. Consciousness (識, shì) can discern and act on the realm of objects; sensation (受, shòu) can receive and act on the realm of objects. Saying '作用各異' (zuòyòng gèyì) [functions are different] refers to the different functions of taking objects, not the different functions of understanding the characteristics of objects when cognizing them. This is because non-discriminating wisdom (無分別智, wú fēnbié zhì) does not create different characteristics of objects. Although subsequent wisdom (后得智, hòu dé zhì) and discriminating mind (分別心, fēnbié xīn) generate various understandings when cognizing objects, this interpretation of the characteristics of consciousness is not adopted here because it is not universal. The meaning of this treatise is simply that the arising of the mind and its action on the realm of objects is called a characteristic (行相, xíngxiàng), which applies to all situations. The understanding of action is not taken as a characteristic because it does not apply to all situations. Moreover, this is precisely the explanation of the discerning words of the fundamental consciousness (本識, běnshì). If the appearance of understanding action is taken as a characteristic, it would greatly contradict the purpose of this treatise, because the fundamental consciousness is spontaneous and without understanding action. If the interpretation of characteristics is limited to subsequent wisdom and discriminating mind, understanding action can be taken as a characteristic.
Treatise: '所緣相似，行相各別' (suǒ yuán xiāngsì, xíngxiàng gèbié) [Objects are similar, characteristics are different]. The commentary quotes the first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, which has three explanations for '同一所緣不同一行相' (tóngyī suǒ yuán bùtóng yī xíngxiàng) [same object, different characteristic]. Among the three explanations of Ximing (西明), the third explanation says: '同一' (tóngyī) [same] has two meanings: one is that the essence is the same, so it is called 'same', which is in line with the commentary's explanation from the perspective of essence; the other is similarity, so it is called 'same', which is in line with the commentary's explanation from the perspective of image. The five explanations of the Essentials (樞要, shūyào) are mostly not beyond these scopes. Various schools do not understand and cling to one explanation, thus making mistakes. The Yaoji (要集) also asserts that some explanations undermine the commentary. If it is said to be 'same' in essence, then non-substantial consciousness should not be corresponding. This refutation is reasonable because this treatise only talks about images and does not involve the unconditioned (無漏, wúlòu), because the treatise says: '然有漏識自體生時，似能所相現' (rán yǒu lòu shí zìtǐ shēng shí, sì néng suǒ xiāng xiàn) [However, when the self-nature of conditioned consciousness arises, it seems that the aspects of the grasper and the grasped appear]. The first volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra applies to both conditioned and unconditioned. This statement is also incorrect. Although it is said that conditioned consciousness seems to manifest two aspects when it arises, it then applies to other situations. Therefore, the sutra verse is quoted: '一切唯有覺' (yīqiè wéi yǒu jué) [Everything is only awareness]. The three aspects in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra say: '然心心所一一生時，各有三分' (rán xīn xīn suǒ yī yī shēng shí, gè yǒu sān fēn) [However, when each mind and mental factor arises, each has three aspects], so it is not just conditioned. If the previous argument only says that conditioned consciousness arises, it proves that it only relies on conditioned consciousness, then the statement 'same object' in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is incorrect.
一行相。但眼．意識不通余識。正釋眼識及俱意識故。彼既許通此論何局。故知本疏深得論旨。
論。不應見分是第三果。本疏云難古師 要集云。陳那但立三分不遮第四。故護法師不違陳那。但是遮破 今謂不爾。雖言破古非陳那等。如理門論破古因明師。豈即破彌勒等師。但破古來不正諸師。今言破古亦復如是。破唯三分以見分為第三果者。不破許有第四分者。
就此能量所量量果別中。相傳解云有六師別。一云覺天說。根為現量。惠為能量。境為所量。根是量果。二云妙音師。根．境同前。能量取識。三云法救師。能量惠及識。余如前說。此皆顯故名現。四云經部。根．境．識和合生法名之為現。根．識為能量。境為所量境。還以根．識為量果。五云犢子部。以神我現量。諸心．心所為能量。神我為量果。六云成實師。以心所中受．想之用為能量。境為所量。識為量果。更當撿文方可為定 本疏問如諸佛及因五．八唯現量應但三分。見分即得為第三果故。答云此不然。內外定故。見分緣外用亦外也。不得為緣內果 要集云。若內外定。已轉依位見分。不應緣第三分。內外定故 今謂不爾。不障緣第三。但不親取。要變于相。相是外攝故。言緣外故。論自云前二是外。
論。所取能取纏。本疏
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『一行相』（ekalakṣaṇa）：僅僅是眼和意識不與其他識共通。這是爲了正確解釋眼識以及與其相關的意識。既然他們允許共通，那麼這個論點又有什麼侷限性呢？因此，可以知道本疏（根本頌的註釋）深刻理解了該論的要旨。
論：不應該認為見分（darśanabhāga）是第三果（phalatṛtīya）。本疏說這是爲了駁難古師。『要集』（Yaoji）中說，陳那（Dignāga）隻立三分（trayaḥ bhāgāḥ），並不遮止第四分（caturtha bhāga）。因此，護法（Dharmapāla）並不違背陳那。但這只是遮破。現在我認為不是這樣。雖然說是破斥古師，但並非陳那等人。例如，『如理門論』（Nyāyapraveśa）破斥古代因明師，難道就是破斥彌勒（Maitreya）等大師嗎？只是破斥古來不正的諸位老師。現在說破斥古師也是如此。破斥唯有三分，認為見分是第三果的人，並不破斥允許有第四分的人。
關於能量（pramāṇa）、所量（prameya）、量果（pramāṇaphala）的區別，相傳的解釋有六師的差別。一說是覺天（Devendra）所說：根（indriya）為現量（pratyakṣa），惠（buddhi）為能量，境（viṣaya）為所量，根是量果。二說是妙音師（Svaraghoṣa）：根、境同前，能量取識（vijñāna）。三說是法救師（Dharma-trāta）：能量是惠和識，其餘如前所說。這些都是顯現的緣故稱為現。四說是經部（Sautrāntika）：根、境、識和合產生法，稱之為現。根、識為能量，境為所量境，還以根、識為量果。五說是犢子部（Vātsīputrīya）：以神我（ātman）為現量，諸心（citta）、心所（caitta）為能量，神我為量果。六說是成實師（Satya-siddhi-śāstra）：以心所中的受（vedanā）、想（saṃjñā）的作用為能量，境為所量，識為量果。更應當檢查原文才能確定。本疏問：如諸佛以及因五、八識唯有現量，應該只有三分，見分就可以作為第三果。回答說：這不對，因為內外是確定的。見分緣外，作用也在外。不能作為緣內的果。『要集』中說：如果內外是確定的，已經轉依（āśraya-parāvṛtti）位的見分，不應該緣第三分，因為內外是確定的。現在我認為不是這樣。不障礙緣第三分，但不親取，要變現於相，相是外攝的緣故。說緣外。
論自己說前二是外。
論：所取（grāhya）能取（grāhaka）纏（bandha）。本疏
【English Translation】 English version: 『Ekalakṣaṇa』 (one characteristic): Only the eye and consciousness are not common to other consciousnesses. This is to correctly explain the eye-consciousness and its associated consciousness. Since they allow it to be common, then what is the limitation of this argument? Therefore, it can be known that the commentary (root verse commentary) deeply understands the essence of the treatise.
Treatise: It should not be considered that the darśanabhāga (seeing-division) is the phalatṛtīya (third result). The commentary says this is to refute the ancient teachers. 『Yaoji』 says that Dignāga only established three divisions (trayaḥ bhāgāḥ) and did not prevent the fourth division (caturtha bhāga). Therefore, Dharmapāla does not contradict Dignāga. But this is only refutation. Now I think it is not like this. Although it is said to refute the ancient teachers, it is not Dignāga and others. For example, 『Nyāyapraveśa』 refutes the ancient logicians, does it refute Maitreya and other masters? It only refutes the incorrect teachers of the past. It is the same now to say that the ancient teachers are refuted. Refuting only three divisions, thinking that the seeing-division is the third result, does not refute those who allow the fourth division.
Regarding the difference between pramāṇa (valid cognition), prameya (object of valid cognition), and pramāṇaphala (result of valid cognition), the traditional explanation has six teachers' differences. One says that it was said by Devendra: indriya (sense faculty) is pratyakṣa (perception), buddhi (intellect) is pramāṇa, viṣaya (object) is prameya, and indriya is pramāṇaphala. The second says it was said by Svaraghoṣa: indriya and viṣaya are the same as before, and pramāṇa takes vijñāna (consciousness). The third says it was said by Dharma-trāta: pramāṇa is buddhi and vijñāna, and the rest is as before. These are all called perception because they are manifest. The fourth says it was said by Sautrāntika: the combination of indriya, viṣaya, and vijñāna produces dharma, which is called perception. indriya and vijñāna are pramāṇa, viṣaya is prameya, and indriya and vijñāna are also pramāṇaphala. The fifth says it was said by Vātsīputrīya: ātman (self) is perception, citta (mind) and caitta (mental factors) are pramāṇa, and ātman is pramāṇaphala. The sixth says it was said by Satya-siddhi-śāstra: the function of vedanā (feeling) and saṃjñā (perception) in the mental factors is pramāṇa, viṣaya is prameya, and vijñāna is pramāṇaphala. It should be checked in the original text to be sure. The commentary asks: Like all Buddhas and the five or eight consciousnesses, there is only perception, so there should only be three divisions, and the seeing-division can be the third result. The answer is: This is not right, because the inside and outside are fixed. The seeing-division is related to the outside, and the function is also outside. It cannot be the result of being related to the inside. 『Yaoji』 says: If the inside and outside are fixed, the seeing-division that has already undergone āśraya-parāvṛtti (transformation of the basis) should not be related to the third division, because the inside and outside are fixed. Now I think it is not like this. It does not hinder being related to the third division, but it does not take it directly, it must transform into the appearance, because the appearance is included in the outside. It is said to be related to the outside.
The treatise itself says that the first two are outside.
Treatise: grāhya (the grasped), grāhaka (the grasper), bandha (bondage). Commentary
云。此唯眾生四分。故言纏縛。相及粗重二縛具故。無漏心四而非纏縛 西明釋云。能取所取四分相屬故名為纏。亦通無漏。非謂煩惱之纏縛也 今謂此非。違論釋故。論云皆有所取能取纏縛。頌言眾生。釋言纏縛。明但眾生有此相縛。不通無漏。安惠可爾。此文且說有漏四分。如三界唯心言。且說有漏唯識。豈以無漏亦唯識。即三界言許通無漏耶。
問既立第三能證第二及第四分。第四復能證第三分。即心能自緣。云何不與世法相違。刀不自割。指端不能觸自指端 答佛地論第三云。答云不見燈等能自照耶。何知自照現見無闇分明顯現。若不自照。應有闇障。應不現見 問燈等非闇。何須照耶 答如瓶．衣等體雖非闇。無燈等照邊。有闇障不得現見。照令闇除衣等現見名為燈照。燈等亦爾。自體生時邊闇障除令現得見。故名自照 問燈能照自令現得見。證心能自緣。衣不自照由他照見。證心不自緣 答心性是照本極成。若例同衣不能照。彼有違自．世間等過。
問量云。心能自照。效能照故。如燈等。此量豈非法自相相違。因．喻所立不成過 答取能照義。以燈為喻故無有過 問豈本不欲證心自緣 答雖言緣自意取顯證。今緣．照雖殊。俱自顯證義 或但相例。不是立量取彼為喻。故無有過。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 云：這只是眾生的四分，所以說是纏縛。因為相分和粗重二縛都具備的緣故。無漏心識的四分則不是纏縛。西明的解釋是：能取和所取的四分相互關聯，所以叫做纏。也包括無漏，但不是指煩惱的纏縛。我認為這種說法不對，因為它違背了論典的解釋。論典說，一切都有所取和能取的纏縛。頌文說眾生，解釋說纏縛，說明只有眾生才有這種相縛，不包括無漏。安慧的說法是可以接受的。這段文字只是說有漏的四分，就像三界唯心所說，只是說有漏的唯識。難道因為無漏也是唯識，就說三界可以包括無漏嗎？ 問：既然設立第三分能證明第二分和第四分，第四分又能證明第三分，這就是心能自緣。為什麼不與世間法相違背呢？刀不能自己割自己，指尖不能觸碰自己的指尖。答：佛地論第三說：回答說，難道沒見過燈等能自己照亮嗎？怎麼知道是自己照亮呢？因為現見沒有黑暗，分明顯現。如果不自己照亮，應該有黑暗遮障，應該不能現見。問：燈等不是黑暗，為什麼需要照亮呢？答：就像瓶子、衣服等，本體雖然不是黑暗，但沒有燈等照亮，旁邊有黑暗遮障，就不能現見。照亮使黑暗消除，衣服等顯現出來，這叫做燈照。燈等也是這樣，自體產生時，旁邊的黑暗遮障消除，使之能夠顯現出來，所以叫做自照。問：燈能照亮自己，使自己顯現出來，證明心能自緣。衣服不能自己照亮，由其他照亮才能看見，證明心不能自緣。答：心性是照，本來就極成了。如果像衣服一樣不能照亮，那就違背了自性、世間等過失。 問：量云：心能自照，因為效能照的緣故，就像燈等。這個量難道不是非法自相相違背嗎？因和喻所立的論點有不成立的過失。答：取能照的意義，用燈來比喻，所以沒有過失。問：難道本來不是要證明心能自緣嗎？答：雖然說緣自，意思是取顯證。現在緣和照雖然不同，但都是自顯證的意義。或者只是相比擬，不是立量，取燈為比喻，所以沒有過失。
【English Translation】 English version: It is said: This is only the fourfold division of sentient beings, hence the term 'entanglement'. It is because the aspect (相, lakṣaṇa) and the grossness (粗重, audārika) of the two entanglements are both present. The fourfold division of the undefiled mind (無漏心, anāsrava-citta) is not an entanglement. The Ximing commentary explains: The fourfold division of the grasper (能取, grāhaka) and the grasped (所取, grāhya) are mutually related, hence the name 'entanglement'. This also applies to the undefiled, but it does not refer to the entanglement of afflictions. I believe this is incorrect because it contradicts the explanation in the treatise. The treatise states that all have the entanglement of the grasped and the grasper. The verse speaks of sentient beings, and the explanation speaks of entanglement, clarifying that only sentient beings have this mutual entanglement, and it does not apply to the undefiled. Anhui's explanation is acceptable. This passage only discusses the fourfold division of the defiled, just as the statement 'the three realms are only mind' only refers to the defiled consciousness-only. Just because the undefiled is also consciousness-only, does that mean the statement 'the three realms' can include the undefiled? Question: Since establishing the third division can prove the second and fourth divisions, and the fourth division can prove the third division, this means the mind can self-cognize (自緣, sva-viṣaya). Why does this not contradict worldly phenomena? A knife cannot cut itself, and the fingertip cannot touch its own fingertip. Answer: The third volume of the Fo Di Lun (佛地論, Buddhabhūmi-śāstra) states: The answer is, have you not seen that a lamp can illuminate itself? How do we know it illuminates itself? Because we directly see that there is no darkness, it is clearly manifest. If it did not illuminate itself, there should be darkness obstructing it, and it should not be directly seen. Question: A lamp is not darkness, so why does it need to illuminate? Answer: Just like a vase or clothing, although their substance is not darkness, without the illumination of a lamp, the darkness nearby obstructs them, and they cannot be directly seen. Illumination removes the darkness, and the clothing becomes visible, this is called lamp illumination. Lamps are the same, when their own substance arises, the darkness nearby is removed, allowing them to be seen, hence the name self-illumination. Question: A lamp can illuminate itself, allowing itself to be seen, proving that the mind can self-cognize. Clothing cannot illuminate itself, it can only be seen through the illumination of others, proving that the mind cannot self-cognize. Answer: The nature of the mind is illumination, it is fundamentally and completely established. If we compare it to clothing, which cannot illuminate, that would violate self-nature, worldly conventions, and other faults. Question: The inference states: The mind can self-illuminate, because it has the nature of illumination, like a lamp. Does this inference not contradict the law of self-nature? The reason and the example used are invalid. Answer: We take the meaning of 'can illuminate', and use the lamp as an example, so there is no fault. Question: Was the original intention not to prove that the mind can self-cognize? Answer: Although we say 'cognizes self', the meaning is to take the manifestation of proof. Although cognition and illumination are different, they both have the meaning of self-manifestation and proof. Or it is just a comparison, not establishing an inference, taking the lamp as an example, so there is no fault.
論。如眾燈明各遍似一。疏及樞要已具解訖 要集彈云。若由炷．盞發影。可言隨彼有多影。但由一光發。如何有多影。彼自解云。謂多燈各發一別光。多光相資假立一明光。一光不明多光方明故 今謂不然。取意有別。若二炷相近同生一焰。光即是一但發一影。若炷相離。或多盞相離。即別生焰。焰別光殊便發多影。然光雖別各遍似一。如共業果。炷．盞相近共生一焰。如二眼根共發一識。不爾假光實非是一。何得喻識而是一耶。又假一明光即應唯發一影。如何有多 又且發影為離炎光為即炎光。若離炎光。光既遍室。影亦應遍。既猶炎東影于西發。即不離炎光。不離炎光不得言一。光不離炎炎應成一故。今共果取離炎光喻。二根發識取不離喻。故疏．樞要得二論意 又西明云。質異同見等四句。有過不成。思之可悉。
論。又諸聖者厭離有色等。本疏據顯言。色界類示 西明云。此說那含等厭色生無色必不下生。不說色界者。彼有色身往欲界故 今謂不爾。違下文故。下云是故現居及當生者變為此界。不言當往者變。若許往者變。無色亦來佛傍側立。亦應許變。況下又難。設有色身粗細懸隔。此變為彼亦何所用。故本解正。
論。故器世界將壞初成而亦現變。問將成可用余界生。變壞時何用而餘生變
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：就像許多燈的光明各自普遍照耀，但看起來像一個整體。疏和樞要都已經解釋完畢。 要集彈駁說：如果是由燈芯、燈盞發出光影，可以說隨著燈芯、燈盞的數量而有多個光影。但如果由一個光源發出，怎麼會有多個光影呢？ 他們自己解釋說：這是說多個燈各自發出一個不同的光，多個光相互資助，假立一個明亮的光。一個光不明顯，多個光才明顯，所以有多個光影。 現在我認為不是這樣。取意有所不同。如果兩個燈芯相近，共同產生一個火焰，光就是一個，只發一個光影。如果燈芯相離，或者多個燈盞相離，就分別產生火焰。火焰不同，光也不同，便會發出多個光影。然而光雖然不同，各自普遍照耀，但看起來像一個整體，如同共同業力的果報。燈芯、燈盞相近，共同產生一個火焰，如同兩個眼根共同產生一個識。否則，假立的光實際上不是一個，怎麼能比喻識而說是一個呢？ 而且假立一個明亮的光，就應該只發一個光影，怎麼會有多個光影呢？ 而且，光影的發出是離開火焰的光，還是不離開火焰的光？如果離開火焰的光，光既然遍佈整個房間，光影也應該遍佈。既然如同火焰在東邊，光影在西邊發出。如果不離開火焰的光，不離開火焰的光就不能說是一個。光不離開火焰，火焰應該成為一個整體。現在共同的果報取離開火焰的光來比喻，二根發識取不離開的比喻。所以疏和樞要得到了二論的意旨。 西明說：質異同見等四句，有過失不能成立。仔細思考就可以明白。 論：還有，諸位聖者厭惡、遠離有色等。本疏根據顯言，類似地顯示。 西明說：這是說阿那含（Anāgāmi，不還果）等厭惡色界，往生到無色界，必定不會再下生到色界。沒有說阿羅漢（Arhat，應供）等，因為他們有色身，會前往欲界。 現在我認為不是這樣。違背了下文的意思。下文說：『是故現居及當生者變為此界』，沒有說當往生者變。如果允許往生者變，無色界的人也應該來到佛的旁邊站立，也應該允許變化。況且下文又反駁說：即使有色身粗細懸隔，這種變化對於他們又有什麼用呢？所以本來的解釋是正確的。 論：所以器世界將要壞滅、開始形成的時候，也會顯現變化。問：將要形成的時候，可以用其他世界的眾生來。壞滅的時候，為什麼還要用其他眾生來變化？
【English Translation】 English version Treatise: Like the light of many lamps, each shining universally, yet appearing as one. The commentary and essential points have already been explained. The Essential Collection refutes: If shadows are emitted by wicks and lamps, it can be said that there are multiple shadows according to their number. But if emitted by a single light source, how can there be multiple shadows? They themselves explain: This means that multiple lamps each emit a different light, and these multiple lights mutually aid each other, falsely establishing a single bright light. If one light is not bright, multiple lights are bright, hence there are multiple shadows. Now, I say it is not so. The intended meaning is different. If two wicks are close together, producing a single flame, the light is one, emitting only one shadow. If the wicks are separated, or multiple lamps are separated, they produce separate flames. Different flames and different lights then emit multiple shadows. However, although the lights are different, each shines universally, appearing as one, like the result of shared karma. Wicks and lamps close together produce a single flame, like two eye-organs jointly producing one consciousness. Otherwise, the falsely established light is not truly one; how can it be compared to consciousness and said to be one? Moreover, if a single bright light is falsely established, it should emit only one shadow; how can there be multiple shadows? Furthermore, is the emission of shadows separate from the flame's light, or inseparable from it? If separate from the flame's light, since the light pervades the entire room, the shadow should also pervade. Since it is like the flame being in the east and the shadow being emitted in the west. If inseparable from the flame's light, it cannot be said to be one. If the light is inseparable from the flame, the flame should become one. Now, the shared result is likened to light separate from the flame, and the two sense organs producing consciousness is likened to inseparability. Therefore, the commentary and essential points grasp the meaning of the two treatises. Xi Ming says: The four phrases 'different in substance, same in appearance,' etc., have faults and cannot be established. Think about it and you will understand. Treatise: Furthermore, all sages are weary of and renounce form, etc. The original commentary, based on explicit words, shows a similar example. Xi Ming says: This refers to Anāgāmis (不還果, Non-Returners) who, disliking the realm of form, are reborn in the formless realm and will definitely not be reborn in the realm of form. It does not refer to Arhats (應供, Worthy Ones), etc., because they have a body of form and will go to the desire realm. Now, I say it is not so. It contradicts the following text. The following text says: 'Therefore, those currently residing and those about to be born transform in this realm,' not saying 'those about to go' transform. If those about to go were allowed to transform, those in the formless realm should also come and stand beside the Buddha, and transformation should also be allowed. Moreover, the following text refutes: Even if bodies of form are vastly different in size, what use is this transformation for them? Therefore, the original explanation is correct. Treatise: Therefore, the world of vessels, when about to be destroyed and when beginning to form, also manifests transformation. Question: When about to form, beings from other realms can be used. When about to be destroyed, why use other beings to transform?
。既餘生變。生變因在。何有盡時 答由彼餘生感界業成熟故變。不爾住時既同此變。此界生無何故即壞。由此故知他壞業變。如在此生他變扶塵沒生他地。或般涅槃他變扶塵。而有膀脹漸爛壞者。壞業力盡三災亦滅。亦由此生本所變界而為引因。下三靜慮涅槃經。說由內過患據引因說。由彼俱業感彼界成故。生余時災由彼引。不爾余由引此言何用。故據實義非隨轉門。引因勢盡此等都滅 問維摩經云。或現劫盡燒天地皆洞然。眾生有常想。照令知速滅。即佛菩薩神力變起。何但眾生 答變化不遮但非實壞。實壞由業非神通力。若定由神力。壞時節不定。故前難云。應實變為此雜穢土。若許實變災壞世界。有相符失。今此文中。說實成壞。不據變化 問劫壞之時彼空界色為有為無。有何不壞。無即違經。經云空劫唯有孔穴色現。即空界色 答雖有非壞。非成壞業之所起故。若許可用故他常變。三災可用。他亦常變。若成壞收應有成壞。以此故知。雖他識變非成壞收 問設生他方自地許變。如在此界大海水等。欲界有情為同變不。若許同變。欲界諸天應見下水寧作琉璃。既見琉璃明不同變。設不同變天有水不 答論說共用即可同變。海不共用。彼不變水。天上可有 若爾八熱大地獄等聖者不用。應不變彼 答現同地故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：既然剩餘的生命會發生變化，那麼發生變化的原因是什麼？什麼時候才能停止變化呢？ 答：這是由於剩餘的生命感受到世界的業力成熟而發生變化。如果不是這樣，那麼停留在世間的時候，既然和這種變化相同，這個世界產生后為什麼會立即壞滅呢？由此可知，是其他的壞滅之業導致的變化。比如在此生中，其他的變化扶持著灰塵，使其沒入並生於其他地方；或者般涅槃（Parinirvana，完全的涅槃）時，其他的變化扶持著灰塵，從而出現膨脹、腐爛的情況。壞滅之業的力量耗盡，三災（Three Disasters）也會消滅。也因此，此生原本所變化的世界成爲了引發的原因。下三靜慮（The lower three dhyanas）的涅槃經中說，這是由內在的過患所導致的，是根據引發的原因來說的。由於他們共同的業力，才感得那個世界的形成。在其他時候發生的災難，也是由他們所引發的。如果不是這樣，那麼『其他的由引發此』這句話有什麼用呢？所以，這是根據真實的意義，而不是隨順轉變的門徑。引發的原因勢力耗盡，這些都會消滅。 問：《維摩經》（Vimalakirti Sutra）中說：『或者顯現劫盡，燃燒天地，一切都洞然，眾生有常想，照亮他們，讓他們知道迅速滅亡。』這是佛菩薩（Buddha-Bodhisattva）的神力變化所引起的，難道僅僅是眾生嗎？ 答：變化並不妨礙，但不是真實的壞滅。真實的壞滅是由業力導致的，而不是神通力。如果一定是神通力導致的，那麼壞滅的時間就不確定。所以之前的難點在於：應該真實地變為這雜穢的土地。如果允許真實的變化導致災難壞滅世界，那麼就會有相符的過失。現在這段文字中，說的是真實的成壞，而不是根據變化來說的。 問：劫壞滅的時候，那個空界（Space Realm）的色（Rupa，物質）是有為法（conditioned dharma）還是無為法（unconditioned dharma）？如果是有為法，為什麼不會壞滅？如果是無為法，就違背了經文。經文中說，空劫（emptiness kalpa）中只有孔穴顯現，色也顯現，指的是空界的色。 答：雖然有，但不是壞滅，因為不是成壞之業所引起的。如果允許可以使用，所以其他的常常變化。三災可以使用，其他的也常常變化。如果成壞收攝，應該有成壞。因此可知，雖然其他的識變化，但不是成壞收攝。 問：假設生於其他地方，允許自己的土地變化，就像在此界的大海水等。欲界（Desire Realm）的有情（sentient beings）是否一同變化？如果允許一同變化，那麼欲界諸天（devas of the Desire Realm）應該看到下面的水，寧願作為琉璃。既然看到琉璃，說明不同變化。如果不同變化，那麼天上是否有水？ 答：論中說，共同使用的就可以一同變化。海水不是共同使用的，所以它不會變化為水。天上可以有水。 問：如果這樣，那麼八熱大地獄（Eight Hot Great Hells）等聖者不用，應該不會變化它們？ 答：因為現在是同一塊土地。 English version: Q: Since the remaining life will change, what is the cause of the change? When will the change stop? A: This is because the remaining life feels the karma of the world maturing and changing. If not, when staying in the world, since it is the same as this change, why does this world perish immediately after it is produced? From this, it can be known that it is the karma of other destructions that causes the change. For example, in this life, other changes support the dust, causing it to sink and be born in other places; or when Parinirvana (complete Nirvana) occurs, other changes support the dust, resulting in swelling and decay. When the power of the karma of destruction is exhausted, the Three Disasters will also be eliminated. Therefore, the world originally transformed in this life becomes the cause of the induction. The Nirvana Sutra of the lower three dhyanas (The lower three dhyanas) says that this is caused by internal faults, and it is based on the cause of induction. Due to their common karma, they feel the formation of that world. The disasters that occur at other times are also caused by them. If not, then what is the use of the phrase 'the other is caused by this'? Therefore, this is based on the true meaning, not the path of following the transformation. When the power of the inducing cause is exhausted, these will all be eliminated. Q: The Vimalakirti Sutra says: 'Or it manifests the end of the kalpa, burning the heavens and the earth, everything is completely burnt, sentient beings have constant thoughts, illuminate them, let them know the rapid destruction.' This is caused by the supernatural power of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (Buddha-Bodhisattva), is it only sentient beings? A: Transformation does not hinder, but it is not real destruction. Real destruction is caused by karma, not supernatural power. If it must be caused by supernatural power, then the time of destruction is uncertain. So the previous difficulty lies in: it should really become this impure land. If real changes are allowed to cause disasters to destroy the world, then there will be corresponding faults. In this text, it speaks of real formation and destruction, not based on transformation. Q: When the kalpa is destroyed, is the rupa (matter) of that Space Realm (Space Realm) a conditioned dharma or an unconditioned dharma? If it is a conditioned dharma, why will it not be destroyed? If it is an unconditioned dharma, it violates the scriptures. The scriptures say that in the emptiness kalpa (emptiness kalpa), only holes appear, and rupa also appears, referring to the rupa of the Space Realm. A: Although there is, it is not destroyed, because it is not caused by the karma of formation and destruction. If it is allowed to be used, so others often change. The Three Disasters can be used, and others also often change. If formation and destruction are collected, there should be formation and destruction. Therefore, it can be known that although other consciousnesses change, they are not collected by formation and destruction. Q: Suppose one is born in another place, allowing one's own land to change, like the sea water in this world. Do sentient beings (sentient beings) in the Desire Realm (Desire Realm) change together? If it is allowed to change together, then the devas of the Desire Realm (devas of the Desire Realm) should see the water below, and would rather take it as lapis lazuli. Since they see lapis lazuli, it means different changes. If there are different changes, then is there water in the heavens? A: The treatise says that what is commonly used can be changed together. Sea water is not commonly used, so it will not change into water. There can be water in the heavens. Q: If so, then the Eight Hot Great Hells (Eight Hot Great Hells) and other sages do not need to, and should not change them? A: Because it is now the same land.
【English Translation】 Modern Chinese Translation: Q: Since the remaining life will change, what is the cause of the change? When will the change stop? A: This is because the remaining life feels the karma of the world maturing and changing. If not, when staying in the world, since it is the same as this change, why does this world perish immediately after it is produced? From this, it can be known that it is the karma of other destructions that causes the change. For example, in this life, other changes support the dust, causing it to sink and be born in other places; or when Parinirvana (complete Nirvana) occurs, other changes support the dust, resulting in swelling and decay. When the power of the karma of destruction is exhausted, the Three Disasters (Three Disasters) will also be eliminated. Therefore, the world originally transformed in this life becomes the cause of the induction. The Nirvana Sutra of the lower three dhyanas (The lower three dhyanas) says that this is caused by internal faults, and it is based on the cause of induction. Due to their common karma, they feel the formation of that world. The disasters that occur at other times are also caused by them. If not, then what is the use of the phrase 'the other is caused by this'? Therefore, this is based on the true meaning, not the path of following the transformation. When the power of the inducing cause is exhausted, these will all be eliminated. Q: The Vimalakirti Sutra (Vimalakirti Sutra) says: 'Or it manifests the end of the kalpa, burning the heavens and the earth, everything is completely burnt, sentient beings have constant thoughts, illuminate them, let them know the rapid destruction.' This is caused by the supernatural power of the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas (Buddha-Bodhisattva), is it only sentient beings? A: Transformation does not hinder, but it is not real destruction. Real destruction is caused by karma, not supernatural power. If it must be caused by supernatural power, then the time of destruction is uncertain. So the previous difficulty lies in: it should really become this impure land. If real changes are allowed to cause disasters to destroy the world, then there will be corresponding faults. In this text, it speaks of real formation and destruction, not based on transformation. Q: When the kalpa is destroyed, is the rupa (matter) of that Space Realm (Space Realm) a conditioned dharma or an unconditioned dharma? If it is a conditioned dharma, why will it not be destroyed? If it is an unconditioned dharma, it violates the scriptures. The scriptures say that in the emptiness kalpa (emptiness kalpa), only holes appear, and rupa also appears, referring to the rupa of the Space Realm. A: Although there is, it is not destroyed, because it is not caused by the karma of formation and destruction. If it is allowed to be used, so others often change. The Three Disasters can be used, and others also often change. If formation and destruction are collected, there should be formation and destruction. Therefore, it can be known that although other consciousnesses change, they are not collected by formation and destruction. Q: Suppose one is born in another place, allowing one's own land to change, like the sea water in this world. Do sentient beings (sentient beings) in the Desire Realm (Desire Realm) change together? If it is allowed to change together, then the devas of the Desire Realm (devas of the Desire Realm) should see the water below, and would rather take it as lapis lazuli. Since they see lapis lazuli, it means different changes. If there are different changes, then is there water in the heavens? A: The treatise says that what is commonly used can be changed together. Sea water is not commonly used, so it will not change into water. There can be water in the heavens. Q: If so, then the Eight Hot Great Hells (Eight Hot Great Hells) and other sages do not need to, and should not change them? A: Because it is now the same land.
若爾水等應然。天現同地 答大海同變。見琉璃者說別水故 若爾魚等居水即見屋宅。大海之中眾生。亦應見屋宅。若許不見海。即非同地變。若許見海水等。應不作舍宅 答許別舍宅居於海水。如地穴居。由業力別。若余別水一處四境。理即不遮。由別業故。如孤獨獄等。
言定通等力。西明云。等取神通。傳三藏亦等願力 有云等取有十能變。定．通．愿同四。佛加被力等 今謂不爾。若佛加被即神通力攝。持經．神咒是法力攝。諸受變改力．煩惱力．改寶珠梵行等力。即前業力攝 要集云。第八三力變。佛等加被與愿無異者 此亦不爾。加被是通。非願力也。
論。及隨法處所攝實色。西明解云。第八緣實不緣假故。然前解處中。即許第八亦緣假色。判為護法正義云。生相等隱第八不緣。長．短等顯故第八緣。又引鏡智緣十八圓滿證八緣假 若如是者今法處中亦應緣假。何但取實。故本疏判。唯緣實者護法正義。若取鏡智緣方．圓等證八緣假。亦應緣過．未及生．住等假相。鏡智緣故。故因果殊不可相例 又云。異生定所生色亦有實用。云威德者是根本定。非勝者起名威德定 今謂不爾。若許異生定變實色。何故瑜伽第十三云。謂超第二阿僧企耶。變有實用。若云彼說通變。此說定變者。此亦不爾
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 若問：如果水等同於大地一樣可以轉變，那麼天空顯現得如同大地一般，應該如何解釋？ 回答：大海也同樣可以轉變。因為看見琉璃（Vaiḍūrya，一種寶石，這裡指清澈的水）的人會說水是不同的。 若問：如果這樣，那麼居住在水中的魚等生物，就應該能看見房屋宅舍。大海之中的眾生，也應該能看見房屋宅舍。如果承認它們看不見大海，那就不是同於大地轉變；如果承認它們能看見海水等，那就不應該建造房屋宅舍。 回答：允許有特別的宅舍居住在海水中，如同地穴居住一樣，這是由於業力不同所致。如果其他特別的水在一個地方的四周，道理上並不妨礙，因為有特別的業力，如同孤獨地獄（Lokantarika，位於世界邊緣的黑暗地獄）等。
關於『定通等力』，西明（可能是指西明寺的僧人）說：『等』字包括神通。傳三藏（可能是指玄奘）也說包括願力。 有人說『等』字包括十種能力的變化。禪定、神通、願力相同，佛的加持力等。 現在我認為不是這樣。如果說是佛的加持，那就是神通力所攝。持經、神咒是法力所攝。諸如受變改的力量、煩惱的力量、改變寶珠梵行的力量等，都是之前的業力所攝。 《要集》中說：第八識有三種力量的變化。佛等的加持與願力沒有區別。 這也是不對的。加持是神通，不是願力。
《瑜伽師地論》說：以及隨法處所攝的真實色。西明解釋說：第八識緣的是真實，不緣虛假。 然而之前的解釋中，就允許第八識也緣虛假色。判為護法（Dharmapāla，一位論師）的正義說：生相等隱沒，第八識不緣；長短等顯現，所以第八識緣。 又引用鏡智（Ādarśa-jñāna，佛的四智之一）緣十八圓滿來證明第八識緣虛假。 如果這樣，那麼現在的法處中也應該緣虛假，為什麼只取真實？所以本疏判斷：只緣真實是護法（Dharmapāla）的正義。如果取鏡智緣方圓等來證明第八識緣虛假，也應該緣過去、未來以及生、住等虛假相，因為鏡智緣故。所以因果不同，不可相提並論。 又說：異生（指凡夫）禪定所生的色也有實用，說威德者是根本定，不是殊勝者所起的名為威德定。 現在我認為不是這樣。如果允許異生禪定轉變真實色，為什麼《瑜伽師地論》第十三卷說：超過第二個阿僧祇耶（Asaṃkhyeya，極大的數字單位）才能轉變有實用？如果說彼處說的是神通變化，此處說的是禪定變化，這也是不對的。
【English Translation】 English version If asked: If water, like the earth, can transform, how should it be explained that the sky appears like the earth? Answer: The great ocean can also transform. Because those who see Vaiḍūrya (a type of gemstone, here referring to clear water) say that water is different. If asked: If so, then fish and other beings living in the water should be able to see houses and dwellings. The beings in the great ocean should also be able to see houses and dwellings. If it is admitted that they cannot see the ocean, then it is not the same as the earth transforming; if it is admitted that they can see seawater, then they should not build houses and dwellings. Answer: It is permissible for special dwellings to exist in seawater, like living in caves, due to different karmic forces. If other special waters are in the four directions of a place, there is no logical obstruction, because of different karmas, like the Lokantarika (a dark hell located at the edge of the world) hells and so on.
Regarding 'the power of Samādhi (concentration), Abhijñā (supernormal knowledges), etc.,' Ximing (possibly referring to a monk from Ximing Temple) said: 'Etc.' includes Abhijñā. The translator Xuanzang also said it includes the power of vows. Some say 'etc.' includes the transformation of ten powers. Samādhi, Abhijñā, and vows are the same, as are the Buddha's blessings, etc. Now I say it is not so. If it is said to be the Buddha's blessing, then it is included in the power of Abhijñā. Upholding scriptures and divine mantras are included in the power of Dharma. Powers such as the power to undergo change, the power of afflictions, the power to change the Brahmacarya (pure conduct) of jewels, etc., are all included in the previous karmic power. The Yaoji says: The eighth consciousness has three kinds of power of transformation. The blessings of the Buddhas, etc., are no different from the power of vows. This is also incorrect. Blessing is Abhijñā, not the power of vows.
The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: And the real form included in the Dharmāyatana (sphere of objects). Ximing explains: The eighth consciousness cognizes the real, not the unreal. However, in the previous explanation, it was allowed that the eighth consciousness also cognizes unreal forms. It is judged as the correct meaning of Dharmapāla (a commentator): The eighth consciousness does not cognize the hidden characteristics such as birth, etc.; it cognizes the manifest characteristics such as length and shortness. It also cites the Ādarśa-jñāna (Mirror Wisdom, one of the Four Wisdoms of the Buddha) cognizing the eighteen perfections to prove that the eighth consciousness cognizes the unreal. If so, then the current Dharmāyatana should also cognize the unreal, why only take the real? Therefore, the commentary judges: Only cognizing the real is the correct meaning of Dharmapāla. If taking the Mirror Wisdom cognizing squares, circles, etc., to prove that the eighth consciousness cognizes the unreal, it should also cognize the past, future, and unreal characteristics such as birth and dwelling, because of the Mirror Wisdom. Therefore, cause and effect are different and cannot be compared. It also says: The form produced by the Samādhi of ordinary beings also has practical use, saying that the majestic power is the fundamental Samādhi, not the one arising from the superior ones called the majestic power Samādhi. Now I say it is not so. If it is allowed that the Samādhi of ordinary beings transforms real form, why does the thirteenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra say: Surpassing the second Asaṃkhyeya (an extremely large numerical unit) is needed to transform something with practical use? If it is said that the former speaks of transformation by Abhijñā, and the latter speaks of transformation by Samādhi, this is also incorrect.
。通力是勝尚超第二劫變方有用。定力是劣。云何凡變即許實用。故威德定是勝人起。三十三云非聖神通不堪受用故 問既許變化。于上地獄各變幾塵。西明釋云。由化心托欲．色異熟本質化。欲界具五。上界除香．味 今謂。上亦變香。法華經云乃至於有頂。聞香知所在。若云彼說法處今說五境者。何故定通變五境耶。應皆法處。若雖定等變非法處收。若爾何等是法處攝。若云雖定等力擊第八變。是業果色故是五塵。若定果等即法處色者。應佛唯有法界。無色等五界。既許定生具十八界。故知上界亦變香境 西明問五根五境隨其所應同在一處。為各別四大造。為一四大造。若一四大造。云何瑜伽云羯剌藍時。能造身根及眼等。大俱時而有次第造耶。若別大造。何故五十四但說七物與眼同處。彼問云色蘊中眼幾物所攝。答若據相離攝。唯有一物。謂眼識所依清凈色。若據不相離攝。即有七物。謂眼．及身．地．色．香．味．觸。三藏解云。同一處者唯一大造。以理推微五根根依同一處者。一地大造。而說造眼四大者。隨所造法。名造眼大。乃至名能造觸大。據實一大。此釋七物有。並會俱時而有。以初即有此能造眼等之功故說俱有 問云何無火等。壽．暖．識三恒不相離除無色處 解云據實有火等。而五十四但說七物
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：通力（神通力）在勝尚超第二劫變時才有用。定力是較差的。為什麼凡是變化就允許實用呢？所以威德定是殊勝之人才能發起的。三十三天說非聖人的神通不能受用。問：既然允許變化，那麼在上地獄各能變化出多少微塵呢？西明的解釋是：由變化心依託欲界、色界的異熟本質而變化。欲界具備五種（色、聲、香、味、觸），上界除去香、味。現在我認為，上界也能變化出香。法華經說乃至到達有頂天，聞到香味就知道所在。如果說那裡說法的地方現在說五境，那麼為什麼定通能變化五境呢？應該都是法處。如果即使是定等變化，非法處也能攝入。如果這樣，什麼才是法處所攝呢？如果說即使是定等力量衝擊第八識而變化，是業果色，所以是五塵。如果定果等是法處色，那麼佛就應該只有法界，沒有色等五界。既然允許定生具備十八界，所以知道上界也能變化出香境。西明問：五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身）五境（色、聲、香、味、觸）隨其所應同在一處，是各自不同的四大（地、水、火、風）所造，還是一個四大所造？如果一個四大所造，為什麼瑜伽說羯剌藍（受精卵）時，能造身根以及眼等，四大同時而有次第地造呢？如果分別由不同的四大所造，為什麼五十四卷只說七物與眼同處？他問色蘊中眼由幾物所攝？答：如果根據相離攝，只有一物，即眼識所依的清凈色。如果根據不相離攝，即有七物，即眼、及身、地、色、香、味、觸。三藏的解釋是：同一處者唯一大造。以理推微，五根根依同一處者，一地大造。而說造眼四大者，隨所造法，名造眼大，乃至名能造觸大。據實一大。此解釋七物有，並會俱時而有。以初即有此能造眼等之功故說俱有。問：為什麼沒有火等？壽、暖、識三者恒常不相離，除了無色界。解釋說：據實有火等，而五十四卷只說七物。
【English Translation】 English version: Supernatural power (Tongli) is only useful when surpassing the second Kalpa transformation. Meditative power (Dingli) is inferior. Why is any transformation allowed to be practical? Therefore, majestic meditative power is initiated by superior beings. The Thirty-three Heavens state that non-saints' supernatural powers cannot be used. Question: Since transformation is allowed, how many dust motes can be transformed in the upper and lower realms respectively? Ximing explains: Transformation arises from the mind of transformation relying on the different ripe essence of the desire and form realms. The desire realm possesses five (form, sound, smell, taste, touch), while the upper realm excludes smell and taste. Now, I believe that the upper realm can also transform smell. The Lotus Sutra says that even reaching the peak of existence, one can know the location by smelling the fragrance. If it is said that the place where the Dharma is spoken there now speaks of the five senses, then why can meditative power transform the five senses? It should all be Dharma-objects. If even meditative power transforms, non-Dharma-objects can also be included. If so, what is included in Dharma-objects? If it is said that even the power of meditation impacts the eighth consciousness and transforms, it is karmic result form, so it is the five dusts. If the result of meditation is Dharma-object form, then the Buddha should only have the Dharma realm, without the five realms of form, etc. Since it is allowed that meditation gives rise to the eighteen realms, it is known that the upper realm can also transform the realm of smell. Ximing asks: The five roots (eye, ear, nose, tongue, body) and five objects (form, sound, smell, taste, touch) are in the same place as they should be, are they created by different four great elements (earth, water, fire, wind), or by one four great elements? If created by one four great elements, why does the Yoga say that at the time of Kalala (fertilized egg), the body root and eyes, etc., can be created, and the four great elements exist simultaneously but in sequence? If created by different four great elements, why does Chapter 54 only say that seven things are in the same place as the eye? He asks, how many things are included in the eye in the form aggregate? Answer: If according to separation, only one thing is included, which is the pure form on which eye consciousness relies. If according to non-separation, there are seven things, namely eye, body, earth, form, smell, taste, and touch. The Tripitaka explains: Those in the same place are created by only one great element. Reasoning subtly, those whose root relies on the same place for the five roots are created by one earth element. And saying that the four great elements create the eye means that according to the Dharma created, it is called the great element that creates the eye, and even the great element that can create touch. In reality, it is one great element. This explains that the seven things exist and come together simultaneously. Because from the beginning, there is the function of creating the eye, etc., it is said to exist simultaneously. Question: Why are there no fire, etc.? Life, warmth, and consciousness are always inseparable, except in the formless realm. The explanation is: In reality, there are fire, etc., but Chapter 54 only mentions seven things.
者。據相顯說。以地堅性眼等所依。是故偏說。
論。因緣分別二變西明二解。第二唯第八心王為因緣變。云何名有實用。實用有二。如色一質礙用。二本質用。若爾五識所變為第六質。何非因緣。若云無質礙用不具二義者。第八所變長等亦唯為本質應非因緣。法師自云。若爾初解為勝 問第八在意界。所緣應當唯法界。云何通十八界耶 答依彼六二緣。意處所緣法界攝。不依六二緣。隨彼所緣十八攝。又以闇從明十八界攝 既爾何不別立界處 答處．界．出生．及因義。意處所緣法處收。第八無別出生．因故。亦隨六意處攝 問若五識變相分無礙。與對法第三相違。彼論有對無對分別中雲。諸有見者皆是有對。豈眼識相分非有見耶。彼論云。謂眼所行境是有見義。故眼識相應名有見。若云有對者。是境界有對。非障礙有對者。理亦不然。彼云三因故名有對。謂種類故。積集故。不修治故。種類者互為能所礙。積集者極微已上。以一極微無對礙故。不修治者非定起色 今為二解。一云五識所變並是有礙。且說有見舉此例余。即對法雲。諸有見色名有對故 一云無對。非有見故。眼所行境名為有見。眼根但照彼本質故 若爾何故名同境根 答同取本質。如說王所同一所緣 或有對三義。本質具三。相但后二。總名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 有人根據顯現的相來說，因為地（prthivi，堅性）、眼（caksu）等所依賴的緣故，所以偏重這樣說。
論：因緣分別有兩種變化，西方學者明白兩種解釋。第二種解釋認為只有第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）的心王是因緣所變。怎樣才能稱作有實用呢？實用有兩種：一是色（rupa）的質礙作用，二是本質作用。如果這樣，五識（panca-vijnana）所變成為第六質，為什麼不是因緣所變呢？如果說沒有質礙作用，不具備兩種意義，那麼第八識所變的長等也只是本質，不應是因緣所變。法師自己說，如果這樣，最初的解釋更為殊勝。問：第八識在意界（mano-dhatu）中，所緣的應當只有法界（dharma-dhatu），怎樣才能貫通十八界（dasa-atta-dhatu）呢？答：依靠彼六二緣。意處（mano-ayatana）所緣的包含在法界中。不依靠六二緣，隨著它所緣的包含在十八界中。又因為從黑暗到光明，包含在十八界中。既然這樣，為什麼不另外設立界處呢？答：處、界、出生以及因的意義。意處所緣的被法處（dharma-ayatana）收攝。第八識沒有別的出生和因的緣故，也隨著六意處收攝。問：如果五識所變的相分沒有障礙，與《阿毗達磨》（Abhidharma）第三相違背。該論在有對無對的分別中說，凡是有可見的都是有對的。難道眼識（caksu-vijnana）的相分不是有可見的嗎？該論說，所謂眼所行的境界是有可見的意義，所以眼識相應稱為有可見。如果說有對，是境界有對，不是障礙有對，道理也不對。該論說因為三種原因所以稱為有對，即種類故、積集故、不修治故。種類是指互相成為能所障礙。積集是指極微以上，因為一個極微沒有對礙的緣故。不修治是指非定起色。
現在有兩種解釋。一種認為五識所變都是有礙的。且說有可見的，舉這個例子類推其餘。即《對法》說，凡是有可見的色都稱為有對。一種認為無對，因為不是有可見的緣故。眼所行的境界稱為有可見，眼根（caksu-indriya）只是照彼本質的緣故。如果這樣，為什麼稱為同境根呢？答：共同取本質。如說國王所同一所緣。或者有對有三種意義，本質具備三種，相分只有后兩種，總名。
【English Translation】 English version: Some say this based on the manifested appearances, because of the reliance on earth (prthivi, solidity), eye (caksu), etc., hence the emphasis on this explanation.
Treatise: The causes and conditions are distinguished by two kinds of transformations, and Western scholars understand two explanations. The second explanation considers only the mind-king of the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, store consciousness) as transformed by causes and conditions. How can it be called having practical use? Practical use has two aspects: first, the obstructive function of form (rupa); second, the essential function. If so, what is transformed by the five consciousnesses (panca-vijnana) becomes the sixth substance, why is it not transformed by causes and conditions? If it is said that it does not have obstructive function and does not possess both meanings, then the length, etc., transformed by the eighth consciousness should also only be the essence and should not be transformed by causes and conditions. The Dharma master himself said that if so, the initial explanation is more superior. Question: The eighth consciousness is in the mind element (mano-dhatu), what it cognizes should only be the dharma element (dharma-dhatu), how can it encompass the eighteen realms (dasa-atta-dhatu)? Answer: Relying on those six and two conditions. What the mind-base (mano-ayatana) cognizes is included in the dharma element. Not relying on the six and two conditions, it is included in the eighteen realms according to what it cognizes. Also, because of the transition from darkness to light, it is included in the eighteen realms. Since this is the case, why not establish separate realms and bases? Answer: The meanings of base, realm, arising, and cause. What the mind-base cognizes is collected by the dharma-base (dharma-ayatana). Because the eighth consciousness does not have separate arising and cause, it is also collected along with the six mind-bases. Question: If the image-division transformed by the five consciousnesses is without obstruction, it contradicts the third aspect of the Abhidharma. In the distinction between with-opposition and without-opposition in that treatise, it says that whatever is visible is with-opposition. Is it not that the image-division of eye-consciousness (caksu-vijnana) is visible? That treatise says that what the eye perceives is the meaning of being visible, so eye-consciousness in association is called visible. If it is said that with-opposition means the object is with-opposition, not that the obstruction is with-opposition, the reasoning is also incorrect. That treatise says it is called with-opposition because of three reasons, namely, because of kind, because of accumulation, and because of non-cultivation. Kind refers to mutually being able to obstruct. Accumulation refers to above the extremely small, because one extremely small particle does not have opposition. Non-cultivation refers to form that does not arise determinately.
Now there are two explanations. One considers that what is transformed by the five consciousnesses is all with obstruction. Let's talk about what is visible, and use this example to extrapolate to the rest. That is, the Abhidharma says that all visible forms are called with-opposition. One considers it without-opposition, because it is not visible. What the eye perceives is called visible, because the eye-organ (caksu-indriya) only illuminates its essence. If so, why is it called a sense-organ with a shared object? Answer: They commonly grasp the essence. As it is said that the king shares the same object. Or with-opposition has three meanings, the essence possesses all three, the image-division only possesses the latter two, collectively named.
有對。非礙名對。今據所變有質礙對。名為實用。五識相無。若準此釋。七識應是分別變收。但為境故 此亦不然。自在定生既有實用。何非因緣 答定．散別故。自在所生為食等用。不得相例 若爾五識亦因緣變。有段食用故 據此可爾 又解亦非。為他食用是因緣。五變自用故非因緣。
成唯識論了義燈卷第三(終) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1832 成唯識論了義燈
成唯識論了義燈卷第四(本)
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼撰
論。觸謂三和分別變異等。辨其體業 問何故心王但辨自性．行相不說作業。心所即辨作業．自性不說行相耶 答互相影顯。或已略明故今不說。前第二云。識．受．想等了別領納等行相各異故。受等所依說是觸業。亦影顯識為余所依即識作業 問心．心所法微隱難知。或以作用或以行相而顯自體。作用與行相復有何別 答行相顯自取境功能。作用顯他依止功能。然心王多己行相顯自體。心所不定。作意警心。思令造作非緣境用。受領順違。想取境像。此即緣用故。解識行相即是了別。了別即是見分所攝。第一卷云。識謂了別。即以行相顯于自體。第三卷引無始時來界等。即顯與他為因緣用。即是作用顯于自體。論云故以作用而顯示之 問若以了別即是顯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：『有對』（yǒuduì）和『非礙名對』（fēi ài míng duì）的說法是正確的。現在根據所轉變的有質礙的對立，稱為『實用』（shíyòng）。五識（wǔshí）的相是無質礙的。如果按照這個解釋，第七識（qīshí）應該被分別變所攝。但因為是境的緣故。 答：這也不對。自在定（zìzài dìng）所生既有實用，為什麼不是因緣呢？ 答：因為定和散是不同的。自在所生是爲了飲食等用，不能互相類比。 問：如果這樣，五識也是因緣所變，有段食用（duàn shíyòng）的緣故？ 答：根據這個說法，可以這樣認為。 又一種解釋也不對。為他人食用是因緣，五變（wǔ biàn）是自用，所以不是因緣。
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第三（終） 大正藏第43冊 No. 1832 《成唯識論了義燈》
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第四（本）
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼（zīzhōu dàyúnsì bǐqiū huìzhǎo）撰
論：觸（chù）是指三和（sānhé）分別變異等，辨別它的體和業。 問：為什麼心王（xīnwáng）只辨別自性（zìxìng）、行相（xíngxiàng），而不說作業（zuòyè）？心所（xīnsuǒ）卻辨別作業、自性，而不說行相呢？ 答：這是互相影顯。或者已經略微說明，所以現在不說。前面第二卷說：『識（shí）、受（shòu）、想（xiǎng）等了別領納等行相各異。』受等所依說是觸業，也影顯識為其餘所依，即是識的作業。 問：心、心所法微隱難知，或者以作用（zuòyòng），或者以行相來顯示自體。作用與行相又有什麼區別呢？ 答：行相顯示自己取境的功能，作用顯示依止他物的功能。然而心王多以自己的行相顯示自體，心所則不一定。作意（zuòyì）警覺心，思（sī）令心造作，不是緣境的作用。受領（shòulǐng）順違，想取（xiǎngqǔ）境像。這就是緣境的作用。所以，解釋識的行相就是了別，了別就是見分（jiànfēn）所攝。第一卷說：『識謂了別。』就是以行相顯示自體。第三卷引用無始時來界等，就是顯示與他為因緣用，就是作用顯示自體。論中說：『所以用作用來顯示它。』 問：如果以了別就是顯示
【English Translation】 English version: Question: The statements 'having opposition' (yǒuduì) and 'non-obstructive name opposition' (fēi ài míng duì) are correct. Now, based on the transformed opposition with substance and obstruction, it is called 'practical use' (shíyòng). The characteristics of the five consciousnesses (wǔshí) are without obstruction. If according to this explanation, the seventh consciousness (qīshí) should be included in the differentiated transformation. But because it is the object. Answer: This is also incorrect. Since what is produced from the Samadhi of Sovereignty (zìzài dìng) has practical use, why is it not a cause and condition? Answer: Because the meditative and scattered states are different. What is produced from Sovereignty is for the use of food and drink, etc., and cannot be compared analogously. Question: If that's the case, the five consciousnesses are also transformed by causes and conditions, because they have segmented food use (duàn shíyòng)? Answer: According to this statement, it can be considered so. Another explanation is also incorrect. Using for others is a cause and condition, the five transformations (wǔ biàn) are for self-use, so they are not causes and conditions.
Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 3 (End) Taisho Tripitaka Volume 43, No. 1832, Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only
Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only, Volume 4 (Beginning)
Composed by Bhikshu Huizhao (bǐqiū huìzhǎo) of Dayun Temple in Zizhou (zīzhōu dàyúnsì)
Treatise: Contact (chù) refers to the combination of the three (sānhé), differentiation, transformation, etc., distinguishing its substance and function. Question: Why does the Mind-King (xīnwáng) only distinguish self-nature (zìxìng) and characteristics (xíngxiàng), and not speak of activity (zuòyè)? Why do the Mental Factors (xīnsuǒ) distinguish activity and self-nature, but not speak of characteristics? Answer: This is mutual reflection and manifestation. Or it has already been briefly explained, so it is not mentioned now. The second volume earlier said: 'Consciousness (shí), sensation (shòu), conception (xiǎng), etc., have different characteristics such as distinguishing and receiving.' The basis of sensation, etc., is said to be the activity of contact, which also reflects that consciousness is the basis of the rest, which is the activity of consciousness. Question: The Mind and Mental Factors are subtle and difficult to understand. How are their self-substances manifested through function (zuòyòng) or characteristics? What is the difference between function and characteristics? Answer: Characteristics manifest the function of oneself taking an object, while function manifests the function of relying on others. However, the Mind-King mostly manifests its self-substance through its own characteristics, while Mental Factors are not necessarily so. Attention (zuòyì) alerts the mind, thought (sī) causes the mind to create, which is not the function of cognizing an object. Sensation receives (shòulǐng) what is agreeable or disagreeable, and conception takes (xiǎngqǔ) the image of the object. This is the function of cognizing an object. Therefore, explaining the characteristics of consciousness is differentiation, and differentiation is included in the seeing-division (jiànfēn). The first volume says: 'Consciousness is differentiation.' This is manifesting the self-substance through characteristics. The third volume quotes the realm from beginningless time, etc., which is manifesting the use of cause and condition with others, which is the function manifesting the self-substance. The treatise says: 'Therefore, it is manifested through function.' Question: If differentiation is manifestation
自。何故觸等亦稱爲了。下第五云。作意了此所未了相等 答同一了言各各顯自此有何妨 不爾違前第二所說。彼云了別領納等行相各異故 答了有二義。一緣境名了。通心及所。二行相了別。非所但王。而作意等亦言了者。說緣境了非行相了 或有單．復。單言了者即通王．所。言了別者非所唯王。前識但云了者。以頌文窄略去別字。后釋方言了謂了別 或泛明緣王．所俱了。辨別行相了非心所 問何故王．所或取了境。或余作用而顯自性 答造論者意隨舉一種。或就顯明瞭。不可一準 問同舉作用以顯性．業二用何別 答有云。親用顯性。疏用顯業。近遠．內外．自他亦爾 要集云。作用有二。一唯自用。二通他用。唯自顯性。通他顯業 今謂不定。如觸順生心所功能以顯自識。亦能似根境順生。即是通他。雖總是觸自性。且舉和合令同觸境為觸自性。非謂三和分別變異非觸自性。正以此等明自性故 作意引心令趣于境。此即唯自舉一例余。若云據心所說如何不簡。又通他顯業過亦未離。從多可爾 西明云。了者通行相。王．所俱有。如第五說 今謂不爾。若同了別何故次下難第三師。云勿觸等五亦能了別。故知了別非通行相。應如前解 問觸似三順生似彼是觸性。亦應似因之果皆觸自性。若不爾如何難他。似因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：為什麼觸等心所也稱為『了』（瞭解、明白）？《瑜伽師地論》第五卷說，作意能『了』（瞭解）此前未『了』（瞭解）的相等。答：雖然都用『了』字，但各自顯示自身的作用，這有什麼妨礙？不然就違背了前面第二卷所說的，『了別』（清晰辨別）、『領納』（領受）等行相各不相同。答：『了』有兩種含義：一是緣取境界，這可以通於心王（心識）和心所（心理活動）；二是行相了別，這並非心所的作用，而是心王的作用。而作意等心所也說『了』，是指它們緣取境界的『了』，而不是行相了別的『了』。或者有單用和複用的情況。單用『了』字，就通於心王和心所。說『了別』，就不是心所的作用，而是唯有心王的作用。前五識只說『了』，是因為頌文簡略，省略了『別』字。後面的解釋才說『了』是指『了別』。或者泛泛地說明緣取境界，心王和心所都能『了』。辨別行相，則只有心王才能『了』。問：為什麼心王和心所有時取『了』境，有時取其他作用來顯示自性？答：造論者的意圖是隨意舉出一種。或者就顯明的作用來說。不可一概而論。問：同樣是舉出作用來顯示自性和作用，這兩種作用有什麼區別？答：有人說，親近的作用顯示自性，疏遠的作用顯示作用。近和遠、內和外、自和他也一樣。要集說，作用有兩種：一種是唯有自身才能使用的，一種是通於他人使用的。唯有自身才能使用的，顯示自性。通於他人使用的，顯示作用。我認為不一定。比如觸能順著產生心所的功能來顯示自身的識，也能像根和境一樣順著產生，這就是通於他人。雖然總是觸的自性，但舉出和合，使之與觸境相同，作為觸的自性，並非說三和合的分別變異不是觸的自性。正是用這些來闡明自性。作意引導心識趨向于境界，這只是唯有自身才能使用的，舉出一個例子，其餘的可以類推。如果說根據心所來說，為什麼不簡別？又說通於他人來顯示作用的過失也沒有離開。從多數情況來說可以這樣。西明說，『了』是通行的行相，心王和心所都有。如第五卷所說。我認為不是這樣。如果相同于『了別』，為什麼接著要難為第三師，說不要認為觸等五種心所也能『了別』。所以知道『了別』不是通行的行相。應該像前面解釋的那樣。問：觸類似三和合順著產生，類似那個是觸的自性。也應該類似因的果都是觸的自性。如果不這樣，如何難倒他人？類似因...
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Why are mental factors such as Sparsha (contact) also called 'understanding'? The fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that Manasikara (attention) can 'understand' what was previously not 'understood'. Answer: Although the word 'understanding' is used, each reveals its own function, so what's the harm? Otherwise, it would violate what was said in the second volume earlier, that the characteristics of 'Vijnana' (distinct cognition), 'Vedana' (feeling), etc., are different. Answer: 'Understanding' has two meanings: one is to cognize the object, which can apply to both Citta (mind) and Caitta (mental factors); the other is the distinct cognition of characteristics, which is not the function of mental factors, but the function of the mind. When mental factors such as Manasikara are also said to 'understand', it refers to their 'understanding' of cognizing the object, not the 'understanding' of distinct cognition of characteristics. Or there are cases of single and compound usage. The single use of the word 'understanding' applies to both the mind and mental factors. Saying 'distinct cognition' is not the function of mental factors, but only the function of the mind. The first five consciousnesses only say 'understanding' because the verse is concise and omits the word 'distinct'. The later explanation says that 'understanding' means 'distinct cognition'. Or it generally explains that both the mind and mental factors can 'understand' the object. Distinguishing characteristics is only the function of the mind. Question: Why do the mind and mental factors sometimes take 'understanding' the object and sometimes take other functions to reveal their own nature? Answer: The intention of the author is to randomly cite one. Or it is based on the obvious function. It cannot be generalized. Question: Similarly, using the function to reveal nature and function, what is the difference between these two functions? Answer: Some say that the close function reveals nature, and the distant function reveals function. The same is true for near and far, inner and outer, self and other. The Yaoji says that there are two kinds of functions: one is only for self-use, and the other is for common use. Only self-use reveals nature. Common use reveals function. I think it is not necessarily. For example, Sparsha can follow the function of generating mental factors to show its own consciousness, and it can also follow the generation like the root and the object, which is for common use. Although it is always the nature of Sparsha, it is cited as a combination to make it the same as the object of Sparsha as the nature of Sparsha, not to say that the differentiation and variation of the three combinations are not the nature of Sparsha. It is precisely with these that the nature is clarified. Manasikara guides the mind to tend towards the object, which is only for self-use. Take one example, and the rest can be inferred. If you say that according to the mental factors, why not distinguish? Also, the fault of saying that it is common to others to show the function has not been left. It can be like this from the majority of situations. Ximing said that 'understanding' is a common characteristic, and both the mind and mental factors have it. As said in the fifth volume. I don't think so. If it is the same as 'distinct cognition', why then make it difficult for the third teacher, saying don't think that the five mental factors such as Sparsha can also 'distinctly cognize'. So I know that 'distinct cognition' is not a common characteristic. It should be explained as before. Question: Sparsha is similar to the three combinations following the generation, and similar to that is the nature of Sparsha. It should also be similar to the fruit of the cause, which is the nature of Sparsha. If not, how can you stump others? Similar to cause...
之果應皆受性 答不唯領似名觸自性。更有餘用。彼唯似因名受自性故作是難 問觸謂三和即從因果為名。分別變異即能領似之稱。此即辨名。觸境為性應始顯體。今為但顯體。為雙辨名．體 答雖似釋名正只顯性 或兼辨名。尋名取體。所以雙辨。然依論意正為辨體。以理俱取義亦不違 問六．八境．根別。可說三和生。第七根．境同。應從二和起 一云可爾 二雲根．境義殊亦三和起 又據極成說三和起。依大不共亦二和生。
問觸依三和起。從彼名三和。識．受二．四生。應名二四和 答二解。一云觸亦和彼。余不和彼故不得名 二云亦得 問識二和起得名二和。識作意生應名警覺 答識從彼起體亦和。故得從彼名二和。從作意生非警覺。不從於彼名警覺 問作意警心種位能警。三和起觸種位三和 答根．識種位劣無用未三和。作意效能警故種位起用。
論。作意謂能警心為性者。為種位警。為現行位 答準諸師說通二位警。本疏種位非在現行西明．要集俱非本釋云。論二說通於種．現。如五蘊論云謂能令心發悟為性。顯揚第一云。依心所起。與心俱轉。相應。動心為體。引心為業。若依有部自有兩說。雜心依現故彼論云．憶者于緣發悟。一在生相。正理十一云。作意正現前者。謂正起近現前自境
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果一切結果都應該取決於其自性，那麼觸（Sparśa，感官接觸）的結果也應該取決於其自性嗎？ 答：不，不僅僅是領納相似之名、觸的自性。還有其他的功用。因為他們僅僅是相似之因，名和受的自性，所以才這樣發問。 問：觸被稱為三和合（tisṛṇāṃ saṃnidhināṃ，根、境、識三者的結合），是從因果關係上命名的嗎？分別變異，就是能夠領納相似的稱謂。這就在辨別名相。觸境為自性，應該首先顯現其體性。現在是僅僅顯現體性，還是同時辨別名和體？ 答：雖然像是解釋名相，但實際上只是顯現其體性。或者兼顧辨別名相。通過名稱來探求體性，所以同時辨別。然而，根據論的意義，主要是爲了辨別體性。因為道理上可以同時取用，意義上也不相違背。 問：六識（ṣaṭ vijñānāni，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意）和八識（aṣṭa vijñānāni，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意、末那、阿賴耶）的境和根不同，可以說由三和合而生。第七識（末那識，manas-vijñāna）的根和境相同，應該由二和合而起。 一種觀點認為可以這樣。 另一種觀點認為根和境的意義不同，仍然由三和合而起。又根據極成之理說三和合而起。依照大不共之理，也由二和合而生。 問：觸依賴三和合而起，因此被稱為三和合。識（vijñāna，意識）、受（vedanā，感受）由二和合、四和合而生，應該被稱為二和合、四和合嗎？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種觀點認為觸也和合了它們，其餘的沒有和合它們，所以不能這樣命名。 另一種觀點認為也可以這樣命名。 問：識由二和合而起，可以命名為二和合。識由作意（manasikāra，心理活動）而生，應該命名為警覺嗎？ 答：識從它們而起，體性也和合，所以可以從它們命名為二和合。從作意而生，不是警覺，不從它們命名為警覺。 問：作意在種子位（bīja-avasthā，潛在狀態）能夠警覺，三和合而起的觸在種子位也是三和合嗎？ 答：根和識的種子位弱小無用，沒有三和合。作意效能夠警覺，所以在種子位起作用。 論：作意，是指能夠警覺心識的性質。是指種子位警覺，還是現行位（vartamāna-avasthā，顯現狀態）警覺？ 答：按照諸位論師的說法，兩種狀態都能警覺。《本疏》認為種子位不在現行位。《西明》、《要集》都不同意這種觀點。《本釋》說，論中有兩種說法，都包括種子位和現行位。如《五蘊論》所說：『是指能夠使心發悟的性質。』《顯揚第一》說：『依賴心所而起，與心同時運轉，相應，以動心為體，以引心為業。』如果依照有部的觀點，自有兩種說法。《雜心》依據現行位，所以該論說：『憶念者對於緣而發悟。』一種是在生相。《正理十一》說：『作意正在現前者，是指正在生起、接近現前的自境。』
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If all results should depend on their own nature, should the result of Sparśa (sensory contact) also depend on its own nature? Answer: No, not only the name of perceiving similarity, the nature of Sparśa. There are other functions as well. Because they are merely the cause of similarity, the nature of name and Vedanā (feeling), hence the question. Question: Sparśa is called tisṛṇāṃ saṃnidhināṃ (the combination of root, object, and consciousness), is it named from the relationship of cause and effect? Differentiating and varying is the term for being able to perceive similarity. This is distinguishing names. Sparśa taking the object as its nature should first manifest its essence. Is it now merely manifesting its essence, or simultaneously distinguishing name and essence? Answer: Although it seems like explaining names, it actually only manifests its essence. Or it takes into account distinguishing names. Seeking the essence through names, so it distinguishes both. However, according to the meaning of the treatise, it is mainly for distinguishing the essence. Because it can be taken simultaneously in principle, it does not contradict in meaning. Question: The objects and roots of the six consciousnesses (ṣaṭ vijñānāni, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) and the eight consciousnesses (aṣṭa vijñānāni, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, mind, manas, and ālayavijñāna) are different, so it can be said to arise from the combination of three. The root and object of the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñāna) are the same, so it should arise from the combination of two. One view is that it can be so. Another view is that the meanings of root and object are different, so it still arises from the combination of three. Also, according to the principle of established truth, it arises from the combination of three. According to the principle of great non-commonality, it also arises from the combination of two. Question: Sparśa relies on the combination of three to arise, so it is called the combination of three. Vijñāna (consciousness) and Vedanā (feeling) arise from the combination of two and the combination of four, should they be called the combination of two and the combination of four? Answer: There are two explanations. One view is that Sparśa also combines them, the others do not combine them, so it cannot be named this way. Another view is that it can also be named this way. Question: Vijñāna arises from the combination of two, so it can be named the combination of two. Vijñāna arises from Manasikāra (mental activity), should it be named alertness? Answer: Vijñāna arises from them, and its essence also combines, so it can be named the combination of two from them. Arising from Manasikāra is not alertness, it is not named alertness from them. Question: Manasikāra in the Bīja-avasthā (seed state) can be alert, is Sparśa arising from the combination of three also the combination of three in the seed state? Answer: The seed states of root and Vijñāna are weak and useless, there is no combination of three. Manasikāra has the ability to be alert, so it functions in the seed state. Treatise: Manasikāra refers to the nature of being able to alert consciousness. Does it refer to the seed state being alert, or the Vartamāna-avasthā (manifest state) being alert? Answer: According to the statements of the various masters, both states can be alert. The 'Original Commentary' believes that the seed state is not in the manifest state. 'Ximing' and 'Yaoji' disagree with this view. The 'Original Explanation' says that there are two views in the treatise, both including the seed state and the manifest state. As the 'Treatise on the Five Aggregates' says: 'It refers to the nature of being able to make the mind awaken.' 'Xianyang First' says: 'It arises relying on mental factors, operates simultaneously with the mind, corresponds, takes moving the mind as its essence, and taking leading the mind as its function.' If according to the view of the Sarvāstivāda school, there are two views of its own. 'Zaxin' relies on the manifest state, so that treatise says: 'The one who remembers awakens to the condition.' One is in the phase of arising. 'Zhengli Eleven' says: 'Manasikāra is precisely the one who is present before the manifest, referring to the self-object that is currently arising and approaching the present.'
。即正生時將入現在取自境義。大乘亦二說。一依顯揚。現在作意警同時相應之心。文如前引。二依此論。擊發現起心種。引現起心趣所緣境。然釋此論自有兩解。一謂此未來作意種子。警覺未來應起心種。由此令心趣自現在境。一云現在作意。警覺現在應起心種。引彼現心令趣自境。此釋為勝 今謂不爾。若依有部正理為正。即雜心論于將所緣發悟為性。同於正理。若即如彼即不正義。若依大乘。亦唯一說。五蘊論云謂能令心者。心種亦得名心。不言能令現心發悟性故。若依顯揚云從阿賴耶識種子所生依心所起。與心俱轉。相應。動心為體者。初二句簡他宗義。依心所起顯心所義。與心俱轉簡前後生。相應者簡同時色根。因解心所相應義。動心為體方顯自體。動應起心為體即是種心。若正現在。即正已起。何名應起。既已現起。更何須警。若警令解此是惠能。警令趣境不異於業。若警令起起竟何須警。若云既許現因能生現果。何妨現在警覺於心者不爾。以種現在生現心時。雖俱在現要能生未生。若有種時已有彼現。何須種起。若現根等不是令生但為依住。若是能生應有根時常有識起。猶如作意有現能警必有心故 若云種位能警即是未來。未來無體如何能警者不爾。大乘因果深妙離言。觀當生現假說未來。雖在種位與
所生現亦正現在。此護法宗。無勞異覺。粗觀即似現警。細尋警理難見 然瑜伽說。作意云何謂迴轉性者。即顯揚同。迴轉與動義意相似。故如前會不應於此有別師計。是論所破。故回趣者但破小乘。
論。破執中持心令住者。諸說但破大乘異計。西明初解亦破小乘。要集亦非本疏所說。集論但云持心為業。雜集釋云數數引心。是引名持。非住名持。既云數數引心。與此論同。故不應破 今謂不爾。雜集云。即於此境數數引心。是故心得定者名得作意。本疏意者。但以論言即於此境數數引心。既云此境即是一境。數數引心故於一境數數引心。明即是住。不爾何故復云是故心得定者名得作意。故雜集意明此作意持心令住方始得定。集論據增。雜集謂為盡理。故今論破。若但破小乘。何部所計判定為勝。
問想既施設名言為業。何非語因 答準雜集論說。為隨說因非語加行。由想境像方立名言。此勢用疏。尋．伺用親正起語故說為語行。
論。覆謂染法障礙聖道者。問染法障聖道說名為有覆。不善亦障聖同名為有覆 答據能障聖道。不善應名覆。招果勢用強故不名有覆 問不善招報強從勝不名覆。無想不感果障聖名有覆 答自性染法覆蔽勝障聖名有覆。無想報等翳理微故不名有覆。
所例王門四
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『所生現亦正現在。此護法宗（指護法菩薩的學說）。無勞異覺。粗觀即似現警。細尋警理難見。』然《瑜伽師地論》說：『作意云何？謂迴轉性者。』即與《顯揚聖教論》相同。迴轉與動義意相似。故如前會，不應於此有別師計。是論所破。故回趣者但破小乘。
論：『破執中持心令住者。』諸說但破大乘異計。西明初解亦破小乘。《要集》亦非本疏所說。《集論》但云持心為業。《雜集論》釋云：『數數引心。』是引名持，非住名持。既云數數引心，與此論同。故不應破。今謂不爾。《雜集論》云：『即於此境數數引心。是故心得定者名得作意。』本疏意者，但以論言『即於此境數數引心』，既云此境即是一境，數數引心故於一境數數引心。明即是住。不爾何故復云『是故心得定者名得作意』。故《雜集論》意明此作意持心令住方始得定。《集論》據增，《雜集論》謂為盡理。故今論破。若但破小乘，何部所計判定為勝？
問：想既施設名言為業，何非語因？答：準《雜集論》說，為隨說因非語加行。由想境像方立名言。此勢用疏。尋（尋求）.伺（伺察）用親正起語故說為語行。
論：『覆謂染法障礙聖道者。』問：染法障聖道說名為有覆，不善亦障聖同名為有覆？答：據能障聖道，不善應名覆。招果勢用強故不名有覆。問：不善招報強從勝不名覆，無想不感果障聖名有覆？答：自性染法覆蔽勝障聖名有覆。無想報等翳理微故不名有覆。
所例王門四
【English Translation】 English version:
'What is born is also presently existing. This is the doctrine of Dharmapala (護法, a bodhisattva). There is no need for different interpretations. A cursory glance suggests an immediate warning, but a detailed examination reveals the difficulty in understanding the principle of warning.' However, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) says: 'What is attention (作意)? It is called the nature of turning.' This is the same as the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations (顯揚聖教論). 'Turning' and 'moving' have similar meanings. Therefore, as in the previous discussion, there should not be a separate teacher's view here. This is what the treatise refutes. Thus, those who advocate 'turning towards' only refute the Hinayana.
Treatise: 'Those who maintain the mind in the midst of refutation.' The various views only refute the differing views of Mahayana. The initial explanation of Ximing also refutes the Hinayana. The Essentials Collection (要集) is also not what the original commentary says. The Compendium of Topics (集論) only says that maintaining the mind is its function. The Collected Annotations (雜集論) explains: 'Repeatedly directing the mind.' 'Directing' is called 'maintaining,' not 'abiding' is called 'maintaining.' Since it says 'repeatedly directing the mind,' it is the same as this treatise. Therefore, it should not be refuted. Now, we say it is not so. The Collected Annotations says: 'Immediately, in this state, repeatedly directing the mind. Therefore, those whose minds are concentrated are called those who have attained attention.' The meaning of the original commentary is that the treatise says 'immediately, in this state, repeatedly directing the mind.' Since it says 'this state' is one state, repeatedly directing the mind, therefore, in one state, repeatedly directing the mind. Clearly, it is abiding. Otherwise, why would it say 'Therefore, those whose minds are concentrated are called those who have attained attention'? Therefore, the meaning of the Collected Annotations is that this attention, maintaining the mind in abiding, is how one attains concentration. The Compendium of Topics is based on augmentation, while the Collected Annotations considers it to be exhaustive. Therefore, this treatise refutes it. If it only refutes the Hinayana, which school's view is judged to be superior?
Question: Since thought (想) has the function of establishing names and words, why is it not a cause of speech? Answer: According to the Collected Annotations, it is a cause of following speech, not a verbal action. Names and words are established based on the images of thought. This is a superficial use. Seeking (尋) and examining (伺) are directly involved in initiating speech, so they are called verbal actions.
Treatise: 'Covered means that defiled dharmas obstruct the holy path.' Question: Defiled dharmas obstructing the holy path are said to be 'covered.' Do unwholesome actions also obstruct the holy path and are similarly called 'covered'? Answer: Based on the ability to obstruct the holy path, unwholesome actions should be called 'covered.' However, because the force of attracting karmic results is strong, they are not called 'covered.' Question: Unwholesome actions attracting strong retribution are not called 'covered' because of their strength. Does the state of no-thought (無想) not produce karmic results but obstruct the holy path and is therefore called 'covered'? Answer: Defiled dharmas by their nature cover and strongly obstruct the holy path, so they are called 'covered.' The obscuration of the principle by the retribution of no-thought is subtle, so it is not called 'covered.'
Like the four gates of a royal city.
師不同。第三難陀。若唯安惠者不爾。通則可然。救破隨舉言似根等。諸師各解得通種．現。文言通故。
問且六能熏。為共成一本質之種。為各別熏 答有二解。一云共成一本質種。而相．見種各別。一云質亦各別。后說為正 問俱是多因共生一果。何故后正 答種同一處可共生果。能熏相異各別熏質 問受熏雖不在所。緣境俱同王．所。所變根．境之時俱有用不 答西明云。三藏二解。一云觸等所變俱無實用。境可增上緣。而非是所緣。一云非例。根是增上義。故唯心變。境是疏緣義。亦通心所。后釋為正 今謂未然。心所所變為六所緣理即不障。為五識境違于正義。護法五識不許緣假故。若云對第六說者亦不然。根．境相望根既望五論。境是五境。如何對六說。雖傳三藏不見同聞。況復教依法不依人故。
論。體既本有等。本疏設難。要集云。有救。婆沙救云。見色等用不通過去故三世別。正理師救。約同類因取果作用以辨三世。余皆功能。此設彼救。在疏不引云破不成據何所以 今謂若婆沙救見色等用。不通過去故三世別者。則色等五境雖在現在。亦無見等用應名過去。正理唯約因類之因取與果用名為作用。以同類勝者。則苦法忍應不得生。闕同類因無作用故 又復五因俱因緣性。俱能取果何非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：各家老師的觀點不同。例如，第三難陀（Nanda，人名）。如果只接受安慧（Anhui，人名，佛教論師）的觀點，那就不對了。如果融會貫通各種觀點，那就可以接受。對於救濟和駁斥，可以隨意引用『似根』等說法。各位老師各自的解釋可以貫通種子和現行。因為經文的語言是貫通的。
問：如果六種能熏習力共同形成一個本質的種子，還是各自熏習？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是共同形成一個本質的種子，而相分（nimitta-bhāga）和見分（darśana-bhāga）的種子是各自不同的。另一種說法是本質也是各自不同的。后一種說法是正確的。問：都是多個原因共同產生一個結果，為什麼后一種說法是正確的？答：種子在同一個地方可以共同產生結果。能熏習的相分不同，所以各自熏習本質。問：受熏習的雖然不在所緣的境界中，但所緣的境界都與國王（rāja，比喻阿賴耶識）、所（parigraha，比喻末那識）相同。所變現的根（indriya）和境（viṣaya）在什麼時候有用？答：西明寺（Ximing Temple，寺名）的僧人說，三藏（Tripitaka，佛教經典總稱）有兩種解釋。一種說法是觸等所變現的都沒有實際用處。境可以作為增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya），但不是所緣緣（ālambana-pratyaya）。另一種說法是不能這樣類比。根是增上義，所以只有心變現。境是疏遠的緣，也通於心所。后一種解釋是正確的。我認為不然。心所所變現的作為六識的所緣，在道理上沒有障礙。作為五識的境界，就違背了正確的含義。護法（Dharmapāla，人名，佛教論師）的五識不允許緣假法。如果說是對第六識說的，那也不對。根和境相互對應，根既然是相對於五識來說的，境就是五境。怎麼能對第六識說呢？雖然是三藏傳下來的，但沒有見到相同的說法。而且應該依據佛法，而不是依據個人。
論：體既然是本有的等等。原本的疏文設定了難題。《要集》（Yaoji，書名）中說，有人救濟。婆沙師（Vaibhāṣika，佛教論師）救濟說，見色等作用不能通過過去，所以三世（過去、現在、未來）是不同的。正理師（Nyāya，古印度哲學流派）救濟說，根據同類因產生結果的作用來區分三世，其餘的都是功能。這裡設定了對方的救濟，但疏文沒有引用，說破斥不成立，這是為什麼？我認為，如果婆沙師救濟說，見色等作用不能通過過去，所以三世是不同的，那麼色等五境即使在現在，也沒有見等作用，應該叫做過去。正理師只根據因類之因產生結果的作用，稱為作用，以同類中殊勝的為準，那麼苦法忍（duḥkha-dharma-kṣānti）就不應該產生，因為缺少同類因，沒有作用。而且五因（五種原因）都是因緣性（hetu-pratyaya），都能產生結果，為什麼不行？
【English Translation】 English version: The teachers' views differ. For example, the third Nanda (Nanda, a personal name). If only accepting Anhui's (Anhui, a personal name, a Buddhist philosopher) view, then it is incorrect. If integrating various views, then it is acceptable. Regarding rescue and refutation, one can freely cite statements like 'similar roots'. Each teacher's explanation can connect seeds and manifestations. Because the language of the scriptures is interconnected.
Question: If the six powers of conditioning together form a seed of one essence, or do they condition separately? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that they together form a seed of one essence, while the seeds of the image-aspect (nimitta-bhāga) and the seeing-aspect (darśana-bhāga) are different from each other. Another explanation is that the essence is also different from each other. The latter explanation is correct. Question: Both are multiple causes jointly producing one result, why is the latter explanation correct? Answer: Seeds in the same place can jointly produce results. The conditioning images are different, so they condition the essence separately. Question: Although the conditioned is not in the object of perception, the perceived objects are the same as the king (rāja, metaphor for Ālaya-vijñāna), and the possessed (parigraha, metaphor for Manas-vijñāna). When are the transformed roots (indriya) and objects (viṣaya) useful? Answer: The monks of Ximing Temple (Ximing Temple, temple name) said that the Tripitaka (Tripitaka, the general term for Buddhist scriptures) has two explanations. One explanation is that the transformed touches and so on have no practical use. Objects can be an enhancing condition (adhipati-pratyaya), but not an object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya). Another explanation is that it cannot be compared in this way. Roots are enhancing in meaning, so only the mind transforms. Objects are distant conditions, also connected to mental functions. The latter explanation is correct. I think not. The transformations of mental functions as the objects of the six consciousnesses have no obstacles in principle. As the realm of the five consciousnesses, it violates the correct meaning. Dharmapāla's (Dharmapāla, a personal name, a Buddhist philosopher) five consciousnesses do not allow conditioning of false dharmas. If it is said to be speaking to the sixth consciousness, that is also incorrect. Roots and objects correspond to each other, since roots are relative to the five consciousnesses, objects are the five objects. How can it be said to the sixth consciousness? Although it was passed down by the Tripitaka, the same statement has not been seen. Moreover, one should rely on the Dharma, not on individuals.
Treatise: Since the substance is originally existent, etc. The original commentary sets up a difficult problem. The 'Essentials Collection' (Yaoji, book title) says that someone rescued it. The Vaibhāṣika (Vaibhāṣika, a Buddhist philosopher) rescued it by saying that the function of seeing forms, etc., cannot pass through the past, so the three times (past, present, future) are different. The Nyāya (Nyāya, an ancient Indian philosophical school) rescued it by distinguishing the three times based on the function of the same kind of cause producing results, and the rest are functions. Here, the other party's rescue is set up, but the commentary does not cite it, saying that the refutation is not established, why is this? I think that if the Vaibhāṣika rescued it by saying that the function of seeing forms, etc., cannot pass through the past, so the three times are different, then even if the five objects such as forms are in the present, they have no function of seeing, etc., and should be called the past. The Nyāya only calls the function of the same kind of cause producing results as function, taking the superior of the same kind as the standard, then the endurance of suffering-dharma (duḥkha-dharma-kṣānti) should not arise, because there is a lack of the same kind of cause, and there is no function. Moreover, the five causes (five kinds of causes) are all causal nature (hetu-pratyaya), and can all produce results, why not?
作用。若非作用應非因緣。又婆沙第十二云。等無間緣除阿羅漢最後心．心所法余過．現心．心所法。有餘師說。亦為等無間緣。但後果不生。評不應爾。所以者何。等無間緣依作用立。若法與彼法作等無間緣。無法無有情能為障礙令彼不生。世第一法非最後心。后非同類可非無間。以此故知。無學後心無有作用。既無作用何非過去。故助難成。然準婆沙。等無間緣過去亦有取與果用。彼第十云。何者等無間緣。云與次第義。與作用義。此是與果。復云能生心義。能引發義。此取果義。又云能引等無間法名等無間緣。故知等無間有取．與義。
論。前因滅位等。有三解。一約等無間。前因果滅。后念識因果生。二約種子。前種因滅位。后種果正生。三約前念。現種因果滅位。后念現種因果生。以諸種子與第八識俱生滅故。如秤兩頭。以影略說。前但云因滅。后但舉果生。此解為正。
論。觀現在法等。西明云。觀現在種法有引後用。于因上假立當果。對說現因 今謂不爾。何者云于現在種因之上假立當果。為觀現因名作當果。為觀現因能有所引名為當果。若觀現因名為當果。果因無別 又論云假謂現識似彼相現。若觀引後用說彼所引名為當果。即不依于現因之上假立當果。所引非因但是依識變作未來假名
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：作用。如果不是作用，就不應是因緣。另外，《婆沙論》第十二卷說，等無間緣除了阿羅漢（Arhat，已證得涅槃的聖者）的最後心、心所法（Citta-caitta dharma，心和與心相關的心理現象）之外，其餘過去、現在的的心、心所法都是等無間緣。有其他論師說，阿羅漢的最後心也是等無間緣，但不會產生後果。評論說不應該這樣認為。為什麼呢？等無間緣是依據作用而成立的。如果一個法與另一個法作為等無間緣，就沒有任何法或有情（Sentient beings，有情識的生命）能夠障礙它，使它不產生。世第一法（Lokagradharma，指修行者在三界內所能達到的最高境界）不是最後的心，其後念並非同類，可以是非無間。因此可知，無學（Asaiksa，已完成修行的聖者）的後心沒有作用。既然沒有作用，為什麼不是過去法呢？所以助成很難成立。然而，根據《婆沙論》，等無間緣在過去也有取與果的作用。《婆沙論》第十卷說，什麼是等無間緣？說是具有次第的意義，具有作用的意義。這是與果。又說能生心的意義，能引發的意義。這是取果的意義。又說能引發等無間法，名為等無間緣。所以可知等無間有取與的意義。
論：前因滅位等。有三種解釋。第一種是關於等無間緣。前因果滅，后念識因果生。第二種是關於種子（Bija，潛藏的可能性）。前種子因滅位，后種子果正生。第三種是關於前念。前念現種因果滅位，后念現種因果生。因為所有的種子都與第八識（Alaya-vijñana，阿賴耶識，又稱藏識）同時生滅，就像天平的兩端。這裡只是簡略地說，前面只說因滅，後面只說果生。這種解釋是正確的。
論：觀現在法等。西明說，觀察現在的種子法有引發後來的作用，在因上假立當來的果。相對而言，說現在的因。現在我認為不是這樣。為什麼說在現在的種子因之上假立當來的果呢？是觀察現在的因，稱之為當來的果，還是觀察現在的因能夠有所引發，稱之為當來的果？如果觀察現在的因，稱之為當來的果，那麼果和因就沒有區別了。而且論中說，假是指現在的識（Vijñana，意識）顯現出相似的相。如果觀察引發後來的作用，說它所引發的，稱之為當來的果，那麼就不依賴於現在的因之上假立當來的果。所引發的不是因，只是依據識的變現，作為未來的假名。
【English Translation】 English version: Function. If it were not a function, it should not be a cause and condition. Furthermore, the twelfth volume of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra states that the samanantarapratyaya (immediately preceding condition) excludes the last citta (mind) and caitta dharma (mental factors) of an Arhat (one who has attained Nirvana), while the remaining past and present citta and caitta dharma are samanantarapratyaya. Some teachers say that the last mind of an Arhat is also a samanantarapratyaya, but it does not produce a result. The commentary says that this should not be the case. Why? The samanantarapratyaya is established based on function. If a dharma serves as a samanantarapratyaya for another dharma, then no dharma or sentient being (Sentient beings, beings with consciousness) can obstruct it, preventing it from arising. The lokagradharma (the highest dharma in the world of desire) is not the last mind, and its subsequent thought is not of the same kind, so it can be non-immediate. Therefore, it can be known that the mind after the asaiksa (one who has completed training) has no function. Since it has no function, why is it not a past dharma? Therefore, the assistance is difficult to establish. However, according to the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra, the samanantarapratyaya also has the function of taking and giving results in the past. The tenth volume of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra says, what is the samanantarapratyaya? It is said to have the meaning of sequence and the meaning of function. This is giving the result. It also says the meaning of being able to generate the mind, the meaning of being able to initiate. This is taking the result. It also says that the ability to initiate the samanantara dharma is called samanantarapratyaya. Therefore, it can be known that the samanantarapratyaya has the meaning of taking and giving.
Treatise: 'The position of the preceding cause being extinguished,' etc. There are three explanations. The first is about the samanantarapratyaya. The preceding cause and effect are extinguished, and the subsequent thought's consciousness cause and effect arise. The second is about the bija (seed, potentiality). The preceding seed cause is extinguished, and the subsequent seed effect is truly arising. The third is about the preceding thought. The preceding thought's present seed cause and effect are extinguished, and the subsequent thought's present seed cause and effect arise. Because all seeds arise and cease simultaneously with the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñana, storehouse consciousness), like the two ends of a scale. This is a brief explanation, where the preceding only mentions the cause being extinguished, and the subsequent only mentions the effect arising. This explanation is correct.
Treatise: 'Observing the present dharma,' etc. Ximing says that observing the present seed dharma has the function of initiating the subsequent. A future effect is provisionally established on the cause. Relatively speaking, the present cause is spoken of. Now I say that this is not the case. Why say that a future effect is provisionally established on the present seed cause? Is it that observing the present cause is called the future effect, or is it that observing the present cause is able to initiate something, which is called the future effect? If observing the present cause is called the future effect, then there is no difference between the effect and the cause. Moreover, the treatise says that provisional means that the present consciousness (Vijñana, consciousness) manifests a similar appearance. If observing the function of initiating the subsequent, and saying that what it initiates is called the future effect, then it does not rely on the present cause to provisionally establish the future effect. What is initiated is not the cause, but is only based on the transformation of consciousness, as a provisional name for the future.
當果。依現立當故是假立 又解云。現識者即種子識。有似酬前引后相故說之為似。即托此相而假說曾．當。非觀心上變 此亦不爾。何者前觀現在法等。後言假謂現識似彼相現。若非依此觀心現識之上有似曾．當相現。種子之上何能似有。然當兩重因果。文顯可知 問疏云依識變曾．當假立三世。為道理三世。為唯識三世。若道理三世。與唯識三世有何差別 答不尋因果相酬引邊。但說過去事。及記未來諸可怖事。而心變作過．未之相。對彼二相說名現在。即是唯識。故與此別。復更有解 然立三世諸宗不同。如一說部三世但言都無實體。若出世部依法立世。世間是假世亦假。出世實世亦實。大眾．經部等。過．未是假。現在是實 若薩婆多三世俱實。俱舍二十引教及理立三世實。然就彼宗有四師別。故彼頌云。此中有四種。類．相．位．待異。第三約作用立世最為善。一法救說。由三類不同三世有異。非體不同。如破金器作余物時。形色雖有殊。而顯色無異。行於三世唯舍類得類。非舍體得體。二妙音說。由相不同三世有異。相不同者。一云不相應中別有一類世相不同三世有異隨一世相合。餘二世相隱。非謂體無。二云世相有用時名合。相雖無用而隨於法其體非無。三世友說。由位不同三世有異。非體有異。如運
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 當果（未來的結果）。因為是依據現在而假立未來，所以說是假立。另一種解釋是，現在的意識就是種子識（儲存所有經驗的意識）。因為它有類似酬答過去、引導未來的表象，所以說它『類似』。即依託這種表象而假說過去和未來，並非觀察心上所變現的。這種說法也不對。為什麼呢？因為前面觀察現在的法等等，後面說『假』，是指現在的意識類似那些表象顯現。如果不是依據這種觀察，在心識的顯現上有類似過去和未來的表象顯現，那麼在種子之上怎麼能有類似呢？然而，當有兩重的因果關係，文義顯明可知。問：疏文中說，依據意識變現而假立三世（過去、現在、未來），這是道理上的三世，還是唯識宗的三世？如果是道理上的三世，與唯識宗的三世有什麼差別？答：不尋求因果相酬引的方面，只是說過去的事情，以及記住未來那些可怕的事情，而心變現出過去和未來的表象，針對那兩種表象而說名為現在，這就是唯識宗的三世，所以與此不同。還有其他的解釋。然而，建立三世的各個宗派不同。例如，一說部認為三世都完全沒有實體。如果出世部依法建立世，世間是假的，世也假，出世是真實的，世也真實。大眾部、經部等認為，過去和未來是假的，現在是真實的。如果薩婆多部認為三世都是真實的。《俱舍論》第二十卷引用教義和道理來建立三世是真實的。然而，就那個宗派來說，有四位論師的差別。所以那首偈頌說：『此中有四種，類、相、位、待異。』第三種是約作用來建立世，最為完善。一、法救說，由於三種類別不同，三世才有差異，並非本體不同。如同打破金器製作其他物品時，形狀顏色雖然有差別，而顯色沒有不同。行於三世，只是捨棄類別而得到類別，並非捨棄本體而得到本體。二、妙音說，由於相不同，三世才有差異。相不同是指：一說，在不相應法中，另外有一種世相，由於不同，三世才有差異，隨著某一世的相符合，其餘兩世的相就隱藏，並非說本體沒有。二說，世相有用時名為符合，相雖然沒有用，但隨著法，它的本體並非沒有。三、世友說，由於位置不同，三世才有差異，並非本體有差異。如同運
【English Translation】 English version 『Dang Guo』 (future result). Because it is based on the present to provisionally establish the future, it is said to be provisional. Another explanation is that the present consciousness is the 『seed consciousness』 (consciousness that stores all experiences). Because it has an appearance similar to responding to the past and leading to the future, it is said to be 『similar』. That is, relying on this appearance to provisionally speak of the past and future, not observing what is transformed on the mind. This statement is also incorrect. Why? Because earlier, one observes the present dharmas, etc., and later says 『provisional』, referring to the present consciousness appearing similar to those appearances. If it were not based on this observation, with appearances similar to the past and future appearing on the manifestation of the mind consciousness, then how could there be similarity on the seeds? However, there are two layers of cause and effect, and the meaning of the text is clearly knowable. Question: The commentary says that provisionally establishing the three times (past, present, future) based on the transformation of consciousness, is this the three times in terms of principle, or the three times of the Yogacara school? If it is the three times in terms of principle, what is the difference between it and the three times of the Yogacara school? Answer: Not seeking the aspect of cause and effect responding and leading, but only speaking of past events, and remembering those frightening future events, and the mind transforms into the appearances of the past and future, and calling it the present in relation to those two appearances, this is the three times of the Yogacara school, so it is different from this. There are other explanations as well. However, the various schools that establish the three times differ. For example, the Ekavyavaharika school believes that the three times have no substance at all. If the Lokottaravada school establishes the world according to the Dharma, the mundane is false, and the world is also false, the supramundane is real, and the world is also real. The Mahasanghika, Sautrantika, etc., believe that the past and future are false, and the present is real. If the Sarvastivada school believes that the three times are all real. The twentieth volume of the Abhidharmakosha cites teachings and principles to establish that the three times are real. However, in that school, there are differences among four teachers. Therefore, that verse says: 『In this there are four kinds, difference in class, appearance, position, and dependence.』 The third is to establish the world in terms of function, which is the most complete. First, Dharmatrāta says that because the three categories are different, the three times are different, not because the substance is different. Just as when breaking a gold vessel to make other objects, although the shape and color are different, the manifest color is not different. Acting in the three times, one only abandons the category and obtains the category, not abandoning the substance and obtaining the substance. Second, Ghosaka says that because the appearances are different, the three times are different. The difference in appearances refers to: one says, in non-associated dharmas, there is another kind of world appearance, because of the difference, the three times are different, as the appearance of one time corresponds, the appearances of the other two times are hidden, not saying that the substance does not exist. The second says, the world appearance is called corresponding when it is useful, although the appearance is not useful, but following the Dharma, its substance is not non-existent. Third, Vasumitra says that because the positions are different, the three times are different, not because the substance is different. Like transporting
一籌置在一位名一。在千位名千。位雖別體不別。四覺天說。由觀待有別故三世異。觀待后故名過去。觀待前故名未來。俱觀待名現在。俱舍論破法救所說。執法轉變置數論朋中。妙音所立世相雜亂。三世皆有三世相故。覺天所說前後相待。一世法中應有三世。謂過去世前後剎那應名去．來。中名為現。唯許第三依作用立。世無雜亂。婆沙同俱舍。正理許類異。俱破妙音及覺天說 大乘所立或二或三如本疏辨。所指之文恐煩略引 瑜伽第三云何建立。謂諸種子不離法故如法建立。若諸果法若已滅相是過去。有因未生相是未來。已生未滅相是現在 瑜伽五十一云。過去行雲何。謂相已滅沒自性已舍。現在行雲何。謂相未滅沒自性未舍。未來行雲何。謂因現在有自相未生未得自性 瑜伽五十二云。過去諸行與果故有。未來諸行攝因故有。所以者何現在諸行三相所顯。一是過去果性故。二是未來因性故。三自相相續不斷故 又云。已與果種子相續名過去界。若未與果當來種子相續名未來界。若未與果現在種子相續名現在界 辨中邊第二云。因果已．未用是世義應知 釋云。謂于因果俱已受用是過去義。俱未受用是未來義。若已受用因未已受用果是現在義。此等但約因果種子顯世差別。皆是道理三世所攝 諸說神通．三明等者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一個籌碼放在個位上，稱作一。放在千位上，稱作千。位置雖然不同，但本體沒有區別。四覺天（Sautrāntika，經量部）認為，由於觀待（pratītya，條件）不同，所以三世（過去、現在、未來）才有差別。觀待之後，稱作過去。觀待之前，稱作未來。同時觀待，稱作現在。《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）駁斥了法救（Dharmatrāta）的說法，他執著於法的轉變，將數論（Sāṃkhya）的朋黨置於其中。妙音（Ghoṣaka）所建立的世相雜亂不堪，因為三世都具有三世的相狀。覺天所說的前後相互觀待，那麼一世法中就應該有三世。所謂過去世的前後剎那應該稱作過去、未來，中間稱作現在。只允許第三種（現在）依據作用而建立，世間才不會雜亂。《婆沙論》（Mahāvibhāṣā）的觀點與《俱舍論》相同。《正理》（Nyāya）則允許種類不同，都駁斥了妙音和覺天的說法。 大乘（Mahāyāna）所建立的，或者兩種或者三種，如本疏所辨析。所指的經文恐怕繁瑣，所以略去引用。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第三卷說：如何建立（三世）？就是說，各種種子不離法（dharma）的緣故，如法建立。如果各種果法（phala-dharma）已經滅相，就是過去。有因（hetu）但尚未生相，就是未來。已經生但尚未滅相，就是現在。《瑜伽師地論》第五十一卷說：過去的行（saṃskāra）是什麼？就是說，相（lakṣaṇa）已經滅沒，自性（svabhāva）已經捨棄。現在的行是什麼？就是說，相尚未滅沒，自性尚未捨棄。未來的行是什麼？就是說，因為現在有，但自相尚未生起，尚未得到自性。《瑜伽師地論》第五十二卷說：過去的諸行與果（phala）的緣故而有。未來的諸行攝取因（hetu）的緣故而有。為什麼呢？現在的諸行被三種相所顯現：一是過去的果性，二是未來的因性，三是自相相續不斷。 又說：已經與果的種子相續，稱作過去界。如果尚未與果，當來（未來）的種子相續，稱作未來界。如果尚未與果，現在的種子相續，稱作現在界。《辨中邊論》（Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya）第二卷說：因果已經、未受用，是世（adhvan，時間）的意義，應當知道。解釋說：對於因果都已經受用，是過去的意義。對於因果都未受用，是未來的意義。如果已經受用因，但未已經受用果，是現在的意義。這些只是依據因果種子來顯示世的差別，都是道理，被三世所攝。那些說神通（abhijñā）、三明（tri-vidyā）等的人
【English Translation】 English version A counter placed in the ones place is called one. Placed in the thousands place, it's called a thousand. Though the positions are different, the substance is not. The Sautrāntikas (Sautrāntika, those who uphold the sūtras) say that the three times (past, present, future) are different because of different conditions (pratītya, conditions). Considering what has passed, it is called the past. Considering what is to come, it is called the future. Considering both together, it is called the present. The Abhidharmakośa refutes what Dharmatrāta said, who clung to the transformation of dharmas, placing the party of Sāṃkhya within it. The world-appearance established by Ghoṣaka is chaotic, because the three times all have the characteristics of the three times. What the Sautrāntikas say, that past and future are mutually dependent, then within one time-dharma there should be three times. The past and future moments of the past should be called past and future, and the middle one called present. Only the third (present) is allowed to be established based on function, so that the world is not chaotic. The Mahāvibhāṣā agrees with the Abhidharmakośa. The Nyāya allows for different kinds, and both refute what Ghoṣaka and the Sautrāntikas say. What the Mahāyāna establishes is either two or three, as explained in the commentary. The texts referred to are omitted for fear of being tedious. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, third fascicle, says: How are (the three times) established? That is to say, the various seeds are not separate from the dharma (dharma), therefore they are established according to the dharma. If the various result-dharmas (phala-dharma) have already ceased in appearance, that is the past. If there is a cause (hetu) but the appearance has not yet arisen, that is the future. If it has already arisen but has not yet ceased in appearance, that is the present. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, fifty-first fascicle, says: What are past saṃskāras (saṃskāra, formations)? That is to say, the characteristic (lakṣaṇa) has already ceased and disappeared, and the self-nature (svabhāva) has already been abandoned. What are present saṃskāras? That is to say, the characteristic has not yet ceased and disappeared, and the self-nature has not yet been abandoned. What are future saṃskāras? That is to say, because of the present, but the self-characteristic has not yet arisen, and the self-nature has not yet been obtained. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, fifty-second fascicle, says: The past saṃskāras exist because of the result (phala). The future saṃskāras exist because of the cause (hetu). Why? The present saṃskāras are manifested by three characteristics: first, the nature of the past result; second, the nature of the future cause; and third, the continuous unbrokenness of the self-characteristic. It also says: The continuous succession of seeds that have already given a result is called the past realm. If the seeds of the future that have not yet given a result are in continuous succession, that is called the future realm. If the present seeds that have not yet given a result are in continuous succession, that is called the present realm. The Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya, second fascicle, says: The cause and result having been used or not used is the meaning of time (adhvan, time), it should be known. The explanation says: For the cause and result that have both been used, that is the meaning of the past. For the cause and result that have both not been used, that is the meaning of the future. If the cause has already been used, but the result has not yet been used, that is the meaning of the present. These only use the seeds of cause and result to show the difference of time, and all are reasonable and included within the three times. Those who speak of superknowledges (abhijñā), the three knowledges (tri-vidyā), etc.
。皆神通三世。今此論文。即唯識三世。
論云假謂現識似彼相現。又宗明唯識。然準西明似約道理釋此因果。要集亦同。智者簡擇。
問法有三性假立三世依何性耶 答據實道理唯依依他。若據隨緣假施設者通依三性。要集說云。圓成常住。遍計性無。俱不依立三世差別 今謂克性雖爾。然諸經論亦依假立。且圓成實依詮以顯得說三世。何者如十二行眼智明覺。各於四諦觀去．來．今。于圓成實若不依詮假立三世。不成四行。故依圓成亦得假立。即通唯識．道理二種。依遍計性亦得假立。何者如般若經云。無我人等 天親論釋。約妄執我三世總別立此四種。即依遍計立三世也。此但唯識三世非余。依依他起所立三世。如前所引。所引之文但全依觀緣起正理。圓成非緣起。遍計無自性。故略不說。
論。必不退起煩惱障故者。退起煩惱分位前後。諸宗說異。若大眾部等。見道煩惱有退之者。以單道故。修必不退。以雙道故。若薩婆多。見道煩惱必定不退。以速疾道。修道有退。以容豫故。然修道惑。先六行斷後八聖者必定不退。一為利根。二以世出世二道斷故。又若經生即亦不退。若大乘宗二俱不退。以永斷種。過．未無故。然大乘言退退失世間現法樂住。小乘退者。退失聖果。然必此生還得彼果
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：都具有通達過去、現在、未來三世的神通。現在這部論著，就是唯識宗所說的三世。
論中說，『假』是指現在的識，好像外境的相顯現出來。而且宗義闡明唯識。然而根據西明的觀點，似乎是依據道理來解釋這種因果關係。《要集》的觀點也相同。智者應當仔細辨別。
問：法的三性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）是假立三世的基礎，那麼是依據哪種性質呢？答：根據真實的道理，只依據依他起性。如果根據隨緣假施設的觀點，那麼就通於三性。《要集》中說，圓成實性是常住的，遍計所執性是虛妄的，這兩種性質都不依據而建立三世的差別。現在我認為，雖然從克制性質的角度來看是這樣，但是許多經論也依據假立。而且圓成實性是依據詮釋來顯現，從而述說三世。例如十二行觀中的眼智明覺，各自在四諦中觀察過去、現在、未來。對於圓成實性，如果不依據詮釋假立三世，就不能成就四行觀。所以依據圓成實性也可以假立三世，這貫通了唯識和道理兩種觀點。依據遍計所執性也可以假立三世。例如《般若經》中說，無我、無人等等。天親菩薩的論釋說，是就妄執的我，在三世中總別地建立這四種。這就是依據遍計所執性來建立三世。這只是唯識宗的三世，不是其他的。依據依他起性所建立的三世，就像前面所引用的。所引用的文句只是完全依據觀緣起的正理。圓成實性不是緣起，遍計所執性沒有自性，所以略而不說。
論中說，『必定不會退轉而生起煩惱障』，關於退轉生起煩惱的分位前後，各宗派的說法不同。如果按照大眾部等宗派的觀點，見道位的煩惱有退轉的情況，因為是單道。修道位必定不會退轉，因為是雙道。如果按照薩婆多部的觀點，見道位的煩惱必定不會退轉，因為是速疾道。修道位有退轉的情況，因為是容豫道。然而修道位的惑，先斷六行，后證八聖道的人必定不會退轉。一是由於是利根，二是以世間道和出世間道兩種道來斷除的緣故。又如果經生，那麼也必定不會退轉。如果按照大乘宗的觀點，見道位和修道位都不會退轉，因為已經永遠斷除了煩惱的種子，過去和未來都沒有了。然而大乘所說的退轉，是退失世間的現法樂住。小乘所說的退轉，是退失聖果。然而必定此生還能獲得那個果位。
【English Translation】 English version: All possess the神通 (shentong, supernormal powers) of knowing the three times (past, present, and future). This treatise now is the three times according to the Yogācāra school.
The treatise says, '假 (jia, provisional) means the present consciousness appearing as if it were the object.' Moreover, the doctrine clarifies Vijñānavāda (唯識, Only-Consciousness). However, according to Ximing's view, it seems to explain this cause and effect based on reason. The Yaoji (要集, Essentials Collection) is the same. The wise should carefully discern.
Question: The three natures of dharma (遍計所執性 [bianjisuozhixing, parikalpita-svabhāva, the nature of what is completely conceptualized], 依他起性 [yitaxing, paratantra-svabhāva, the nature of dependence on others], and 圓成實性 [yuanchengshixing, parinispanna-svabhāva, the nature of perfect accomplishment]) are the basis for provisionally establishing the three times. So, which nature is relied upon? Answer: According to the true principle, only the nature of dependence on others is relied upon. If according to the view of provisionally establishing based on conditions, then it applies to all three natures. The Yaoji says that the nature of perfect accomplishment is permanent, and the nature of what is completely conceptualized is illusory. Neither of these two natures is relied upon to establish the differences of the three times. Now, I think that although this is the case from the perspective of restraining the nature, many sutras and treatises also rely on provisional establishment. Moreover, the nature of perfect accomplishment is manifested through explanation, thereby describing the three times. For example, the eye-wisdom-illumination-awareness in the twelve aspects of observation each observe the past, present, and future in the Four Noble Truths. Regarding the nature of perfect accomplishment, if the three times are not provisionally established based on explanation, the four aspects of observation cannot be accomplished. Therefore, the three times can also be provisionally established based on the nature of perfect accomplishment, which connects the two views of Vijñānavāda and reason. The three times can also be provisionally established based on the nature of what is completely conceptualized. For example, the Prajñāpāramitā Sutra says, 'No self, no person, etc.' Vasubandhu's commentary says that these four are established in general and in particular in the three times based on the falsely clung-to self. This is establishing the three times based on the nature of what is completely conceptualized. This is only the three times of Vijñānavāda, not others. The three times established based on the nature of dependence on others are like what was quoted earlier. The quoted sentences are completely based on the correct principle of observing dependent origination. The nature of perfect accomplishment is not dependent origination, and the nature of what is completely conceptualized has no self-nature, so it is briefly not discussed.
The treatise says, 'Certainly will not regress and give rise to the afflictive obscuration.' Regarding the order of regression and arising of afflictions, the views of each school are different. If according to the view of the Mahāsāṃghika school, the afflictions of the path of seeing have regression because it is a single path. The path of cultivation certainly does not regress because it is a dual path. If according to the Sarvāstivāda school, the afflictions of the path of seeing certainly do not regress because it is a swift path. The path of cultivation has regression because it is a leisurely path. However, those who sever the delusions of the path of cultivation, first severing the six aspects and then realizing the eight noble paths, certainly do not regress. One is because they are of sharp faculties, and two is because they are severed by both the mundane path and the supramundane path. Moreover, if one is born into the stream, then they certainly do not regress. If according to the Mahāyāna school, both the path of seeing and the path of cultivation do not regress because the seeds of afflictions have been permanently severed, and there is no past or future. However, the regression spoken of by Mahāyāna is the loss of the present-life happiness and abiding in the world. The regression spoken of by the Hīnayāna is the loss of the holy fruit. However, one will certainly attain that fruit in this life.
必不經生。然論退性通三界聖。若現退者。但在人間有退緣故。退緣有五。一謂僧事。二和諍。三謂遠行。四多病。五樂誦經。
論。剎那剎那轉增進故。西明云。已上三地依生空觀入滅定時。為進不進。解云不進。以不斷法執故。準此義故有超劫事 今謂不爾。雖依生空入于滅定。而亦增進。不起滅定現諸威儀。能以剎那剎那行利樂故。非彼增進唯約法空斷法執說。不爾違此剎那進言。唯除大悲盡生界愿。十地滿已可無增進。不爾修行無量阿僧祇而不滿足。非三大劫修能滿足以外皆增。又入定時定必自利功德亦進。而超劫事不妨亦成。若入法空正斷法執。有心利物更增進故。雖俱增進何廢勝劣。況復智增超悲增者 又解八地已去實無超者。地地力齊一種增進。無勝劣故。言超劫者。約為化生化身而說。非實報身。報身難思。十地菩薩尚不能見。況地前生。又不由報身方現八相。準華嚴經。十信菩薩亦現八相。豈十地聖不能現相。要須成佛耶。本疏云。八地已上初一剎那倍前二劫。第二剎那更倍前念 要集云。十地經云。於一念中所起智業。比自從初發心以來竟第七地。百分乃至非算數譬喻之所能及。準此經文非唯一倍 今謂此文或據別意。非必一切。如般若經以持經福比前捨身供養佛等。百分不及一。乃至所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：必定不會經歷出生。然而，關於退轉的性質，它貫通三界聖者。如果出現退轉的情況，那隻會在人間，因為人間有導致退轉的因緣。退轉的因緣有五種：一是僧團事務，二是互相爭執，三是遠行，四是多病，五是喜歡誦經。
論：因為剎那剎那都在增長進步。西明說：以上三地（指菩薩三地）依靠生空觀（Śūnyatā-darśana，對事物空性的觀察）進入滅盡定時（Nirodha-samāpatti，一種禪定狀態），是進步還是不進步？解釋說是不進步，因為沒有斷除法執（Dharma-graha，對法的執著）。根據這個意思，有超越劫數的事情發生。現在我認為不是這樣。雖然依靠生空進入滅盡定，但也在增長進步。即使不起滅盡定，顯現各種威儀，也能以剎那剎那的行為利益眾生，所以不能說他們的進步僅僅是關於法空，斷除法執。否則就違背了這裡說的剎那進步。只有發大悲心，盡未來際度化眾生的願望，十地（Daśa-bhūmi，菩薩修行的十個階段）圓滿后才可以沒有增長進步。否則修行無量阿僧祇劫（Asaṃkhya，極長的時間單位）也不滿足。不是三大阿僧祇劫的修行就能滿足的，除此之外都在增長。而且進入定時，禪定必定有自利功德也在進步。而超越劫數的事情不妨礙也能夠成就。如果進入法空，真正斷除法執，有心利益眾生，會更加增長進步。雖然都在增長進步，為什麼妨礙有殊勝和低劣之分呢？更何況智慧的增長超過慈悲的增長。又有人解釋說，八地（菩薩八地）以後實際上沒有超越的，每個地的力量相同，都是一種增長進步，沒有殊勝和低劣之分。說超越劫數，是針對化生（Upapāduka，由業力直接化生）和化身（Nirmāṇakāya，佛的化身）而說的，不是實報身（Saṃbhogakāya，佛的報身）。報身難以思議，十地菩薩尚且不能見到，更何況地前菩薩。而且不是隻有報身才能顯現八相（佛陀一生中的八個重要事件）。根據《華嚴經》，十信菩薩（菩薩十信位）也能顯現八相。難道十地聖者不能顯現八相，一定要成佛嗎？本疏說，八地以上最初一剎那超過之前的二劫，第二個剎那更超過前一個剎那。要集說，《十地經》說：在一念中所產生的智慧功業，比從最初發心以來到第七地，百分之一乃至無法用算數譬喻來形容。根據這部經文，不僅僅是一倍。現在我認為這段經文或許是根據別的意思，不一定適用於所有情況。如《般若經》用持經的福德比喻之前捨身供養佛等等，百分之一都不及，乃至所不及。
【English Translation】 English version: Surely will not experience birth. However, regarding the nature of regression, it pervades the saints of the Three Realms. If regression occurs, it only happens in the human realm because there are causes and conditions for regression in the human realm. There are five causes and conditions for regression: first, monastic affairs; second, disputes; third, distant travels; fourth, frequent illnesses; fifth, delight in reciting scriptures.
Treatise: Because it increases and progresses moment by moment. Ximing said: When the above three grounds (referring to the three grounds of Bodhisattvas) rely on the contemplation of emptiness of existence (Śūnyatā-darśana, the observation of the emptiness of things) to enter the extinction Samadhi (Nirodha-samāpatti, a state of meditation), do they progress or not? The explanation is that they do not progress because they have not severed the attachment to Dharma (Dharma-graha, attachment to the Dharma). According to this meaning, there are matters of transcending kalpas (Asaṃkhya, an extremely long unit of time). Now I think it is not so. Although relying on the emptiness of existence to enter the extinction Samadhi, they are also increasing and progressing. Even without arising from the extinction Samadhi and manifesting various dignified behaviors, they can benefit sentient beings with actions moment by moment. Therefore, it cannot be said that their progress is only about the emptiness of Dharma and severing the attachment to Dharma. Otherwise, it would contradict the statement here about progressing moment by moment. Only with the great compassionate mind and the vow to liberate all sentient beings in the future, can there be no increase and progress after the ten grounds (Daśa-bhūmi, the ten stages of Bodhisattva practice) are fulfilled. Otherwise, practicing for countless Asaṃkhya kalpas will not be enough. It is not that the practice of three great Asaṃkhya kalpas can be satisfied; apart from that, all are increasing. Moreover, when entering Samadhi, the meditation must have the merit of benefiting oneself, and it is also progressing. And the matter of transcending kalpas does not hinder and can also be accomplished. If one enters the emptiness of Dharma and truly severs the attachment to Dharma, and has the intention to benefit sentient beings, one will increase and progress even more. Although all are increasing and progressing, why does it hinder the distinction between superior and inferior? Moreover, the increase in wisdom surpasses the increase in compassion. Also, some explain that after the eighth ground (the eighth ground of Bodhisattva), there is actually no transcendence. The power of each ground is the same, and it is a kind of increase and progress, without distinction between superior and inferior. Saying transcending kalpas is for the sake of transformation birth (Upapāduka, directly born by karma) and transformation body (Nirmāṇakāya, the transformation body of the Buddha), not the reward body (Saṃbhogakāya, the reward body of the Buddha). The reward body is difficult to conceive, and even the Bodhisattvas of the ten grounds cannot see it, let alone the Bodhisattvas before the grounds. Moreover, it is not only the reward body that can manifest the eight aspects (eight important events in the life of the Buddha). According to the Avataṃsaka Sūtra, the Bodhisattvas of the ten faiths (the ten stages of faith of Bodhisattvas) can also manifest the eight aspects. Can't the saints of the ten grounds manifest the eight aspects, and must they become Buddhas? The original commentary says that the first moment above the eighth ground exceeds the previous two kalpas, and the second moment exceeds the previous moment even more. The Essential Collection says, 'The Ten Grounds Sutra says: The wisdom karma generated in one thought is more than one hundred percent, even beyond calculation and metaphor, compared to the time from the initial aspiration to the seventh ground.' According to this sutra, it is not just one time. Now I think this passage may be based on another meaning, and it does not necessarily apply to all situations. For example, the Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra uses the merit of upholding the sutra to compare with the previous offering of the Buddha by sacrificing one's body, etc., and it is less than one percent, and even less than what is not.
不能及。準無著論判在地前。豈在此位即一切行便能多倍已前行耶。
第八識名總有十八 頌曰。
無沒．本．宅．藏 種．無垢．持．緣 顯．現．轉．心．依 異．識．根．生．有
釋曰。初無沒識者。無相論云。一切諸種無所隱沒故無沒也 二名本識者。謂是一切法之根本故 第三宅者。亦無相論云。是種子之宅舍故 四藏識者。謂執藏識。即阿賴耶 五名種者。謂種子識 六無垢識者。如下引經 七名執持識。謂阿陀那識 八名緣者。辨中邊論云。能緣事識故 九名顯者。無相論云。為顯五根．四大等皆於此顯也 十名現識者。楞伽經云。諸法皆于本識上現故 十一轉者。無相論云。與諸法為依而起故 十二名心者。謂集起義故 十三名依者。謂所知依故 十四名異者。謂異熟識也 十五名識。無相論云。分別事識也 十六名根識者。大眾部立為根本識 十七名生者。謂化地部立名窮生死蘊 十八名有者。謂上坐部．分別說部立為有分識。所引經論當更撿文 問增一經中立四賴耶。何故不說 解云。彼四種名不唯目識故此不說。或為十九亦復不遮。準舊人釋名有十七。一阿梨耶此翻元沒。二阿陀那。三窮生陰識。四名了別識。五名質多此云心識。六意識。體是意根故名識故。七第一識
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無法達到。準無著（Asanga）的《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）判斷在地前（菩薩十地之前）。難道在此位階，一切修行就能比之前的修行多出數倍嗎？
第八識（第八意識，阿賴耶識，Ālayavijñāna）總共有十八個名稱： 頌曰： 無沒（無所隱沒）、本（根本）、宅（宅舍）、藏（執藏）、種（種子）、無垢（清凈）、持（執持）、緣（能緣）、顯（顯現）、現（顯現）、轉（轉變）、心（集起）、依（所依）、異（異熟）、識（分別）、根（根本）、生（生死）、有（有分）。
釋曰：首先，『無沒識』，無相論（ Nirālambanavāda）說：『一切諸種無所隱沒，故名無沒。』第二，名為『本識』，因為是一切法的根本。第三，『宅』，也如無相論所說：『是種子之宅舍。』第四，『藏識』，即執藏識，也就是阿賴耶識（Ālaya）。第五，名為『種識』，即種子識。第六，『無垢識』，如下文引經說明。第七，名為『執持識』，即阿陀那識（Ādāna-vijñāna）。第八，名為『緣』，《辨中邊論》（Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya）說：『能緣事識故。』第九，名為『顯』，無相論說：『為顯五根（五種感覺器官）、四大（地、水、火、風）等皆於此顯現。』第十，名為『現識』，《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）說：『諸法皆于本識上顯現。』第十一，『轉』，無相論說：『與諸法為依而起。』第十二，名為『心』，因為有集起之義。第十三，名為『依』，因為是所知（認識對像）的所依。第十四，名為『異』，即異熟識（Vipāka-vijñāna）。第十五，名為『識』，無相論說：『分別事識。』第十六，名為『根識』，大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）立為根本識。第十七，名為『生』，化地部（Mahīśāsaka）立名為窮生死蘊。第十八，名為『有』，上座部（Sthavira）和分別說部（Vibhajyavāda）立為有分識（Bhavaṅga-citta）。所引用的經論應當進一步查閱原文。 問：增一阿含經（Ekottara Āgama）中立有四賴耶（四種阿賴耶），為何此處不說？ 答：因為這四種名稱不只指稱第八識，所以這裡不說。或者說，即使有十九種名稱也不相違背。根據舊人的解釋，有十七個名稱：一、阿梨耶（Ālaya），翻譯為元沒。二、阿陀那（Ādāna）。三、窮生陰識。四、了別識。五、質多（Citta），意為心識。六、意識。體是意根，所以也稱為識。七、第一識。
【English Translation】 English version: It cannot be attained. According to Asanga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana), the judgment is made before reaching the Bhumi (the ten stages of Bodhisattva). How could it be that at this stage, all practices can be many times greater than before?
The eighth consciousness (Ālayavijñāna) has a total of eighteen names: Verse: No disappearance (no concealment), root (fundamental), abode (dwelling), store (repository), seed (potential), undefiled (pure), holding (sustaining), condition (cause), manifestation (appearance), appearing (manifesting), transformation (evolving), mind (accumulating), support (basis), different (resultant), consciousness (discriminating), root (fundamental), birth (existence), existence (continuum).
Explanation: First, 'No disappearance consciousness' (nirālambanavāda) says: 'All seeds are not concealed, hence the name no disappearance.' Second, it is called 'Root consciousness' because it is the root of all dharmas. Third, 'Abode', as also stated in nirālambanavāda: 'It is the dwelling place of seeds.' Fourth, 'Store consciousness', which is the clinging consciousness, namely Ālaya. Fifth, it is called 'Seed consciousness', which is the seed consciousness. Sixth, 'Undefiled consciousness', as explained in the scriptures cited below. Seventh, it is called 'Holding consciousness', namely Ādāna-vijñāna. Eighth, it is called 'Condition', Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (Discrimination of the Middle and the Extremes) says: 'Because it can condition the object consciousness.' Ninth, it is called 'Manifestation', nirālambanavāda says: 'To manifest the five roots (five sense organs), the four elements (earth, water, fire, wind), etc., all appear in this.' Tenth, it is called 'Appearing consciousness', Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra (The Lankavatara Sutra) says: 'All dharmas appear on the root consciousness.' Eleventh, 'Transformation', nirālambanavāda says: 'It arises relying on all dharmas.' Twelfth, it is called 'Mind' because it has the meaning of accumulation. Thirteenth, it is called 'Support' because it is the support of the knowable (object of cognition). Fourteenth, it is called 'Different', which is Vipāka-vijñāna (resultant consciousness). Fifteenth, it is called 'Consciousness', nirālambanavāda says: 'Discriminating object consciousness.' Sixteenth, it is called 'Root consciousness', which the Mahāsāṃghika school establishes as the fundamental consciousness. Seventeenth, it is called 'Birth', which the Mahīśāsaka school establishes as the exhaustion of the aggregates of life and death. Eighteenth, it is called 'Existence', which the Sthavira and Vibhajyavāda schools establish as Bhavaṅga-citta (life-continuum consciousness). The cited scriptures and treatises should be further examined in the original text. Question: In the Ekottara Āgama, four Ālayas are established, why are they not mentioned here? Answer: Because these four names do not only refer to the eighth consciousness, they are not mentioned here. Or rather, even if there are nineteen names, it is not contradictory. According to the old interpretations, there are seventeen names: 1. Ālaya, translated as original disappearance. 2. Ādāna. 3. Exhaustion of the aggregates of life and death consciousness. 4. Discriminating consciousness. 5. Citta, meaning mind-consciousness. 6. Consciousness. Its essence is the mind-root, so it is also called consciousness. 7. First consciousness.
。從本向末數為第一。八第八識。從末向本數為第八。九種子識。十名緣識。十一根本識。十二有分識。十三果報識。十四智相識。以有解性聞熏習故。楞伽云。一轉相識。二業相識。三智相識。十五真相識。四卷楞伽云。真相識即前智相。不同染法虛妄名真。十六藏識。楞伽云。藏識海常住。十七現識。常現不斷。楞伽云。略說有三。謂真識．現識．分別識。
論。或名阿賴耶等。本云。但有能藏雜染及我見執。不說為染熏習所藏。不通果位。無熏習故。能緣執藏雖無我執。平等智緣亦通果位。所以但簡我執執藏。故論云。非無學位．不退菩薩。有雜染法執藏義故。執者緣執．妄執俱名為執。如言執受。執言通故。不唯妄執。故但簡染。不爾但應云非無學位．不退菩薩有執藏義。何須說云有雜染法執藏義故。故但說二。如下釋頌。初約一義名阿賴耶。后更義釋具足三義。不云唯以二義解藏。不違諸論。若如諸釋不假別文。即此論文可具三藏。即我見．愛等緣執我邊。是我愛執藏義。即能熏彼是所藏義。不可取藏雜染品法即是染法能藏之義。以攝大乘釋雜染者是諸轉識非阿賴耶。然此舍名。唯約緣縛斷伏盡位名之為舍。非舍能藏．所藏之義。以雜染言有漏三性皆名雜染通於二障。無文唯說是所知障。八地已去五
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：從本向末數，第八個是第八識（Aṭṭhavijñāna，八種意識之一）。從末向本數，第八個是第九種子識（Bīja-vijñāna，儲存所有潛在經驗的意識）。第十名緣識（Nāma-rūpa-vijñāna，與名色相關的意識）。第十一根本識（Mūla-vijñāna，根本的意識）。第十二有分識（Bhavaṅga-vijñāna，生命延續的意識）。第十三果報識（Vipāka-vijñāna，業力果報的意識）。第十四智相識（Jñāna-lakṣaṇa-vijñāna，智慧之相的意識），因為它具有理解的性質，並被聽聞所熏習。《楞伽經》（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra）說：第一是轉相識（Pravṛtti-vijñāna，轉變之相的意識），第二是業相識（Karma-lakṣaṇa-vijñāna，業力之相的意識），第三是智相識（Jñāna-lakṣaṇa-vijñāna，智慧之相的意識）。《楞伽經》第四卷說：真相識（Tathatā-vijñāna，真如之相的意識）就是前面的智相識，它與染污法不同，虛妄的才稱為真。第十六藏識（Ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切種子的意識）。《楞伽經》說：藏識海是常住的。第十七現識（Vartamāna-vijñāna，持續顯現的意識），它持續不斷地顯現。《楞伽經》說：簡略地說有三種，即真識（Satya-vijñāna，真實的意識）、現識（Vartamāna-vijñāna，顯現的意識）和分別識（Vikalpa-vijñāna，分別的意識）。 論：或者稱為阿賴耶（Ālaya，藏識）等。《本論》說：只有能藏雜染和我見執著，沒有說被染污熏習所藏，不通達果位，因為沒有熏習。能緣執藏雖然沒有我執，平等智緣也通達果位。所以只簡別我執執藏。因此，《論》說：非無學位（Aśaikṣa，無學位的聖者）、不退菩薩（Avaivartika Bodhisattva，不會退轉的菩薩），有雜染法執藏的意義。執著，包括緣執和妄執，都稱為執著，如說『執受』。『執』字是通用的，不只是妄執。所以只簡別染污。否則，只應該說非無學位、不退菩薩有執藏的意義，何必說有雜染法執藏的意義呢？所以只說兩種。如下解釋頌文。首先從一個意義上稱為阿賴耶。後面更進一步解釋，具足三種意義。不說只用兩種意義來解釋『藏』，不違背各種論典。如果像各種解釋那樣，不假借其他文字，那麼這篇論文就可以具備三種『藏』。即我見、愛等緣執我邊，是我愛執藏的意義。即能熏彼是所藏的意義。不可取藏雜染品法，即是染法能藏的意義。以《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）解釋雜染，指的是各種轉識，而不是阿賴耶。然而，捨棄這個名稱，只是在緣縛斷伏盡位時才稱為捨棄，不是捨棄能藏、所藏的意義。因為雜染這個詞，有漏的三性都稱為雜染，通於二障。沒有文字只說是所知障（Jñeyāvaraṇa，知識上的障礙）。八地以後五
【English Translation】 English version: Counting from the root to the end, the eighth is the eighth consciousness (Aṭṭhavijñāna). Counting from the end to the root, the eighth is the ninth seed consciousness (Bīja-vijñāna). Tenth is name-form consciousness (Nāma-rūpa-vijñāna). Eleventh is the fundamental consciousness (Mūla-vijñāna). Twelfth is the life-continuum consciousness (Bhavaṅga-vijñāna). Thirteenth is the resultant consciousness (Vipāka-vijñāna). Fourteenth is the wisdom-aspect consciousness (Jñāna-lakṣaṇa-vijñāna), because it has the nature of understanding and is perfumed by hearing. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says: First is the transformation-aspect consciousness (Pravṛtti-vijñāna), second is the karma-aspect consciousness (Karma-lakṣaṇa-vijñāna), and third is the wisdom-aspect consciousness (Jñāna-lakṣaṇa-vijñāna). The fourth fascicle of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says: The suchness-aspect consciousness (Tathatā-vijñāna) is the same as the previous wisdom-aspect consciousness; it is different from defiled dharmas, and only the false is called true. Sixteenth is the storehouse consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna). The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says: The storehouse consciousness sea is permanent. Seventeenth is the present consciousness (Vartamāna-vijñāna), which constantly appears without interruption. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra says: Briefly speaking, there are three, namely true consciousness (Satya-vijñāna), present consciousness (Vartamāna-vijñāna), and discriminating consciousness (Vikalpa-vijñāna). Treatise: Or it is called Ālaya (storehouse consciousness), etc. The original text says: There is only the ability to store defilements and the attachment to self-view; it is not said to be stored by defiled perfuming, and it does not extend to the fruition stage because there is no perfuming. Although the object-clinging storehouse does not have self-attachment, the equality-wisdom condition also extends to the fruition stage. Therefore, only self-attachment clinging is distinguished. Thus, the Treatise says: Non-learners (Aśaikṣa) and non-retrogressing Bodhisattvas (Avaivartika Bodhisattva) have the meaning of clinging to defiled dharmas. Clinging, including object-clinging and deluded clinging, is called clinging, as in the saying 'grasping'. The word 'clinging' is universal, not just deluded clinging. Therefore, only defilement is distinguished. Otherwise, it should only be said that non-learners and non-retrogressing Bodhisattvas have the meaning of clinging to the storehouse; why is it necessary to say that they have the meaning of clinging to defiled dharmas? Therefore, only two are mentioned. The following explains the verse. First, it is called Ālaya from one meaning. Later, it is further explained, fully possessing three meanings. It is not said that only two meanings are used to explain 'storehouse', which does not contradict various treatises. If it is like various explanations, without borrowing other texts, then this treatise can possess three 'storehouses'. That is, self-view, love, etc., cling to the side of self, which is the meaning of self-love clinging to the storehouse. That is, the ability to perfume it is the meaning of what is stored. The defiled dharma qualities that cannot be taken as the storehouse are the meaning of the defiled dharma that can store. According to the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's explanation of defilement, it refers to various transforming consciousnesses, not the Ālaya. However, abandoning this name is only called abandoning when the conditions of bondage are cut off, subdued, and exhausted, not abandoning the meaning of the ability to store and what is stored. Because the word 'defilement' refers to the three natures of the contaminated, which are all called defilement, encompassing the two obstructions. There is no text that only says it is the knowledge obstruction (Jñeyāvaraṇa). After the eighth ground, five
．七有漏猶得現行能熏第八相．見二分具能所藏。但無我執即名為舍。故前文云。雖未斷盡異熟識中煩惱種子。而緣此識我見．愛等。不復執藏為自內我。由斯永舍阿賴耶名。不言能藏．所藏並無方名為舍 問何故不同阿陀那名失一之時而名不捨 答此約緣縛義。彼約自性義。若無我執離能緣縛舍賴耶名。雖無結生猶執根．種。陀那不失。
論。異熟將得菩提時舍。準有二師。且言得者。準薩婆多自有二說。一云體別。以初得名得。后名成就。若爾何不立成就耶 答以得類故不立成就為不相應。二云得與成就體是其一。初得名得。得已相續名為成就。或未來名得。現．過名成。若大乘師雖無別文。準瑜伽論得．獲．成就體一名別。
釋此將得有二師。一云因果別時。即下論引無種已生之師計也。以果與無間道俱生因在滅相。釋將得言如疏。二云因果同時。俱與無間同時生滅。準此二師各分為二。一無間道舍。一解脫道舍。合成四釋。
論。無散動故。明佛果無尋伺 西明云。問八地已上無分別智豈不發業耶。解云無分別智有其二種。一獨行。二與后得俱。前不發業唯緣真故。后即發業與尋．伺俱。又解后得有二種。一與根本俱。一彆頭起。初不發業。無分別故。后可發業。雖有二解前解為勝 今謂
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 七有漏（satta asava，七種煩惱）仍然可以現行，能夠熏習第八識（阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna）的相。見分（darśana-bhāga）和二分（dvaya）都具備能藏和所藏的功能。但如果沒有我執（ātma-graha），就叫做捨棄。所以前面的經文說，雖然沒有斷盡異熟識（vipāka-vijñāna）中的煩惱種子，但是緣于這個識的我見（ātma-dṛṣṭi）、愛（prema）等等，不再執藏為自己的內在自我。因此永遠捨棄阿賴耶（ālaya）這個名稱。不是說能藏和所藏都沒有了才叫做捨棄。
問：為什麼不像阿陀那（ādāna，執取）這個名稱失去一次時就不捨棄名稱呢？
答：這是就緣縛的意義來說的，阿陀那（ādāna）是就自性的意義來說的。如果沒有我執（ātma-graha），離開了能緣的束縛，就捨棄了賴耶（ālaya）這個名稱。雖然沒有結生（pratisaṃdhi），仍然執著根和種子，阿陀那（ādāna）不會失去。
論：異熟（vipāka）將要得到菩提（bodhi）的時候捨棄。按照有兩位論師的說法。暫且說得到的人，按照薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）自己有兩種說法。一種說法是體是不同的，最初得到叫做得，後來叫做成就。如果這樣，為什麼不立成就這個名稱呢？
答：因為得的種類，所以不立成就，因為不相應。另一種說法是得和成就體是一個，最初得到叫做得，得到以後相續叫做成就。或者未來叫做得，現在和過去叫做成就。如果大乘論師（Mahāyāna），雖然沒有別的經文，按照瑜伽論（Yogaśāstra），得、獲、成就體是一個，名稱不同。
解釋：這個將要得到有兩位論師的說法。一種說法是因果不同時，就是下面的論引用的無種已生的論師的說法。因為果和無間道（ānantarya-mārga）同時生，因在滅相。解釋將要得到，就像疏一樣。另一種說法是因果同時，都和無間（ānantarya）同時生滅。按照這兩位論師各自分為兩種。一種是無間道（ānantarya-mārga）舍，一種是解脫道（vimukti-mārga）舍。合成四種解釋。
論：因為沒有散動，所以說明佛果沒有尋伺（vitarka-vicāra）。西明說：問：八地（aṭṭhamaka bhūmi）以上沒有分別智（vikalpa-jñāna），難道不發業嗎？解釋說：無分別智（vikalpa-jñāna）有兩種。一種是獨行，一種是和后得俱。前者不發業，只緣真如的緣故。後者就發業，和尋伺（vitarka-vicāra）俱。又解釋后得有兩種。一種是和根本俱，一種是別頭起。最初不發業，因為沒有分別的緣故。後來可以發業。雖然有兩種解釋，前一種解釋是最好的。現在說：
【English Translation】 English version: The seven āsavas (satta asava, seven outflows) can still be active and able to perfume the aspect of the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness). The seeing-aspect (darśana-bhāga) and the two aspects (dvaya) both possess the functions of being able to store and being stored. But if there is no self-grasping (ātma-graha), it is called abandoning. Therefore, the previous text says that although the seeds of afflictions in the resultant consciousness (vipāka-vijñāna) have not been completely cut off, the self-view (ātma-dṛṣṭi), love (prema), etc., that are conditioned by this consciousness are no longer grasped as one's inner self. Therefore, the name ālaya is forever abandoned. It is not said that abandoning only occurs when both the able-to-store and the stored are gone.
Question: Why is the name not abandoned when the name ādāna (grasping) is lost once?
Answer: This is in terms of the meaning of conditioned bondage, while ādāna is in terms of the meaning of self-nature. If there is no self-grasping (ātma-graha), and one is free from the bondage of the able-to-condition, the name ālaya is abandoned. Although there is no rebirth (pratisaṃdhi), one still clings to the roots and seeds, and ādāna is not lost.
Treatise: The resultant (vipāka) is abandoned when one is about to attain bodhi (bodhi, enlightenment). According to two teachers. Let's say that the one who attains, according to the Sarvāstivāda school (Sarvāstivāda), has two views. One view is that the substance is different. The first attainment is called 'attainment,' and the later one is called 'accomplishment.' If so, why not establish the name 'accomplishment'?
Answer: Because of the category of attainment, 'accomplishment' is not established because it is not corresponding. Another view is that the substance of attainment and accomplishment is the same. The first attainment is called 'attainment,' and the continuous attainment is called 'accomplishment.' Or the future is called 'attainment,' and the present and past are called 'accomplishment.' If it is a Mahāyāna teacher (Mahāyāna), although there is no other text, according to the Yogaśāstra (Yogaśāstra), attainment, acquisition, and accomplishment are the same substance with different names.
Explanation: There are two teachers who say that this is about to be attained. One view is that the cause and effect are at different times, which is the view of the teacher who says that there is no seed and it has already been produced, as quoted in the following treatise. Because the effect and the immediate path (ānantarya-mārga) arise simultaneously, and the cause is in the phase of extinction. Explaining 'about to be attained' is like the commentary. Another view is that the cause and effect are simultaneous, and both arise and cease simultaneously with the immediate (ānantarya). According to these two teachers, each is divided into two. One is abandonment on the immediate path (ānantarya-mārga), and the other is abandonment on the path of liberation (vimukti-mārga). Combining them, there are four explanations.
Treatise: Because there is no distraction, it explains that there is no investigation and analysis (vitarka-vicāra) in the fruit of Buddhahood. Ximing said: Question: Above the eighth ground (aṭṭhamaka bhūmi), there is no non-discriminating wisdom (vikalpa-jñāna), so doesn't it generate karma? Explanation: There are two kinds of non-discriminating wisdom (vikalpa-jñāna). One is solitary, and the other is together with subsequent attainment. The former does not generate karma because it only conditions the true suchness. The latter generates karma and is together with investigation and analysis (vitarka-vicāra). Another explanation is that there are two kinds of subsequent attainment. One is together with the fundamental, and the other arises separately. The former does not generate karma because there is no discrimination. The latter can generate karma. Although there are two explanations, the former explanation is the best. Now saying:
不爾。尋．伺既與根本智俱。云何根本不名分別。又若尋．伺與無分別同親緣如。不得名思惟真如。若不與同緣。豈王與所不全同緣耶。所餘心所亦應不與同緣真如。余若不然。尋．伺何爾。故后說正。與根本俱必無尋伺 西明云。若其不許根本智俱后得正智與尋．伺並。如金剛定必二智俱。豈於此時不起言說。言說必假尋．伺為因。若不起說即此菩薩不及於前。云何剎那轉增勝耶 今謂雖許金剛定位起說增進。不必要與尋．伺相應。何者金剛喻定依第四定。尋．伺初靜豈下地心所與上心王相應耶。若爾便與雜集第五相應品違。又同分界地相應。非異分界地。如欲界．色．無色界不相應。初靜慮．第二靜慮不相應。今為二解。一云于藥．病未知據已前說。此位云等覺故不假尋．伺。一云金剛定前起于尋．伺。觀藥．病等擊發語言即入此定。故雖在定而能說法。方便雖屬於前。正說法時在金剛定能令增進何所相違。此解為正。
論。亦舍受俱。本疏三釋。初釋為勝。餘地雖不起。如見道等亦得令增 西明．要集取第三說不同見道。見道後起故可得增。佛果不增 今謂不爾。本疏不云佛果更增故諸地有。如見無漏雖遍五地。大乘唯依第四定起。后亦不重起余無漏。鏡智亦爾。在無間道但令彼增。佛位不起故第一勝
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 並非如此。如果尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（Vicara，精細的思考）與根本智（Mula-jnana，根本智慧）同時存在，為何根本智不被稱為分別？此外，如果尋和伺與無分別（Avikalpa，無分別）的真如（Tathata，如實）有相同的親近關係，就不應被稱為思惟真如。如果它們沒有相同的緣，難道王（心王，即主要的心識）與所（心所，即伴隨心王的其他心理活動）不是完全相同地緣于真如嗎？其餘的心所也應該不與真如同緣。如果其餘的心所不是這樣，為何尋和伺會是這樣呢？所以後來的說法是正確的：與根本智同時存在，必定沒有尋和伺。西明法師說：『如果他不允許根本智與后得正智（後天獲得的正確智慧）同時存在，那麼尋和伺也會同時存在。就像金剛定（Vajropama-samadhi，金剛喻定）必定是兩種智慧同時存在。難道在這個時候不會產生言說嗎？言說必定要藉助尋和伺作為原因。如果不產生言說，那麼這位菩薩就比不上之前。如何能剎那間轉增勝呢？』 現在我認為，即使允許金剛定位產生言說和增進，也不必要與尋和伺相應。為什麼呢？因為金剛喻定是依據第四禪（Dhyana，禪定）。尋和伺最初止息，難道下地的心所會與上地的心王相應嗎？如果這樣，就與《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第五品相應品相違背。而且，相同分界的地相應，不同分界的地不相應。例如欲界（Kama-dhatu，慾望界）、色界（Rupa-dhatu，色界）、無色界（Arupa-dhatu，無色界）不相應。初禪（Prathama-dhyana，初靜慮）、第二禪（Dvitiya-dhyana，第二靜慮）不相應。現在有兩種解釋。一種說法是，對於藥和病，在未知的情況下，依據之前所說的。這個位置稱為等覺（Samyak-sambuddha，正等覺），所以不需要藉助尋和伺。另一種說法是，在金剛定之前，產生尋和伺，觀察藥和病等，然後發出語言，隨即進入此定。所以即使在定中，也能說法。方便雖然屬於之前，但真正說法時，在金剛定中能夠令其增進，有什麼相違背的呢？這種解釋是正確的。 論中說：『也與舍受（Upeksha-vedana，舍受）同時存在。』本疏有三種解釋。最初的解釋最為殊勝。其餘的地雖然不起作用，但如見道（Darshana-marga，見道）等也能令其增進。西明法師和《要集》採用第三種說法，不同於見道。見道是之後產生的，所以可以增進。佛果（Buddha-phala，佛果）不增進。現在我認為不是這樣。本疏沒有說佛果會進一步增進，所以諸地才有增進。如見道無漏（Anasrava，無漏）雖然遍及五地，但大乘唯獨依據第四禪而起。之後也不會重複產生其餘的無漏。鏡智（Adarsha-jnana，大圓鏡智）也是如此。在無間道（Anantarya-marga，無間道）中，只是令其增進。佛位不起作用，所以第一種解釋最為殊勝。
【English Translation】 English version: Not so. If Vitarka (initial application of thought) and Vicara (sustained application of thought) are simultaneous with Mula-jnana (fundamental wisdom), why is Mula-jnana not called discrimination? Furthermore, if Vitarka and Vicara have the same close relationship with Avikalpa (non-discrimination) Tathata (suchness), they should not be called thinking about Tathata. If they do not have the same condition, does the King (mind-king, the primary consciousness) and the mental associates (citta-vrtti, mental activities accompanying the mind-king) not completely condition Tathata in the same way? The remaining mental associates should also not condition Tathata in the same way. If the remaining mental associates are not like this, why would Vitarka and Vicara be like this? Therefore, the later statement is correct: being simultaneous with fundamental wisdom, there must be no Vitarka and Vicara. The Ximing master said: 'If he does not allow fundamental wisdom to be simultaneous with later-acquired correct wisdom, then Vitarka and Vicara will also be simultaneous. Just like Vajropama-samadhi (diamond-like samadhi) must be two wisdoms simultaneous. At this time, would speech not arise? Speech must rely on Vitarka and Vicara as the cause. If speech does not arise, then this Bodhisattva is not as good as before. How can he increase in superiority in an instant?' Now I think that even if Vajropama-samadhi is allowed to produce speech and advancement, it is not necessary to be associated with Vitarka and Vicara. Why? Because Vajropama-samadhi is based on the fourth Dhyana (meditative absorption). Vitarka and Vicara initially cease, would the mental associates of the lower realm be associated with the mind-king of the upper realm? If so, it would contradict the fifth chapter on association in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma). Moreover, the realms of the same division are associated, and the realms of different divisions are not associated. For example, the Kama-dhatu (desire realm), Rupa-dhatu (form realm), and Arupa-dhatu (formless realm) are not associated. The Prathama-dhyana (first Dhyana) and Dvitiya-dhyana (second Dhyana) are not associated. Now there are two explanations. One explanation is that, regarding medicine and illness, in the case of not knowing, it is based on what was said before. This position is called Samyak-sambuddha (perfectly enlightened one), so it does not need to rely on Vitarka and Vicara. Another explanation is that, before Vajropama-samadhi, Vitarka and Vicara arise, observing medicine and illness, etc., and then uttering speech, and then entering this samadhi. So even in samadhi, one can preach the Dharma. Although the skillful means belong to before, when truly preaching the Dharma, in Vajropama-samadhi, it can cause it to increase, what contradiction is there? This explanation is correct. The treatise says: 'It is also simultaneous with Upeksha-vedana (equanimity).' The commentary has three explanations. The initial explanation is the most excellent. Although the other realms do not function, such as the Darshana-marga (path of seeing), they can also cause it to increase. The Ximing master and the Yaoji adopt the third explanation, which is different from the path of seeing. The path of seeing is produced later, so it can increase. The Buddha-phala (Buddha fruit) does not increase. Now I think it is not like this. The commentary does not say that the Buddha fruit will further increase, so the realms have increase. Like the Anasrava (non-outflow) of the path of seeing, although it pervades the five realms, the Mahayana only arises based on the fourth Dhyana. Afterwards, it will not repeatedly produce the remaining non-outflow. The Adarsha-jnana (mirror-like wisdom) is also like this. In the Anantarya-marga (path of immediate consequence), it only causes it to increase. The Buddha position does not function, so the first explanation is the most excellent.
西明又云。唯依第四。自問云應闕喜無量。答設無何失。無眼．耳通及滅盡定不成失故。問既爾如何有喜無量。解云依第六識。豈第六識依下二地。解云通依九地。若爾有時無喜無量。諸地易故 今解許眼．耳通通八識有。佛智遍緣故有何過。設六識等依第四定。亦有喜無量。說彼無者約餘人說。如說上地無鼻．舌識。豈不許佛上地有耶。若不許者違論所說十八界通漏與無漏。然無漏五識不通無色。以色界中餘地少有故。彼界全無故。如鼻．舌識許通欲．色。不可無漏許色界有。亦令無色有。此喜無量亦復如是。通四禪有不通無色。
問初能變中約染．不染二位對辨。上十義中何故但約四義聊簡耶 解云有三義。一有無對。二同異對。三信疑對。前十義中異熟．賴耶已明。舍位二唯因有果位即無。次前已明不須對辨。有無全別故。此有無對。其行相．一切種。舍受俱．如暴流。此之四義因果共同故亦不辨。其無記性．心所相應．緣三種境。與果有異故今對辨。余並信故。唯舍受疑。故今更辨 問因位緣三。果一切寬狹不同即聊簡。果位行相與因殊。遍與不遍應分別 答有二解。一雲實應分別。以行相者即約緣境功能而說。果位既言遍緣。即是簡別行相。二雲影略 問因位通持漏無漏種。果唯無漏何不對簡 解云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 西明又說，只有依據第四禪定。自問：『應闕喜無量（指在第四禪定中可能缺乏喜無量這種感受），是嗎？』回答：『假設沒有喜無量，會有什麼缺失呢？』因為沒有眼識、耳識的神通以及滅盡定，所以沒有喜無量並沒有什麼缺失。問：『既然如此，如何會有喜無量呢？』解釋說：『依據第六意識。』難道第六意識是依據下二地（指欲界和色界初禪）嗎？解釋說：『普遍依據九地（指欲界、色界四禪、無色界四空定）。』如果這樣，有時就沒有喜無量了，因為諸地容易改變。現在解釋允許眼識、耳識的神通普遍存在於八識中。因為佛的智慧普遍照見，有什麼過失呢？假設第六意識等依據第四禪定，也有喜無量。說那裡沒有喜無量，是就其他人來說的。如同說上地沒有鼻識、舌識，難道不承認佛在上地有鼻識、舌識嗎？如果不承認，就違背了論中所說的十八界（指六根、六塵、六識）普遍有有漏和無漏。然而無漏的五識不普遍存在於無色界，因為在中陰身中，其餘地很少有五識，而且無色界完全沒有五識。如同鼻識、舌識允許普遍存在於欲界、色界，不可因為無漏允許在中陰身有，也令無色界有。這喜無量也是這樣，普遍存在於四禪，不普遍存在於無色界。
問：『在初能變（指阿賴耶識的最初轉變）中，大約從染污和不染污兩種狀態對比辨析。在上面的十個意義中，為什麼只大約用四個意義來稍微簡略說明呢？』解釋說：『有三種意義。一是有無對比。二是同異對比。三是信疑對比。前面的十個意義中，異熟（指異熟果）、賴耶（指阿賴耶識）已經明白。舍位（指捨棄的地位）這兩種只有因位有，果位就沒有。其次，前面已經明白，不需要對比辨析。因為有無完全不同。這是有無對比。至於行相（指阿賴耶識的行相）、一切種（指一切種子）、舍受俱（指與舍受相應）、如暴流（指像暴流一樣），這四個意義因果共同，所以也不辨析。至於無記性（指無記的性質）、心所相應（指與心所相應）、緣三種境（指緣三種境界），因為與果位有差異，所以現在對比辨析。其餘的都因為是可信的。只有舍受是可疑的，所以現在進一步辨析。問：『因位緣三種境界，果位緣一切境界，寬狹不同，所以稍微簡略說明。果位的行相與因位不同，普遍與不普遍應該分別說明。』答：『有兩種解釋。一種說法是確實應該分別說明。因為行相是大約從緣境界的功能來說的。果位既然說普遍緣，就是簡別行相。』另一種說法是影略（指簡略）。問：『因位普遍持有有漏和無漏的種子，果位只有無漏的種子，為什麼不對簡略說明？』解釋說：
【English Translation】 English version Xi Ming also said, 'Only rely on the Fourth Dhyana (the fourth level of meditative absorption). Ask yourself: 'Should there be a lack of immeasurable joy (喜無量, Xǐ Wúliàng, the boundless feeling of joy) [in the Fourth Dhyana]?' Answer: 'Suppose there is no immeasurable joy, what loss would there be?' Because there is no supernatural power of eye-consciousness (眼通, Yǎntōng) and ear-consciousness (耳通, Ěrtōng), and the cessation attainment (滅盡定, Mièjìndìng), there is no loss if there is no immeasurable joy. Question: 'Since that's the case, how can there be immeasurable joy?' Explain: 'Rely on the Sixth Consciousness (第六識, Dìliùshì).』 Could it be that the Sixth Consciousness relies on the lower two realms (下二地, Xià'èrdì, referring to the Desire Realm and the First Dhyana of the Form Realm)? Explain: 'Universally relies on the Nine Grounds (九地, Jiǔdì, referring to the Desire Realm, the Four Dhyanas of the Form Realm, and the Four Formless Realms).' If so, sometimes there is no immeasurable joy, because the grounds are easily changed. Now, the explanation allows the supernatural powers of eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness to universally exist in the Eight Consciousnesses. Because the Buddha's wisdom universally illuminates, what fault is there? Suppose the Sixth Consciousness, etc., relies on the Fourth Dhyana, there is also immeasurable joy. Saying that there is none there is speaking about others. Just as saying that there is no nose-consciousness (鼻識, Bíshì) and tongue-consciousness (舌識, Shéshì) in the higher realms, wouldn't you admit that the Buddha has nose-consciousness and tongue-consciousness in the higher realms? If you don't admit it, you violate the theory that the Eighteen Realms (十八界, Shíbājiè, referring to the six sense organs, six sense objects, and six consciousnesses) universally have defiled (有漏, Yǒulòu) and undefiled (無漏, Wúlòu). However, the undefiled five consciousnesses do not universally exist in the Formless Realm, because in the intermediate existence (中陰, Zhōngyīn), the other grounds rarely have the five consciousnesses, and the Formless Realm completely lacks the five consciousnesses. Just as nose-consciousness and tongue-consciousness are allowed to universally exist in the Desire Realm and the Form Realm, it is not permissible to allow the undefiled to exist in the intermediate existence and also cause it to exist in the Formless Realm. This immeasurable joy is also like this, universally existing in the Four Dhyanas, not universally existing in the Formless Realm.'
Question: 'In the initial transformation (初能變, Chūnéngbiàn) [of the Alaya Consciousness], approximately analyze and distinguish between the defiled and undefiled states. In the above ten meanings, why only use approximately four meanings to briefly explain?' Explain: 'There are three meanings. First, the contrast between existence and non-existence. Second, the contrast between sameness and difference. Third, the contrast between belief and doubt. In the previous ten meanings, the Vipaka (異熟, Yìshú, the result of karma) and Alaya (賴耶, Làiyé, the Alaya Consciousness) are already clear. The positions of abandonment (舍位, Shěwèi) only exist in the causal stage, not in the resultant stage. Secondly, it has already been made clear before, so there is no need to analyze and distinguish. Because existence and non-existence are completely different. This is the contrast between existence and non-existence. As for the characteristics (行相, Xíngxiàng), all seeds (一切種, Yīqièzhǒng), associated with neutral feeling (舍受俱, Shěshòujù), like a violent torrent (如暴流, Rúbàoliú), these four meanings are common to both cause and effect, so they are not analyzed either. As for the unrecordable nature (無記性, Wújìxìng), associated with mental factors (心所相應, Xīnsuǒxiāngyìng), and the object of the three kinds of realms (緣三種境, Yuánsānzhǒngjìng), because they are different from the resultant stage, they are now analyzed and distinguished. The rest are all because they are believable. Only neutral feeling is doubtful, so it is now further analyzed. Question: 'The causal stage is related to the three kinds of realms, and the resultant stage is related to all realms, which are different in width and narrowness, so briefly explain. The characteristics of the resultant stage are different from the causal stage, and whether they are universal or not should be explained separately.' Answer: 'There are two explanations. One explanation is that it should indeed be explained separately. Because the characteristics are approximately described from the function of the object of the relationship. Since the resultant stage says that it is universally related, it is a brief distinction of the characteristics.' The other explanation is that it is a brief omission (影略, Yǐnglüè). Question: 'The causal stage universally holds the seeds of defiled and undefiled, and the resultant stage only has the seeds of undefiled, why not briefly explain?' Explain:
因果持種雖純雜不同。持種義同故不對辨 問因果兩位別持種名同故不簡。果因二位殊相應義同不對辨 答持種名雖通果位。不增故不簡。相應義雖等。果位增故相對辨。上同異對 問持種果不增義齊故不簡。舍受果不別義同何故辨 答果位唯善性。恐疑余受俱。今辨性雖殊果因俱舍受。此即信疑對。
論。末那意識轉識攝故等。此量以先成第六有別俱有依者。應有不定過 解云不然。以自許七有別依根。無不定過。為除他疑故。成第七有別俱有依。作量可知 此量應有有法不極成 答前成第六有別依根。即是意根意根即第七故無此過 要集云。成第六對小乘說。成第七對大乘說故有法成 今謂不爾。若不對小成七有依。他作不定過。如何遣故亦對小 有云。量有法差別相違云。第七不用第八為俱有別依。轉識攝故。如眼等識 此亦不爾。他許五識所依各別不唯是一。若不如是。如極成五識隨舉一量時。應有法差別相違過。以余所依非此依故 有作比量相違云。不用第八為別依。自非異熟故 若爾五識亦同此過非唯異熟故 要集為作相違決定云。第七必用第八為俱有別依。恒行心品攝非識故。如第八五數 此亦不爾。夫言決定因．喻兩許可成決定。若對小乘第八他無。何成決定。又亦名意識持業釋名。又心．意
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因果的『持種』（Bija-dharana，種子執持）雖然有純粹和混雜的不同，但『持種』的意義相同，所以不對它們進行辨析。問：因位和果位，兩個階段分別執持『持種』，名稱相同，所以不進行簡別嗎？果位和因位，兩種狀態雖然不同，但相應的意義相同，所以不對它們進行辨析嗎？答：『持種』的名稱雖然通用於果位，但果位沒有增加新的『持種』，所以不進行簡別。相應的意義雖然相等，但果位有所增加，所以相對地進行辨析。以上是關於相同和不同的對辨。 問：『持種』在果位沒有增加，意義相同，所以不進行簡別。舍受（Upeksha，不苦不樂的感受）的果報沒有差別，意義相同，為什麼還要辨析？答：果位只有善性，恐怕有人懷疑其餘的感受也是如此。現在辨析的是，雖然性質不同，但果和因都是舍受。這是關於相信和懷疑的對辨。 論：末那識（Manas-vijnana，末那識）屬於轉識（Pravrtti-vijnana，轉變識）所攝，等等。這個論證如果以已經成立的第六識（意識）有不同的俱有依（Sahabhava-ashraya，共同存在的所依）為前提，應該會有不定過的過失。解釋說：不是這樣的。因為自己承認第七識（末那識）有不同的所依根，所以沒有不定過的過失。爲了消除他人的懷疑，成立第七識有不同的俱有依，可以這樣論證。這個論證應該有有法（Dharmin，具有特定性質的事物）不極成（Aprasiddha，不被普遍承認）的過失。答：前面成立第六識有不同的所依根，這個所依根就是意根（Manas-indriya，意根），意根就是第七識，所以沒有這個過失。要集說：成立第六識是對小乘（Hinayana）說的，成立第七識是對大乘（Mahayana）說的，所以有法是成立的。現在認為不是這樣。如果不針對小乘成立第七識有依，他人會提出不定過的過失，如何消除呢？所以也是針對小乘說的。有人說：論證有有法差別相違的過失，說：第七識不用第八識（阿賴耶識）作為共同存在的所依，因為屬於轉識所攝，就像眼識等識。這也是不對的。他人承認五識（前五識）的所依各自不同，不是唯一的。如果不是這樣，就像極成五識，隨便舉一個進行論證時，應該有有法差別相違的過失，因為其餘的所依不是這個所依。有人作比量相違的論證說：不用第八識作為不同的所依，因為它本身不是異熟（Vipaka，果報）。如果是這樣，五識也同樣有這個過失，因為它們也不是唯一的異熟。要集爲了作出相違決定的論證說：第七識必須用第八識作為共同存在的所依，因為它屬於恒常執行的心品所攝，不是識，就像第八識和五數（五遍行心所）。這也是不對的。所謂決定，是指因和喻兩者都許可成立的決定。如果針對小乘，他們沒有第八識，如何成立決定呢？而且也名為意識，是持業釋的名稱。而且心、意
【English Translation】 English version Although the 『Bija-dharana』 (seed-holding) of cause and effect differ in purity and impurity, the meaning of 『Bija-dharana』 is the same, so they are not distinguished. Question: In the stages of cause and effect, the two stages separately hold 『Bija-dharana』, and the names are the same, so are they not distinguished? Although the two states of cause and effect are different, the corresponding meanings are the same, so are they not distinguished? Answer: Although the name 『Bija-dharana』 is common to the fruit stage, the fruit stage does not add new 『Bija-dharana』, so it is not distinguished. Although the corresponding meanings are equal, the fruit stage increases, so they are distinguished relatively. The above is about the comparison of similarities and differences. Question: 『Bija-dharana』 does not increase in the fruit stage, and the meaning is the same, so it is not distinguished. The result of Upeksha (equanimity) has no difference, and the meaning is the same, so why should it be distinguished? Answer: The fruit stage only has good nature, and it is feared that others will suspect that the rest of the feelings are also like this. What is now distinguished is that although the nature is different, both cause and effect are Upeksha. This is the comparison of belief and doubt. Treatise: Manas-vijnana (Manas consciousness) belongs to Pravrtti-vijnana (evolving consciousness), and so on. If this argument is based on the already established sixth consciousness (consciousness) having different Sahabhava-ashraya (co-existing supports), there should be the fault of uncertain fault. The explanation says: It's not like that. Because one admits that the seventh consciousness (Manas consciousness) has different supporting roots, there is no uncertain fault. In order to eliminate the doubts of others, it can be argued that the seventh consciousness has different co-existing supports. This argument should have the fault that Dharmin (a thing with specific properties) is Aprasiddha (not universally recognized). Answer: The sixth consciousness was previously established to have different supporting roots, and this supporting root is Manas-indriya (the root of mind), and the root of mind is the seventh consciousness, so there is no such fault. Yaoji said: Establishing the sixth consciousness is for Hinayana (Small Vehicle), and establishing the seventh consciousness is for Mahayana (Great Vehicle), so the Dharma is established. Now it is thought that it is not like this. If the seventh consciousness with support is not established for Hinayana, others will raise the fault of uncertain fault, how to eliminate it? So it is also aimed at Hinayana. Some people say: The argument has the fault of contradictory differences in Dharma, saying: The seventh consciousness does not use the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) as a co-existing support, because it belongs to the evolving consciousness, just like the eye consciousness and other consciousnesses. This is also wrong. Others admit that the supports of the five consciousnesses (the first five consciousnesses) are different from each other, not unique. If this is not the case, just like the extremely accomplished five consciousnesses, when one is cited for argument, there should be the fault of contradictory differences in Dharma, because the rest of the supports are not this support. Some people make an argument of contradictory comparison, saying: The eighth consciousness is not used as a different support, because it is not Vipaka (retribution) itself. If this is the case, the five consciousnesses also have the same fault, because they are not the only retribution. Yaoji made an argument for making a contradictory decision, saying: The seventh consciousness must use the eighth consciousness as a co-existing support, because it belongs to the mind category that runs constantly, not consciousness, just like the eighth consciousness and the five numbers (five omnipresent mental factors). This is also wrong. The so-called decision refers to the decision that both the cause and the metaphor are allowed to be established. If it is aimed at Hinayana, they do not have the eighth consciousness, how can the decision be established? Moreover, it is also named consciousness, which is the name of the holding industry interpretation. And mind, intention
．識亦八通名。今言非識即不成因。應如前辨。
第八理應下。余辨量過云。有有法自相相違。應非第八識。是識性故。亦有有法差別相違。應不受熏持種。亦有法差別相違因。應不用第七為俱有依 要集云。前二對大有違宗過。第三量中同喻一分所立不成 今謂有餘。若對小乘前二何過。不違自故。又前已成第七識有別所依根。即是第八故不諍有法。諍有法者。亦有宗中所別不極成。故知不諍有法。又亦未諍受熏持種。理門論云。隨所成立說名為宗。彼非所成故無差別。既立第八不依第七。依第七者即是異喻。識性故因於異喻轉有不定過。由前已成第六依七故有不定。余煩不指 又成第八云。應有俱有相續識為增上不共俱有所依根。若言識性故因有不定過。五是識性不以相續識為不共俱有所依根。今云自體恒續識性故如第七識 問此頌本明第八與余為依。何故此中明第八識依第七耶 答因言長理故便成立。為除他疑等。
陀那不為二乘說。西明疏問言。若不為定性二乘說者。解深密經復云何通。彼云今第三時普為發趣一切乘耶。解云彼文非但為直往亦為不定性故通一切乘 今謂自違。前云爲說令起滅定。今言不為故自相違 又經云普為一切乘。不為定性乘。還非普為 今謂。初教說有唯為小乘。次教說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『識亦八通名。今言非識即不成因。應如前辨。』意思是說，『識』（vijñāna，了別作用）也可以是八識（aṣṭa-vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）的通稱。如果說不是『識』就不能成為因，那麼應該像前面那樣辨析。
『第八理應下。余辨量過云。有有法自相相違。應非第八識。是識性故。亦有有法差別相違。應不受熏持種。亦有法差別相違因。應不用第七為俱有依。』意思是說，在關於第八識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）的討論中，如果用量（anumāna，推論）來辨析，會產生過失。例如，如果說『有法』（dharmin，具有某種性質的事物）自相矛盾，那麼第八識就不應該存在，因為它具有『識』的性質。同樣，如果說『有法』的差別相矛盾，那麼第八識就不應該接受熏習和保持種子（bīja，潛在的可能性）。此外，如果說『有法』的差別相矛盾，那麼第八識就不應該以第七識（manas，末那識）作為俱有依（sahabhūta-āśraya，共同存在的所依）。
『要集云。前二對大有違宗過。第三量中同喻一分所立不成。』意思是說，《要集》中提到，前兩個論點對於大乘（Mahāyāna）來說，存在違背宗義的過失。第三個論點中，同喻（sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta，相似的例子）的一部分所建立的論證是不成立的。
『今謂有餘。若對小乘前二何過。不違自故。又前已成第七識有別所依根。即是第八故不諍有法。諍有法者。亦有宗中所別不極成。故知不諍有法。又亦未諍受熏持種。理門論云。隨所成立說名為宗。彼非所成故無差別。既立第八不依第七。依第七者即是異喻。識性故因於異喻轉有不定過。由前已成第六依七故有不定。余煩不指。』意思是說，現在認為還有剩餘的討論空間。如果針對小乘（Hināyāna）來說，前兩個論點有什麼過失呢？因為它們不違背小乘自身的觀點。而且，之前已經成立了第七識有特別的所依根，那就是第八識，所以沒有必要爭論『有法』。如果爭論『有法』，那麼在宗義中所特別指出的內容就沒有完全成立。因此，可以知道沒有必要爭論『有法』。而且，也沒有爭論接受熏習和保持種子的能力。《理門論》中說，根據所成立的觀點來確定宗義。那些沒有成立的觀點就沒有差別。既然已經確立了第八識不依賴於第七識，那麼依賴於第七識的觀點就是不同的比喻。因為『識』的性質，所以作為原因的比喻會產生不確定的過失。由於之前已經成立了第六識依賴於第七識，所以存在不確定性。其餘的繁瑣之處就不一一指出了。
『又成第八云。應有俱有相續識為增上不共俱有所依根。若言識性故因有不定過。五是識性不以相續識為不共俱有所依根。今云自體恒續識性故如第七識。』意思是說，又成立第八識的觀點是：應該有共同存在且相續不斷的識，作為增上（adhipati，增上緣）和不共同的俱有所依根。如果說因為『識』的性質，所以作為原因的比喻會產生不確定的過失，因為前五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）也是『識』的性質，但它們不以相續不斷的識作為不共同的俱有所依根。現在說，因為第八識的自體是恒常相續的識的性質，所以就像第七識一樣。
『問此頌本明第八與余為依。何故此中明第八識依第七耶。』意思是說，有人問：這個頌原本是說明第八識與其他識之間的相互依賴關係，為什麼這裡要說明第八識依賴於第七識呢？
『答因言長理故便成立。為除他疑等。』意思是說，回答是：因為原因和道理很長，所以就成立了。爲了消除其他的疑惑等等。
『陀那不為二乘說。西明疏問言。若不為定性二乘說者。解深密經復云何通。彼云今第三時普為發趣一切乘耶。解云彼文非但為直往亦為不定性故通一切乘。』意思是說，『陀那』（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）不是為二乘（śrāvaka-yāna和pratyekabuddha-yāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）說的。《西明疏》中問道：如果不為定性二乘（已決定證入二乘果位的人）說，那麼《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra）又該如何解釋呢？《解深密經》中說，現在第三時（佛陀說法時期的第三個階段）普遍爲了引導一切乘（yāna，交通工具，比喻修行道路）的人。解釋說，那段經文不僅僅是爲了直接趨向大乘的人，也是爲了不定性（不確定最終會證入哪一乘）的人，所以可以通用於一切乘。
『今謂自違。前云爲說令起滅定。今言不為故自相違。』意思是說，現在認為這是自相矛盾的。前面說爲了使他們生起滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti，一種禪定狀態），現在又說不是爲了他們，所以是自相矛盾的。
『又經云普為一切乘。不為定性乘。還非普為。』意思是說，而且經中說普遍爲了所有乘，卻又說不是爲了定性乘，那麼就不是普遍爲了所有乘了。
『今謂。初教說有唯為小乘。次教說。』意思是說，現在認為，最初的教法說有阿賴耶識只是爲了小乘，後來的教法說……
【English Translation】 English version: 'Śik api aṣṭau samjñāḥ. Idānīṃ ucyate na śik iti na kāraṇam. Yathā pūrvam vivecaniyam.' This means, 'Cognition' (vijñāna, the function of discernment) can also be a general term for the eight consciousnesses (aṣṭa-vijñāna, eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness, manas consciousness, and ālayavijñāna consciousness). If it is said that something cannot be a cause if it is not 'cognition,' then it should be analyzed as before.
'Aṣṭama yuktam adhaḥ. Śeṣa vivecana pramāṇa doṣaḥ ucyate. Asti asti-dharma svabhāva viruddhaḥ. Na yuktam aṣṭama śik. Śik svabhāvaḥ iti. Api asti asti-dharma viśeṣa viruddhaḥ. Na yuktam anubhūta dhāraṇa bīja. Api asti dharma viśeṣa viruddhaḥ kāraṇam. Na yuktam saptama saha-bhūta āśraya.' This means, in the discussion about the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness), if inference (anumāna, reasoning) is used for analysis, faults will arise. For example, if it is said that a 'dharmin' (something possessing a certain quality) is self-contradictory, then the eighth consciousness should not exist because it has the nature of 'consciousness.' Similarly, if it is said that the differences of a 'dharmin' are contradictory, then the eighth consciousness should not receive impressions and maintain seeds (bīja, potential possibilities). Furthermore, if it is said that the differences of a 'dharmin' are contradictory, then the eighth consciousness should not use the seventh consciousness (manas, mind consciousness) as a co-existent basis (sahabhūta-āśraya, a basis for co-existence).
'Yaoji yun. Pūrvau dvau prati mahā viruddha siddhānta doṣaḥ. Tṛtīya pramāṇa madhye samāna dṛṣṭānta eka bhāga sthāpita asiddha.' This means, the Yaoji mentions that the first two arguments, with respect to the Mahāyāna, have the fault of contradicting the established doctrine. In the third argument, the establishment of one part of the similar example (sādṛśya-dṛṣṭānta, example of similarity) in the inference is not established.
'Idānīṃ ucyate śeṣaḥ. Yadi prati Hīnayāna pūrvau dvau kaḥ doṣaḥ. Na viruddhaḥ svayam iti. Api pūrvam siddha saptama śik asti viśeṣa āśraya mūla. Tat aṣṭama iti na vivāda asti-dharma. Vivāda asti-dharma yaḥ. Api asti siddhānta madhye viśeṣa na atyanta siddha. Jñāyate na vivāda asti-dharma. Api na vivāda anubhūta dhāraṇa bīja. Limenlun yun. Yathā sthāpita ucyate nāma siddhānta. Tat na siddha iti na viśeṣa. Yadi sthāpita aṣṭama na āśrita saptama. Āśrita saptama yaḥ tat bhinna dṛṣṭānta. Śik svabhāvaḥ iti kāraṇam prati bhinna dṛṣṭānta vartate asti aniyata doṣaḥ. Yasmāt pūrvam siddha ṣaṣṭha āśrita saptama iti asti aniyata. Śeṣa kliṣṭa na nirdiśyate.' This means, now it is considered that there is remaining space for discussion. If directed towards the Hīnayāna, what faults do the first two arguments have? Because they do not contradict the Hīnayāna's own views. Moreover, it has already been established that the seventh consciousness has a special basis of reliance, which is the eighth consciousness, so there is no need to argue about 'dharmin.' If there is an argument about 'dharmin,' then what is specifically pointed out in the doctrine is not completely established. Therefore, it can be known that there is no need to argue about 'dharmin.' Moreover, there is no argument about the ability to receive impressions and maintain seeds. The Limenlun says that the doctrine is determined according to the established view. Those views that are not established have no difference. Since it has been established that the eighth consciousness does not depend on the seventh consciousness, then the view that depends on the seventh consciousness is a different metaphor. Because of the nature of 'consciousness,' the metaphor as a cause will produce an uncertain fault. Since it has already been established that the sixth consciousness depends on the seventh consciousness, there is uncertainty. The remaining complexities will not be pointed out one by one.
'Api siddha aṣṭama yun. Yuktam asti saha-bhūta anukrama śik prati adhipati asādhāraṇa saha-bhūta āśraya mūla. Yadi ucyate śik svabhāvaḥ iti kāraṇam asti aniyata doṣaḥ. Pañca asti śik svabhāvaḥ na prati anukrama śik prati asādhāraṇa saha-bhūta āśraya mūla. Idānīṃ ucyate svayam satata anukrama śik svabhāvaḥ iti yathā saptama śik.' This means, the view that establishes the eighth consciousness is: there should be a co-existent and continuous consciousness as the dominant (adhipati, dominant condition) and non-common co-existent basis of reliance. If it is said that because of the nature of 'consciousness,' the metaphor as a cause will produce an uncertain fault, because the first five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) also have the nature of 'consciousness,' but they do not take continuous consciousness as a non-common co-existent basis of reliance. Now it is said that because the self-nature of the eighth consciousness is the nature of constant and continuous consciousness, it is like the seventh consciousness.
'Praśna idam gāthā mūlam vyakta aṣṭama saha śeṣa prati āśraya. Kaḥ hetu asmin madhye vyakta aṣṭama śik āśrita saptama yaḥ?' This means, someone asks: This verse originally explains the mutual dependence between the eighth consciousness and the other consciousnesses, why does it explain here that the eighth consciousness depends on the seventh consciousness?
'Uttara kāraṇam vacanam dīrgha nyāya iti sthāpita. Prati apanayana para sandeha ādi.' This means, the answer is: Because the reasons and principles are lengthy, it is established. In order to eliminate other doubts, etc.
'Tuo na na prati śrāvaka-yāna ucyate. Ximing shu praśna vacanam. Yadi na prati nitya-svabhāva śrāvaka-yāna ucyate yaḥ. Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra api katham samyak. Tat yun idānīṃ tṛtīya kāla sarva prati pravṛtti sarva yāna yaḥ? Vyākhyā tat sūtra na eva prati ṛju-gati api prati aniyata-svabhāva iti samyak sarva yāna.' This means, 'Tuona' (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness) is not spoken for the two vehicles (śrāvaka-yāna and pratyekabuddha-yāna, Hearer Vehicle and Solitary Realizer Vehicle). The Ximing Commentary asks: If it is not spoken for those of fixed nature in the two vehicles (those who have decided to enter the fruit of the two vehicles), then how should the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra be explained? The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra says that now, in the third period (the third stage of the Buddha's teaching period), it is universally for guiding all those of all vehicles (yāna, vehicle, a metaphor for the path of practice). The explanation is that that passage is not only for those who directly tend towards the Mahāyāna, but also for those of unfixed nature (those who are uncertain which vehicle they will ultimately enter), so it can be applied to all vehicles.
'Idānīṃ ucyate svayam viruddha. Pūrvam yun prati kathana linga utpāda nirodha samādhi nitya. Idānīṃ vacanam na prati iti svayam viruddha.' This means, now it is considered that this is self-contradictory. Earlier it was said that it was for them to generate the cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti, a state of meditative absorption), but now it is said that it is not for them, so it is self-contradictory.
'Api sūtra yun sarva prati sarva yāna. Na prati nitya-svabhāva yāna. Api na sarva prati.' This means, moreover, the sutra says that it is universally for all vehicles, but it also says that it is not for those of fixed nature, so it is not universally for all vehicles.
'Idānīṃ ucyate. Prathama śikṣā kathana asti eva prati śrāvaka-yāna. Dvitīya śikṣā kathana.' This means, now it is considered that the initial teaching that there is an ālayavijñāna was only for the Hearer Vehicle, and the later teaching says...
空唯為大乘。后通空有云為一切。非必句句皆通一切。如瑜伽論通說三乘法雲為一切乘。非唯說大云爲諸乘。
西明云。勝軍論師立比量云。諸大乘經等。云有不定過。以發智論亦兩俱極成非佛語所不攝。自救云無不定過。彼有許發智是佛說故 今謂不爾。對彼小乘。自不許發智論是佛說者。豈無不定耶。又問此因豈不有隨一不成失。小乘不許極成非佛語所不攝故。唯大乘許不得云兩俱。若他許非外道語。云非佛語所不攝。則有不定。發智論等亦非外道語攝。若許是佛說故。云極成非佛語所不攝。即有相符失。如本疏立比量無過。
判比量云。論第五因有相違決定云。諸大乘經。非至教量。樂小乘者不許顯示無顛倒理契經攝故。如外道論等 今謂不爾。彼因一分違宗。即一分不成之因。何名決定 問何名一分不成因耶 答彼許三法印教順於正理。今大乘教亦順三法印。何故不顯無顛倒理。若云不順三法印者。此亦不爾。何者俱顯無我諸行無常。何非順法印。若云非全者。豈增一等句句皆明無我等耶。若云雖非句句皆明。然順無我等。大教亦爾。故不成因。設縱云非全。亦彼因過。不云一分不能顯故。又因明法立自宗義。自許言簡共許得成。相違決定所立因．喻必須兩許。今因非共故。不得成決定相違。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 空宗唯識學派認為大乘佛教是最重要的。後來，空有學派認為空和有涵蓋了一切。但這並不意味著每一句話都適用於一切情況。例如，《瑜伽師地論》廣泛地闡述了三乘佛法，並稱其為一切乘，但這並不意味著僅僅闡述大乘就等同於闡述了所有乘。
西明法師說，勝軍論師建立了一個比量（推理）：「諸大乘經等，云有不定過（存在不確定的過失）」，因為《發智論》也被雙方都認為是極成（公認的），並且不被非佛語所包含。勝軍論師自我辯護說沒有不確定的過失，因為他們承認《發智論》是佛陀所說。我認為不是這樣。對於那些不承認《發智論》是佛陀所說的小乘佛教徒來說，難道沒有不確定性嗎？此外，有人問，這個因（理由）難道沒有隨一不成（部分不成立）的過失嗎？因為小乘佛教徒不承認極成，也不承認非佛語所不包含。只有大乘佛教徒才承認，所以不能說是雙方都承認。如果對方承認它不是外道（非佛教）的言論，並認為它不被非佛語所包含，那麼就存在不確定性，因為《發智論》等也不屬於外道的言論。如果承認它是佛陀所說，並認為它是極成且不被非佛語所包含，那麼就存在相符的過失，就像本疏（註釋）建立比量時沒有過失一樣。
判斷比量時說，論證的第五個原因存在相違決定（自相矛盾的確定性）的過失，即「諸大乘經，非至教量（不是最究竟的教導）」，因為信奉小乘佛教的人不承認它顯示了沒有顛倒的真理，並且不屬於契經（佛經）的範疇，就像外道論典一樣。我認為不是這樣。這個原因的一部分與宗義（主張）相違背，即一部分不成立的原因，怎麼能稱之為決定呢？有人問，什麼叫做一部分不成立的原因呢？回答是，他們承認三法印（諸行無常、諸法無我、涅槃寂靜）的教義是順應正理的。現在，大乘佛教的教義也順應三法印，為什麼不顯示沒有顛倒的真理呢？如果說它不順應三法印，這也是不對的。因為它同時顯示了無我和諸行無常，怎麼能說不順應法印呢？如果說它不是完全順應，難道《增一阿含經》等每一句話都明確地闡明了無我等道理嗎？如果說雖然不是每一句話都明確闡明，但順應了無我等道理，那麼大乘佛教的教義也是如此，所以這個原因是不成立的。即使假設說它不是完全順應，這也是對方的原因的過失，因為他們沒有說一部分不能顯示。此外，因明（邏輯學）的法則要求確立自己的宗義，自己承認的，並且被共同承認的才能成立。相違決定所確立的因和喻（比喻）必須雙方都承認。現在，這個原因不是雙方都承認的，所以不能成立決定相違。
【English Translation】 English version: The Śūnyatā-Vijñānavāda (emptiness-consciousness only) school considers Mahāyāna Buddhism to be the most important. Later, the Śūnyatā-Astivāda (emptiness-existence) school considered emptiness and existence to encompass everything. However, this does not mean that every sentence applies to every situation. For example, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra extensively expounds the Dharma of the Three Vehicles and calls it the One Vehicle, but this does not mean that merely expounding the Mahāyāna is equivalent to expounding all vehicles.
The Ximing (西明) monk said that Master Shenggun (勝軍) established a syllogism (inference): 'The Mahāyāna sutras, etc., have the fault of being uncertain,' because the Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra (發智論) is also considered by both sides to be established (accepted), and is not included in what is not the Buddha's word. Master Shenggun defended himself by saying that there is no uncertain fault, because they admit that the Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra is spoken by the Buddha. I think this is not the case. For those Śrāvakayāna (小乘) Buddhists who do not admit that the Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra is spoken by the Buddha, is there no uncertainty? Furthermore, someone asked, does this reason not have the fault of being partially unestablished? Because the Śrāvakayāna Buddhists do not admit that it is established, nor do they admit that it is not included in what is not the Buddha's word. Only the Mahāyāna Buddhists admit it, so it cannot be said that both sides admit it. If the other party admits that it is not a heretical (non-Buddhist) statement, and considers that it is not included in what is not the Buddha's word, then there is uncertainty, because the Jñānaprasthāna-śāstra, etc., are also not included in heretical statements. If it is admitted that it is spoken by the Buddha, and it is considered to be established and not included in what is not the Buddha's word, then there is a fault of correspondence, just as there is no fault when the commentary establishes a syllogism.
When judging the syllogism, it is said that the fifth reason of the argument has the fault of contradictory certainty, that is, 'The Mahāyāna sutras are not the ultimate teaching,' because those who believe in the Śrāvakayāna do not admit that it shows the truth without inversion, and does not belong to the category of sūtras (佛經), just like heretical treatises. I think this is not the case. Part of this reason contradicts the doctrine (主張), that is, a partially unestablished reason, how can it be called certainty? Someone asked, what is called a partially unestablished reason? The answer is that they admit that the doctrine of the Three Dharma Seals (三法印) (impermanence of all conditioned things, no self in all phenomena, nirvāṇa is quiescence) is in accordance with the correct principle. Now, the doctrine of Mahāyāna Buddhism also conforms to the Three Dharma Seals, why does it not show the truth without inversion? If it is said that it does not conform to the Three Dharma Seals, this is also incorrect. Because it simultaneously shows no-self and the impermanence of all conditioned things, how can it be said that it does not conform to the Dharma Seals? If it is said that it is not completely in accordance, do the sentences of the Ekottara Āgama (增一阿含經), etc., clearly explain the principles of no-self, etc.? If it is said that although not every sentence clearly explains it, it conforms to the principles of no-self, etc., then the doctrine of Mahāyāna Buddhism is also like this, so this reason is not established. Even if it is assumed that it is not completely in accordance, this is the fault of the other party's reason, because they did not say that a part cannot show it. Furthermore, the rules of logic (因明) require establishing one's own doctrine, and what is admitted by oneself and commonly admitted can be established. The reason and example (比喻) established by contradictory certainty must be admitted by both parties. Now, this reason is not admitted by both parties, so it cannot establish contradictory certainty.
又判量云。勝軍量中三藏所加。亦有相違決定。云大乘教非至教量。自許非佛語攝故。亦不為過。理如前辨 又云有不定。為如增一等自許非佛語所不攝故至教量攝。為如色等自許非佛語所不攝故非至教量 此亦不爾。色等共許是非佛語攝。因於彼無不成不定。
疏云又非唯體至離此說大乘無故者。彼莊嚴論以智為大乘體。此以教．理．行．果皆是故。不言體但總言大乘。若不爾大乘教理是何所攝。大乘以何為體。若唯取智有局義故 問此論七因與顯揚論十因有何差別 答多小開合有差別故。八因同莊嚴論 一先不記別故 二今不可知故。即是同行。與小同時行。寧知大乘獨非佛說 三多有所作故。即莊嚴論能行此法智。依信修行得三惠等 四極重障故。即莊嚴論生怖畏等。由畏大乘不順怖謗成重障故。此意于小教順修得益。怖謗獲罪。既是佛說大乘亦爾故是佛說。或俱第七收。莊嚴約能所斷合。顯揚別開。就能斷中加行后得開之為二。廣略別故 五非尋伺境。即莊嚴第三不行 六證大覺故。即莊嚴論四者成就。此意汝許先佛得菩提者說。今佛亦證大覺亦說大教。然顯揚云。若未成佛能說佛教不應道理者。反顯證大覺定說大教即應道理 七無第三乘過失故者。即莊嚴論第五體者。此意既許余佛有大乘體。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 又，判量中說到，勝軍（Jina，佛教論師名）在量論中補充的內容，也有互相矛盾和不確定的地方。他說，『大乘教不是至教量（pramāṇa，有效認知手段），因為它自己承認不屬於佛語所攝』，這也不算過失，道理如前所述。 又說，有不確定的情況。例如《增一阿含經》（Ekottara Āgama）等，自己承認不屬於佛語所攝，卻屬於至教量所攝；又如色等，自己承認不屬於佛語所攝，所以不是至教量所攝。 這也不對。色等是大家公認的不屬於佛語所攝，因此用它來作為理由，對於勝軍的論點來說，是不成立的，因為存在共同認可的非佛語例子，所以他的論點是不確定的。 疏文中說，『又不僅是體性，乃至離開此說就沒有大乘』。因為《莊嚴經論》（Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra）以智慧（jñāna）為大乘的體性，而這裡認為教、理、行、果都是大乘，所以不單說體性，而是總說大乘。如果不是這樣，大乘的教和理又屬於什麼呢？大乘以什麼為體性呢？如果只取智慧，就顯得侷限了。 問：此論中的七個理由與《顯揚聖教論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）中的十個理由有什麼區別？ 答：多與少、展開與合併有所區別。八個理由與《莊嚴經論》相同： 一、先前沒有記別（vyākaraṇa，預言）的緣故； 二、現在不可知的緣故。這與同行（sahacārin，伴隨）相同，與小乘（Hinayana）同時進行。怎麼知道大乘唯獨不是佛說的呢？ 三、多有所作為的緣故。這與《莊嚴經論》中能行此法智（dharma-jñāna，法智）相同，依靠信心修行，得到三慧（trayaḥ prajñāḥ，聞、思、修慧）等。 四、極重障礙的緣故。這與《莊嚴經論》中產生怖畏（bhaya，恐懼）等相同。由於畏懼大乘，不順從和誹謗，形成嚴重的障礙。這個意思是，對於小乘教順從修行可以獲得利益，怖畏和誹謗會獲罪。既然小乘是佛說的，大乘也應該是這樣，所以大乘也是佛說的。或者兩者都歸於第七個理由。 《莊嚴經論》是從能斷和所斷合併的角度來說的，《顯揚聖教論》是分別展開的，從能斷中將加行（prayoga，準備階段）和后得（adhigama，證悟階段）分開為二，這是廣略的區別。 五、非尋伺境（atarkāvacara，不可思議）。這與《莊嚴經論》中的第三個『不行』相同。 六、證大覺（mahābodhi，大菩提）的緣故。這與《莊嚴經論》中的第四個『成就』相同。這個意思是，你承認過去的佛陀證得菩提並說法，現在的佛陀也證得大覺並說大教。然而，《顯揚聖教論》說，如果未成佛就能說佛教，這是不應道理的，反過來顯示證得大覺必定說法教，這才是應有的道理。 七、沒有第三乘過失的緣故。這與《莊嚴經論》中的第五個『體』相同。這個意思是，既然承認其他的佛陀有大乘的體性。
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, in the analysis of valid cognition (pramāṇa), what Jina (a Buddhist philosopher) adds in his treatise on valid cognition also contains contradictions and uncertainties. He says, 'The Mahayana teachings are not a valid means of knowledge (pramāṇa) because they themselves admit that they are not included in the words of the Buddha.' This is not a fault, as the reasoning has been explained before. He also says that there is uncertainty. For example, the Ekottara Āgama (a Buddhist scripture) and others admit that they are not included in the words of the Buddha, yet they are included in valid means of knowledge. On the other hand, forms (rūpa) and others admit that they are not included in the words of the Buddha, so they are not valid means of knowledge. This is also incorrect. Forms and others are universally acknowledged as not included in the words of the Buddha. Therefore, using this as a reason is not established for Jina's argument because there are commonly accepted examples of non-Buddha's words, so his argument is uncertain. The commentary says, 'Moreover, it is not only the essence, but without this teaching, there is no Mahayana.' Because the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra (a Buddhist text) considers wisdom (jñāna) as the essence of Mahayana, while here it is considered that the teachings (śāsana), principles (yukti), practice (pratipatti), and result (phala) are all Mahayana. Therefore, it does not only speak of the essence but generally speaks of Mahayana. If it were not so, to what would the teachings and principles of Mahayana belong? What would be the essence of Mahayana? If only wisdom is taken, it would seem limited. Question: What is the difference between the seven reasons in this treatise and the ten reasons in the Abhidharmasamuccaya (a Buddhist text)? Answer: There is a difference in terms of more or less, expansion and contraction. The eight reasons are the same as in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra: 1. Because there was no prior prediction (vyākaraṇa); 2. Because it is unknowable now. This is the same as co-occurrence (sahacārin), occurring simultaneously with the Hinayana (the Lesser Vehicle). How do we know that the Mahayana alone is not spoken by the Buddha? 3. Because it has much to accomplish. This is the same as the wisdom of practicing this Dharma (dharma-jñāna) in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra, relying on faith and practice to obtain the three wisdoms (trayaḥ prajñāḥ: hearing, thinking, and cultivating). 4. Because of extremely heavy obstacles. This is the same as generating fear (bhaya) and others in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra. Due to fearing the Mahayana, not complying with it, and slandering it, severe obstacles are formed. This means that following the teachings of the Hinayana and practicing them can bring benefits, while fearing and slandering them will incur offenses. Since the Hinayana is spoken by the Buddha, the Mahayana should also be like this, so the Mahayana is also spoken by the Buddha. Or both are included in the seventh reason. The Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra speaks from the perspective of merging what can be severed and what is severed, while the Abhidharmasamuccaya separately expands them, dividing the preparatory stage (prayoga) and the stage of attainment (adhigama) from what can be severed into two. This is a difference in terms of breadth and brevity. 5. Not an object of thought and investigation (atarkāvacara). This is the same as the third 'non-practice' in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra. 6. Because of attaining great enlightenment (mahābodhi). This is the same as the fourth 'accomplishment' in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra. This means that you admit that the Buddhas of the past attained enlightenment and spoke the Dharma, and the Buddhas of the present also attain great enlightenment and speak the great teachings. However, the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that if one can speak the Buddha's teachings without becoming a Buddha, it is unreasonable. Conversely, it shows that attaining great enlightenment certainly means speaking the great teachings, which is the proper reasoning. 7. Because there is no fault of a third vehicle. This is the same as the fifth 'essence' in the Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra. This means that since it is admitted that other Buddhas have the essence of the Mahayana.
今佛亦有。大乘無異體是一故。此佛無者。即是此佛無第三乘體。故成過失 八者此若無有應無一切智者成過故者。即莊嚴第六非體。此言非者無也。既無大乘體。應無一切智。誰出於世說聲聞乘 九緣此為境如理思惟對治一切諸煩惱故。即莊嚴第七 十不應如言取彼意故。即莊嚴第八。故十與八但開合別。事意不差。以莊嚴論頌及顯揚論俱無著造故。
論。上坐部經分別論者。上坐部者以有引經。亦名經量部。非二十部中經部。此上坐部中有阿羅漢迦多衍那弗呾羅。善閑論藏。難此上坐莫能對之。遂湊雪山。因名雪轉部 分別論者。即說假部。舊名分別說部。無性論中順古名分別說部。宗輪論中無分別部有說假部。俱說有分心。
上坐九心。五門分別。一列名釋。二諸識分別。三三性分別。四生死分別。五前後分別。如樞要說。
論。已引聖教等。瑜伽八證。雜集引同。頌云執受．初．明瞭。種子．業．身受。無心定．命終。無皆不應理。初生．明瞭．業用三義此論中無。趣生．壽識．互緣．依食．及心染凈。此之五種彼論非有。餘五共同。然互廣略 瑜伽等中第一執受。二最初生起。謂有部等既諸識不俱。如六境齊至。應無初生識。根．境．作意緣皆等故。大乘許俱。故難於他無初生識。他即
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：現在佛也有大乘，因為沒有不同的個體，所以是一體的。如果說這個佛沒有大乘，那就是說這個佛沒有第三乘的體性，因此構成過失。第八點，如果這樣沒有一切智，就會構成過失，指的是《莊嚴經論》第六品所說的『非體』。這裡說的『非』就是『沒有』的意思。既然沒有大乘的體性，就不應該有一切智，誰會出現在世間宣說聲聞乘呢？第九點，因為以這個為境界，如理思惟，對治一切煩惱，指的是《莊嚴經論》第七品。第十點，不應該像字面意思那樣理解他的意圖，指的是《莊嚴經論》第八品。所以第八品和第十品只是開合不同，意思沒有差別。因為《莊嚴經論》的偈頌和《顯揚聖教論》都不是無著（Asanga）菩薩所造。 論：上座部經分別論者，上座部（Sthavira Nikāya）因為引用經典，也叫經量部（Sautrāntika）。不是二十部中的經部（Sūtrapiṭaka）。這個上座部中有阿羅漢迦多衍那弗呾羅（Kātyāyanīputra），精通論藏，上座部沒有人能難倒他，於是前往雪山，因此得名雪轉部。分別論者，就是說假部（Prajñaptivāda），舊稱分別說部（Vibhajyavāda）。無性論中沿用古稱，稱其為分別說部。宗輪論中沒有分別部，有說假部，都說有分心。 上座部的九心，從五個方面進行分別：一是列出名稱並解釋，二是各種識的分別，三是三性的分別，四是生死的分別，五是前後的分別。如《樞要》所說。 論：已經引用聖教等。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）有八種證明，與《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）引用的相同。頌文說：『執受、初、明瞭，種子、業、身受，無心定、命終，無皆不應理。』初生、明瞭、業用這三種意義，這部論中沒有。趣生、壽識、互緣、依食、以及心染凈，這五種在《雜集論》中沒有。其餘五種相同。然而互有廣略。《瑜伽師地論》等中，第一是執受，第二是最初生起。有部（Sarvāstivāda）等認為諸識不是同時生起，如果六境同時到來，應該沒有最初生起的識，因為根、境、作意緣都相同。大乘（Mahāyāna）認為諸識是同時生起的，所以可以反駁對方沒有最初生起的識。對方即是...
【English Translation】 English version: Now, the Buddhas also possess the Mahāyāna, because there are no different entities, thus they are one. If it is said that this Buddha does not have the Mahāyāna, then it means that this Buddha does not have the nature of the Third Vehicle, thus constituting a fault. Eighthly, if there is no All-Knowing Wisdom (Sarvajñāna), it would constitute a fault, referring to the 'non-entity' mentioned in the sixth chapter of the Śūraṅgama Sūtra. The 'non' here means 'absence'. Since there is no nature of the Mahāyāna, there should be no All-Knowing Wisdom. Who would appear in the world to preach the Śrāvakayāna (Vehicle of Hearers)? Ninthly, because taking this as an object, contemplating rationally, and counteracting all afflictions, refers to the seventh chapter of the Śūraṅgama Sūtra. Tenthly, one should not understand his intention literally, referring to the eighth chapter of the Śūraṅgama Sūtra. Therefore, the eighth and tenth chapters are only different in opening and closing, and the meaning is not different. Because the verses of the Śūraṅgama Sūtra and the Abhidharmasamuccaya were not composed by Asaṅga. Treatise: The Sthavira Nikāya (Elders School) is also called Sautrāntika (Sūtra Followers) because it quotes scriptures. It is not the Sūtrapiṭaka (Basket of Discourses) among the twenty schools. In this Sthavira Nikāya, there is the Arhat Kātyāyanīputra (Son of Kātyāyanī), who is well-versed in the Abhidharma Piṭaka (Basket of Higher Knowledge). No one in the Sthavira Nikāya can refute him, so he went to the Snow Mountains, hence the name Haimavata (Snow-Turning School). The Vibhajyavāda (Distinctionists) is the Prajñaptivāda (Conventionalists), formerly known as the Vibhajyavāda (Analysts). In the Anabhisaṃbodhi, the ancient name Vibhajyavāda is used. In the Samayabhedoparacanacakra, there is no Vibhajyavāda, but there is Prajñaptivāda, both of which say there is a part of mind. The nine minds of the Sthavira Nikāya are distinguished from five aspects: first, listing the names and explaining them; second, distinguishing the various consciousnesses; third, distinguishing the three natures; fourth, distinguishing birth and death; and fifth, distinguishing before and after. As the Essentials says. Treatise: The holy teachings, etc., have already been cited. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra has eight proofs, which are the same as those cited in the Abhidharmasamuccaya. The verse says: 'Grasping, beginning, clarity, seeds, karma, body feeling, mindless concentration, death, non-existence are all unreasonable.' The three meanings of initial birth, clarity, and karmic function are not in this treatise. The five of going to birth, life consciousness, mutual condition, relying on food, and mental defilement and purity are not in the Abhidharmasamuccaya. The remaining five are the same. However, they are mutually broad and concise. In the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the first is grasping, and the second is the initial arising. The Sarvāstivāda (All Exists School), etc., believe that the consciousnesses do not arise simultaneously. If the six objects arrive simultaneously, there should be no initially arising consciousness, because the roots, objects, and attention conditions are all the same. The Mahāyāna believes that the consciousnesses arise simultaneously, so it can refute the other party's lack of initially arising consciousness. The other party is...
設難。若無初生許俱起者。應一有情二識俱起。以大乘許賴耶定有故。今外人且就此難。不爾應難三四等俱。故下卻難。猶如有一俱時欲見乃至欲識。隨有一識最初生起不應道理 問設許俱生如何能證有第八識 答此非正證。因釋外難故為一因 或應展轉立俱有根證有第八 又解傳釋。外難若有第八一切時行。最初生起識不得。我無第八初生可得 今牒外難云。云何不可得耶。有外難云。若許恒有第八識者。應有二識俱起之失。故初起識不可得義。應知容俱故有可得 問若爾第七亦復恒行何有初起 答以他未許有第七識。且八．六對許八初生證有賴耶。若他難七恒與八俱無初生亦成我義 問他救言。初生之位五根未成。意識初生此有何失。即應難言。有所依意與六俱生。故說初起義亦不立。前釋為勝 明瞭．作業亦是展轉。顯成俱起證第八義。然四業者初了器。第二了根．依處．種子。了我第七。了境第六。顯四業俱。故證第八道理稍隱 攝大乘論以染凈心總別合說。雜染之中定．散別故初說欲界 欲界之中初辨惑．業．生雜染三。生中復分色根執受。名色互依。及依食住。次辨色．無色界惑．業．生三。生中復分滅．離二趣。又約二界明生死位冷觸不成。次明清凈中分世．出世。出世之中明滅定證。次重顯前三雜染
中為種不成破上坐部。準彼但有此論八義。初持種義即彼雜染清凈中攝。執受．名色．四食．趣生．生死．滅定七義名同。但開合廣略。異熟．壽識彼無此二。又復此論心染凈證。最在後明顯別依總故。彼即初明總離別故。
言諸法種子之所集起故名為心者。經部雖以色心互熏俱得持種。識持法種通於三界勝故。但說種集名心 若薩婆多雲。以心能分別色。非色分別心。故說心為種。即以現在心法為種 大眾部師亦心用強立種子稱 上坐部師雖前色心俱為后種。亦心強故獨心名種。
論。別類必同別事性故者。西明云。一云不立法同。一云亦立。前說為勝 今謂不爾。俱舍論中經部破他大同唯識。此論既難令相似法立於同分故立法同。此義為勝 問彼宗識類為是何性 答本計無記故受熏持種 問許間斷不 答彼許相續 問若爾如何言又無心位此類定無 答此以理逼。既稱識類。識既間斷類亦應然。類依識立如得等故。
論。又阿羅漢或異生心等者。問彼計識類亙通三世而性不易。即難令凡聖染凈應互相熏。第八一類三世不易應同彼過 答不例。彼立識類依識而成。即彼識攝。無別法收。故有此過。大乘八識體性各別。非一識類。故不成過。
論。許類是假應不持種子者。問種子體是實。識類
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 上座部（Sthavira Nikāya）中有一個名為『種不成破』的派別。他們大概只有這部論中的八個要義。最初的『持種義』包含在雜染和清凈之中。『執受』、『名色』（nāmarūpa，五蘊中的受、想、行、識四蘊）、『四食』（catvāro āhārā，段食、觸食、思食、識食）、『趣生』、『生死』、『滅定』這七個要義名稱相同，只是在開合廣略上有所不同。『異熟』和『壽識』這兩個要義他們沒有。此外，這部論中心染凈的論證，最後才明顯地分別依據總相，而他們一開始就明辨總相和別相。
關於『諸法種子之所集起故名為心』的說法，經部（Sautrāntika）雖然認為色和心互相熏習都能持種，但因為識持法種通於三界更為殊勝，所以只說種子集起名為心。如果薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）認為，因為心能分別色，而色不能分別心，所以說心為種，那就是以現在的心法為種。大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）的論師也認為心的作用強大，所以立種子之名。上座部的論師雖然認為先前的色和心都是後來的種子，但因為心更強大，所以只有心被稱為種。
論中說：『別類必同別事性故』。西明說：『一種說法是不立法同，一種說法是也立法同，前一種說法更好。』我認為不是這樣。在《俱舍論》（Abhidharmakośa）中，經部駁斥他人大同唯識的觀點。這部論既然難以使相似的法立於同分，所以立法同。這個意義更好。問：他們宗派的識類是什麼性質？答：本來認為是無記性，所以接受熏習而持種。問：允許間斷嗎？答：他們允許相續。問：如果這樣，為什麼說又沒有心位，此類必定沒有？答：這是用道理逼迫。既然稱為識類，識既然間斷，類也應該如此。類依靠識而立，就像得等一樣。
論中說：『又阿羅漢或異生心等』。問：他們認為識類貫通三世而性質不變，這就難以使凡夫和聖人、染污和清凈互相熏習。第八識的一類三世不變，應該和他們的過失相同。答：不能類比。他們立識類依靠識而成，就在那個識的範疇內，沒有別的法來收攝，所以有這個過失。大乘八識的體性各自不同，不是一種識類，所以不成過失。
論中說：『許類是假，應該不持種子』。問：種子的體是真實的，識類
【English Translation】 English version: Within the Sthavira Nikāya (上坐部), there is a faction known as 'Zhong Bu Cheng Po' (種不成破). They supposedly only adhere to eight key tenets within this treatise. The initial 'holding seed meaning' (持種義) is encompassed within defilement and purity. The seven meanings of 'grasping' (執受), 'name and form' (名色, nāmarūpa, the four skandhas of feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness), 'four kinds of nutriment' (四食, catvāro āhārā, coarse food, sense-impression, volition, and consciousness), 'destined birth', 'birth and death', and 'cessation attainment' share the same names, differing only in their scope and detail. They lack the two meanings of 'resultant maturation' and 'lifespan consciousness'. Furthermore, the arguments concerning the defilement and purity of mind in this treatise are clearly based on general characteristics at the end, whereas they initially clarify general and specific characteristics.
Regarding the statement 'because the seeds of all dharmas are accumulated, it is called mind', although the Sautrāntika (經部) school believes that both form and mind mutually influence each other and can hold seeds, because consciousness holding the seeds of dharmas is superior throughout the three realms, it is only said that the accumulation of seeds is called mind. If the Sarvāstivāda (薩婆多部) school believes that because the mind can distinguish form, but form cannot distinguish the mind, therefore the mind is said to be the seed, then it is taking the present mind-dharma as the seed. The teachers of the Mahāsaṃghika (大眾部) also assert the name of seed because of the strong function of the mind. Although the Sthavira teachers believe that the preceding form and mind are both seeds for the subsequent ones, because the mind is stronger, only the mind is called the seed.
The treatise states: 'Different categories must be the same because of different event natures.' Ximing says: 'One view is that the law of sameness is not established; another view is that it is also established. The former view is better.' I say that is not the case. In the Abhidharmakośa (俱舍論), the Sautrāntika refutes others' views of a great unified consciousness. Since this treatise makes it difficult for similar dharmas to be established in the same division, the law of sameness is established. This meaning is better. Question: What is the nature of the consciousness category in their school? Answer: Originally, it was considered to be neutral, so it receives influence and holds seeds. Question: Is interruption allowed? Answer: They allow continuity. Question: If so, how can it be said that there is no such category in the state of no-mind? Answer: This is forced by reason. Since it is called a consciousness category, and consciousness is interrupted, the category should also be so. The category relies on consciousness for its establishment, just like attainment and so on.
The treatise states: 'Also, the minds of Arhats or ordinary beings are equal.' Question: They believe that the consciousness category pervades the three times and its nature does not change, which makes it difficult for the defilement and purity of ordinary beings and sages to mutually influence each other. The eighth consciousness, one category unchanging throughout the three times, should be the same as their fault. Answer: It cannot be compared. They establish the consciousness category relying on consciousness for its formation, which is within the scope of that consciousness, and there is no other dharma to encompass it, so there is this fault. The nature of the eight consciousnesses of Mahayana is different from each other, not one kind of consciousness, so it is not a fault.
The treatise states: 'If the category is admitted to be false, it should not hold seeds.' Question: The substance of the seeds is real, the consciousness category
假不持。心．心法是真。假法非能礙 答持種具四義。假法闕不持。遮法據功能。假法何妨礙 今助解云。遮用勢疏遠。假法亦能防。持種據親含。要實方能受 又難云。二定依種立。雖假還防種。識類依識立。識類持識種 答解如前。
論。依似比量撥無此識者。本疏及樞要皆辨過失。如彼諸說。宗中無有法不極成過。以其真性不是有法。舉此真性意。取有為以為有法故 今謂是過。彼舉真性。真性皆空無有為法。本意不取真性為有法。于真性中復不可言說。說何以為有為有法。故有法過。若取護法勝義有為。有為非空不空。彼一分違自宗過。取薩婆多勝義有為。俱違宗過 復有說彼因亦無過。緣生法空符宗無故 此亦不爾。若緣生法空。是護法許宗有相符。緣生不空。清辨言空隨一不成過。又勝義空。何有緣生。亦彼自隨一不成過。又依世俗緣生許有幻事為喻。世俗有體因於彼轉。是法自相相違因。若以實幻為喻。彼非緣生闕因后二相。以似幻喻有為異法喻緣生因轉。亦是法自相相違因。喻過準知 西明云。依清辨造中觀心論入真甘露品中說。阿賴耶識無別有性。眼等六識所不攝故。猶若空華。護法今破。然彼比量有三過失。故言似比。宗依勝義勝義說無第八。有相符過。亦有立已成過。若約世俗有違教過
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果不是真實的『持』（dharana，保持），心和心法才是真實的，那麼虛假的法怎麼能成為障礙呢？ 答：『持種』（種子保持）具備四種含義，虛假的法因為缺少這些含義而不能『持』。遮止法是根據其功能來定義的，虛假的法又怎麼會妨礙呢？ 現在進一步解釋：遮止的作用是間接和疏遠的，虛假的法也能起到防禦作用。而『持種』是根據其直接包含的意義來定義的，必須是真實的才能接受。 又有人提問：二種禪定是依據種子而建立的，即使是虛假的禪定也能防止種子的流失。識的種類是依據識而建立的，識的種類也能保持識的種子。 回答與之前的解釋相同。
論：如果有人依據相似的比量來否定阿賴耶識（ālayavijñāna，藏識）的存在，本疏和樞要都辨析了其中的過失，就像他們所說的那樣。宗（paksa，論題）中沒有一個法不是『極成過』（prasiddha-hetu，已成立的理由）的過失，因為它的真性不是『有法』（dharmin，具有屬性的事物）。提出這個真性的意思是，取有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma，有為法）作為『有法』。 現在我認為這是個過失。他們提出真性，真性皆空，沒有有為法。本意不是取真性作為『有法』，在真性中又不可言說，說什麼作為有為的『有法』呢？所以有『有法過』。如果取護法（Dharmapāla）所說的勝義有為（paramārtha-saṃskṛta，勝義諦的有為法），有為不是空也不是不空，這就有一部分違背了自己宗派的過失。如果取薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda，一切有部）所說的勝義有為，就完全違背了宗派的過失。 又有人說，他們的因（hetu，理由）也沒有過失，因為緣生法（pratītyasamutpāda-dharma，緣起法）是空的，符合宗派的觀點。 這也是不對的。如果緣生法是空的，這是護法所允許的，宗派的觀點是相符的。如果緣生法不是空的，清辨（Bhāviveka）說過，空和隨一不成都是過失。而且勝義諦是空的，怎麼會有緣生呢？這也是他們自己隨一不成都是過失。又依據世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗諦）緣生，允許有幻事作為比喻。世俗諦是有實體的，因（hetu，理由）在其中運轉。這是法自相相違的因。如果以真實的幻事作為比喻，它不是緣生的，缺少因和后二相。用類似於幻事的有為法作為異法（vaidharmya，不同屬性）來比喻緣生，因也在運轉，這也是法自相相違的因。比喻的過失可以類推得知。 西明（Ximing，人名）說：依據清辨所造的《中觀心論》（Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā）進入《真甘露品》中所說，阿賴耶識沒有單獨的自性，因為它不被眼等六識所包含，就像空中的花朵一樣。護法現在要破斥這種觀點。然而，他們的比量有三種過失，所以說是相似的比量。宗依據勝義諦，勝義諦說沒有第八識，有相符的過失。也有立已成的過失。如果按照世俗諦來說，有違背教義的過失。
【English Translation】 English version: Q: If it is not true 'dharana' (holding), and mind and mental factors are true, how can false dharmas become obstacles? A: 'Dharana of seeds' has four meanings. False dharmas lack these meanings and cannot 'hold'. Restrictive dharmas are defined according to their function. How can false dharmas be an obstacle? Now, to further explain: The function of restriction is indirect and distant. False dharmas can also provide defense. 'Dharana of seeds' is defined according to its directly contained meaning. It must be true to be able to receive. Someone asks again: The two samadhis (meditative states) are established based on seeds. Even false samadhis can prevent the loss of seeds. The types of consciousness are established based on consciousness. The types of consciousness can also hold the seeds of consciousness. The answer is the same as the previous explanation.
Treatise: If someone relies on a similar inference to deny the existence of ālayavijñāna (store consciousness), the original commentary and key texts have all analyzed the faults, just as they said. In the paksa (thesis), there is no dharma that is not the fault of 'prasiddha-hetu' (already established reason), because its true nature is not a 'dharmin' (subject possessing attributes). The intention of proposing this true nature is to take conditioned dharmas (saṃskṛta-dharmas) as the 'dharmin'. Now I think this is a fault. They propose true nature, but true nature is empty, and there are no conditioned dharmas. The original intention is not to take true nature as the 'dharmin'. Moreover, in true nature, it is impossible to say anything. What can be said as the conditioned 'dharmin'? Therefore, there is the fault of 'dharmin'. If we take Dharmapāla's definition of paramārtha-saṃskṛta (conditioned dharmas in ultimate truth), conditioned dharmas are neither empty nor non-empty, which is a partial violation of their own school. If we take Sarvāstivāda's definition of paramārtha-saṃskṛta, it completely violates the school. Someone also says that their hetu (reason) has no fault, because pratītyasamutpāda-dharma (dependent origination) is empty, which is in accordance with the school's view. This is also incorrect. If dependent origination is empty, this is allowed by Dharmapāla, and the school's view is consistent. If dependent origination is not empty, Bhāviveka said that both emptiness and the failure of either one are faults. Moreover, ultimate truth is empty, so how can there be dependent origination? This is also their own fault of the failure of either one. Furthermore, based on saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth), dependent origination allows illusory events as metaphors. Conventional truth has substance, and the hetu (reason) operates within it. This is a hetu that contradicts the self-nature of the dharma. If we use true illusions as metaphors, they are not dependently originated and lack the cause and the latter two aspects. Using conditioned dharmas similar to illusions as vaidharmya (different attributes) to metaphorically represent dependent origination, the hetu is also operating, which is also a hetu that contradicts the self-nature of the dharma. The faults of the metaphor can be inferred by analogy. Ximing said: According to Bhāviveka's Madhyamaka-hṛdaya-kārikā, entering the chapter of 'True Ambrosia', ālayavijñāna has no separate self-nature because it is not included in the six consciousnesses of the eyes, etc., just like flowers in the sky. Dharmapāla is now refuting this view. However, their inference has three faults, so it is called a similar inference. The thesis is based on ultimate truth, and ultimate truth says there is no eighth consciousness, which has the fault of being consistent. There is also the fault of establishing what is already established. If we speak according to conventional truth, there is the fault of violating the teachings.
。因有共不定。為如空華六識不攝故非有。為如色等是有。若宗言無別識性。即有他不定。為如第七六識所不攝故第八是有 今謂不爾。要集雖云三藏所說。然恐傳錯。何者諸大乘經清辨同信。勝義諸法空。世俗諸法有。何獨偏破中宗第八。設依勝義。即無違教失。教依俗說。何得相違云違前經。又護法勝義非空不空。彼說皆空何得相符。又四勝義及四世俗。皆瑜伽．顯揚等立。未必清辨亦許各四。何須云勝義勝義撥無一切量 西明即取掌珍比量然出過云。若依勝義宗相符。若依世俗違聖教 今謂不爾。非相符過。義如前說。不違聖教比量標依真性說故。故本疏述正契深旨。
論。彼特違害者。據勝義諦非空不空。今謂皆空故特違前集起心經。又仁王般若云。有無本自二。即辨世諦何得依勝義立一切皆空。雖亦違前楞伽．深密。在此證明即違此經。破無為量準前辨。
釋身受中。問無心定中引輕安大種不 答引不引俱無妨難 二俱有過。何者若言不引。何故第七云令身安和故亦名定。若云引者定既無心以何法引。若言加行心引。即非無心定 答不引輕安大種。但無苦迫說為安和。或微調適如欲等持 問有心定中所引輕安大種定心緣不 答緣亦無失。然不緣時以別思慮故。
論趣生體要具四義。如本
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為有共同和不定的過失。譬如空中的花朵，六識不攝屬，所以說它不存在。又譬如色等是存在的。如果對方宗派說沒有別的識性，那就有了他宗不定的過失。譬如第七識，六識不攝屬，所以第八識是存在的。現在我們認為不是這樣。《攝大乘論》雖然說是三藏所說，但恐怕是傳抄錯誤。為什麼呢？因為各大乘經典，清辨和《同性經》都一致認為，勝義諦中的諸法是空性的，世俗諦中的諸法是存在的。為什麼唯獨要破斥中觀宗的第八識呢？假設依據勝義諦，就沒有違背教義的過失。教義是依據世俗諦說的，怎麼能說相違背，說違背了之前的經典呢？而且護法的勝義諦是非空非不空的，他們說一切皆空，怎麼能相符合呢？還有四種勝義諦和四種世俗諦，都是《瑜伽師地論》、《顯揚聖教論》等建立的，未必清辨也認可各有四種。為什麼一定要說勝義諦、勝義諦，否定一切量呢？西明就是取《掌珍論》的比量，然而卻超出了範圍，說如果依據勝義諦，宗義就相符，如果依據世俗諦，就違背聖教。現在我們認為不是這樣。沒有相符的過失，道理如前面所說。不違背聖教，因為比量的標宗是依據真性說的。所以本疏的闡述正符合深奧的旨意。 論：他們特別違背的原因是，依據勝義諦，是非空非不空的。現在說一切皆空，所以特別違背了之前的《集起心經》。還有《仁王般若經》說：『有和無本來就是二』，這是辨別世俗諦的，怎麼能依據勝義諦立一切皆空呢？雖然也違背了之前的《楞伽經》、《深密經》，但在此證明就是違背了這部經。破斥無為的量，參照前面的辨析。 在解釋身受時，問：在無心定中，是否引生輕安的大種？答：引生或不引生，都沒有妨礙和困難。兩種說法都有過失。為什麼呢？如果說不引生，為什麼第七識說，使身體安和，所以也叫做定？如果說引生，定既然沒有心，用什麼方法引生？如果說是加行心引生，那就不是無心定了。答：不引生輕安的大種，只是沒有苦惱逼迫，所以說為安和。或者稍微調適，如同想要保持等持一樣。問：有心定中所引生的輕安大種，定心緣取它嗎？答：緣取也沒有過失。然而不緣取時，是因為有別的思慮的緣故。 論：趣入生命體，需要具備四種意義。如本論所說。
【English Translation】 English version: Because there are common and uncertain faults. For example, like flowers in the sky, the six consciousnesses do not include them, so it is said that they do not exist. And like form, etc., they exist. If the opponent's sect says that there is no other consciousness nature, then there is the fault of uncertain otherness. For example, like the seventh consciousness, the six consciousnesses do not include it, so the eighth consciousness exists. Now we think it is not like this. Although the Compendium of Abhidharma says that it was spoken by the Three Treasures (Tripitaka), I am afraid that it was copied incorrectly. Why? Because the major Mahayana sutras, Qingbian (Bhavyaviveka) and the Samdhinirmochana Sutra, all agree that the dharmas in the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya) are empty, and the dharmas in the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya) exist. Why only refute the eighth consciousness of the Madhyamaka school? Suppose based on the ultimate truth, there is no fault of violating the teachings. The teachings are based on the conventional truth, how can it be said to be contradictory, saying that it violates the previous sutras? Moreover, the ultimate truth of Dharmapala (Dharmapāla) is neither empty nor not empty, they say that everything is empty, how can they be consistent? Also, the four ultimate truths and four conventional truths are all established by Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (Asanga's Exposition of the Holy Teaching), etc., it is not necessarily that Qingbian also recognizes that there are four of each. Why must it be said that the ultimate truth, the ultimate truth, denies all valid cognition? Ximing (a commentator) took the inference of the Tarka-śāstra (Jewel in the Palm), but it went too far, saying that if based on the ultimate truth, the sect's meaning is consistent, if based on the conventional truth, it violates the holy teachings. Now we think it is not like this. There is no fault of being consistent, the reason is as mentioned before. It does not violate the holy teachings, because the proposition of the inference is based on the true nature. Therefore, the commentary of this treatise precisely matches the profound meaning. Treatise: The reason why they particularly violate is that, according to the ultimate truth, it is neither empty nor not empty. Now it is said that everything is empty, so it particularly violates the previous Samuccaya-hrdaya Sutra. Also, the Benevolent King Prajna Sutra says: 'Existence and non-existence are originally two', this is to distinguish the conventional truth, how can it be based on the ultimate truth to establish that everything is empty? Although it also violates the previous Lankavatara Sutra, Sandhinirmocana Sutra, but proving it here is to violate this sutra. Refuting the measure of the unconditioned, refer to the previous analysis. In explaining body and feeling, question: In the samadhi without mind, does it generate the great elements of lightness and ease? Answer: Whether it generates or does not generate, there is no obstacle or difficulty. Both statements have faults. Why? If it is said that it does not generate, why does the seventh consciousness say that it makes the body peaceful and harmonious, so it is also called samadhi? If it is said that it generates, since the samadhi has no mind, what method is used to generate it? If it is said that it is generated by the preparatory mind, then it is not a samadhi without mind. Answer: It does not generate the great elements of lightness and ease, it is only without the suffering of oppression, so it is said to be peaceful and harmonious. Or slightly adjusted, like wanting to maintain equanimity. Question: Does the mind in samadhi cognize the great elements of lightness and ease generated in the samadhi with mind? Answer: Cognizing it is also without fault. However, when it does not cognize it, it is because of other thoughts. Treatise: To enter the life body, it is necessary to have four meanings. As stated in this treatise.
疏明。然總聊簡。一切法有二種。一有為。二無為。無為非生故不須簡 有為之中略有三類。一色。二不相應。三心．心所 且色法中異熟五根。有實及恒起無雜亂。然體不遍。長養．等流則有雜亂。在下起上天眼耳故。是長養故。便闕三義但有一實。若五境色。一非一向實。二非是恒。三非遍。業果無色無。定果欲界無。四非不雜。以下上五識緣上下境故。法處色中初四闕四義。唯假不恒不遍起雜。定自在色體通假實。亦闕四義 第二不相應行總闕實義。命根．眾同分闕一具三。恒遍無雜故。異生性一闕三有一。遍三界故 或可具二。雖總言依見所斷立。若在欲界即依欲界分別惑立。故亦無雜。余準可知 第三心．心所法中。初辨心所。后辨心王。心所之中六位差別總而言之。遍行．別境唯有實．遍闕恒．無雜。所餘四位總聚而言四義俱闕。約三性別辨具闕者。且於善中分為二種。一生得。二方便。其生得善四義具幾。答決定有二。謂實及遍。定闕恒一。無雜二說。一云約界不雜。據趣雜亂。如人中得起天．鬼趣等生得善業。由生得善感彼趣報故。然論云。諸生得善及意識中業所感者。雖遍趣生起無雜亂者。異熟是護法文。生得善者是難陀師義。與護法文合說無雜。據護法正義許生得善雜。二云不雜由在人中造作善
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 疏明。總而言之，簡單來說，一切法可分為兩種：一是有為法，二是無為法。無為法不生不滅，因此無需進一步區分。有為法中略有三類：一是色法，二是不相應行法，三是心和心所法。 首先討論色法，異熟所生的五根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身），具有真實、恒常生起、沒有雜亂的三種特性。然而，其體性並不周遍。長養色和等流色則具有雜亂性，因為地獄可以生起上界的天眼和天耳，這是長養的緣故。因此，長養色只具備真實性這一個特性。如果是五境色（色、聲、香、味、觸），則不具備一向真實、恒常、周遍的特性。業果所生的色法在無色界中不存在，定果所生的色法在欲界中不存在。而且，五境色也不是沒有雜亂的，因為地獄和上界的五識可以緣取上地獄的境界。法處所攝的色法，最初的四種（地、水、火、風）缺少四種特性，只有虛假、不恒常、不周遍、生起雜亂的特性。定自在所生的色法，其體性既可以是真實的，也可以是虛假的，也缺少四種特性。 第二，不相應行法總體上缺少真實性。命根和眾同分缺少真實性，但具備恒常、周遍、沒有雜亂的三種特性。異生性缺少恒常、周遍、沒有雜亂的三種特性，但具備真實性。異生性遍及三界，或者可以說具備真實性和周遍性兩種特性。雖然總的來說是依據見所斷的煩惱而建立的，但如果在欲界，就是依據欲界的分別煩惱而建立的，因此也沒有雜亂性。其餘的可以依此類推。 第三，在心和心所法中，先辨析心所法，后辨析心王（心識）。心所法中，六種型別的差別，總的來說，遍行心所和別境心所只有真實性和周遍性，缺少恒常性和沒有雜亂性。其餘四種心所（善、惡、煩惱、不定）總體而言，四種特性都缺少。如果按照三性（善、惡、無記）來辨析，哪些心所具備哪些特性，哪些心所缺少哪些特性呢？首先，在善心中，又分為兩種：一是生得善，二是方便生善。那麼，生得善具備幾種特性呢？回答是決定具備兩種，即真實性和周遍性。一定缺少恒常性，對於是否沒有雜亂性，有兩種說法。一種說法是，按照界限來說沒有雜亂，按照趣向來說則有雜亂。例如，在人道中獲得的生得善業，可以生起天道、鬼道等趣向的果報。因為生得善業能夠感得那些趣向的果報。然而，《論》中說，『諸生得善以及意識中的業所感者，雖然遍及各趣生起，但沒有雜亂。』異熟是護法的說法，生得善是難陀師的觀點。與護法的說法結合起來，就是沒有雜亂。按照護法的正義，允許生得善有雜亂。另一種說法是沒有雜亂，因為在人道中造作善業。
【English Translation】 English version: Elucidation. In brief, all dharmas are of two types: conditioned (有為, yǒu wéi) and unconditioned (無為, wú wéi). Unconditioned dharmas are not subject to birth and death, so they need no further distinction. Among conditioned dharmas, there are roughly three categories: form (色, sè), non-associated formations (不相應, bù xiāng yìng), and mind (心, xīn) and mental factors (心所, xīn suǒ). First, concerning form, the five sense faculties (五根, wǔ gēn) arising from maturation (異熟, yì shú) possess the three characteristics of being real (實, shí), constantly arising (恒起, héng qǐ), and unmixed (無雜亂, wú zá luàn). However, their substance is not pervasive (遍, biàn). Nourishing form (長養, zhǎng yǎng) and outflowing form (等流, děng liú) are mixed, because the divine eye (天眼, tiān yǎn) and divine ear (天耳, tiān ěr) of the lower realms can arise in the higher realms; this is due to nourishment. Therefore, nourishing form only possesses the single characteristic of being real. As for the five sense objects (五境, wǔ jìng), they are not always real, not constant, and not pervasive. Form arising from karmic results does not exist in the Formless Realm, and form arising from meditative results does not exist in the Desire Realm. Furthermore, they are not unmixed, because the five consciousnesses of the lower and upper realms can cognize the objects of the upper and lower realms. The initial four elements (地、水、火、風, dì, shuǐ, huǒ, fēng) within the form aggregate lack all four characteristics, possessing only the characteristics of being unreal, inconstant, non-pervasive, and mixed. Form arising from meditative mastery can be either real or unreal, and also lacks all four characteristics. Second, non-associated formations generally lack the characteristic of reality. Life force (命根, mìng gēn) and commonality of species (眾同分, zhòng tóng fēn) lack reality but possess the three characteristics of constancy, pervasiveness, and being unmixed. Heterogeneity (異生性, yì shēng xìng) lacks the three characteristics of constancy, pervasiveness, and being unmixed, but possesses reality. Heterogeneity pervades the Three Realms, or it can be said to possess the two characteristics of reality and pervasiveness. Although it is generally established based on afflictions severed by insight, if it is in the Desire Realm, it is established based on the afflictions of discrimination in the Desire Realm, so it is also unmixed. The rest can be inferred accordingly. Third, concerning mind and mental factors, first analyze the mental factors, then analyze the mind-king (心王, xīn wáng). Among the mental factors, the differences in the six categories, generally speaking, pervasive mental factors (遍行, biàn xíng) and object-specifying mental factors (別境, bié jìng) only possess reality and pervasiveness, lacking constancy and being unmixed. The remaining four categories (wholesome, unwholesome, afflictive, indeterminate) generally lack all four characteristics. If analyzed according to the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, neutral), which mental factors possess which characteristics, and which lack which? First, within wholesome mind, there are two types: innate (生得, shēng dé) and acquired (方便, fāng biàn). Then, how many characteristics does innate wholesome mind possess? The answer is that it definitely possesses two, namely reality and pervasiveness. It certainly lacks constancy, and there are two views regarding whether it is unmixed. One view is that it is unmixed according to realm, but mixed according to destination. For example, innate wholesome karma acquired in the human realm can give rise to the results of destinations such as the heavens or the ghost realm, because innate wholesome karma can bring about the results of those destinations. However, the Treatise says, 'Innate wholesome [dharmas] and those produced by karma in consciousness, although they arise throughout all destinations, are unmixed.' I-shu is the statement of Dharmapala (護法, hù fǎ), and innate wholesome [dharmas] are the view of Nanda (難陀, nán tuó). Combining the statement of Dharmapala, it is unmixed. According to the correct meaning of Dharmapala, innate wholesome [dharmas] are allowed to be mixed. The other view is that it is unmixed, because wholesome karma is created in the human realm.
業。擊彼舊業感余善報。非在人中起彼天中生得善業。二說前正。以同欲界無定所屬。如煩惱等 又解五趣亦別。以定異因遍諸法故。雖然起雜 問惑．業．生三雖同一界五趣應別。不爾豈可是人趣中不善業於他趣受。若云非定屬。亦應報無屬。若許報無屬。應無五趣別。如業煩惱故。若言報有屬。惑．業亦應然。道理稍難智者思擇。以惑．業二隨報定勝。順定異因故。問方便善中得具幾義 答約總而言。有實及遍。闕恒．無雜。若別別說。但有實義。闕餘三種。亦不遍故。思惠但在欲聞惠通下二。修惠在上二。總聚亦假。義如前說 不善準知 無記有四。且異熟無記中若非業感所知障攝。總而言之亦闕四義。若業感異熟。得有實．無雜。餘二準知 次明心王。分為四類。謂五．六．七．八。五識唯實闕餘三義。若約三性善性如前。異熟無記或容有雜。如地獄等受等流樂。如在人中受別報苦。據界無雜。趣即有雜。第六有二。實．遍三界。闕恒．無雜。約三性言異熟無雜。以地獄中無異熟樂。於人趣中無異熟苦故 第七有云四義皆有。然非趣生 何故如是 答有四解。一云不共。今據共許簡趣生體。二云間斷。聖道．滅定中不起故。三云非業所感。謂是異熟具四義者方是趣生故。論云非異熟法趣生雜亂 今者又解。第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：業。擊破過去的業力，感受剩餘的善報。不是在人道中開始，而是在天道中出生，獲得善業。第二種說法是正確的。因為同屬欲界，沒有固定的歸屬。如同煩惱等。又解釋說五趣也有區別。因為決定的不同原因遍及一切法。雖然有雜染產生。問：迷惑（惑）、業（業）、生（生）三者雖然在同一界，五趣應該有所區別。如果不是這樣，怎麼可能在人道中的不善業在其他趣受報。如果說不是固定的歸屬，也應該報應沒有歸屬。如果允許報應沒有歸屬，應該沒有五趣的區別。如同業和煩惱一樣。如果說報應有歸屬，迷惑和業也應該如此。道理稍微難以理解，智者應該思考選擇。因為迷惑和業二者隨著報應的決定而變得強大。順應決定的不同原因。問：在方便善中能具備幾種意義？答：總的來說，有真實和普遍。缺少恒常和無雜染。如果分別來說，只有真實的意義。缺少其餘三種。也不普遍。思所成的智慧只在欲界，聞所成的智慧通於下二界。修所成的智慧在上二界。總的聚集也是虛假的。意義如同前面所說。不善可以類推得知。無記有四種。且在異熟無記中，如果不是業力所感，不是所知障所攝。總的來說也缺少四種意義。如果是業力所感的異熟，可以有真實和無雜染。其餘兩種可以類推得知。接下來闡明心王。分為四類。即五識、六識、七識、八識。五識只有真實，缺少其餘三種意義。如果從三性來說，善性如同前面所說。異熟無記或許容許有雜染。如同在地獄等感受等流的快樂。如同在人道中感受不同的報應苦。從界來說沒有雜染。從趣來說就有雜染。第六識有兩種。真實和普遍，遍及三界。缺少恒常和無雜染。從三性來說，異熟沒有雜染。因為在地獄中沒有異熟的快樂。在人道中沒有異熟的苦。第七識有人說四種意義都有。然而不是趣生。為什麼會這樣？答：有四種解釋。一種說法是不共。現在根據共同認可的說法，簡化趣生的本體。第二種說法是間斷。在聖道和滅盡定中不起作用。第三種說法不是業力所感。認為異熟具備四種意義的才是趣生。論中說不是異熟的法，趣生雜亂。現在又解釋說，第七識
【English Translation】 English version: Karma. Shattering past karma and experiencing the remaining good rewards. Not starting in the human realm, but being born in the heavenly realm, obtaining good karma. The second statement is correct. Because belonging to the desire realm, there is no fixed belonging. Like afflictions, etc. Furthermore, it is explained that the five realms also have differences. Because the determined different causes pervade all dharmas. Although defilements arise. Question: Although delusion (惑, huò), karma (業, yè), and birth (生, shēng) are in the same realm, the five realms should be different. If not, how could the unwholesome karma in the human realm be experienced in other realms? If it is said that there is no fixed belonging, then the retribution should also have no belonging. If it is allowed that retribution has no belonging, there should be no distinction between the five realms. Like karma and afflictions. If it is said that retribution has belonging, then delusion and karma should also be the same. The reasoning is slightly difficult to understand, and the wise should contemplate and choose. Because delusion and karma both become strong with the determination of retribution, conforming to the determined different causes. Question: How many meanings can be possessed in skillful means of goodness? Answer: Generally speaking, there are truthfulness and pervasiveness. Lacking constancy and non-mixture. If speaking separately, there is only the meaning of truthfulness. Lacking the remaining three. It is also not pervasive. Wisdom born of thought is only in the desire realm, wisdom born of hearing pervades the lower two realms. Wisdom born of cultivation is in the upper two realms. The total gathering is also false. The meaning is as previously stated. Unwholesomeness can be inferred. The unmarked has four types. Moreover, in the unmarked of different maturation, if it is not felt by karma, not included in the obstruction of the knowable. Generally speaking, it also lacks four meanings. If it is the different maturation felt by karma, it can have truthfulness and non-mixture. The remaining two can be inferred. Next, clarify the mind-king. Divided into four categories. Namely, the five consciousnesses, the sixth consciousness, the seventh consciousness, and the eighth consciousness. The five consciousnesses only have truthfulness, lacking the remaining three meanings. If speaking from the three natures, the wholesome nature is as previously stated. The unmarked of different maturation may allow for mixture. Like experiencing the pleasure of equal flow in hells, etc. Like experiencing different retribution of suffering in the human realm. From the perspective of the realm, there is no mixture. From the perspective of the realm of existence, there is mixture. The sixth consciousness has two types. Truthfulness and pervasiveness, pervading the three realms. Lacking constancy and non-mixture. From the perspective of the three natures, different maturation has no mixture. Because there is no pleasure of different maturation in hells. There is no suffering of different maturation in the human realm. Some say that the seventh consciousness has all four meanings. However, it is not a realm of existence. Why is this so? Answer: There are four explanations. One explanation is non-common. Now, according to the commonly accepted statement, simplify the essence of the realm of existence. The second explanation is intermittent. It does not arise in the holy path and cessation attainment. The third explanation is not felt by karma. It is believed that only different maturation possessing four meanings is a realm of existence. The treatise says that it is not the dharma of different maturation, the realms of existence are mixed up. Now it is explained again that the seventh consciousness
七闕一。有性之人起有雜故。據界而言亦闕恒義。如生欲界起平等智。無性之人是此類故。又約識明不據人故。唯第八識具四義故 問若許第六異熟無雜。如殃掘摩．阿阇世轉異熟于余受。何得不雜 答據五識說非第六識 又已解脫聖人身中無苦異熟。經說有者現業果化。設非無學見道惑亡因無果喪。設有苦者等流．增上非是異熟。如地獄樂。
論。唯異熟心及彼心所實恒遍無雜是正實趣生 問立趣生體。為但依王。亦兼心所。為實．為假 答有三釋。一云但依心王立趣生體。具四義故。若依王．所即六趣生有違前失。此卷初云應一有情有六種體。第一云此識足為界趣生體。無勞別執有實命根。亦不得云此中識言亦攝心所。彼辨唯識義。此出趣生體 又若此識言亦攝心所。命根亦應通依王．所種。故但依王立趣生體。第七亦云然立有情依命根數惑異熟識。故知不多 何故論云唯異熟識及彼心所是正實趣生 答此相從說。正取心王。不爾同前六種體失何得難他 問八俱五數四闕何義而非有情 答八俱雖具。種類言之有雜有間。據百法簡不約相應。不爾命根及眾同分。遍．恒．無雜足為趣生。何要須實。一云通依王所立為趣生。此正辨云唯異熟識心及心所實．恒．遍．無雜是正實趣生。又結云正實趣生既唯異熟心及
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 七闕一。有情眾生因為具有不同的性質而產生混雜的情況。從界（Dhatu，指欲界、色界、無色界）的角度來說，也缺少恒常的意義。例如，在欲界產生平等智，無性之人就是這種情況。另外，從識（Vijnana，指八識）的角度來說，不以人為依據，只有第八識（Alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）才具備四種意義（實、恒、遍、無雜）。 問：如果允許第六識（Mano-vijnana，意識）的異熟果報沒有混雜，就像鴦掘摩羅（Angulimala，指殺人狂魔最終被佛陀度化）和阿阇世王（Ajatasattu，指頻婆娑羅王之子）將異熟果報轉移到其他感受上，為什麼不能算作不雜呢？ 答：這是根據前五識（Panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）來說的，不是指第六識。 另外，已經解脫的聖人身體中沒有痛苦的異熟果報。經書上所說的有，是現世業力所產生的果報變化。假設不是無學（Asaiksa，指阿羅漢果位），見道（Darshana-marga，指證悟真理的道路）的迷惑消失，因果就會喪失。即使有痛苦，也是等流果（Nisyanda-phala，指與因相似的果報）和增上果（Adhipati-phala，指由增上緣所產生的果報），而不是異熟果報。例如地獄中的快樂。 論：只有異熟心（Vipaka-citta，指異熟果報的心識）以及與它相應的心所（Caitasika，指心識的附屬作用）才是真實、恒常、普遍、沒有混雜的，才是真正的趣生（Gati-utpatti，指投生到六道輪迴）。 問：建立趣生的本體，是隻依據心王（Citta-raja，指八識中的主要識），還是也包括心所？是真實的還是虛假的？ 答：有三種解釋。第一種說法是隻依據心王來建立趣生的本體，因為它具備四種意義。如果依據心王和心所，那麼六趣（Sad-gati，指地獄、餓鬼、畜生、阿修羅、人、天）的產生就與之前的說法相違背，因為本捲開頭說應該一個有情眾生有六種本體。第一種說法是，這個識足以作為界（Dhatu，指欲界、色界、無色界）、趣（Gati，指六道輪迴）、生的本體，不需要另外執著于有真實的命根（Jivitendriya，指維持生命的能力）。也不得說這個識也包括心所，因為那是辨別唯識（Vijnanavada，指唯識宗）的意義，而這裡是說明趣生的本體。 另外，如果這個識也包括心所，那麼命根也應該普遍地依據心王和心所的種子。所以只依據心王來建立趣生的本體。第七識（Manas-vijnana，末那識）也說，建立有情眾生是依據命根、數（Samkhya，指數量）、迷惑（Klesha，指煩惱）、異熟識。所以知道不多。 為什麼論中說只有異熟識以及與它相應的心所才是真正真實的趣生？ 答：這是從相（Lakshana，指事物的外在特徵）的角度來說的，主要取心王。否則就和前面所說的六種本體的缺失一樣，怎麼能責難他人呢？ 問：八俱（Ashta-samprayukta，指八個心識同時生起）、五數（Panca-samkhya，指五個心所）、四闕（Catur-vikala，指缺少四種意義）是什麼意思，為什麼不是有情眾生？ 答：八俱雖然具備，但從種類上來說，有混雜和間斷。根據《百法明門論》（Sata-dharma-prakasha-mukha-shastra）的簡擇，不是根據相應。否則命根和眾同分（Nikaya-sabhaga，指同類眾生的共業）具備普遍、恒常、沒有混雜的特點，就足以成為趣生，為什麼需要真實呢？另一種說法是，普遍地依據心王和心所來建立趣生。這裡正是辨別說只有異熟識以及與它相應的心所才是真實、恒常、普遍、沒有混雜的，才是真正的趣生。最後總結說，真正的趣生只有異熟心以及
【English Translation】 English version: Seven Deficiencies, Part One. Sentient beings arise with mixed qualities due to their varying natures. From the perspective of realms (Dhatu, referring to the Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm), there is also a lack of constancy. For example, the arising of equanimity wisdom in the Desire Realm is characteristic of those without inherent nature. Furthermore, from the perspective of consciousness (Vijnana, referring to the eight consciousnesses), it is not based on individuals; only the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana, storehouse consciousness) possesses the four qualities (real, constant, pervasive, unmixed). Question: If the resultant maturation of the sixth consciousness (Mano-vijnana, mind consciousness) is allowed to be unmixed, like Angulimala (a serial killer who was eventually converted by the Buddha) and King Ajatasattu (son of King Bimbisara) transferring the resultant maturation to other sensations, why can't it be considered unmixed? Answer: This is discussed in terms of the first five consciousnesses (Panca-vijnana, eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness), not the sixth consciousness. Moreover, liberated saints do not have painful resultant maturation in their bodies. The scriptures that mention it refer to the transformation of the results of present karma. If it were not for the non-learners (Asaiksa, referring to the state of Arhat), the delusion of the path of seeing (Darshana-marga, referring to the path of realizing the truth) would disappear, and the cause would lose its effect. Even if there is suffering, it is a flowing result (Nisyanda-phala, referring to a result similar to the cause) and an augmenting result (Adhipati-phala, referring to a result produced by an augmenting condition), not a resultant maturation. For example, the pleasure in hell. Treatise: Only the resultant maturation mind (Vipaka-citta, referring to the consciousness of resultant maturation) and its associated mental factors (Caitasika, referring to the subsidiary functions of consciousness) are truly real, constant, pervasive, and unmixed, and are the true basis for rebirth (Gati-utpatti, referring to rebirth in the six realms of samsara). Question: In establishing the substance of rebirth, is it based solely on the mind-king (Citta-raja, referring to the main consciousness among the eight consciousnesses), or does it also include mental factors? Is it real or false? Answer: There are three explanations. The first explanation is that the substance of rebirth is established solely based on the mind-king because it possesses the four qualities. If it were based on both the mind-king and mental factors, the arising of the six realms (Sad-gati, referring to hell, hungry ghosts, animals, asuras, humans, and gods) would contradict the previous statement, because the beginning of this chapter states that one sentient being should have six substances. The first explanation is that this consciousness is sufficient as the substance of realm (Dhatu, referring to the Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm), rebirth (Gati, referring to the six realms of samsara), and arising, and there is no need to cling to a real life-force (Jivitendriya, referring to the ability to sustain life). It should also not be said that this consciousness includes mental factors, because that is distinguishing the meaning of Consciousness-Only (Vijnanavada, referring to the Yogacara school), while this is explaining the substance of rebirth. Furthermore, if this consciousness also includes mental factors, then the life-force should also universally rely on the seeds of the mind-king and mental factors. Therefore, the substance of rebirth is established solely based on the mind-king. The seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana, mind consciousness) also states that the establishment of sentient beings is based on life-force, number (Samkhya, referring to quantity), defilements (Klesha, referring to afflictions), and resultant maturation consciousness. Therefore, it is known that it is not much. Why does the treatise state that only the resultant maturation consciousness and its associated mental factors are truly real rebirth? Answer: This is discussed from the perspective of characteristics (Lakshana, referring to the external features of things), mainly taking the mind-king. Otherwise, it would be the same as the lack of the six substances mentioned earlier, how can one blame others? Question: What is the meaning of eight concommitant (Ashta-samprayukta, referring to the simultaneous arising of eight consciousnesses), five numbers (Panca-samkhya, referring to five mental factors), and four deficiencies (Catur-vikala, referring to lacking four qualities), and why are they not sentient beings? Answer: Although eight concommitant are possessed, from the perspective of types, there are mixtures and interruptions. According to the selection of the Hundred Dharmas (Sata-dharma-prakasha-mukha-shastra), it is not based on association. Otherwise, the life-force and the commonality of species (Nikaya-sabhaga, referring to the common karma of beings of the same kind) possess the characteristics of universality, constancy, and unmixedness, which would be sufficient to become rebirth, why is reality needed? Another explanation is that rebirth is universally established based on the mind-king and mental factors. Here, it is precisely distinguishing that only the resultant maturation consciousness and its associated mental factors are real, constant, pervasive, and unmixed, and are the true rebirth. Finally, it concludes that the true rebirth is only the resultant maturation mind and
心所。彼心．心所離第八識理不得成。又復王．所同引業招。而前說云此識足為界趣生體。據勝偏說。難他有情應有六體者。據六受熏後生現時應六第八。經說無處無容二識並生故彼成過。不障王．所六各一體說為有情 問若爾何故第七云然立有情依命根數惑異熟識 答同一聚故名之為一。或從王勝說趣生一。一云通依王．所總立為一。何以得知。準前不許多體。準后依命根數立。此文復舉王．所順前後故 若爾趣生體應是假。何故論云是正實趣生 答正簡方便惑．業中有。實簡遍計妄立趣生。今此趣生體雖是假。依實法立故言實．恒．遍．無雜 問何理得知趣生體假。答準第七云然立有情依命根數惑異熟識故。不障能依趣生體假 問趣生體百法何攝 答依初二釋即心．心法攝。若依后體即有二解。一云假有三種。一相待假。如長等色。二分位假。如生等相。三聚集假。即隨實攝(是更一法師解)今云不相應攝。大乘許多不唯二十四。如隨煩惱且據勝說二十四種。或同分攝如法同分。但云眾同分者。且對他宗不立法同分者說。若據寬論。應但云同分。或有眾同分。眾同分中有總有別。此別同分。雖無教文理亦無失。
問解執受中。準瑜伽論等。皆有五因。何故但舉三因。不說非善．染及業所引 答有二解 一云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：心所（Citta-samprayukta，與心相應的心理活動）。如果心和心所離開第八識（Alaya-vijñana，阿賴耶識）的道理，就不能成立。而且，心王（心識的主要部分）和心所共同由引業所招感。但前面說這個識足以作為界趣（Gati，輪迴的去處）的生體，這是就殊勝的一面來說的。如果有人問，其他有情應該有六個生體嗎？這是根據六受（六種感受）熏習后，產生現行時，應該有六個第八識。經中說沒有地方、沒有空間可以容納兩個識同時產生，所以這個說法會造成過失。這不妨礙心王和心所各有各的生體，說為一個有情。 問：如果是這樣，為什麼第七識（Manas-vijñana，末那識）說『然而建立有情，依賴於命根、數、惑、異熟識』呢？答：因為它們是同一聚集，所以稱為一個。或者從心王殊勝的角度來說，趣生是一個。另一種說法是，通指依賴於心王和心所，總合起來建立為一個。憑什麼知道呢？根據前面不承認有許多生體，根據後面依賴於命根和數來建立。這段文字又舉出心王和心所，是爲了順應前後文。 如果這樣，趣生體應該是假立的。為什麼《瑜伽師地論》說它是真實趣生呢？答：『正』是爲了簡別方便惑和業中的趣生，『實』是爲了簡別遍計所執（Parikalpita，虛妄分別）妄立的趣生。現在這個趣生體雖然是假立的，但它是依實法而建立的，所以說是『實』、『恒』、『遍』、『無雜』。 問：根據什麼道理得知趣生體是假立的？答：根據第七識說『然而建立有情，依賴於命根、數、惑、異熟識』。這不妨礙能依的趣生體是假立的。 問：趣生體在百法（一百種法）中屬於哪一類？答：根據最初的兩種解釋，屬於心和心法。如果根據後面的生體，就有兩種解釋。一種說法是，假有三種：一是相待假，如長短等色；二是分位假，如生等相；三是聚集假，即隨實法攝（這是更一法師的解釋）。現在說是屬於不相應行法。大乘佛教有很多法，不只是二十四種。比如隨煩惱，只是就殊勝的方面來說有二十四種。或者屬於同分攝，如法同分。但說眾同分，是對那些不立法同分的宗派說的。如果從寬泛的角度來說，應該只說同分。或者有眾同分，眾同分中有總有別。這種別同分，雖然沒有教文，但道理上也沒有缺失。 問：在解釋執受（Grahana，領納）時，根據《瑜伽師地論》等，都有五種原因。為什麼只舉出三種原因，不說非善、染污以及業所引呢？答：有兩種解釋：一種說法是……
【English Translation】 English version: Citta-samprayukta (mental factors associated with the mind). If the mind and mental factors are separated from the principle of the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñana, storehouse consciousness), it cannot be established. Moreover, the Citta (main part of consciousness) and Citta-samprayukta are jointly summoned by the karma that draws one into rebirth. However, it was previously said that this consciousness is sufficient to be the entity of the realm of existence (Gati, destination of rebirth). This is according to the superior aspect. If someone asks, should other sentient beings have six entities? This is based on the fact that after the six feelings (six types of sensations) are imprinted, when they manifest, there should be six eighth consciousnesses. The sutras say that there is no place, no space to accommodate two consciousnesses arising simultaneously, so this statement would cause a fault. This does not hinder the Citta and Citta-samprayukta each having its own entity, said to be one sentient being. Question: If this is the case, why does the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñana, mind consciousness) say, 'However, the establishment of sentient beings relies on the life force, number, afflictions, and the Vipaka-vijñana (resultant consciousness)'? Answer: Because they are the same aggregation, they are called one. Or, from the perspective of the superiority of the Citta, the realm of existence is one. Another saying is that it generally relies on the Citta and Citta-samprayukta, combined to establish one. How do we know this? According to the previous statement that does not acknowledge many entities, according to the latter relying on the life force and number to establish. This passage also mentions the Citta and Citta-samprayukta in order to comply with the preceding and following texts. If this is the case, the entity of the realm of existence should be provisionally established. Why does the Yogacarabhumi-sastra say that it is the real realm of existence? Answer: 'Real' is to distinguish the realm of existence in expedient afflictions and karma, 'actual' is to distinguish the realm of existence falsely established by Parikalpita (conceptual construction). Now, although this entity of the realm of existence is provisionally established, it is established based on real dharmas, so it is said to be 'real', 'constant', 'pervasive', and 'unmixed'. Question: According to what principle do we know that the entity of the realm of existence is provisionally established? Answer: According to the seventh consciousness saying, 'However, the establishment of sentient beings relies on the life force, number, afflictions, and the Vipaka-vijñana.' This does not hinder the entity of the realm of existence that is relied upon from being provisionally established. Question: Which category of the hundred dharmas (one hundred types of phenomena) does the entity of the realm of existence belong to? Answer: According to the first two explanations, it belongs to the mind and mental factors. If according to the latter entity, there are two explanations. One saying is that there are three types of provisionality: first, relative provisionality, such as long and short colors; second, positional provisionality, such as birth and other characteristics; third, aggregational provisionality, which is included in real dharmas (this is Master Gengyi's explanation). Now it is said to belong to non-associated formations. Mahayana Buddhism has many dharmas, not just twenty-four types. For example, the secondary afflictions are only said to be twenty-four types in terms of superiority. Or it belongs to the category of commonality, such as dharma commonality. But saying 'group commonality' is for those schools that do not establish dharma commonality. If speaking from a broad perspective, it should only be said to be commonality. Or there is group commonality, and within group commonality there is general and specific. This specific commonality, although there is no textual teaching, there is no loss in principle. Question: In explaining Grahana (perception), according to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and others, there are five causes. Why are only three causes mentioned, and not non-virtuous, defiled, and karma-induced? Answer: There are two explanations: One saying is...
先業所引是相續上義。非善．染者一類上義。所以不說。一云亦簡佛果。雖有執受而非業引。雖是一類許是善故。故不言二。西明云。初二即一類攝。
二云欲顯執受非要五義。佛有執受故。此解為正。若如前解但云眼等無如是義。何須重說一類等三。
論受生命終必住散．心非無心．定 問若爾何故摩訶俱瑟恥羅經。羅漢入滅定方化火燒身。入無餘涅槃耶 答有二解。一云以期愿故。入滅定前起加行意。愿化火燒身。方入滅定折伏心力令其衰損方入無餘。言住散．心非定心非無心者。據不期愿說。惑約有學及異生說。不遮無學 一云入滅定已損伏心力出滅定後方入無餘。言入滅定即入無餘者。據前方便說 此雖二解約小乘說。若大乘師。雖入滅定。有第八識。是散非定。有心非無。故此論云。若無此識生．死時心不應有故 問若有第八許在滅定得入無餘。何故在有心定而無死者 答約無期愿有學等說。何故如是。若無期愿。定力所持不得死故 又準大乘。正死時心。中有初心。本有初心。皆是無記。然有一師云。中有初心及與末心。是起愛心。本有初心亦爾。何以得知。以瑜伽論六位無心。不說生．死位是無心故。準知有第六 一師云是無記心。六無心位不言生死時者。即悶絕攝故不別說。后師為正。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 先前的業力所牽引是相續的意義，而不是善或染污的一類上的意義。因此論中沒有說明。另一種說法是，這也排除了佛果，雖然佛果有執受，但不是業力所牽引。雖然佛果屬於同一類，但許可是善的，所以論中沒有說兩種情況。 西明法師說，最初的兩種情況實際上包含在同一類中。 另一種說法是，想要顯示執受並非一定要有五種意義。佛有執受的緣故。這種解釋是正確的。如果像之前的解釋那樣，只需說眼等沒有這樣的意義，何必重複說一類等三種情況呢？ 論中說，受生命終結時必定處於散亂心或非無心的狀態，而不是禪定狀態。問：如果這樣，為什麼《摩訶俱瑟恥羅經》（Mahākoṣṭhila Sūtra）中說，阿羅漢（Arhat）進入滅盡定（Nirodha-samāpatti）后才能化火燒身，進入無餘涅槃（Anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa）呢？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，因為有期愿的緣故。在進入滅盡定之前，發起加行意願，希望化火燒身。然後進入滅盡定，折伏心力，使其衰損，才能進入無餘涅槃。所說的處於散亂心或非禪定心、非無心狀態，是根據沒有期愿的情況說的。迷惑是針對有學（Śaikṣa）和異生（Pṛthagjana）說的，不排除無學（Aśaikṣa）。另一種說法是，進入滅盡定后，損伏心力，出滅盡定后才進入無餘涅槃。所說的進入滅盡定就是進入無餘涅槃，是根據之前的方便說的。雖然這兩種解釋是根據小乘（Hīnayāna）說的，但如果按照大乘（Mahāyāna）的觀點，即使進入滅盡定，也有第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna），是散亂的，不是禪定，是有心的，不是無心。所以此論說，如果沒有這個識，生死時心就不應該存在。問：如果存在第八識，允許在滅盡定中進入無餘涅槃，為什麼在有心定中卻沒有死亡呢？答：這是根據沒有期愿的有學等情況說的。為什麼會這樣呢？如果沒有期愿，由於禪定力量的維持，就不能死亡。又根據大乘，正死時心、中有（Antarābhava）的最初心、本有（Bhavaṅga）的最初心，都是無記（Avyākṛta）的。然而，有一位法師說，中有的最初心和最後心，是生起愛心的。本有的最初心也是如此。如何得知呢？因為《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）的六位無心中，沒有說生死位是無心，因此可以推知有第六識。一位法師說是無記心。六無心位沒有說生死時，是因為包含在悶絕中，所以沒有單獨說明。后一位法師的說法是正確的。
【English Translation】 English version: The prior karma that leads is the meaning of continuity, not the meaning of being in the category of good or defiled. That's why it's not mentioned in the treatise. Another explanation is that it also excludes the fruit of Buddhahood (Buddha-phala), although the fruit of Buddhahood has apprehension (upalabdhi), it is not led by karma. Although the fruit of Buddhahood belongs to the same category, it is permissible to be good, so the treatise does not mention two situations. The Western Brightness Master (Ximing) said that the initial two situations are actually included in the same category. Another explanation is to show that apprehension does not necessarily have to have five meanings. Because the Buddha has apprehension. This explanation is correct. If it were like the previous explanation, it would only be necessary to say that the eyes, etc., do not have such a meaning, why repeat saying one category, etc., three situations? The treatise says that when life ends, one must be in a state of distracted mind or non-mindlessness, not in a state of meditation. Question: If so, why does the Mahākoṣṭhila Sūtra say that an Arhat can only incinerate his body with fire after entering Nirodha-samāpatti and enter Anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that it is because of aspiration. Before entering Nirodha-samāpatti, one initiates the intention of practice, hoping to incinerate the body with fire. Then enter Nirodha-samāpatti, subdue the power of the mind, weaken it, and then enter Anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa. The statement of being in a state of distracted mind or non-meditative mind, non-mindlessness, is based on the situation of not having aspiration. Delusion is directed towards Śaikṣa and Pṛthagjana, not excluding Aśaikṣa. Another explanation is that after entering Nirodha-samāpatti, one weakens the power of the mind, and after exiting Nirodha-samāpatti, one enters Anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa. The statement that entering Nirodha-samāpatti is entering Anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa is based on the previous expedient. Although these two explanations are based on Hīnayāna, if according to the view of Mahāyāna, even if one enters Nirodha-samāpatti, there is still the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna), which is distracted, not meditative, is mindful, not mindless. Therefore, this treatise says that if there is no such consciousness, the mind at the time of birth and death should not exist. Question: If the eighth consciousness exists, allowing one to enter Anupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa in Nirodha-samāpatti, why is there no death in a mindful meditation? Answer: This is based on the situation of Śaikṣa, etc., without aspiration. Why is it like this? If there is no aspiration, one cannot die due to the maintenance of the power of meditation. Also, according to Mahāyāna, the mind at the time of death, the initial mind of Antarābhava, and the initial mind of Bhavaṅga are all Avyākṛta. However, one Dharma master says that the initial and final minds of Antarābhava are the arising of loving-kindness. The initial mind of Bhavaṅga is also the same. How is it known? Because in the six states of mindlessness in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, it is not said that the state of birth and death is mindless, therefore it can be inferred that there is a sixth consciousness. One Dharma master says it is an Avyākṛta mind. The six states of mindlessness do not mention the time of birth and death because they are included in fainting, so they are not separately explained. The latter Dharma master's statement is correct.
論。識緣名色名色緣識。問此中所說識與名色為據種說。為據現行 答二俱何失 二俱有過。何者若據種說不應難他云羯剌藍時無五識故。種子恒有何得云無。若約現行即非正支。又初生位一剎那時。大乘自許亦無第六。何得說言猶如束蘆俱時而轉。若取第七非名色支 答名色有二。一十二支中所說名色。二泛爾名色。若十二支所說名色。據體是種。依當分位亦說現行。故十地論說。十二支皆有子時果時。又種子中復有總別。如下第八說。若泛名色。但云名色未必名支。設名為支即通假實。今此中說泛名色支。名中識支即第七識。一切恒有如二束蘆故自無過 然釋此經文總有七釋。一薩婆多師。如本疏辨。二本經部師。同有部釋。三末經部師。許有細意識。羯剌藍時粗識為名中識。細識為識故如束蘆。四本上坐。亦計二識許俱時轉。釋同末經部。五末上坐。粗細二識必不俱時。釋意大同一切有部。六大眾部師。六識俱轉言如束蘆。據七日已后。七日已前未有五識約長時說。七大乘師。復有三釋。一依此論十二有支當起位說。二依瑜伽第九所說。復有二解。如本疏明。三依泛明名色支說。今此論意約泛名色。不依瑜伽第九二說。及下緣起。皆喻不成 然有解云。依瑜伽后說名中非必具四蘊故。亦取束蘆而為喻故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 論：識緣名色（vijñāna-nāmarūpa，意識依賴於名色而生），名色緣識（nāmarūpa-vijñāna，名色依賴於意識而生）。問：這裡所說的識與名色，是根據種子（bīja，潛在狀態）來說的，還是根據現行（vartamāna，顯現狀態）來說的？答：兩者都包括，有什麼不可以的？兩者都有過失。為什麼呢？如果根據種子來說，就不應該反駁他人說羯剌藍（kalala，受精卵最初階段）時沒有五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）。因為種子是恒常存在的，怎麼能說沒有呢？如果根據現行來說，就不是正支（anga，正確的支分）。而且，初生的時候，在一剎那（kṣaṇa，極短的時間單位）內，大乘（Mahāyāna）自己也承認沒有第六識（manovijñāna，意識）。怎麼能說像束蘆葦一樣同時運轉呢？如果取第七識（kliṣṭamanas，末那識），就不是名色支。答：名色有兩種，一種是十二緣起（dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda）中所說的名色，一種是泛指的名色。如果是十二緣起中所說的名色，就其體性來說是種子，依據其當下的位次也說是現行。所以《十地論》（Daśabhūmika Sūtra）說，十二緣起都有子時和果時。而且種子中又有總和別的區分，如下文第八識（ālayavijñāna，阿賴耶識）所說。如果是泛指的名色，只說是名色，未必是緣起支。即使是緣起支，也包括假和實。現在這裡說的是泛指的名色支，名中的識支就是第七識，一切時恒常存在，就像兩束蘆葦一樣，所以自然沒有過失。 然而解釋這部經文總共有七種解釋。第一種是薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）的觀點，如本疏所辨析。第二種是本經部師（Sautrāntika）的觀點，與有部（Sarvāstivāda）的解釋相同。第三種是末經部師的觀點，承認有細意識。羯剌藍時，粗識為名中的識，細識為識，所以像束蘆葦。第四種是本上座部（Sthavira）的觀點，也認為有兩種識，承認同時運轉。解釋與末經部相同。第五種是末上座部的觀點，粗細兩種識必定不同時。解釋的意思與一切有部大同小異。第六種是大眾部（Mahāsāṃghika）的觀點，六識（ṣaḍ-vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意識）同時運轉，說像束蘆葦，是根據七日以後。七日以前沒有五識，是約長時間來說的。第七種是大乘師的觀點，又有三種解釋。一是依據此論，十二有支（bhavaṅga，有分）當起位時說。二是依據《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第九卷所說，又有兩種解釋，如本疏所說明。三是依據泛指的名色支來說。現在此論的意思是約泛指的名色，不依據《瑜伽師地論》第九卷的兩種說法，以及下文的緣起，都不能成立。 然而有人解釋說，依據《瑜伽師地論》後文所說，名中不必具備四蘊（catvāri arūpaskandhāḥ，受、想、行、識），所以也取束蘆葦作為比喻。
【English Translation】 English version Treatise: Consciousness conditions name and form (vijñāna-nāmarūpa), and name and form conditions consciousness (nāmarūpa-vijñāna). Question: Does the consciousness and name and form mentioned here refer to the seed (bīja, potential state) or the present activity (vartamāna, manifest state)? Answer: Both are included, what's wrong with that? Both have faults. Why? If based on the seed, one should not refute others by saying that there are no five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna, eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) at the time of kalala (the initial stage of the embryo). Because the seed is always present, how can it be said that there is none? If based on present activity, then it is not a correct limb (anga, component). Moreover, at the time of initial birth, in a single kṣaṇa (an extremely short unit of time), the Mahāyāna itself admits that there is no sixth consciousness (manovijñāna, mind consciousness). How can it be said that they operate simultaneously like a bundle of reeds? If the seventh consciousness (kliṣṭamanas, afflicted mind) is taken, it is not a limb of name and form. Answer: There are two types of name and form, one is the name and form mentioned in the twelve links of dependent origination (dvādaśāṅga-pratītyasamutpāda), and the other is the general name and form. If it is the name and form mentioned in the twelve links of dependent origination, its essence is the seed, and it is also said to be present activity according to its current position. Therefore, the Daśabhūmika Sūtra says that the twelve links all have a seed time and a fruit time. Moreover, there are general and specific distinctions within the seed, as mentioned below in relation to the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna, storehouse consciousness). If it is a general name and form, just saying name and form does not necessarily mean it is a limb of dependent origination. Even if it is a limb of dependent origination, it includes both the provisional and the real. What is being discussed here is the general limb of name and form, and the consciousness limb within name is the seventh consciousness, which is always present, like two bundles of reeds, so naturally there is no fault. However, there are seven interpretations of this sutra in total. The first is the view of the Sarvāstivāda school, as analyzed in the commentary. The second is the view of the Sautrāntika school, which is the same as the Sarvāstivāda interpretation. The third is the view of the later Sautrāntika school, which admits the existence of subtle consciousness. At the time of kalala, the coarse consciousness is the consciousness in name, and the subtle consciousness is consciousness, so it is like a bundle of reeds. The fourth is the view of the original Sthavira school, which also believes that there are two types of consciousness and admits that they operate simultaneously. The interpretation is the same as the later Sautrāntika. The fifth is the view of the later Sthavira school, which believes that the coarse and subtle consciousnesses definitely do not occur simultaneously. The meaning of the interpretation is largely the same as that of the Sarvāstivāda school. The sixth is the view of the Mahāsāṃghika school, which believes that the six consciousnesses (ṣaḍ-vijñāna, eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind consciousnesses) operate simultaneously, saying that it is like a bundle of reeds, based on the period after seven days. Before seven days, there are no five consciousnesses, which is said in terms of a long period of time. The seventh is the view of the Mahāyāna masters, which has three interpretations. One is based on this treatise, saying that it is when the twelve links of existence (bhavaṅga, life-continuum) arise. The second is based on what is said in the ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, which has two interpretations, as explained in the commentary. The third is based on the general limb of name and form. The meaning of this treatise now is about the general name and form, not based on the two interpretations in the ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, and the dependent origination below cannot be established. However, some people explain that, according to what is said later in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, name does not necessarily have the four aggregates (catvāri arūpaskandhāḥ, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness), so the bundle of reeds is also taken as a metaphor.
此亦不爾同上坐等過。本疏雖云瑜伽第九第二解意同於此論。意亦取七為名中識。彼論第九但云所餘曰名不遮第七。故束蘆喻善得成立。
觀于緣起染凈順逆。四十四智七十七智等。廣如余辨。今且略 問如有處言觀緣起支齊識退還者何 答依染逆中初修習位。作安立諦近方便觀作如是說。何者如觀老死苦．老死集．老死滅．老死趣滅行。乃至隨應歷觀諸諦。由老死支苦諦所攝。于緣起中先逆觀察。以三種相觀老死支。一細因緣。二粗因緣。三非不定。感生因緣。細謂愛．取．有。生自體名粗。由此二生而有老死。當來老死細生為因。現法老死粗生為因。除二生體余定無能與老死果名非不定。雖觀老死苦諦至愛。於後際苦並彼集諦未為喜足。遂復觀察後集因緣現在眾苦。謂遍逆觀受．觸．六處．名色．與識。觀未來苦是當苦諦。觀彼集因是當集諦。觀未來世苦之集諦由誰而有。知由從前集所生起識為邊際現法苦有。既知從先集所生起。不應復觀此云何有。由識．名色譬如束蘆展轉相緣無作者等。是故觀察齊識退還。故不至於行．無明支。如是觀察苦．集十支次觀滅諦。始從老死乃至無明。云何當滅。由不造彼無明為緣新行支。故彼苦方滅。次更尋求證此滅道。憶昔師授于緣起法。世間正見令起現前。如是數觀
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
這也與之前提到的上座部等人的錯誤觀點不同。《瑜伽師地論》的本疏雖然說第九卷第二部分的解釋與此論相同，但實際上也只是取第七識作為『名』中的一部分。彼論第九卷只說『所餘』（即第七識）被稱為『名』，並沒有完全排除第七識的可能性。因此，用束蘆的比喻來解釋『名』與『識』的關係是完全成立的。
觀察緣起的染凈順逆，有四十四智、七十七智等，詳細內容見其他地方的辨析。現在只簡單說明一下：
問：如果有的地方說觀察緣起支到識就停止退還，這是什麼意思？
答：這是指在染污的逆向觀察中，處於最初修習的階段。爲了確立苦諦，進行接近方便的觀修時，會這樣說。例如，觀察老死是苦，老死的集起，老死的滅，以及通向老死滅的修行。由於老死支屬於苦諦，所以在緣起中首先逆向觀察。用三種相來觀察老死支：一是細微的因緣，二是粗顯的因緣，三是非決定的因緣。愛、取、有是產生老死的細微因緣，老死自身的產生是粗顯的因緣。未來的老死以細微的生為因，現在的老死以粗顯的生為因。除了這兩種生之外，其他任何事物都不能直接導致老死的結果，所以稱為非決定的因緣。雖然觀察老死苦諦一直到愛，但對於未來世的苦以及苦的集起還不滿足，所以進一步觀察導致現在眾苦的因緣，也就是逆向觀察受、觸、六處、名色和識。觀察未來世的苦是未來的苦諦，觀察導致未來世苦的因是未來的集諦。觀察未來世的苦的集起是由什麼產生的，得知是由之前集起所產生的識為邊際的現法苦。既然已經知道是由之前的集起所產生的，就不應該再繼續觀察『這是如何產生的』。因為識和名色就像束蘆一樣，互相依賴，沒有作者等等。所以觀察到識就停止退還，因此不會繼續觀察到行和無明支。這樣觀察苦、集十支后，接著觀察滅諦，從老死開始一直到無明，如何才能滅除？由於不造作以無明為緣的新行支，所以苦才能滅除。然後進一步尋求證得滅的道路，回憶起過去老師傳授的緣起法，使世間的正見得以生起並顯現。像這樣反覆觀察。
【English Translation】 English version:
This also differs from the errors of the aforementioned Sthaviras and others. Although the commentary on the Yogacarabhumi-sastra states that the second section of the ninth fascicle has the same meaning as this treatise, it actually only takes the seventh consciousness as part of 'name' (nama). The ninth fascicle of that treatise only says that 'the remainder' (i.e., the seventh consciousness) is called 'name', without completely excluding the possibility of the seventh consciousness. Therefore, the analogy of the bundle of reeds to explain the relationship between 'name' and 'consciousness' is perfectly valid.
Observing the defiled and purified, forward and reverse aspects of dependent origination, there are forty-four wisdoms, seventy-seven wisdoms, etc., the details of which can be found in other analyses. Now, let's briefly explain:
Question: If some places say that observing the limbs of dependent origination stops and reverts at consciousness, what does this mean?
Answer: This refers to the initial stage of practice in the reverse observation of defilement. In order to establish the truth of suffering (duhkha satya), when engaging in the preliminary practice of contemplation, it is said in this way. For example, observing that old age and death are suffering, the arising of old age and death, the cessation of old age and death, and the path leading to the cessation of old age and death. Since the limb of old age and death belongs to the truth of suffering, one first observes it in reverse in dependent origination. One observes the limb of old age and death with three aspects: first, subtle causes; second, coarse causes; and third, non-deterministic causes. Craving (trsna), grasping (upadana), and becoming (bhava) are the subtle causes of the arising of old age and death; the arising of old age and death itself is the coarse cause. Future old age and death have subtle birth as their cause, and present old age and death have coarse birth as their cause. Apart from these two births, nothing else can directly lead to the result of old age and death, so it is called a non-deterministic cause. Although one observes the truth of suffering of old age and death all the way to craving, one is not satisfied with the suffering of the future and the arising of suffering. Therefore, one further observes the causes that lead to present suffering, which is the reverse observation of feeling (vedana), contact (sparsha), the six sense bases (sadayatana), name and form (nama-rupa), and consciousness (vijnana). Observing the suffering of the future is the future truth of suffering, and observing the cause that leads to the suffering of the future is the future truth of arising. Observing what causes the arising of suffering in the future, one knows that it is the present suffering with consciousness as its boundary, which arises from the previous arising. Since it is already known that it arises from the previous arising, one should not continue to observe 'how this arises'. Because consciousness and name and form are like a bundle of reeds, mutually dependent, without a creator, etc. Therefore, observation stops and reverts at consciousness, and thus one does not continue to observe the limbs of action (samskara) and ignorance (avidya). After observing the ten limbs of suffering and arising in this way, one then observes the truth of cessation (nirodha satya), starting from old age and death and going all the way to ignorance, how can they be eliminated? Because one does not create new actions (samskara) with ignorance as their cause, suffering can be eliminated. Then, one further seeks the path to attain cessation, recalling the dependent origination taught by the teacher in the past, so that the worldly right view can arise and manifest. One observes repeatedly in this way.
令見增長。是染逆觀 此觀老死滅及趣滅行即至無明。此中且約未來現在老死支因。略不言過去老死及因。由作四諦故合觀察。若作七十七智。即三世別觀。或約現老死。觀近遠因。因皆過去。即至愛支。若觀未來老死。從有至愛。若受已前是未來苦。約當起次第。不爾種子非展轉緣 問或有處說從觀無明至生即止者何。答約機欲待尋因果說。老死無果但至生支 問或有逆觀至名色支。有何所以 答據業種名識支。識在名色攝故 論中名色名體多釋。或四蘊為名。如此中說。或三蘊為名。即薩婆多等。或無間滅意因名。瑜伽第九。或通染污。即此文是。或凈無記。即下十二支。克性名支。唯業所感故。◎
成唯識論了義燈卷第四(本終)
成唯識論了義燈卷第四(末)(論第四)
◎段食之體。于變壞已有資長攝持方名為食。雜集第五云。有變壞故有變壞者。變壞故即香．味．觸體變壞時。變壞者即資持之用 問為正變壞時名食。為長養資持之時方名為食 答資持用時方名為食。故瑜伽六十六云。若諸段物于吞嚥時。令心歡喜諸根悅豫。當於爾時不名段食但名觸食。若受用已安隱消變增長喜樂。于消變時乃名段食。未資長時但是觸食者。望生喜樂及順益舍可為觸食。不爾亦非。故本疏云。名為觸食
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 觀察增長的次第。這是以染污的逆向觀察方式，此觀察從老死之滅以及趨向滅的行開始，最終到達無明（Avidyā）。這裡主要針對未來和現在的老死之因進行討論，略去過去的老死及其原因。因為要進行四諦（catvāri āryasatyāni）的觀察，所以需要綜合觀察。如果進行七十七智的分析，則需要分別觀察三世。或者針對現在的老死，觀察其近因和遠因，這些原因都屬於過去，最終會追溯到愛支（Tṛṣṇā）。如果觀察未來老死，則從有（Bhava）追溯到愛。如果受（Vedanā）之前的部分是未來的苦，則按照將要產生的次第進行觀察。否則，種子就不是輾轉相緣的關係了。 問：為什麼有些地方說從觀察無明到生（Jāti）就停止了呢？答：這是根據眾生的根機和慾望，爲了尋找因果關係而說的。老死沒有結果，只能追溯到生支。 問：為什麼有些逆向觀察只到名色（Nāmarūpa）支呢？答：這是因為業的種子是名識支，而識（Vijñāna）包含在名色之中。 論中對於名色的解釋有很多種。或者將四蘊（catvāri skandha）視為名，就像這裡所說的。或者將三蘊視為名，就像薩婆多部（Sarvāstivāda）所說的那樣。或者將無間滅意（anantarika-nirodha）視為因，如《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第九卷所說。或者通於染污，就像本文所說的那樣。或者清凈無記，就像下面的十二支所說的那樣。克性被稱為支，是因為唯有業所感。 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第四（本終） 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第四（末）（論第四） 段食（kabaḍīkāra-āhāra）的本體，在變壞之後，具有滋養和攝持的功能才能稱為食。在《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第五卷中說：『因為有變壞，所以有變壞者。』變壞故，指的是香、味、觸的本體變壞時。變壞者，指的是資持的作用。 問：是在正變壞的時候稱為食，還是在長養資持的時候才稱為食？答：在資持作用的時候才稱為食。所以《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷中說：『如果各種段食在吞嚥的時候，使內心歡喜，諸根悅豫，那麼在這個時候不稱為段食，只能稱為觸食（sparśa-āhāra）。如果受用之後，能夠安穩地消化、變化、增長喜樂，那麼在消化變化的時候才稱為段食。』在沒有資養增長的時候，只能算是觸食。希望產生喜樂以及順益舍才能作為觸食，否則也不是。所以本疏中說：『名為觸食。』
【English Translation】 English version Observing the sequence of increase. This is a reversed observation of defilement. This observation starts from the cessation of old age and death, and the path leading to cessation, eventually reaching ignorance (Avidyā). Here, we mainly discuss the causes of old age and death in the future and present, omitting the old age and death of the past and their causes. Because we are conducting the observation of the Four Noble Truths (catvāri āryasatyāni), a comprehensive observation is required. If we analyze with the seventy-seven wisdoms, then we need to observe the three times separately. Or, focusing on present old age and death, observe their near and far causes, all of which belong to the past, eventually tracing back to craving (Tṛṣṇā). If we observe future old age and death, we trace back from existence (Bhava) to craving. If the part before feeling (Vedanā) is future suffering, then we observe according to the sequence of what will arise. Otherwise, the seeds would not be related through interdependent origination. Question: Why do some places say that the observation stops from ignorance to birth (Jāti)? Answer: This is said according to the faculties and desires of beings, in order to seek the cause and effect relationship. Old age and death have no result, they can only be traced back to the birth link. Question: Why does some reversed observation only reach the name and form (Nāmarūpa) link? Answer: This is because the seed of karma is the name-consciousness link, and consciousness (Vijñāna) is included in name and form. In the treatise, there are many explanations for name and form. Or, the four aggregates (catvāri skandha) are regarded as name, as mentioned here. Or, the three aggregates are regarded as name, as said by the Sarvāstivāda school. Or, the immediately ceasing mind (anantarika-nirodha) is regarded as the cause, as stated in the ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. Or, it applies to defilement, as in this text. Or, it is pure and neutral, as in the following twelve links. The characteristic is called a link because it is only felt by karma. The End of Volume Four of the Elucidation of the Meaning of the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only The End of Volume Four (End) of the Elucidation of the Meaning of the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-Only (Treatise Four) The substance of physical food (kabaḍīkāra-āhāra), can only be called food when it has the function of nourishing and sustaining after being broken down. In the fifth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, it says: 'Because there is breaking down, there is the one who breaks down.' 'Because of breaking down' refers to when the substance of smell, taste, and touch is broken down. 'The one who breaks down' refers to the function of nourishing and sustaining. Question: Is it called food when it is being broken down, or is it called food when it is nourishing and sustaining? Answer: It is called food when it is nourishing and sustaining. Therefore, the sixty-sixth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'If various physical foods, when swallowed, make the mind happy and the senses pleased, then at this time they are not called physical food, but only called contact food (sparśa-āhāra). If, after being consumed, they can be digested, transformed, and increase joy and pleasure, then they are called physical food when they are being digested and transformed.' When it is not nourishing and increasing, it can only be considered contact food. Hoping to generate joy and pleasure and beneficial relinquishment can be considered contact food, otherwise it is not. Therefore, the commentary says: 'It is called contact food.'
。望一食者非望餘生。若望一切有非是食。此意即于所食香．味．觸。有不生喜樂等。即非觸食 問諸觸塵皆段食耶 答不爾。以觸通上界故 問若以觸對香．味有觸非食。以香．味對觸。香．味有非食 答香．味唯欲有。但香．味皆食 問香．味上亦有。有香味非食 答據業果說。上界香．味是定果故。或是法處故不為例 問業果上地無。段食唯欲系。定香．味上有。段通色界系 答設菩薩等變假無食用。設有實用。據為增上。引生欲界有情所變香．味．觸三。而以為食。亦不取本質故不通上 問何故欲界變段食即許通質．相。定等變段食唯相不通質 答欲界有漏性是食。同界通質．相。定起無漏性非食。異界不通質 問定果唯第六變可成無漏。通亦擊第八變故應有漏 答第六變者可是無漏。彼自第八緣彼起相即是有漏。然為下食是第六變者非第八變。而第八云前七非八所杖質者。據見分說。設通相分。據業力說。定通不遮 又解設第八變為下食者。為緣起食。而體非食 又解言唯欲系據業果說。若通．定起亦許上系。然法師意取初解正 問如他通等引。即許下識相分上界收今變段食何不爾耶 答雖名通．定果。然非上界收。以漏．無漏不相順故。設緣彼第八所變之相。亦不隨彼。隔無漏故。勢分遠故。非正能引故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：希望只吃一頓飯的人，不希望有餘生。如果希望擁有一切有形之物，那不是食物。這個意思就是對於所吃的香、味、觸，沒有產生喜悅等感覺，就不是觸食。 問：所有的觸塵都是段食嗎？ 答：不是的。因為觸可以通往上界。 問：如果用觸來對應香、味，有觸不是食物。用香、味來對應觸，香、味有不是食物的嗎？ 答：香、味只存在於欲界（Kāmadhātu）。但是香、味都是食物。 問：香、味在上界也有，有香、味不是食物嗎？ 答：根據業果（karma-phala）來說，上界的香、味是定果（dhyāna-phala），或者屬於法處（dharmāyatana），所以不作為例子。 問：業果在上地沒有，段食只在欲界系（Kāmadhātu-dhātu）。定香、味在上界有，段食可以通往各個系嗎？ 答：假設菩薩（Bodhisattva）等變化出假的沒有食物可食用，假設有實際可用的食物，根據增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya）來說，引發欲界有情（Kāmadhātu sattva）所變化出來的香、味、觸三種，而作為食物。也不取其本質，所以不能通往上界。 問：為什麼欲界變化出來的段食就允許通質、相，禪定等變化出來的段食只有相不通質？ 答：欲界有漏（sāsrava）的性質是食物，在同一界內可以通質、相。禪定生起的無漏（anāsrava）性質不是食物，在不同界內不能通質。 問：定果只有第六識（manovijñāna）變化才可以成為無漏，如果也通過第八識（ālayavijñāna）變化，應該是有漏的？ 答：第六識變化出來的可以是無漏的。它自己第八識緣起所產生的相是有漏的。然而作為地獄的食物是第六識變化出來的，不是第八識變化出來的。而第八識說前七識不是第八識所依賴的本質，是根據見分（darśana-bhāga）來說的。假設通相分（nimitta-bhāga），是根據業力（karma-bala）來說的。禪定通達並不遮止。 又一種解釋是，假設第八識變化成為地獄的食物，是爲了緣起食（pratītyasamutpāda-āhāra），而體性不是食物。 又一種解釋是，只說欲界系是根據業果來說的。如果通達禪定生起，也允許是上界系。然而法師的意圖是採取最初的解釋是正確的。 問：如同神通等引發，就允許下識的相分被上界所攝取，現在變化段食為什麼不可以這樣呢？ 答：雖然名為神通、定果，然而不是上界所攝取。因為有漏和無漏不能相互順應。假設緣彼第八識所變化的相，也不隨彼，因為隔著無漏，勢力相差遙遠，不是真正的能引發，所以不行。
【English Translation】 English version: One who hopes for only one meal does not hope for the rest of life. If one hopes for all that exists, that is not food. This means that with regard to the fragrance, taste, and touch of what is eaten, if joy and pleasure do not arise, then it is not tactile food (sparśa-āhāra). Question: Are all sense objects of touch (sparśa-dhātu) material food (kabaḍīkāra-āhāra)? Answer: No. Because touch can extend to the upper realms. Question: If touch corresponds to fragrance and taste, there is touch that is not food. If fragrance and taste correspond to touch, are there fragrances and tastes that are not food? Answer: Fragrance and taste exist only in the Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu). However, fragrance and taste are both food. Question: Fragrance and taste also exist in the upper realms; are there fragrances and tastes that are not food? Answer: According to the principle of karmic results (karma-phala), the fragrances and tastes of the upper realms are the results of meditative concentration (dhyāna-phala), or they belong to the sphere of dharmas (dharmāyatana), so they are not taken as examples. Question: Karmic results do not exist in the higher realms, and material food exists only in the Desire Realm. Meditative fragrance and taste exist in the upper realms; can material food extend to all realms? Answer: Suppose Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattva) transform illusory food that cannot be eaten. Suppose there is actually usable food, according to the dominant condition (adhipati-pratyaya), it induces the three transformations of fragrance, taste, and touch by sentient beings in the Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu sattva), and these are taken as food. It does not take their essence, so it cannot extend to the upper realms. Question: Why is it that material food transformed in the Desire Realm is allowed to include both substance and appearance, while material food transformed in meditative concentration only includes appearance and not substance? Answer: The nature of defiled (sāsrava) existence in the Desire Realm is food, and within the same realm, it includes both substance and appearance. The nature of undefiled (anāsrava) existence arising from meditative concentration is not food, and in different realms, it does not include substance. Question: Only the transformation by the sixth consciousness (manovijñāna) in meditative results can become undefiled. If it is also transformed through the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna), should it be defiled? Answer: What is transformed by the sixth consciousness can be undefiled. The appearance arising from the eighth consciousness itself is defiled. However, the food for the lower realms is transformed by the sixth consciousness, not by the eighth consciousness. And the eighth consciousness says that the essence on which the first seven consciousnesses do not rely is according to the aspect of perception (darśana-bhāga). If it includes the aspect of appearance (nimitta-bhāga), it is according to the power of karma (karma-bala). Meditative concentration does not prevent this. Another explanation is that if the eighth consciousness transforms into food for the lower realms, it is for conditioned food (pratītyasamutpāda-āhāra), but its essence is not food. Another explanation is that only the Desire Realm is mentioned according to karmic results. If it is understood that meditative concentration arises, it is also allowed to be of the upper realms. However, the Dharma master's intention is to take the initial explanation as correct. Question: Just as with supernormal powers, it is allowed for the aspect of the lower consciousness to be included in the upper realms. Why is it not so with the transformation of material food now? Answer: Although it is called supernormal power and the result of meditative concentration, it is not included in the upper realms. Because defiled and undefiled cannot be mutually compatible. Suppose the appearance transformed by that eighth consciousness does not follow it, because it is separated by the undefiled, and the power is far apart, it is not the true cause, so it is not possible.
。雖然稍難。智者思擇 問觸食能生喜樂。思食必欲俱。喜樂攝益欲自希望。應受及欲說之為食 答由觸起受。由思起欲。舉果顯因。正由觸．思說此為食。故瑜伽九十四云。能順樂受諸有漏觸。能與喜樂為食。由喜樂故便能長養諸根大種。乃至云。由能執受諸根大種。並壽及暖與識不離為因而住。是故說識。為彼住因。由彼住故。氣力．喜樂．專住．希望依彼而轉 此意由識持根大等。喜等依轉故識為食 六十六云。若諸段物于吞嚥時。令心歡喜諸根悅豫。類觸及思能生於彼方有資益故非受欲。亦如凈土法生喜樂法體是食非喜樂受。然觸能和根．識取境資益唯在觸數。思慮益根非希望故 又解不同法食。法食即取喜樂為食。受從因名名法喜樂。前解為正 佛地論云。此凈土中諸佛菩薩后得無漏。能說能受大乘法味生大喜樂。既云法味。明法是食。此意由法能生喜樂方名為食。不生喜樂不能為食 問識食以攝持為用。第八能攝持其理極成。眼等說攝持何者是也 答眼等非執持者。以不恒故。非有識時亦不執持。由識取境亦資持根 問觸．思生憂．苦此俱不是食。識有憂．苦俱。亦應不是食 答體能攝持長養未來。以招后報故亦為食。故五十七云。能與後後為增盛因令彼得生。九十四文意亦同此 問惡趣非招報。憂苦俱
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：雖然這有點難。智者會仔細思考。問：觸食（sparśa-āhāra，感官印象之食）能產生喜樂嗎？思食（manas-āhāra，意念之食）是否必然與欲求相伴？喜樂是否能攝受和增益欲求，而欲求本身是否包含希望？應受和欲求是否可以被稱作食？答：受（vedanā，感受）由觸（sparśa，感官印象）而生起，欲（chanda，意欲）由思（manasikara，意念）而生起。這是舉果顯因，正是因為觸和思，才說它們是食。所以《瑜伽師地論》第九十四卷說：『能順應樂受的各種有漏觸，能給予喜樂作為食。』由於喜樂，就能長養諸根和大種（四大元素），乃至說：『由於能執持諸根和大種，以及壽命和暖氣，使識（vijñāna，意識）不離而住，作為其因。』因此說識是它們的住因。由於它們的住立，氣力、喜樂、專住、希望都依它們而運轉。』 這裡的意思是，由於識持諸根和大種等，喜樂等依之運轉，所以識是食。《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷說：『如果各種段食（kabalikara-āhāra，段食）在吞嚥時，能令心歡喜，諸根悅豫，類似於觸和思能生起彼等，方才有資益，所以不是受和欲。』也像凈土的法能生喜樂，法體是食，而不是喜樂受。然而，觸能和合根、識取境，資益只在于觸數。思慮能增益根，但不是因為希望的緣故。 又有一種不同的解釋，認為法食（dharma-āhāra，佛法之食）就是取喜樂為食，受從因得名，名為法喜樂。但前一種解釋是正確的。《佛地論》說：『此凈土中，諸佛菩薩后得無漏智，能說能受大乘法味，生大喜樂。』既然說是法味，就表明法是食。這裡的意思是，由於法能生喜樂，才名為食，不生喜樂就不能稱為食。問：識食以攝持為用，第八識（阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijñāna）能攝持的道理非常明顯，眼等（五根）所說的攝持是什麼呢？答：眼等不是執持者，因為它們不是恒常的。沒有識的時候，它們也不能執持。由於識取境，也能資持諸根。 問：觸和思生起憂和苦，這些都不是食。識有憂和苦，也應該不是食。答：識的本體能攝持和長養未來，因為它能招感後世的果報，所以也是食。因此《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷說：『能與後後為增盛之因，令彼得生。』第九十四卷的意思也與此相同。問：惡趣（durgati，惡道）不能招感果報，只有憂苦。
【English Translation】 English version: Although it's a bit difficult, the wise will contemplate carefully. Question: Can sparśa-āhāra (sense-impression food) generate joy and pleasure? Is manas-āhāra (volitional food) necessarily accompanied by desire? Can joy and pleasure embrace and benefit desire, and does desire itself contain hope? Should reception and desire be called food? Answer: Vedanā (feeling) arises from sparśa (sense-impression), and chanda (volition) arises from manasikara (volition). This is showing the cause by citing the effect. It is precisely because of sparśa and manasikara that they are called food. Therefore, the ninety-fourth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Various contaminated sparśas that accord with pleasant feelings can give joy and pleasure as food.' Because of joy and pleasure, they can nourish the roots and mahābhūtas (great elements), and even say: 'Because they can uphold the roots and mahābhūtas, as well as life and warmth, making vijñāna (consciousness) dwell without separation as its cause.' Therefore, it is said that vijñāna is the cause of their dwelling. Because of their dwelling, strength, joy, concentration, and hope all revolve depending on them.' The meaning here is that because vijñāna holds the roots and mahābhūtas, etc., and joy, etc., revolve depending on it, vijñāna is food. The sixty-sixth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'If various kabalikara-āhāra (physical food) can make the mind rejoice and the roots delight when swallowed, similar to sparśa and manasikara being able to generate them, then there is benefit, so it is not feeling and desire.' It is also like the dharma of the Pure Land being able to generate joy and pleasure, the dharma-body is food, not the feeling of joy and pleasure. However, sparśa can harmonize the roots and consciousness in taking objects, and the benefit is only in the number of sparśas. Volition can benefit the roots, but not because of hope. There is also a different explanation that dharma-āhāra (dharma food) is taking joy and pleasure as food, and feeling is named dharma-joy and pleasure from the cause. But the former explanation is correct. The Buddhabhūmi-śāstra says: 'In this Pure Land, the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas attain uncontaminated wisdom later, and can speak and receive the flavor of the Mahāyāna dharma, generating great joy and pleasure.' Since it is said to be the flavor of the dharma, it shows that the dharma is food. The meaning here is that because the dharma can generate joy and pleasure, it is called food; if it does not generate joy and pleasure, it cannot be called food. Question: Vijñāna-āhāra uses embracing as its function. The principle that the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna) can embrace is very clear. What is the embracing spoken of by the eyes, etc. (the five roots)? Answer: The eyes, etc., are not holders because they are not constant. They cannot hold when there is no consciousness. Because vijñāna takes objects, it can also support the roots. Question: Sparśa and manasikara generate sorrow and suffering, and these are not food. Vijñāna has both sorrow and suffering, so it should not be food either. Answer: The substance of vijñāna can embrace and nourish the future because it can attract the retribution of later lives, so it is also food. Therefore, the fifty-seventh fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'It can give later and later as a cause of increasing, causing them to be born.' The meaning of the ninety-fourth fascicle is the same as this. Question: The evil realms (durgati) cannot attract retribution, only sorrow and suffering.
非食 答以識現起依持亦食 問觸．思通八俱。六俱勝名食。識體雖八種。第六偏名食 答二解。一不齊解。順生喜．樂起希望。六識俱勝偏名食 攝持是識食。八俱攝持不唯六。二義齊解。識體有八種。勝食唯第八。觸思雖遍俱。六併名勝食 問根由他資發識明盛。根不名食。識由他資方能攝持。何故名食 答根必由段資方能發識不是食。識體設不資。七．八攝持故名食 瑜伽六十六問有七因緣任持諸行。一生。二命。三食。四心自在通。五因緣和合。六三性業。七無障礙。由是七因諸行得住。何故世尊但說有情由食而住。答由五因緣說由食住。一是諸行住多分因。二易取易入。三能令羸損根大增益。又令病癒。四令不中夭。五易入道。由此五因說由食住。五十七同 問由識資根故得名食者。意根過去後識方生。識生之時意根落謝。云何後有法。為前無法食 答不約無間滅。據俱有意資彼名食。故五十七云。云何識與意根為食。答由三資持所任持故。能與後後為增盛因令彼得生 問眠．梵行等皆為長養。余何非食 答五十七云。長養有二。攝受別義及不損害。段食具二勝故名食。余但不損害。劣故不名食 若爾四食應總具二。何故不說在長養中 答雖未見文且為一釋。四食且舉初說。例余亦為長養。不爾九十四四皆
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 非食：問：為什麼說『識』（vijñāna，了別作用）是『食』（āhāra，滋養）？ 答：因為『識』的生起和依持也需要滋養。問：『觸』（sparśa，感覺）、『思』（cetanā，意志）與八識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）普遍相關聯，為什麼只有與六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）相關聯的『觸』和『思』才被稱為『食』？『識』的本體有八種，為什麼只有第六識（意識）特別被稱為『食』？ 答：有兩種解釋。第一種是不完全相同的解釋：順應產生喜悅和快樂，並由此產生希望，與六識相關聯的『觸』和『思』因此被稱為『食』。『攝持』（samgraha，支援）是『識食』的作用，八識都具有攝持的作用，但不僅僅是六識。第二種是意義相同的解釋：『識』的本體有八種，但最主要的『食』是第八識（阿賴耶識）。『觸』和『思』雖然普遍與八識相關聯，但與六識相關聯的『觸』和『思』並稱為『勝食』（adhipati-āhāra，增上食）。 問：根（indriya，感覺器官）依賴於其他因素的資助才能引發『識』，使『識』明亮和旺盛，但根不被稱為『食』。『識』依賴於其他因素的資助才能進行攝持，為什麼『識』被稱為『食』？ 答：根必須依賴於段食（kabaḍīkāra-āhāra，粗摶食）的資助才能引發『識』，因此根不是『食』。『識』的本體即使不依賴於段食，也能通過第七識（末那識）和第八識（阿賴耶識）的攝持而存在，因此被稱為『食』。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第六十六卷中提到有七種因緣能夠任持諸行（saṃskāra，有為法）：一是生（jāti，出生），二是命（jīvita，壽命），三是食（āhāra，滋養），四是心自在通（citta-vaśitā-abhijñā，心自在神通），五是因緣和合（hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrī，因緣聚合），六是三性業（tri-svabhāva-karma，三種性質的業），七是無障礙（anāvaraṇa，沒有障礙）。由於這七種原因，諸行得以存在。為什麼世尊（Bhagavān，佛）只說有情（sattva，眾生）依靠『食』而存在？ 答：由於五個原因，佛說依靠『食』而存在。一是『食』是諸行存在的大部分原因；二是『食』容易獲取和攝入；三是『食』能夠使虛弱的根和大種（mahābhūta，四大元素）得到增長；又能使疾病痊癒；四是『食』能使眾生不至於中途夭折；五是『食』容易使眾生進入正道。由於這五個原因，佛說依靠『食』而存在。與第五十七卷相同。 問：如果說因為『識』資助根，所以『識』被稱為『食』，那麼意根（mano-indriya，意根）在過去，後來的『識』才能產生。『識』產生的時候，意根已經衰落謝世。為什麼後來的有法（bhāva，存在）能夠成為先前無法（abhāva，不存在）的『食』？ 答：不是指無間滅（anantara-niruddha，立即滅亡）。根據同時存在的意根資助『識』，『識』才能被稱為『食』。所以第五十七卷中說：『什麼是『識』與意根的『食』的關係？』回答是：『由於三方面的資助和任持，能夠成為後來的增盛的原因，使它們得以產生。』 問：睡眠（middha，睡眠）、梵行（brahmacarya，清凈行）等都能促進生長和滋養，為什麼其他的不是『食』？ 答：第五十七卷中說：『長養有兩種：一是攝受的特殊意義，二是不損害。段食同時具備這兩種殊勝的意義，所以被稱為『食』。其他的只是不損害，作用較弱，所以不被稱為『食』。』 如果這樣，四食（catvāra āhārāḥ，四種滋養）應該都具備這兩種意義。為什麼不說它們都屬於長養的範疇？ 答：雖然沒有看到相關的經文，但可以這樣解釋：四食只是舉出最初的說法，其他的也可以作為長養。否則，第九十四卷中四食都……
【English Translation】 English version Non-Food: Question: Why is 『consciousness』 (vijñāna) said to be 『food』 (āhāra)? Answer: Because the arising and sustenance of 『consciousness』 also require nourishment. Question: 『Contact』 (sparśa) and 『volition』 (cetanā) are universally associated with the eight consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, mind-consciousness, manas-consciousness, and ālaya-consciousness), why are only 『contact』 and 『volition』 associated with the six consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness, and mind-consciousness) called 『food』? The essence of 『consciousness』 is of eight kinds, why is only the sixth consciousness (mind-consciousness) specifically called 『food』? Answer: There are two explanations. The first is a non-identical explanation: conforming to the arising of joy and pleasure, and thereby generating hope, 『contact』 and 『volition』 associated with the six consciousnesses are therefore called 『food』. 『Sustaining』 (samgraha) is the function of 『consciousness-food』. All eight consciousnesses have the function of sustaining, but not only the six consciousnesses. The second is an explanation of identical meaning: the essence of 『consciousness』 is of eight kinds, but the most important 『food』 is the eighth consciousness (ālaya-consciousness). Although 『contact』 and 『volition』 are universally associated with the eight consciousnesses, 『contact』 and 『volition』 associated with the six consciousnesses are collectively called 『dominant food』 (adhipati-āhāra). Question: The sense faculties (indriya) rely on the assistance of other factors to initiate 『consciousness』, making 『consciousness』 bright and vigorous, but the sense faculties are not called 『food』. 『Consciousness』 relies on the assistance of other factors to perform sustaining, why is 『consciousness』 called 『food』? Answer: The sense faculties must rely on the assistance of coarse food (kabaḍīkāra-āhāra) to initiate 『consciousness』, therefore the sense faculties are not 『food』. Even if the essence of 『consciousness』 does not rely on coarse food, it can exist through the sustaining of the seventh consciousness (manas-consciousness) and the eighth consciousness (ālaya-consciousness), therefore it is called 『food』. The sixty-sixth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra mentions that there are seven conditions that can maintain all conditioned phenomena (saṃskāra): first, birth (jāti); second, life (jīvita); third, food (āhāra); fourth, mastery of mind through supernormal powers (citta-vaśitā-abhijñā); fifth, the aggregation of causes and conditions (hetu-pratyaya-sāmagrī); sixth, karma of the three natures (tri-svabhāva-karma); and seventh, non-obstruction (anāvaraṇa). Because of these seven reasons, conditioned phenomena can exist. Why did the World-Honored One (Bhagavān) only say that sentient beings (sattva) exist by relying on 『food』? Answer: Because of five reasons, the Buddha said that existence relies on 『food』. First, 『food』 is the majority cause for the existence of conditioned phenomena; second, 『food』 is easy to obtain and ingest; third, 『food』 can increase the weak sense faculties and the great elements (mahābhūta); and can also heal diseases; fourth, 『food』 can prevent sentient beings from dying prematurely; fifth, 『food』 easily leads sentient beings onto the right path. Because of these five reasons, the Buddha said that existence relies on 『food』. Same as the fifty-seventh volume. Question: If it is said that because 『consciousness』 assists the sense faculties, 『consciousness』 is called 『food』, then the mind-faculty (mano-indriya) exists in the past, and later 『consciousness』 can arise. When 『consciousness』 arises, the mind-faculty has already declined and passed away. Why can the later existent phenomena (bhāva) become the 『food』 of the previously non-existent (abhāva)? Answer: It does not refer to immediate cessation (anantara-niruddha). According to the simultaneous existence of the mind-faculty assisting 『consciousness』, 『consciousness』 can be called 『food』. Therefore, the fifty-seventh volume says: 『What is the relationship between 『consciousness』 and the mind-faculty as 『food』?』 The answer is: 『Due to the assistance and sustenance from three aspects, it can become the cause of later increase, enabling them to arise.』 Question: Sleep (middha), pure conduct (brahmacarya), etc., can all promote growth and nourishment, why are the others not 『food』? Answer: The fifty-seventh volume says: 『There are two kinds of nourishment: one is the special meaning of reception, and the other is non-harming. Coarse food simultaneously possesses these two superior meanings, therefore it is called 『food』. The others only do not harm, and their function is weaker, therefore they are not called 『food』.』 If so, the four foods (catvāra āhārāḥ) should all possess these two meanings. Why not say that they all belong to the category of nourishment? Answer: Although the relevant scriptures have not been seen, it can be explained as follows: the four foods are only cited as the initial statement, and the others can also be regarded as nourishment. Otherwise, in the ninety-fourth volume, the four foods all...
有能長養根大何理不得在長養中 問為與已生法為食。為未生法為食。若已生生已不住。若未生未生無體 答九十四云。然唯約與未生諸法說為食義 問前難善通。后難未遣 答能令後生有增盛用相續而起即是食義。非是無法故。九十四云。然唯約與未生諸法作生緣理。唯法引法說為食義。
論。此四能持有情身命說之為食。余解唯能持名食 今謂不爾。亦必長養。且舉攝持 問如在滅定經于多日 以何為食 答識．觸．思三 何無段食 答傳釋段食持身正經七日。住定時多故無段食 亦有許此定多時有段食。由定力持得多時住。出定死者自業盡故 要集難云。既許有段食。何故破外不依食住。故相傳云。過七日後段食即盡。唯由三食定勢力故持身久住。出定無力又無段食故即命終 今謂此說道理有餘。定力持身既得久住。何故不能持彼段食令得久住。如外衣發定持不壞。又住定多時出定之後。或有即死有非死者。何者。現見世間病力持身。雖不飲食多日不死藥力亦然。何獨在定食力即盡出定即終 問既許有段食經何不說 答壽．暖．識三不相離故經即說有。段食非不離故不說有。又如食已即入滅定。豈才入定段食即無。經不說有且作斯理。段食有．不有。出定終．不終。未見大乘文。后當撿決。
論。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 有何道理使得長養根（指眾生的生命之根）不能在長養中得到增長呢？ 問：『食』是對於已生之法起作用，還是對於未生之法起作用？如果對於已生之法，那麼已生之法已經存在，不會停留在原地；如果對於未生之法，那麼未生之法還沒有實體。 答：《九十四》中說：『然而只是就給予未生諸法來說明『食』的意義。』 問：前面的疑問勉強可以理解，後面的疑問還沒有解決。 答：能夠使後來的生起有增盛的作用，並且相續不斷地生起，這就是『食』的意義。並不是沒有根據的。《九十四》中說：『然而只是就給予未生諸法作為生起之緣的道理，唯有法引導法，才可稱為『食』的意義。』 論：這四種『食』能夠維持有情眾生的身命，所以稱為『食』。其他的解釋認為只能維持其名，不能長養。 現在我認為不是這樣，『食』也必定有長養的作用。姑且舉出攝持的作用。 問：如果有人處於滅盡定（一種甚深的禪定狀態）中很多天，那麼他們依靠什麼為食呢？ 答：依靠識（意識）、觸（感覺）、思（思維）這三種『食』。 問：為什麼沒有段食（指日常飲食）呢？ 答：相傳的解釋是，段食維持身體正常運轉需要七天。處於禪定狀態的時間很長，所以不需要段食。 也有人認為這種禪定狀態中，長時間存在段食。由於禪定的力量維持，可以長時間保持。出定后死亡的人，是因為自身的業力已經耗盡。 《要集》中提出疑問：既然允許有段食，為什麼駁斥外道不依靠食物而存在？所以相傳的說法是，超過七天後，段食就耗盡了，只是依靠三種『食』的禪定力量，才能維持身體長久存在。出定后沒有力量，又沒有段食，所以就會死亡。 現在我認為這種說法還有道理不足的地方。禪定的力量維持身體已經可以長久存在，為什麼不能維持段食也長久存在呢？比如外衣和頭髮，禪定可以維持它們不壞。而且處於禪定狀態很長時間后，出定之後，有的人立即死亡，有的人卻不會死亡。這是為什麼呢？現在可以看到世間有疾病的力量維持身體，即使不飲食也能多天不死，藥物的力量也是這樣。為什麼唯獨在禪定中，食物的力量就會耗盡，出定后就立即死亡呢？ 問：既然允許有段食，為什麼經典中沒有說呢？ 答：因為壽（壽命）、暖（體溫）、識（意識）這三者不相分離，所以經典中就說了有。段食不是不相分離的，所以經典中沒有說有。又比如吃完飯後立即進入滅盡定，難道才進入禪定，段食就立即消失了嗎？經典中沒有說有，姑且這樣理解。段食的有無，出定后死亡與否，還沒有看到大乘經典的記載，以後應當查閱決定。 論：
【English Translation】 English version What reason is there that the nourishing root (referring to the root of life of sentient beings) cannot be increased in nourishment? Question: Does 'food' act on already-arisen dharmas (phenomena), or on not-yet-arisen dharmas? If it is for already-arisen dharmas, then already-arisen dharmas already exist and will not remain in place; if it is for not-yet-arisen dharmas, then not-yet-arisen dharmas have no substance. Answer: The Ninety-fourth says: 'However, only in relation to giving to not-yet-arisen dharmas is the meaning of 'food' explained.' Question: The previous question can barely be understood, but the latter question has not been resolved. Answer: Being able to cause later arising to have an increasing function, and arising continuously, is the meaning of 'food'. It is not without basis. The Ninety-fourth says: 'However, only in relation to giving to not-yet-arisen dharmas as the reason for arising, only when dharma leads dharma, can it be called the meaning of 'food'.' Treatise: These four 'foods' are able to maintain the body and life of sentient beings, so they are called 'food'. Other explanations believe that they can only maintain the name and cannot nourish. Now I say that this is not the case, 'food' must also have a nourishing effect. Let's just mention the effect of sustaining. Question: If someone is in Nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment, a deep state of meditation) for many days, then what do they rely on for food? Answer: Rely on the three 'foods' of consciousness (識, vijñāna), contact (觸, sparśa), and volition (思, cetanā). Question: Why is there no physical food (段食, kabaḍīkāra-āhāra)? Answer: The transmitted explanation is that physical food is needed to maintain the normal functioning of the body for seven days. Being in a state of meditation for a long time, so there is no need for physical food. Some also believe that in this state of meditation, physical food exists for a long time. Because of the power of meditation, it can be maintained for a long time. Those who die after emerging from meditation are because their own karma has been exhausted. The Yaoji raises the question: Since physical food is allowed, why refute the heretics who do not rely on food to exist? Therefore, the transmitted saying is that after more than seven days, physical food is exhausted, and only relying on the meditative power of the three 'foods' can the body be maintained for a long time. After emerging from meditation, there is no power and no physical food, so they will die. Now I think this statement still has insufficient reasoning. The power of meditation to maintain the body can already exist for a long time, why can't it maintain physical food to also exist for a long time? For example, outer clothing and hair, meditation can maintain them without decay. Moreover, after being in a state of meditation for a long time, after emerging from meditation, some people die immediately, while others do not. Why is this? Now it can be seen that the power of disease in the world maintains the body, even without eating, one can survive for many days, and the power of medicine is also like this. Why only in meditation does the power of food run out, and one dies immediately after emerging from meditation? Question: Since physical food is allowed, why is it not mentioned in the scriptures? Answer: Because life (壽, āyus), warmth (暖, uṣman), and consciousness (識, vijñāna) are inseparable, so the scriptures say that there is. Physical food is not inseparable, so the scriptures do not say that there is. Also, for example, after eating, one immediately enters Nirodha-samāpatti, does physical food immediately disappear as soon as one enters meditation? The scriptures do not say that there is, let's understand it this way. Whether physical food exists or not, whether one dies after emerging from meditation or not, I have not seen the records of the Mahayana scriptures, and I should check and decide later. Treatise:
然行於法有遍非遍者。身．語．心行各有三種。身行三者。出入二息此非遍行。動發思者是遍行。語行三者。尋．伺二種非遍行。亦思為遍行。如來無尋．伺。有八聖道支正義許說法故。意行三者。謂受．想二及審決思。三俱遍行。心起必有故 問尋．伺既非遍行。何故難他尋．伺于語是遍行攝 答就他宗說。實非遍行。能遍起語即是思數 若爾何故第二定已上自地有思得起語言。何假尋伺 答粗思能發語。上細不能發。在佛即得任運語故。然薩婆多及本經部二息非遍。尋．伺是遍而不說思。大乘如前說。末經部師許受．想二亦非遍行。以滅定中有心無所故。尋．伺是遍。三宗差別 問識依根．境起。說識三和生。亦由心行起。應說為四和 答根．境正牽體。說識三和生。想等助功能。非說四和起 問意由受．想起。受．想名心行。根．境正牽生。亦說名心行 答受．想是心所。即得說心行。根．境非心所。不得名心行 問何故滅定偏厭受．想 答論云資助心強是故偏厭。又由受為禪增上障。想于定為增上障。由受領下劣定。由想想像故障勝定。又受于苦果增。想于苦因增。由想像故起作諸業。由受領苦果故。聖者雙厭。外道偏厭。又初靜慮望欲以靜除散。二禪望初以細除粗。三禪望二以靜除動。四禪望三以密除疏。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 然而，在法（dharma）的修行中，存在著遍行（pervasive）和非遍行（non-pervasive）的區別。身（body）、語（speech）、心（mind）的行為各有三種。 身行（bodily actions）三種：出息（expiration）和入息（inspiration）這二者並非遍行。動（movement）、發（initiation）、思（thought）是遍行。 語行（verbal actions）三種：尋（vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（vicara，精細的思考）這二者並非遍行。思（thought）是遍行。如來（Tathagata，佛陀）沒有尋和伺，因為有八聖道支（Eightfold Noble Path）的正義，允許說法。 意行（mental actions）三種：即受（vedana，感受）、想（samjna，概念）以及審決思（cetana，決意思考）。這三者都是遍行，因為心（citta）的生起必然伴隨它們。 問：尋和伺既然不是遍行，為什麼難陀（Nanda）認為尋和伺在語（speech）中是遍行所攝？ 答：這是就他宗（other schools）的觀點來說的。實際上，它們並非遍行。能夠普遍引發語言的是思數（cetasika，心所）。 若果真如此，為什麼在第二禪（second dhyana）及以上的禪定中，自地（own realm）有思（thought）能夠生起語言，還需要尋和伺呢？ 答：粗略的思能夠引發語言，而精細的思不能引發。在佛（Buddha）的境界，就能隨心所欲地說話。然而，薩婆多部（Sarvastivada）和本經部（Sautrantika）認為出入息不是遍行，尋和伺是遍行，但不說思。大乘（Mahayana）如前所述。末經部（Later Sautrantika）的師父們認為受和想也不是遍行，因為在滅盡定（nirodha-samapatti）中有心（mind）但沒有所緣（object）。尋和伺是遍行。這是三宗（three schools）的差別。 問：識（vijnana，意識）依賴根（indriya，感官）、境（visaya，對像）而生起，說識是三和合生（three factors arising together）。也由心行（mental actions）生起，應該說是四和合嗎？ 答：根和境是主要牽引本體的，所以說識是三和合生。想（samjna）等是輔助功能，所以不說四和合生。 問：意（manas，意）由受和想起，受和想被稱為心行。根和境是主要牽引生起的，也可以說成心行嗎？ 答：受和想是心所（cetasika），因此可以稱為心行。根和境不是心所，因此不能稱為心行。 問：為什麼滅盡定（nirodha-samapatti）特別厭惡受和想？ 答：論（treatise）中說，因為它們資助心（mind）的力量很強，所以特別厭惡。又因為受是禪定（dhyana）增上的障礙，想是禪定增上的障礙。因為受會領納下劣的禪定，想會通過想像來妨礙殊勝的禪定。而且，受會增加苦果（suffering result），想會增加苦因（suffering cause）。因為想像的緣故，會造作諸業（karma）。因為受領納苦果的緣故，聖者（arya）會同時厭惡它們。外道（tirthika）則偏重厭惡。此外，初禪（first dhyana）相對於欲界（desire realm），用寂靜來去除散亂。二禪（second dhyana）相對於初禪，用精細來去除粗糙。三禪（third dhyana）相對於二禪，用寂靜來去除動搖。四禪（fourth dhyana）相對於三禪，用細密來去除疏漏。
【English Translation】 English version: However, in the practice of the Dharma, there are distinctions between what is pervasive and what is non-pervasive. The actions of body, speech, and mind each have three aspects. The three bodily actions are: expiration and inspiration, which are non-pervasive. Movement, initiation, and thought are pervasive. The three verbal actions are: vitarka (initial application of thought) and vicara (sustained application of thought), which are non-pervasive. Thought is pervasive. The Tathagata (Buddha) is without vitarka and vicara because the righteousness of the Eightfold Noble Path permits the teaching of the Dharma. The three mental actions are: vedana (feeling), samjna (perception), and cetana (volition). All three are pervasive because the arising of the mind necessarily accompanies them. Question: Since vitarka and vicara are not pervasive, why does Nanda consider vitarka and vicara to be included as pervasive in speech? Answer: This is according to the view of other schools. In reality, they are not pervasive. What can universally initiate speech is the cetasika (mental factor) of thought. If that is the case, why is it that in the second dhyana (meditative absorption) and above, thought in its own realm can give rise to speech? Why are vitarka and vicara still needed? Answer: Coarse thought can initiate speech, but subtle thought cannot. In the state of the Buddha, speech can arise spontaneously. However, the Sarvastivada and Sautrantika schools consider expiration and inspiration to be non-pervasive, and vitarka and vicara to be pervasive, but they do not mention thought. The Mahayana view is as previously stated. Teachers of the Later Sautrantika school consider feeling and perception to be non-pervasive as well, because in nirodha-samapatti (cessation of feeling and perception), there is mind but no object. Vitarka and vicara are pervasive. These are the differences among the three schools. Question: Since vijnana (consciousness) arises dependent on the indriya (sense faculties) and visaya (sense objects), and it is said that consciousness arises from the combination of three factors, and it also arises from mental actions, should it be said that it arises from the combination of four factors? Answer: The sense faculties and sense objects are what primarily draw in the substance, so it is said that consciousness arises from the combination of three factors. Perception and the like are auxiliary functions, so it is not said that it arises from the combination of four factors. Question: Manas (mind) arises from feeling and perception, and feeling and perception are called mental actions. Since the sense faculties and sense objects are what primarily draw in the arising, can they also be called mental actions? Answer: Feeling and perception are cetasikas (mental factors), so they can be called mental actions. The sense faculties and sense objects are not cetasikas, so they cannot be called mental actions. Question: Why is nirodha-samapatti (cessation of feeling and perception) particularly averse to feeling and perception? Answer: The treatise says that it is because they strongly support the power of the mind, so they are particularly disliked. Also, feeling is an increasing obstacle to dhyana (meditative absorption), and perception is an increasing obstacle to dhyana. Because feeling leads to inferior dhyanas, and perception obstructs superior dhyanas through imagination. Moreover, feeling increases suffering results, and perception increases suffering causes. Because of imagination, various karmas are created. Because feeling experiences suffering results, the aryas (noble ones) dislike them both equally. The tirthikas (non-Buddhists) particularly dislike them. Furthermore, the first dhyana (first meditative absorption) relative to the desire realm (kama-dhatu) uses tranquility to remove distraction. The second dhyana relative to the first dhyana uses subtlety to remove coarseness. The third dhyana relative to the second dhyana uses tranquility to remove agitation. The fourth dhyana relative to the third dhyana uses subtlety to remove grossness.
薩婆多等。由得彼定引得堅密四大閉身隙故。所以無二息。大乘不爾。但以定能除其隙故無出入息。設兼引大亦復無違。但非唯大能閉身隙。
論。心清凈故有清凈等。諸部不同。薩婆多雲。六界為有情。謂四大．識．空。然心勝故。說心染凈。經部由種色．心俱持。色持不遍。心持種遍。故說由心有情染凈。上坐部等。心能分別色。色不能分別心故作是說。
以心為本有漏法。因心而生無漏法。依心住故結無漏心受彼熏下結有漏 又初總句。因心生是有漏。依心住是無漏。后兩句釋成 又以心為本。謂無為法因心顯故。因心而生有漏法。依心而住無漏法。以心為本即無為之別句。亦有為之總句。
論。若無此識至皆應無因者。準攝論破雜染中有三。煩惱．業．生。今此顯破生及煩惱。行緣識下兼破業染。此初段中分云。若無此識持煩惱種。界地往還諸煩惱起皆應無因。此約三性心后煩惱起無因。疏引所染初識者。彼計受生必起煩惱。初受生識是染污故。此之識支應無種生。故以煩惱及隨煩惱。皆應無因。
謂從無想等諸地歿者。等取上下諸地。以無想天長時無六識故就顯說。
論。若無此識持業果下。應分其文云。若無此識持業種。一界地往還。后業起應無因。二異類法后。業起應
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins，一切有部）等人認為，通過禪定可以使四大（地、水、火、風）緊密地閉合身體的空隙，因此沒有呼吸。但大乘佛教不這樣認為，而是認為禪定能夠消除身體的空隙，所以沒有出入息。如果也認為禪定也能引導四大，也沒有衝突，但並非只有四大才能閉合身體的空隙。
論：心清凈所以有清凈等等，各部派的觀點不同。薩婆多部說，六界（地、水、火、風、空、識）構成有情（sentient being），即四大、識和空。然而，因為心最重要，所以說心的染污和清凈。經部（Sautrantika）認為，種子（bija）和色（rupa）、心（citta）共同維持有情，色維持不普遍，心維持種子普遍，所以說有情的染污和清凈由心決定。上座部（Theravada）等認為，心能夠分別，色不能分別心，所以這樣說。
以心為根本，產生有漏法（conditioned dharma）。因為心而生起無漏法（unconditioned dharma）。依靠心而住，結縛無漏心，接受它的熏習，下結縛有漏。又，最初的總句是，因為心生是有漏，依靠心住是無漏。后兩句解釋併成就它。又，以心為根本，是指無為法（asamskrta dharma）因為心而顯現。因為心而生有漏法。依靠心而住無漏法。以心為根本，是無為法的別句，也是有為法的總句。
論：如果無此識（consciousness），乃至都應該沒有原因。根據《攝論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）破斥雜染（samklesa）中有三種：煩惱（klesa）、業（karma）、生（jati）。現在這裡顯示破斥生和煩惱。行緣識（samskara-vijnana）以下兼破業染。這最初一段中分說，如果無此識持有煩惱的種子，在界地（dhatu-bhumi）往還，各種煩惱生起都應該沒有原因。這是指三性心（tri-svabhava-citta）之後煩惱生起沒有原因。疏鈔引用所染的最初識，他們認為受生必定生起煩惱，最初受生的識是染污的，這個識支應該沒有種子生，所以煩惱和隨煩惱都應該沒有原因。
所謂從無想等諸地死亡的人，等同於取上下諸地。因為無想天（Asamjna-deva）長時間沒有六識（sad-vijnana），所以就明顯地說。
論：如果無此識持有業果（karma-phala）以下，應該分開它的文句說，如果無此識持有業的種子，一，在界地往還，後來的業生起應該沒有原因。二，異類法（different kinds of dharma）之後，業生起應該沒有原因。
【English Translation】 English version: The Sarvastivadins (those who assert everything exists) and others believe that through Samadhi (meditative absorption), the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind) can tightly close the gaps in the body, thus there is no breathing. However, Mahayana Buddhism does not think so, but believes that Samadhi can eliminate the gaps in the body, so there is no inhalation or exhalation. If it is also believed that Samadhi can also guide the four great elements, there is no conflict, but it is not only the four great elements that can close the gaps in the body.
Treatise: Because the mind is pure, there is purity, etc. Different schools have different views. The Sarvastivadins say that the six elements (earth, water, fire, wind, space, and consciousness) constitute a sentient being, namely the four great elements, consciousness, and space. However, because the mind is the most important, it is said that the defilement and purity of the mind. The Sautrantika (those who uphold the Sutras) believe that the seed (bija), form (rupa), and mind (citta) jointly maintain sentient beings. Form maintains it not universally, and the mind maintains the seeds universally, so it is said that the defilement and purity of sentient beings are determined by the mind. The Theravada (School of the Elders) and others believe that the mind can discriminate, and form cannot discriminate the mind, so they say this.
The mind is the root, and conditioned dharmas (samskrta dharma) arise from it. Because of the mind, unconditioned dharmas (asamskrta dharma) arise. Relying on the mind, the unconditioned mind is bound, receiving its influence, and subsequently binding the conditioned. Furthermore, the initial general statement is that conditioned dharmas arise from the mind, and unconditioned dharmas abide in the mind. The latter two sentences explain and accomplish it. Also, the mind is the root, which means that unconditioned dharmas are manifested because of the mind. Conditioned dharmas arise because of the mind. Unconditioned dharmas abide in the mind. The mind as the root is a specific statement for unconditioned dharmas and a general statement for conditioned dharmas.
Treatise: If there were no such consciousness, then everything should have no cause. According to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, there are three types of defilements (samklesa): afflictions (klesa), karma, and birth (jati). Now, this shows the refutation of birth and afflictions. Samskara-vijnana (volitional activities conditioning consciousness) below also refutes karmic defilement. This initial section states that if there were no such consciousness holding the seeds of afflictions, then the arising of various afflictions when going back and forth between realms and planes (dhatu-bhumi) should have no cause. This refers to the arising of afflictions after the three-natured mind (tri-svabhava-citta) having no cause. The commentary quotes the initially defiled consciousness, as they believe that birth necessarily gives rise to afflictions, and the initial consciousness at birth is defiled. This branch of consciousness should have no seed to arise from, so afflictions and secondary afflictions should have no cause.
Those who die from the plane of non-perception (Asamjna-deva), etc., are equivalent to taking the upper and lower planes. Because the plane of non-perception (Asamjna-deva) lacks the six consciousnesses (sad-vijnana) for a long time, it is explicitly stated.
Treatise: If there were no such consciousness holding the karmic result (karma-phala) below, the sentence should be divided as follows: If there were no such consciousness holding the seeds of karma, one, when going back and forth between realms and planes, the subsequent arising of karma should have no cause. Two, after different kinds of dharmas, the arising of karma should have no cause.
無因。三性心易不受彼熏。故業起無因 破業果亦分二。一界地往還。果起無因。二異類法后。果起無因。攝論中亦云。若異熟斷已而更別生。應成別受生失。無漏心後果起無因。又滅二趣如本疏辨。
問本疏難經部。云行在現在果在未來。或一劫等如何能感者。大乘亦爾何偏難他 答大乘本識持彼種故多劫猶在。彼識間斷故不為例。
又難有部云。識位中色無異熟識可名果識支。如何俱色說行能感。今疑此難。如大乘唯識。豈一切法與識同性。外云分位亦爾。未必與識同性故為業感 答云我言唯識皆不離識。如行緣識皆行所感。汝言行緣識。有識非行緣。故不為例。
難經部。云未來無故不得云感。但可云熏者何也 解此談本計。一以懸遠故。二識是無故不感。但由行熏。鄰次之識相續。得至受生位識。名行緣識。若大乘說。非望現識名為識支。即種子是。故行能感。非懸遠故。
論。又行緣識應不得成者。今更助解。初正破經部熏故名緣。無性攝論第．二云。謂行為緣貪等俱生眼等轉識許為識支此不應理 此意六識不是受熏。有間斷故。貪俱染識非無記故。不是受熏故。行不熏眼等轉識 攝論復云。識緣名色有聖言故。所以者何。眼等諸識剎那速壞久已謝滅。為名色緣不應道理 此意轉
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：無因。三種自性（三性）的心識不容易受到業力的薰染。所以說業的生起沒有原因。破除業果也分為兩種情況：一是界地往還，果報的生起沒有原因；二是不同類別的法之後，果報的生起沒有原因。《攝大乘論》中也說，如果異熟果斷滅之後又重新產生，應該成為別受生的過失。無漏心之後的果報生起沒有原因。又滅盡二趣，如本疏所辨析的那樣。
問：本疏中責難經部，說行為在現在，果報在未來，或者間隔一劫等時間，如何能夠產生感應？大乘也是如此，為什麼只責難經部？答：大乘的本識（alaya-vijñana）持有業的種子，所以經過多劫仍然存在。而經部的識有間斷，所以不能作為例子。
又責難有部，說在識的階段，色法沒有異熟識可以稱為果識支，如何能說色法與識同時存在，而行為能夠產生感應？現在懷疑這個責難。比如大乘唯識，難道一切法都與識的自性相同嗎？外人說分位也是如此，未必與識的自性相同，所以能被業力所感。答：我說唯識，都是不離識的。比如行緣識，都是行所感。你說行緣識，有識不是行所緣，所以不能作為例子。
責難經部，說未來沒有，所以不能說感應，只能說是熏習，這是為什麼呢？解釋這個是根據經部的觀點。一是時間懸遠，二是識是無常的，所以不能感應，只能由行為熏習，鄰近的識相續，直到受生位的識，稱為行緣識。如果按照大乘的說法，不是指現在的識作為識支，而是指種子。所以行為能夠感應，不是因為時間懸遠。
論：又說行緣識應該不能成立。現在進一步解釋。首先破斥經部因為熏習所以稱為緣。無性《攝大乘論》第二卷說：『所謂行為緣，貪等俱生的眼等轉識，許為識支，這不應該成立。』這裡的意思是說六識不是受熏習的，因為有間斷。與貪等煩惱同時生起的染污識不是無記性，所以不是受熏習的。所以行為不熏習眼等轉識。《攝大乘論》又說：『識緣名色有聖言的依據，為什麼呢？眼等諸識剎那間迅速壞滅，很久以前就已經謝滅，作為名色的緣是不合理的。』這裡的意思是說轉識。
【English Translation】 English version: Without a cause. The minds of the three natures (trisvabhāva) are not easily influenced by karma. Therefore, it is said that the arising of karma has no cause. The refutation of karmic results is also divided into two situations: first, the coming and going between realms, where the arising of results has no cause; second, after different kinds of dharmas, where the arising of results has no cause. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha also says that if the vipāka (異熟, result of karma) is cut off and then arises again, it should become the fault of separate rebirth. The arising of results after the anāsrava-citta (無漏心, undefiled mind) has no cause. Furthermore, the extinction of the two destinies is as explained in the original commentary.
Question: The original commentary criticizes the Sautrāntika school, saying that if the action is in the present and the result is in the future, or separated by an eon, how can it produce a response? The Mahāyāna is also like this, so why only criticize the Sautrāntika? Answer: The ālaya-vijñana (本識, store consciousness) of the Mahāyāna holds the seeds of karma, so it still exists after many eons. But the consciousness of the Sautrāntika has interruptions, so it cannot be taken as an example.
Also, criticize the Sarvāstivāda school, saying that in the stage of consciousness, rūpa (色, form) does not have vipāka-vijñana (異熟識, resultant consciousness) that can be called a fruit-consciousness element. How can it be said that rūpa exists simultaneously with consciousness, and that action can produce a response? Now I doubt this criticism. For example, in Mahāyāna vijñānavāda (唯識, Consciousness-only), are all dharmas the same in nature as consciousness? Outsiders say that divisions are also like this, not necessarily the same in nature as consciousness, so they can be influenced by karma. Answer: When I say vijñānavāda, it is all inseparable from consciousness. For example, action conditions consciousness, and it is all conditioned by action. You say that action conditions consciousness, and there is consciousness that is not conditioned by action, so it cannot be taken as an example.
Criticize the Sautrāntika school, saying that because the future does not exist, it cannot be said to be a response, but only a bhāvana (熏習, perfuming), why is that? Explaining this is based on the Sautrāntika's view. First, because the time is distant, and second, because consciousness is impermanent, so it cannot respond, but can only be perfumed by action, with the adjacent consciousnesses continuing until the consciousness in the stage of rebirth, which is called action-conditioned consciousness. If according to the Mahāyāna, it does not refer to the present consciousness as a consciousness element, but refers to the seed. Therefore, action can respond, not because the time is distant.
Treatise: Also, it is said that action-conditioned consciousness should not be established. Now I will explain further. First, refute the Sautrāntika school because it is perfumed, so it is called a condition. The second volume of Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṃgraha says: 'That is, action is a condition, and the vijñānas (轉識, transformed consciousnesses) such as eye-consciousness that arise together with greed, etc., are allowed to be consciousness elements, which should not be established.' The meaning here is that the six consciousnesses are not perfumed because there are interruptions. The defiled consciousnesses that arise simultaneously with afflictions such as greed are not indeterminate, so they are not perfumed. Therefore, action does not perfume the transformed consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha also says: 'There is scriptural evidence that consciousness conditions nāmarūpa (名色, name and form), why? The consciousnesses such as eye-consciousness quickly perish in an instant, and have long since ceased, so it is unreasonable to be a condition for nāmarūpa.' The meaning here is that the transformed consciousnesses.
破識緣名色亦復不成。經部轉救。貪等俱識與行相應。熏結生位識名行緣識。亦不得成。結生識起。能熏行等久已滅故。非無體法而為能熏故。亦不成故 無性論云。若畏此失許結生識為識支者。此亦不然。于結生時。福等諸行久已滅故。非從久滅此復應生 若云非熏但說能感。即感故名緣。與有部同。次下雙破結生染識非行感故。彼此宗計唯無記法為業所感。彼兩宗計結生之識與愛恚俱。染非業感故 無性云。又結生心非無記故。愛恚俱故。既非無記。以行為緣不應道理 薩婆多救如本疏辨。本經部救同薩婆多。以生位色為業熏感。同有部破。
亦時分懸隔無緣義故。若末經部救云。我有粗細二識。粗者染俱結生。細者無記為業熏感 若上坐部亦二意識雖不說熏亦說為感。二俱許細是異熟性。故無性論云。于母胎中有異熟識。與赤．白和合。乃至謂依異熟識有意識轉 若爾即應二識俱轉 設俱何過 違聖教故 上坐救云我部不誦無違教過者。即難。應有二眼等識生。六識攝故不許違理。許即自違。不許五識有粗細故 末經部救。熏于識類。類性無記。說為識支。感亦不違者 此如前破。又違經名。經云緣識不云緣識類。所餘救．破準例可知。雖無文證理亦不違。
論去來得等非實有故。兼破正量部不失
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果破斥了『識』，那麼『緣』、『名色』也同樣不能成立。經部（Sautrāntika）試圖辯解，認為貪等煩惱與『識』和『行』相應，熏習結合，使得結生位的『識』成為『行』的『緣』。但這也不能成立，因為結生識生起時，能夠熏習的『行』等早已滅去。沒有實體的法不能作為能熏習者，所以這個觀點也不成立。《無性論》說：『如果害怕這個過失，而允許結生識作為識支，這也是不行的。在結生的時候，福等諸行早已滅去，不應該從已經滅去的事物中再次產生。』 如果說不是熏習，只是說能夠感果，因為能夠感果所以稱為『緣』，這與有部（Sarvāstivāda）相同。接下來要同時破斥結生染污識不是『行』所感。因為他們兩宗都認為只有無記法才是業所感。而他們兩宗都認為結生之識與愛、恚同時生起，是染污的，不是業所感。《無性論》說：『而且結生心不是無記的，因為它與愛、恚同時生起。既然不是無記，以『行』為『緣』就不合道理。』 薩婆多（Sarvāstivāda）的辯解如本疏所辨。本經部的辯解與薩婆多相同，認為生位色是業所熏感。這與有部的破斥相同。 而且時間間隔太遠，沒有『緣』的意義。如果末經部辯解說：『我有粗細兩種識，粗的與染污同時結生，細的無記，為業所熏感。』如果上座部（Theravada）也認為兩種意識雖然不說熏習，也說是『感』。兩部都承認細識是異熟性。《無性論》說：『在母胎中有異熟識，與赤、白和合，乃至說依靠異熟識有意識運轉。』如果這樣，就應該兩種識同時運轉。 即使同時運轉，有什麼過失呢？違背聖教啊！上座部辯解說：『我部不誦，沒有違背聖教的過失。』那麼就反駁說：應該有二眼等識生起，因為六識所攝，不允許就違背道理。允許就自相矛盾，因為不允許五識有粗細之分。末經部辯解說：熏習的是識的種類，種類是無記的，所以說為識支，感果也不違背。這如同前面所破斥的。又違背經文的名稱，經文說『緣識』，沒有說『緣識類』。其餘的辯解和破斥，可以參照類推得知。雖然沒有文字證據，但道理上也不違背。 論證過去、未來、得到等不是真實存在的，兼破正量部（Sammitīya）的不失法。
【English Translation】 English version: If 『consciousness』 (識, vijñāna) is refuted, then 『condition』 (緣, pratyaya) and 『name and form』 (名色, nāmarūpa) also cannot be established. The Sautrāntika (經部) school attempts to argue that afflictions such as greed are associated with 『consciousness』 and 『action』 (行, saṃskāra), and through this association and accumulation, the 『consciousness』 in the moment of rebirth becomes the 『condition』 for 『action』. However, this cannot be established because when the rebirth consciousness arises, the 『actions』 that could have influenced it have already ceased. A dharma without substance cannot be a cause of influence, so this view is also untenable. The Wu Xing Lun (無性論, Treatise on the Absence of Intrinsic Nature) states: 『If one fears this fault and allows rebirth consciousness to be a branch of consciousness, this is also not acceptable. At the time of rebirth, virtuous actions and so on have already ceased, and it is not reasonable for them to arise again from something that has already ceased.』 If it is said that it is not influence but simply the ability to produce a result, and that it is called a 『condition』 because of this ability to produce a result, this is the same as the Sarvāstivāda (有部) school. Next, both will be refuted simultaneously, as the defiled rebirth consciousness is not produced by 『action』. This is because both schools believe that only neutral (無記, avyākṛta) dharmas are produced by karma. Both schools believe that the rebirth consciousness arises simultaneously with love and hatred, and is defiled, not produced by karma. The Wu Xing Lun states: 『Moreover, the rebirth mind is not neutral, because it arises simultaneously with love and hatred. Since it is not neutral, it is not reasonable for it to have 『action』 as its 『condition』.』 The Sarvāstivāda's defense is as explained in the commentary. The defense of this Sautrāntika school is the same as that of the Sarvāstivāda, believing that the form at the moment of birth is influenced by karma. This is the same as the Sarvāstivāda's refutation. Furthermore, the time interval is too great, and there is no meaning of 『condition』. If the later Sautrāntika school argues: 『I have two types of consciousness, coarse and subtle. The coarse one is defiled and arises simultaneously with rebirth, while the subtle one is neutral and influenced by karma.』 If the Theravada (上座部) school also believes that although they do not speak of influence, they do speak of 『production』 for both types of consciousness. Both schools admit that the subtle consciousness is of the nature of resultant (異熟, vipāka). The Wu Xing Lun states: 『In the mother's womb, there is resultant consciousness, which combines with red and white, and it is said that consciousness operates based on the resultant consciousness.』 If this is the case, then both types of consciousness should operate simultaneously. Even if they operate simultaneously, what is the fault? It contradicts the sacred teachings! The Theravada school argues: 『My school does not recite this, so there is no fault of contradicting the teachings.』 Then it is refuted: there should be two eye consciousnesses arising, because they are included in the six consciousnesses. If it is not allowed, it contradicts reason. If it is allowed, it is self-contradictory, because it is not allowed for the five consciousnesses to have coarse and subtle distinctions. The later Sautrāntika school argues: what is influenced is the type of consciousness, and the type is neutral, so it is said to be a branch of consciousness, and producing a result does not contradict. This is like what was refuted earlier. It also contradicts the name of the sutra, which says 『condition for consciousness』 and does not say 『condition for the type of consciousness』. The remaining defenses and refutations can be understood by analogy. Although there is no textual evidence, it does not contradict reason. Arguing that past, future, attainment, etc., are not truly existent, also refutes the non-loss of the Sammitīya (正量部) school.
增長性。故云得等。
略解依中。疏云如何說依不與七同緣下。此前師難后師。若爾如何下。后師難前師。答兩人依別下。前師釋。問曰下。后師難前師。彼質答曰。前師文。答而復質。后師文。
然彼所依總有三種者。問心．心所法起藉四緣。何故但說三種依耶 解云所緣通內外。餘三唯在內故但說三 問余識緣內外。不得說四依。第七唯內緣。何不說四依 答三緣生識勝故但說三依。緣依亦外緣。力微不說四 問境界生心劣。故不說四依。所緣引識微。應非二和起 答二和通遠近。根．境併爲緣。依義據親近。境疏不說依 又云。不例。三緣依聲中說。所緣緣者是于聲說 此明所依故彼非例。
難陀勝子等。立種生現前後異時。引雜集等云。有眼非眼界等。又瑜伽云。無常法與他性為因。亦與后念自性為因。非即此剎那。以非即此剎那。長貫前他性因中故。因果不俱。攝論俱生俱滅者。如疏中會。
釋俱有依中。本判為四。第二即是安惠師等 西明判云。第二火辨 要集疑雲。若第二師是安惠者。破前師云十八界種應成雜亂。安惠既許自證分種傍生十八界。種亦成雜亂。若一自證分義說根．境亦成雜亂。安惠自許第七入見即有間斷。何故下文云雖不間斷而有轉易 今為釋之。安惠自種子
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 增長性，所以說『得等』（獲得等等）。
略解依據《中論》。疏文中說：『如何說依（所依）不與七識同緣下』。這是前一位論師為難后一位論師。『若爾如何下』，這是后一位論師為難前一位論師。回答說：『兩人依別下』，這是前一位論師的解釋。『問曰下』，這是后一位論師為難前一位論師。『彼質答曰』，這是前一位論師的文句。『答而復質』，這是后一位論師的文句。
然而，所依總共有三種。問：心、心所法生起憑藉四緣（四種因緣），為什麼只說三種依呢？答：所緣通內外（所緣緣通於內外），其餘三緣只在內（其餘三種因緣只在內部），所以只說三種。問：其餘識緣內外（其餘的識緣于內外），不得說四依（不能說四種所依）。第七識唯內緣（第七識只緣于內部），為什麼不說四依呢？答：三緣生識勝（三種因緣產生識的作用更強），所以只說三種所依。緣依（緣所依）也緣于外，力量微弱，所以不說四依。問：境界生心劣（境界產生心的作用較弱），所以不說四依。所緣引識微（所緣引導識的作用微弱），應該不是二和（兩種和合）生起。答：二和通遠近（兩種和合包括遠和近），根、境併爲緣（根和境都作為緣），依義據親近（所依的意義在於親近），境界疏遠所以不說依。又說：不類比，三緣在依的音聲中說，所緣緣是在音聲上說。這說明所依，所以不能類比。
難陀勝子（Nanda，佛陀的堂弟）等人，立種生現前後異時（種子生出現行是前後不同時），引用《雜集論》等說：『有眼非眼界等』。又《瑜伽師地論》說：『無常法與他性為因（無常法以其他性質為因），也與后念自性為因（也以後續念頭的自性為因），非即此剎那（不是在此剎那）。』因為不是在此剎那，長貫前他性因中（長時間貫穿於之前的他性因中），所以因果不俱（因果不是同時）。《攝大乘論》中說俱生俱滅（同時生起同時滅亡），如疏文中解釋。
解釋俱有依中，原本判為四種。第二種就是安慧（Anhui，一位論師）師等人。西明（地名）判為：第二種是火辨（一位論師）。《要集》懷疑說：如果第二位論師是安慧，那麼破斥前一位論師說十八界種應該成為雜亂。安慧既然允許自證分種（自證分的種子）傍生十八界（旁生十八界），種子也成為雜亂。如果以一個自證分的意義來說，根、境也成為雜亂。安慧自己承認第七識入見即有間斷（第七識進入見分就有間斷），為什麼下文說雖然不間斷而有轉易（雖然沒有間斷但是有轉變）？現在解釋它：安慧自種子（安慧自己的種子）。
【English Translation】 English version: It is of an increasing nature. Therefore, it is said 'attaining, etc.'
A brief explanation is based on the Madhyamaka-karika (Treatise on the Middle Way). The commentary says, 'How can it be said that the support (ālambana) is not co-operative with the seven consciousnesses?' This is the former teacher challenging the latter teacher. 'If so, how?' This is the latter teacher challenging the former teacher. The answer is, 'The two teachers rely on different things.' This is the former teacher's explanation. 'Questioning, etc.' This is the latter teacher challenging the former teacher. 'He questioned and answered.' This is the former teacher's statement. 'Answering and questioning again.' This is the latter teacher's statement.
However, there are generally three types of supports. Question: The arising of mind and mental factors relies on four conditions (four causes and conditions). Why are only three supports mentioned? Answer: The object condition (ālambana-pratyaya) is common to both internal and external (the object condition is common to both internal and external), while the other three conditions are only internal (the other three conditions are only internal), so only three are mentioned. Question: The other consciousnesses are conditioned by both internal and external (the other consciousnesses are conditioned by both internal and external), so four supports cannot be mentioned (four supports cannot be mentioned). The seventh consciousness is only internally conditioned (the seventh consciousness is only internally conditioned), why are four supports not mentioned? Answer: The three conditions produce consciousness more effectively (the three conditions produce consciousness more effectively), so only three supports are mentioned. The condition of support (adhipati-pratyaya) is also conditioned by the external (adhipati-pratyaya is also conditioned by the external), but its power is weak, so four are not mentioned. Question: The arising of mind from the realm is inferior (the arising of mind from the realm is inferior), so four supports are not mentioned. The object that leads to consciousness is subtle (the object that leads to consciousness is subtle), so it should not be the arising of two combinations (it should not be the arising of two combinations). Answer: The two combinations include both near and far (the two combinations include both near and far), the root and the realm are both conditions (the root and the realm are both conditions), the meaning of support is based on closeness (the meaning of support is based on closeness), the realm is distant, so it is not mentioned as a support. It is also said: It is not analogous. The three conditions are mentioned in the sound of support, the object condition is mentioned in the sound. This explains the support, so it cannot be analogous.
Nanda (Nanda, Buddha's cousin), etc., establish that the arising of seeds and the manifestation of phenomena are at different times (the arising of seeds and the manifestation of phenomena are at different times), citing the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Scholasticism) etc., saying, 'There is eye, non-eye realm, etc.' Also, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) says, 'Impermanent dharmas take other natures as their cause (Impermanent dharmas take other natures as their cause), and also take the self-nature of subsequent thoughts as their cause (and also take the self-nature of subsequent thoughts as their cause), not just this moment (not just this moment).' Because it is not just this moment, it extends through the previous other-nature cause (it extends through the previous other-nature cause), so cause and effect are not simultaneous (cause and effect are not simultaneous). The Mahayana-samgraha (Compendium of the Great Vehicle) says that they arise and cease simultaneously (they arise and cease simultaneously), as explained in the commentary.
In explaining the co-operative support, the original judgment was four types. The second type is Anhui (Anhui, a commentator) and others. Ximing (place name) judges: The second type is Huobian (a commentator). The Yaoji (Essentials Collected) doubts: If the second teacher is Anhui, then refuting the former teacher says that the seeds of the eighteen realms should become mixed up. Since Anhui allows the self-cognition division seeds (self-cognition division seeds) to give rise to the eighteen realms (give rise to the eighteen realms), the seeds also become mixed up. If the meaning of one self-cognition division is used, the roots and realms also become mixed up. Anhui himself admits that the seventh consciousness entering the seeing division has interruptions (the seventh consciousness entering the seeing division has interruptions), why does the following text say that although there are no interruptions, there are changes (although there are no interruptions, there are changes)? Now to explain it: Anhui's own seeds (Anhui's own seeds).
是假。然功能別成十八界。如不相應依實假立不相雜亂。依自證分義分亦得 又就他宗而為此難亦復無過。許阿賴耶變似色根等 或余師義。設自所許約計情別。亦不雜亂 言第七雖無間斷者。是余師義。以與安惠合為文故。故疏言等不唯安惠。本乃十釋西方別行。疏主既是此翻糅者。故能深達。余不勞疑。
就難陀釋俱有依中。解二十唯識頌有三解。初依見．相別種義解。言識從自種生者。即識見分。似境相轉者。既起現行。帶境相起似彼所執外境相現。無別五根。即見分種名為五根。所帶似境即是五境 二云識者五識相分。不離識故名之為識。從種起現為五識境。實在內識似外而現。為成內外處分種為十 三云依見．相分同種義解。五識見．相合名為識。自種生者。見分從種起現行也。雖無別種亦帶相起名似境相轉 觀所緣緣論三釋大同。但互為緣。少有差別。
論。又彼應非唯有執受等。本疏意云。三業能感。身業是色即有執受。約扶塵說。聲離質已即非執受。意業現行及三實業。亦非執受。前云約執令生覺受而說。前第二說種名執受。約同安危說故。今據諸論明十八界中。幾有執受。但云五色根。故言應非唯執受等 西明云。此說實能感五識業。說五識依故。唯思種實業。色．聲假說。非正感故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這是假設。然而，各個功能分別形成了十八界（Dhatus，構成經驗世界的十八種元素）。例如，不相應的行法（Citta-viprayukta-samskaras，既非心也非色的抽像概念）依賴於真實和假設而建立，不會混雜錯亂。依據自證分（Svasamvedana，意識的自我認知）的意義來區分也可以。另外，即使是依據其他宗派的觀點來提出這個詰難，也沒有什麼不妥。他們也允許阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，儲存所有經驗的倉庫識）變現出類似色根（Rupa-indriya，感覺器官）等事物。或者，其他老師的觀點是，即使是自己所允許的，也可以根據計度情狀的不同而有所區別，也不會混雜錯亂。說到第七識（末那識，Manas，持續的自我意識）沒有間斷，這是其他老師的觀點，因為它與安慧（Sthiramati，一位佛教論師）的觀點相合，所以疏文中說『等』，不只是安慧的觀點。原本有十種解釋，在西方單獨流行。疏主既然是翻譯和糅合這些觀點的人，所以能夠深刻理解，其他人不必懷疑。 關於難陀（Nanda，一位佛教論師）解釋俱有依（Sahabhava-asraya，共同存在的所依）時，對《二十唯識頌》（Vimsatika，唯識宗的二十頌論著）有三種解釋。第一種是依據見分（Darsana-bhaga，意識的認知方面）和相分（Nimitta-bhaga，意識的對象方面）的種子差別義來解釋。說到『識從自種生』，就是指識的見分。『似境相轉』，是指已經生起現行，帶著境界的相狀生起，類似他們所執著的外境相狀顯現。沒有其他的五根，就是指見分的種子名為五根。所帶的類似境界就是五境（五種感官對像）。第二種說法是，識就是五識（五種感官意識）的相分，因為不離識，所以名為識。從種子生起現行，作為五識的境界。實在的內識（內在的意識）類似外境而顯現，爲了成就內外處（Ayatana，感官領域）的區分，將種子分為十種。第三種說法是，依據見分和相分同一種子的意義來解釋。五識的見分和相分合起來名為識。『自種生』，是指見分從種子生起現行。即使沒有其他的種子，也帶著相狀生起，名為『似境相轉』。《觀所緣緣論》（Alambana-pratyaya-pariksa，一部關於意識對像和條件的論著）的三種解釋大體相同，只是相互作為緣（Pratyaya，條件），稍微有些差別。 論中說：『又，第八識（阿賴耶識）不應只是有執受（Upadana，抓住）等作用。』本疏的意義是說，身、口、意三業（Karma，行為）能夠感果。身業是色法（Rupa，物質現象），所以有執受，這是就扶塵根（輔助性的感官）來說的。聲音離開了實質，就不是執受。意業的現行和三種真實業（善業、惡業、無記業），也不是執受。前面說的是『根據執取而產生覺受』而說的。前面第二種說法是，種子名為執受，是根據共同的安危來說的。現在根據各種論典來說明十八界中，哪些有執受，只是說五色根。所以說『不應只是有執受等』。西明（一位佛教論師）說，這是說真實能夠感果的五識業，因為是五識所依。只有思的種子是真實業，色、聲是假說，不是真正感果的。
【English Translation】 English version: This is a hypothesis. However, each function separately forms the eighteen Dhatus (elements that constitute the world of experience). For example, Citta-viprayukta-samskaras (non-associated formations, abstract concepts that are neither mind nor matter) are established based on reality and assumption, and are not mixed up or confused. It is also possible to distinguish them according to the meaning of Svasamvedana (self-awareness). Furthermore, even if this challenge is raised based on the views of other schools, there is nothing wrong with it. They also allow Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness, the repository of all experiences) to manifest things like Rupa-indriya (sense organs). Alternatively, other teachers' views are that even what is allowed by oneself can be distinguished according to different estimations of circumstances, and will not be mixed up or confused. When it is said that the seventh consciousness (Manas, continuous self-consciousness) is without interruption, this is the view of other teachers, because it is in accordance with the view of Sthiramati (a Buddhist commentator), so the commentary says 'etc.,' not just Sthiramati's view. Originally there were ten explanations, which circulated separately in the West. Since the commentator is the one who translated and mixed these views, he is able to understand them deeply, and others need not doubt. Regarding Nanda's (a Buddhist commentator) explanation of Sahabhava-asraya (co-existent support), there are three explanations of the Vimsatika (Twenty Verses, a treatise of the Vijnanavada school). The first is based on the meaning of the difference between the seeds of Darsana-bhaga (cognitive aspect of consciousness) and Nimitta-bhaga (objective aspect of consciousness). When it is said that 'consciousness arises from its own seed,' it refers to the Darsana-bhaga of consciousness. 'Transforms into the appearance of an object' means that it has already arisen into manifestation, arising with the appearance of a realm, similar to the appearance of the external realm that they are attached to. There are no other five senses; it refers to the seed of the Darsana-bhaga being called the five senses. The similar realm that it carries is the five sense objects. The second explanation is that consciousness is the Nimitta-bhaga of the five consciousnesses (five sensory consciousnesses), because it is inseparable from consciousness, it is called consciousness. Arising from the seed into manifestation, it serves as the realm of the five consciousnesses. The real inner consciousness (internal consciousness) appears similar to the external realm, and in order to accomplish the distinction between inner and outer Ayatanas (sense fields), the seeds are divided into ten types. The third explanation is based on the meaning of the same seed for Darsana-bhaga and Nimitta-bhaga. The Darsana-bhaga and Nimitta-bhaga of the five consciousnesses together are called consciousness. 'Arising from its own seed' means that the Darsana-bhaga arises from the seed into manifestation. Even if there are no other seeds, it also arises with an appearance, called 'transforms into the appearance of an object.' The three explanations in the Alambana-pratyaya-pariksa (Examination of the Conditions for Objects of Consciousness, a treatise on the objects and conditions of consciousness) are largely the same, but they serve as Pratyayas (conditions) for each other, with slight differences. The treatise says: 'Furthermore, the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) should not only have the function of Upadana (grasping), etc.' The meaning of this commentary is that the three Karmas (actions) of body, speech, and mind can produce results. Body Karma is Rupa (material phenomena), so it has Upadana, which is in terms of the auxiliary sense organs. Sound, when separated from substance, is not Upadana. The manifestation of mind Karma and the three real Karmas (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) are also not Upadana. What was said earlier was 'based on grasping to produce sensation.' The second statement earlier was that the seed is called Upadana, which is in terms of shared safety and danger. Now, according to various treatises, among the eighteen Dhatus, which have Upadana, it only says the five sense organs. Therefore, it says 'should not only have Upadana, etc.' Ximing (a Buddhist commentator) said that this is saying that the five consciousness Karmas that can truly produce results, because they are the basis of the five consciousnesses. Only the seed of thought is real Karma, while form and sound are hypothetical, not truly producing results.
。由此思種唯非執受。唯非色蘊。唯非內處。違聖教說此三皆唯 集云。感相分種非五識依。能感思業。即非色．聲。約生覺受故思非執。無表是假無感果用。故取有釋 今謂不爾。有說所釋具言假身語業並實思業。論云非唯故通有執等。不云唯非有執受等。顛倒論文故非為正。前第二說。執受有二。謂諸種子及有根身。若謂今據生覺受說者。且五色根為唯取現。為亦兼種。唯現可爾。通種即非唯有執受。若云據現者。何故前難云又諸聖教說眼等根皆通現．種。執唯是種與教相違耶。故知五根通於種．現。據生覺受自亦不唯。何但難他。故本釋正。
阿賴耶識于有色界遍依諸根與楞伽同者(后更撿文)。
論。既許現識以種為依等。本疏說云此令種子有俱有依。論言現識依種者。以所依根通種．現故。故疏言種。若謂論文應言現行以種子為因緣者。即此中種依現行識。無同喻過。第八望種非因緣故是俱有依 然西明云。此中正明俱有依。如何義準因緣為例。解云理實不應為例。而凈月意。前二師皆不許種亦有所依故。今義準令種識亦有所依。量云種識亦有所依。現種識中隨一攝故。猶如現識。雖彼所依因緣．俱有二依不同。而依義齊且引為例。所以者何。能熏有因緣義。異熟望種非因緣故。此意且引為例
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，思的種子並非執受（指被執取和感受），並非色蘊（物質的集合），也並非內處（內在的感官領域）。這與聖教的說法相違背，因為聖教說這三者都是唯識所集。集論中說：『能感果報的相分種子不是前五識所依賴的，它能感受思業，因此不是色、聲等。』因為是關於產生感覺和領受，所以思不是執受。無表業是虛假的，沒有感受果報的作用，所以才需要解釋。 現在我認為不是這樣。有人說，所解釋的包括虛假的身體和語言業，以及真實的思業。論中說『非唯』，所以包括有執受等。論中沒有說『唯非有執受等』，這是顛倒了論文的說法，所以是不正確的。前面第二點說，執受有兩種，即各種種子和有根的身體。如果說現在是根據產生感覺和領受來說的，那麼五色根是隻取現在的，還是也包括種子？只取現在還可以，如果包括種子，就不是隻有執受。如果說是根據現在來說的，那麼為什麼前面要反駁說『又各種聖教說眼等根都包括現在和種子，執受只是種子，這與聖教相違背』呢？所以要知道五根包括種子和現在。根據產生感覺和領受來說，自己也不是隻有執受，為什麼只反駁別人呢？所以原本的解釋是正確的。 阿賴耶識對於有情眾生普遍地依附於各種根，這與《楞伽經》的說法相同（之後會再次檢查經文）。 論中說：『既然承認現識以種子為所依等。』本疏解釋說：『這是爲了讓種子也有俱有依。』論中說現識依附於種子，是因為所依附的根包括種子和現在。所以疏中說是種子。如果說論文應該說『現行以種子為因緣』，那麼這其中種子依附於現行識，就沒有同喻的過失。第八識對於種子來說不是因緣，所以是俱有依。然而西明說：『這裡正是說明俱有依，怎麼能義準因緣為例呢？』解釋說：『理實上不應該為例，而凈月的意思是，前兩位法師都不允許種子也有所依，所以現在義準讓種子識也有所依。』可以量度說：『種子識也有所依，因為它被包含在現種識中的任何一個，就像現識一樣。』雖然它所依附的因緣和俱有二依不同，但依附的意義相同，所以姑且引為例。為什麼呢？能熏習有因緣的意義，異熟果對於種子來說不是因緣，所以這個意思是姑且引為例。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, the seed of thought is neither 'perceived' (referring to being grasped and felt), nor 'rupa-skandha' (the aggregate of matter), nor 'internal sense-base' (the inner sensory realm). This contradicts the teachings of the sacred texts, which state that these three are all collected by Vijnana. The Samgraha states: 'The seed of the aspect that can sense retribution is not what the first five consciousnesses rely on; it can sense thought-karma, therefore it is not form, sound, etc.' Because it is about generating feeling and reception, thought is not 'perceived'. Unmanifested karma is false and has no function of sensing retribution, so it needs explanation. Now I think it's not like this. Some say that what is explained includes false body and speech karma, as well as true thought karma. The treatise says 'not only', so it includes 'perceived', etc. The treatise does not say 'only not perceived, etc.', which is reversing the statement of the treatise, so it is incorrect. The second point earlier said that there are two kinds of 'perceived', namely various seeds and rooted bodies. If it is said that it is now based on the generation of feeling and reception, then do the five sense organs only take the present, or also include seeds? Only taking the present is acceptable, but if it includes seeds, it is not only 'perceived'. If it is said that it is based on the present, then why did you refute earlier by saying 'Also, various sacred texts say that the roots of the eyes, etc., all include the present and seeds, and 'perceived' is only seeds, which contradicts the sacred texts'? Therefore, it should be known that the five roots include seeds and the present. According to the generation of feeling and reception, one is not only 'perceived' oneself, so why only refute others? Therefore, the original explanation is correct. Alaya-vijnana (storehouse consciousness) universally relies on various roots for sentient beings, which is the same as the statement in the Lankavatara Sutra (the text will be checked again later). The treatise says: 'Since it is admitted that the present consciousness relies on seeds, etc.' The commentary explains: 'This is to allow seeds to also have co-existent support.' The treatise says that the present consciousness relies on seeds because the roots on which it relies include seeds and the present. Therefore, the commentary says seeds. If it is said that the treatise should say 'present activity takes seeds as the cause and condition', then the seeds in this rely on the present consciousness, and there is no fault of the same metaphor. The eighth consciousness is not a cause and condition for seeds, so it is a co-existent support. However, Ximing said: 'This is precisely explaining co-existent support, how can the cause and condition be taken as an example by analogy?' The explanation says: 'In reality, it should not be taken as an example, but Jingyue's meaning is that the previous two Dharma masters did not allow seeds to have support, so now, by analogy, seed consciousness is also allowed to have support.' It can be measured by saying: 'Seed consciousness also has support because it is included in any of the present seed consciousnesses, just like present consciousness.' Although the cause and condition and co-existent two supports on which it relies are different, the meaning of reliance is the same, so it is tentatively taken as an example. Why? The ability to perfume has the meaning of cause and condition, and the different ripening fruit is not a cause and condition for seeds, so this meaning is tentatively taken as an example.
者。雖成因緣為所依。且取依義。因緣．俱有同是依義。若云因緣依。第八現行望種即非。為避此過云且引義例 今謂不然。若但成依。有為諸法皆杖托依。應成相符。若成因緣。第八望種非是因緣。成作因緣。便有一分違宗之失。故知前師不立種子有俱有依。今立此義違他順己。不乖聖教故本疏正。
疏言故令異熟種以現行為住依。以種子因緣依與現行俱有依為例者。意以異熟識中種。即以第八現行為住依。能熏轉識望于種子雖是因緣。亦與種俱有。故與諸現行識。俱有依為例。新舊合者釋生長義。
論。俱有所依。護法義簡取決定有境為主為所依。簡余非所依。
令心心所取自所緣。此即舉果顯因所依。若法雖杖托因緣起。而不能取自所緣者。果名有依。不名有所依。因緣望彼但得為依。而非所依。何故如是。以瑜伽論唯心．心所名有所依。余不名有所依。若不作斯義門簡者法有相濫 然疏云而以義準由少義理。謂自身識為依。非后為前前為后依及他為自依 要集云。此無相濫。此中既辨俱有依根。非前後故。自識不依他根而起已極成故。故唯四義簡法已盡 今謂不爾。雖知四義簡法已周。論文不顯。但且對前諸師異說。辨彼非所依。不顯簡他及於前後。明是自身。若以言俱有。即不須簡非前
後者。亦應云等無間。明前望后為等無間。何須復云前聚於後。下解開導云於後生心．心所法。又本辨心．心法。何須說云謂有緣法。言心．心所豈非能緣。又如熏習。熏自極成。可須復簡他身前後。故今疏意。心．心所法杖因托緣皆得名依。既論說云展轉增上力。二識成決定。亦是自識因他識生。何故不簡。前後雖別亦得名有。如前因果別時家。解攝論熏習俱生俱滅。以前後法同有生滅。云俱生俱滅。今前後心異遍計故俱得名有。何故不簡不以同是有。要非前後是俱有依。
又云。樞要云前三各具四義。若爾決定簡法已盡。謂同境即顯有境。根本即為主故。由此證知餘三無用 今謂此情不悟大意。何者本疏以論說俱有依。前明具義。后復云同境．不共．分別．染凈．根本所依不同。此之五種於前義中為具不具。若其不具得為所依。何須前義。要具為依。即是前三各具四義。四義隨有。即具前義方是所依。由是身根望眼等四識。非彼五種。故非所依 要集云。今解身根為主義簡者 今謂不爾。論文字意。為主一義。以王簡臣不簡身根。若云雖有身根。四根若𨷂四識不生。故知不依者不然。亦雖有第六。若無身根身識不起。豈許身識不依第六。故不以主簡別身根 又樞要言順取所緣者。解同境根。若同境根亦具前
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 後者也應該稱為『等無間』（Samanantarika，無間緣）。明確了前一個念頭指向后一個念頭，就是『等無間』。為什麼還要重複說『前一個聚集在後一個』呢？下面的解釋引導說，在後一個念頭生起時，是心和心所法。而且原本就辨析了心和心所法，為什麼還要說『所謂有緣法』呢？說心和心所，難道不是能緣嗎？又比如熏習，熏習的道理非常明顯，還需要區分其他身的前後嗎？所以現在疏文的意思是，心和心所法，憑藉因和緣，都可以稱為所依。既然論述說『輾轉增上力，二識成決定』，也是自己的識因其他識而生。為什麼不區分呢？前後雖然不同，也可以稱為『有』。如同前因後果，時間不同。解釋《攝論》說熏習是俱生俱滅，因為前後法都有生滅，所以說俱生俱滅。現在前後心因為遍計（Prapancha，虛妄分別）不同，所以都可以稱為『有』。為什麼不區分，不因為同樣是『有』，就認為不是前後，而是俱有的所依呢？ 又說，『樞要』說前三者各自具有四種意義。如果這樣，那麼決定簡擇法的意義已經窮盡了。所謂『同境』就顯示了『有境』，『根本』就是『為主』的緣故。由此可以證明其餘三種沒有用處。現在我認為這種看法沒有領悟到大意。為什麼呢？原本的疏文以論述俱有依，前面說明了具有的意義，後面又說同境、不共、分別、染凈、根本所依不同。這五種在前面的意義中是具有還是不具有？如果是不具有，可以作為所依嗎？一定要具有才能作為所依。也就是前面三種各自具有四種意義，四種意義隨之具有，才具有前面的意義，才是所依。因此，身根相對於眼等四識，不是那五種，所以不是所依。『要集』說，現在解釋身根是主義簡擇者。現在我認為不是這樣。論文的本意，『為主』是一種意義，用君王來簡擇臣子，而不是簡擇身根。如果說即使有身根，四根如果衰弱，四識也不會生起，所以知道不是所依，這樣說是不對的。即使有第六識，如果沒有身根，身識也不會生起，難道允許身識不依第六識嗎？所以不用『主』來簡別身根。又『樞要』說順取所緣，解釋同境根。如果同境根也具有前面的。
【English Translation】 English version: The latter should also be called 'Samanantarika' (無間緣, the immediately preceding condition). Clearly, the preceding thought points to the following thought, which is 'Samanantarika'. Why repeat that 'the former gathers in the latter'? The following explanation guides that when the latter thought arises, it is mind and mental factors (心所法, Citta-caitasika). Moreover, originally, mind and mental factors were distinguished, so why say 'so-called conditioned dharmas (有緣法, Hetu-pratyaya)'? When speaking of mind and mental factors, aren't they the 'able to cognize' (能緣, Alambana)? Furthermore, like熏習 (Vāsanā, perfuming), the principle of perfuming is very clear. Is it necessary to distinguish the former and latter of other bodies? Therefore, the meaning of the commentary now is that mind and mental factors, relying on causes and conditions, can all be called the 'supported' (所依, Āśraya). Since it is discussed that 'the force of mutual increase, the two consciousnesses become definite', it is also that one's own consciousness arises from other consciousnesses. Why not distinguish? Although the former and latter are different, they can also be called 'existent' (有, Asti). Like former causes and later effects, the time is different. The explanation of the Compendium on the Mahāyāna says that perfuming is co-arising and co-ceasing because the former and latter dharmas both have arising and ceasing, so it is said to be co-arising and co-ceasing. Now, the former and latter minds are different because of Prapancha (遍計, conceptual proliferation), so they can all be called 'existent'. Why not distinguish, and not because they are both 'existent', consider them not to be former and latter, but co-existent supports? Furthermore, it is said, 'Essentials' says that the former three each have four meanings. If so, then the meaning of definitely selecting dharmas is exhausted. The so-called 'same object' (同境, Sāmanādhikaraṇa) reveals 'having an object' (有境, Salambana), and 'fundamental' (根本, Mūla) is because it is 'the main' (為主, Adhipati). From this, it can be proven that the remaining three are useless. Now, I think this view does not understand the general meaning. Why? The original commentary discusses the co-existent support, the former explains the meaning of having, and the latter says that the same object, non-common, discrimination, defiled and pure, and fundamental supports are different. Do these five have or not have the meaning of the former? If they do not have it, can they be considered supports? They must have it to be considered supports. That is, the former three each have four meanings, and the four meanings are possessed, then they have the former meaning and are the support. Therefore, the body faculty, relative to the four consciousnesses of the eye, etc., is not those five, so it is not the support. 'Important Collection' says, now explaining that the body faculty is the selector of the main meaning. Now, I think it is not so. The original intention of the treatise is that 'being the main' is a meaning, using the king to select ministers, not selecting the body faculty. If it is said that even if there is a body faculty, if the four faculties are weak, the four consciousnesses will not arise, so it is known that it is not the support, that is not right. Even if there is the sixth consciousness, if there is no body faculty, body consciousness will not arise, how can body consciousness be allowed not to rely on the sixth consciousness? Therefore, the body faculty is not distinguished by 'the main'. Also, 'Essentials' says to follow the object, explaining the same object faculty. If the same object faculty also has the former.
義。不解有境義。不得妄難。故七依八即不同境。故知不約順取境義。說有境義。若順不順皆有境故。智者當察 問今解俱有依根。既以有境簡去種子。豈可種子非俱有依。若非是依。種應非根。便違聖說眼等五根皆通種．現 答論根通種．現。今護法辨依．所依別。現根用勝名為所依。種根非勝不說所依。若取種根為俱有所依者。自種應是。今辨俱有所依。不依解根義。故不取種。
問言同境根。即眼等五根。是未知眼等識。緣境變相為親所緣。眼等五根為照相分為照本質。若照本質即不同境。質．相異故。若照相分。本質何遮而不能照 答今二解。一云雙照。俱色境故。無法遮故。一云照相分。云同分根能照境故。隔自識相故不照質 問如隔琉璃等尚能見外。自識相分有說非礙。何故能遮 答勢分力隔不以相礙前解為勝 問五識變相。為依託質。為不離見。若依託質。應離識取。若不離見。何成離合知。識皆與根不即離故 答雖依託質不離見分。俱悉無過。以能緣見不可說云在此非彼處。以無形礙故 若爾如何名離合取 答以五色根望本質說。不約相分。故成離合。不離識緣。
問五識何為以第六識為分別根 答瑜伽五十五云。由三緣故。謂極明瞭故。于彼作意故。依資養故 言明了取者。意雖由五
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不理解有境（yǒu jìng，具有所緣對像）的含義，就不要隨意發難。因此，七依八即（qī yī bā jí，七種依持和八種即）所依的境（jìng，所緣對像）不同。所以要知道，如果不按照順取境（shùn qǔ jìng，順著去取境）的含義，就說有境（yǒu jìng，具有所緣對像）的含義。如果順與不順都有境（yǒu jìng，具有所緣對像），智者應當仔細觀察。問：現在解釋俱有依根（jù yǒu yī gēn，共同存在的所依根），既然用有境（yǒu jìng，具有所緣對像）來區分種子（zhǒng zi，潛在的），難道種子（zhǒng zi，潛在的）不是俱有依（jù yǒu yī，共同存在的所依）嗎？如果不是所依，種子（zhǒng zi，潛在的）就不應該是根（gēn，根源），就違背了聖人所說的眼等五根（yǎn děng wǔ gēn，眼等五種感覺器官）都通於種子（zhǒng zi，潛在的）和現行（xiàn xíng，顯現的）。答：論典說根（gēn，根源）通於種子（zhǒng zi，潛在的）和現行（xiàn xíng，顯現的）。現在護法（hù fǎ，佛教術語，護持佛法）辨別所依（suǒ yī，所依賴的）和能依（néng yī，能依賴的）的區別。現根（xiàn gēn，顯現的根）的作用更強，所以稱為所依（suǒ yī，所依賴的）。種子根（zhǒng zi gēn，潛在的根）的作用不強，所以不說是所依（suǒ yī，所依賴的）。如果取種子根（zhǒng zi gēn，潛在的根）作為俱有所依（jù yǒu suǒ yī，共同存在的所依），那麼自種（zì zhǒng，自身的種子）應該是。現在辨別俱有所依（jù yǒu suǒ yī，共同存在的所依），不依據理解根（gēn，根源）的含義，所以不取種子（zhǒng zi，潛在的）。 問：所說的同境根（tóng jìng gēn，相同的所緣境根），就是眼等五根（yǎn děng wǔ gēn，眼等五種感覺器官）。是說未知眼等識（yǎn děng shí，眼等識）緣境（yuán jìng，緣取對像）的變相（biàn xiàng，變化之相）作為親所緣（qīn suǒ yuán，直接所緣），眼等五根（yǎn děng wǔ gēn，眼等五種感覺器官）作為照相分（zhào xiàng fēn，照了相分）為照本質（zhào běn zhì，照了本質）。如果照本質（zhào běn zhì，照了本質），就是不同境（tóng jìng，相同所緣境）。因為質（zhì，本質）和相（xiàng，現象）不同。如果照相分（zhào xiàng fēn，照了相分），本質（běn zhì，本質）有什麼遮蔽而不能照呢？答：現在有兩種解釋。一種說法是雙照（shuāng zhào，同時照了），因為都是色境（sè jìng，色所緣境），沒有法可以遮蔽。一種說法是照相分（zhào xiàng fēn，照了相分），因為同分根（tóng fēn gēn，同類根）能照境（zhào jìng，照了所緣境），隔著自識相（zì shí xiàng，自身識的相分），所以不照本質（zhào běn zhì，照了本質）。問：如同隔著琉璃等尚且能看見外面，自識相分（zì shí xiàng fēn，自身識的相分）有人說不是障礙，為什麼能遮蔽呢？答：勢分力（shì fēn lì，勢力）的隔離，不是用相（xiàng，現象）來障礙。前面的解釋更勝一籌。問：五識（wǔ shí，五種感覺意識）變相（biàn xiàng，變化之相），是依託質（yī tuō zhì，依賴本質），還是不離見（bù lí jiàn，不離開能見）？如果依託質（yī tuō zhì，依賴本質），應該離開識（shí，意識）來取。如果不離見（bù lí jiàn，不離開能見），怎麼能成就離合知（lí hé zhī，分離和合的認知）？因為識（shí，意識）都與根（gēn，根源）不即不離。答：雖然依託質（yī tuō zhì，依賴本質），但不離見分（bù lí jiàn fēn，不離開能見之分），都沒有過失。因為能緣見（néng yuán jiàn，能緣取的能見）不可說云在此非彼處（zài cǐ fēi bǐ chù，在此處而非彼處），因為沒有形礙。如果這樣，如何名為離合取（lí hé qǔ，分離和合的取）？答：以五色根（wǔ sè gēn，五種色根）望本質（wàng běn zhì，望向本質）來說，不按照相分（xiàng fēn，相分），所以成就離合（lí hé，分離和合），不離識緣（bù lí shí yuán，不離開意識的緣取）。 問：五識（wǔ shí，五種感覺意識）為什麼以第六識（dì liù shí，第六意識）為分別根（fēn bié gēn，分別的根源）？答：瑜伽五十五（yú qié wǔ shí wǔ，《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷）說，由於三種緣故：極明瞭故（jí míng liǎo gù，極其明瞭的緣故），于彼作意故（yú bǐ zuò yì gù，對於它作意的緣故），依資養故（yī zī yǎng gù，依賴資養的緣故）。說『明瞭取』（míng liǎo qǔ，明瞭地取），意（yì，意識）雖然由五（wǔ，五識）...
【English Translation】 English version: Do not misunderstand the meaning of 'having an object' (yǒu jìng) and raise unwarranted difficulties. Therefore, the objects (jìng) of the seven supports and eight identities (qī yī bā jí) are different. Thus, it should be understood that if one does not follow the meaning of 'taking an object in accordance' (shùn qǔ jìng), one speaks of the meaning of 'having an object' (yǒu jìng). If both accordance and non-accordance have an object (yǒu jìng), the wise should carefully observe. Question: Now, explaining the 'co-existent dependent roots' (jù yǒu yī gēn), since 'having an object' (yǒu jìng) is used to distinguish it from 'seeds' (zhǒng zi), how can seeds (zhǒng zi) not be 'co-existent dependents' (jù yǒu yī)? If they are not dependents, seeds (zhǒng zi) should not be roots (gēn), which would contradict the sage's saying that the five sense organs (yǎn děng wǔ gēn), such as the eyes, all connect to seeds (zhǒng zi) and manifestations (xiàn xíng). Answer: The treatise says that roots (gēn) connect to seeds (zhǒng zi) and manifestations (xiàn xíng). Now, Dharmapāla (hù fǎ) distinguishes between what is depended upon (suǒ yī) and what depends (néng yī). The function of manifest roots (xiàn gēn) is superior, so they are called what is depended upon (suǒ yī). Seed roots (zhǒng zi gēn) are not superior, so they are not called what is depended upon (suǒ yī). If seed roots (zhǒng zi gēn) are taken as co-existent dependents (jù yǒu suǒ yī), then self-seeds (zì zhǒng) should be. Now, distinguishing co-existent dependents (jù yǒu suǒ yī) does not rely on understanding the meaning of roots (gēn), so seeds (zhǒng zi) are not taken. Question: The 'roots with the same object' (tóng jìng gēn) that are spoken of are the five sense organs (yǎn děng wǔ gēn), such as the eyes. Does this mean that the unknown transformations (biàn xiàng) of the objects (yuán jìng) cognized by the consciousnesses (yǎn děng shí) such as eye-consciousness are the direct objects (qīn suǒ yuán), and the five sense organs (yǎn děng wǔ gēn) illuminate the image-aspect (zhào xiàng fēn) to illuminate the essence (zhào běn zhì)? If they illuminate the essence (zhào běn zhì), then they are not the same object (tóng jìng), because the essence (zhì) and the image (xiàng) are different. If they illuminate the image-aspect (zhào xiàng fēn), what prevents the essence (běn zhì) from being illuminated? Answer: There are now two explanations. One says that they illuminate both (shuāng zhào), because they are both form-objects (sè jìng), and there is no dharma that can obstruct them. One says that they illuminate the image-aspect (zhào xiàng fēn), because the roots of the same category (tóng fēn gēn) can illuminate the object (zhào jìng), but they do not illuminate the essence (zhào běn zhì) because they are separated by their own consciousness-aspect (zì shí xiàng). Question: Just as one can see outside through glass, some say that one's own consciousness-aspect (zì shí xiàng fēn) is not an obstacle, so why can it obstruct? Answer: The separation is due to the force of power (shì fēn lì), not due to the obstruction of the image (xiàng). The previous explanation is superior. Question: Are the transformations (biàn xiàng) of the five consciousnesses (wǔ shí) dependent on the essence (yī tuō zhì), or are they inseparable from seeing (bù lí jiàn)? If they are dependent on the essence (yī tuō zhì), they should be taken apart from consciousness (shí). If they are inseparable from seeing (bù lí jiàn), how can separate and combined cognition (lí hé zhī) be accomplished? Because consciousness (shí) is neither identical to nor separate from the root (gēn). Answer: Although they are dependent on the essence (yī tuō zhì), they are not separate from the seeing-aspect (bù lí jiàn fēn), and there is no fault. Because the seeing that can cognize (néng yuán jiàn) cannot be said to be 'here and not there' (zài cǐ fēi bǐ chù), because it has no form or obstruction. If so, how is it called 'separate and combined taking' (lí hé qǔ)? Answer: Speaking from the perspective of the five sense organs (wǔ sè gēn) looking towards the essence (wàng běn zhì), not according to the image-aspect (xiàng fēn), so separate and combined (lí hé) is accomplished, and it is not separate from the cognition of consciousness (bù lí shí yuán). Question: Why do the five consciousnesses (wǔ shí) take the sixth consciousness (dì liù shí) as the root of discrimination (fēn bié gēn)? Answer: The fifty-fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (yú qié wǔ shí wǔ) says that it is due to three reasons: because it is extremely clear (jí míng liǎo gù), because of attention to it (yú bǐ zuò yì gù), and because of reliance on nourishment (yī zī yǎng gù). 'Clearly taking' (míng liǎo qǔ) means that although the mind (yì) is due to the five (wǔ)...
而得明瞭。五亦由六能明瞭取。若無意識五不起故 于彼作意者。由欲得緣彼境界故。即同緣義 依資養者。謂由意識資養。眼等識方得起故。即引發義。
但說五識依五根者由二義故。言相順者。一近相順。即近所依。二相資相順。五根有漏五識亦有漏。五根無漏五識亦無漏故。
后開導依。本疏三師。第一難陀等。瑜伽第三云。又非五識身有二剎那相隨俱生。亦無展轉無間更互而生 又一剎那五識生已。從此無間必意識生。從此無間或時散亂。或耳識生。或五識身中隨一識生 此師準文不許五識俱生。亦無二剎那續。亦非更互生。若前若后必意識起。是故五識必用第六為開導依 第二安惠等。第三護法等 西明云。第二凈月。安惠師許三位無末那故 要集亦云。定非安惠。論云平等性智相應末那初起。必由第六意識為開導依。彼許三位無末那故。則不得言相應末那 今謂不爾。準何得知是凈月義。既自不識梵本。又非翻譯之人 若是安惠前難如何 答準本疏釋云即顯末那名通無漏。雖即六識轉末那得名為第七。實非第七。不通凈故。不爾違經。初地初心第七識俱平等性智等。如疏具釋 又下第五卷中亦有此解 疏外又解。前難陀師云。第六意識自相續故亦總用。前六轉識內。隨何為開導依。第七．八
識雖自相續。見道初轉由第六引。應用第六為開導依。就彼宗難正彼義故。不依自宗。疏主既親承梵本翻此論文。豈肯鄭重為斯錯判 今又助解。言安惠等許凈第七即是余師。余文即通安惠及余。述正文中雲。第七末那用前自類或第六識為開導依 染相續位自類為依。無漏間斷既有第六即為開導。滅定位出。應云用第八為開導依。略而不言。
第二師文中有二。初縱。后奪。初中有三。一云未自在位可如所說。二遇境位。謂卒爾遇境位可如所說。三遇非勝境位可如所說。上一位字貫于下二。次一遇字通第二三 若自在位下。奪翻前三位。言自在位者奪初位。此師意云。謂互用位多恒緣境。此意破前六塵境至識不併生。以即剎那而便落謝。互用之位如眼識起。雖有餘境亦能緣之。何假余識而眼識間斷耶。
問護法等師何性界心得出滅定 答廣惠聲聞．自在菩薩。隨何界地方便善心。若依自地亦通生得。未遍超者。隨其所應。或依他地方便善心。若全未超。但依自地方便心出。依方便入故。
論。又異熟心依染污意等者。何故無性兩釋。一云即第六識為染污依。第二同世親。所謂末那。何故二別 答兩論不違。此有二義。一恒相續。二緣內外起增上愛故。無性即據通緣內外起染污故。不言第七。世親即
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 雖然『識』（vijnana）本身是連續不斷的，但在見道（darshana-marga）的最初階段，是由第六識（mano-vijnana）引導的。在應用時，第六識是開導所依賴的對象。因為針對他們的宗派難以糾正他們的觀點，所以不依賴他們自己的宗派。疏主（指《成唯識論述記》的作者窺基）既然親自依據梵文字翻譯此論文，怎麼會如此鄭重地做出這樣的錯誤判斷呢？現在再進一步解釋，安慧等人允許清凈的第七識（末那識，manas-vijnana）就是其他論師的觀點。『余文』可以指安慧及其他人。《述正文》中說，第七末那識使用之前的同類識或者第六識作為開導所依賴的對象。在染污相續的階段，以同類識為所依。無漏（anāsrava）間斷時，既然有第六識，就以第六識為開導。從滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti）出來時，應該說用第八識（阿賴耶識，ālaya-vijnana）作為開導所依，這裡省略了沒有說。
第二位論師的觀點中有兩個部分，先是縱容，后是駁斥。縱容部分有三點：一是說在未自在的階段可以如你所說；二是遇到境界的階段，指突然遇到境界時可以如你所說；三是遇到非殊勝境界的階段可以如你所說。上面的『位』字貫穿下面的兩個階段，『遇』字貫穿第二和第三點。如果是在自在位以下，就駁斥前面的三個階段。說自在位是指相互作用的階段，大多恒常緣取境界。這個觀點是爲了破斥前面所說的六塵境（rupa, shabda, gandha, rasa, sparshtavya, dharma）至識（vijnana）不能同時生起。因為即使是剎那間也會消逝。相互作用的階段，比如眼識（caksu-vijnana）生起時，即使有其他的境界，也能緣取，為什麼需要其他的識而導致眼識間斷呢？
問：護法（Dharmapala）等論師，什麼性質、什麼界的心可以從滅盡定中出來？答：廣慧聲聞（sravaka）、自在菩薩（bodhisattva），無論在哪個界地，只要是方便善心（kusala-citta）就可以。如果依據自己的地，也包括生得的。沒有完全超越者，根據他們的情況。或者依據他方的方便善心。如果完全沒有超越，就只依據自己的地方便心出來。因為是依據方便進入的。
論：『又異熟心（vipāka-citta）依靠染污意等』，為什麼無性（Asanga）有兩種解釋？一種說法是第六識作為染污的所依，第二種說法與世親（Vasubandhu）相同，認為是末那識。為什麼有兩種不同的說法？答：兩種論述並不矛盾。這裡有兩種含義：一是恒常相續，二是緣取內外而生起增上的愛。無性是根據普遍緣取內外而生起染污來說的，所以沒有說第七識。世親是根據
【English Translation】 English version: Although 『consciousness』 (vijnana) itself is continuous, in the initial stage of the path of seeing (darshana-marga), it is guided by the sixth consciousness (mano-vijnana). In application, the sixth consciousness is the object upon which guidance relies. Because it is difficult to correct their views regarding their own school, one does not rely on their own school. Since the commentator (referring to Kuiji, the author of the 『Commentary on the Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only』) personally translated this treatise based on the Sanskrit text, how could he have made such a serious misjudgment? Now, to further explain, Anhui and others allow that the pure seventh consciousness (manas-vijnana) is the view of other teachers. 『Other texts』 can refer to Anhui and others. The 『Statement of Correct Meaning』 says that the seventh manas consciousness uses the preceding consciousness of the same type or the sixth consciousness as the object upon which guidance relies. In the stage of defiled continuity, it relies on consciousness of the same type. When there is a break in the undefiled (anāsrava) state, since there is the sixth consciousness, it serves as guidance. When emerging from cessation meditation (nirodha-samāpatti), it should be said that the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijnana) is used as the object upon which guidance relies, but this is omitted here.
The view of the second teacher has two parts: first, concession, then refutation. The concession part has three points: first, it is said that in the stage of non-mastery, it can be as you say; second, in the stage of encountering an object, referring to when suddenly encountering an object, it can be as you say; third, in the stage of encountering a non-superior object, it can be as you say. The word 『stage』 above runs through the two stages below, and the word 『encounter』 runs through the second and third points. If it is below the stage of mastery, then it refutes the previous three stages. Saying the stage of mastery refers to the stage of mutual interaction, mostly constantly grasping objects. This view is to refute the previous statement that the six sense objects (rupa, shabda, gandha, rasa, sparshtavya, dharma) up to consciousness (vijnana) cannot arise simultaneously. Because even in an instant, they will disappear. In the stage of mutual interaction, for example, when eye consciousness (caksu-vijnana) arises, even if there are other objects, it can grasp them, so why is there a need for other consciousnesses that cause eye consciousness to be interrupted?
Question: According to teachers like Dharmapala, what nature and realm of mind can emerge from cessation meditation? Answer: The wise Sravakas (sravaka) and free Bodhisattvas (bodhisattva), in whatever realm they are, as long as it is a skillful wholesome mind (kusala-citta), can emerge. If based on their own ground, it also includes what is naturally obtained. Those who have not completely transcended, it depends on their situation. Or based on the skillful wholesome mind of another place. If they have not transcended at all, they only emerge based on their own skillful mind. Because they enter based on skillful means.
Treatise: 『Moreover, the resultant consciousness (vipāka-citta) relies on defiled intention, etc.』, why does Asanga (Asanga) have two explanations? One explanation is that the sixth consciousness is the basis of defilement, and the second explanation is the same as Vasubandhu (Vasubandhu), considering it to be the manas consciousness. Why are there two different explanations? Answer: The two statements are not contradictory. There are two meanings here: one is constant continuity, and the other is arising of increasing love by grasping internal and external objects. Asanga speaks from the perspective of universally grasping internal and external objects and generating defilement, so he does not mention the seventh consciousness. Vasubandhu speaks from the perspective of
據恒相續識常起染污。非無第六。以非恒故隱而不說。無性菩薩據續生時。非無第七。以不外緣故亦不說 然今此師所說染意。或同世親。或同無性 或可染意依第七說。相應悲願即第六識。以此為證。證誠第八用第六．七為開導依。以因大悲依第六故。染復第六不證第七 或此師意且據凡夫一分而說。初受生識。以染污意方得受生。即中蘊末心。除轉輪王必起貪．嗔方得受生。相應悲願即是二智。
論。若增盛境等。西明云。此有一句。境勝心非勝。謂率爾心。此中應有等流心．境俱勝。已攝在前等流心中 今謂不然。證五相續。云遇勝境理必相續。定非率爾。率爾之心非多剎那故。若許率爾自類相續。應引瑜伽論云由率爾心。乃至相續而轉。何故云決定心后等。前文已證等流翻前率爾 遇勝境下。翻前非勝境。不說唯率爾。前文且約泛爾等流心。即心勝境非勝。此約心境俱勝破 或可。前約心相續趣境破。此約境相續勝逼心俱令心相續。故二文別今準此文當后二心。故俱勝句攝。
問戲忘憤恚定是何天 答本疏釋云。欲四空天。非下二天。西明云。通六天 要集斷云。此說近理。以婆沙說在下二天。大小雖殊俱得為證 今謂不爾。四句自體。若不約定人．處而說。但據逢緣可通六慾。若約定人．處。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 據恒常相續的識總是生起染污（煩惱）。並非沒有第六識（末那識，Manas-vijnana），因為第六識不是恒常的，所以隱而不說。無性菩薩根據相續產生的時候說，並非沒有第七識（阿陀那識，Adana-vijnana），因為第七識不向外攀緣，所以也不說。然而現在這位論師所說的染污意，或者與世親（Vasubandhu）的觀點相同，或者與無性（Asanga）的觀點相同。或者可以說染污意是依據第七識而說的，與第七識相應的悲願就是第六識。以此作為證據，證明第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）使用第六識和第七識作為開導的依據。因為依仗大悲心而依第六識的緣故，染污又回到第六識，不能證明第七識。或者這位論師的用意只是根據凡夫的一部分情況而說。最初受生的識，因為有染污意的緣故才能受生，也就是中陰身（Antarabhava）末期之心。除了轉輪王（Chakravartin）之外，必定生起貪（Lobha）、嗔（Dvesha）才能受生。與此相應的悲願就是二智（兩種智慧）。
論：如果增盛的境界等等。西明說：這裡有一句話，境界殊勝而心不殊勝，說的是率爾心（剎那生滅之心）。這裡應該有等流心（與前念相似的心）和境界都殊勝的情況，已經包含在前面的等流心中了。現在我認為不是這樣。證明五相續（五種相續）說遇到殊勝的境界，理所當然會相續不斷，一定不是率爾心。因為率爾心不是多個剎那的緣故。如果允許率爾心自類相續，應該引用《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）說由率爾心，乃至相續而轉。為什麼說決定心之後是等流心？前面的文章已經證明等流心是與前面的率爾心相反的。遇到殊勝境界下，是與前面的非殊勝境界相反。不說只有率爾心。前面的文章只是就泛爾等流心來說，也就是心殊勝而境界不殊勝。這裡是就心和境界都殊勝來破斥。或者可以說，前面是就心相續趨向境界來破斥，這裡是就境界相續殊勝逼迫心，使心也相續不斷。所以這兩篇文章有所區別。現在根據這篇文章，應當是後面的兩種心，所以都殊勝這句話包含了。
問：戲笑、忘失、憤恨、恚怒，是屬於什麼天（Deva）？答：本疏解釋說：屬於欲界四天（Chaturmaharajika-kayikas）、色界空天（Arupaloka）。不屬於下二天。西明說：通於六慾天（六慾天，Six Desire Heavens）。《要集》斷定說：這種說法比較合乎道理。因為《婆沙論》（Vibhasa）說在下二天。大小雖然不同，都可以作為證據。現在我認為不是這樣。四句自體，如果不約定人和處所而說，只是根據逢緣的情況，可以通於六慾天。如果約定人和處所，
【English Translation】 English version According to the constantly continuing consciousness, defilements (kleshas) always arise. It is not that there is no sixth consciousness (Manas-vijnana), but because the sixth consciousness is not constant, it is hidden and not spoken of. Asanga Bodhisattva, according to the time of continuous arising, says that it is not that there is no seventh consciousness (Adana-vijnana), but because the seventh consciousness does not reach out to external objects, it is also not spoken of. However, the defiled mind spoken of by this teacher now is either the same as Vasubandhu's view or the same as Asanga's view. Or it can be said that the defiled mind is spoken of based on the seventh consciousness, and the compassion and vows corresponding to the seventh consciousness are the sixth consciousness. Taking this as evidence, it proves that the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) uses the sixth and seventh consciousnesses as the basis for guidance. Because relying on great compassion relies on the sixth consciousness, defilement returns to the sixth consciousness, and the seventh consciousness cannot be proven. Or this teacher's intention is only based on a portion of ordinary people. The initial consciousness of being born is only able to be born because of the defiled mind, which is the mind at the end of the intermediate state (Antarabhava). Except for the Chakravartin, greed (Lobha) and hatred (Dvesha) must arise in order to be born. The compassion and vows corresponding to this are the two wisdoms.
Treatise: If the increasing and flourishing realm, etc. Ximing said: There is a sentence here, the realm is superior but the mind is not superior, referring to the impulsive mind (momentary mind). Here, there should be a situation where both the flowing mind (mind similar to the previous thought) and the realm are superior, which is already included in the previous flowing mind. Now I think it is not like this. Proving the five continuations (five kinds of continuations) says that when encountering a superior realm, it will naturally continue without interruption, and it is definitely not an impulsive mind. Because the impulsive mind is not multiple moments. If it is allowed that the impulsive mind continues in its own category, it should be quoted from the Yogacarabhumi-sastra saying that from the impulsive mind, it continues to transform. Why is it said that after the determined mind is the flowing mind? The previous article has already proven that the flowing mind is the opposite of the previous impulsive mind. Under encountering a superior realm, it is the opposite of the previous non-superior realm. It is not said that there is only an impulsive mind. The previous article only refers to the general flowing mind, which is the mind is superior but the realm is not superior. This is to refute the situation where both the mind and the realm are superior. Or it can be said that the previous one refuted the mind's continuous tendency towards the realm, and this one is about the realm's continuous superiority forcing the mind to also continue. Therefore, these two articles are different. Now, according to this article, it should be the latter two kinds of minds, so the sentence 'both are superior' is included.
Question: Laughter, forgetfulness, resentment, and anger, to which heaven (Deva) do they belong? Answer: The original commentary explains that they belong to the Four Heavenly Kings of the Desire Realm (Chaturmaharajika-kayikas) and the Formless Heaven of the Form Realm (Arupaloka). They do not belong to the lower two heavens. Ximing said: They are common to the Six Desire Heavens (Six Desire Heavens). The Yaoji concludes that this statement is more reasonable. Because the Vibhasa says that they are in the lower two heavens. Although the size is different, they can both be used as evidence. Now I think it is not like this. The four-sentence self-nature, if it is not agreed upon the person and place, but only according to the circumstances, it can be common to the Six Desire Heavens. If the person and place are agreed upon,
即本疏為正。然準道理據定人處。不爾但應人為他害即非自害。若有自害即非他害。何要戲忘．意．憤恚天及羯剌藍位。又戲．憤天既屬帝釋。豈與非天共戰之時不為彼害。若為彼害此即不定。即應佛使等有自他害。俱不定故即有雜亂。據無雜亂大乘約定。即本疏正。無相亂失及不定過。又出曜論云四空天。
論。然攝大乘說色亦容有等無間緣者是縱奪言者。釋彼論第三云。謂經部師作如是執。色心無間生者。謂諸色．心前後次第相續而生。是諸法種子者。是諸有為能生因性。謂彼執言。從前剎那色后剎那色無間而生。從前剎那心后剎那心及相應法無間而生(已上論文)。破已下結云。但應容有等無間緣及增上緣。無有因緣。今指此文。是縱經師有等無間。奪彼前後為因緣義。若爾何故攝論第一云又經部師不說唯色名為心法等無間緣。此所無故。心及心法四緣定故。釋文如疏。
論。故展轉作等無間緣者。問心．心所法多少起。而得說為緣。何妨諸識多少生。亦復得為緣。質云諸識前後多少起。相望得成緣。色法多少生前後。亦成無間緣。彼復質云。諸識多少起。例同色不成緣。汝諸心所多少生。亦應同色不成緣 解云心．心所法和合似一。共辨一事得互為緣。諸識不然。何得互為緣。
然諸心所
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，這個疏解是正確的。然而，要根據道理和依據來確定人的處境。否則，如果只是因為別人加害，那就不是自害。如果有自害，那就不是他害。為什麼還要提到戲忘（Xiwang，指嬉戲和遺忘）、意（Yi，指意志）、憤恚（Fenhui，指憤怒怨恨）、天（Tian，指天神）以及羯剌藍位（Gala Lanwei，指胎兒最初的凝結狀態）呢？而且，戲忘天（Xiwang Tian，嬉戲和遺忘之天）和憤恚天（Fenhui Tian，憤怒怨恨之天）既然屬於帝釋（Di Shi，佛教中的天神），難道在與非天（Fei Tian，指阿修羅）作戰時，不會受到他們的傷害嗎？如果會受到傷害，那麼這種說法就不確定了。這樣一來，佛使（Fo Shi，指佛的使者）等就既有自害又有他害，都是不確定的，就會產生混亂。根據沒有混亂的大乘（Da Cheng，佛教中的大乘宗派）約定，這個疏解是正確的，沒有相互擾亂、缺失和不確定的過失。又，《出曜論》（Chu Yao Lun）中說到了四空天（Si Kong Tian，指色界天的四種無色天）。 論：然而，《攝大乘論》（She Da Cheng Lun）說色法也可能具有等無間緣（Deng Wujian Yuan，指無間緣，即緊接著前一法生起后一法的條件），這是一種縱奪的說法。解釋《攝大乘論》第三卷時說：『經部師（Jing Bu Shi，佛教部派之一）這樣認為，色法和心法無間產生，是指各種色法和心法前後次第相續而生。這些是諸法的種子，是有為法（You Wei Fa，指有生滅變化的法）能夠產生的因性。』他們認為，從前一剎那的色法到后一剎那的色法是無間產生的，從前一剎那的心法到后一剎那的心法以及相應的法也是無間產生的（以上是論文）。破斥之後總結說：『但應容許有等無間緣和增上緣（Zengshang Yuan，指增上緣，即對結果起增強作用的條件），而沒有因緣（Yin Yuan，指直接產生結果的條件）。』現在指出這段文字，是縱容經部師有等無間緣，否定他們認為前後剎那之間是因緣的觀點。如果這樣，為什麼《攝大乘論》第一卷說：『經部師不說唯有色法名為心法的等無間緣，因為這裡沒有這種說法。心法和心所法的四緣是確定的。』解釋的文字如同疏解所說。 論：所以，展轉作為等無間緣。問：心法和心所法（Xin Suo Fa，指與心識相應的心理活動）有多少生起，才能說是緣呢？為什麼各種識（Shi，指心識）有多少生起，就不能說是緣呢？質問說：各種識前後有多少生起，相互之間可以成為緣。色法有多少生起，前後之間也可以成為無間緣。對方又質問說：各種識有多少生起，如果像色法一樣，就不能成為緣。你們的各種心所法有多少生起，也應該像色法一樣，不能成為緣。解答說：心法和心所法和合在一起，看起來像一個整體，共同辨別一件事，所以可以互為緣。各種識不是這樣，怎麼能互為緣呢？ 然而，各種心所法。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, this commentary is correct. However, one should determine a person's situation based on reason and evidence. Otherwise, if it is merely harm from others, then it is not self-harm. If there is self-harm, then it is not harm from others. Why mention Xiwang (戲忘, meaning playfulness and forgetfulness), Yi (意, meaning intention), Fenhui (憤恚, meaning anger and resentment), Tian (天, meaning gods), and Gala Lanwei (羯剌藍位, referring to the initial state of coagulation of a fetus)? Moreover, since Xiwang Tian (戲忘天, the heaven of playfulness and forgetfulness) and Fenhui Tian (憤恚天, the heaven of anger and resentment) belong to Di Shi (帝釋, Indra), wouldn't they be harmed by Fei Tian (非天, Asuras) when fighting with them? If they are harmed, then this statement is uncertain. In that case, Fo Shi (佛使, Buddha's messengers) and others would have both self-harm and harm from others, both of which are uncertain, leading to confusion. According to the agreement of the Mahayana (大乘, the Great Vehicle school of Buddhism), which is free from confusion, this commentary is correct, without the faults of mutual disturbance, omission, and uncertainty. Furthermore, the Chu Yao Lun (出曜論) mentions the Four Formless Realms (Si Kong Tian, 四空天, the four formless heavens of the Form Realm). Treatise: However, the She Da Cheng Lun (攝大乘論, Compendium of the Mahayana) says that form (色) may also have contiguity condition (Deng Wujian Yuan, 等無間緣, immediately preceding condition), which is a statement of appropriation and denial. The explanation in the third volume of the She Da Cheng Lun says: 'The Jing Bu Shi (經部師, Sautrantika school) holds that form and mind arise without interval, meaning that various forms and minds arise successively one after another. These are the seeds of all dharmas, the causal nature that conditioned phenomena (You Wei Fa, 有為法, conditioned phenomena) can produce.' They believe that from the previous moment of form to the next moment of form, there is uninterrupted arising; from the previous moment of mind to the next moment of mind and the corresponding dharmas, there is also uninterrupted arising (the above is from the treatise). After refuting this, it concludes: 'One should only allow for contiguity condition and dominant condition (Zengshang Yuan, 增上緣, supporting condition), but not direct cause (Yin Yuan, 因緣, direct cause).' Now, pointing out this passage, it indulges the Sautrantikas in having contiguity condition, denying their view that the preceding and following moments are direct causes. If so, why does the first volume of the She Da Cheng Lun say: 'The Sautrantikas do not say that only form is called the contiguity condition of mental dharmas, because this is not present here. The four conditions of mind and mental dharmas are fixed.' The explanation is as the commentary says. Treatise: Therefore, they reciprocally act as contiguity conditions. Question: How many mental dharmas (Xin Suo Fa, 心所法, mental factors) arise to be considered conditions? Why can't various consciousnesses (Shi, 識, consciousnesses), no matter how many arise, be considered conditions? The challenge is: Various consciousnesses arise one after another, and can become conditions for each other. Form arises one after another, and can also become contiguity conditions. The opponent further challenges: If various consciousnesses arise in quantity, and are like form, then they cannot become conditions. Your various mental factors, arising in quantity, should also be like form and not become conditions. The answer is: Mental dharmas combine and appear as one, jointly discerning one thing, so they can be conditions for each other. Various consciousnesses are not like this, so how can they be conditions for each other? However, various mental factors.
非開導依。問心所望王不開導。心所非所依。心王心所既導生。何妨心所亦成依。解云等無間緣義相引。心所可成緣。開導據勝能。非主不成開導依。
疏云如攝論第一云。一法未達未遍知者。此引攝論云佛不為小乘說阿賴耶識。外人即引經文為難。若爾何故經中世尊云。我不說一法未達未遍知。而能永斷一切煩惱成阿羅漢。我唯說言一切法已達已遍知。方能斷惑成阿羅漢。言達無間道。遍知解脫道。此難意云。若不為說阿賴耶識。豈得云於一切法已達遍知。無性為釋。此佛密意說不斷煩惱。以別相聲說總相處。非諸煩惱有各別斷。或取共相無常等行故。不為說阿賴耶識 此意以別相名。意詮生空總相義處方能斷惑。惑共相無常行。非緣別別色等之智。而能斷惑。故言一法未達遍知者。別相之聲。說總相智而能斷惑。非一一法皆達知盡方能斷惑。故不為說阿賴耶識 今瑜伽文亦復如是。意說前各自別識。為后各自別識等無間緣故。于總處說。若彼六識為此六識等。此是別意言聲。于總處轉故 又此言總意別有三。一會前第三云。若此識無間諸識決定生者。若此識及諸識皆是總語。意說各別八識。舉此總聲。非謂諸識許互為緣。一云解第三意。別說后識定生。簡無學最後心。然舉于總諸識生聲。一云會前又此六識
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：非開導所依。問：心所（Cittacaitta，與心相關的心理活動）期望心王（Cittaraja，主要的心識）不開導。答：心所不是心王所依賴的。心王和心所既然能引導產生，為什麼心所不能成為所依呢？解釋說，這是等無間緣（Samanantarapaccaya，無間緣，即緊隨前一剎那生滅的因緣）的意義相互牽引。心所可以成為緣。開導是根據殊勝的功能，不是主要的心識就不能成為開導所依。
疏文中說，如《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第一卷所說：『如果有一種法沒有達到或沒有完全瞭解。』這裡引用《攝大乘論》說，佛不為小乘（Hīnayāna）說阿賴耶識（Ālayavijñāna，藏識）。外道就引用經文來為難。如果這樣，為什麼經中世尊（Śākyamuni，釋迦牟尼佛）說：『我不說有一種法沒有達到或沒有完全瞭解，而能永遠斷除一切煩惱成為阿羅漢（Arhat，阿羅漢）。我只說一切法已經達到和完全瞭解，才能斷除迷惑成為阿羅漢。』所說的『達到』是指無間道（Anantarikamārga，無間道），『完全瞭解』是指解脫道（Vimuktimārga，解脫道）。這個為難的意思是，如果不為他們說阿賴耶識，怎麼能說對於一切法已經達到和完全瞭解呢？無性（Asaṅga，無著）解釋說，這是佛的密意，說的是不斷煩惱，用別相（Visesa-laksana，特殊相）的聲音說總相（Sāmānya-laksana，普遍相）之處。不是諸煩惱有各自的斷除，或者取共同的無常等行（Anitya，無常）的緣故，所以不為他們說阿賴耶識。這個意思是，用別相的名字，意指詮釋生空（Śūnyatā，空性）的總相意義之處才能斷除迷惑。迷惑的共同相是無常等行，不是緣于個別的色等之智，就能斷除迷惑。所以說『一種法沒有達到或完全瞭解』，是指別相的聲音，說的是總相智才能斷除迷惑，不是每一種法都達到和了解完盡才能斷除迷惑。所以不為他們說阿賴耶識。現在《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）的文也是這樣，意思是說前面的各自別識，是後面的各自別識的等無間緣的緣故，所以在總處說。如果這六識為此六識等，這是別意的言語聲音，在總處轉化。還有，這裡說總意別有三種。一是會前第三種說法，『如果這個識無間，諸識決定生起』，『如果這個識及諸識』都是總語，意思是說各自別的八識（Aṣṭavijñāna，八識）。舉這個總聲，不是說諸識允許互相為緣。一種說法是解釋第三種意思，別說后識決定生起，簡別無學（Aśaikṣa，無學）的最後心。然而舉的是總的諸識生起的聲音。一種說法是會前又說這六識。
【English Translation】 English version: Not a support for guidance. Question: The mental concomitants (Cittacaitta) hope that the mind-king (Cittaraja) does not guide. Answer: Mental concomitants are not what the mind-king relies on. Since the mind-king and mental concomitants can guide and produce, why can't mental concomitants also become a support? The explanation is that the meaning of the immediately preceding condition (Samanantarapaccaya) mutually attracts. Mental concomitants can become a condition. Guidance is based on superior function; if it is not the main consciousness, it cannot become a support for guidance.
The commentary says, as the first volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha states: 'If one dharma has not been attained or not fully understood.' Here, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha is quoted to say that the Buddha does not explain the Ālayavijñāna to the Hīnayāna. Outsiders then use the sutra text to challenge. If so, why did the World-Honored One (Śākyamuni) say in the sutra: 'I do not say that one dharma has not been attained or not fully understood, and yet one can permanently cut off all afflictions and become an Arhat.' I only say that all dharmas have been attained and fully understood, and then one can cut off delusion and become an Arhat.' 'Attained' refers to the immediately preceding path (Anantarikamārga), and 'fully understood' refers to the path of liberation (Vimuktimārga). The meaning of this challenge is, if the Ālayavijñāna is not explained to them, how can it be said that all dharmas have been attained and fully understood? Asaṅga explains that this is the Buddha's secret intention, saying that afflictions are not cut off, using the sound of specific characteristics (Visesa-laksana) to speak of the place of general characteristics (Sāmānya-laksana). It is not that all afflictions are cut off individually, or that taking the common impermanence (Anitya) and other practices as the cause, so the Ālayavijñāna is not explained to them. The meaning is that using the name of specific characteristics, intending to explain the meaning of the general characteristic of emptiness (Śūnyatā), one can cut off delusion. The common characteristic of delusion is impermanence and other practices; it is not by relying on the wisdom of individual forms, etc., that one can cut off delusion. Therefore, it is said that 'one dharma has not been attained or fully understood' refers to the sound of specific characteristics, speaking of the wisdom of general characteristics to cut off delusion, not that every dharma must be attained and fully understood to cut off delusion. Therefore, the Ālayavijñāna is not explained to them. The text of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is also like this, meaning that the preceding individual consciousnesses are the immediately preceding condition for the subsequent individual consciousnesses, so it is spoken of in general terms. If these six consciousnesses are like these six consciousnesses, this is the sound of language with a different meaning, transforming in the general place. Furthermore, there are three types of general intention with specific meanings here. One is the third statement from the previous meeting, 'If these consciousnesses are immediately followed by the definite arising of other consciousnesses,' 'If this consciousness and other consciousnesses' are all general terms, meaning the eight consciousnesses (Aṣṭavijñāna) individually. Using this general term does not mean that the consciousnesses are allowed to be causes for each other. One explanation is to interpret the third meaning, specifically saying that the subsequent consciousnesses definitely arise, distinguishing the final mind of the non-learner (Aśaikṣa). However, the general sound of the arising of all consciousnesses is used. One explanation is that the previous meeting also said these six consciousnesses.
為彼六識。意欲別說各自六識。舉彼總聲意目別六。非此六言總含八識云言總意別。何者五十二初舉諸心．心所無間后諸心．心所生。通詮八識。重複言此六彼六。據三乘通說。故不通八。
論。為顯此識依緣同故。有二解。一云依是不共依。緣是因緣依。以總聚言。不須分別種之與現。種不離識自體分故。云依．緣同 又解以總聚言緣第八識。因緣．增上。種．現雖殊總不離第八。但不說等無間非所緣故。此據染說。若無漏位亦緣無間識 二云依所依。緣即所緣。以因緣．增上俱名為依。緣即所緣。即下許第八自體及種子。如次計為我及我所師義。又前二依有勝用故。所以偏說。非謂為顯依．緣同故。以且解依彼轉未解緣彼轉故。然要集云。或可初釋唯俱有依。后釋通二 今謂不爾。若初但一。何故論云俱顯前二。故說有餘。
論釋緣彼。問難陀師計七依本識。亦緣彼相應。何名依彼緣彼。答據執為我名依緣彼。火辨．安惠並準此釋。
問火辨何故不執自體以為我見 答見分作用故執我。自證沉隱故不執之。
安惠破火辨中。有三番問答。初約定。次變不變時。后約凡夫厭色生上不變色難。不同聖者生上變色。
問護法正義七緣八為我。自證緣見作何行相 答不同見分。自證思量見
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了說明那六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）。想要分別說明各自的六識，所以用總括的『意』字來指代各個不同的六識。並非這句『六』字總括包含了八識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識），說是總括而意義有別。什麼是五十二個心所法？最初舉出諸心、心所，無間斷地，後來的諸心、心所生起，普遍地詮釋了八識。重複說『此六』、『彼六』，是根據三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）共通的說法，所以不通於八識。
論：爲了顯示此識（指前六識）所依之緣是相同的，有兩種解釋。一種說法是，『依』是不共依，『緣』是因緣依。用總括的說法，不需要分別種子和現行。因為種子不離識的自體分。所以說『依』、『緣』相同。另一種解釋是用總括的說法，緣第八識（阿賴耶識）的因緣、增上緣。種子和現行雖然不同，總的來說不離第八識。但是不說等無間緣，因為它不是所緣的緣故。這是根據染污來說的。如果是在無漏位，也緣無間識。第二種說法是，『依』是所依，『緣』就是所緣。因為因緣、增上緣都叫做『依』，『緣』就是所緣。就是下面所允許的第八識的自體和種子，依次被計為我及我所，這是師長的意義。又因為前面的兩種『依』有殊勝的作用，所以偏重說明。並非是爲了顯示『依』、『緣』相同，因為只是解釋了依彼而轉，沒有解釋緣彼而轉。然而《集論》說，或許最初的解釋只是俱有依，後來的解釋通於兩種。現在我認為不是這樣。如果最初只是一種，為什麼論中說同時顯示前兩種？所以說還有剩餘的意義。
論釋緣彼。問：難陀師認為七識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）依止本識（阿賴耶識），也緣彼相應法，為什麼叫做依彼緣彼？答：根據執著為我的緣故，叫做依緣彼。火辨、安慧都按照這個解釋。
問：火辨為什麼不執著自體作為我見？答：因為見分有作用，所以執著我。自證分沉寂隱沒，所以不執著它。
安慧破斥火辨的觀點中，有三番問答。最初是約定，其次是變與不變的時候，最後是關於凡夫厭惡色而生起上界的不變色之難，不同於聖者生起上界的變化色。
問：護法的正義是七識緣八識作為我，自證分緣見分作何種行相？答：不同於見分，自證分思量見分。
【English Translation】 English version: To explain those six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness). Wanting to separately explain each of the six consciousnesses, the general term 'mind' is used to refer to the different six. It is not that this word 'six' generally includes the eight consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness, manas consciousness, and alaya consciousness), saying it is general but with different meanings. What are the fifty-two mental factors? Initially, the various minds and mental factors are mentioned, without interruption, and the subsequent arising of minds and mental factors universally explains the eight consciousnesses. The repetition of 'these six' and 'those six' is based on the common teachings of the Three Vehicles (Sravaka Vehicle, Pratyekabuddha Vehicle, and Bodhisattva Vehicle), so it does not extend to the eight consciousnesses.
Treatise: To show that the conditions relied upon by this consciousness (referring to the first six consciousnesses) are the same, there are two explanations. One explanation is that 'reliance' is the uncommon reliance, and 'condition' is the causal condition. Using a general statement, there is no need to distinguish between seeds and manifestations. Because seeds are not separate from the self-nature division of consciousness. Therefore, it is said that 'reliance' and 'condition' are the same. Another explanation is to use a general statement, referring to the causal and dominant conditions of the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness). Although seeds and manifestations are different, generally speaking, they are not separate from the eighth consciousness. However, the immediate condition is not mentioned because it is not the object of cognition. This is based on defilement. If it is in the state of non-outflow, it also conditions the immediate consciousness. The second explanation is that 'reliance' is what is relied upon, and 'condition' is what is conditioned. Because causal and dominant conditions are both called 'reliance', and 'condition' is what is conditioned. That is, the self-nature and seeds of the eighth consciousness, which are allowed below, are successively regarded as self and what belongs to self, which is the meaning of the teacher. Moreover, because the previous two 'reliances' have superior functions, they are emphasized. It is not to show that 'reliance' and 'condition' are the same, because it only explains relying on it to turn, and does not explain conditioning it to turn. However, the Compendium of Determinations says that perhaps the initial explanation is only the co-existent reliance, and the later explanation applies to both. Now I think it is not like this. If there is only one initially, why does the treatise say that it simultaneously shows the previous two? Therefore, it is said that there is remaining meaning.
The treatise explains 'conditioning it'. Question: Nanda teacher believes that the seven consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, mind consciousness, manas consciousness, and alaya consciousness) rely on the original consciousness (Alaya consciousness) and also condition its corresponding dharmas, why is it called relying on it and conditioning it? Answer: According to the attachment to self, it is called relying on and conditioning it. Huobian and Anhui both follow this explanation.
Question: Why doesn't Huobian cling to the self-nature as the view of self? Answer: Because the seeing division has a function, it clings to self. The self-awareness division is silent and hidden, so it does not cling to it.
In Anhui's refutation of Huobian's view, there are three rounds of questions and answers. The first is the agreement, the second is the time of change and non-change, and the last is about the difficulty of ordinary people disliking form and giving rise to the unchanging form of the upper realm, which is different from the changing form of the upper realm arising from sages.
Question: According to the correct meaning of Dharmapala, the seven consciousnesses condition the eighth consciousness as self, what kind of activity does the self-awareness division perform when conditioning the seeing division? Answer: Different from the seeing division, the self-awareness division contemplates the seeing division.
分之時。不作內外我非我解。但冥證見體。亦如邪見緣外之時。見之自證緣見之時。但證見體不同邪見。
問論無一心中有斷．常見故。我．我所執不俱起者。何故分別行緣蘊。不分別所起處等起我我所見耶 答二十句等。雖同依色蘊等不是同時。前後別起故即無妨 問斷．常依惠立。二見不併生。二執一惠生。兩執不併起 答斷．常境別。二執境同。
思量為性相。問既恒思量所執我相。與我見何別。俱作我解故。復何不名我見 答我見推求並作我解。此作我解而不推求。故不名我見 問何以得知心作我解 答準心所知。既云我愛．我慢等。當爾彼愛等。若不作我解。貪愛於何。又亦不應名我愛等。由此準知。心王亦作我解 若爾心王應取別相 答不爾。即此我境是總相故。領納屬於順益己相。而貪愛等方為別相。論說唯言故 問我無我等是其差別。何名總相 答準諸法自性差別。名非總相可爾。今心王所取總相。心所所取別相。與彼有別。于彼自性差別之上。各有總相．別相故。不爾王．所境應差別。故知我者即是境之總相。於我之上可意．不可意等方是別相 又有解云。心王亦取別相。辨中邊論云。心王亦能取總．別相。今撿彼論第一云。唯能了境總相名心。亦了差別名為受等。準此心王不取別相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當（意識）分離的時候，不產生內外、我、非我的理解。只是默默地證實所見之本體，也像邪見緣于外境的時候一樣。見（意識）的自證緣于見（行為）的時候，只是證實所見之本體，這與邪見不同。
問：如果按照論典所說，一個心中有斷見和常見，因為我執和我所執不會同時生起，那麼為什麼分別行緣于蘊的時候，不分別所生起之處等，生起我見和我所見呢？答：二十句等，雖然同樣依賴於色蘊等，但不是同時生起，而是前後分別生起，所以沒有妨礙。問：斷見和常見依賴於智慧而建立，這兩種見解不會同時產生，兩種執著由一個智慧產生，這兩種執著不會同時生起。答：斷見和常見的境界不同，兩種執著的境界相同。
思量是（我見的）體性和相狀。問：既然恒常思量所執著的我相，這與我見有什麼區別？都產生對我的理解。又為什麼不稱為我見呢？答：我見是推求併產生對我的理解，而這種（思量）產生對我的理解但不推求，所以不稱為我見。問：如何得知心產生對我的理解呢？答：參照心所（Citta-cetasika）可知。既然說『我愛』（atta-sneha）、『我慢』（atta-mana）等，應當如此理解彼愛等。如果不產生對我的理解，貪愛于什麼呢？又也不應該稱為我愛等。由此參照可知，心王（Citta）也產生對我的理解。如果這樣，心王應該取不同的相狀。答：不是這樣。即此我境是總相的緣故。領納屬於順益自己的相狀，而貪愛等才是別相。論典只說了（總相）。問：我、無我等是其差別，為什麼稱為總相？答：參照諸法自性的差別，稱為非總相是可以的。現在心王所取的是總相，心所所取的是別相，與彼（諸法自性）有區別。于彼自性差別之上，各有總相、別相的緣故。否則，心王和心所的境界應該有差別。所以知道我者，就是境界的總相。於我之上，可意、不可意等才是別相。又有解釋說，心王也取別相。《辨中邊論》（Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya）說，心王也能取總相、別相。現在檢查彼論第一（品）說，唯能了知境界總相名為心，也能了知差別名為受等。參照此（論），心王不取別相。
【English Translation】 English version: At the time of separation, there is no arising of understanding of internal and external, self, and non-self. One merely silently verifies the essence of what is seen, just as when a false view is conditioned by an external object. When the self-verification of seeing (consciousness) is conditioned by seeing (action), one merely verifies the essence of what is seen, which is different from false views.
Question: If, according to the treatises, there are both annihilationism (Ucchedavāda) and eternalism (Sassatavāda) in one mind, because the attachment to 'I' (Atman) and 'mine' (Atmiya) do not arise simultaneously, then why, when the respective actions are conditioned by the aggregates (Skandha), is there no distinction made between the place of arising, etc., and the arising of the view of 'I' and 'mine'? Answer: The twenty phrases, etc., although similarly dependent on the aggregate of form (Rupa-skandha), etc., do not arise simultaneously but separately, one after the other, so there is no contradiction. Question: Annihilationism and eternalism are established based on wisdom (Prajna); these two views do not arise simultaneously, and two attachments arise from one wisdom; these two attachments do not arise simultaneously. Answer: The objects of annihilationism and eternalism are different, while the objects of the two attachments are the same.
Reflection is the nature and characteristic (of the view of self). Question: Since one constantly reflects on the characteristic of 'I' that is clung to, what is the difference between this and the view of 'I'? Both give rise to the understanding of 'I'. Why is it not called the view of 'I'? Answer: The view of 'I' involves investigation and the arising of the understanding of 'I', while this (reflection) gives rise to the understanding of 'I' without investigation, so it is not called the view of 'I'. Question: How can one know that the mind gives rise to the understanding of 'I'? Answer: It can be inferred from the mental factors (Citta-cetasika). Since it is said 'love of self' (atta-sneha), 'pride of self' (atta-mana), etc., one should understand these loves, etc., in this way. If there is no arising of the understanding of 'I', what is the object of attachment? And it should not be called 'love of self', etc. From this inference, one knows that the mind-king (Citta) also gives rise to the understanding of 'I'. If so, the mind-king should grasp different characteristics. Answer: It is not so. This object of 'I' is the general characteristic (Samanya-lakshana). Reception (Vedana) belongs to the characteristic of benefiting oneself, while attachment, etc., are specific characteristics (Vishesha-lakshana). The treatises only mention (the general characteristic). Question: 'I', 'non-I', etc., are their differences; why are they called general characteristics? Answer: Referring to the differences in the self-nature of all dharmas, it is acceptable to call them non-general characteristics. Now, what the mind-king grasps is the general characteristic, and what the mental factors grasp is the specific characteristic, which is different from those (self-natures of dharmas). Above those differences in self-nature, there are general and specific characteristics. Otherwise, the objects of the mind-king and mental factors should be different. Therefore, knowing 'I' is the general characteristic of the object. Above 'I', pleasant, unpleasant, etc., are specific characteristics. There is also an explanation that the mind-king also grasps specific characteristics. The Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya says that the mind-king can also grasp general and specific characteristics. Now, examining the first (chapter) of that treatise, it says that only the understanding of the general characteristic of the object is called mind, and the understanding of differences is called reception, etc. Referring to this (treatise), the mind-king does not grasp specific characteristics.
。此論第五亦識能了別事之總相不言了別事之別相 問心王既作我解即是我執。云何第八卷護法正義。云執我法者必是惠故。不說所餘 答心雖作我相而不執之。執者是惠故 又釋云。彼據勝說。及根本說。此據相從。必由於惠方能起執。非於此聚而無有惠可起執者故。言必是惠故。不障相應亦有二執 問貪等皆有執者。疑有執不 答執必見俱。疑非見並。又執必決。疑不決故。疑不是執 問如思相應業之眷屬。亦立業名。與見相應見之眷屬。何不名見 答業是造作義 俱能造作未來果。及所造事業。故俱名業。見者推求。相應非推求故不名見 又釋克性即非。相從亦見。如似智惠相從俱名智惠故 問執我是惠能。同聚俱執我。推求是惠用。相應亦推求 答推求是見。余法不推求。執者堅取義。同聚俱執我。
問既恒審思量與思何別 答通．別有異。此但思我。彼思一切 問未轉可爾。已轉如何。已轉通緣一切法故 答亦總．別緣。勝劣有異。王取總相勝。所取別相勝。不爾果位王．所二種俱能遍緣。如何取別。然第五云。心王取總相。心所通總．別。且據因說。若在果位。王．所俱能緣一切法取總．別相。但勝劣異。
西明云。何故釋名門但解末那。三性門中即解心所。解云理實于諸門中皆有二義。影
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：此論第五也認識到能辨別事物總相的識，而不說辨別事物別相的識。問：心王既然產生『我』的理解，那就是我執。為什麼第八卷護法（Vasubandhu）的正義說：『執著於我法的一定是智慧』，而不說其他的？答：心雖然產生『我』的相狀，但不執著於它。執著的是智慧。又解釋說：那是根據殊勝的說法和根本的說法。這裡是根據相隨的說法，必定由於智慧才能生起執著。不是說在這個聚合中沒有智慧可以生起執著，所以說『一定是智慧』。不障礙相應的也有兩種執著。問：貪等都有執著，疑惑是否有執著？答：執著必定與見（dṛṣṭi）同時生起，疑惑不是與見並生。而且執著必定是決定的，疑惑是不決定的，所以疑惑不是執著。問：如與思（cetanā）相應的業的眷屬，也立為業名，與見相應的見的眷屬，為什麼不名為見？答：業是造作的意思，都能造作未來的果，以及所造的事業，所以都名為業。見是推求，相應不是推求，所以不名為見。又解釋說克性（Krakucchanda）即非，相隨也是見，如相似的智慧，相隨都名為智慧。問：執著『我』是智慧的功能，同聚一起執著『我』，推求是智慧的作用，相應也推求。答：推求是見，其餘法不推求。執著是堅固取著的意思，同聚一起執著『我』。 問：既然恒常審細地思量，與思有什麼區別？答：通和別有差異。這裡只是思量『我』，那裡是思量一切。問：未轉依（āśraya-parāvṛtti）時可以這樣說，已轉依時如何？已轉依時通緣一切法。答：也是總和別地緣。殊勝和低劣有差異。心王（citta）取總相殊勝，心所（caitta）取別相殊勝。不然，果位時心王和心所兩種都能普遍地緣，如何取別相？然而第五說：心王取總相，心所通總和別。且根據因位說。若在果位，心王和心所都能緣一切法，取總和別相，但殊勝和低劣有差異。 西明（Ximing Temple）說：為什麼釋名門只解釋末那（manas），三性門中就解釋心所？解釋說：理實在各個門中都有兩種意義，影。
【English Translation】 English version: This fifth treatise also recognizes the consciousness that can distinguish the general characteristics of things, but does not speak of the consciousness that distinguishes the specific characteristics of things. Question: Since the mind-king (citta) produces the understanding of 'I', that is ego-attachment (ātma-graha). Why does the Righteousness of Vasubandhu in the eighth volume say: 'Those who are attached to the self and the dharma must be wisdom (prajñā),' and not say others? Answer: Although the mind produces the appearance of 'I', it does not cling to it. It is wisdom that clings. Another explanation says: That is based on the superior statement and the fundamental statement. This is based on the statement of following along, and attachment can only arise from wisdom. It is not that there is no wisdom in this aggregate that can give rise to attachment, so it is said that 'it must be wisdom'. There are also two kinds of attachments that do not hinder correspondence. Question: All of greed and the like have attachments, is there doubt about having attachments? Answer: Attachment must arise simultaneously with view (dṛṣṭi), doubt does not arise together with view. Moreover, attachment must be decisive, doubt is not decisive, so doubt is not attachment. Question: Like the retinue of karma corresponding to thought (cetanā), it is also established as the name of karma. Why is the retinue of view corresponding to view not called view? Answer: Karma means creation, both can create future fruits, as well as the created undertakings, so both are called karma. View is investigation, correspondence is not investigation, so it is not called view. Another explanation says that Krakucchanda is not, following along is also view, such as similar wisdom, following along are both called wisdom. Question: Attachment to 'I' is the function of wisdom, clinging to 'I' together in the same aggregate, investigation is the effect of wisdom, correspondence also investigates. Answer: Investigation is view, the remaining dharmas do not investigate. Attachment means firmly grasping, clinging to 'I' together in the same aggregate. Question: Since it is constantly and carefully thinking, what is the difference between this and thought? Answer: There are differences in generality and specificity. Here it is only thinking about 'I', there it is thinking about everything. Question: It can be said like this before the transformation of the basis (āśraya-parāvṛtti), what about after the transformation of the basis? After the transformation of the basis, it universally conditions all dharmas. Answer: It also conditions generally and specifically. There are differences in superiority and inferiority. The mind-king (citta) takes the general characteristics as superior, and the mental functions (caitta) take the specific characteristics as superior. Otherwise, in the fruition position, both the mind-king and the mental functions can universally condition, how can they take specific characteristics? However, the fifth says: The mind-king takes the general characteristics, and the mental functions communicate both general and specific. And according to the causal position. If in the fruition position, both the mind-king and the mental functions can condition all dharmas, taking general and specific characteristics, but there are differences in superiority and inferiority. Ximing Temple said: Why does the chapter on explaining names only explain manas, and the chapter on the three natures explain mental functions? The explanation says: In fact, there are two meanings in each chapter, shadow.
略互顯 今謂有餘。若言諸門皆有二義。釋王有覆性。所亦性同。于余門中若皆如是者。心王四惑俱。豈我見等亦四惑俱耶。故思為性相者。但解于王。心所不爾。設心所思 個思量。所餘心所非恒思量。又思雖有思量之義。不以思量釋思性相。然辨三性門中解心所者。以彼心所有貪．慢等。不知不善為有覆性。王由相應得成三性。所由所依是有覆故雙問答。至下更釋。此問本意自釋第二變。不解心所。不可門門皆相影顯。
問言四惑俱我癡．我見。如論自辨。愛有四種。慢七．九種。是何愛．慢 答是總愛。以緣我故非余行相。七慢之中是我慢攝。我慢恒起。非九慢類。
論。及余觸等俱。有二師釋。初師二解。一四惑余。一無覆性余 若爾後言有覆性攝。豈不重耶 答此師解余有其二義。一遮。二表。今取遮義。五遍行法前與八俱。亦與七俱。恐同於前是無覆性。故余言遮。後言有覆攝者是其表義故無有過。
簡別境五中。問此師第七何無慾耶 答緣未遂境可有欲生。此識緣我恒遂無慾 難七緣境恒遂。不希未遂無慾俱。佛果所緣恒現前。無彼未合欲不起 答佛果悲願度眾生。境界雖現欲無減。因中我法恒現取無愿不希非欲並 又釋如疏。餘四準此。
問此師何故七非隨俱 答此師意說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 略互顯：現在說『有餘』。如果說各個『門』都有兩種含義，解釋『王』（心王，指八識）具有『有覆性』（指能覆蓋真性的性質）。『所』（心所，指伴隨心王生起的各種心理活動）的性質也相同。如果在其他的『門』中都像這樣，那麼『心王』和四種煩惱（四惑）就同時存在。難道『我見』等也和四惑同時存在嗎？所以，認為『思』是自性的觀點，只解釋了『王』，而沒有解釋『心所』。假設『心所』的『思』是個別的『思量』，那麼其餘的『心所』就不是恒常的『思量』。而且，『思』雖然有『思量』的含義，但不能用『思量』來解釋『思』的自性和性質。然而，在辨別『三性』（善性、惡性、無記性）的『門』中，解釋『心所』時，因為那些『心所』具有貪、慢等，不知道不善是有覆性。『王』由於相應而成為『三性』。『所』由於所依是有覆的，所以雙重提問和回答。到下面會進一步解釋。這個提問的本意是自己解釋第二種變化，不理解『心所』，就不能使各個『門』都相互影顯。
提問：四惑同時存在，即『我癡』、『我見』。就像論中自己辨別的那樣，愛有四種，慢有七種或九種。這是什麼樣的愛和慢？回答：是總愛，因為它緣于『我』，而不是其他的行相。七慢之中，是『我慢』所包含的。『我慢』恒常生起，而不是九慢的種類。
論：以及其餘的觸等同時存在。有兩種解釋。第一種解釋有兩種說法：一是四惑和『余』（指除了四惑之外的其他心所），二是無覆性的『余』。如果這樣，後面說『有覆性』包含，豈不是重複了嗎？回答：這種解釋的『余』有兩種含義：一是遮止，二是表述。現在取遮止的含義。五遍行法（觸、作意、受、想、思）前面與八個心所同時存在，也與七個心所同時存在，恐怕和前面一樣是無覆性，所以用『余』來遮止。後面說『有覆性』包含，是表述的含義，所以沒有過失。
簡別境五中，提問：這種解釋中，為什麼第七識沒有『欲』？回答：緣于未遂的境界，可能會產生『欲』。這個識緣于『我』，恒常遂意，所以沒有『欲』。難：第七識緣于境界恒常遂意，不希望未遂，所以沒有『欲』。佛果所緣的境界恒常現前，沒有那些未結合的，所以『欲』不會生起。回答：佛果有悲願來度化眾生，境界雖然現前，但『欲』沒有減少。因地中的『我』和『法』恒常顯現，取用，沒有願望，不希望，所以『非欲』並存。又解釋如疏中所示。其餘四種（作意、受、想、思）可以參照這個解釋。
提問：這種解釋中，為什麼第七識不是隨煩惱同時生起？回答：這種解釋的意思是說
【English Translation】 English version Slight mutual manifestation: Now it is said 'there is remainder'. If it is said that each 'gate' (referring to aspects of consciousness) has two meanings, it explains that 'King' (referring to the mind-king, the eight consciousnesses) has 'covered nature' (referring to the nature that can cover the true nature). The nature of 'what belongs' (referring to mental activities that arise with the mind-king) is also the same. If in other 'gates' it is all like this, then 'mind-king' and the four afflictions (four delusions) exist simultaneously. Could it be that 'self-view' and others also exist simultaneously with the four delusions? Therefore, the view that 'thought' is the nature only explains 'King', but does not explain 'what belongs to the mind'. Suppose the 'thought' of 'what belongs to the mind' is an individual 'thinking', then the remaining 'mental activities' are not constant 'thinking'. Moreover, although 'thought' has the meaning of 'thinking', it cannot use 'thinking' to explain the nature and characteristics of 'thought'. However, in distinguishing the 'three natures' (good nature, evil nature, neutral nature), when explaining 'what belongs to the mind', because those 'mental activities' have greed, arrogance, etc., they do not know that non-virtue has a covering nature. 'King' becomes the 'three natures' due to correspondence. 'What belongs' is based on what is relied upon having a covering nature, so there is a double question and answer. It will be further explained below. The original intention of this question is to explain the second transformation itself. If you do not understand 'what belongs to the mind', you cannot make each 'gate' mutually manifest.
Question: The four delusions exist simultaneously, namely 'self-ignorance' and 'self-view'. Just as the treatise itself distinguishes, there are four types of love, and seven or nine types of arrogance. What kind of love and arrogance is this? Answer: It is general love, because it is based on 'self', not other aspects. Among the seven arrogances, it is included in 'self-arrogance'. 'Self-arrogance' constantly arises, not the kind of nine arrogances.
Treatise: And the remaining contacts, etc., exist simultaneously. There are two explanations. The first explanation has two statements: one is the four delusions and 'remainder' (referring to other mental activities besides the four delusions), and the other is the 'remainder' of non-covered nature. If so, isn't it redundant to say later that 'covered nature' is included? Answer: The 'remainder' in this explanation has two meanings: one is to prevent, and the other is to express. Now we take the meaning of prevention. The five omnipresent dharmas (contact, attention, feeling, conception, thought) exist simultaneously with eight mental activities in front, and also exist simultaneously with seven mental activities. Fearing that it is the same as the previous non-covered nature, the word 'remainder' is used to prevent it. The later statement that 'covered nature' is included is the meaning of expression, so there is no fault.
In distinguishing the five objects, question: In this explanation, why does the seventh consciousness not have 'desire'? Answer: 'Desire' may arise from an unfulfilled state. This consciousness is based on 'self', always fulfilling, so there is no 'desire'. Difficulty: The seventh consciousness is always fulfilled based on the state, does not hope for unfulfilled, so there is no 'desire'. The state that the Buddha-fruit relies on is always present, without those uncombined, so 'desire' will not arise. Answer: The Buddha-fruit has compassion and vows to save sentient beings. Although the state is present, 'desire' is not reduced. In the causal ground, 'self' and 'dharma' always appear, taken and used, without wishes, without hope, so 'non-desire' coexists. Another explanation is as shown in the commentary. The remaining four (attention, feeling, conception, thought) can refer to this explanation.
Question: In this explanation, why does the seventh consciousness not arise simultaneously with the secondary afflictions? Answer: The meaning of this explanation is that
。二十隨惑。雜集論說皆假有故。依根本惑分位立之。此識俱惑恒無間斷無分位故不得並。又五十八云。諸隨煩惱皆是煩惱品類 若爾何故抉擇五十五云。無慚．無愧．不信．懈怠是實物有。放逸是假有。餘者論說是世俗有耶 答此師意說。假者有二。一相待假。二分位假。前無實體。分位假者而是有體。雲實有者據分位說。云世俗者通於假實。以相待．分位俱名為假。
問實有假有理可易知。世俗有言應須分別。唯識論等說沈．掉等是別有體。如何大論云世俗有 答言世俗有者非謂假有。不同放逸定是假故。不同無慚等四依勝道理別有體用不名實有。此沈．掉等皆他等流。別有體性義非勝顯不名勝義有。非體假無名世俗有。
問論會違云。依二十二隨煩惱說者。準百法論二十隨惑成於百法。瑜伽論中惑說二十二．二十四．二十六。應不唯百法。
答大論中據取別境及四不定是染性者。煩惱等流品類不同說多少別。離彼二位更無別法。百法論等據其體性有差別者但說百法。亦不相違。
論。言要緣曾受境類者。有二說。一云境類者。緣滅．道時但緣其名名亦為境。此境是滅．道類。二云境體之類。如緣苦．集親符其體。亦已曾受后復緣時。言緣境類。即前體類。余準此釋 又云名是名類。謂
先聞緣今復聞緣。二名是體之類。謂先見體今復緣名。三體是體之類。四體是名之類。準前可解。
問護法正義云。非諸染心皆緣曾受境。及邪簡擇故忘念．不正知依念．惠者不遍染心。依無明立即遍染心者。如緣現在復非簡擇。起此忘念．不正知時。與無明俱不。若許俱者。忿等應嗔俱。若不俱者。應非遍染 答義別說之。猶如見．惠。雖不相應可得俱起。以他性相應非自性故。
問如緣曾境及邪簡擇起忘念等。依二法立。為一忘念等。為有二耶 答疏有二解。后說為正 然要集云。有說兩說皆違第六。故第六云。染念．染惠雖非念．惠俱。而癡分者亦得相應。既廣破已彼自釋云。若無念．惠。唯癡上立。若念．惠起。即與無明各二法立。即自問云。既二並起為一為異。答謂攬二分假立一法。具含二義。故癡分義念．惠相應。念惠分義非念．惠俱。與癡相應故無有過 今謂此說即是前明。何勞別說 本疏云。惑總依惠．無明立一不正知。不正知是假。不可言有二。今云攬二分假立一法。豈非前明。本疏引例。如放逸等依四法立。不約貪等別。說二相應故。此意放逸雖依貪立。二得相應據余分說。說遍染故。例不正知等相應亦爾。何勞更言故癡分義念．惠相應。念惠分義非念．惠俱。與癡相應故無有失耶
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『先聞緣今復聞緣』（先前聽聞的緣，現在又聽聞的緣）。『二名是體之類』（兩種名稱是本體的類別）。意思是先前見到本體，現在又聽聞名稱。『三體是體之類』（三種本體是本體的類別）。『四體是名之類』（四種本體是名稱的類別）。參照前面的解釋就可以理解。
問：護法（Dharmapāla）的正義說，不是所有的染污心都緣于曾經領受的境界，以及邪惡的簡擇。所以忘念（Muṣitasmṛtitā，正念的缺失）、不正知（Asamprajanya，對現實的錯誤認知）依賴於念（Smṛti，正念）、慧（Prajñā，智慧）的，並不普遍存在於染污心中。如果依賴於無明（Avidyā，無知）就立即普遍存在於染污心中，比如緣于現在，又不是簡擇，生起這種忘念、不正知的時候，與無明同時存在嗎？如果允許同時存在，那麼忿（Krodha，憤怒）等應該與嗔（Dveṣa，嗔恨）同時存在。如果不允許同時存在，那麼應該不是普遍存在於染污心中。 答：意義不同，所以這樣說。猶如見（Darśana，見解）、慧（Prajñā，智慧），雖然不相應，也可以同時生起。因為他是異性相應，不是自性相應。
問：如果緣于曾經的境界以及邪惡的簡擇而生起忘念等，依賴於兩種法而成立。是一種忘念等，還是有兩種呢？ 答：疏（對經文的註釋）有兩種解釋。後面的說法是正確的。 然而《要集》說，有人說兩種說法都違背了第六識（第六意識，mano-vijñāna）。所以第六識說，染污的念（Smṛti，正念）、染污的慧（Prajñā，智慧）雖然不是念、慧同時存在，但是屬於癡（Moha，愚癡）的部分也可以相應。既然已經廣泛破斥了，他自己解釋說，如果沒有念、慧，只在癡上成立。如果念、慧生起，就與無明各自兩種法成立。他自己問，既然兩種同時生起，是一還是異？回答說，是總括兩種部分假立一種法，包含兩種意義。所以癡的部分的意義與念、慧相應，念慧的部分的意義不是念、慧同時存在，與癡相應，所以沒有過失。現在我認為這種說法就是前面所說的，何必另外再說呢？ 本疏說，迷惑總的來說依賴於慧、無明而成立一種不正知。不正知是假立的，不能說有兩種。現在說總括兩種部分假立一種法，難道不是前面所說的嗎？本疏引用例子，如放逸（Pramāda，放縱）等依賴於四種法而成立，不特別針對貪（Lobha，貪婪）等，說兩種相應。這個意思是放逸雖然依賴於貪而成立，兩種可以相應，是根據其餘部分來說的，說普遍存在於染污心中。例如不正知等相應也是這樣。何必再說癡的部分的意義與念、慧相應，念慧的部分的意義不是念、慧同時存在，與癡相應，所以沒有過失呢？
【English Translation】 English version 'First hearing of condition, now again hearing of condition.' 'Two names are types of substance.' Meaning, previously seeing the substance, now again hearing the name. 'Three substances are types of substance.' 'Four substances are types of name.' Understandable by referring to the previous explanation.
Question: Dharmapāla's (Protector of the Dharma) correct meaning says, not all defiled minds are conditioned by previously experienced realms, and evil discernment. Therefore, forgetfulness (Muṣitasmṛtitā, absence of mindfulness), non-correct knowledge (Asamprajanya, incorrect cognition of reality) relying on mindfulness (Smṛti, correct mindfulness), wisdom (Prajñā, wisdom), are not universally present in defiled minds. If relying on ignorance (Avidyā, ignorance) immediately universally present in defiled minds, such as being conditioned by the present, and not discernment, when this forgetfulness, non-correct knowledge arises, does it coexist with ignorance? If allowing coexistence, then anger (Krodha, wrath) etc. should coexist with hatred (Dveṣa, aversion). If not allowing coexistence, then it should not be universally present in defiled minds. Answer: The meaning is different, so it is said this way. Like seeing (Darśana, view), wisdom (Prajñā, wisdom), although not corresponding, can arise simultaneously. Because it is heterogenous correspondence, not self-nature correspondence.
Question: If forgetfulness etc. arises from being conditioned by past realms and evil discernment, relying on two dharmas to establish. Is it one forgetfulness etc., or are there two? Answer: The commentary (annotation on the sutra) has two explanations. The latter saying is correct. However, the Essential Collection says, some say both sayings violate the sixth consciousness (sixth consciousness, mano-vijñāna). Therefore, the sixth consciousness says, defiled mindfulness (Smṛti, correct mindfulness), defiled wisdom (Prajñā, wisdom) although not mindfulness, wisdom coexisting, but belonging to the part of delusion (Moha, delusion) can also correspond. Since it has been widely refuted, he himself explains, if there is no mindfulness, wisdom, it is only established on delusion. If mindfulness, wisdom arises, then it is established with ignorance as two dharmas each. He himself asks, since the two arise simultaneously, are they one or different? The answer is, it is a general summary of two parts, falsely establishing one dharma, containing two meanings. Therefore, the meaning of the part of delusion corresponds to mindfulness, wisdom, the meaning of the part of mindfulness and wisdom is not mindfulness, wisdom coexisting, corresponding to delusion, so there is no fault. Now I think this saying is what was said before, why bother saying it again? The original commentary says, confusion generally relies on wisdom, ignorance to establish one non-correct knowledge. Non-correct knowledge is falsely established, it cannot be said that there are two. Now saying that it is a general summary of two parts, falsely establishing one dharma, isn't it what was said before? The original commentary cites examples, such as negligence (Pramāda, negligence) etc. relying on four dharmas to establish, not specifically targeting greed (Lobha, greed) etc., saying that the two correspond. The meaning of this is that although negligence relies on greed to establish, the two can correspond, it is based on the remaining parts, saying that it is universally present in defiled minds. For example, the correspondence of non-correct knowledge etc. is also like this. Why bother saying again that the meaning of the part of delusion corresponds to mindfulness, wisdom, the meaning of the part of mindfulness and wisdom is not mindfulness, wisdom coexisting, corresponding to delusion, so there is no fault?
又復彼說自有過失。何者彼云。或可念．惠．無明各別立一。雖有多種相用無別故說為一。二十隨惑等但說一故。據實有多。隨用立多而體非多。故說事等約體說等。用望于體不說相應。非他性故。若爾不害．無嗔二數應不相應。第六云信等皆遍善心故。解云但云遍善不言相應。亦不言俱故無有過 今難彼云。既云各別立一。即有多放逸等。若用若體俱多法故。何得云等。非受．想等有多並故 又云。不害．無嗔彼但云遍不言相應。亦不言俱者。豈許不害．無嗔前後別起言不俱起。故依雖別。取各功能假立為一。名為體等。不害．無嗔雖不相應而許俱起 問且如不翻別境入隨惑中。別境染念．染惠。亦名忘念及不正知不。若不爾者應非是染。以正念．正知故。若許亦名忘念及不正知者。與隨惑中二法何別 答別境中忘念者。謂於過去曾受境界忘追憶故。隨中忘念只忘失正念。不要忘念過去之境 問若爾前善心中。不能記憶曾所受境應非忘念。以非染故 答起善心時。雖有不能憶過去境。而於現境能正念故 問緣現可爾。緣過如何(思之)。若別境中惡惠必邪簡擇。隨中惡惠能惡于惠。即令知不正。非要邪簡擇。又假．實殊。有無體別。隨惑但作用。而無別自體。別境有別體。
成唯識論了義燈卷第四(終)
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：此外，對方的說法本身也存在過失。他們說：『或者可以認爲念(smṛti，憶念)、惠(prajñā，智慧)、無明(avidyā，對事物真相的迷惑)各自獨立存在。雖然有多種作用和表現，但因為沒有本質上的區別，所以說它們是一個。』二十種隨煩惱等只是被說成一個，實際上有很多。根據作用而說成多個，但本體並非多個。因此，說事等是就本體而言的相等。作用相對於本體，不能說是相應，因為它們不是不同的性質。如果這樣，那麼不害(ahimsa，不傷害)和無嗔(adveṣa，不嗔恨)這兩個心所就應該不相應。第六識說信(śraddhā，信仰)等都遍及善心，所以解釋說只是說遍及善心，沒有說相應，也沒有說同時，所以沒有過失。現在反駁他們說：既然說各自獨立存在，那麼就有很多放逸等。無論是作用還是本體，都是多種法，怎麼能說是相等呢？不是受(vedanā，感受)、想(saṃjñā，表象)等有很多並存嗎？又說：『不害和無嗔，他們只是說遍及，沒有說相應，也沒有說同時。』難道允許不害和無嗔前後分別生起，說不是同時生起嗎？所以，雖然所依不同，但取各自的功能，假立為一個，名為本體相等。不害和無嗔雖然不相應，但允許同時生起。問：比如不翻譯別境(viṣaya，認識對像)而將其歸入隨煩惱中，別境中的染念(kliṣṭa-smṛti，被染污的憶念)和染惠(kliṣṭa-prajñā，被染污的智慧)，也可以稱為忘念(muṣitasmṛtitā，失去正念)和不正知(asaṃprajanya，缺乏正知)嗎？如果不是這樣，那麼就應該不是染污的，因為有正念(samyak-smṛti，正確的憶念)和正知(samyak-prajñā，正確的認知)。如果允許也稱為忘念和不正知，那麼與隨煩惱中的這兩種法有什麼區別？答：別境中的忘念，是指對於過去曾經感受過的境界，忘記追憶。隨煩惱中的忘念只是忘記失去正念，不一定要忘記過去之境。問：如果這樣，那麼之前的善心中，不能記憶曾經感受過的境界，應該不是忘念，因為不是染污的。答：生起善心時，雖然有不能憶起過去境界的情況，但對於現在的境界能夠保持正念。問：緣于現在的境界可以這樣說，緣於過去的境界又該如何解釋（思考）？如果別境中的惡惠(durbuddhi，惡慧)必然是邪惡的簡擇，那麼隨煩惱中的惡惠能夠惡于惠，即使知不正，也非要邪惡的簡擇。而且，假和實不同，有和無本體上的區別。隨煩惱只是作用，而沒有獨立的自體。別境有獨立的本體。 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第四（終）
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, their own argument contains flaws. What are they? They say: 'Perhaps mindfulness (smṛti), wisdom (prajñā), and ignorance (avidyā) can each be established as separate entities. Although they have various functions and manifestations, they are said to be one because they have no essential difference.' The twenty secondary afflictions (upa-kleśa) are only spoken of as one, but in reality, there are many. According to their function, they are spoken of as many, but their essence is not many. Therefore, saying that things are equal refers to equality in essence. Function in relation to essence cannot be said to be corresponding, because they are not of a different nature. If that is the case, then non-harming (ahimsa) and non-hatred (adveṣa) should not be corresponding. The sixth consciousness says that faith (śraddhā) and so on pervade all wholesome minds, so it is explained that it only says pervades wholesome minds, it does not say corresponding, nor does it say simultaneous, so there is no fault. Now, I refute them by saying: Since it is said that each is established separately, then there are many instances of laxity and so on. Whether it is function or essence, they are all multiple dharmas, so how can they be said to be equal? Are there not many feelings (vedanā), perceptions (saṃjñā), and so on that coexist? Furthermore, they say: 'Non-harming and non-hatred, they only say pervade, they do not say corresponding, nor do they say simultaneous.' Do they allow non-harming and non-hatred to arise separately, saying that they do not arise simultaneously? Therefore, although the bases are different, they take each function and falsely establish it as one, calling it equality in essence. Although non-harming and non-hatred are not corresponding, they allow them to arise simultaneously. Question: For example, if we do not translate specific objects (viṣaya) and include them in the secondary afflictions, can defiled mindfulness (kliṣṭa-smṛti) and defiled wisdom (kliṣṭa-prajñā) in specific objects also be called forgetfulness (muṣitasmṛtitā) and non-comprehension (asaṃprajanya)? If not, then they should not be defiled, because there is right mindfulness (samyak-smṛti) and right knowledge (samyak-prajñā). If it is allowed that they are also called forgetfulness and non-comprehension, then what is the difference between these two dharmas in the secondary afflictions? Answer: Forgetfulness in specific objects refers to forgetting to recall past experiences. Forgetfulness in secondary afflictions only forgets to lose right mindfulness, it does not necessarily forget past objects. Question: If that is the case, then in the previous wholesome mind, not being able to remember past experiences should not be forgetfulness, because it is not defiled. Answer: When a wholesome mind arises, although there are cases where past experiences cannot be remembered, there is right mindfulness for present objects. Question: It may be so for objects in the present, but how about objects in the past (think about it)? If evil wisdom (durbuddhi) in specific objects is necessarily evil discernment, then evil wisdom in secondary afflictions can be evil towards wisdom, even if knowledge is not right, it does not necessarily have to be evil discernment. Moreover, the false and the real are different, and existence and non-existence have essential differences. Secondary afflictions are only functions and have no independent self-essence. Specific objects have independent essence. The End of the Fourth Scroll of the 'Commentary Illuminating the Meaning of the Consciousness-Only Treatise'
大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1832 成唯識論了義燈
成唯識論了義燈卷第五(本)(論第五)
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼撰
第二師釋。末那通四受俱 問云何欲界不與苦俱。乃至二靜慮云何不與樂受並 答疏已簡訖 云何與憂．喜俱 答且與喜俱有其三釋 一云喜與第六俱。第七與六俱故。云與喜相應。不爾。何以故。云緣有喜地善業所引果故。不緣第六故此解非 二云果從因故。或從喜受相應思之所感此第八識。第七緣此引業果故。名緣有喜等與喜受俱 三云相順故俱。如說五識緣前相分。此相從前五識熏成。后五識緣云緣前相。此義亦爾。此果從喜及相應思之所招感。雖緣此果順彼因故云與喜俱。余受相應三釋。準此 問疏云。若四受俱則金剛心非頓斷過者。說與舍受俱。豈不漸斷。以易地舍故 答云若喜等俱。必隨地別染法俱斷。如六識故。若舍受俱即可頓斷。如第八識舍俱頓斷。其理極成。故無有失。
問論云緣內執我。此之我見。為唯見分名我見。自證分亦我見收 答設俱何過 答俱有失。若不名我見。貪．嗔亦然。彼自證分應非貪等。若名我見。應許緣外。何名緣內。亦應非量攝 答但見分名我見。非自證分。我見自證但名染惠。何故不同貪等。 答貪等稱境亦得生貪
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第五（本）（《論》第五）
淄州大云寺苾芻惠沼 撰
第二師的解釋。末那識（末那，manas，意為『意』）與四種感受（四受）同時存在。問：為什麼欲界（欲界，Kāmadhātu，佛教宇宙觀中眾生具有慾望的生存領域）不與苦受同時存在？乃至二禪天（二靜慮，second Dhyāna，色界中的第二個禪定層次）為什麼不與樂受並存？答：疏文已經簡要說明過了。問：如何與憂受、喜受同時存在？答：暫且說與喜受同時存在，有三種解釋：第一種解釋是，喜受與第六識（第六識，the sixth consciousness，即意識）同時存在，第七識（第七識，the seventh consciousness，即末那識）與第六識同時存在，所以說與喜受相應。如果不這樣，為什麼呢？因為緣于有喜地（有喜地，a joyful realm）的善業所引發的果報的緣故，不是緣于第六識的緣故，所以這種解釋是不對的。第二種解釋是，果報從因緣而來，或者從與喜受相應的思（思，cetana，意志）所感得的第八識（第八識，the eighth consciousness，即阿賴耶識）。第七識緣於此引業果（引業果，the result of karma that leads to rebirth），所以名為緣于有喜等，與喜受同時存在。第三種解釋是，因為相順的緣故同時存在。如經文所說，五識（五識，the five consciousnesses，即眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）緣於前五識所變現的相分（相分，the objective aspect of perception）。此相分從前五識熏習而成，后五識緣於此相分，稱為緣於前相分。這個道理也是一樣。此果報從喜受以及相應的思所招感，雖然緣於此果報，但順應那個因，所以說與喜受同時存在。其餘的感受相應的解釋，可以參照這個來理解。問：疏文說，如果四種感受同時存在，那麼金剛心（金剛心，vajra-like mind，比喻堅不可摧的智慧）就不能頓斷煩惱了。現在說與舍受（舍受，upekṣā，不苦不樂的感受）同時存在，難道不是漸斷煩惱嗎？因為容易捨棄的緣故。答：如果與喜受等同時存在，必定隨著所處的境界不同，染污法（染法，defilements）也一同斷除，如同第六識一樣。如果與舍受同時存在，就可以頓斷煩惱，如同第八識與舍受同時頓斷一樣，這個道理非常明顯，所以沒有過失。
問：《論》中說緣于內在而執著於我（我，ātman，靈魂或自我）。這個我見（我見，ātmadṛṣṭi，認為存在真實自我的邪見），是隻有見分（見分，the perceiving aspect of consciousness）才稱為我見，還是自證分（自證分，the self-cognizing aspect of consciousness）也包含在我見之中？答：如果都包含，有什麼過失嗎？問：都包含就有過失。如果不稱為我見，那麼貪（貪，rāga，貪慾）、嗔（嗔，dveṣa，嗔恨）也是如此，它們的自證分應該不是貪等。如果稱為我見，就應該允許緣于外境，怎麼能稱為緣于內在呢？也應該不屬於量（量，pramāṇa，有效的認知方式）所攝。答：只有見分才稱為我見，不是自證分。我見的自證分只能稱為染污的智慧。為什麼與貪等不同呢？答：貪等稱合外境也能生起貪慾。
【English Translation】 English version
The Elucidation Lamp of the Cheng Weishi Lun, Volume 5 (Original) (Treatise 5)
Composed by Bhikshu Huizhao of Dayun Temple in Zizhou
The second teacher's explanation. Manas (manas, meaning 'mind') is concurrent with the four feelings (four sensations). Question: Why is the desire realm (Kāmadhātu, the realm of existence where beings have desires in Buddhist cosmology) not concurrent with painful feeling? And why are the second dhyāna heavens (second Dhyāna, the second level of meditative absorption in the Form Realm) not concurrent with pleasant feeling? Answer: The commentary has already briefly explained this. Question: How can it be concurrent with sorrowful and joyful feelings? Answer: Let's first discuss being concurrent with joyful feeling, there are three explanations: The first explanation is that joyful feeling is concurrent with the sixth consciousness (the sixth consciousness, i.e., the mind consciousness), and the seventh consciousness (the seventh consciousness, i.e., manas) is concurrent with the sixth consciousness, so it is said to be corresponding with joyful feeling. If not, why? Because it is due to the result brought about by the wholesome karma of the joyful realm (a joyful realm), not because it is related to the sixth consciousness, so this explanation is incorrect. The second explanation is that the result comes from the cause, or from the eighth consciousness (the eighth consciousness, i.e., the Ālaya consciousness) felt by the thought (cetana, volition) corresponding to joyful feeling. The seventh consciousness is related to the result of this leading karma (the result of karma that leads to rebirth), so it is called being related to joy, etc., and is concurrent with joyful feeling. The third explanation is that they are concurrent because they are in accordance with each other. As the sutra says, the five consciousnesses (the five consciousnesses, i.e., eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) are related to the objective aspect (the objective aspect of perception) transformed by the previous five consciousnesses. This objective aspect is formed by the imprints of the previous five consciousnesses, and the later five consciousnesses are related to this objective aspect, called being related to the previous objective aspect. The same principle applies here. This result is brought about by joyful feeling and corresponding thought, although it is related to this result, it is in accordance with that cause, so it is said to be concurrent with joyful feeling. The explanations for the other corresponding feelings can be understood by referring to this.
Question: The commentary says that if the four feelings are concurrent, then the vajra-like mind (vajra-like mind, a metaphor for indestructible wisdom) cannot instantly cut off afflictions. Now it is said to be concurrent with neutral feeling (upekṣā, neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling), isn't it a gradual cutting off of afflictions? Because it is easy to abandon. Answer: If it is concurrent with joyful feeling, etc., then the defilements (defilements) will definitely be cut off along with the different realms, just like the sixth consciousness. If it is concurrent with neutral feeling, then afflictions can be instantly cut off, just like the eighth consciousness instantly cutting off neutral feeling, this principle is very clear, so there is no fault.
Question: The Treatise says that it is related to the inner and clings to the self (ātman, soul or self). Is this self-view (ātmadṛṣṭi, the false view that there is a real self) only the perceiving aspect (the perceiving aspect of consciousness) called self-view, or is the self-cognizing aspect (the self-cognizing aspect of consciousness) also included in self-view? Answer: If both are included, what is the fault? Question: If both are included, there is a fault. If it is not called self-view, then greed (rāga, desire) and hatred (dveṣa, aversion) are also the same, their self-cognizing aspects should not be greed, etc. If it is called self-view, then it should be allowed to be related to external objects, how can it be called being related to the inner? It should also not be included in valid cognition (pramāṇa, valid means of knowing). Answer: Only the perceiving aspect is called self-view, not the self-cognizing aspect. The self-cognizing aspect of self-view can only be called defiled wisdom. Why is it different from greed, etc.? Answer: Greed, etc., can also give rise to greed when it matches external objects.
。如五識俱等。我見不稱境故。自證非我見 問何故不稱。即非我見但名染惠 答如緣無為緣他界等。見分緣時不稱無為．他界。但見分名無為緣．他界緣。自證不得名無為緣等。我見亦爾。又若見之自體名我見即得。若緣我故名我見者。自證即非。貪等亦爾。若緣色起貪名為貪等。自證即非。不緣色故。貪自證故名為貪等。自體亦是。
論故此相應唯是舍受者。問第七緣於八。隨緣唯舍受。第六緣七．八。隨彼唯舍受 答第七恒內緣。隨境唯舍受。第六緣內外。不得唯舍受 問六是能引七所引。隨彼能引成無漏。七是所引六能引。應隨能引通三受 答無漏起時難。隨他起無漏。緣境恒任運。故不通三受 問第七無漏他引生。不隨能引通三受。第七無漏由他引。不隨能引同一地 答凈法起時難。隨他能引同一地。舍受任運起。不隨能引通三受 問第七任運起。不隨能引通三受。五識任運生。不隨能引通三受 答五識易脫起。隨他通三受。第七緣一類。不隨他三受 問五識任運他引生。即隨能引通三受。第七一類他引起。應隨能引通三受 質答云五識雖他引。不隨能引尋伺俱。平等雖他引。不隨能引通三受。
論若與藏識有異等者。要集云。有說．有解三位無故無恒轉義。亦不應理。未斷滅來恒續起故。同
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果五種感官的意識（五識）都平等運作，那麼『我見』（認為有一個真實不變的『我』的觀念）就不能完全符合實境。因此，自證分（sva-saṃvedana，意識能夠感知自身的部分）不是『我見』。 問：為什麼『我見』不能完全符合實境？難道它不是『我見』，而只是被稱為染污的智慧（惠，慧的古字）？ 答：就像緣于無為法（asaṃskṛta，沒有因緣造作的法）或緣於他界（其他世界）等情況一樣，見分（darśana-bhāga，意識的顯現部分）在緣取對像時，並不能完全符合無為法或他界的真實情況。只能說見分是『緣于無為法』或『緣於他界』的緣。自證分不能被稱為『無為法緣』等。『我見』也是如此。另外，如果見的自體（本質）被稱為『我見』，那就可以成立。但如果是因緣于『我』的緣故而被稱為『我見』，那麼自證分就不是『我見』。貪等煩惱也是如此。如果緣於色（rūpa，物質）而生起的貪愛被稱為貪等煩惱，那麼自證分就不是貪等煩惱，因為它不緣於色。因為貪愛能夠自證，所以被稱為貪等煩惱，其自體也是貪等煩惱。
論：因此，與阿賴耶識（ālaya-vijñāna，藏識，儲存一切種子識）相應的受（vedanā，感受）只有舍受（upekṣā，不苦不樂的感受）。 問：第七識（末那識，manas，意根）緣于第八識（阿賴耶識），隨其所緣只有舍受。第六識（意識，vijñāna）緣于第七識和第八識，隨其所緣也只有舍受嗎？ 答：第七識恒常向內緣取，隨其所緣的境界只有舍受。第六識緣取內外境，不一定只有舍受。 問：第六識是能引（引導）者，第七識是所引（被引導）者。如果隨其能引而成就無漏（anāsrava，沒有煩惱），那麼第七識是所引，第六識是能引，應該隨其能引而通於三種感受（苦受，樂受，舍受）。 答：無漏生起時很難，需要隨順其他因緣才能生起無漏。緣取境界是恒常任運（自然而然）的，所以不通於三種感受。 問：第七識的無漏是由他力引導而生起的，不隨其能引而通於三種感受。第七識的無漏是由他力引導，不隨其能引而處於同一地（同一禪定層次）。 答：清凈法生起時很難，需要隨順其他能引才能處於同一地。舍受是任運生起的，不隨其能引而通於三種感受。 問：第七識是任運生起的，不隨其能引而通於三種感受。五識是任運生起的，不隨其能引而通於三種感受。 答：五識容易脫離（原來的狀態）而生起，隨順其他因緣而通於三種感受。第七識緣取單一型別（的境界），不隨順其他因緣而通於三種感受。 問：五識是任運且由他力引導而生起的，就隨順其能引而通於三種感受。第七識緣取單一型別且由他力引導而生起，應該隨順其能引而通於三種感受。 答辯說：五識雖然由他力引導，但不隨順其能引而具有尋（vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（vicāra，精細的思考）。平等性（指第七識的平等性）雖然由他力引導，但不隨順其能引而通於三種感受。
論：如果與阿賴耶識有差異或相等之處，瑜伽師地論（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）的《攝事分》（Śravakabhumi）中說：『有人說，有人解釋，在三種狀態下沒有阿賴耶識，因此沒有恒常流轉的意義。』這種說法也不應道理，因為在未斷滅之前，阿賴耶識是恒常相續生起的，是相同的。
【English Translation】 English version: If the five consciousnesses (pañca-vijñāna, five sense consciousnesses) are all operating equally, then the 'self-view' (ātma-dṛṣṭi, the notion of a real and unchanging 'self') cannot fully accord with reality. Therefore, the self-awareness (sva-saṃvedana, the part of consciousness that perceives itself) is not 'self-view'. Question: Why does 'self-view' not fully accord with reality? Is it not 'self-view', but merely called defiled wisdom (hui)? Answer: Just as in the case of being conditioned by the unconditioned (asaṃskṛta, that which is not produced by causes and conditions) or being conditioned by other realms, the perception-part (darśana-bhāga, the appearing aspect of consciousness) when perceiving objects, cannot fully accord with the reality of the unconditioned or other realms. It can only be said that the perception-part is a condition 'conditioned by the unconditioned' or 'conditioned by other realms'. Self-awareness cannot be called 'conditioned by the unconditioned', etc. 'Self-view' is also like this. Furthermore, if the very nature of perception is called 'self-view', then it is valid. But if it is called 'self-view' because it is conditioned by 'self', then self-awareness is not 'self-view'. Afflictions such as greed are also like this. If greed arising from being conditioned by form (rūpa, matter) is called greed, then self-awareness is not greed, because it is not conditioned by form. Because greed can be self-aware, it is called greed, and its very nature is also greed.
Treatise: Therefore, the feeling (vedanā, sensation) associated with the ālaya-consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness) is only neutral feeling (upekṣā, neither pleasant nor unpleasant feeling). Question: The seventh consciousness (manas, mind), being conditioned by the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna), only has neutral feeling according to what it is conditioned by. Does the sixth consciousness (vijñāna, consciousness), being conditioned by the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, also only have neutral feeling according to what it is conditioned by? Answer: The seventh consciousness constantly perceives inwardly, and the realm it perceives is only neutral feeling. The sixth consciousness perceives both internal and external realms, and does not necessarily only have neutral feeling. Question: The sixth consciousness is the leader (leading), and the seventh consciousness is the led (being led). If following the leader, non-outflow (anāsrava, without defilements) is achieved, then the seventh consciousness is the led, and the sixth consciousness is the leader, it should follow the leader and be connected to the three feelings (painful, pleasant, and neutral). Answer: It is difficult for non-outflow to arise, it needs to follow other conditions to arise. Perceiving realms is constant and spontaneous, so it is not connected to the three feelings. Question: The non-outflow of the seventh consciousness is produced by being led by others, it does not follow the leader and is connected to the three feelings. The non-outflow of the seventh consciousness is led by others, it does not follow the leader and is in the same ground (same level of samādhi). Answer: It is difficult for pure dharmas to arise, it needs to follow other leaders to be in the same ground. Neutral feeling arises spontaneously, it does not follow the leader and is connected to the three feelings. Question: The seventh consciousness arises spontaneously, it does not follow the leader and is connected to the three feelings. The five consciousnesses arise spontaneously, they do not follow the leader and are connected to the three feelings. Answer: The five consciousnesses easily detach (from the original state) and arise, following other conditions and being connected to the three feelings. The seventh consciousness perceives a single type (of realm), not following other conditions and being connected to the three feelings. Question: The five consciousnesses arise spontaneously and are led by others, thus following the leader and being connected to the three feelings. The seventh consciousness perceives a single type and is led by others, it should follow the leader and be connected to the three feelings. The answer says: Although the five consciousnesses are led by others, they do not follow the leader and have both coarse thought (vitarka) and subtle thought (vicāra). Although equality (referring to the equality of the seventh consciousness) is led by others, it does not follow the leader and is connected to the three feelings.
Treatise: If there are differences or similarities with the ālaya-consciousness, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra's Śravakabhumi says: 'Some say, some explain, that in three states there is no ālaya-consciousness, therefore there is no meaning of constant transformation.' This statement is also unreasonable, because before it is cut off, the ālaya-consciousness constantly arises continuously, it is the same.
第八識未入四位恒名賴耶。故依有釋無故不說。或相同不說 今謂不爾。賴耶設入四位。未成無漏故說恒轉。不約名說恒轉如流。末那三位轉成無漏。轉易非恒故不如流。
論。此意心所何性攝耶。疏有二解。初云雙問雙答。王由心所成三性故。初舉所顯王。故論云。此意相應四煩惱是染法故。次顯由王所成有覆。論云此俱染法所依細故。故雙問答。
問七緣八為我隨境一界系。第六緣三界為我三界系 答自地互相增。隨自自地系。他地不相增。不隨他地系。
論。此位染意。疏云。通二執說 要集等說。唯說人執。不說法執。何以故。若說法執。何故論言三乘聖道有伏．滅義。二乘無學不應永舍。又護法釋。三位無者依染意說。故知法執不名染意 令謂。但說于論不違。是本意故。雖定性二乘不能伏斷。望彼非染不名染意。對不定性及定大乘。法執名染。然不定性生空聖道亦不能伏。故論云三乘聖道有伏．滅義。若唯人執。應言三乘聖道俱能伏滅。何須得言有。三位無染亦復無過。法執望二乘定性不名染。三位中不無。若望菩薩三位中無。文含義隱。餘者不悉。
論。又如未證補特伽羅。西明量云。未起法空。應有法執恒行。以未起對治故。猶如我執位 此量喻中所立不成。樞要云。法執
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：第八識如果未進入四位（指種子位、受熏位、轉變位、顯現位），則始終被稱為阿賴耶識（Ālaya-vijñāna，藏識，根本識）。因此，依據某些解釋，因為沒有理由而不說。或者因為相同而不說。現在我們認為不是這樣。阿賴耶識即使進入四位，因為沒有成為無漏（anāsrava，清凈無漏）的，所以說它是『恒轉』的。這裡說的『恒轉』不是指名稱上的恒常流轉。末那識（manas，意根）在三位（染污位、轉變位、清凈位）轉變成為無漏。轉變容易，不是恒常的，所以不能比作水流。
論：這個意（manas）相應的心所（caitta，心所有法）屬於什麼性質？疏（指對論的註釋）有兩種解釋。第一種解釋是雙重提問，雙重回答。意（manas）由心所構成，具有三種性質（善、惡、無記），所以首先提出所要顯明的意（manas）。因此，論中說：『這個意（manas）相應的四種煩惱（kleśa）是染污法。』其次顯明由意（manas）所構成的有覆無記性（sāvranāvr̥ta-avyākr̥ta，有覆障但非善非惡的性質）。論中說：『這些都是染污法所依賴的細微之處。』所以是雙重提問和回答。
問：第七識（末那識）以第八識（阿賴耶識）為『我』（ātman），隨逐的境界是哪一界（dhātu，界別），屬於哪一界系（dhātu-baddha，被界所束縛）？第六識（意識，vijñāna）以三界（欲界、色界、無色界）為『我』，屬於哪一界系？答：各自的自地（sva-bhūmi，自身所處的層次）互相增益，隨逐各自所處的界系。他地（para-bhūmi，其他層次）不能互相增益，不隨逐其他層次的界系。
論：這個位置上的染污意（kliṣṭa-manas）。疏中說：『通於人我執（pudgala-ātmagrāha，對補特伽羅的『我』的執著）和法我執（dharma-ātmagrāha，對法的『我』的執著）兩種執著。』《要集》等書說：只說人我執，不說*法我執。為什麼呢？如果說法我執，為什麼論中說三乘（triyāna，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）聖道（ārya-mārga，聖者的道）有伏（壓伏）、滅（斷滅）的意義？二乘（śrāvakayāna，聲聞乘和pratyekabuddhayāna，緣覺乘）的無學（aśaikṣa，無學果位）不應該永遠捨棄法我執。又護法（Dharmapāla）解釋說，三位（見道位、修道位、無學位）中沒有法我執是依據染污意（kliṣṭa-manas）說的。因此可知，法我執不稱為染污意。令認為，只是在論中這樣說，並沒有違背本意。雖然定性二乘（niyata-yāna，決定性的二乘根性）不能壓伏斷除法我執，但相對於他們來說，法我執不是染污，所以不稱為染污意。對於不定性（aniyata-yāna，不決定性的根性）以及定性大乘（niyata-mahāyāna，決定性的大乘根性）來說，法我執是染污。然而，不定性二乘的生空聖道（śūnyatā-ārya-mārga，證悟空性的聖道）也不能壓伏法我執。所以論中說三乘聖道有伏、滅的意義。如果只有人我執，應該說三乘聖道都能壓伏斷滅，何必說『有』呢？三位中沒有染污意也沒有過失。法我執相對於二乘定性來說，不稱為染污，在三位中不是沒有。如果相對於菩薩來說，三位中沒有法我執。文中的含義隱晦，其餘的就不詳細說了。
論：又如未證得補特伽羅（pudgala，人，個體）。西明（寺廟名）的量式（推理形式）說：未生起法空智（dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna，對法空性的智慧），應該有法我執恒常生起，因為沒有生起對治（pratipakṣa，對抗的力量）的緣故，猶如我執（ātmagrāha）的地位。這個量式中的比喻所立的宗（pakṣa，論題）不成立。《樞要》中說：法執（dharma-graha，對法的執著）
【English Translation】 English version: If the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness, fundamental consciousness) has not entered the four stages (seed stage, influenced stage, transformation stage, manifestation stage), it is always called Ālaya-vijñāna. Therefore, according to some interpretations, it is not mentioned because there is no reason, or it is not mentioned because it is the same. Now we think it is not so. Even if the Ālaya-vijñāna enters the four stages, because it has not become unconditioned (anāsrava, pure and unconditioned), it is said to be 'constant transformation'. The 'constant transformation' here does not refer to the constant flow in name. The manas (mind consciousness) transforms into unconditioned in the three stages (defiled stage, transformation stage, pure stage). Transformation is easy and not constant, so it cannot be compared to a stream.
Treatise: What is the nature of the mental factors (caitta, mental events) associated with this mind (manas)? The commentary has two explanations. The first explanation is a double question and a double answer. The mind (manas) is composed of mental factors and has three natures (good, evil, neutral), so first, the mind (manas) to be clarified is put forward. Therefore, the treatise says: 'The four afflictions (kleśa) associated with this mind (manas) are defiled dharmas.' Secondly, it clarifies the obscured and indeterminate nature (sāvranāvr̥ta-avyākr̥ta, obscured but neither good nor evil nature) composed of the mind (manas). The treatise says: 'These are the subtle places on which defiled dharmas depend.' So it is a double question and answer.
Question: Which realm (dhātu, sphere) does the seventh consciousness (manas) take the eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna) as 'self' (ātman) and follow, and to which realm is it bound (dhātu-baddha, bound by the realm)? Which realm does the sixth consciousness (consciousness, vijñāna) take the three realms (desire realm, form realm, formless realm) as 'self' and to which realm is it bound? Answer: Each's own ground (sva-bhūmi, one's own level) mutually increases, following the realm to which they belong. Other grounds (para-bhūmi, other levels) cannot mutually increase, and do not follow the realms of other levels.
Treatise: The defiled mind (kliṣṭa-manas) in this position. The commentary says: 'It applies to both the ego-grasping of persons (pudgala-ātmagrāha, attachment to the 'self' of pudgala) and the ego-grasping of dharmas (dharma-ātmagrāha, attachment to the 'self' of dharmas).' The Essentials, etc., say: Only the ego-grasping of persons is mentioned, not the ego-grasping of dharmas. Why? If the ego-grasping of dharmas is mentioned, why does the treatise say that the holy path (ārya-mārga, the path of the noble ones) of the three vehicles (triyāna, Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Bodhisattvayāna) has the meaning of subduing (suppression) and extinguishing (extinction)? The Arhats (aśaikṣa, state of no more learning) of the Two Vehicles (śrāvakayāna, Hearer Vehicle and pratyekabuddhayāna, Solitary Realizer Vehicle) should not abandon the ego-grasping of dharmas forever. Furthermore, Dharmapāla explains that the absence of ego-grasping of dharmas in the three stages (path of seeing, path of cultivation, path of no more learning) is based on the defiled mind (kliṣṭa-manas). Therefore, it can be known that the ego-grasping of dharmas is not called defiled mind. Ling thinks that it is only said in the treatise, and it does not violate the original intention. Although those of the Two Vehicles of fixed nature (niyata-yāna, those of fixed Two Vehicle capacity) cannot subdue and cut off the ego-grasping of dharmas, relative to them, the ego-grasping of dharmas is not defiled, so it is not called defiled mind. For those of unfixed nature (aniyata-yāna, those of unfixed capacity) and those of fixed Mahāyāna (niyata-mahāyāna, those of fixed Mahāyāna capacity), the ego-grasping of dharmas is defiled. However, the emptiness-realizing holy path (śūnyatā-ārya-mārga, the holy path of realizing emptiness) of the Two Vehicles of unfixed nature cannot subdue the ego-grasping of dharmas either. Therefore, the treatise says that the holy path of the three vehicles has the meaning of subduing and extinguishing. If there is only ego-grasping of persons, it should be said that the holy path of the three vehicles can subdue and extinguish, why say 'has'? There is no fault in not having defiled mind in the three stages either. The ego-grasping of dharmas is not called defiled relative to the Two Vehicles of fixed nature, and it is not absent in the three stages. If it is relative to the Bodhisattvas, there is no ego-grasping of dharmas in the three stages. The meaning of the text is obscure, and the rest will not be explained in detail.
Treatise: Also, like those who have not realized the pudgala (pudgala, person, individual). The inference (reasoning form) of Ximing (temple name) says: If the wisdom of dharma-śūnyatā (dharma-śūnyatā-jñāna, wisdom of the emptiness of dharmas) has not arisen, there should be constant arising of dharma-ātmagrāha (attachment to the 'self' of dharmas), because the antidote (pratipakṣa, opposing force) has not arisen, just like the position of ātmagrāha (attachment to self). The proposition (pakṣa, topic) established in the analogy of this inference is not established. The Essentials says: Dharma-graha (attachment to dharmas)
未證法空位(有法)。應恒行(法)。二執隨一攝故。猶如生執 有妄出過云因有法自相相違。錯引樞要。解論文中所立宗．因便俱有過失故。
問住滅定者。世尊入滅定不。答有三解。
一云不入。若爾云何具諸功德。答成就滅定而不現起 二云入。若爾何故訶菩薩入。答呵耽樂者。諸經亦有勸菩薩入 問既入滅定六識不行。何能利生 答由加行意願力故。不起滅定現威儀化生。佛即任運不假加行 三云雖似入而實不入 傳云。思益經說入理滅定識即不行。入事滅定識即猶起。言似入者即事滅定 然傳撿文三釋之中第二釋勝。故此論難。若平等智依第六者應有間斷。許佛恒行如鏡智故。若不入滅設入不滅。即六恒行如何成難。
言所立宗因便俱有失。疏云有自法自相相違決定者。改彼因云。除聖道等意識。無俱有依。是意識故。如三位意識。因改於前。前因亦應除三位六識攝故。無不定過。
樞要云。又因有自法自相相違。以無學不定意為同法故。此量意云。以無學人恒無第七。言不定者。除在滅定無第六識。取不入滅時第六意識為同法故。然以理論。此中宗有二。一總立第六意識。二簡去三位取余第六。因亦有二。一總因六識攝故。二別因亦簡三位非三位。餘六識攝。隨其所應以二因各
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 未證得法空之位（仍有法存在）。應當恒常修行（佛法）。因為兩種執著總會包含其中一種。就像對生的執著一樣。如果說因為有法，就會有虛妄產生的過失，這是因為自法和自相之間存在矛盾。這是錯誤地引用了關鍵之處。因為這樣解釋，論文中所立的宗和因都會有過失。
問：安住于滅盡定中的人，世尊是否也進入滅盡定？答：有三種解釋。
第一種說法認為不進入。如果這樣，如何能具備各種功德？答：成就了滅盡定，但不顯現出來。第二種說法認為進入。如果這樣，為什麼呵斥菩薩進入滅盡定？答：呵斥貪戀滅盡定的人。有些經典也勸導菩薩進入滅盡定。問：既然進入滅盡定，六識就不起作用，如何利益眾生？答：由於過去修行的意願力，不從滅盡定中起身，也能顯現威儀，化度眾生。佛是任運而為，不需要特別的修行。第三種說法認為雖然看似進入，但實際上沒有進入。傳說《思益經》說，進入理滅定時，識就不起作用；進入事滅定時，識仍然起作用。所說的『看似進入』，就是指事滅定。然而，經過考察文獻，三種解釋中第二種解釋最為殊勝。因此，這個論點難以成立。如果平等智依賴於第六識，就應該有間斷。允許佛陀恒常修行，就像鏡智一樣。如果不進入滅盡定，或者即使進入也不滅盡，那麼六識恒常執行，如何成為難題？
所說的『所立宗和因都有過失』，疏文中說存在自法和自相之間的矛盾。可以修改那個因，說：除了聖道等意識，沒有共同的所依。因為是意識的緣故，就像三位意識一樣。因修改於前，之前的因也應該排除三位六識所包含的，這樣就沒有不確定的過失。
關鍵在於，因存在自法和自相之間的矛盾，因為以無學的不定意作為同法。這個量意是說：因為無學之人恒常沒有第七識。所說的不定，是指除了在滅盡定中沒有第六識，取不入滅盡定時的第六意識作為同法。然而，從理論上來說，這裡宗有兩個：一是總的立第六意識，二是簡去三位，取其餘的第六識。因也有兩個：一是總因，因為六識所包含；二是別因，也簡去三位，不是三位，是其餘六識所包含。根據情況，用兩個因各自...
【English Translation】 English version: Not yet attained the state of Dharma-sunyata (still having Dharma). One should constantly practice (the Dharma). Because one of the two attachments is always included. It's like the attachment to birth. If it is said that because there is Dharma, there will be the fault of false arising, this is because there is contradiction between Sva-dharma (own-dharma) and Sva-lakshana (own-characteristic). This is a wrong citation of the key point. Because with this explanation, both the thesis and the reason established in the treatise will have faults.
Question: For those who dwell in Nirodha-samapatti (cessation attainment), does the World-Honored One (Bhagavan) also enter Nirodha-samapatti? Answer: There are three explanations.
The first explanation is that He does not enter. If so, how can He possess all merits? Answer: He has accomplished Nirodha-samapatti but does not manifest it. The second explanation is that He enters. If so, why does He rebuke Bodhisattvas for entering it? Answer: He rebukes those who are attached to Nirodha-samapatti. Some sutras also encourage Bodhisattvas to enter it. Question: Since the six consciousnesses do not function when entering Nirodha-samapatti, how can He benefit sentient beings? Answer: Due to the power of past practice and aspiration, without arising from Nirodha-samapatti, He can manifest dignified conduct and transform sentient beings. The Buddha acts spontaneously, without the need for special practice. The third explanation is that although it seems like He enters, He actually does not enter. It is said that the Si Yi Jing (Sutra of Thinking and Unthinking) says that when entering the Nirodha-samapatti of principle, consciousness does not function; when entering the Nirodha-samapatti of event, consciousness still functions. The 'seeming to enter' refers to the Nirodha-samapatti of event. However, after examining the texts, the second explanation is the most excellent among the three. Therefore, this argument is difficult to establish. If the Equality Wisdom (Samatajnana) relies on the sixth consciousness, there should be interruption. It is permissible for the Buddha to practice constantly, like the Mirror Wisdom (Adarsa-jnana). If He does not enter Nirodha-samapatti, or even if He enters, He does not cease, then how can the constant functioning of the six consciousnesses be a problem?
The so-called 'both the thesis and the reason have faults', the commentary says that there is contradiction between Sva-dharma and Sva-lakshana. The reason can be modified to say: Except for the consciousness of the Noble Path (Aryamarga) etc., there is no common basis. Because it is consciousness, like the consciousness in the three states. The reason is modified from the previous one, and the previous reason should also exclude the three states included in the six consciousnesses, so there is no uncertain fault.
The key is that the reason has contradiction between Sva-dharma and Sva-lakshana, because the indeterminate mind of the non-learner (Asaiksa) is taken as the similar instance. The meaning of this inference is: Because the non-learner constantly does not have the seventh consciousness. The so-called indeterminate refers to the fact that except for the absence of the sixth consciousness in Nirodha-samapatti, the sixth consciousness when not entering Nirodha-samapatti is taken as the similar instance. However, theoretically speaking, there are two theses here: one is the general establishment of the sixth consciousness, and the other is the exclusion of the three states, taking the remaining sixth consciousness. There are also two reasons: one is the general reason, because it is included in the six consciousnesses; the other is the specific reason, also excluding the three states, not the three states, but included in the remaining six consciousnesses. Depending on the situation, use the two reasons respectively...
成二宗。過思可知。
論。初通一切異生相續。西明兩釋。一明執相續。二云相續者身。意取此解 要集亦云。此依五蘊身名相續。非執非心 今謂不爾。此文意顯三位差別有續有間。初總明之。後重料簡起．不起時。故前相續。明此俱意有間有續。不明其身。若以五蘊身為所依名為相續。且如我執亦依聖身。何故不云相續。平等性智亦依菩薩。亦何不云相續。
論。我法二見用雖有別同依一惠。要集等云。必無別種所知障定。前已略明。今更重顯。若無別種諸羅漢等起法執時能熏種不。若言不熏。能熏四義少何不熏。若言許熏者。豈非別種。能熏唯是所知障故 又復自言。一惠用分熏成二種。即是別種。何云必同說為煩惱者。是據根本及多分故。
論。法執俱意於二乘等。等取凡夫。即二乘凡夫 西明等云。等取菩薩生空智。以不障彼智亦名不染 要集云。后說為勝。若等凡夫菩薩亦有。何故不等 今謂前勝。論云于諸菩薩即通凡．聖。若望菩薩生空不染。起生空時可非菩薩。又亦應言于諸菩薩除生空智亦名為染。前句總說。文復不除。故知總望不等菩薩起生空時。然于菩薩不言等。諸言攝故。前影后故。俱無有過。
論是異熟生攝者。且如異熟生心乃至變化。大小乘別。小乘四心定唯無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 成二宗。過思可知。
論。初通一切異生相續。西明兩釋。一明執相續。二云相續者身。意取此解 要集亦云。此依五蘊身名相續。非執非心 今謂不爾。此文意顯三位差別有續有間。初總明之。後重料簡起．不起時。故前相續。明此俱意有間有續。不明其身。若以五蘊身為所依名為相續。且如我執亦依聖身。何故不云相續。平等性智亦依菩薩。亦何不云相續。
論。我法二見用雖有別同依一惠。要集等云。必無別種所知障定。前已略明。今更重顯。若無別種諸羅漢等起法執時能熏種不。若言不熏。能熏四義少何不熏。若言許熏者。豈非別種。能熏唯是所知障故 又復自言。一惠用分熏成二種。即是別種。何云必同說為煩惱者。是據根本及多分故。
論。法執俱意於二乘等。等取凡夫。即二乘凡夫 西明等云。等取菩薩生空智。以不障彼智亦名不染 要集云。后說為勝。若等凡夫菩薩亦有。何故不等 今謂前勝。論云于諸菩薩即通凡．聖。若望菩薩生空不染。起生空時可非菩薩。又亦應言于諸菩薩除生空智亦名為染。前句總說。文復不除。故知總望不等菩薩起生空時。然于菩薩不言等。諸言攝故。前影后故。俱無有過。
論是異熟生攝者。且如異熟生心乃至變化。大小乘別。小乘四心定唯無
【English Translation】 English version These are the two schools of thought. It can be understood through careful consideration.
Treatise: Initially, it generally connects all different beings' continuities. The Western Clarification (Xi Ming) offers two explanations: one clarifies the attachment to continuity, and the other states that continuity is the body. The intention is to adopt this latter explanation. The Essential Collection (Yao Ji) also states that this relies on the five aggregates (w蘊, Wǔ Yùn) body being named continuity, which is neither attachment nor mind. Now, we say this is not the case. This text clearly shows the differences in the three positions: having continuity and having intervals. First, it generally clarifies this. Later, it carefully examines when it arises and when it does not. Therefore, the preceding continuity clarifies that both intentions have intervals and continuity. It does not clarify the body. If the five aggregates body is taken as the basis and named continuity, then, for example, self-attachment also relies on the holy body. Why is it not called continuity? Equality Wisdom (平等性智, Píngděng xìng zhì) also relies on the Bodhisattva (菩薩, Púsà). Why is it also not called continuity?
Treatise: Although the functions of the two views of self and Dharma (法, Fǎ) are different, they both rely on one wisdom (惠, Huì). The Essential Collection (Yao Ji) and others state that there must be no separate type of cognitive obscuration (所知障, Suǒ zhī zhàng). This has been briefly clarified before, and now it is re-emphasized. If there is no separate type, when Arhats (羅漢, Luóhàn) and others arise with Dharma attachment, can they imprint seeds or not? If it is said that they do not imprint, what is lacking in the four meanings of being able to imprint that prevents them from imprinting? If it is admitted that they can imprint, is this not a separate type? The ability to imprint is only due to cognitive obscuration. Furthermore, it is said that one wisdom divides its function and imprints to form two types, which are separate types. Why is it said that they are necessarily the same? Saying they are afflictions is based on the root and the majority of cases.
Treatise: Dharma attachment is intended for both the Two Vehicles (二乘, Èr Shèng) and others. 'Others' includes ordinary beings, that is, the ordinary beings of the Two Vehicles. The Western Clarification (Xi Ming) and others state that 'others' includes the Bodhisattva's wisdom of emptiness of existence (生空智, Shēng kōng zhì), because it does not obstruct that wisdom and is also called non-defiled. The Essential Collection (Yao Ji) states that the latter explanation is superior. If it includes ordinary beings, then Bodhisattvas also have it. Why is it not included? Now, we say the former is superior. The treatise states that for all Bodhisattvas, it includes both ordinary and holy beings. If, in relation to the Bodhisattva, the emptiness of existence is not defiled, then when emptiness of existence arises, it may not be a Bodhisattva. Furthermore, it should also be said that for all Bodhisattvas, except for the wisdom of emptiness of existence, it is also called defiled. The preceding sentence is a general statement, and the text does not exclude it. Therefore, it is known that generally speaking, it does not include the time when Bodhisattvas arise with emptiness of existence. However, it is not said to include Bodhisattvas, because the word 'all' includes them. The preceding shadows the latter, so there is no fault in either.
Treatise: Is it included in the result of maturation (異熟生, Yì shú shēng)? For example, the mind born from the result of maturation, and even transformations, differ between the Great Vehicle (大乘, Dà Shèng) and the Small Vehicle (小乘, Xiǎo Shèng). The four minds of the Small Vehicle are definitely only without...
記。然變化心通欲．色界。威儀心寬。餘三不攝。併入威儀唯單非雙 問受戒等發起威儀。豈非是善 答彼宗意云。欲得受戒此心是善。起禮拜等即是無記。然立戒體不依發起身．語業思。依色．聲立。大乘變化唯四靜慮。通善．無記及漏．無漏。餘三通 性．漏．無漏。如前已明。然得合起。如行道路歌舞拍鼓。或前後心發俱時亦得。或業果心不能俱發若非業果及善惡能四心義說。非多心並。大論云此世俗有故。云無記者據別說故。
論說心意識。薩婆多雲。五門義別。一名門。但與施名。二義門集起名心。了別名識。思量名意。三業用門。遠知名心。開導名意。受生名識。四世門。過去名意。現在名心。未來名識五施設門。在蘊名識。在處名意。在界名心。皆通六識。非離六外別有心意。后撿文注。大乘即別。
解脫經者。有云。因道斷障得解脫故名解脫經。要集云。如天請問等不名解脫經故 今謂不爾何經不令修道斷障。不爾何得云引對治故明是佛說。故前說是。然天請問是別名。言解脫者。是諸不入阿含者之總名。
染污意恒時等者。諸部釋異。且有部云。染污意者。謂第六識。恒時者。非不斷故名為恒時。如常施食常受樂等。俱生滅者。非謂同時名俱。生滅俱有故名俱。即是諸或皆有生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無記。然而變化心通欲（指希望，慾望）。威儀心寬。其餘三種不包括。併入威儀，唯有單非雙（指單一而非成雙）。問：受戒等發起威儀，難道不是善嗎？答：彼宗的意思是，想要受戒的這個心是善的，而起禮拜等行為則是無記。然而建立戒體不依據發起的身、語業思，而是依據色、聲建立。大乘的變化唯有四靜慮（指四種禪定狀態），通於善、無記以及有漏、無漏。其餘三種通於性、有漏、無漏，如前已說明。然而可以合併而起，如行走道路、唱歌跳舞拍鼓，或者前後心同時發生也可以。或者業果心不能同時發生，若非業果以及善惡，能以四心義來說明，並非多心並起。《大論》說這是世俗所有，所以說無記是據別而說。
論中說心意識，薩婆多（梵文：Sarvastivada，一切有部）說，五門義別。一名門，只與施名。二義門，集起名心，了別名識，思量名意。三業用門，遠知名心，開導名意，受生名識。四世門，過去名意，現在名心，未來名識。五施設門，在蘊名識，在處名意，在界名心。都通於六識，並非離開六識之外另有心意。後面再查閱文獻註釋。大乘則有所區別。
《解脫經》有人說，因為修道斷除障礙而得到解脫，所以名為《解脫經》。《要集》說，如《天請問經》等不名為《解脫經》。現在我認為不是這樣，哪部經不令人修道斷除障礙呢？不然怎麼能說引對治，所以明白是佛所說。所以前面說是。《天請問經》是別名，說解脫，是諸不入阿含（梵文：Agama，阿含經）者的總名。
染污意恒時等，各部解釋不同。且有部說，染污意，是指第六識。恒時，並非不斷，所以名為恒時，如常施食、常受樂等。俱生滅，並非指同時，而是生滅俱有，所以名為俱。即是諸或皆有生。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Amnemonic. However, the transformation mind is connected to desire (referring to hope and desires). The demeanor mind is broad. The remaining three are not included. They are incorporated into demeanor, only single, not double (referring to single rather than paired). Question: Isn't initiating demeanor through receiving precepts etc., good? Answer: Their sect's meaning is that the mind that desires to receive precepts is good, while performing prostrations etc., is amnemonic. However, establishing the precept body does not rely on the initiating actions of body, speech, and thought, but is established based on form and sound. The transformations of Mahayana are only the four dhyanas (referring to the four states of meditation), which are connected to good, amnemonic, and defiled, undefiled. The remaining three are connected to nature, defiled, and undefiled, as previously explained. However, they can arise together, such as walking on the road, singing, dancing, and drumming, or the preceding and following minds can occur simultaneously. Or the karmic result mind cannot occur simultaneously. If it is not a karmic result and is not good or evil, it can be explained with the meaning of the four minds, not multiple minds arising together. The Mahayana-samgraha says that this is what exists in the mundane world, so saying amnemonic is based on separate consideration.'
'The treatise speaks of mind, thought, and consciousness. Sarvastivada (梵文：Sarvastivada，一切有部) says that the five gates have different meanings. The first gate is the name gate, only giving the name of giving. The second gate is the meaning gate, accumulation is called mind, discernment is called consciousness, and thinking is called thought. The third gate is the karmic function gate, knowing from afar is called mind, guiding is called thought, and receiving rebirth is called consciousness. The fourth gate is the world gate, the past is called thought, the present is called mind, and the future is called consciousness. The fifth gate is the establishment gate, being in the skandhas is called consciousness, being in the ayatanas is called thought, and being in the dhatus is called mind. All are connected to the six consciousnesses, and there is no separate mind or thought apart from the six consciousnesses. Later, examine the literature and annotations. Mahayana is different.'
'The Vimukti Sutra (解脫經). Some say that because one attains liberation by cultivating the path and cutting off obstacles, it is called the Vimukti Sutra. The Yaoji says that scriptures such as the Brahmajala Sutra are not called the Vimukti Sutra. Now I say that this is not so. Which sutra does not cause people to cultivate the path and cut off obstacles? Otherwise, how can it be said to introduce antidotes, so it is clear that it is spoken by the Buddha. So the previous saying is correct. The Brahmajala Sutra is a separate name. Saying liberation is the general name for those who do not enter the Agamas (梵文：Agama，阿含經).'
'The defiled mind is constant, etc. Various schools have different interpretations. Moreover, the Sarvastivada says that the defiled mind refers to the sixth consciousness. Constant means that it is not interrupted, so it is called constant, such as constantly giving food and constantly receiving pleasure. Co-arising and ceasing does not mean simultaneously, but rather that arising and ceasing exist together, so it is called co-. That is, all or all have arising.'
滅。若解脫者。對治道起。非曾非當有者。但舍其得離緣縛故。非無體性 上坐部云。染意恒時。謂細意識。無間斷故。諸或俱生云俱生滅。過．未無故非曾．當有 問若細意識。如受生等恒時相續與四或俱。云何攝論第二云。依染污故時無斷故。以此為難又九心輪以有分心是受生心。唯是無記。又下會瑜伽云。地獄無間有異熟生。是上坐義。準此非細染意受生。應非彼釋 答上坐部中有本末計。無覆受生是本計。細染意生是末計。經部師中亦本末計。釋經準之。
明不共無明。攝論第五云。此於五識無容說有。是處無有能對治故。若處有能治。此處有所治。非五識中有彼能治。於此見道不生起故 此意五識在見道位未成無漏。若有不共無明。即在聖位亦名為醉。與教相違。說異生故。不云聖者亦恒常起 又約菩薩起見道說。爾時第七亦無漏故。非謂二乘所起見道。亦非第六立第七故 問無性之人既無對治。應總不有 答是異生故。又此難意且據有姓起見道說。不爾許五有成事智。應有不共 問攝論復云。亦非染污意識中有。與余煩惱共相應時。不共無明名不成故 既爾如何與四或俱。應初師勝 答彼論敘難云。不共無明亦不成就。與身見等恒相應故。自釋云。汝難不平。非我說彼與余煩惱不相應故名為不共。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 滅。如果解脫，對治道就會生起。對於非過去、非未來的事物，只是捨棄其因緣束縛而得到的解脫，並非沒有本體自性。 上座部認為，染污的意念是恒常存在的，指的是微細意識，因為它沒有間斷。諸有部認為俱生煩惱是同時生滅的，因為過去和未來不存在，所以不是過去有或未來有。 問：如果微細意識像受生等一樣恒常相續，並且與四種煩惱同時生起，那麼《攝大乘論》第二卷所說『依染污故，時無斷故』該如何解釋？以此來提出疑問。另外，九心輪以有分心作為受生心，而有分心只是無記。而且下部瑜伽說，地獄無間有異熟生，這是上座部的觀點。按照這個推論，微細染污意念的受生應該不是上座部的解釋。 答：上座部中有本計和末計的說法。無覆無記的受生是本計，微細染污意念的生起是末計。經部師中也有本計和末計的說法，可以參照解釋經典。 闡明不共無明。《攝大乘論》第五卷說：『這在五識中是不能說有的，因為在五識中沒有能對治它的。』如果某個地方有能對治的，那麼這個地方就有所要對治的。五識中沒有能對治不共無明的，因此在五識中見道不會生起。這裡的意思是說，五識在見道位時還沒有成為無漏。如果存在不共無明，即使在聖位也仍然被稱為『醉』，這與教義相違背，因為教義說的是異生，而不是說聖者也恒常生起不共無明。 又可以從菩薩生起見道的角度來說，那時第七識也是無漏的，而不是說二乘所生起的見道。也不是在第六識的基礎上建立第七識。 問：無性之人既然沒有對治，那麼應該完全沒有不共無明才對。 答：因為他們是異生。而且這個疑問是根據有姓之人發起見道來說的。否則，如果允許五識中有成事智，那麼就應該有不共無明。 問：《攝大乘論》又說：『也不在染污意識中存在，因為在與其餘煩惱共同相應時，不共無明這個名稱不能成立。』既然如此，如何能與四種煩惱同時生起？難道最初的說法更勝一籌？ 答：那部論在敘述難題時說：『不共無明也不能成就，因為它與身見等恒常相應。』自己解釋說：『你的疑問不成立，我並不是說它因為不與其餘煩惱相應才被稱為不共。』
【English Translation】 English version Extinction. If there is liberation, the path of counteraction arises. For things that are neither past nor future, it is merely abandoning the liberation obtained from the bonds of conditions, not that there is no inherent nature. The Theravada school believes that defiled thoughts are constant, referring to subtle consciousness, because it is uninterrupted. The Sarvastivada school believes that co-arisen afflictions arise and cease simultaneously, because the past and future do not exist, so they are neither past nor future. Question: If subtle consciousness is constantly continuous like rebirth and arises simultaneously with the four afflictions, how should we explain what is said in the second volume of the 'Compendium of the Great Vehicle' that 'because of defilement, there is no interruption in time'? This is used to raise a question. In addition, the nine-citta-cakras (nine wheels of consciousness) use the bhavanga-citta (subconscious mind) as the rebirth consciousness, and the bhavanga-citta is only neutral. Moreover, the lower Yoga school says that there is uninterrupted vipaka-ja (resultant birth) in hell, which is the view of the Theravada school. According to this inference, the rebirth of subtle defiled thoughts should not be the explanation of the Theravada school. Answer: The Theravada school has the saying of mula-paksa (original position) and uttara-paksa (subsequent position). Rebirth with avyakrta (non-specified) is the mula-paksa, and the arising of subtle defiled thoughts is the uttara-paksa. The Sautrantika school also has the saying of mula-paksa and uttara-paksa, which can be referred to when explaining the scriptures. Clarifying uncommon ignorance. The fifth volume of the 'Compendium of the Great Vehicle' says: 'This cannot be said to exist in the five consciousnesses, because there is nothing to counteract it in the five consciousnesses.' If there is something to counteract in a certain place, then there is something to be counteracted in that place. There is nothing to counteract uncommon ignorance in the five consciousnesses, so the path of seeing does not arise in the five consciousnesses. The meaning here is that the five consciousnesses have not become anasrava (untainted) when they are in the position of the path of seeing. If there is uncommon ignorance, even in the state of a sage, it is still called 'intoxicated', which contradicts the teachings, because the teachings speak of ordinary beings, not that sages also constantly arise uncommon ignorance. It can also be said from the perspective of a Bodhisattva arising the path of seeing, at that time the seventh consciousness is also anasrava, not that the path of seeing arising from the two vehicles. It is also not establishing the seventh consciousness on the basis of the sixth consciousness. Question: Since those without the potential for enlightenment have no counteraction, then they should have no uncommon ignorance at all. Answer: Because they are ordinary beings. Moreover, this question is based on the assumption that those with the potential for enlightenment initiate the path of seeing. Otherwise, if it is allowed that there is accomplished wisdom in the five consciousnesses, then there should be uncommon ignorance. Question: The 'Compendium of the Great Vehicle' also says: 'It also does not exist in defiled consciousness, because when it is in accordance with other afflictions, the name of uncommon ignorance cannot be established.' If so, how can it arise simultaneously with the four afflictions? Is the initial statement superior? Answer: That treatise, when describing the difficulty, says: 'Uncommon ignorance cannot be accomplished either, because it is constantly in accordance with self-view and other afflictions.' It explains itself by saying: 'Your question is not valid, I am not saying that it is called uncommon because it is not in accordance with other afflictions.'
然說彼或余處所無故名不共。譬如十八不共佛法。前說與余煩惱相應名不成者。觀他所立顯彼過故 此意就他薩婆多等云與余俱不名不共。顯彼自違故為此難。非我說與余或俱時不名不共。
論。此識若無彼依寧有者。大乘顯小若無第七經義不成。故難外云。眼等此中攝有俱起根名二緣。意亦六中收。應依現意名二緣 外難大乘雲。意識二緣生。緣無意得起。何妨二緣生根無意亦起。經部共大同許過．未無。緣無亦許起故為此難 答持自有無俱是法。緣無現相二緣生。過去滅意現非有。意識根無不應起 若薩婆多就大乘宗。為前難亦得。經部滅無假立意名。就大難云。五識六二緣緣實根亦實。意識六二緣緣假根亦假。然下別破經部。此先假敘。有部為難。亦就大乘 答雲根法是所依。意俱非得假 又釋親相相是緣生。質無亦是實。同五六二緣。所依根不假 外又難云。經說六二緣。根假識不生。識托六二緣。境假應不起 答所緣勢疏遠。設假識得生。所依勝增上。勢近假不起。然以親相分例同根現實應好。
不可說色為被所依。破上坐部云。五識依色根。五識無分別。意識依色根。意識無分別。被質難大乘雲。第八依意根。第八無分別。何妨第六依色根。意識有分別 答色法性是鈍。五依不分別。意法是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此說，因為在其他地方沒有，所以稱為『不共』（獨有的，不與其他事物共有）。例如十八不共佛法（佛陀獨有的十八種功德）。前面所說的『與其他的煩惱相應，因此不能成立』，是指觀察他人所建立的理論，從而揭示他們的過失。這個意思是針對薩婆多（一切有部）等人說的，他們認為『與其他的（煩惱）同時存在，就不能稱為不共』。這是爲了顯示他們自相矛盾，所以用這個來責難他們。並不是我說與其他的（煩惱）同時存在時，就不能稱為不共。
論：如果這個識（意識）沒有那個所依賴的根，怎麼會存在呢？大乘（Mahāyāna）爲了顯示小乘（Hinayana）的不足，指出如果沒有第七識（末那識），經義就不能成立。所以責難外道說：眼等（眼識等五識）在這裡包含有同時生起的根，稱為二緣（根和境）。意（意識）也包含在六識中，應該依賴現前的意，稱為二緣。外道責難大乘說：意識由二緣（根和境）產生，即使沒有意根也能生起。為什麼妨礙二緣生起，即使沒有意根也能生起呢？經部（Sautrāntika）和大乘共同承認過去和未來不存在。即使沒有緣也能生起，所以用這個來責難。
回答：持有（根）自有和無有都是法。即使沒有緣，現前的相也能由二緣生起。過去的滅意現在沒有。意識沒有根不應該生起。如果薩婆多宗（一切有部）針對大乘宗（Mahāyāna），也可以用前面的責難。經部（Sautrāntika）認為滅無是假立的意。針對大乘責難說：五識和六識都是二緣，緣是真實的根也是真實的。意識和六識都是二緣，緣是假立的根也是假立的。然而下面會分別破斥經部。這裡先假裝敘述。有部（Sarvāstivāda）用來責難，也是針對大乘。
回答說：根法是所依賴的，意同時存在卻不能得到假立的。又解釋說，親近的相是緣生起的。本質上沒有也是真實的。和五識六識一樣是二緣。所依賴的根不是假立的。外道又責難說：經中說六識是二緣，根是假立的，識不能生起。識依託六識是二緣，境是假立的，應該也不能生起。回答說：所緣的勢力疏遠。即使是假立的，識也能生起。所依賴的根是殊勝的增上緣。勢力親近，假立的就不能生起。然而用親近的相來比喻，和根是真實存在的情況應該更好。
不能說色法是被所依賴的。破斥上座部（Sthavira Nikāya）說：五識依賴色根，五識沒有分別。意識依賴色根，意識沒有分別。被質難的大乘說：第八識（阿賴耶識）依賴意根，第八識沒有分別。為什麼妨礙第六識（意識）依賴色根，意識有分別？回答說：色法的性質是遲鈍的。五識依賴它沒有分別。意法是……
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, it is said that it is called 'uncommon' (unique, not shared with other things) because it is not found in other places. For example, the eighteen uncommon qualities of the Buddha (eighteen unique merits of the Buddha). The previously mentioned 'corresponding to other afflictions, therefore cannot be established' refers to observing the theories established by others, thereby revealing their faults. This meaning is directed at the Sarvāstivādins (those of the Sarvāstivāda school) and others, who believe that 'existing simultaneously with other (afflictions) cannot be called uncommon.' This is to show their self-contradiction, so this is used to challenge them. It is not that I say that when existing simultaneously with other (afflictions), it cannot be called uncommon.
Treatise: If this consciousness (vijñāna) does not have that dependent root, how can it exist? The Mahāyāna reveals the inadequacy of the Hinayana by pointing out that if there is no seventh consciousness (manas), the meaning of the scriptures cannot be established. Therefore, it challenges the outsiders by saying: The eye, etc. (eye consciousness, etc., the five senses) here include the simultaneously arising root, called the two conditions (root and object). The mind (manas, i.e., the sixth consciousness) is also included in the six consciousnesses and should rely on the present mind, called the two conditions. Outsiders challenge the Mahāyāna by saying: Consciousness arises from two conditions (root and object), and it can arise even without the mind-root. Why hinder the arising of two conditions, even if the mind-root does not arise? The Sautrāntika and Mahāyāna both acknowledge that the past and future do not exist. Even without conditions, it can arise, so this is used to challenge.
Answer: Holding (the root) as self-existent or non-existent are both dharmas. Even without conditions, the present appearance can arise from two conditions. The past extinguished mind does not exist now. Consciousness should not arise without a root. If the Sarvāstivāda school is targeting the Mahāyāna school, the previous challenge can also be used. The Sautrāntika school believes that extinction is a falsely established mind. Challenging the Mahāyāna by saying: The five consciousnesses and six consciousnesses are both two conditions, the condition is real and the root is also real. The consciousness and six consciousnesses are both two conditions, the condition is falsely established and the root is also falsely established. However, the Sautrāntika school will be refuted separately below. Here, it is first pretended to narrate. The Sarvāstivāda school uses it to challenge, also targeting the Mahāyāna.
Answering: The root-dharma is what is relied upon, the mind exists simultaneously but cannot obtain a false establishment. Furthermore, it is explained that the close appearance is what arises from conditions. Being non-existent in essence is also real. Like the five consciousnesses and six consciousnesses, it is two conditions. The root that is relied upon is not falsely established. Outsiders further challenge by saying: The scriptures say that the six consciousnesses are two conditions, the root is falsely established, and consciousness cannot arise. Consciousness relies on the six consciousnesses as two conditions, the object is falsely established, and it should not arise either. Answering: The power of the object is distant. Even if it is falsely established, consciousness can arise. The root that is relied upon is a superior augmenting condition. The power is close, and what is falsely established cannot arise. However, using the close appearance as an analogy, it should be better if the root is real.
It cannot be said that form is what is relied upon. Refuting the Sthavira Nikāya (Theravada) by saying: The five consciousnesses rely on the form-root, the five consciousnesses have no discrimination. Consciousness relies on the form-root, consciousness has no discrimination. The Mahāyāna, being challenged, says: The eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna) relies on the mind-root, the eighth consciousness has no discrimination. Why hinder the sixth consciousness (manovijñāna) from relying on the form-root, and consciousness having discrimination? Answering: The nature of form-dharma is dull. The five consciousnesses rely on it without discrimination. The mind-dharma is...
勝依。要思方分別 外難六依意根六有分別。八依意根八有分別 答第八自性無明瞭。雖依意根不分別。第六自性有多能。更得意依故分別。
問現在名為意。已滅依此立意名。現在亦名識。已滅依現應名識 答意名通二義。已滅依止得意名。識者唯了別。已滅無能不名識。
論。由我執故令六識中等者。疏有二解。取后解正。西明取前。要集亦同。今謂后釋為勝。由我執故不能亡相云我能行施。豈第七我緣施等生言我能施。故本疏意。此第六我。由第七我為所依止行相增明。非云我施是第七我。若執三輪相是第七我。七地已前有時未伏。何況地前既不能伏。施等三輪何能亡相故。
言相縛。有其兩種。一通一切相。由第七我。二執三輪相。雖亦由第七正說第六。然攝大乘據所依止故。云自謂我能修行施等。非離無明我執隨遂。非離依止而有無明等。若即說是第七我執不能亡相。應云非離無明我執自性而能執相等。何須云非離無明我執隨逐。非離依止故說所由非說即是。然此論引瑜伽為證者。是通證故。非唯證彼三輪之相。若云由無漏無分別方能伏此相。即見道前應非波羅故。地前修有漏加行無分別智慧伏第六故成密多 問言相縛者。為煩惱障。為所知障 答設爾何失 二俱有過。若由煩惱障。二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：勝依。如果要思考分辨，外在的困難在於六依（六種依靠，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根）和意根的六種分別。八依（八種依靠，可能指八識）和意根的八種分別。回答：第八識（阿賴耶識）的自性是不明瞭的。雖然依靠意根，但它不進行分別。第六識（意識）的自性有很多功能，因為它能得到意根的依靠，所以能進行分別。
問：現在被稱為意（manas，末那識），已滅的（過去）依靠它而建立意的名稱。現在也稱為識（vijñana，識），已滅的（過去）依靠現在，應該也稱為識嗎？答：意的名稱包含兩種含義。已滅的（過去）依靠止息而得到意的名稱。識只是了別（區分），已滅的沒有能力，所以不稱為識。
論：由於我執的緣故，使得六識處於中等狀態。疏中有兩種解釋，採取後面的解釋是正確的。西明採取前面的解釋，要集也相同。現在認為後面的解釋更為優勝。由於我執的緣故，不能忘卻（三輪體空）的相，說『我能行佈施』。難道是第七識（末那識）的我緣于佈施等而生起，說『我能佈施』嗎？所以本疏的意義是，這個第六識的我，由於第七識的我作為所依止，行相才更加明顯，而不是說『我施』是第七識的我。如果執著三輪（施者、受者、施物）的相是第七識的我，那麼七地（遠行地）以前有時還不能降伏（我執），更何況是地前（菩薩十地之前）既然不能降伏，佈施等三輪怎麼能忘卻相呢？
說到相縛，有兩種。一種是通於一切相，由第七識的我執著。另一種是執著三輪的相，雖然也由第七識，但正說的是第六識。然而《攝大乘論》根據所依止的緣故，說『自認為我能修行佈施等』，不能離開無明和我執的隨逐，不能離開依止而有無明等。如果直接說這是第七識的我執，不能忘卻相，應該說『不能離開無明我執的自性而能執著相』。何必說『不能離開無明我執的隨逐』呢？不能離開依止，所以說是所由，而不是說就是。然而此論引用《瑜伽師地論》作為證據，是通證的緣故，不是隻證明那三輪的相。如果說由無漏無分別的智慧才能降伏此相，那麼見道（初地）前應該不是波羅蜜多（到彼岸）的緣故。地前修有漏加行無分別的智慧能降伏第六識的緣故，才能成就密多（波羅蜜多）。問：說到相縛，是煩惱障，還是所知障？答：如果這樣假設，有什麼過失？兩種都有過失。如果是由於煩惱障，二...
【English Translation】 English version: Sheng Yi. If one wants to contemplate and differentiate, the external difficulty lies in the six supports (six roots: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind) and the six distinctions of the mind root. The eight supports (possibly referring to the eight consciousnesses) and the eight distinctions of the mind root. Answer: The nature of the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijñana) is unclear. Although it relies on the mind root, it does not differentiate. The nature of the sixth consciousness (consciousness) has many functions because it can obtain the reliance of the mind root, so it can differentiate.
Question: What is now called 'manas' (mind, the seventh consciousness), the extinguished (past) relies on it to establish the name of 'manas'. What is now also called 'vijñana' (consciousness), the extinguished (past) relies on the present, should it also be called 'vijñana'? Answer: The name 'manas' contains two meanings. The extinguished (past) relies on cessation to obtain the name of 'manas'. 'Vijñana' is only discrimination (distinguishing), the extinguished has no ability, so it is not called 'vijñana'.
Treatise: Because of the attachment to self, the six consciousnesses are in a middling state. The commentary has two explanations, taking the latter explanation as correct. Ximing takes the former explanation, and Yaoji is the same. Now it is considered that the latter explanation is superior. Because of the attachment to self, one cannot forget the characteristics (emptiness of the three wheels), saying 'I can perform giving'. Is it that the seventh consciousness (manas) arises from the conditions of giving, etc., saying 'I can give'? Therefore, the meaning of this commentary is that this sixth consciousness of 'I', because the seventh consciousness of 'I' is the support, the characteristics become more obvious, not that 'I give' is the seventh consciousness of 'I'. If one clings to the characteristics of the three wheels (giver, receiver, and gift) as the seventh consciousness of 'I', then before the seventh ground (Far-Going Ground), sometimes one cannot subdue (self-attachment), let alone before the grounds (before the ten Bodhisattva grounds). Since one cannot subdue it, how can the three wheels of giving, etc., forget the characteristics?
Speaking of the bondage of characteristics, there are two kinds. One is common to all characteristics, due to the attachment to self of the seventh consciousness. The other is clinging to the characteristics of the three wheels, although it is also due to the seventh consciousness, but it is mainly about the sixth consciousness. However, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (Compendium of the Mahayana) says 'one thinks that I can practice giving, etc.' based on the support, one cannot leave the pursuit of ignorance and self-attachment, one cannot have ignorance, etc., without reliance. If one directly says that this is the self-attachment of the seventh consciousness, one cannot forget the characteristics, one should say 'one cannot cling to characteristics without the nature of ignorance and self-attachment'. Why say 'one cannot leave the pursuit of ignorance and self-attachment'? One cannot leave the reliance, so it is said to be the cause, not that it is. However, this treatise cites the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) as evidence, which is a general proof, not just proving the characteristics of those three wheels. If one says that only non-outflow and non-discriminating wisdom can subdue this characteristic, then before the path of seeing (first ground), it should not be Paramita (to the other shore). Before the grounds, cultivating outflowing practices with non-discriminating wisdom can subdue the sixth consciousness, so one can achieve Mita (Paramita). Question: Speaking of the bondage of characteristics, is it the affliction obstacle or the knowledge obstacle? Answer: If you assume this, what is the fault? Both have faults. If it is due to the affliction obstacle, two...
乘無學有漏心位應無相縛。我執斷故。若由所知障。生空后智應有相縛 二解 一云由所知障 若爾生空后得應縛 答不相順故。依安惠釋此即為正 二云以煩惱障為相縛體 若爾二乘無學有漏善無記心應無相縛 答由此相分體是有漏。是彼所引熏成種故。今雖斷彼我執體盡由有相縛。然法執體非正相縛。執有相故為依助彼我執起故。是助相縛。無學散善及無記心。亦有此助未離相縛。生空后得雖有其助。無昔有漏所熏之相正相縛者。故得云無。此釋為正 然執三輪相唯第六識。五．八任運。第七內緣故。若有漏相名為相縛。即通八識 問諸論但云令六識中不能亡相。如何今說通於八識 答彼據三輪。令第六識由執我故。令前六識皆為相拘不了幻故。第七緣八亦為相拘。相縛本故。皆是相縛。若七執我不名相縛。六識如何得名相縛 又此論云。言相縛者。謂于境相不能了達如幻事等。由斯見分相分所拘不得自在故名相縛。以此故知通於八識 問若爾二乘無學五．八應有相縛。不了幻故。答有二解。一云染意滅故五．八無縛。二云既緣有漏所生相分。是分別相猶是相縛。如似有漏昔由第七漏俱成漏。染七無時五．八二識仍有漏攝。相縛應然 問相縛于見說相名縛。見縛自證名見縛等 答如樞要解亦許名縛 有云。同種非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果處於無學位的有漏心位，應該沒有相縛（Xiangbo，form-bondage），因為我執（Wo Zhi，ego-grasping）已經斷除。如果由於所知障（Suo Zhi Zhang，cognitive obscurations），在證悟空性之後產生的智慧應該有相縛。 有兩種解釋： 第一種解釋認為，相縛是由於所知障造成的。如果這樣，證悟空性之後的后得智（Hou De Zhi，subsequent wisdom）應該受到束縛。回答是：因為它們不相順應。根據安慧（An Hui）的解釋，這種說法是正確的。 第二種解釋認為，煩惱障（Fan Nao Zhang，afflictive obscurations）是相縛的本體。如果這樣，二乘（Er Sheng，two vehicles）的無學位有漏善無記心（Wu Xue Wei You Lou Shan Wu Ji Xin，non-learning stage contaminated wholesome and neutral mind）應該沒有相縛。回答是：因為這些相分（Xiang Fen，form-aspects）的本體是有漏的，是被它們所引導和熏習而成的種子。即使現在斷除了我執，其本體已經窮盡，仍然受到相縛的束縛。然而，法執（Fa Zhi，grasping at phenomena）的本體並非真正的相縛，因為執著于有相，是爲了依助我執的生起，所以是輔助性的相縛。無學位的散善心和無記心，也存在這種輔助性的相縛，尚未脫離相縛。證悟空性之後的后得智雖然有這種輔助，但沒有過去有漏所熏習的相作為真正的相縛，所以可以說沒有相縛。這種解釋是正確的。 然而，執著於三輪（San Lun，three wheels）之相的只有第六識（Di Liu Shi，sixth consciousness），第五識（Di Wu Shi，fifth consciousness）和第八識（Di Ba Shi，eighth consciousness）是任運的，第七識（Di Qi Shi，seventh consciousness）是向內攀緣的。如果有漏之相被稱為相縛，那麼就貫通八識（Ba Shi，eight consciousnesses）。 問：諸論只說要讓第六識中不能忘失相，為什麼現在說貫通八識？ 答：那是根據三輪來說的，讓第六識由於執著於我，讓前六識都受到相的拘束，不能了達如幻的道理。第七識攀緣第八識也被相拘束，因為相縛的根本就在於此，所以都是相縛。如果第七識執著於我卻不被稱為相縛，那麼第六識又如何能被稱為相縛呢？ 而且這部論典說：『所謂的相縛，是指對於境相不能了達如幻事等，因此被見分（Jian Fen，seeing-aspect）和相分所拘束，不得自在，所以稱為相縛。』由此可知，相縛貫通八識。 問：如果這樣，二乘的無學位第五識和第八識應該有相縛，因為不了達如幻的道理。 答：有兩種解釋。第一種解釋認為，因為染污的意（Yi，intention）已經滅除，所以第五識和第八識沒有束縛。第二種解釋認為，既然攀緣有漏所生的相分，是分別之相，仍然是相縛。就像有漏的相似，過去由於第七識的染污而成為有漏，當染污的第七識不存在時，第五識和第八識仍然屬於有漏的範疇，相縛也應該如此。 問：相縛是對見分說的，說相是束縛，見縛是自證分（Zi Zheng Fen，self-cognizing aspect）被稱為見縛等等。 答：如樞要（Shu Yao）的解釋也允許稱為束縛。 有人說，同一種子不是。
【English Translation】 English version: If one is in the non-learning stage with a contaminated mind, there should be no Xiangbo (form-bondage), because Wo Zhi (ego-grasping) has been severed. If due to Suo Zhi Zhang (cognitive obscurations), the wisdom arising after realizing emptiness should have Xiangbo. There are two explanations: The first explanation is that Xiangbo is caused by Suo Zhi Zhang. If so, Hou De Zhi (subsequent wisdom) after realizing emptiness should be bound. The answer is: because they are not in accordance. According to An Hui's explanation, this statement is correct. The second explanation is that Fan Nao Zhang (afflictive obscurations) is the substance of Xiangbo. If so, the non-learning stage contaminated wholesome and neutral mind of Er Sheng (two vehicles) should have no Xiangbo. The answer is: because the substance of these Xiang Fen (form-aspects) is contaminated, being the seeds that are guided and perfumed by them. Even if Wo Zhi is now severed and its substance is exhausted, it is still bound by Xiangbo. However, Fa Zhi (grasping at phenomena) is not the true Xiangbo, because clinging to forms is to assist the arising of Wo Zhi, so it is an auxiliary Xiangbo. The scattered wholesome mind and neutral mind of the non-learning stage also have this auxiliary Xiangbo, not yet free from Xiangbo. Although Hou De Zhi after realizing emptiness has this assistance, it does not have the form perfumed by past contamination as the true Xiangbo, so it can be said that there is no Xiangbo. This explanation is correct. However, only the Di Liu Shi (sixth consciousness) clings to the forms of San Lun (three wheels), the Di Wu Shi (fifth consciousness) and Di Ba Shi (eighth consciousness) are spontaneous, and the Di Qi Shi (seventh consciousness) clings inwardly. If contaminated forms are called Xiangbo, then it pervades the Ba Shi (eight consciousnesses). Question: The treatises only say that the sixth consciousness should not forget forms, why is it now said to pervade the eight consciousnesses? Answer: That is based on the three wheels, allowing the sixth consciousness to be bound by forms due to clinging to the self, causing the first six consciousnesses to be bound by forms, unable to understand the principle of illusion. The seventh consciousness clinging to the eighth consciousness is also bound by forms, because the root of Xiangbo lies in this, so they are all Xiangbo. If the seventh consciousness clinging to the self is not called Xiangbo, then how can the sixth consciousness be called Xiangbo? Moreover, this treatise says: 'The so-called Xiangbo refers to the inability to understand the forms of objects as illusory events, etc., and therefore being bound by Jian Fen (seeing-aspect) and Xiang Fen, unable to be free, so it is called Xiangbo.' From this, it can be known that Xiangbo pervades the eight consciousnesses. Question: If so, the fifth and eighth consciousnesses of the non-learning stage of the two vehicles should have Xiangbo, because they do not understand the principle of illusion. Answer: There are two explanations. The first explanation is that because the contaminated Yi (intention) has been extinguished, the fifth and eighth consciousnesses have no bondage. The second explanation is that since clinging to the form-aspects produced by contamination is a discriminating form, it is still Xiangbo. Just like the similarity of contamination, in the past it became contaminated due to the contamination of the seventh consciousness, when the contaminated seventh consciousness does not exist, the fifth and eighth consciousnesses still belong to the category of contamination, and Xiangbo should be the same. Question: Xiangbo is said to be for the seeing-aspect, saying that form is bondage, and seeing-bondage is called Zi Zheng Fen (self-cognizing aspect) being called seeing-bondage, etc. Answer: The explanation of Shu Yao also allows it to be called bondage. Some say that the same seed is not.
縛。別種為縛 要集云。今謂見有三輪非如幻等故說相縛。余分不爾故不說縛。有說違文。但于施等不亡相故。有云違理。同種生果分能所緣。如何不許說能所縛 今謂要集前後自違。何者難有說即云違文。文但說施等不亡相故。即是不許余分名縛。難有云即能所緣故。若許能所緣為縛。前難三輪非。若唯三輪名縛。即能所俱縛非。若云難有說據相縛說。難有云據能所緣縛說。若爾能所緣縛可非縛耶。既自許縛。如何難有說。有說會論說三輪文據易了說故 又論縛者有其多種。或說二縛。一相應縛。二所緣縛。又說二縛。一能緣縛。二所緣縛。又說二縛。一相縛。二粗重縛 能緣王．所與或俱時不得自在。為相應法之所縛故。相應即縛持業為名 能緣王．所為境所拘名所緣縛。通法執心 能緣縛者。即所縛境為能緣心縛。如阿賴耶名 相縛者。心為相所拘名為相縛 相縛有三。一云一切相分皆名為縛。即安惠師。據法執說。能所取故。雖知如幻不能無自性故。或同護法但據我執不了如幻。非據法執。又云此意未滅時識縛終不脫。三位既無末那即無相縛故 二云但有漏相即名相縛。唯除無漏通於八識。一云據法執不了幻故執之為有。一云據我執但不了幻即為相縛。故通法執。若幻不了如幻。縛在生死名為相縛。唯在我執
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『縛』（Bandhana，束縛）——不同的解釋認為『縛』是束縛。『要集』中說：現在認為見到有三輪（施者、受者、施物）並非如幻象等，所以說是『相縛』（Rupa-bandhana，對相的束縛）。其餘部分不是這樣，所以不說『縛』。有人說這違反了經文，因為在佈施等行為中，對相的執著沒有消失。有人說這違反了道理，因為同類的因產生果，能緣和所緣，為什麼不允許說能緣和所緣的束縛呢？ 現在認為『要集』前後自相矛盾。為什麼呢？『難有』的說法就是說違反了經文。經文只是說佈施等行為中，對相的執著沒有消失，就是不允許其餘部分稱為『縛』。『難有』的說法就是能緣和所緣。如果允許能緣和所緣是『縛』，那麼之前對三輪並非如幻象的質疑就不成立。如果只有三輪稱為『縛』，那麼能緣和所緣都不是『縛』。如果說『難有』的說法是根據『相縛』來說的，『難有』的說法是根據能緣和所緣的束縛來說的。如果是這樣，能緣和所緣的束縛可以不是束縛嗎？既然自己承認是束縛，為什麼還要質疑『難有』的說法呢？有人解釋說，會論說三輪的經文是爲了容易理解而說的。 此外，關於『縛』，有多種說法。或者說有兩種『縛』：一是『相應縛』（Samprayoga-bandhana，與心相應法的束縛），二是『所緣縛』（Alambana-bandhana，對所緣境的束縛）。又說有兩種『縛』：一是『能緣縛』（Grahaka-bandhana，能緣心的束縛），二是『所緣縛』。又說有兩種『縛』：一是『相縛』，二是『粗重縛』（奧義書中的概念，指業力）。 能緣的心王和所與的境，或者同時不能自在，因為被相應法所束縛。相應法即是『縛』，以『縛』作為持業釋的名稱。 能緣的心王被所緣的境所拘束，稱為『所緣縛』，這適用於法執和心。 『能緣縛』，就是所束縛的境被能緣的心所束縛，如阿賴耶識（Alaya-vijnana，藏識）的名稱。 『相縛』，心被相所拘束，稱為『相縛』。 『相縛』有三種說法：一是認為一切相分都稱為『縛』，這是安慧論師的觀點，根據法執來說，因為有能取和所取。雖然知道如幻象，但不能沒有自性。或者與護法論師的觀點相同，但根據我執來說，不瞭解如幻象，而不是根據法執。又說，這種意識沒有滅除時，識的束縛終究不能脫離。三位既然沒有末那識（Manas，末那識），就沒有相縛。 二是認為只有有漏的相才稱為『相縛』，只有無漏的相才能通於八識。一是根據法執，不瞭解幻象，所以執著為實有。一是根據我執，只要不瞭解幻象就是『相縛』，所以通於法執。如果對幻象不瞭解如幻象，束縛在生死中，稱為『相縛』，這隻存在於我執。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Bandhana' (縛, Bondage) - Different interpretations consider 'Bandhana' as bondage. 'Yaoji' says: Now it is considered that seeing the three wheels (giver, receiver, and object of giving) are not like illusions, so it is said to be 'Rupa-bandhana' (相縛, bondage to form). The rest is not like this, so it is not called 'Bandhana'. Some say this violates the scriptures, because in acts such as giving, the attachment to form has not disappeared. Some say this violates the principle, because similar causes produce effects, the grasper and the grasped, why is it not allowed to say the bondage of the grasper and the grasped? Now it is considered that 'Yaoji' contradicts itself. Why? The saying of 'Nanyou' is that it violates the scriptures. The scriptures only say that in acts such as giving, the attachment to form has not disappeared, which means that the rest is not allowed to be called 'Bandhana'. The saying of 'Nanyou' is the grasper and the grasped. If it is allowed that the grasper and the grasped are 'Bandhana', then the previous question about the three wheels not being like illusions is not valid. If only the three wheels are called 'Bandhana', then the grasper and the grasped are not 'Bandhana'. If it is said that the saying of 'Nanyou' is based on 'Rupa-bandhana', the saying of 'Nanyou' is based on the bondage of the grasper and the grasped. If so, can the bondage of the grasper and the grasped not be bondage? Since it is admitted to be bondage, why question the saying of 'Nanyou'? Some explain that the scriptures of the assembly on the three wheels are said for easy understanding. In addition, regarding 'Bandhana', there are various sayings. Or there are two types of 'Bandhana': one is 'Samprayoga-bandhana' (相應縛, bondage of co-existing mental factors), and the other is 'Alambana-bandhana' (所緣縛, bondage to the object of cognition). There are also two types of 'Bandhana': one is 'Grahaka-bandhana' (能緣縛, bondage of the grasping mind), and the other is 'Alambana-bandhana'. There are also two types of 'Bandhana': one is 'Rupa-bandhana', and the other is 'heavy bondage' (a concept in the Upanishads, referring to karma). The grasping mind and the object given, or at the same time cannot be free, because they are bound by co-existing mental factors. Co-existing mental factors are 'Bandhana', using 'Bandhana' as the name of the possessive compound. The grasping mind is bound by the object of cognition, which is called 'Alambana-bandhana', which applies to attachment to dharma and the mind. 'Grahaka-bandhana' is that the bound object is bound by the grasping mind, such as the name of Alaya-vijnana (阿賴耶識, store consciousness). 'Rupa-bandhana' is that the mind is bound by form, which is called 'Rupa-bandhana'. There are three sayings about 'Rupa-bandhana': one is that all aspects of form are called 'Bandhana', which is the view of Acharya Anhui, based on attachment to dharma, because there is the grasper and the grasped. Although it is known to be like an illusion, it cannot be without self-nature. Or it is the same as the view of Acharya Dharmapala, but based on attachment to self, not understanding like an illusion, not based on attachment to dharma. It is also said that when this consciousness is not extinguished, the bondage of consciousness cannot be escaped. Since there is no Manas (末那識, Manas) in the three positions, there is no Rupa-bandhana. The second is that only contaminated forms are called 'Rupa-bandhana', and only uncontaminated forms can pass through the eight consciousnesses. One is based on attachment to dharma, not understanding the illusion, so clinging to it as real. One is based on attachment to self, as long as one does not understand the illusion, it is 'Rupa-bandhana', so it passes through attachment to dharma. If one does not understand the illusion as an illusion, being bound in samsara is called 'Rupa-bandhana', which only exists in attachment to self.
三云據行六度三輪之相。但在第六我執相應識所緣相。由此不能成到彼岸 若爾善心皆無我執。行度是善。應無相縛 答據間雜說不能亡相 問若無我雜即名無相。巧便最勝與清凈最勝二二何有別 答巧便據無執。清凈據無悔。諸說相縛不過於此 粗重縛者。總攝諸文粗重有四。一現行有漏諸心心所。即雜集說二十四粗重。二現行二障。三二障種子。四二障習氣。或可。現行通說有漏三性心法。種子應然。以善無記種子。粗重義稍隱故。諸略不說 今說相縛據我執引及六度說。依共不共。對小乘故依我執說。據自義故約六度說。言粗重者此論不明。引經頌有。隨其所應皆修止．觀方能除之。通說無爽。
以有漏言表漏俱故。有漏有三。一體是漏為有所有名為有漏。即三漏中言有漏。是有者三有。此說上界內身為有。以上二界緣身起愛離外境貪故。有之漏名有漏。即二界煩惱名為有漏。漏是所有。二有他漏故名為有漏。即說能有。三者漏性合故名為有漏。亦煩惱自體。由此漏在生死中故即體有用名為有漏 今者此間表漏俱者。取能有體名為有漏不取煩惱。故前偏難云。又善．無覆無記心時。若無我執應非有漏。瑜伽但說有他漏故。雜集通說 問若與漏俱方成有漏。即與雜集第三．瑜伽六十五皆悉相違。彼二論文
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 三云依據我執之相來行六度（佈施、持戒、忍辱、精進、禪定、般若）和三輪體空之相。但這些都只是在與第六識（末那識）相應的我執所緣之相上進行。因此，不能真正到達彼岸（涅槃）。 如果這樣說，那麼所有善心都沒有我執，而行六度是善行，應該沒有相的束縛才對？ 回答是，因為其中夾雜著我執，所以不能消除相。問：如果沒有我執的夾雜，就叫做無相。那麼，方便最勝和清凈最勝這二者有什麼區別？ 答：方便最勝在于沒有執著，清凈最勝在于沒有後悔。所有關於相的束縛的說法，都離不開這兩點。 粗重縛，總括各種經文，粗重有四種：一是現行的有漏（煩惱）諸心和心所（心理活動），也就是《雜集論》所說的二十四種粗重。二是現行的二障（煩惱障和所知障）。三是二障的種子。四是二障的習氣。或者可以這樣說，現行可以統指有漏的三性（善、惡、無記）心法。種子也應該是這樣，因為善和無記的種子，粗重的意義稍微隱晦，所以一般略而不說。 現在所說的相縛，是依據我執的牽引以及六度來說的。依據共同和不共同，針對小乘（聲聞乘）來說，是依據我執說的。根據自義來說，是約六度說的。而粗重，這部論典沒有明確說明，只是引用經文的偈頌說：『隨其所應皆修止觀，方能除之。』這是普遍適用的，沒有差錯。 因為有漏這個詞表示與煩惱相伴隨，所以說有漏有三種含義：一是體性是煩惱，為有所有，名為有漏，也就是三漏（欲漏、有漏、無明漏）中所說的有漏。是有，指的是三有（欲有、色有、無色有）。這裡說的是上界（色界和無色界）以內，以自身為有。因為以上二界緣自身而生起愛，遠離對外境的貪著。有的煩惱名為有漏，也就是二界（色界和無色界）的煩惱名為有漏。煩惱是所有。二是具有他漏，所以名為有漏，也就是指能有。三是煩惱的性質結合在一起，所以名為有漏，也就是煩惱的自體。由此，煩惱在生死中，所以體和用都稱為有漏。 現在這裡說表示與煩惱相伴隨，取能有的體性名為有漏，不取煩惱。所以前面偏頗地責難說：『又在善、無覆無記心的時候，如果沒有我執，應該不是有漏。』《瑜伽師地論》只說了具有他漏，而《雜集論》則普遍地說了。 問：如果與煩惱相伴隨才成為有漏，那麼就與《雜集論》第三卷、《瑜伽師地論》第六十五卷都相違背。這兩部論典的經文...
【English Translation】 English version It is said that one practices the six pāramitās (giving, discipline, patience, diligence, meditation, and wisdom) and the aspect of the three wheels empty based on the aspect of clinging to self. However, these are only performed on the aspect of what is cognized by the sixth consciousness (Manas-vijnana) that corresponds to clinging to self. Therefore, one cannot truly reach the other shore (Nirvana). If that's the case, then all virtuous minds have no clinging to self, and practicing the pāramitās is virtuous, so there should be no bondage of aspects, right? The answer is that because it is mixed with clinging to self, the aspect cannot be eliminated. Question: If there is no mixture of clinging to self, it is called non-aspect. Then, what is the difference between skillful means being supreme and purity being supreme? Answer: Skillful means being supreme lies in having no attachment, and purity being supreme lies in having no regret. All statements about the bondage of aspects cannot be separated from these two points. The bondage of grossness, summarizing various scriptures, there are four types of grossness: First, the currently active defiled (with afflictions) minds and mental activities, which are the twenty-four types of grossness mentioned in the Abhidharmasamuccaya. Second, the currently active two obscurations (afflictive obscuration and cognitive obscuration). Third, the seeds of the two obscurations. Fourth, the habitual tendencies of the two obscurations. Or it can be said that the currently active can generally refer to the defiled three natures (virtuous, non-virtuous, and neutral) of mental dharmas. The seeds should also be like this, because the meaning of grossness of virtuous and neutral seeds is slightly obscure, so it is generally omitted. The aspect bondage now being discussed is based on the attraction of clinging to self and the six pāramitās. Based on common and uncommon, it is said based on clinging to self for the sake of the Small Vehicle (Śrāvakayāna). According to its own meaning, it is said in terms of the six pāramitās. As for grossness, this treatise does not explicitly explain it, but quotes the verses of the scriptures saying: 'According to what is appropriate, one should cultivate both cessation and insight to eliminate it.' This is universally applicable and without error. Because the term 'defiled' indicates being accompanied by afflictions, there are three meanings of 'defiled': First, the nature is affliction, owned by existence, called defiled, which is the defiled mentioned in the three defilements (sensuality defilement, existence defilement, ignorance defilement). 'Existence' refers to the three existences (desire existence, form existence, formless existence). Here it refers to within the upper realms (form realm and formless realm), taking oneself as existence. Because the above two realms arise love based on oneself, and are far from greed for external objects. The affliction of existence is called defiled, which is the afflictions of the two realms (form realm and formless realm) called defiled. Affliction is owned. Second, having other defilements, it is called defiled, which refers to the ability to have. Third, the nature of affliction is combined, so it is called defiled, which is the self-nature of affliction. Therefore, affliction is in samsara, so both the nature and function are called defiled. Now, here it says that indicating being accompanied by afflictions, taking the nature of the ability to have as defiled, not taking affliction. Therefore, the previous biased criticism said: 'Also, at the time of virtuous, neutral, and non-specified minds, if there is no clinging to self, it should not be defiled.' The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra only mentioned having other defilements, while the Abhidharmasamuccaya generally mentioned it. Question: If being accompanied by afflictions makes it defiled, then it contradicts both the third volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the sixty-fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The scriptures of these two treatises...
不唯漏俱名有漏故 二論云何 且對法雲。漏自性故。漏相屬故。漏所縛故。漏所隨故。漏隨順故。漏種類故 初漏自性故即煩惱體。漏性合故名為有漏。由此自體漏在生死名漏性合。余之五種由此自性名為有漏 漏相屬者。與漏相應及漏所依。即染污心．心所名相應。遍行．別境及前七識與或俱者眼等五根名漏所依 所縛者。謂有漏善法。由漏勢力招後有故。此中亦攝六外境．無記心。且據善說 若準瑜伽。過未有漏法善．無記心皆非所縛。及現外境非現量緣亦非所縛者。彼據質說。過．未無故。善．無記心非漏相應。漏心緣時在過．未故。現色若非現量心緣。不親杖質說非所緣 對法論據親相分及疏所緣說亦成所緣。同六十六。斷緣縛說。各據一義故不相違 漏所隨者。謂餘地法。不互相增故。漏隨順者。順抉擇分。異地不增。同地得增。容漏俱故。若無漏者非隨順故。有漏之者雖增背有。然與漏俱。不爾漏俱非漏目故。或雖漏俱而不增益。稱損力益能轉故。然成有漏言增益者據餘漏說。漏種類者。無學諸蘊。前生煩惱之所起故。瑜伽六十五說有漏差別。由五相故。謂事故．隨眠故．相應故．所緣故．生起故。事謂清凈諸色三性心．心所。此是能有諸漏體事。隨其所應由余四相說名有漏。謂隨眠故．相應故．所緣
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 不唯獨因為『漏』（煩惱）之名才說是有漏，那麼二論（指《阿毗達磨對法論》和《瑜伽師地論》）是如何解釋的呢？ 且看《對法論》說：因為『漏』的自性，因為『漏』的相屬，因為『漏』的所縛，因為『漏』的所隨，因為『漏』的隨順，因為『漏』的種類。 首先，『漏』的自性，就是煩惱的本體。因為與『漏』的性質相合，所以稱為有漏。由此，自體與『漏』同在生死之中，名為『漏』性相合。其餘五種（相屬、所縛、所隨、隨順、種類）也由此自性而被稱為有漏。 『漏』的相屬，是指與『漏』相應以及『漏』所依附的。即染污的心和心所，名為相應。遍行、別境以及前七識與（『漏』）或俱，眼等五根名為『漏』所依。 『漏』的所縛，是指有漏的善法，因為『漏』的勢力招感後有。這裡也包括六外境、無記心。這裡僅就善法來說。 如果按照《瑜伽師地論》，過去和未來的有漏法，善和無記心都不是『漏』所縛。以及現在的外境，如果不是現量所緣，也不是『漏』所縛。那是根據『質』（實體）來說的。過去和未來沒有實體，善和無記心不與『漏』相應，『漏』心緣取時在過去和未來。現在的色法如果不是現量心所緣，不親近實體，所以說不是所緣。 《對法論》根據親近的相分以及疏遠的所緣來說，也成為所緣。如同第六十六（卷）。斷緣縛的說法，各自根據一個角度，所以不相違背。 『漏』的所隨，是指餘地法，因為不互相增益。『漏』的隨順，是指順抉擇分。異地不增益，同地可以增益，因為可以與『漏』同在。如果沒有『漏』，就不是隨順。有漏的（法）雖然增益背離（涅槃），但與『漏』同在。否則，與『漏』同在就不是『漏』的目標了。或者雖然與『漏』同在，但不增益，稱量損力，能夠轉變。然而，成就為有漏，說增益是根據其餘的『漏』來說的。 『漏』的種類，是指無學（阿羅漢）的諸蘊，是前生煩惱所生起的。瑜伽第六十五（卷）說有漏的差別，由五種相：事、隨眠、相應、所緣、生起。事，是指清凈的諸色和三性的心、心所。這是能夠成為諸『漏』的體事。隨其所應，由其餘四相說名為有漏。即隨眠、相應、所緣。
【English Translation】 English version: It's not solely because of the name 'Asrava' (leakage, referring to defilements) that something is said to be with Asrava. How do the two treatises (referring to the Abhidharma-samuccaya and the Yogacarabhumi-sastra) explain this? Let's look at what the Abhidharma-samuccaya says: because of the nature of 'Asrava', because of the association with 'Asrava', because of being bound by 'Asrava', because of being accompanied by 'Asrava', because of being in accordance with 'Asrava', because of the category of 'Asrava'. Firstly, the nature of 'Asrava' is the very essence of defilements. Because it is in accordance with the nature of 'Asrava', it is called having 'Asrava'. Therefore, the self-nature being together with 'Asrava' in Samsara (cycle of rebirth) is called being in accordance with the nature of 'Asrava'. The other five (association, being bound, being accompanied, being in accordance, category) are also called having 'Asrava' because of this self-nature. The association with 'Asrava' refers to what is associated with 'Asrava' and what 'Asrava' relies on. That is, the defiled mind and mental factors are called association. The pervasive, the specific, and the first seven consciousnesses are together with ('Asrava') or not, the five sense organs such as the eyes are called what 'Asrava' relies on. Being bound by 'Asrava' refers to wholesome dharmas with 'Asrava', because the power of 'Asrava' invites future existence. This also includes the six external objects and the neutral mind. Here, it is only discussed in terms of wholesome dharmas. If according to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, past and future dharmas with 'Asrava', wholesome and neutral minds are not bound by 'Asrava'. And present external objects, if they are not perceived by direct perception, are also not bound by 'Asrava'. That is according to the 'substance'. The past and future have no substance, wholesome and neutral minds are not associated with 'Asrava', the mind of 'Asrava' takes as object in the past and future. If the present form is not perceived by direct perception, it is not close to the substance, so it is said not to be the object. The Abhidharma-samuccaya says that according to the close image-component and the distant object, it also becomes the object. Like the sixty-sixth (chapter). The statement of cutting off the binding of conditions, each is based on one perspective, so they are not contradictory. Being accompanied by 'Asrava' refers to the dharmas of other realms, because they do not increase each other. Being in accordance with 'Asrava' refers to the part in accordance with the decisive. Different realms do not increase, the same realm can increase, because it can be together with 'Asrava'. If there is no 'Asrava', it is not in accordance. Although the dharmas with 'Asrava' increase and turn away (from Nirvana), they are together with 'Asrava'. Otherwise, being together with 'Asrava' is not the goal of 'Asrava'. Or although it is together with 'Asrava', it does not increase, weighing the loss of power, it can transform. However, achieving having 'Asrava', saying increase is based on the other 'Asravas'. The category of 'Asrava' refers to the aggregates of the non-learner (Arhat), which are produced by the defilements of the previous life. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra sixty-fifth (chapter) says that the difference of having 'Asrava' is due to five aspects: matter, latent tendencies, association, object, arising. Matter refers to the pure forms and the minds and mental factors of the three natures. This is the substance that can become the body of the 'Asravas'. As appropriate, it is called having 'Asrava' by the other four aspects. That is, latent tendencies, association, object.
故．生起故。即前諸法煩惱未斷所有種子說名隨眠。彼由此種說名有漏。諸染心．心所由相應故說名有漏。若諸有事現量所行。若有漏所生增上所起。如是一切漏所緣故名為有漏。現在名有事。若依清凈色識所行名現量所行 此據貪等能現量緣彼色等境名漏所緣。余非所緣。論云但由自分別所起相起諸煩惱。非彼諸法為此分明所行境故。故如前會 由生起故成有漏者。隨眠未斷順煩惱境現在前故。此據惑引 又云。從一切不善煩惱。諸異熟果。及異熟果增上所引外事生起。亦生起故說名有漏。此有漏果為依所生亦名有漏 五聚之法于有漏位三性之中。依雜集六．瑜伽五義各具幾義名為有漏。如樞要下卷解十二支三斷中辨。準此二文。不唯漏俱名為有漏 答此據正因。被據別義。故不相違。
言互相增益者。問第七與六為雜染依增益於六。六識如何增益第七 答有二義。一者增長。二者不損 若第六識發業感八為彼依緣。得相續住故名增益 起有漏時。設雖不能增長第七。而不損害亦名增益。非如無漏起必損彼不名增長。亦如眠睡。雖于眼根不能增長。而不損害亦名長養。此亦應爾。
釋意識得名。問五．八皆依七。何故六稱不共依。獨得名意識非五．八耶。答若染凈依及俱有依。七望五．八俱是所依。然
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，由於生起（煩惱）的緣故，（這些法）被稱為『有漏』。那些先前諸法（指五蘊）的煩惱未斷，其所有的種子被稱為『隨眠』（Anusaya，煩惱的潛在形式）。由於這些『隨眠』的種子，（五蘊）被稱為『有漏』。那些染污的心和心所，由於與『隨眠』相應，也被稱為『有漏』。如果諸法是現量（Pratyaksa，直接感知）所行境，或者是由有漏法所生、增上所起的，那麼所有這些由於是『漏』（Asrava，煩惱）所緣的境，因此被稱為『有漏』。『現在』被稱為『有事』。如果所行境是依于清凈的色和識，則稱為『現量所行』。這裡指的是貪等煩惱能夠現量地緣取彼色等境，因此是『漏』所緣。其餘則不是『漏』所緣。論中說，僅僅由於自己的分別所產生的相而生起諸煩惱，而不是因為那些法是為此分明所行境的緣故。所以如前所會通的那樣。由於生起的緣故成為『有漏』，是因為『隨眠』未斷，順於煩惱的境現在前的緣故。這是指惑的牽引作用。又說，從一切不善煩惱，諸異熟果（Vipaka-phala，果報），以及異熟果增上所引的外事生起，也因為生起的緣故被稱為『有漏』。這個有漏的果，作為所依而生，也稱為『有漏』。五聚之法（五蘊）在有漏位的三性（善、惡、無記）之中，依據《雜集論》第六和《瑜伽師地論》第五的意義，各自具有幾個意義被稱為『有漏』？如同《樞要》下卷解釋十二支三斷中所辨析的那樣。根據這兩段文字，不僅僅是與『漏』俱生的法被稱為『有漏』。回答說，這是根據正因，被據別義，所以不相違背。 所說的『互相增益』是指：問：第七識（末那識，Manas）與第六識（意識，Vijnana）之間，第七識作為雜染的所依，增益於第六識，那麼第六識如何增益第七識？答：有兩種意義。一是增長，二是不損害。如果第六識發業，感得第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）作為它的所依緣，使得第八識得以相續住持，因此稱為增益。在生起有漏法的時候，即使第六識不能增長第七識，但不損害第七識也稱為增益。不像無漏法生起時必定損害第七識，因此不稱為增長。就像睡眠一樣，雖然對於眼根不能增長，但不損害眼根也稱為長養。這裡也應該如此。 解釋意識得名：問：第五識（眼識等五識）、第八識都依于第七識，為什麼只有第六識被稱為『不共依』，而獨得名『意識』，而不是第五識、第八識？答：如果從染凈的所依以及俱有的所依來說，第七識對於第五識、第八識都是所依。然而，
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, due to the arising (of afflictions), (these dharmas) are called 'with outflows' (Asrava). Those seeds of afflictions that have not been severed from the previous dharmas (referring to the five skandhas) are called 'latent tendencies' (Anusaya). Due to these seeds of 'latent tendencies,' (the five skandhas) are called 'with outflows.' Those defiled minds and mental factors, due to their association with 'latent tendencies,' are also called 'with outflows.' If dharmas are objects of direct perception (Pratyaksa), or are produced and arisen from conditioned dharmas, then all of these are called 'with outflows' because they are objects of 'outflows' (Asrava). 'Present' is called 'with affairs.' If the object of experience is based on pure form and consciousness, it is called 'object of direct perception.' This refers to the fact that afflictions such as greed can directly perceive objects such as form, and therefore are objects of 'outflows.' The rest are not objects of 'outflows.' The treatise says that afflictions arise merely from the appearances produced by one's own discrimination, and not because those dharmas are objects clearly experienced for this reason. Therefore, it is as previously reconciled. Becoming 'with outflows' due to arising is because 'latent tendencies' have not been severed, and objects that accord with afflictions appear in the present. This refers to the function of the force of delusion. It is also said that from all unwholesome afflictions, the results of maturation (Vipaka-phala), and external affairs induced by the increase of the results of maturation, are also called 'with outflows' because of their arising. This result of outflows, as that which is relied upon for arising, is also called 'with outflows.' Among the three natures (wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral) of the five aggregates in the state of outflows, according to the meanings of the sixth chapter of the Samuccaya and the fifth chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, how many meanings does each possess to be called 'with outflows'? It is as analyzed in the lower volume of the Key Essentials in the explanation of the three severances of the twelve links. According to these two passages, it is not only the dharmas that arise together with 'outflows' that are called 'with outflows.' The answer is that this is based on the correct cause, and is based on a separate meaning, so they are not contradictory. What is meant by 'mutually increasing' refers to: Question: Between the seventh consciousness (Manas) and the sixth consciousness (Vijnana), the seventh consciousness, as the basis of defilement, increases the sixth consciousness, so how does the sixth consciousness increase the seventh consciousness? Answer: There are two meanings. One is to increase, and the other is not to harm. If the sixth consciousness initiates actions and causes the eighth consciousness (Alaya-vijnana) to be its dependent condition, so that the eighth consciousness can continue to abide, it is therefore called increasing. When conditioned dharmas arise, even if the sixth consciousness cannot increase the seventh consciousness, not harming the seventh consciousness is also called increasing. It is not like when unconditioned dharmas arise, they necessarily harm the seventh consciousness, so it is not called increasing. Just like sleep, although it cannot increase the eye faculty, not harming the eye faculty is also called nourishing. It should be the same here. Explaining the name of consciousness: Question: The fifth consciousness (the five sense consciousnesses) and the eighth consciousness both rely on the seventh consciousness, so why is only the sixth consciousness called the 'uncommon basis,' and uniquely named 'consciousness,' and not the fifth consciousness or the eighth consciousness? Answer: If we speak of the basis of defilement and purity, and the basis of co-existence, the seventh consciousness is the basis for both the fifth consciousness and the eighth consciousness. However,
近順生不共依者。即唯第六。今言不共意。顯近而順生。何者以六種子必隨七種。七種生現意識隨生。如眼識種依眼根種。此亦如是。五．八不說依第七種。故此得名無相濫失 若爾七依八生何不名心。八依七生何不名意 答論云辨識得名心．意非例。又七．八自相續。當體得名。六識間斷。從依．緣目。或準界．處俱名心意。第七名心意。第八名意心。理亦無失。然無誠文。
論。若得自在諸根互用。樞要二說。于第一師自有二解。一云五識各各能緣一切諸境皆得自相。無壞根．境過。言離合者。據因位說。不障果位。得自在故 又如第八識雖緣諸境皆得自相。不有壞過。以于果位體有多能。非體轉變為余法體故。不得難云見色名為眼。亦許聞聲等。能造名為大。色等亦能造。彼體轉異。此是功能。若以色能見。可例色能造。見色眼功能。非是體轉變。然法師意存第二解。若第二師各還自根緣于自相不名互用 要集云。舊相傳有三師。一云一識通依六根。各取根所得自境。二云一識通緣六境。各依自根。境是共故。劣得通余。一云一識通依六根通緣六境。未詳決云。根．識不共。境即是共。不欲壞自根．識所行。若一識通依諸根。即壞根．識。故用他境不用他根。今存未詳 今謂有餘。何者境是共取。本自共
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 與近順生不共所依的，就是第六識（第六意識）。現在說『不共意』，是爲了顯示它既近又順著生起。為什麼呢？因為第六識的種子必定跟隨第七識（末那識）的種子，第七識生起時，現前的意識也隨之生起。就像眼識的種子依附於眼根的種子一樣，這裡也是如此。第五識（前五識）和第八識（阿賴耶識）不說依附於第七識，所以第六識才得名『無相濫失』。 如果這樣，第七識依附於第八識生起，為什麼不叫『心』呢？第八識依附於第七識生起，為什麼不叫『意』呢？答：論中說，辨別和認識才得名為『心』、『意』，不能以此為例。而且第七識和第八識是自相續，就其本體而言就可得名。第六識是間斷的，從所依和所緣來命名。或者可以按照界和處都可稱為『心意』的原則，第七識可以稱為『心意』，第八識可以稱為『意心』，道理上也沒有錯失。但是沒有明確的經文依據。 論：如果獲得自在，諸根可以互相使用。《樞要》中有兩種說法。在第一位法師的觀點中，有兩種解釋。一種說法是，前五識各自能夠緣取一切諸境，都能得到自相，沒有損壞根和境的過失。說『離合』，是根據因位的說法，不障礙果位，因為已經獲得自在。又如第八識雖然緣取諸境都能得到自相，沒有損壞的過失，因為在果位上，本體具有多種功能，不是本體轉變成為其他法的本體。不能用『見色名為眼，也允許聞聲等』來反駁。能造名為大，色等也能造。彼體轉變不同，這是功能。如果用色能見，可以類比色能造。見色的眼的功能，不是本體轉變。然而法師的意圖在於第二種解釋。如果第二位法師認為，各識仍然各自用自己的根緣取自己的自相，這不叫互相使用。 《要集》中說，舊時相傳有三位法師的觀點。一位認為，一識可以通依六根，各自取根所得到的自境。二位認為，一識可以通緣六境，各自依自己的根，因為境是共同的，所以低劣的可以通於其餘的。三位認為，一識可以通依六根，通緣六境。尚未詳細決定。根和識是不共的，境是共同的，不想損壞自根和自識所行。如果一識通依諸根，就損壞了根和識。所以用他境不用他根。現在存疑。現在我認為還有剩餘的道理。因為境是共同取用的，本來就是共同的。
【English Translation】 English version That which is the non-common support of the immediately preceding and compliant arising is only the sixth consciousness (sixth consciousness). Now, the term 'non-common intention' is used to show that it is both near and compliant in its arising. Why? Because the seed of the sixth consciousness invariably follows the seed of the seventh consciousness (Manas-vijnana), and when the seventh consciousness arises, the present consciousness also arises accordingly. Just as the seed of eye-consciousness relies on the seed of the eye-organ, so it is here. The fifth (five sense consciousnesses) and eighth consciousnesses (Alaya-vijnana) are not said to rely on the seventh consciousness, hence the sixth consciousness is named 'non-discriminating loss'. If that is so, why is it not called 'mind' when the seventh consciousness relies on the eighth consciousness to arise? Why is it not called 'intention' when the eighth consciousness relies on the seventh consciousness to arise? Answer: The treatise says that discrimination and recognition are named 'mind' and 'intention', and this cannot be taken as an example. Moreover, the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are self-continuing, and are named by their very nature. The sixth consciousness is intermittent, and is named from its support and object. Or, according to the principle that both realms and locations can be called 'mind-intention', the seventh consciousness can be called 'mind-intention', and the eighth consciousness can be called 'intention-mind', which is logically correct. However, there is no clear scriptural basis for this. Treatise: If one attains freedom, the organs can be used interchangeably. There are two explanations in the 'Essentials'. In the view of the first teacher, there are two interpretations. One explanation is that each of the five sense consciousnesses can grasp all objects and obtain their own characteristics, without the fault of damaging the organs and objects. The term 'separation and combination' is based on the stage of cause, and does not hinder the stage of effect, because one has attained freedom. Furthermore, although the eighth consciousness grasps all objects, it can obtain its own characteristics without the fault of damage, because in the stage of effect, the entity has multiple functions, and the entity does not transform into the entity of other dharmas. One cannot refute by saying 'seeing color is called eye, and hearing sound is also allowed'. The ability to create is called great, and color etc. can also create. Their entity transformation is different, this is a function. If color can be used to see, it can be compared to color being able to create. The function of the eye that sees color is not a transformation of the entity. However, the teacher's intention lies in the second explanation. If the second teacher believes that each consciousness still uses its own organ to grasp its own characteristics, this is not called interchangeable use. The 'Essential Collection' says that there are three teachers' views traditionally passed down. One believes that one consciousness can rely on all six organs and each take the self-object obtained by the organ. The second believes that one consciousness can grasp all six objects and each rely on its own organ, because the object is common, so the inferior can communicate with the rest. The third believes that one consciousness can rely on all six organs and grasp all six objects. It has not yet been determined in detail. Organs and consciousness are non-common, and objects are common, and one does not want to damage what is done by one's own organs and consciousness. If one consciousness relies on all organs, it damages the organs and consciousness. Therefore, one uses other objects but not other organs. Now there is doubt. Now I think there is still remaining reason. Because the object is commonly taken, it is originally common.
成 若不欲壞自根．識所行。通依諸根即壞根．識。故用他境不用他根者 今依自根取于余境。不分離合得假實境。豈不猶有壞根．境失。以余識．根取余境故。既不釋通。應依樞要。
問佛五識緣五塵之境為定生不。若定所生應法處攝。五根亦爾 答有二解。準下第十。一云法處。唯有三界成無漏故。一云夫定所變。未必定在法處所收。若無色界定力所起即法處收。以無所依根．境別故。若在色界定通力生。通自處攝。如天眼．耳非在法處 或托質變五境所收。若獨影起即法處攝。或在佛位法爾無漏五塵境收。新所熏者即法處攝。以其法爾不由定通。若新熏者由定通起故。
問五識三性許得容俱者。且善眼識至等流已。不善耳識所緣。緣至起率爾心。爾時意識亦同聞聲。為是率爾。為等流心。若等流心當與眼識同是善性。率爾無記。未轉依位前三無記。不可二性一心並起。若是無記。眼識爾時如何成善。無善意識為能引故 答且通初難。五心義說。善等流意與耳同緣。雖是善性。亦名率爾。以其聲境創墮心故。不可說是等流之心。前未聞聲故。不得唯率爾。亦與眼識仍同緣故。故因通二。然是善性。言前三心未轉依位唯無記者。或據全未轉依。不得自在別別五心。多分而說。若已分得轉依之者。得自在
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 成：如果不想破壞自己的根（indriya，感覺器官）和識（vijñāna，意識）的作用，那麼通過其他根的作用就會破壞根和識。因此，使用其他境界而不是其他根。現在依靠自己的根來獲取其他的境界，不分離也不結合，得到虛假的和真實的境界。難道不會仍然有破壞根和境界的過失嗎？因為用其他的識和根來獲取其他的境界的緣故。既然不能普遍解釋，就應該依據樞要。
問：佛的五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）所緣的五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）境界是由於禪定而產生的嗎？如果是由於禪定而產生的，就應該被法處（dharmadhātu，法界）所攝。五根（眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根）也是這樣嗎？ 答：有兩種解釋。按照下面的第十（品）。一種說法是法處只有三界（欲界、色界、無色界）成就無漏（anāsrava，沒有煩惱）。另一種說法是，由禪定所變現的，不一定都在法處所收。如果沒有禪定力所生起的，就被法處所收，因為沒有所依的根和境界的差別。如果是在禪定通力（abhijñā，神通）中產生的，就普遍地被自身所攝。比如天眼（divyacakṣus，天眼通）和天耳（divyaśrotra，天耳通）不是在法處。或者依託物質而變現為五境所收。如果是獨影而起，就被法處所攝。或者在佛的果位，法爾（dharmatā，事物本性）就是無漏的五塵境界所收。新熏習的就被法處所攝，因為它是法爾如此，不是由禪定通力所致。如果是新熏習的，由禪定通力而生起。
問：五識的三性（善性、惡性、無記性）允許同時存在嗎？比如善的眼識到了等流（nisyanda，等流果）的時候，不善的耳識所緣的境界，緣到生起率爾心（kṣaṇika-citta，剎那心）。這時意識也同樣聽到聲音，是率爾心還是等流心？如果是等流心，應當與眼識同樣是善性。率爾心是無記性。在沒有轉依（āśraya-parivṛtti，轉依）之前，前三心是無記性，不可能兩種性質的心同時生起。如果是無記性，眼識這時如何成為善性？因為沒有善的意識作為能引導的原因嗎？ 答：先通達第一個難題。《五心義》中說，善的等流意識與耳識一同緣取。雖然是善性，也叫做率爾心，因為聲音的境界剛剛進入心中。不能說是等流心，因為之前沒有聽到聲音。不能只是率爾心，也與眼識仍然一同緣取。所以因為通達了兩種。然而它是善性。說前三心在沒有轉依之前只是無記性的，或者根據完全沒有轉依，不能自在地分別五心，大部分是這樣說的。如果已經分別得到轉依的，就能夠自在。
【English Translation】 English version: Cheng: If you do not want to destroy the function of your own indriya (sense organs) and vijñāna (consciousness), then relying on other sense organs will destroy the root and consciousness. Therefore, using other realms instead of other roots. Now relying on one's own roots to obtain other realms, neither separating nor combining, one obtains false and real realms. Wouldn't there still be the fault of destroying the root and realm? Because other consciousnesses and roots are used to obtain other realms. Since it cannot be explained universally, it should be based on the essentials.
Question: Are the five dust (rūpa, śabda, gandha, rasa, sparśa) realms that the Buddha's five consciousnesses (eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) perceive produced by samādhi (concentration)? If they are produced by samādhi, then they should be included in the dharmadhātu (dharma realm). Are the five indriya (eye-organ, ear-organ, nose-organ, tongue-organ, body-organ) also like this? Answer: There are two explanations. According to the tenth (chapter) below. One says that the dharmadhātu only has the three realms (kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu, arūpadhātu) achieving anāsrava (non-outflow, without afflictions). Another says that what is transformed by samādhi is not necessarily included in the dharmadhātu. If it is not produced by samādhi power, then it is included in the dharmadhātu, because there is no difference between the root and the realm on which it relies. If it is produced in samādhi abhijñā (supernatural power), then it is universally included in itself. For example, divyacakṣus (divine eye) and divyaśrotra (divine ear) are not in the dharmadhātu. Or relying on matter to transform into what is included in the five realms. If it arises from a single shadow, then it is included in the dharmadhātu. Or in the Buddha's position, dharmatā (the nature of things) is naturally included in the anāsrava five dust realms. What is newly perfumed is included in the dharmadhātu, because it is naturally so, not caused by samādhi abhijñā. If it is newly perfumed, it arises from samādhi abhijñā.
Question: Are the three natures (good, evil, neutral) of the five consciousnesses allowed to exist simultaneously? For example, when the good eye-consciousness reaches nisyanda (outflow, result of outflow), the realm perceived by the evil ear-consciousness reaches the arising of kṣaṇika-citta (momentary mind). At this time, the consciousness also hears the sound, is it kṣaṇika-citta or nisyanda-citta? If it is nisyanda-citta, it should be of the same good nature as the eye-consciousness. Kṣaṇika-citta is of neutral nature. Before āśraya-parivṛtti (transformation of the basis), the first three minds are of neutral nature, it is impossible for two natures of mind to arise simultaneously. If it is of neutral nature, how does the eye-consciousness become good at this time? Because there is no good consciousness as a guiding cause? Answer: First, understand the first difficult question. The 'Meaning of the Five Minds' says that the good nisyanda consciousness and the ear-consciousness perceive together. Although it is of good nature, it is also called kṣaṇika-citta, because the realm of sound has just entered the mind. It cannot be said to be nisyanda-citta, because the sound has not been heard before. It cannot be just kṣaṇika-citta, and it still perceives together with the eye-consciousness. Therefore, because it understands both. However, it is of good nature. Saying that the first three minds are only of neutral nature before transformation, or based on the fact that there is no complete transformation, one cannot freely distinguish the five minds, mostly speaking like this. If one has already separately obtained transformation, one can be free.
者。五心俱者。可通三性。不爾如何論云非取聲時即便出定。領受聲已若有希望后時方出。此言希望即尋求心。不得說言欲希望時即便出定。論云若有希望後方出定故。亦不得言定前加行立期愿云。若聞異聲即便出定尋求境事故言希望。非於定中作尋求。何者希望聲時。為在定內。為已出定。若在定內。希望之心即是尋求。尋求之心與欲俱故。若此希望非尋求者。是何心攝。若云希望即已出定。與論文違。論云若有希望后時方出故 西明釋云。若依正本。非即彼定相應意識能取此聲。由此釋家二釋不同 今謂不爾。違論文故。所引釋家非經論故不可為證。
釋后難者。論言五識由意識引成善染者。據初起說。非約相續善染之時恒由意引。故下論云。諸處但言五俱意識亦緣五境。不說同性 西明云。唯率爾．染凈．等流三心與五識俱。尋求．決定唯緣過去比量之心。不與五俱。問如前第四云遇非勝境。可許率爾心后五識間斷。遇勝境位率爾心后五不間斷。豈不中間起尋求已。方起決定．染凈．等流。若有尋決。云何不與五識俱耶。解云遇勝境位雖多剎那。率爾不斷。而無餘心。若爾率爾唯是無記。如忿恚天既是勝境。可唯無記。不見憤恚成無記故。解云許此初起率爾無記。從此心後起于染凈．等流二心。以不善故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：如果五種心識同時生起，就可以通達三種自性（指善、惡、無記三種性質）。如果不是這樣，又怎麼能說不是在聽取聲音的時候就立即出定呢？如果領受聲音之後，希望之後才出定，那麼這種『希望』就是尋求的心。不能說想要希望的時候就立即出定。論中說，如果希望之後才出定。因此，也不能說在入定前的加行階段就立下誓願說，如果聽到不同的聲音就立即出定去尋求境界。所以說『希望』，不是在定中進行尋求。那麼，希望聽到聲音的時候，是在定內，還是已經出定？如果在定內，希望的心就是尋求。尋求的心與慾念同時生起。如果這種希望不是尋求，那麼屬於哪種心識？如果說希望就已經出定，就與論文相違背。論文說，如果希望之後才出定。西明（地名，或指西明寺）的解釋說，如果按照正本，不是與彼定相應的意識能夠取此聲音。因此，解釋家有兩種不同的解釋。我認為不是這樣，因為與論文相違背。所引用的解釋家的說法不是經論，不能作為證據。
解釋後面的疑問：論中說，五識由意識引導而成為善或染污，這是就最初生起時說的。不是說在相續的善或染污的時候，總是由意識引導。所以下面的論中說，各個地方只說五俱意識也緣於五境，沒有說同性。西明說，只有率爾心（最初一念）、染凈心、等流心（相似相續的心）與五識同時生起。尋求心、決定心只緣於過去的比量之心，不與五識同時生起。問：如前面第四卷所說，遇到不殊勝的境界，可以允許率爾心后五識間斷。遇到殊勝的境界，率爾心后五識不間斷。難道不是中間生起尋求之後，才生起決定心、染凈心、等流心嗎？如果有尋求和決定，怎麼能不與五識同時生起呢？解釋說，遇到殊勝的境界，雖然有很多剎那，率爾心不斷，而沒有其他心。如果這樣，率爾心只是無記。如忿恚天（發怒的天人）既然是殊勝的境界，可以只是無記嗎？不見忿恚成為無記的緣故。解釋說，允許這最初生起的率爾心是無記。從此心之後，生起染凈心、等流心。因為是不善的緣故。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously, they can penetrate the three natures (referring to the three qualities of good, evil, and neutral). If this is not the case, how can it be said that one does not immediately emerge from Samadhi (定, meditative state) when hearing a sound? If, after receiving the sound, one hopes to emerge from Samadhi later, then this 'hope' is the mind of seeking. It cannot be said that one immediately emerges from Samadhi when wanting to hope. The treatise says that if one hopes to emerge from Samadhi later. Therefore, it cannot be said that in the preliminary practice before entering Samadhi, one makes a vow, saying, 'If I hear a different sound, I will immediately emerge from Samadhi to seek the object.' Therefore, 'hope' is not seeking within Samadhi. So, when hoping to hear the sound, is it within Samadhi or already out of Samadhi? If it is within Samadhi, the mind of hope is seeking. The mind of seeking arises simultaneously with desire. If this hope is not seeking, then to which consciousness does it belong? If it is said that hope is already out of Samadhi, it contradicts the treatise. The treatise says that if one hopes to emerge from Samadhi later. The explanation of Ximing (西明, place name, or referring to Ximing Temple) says that, according to the original text, it is not the consciousness corresponding to that Samadhi that can grasp this sound. Therefore, the interpreters have two different explanations. I think this is not the case because it contradicts the treatise. The sayings of the interpreters cited are not from Sutras or Treatises and cannot be used as evidence.
Explaining the later doubts: The treatise says that the five consciousnesses are led by the mind-consciousness to become good or defiled, which refers to the initial arising. It does not mean that during the continuity of good or defiled states, they are always led by the mind-consciousness. Therefore, the following treatise says that in various places, it is only said that the five co-arising consciousnesses also cognize the five objects, without mentioning the same nature. Ximing says that only the 'first-moment' mind (率爾心, initial thought), the defiled/pure mind, and the 'flowing-on' mind (等流心, similar continuous mind) arise simultaneously with the five consciousnesses. The seeking mind and the determining mind only cognize the past inferential mind and do not arise simultaneously with the five consciousnesses. Question: As mentioned in the fourth volume earlier, when encountering an unfavorable object, it can be allowed that the five consciousnesses are interrupted after the 'first-moment' mind. When encountering a favorable object, the five consciousnesses are not interrupted after the 'first-moment' mind. Isn't it that after seeking arises in the middle, the determining mind, the defiled/pure mind, and the 'flowing-on' mind arise? If there is seeking and determining, how can they not arise simultaneously with the five consciousnesses? The explanation says that when encountering a favorable object, although there are many kshanas (剎那, very short moments), the 'first-moment' mind is continuous, and there are no other minds. If so, the 'first-moment' mind is only neutral. Since an angry Deva (天, celestial being) is a favorable object, can it only be neutral? It is not seen that anger becomes neutral. The explanation says that it is allowed that this initially arising 'first-moment' mind is neutral. After this mind, the defiled/pure mind and the 'flowing-on' mind arise because it is unwholesome.
。若爾五識成善．染者必意引生。若不尋求云何起憤恚。若起尋求云何非五俱。解云三藏一解云。許五俱意通有比量。而集量說五俱現量。不說唯言。如緣教等有比量故。又解不許。若爾前難猶未能通。解云五俱率爾。雖同無記不起尋求。由前勢分力。意成善．染引五成善．染 此亦不然。若由前力。何不初遇由前力故。即成善．染。解云可爾。此亦不然。許率爾心唯無記故云何善．染。若云除初念比量相違。又若前心已逢不善。可由前力。前惑無記。強力忽至起于憤恚。豈前有恚耶 今者解云。率爾．尋求亦許五俱。言緣過去約間斷說。今言俱者據相續說。故無緣過去。現．比同時失 問定中無五識。遇聲耳識生。睡時五識無。喚時睡內起 答有二解。一云不例。有心定有意為依耳識生。眠時意或無。無依耳不起 一云眠中縱有意。昧略耳不生。定中意明瞭。聞聲耳識起 西明云。睡起耳識如定聞聲。亦無文障問定中身識亦得起不 答有二解。一云不得。準前第三云。謂若在定等。理有眾多身受生起等。故無身識 若爾前云諸定皆無五識身故。何故定中說有耳識 答前據他宗 若爾猶有比量相違 一云許起無失。若諸菩薩五識皆起。二乘不定。問在無所有處定意緣聲時。與耳同熏欲界之聲。為無所有處 答定心所變
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：如果前五識成為善或染污，一定是意識引導產生的。如果不經過尋求，怎麼會產生憤恚？如果經過尋求，為什麼不能五識同時生起？ 解答：三藏的一種解釋是，允許五識同時生起，意識可以通過比量（推理）參與。而《集量論》只說五識同時生起是現量（直接感知），並沒有說只有現量。例如，緣教等情況就存在比量。另一種解釋是不允許五識同時生起。如果這樣，前面的疑問仍然無法解決。 解答：五俱率爾（突然、不經意）的心念雖然是無記（非善非惡），但不會產生尋求。由於之前的勢力的作用，意識成為善或染污，引導五識也成為善或染污。但這種說法也不對。如果是由之前的勢力，為什麼初次相遇時，不直接由於之前的勢力而成為善或染污？ 解答：可以這樣說。但這種說法也不對，因為允許率爾的心念只有無記，怎麼會是善或染污？如果說除了初念，這與比量相違。而且，如果之前的心念已經遇到不善，可以由之前的勢力。之前的迷惑是無記，強大的力量突然到來，產生憤恚。難道之前就有憤恚嗎？ 現在的解釋是，率爾和尋求也允許與五識同時生起。說緣過去，是約間斷來說。現在說同時，是據相續來說。所以不存在緣過去，現量和比量同時喪失的問題。 問：在禪定中沒有五識，遇到聲音時，耳識會生起。睡眠時五識沒有，呼喚時睡眠中會產生反應。 答：有兩種解釋。一種解釋是不一樣。有心定的情況下，有意作為所依，耳識才會生起。睡眠時意識可能沒有，沒有所依，耳識就不會生起。另一種解釋是，睡眠中即使有意識，也是昧略（不清晰），耳識不會生起。禪定中意識明瞭，聽到聲音時，耳識就會生起。 西明說：睡醒時的耳識就像禪定中聽到聲音一樣，也沒有經文上的障礙。問：禪定中身識也能生起嗎？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種解釋是不能。根據前面第三種說法，如果在禪定等狀態，理論上會有很多身受生起等，所以沒有身識。 如果這樣，前面說諸定都沒有五識身，為什麼禪定中又說有耳識？答：前面是根據其他宗派的說法。 如果這樣，仍然存在與比量相違的情況。一種解釋是允許生起，沒有過失。如果諸菩薩五識都生起，二乘則不一定。問：在無所有處定（一種禪定狀態）中，意識緣聲時，與耳識一同薰染欲界的聲音，還是無所有處的聲音？ 答：是定心所變現的聲音。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If the former five consciousnesses become wholesome or defiled, it must be that the mind consciousness (意, yi, mind consciousness) leads to their arising. If there is no seeking, how can anger arise? If there is seeking, why can't the five consciousnesses arise simultaneously? Answer: One explanation from the Tripiṭaka (三藏, Sānzàng, the three collections of Buddhist texts) is that it allows the five consciousnesses to arise simultaneously, and the mind consciousness can participate through inference (比量, bǐliàng, inference). However, the Compendium of Valid Cognition (集量論, Jíliàng Lùn) only says that the simultaneous arising of the five consciousnesses is direct perception (現量, xiànliàng, direct perception), and does not say that it is only direct perception. For example, in the case of dependent origination (緣教, yuánjiào), there is inference. Another explanation does not allow the five consciousnesses to arise simultaneously. If so, the previous question still cannot be resolved. Answer: Although the sāhasika (率爾, shuài'ěr, sudden, unintentional) thought of the five simultaneous consciousnesses is neutral (無記, wújì, neither wholesome nor unwholesome), it does not generate seeking. Due to the force of the previous momentum, the mind consciousness becomes wholesome or defiled, leading the five consciousnesses to also become wholesome or defiled. But this statement is also incorrect. If it is due to the previous force, why doesn't the initial encounter directly become wholesome or defiled due to the previous force? Answer: It can be said so. But this statement is also incorrect, because sāhasika thoughts are only allowed to be neutral, how can they be wholesome or defiled? If it is said that it excludes the initial thought, this contradicts inference. Moreover, if the previous thought has already encountered unwholesome things, it can be due to the previous force. The previous delusion is neutral, and a strong force suddenly arrives, generating anger. Was there anger before? The current explanation is that sāhasika and seeking are also allowed to arise simultaneously with the five consciousnesses. Saying 'related to the past' is speaking in terms of discontinuity. Saying 'simultaneous' now is speaking in terms of continuity. Therefore, there is no problem of losing the ability to relate to the past, direct perception, and inference simultaneously. Question: In meditative absorption (定, dìng, meditative absorption), there are no five consciousnesses. When encountering sound, the ear consciousness arises. When sleeping, the five consciousnesses are absent. When called, there is a response in sleep. Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that they are not the same. In the case of meditative absorption with mind, the ear consciousness arises with the mind as its basis. When sleeping, the mind may be absent, and without a basis, the ear consciousness will not arise. Another explanation is that even if there is mind in sleep, it is vague (昧略, mèilüè, vague), and the ear consciousness will not arise. In meditative absorption, the mind is clear, and when hearing sound, the ear consciousness will arise. Ximing (西明, Xīmíng, a Buddhist temple) said: The ear consciousness upon waking from sleep is like hearing sound in meditative absorption, and there is no textual obstacle. Question: Can body consciousness also arise in meditative absorption? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that it cannot. According to the third statement above, if one is in meditative absorption, there are theoretically many bodily sensations arising, so there is no body consciousness. If so, why does it say that there is ear consciousness in meditative absorption when it was previously said that all meditative absorptions lack the five consciousnesses? Answer: The previous statement was based on the views of other schools. If so, there is still a contradiction with inference. One explanation is that it is allowed to arise without fault. If all the five consciousnesses of the Bodhisattvas arise, it is not certain for the Two Vehicles (二乘, Èrchéng, Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas). Question: When the mind in the Station of No-thingness (無所有處定, wúsuǒyǒuchù dìng, the meditative state of no-thingness) contemplates sound, does it simultaneously perfume the sound of the desire realm (欲界, yùjiè, the realm of desire) with the ear consciousness, or the sound of the Station of No-thingness? Answer: It is the sound transformed by the mind of meditative absorption.
屬能緣心。不同耳識。
論。故六轉識三性容俱。本疏不說欲界之中有通果無記 要集云。俱舍第七從通果心無間生二。謂自界一即通果心。及色界一即加行善。此云欲界通果心者。唯是變化。依六十九云。又從欲界無記心無間色界善心生。如色界果欲界變化心。乃至又說此心為欲界者。當知是彼影像類故。非自性故。要集意云。初言從欲界無記心無間色界善心生同俱舍論。如色界果下兩說。一同本疏。一云亦同俱舍 今謂不爾。初文即與后二文非別。云又從欲界無記心無間色界善心生者。據似欲界名為欲界。非自性故。復即此心從於色界善心得生故。論總釋云又說此心為欲界者。當知是彼影像類故。非自性故。前文復云諸神境智。或加行得。或生得。云生得者。謂生色等乃至云。又有欲界諸天及人一分福果所致。不說有加行得。若許欲界有從定引變化心者。即加行得。何故不說有加行得。五十四云。欲界無覆無記有變化心云。此唯是生得。謂天龍等。又云然無修果心。然顯揚論但說欲界有變化。或是業果。或是上界。似欲界故名為欲界。非許欲界有定所引變化無記。
受分二中。苦通無漏。憂根不通 西明解云。五識相應苦受。從后得智大悲力。親所引生故通無漏。要集斷云。有釋為勝 今謂此釋與本
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 屬能緣心，不同於耳識（耳朵的識別能力）。 論：因此，六種轉識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）的三種性質（善、惡、無記）可以同時存在。本疏沒有說欲界（佛教宇宙觀中的最低層）之中有通果無記（既非善也非惡的果報）的情況。要集說：俱舍論第七卷說，從通果心（達到某種果位的修行者的心）無間生出兩種心，一是自界（自身所處的境界）的通果心，一是加行善（通過努力修行而產生的善）。這裡說的欲界通果心，只是變化（神通變化）。依據六十九卷說，又從欲界無記心（既非善也非惡的欲界眾生的心）無間生出善心，比如神通果位的欲界變化心。乃至又說此心為欲界，應當知道這是它的影像類似欲界，並非自性（本質）就是欲界。要集的意思是，最初說從欲界無記心無間生出善心，與俱舍論相同。如神通果下兩說，一種說法與本疏相同，一種說法也與俱舍論相同。我認為不是這樣。最初的說法與后兩種說法並非不同。說又從欲界無記心無間生出善心，是根據類似欲界而稱為欲界，並非自性就是欲界。而且此心是從善心得生，所以論總解釋說又說此心為欲界，應當知道這是它的影像類似欲界，並非自性就是欲界。前文又說諸神境智（通過神通達到的智慧），或是通過加行（努力修行）得到，或是生來就具有。說生來就具有，是指生在色界（佛教宇宙觀中的中間層）等。乃至說，又有欲界諸天（欲界的神）及人一部分福果所致。沒有說有通過加行得到的。如果允許欲界有從禪定引發的變化心，那就是通過加行得到的。為什麼不說有通過加行得到的？五十四卷說，欲界無覆無記（沒有遮蔽的既非善也非惡）有變化心，這只是生來就具有的，指天龍等。又說，然而沒有修果心（通過修行得到的果報之心）。然而顯揚論只是說欲界有變化，或是業果（業力導致的果報），或是上界（更高的境界），因為類似欲界所以稱為欲界，並非允許欲界有禪定所引發的變化無記。 受分二中，苦通無漏（沒有煩惱），憂根不通。西明解釋說，五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）相應的苦受，是從后得智（證悟后獲得的智慧）大悲力（偉大的慈悲力量）親所引發，所以通無漏。要集斷言說，有解釋認為是殊勝。我認為這種解釋與本疏的觀點一致。
【English Translation】 English version: The faculty belongs to the mind that can perceive, unlike the ear consciousness (the ability of the ear to discern). Treatise: Therefore, the three natures (good, evil, and neutral) of the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness) can coexist. The original commentary does not state that there is a 'universal result of neutral karma' (a result that is neither good nor evil) in the desire realm (the lowest realm in Buddhist cosmology). The 'Essentials Collection' states: The seventh volume of the 'Abhidharma-kosa' says that two types of minds arise without interruption from the 'universal result mind' (the mind of a practitioner who has attained a certain level of realization): one is the 'universal result mind' of its own realm (the realm in which the practitioner resides), and the other is 'applied effort virtue' (virtue generated through diligent practice). The 'universal result mind' of the desire realm mentioned here is merely transformation (supernatural transformation). According to volume sixty-nine, a virtuous mind also arises without interruption from the neutral mind of the desire realm, such as the transformation mind of the desire realm in the state of supernatural attainment. Furthermore, it is said that this mind is of the desire realm, one should know that it is an image similar to the desire realm, not its inherent nature. The meaning of the 'Essentials Collection' is that the initial statement that a virtuous mind arises without interruption from the neutral mind of the desire realm is the same as the 'Abhidharma-kosa'. The two statements under 'supernatural attainment' are one that is the same as the original commentary, and one that is also the same as the 'Abhidharma-kosa'. I believe this is not the case. The initial statement is not different from the latter two statements. The statement that a virtuous mind arises without interruption from the neutral mind of the desire realm is based on the resemblance to the desire realm, and is therefore called the desire realm, but it is not its inherent nature. Moreover, this mind arises from the virtuous mind, so the treatise explains in general that when it is said that this mind is of the desire realm, one should know that it is an image similar to the desire realm, not its inherent nature. The previous text also states that the wisdom of spiritual powers is either obtained through applied effort or is innate. The statement that it is innate refers to being born in the form realm (the middle realm in Buddhist cosmology), etc. Furthermore, it is said that some gods (devas) and humans in the desire realm are due to the results of their blessings. It is not said that it is obtained through applied effort. If it is allowed that the desire realm has a transformation mind induced by meditation, then it is obtained through applied effort. Why is it not said that it is obtained through applied effort? Volume fifty-four states that the desire realm has a neutral mind without obscuration that has transformation, which is only innate, referring to nagas (dragons), etc. It also says that there is no mind resulting from cultivation. However, the 'Compendium of Determinations' only states that the desire realm has transformation, either as a result of karma or as a higher realm, and because it resembles the desire realm, it is called the desire realm, but it does not allow the desire realm to have a neutral mind of transformation induced by meditation. Among the two divisions of feeling, suffering is connected to the unconditioned (free from defilements), while sorrow is not. The 'Western Brightness' commentary explains that the suffering feeling associated with the five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body) is directly caused by the power of great compassion from the wisdom attained after enlightenment, so it is connected to the unconditioned. The 'Essentials Collection' asserts that some interpretations consider it superior. I believe this interpretation is consistent with the view of the original commentary.
疏中第二解同。約何為勝。
明三斷中。有解云。苦受中求不斷故亦非斷。離欲舍故已斷說非所斷。要集斷云。有解為勝 今為此釋求不斷故。亦非斷者。即本疏解隨順趣向不斷法故。假名不斷。如何云勝。余如此類。披者當知。不能具指。
又身心受。何故五俱名為身受。第六識俱名為心受。
答有二解。一云身者積聚義。五種色根皆積聚。依彼五根皆名身 二云身者唯屬身根。餘四依身相從名身。故能依受得名身受 難五識別依根。相應之受得身名。第六別依意。相應之受標意稱 答五根皆積聚受。從所依得名身。對色辨於心。第六相應非意受 問色心以相對六不同。五名身受。身．眼兩相望。眼不齊身立身受 答身．眼俱色並得名身。對色．心殊六名心受 又受依于身即名身受。受依于意應名意受 且質答云。六受依于意。依意名意受。五受依眼等。應名眼等受。據門明別。身．心相對名身心受。不可齊責。
三學分別。集論第二．雜集第四俱說。從求解脫者等。身中所有有為善法。名學無學。即簡不為求解脫者。雖有善法不名學無學法。瑜伽六十六云。謂預流等補特伽羅出世有為法。若世間善法。是名為學。瑜伽第十說預流等皆有一分十二有支。是非學非無學者。據未趣求解脫之時
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 疏中的第二種解釋相同。根據什麼來判斷哪種解釋更勝一籌？
在闡明三斷（指見苦所斷、見集所斷、見滅道所斷）時，有一種解釋說：在苦受中尋求不間斷，因此也不是斷。因為已經離開了慾望和捨棄，所以說已斷，並非是所要斷的。要以集斷的解釋為勝。現在為此解釋：因為尋求不間斷，所以也不是斷，這與本疏的解釋相符，隨順趣向不間斷的法，所以假名為不間斷。如何能說是勝呢？其餘類似的情況，閱讀者應當知曉，不能一一指出。
另外，身受和心受，為什麼五識相應的受都稱為身受，而第六識相應的受稱為心受？
回答有兩種解釋：一種說法是，『身』是積聚的意思，五種色根都是積聚，依于這五根的受都稱為身受。第二種說法是，『身』僅僅指身根，其餘四根依于身根，相互隨從，所以稱為身。因此，能依的受就得名為身受。提問：五識分別依于根，相應的受得名為身。第六識分別依于意，相應的受標明為意。回答：五根都是積聚的受，從所依的根而得名身，對色根而言辨別於心。第六識相應的受不是意受。提問：色和心相對，六識不同。五識名為身受，身根和眼根相互比較，眼根不與身根並列，卻立名為身受。回答：身根和眼根都是色法，都可以得名身。對色和心加以區分，六識名為心受。另外，受依于身就名為身受，受依于意應該名為意受。暫且用質答的方式回答：六受依于意，依于意名為意受。五受依于眼等根，應該名為眼等受。根據根門來區分，身和心相對，名為身心受，不可一概而論。
關於三學（戒、定、慧）的分別。《集論》第二和《雜集論》第四都說，從求解脫的人等，身中所有有為的善法，名為學和無學。這就簡別了不為求解脫的人，即使有善法，也不名為學和無學法。《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷說：所謂的預流（Srotapanna，須陀洹）等補特伽羅（Pudgala，人）的出世有為法，如果是世間的善法，就名為學。《瑜伽師地論》第十卷說，預流等都有一分十二有支（十二因緣），是非學非無學。這是根據他們未趣向求解脫的時候來說的。
【English Translation】 English version: The second explanation in the commentary is the same. According to what is it judged which explanation is superior?
In clarifying the three severances (severance by seeing suffering, severance by seeing origination, severance by seeing cessation and the path), there is an explanation that says: seeking non-cessation in suffering is therefore also not severance. Because one has already departed from desire and renunciation, it is said to be already severed, not what is to be severed. The explanation of severance by origination should be considered superior. Now, for this explanation: because seeking non-cessation, it is also not severance, which is in accordance with the commentary, following and inclining towards the Dharma of non-cessation, therefore it is nominally called non-cessation. How can it be said to be superior? The reader should know the rest of the similar situations, which cannot be pointed out one by one.
Also, bodily feeling and mental feeling, why are the feelings associated with the five consciousnesses all called bodily feeling, while the feeling associated with the sixth consciousness is called mental feeling?
There are two explanations in response: one explanation is that 'body' means accumulation. The five sense faculties are all accumulations, and the feelings based on these five faculties are all called bodily feeling. The second explanation is that 'body' refers only to the body faculty, and the other four faculties rely on the body faculty, following each other, so they are called body. Therefore, the feeling that relies on them is named bodily feeling. Question: The five consciousnesses separately rely on the roots, and the corresponding feeling is named body. The sixth consciousness separately relies on the mind, and the corresponding feeling is labeled as mind. Answer: The five roots are all accumulated feelings, and the name body is derived from the root on which they rely, distinguishing it from the mind in relation to form. The feeling associated with the sixth consciousness is not mental feeling. Question: Form and mind are relative, and the six consciousnesses are different. The five consciousnesses are called bodily feeling. When the body root and the eye root are compared, the eye root is not aligned with the body root, but it is established as bodily feeling. Answer: Both the body root and the eye root are form, and both can be named body. Distinguishing between form and mind, the six consciousnesses are named mental feeling. Also, feeling that relies on the body is named bodily feeling, and feeling that relies on the mind should be named mental feeling. Let's answer with a direct response: the six feelings rely on the mind, and relying on the mind is named mental feeling. The five feelings rely on the eye and other roots, and should be named eye and other feelings. Distinguishing according to the root, body and mind are relative, and are named bodily and mental feeling, which cannot be generalized.
Regarding the distinction of the three learnings (discipline, concentration, wisdom). Both the second volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the fourth volume of the Samuccayavyākhyā say that, for those who seek liberation, all conditioned virtuous dharmas in the body are called learning and no-learning. This distinguishes those who do not seek liberation, even if they have virtuous dharmas, they are not called learning and no-learning dharmas. The sixty-sixth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: The supramundane conditioned dharmas of the Srotapanna (stream-enterer) etc. Pudgalas (persons), if they are mundane virtuous dharmas, are called learning. The tenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the Srotapanna etc. all have a portion of the twelve limbs of existence (twelve links of dependent origination), which are neither learning nor no-learning. This is according to when they have not yet turned towards seeking liberation.
所造善業。非學無學。若資糧．加行為有支者。可是學法。故說一分。不爾應言所有有支皆非學法。何云一分。言資糧等非有支者。據無漏者說 又解或雖有漏。厭背有故。非有支攝。言一分者。據預流七返有及一來等有。名為一分。非學無學。余如理思。
論。五識俱起任運貪癡等。西明一釋不發業言不簡五識。但有隨轉。不為轉因能發業故。此意隨轉不為轉因。明非不善故。不發業故。第二又解云。亦通不善。由意所引理應能發。無文遮故。然意取前釋 要集亦斷。西明前勝 今謂不爾。若以五識但隨轉因非轉因故非不善者。嗔通五識。亦應有覆非不善耶。又論本頌云善不善俱非。若非不善違本論說。故雖隨轉起惡業者亦是不善。又瑜伽八十九云。當知此中能起一切不善法貪名貪不善根。嗔．癡亦爾。三不善根既通五識。明知隨轉。起不善法亦名不善。又此論第六云。貪．嗔．癡三俱生分別。一切容與五受相應。明知此三分別起者通五識有。若唯意俱。但四受俱。無苦受並。純受苦處意方有苦。以三惡道無分別故。既論許五有分別惑。下三性門云。欲界系分別起者唯不善攝。發惡行故。五識既非轉因發業。如何得云唯不善攝。發惡行故。故知五俱任運貪．癡不作隨轉發業之者。即是有覆。若隨轉發即不善收
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 所造的善業，如果不是有學位或無學位的人所為，如果資糧道和加行道是有支分（anga，構成要素）的，那麼可以說是學法（śaikṣa-dharma，有待學習的法）。所以說只是一部分。否則就應該說所有有支分的都不是學法，為什麼說只是一部分呢？說資糧道等不是有支分的，是根據無漏（anāsrava，無煩惱）的修行者來說的。另一種解釋是，或者雖然是有漏（sāsrava，有煩惱）的，但因為厭惡背離，所以不被攝入有支分中。說一部分，是根據預流果（srota-āpanna，入流者）七次往返欲界以及一來果（sakṛdāgāmin，一來者）等情況來說的，這只是一部分，其餘的要如理作意（yoniso manasikāra，如理思維）。
論：五識（pañca vijñāna，眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）同時生起任運（自發）的貪（rāga，貪慾）、癡（moha，愚癡）等。西明（地名）的一種解釋是不說能發業（karma，行為）是指不簡別五識，只是有隨轉（anuvṛtti，跟隨轉變），不能作為轉變的原因來發起業。這個意思是說，隨轉不是轉變的原因，表明不是不善（akuśala，不好的），所以不能發起業。第二種解釋說，也通於不善，由意識（manas，心意）所引導，按道理應該能發起業，沒有經文遮止。然而，意識採取前一種解釋。《要集》也斷言如此，西明的前一種解釋更勝一籌。現在我認為不是這樣。如果認為五識只是隨轉的原因，不是轉變的原因，所以不是不善，那麼嗔（dveṣa，嗔恨）通於五識，也應該是有覆無記（sāvranāvyākṛta，有覆蔽的無記），不是不善嗎？而且論的頌文說，善（kuśala，好的）、不善都不是，如果不是不善，就違背了本論的說法。所以即使是隨轉而生起惡業（pāpa-karma，不好的行為）的，也是不善。而且《瑜伽師地論》第八十九卷說，應當知道，這裡能生起一切不善法的貪，名為貪不善根（akuśala-mūla，不善的根本），嗔、癡也是這樣。三種不善根既然通於五識，明顯知道隨轉而生起不善法也名為不善。而且此論第六卷說，貪、嗔、癡三種俱生（sahaja，與生俱來）的分別（vikalpa，分別），一切都容許與五受（pañca vedanā，五種感受）相應。明顯知道這三種分別生起的通於五識所有。如果只有意識俱起，就只有四受俱起，沒有苦受（duḥkha vedanā，痛苦的感受）並存。純粹感受痛苦的地方，意識才有苦受。因為三惡道（tri-apāya-bhūmi，地獄、餓鬼、畜生）沒有分別的緣故。既然論允許五識有分別的惑（kleśa，煩惱），下文的三性門（tri-svabhāva-dvāra，三種自性之門）說，欲界系（kāma-dhātu，欲界）分別生起的唯有不善所攝，因為發起惡行的緣故。五識既然不是轉變的原因，不能發起業，如何能說唯有不善所攝，因為發起惡行的緣故？所以知道五識俱起任運的貪、癡，不作為隨轉發起業的，就是有覆無記。如果隨轉發起業，就是不善所攝。
【English Translation】 English version The virtuous deeds created, if not by those with or without learning, if the stages of accumulation and application have components (anga, constituents), then they can be considered 'śaikṣa-dharma' (teachings for those still learning). Therefore, it is said to be only a part. Otherwise, it should be said that all those with components are not 'śaikṣa-dharma'. Why say only a part? Saying that the stages of accumulation, etc., do not have components is according to those without outflows (anāsrava, free from defilements). Another explanation is that even if they have outflows (sāsrava, with defilements), because of aversion and turning away, they are not included in having components. Saying 'a part' is according to those who are 'srota-āpanna' (stream-enterers) returning seven times and those who are 'sakṛdāgāmin' (once-returners), etc. This is only a part; the rest should be contemplated appropriately (yoniso manasikāra, with proper reflection).
Treatise: The spontaneous greed (rāga, desire) and ignorance (moha, delusion), etc., that arise simultaneously with the five consciousnesses (pañca vijñāna, eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses). One interpretation from Ximing (place name) does not say that 'able to initiate karma' means not distinguishing the five consciousnesses, but only having 'anuvṛtti' (following transformation), not being able to initiate karma as a cause of transformation. This means that 'anuvṛtti' is not the cause of transformation, indicating that it is not 'akuśala' (unwholesome), so it cannot initiate karma. A second explanation says that it also applies to unwholesome, because it is guided by the mind (manas, intellect), and it should be able to initiate karma, as there is no sutra to prevent it. However, the mind takes the former explanation. The 'Essentials Collection' also asserts this, and the former explanation of Ximing is superior. Now, I say it is not so. If it is thought that the five consciousnesses are only the cause of 'anuvṛtti', not the cause of transformation, so they are not unwholesome, then anger (dveṣa, hatred), which is connected to the five consciousnesses, should also be 'sāvranāvyākṛta' (obscured and indeterminate), not unwholesome? Moreover, the verse of the treatise says that neither wholesome (kuśala, good) nor unwholesome, if it is not unwholesome, it contradicts the statement of this treatise. Therefore, even if unwholesome karma (pāpa-karma, bad actions) arises from 'anuvṛtti', it is also unwholesome. Moreover, the eighty-ninth volume of the 'Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra' says, 'It should be known that the greed that can generate all unwholesome dharmas is called the root of unwholesome greed (akuśala-mūla, root of evil), and so are anger and ignorance.' Since the three unwholesome roots are connected to the five consciousnesses, it is clear that generating unwholesome dharmas through 'anuvṛtti' is also called unwholesome. Moreover, the sixth volume of this treatise says, 'The greed, anger, and ignorance that arise simultaneously are all allowed to correspond to the five feelings (pañca vedanā, five types of sensation).' It is clear that these three that arise from discrimination (vikalpa, conceptualization) are connected to the five consciousnesses. If they only arise with the mind, then only four feelings arise together, without the co-existence of painful feeling (duḥkha vedanā, feeling of suffering). Only in places where pure suffering is experienced does the mind have painful feeling, because the three evil realms (tri-apāya-bhūmi, hell, hungry ghosts, and animals) have no discrimination. Since the treatise allows the five consciousnesses to have defilements (kleśa, afflictions) of discrimination, the section on the three natures (tri-svabhāva-dvāra, three natures) below says that those that arise from discrimination in the desire realm (kāma-dhātu, realm of desire) are only included in the unwholesome, because they initiate evil actions. Since the five consciousnesses are not the cause of transformation and cannot initiate karma, how can it be said that they are only included in the unwholesome, because they initiate evil actions? Therefore, it is known that the spontaneous greed and ignorance that arise simultaneously with the five consciousnesses, not acting as those who initiate karma through 'anuvṛtti', are 'sāvranāvyākṛta' (obscured and indeterminate). If they initiate karma through 'anuvṛtti', they are included in the unwholesome.
。又第二云。異熟習氣謂六識中有漏善等。又等流習氣言七識中即皆許有。既云六識中。明六轉識俱有異熟．習氣。雖不能作引業習氣。而作滿業。不應隨轉能為滿業唯有覆性。故不發業言。亦簡五識中。本說為勝。然云六十七．八說。不發業癡等是無記者。或傳寫誤。應云五十七．八。以彼文說俱生身見唯是無記。義準邊見及癡．慢．愛修道一分與身見俱亦是無記。不能發業。
言初二近分名喜悅心者。準瑜伽五十七有十一根。此論下文初二近分定無樂根。故但十一。如疏所說。然疏義準既引經文離生喜樂。以經說喜即證有喜。經既說樂何不有樂。準此道理合有樂根。但未明滿說十一根。非於此中許有二解。下文定判無樂根故。
問苦．樂貫身．心。二受即分兩。舍受身心遍。何故不分多 答苦．樂通尤．微。是以各分兩。舍受唯一類。所以不分多 又解舍受相無別。身．心併名舍。逼．悅相有殊。苦．樂各分二 問何故不言憂．喜．舍三以攝苦．樂 答憂．喜有異熟。體非是異熟。苦．樂有異熟。又體是異熟。又苦．樂通三性。憂非染．無記。又憂離欲舍。余非離欲舍。苦．樂體寬。舉攝憂．喜 問初二根本悅未極。悅于身．心分喜．樂。極苦中有迫未極。迫於身．心分憂．苦 答二禪無五識。意喜
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：此外，第二卷中說，『異熟習氣』指的是第六識（六識：眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）中具有有漏的善等（善等：善、不善、無記）。又，『等流習氣』指的是第七識（第七識：末那識），其中都允許有。既然說在第六識中，就表明六個轉識（六轉識：即前六識）都具有異熟習氣。雖然不能作為引業的習氣，但可以作為滿業。不應隨著轉識而能作為滿業的只有覆性（覆性：覆蓋真性的煩惱）。因此，『不發業』的說法，也排除了五識（五識：眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）。原本的說法是爲了突出殊勝之處。然而，如果說六十七、八說，『不發業癡』等是無記的，可能是傳抄錯誤。應該說五十七、八。因為那裡的文字說，俱生身見（俱生身見：與生俱來的對自我的執著）只是無記。按照這個意思，邊見（邊見：執著于極端觀點的錯誤見解）以及癡、慢、愛修道的一部分與身見一起也是無記，不能引發業力。
關於最初的兩個近分定（近分定：接近根本定的禪定），被稱為『喜悅心』，根據《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷，有十一根（十一根：眼根、耳根、鼻根、舌根、身根、意根、男根、女根、命根、樂根、苦根）。此論的下文說，最初的兩個近分定沒有樂根，所以只有十一根，如疏中所說。然而，疏的含義是引用經文『離生喜樂』（離生喜樂：通過遠離慾望而產生的喜悅和快樂）。因為經文說有喜，就證明有喜。經文既然說有樂，為什麼沒有樂呢？按照這個道理，應該有樂根。只是沒有明確完整地說有十一根，不是在這裡允許有兩種解釋。下文明確判定沒有樂根。
問：苦、樂貫穿身、心，兩種感受就分為兩部分。舍受（舍受：不苦不樂的感受）遍及身心，為什麼不分多部分？答：苦、樂貫通強烈和微弱，因此各自分為兩部分。舍受只有一種型別，所以不分多部分。又解釋說，舍受的相沒有區別，身、心都稱為舍。逼迫和喜悅的相有差別，苦、樂各自分為二。
問：為什麼不說憂、喜、舍三種感受來涵蓋苦、樂？答：憂、喜有異熟果報，但其體性不是異熟果報。苦、樂有異熟果報，而且其體性也是異熟果報。而且，苦、樂貫通三性（三性：善、惡、無記），憂不是染污和無記。而且，憂是離欲的舍，其餘不是離欲的舍。苦、樂的體性寬廣，可以涵蓋憂、喜。
問：最初的兩個根本定（根本定：禪定的最高境界）的喜悅沒有達到極致，喜悅在身、心中分為喜、樂。極苦中有逼迫但沒有達到極致，逼迫在身、心中分為憂、苦？答：二禪沒有五識，只有意喜（意喜：意識產生的喜悅）。
【English Translation】 English version: Furthermore, the second chapter states, 'Ripening habit-energy' refers to the tainted good, etc., within the six consciousnesses (six consciousnesses: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness). Also, 'Equal-flowing habit-energy' refers to the seventh consciousness (seventh consciousness: Manas consciousness), in which it is all allowed. Since it is said to be within the six consciousnesses, it clarifies that all six transforming consciousnesses (six transforming consciousnesses: the preceding six consciousnesses) possess ripening habit-energy. Although they cannot act as the habit-energy of projecting karma, they can act as fulfilling karma. It should not be that only the obscured nature (obscured nature: afflictions that cover the true nature) can act as fulfilling karma following the transforming consciousnesses. Therefore, the statement 'does not generate karma' also excludes the five consciousnesses (five consciousnesses: eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness). The original statement was to emphasize the superior aspect. However, if it is said in sixty-seven or eight places that 'non-karma-generating ignorance,' etc., is neutral, it may be a copying error. It should be said in fifty-seven or eight places. Because the text there states that the innate view of self (innate view of self: the inherent attachment to self) is only neutral. According to this meaning, the extreme views (extreme views: erroneous views clinging to extreme viewpoints) and a portion of ignorance, pride, and love in the path of cultivation, along with the view of self, are also neutral and cannot generate karma.
Regarding the initial two proximate concentrations (proximate concentrations: meditative states close to fundamental concentration), which are called 'joyful mind,' according to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume fifty-seven, there are eleven faculties (eleven faculties: eye faculty, ear faculty, nose faculty, tongue faculty, body faculty, mind faculty, male faculty, female faculty, life faculty, pleasure faculty, pain faculty). The text below states that the initial two proximate concentrations do not have the pleasure faculty, so there are only eleven faculties, as stated in the commentary. However, the meaning of the commentary is to cite the sutra text 'joy and pleasure born of detachment' (joy and pleasure born of detachment: joy and pleasure arising from separation from desires). Because the sutra says there is joy, it proves there is joy. Since the sutra says there is pleasure, why is there no pleasure? According to this reasoning, there should be a pleasure faculty. It is just that it is not clearly and completely stated that there are eleven faculties, not that there are two interpretations allowed here. The text below clearly judges that there is no pleasure faculty.
Question: Pain and pleasure pervade the body and mind, so the two feelings are divided into two parts. Equanimity (equanimity: feeling of neither pain nor pleasure) pervades the body and mind, why is it not divided into multiple parts? Answer: Pain and pleasure encompass both strong and subtle, so they are each divided into two parts. Equanimity is only of one type, so it is not divided into multiple parts. Another explanation is that the characteristics of equanimity are not distinct, so both body and mind are called equanimity. The characteristics of oppression and delight are different, so pain and pleasure are each divided into two.
Question: Why not say that sorrow, joy, and equanimity encompass pain and pleasure? Answer: Sorrow and joy have ripening results, but their nature is not ripening results. Pain and pleasure have ripening results, and their nature is also ripening results. Moreover, pain and pleasure encompass the three natures (three natures: good, evil, neutral), sorrow is not defiled and neutral. Moreover, sorrow is detachment from desire, the others are not detachment from desire. The nature of pain and pleasure is broad, encompassing sorrow and joy.
Question: The joy of the initial two fundamental concentrations (fundamental concentrations: the highest state of meditation) is not yet extreme, joy is divided into joy and pleasure in the body and mind. In extreme suffering, there is oppression but it is not yet extreme, oppression is divided into sorrow and pain in the body and mind? Answer: The second dhyana does not have the five consciousnesses, only mental joy (mental joy: joy arising from consciousness).
悅根分喜．樂。中有六識俱。不于意憂分憂．苦 若爾初禪既有三識。應不于意分喜．樂 答亦不遍。二根無識 又解定喜適悅勝。遍於身．心分喜．樂。中有未極迫非勝。不于憂受分憂苦。又具五識各迫於根。不假意憂分苦 問初二意唯喜。從喜分於樂。雜受意唯憂。從憂離出苦 答喜．樂相順得同種。故可從喜分於樂。憂．苦相違種不同。不得於憂分出苦。又二解同前 問意俱之喜分之為二種或同。別生現是一。不得二受各別而生。無一心中有二受故。既於一受分為喜．樂。應當是假 答適悅身心義有別故。不以悅心邊即名為樂。適身邊即名為喜。故是實有。猶如二智 問二執約義分說。為世俗有。二受據義說。何得體成實 答執依別境惠。說為世俗有。喜樂不依他。同智為實有 問同從種生。何故悅根名樂非喜 答意有分別故。根無分別故 樞要兩釋憂根。一云不通無記。一云雖無文說。理通無記。悔必憂俱。彼既無記。憂何妨爾。瑜伽論說非無記者。隨轉理門 然要集云。樞要云。悔必憂俱。今有兩釋。應云許必憂俱。何以故。即瑜伽云。若通一切識身者。遍與一切根相應。若不通一切識身者。意地一切根相應。說一切言無簡別故。即許俱生身邊見等亦與憂俱。彼既無記。憂亦定爾。以悔許字少相近故。寫者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『悅根』（能產生愉悅感受的感官）能感受到喜和樂。在『中有』（中陰身階段）有六識同時存在。不會在意念上感受到憂愁和痛苦。如果這樣說，初禪既然有三種識，那麼應該也不會在意念上感受到喜和樂？回答是，也不完全是這樣。因為有兩個根沒有識。另一種解釋是，禪定中的喜悅和適悅更為強烈，遍及身心，所以能感受到喜和樂。而『中有』階段的感受沒有那麼強烈，所以不會感受到憂愁和痛苦。而且，五識各自直接作用於根，不需要通過意念來感受痛苦。 問：初禪和二禪的意念只有喜，從喜中分離出樂。而雜受的意念只有憂，從憂中分離出苦。 答：喜和樂是相順的，屬於同一種類，所以可以從喜中分離出樂。而憂和苦是相反的，種類不同，所以不能從憂中分離出苦。還有兩種解釋和前面一樣。 問：意念中的喜被分為兩種，是相同還是不同？別生現是一，不能有兩個感受各自產生，因為一個心中不能同時存在兩種感受。既然從一個感受中分出喜和樂，那麼應該是虛假的。 答：適悅身心的意義不同，所以不能因為悅心就叫做樂，適身就叫做喜。所以是真實存在的。就像兩種智慧一樣。 問：兩種執著是根據意義來區分說明的，是世俗意義上的存在。兩種感受是根據意義來說的，為什麼能成為實體存在？ 答：執著依賴於別境慧，所以說是世俗意義上的存在。喜和樂不依賴於其他，和智慧一樣是真實存在的。 問：同樣是從種子生起，為什麼悅根被稱為樂而不是喜？ 答：因為意念有分別，而根沒有分別。 『樞要』（佛教術語，指重要的理論或實踐）對憂根有兩種解釋。一種說法是不通於無記（不善不惡的狀態）。另一種說法是，雖然沒有文字說明，但道理上是通於無記的。因為後悔必定與憂愁同時產生，既然後悔是無記的，那麼憂愁為什麼不能是無記的呢？《瑜伽論》說不是無記的，是隨順於理的。 然而，《要集》說，《樞要》說，後悔必定與憂愁同時產生。現在有兩種解釋，應該說是『許』（允許）必定與憂愁同時產生。為什麼呢？因為《瑜伽論》說，如果通於一切識身，就遍與一切根相應。如果不通於一切識身，就與意地的一切根相應。說『一切』沒有簡別，就是說俱生的身邊見等也與憂愁同時產生。既然身邊見等是無記的，那麼憂愁也一定是無記的。因為『悔』和『許』字形相近，所以是抄寫錯誤。
【English Translation】 English version: The 'root of pleasure' (the sensory faculty that generates pleasant feelings) can experience joy and happiness. In the 'intermediate state' (the bardo), all six consciousnesses are present simultaneously. One does not experience sorrow and suffering in the mind. If that's the case, since the first Dhyana (禪那, meditative state) has three consciousnesses, shouldn't it also not experience joy and happiness in the mind? The answer is, not entirely. Because two roots do not have consciousness. Another explanation is that the joy and pleasure in Dhyana are more intense, pervading body and mind, so one can experience joy and happiness. The feelings in the 'intermediate state' are not as intense, so one does not experience sorrow and suffering. Moreover, the five consciousnesses each act directly on the root, without needing to experience suffering through the mind. Question: The mind in the first and second Dhyanas only has joy, from which happiness is separated. The mind of mixed feelings only has sorrow, from which suffering is separated. Answer: Joy and happiness are harmonious and belong to the same category, so happiness can be separated from joy. Sorrow and suffering are opposite and belong to different categories, so suffering cannot be separated from sorrow. There are two other explanations that are the same as before. Question: The joy in the mind is divided into two types, are they the same or different? Separate arising is one, two feelings cannot arise separately, because two feelings cannot exist in one mind at the same time. Since joy and happiness are separated from one feeling, then it should be false. Answer: The meanings of pleasing the body and mind are different, so one cannot call it happiness just because it pleases the mind, or call it joy just because it pleases the body. So it is real. Just like the two wisdoms. Question: The two attachments are distinguished and explained according to meaning, and exist in the mundane sense. The two feelings are explained according to meaning, how can they become substantial existences? Answer: Attachment relies on the wisdom of the separate realm, so it is said to exist in the mundane sense. Joy and happiness do not rely on others, and are real existences like wisdom. Question: Since they both arise from seeds, why is the root of pleasure called happiness instead of joy? Answer: Because the mind has discrimination, while the root does not. 'Key Essentials' (樞要, a Buddhist term referring to important theories or practices) has two explanations for the root of sorrow. One explanation is that it does not extend to the indeterminate (無記, a state of neither good nor evil). The other explanation is that, although there is no textual explanation, it is logically connected to the indeterminate. Because regret must arise simultaneously with sorrow, and since regret is indeterminate, why can't sorrow be indeterminate? The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽論) says that it is not indeterminate, but follows the principle of reason. However, the Yaoji (要集) says, and Key Essentials says, that regret must arise simultaneously with sorrow. Now there are two explanations, it should be said that 'permission' (許) must arise simultaneously with sorrow. Why? Because the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that if it extends to all consciousness bodies, it pervades and corresponds to all roots. If it does not extend to all consciousness bodies, it corresponds to all roots in the mind realm. Saying 'all' without distinction means that the co-arising body-side views, etc., also arise simultaneously with sorrow. Since body-side views, etc., are indeterminate, then sorrow must also be indeterminate. Because the characters 'regret' (悔) and 'permission' (許) are similar in shape, it is a copying error.
有誤。又解應云悔必憂俱。準第七論。二師俱云。悔憂受俱。不說身見等與憂受俱。瑜伽自簡云。皆於三受現行可得。不說五受。后即釋前。故但三受。然要集云。下論二師。俱不許悔得與憂俱。斷此說非 此亦不爾。下第七卷二師俱許悔與憂並。初師云有義惡作憂．舍相應不說苦受。后師加苦故。第二師云有義此四亦苦受俱。何得說云二俱不說悔與憂俱。然準下釋。悔通凈無記。不通染無記。身．邊見等既染無記。故不得並。但可苦俱。故知證憂是無記者取前許俱。不爾相違。然瑜伽論。云若任運生皆於三受現行可得。亦攝憂．喜。是總說故。于分別惑有俱．不俱。方別說之。故彼論云。不任運生。一切煩惱隨其所應諸根相應。我今當說。貪於一時。樂．喜相應。或於一時憂．苦相應。若於此中。唯說三受。何故不任運。即通說憂．喜。故以此義準通無記。然不定判此解為正 問何故憂受非染無記 答有云以非報故不通無記 若爾威儀．工巧亦非是報何通無記 今解明．昧二相別。故不通無記 問若爾喜亦明利。何得無記 答上地有喜以定力故。或雖明顯然皆無記。故得染俱。欲無定伏。或明利者即非無記。下云恃苦劣蘊憂相應者。是分別惑。必不善故。于無記事而起憂者。是凈無記。若不活畏等。雖緣資具無記事
生。由分別我起故不善 問地獄惡業招。定成眼等令受苦。何不定成二形令受苦 答形根受欲具。無暇受欲可無形。五根五識依。無根無識要成就。
論。余雜受處無異熟樂。西明三釋云。三義。第三有。雜受處等流．異熟二樂俱有。如二十唯識云。諸有傍生生天上者。必有能感彼器樂業。生彼定受器所生樂。又攝論云。諸惡趣中一向苦處。既說中言容有樂受。瑜伽等說各據一義故不相違 今謂不爾。違二論文。大論說為定不成就。此論又言余雜受處無異熟樂名純苦故。只許雜受有等流樂。非是異熟。言惡趣中。簡欲人等。若依前會是隨轉理。簡余雜受。非是中言許異熟樂 若爾二十唯識復如何通 答彼云業感器所生樂。不云業感所生受樂。若許有業感異熟樂者。應云彼必定有業感之樂。何須云器。如緣外境通三性心非唯異熟。此亦應爾器雖業感。何廢得生等流之樂。
言未至定有十一根者。謂信等五．三無漏根．喜．舍．意根。以不生彼無色根．命。云何有意。意即第七。隨生系故 答略為二解。一約三乘通意根說。即次第滅。二據大乘有第七識起無漏說。
問有漏五識第四定無。無漏言有。有漏喜．樂第四定無。無漏喜樂第四定有 答有二解。一云以義齊之亦許得有。如彼五識。若不許五通四
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 生。由於分別『我』（ātman）而生起不善業。問：地獄的惡業招致果報。決定形成眼等根令眾生受苦。為什麼不決定形成二形（ उभयलिङ्ग, ubhayaliṅga，指同時具有男女兩性性徵的身體）令眾生受苦？答：形根是感受慾望的工具。沒有空閑享受慾望的可以沒有形根。五根是五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）所依賴的基礎。沒有根就沒有識，這是必須成就的。
論：其餘雜受之處沒有異熟樂（vipāka-sukha，由異熟果報產生的快樂）。西明的三種解釋說：有三種含義。第三種含義是：在雜受之處，等流樂（niṣyanda-sukha，由修行等流而產生的快樂）和異熟樂兩種快樂都有。如《二十唯識論》（Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi）所說：『那些傍生（tiryak，指畜生）生到天上的人，必定有能夠感得天上器世間之樂的業。生到那裡必定會領受器世間所生的快樂。』又《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）說：『在各種惡趣（durgati）中，都是一向純苦之處。』既然說了『中』，就容許有樂受。瑜伽行派的論著等所說，各自依據一種含義，所以不相違背。現在我認為不是這樣。這與兩篇論文相違背。《大毗婆沙論》（Mahāvibhāṣā）說為『決定不成就』。此論又說其餘雜受之處沒有異熟樂，名為純苦，所以只允許雜受有等流樂，不是異熟樂。說『惡趣中』，是爲了簡別欲界的人等。如果依據前面的解釋，這是隨順轉理。簡別其餘雜受，不是因為『中』就允許有異熟樂。如果這樣，《二十唯識論》又如何解釋？答：它說業感得器世間所生的快樂，沒有說業感得所生之受樂。如果允許有業感得異熟樂，就應該說『那裡必定有業感之樂』。何必說『器』？如緣外境通於三性（善、惡、無記）的心，並非只有異熟。這也應該如此，器世間雖然是業感，但有什麼妨礙眾生獲得等流之樂呢。
說『未至定』（anāgāmya-samādhi，色界根本四禪之前的定）有十一根（indriya，指生理和精神功能）是指信等五根（信、精進、念、定、慧）、三無漏根（未知當知根、已知根、具知根）、喜根、舍根、意根。因為不生彼處，所以沒有色根、命根。為什麼有意根？意即第七識（末那識，manas-vijñāna）。隨生而繫縛的緣故。答：略為兩種解釋。一是約三乘（聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）共通的意根來說，即次第滅盡。二是據大乘（Mahāyāna）有第七識生起無漏來說。
問：有漏的五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）在第四禪定中沒有。無漏的五識說有。有漏的喜、樂在第四禪定中沒有。無漏的喜、樂在第四禪定中有。答：有兩種解釋。一是說以意義相齊，也允許有。如彼五識。如果不允許五通（五神通）通於第四禪定。
【English Translation】 English version: Birth. Unwholesome deeds arise from the differentiation of 'self' (ātman). Question: The evil karma of hell brings about retribution. It is determined that the sense organs such as eyes are formed to cause suffering to sentient beings. Why is it not determined that hermaphrodites ( उभयलिङ्ग, ubhayaliṅga, referring to a body with both male and female sexual characteristics) are formed to cause suffering? Answer: The sense organs are tools for experiencing desires. Those who have no time to enjoy desires can be without sense organs. The five sense organs are the basis upon which the five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) depend. Without the sense organs, there is no consciousness, and this must be accomplished.
Treatise: In other places of mixed experiences, there is no vipāka-sukha (異熟樂, pleasure arising from the result of vipāka). The three explanations of Ximing say: There are three meanings. The third meaning is: In places of mixed experiences, both niṣyanda-sukha (等流樂, pleasure arising from the outflow of practice) and vipāka-sukha exist. As the Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (《二十唯識論》) says: 'Those animals (tiryak, 畜生) who are born in the heavens must have karma that can bring about the pleasure of the celestial realm. Being born there, they will certainly receive the pleasure arising from the realm.' Also, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (《攝大乘論》) says: 'In all the evil destinies (durgati, 惡趣), they are always places of pure suffering.' Since 'middle' is mentioned, it allows for the experience of pleasure. The statements in the Yogācāra treatises and others are each based on one meaning, so they do not contradict each other. Now I think it is not so. This contradicts two texts. The Mahāvibhāṣā (《大毗婆沙論》) says 'definitely not accomplished.' This treatise also says that in other places of mixed experiences, there is no vipāka-sukha, called pure suffering, so it only allows mixed experiences to have niṣyanda-sukha, not vipāka-sukha. Saying 'in the evil destinies' is to distinguish humans and others in the desire realm. If based on the previous explanation, this follows the principle of transformation. Distinguishing other mixed experiences, it is not because of 'middle' that vipāka-sukha is allowed. If so, how is the Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratāsiddhi explained? Answer: It says that karma brings about the pleasure arising from the realm, not that karma brings about the pleasure of experience. If it is allowed that karma brings about vipāka-sukha, it should be said 'there must be pleasure brought about by karma.' Why say 'realm'? Just as the mind that cognizes external objects is of three natures (good, evil, neutral), not only vipāka. It should also be so here, although the realm is brought about by karma, what prevents sentient beings from obtaining niṣyanda-sukha?
Saying that 'anāgāmya-samādhi' (未至定, the preliminary stage of meditation before the four dhyānas in the form realm) has eleven indriya (根, faculties) refers to the five faculties of faith, etc. (faith, vigor, mindfulness, concentration, wisdom), the three undefiled faculties (anājñāta-jñāsyāmīndriya, ājñendriya, ājñātāvīndriya), the faculty of joy, the faculty of equanimity, and the faculty of mind. Because they are not born there, there are no form faculties or life faculties. Why is there a mind faculty? Mind refers to the seventh consciousness (manas-vijñāna, 末那識). Because it is bound by birth. Answer: Briefly, there are two explanations. One is in terms of the mind faculty common to the three vehicles (Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna), which is extinguished in sequence. The second is according to the Mahāyāna (大乘), which has the seventh consciousness arising without defilements.
Question: The defiled five consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness) are not present in the fourth dhyāna. The undefiled five consciousnesses are said to be present. The defiled joy and pleasure are not present in the fourth dhyāna. The undefiled joy and pleasure are present in the fourth dhyāna. Answer: There are two explanations. One is that, by analogy, it is also allowed to be present. Like those five consciousnesses. If the five supernormal powers (five abhijñās) are not allowed to extend to the fourth dhyāna.
禪者。復無此難。又如大乘見道。必第四定。初地既言極喜故有喜受。樂準此誠。二云不齊解。佛成事智不與喜俱。相粗動故第四定無。起依色根。第四定中有五色根故有五識。然要集不許無漏五識通四禪者不爾。無文遮故 問何故明遍行中。但舉觸等不言作意 答有二解。一云以順前故。前但言受．想．思等所依為業。不言作意。二云順經部師立余心所。以作意等思之分位。舉思攝末故不盡陳。
言所緣事不同者。略有二解。一云非體及相。緣無法時彼無體故。無分別智無相狀故。但緣于境差別義故。此解不當。豈緣境時不得自相 二云體事 若爾無法何有體事 答緣無心不起。無法不稱事。緣無心既生。有無皆體事。俱得名法。各持自性。何非是事。
論思令心取正因等相。西明云。此令心取正因等相。豈不心王亦取別相。解云不爾。思有二用。謂能取自正因等相。亦令心王取正因等。心唯取自。不能令他取正因等。故不得言心取別相。又解設許取別。義亦無失。而言心王唯取總者。約正用說。故不相違。取前說勝 今謂前說亦少難解。且正因等相。為是總相。為別相耶。若是別相心不應取。違諸論故。若是總相違前說故。前解心所皆云了。此論自釋言。此表心所亦緣總相。此言單以目總。正因等相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 禪者，再沒有這樣的詰難了。又比如大乘見道，必定在第四禪定中。初地菩薩既然被稱為極喜地，因此有喜受。快樂也應依此而成立。第二種說法認為（佛的）成事智（成就一切事業的智慧）不與喜受同時存在，因為喜受的相狀粗糙而動盪，所以在第四禪定中沒有。第四禪定的生起依賴於色根（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身五種感覺器官）。第四禪定中有五種色根，因此有五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）。然而，《瑜伽師地論·攝抉擇分》不允許無漏的五識通於四禪定，並非如此，因為沒有經文遮止。 問：為什麼在說明遍行心所時，只舉出觸等，而不說作意（Manasikara）？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是爲了順應前面的內容，前面只說了受、想、思等所依賴的為業，沒有說作意。另一種說法是順應經部師的觀點，他們認為作意等是思的分位，舉出思就攝盡了末節，所以沒有全部陳述。
說到所緣的事物不同，大概有兩種解釋。一種說法不是指體和相，因為緣無法時，它沒有體，無分別智沒有相狀，只是緣于境的差別意義。這種解釋不恰當，難道緣境時就不能得到自相嗎？第二種說法是指體事。 如果這樣，無法怎麼會有體事呢？答：緣無心不起，無法不稱為事。緣無心既然生起，有和無都是體事，都可以稱為法，各自持有自己的體性，為什麼不是事呢？
《瑜伽師地論》說，思能令心取正因等相。西明法師說，『此令心取正因等相』，難道心王（心識的主體）不也取別相嗎？解釋說，不是這樣。思有兩種作用，一是能取自的正因等相，二是能令心王取正因等。心王只能取自相，不能令他取正因等，所以不能說心取別相。又一種解釋是，即使允許取別相，在義理上也沒有缺失。說心王只取總相，是就主要作用來說，所以不相違背。取前一種說法更好。 現在我認為前一種說法也有一些難以理解的地方。且說正因等相，是總相還是別相呢？如果是別相，心不應該取，違背了各種論典。如果是總相，又違背了前面的說法，前面解釋心所都說是了別。此論自己解釋說，這表明心所也緣總相。這裡單單用『此』字來指總相，正因等相。
【English Translation】 English version: O practitioner of Zen, there is no further difficulty like this. Furthermore, consider the path of seeing (Darshana-marga) in the Mahayana tradition, which invariably occurs in the fourth Dhyana (meditative state). Since the first Bhumi (stage of a Bodhisattva) is called the 'Extremely Joyful' (Pramudita), it therefore possesses the feeling of joy (Hrada). Pleasure (Sukha) should also be established accordingly. The second explanation suggests that the Buddha's wisdom of accomplished actions (Krtyanusthana-jnana) does not coexist with joy, as joy's characteristics are coarse and fluctuating, thus absent in the fourth Dhyana. The arising of the fourth Dhyana relies on the sense faculties (Rupa-indriya). Since the fourth Dhyana contains the five sense faculties (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body), it therefore possesses the five consciousnesses (Vijnana). However, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra does not permit the undefiled (Anasrava) five consciousnesses to extend to the four Dhyanas; this is not the case, as there is no sutra prohibiting it. Question: Why, when explaining the pervasive mental factors (Sarvatraga-cittavrtti), are only contact (Sparsha) and others mentioned, but not attention (Manasikara)? Answer: There are two explanations. One is to align with the preceding content, which only stated that feeling (Vedana), perception (Samjna), thought (Chetana), etc., rely on action (Karma), without mentioning attention. The other is to align with the view of the Sautrantika school, which considers attention and others as aspects of thought; mentioning thought encompasses the minor details, so they are not all stated.
Regarding the difference in the objects of focus (Alambana), there are roughly two explanations. One is that it does not refer to essence (Svarupa) and characteristics (Lakshana), because when focusing on the non-existent (Asat), it has no essence, and non-discriminating wisdom (Nirvikalpa-jnana) has no characteristics, but only focuses on the differential meaning of the object. This explanation is inappropriate; how can one not attain the self-characteristics when focusing on an object? The second explanation refers to essence and matter (Vastu). If so, how can the non-existent have essence and matter? Answer: The mind does not arise from focusing on nothing. The non-existent is not called matter. Since the mind arises from focusing on the non-existent, both existence and non-existence are essence and matter, both can be called Dharma, each possessing its own nature; why is it not matter?
The Yogacarabhumi-sastra states that thought enables the mind to grasp the characteristics of the correct cause (Hetu) and so on. The Western Brightness (Xi Ming) master said, 'This enables the mind to grasp the characteristics of the correct cause and so on.' Does the mind-king (Citta-raja) not also grasp distinct characteristics (Visesa-lakshana)? The explanation is that it does not. Thought has two functions: one is to grasp the characteristics of its own correct cause and so on, and the other is to enable the mind-king to grasp the correct cause and so on. The mind-king can only grasp its own characteristics and cannot enable others to grasp the correct cause and so on, so it cannot be said that the mind grasps distinct characteristics. Another explanation is that even if it is allowed to grasp distinct characteristics, there is no loss in meaning. Saying that the mind-king only grasps general characteristics (Samanya-lakshana) is in terms of its primary function, so there is no contradiction. Taking the former explanation is better. Now I think the former explanation is also somewhat difficult to understand. Let's say the characteristics of the correct cause and so on, are they general characteristics or distinct characteristics? If they are distinct characteristics, the mind should not grasp them, violating various treatises. If they are general characteristics, it contradicts the previous statement, which explained that mental factors are all discerning. This treatise itself explains that this indicates that mental factors also focus on general characteristics. Here, the word 'this' (此) is simply used to refer to general characteristics, the characteristics of the correct cause and so on.
明即是別。不爾應無所了別相。
論求不合離時可忻自體非所厭者。非是唯忻自身。但彼所厭無處之位名為自體。
問小乘雲根及作意能勝發起由彼勝解。難云應無窮失。彼或難。汝宗作意應亦待余亦有無窮失 答以彼救言根及作意為勝發起。復由勝解。既有兩重。故應更有。故無窮失。大乘作意。能驚所餘更無能驚。故不可難應有無窮。若強為難。返例作意令心趣異境。作意亦應更待余方能趣異境。
釋能憶因。廣如前辨。
要集云。正法念經第十七具列十大地。及涅槃經第二十七云。下定者十大地中心數定也 會云正法念正量部義。涅槃隨彼轉。非真實理。故非所依。
論遮等引故者。定有七名。一名三摩呬多。此云等引。三摩云等。呬多雲引。二云三摩地。此云等持。三云三摩缽底。此云等至。四云馱那演那。此云靜慮。五云質多翳迦阿羯羅多。此云心一境性。質多雲心。翳迦云一。阿羯羅云境。多雲性。六奢摩他。此云心也。七云現法樂住。等引通有無心。唯定非散 瑜伽十一云。非於欲界心一境性。
等持。有心通定及散。然經論中就勝。且說空無相愿名三摩地 等至。通目有無心定。然經論中就勝唯說。五現見等相應諸定名為等至 靜慮。通攝有無心定．漏及無漏
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『明』（Ming）即是『別』（Bie），如果不是這樣，就應該沒有了別的相狀可以瞭解。
論述尋求不合離時令人欣喜的自體不是令人厭惡的：並非只是欣喜自身，而是將那些令人厭惡的無處安放的位置稱為自體。
問：小乘認為根和作意能夠勝過發起，是因為勝解。難：這樣應該有無窮的過失。他們或者會反駁：你們宗派的作意也應該等待其他的，也會有無窮的過失。答：用他們的說法來反駁，根和作意是勝過發起的，又因為勝解，既然有兩重，就應該還有更多，所以有無窮的過失。大乘的作意，能夠驚動其餘的，沒有其他的能夠驚動它，所以不能反駁說應該有無窮。如果強行反駁，反過來舉例說作意讓心趣向不同的境界，作意也應該等待其他的才能趣向不同的境界。
解釋能憶起的因，詳細的如同前面所辨析的。
《要集》中說，《正法念經》第十七詳細列舉了十大地，以及《涅槃經》第二十七說，下定者是十大地的中心數定。會通說：《正法念經》是正量部的義理，《涅槃經》隨著他們而轉變，不是真實的道理，所以不是所依據的。
論述遮止等引的緣故：定有七個名稱。一是『三摩呬多』（Samahita），這裡翻譯為『等引』，『三摩』（Sama）是『等』的意思，『呬多』（hita）是『引』的意思。二是『三摩地』（Samadhi），這裡翻譯為『等持』。三是『三摩缽底』（Samapatti），這裡翻譯為『等至』。四是『馱那演那』（Dhyana），這裡翻譯為『靜慮』。五是『質多翳迦阿羯羅多』（Citta-ekagrata），這裡翻譯為『心一境性』，『質多』（Citta）是『心』的意思，『翳迦』（Eka）是『一』的意思，『阿羯羅』（Agra）是『境』的意思，『多』（ta）是『性』的意思。六是『奢摩他』（Samatha），這裡翻譯為『止』。七是『現法樂住』。『等引』通於有心和無心，只有定不是散亂。《瑜伽師地論》第十一說：不是在欲界的心一境性。
『等持』，有心通於定和散亂，然而經論中就殊勝而言，且說空、無相、愿名為『三摩地』（Samadhi）。『等至』，總括有心和無心的定，然而經論中就殊勝而言，只說五現見等相應的諸定名為『等至』（Samapatti）。『靜慮』（Dhyana），總攝有心和無心的定，有漏和無漏。
【English Translation】 English version 'Ming' (明, Illumination) is 'Bie' (別, Distinction). Otherwise, there should be no distinguishing characteristics to understand.
Discussing the seeking of a delightful self that is neither united nor separated, and is not repulsive: It is not merely delighting in oneself, but rather designating those repulsive and unplaceable positions as the self.
Question: The Theravada school says that the roots and attention (作意, Manasikara) can surpass arising due to superior understanding (勝解, Adhimoksha). Objection: This should lead to infinite regress. They might retort: Your school's attention also relies on others, which also leads to infinite regress. Answer: Rebutting with their own words, the roots and attention surpass arising, and also rely on superior understanding. Since there are two layers, there should be more, thus leading to infinite regress. The Mahayana attention can startle the rest, and nothing else can startle it, so it cannot be objected that it should lead to infinite regress. If one insists on objecting, conversely, exemplify that attention directs the mind towards different realms, and attention should also rely on others to direct it towards different realms.
The explanation of the cause of recollection is as detailed as the previous analysis.
The 'Yao Ji' (要集, Essential Collection) says that the seventeenth chapter of the 'Zheng Fa Nian Jing' (正法念經, Sutra of the Establishment of Right Mindfulness) lists the ten great lands in detail, and the twenty-seventh chapter of the 'Nirvana Sutra' (涅槃經, Nirvana Sutra) says that those who are settled below are settled in the central number of the ten great lands. Harmonizing this, it says: The 'Zheng Fa Nian Jing' (正法念經, Sutra of the Establishment of Right Mindfulness) follows the meaning of the Sautrantika school, and the 'Nirvana Sutra' (涅槃經, Nirvana Sutra) follows their transformation, which is not the true principle, so it is not to be relied upon.
Discussing the reason for preventing 'equal induction': There are seven names for 'Samadhi' (定, Concentration). The first is 'Samahita' (三摩呬多), which is translated here as 'equal induction' (等引, Dengyin). 'Sama' (三摩) means 'equal', and 'hita' (呬多) means 'induction'. The second is 'Samadhi' (三摩地), which is translated here as 'equal holding' (等持, Dengchi). The third is 'Samapatti' (三摩缽底), which is translated here as 'equal attainment' (等至, Dengzhi). The fourth is 'Dhyana' (馱那演那), which is translated here as 'quiet contemplation' (靜慮, Jinglv). The fifth is 'Citta-ekagrata' (質多翳迦阿羯羅多), which is translated here as 'one-pointedness of mind' (心一境性, Xinyijingxing). 'Citta' (質多) means 'mind', 'Eka' (翳迦) means 'one', 'Agra' (阿羯羅) means 'object', and 'ta' (多) means 'nature'. The sixth is 'Samatha' (奢摩他), which is translated here as 'stopping' (止, Zhi). The seventh is 'present life blissful abiding'. 'Equal induction' (等引, Dengyin) encompasses both with and without mind, only 'Samadhi' (定, Concentration) is not scattered. The eleventh chapter of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' (瑜伽師地論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) says: It is not one-pointedness of mind in the desire realm.
'Equal holding' (等持, Dengchi), with mind, encompasses both 'Samadhi' (定, Concentration) and scattering. However, in the sutras and treatises, in terms of superiority, it is said that emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness are called 'Samadhi' (三摩地). 'Equal attainment' (等至, Dengzhi), generally encompasses 'Samadhi' (定, Concentration) with and without mind. However, in the sutras and treatises, in terms of superiority, it is only said that the various 'Samadhi' (定, Concentration) corresponding to the five direct perceptions are called 'equal attainment' (等至, Dengzhi). 'Quiet contemplation' (靜慮, Jinglv), generally encompasses 'Samadhi' (定, Concentration) with and without mind, with outflows and without outflows.
．染與不染。依色四地非余處有。諸處據勝多說色地有心清凈功德名為靜慮。
心一境性。即等持也。以心一境性釋等持故 奢摩他者。唯有心凈定。不通散位。
現法樂住。唯在靜慮。根本非余。凈不通散。然等引寬通攝一切有無心位諸功德。故瑜伽論中偏立地名。等至不爾。◎
成唯識論了義燈卷第五(本終)
成唯識論了義燈卷第五(末)
◎論第六
論于實德能深忍樂欲心凈為信。雜集論中略標同此。境．業少異彼云。顯揚說境相似。俱云于有體．有德．有能。且就有體不說唯言。不爾信緣過．未等法豈有體耶。因果．自性正同此論。彼云忍可．清凈．希望為體。顯揚略果。五蘊同此。但因果具說。彼云極正符順心凈為性。符順之言通忍．欲二。故此論云。若印順者即勝解故。若樂順者即是欲故 問此因果為前後俱 答或俱時。或因前果后。亦無定說。境亦同此。彼云謂于業果諸諦．寶中。業果即諦。總是此論實事．理也。業中雜集但云樂欲所依為業。不說治業。顯揚五業初一治業。餘四即此樂善為業。廣中五蘊．顯揚並無。雜集廣體。此論具廣。隨作者意皆不相違。
疏言非慚慚故信是無慚非信信故慚是不信者。顯體各異。非以信令心凈。慚是不信。非以慚令
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 染與不染，取決於色界四禪（rūpadhātu catuḥ-dhyāna，色界的四種禪定境界），其他地方沒有。其他地方只是根據最殊勝的情況來說，色界有清凈心的功德，這被稱為靜慮（dhyāna，禪定）。 心一境性（ekāgratā，專注一境的狀態），就是等持（samādhi，三摩地，心定）。因為用『心一境性』來解釋『等持』。 奢摩他（śamatha，止，平靜），只有清凈的禪定，不包括散亂的狀態。 現法樂住（dṛṣṭa-dharma-sukha-vihāra，現世安樂的住處），只存在於靜慮（dhyāna，禪定）的根本定中，不在其他地方。清凈不包括散亂的狀態。然而，等引（samāpatti，等至）寬泛地包括一切有心和無心的狀態的各種功德。因此，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）中特別設立了地的名稱。等至（samāpatti，等至）不是這樣。 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第五（本終） 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第五（末） ◎論第六 論中說，對於真實的事、功德、能力，能夠深深地忍可、喜愛、希求，並且內心清凈，這就是信（śraddhā，信心）。《雜集論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）中簡略地標示與此相同。境（viṣaya，對像）、業（karma，行為）略有不同，彼論說《顯揚聖教論》（Asaṅga）說境相似，都說對於『有體』、『有德』、『有能』的事物。且就『有體』來說，不說『唯有』。如果不是這樣，信所緣的過去、未來等法，難道有體嗎？因（hetu，原因）、果（phala，結果）、自性（svabhāva，自性）與此論完全相同。彼論說忍可、清凈、希望為體（svabhāva，自性）。《顯揚聖教論》（Asaṅga）省略了果。五蘊（pañca-skandha，五蘊）與此論相同。只是因果都詳細說明了。彼論說極其正確地符合、順應，內心清凈為性（prakṛti，本性）。『符合、順應』的說法包括忍可和希求兩種。所以此論說，如果印可順應，就是勝解（adhimokṣa，勝解）。如果樂於順應，就是欲（chanda，欲）。問：這因果是同時還是前後？答：或者同時，或者因在前果在後，也沒有定論。境（viṣaya，對像）也與此相同。彼論說，就是對於業果（karma-phala，業與果報）、諸諦（satya，真諦）、寶（ratna，寶）中。業果就是諦，總的來說就是此論的實事、理。業（karma，行為）中，《雜集論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）只說樂欲所依為業，不說治業。《顯揚聖教論》（Asaṅga）的五業中，第一個是治業，其餘四個就是此論的樂善為業。廣中五蘊（pañca-skandha，五蘊），《顯揚聖教論》（Asaṅga）都沒有。《雜集論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）廣說體（svabhāva，自性）。此論具足廣說。隨作者的意圖，都沒有互相違背。 疏中說，不是因為沒有慚愧（ahrīka，無慚）所以信（śraddhā，信心）是無慚，不是因為信（śraddhā，信心）所以慚愧（hrī，慚）是不信，顯示體（svabhāva，自性）各自不同。不是用信（śraddhā，信心）使內心清凈，慚愧（hrī，慚）是不信，不是用慚愧（hrī，慚）使內心清凈。
【English Translation】 English version Contamination and non-contamination depend on the four dhyānas (rūpadhātu catuḥ-dhyāna) of the Form Realm; they are not found elsewhere. Other places are mentioned based on the most excellent conditions, stating that the Form Realm possesses the merit of a pure mind, which is called dhyāna (dhyāna, meditation). One-pointedness of mind (ekāgratā, the state of being focused on one object) is samādhi (samādhi, concentration). 'One-pointedness of mind' is used to explain 'samādhi'. Śamatha (śamatha, tranquility) only exists in pure meditation and does not include scattered states. Pleasant abiding in the present life (dṛṣṭa-dharma-sukha-vihāra, dwelling in happiness in the present life) exists only in the fundamental dhyāna (dhyāna, meditation) and not elsewhere. Purity does not include scattered states. However, samāpatti (samāpatti, attainment) broadly includes all merits of states with and without mind. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) specifically establishes the names of the grounds. Samāpatti (samāpatti, attainment) is not like this. Completion of the Meaning Lamp Commentary on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, Volume 5 (End of this part) Completion of the Meaning Lamp Commentary on the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra, Volume 5 (End) ◎ Treatise 6 The treatise states that faith (śraddhā, faith) is the ability to deeply endure, love, desire, and have a pure mind towards real things, virtues, and abilities. The Abhidharma-samuccaya (Abhidharma-samuccaya) briefly indicates the same. The object (viṣaya, object) and action (karma, action) are slightly different; that treatise says that the Asaṅga's (Asaṅga) says the objects are similar, both speaking of things that 'have substance', 'have virtue', and 'have ability'. Furthermore, regarding 'having substance', it does not say 'only'. If it were not so, would the past, future, and other dharmas that faith relies on have substance? The cause (hetu, cause), result (phala, result), and self-nature (svabhāva, self-nature) are exactly the same as in this treatise. That treatise says that endurance, purity, and hope are the nature (svabhāva, self-nature). The Asaṅga's (Asaṅga) omits the result. The five aggregates (pañca-skandha, five aggregates) are the same as in this treatise. It's just that both cause and result are explained in detail. That treatise says that being extremely correct, conforming, and according, and having a pure mind is the nature (prakṛti, nature). The statement 'conforming and according' includes both endurance and desire. Therefore, this treatise says that if one approves and conforms, it is adhimokṣa (adhimokṣa, superior understanding). If one delights in conforming, it is chanda (chanda, desire). Question: Are these causes and results simultaneous or sequential? Answer: They may be simultaneous, or the cause may precede the result; there is no fixed rule. The object (viṣaya, object) is also the same as this. That treatise says that it is in relation to karma and its results (karma-phala, karma and its results), the truths (satya, truths), and the jewels (ratna, jewels). Karma and its results are the truths, and in general, they are the real things and principles of this treatise. Regarding action (karma, action), the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Abhidharma-samuccaya) only says that the basis of desire is action, and does not speak of corrective action. Among the five actions of the Asaṅga's (Asaṅga), the first is corrective action, and the remaining four are the virtuous actions of this treatise. Regarding the five aggregates (pañca-skandha, five aggregates) in the extensive explanation, the Asaṅga's (Asaṅga) does not have them. The Abhidharma-samuccaya (Abhidharma-samuccaya) extensively explains the nature (svabhāva, self-nature). This treatise fully explains it. According to the intention of the author, there are no contradictions. The commentary says that it is not because there is no shame (ahrīka, shamelessness) that faith (śraddhā, faith) is shameless, and it is not because of faith (śraddhā, faith) that shame (hrī, shame) is disbelief, showing that their natures (svabhāva, self-nature) are different. It is not by faith (śraddhā, faith) that the mind is purified, and shame (hrī, shame) is disbelief; it is not by shame (hrī, shame) that the mind is purified.
心善。信是無慚。諸餘廣略性．業同別準此釋知 然西明解慚中。言自．法．力。同雜心說。一自境上。謂上品人慚于自身不作諸惡。二法增上。是中品人為護聖教不造諸惡。三世間增上。謂下品人護世名利不造諸惡者 今謂不爾。顯揚．五蘊及此論中。但云依自．法二。無世間言。若云下品屬愧不在於慚。此亦不爾。豈上．中品起慚之人不有愧耶。故不得同雜心所說。
十一善法所有別相論各自說。如信以凈為相。慚等雖善非凈為相。慚以崇重。愧以輕拒等 然要集云。實．德．能三是信別相。或可。是境。以決定相是信別相 今謂不爾。實．德．能三定是信境。不勞說或。論云于實．得．能心凈為體。若實．德．能是信別相。豈于別相自生信耶。若以決定為信別相。勝解何殊。若云此說所取境相非。說能取自相者。如何說云或可。此三是信境體。非信別相 又云可慚可愧為二所緣。準下應云。信應可信。受應可受。慚即可崇。愧以可拒。此為別相。余皆準知者 此亦難知。實．德．能三即信所緣。順．違．俱非是受所領。慚．愧等法下文既言隨緣何境。豈于苦．集可崇。滅．道可拒耶。若云論說皆有崇重及輕拒義。如何前云可慚．可愧是二所緣。豈即不緣滅等體耶。今解之者。自性各殊境或通局。如慚．愧
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『心善』是指『信』是沒有羞恥的。其他廣泛而簡略的性質和作用，可以參照這個解釋來理解。然而，西明的解釋中，『慚』包含『自』、『法』、『力』三種。這與《雜心論》的說法相同。第一種是『自境上』，指上品之人因慚愧自身而不做諸惡。第二種是『法增上』，是中品之人爲了守護聖教而不造諸惡。第三種是『世間增上』，指下品之人爲了維護世間的名利而不造諸惡。現在我認為不是這樣。《顯揚聖教論·五蘊品》和本論中，只說依靠『自』、『法』兩種，沒有提到『世間』。如果說下品之人屬於『愧』，而不是『慚』，這也是不對的。難道上品和中品生起『慚』的人就沒有『愧』嗎？所以不能與《雜心論》的說法相同。
十一種善法的所有差別相，各論自有說明。例如，『信』以清凈為相，『慚』等雖然是善法，但不是以清凈為相。『慚』以崇敬為相，『愧』以輕視拒絕為相等等。然而，《瑜伽師地論·攝事品》說，『實』（真實）、『德』（功德）、『能』（能力）三種是『信』的差別相。或者說，它們是『信』的所緣境，以決定的相為『信』的差別相。現在我認為不是這樣。『實』、『德』、『能』三種一定是『信』的所緣境，不需要說『或者』。論中說，對於『實』、『德』、『能』，內心清凈為體性。如果『實』、『德』、『能』是『信』的差別相，難道會對於差別相自身生起『信』嗎？如果以『決定』為『信』的差別相，那與『勝解』有什麼區別？如果說這裡說的是所取境的相，而不是說能取自相，那又如何說『或者』呢？這三種是『信』的所緣境和體性，不是『信』的差別相。又說，可慚、可愧是『慚』和『愧』的所緣。按照這個推論，應該說『信』是可信的，『受』是可接受的，『慚』是可崇敬的，『愧』是可拒絕的，這些是差別相，其餘的可以參照理解。這也是難以理解的。『實』、『德』、『能』三種就是『信』的所緣，順、違、俱非是『受』所領納的。『慚』、『愧』等法，下文既然說隨所緣何境，難道對於苦、集可以崇敬，對於滅、道可以拒絕嗎？如果說論中說的都有崇敬和輕視拒絕的含義，那為什麼前面說可慚、可愧是二者的所緣？難道就不緣于滅等的體性嗎？現在解釋為，自性各自不同，所緣境或者有共通或者有侷限。例如『慚』、『愧』。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Heart-goodness' means that 'faith' (Śraddhā) is without shame (ahrīka). Other extensive and concise natures and functions can be understood by referring to this explanation. However, in the explanation of Ximing, 'shame' (hrī) includes three types: 'self' (ātman), 'dharma', and 'power' (bala). This is the same as the saying in the Abhidharmasamuccaya. The first is 'self-object', referring to superior people who do not commit evil deeds out of shame for themselves. The second is 'dharma-augmentation', which refers to middle-grade people who do not commit evil deeds to protect the holy teachings. The third is 'worldly-augmentation', which refers to inferior people who do not commit evil deeds to maintain worldly fame and gain. Now I think this is not the case. In the Abhidharmasamuccaya - Skandhadhātuāyatanalakṣaṇa and in this treatise, it is only said to rely on 'self' and 'dharma', without mentioning 'worldly'. If it is said that inferior people belong to 'disgrace' (apatrāpya), not 'shame', this is also incorrect. Do people of superior and middle grades who arise 'shame' not have 'disgrace'? Therefore, it cannot be the same as the saying in the Abhidharmasamuccaya.
The specific characteristics of the eleven good dharmas are explained separately in each treatise. For example, 'faith' is characterized by purity, while 'shame' and others, although they are good dharmas, are not characterized by purity. 'Shame' is characterized by reverence, 'disgrace' is characterized by contemptuous rejection, and so on. However, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra - Vastusaṃgrahaṇī says that 'reality' (satya), 'virtue' (guṇa), and 'ability' (śakti) are the specific characteristics of 'faith'. Or, they are the objects of 'faith', with the characteristic of certainty being the specific characteristic of 'faith'. Now I think this is not the case. 'Reality', 'virtue', and 'ability' must be the objects of 'faith', and there is no need to say 'or'. The treatise says that with regard to 'reality', 'virtue', and 'ability', the purity of the mind is the nature. If 'reality', 'virtue', and 'ability' are the specific characteristics of 'faith', how can faith arise in the specific characteristics themselves? If 'certainty' is taken as the specific characteristic of 'faith', what is the difference from 'resolution' (adhimokṣa)? If it is said that what is said here is the characteristic of the object taken, not the characteristic of the subject taking, then how can it be said 'or'? These three are the object and nature of 'faith', not the specific characteristics of 'faith'. It is also said that what is shameful and disgraceful are the objects of 'shame' and 'disgrace'. According to this inference, it should be said that 'faith' should be believable, 'feeling' (vedanā) should be acceptable, 'shame' should be reverent, and 'disgrace' should be rejectable. These are the specific characteristics, and the rest can be understood by analogy. This is also difficult to understand. 'Reality', 'virtue', and 'ability' are the objects of 'faith', and agreeable, disagreeable, and neither are what 'feeling' experiences. Since the text below says that 'shame', 'disgrace', and other dharmas depend on whatever object they are related to, how can one revere suffering and accumulation, and reject cessation and the path? If it is said that what the treatise says all have the meaning of reverence and contemptuous rejection, then why did it say earlier that what is shameful and disgraceful are the objects of the two? Does it not relate to the nature of cessation and so on? Now the explanation is that the natures are different, and the objects may be common or limited. For example, 'shame' and 'disgrace'.
二及無貪嗔。皆云隨緣何境。余或有別。即所樂決定等。然心所中。諸論上下有說所緣境別相者。即可定知。有不說者既未見文。不可臆定。
問以羞．恥二為慚．愧體。一體義分則成假。二執本后俱同惠。一體用分應不實。初二靜慮意名喜．樂為問亦爾 答同依一惠不別立。約義用別故是實。慚．愧同體既別立。如忘念等故應假。
問若許慚．愧定俱起者。何故五十三云若有慚正現前必亦有愧。非有愧者必定有慚。是故慚法最為強勝耶 答彼據別義。受戒者隨護他心。望他起愧。望自起慚。以于自處羞慚之時。必亦顧他而生於愧。以顧自增必羞他故。若於他處。羞愧之時未必生慚。以顧自劣故 或隨增說。諸違準此。
問信云令他凈。舍亦令他靜。此慚等能令他崇。令他拒等不 答論既無文。設復不能亦有何過。以諸心所功用別故。且如作意能警於他。非令所警亦能警故。設復令他亦崇拒等亦有何過。以心．心所用有通局。法性爾故。然非必皆例。
問根本六或及二十隨。但翻十一為善十一。余之十五何故不翻 答西明釋云。所以不翻者。一為不定屬一善故。二為或屬純凈善。或入雜類善 今謂不爾。且忿．恨等定屬無嗔。入純凈善非在雜類。但應如論。一相用有別。二遍六識。三障勝因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二、關於無貪（Araga，不貪婪）和無嗔（Adosa，不嗔恨）。都說是隨順因緣，那麼在任何情況下都是如此嗎？或者還有其他區別，比如所樂（喜歡的事物）是確定的等等？答：在心所（Caitasika，心所法）中，各種論典的上下文中，有說到所緣境（Alambana，認識對像）的差別相的，就可以確定地知道。沒有說到的，既然沒有見到經文，就不能隨意臆斷。
問：以羞（Hri，羞恥）和恥（Apatrapya，無慚）二者作為慚（Hri，有慚）和愧（Apatrapya，有愧）的本體。如果本體相同而意義不同，那就成了假立。如果二者執持的本體和結果都與慧（Prajna，智慧）相同，如果本體相同而作用不同，那應該是不真實的。最初的二禪（Dhyana，禪定）中，意（Manas，意）被稱為喜（Priti，喜）和樂（Sukha，樂），這個問題也可以這樣問嗎？答：慚和愧共同依於一個智慧，沒有另外設立。因為意義和作用不同，所以是真實的。慚和愧本體相同卻另外設立，就像忘念（Moha，愚癡）等一樣，所以應該是假立的。
問：如果允許慚和愧一定同時生起，為什麼《五十三參》中說：『如果慚正現前，必定也有愧。但有愧的人，不一定有慚。所以慚法最為強勝』呢？答：那是根據不同的意義來說的。受戒的人隨順守護他人的心，希望他人產生愧。希望自己產生慚。因為在自己感到羞慚的時候，必定也會顧及他人而產生愧。因為顧及自己更多，必定會羞於他人。如果在他人那裡感到羞愧的時候，未必會產生慚。因為顧及自己不如他人。或者隨順增上的情況來說。各種違背的情況，可以參照這個原則。
問：信（Sraddha，信仰）說是使他人清凈，舍（Tyaga，捨棄）也使他人安靜。那麼慚等能使他人崇敬，使他人拒絕等等嗎？答：論典既然沒有經文，即使不能，又有什麼過錯呢？因為各種心所的功用不同。比如作意（Manaskara，作意）能警覺他人，但不能使被警覺的人也能警覺。即使能使他人也崇敬或拒絕等等，又有什麼過錯呢？因為心和心所的作用有共通和侷限，法性就是如此。但並非所有情況都可以類比。
問：根本六煩惱（Klesha，煩惱）或者二十隨煩惱（Upaklesha，隨煩惱），只翻譯了十一善心所（Kusala，善）為善，其餘的十五個為什麼不翻譯？答：西明法師解釋說：不翻譯的原因，一是它們不一定屬於一種善。二是或者屬於純凈的善，或者進入雜類的善。我認為不是這樣。比如忿（Krodha，忿怒）、恨（Upanaha，怨恨）等一定屬於無嗔，進入純凈的善，而不是在雜類中。但應該像論典所說的那樣：一是相用有區別，二是遍於六識（Vijnana，識），三是障礙殊勝的因。
【English Translation】 English version Secondly, regarding Araga (non-attachment) and Adosa (non-hatred). It is said that they follow conditions, so is this the case in all situations? Or are there other distinctions, such as the object of enjoyment being fixed, etc.? Answer: In the Abhidharma texts, in various treatises, both earlier and later, those that discuss the distinct characteristics of Alambana (the object of cognition) can be definitively known. Those that do not mention it, since no textual evidence is seen, cannot be arbitrarily determined.
Question: Taking Hri (shame) and Apatrapya (remorse) as the substance of Hri (conscience) and Apatrapya (lack of conscience). If the substance is the same but the meaning is different, then it becomes a false establishment. If the substance and result held by the two are both the same as Prajna (wisdom), if the substance is the same but the function is different, then it should be unreal. In the initial two Dhyanas (meditative absorptions), Manas (mind) is called Priti (joy) and Sukha (happiness), can this question also be asked in this way? Answer: Conscience and lack of conscience both rely on one wisdom, without separate establishment. Because the meaning and function are different, they are real. Conscience and lack of conscience have the same substance but are established separately, like Moha (delusion) and so on, so they should be false establishments.
Question: If it is accepted that conscience and lack of conscience necessarily arise together, why does the Fifty-Three Pilgrimages say: 'If conscience is presently manifest, then there must also be lack of conscience. But those who have lack of conscience do not necessarily have conscience. Therefore, the Dharma of conscience is the most powerful'? Answer: That is according to different meanings. Those who take precepts follow and protect the minds of others, hoping that others will generate lack of conscience. Hoping that they themselves will generate conscience. Because when one feels shame in oneself, one will certainly also consider others and generate lack of conscience. Because considering oneself more, one will certainly be ashamed of others. If one feels lack of conscience in others, one may not necessarily generate conscience. Because considering oneself inferior to others. Or it is according to the increasing situation. Various violations can refer to this principle.
Question: Sraddha (faith) is said to purify others, and Tyaga (renunciation) also calms others. Then can conscience, etc., cause others to respect, cause others to reject, etc.? Answer: Since the treatises have no textual evidence, even if they cannot, what fault is there? Because the functions of various mental factors are different. For example, Manaskara (attention) can alert others, but it cannot make the alerted person also alert. Even if it can cause others to also respect or reject, etc., what fault is there? Because the functions of mind and mental factors have commonality and limitations, such is the nature of Dharma. But not all situations can be analogized.
Question: Of the six fundamental Kleshas (afflictions) or the twenty Upakleshas (secondary afflictions), only the eleven Kusala (wholesome) mental factors are translated as wholesome, why are the remaining fifteen not translated? Answer: The master Ximing explains: The reason for not translating is that one, they do not necessarily belong to one kind of wholesome. Two, they either belong to pure wholesome or enter into mixed wholesome. I think it is not like this. For example, Krodha (anger), Upanaha (resentment), etc., certainly belong to non-hatred, entering into pure wholesome, not in the mixed category. But it should be as the treatises say: one, the characteristics and functions are different, two, they pervade the six Vijnanas (consciousnesses), and three, they obstruct superior causes.
。以彼忿等無別相用。不遍六識非障勝因故。不別翻立為善教。如不放逸對治放逸。由不放逸成滿一切世出世善。防惡修善以此勝故。差別立之。余不立者應準此知。
論非見所斷者。疏言彼不言善法斷緣縛者名為見斷 雖無相定所招異熟入聖名斷。定非見斷。不爾修道煩惱發業。亦招惡趣別報苦果。果雖見斷。修道煩惱豈見斷耶。既能縛在但約見斷。不生名斷。非約斷縛。不障見故。以此證知善非見斷。
問此引五十七二十二根三斷之文。若非緣縛名為見斷。七色命根何名見斷。斷有幾種 答斷有四種。一自性斷。二相應斷。三緣縛斷。四不生斷 言自性斷者。謂本隨惑。性是染故。及不善業。業雖是思如似五見非相應斷。相應斷 相應斷者。有漏八識．五遍行全別境不定二各少分。自性非染由與惑俱。斷相應時心等解脫。故五十四云。又復諸識自性非染。涅槃經亦云。斷相應貪等名心解脫。又五十九云。從彼相應及所緣故煩惱可斷。然所緣斷或不生斷攝。以無境故。或即不生。又由相應煩惱斷故。不為境縛名所緣斷。故彼云相應斷已不復緣境故從所緣亦說名斷。
緣縛斷者。一切有漏不染污法 不生斷者。惡趣異熟無想定等。第八卷中更當分別 問此前說斷依何斷說 答依不生及緣縛斷。十四
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為忿等煩惱沒有與其它煩惱不同的作用，並且它們不普遍存在於六識中，也不是殊勝的障礙之因，所以不特別建立為善法來教導。就像不放逸對治放逸一樣，由於不放逸能夠圓滿一切世間和出世間的善，並且能夠防止惡行、修習善行，因此它非常殊勝，所以特別建立。其餘沒有特別建立的，應該參照這個道理來理解。
關於非見所斷的法，疏文中說，那些不被稱為善法的斷緣縛的法，才被稱為見所斷。雖然通過無想定所招感的異熟果，在證入聖道時會被斷除，但無想定並非見所斷。如果不是這樣，那麼修道位所生的煩惱引發的業，也會招感惡趣的別報苦果。雖然果是見所斷，但修道位的煩惱難道也是見所斷嗎？既然能夠束縛，就只是針對見所斷而言，不生起才稱為斷，而不是針對斷除束縛而言，因為它不障礙見道。通過這些可以證明，善法不是見所斷。
問：這裡引用了五十七、二十二根和三斷的經文。如果說非緣縛的法稱為見所斷，那麼七色根和命根又屬於哪種見所斷呢？斷有幾種？答：斷有四種：一、自性斷；二、相應斷；三、緣縛斷；四、不生斷。自性斷是指那些本來就是染污的隨惑，以及不善業。業雖然是思，但類似於五見，不是相應斷。相應斷是指有漏的八識、五遍行、全部的別境以及不定中的少部分。它們本身不是染污的，因為與煩惱同時生起，所以在斷除相應煩惱時，心等也得到解脫。所以《五十四》中說：『而且諸識的自性並非染污。』《涅槃經》也說：『斷除相應的貪等，稱為心解脫。』《五十九》中說：『從它相應的以及所緣的緣故，煩惱可以被斷除。』然而，所緣斷或者被不生斷所攝，因為它沒有境；或者就是不生斷。又因為相應煩惱被斷除的緣故，不被境所束縛，所以稱為所緣斷。所以那裡說，相應斷已經斷除，不再緣境，所以從所緣的角度也說名為斷。
緣縛斷是指一切有漏的不染污法。不生斷是指惡趣的異熟果和無想定等。第八卷中會更詳細地分別。問：前面所說的斷是依據哪種斷來說的？答：是依據不生斷和緣縛斷。十四
【English Translation】 English version: Because anger and other afflictions do not have different functions from other afflictions, and they are not universally present in the six consciousnesses, nor are they the cause of superior obstacles, they are not specifically established as good teachings. Just as non-negligence counteracts negligence, because non-negligence can perfect all worldly and supramundane good, and can prevent evil deeds and cultivate good deeds, it is very superior, so it is specifically established. The rest that are not specifically established should be understood in accordance with this principle.
Regarding the dharmas that are not severed by seeing, the commentary says that those that are not called the severed bonds of good dharmas are called severed by seeing. Although the different ripening result caused by the state of non-perception is severed when entering the path of the saints, the state of non-perception is not severed by seeing. If this were not the case, then the karma generated by the afflictions in the path of cultivation would also cause the different retribution of suffering in the evil realms. Although the result is severed by seeing, are the afflictions in the path of cultivation also severed by seeing? Since it can bind, it is only in terms of what is severed by seeing. Not arising is called severance, not in terms of severing the bonds, because it does not obstruct seeing. From this, it can be proved that good dharmas are not severed by seeing.
Question: Here, the texts of the fifty-seven, twenty-two roots, and three severances are cited. If dharmas that are not bound by conditions are called severed by seeing, then to which kind of severance by seeing do the seven color roots and the life root belong? How many kinds of severance are there? Answer: There are four kinds of severance: 1. Severance by nature (自性斷); 2. Severance by association (相應斷); 3. Severance by conditional binding (緣縛斷); 4. Severance by non-arising (不生斷). Severance by nature refers to the inherent defilements of the accompanying afflictions, as well as unwholesome karma. Although karma is thought, it is similar to the five views and is not severance by association. Severance by association refers to the leaky eight consciousnesses, the five omnipresent mental factors, all of the specific objects, and a small part of the undetermined mental factors. They are not inherently defiled, but because they arise simultaneously with afflictions, when the associated afflictions are severed, the mind and so on are also liberated. Therefore, it is said in 《Fifty-four》: 'Moreover, the nature of the consciousnesses is not defiled.' The 《Nirvana Sutra》 also says: 'Severing the associated greed and so on is called liberation of the mind.' 《Fifty-nine》 says: 'From its association and the object it cognizes, afflictions can be severed.' However, severance by object is either included in severance by non-arising, because it has no object; or it is severance by non-arising. Also, because the associated afflictions are severed, it is not bound by the object, so it is called severance by object. Therefore, it says there that the associated severance has already been severed and no longer cognizes the object, so from the perspective of the object, it is also called severance.
Severance by conditional binding refers to all leaky undefiled dharmas. Severance by non-arising refers to the different ripening results of the evil realms and the state of non-perception, and so on. These will be explained in more detail in the eighth volume. Question: Which kind of severance is the severance mentioned earlier based on? Answer: It is based on severance by non-arising and severance by conditional binding. Fourteen.
一分見所斷。據不生說。或通相應斷。與見或俱故說見斷。然不盡理。有非斷故。一分修斷據緣縛說。十二一分修所斷。一切約緣縛斷。八十七文又說四斷少同於此。故說一分修斷。以信等五．未知當知通漏無漏。無漏之者即非所斷。憂．苦二受性非無漏。以引無漏及無漏引說為非斷。實非無漏 問若爾意．喜．樂．舍亦通無漏。何唯說斷 無想定等準第八說亦通見斷。此何不說 答此後問疏中解訖。釋前難者。意．喜．樂．舍無漏之者實通非斷。以意及舍八識通說。非皆無漏。且據全說 問在二乘身無漏非全。若在佛身七色根除女。五受除憂．苦。三無漏除二。皆通無漏。何故非全不說非斷 答據三乘通。若約大乘得通非斷 問諸有漏法非性染者。在二乘身無能緣惑說為修斷。然法猶在。若佛身中總滅。不有是何斷攝 答不生斷攝 問何以得知 答集論中說無學后蘊無種已生。準此因無果不生故 問如八難身等所起信等。入見道已彼身不受。信等起不。若不起者是何斷收。若許起者無所依身。如何得起 答二解。一云不起。不生斷攝。所依無故。一云得起。依現身故。然應分別。生得者不生無雜亂故。方便者起許雜亂故。界系定故。身不定故 或容生得。界雖無雜趣許雜故。如人中造生天業等。通生得故。前第三云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『一分見所斷』（ekadeśa-darśana-prahātavyāh），根據『不生』（anutpāda）的觀點來說明。或者可以理解為通於『相應斷』（samprayoga-prahātavyāh）。因為它與『見』（darśana）有時同時生起，所以說是『見斷』（darśana-prahātavyāh）。然而，這種說法並不完全合理，因為有些情況並非如此。『一分修斷』（ekadeśa-bhāvanā-prahātavyāh）是根據『緣縛』（pratyaya-bandhana）來說明的。十二種『一分』（ekadeśa）是『修所斷』（bhāvanā-prahātavyāh）。一切都是根據『緣縛』（pratyaya-bandhana）來斷除的。八十七個條目中又說了四種『斷』（prahātavyāh），與此略有不同。所以說『一分修斷』（ekadeśa-bhāvanā-prahātavyāh），因為『信』（śraddhā）等五種，以及『未知當知』（ajñāta-jñāsyāmīndriya）通於『漏』（āsrava）和『無漏』（anāsrava）。屬於『無漏』（anāsrava）的那些就不是『所斷』（prahātavyāh）。『憂』（daurmanasya）、『苦』（duhkha）兩種感受的性質並非『無漏』（anāsrava），因為它們能引發『無漏』（anāsrava），以及『無漏』（anāsrava）能引發它們，所以說它們不是『斷』（prahātavyāh），實際上它們並非『無漏』（anāsrava）。 問：如果這樣，那麼『意』（manas）、『喜』（prīti）、『樂』（sukha）、『舍』（upekṣā）也通於『無漏』（anāsrava），為什麼只說它們是『斷』（prahātavyāh）呢？『無想定』（asaṃjñā-samāpatti）等，按照第八識的說法，也通於『見斷』（darśana-prahātavyāh），為什麼這裡不說呢？答：這些後面的問題在疏文中已經解釋過了。解釋前面的難題，『意』（manas）、『喜』（prīti）、『樂』（sukha）、『舍』（upekṣā）中屬於『無漏』（anāsrava）的那些，實際上通於非『斷』（prahātavyāh），因為『意』（manas）和『舍』（upekṣā）在八識中普遍存在，並非都是『無漏』（anāsrava）。這裡只是根據整體情況來說明。 問：在二乘（śrāvakayāna, pratyekabuddhayāna）的身體中，『無漏』（anāsrava）並非完全。如果在佛身（buddhakāya）中，七種色根（rūpāyatana）除了女性，五種感受（vedanā）除了『憂』（daurmanasya）、『苦』（duhkha），三種『無漏』（anāsrava）除了兩種，都通於『無漏』（anāsrava）。為什麼不因為它們並非完全而說它們不是『斷』（prahātavyāh）呢？答：這是根據三乘（triyāna）共通的情況來說的。如果按照大乘（mahāyāna）的觀點，它們可以通於非『斷』（prahātavyāh）。問：那些並非本質上被染污的『有漏法』（sāsrava-dharma），在二乘（śrāvakayāna, pratyekabuddhayāna）的身體中，沒有能緣的迷惑，所以說是『修斷』（bhāvanā-prahātavyāh）。然而，法仍然存在。如果在佛身（buddhakāya）中完全滅盡，不存在了，這屬於哪種『斷』（prahātavyāh）呢？答：屬於『不生斷』（anutpāda-prahātavyāh）。問：如何得知？答：《集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）中說，無學（aśaikṣa）之後的蘊（skandha）沒有種子已經生起。根據這個，因為沒有因，所以果不會生起。 問：比如八難（aṣṭākṣaṇa）之身等所產生的『信』（śraddhā）等，進入見道（darśanamārga）之後，那個身體不再接受。『信』（śraddhā）等還會生起嗎？如果不生起，屬於哪種『斷』（prahātavyāh）？如果允許生起，沒有所依之身，如何能夠生起？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是不生起，屬於『不生斷』（anutpāda-prahātavyāh），因為沒有所依。另一種說法是可以生起，因為依賴於現有的身體。然而，應該分別看待。生來就有的不會生起，因為沒有混雜。通過方便產生的可以生起，因為允許混雜。因為界限是確定的，身體是不確定的。或者容許生來就有的生起，雖然界限沒有混雜，但趣向允許混雜。比如人在人間造作生天的業等，通於生來就有的。前面第三種說法是這樣。
【English Translation】 English version 'Ekadeśa-darśana-prahātavyāh' (Partially Abandoned by Seeing) is explained according to the view of 'anutpāda' (non-arising). Alternatively, it can be understood as being common to 'samprayoga-prahātavyāh' (abandonment by association). Because it sometimes arises simultaneously with 'darśana' (seeing), it is said to be 'darśana-prahātavyāh' (abandoned by seeing). However, this statement is not entirely reasonable, as this is not always the case. 'Ekadeśa-bhāvanā-prahātavyāh' (Partially Abandoned by Cultivation) is explained according to 'pratyaya-bandhana' (conditioned bondage). The twelve 'ekadeśa' (parts) are 'bhāvanā-prahātavyāh' (abandoned by cultivation). Everything is abandoned according to 'pratyaya-bandhana' (conditioned bondage). The eighty-seven items also mention four types of 'prahātavyāh' (abandonment), which are slightly different from this. Therefore, it is said to be 'ekadeśa-bhāvanā-prahātavyāh' (partially abandoned by cultivation), because 'śraddhā' (faith) and the five others, as well as 'ajñāta-jñāsyāmīndriya' (the faculty of 'I shall know the unknown'), are common to 'āsrava' (influx) and 'anāsrava' (non-influx). Those that belong to 'anāsrava' (non-influx) are not 'prahātavyāh' (to be abandoned). The nature of the two feelings, 'daurmanasya' (sorrow) and 'duhkha' (suffering), is not 'anāsrava' (non-influx), because they can induce 'anāsrava' (non-influx), and 'anāsrava' (non-influx) can induce them, so it is said that they are not 'prahātavyāh' (to be abandoned), but in reality, they are not 'anāsrava' (non-influx). Question: If this is the case, then 'manas' (mind), 'prīti' (joy), 'sukha' (happiness), and 'upekṣā' (equanimity) are also common to 'anāsrava' (non-influx), why are they only said to be 'prahātavyāh' (to be abandoned)? 'Asaṃjñā-samāpatti' (non-perception attainment), etc., according to the explanation of the eighth consciousness, are also common to 'darśana-prahātavyāh' (abandoned by seeing), why is this not mentioned here? Answer: These later questions have already been explained in the commentary. Explaining the previous difficulty, those among 'manas' (mind), 'prīti' (joy), 'sukha' (happiness), and 'upekṣā' (equanimity) that belong to 'anāsrava' (non-influx) are actually common to non-'prahātavyāh' (to be abandoned), because 'manas' (mind) and 'upekṣā' (equanimity) are universally present in the eight consciousnesses, and not all of them are 'anāsrava' (non-influx). This is explained according to the overall situation. Question: In the bodies of the two vehicles (śrāvakayāna, pratyekabuddhayāna), 'anāsrava' (non-influx) is not complete. If in the body of a Buddha (buddhakāya), the seven sense bases (rūpāyatana) excluding the female, the five feelings (vedanā) excluding 'daurmanasya' (sorrow) and 'duhkha' (suffering), and the three 'anāsrava' (non-influx) excluding two, are all common to 'anāsrava' (non-influx). Why are they not said to be non-'prahātavyāh' (to be abandoned) because they are not complete? Answer: This is explained according to the common situation of the three vehicles (triyāna). If according to the view of the Mahāyāna (mahāyāna), they can be common to non-'prahātavyāh' (to be abandoned). Question: Those 'sāsrava-dharma' (defiled dharmas) that are not inherently defiled, in the bodies of the two vehicles (śrāvakayāna, pratyekabuddhayāna), do not have the delusion of being able to perceive, so they are said to be 'bhāvanā-prahātavyāh' (abandoned by cultivation). However, the dharma still exists. If they are completely extinguished in the body of a Buddha (buddhakāya) and no longer exist, to which type of 'prahātavyāh' (abandonment) does this belong? Answer: It belongs to 'anutpāda-prahātavyāh' (abandonment by non-arising). Question: How is this known? Answer: The 'Abhidharmasamuccaya' (Compendium of Abhidharma) says that after the stage of no more learning (aśaikṣa), the aggregates (skandha) no longer have the seeds that have already arisen. According to this, because there is no cause, the effect will not arise. Question: For example, 'śraddhā' (faith) and so on, which arise from the bodies of the eight difficulties (aṣṭākṣaṇa), etc., after entering the path of seeing (darśanamārga), that body no longer receives them. Will 'śraddhā' (faith) and so on still arise? If they do not arise, to which type of 'prahātavyāh' (abandonment) do they belong? If it is allowed to arise, without a supporting body, how can it arise? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that it does not arise and belongs to 'anutpāda-prahātavyāh' (abandonment by non-arising), because there is no support. The other explanation is that it can arise because it relies on the existing body. However, it should be viewed separately. Those that are innate will not arise because there is no mixing. Those that are produced through skillful means can arise because mixing is allowed. Because the boundaries are fixed, the body is not fixed. Or it is permissible for the innate to arise, although the boundaries are not mixed, the tendencies allow mixing. For example, a person in the human realm creates karma to be born in the heavens, etc., which is common to the innate. The third explanation above is like this.
不雜亂者據界地說。
問何故列煩惱中。瑜伽第八．五十八皆五見在前。次列貪．瞋．慢．無明．疑 答利鈍前後。此論．顯揚及雜集等。以正翻善先明貪等 問何故此論疑后明慢。余慢后癡 答此約三不善根。余約別通迷諦行故 問何故此論疑在見前。五蘊等疑獨在見后 答俱生分別利鈍前後。五蘊等據俱生分別。疑在見后。此論等據利鈍殊故。疑在見前。
論。于有有具。本云。大乘許貪緣于滅．道。五十八等不說之者。下文自會隨粗相說。此許得緣。云貪與見．慢容俱起故。此意見．慢既執佛性。以之為我。皆容貪俱 要集斷云。邪見撥無不與貪俱。若撥好事邪見．嗔俱。此意撥滅．道者是好事故。非道計道．不死憍亂皆緣余法。非滅．道諦。若定．法愛非邪見俱。身見俱貪唯緣苦諦。何見俱貪得緣滅．道。故非有具 此釋不爾。準上應知。又全界煩惱皆能結生。既許煩惱有親緣者何非有具。
慢類有九。疏云過慢慢卑慢如次起初三者。謂于等計己勝起我勝慢類。于勝計己等。雖亦是過慢。令言我勝故除于彼。
于等計等起我等類。不言於劣計勝。言我等故。依其卑慢起我劣慢類 卑慢慢過慢如次起中三者。此依卑慢起有勝我慢類。于等計等起有等我類。于等計勝起有劣我類 慢過慢
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『不雜亂者據界地說』，是指煩惱的分類依據其所屬的界（三界：欲界、色界、無色界）來劃分。
問：為什麼（在煩惱的排列中）將（無明）列在煩惱之中？《瑜伽師地論》第八和第五十八卷都將五見（身見、邊見、邪見、見取見、戒禁取見）列在前面，然後才列貪、嗔、慢、無明、疑。 答：這是因為（五見和貪等煩惱）的利鈍（根器）和前後（生起順序）不同。此論（《成唯識論》）、《顯揚聖教論》以及《雜集論》等，因為要正確地翻譯『善』，所以先說明貪等煩惱。
問：為什麼此論（《成唯識論》）將疑放在慢之前面，而其他的論典將慢放在癡（無明）之前面？ 答：這是因為此論是根據三不善根（貪、嗔、癡）來排列的，而其他的論典是根據別通迷諦行（對四聖諦的迷惑和行為）來排列的。
問：為什麼此論（《成唯識論》）將疑放在五見之前面，而五蘊等（相關的論述）中，疑卻單獨地放在五見之後面？ 答：這是因為俱生（與生俱來的）和分別（後天習得的）的利鈍和前後不同。五蘊等是根據俱生和分別來區分的，疑在五見之後。此論等是根據利鈍的差別，所以疑在五見之前。
論：『于有有具』，本論（《成唯識論》）說：大乘允許貪緣于滅諦（涅槃）和道諦（通往涅槃的道路）。第五十八卷等沒有這樣說，是因為下文會解釋，那是隨順粗顯的相來說的。這裡允許（貪）可以緣于（滅諦和道諦），因為貪可以和見、慢同時生起。這裡的意見和慢既然執著佛性，以之為我，都允許和貪同時生起。
《要集》中斷言：邪見如果撥無（否認因果），就不會和貪同時生起。如果撥無好事，邪見就會和嗔同時生起。這裡的意思是，撥無滅諦和道諦是好事，所以（邪見）和嗔同時生起。非道計道（把不是道的當成道）、不死憍亂（認為自己不會死而驕傲放縱）都是緣于其他的法，而不是滅諦和道諦。如果定愛（對禪定的貪愛）和法愛（對佛法的貪愛）不會和邪見同時生起，身見俱貪（與身見同時生起的貪）只緣于苦諦。那麼，什麼見俱貪可以緣于滅諦和道諦呢？所以（滅諦和道諦）不是『有有具』（產生存在的工具）。
此處的解釋不是這樣。應該按照上面的解釋來理解。而且，全界的煩惱都能結生（導致輪迴），既然允許煩惱有親緣（直接的因緣），為什麼不是『有有具』呢？
慢類有九種。疏中說，過慢、慢慢、卑慢是依次從最初的三種慢產生的。也就是說，對於和自己相等的人，認為自己勝過他們，從而生起我勝慢（認為自己比別人優越的驕傲）等。對於勝過自己的人，認為自己和他們相等，雖然也是過慢，但因為說『我勝』，所以排除了這種情況。
對於和自己相等的人，認為自己和他們相等，從而生起我等慢（認為自己和別人一樣的驕傲）等。沒有說對於不如自己的人，認為自己勝過他們，因為說了『我等』。依據卑慢（認為自己不如別人的自卑），生起我劣慢（認為自己不如別人的驕傲）等。 卑慢、慢慢、過慢是依次從中間的三種慢產生的。這是依據卑慢，生起有勝我慢（認為自己有勝過別人的地方的驕傲）等。對於和自己相等的人，認為自己和他們相等，從而生起有等我慢（認為自己和別人一樣的地方的驕傲）等。對於和自己相等的人，認為自己勝過他們，從而生起有劣我慢（認為自己不如別人的地方的驕傲）等。 慢、過慢
【English Translation】 English version: 'Those that are not mixed are said to be based on the realm.' This refers to the classification of afflictions based on the realm to which they belong (the three realms: the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm).
Question: Why is (ignorance) listed among the afflictions? The eighth and fifty-eighth volumes of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) both list the five views (self-view, extreme view, wrong view, view of holding to views, and view of holding to precepts) first, and then list greed, hatred, pride, ignorance, and doubt. Answer: This is because of the difference in sharpness (of faculties) and the order of arising (between the five views and afflictions such as greed). This treatise (Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra (成唯識論)), the Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma (顯揚聖教論), and the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論), etc., because they want to correctly translate 'good,' first explain afflictions such as greed.
Question: Why does this treatise (Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra (成唯識論)) place doubt before pride, while other treatises place pride before ignorance? Answer: This is because this treatise is based on the three unwholesome roots (greed, hatred, and ignorance), while other treatises are based on the specific and general confusion regarding the Truths (the confusion and actions related to the Four Noble Truths).
Question: Why does this treatise (Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra (成唯識論)) place doubt before the five views, while in the discussions on the five aggregates, doubt is placed after the five views? Answer: This is because of the difference in sharpness and order of arising between the innate and the acquired. The discussions on the five aggregates are based on distinguishing between the innate and the acquired, with doubt after the five views. This treatise, etc., is based on the difference in sharpness, so doubt is before the five views.
Treatise: 'Regarding existence, there are the means of existence.' The original treatise (Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi-sastra (成唯識論)) says: The Mahayana allows greed to be conditioned by cessation (Nirvana (滅諦)) and the path (the path to Nirvana (道諦)). The fifty-eighth volume, etc., does not say this because the following text will explain that it is speaking according to the coarse and obvious aspects. Here, it is allowed that (greed) can be conditioned by (cessation and the path) because greed can arise simultaneously with views and pride. Since the views and pride here cling to Buddha-nature, taking it as self, they are all allowed to arise simultaneously with greed.
The Essentials Collected (要集) states: If wrong view denies causality, it will not arise simultaneously with greed. If it denies good deeds, wrong view will arise simultaneously with hatred. The meaning here is that denying cessation and the path is a good deed, so (wrong view) arises simultaneously with hatred. Taking what is not the path as the path, and being arrogant and unrestrained due to the belief in immortality, are all conditioned by other dharmas, not by cessation and the path. If love of meditation and love of the Dharma do not arise simultaneously with wrong view, then greed associated with self-view is only conditioned by suffering. So, what greed associated with views can be conditioned by cessation and the path? Therefore, (cessation and the path) are not 'means of existence.'
This explanation is not so. It should be understood according to the above explanation. Moreover, the afflictions of all realms can lead to rebirth, so since it is allowed that afflictions have direct causes, why are they not 'means of existence'?
There are nine types of pride. The commentary says that excessive pride, pride, and inferior pride arise sequentially from the first three types of pride. That is, for those who are equal to oneself, thinking that one is superior to them, thus giving rise to 'I am superior' pride (我勝慢) etc. For those who are superior to oneself, thinking that one is equal to them, although it is also excessive pride, it is excluded because it says 'I am superior.'
For those who are equal to oneself, thinking that one is equal to them, thus giving rise to 'I am equal' pride (我等慢) etc. It does not say that for those who are inferior to oneself, thinking that one is superior to them, because it says 'I am equal.' Based on inferior pride, giving rise to 'I am inferior' pride (我劣慢) etc. Inferior pride, pride, and excessive pride arise sequentially from the middle three types of pride. This is based on inferior pride, giving rise to 'I have superior' pride (有勝我慢) etc. For those who are equal to oneself, thinking that one is equal to them, thus giving rise to 'I have equal' pride (有等我慢) etc. For those who are equal to oneself, thinking that one is superior to them, thus giving rise to 'I have inferior' pride (有劣我慢) etc. Pride, excessive pride
卑慢如次起后三者。于等計等起無勝類。于等計勝起無等類。依卑慢起無劣慢類。如俱舍第十九．婆沙一百九十九說 問且我勝慢類。何故但依于等計勝。不言于勝計等 答今既言我勝。明非於勝計己等者。余準此知 問何故不于慢過慢起 答據多分說。不多於勝計己為勝。此依發智論說。依品類足論亦于彼起。故婆沙一百九十九云。此依本論所釋如是。依品類足論。我勝慢類中攝三種。若劣謂己勝即是慢。于等謂己勝即過慢。于勝謂己勝是慢過慢。餘八慢類如理應說 準此發智依多分說。品類足論據盡理言。然此九類三於過慢起。謂我勝．有劣．無等三于慢生。謂我等．有等．無勝俱于中品處生。餘三依下品處起。以於他勝計己劣故。問慢類與慢有何差別 答有二義。一要依我見後生及俱二多不全。依品類足即復有過。如似過慢于勝謂已等等計己勝。我勝但于等計己勝故不全分。依品類足我勝依三生。謂於劣．等．勝皆計己勝。故即是過 問．我．劣類三依卑慢起。既全非分與七何殊 答有初一義 問何故我見俱後起者為慢類。豈不許七慢依我見俱後生 答不障七慢．我見俱後生。但行相別直。計我後起者為慢。計我勝等後起慢者。即是慢類。或不依我慢亦得生。類必依我。又由分及過。是彼七類。亦應說云我見后
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 卑慢（覺得自己卑賤）之後，會依次生起三種慢。對於與自己相等的人，會產生『我與他相等』的慢；對於勝過自己的人，會產生『我與他相等』的慢；因為卑慢，不會產生『我比他差』的慢。正如《俱舍論》第十九卷和《婆沙論》第一百九十九卷所說。 問：且說『我勝慢』這一類，為什麼只說『對於與自己相等的人，認為自己勝過他』，而不說『對於勝過自己的人，認為自己與他相等』呢？ 答：現在既然說了『我勝』，就表明不是『對於勝過自己的人，認為自己與他相等』。其餘情況可以依此類推。 問：為什麼不會對慢和過慢生起慢呢？ 答：這是根據大多數情況來說的。很少有人對於勝過自己的人，認為自己勝過他。這是根據《發智論》所說。根據《品類足論》，也會對他們生起慢。所以《婆沙論》第一百九十九卷說：『這是根據本論所解釋的。』根據《品類足論》，『我勝慢』這一類包含三種情況：如果對方不如自己，認為自己勝過他，這就是慢；如果對方與自己相等，認為自己勝過他，這就是過慢；如果對方勝過自己，認為自己勝過他，這就是慢過慢。其餘八種慢類也應該按照這個道理來說。 根據《發智論》，這是根據大多數情況來說的。《品類足論》則是根據所有情況來說的。然而這九種慢類中，有三種是對過慢生起的，即『我勝』、『有劣』（擁有不如別人的東西）、『無等』（沒有與自己相等的人）。三種是對慢生起的，即『我等』（我與他相等）、『有等』（擁有與別人相等的東西）、『無勝』（沒有勝過自己的人），這三種都屬於中等程度的慢。其餘三種是根據下等程度的情況生起的，因為對於勝過自己的人，認為自己不如他。 問：慢類與慢有什麼差別？ 答：有兩個方面的差別。一是必須要依靠我見之後才能產生，以及同時產生；二是大多不完全。根據《品類足論》，還有過分的。例如，類似於過慢的情況，對於勝過自己的人，認為自己與他相等，等等，認為自己勝過他。『我勝』只是對於與自己相等的人，認為自己勝過他，所以不完全。根據《品類足論』，『我勝』是根據三種情況產生的，即對於不如自己的人、與自己相等的人、勝過自己的人，都認為自己勝過他，所以就是過分。 問：『我』、『劣』這兩類是根據卑慢產生的。既然完全沒有共同之處，與其餘七種慢有什麼區別？ 答：有第一個方面的含義。 問：為什麼說與我見同時或之後產生的才算是慢類呢？難道不允許七種慢與我見同時或之後產生嗎？ 答：不妨礙七種慢與我見同時或之後產生。只是行相不同。直接認為『我』之後產生的才是慢。認為『我勝』等等之後產生的慢，就是慢類。或者不依靠『我』，慢也可以產生，但慢類必須依靠『我』。又因為有部分和過分，所以是那七種慢類。也應該說與我見之後產生。
【English Translation】 English version After humility (thinking oneself lowly), three types of conceit arise in sequence. Towards those who are equal, the conceit of 'I am equal' arises. Towards those who are superior, the conceit of 'I am equal' arises. Because of humility, the conceit of 'I am inferior' does not arise. This is as stated in the Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of Knowledge), Volume 19, and the Mahāvibhāṣā (Great Commentary), Volume 199. Question: Regarding the category of 'conceit of being superior,' why is it only said that 'towards those who are equal, one thinks oneself superior,' and not 'towards those who are superior, one thinks oneself equal'? Answer: Since it is stated 'I am superior,' it is clear that it does not refer to 'thinking oneself equal to those who are superior.' The rest can be understood by analogy. Question: Why does conceit not arise towards conceit and excessive conceit? Answer: This is according to the majority of cases. It is rare for someone to think themselves superior to those who are superior. This is according to the Jñānaprasthāna (Foundation of Knowledge). According to the Dharmaskandha (Aggregation of Dharmas), it also arises towards them. Therefore, the Mahāvibhāṣā, Volume 199, states: 'This is as explained according to the original treatise.' According to the Dharmaskandha, the category of 'conceit of being superior' includes three cases: if the other is inferior, thinking oneself superior is conceit; if the other is equal, thinking oneself superior is excessive conceit; if the other is superior, thinking oneself superior is conceit exceeding conceit. The remaining eight types of conceit should be explained accordingly. According to the Jñānaprasthāna, this is according to the majority of cases. The Dharmaskandha speaks exhaustively. However, among these nine types of conceit, three arise towards excessive conceit, namely 'I am superior,' 'having inferiority,' and 'having no equal.' Three arise towards conceit, namely 'I am equal,' 'having equality,' and 'having no superior,' all of which arise in the middle range. The remaining three arise in the lower range, because towards those who are superior, one thinks oneself inferior. Question: What is the difference between types of conceit and conceit itself? Answer: There are two differences. First, it must rely on the view of self (ātma-dṛṣṭi) to arise, either after or simultaneously; and second, it is mostly incomplete. According to the Dharmaskandha, there is also excessiveness. For example, similar to excessive conceit, towards those who are superior, thinking oneself equal, etc., thinking oneself superior. 'I am superior' only thinks oneself superior to those who are equal, so it is incomplete. According to the Dharmaskandha, 'I am superior' arises based on three cases: towards those who are inferior, equal, and superior, all thinking oneself superior, so it is excessive. Question: The categories of 'I' and 'inferior' arise based on humility. Since there is no commonality at all, what is the difference from the other seven types of conceit? Answer: There is the first aspect of meaning. Question: Why is it said that what arises simultaneously with or after the view of self is considered a type of conceit? Is it not allowed that the seven types of conceit arise simultaneously with or after the view of self? Answer: It does not hinder the seven types of conceit from arising simultaneously with or after the view of self. It is just that the modes of operation are different. Directly thinking 'I' after it arises is conceit. Thinking 'I am superior,' etc., after conceit arises is a type of conceit. Or, without relying on 'I,' conceit can also arise, but types of conceit must rely on 'I.' Also, because of partiality and excessiveness, they are those seven types of conceit. It should also be said that they arise after the view of self.
起為慢。我所後起為類。計我有劣勝。劣勝屬我等。雖非即我所。行相似彼 西明云。九類三依三品生。三依上品生。三依中上生。我勝類中攝三種慢。謂於劣計勝。于等謂己勝。于勝謂己勝。如次慢．過慢．慢過慢。餘八慢類應如理思。我等慢類依中上生攝二慢。我劣但依上品生攝一慢。有勝慢類同此我劣。無劣亦同。有等類同我等。有劣．無勝．無等類此三亦同我勝 今謂似誤。標云三依三品生。復云有劣．無勝．無等亦同我勝。即四依三品生。何得言三。準應無勝同彼我等中上品生 又復我劣等三慢類依下品生。何得依上。計己劣故。故俱舍十九云。于多分勝謂己小劣。卑慢可成。有高處故。無劣我慢高處是何(此問)。謂于如是自所愛樂勝有情聚。及顧己身雖知極劣而自尊重(此答)。既云雖知極劣而自尊重。明非上品。
論。猶預為性者。本云即緣理事俱是疑也 西明云。依諦門釋名他世等。而無事疑說為染污。如疑杌為人皆事中疑。不隱沒無記異熟生攝 要集斷云。有釋為勝。此論下云。三見及疑。獨頭無明親迷諦故。五十八同。若有事疑。同見取等緣他見等。而論不說 今謂不爾。五十八云。謂於他世作用因果等。又前等四云。且疑他世為有為無。于彼有何欲．勝解相。依疑他世等。是事非理。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 生起我慢的原因是，認為自己與我相關聯。計較自己比別人差或比別人好。認為不如別人或勝過別人都與我有關。雖然這些慢不是直接的我，但行為上與我相似。西明法師說，九種慢依據三種情況產生：三種慢依據上品產生，三種慢依據中上品產生。認為自己勝過別人這類慢包含三種慢，即認為不如自己的人勝過自己，認為與自己相等的人勝過自己，認為勝過自己的人勝過自己。依次是慢、過慢、慢過慢。其餘八種慢應該如理思維。認為自己與別人相等這類慢依據中上品產生，包含兩種慢。認為自己不如別人只依據上品產生，包含一種慢。有勝過別人的慢與認為自己不如別人相同。沒有不如別人的慢也相同。有與自己相等的人的慢與認為自己與別人相等相同。有不如別人、沒有勝過別人、沒有與自己相等的人的慢，這三種慢也與認為自己勝過別人相同。現在我認為這裡似乎有錯誤。前面說三種慢依據三種情況產生，後面又說有不如別人、沒有勝過別人、沒有與自己相等的人的慢也與認為自己勝過別人相同。這就成了四種慢依據三種情況產生，怎麼能說是三種呢？應該認為沒有勝過別人的慢與認為自己與別人相等的情況相同，依據中上品產生。而且認為自己不如別人等三種慢依據下品產生，怎麼能依據上品呢？因為認為自己不如別人。所以《俱舍論》第十九卷說，在大部分人勝過自己的情況下，認為自己稍微不如別人，卑慢才能成立，因為有高處可以仰望。沒有不如別人的我慢，高處是什麼呢（這是提問）？是指對於自己所喜愛、勝過自己的有情眾生，以及顧及自身，即使知道自己非常差，也自我尊重（這是回答）。既然說即使知道自己非常差，也自我尊重，說明不是上品。 猶豫的性質是什麼呢？原本說就是對事和理都懷疑。西明法師說，依據諦門解釋名稱，如來世等，而沒有對事情的懷疑，說是染污。比如懷疑木樁是人，都是對事情的懷疑。不隱沒無記異熟生攝。要集斷說，有解釋為勝。此論下面說，三種見和懷疑，單獨的無明親自體悟真諦。五十八同。如果有對事情的懷疑，與見取等相同，緣于其他見解等，但論中沒有說。現在我認為不是這樣。《五十八》中說，就是對於來世、作用、因果等。又前面等四中說，姑且懷疑來世是有還是沒有。對於來世有什麼慾望、勝解的相狀呢？依據懷疑來世等，是不合道理的。
【English Translation】 English version: Arising from pride stems from the notion that something is related to 'me'. It involves comparing oneself, considering oneself inferior or superior. The belief of being inferior or superior is tied to 'me'. Although these forms of pride are not directly 'me', their behavior resembles 'me'. Master Ximing said that nine types of pride arise based on three conditions: three types of pride arise based on the superior level, and three types arise based on the medium-superior level. The category of pride that considers oneself superior includes three types of pride, namely, considering those inferior to oneself as superior, considering those equal to oneself as superior, and considering those superior to oneself as superior. These are, in order, pride (māna), excessive pride (atimāna), and pride beyond pride (mānātimāna). The remaining eight types of pride should be contemplated rationally. The category of pride that considers oneself equal to others arises based on the medium-superior level, encompassing two types of pride. Considering oneself inferior only arises based on the superior level, encompassing one type of pride. Having pride in surpassing others is the same as considering oneself inferior. Not having inferiority is also the same. Having equality with others is the same as considering oneself equal to others. Having inferiority, not surpassing others, and not having equality with others, these three are also the same as considering oneself superior. Now, I think there seems to be a mistake here. It was stated earlier that three types of pride arise based on three conditions, but later it says that having inferiority, not surpassing others, and not having equality with others are also the same as considering oneself superior. This would make four types of pride arising based on three conditions, how can it be said to be three? It should be considered that not surpassing others is the same as considering oneself equal to others, arising based on the medium-superior level. Moreover, the three types of pride, such as considering oneself inferior, arise based on the inferior level, how can they be based on the superior level? Because one considers oneself inferior. Therefore, the nineteenth volume of the Abhidharmakośa says that in situations where most people surpass oneself, considering oneself slightly inferior, humble pride can be established, because there is a high place to look up to. Without inferiority pride, what is the high place (this is a question)? It refers to the sentient beings one loves and who surpass oneself, and considering oneself, even knowing that one is extremely inferior, one still respects oneself (this is the answer). Since it says that even knowing that one is extremely inferior, one still respects oneself, it indicates that it is not the superior level. What is the nature of hesitation? Originally, it was said to be doubt about both things and principles. Master Ximing said that based on the Truth Gate, names are explained, such as the next life, etc., but without doubt about things, it is said to be defilement. For example, doubting a stake is a person is doubting things. It does not conceal the non-recollective, indeterminate, and resultant. Yao Ji Duan says that some explain it as superior. This treatise below says that the three views and doubt, the solitary ignorance personally realize the truth. Fifty-eight are the same. If there is doubt about things, it is the same as view-attachment, etc., relying on other views, etc., but the treatise does not say. Now, I think it is not like this. In Fifty-eight, it says that it is about the next life, function, cause and effect, etc. Also, in the previous four, it says that for the time being, doubt whether the next life exists or not. What desires and resolutions are there for the next life? Relying on doubt about the next life, etc., is unreasonable.
云迷理事。本疏不說疑杌為人亦煩惱疑。若以諦攝何法非諦。嗔余愛等迷別事生。亦應是理。瞋．愛所緣亦諦攝故。
疑惠為體。西明釋云。三因成之 要集云。準后師破有釋順文 今謂不爾。訓釋證中雲。末底．般若義無異故者。轉釋末底。不爾有疑毗助末底何得是惠。故轉解云。末底．般若義無別故。若將般若為第三因有何所以。
薩迦耶見諸釋云云 要集云。大乘移轉。意同世親。非謂有無不定或異二宗名為移轉。理已定故名不順故 今謂不爾。不得本意。疏云。今大乘意心上所現似我之相體非實有。是假法故。又體非全無。依他起性成所緣緣故。說非實有亦非虛偽。唯是依他移轉之法我之所依(此同攝論等)。又云。又依所執可言虛偽。依所變相可言為有。非如余宗定實定偽。故名為移轉 此意不云異二宗故名為移轉。但云是眾緣生移轉之法。不同有部實。非如經部假和合相。不以有無二宗不定名為移轉。
論。此見差別二十句等。西明云。分別行緣蘊。亦分別所起處者云。三藏二解。一云我所為所起處。計色為我等。皆依我所而得計我故。一云以我為所起處。以依我體有諸我所故。疏自斷云。今取初解。此明我我所見行相。不欲辨我我所 今謂難知。但我所見依我見生。我見不依我所見
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 云迷理事。本疏（指唯識述記）不說疑杌（猶豫不決）為人，也煩惱于疑。如果用諦（真理）來攝取，什麼法不是諦呢？嗔（嗔恨）、余愛（其他的愛）等從迷別的事物產生，也應該是這個道理。因為嗔、愛所緣的對象也被諦所攝取。
疑以智慧為體。西明（西明寺圓測法師）解釋說，由三種原因構成。要集（《瑜伽師地論要集》）說，按照後來的法師破斥有宗的說法來解釋順文。我認為不是這樣。訓釋證中說，末底（mati，智慧）和般若（prajna，智慧）的意義沒有區別。這是轉而解釋末底。如果不是這樣，有疑慮，毗助（不知道是什麼）末底，怎麼能是智慧呢？所以轉而解釋說，末底和般若的意義沒有區別。如果將般若作為第三個原因，有什麼道理呢？
薩迦耶見（Sakkāya-ditthi，身見）的各種解釋云云。要集說，大乘移轉。意思與世親（Vasubandhu）相同。不是說有無不定或者不同於二宗才叫做移轉。因為道理已經確定，所以說不順從。我認為不是這樣。沒有理解本意。疏（《成唯識論述記》）中說，現在大乘的意思是，心上所顯現的類似我的相，體性並非真實存在。是假法的緣故。又體性並非完全沒有，因為是依他起性，成就所緣緣的緣故。所以說非真實存在，也非虛偽，只是依他移轉之法，是我所依賴的（這與《攝大乘論》等相同）。又說，又依據所執著的，可以說虛偽。依據所變現的相，可以說是有。不像其他宗派那樣，確定是真實或者虛偽。所以叫做移轉。這個意思不是說因為不同於二宗才叫做移轉。只是說是眾緣生起的移轉之法。不同於有部（Sarvāstivāda）認為是真實的。不像經部（Sautrāntika）認為是假的和合相。不是以有無二宗不定才叫做移轉。
論（《成唯識論》）中說，這種見的差別有二十句等。西明說，分別行緣蘊（skandha，蘊），也分別所起之處。三藏（玄奘）有兩種解釋。一種說法是，我所（屬於我的）是所起之處。計色（rupa，色蘊）為我等，都是依據我所而產生計我的。一種說法是，以我為所起之處。因為依據我的本體，才有各種我所。疏（《成唯識論述記》）自己判斷說，現在採用第一種解釋。這說明我見和我所見的行相。不想辨別我與我所。我認為難以理解。但我所見依據我見產生。我見不依據我所見。
【English Translation】 English version Clouds obscure the principles. This commentary (referring to the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-ṭīkā) does not say that doubt and hesitation are human, nor is it troubled by doubt. If we encompass with truth (諦, satya), what dharma is not truth? Anger (嗔, krodha), other loves (余愛, other forms of attachment), etc., arise from confused and distinct things; this should also be the principle, because the objects of anger and love are also encompassed by truth.
Doubt has wisdom as its essence. Ximing (Venerable Yuan Ce of Ximing Temple) explains that it is composed of three causes. Yaoji (Essentials of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra) says, according to the later masters' refutation of the Sarvāstivāda school, interpret it according to the text. I say it is not so. The explanation in the 'Explanation and Proof' says that mati (末底, wisdom) and prajna (般若, prajñā, wisdom) have no difference in meaning. This is a re-explanation of mati. If it were not so, there would be doubt; how could vibhuti (毗助, unknown meaning) mati be wisdom? Therefore, it is re-explained that mati and prajna have no difference in meaning. If prajna is taken as the third cause, what is the reason?
Various explanations of Sakkāya-ditthi (薩迦耶見, view of self). Yaoji says, Mahayana shifts. The meaning is the same as Vasubandhu's. It is not that being uncertain about existence or non-existence, or being different from the two schools, is called shifting. Because the principle is already determined, it is said to be not in accordance. I say it is not so. The original meaning is not understood. The commentary (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-ṭīkā) says, now the meaning of Mahayana is that the appearance of something like 'I' manifested in the mind is not truly existent in nature. It is because it is a false dharma. Moreover, its nature is not completely non-existent, because it is of dependent origination, accomplishing the object-condition. Therefore, it is said to be neither truly existent nor false, but only a dharma of dependent origination, which is what 'I' relies on (this is the same as the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, etc.). It also says, moreover, according to what is clung to, it can be said to be false. According to the transformed appearance, it can be said to be existent. It is not like other schools that determine it to be truly existent or false. Therefore, it is called shifting. This meaning does not say that it is called shifting because it is different from the two schools. It only says that it is a dharma of dependent origination. It is different from the Sarvāstivāda school, which considers it to be real. It is not like the Sautrāntika school, which considers it to be a false aggregate. It is not called shifting because of the uncertainty of the two schools of existence and non-existence.
The treatise (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra) says that the differences in this view are twenty sentences, etc. Ximing says, distinguishing the skandhas (蘊, aggregates) of action and conditions, and also distinguishing the place where they arise. The Tripiṭaka (玄奘, Xuanzang) has two explanations. One explanation is that 'what belongs to me' (我所, what pertains to the self) is the place where they arise. Considering rupa (色, form) as 'I', etc., all rely on 'what belongs to me' to generate the conception of 'I'. One explanation is that 'I' is the place where they arise. Because based on the essence of 'I', there are various 'what belongs to me'. The commentary (Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-ṭīkā) itself judges that it now adopts the first explanation. This explains the characteristics of the view of 'I' and 'what belongs to me'. It does not intend to distinguish between 'I' and 'what belongs to me'. I think it is difficult to understand. But the view of 'what belongs to me' arises based on the view of 'I'. The view of 'I' does not rely on the view of 'what belongs to me'.
起。又執色等為我之時不計為所。何得說云皆依我所。而得計我故。
問此二十句為一人起。為多人起 答據一切說。若計色我則非余故。余但我所 問何因一一計為三所 答雜集第一云。相應我所故。隨轉我所故。不離我所故。相應所者。謂我有色。乃至有識。由我與彼相應說有彼故。此由我俱說為相應。隨轉所者。若彼由此自在力轉。或舍或役。此由屬於我隨我轉故。不離所者。謂我在中遍體隨行。此由我在中不離彼故。余皆準知。
六十二見。瑜伽第六．顯揚論第九破常論中。明四遍常四分初二。有想無想但非中我有色想等有苦受等有邊二解。瑜伽第七．顯揚第十明五現涅槃．邊無邊憍亂．二無因七斷。瑜伽第五有憤恚忘念不說分常。五十八中有遍常等名而無別解。然有諸惑迷諦親疏。八十七具有名。婆沙第一百九十九。初明五現涅槃。次四遍分常二無因有邊等無死四。第二百有想等十六。無想俱非。各八並七斷滅。婆娑 問六十二見由何因起 答如本章說。有二因起。一佛說所因。二見起所因。又瑜伽八十七云。諸惡見趣由六因緣而得建立。一由因緣故。二由依教故。三依靜慮故。四依世故。五依諸見故。六由生處故。因緣即是薩迦耶見。教即外道師弟相授靜慮即是宿住．天眼。世即依過．及現
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：又執著色等為『我』的時候，不認為是『我所』。為什麼說都依『我所』，而因此執著于『我』呢？ 答：這二十句是針對一個人說的，還是針對多個人說的？答：根據一切情況來說。如果執著色為『我』，那麼就不是其他人的，其他人只是『我所』。問：為什麼一一執著為三種『所』呢？答：《雜集論》第一卷說：『相應我所』，『隨轉我所』，『不離我所』。『相應所』是指：『我有色』，乃至『我有識』。因為『我』與它們相應，所以說有它們。這是因為『我』與它們共同存在，所以說是相應。『隨轉所』是指：如果它們因為『我』的自在力而轉變，或者被捨棄，或者被役使。這是因為它們屬於『我』，跟隨『我』而轉變。『不離所』是指：『我』在其中，遍及全體，隨之而行。這是因為『我』在其中，不離開它們。其餘的都可以類推得知。 六十二見（Sixty-two Views）。《瑜伽師地論》第六卷、《顯揚聖教論》第九卷破常論中，闡明四遍常（Four kinds of eternally existing self）的四種分類，最初兩種：有想（with perception）、無想（without perception），但並非中我有色想等，有苦受等，有邊二解。《瑜伽師地論》第七卷、《顯揚聖教論》第十卷闡明五現涅槃（Five kinds of Nirvana in the present life）、邊無邊憍亂（finite or infinite）、二無因（two without cause）、七斷（seven annihilation views）。《瑜伽師地論》第五卷有憤恚忘念不說分常（anger, resentment, forgetfulness, non-speaking, division, permanence）。五十八見（Fifty-eight Views）中有遍常等名稱，但沒有特別的解釋。然而有各種迷惑真諦的親疏關係。八十七見（Eighty-seven Views）具有名稱。《大毗婆沙論》第一百九十九卷，首先闡明五現涅槃，其次是四遍分常（four divisions of eternally existing self），二無因（two without cause），有邊等無死四（finite etc., four without death）。第二百卷，有想等十六（sixteen with perception etc.），無想俱非（neither with nor without perception）各有八種，加上七斷滅（seven annihilation views）。《大毗婆沙論》問：六十二見由什麼原因產生？答：如本章所說，有兩種原因產生：一是佛說所因，二是見起所因。又《瑜伽師地論》第八十七卷說：各種惡見趣由六種因緣而得以建立：一是由因緣故，二是由依教故，三是依靜慮故，四是依世故，五是依諸見故，六是由生處故。因緣就是薩迦耶見（Satkayadristi, view of the existence of self）。教就是外道師弟相授，靜慮就是宿住（knowledge of former abodes）、天眼（divine eye）。世就是依過（reliance on the past）及現（present）。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Furthermore, when clinging to form, etc., as 'I', one does not consider them as 'mine'. Why is it said that all depend on 'mine', and thus one clings to 'I'? Answer: Are these twenty sentences directed at one person or multiple people? Answer: According to all circumstances. If one clings to form as 'I', then it is not someone else's; others are merely 'mine'. Question: Why cling to each one as three kinds of 'mine'? Answer: The first volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'Corresponding mine', 'transforming mine', 'inseparable mine'. 'Corresponding mine' refers to: 'I have form', and even 'I have consciousness'. Because 'I' corresponds with them, it is said that there are they. This is because 'I' exists together with them, so it is said to be corresponding. 'Transforming mine' refers to: if they are transformed by 'my' power of self-mastery, or are abandoned, or are enslaved. This is because they belong to 'me' and transform following 'me'. 'Inseparable mine' refers to: 'I' am within them, pervading the whole, following them. This is because 'I' am within them, not separated from them. The rest can be inferred accordingly. The Sixty-two Views (Sixty-two Views). The sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the ninth volume of the Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma in the section on refuting permanence, clarify the four categories of the Four kinds of eternally existing self (Four kinds of eternally existing self), the first two: with perception (with perception), without perception (without perception), but not the idea of form etc. in the middle self, having suffering etc., two interpretations of having boundaries. The seventh volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the tenth volume of the Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma clarify the Five kinds of Nirvana in the present life (Five kinds of Nirvana in the present life), confusion about finite or infinite (finite or infinite), two without cause (two without cause), seven annihilation views (seven annihilation views). The fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra has anger, resentment, forgetfulness, non-speaking, division, permanence (anger, resentment, forgetfulness, non-speaking, division, permanence). Among the Fifty-eight Views (Fifty-eight Views) there are names such as eternally existing self, but there is no special explanation. However, there are various degrees of closeness and distance in confusing the truth. The Eighty-seven Views (Eighty-seven Views) have names. The 199th volume of the Mahavibhasa, first clarifies the Five kinds of Nirvana in the present life, then the four divisions of eternally existing self (four divisions of eternally existing self), two without cause (two without cause), finite etc., four without death (finite etc., four without death). The 200th volume has sixteen with perception etc. (sixteen with perception etc.), neither with nor without perception (neither with nor without perception), each with eight kinds, plus seven annihilation views (seven annihilation views). Mahavibhasa Question: What causes the Sixty-two Views to arise? Answer: As this chapter says, there are two causes: one is the cause spoken by the Buddha, and the other is the cause of the arising of views. Furthermore, the 87th volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: Various evil views arise from six causes: one is due to causes and conditions, two is due to reliance on teachings, three is due to reliance on meditative concentration, four is due to reliance on the world, five is due to reliance on various views, and six is due to the place of birth. Causes and conditions are the view of the existence of self (Satkayadristi, view of the existence of self). Teachings are the transmission from teacher to disciple in external paths, meditative concentration is knowledge of former abodes (knowledge of former abodes) and divine eye (divine eye). The world is reliance on the past (reliance on the past) and the present (present).
．未來計前後際。見即我見。生即生處。一親依薩迦耶見起邊見。以執我為斷常者是邊見故。疏依起邪見。以其邪見不要執我方起邪見。然初因力依教緣力是通因。依靜慮下是別起因。依靜慮起四遍常見。四分常見。四有邊等二無因見。四不死論。論皆說依靜慮起故。依世因者。更非別起。約前後際分。依見生二十四。謂我有色等四有邊等四生有想無想俱非。依生起八。謂我有一相等四。我有樂等四。文中不說七斷五現。義準七斷依世及見。五現初一依邪見起。余之四現依靜慮生。得現法樂後方起此見故。然無因中但說依定。不說依于尋思起者。義準亦依世及邪見 問此諸見起。為皆具六因緣方起。為有不具 答通明見起不過六因。非一一見皆具此六。如依尋思不死憍亂。未必依定後方起故 問六十二見攝見盡不。答不盡。如十四不可記。亦有斷常及俱生等。皆不攝故 問若爾何故但六十二 答隨增說故。如不相應及隨或等。實非攝盡 問準婆沙一百九十九。四有邊等計我世間俱是有邊。何非邊見 答不計斷常故非邊見 問何非我見 答依彼宗計。有邊常見。無邊斷見。若俱句者一分斷常。非有無邊者唯薩迦邪見。依大乘說。依我見後計有邊等故。有邊等見不是我見 或可。大乘與彼有別。瑜伽．顯揚皆不說我但執世
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 未來追溯過去，見解即是我見（Sakkāya-ditthi，身見，認為五蘊和合的身體中存在真實的『我』）。產生即是產生之處。最初依靠薩迦耶見（Sakkāya-ditthi）產生邊見（Antagāhika-ditthi，執斷常二邊的邪見），因為執著『我』為斷滅或常存的便是邊見。進一步依靠則產生邪見（Micchā-ditthi，否認因果的見解），因為只有在邪見不執著于『我』時，才會產生邪見。然而，最初的因力，依靠教法的因緣力，是普遍的因。依靠禪定之下是特別產生的因。依靠禪定產生四種常見（認為世界和『我』都是常存的），四種部分常見（認為世界的一部分是常存的），四種有邊等見，兩種無因見（認為事物沒有原因），四種不死論（認為死後有不滅的存在）。這些論述都說依靠禪定而產生。依靠世間的原因，則不是特別產生。大約從前後際來分。依靠見解產生二十四種，即『我有色』等四種，『有邊』等四種，『生有想』、『生無想』、『生非想非非想』。依靠產生八種，即『我有一相』等四種，『我有樂』等四種。文中沒有說七斷滅見和五現法涅槃見。根據意義推斷，七斷滅見依靠世間和見解而產生。五現法涅槃見中，最初一種依靠邪見產生，其餘四種依靠禪定而生，因為獲得現世的快樂后才產生這種見解。然而，在無因見中，只說依靠禪定，沒有說依靠尋思而產生，根據意義推斷，也依靠世間和邪見。 問：這些見解的產生，是都具備六種因緣才產生，還是有不具備的？答：總的來說，見解的產生不超過六種因，但不是每一種見解都具備這六種。例如，依靠尋思、不死論、憍亂等，未必依靠禪定之後才產生。 問：六十二見（六十二種邪見）能包含所有的見解嗎？答：不能包含。例如十四不可記（十四種不可回答的問題），也有斷見、常見以及俱生等見，都沒有包含在內。 問：如果這樣，為什麼只有六十二見？答：隨順增上來說的緣故。例如不相應行法以及隨煩惱等，實際上並沒有完全包含。 問：按照《婆沙論》一百九十九種見解，四有邊等見認為『我』和世間都是有邊的，為什麼不是邊見？答：因為不執著斷滅和常存，所以不是邊見。 問：為什麼不是我見？答：按照他們的宗派來說，有邊是常見，無邊是斷見。如果俱時說，一部分是斷見，一部分是常見。沒有無邊見，只有薩迦耶見（Sakkāya-ditthi）和邪見（Micchā-ditthi）。按照大乘的說法，依靠我見（Atta-ditthi，認為有一個真實的『我』）之後才認為有邊等見，所以有邊等見不是我見。 或者可以這樣理解，大乘和小乘對此有區別。《瑜伽師地論》和《顯揚聖教論》都沒有說『我』，只是執著於世間。
【English Translation】 English version Tracing back to the future and past, views are identical to Sakkāya-ditthi (self-view, the belief that a real 'self' exists within the aggregation of the five skandhas). Arising is the place of arising. Initially, clinging to Sakkāya-ditthi gives rise to Antagāhika-ditthi (views of eternalism or annihilationism), because clinging to 'self' as either annihilated or permanent is Antagāhika-ditthi. Further reliance leads to Micchā-ditthi (wrong view, denying causality), because only when wrong view does not cling to 'self' does wrong view arise. However, the initial causal force, relying on the causal force of teachings, is a universal cause. Relying on meditation below is a specifically arising cause. Relying on meditation gives rise to four kinds of eternalist views (believing the world and 'self' are permanent), four kinds of partial eternalist views (believing part of the world is permanent), four kinds of views of finitude, two kinds of causeless views (believing things have no cause), and four kinds of evasive answers about the afterlife. These discourses all say they arise from meditation. Relying on worldly causes is not a special arising. Roughly dividing from the perspective of past and future, relying on views gives rise to twenty-four kinds, namely the four kinds of 'I have form' etc., the four kinds of 'finite' etc., 'born with perception', 'born without perception', 'born neither with nor without perception'. Relying on arising gives rise to eight kinds, namely the four kinds of 'I have one aspect' etc., the four kinds of 'I have pleasure' etc. The text does not mention the seven annihilationist views and the five views of present-life Nibbana. Inferring from the meaning, the seven annihilationist views arise from reliance on the world and views. Among the five views of present-life Nibbana, the first arises from wrong view, and the remaining four arise from meditation, because this view arises after obtaining present-life pleasure. However, in causeless views, it only says relying on meditation, not relying on thinking, inferring from the meaning, also relying on the world and wrong view. Question: Do these views arise only when all six causes and conditions are present, or are there cases where they are not all present? Answer: Generally speaking, the arising of views does not exceed six causes, but not every view has all six. For example, relying on thinking, evasive answers about the afterlife, arrogance, etc., does not necessarily arise after meditation. Question: Can the sixty-two views (sixty-two kinds of wrong views) encompass all views? Answer: They cannot. For example, the fourteen unanswerable questions also include views of annihilation, permanence, and co-arising, which are not included. Question: If so, why are there only sixty-two views? Answer: Because they are spoken of according to increase. For example, non-associated formations and secondary defilements are not completely included. Question: According to the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra's one hundred and ninety-nine views, the four views of finitude etc. believe that 'self' and the world are finite. Why are they not views of extremes? Answer: Because they do not cling to annihilation or permanence, they are not views of extremes. Question: Why are they not self-views? Answer: According to their school, finitude is eternalism, and infinitude is annihilationism. If spoken of simultaneously, part is annihilationism and part is eternalism. There is no view of infinitude, only Sakkāya-ditthi and Micchā-ditthi. According to Mahayana, relying on Atta-ditthi (the belief in a real 'self') leads to the belief in views of finitude etc., so views of finitude etc. are not self-views. Or it can be understood this way, Mahayana and Hinayana have differences on this. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and the * * * do not speak of 'self', but only cling to the world.
界故邪見收。婆沙三說第一說中。初二天眼通。第三兼神境。第四遮前。第二說中據彼自世界傍布上下。更無別三千界。但依天眼。彼云見豎有邊。見傍無邊。第三說中。但據我體有邊無邊。由有執我卷舒不定。故知宗別。不須和會。
問四遍常見何地界系。何地界起 答有二解。一云色界。通四靜慮。瑜伽第六說依下中上靜慮。起宿住隨念。或依天眼計現在世。準此雖不在定。得定後起故在上地。一云雖定後起。是分別見世道不伏。起下無失。然非未得定。然起之者通欲．色界 又解唯欲。論云謂如有一若沙門。若婆羅門。起如是見立如是論。沙門婆羅門唯在欲人。又瑜伽第七明四有邊中明。沙門婆羅門依止靜慮起如是見。乃至云當知此中以說因緣及能計者故。不得通上 然前說勝。言彼起者據多分說。
四分常中初二系地及能起者。如遍常說。忿恚．妄念所起之見。可通上下。能起唯欲。以生人中起宿住後起此見故。又遍分常一唯起一。依上中下宿住別故。因天眼后故。
有想十六中。有想及受或一人起。何以得知。準論破云。所執之我由想所作及受所作。為有變易。為無變易。乃至云。若言無者。有一想已后種種想小無量想。不應道理。又純有樂已后純有苦等。不應道理 準此所破。若一唯
起一。破成相符。不許更有餘想．受故。邊見之中有邊四句。一唯起一。何以得知。論云爲對治此故。即由異句異文而起執者。彼許我非色非非色。第二釋中亦云。對治此故但由文異不由義異。而起執者彼計非有邊非無邊 系地及起隨所計法有無處說。或能起者唯在於欲。
問邪見之中有邊等四系何界能起何 答如四遍常說。
不死憍亂通色．欲系。通二地起。梵于釋子行諂亂故。或系能起皆唯欲界。梵于釋子但是行諂不是邪見。
二無因論通計色．欲二界能起。何以故。依止靜慮及依尋思皆得起故。然依尋思起唯在於欲界。
問七斷滅何界系何地起 答隨計七斷即彼地繫起。下不見上故 問若爾何故破諸外道。復云由教理起如是見耶 答據能計者破諸外道。若所起之見及能起見即隨彼地 又解見及起者唯在欲界。由諸外道依教及理起如是見。據此破故。此答章中第一問也 又解六十二見俱欲界起。系隨所應大小諸論皆說在此 若爾邊見上二界中皆不起耶 答泛計斷常上二界起。非六十二。
問何故遍常憶二十．四十．八十劫不增減耶 答依世靜慮三品差別法爾力故 何無計生。
答壞即攝滅。成即攝生。然外道計但是隱顯 何無捷智 答宗說別故 問一分常中何無計色二定已
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 起一：破除對『成』（bhava，存在）的執著，要符合實相，不允許有額外的臆想。接受這個觀點，在『邊見』（antagrahadrishti，極端見解）中，有關於『邊』的四種說法。『唯起一』（ekabhavika，一生補處），如何得知？論中說，這是爲了對治那些因為不同語句和不同文字而產生執著的人。他們允許我說『非色』（arupa，無色）和『非非色』。第二種解釋中也說，爲了對治那些僅僅因為文字不同，而不是意義不同而產生執著的人，他們認為『非有邊』（antavanta，有邊）和『非無邊』（anantavanta，無邊）。 繫縛于『地』（bhumi，地）以及隨其所執著的法，在『有』（asti，存在）或『無』（nasti，不存在）之處宣說。或者，能夠生起這些見解的，僅僅存在於『欲界』（kamadhatu，慾望界）。 問：在『邪見』（mithyadrishti，錯誤見解）中，關於『邊』等的四種系縛，在哪個界（dhatu，界）能夠生起？在哪個地（bhumi，地）能夠生起？答：如同四種『遍常』（nitya，常）的說法。 『不死憍亂』（amaramara-vikshepa，不死者的擾亂）通於『色界』（rupadhatu，色界）和『欲界』。通於兩個地生起。因為『梵』（brahma，梵天）對『釋子』（shakya-putra，釋迦之子，即佛教徒）施行諂媚和擾亂。或者，這些繫縛能夠生起的，都僅僅在欲界。梵天對釋子只是施行諂媚，而不是邪見。 『二無因論』（ahetuka-vada，無因論）普遍認為在色界和欲界都能生起。為什麼呢？因為依止『靜慮』（dhyana，禪定）以及依止『尋思』（vitarka，尋思）都能生起。然而，依止尋思而生起的，僅僅存在於欲界。 問：七種『斷滅見』（uccheda-vada，斷滅論）在哪個界繫縛？在哪個地生起？答：隨其所執著的七種斷滅見，就在那個地繫縛和生起。因為下層不能見到上層。問：如果這樣，為什麼還要破斥各種外道（tirthika，外道）？又說由教義和道理而生起這樣的見解呢？答：這是根據能夠進行計度的人來破斥各種外道。如果所生起的見解以及能夠生起見解的，就隨其所在的地。又解釋說，見解和生起見解的人，僅僅在欲界。因為各種外道依止教義和道理而生起這樣的見解，根據這個來破斥他們。這是對本章中第一個問題的回答。又解釋說，六十二見（drishti，見）都在欲界生起。繫縛隨其所應，大小各種論典都這樣說。如果這樣，那麼邊見在上二界中都不生起嗎？答：普遍計度斷常的見解，在上二界中生起，但不是六十二見。 問：為什麼普遍認為常的憶念是二十、四十、八十劫（kalpa，劫），不會增加或減少呢？答：這是依止世間靜慮的三種品類的差別，是法爾（dharma-ta，法性）的力量所致。為什麼沒有計度生？ 答：『壞』（destruction）即是攝滅，『成』（formation）即是攝生。然而外道認為這只是隱沒和顯現。為什麼沒有捷智（quick wisdom）？答：因為宗派和說法不同。問：在『一分常』（ekanta-nitya，一部分常）中，為什麼沒有計度色界二禪（dhyana，禪定）？
【English Translation】 English version: Beginning with One: Break through the attachment to 'becoming' (bhava, existence), conforming to reality, and not allowing any additional speculation. Accepting this view, within 'views of extremes' (antagrahadrishti, extreme views), there are four statements about 'extremes'. 'Only arising once' (ekabhavika, destined to one more rebirth), how is this known? The treatise says it is to counteract those who develop attachments due to different sentences and different words. They allow me to say 'non-form' (arupa, formless) and 'non-non-form'. The second explanation also says that to counteract those who develop attachments merely because of different words, not different meanings, they consider 'finite' (antavanta, having an end) and 'infinite' (anantavanta, without end). Bound to the 'ground' (bhumi, level) and according to the dharma they are attached to, speaking of 'existence' (asti, being) or 'non-existence' (nasti, non-being). Or, those who can give rise to these views exist only in the 'desire realm' (kamadhatu, realm of desire). Question: Within 'wrong views' (mithyadrishti, false views), in which realm (dhatu, realm) can the four bondages concerning 'extremes' and so on arise? In which ground (bhumi, level) can they arise? Answer: As with the four kinds of 'eternal' (nitya, permanent) statements. 'Distraction due to the pride of immortality' (amaramara-vikshepa, the disturbance of those who believe in immortality) is common to the 'form realm' (rupadhatu, realm of form) and the desire realm. It arises in two levels. Because 'Brahma' (brahma, the god Brahma) practices flattery and disturbance towards the 'sons of Shakya' (shakya-putra, sons of Shakya, i.e., Buddhists). Or, these bondages that can arise are only in the desire realm. Brahma only practices flattery towards the sons of Shakya, not wrong views. 'Two without cause theories' (ahetuka-vada, causelessness) generally believe that they can arise in both the form realm and the desire realm. Why? Because relying on 'meditative concentration' (dhyana, meditation) and relying on 'thinking' (vitarka, thought) can both give rise to them. However, what arises relying on thinking exists only in the desire realm. Question: In which realm are the seven kinds of 'annihilationism' (uccheda-vada, annihilationism) bound? On which ground do they arise? Answer: According to the seven kinds of annihilationism they are attached to, they are bound and arise on that ground. Because the lower cannot see the upper. Question: If so, why refute the various non-Buddhist schools (tirthika, non-Buddhist)? And say that such views arise from doctrine and reason? Answer: This is to refute the various non-Buddhist schools based on those who can make calculations. If the views that arise and those who can give rise to views, then they follow the ground where they are. It is also explained that views and those who give rise to views are only in the desire realm. Because various non-Buddhists rely on doctrine and reason to give rise to such views, and based on this, they are refuted. This is the answer to the first question in this chapter. It is also explained that the sixty-two views (drishti, views) all arise in the desire realm. The bondages are as appropriate, and all the large and small treatises say so. If so, then do views of extremes not arise in the upper two realms? Answer: The views that universally calculate permanence and impermanence arise in the upper two realms, but they are not the sixty-two views. Question: Why is it generally believed that the memory of permanence is twenty, forty, or eighty kalpas (kalpa, eon), and it does not increase or decrease? Answer: This is due to the difference in the three categories of worldly meditative concentration, and it is due to the power of dharma-ta (dharma-ta, the nature of dharma). Why is there no calculation of birth? Answer: 'Destruction' is the absorption of cessation, and 'formation' is the absorption of birth. However, non-Buddhists believe that this is only concealment and manifestation. Why is there no quick wisdom? Answer: Because the sect and the teachings are different. Question: In 'partial permanence' (ekanta-nitya, partial permanence), why is there no calculation of the second dhyana (dhyana, meditation) of the form realm?
上沒生此耶 答上無尋詞故。無王臣故。無諂誑故。由誑故言我是常能生汝等。由諂故計王為文常能生故 問欲界何故不計地居及於仙趣一分常耶 答地居二天境非勝故。仙無別趣境亦非勝 準何得知。憤恚妄念在空居天 答本疏已引文。又出曜論念品中說。昔佛在時有空界天。名歡樂過。猶極歡樂從彼沒故來生此間。從喜噬天。文亦同此。既言空界天。明非地居 問何故遍分兼常見立以常見名。有想等論亦是常見。不標常見名。立有想等稱 答遍分常中生處無別。又彼在初故標常名。有想等見生處有殊。覆在后故立有想等名。又若名常相濫不便。
問何不計餘地惡道為斷滅耶 答在惡趣中無分別見。現生人趣不可計彼死後斷滅。除惡趣外余皆有計。
問何以無因唯在無想 答在無想天久無心故。余天有心知前生因。雖生下已亦不能憶前生彼因。由勢分力不計無因。無色歿來無宿住通。不知從彼歿。不于無色後計為無因。泛無因計亦通余答。如尋思起者。
問何故無色根本近分及靜慮近分。不計為現涅槃耶 等近分欣求未安住故。第四靜慮離諸過患身心俱安。執為涅槃。無色心安。無身安故。不執為現涅槃。無色根本計後生彼亦為涅槃。不執為現。
問何故人六慾天為一涅槃。斷滅開耶 答
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本", "問：在你（指常見外道所認為的『常』）產生之前，是什麼樣的？", "答：在那之前沒有尋伺（尋思和伺察，指粗細的心理活動），沒有國王和大臣，沒有諂媚和欺騙。因為欺騙，所以說『我是常，能夠產生你們』。因為諂媚，所以認為國王是永恒的，能夠產生萬物。", "問：為什麼欲界不認為地居天和仙趣的一部分是常呢？", "答：因為地居天的兩個天境並不殊勝，仙人沒有特別的境界，也不殊勝。", "問：根據什麼得知，憤恨和妄念存在於空居天？", "答：本疏已經引用了經文。而且《出曜經》的念品中說，過去佛在世的時候，有空界天，名叫歡樂過，因為極度歡樂而從那裡死去，來到這裡（人間）投生。從喜噬天，經文也與此相同。既然說是空界天，就明顯不是地居天。", "問：為什麼普遍地將兼有常見的見解，用『常見』來命名？有想等論也是常見，卻不標明『常見』之名，而立『有想』等名稱？", "答：在普遍的『常』中，產生之處沒有區別。而且它在最初，所以標明『常』名。有想等見，產生之處有差別，而且在『常』之後，所以立『有想』等名。而且如果命名為『常』，容易互相混淆，不方便。", "問：為什麼不認為其餘地獄惡道是斷滅見呢？", "答：在惡趣中沒有分別見。現在生在人趣，不能認為他們死後是斷滅。除了惡趣之外，其餘都有這種計度。", "問：為什麼無因見只存在於無想天？", "答：因為在無想天很久沒有心識活動。其餘天有心識，知道前生的因。即使投生到地獄，也不能回憶起前生在無想天的因。由於勢力微弱，所以不認為是無因。從無色界死去的人沒有宿住神通，不知道自己從那裡死去，所以不在無色界之後認為是無因。泛泛地認為無因，也可以用其他的答案來解釋，比如尋伺的生起。", "問：為什麼無色界的根本定、近分定以及靜慮的近分定，不認為是現世涅槃呢？", "答：因為近分定還在欣求，沒有安住。第四靜慮遠離各種過患，身心都安穩，所以執著為涅槃。無色界心安穩，但是沒有身體的安穩，所以不執著為現世涅槃。無色界的根本定認為死後生到那裡也是涅槃，但不執著為現世涅槃。", "問：為什麼人道和六慾天被認為是一個涅槃或斷滅的開端？", "english_translations": [ "English version", "Question: Before 'this' (referring to the 'eternal' entity as perceived by common heretics) came into being, what was it like?", "Answer: Before that, there was no seeking (vitarka and vicara, referring to coarse and subtle mental activities), no king and ministers, no flattery and deceit. Because of deceit, they say, 'I am eternal and can produce you.' Because of flattery, they consider the king to be eternal and capable of producing all things.", "Question: Why doesn't the Desire Realm consider the earth-dwelling heavens and a portion of the celestial realms to be eternal?", "Answer: Because the two realms of the earth-dwelling heavens are not superior, and the celestial beings do not have a special realm, nor are they superior.", "Question: According to what is it known that resentment and delusional thoughts exist in the heavens of the sky realm?", "Answer: The original commentary has already quoted the scripture. Moreover, the 'Mindfulness' chapter of the Chu Yao Jing says that in the past, when the Buddha was in the world, there was a heaven in the sky realm called 'Excessive Joy,' who died from extreme joy and was reborn here (in the human realm). The scripture 'From Joy Devouring Heaven' is the same as this. Since it is said to be a heaven in the sky realm, it is clearly not an earth-dwelling heaven.", "Question: Why is the view that combines the concept of permanence universally named 'eternal view'? The doctrines of 'with thought' and others are also eternal views, but they are not labeled with the name 'eternal view,' but rather with names like 'with thought'?", "Answer: Within the universal 'eternal,' there is no difference in the place of origin. Moreover, it is at the beginning, so it is labeled with the name 'eternal.' The views of 'with thought' and others have differences in the place of origin, and they are after 'eternal,' so they are given names like 'with thought.' Also, if it were named 'eternal,' it would be easy to confuse with each other, which would be inconvenient.", "Question: Why are the remaining evil paths of hell not considered annihilation views?", "Answer: There are no discriminating views in the evil realms. Those who are currently born in the human realm cannot be considered annihilated after death. Except for the evil realms, all others have this kind of speculation.", "Question: Why does the view of no cause only exist in the Heaven of Non-Perception (Asamjnasattva)?", "Answer: Because there has been no mental activity in the Heaven of Non-Perception for a long time. The other heavens have consciousness and know the cause of their previous lives. Even if they are reborn in a lower realm, they cannot recall the cause of their previous lives in the Heaven of Non-Perception. Due to the weakness of their power, they are not considered to be without cause. Those who die from the Formless Realm do not have the power of remembering past lives and do not know that they died from there, so they are not considered to be without cause after the Formless Realm. The general view of no cause can also be explained by other answers, such as the arising of seeking.", "Question: Why are the fundamental concentration and the proximate concentration of the Formless Realm, as well as the proximate concentration of the meditative concentrations, not considered to be Nirvana in the present life?", "Answer: Because the proximate concentration is still seeking and has not settled down. The Fourth Dhyana is free from all faults, and both body and mind are stable, so it is clung to as Nirvana. The mind in the Formless Realm is stable, but there is no stability of the body, so it is not clung to as Nirvana in the present life. The fundamental concentration of the Formless Realm considers that being born there after death is also Nirvana, but it is not clung to as Nirvana in the present life.", "Question: Why are the human realm and the six desire heavens considered to be the beginning of one Nirvana or annihilation?" ] }
同住欲塵樂故為一涅槃。粗細趣別七斷別開。
問何故色合為一。無色為四斷滅 答色相易知故合為一。無色難了故開為四 問此等諸見幾于即蘊我見後起。幾於離蘊我後起 答準論云。命者即身。計我有邊。命者異身。計我無邊等。準此有想八論。八無想俱非。言有色有邊是即蘊。言無色無邊是離蘊。俱句是即離。有想餘八皆是即蘊 又解無色亦即蘊我。但執非色即受．想等故亦即蘊。有邊等四是離蘊。以大論第六云執我隨身其量不定。俱通即．離。言少色等者。且據即蘊說。理實通二。準有我有色即執色為我。既言我一想等。應即執彼為我。四遍常中舉伊師迦。即僧佉類。應離蘊我。七斷滅者應即蘊我。勝．數離蘊皆計常故。分常不定 問何故不說見．戒及我所見並余邪見。為六十二中見數耶 答我不多爭。計常斷等有多爭故。過增多起。邪見之中。亦據過增多起者說。見．戒二取。依于彼執非根本故 問何故但立前後二際。不立現在為中際見耶 答如現涅槃是計現在。未來前故。過去後故。故不別立。以前釋難。或有論文。或無文者。粗說如此。后更尋文。
論。如是總別十煩惱中。本說若總若別但有十種。如貪．嗔等。各有總別差別行相。若是迷諦及自行相。不過總別。又要集斷未詳為勝。然猶
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『同住欲塵樂』因此被視為一種涅槃（Nirvana，解脫）。根據粗細和趨向的不同，七種斷滅見被分別闡述。
問：為什麼色蘊（Rupa-skandha，物質之蘊）被合為一類，而無色蘊（Arupa-skandha，非物質之蘊）卻被分為四類斷滅見？ 答：因為色蘊的相狀容易理解，所以合為一類；而無色蘊難以完全瞭解，所以分為四類。 問：這些見解中，哪些是在『即蘊我見』（認為『我』等同於五蘊）之後產生的，哪些是在『離蘊我見』（認為『我』獨立於五蘊）之後產生的？ 答：根據論典的說法，『命者即身』，就認為『我』有邊際；『命者異身』，就認為『我』沒有邊際等等。依照這個標準，有想的八種論點和八種無想的論點都不屬於這兩者。說『有色有邊』是『即蘊』，說『無色無邊』是『離蘊』。同時包含兩者的說法是『即離』。有想的其餘八種都屬於『即蘊』。另一種解釋是，無色也屬於『即蘊我』，只是執著于非色，即受、想等等，所以也屬於『即蘊』。有邊等等四種是『離蘊』。因為《大論》第六卷說，執著于『我』隨著身體，其量不定，這同時適用於『即』和『離』。說到『少色』等等，只是根據『即蘊』來說，實際上兩者都包括。如果認為『我有色』，就是執著於色為『我』。既然說『我一想等』，就應該執著于那些為『我』。四種遍常中提到的伊師迦（Isika），屬於僧佉派（Samkhya），應該屬於『離蘊我』。七種斷滅見應該屬於『即蘊我』。勝論派（Vaisesika）和數論派（Samkhya）的『離蘊』都認為是常，所以分為常和不定。 問：為什麼不說見取見（Silabbataparamasa，持戒邪見）、戒禁取見（Ditthiparamasa，不正見）以及我所見（Attavada，我見）和其餘邪見，是否都屬於六十二見之中？ 答：因為我見沒有太多爭論，而計常、計斷等等有很多爭論，過失和增長也更多。在邪見之中，也根據過失和增長更多的情況來說。見取見和戒禁取見，是依附於那些執著，不是根本的。 問：為什麼只設立前後二際（過去和未來），而不設立現在作為中際見？ 答：因為如現涅槃（Drtstadharmaparinirvanavada，現法涅槃論）是計執現在，未來在過去之前，過去在未來之後，所以不另外設立。以上是用來解釋疑難。有些論典有文字，有些沒有文字，粗略地說是這樣，以後再進一步查詢。
論：像這樣總的和別的十種煩惱中，原本說總的和別的只有十種，如貪、嗔等等，各有總的和別的差別行相。如果是迷惑真諦和自行相，不超過總和別。又要聚集斷除，還不清楚哪個更好，但還是...
【English Translation】 English version: 'Dwelling together, desiring the pleasure of dust' is therefore regarded as a kind of Nirvana (Nirvana, liberation). According to the differences in coarseness and tendencies, the seven annihilation views are explained separately.
Question: Why is the Rupa-skandha (aggregate of form, material aggregate) combined into one category, while the Arupa-skandha (immaterial aggregate) is divided into four types of annihilation views? Answer: Because the characteristics of the Rupa-skandha are easy to understand, it is combined into one category; while the Arupa-skandha is difficult to fully understand, it is divided into four categories. Question: Among these views, which arise after the 'Sakkayaditthi' (self-view associated with the aggregates, the view that 'I' is identical to the five aggregates), and which arise after the 'separate-aggregate self-view' (the view that 'I' is independent of the five aggregates)? Answer: According to the treatises, 'the life is the body' means believing that 'I' has boundaries; 'the life is different from the body' means believing that 'I' has no boundaries, and so on. According to this standard, the eight arguments of those with perception and the eight arguments of those without perception do not belong to either of these. Saying 'having form and having boundaries' is 'identical to the aggregates', saying 'having no form and having no boundaries' is 'separate from the aggregates'. The statement that includes both is 'both identical and separate'. The remaining eight of those with perception all belong to 'identical to the aggregates'. Another explanation is that formlessness also belongs to 'self identical to the aggregates', but it is attached to non-form, i.e., feeling, perception, etc., so it also belongs to 'identical to the aggregates'. The four with boundaries, etc., are 'separate from the aggregates'. Because the sixth volume of the Mahayana-samgraha says that attachment to 'I' follows the body, its quantity is uncertain, which applies to both 'identical' and 'separate'. When speaking of 'little form', etc., it is only according to 'identical to the aggregates', but in reality, both are included. If one believes 'I have form', it is attachment to form as 'I'. Since it is said 'I, one thought, etc.', one should be attached to those as 'I'. The Isika mentioned in the four pervasive permanences belongs to the Samkhya school, and should belong to 'self separate from the aggregates'. The seven annihilation views should belong to 'self identical to the aggregates'. The Vaisesika and Samkhya schools' 'separate from the aggregates' are both considered permanent, so they are divided into permanent and uncertain. Question: Why are the wrong views of holding to views (Ditthiparamasa, clinging to views), wrong views of holding to precepts (Silabbataparamasa, clinging to rites and rituals), as well as the view of what belongs to me (Attavada, the doctrine of self) and other wrong views not mentioned, and whether they all belong to the sixty-two views? Answer: Because the self-view does not have much controversy, while counting permanence, counting annihilation, etc., have many controversies, and the faults and increases are also greater. Among the wrong views, it is also based on the situation where faults and increases are greater. The wrong views of holding to views and the wrong views of holding to precepts are attached to those attachments and are not fundamental. Question: Why are only the two extremes of past and future established, and not the present established as the middle extreme view? Answer: Because the doctrine of present Nirvana (Drtstadharmaparinirvanavada, the doctrine of Nirvana in this life) is the attachment to the present, the future is before the past, and the past is after the future, so it is not established separately. The above is used to explain difficulties. Some treatises have texts, and some do not have texts. Roughly speaking, this is the case, and we will look further later.
Treatise: Like this, among the ten kinds of afflictions, both general and specific, it was originally said that there are only ten kinds, both general and specific, such as greed, anger, etc., each with general and specific different characteristics. If it is delusion about the truth and self-characteristics, it does not exceed the general and specific. It is also necessary to gather and cut off, and it is not clear which is better, but still...
未盡。慢及三見名總。餘六名別。此亦不爾。此十煩惱俱通總別故但總云。
論云學現觀者等。本釋如疏 西明云。八十八云。然于修習諦現觀時。由意樂故。恐于涅槃我當無有等。準此未入見道者 要集斷云。有釋為勝 今意疑雲。準八十八是未入見。彼文說云。由此隨眠薩迦耶見增上力故。于諸行中起邪分別謂我當斷。便於涅槃發生斷見。由此因緣于般涅槃其心退還不樂趣入。既與此論引文不同。疑此論引。更是別文。疏忌不引 然疏中指八十八者。疑是所等。又但證是斷見。即得。不證俱生。文云起邪分別謂我當斷。不分明說是俱生故。或此文通非定凡聖。不爾何故文不相似。然準論引。本疏釋正。何以故。意證俱生通於斷見。引見道後起可證誠。若見道前何得知是俱生斷見。
論。謂禽獸等可造業不。如樞要說 要集云。純苦趣中。及禽獸等愚鈍之類。不起分別。論有誠文。于雜受處如龍鬼等點利之者亦得聽法。種種計盡應有分別。如經中說。鬼拍舍利頭。陷身入地獄。證知鬼中造往惡趣業。人愚鈍者行殺生等。必能造往惡趣業。義同禽獸 今謂不爾。三惡趣中造感別報善惡業者。此即可爾。總報不造。無分別故。禽獸苦微不簡愚點皆不能起。若以鬼打舍利子頭。即證造總感惡趣業。經中亦說龍
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 未盡。『慢』以及『三見』（薩迦耶見、邊執見、邪見）是總稱。其餘六種（貪、嗔、癡、疑、見取見、戒禁取見）是別稱。這裡的情況不是這樣。這十種煩惱都通於總和別，所以只說是『總』。
《論》中『學現觀者等』。原本的解釋如同疏文。西明說：『八十八云』。然而在修習諦現觀的時候，由於意樂的緣故，恐怕對於涅槃我會沒有等等。根據這個，未入見道的人。要集斷言：『有解釋為勝』。現在的意思是懷疑：根據八十八是未入見道。那篇文章說：『由此隨眠薩迦耶見增上力故，于諸行中起邪分別謂我當斷，便於涅槃發生斷見。由此因緣于般涅槃其心退還不樂趣入。』既然與此論引用的文章不同，懷疑此論引用的是別的文章。疏文忌諱不引用。然而疏文中指的八十八，懷疑是所等。又只是證明是斷見，就可以。不證明俱生。文章說『起邪分別謂我當斷』，不分明說是俱生，所以或者這篇文章通於非定凡聖。不然為什麼文章不相似。然而根據論的引用，原本的疏文解釋是正確的。為什麼呢？意證俱生通於斷見，引用見道後起可以證明。如果見道前怎麼知道是俱生斷見。
《論》：『禽獸等可以造業嗎？』如同樞要所說。要集說：『純苦趣中，以及禽獸等愚鈍之類，不起分別。』論中有誠實的文章。在雜受之處，如龍鬼等聰明的人也可以聽法。種種計盡應該有分別。如經中所說：『鬼拍舍利頭，陷身入地獄。』證明鬼中造往惡趣業。人愚鈍者行殺生等，必定能造往惡趣業，意義同於禽獸。現在的意思是：不是這樣。三惡趣中造感別報善惡業的人，這就可以。總報不造，因為沒有分別。禽獸苦微不簡愚點都不能起。如果以鬼打舍利子頭，就證明造總感惡趣業。經中也說龍（Nāga）。
【English Translation】 English version: Not finished. 'Conceit' (Māna) and the 'Three Views' (Sakkāya-ditthi (belief in a self), Vicikicchā (doubt), and Silabbataparamasa (attachment to rites and rituals)) are general terms. The remaining six (greed, hatred, delusion, doubt, wrong view, and holding to precepts and vows wrongly) are specific terms. This is not the case here. These ten afflictions all apply to both general and specific, so it is only referred to as 'general'.
In the 'Treatise', 'those who study Abhisamayalankara (manifest realization)' etc. The original explanation is as in the commentary. Ximing said: 'Eighty-eight clouds'. However, when practicing the contemplation of the truths, due to intention, fearing that in Nirvana I will not exist, etc. According to this, those who have not entered the path of seeing. Yaoji asserts: 'Some explain it as superior'. The current meaning is doubt: according to the eighty-eight, it is not entering the path of seeing. That article says: 'Due to the increasing power of Sakkāya-ditthi (belief in a self) in these latent tendencies, they arise wrong discriminations in all actions, thinking that I should be cut off, and then generate the view of annihilation in Nirvana. Due to this cause, their minds retreat from Parinirvana and do not delight in entering it.' Since it is different from the article quoted in this treatise, it is suspected that this treatise quotes another article. The commentary avoids quoting it. However, the eighty-eight referred to in the commentary are suspected to be what is equal. Also, only proving that it is the view of annihilation is sufficient. It does not prove the co-arisen. The article says 'arising wrong discriminations, thinking that I should be cut off', it does not clearly say that it is co-arisen, so perhaps this article applies to both non-definite ordinary and holy beings. Otherwise, why are the articles not similar. However, according to the treatise's quotation, the original commentary's explanation is correct. Why? Intuitively proving that the co-arisen applies to the view of annihilation, quoting what arises after the path of seeing can prove it. If before the path of seeing, how can one know that it is the co-arisen view of annihilation?
The 'Treatise': 'Can animals, etc., create karma?' As the essentials say. Yaoji says: 'In the purely suffering realms, and among dull beings such as animals, etc., no discrimination arises.' There is a sincere article in the treatise. In places of mixed reception, such as intelligent beings like Nāgas (dragons) and ghosts, they can also listen to the Dharma. All kinds of calculations should have discrimination. As it is said in the sutra: 'A ghost hit Śāriputra's head and sank into hell.' Proving that ghosts create karma leading to evil realms. Dull people who commit killing, etc., will definitely be able to create karma leading to evil realms, the meaning is the same as animals. The current meaning is: it is not so. Those in the three evil realms who create good and evil karma that feels separate retribution, this is possible. The total retribution is not created, because there is no discrimination. Animals are slightly bitter and do not distinguish between foolish and intelligent, they cannot arise. If a ghost hits Śāriputra's head, it proves that they create karma that totally feels evil realms. The sutra also says Nāga (dragon).
鬼聞經見諦得果。豈許實耶。許即違論。不許違經。故知經中據化相說入見諦等。感善惡趣據助感說。
論。與身邪見一分亦爾。西明釋云。執極苦蘊為我。即無慢俱。非極苦蘊亦得慢俱。故下文云。特苦劣蘊憂相應故 今謂本解為正。許慢與彼執苦蘊身見得並。此言一分據多分說。故下初師亦許緣苦俱蘊起慢憂俱。第二師亦云亦苦俱起。西明若云執極苦蘊為我無慢。慢何苦俱。不可與余俱。不許身見並。無別因故 問據多分說。實理何俱 答據分別慢不與執苦蘊一分我見俱。下約俱生故得俱起 又慢有七。卑慢得俱。故瑜伽五十九云。若任運生。一切煩惱。皆於三受現行可得。若分別者略有二慢。一高舉慢。二卑下慢。高舉有三。一稱量。二解了。三利養。此高舉慢喜根相應。若卑下慢憂根相應。
問論云貪瞋癡三俱生分別一切容與五受相應者意地分別純苦趣無。雜受人中五雖有苦。復無分別。如何得言一切容與五受相應 答準五十九許五識有分別煩惱。雖非自力由意引生。何以得知。彼云不任運生一切煩惱諸根相應。我今當說。貪於一時樂．喜相應。我於一時憂．苦相應。恚中亦云。恚於一時憂．苦相應。或於一時喜．樂相應。問如何等。答謂如有一自然為苦逼切身心。遂于內苦作意思惟發恚恨心等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《鬼聞經》中說見到真諦就能證得果位，這難道是真實的嗎？如果說是真實的，就違背了《俱舍論》的觀點；如果說不是真實的，就違背了佛經的說法。因此，我們應該知道，經中所說的證入見諦等，是根據教化的方便而說的。而感受善惡趣，是根據助緣和感果的關係而說的。
《俱舍論》中說，邪見的一部分也是如此。西明的解釋是：執著極度痛苦的蘊為『我』，就不會有慢心同時生起。如果不是極度痛苦的蘊，也可能與慢心同時生起。所以下文說：『特別是因為痛苦低劣的蘊與憂愁相應。』我認為原本的解釋是正確的，允許慢心與執著痛苦蘊的身見同時生起。這裡說『一部分』是根據多數情況來說的。所以下文的初師也允許緣于痛苦的蘊生起慢心和憂愁。第二師也說，也可以與痛苦同時生起。西明如果說執著極度痛苦的蘊為『我』就沒有慢心，那麼慢心怎麼會與痛苦同時生起呢？如果不可以與其他的（蘊）同時生起，就不允許與身見同時生起，因為沒有其他的因緣。
問：根據多數情況來說，實際的道理是什麼同時生起呢？答：根據分別慢來說，不與執著痛苦蘊一部分的『我見』同時生起。下文是根據俱生來說的，所以可以同時生起。而且慢心有七種，卑慢可以同時生起。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五十九卷說：如果是任運而生的，一切煩惱都可以在三種感受（樂受、苦受、不苦不樂受）現行時得到。如果是分別而生的，大概有兩種慢，一種是高舉慢，一種是卑下慢。高舉慢有三種：一是稱量，二是解了，三是利養。這種高舉慢與喜根相應。如果是卑下慢，就與憂根相應。
問：《俱舍論》中說，貪、嗔、癡三種煩惱，俱生和分別的一切，都可能與五種感受相應。那麼，意地分別純粹是苦趣，沒有（樂受等）。雜受的人中，五種感受雖然有苦受，卻沒有分別。怎麼能說一切都可能與五種感受相應呢？答：根據《瑜伽師地論》第五十九卷，允許五識有分別煩惱，雖然不是自己產生的，而是由意根引導產生的。怎麼知道呢？那裡說，不是任運而生的一切煩惱，都與諸根相應。我現在應當說，貪心在某個時候與樂受、喜受相應，在某個時候與憂受、苦受相應。嗔恚中也說，嗔恚在某個時候與憂受、苦受相應，或者在某個時候與喜受、樂受相應。問：比如什麼情況呢？答：比如有一個人，自然地被痛苦逼迫身心，於是對內在的痛苦進行思惟，生起嗔恨心等。
【English Translation】 English version In the Ghuiven Sutra, it says that attaining the fruit is possible by seeing the truth. Is this truly the case? If it is said to be true, it contradicts the views of the Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya (Treatise on the Treasury of Abhidharma); if it is said to be untrue, it contradicts the teachings of the sutras. Therefore, we should know that the attainment of darśanamārga (path of seeing) and so on mentioned in the sutras are based on the expedient of teaching. And experiencing good and evil realms is based on the relationship of auxiliary causes and resultant effects.
The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya says that a portion of satkāyadṛṣṭi (view of self) is also like this. The interpretation of Ximing says: clinging to the extremely painful skandha (aggregate) as 'self' will not have māna (pride) arising simultaneously. If it is not an extremely painful skandha, it is possible for māna to arise simultaneously. Therefore, the following text says: 'Especially because the painful and inferior skandha is associated with sorrow.' I think the original interpretation is correct, allowing māna to arise simultaneously with the satkāyadṛṣṭi that clings to the painful skandha. Saying 'a portion' here is based on the majority of cases. Therefore, the first teacher in the following text also allows māna and sorrow to arise from the painful skandha. The second teacher also says that it can also arise with pain. If Ximing says that clinging to the extremely painful skandha as 'self' has no māna, then how can māna arise simultaneously with pain? If it cannot arise simultaneously with other (skandhas), it is not allowed to arise simultaneously with satkāyadṛṣṭi, because there is no other cause.
Question: According to the majority of cases, what is the actual principle that arises simultaneously? Answer: According to vikalpa-māna (discriminating pride), it does not arise simultaneously with the satkāyadṛṣṭi that clings to a portion of the painful skandha. The following text is based on sahaja (innate), so it can arise simultaneously. Moreover, there are seven types of māna, and hīnamāna (inferiority complex) can arise simultaneously. Therefore, Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) Volume 59 says: If it arises spontaneously, all kleśas (afflictions) can be obtained when the three vedanā (feelings) (pleasant, painful, and neutral) are present. If it arises from discrimination, there are roughly two types of māna, one is utkarṣamāna (superiority complex), and the other is avamāna (inferiority complex). Utkarṣamāna has three types: one is comparison, two is understanding, and three is gain. This utkarṣamāna is associated with the sukha-indriya (faculty of joy). If it is avamāna, it is associated with the daurmanasya-indriya (faculty of sorrow).
Question: The Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya says that all rāga (greed), dveṣa (hatred), and moha (delusion), both sahaja and vikalpa, can be associated with the five vedanā. Then, the manodhātu (mind element) is purely the realm of suffering, without (pleasure, etc.). Among humans who experience mixed feelings, although there is painful feeling among the five feelings, there is no discrimination. How can it be said that everything can be associated with the five feelings? Answer: According to Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra Volume 59, it is allowed that the five vijñāna (consciousness) have vikalpa-kleśas (discriminating afflictions), although they are not produced by themselves, but are produced by the manas (mind). How do we know? It says there that not all kleśas that arise spontaneously are associated with the indriya (faculties). I should now say that rāga is associated with pleasant and joyful feelings at some times, and with sorrowful and painful feelings at some times. It is also said in dveṣa that dveṣa is associated with sorrowful and painful feelings at some times, or with joyful and pleasant feelings at some times. Question: For example, what kind of situation? Answer: For example, there is a person who is naturally oppressed by suffering in body and mind, and then contemplates the inner suffering, and generates hatred, etc.
。喜樂相應意亦同此 準此文意。于極苦處意雖有苦。而無分別。分別起慢不說苦俱。人中．雜處五既有苦故得與俱 論復說云。遂于內苦作意思惟發恚恨心。由是故恚憂．苦相應 故由意引五起分別。由此二論俱作定說。不爾相違。
論云見非惠俱不異惠故者。問五見不異惠。不得與惠俱者。何故前第四卷說第七惠俱。我見恒行不異惠故 答有二解。一云一俱有名俱。二相應名俱。前據俱有。此約相應。他性相應非自性故。如覆．誑等是貪癡分。貪分雖貪俱。說與癡相應。若不爾者。豈于貪分立覆等時不有癡耶 又解不然。諸說俱者解相應門。前據義說。所以云見雖即惠。如心所中義別故開。今據別體見非惠俱。不障義分說與惠並。若爾如何他性相應。若許義別名他相應。貪分覆．誑應貪相應。論既不許。前說為勝。于相應門義說俱起。此亦何失。
論。當知俱生身邊二見唯無記攝不發惡業。問若爾何故全界煩惱皆能發潤 答有二解。一云約總說。二云此據親發。無記不能。若通助正。全界能發。此說為正。
論。若得彼地根本定已。問依近分定伏下九品。未入根本未起彼惑。命終之者何惑潤生 答二解。一解如疏。一云亦許上地種潤 若爾何故不用下潤 答已折伏現種子無能 若爾何故五十九
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：喜樂相應的『意』也是同樣的道理。按照這個文意，在極度痛苦的情況下，『意』雖然有苦，卻沒有分別。因為分別會產生我慢，所以不說苦和『意』同時存在。但在人中，因為雜處五蘊，既有苦，所以可以和『意』同時存在。論中又說，於是對內在的痛苦進行思考，產生憤怒和怨恨。因此，憤怒、憂愁、痛苦與『意』相應。所以，由『意』引導五蘊產生分別。因此，這兩部論都作出了確定的說法，否則就會相互矛盾。
論中說，『見』不是和『慧』同時存在，因為『見』和『慧』沒有差別。問：五見和『慧』沒有差別，為什麼不能和『慧』同時存在呢？為什麼前面第四卷說第七『慧』同時存在？因為我見恒常執行，和『慧』沒有差別。答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，一種是俱有名俱，一種是相應名俱。前面是根據俱有，這裡是根據相應。因為他性相應不是自性，就像覆、誑等是貪癡的一部分。貪的一部分雖然和貪同時存在，但說是和癡相應。如果不是這樣，難道在貪的一部分設立覆等的時候，就沒有癡嗎？又一種解釋不然，諸說俱者解釋相應門。前面是根據義理說的，所以說『見』雖然就是『慧』，但就像心所中義理有差別，所以分開。現在根據別體，『見』不是和『慧』同時存在，不妨礙義理的區分，所以說和『慧』並存。如果這樣，如何他性相應？如果允許義理有差別，就叫他相應。貪的一部分覆、誑應該和貪相應。論既然不允許，前面的說法更好。在相應門中，義理上說同時產生，這又有什麼損失呢？
論中說，應當知道俱生身見和邊見都只是無記，不會引發惡業。問：如果這樣，為什麼整個欲界的煩惱都能引發和滋潤惡業呢？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，約總的來說。一種說法是，這是根據親身引發來說的，無記不能。如果通過幫助正業，整個欲界都能引發。這種說法是正確的。
論中說，如果得到了彼地的根本定。問：依靠近分定伏下九品，未入根本定，未生起彼惑，命終的人，什麼惑潤生呢？答：兩種解釋。一種解釋如疏中所說。一種說法是，也允許上地種子潤生。如果這樣，為什麼不用下地潤生呢？答：因為已經摺伏，現行種子沒有能力。如果這樣，為什麼是五十九...
【English Translation】 English version: The 'intention' (意, yi) corresponding to joy and happiness is also the same principle. According to this text, in extremely painful situations, although the 'intention' experiences suffering, it does not have discrimination (分別, fenbie). Because discrimination gives rise to pride (慢, manā), it is not said that suffering and 'intention' exist simultaneously. However, among humans, because of the mixture of the five aggregates (五蘊, wǔyùn), since there is suffering, it can exist simultaneously with 'intention'. The treatise further states that one then contemplates internal suffering, generating anger (恚, hui) and resentment (恨, hen). Therefore, anger, sorrow (憂, you), and suffering correspond to 'intention'. Thus, 'intention' guides the five aggregates to produce discrimination. Therefore, both treatises make definite statements, otherwise they would contradict each other.
The treatise states that 'view' (見, jian) is not simultaneous with 'wisdom' (慧, hui), because 'view' and 'wisdom' are not different. Question: If the five views (五見, wǔjiàn) are not different from 'wisdom', why can't they exist simultaneously with 'wisdom'? Why did the fourth chapter say that the seventh 'wisdom' exists simultaneously? Because the view of self (我見, wojian) constantly operates and is not different from 'wisdom'. Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that one is simultaneous in name and existence, and the other is simultaneous in correspondence. The former is based on co-existence, while the latter is based on correspondence. Because other-nature correspondence is not self-nature, like concealment (覆, fu) and deceit (誑, kuang) are part of greed (貪, tan) and delusion (癡, chi). Although part of greed exists simultaneously with greed, it is said to correspond to delusion. If not, wouldn't there be delusion when establishing concealment, etc., as part of greed? Another explanation is not so. Those who say 'simultaneous' explain the door of correspondence. The former is based on the meaning, so it is said that although 'view' is 'wisdom', just like the difference in meaning in mental factors (心所, xinsuo), they are separated. Now, based on separate entities, 'view' is not simultaneous with 'wisdom', which does not hinder the distinction of meaning, so it is said to coexist with 'wisdom'. If so, how is it other-nature correspondence? If it is allowed that there is a difference in meaning, it is called other-correspondence. The concealment and deceit of the greed part should correspond to greed. Since the treatise does not allow it, the previous statement is better. In the door of correspondence, it is said that they arise simultaneously in meaning, so what is the loss?
The treatise states that it should be known that the innate view of self (身見, shenjian) and extreme view (邊見, bianjian) are only included in the indeterminate (無記, wuji) and do not generate evil karma. Question: If so, why can all the afflictions (煩惱, fannao) of the entire desire realm (欲界, yujie) generate and nourish evil karma? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that it is about the general statement. One explanation is that this is based on personal generation, and the indeterminate cannot. If through helping the right action, the entire desire realm can generate it. This statement is correct.
The treatise states that if one has attained the fundamental concentration (根本定, genbending) of that realm. Question: Relying on the proximity concentration (近分定, jinfending) to subdue the lower nine grades, not entering the fundamental concentration, not generating that delusion, what delusion nourishes rebirth for the person who dies? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is as stated in the commentary. One explanation is that it is also allowed that the seeds of the upper realm nourish rebirth. If so, why not use the lower realm to nourish rebirth? Answer: Because it has been subdued, the present seeds have no ability. If so, why is it fifty-nine...
云。一纏及隨眠結生相續。謂諸異生。二唯隨眠結生相續。謂見諦跡 答此據多分。如說見諦．隨眠．潤生。不妨初二果亦起現纏。雖說異生現．種共潤。何妨唯種 問何以得知初二果起現纏潤生 答瑜伽第一云。又諸異生將命終時。我愛現行由此力故便愛自身。由此建立中有．生報。若預流．一來爾時我愛亦復現行。雖言制伏不言非潤。雜集第五云。由此勢力諸異生輩今以無間中有相續。未離欲聖者亦爾。臨命終時。乃至未至不明瞭想位。其中能起此愛現行。然下雖說對治攝伏。不言非潤。離欲聖者文自說言。對治力強愛不現行。由隨眠力令生相續 又解聖唯種潤。凡唯種現 若爾二論文如何通 答皆言制伏不言能潤。設潤是助。五十九文據正潤說。亦不相違 如實義者。凡夫二果俱種．現潤。文如前說 若爾無心．睡．悶被殺。既無現愛。用何正潤 答臨終有心必定起愛。非一剎那即能殺故 問于潤生位中有．生殊。又起愛緣自身．境別。為於二位俱起二愛。為不爾耶 答潤中有起自體愛。潤生有起境界愛。以于死有不見中有。謂我無有起自體愛。于中有位見生處故起境界愛。故瑜伽第一云。我愛現行由此力故。謂我當無便愛自體。由此建立生報自體。乃至云。自於彼業所得生處。還見如是種類有情。喜樂馳趣即
于生處境色所礙。中有遂滅生有續起 問中有末心名為死不 西明云。不名為死。言中有歿者約六識說。第八相續 今謂不爾。對法．瑜伽俱云。中有極住七日。或有中夭。乃至極經七返更不得過。若準此文許中有死。若云只是六識不行。云何七日方一不行。六日等時何緣不滅。若云亦許即是逢緣礙六不起。何定七日及極七七。又復中有改生別趣。豈第八不捨即往彼耶。若爾應成趣生亂過。又何得云或有中夭。是故應許中有有死。雜集．瑜伽文皆具顯 若爾何非名為死有。下第八說總名生支 答趣生方便雖有生死。非別死支 若爾何故名為生死 答依四有說非。十二支據不改趣 若中有歿別趣生者。即名死支。何要須立此四有耶 答差別義故準名可知。
問既依六行能伏下惑方得上定。六行伏惑其義云何 答略四義明。一辨六行相。二約七作意明。三約四道。四約四對治。言六行者。觀下為粗．苦．障。觀上為靜．妙．離。能觀唯惠。粗．靜六相即所觀境。行謂行解行相。通能所觀。如十六行。然能觀勝獨得行名。觀于下地作粗相時。尋思六事故。瑜伽三十三云。云何覺了欲界粗相。謂正尋思欲界六事。一義．二事．三相．四品．五時．六理。義謂煩惱．疫癘．災害等。事謂于境起內外貪。相謂于境是順生受想
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 于生處境，因色（rupa，物質、形態）所障礙。中陰（antarabhava，死亡到再生的過渡期）遂滅，新的生命相續生起。問：中陰身（antabhava-kaya，中有）終結時，心識是否稱為死亡？ 西明法師說：不稱為死亡。說中陰身消亡，是就六識（sad-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）而言，第八識（alaya-vijnana，阿賴耶識）仍然相續存在。現在我認為不是這樣。《對法論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）和《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）都說，中陰身最多停留七日，或者中途夭折，甚至最多經歷七個七日，不能超過。如果按照這個說法，就允許中陰身有死亡。如果說只是六識不行，為何七日才不行一次？六日等時間為何不滅？如果說也允許是遇到因緣障礙六識不起作用，為何確定是七日以及最多七個七日？而且中陰身改變去往別的趣向（gati，輪迴的道途），難道第八識不捨棄就前往那裡嗎？如果這樣，應該構成趣向生亂的過失。又怎麼能說或者中途夭折？所以應該允許中陰身有死亡。《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）和《瑜伽師地論》的文句都詳細地顯示了這一點。 如果這樣，為何不稱為死有（marana-bhava，死亡階段）？下面第八識說總名為生支（jati-anga，生支）。答：趣向出生的方便雖然有生死，但不是單獨的死支。如果這樣，為何稱為生死？答：依據四有（catvaro bhavah，生有、本有、死有、中有）說，不是十二因緣支（dvadasanga-pratityasamutpada，十二緣起）所說的，十二因緣支據不改變趣向而言。如果中陰身消亡，去往別的趣向出生，就名為死支。為何要設立這四有呢？答：爲了差別的意義，根據名稱可以知道。 問：既然依靠六行觀（sad-akara，六行相）能夠降伏地獄的惑（klesha，煩惱），才能得到上界的禪定（samadhi，三昧），六行觀降伏煩惱的意義是什麼？答：略說有四種意義：一、辨別六行相；二、約七作意（sapta manaskara，七種作意）說明；三、約四道（catvari-marga，四聖道）說明；四、約四對治（catvari pratipaksa，四種對治）說明。所說的六行觀，觀察地獄為粗（粗顯）、苦（痛苦）、障（障礙），觀察上界為靜（寂靜）、妙（微妙）、離（遠離）。能觀的是智慧（prajna，般若），粗、靜六相是所觀的境界。行，是指行解行相，通於能觀和所觀。如十六行觀（solasa-akara，十六行相）。然而能觀的智慧殊勝，單獨得到行的名稱。觀察下地作粗相時，尋思六事，所以《瑜伽師地論》第三十三卷說：『云何覺了欲界粗相？謂正尋思欲界六事：一、義，二、事，三、相，四、品，五、時，六、理。』義，是指煩惱、疫癘、災害等。事，是指對於境界生起內外貪愛。相，是指對於境界是順生的受（vedana，感受）和想（samjna，概念）。
【English Translation】 English version Being in the state of birth is obstructed by form (rupa). The intermediate state (antarabhava) then ceases, and a new existence continues to arise. Question: When the intermediate being (antabhava-kaya) ends, is the mind called death? The master Ximing said: It is not called death. Saying that the intermediate being perishes refers to the six consciousnesses (sad-vijnana); the eighth consciousness (alaya-vijnana) continues. Now I say it is not so. Both the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Yogacarabhumi-sastra say that the intermediate being stays for a maximum of seven days, or dies prematurely, or even goes through a maximum of seven sets of seven days, and cannot exceed that. If according to this statement, it is permissible for the intermediate being to die. If it is said that only the six consciousnesses do not function, why does it only not function once every seven days? Why do they not cease during the six days? If it is said that it is also permissible that the six consciousnesses do not arise when encountering conditions, why is it fixed at seven days and a maximum of seven sets of seven days? Moreover, the intermediate being changes and goes to another realm (gati). Does the eighth consciousness not abandon and go there? If so, it should constitute the fault of confusion in the realm of birth. And how can it be said that it dies prematurely? Therefore, it should be permissible for the intermediate being to die. The texts of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the Yogacarabhumi-sastra both clearly show this. If so, why is it not called the dying state (marana-bhava)? The eighth consciousness below is said to be collectively called the birth factor (jati-anga). Answer: Although the means of going to birth have birth and death, it is not a separate death factor. If so, why is it called birth and death? Answer: According to the four states of existence (catvaro bhavah), it is not what the twelve links of dependent origination (dvadasanga-pratityasamutpada) say; the twelve links of dependent origination are based on not changing the realm. If the intermediate being perishes and goes to birth in another realm, it is called the death factor. Why is it necessary to establish these four states of existence? Answer: For the sake of the meaning of difference, it can be known according to the name. Question: Since relying on the six aspects (sad-akara) can subdue the afflictions (klesha) of the lower realm, one can attain the samadhi of the upper realm. What is the meaning of the six aspects subduing afflictions? Answer: Briefly speaking, there are four meanings: 1. Distinguishing the six aspects; 2. Explaining in terms of the seven mental activities (sapta manaskara); 3. Explaining in terms of the four paths (catvari-marga); 4. Explaining in terms of the four antidotes (catvari pratipaksa). The so-called six aspects are observing the lower realm as coarse, suffering, and obstructive, and observing the upper realm as tranquil, subtle, and distant. What can observe is wisdom (prajna), and the six aspects of coarse and tranquil are the objects of observation. 'Aspect' refers to the aspect of understanding and practice, encompassing both what can observe and what is observed, such as the sixteen aspects (solasa-akara). However, the wisdom that can observe is superior and uniquely obtains the name of 'aspect'. When observing the lower realm as coarse, one contemplates six things. Therefore, the thirty-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'How does one realize the coarse aspect of the desire realm? It means correctly contemplating six things of the desire realm: 1. Meaning, 2. Thing, 3. Aspect, 4. Category, 5. Time, 6. Reason.' 'Meaning' refers to afflictions, epidemics, disasters, etc. 'Thing' refers to arising internal and external greed towards objects. 'Aspect' refers to the feeling (vedana) and conception (samjna) that arise in accordance with objects.
心見倒本隨或等所依之處。品謂諸欲所生過患眾多品類。時謂三世常生過患。理謂尋思依於三量觀彼諸欲生過失理。所修靜相翻上應知。且就欲界名觀諸欲。然斷惑時觀下三相隨一現前。上三亦爾。非各具三。亦不隨觀下上唯一。要上下各一。以厭下欣上故。故雜集第九云。見欲界中過患等故了達粗相。初靜慮中此相無故名為靜相。是名了相作意。勝解作意中亦云。如是尋思粗．靜相性。是名勝解作意。餘五準應各觀二相。由有餘能。諸論之中皆略不說。不爾余或是何行斷。非出世道故。然無間．解脫各一行相。各一剎那。以時促故。然無間道觀粗。解脫道觀靜。余皆準知。未見大乘經論文說。準俱舍論第二十四云。諸無間道緣自次下地諸有漏法。作苦．粗等三行相中隨一行相。諸解脫道緣次上地諸有法。作靜．妙等三行相中隨一行相。又粗．苦．障三種境相為靜．妙．離。如次翻之。又粗．靜相二各是總。余之二二各各是別。故雜集第九云。如是粗相略有二種。一住于重苦不寂靜住故。二命行漸少壽命短促故。即所觀障。靜相者謂於一切上地。乃至非想非非想處。與粗相相違故。瑜伽三十三文大同此 二約七作意明者。欲九品惑斷初三品。各用了相．勝解二種作意而為加行。創難斷故。或初三品同一加行．勝進故。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『心見』指的是產生顛倒認知、執著和依賴的根本之處。『品』指的是由各種慾望所產生的眾多過患和種類。『時』指的是在過去、現在、未來三世中持續產生的過患。『理』指的是通過思考，依據三種衡量標準（現量、比量、聖教量），觀察由各種慾望所產生的過失的道理。所修的『靜相』與上述相反，應當知曉。這裡僅就欲界而言，觀察各種慾望。然而，在斷除煩惱時，觀察下三品煩惱時，隨其中一種行相現前即可；觀察上三品煩惱時，也是如此。並非每品都具備三種行相，也不是隻觀察上地獄中的唯一一種行相，而是上地獄各取其一，因為要厭離地獄，欣求上界。因此，《雜集論》第九卷說：『因為見到欲界中的過患等，所以了達粗相。初禪中沒有這種粗相，所以稱為靜相。』這稱爲了相作意。勝解作意中也說：『像這樣尋思粗相和靜相的體性，這稱為勝解作意。』其餘五種作意，也應各自觀察兩種行相，因為還有餘力。各種論典中都省略不提，否則，其餘的行相是通過什麼來斷除的呢？因為不是通過出世道。然而，無間道和解脫道各有各的行相，各只有一個剎那，因為時間短暫。然而，無間道觀察粗相，解脫道觀察靜相，其餘的可以類推得知。我沒有見過大乘經論對此的闡述。根據《俱舍論》第二十四卷所說：『諸無間道緣自次下地諸有漏法，作苦、粗等三行相中隨一行相。諸解脫道緣次上地諸有法，作靜、妙等三行相中隨一行相。』又，粗、苦、障三種境相，對應于靜、妙、離，依次翻轉。又，粗相和靜相各自是總相，其餘的二二各自是別相。所以《雜集論》第九卷說：『像這樣，粗相略有二種：一是安住在重苦中，不得寂靜安住；二是命行逐漸減少，壽命短促。』這就是所觀察的障礙。靜相指的是在一切上地，乃至非想非非想處（既不是『有想』也不是『無想』的境界），與粗相相反。』《瑜伽師地論》第三十三卷的文義與此大同小異。二者結合七作意來說明，欲界九品煩惱，斷除最初三品時，各自用了相作意和勝解作意這兩種作意作為加行，因為最初的煩惱難以斷除。或者說，最初三品煩惱使用同一種加行，從而能夠勝進。
【English Translation】 English version: 'Heart-seeing' refers to the fundamental place where inverted cognitions, attachments, and dependencies arise. 'Categories' refer to the numerous faults and types arising from various desires. 'Time' refers to the faults that constantly arise in the three times: past, present, and future. 'Reason' refers to contemplating, based on the three means of valid cognition (direct perception, inference, and scriptural authority), the reasons for the faults arising from various desires. The 'tranquil aspect' cultivated is the opposite of the above and should be understood accordingly. Here, we only discuss the realm of desire, observing various desires. However, when cutting off afflictions, when observing the lower three categories of afflictions, any one of the aspects may appear; the same is true when observing the upper three categories of afflictions. It is not that each category possesses three aspects, nor is it that only one aspect is observed in the upper and lower realms, but rather one from each of the upper and lower realms is taken, because one wants to renounce the lower realm and aspire to the higher realm. Therefore, the ninth fascicle of the Compendium of Determinations says: 'Because one sees the faults in the desire realm, one understands the coarse aspect. In the first dhyana (meditative absorption), there is no such coarse aspect, so it is called the tranquil aspect.' This is called the aspect-ascertaining attention. In the comprehending attention, it is also said: 'Like this, contemplating the nature of the coarse and tranquil aspects is called the comprehending attention.' The remaining five attentions should each observe two aspects, because there is still remaining ability. The various treatises all omit mentioning this, otherwise, through what are the remaining aspects cut off? Because it is not through the supramundane path. However, the path of immediate consequence (Anantarya-marga) and the path of liberation (vimukti-marga) each have their own aspect, each lasting only one instant, because time is short. However, the path of immediate consequence observes the coarse aspect, and the path of liberation observes the tranquil aspect; the rest can be inferred accordingly. I have not seen any explanations of this in Mahayana sutras or treatises. According to the twenty-fourth fascicle of the Abhidharmakosa: 'The paths of immediate consequence take as their object the contaminated dharmas of the realm immediately below, and generate any one of the three aspects of suffering, coarseness, etc. The paths of liberation take as their object the dharmas of the realm immediately above, and generate any one of the three aspects of tranquility, excellence, etc.' Furthermore, the three aspects of object: coarseness, suffering, and obstruction, correspond to tranquility, excellence, and separation, in reverse order. Also, the coarse and tranquil aspects are each general aspects, while the remaining two pairs are each specific aspects. Therefore, the ninth fascicle of the Compendium of Determinations says: 'Like this, the coarse aspect is roughly of two types: first, dwelling in heavy suffering, not dwelling in tranquility; second, the life force gradually diminishes, and lifespan is short.' This is the obstruction being observed. The tranquil aspect refers to all the higher realms, up to the realm of neither perception nor non-perception (Naivasamjnanasamjnayatana) (a state that is neither 'with perception' nor 'without perception'), which is the opposite of the coarse aspect.' The meaning of the thirty-third fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra is largely the same as this, with minor differences. The two are explained in conjunction with the seven attentions: when cutting off the nine categories of afflictions in the desire realm, the first three categories each use the aspect-ascertaining attention and the comprehending attention as preparatory practices, because the initial afflictions are difficult to cut off. Or, the first three categories of afflictions use the same preparatory practice, so that they can advance further.
唯識第十云。二乘根鈍漸斷障時。無間．解脫必各別起。加行．勝進或總或別。中下亦爾。而為加行。遠離作意為無間道。攝樂作意為解脫道及勝進故。三十三云。從是已后愛樂於斷。愛樂遠離。于諸斷中見勝功德。觸證小分遠離喜樂。於時時間欣樂作意而深慶悅。於時時間厭離作意而深厭患 準此觸證少分即解脫道。欣樂作意即勝進道。而深厭患即加行道。中三品惑還用攝樂。而為四道中品易除。非余作意而為加行。下三品惑觀察作意為加行道。將欲出界細難斷故。一為加行復不同初。創極難斷故。加行究竟作意為無間道。加行究竟果作意為解脫道。故瑜伽三十三云。了相作意于所應斷。能正了知。心生希愿。勝解作意為斷為得正發加行。遠離作意能捨所有上品煩惱。攝樂作意能捨所有中品煩惱。觀察作意能于所得離增上慢安住其心。加行究竟作意能捨所有下品煩惱。究竟果作意能正領受彼諸作意善修習果。既言能正領受。即是證義。故是解脫 又解別起解脫。非第七作意。瑜伽十一云。由證方便究竟作意果煩惱斷已。方得根本三摩地故。加行究竟果作意。三十三說是根本定俱行作意。十一復云。由證果煩惱斷已方得根本。故知別起。二說俱得。次下更解 問既有九品。何但說三 答從總品類說故但分三品 問準斷
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 《唯識》第十說，二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）根器遲鈍，逐漸斷除煩惱障礙時，無間道（Anantarya-marga，直接斷除煩惱的道）、解脫道（Vimukti-marga，從煩惱中解脫的道）必定各自 अलग से उत्पन्न होते हैं。加行道（Prayoga-marga，為進入無間道所做的準備）和勝進道（Visesa-marga，在解脫道之後更進一步的修行）或者總合或者 अलग से उत्पन्न होते हैं。中品和下品煩惱也是這樣。以遠離作意作為加行道，以攝樂作意作為解脫道和勝進道。《瑜伽師地論》第三十三卷說，從那以後，喜愛斷除煩惱，喜愛遠離煩惱，在各種斷除煩惱的方法中看到殊勝的功德，體驗到少許遠離煩惱的喜樂，時時欣喜地進行作意（Manaskara，心理活動），內心深感慶幸喜悅，時時厭惡地進行作意，內心深感厭倦。《瑜伽師地論》第三十三卷說，從那以後，喜愛斷除煩惱，喜愛遠離煩惱，在各種斷除煩惱的方法中看到殊勝的功德，體驗到少許遠離煩惱的喜樂，時時欣喜地進行作意（Manaskara，心理活動），內心深感慶幸喜悅，時時厭惡地進行作意，內心深感厭倦。按照這個說法，體驗到少許遠離煩惱的喜樂就是解脫道，欣喜的作意就是勝進道，深感厭倦就是加行道。中三品煩惱仍然用攝樂作意，作為四道（加行道、無間道、解脫道、勝進道），中品煩惱容易斷除，不是其他作意可以作為加行道的。下三品煩惱用觀察作意作為加行道，因為將要出離三界，這些煩惱細微難以斷除。作為加行道又與最初不同，因為最初的煩惱極其難以斷除。加行究竟作意作為無間道，加行究竟果作意作為解脫道。所以《瑜伽師地論》第三十三卷說，了相作意對於所應斷除的煩惱，能夠正確地瞭解，心中產生希望，勝解作意爲了斷除煩惱和獲得解脫而真正地發起加行，遠離作意能夠捨棄所有上品煩惱，攝樂作意能夠捨棄所有中品煩惱，觀察作意能夠對於所得的成就，遠離增上慢，安住其心，加行究竟作意能夠捨棄所有下品煩惱，究竟果作意能夠正確地領受那些作意善修習的果報。既然說是能夠正確地領受，那就是證悟的意義，所以是解脫道。另外，解脫道是 अलग से उत्पन्न होते हैं的解脫，不是第七作意。《瑜伽師地論》第十一卷說，由於證悟方便究竟作意，果煩惱斷除之後，才能獲得根本三摩地（Mula-samadhi，根本禪定）。加行究竟果作意，《瑜伽師地論》第三十三卷說是根本定俱行作意，《瑜伽師地論》第十一卷又說，由於證悟果煩惱斷除之後才能獲得根本定，所以知道是 अलग से उत्पन्न होते हैं的。兩種說法都認為可以同時獲得。接下來進一步解釋。問：既然有九品煩惱，為什麼只說三品？答：從總體的品類來說，所以只分為三品。問：按照斷除煩惱的順序，
【English Translation】 English version The tenth chapter of Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi says: When the two vehicles (Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana) with dull roots gradually sever the obstacles, the Anantarya-marga (path of immediate consequence) and Vimukti-marga (path of liberation) necessarily arise separately. The Prayoga-marga (path of application) and Visesa-marga (path of special advancement) may arise together or separately. The same applies to the middle and lower grades of afflictions. The viraga-manaskara (thought of detachment) serves as the Prayoga-marga, while the pritisukha-manaskara (thought of joy and pleasure) serves as the Vimukti-marga and Visesa-marga. The thirty-third chapter of Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'From then on, one loves to sever afflictions, loves to be detached. In the various methods of severing afflictions, one sees excellent merits, experiences a small portion of the joy of detachment, and constantly rejoices in the manaskara (mental activity), feeling deeply delighted. At times, one loathes the manaskara, feeling deeply disgusted.' According to this, experiencing a small portion of detachment is the Vimukti-marga, joyful manaskara is the Visesa-marga, and deep disgust is the Prayoga-marga. The middle three grades of afflictions still use pritisukha-manaskara as the four paths (Prayoga-marga, Anantarya-marga, Vimukti-marga, Visesa-marga). Middle-grade afflictions are easy to sever; other manaskara cannot serve as the Prayoga-marga. The lower three grades of afflictions use vipasyana-manaskara (thought of observation) as the Prayoga-marga, because they are about to leave the realm of desire, and these afflictions are subtle and difficult to sever. Serving as the Prayoga-marga is also different from the beginning, because the initial afflictions are extremely difficult to sever. The Prayoga-nistha-manaskara (thought of ultimate application) serves as the Anantarya-marga, and the Prayoga-nistha-phala-manaskara (thought of ultimate application result) serves as the Vimukti-marga. Therefore, the thirty-third chapter of Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Lakshana-manaskara (thought of characteristics) can correctly understand the afflictions that should be severed, and the mind generates hope. Adhimoksha-manaskara (thought of firm conviction) truly initiates the Prayoga-marga to sever afflictions and attain liberation. Viraga-manaskara can abandon all upper-grade afflictions. Pritisukha-manaskara can abandon all middle-grade afflictions. Vipasyana-manaskara can, regarding the achievements attained, stay away from arrogance and abide in the mind. Prayoga-nistha-manaskara can abandon all lower-grade afflictions. Nistha-phala-manaskara can correctly receive the fruits of those manaskara that have been well cultivated.' Since it is said that one can correctly receive, that is the meaning of enlightenment, so it is the Vimukti-marga. Furthermore, Vimukti (liberation) arises separately, not with the seventh manaskara. The eleventh chapter of Yogacarabhumi-sastra says: 'Because after the afflictions of the result are severed by the upaya-nistha-manaskara (thought of ultimate means), one can then attain the Mula-samadhi (fundamental samadhi).' The Prayoga-nistha-phala-manaskara is said in the thirty-third chapter to be the manaskara that accompanies the fundamental samadhi. The eleventh chapter of Yogacarabhumi-sastra also says: 'Because after the afflictions of the result are severed, one can then attain the fundamental samadhi,' so it is known that it arises separately. Both statements agree that they can be attained simultaneously. The following further explains. Question: Since there are nine grades of afflictions, why are only three mentioned? Answer: From the perspective of overall categories, they are divided into three grades. Question: According to the order of severing afflictions,
九品惑。有九無間九解脫道。何故但三名為斷耶 答有二解。一云此三作意各各斷三。行相品類皆相似故。論不別說。一云惑雖九品但三品斷。以其世道有三品故。諸論皆唯說三品斷。非九品故 問依前說中斷下品惑。復分三品斷第三品可名究竟。斷初中二何名究竟 答非望自類三品而說。望總三品合斷。下三總是下品故名究竟。不爾何故瑜伽．雜集俱但說究竟斷下品惑耶。依第二解即無此妨 問斷下品中前二品惑。用何作意為解脫道 答一云用攝樂作意為二品解脫。六十二說通四道故。瑜伽三十三．雜集第九。俱說第七作意是根本定俱作意故。又斷此下品無間道時。未入根本故。一云即第七作意。言根本定俱作意者。據斷下下解脫道說。一云即加行究竟作意。為三無間二解脫道。以名體同論不別說。此應好。如攝樂作意斷中三品可為四道 問若以攝樂為斷中品之四道者。論何不說 答以影顯故。上下二品俱說加行及解脫道。故於中品略而不說。又斷中品同一作意。雖有四道更不別說 問何以得知攝樂通四 答六十二云。攝樂作意四種道攝 問且斷欲界第九品惑起解脫道。即是根本為近分耶 答有二解 一云即入。三十三及雜集第九俱云。是名加行究竟作意。從此無間由是因緣。證入根本初靜慮定。即此初靜慮定俱作
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：有九品煩惱，也有九無間道和九解脫道，為什麼只說斷了三品煩惱呢？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，這三種作意各自斷除三品煩惱，因為它們的行相和品類都相似，所以《瑜伽師地論》沒有分別說明。另一種說法是，煩惱雖然有九品，但只斷除三品，因為世俗道只有三品。所以，各論都只說斷除三品煩惱，而不是九品。 問：如果按照前面的說法，斷除下品煩惱中的下品，再分三品，斷除第三品可以稱為究竟。那麼，斷除最初和中間的兩種煩惱，為什麼也稱為究竟呢？ 答：這不是針對同類三品來說的，而是針對總的三品合起來斷除。下三品總的來說都是下品，所以稱為究竟。否則，為什麼《瑜伽師地論》和《雜集論》都只說究竟斷除下品煩惱呢？如果按照第二種解釋，就沒有這個疑問了。 問：斷除下品煩惱中的前兩品煩惱，用什麼作意作為解脫道呢？ 答：一種說法是用攝樂作意作為這兩品煩惱的解脫道。《六十二見經》說攝樂作意通於四道。《瑜伽師地論》第三十三卷和《雜集論》第九卷都說第七作意是根本定俱作意。而且，斷除這個下品煩惱的無間道時，還沒有進入根本定。另一種說法就是第七作意。說根本定俱作意，是根據斷除下下品煩惱的解脫道來說的。還有一種說法是，用加行究竟作意作為三無間道和二解脫道，因為名稱和體性相同，所以論中沒有分別說明。這種說法應該是正確的。如果用攝樂作意斷除中品煩惱，可以作為四道。 問：如果用攝樂作意作為斷除中品煩惱的四道，為什麼論中沒有說明呢？ 答：因為這是影顯的緣故。上下兩品都說明了加行道和解脫道，所以對中品就省略而不說了。而且，斷除中品煩惱用同一種作意，雖然有四道，也不再分別說明。 問：怎麼知道攝樂作意通於四道呢？ 答：《六十二見經》說，攝樂作意包含四種道。 問：斷除欲界第九品煩惱時，生起的解脫道，是屬於根本定還是近分定呢？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是屬於根本定。《瑜伽師地論》第三十三卷和《雜集論》第九卷都說，這叫做加行究竟作意。從這個無間道開始，由於這個因緣，證入根本初禪定。也就是這個初禪定俱作意。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: There are nine grades of defilements (Kleshas), and also nine uninterrupted paths (Anantarya-marga) and nine liberation paths (Vimukti-marga). Why is it only said that three grades are severed? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that each of these three mental activities (Manaskara) severs three grades of defilements, because their characteristics (Lakshana) and categories (Prakara) are similar, so the Yogacarabhumi-sastra does not explain them separately. Another explanation is that although there are nine grades of defilements, only three grades are severed, because the worldly path (Laukika-marga) has only three grades. Therefore, all treatises only speak of severing three grades of defilements, not nine grades. Question: If, according to the previous explanation, the lowest of the lower grade of defilements is severed, and further divided into three grades, severing the third grade can be called ultimate (Nistha). Then, why is severing the first and middle two defilements also called ultimate? Answer: This is not said in relation to the three grades of the same category, but in relation to the total three grades combined to be severed. The lower three grades are generally the lower grade, so it is called ultimate. Otherwise, why do the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the Abhidharmasamuccaya only speak of ultimately severing the lower grade of defilements? If according to the second explanation, there is no such question. Question: What mental activity is used as the liberation path to sever the first two defilements in the lower grade of defilements? Answer: One explanation is that the mental activity of gathering joy (Samgraha-pramodya-manaskara) is used as the liberation path for these two defilements. The Sixty-two Views Sutra says that it is connected to the four paths. Yogacarabhumi-sastra chapter 33 and Abhidharmasamuccaya chapter 9 both say that the seventh mental activity is the mental activity associated with the fundamental concentration (Mula-dhyana). Moreover, when severing the uninterrupted path of this lower grade of defilements, one has not yet entered the fundamental concentration. Another explanation is that it is the seventh mental activity itself. Saying that it is the mental activity associated with the fundamental concentration is based on the liberation path of severing the lowest of the lower grade of defilements. Still another explanation is that the mental activity of ultimate application (Prayoga-nistha-manaskara) is used as the three uninterrupted paths and two liberation paths, because the name and nature are the same, so the treatise does not explain them separately. This explanation should be good. If the mental activity of gathering joy is used to sever the middle grade of defilements, it can be used as the four paths. Question: If the mental activity of gathering joy is used as the four paths for severing the middle grade of defilements, why is it not explained in the treatise? Answer: Because it is implied. The application path and liberation path are explained for both the upper and lower grades, so it is omitted for the middle grade. Moreover, severing the middle grade of defilements uses the same mental activity, so although there are four paths, they are not explained separately. Question: How do we know that the mental activity of gathering joy is connected to the four paths? Answer: The Sixty-two Views Sutra says that the mental activity of gathering joy includes four kinds of paths. Question: When severing the ninth grade of defilements in the desire realm (Kama-dhatu), does the arising liberation path belong to the fundamental concentration or the proximate concentration (Upacara-samadhi)? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that it belongs to the fundamental concentration. Yogacarabhumi-sastra chapter 33 and Abhidharmasamuccaya chapter 9 both say that this is called the mental activity of ultimate application. From this uninterrupted path, due to this cause, one enters the fundamental first dhyana (Prathama-dhyana). That is, this first dhyana is associated with the mental activity.
意。名加行究竟果作意。第七作意是彼解脫故。即入根本 一云或有不入。故瑜伽第十一云。于有漏方便中先說解脫。后說三摩地。由證方便究竟作意果煩惱斷已。方得根本三摩地故。既言由證果已方得根本三摩地。故解脫道非即根本。準此二文約利鈍別。二解俱正。各不相違 問若攝樂作意斷中品惑。何故三十三云。為除惛沈等 答約修加行觀凈．妙相策持其心。非無間道 問若觀察作意為斷下品加行道者。何故但云離增上慢 答為斷少得謂為多得增上慢故。進修加行斷所未斷惑。有說言斷三三品后品無間。即前無間之解脫道。此義雖得然違成唯識。彼第十云。二乘根鈍漸斷障時。無間．解脫必各別起 或可。不違。彼約實斷。此據伏說 約四道者。此之六行加行．勝進各得具作。以時長故。無間．解脫各一行相故。六十二云。諸近分定．若方便道．若無間道．若解脫道。或為斷滅。或為證得。而修習者或觀下過失觀上寂靜。若勝進道當知彼是遍滿所緣。又三十三等。于了相．勝解二種作意。俱云觀粗．靜故。俱舍亦同。如次前引約對治者。有四對治。一厭患對治．二斷對治．三持對治．四遠分對治。前約作意以辨六行。今約作意配四對治。即可準知。瑜伽六十六云。當知此中從了相作意。乃至勝解作意。名厭患對
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 意。名為加行究竟果作意。第七作意是因為彼解脫的緣故，即進入根本定。一種說法是或者有不進入根本定的情況。所以《瑜伽師地論》第十一卷說：『在有漏的方便道中，先說解脫道，后說三摩地。』因為證得方便究竟作意的果，煩惱斷除后，才能得到根本三摩地。既然說因為證得果后才能得到根本三摩地，所以解脫道並非就是根本定。根據這兩段文字，可以按照根性的利鈍來區分，兩種解釋都正確，各自不相違背。
問：如果攝樂作意斷除中品惑，為什麼《三十三》中說：『爲了去除昏沉等』？
答：這是指修加行時，觀察清凈、微妙的景象來策勵自己的心，並非無間道。
問：如果觀察作意是爲了斷除下品加行道的惑，為什麼只說遠離增上慢？
答：爲了斷除因為獲得少許成就就認為自己獲得很多成就的增上慢。繼續修加行，斷除尚未斷除的惑。有人說斷除三三品（九品惑中的前三品）后品的無間道，就是前無間道的解脫道。這個說法雖然可以成立，但是違背了《成唯識論》。《成唯識論》第十卷說：『二乘根性遲鈍，逐漸斷除障礙時，無間道和解脫道必定各自生起。』
或者，可以認為不違背。《成唯識論》說的是實際斷除，這裡說的是伏除。按照四道來說，這六行（六種作意）加行道和勝進道都可以具足，因為時間長。無間道和解脫道各自只有一種行相，所以《六十二》中說：『各種近分定，無論是方便道、無間道、還是解脫道，或者爲了斷滅，或者爲了證得，而修習的人或者觀察下方的過失，觀察上方的寂靜。』如果是勝進道，應當知道那是遍滿所緣。另外，《三十三》等，對於了相作意和勝解作意，都說觀察粗相和靜相，《俱舍論》也是如此。像前面引用的那樣，按照對治來說，有四種對治：一、厭患對治；二、斷對治；三、持對治；四、遠分對治。前面是按照作意來辨別六行，現在是按照作意來配合四種對治，就可以知道。《瑜伽師地論》第六十六卷說：『應當知道，這裡從了相作意，乃至勝解作意，名為厭患對
【English Translation】 English version: Intention. It is called 'intention of the ultimate result of application'. The seventh intention is because of that liberation, that is, entering the fundamental state. One view is that there are cases where one does not enter the fundamental state. Therefore, the eleventh volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'In the expedient path with outflows, liberation is mentioned first, and then samādhi (concentration). Because after attaining the result of the ultimate intention of the expedient, and after afflictions are severed, one can attain the fundamental samādhi.' Since it is said that one can attain the fundamental samādhi only after attaining the result, the path of liberation is not the fundamental state itself. According to these two texts, they can be distinguished based on the sharpness or dullness of the faculties. Both explanations are correct and do not contradict each other.
Question: If the intention of delighting in absorption severs the medium-grade afflictions, why does Thirty-Three say: 'To remove drowsiness, etc.'?
Answer: This refers to cultivating the application by observing pure and subtle appearances to encourage one's mind; it is not the immediate path.
Question: If the intention of observation is to sever the lower-grade afflictions of the path of application, why does it only say to abandon arrogance?
Answer: It is to sever the arrogance of thinking that one has attained much when one has only attained a little. Continue to cultivate the application and sever the afflictions that have not yet been severed. Some say that the immediate path of the subsequent stage after severing the first three stages of the nine grades of afflictions is the liberation path of the previous immediate path. Although this statement can be established, it contradicts the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra. The tenth volume of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra says: 'When those of the Two Vehicles with dull faculties gradually sever obstacles, the immediate path and the liberation path must arise separately.'
Or, it can be considered not contradictory. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra speaks of actual severance, while this speaks of subduing. According to the Four Paths, these six practices (six intentions) can be fully present in the path of application and the path of progress because of the long duration. The immediate path and the liberation path each have only one aspect. Therefore, Sixty-Two says: 'Various proximate concentrations, whether they are the expedient path, the immediate path, or the liberation path, are either for severing or for attaining, and those who cultivate them either observe the faults below or observe the tranquility above.' If it is the path of progress, one should know that it is the all-pervading object. In addition, Thirty-Three, etc., both say that the intention of understanding appearances and the intention of firm conviction observe coarse and still appearances. The Abhidharmakośa is also the same. As quoted earlier, according to the antidotes, there are four antidotes: 1. antidote of aversion; 2. antidote of severance; 3. antidote of maintenance; 4. antidote of distance. The former distinguishes the six practices according to intention, and now the intentions are matched with the four antidotes, which can be known. The sixty-sixth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'One should know that here, from the intention of understanding appearances to the intention of firm conviction, it is called the antidote of aversion.'
治修。從遠離作意。乃至方便究竟作意。名斷對治修。方便究竟果作意。名持對治修。從此已上七種作意。隨於勝地上地所攝。當知一切名遠分對治修。此約一相。據實攝樂通四對治。觀察亦通厭患對治。義如前說 問準三十三．雜集第九。俱不說觀察作意為能斷惑。何故此文說斷對治修 答一云。初二作意全未有斷。第七作意據于下地更無可斷。中間觀察前後有斷。故相從說名斷對治。
問下起上中。身．邊二見為定為生 答有二解。一云定煩惱得宿住通或復天眼。見彼梵王執我計常即是定類。二云生惑。此于地身起此二見。是彼生類故名生惑。然定惑唯分別起。生惑通二種。然正潤生不取二見。於此位起亦復無失。然是總緣。非是別緣。以未來無別緣我見無所杖質故。
論。生上起下且如謗滅。要集斷云。有釋為勝。中有．本有。若色．無色。皆得起謗及起諸惑。俱生身．邊二見。雖不與潤生愛俱。而前後起于理無妨。然理難見 今謂若中有．本有。若色．無色皆得起謗者。據何等說。若增上慢得初三定。未將極沒生於上。未無生故。在中．本有俱不應謗。若得第四定謂第四果。即生第四中有起謗。論有誠文。不說生本有。亦不應生無色起謗。何以故。得第四定。執為第四果。必不更修無色界定。何
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 治修：從遠離作意開始，直到方便究竟作意，這被稱為斷對治修。方便究竟果作意，被稱為持對治修。從這裡往上的七種作意，都屬於勝地上地所攝，應當知道這一切都叫做遠分對治修。這是從一相上來說的，實際上攝樂作意也通於四種對治。觀察作意也通於厭患對治，道理和前面說的一樣。問：根據《三十三》和《雜集第九》，都沒有說觀察作意能夠斷惑，為什麼這篇文章說它是斷對治修？答：一種說法是，最初的兩種作意完全沒有斷惑，第七種作意根據下地來說，也沒有什麼可以斷的。中間的觀察作意，前後都有斷惑，所以相因而說，稱為斷對治。
問：從下地生起上地的惑，身見（Sakkāya-diṭṭhi，認為五蘊和合的身體是真實的我）、邊見（antagāhika-diṭṭhi，斷見或常見）是屬於定惑還是生惑？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是定惑，因為通過煩惱得到宿住通（pubbe-nivāsānussati-ñāṇa，回憶前世的能力）或者天眼通（dibba-cakkhu，天眼），見到彼梵天王執著于『我』，認為是常，這就是定類。另一種說法是生惑，因為在此地生起這兩種見，是屬於彼生類，所以稱為生惑。然而，定惑只是分別產生的，生惑則通於兩種（分別和俱生）。然而，真正潤生的不是這兩種見。即使在這個階段生起，也沒有什麼過失。然而，這是總緣，不是別緣。因為未來沒有特別的因緣，我見（atta-diṭṭhi，認為有『我』的見解）沒有所依賴的實質。
論：從上地生起下地的惑，比如誹謗滅盡。要集斷說，有一種解釋認為是勝。中有（antarābhava，死亡到再生的中間狀態）、本有（bhava，生命存在），無論是色界（rūpadhātu，有物質的界）還是無色界（arūpadhātu，沒有物質的界），都可以生起誹謗以及生起各種惑。俱生的身見、邊見，雖然不與潤生的愛（taṇhā，渴愛）同時生起，但是前後生起在道理上沒有妨礙。然而，這個道理難以見到。現在說，如果中有、本有，無論是色界還是無色界，都可以生起誹謗，這是根據什麼說的？如果因為增上慢（adhimāna，未證得的境界，自認為已證得）而得到初禪、二禪、三禪，還沒有將極沒生於上地，因為還沒有無生，所以在中有、本有都不應該誹謗。如果得到第四禪，認為自己證得了第四果，就會在第四禪的中有生起誹謗。論中有明確的文字。不說生本有，也不應該在無色界生起誹謗。為什麼呢？因為得到第四禪，執著于第四果，必定不會再修無所有處定（ākiñcaññāyatana，無所有處禪定）。
【English Translation】 English version: Curing cultivation: Starting from 'keeping distance' attention and up to 'ultimate expedient' attention, this is called 'severing counteractive' cultivation. 'Ultimate expedient result' attention is called 'maintaining counteractive' cultivation. From here upwards, the seven types of attention, all belonging to the superior grounds, should be known as 'remote counteractive' cultivation. This is spoken from the perspective of one aspect; in reality, 'enjoyment' attention also encompasses the four counteractions. 'Observation' attention also encompasses 'aversion' counteraction, the meaning being as previously explained. Question: According to the thirty-third section and the ninth chapter of the Compendium, 'observation' attention is not mentioned as being able to sever defilements. Why does this text say it is 'severing counteractive' cultivation? Answer: One explanation is that the first two types of attention do not sever anything at all. The seventh type of attention, based on the lower grounds, has nothing more to sever. The 'observation' attention in the middle severs both before and after, so it is spoken of in relation to that, and called 'severing counteractive'.
Question: When arising from a lower ground to a higher ground, are 'self-view' (Sakkāya-diṭṭhi, the view that the aggregates are 'self') and 'extreme views' (antagāhika-diṭṭhi, eternalism or annihilationism) fixed or arising defilements? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that they are fixed defilements, because through defilements one obtains the ability to remember past lives (pubbe-nivāsānussati-ñāṇa) or the divine eye (dibba-cakkhu), and sees that Brahma (brahmā, a type of deity) clings to 'I' and considers it permanent; this is the fixed category. The other explanation is that they are arising defilements, because arising these two views in this ground belongs to that arising category, so they are called arising defilements. However, fixed defilements only arise through discrimination, while arising defilements encompass both types (discrimination and innate). However, these two views do not truly fuel rebirth. Even if they arise at this stage, there is no fault. However, this is a general condition, not a specific condition, because in the future there is no specific condition, and 'self-view' (atta-diṭṭhi, the belief in a self) has no substantial basis to rely on.
Treatise: When arising from a higher ground to a lower ground, such as slandering cessation. The Essential Collection on Severance says that one explanation considers it superior. The intermediate existence (antarābhava, the state between death and rebirth), the fundamental existence (bhava, existence), whether in the realm of form (rūpadhātu, the realm of material existence) or the formless realm (arūpadhātu, the realm of immaterial existence), can all give rise to slander and various defilements. Innate 'self-view' and 'extreme views', although not arising simultaneously with the craving (taṇhā, thirst) that fuels rebirth, can arise before or after without any contradiction in principle. However, this principle is difficult to see. Now, if the intermediate existence, the fundamental existence, whether in the realm of form or the formless realm, can all give rise to slander, based on what is this said? If, due to excessive pride (adhimāna, thinking one has attained what one has not), one attains the first, second, or third dhyana (jhāna, meditative absorption), and has not yet completely died and been reborn in a higher ground, because there is no non-arising yet, then in the intermediate existence and the fundamental existence, one should not slander. If one attains the fourth dhyana and thinks one has attained the fourth fruit, then one will slander in the intermediate existence of the fourth dhyana. The treatise has clear statements. It does not say that one can slander in the fundamental existence, nor should one slander in the formless realm. Why not? Because having attained the fourth dhyana and clinging to the fourth fruit, one will certainly not cultivate the sphere of nothingness (ākiñcaññāyatana, the formless realm of nothingness).
以故。既取第四有漏定為果體。更修無色定將作何法。若作勝功德。即不應執第四定為極。若諸外道生色謗者。是色邪見。不說外道起下謗滅墮地獄故。若生無色界厭背下故。彼不緣下。如何可說謗釋涅槃。若謗彼執所得涅槃非實涅槃。乃是正見非邪見故。又複本計彼天為果。得何故謗。若言上地邪見謗下者。此亦不然。本解生上起下。不論生上起上。又設生上起上謗下亦非無色。論但說言舍那菩薩．廣惠聲聞。以無色心了一切法。不說余故。諸起多少。無文定判。隨諸取捨 問上緣于下見．戒二取。如何得緣下望于上不得名勝 答憶昔地獄所起見．戒執為勝凈。望地獄說為勝為凈不形於上 西明釋上緣貪會違云或依別緣言總別者。且說五種有其三句。一唯總非別。謂薩迦耶見及邊邪見俱生．分別。二唯別非總。謂嗔雖無正文。分別．俱生義亦無妨。三通別總。謂貪．慢 今謂。嗔惑亦得總緣與見．慢俱。邪見總撥。慢亦總㥄。嗔既許俱。何不總緣。身．邊亦別。如四分常論緣彼梵王及大種等。若非計我說為斷常。非邊見故。然雖得上定方計梵王等。所起之見未必上故。
論然迷諦相有總有別。雜心論云。下苦具一切。二行離三見。道除於二見。上界不行恚 今大乘頌。欲迷四各十。隨行三八種。修六通行迷。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因此，既然已經取第四有漏定（指有煩惱的禪定）作為果報的本體，再修習無色定（指沒有物質存在的禪定）將要作什麼呢？如果說是爲了獲得更殊勝的功德，那就不應該執著于第四禪定為最高的境界。如果有些外道（指不信佛教的修行者）因為貪戀色界而誹謗無色界，這是對色界的邪見。經文中沒有說外道因為生起低劣的誹謗而墮入地獄。如果（修行者）對無色界生起厭惡，背離地獄，他們不緣于地獄，怎麼能說他們誹謗了釋迦牟尼佛的涅槃呢？如果他們誹謗那些人執著所得的涅槃不是真正的涅槃，那反而是正確的見解，不是邪見。而且，原本就認為彼天（指無色界天）是果報，得到后又為何要誹謗呢？如果說上地（指更高層次的禪定）的邪見誹謗下地，這也是不對的。原本的解釋是生於上界而對地獄產生邪見，不論是生於上界而對上界產生邪見。即使是生於上界而對上界產生邪見，誹謗地獄，也不是無色界的問題。《瑜伽師地論》只是說舍那菩薩（指盧舍那佛）和廣慧聲聞（指智慧廣大的聲聞弟子），以無色界的心智完全瞭解一切法，沒有說其他人，所以對於生起多少邪見，沒有明確的判定，只能隨各自的取捨。問：上界緣于地獄的見取（指錯誤的見解）和戒禁取（指錯誤的戒律），為什麼能緣于地獄，而地獄期望于上界就不能稱為殊勝呢？答：因為憶念過去在地獄所產生的見解和戒律執著為殊勝清凈，所以相對於地獄來說是殊勝清凈，但對於上界來說就不是了。西明（指西明寺）的解釋說上界緣于貪慾會違背（教義），或者依據其他因緣來說總相和別相。暫且說五種（煩惱）有三種情況：一是隻有總相，沒有別相，指的是薩迦耶見（指身見，認為五蘊是真實的我）和邊邪見（指斷常二見）的俱生和分別。二是隻有別相，沒有總相，指的是嗔恚，雖然沒有明確的經文，但分別和俱生的含義也沒有妨礙。三是通於別相和總相，指的是貪慾和慢。現在認為，嗔恚也可以總緣，與見和慢一起。邪見是總的否定，慢也是總的傲慢，既然允許嗔恚一起，為什麼不能總緣呢？身見和邊見也是別相，如四分律常論中緣于彼梵王和大種等。如果不是計執我說為斷常，就不是邊見。然而，即使是得到上定才計執梵王等，所產生的見解也未必是上界的見解。 《瑜伽師地論》說，迷惑真諦的相狀有總相和別相。《雜心論》說，地獄（指欲界）的苦具足一切，二行（指有身見和戒禁取）遠離三種見（指有身見、邊見和邪見），道（指修道）去除兩種見（指有身見和戒禁取），上界（指色界和無色界）不行嗔恚。現在大乘的頌文說，欲界迷惑四諦各有十種，隨行有三種八種，修道有六種通行迷惑。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, since the Fourth Dhyana with outflows (referring to meditation with afflictions) has already been taken as the substance of the result, what will be done by further cultivating the Formless Dhyanas (referring to meditation without material existence)? If it is said to be for obtaining more superior merits, then one should not cling to the Fourth Dhyana as the highest state. If some non-Buddhist practitioners (referring to those who do not believe in Buddhism) slander the Formless Realm because they are attached to the Realm of Form, this is a wrong view about the Realm of Form. The scriptures do not say that non-Buddhists fall into hell because they give rise to inferior slanders. If (practitioners) develop aversion to the Formless Realm and turn away from the lower realm, they do not relate to the lower realm, so how can it be said that they slander Shakyamuni Buddha's Nirvana? If they slander those who cling to the Nirvana they have attained as not being true Nirvana, then that is actually a correct view, not a wrong view. Moreover, it was originally thought that that heaven (referring to the Formless Realm heaven) was the result, so why slander it after obtaining it? If it is said that the wrong view of the higher realm slanders the lower realm, that is also incorrect. The original explanation is that one is born in the higher realm and develops wrong views about the lower realm, regardless of whether one is born in the higher realm and develops wrong views about the higher realm. Even if one is born in the higher realm and develops wrong views about the higher realm, slandering the lower realm, it is not a problem of the Formless Realm. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra only says that Losana Buddha (referring to Vairocana Buddha) and the Saravasti (referring to a disciple of Buddha with great wisdom), with the mind of the Formless Realm, completely understand all dharmas, and does not mention others, so there is no clear judgment on how much wrong view arises, and it can only be based on individual choices. Question: Why can the higher realm relate to the wrong views (referring to wrong views) and adherence to precepts (referring to wrong precepts) of the lower realm, but the lower realm's expectation of the higher realm cannot be called superior? Answer: Because one remembers the views and adherence to precepts that were produced in the past in the lower realm as superior and pure, so it is superior and pure relative to the lower realm, but it is not so for the higher realm. Ximing's (referring to Ximing Temple) explanation says that the higher realm's relation to greed would violate (the teachings), or based on other causes and conditions, it speaks of general and specific aspects. Let's say that the five (afflictions) have three situations: one is that there is only the general aspect, not the specific aspect, referring to the co-arising and differentiating of Satkayadristi (referring to self-view, thinking that the five aggregates are the real self) and Antagrahadristi (referring to the two extreme views of permanence and annihilation). Two is that there is only the specific aspect, not the general aspect, referring to anger, although there is no clear scripture, the meaning of differentiation and co-arising is not hindered. Three is that it is common to both the specific and general aspects, referring to greed and pride. Now it is thought that anger can also be generally related, together with views and pride. Wrong view is a general negation, and pride is also a general arrogance. Since anger is allowed to be together, why can't it be generally related? Self-view and extreme views are also specific aspects, such as in the Sarvastivada Vinaya, which often discusses relating to Brahma and the great elements. If it is not clinging to the idea that I am permanent or annihilated, then it is not an extreme view. However, even if one attains the higher Dhyana and then clings to Brahma, etc., the views that arise may not be the views of the higher realm. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that the characteristics of being deluded about the true meaning have general and specific aspects. The Samuccaya-Abhidharma-hrdaya says that the suffering of the lower realm (referring to the Desire Realm) is complete with everything, the two practices (referring to self-view and adherence to precepts) are far from the three views (referring to self-view, extreme views, and wrong views), the path (referring to cultivation) removes the two views (referring to self-view and adherence to precepts), and the higher realm (referring to the Form Realm and the Formless Realm) does not practice anger. Now the Mahayana verse says that the Desire Realm is deluded about the Four Noble Truths, each with ten types, the accompanying practices have three types of eight, and cultivation has six types of common delusions.
上見．修除恚。
然迷諦相有總有別。總有四句。一數總行別。二行總數別。三數總行總。四數別行別。
數總行別。諦各有十。各迷自諦名為行別 行總數別者。即前頌中。然依一諦緣迷多諦名為行總 若數總行總者。諦各有十名數總。行總者迷二三諦等皆名為總。二二迷有六。即有六十。上二界諦各除其嗔。六九五十四。合一百八。三界總有一百六十八。若三三合有四句。欲有四十。上二界諦各三十六。合一百一十二。若四諦合三界四諦有二十八。若數別行別。即前頌中各迷自諦 問此中依別緣別從何說迷 答從所緣迷。依非緣故 若爾應是所緣諦惑。何故說依 答因彼生故。依彼起故 問一百二十八依何者立 答依數總行別。並修道惑。若依余句即有增減。思可知之。
問依．緣何別 答有二。一云緣謂緣藉。即所依名緣。二云依即依詫。緣所緣境。如起無明迷於苦．集。因此起疑。疑已即生邪見。總撥無其四諦。即所疑撥為所緣。無明即因依 問各從何斷為從所依。為從所緣而說斷耶 答從依．緣斷皆悉無過。以大乘中見惑頓斷。不同有部前後別斷。又有四句。有迷而不緣。謂二取。有緣而不迷。謂無漏智。有俱緣．迷。疑邪見等。有非緣．迷。緣龜毛等。非諦攝故。
問此十煩惱
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：上面講到，要修習去除嗔恚（du shi）。
然後，對於真諦（di）的迷惑，有總相和別相之分。總相有四種情況：一是數量上是總相，行相上是別相；二是行相上是總相，數量上是別相；三是數量上是總相，行相上也是總相；四是數量上是別相，行相上也是別相。
數量上是總相，行相上是別相，指的是每一諦（di）各有十種迷惑。各自迷惑于自身所對應的諦（di），這被稱為行相上的差別。行相上是總相，數量上是別相，就是前面頌文中所說的。如果依賴於一個諦（di），而緣于迷惑多個諦（di），這被稱為行相上的總相。如果數量上是總相，行相上也是總相，指的是每一諦（di）各有十種迷惑，這被稱為數量上的總相。行相上的總相，指的是迷惑於二個或三個諦（di）等，都可稱為總相。兩個諦（di）的結合迷惑有六種情況，所以總共有六十種。在上二界（指色界和無色界）的諦（di）中，各自去除嗔恚（du shi），六乘以九等於五十四。總共加起來有一百零八種。三界總共有 一百六十八種。如果三個諦（di）結合，有四種情況。欲界有四十種，上二界每一界有三十六種，加起來有一百一十二種。如果四個諦（di）結合，三界四諦（di）有二十八種。如果數量上是別相，行相上也是別相，就是前面頌文中所說的各自迷惑于自身所對應的諦（di）。問：這裡所說的依賴於別相，緣于別相，是從哪裡說明迷惑的？答：從所緣的迷惑來說明。因為是依賴於非緣故。如果這樣，應該說是所緣的諦（di）的迷惑，為什麼說是依賴呢？答：因為從它產生，因為依賴它而生起。問：一百二十八種迷惑是依據什麼而建立的？答：依據數量上是總相，行相上是別相，以及修道所生的迷惑。如果依據其他的說法，就會有增加或減少，仔細思考就可以知道。
問：依（yi）和緣（yuan）有什麼區別？答：有兩種說法。一種說法是，緣（yuan）指的是緣借，也就是所依賴的被稱為緣（yuan）。另一種說法是，依（yi）指的是依恃，緣（yuan）指的是所緣的境界。例如，生起無明（wu ming）而迷惑于苦諦（ku di）和集諦（ji di），因此產生懷疑，懷疑之後就產生邪見（xie jian），完全否定四諦（si di），那麼所懷疑和否定的就是所緣，無明（wu ming）就是因依。問：各種煩惱是從所依處斷除，還是從所緣處斷除呢？答：從依（yi）和緣（yuan）處斷除都沒有過錯。因為在大乘佛教中，見惑（jian huo）是頓斷的，不同於有部佛教中前後分別斷除。還有四種情況：有迷惑而不緣的，比如二取；有緣而不迷惑的，比如無漏智；有既緣又迷惑的，比如懷疑和邪見（xie jian）等；有非緣非迷惑的，比如緣于龜毛等，因為它們不屬於真諦（di）所包含的範圍。
問：這十種煩惱（fan nao）……
【English Translation】 English version: Above, it was discussed how to cultivate the removal of aversion (du shi).
Furthermore, regarding delusion about the nature of the Truths (di), there are general and specific aspects. Generally, there are four possibilities: first, general in number, specific in aspect; second, general in aspect, specific in number; third, general in both number and aspect; fourth, specific in both number and aspect.
General in number, specific in aspect, refers to each Truth (di) having ten types of delusion. Each being deluded about its own respective Truth (di) is called specific in aspect. General in aspect, specific in number, is as mentioned in the previous verse. If one relies on one Truth (di) but is deluded about multiple Truths (di), this is called general in aspect. If general in both number and aspect, it refers to each Truth (di) having ten types of delusion, which is called general in number. General in aspect refers to being deluded about two or three Truths (di), etc., all of which can be called general. The combination of delusion about two Truths (di) has six possibilities, so there are a total of sixty. In the Truths (di) of the upper two realms (referring to the Form Realm and Formless Realm), aversion (du shi) is removed from each, six multiplied by nine equals fifty-four. Adding them together, there are one hundred and eight. In total, the three realms have one hundred and sixty-eight. If three Truths (di) are combined, there are four possibilities. The Desire Realm has forty, and each of the upper two realms has thirty-six, adding up to one hundred and twelve. If four Truths (di) are combined, the four Truths (di) of the three realms have twenty-eight. If specific in both number and aspect, it is as mentioned in the previous verse, each being deluded about its own respective Truth (di). Question: From where does this discussion of relying on the specific and being conditioned by the specific explain delusion? Answer: It explains delusion from the perspective of what is conditioned. Because it relies on non-conditions. If that's the case, it should be said to be delusion about the Truth (di) that is conditioned. Why is it said to be reliance? Answer: Because it arises from it, because it originates relying on it. Question: Upon what are the one hundred and twenty-eight delusions established? Answer: They are established upon being general in number and specific in aspect, as well as the delusions arising from the path of cultivation. If based on other statements, there would be increases or decreases, which can be understood through careful consideration.
Question: What is the difference between reliance (yi) and condition (yuan)? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that condition (yuan) refers to what is borrowed, that which is relied upon is called condition (yuan). The other explanation is that reliance (yi) refers to dependence, and condition (yuan) refers to the object being conditioned. For example, arising from ignorance (wu ming) and being deluded about the Truth of Suffering (ku di) and the Truth of Accumulation (ji di), doubt arises from this, and after doubt, wrong views (xie jian) arise, completely denying the Four Truths (si di). Then what is doubted and denied is what is conditioned, and ignorance (wu ming) is the causal reliance. Question: Are the various afflictions severed from the place of reliance or from the place of condition? Answer: There is no fault in severing them from either reliance (yi) or condition (yuan). Because in Mahayana Buddhism, the delusions of view (jian huo) are severed suddenly, unlike in the Sarvastivada school where they are severed separately in sequence. There are also four possibilities: there is delusion without condition, such as dualistic grasping; there is condition without delusion, such as undefiled wisdom; there is both condition and delusion, such as doubt and wrong views (xie jian), etc.; there is neither condition nor delusion, such as being conditioned by turtle hair, etc., because they are not included within the scope of the Truths (di).
Question: These ten afflictions (fan nao)...
迷諦親疏。瞋．慢．邪見。疑．及無明親迷易知。身．邊二見總不緣理。如何親迷 答雖不緣理。正迷於彼空無我理。行相深迷名為親迷。若迷余諦約通空非我翻彼行相。及執余諦下惑以為我故亦名迷。二取行相雖深亦緣余諦下惑。但非正翻空無我理。不名親迷。
問嗔．慢憎㥄滅．道可得親迷。貪不親貪滅．道何得親迷 答論云。貪．嗔．慢三見．疑俱生隨應如彼。貪二見俱故得親迷 忿依對現前不繞益境。西明問云。忿既緣滅。如何此說依現前境。解云從多為論。此論．顯揚俱說緣現。實亦緣滅 今謂。此釋有違下文。初師小十總不緣上。后師嫉等亦不說忿尚不緣上如何緣滅。下許嫉等親迷滅道。不說此忿緣于滅道。若爾準下說忿亦緣剎那過去。非唯現境。今何說現。若見怨家說滅．道等。豈不于彼亦起忿耶。慈恩解云。許亦無失。此就粗相云不親緣。或即是嗔雖然未見正文。任情取捨。然西明云。忿要托本質。準既得緣剎那過去。亦不唯托于質。
問諂誑唯初定。初定意受而說是喜。悅根名樂。云何諂誑得與樂俱 答雖悅根名正樂。是意相應喜故得與並 問地獄之中業相皆現。云何有誑說與苦俱 答雖業相現而亦起誑。更撿十地論。地獄有誑語業道不。
問忿等依嗔分。嗔得身邊俱。忿等何
不爾 答粗細異故 問忿等粗猛各起名主。與慢等俱豈存主稱 答以自類非俱說為主故。
問五識得法自相。云何得與分別惑俱 答自無分別。由他引生。證境分明故得自相。
問散亂云何得與定並 答味定之中正慘憂故得與相應。又貪．嗔等專注緣境。亦有染定故散亂並。
論。隨所依緣總別惑力者。一云隨彼所緣依於四諦總別惑起。如彼煩惱皆通四諦。二云迷諦煩惱或依或緣。分成四句。有依一諦緣多。有依多緣一。有依一緣一。有依多緣多。行相思準。隨惑隨彼 問從何說斷 隨所依緣皆得無妨。
論第七卷
論。一門轉故。西明云。一意根門轉故 今謂不然。既有色根何不依轉。即應解云猶無五識。不作是釋更無別因。若云猶昧略故。定既明廣。何不依彼五色根門。又復下文明五俱意。非專爲了五識所緣。又于彼所緣能明瞭取。故知一門轉。明唯一意識。若一根門。應言依一門轉。
論。如余蓋纏。要集云。有說不立量也。西明二量。一云睡眠非無體用。是蓋纏故。如余蓋纏。今謂此量亦一分違宗之失。何以故。睡眠假實通名。今若成立假睡有體。即違宗失。猶言不簡。立量應言。實睡眠非無心位。因．喻可知。言實睡眠簡無心位假名睡眠。不顯有別實體。以經部師觸
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：如果不是這樣，回答：因為粗細不同。問：忿（krodha，憤怒）等粗猛的煩惱各自有其主要作用，與慢（māna，傲慢）等煩惱同時生起時，是否還存在主要作用的說法？答：因為是以各自的類別來說明，並非同時都作為主要作用。 問：五識（pañca-vijñāna，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）如何獲得法的自相（svalakṣaṇa，事物自身獨有的特性）？又如何能與分別的迷惑同時存在？答：五識本身沒有分別能力，是由其他因素引導而產生。因為對所認識的境界非常清楚，所以能獲得自相。 問：散亂（vikṣepa，心神不定）如何能與禪定（samādhi，精神集中）同時存在？答：在體驗禪定的過程中，可能會產生憂愁等情緒，因此可以與散亂相應。此外，貪（rāga，貪慾）、嗔（dveṣa，嗔恨）等煩惱專注地緣取對像時，也會有染污的禪定，所以散亂可以同時存在。 論：隨所依緣總別惑力者。一種說法是，隨著所緣的對象，依於四諦（catvāri-āryasatyāni，苦、集、滅、道）產生總相或別相的迷惑。例如，那些煩惱都貫通於四諦。另一種說法是，迷惑真諦的煩惱，或者作為所依，或者作為所緣，分成四句：有的是依於一個真諦而緣于多個真諦，有的是依于多個真諦而緣於一個真諦，有的是依於一個真諦而緣於一個真諦，有的是依于多個真諦而緣于多個真諦。其行相和思慮可以類推。問：從哪個角度來說斷除煩惱？答：無論從哪個所依或所緣的角度來說，都可以斷除，沒有妨礙。 論第七卷 論：一門轉故。西明說：因為一個意根（mano-indriya，意識的根源）門運轉的緣故。現在的觀點認為不是這樣。既然有色根（rūpa-indriya，視覺的根源），為什麼不依色根運轉？應該解釋為仍然沒有五識。如果不這樣解釋，就沒有其他的理由。如果說仍然不明顯，那麼禪定既然明顯而廣大，為什麼不依於五色根門？而且，下面的經文說明五種意識同時與意根相應，並非專門爲了五識所緣。又因為對於所緣的對象能夠清楚地把握，所以知道一門轉，說明只有意識。如果說一個根門，應該說依於一個門運轉。 論：如余蓋纏。要集說：有人說不立量也。西明立二量。一是睡眠並非沒有體用，因為是蓋纏（āvaraṇa，覆蓋、纏縛），如同其他的蓋纏。現在的觀點認為這個量式也有一部分違背宗義的過失。為什麼呢？因為睡眠有假名和實體的區分。現在如果成立假名睡眠有實體，就違背了宗義。如果說不簡別，那麼立量時應該說：實體睡眠並非沒有心位的狀態。原因和比喻可以類推。說實體睡眠是爲了簡別沒有心位的假名睡眠，不顯示有別的實體。因為經部師（Sautrāntika，佛教部派之一）接觸。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If it is not so, Answer: Because the coarseness and fineness are different. Question: When afflictions such as krodha (anger) each have their primary function, and arise simultaneously with afflictions such as māna (pride), does the assertion of a primary function still hold? Answer: Because it is explained according to their respective categories, not all are considered primary simultaneously. Question: How do the pañca-vijñāna (five consciousnesses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) attain the svalakṣaṇa (self-characteristic) of dharmas (phenomena)? And how can they coexist with the delusion of discrimination? Answer: The five consciousnesses themselves do not have the ability to discriminate; they are generated by other factors. Because they are very clear about the objects they perceive, they can attain their self-characteristic. Question: How can vikṣepa (distraction) coexist with samādhi (concentration)? Answer: In the process of experiencing samādhi, emotions such as sorrow may arise, so it can be associated with distraction. In addition, when afflictions such as rāga (greed) and dveṣa (hatred) focus intently on objects, there can also be defiled samādhi, so distraction can coexist. Treatise: Regarding the power of afflictions based on what is relied upon and what is conditioned, in general and in particular. One view is that, depending on the object conditioned, afflictions arise based on the Four Noble Truths (catvāri-āryasatyāni: suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path). For example, those afflictions all pervade the Four Noble Truths. Another view is that afflictions that delude the Truths either serve as the basis or as the object conditioned, divided into four statements: Some rely on one Truth and condition multiple Truths; some rely on multiple Truths and condition one Truth; some rely on one Truth and condition one Truth; some rely on multiple Truths and condition multiple Truths. Their characteristics and considerations can be inferred analogously. Question: From what perspective is the elimination of afflictions discussed? Answer: From whichever perspective of what is relied upon or what is conditioned, elimination is possible without hindrance. Treatise, Volume 7 Treatise: 'Because of the turning of one gate.' Ximing says: 'Because of the turning of one mano-indriya (mind-faculty gate).' The current view is that this is not the case. Since there is a rūpa-indriya (sense faculty of sight), why not rely on the turning of the sense faculty of sight? It should be explained as still not having the five consciousnesses. If it is not explained this way, there is no other reason. If it is said that it is still not clear, then since samādhi is clear and vast, why not rely on the five sense faculty gates? Moreover, the following text explains that the five consciousnesses are simultaneous with the mind-faculty, not exclusively for the objects conditioned by the five consciousnesses. Also, because one can clearly grasp the objects conditioned, it is known that the turning of one gate indicates only consciousness. If it were one sense faculty gate, it should be said 'relying on the turning of one gate.' Treatise: 'Like other coverings and entanglements.' Yaoji says: 'Some say that no proof is established.' Ximing establishes two proofs. One is that sleep is not without substance and function, because it is a āvaraṇa (covering, entanglement), like other coverings and entanglements. The current view is that this proof also has the fault of partially violating the thesis. Why? Because sleep has both nominal and substantial aspects. If it is now established that nominal sleep has substance, it violates the thesis. If it is said that it is not distinguished, then when establishing the proof, it should be said: 'Substantial sleep is not a state without mind.' The reason and analogy can be inferred. Saying 'substantial sleep' is to distinguish it from nominal sleep without mind, not showing that there is a separate substance. Because the Sautrāntika (a Buddhist school) touches.
．受．想外。並思分位皆是假故。取蓋纏喻。即有一分所立不成。意簡經部師于無心位實立睡眠故。又量云。實睡眠是心相應．因。喻可知。論中第二宗法因．喻下安。文中故字應蓋纏下著。是因所須故。性相為文。非依次第。前云有無心位者。立量應云非無心位。文中略無宗中有法。前文彰訖故略不言。本疏云非即無心必是心所。是二宗法。如余蓋故。即是指喻 又云非無體法。第三宗法。比量準知。故略不具。然論文中初二句會諸違。后兩句破異執。
論非思惠想纏彼性故。本疏如初量云。染思．惠一分為悔。染思．想一分為眠。應非為纏性。是思惠想故。第二量為惡作等。一分非染思惠想。是有法。非彼惡作等二法性(是法)。是思惠想故 要集云。有說初釋稍不順文。文云非思惠想是宗法。非是有法。亦非因故 今謂初釋亦無有過。以性相為文。且除非字加一染字。言染思惠想一分。為悔眠為有法。取初非字及纏性字。即為宗法。取前思惠想及后性故字為因。文言彼者即是凈無記思惠想為喻。應加如如彼彼余余者。即凈無記思惠想余。即悔眠余。彼即凈無記思惠想。以宗有法取依染思惠想悔眠。同喻取非悔眠外餘思惠想。因言思惠性故。取總思惠想貫通宗．喻故皆具足。
論。不深推度及深推度
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 ．受．想之外，並且思的分位都是虛假的緣故，用蓋纏來比喻。這樣就有一部分所立的觀點不能成立。這是爲了簡要說明經部師在無心位實際設立睡眠的觀點。又可以這樣立量：真實的睡眠是與心相應的（因），比喻可以類推得知。論中第二宗法（指陳述對像）、因（理由）、比喻都安立在下文。文中的『故』字應該放在『蓋纏』之下，因為這是因所需要的。這裡是按照體性和相狀來行文，不是按照次第。前面說有無心位的人，立量應該說『非無心位』。文中省略了『無宗中有法』，因為前面的文章已經闡明，所以這裡省略不提。本疏說『非即無心必是心所』，這是二宗法，如同其餘的蓋一樣。這裡指的是比喻。又說『非無體法』，這是第三宗法，比量可以類推得知，所以這裡省略不具。然而論文中，前兩句是爲了會通各種違背之處，后兩句是爲了破斥不同的執著。
論：不是思、惠、想的纏，因為它們的體性如此。本疏如初量所說：染污的思、惠一部分成為悔，染污的思、想一部分成為眠，應該不是纏的體性，因為它們是思、惠、想。第二個量是針對惡作等，一部分不是染污的思、惠、想，這是有法，不是那些惡作等二法的體性（是法），因為它們是思、惠、想。要集說：有人說最初的解釋稍微不順文義，文義說『非思惠想』是宗法，『非是有法』，也不是因。現在我認為最初的解釋也沒有過錯，因為是按照體性和相狀來行文。姑且把『非』字加一個『染』字，說染污的思、惠、想一部分，為悔眠為有法。取最初的『非』字和『纏性』字，就作為宗法。取前面的『思惠想』和後面的『性故』字作為因。文中的『彼』字就是指清凈無記的思、惠、想作為比喻。應該加上『如如彼彼余余』，就是清凈無記的思、惠、想之外的其餘，就是悔眠之外的其餘，『彼』就是清凈無記的思、惠、想。以宗有法取依染污的思、惠、想悔眠，同喻取非悔眠之外的其餘思、惠、想。因說『思惠性故』，取總的思、惠、想貫通宗、喻，所以都具足。
論：不深入推度以及深入推度
【English Translation】 English version ．Outside of feeling (受, vedanā), perception (想, saṃjñā), and also the divisions of thought (思, cetanā) are all false, hence the analogy of coverings (蓋, āvaraṇa) and entanglements (纏, paryavasthāna). Thus, a portion of what is established cannot stand. This is to briefly explain the view of the Sautrāntika school, which actually establishes sleep in the state of no-mind. Furthermore, a syllogism can be established as follows: Actual sleep is mind-associated (因, hetu), the analogy can be inferred. In the treatise, the second subject (宗法, dharmin), reason (因, hetu), and analogy (喻, dṛṣṭānta) are all placed below. The word 'therefore' (故, tasmāt) in the text should be placed under 'coverings and entanglements' because this is what the reason requires. The text here proceeds according to essence (性, svabhāva) and characteristics (相, lakṣaṇa), not according to sequence. Those who previously stated that there is a state of no-mind should establish the syllogism as 'not a state of no-mind.' The text omits 'having a property in the subject' (無宗中有法), because the previous text has already clarified it, so it is omitted here. The commentary states, 'Not that no-mind is necessarily a mental factor,' this is the second subject, like the remaining coverings. This refers to the analogy. Furthermore, it states, 'Not a non-substantial dharma,' this is the third subject. The inference can be inferred accordingly, so it is omitted here. However, in the treatise, the first two sentences reconcile the contradictions, and the last two sentences refute different attachments.
Treatise: Not entanglements of thought (思, cetanā), wisdom (惠, prajñā), and perception (想, saṃjñā), because of their nature. The commentary, like the initial syllogism, states: Defiled thought and wisdom, a portion becomes regret (悔, kaukṛtya); defiled thought and perception, a portion becomes sleep (眠, styāna); they should not be the nature of entanglements, because they are thought, wisdom, and perception. The second syllogism is directed at remorse (惡作, kaukṛtya) and the like; a portion is not defiled thought, wisdom, and perception; this is the subject (有法, dharmin), not the nature of those two dharmas of remorse and the like (是法, dharma), because they are thought, wisdom, and perception. The Essential Collection (要集, Yōshū) states: Some say that the initial explanation is slightly inconsistent with the text. The text states 'not thought and wisdom' is the subject, 'not having a property' and also not the reason. Now I say that the initial explanation is also without fault, because the text proceeds according to essence and characteristics. For the time being, add the word 'defiled' (染, rañj) to the word 'not' (非, na), saying that a portion of defiled thought and wisdom, becoming regret and sleep, is the subject. Taking the initial word 'not' and the words 'entanglement nature' (纏性, paryavasthāna-svabhāva), it becomes the subject. Taking the preceding 'thought and wisdom' and the following words 'because of nature' (性故, svabhāva-hetu) as the reason. The word 'those' (彼, te) in the text refers to pure and neutral thought and wisdom as the analogy. One should add 'as as those those remaining remaining' (如如彼彼余余, yathā yathā te te śeṣa śeṣa), that is, the remaining outside of pure and neutral thought and wisdom, that is, the remaining outside of regret and sleep, 'those' is pure and neutral thought and wisdom. Taking the subject as relying on defiled thought and wisdom, regret and sleep, the similar analogy takes the remaining thought and wisdom outside of non-regret and sleep. The reason says 'because of the nature of thought and wisdom,' taking the general thought and wisdom to connect the subject and analogy, so all are complete.
Treatise: Not deep consideration and deep consideration.
。本疏初云。不深即不推度。以對法言不推度故。二云雖不如惠有深推度。亦淺推度。會對法雲不推度者。不深推度。要集斷云。雖有二說合為初釋。違大論文 今謂此斷何太猛乎。以會對法同瑜伽說。從何說違 西明一云。尋伺不推度時唯思為性。以無惠故。深推度時以惠為性。此釋正違瑜伽所說不深推度言 二云尋．伺必用二法假合為性。謂一剎那二用各別。不深推度是思用。深推度是惠用。此義不了。尋．伺不俱。如何二用一剎那分。若謂尋時有思伺時有惠。違論所說。若言或起尋時。或起伺時。俱依思．惠二法用分。尋．伺何別。故知尋淺度伺深度。故此論言粗轉細轉。又云二類各別。又前第四淺深推度粗細發言。雖俱依二。尋時思增名不深度。伺時惠增名深度。故五蘊論云。尋求意言思．惠差別。令心粗為性。伺察意言思．惠差別。令心細為性。此論復云思．惠合成。而顯揚論云。尋或由思於法造作。或時由惠於法推求者。據增相說。思造作勝。惠推度勝。瑜伽第五謂不深推度所緣思為體性。據尋說。若深推度所緣惠為體性。據伺論。皆約增語。實尋．伺二皆依思．惠 若爾何故雜集第二。尋．伺俱言推度不推度 答準此論意釋彼論云。尋言推度淺推。不推者不深。伺言推度者深。不推者淺。若爾伺淺度時
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：本疏一開始說：『不深即不推度』，這是因為《對法論》說不推度。接著又說：『雖不如慧有深推度，亦淺推度』，這是爲了對應《對法論》所說的不推度，即不深推度。《要集》的判斷說：『雖有二說，合為初釋，違背《大論文》』。現在我認為這個判斷是否過於武斷？因為對應《對法論》與《瑜伽師地論》的說法，又從何處說違背呢？ 西明的一種觀點認為：『尋伺不推度時，唯以思為體性，因為沒有慧的緣故；深推度時，以慧為體性』。這種解釋正好違背了《瑜伽師地論》所說的不深推度之言。另一種觀點認為：『尋伺必定要用兩種法假合為體性，即一個剎那有兩種作用，各自不同。不深推度是思的作用，深推度是慧的作用』。這個意義不明確。尋伺不同時出現，如何在一個剎那間區分兩種作用？如果說尋的時候有思，伺的時候有慧，就違背了論中所說。如果說或者生起尋的時候，或者生起伺的時候，都依靠思、慧兩種法的作用區分，那麼尋和伺有什麼區別呢？所以知道尋是淺度，伺是深度。因此此論說粗轉和細轉。又說兩類各自不同。前面第四品淺深推度粗細發言，雖然都依靠兩種法，尋的時候思增多，名為不深度；伺的時候慧增多，名為深度。所以《五蘊論》說：『尋求意言思、慧差別，令心粗為體性；伺察意言思、慧差別，令心細為體性』。此論又說思、慧合成。而《顯揚論》說：『尋或者由思對於法進行造作，或者由慧對於法進行推求』，這是根據增上的相來說的。思的造作勝過慧，慧的推度勝過思。《瑜伽師地論》第五品說不深推度所緣的思為體性，這是根據尋來說的；如果深推度所緣的慧為體性，這是根據伺來說的。都是就增上的語言來說的，實際上尋和伺都依靠思、慧。 如果這樣，那麼為什麼《雜集論》第二品中，尋伺都說推度和不推度呢？回答：按照此論的意義解釋彼論說，尋說推度是淺推，不推是不深；伺說推度是深，不推是淺。如果這樣，伺淺度的時候
【English Translation】 English version: This commentary initially states, 'Not deep means not investigation,' because the Abhidharma states there is no investigation. It then says, 'Although not as deep as the wisdom's deep investigation, there is also shallow investigation,' to correspond with the Abhidharma's statement of no investigation, meaning not deep investigation. The Yaoji concludes, 'Although there are two views, combining them into the initial explanation contradicts the Mahayana-samgraha.' Now, I wonder if this judgment is too hasty? Since it corresponds with the Abhidharma and aligns with the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, how can it be said to contradict? One view from Ximing states, 'When seeking and examining do not involve investigation, their nature is solely thought, because there is no wisdom; when there is deep investigation, their nature is wisdom.' This explanation directly contradicts the Yogacarabhumi-sastra's statement of not deep investigation. Another view states, 'Seeking and examining must use two dharmas combined as their nature, meaning one instant has two separate functions. Not deep investigation is the function of thought, deep investigation is the function of wisdom.' This meaning is unclear. Seeking and examining do not occur simultaneously, so how can two functions be distinguished in one instant? If it is said that when seeking, there is thought, and when examining, there is wisdom, it contradicts what the treatise says. If it is said that either seeking arises or examining arises, both rely on the functions of thought and wisdom to distinguish them, then what is the difference between seeking and examining? Therefore, it is known that seeking is shallow investigation, and examining is deep investigation. Thus, this treatise speaks of coarse movement and subtle movement. It also says the two categories are distinct. Earlier, the fourth chapter spoke of shallow and deep investigation, coarse and subtle expression. Although both rely on two, when seeking, thought increases, and it is called not deep; when examining, wisdom increases, and it is called deep. Therefore, the Five Skandhas Treatise says, 'Seeking, the mental expression of thought and wisdom's difference, makes the mind coarse in nature; examining, the mental expression of thought and wisdom's difference, makes the mind subtle in nature.' This treatise also says thought and wisdom combine. However, the Asanga's Compendium of Determinations says, 'Seeking is either the fabrication of dharmas by thought or the investigation of dharmas by wisdom,' which is based on the aspect of increase. The fabrication of thought surpasses wisdom, and the investigation of wisdom surpasses thought. The fifth chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says the object of not deep investigation is thought as its nature, which is based on seeking; if the object of deep investigation is wisdom as its nature, it is based on examining. All are based on the language of increase; in reality, both seeking and examining rely on thought and wisdom. If so, then why do both seeking and examining speak of investigation and non-investigation in the second chapter of the Samuccaya? Answer: According to the meaning of this treatise, explain that treatise by saying that seeking's investigation is shallow investigation, and non-investigation is not deep; examining's investigation is deep, and non-investigation is shallow. If so, when examining shallowly
與尋何別。復如何此論云不深及深推度類別 答伺言不推。望尋猶深。但望自伺惠增深度。思增不深推。故亦無失。故雜集論尋．伺俱云依思依惠者。于推度不推度位。如其次第不得別以淺度配尋。深推配伺 問若爾何故雜集復云尋．伺二種行相相類。故以粗．細建立差別 答亦不違。尋．伺俱于意言推度之行相相類。非於淺深粗細相類。彼論且約他用粗細建立。此論約自行相。此論亦言。尋令心粗轉。伺令心細轉。各據一義。盡理應言。尋．伺于境淺深推度。令心於境粗細而轉。如次差別。
論。尋伺與識俱不俱門。本疏云。自性有二。一尋．伺為體。即雜集論第二所說自性分別。即七分別中有相分別。二非尋．伺為體。即此論第五。及攝論第一。許五識有自性分別。但不許有隨念．計度二分別故 問論不說言五識中有自性分別。但破於他意識應無隨念．計度二種 答論雖不明言五識有。但破不許有隨念．計度。意即許有自性分別。不爾何故二論俱破二種分別不難自性。又有二義。一依遍義。即瑜伽云。有分別非尋伺。及唯識．攝論。許五識有自性分別。二不遍義。即瑜伽云。謂諸尋．伺必是分別。對法據此三種分別。云唯一意識由三分別故有分別。又瑜伽論第五說云。或有分別非尋伺。謂望出世智所餘一切
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：尋（Vitarka）和伺（Vicara）有什麼區別？又如何解釋《雜集論》中說尋不深，伺深，並推度類別？ 答：伺不推度。從期望上來說，望尋比尋更深。但從自身來說，伺憑藉智慧增加了深度，憑藉思考增加了不深推度，因此也沒有錯誤。《雜集論》中說尋和伺都依賴於思和慧，這是指在推度與不推度的位置上，按照次序不能將淺度與尋相配，將深推與伺相配。 問：如果這樣，為什麼《雜集論》又說尋和伺兩種行相相似，所以用粗和細來建立差別？ 答：這也不矛盾。尋和伺都在意言推度的行相上相似，而不是在淺深粗細上相似。那個論典只是根據其他作用來建立粗細，這個論典是根據自身行相。這個論典也說，尋使心粗轉，伺使心細轉，各自根據一個意義。應該說，尋和伺對於境界的淺深推度，使心對於境界粗細而轉，按照次序有差別。
論：尋伺與識俱不俱門。本疏說：自性有兩種。一是尋和伺為體，即《雜集論》第二所說的自性分別，即七分別中有相分別。二是非尋和伺為體，即此論第五，以及《攝論》第一，允許五識有自性分別，但不允許有隨念和計度兩種分別。 問：論中沒有說五識中有自性分別，只是破斥他人認為意識沒有隨念和計度兩種分別的觀點。 答：論中雖然沒有明確說五識有自性分別，但破斥了不許有隨念和計度，意思就是允許有自性分別。否則，為什麼兩個論典都破斥兩種分別，而不難自性分別？又有兩種意義。一是依遍義，即《瑜伽師地論》說，有分別不是尋伺，以及《唯識論》、《攝大乘論》允許五識有自性分別。二是不遍義，即《瑜伽師地論》說，凡是尋和伺，必定是分別。對法論根據這三種分別，說只有意識由三種分別，所以有分別。又《瑜伽師地論》第五說，或者有分別不是尋伺，是指除了出世智以外的所有一切。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: What is the difference between Vitarka (尋, initial application of thought) and Vicara (伺, sustained application of thought)? And how to explain the statement in the Abhidharmasamuccaya that Vitarka is not deep, while Vicara is deep, and categorizes according to inference? Answer: Vicara does not infer. From the perspective of expectation, hoping for Vicara is deeper than Vitarka. However, from its own perspective, Vicara increases depth through wisdom and increases non-deep inference through thought, so there is no error. The Abhidharmasamuccaya states that both Vitarka and Vicara rely on thought and wisdom, which means that in the positions of inference and non-inference, one cannot match shallowness with Vitarka and deep inference with Vicara in order. Question: If so, why does the Abhidharmasamuccaya also say that the two characteristics of Vitarka and Vicara are similar, so they establish differences based on grossness and subtlety? Answer: This is not contradictory. Vitarka and Vicara are similar in the characteristic of ideational inference, but not in shallowness, depth, grossness, and subtlety. That treatise establishes grossness and subtlety based on other functions, while this treatise is based on its own characteristics. This treatise also says that Vitarka makes the mind turn coarsely, and Vicara makes the mind turn subtly, each based on one meaning. It should be said that Vitarka and Vicara, regarding the shallowness and depth of inference of the object, cause the mind to turn coarsely or subtly towards the object, with differences in order.
Treatise: The section on whether Vitarka and Vicara are concurrent or not concurrent with consciousness. The commentary says: There are two kinds of self-nature. One is that Vitarka and Vicara are the substance, which is the self-nature discrimination mentioned in the second part of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, namely the aspect discrimination among the seven discriminations. The second is that Vitarka and Vicara are not the substance, which is the fifth part of this treatise, and the first part of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha, which allows the five consciousnesses to have self-nature discrimination, but does not allow the two discriminations of recollection and conceptualization. Question: The treatise does not say that there is self-nature discrimination in the five consciousnesses, but only refutes the view that the mind consciousness should not have the two kinds of recollection and conceptualization. Answer: Although the treatise does not explicitly say that the five consciousnesses have self-nature discrimination, it refutes the denial of recollection and conceptualization, which means that it allows self-nature discrimination. Otherwise, why do both treatises refute the two discriminations without challenging self-nature discrimination? There are also two meanings. One is according to the pervasive meaning, that is, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that there is discrimination that is not Vitarka and Vicara, and the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi and Mahāyānasaṃgraha allow the five consciousnesses to have self-nature discrimination. The second is the non-pervasive meaning, that is, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that all Vitarka and Vicara are necessarily discrimination. The Abhidharma treatises, based on these three discriminations, say that only the mind consciousness has discrimination because of the three discriminations. Also, the fifth part of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that there is discrimination that is not Vitarka and Vicara, referring to everything other than supramundane wisdom.
三界心．心所。皆是分別而非尋伺。既名分別復非尋．伺。若非自性名為分別。豈由他耶。不得定執二論自性即是尋．伺。許彼五有。但是隨轉縱破小乘。無論說故 問既約自性。八識皆有任運分別。七．八何無 答約三乘通不說七．八。
問七分別其義云何 答略三門辨。一列名。二出體。三諸門。列名瑜伽第一云。謂有相分別．無相分別．任運分別．尋求分別．伺察分別．染污分別．不染污分別。雜集第二亦有七分別。名同瑜伽。但任運一在第一列。余依次第 二出體者。瑜伽論七並以尋．伺為體。故瑜伽第五云。尋．伺差別者。有七種差別。即七分別 又云諸尋．伺皆分別。有分別非尋．伺。謂望出世智所餘一切三界心心所。若對法七除任運一。余亦尋．伺為體。故對法第二以三攝七除任運一。皆三所攝。三唯第六。即瑜伽第一。意不共業尋．伺為體。任運一種。此論會云即是五識。對法復云。謂五識身。故即五識為任運體 三分別體。隨念．計度亦尋．伺為體。自性一種有其二說。準雜集論唯在意識。即尋．伺為體。準攝論．唯識許五識有。若隨轉門亦尋．伺為體。若真實義即五識為性。上總相出。若別出體。廣如慈恩對法疏辨 諸門分別者。一約三．七相攝。二約識．地有無。三漏．無漏。四依問答
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 三界（Trailokya，欲界、色界、無色界）的心和心所（Citta-caitta，心理活動和心理因素），都是分別（Vikalpa，區分）而不是尋（Vitarka，粗略的觀察）和伺（Vicara，精細的觀察）。既然名為分別，又不是尋和伺。如果不是自性（Svabhava，自身本性）名為分別，難道是由他性（Parabhava，其他本性）嗎？不能夠執著地認為二論的自性就是尋和伺。如果承認彼五有（指五識），那只是隨其轉變，即使破斥小乘（Hinayana），也無論如何要這樣說。問：既然是就自性而言，八識（Astvijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識、阿賴耶識）都有任運分別（自動產生的分別），為什麼第七識（末那識，Manas-vijnana）和第八識（阿賴耶識，Alaya-vijnana）沒有？答：這是就三乘（Triyana，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）共通的教義而言，所以沒有說第七識和第八識。
問：第七分別的含義是什麼？答：略用三個方面來辨析。一是列出名稱，二是說明本體，三是各種門類。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）第一卷說：『有相分別（有對象的分辨）、無相分別（無對象的分辨）、任運分別（自然而然的分辨）、尋求分別（尋求時的分辨）、伺察分別（仔細觀察時的分辨）、染污分別（被污染的分辨）、不染污分別（未被污染的分辨）。』《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第二卷也有七種分別，名稱與《瑜伽師地論》相同，只是任運分別排在第一位，其餘按照順序排列。二、關於本體，《瑜伽師地論》認為七種分別都以尋和伺為本體。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五卷說：『尋和伺的差別在於有七種差別，即七種分別。』又說：『所有的尋和伺都是分別，但有分別不是尋和伺，指的是除了出世智（Lokottara-jnana，超越世間的智慧）以外的一切三界的心和心所。』如果按照《對法論》（Abhidharma-sastra）的說法，七種分別中除了任運分別，其餘都以尋和伺為本體。所以《對法論》第二卷用三種來概括七種分別，除了任運分別，其餘都屬於這三種。三、只有第六識（意識，Manovijnana）即《瑜伽師地論》第一卷所說的意不共業（與意識不共的業）以尋和伺為本體。任運分別這一種，《瑜伽師地論》解釋說是五識（Panca-vijnana，眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）。《對法論》也說：『指的是五識身。』所以就是以五識為任運分別的本體。三、分別的本體，隨念（Anusmriti，隨順憶念）、計度（Parikalpita，推測衡量）也以尋和伺為本體。自性這一種有兩種說法。按照《雜集論》，只在意識中才有，即以尋和伺為本體。按照《攝大乘論》（Mahayanasamgraha）和《唯識論》（Vijnaptimatrata-sastra），允許五識也有。如果從隨轉門（隨其轉變的方面）來說，也以尋和伺為本體。如果從真實義來說，就是以五識為自性。以上是總的方面來說明。如果要分別說明本體，詳細的可以參考慈恩（窺基）的《對法疏》（Abhidharmakosa-tika）。各種門類的分別：一是關於三和七的相互包含關係，二是關於識和地的有無，三是關於有漏（Sasrava，有煩惱）和無漏（Anasrava，無煩惱），四是根據問答來分析。
【English Translation】 English version The mind and mental factors (Citta-caitta) of the three realms (Trailokya), are all discriminations (Vikalpa) and not investigation (Vitarka) and analysis (Vicara). Since it is called discrimination, it is not investigation and analysis. If it is not self-nature (Svabhava) that is called discrimination, is it due to other-nature (Parabhava)? One cannot stubbornly hold that the self-nature of the two treatises is investigation and analysis. If one admits the existence of the five consciousnesses, it is only following their transformations, even if refuting the Hinayana, one must say so regardless. Question: Since it is in terms of self-nature, all eight consciousnesses (Astvijnana) have spontaneous discrimination, why do the seventh (Manas-vijnana) and eighth (Alaya-vijnana) consciousnesses not have it? Answer: This is in terms of the common teachings of the three vehicles (Triyana), so the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are not mentioned.
Question: What is the meaning of the seventh discrimination? Answer: Briefly analyze it from three aspects. First, list the names; second, explain the substance; and third, the various categories. The first volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' says: 'There are discrimination with object (having object of discrimination), discrimination without object (without object of discrimination), spontaneous discrimination (naturally arising discrimination), seeking discrimination (discrimination during seeking), scrutinizing discrimination (discrimination during careful observation), defiled discrimination (contaminated discrimination), and undefiled discrimination (uncontaminated discrimination).' The second volume of the 'Abhidharmasamuccaya' also has seven discriminations, with the same names as the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra', except that spontaneous discrimination is listed first, and the rest are arranged in order. Second, regarding the substance, the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' considers all seven discriminations to have investigation and analysis as their substance. Therefore, the fifth volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' says: 'The difference between investigation and analysis lies in having seven differences, which are the seven discriminations.' It also says: 'All investigation and analysis are discriminations, but there are discriminations that are not investigation and analysis, referring to all minds and mental factors of the three realms except for transcendental wisdom (Lokottara-jnana).' According to the 'Abhidharma-sastra', among the seven discriminations, except for spontaneous discrimination, the rest have investigation and analysis as their substance. Therefore, the second volume of the 'Abhidharma-sastra' uses three categories to summarize the seven discriminations, excluding spontaneous discrimination, the rest belong to these three categories. Third, only the sixth consciousness (Manovijnana), that is, the non-common karma of the mind (karma not shared with consciousness) mentioned in the first volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra', has investigation and analysis as its substance. This type of spontaneous discrimination, the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' explains as the five consciousnesses (Panca-vijnana). The 'Abhidharma-sastra' also says: 'It refers to the body of the five consciousnesses.' Therefore, it is the five consciousnesses that are the substance of spontaneous discrimination. Third, the substance of discrimination, recollection (Anusmriti) and conceptualization (Parikalpita) also have investigation and analysis as their substance. There are two views on the nature of self-nature. According to the 'Abhidharmasamuccaya', it only exists in the consciousness, that is, investigation and analysis as its substance. According to the 'Mahayanasamgraha' and 'Vijnaptimatrata-sastra', it is allowed that the five consciousnesses also have it. If viewed from the aspect of transformation, it also has investigation and analysis as its substance. If viewed from the true meaning, it is the five consciousnesses as its nature. The above is a general explanation. If one wants to explain the substance separately, detailed information can be found in Ci En's (Kuiji) 'Abhidharmakosa-tika'. The distinctions of various categories: one is about the mutual inclusion relationship between three and seven, two is about the presence or absence of consciousness and grounds, three is about defiled (Sasrava) and undefiled (Anasrava), and four is based on question and answer analysis.
分別 相攝有二。一以三攝七。二以七攝七。以三攝七有二。一攝雜集七。二攝瑜伽七 攝雜集七者。先顯三分別行相。後方辨攝。雜集論云。自性分別者。謂于現在所受諸行自相行分別。隨念分別者。謂于昔曾所受諸行。追念行分別。計度分別者。謂于去．來．今不現．見．事思構行分別。初依現境自相而緣。次緣過去。后通三世。于所緣境異相分別 次辨攝者。依不遍行相。雜集三分別不攝任運。彼釋任運。謂五識身。明三分別唯意識故 彼云於六識中幾有分別。答唯一意。由三分別故有分別。為此不攝七中初一。有相一種即自性．隨念二分別攝。以自性緣現在。隨念緣過去。有相一種通緣過．現故此二攝。故彼論云。有相分別。謂自性．隨念。取過．現境種種相故。此意由有相取過．現境種種相故。彼二種攝 無相分別但緣未來。計度分別通緣三世。文雖不言與三相攝。實計度攝。以緣未來非初二攝。計度小分故計度攝。后四皆是計度所攝。彼論釋云。所餘分別皆用計度分別以為自性。所以者何。以思度故。或時尋求。或時伺察。或時染污。或不染污。三中據總合之為一。七中約別故離為四。以此準知。后四皆通緣於三世唯是尋．伺。彼云以思度故前三不定。寬狹而言七寬三狹。據遍行相。唯識等說。任運即是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 分別相攝有兩種。第一種是以三攝七，第二種是以七攝七。以三攝七有兩種，一是攝《雜集論》中的七種分別，二是攝《瑜伽師地論》中的七種分別。 攝《雜集論》中的七種分別：先闡明三種分別的行相，然後辨析如何攝納。 《雜集論》中說：『自性分別』，是指對現在所感受的諸行，就其自相進行分別。 『隨念分別』，是指對過去曾經感受過的諸行，追憶思念而進行分別。 『計度分別』，是指對過去、未來、現在，不顯現、不見的事物，進行思考構想而進行分別。』 最初是依于目前的境界，緣于諸法的自相；其次是緣於過去；最後通於三世。對於所緣的境界，從不同的方面進行分別。 其次辨析如何攝納：依據不普遍的行相，《雜集論》的三種分別不包括任運分別。該論解釋任運分別，是指五識身。說明三種分別只是意識的作用。因此，這三種分別不攝納七種分別中的第一種。有相分別這一種，即由自性分別和隨念分別這兩種分別所攝納。因為自性分別緣于現在，隨念分別緣於過去，有相分別通於緣過去和現在，因此這兩種分別可以攝納有相分別。所以該論說：『有相分別，是指自性分別和隨念分別，因為它們取過去和現在的種種境相。』 這意思是說，因為有相分別取過去和現在的種種境相，所以被這兩種分別所攝納。 無相分別只緣于未來，計度分別通於緣三世。經文雖然沒有說與三種分別如何相攝，但實際上是被計度分別所攝納。因為緣于未來，不是最初兩種分別所能攝納的，而且是計度分別的一小部分，所以被計度分別所攝納。后四種分別都是被計度分別所攝納。該論解釋說：『其餘的分別都是用計度分別作為其自性。』 為什麼這樣說呢？因為它們都經過了思考衡量。有時是尋求，有時是伺察，有時是染污的，有時是不染污的。三種分別是從總體上合為一種，七種分別是從類別上分為四種。由此可以推知，后四種分別都通於緣三世，只是尋和伺。該論說因為它們都經過了思考衡量，所以前三種分別是不定的。從寬泛和狹窄來說，七種分別寬泛，三種分別狹窄。從普遍的行相來說，《唯識論》等論典說，任運就是。 English version There are two ways in which distinctions are mutually inclusive. The first is to include the seven within the three; the second is to include the seven within the seven. There are two ways to include the seven within the three: first, to include the seven distinctions in the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma); second, to include the seven distinctions in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice). Including the seven distinctions in the Abhidharma-samuccaya: First, the characteristics of the three distinctions are explained; then, how they include the seven is analyzed. The Abhidharma-samuccaya says: 『Svabhāva-vikalpa (Distinction of self-nature) refers to distinguishing the self-nature of the phenomena experienced in the present. Anusmṛti-vikalpa (Distinction of recollection) refers to distinguishing by recollecting the phenomena experienced in the past. Vitarka-vikalpa (Distinction of conceptualization) refers to distinguishing by thinking and constructing phenomena that are not manifest or seen in the past, future, and present.』 Initially, it relies on the present realm, focusing on the self-nature of phenomena; then, it focuses on the past; finally, it encompasses the three times. It distinguishes the objects of focus from different aspects. Next, how they include the seven is analyzed: Based on the non-pervasive characteristic, the three distinctions in the Abhidharma-samuccaya do not include nimitta (spontaneous thought). The treatise explains nimitta as the five consciousnesses, clarifying that the three distinctions are only functions of the mind consciousness. Therefore, these three distinctions do not include the first of the seven distinctions. Sa-ākāra (With-image) includes both svabhāva and anusmṛti. Because svabhāva focuses on the present and anusmṛti focuses on the past, and sa-ākāra focuses on both the past and present, these two include sa-ākāra. Therefore, the treatise says: 『Sa-ākāra-vikalpa refers to svabhāva and anusmṛti, because they grasp various aspects of past and present realms.』 This means that because sa-ākāra grasps various aspects of past and present realms, it is included by these two. Nirākāra (Without-image) only focuses on the future, while vitarka focuses on all three times. Although the text does not explicitly state how it is mutually inclusive with the three distinctions, it is actually included by vitarka. Because it focuses on the future, it cannot be included by the first two, and it is a small part of vitarka, so it is included by vitarka. The last four are all included by vitarka. The treatise explains: 『The remaining distinctions all use vitarka as their self-nature.』 Why is this so? Because they all involve thinking and deliberation. Sometimes it is seeking, sometimes it is investigating, sometimes it is defiled, and sometimes it is undefiled. The three distinctions are combined into one from a general perspective, while the seven distinctions are divided into four from a specific perspective. From this, it can be inferred that the last four distinctions all focus on the three times, and are only vicāra (coarse inquiry) and vitarka (subtle inquiry). The treatise says that because they all involve thinking and deliberation, the first three distinctions are uncertain. In terms of broadness and narrowness, the seven distinctions are broad, and the three distinctions are narrow. In terms of pervasive characteristics, the Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-only) and other treatises say that nimitta is.
【English Translation】 There are two ways in which distinctions are mutually inclusive. The first is to include the seven within the three; the second is to include the seven within the seven. There are two ways to include the seven within the three: first, to include the seven distinctions in the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma); second, to include the seven distinctions in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice). Including the seven distinctions in the Abhidharma-samuccaya: First, the characteristics of the three distinctions are explained; then, how they include the seven is analyzed. The Abhidharma-samuccaya says: 'Svabhāva-vikalpa (Distinction of self-nature) refers to distinguishing the self-nature of the phenomena experienced in the present. Anusmṛti-vikalpa (Distinction of recollection) refers to distinguishing by recollecting the phenomena experienced in the past. Vitarka-vikalpa (Distinction of conceptualization) refers to distinguishing by thinking and constructing phenomena that are not manifest or seen in the past, future, and present.' Initially, it relies on the present realm, focusing on the self-nature of phenomena; then, it focuses on the past; finally, it encompasses the three times. It distinguishes the objects of focus from different aspects. Next, how they include the seven is analyzed: Based on the non-pervasive characteristic, the three distinctions in the Abhidharma-samuccaya do not include nimitta (spontaneous thought). The treatise explains nimitta as the five consciousnesses, clarifying that the three distinctions are only functions of the mind consciousness. Therefore, these three distinctions do not include the first of the seven distinctions. Sa-ākāra (With-image) includes both svabhāva and anusmṛti. Because svabhāva focuses on the present and anusmṛti focuses on the past, and sa-ākāra focuses on both the past and present, these two include sa-ākāra. Therefore, the treatise says: 'Sa-ākāra-vikalpa refers to svabhāva and anusmṛti, because they grasp various aspects of past and present realms.' This means that because sa-ākāra grasps various aspects of past and present realms, it is included by these two. Nirākāra (Without-image) only focuses on the future, while vitarka focuses on all three times. Although the text does not explicitly state how it is mutually inclusive with the three distinctions, it is actually included by vitarka. Because it focuses on the future, it cannot be included by the first two, and it is a small part of vitarka, so it is included by vitarka. The last four are all included by vitarka. The treatise explains: 'The remaining distinctions all use vitarka as their self-nature.' Why is this so? Because they all involve thinking and deliberation. Sometimes it is seeking, sometimes it is investigating, sometimes it is defiled, and sometimes it is undefiled. The three distinctions are combined into one from a general perspective, while the seven distinctions are divided into four from a specific perspective. From this, it can be inferred that the last four distinctions all focus on the three times, and are only vicāra (coarse inquiry) and vitarka (subtle inquiry). The treatise says that because they all involve thinking and deliberation, the first three distinctions are uncertain. In terms of broadness and narrowness, the seven distinctions are broad, and the three distinctions are narrow. In terms of pervasive characteristics, the Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-only) and other treatises say that nimitta is.
自性所攝。有漏心．心所。因循取境異無漏故名。為分別。是心．心所本自性故名為自性。自性即分別。又自性言亦通境說。雜集論云。如所緣相無異分別。于自境界任運轉故。即自性之分別。名自性分別。故知任運亦自性攝 次三攝彼瑜伽七者。依不遍行相。唯是意識不共業故。即全相攝。以其三．七俱用尋．伺二法為體。即尋．伺皆分別句。有相即隨念攝。瑜伽解有相云。于先所受義。諸根成熟善名言者。于先即緣過去境故隨念攝。無相即自性及隨念攝。緣過．現故。故彼。論云。無相分別者。謂隨先所引。及嬰兒等不善名言者所有分別。任運分別亦自性攝。緣現在故。故彼論云。隨境勢力。任運而轉所有分別。故自性攝。餘四同前計度所攝。通緣境故 依遍行相。自性少分攝於任運。即瑜伽論第五所說。或有分別非尋伺句 次以七攝七者。以雜集七。攝瑜伽七。雜集任運不攝瑜伽。非尋伺故。有相少分攝伽有相。彼緣過．現。瑜伽有相唯緣過去。論云謂先所受義。既說先受。故唯過去 或通現．過。論云于先所受義諸根成熟善名言者所起分別。先受之類亦云先受。即全相攝 無相攝彼無相少分。瑜伽通緣世。雜集唯未來 或瑜伽無相亦雜集論有相所攝。彼論釋云。隨先所引。及嬰兒等不善名者所有分別。但約善
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 自性所攝的分別。有漏的心和心所，因為順著因緣取境，不同於無漏，所以稱為『分別』。因為這些心和心所的本性就是分別，所以名為『自性』。『自性』即是『分別』。另外，『自性』一詞也可以從境的角度來說。《雜集論》中說：『如所緣相無異分別，于自境界任運轉故。』這就是自性的分別，名為自性分別。因此可知任運也是自性所攝。 其次，用三類（自性、有相、無相）來攝取《瑜伽師地論》中的七類（尋、伺、有相、無相、任運、計度、隨念）分別：依據不遍行的相，唯有意識的不共業，所以是全相攝。因為三類和七類都用尋和伺二法作為體，所以尋和伺都屬於分別句。有相即隨念所攝。《瑜伽師地論》解釋有相說：『于先所受義，諸根成熟善名言者』，因為『于先』即是緣過去境，所以屬於隨念所攝。無相即自性和隨念所攝，因為緣過去和現在。所以該論說：『無相分別者，謂隨先所引，及嬰兒等不善名言者所有分別。』任運分別也屬於自性所攝，因為緣現在。所以該論說：『隨境勢力，任運而轉所有分別。』故屬於自性所攝。其餘四類（尋、伺、計度、隨念）同前計度所攝，因為通緣一切境。 依據遍行相，自性少分攝於任運，即《瑜伽師地論》第五所說：『或有分別非尋伺句』。 其次，用七類來攝取七類：用《雜集論》的七類，攝取《瑜伽師地論》的七類。《雜集論》的任運不攝《瑜伽師地論》的尋和伺，因為不是尋伺。《雜集論》的有相少分攝《瑜伽師地論》的有相，因為前者緣過去和現在，後者《瑜伽師地論》的有相唯緣過去。《瑜伽師地論》說：『謂先所受義』，既然說是『先受』，所以唯是過去。 或者也通於現在和過去。《瑜伽師地論》說：『于先所受義諸根成熟善名言者所起分別』，『先受之類』也說是『先受』，即是全相攝。 《雜集論》的無相攝《瑜伽師地論》的無相少分，《瑜伽師地論》通緣三世，《雜集論》唯緣未來。 或者《瑜伽師地論》的無相也被《雜集論》的有相所攝。該論解釋說：『隨先所引，及嬰兒等不善名者所有分別』，但約善名言。
【English Translation】 English version: Discrimination (Vikalpa) included in Self-nature (Svabhāva). Defiled mind (Sāsrava-citta) and mental factors (caitta), because they follow conditions and grasp objects, unlike undefiled (Anāsrava) ones, are called 'Discrimination'. Because the very nature of these minds and mental factors is discrimination, it is called 'Self-nature'. 'Self-nature' is 'Discrimination'. Furthermore, the term 'Self-nature' can also be explained from the perspective of the object (Viṣaya). The Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'Like the perceived object, there is no difference in discrimination, because it operates freely in its own realm.' This is the discrimination of self-nature, called Self-nature Discrimination. Therefore, it can be known that effortless (Animitta) is also included in Self-nature. Secondly, using the three categories (Self-nature, With-image (Sākāra), Without-image (Nirākāra)) to encompass the seven categories (Seeking (Vitarka), Examining (Vicāra), With-image, Without-image, Effortless, Deliberate (Parikalpita), Recollection (Anusmṛti)) of discrimination in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra: According to the aspect of non-pervasive (Apratisaṃkhyā) functioning, only the non-common karma of consciousness (Vijñāna) is included in the entire aspect. Because the three and seven categories both use the two dharmas of seeking and examining as their essence, seeking and examining both belong to the sentence of discrimination. With-image is included in recollection. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra explains With-image as: 'Regarding the meaning previously received, those with roots matured and good expressions', because 'previously' means relating to past objects, so it belongs to recollection. Without-image is included in Self-nature and Recollection, because it relates to the past and present. Therefore, that treatise says: 'Without-image discrimination refers to the discrimination that follows what was previously introduced, and the unskilled expressions of infants, etc.' Effortless discrimination also belongs to Self-nature, because it relates to the present. Therefore, that treatise says: 'Following the power of the object, the discrimination that operates effortlessly.' Therefore, it belongs to Self-nature. The remaining four categories (Seeking, Examining, Deliberate, Recollection) are the same as the previously calculated, because they universally relate to all objects. According to the aspect of pervasive functioning, a small part of Self-nature is included in Effortless, as stated in the fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra: 'Or there is discrimination that is not a sentence of seeking and examining.' Next, using the seven categories to encompass the seven categories: Using the seven categories of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, encompass the seven categories of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra. The Effortless of the Abhidharmasamuccaya does not encompass the Seeking and Examining of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, because it is not seeking and examining. A small part of the With-image of the Abhidharmasamuccaya encompasses the With-image of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, because the former relates to the past and present, while the latter, the With-image of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, only relates to the past. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Regarding the meaning previously received', since it says 'previously received', it is only the past. Or it also connects to the present and past. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'The discrimination that arises from those with roots matured and good expressions regarding the meaning previously received', 'the category of previously received' is also said to be 'previously received', which is the entire aspect. The Without-image of the Abhidharmasamuccaya encompasses a small part of the Without-image of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra universally relates to the three times (past, present, future), while the Abhidharmasamuccaya only relates to the future. Or the Without-image of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is also encompassed by the With-image of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. That treatise explains: 'The discrimination that follows what was previously introduced, and the unskilled expressions of infants, etc.', but only about good expressions.
不善言分有無相。緣境無異故。有相攝。前解為勝 任運據通攝彼少分。以依尋．伺及自性別 據不遍說。雜集任運不攝瑜伽任運分別。體性別故。余各如名自類相攝。說無別故 約識．地分別者。初約識。后約地。約識明者。且三分別約遍行相。自性分別通八識有。計度分別通六．七識。尋．伺為體第七識無。恒審思量虛妄計度第七識有。不爾執我是何分別。體非尋．伺而依思惠立此分別。不遍行相唯在第六。如雜集說唯第六識。更不通余 雜集七中任運分別即通五．八。余唯第六。上據非遍。遍行相者。非諸分別皆尋．伺為體。瑜伽第五云。有分別非尋．伺故。有相亦緣現在。復攝自性可通六識。任運既緣現境同於自性。可通七識。唯除第七。以恒計度故。五在第六除無相一。餘四通第七。計度攝故。準瑜伽釋。行境不違第七識故。瑜伽七中不遍行相。唯第六識。說是第六不共業故。若遍行相有相無相是率爾境引至等流。名先所受．隨先所引。即有相．無相．任運．染污．及不染污通前六識。若過去境名先所受．隨先所引。即除初二。不通五識。三通五識。染污通緣三世境故。于現在境執著。俱行所起分別。或隨與一本隨煩惱相應所起法執。既通五識中。有執著俱行所起分別。故通五有。與信等俱名不染污。故亦
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『不善言分別』是有相還是無相？因為所緣的境沒有差別，所以是有相所攝。前面的解釋更為殊勝。『任運分別』就普遍性而言，可以涵蓋前面所說的少部分，因為它依賴於尋（Vitarka，粗分別）和伺（Vicara，細分別）以及自身的體性差別。這是就其不普遍性而言。在《雜集論》中，『任運分別』不包括《瑜伽師地論》中的『任運分別』，因為它們的體性不同。其餘的分別，各自按照名稱歸入自己的類別，因為沒有說它們之間有差別。 如果從識和地的角度來分別，首先是從識的角度，然後是從地的角度。從識的角度來說明，暫且說三種分別（自性分別、計度分別、任運分別）是就遍行相而言的。『自性分別』通於八識都有。『計度分別』通於第六識和第七識。以尋和伺為體性的分別，第七識沒有，因為第七識是恒常審思量，虛妄計度。第七識有的是虛妄計度，否則，執著『我』是什麼分別呢？它的體性不是尋和伺，而是依靠思和慧來建立這種分別。不遍行相的分別只在第六識中，如《雜集論》所說，只在第六識，不再通於其他識。 《雜集論》第七卷中，『任運分別』通於第五識和第八識，其餘的只在第六識。上面是就非遍行相而言。就遍行相而言，不是所有的分別都以尋和伺為體性。《瑜伽師地論》第五卷說，有分別不是尋和伺。有相也緣于現在。又涵蓋自性，可以通於六識。任運既然緣于現在的境，與自性相同，可以通於七識，唯獨除去第七識，因為它恒常計度。第五識在第六識中，除去無相，其餘四種通於第七識，因為被計度所攝。按照《瑜伽師地論》的解釋，行境不違背第七識。在《瑜伽師地論》第七卷中，不遍行相唯獨在第六識，因為說是第六識的不共業。如果是遍行相，有相和無相是率爾境（Sahasa，突然出現的境界）引導至等流（Nisyanda，相續流注），名為先所受、隨先所引，即有相、無相、任運、染污以及不染污，通於前六識。如果是過去境，名為先所受、隨先所引，那就除去最初的兩種（有相、無相），不通於第五識。三種（任運、染污、不染污）通於第五識，因為染污通於緣三世境。在現在境中執著，與執著俱行所產生的分別，或者隨順與根本隨煩惱相應的所生法執，既然通於第五識中，有執著俱行所產生的分別，所以通於五識都有。與信等俱行，名為不染污，所以也通於五識。
【English Translation】 English version Is 'ill-spoken discrimination' with-form (有相, Sākāra) or without-form (無相, Nirākāra)? Because there is no difference in the object cognized, it is included in 'with-form'. The previous explanation is superior. 'Effortless discrimination' (任運分別, Renyun fenbie) universally encompasses the aforementioned smaller portion, because it relies on Vitarka (尋, rough investigation) and Vicara (伺, subtle investigation) and its own distinct nature. This is in terms of its non-universality. In the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論, Zajilun), 'effortless discrimination' does not include the 'effortless discrimination' in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Yuqiashidilun), because their natures are different. The remaining discriminations are each categorized according to their names, because it is not said that there is a difference between them. If we differentiate from the perspective of consciousness (識, Vijñāna) and ground (地, Bhūmi), first from the perspective of consciousness, then from the perspective of ground. Explaining from the perspective of consciousness, let's say that the three discriminations (self-nature discrimination, conceptual discrimination, effortless discrimination) are in terms of pervasive characteristics. 'Self-nature discrimination' is common to all eight consciousnesses. 'Conceptual discrimination' is common to the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. Discrimination whose nature is Vitarka and Vicara is absent in the seventh consciousness, because the seventh consciousness is constantly and deliberately thinking and falsely conceptualizing. What the seventh consciousness has is false conceptualization; otherwise, what discrimination is it that clings to 'I'? Its nature is not Vitarka and Vicara, but it relies on thought (思, Cetana) and wisdom (慧, Prajñā) to establish this discrimination. Discrimination with non-pervasive characteristics is only in the sixth consciousness, as the Abhidharmasamuccaya says, only in the sixth consciousness, and does not extend to other consciousnesses. In the seventh volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, 'effortless discrimination' is common to the fifth and eighth consciousnesses, and the rest are only in the sixth consciousness. The above is in terms of non-pervasive characteristics. In terms of pervasive characteristics, not all discriminations have Vitarka and Vicara as their nature. The fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that there are discriminations that are not Vitarka and Vicara. 'With-form' also cognizes the present. It also encompasses self-nature, which can be common to the six consciousnesses. Since effortless discrimination cognizes the present object, it is the same as self-nature and can be common to the seven consciousnesses, except for the seventh consciousness, because it is constantly conceptualizing. The fifth consciousness in the sixth consciousness, except for 'without-form', the remaining four are common to the seventh consciousness, because they are included in conceptualization. According to the explanation in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, the object cognized does not contradict the seventh consciousness. In the seventh volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, non-pervasive characteristics are only in the sixth consciousness, because it is said to be the non-common karma of the sixth consciousness. If it is a pervasive characteristic, 'with-form' and 'without-form' are Sahasa (率爾境, suddenly arising objects) leading to Nisyanda (等流, continuous flow), called previously received and subsequently led, that is, 'with-form', 'without-form', 'effortless', 'defiled', and 'undefiled', common to the first six consciousnesses. If it is a past object, it is called previously received and subsequently led, then the first two (with-form, without-form) are removed, and it is not common to the fifth consciousness. The three (effortless, defiled, undefiled) are common to the fifth consciousness, because defiled is common to cognizing objects of the three times. Clinging to the present object, the discrimination arising together with clinging, or the Dharma-clinging arising in accordance with the fundamental afflictions, since it is common to the fifth consciousness, there is discrimination arising together with clinging, so it is common to all five consciousnesses. Arising together with faith (信, Śraddhā) and so on is called undefiled, so it is also common to the five consciousnesses.
通五 依地分別。準局行相尋．伺為體。則系欲界及初靜慮。若約依起得通九地。上得起下尋．伺法故。九潤生心容俱起故。若通行相準所依識隨地有無。漏無漏分別者。準瑜伽第五。諸分別皆有漏。論云。謂望出世智所依一切三界心．心所皆是分別故。又釋。或通無漏。言望出世智者。據無分別智名為出世。后智即名世出世智。以緣俗故亦名世間。即如經論說起世間心是。即名分別故。正思推在因即用尋．伺為體。辨中邊論名分別支。大論復云諸尋．伺皆分別。故通無漏 依問答分別者。一問準瑜伽第一。尋．伺是意不共業攝。七種分別尋．伺為體。如何得通余識餘地 答準瑜伽第五云。若尋．伺皆分別。有分別非尋伺。準此二句。只言尋．伺必是七分別。不言七分別皆定是尋．伺。不爾者為如是句答。由有分別非皆尋．伺。攝論．唯識。許自性一通六識有。雜集論許任運分別即五識身。不爾相違 問設若分別皆是尋．伺何過不許 答一違論說有分別非尋伺。復有三失。一地不遍。二識不遍。三行不遍。不遍九地故。二于地中不遍識故。三于識中不遍行故。無尋．伺時非分別故 問三七分別。與五法中分別何別 答據別行相。五中分別寬。通諸有漏。三七分別唯第六俱尋．伺二法。及眼等五識。若通行相。三．七．
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 通五：依地分別。準局行相，尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）伺（Vicara，精細的思考）為體。則系欲界及初靜慮（Prathama-dhyana，第一禪）。若約依起，得通九地。上得起下尋伺法故。九潤生心容俱起故。若通行相，準所依識隨地有無。漏（Asrava，煩惱）無漏分別者，準瑜伽第五。諸分別皆有漏。論云：『謂望出世智所依一切三界心、心所皆是分別故。』又釋：或通無漏。言望出世智者，據無分別智名為出世。后智即名世出世智。以緣俗故亦名世間。即如經論說起世間心是，即名分別故。正思推在因即用尋伺為體。辨中邊論名分別支。大論復云諸尋伺皆分別。故通無漏。依問答分別者：一問準瑜伽第一。尋伺是意不共業攝。七種分別尋伺為體。如何得通余識餘地？答準瑜伽第五云：『若尋伺皆分別，有分別非尋伺。』準此二句。只言尋伺必是七分別。不言七分別皆定是尋伺。不爾者為如是句答。由有分別非皆尋伺。攝論、唯識，許自性一通六識有。雜集論許任運分別即五識身。不爾相違。問設若分別皆是尋伺何過不許？答一違論說有分別非尋伺。復有三失。一地不遍。二識不遍。三行不遍。不遍九地故。二于地中不遍識故。三于識中不遍行故。無尋伺時非分別故。問三七分別。與五法中分別何別？答據別行相。五中分別寬。通諸有漏。三七分別唯第六俱尋伺二法。及眼等五識。若通行相，三七
【English Translation】 English version: Section 5: Differentiation Based on Grounds. According to the scope of activities, Vitarka (rough thought) and Vicara (subtle thought) are its essence. Thus, it is related to the Desire Realm and the First Dhyana (Prathama-dhyana, First Meditation). If based on arising, it can pervade the Nine Grounds, because the higher grounds can give rise to the Vitarka and Vicara of the lower grounds, and the nine minds that moisten existence can arise together. If based on the characteristics of activities, according to whether the consciousness relied upon exists in each ground, differentiating between defiled (Asrava, outflows/defilements) and undefiled, according to the fifth book of the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra, all discriminations are defiled. The treatise says: 'Referring to all minds and mental factors in the Three Realms that are relied upon by transcendent wisdom, all are discriminations.' Another explanation: it can also be undefiled. The term 'referring to transcendent wisdom' means that non-discriminating wisdom is called transcendent. Subsequent wisdom is called mundane-transcendent wisdom because it is related to the mundane and is also called mundane. That is, as the sutras and treatises say, the arising of mundane mind is called discrimination. Correct contemplation and inference, in terms of cause, use Vitarka and Vicara as its essence. The Discrimination Between the Middle and Extremes names it a branch of discrimination. The Great Treatise also says that all Vitarka and Vicara are discriminations, thus pervading the undefiled. Differentiating based on questions and answers: Question 1, according to the first book of the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra, Vitarka and Vicara are included in the non-common karma of the mind. The seven types of discrimination have Vitarka and Vicara as their essence. How can they pervade other consciousnesses and other grounds? Answer, according to the fifth book of the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra: 'If Vitarka and Vicara are all discriminations, there are discriminations that are not Vitarka and Vicara.' According to these two sentences, it only says that Vitarka and Vicara must be the seven discriminations, but it does not say that the seven discriminations are necessarily Vitarka and Vicara. If not, this sentence is the answer. Because there are discriminations that are not all Vitarka and Vicara. The Samgraha-sastra and Vijnaptimatrata-sastra allow that the self-nature is one and pervades the six consciousnesses. The Samuccaya-sastra allows spontaneous discrimination to be the five sense consciousnesses. Otherwise, they would contradict each other. Question: If all discriminations are Vitarka and Vicara, what fault is there in not allowing it? Answer: First, it contradicts the treatise which says that there are discriminations that are not Vitarka and Vicara. There are also three faults: First, the grounds are not pervasive. Second, the consciousnesses are not pervasive. Third, the activities are not pervasive. It is not pervasive in the nine grounds. Second, within the grounds, it is not pervasive in the consciousnesses. Third, within the consciousnesses, it is not pervasive in the activities. When there is no Vitarka and Vicara, it is not discrimination. Question: What is the difference between the three and seven discriminations and the discriminations in the five dharmas? Answer: According to different characteristics, the discriminations in the five are broader, pervading all defiled things. The three and seven discriminations only have the sixth consciousness together with the two dharmas of Vitarka and Vicara, and the five sense consciousnesses. If based on the characteristics of activities, the three and seven
五法寬狹相似。或三．七寬。通無漏故。又五法分別總義。三．七分別別義。
論云而似憂故總說為憂者。問第五論云。有分別故憂。無分別故苦。如何得言而似憂故 解云前分別非分別。且約六識五無六有。相顯故說。于意識中分別意識。得與苦憂俱。俱分別故相從名憂。
論。以名身等義為境故者。等取句．文。義通二種。一境義。二道理義。即取名等及所詮義俱為意境。非五識緣。據未自在。然文即字。非正能詮為二所依。相從而說有能詮義。諸論但說名詮自性。句詮差別。不別說字為能詮故。
論。四無記中悔唯中二者。問異熟．通果。俱容得起威儀．工巧。悔既容與中二性俱。應通四種 答雖色界天起通果心來至佛所。起身威儀及語工巧。又諸聖者起通果心。屈申言語不為利樂。皆是無記。此皆上界及異熟心起。非單四無記故皆不俱。今據單起威儀．工巧。容與悔俱。
問悔非染．無記俱者。如所知障望菩薩人。即是染污。豈非彼俱 答據煩惱障非染無記。依所知障通染無記。故不相違定論尋伺十一俱。增輕安故。
疏云言人云。三藏言西方有二說。一云未至定有尋．伺非根本地者。不然。尋．伺支非未至故。論有誠文。初靜慮也。此意不是不許尋．伺通近分地。但說立禪
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：五法的寬狹程度相似。或者說，三法和七法在範圍上較寬泛，因為它們通於無漏法。此外，五法是分別總體的含義，而三法和七法是分別個別的含義。
論中說因為（苦受）類似於憂愁，所以總的稱之為憂愁。有人問：第五論中說，因為有分別所以是憂愁，沒有分別所以是苦受，怎麼能說（苦受）類似於憂愁呢？解釋說：前面所說的分別和沒有分別，是就六識而言的，五識沒有分別，六識有分別，這是爲了顯示它們的差別而說的。在意識中，分別意識既可以與苦受同時生起，也可以與憂愁同時生起。因為它們都具有分別的特性，所以（苦受）依附於（憂愁）而被稱為憂愁。
論中說，以名身等意義作為所緣境。『等』字包括句身和文身。『義』包括兩種：一是境義，二是道理義。也就是說，名身等以及它們所詮釋的意義，都作為意識的所緣境。這不是五識所能緣的，這是就還沒有獲得自在的人來說的。然而，文身就是字，它不是直接的能詮，而是名身和句身所依賴的基礎。因為它們相互依存，所以說文身具有能詮的意義。各種論典只說名身詮釋自性，句身詮釋差別，沒有單獨說字是能詮。
論中說，在四種無記法中，追悔只與中間二者（威儀路和工巧處）相應。有人問：異熟生心和通果心，都可能引發威儀路和工巧處。追悔既然可以與中間二性同時生起，那麼應該通於四種（無記）才對。回答說：即使是色界天人以通果心來到佛所，起身威儀和語言工巧；又或者諸位聖者以通果心，屈伸肢體、發表言語，但不是爲了利益安樂他人，這些都是無記。這些都是上界心或者異熟生心所引發的，不是單純的四無記心，所以不能同時生起。現在所說的是指單純引發威儀路和工巧處，才可能與追悔同時生起。
有人問：追悔不是與染污和無記同時生起嗎？比如，就所知障而言，對於菩薩來說，就是染污的，難道不是與染污同時生起嗎？回答說：這裡說的是煩惱障，不是與染污和無記同時生起。就所知障而言，通於染污和無記，所以並不矛盾。定論說尋和伺與十一個心所同時生起，是因為增加了輕安的緣故。
疏中說，言人說，三藏說西方有兩種說法。一種說法是，未至定中有尋和伺，不是根本地。這種說法不對。因為尋和伺不是未至定的支分。論中有明確的文句說，初禪就是根本地。這裡的意思不是不允許尋和伺通於近分地，只是說建立禪定。
【English Translation】 English version: The scope of the five dharmas is similar. Alternatively, the three and seven dharmas are broader in scope because they are connected to the unconditioned (anāsrava). Furthermore, the five dharmas distinguish the general meaning, while the three and seven dharmas distinguish the individual meanings.
The treatise says that because (suffering) resembles sorrow, it is generally called sorrow. Someone asks: The fifth treatise says that because there is discrimination, it is sorrow; because there is no discrimination, it is suffering. How can it be said that (suffering) resembles sorrow? The explanation is: The aforementioned discrimination and non-discrimination refer to the six consciousnesses. The five consciousnesses have no discrimination, while the six consciousnesses have discrimination. This is said to show their differences. In consciousness, discriminating consciousness can arise simultaneously with both suffering and sorrow. Because they both have the characteristic of discrimination, (suffering) relies on (sorrow) and is called sorrow.
The treatise says that name-body (nāmakāya) and so on are taken as objects. 'So on' includes sentence-body (padakāya) and word-body (vyañjanakāya). 'Meaning' includes two types: one is object-meaning (ālambanārtha), and the other is principle-meaning (tattvārtha). That is to say, name-body and so on, as well as the meanings they express, are all taken as objects of consciousness. This is not what the five consciousnesses can cognize; this is in reference to those who have not yet attained freedom. However, word-body is the same as letters; it is not a direct expresser but rather the foundation upon which name-body and sentence-body rely. Because they are interdependent, it is said that word-body has the meaning of expressing. Various treatises only say that name-body expresses self-nature (svalakṣaṇa), and sentence-body expresses differences (viśeṣa), without separately saying that letters are expressers.
The treatise says that among the four indeterminate (avyākṛta) dharmas, regret (kaukṛtya) only corresponds to the middle two (manner of deportment and skillful activities). Someone asks: Actions resulting from fruition (vipāka) and supernormal powers (abhijñā), can both give rise to manner of deportment and skillful activities. Since regret can arise simultaneously with the middle two natures, it should be connected to all four (indeterminate dharmas). The answer is: Even if a celestial being from the form realm (rūpadhātu) comes to the Buddha with a mind of supernormal power, performing manner of deportment and skillful speech; or if noble ones, with a mind of supernormal power, bend and stretch their limbs and speak words, but not for the benefit and happiness of others, these are all indeterminate. These are all caused by the mind of the upper realms or the mind of fruition, not by the simple four indeterminate minds, so they cannot arise simultaneously. What is being said now refers to the simple arising of manner of deportment and skillful activities, which can arise simultaneously with regret.
Someone asks: Isn't regret simultaneous with defilement (kliṣṭa) and indeterminate? For example, in terms of the obscuration of knowledge (jñeyāvaraṇa), for bodhisattvas, it is defiled; isn't it simultaneous with defilement? The answer is: What is being said here refers to the obscuration of affliction (kleśāvaraṇa), not being simultaneous with defilement and indeterminate. In terms of the obscuration of knowledge, it is connected to both defilement and indeterminate, so there is no contradiction. The established theory says that initial application (vitarka) and sustained application (vicāra) arise simultaneously with eleven mental factors (caittas), because of the increase of pliancy (praśrabdhi).
The commentary says that a certain person said that the Tripiṭaka master said that there are two views in the West. One view is that initial and sustained application are present in the access concentration (upacāra-samādhi), not in the fundamental ground (mūlabhūmi). This view is incorrect because initial and sustained application are not factors of the access concentration. The treatise has clear statements that the first dhyana (dhyāna) is the fundamental ground. The meaning here is not to deny that initial and sustained application are connected to the proximity realm (upacāra-bhūmi), but simply to establish dhyana.
支不依近分故。破他妄傳三藏云西方有二釋。一云尋．伺在未至定非根本地故。諸德不悉皆妄彈斥。應尋此說了本為真 問何以得知。靜慮支立唯依根本 答顯揚第二云。離欲惡不善法故。有尋有伺離生喜樂初靜慮具足住 釋云。具足者謂修習圓滿。住者謂于入住出隨意自在。若此諸支在近分立。何名圓滿出入自在。若分有故亦得立支。無色應立。何故對法第九不依無色故唯根本。
論。又說彼是言說因者。本說如疏 西明釋云。正引十地三請之中第一請文。長行釋云唯嘆凈覺。凈覺是說因故。覺名覺觀。即口言行。三藏解云。應言尋．伺。言覺觀者譯家謬也。今護法師引為誠證者 今恐傳謬。何以故。本疏主說親承三藏云。撿梵本言僧羯臘波但是思惟。亦無正字。何況是尋。言覺者覺觀。此說覺為觀。譯家增故 今西明云三藏解云應言尋．伺。言覺觀者譯家謬也。經但說云凈覺。覺即是尋。如何得言應云尋．伺。故知傳謬 問設唯是觀。觀即是尋。尋是語因。后師何故不引為證 答正思惟支體有二種。一通諸部二乘因果。及大乘因后得位。體即唯是尋。一唯大乘。因果通本后。體即思及惠。瑜伽二十九云。若心趣入諸所尋思。彼唯尋思如是相狀所有尋思。乃至云。起善思惟發起種種如法言論。是名正語。正語
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 支分不依靠近分定（Upacarasamadhi），所以破斥那些錯誤地宣揚三藏（Tripitaka）的人，他們說西方有二種禪定。一種說法是尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（Vicara，精細的思考）存在於未至定（Upacarasamadhi，接近根本定的禪定）中，而不是在根本定（Mūlasamādhi，真正的禪定）的境界中。因此，諸位有德之士不應全部都妄加彈劾斥責。應該探究這種說法的本來面目，以確定其真實性。問：如何得知靜慮（Dhyāna，禪定）的支分僅僅依靠根本定呢？答：《顯揚聖教論》（Śrāvakabhūmi）第二卷說：『因為遠離了欲、惡和不善法，所以具有尋和伺，從遠離（這些煩惱）而生出喜和樂，初靜慮（Prathama-dhyāna）才能具足安住。』解釋說：『具足』是指修習圓滿，『安住』是指對於入定、住定和出定隨意自在。如果這些支分在近分定中成立，怎麼能說是圓滿和出入自在呢？如果因為有部分（相似之處）就可以成立支分，那麼無色定（Ārūpya-samāpatti）也應該成立（為靜慮的支分）。為什麼《阿毗達磨對法論》（Abhidharma）第九卷不依靠無色定，而只依靠根本定呢？
論：又說『彼是言說因』，原本的說法如疏文中所示。西明（寺的僧人）解釋說：『正是引用《十地經》（Daśabhūmika Sūtra）中三請（佛陀被請求說法三次）中的第一次請求的經文。』長行（散文）解釋說，只是讚歎『凈覺』（Visuddha-bodhi，清凈的覺悟）。凈覺是言說的原因，覺（Bodhi，覺悟）名為覺觀（Bodhi-vicara，覺悟的觀察），也就是口頭上的言行。三藏的解釋說：『應該說是尋和伺，說成覺觀是譯者的錯誤。』現在護法（Dharmapāla）論師引用它作為可靠的證據，恐怕是傳抄有誤。為什麼呢？因為本疏的作者說他親自接受了三藏的教導，說：『檢查梵文字，僧羯臘波（Saṃkalpa）只是思惟（thinking），也沒有正字，更何況是尋？』說『覺』是覺觀，這是說覺就是觀，是譯者增添的。現在西明（寺的僧人）說三藏的解釋說應該說是尋和伺，說成覺觀是譯者的錯誤。經文只是說『凈覺』，覺就是尋，怎麼能說應該說是尋和伺呢？所以知道是傳抄有誤。問：假設只是觀，觀就是尋，尋是語言的原因，後來的論師為什麼不引用它作為證據呢？答：正思惟（Samyak-saṃkalpa，正確的思惟）的支分有兩種。一種是通用於所有部派的二乘（Śrāvaka-yāna和Pratyekabuddha-yāna）的因果，以及大乘（Mahāyāna）的因位和后得位（Prsthalabdha-bhūmi，證悟后的境界），其體性只是尋。另一種是唯獨大乘，因果通於根本位和后得位，其體性是思（cetanā，意志）和慧（prajñā，智慧）。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第二十九卷說：『如果心趣入于各種所尋思的事物，那只是尋思這些事物的相狀，所有尋思，乃至說，發起善的思惟，發起種種如法的言論，這叫做正語（Samyag-vāc，正確的言語）。』
【English Translation】 English version Because the auxiliary stages (Upacarasamadhi) are not relied upon, those who falsely propagate the Tripiṭaka (three baskets of Buddhist scriptures) are refuted, claiming that there are two types of meditation in the West. One view is that Vitarka (initial application of thought) and Vicara (sustained application of thought) exist in Upacarasamadhi (access concentration), not in the realm of Mūlasamādhi (fundamental concentration). Therefore, virtuous individuals should not indiscriminately criticize and reject this view. The original intent of this statement should be investigated to determine its truth. Question: How do we know that the limbs of Dhyāna (meditation) rely solely on fundamental concentration? Answer: The second volume of the Śrāvakabhūmi (Stages of Disciples) in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) states: 'Because of detachment from desires, evil, and unwholesome dharmas, there is Vitarka and Vicara, and joy and happiness arise from detachment (from these afflictions), and the first Dhyāna (Prathama-dhyāna) is fully established.' The explanation is: 'Fully established' means complete cultivation, and 'established' means being freely in control of entering, abiding in, and emerging from meditation. If these limbs were established in access concentration, how could they be considered complete and freely controlled in entering and emerging? If limbs could be established simply because of partial (similarity), then the formless attainments (Ārūpya-samāpatti) should also be established (as limbs of Dhyāna). Why does the ninth volume of the Abhidharma not rely on the formless attainments, but only on fundamental concentration?
Treatise: Furthermore, it is said that 'it is the cause of speech,' as originally stated in the commentary. The monk of Ximing Temple explained: 'It is precisely quoting the first request from the three requests (for the Buddha to teach) in the Daśabhūmika Sūtra (Ten Stages Sutra).' The prose explanation says that it only praises 'pure awakening' (Visuddha-bodhi). Pure awakening is the cause of speech, and awakening (Bodhi) is called Bodhi-vicara (awakening-observation), which is verbal action. The Tripiṭaka explanation says: 'It should be said Vitarka and Vicara; calling it Bodhi-vicara is a translator's error.' Now, Dharmapāla cites it as reliable evidence, but it is feared that there is a transmission error. Why? Because the author of the commentary said that he personally received the teachings of the Tripiṭaka, saying: 'Checking the Sanskrit text, Saṃkalpa (intention) is only thinking, and there is no proper word, let alone Vitarka?' Saying 'awakening' is Bodhi-vicara, this is saying that awakening is observation, which is an addition by the translator. Now, the monk of Ximing Temple says that the Tripiṭaka explanation says it should be said Vitarka and Vicara; calling it Bodhi-vicara is a translator's error. The sutra only says 'pure awakening,' and awakening is Vitarka, so how can it be said that it should be said Vitarka and Vicara? Therefore, it is known that there is a transmission error. Question: Suppose it is only observation, observation is Vitarka, and Vitarka is the cause of language, why didn't later masters cite it as evidence? Answer: There are two types of limbs of right thought (Samyak-saṃkalpa). One is common to the cause and effect of the two vehicles (Śrāvaka-yāna and Pratyekabuddha-yāna) of all schools, and the cause position and subsequent attainment position (Prsthalabdha-bhūmi) of the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle), and its nature is only Vitarka. The other is unique to the Mahāyāna, and the cause and effect extend to the fundamental position and the subsequent attainment position, and its nature is cetanā (volition) and prajñā (wisdom). The twenty-ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'If the mind enters into various objects of thought, it is only thinking about the characteristics of these objects, all thinking, and even says, generating wholesome thoughts, generating various lawful speech, this is called right speech (Samyag-vāc).'
是果。思惟語因。及顯揚第二云。尋求極尋求。現前尋求覺了。計算觀察。思惟思惟性 又瑜伽二十九云。若得彼已以惠安立如證而覺。總立此二合名正見。準知此俱正思惟支皆是初體 對法第十說惠蘊攝正見．正思惟．正勤 九十八云。若出世間以正智為自性。除諸戒支。安立非安立真如為所緣 瑜伽二十九云。由八支攝行跡正道。能無餘斷一切煩惱。能于解脫究竟作證。是故名為八支聖道。當知此中若覺支時所得真覺。此根本位。若得彼已以惠安立如證而覺 此後得位云如證而覺故。此等皆是后八支體。不說尋故。后師依大乘通因果本后正思惟支。非是尋故所以不引。
問身．語．心行有遍非遍。第四定地雖無出入息。有思遍行身業得轉。在佛果位既無尋．伺語之遍行。語應不轉 答如疏及樞要說 問既說語業為語遍行。第二定上地法有語。同身行故 答約佛可爾。語不假尋。除佛已外語必尋引故已上無 問說法逗機語假尋．伺。泛爾言說何假尋．伺。猶如五識多由彼起。亦有五識非尋．伺生。如無色定起耳聞聲等 答二定已上起語時難。猶如五識必假尋．伺 問身在欲界及初靜慮起語時易。應同五識 答語皆推度起必尋．伺。五識不爾故不得例 又設一解。欲界泛語．二定已上或有語言非尋．伺發。但用
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：是結果。思考語言的原因。以及《顯揚第二》中說：『尋求，極度尋求，當下尋求覺悟，計算觀察，思考思考的性質。』又《瑜伽》第二十九卷說：『如果獲得那個之後，用智慧安立，如實證悟。』總合建立這兩個，名為正見。』由此可知，這二者都屬於正思惟支的最初本體。對法第十說，慧蘊包含正見、正思惟、正勤。第九十八卷說：『如果出世間以正智為自性，去除各種戒支，安立非安立的真如為所緣。』《瑜伽》第二十九卷說：『由八支所攝的行跡正道，能夠完全斷除一切煩惱，能夠對於解脫究竟作證。』所以名為八支聖道。應當知道，這其中如果覺支時所得的真覺，是根本位。如果獲得那個之後，用智慧安立，如實證悟。』這是后得位，說『如實證悟』。因此這些都是后八支的本體。因為沒有說『尋』的緣故。後來的老師依據大乘，貫通因果本后，正思惟支不是『尋』的緣故，所以沒有引用。
問：身、語、心行有普遍和不普遍的區分嗎？第四禪定地雖然沒有出入息，但有思遍行的身業得以運轉。在佛果位，既然沒有尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）、伺（Vicara，精細的思考）的語言遍行，語言應該不能運轉。答：如疏和樞要所說。問：既然說語業是語言的遍行，第二禪定以上的地方法有語言，和身行一樣。答：對於佛來說可以這樣。語言不依賴於尋。除了佛以外，語言必定由尋引導，所以以上沒有。問：說法開導眾生，語言依賴於尋、伺。一般的說話為什麼依賴於尋、伺？猶如五識（五種感官意識）大多由此產生，也有五識不是由尋、伺產生，如無色定（Arupa-dhatu，沒有物質的禪定）中聽到聲音等。答：二禪定以上產生語言時困難。猶如五識必定依賴於尋、伺。問：身體在欲界（Kama-dhatu，有慾望的界）和初禪定（初靜慮）時，產生語言容易。應該和五識一樣。答：語言都是推測思考產生的，必定依賴於尋、伺。五識不是這樣，所以不能類比。又假設一種解釋。欲界一般的說話，二禪定以上或許有語言不是由尋、伺引發。但用...
【English Translation】 English version: Is the result. Contemplate the cause of speech. And the second 'Manifestation' says: 'Seek, extremely seek, presently seek enlightenment, calculate and observe, contemplate the nature of contemplation.' Also, the twenty-ninth volume of 'Yoga' says: 'If one obtains that and establishes it with wisdom, awakening as if having realized it.' Establishing these two together is called Right View.' From this, it can be known that both of these belong to the initial essence of the Right Thought branch. The tenth 'Abhidharma' says that the aggregate of wisdom includes Right View, Right Thought, and Right Diligence. The ninety-eighth volume says: 'If the supramundane is characterized by Right Knowledge, removing various precepts, establishing the suchness of non-establishment as the object.' The twenty-ninth volume of 'Yoga' says: 'The path of practice encompassed by the eight branches can completely cut off all afflictions and can ultimately testify to liberation.' Therefore, it is called the Eightfold Noble Path. It should be known that the true awakening obtained during the branch of awakening is the fundamental position. 'If one obtains that and establishes it with wisdom, awakening as if having realized it.' This is the subsequent attainment position, saying 'awakening as if having realized it.' Therefore, these are all the essence of the latter eight branches. Because 'Vitarka (尋, gross thought)' is not mentioned. Later teachers, based on Mahayana, connect the cause and effect, the beginning and the end, the Right Thought branch is not 'Vitarka (尋, gross thought)', so it is not cited.
Question: Are there universal and non-universal distinctions in body, speech, and mind actions? Although there is no inhalation or exhalation in the fourth Dhyana (禪定, meditative state), the body karma of thought pervading can still function. In the Buddha's fruition position, since there is no Vitarka (尋, gross thought) or Vicara (伺, subtle thought) pervading speech, speech should not be able to function. Answer: As the commentary and essential points say. Question: Since it is said that speech karma is the pervading of speech, the Dharma above the second Dhyana (禪定, meditative state) has speech, like body action. Answer: It can be like this for the Buddha. Speech does not depend on Vitarka (尋, gross thought). Except for the Buddha, speech must be guided by Vitarka (尋, gross thought), so there is none above. Question: When explaining the Dharma to enlighten sentient beings, speech depends on Vitarka (尋, gross thought) and Vicara (伺, subtle thought). Why does ordinary speech depend on Vitarka (尋, gross thought) and Vicara (伺, subtle thought)? Just as the five consciousnesses (五識, five sense consciousnesses) mostly arise from this, there are also five consciousnesses that do not arise from Vitarka (尋, gross thought) and Vicara (伺, subtle thought), such as hearing sounds in the Arupa-dhatu (無色定, formless realm). Answer: It is difficult to produce speech above the second Dhyana (禪定, meditative state). Just as the five consciousnesses must depend on Vitarka (尋, gross thought) and Vicara (伺, subtle thought). Question: It is easy to produce speech when the body is in the Kama-dhatu (欲界, desire realm) and the first Dhyana (初靜慮, first meditative state). It should be the same as the five consciousnesses. Answer: Speech is all produced by speculation and thought, and must depend on Vitarka (尋, gross thought) and Vicara (伺, subtle thought). The five consciousnesses are not like this, so they cannot be compared. Also, suppose an explanation. Ordinary speech in the Kama-dhatu (欲界, desire realm), and perhaps speech above the second Dhyana (禪定, meditative state) is not initiated by Vitarka (尋, gross thought) and Vicara (伺, subtle thought). But using...
思生。諸論但言尋．伺起者隨粗相說。如思惟支。
問正思惟支以尋為體。佛身闕過。諸靜慮支既說尋．伺。佛無應過。齊功德故 答道支唯無漏。佛無可成過。禪支漏無漏。縱闕亦非過。不爾功德即令具者。諸佛應成有漏禪支。是功德故。又如疏解依于思惠 若爾無粗細。何成對治支 答亦依思惠分為粗細及對治支。如正思惟。亦無過失。
說心心所俱不俱等諸門分別。廣如百法玄贊所明。
論。為離心體有別自性等。本釋如疏 要集云。妙音不立。勘文不獲。楞伽．中百論師等者。護法造論不闕此地諸師所難。智度論等廣辨心所復何人也。或可。護法假敘賓主 今謂。本意云楞伽．中百論等諸師。非說此地但說西國。如理門論云破古因明師。古因明師不善之者。非無著等。楞伽等師者。道理亦爾。雖智度論廣明心所。何妨有說即心分位。如智度論廣辨諸法。何妨清辨云勝義空俗妄為有。不妨護法依彼等計假立賓主起此問端。
心遠獨行者。攝論既云無第二故名為獨行。似依一意識義釋。準引此難。不唯依經部。
論士夫六界。釋如疏引 問四大及心體性可知。空體是何 答準雜集第二廢立二十五種色云。謂作所依故。作相故。即立迥色及表色所以。表即屈申。正是動作。故瑜伽第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 思生（思考產生）。各種論典只是根據粗略的表相來說明尋（Vitarka，粗略的思考）和伺（Vicara，精細的思考）的生起。例如思惟支（thought component）。
問：正思惟支（right thought component）以尋為本體。佛身（Buddha's body）會有缺失和過失。各種靜慮支（meditative absorption component）既然說了尋和伺，佛不應該有過失。因為功德是齊等的。答：道支（path component）唯有無漏（unconditioned）。佛沒有可以成就的過失。禪支（meditative absorption component）有有漏（conditioned）和無漏。縱然缺失也不是過失。如果不是這樣，功德就能夠使之具足，那麼諸佛（Buddhas）應該成就為有漏的禪支。因為這是功德。又如疏解（commentary）所說，是依于思惠（thought and wisdom）。如果這樣，沒有粗細之分，如何成為對治支（antidote component）？答：也是依據思惠分為粗細以及對治支。例如正思惟。也沒有過失。
關於心（citta，mind）和心所（cetasika，mental factors）的俱（simultaneous）不俱（non-simultaneous）等各種門類的分別，詳細情況如《百法玄贊》（Commentary on the Hundred Dharmas）所說明。
論：爲了離開心體（mind-essence）有別的自性（own-nature）等。本釋（original explanation）如疏（commentary）所說。《要集》（Essentials Collected）說：『妙音（Melodious Sound）不立（not established）。』勘文（examining the text）沒有獲得。楞伽（Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra，《楞伽經》）、中百論師（Mādhyamika philosophers，中觀派論師）等。護法（Dharmapāla）造論（treatise）不會缺少此地諸師（teachers）的詰難。《智度論》（Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa，大智度論）等廣泛辨析心所，又是何人呢？或許，護法假借敘述賓主（host and guest）。現在認為，本意是說楞伽、《中百論》等諸師，不是說此地，只是說西國（India）。如《理門論》（Nyāyamukha，因明入正理論）說破斥古代因明師（logicians）。古代因明師不善於此道的人，不是無著（Asaṅga）等。楞伽等師的道理也是這樣。雖然《智度論》廣泛闡明心所，又何妨有人說即心分位（aspects of mind）？如《智度論》廣泛辨析諸法（all dharmas），又何妨清辨（Bhāviveka）說勝義空（ultimate emptiness），俗妄為有（conventional existence is false）？不妨護法依據他們的計度，假立賓主，發起這個問端。
心遠獨行（mind travels far and alone）。《攝論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya，阿毗達磨集論）既然說沒有第二個，所以名為獨行。似乎是依據一意識（one consciousness）的意義來解釋。依據這個來引申，不只是依據經部（Sūtra school）。
論：士夫六界（six elements of a person）。解釋如疏（commentary）所引用。問：四大（four great elements）以及心體（mind-essence）的體性可以知道。空體（emptiness element）是什麼？答：依據《雜集》（Abhidharma-samuccaya，阿毗達磨集論）第二，廢立二十五種色（twenty-five kinds of form）說，因為是作為所依（basis），作為相（characteristic），所以建立迥色（distinctive form）以及表色（representative form）的原因。表色就是屈伸（bending and stretching），正是動作。所以《瑜伽》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra，瑜伽師地論）第
【English Translation】 English version: Thinking arises. Various treatises only explain the arising of Vitarka (gross thought) and Vicara (subtle thought) according to their coarse appearances. For example, the thought component.
Question: The right thought component has Vitarka as its essence. The Buddha's body would have deficiencies and faults. Since the various meditative absorption components mention Vitarka and Vicara, the Buddha should not have faults because the merits are equal. Answer: The path component is only unconditioned. The Buddha has no faults to achieve. The meditative absorption component has both conditioned and unconditioned aspects. Even if there are deficiencies, they are not faults. If this were not the case, merits could make it complete, then the Buddhas should achieve conditioned meditative absorption components because this is a merit. Furthermore, as the commentary says, it relies on thought and wisdom. If so, without coarse and subtle distinctions, how can it become an antidote component? Answer: It is also based on thought and wisdom, dividing them into coarse and subtle, as well as antidote components. For example, right thought. There are also no faults.
Regarding the distinctions of simultaneous and non-simultaneous, etc., of the mind (citta) and mental factors (cetasika), the details are as explained in the Commentary on the Hundred Dharmas.
Treatise: In order to separate the mind-essence and have other own-natures, etc. The original explanation is as the commentary says. The Essentials Collected says: 'Melodious Sound is not established.' Examining the text did not yield it. The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Mādhyamika philosophers, etc. Dharmapāla, in creating treatises, would not lack the challenges of the teachers in this land. The Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa, etc., extensively analyze mental factors, so who is it? Perhaps, Dharmapāla borrows the narration of host and guest. Now it is believed that the original intention is to say the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, Mādhyamika philosophers, etc., not to say this land, but only to say India. As the Nyāyamukha says, refuting ancient logicians. The ancient logicians are those who are not good at this path, not Asaṅga, etc. The reasoning of the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra, etc., is also like this. Although the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa extensively elucidates mental factors, what harm is there in someone saying that they are aspects of mind? Just as the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa extensively analyzes all dharmas, what harm is there in Bhāviveka saying that ultimate emptiness is empty, and conventional existence is false? It does not prevent Dharmapāla from relying on their calculations, falsely establishing host and guest, and initiating this question.
The mind travels far and alone. Since the Abhidharma-samuccaya says there is no second, it is called traveling alone. It seems to be explained according to the meaning of one consciousness. Based on this to extend, it is not only based on the Sūtra school.
Treatise: The six elements of a person. The explanation is as quoted in the commentary. Question: The nature of the four great elements and the mind-essence can be known. What is the emptiness element? Answer: According to the Abhidharma-samuccaya, in the second section, the establishment and rejection of twenty-five kinds of form, because it serves as a basis and as a characteristic, the reason for establishing distinctive form and representative form. Representative form is bending and stretching, which is precisely movement. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, in the
一云。表色者謂業用為作。動轉差別。此作所依即彼迥色。迥色者雜集云。謂離余礙觸方所可得 問何非余空說是迥色。既云迥色復何名空 答士夫界故非虛空。空離礙觸方所故複名空 問若取迥色。迥色即離四大有。何故餘部說唯四大不立所造 答彼不了故。宗計異故。不可為責。經部有師不立心所。大乘異說亦復同彼。共引此經不唯經部。瑜伽但云有一沙門若婆羅門。欲令名中唯心實有非諸心所。或亦假敘。非必彼難。
論。此依世俗若依勝義等者。本釋如疏。要集云。此定不依第一俗．第三真．第四真．俗。識心心所辨差別故。下文諸識真俗相對望第四。真俗等漸次門故。離重言故 今謂不爾。今此且以心與心所約二諦辨。亦例于識。下八識中心所同王。異聚相望攝其見．相皆悉歸識。唯識宗故。故下云。八識自性不可言定一。行相．所依．緣．相應異故。既約緣．依．相應辨異。故知不異亦說行相．依．緣．相應。不爾應非如幻事等。有定性故。前別後總相望對辨。俱四真俗亦無重言失。
論。彼中有必起等。樞要云。勘有中有無中有。答云本計無末計有 又曾聞釋。約本而言云無中有。今據末計故有中有 又云本計有二。一理為量。二教為量。因分兩諍。理為量者即立中有。今論約此故說云有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 一[論]說，『表色』（Rūpa，物質）指的是『業用』（karma-prayoga，行為的作用）表現爲動作和變化。這種作用所依賴的就是『迥色』（vivikta-rūpa，可分離的物質）。《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）中說，『迥色』是指可以脫離其他障礙和觸覺，在特定方位上可以獲得的[物質]。 問：為什麼不是像虛空（ākāśa）一樣被稱為『迥色』呢？既然稱為『迥色』，又為什麼稱其為空（śūnya）呢？ 答：因為它是士夫（puruṣa，人）的界限，所以不是虛空。因為空（śūnya）脫離了障礙、觸覺和方位，所以又被稱為空。 問：如果取『迥色』，那麼『迥色』就脫離了四大（mahābhūta，地、水、火、風）。為什麼其他部派說只有四大，而不建立所造色（upādā-rūpa，由四大產生的物質）呢？ 答：因為他們不瞭解，或者因為宗派的見解不同，所以不能以此責難。經部（Sautrāntika）中有老師不建立心所（caitta，心所法）。大乘（Mahāyāna）不同的說法也與此相同。共同引用這部經，不僅僅是經部。瑜伽行派（Yogācāra）只是說，有一位沙門（śrāmaṇa，出家修行者）或婆羅門（brāhmaṇa，祭司），想要使名（nāma，名稱）中只有心（citta，意識）是真實的，而不是各種心所。或者也只是假設的敘述，不一定是他們的責難。
[論]說，『這依據世俗諦（saṃvṛti-satya，世俗真理），如果依據勝義諦（paramārtha-satya，勝義真理）等』。原本的解釋就像疏（註釋）中說的那樣。《要集》中說，這一定不依據第一俗諦、第三真諦、第四真俗諦，因為[這部分經文]辨別了識（vijñāna，意識）、心（citta，心）和心所（caitta，心所法）的差別。下文的諸識真俗相對，是相對於第四真俗諦。真俗等是漸次入門的方法，爲了避免重複的言辭。 現在我認為不是這樣。現在這裡暫且用心（citta，心）和心所（caitta，心所法）來辨別二諦（satya-dvaya，兩種真理），也可以類推到識（vijñāna，意識）。下文的八識（aṣṭa-vijñāna，八種意識）中心所與心王（citta-rāja，心王，即主要意識）相同。從不同的集合體來看，攝取其見分（darśana-bhāga，認識的部分）和相分（nimitta-bhāga，被認識的部分）都歸於識（vijñāna，意識），因為是唯識宗（Vijñānavāda）。所以下文說，八識的自性不可說是一定的，因為行相（ākāra，狀態）、所依（āśraya，所依賴的）、緣（ālambana，所緣）和相應（samprayoga，共同運作）不同。既然通過緣、依、相應來辨別差異，就知道不異也說了行相、依、緣、相應。否則，應該不像幻事等，因為有固定的自性。前面是分別辨別，後面是總的辨別，相互對照辨別，都具有四種真俗諦，也沒有重複言辭的過失。
[論]說，『彼中有必起等』。《樞要》中說，考察有中有（bhava-antarā，中陰身）和無中有（abhava-antarā，無中陰身）。回答說，最初的計議是無，最後的計議是有。 又曾經聽聞解釋，從根本上說，說沒有中有。現在根據最後的計議，所以有中有。 又說，最初的計議有兩種，一是理為衡量標準，二是教為衡量標準。因為分成了兩種而爭論。以理為衡量標準，就建立中有。現在的論述是根據這個，所以說有。
【English Translation】 English version: One [treatise] says, 'Rūpa' (form, matter) refers to 'karma-prayoga' (the application of action) manifesting as movement and change. That upon which this action relies is 'vivikta-rūpa' (distinct form). The Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) says, 'vivikta-rūpa' refers to [matter] that can be obtained apart from other obstructions and tactile sensations, and in a specific location. Question: Why is it not called 'vivikta-rūpa' like ākāśa (space)? Since it is called 'vivikta-rūpa', why is it also called śūnya (emptiness)? Answer: Because it is the boundary of puruṣa (person), it is not ākāśa. Because śūnya (emptiness) is free from obstructions, tactile sensations, and location, it is also called emptiness. Question: If 'vivikta-rūpa' is taken, then 'vivikta-rūpa' is separate from the mahābhūta (the four great elements: earth, water, fire, and wind). Why do other schools say that there are only the four great elements and do not establish upādā-rūpa (derived form, matter derived from the four great elements)? Answer: Because they do not understand, or because the views of the schools are different, so one cannot blame them for this. In the Sautrāntika school, there are teachers who do not establish caitta (mental factors). The different teachings of Mahāyāna are also the same as this. This sutra is commonly cited, not just by the Sautrāntika school. The Yogācāra school only says that there is a śrāmaṇa (ascetic) or brāhmaṇa (priest) who wants to make only citta (mind, consciousness) in nāma (name) real, not the various mental factors. Or it may just be a hypothetical narrative, not necessarily their criticism.
[The treatise] says, 'This is based on saṃvṛti-satya (conventional truth), if based on paramārtha-satya (ultimate truth), etc.' The original explanation is as in the commentary. The Yaoji says that this is definitely not based on the first conventional truth, the third ultimate truth, or the fourth conventional-ultimate truth, because [this part of the text] distinguishes the differences between vijñāna (consciousness), citta (mind), and caitta (mental factors). The various consciousnesses in the following text are true and conventional relative to each other, relative to the fourth conventional-ultimate truth. Truth and convention, etc., are gradual methods of entry, in order to avoid repetitive words. Now I think it is not like this. Now here, for the time being, use citta (mind) and caitta (mental factors) to distinguish the two truths (satya-dvaya), which can also be analogized to vijñāna (consciousness). In the following eight consciousnesses (aṣṭa-vijñāna), the mental factors are the same as the mind-king (citta-rāja, the main consciousness). From the perspective of different aggregates, the darśana-bhāga (cognitive aspect) and nimitta-bhāga (objective aspect) are all included in vijñāna (consciousness), because it is the Vijñānavāda (Yogācāra) school. Therefore, the following text says that the nature of the eight consciousnesses cannot be said to be fixed, because the ākāra (appearance), āśraya (basis), ālambana (object), and samprayoga (concomitance) are different. Since differences are distinguished through object, basis, and concomitance, it is known that non-difference also speaks of appearance, basis, object, and concomitance. Otherwise, it should not be like illusory things, because they have a fixed nature. The former is separate distinction, and the latter is general distinction, mutually contrasting distinction, both have four kinds of conventional and ultimate truths, and there is no fault of repetitive words.
[The treatise] says, 'In the intermediate state, there must be arising, etc.' The Shuyao says, examine bhava-antarā (intermediate existence) and abhava-antarā (non-intermediate existence). The answer is that the initial consideration is non-existence, and the final consideration is existence. Also, I once heard an explanation that, fundamentally speaking, there is no intermediate existence. Now, according to the final consideration, there is intermediate existence. It is also said that there are two kinds of initial considerations, one is reason as the standard of measurement, and the other is teaching as the standard of measurement. Because they are divided into two, they argue. Taking reason as the standard of measurement establishes intermediate existence. The current discussion is based on this, so it says there is existence.
。若引經為量者不立中有 然要集云。勘宗輪論。上坐複名雪山。立八義別。余同一切有。即云立中有。大眾等四部都無中有 今謂不定。一切有部本宗同中論文。不說定有中有。云末宗異義其類無邊。雪山同彼豈有中有。其大眾等論文不說定無中有。而云菩薩入胎作白象形。準此即似立於中有。故要集說無其準定。
論。彼天唯在第四靜慮者。廣如本疏。又云無色非天眼境。若無心時既無色身。誰為能證涅槃之者。又復地法無無相定。故此異熟不在余處。
論即能引發無想定思。要集云。有說．有釋各有三解。彼第三為此初說。彼第一為此第三說。彼此第二義即不同。今取有釋第三為正 既有說第一即有釋第三。何故獨取有釋第三而為正釋。有說疏文不斷第三為正說故。然以理準非。極厭心招彼總報。極厭心種招彼別報。何所相違。又微微心種是能引發無想定思。能感彼果順五十六。不爾一因如何能感有無心別相違二果 又西明云。微微心及微心相應思引總報。以有心故。即彼二種至無心位引別報。以無心故 今謂不爾。豈于微心種亦立無心定耶。
論。令身安和故亦名定。西明云。雖非心所專注一境。令身安和故亦名定 要集云。有釋初釋為勝 今謂不爾。無心睡眠亦非心所專注一境何無安和
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果引用經文作為衡量標準，就不能確立『中有』（antabhava，指死亡和投生之間的過渡狀態）。《要集》中說：『查閱《宗輪論》，上座部又名雪山部，確立了八種不同的觀點，其餘與一切有部相同。』這說明他們確立了『中有』。大眾部等四個部派都沒有『中有』。現在認為這並不確定。一切有部的根本宗義與《中論》相同，沒有說一定有『中有』，只是說末宗的異議種類繁多。雪山部與他們相同，怎麼會有『中有』呢？大眾部等的論文沒有說一定沒有『中有』，而是說菩薩入胎時呈現白象的形象。根據這一點，似乎是確立了『中有』。所以《要集》說沒有『中有』，其依據並不確定。
論：那些天人只在第四禪天中。詳細情況見本疏。又說，無色界不是天眼所能觀察到的境界。如果沒有心識的時候，既然沒有色身，誰來作為證得涅槃的人呢？而且，地界之法沒有無想定。所以這種異熟果報不在其他地方。
論：就是能夠引發無想定（asaññā-samāpatti，一種禪定狀態，在此狀態下，心識和感受暫時停止）的思。 《要集》中說：『有說和有釋各有三種解釋。』他們認為第三種解釋是最初的說法，第一種解釋是第三種說法。彼此的第二種解釋不同。現在採用有釋的第三種解釋是正確的。既然有說的第一種解釋就是有釋的第三種解釋，為什麼只採用有釋的第三種解釋作為正確的解釋呢？因為有說的疏文中不斷地將第三種解釋作為正確的解釋。然而，從道理上來說並非如此。極度厭惡的心招感總報，極度厭惡的心種招感別報，這有什麼矛盾呢？而且，微微的心種是能夠引發無想定思的，能夠感得那個果報，順應五十六心所。否則，一個因如何能夠感得有心和無心這兩種相互矛盾的果報呢？又，西明說：『微微的心以及與微心相應的思引發總報，因為有心識的緣故。這兩種心識到了無心位時，引發別報，因為沒有心識的緣故。』現在認為不是這樣。難道在微心種中也確立無心定嗎？
論：使身體安穩平和，所以也叫做定。西明說：『雖然不是心所專注於一個境界，但使身體安穩平和，所以也叫做定。』《要集》中說：『有釋的最初解釋是最好的。』現在認為不是這樣。無心睡眠也不是心所專注於一個境界，為什麼沒有安穩平和呢？
【English Translation】 English version: If one uses scriptures as a measure, then one cannot establish the 『antabhava』 (intermediate state between death and rebirth). The 『Yaoji』 says: 『Examining the 『Samayabhedoparacanacakra』, the Theravada school, also known as the Himavat school, established eight different views, the rest being the same as the Sarvastivada school.』 This indicates that they established the 『antabhava』. The Mahasanghika and the other four schools do not have the 『antabhava』. Now it is considered uncertain. The fundamental doctrine of the Sarvastivada school is the same as the 『Madhyamaka-sastra』, not saying that there is definitely an 『antabhava』, but only saying that the different views of the later schools are numerous. The Himavat school is the same as them, how could there be an 『antabhava』? The treatises of the Mahasanghika and others do not say that there is definitely no 『antabhava』, but say that when a Bodhisattva enters the womb, he appears in the form of a white elephant. According to this, it seems that the 『antabhava』 is established. Therefore, the 『Yaoji』 says that there is no 『antabhava』, but its basis is not certain.
Treatise: Those devas are only in the Fourth Dhyana heaven. See the original commentary for details. It also says that the formless realm is not a realm that can be observed by the divine eye. If there is no consciousness, since there is no form body, who will be the one to attain Nirvana? Moreover, the element of earth does not have the Asamjna-samapatti (a state of meditation where consciousness and feelings are temporarily suspended). Therefore, this Vipaka (result of karma) is not in other places.
Treatise: It is the thought that can induce the Asamjna-samapatti (a state of meditation where consciousness and feelings are temporarily suspended). The 『Yaoji』 says: 『There are three explanations in both the 『You Shuo』 and 『You Shi』 schools.』 They consider the third explanation to be the initial statement, and the first explanation to be the third statement. The second explanations of each are different. Now, taking the third explanation of the 『You Shi』 as correct. Since the first explanation of the 『You Shuo』 is the same as the third explanation of the 『You Shi』, why only take the third explanation of the 『You Shi』 as the correct explanation? Because the commentary of the 『You Shuo』 constantly regards the third explanation as the correct explanation. However, logically, it is not so. Extreme aversion generates the general retribution, and the seed of extreme aversion generates the specific retribution. What is contradictory about this? Moreover, the subtle seed of mind is what can induce the Asamjna-samapatti, and can cause that result, in accordance with the fifty-six mental factors. Otherwise, how can one cause produce two contradictory results of having and not having consciousness? Also, Ximing said: 『The subtle mind and the thought corresponding to the subtle mind induce the general retribution, because there is consciousness. These two kinds of consciousness, when they reach the state of no-mind, induce the specific retribution, because there is no consciousness.』 Now it is considered not so. Is the no-mind samadhi also established in the subtle mind seed?
Treatise: Making the body peaceful and harmonious is also called samadhi. Ximing said: 『Although it is not a mental state focused on one object, making the body peaceful and harmonious is also called samadhi.』 The 『Yaoji』 says: 『The initial explanation of the 『You Shi』 is the best.』 Now it is considered not so. Sleeplessness without mind is also not a mental state focused on one object, why is there no peace and harmony?
。亦名為定。故如由前加行定力令身安和。以無心時安和。亦彼有心時安和。同得定名。故本解正。
論又唯是善等。本說彼所引故。釋唯是善。下上地無。明屬地因 西明云。彼所引故通二義 今謂不爾。加行善定引故善。不以善定引是屬第四定。在文自解。下上地無由前說故。指同於前說無想報。
論。四業通三除順現受者。略論其業總有兩種。一定感果。二不定感果。故瑜伽第九云。順定受業者。謂故思已若作若增長業。順不定受業者。謂故思已作而不增長業。此意即說。由審．決思為方便名故思。故九十云。故思故造業者。謂先思量。已隨尋思。已隨伺察。已起身．語。名作業。令種增長名增長業雜集第七云作者謂起造諸業令其現行。增長者謂令習氣增益 除此已外設有故思。不起身．語等。及雖起身．語。而不令種增上。不令種增長業者。即有十種。瑜伽第九云。增長業者謂除十種。一夢所作。二無知所作。三無故思所作。四不利不數所作。五狂亂所作。六失念所作。七非樂欲所作。八自性無記。九悔所損。十對治所損。除此十種名增長業。不增長業謂此十種。然增長者異熟定及時報。不增長者俱不定攝。雜集第八據定受業說有三種。即現．生．后。于慈定等造善惡業是現受攝。五無間等名生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：也叫做『定』（Samadhi，禪定）。因此，就像通過之前的加行（preparatory practice）禪定之力，使身體安穩平和，在無心之時安穩平和，也在有心之時安穩平和，同樣可以得到『定』的名稱。所以根本的解釋是正確的。
《瑜伽師地論》又說，『定』唯是善等，根本上是由於它所引發的。解釋說，『唯是善』，下地和上地沒有，說明屬於地（bhumi，境界）的因。西明法師說，『彼所引故』，可以有兩種解釋。我認為不是這樣。加行善定引發的才是善，不是善定引發的，就屬於第四禪定。在經文中會自己解釋。下地和上地沒有，是因為前面已經說過，指的是和前面所說的無想報（asaṃjñika-bhūmi，無想有情天）相同。
《瑜伽師地論》說，四種業（karma，行為）通於三受（vedanā，感受），除了順現受業（drsta-dharma-vedaniya-karma，現世報業）。簡略地說，業總共有兩種：一是決定感果的，二是不決定感果的。所以《瑜伽師地論》第九卷說：『順定受業（niyata-vedaniya-karma，定受業）者，是指經過故意思考後，所作或增長的業。順不定受業（aniyata-vedaniya-karma，不定受業）者，是指經過故意思考後，所作但不增長的業。』這裡的意思是說，通過審慮、決定的思為方便，稱為『故思』。所以第九十卷說：『故思故造業者，是指先思量，然後隨著尋思，然後隨著伺察，然後起身、語，稱為作業。使種子增長，稱為增長業。』《雜集論》第七卷說：『作者，是指發起造作諸業，使其現行。增長者，是指使習氣增益。』除了這些以外，即使有故思，但不起身、語等，以及雖然起身、語，但不使種子增上，不使種子增長的業，就有十種。《瑜伽師地論》第九卷說：『增長業者，是指除了十種：一、夢中所作；二、無知所作；三、無故思所作；四、不利不數所作；五、狂亂所作；六、失念所作；七、非樂欲所作；八、自性無記（avyākrta，不記說）；九、悔所損；十、對治所損。』除了這十種，稱為增長業。不增長業，就是指這十種。然而增長業的異熟（vipāka，果報）是決定的，以及時報也是決定的；不增長業，都是不定的。《雜集論》第八卷根據定受業，說有三種，即現受、生受、后受。于慈定等造善惡業，屬於現受攝。五無間等，名為生受。
【English Translation】 English version: It is also called 『Samadhi』 (concentration). Therefore, just as the power of Samadhi from the preceding preparatory practice makes the body peaceful and harmonious, being peaceful and harmonious when without mind, and also being peaceful and harmonious when with mind, one can similarly attain the name of 『Samadhi』. Therefore, the fundamental explanation is correct.
The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra also states that 『Samadhi』 is only good, etc., fundamentally because of what it gives rise to. The explanation says, 『Only good,』 the lower and upper realms do not have it, indicating that it belongs to the cause of the bhumi (level, stage). The Ximing master said, 『Because of what it gives rise to,』 there can be two explanations. I think this is not so. What is given rise to by the preparatory practice of good Samadhi is good; what is not given rise to by good Samadhi belongs to the fourth dhyana (meditative absorption). The text itself will explain. The lower and upper realms do not have it because it has been said before, referring to being the same as the asaṃjñika-bhūmi (realm of non-perception) mentioned before.
The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that the four karma (actions) are common to the three vedanā (feelings), except for drsta-dharma-vedaniya-karma (karma to be experienced in the present life). Briefly speaking, there are two kinds of karma in total: one that definitely brings about a result, and one that does not definitely bring about a result. Therefore, the ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 『Niyata-vedaniya-karma (karma to be definitely experienced) refers to karma that is intentionally thought about and then performed or increased. Aniyata-vedaniya-karma (karma to be indefinitely experienced) refers to karma that is intentionally thought about and then performed but not increased.』 The meaning here is that through deliberation and decisive thought as a means, it is called 『intentional thought』. Therefore, the ninetieth volume says: 『Karma intentionally thought about and then created refers to first thinking, then following with reflection, then following with examination, then arising with body and speech, which is called action. Causing the seed to grow is called increasing karma.』 The seventh volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya says: 『The doer refers to initiating and creating all karma, causing them to manifest. The increaser refers to causing the habitual tendencies to increase.』 Apart from these, even if there is intentional thought, but one does not arise with body and speech, etc., and even though one arises with body and speech, but does not cause the seed to increase, karma that does not cause the seed to grow, there are ten kinds. The ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 『Increasing karma refers to excluding ten kinds: 1. What is done in a dream; 2. What is done unknowingly; 3. What is done without intentional thought; 4. What is done unfavorably and infrequently; 5. What is done in madness; 6. What is done in forgetfulness; 7. What is done without desire; 8. What is avyākrta (unspecified) by nature; 9. What is harmed by regret; 10. What is harmed by the antidote.』 Apart from these ten kinds, it is called increasing karma. Non-increasing karma refers to these ten kinds. However, the vipāka (result) of increasing karma is definite, and the time of retribution is also definite; non-increasing karma are all indefinite. The eighth volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, according to definitely experienced karma, says there are three kinds, namely, experienced in the present life, experienced in the next life, and experienced in a later life. Creating good and bad karma in loving-kindness Samadhi, etc., belongs to being experienced in the present life. The five anantarya-karma (actions leading to immediate retribution), etc., are called being experienced in the next life.
受業。若此生造度生方受名為后受。設有一業或現或生受報不盡更多生受。從初現．生但名現．生。不名后受。故第八云於此業中從初熟位建立順現法受等名。不唯受此一位異熟 雜集第七定與不定分之為三。彼云。如經言決定業。謂作業決定受異熟定分位定 作業通定不定。定受是不定。理如后解。分位是定。時．報俱定故。瑜伽六十據定不定總說四業。彼云復有四業。一異熟定。二時分定。三二俱定。四二俱不定。第三是定。餘三不定。第一約報受雖是定。然時不定。第二時定而報不定故並不定 雜集第七約定不定說有五業。彼云。故思造業略有五種。謂他所教敕他所勸請。無所了別根本執著．顛倒分別 五句如次。初三不增長。輕故不必受異熟。即時定報不定。及俱不定。后二增長。重故必定受異熟。即報定時不定。及時報俱決定。故下文言。受異熟決定者。如先所說故思造業。若此定受時報俱定者。即無分位決定何得別說。故下分位定。云如由此業于現法中必定受異熟生．后準此。又此無想定正是顛倒分別。妄報涅槃。既通四業。明知后二非唯時．報二俱決定 顯揚十九約定不定分之為五。彼云如是業有五種決定。一現受決定。二生受決定。三后差別受決定。四受報決定。五作業決定。初三時定。或時．報俱
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 受業。如果此生造作、度量，此生方才接受名稱為『后受』。假設有一種業，或者現世，或者來世受報沒有窮盡，更多的是來世接受果報。從最初的現世、來世，只稱為『現受』、『生受』，不稱為『后受』。所以《第八阿賴耶識論》（第八云）說，對於此業中，從最初成熟的階段建立順現法受等名稱。不只是接受這一階段的異熟果報。《雜集論》第七將決定與不定分為三種。其中說，如經文所說『決定業』，是指作業決定、受異熟果報決定、分位（時間階段）決定。作業通於決定與不決定。決定受是不決定的，道理如後面解釋。分位是決定的，因為時間和果報都決定。《瑜伽師地論》第六十根據決定與不決定總說四種業。其中說，又有四種業：一、異熟果報決定；二、時間階段決定；三、二者都決定；四、二者都不決定。第三種是決定的，其餘三種是不決定的。第一種關於果報接受雖然是決定的，但是時間不決定。第二種時間決定而果報不決定，所以都不決定。《雜集論》第七根據決定與不決定說有五種業。其中說，所以思心所造作的業略有五種，即他人所教敕、他人所勸請、無所了別（沒有真正理解）、根本執著、顛倒分別。這五句依次對應：最初三種不增長，因為輕微，不必接受異熟果報，即時間決定而果報不決定，以及二者都不決定。后兩種增長，因為重大，必定接受異熟果報，即果報決定而時間不決定，以及時間和果報都決定。所以下文說，接受異熟果報決定，如先前所說思心所造作的業。如果此決定受時間和果報都決定，就沒有分位決定，怎麼能分別說明呢？所以下文分位決定說，如由此業在現世中必定接受異熟果報，來世也準此。又此無想定正是顛倒分別，妄想涅槃，既然通於四種業，明顯知道后兩種並非只有時間和果報二者都決定。《顯揚聖教論》第十九根據決定與不決定分為五種。其中說，這樣的業有五種決定：一、現受決定；二、生受決定；三、后差別受決定；四、受報決定；五、作業決定。最初三種時間決定，或者時間和果報都決定。
【English Translation】 English version Karma to be Experienced. If in this life actions are created and measured, then only in this life is the name 'Later Experience' received. Suppose there is a karma, either in the present life or in a future life, the retribution is not exhausted, and more future lives receive the karmic result. From the initial present life or future life, it is only called 'Present Experience' or 'Future Experience', not 'Later Experience'. Therefore, the Eighth Consciousness Treatise (Eighth says) states that for this karma, from the initial stage of maturation, names such as 'agreeable to the present Dharma experience' are established. It is not just accepting the different mature karmic result of this one stage. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) Seventh divides the definite and indefinite into three types. It says, as the sutra states, 'Definite Karma' refers to the action being definite, the experience of different mature karmic results being definite, and the sthiti (temporal phase) being definite. The action is common to both definite and indefinite. Definite experience is indefinite, the reason being as explained later. The sthiti is definite because both time and retribution are definite. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (Stages of Yoga Practice) Sixty generally discusses four types of karma based on definite and indefinite. It says, there are also four types of karma: 1. The different mature karmic result is definite; 2. The temporal phase is definite; 3. Both are definite; 4. Neither are definite. The third type is definite, and the remaining three are indefinite. The first type, regarding the acceptance of retribution, although it is definite, the time is indefinite. The second type, the time is definite but the retribution is indefinite, so neither is definite. The Abhidharmasamuccaya Seventh discusses five types of karma based on definite and indefinite. It says, therefore, karma created by thought is roughly of five types, namely: those instructed by others, those persuaded by others, those without true understanding, fundamental attachment, and inverted discrimination. These five phrases correspond in order: the first three do not increase, because they are light, it is not necessary to experience different mature karmic results, that is, the time is definite but the retribution is indefinite, and neither are definite. The latter two increase, because they are heavy, it is certain to experience different mature karmic results, that is, the retribution is definite but the time is indefinite, and both time and retribution are definite. Therefore, the following text says that the experience of different mature karmic results is definite, as the karma created by thought mentioned earlier. If this definite experience has both time and retribution definite, then there is no sthiti definite, how can it be explained separately? Therefore, the following text on sthiti definite says, such as from this karma, in the present life, it is certain to experience different mature karmic results, and the future life is also based on this. Moreover, this non-conceptual concentration is precisely inverted discrimination, falsely imagining Nirvana, since it is common to the four types of karma, it is clear that the latter two are not only definite in both time and retribution. The Asanga's Compendium of Determinations Nineteenth divides into five types based on definite and indefinite. It says, such karma has five types of definiteness: 1. Present experience is definite; 2. Future experience is definite; 3. Later differentiated experience is definite; 4. Retribution experience is definite; 5. Action is definite. The first three have definite time, or both time and retribution are definite.
定。第四報定時不定。第五通報定及時．報定。以于第五決定受報。並決定作業與前有別。故雜集第七云。作業決定者。由宿業力感得決定異熟相續(相續即身)。於此生中決定造此業 既云感得決定異熟不言時定。故知是通。不爾于彼報定非時。異熟身上豈不造惡業耶 又受報定而時不定。及彼報定。非唯別報。既通總報。豈得令于現法受耶 雖有總報若於現受容受別報。當彼總報故。此等諸文開合有殊。不過此論所說四業 本疏云。顯揚論中於不定中報．時定不定別出故 要集云。顯揚皆云決定不說不定。由此後二不名不定。業．報相對以辨決定。據實前四即瑜伽六十時．報俱定收 今謂不爾。前四受報決定。唯果非業。即不得云業有五種。若云亦業．報決定是俱句者。即是前三。何須別說。又報定受時不定者。是何句收。名當不收。乖者相攝。不見此理。故依本釋理教無違。
問準修無想即雜集第七五業之中顛倒分別。彼說定受。此云通三並不定受。豈不相違 答彼據造不善言為正法等。故是定受。此約修善。故通不定 問修此定者既許生色亦得後起。生彼所修定俱之思可不受報。若許受報即唯生受。不可生．后二業同招。若唯昔修能感彼果。後起之者何為不感 答生彼起者非猛利故劣故不受。不爾重修
亦能別感。應重生彼。以昔人中后報受故 問若昔人中得已退失。但不退下三靜慮定。命終生彼得重起不 答即論二師說各不同。若初師解退與不退。生下三天不得重起。生無想者下初修退。後生重起亦名后報 若第二師。欲界雖退。生下靜慮亦得重起。五十六云。先於此起後於色界第四靜慮當受彼果。如疏文解 若云在欲設不退失。亦有生下三靜慮中而得重起者。不爾。異生潤生要現行故。若不退無想。下三靜慮得離染故如何得生。若許得生。即無六行伏惑上生 問昔定已失生上重修。如何已失定后還能感果 答由后定力資彼故。能同地法故。
言滅盡定者等。本釋西明各如疏辨 要集云。有說意云。此中唯約二乘學無學說。若諸菩薩下文方說。有釋意云。此通三乘有學無學。明得滅定人。要斷三界惑下。明初起．後起。于中初說二乘。后明菩薩。若不爾者。得滅定人不說如來理有不盡 今謂此斷全不相應。本釋意解簡不得人。除此所簡顯皆是得。何攝不盡。妄為思度。諸如是文。下但略指。不能一一具顯其非。尋者細思。
然西明釋能得人中。菩薩二種。漸悟如聲聞數。四萬．二萬．十千劫中亦入滅定。從信位乃至等覺。有五十一賢聖 今謂不爾。諸經但說有四十二賢聖。除等．妙覺猶有四十。若四
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 也能識別感受。應當重新生到那裡，因為過去在人中修習的果報在後面顯現的緣故。問：如果過去在人中得到的禪定已經退失，但是沒有退到低於第三禪定的境界，命終後生到那裡還能重新獲得禪定嗎？答：對此，論主世親（Vasubandhu）和無性（Asanga）二位論師的說法各不相同。如果按照世親論師的解釋，禪定退失與沒有退失，都不能在生到下三禪天后重新獲得禪定。如果生到無想天（Asaññasatta），在地獄最初修習時退失，後來生到上界重新獲得禪定，也可以稱為后報。如果按照無性論師的說法，即使在欲界退失禪定，生到下三禪天也能重新獲得禪定。《五十六頌》（Pañcaviṃśati）中說：『先前在此地生起，後來在第四禪定應當承受那個果報。』就像疏文解釋的那樣。如果說在欲界沒有退失禪定，也有生到下三禪天中而能重新獲得禪定的情況嗎？不是這樣的。因為異生（bālapṛthagjana）的潤生需要現行（指臨終時的心念），如果沒有退失無想定的禪定，下三禪天已經遠離染污，怎麼能生到那裡呢？如果允許可以生到那裡，就沒有六行觀伏惑而向上生的情況了。問：過去修習的禪定已經失去，生到上界重新修習，為什麼已經失去的禪定後來還能感果呢？答：由於後來的禪定力量資助過去的禪定，能夠與同地的法相應。
『言滅盡定者等』，本釋和西明（Ximing）的解釋各自如疏文所辨。要集（Yaoji）中說：有一種說法的意思是，這裡只針對二乘（Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna）的有學（śaikṣa）和無學（arhat）聖者來說。如果是諸位菩薩，下文會說明。有一種解釋的意思是，這裡通指三乘（Triyāna）的有學和無學聖者。說明獲得滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti）的人，要斷除三界的煩惱。下面說明初起和後起。其中先說二乘，后說明菩薩。如果不是這樣，獲得滅盡定的人不說如來（Tathāgata），道理上就有不周全的地方。我認為這種判斷完全不相應。本釋的用意在於簡別不得滅盡定的人，除了這裡所簡別的人，其餘都顯示是獲得滅盡定的人。還有什麼沒有包括的呢？這是妄加思量。像這樣的文句，下面只是略微指出，不能一一詳細地顯示其錯誤。尋閱的人仔細思考。
然而西明（Ximing）的解釋中，能獲得滅盡定的人中，菩薩有兩種：漸悟的菩薩就像聲聞（Śrāvaka）一樣，在四萬、二萬、一萬劫中也能進入滅盡定，從信位（śraddhānusārin）乃至等覺（Samyaksambuddha），有五十一賢聖。我認為不是這樣。諸經只說有四十二賢聖，除去等覺和妙覺（Adbhutasambuddha），還有四十位。如果四
【English Translation】 English version: Also able to discern feelings. One should be reborn there because the past retribution cultivated in human life manifests later. Question: If the samādhi (concentration) attained in human life has been lost, but not to a state lower than the Third Dhyāna (Jhāna), can one regain the samādhi after being reborn there? Answer: On this, the explanations of Master Vasubandhu (世親) and Master Asanga (無性) differ. According to Master Vasubandhu's explanation, whether the samādhi is lost or not, one cannot regain it after being reborn in the lower three Dhyāna heavens. If one is born in the Heaven of Non-Perception (無想天, Asaññasatta), having lost the samādhi initially cultivated in the lower realm, and later regains it after being reborn in the upper realm, it can also be called later retribution. According to Master Asanga's explanation, even if the samādhi is lost in the Desire Realm (欲界, Kāmadhātu), one can still regain it after being reborn in the lower Dhyānas. The Fifty-Six Verses (五十六頌, Pañcaviṃśati) states: 'Having arisen here first, later in the Fourth Dhyāna, one should receive that result.' This is as explained in the commentary. If it is said that one has not lost the samādhi in the Desire Realm, is it also possible to be reborn in the lower three Dhyānas and still regain the samādhi? It is not so. Because the rebirth of ordinary beings (異生, bālapṛthagjana) requires present action (referring to the thought at the time of death). If one has not lost the samādhi of the Non-Perception, the lower three Dhyānas have already been separated from defilements, how can one be born there? If it is allowed to be born there, then there would be no sixfold contemplation (六行觀) to subdue afflictions and ascend upwards. Question: The samādhi cultivated in the past has been lost, and one cultivates it again after being born in the upper realm. Why can the lost samādhi still produce results later? Answer: Because the power of the later samādhi supports the past samādhi, enabling it to be in accordance with the Dharma of the same realm.
'The statement 'Regarding the Cessation Attainment (滅盡定, nirodha-samāpatti)' etc., the original explanation and Ximing's (西明) explanations each follow the commentary's distinctions. The Essential Collection (要集, Yaoji) states: One explanation means that this only refers to the Śrāvakas (聲聞, Śrāvakayāna) and Pratyekabuddhas (緣覺, Pratyekabuddhayāna) who are still learning (有學, śaikṣa) and those who have completed their learning (無學, arhat). As for the Bodhisattvas, it will be explained later. Another explanation means that this refers to the learners and the fully learned of all three vehicles (三乘, Triyāna). It explains that those who attain the Cessation Attainment must sever the afflictions of the Three Realms. Below, it explains the initial arising and the subsequent arising. Among them, it first speaks of the Two Vehicles, and then explains the Bodhisattvas. If it were not so, not mentioning the Tathāgata (如來) among those who attain the Cessation Attainment would be incomplete in principle. I believe this judgment is completely inappropriate. The intention of the original explanation is to distinguish those who cannot attain the Cessation Attainment. Except for those distinguished here, all others are shown to be those who attain the Cessation Attainment. What else is not included? This is reckless speculation. Such sentences are only briefly pointed out below, and their errors cannot be shown in detail one by one. Those who seek should think carefully.
However, in Ximing's (西明) explanation, among those who can attain the Cessation Attainment, there are two types of Bodhisattvas: those who gradually awaken are like the Śrāvakas (聲聞), and can also enter the Cessation Attainment in 40,000, 20,000, or 10,000 kalpas (劫). From the Stage of Faith (信位, śraddhānuśārin) up to the Equal Awakening (等覺, Samyaksambuddha), there are fifty-one sages. I believe this is not so. The scriptures only say that there are forty-two sages. Excluding the Equal Awakening and the Wonderful Awakening (妙覺, Adbhutasambuddha), there are still forty.
．二．十千合之為一。還四十一。若開為三。即四十三。如何得有五十一耶。仁王般若雖說十信。頌中但云聖胎三十不云四十。故今正釋。二乘如彼。菩薩有二。頓悟菩薩或十或四。初地．七地二說別故。漸悟菩薩或七十四。四萬中有七十二。二萬．十千各為一人。成四十七。四萬劫中分四十五。二萬．十千或四十七。以此論中有二說故。將此歷彼四十賢聖。或七十四個四十賢聖。或四十七個四十賢聖。漸悟之中伏離惑品根位別故。隨粗如是。細更有餘。如初二果迴心已后亦容得起。下唯遮凡。未斷見惑 又說要斷欲修惑等據二乘說。不障迴心。雖不斷欲所有煩惱。然伏惑得第四靜慮。依邊際定受變易身。既有此能。何妨不得九次第定。又不得九定。具不能證得邊際定。故雜集第九云。靜慮．無色邊際定者。為欲引發勝品功德得自在等。修堪任定到究竟故。下論說云。或有七地滿心等起。據決定說。如變易生。不爾何故或有初地。由是此論但云或有學聖。但簡凡夫決定不得。有學有得不唯身證。迴心者得。余不說者據非迴心。若作此說應符妙理。
論此定初起唯在人中。本釋欲天亦得初起。有身證故。有釋唯人非在欲天。此論說唯。集論第五云。要於人趣方能引發。雜集第九釋云。言引發者是初起義 今者助明
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二，將十千合為一個整體，仍然是四十一。如果將其分為三部分，則為四十三。如何能得到五十一呢？《仁王般若經》雖然說了十信，但偈頌中只說聖胎三十，沒有說四十。所以現在正確解釋：二乘就像那樣。菩薩有兩種：頓悟菩薩或者十或者四，這是因為初地和七地的兩種說法不同。漸悟菩薩或者七十四，四萬劫中有七十二，二萬和十千各算一人，成為四十七。四萬劫中分為四十五，二萬和十千或者四十七，這是因為此論中有兩種說法。將此歷經彼四十賢聖，或者七十四個四十賢聖，或者四十七個四十賢聖。漸悟之中，降伏和脫離惑品的根位不同，所以隨著粗略的情況是這樣，細緻的情況還有更多。例如初果和二果迴心之後，也可能生起。下面只是遮止凡夫，沒有斷除見惑。又說要斷除欲修惑等，是根據二乘來說的，不障礙迴心。雖然不斷除慾望的所有煩惱，但降伏惑而得到第四靜慮，依靠邊際定而接受變易身。既然有這種能力，為什麼不能得到九次第定呢？又不能得到九定，就不能證得邊際定。所以《雜集論》第九說：『靜慮、無色邊際定，是爲了引發殊勝的功德，得到自在等，修習堪任定到究竟的緣故。』下論說：『或者有七地滿心等起』，是根據決定的情況來說的，例如變易生。不然，為什麼或者有初地？因此，此論只說或者有學聖，只是簡別凡夫決定不能得到。有學有得，不只是身證，迴心的人可以得到。其餘不說，是根據非迴心的人。如果這樣說，就應該符合妙理。
論述此定最初生起只在人中。本來色界天也可能最初生起，因為有身證的緣故。有一種解釋說只有人，不在欲界天。此論只這樣說。《集論》第五說：『一定要在人趣才能引發。』《雜集論》第九解釋說：『所說的引發，是最初生起的意思。』現在我來幫助說明。
【English Translation】 English version II. Ten thousand combined into one is still forty-one. If divided into three, it becomes forty-three. How can there be fifty-one? Although the Renwang Prajna Sutra (仁王般若, Benevolent Kings Sutra) speaks of the ten faiths, the verse only mentions the thirty stages of the holy womb and not forty. Therefore, I will now explain correctly: the Sravakas (聲聞, Hearers) and Pratyekabuddhas (緣覺, Solitary Buddhas) are like that. There are two types of Bodhisattvas (菩薩, beings striving for enlightenment): the Bodhisattva of sudden enlightenment is either ten or four, because the explanations for the first Bhumi (初地, the first of the ten Bodhisattva stages) and the seventh Bhumi differ. The Bodhisattva of gradual enlightenment is either seventy-four, with seventy-two out of forty thousand kalpas (劫, eons), and two groups of ten thousand each counted as one person, making forty-seven. In forty thousand kalpas, it is divided into forty-five, with two groups of ten thousand or forty-seven, because there are two explanations in this treatise. Applying this to the forty Aryas (賢聖, noble ones), there are either seventy-four groups of forty Aryas, or forty-seven groups of forty Aryas. Among gradual enlightenment, the roots and positions of subduing and abandoning the defilements differ, so it is like this according to the coarse aspects; there is even more in the subtle aspects. For example, after the first and second Fruits (果, stages of enlightenment) have a change of heart, it is also possible to arise. Below, it only prevents ordinary beings who have not severed the view-delusions (見惑, delusions arising from incorrect views). Furthermore, the statement that one must sever the desire-realm delusions (欲修惑, delusions related to desire) etc., is based on the Two Vehicles (二乘, Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas), and does not obstruct the change of heart. Although one does not sever all the afflictions of desire, one subdues the delusions and attains the Fourth Dhyana (靜慮, meditative absorption), relying on the borderline samadhi (邊際定, a high level of meditative concentration) to receive the transformation body (變易身, a subtle body attained in higher realms). Since one has this ability, why can't one attain the Nine Sequential Dhyanas (九次第定, nine progressive stages of meditative absorption)? Furthermore, if one cannot attain the nine Dhyanas, one cannot realize the borderline samadhi. Therefore, the ninth chapter of the Compendium of Abhidharma-samuccaya (雜集論, Compendium of Topics in the Abhidharma) says: 'The borderline samadhi of Dhyana and the Formless Realms (無色, realms beyond form) is for the purpose of inducing superior qualities, attaining freedom, etc., and cultivating the capable samadhi (堪任定, a state of mental fitness) to the ultimate extent.' The lower treatise says: 'Or there are those who arise from the full mind of the seventh Bhumi,' which is based on a definitive statement, such as the transformation birth (變易生, birth in the higher realms). Otherwise, why would there be those who are in the first Bhumi? Therefore, this treatise only says that there are those who are Aryas in training (有學聖, those still learning), only distinguishing that ordinary beings definitely cannot attain it. Those in training have attainment, not only body-witness (身證, direct realization). Those who have a change of heart can attain it. The reason for not mentioning others is because they are not those who have a change of heart. If one makes this statement, it should conform to the wonderful principle.
This treatise discusses that the initial arising of this samadhi (定, meditative concentration) only occurs among humans. Originally, it is also possible for it to initially arise in the Form Realm Heavens (色天, heavens of form), because there is body-witness. One explanation says only humans, not in the Desire Realm Heavens (欲天, heavens of desire). This treatise only says this. The fifth chapter of the Compendium of Abhidharma-samuccaya says: 'It is necessary to be in the human realm to be able to induce it.' The ninth chapter of the Compendium of Abhidharma-samuccaya explains: 'What is meant by inducing is the meaning of initial arising.' Now I will help to clarify.
。欲天許有身證何失。若不許有身證即唯惠解脫。此等回趣入初地后可非初起。準此色界聖者回心。非必皆身證及俱解脫。由此雜集第九復云。諸聖弟子為欲安住寂靜住故。於人趣等引此滅定令現在前。既有等言。明余初起。此唯言者據各自乘從多分說。或隨粗相。不障迴心于余初起。如似見道。顯揚論說唯欲人天。雖說唯言。亦許色界二乘聖者回心后入大乘見道。滅定唯人初起準彼。
論前云雖屬有頂者。起等至中本疏二解。今又助解。且依初師依加行心亦得云超。約定次第余非想非非想定后為加行入。今隨何心或以欲界心或初靜慮心為加行入。非要余定后故得名超。屬有頂者據初起說 依第二師。隨何地心后即能入。此不須加行。如似如來任運能入非起加行 問若心先起伏已入滅。彼無不起。何得說言微微心后厭心功能不起位立 答彼依初修作如是說。非自在者 若爾彼心於余定時元來不起。應恒名入滅 答有餘定心非名入滅。余定心無此定方顯。二說后勝。
論。鄔陀夷經是此誠證無色亦名意成天故。要集斷本釋云。舍利子意在色後起未說無色。出現意成天謂非想者。不了舍利子意所以見訶。依何文義證無色界亦入滅定。云此誠證故非善釋 今謂要集不了本解謂非善釋。即是後世鄔陀夷也。言意成
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說欲界天（Kāmadhātu）允許有通過身體證得（身證）的狀態，那麼會失去什麼？如果說不允許有通過身體證得的狀態，那就只有慧解脫（prajñā-vimukti）了。這些回小向大（回趣）的聖者，在進入初地（prathamā bhūmi）之後才可能，並非最初開始就具備。按照這個標準，聖者回心（迴心），不一定都是通過身體證得，也不一定是俱解脫（ubhayatobhāga-vimukti）。因此，《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）第九卷又說：『諸聖弟子爲了安住在寂靜的禪定中，在人趣等境界中，使此滅盡定（nirodha-samāpatti）現在顯前。』既然有『等』字，就說明還有其他的初起（最初開始）。這裡只說『此』，是根據各自所乘的法門，從大多數情況來說，或者根據粗略的表相來說。這並不妨礙迴心向大乘的聖者最初開始修習其他法門，就像見道（darśanamārga）一樣。《顯揚聖教論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā）說只針對欲界人天（Kāmadhātu）。雖然只說了『唯』，也允許聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna）和緣覺乘（Pratyekabuddhayāna）的聖者回心後進入大乘的見道。滅盡定只有人趣最初開始修習，可以按照這個標準來理解。
論中前面說『雖然屬於有頂天（Akaniṣṭha）』，關於『起等至』，《瑜伽師地論·本地分》的疏（本疏）有兩種解釋。現在再補充解釋。暫且按照第一位論師的觀點，依靠加行心（prayoga-citta）也可以說是『超』。這是約定了次第，在餘下的非想非非想定（naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana）之後作為加行而進入。現在隨著任何心，或者用欲界心，或者用初禪心（prathamadhyāna-citta）作為加行而進入，不一定要在餘下的禪定之後，所以可以稱為『超』。『屬於有頂天』是根據最初開始修習來說的。按照第二位論師的觀點，隨著任何地的心之後就能進入，這不需要加行，就像如來（Tathāgata）任運就能進入，不需要起加行一樣。問：如果心先前已經伏藏而進入滅盡定，那麼它就不會再起，怎麼能說在微微細心之後，厭惡心的功能在不起的狀態下成立呢？答：這是根據最初修習的人這樣說的，不是自在者（Īśvara）。如果這樣，那麼那個心在其他的定時本來就不起，應該總是名為入滅盡定。答：還有其他的定心，不能稱為入滅盡定，因為其他的定心沒有這種定的作用，才能顯現出滅盡定的作用。后一種說法更為殊勝。
論中說：『《鄔陀夷經》（Udayi Sutta）是這個的真實證據，因為無色界（Arūpadhātu）也名為意成天（manomayakāya）。』《要集》（Yaoji）斷本解釋說：『舍利子（Śāriputra）的意思是在色界（Rūpadhātu）之後才說無色界，出現意成天是指非想非非想處天（naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana），不瞭解舍利子的意思，所以被訶責。』依據什麼文義來證明無色界也能進入滅盡定？說『這是真實證據』，所以不是好的解釋。現在我認為《要集》不瞭解本解，認為不是好的解釋，就是後世的鄔陀夷。說『意成』
【English Translation】 English version: If it is allowed that the Desire Realm (Kāmadhātu) has bodily attainment (身證, śarīra-sākṣin), what is lost? If bodily attainment is not allowed, then there is only wisdom liberation (惠解脫, prajñā-vimukti). These beings who turn towards the Mahāyāna (回趣) are possible after entering the first bhūmi (初地, prathamā bhūmi), not from the very beginning. According to this standard, the turning of the mind (迴心) of a noble one (聖者, ārya) does not necessarily involve bodily attainment, nor is it necessarily both liberation (俱解脫, ubhayatobhāga-vimukti). Therefore, the ninth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論) further states: 'Noble disciples, in order to abide in a state of quietude, bring this cessation attainment (滅盡定, nirodha-samāpatti) into the present in realms such as the human realm.' Since there is the word 'such as' (等), it indicates other initial occurrences (初起). The use of 'this' here is based on the respective vehicles (乘, yāna) that each follows, speaking from the majority of cases, or according to the gross appearance. This does not hinder the initial occurrence of turning the mind towards the Mahāyāna, just like the path of seeing (見道, darśanamārga). The Abhidharma-samuccaya-vyākhyā (顯揚聖教論) says it is only for humans and gods in the Desire Realm (欲人天, Kāmadhātu). Although it only says 'only' (唯), it also allows noble ones of the Śrāvakayāna (聲聞乘) and Pratyekabuddhayāna (緣覺乘) to enter the path of seeing of the Mahāyāna after turning their minds. Cessation attainment only initially occurs in the human realm, which can be understood according to this standard.
The treatise previously stated, 'Although belonging to the Peak of Existence (有頂天, Akaniṣṭha)', regarding 'arising from samāpatti' (起等至), the commentary (本疏) in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論) has two explanations. Now, I will add another explanation. For the time being, according to the first teacher's view, relying on the preparatory mind (加行心, prayoga-citta), it can also be said to 'transcend' (超). This is because it is stipulated that after the remaining realm of neither perception nor non-perception (非想非非想定, naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana), it is entered as a preparation. Now, with any mind, either with a mind of the Desire Realm or with a mind of the first dhyāna (初禪心, prathamadhyāna-citta) as a preparation, it is not necessary to be after the remaining samādhis, so it can be called 'transcend'. 'Belonging to the Peak of Existence' is according to the initial occurrence. According to the second teacher's view, it can be entered after any realm of mind, which does not require preparation, just like the Tathāgata (如來) can enter effortlessly, without the need for preparation. Question: If the mind has already been subdued and entered cessation, then it will not arise again. How can it be said that after the subtle mind, the function of the mind of aversion is established in a state of non-arising? Answer: This is said according to those who initially practice, not those who are masters (自在者, Īśvara). If so, then that mind originally does not arise in other times of samādhi, and should always be called entering cessation. Answer: There are other minds of samādhi that cannot be called entering cessation, because other minds of samādhi do not have the function of this samādhi, so the function of cessation attainment can be manifested. The latter explanation is more superior.
The treatise says: 'The Udayi Sutta (鄔陀夷經) is the true evidence for this, because the Formless Realm (無色界, Arūpadhātu) is also called mind-made body (意成天, manomayakāya).' The Yaoji (要集) explanation says: 'Śāriputra's (舍利子) meaning is that the Formless Realm is spoken of after the Form Realm (色界, Rūpadhātu). The appearance of the mind-made body refers to the realm of neither perception nor non-perception (非想非非想處天, naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana). He did not understand Śāriputra's meaning, so he was criticized.' According to what textual meaning is it proven that the Formless Realm can also enter cessation attainment? Saying 'This is true evidence' is therefore not a good explanation. Now I think that the Yaoji does not understand the original explanation, and thinks that it is not a good explanation, which is the Udayi of later generations. Saying 'mind-made'
天超過段食。舍利子說有退定者。色界後起。出現不了謂是非想。故知上二俱名意成。俱舍引經復云。隨受一處意成天身。能入出此定。故通無色。經不遮彼言隨一故。又瑜伽五十六。復於色界重現在前。托色所依方現前故。若已建立於一切處皆得現前。說一切處不簡下三。此論后師要斷下三方起此者。未必為正。故但河沙彌不了說意。何非善釋為誠證耶 西明云。然大乘宗分成兩說。難陀等說。上界八地起滅盡定。故名意成天。覺師子釋。第四靜慮已上五地方起滅定名意成天。護法同第二釋者 準何得知難陀通說。覺師子說唯上五地名意成天。若準雜集第九。覺師子釋四句之中。許第四靜慮重起。不言下三非意成天。豈善釋耶。若將護法同第二說。如何釋彼五十六文於一切處皆得現起。若云少分一切。雜集不說唯言。
論于藏識教等。本云建立者是信有義。非成立義。定性之中有愚法者不信不入。不愚法者雖信大乘不將究竟。由信有故生彼入定 要集云。既信大乘何非究竟者。
此不解意。本釋意云。雖信大乘不將究竟唯有一乘。信有三故。如求聲聞信有獨覺。不將究竟唯一獨覺無聲聞乘 又雖信大性。自無力能證得大故。法花論為信種種乘異。但說一乘故 西明云。經不為說不求一切智故。今者為說
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：天人可以超越段食（指通過食物攝取營養）。舍利子說有從禪定中退出來的人，之後重新進入禪定。如果不能清楚地認識到非想（非想非非想處定），就不能說是真正理解了。因此，可以知道以上兩種情況都稱為意成天（指通過意念化生的天人）。《俱舍論》引用經文也說，隨其所受生於一處意成天之身，能夠進入和出離這種禪定。因此，意成天通於無色界。經文沒有遮止無色界天人，因為經文說的是『隨一處』。另外，《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷說，又在意成天中重新顯現，需要依託色界所依才能顯現。如果已經在一切處建立了意成天，那麼在一切處都可以顯現。說『一切處』並沒有排除下三界（指欲界、色界、無色界）。此論的後來的論師認為，必須斷除下三界才能生起意成天，這種說法未必正確。所以，河沙彌（指數量眾多的修行者）不瞭解意成天的含義。為什麼不把這種不瞭解作為誠實的證據呢？ 西明法師說，大乘宗分成兩種說法。難陀（Ananda，佛陀的十大弟子之一）等人說，上界八地（指色界和無色界的八個禪定層次）可以生起滅盡定（一種高級禪定），所以稱為意成天。覺師子（Buddhabhadra，一位譯經師）解釋說，第四靜慮（色界第四禪）及以上的五地可以生起滅盡定，稱為意成天。護法（Dharmapala，一位瑜伽行唯識學派的論師）的觀點與第二種解釋相同。根據什麼可以知道難陀的說法是通說的，而覺師子的說法只是上五地才稱為意成天呢？如果根據《雜集論》第九卷，覺師子的解釋在四句之中，允許第四靜慮重新生起，但沒有說下三界不是意成天，這難道是好的解釋嗎？如果將護法的觀點與第二種說法相同，那麼如何解釋《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷中『在一切處都可以顯現』的說法呢？如果說是少分的一切處，《雜集論》並沒有這樣說，只是說『一切』。 論中關於藏識（阿賴耶識，第八識）的教義等，原本說『建立』是指『信有』的意義，而不是『成立』的意義。定性（指具有固定根性）的人中，有愚法者（指智慧低下的人）不相信也不進入大乘佛法。不愚法者雖然相信大乘，但不將其作為究竟的歸宿。因為相信有大乘佛法，所以生到彼處並進入禪定。要集論中說，既然相信大乘，為什麼不將其作為究竟的歸宿呢？ 這是不理解本論的含義。本論的解釋是說，雖然相信大乘，但不將其作為唯一的究竟歸宿，因為他們相信有三種乘（指聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）。因為相信有三種乘，就像求聲聞果的人相信有獨覺果一樣，但不將獨覺果作為唯一的究竟歸宿，因為他們認為沒有聲聞乘。又比如，雖然相信有大性（指佛性），但自己沒有能力證得大性。所以，《法華論》認為他們相信種種不同的乘，但只說一乘（指佛乘）。西明法師說，經文不為他們宣說，因為他們不求一切智（指佛的智慧）。現在為他們宣說。
【English Translation】 English version: Celestial beings can transcend sectional food (referring to obtaining nourishment through food). Shariputra (one of the Buddha's ten principal disciples) said that there are those who retreat from Samadhi (a state of meditative consciousness), and then re-enter Samadhi. If one cannot clearly recognize the state of 'neither perception nor non-perception' (the highest state of Samadhi in the Formless Realm), then one cannot be said to truly understand it. Therefore, it can be known that both of the above situations are called 'Manomayakaya Devas' (referring to celestial beings born through mental creation). The Abhidharmakosa also quotes a sutra saying that according to where one is born in one place with a Manomayakaya body, one can enter and exit this Samadhi. Therefore, Manomayakaya Devas are common in the Formless Realm. The sutra does not prohibit celestial beings of the Formless Realm because the sutra says 'in one place'. Furthermore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Volume 56, says that again, in the Manomayakaya Devas, re-manifestation requires reliance on the support of the Form Realm to manifest. If Manomayakaya Devas have already been established everywhere, then they can manifest everywhere. Saying 'everywhere' does not exclude the lower three realms (referring to the Desire Realm, Form Realm, and Formless Realm). Later commentators of this treatise believe that one must cut off the lower three realms in order to generate Manomayakaya Devas, but this statement is not necessarily correct. Therefore, numerous monks do not understand the meaning of Manomayakaya Devas. Why not regard this lack of understanding as honest evidence? The Dharma Master Ximing said that the Mahayana school is divided into two views. Ananda (one of the Buddha's ten principal disciples) and others said that in the upper eight grounds (referring to the eight levels of Samadhi in the Form and Formless Realms), the Cessation Samadhi (a high-level Samadhi) can arise, so they are called Manomayakaya Devas. Buddhabhadra (a translator of sutras) explained that the Fourth Dhyana (the fourth level of Samadhi in the Form Realm) and the five grounds above it can give rise to Cessation Samadhi, and are called Manomayakaya Devas. Dharmapala's (a Yogacara scholar) view is the same as the second explanation. According to what can it be known that Ananda's statement is a general statement, while Buddhabhadra's statement only refers to the upper five grounds as Manomayakaya Devas? If according to the Abhidharmasamuccaya, Volume 9, Buddhabhadra's explanation in the four sentences allows the Fourth Dhyana to arise again, but does not say that the lower three realms are not Manomayakaya Devas, is this a good explanation? If Dharmapala's view is the same as the second statement, then how to explain the statement in the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Volume 56, that 'they can manifest everywhere'? If it is said that it is a small part of everywhere, the Abhidharmasamuccaya does not say this, it only says 'everywhere'. In the treatise on the teachings of the Alaya-vijnana (the store consciousness, the eighth consciousness), it originally said that 'establishment' refers to the meaning of 'believing in existence', not the meaning of 'establishing'. Among those with fixed natures, there are those who are foolish in the Dharma (referring to those with low wisdom) who do not believe in or enter the Mahayana Dharma. Those who are not foolish in the Dharma, although they believe in Mahayana, do not regard it as the ultimate destination. Because they believe in the existence of Mahayana Dharma, they are born there and enter Samadhi. The Yaoji says, since they believe in Mahayana, why not regard it as the ultimate destination? This is not understanding the meaning of the treatise. The explanation of the treatise is that although they believe in Mahayana, they do not regard it as the only ultimate destination, because they believe in the three vehicles (referring to the Sravaka Vehicle, Pratyekabuddha Vehicle, and Bodhisattva Vehicle). Because they believe in the three vehicles, just as those who seek the Sravaka fruit believe in the Pratyekabuddha fruit, but do not regard the Pratyekabuddha fruit as the only ultimate destination, because they believe that there is no Sravaka Vehicle. Also, for example, although they believe in the Great Nature (referring to Buddha-nature), they do not have the ability to realize the Great Nature themselves. Therefore, the Lotus Sutra Treatise believes that they believe in various different vehicles, but only speaks of the One Vehicle (referring to the Buddha Vehicle). The Dharma Master Ximing said that the sutra does not preach to them because they do not seek all-knowing wisdom (referring to the wisdom of the Buddha). Now it is preached to them.
令入滅定故 今者問彼。何大教中令入。為說阿毗達摩解深密等。皆不為說。至涅槃經但說六故。阿含等經已密說故。故知建立者是信有義。故此論云于藏識教未信受者。無色不起已信。生彼亦得現前。不言成立藏識已后信者方起故。
論。不還潤生唯種非現。要集云。五十九云唯隨眠潤。見諦跡者。五十二云見聖蹟者於後有愛得非擇滅。二文相影。故知初二聖亦唯種潤。對法第五．瑜伽第一言離欲者或少或倍或全離欲皆名離欲 今謂不爾。言見諦跡四果俱是。言離欲者非少分離得離欲名。大小乘教說離欲聖非初二故。對法第五云。此自體愛唯是俱生。乃至云。由此勢力諸異生輩。令無間中有相續。未離欲聖者亦爾。臨命終時乃至未至不明瞭想位。其中能起此愛現行。瑜伽雖云制而不著。不云不起。對法雲然能攝伏非不生起。今云不起豈不乖返。應依本解及西明釋 又問雜集第五云。中有沒心常是染污。猶如死有。準文通說不還果人 答此亦不定。云如死有。豈不還果死有之心常染污耶。故但通說應可簡擇。
問入滅定時有二加行。一緣滅受想。二緣無相界。于出定時緣於何境。觸於何觸 答瑜伽第十二云。出滅定時觸三種觸。一不動觸。二無所有觸。三無相觸。謂出定時多由三境而出於定。一由有境二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：爲了讓他們進入滅盡定，現在我問他們。讓他們進入什麼樣的大教之中？是說《阿毗達摩》（Abhidharma，論藏）和《解深密經》等等嗎？這些都不是。直到《涅槃經》（Nirvana Sutra）才說了六個原因。因為《阿含經》（Agama Sutras）等經典已經秘密地說了這些原因。因此，我們知道建立這些教義的人是相信有藏識（alaya-vijñana，阿賴耶識）的意義的。所以這部論典說，對於尚未信受藏識教義的人，無色界（arupa-dhatu）的煩惱不會生起；已經相信的人，即使生在無色界，這些煩惱也可能現前。這裡並沒有說只有在成立藏識之後才相信的人，這些煩惱才會生起。
論：不還果（Anagamin）的聖者潤生，只是通過種子，而不是通過現行。要集說：『五十九說只是隨眠潤。』見諦跡者（dṛṣṭi-satya-marga，見道者），五十二說：『見聖蹟者對於後有愛（bhava-tanha）得到非擇滅（pratisankhya-nirodha）。』這兩段經文互相呼應。因此，我們知道初果（Sotapanna）和二果（Sakadagamin）的聖者也只是通過種子來潤生。對法第五和瑜伽第一說，離欲者，或者少分、或者倍增、或者完全離欲，都可以稱為離欲。現在我認為不是這樣。說見諦跡者，四果（四向四果）都是。說離欲者，不是少分離就能得到離欲之名。大小乘的教義都說離欲的聖者不是初果和二果。對法第五說：『這種自體愛（atma-sneha）只是俱生的。』乃至說：『由於這種力量，使得各種異生輩（prthag-jana）的無間中有（antarabhava）相續不斷。』未離欲的聖者也是這樣，臨命終時，乃至未至不明瞭想位，其中能生起這種愛的現行。瑜伽雖然說制伏而不執著，但沒有說不起。對法說：『能夠攝伏，但不是不生起。』現在說不起，豈不是自相矛盾？應該依據原本的解釋和西明的解釋。
又問：雜集第五說：『中有（antarabhava）的沒心常常是染污的，猶如死有（cyuti-citta）。』按照經文的通說，不還果的人也是這樣。答：這也不一定。說『如死有』，難道不還果死有之心常常是染污的嗎？所以只是通說，應該加以簡擇。
問：入滅盡定（nirodha-samapatti）時有兩種加行（prayoga）：一是緣滅受想（nirodha-samjna-vedana），二是緣無相界（arupa-dhatu）。那麼，在出滅盡定時，緣于什麼境界？觸于什麼觸？答：瑜伽第十二說：出滅盡定時觸三種觸：一是不動觸（aninjya-sparsha），二是無所有觸（akimcanya-sparsha），三是無相觸（animitta-sparsha）。意思是說，出滅盡定時多由三種境界而出定：一是由有境（savitarka-savicara）而出定，二
【English Translation】 English version: In order to let them enter Nirodha-samapatti (滅盡定, cessation attainment), now I ask them. Into what kind of great teaching do you let them enter? Is it saying the Abhidharma (阿毗達摩, collection of treatises) and the Sandhinirmocana Sutra (解深密經, Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra) and so on? These are not it. Only the Nirvana Sutra (涅槃經, Nirvana Sutra) speaks of six reasons. Because the Agama Sutras (阿含經, Agama Sutras) and other scriptures have already secretly spoken of these reasons. Therefore, we know that the person who established these teachings believes in the meaning of Alaya-vijñana (藏識, storehouse consciousness). So this treatise says that for those who have not yet believed in the teachings of Alaya-vijñana, the afflictions of the Arupa-dhatu (無色界, formless realm) will not arise; those who have already believed, even if they are born in the Arupa-dhatu, these afflictions may manifest. It does not say here that only those who believe after the establishment of Alaya-vijñana will these afflictions arise.
Treatise: The Anagamin (不還果, Non-Returner) Arhat's rebirth is only through seeds, not through manifestation. The Yaoji (要集) says: 'Fifty-nine say it is only through latent afflictions.' The Dṛṣṭi-satya-marga (見諦跡者, one who sees the path of truth), fifty-two say: 'One who sees the holy path obtains the cessation of choice (pratisankhya-nirodha, 非擇滅) for the love of future existence (bhava-tanha, 後有愛).' These two passages echo each other. Therefore, we know that the Sotapanna (初果, Stream-enterer) and Sakadagamin (二果, Once-returner) Arhats also only nourish rebirth through seeds. The fifth of the Abhidharma and the first of the Yoga say that those who are detached from desire, whether partially, doubly, or completely detached from desire, can be called detached from desire. Now I think it is not so. Saying the Dṛṣṭi-satya-marga, all four fruits (four paths and four fruits) are included. Saying those who are detached from desire, not just a little detachment can obtain the name of detachment from desire. The teachings of both the Mahayana and Hinayana say that the Arhats detached from desire are not the Sotapanna and Sakadagamin. The fifth of the Abhidharma says: 'This self-love (atma-sneha, 自體愛) is only innate.' And even says: 'Because of this power, the intermediate existence (antarabhava, 中有) of various ordinary beings (prthag-jana, 異生輩) continues uninterrupted.' The Arhats who have not detached from desire are also like this, at the time of death, even until they have not reached the state of unclear thought, among them can arise the manifestation of this love. Although the Yoga says to restrain but not to be attached, it does not say that it does not arise. The Abhidharma says: 'Able to subdue, but not that it does not arise.' Now saying that it does not arise, is this not contradictory? It should be based on the original explanation and the explanation of Ximing.
Also asked: The fifth of the Samuccaya (雜集) says: 'The mind of the intermediate existence (antarabhava, 中有) is always defiled, like the dying mind (cyuti-citta, 死有).' According to the general saying of the scripture, the Anagamin Arhat is also like this. Answer: This is also not certain. Saying 'like the dying mind', is the dying mind of the Anagamin Arhat always defiled? So it is only a general saying, and should be carefully considered.
Question: When entering Nirodha-samapatti (滅盡定, cessation attainment), there are two preparatory practices (prayoga, 加行): one is to contemplate the cessation of perception and feeling (nirodha-samjna-vedana, 滅受想), and the other is to contemplate the formless realm (arupa-dhatu, 無相界). Then, when emerging from Nirodha-samapatti, what realm is contemplated? What touch is touched? Answer: The twelfth of the Yoga says: When emerging from Nirodha-samapatti, three kinds of touch are touched: one is the immovable touch (aninjya-sparsha, 不動觸), the second is the touch of nothingness (akimcanya-sparsha, 無所有觸), and the third is the formless touch (animitta-sparsha, 無相觸). It means that when emerging from Nirodha-samapatti, one mostly emerges from the samadhi through three kinds of realms: one is emerging from the samadhi through the realm of existence (savitarka-savicara, 有境), two
由境境。三由滅境。由此三境于出定時。如其次第觸三種觸。如樞要說 又說依初學者。緣滅受想入。緣初二境出。同有為故 依久學者。緣無相入。緣第三境出。同無為故。
若自在者。前隨何境入。后隨何境出。又未自在。出必定心。在前方便依空等持入。今依空等持出。緣于有境。觸不動觸。依觀五蘊內身無我以為空入。令無我見計內為我名為不動。不為我見之所動故。依無愿等持入緣境境。出觸無所有觸。是五根境之境名為境境。於六塵境無有貪．嗔．癡故。名無所有觸 依無相等持。入緣滅境。出觸無相觸。以是滅性名為滅境。無其十相名為無相。初二緣事。后一緣理 然三等持通定及散。未自在者唯依定出。若自在者通依定散。或依空入依無相出 此言觸者非觸塵也。觸謂觸對。即觸心所能令根．境順生心所。以觸境時不起我見不起貪等不作相狀。如次即是三觸得名。
論。或此俱是觸處少分。問無色界中既云無色。死．生如何是悶絕攝 答即依前解四蘊分位假立悶絕亦無有失。此皆共成。
成唯識論了義燈卷第五(末終) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1832 成唯識論了義燈
成唯識論了義燈卷第六(本)(論第七未盡)
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼撰
言余
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：由境境（指五根境之境）入定。由滅境（指滅性）入定。由此三種境界，在出定時，按照次序觸及三種觸：不動觸、無所有觸、無相觸，如《樞要》所說。又說，依據初學者，緣滅受想入定，緣初二境出定，因為它們都是有為法。依據久學者，緣無相入定，緣第三境出定，因為它是無為法。
如果自在者，之前隨任何境界入定，之後隨任何境界出定。又未自在者，出定必定依心。在前方便時，依據空等持入定，現在依據空等持出定，緣于有境，觸及不動觸。依據觀五蘊內身無我而入空定，使無我見認為內在為我，名為不動，不為我見所動。依據無愿等持入定，緣境境出定，觸及無所有觸。是五根境之境名為境境，於六塵境沒有貪、嗔、癡，所以名為無所有觸。依據無相等持入定，緣滅境出定，觸及無相觸。因為是滅性，所以名為滅境，沒有十相，所以名為無相。初二者緣事，后一者緣理。然而三種等持通於定和散。未自在者只依據定出定。如果自在者，通於依據定和散。或者依據空入定，依據無相出定。這裡說的觸，不是觸塵，觸是指觸對，即觸心所能使根、境順生心所。因為觸境時不起我見，不起貪等，不作相狀，所以依次就是三種觸的得名。
論：或者這些都是觸處的小部分。問：無色中既然說沒有色，死、生如何是悶絕所攝？答：就是依據前面解釋的四蘊分位，假立悶絕也沒有過失。這些都共同成就。
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第五（末終） 《大正藏》第43冊 No. 1832 《成唯識論了義燈》
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第六（本）（論第七未盡）
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼撰
言余
【English Translation】 English version: Entering Samadhi (concentration) from Jing Jing (the realm of the five sense organs). Entering Samadhi from Mie Jing (the realm of cessation). From these three realms, upon emerging from Samadhi, one touches three kinds of contact in sequence: Immovable Contact, Non-Possession Contact, and Signless Contact, as stated in the 'Essentials'. It is also said that, according to beginners, one enters Samadhi by contemplating the cessation of sensation and thought, and emerges from the first two realms, because they are conditioned phenomena. According to advanced practitioners, one enters Samadhi by contemplating the signless, and emerges from the third realm, because it is unconditioned.
If one is free, one can enter Samadhi from any realm and emerge from any realm. If one is not free, emerging from Samadhi must rely on the mind. In the preliminary practice, one enters Samadhi based on the Emptiness Samadhi, and now emerges from Samadhi based on the Emptiness Samadhi, contacting the Immovable Contact in relation to the realm of existence. Entering the Emptiness Samadhi by contemplating the non-self of the inner body of the five aggregates, making the view of non-self regard the inner as self, which is called Immovable, not moved by the view of self. Entering Samadhi based on the Wishlessness Samadhi, emerging from Jing Jing, one touches the Non-Possession Contact. The realm of the five sense organs is called Jing Jing, and there is no greed, anger, or delusion in the realm of the six sense objects, so it is called Non-Possession Contact. Entering Samadhi based on the Signlessness Samadhi, emerging from the realm of cessation, one touches the Signless Contact. Because it is the nature of cessation, it is called the realm of cessation, and it does not have the ten characteristics, so it is called Signless. The first two relate to phenomena, and the last one relates to principle. However, the three Samadhis are common to both Samadhi and distraction. Those who are not free only emerge from Samadhi based on Samadhi. If one is free, it is common to rely on both Samadhi and distraction. Or one enters Samadhi based on Emptiness and emerges from Samadhi based on Signlessness. The 'contact' mentioned here is not contact with dust. Contact refers to touching, that is, the mental function of contact that enables the sense organs and objects to give rise to mental functions in accordance. Because when touching the realm, one does not arise the view of self, does not arise greed, etc., and does not make appearances, so in sequence, these are the names of the three contacts.
Treatise: Or these are all small parts of the place of contact. Question: Since it is said that there is no form in the formless realm, how are death and birth included in fainting? Answer: That is, based on the previously explained divisions of the four aggregates, the hypothetical establishment of fainting is also without fault. These all jointly accomplish.
'Commentary on the Meaning of the Consciousness-Only Treatise', Volume 5 (End) 'Taisho Tripitaka', Volume 43, No. 1832, 'Commentary on the Meaning of the Consciousness-Only Treatise'
'Commentary on the Meaning of the Consciousness-Only Treatise', Volume 6 (Original) (Treatise 7 not finished)
Composed by Bhikshu Huizhao of Dayun Temple in Zizhou
Speaking of the rest
識識故。本釋如疏。西明云。第六意識。及大眾部等所立細意識。自宗七．八皆是有法余識識故。然七．八識前依理．教已成立。故有法得成 今謂不爾。若前成立有法得成。非取外法前已立訖。應立已成。若云前立為有。今立不離故非已成。前亦數成不離識訖。又大眾部立粗．細二第六意識。今亦立彼豈不違宗。若云彼細即我第八。何成立彼大眾所立細意識耶。立自八故。又若不置極成之言。後身菩薩不善意識。他方諸佛第六意識。亦有法中應有一分所別不成。若置極成即七．八識非他遍許 要集云。若余識中兼七．八者。有法雖言余識。仍有不定。由此有釋于理為勝 今謂不爾。余識有法既兼七．八。更有何識而為不定。以避此過。但云余識不言第六故。又設非兼七．八。親所緣境不離能緣心。亦無不定。
論。謂識等生時無實作用等者。大乘鏡中實無色起。薩婆多許有別色生故。此論云。但如鏡等似外境現。本釋如汝即是如彼薩婆多等。若經部師宗雖無別色亦有似現。非大乘宗許有別色故。維摩經等云。如燋谷芽。如谷響。如映象等。並喻無故 若爾何故攝大乘等以映象等喻依他起。不可就他他是實故。自無別色。何喻依他 答有二義。一取不離義二取似義。且如映象。薩婆多許。一不離鏡。二似面等像
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 關於『識識故』（因為是意識的緣故）。本釋（根本解釋）如同疏文所說。西明（西明寺）的觀點是：第六意識，以及大眾部等所建立的細意識，自宗（唯識宗）認為第七識和第八識都是『有法』（具有特定性質的事物），因為它們都是意識。然而，第七識和第八識的存在，之前已經通過理證和教證成立，所以『有法』的性質得以成立。現在我們認為並非如此。如果之前成立了『有法』，『有法』的性質就得以成立，那麼就不應該再取外法（外部事物），因為外法之前已經成立了。如果說之前成立了『有』，現在成立的是不離識的『有』，所以不是已經成立的。那麼之前也已經數次成立了不離識的『有』。而且，大眾部建立了粗和細兩種第六意識，現在我們也建立他們所建立的，難道不違背宗義嗎？如果說他們所建立的細意識就是我們的第八識，那麼又如何成立他們大眾部所建立的細意識呢？（我們）成立的是我們自己的第八識。而且，如果不設定『極成』（雙方都認可）這個條件，那麼後世的菩薩的不善意識，以及他方諸佛的第六意識，也應該在『有法』中佔有一部分，這樣就無法區分了。如果設定了『極成』這個條件，那麼第七識和第八識就不是他人普遍認可的。 《要集》中說：如果其餘的意識中兼具第七識和第八識，那麼『有法』雖然說是其餘的意識，仍然有不確定的地方。因此，這樣解釋在理上更為優勝。現在我們認為並非如此。其餘的意識的『有法』既然兼具第七識和第八識，那麼還有什麼意識是不確定的呢？爲了避免這個過失，只說其餘的意識，而不說第六意識。而且，即使不兼具第七識和第八識，親所緣境（直接認識的對象）不離能緣心（能認識的心），也沒有不確定的地方。 論：所謂意識等生起時沒有實際作用等，是因為大乘的鏡中實際上沒有色法生起。薩婆多部（一切有部）認為有不同的色法生起。因此，此論說：但如同鏡子等顯現出外境的影像。本釋說：你（經部師）就是如同薩婆多部等。如果經部師的宗義雖然沒有不同的色法，也有相似的顯現，因為大乘宗不承認有不同的色法。維摩經等說：如同焦芽敗種，如同谷響，如同映象等，都是比喻沒有實體的。 如果這樣，為什麼《攝大乘論》等用映象等來比喻依他起（緣起）呢？不能就他（薩婆多部）來說，因為他是真實的。自己（唯識宗）沒有不同的色法，用什麼來比喻依他起呢？回答有兩個含義：一是取不離的含義，二是取相似的含義。比如映象，薩婆多部承認，一是不離鏡子，二是相似於面容等的影像。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding 'shishi gu' (because it is consciousness). The original explanation is as the commentary says. Ximing (Ximing Temple) holds that the sixth consciousness, and the subtle consciousness established by the Mahasamghika school and others, our own school (Vijnanavada) considers the seventh and eighth consciousnesses to be 'dharma-possessors' (things possessing specific qualities), because they are consciousnesses. However, the existence of the seventh and eighth consciousnesses has already been established through reason and scripture, so the nature of 'dharma-possessor' is established. Now we think it is not so. If the 'dharma-possessor' was established before, and the nature of 'dharma-possessor' was established, then one should not take external dharmas (external things), because external dharmas have already been established before. If it is said that 'existence' was established before, and what is established now is 'existence' that is inseparable from consciousness, so it is not already established. Then the 'existence' that is inseparable from consciousness has also been established many times before. Moreover, the Mahasamghika school established two kinds of sixth consciousness, coarse and subtle. Now we also establish what they established, wouldn't that violate the tenets of our school? If it is said that the subtle consciousness they established is our eighth consciousness, then how can we establish the subtle consciousness established by the Mahasamghika school? (We) establish our own eighth consciousness. Moreover, if the condition of 'universally accepted' is not set, then the unwholesome consciousness of future Bodhisattvas, and the sixth consciousness of Buddhas in other lands, should also occupy a part of the 'dharma-possessor', so they cannot be distinguished. If the condition of 'universally accepted' is set, then the seventh and eighth consciousnesses are not universally accepted by others. The 'Yaoji' says: If the remaining consciousnesses also include the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, then although the 'dharma-possessor' is said to be the remaining consciousnesses, there are still uncertainties. Therefore, this explanation is superior in reason. Now we think it is not so. Since the 'dharma-possessor' of the remaining consciousnesses also includes the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, then what other consciousness is uncertain? In order to avoid this fault, only the remaining consciousnesses are mentioned, and the sixth consciousness is not mentioned. Moreover, even if they do not include the seventh and eighth consciousnesses, the directly perceived object (the object directly cognized) is not separate from the cognizing mind (the mind that can cognize), and there is no uncertainty. The treatise says: The so-called absence of actual function when consciousnesses arise, etc., is because no form actually arises in the mirror of Mahayana. The Sarvastivada school (the school of 'everything exists') believes that different forms arise. Therefore, this treatise says: But like mirrors, etc., they manifest images of external objects. The original explanation says: You (the Sautrantika teacher) are like the Sarvastivada school, etc. If the Sautrantika teacher's doctrine does not have different forms, there are also similar manifestations, because the Mahayana school does not admit that there are different forms. The Vimalakirti Sutra, etc., say: Like scorched seeds, like echoes, like reflections in a mirror, etc., they are all metaphors for the absence of substance. If so, why do the 'Mahayana-samgraha', etc., use reflections in a mirror, etc., to illustrate dependent origination (pratītyasamutpāda)? It cannot be explained in terms of him (the Sarvastivada school), because he is real. Our own school (Vijnanavada) does not have different forms, so what can be used to illustrate dependent origination? The answer has two meanings: one is to take the meaning of inseparability, and the other is to take the meaning of similarity. For example, a reflection in a mirror, the Sarvastivada school admits, one is inseparable from the mirror, and the other is similar to the image of the face, etc.
而非實面。不取像色實與非實。對薩婆多取其二義。對經部師取似有義。實不離心 問大乘鏡中既實無像。云何解深密心意識品云。如一影生緣現前。唯一影起等。佛地經云。如依圓鏡眾像影現 答就他宗及世間許取以為喻。亦復無違。經部雖無實影。取似亦復無失。攝論云。由迷亂故謂見影像等。據自實義以破他宗。故解深密雲。如鏡為緣還見自質。非鏡有影。大智度論三十六云。如油中見像等者。亦是就他非龍猛等執彼為實 問難他心智應緣外境。今云緣自心非親緣他心。亦應如鏡為緣還見自質者。為鏡喻心。為當取質 答設爾何失 二俱有過。以鏡喻心。應云以鏡為緣還見自鏡故。心為緣還見自心。如何得云還見自質。以質喻心為難準此 答二解。一云且約散位應云如質以鏡為緣還見自質。今他心智以他心緣還見自心。二云約定如定為緣。自心變作種種影像不離自心。如似散心以鏡為緣還見本質。非離於質鏡中別生 問自心他為緣還能見自心。自質鏡為緣質不能見。質如何為喻 答喻取少分。如似眼質以鏡為緣還見眼質。故云還見自質。雖所見非眼。眼依處故。隨世俗故 問所見之中據大乘宗質．相有別。云何得云還見自質 答攝相從質以似於質。據實所見親見自相。取少分喻喻他心智等所取之境。皆悉無過。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 而非實面。不應執取影像的色相，無論是真實的還是非真實的。對於薩婆多部（Sarvastivadins，一切有部），我們採納他們關於影像的兩種含義。對於經部師（Sautrantikas，經量部），我們採納影像『似乎存在』的含義。實際上，影像不離於心。 問：既然大乘（Mahayana）認為鏡中實際上沒有影像，那麼如何解釋《解深密經》（Samdhinirmocana Sutra）心意識品中的說法，『如一影生緣現前，唯一影起等』？以及《佛地經》（Buddhabhumisutra）中的說法，『如依圓鏡眾像影現』？ 答：這些說法是就其他宗派以及世俗的觀點而言，取其作為比喻，並沒有什麼衝突。即使經部不認為有真實的影像，採納『似乎存在』的觀點也沒有問題。《攝大乘論》（Mahayanasamgraha）中說：『由於迷亂的緣故，人們認為自己看到了影像等等。』這是根據自宗的真實義來破斥其他宗派的觀點。所以《解深密經》中說：『如鏡為緣還見自質，非鏡有影。』《大智度論》（Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra）第三十六卷中說：『如油中見像等者』，也是就他宗的觀點而言，並非龍樹（Nagarjuna）等大師認為那些影像真實存在。 問：他心智（paracitta-jnana）應該緣于外境，現在卻說緣于自心，並非直接緣於他心。如果說『如鏡為緣還見自質』，那麼是以鏡子比喻心，還是應當取鏡子所反映的質（本質）？ 答：假設是這樣，又有什麼過失呢？ 二者都有過失。如果以鏡子比喻心，那麼應該說『以鏡為緣還見自鏡』，即心為緣還見自心。怎麼能說『還見自質』呢？如果以質比喻心來發難，又該如何解釋呢？ 答：有兩種解釋。第一種解釋是，且就散位（未入定狀態）而言，應該說『如質以鏡為緣還見自質』。現在他心智以他心為緣，還見自心。第二種解釋是，約定（入定狀態）如同定為緣，自心變作種種影像，但不離自心。如同散心以鏡為緣，還見本質，並非脫離本質，在鏡中另外產生。 問：自心以他心為緣，還能見到自心。而自質以鏡子為緣，質本身卻不能見到質。那麼，如何以質作為比喻呢？ 答：這個比喻只取其少部分相似之處。比如，眼睛的質以鏡子為緣，還能見到眼睛的質，所以說『還見自質』。雖然所見並非眼睛本身，但眼睛是所見影像的依處。這是隨順世俗的說法。 問：所見之中，根據大乘宗的觀點，質和相是有區別的。怎麼能說『還見自質』呢？ 答：這是攝相從質，因為影像類似於質。實際上，所見是親見自相。取其少部分相似之處來比喻他心智等所取之境，都沒有什麼過失。
【English Translation】 English version Rather than a real surface. Do not grasp at the appearance of form, whether real or unreal. For the Sarvastivadins (those who believe in the existence of all dharmas), we adopt their two meanings regarding images. For the Sautrantikas (those who uphold the sutras), we adopt the meaning of 'seeming to exist.' In reality, images are inseparable from the mind. Question: Since Mahayana (the Great Vehicle) believes that there are actually no images in a mirror, how do we explain the statement in the 'Mind-Only Consciousness' chapter of the Samdhinirmocana Sutra (Explication of the Profound Secrets Sutra), 'Like a single shadow arising when conditions are present, only a single shadow arises, etc.'? And the statement in the Buddhabhumisutra (Buddha-Land Sutra), 'Like various images appearing reflected in a round mirror'? Answer: These statements are made from the perspective of other schools and worldly views, taking them as metaphors, and there is no contradiction. Even if the Sautrantikas do not believe in real images, adopting the view of 'seeming to exist' is also not a problem. The Mahayanasamgraha (Compendium of the Great Vehicle) says: 'Due to delusion, people think they see images, etc.' This is based on the true meaning of our own school to refute the views of other schools. Therefore, the Samdhinirmocana Sutra says: 'Like using a mirror as a condition to see one's own substance, the mirror does not have shadows.' The thirty-sixth volume of the Mahaprajnaparamita-sastra (Great Perfection of Wisdom Treatise) says: 'Like seeing images in oil, etc.,' this is also from the perspective of other schools, and not that Nagarjuna (a great Buddhist philosopher) and others believed those images to be real. Question: Other-minds' knowledge (paracitta-jnana) should be based on external objects, but now it is said to be based on one's own mind, not directly based on other minds. If it is said 'like using a mirror as a condition to see one's own substance,' then is the mirror a metaphor for the mind, or should we take the substance (essence) reflected by the mirror? Answer: Suppose it is so, what fault is there? Both have faults. If the mirror is a metaphor for the mind, then it should be said 'using the mirror as a condition to see one's own mirror,' that is, the mind as a condition to see one's own mind. How can it be said 'to see one's own substance'? If the substance is used as a metaphor for the mind to raise a difficulty, how should it be explained? Answer: There are two explanations. The first explanation is, for the scattered state (not in a state of samadhi), it should be said 'like the substance using the mirror as a condition to see one's own substance.' Now, other-minds' knowledge uses other minds as a condition to see one's own mind. The second explanation is, the agreed-upon (state of samadhi) is like samadhi as a condition, one's own mind transforms into various images, but it is inseparable from one's own mind. Like the scattered mind using the mirror as a condition to see the essence, it is not separate from the essence, and it is not produced separately in the mirror. Question: One's own mind can see one's own mind by using other minds as a condition. But the substance itself cannot see the substance by using the mirror as a condition. Then, how can the substance be used as a metaphor? Answer: This metaphor only takes a small part of the similarity. For example, the substance of the eye can still see the substance of the eye by using the mirror as a condition, so it is said 'to see one's own substance.' Although what is seen is not the eye itself, the eye is the basis of the seen image. This is following the worldly saying. Question: Among what is seen, according to the view of Mahayana, there is a difference between substance and appearance. How can it be said 'to see one's own substance'? Answer: This is taking the appearance from the substance, because the image is similar to the substance. In reality, what is seen is directly seeing one's own appearance. Taking a small part of the similarity to use as a metaphor for the objects taken by other-minds' knowledge, etc., there is no fault.
故無性論第五云。非等引地善惡思業本質為緣。影像果生亦復如是 問諸迷亂見所見影像。以何為體。何處所攝 答獨頭散意分別。妄執謂鏡有影等是迷亂等所見影像 何處攝者。要集云。有說還是色處似前相故者 本疏無文。本釋法苑法處章中雲。影像色是色處者。據獨意識散。緣五塵名分別意。以相從質在色處攝。不解鏡中執有實色為影像者。法師本釋不託于質妄執映象為實有者。是法處中遍計所起 問顯揚論中五塵色境亦有影像色。法處色中定所行境。亦有影像色。遍計色中亦有影像色。有何差別 答色處影像有其二解。一云分別意識緣五塵相。以境對根應法處攝。今者從質及所生果故色處收。二云五識所變名影像色。本識所變為所餘色。以根對境第八所變應法處收。以闇從明故色處攝。二解俱得。然第二勝 遍計影像前已略辨。定所行者。所變金等無實用等名定影像 問以鏡為緣。何故不言還見自影。緣影像故 答緣影不極成。攝相云見質。
釋他心智名唯識中。西明云。安惠三釋。護法二釋。安惠無違。護法釋中第二云。一切所緣不離能緣故名唯識。通一切位者。言中有監。云一切所緣不分親．疏。疏所緣緣監親所緣。總云不離能緣故。若疏所緣緣亦不離能緣心。何須云緣他心智。不親緣他心故非離
識取。設親緣他心。亦不離自心故。又前如何言應不親緣離自之色等。以彼所緣無離自故。正解應云一切親所緣不離能緣故名唯識。
論。一切種子識。西明云。能引自類及引同時自類現行。是因緣性。即自問云。若爾如何牽引種子為因緣性。解雲實非因緣。然菩薩地假名因緣。因緣類故 今謂不爾。遠望當現名為牽引。未潤等種自類相生亦是此因。故名因緣。
論。極微圓故。西明三釋。第三云。前文通釋因果第八。即無所熏故。後文通釋因果第八因微果圓 要集云。于諸釋中有釋第三于理相順 今謂不爾。謂七轉識。別釋前七。第八心品下。別釋第八。極微圓故。通釋八識在因異熟。果位無漏不熏所以。以業異熟極微劣故不熏。果位無漏極圓滿故不熏。不爾前言除佛果善極劣無記不能熏者。有何所以。由此本說于理為勝。以疏解云又解因中第八。及六識中異熟之心。並不熏者以極微故。果上第八以極圓故。偏簡第八果方無漏。五識異解有許通因。佛身善法無增減故。實果八識俱應簡之。通釋八識。由此前論但說有七能熏本識生自類種。
論。異生求趣色界心后引生無漏等。本釋頓悟至第八地生第四禪。初得勝身方受變易 西明云。異生求佛是頓悟人。未斷煩惱隨眠力故。色界心后引生無漏 今
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
辨識：假設有親緣的他心，也不離於自身的心識。那麼之前如何說『不應親緣離開自身之色等』呢？因為它們所緣的境沒有離開自身。正確的解釋應該是說，一切親所緣不離開能緣的心識，所以名為唯識。 論：一切種子識（ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切事物種子的意識）。西明法師說：『能引生同類以及引生同時的同類現行，是因緣性。』然後自己提問：『如果這樣，如何牽引種子作為因緣性呢？』解答說：『實際上並非因緣，然而《菩薩地持經》中假名為因緣，因為是因緣的類別。』現在我認為不是這樣。從長遠來看，預示將來的生起，名為牽引。未被滋潤等的種子，其同類相生也是這個原因。所以名為因緣。 論：極微圓滿的緣故。西明法師有三種解釋。第三種說：『前面的經文是通用於解釋因果第八識（ālaya-vijñāna，儲存一切事物種子的意識）。即沒有被熏習的緣故。後面的經文是通用於解釋因果第八識，因為因是微小的，果是圓滿的。』《要集》中說：『在各種解釋中，第三種解釋在道理上是相順的。』現在我認為不是這樣。這是指七轉識（seven transformations of consciousness），分別解釋前七識。第八識的心品下，分別解釋第八識。『極微圓故』，是通用於解釋八識在因位的異熟果。果位無漏不被熏習的原因。因為業的異熟是極微細的，所以不被熏習。果位的無漏是極圓滿的，所以不被熏習。如果不是這樣，之前所說的『除了佛果的善，極劣的無記不能熏習』，又是什麼原因呢？因此，這個根本的說法在道理上是更勝一籌的。因為疏解中說：『又解釋因中的第八識，以及六識中的異熟之心，不被熏習是因為極微細的緣故。果上的第八識因為極圓滿的緣故。』特別指出了第八識在果位才是無漏的。五識的另一種解釋是允許通於因位的。佛身的善法沒有增減的緣故。實際上果位的八識都應該簡別出來。這是通用於解釋八識的。因此，前面的論述只是說有七識能夠熏習本識，產生同類的種子。 論：異生（prthag-jana，凡夫）求趣入心后，引生無漏等。原本的解釋是頓悟直到第八地，產生第四禪。最初獲得殊勝的身體，才接受變易。西明法師說：『異生求佛是頓悟的人。因為沒有斷除煩惱隨眠的勢力，在心后引生無漏。』現在我認為不是這樣。
【English Translation】 English version:
Discernment: Suppose there is other's mind that is related, it is also not apart from one's own mind. Then how did it say before 'should not be related to colors etc. that are apart from oneself'? Because the object they perceive is not apart from oneself. The correct explanation should be that all objects that are closely related are not apart from the perceiving mind, therefore it is called Vijñānavāda (Consciousness-only). Treatise: The Ālaya-vijñāna (storehouse consciousness, the consciousness that stores the seeds of all things). The Ximing master said: 'It can generate similar kinds and generate simultaneous similar kinds of present activity, which is the nature of cause and condition.' Then he asked himself: 'If so, how can the seeds be drawn as the nature of cause and condition?' The answer is: 'In reality, it is not a cause and condition, but in the Bodhisattvabhumi Sutra, it is nominally called a cause and condition because it is a category of cause and condition.' Now I think it is not like this. Looking at the distant future, predicting the future arising is called drawing. The similar arising of seeds that have not been moistened is also the reason for this. Therefore, it is called cause and condition. Treatise: Because of the perfection of the ultimate particle. The Ximing master has three explanations. The third one says: 'The previous text is a general explanation of the cause and effect of the eighth consciousness (ālaya-vijñāna, storehouse consciousness). That is, because it is not perfumed. The following text is a general explanation of the cause and effect of the eighth consciousness, because the cause is tiny and the effect is perfect.' The Yaoji says: 'Among the various explanations, the third explanation is consistent with the principle.' Now I think it is not like this. This refers to the seven transformations of consciousness, explaining the first seven consciousnesses separately. Below the mind category of the eighth consciousness, the eighth consciousness is explained separately. 'Because of the perfection of the ultimate particle' is a general explanation of the eight consciousnesses in the causal stage of maturation. The reason why the fruition stage is unpolluted and not perfumed. Because the maturation of karma is extremely subtle, it is not perfumed. The unpolluted state of the fruition stage is extremely perfect, so it is not perfumed. If this is not the case, what is the reason for what was said before, 'Except for the good of the Buddha's fruition, the extremely inferior neutral cannot be perfumed'? Therefore, this fundamental statement is superior in principle. Because the commentary says: 'Also explain that the eighth consciousness in the cause, and the maturation mind in the six consciousnesses, are not perfumed because they are extremely subtle. The eighth consciousness on the fruition is unpolluted because it is extremely perfect.' It specifically points out that the eighth consciousness is unpolluted only in the fruition stage. Another explanation of the five consciousnesses is that they are allowed to pass through the causal stage. Because the good dharma of the Buddha's body does not increase or decrease. In reality, all eight consciousnesses in the fruition stage should be distinguished. This is a general explanation of the eight consciousnesses. Therefore, the previous discussion only said that there are seven consciousnesses that can perfume the fundamental consciousness and produce seeds of the same kind. Treatise: After the ordinary being (prthag-jana, common person) seeks to enter the ** mind, it leads to the arising of the unpolluted etc. The original explanation is that sudden enlightenment leads to the eighth ground, producing the fourth dhyana. Only after initially obtaining a superior body does one accept transformation. The Ximing master said: 'The ordinary being seeking Buddhahood is a person of sudden enlightenment. Because the power of the latent afflictions has not been cut off, the unpolluted arises after the ** mind.' Now I think it is not like this.
謂若已隨眠未斷即生彼天。初二果人隨眠。及未斷色第三果人迴心求佛。亦應定生第四靜慮。有隨眠故由此故知。頓悟勝能不厭生死。取最勝身方受變易故必生彼。二乘不然故不定生 要集云。八地已上亦不斷隨眠受生有用。故第十地方生自在。餘地菩薩未極熏修故不得生。由此瑜伽第四云。由極熏修第十地故得生其中。顯揚第二云。若善修習不思議三摩地所引第十地中第四靜慮處者。受出過凈居大自在天生果。經論文顯。二乘迴心。若無學者。一切後生皆得非擇滅。欲界經生初之二果。上二界生亦非擇滅。即于欲界受變易生。不還果人慾界迴心。即于欲界受變易報。色界迴心即色界受。此學無學受變易已必無死生。但往自在不名為生。頓悟菩薩唯除三惡。餘一切生未得非擇。煩惱未斷雖受變易亦有生死 今謂不爾。諸受變易必無舍壽別受生死。若別受報。為廣果天業。為大自在天業。若廣果業不異前受。何須更受。若自在天業彼何時造。若是新造非名后報。若是舊造應五那含人舊造凈居業。彼既不爾此如何然 又復二乘有學回心至第十地應別生死。文說第十地菩薩生。不云直往非漸悟故。又此論第八云。謂不定性獨覺．聲聞．及得自在大愿菩薩。已永斷伏煩惱障故。無容復受當分段身。恐廢長時修菩薩行。遂以無漏
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果說隨眠（Anusaya，煩惱的潛在傾向）未斷就生到彼天，那麼初果（Sotapanna，須陀洹）、二果（Sakadagamin，斯陀含）聖者還有隨眠，以及未斷色界煩惱的三果（Anagamin，阿那含）聖者回心向佛，也應該必定生到第四禪天（Fourth Dhyana Heaven）。因為他們有隨眠存在。由此可知，頓悟的殊勝之處在於不厭棄生死，只有獲得最殊勝的身體才能承受變易生死，所以必定生到彼天。而聲聞、緣覺二乘不是這樣，所以不一定生到彼天。
《要集》中說，八地（不動地）以上的菩薩也還有隨眠未斷，所以受生還有作用。因此，十地（法雲地）菩薩才能自在受生，其餘地的菩薩因為沒有極度熏修，所以不能自在受生。由此，《瑜伽師地論》第四卷說，由於極度熏修的緣故，十地菩薩才能生到其中。《顯揚聖教論》第二卷說，如果善於修習不思議三摩地所引發的十地中的第四禪天，就能承受超出凈居天的大自在天之果報。經文和論典都顯示，二乘聖者回心向大乘，如果沒有證得無學果位，那麼一切後生都能得到非擇滅（Asamskrta，不生不滅的涅槃狀態）。欲界眾生證得初果、二果，以及上二界眾生證得非擇滅，就能在欲界承受變易生死。不還果聖者在欲界迴心向大乘，就能在欲界承受變易果報。迴心當下就承受果報。這些有學、無學聖者承受變易生死後，必定沒有死生，只是前往自在之處，不能稱為受生。頓悟的菩薩除了三惡道之外，其餘一切生處都未得非擇滅，煩惱未斷，即使承受變易生死，也還是有生死。
現在我認為不是這樣。所有承受變易生死的，必定沒有捨棄壽命而另外承受生死。如果另外承受果報，那是廣果天（Vrihatphala Heaven）的業，還是大自在天（Mahadeva）的業？如果是廣果天的業，和之前的承受沒有區別，何必再承受一次？如果是大自在天的業，那麼這個業是什麼時候造的？如果是新造的，就不能稱為后報；如果是舊造的，那麼五不還天（Suddhavasa Heavens）的聖者舊造的凈居天業又該如何解釋？他們既然不是這樣，這裡又怎麼會是這樣呢？
而且，二乘有學回心向大乘，直到十地菩薩，應該還有另外的生死。經文說十地菩薩受生，沒有說直接前往，因為不是漸悟的緣故。而且，《瑜伽師地論》第八卷說，所謂不定性的獨覺、聲聞，以及獲得自在的大愿菩薩，已經永遠斷除或降伏了煩惱障，不可能再承受分段生死身，恐怕耽誤了長時間修菩薩行的機會，所以用無漏...
【English Translation】 English version: If it is said that one is born in that heaven with Anusaya (latent tendencies of afflictions) not yet severed, then the Srotapanna (stream-enterer), Sakadagamin (once-returner), who are the first two fruits, still have Anusaya, and the Anagamin (non-returner) who has not severed the form realm afflictions, if they turn their minds towards the Buddha, should also be born in the Fourth Dhyana Heaven. Because they have Anusaya. From this, it is known that the superior ability of sudden enlightenment lies in not being averse to birth and death. Only by obtaining the most superior body can one bear the transformation of birth and death, so they are sure to be born there. The Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas of the Two Vehicles are not like this, so they are not necessarily born there.
The 'Yao Ji' says that even Bodhisattvas above the Eighth Bhumi (Immovable Ground) still have Anusaya not severed, so there is still a use for rebirth. Therefore, Bodhisattvas of the Tenth Bhumi (Cloud of Dharma Ground) can be reborn freely, while Bodhisattvas of other Bhumis cannot be reborn freely because they have not cultivated to the extreme. From this, the fourth volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' says that because of the extreme cultivation, Bodhisattvas of the Tenth Bhumi can be born there. The second volume of the 'Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma' says that if one is skilled in cultivating the Fourth Dhyana Heaven in the Tenth Bhumi, which is induced by the inconceivable Samadhi, one can receive the fruit of being born as a Mahadeva (Great God) who surpasses the Suddhavasa Heavens (Pure Abodes). The sutras and treatises all show that if the Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas of the Two Vehicles turn their minds towards the Mahayana, and if they have not attained the state of No-Learning, then all subsequent births can attain Asamskrta (unconditioned Nirvana). Beings in the desire realm who attain the first and second fruits, and beings in the upper two realms who attain Asamskrta, can bear the transformation of birth and death in the desire realm. An Anagamin who turns his mind towards the Mahayana in the desire realm can bear the fruit of transformation in the desire realm. The moment of turning the mind is the moment of bearing the fruit. These learners and non-learners, after bearing the transformation of birth and death, will surely not have death and birth, but will only go to a place of freedom, which cannot be called rebirth. Bodhisattvas of sudden enlightenment, except for the three evil paths, have not attained Asamskrta in all other places of birth. If afflictions are not severed, even if they bear the transformation of birth and death, they still have birth and death.
Now I think it is not like this. All those who bear the transformation of birth and death will surely not abandon their lifespan and bear another birth and death. If they bear another fruit, is it the karma of the Vrihatphala Heaven (Great Fruit Heaven) or the karma of the Mahadeva (Great God)? If it is the karma of the Vrihatphala Heaven, there is no difference from the previous bearing, so why bear it again? If it is the karma of the Mahadeva, when was this karma created? If it is newly created, it cannot be called subsequent retribution; if it is old karma, then how should we explain the old karma of the Suddhavasa Heavens created by the Anagamins of the Five Pure Abodes? Since they are not like this, how can it be like this here?
Moreover, Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas of the Two Vehicles who are learners, if they turn their minds towards the Mahayana, until they reach the Tenth Bhumi, should still have another birth and death. The sutras say that Bodhisattvas of the Tenth Bhumi are born, not that they go directly, because it is not gradual enlightenment. Moreover, the eighth volume of the 'Yogacarabhumi-sastra' says that the Pratyekabuddhas and Sravakas of uncertain nature, and the Bodhisattvas of great vows who have attained freedom, have already permanently severed or subdued the afflictive obscurations, so it is impossible for them to bear the body of segmented birth and death again, for fear of delaying the opportunity to cultivate the Bodhisattva path for a long time, so they use the unconditioned...
勝定願力。如延壽法資現身因。令彼長時與果不絕。數數如是定愿資助。乃至證得無上菩提。若第十地有生死者。應更容受當分段身。亦非永伏煩惱障。又不得云資現身因與果不絕 問二乘見道前回心趣大。為漸。為頓 答如本法花疏。及法花義決廣．辨。恐煩不敘。
論。大自在宮者。對法第六．解深密經．瑜伽七十八九皆總相說。如瑜伽七十九所說。凈土或三地菩薩等往生。十地亦在其中。對法但明佛之凈土。云唯佛所覺非得靜慮者靜慮境界。總相說土不簡何佛。亦通菩薩而得往生。文中亦含大自在宮菩薩生處。不爾十地菩薩不生。由文隱故。要集家說餘本不獲 然自在宮受佛位處。居他用土處所不定。何以得知。準十地經云。是時菩薩三昧現前時。有大寶蓮花王。周圓如十阿僧祇百千三千大千諸佛世界。是時菩薩其身殊妙稱可花坐。世界既有十方。非同有部傍布。故自在宮處所不定。然十地經論。后報利益摩醯首羅智處生故者。據第十地初往而說。第十地滿欲受佛位所居之土。非必住在自在宮處 問如初地菩薩見他受用土。如百三千。已上漸倍。計第十地所睹凈土。無量無邊。如何猶生凈居之上大自在耶。又初地已去無惡道畏。以常生佛土。非彼佛土唯凈居上故 答佛土雖大小有殊。菩薩有漏諸現起識。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 勝定願力（殊勝且堅定的願力）。如同延續壽命的方法資助現世之身，使那（善果）長時間持續，果報不絕。多次這樣以堅定的願力資助，乃至證得無上菩提（最高的覺悟）。如果第十地（菩薩修行的最高階段）的菩薩還有生死，就應該再次承受相應的分段之身（由業力所感的身軀），也並非永遠降伏了煩惱障（由煩惱產生的障礙）。又不能說資助現世之身的因果不會斷絕。 問：二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）在見道（證悟真理）之前回心向大乘（菩薩乘），是漸悟還是頓悟？ 答：如《法華疏》和《法華義決》中廣泛辨析的那樣，恐怕繁瑣，這裡就不敘述了。
論：關於大自在宮（摩醯首羅天所居住的宮殿），《對法論》第六卷、《解深密經》、《瑜伽師地論》第七十八和七十九卷都從總體上進行了說明。如《瑜伽師地論》第七十九卷所說，凈土（清凈的佛土）或者三地菩薩等可以往生，十地菩薩也包括在其中。《對法論》只說明瞭佛的凈土，說只有佛才能覺悟，不是得到靜慮（禪定）者所能達到的靜慮境界。總體上說佛土不區分是哪位佛的，也允許菩薩往生。文中也包含大自在宮是菩薩的出生之處。否則，十地菩薩就不能往生。因為文句隱晦，要依靠集家的說法，其他版本沒有記載。然而，大自在宮是接受佛位的地方，居住在他受用土（佛為菩薩示現的清凈國土）的處所不固定。如何得知？根據《十地經》所說，『這時菩薩三昧現前時，有大寶蓮花王，周圓如十阿僧祇百千三千大千諸佛世界』。這時菩薩的身軀殊妙，與蓮花座相稱。世界既然有十方，不同於有部（說一切有部）的橫向分佈。所以大自在宮的處所不固定。然而《十地經論》說，『后報利益摩醯首羅智處生故』，是根據第十地菩薩初次前往而說的。第十地菩薩圓滿后，將要接受佛位所居住的佛土，不一定住在自在宮處。 問：如初地菩薩見到他受用土，如一百個三千大千世界。以上逐漸增加一倍。計算第十地菩薩所見到的凈土，無量無邊。如何仍然往生到凈居天（色界天的最高層）之上的大自在天呢？又初地菩薩已經沒有惡道（地獄、餓鬼、畜生）的畏懼，因為常生於佛土，不是那些佛土只有凈居天之上才有。 答：佛土雖然大小有差別，菩薩有漏的各種現起識（有侷限性的意識）。
【English Translation】 English version The power of superior and steadfast vows. Like the method of prolonging life, it supports the present body, causing that (good result) to last for a long time, with uninterrupted fruition. Repeatedly, in this way, steadfast vows provide assistance, until one attains Anuttara-Samyak-Sambodhi (supreme enlightenment). If a Bodhisattva of the Tenth Ground (the highest stage of Bodhisattva practice) still has birth and death, they should again receive a corresponding segmented body (a body formed by karmic forces), and it is not that they have permanently subdued the afflictive obscurations (obstacles arising from afflictions). Furthermore, it cannot be said that the cause and effect of supporting the present body will not be severed. Question: When those of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) turn their minds towards the Mahāyāna (Bodhisattvayāna) before seeing the Path (realizing the truth), is it gradual or sudden? Answer: As extensively discussed in the commentaries on the Lotus Sutra and the Meaning Decisions of the Lotus Sutra, I will not elaborate here for fear of being tedious.
Treatise: Regarding the palace of Mahādeva (the palace where Maheśvara dwells), the sixth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra, and the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra volumes 78 and 79 all provide general explanations. As stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra volume 79, Pure Lands (pure Buddha-fields) or Bodhisattvas of the Third Ground, etc., can be reborn there, and Bodhisattvas of the Tenth Ground are also included. The Abhidharmasamuccaya only explains the Pure Land of the Buddha, saying that only the Buddha can awaken to it, and it is not the realm of meditative absorption (dhyāna) that those who have attained meditative absorption can reach. Generally speaking, the Buddha-field does not distinguish which Buddha it belongs to, and Bodhisattvas are also allowed to be reborn there. The text also implies that the palace of Mahādeva is the birthplace of Bodhisattvas. Otherwise, Bodhisattvas of the Tenth Ground could not be reborn there. Because the wording is obscure, it relies on the explanations of the compilers; other versions do not record this. However, the palace of Mahādeva is the place where Buddhahood is received, and the location of dwelling in the other-enjoyment land (pure lands manifested by Buddhas for Bodhisattvas) is not fixed. How can we know this? According to the Ten Grounds Sutra, 'At that time, when the Bodhisattva's samādhi manifests, there is a great treasure lotus king, as vast as ten asaṃkhya hundreds of thousands of three-thousand-great-thousand Buddha-worlds'. At that time, the Bodhisattva's body is extraordinary and matches the lotus seat. Since the world has ten directions, it is different from the lateral distribution of the Sarvāstivāda school. Therefore, the location of the palace of Mahādeva is not fixed. However, the Ten Grounds Sutra Commentary says, 'Because of being born in the place of Maheśvara's wisdom, which benefits later rewards', this is said in reference to the first visit of the Bodhisattva of the Tenth Ground. The Buddha-field where the Bodhisattva of the Tenth Ground will dwell after completing their practice and receiving Buddhahood is not necessarily located in the palace of Mahādeva. Question: If a Bodhisattva of the First Ground sees other-enjoyment lands, such as a hundred three-thousand-great-thousand worlds, and this gradually doubles upwards, calculating the Pure Lands seen by a Bodhisattva of the Tenth Ground, which are immeasurable and boundless, how can they still be reborn in the Mahādeva heaven above the Pure Abodes (the highest level of the Form Realm)? Furthermore, Bodhisattvas from the First Ground onwards have no fear of the evil realms (hell, hungry ghosts, animals) because they are constantly born in Buddha-fields, and it is not that those Buddha-fields only exist above the Pure Abodes. Answer: Although Buddha-fields vary in size, Bodhisattvas have various active consciousnesses with limitations.
猶是有漏屬界地故。非離三界有別眾生。隨生何土約第八識皆屬界故。約此而言十地菩薩由極熏修。超五凈居生自在宮故亦無失 然自在宮非凈居攝。瑜伽第四云。色界之中十八住處。無想天者廣果天攝。非別處所。既云十八住處。復言無想廣果天攝。故自在宮非五凈居。若凈居攝處應十七非十八故。
論第六轉識三界九地更相引故者。問總有幾心從欲何心生欲何心。生上二界心及不繫心為問亦爾 答準顯揚十八云。欲繫有八心。一生得善。二方便善。三不善。四有覆無記。及無覆無記分為四種。謂異熟．威儀．工巧．變化心。色系有六心。除不善．工巧。無色系有四。除不善．威儀．工巧．變化心。不繫心有二。謂有學．無學 總二十心。然總相說。欲起三界。色起二界。無色起無色。並各起不繫。又自欲界無變化心。從相似說實是上界。故六十九云。如色界果欲界變化心。即從色界善心無間此欲界無記心。又說此心為欲界者。當知是彼影像類。非自性故準此據實欲界七心。除變化心。非欲系故。言互相生為無間者。且約欲界略為頌曰。
欲生得起七 得定或九．十 自從於十生 方便亦定七 初得定生九 自在起十三 從他生亦然 不善自地七 余界有二說 自．上各七生 有覆
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為仍然是有漏的，屬於三界範圍，所以並非脫離三界之外還有其他眾生。無論眾生生於何處，從第八識（Alaya-識，阿賴耶識）的角度來看，都屬於三界之內。從這個角度來說，十地菩薩（Bodhisattva of the Tenth Ground）由於極深的熏修，超越了五凈居天（Five Pure Abodes），生於自在宮（Akanistha Heaven），也沒有什麼不妥。然而，自在宮並不屬於五凈居天所攝。瑜伽師地論第四卷說：『**之中有十八個住處，無想天（Asanjnasattva Heaven）屬於廣果天（Vehapphala Heaven）所攝，並非單獨的處所。』既然說是十八個住處，又說無想天屬於廣果天所攝，所以自在宮不是五凈居天。如果屬於五凈居天所攝，那麼住處應該是十七個，而不是十八個。
論第六轉識說，三界九地互相牽引。問：總共有多少種心？從欲界（Kamadhatu）的什麼心生起欲界的心？什麼心生起色界（Rupadhatu）和無色界（Arupadhatu）的心？以及不繫心（心不被任何事物束縛）的情況也是如此嗎？答：根據顯揚聖教論第十八卷所說，欲界有八種心：一生得善心（innate wholesome mind），二方便善心（expedient wholesome mind），三不善心（unwholesome mind），四有覆無記心（defiled neutral mind），以及無覆無記心（undefiled neutral mind）分為四種，即異熟心（resultant mind）、威儀心（mind of deportment）、工巧心（skillful mind）、變化心（transformation mind）。色界有六種心，除去不善心和工巧心。無色界有四種心，除去不善心、威儀心、工巧心、變化心。不繫心有兩種，即有學心（mind of a learner）和無學心（mind of an Arhat）。總共有二十種心。然而，總的來說，欲界的心可以生起三界的心，色界的心可以生起色界和無色界的心，無色界的心可以生起無色界的心，並且各自可以生起不繫心。此外，欲界本身沒有變化心，從相似的角度來說，實際上是上界的心。所以瑜伽師地論第六十九卷說：『比如果的欲界變化心，實際上是從的善心無間生起的這個欲界的無記心。』又說這個心是欲界的心，應當知道這是它的影像相似之類，並非自性。根據這個，實際上欲界有七種心，除去變化心，因為它不屬於欲界。說互相生起是無間生起，這裡就欲界的情況略作偈頌：
欲界生得心，能生七種心， 得定心或九，或十種心生。 從自在心生，能生十種心起， 方便心亦定，能生七種心起。 初得定心生，能生九種心起， 自在心生起，能生十三種心。 從他心生起，情況也是如此， 不善心自地，能生七種心起。 其餘界有二說，自地、上地各七種心生。 有覆無記心。
【English Translation】 English version: Because it is still afflicted and belongs to the realm of the Three Realms (Trailokya), it is not the case that there are beings separate from the Three Realms. Wherever beings are born, from the perspective of the Eighth Consciousness (Alaya-vijnana), they all belong to the realm. From this perspective, it is not inappropriate that the Bodhisattvas of the Tenth Ground (Dasabhumi) transcend the Five Pure Abodes (Suddhavasa Heavens) and are born in the Akanistha Heaven (Highest Form Realm Heaven) due to their profound cultivation. However, the Akanistha Heaven is not included within the Five Pure Abodes. The fourth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra states: 'Among the ** there are eighteen abodes. The Asanjnasattva Heaven (Heaven of Non-Perception) is included within the Vehapphala Heaven (Heaven of Great Reward), and is not a separate place.' Since it is said that there are eighteen abodes, and it is also said that the Asanjnasattva Heaven is included within the Vehapphala Heaven, therefore the Akanistha Heaven is not one of the Five Pure Abodes. If it were included within the Five Pure Abodes, then there should be seventeen abodes, not eighteen.
The sixth chapter of the Treatise on the Transformation of Consciousness states that the Three Realms and Nine Grounds mutually influence each other. Question: How many types of minds are there in total? From what mind in the Desire Realm (Kamadhatu) does the mind of the Desire Realm arise? What minds give rise to the minds of the Form Realm (Rupadhatu) and the Formless Realm (Arupadhatu)? And what about the case of the Unconditioned Mind (mind not bound by anything)? Answer: According to the eighteenth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, there are eight types of minds in the Desire Realm: 1. Innate wholesome mind, 2. Expedient wholesome mind, 3. Unwholesome mind, 4. Defiled neutral mind, and undefiled neutral mind divided into four types, namely, resultant mind, mind of deportment, skillful mind, and transformation mind. There are six types of minds in the Form Realm, excluding unwholesome mind and skillful mind. There are four types of minds in the Formless Realm, excluding unwholesome mind, mind of deportment, skillful mind, and transformation mind. There are two types of Unconditioned Minds, namely, the mind of a learner and the mind of an Arhat. There are twenty types of minds in total. However, generally speaking, the mind of the Desire Realm can give rise to the minds of the Three Realms, the mind of the Form Realm can give rise to the minds of the Form Realm and the Formless Realm, the mind of the Formless Realm can give rise to the mind of the Formless Realm, and each can give rise to the Unconditioned Mind. Furthermore, the Desire Realm itself does not have a transformation mind; from a similar perspective, it is actually the mind of the upper realm. Therefore, the sixty-ninth chapter of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra states: 'For example, the transformation mind of the Desire Realm in ** fruit is actually the neutral mind of the Desire Realm that arises immediately from the wholesome mind of **.' It is also said that this mind is the mind of the Desire Realm; it should be known that this is its image-like similarity, not its own nature. According to this, in reality, the Desire Realm has seven types of minds, excluding the transformation mind, because it does not belong to the Desire Realm. Saying that they arise mutually is to say that they arise without interruption; here, a verse is briefly made about the situation of the Desire Realm:
The innate mind of the Desire Realm can give rise to seven types of minds, The mind of attainment of concentration can give rise to nine or ten types of minds. From the mind of ease, it can give rise to ten types of minds. The expedient mind and the mind of concentration can give rise to seven types of minds. The initial mind of attainment of concentration can give rise to nine types of minds. The mind of ease can give rise to thirteen types of minds. The situation is the same when arising from other minds. The unwholesome mind of its own ground can give rise to seven types of minds. There are two views on the remaining realms: the mind of its own ground and the upper ground can each give rise to seven types of minds. Defiled neutral mind.
同十二 從他十六生 生死等分別 異熟唯生九 自七二有覆 亦從自七生 威儀．巧定九 或十五不定 二從他自七 上二界不定
言欲生得起七。得定或九十者。且欲生得非得定者無間生七。謂欲界七。若初得定無間生九。加色．無色有覆無記。即潤生位。若久習者無間生十。加色威儀。故瑜伽六十九云。若已起靜慮．無色不退失者。彼從欲界善心無間。隨其所樂上地諸心及學．無學心欲起現前。先已善取彼行相故。于彼諸心如意能起。準此文意總說二善。今取生得。故起威儀 自從於十生者。亦從欲七並上三起。色界二心威儀有覆無色有覆。 據在欲說 或可。十二亦從上二方便善生 前說為好。鄰彼勝心非起生得 方便亦定七。初得定生九。自在起十三者。若方便善生欲七心。若初得定即能起九。加色定善。故六十九云。若先未起靜慮．無色。初欲生時要從欲界善心無間。初靜慮地善心得生。受生位中起上有覆。若久習者無間生十三。欲界六心。除其不善。色界三心方便有覆並及威儀。起無色二方便善心及以有覆。並學無學心。總望善說 從他生亦然者。亦從前十三此方便善生。
不善自地七餘界有二說。定得無間生自地七。上地二說。一云若諸異生離欲界欲。雖不能伏欲見
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 同十二：從他十六生 生死等分別，異熟唯生九 自七二有覆，亦從自七生 威儀．巧定九，或十五不定 二從他自七，上二界不定
言欲界眾生想要生起七種心。得到禪定或者九種、十種心。如果想要生起但沒有得到禪定的人，無間生起七種心，指欲界（Kāmadhātu）的七種心。如果初次得到禪定，無間生起九種心，加上色界（Rūpadhātu）、無色界（Arūpadhātu）的有覆無記心，即潤生位。如果長期修習禪定，無間生起十種心，加上色界的威儀心。所以《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第六十九卷說，如果已經生起靜慮（dhyāna）、無色定（arūpa-samāpatti）且沒有退失的人，他從欲界的善心無間，隨著他所樂意，上地諸心以及有學（śaikṣa）、無學（aśaikṣa）心想要生起現前，因為先前已經很好地取得了那些行相。對於那些心，能夠如意地生起。根據這段文字的意思，總的說來是兩種善心。現在取生得心，所以生起威儀心。自從於十生起，也從欲界七種心以及上界三種心生起。二心指威儀心、有覆無色有覆心。這是根據在欲界的情況來說的。或者，十二種心也從上二界的方便善心生起。前面的說法更好。鄰近那些殊勝的心，不是生起生得心。方便善心也必定生起七種心。初次得到禪定生起九種心。自在地生起十三種心，如果是方便善心生起欲界的七種心。如果初次得到禪定，就能生起九種心，加上色界的定善心。所以第六十九卷說，如果先前沒有生起靜慮、無色定，初次想要生起時，要從欲界的善心無間，初靜慮地的善心得生。在受生位中生起上界的有覆心。如果長期修習，無間生起十三種心，欲界的六種心，除去不善心。三種心指方便有覆心以及威儀心。生起無色界的兩種方便善心以及有覆心。以及有學無學心。總的來說是針對善心說的。從他生起也是這樣，也從前面的十三種方便善心生起。
不善心從自地生起七種，從其餘界生起有兩種說法。定得心無間生起自地的七種心，從上地生起有兩種說法。一種說法是，如果諸異生離開了欲界的慾望，雖然不能夠降伏欲界的見惑（dṛṣṭi）
【English Translation】 English version Verse 12: From Others, Sixteen Arise Birth, death, and so forth are distinguished; only nine arise from vipāka (resultant consciousness). Seven from self, two obscured; also from self, seven arise. Posture and skillful concentration, nine; or fifteen, uncertain. Two from others, self, seven; the upper two realms, uncertain.
It is said that seven types of consciousness arise from those desiring to be born. Those who have attained samādhi (concentration) may experience nine or ten. For those desiring birth but not having attained samādhi, seven arise without interruption, referring to the seven types of consciousness in the Kāmadhātu (desire realm). If one initially attains samādhi, nine arise without interruption, adding the obscured indeterminate consciousness of the Rūpadhātu (form realm) and Arūpadhātu (formless realm), which is the stage of rebirth. If one is long accustomed to it, ten arise without interruption, adding the posture consciousness of the Rūpadhātu. Therefore, the sixty-ninth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra states: 'If one has already arisen in dhyāna (meditative absorption) and arūpa-samāpatti (formless attainment) without losing them, then from the wholesome mind of the desire realm, without interruption, according to what one desires, the minds of the higher realms, as well as the minds of the śaikṣa (learner) and aśaikṣa (non-learner), wish to arise. Because one has previously well-grasped those aspects, one can arise in those minds at will.' According to the meaning of this passage, generally speaking, there are two wholesome minds. Now, taking the spontaneously arisen mind, posture consciousness arises. Since it arises from ten, it also arises from the seven types of consciousness in the desire realm and the three types of consciousness in the upper realms. The two minds refer to posture consciousness and obscured consciousness of the formless realm. This is based on the situation in the desire realm. Alternatively, twelve types of consciousness also arise from the skillful wholesome minds of the upper two realms. The previous statement is better. Those excellent minds nearby do not arise from spontaneously arisen minds. Skillful means also definitely give rise to seven types of consciousness. Initially attaining samādhi gives rise to nine types of consciousness. Freely arising thirteen types of consciousness, if it is a skillful wholesome mind, gives rise to the seven types of consciousness in the desire realm. If one initially attains samādhi, one can arise in nine types of consciousness, adding the wholesome samādhi consciousness of the Rūpadhātu. Therefore, the sixty-ninth fascicle states: 'If one has not previously arisen in dhyāna or arūpa-samāpatti, when one initially desires to arise, one must arise from the wholesome mind of the desire realm without interruption. The wholesome mind of the first dhyāna ground arises. In the stage of rebirth, the obscured mind of the upper realm arises.' If one is long accustomed to it, thirteen types of consciousness arise without interruption, the six types of consciousness in the desire realm, excluding the unwholesome. The three minds refer to skillful obscured consciousness and posture consciousness. The two skillful wholesome minds of the formless realm arise, as well as obscured consciousness, and the minds of the śaikṣa and aśaikṣa. Generally speaking, this is in reference to wholesome minds. It is also the same when arising from others, also arising from the previous thirteen types of skillful wholesome minds.
Unwholesome minds arise from seven types of consciousness in their own realm, and there are two views on arising from other realms. Minds obtained through samādhi arise without interruption from seven types of consciousness in their own realm, and there are two views on arising from the upper realms. One view is that if beings have departed from the desires of the desire realm, although they cannot subdue the views (dṛṣṭi) of the desire realm,
道惑。而定慚等力所制伏不起不善。即欲不善非為無間生上地心。以其迷理惑總不伏故彼得起。緣事無漸類等已伏。雖起迷理故非不善 二云既不能伏見所起惑分別見等。故容不善無間生色異熟生心威儀有覆。生無色二異熟有覆。總十二心 自上各七生者。從自地七亦上七生。從色有覆生得威儀並異熟生。據定姓人所知障說下不善起。非方便善勢強勝故。非業異熟。起非雜故。無色界三生得有覆異熟生心從十四生。若準初解但欲七起 有覆同十二者如第二師不善心說 從他十六生者。從自地七色界五心二善異熟有覆威儀無色四心。除色威儀故 生死等分別者。六十九云。退先所得二界定時。由染污心現前故退。此下染心從上善染無間而生。此說退定起下心者。又從上歿從上地善．染．無記無間。唯生下地染污。此說潤生從彼類起。又見道惑亦容上界三性間生。但除方便。義如前說 異熟唯生九自七二有覆者。生自地七上二有覆。即潤生位 亦從自七生者。六十九云。從欲界系若善若染污若無覆無記。無間遍生欲系一切。故知異熟亦自七起 威儀巧定九或十五不定者。生自地七上二有覆。亦潤生位。或十五不定者。得定自在從此二心亦可起二。若無工巧但起威儀。及二方便學無學心。或總不得。勢力劣故。約似欲心變化
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 對於『道惑』（對真理的迷惑），『定』（禪定）和『慚』（羞愧）等力量能夠制伏，使不善念頭不起。即使想要產生不善念頭，也不會直接產生上界的心，因為對真理的迷惑總的來說沒有被制伏，所以不善念頭才可能生起。而對於『緣事無漸類』（逐漸產生的與事物相關的迷惑）等已經被制伏。即使生起，因為是對真理的迷惑，所以不是不善念頭。 第二種說法是，既然不能制伏『見』（錯誤的見解）所引起的迷惑，如『分別見』（分別產生的錯誤見解）等，那麼就可能產生不善念頭，無間地產生色界的異熟生心（由業力成熟而產生的心）、威儀心（有禮儀的心）和有覆無記心（被無明覆蓋的無記心），以及無色界的兩種異熟心和有覆無記心。總共有十二種心。 從上面各自的七種心生起的情況來看，從自身地界的七種心也可以向上生起七種心。從色界的有覆無記心生起，可以得到威儀心和異熟生心。根據具有禪定的人的所知障來說，地獄的不善念頭會生起，因為方便善的力量強大，所以不是業異熟。生起不是雜亂的。無色界的三種心生起，可以得到有覆無記的異熟生心，從十四種心生起。如果按照最初的解釋，只有慾望的七種心會生起。有覆無記心與十二種心相同，就像第二位論師所說的不善心一樣。從其他十六種心生起的情況來看，從自身地界的七種心、五種心、兩種善的異熟心、有覆無記的威儀心和無色界的四種心生起，排除了色界的威儀心。 關於生死等的分別，第六十九卷說，當退失先前獲得的二界禪定時，由於染污心現前而退失。這以下的染污心是從上界的善心和染污心無間地產生的。這裡說的是退失禪定而生起地獄的心的情況。又從上界死亡，從上界的善、染、無記無間地，只生起地獄的染污心。這裡說的是潤生是從那類心生起的。又見道的迷惑也可能在上界的三性心之間產生，但排除了方便心。道理如前所述。異熟心只生起九種心，自身七種和兩種有覆無記心，即潤生位。也從自身七種心生起的情況來看，第六十九卷說，從欲界系，無論是善、染污還是無覆無記，無間地普遍生起欲界系的一切心。因此可知異熟心也從自身七種心生起。威儀心、巧心和定心，九種或十五種不定，生起自身七種心和上界兩種有覆無記心，也是潤生位。或者十五種不定，得到禪定自在，從此二心也可以生起兩種心。如果沒有工巧，只生起威儀心，以及兩種方便學心和無學心。或者總的來說都不能生起，因為勢力弱。大約類似於慾望心的變化。
【English Translation】 English version: Regarding 『Doubt of the Path』 (道惑, Douhuo, delusion about the truth), 『Samadhi』 (定, Ding, meditation) and 『Shame』 (慚, Can, sense of shame) and other powers can subdue, so that unwholesome thoughts do not arise. Even if one wants to generate unwholesome thoughts, the mind of the higher realms will not arise directly, because the delusion about the truth has not been subdued in general, so unwholesome thoughts can arise. As for 『Gradual Delusions Related to Matters』 (緣事無漸類, Yuanshi Wujianlei, gradual delusions related to matters), etc., they have already been subdued. Even if they arise, because it is a delusion about the truth, it is not an unwholesome thought. The second explanation is that since one cannot subdue the delusions caused by 『Views』 (見, Jian, wrong views), such as 『Discriminatory Views』 (分別見, Fenbie Jian, views arising from discrimination), etc., then unwholesome thoughts may arise, and the mind of resultant of form realm (異熟生心, Yishusheng Xin, mind arising from the maturation of karma), the mind of deportment (威儀心, Wei Yi Xin, mind of etiquette), and the obscured indeterminate mind (有覆無記心, Youfu Wuji Xin, obscured neutral mind) of the form realm, as well as the two resultant minds and the obscured indeterminate mind of the formless realm, arise without interruption. There are twelve types of minds in total. Looking at the cases of arising from the above seven types of minds, the seven types of minds from one's own realm can also arise upwards to the seven types of minds. Arising from the obscured indeterminate mind of the form realm, one can obtain the mind of deportment and the resultant mind. According to the knowable obscurations of people with samadhi, the unwholesome thoughts of the lower realms will arise, because the power of skillful means and goodness is strong, so it is not the resultant of karma. The arising is not mixed. The three types of minds of the formless realm can obtain the obscured indeterminate resultant mind, arising from fourteen types of minds. If according to the initial explanation, only the seven types of minds of desire will arise. The obscured indeterminate mind is the same as the twelve types of minds, just like the unwholesome mind said by the second teacher. Looking at the cases of arising from the other sixteen types of minds, they arise from the seven types of minds, five types of minds, two types of good resultant minds, the obscured indeterminate mind of deportment, and the four types of minds of the formless realm, excluding the mind of deportment of the form realm. Regarding the distinctions of birth and death, etc., the sixty-ninth volume says that when one loses the previously obtained samadhi of the two realms, it is because the defiled mind manifests and causes the loss. The defiled mind below this arises without interruption from the good mind and defiled mind of the upper realms. This speaks of the situation of losing samadhi and arising the mind of the lower realms. Also, dying from the upper realms, from the good, defiled, and indeterminate minds of the upper realms without interruption, only the defiled mind of the lower realms arises. This speaks of the rebirth arising from that type of mind. Also, the delusions of the path of seeing may also arise between the three natures of the upper realms, but excluding the mind of skillful means. The principle is as previously stated. The resultant mind only arises nine types of minds, seven of one's own and two obscured indeterminate minds, which is the state of rebirth. Also, looking at the cases of arising from one's own seven types of minds, the sixty-ninth volume says that from the desire realm, whether it is good, defiled, or unobscured indeterminate, all minds of the desire realm arise universally without interruption. Therefore, it can be known that the resultant mind also arises from one's own seven types of minds. The mind of deportment, skillful mind, and samadhi mind, nine or fifteen types are uncertain, arising from one's own seven types of minds and the two obscured indeterminate minds of the upper realms, which is also the state of rebirth. Or fifteen types are uncertain, obtaining the freedom of samadhi, from these two minds, two types of minds can also arise. If there is no skillfulness, only the mind of deportment arises, as well as the two types of expedient learning minds and non-learning minds. Or in general, none can arise, because the power is weak. It is approximately similar to the changes of the mind of desire.
無記。生色善心。六十九說文如前引 二從他自七上二界不定者。威儀．工巧從欲七生。上界不定。上下間生從二有覆色界威儀生得異熟。或總不得。勢隔遠故。且約欲界心生他自。餘者準知。恐繁故止。俱舍第七說與此別。披對可知。雜集第五但約生因。有其十種心生次第。略示大綱。亦不具述。
五識等無間有二師 問第二說因位何故不生無漏 答以因位五根第八相分。不可有漏不共必俱同境有漏發無漏識。明昧異故 問且如五根亦有有漏無漏種子。然異熟識許緣有漏不緣無漏但持不失。何妨五根亦起無漏持而不緣發無漏識。無漏相好亦復如是 答無漏種隱第八不緣。無漏根顯如何不緣。無漏相好不變非執故亦不緣不同五根。又云五根必覺受。未有五根八不緣。種子非覺受。自有種子八不緣 問初二果人得初近分無漏聖道。迴心之後受變易生起何無漏 答第四定地。何以故。由此迴心勝修習故得第四定。故瑜伽論第八十云。若有善修四神足者。或住一劫。或一劫餘。彼文乘前雖約無學據決定說。今前三果若不善修應不住壽。既許得通方能住壽。故極熏修靜慮無色。瑜伽六十九云。云何愿智。俱分解脫利根羅漢。熏修邊際第四靜慮為依止故 雖說無學準知迴心有學亦然。若無愿智云何能知壽將欲盡受變易耶
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 無記。（指非善非惡的狀態）。生色善心。（產生色界善心）。六十九說文如前引（《瑜伽師地論》第六十九卷的說法如前文所引用）。二從他自七上二界不定者。（第二種，從他而生，七識和上二界是不定的）。威儀．工巧從欲七生。（威儀和工巧是從欲界七識所生）。上界不定。（上二界是不定的）。上下間生從二有覆威儀生得異熟。（上地獄之間產生，從二有覆障威儀而生，得到異熟果報）。或總不得。（或者完全得不到）。勢隔遠故。（因為勢力阻隔遙遠）。且約欲界心生他自。（暫且以欲界心生起他自為例）。餘者準知。（其餘情況可以類推得知）。恐繁故止。（恐怕過於繁瑣，所以就此停止）。俱舍第七說與此別。（《俱舍論》第七卷的說法與此不同）。披對可知。（對照披閱就可以知道）。雜集第五但約生因。（《雜集論》第五卷只是從生起的原因來說）。有其十種心生次第。（有十種心生起的次第）。略示大綱。（簡略地顯示一個綱要）。亦不具述。（也不詳細敘述）。
五識等無間有二師。（五識的等無間緣有兩位論師的觀點）。問第二說因位何故不生無漏。（問：第二種說法，在因位的時候為什麼不生起無漏智）。答以因位五根第八相分。（答：因為在因位的時候，五根和第八識的相分）。不可有漏不共必俱同境有漏發無漏識。（不可能是有漏不共，必定同時同境的有漏法，能夠引發無漏識）。明昧異故。（因為明瞭和昧略是不同的）。問且如五根亦有有漏無漏種子。（問：且如五根也有有漏和無漏的種子）。然異熟識許緣有漏不緣無漏但持不失。（然而異熟識允許緣有漏而不緣無漏，只是保持而不喪失）。何妨五根亦起無漏持而不緣發無漏識。（為什麼妨礙五根也生起無漏，保持而不緣，從而引發無漏識）。無漏相好亦復如是。（無漏的相好也是這樣）。答無漏種隱第八不緣。（答：無漏的種子隱藏在第八識中，不緣）。無漏根顯如何不緣。（無漏的根顯現，怎麼能不緣呢）。無漏相好不變非執故亦不緣不同五根。（無漏的相好不變異，不是執取對象，所以也不緣，這和五根不同）。又云五根必覺受。（又說五根必定有覺受）。未有五根八不緣。（沒有五根第八識不緣的情況）。種子非覺受。（種子不是覺受）。自有種子八不緣。（自然有種子第八識不緣的情況）。問初二果人得初近分無漏聖道。（問：初果和二果的人得到初禪近分的無漏聖道）。迴心之後受變易生起何無漏。（迴心之後，感受變易，生起什麼無漏智）。答第四定地。（答：第四禪定地）。何以故。（為什麼呢）。由此迴心勝修習故得第四定。（因為由此迴心勝過修習，所以得到第四禪定）。故瑜伽論第八十云。（所以《瑜伽師地論》第八十卷說）。若有善修四神足者。（如果有人善於修習四神足）。或住一劫。（或者住一劫）。或一劫餘。（或者一劫多）。彼文乘前雖約無學據決定說。（那段經文雖然承接前文，是針對無學果位，根據決定的情況來說的）。今前三果若不善修應不住壽。（現在前三果如果不好好修習，應該不能住壽）。既許得通方能住壽。（既然允許得到神通才能住壽）。故極熏修靜慮無色。（所以要極力熏修靜慮和無色定）。瑜伽六十九云。（《瑜伽師地論》第六十九卷說）。云何愿智。（什麼是愿智）。俱分解脫利根羅漢。（俱分解脫的利根阿羅漢）。熏修邊際第四靜慮為依止故。（熏修邊際第四靜慮作為依止的緣故）。雖說無學準知迴心有學亦然。（雖然說的是無學，但可以類推得知迴心的有學也是這樣）。若無愿智云何能知壽將欲盡受變易耶。（如果沒有愿智，怎麼能知道壽命將要終盡，感受變易呢）。
【English Translation】 English version: Avyākrta (Undetermined). Production of wholesome mind in the Form Realm. The 69th fascicle's explanation is as previously cited. The second type, arising from others, where the seven consciousnesses and the two upper realms are indefinite: Dignified deportment and skillful crafts arise from the desire realm's seven consciousnesses. The upper realms are indefinite. Arising between the upper and lower realms originates from the two with obscured **dignified deportment, resulting in Vipāka (differently matured result). Or, it may not occur at all, due to the great distance and separation of power. This is exemplified by the mind arising from others in the desire realm. The rest can be inferred accordingly. To avoid excessive detail, I will stop here. The seventh fascicle of the Abhidharmakośa differs from this. It can be understood by comparing and contrasting. The fifth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya only discusses the causes of arising, presenting ten types of mind arising in sequence, briefly outlining the main points, without fully elaborating.
Regarding the immediate contiguity of the five consciousnesses, there are two teachers' views. Question: Why does the second explanation not produce Anāsrava (untainted wisdom) at the causal stage? Answer: Because at the causal stage, the five roots and the eighth consciousness's aspect division cannot be tainted and non-common, necessarily simultaneous and sharing the same object, for a tainted phenomenon to give rise to an untainted consciousness, due to the difference in clarity and obscurity. Question: For example, the five roots also have tainted and untainted seeds. However, the Vipāka consciousness is allowed to cognize the tainted but not the untainted, merely maintaining it without loss. Why can't the five roots also arise as untainted, maintaining but not cognizing, thereby giving rise to untainted consciousness? The untainted marks and qualities are also like this. Answer: The untainted seeds are hidden in the eighth consciousness and are not cognized. How can the untainted roots, being manifest, not be cognized? The untainted marks and qualities do not change and are not objects of attachment, so they are also not cognized, unlike the five roots. Furthermore, it is said that the five roots necessarily involve sensation. There has never been a case where the five roots are not cognized by the eighth consciousness. Seeds are not sensations. There are naturally seeds that are not cognized by the eighth consciousness. Question: The first and second Fruition Arhats attain the initial near-attainment of the untainted noble path. After turning the mind, what kind of untainted wisdom arises when experiencing change? Answer: The fourth Dhyāna (meditative absorption) ground. Why? Because this turning of the mind surpasses cultivation, thus attaining the fourth Dhyāna. Therefore, the eightieth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'If someone is skilled in cultivating the four Īrdhipāda (bases of magical power), they may abide for one Kalpa (eon), or more than one Kalpa.' Although that passage, following the previous context, refers to the Arhats of No-more-learning (Aśaikṣa), it speaks from a definitive perspective. Now, if the first three Fruition Arhats do not cultivate well, they should not be able to prolong their lifespan. Since it is allowed that only by attaining supernormal powers can one prolong their lifespan, therefore, one must diligently cultivate Dhyāna and the Formless Realms. The sixty-ninth fascicle of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'What is the Jñāna (wisdom) of aspiration? It is because the Arhats of keen faculties who are liberated by both wisdom and meditation cultivate the fourth Dhyāna to its limit as their basis.' Although it speaks of the Arhats of No-more-learning, it can be inferred that those with learning who turn their minds are also the same. If there is no Jñāna of aspiration, how can one know that their lifespan is about to end and experience change?
問既依第四無漏勝定方受變易。如何不斷下地惑耶。若許斷者應得不還方受變易。如何涅槃經雲鬚陀洹人經八萬劫。斯陀含人經六萬劫 答雖起無漏依勝進道非無間道故不得果。故雜集第九。解入無色寂靜解脫未離色界欲云。謂諸聖者已得第四靜慮不求生無色。舍斷結道依勝進道。漸次能入無色界寂靜解脫定。此言未離色慾約不斷種。寂靜解脫定即滅盡定。小果尚爾。況迴心已而不能耶 問準彼無學趣大時疾。有學回心何不取果 答雖知趣疾以厭小果所以不取。
所緣緣中第二師說。第八相分皆杖質生。第三師云非諸有情種皆等故。西河雋法師云。因位第八不緣無漏。雖五性別非可為難。又如長養色一切有情勝劣不定上得為緣。雖五性殊何妨得慮。且為一解。長養色等雖或勝劣有情皆有。故得為緣。無漏種子有無無體不得所慮。又種多少不唯無漏。于諸有情且約有漏斷未斷別故得為難。正解如本 西明解云。第三師難第二師言。應無凡聖等異 此難非理。因八不緣無漏種故。又復前師但云自第八影必須枝質。非自無種必須變化。若以他有即例為質。應眼等起所有色等恒具彼影必枝質故。既眼等起或唯緣青等。故約自相必須杖他。非他所有皆須為質故。今此難約自所變有多種子。所對有情非必相似 今準難意通因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：如果已經依靠第四禪的無漏殊勝禪定來接受變易生死，為什麼不能斷除下地的煩惱呢？如果允許斷除，那麼應該證得不還果才能接受變易生死。為什麼《涅槃經》中說須陀洹（Sotapanna，入流果）需要經歷八萬劫，斯陀含（Sakadagamin，一來果）需要經歷六萬劫？ 答：雖然生起無漏智慧，但依靠的是殊勝增進道，而不是無間道，所以不能證果。因此，《雜集論》第九卷解釋進入無色界的寂靜解脫時說，沒有離開欲界，指的是那些已經獲得第四禪但不求生無色界的聖者，他們捨棄斷結的道路，依靠殊勝增進道，逐漸能夠進入無慾界的寂靜解脫定。這裡說『未離欲』是指沒有斷除欲界的煩惱種子。寂靜解脫定就是滅盡定。小乘的果位尚且如此，何況回小向大的菩薩呢？ 問：按照《俱舍論》的說法，無學（Arhat，阿羅漢）趣向大乘時速度很快，有學（Siksa，有學位的修行者）回小向大為什麼不立即證果呢？ 答：雖然知道趣向大乘的速度很快，但因為厭倦小乘的果位，所以不立即證果。 在所緣緣中，第二位論師說：第八識的相分都是依靠根身（質）而生起的。第三位論師說：不是所有有情的種子都相同。西河雋法師說：因位的第八識不緣無漏法。雖然五性各不相同，但這不能成為障礙。又如長養色，一切有情的勝劣不定，上界的長養色可以作為地獄的所緣緣。雖然五性不同，有什麼妨礙呢？且作為一種解釋，長養色等雖然或許有勝劣之分，但一切有情都有，所以可以作為所緣緣。而無漏種子，有的有，有的沒有，沒有自體，不能作為所緣慮。而且種子的多少不僅限於無漏法，對於有情來說，主要是根據有漏煩惱的斷與未斷來區分，所以這可以成為障礙。正確的解釋如《成唯識論》所說。 西明法師解釋說：第三位論師反駁第二位論師說：這樣一來，凡夫和聖人就沒有區別了。 這種反駁沒有道理。因為因位的第八識不緣無漏種子。而且，前面的論師只是說第八識的影像必須依靠根身，而不是說沒有種子就必須變化。如果以他人所擁有的就作為自己的根身，那麼眼睛等生起時所緣的顏色等，都應該恒常具有那些顏色的影像，因為必須依靠根身。既然眼睛等生起時，或者只緣青色等，所以說就自相而言，必須依靠他物，但不是他人所擁有的都必須作為根身。現在這種反駁是說，就自身所變現的種子而言，所面對的有情不一定相似。現在根據反駁的意義來貫通因果。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If one relies on the fourth Dhyana's (meditative state) Anāsrava (without outflows, non-defiled) superior Samādhi (concentration) to accept transformation and change, why can't one sever the afflictions of the lower realms? If it is allowed to be severed, then one should attain the Anāgāmin (non-returner) stage to accept transformation and change. Why does the Nirvana Sutra say that a Sotapanna (stream-enterer) needs to go through 80,000 kalpas (aeons), and a Sakadagamin (once-returner) needs to go through 60,000 kalpas? Answer: Although Anāsrava wisdom arises, it relies on the superior progressive path, not the immediate path, so one cannot attain the fruit. Therefore, the ninth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) explains that entering the Arūpadhātu (formless realm) tranquil liberation means not being separated from the Kāmadhātu (desire realm). It refers to those holy ones who have already attained the fourth Dhyana but do not seek rebirth in the Arūpadhātu. They abandon the path of severing bonds and rely on the superior progressive path, gradually able to enter the desireless tranquil liberation Samādhi. Here, 'not separated from desire' means not severing the seeds of afflictions of the desire realm. Tranquil liberation Samādhi is Nirodha-samāpatti (cessation attainment). Even the small vehicle's fruit is like this, let alone Bodhisattvas who turn from the small to the great? Question: According to the Abhidharmakośa, when an Arhat (one who is worthy) turns towards the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle), it is fast. Why doesn't a Śaikṣa (one under training) who turns from the small to the great immediately attain the fruit? Answer: Although one knows that turning towards the Mahāyāna is fast, one does not immediately attain the fruit because one is weary of the small vehicle's fruit. In the object-condition, the second teacher says: The appearance-aspects of the eighth consciousness all arise relying on the physical body (matter). The third teacher says: Not all sentient beings have the same seeds. The Venerable Master Jue of Xihe says: The eighth consciousness in the causal stage does not cognize Anāsrava dharmas. Although the five natures are different, this cannot be an obstacle. Also, like the nutritive rūpa (matter), the superiority or inferiority of all sentient beings is uncertain, and the superior nutritive rūpa can be a condition for the inferior. Although the five natures are different, what is the hindrance? As one explanation, although nutritive rūpa and the like may have superiority or inferiority, all sentient beings have them, so they can be a condition. But Anāsrava seeds, some have them, some don't, and they don't have a self-nature, so they cannot be cognized. Moreover, the quantity of seeds is not limited to Anāsrava dharmas. For sentient beings, the main distinction is between the severance and non-severance of defiled afflictions, so this can be an obstacle. The correct explanation is as stated in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (Treatise on the Establishment of Consciousness-Only). Master Ximing explains: The third teacher refutes the second teacher, saying: In that case, there would be no difference between ordinary beings and holy beings. This refutation is unreasonable. Because the eighth consciousness in the causal stage does not cognize Anāsrava seeds. Moreover, the previous teacher only said that the image of the eighth consciousness must rely on the physical body, not that the absence of seeds must require transformation. If what others have is taken as one's own physical body, then the colors and the like that arise when the eyes and the like arise should always have the images of those colors, because they must rely on the physical body. Since when the eyes and the like arise, they may only cognize blue and the like, it is said that in terms of self-nature, one must rely on others, but not everything that others have must be taken as one's own physical body. Now, this refutation is saying that in terms of the seeds transformed by oneself, the sentient beings faced are not necessarily similar. Now, according to the meaning of the refutation, the cause and effect are connected.
果位。若果位八緣無漏種。或有有情無無漏種。若望此說自相無質若云依有為質無者不杖。何故不許于已有用杖彼質變。于自無用但自親緣即不杖質 然西明云。護法依自八變有用以難於他者。亦不應理彼師亦許有用變故。前第二卷變自他根。俱許有用非無用變。又難變器亦取有用。非是許有無用亦變。
論。除后剎那等。本釋義準。菩薩三心相見道中。前二初根。第三心去屬第二根。論文不簡除何見道最後剎那。總相說故。或依雜集總十六心隨他相說。雜集第九云。未知攝見。已知攝修。具攝無學。以薩婆多第十六心判屬修道故是隨他 或一剎那少故。隱之從多說修 又由小乘說。十六心緣於四諦。至第十六無所未知故已知攝 若大乘說總十六心通緣理智。道類智忍緣智已周。與有部別。故第十六已知根攝者。或依二乘。或依他轉。今據瑜伽唯識第九。菩薩相見覆有三心。以法前真無間．解脫別．總建立。初二別觀。第三合法。即是重觀。二十六心皆云法真見道無間．解脫。故亦重觀。非未當知可當知故。又雜集第十云。如是十根先未知真。為欲得知修習轉故。名未知當知根。二心正知。故第三心即屬第二。雖是見道屬第二根。然要集云。菩薩不觀二十六。可如所言至第三心名已知根。然無文簡二十六心。又
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 果位（Attainment of Fruition）。如果果位是八緣無漏種（Eight Conditions of Seed of Non-Outflow），或者有些有情沒有無漏種。如果根據這個來說自相無質（Own-Character without Substance），如果說依靠有為質（Conditioned Substance）就沒有，那就不成立。為什麼不允許已經存在的有用之物憑藉它的質變（Substance Transformation）？對於自身無用，但自身親近的因緣，就不憑藉質變。然而西明（Xi Ming，人名）說，護法（Dharmapala，菩薩名）依靠自身八變有用（Eight Transformations of Usefulness）來駁斥他人，也是不合理的，因為護法也承認有用變。前面第二卷說，變自他根（Transforming Roots of Self and Others），都承認有用，不是無用變。而且，所轉變的器物也取其有用之處，並非是允許存在無用也變的情況。
論（Treatise）。除了后剎那等。本釋義準。菩薩三心相見道（Three Minds in the Path of Seeing）中，前二屬於初根（First Root），第三心屬於第二根（Second Root）。論文沒有簡別排除哪個見道的最後剎那，因為是總相說。或者依據雜集（Samuccaya，論名）總共十六心（Sixteen Minds）隨他相說。雜集第九說，未知攝見（Unknown Included in Seeing），已知攝修（Known Included in Cultivation），具攝無學（Fully Included in No More Learning）。因為薩婆多（Sarvastivada，部派名）第十六心判屬修道（Path of Cultivation），所以是隨他。或者因為一剎那太少，所以隱去不說，從多數說修。又因為小乘（Hinayana）說，十六心緣於四諦（Four Noble Truths），到第十六心沒有什麼未知，所以已知攝。如果大乘（Mahayana）說總共十六心通緣理智（Principle and Wisdom），道類智忍（Knowledge of the Path and Endurance）緣智已經周遍，與有部（Sarvastivada）不同，所以第十六已知根攝。或者依據二乘（Two Vehicles），或者依據他轉（Transformation by Others）。現在根據瑜伽唯識第九（Yogacara-Vijnanavada IX），菩薩相見覆有三心，以法前真無間（Truth of Dharma before No Interval）、解脫別（Distinct Liberation）、總建立（General Establishment）來分別。初二別觀（Separate Contemplation），第三合法（Combining with Dharma），就是重觀（Repeated Contemplation）。二十六心都說法真見道無間（Truth of Dharma in the Path of Seeing without Interval）、解脫（Liberation），所以也是重觀，不是未當知可當知（Not Yet to be Known but Knowable）。又雜集第十說，如此十根（Ten Roots）先未知真（Previously Unknown Truth），爲了想要得知而修習轉變，所以名為未知當知根（Root of Unknown and Knowable）。二心正知（Two Minds Correctly Know），所以第三心就屬於第二。雖然是見道屬於第二根，然而要集（Yaoji，書名）說，菩薩不觀二十六，可以如所說至第三心名為已知根（Root of Known）。然而沒有文章簡別二十六心。又
【English Translation】 English version Fruition. If Fruition is the seed of non-outflow with eight conditions (Eight Conditions of Seed of Non-Outflow), or some sentient beings do not have the seed of non-outflow. If based on this to say own-character without substance (Own-Character without Substance), if saying relying on conditioned substance (Conditioned Substance) then there is not, then it is not established. Why not allow something already existing and useful to rely on its substance transformation (Substance Transformation)? For something useless to oneself, but a close condition to oneself, then it does not rely on substance transformation. However, Xi Ming (Xi Ming, a person's name) said, Dharmapala (Dharmapala, a Bodhisattva's name) relying on his own eight transformations of usefulness (Eight Transformations of Usefulness) to refute others is also unreasonable, because Dharmapala also admits useful transformation. In the previous second chapter, transforming roots of self and others (Transforming Roots of Self and Others), both admit usefulness, not useless transformation. Moreover, the transformed objects also take their usefulness, not allowing uselessness to also transform.
Treatise. Except for the later moment, etc. The meaning of the original explanation is accurate. In the three minds of the Bodhisattva's path of seeing (Three Minds in the Path of Seeing), the first two belong to the first root (First Root), and the third mind belongs to the second root (Second Root). The thesis does not distinguish and exclude which final moment of the path of seeing, because it is a general description. Or according to the Samuccaya (Samuccaya, name of a treatise), a total of sixteen minds (Sixteen Minds) follow the description of others. Samuccaya IX says, 'Unknown included in seeing (Unknown Included in Seeing), known included in cultivation (Known Included in Cultivation), fully included in no more learning (Fully Included in No More Learning).' Because the Sarvastivada (Sarvastivada, name of a school) judges the sixteenth mind to belong to the path of cultivation (Path of Cultivation), it follows others. Or because one moment is too short, it is hidden and not mentioned, and cultivation is discussed from the majority. Also, because the Hinayana (Hinayana) says that the sixteen minds are related to the Four Noble Truths (Four Noble Truths), and there is nothing unknown in the sixteenth mind, it is included in the known. If the Mahayana (Mahayana) says that the total of sixteen minds are universally related to principle and wisdom (Principle and Wisdom), the knowledge of the path and endurance (Knowledge of the Path and Endurance) is already complete, which is different from the Sarvastivada, so the sixteenth is included in the root of the known. Or according to the Two Vehicles (Two Vehicles), or according to transformation by others (Transformation by Others). Now, according to Yogacara-Vijnanavada IX (Yogacara-Vijnanavada IX), the Bodhisattva's seeing again has three minds, which are distinguished by the truth of Dharma before no interval (Truth of Dharma before No Interval), distinct liberation (Distinct Liberation), and general establishment (General Establishment). The first two are separate contemplation (Separate Contemplation), and the third is combining with Dharma (Combining with Dharma), which is repeated contemplation (Repeated Contemplation). All twenty-six minds say the truth of Dharma in the path of seeing without interval (Truth of Dharma in the Path of Seeing without Interval), liberation (Liberation), so it is also repeated contemplation, not 'not yet to be known but knowable (Not Yet to be Known but Knowable)'. Also, Samuccaya X says, 'These ten roots (Ten Roots) previously did not know the truth (Previously Unknown Truth), and in order to want to know and cultivate transformation, they are called the root of unknown and knowable (Root of Unknown and Knowable).' The two minds correctly know (Two Minds Correctly Know), so the third mind belongs to the second. Although it is the path of seeing belonging to the second root, the Yaoji (Yaoji, name of a book) says that the Bodhisattva does not contemplate twenty-six, and it can be said that the third mind is called the root of the known (Root of Known). However, there is no text distinguishing the twenty-six minds. Also
若唯觀真智十六可如所說。上下四諦十六如何。又瑜伽等云。初無相從世第一無間而生。三心．十六但云從此。不可即說真．相同時。由此道理真后三心 及二十六皆名相見 準此意說。不許本釋三心第三屬第二根 復云無相從世第一法無間而生者。謂本師許真．相同時義說前後 今謂不然。三心見道瑜伽五十五亦云從抉擇分邊際善根無間而生 此論亦會諸相見道依真假說世第一法無間而生非唯無相 又二十六皆是重緣。何者二十六心俱法真見。即三心後重觀法彼。何非已知。若約觀俗。上下十六第十六心。未有智知應名當知。若云論說除后剎那者。論亦說云無所未知。即屬第二。故知雜集說前十五為未知者隨他相說。如說已知即攝修道。據自大乘第十六心雖已知根是見道故。故知諸說義意各別。然本疏中自分大小立三根別。
論。前三無色等者。本疏解云。彼無加行。又曾未起現行無漏故。取異生先修得者名現觀邊。雖不現行亦此根攝。修道得起。今者又準六十九文。資糧．加行．見道亦增。修道中起。彼解世俗智初中后際生起次第云。五見．貪等是染污等。諸世俗智應斷。應知為欲生起彼對治故起無倒見。是善有漏世俗智攝。乃至云。又即以彼世第一法所攝俗智。為依止故能入見道。升見道時即先所修善世
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果僅僅觀察真智十六心，或許可以如你所說。那麼上下四諦的十六心又該如何解釋？而且《瑜伽師地論》等經論中說，初無相智從世第一法無間生起，而三心和十六心只是說『從此』生起。不能直接說真智和相智同時生起。按照這個道理，真智后的三心以及二十六心都名為相見。按照這個意思來說，不允許本釋中三心的第三心屬於第二根。又說無相智從世第一法無間生起，是指本師允許真智和相智同時生起的意義，所以才說前後。現在我認為不是這樣。《三心見道瑜伽五十五》也說從抉擇分邊際善根無間生起。此論也融會了諸相見道，依據真假之說，世第一法無間生起，並非只有無相智。而且二十六心都是重緣。哪些是二十六心俱法真見呢？就是三心後重觀法彼。為什麼不是已知呢？如果按照觀俗諦來說，上下十六心的第十六心，還沒有智知，應該名為當知。如果說論中說了除去後剎那，論中也說無所未知，就屬於第二根。所以知道《雜集論》說前十五心為未知，是隨他相而說。如說已知，就攝屬於修道。根據自大乘，第十六心雖然已知根是見道。所以知道各種說法的意義各不相同。然而本疏中自分大小，立三根差別。
論：前三無色等。本疏解釋說：他們沒有加行，又曾經沒有生起現行無漏，所以取異生先修得者，名為現觀邊。雖然不現行，也屬於此根所攝。修道得起。現在又根據六十九文，《資糧》、《加行》、《見道》也增加。修道中起。他們解釋世俗智初中后際生起次第說：五見、貪等是染污等。諸世俗智應該斷除，應該知道爲了生起彼對治，所以生起無倒見，是善有漏世俗智所攝。乃至說：又即以彼世第一法所攝俗智，為依止，所以能夠進入見道。升見道時，就是先前所修的善世
【English Translation】 English version: If we only observe the sixteen moments of True Wisdom (zhen zhi) perhaps it could be as you say. But how do we explain the sixteen moments of the upper and lower Four Noble Truths (si di)? Furthermore, the Yogaśāstra and other treatises state that the initial signless wisdom (wu xiang zhi) arises without interruption from the highest mundane dharma (shi di yi fa), while the Three Minds (san xin) and Sixteen Minds (shi liu xin) only state that they arise 'from this'. It cannot be directly said that True Wisdom and phenomenal wisdom arise simultaneously. According to this reasoning, the three minds after True Wisdom, as well as the twenty-six minds, are all called phenomenal perception (xiang jian). According to this meaning, it is not permissible for the third of the Three Minds in the original commentary to belong to the second root. It is also said that signless wisdom arises without interruption from the highest mundane dharma, which refers to the meaning that the original teacher allows True Wisdom and phenomenal wisdom to arise simultaneously, hence the statement of before and after. Now I think it is not so. The Three Minds Seeing the Path Yoga 55 also states that it arises without interruption from the boundary wholesome roots of the decisive division. This treatise also integrates the various phenomenal perceptions of the path, based on the truth and falsehood, the highest mundane dharma arises without interruption, not only signless wisdom. Moreover, the twenty-six minds are all re-conditioned. Which are the twenty-six minds that are co-existent with the True View of Dharma? It is the re-observation of the Dharma after the Three Minds. Why is it not already known? If according to the observation of conventional truth (su di), the sixteenth mind of the upper and lower sixteen minds, has not yet known with wisdom, it should be called 'to be known'. If it is said that the treatise excludes the later moment, the treatise also says that there is nothing unknown, which belongs to the second root. Therefore, it is known that the Compendium of Abhidharma says that the first fifteen minds are unknown, which is said according to others' perspectives. As it is said that it is already known, it is included in the path of cultivation. According to the self-Great Vehicle (da cheng), although the sixteenth mind already knows that the root is the path of seeing. Therefore, it is known that the meanings of the various statements are different. However, in the original commentary, the differences between large and small are distinguished, and the differences between the three roots are established.
Treatise: The first three formless realms, etc. The original commentary explains: They do not have application, and have never arisen as manifest unconditioned, so those who first cultivate and attain from different births are called the edge of manifest contemplation. Although not manifest, it is also included in this root. The path of cultivation can arise. Now, according to the sixty-ninth text, the stages of accumulation (zi liang), application (jia xing), and seeing the path (jian dao) are also increased. It arises in the path of cultivation. They explain the order of arising of mundane wisdom in the initial, middle, and final stages, saying: The five views, greed, etc., are defiled, etc. All mundane wisdom should be abandoned, and it should be known that in order to generate the antidote to them, the non-inverted view arises, which is included in wholesome conditioned mundane wisdom. And even says: Also, the mundane wisdom included in the highest mundane dharma is relied upon, so it can enter the path of seeing. When ascending to the path of seeing, it is the wholesome world that was previously cultivated
俗智所有種子。由彼熏修皆得清凈。亦名為修。此則名為諦現觀邊諸世俗智。出見道已生起此智。證見所斷諸法解脫 此文通說三乘俱起故。次下文云。又能了知我已證得預流果等。故知大乘于見道前解脫分位。起無色善亦生無色。故知資糧通修無色。入見傍修論中不言。傍修之者唯根本位。唯是無漏。準論后解。無色亦有三無漏根。五十七云下三無色有十一根故。通漏．無漏。準此大乘不同有部入見道已更不現起 問若於修道四善根等皆得重起。何不雜亂 答亦不然。以位別故。若修道位非名善根。如見道種后亦生修不爾修道從何種起。雖見種生不名為見。后修道位雖彼種生。不名善根。又本無漏種在資糧．加行亦名彼道。雜集說為道諦攝故。皆許不雜故彼亦然。問在根本位傍修世俗。亦得名根本不 答名根本何失 非無漏故失 答言無漏者據現行說。據未知當知根說。非約種子 要集云。世俗非無漏。不得名根本者亦應無色無見道。不得名根本。雖無見道說為根本。雖有漏攝。相從名本故亦無失 問論云回趣大者。為證法空所起生空。順益法空可此根攝。有漏不順何亦此攝 答二乘生空有不順者。但舉回趣大乘。所修有漏皆順見道。傍修為根何失。故要集云傍修之者唯取無漏。世俗智等不資見道。可詳得失 要集
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 俗智所含藏的一切種子，通過熏習修持都能變得清凈，這也被稱為『修』。這裡指的是在諦現觀（satya-abhisamaya，對真諦的現觀）階段所產生的各種世俗智慧。這種智慧在證入見道（darśana-mārga，見道）之後才會生起，並且能夠證得從見道所斷除的各種煩惱的解脫。這段經文是通用於聲聞乘、緣覺乘和菩薩乘，三乘都會生起這種智慧。接下來的經文說：『又能了知我已經證得了預流果（srota-āpanna-phala，入流果）等等。』由此可知，大乘行者在見道之前的解脫分位，所生起的無色界善法也會生於無色界。因此可知，資糧位（sambhāra-mārga，資糧道）也通於修習無色界禪定。至於在入見道時是否兼修，論中沒有提及。所謂兼修，僅指在根本位（mūla-bhūmi，根本位）進行，而且一定是無漏的。根據論后的解釋，無色界也有三種無漏根（anāsrava-indriya，無漏根）。《五十七》中說，下三無色界有十一根，既包括有漏也包括無漏。按照這種說法，大乘不同於有部宗，認為入見道之後不再生起世俗智。 問：如果在修道位（bhāvanā-mārga，修道）的四善根等都能重新生起，為什麼不會雜亂呢？ 答：也不會雜亂，因為位次不同。在修道位，就不能稱為善根。比如見道位的種子，之後也會生起修道位的法，但不能說修道位的法是從見道位生起的。即使是從見道位的種子生起，也不能稱為見道。後來的修道位，即使是見道位的種子生起，也不能稱為善根。而且，原本的無漏種子在資糧位和加行位（prayoga-mārga，加行道）也被稱為彼道。雜集論中說，這是被道諦（duḥkha-satya，道諦）所攝持的緣故。大家都認可不會雜亂，所以這裡也是一樣。 問：在根本位兼修世俗法，也可以稱為根本嗎？ 答：稱為根本有什麼不可以呢？ 問：因為不是無漏的，所以不可以。 答：說無漏，是根據現行來說的，是根據未知當知根（ajñāta-ājñāsyāmīndriya，未知當知根）來說的，不是根據種子來說的。《要集》中說，世俗法不是無漏的，所以不能稱為根本。那麼，無色界和無見道，也不能稱為根本了。雖然沒有見道，但也可以說是根本。雖然是有漏所攝，但因為相似而稱為根本，所以也沒有什麼過失。 問：論中說『回趣大者』，是爲了證法空（dharma-śūnyatā，法空）所生起的生空（pudgala-śūnyatā，人空）。順益於法空的可以被此根所攝，但有漏的並不順益於法空，為什麼也被此根所攝呢？ 答：二乘的生空有不順益於法空的，但這裡說的是迴向于大乘。所修的有漏法都順益於見道，兼修作為根本，有什麼不可以呢？所以《要集》中說，兼修只取無漏法，世俗智等不資助見道。可以詳細考慮其中的得失。《要集》
【English Translation】 English version All the seeds contained within mundane wisdom (laukika-jñāna) can become purified through cultivation and practice; this is also called 'cultivation' (bhāvanā). This refers to the various mundane wisdoms that arise during the stage of 'contemplation of the truth' (satya-abhisamaya). This wisdom arises after entering the 'path of seeing' (darśana-mārga), and it can realize the liberation from the afflictions that are severed by the path of seeing. This passage applies to the Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, and Mahāyāna, as all three vehicles generate this wisdom. The following text says: 'And also, one can know that I have attained the Stream-enterer fruit (srota-āpanna-phala), etc.' From this, it is known that in the Mahāyāna, during the stage of 'part of liberation' (vimukti-bhāga) before the path of seeing, the formless realm wholesome dharmas (arūpa-kuśala-dharma) that arise also arise in the formless realm. Therefore, it is known that the 'path of accumulation' (sambhāra-mārga) also includes the cultivation of the formless realm. As for whether there is concurrent cultivation when entering the path of seeing, it is not mentioned in the treatise. The so-called concurrent cultivation only refers to that which is done in the 'fundamental stage' (mūla-bhūmi), and it must be unconditioned (anāsrava). According to the later explanation in the treatise, the formless realm also has three unconditioned roots (anāsrava-indriya). The 'Fifty-Seven' says that the lower three formless realms have eleven roots, including both conditioned (sāsrava) and unconditioned. According to this, the Mahāyāna differs from the Sarvāstivāda school, which believes that mundane wisdom does not arise again after entering the path of seeing. Question: If the four wholesome roots (kuśala-mūla) and so on in the path of cultivation (bhāvanā-mārga) can all arise again, why wouldn't they become mixed up? Answer: They will not become mixed up because the stages are different. In the stage of cultivation, it cannot be called a wholesome root. For example, the seed of the path of seeing will also give rise to the dharma of the path of cultivation later, but it cannot be said that the dharma of the path of cultivation arises from the path of seeing. Even if it arises from the seed of the path of seeing, it cannot be called the path of seeing. In the later stage of cultivation, even if the seed of the path of seeing arises, it cannot be called a wholesome root. Moreover, the original unconditioned seed is also called 'that path' in the path of accumulation and the path of application (prayoga-mārga). The Compendium of Assemblies says that it is included in the truth of the path (duḥkha-satya). Everyone acknowledges that they do not become mixed up, so it is the same here. Question: Can concurrent cultivation of mundane dharmas in the fundamental stage also be called fundamental? Answer: What is wrong with calling it fundamental? Question: It is not unconditioned, so it cannot be called fundamental. Answer: Saying 'unconditioned' is based on the present manifestation, based on the 'root of knowing what is not yet known' (ajñāta-ājñāsyāmīndriya), not based on the seed. The Essential Collection says that mundane dharmas are not unconditioned, so they cannot be called fundamental. Then, the formless realm and the absence of the path of seeing also cannot be called fundamental. Although there is no path of seeing, it can still be called fundamental. Although it is included in the conditioned, it is called fundamental because of similarity, so there is no fault. Question: The treatise says 'those who turn towards the Great Vehicle' (Mahāyāna), which is the emptiness of self (pudgala-śūnyatā) that arises to realize the emptiness of phenomena (dharma-śūnyatā). That which benefits the emptiness of phenomena can be included in this root, but the conditioned does not benefit the emptiness of phenomena, so why is it also included in this root? Answer: The emptiness of self of the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) does not benefit the emptiness of phenomena, but here it refers to those who turn towards the Great Vehicle. All the conditioned dharmas cultivated benefit the path of seeing. What is wrong with concurrent cultivation being the root? Therefore, the Essential Collection says that concurrent cultivation only takes the unconditioned dharmas, and mundane wisdom, etc., does not aid the path of seeing. One can carefully consider the gains and losses in this. The Essential Collection.
等云。菩薩地前未起無漏。二乘生空無漏智者是彼種姓。非是菩薩。以量成立。生空無漏地前不起 今謂不爾。此論明說。或二乘位回趣大者。為證法空地前所起九地所攝生空無漏。彼皆菩薩此根所攝。今者不許豈不乖耶。二乘聖者回心向大。豈可不起無漏智耶。迴心已前既名菩薩。所起無漏何非此根。法花經云。汝等所行是菩薩道。據不定者皆是此根。
問學無學法通漏無漏。云何后二皆唯無漏不通漏耶 答據增上義以立於根。有漏于諸諦現觀中非增勝故。若準雜集第十。后二亦通有漏．無漏。已知通憂。具知除憂。故此說無漏據增勝故 若爾初根應不通漏 答于異生中。此增勝故 問瑜伽五十七問云。幾根入初靜慮。答八。后三一分能入。一分不能 初言八者即總相說。謂信等五．樂．喜．舍根。后三一分能入。利根超果及入大乘。一分不能鈍根慧脫阿羅漢等 言第三亦八 然非即喜。此約為依能入彼說。故通喜根 非即彼者 非入彼地 第四靜慮及無色定七根能入 據樂為依入第四定。非無色定亦樂為依 或據鄰超。舉一顯余 后三云一能入有一不能。次第．惠脫三不能入超取第三。獨覺．菩薩此等能入 或通種．現非唯約現 問非樂．喜．舍三受俱生。如何皆說九根為體 答三無漏根通彼九根。非說剎
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：有人問：『等地』（Dengdi，菩薩修行所經歷的階段）的菩薩在證得菩薩果位之前，尚未生起無漏智慧。二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的聖者通過證悟空性而獲得的無漏智慧，才是菩薩的種姓。這並非菩薩的智慧。』這是以理量來成立的觀點，認為證悟空性的無漏智慧在地前不會生起。 現在我們認為這種說法是不對的。此論明確說明，有些二乘行者後來回心轉意，趣向大乘。爲了證明證悟空性的無漏智慧是地前所生起，並且被九地所攝，這些回心轉意的二乘行者都是菩薩，他們的智慧也屬於菩薩的根性。現在如果不承認這一點，豈不是自相矛盾嗎？二乘聖者回心向往大乘，難道不能生起無漏智慧嗎？在迴心向大乘之前，他們就已經被稱為菩薩，那麼他們所生起的無漏智慧，為何不能被認為是菩薩的根性呢？《法華經》中說：『你們所行的是菩薩道。』根據這些不確定因素，都可以認為是菩薩的根性。 有人問：『有學法和無學法既可以是有漏的，也可以是無漏的。為什麼後兩者（樂根、喜根、舍根）都只是無漏的，而不通於有漏呢？』答：『這是根據增上義來建立根的。有漏法在對諸諦的現觀中，不是最殊勝的。』如果按照《雜集論》第十卷的說法，後兩者也通於有漏和無漏。已經知道了普遍的憂愁，就能完全去除憂愁。所以這裡說無漏，是根據增上義來說的。 『如果這樣說，那麼初根（信根、精進根、念根、定根、慧根）應該也不通於有漏了？』答：『在異生位（尚未證得聖果的凡夫）中，初根是最殊勝的。』 有人問：『《瑜伽師地論》第五十七卷中問到：有幾種根可以進入初禪？』答：『八種。后三種（喜根、樂根、舍根）一部分可以進入，一部分不能進入。』初禪所說的八種根，是總相而言，包括信等五根，以及樂根、喜根、舍根。后三種根一部分可以進入，指的是利根者超越果位，或者進入大乘；一部分不能進入，指的是鈍根的慧解脫阿羅漢等。 『第三禪也說是八種根？』然而並非就是喜根。這是就所依的禪定來說的，所以也通於喜根。『並非就是彼者』，指的是並非進入彼地（第三禪）。第四禪和無色定有七種根可以進入。這是根據樂根作為所依而進入第四禪，並非無色定也是以樂根為所依。或者根據鄰近的禪定來超越，舉出一個例子來顯示其餘的。 后三種根說一種可以進入，一種不能進入。次第解脫和慧解脫的三種阿羅漢不能進入，超越禪定而取第三禪。獨覺和菩薩等可以進入。或者通於種子和現行，並非僅僅指現行。 有人問：『樂受、喜受、舍受並非同時生起，為什麼都說九根為體呢？』答：『三種無漏根通於這九根，並非說一剎那間同時生起。』
【English Translation】 English version: Someone asks: 'Bodhisattvas in the 'Dengdi' (the stages experienced by Bodhisattvas in their practice) before attaining the Bodhisattva fruit, have not yet generated uncontaminated wisdom (anāsrava-jñāna). The uncontaminated wisdom attained by the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) through realizing emptiness is the lineage of Bodhisattvas. This is not the wisdom of Bodhisattvas.' This view is established by logical reasoning, asserting that uncontaminated wisdom realizing emptiness does not arise before the 'ground' (bhūmi). Now, we believe this statement is incorrect. This treatise clearly states that some practitioners of the Two Vehicles later repent and turn towards the Mahāyāna. To prove that uncontaminated wisdom realizing emptiness arises before the 'ground' and is encompassed by the nine grounds, these repentant practitioners of the Two Vehicles are all Bodhisattvas, and their wisdom also belongs to the nature of Bodhisattvas. If we do not acknowledge this now, wouldn't it be contradictory? When the saints of the Two Vehicles turn their minds towards the Great Vehicle, can they not generate uncontaminated wisdom? Before turning their minds towards the Great Vehicle, they are already called Bodhisattvas, so why can't the uncontaminated wisdom they generate be considered the nature of Bodhisattvas? The Lotus Sutra says: 'What you are practicing is the Bodhisattva path.' Based on these uncertain factors, it can all be considered the nature of Bodhisattvas. Someone asks: 'Learned and unlearned dharmas can be both contaminated (sāsrava) and uncontaminated. Why are the latter two (joy faculty, pleasure faculty, equanimity faculty) only uncontaminated and not related to contaminated dharmas?' The answer is: 'This is based on the meaning of superiority in establishing the faculties. Contaminated dharmas are not the most superior in the direct realization of the Four Noble Truths.' According to the tenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, the latter two are also related to both contaminated and uncontaminated dharmas. Having known the universal sorrow, one can completely remove sorrow. Therefore, saying 'uncontaminated' here is based on the meaning of superiority. 'If that's the case, then the initial faculties (faith faculty, vigor faculty, mindfulness faculty, concentration faculty, wisdom faculty) should also not be related to contaminated dharmas?' The answer is: 'Among ordinary beings (those who have not yet attained the fruit of a saint), the initial faculties are the most superior.' Someone asks: 'The fifty-seventh volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra asks: How many faculties can enter the first dhyāna (jhāna)?' The answer is: 'Eight. The latter three (joy faculty, pleasure faculty, equanimity faculty) can enter partially, and partially cannot enter.' The eight faculties mentioned in the first dhyāna are in general terms, including the five faculties of faith, etc., as well as the pleasure faculty, joy faculty, and equanimity faculty. The latter three faculties can enter partially, referring to those with sharp faculties who transcend the fruit or enter the Mahāyāna; partially cannot enter, referring to dull-witted wisdom-liberated Arhats, etc. 'The third dhyāna is also said to have eight faculties?' However, it is not exactly the joy faculty. This is in terms of the dhyāna that is relied upon, so it also relates to the joy faculty. 'Not exactly that one' refers to not entering that ground (the third dhyāna). The fourth dhyāna and the formless attainments (arūpa-samāpatti) have seven faculties that can enter. This is based on relying on the pleasure faculty to enter the fourth dhyāna; it is not that the formless attainments also rely on the pleasure faculty. Or it is based on transcending to a neighboring dhyāna, using one example to illustrate the others. The latter three faculties say that one can enter and one cannot enter. Arhats with sequential liberation and wisdom liberation cannot enter, transcending the dhyāna and taking the third dhyāna. Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas, etc., can enter. Or it relates to both seeds and manifestations, not just manifestations. Someone asks: 'Pleasant feeling, joyful feeling, and neutral feeling do not arise simultaneously, so why are all nine faculties said to be the body?' The answer is: 'The three uncontaminated faculties relate to these nine faculties; it is not saying that they arise simultaneously in one instant.'
那一一皆具。如依近分但有喜根。下三靜慮即有樂根。依第四定即有舍根。故但通說 問準大乘宗。非非想處亦有無漏。何故不言四無色定皆有此根。而五十七云非想地但只有八。準此即有信等五根及意．舍．命。無三無漏。何故爾耶 答準大乘宗雖有無漏。隨他相說故無無漏 或彼無漏以昧劣故非三根體 若爾何故此論復云從見道后所有信等無漏九根。一切皆是后二根體準此所難前釋為勝。◎
成唯識論了義燈卷第六解論第七未盡
成唯識論了義燈卷第六(末)(論第八)
◎論如是四緣依十五處立為十因者。問依處有十五。何故因但十而不增減 答略頌辨釋。頌曰。
果於因違順 顯與及形持 親疏並遠近 順別立十因
釋有六對。一違順對。分為二因。相違因．不相違因。違者相違。因能違諸法不生等故。相違有六。瑜伽三十八云。一言說相違。謂諸言論前後相違。即自語相違等。二道理相違。即四相違等。三生起相違。能生緣闕障波生會。四同處相違。謂明闇等不可同處。五怨敵相違。如毒蛇鼠狼等。互為怨害故。六障治相違。謂不凈觀能違貪等。今取生起相違立相違因。順者謂餘九因皆順生果。名不相違因 二就順中分顯與對。顯者謂隨說因。由言說故能顯諸法。非為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 那一一具備。例如，依據近分定，只有喜根（prīti-indriya，喜受），下三靜慮（dhyāna，禪定）就有樂根（sukha-indriya，樂受）。依據第四禪定，就有舍根（upekṣā-indriya，不苦不樂受）。所以只通泛地說。 問：按照大乘宗的觀點，非想非非想處（naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana，既非有想也非無想處）也有無漏法（anāsrava，無煩惱）。為什麼不說四無色定（ārūpya-samāpatti，無色界的禪定）都有此根？而《五十七》中說非想非非想處只有八種根。按照這個說法，就有信等五根（śraddhā-indriya，信根等五種根）、以及意（manas，意識）、舍（upekṣā，舍受）、命（jīvita，命根）。沒有三種無漏根。為什麼這樣呢？ 答：按照大乘宗的觀點，雖然有無漏法，但隨順其他宗派的觀點，所以沒有無漏根。或者，那裡的無漏法因為太微弱，所以不是三種根的本體。 如果這樣，為什麼此論又說從見道（darśana-mārga，見道位）之後，所有的信等無漏九根，一切都是后兩種根的本體？按照這個提問，之前的解釋更為合適。 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第六 解論第七 未完 《成唯識論了義燈》卷第六（末）（論第八） 論：像這樣，四緣（catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ，四種因緣）依據十五處（pañcadaśa sthānāni，十五種處所）建立為十因（daśa hetu，十種因）。問：依據處所有十五種，為什麼因只有十種，不多也不少？ 答：用簡略的頌文來辨別解釋。頌文說： 果於因違順，顯與及形持，親疏並遠近，順別立十因。 解釋有六對。一、違順對。分為兩種因：相違因（viruddha-hetu，相反的因）、不相違因（aviruddha-hetu，不相反的因）。違者是相反的。因能夠違背諸法不生等，所以是相違。相違有六種。《瑜伽師地論》第三十八卷說：一、言說相違，指言論前後矛盾，即自語相違等。二、道理相違，即四相違等。三、生起相違，指能生之緣缺少，或者有障礙產生。四、同處相違，指光明和黑暗等不能在同一處所。五、怨敵相違，如毒蛇和鼠狼等，互相為仇敵。六、障治相違，指不凈觀（aśubha-bhāvanā，不凈的觀想）能夠違背貪慾等。現在取生起相違作為相違因。順者，指其餘九種因都順應產生果，名為不相違因。二、就在順應中分顯與對。顯者，指隨說因（anuvyākhyāna-hetu，隨順解說的因），因為言說的緣故能夠顯示諸法，而不是爲了...
【English Translation】 English version That each and every one is fully equipped. For example, based on the near-attainment concentration (upacāra-samādhi), there is only the pleasure faculty (prīti-indriya, faculty of joy). The lower three meditative states (dhyāna, meditative absorption) then have the happiness faculty (sukha-indriya, faculty of happiness). Based on the fourth dhyāna, there is the indifference faculty (upekṣā-indriya, faculty of equanimity). Therefore, it is only generally stated. Question: According to the Mahāyāna school, the realm of neither perception nor non-perception (naiva-saṃjñā-nāsaṃjñāyatana, the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception) also has undefiled (anāsrava, free from defilements) qualities. Why is it not said that all four formless absorptions (ārūpya-samāpatti, formless attainments) have this faculty? And the 'Fifty-Seven' states that the realm of neither perception nor non-perception only has eight faculties. According to this, there are the five faculties of faith, etc. (śraddhā-indriya, etc., the five faculties of faith, energy, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom), as well as mind (manas, consciousness), equanimity (upekṣā, equanimity), and life (jīvita, life faculty). There are no three undefiled faculties. Why is this so? Answer: According to the Mahāyāna school, although there are undefiled qualities, following the views of other schools, there are no undefiled faculties. Or, the undefiled qualities there are too subtle, so they are not the substance of the three faculties. If that is the case, why does this treatise also say that after the path of seeing (darśana-mārga, the path of insight), all the undefiled nine faculties of faith, etc., are all the substance of the latter two faculties? According to this question, the previous explanation is better. Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-ṭīkā-laṅkāra, Volume 6, Explanation of Treatise 7, Incomplete Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi-śāstra-ṭīkā-laṅkāra, Volume 6 (End) (Treatise 8) Treatise: In this way, the four conditions (catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ, four conditions) are established as ten causes (daśa hetu, ten causes) based on fifteen places (pañcadaśa sthānāni, fifteen locations). Question: Since there are fifteen places, why are there only ten causes, neither more nor less? Answer: Use a concise verse to distinguish and explain. The verse says: The result, in relation to the cause, contrary and conforming, manifesting and form-sustaining, intimate and distant, as well as far and near, conforming and distinct, establishes the ten causes. The explanation has six pairs. First, the contrary and conforming pair. Divided into two causes: contrary cause (viruddha-hetu, contradictory cause) and non-contrary cause (aviruddha-hetu, non-contradictory cause). Contrary means opposite. The cause can contradict the non-arising of phenomena, etc., so it is contrary. There are six types of contrary. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume thirty-eight, says: 1. Contradiction in speech, referring to contradictions in statements, such as self-contradictory speech, etc. 2. Contradiction in reason, referring to the four contradictions, etc. 3. Contradiction in arising, referring to the lack of conditions for arising, or the presence of obstacles to arising. 4. Contradiction in the same place, referring to light and darkness, etc., which cannot be in the same place. 5. Contradiction as enemies, such as poisonous snakes and weasels, etc., which are mutually harmful. 6. Contradiction as obstacles and remedies, referring to the contemplation of impurity (aśubha-bhāvanā, contemplation of the impure) which can counteract greed, etc. Now, taking the contradiction in arising as the contrary cause. Conforming refers to the remaining nine causes which all conform to the arising of the result, and are called non-contrary causes. Second, within conforming, distinguishing the manifesting and form-sustaining pair. Manifesting refers to the cause of explanation (anuvyākhyāna-hetu, cause of explanation), because of speech, it can reveal phenomena, but not for...
因生。與者謂同事因。謂從觀待乃至定異。皆同能生助與果故。就同事因分形持對離出二因。形謂形待。立觀待因待因果起故。持謂扶義。立攝受因。又于同事。分遠近對。離出牽引．生起二因。二因中有等流．異熟二因別故。名為親疏。由因去果有遠近故於近之中分順別對離為二因謂引發．定異。故此十因更不增減 問何故依處分為十五。依之立因即但有十 答如論辨 問因何開十。果唯立五 答因義隱而難知所以開之為十。果相顯而易了。是以立之為五。又為果中為無為別。無為立一。有為立四。生自他殊分之為二。謂等流．異熟。人法有別。復分士用．增上。或親疏有異。分士用．增上。由此得彼立為士用。不障他生亦成增上 問何故無為果唯立一 答無為理同故果立一。有為事異疏成四種 又解因雖有十不出生．了。所得之果不越為與無為。為無為中分共不共。不共者有為之中異熟．等流。無為之中即一離系。共謂士用及與增上。不生士用即無為是。增上用寬故得通二。故果但五。
論一語依處等。西明二釋。初取本解彼論似義。第二取本正解彼文 據實本解此論正釋瑜伽等文。取所起語為語依處。即此依處為隨說因。故瑜伽第五明因依處云。謂依語依處施設隨說因。乃至云想為先故語轉。由語故隨見
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因生。『與者』指同事因（共同起作用的因），即從觀待（條件）乃至定異（確定差異）都共同能產生幫助並給予結果。就同事因分為形持對離出二因。『形』指形待（形式上的依賴），建立觀待因，因為依賴因果才能生起。『持』指扶義（扶持的意義），建立攝受因。又在同事因中，分為遠近對，離出牽引、生起二因。二因中有等流因（同類相續的因）和異熟因（不同類成熟的因）的區別，因此名為親疏。由於因到果有遠近的緣故，在近的之中分為順別對離為二因，即引發和定異。因此這十因不再增加或減少。
問：為什麼依處分為十五種，而依據依處建立的因卻只有十種？ 答：如論中所辨析。
問：為什麼因要開立為十種，而果只建立五種？ 答：因為因的意義隱晦而難以理解，所以開立為十種；果的相狀明顯而容易瞭解，所以建立為五種。又因為果中分為有為（有生滅變化的）和無為（無生滅變化的），無為建立一種，有為建立四種。生自他（從自身產生還是從他物產生）的差別分為兩種，即等流和異熟。人法（人和事物）有差別，又分為士用（人的作用）和增上（增上的作用）。或者親疏有差異，分為士用和增上。由此得到彼，建立為士用，不障礙他物產生也成為增上。
問：為什麼無為果只建立一種？ 答：因為無為的道理相同，所以果只建立一種；有為的事物不同，疏遠而成為四種。
又解釋說，因雖然有十種，但不超出產生和了別的範圍。所得到的果不超過有為和無為。在有為和無為中分為共（共同的）和不共（不共同的）。不共同的，在有為之中是異熟和等流，在無為之中就是一種離系（解脫）。共同的指士用以及增上。不產生士用，即無為就是。增上的作用寬泛，所以能夠貫通二者。所以果只有五種。
論中『一語依處等』，西明有兩種解釋。第一種取本來的解釋，那個論好像是這個意思。第二種取本來的正確解釋，那個文章。
根據實際情況，本來的解釋是正確解釋《瑜伽師地論》等文章。取所產生的語言作為語言的依處。即這個依處作為隨說因（伴隨言說的因）。所以《瑜伽師地論》第五卷說明因的依處說：『即依據語言的依處設施隨說因』，乃至說『以想為先，所以語言才能運轉，因為有語言，所以才能隨之見到』。
【English Translation】 English version: Causes produce. 'Giver' refers to the co-operative cause (hetu) (the cause that works together), meaning that from conditionality (觀待, guan dai) to determination of difference (定異, ding yi), all can jointly produce, assist, and give rise to the result. Co-operative causes are divided into two: form-holding and opposition-separation-emergence. 'Form' refers to formal dependence (形待, xing dai), establishing the conditional cause, because dependence on causes and conditions gives rise to the result. 'Holding' refers to the meaning of support (扶義, fu yi), establishing the receptive cause. Furthermore, within co-operative causes, there is a division into near and far opposites, separating out the attracting and arising causes. Within these two causes, there is a distinction between the homogenous flow cause (等流因, deng liu yin) and the differentiated maturation cause (異熟因, yi shu yin), hence the names intimate and distant. Because the distance from cause to effect varies, among the near ones, there is a division into two causes: favorable-distinctive opposition-separation, namely, the inducing and determining difference. Therefore, these ten causes neither increase nor decrease.
Question: Why are the bases of dependence divided into fifteen, while the causes established based on these bases are only ten? Answer: As discussed in the treatise.
Question: Why are causes opened up into ten, while results are only established as five? Answer: Because the meaning of causes is hidden and difficult to understand, they are opened up into ten; the characteristics of results are clear and easy to understand, so they are established as five. Furthermore, results are divided into conditioned (有為, you wei) and unconditioned (無為, wu wei); one is established for the unconditioned, and four are established for the conditioned. The difference between arising from self and arising from other is divided into two, namely, homogenous flow and differentiated maturation. The difference between persons and phenomena is further divided into volitional action (士用, shi yong) and augmentation (增上, zeng shang). Or, due to differences in intimacy and distance, they are divided into volitional action and augmentation. From this, that is obtained, establishing volitional action; not obstructing the arising of others also becomes augmentation.
Question: Why is only one unconditioned result established? Answer: Because the principles of the unconditioned are the same, only one result is established; the affairs of the conditioned are different, becoming four due to distance.
Furthermore, it is explained that although there are ten causes, they do not go beyond the scope of production and discernment. The results obtained do not exceed conditioned and unconditioned. Among the conditioned and unconditioned, there is a division into common and uncommon. The uncommon, within the conditioned, are differentiated maturation and homogenous flow; within the unconditioned, it is the one separation from bondage (離系, li xi). The common refers to volitional action and augmentation. Not producing volitional action, that is the unconditioned. The function of augmentation is broad, so it can encompass both. Therefore, there are only five results.
In the treatise, 'one speech base of dependence, etc.,' Ximing has two interpretations. The first takes the original interpretation, that the treatise seems to mean this. The second takes the original correct interpretation, that article.
According to the actual situation, the original interpretation is the correct explanation of texts such as the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論, Yu Jia Shi Di Lun). Taking the language produced as the base of dependence for language. That is, this base of dependence serves as the accompanying speech cause (隨說因, sui shuo yin). Therefore, the fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra explains the base of dependence for causes, saying: 'That is, based on the base of dependence for language, the accompanying speech cause is established,' and even says, 'With thought as the precursor, language can then operate, because there is language, one can then see accordingly.'
．聞．覺．知起諸言說。既云由語故起諸言說。不云由名．想．見故起諸言說。明知不取名．相．見三。為語依處及隨說因。顯揚十八亦同瑜伽第五。雖瑜伽．顯揚解語因。云名為先故想。想為先故說。是謂彼諸法隨說因似取名．想．語三為隨說因。準解因依處。既但云由語故起諸言說。不云由名．想．語起諸言說。亦不云由語等故起諸言說。諸家何煩分為兩釋。故唯雜集準論有殊。
言隨見聞覺知者。法師雜集疏云。略以二門分別。一出體。二廢立。初出體者。雜集第二．瑜伽五十六皆作是說。約勝義諦。見等非根。亦非識等。眾緣生故。剎那滅故。無作用故。由有和合假名見等。依世俗諦。見等是根。非彼識等。具五義故 彼論說六。今言五者但取根義不取教量。言五義者。一由生因。眼生識故。二由依處。識依眼故。三由無動。相續一類故。四由自在。不待外緣唸唸生故。五端嚴轉。嚴依身故。六由說故。聖教說眼能見色故 瑜伽第二說。見謂眼根現見外色。聞謂從他。覺謂不見及不曾聞。但自思惟稱量觀察。知謂于內所受所證。九十三說。見．知二種現量所攝。覺謂比量。聞聖言量。準此即說眼根名見。意因耳生緣教名聞。通緣一切名．句．文三屈曲生。故陳那說。彼聖言量者此量所攝。故聞是意。因
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：聽聞、覺察、知曉產生各種言說。既然說是由於語言的緣故產生各種言說，而不是說由於名稱（nama，事物的名稱）、想像（samjna，對事物的概念化）和見解（drsti，對事物的看法）的緣故產生各種言說，這明顯表明不採納名稱、想像和見解這三者作為語言的依據和隨之言說的原因。《顯揚聖教論》第十八卷也與《瑜伽師地論》第五卷相同。雖然《瑜伽師地論》和《顯揚聖教論》解釋語言的原因時，說名稱是想像的先導，想像是言說的先導，這似乎是說這些法是隨之言說的原因，類似於採納名稱、想像和語言這三者作為隨之言說的原因，可以參照解釋原因和依據之處。既然只說由於語言的緣故產生各種言說，而不是說由於名稱、想像和語言產生各種言說，也不說由於語言等等產生各種言說，各家又何必分為兩種解釋呢？所以只有《雜集論》與論典有所不同。
關於隨見聞覺知而言說，法師在《雜集論疏》中說，大概用兩種方式來分別：一是指出本體，二是廢立。首先，指出本體，《雜集論》第二卷和《瑜伽師地論》第五十六卷都這樣說：從勝義諦（paramartha-satya，究竟真理）的角度來說，見等等不是根（indriya，感覺器官），也不是識（vijnana，意識）等等，因為它們是眾緣所生，剎那間滅亡，沒有作用。由於有和合而假名為見等等。從世俗諦（samvriti-satya，相對真理）的角度來說，見等等是根，不是那些識等等，因為它們具備五種意義（彼論說六種，現在說五種，只是取根的意義，不取教量的意義）。這五種意義是：一、由生因，眼睛產生識的緣故；二、由依處，識依賴眼睛的緣故；三、由無動，相續一類的緣故；四、由自在，不依賴外緣唸唸產生的緣故；五、端嚴轉，端正莊嚴依賴身體的緣故；六、由說故，聖教說眼睛能看見顏色的緣故。《瑜伽師地論》第二卷說，見是指眼根直接看見外面的顏色。聞是指從他人那裡聽到的。覺是指沒有看見和不曾聽聞，只是自己思考衡量觀察。知是指對內心所接受和所證悟的。《瑜伽師地論》第九十三卷說，見和知這兩種屬於現量（pratyaksha，現量，直接認知）所攝。覺屬於比量（anumana，比量，推理認知）。聞屬於聖言量（agama，聖言量，聖教量）。按照這個說法，就是說眼根名為見，意根因耳根產生，緣于教法名為聞，普遍緣於一切名、句、文三種屈曲產生。所以陳那（Dignaga）說，那些聖言量就是此量所攝。所以聞是意根的原因。
【English Translation】 English version: Hearing, perceiving, and knowing give rise to various expressions. Since it is said that various expressions arise due to language, and not due to names (nama, names of things), conceptions (samjna, conceptualization of things), and views (drsti, perspectives on things), it is clear that these three—names, conceptions, and views—are not taken as the basis of language and the cause of subsequent expressions. The eighteenth volume of the Xianyang Shengjiao Lun is also the same as the fifth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. Although the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the Xianyang Shengjiao Lun explain the cause of language by saying that names precede conceptions and conceptions precede expressions, it seems that these dharmas are the cause of subsequent expressions, similar to taking names, conceptions, and language as the cause of subsequent expressions. This can be understood by referring to the explanation of the cause and basis. Since it is only said that various expressions arise due to language, and not due to names, conceptions, and language, nor due to language, etc., why do various schools need to divide it into two interpretations? Therefore, only the Abhidharmasamuccaya differs from the treatises.
Regarding speaking in accordance with seeing, hearing, perceiving, and knowing, the Dharma master in the commentary on the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that it can be distinguished in roughly two ways: first, by pointing out the substance; second, by establishing and abolishing. First, pointing out the substance, the second volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya and the fifty-sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra both say this: From the perspective of the ultimate truth (paramartha-satya, ultimate truth), seeing, etc., are not sense faculties (indriya, sense organs), nor are they consciousness (vijnana, consciousness), etc., because they arise from various conditions, perish in an instant, and have no function. Because there is a combination, they are nominally called seeing, etc. From the perspective of conventional truth (samvriti-satya, relative truth), seeing, etc., are sense faculties, not those consciousnesses, etc., because they possess five meanings (that treatise says six, but now we say five, only taking the meaning of sense faculties, not taking the meaning of scriptural authority). These five meanings are: first, due to the cause of arising, because the eye produces consciousness; second, due to the basis of dependence, because consciousness depends on the eye; third, due to immobility, because they are continuously of one kind; fourth, due to autonomy, because they arise moment by moment without relying on external conditions; fifth, due to elegant transformation, because elegance and adornment depend on the body; sixth, due to saying, because the holy teachings say that the eye can see colors. The second volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that seeing refers to the eye faculty directly seeing external colors. Hearing refers to what is heard from others. Perceiving refers to what has not been seen or heard, but is thought about, measured, and observed by oneself. Knowing refers to what is received and realized internally. The ninety-third volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that seeing and knowing are included in direct perception (pratyaksha, direct cognition). Perceiving belongs to inference (anumana, inferential cognition). Hearing belongs to scriptural authority (agama, scriptural authority). According to this statement, it means that the eye faculty is called seeing, the mind faculty arises due to the ear faculty, and relying on the teachings is called hearing, which universally relies on all three kinds of names, sentences, and syllables. Therefore, Dignaga says that those scriptural authorities are included in this measure. Therefore, hearing is the cause of the mind faculty.
耳聞聲故耳稱聞。耳實不能緣名等故。非比量故。緣非聖言亦此聞攝。論多依彼聞聖言故。覺者即是不依見等。獨生意識及第七識。瑜伽但說為比量者。依意識說。末那亦能起構畫故。亦不曾嗅。不曾嘗觸。不曾知證。但意思惟籌量觀察。亦是覺收。論中但舉不曾見．聞。舉勝說故。隨五識后所起意識比量者。亦此覺收。但舉獨頭。彰勝用故。不爾便闕此之意識 知者即是耳．鼻．舌．身．五俱意識．第八心品．及諸定心。瑜伽別說自內所受所證等故。又說此知現量攝故。即顯見．知唯現量攝。聞．覺二種通比．非量。及顯見．知通漏．無漏。聞．覺唯有漏。諸無漏心緣教生者。知所攝故。非比量故 或說此四攝識不盡。緣非教聲有非．比量。聞不攝故。末那構畫非量所攝。覺不攝故。或四但據六識作論。七識不能分明了境起言說故。又顯揚十八說。在欲界中具四言說。色界無覺無推度故。無色全無。故知此四攝法不盡 此義不然。聖非聖言通依四故。依七起言無處攝故。色界意識染心等后所起言說。無處攝故。然彼地心多無構畫而起言說。非彼全無覺言說也。說無色界無四言說。豈彼界中知亦非有。外道邪見覺亦無邪。由此色界具四。無色有覺．知而無言說。故知如前所說為善 二廢立者。以理而論且應立二。一知
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因為聽到聲音的緣故，所以耳朵才被稱為『聞』（śruti，聽覺）。但實際上，耳朵並不能直接攀緣名相等法，所以它不是比量（anumāna，推論）。攀緣非聖言的聽聞也包含在此處，因為論典大多依據聽聞聖言。『覺』（mati，覺知）指的是不依賴見等根識而生的獨頭意識和第七識（末那識，manas）。《瑜伽師地論》中將覺說為比量，是依據意識而說的，因為末那識也能產生構畫作用。它不曾嗅、不曾嘗、不曾觸、不曾知證，只是意思惟、籌量、觀察，也屬於覺的範疇。論中只舉出『不曾見、聞』，是爲了突出殊勝之處。隨五識之後所起的意識比量，也屬於覺的範疇。只舉出獨頭意識，是爲了彰顯其殊勝作用。否則，這種意識就缺失了。 『知』（vijñāna，了別）指的是耳、鼻、舌、身五俱意識、第八識（阿賴耶識，ālayavijñāna）心品，以及諸種定心。《瑜伽師地論》中特別說明了自內所受所證等，又說此『知』屬於現量（pratyakṣa，現觀）所攝，這表明見、知唯有現量所攝，而聞、覺二種則通於比量和非量。同時也表明見、知通於有漏和無漏，而聞、覺唯有有漏。諸無漏心緣教而生者，屬於知所攝，而不是比量所攝。 或者有人說，這四種（見、聞、覺、知）並沒有完全涵蓋所有的識，因為緣非教聲的非量聽聞，聞沒有包含。末那識的構畫也不屬於量所攝，覺沒有包含。或者說，這四種只是根據六識而作的論述，第七識不能分明了境而起言說。此外，《顯揚聖教論》第十八說，在欲界中具有四種言說，因為沒有覺和推度。無色界則完全沒有。所以可知這四種攝法並不完全。 這種說法是不對的。因為聖言和非聖言都通於四種（見、聞、覺、知）。依第七識而起的言說沒有地方可以包含。意識染心等之後所起的言說，也沒有地方可以包含。然而，彼地（指無色界）的心大多沒有構畫而能起言說，並非完全沒有覺的言說。說沒有四種言說，難道彼界中知也沒有嗎？外道的邪見，覺也沒有邪嗎？因此欲界具足四種。無色界有覺、知而沒有言說。所以可知如前所說是正確的。 二、廢立：以理而論，應該建立兩種。一是知。
【English Translation】 English version: Because of hearing sounds, the ear is called 'hearing' (śruti). But in reality, the ear cannot directly grasp phenomena such as names, so it is not inference (anumāna). Hearing that grasps non-scriptural sounds is also included here, because treatises mostly rely on hearing the sacred words. 'Perception' (mati) refers to the solitary consciousness and the seventh consciousness (manas) that arise without relying on seeing and other sense consciousnesses. In the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, perception is described as inference based on consciousness, because manas can also produce conceptualization. It has never smelled, tasted, touched, or known through direct experience, but only thinks, deliberates, and observes, and it is also included in the category of perception. The text only mentions 'never seen or heard' to highlight the superior aspects. The inference of consciousness that arises after the five sense consciousnesses is also included in the category of perception. Only the solitary consciousness is mentioned to highlight its superior function. Otherwise, this kind of consciousness would be missing. 'Cognition' (vijñāna) refers to the five consciousnesses associated with the ear, nose, tongue, and body, the mental functions of the eighth consciousness (ālayavijñāna), and various meditative states. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra specifically explains what is received and realized internally, and also says that this 'cognition' is included in direct perception (pratyakṣa), which shows that seeing and knowing are only included in direct perception, while hearing and perception are both included in inference and non-perception. It also shows that seeing and knowing are both included in defiled and undefiled states, while hearing and perception are only defiled. Those undefiled minds that arise from teachings are included in cognition, not in inference. Alternatively, some say that these four (seeing, hearing, perception, and cognition) do not completely cover all consciousnesses, because non-perceptual hearing that grasps non-scriptural sounds is not included in hearing. The conceptualization of manas is also not included in perception. Or it is said that these four are only based on the six consciousnesses, and the seventh consciousness cannot clearly understand objects and give rise to speech. Furthermore, the eighteenth chapter of the Śūnyatā-sampatti says that in the desire realm, there are four kinds of speech, because there is no perception or inference. The formless realm has none at all. Therefore, it can be known that these four categories do not completely cover all phenomena. This statement is incorrect. Because sacred and non-sacred words are both related to the four (seeing, hearing, perception, and cognition). Speech that arises based on the seventh consciousness has nowhere to be included. Speech that arises after the defiled mind of consciousness also has nowhere to be included. However, the minds in that realm (the formless realm) mostly do not have conceptualization but can give rise to speech, and it is not that there is no speech of perception at all. If it is said that there are no four kinds of speech, then is there no cognition in that realm? Are the wrong views of non-Buddhists and the perceptions also not wrong? Therefore, the desire realm has all four. The formless realm has perception and cognition but no speech. Therefore, it can be known that what was said earlier is correct. Two, abolishment and establishment: Logically speaking, two should be established. One is cognition.
。二覺。一切現量皆知所攝。一切比量．非量皆覺所攝。或應立三。現量．比量．非量別故 今為西者眼用遠明。知中離出獨立為見意識用廣。聞．覺．知攝。分位開三。外緣師教。及自推尋。內證境故。末那唯有染．凈二類。構畫證解二類境故。余之五識用非別勝。內慮義等總立名知。又初相遇眼先能見。聞彼言說心構畫之。然後諸根領余境界。次第既爾。用有勝劣或合或開。故非增減。余諸義門如別章說。
論。習氣依處等者。西明自問。準菩薩地。依牽引因引二涅槃。如何此論下得果中不得離系。此論種子對有為果故。五果中除牽引．生起。不能親證離系果故。此解不爾 今謂若約能引即取種子。菩薩地是若據能證即除種子。此論文是非此論中唯望有為。但種．現殊。引證有別。各據一義故不相違 又問云。瑜伽第五說業種子為牽引因。名言種子為生起因。如何此中約潤．未潤開為二因。解云又此二因通諸種子。如此論說。然尋伺地就相顯說。以業對疏故名牽引。名言生果親名生起。此牽引．生起多義不同。或有處說近遠相對二因門。如雜集第四。無明望老死為引。無明望行為生故。或有處說名言．業種為二因門。如尋伺地。彼論云。依習氣依處。由凈不凈業等牽引自體。乃至廣說。有潤種子依處。三界
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：第二種覺悟是，一切現量（直接感知）都被『知』所包含。一切比量（推理）、非量（非理性認知）都被『覺』所包含。或者應該設立三種，因為現量、比量、非量是不同的。現在對於西方人來說，眼睛的作用在於看得遠而清晰，『知』從中分離出來，獨立成為『見』，意識的作用廣泛，包含『聞』、『覺』、『知』。從作用上可以分為三種：外在依靠老師的教導，以及自己推測探尋，內在證悟境界。末那識只有染污和清凈兩種。構畫和證悟兩種境界。其餘五識的作用沒有特別突出的，將內在的思考等總稱為『知』。而且最初相遇時，眼睛先能看見，聽到言語后，心進行構畫，然後其他根領受其餘境界。次第既然如此，作用有強有弱，或者合併或者分開，所以不是增多也不是減少。其餘各種義理，如同在其他章節所說。 論：關於習氣所依之處等。西明自己提問：按照《菩薩地持經》的說法，依靠牽引因來引導兩種涅槃，為什麼這部論在下位得到果位，卻不能得到離系果？因為這部論的種子是針對有為果的，在五種果中，除了牽引和生起，不能親自證得離系果。這種解釋不對。現在認為，如果從能引導的角度來說，就取種子；《菩薩地持經》是如果從能證得的角度來說，就去除種子。這部論的文字是非此論中只針對有為法。只是種子和現行的不同，引導和證得有所區別，各自依據一個義理，所以不相違背。又問：瑜伽第五說，業的種子是牽引因，名言的種子是生起因，為什麼這裡按照潤和未潤分為兩種因？解釋說：這兩種因貫通所有種子，就像這部論所說。然而尋伺地從現象上明顯說明，因為業是疏遠的，所以稱為牽引，名言產生果是親近的，所以稱為生起。這種牽引和生起有很多不同的含義。或者有些地方說近和遠相對的兩種因，如《雜集論》第四。無明對於老死是牽引，無明對於行是生起。或者有些地方說名言和業種是兩種因，如尋伺地。那部論說：依靠習氣所依之處，由清凈和不清凈的業等牽引自體，乃至廣說。有潤的種子所依之處，三界
【English Translation】 English version: The second awareness is that all direct perceptions (present moment awareness) are included in 'knowing'. All inferences (reasoning) and non-valid cognitions (irrational cognitions) are included in 'awareness'. Or perhaps three should be established, because direct perception, inference, and non-valid cognition are different. Now, for Westerners, the function of the eyes is to see far and clearly, and 'knowing' is separated from it, independently becoming 'seeing'. The function of consciousness is broad, encompassing 'hearing', 'awareness', and 'knowing'. Functionally, it can be divided into three: externally relying on the teachings of teachers, and self-speculation and exploration, internally realizing the state. Manas (mind consciousness) only has two types: defiled and pure, conceptualizing and realizing two types of states. The functions of the remaining five senses are not particularly prominent, and internal thoughts are collectively called 'knowing'. Moreover, in the initial encounter, the eyes can see first, and after hearing words, the mind conceptualizes, and then the other senses perceive the remaining states. Since the order is like this, the functions have strengths and weaknesses, or they are combined or separated, so it is neither increasing nor decreasing. The remaining various meanings are as described in other chapters. Treatise: Regarding the basis of habitual tendencies, etc. Ximing himself asks: According to the Bodhisattvabhumi, relying on the causal factor of attraction to lead to two kinds of Nirvana, why does this treatise obtain the fruit in the lower position, but cannot obtain the fruit of separation from bondage? Because the seeds in this treatise are aimed at conditioned fruits, and among the five fruits, apart from attraction and arising, they cannot personally realize the fruit of separation from bondage. This explanation is not correct. Now, it is believed that if viewed from the perspective of what can lead, then the seeds are taken; the Bodhisattvabhumi is if viewed from the perspective of what can be realized, then the seeds are removed. The text of this treatise is non-this treatise only targets conditioned dharmas. It is just the difference between seeds and manifestations, and there is a difference between leading and realizing. Each is based on one meaning, so they do not contradict each other. Also asked: The fifth Yoga says that the seeds of karma are the causal factor of attraction, and the seeds of names and words are the causal factor of arising. Why are they divided into two causes here according to moistened and unmoistened? The explanation says: These two causes connect all seeds, just as this treatise says. However, the Vicara (Vitarka and Vicara) ground clearly explains from the phenomenon, because karma is distant, so it is called attraction, and the name and word producing the fruit is close, so it is called arising. This attraction and arising have many different meanings. Or some places say two causes relative to near and far, such as the fourth Samuccaya. Ignorance is attraction to old age and death, and ignorance is arising to action. Or some places say that names and words and karma seeds are two causes, such as the Vicara ground. That treatise says: Relying on the basis of habitual tendencies, the self is attracted by pure and impure karma, etc., and so on. The basis of moistened seeds, the three realms
系法各從種生。名生起因。顯揚同此 今謂此文亦兼未潤已潤名為引．生於生說潤顯引未潤。不唯業種與名言對。故二論云。愛為能潤。種為所潤。故引經云。業為感生因。愛為生起因 或有處說種子能生異類．自類二因門。如菩薩地雜染中說。于現法中無明等法。所有已生已長種子。今此種子望于餘生生老死等為牽引因。無明等法各別種子名生起因 今謂此中亦約遠近已生已長故近。望于餘生生老死等即是望遠。故無記因中雲。由各別自種子。種種稼穡差別而生為牽引因。即彼種子望所生芽名生起因。又云一切種子望后自果名牽引因。望初自果名生起因。非必異類 或有處說種對涅槃．菩提分法二因門。如菩薩地清凈因中說云 今謂此中亦兼未熟及已熟位名為引．生。說攝受因親近善士。聽聞正法。諸根成熟。名攝受因。次說生起故由成熟。
論。攝受五等。問何故諸論釋此十因次第有別。此論牽．生后說攝受。菩薩地文攝受因後方釋能生 答菩薩地文據生現次第。由有習氣諸緣攝受方始能生。余文即據體類次第。引．生同種未潤．潤別。故不相違。本釋云。助成因緣。名為攝受。故除因緣親能生。故雜集論云。雖自種生能增彼力名攝受因。西明釋云。能增彼力故者。是釋彼因義。非釋其名 今謂不爾。設解
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 牽引和生起各自從種子產生，名稱的產生也有其原因，這些都以相同的方式顯現和闡揚。現在說這段文字也包括了未滋潤和已滋潤的種子，將未滋潤的種子名為牽引因，已滋潤的種子名為生起因。這不僅是業的種子與名稱言語相對，所以二論中說，愛是能滋潤的，種子是被滋潤的。所以經文中說，業是感受出生的原因，愛是生起的原因。 或者有些地方說種子能產生異類和自類兩種原因，如《菩薩地雜染品》中所說，在現世中，無明等法，所有已經產生和增長的種子，現在這些種子對於來世的生老死等來說是牽引因，無明等法各自的種子名為生起因。 現在說這裡也包括了遠近和已生已長，所以是近。對於來世的生老死等來說就是遠。所以在無記因中說，由於各自不同的種子，各種莊稼產生差別，這是牽引因。即那些種子對於所生的芽來說是生起因。又說一切種子對於後來的自果來說是牽引因，對於最初的自果來說是生起因，不一定是異類。 或者有些地方說種子對於涅槃和菩提分法是兩種原因，如《菩薩地清凈因品》中所說。現在說這裡也包括了未成熟和已成熟的階段，名為牽引和生起。說攝受因是親近善知識，聽聞正法，諸根成熟，名為攝受因。接著說生起，所以是由成熟。 論中說，攝受有五種等等。問：為什麼各種論典解釋這十種因的次第有所不同？這部論在牽引和生起之後說攝受，而《菩薩地》的文句在攝受因之後才解釋能生？答：《菩薩地》的文句是根據產生顯現的次第，由於有習氣，各種因緣攝受才能產生。其他的文句是根據體類的次第，牽引和生起是同一種，只是未滋潤和已滋潤的區別，所以不矛盾。本釋說，幫助成就因緣，名為攝受。所以除了因緣親近能生，所以《雜集論》說，即使是自種子產生，能增加它的力量也名為攝受因。西明的解釋說，能增加它的力量，是解釋那個因的意義，不是解釋它的名稱。現在說不是這樣，假設解釋……
【English Translation】 English version: 'Attraction' (牽引, Qiān yǐn) and 'arising' (生起, Shēng qǐ) each originate from seeds. The origination of names also has its causes, and these are all manifested and elucidated in the same way. Now, it is said that this passage also includes both unmoistened and moistened seeds, naming the unmoistened seeds 'attraction cause' and the moistened seeds 'arising cause'. This is not only the opposition between the seeds of karma and name-speech, therefore the two treatises say that love is what can moisten, and seeds are what are moistened. Therefore, the sutra says that karma is the cause of feeling birth, and love is the cause of arising. Or some places say that seeds can produce two kinds of causes, heterogeneous and homogeneous, as said in the 'Contamination Chapter' of the Yogācārabhūmi (菩薩地, Púsà dì). In the present life, for dharmas such as ignorance, all seeds that have already arisen and grown, these seeds are now the 'attraction cause' for future lives' birth, aging, and death. The respective seeds of dharmas such as ignorance are called 'arising cause'. Now it is said that this also includes near and far, already arisen and grown, so it is near. Regarding future lives' birth, aging, and death, it is far. Therefore, in the indeterminate cause, it is said that due to different seeds, various crops produce differences, which is the 'attraction cause'. That is, those seeds are the 'arising cause' for the sprouts they produce. It is also said that all seeds are the 'attraction cause' for their subsequent fruits, and the 'arising cause' for their initial fruits, not necessarily heterogeneous. Or some places say that seeds are two kinds of causes for nirvana (涅槃, Niè pán) and the factors of bodhi (菩提, Pútí), as said in the 'Purification Cause Chapter' of the Yogācārabhūmi. Now it is said that this also includes the immature and mature stages, called 'attraction' and 'arising'. It is said that the 'reception cause' is to be close to good teachers, listen to the correct Dharma, and mature the faculties, which is called the 'reception cause'. Then it says 'arising', so it is due to maturity. The treatise says that reception has five kinds, etc. Question: Why do various treatises interpret the order of these ten causes differently? This treatise says 'reception' after 'attraction' and 'arising', while the text of the Yogācārabhūmi explains 'capable of producing' after the 'reception cause'? Answer: The text of the Yogācārabhūmi is based on the order of manifestation, because only with habits and various conditions of reception can it produce. Other texts are based on the order of categories, 'attraction' and 'arising' are the same kind, only with the difference between unmoistened and moistened, so there is no contradiction. The original explanation says that helping to achieve conditions is called 'reception'. Therefore, besides the conditions that are close to producing, the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論, Zájí lùn) says that even if it is produced by its own seed, increasing its power is also called the 'reception cause'. The explanation of Ximing says that being able to increase its power is explaining the meaning of that cause, not explaining its name. Now it is said that it is not like this, suppose explaining...
因義取以釋名斯有何過。如彼論解隨說因云隨起說故。觀待因云欲生因故。牽引因云招當有故。生起因云生當有故。攝受因云能增彼力故。若不以此釋因之義解其因名。更何義釋。又復自云。攝受因者諸論解名不同。瑜伽等論因能攝果名攝受因。雜集余因釋名皆同諸論。何獨攝受但解因義。又瑜伽三十八云。因彼一切心及心所。前生開導所攝受故。所緣境界所攝受故。方生．方轉故。攝受者即是增力。不爾如何方生．方轉。
論。引發因。本疏解云。必是同性。望后勝品。性論則狹。界論則寬 西明云。但顯隨同類。未必同性 要集釋云。有釋意者三性種子隨所依識成無記性。雖性不同然相順故能生善等。問此言隨所依識成無記性。雖性不同然相順故能生善等者。為善種依識名無記故。生現善法名相順。為生異性名相順。若生異性違諸論說。若還生善此即性同。如何得言未必性同。故前第二云因果俱有善等性故亦名善等 要集又云。如三性第六緣第八見。所現影像隨自見分即通三性。而能熏成無記種子。此亦異性相順能生者 誰言此相定隨見性。若定隨見生無記果。非性決定各引自果。若云六義彼說種子者。豈相熏彼見種非親因緣耶。
論。菩薩地說等。本釋云。牽引種子生起種子。合六因中諸因緣種。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果根據意義來解釋名稱，這有什麼過錯呢？就像那些論典的解釋，隨說因（Hetu-pratyaya，能使相應法隨之生起的因）是因為隨著（果）而生起才這樣說的；觀待因（Adhipati-pratyaya，起主導作用的因）是因為想要產生（果）才這樣說的；牽引因（Samanantara-pratyaya，引導後續的因）是因為招引未來的（果）才這樣說的；生起因（Sahakari-pratyaya，幫助生起的因）是因為產生未來的（果）才這樣說的；攝受因（Alambana-pratyaya，接受和支援的因）是因為能夠增強那個力量才這樣說的。如果不這樣解釋因的意義，又用什麼意義來解釋因的名稱呢？而且你自己也說，關於攝受因，各個論典的解釋不同。《瑜伽師地論》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra）等論典認為，因能夠攝持果，就叫做攝受因。《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）對其他因的解釋名稱都和各論典相同，為什麼唯獨對攝受因只解釋因的意義呢？而且《瑜伽師地論》第三十八卷說，因為那一切心和心所，被前一生開導所攝受，被所緣境界所攝受，才產生、才轉變，所以攝受就是增強力量。如果不是這樣，怎麼會產生、怎麼會轉變呢？
論：引發因（Janaka-hetu，產生結果的因）。本疏解釋說：『必定是同性質的，相對於後來的殊勝品來說。』如果按照性質來論，那就太狹隘了；如果按照界限來論，那就太寬泛了。西明（地名，此處指西明寺的僧人）說：『只是顯示隨同類，未必是同性質的。』《要集》（書名）解釋說：『有解釋的人認為，三性（善、惡、無記）的種子隨著所依的識而成為無記性，雖然性質不同，但因為相互順應，所以能夠產生善等。』問：這句話『隨著所依的識而成為無記性，雖然性質不同，但因為相互順應，所以能夠產生善等』，是說善的種子依靠識而成為無記性，所以產生現在的善法就叫做相互順應嗎？還是說產生異性就叫做相互順應？如果產生異性，就違背了各種論典的說法。如果還是產生善，那就是性質相同，怎麼能說未必性質相同呢？所以前面第二卷說，因為因果都具有善等性質，所以也叫做善等。《要集》又說：『比如三性的第六意識緣第八阿賴耶識的見分，所顯現的影像隨著自己的見分而貫通三性，從而能夠熏成無記的種子。』這也是異性相互順應而能夠產生（果）的例子。誰說這種現象一定隨著見分的性質？如果一定隨著見分而產生無記的果，那就不是性質決定，而是各自引生自己的果。如果說第六意識的意義是他們所說的種子，難道第六意識的相不是第八阿賴耶識見分的親因緣嗎？
論：《菩薩地》（Bodhisattvabhumi）等。本釋解釋說：牽引種子（akarshana-bija）和生起種子（utpadaka-bija），合起來就是六因中的各種因緣種子。
【English Translation】 English version: What fault is there in explaining a name based on its meaning? Like the explanations in those treatises, Hetu-pratyaya (the condition that causes corresponding dharmas to arise) is so called because it arises along with (the result); Adhipati-pratyaya (the dominant condition) is so called because it desires to produce (the result); Samanantara-pratyaya (the immediately preceding condition) is so called because it attracts the future (result); Sahakari-pratyaya (the assisting condition) is so called because it generates the future (result); Alambana-pratyaya (the objective condition) is so called because it can increase that power. If the meaning of 'cause' is not explained in this way, what other meaning can be used to explain the name of 'cause'? Moreover, you yourself say that the explanations of Alambana-pratyaya differ in various treatises. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra and other treatises consider that a cause that can hold a result is called Alambana-pratyaya. The Abhidharmasamuccaya explains the names of other causes in the same way as the various treatises. Why only explain the meaning of 'cause' for Alambana-pratyaya? Moreover, the thirty-eighth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that because all those minds and mental factors are received and supported by the preceding arising, and are received and supported by the object, they arise and transform. Therefore, 'receiving and supporting' means increasing power. If it were not so, how could they arise and transform?
Treatise: Janaka-hetu (the cause that produces the result). The original commentary explains: 'It must be of the same nature, relative to the later superior product.' If it is discussed according to nature, it is too narrow; if it is discussed according to boundary, it is too broad. Ximing (a place name, referring to monks of Ximing Temple here) said: 'It only shows following the same category, not necessarily the same nature.' Yaoji (book name) explains: 'Some explain that the seeds of the three natures (good, evil, and neutral) become neutral depending on the consciousness they rely on. Although the natures are different, they can produce good, etc., because they are in harmony with each other.' Question: Does the statement 'becoming neutral depending on the consciousness they rely on, although the natures are different, they can produce good, etc., because they are in harmony with each other' mean that the good seed becomes neutral by relying on consciousness, so producing the present good dharma is called being in harmony with each other? Or does it mean that producing a different nature is called being in harmony with each other? If it produces a different nature, it violates the statements of various treatises. If it still produces good, then it is of the same nature. How can it be said that it is not necessarily of the same nature? Therefore, the second volume earlier said that because both cause and effect have good, etc., natures, they are also called good, etc. Yaoji also said: 'For example, the sixth consciousness of the three natures conditions the seeing-portion of the eighth Alaya consciousness. The image manifested follows its own seeing-portion and penetrates the three natures, thus being able to perfume a neutral seed.' This is also an example of different natures being in harmony with each other and being able to produce (the result). Who says that this phenomenon necessarily follows the nature of the seeing-portion? If it necessarily follows the seeing-portion and produces a neutral result, then it is not the nature that determines, but each draws its own result. If it is said that the meaning of the sixth consciousness is the seed they speak of, isn't the aspect of the sixth consciousness the direct cause of the seeing-portion of the eighth Alaya consciousness?
Treatise: Bodhisattvabhumi, etc. The original commentary explains: Akarshana-bija (attracting seed) and Utpadaka-bija (producing seed), combined are the various causal seeds in the six causes.
未潤已前亦未成熟。皆名牽引種。即牽引因全四因少分。除生起因故。若被潤已去皆名已熟。即生起因全四因少分。除牽引因。是此生起因 西明云。於六因諸因緣未潤未成名牽引種。已潤已熟名生起種 要集云。有說順前違后。有釋順后違前。然云有釋于理為勝 今謂不爾。準西明釋。六因俱通牽引．生起者。即牽引．生起二種何殊。若云望果位分二因緣種。正生現果已潤熟故名生起種。即此因種望后自果。未潤熟故名牽引種。由此俱通者。此說亦非。準此即應生起在初牽引居后。又不可有潤望果遠近亦分成二。前文自云。未成熟位。謂能牽引遠自果故。已成熟位。謂能生起近自果故。故知牽引即牽引種。生起即生起種。違彼等文不可更分。彼後文云。彼六因中諸因緣種。皆攝在此二位中故者。意說。已潤之種卻說未潤之時名牽引種。未潤之種影論。若潤已去名生起種。云彼六因皆攝在此二位中故。據談其體。只是未潤全名牽引種。已潤全名生起種。故不違后。然下論釋尋伺地文言生起因。與釋菩薩地文有別。彼文不約潤未潤分。但據親能生自果者即是生起。不為一例。
論若增上果十因四緣一切容得者。問相違因以何為增上果 要集云。有說章云如霜等與青葉等為相違因。黃葉為相違果。西明釋云。即由霜
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 未被滋潤之前也未成熟的，都叫做『牽引種』（指能牽引結果的種子）。也就是牽引因包含全部四因的少部分，除去生起因的緣故。如果被滋潤之後，都叫做『已熟』，也就是生起因包含全部四因的少部分，除去牽引因。這就是生起因。 西明法師說：『在六因和諸因緣中，未被滋潤、未成熟的叫做牽引種，已被滋潤、已成熟的叫做生起種。』 《要集》中說：『有人說順應前文而違背後文，有人解釋說順應後文而違背前文。』然而《要集》說『有人解釋』在道理上是更勝一籌的。 我現在認為不是這樣。按照西明法師的解釋，六因都貫通牽引和生起，那麼牽引和生起這兩種有什麼區別呢？如果說從果位的角度來區分這兩種因緣種子，正在產生顯現的果實，因為已經被滋潤成熟，所以叫做生起種。而這個因種對於它之後的果實來說，因為還沒有被滋潤成熟，所以叫做牽引種。因此說六因都貫通牽引和生起。這種說法也是不對的。按照這種說法，就應該是生起在先，牽引在後。又不能因為期望果實的遠近而分成兩種。前面的文章自己說：『未成熟位』，是指能夠牽引遠離自身果實的緣故。『已成熟位』，是指能夠生起鄰近自身果實的緣故。所以知道牽引就是牽引種，生起就是生起種。違背了那些文章，不能再進行區分。後面的文章說：『那六因中的諸因緣種子，都包含在這兩個位置中』，意思是說，已經滋潤的種子卻說成未滋潤的時候，叫做牽引種；未滋潤的種子，如果滋潤之後就叫做生起種。說『那六因都包含在這兩個位置中』，是根據談論它的本體來說的。只是未滋潤的完全叫做牽引種，已滋潤的完全叫做生起種。所以不違背後文。然而下文論述尋伺地的時候，所說的生起因，與解釋菩薩地的時候有所區別。那篇文章不按照滋潤與未滋潤來區分，只是根據能夠親近地產生自身果實的，就是生起因，不能作為唯一的例子。 論中說，如果增上果十因四緣一切都容許，那麼，相違因以什麼作為增上果？ 《要集》中說：『有人說，例如霜等與青葉等作為相違因，黃葉作為相違果。』西明法師解釋說：『就是由於霜』
【English Translation】 English version Those that are not yet moistened and not yet mature are all called '牽引種 (qiān yǐn zhǒng)' (seeds that lead to results). That is, the '牽引因 (qiān yǐn yīn)' (leading cause) includes a small portion of all four causes, except for the '生起因 (shēng qǐ yīn)' (arising cause). If they are moistened, they are all called '已熟 (yǐ shú)' (matured), which means the '生起因 (shēng qǐ yīn)' (arising cause) includes a small portion of all four causes, except for the '牽引因 (qiān yǐn yīn)' (leading cause). This is the '生起因 (shēng qǐ yīn)' (arising cause). The Ximing master said: 'Among the six causes and all conditions, those that are not moistened and not mature are called '牽引種 (qiān yǐn zhǒng)' (leading seeds), and those that are moistened and mature are called '生起種 (shēng qǐ zhǒng)' (arising seeds).' The 'Yaoji' says: 'Some say it accords with the previous text but contradicts the later text, and some explain it accords with the later text but contradicts the previous text.' However, the 'Yaoji' says 'some explain' is superior in reason. I now think it is not so. According to the Ximing master's explanation, if the six causes all penetrate both '牽引 (qiān yǐn)' (leading) and '生起 (shēng qǐ)' (arising), then what is the difference between these two? If it is said that from the perspective of the fruit position, these two kinds of causal seeds are distinguished, and the fruit that is currently produced is called '生起種 (shēng qǐ zhǒng)' (arising seed) because it has been moistened and matured. And this causal seed, in relation to its subsequent fruit, is called '牽引種 (qiān yǐn zhǒng)' (leading seed) because it has not yet been moistened and matured. Therefore, it is said that the six causes all penetrate both '牽引 (qiān yǐn)' (leading) and '生起 (shēng qǐ)' (arising). This statement is also incorrect. According to this statement, '生起 (shēng qǐ)' (arising) should come first, and '牽引 (qiān yǐn)' (leading) should come later. Also, it cannot be divided into two based on the distance of expectation of the fruit. The previous text itself says: 'The immature position' refers to the ability to lead away from its own fruit. 'The mature position' refers to the ability to give rise to its own near fruit. Therefore, it is known that '牽引 (qiān yǐn)' (leading) is the '牽引種 (qiān yǐn zhǒng)' (leading seed), and '生起 (shēng qǐ)' (arising) is the '生起種 (shēng qǐ zhǒng)' (arising seed). It contradicts those texts and cannot be further divided. The later text says: 'All the causal seeds in those six causes are included in these two positions', meaning that the already moistened seed is called '牽引種 (qiān yǐn zhǒng)' (leading seed) when it is said to be unmoistened; the unmoistened seed is called '生起種 (shēng qǐ zhǒng)' (arising seed) if it is moistened. Saying 'those six causes are all included in these two positions' is based on discussing its substance. Only the unmoistened is completely called '牽引種 (qiān yǐn zhǒng)' (leading seed), and the moistened is completely called '生起種 (shēng qǐ zhǒng)' (arising seed). Therefore, it does not contradict the later text. However, the '生起因 (shēng qǐ yīn)' (arising cause) mentioned in the lower text discussing the '尋伺地 (xún sì dì)' (place of seeking and examining) is different from the explanation in the '菩薩地 (pú sà dì)' (Bodhisattva ground). That text does not distinguish according to whether it is moistened or not, but only according to what can closely produce its own fruit, which is the '生起因 (shēng qǐ yīn)' (arising cause), and cannot be taken as the only example. The treatise says, if the '增上果 (zēng shàng guǒ)' (adhipati-phala, dominant result), ten causes and four conditions are all permissible, then what does the '相違因 (xiāng wéi yīn)' (opposing cause) take as the '增上果 (zēng shàng guǒ)' (adhipati-phala, dominant result)? The 'Yaoji' says: 'Some say, for example, frost and green leaves are opposing causes, and yellow leaves are opposing results.' The Ximing master explains: 'That is due to frost.'
故令青等不生即相違果。要集云。今有釋勝。若由霜等黃葉生者。是不相違非相違因。又云由霜等損青葉故。令青葉等失緣不生得非擇滅。霜為違因。非擇滅為相違果 今謂二釋俱難。何者若青等不生即相違果者。不生者是何法。若彼青等不生即無體法。如何無法與有為果。又不相違因云。此相違因若闕若離。是不相違因。不可無法與有為因 若云青等失緣不生得非擇滅。霜為違因非擇為果者。亦不爾。若望非擇還是順因。不可與青等為相違因。別取非擇為果。又論釋。因順益義。緣是建立。故知不與不生住等為因。若云望不生住等是順益者。復不得云相違因。又無體故誰為果耶 問若爾相違誰之因果 答今謂本釋取黃等為果即黃等因 若爾相順何名相違 答此言無過。如四相違因與相違法為因故。菩薩地云。若雜染品諸相違因。當知即是清凈法因。若清凈品諸相違因。當知即是雜染法因。是故此論總說十因得增上果。望義別故 要集問云。十因．四緣但約有法有為而說。亦通無法及無為耶。答云有說章云。但依有為為論。無法無體。無為無作用。故非因果。要集自云。今謂觀待應有無法無為為因。境界依處亦通無為。如何得說非立因果 今謂要集大有朋附之心。本疏正釋此文十因四緣得增上果 問云然不相違中攝無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，如果說霜導致青葉等不生，那就是相違果（vipratyakṣa-phala，相反的結果）。《要集》中說：『現在有解釋說，如果由於霜等導致黃葉產生，這就是不相違因（avipratyakṣa-hetu，不相反的原因），而非相違因。』又說：『由於霜等損害青葉，導致青葉等失去因緣而不能產生，從而獲得非擇滅（apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha，非擇滅）。霜是違因（virodha-hetu，相反的原因），非擇滅是相違果。』 現在我認為這兩種解釋都有困難。為什麼呢？如果說青葉等不生就是相違果，那麼『不生』是什麼法？如果彼青葉等不生就是無體法（abhāva-dharma，不存在的事物），那麼如何能讓『無』成為『有』的果呢？而且不相違因中說：『此相違因如果缺失或分離，就是不相違因。』不能讓『無』成為『有』的因。 如果說青葉等失去因緣不生，從而獲得非擇滅，霜是違因，非擇滅是果，也不對。如果從非擇滅的角度來看，霜還是順因（anukūla-hetu，順益的原因），不能與青葉等成為相違因。另外選取非擇滅作為果。而且，《論》中解釋說，『因』是順益之義，『緣』是建立。所以知道不與不生、住等作為因。如果說從不生、住等的角度來看是順益，又不能說是相違因。而且因為沒有實體，誰來作為果呢？ 問：如果這樣，相違是誰的因果呢？ 答：現在我認為原本的解釋是取黃葉等作為果，也就是黃葉等的因。 問：如果這樣，相順的為什麼叫做相違呢？ 答：這樣說沒有過錯。如同四相違因（catuḥ-pratyaya-hetu，四種相反的原因）與相違法（pratyaya-dharma，相反的法）作為因一樣。如《菩薩地》中說：『如果雜染品（saṃkleśa-pakṣa，染污品）的各種相違因，應當知道就是清凈法（śuddha-dharma，清凈的法）的因。如果清凈品的各種相違因，應當知道就是雜染法的因。』因此，此論總說十因（daśa-hetu，十種因）得到增上果（adhipati-phala，增上果），是因為觀察的角度不同。 《要集》問：『十因、四緣（catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ，四種緣）只是就『有法』（sad-dharma，存在的法）、『有為』（saṃskṛta，有為法）而說，還是也包括『無法』（asad-dharma，不存在的法）及『無為』（asaṃskṛta，無為法）呢？』答：『《有說章》中說：只是依據有為法來討論。無法沒有實體，無為沒有作用，所以不是因果。』《要集》自己說：『現在我認為，從觀待的角度來說，應該有無法、無為作為因。境界依處也包括無為。怎麼能說不成立因果呢？』 現在我認為《要集》有很大的偏袒之心。原本的疏文正確地解釋了此文，十因四緣得到增上果。 問：然而，不相違中包含『無』嗎？
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, if it is said that frost causes the non-arising of green leaves, etc., that is a 'vipratyakṣa-phala' (contrary result). The 'Yaoji' says: 'Now there is an explanation that if yellow leaves arise due to frost, etc., that is an 'avipratyakṣa-hetu' (non-contrary cause), not a contrary cause.' It also says: 'Because frost, etc., damages green leaves, causing the green leaves, etc., to lose their conditions and not arise, thereby attaining 'apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' (cessation through non-discrimination). Frost is a 'virodha-hetu' (contrary cause), and 'apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' is a 'vipratyakṣa-phala'.' Now I think both of these explanations have difficulties. Why? If it is said that the non-arising of green leaves, etc., is a 'vipratyakṣa-phala', then what is 'non-arising'? If those green leaves, etc., do not arise, then it is an 'abhāva-dharma' (non-existent thing). How can 'non-existence' be the result of 'existence'? Moreover, in the non-contrary cause, it is said: 'If this contrary cause is missing or separated, it is a non-contrary cause.' It is impossible for 'non-existence' to be the cause of 'existence'. If it is said that green leaves, etc., lose their conditions and do not arise, thereby attaining 'apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha', and that frost is a contrary cause and 'apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' is the result, that is also incorrect. If viewed from the perspective of 'apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha', frost is still an 'anukūla-hetu' (favorable cause). It cannot be a contrary cause to green leaves, etc. Furthermore, 'apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha' is selected as the result. Moreover, the 'Treatise' explains that 'cause' means favorable benefit, and 'condition' means establishment. Therefore, it is known that it does not take non-arising, abiding, etc., as causes. If it is said that viewed from the perspective of non-arising, abiding, etc., it is a favorable benefit, then it cannot be said to be a contrary cause. And because there is no substance, who is the result? Question: If so, whose cause and result is contrariness? Answer: Now I think the original explanation takes yellow leaves, etc., as the result, which is the cause of yellow leaves, etc. Question: If so, why is what is harmonious called contrary? Answer: There is nothing wrong with saying that. Just as the 'catuḥ-pratyaya-hetu' (four contrary causes) and 'pratyaya-dharma' (contrary dharma) are causes. As the 'Bodhisattvabhūmi' says: 'If the various contrary causes of the 'saṃkleśa-pakṣa' (defiled category), it should be known that they are the causes of 'śuddha-dharma' (pure dharma). If the various contrary causes of the pure category, it should be known that they are the causes of defiled dharma.' Therefore, this treatise generally says that the 'daśa-hetu' (ten causes) obtain the 'adhipati-phala' (dominant result) because the perspectives of observation are different. The 'Yaoji' asks: 'Do the ten causes and 'catvāraḥ pratyayāḥ' (four conditions) only refer to 'sad-dharma' (existent dharma) and 'saṃskṛta' (conditioned phenomena), or do they also include 'asad-dharma' (non-existent dharma) and 'asaṃskṛta' (unconditioned phenomena)?' The answer is: 'The 'Chapter on Existence' says: It only discusses based on conditioned phenomena. Non-existence has no substance, and the unconditioned has no function, so they are not cause and result.' The 'Yaoji' itself says: 'Now I think that from the perspective of dependence, there should be non-existence and the unconditioned as causes. The realm of reliance also includes the unconditioned. How can it be said that cause and result are not established?' Now I think the 'Yaoji' has a great deal of bias. The original commentary correctly explains this text, that the ten causes and four conditions obtain the dominant result. Question: However, does non-contrariness include 'non-existence'?
為。如何得增上 答十因皆得無不得者。不同小乘無為非六因．五果之因果。不言有取與為因。然與所不障礙為因。所不疑即是此無為之果也。無與取義不同小乘也 又撿本章得果門中雲。問既由假者所證。何故真如不名士用果。答若五蘊假者為士夫。真如非士用果。若約勤劬之所得別別法所顯。何妨士用果。以正智證故。不說無為非是因果。重總略問 問依雜集論名．想．見三是語因。即得名為隨說因不 答準前釋語為隨說因非名想見 問既是語因。何不名為隨說因耶 答此不說為隨說因者。意以一切法為所說。語隨彼說名隨說因。此即隨所說之因。即能說為體。不欲明彼語因為隨說因。若說此為因。即言隨所說家能說之因。望所說法以疏遠故 問論言謂除前四所餘得果是增上果者。為據法士用．假者士用。若法士用攝法盡故。更有何法得增上果 答俱無失。然法士用中不攝無為。無為不障余法得生。皆增上果 問相違因即染善。云何不說得異熟果耶。無聞滅依及根依處俱通三性。何故攝受不得異熟果耶 答無間滅依及根依處並相違因俱是現行。異熟果者約望種得 問若爾如何名有異熟 答據實能有名有異熟。去果稍遙不說得之。
論。傍論已了等。本有二解。意云四緣依十五依處下是傍論。前解四緣並是正
論。何以故。以結止傍應辨正論已。下即辨本識中種容作三緣生現分別等。西明二釋即取四緣已下皆為傍論。頌意為顯緣生分別。意非欲辨緣差別故。要集云。若扶頌意為正論。不扶頌意為傍論即有釋后解為勝 今謂不然。本釋外難若無外境分別不生難。論主頌答由種子識展轉力故彼分別生。即顯由緣分別方起。故辨四緣緣生分別。俱為正論。如下生死果因皆正論。若說四緣非為正論。云何論結止傍論已。猶約四緣辨生分別。如何后結依斯內識互為緣起。分別因果理教皆成。舍正執邪何固執也。
論。前七於八所緣容有者。西明云。第六所緣變虛空心心所等以為相分。亦熏生彼空等相種。非是能熏生第八現行見．相種。第八不緣空等種故 今謂不然。若緣虛空等別熏成種。虛空．極微等皆應非假。從種生故。多過如前第一卷辨。又許成種。雖見種別。非必無漏。八何不緣。若云假故八不緣者。即應如無不能成種。既許成種即體實有。八定能緣。八既不緣。明虛空．極微不別成種。雖本釋云第六熏成空等種子。不生第八現行相分。以八不緣虛空等故。不言離見別熏成種。不言此種非八所緣故言無過。
論。唯除見分非相所緣等者。本釋如疏 西明四釋。於四釋中初釋分二。第二釋中分三。第三釋中分四。第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：為什麼這樣說呢？因為已經辨明了以『結止傍應辨正論』（指對論題的總結、停止、輔助和應答進行辨析）之後的內容。下面就是辨析本識（根本識，即阿賴耶識）中的種子如何容許作為三種緣（條件）生起顯現和分別等等。西明（指西明寺的解釋）的兩種解釋認為，從『四緣』（四種條件）開始以下的內容都是輔助性的論述。頌文的意義在於闡明緣起所生的分別，並非想要辨析緣的差別。要集（指《成唯識論要集》）中說，如果扶助頌文的意義，就是正論；如果不扶助頌文的意義，就是輔助性的論述，那麼解釋後面的內容就更勝一籌。現在我認為不是這樣。本釋（指《成唯識論》的解釋）對外難（指對論點的反駁），如果不存在外境，分別就不會產生。論主（指《成唯識論》的作者）用頌文回答說，由於種子識的展轉力量，那種分別才會產生。這表明分別的產生是由於各種條件。因此，辨析四緣和緣起所生的分別，都是正論。如下文的生死果因都是正論。如果說四緣不是正論，那麼怎麼能說已經辨明了『結止傍論』之後的內容呢？仍然圍繞四緣來辨析生起和分別。如何才能在後面的總結中依據這種內在的識，互相作為緣起，使分別的因果在理和教上都成立呢？捨棄正確的觀點而執著于錯誤的觀點，為什麼如此固執呢？
論：前七識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識、末那識）對於第八識（阿賴耶識）所緣的容許情況是怎樣的呢？西明說：第六識（意識）所緣的變現的虛空、心心所等，作為相分（所認識的對象），也熏習產生那些虛空等相的種子。但不是能熏習產生第八識的現行見分（能認識的主體）和相分的種子。因為第八識不緣虛空等的種子。現在我認為不是這樣。如果緣虛空等分別熏習成種子，那麼虛空、極微等都應該不是假有的，因為是從種子產生的。這樣的過失很多，就像前面第一卷辨析的那樣。又允許成為種子，即使見到種子有差別，也未必是無漏的。第八識為什麼不能緣呢？如果說因為是假有的，所以第八識不緣，那麼就應該像不存在一樣，不能成為種子。既然允許成為種子，那麼它的體性就是真實的，第八識一定能緣。第八識既然不緣，就表明虛空、極微等不能分別成為種子。雖然本釋說第六識熏習成為虛空等種子，但不生起第八識的現行相分，因為第八識不緣虛空等。沒有說離開見分另外熏習成為種子，也沒有說這種種子不是第八識所緣的，所以說沒有過失。
論：只有見分不是相分所緣的等等。本釋如疏（指《成唯識論述記》的解釋）。西明有四種解釋。在四種解釋中，第一種解釋又分為兩種。第二種解釋又分為三種。第三種解釋又分為四種。 English version: Treatise: Why is it so? Because the content after 'conclusion, cessation, auxiliary, and responsive correct treatises' (referring to distinguishing the summary, stopping, assisting, and responding to the topic) has already been clarified. The following is to distinguish how the seeds in the fundamental consciousness (the Alaya consciousness) are allowed to arise as three conditions, manifesting and differentiating, and so on. The two interpretations of Ximing (referring to the interpretation of Ximing Temple) believe that the content from 'four conditions' onwards are all auxiliary discussions. The meaning of the verse is to clarify the differentiations arising from conditioned origination, not to distinguish the differences of conditions. The Yaoji (referring to the 'Essentials of the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only') says that if supporting the meaning of the verse is a correct treatise; if not supporting the meaning of the verse is an auxiliary treatise, then interpreting the later content is superior. Now I think it is not so. The original interpretation (referring to the interpretation of the 'Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only') refutes external objections, if there is no external environment, differentiations will not arise. The author of the treatise (referring to the author of the 'Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only') answers with a verse, saying that due to the power of the transformation of the seed consciousness, that differentiation arises. This shows that the arising of differentiation is due to various conditions. Therefore, distinguishing the four conditions and the differentiations arising from conditioned origination are both correct treatises. The causes and effects of birth and death below are all correct treatises. If it is said that the four conditions are not correct treatises, then how can it be said that the content after 'conclusion, cessation, and auxiliary treatises' has been clarified? Still, it revolves around the four conditions to distinguish arising and differentiation. How can one rely on this internal consciousness in the later summary, mutually as conditioned origination, so that the causes and effects of differentiation are established in both reason and teaching? Abandoning the correct view and clinging to the wrong view, why be so persistent?
Treatise: What is the permissible situation of the first seven consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness, Manas consciousness) in relation to what the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness) cognizes? Ximing said: The manifested emptiness, mental functions, etc., cognized by the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness), as the object-aspect (the object of cognition), also perfumed and produced the seeds of those emptiness aspects. But it is not able to perfume and produce the seeds of the currently active subject-aspect (the subject of cognition) and object-aspect of the eighth consciousness. Because the eighth consciousness does not cognize the seeds of emptiness, etc. Now I think it is not so. If emptiness, etc., are separately perfumed into seeds, then emptiness, extremely subtle particles, etc., should not be hypothetical, because they are produced from seeds. There are many such faults, just like the analysis in the first volume. Also, allowing it to become a seed, even if the seed is seen to be different, it is not necessarily without outflows. Why can't the eighth consciousness cognize it? If it is said that because it is hypothetical, the eighth consciousness does not cognize it, then it should be like non-existence, unable to become a seed. Since it is allowed to become a seed, then its nature is real, and the eighth consciousness must be able to cognize it. Since the eighth consciousness does not cognize it, it shows that emptiness, extremely subtle particles, etc., cannot be separately formed into seeds. Although the original interpretation says that the sixth consciousness perfumes and becomes the seeds of emptiness, etc., it does not give rise to the currently active object-aspect of the eighth consciousness, because the eighth consciousness does not cognize emptiness, etc. It does not say that it is separately perfumed into seeds apart from the subject-aspect, nor does it say that this seed is not cognized by the eighth consciousness, so it is said that there is no fault.
Treatise: Only the subject-aspect is not cognized by the object-aspect, etc. The original interpretation is as explained in the commentary (referring to the interpretation of the 'Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only'). Ximing has four interpretations. Among the four interpretations, the first interpretation is divided into two. The second interpretation is divided into three. The third interpretation is divided into four.
【English Translation】 Treatise: Why is it so? Because the content after 'conclusion, cessation, auxiliary, and responsive correct treatises' (referring to distinguishing the summary, stopping, assisting, and responding to the topic) has already been clarified. The following is to distinguish how the seeds in the fundamental consciousness (the Alaya consciousness) are allowed to arise as three conditions, manifesting and differentiating, and so on. The two interpretations of Ximing (referring to the interpretation of Ximing Temple) believe that the content from 'four conditions' onwards are all auxiliary discussions. The meaning of the verse is to clarify the differentiations arising from conditioned origination, not to distinguish the differences of conditions. The Yaoji (referring to the 'Essentials of the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only') says that if supporting the meaning of the verse is a correct treatise; if not supporting the meaning of the verse is an auxiliary treatise, then interpreting the later content is superior. Now I think it is not so. The original interpretation (referring to the interpretation of the 'Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only') refutes external objections, if there is no external environment, differentiations will not arise. The author of the treatise (referring to the author of the 'Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only') answers with a verse, saying that due to the power of the transformation of the seed consciousness, that differentiation arises. This shows that the arising of differentiation is due to various conditions. Therefore, distinguishing the four conditions and the differentiations arising from conditioned origination are both correct treatises. The causes and effects of birth and death below are all correct treatises. If it is said that the four conditions are not correct treatises, then how can it be said that the content after 'conclusion, cessation, and auxiliary treatises' has been clarified? Still, it revolves around the four conditions to distinguish arising and differentiation. How can one rely on this internal consciousness in the later summary, mutually as conditioned origination, so that the causes and effects of differentiation are established in both reason and teaching? Abandoning the correct view and clinging to the wrong view, why be so persistent? Treatise: What is the permissible situation of the first seven consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, mind consciousness, Manas consciousness) in relation to what the eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness) cognizes? Ximing said: The manifested emptiness, mental functions, etc., cognized by the sixth consciousness (mind consciousness), as the object-aspect (the object of cognition), also perfumed and produced the seeds of those emptiness aspects. But it is not able to perfume and produce the seeds of the currently active subject-aspect (the subject of cognition) and object-aspect of the eighth consciousness. Because the eighth consciousness does not cognize the seeds of emptiness, etc. Now I think it is not so. If emptiness, etc., are separately perfumed into seeds, then emptiness, extremely subtle particles, etc., should not be hypothetical, because they are produced from seeds. There are many such faults, just like the analysis in the first volume. Also, allowing it to become a seed, even if the seed is seen to be different, it is not necessarily without outflows. Why can't the eighth consciousness cognize it? If it is said that because it is hypothetical, the eighth consciousness does not cognize it, then it should be like non-existence, unable to become a seed. Since it is allowed to become a seed, then its nature is real, and the eighth consciousness must be able to cognize it. Since the eighth consciousness does not cognize it, it shows that emptiness, extremely subtle particles, etc., cannot be separately formed into seeds. Although the original interpretation says that the sixth consciousness perfumes and becomes the seeds of emptiness, etc., it does not give rise to the currently active object-aspect of the eighth consciousness, because the eighth consciousness does not cognize emptiness, etc. It does not say that it is separately perfumed into seeds apart from the subject-aspect, nor does it say that this seed is not cognized by the eighth consciousness, so it is said that there is no fault. Treatise: Only the subject-aspect is not cognized by the object-aspect, etc. The original interpretation is as explained in the commentary (referring to the interpretation of the 'Commentary on the Treatise on Establishing Consciousness-only'). Ximing has four interpretations. Among the four interpretations, the first interpretation is divided into two. The second interpretation is divided into three. The third interpretation is divided into four.
四釋中分六。成十五釋。總第四釋與本釋同。別分成六。即不同本 要集斷云。四釋之中第四為正。無漏心等用周遍故。于變不變十五釋中。第十三為勝 正智證如及余心等證自證者。皆不變相。此餘一切見等。緣相必變而緣 今謂。西明十五釋中皆無一正。所以者何。且就第四分六釋中。一云見緣相變。余皆不變者不爾。既就體四分以辨相緣。見緣自相即是親緣。如何名變。若帶起名變。是自證分。故前第一卷云。變謂識體轉似二分。亦不關見。更變相緣無文說故。餘二緣相如何不變。二云見緣三變。余皆不變 此亦不爾。見緣相變有過同前。餘二緣三皆不變者。二緣相分如何不變。第四緣見不變相者。自證何殊 要集救云兼正有別者。既兼正殊。何不變相。不變相齊如何兼正。三云見緣四變。余皆不變。過準前知。四云三緣相變。緣余不變。要集斷此解中為正 今謂。同前皆亦不正。何者見緣后二變相可爾。如何緣相更說變相。豈不親緣同體相分。又第四分緣相是兼。許變相緣。緣于見分亦兼非正。何不變相。說果緣他過亦準知 要集言。有說云。見緣自證變影而緣。證自證分緣相．見分。見緣三．四以隔越故。變影而緣皆不應理。同體義分何言隔越。見望自證如何名隔。見緣自證既自內證。如何變緣。若變相緣
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 四釋中分為六種解釋，成就十五種解釋。總的來說，第四種解釋與根本解釋相同。分別來說，分成六種解釋，就與根本解釋不同。《要集》斷言，四種解釋之中，第四種解釋最為正確，因為無漏心等的作用周遍。在變與不變的十五種解釋中，第十三種解釋最為殊勝，正智證悟真如（Tathātā，事物的真實如是的狀態）以及其他心等證悟自證分（Svasaṃvedana，能認知自身的心識），都是不變的相。其餘一切見等，緣取相分（Viṣaya，被認知的外境）必定會變化而緣取。 現在我們認為，西明的十五種解釋中沒有一個是正確的。為什麼呢？且就第四種分為六種解釋來說，其中一種說法是見分（Darśana，能見的心識）緣取相分會變化，其餘都不變化，這種說法是不對的。既然就體四分來辨別相緣，見分緣取自相就是親緣，怎麼能說是變化呢？如果說帶起就叫做變化，那就是自證分了。所以前面第一卷說，『變化是指識體轉而相似於二分』，也不關見分的事。更變相緣沒有經文依據。其餘兩種緣取相分，怎麼能說是不變化呢？第二種說法是見分緣取三種變化，其餘都不變化，這種說法也是不對的。見分緣取相分變化，有過失與前面相同。其餘兩種緣取三種都不變化，兩種緣取相分，怎麼能說是不變化呢？第四種緣取見分不變相，那與自證分有什麼區別呢？《要集》辯解說兼有正與別的不同，既然兼有正的殊勝，為什麼不變相呢？不變相相同，怎麼能說是兼有正呢？第三種說法是見分緣取四種變化，其餘都不變化，過失可以參照前面來理解。第四種說法是三種緣取相分變化，緣取其餘的不變化，《要集》斷定這種解釋是正確的。現在我們認為，與前面相同，也都是不正確的。為什麼呢？見分緣取后兩種變化之相還可以，怎麼能緣取相分再說變化之相呢？難道不是親緣同體相分嗎？又第四分緣取相分是兼帶的，允許變化相緣，緣取見分也是兼帶而非正的，為什麼不變相呢？說果緣取他，過失也可以參照來理解。《要集》說，有人說，見分緣取自證分變化之影而緣取，證自證分緣取相分、見分，見分緣取三、四以隔越的緣故，變化之影而緣取都是不合道理的。同體義分，為什麼要說隔越呢？見分望向自證分，怎麼能說是隔呢？見分緣取自證分，既然是自內證，怎麼能變化緣取呢？如果變化相緣，
【English Translation】 English version The four explanations are divided into six, resulting in fifteen explanations. Generally, the fourth explanation is the same as the original explanation. Specifically, divided into six, it differs from the original. The 'Essentials Collection' asserts that among the four explanations, the fourth is the most correct because the function of the non-outflow mind (Anāsrava-citta, mind free from defilements) and others is pervasive. Among the fifteen explanations of change and non-change, the thirteenth is the most excellent, as Correct Wisdom (Samyagjñāna, right knowledge) realizes Suchness (Tathātā, the true nature of things) and other minds realize Self-Awareness (Svasaṃvedana, the aspect of consciousness that is aware of itself), which are unchanging aspects. All other seeing, etc., necessarily change and apprehend the Object-Aspect (Viṣaya, the object of cognition). Now, we believe that none of the fifteen explanations of Ximing are correct. Why? Let's take the fourth division into six explanations. One view is that the Seeing-Aspect (Darśana, the aspect of consciousness that sees) changes when it apprehends the Object-Aspect, while the others do not change. This is incorrect. Since the four aspects of the entity are used to distinguish the conditions of apprehension, the Seeing-Aspect apprehending its own aspect is a direct condition. How can it be said to change? If 'bringing about' is called change, then it is the Self-Awareness Aspect. Therefore, the first volume says, 'Change means that the nature of consciousness transforms to resemble the two aspects,' which does not concern the Seeing-Aspect. There is no textual basis for further changing the conditions of apprehension. How can the other two apprehending the Object-Aspect be said not to change? The second view is that the Seeing-Aspect apprehends three changes, while the others do not change. This is also incorrect. The Seeing-Aspect changing when it apprehends the Object-Aspect has the same fault as before. The other two apprehending three do not change. How can the two apprehending the Object-Aspect be said not to change? The fourth apprehends the Seeing-Aspect without changing its aspect. What is the difference from Self-Awareness? The 'Essentials Collection' argues that it combines the difference between the correct and the distinct. Since it combines the excellence of the correct, why does it not change its aspect? If the unchanging aspects are the same, how can it be said to combine the correct? The third view is that the Seeing-Aspect apprehends four changes, while the others do not change. The fault can be understood by referring to the previous explanation. The fourth view is that three apprehend the Object-Aspect with change, while apprehending the rest without change. The 'Essentials Collection' determines that this explanation is correct. Now, we believe that, like the previous ones, it is also incorrect. Why? It is acceptable for the Seeing-Aspect to apprehend the latter two changing aspects, but how can one say that apprehending the Object-Aspect is a changing aspect? Isn't it a direct condition of the same entity as the Object-Aspect? Furthermore, the fourth aspect apprehending the Object-Aspect is incidental, allowing for changing conditions of apprehension. Apprehending the Seeing-Aspect is also incidental and not correct. Why does it not change its aspect? Saying that the result apprehends others, the fault can also be understood by referring to the previous explanation. The 'Essentials Collection' says that some say that the Seeing-Aspect apprehends the shadow of the Self-Awareness Aspect and apprehends it, while the Self-Awareness Aspect apprehends the Object-Aspect and the Seeing-Aspect. The Seeing-Aspect apprehends three or four because of separation, so apprehending the shadow of change is unreasonable. The aspects of the same entity, why say there is separation? The Seeing-Aspect looking towards the Self-Awareness Aspect, how can it be said to be separated? The Seeing-Aspect apprehending the Self-Awareness Aspect, since it is self-internal proof, how can it change and apprehend? If it changes the conditions of apprehension,
。何名緣自。由此內證不變而緣。三緣相分變影而緣。不由隔越及由實性者 今依疏文但云新得即變影緣。無隔越語。以後二分望相名隔。見望第四義越名隔。理亦無違。若云既變相緣何名緣自者。此難亦非。如以鏡為緣還見自質。以心為緣還見自心等言豈不變相耶。見緣自證。變自證相故名為緣自。于理何違。
論。諸業謂福非福不動等者。準雜集第七云。不動業者謂色．無色系善 問何故色．無色系業名不動耶 答如欲界中余趣圓滿善．不善業。遇緣轉得余趣異熟。非色．無色系業有如是事。所受異熟界地決定故。是故約與異熟不可移轉名為不動。本疏云。如資下業生五凈居非不移轉。故此解非。論第二釋云。又定地攝故說為不動。本疏云。以定能住於一境故。此釋為勝 西明釋云。雜集初釋就任性業說。若約勝緣非無移轉。后說上地散善從定假名不動 今謂不然。豈欲界業不遇別緣雖任性業。亦別趣處受耶。若爾總不定。何得有定受。又復五趣應無定異因。若爾如何瑜伽．雜集等。俱說定異即各別感五趣因果。若許遇緣方別趣受。無緣不別。與上何殊不名不動。有解釋云。熏禪同地。但非異界地故名不動 要集云。有解為勝 今謂不爾。豈欲系業于異界地受耶。亦同地趣不定應同不動。若許異界受。即異
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：什麼叫做緣自？這是由於內證不變而產生的緣。三種緣（指親因緣、所緣緣、增上緣）的相分（指認識對像）變化成影像而產生的緣。不是由於隔越（指空間上的阻隔）或者實性（指事物本身的性質）而產生的。現在依照疏文的說法，只是說新獲得的（相分）就是變影緣，沒有隔越的說法。以後二分（指見分和相分）相對於相分來說，稱為隔。見分相對於第四義（指自證分）來說，越過（其他分）稱為隔，道理上也沒有違背。如果說既然變化成相緣，為什麼還叫做緣自呢？這種疑問也是不對的。比如以鏡子為緣，還能見到自己的面容；以心為緣，還能見到自己的心等等，難道不是變化成相嗎？見分緣自證分，變化成自證分的相，所以叫做緣自，在道理上有什麼違背呢？ 論：各種業，指福業、非福業、不動業等等。根據《雜集論》第七卷所說，不動業是指色界、無色界的善業。問：為什麼色界、無色界的業叫做不動業呢？答：因為在欲界中，其餘各道的圓滿的善業、不善業，遇到因緣會轉而得到其餘各道的異熟果報。而色界、無色界的業沒有這樣的情況，所受的異熟果報的界地是決定的。所以，從給予異熟果報不可轉移的角度來說，叫做不動。本疏說：比如憑藉下劣的業而生到五凈居天，並非不可轉移。所以這種解釋是不對的。論的第二種解釋說：又因為被禪定所攝持，所以說是不動。本疏說：因為禪定能夠安住於一個境界。這種解釋更好。西明的解釋說：《雜集論》最初的解釋是就任性業來說的，如果從殊勝的因緣來說，並非沒有轉移。後來的說法是說上界的散善，從禪定假名為不動。我認為不是這樣。難道欲界的業不遇到其他的因緣，即使是任性業，也會在其他的道處接受果報嗎？如果這樣，那就總是不定的，怎麼會有定受呢？而且五道應該沒有一定的差異原因。如果這樣，瑜伽師地論、《雜集論》等，如何都說確定差異，即各自感受五道的因果呢？如果允許遇到因緣才在其他道接受果報，沒有因緣就不在其他道接受果報，和上面有什麼區別，不能叫做不動。有解釋說：熏禪在同一地，但不是不同的界地，所以叫做不動。要集說：有解釋認為是好的。我認為不是這樣。難道欲界的業會在不同的界地接受果報嗎？也在同一地，道不確定，應該和不動一樣。如果允許在不同的界接受果報，就是不同的。
【English Translation】 English version: What is called 'arising from self'? It arises from the unchanging inner proof (內證, neizheng, inner proof). The three conditions (三緣, sanyuan, three conditions: Hetupratyaya, Alambanapratyaya, Adhipatipratyaya) of the aspect-division (相分, xiangfen, aspect-division) change into an image and thus arise. It does not arise due to separation (隔越, geyue, separation) or inherent nature (實性, shixing, inherent nature). Now, according to the commentary, it is simply said that the newly obtained (aspect-division) is the changed-image condition, without mentioning separation. Later, the two divisions (見分, jianfen, seeing-division and 相分, xiangfen, aspect-division) are called separated in relation to the aspect-division. The seeing-division is called separated in relation to the fourth meaning (第四義, disiyi, fourth meaning, i.e., self-awareness-division 自證分, zizhengfen), and there is no contradiction in principle. If it is said that since it has changed into an aspect-condition, why is it called 'arising from self'? This question is also incorrect. For example, using a mirror as a condition, one can still see one's own face; using the mind as a condition, one can still see one's own mind, etc. Are these not changes into aspects? The seeing-division conditions the self-awareness-division, changing into the aspect of the self-awareness-division, so it is called 'arising from self'. What contradiction is there in principle? Treatise: The various karmas refer to meritorious karma, non-meritorious karma, unmoving karma, etc. According to the seventh volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論, Zajilun), unmoving karma refers to the meritorious karma of the Form Realm (色界, Sejie) and Formless Realm (無色界, Wusejie). Question: Why is the karma of the Form Realm and Formless Realm called unmoving karma? Answer: Because in the Desire Realm (欲界, Yujie), the complete meritorious and non-meritorious karmas of the other destinies, when encountering conditions, will transform and obtain the different matured retributions of the other destinies. The karma of the Form Realm and Formless Realm does not have such a situation; the realm and ground of the matured retribution received are fixed. Therefore, from the perspective of giving matured retribution that cannot be transferred, it is called unmoving. The original commentary says: For example, relying on inferior karma to be born in the Five Pure Abodes (五凈居, Wujingju), it is not that it cannot be transferred. Therefore, this explanation is incorrect. The second explanation of the treatise says: Also, because it is included in the meditative ground, it is said to be unmoving. The original commentary says: Because meditation can abide in one state. This explanation is better. The Ximing explanation says: The initial explanation of the Abhidharmasamuccaya is based on karma that is left to its own nature. If based on superior conditions, it is not that there is no transfer. The later explanation refers to the scattered good deeds of the upper realms, which are nominally called unmoving based on meditation. I think this is not the case. Does the karma of the Desire Realm not encounter other conditions, even if it is karma left to its own nature, and still receive retribution in other destinies? If so, then it is always uncertain, how can there be fixed reception? Moreover, the five destinies should not have fixed different causes. If so, how do the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論, Yuqieshidi Lun), Abhidharmasamuccaya, etc., all say that fixed differences, that is, each separately feels the causes and effects of the five destinies? If it is allowed that only when encountering conditions will one receive retribution in other destinies, and without conditions one will not receive retribution in other destinies, what is the difference from the above, and it cannot be called unmoving. Some explanations say: The meditation-induced karma is in the same ground, but not in different realm-grounds, so it is called unmoving. The Yaoji says: Some explanations are considered good. I think this is not the case. Does the karma of the Desire Realm receive retribution in different realm-grounds? Also in the same ground, the destiny is uncertain, it should be the same as unmoving. If it is allowed to receive retribution in different realms, then it is different.
地漏隨增。亦別界別受。違諸聖教。故為不可 又云。雜集后解但云。定地攝故名不動業。若定若散皆定地攝。不可難言散善非定應非不動 今謂不爾。若許散善非別處受。自性不動。何須定攝。若許別處受。何得名不動。若云以定不動從定名不動。亦應定俱名為修惠。聞惠從定亦名修惠。此既不爾彼云何然。又許散善定地攝故名為不動。即有覆無記業。亦應名不動。同定地攝故 問許業異熟移轉異受。如何十因立定異因 答非說諸業皆名定異皆可移轉。但據總報定業界地起異立為定異。不定別報許移轉于異趣受故。同地總報不妨異受。如生凈居。故雜集云。如欲界中余趣圓滿善不善業。遇緣轉得余趣異熟。不說引業。又圓滿業所得異熟有共不共。如鹿王膊．師子臆等。為共通善．惡趣故。頂肉髻．雙佉大通人．天趣立定異因。轉余受業。各據別義皆不相違。
論。三熏習義。疏有五門。然西明釋云。眼等五識見．相能熏亦名錶義。表義第六之所引故。又眼識等相分。所熏為三因緣。第八．第六．及自相分 今謂不爾。為二識因自及第八。如何與六作因緣耶。第六相分自能熏故。眼等不緣第六相故 又云第七相但顯境。從顯境生。第七見分體即顯境。亦前念生而名顯境。而無表義。亦非意識緣名引故 今謂此釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 地漏隨增，也屬於不同的界別接受果報，這違背了諸位聖人的教誨，因此是不可行的。又說，《雜集論》後來的解釋只是說：『因為屬於定地的範疇，所以稱為不動業。』無論是定業還是散業，都屬於定地的範疇。不能反駁說散善不是定業，所以不應該是不動業。我認為不是這樣的。如果允許散善不在別處接受果報，其自性是不動的，那又何必屬於定地呢？如果允許在別處接受果報，又怎麼能稱為不動業呢？如果說因為定業不動，所以從定業的角度稱為不動業，那也應該把與定業相關的都稱為修惠。聽聞佛法所獲得的智慧，因為與定業相關，也稱為修惠。既然這樣不行，那上述的說法又怎麼能成立呢？又允許散善因為屬於定地的範疇，所以稱為不動業，那麼有覆無記業也應該稱為不動業，因為它也屬於定地的範疇。問：如果允許業的異熟果報可以轉移到不同的地方接受，那麼十因中的定異因如何成立呢？答：並不是說所有的業都稱為定異，都可以轉移。只是根據總報是定業，從界地產生的不同而立為定異。不定的別報允許轉移到不同的趣道接受果報。在同一個界地，總報不妨礙在不同的地方接受果報，比如生到凈居天。所以《雜集論》說：『比如欲界中其他趣道的圓滿善業和不善業，遇到因緣可以轉而在其他趣道獲得異熟果報。』這裡沒有說引業。而且圓滿業所獲得的異熟果報有共同的，也有不共同的，比如鹿王的肩膀、獅子的胸膛等，是爲了共通的善趣和惡趣。頂肉髻、雙佉（含義不明）大通人、天趣，設立定異因，轉移其他接受果報的業。各自根據不同的意義，都是不相違背的。
論：三熏習義。疏有五門。然而西明的解釋說：眼等五識的見分和相分能夠熏習，也稱為表義，因為表義是第六識所引導的。而且眼識等的相分，所熏習的是三種因緣：第八識、第六識，以及自身的相分。我認為不是這樣的。作為兩種識的因，只有自身和第八識。怎麼能與第六識作為因緣呢？第六識的相分自身能夠熏習，眼等識不緣第六識的相分。又說第七識的相分只是顯現境界，從顯現境界而生。第七識的見分本體就是顯現境界，也是從前念而生，稱為顯現境界，但沒有表義，也不是意識所緣，所以不能稱為引導。我認為這種解釋...
【English Translation】 English version The leakage increases accordingly, and it also belongs to different realms receiving retribution, which violates the teachings of all the saints, so it is not feasible. It is also said that the later explanation of the Za Ji Lun (Compendium of Determinations) only says: 'Because it belongs to the category of fixed land, it is called immovable karma.' Whether it is fixed karma or scattered karma, it belongs to the category of fixed land. It cannot be refuted that scattered good deeds are not fixed karma, so they should not be immovable karma. I think it's not like that. If it is allowed that scattered good deeds do not receive retribution in other places, its self-nature is immovable, then why should it belong to fixed land? If it is allowed to receive retribution in other places, how can it be called immovable karma? If it is said that because fixed karma is immovable, it is called immovable karma from the perspective of fixed karma, then everything related to fixed karma should also be called xiu hui (cultivating wisdom). The wisdom gained from hearing the Dharma is also called xiu hui because it is related to fixed karma. Since this is not possible, how can the above statement be established? It is also allowed that scattered good deeds are called immovable karma because they belong to the category of fixed land, then covered and non-remembered karma should also be called immovable karma, because it also belongs to the category of fixed land. Question: If it is allowed that the different retribution of karma can be transferred to different places to receive, how can the fixed different cause in the ten causes be established? Answer: It is not said that all karma is called fixed different and can be transferred. It is only based on the fact that the total retribution is fixed karma, and the difference arising from the realm is established as fixed different. The uncertain separate retribution is allowed to be transferred to different destinies to receive retribution. In the same realm, the total retribution does not prevent receiving retribution in different places, such as being born in the Pure Abode Heaven. Therefore, the Za Ji Lun says: 'For example, the complete good and bad karma of other destinies in the desire realm can be transformed to obtain different retribution in other destinies when encountering conditions.' It does not mention the leading karma here. Moreover, the different retribution obtained by complete karma has common and uncommon aspects, such as the shoulder of the deer king and the chest of the lion, which are for the common good and bad destinies. The ding rou ji (protuberance of flesh on the crown of the head), shuang qie (meaning unclear), great enlightened person, and heavenly destiny establish fixed different causes, transferring other karma that receives retribution. Each is based on different meanings, and they are not contradictory.
Treatise: The meaning of the three perfumations. The commentary has five aspects. However, the explanation of Ximing says: The seeing-aspect and appearance-aspect of the five consciousnesses such as the eye consciousness can perfumate, and it is also called biao yi (expressing meaning), because biao yi is guided by the sixth consciousness. Moreover, the appearance-aspect of the eye consciousness and others is perfumed by three kinds of causes and conditions: the eighth consciousness, the sixth consciousness, and its own appearance-aspect. I don't think so. As the cause of the two kinds of consciousness, there are only itself and the eighth consciousness. How can it be a cause and condition with the sixth consciousness? The appearance-aspect of the sixth consciousness can perfumate itself, and the eye consciousness and others do not relate to the appearance-aspect of the sixth consciousness. It is also said that the appearance-aspect of the seventh consciousness only manifests the realm, and it arises from manifesting the realm. The nature of the seeing-aspect of the seventh consciousness is to manifest the realm, and it also arises from the previous thought, and it is called manifesting the realm, but it has no biao yi, and it is not the object of the consciousness, so it cannot be called guidance. I think this explanation...
義猶有餘。依有漏說義則可爾。表義名言得通無漏。平等六引豈不緣名。許隨六引隨緣何境通亦為勝 西明云。二執現惠不俱故無兩惠。斷有前後。以能斷道有差別故。一現熏成兩種 今謂不爾。若以斷有前後。一現熏成兩種。種子．現行性相同故。何不生於兩現。又后現．種俱說斷故 又前自斷熏習雖三。隨義分三。而能熏一。故成一種 二執現一。何故熏二 又前自云。眼識所熏相分既生三現。為成一種。為三種耶。答有二解。一云生三。一云生一。引三藏判一種為勝 三識既不恒俱。界地有無復別。許熏成一。二執斷雖前後。依識界地無差。如何即令別種。由此應知。所有我執及煩惱障。必與法執及所知障同種而生。然有法執及所知障。不與我執及煩惱障同種。如二乘無學所起執障現熏成種。余有同異準此類知。
論。云此頌所言等。問相見等取由業所招。云與取俱。今三熏習。我執習氣非業所招。如何得云由業．習氣二取習俱 答前云由業與習氣俱能生現果是親疏緣。今此亦望業．習二俱能生現果親疏差別。不云業招我執習氣。
論。此中無明唯取能發正感後世善惡業者 問何故此論無明．行為能引。識等五名所引。瑜伽即說無明至受皆名引因 答此論據行能引五趣業果種子。未潤之位分為生引
。業引果種故二能引。五種所引。能所引殊。瑜伽望果未潤之位。去果猶違。初之七支總名為引。已潤七支果近名生。即牽引．生起二因所攝。已起名果。果即是彼遠近因果。故說于現法后法中。識乃至受。于生．老死位所攝諸支。言現法即前七。后法即后三 或現法即前十。后法生老死 或現法是今果。后法是後果。總顯二世。生．老死支皆引．生果。此二是彼引．生因之果。望義有別。故不相違 問正發行支唯見無明。發三種業各何性耶 答外法異生於欲界中發三種業。皆是不善。此論第六及雜集論。皆云欲界分別煩惱是不善故。又緣起經下捲雲。外法異生非理作意所引四種轉異無明。即起欲界不共．相應．纏．及隨眠故是不善。發初靜慮行支無明亦是不善。是欲界故。已上諸地發行無明即是有覆。定地攝故 內法異生若放逸者。發行無明可通二性。不放逸者發行無明即唯有覆 問準何得知 答準緣起經云外法異生非理作意所引四種轉異無明。既由非理作意引生四種無明。明知不善。又由外道迷生死果執為涅槃。起不動行。所起無明與邪行。為依方起彼行故是不善 內法異生髮非福行亦唯不善。非有覆惑能發非福不善之業。
若不放逸起非福業雖無明發。不能為緣招三惡趣。故非無明支 內法異生若諸放逸
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：業能引發果報，所以說有兩種引發。五種是所引發的。能引發和所引發有所不同。《瑜伽師地論》認為，對於尚未成熟的果報來說，遠離果報仍然是違背正道的。最初的七支總稱為『引』，已經成熟的七支，果報臨近，稱為『生』，即由牽引和生起兩種因所攝。已經產生的稱為果報。果報就是那些遠近因所產生的果。所以說在現世和來世中，識乃至受，都屬於生、老、死位所攝的各個支分。所說的現世，就是指前面的七支；來世，就是指後面的三支。或者現世指前面的十支，來世指生老死。總的來說，顯示了兩個世間。生、老、死支都是引發和生起的果報。這兩種是引發和生起之因的果報。從意義上來說有所區別，所以並不矛盾。 問：正發行支僅僅見到無明，那麼所發的三種業各自是什麼性質呢？答：外法異生在欲界中所發的三種業，都是不善的。這部論（指《瑜伽師地論》）第六卷以及《雜集論》都說，欲界的分辨煩惱是不善的。而且《緣起經》下卷說，外法異生由非理作意所引發的四種轉異無明，即生起欲界不共、相應、纏、以及隨眠，所以是不善的。發起初禪的行支無明也是不善的，因為屬於欲界。以上各地的發行無明就是有覆的，因為屬於定地所攝。 內法異生如果放逸，發行無明可以通於兩種性質。不放逸者，發行無明就只有有覆的性質。問：根據什麼得知？答：根據《緣起經》說，外法異生由非理作意所引發的四種轉異無明，既然由非理作意引發產生四種無明，明顯知道是不善的。又因為外道迷惑于生死果報，執著為涅槃，生起不動行。所生起的無明與邪行，作為依據才生起那種行為，所以是不善的。內法異生髮起非福行也只有不善的性質。因為沒有有覆的迷惑能夠發起非福不善之業。 如果不放逸而生起非福業，即使由無明發起，也不能作為因緣招感三惡趣的果報，所以不是無明支。內法異生如果諸位放逸者
【English Translation】 English version: Karma can lead to consequences, hence there are two types of leading. Five are what are led. The ability to lead and what is led are different. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra considers that for consequences that have not yet matured, being far from the consequences is still contrary to the right path. The initial seven limbs are collectively called 'leading' (引), and the seven limbs that have matured, with consequences near, are called 'arising' (生), which are encompassed by the two causes of attraction and arising. What has already arisen is called consequence. The consequence is the result of those distant and near causes. Therefore, it is said that in the present and future lives, consciousness (識) to feeling (受) all belong to the branches encompassed by birth, old age, and death. The so-called present life refers to the first seven limbs; the future life refers to the last three limbs. Or the present life refers to the first ten limbs, and the future life refers to birth, old age, and death. In general, it shows the two worlds. The branches of birth, old age, and death are all consequences of leading and arising. These two are the consequences of the causes of leading and arising. There is a difference in meaning, so there is no contradiction. Question: The branch of right effort only sees ignorance (無明 Avidya), so what is the nature of the three karmas that are generated? Answer: Ordinary beings (異生 prthag-jana) in the desire realm (欲界 Kāmadhātu) generate three types of karma, all of which are unwholesome. The sixth volume of this treatise (referring to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra) and the Abhidharmasamuccaya both say that the discriminating afflictions (煩惱 klesha) of the desire realm are unwholesome. Moreover, the lower volume of the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra says that the four types of transformed ignorance (無明 Avidya) caused by irrational attention (非理作意 ayonisomanasikara) of ordinary beings in external dharmas, that is, the arising of the non-common, corresponding, entangling, and latent tendencies of the desire realm, are unwholesome. The ignorance of the practice branch that initiates the first dhyana (初禪 prathama dhyāna) is also unwholesome because it belongs to the desire realm. The ignorance of issuance in the above-mentioned realms is obscured (有覆 avrta), because it belongs to the realm of concentration (定地 samāhita bhūmi). If ordinary beings in internal dharmas are negligent, the ignorance of issuance can be of two natures. If they are not negligent, the ignorance of issuance is only obscured. Question: According to what is this known? Answer: According to the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra, the four types of transformed ignorance caused by irrational attention of ordinary beings in external dharmas, since the four types of ignorance are generated by irrational attention, it is clear that they are unwholesome. Moreover, because non-Buddhists are confused about the consequences of birth and death, clinging to nirvana, they generate the immovable action (不動行 anenja samskara). The ignorance that arises and the wrong practice are the basis for generating that action, so it is unwholesome. The non-meritorious action (非福行 apunya samskara) initiated by ordinary beings in internal dharmas is also only unwholesome. Because there is no obscured delusion that can initiate the non-meritorious unwholesome karma. If one is not negligent and generates non-meritorious karma, even if it is initiated by ignorance, it cannot be the cause of attracting the consequences of the three evil destinies (三惡趣 tri-apaya), so it is not a branch of ignorance. If ordinary beings in internal dharmas are negligent
及不放逸起福．不動所有無明。一云有覆。信為依故。故緣起經上捲雲。若由欲愛造諸福行。彼信為依乃造斯行。于生於死起定信故。此愛及取由信攝伏。我于設為有覆無記。故內法異生求善趣生。雖不能了彼生死苦。是于生死起定信故 又復求生知足凈土。亦是生死由定信故。攝彼無明是有覆性 一云若放逸者起于福行。通有覆．不善無明所發。以放逸者當感惡趣。經唯說彼不放逸之者造非福行不感惡趣故。如何不起不善無明發于福行。即諸但求人．天福樂放逸之者起不善發。若求知足希見佛等即有覆發。此釋為勝。
若不放逸發福．不動又有二說。一云隨眠。非現行發故。雜集論第七云。未見諦者雖起善心。由彼隨眠所隨逐故亦名愚癡。由彼勢力於三界苦不如實知。便發福．不動業。緣起經下捲雲。又不放逸內法果生。若造福行及不動行。彼是正法如理作意相應善心之所引發。解脫為依迴向解脫而引發故。雖于善趣感殊勝生。而非無明起增上緣。既云相應善心之所引發。明無現行。然說雖于善趣感殊勝生故由種發。不爾應非行支所攝 問若許異生種子發業。何故用下無明發上地行 答樞要釋．云。有下現行無明為因起。自迷真實義愚現見有故。此意由愚求上地生故下愚發一云唯除不共余無明發。諸不放逸及
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：以及不放逸而生起的福業，不會觸動所有的無明。一種說法是『有覆』（Avrana，被覆蓋的），因為有信為依靠。所以《緣起經》上卷說：『如果因為對慾望的愛而造作各種福業，那麼這種行為是因為有信為依靠才造作的。』因為對於生和死產生了堅定的信念。這種愛和取（Upadana，執取）被信所攝伏。我認為這可以被設定為『有覆無記』（Avyakrta-avrana，被覆蓋的無記）。因此，內在修法的異生（Prthagjana，凡夫）追求善趣的轉生，即使不能完全瞭解生死的痛苦，也是因為對生死產生了堅定的信念。又或者，追求往生知足天（Tusita，兜率天）的凈土，也是因為對生死有堅定的信念。這種信念所攝伏的無明是有覆性的。 一種說法是，如果放逸的人發起福業，那麼這是由有覆和不善的無明所引發的。因為放逸的人會感得惡趣的果報。《經》中只說了不放逸的人造作非福業不會感得惡趣的果報。那麼，如何解釋不生起不善的無明卻能發起福業呢？這是指那些只求人天福樂的放逸之人所生起的不善。如果追求知足天，希望見到佛等等，那就是有覆的無明所引發的。這種解釋更為殊勝。 如果不放逸而發起福業，不會觸動，又有兩種說法。一種說法是隨眠（Anusaya，潛在的煩惱），因為不是現行發起。所以《雜集論》第七卷說：『沒有見到真諦的人，即使生起善心，因為被隨眠所跟隨，也叫做愚癡。』因為隨眠的力量，對於三界的苦不如實知，便發起福業和不動業（Anenja，無色界的業）。《緣起經》下卷說：『又不放逸的內在修法產生果報，如果造作福業和不動業，這是與正法如理作意（Yoniso-manasikara，如理作意）相應的善心所引發的。』因為以解脫為依靠，迴向解脫而引發。雖然在善趣感得殊勝的果報，但不是無明生起增上緣（Adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣）。既然說是與相應的善心所引發，就表明沒有現行。然而，說雖然在善趣感得殊勝的果報，所以是由種子發起。否則，就不應該被行支所攝。 問：如果允許異生（Prthagjana，凡夫）的種子發起業，為什麼用下地的無明發起上地的行為？答：樞要釋說：『有下地的現行無明為因生起，因為自己迷惑了真實的意義，愚昧地認為有現見。』這個意思是，因為愚昧地追求上地的轉生，所以下地的愚昧得以發起。一種說法是，唯獨除了不共無明（Asadharana-avidya，不共無明）之外，其他的無明都可以發起。那些不放逸的人以及...
【English Translation】 English version: And the merit arising from non-negligence does not stir all ignorance. One explanation is 'Avrana' (covered), because it relies on faith. Therefore, the upper volume of the 'Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra' says: 'If one performs meritorious deeds out of love for desire, then this action is performed because it relies on faith.' Because one has firm faith in birth and death. This love and grasping (Upadana) are subdued by faith. I consider this to be set as 'Avyakrta-avrana' (covered and indeterminate). Therefore, the Prthagjana (ordinary being) who practices inner Dharma seeks rebirth in good realms, even if they cannot fully understand the suffering of birth and death, it is because they have firm faith in birth and death. Or, seeking rebirth in the pure land of Tusita (Contentment), is also because of firm faith in birth and death. The ignorance subdued by this faith is of a covered nature. One explanation is that if a negligent person initiates meritorious deeds, then this is caused by covered and unwholesome ignorance. Because a negligent person will experience the retribution of evil realms. The 'Sūtra' only says that a non-negligent person who performs non-meritorious deeds will not experience the retribution of evil realms. So, how to explain that not arising unwholesome ignorance can initiate meritorious deeds? This refers to the unwholesome arising of those negligent people who only seek human and heavenly bliss. If seeking Tusita, hoping to see the Buddha, etc., then it is caused by covered ignorance. This explanation is more excellent. If non-negligence initiates merit, it does not stir, and there are two explanations. One explanation is Anusaya (latent defilements), because it is not initiated in the present. Therefore, the seventh volume of the 'Abhidharmasamuccaya' says: 'Those who have not seen the truth, even if they generate good thoughts, are also called ignorant because they are followed by Anusaya.' Because of the power of Anusaya, they do not truly know the suffering of the three realms, and thus initiate meritorious deeds and Anenja (immovable karma, karma of the formless realm). The lower volume of the 'Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra' says: 'And the inner practice of non-negligence produces retribution, if one performs meritorious deeds and immovable karma, this is caused by good thoughts corresponding to Yoniso-manasikara (appropriate attention) of the right Dharma.' Because it relies on liberation, it is initiated by dedicating to liberation. Although one experiences excellent retribution in good realms, it is not that ignorance arises as Adhipati-pratyaya (dominant condition). Since it is said to be caused by corresponding good thoughts, it indicates that there is no present action. However, it is said that although one experiences excellent retribution in good realms, it is initiated by seeds. Otherwise, it should not be included in the limb of action. Question: If it is allowed for the seeds of Prthagjana (ordinary beings) to initiate karma, why use the ignorance of the lower realm to initiate the actions of the higher realm? Answer: The essential explanation says: 'There is the arising of present ignorance in the lower realm as the cause, because one is confused about the true meaning, and ignorantly thinks there is present seeing.' This means that because one ignorantly seeks rebirth in the higher realm, the ignorance of the lower realm can be initiated. One explanation is that, except for Asadharana-avidya (uncommon ignorance), other ignorance can initiate. Those who are non-negligent and...
聖有學。當起三種無明發非福行。雖不招果非無無明。故知起福及不動行。有餘現發。故緣起上云。復有一類依無有愛。造諸福行或不動行。乃至云。又無知故。于非對治起對治想。造諸福行或不動行。由是道理。如是諸行應知唯用無明為緣非愛及取。此求無有云依無有愛。通外道說。求當涅槃名依無有愛。即內法異生。故起現愚發福不動 既有二釋何者為勝 答準雜集論說有隨眠。又緣起經以外道作從不如理作意生由無明發。內法不放逸發福．不動行。如理作意生。如理作意非彼無明生起之因。即前解勝 若準緣起經。由三無明起非福行。何故不得現行發行。若不起無明發行感果。亦應不起現愛．取潤。又緣起經唯說諸聖有學。不共無明已永斷故。不造新業。不言異生有學。餘三無明皆悉不起不造新業。所有故業由隨眠力未永斷滅。暫觸還吐。準此后勝。既無評家任意取捨 問內法異生何名放逸位。何處非放逸位 答無文判定。或有說。在十信已去。或十住第四住位。或說四善根位 今為二解。一云但約策勵不策分二類別。經不定處故。一云四善根位。多住內門修不放逸故 問若內法異生不放逸者。亦造感總福．不動業。何故緣起經上。云由此道理應知內法諸有學者。不緣無明更造諸行 答據不以不共無明為緣發行
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：聖有學者，當生起三種無明，從而發起非福行。雖然不招致果報，但並非沒有無明。因此可知，發起福行及不動行，還有殘餘的現行生髮。所以在緣起經上說：『又有一類眾生，依賴於對「無有」的愛著（Upeksha，舍），造作各種福行或不動行。』乃至說：『又因為無知（Avidya，無明）的緣故，對於非對治法生起對治法的想法，造作各種福行或不動行。』由於這個道理，應當知道這些行為僅僅以無明為緣，而不是以愛（Trsna，渴愛）和取（Upadana，執取）為緣。這裡所說的求「無有」，是指依賴於對「無有」的愛著，這是對外道的說法。而求當來涅槃，名為依賴於對「無有」的愛著，這是指內道的異生。因此，生起現行愚昧，從而發起福行和不動行。 既然有兩種解釋，哪一種更為殊勝？ 答：根據《雜集論》所說，有隨眠（Anusaya，隨眠）。而且《緣起經》以外道作為例子，認為是從不如理作意生起，由無明而發起。內道不放逸，發起福行和不動行，是從如理作意生起。如理作意不是彼無明生起的因，因此前一種解釋更為殊勝。 如果根據《緣起經》，由三種無明生起非福行，為什麼不能有現行生髮？如果不起無明，發行感果，也應該不起現行的愛和取來滋潤。 而且《緣起經》只說了諸聖有學者，因為不共無明（Asadharana-avidya，不共無明）已經永遠斷除，所以不再造作新的業。沒有說異生有學，其餘三種無明都全部不起，不造作新的業。所有過去的業，由於隨眠的力量沒有永遠斷滅，暫時接觸還會再次顯現。根據這個，后一種解釋更為殊勝。既然沒有評判家，可以任意取捨。 問：內道異生，什麼叫做放逸位？什麼地方叫做非放逸位？ 答：沒有明確的判定。或者有人說，在十信之後。或者十住的第四住位。或者說在四善根位。 現在有兩種解釋。一種說法是，僅僅根據策勵和不策勵來分為兩種類別，因為經典沒有明確的規定。另一種說法是，在四善根位，多數安住于內門修習不放逸的緣故。 問：如果內道異生不放逸，也造作感得總福和不動業，為什麼《緣起經》上說，由於這個道理，應當知道內道的諸有學者，不以無明為緣，再造作各種行為？ 答：這是根據不以不共無明為緣而發起。
【English Translation】 English version: A noble disciple should generate three kinds of ignorance (Avidya), thereby initiating non-meritorious actions (Apunya-karma). Although these actions do not lead to fruition, it does not mean there is no ignorance involved. Therefore, it is known that initiating meritorious actions (Punya-karma) and imperturbable actions (Anenja-karma) still involves residual active manifestations. Hence, in the teaching on Dependent Origination (Pratītyasamutpāda), it is said: 'Furthermore, there is a class of beings who, relying on the love of non-existence (Upeksha), create various meritorious or imperturbable actions.' And further: 'Also, due to ignorance (Avidya), they arise with the thought of counteracting what is not a counteractive, creating various meritorious or imperturbable actions.' Due to this reason, it should be understood that these actions are solely conditioned by ignorance, and not by craving (Trsna) and grasping (Upadana). The seeking of 'non-existence' here refers to relying on the love of non-existence, which is a teaching for externalists (Tirthika). Seeking future Nirvana is called relying on the love of non-existence, which refers to ordinary beings (Prthagjana) within the internal Dharma. Therefore, generating active ignorance leads to initiating meritorious and imperturbable actions. Since there are two interpretations, which one is superior? Answer: According to the Abhidharma-samuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma), there are latent tendencies (Anusaya). Moreover, the Pratītyasamutpāda Sutra uses externalists as an example, stating that it arises from irrational attention (Ayoniśo-manaskara), initiated by ignorance. Internal Dharma practitioners, being non-negligent, initiate meritorious and imperturbable actions, arising from rational attention (Yoniśo-manaskara). Rational attention is not the cause of the arising of that ignorance; therefore, the former interpretation is superior. If, according to the Pratītyasamutpāda Sutra, non-meritorious actions arise from three kinds of ignorance, why can't there be active manifestations? If ignorance does not arise, initiating actions leading to fruition, then active craving and grasping should also not arise to nourish them. Moreover, the Pratītyasamutpāda Sutra only mentions noble disciples (Arya-śrāvaka), because non-common ignorance (Asadharana-avidya) has been permanently severed, so they no longer create new karma. It does not say that ordinary disciples (Prthagjana-śrāvaka), with the remaining three kinds of ignorance, do not arise at all and do not create new karma. All past karma, due to the power of latent tendencies, has not been permanently eradicated; temporary contact will still cause it to manifest again. According to this, the latter interpretation is superior. Since there is no judge, one can arbitrarily choose. Question: What is called the state of negligence (Pramada) for ordinary beings within the internal Dharma? What place is called the state of non-negligence (Apramada)? Answer: There is no clear determination. Or some say it is after the ten faiths (Dasabala). Or the fourth stage of the ten abodes (Dasabhumi). Or it is said to be in the four roots of goodness (Kusalamula). Now there are two interpretations. One says that it is merely divided into two categories based on exertion and non-exertion, because the scriptures do not clearly specify. The other says that it is in the four roots of goodness, because they mostly abide in the internal gate, cultivating non-negligence. Question: If ordinary beings within the internal Dharma are non-negligent, and also create karma that leads to general merit and imperturbability, why does the Pratītyasamutpāda Sutra say that due to this reason, it should be known that noble disciples within the internal Dharma do not rely on ignorance to create various actions? Answer: This is based on not initiating actions conditioned by non-common ignorance.
。云不緣無明更造諸行。異彼外法所有異生。故彼文云。是故唯依外法異生。我說順次雜染緣起最極圓滿。非住內法。若即依文。應知內法諸有學者皆不造行。與前相違。前云內法異生若放逸者。彼除一種不共無明。所餘無明為緣生行。又緣起經．雜集論．及此論。皆聖者不造新業。不言諸有學皆不造新業 然要集云。無性攝論第八。云由加行證得者。謂能感異熟果義。非異熟因。能對治彼故。即增上果假名異熟。由此故知。內法異生不造總業者不然。彼攝論文約見道前後修無分別智。不言余所修善皆即增上假名異熟。故不為證 問四無明何者是耶 答彼經意以現種相對立纏隨眠。纏中俱不俱行對立為相應．不共。故緣起經云。纏無明尚細。況有隨眠。相應無明尚細。況不共無明。故依二對立四無明。即諸種子名隨眠。現行分二。與根本惑俱名相應。不與本俱名為不共。然多說是是主獨行。迷因果理行相細故。不同非主獨行無明 問所發行支即三種業。業有三思。身．語唯動發。意可通三。作動意故。亦有動發。然福．不動必非癡俱。以是善故。準此唯有遠緣引起。不了當苦而忻求等。唯見道惑。即但正發無助發者 答與見惑前後而生有助不妨 問外法異生髮福．不動。無明俱思有是不善。何非行支 答彼無加行。非
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：如果說，不明（Avidya）不作為緣由，異生（prthag-jana）就不會造作諸行（Samskara），這與外道（Tirthika）的異生不同。因此，那段經文說：『所以，我說唯有依靠外道的異生，才會有順次雜染緣起的完全圓滿』，而不是住在內道（自宗）的異生。如果按照這段經文，就應該知道內道的所有有學（saiksa）都不會造作諸行，這與前面的說法相矛盾。前面說內道的異生如果放逸，除了不共無明（Asadharana-avidya）之外，其餘的無明都會作為緣由而產生諸行。而且，《緣起經》（Pratityasamutpada-sutra）、《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）以及這部論都說，聖者（Arya）不會造作新的業（Karma），但沒有說所有的有學都不會造作新的業。然而，《集論》（Samuccaya）說，《無性攝論》（Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma）第八品說，通過加行（prayoga）證得的，是指能夠感受異熟果（vipaka-phala）的意義，而不是異熟因（vipaka-hetu），因為能夠對治它。這就是增上果（adhipati-phala）的假名異熟。由此可知，內道的異生不造作總業（samasta-karma）的說法是不對的。那部《攝論》是針對見道（darshana-marga）前後修習無分別智（nirvikalpa-jnana）而說的，並沒有說其餘所修的善都是增上假名異熟，所以不能作為證據。 問：四種無明（catasro-avidya）是什麼？ 答：那部經的用意是以現行（paryavasthana）和種子（bija）相對立，纏（paryavasthana）和隨眠（anusaya）相對立，纏中又以俱行（sahaja）和不俱行（asahaja）相對立，作為相應（samprayukta）和不共（asamprayukta）。所以，《緣起經》說：『纏的無明尚且微細，更何況隨眠？相應的無明尚且微細，更何況不共的無明？』所以，依據這兩種對立，就有了四種無明。所有的種子叫做隨眠，現行分為兩種，與根本惑（mula-klesha）一起的叫做相應，不與根本惑一起的叫做不共。然而，多數說法是這是主導的、單獨發生的，因為迷惑因果道理的行相很微細，不同於非主導的、單獨發生的無明。 問：所發行的支（bhava-anga）就是三種業（tri-karma）。業有三種思（tri-cetana）。身（kaya）、語（vak）只有動發（pratisandhi），意（manas）可以通於三種。因為作動意（karma-cetana）也有動發。然而，福（punya）、不動（aningya）必定不是與癡（moha）一起的，因為這是善的緣故。按照這個推論，只有遠緣（dura-hetu）引起，不了知將來的苦而欣求等等，只有見道惑（darshana-klesha），也就是隻有正發（avasthana），沒有助發（anavasthana）？ 答：與見惑前後而生有助發不妨。 問：外道的異生髮福、不動，無明俱思有不是不善的，為什麼不是行支？ 答：因為他們沒有加行，不是殷重（guru）。
【English Translation】 English version: If ignorance (Avidya) were not the cause, beings (prthag-jana) would not create formations (Samskara), which is different from the beings of external paths (Tirthika). Therefore, that text says: 'Therefore, I say that only by relying on the beings of external paths can the complete cycle of dependent origination of defilement be fully realized,' and not by those who abide in the internal path (own school). If we follow this text, we should know that all learners (saiksa) of the internal path do not create formations, which contradicts the previous statement. The previous statement said that if beings of the internal path are negligent, then, except for uncommon ignorance (Asadharana-avidya), the remaining ignorance will be the cause of the arising of formations. Moreover, the 'Dependent Origination Sutra' (Pratityasamutpada-sutra), the 'Compendium of Abhidharma' (Abhidharmasamuccaya), and this treatise all say that the noble ones (Arya) do not create new karma (Karma), but they do not say that all learners do not create new karma. However, the 'Collection Treatise' (Samuccaya) says that the eighth chapter of 'Asanga's Compendium of Abhidharma' says that what is attained through effort (prayoga) refers to the meaning of being able to experience the result of maturation (vipaka-phala), not the cause of maturation (vipaka-hetu), because it can counteract it. This is the nominal maturation of the dominant result (adhipati-phala). From this, it can be known that the statement that beings of the internal path do not create collective karma (samasta-karma) is incorrect. That 'Compendium Treatise' is aimed at cultivating non-conceptual wisdom (nirvikalpa-jnana) before and after the path of seeing (darshana-marga), and it does not say that all the good deeds cultivated are dominant nominal maturation, so it cannot be used as evidence. Question: What are the four types of ignorance (catasro-avidya)? Answer: The intention of that sutra is to contrast manifestation (paryavasthana) with seeds (bija), entanglement (paryavasthana) with latent tendencies (anusaya), and among entanglements, to contrast co-occurring (sahaja) with non-co-occurring (asahaja) as corresponding (samprayukta) and non-common (asamprayukta). Therefore, the 'Dependent Origination Sutra' says: 'The ignorance of entanglement is already subtle, let alone latent tendencies? The corresponding ignorance is already subtle, let alone non-common ignorance?' Therefore, based on these two contrasts, there are four types of ignorance. All seeds are called latent tendencies, and manifestation is divided into two types: that which is with the root affliction (mula-klesha) is called corresponding, and that which is not with the root affliction is called non-common. However, most say that this is dominant and occurs alone, because the appearance of confusing the principles of cause and effect is very subtle, unlike non-dominant and alone ignorance. Question: The limb of becoming (bhava-anga) that is produced is the three karmas (tri-karma). Karma has three intentions (tri-cetana). Body (kaya) and speech (vak) only have activation (pratisandhi), while mind (manas) can encompass all three. Because the intention of action (karma-cetana) also has activation. However, merit (punya) and immovability (aningya) must not be with delusion (moha), because it is good. According to this inference, only distant causes (dura-hetu) give rise to it, not understanding future suffering and seeking joy, etc., only the afflictions of the path of seeing (darshana-klesha), that is, only the actual arising (avasthana), without the assisting arising (anavasthana)? Answer: It does not matter if assisting arising occurs before or after the afflictions of the path of seeing. Question: External beings generate merit and immovability, and the ignorance-accompanied thought is not unwholesome, so why is it not a limb of becoming? Answer: Because they do not have effort, it is not weighty (guru).
故思業。故非行支。后正起者即由故思思已起業。故為行支 問福．不動行既非癡俱。云何論會雜集論說無明與行為因緣者。依無明俱業習氣說。無明俱故假說無明。實是行種 答此亦無違。說無明俱名業習者。因中說果。當起現思為行支故。又據不善。非福．不動 問非福不善正見惑發。正起行時與何惑俱。若與見惑俱。還應重發。若與修惑俱。任運非猛利 答二俱無失。設與見惑俱。亦非重發。正造行故。余後起故。若與修惑俱。由見惑引。與無慚等俱。故成不善 問名色支體以攝六識。六處體中以何為意 答本疏中釋云若有異熟居過去世說為意也。此約一意。二世分別即義說別 若爾應假如見惠等 解云許假何失 有違下過。下假實門言名色．六處皆是實故 解云據多分說。如行支中亦假說色。假實門中亦說實故 今助一解。如名色支色除五根。于名之中除識何咎。但有想．行亦得為名。非假非雜。
論。由斯識等亦說現行。西明初云。相從假說。十二有支皆通種．現。云有支通現行者。卻談業行假說有支。由彼熏成有種子故 今謂不然。識等俱有支現。不約過說。據當生說。故知有支約當起說。以五果種潤為有支同行支故。何不據當卻談過去。若云望生．老死但識等五不通行故者。卻談業行亦唯行支無
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因此，是故意思業。故意思業不是行支（karma-hetu, 行的因素）。後來正確生起的，即是由故意思思慮後生起的業。所以是行支。問：福行（punya-karma, 善業）、不動行（aninjya-karma, 無動業）既然不是與癡（moha, 愚癡）同時生起，為何《會雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya, 阿毗達磨集論）說無明（avidya, 無明）與行為因緣呢？答：是依據與無明同時生起的業習氣（karma-vasana, 業的習氣）說的。因為與無明同時生起，所以假說為無明。實際上是行（karma, 業）的種子（bija, 種子）。 答：這也沒有矛盾。說與無明同時生起名為業習氣，這是在因中說果。當生起的現思（vartamana-citta, 現在的思）是行支的緣故。又根據不善（akusala, 不善），不是福行、不動行。問：非福（apunya, 非福業）不善的正見（samyag-drsti, 正見）惑（klesha, 煩惱）發動，正確生起行時與什麼惑同時生起？如果與見惑（drsti-klesha, 見惑）同時生起，還應該重複發動。如果與修惑（bhavana-klesha, 修惑）同時生起，任運（svabhavatah, 自然而然）不猛利（tivra, 強烈）。 答：兩種都沒有過失。假設與見惑同時生起，也不是重複發動。因為正在造行（karma-karana, 造業），其餘是後來生起的緣故。如果與修惑同時生起，由見惑引導，與無慚（ahrikya, 無慚）等同時生起，所以成為不善。問：名色支（nama-rupa-anga, 名色支）的體（kaya, 身體）用以攝取六識（sad-vijnana, 六識），六處支（sad-ayatana-anga, 六處支）的體中用什麼作為意（manas, 意）？答：本疏（mula-tika, 根本疏）中解釋說，如果有異熟（vipaka, 異熟果）存在於過去世（atita-adhvan, 過去世），就說為意。這是就一個意來說。二世（dve-adhvan, 過去和未來二世）分別，就意義上說是不同的。 如果這樣，應該假如見（drsti, 見）、惠（prajna, 智慧）等。解釋說：允許假如有什麼過失？有違背下面的過失。下面假實門（satya-asatya-mukha, 真假門）說名色、六處都是真實的緣故。解釋說：根據大部分來說。如行支中也假說色（rupa, 色）。假實門中也說是真實的緣故。現在幫助一種解釋。如名色支中，色（rupa, 色）除去五根（panca-indriya, 五根）。于名（nama, 名）之中除去識（vijnana, 識）有什麼過錯？但有想（samjna, 想）、行（samskara, 行）也可以作為名。非假非雜。 論：由此識（vijnana, 識）等也說現行（vartamana-karana, 現在的行為）。西明（Xi Ming Temple, 西明寺）最初說：相從假說。十二有支（dvadasanga-bhavacakra, 十二有支）都通於種子、現行。說有支通於現行，卻談業行假說有支。由它熏成有種子的緣故。現在認為不是這樣。識等都有有支的現行。不就過去說。根據當生（bhavisyat-utpada, 未來生起）說。所以知道有支是就當起（bhavisyat-utpada, 未來生起）說。以五果種（panca-phala-bija, 五果的種子）潤為有支同行支的緣故。為什麼不根據當生卻談過去？如果說望生、老死（jara-marana, 老死）但識等五不通行（gamana, 執行）的緣故。卻談業行也只有行支沒有。
【English Translation】 English version Therefore, intentional karma is not a factor of action (karma-hetu). That which arises correctly later is the karma arising from intentional thought. Therefore, it is a factor of action. Question: Since meritorious action (punya-karma) and non-wavering action (aninjya-karma) do not occur simultaneously with ignorance (moha), why does the Abhidharmasamuccaya say that ignorance is a cause and condition for action? Answer: It is based on the karmic habit (karma-vasana) arising simultaneously with ignorance. Because it arises simultaneously with ignorance, it is provisionally called ignorance. In reality, it is the seed (bija) of action (karma). Answer: There is no contradiction here either. Saying that what arises simultaneously with ignorance is called karmic habit is speaking of the result in the cause. The present thought (vartamana-citta) that is about to arise is the factor of action. Moreover, it is based on unwholesome (akusala) actions, not meritorious or non-wavering actions. Question: When unwholesome actions and the correct view (samyag-drsti) of non-merit arise, with what afflictions (klesha) does the correct action arise? If it arises simultaneously with afflictions of view (drsti-klesha), it should arise repeatedly. If it arises simultaneously with afflictions of cultivation (bhavana-klesha), it is naturally not intense (tivra). Answer: Neither is a fault. Even if it arises simultaneously with afflictions of view, it does not arise repeatedly. Because one is currently creating action (karma-karana), the rest arise later. If it arises simultaneously with afflictions of cultivation, it is guided by afflictions of view and arises simultaneously with shamelessness (ahrikya) and so on, thus becoming unwholesome. Question: The body (kaya) of the name and form factor (nama-rupa-anga) is used to encompass the six consciousnesses (sad-vijnana). Within the body of the six sense bases factor (sad-ayatana-anga), what is used as mind (manas)? Answer: The original commentary (mula-tika) explains that if there is a ripening (vipaka) existing in the past (atita-adhvan), it is said to be mind. This is speaking of one mind. Distinguishing between the two times (dve-adhvan) means that they are different in meaning. If that is the case, one should assume views (drsti), wisdom (prajna), and so on. The explanation says: What fault is there in allowing assumptions? There is a contradiction with the following fault. The following gate of truth and falsehood (satya-asatya-mukha) says that name and form and the six sense bases are all real. The explanation says: It is based on the majority. For example, in the action factor, form (rupa) is also provisionally spoken of. In the gate of truth and falsehood, it is also said to be real. Now, I will assist with one explanation. For example, in the name and form factor, form (rupa) excludes the five roots (panca-indriya). Within name (nama), what fault is there in excluding consciousness (vijnana)? But having thought (samjna) and action (samskara) can also be name. It is neither provisional nor mixed. Treatise: Therefore, consciousness (vijnana) and so on are also said to be present actions (vartamana-karana). Xi Ming Temple initially said: Speaking provisionally according to appearance. The twelve factors of existence (dvadasanga-bhavacakra) all connect to seeds and present actions. Saying that the factors of existence connect to present actions is speaking of the action of karma and provisionally calling it a factor of existence. Because it is perfumed by it, it has seeds. Now, I say that this is not the case. Consciousness and so on all have the present action of the factors of existence. It is not spoken of in terms of the past. It is spoken of in terms of what will arise (bhavisyat-utpada). Therefore, it is known that the factors of existence are spoken of in terms of what will arise. Because the five fruit seeds (panca-phala-bija) are moistened as factors of existence together with the action factor. Why not speak of the past based on what will arise? If it is said that birth and old age and death (jara-marana) are only the five of consciousness and so on that do not travel (gamana). Speaking of the action of karma is also only the action factor without.
五果現。又此論云。故望當生現起假說于理為勝。故十地經論云。十二支皆有子時．果時。子謂種位。果即現行。緣起經及此論皆悉同故。
論。復由此說生引同時等者。有其四釋。一云生引等支。未潤之時不與生支俱。若潤已后但名有支。故名不俱。此解但潤．未潤不俱。不解得生．引同時 第二云。雖云潤．未潤時不俱。正潤之時生．引得俱。此解雖似順文未契復由此說。復由此說者。即指前詞。依當現起。亦違十地經說子．果俱時 第三云。于現生．老二支位中。有當來識等五果種。為當來所引支。與現生．老同時而有。此生．老支是過去愛．取之所生。故名生．引同時。此上諸解皆為不正 第四云。潤．未潤時必是不俱。被潤已去正生現時果因同時。即此生．老望愛．取．有是所生。即此生．老位識等種子。望前無明．行支是彼所引。未潤之時必不得俱。愛潤已去即得為俱。名生．引同時。此同本疏。西明釋同第三。不順經論。此論云。依當現起說有前後。由斯識等亦說現行。因時定無現行義。故復由此說生．引同時。既云復由此說。即由前說現起次第。據此一重亦未能解兩重緣起。又緣起經云。若引若生。為一時起。為次第起。世尊告曰。一時而起次第宣說若一時起。何因緣故。先說其引。后說其生
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『五果現』（五種結果顯現）。此外，此論（指《瑜伽師地論》）說：『所以說，依望當來生起現行假說，在道理上更為殊勝。』所以《十地經論》說：『十二緣起支都有子時（種子位）和果時（結果位）。子是指種子位，果是指現行。』《緣起經》及此論都完全相同。
論：又由此說『生』（生支）和『引』（引支）是同時等，有四種解釋。第一種解釋說，『生』和『引』等支，在未被煩惱潤澤的時候，不與『生』支同時存在。如果被潤澤之後，就僅僅稱為『有支』，所以說不俱。這種解釋只解釋了潤澤和未潤澤時不俱，沒有解釋得到『生』和『引』是同時的。第二種解釋說，雖然說潤澤和未潤澤時不同時，但在正被潤澤的時候，『生』和『引』可以同時存在。這種解釋雖然看似順應文句，但並不符合『又由此說』。『又由此說』，就是指前面的詞，依當來現起。也違背了《十地經》所說的『子』和『果』是同時的。第三種解釋說，在現生的『生』支和『老』支的位中，有當來的識等五果的種子，作為當來所引的支，與現生的『生』和『老』同時存在。這個『生』和『老』支是過去愛、取所生的，所以稱為『生』和『引』同時。以上這些解釋都不正確。第四種解釋說，潤澤和未潤澤時必定不同時，被潤澤之後，正生現行果因同時。即這個『生』和『老』望向愛、取、有，是被它們所生的。即這個『生』和『老』位的識等種子，望向前面的無明、行支，是被它們所引的。未被潤澤的時候必定不能同時存在，愛潤澤之後就可以同時存在，名為『生』和『引』同時。這與本疏（指《瑜伽師地論疏》）相同。西明的解釋與第三種相同，不順應經論。此論說：『依當來現起說有前後，因此識等也說是現行。因時一定沒有現行的意義。』所以又由此說『生』和『引』同時。既然說『又由此說』，就是由前面所說的現起次第。根據這一重意思，也不能解釋兩重緣起。此外，《緣起經》說：『是引還是生，是一時生起，還是次第生起？』世尊說：『一時生起，次第宣說。』如果是一時生起，因為什麼緣故，先說引，后說生？
【English Translation】 English version: 'The five fruits manifest' (the manifestation of five results). Furthermore, this treatise (referring to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra) states: 'Therefore, it is more reasonable to hypothetically say that future arising manifests in the present.' Therefore, the Dasabhumika-sutra-sastra says: 'All twelve links of dependent origination have a seed time (seed position) and a fruit time (result position). The seed refers to the seed position, and the fruit refers to the present action.' The Pratityasamutpada Sutra and this treatise are completely in agreement.
Treatise: Furthermore, regarding the statement that 'birth' (jati, the link of birth) and 'leading' (akarshana, the link of leading) are simultaneous, there are four explanations. The first explanation says that the links of 'birth' and 'leading,' etc., do not occur simultaneously with the 'birth' link when they are not moistened by afflictions. If they are moistened, they are merely called 'bhava' (becoming, the link of becoming), so they are said to be non-simultaneous. This explanation only explains that they are non-simultaneous when moistened and not moistened, but it does not explain that 'birth' and 'leading' are simultaneous. The second explanation says that although they are said to be non-simultaneous when moistened and not moistened, 'birth' and 'leading' can occur simultaneously when they are being moistened. Although this explanation seems to follow the text, it does not accord with 'Furthermore, regarding this statement.' 'Furthermore, regarding this statement' refers to the preceding words, based on future arising. It also contradicts the Dasabhumika Sutra's statement that the 'seed' and 'fruit' are simultaneous. The third explanation says that in the positions of the 'birth' and 'old age' (jara, the link of old age) links in the present life, there are seeds of the five fruits, such as vijnana (consciousness, the link of consciousness), which are the links led to the future, and they exist simultaneously with the 'birth' and 'old age' of the present life. These 'birth' and 'old age' links are born from past trsna (craving, the link of craving) and upadana (grasping, the link of grasping), so they are called 'birth' and 'leading' simultaneous. All of the above explanations are incorrect. The fourth explanation says that they are definitely non-simultaneous when moistened and not moistened, and after being moistened, the cause and effect of the present manifestation of birth are simultaneous. That is, these 'birth' and 'old age' links, in relation to trsna (craving), upadana (grasping), and bhava (becoming), are born from them. That is, the seeds of vijnana (consciousness), etc., in the position of these 'birth' and 'old age' links, in relation to the preceding avidya (ignorance, the link of ignorance) and samskara (volitional formations, the link of volitional formations) links, are led by them. They definitely cannot exist simultaneously when they are not moistened, and they can exist simultaneously after being moistened by trsna (craving), and they are called 'birth' and 'leading' simultaneous. This is the same as the commentary (referring to the Yogacarabhumi-sastra-tika). The interpretation of Ximing is the same as the third, which does not accord with the sutras and treatises. This treatise says: 'Based on future arising, it is said that there is a sequence, so it is also said that vijnana (consciousness), etc., are present actions. There is definitely no meaning of present action at the time of cause.' Therefore, it is said again that 'birth' and 'leading' are simultaneous. Since it says 'Furthermore, regarding this statement,' it is based on the sequence of present arising mentioned earlier. According to this one aspect, it cannot explain the two-fold dependent origination. Furthermore, the Pratityasamutpada Sutra says: 'Is it leading or birth, arising simultaneously or arising sequentially?' The World-Honored One said: 'Arising simultaneously, explained sequentially.' If they arise simultaneously, for what reason is leading explained first and birth explained later?
。世尊告曰。要由有引後有方生。非無引故 若據現生．老。即由生已方造來業引識等五 即是由有生已方始有引。何得云要有引後有方生非無引故。
論。復依迷外增上果愚等。問準此論文。由遇迷境起受生愛。準瑜伽第九云。又由第二境界所生受．果愚故。起緣境界受愛。愚緣受生。如何會釋 答有二解。一云由無明為先不了外境增上果故發起于受。受為緣生愛。非緣受起愚。而言境界所生受果愚者。由愚是彼境界果受之因故。論言由第二境界所生受果愚故起緣境界受愛。不言境界愚愛故前第四云。唯無明受為緣生愛。此非受支。一云由此第二境界所生受之迷增上果愚。意云此境界所生受。是迷外增上果愚之所生。即說此受由境及愚二力所生故。即由第二境界所生受因境所生。又取受字云受果愚。即因愚起舉果顯因。云第二境界所生受果愚。正說應云迷外增上果境界愚為緣起受。受彼外果方起愛．取故。前云受二種先業果。謂受內異熟果。及境界所生受增上果。此意云。境界所生受。受外增上果。不得說境是受之果。論云受二種先業果故。又九十三云。復由第二境界所生增上果愚。緣境界受發生貪愛。此即直明 西明二解。一云迷受生愚。此受是外境界增上果故。此論即云外增上果愚。故不相違。一云迷境
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：世尊（Bhagavan，佛陀的尊稱）告訴他們：『必須要有引發後有的因緣才能產生（後有），不是沒有引發的緣故。』如果根據現生和老死來說，就是因為有了生之後，才造作未來的業，引發識等五蘊。這就是因為有了生之後，才開始有引發。怎麼能說必須要有引發後有的因緣才能產生（後有），不是沒有引發的緣故呢？
論：又依據對迷惑的外界增上果的愚癡等等。問：按照這篇論文，由於遇到迷惑的境界而生起感受和愛。按照《瑜伽師地論》第九卷所說：『又由於第二種境界所生的感受和果報愚癡的緣故，生起緣于境界的愛。愚癡緣于感受而生。』應該如何解釋呢？答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，由於無明為先，不瞭解外境的增上果，所以發起感受。感受為緣而生愛。不是因為感受而生起愚癡。而說境界所生的感受果報愚癡，是因為愚癡是那個境界果報感受的原因。論文說由於第二種境界所生的感受果報愚癡的緣故，生起緣于境界的愛。沒有說境界愚癡和愛。所以前面第四卷說：『只有無明和感受為緣而生愛。』這不是感受支。一種說法是，由此第二種境界所生的感受，是對迷惑的外界增上果的愚癡。意思是說，這個境界所生的感受，是被迷惑的外界增上果的愚癡所生的。就是說這個感受是由境界和愚癡兩種力量所生的。就是由第二種境界所生的感受，是因境界所生的。又取感受的『受』字，說『受果愚』，就是因為愚癡而舉出果報來顯示原因。說『第二種境界所生的感受果報愚癡』，正確的說法應該是『迷惑的外界增上果境界愚癡為緣而生起感受』。感受那個外在的果報，才生起愛和取。前面說感受兩種先業的果報，就是感受內在的異熟果，以及境界所生的感受增上果。這裡的意思是說，境界所生的感受，感受外在的增上果。不能說境界是感受的果報。論文說感受兩種先業的果報。又第九十三卷說：『又由於第二種境界所生的增上果愚癡，緣于境界的感受而發生貪愛。』這直接說明了。西明的兩種解釋。一種說法是，迷惑感受而生愚癡。這個感受是外在境界的增上果。這篇論文就說是外在增上果愚癡。所以不相違背。一種說法是，迷惑境界
【English Translation】 English version: The Blessed One (Bhagavan, an honorific for the Buddha) said, 'It is necessary that there be a cause that leads to subsequent existence for it to arise; it is not without a cause.' If based on present life and old age and death, it is because after birth, one creates future karma, which leads to the five aggregates of consciousness (skandha). This is because only after birth does the leading begin. How can it be said that it is necessary that there be a cause that leads to subsequent existence for it to arise; it is not without a cause?
Treatise: Furthermore, based on delusion regarding external dominant result ignorance, etc. Question: According to this treatise, due to encountering deluded realms, feeling and craving arise. According to the ninth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, 'Furthermore, due to the feeling and result ignorance arising from the second realm, craving arises in relation to the realm. Ignorance arises in relation to feeling.' How should this be explained? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that due to ignorance being primary, not understanding the dominant result of the external realm, feeling arises. Feeling is the condition for the arising of craving. It is not that ignorance arises in relation to feeling. And saying that the feeling result ignorance arising from the realm is because ignorance is the cause of that realm's result feeling. The treatise says that due to the feeling result ignorance arising from the second realm, craving arises in relation to the realm. It does not say realm ignorance and craving. Therefore, the fourth fascicle earlier said, 'Only ignorance and feeling are the conditions for the arising of craving.' This is not a feeling branch. One explanation is that the feeling arising from this second realm is ignorance of the deluded external dominant result. The meaning is that the feeling arising from this realm is produced by the ignorance of the deluded external dominant result. That is to say, this feeling is produced by the power of both the realm and ignorance. That is, the feeling arising from the second realm is caused by the realm. Furthermore, taking the word 'feeling' (vedana) and saying 'feeling result ignorance' is to use the result to reveal the cause because of ignorance. Saying 'the feeling result ignorance arising from the second realm,' the correct way to say it should be 'ignorance of the deluded external dominant result realm is the condition for the arising of feeling.' Feeling that external result then gives rise to craving and grasping. Earlier it was said that feeling is the result of two kinds of past karma, namely, feeling the internal ripening result and the dominant result of feeling arising from the realm. The meaning here is that the feeling arising from the realm feels the external dominant result. It cannot be said that the realm is the result of feeling. The treatise says that feeling is the result of two kinds of past karma. Furthermore, the ninety-third fascicle says, 'Furthermore, due to the dominant result ignorance arising from the second realm, greed and craving arise in relation to the realm's feeling.' This directly explains it. The two explanations of Ximing. One explanation is that delusion arises from feeling. This feeling is the dominant result of the external realm. This treatise says that it is ignorance of the external dominant result. Therefore, they are not contradictory. One explanation is that delusion of the realm
界生愚故。此論云迷外增上果愚。然境界是受增上果。故瑜伽即云境界所生受果愚 要集云。后解為勝 今謂俱非。何者初釋云受是外境界增上果。若爾何故云受二種先業果。后釋云境界是受增上果故。亦違前文二先業果。又境界是受所緣緣。即應受為果。如何說所緣還以為果 問此云迷內異熟。通含世俗．勝義。未知迷何世俗勝義 一云迷第二俗 若爾緣事應非見惑 答見戒取等雖緣事生。何妨見惑 二云迷惡道苦為俗愚。迷人天苦為勝義。此釋為正。然俱諦攝。而雜集第七云。愚內異熟真實義。真實義即四聖諦者。然迷世俗得其總名。云內異熟。迷真實義者微細。故云真義。即四聖諦。據四聖諦亦攝內異熟。內異熟亦攝真實義。互舉總義。
論。如從中有至本有等。問從中有位即名生支。于中有中亦有許死。何非老死 西明云。是生方便。六識悶絕有第八識。故非老死 今釋有死非名老死支者。以是趣生方便攝故未名老死。
論。然如彼取定有種故者。問前愛增名取。愛．取俱種如何說增 答據昔現行熏種時說。
論。生惡趣者于現我境亦有愛故者。西明舊疏云。緣起約已生惡起說不起愛。觀佛三昧據將生說 準此會釋不合經文。文云依無希求。即約未生說無。不約已生。今準要集云。有兩釋
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為對境界的愚昧而產生愚癡。此論典說，這是對迷惑外在增上果的愚癡。然而，境界是領受的增上果。所以《瑜伽師地論》說，境界所產生的領受是果報愚。要集說，後面的解釋更好。我認為兩種說法都不對。為什麼呢？最初的解釋說，領受是外在境界的增上果。如果是這樣，為什麼又說領受有兩種先業果呢？後面的解釋說，境界是領受的增上果，這也違反了前面所說的兩種先業果。而且，境界是領受的所緣緣，那麼領受就應該是果。怎麼能說所緣反過來成為果呢？ 問：這裡說迷惑內在異熟，既包括世俗諦，也包括勝義諦。不知道迷惑的是哪種世俗諦和勝義諦？一種說法是迷惑第二種世俗諦。如果是這樣，緣事就不應該是見惑了。答：即使見戒取等是緣事而生，又有什麼妨礙它們是見惑呢？另一種說法是迷惑惡道之苦是世俗愚，迷惑人天之苦是勝義愚。這種解釋是正確的。然而，它們都屬於諦。而《雜集論》第七卷說，愚昧內在異熟的真實義，真實義就是四聖諦。然而，迷惑世俗諦得到的是總的名稱，叫做內在異熟。迷惑真實義則非常細微，所以叫做真義，也就是四聖諦。從四聖諦的角度來說，也包括了內在異熟。內在異熟也包括了真實義。這裡是互相舉出總的含義。 論：例如從中陰身到本有身等。問：從中陰身位就叫做生支。在中陰身中也有死亡。為什麼不是老死支？西明說，這是出生的方便。六識悶絕，還有第八識，所以不是老死。我的解釋是，有死亡，但不能稱為老死支，因為這是趣向出生的方便，所以還不能稱為老死。 論：然而，就像他們確定有種子一樣。問：前面的愛增長叫做取。愛和取都是種子，為什麼說是增長？答：這是根據過去現行熏習種子時說的。 論：生惡趣的人對於現在的我境也有愛，西明舊疏說，緣起是就已生惡趣說不起愛，觀佛三昧是就將要生說。按照這種方式來會通解釋不符合經文。經文說，依靠沒有希求，是就未生說的沒有，不是就已生說的。現在按照要集說，有兩種解釋。
【English Translation】 English version: Ignorance arises because of delusion regarding realms. This treatise states that it is ignorance of being deluded about the external conditioning result. However, realms are the conditioning result of reception. Therefore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that the reception produced by realms is the ignorance of result. The Yaoji says that the latter explanation is better. I say that both explanations are incorrect. Why? The initial explanation says that reception is the conditioning result of external realms. If that is the case, why is it said that reception has two kinds of prior karma results? The latter explanation says that realms are the conditioning result of reception, which also contradicts the previous statement of two prior karma results. Moreover, realms are the object-condition (alambana-pratyaya) of reception, so reception should be the result. How can it be said that the object-condition becomes the result? Question: This says that delusion about internal vipaka (異熟, ripening), includes both conventional truth (samvriti-satya) and ultimate truth (paramartha-satya). I don't know which conventional truth and ultimate truth are being deluded about. One explanation is that it is delusion about the second conventional truth. If that is the case, then object-related matters should not be afflictions of view (drsti-klesha). Answer: Even if views such as attachment to views and precepts arise from object-related matters, what prevents them from being afflictions of view? Another explanation is that delusion about the suffering of evil destinies is conventional ignorance, and delusion about the suffering of humans and gods is ultimate ignorance. This explanation is correct. However, they are both included in the Truths (satya). Furthermore, the seventh volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that the true meaning of ignorance about internal vipaka is the Four Noble Truths (catur-arya-satya). However, delusion about conventional truth obtains the general name of internal vipaka. Delusion about ultimate truth is very subtle, so it is called true meaning, which is the Four Noble Truths. From the perspective of the Four Noble Truths, it also includes internal vipaka. Internal vipaka also includes ultimate truth. Here, they are mutually citing the general meaning. Treatise: For example, from the intermediate existence (antarabhava) to the basic existence (bhava) etc. Question: The intermediate existence is called the limb of birth (jati-anga). There is also death in the intermediate existence. Why is it not the limb of old age and death (jara-marana-anga)? Ximing says that it is a means of birth. The six consciousnesses are in a state of faintness, and there is still the eighth consciousness, so it is not old age and death. My explanation is that there is death, but it cannot be called the limb of old age and death, because it is included in the means of approaching birth, so it cannot yet be called old age and death. Treatise: However, just as they determine that there is a seed. Question: The increase of previous craving is called grasping (upadana). Both craving (trsna) and grasping are seeds, so why is it said to be an increase? Answer: This is based on when the past active karma (karma) perfumed the seed. Treatise: Those who are born in evil destinies also have craving for their present realm. The old commentary of Ximing says that dependent origination (pratitya-samutpada) speaks of not arising craving in those who are already born in evil destinies, while the Visualization Samadhi Sutra of the Buddha speaks of those who are about to be born. To reconcile these explanations in this way does not accord with the sutra text. The text says that it relies on no desire, which speaks of no desire in those who are not yet born, not in those who are already born. Now, according to the Yaoji, there are two explanations.
。初釋同本疏 后釋云。此約欲界終生惡趣者說。若上界命終生惡趣者。若起欲界愛有上緣失。若上界愛非自地緣故。二云生惡趣已於自真我實有愛生。即以此理證愛遍有。非此潤生。雖有二釋后釋為正 今謂前釋許愛上緣。亦無有失。如前第六云。求上地生味上定故。許愛上緣。設云潤生不得上緣者。約不別緣。總緣何失。若云生已方始起愛。違前第三。於五取蘊非愛著處。謂生惡處念我何時當舍此命此苦身心。如何起愛。據實生已亦許起愛。非必愛彼故。前五．六俱引大論云不遍一切識身者。意地一切根相應。然爭潤生彼非所爭 西明又問。若爾論中二說皆無惡趣潤愛。應唯種潤。解云由業力故於寒熱等處可愛相生。如觀佛三昧經說 今問此說于欲可爾。上界生下起愛。如何非於上界有寒熱等相。故由此既顯潤生起愛引生惡趣。于現我境。明是欲生。非生彼已方始起愛。故前釋勝。
論如下無明發上地行者。問緣起經云。何不說愛．取與行為緣。世尊告曰。愛．取二種自界所行。乃至愛．取與彼色．無色界諸不動行。為等起緣不應道理。非境界故 準此愛取唯自界緣。上非境界。如何第六云求上地生味上定故愛亦緣上 答經據多分未得定者。論約得定少分上緣。故不相違 又復經意雖愛．取緣。要因無明不
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 初釋與《同本疏》相同。後來的解釋說，這是針對欲界眾生最終墮入惡趣的情況。如果上界眾生死後墮入惡趣，如果生起對欲界的愛，就會有上緣的喪失。如果對上界的愛不是以自身為緣故。第二種說法是，已經墮入惡趣后，對真實的自我產生了愛，就以此理來證明愛是普遍存在的。但這不是潤生的原因。雖然有兩種解釋，但后一種解釋是正確的。現在我認為，前一種解釋允許愛有上緣，也沒有什麼損失。就像前面第六卷所說，爲了求生上地，貪戀上界的禪定，所以允許愛緣于上界。假設說潤生不能有上緣，那只是說不特別緣，總的來說緣又有什麼損失呢？如果說生了以後才開始生起愛，就違反了前面第三卷所說的，對於五取蘊沒有愛著的地方。意思是說，在惡處想著我什麼時候才能捨棄這個性命，這個痛苦的身心，怎麼會生起愛呢？實際上，生了以後也允許生起愛，但不一定是愛那個地方。所以前面第五、六卷都引用《大論》說不遍一切識身，意思是說，意地的一切根相應。然而，爭論潤生的問題，那不是我們所爭論的。西明又問，如果這樣，論中兩種說法都沒有惡趣的潤愛，應該只有種潤。解釋說，由於業力的緣故，在寒冷或炎熱的地方，可愛的相貌會生起，就像《觀佛三昧經》所說的那樣。現在我問，這種說法在欲界還可以，上界生到地獄生起愛，怎麼說上界沒有寒冷或炎熱等相呢？所以由此既顯示了潤生起愛，引導眾生墮入惡趣，對於現在的我境，明顯是欲界眾生。不是生到那裡以後才開始生起愛。所以前一種解釋更好。
論中說，如果沒有無明，就不會有發起上地之行的行為。問：為什麼《緣起經》中沒有說愛、取與行為緣呢？世尊說：愛、取兩種是在各自的界內活動，乃至愛、取與彼色、無色諸不動行為等起緣是不應道理的，因為不是境界。按照這個說法，愛取只能緣于自己的界，上界不是境界。為什麼第六卷說，爲了求生上地，貪戀上界的禪定，所以愛也緣于上界呢？回答說，經是根據大部分沒有得到禪定的人來說的，論是根據得到禪定的少部分人可以緣于上界來說的，所以不相違背。而且，經的意思是，即使愛、取緣，也要因為無明。
【English Translation】 English version: The initial explanation is the same as the 'Commentary on the Same Text'. The later explanation says that this refers to the situation where beings in the desire realm ultimately fall into evil destinies. If beings in the upper realms die and are reborn in evil destinies, if love for the desire realm arises, there will be a loss of the upper condition. If love for the upper realms is not conditioned by itself. The second explanation is that after falling into evil destinies, love arises for the true self, and this reason is used to prove that love is pervasive. But this is not the cause of 'run sheng' (潤生, lit. moistening rebirth). Although there are two explanations, the latter is correct. Now I think that the former explanation allows love to have an upper condition, and there is no loss. Just like what was said in the sixth volume earlier, in order to seek rebirth in the upper realms, craving for the samadhi of the upper realms, so it is allowed that love is conditioned by the upper realms. Suppose it is said that 'run sheng' cannot have an upper condition, that is just to say that it is not particularly conditioned, what loss is there in generally conditioning? If it is said that love only arises after being born, it violates what was said in the third volume earlier, that there is no attachment to the five aggregates. It means that in evil places, thinking about when I can abandon this life, this painful body and mind, how can love arise? In fact, it is also allowed to arise after being born, but it is not necessarily loving that place. So the fifth and sixth volumes earlier both quoted the Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra (大論, Great Treatise) saying that it does not pervade all consciousness bodies, meaning that all the roots of the mind realm are corresponding. However, arguing about the issue of 'run sheng', that is not what we are arguing about.
Ximing (西明, a Buddhist monk) further asked, if so, neither of the two explanations in the treatise has the 'run ai' (潤愛, moistening love) of evil destinies, it should only be 'zhong run' (種潤, seed moistening). The explanation is that due to the power of karma, in cold or hot places, lovable appearances will arise, just like what the Visualization of Buddha Samadhi Sutra (觀佛三昧經) says. Now I ask, this statement is okay in the desire realm, but how can it be said that there are no cold or hot appearances in the upper realms when beings are born from the upper realms to the lower realms? Therefore, this shows that 'run sheng' arises love, guiding beings to fall into evil destinies, for the present realm of myself, it is clearly beings in the desire realm. It is not that love only arises after being born there. So the former explanation is better.
The treatise says that if there is no ignorance (無明, avidyā), there will be no actions that initiate the practice of the upper realms. Question: Why doesn't the Pratītyasamutpāda Sūtra (緣起經, Sūtra on Dependent Origination) say that love (愛, tṛṣṇā), grasping (取, upādāna), and action (行, saṃskāra) are the conditions? The World Honored One said: The two kinds of love and grasping are active within their own realms, and even love and grasping and those form (色, rūpa), formless (無色, arūpa) and immovable actions (不動行, āneñja saṃskāra) as the arising conditions are unreasonable, because they are not the object. According to this statement, love and grasping can only be conditioned by their own realms, and the upper realms are not the object. Why does the sixth volume say that in order to seek rebirth in the upper realms, craving for the samadhi of the upper realms, so love is also conditioned by the upper realms? The answer is that the sutra is based on most people who have not attained samadhi, and the treatise is based on the few people who have attained samadhi who can be conditioned by the upper realms, so they do not contradict each other. Moreover, the meaning of the sutra is that even if love and grasping are conditioned, it is because of ignorance.
了彼苦方起愛．取。故無明發非愛．取發。雖作意時如理相應不起無明。由有彼種隨眠力故。令此不了上界為苦造不動等。故無明發。如二乘者有漏善心不了于境。說由無明習氣力故。此亦如是 問既有上地無明等種不許發行。明內法異生不放逸者。造福．不動用隨眠發亦非行支。同彼種故 答不例。如近分定初剎那思。是上地行。初起之時不由上心不了方起。故由下地無明所發。若在欲界為求善果起造福業。即由不了為苦方求。既與如理作意相應。明非現愚能發行支。若近分定相應之思。不感根本總報果者。可近分心為求上生。修根本定由彼種發。既下論云。即苦．粗等六種行相。有求上生而起彼故。故近分定說為行支。明由下發 問行支是思。如何下云上地行支能伏下地。即苦．粗等六種行相。六種行相是惠行故 答惠俱之思亦名行相。為行何失。
論。此十二支十因二果等。準瑜伽第九分為三際。謂初中后。由待前七有愛．取．有。由待此三有現生．老死。此雖二世。據后報業造．潤．得果三世時別分初中后。克實還過去十支因。有現二支果。謂生．老死。以今生老。望后更起無明．行等。即名中際。以待生等起無明等故名后際。即是兩重。非同有部。
論。九實三假等。據何名假 答本釋云。顯
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：當了知苦諦時，才會生起愛和取（tanha, upadana）的執著。因此，無明（avijja）的生起不是因為愛和取的生起。即使在如理作意時，也不會生起無明，因為有無明隨眠（anusaya）的力量，導致不了知上界為苦，從而造作不動業等。所以說無明會生起。例如，二乘人（聲聞和緣覺）的有漏善心不了知于境界，這是由於無明習氣力的緣故，這裡的情況也是如此。問：既然有上地無明等的種子，但不允許它發動，那麼對於明內法（指對佛教教義有清晰理解）的異生（凡夫），不放逸者，造福業和不動業的隨眠發動，也不是行支（sankhara，行蘊），因為它與上地無明等種子相同。答：不能這樣類比。例如，近分定（upacara-samadhi，欲界定和色界定之間的禪定狀態）初剎那的思（cetanā，意志），是上地的行。初起之時，不是由於上地的心不了知才生起，而是由下地的無明所發動。如果在欲界爲了求善果而發起造福業，就是由於不了知為苦才去追求。既然與如理作意相應，就表明不是現行的愚癡能夠發動行支。如果近分定相應的思，不感得根本定的總報果，那麼近分心爲了求上生，修根本定是由上地無明等種子所發動。既然下文說，即苦、粗等六種行相，有求上生而生起它們的緣故，所以近分定說是行支，表明是由下地無明所發動。問：行支是思，為什麼下文說上地行支能夠調伏下地，即苦、粗等六種行相。六種行相是慧（prajna）的作用。答：與慧相應的思也稱為行相，作為行支有什麼過失？ 論：這十二支（十二因緣）分為十因二果等，按照《瑜伽師地論》第九分的說法，可以分為三際，即初際、中際和后際。由於等待前七支，才有愛、取、有。由於等待這三支，才有現生和老死。這雖然是兩世，但根據后報業的造作、滋潤和得果，可以分為三世，從而區分初際、中際和后際。實際上，過去有十支因，現在有生和老死這兩支果。因為今生的老死，展望未來會再次生起無明、行等，這就叫做中際。因為等待生等而生起無明等，所以叫做后際。這就是兩重因果關係，不同於有部（Sarvastivada）。 論：九實三假等，是根據什麼稱為假？答：本釋說，是爲了顯明。
【English Translation】 English version: When one understands suffering, craving (tanha) and grasping (upadana) arise. Therefore, ignorance (avijja) does not arise because of craving and grasping. Even when engaging in appropriate attention, ignorance does not arise because of the power of latent ignorance (anusaya), which causes one to not understand the upper realms as suffering, thus creating unwavering karma, etc. Therefore, ignorance arises. For example, the defiled wholesome mind of the Two Vehicles (Sravakas and Pratyekabuddhas) does not understand the object, which is due to the force of the habitual tendencies of ignorance; the situation here is similar. Question: Since there are seeds of ignorance, etc., from the upper realms, but they are not allowed to manifest, then for an ordinary being (prthagjana) who understands the inner Dharma (Buddhist teachings) and is diligent, the latent tendencies of creating meritorious karma and unwavering karma are also not a factor of formation (sankhara), because it is the same as the seeds of ignorance, etc., from the upper realms. Answer: It cannot be compared in this way. For example, the thought (cetanā) in the initial moment of the access concentration (upacara-samadhi, the state of meditation between desire realm concentration and form realm concentration) is a formation of the upper realms. When it initially arises, it does not arise because the mind of the upper realms does not understand, but rather it is activated by the ignorance of the lower realms. If, in the desire realm, one initiates the creation of meritorious karma in order to seek wholesome results, it is because one does not understand suffering that one seeks it. Since it is in accordance with appropriate attention, it indicates that it is not manifest ignorance that can activate the factor of formation. If the thought associated with access concentration does not result in the overall retribution of fundamental concentration, then the access concentration mind, in order to seek rebirth in the upper realms, cultivates fundamental concentration, which is activated by the seeds of ignorance, etc., from the upper realms. Since the text below says that the six aspects of suffering, coarseness, etc., arise because one seeks rebirth in the upper realms, therefore access concentration is said to be a factor of formation, indicating that it is activated by the ignorance of the lower realms. Question: The factor of formation is thought, so why does the text below say that the factor of formation of the upper realms can subdue the lower realms, namely the six aspects of suffering, coarseness, etc.? The six aspects are the function of wisdom (prajna). Answer: Thought associated with wisdom is also called an aspect; what fault is there in it being a factor of formation? Treatise: These twelve links (of dependent origination) are divided into ten causes and two effects, etc. According to the ninth section of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, they can be divided into three periods: the initial, middle, and final. Due to waiting for the previous seven links, there are craving, grasping, and becoming. Due to waiting for these three links, there are present life and old age and death. Although this is two lifetimes, according to the creation, nourishment, and attainment of results of subsequent karma, it can be divided into three lifetimes, thus distinguishing the initial, middle, and final periods. In reality, there are ten causal links in the past, and two resultant links in the present: birth, old age, and death. Because the old age and death of this life, looking forward to the future, will again give rise to ignorance, formation, etc., this is called the middle period. Because waiting for birth, etc., gives rise to ignorance, etc., this is called the final period. This is a double causal relationship, different from the Sarvastivada. Treatise: The nine real and three provisional, etc., according to what are they called provisional? Answer: The original commentary says it is to clarify.
生．異．滅三相位別名生．老．死。體即識等。故有．生．老死三是假也。此自無體。攬他為故。不約多法名之無假。名色．六處亦多法故。亦不克性辨其假實。行支非一。通假身語名為行故。不可云思有三非一非約色聲。亦應無明．觸．受及愛俱非一事。各有多故。雖六觸．受及四愛等。不名多事。故色．聲．思多事是行。故知有支無其自體。即已潤六支。生．老死支即前識等三相位。別更無異體。故名為假 西明三釋。一云識等多法立三依來生等。一云識等五法隨名出體。在不相應。一云合前二說。故名為假 今謂不爾。若多法立說有名假。名色等同。若依來生。論不應言三相位別。生．異．滅相非未來故。生．老支非不相應故 又言或可。體不異故說為假。此同本釋。故可為正 要集雖更多雲。自為問答愛．取相例。還云愛．取體用俱別。行等用別體同。準此既云用別體同名之為有故是假者。此即前因。何勞別說。
論。雜修靜慮資下故業等者。準俱舍論。初后各一剎那無漏。中間剎那起有漏定。第四靜慮三心成滿。次漸修下三禪各三。大乘少別。且談雜修總有五種。一純有漏定熏修。謂生四靜慮。除五凈居。二純無漏定熏修。八地已去受變易生。有漏定盡故。三漏無漏雜修。即為定得自在故。及受等至
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：生的、異的、滅的三種相位，別名是生、老、死。它們的本體就是識等等。所以，有、生、老、死這三者都是假有的。這些本身沒有實體，是依仗其他事物而存在。如果不依據多種法而稱之為假有，那麼名色（nāmarūpa，name and form）、六處（ṣaḍāyatana，six sense bases）也是多種法，所以也是假有。不能通過辨別其自性來區分其真假。行支（saṃskāra，volitional activities）不是單一的，它通過假借身語來命名為行，所以不能說思（cetanā，intention）有三種，不是單一的，不是關於色聲（rūpa-śabda，form and sound）。也應該說無明（avidyā，ignorance）、觸（sparśa，contact）、受（vedanā，feeling）以及愛（tṛṣṇā，craving）都不是單一的事物，因為它們各自包含多種因素。雖然六觸、受以及四愛等等，不被稱為多種事物。所以，色、聲、思多種事物是行。因此可知有支（bhavaṅga，the limb of existence）沒有其自體。即已經滋潤了六支。生、老、死支就是之前的識等等三種相位，沒有其他不同的本體，所以被稱為假有。西明（Ximing Temple）有三種解釋。第一種說法是識等多種法依據三依（tri-āśraya，three supports）而建立生等。第二種說法是識等五法（vijñāna etc. five dharmas）隨著名稱而顯現本體，存在於不相應（viprayukta，dissociated）之中。第三種說法是綜合前兩種說法，所以被稱為假有。我認為不是這樣。如果多種法建立，說有名假，那麼名色等也是如此。如果依據來生，那麼不應該說三種相位有區別，因為生、異、滅相不是未來。生、老支不是不相應。又說或許可以，因為本體沒有差異，所以說是假有。這與本來的解釋相同，所以可以認為是正確的。要集（Yaoji）雖然說了更多，說以愛、取（upādāna，grasping）為例進行問答，還說愛、取的本體和作用都不同，行等作用不同但本體相同。按照這個說法，既然說作用不同但本體相同，稱之為有，所以是假有，這與之前的理由相同，何必另外說明。 論：雜修靜慮（dhyāna，meditative absorption）資下故業等，依據俱舍論（Abhidharmakośa，Treasury of Metaphysics）的說法，最初和最後各有一個剎那（kṣaṇa，moment）是無漏（anāsrava，untainted），中間的剎那生起有漏定（sāsrava-samādhi，tainted concentration）。第四靜慮（caturtha-dhyāna，fourth dhyana）由三個心念構成圓滿。然後逐漸修習下三禪（lower three dhyanas），每個禪各三個心念。大乘（Mahāyāna，Great Vehicle）略有不同。且談雜修總共有五種。第一種是純粹的有漏定熏修，指的是生起四靜慮，除了五凈居天（pañca-śuddhāvāsa，five pure abodes）。第二種是純粹的無漏定熏修，八地（aṣṭamī-bhūmi，eighth ground）之後接受變易生（parināma-maraṇa，changeable birth），有漏定已經窮盡。第三種是漏無漏雜修，是爲了獲得定的自在，以及接受等至（samāpatti，attainment）。
【English Translation】 English version: The three phases of arising, change, and cessation are also known as birth, aging, and death. Their essence is consciousness and so on. Therefore, existence, birth, aging, and death are all provisional. These themselves have no substance, but rely on other things to exist. If we do not call something provisional based on multiple dharmas, then nāmarūpa (name and form), and ṣaḍāyatana (six sense bases) are also multiple dharmas, so they are also provisional. We cannot distinguish their truth or falsehood by discerning their nature. The saṃskāra (volitional activities) is not singular; it is named 'action' by borrowing from body and speech, so it cannot be said that cetanā (intention) has three aspects, is not singular, and is not about rūpa-śabda (form and sound). It should also be said that avidyā (ignorance), sparśa (contact), vedanā (feeling), and tṛṣṇā (craving) are not singular things, because they each contain multiple factors. Although the six contacts, feelings, and four cravings, etc., are not called multiple things. Therefore, form, sound, and intention, these multiple things, are saṃskāra. Therefore, it can be known that bhavaṅga (the limb of existence) has no self-nature. That is, it has already moistened the six limbs. The limbs of birth, aging, and death are the three phases of the previous consciousness and so on, and there is no other different substance, so they are called provisional. Ximing Temple has three explanations. The first explanation is that multiple dharmas such as consciousness are established based on the tri-āśraya (three supports) to produce birth and so on. The second explanation is that the five dharmas such as consciousness reveal their essence according to their names, existing in viprayukta (dissociation). The third explanation is a combination of the previous two explanations, so it is called provisional. I think this is not the case. If multiple dharmas are established and it is said to have a nominal existence, then nāmarūpa etc. are also like this. If it relies on future birth, then it should not be said that the three phases are different, because the phases of arising, change, and cessation are not in the future. The limbs of birth and aging are not dissociated. It is also said that perhaps it is possible, because the essence is not different, so it is said to be provisional. This is the same as the original explanation, so it can be considered correct. Yaoji, although it said more, said to use craving and grasping as examples for questions and answers, and also said that the essence and function of craving and grasping are different, while the function of saṃskāra etc. is different but the essence is the same. According to this statement, since it is said that the function is different but the essence is the same, and it is called existence, so it is provisional, this is the same as the previous reason, why bother to explain it separately? Treatise: 'Cultivating dhyāna (meditative absorption) with mixed practices supports lower past karma, etc.' According to the Abhidharmakośa (Treasury of Metaphysics), the first and last kṣaṇa (moment) each are anāsrava (untainted), and the intermediate kṣaṇa arises as sāsrava-samādhi (tainted concentration). The caturtha-dhyāna (fourth dhyana) is formed by three mind moments to become complete. Then gradually cultivate the lower three dhyanas, each dhyana with three mind moments. The Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle) is slightly different. Let's talk about mixed cultivation, which has five types in total. The first type is pure tainted concentration cultivation, which refers to the arising of the four dhyanas, except for the pañca-śuddhāvāsa (five pure abodes). The second type is pure untainted concentration cultivation, after the aṣṭamī-bhūmi (eighth ground) receiving parināma-maraṇa (changeable birth), the tainted concentration has been exhausted. The third type is mixed tainted and untainted cultivation, which is for obtaining freedom in concentration, and for receiving samāpatti (attainment).
自在果故。即現法樂住。並生凈居等。四有漏定散雜熏修。謂阿羅漢舍福．命行資命．福果。五無漏定散雜熏修。謂二乘及七地已前菩薩變易生死。此資故業生凈居者。第三所攝。然此雜修有漏為兩邊。無漏一剎那居中名修成漏。如五凈居業異生身造種在身中。任運但能感下天處。由起希愿熏修成滿。無漏定力改轉資昔感生業種。令勢殊勝生五凈居。故非有漏為中間也。其力劣故。又初剎那有漏為加行。伏除定障。次念無漏為無間道正除定障。后一念有漏為解脫道。故熏修滿。若以有漏為中。無漏為初後者。豈以無漏為加行。有漏為無間道耶。末後解脫為能資故。所資相順方能生果故。又此雜修初起。唯在人趣三洲。以修滅定初唯人故。或通六天。皆入見故。然不經生方雜修生。通利鈍根。鈍根有退生下靜慮重起方生。
論。又說全界一切煩惱等。問正無明支唯見道斷。助者通修。善惡趣同。何故說云往惡趣行唯分別起。豈善趣總業任運能發耶 答往惡趣總報業。正．助唯分別發。人天總報任運亦助。由此能發惡報行者說唯分別。故五十九。云若諸煩惱猛利現行。方能發起往惡趣業。非諸失念而現行者。又分別起能發此業。非任運起。若許修惑助發總報。此何所簡 若爾如何說全煩惱皆能發業 答約人天說。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 因為自在果的緣故，就能證得現法樂住，並且能往生到凈居天等。四、有漏的定、散、雜熏修，指的是阿羅漢捨棄福德和壽命，以及資助壽命和福果的行為。五、無漏的定、散、雜熏修，指的是二乘（聲聞、緣覺）以及七地之前的菩薩的變易生死。這裡說因為資助過去所造的業而生到凈居天，屬於第三種情況。然而，這種雜修，以有漏為兩邊，無漏的一剎那居於中間，稱為修成漏。例如，五凈居天的業所生的異生身，其所造的業種在身中，自然只能感得下層天的果報。由於發起希愿並加以熏修，使其圓滿，無漏定的力量改變並轉化了過去感生之業的種子，使其勢力殊勝，從而能生到五凈居天。所以，並非有漏居於中間。因為有漏的力量弱。而且，最初一剎那的有漏是加行位，用來伏除定障；其次一念的無漏是無間道，真正地斷除定障；最後一念的有漏是解脫道，所以熏修圓滿。如果以有漏為中間，無漏為初和后，難道是以無漏為加行，有漏為無間道嗎？最後的解脫道是爲了能資助的緣故，所資助的相互順應才能產生結果。而且，這種雜修最初發起，只在人趣的三洲，因為修滅盡定最初只有人才可以。或者也通於六慾天，因為都能進入見道。然而，不是經過轉生才能雜修而生，通於利根和鈍根。鈍根的人會有退失，生到下層靜慮天，重新發起才能生到凈居天。
論：又說全界一切煩惱等。問：正無明支唯見道斷，助者通修，善惡趣同。何故說云往惡趣行唯分別起，豈善趣總業任運能發耶？答：往惡趣的總報業，正和助都是由分別而發。人天總報任運也有幫助。因此，能引發惡報的行為才說是唯分別。所以第五十九說，如果各種煩惱猛利地現行，才能發起往惡趣的業，不是那些失念而現行的。而且，分別而起才能引發這種業，不是任運而起。如果允許修惑幫助引發總報，這又有什麼簡別的意義？如果這樣，為什麼說一切煩惱都能發業？答：這是就人天來說的。
【English Translation】 English version Because of the reward of 'self-mastery', one can attain 'present-life bliss abiding' and be reborn in the Pure Abodes (Śuddhāvāsa). Fourth, defiled (sāsrava) meditative concentration (dhyāna), scattered mind (vikṣepa), and mixed cultivation (sammisra-bhāvanā) refer to the Arhat's abandonment of merit (puṇya) and lifespan (āyu), as well as the actions that support life and the fruits of merit. Fifth, undefiled (anāsrava) meditative concentration, scattered mind, and mixed cultivation refer to the 'transformation and death' (vipariṇāma-maraṇa) of the Two Vehicles (śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha) and Bodhisattvas before the Seventh Ground (bhūmi). Here, it is said that rebirth in the Pure Abodes is due to supporting past karma, which belongs to the third category. However, in this mixed cultivation, the defiled is on both sides, and the undefiled moment (kṣaṇa) is in the middle, which is called 'cultivating and completing defilement'. For example, the 'different-born body' (pṛthag-jana-kāya) born from the karma of the Five Pure Abodes, the seeds of karma created in the body can only naturally result in rebirth in the lower heavens. Because of generating aspirations and cultivating them to fulfillment, the power of undefiled meditative concentration changes and transforms the seeds of past karma that lead to rebirth, making their power superior, thereby enabling rebirth in the Five Pure Abodes. Therefore, the defiled is not in the middle, because the power of the defiled is weak. Moreover, the first moment of the defiled is the preparatory action (prayoga-mārga), used to subdue and remove the obstacles to meditative concentration; the next moment of the undefiled is the 'path of immediate succession' (ānantarya-mārga), which truly removes the obstacles to meditative concentration; the last moment of the defiled is the 'path of liberation' (vimukti-mārga), so the cultivation is complete. If the defiled is in the middle, and the undefiled is at the beginning and end, is it that the undefiled is the preparatory action, and the defiled is the 'path of immediate succession'? The final path of liberation is for the sake of being able to support, and only when what is supported is in harmony can it produce results. Moreover, the initial arising of this mixed cultivation only occurs in the three continents (tri-dvīpa) of the human realm (manuṣya-gati), because only humans can initially cultivate the cessation attainment (nirodha-samāpatti). Or it can extend to the six desire heavens (ṣaṭ-kāma-deva), because all can enter the 'path of seeing' (darśana-mārga). However, it is not that one can be born and then engage in mixed cultivation; it is accessible to both sharp and dull faculties. Those with dull faculties may regress, be born in the lower dhyāna heavens, and then re-initiate cultivation to be born in the Pure Abodes.
Treatise: It is also said that all afflictions (kleśa) in the entire realm, etc. Question: The 'ignorance' (avidyā) limb (aṅga) is severed only by the 'path of seeing', while the auxiliary factors are cultivated universally, and the good and evil destinies are the same. Why is it said that the actions leading to evil destinies arise only from discrimination (parikalpita), and that the general karma of good destinies can arise naturally? Answer: The general retribution karma (samudācāra-karma) leading to evil destinies, both the primary and auxiliary factors, arise from discrimination. The general retribution of humans and gods is also aided by natural arising. Therefore, the actions that can trigger evil retribution are said to arise only from discrimination. So, the fifty-ninth verse says, 'If various afflictions manifest intensely, they can trigger the karma leading to evil destinies, not those that manifest through forgetfulness.' Moreover, arising from discrimination can trigger this karma, not arising naturally. If it is allowed that afflictions of cultivation (bhāvanā-klesa) help trigger the general retribution, what is the distinction here? If so, how is it said that all afflictions can trigger karma? Answer: This is in reference to humans and gods.
惡趣行但分別發。故說唯言。又正感惡趣別報業者。亦分別發。任運但能助發別業。故說唯言 若爾生惡趣已。豈不能造別報業耶。若不造者何故第三。云阿賴耶識隨先業轉。眼等六識隨現緣發。若云先造業感待現緣發。若爾即無順現受業。皆先造故。若云現受業唯人天造。惡趣不能斯有何失。若爾龍鬼不得供養初出慈定．見道等耶。若許得者。準此亦能正造感彼惡趣別報 此亦不然。此供養業所感善報。是人天果。非惡趣報 若爾于獄卒等起惡被損豈非別報 準此應知既有此理。取捨任情。
論。愛取二支正潤生者等。問雖知俱生而為正潤。四種愛．取正．助何是 答且四種愛並通二斷。如五十五。為約集諦說四行相治四種愛。即是見斷。出依常樂凈我而生故。又五十五云。愛云何。謂于自體親眤藏護後有愛云何。謂求當來自體差別。喜貪俱愛。謂于現前。或於已得可愛色等。起貪著愛。彼彼希樂。謂于所餘可樂色等起希求愛。六十七釋意亦大同。準此通修。四取之中。于欲境取及我語取俱通修斷。于見．戒取唯見道斷。然余處說四取見斷者。依一相說。據實亦通。故此論中二師俱許通修道斷。助正潤生準即可知 問取體是何 答八十七四取唯貪。彼云復有四取。謂于欲．見．戒禁．我語所有貪慾。瑜伽第十
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 惡趣之行唯有分別才能引發。所以說『唯言』。而且，真正感得惡趣差別果報的業，也是通過分別心引發的。任運而起的行為只能幫助引發差別業。所以說『唯言』。如果這樣，那麼已經生在惡趣之後，難道就不能造作其他果報的業了嗎？如果不能造作，那麼為何第三卷中說阿賴耶識隨著先前的業力運轉，眼等六識隨著現在的因緣而生起？如果說是先前造作的業感果，等待現在的因緣引發，那麼就沒有順現受業了，因為都是先前造作的。如果說現受業只有人天才能造作，惡趣不能，這又有什麼過失呢？如果這樣，龍、鬼等眾生就不能供養剛從慈定中出來、證得見道的聖者了嗎？如果允許他們可以供養，那麼按照這個道理，他們也能真正造作感得惡趣差別果報的業。這種說法也是不對的。這種供養業所感得的善報，是人天的果報，不是惡趣的果報。如果這樣，對於獄卒等眾生生起嗔恨而被損害，難道不是差別果報嗎？按照這個道理，應該知道既然有這個道理，取捨就隨自己的意願了。
論：愛和取這兩種支分，是真正滋潤生命之因的。問：雖然知道是俱生，但是作為真正滋潤生命之因，四種愛和四種取，哪個是正因，哪個是助因？答：四種愛都通於見斷和修斷。如第五十五卷所說，爲了針對集諦宣說四種行相，以對治四種愛，這四種愛就是見斷，因為它們是依于常、樂、凈、我而生起的。又第五十五卷說：『愛是什麼？是指對於自身的親近、愛戀、藏匿和保護。後有愛是什麼？是指尋求未來自身的差別。喜貪俱愛，是指對於現在或者已經得到的可愛色等，生起貪著之愛。彼彼希樂，是指對於其餘可愛的色等，生起希求之愛。』第六十七卷的解釋意思也大致相同。按照這個道理，四種愛也通於修斷。四取之中，對於欲境的取和我語取，都通於修斷。對於見取和戒取，只有見道才能斷除。然而其他地方說四取是見斷，是依據一種相來說的。實際上也通於修斷。所以這個論中，兩位論師都允許四取通於修道斷。助正潤生，按照這個道理就可以知道了。問：取的體性是什麼？答：第八十七卷說四取唯是貪。那裡說：『又有四取，是指對於欲、見、戒禁、我語所有的貪慾。』《瑜伽師地論》第十卷也有類似說法。
【English Translation】 English version Evil destinies are generated only through discrimination. Therefore, it is said 'only through'. Moreover, the karma that truly causes the distinct retribution of evil destinies is also generated through discrimination. Actions arising spontaneously can only assist in generating distinct karma. Therefore, it is said 'only through'. If that is the case, then after being born in an evil destiny, can one not create karma for other retributions? If one cannot, then why does the third volume say that the Alaya Consciousness turns according to previous karma, and the six consciousnesses, such as eye consciousness, arise according to present conditions? If it is said that the karma created previously causes the result, waiting for present conditions to arise, then there would be no immediately experienced karma, because all of it was created previously. If it is said that immediately experienced karma is created only by humans and gods, and not by those in evil destinies, what is the fault in this? If that is the case, then can dragons, ghosts, and other beings not make offerings to those who have just emerged from the Samadhi of Loving-kindness (慈定), and those who have attained the Path of Seeing (見道)? If it is allowed that they can make offerings, then according to this reasoning, they can also truly create karma that causes the distinct retribution of evil destinies. This statement is also incorrect. The good retribution caused by this offering karma is the result of humans and gods, not the retribution of evil destinies. If that is the case, then isn't being harmed by generating hatred towards prison guards and other beings a distinct retribution? According to this reasoning, it should be known that since there is this principle, taking and rejecting is according to one's own will.
Treatise: The two limbs of craving (愛) and grasping (取) are the true causes that moisten rebirth. Question: Although it is known that they are co-arisen, which of the four types of craving and grasping is the primary cause and which is the auxiliary cause for truly moistening rebirth? Answer: All four types of craving are common to both the afflictions to be abandoned by seeing the truth (見斷) and the afflictions to be abandoned by cultivating the path (修斷), as stated in the fifty-fifth volume. In order to explain the four aspects of the Truth of Suffering (集諦) and to counteract the four types of craving, these four types of craving are those to be abandoned by seeing the truth, because they arise based on the notions of permanence (常), pleasure (樂), purity (凈), and self (我). Also, the fifty-fifth volume says: 'What is craving? It refers to the closeness, fondness, concealment, and protection of oneself. What is craving for future existence (後有愛)? It refers to seeking future differences in oneself. Craving accompanied by joy and greed refers to the craving that arises with attachment to present or already obtained desirable forms, etc. The desire for this and that refers to the craving that arises with the desire for other desirable forms, etc.' The explanation in the sixty-seventh volume is largely the same in meaning. According to this reasoning, the four types of craving are also common to the afflictions to be abandoned by cultivating the path. Among the four types of grasping, grasping for objects of desire and grasping for self-assertion are both common to the afflictions to be abandoned by cultivating the path. Grasping for views and grasping for adherence to rules and rituals are only abandoned by seeing the truth. However, other places say that the four types of grasping are those to be abandoned by seeing the truth, which is based on one aspect. In reality, they are also common to the afflictions to be abandoned by cultivating the path. Therefore, in this treatise, both teachers allow that the four types of grasping are common to the afflictions to be abandoned by cultivating the path. The auxiliary cause for truly moistening rebirth can be known according to this reasoning. Question: What is the nature of grasping? Answer: The eighty-seventh volume says that the four types of grasping are only greed. It says there: 'There are also four types of grasping, which refer to the greed for desire, views, adherence to rules and rituals, and self-assertion.' The tenth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) also has a similar statement.
四取亦同。然九十三云。又取欲取。或取見．戒禁．我語取。取諸取已愛．取和合。潤前引因轉名為有。皆言取彼四所取。意取能取故皆即貪依八十九。通能所取皆是取支。故彼論云。若所取。若能取。若所為取。總說為取 問何所取 答欲．見．戒禁．我語是所取。
何為能取 四種貪慾 何所為取 答為得諸欲及為受用故起初取。為貪利養等增上力故起第二取。奢摩他為依為往離欲起第三取。為欲隨說分別所計作業受果士夫之相起我語取 此意由為欲得受用六塵境故。所以起貪乃至。為欲了知所計作業受果起我語取 問若所取境即所取收。若能緣愛即能取攝。何是所為 答前二別明。后一合說。或前所取且對於心。后所為取據由於彼有可樂相方起貪慾名為所為。此多分別。故彼論云。如是四取依二品取。謂在家品起初一。出家品起后三。故是分別。若是俱生何分二品 又此四取初唯在欲。余通三界。故瑜伽第十云。初唯能生欲界苦果。餘三通生三界苦果。即由此說證受外增上果為緣起愛能潤生者據欲界說。上二界中離境貪故 又解四愛舉境明者。亦且據欲界 若爾何愛潤上地生 答雖未見文。準計常我可通見．修。即後有愛及以獨愛潤三界生。或貪喜俱。彼彼希樂。雖舉六境。實通內身。依內身起。四皆通
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 四種『取』（指四取：欲取、見取、戒禁取、我語取）也是如此。然九十三卷中說，又有『取』是『欲取』，或者『取』是『見取』、『戒禁取』、『我語取』。『取』是對於已經取得的事物生起愛著，『取』是和合。潤澤前世，牽引因果，轉變名稱為『有』（bhava）。都說『取』是對於那四種所取之境而生。意思是『取』是能取，所以都依於八十九種貪。通於能取和所取，都屬於『取支』。所以那個論中說：『若是所取，若是能取，若是所為取，總的來說都叫做取。』 問：什麼是所取？ 答：欲（kāma）、見（dṛṣṭi）、戒禁（śīla-vrata）、我語（ātma-vāda）是所取。 什麼是能取？四種貪慾。 什麼是所為取？答：爲了獲得諸欲以及爲了受用，所以生起最初的『取』。爲了貪圖利養等增上力，所以生起第二種『取』。以奢摩他（śamatha，止）為依靠，爲了遠離慾望而生起第三種『取』。爲了想要隨順解說、分別所計度的作業受果的士夫之相，而生起『我語取』。這個意思是說，因為想要獲得受用六塵境，所以生起貪，乃至爲了想要了知所計度的作業受果，而生起『我語取』。 問：如果所取之境就是所取所包含的，如果能緣之愛就是能取所包含的，那麼什麼是所為取？ 答：前面兩種是分別說明，後面一種是合起來說。或者前面的所取只是對於心而言，後面的所為取是根據于那個事物有可樂之相，才生起貪慾，這叫做所為取。這裡有很多分別。所以那個論中說：『像這樣四種取，依靠兩種品類而生起，即在家品生起最初一種，出家品生起後面三種。』所以這是分別。如果是俱生，為什麼分為兩種品類？ 又，這四種取，最初只在欲界，其餘通於三界。所以瑜伽第十卷中說：『最初一種只能生起欲界的苦果，其餘三種通於生起三界的苦果。』就是由此說，證明受用外在增上果為緣而生起愛，能夠潤澤生命，這是根據欲界來說。上二界中，因為離開了對境的貪著。又解釋四愛，舉出六境來說明，也只是根據欲界。若是這樣，什麼愛潤澤上地之生？答：雖然沒有見到經文，但根據推測，常我（nitya-ātman）可以通於見、修。即後有愛（bhavāgra-tṛṣṇā）以及獨愛（ekatva-tṛṣṇā）潤澤三界之生。或者貪和喜一起，對於那個事物希求愛樂。雖然舉出六境，實際上通於內身，依靠內身而生起，四種取都通於。
English version: The four 『graspings』 (catasro grahaṇāḥ: desire-grasping, view-grasping, precept-and-vow-grasping, and self-assertion-grasping) are also the same. However, the ninety-third volume says, 『Again, 『grasping』 is 『desire-grasping』, or 『grasping』 is 『view-grasping』, 『precept-and-vow-grasping』, 『self-assertion-grasping』. 『Grasping』 is the arising of attachment to things already obtained, 『grasping』 is combination. Moistening the previous life, drawing in cause and effect, changing the name to 『existence』 (bhava). All say that 『grasping』 arises in relation to those four objects of grasping. The meaning is that 『grasping』 is the grasper, so all rely on the eighty-nine kinds of greed. Common to the grasper and the grasped, all belong to the 『grasping limb』. Therefore, that treatise says: 『If it is the grasped, if it is the grasper, if it is the grasping for the sake of something, all are generally called grasping.』 Question: What is grasped? Answer: Desire (kāma), view (dṛṣṭi), precepts and vows (śīla-vrata), and self-assertion (ātma-vāda) are grasped. What is the grasper? The four kinds of craving. What is grasping for the sake of something? Answer: In order to obtain desires and in order to enjoy them, the initial 『grasping』 arises. In order to crave for gain and support, the second kind of 『grasping』 arises. Relying on śamatha (tranquility), in order to be free from desire, the third kind of 『grasping』 arises. In order to want to follow the explanation and distinguish the appearance of the person who calculates the actions and receives the results, 『self-assertion-grasping』 arises. The meaning of this is that because one wants to obtain and enjoy the objects of the six senses, greed arises, and even in order to want to know the calculated actions and receiving of results, 『self-assertion-grasping』 arises. Question: If the object of grasping is what is included in grasping, if the love that can connect is what is included in the grasper, then what is grasping for the sake of something? Answer: The first two are explained separately, and the last one is explained together. Or the previous grasping is only in relation to the mind, and the later grasping for the sake of something is based on the fact that there is a pleasant aspect to that thing, and then greed arises, which is called grasping for the sake of something. There are many distinctions here. Therefore, that treatise says: 『Like this, the four graspings arise relying on two categories, namely, the householder category arises the first one, and the monastic category arises the last three.』 So this is a distinction. If it is co-arising, why divide it into two categories? Also, these four graspings are initially only in the desire realm, and the rest are common to the three realms. Therefore, the tenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 『The first one can only give rise to the suffering results of the desire realm, and the other three are common to giving rise to the suffering results of the three realms.』 That is why it is said that proving that receiving external increasing results as a condition gives rise to love, which can moisten life, is based on the desire realm. In the upper two realms, because they are free from attachment to objects. Also, explaining the four loves, giving the six objects to explain, is only based on the desire realm. If so, what love moistens the birth of the upper realms? Answer: Although I have not seen the scripture, according to speculation, the eternal self (nitya-ātman) can be common to view and practice. That is, the love of future existence (bhavāgra-tṛṣṇā) and the love of oneness (ekatva-tṛṣṇā) moisten the birth of the three realms. Or greed and joy are together, desiring and loving that thing. Although the six objects are mentioned, they are actually common to the inner body, arising relying on the inner body, and the four graspings are all common to.
【English Translation】 The four 『graspings』 (catasro grahaṇāḥ: desire-grasping, view-grasping, precept-and-vow-grasping, and self-assertion-grasping) are also the same. However, the ninety-third volume says, 『Again, 『grasping』 is 『desire-grasping』, or 『grasping』 is 『view-grasping』, 『precept-and-vow-grasping』, 『self-assertion-grasping』. 『Grasping』 is the arising of attachment to things already obtained, 『grasping』 is combination. Moistening the previous life, drawing in cause and effect, changing the name to 『existence』 (bhava). All say that 『grasping』 arises in relation to those four objects of grasping. The meaning is that 『grasping』 is the grasper, so all rely on the eighty-nine kinds of greed. Common to the grasper and the grasped, all belong to the 『grasping limb』. Therefore, that treatise says: 『If it is the grasped, if it is the grasper, if it is the grasping for the sake of something, all are generally called grasping.』 Question: What is grasped? Answer: Desire (kāma), view (dṛṣṭi), precepts and vows (śīla-vrata), and self-assertion (ātma-vāda) are grasped. What is the grasper? The four kinds of craving. What is grasping for the sake of something? Answer: In order to obtain desires and in order to enjoy them, the initial 『grasping』 arises. In order to crave for gain and support, the second kind of 『grasping』 arises. Relying on śamatha (tranquility), in order to be free from desire, the third kind of 『grasping』 arises. In order to want to follow the explanation and distinguish the appearance of the person who calculates the actions and receives the results, 『self-assertion-grasping』 arises. The meaning of this is that because one wants to obtain and enjoy the objects of the six senses, greed arises, and even in order to want to know the calculated actions and receiving of results, 『self-assertion-grasping』 arises. Question: If the object of grasping is what is included in grasping, if the love that can connect is what is included in the grasper, then what is grasping for the sake of something? Answer: The first two are explained separately, and the last one is explained together. Or the previous grasping is only in relation to the mind, and the later grasping for the sake of something is based on the fact that there is a pleasant aspect to that thing, and then greed arises, which is called grasping for the sake of something. There are many distinctions here. Therefore, that treatise says: 『Like this, the four graspings arise relying on two categories, namely, the householder category arises the first one, and the monastic category arises the last three.』 So this is a distinction. If it is co-arising, why divide it into two categories? Also, these four graspings are initially only in the desire realm, and the rest are common to the three realms. Therefore, the tenth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 『The first one can only give rise to the suffering results of the desire realm, and the other three are common to giving rise to the suffering results of the three realms.』 That is why it is said that proving that receiving external increasing results as a condition gives rise to love, which can moisten life, is based on the desire realm. In the upper two realms, because they are free from attachment to objects. Also, explaining the four loves, giving the six objects to explain, is only based on the desire realm. If so, what love moistens the birth of the upper realms? Answer: Although I have not seen the scripture, according to speculation, the eternal self (nitya-ātman) can be common to view and practice. That is, the love of future existence (bhavāgra-tṛṣṇā) and the love of oneness (ekatva-tṛṣṇā) moisten the birth of the three realms. Or greed and joy are together, desiring and loving that thing. Although the six objects are mentioned, they are actually common to the inner body, arising relying on the inner body, and the four graspings are all common to.
潤 問內法異生不希後有。于命終時所起煩惱是取支非 答亦是取支 若爾何故八十九云。我為諸取遍知永斷正論大師。故於此法誓修行者。雖帶煩惱身壞命終。而不于彼建立諸取。所以者何。彼于諸欲無所顧戀而出家故 答據分別起不障俱生。如內異生無不共故。雖起於行云不說無明為緣。非無餘愚。此不名取應知亦爾。不還唯種子潤。應不名愛．取。
論。十樂舍俱受不與受共相應故等者。問若約種位。現受與種。何非受俱。若約當起。識及名色。六識未起何有樂．舍 答疏云此生支位寬。故與樂．舍俱。謂從中有至本有中未衰變來皆生支故。約此生支位中識．名色等。非據剎那名識支位得與受俱。依十地論子．果時義。以其生支是前種果。以種從現說得相應。故無違也。
二種生死略以八門分別。一出體。二釋名。三辨相狀。四位次。五約處所。六與四種生死相攝。七會三生死不同。八問答辨 言出體者。二種生死正取異熟第八識為體。兼通余識異熟五蘊。且分段生取名言熏習識等五種而為親因。福．及非福．不動三業。為勝增上能招感緣。一切煩惱總能為發業潤生之緣。由依他緣而得生故。勝鬘經．無上依經．寶性論等。皆隱識等名言親種。但顯增上業名為因。發業潤生惑名之為緣。故勝鬘經云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：內法異生（指修行佛法但未證果的凡夫）不希望有來世。在臨命終時所產生的煩惱，是屬於取支（十二因緣之一，指對慾望的執取）嗎？答：也是屬於取支。問：如果這樣，為什麼《八十九》中說：『我為對諸取的遍知、永斷的正論大師。』因此對於此法發誓修行的人，即使帶著煩惱，身壞命終，也不對那些（煩惱）建立諸取。這是什麼原因呢？因為他們對於各種慾望沒有顧戀而出家。答：這是根據分別生起的煩惱，不障礙俱生（與生俱來）的煩惱。如同內異生沒有不共（不共通）的煩惱一樣。雖然生起於行（十二因緣之一，指造作），（經文）說沒有無明（十二因緣之一，指對真理的迷惑）為緣，並非沒有其餘的愚癡。這不稱為取，應該知道也是這樣。不還果（佛教修行果位之一）只有種子滋潤，應該不稱為愛（十二因緣之一，指貪愛）和取。 論：十樂舍（十種感受中的樂受和舍受）都一起領受，因為不與受（通常指苦受）共同相應等。問：如果從種子位來說，現受與種子，為什麼不是受俱（同時存在）？如果從當來生起來說，識（十二因緣之一，指意識）及名色（十二因緣之一，指精神和物質），六識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）未生起，哪裡有樂、舍？答：疏鈔說，此生支（十二因緣之一，指生命的開始）的位次寬泛，所以與樂、舍俱。意思是說，從中有（中陰身）到本有（出生后的生命體）中未衰變之前，都是生支的範圍。因此，約在這個生支的位次中，識、名色等，不是根據剎那（極短的時間）的名識支位，才能與受俱。依據《十地論》的子、果時的意義，因為生支是前種的果報，以種子從現行來說，才能相應，所以沒有違背。 二種生死（分段生死和變易生死）略以八個方面來分別：一、出體（指出二種生死的本體）；二、釋名（解釋二種生死的名稱）；三、辨相狀（辨別二種生死的相狀）；四、位次（說明二種生死的位次）；五、約處所（從處所方面說明二種生死）；六、與四種生死相攝（二種生死與四種生死的相互包含關係）；七、會三生死不同（會合三種生死的不同之處）；八、問答辨（通過問答來辨析）。說到出體，二種生死主要以異熟第八識（阿賴耶識，儲存業種的根本識）為本體，也包括其餘識的異熟五蘊（色、受、想、行、識五種構成要素）。而且分段生取名言熏習識等五種作為親因，福（善業）、及非福（惡業）、不動三業（禪定之業）作為殊勝的增上能招感之緣，一切煩惱總能作為發業潤生之緣。由於依靠他緣而得以產生，所以《勝鬘經》、《無上依經》、《寶性論》等，都隱藏了識等名言親種，只顯示增上業名為因，發業潤生惑名之為緣。所以《勝鬘經》說
【English Translation】 English version: Question: An 'inner dharma' ordinary being (referring to a common person who practices Buddhism but has not attained enlightenment) does not hope for a future existence. Are the afflictions that arise at the time of death considered a 'grasping' link (one of the twelve links of dependent origination, referring to the clinging to desires)? Answer: They are also considered a 'grasping' link. Question: If that's the case, why does the Eighty-Nine say: 'I am the master of correct discourse who has complete knowledge and permanent severance of all grasping.' Therefore, for those who vow to practice this dharma, even if they carry afflictions and their bodies break and lives end, they do not establish grasping on those (afflictions). What is the reason for this? It is because they have renounced home without any attachment to various desires. Answer: This is based on the afflictions that arise separately, which do not obstruct the co-arisen (innate) afflictions. Just like an 'inner' ordinary being has afflictions that are not uncommon (not universal). Although arising from 'action' (one of the twelve links of dependent origination, referring to volitional activity), (the scripture) says there is no 'ignorance' (one of the twelve links of dependent origination, referring to delusion about reality) as a condition, it does not mean there is no other ignorance. This should be understood as not being called 'grasping' either. A Non-Returner (one of the stages of enlightenment) only has the seeds moistened, and should not be called 'craving' (one of the twelve links of dependent origination, referring to thirst) and 'grasping'. Treatise: The ten pleasures and indifference (pleasurable and neutral feelings among the ten types of feelings) are all experienced together because they are not in accordance with suffering (usually referring to painful feelings), etc. Question: If we consider it from the seed stage, why aren't present feelings and seeds simultaneous? If we consider it from the perspective of future arising, where there is consciousness (one of the twelve links of dependent origination, referring to awareness) and name and form (one of the twelve links of dependent origination, referring to mind and matter), and the six consciousnesses (eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness) have not yet arisen, where do pleasure and indifference come from? Answer: The commentary says that the stage of this 'birth' link (one of the twelve links of dependent origination, referring to the beginning of life) is broad, so it is together with pleasure and indifference. It means that from the intermediate existence (bardo) to the existence after birth (the life after birth) before it declines, it is all within the scope of the 'birth' link. Therefore, regarding consciousness, name and form, etc., in this stage of the 'birth' link, it is not based on the momentary name and consciousness link that they can be together with feelings. According to the meaning of the child and fruit times in the Ten Stages Treatise, because the 'birth' link is the result of the previous seed, it can be in accordance with the seed from the present practice, so there is no contradiction. The two kinds of birth and death (birth and death by segments and birth and death by transformation) are briefly distinguished in eight aspects: 1. Identifying the substance (pointing out the substance of the two kinds of birth and death); 2. Explaining the names (explaining the names of the two kinds of birth and death); 3. Distinguishing the characteristics (distinguishing the characteristics of the two kinds of birth and death); 4. Stages (explaining the stages of the two kinds of birth and death); 5. Regarding the location (explaining the two kinds of birth and death from the perspective of location); 6. Inclusion with the four kinds of birth and death (the mutual inclusion relationship between the two kinds of birth and death and the four kinds of birth and death); 7. Combining the differences between the three kinds of birth and death (combining the differences between the three kinds of birth and death); 8. Questions and answers (analyzing through questions and answers). Speaking of identifying the substance, the two kinds of birth and death mainly take the differentiated result eighth consciousness (Alaya consciousness, the fundamental consciousness that stores the seeds of karma) as the substance, and also include the differentiated result five aggregates (form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness) of the remaining consciousnesses. Moreover, birth by segments takes the five kinds of name and speech habituation consciousness, etc., as the direct cause, and meritorious deeds (good karma), non-meritorious deeds (bad karma), and the three immovable karmas (karma of meditation) as the superior conditions that can attract and sense, and all afflictions can generally be the conditions for initiating karma and moistening birth. Because it is produced by relying on other conditions, the Sutra of Queen Srimala, the Sutra of Supreme Reliance, the Treatise on the Buddha Nature, etc., all hide the direct seeds of name and speech such as consciousness, and only show the superior karma as the cause, and the afflictions that initiate karma and moisten birth as the conditions. Therefore, the Sutra of Queen Srimala says
。如取為緣有漏業因而生三有 變易生死即前識等五果種子皆為親因。欲界福業並色不動。除無想天及五凈居。為近勝緣。依四靜慮緣事無漏后得非智相應定愿。而為遠勝緣。故此論云。由悲願力改轉身命 又云無漏定愿正所資感 又云無漏有分別業。有分別業即后得緣事智俱之思。思亦即愿。故不別說。由所知障執彼菩提有情為有起此悲願。亦為斷除留身久住。故所知障能為其緣。雖實變易用名言種而為親因。福．不動業為增上緣。若無無漏無勝堪能感變易生。由所知障方發悲愿。故起無漏資身故業。故此論云。無漏定愿資有漏業。今隱所資但舉能資及以能發勝劣兩緣。故勝鬘等云無漏業因。所知障緣。有意生身。既以識等名言種子為親因生。明變易生體是有漏。說是無漏界外生死者依勝緣說。或無漏人所受生死。或無煩惱漏所受生死。故名為無漏。非體無漏界外別生。非離三界有別有情。仁王般若云。三界外有別眾生是外道義。非諸佛教。此略出體 二釋名者。一分段。二變易。言分段者。分謂齊限。即謂命根。段謂差別。即五蘊體。舍此受余有差別故。此差別身命有齊限。即段之分名分段。命屬身故即依士釋 或此分段俱通身命。皆隨因緣有定齊限故名分段。亦分亦段名為分段。即持業釋 變易生死者。且依此
論略列三名 一不思議變易生死。釋名如論。亦通依士．持業二釋。以由無漏所資感故。所受變易妙用難測。非下劣境。變易即不思議。持業釋也。或無漏定愿妙用難測。名不思議。不思議之變易生死。即依士釋 二名意成身。身即屬果。意願是因。成通能所。即隨意所成之身。身屬因故依士釋也 三名變化。變謂改舊。化謂新起。變化即身。持業釋也。更有多名。如能顯中邊惠日論辨 三相狀等。並如樞要說。然分段死言屬三界。變易不言。以分段死隨業系地。即言三界。變易之業說是無漏。故不言地 要集說云。隨在二界者 不善論意 變易生死隱不說彼有漏業故。處所差別。略準可知 六與四種生死相攝者。無上依經云。有四種生死。一方便。二因緣。三有有。四無有生死。如分段生死有四種難。一煩惱難。二業難。三報難。四過失難。煩惱難謂無明．愛．取。業難行全及有少分。報難即識等五果．並生．老死。過失難謂生．異．滅．憂．悲．苦惱。以變易四如次譬彼。即所知障為方便。有分別業為因緣。不取無漏有分別業非過失故非失集故或印不同也。所得變易為有有。以其五蘊有生．異．滅等。為無有生死。既喻彼過失。即變易上生．異．滅等行苦攝故。更無餘果云無有生死。準此而言唸唸有四。不同古人
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於略述三種名稱：一、不思議變易生死（不可思議的變異和生死輪迴）。如論中所釋，此名既可作依士釋（取決於某種事物），也可作持業釋（描述事物本身）。因由無漏智慧所資助感應，所承受的變易妙用難以測度，並非下劣境界。變易即是不思議，這是持業釋。或者說，無漏定愿的妙用難以測度，名為不思議。不思議的變易生死，即是依士釋。二、名為意成身（由意念形成的身體）。身屬於果報，意願是因。『成』字兼具能動和所動之意，即隨心意所成就之身。因身體屬於因，故為依士釋。三、名為變化。『變』指改變舊有，『化』指新產生。變化即是身體，這是持業釋。還有更多名稱，如《能顯中邊惠日論》中所辨析的。三相狀等，都如《樞要》所說。然而，分段生死是指三界（欲界、色界、無色界），而變易生死則不特別指明，因為分段生死隨業力系縛于特定地域，即指三界。變易生死的業是無漏業，所以不特別指明地域。《要集》說：『隨在二界者』。《不善論》的觀點是，變易生死隱而不說有漏業的緣故，處所的差別，略微參照可知。六、與四種生死相攝的情況。《無上依經》說：『有四種生死，一、方便，二、因緣，三、有有，四、無有生死。』如分段生死有四種困難：一、煩惱難，二、業難，三、報難，四、過失難。煩惱難指無明（對事物真相的迷惑）、愛（貪愛）、取（執取）。業難指完全或部分的行為。報難即識等五果（五蘊的果報），以及生、老、死。過失難指生、異（變化）、滅（消亡）、憂、悲、苦惱。以變易生死的四種情況依次比喻分段生死的四種困難，即以所知障（對知識的障礙）為方便，以有分別業（帶有分別心的行為）為因緣。不取無漏的有分別業，因為它不是過失，也不是過失的集合，或者印證不同。所得的變易為有有，因為它的五蘊有生、異、滅等。以其為無有生死，既然比喻那些過失，即變易上的生、異、滅等屬於行苦所攝，更沒有其餘的果報可稱為無有生死。依此而言，唸唸都有四種（狀態），這與古人的觀點不同。
【English Translation】 English version On Briefly Listing Three Names: First, Inconceivable Transformation Birth and Death (Anitya-parinama-marana) (inconceivable transformation and cycle of birth and death). As explained in the treatise, this name can be interpreted as either dependent origination (依士釋) or descriptive (持業釋). Because it is supported and influenced by undefiled wisdom (無漏), the subtle functions of the transformations it undergoes are difficult to fathom and are not inferior realms. Transformation itself is inconceivable; this is the descriptive interpretation. Alternatively, the subtle functions of undefiled samadhi (無漏定) and vows are difficult to fathom, hence the name 'inconceivable.' The inconceivable transformation birth and death is the dependent origination interpretation. Second, it is called the 'Mind-Made Body' (意成身). The body belongs to the result, while intention and vows are the cause. 'Made' encompasses both the active and passive aspects, referring to a body that is accomplished according to one's intention. Because the body belongs to the cause, it is the dependent origination interpretation. Third, it is called 'Transformation' (變化). 'Transformation' (變) means changing the old, while 'creation' (化) means newly arising. Transformation is the body itself; this is the descriptive interpretation. There are many other names, as discussed in the Madhyantavibhaga-bhasya (《能顯中邊惠日論》). The three characteristics, etc., are as described in the Essential Instructions (《樞要》). However, 'segmented death' (分段死) refers to the Three Realms (欲界、色界、無色界), while 'transformation death' (變易死) does not specifically mention them, because segmented death is bound by karma to specific realms, which are the Three Realms. The karma of transformation death is said to be undefiled, so it does not specifically mention realms. The Essential Collection (《要集》) says: 'Those who are in the Two Realms...' The view of the Non-Virtue Treatise (《不善論》) is that transformation death implicitly does not mention defiled karma, so the differences in location can be understood by slight reference. Sixth, regarding how it is encompassed by the four types of birth and death, the Anuttarashraya Sutra (《無上依經》) says: 'There are four types of birth and death: first, expedient; second, causal conditions; third, existence of existence; fourth, non-existence of birth and death.' Like segmented birth and death, there are four difficulties: first, the difficulty of afflictions; second, the difficulty of karma; third, the difficulty of retribution; fourth, the difficulty of faults. The difficulty of afflictions refers to ignorance (無明), attachment (愛), and grasping (取). The difficulty of karma refers to complete or partial actions. The difficulty of retribution refers to the five fruits of consciousness, etc. (the results of the five aggregates), as well as birth, old age, and death. The difficulty of faults refers to birth, change (異), cessation (滅), sorrow, grief, suffering, and distress. The four aspects of transformation birth and death are used to illustrate the four difficulties of segmented birth and death in sequence, that is, using the obscuration of knowledge (所知障) as expedient, and conceptual karma (有分別業) as causal conditions. Undefiled conceptual karma is not taken because it is not a fault, nor is it a collection of faults, or the validation is different. The transformation obtained is 'existence of existence,' because its five aggregates have arising, change, cessation, etc. Because it is 'non-existence of birth and death,' since it is likened to those faults, the arising, change, cessation, etc., on transformation are encompassed by the suffering of conditioned existence (行苦), and there are no other results that can be called 'non-existence of birth and death.' According to this, moment by moment there are four (states), which is different from the views of the ancients.
方便生死在初三地。因緣生死四．五．六地。有有生死七．八．九地。無有生死在第十地。隋．唐攝論並悉無文。無上依經及寶性論亦不配地 西明釋云。無明支名方便。所發行支名為因緣。識等八支名為有有。生．老支名為無有 今謂少乖文。既無明喻分段死煩惱難者。即愛．取支亦煩惱攝。既以因緣喻于業難。即有支少分亦因緣攝。余略不論。準論．本疏及前第七等無間緣皆已廣辨。
論。謂無始來等。釋凈相續。以依本識第八無漏法爾種子以為其因。由其轉識數數熏發以為其緣。有凈第八現行相續。即乃至究竟已下釋成相續 問第七亦續。何不說耶 答非持種識故不說之。然此鏡智唯本有種為因。能生所生現識名為始起。能持種故亦名為種。故此論云轉得始起清凈種識。非謂種子。不可說言以新熏勝。由六．七熏成鏡智種。說此作佛云得始起清凈種識。以佛功德唯佛與佛乃能知之。菩薩不知。緣何熏成。亦不可說名言熏習。非彼境故。如欲界心雖變上界不熏彼種。是緣名境非緣事故。果得亦爾。故唯本有種子所生。如初無漏。由余熏發因滿方生。成事亦爾。
論。若無緣用等者。難安惠師。佛菩薩智亦非智品。無見分能緣用故。如虛空等。護法可爾。難陀如何。唯一見分更無別用故。安惠卻誥。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：方便生死存在於初地到第三地（菩薩修行位階）。因緣生死存在於第四、第五、第六地。有有生死存在於第七、第八、第九地。無有生死存在於第十地。隋朝、唐朝的《攝大乘論》及其相關注釋都沒有提到這些。而《無上依經》和《寶性論》也沒有將這些與菩薩的修行位階相對應。 西明寺的解釋是：『無明』這個支（十二因緣之一）可以被看作是『方便』。由『無明』所引發的行為可以被看作是『因緣』。『識』等八個支可以被看作是『有有』。『生』和『老』這兩個支可以被看作是『無有』。 現在我認為這種解釋稍微有些偏離原文。既然沒有用『無明』來比喻分段生死的煩惱，那麼『愛』和『取』這兩個支也應該被歸類為煩惱。既然用『因緣』來比喻業力的障礙，那麼『有』這個支的一部分也應該被歸類為『因緣』。其他的就不詳細討論了。根據《瑜伽師地論》及其相關注釋，以及前面第七識的無間緣，這些都已經詳細解釋過了。 《瑜伽師地論》中說：『從無始以來』等等，解釋了清凈相續。這是因為依靠根本識（第八識，阿賴耶識）中本有的無漏法爾種子作為原因，通過轉識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識）不斷地熏習作為助緣，從而使清凈的第八識得以顯現和相續。『即乃至究竟已下釋成相續』這句話解釋了這種相續的完成。 有人問：『第七識（末那識）也在相續，為什麼不提呢？』 回答是：『因為它不是持種識，所以不提。』然而，這種鏡智（第八識所轉成的智慧）僅僅以本有的種子為因，能夠產生所生的現識，這被稱為『始起』。因為它能夠持有種子，所以也被稱為『種』。因此，《瑜伽師地論》中說『轉得始起清凈種識』，並不是指種子。不能說這是因為新的熏習而變得殊勝。通過第六識和第七識的熏習而形成鏡智的種子。說成佛是『得到始起清凈種識』，是因為佛的功德只有佛與佛才能知道，菩薩是無法知道的。又怎麼能通過熏習而形成呢？也不能說是通過名言熏習，因為它不是鏡智的境界。就像欲界的心雖然可以變現上界的景象，但卻不能熏習上界的種子。這是因為它是緣名境，而不是緣事故。果報的獲得也是如此。所以，它僅僅是由本有的種子所生。就像最初的無漏一樣，通過其他的熏習，因緣圓滿才能產生。成就也是如此。 《瑜伽師地論》中說：『若無緣用等者』，這是在反駁安慧論師的觀點。如果按照安慧論師的觀點，佛和菩薩的智慧也就不是智慧了，因為沒有見分能夠緣用，就像虛空一樣。護法論師的觀點還可以接受，但難陀尊者又該如何解釋呢？因為他只有一見分，沒有其他的功用。安慧論師反駁說：『如果……』
【English Translation】 English version: Convenient birth and death exist in the first to third Bhumis (stages of Bodhisattva practice). Conditioned birth and death exist in the fourth, fifth, and sixth Bhumis. Birth and death with existence exist in the seventh, eighth, and ninth Bhumis. Birth and death without existence exist in the tenth Bhumi. The She Dasheng Lun (Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle) of the Sui and Tang dynasties and its commentaries do not mention these. The Anuttarāśraya-sūtra (Unsurpassed Reliance Sutra) and the Ratnagotravibhāga (Treatise on the Buddha-nature) also do not correlate these with the Bhumis. The Ximing Temple explains: 'Avidyā' (ignorance), one of the twelve Nidānas (links of dependent origination), can be seen as 'convenience'. Actions arising from 'Avidyā' can be seen as 'condition'. The eight links such as 'Vijñāna' (consciousness) can be seen as 'existence with existence'. The two links 'Jāti' (birth) and 'Jarā-maraṇa' (old age and death) can be seen as 'existence without existence'. Now I think this explanation deviates slightly from the original text. Since 'Avidyā' is not used to symbolize the afflictions of segmented birth and death, then the two links 'Tṛṣṇā' (craving) and 'Upādāna' (grasping) should also be classified as afflictions. Since 'condition' is used to symbolize the obstacles of karma, then a portion of the link 'Bhava' (becoming) should also be classified as 'condition'. Other things will not be discussed in detail. According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and its related commentaries, as well as the immediately preceding condition of the seventh consciousness, these have already been explained in detail. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'From beginningless time' etc., explaining the pure continuity. This is because it relies on the inherently pure, undefiled dhātu (element) seeds in the Ālaya-vijñāna (eighth consciousness, storehouse consciousness) as the cause, and through the constant vāsanā (perfuming) of the pravṛtti-vijñānas (active consciousnesses: eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind consciousnesses) as the condition, thereby enabling the pure eighth consciousness to manifest and continue. The phrase 'that is, even to the end, explains the completion of this continuity'. Someone asks: 'The seventh consciousness (Manas-vijñāna, mind consciousness) is also continuing, why is it not mentioned?' The answer is: 'Because it is not a seed-holding consciousness, it is not mentioned.' However, this Ādarśa-jñāna (mirror-like wisdom, the wisdom transformed from the eighth consciousness) relies solely on the inherent seeds as the cause, and is able to produce the manifested consciousness that is produced, which is called 'initial arising'. Because it is able to hold the seeds, it is also called 'seed'. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says 'transforming and obtaining the initially arising pure seed consciousness', which does not refer to the seed. It cannot be said that it becomes superior due to new vāsanā (perfuming). The seeds of Ādarśa-jñāna are formed through the vāsanā of the sixth and seventh consciousnesses. Saying that becoming a Buddha is 'obtaining the initially arising pure seed consciousness' is because the merits of the Buddha can only be known by Buddhas, and Bodhisattvas cannot know them. How can it be formed through vāsanā? It also cannot be said to be through verbal vāsanā, because it is not the realm of Ādarśa-jñāna. Just as the mind of the desire realm can manifest the scenes of the upper realms, but it cannot vāsanā the seeds of the upper realms. This is because it is the object of name, not the object of event. The attainment of the result is also the same. Therefore, it is only produced by the inherent seeds. Just like the initial undefiled, it can only be produced through other vāsanā when the conditions are complete. Accomplishment is also the same. The Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'If there is no conditional function, etc.', this is refuting the view of Acharya Anhui. If according to Acharya Anhui's view, the wisdom of Buddhas and Bodhisattvas would not be wisdom either, because there is no darśana-bhāga (seeing aspect) that can be used, just like space. Acharya Dharmapala's view is acceptable, but how should Venerable Nanda be explained? Because he only has one darśana-bhāga, and no other functions. Acharya Anhui retorted: 'If...'
要有用方是能緣。應有無窮過。見分不起能緣之用。應不能緣。解云準此非難陀難。但護法等 若爾亦有無窮之過。若見能緣不更有用。應有不定 答無無窮過。以見分用從體。亦能非須作用。
論。由斯理趣等者。結上。疏云五．八名識入意識攝未見文故者 若爾第七名意合名意識。準何得知 答第七別名意。通名為識。通別合目。故第四云。彼依主釋。此持業釋。故知余處俱名意識。
論。攝大乘說等者。攝論第四說依他起為所遍計。相．質俱是。故此論云遍計心等所緣緣故。簡圓成實。以相與質不相似故。所以本解親相分者必依他起。本質不定。即除無為。故此論言常遠離前性。
問安惠能執遍在何心 答準前能計遍在八識 若爾安惠自許第八非癡．惠俱。何得有執 答準彼本計亦應許有。但相微細不說二俱。今護法責。出何經論。第八得與癡．惠二俱。若許得俱。恒行不共應亦在第八 若云雖執非無明俱故。即難云。我執必由無明方始得起。既無無明如何起執。故若有執必有無明。準此難。前文言二執必與無明俱故。彼師絕救 又云不說無明有善性故下。別難善心起亦有執。即癡與無癡二法應俱。若許爾者違瓔珞本業經。明．闇一相。善．惡一心。是洴沙國外道師偈。何故不俱正相違故
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 如果能緣起作用，就應該有無窮的過失。如果見分（Dṛṣṭi-bhāga，認識的主體部分）不起能緣的作用，就應該不能緣取對象。解釋說，按照這個道理，並非難陀（Nanda，佛陀的堂弟）的責難。只是護法（Dharmapāla，唯識宗論師）等人認為，如果這樣，也會有無窮的過失。如果見分能緣取對象，不是更有作用嗎？應該有不確定的情況。回答說，沒有無窮的過失，因為見分的作用是從本體而來，也能不須要特別的作用。
論：『由斯理趣等者』，總結上文。疏：『五、八名識入意識攝未見文故者』，如果這樣，第七識（Manas-vijñāna，末那識）名為意，也合名為意識，根據什麼得知？回答說，第七識別名為意，通名為識，通名和別名合在一起。所以第四卷說，『彼依主釋，此持業釋』，因此知道其他地方都名為意識。
論：『攝大乘說等者』，《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）第四卷說，依他起性（Paratantra-svabhāva，事物生起的相互依存性）為所遍計（Parikalpita，虛妄分別），相（Lakṣaṇa，表象）和質（Vastu，本質）都是。因此這個論說，因為遍計所執（Parikalpita-lakṣaṇa，虛妄分別的性質）的心等是所緣緣（Ālambana-pratyaya，生起認識的條件），所以簡別圓成實性（Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva，事物圓滿成就的真實性質）。因為相和質不相似。所以本來的解釋，親相分（事物直接呈現的表象部分）必定是依他起性，本質不確定，這就排除了無為法（Asaṃskṛta-dharma，非因緣和合的法）。因此這個論說，常常遠離前一性質。
問：安慧（Sthiramati，唯識宗論師）認為遍計所執在哪個心識中？答：按照前面的說法，能遍計的心識遍在八識（Aṣṭa vijñāna，八種識）。如果這樣，安慧自己承認第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna，阿賴耶識）不是癡（Moha，愚癡）和慧（Prajñā，智慧）同時具有的，怎麼會有執著？答：按照他本來的觀點，也應該承認有執著，只是相狀微細，所以不說二者同時具有。現在護法責問，出自哪部經論，第八識可以和癡、慧二者同時具有？如果允許同時具有，恒行不共（Saṃprayukta，相應）也應該在第八識。如果說雖然有執著，但不是和無明（Avidyā，無知）同時具有，就反駁說，我執（Ātma-graha，對自我的執著）必定由無明才能生起，既然沒有無明，如何生起執著？所以如果有執著，必定有無明。按照這個道理反駁，前面的文章說二執（二種執著）必定和無明同時具有，那位論師無法辯解。又說『不說無明有善性故』下面，特別反駁善心生起時也有執著，那麼癡和無癡（Amoha，不愚癡）兩種法應該同時具有。如果允許這樣，就違背《瓔珞本業經》（Yingluo Benye Jing），『明（Vidya，光明）和闇（Tamas，黑暗）是一個相，善（Kuśala，善）和惡（Akuśala，惡）是一個心』，這是洴沙國外道師的偈頌，為什麼不一起出現？因為正相反對。
【English Translation】 English version If the function of the 'able-to-apprehend' (能緣, néngyuán) arises, there should be infinite faults. If the 'seeing-aspect' (見分, jiànfēn, the subjective aspect of cognition) does not give rise to the function of 'able-to-apprehend', it should not be able to apprehend. The explanation says that according to this reasoning, it is not Nanda's (難陀, Nánduó) criticism. However, Dharmapāla (護法, Hùfǎ, a Yogācāra philosopher) and others think that if this is the case, there will also be infinite faults. If the 'seeing-aspect' can apprehend, isn't it even more functional? There should be uncertainty. The answer is that there are no infinite faults because the function of the 'seeing-aspect' comes from the substance and can also function without requiring special action.
The Treatise says: 'By this reasoning, etc.' This concludes the above. The Commentary says: 'The fifth and eighth consciousnesses are named as consciousnesses and included in the 'consciousness-aggregate' (意識攝, yìshì shè), but the text has not been seen.' If this is the case, the seventh consciousness (末那識, Mònàshì, Manas-vijñāna) is named 'mind' (意, yì) and is also jointly named 'consciousness-aggregate'. How is this known? The answer is that the seventh consciousness is separately named 'mind' and generally named 'consciousness'. The general and specific names are combined. Therefore, the fourth volume says, 'That is a dependent explanation, this is a possessive explanation.' Therefore, it is known that other places are all named 'consciousness-aggregate'.
The Treatise says: 'The Saṃgraha says, etc.' The fourth volume of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (攝大乘論, Shè Dàchéng Lùn) says that the 'dependent-arising nature' (依他起性, Yī tā qǐ xìng, Paratantra-svabhāva) is what is 'pervasively conceptualized' (所遍計, suǒ biànjì, Parikalpita), both the 'appearance' (相, xiàng, Lakṣaṇa) and the 'substance' (質, zhì, Vastu) are. Therefore, this treatise says that because the mind, etc., of the 'pervasively conceptualized nature' (遍計所執, biànjì suǒ zhí, Parikalpita-lakṣaṇa) is the 'object-condition' (所緣緣, suǒ yuán yuán, Ālambana-pratyaya), it distinguishes the 'perfected nature' (圓成實性, yuánchéng shí xìng, Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). Because the appearance and substance are not similar. Therefore, the original explanation, the 'directly appearing aspect' (親相分, qīn xiāng fēn) must be of the 'dependent-arising nature', and the substance is uncertain, which excludes the 'unconditioned dharma' (無為法, wúwéi fǎ, Asaṃskṛta-dharma). Therefore, this treatise says that it is always far from the previous nature.
Question: In which consciousness does Sthiramati (安慧, Ānhuì, a Yogācāra philosopher) hold the 'pervasively conceptualized' to be? Answer: According to the previous statement, the mind that can pervasively conceptualize is pervasive in the eight consciousnesses (八識, bāshì, Aṣṭa vijñāna). If this is the case, Sthiramati himself admits that the eighth consciousness (阿賴耶識, Ālāyéshì, Ālaya-vijñāna) does not simultaneously possess 'delusion' (癡, chī, Moha) and 'wisdom' (惠, huì, Prajñā), so how can there be attachment? Answer: According to his original view, it should also be admitted that there is attachment, but the appearance is subtle, so it is not said that the two are simultaneously possessed. Now Dharmapāla questions, from which sutra or treatise does it come that the eighth consciousness can simultaneously possess delusion and wisdom? If it is allowed to be simultaneously possessed, 'constant association' (恒行不共, héngxíng bùgòng, Saṃprayukta) should also be in the eighth consciousness. If it is said that although there is attachment, it is not simultaneously possessed with 'ignorance' (無明, wúmíng, Avidyā), then it is refuted by saying that 'self-attachment' (我執, wǒzhí, Ātma-graha) must arise from ignorance. Since there is no ignorance, how can attachment arise? Therefore, if there is attachment, there must be ignorance. According to this reasoning, the previous text says that the two attachments must be simultaneously possessed with ignorance, and that philosopher cannot defend himself. Furthermore, it says 'not saying that ignorance has a good nature' below, specifically refuting that when a good mind arises, there is also attachment, then delusion and non-delusion (無癡, wúchī, Amoha) should be simultaneously possessed. If this is allowed, it violates the Yingluo Benye Jing (瓔珞本業經), 'brightness (明, míng, Vidya) and darkness (闇, àn, Tamas) are one aspect, goodness (善, shàn, Kuśala) and evil (惡, è, Akuśala) are one mind.' This is a verse by a heretical teacher from the country of King Bimbisara (洴沙國, Píngshā Guó), why don't they appear together? Because they are directly opposed.
問安惠能計在無漏心不 答準此論文。但云有漏八識。若準疏引。如佛地論第七。許在二乘無漏心有。若準安惠二十唯識論釋。十地菩薩無漏亦有。由是此論但云如來后得應有執故。前言八識有漏心者據顯處說 問安惠見．相皆是所執。世尊即無。云何今難經說佛智現身土等 答彼師釋云。據增上緣說佛所現。據實有情能感者變。如說法事 由此次難若無緣用應非智等。既成緣用卻成現相。亦復無過。
論。雖各體一而似二生者。本釋如疏 要集云。諸釋言同而意少別 有釋安惠相．見二分從緣生者。是護法師據自抑他。非謂安惠許從種起。如雲習氣是相分攝。此意安惠種非相分說相分者。護法依自而難於他 今謂安惠本計種子依自證分功能義用。非相分攝。前第二云。假法如無非因緣故。若是相分何得言如無。體既無故。復許自證分緣生非無故有種子。種子既非是自證分。能所生別。因果性別。復自證緣。護法菩薩以此理遂非相是何。故作此難。若云見．相從種子生亦非彼計。據何道理約自難他。故知云若緣所生內相．見分非依他起。例彼自證亦應是無。無異因故。是共許義。又前第四云。十八界種應成雜亂等。故許相．見亦從種生。不爾此言空無所益 問安惠相．見既遍計所執。云何攝論云唯量唯二皆名依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：安慧（Anhui，人名，唯識學論師）是否認為無漏心（anāsrava-citta，指沒有煩惱染污的心）中存在計度性？答：按照此論文的說法，只有有漏八識（sāsrava-aṣṭavijñāna，指有煩惱染污的八種識）存在計度性。如果按照疏文的引用，如《佛地論》（Buddhabhūmi-sūtra）第七卷所說，則允許在二乘（śrāvaka-yāna和pratyekabuddha-yāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的無漏心中存在計度性。如果按照安慧的《二十唯識論釋》（Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi-ṭīkā）的說法，十地菩薩（daśa-bhūmi-bodhisattva，指證得十地果位的菩薩）的無漏心中也存在計度性。因此，此論文只說如來的后得智（prsthalabdha-jñāna，指佛陀證悟后獲得的智慧）可能存在執著。之前說八識是有漏心，是根據顯現之處而說的。問：安慧認為見分（darśana-bhāga，能見的主觀部分）和相分（nimitta-bhāga，所見的客觀部分）都是所執著的，世尊（lokanātha，佛陀的尊稱）沒有這些，為什麼現在用經文說佛智（buddha-jñāna，佛陀的智慧）能顯現身土等來責難？答：那位論師解釋說，根據增上緣（adhipati-pratyaya，起主導作用的因緣）來說，佛所顯現的，根據真實有情（satva，指眾生）能感應者而變現。如說法之事。因此，這次責難如果無緣起作用，就不應該是智等。既然成為緣起作用，卻成為現相，也沒有過失。 論：雖然各自的體性是一，但似乎產生二者，本來的解釋如疏文所說。要集說：各種解釋說法相同，但意思略有不同。有解釋說，安慧的相分和見分是從緣而生的，這是護法（Dharmapāla，人名，唯識學論師）爲了壓制對方而說的，並非說安慧允許從種子（bīja，指儲存在阿賴耶識中的潛在力量）生起。如說習氣（vāsanā，指由行為留下的潛在影響）是相分所攝。這個意思是安慧認為種子不是相分，說相分，是護法依據自己的觀點來責難對方。現在認為安慧本來認為種子是依據自證分（svasaṃvedana-bhāga，能自我認識的部分）的功能義用，不是相分所攝。前面第二卷說：假法（kalpita-dharma，指虛假的法）如無，因為不是因緣所生。如果是相分，怎麼能說如無？體性既然是無，又允許自證分緣生，不是無故有種子。種子既然不是自證分，能生和所生有區別，因和果有區別，又是自證分所緣。護法菩薩用這個道理來否定相分是什麼。所以作此責難。如果說見分和相分從種子生，也不是他的觀點。根據什麼道理用自己的觀點來責難對方。所以知道如果緣所生的內相和見分不是依他起（paratantra-utpāda，指依賴其他條件而生起），那麼按照他的自證分也應該是無，因為沒有不同的原因。這是共同認可的意義。又前面第四卷說：十八界（aṣṭādaśa-dhātu，指眼、耳、鼻、舌、身、意六根，色、聲、香、味、觸、法六境，以及眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識、意識六識）的種子應該成為雜亂等。所以允許相分和見分也從種子生。否則，這句話就毫無益處。問：安慧認為相分和見分既然是遍計所執（parikalpita，指虛妄分別），為什麼《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha）說唯量唯二都名為依他起？
【English Translation】 English version: Question: Does Anhui (Anhui, a person's name, a Yogācāra master) believe that there is conceptual construction (parikalpita) in the undefiled mind (anāsrava-citta, referring to a mind without the defilements of afflictions)? Answer: According to this treatise, only the defiled eight consciousnesses (sāsrava-aṣṭavijñāna, referring to the eight types of consciousness with the defilements of afflictions) have conceptual construction. If according to the commentary's citation, such as in the seventh volume of the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra (Buddhabhūmi-sūtra), it is allowed that there is conceptual construction in the undefiled minds of the Two Vehicles (śrāvaka-yāna and pratyekabuddha-yāna, the Hearer Vehicle and the Solitary Realizer Vehicle). If according to Anhui's commentary on the Twenty Verses on Consciousness-Only (Viṃśatikā-vijñaptimātratā-siddhi-ṭīkā), even the undefiled minds of the Ten-Ground Bodhisattvas (daśa-bhūmi-bodhisattva, referring to bodhisattvas who have attained the ten bhūmis) have conceptual construction. Therefore, this treatise only says that the Buddha's subsequent wisdom (prsthalabdha-jñāna, referring to the wisdom obtained by the Buddha after enlightenment) may have attachment. The previous statement that the eight consciousnesses are defiled minds is based on what is manifested. Treatise: Although each entity is one, they appear to arise as two. The original explanation is as the commentary says. The Essentials Collected says: The explanations are the same in wording, but the meanings are slightly different. Some explain that Anhui's image-aspect (nimitta-bhāga, the objective part of perception) and seeing-aspect (darśana-bhāga, the subjective part of perception) arise from conditions. This is Dharmapāla (Dharmapāla, a person's name, a Yogācāra master) speaking to suppress the other, not saying that Anhui allows arising from seeds (bīja, referring to the potential forces stored in the Ālaya consciousness). As it is said that habitual tendencies (vāsanā, referring to the potential influences left by actions) are included in the image-aspect. The meaning of this is that Anhui believes that seeds are not the image-aspect; saying image-aspect is Dharmapāla using his own view to criticize the other. Now it is believed that Anhui originally considered seeds to rely on the function and meaning of the self-awareness aspect (svasaṃvedana-bhāga, the part that can recognize itself), not included in the image-aspect. The second volume earlier said: Imaginary dharmas (kalpita-dharma, referring to false dharmas) are like non-existence because they are not caused by conditions. If it were the image-aspect, how could it be said to be like non-existence? Since the entity is non-existent, it is also allowed that the self-awareness aspect arises from conditions, so seeds do not exist without cause. Since seeds are not the self-awareness aspect, there is a difference between what produces and what is produced, and there is a difference between cause and effect, and it is what the self-awareness aspect relies on. Bodhisattva Dharmapāla uses this reasoning to deny what the image-aspect is. Therefore, this criticism is made. If it is said that the seeing-aspect and image-aspect arise from seeds, that is also not his view. According to what reasoning is one's own view used to criticize the other? Therefore, it is known that if the inner image and seeing-aspects that arise from conditions are not dependently arisen (paratantra-utpāda, referring to arising dependent on other conditions), then according to his self-awareness aspect, it should also be non-existent, because there is no different cause. This is a commonly accepted meaning. Also, the fourth volume earlier said: The seeds of the eighteen realms (aṣṭādaśa-dhātu, referring to the six sense organs of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind, the six sense objects of form, sound, smell, taste, touch, and dharma, and the six consciousnesses of eye consciousness, ear consciousness, nose consciousness, tongue consciousness, body consciousness, and mind consciousness) should become mixed up, etc. Therefore, it is allowed that the image-aspect and seeing-aspect also arise from seeds. Otherwise, this statement would be of no benefit. Question: Since Anhui believes that the image-aspect and seeing-aspect are conceptual constructions (parikalpita, referring to false discriminations), why does the Compendium on the Mahāyāna (Mahāyānasaṃgraha) say that 'only measurement' and 'only two' are both called dependently arisen?
他。西明三釋。一云識自體分與相．見種為依。假說自體名見．相分。非取見．相名依他起。一云自證分上依見．相現。由斯道理說見．相分名依他起。一云據實見．相意取所依。非即二分為依他起。此之三釋。初由自證與見．相種為依。即假說自證為見．相。第二由見．相分依依他現。說此見．相假名依他。第三舉見．相二顯其所依名為唯二。
論。后得智品二分應名遍計所執者。問安惠見．相是計所執。佛果應無。云何今云無漏二分應名遍計 答本計是無。乘前難彼若無見分無能緣用。以量立有。復教證成成佛得有。故為此難 問安惠本計佛無見．相。何智緣真。何智緣俗 答緣自證分名俗。緣如名真 問因位無漏亦許有執。何名現量．比．非量等。又親得緣如不 答準緣他心。云不知如佛智。亦不親緣如。因位名無漏。名緣如。名緣二空等者。據無明漸微。名為無漏緣如緣空。分為凡聖。故諸自證因位不能分明親得。現．比．非量準思可知。
問彼許因位見．相體無。復不親得自證及如。將何以為親所緣緣。第七卷云親所緣緣能緣皆有故 答彼計親所緣緣非必有體 若爾如何此下難云又若二分是計所執應如兔角非所緣緣耶 答略有三解。一云彼許兔角非因生故非所緣緣。二分因產生所緣緣。今此據
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 他。西明三釋：第一種說法認為，識的自體分與相分、見分的種子作為所依賴的基礎，假設自體名為見分、相分。並非直接取見分、相分作為依他起（Paratantra-svabhava，依他起性）。第二種說法認為，自證分（Svasamvedana，自證分）上依見分、相分顯現，因此說見分、相分名為依他起。第三種說法認為，根據實際情況，見分、相分的意圖在於選取所依賴的基礎，並非見分、相分本身就是依他起。 這三種解釋中，第一種認為自證分與見分、相分的種子是所依賴的基礎，因此假設自證分就是見分、相分。第二種認為見分、相分依賴依他起顯現，因此說見分、相分假名為依他起。第三種指出見分、相分是爲了彰顯它們所依賴的基礎，名為唯識二分。
論：后得智（Prsthalabdha-jnana，后得智）的二分（見分、相分）應該被稱作遍計所執（Parikalpita，遍計所執性）嗎？問：如果安慧（Sthiramati）認為見分、相分是遍計所執，那麼佛果（Buddha-phala，佛果）就不應該有見分、相分。為什麼現在說無漏（Anasrava，無漏）的二分應該被稱作遍計所執？答：安慧的本意是認為見分、相分是虛無的。如果按照之前的難點，如果沒有見分，就沒有能緣的作用，那麼就用量（Pramana，量）來建立見分的存在。又用教證來證明成佛後有見分。所以才這樣提問。問：安慧本來認為佛沒有見分、相分，那麼什麼智慧緣真（Tathata，真如），什麼智慧緣俗（Samvrti，世俗）？答：緣自證分名為俗，緣真如名為真。問：因位（Hetu-avastha，因位）的無漏也允許有執著，那麼為什麼稱作現量（Pratyaksha，現量）、比量（Anumana，比量）、非量等？又是否親自獲得緣真如？答：參照緣他心智（Para-citta-jnana，他心智）。認為不知道如佛智，也不親自緣真如。因位名為無漏，名為緣真如，名為緣二空（Dvi-sunyata，二空）等，是因為無明（Avidya，無明）逐漸減弱，所以名為無漏緣真如緣空。分為凡夫和聖人。所以諸自證在因位不能分明地親自獲得。現量、比量、非量等可以參照思考理解。
問：他們認為因位的見分、相分本體是虛無的，又不親自獲得自證和真如，那麼用什麼作為親所緣緣（Adhipati-pratyaya，增上緣）？《第七卷》說親所緣緣和能緣都有。答：他們認為親所緣緣不一定有實體。如果這樣，為什麼下面要反駁說：『如果二分是遍計所執，應該像兔角一樣不是所緣緣』？答：大概有三種解釋。第一種認為，兔角不是因生，所以不是所緣緣，而二分是因生，所以是所緣緣。現在根據……
【English Translation】 English version: He. Three Explanations by Ximing: The first explanation states that the seed of the self-cognition portion (Svasamvedana-bhaga), the object-portion (Vishaya-bhaga), and the subject-portion (Darsana-bhaga) of consciousness serve as the basis upon which the self is nominally designated as the subject-portion and the object-portion. It does not directly take the subject-portion and object-portion as the dependent arising (Paratantra-svabhava). The second explanation states that the subject-portion and object-portion manifest relying on the self-cognition portion. Therefore, the subject-portion and object-portion are said to be nominally designated as dependent arising. The third explanation states that, according to the actual situation, the intention of the subject-portion and object-portion is to select the basis upon which they rely, rather than the subject-portion and object-portion themselves being dependent arising. Among these three explanations, the first considers the self-cognition portion and the seeds of the subject-portion and object-portion as the basis upon which they rely, thus assuming that the self-cognition portion is the subject-portion and object-portion. The second considers that the subject-portion and object-portion manifest relying on dependent arising, thus saying that the subject-portion and object-portion are nominally designated as dependent arising. The third points out that the subject-portion and object-portion are to highlight the basis upon which they rely, named as the two portions of consciousness-only.
Treatise: Should the two portions (subject-portion and object-portion) of subsequent wisdom (Prsthalabdha-jnana) be called the completely conceptualized (Parikalpita)? Question: If Sthiramati believes that the subject-portion and object-portion are completely conceptualized, then the fruit of Buddhahood (Buddha-phala) should not have subject-portion and object-portion. Why is it now said that the unconditioned (Anasrava) two portions should be called completely conceptualized? Answer: Sthiramati's original intention is to consider the subject-portion and object-portion as non-existent. If according to the previous difficulty, if there is no subject-portion, there is no function of the cognizer, then the existence of the subject-portion is established by means of valid cognition (Pramana). Furthermore, the attainment of Buddhahood is proven by scriptural evidence. Therefore, this question is raised. Question: Sthiramati originally believed that the Buddha does not have subject-portion and object-portion, then what wisdom cognizes the truth (Tathata), and what wisdom cognizes the conventional (Samvrti)? Answer: Cognizing the self-cognition portion is called conventional, and cognizing Suchness is called truth. Question: The unconditioned in the causal stage (Hetu-avastha) also allows for attachment, then why are they called perception (Pratyaksha), inference (Anumana), non-cognition, etc.? And does one personally attain the condition of Suchness? Answer: Refer to the wisdom of cognizing others' minds (Para-citta-jnana). It is believed that one does not know the wisdom like the Buddha's, nor does one personally cognize Suchness. The causal stage is called unconditioned, called cognizing Suchness, called cognizing the two emptinesses (Dvi-sunyata), etc., because ignorance (Avidya) gradually diminishes, so it is called unconditioned cognizing Suchness cognizing emptiness. It is divided into ordinary people and sages. Therefore, all self-cognitions cannot be clearly and personally attained in the causal stage. Perception, inference, non-cognition, etc., can be understood by referring to thought.
Question: They believe that the substance of the subject-portion and object-portion in the causal stage is non-existent, and they do not personally attain self-cognition and Suchness, then what is used as the dominant condition (Adhipati-pratyaya)? The seventh volume says that the dominant condition and the cognizer both exist. Answer: They believe that the dominant condition does not necessarily have substance. If so, why is it refuted below: 'If the two portions are completely conceptualized, they should not be conditions like rabbit horns'? Answer: There are roughly three explanations. The first believes that rabbit horns are not produced by causes, so they are not conditions, while the two portions are produced by causes, so they are conditions. Now according to...
無同彼兔角故得為難 一云本計雖無親所緣緣心亦得生。以立唯識故。然陳那所說無非所緣緣者。是破他計就他為語。今者護法約自破彼故為此量 一云護法據攝大乘。有能遍計所遍計俱依他起。此所遍計即疏所緣緣安惠共許。例親所緣緣亦應有體。說所緣緣故。準無著．陳那俱有親．疏二所緣緣。故今此破依共許教立量破彼。非是護法據自破他。此釋為勝 今此論文舉反破量不舉順成。舉順成者。應云佛親所緣緣相．見分有。例余相．見亦應是有。是所緣緣故。如佛相．見。然始反成。若二分無應非所緣緣。體非有故。如兔角等。安惠設許亦所緣緣。能所遍計是何所攝。若所遍計是依他有。若能遍計非是內心。若計所執非所緣緣。不說無法為所遍計故。安惠自許因位諸心皆能計故。既說能計即托依他為所遍計。故相．見無非所緣緣。故今難云見．相體無非所緣緣 問若計所執非所緣緣。如何下說為凡聖境 答境寬緣狹。設非所緣約智疏緣亦得名境。親緣相分是所緣緣。能緣皆有。唯識理故。非要質有方能起心。
論。又諸習氣等。本釋如疏 西明云。又諸種子是第八相。若是所執應非因緣。以無體故。如空花等 今謂不爾。若許種子是相分收。彼計相無。何故護法第二卷難云假法如無體即無故。又不應言既非
一異應如瓶等是假非實。瓶依四塵。非全無故。不同空花等。
論。二空所顯等。本釋如疏 有云。真如為二空顯者。由實無二我及空無二我。離此增減方是圓成 要集云。空雖非表詮。與表詮為因故名空顯。智緣二空未顯真故 今謂不爾。智緣空時雖未即證。因此能顯。若即由空方顯真者。智正觀空真如未顯。智正證真復不作空。不可非智觀空空自顯真。離觀空智空自顯真何時能顯。佛地論中但云就加行觀名為共相。不說由性空顯名為共相。
論。猶如幻事等。如樞要及辨中邊疏述 問如依鏡緣還見自質者。如月中像誰之質耶 解云以月為緣還見本質。彼是大海大山魚質 若爾豈見障外色耶 解云許亦無失。如隔琉璃見外色故。又非障外。因彼月輪不受眼光下見山海。如因鏡面自見背故。
論。三唯識真如者。本疏云見識真如便能知此。意說所觀如 要集云。有釋云。三藏解云。或用觀智名為真如。不爾便與後文相違。染凈唯識應通三性。此意若說所觀如。遍三性故應通三性 今謂本釋為正。何以故。若取能觀名唯識如。何故七十七云。謂一切行唯是識性。又如何言由相真如了別真如故。一切諸法平等平等。以能觀智雖是行收非一切行。又能觀智二乘等無。如何平等 若云就所觀說即非能觀。若
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一異應如瓶等是假非實。瓶（瓶子）的產生依賴於地、水、火、風四種基本元素（四塵），並非完全虛無，所以不同於空花等虛幻之物。
論：二空所顯等。本釋如疏（這段經文的解釋如同註釋所說）。有人說，真如（Tathata，事物的真實本性）是由二空（兩種空性）所顯現的，因為實際上沒有我（自我）以及空無我（沒有自我的空性），脫離了這種增減才是圓成實性（Parinispanna，完美實現的本性）。要集（Yaoji，佛教文獻名）中說，空雖然不是直接表達，但與直接表達互為因果，所以稱為空顯。智慧與二空相連，但尚未顯現真如。現在我認為不是這樣。智慧與空相連時，雖然沒有立即證悟，但因此能夠顯現真如。如果僅僅通過空才能顯現真如，那麼智慧正觀空時，真如尚未顯現；智慧真正證悟真如時，又不再觀空。不能說不是智慧觀空，而是空自身顯現真如。如果離開觀空的智慧，空自身顯現真如，那要何時才能顯現？《佛地論》（Buddhabhumi Sutra）中只說在加行位（Yogacarabhumi，瑜伽行地）的觀修中稱為共相（Salaksana，共同特徵），沒有說由自性空顯現而稱為共相。
論：猶如幻事等。如樞要及辨中邊疏述（這段經文的解釋如同樞要和辨中邊疏述所說）。問：如果像依靠鏡子才能看到自己的面容一樣，那麼月亮中的影像又是誰的面容呢？答：以月亮為緣才能看到本質。那是大海、大山、魚的本質。如果這樣，難道能看到障礙物之外的顏色嗎？答：允許這樣也沒有過失。就像隔著琉璃也能看到外面的顏色一樣。而且也不是在障礙物之外，因為月亮不接受眼光，而是向下照見山海。就像因為鏡面才能看到自己的背面一樣。
論：三唯識真如者。本疏說，見到識的真如就能知道這個。意思是說所觀的真如。要集說，有一種解釋說，三藏（Tripitaka，佛教經典的總稱）解釋說，或者用觀智（Prajna，智慧）來稱呼真如。否則就與後面的經文相違背，染凈唯識（受污染和清凈的唯識）應該貫通三性（三種自性）。這個意思是說，如果說所觀的真如，因為它遍及三性，所以應該貫通三性。現在我認為本釋是正確的。為什麼呢？如果取能觀的智慧名為唯識真如，為什麼第七十七卷說，一切行為都只是識的性質？又如何說由相真如（Lakshana-tathata，相的真如）了別真如（Vijnana-tathata，了別的真如）的緣故，一切諸法平等平等？因為能觀的智慧雖然是行所包含的，但並非一切行。而且能觀的智慧二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）等沒有，如何平等？如果說就所觀的說，那就不是能觀的智慧了。
【English Translation】 English version The oneness and difference should be understood as being like a jar, which is unreal and not substantial. A jar depends on the four elements (earth, water, fire, and wind - four dusts). It is not entirely non-existent, and therefore different from illusory things like 'flowers in the sky'.
Treatise: 'What is revealed by the two emptinesses,' etc. The original explanation is as in the commentary. Some say that 'Tathata' (真如, the suchness or true nature of things) is revealed by the two emptinesses (二空, two kinds of emptiness) because there is actually no 'self' (我) and no 'emptiness of self' (空無我). Only by being free from these additions and subtractions can one attain 'Parinispanna' (圓成, the perfectly accomplished nature). 'Yaoji' (要集, Essentials Collected) says that although emptiness is not directly expressed, it is the cause of direct expression, so it is called 'revealed by emptiness.' Wisdom connected with the two emptinesses has not yet revealed 'Tathata'. Now, I say that this is not the case. Although one does not immediately realize it when wisdom is connected with emptiness, it can reveal 'Tathata' because of this. If 'Tathata' can only be revealed through emptiness, then when wisdom directly contemplates emptiness, 'Tathata' is not yet revealed; when wisdom truly realizes 'Tathata', it no longer contemplates emptiness. It cannot be said that it is not wisdom contemplating emptiness, but that emptiness itself reveals 'Tathata'. If one leaves the wisdom of contemplating emptiness, when can emptiness itself reveal 'Tathata'? In the 'Buddhabhumi Sutra' (佛地論, Discourse on the Buddha-land), it only says that it is called 'common characteristic' (共相, salaksana) in the practice of 'Yogacarabhumi' (加行位, the stage of practice), and it does not say that it is called 'common characteristic' because it is revealed by the emptiness of inherent nature.
Treatise: 'Like illusory things,' etc. As in the 'Essentials' and the commentary on 'Distinguishing the Middle and the Extremes'. Question: If it is like relying on a mirror to see one's own face, then whose face is the image in the moon? Answer: By relying on the moon as a condition, one can see the essence. That is the essence of the great sea, the great mountains, and the fish. If so, can one see colors outside the barrier? Answer: It is permissible to allow this without error. Just as one can see colors outside through glass. Moreover, it is not outside the barrier, because the moon does not receive the light of the eyes, but shines down on the mountains and seas. Just as one can see one's own back because of the surface of the mirror.
Treatise: 'The 'Tathata' of the three 'Vijnanas' (唯識, consciousness-only),' etc. The original commentary says that seeing the 'Tathata' of consciousness can enable one to know this. It means the 'Tathata' that is observed. 'Yaoji' says that there is an explanation that the 'Tripitaka' (三藏, the three baskets of Buddhist scriptures) explains that 'Tathata' is sometimes called 'wisdom of observation' (觀智, prajna). Otherwise, it would contradict the later text, and the defiled and pure 'Vijnanas' should pervade the three natures (三性, three self-natures). This means that if one speaks of the 'Tathata' that is observed, it should pervade the three natures because it pervades the three natures. Now, I say that the original explanation is correct. Why? If one takes the wisdom of observation as the 'Tathata' of 'Vijnana', why does the seventy-seventh volume say that all actions are only the nature of consciousness? And how can it be said that because of the 'Tathata' of characteristics (相真如, lakshana-tathata) and the 'Tathata' of discrimination (了別真如, vijnana-tathata), all dharmas are equal and equal? Because the wisdom of observation, although it is included in actions, is not all actions. Moreover, the wisdom of observation is not possessed by the two vehicles (二乘, Sravakayana and Pratyekabuddhayana), so how can it be equal? If one speaks of what is observed, then it is not the wisdom of observation.
爾既取所觀唯識。何故不通初二性攝 答就所觀性即唯成實。約詮顯者可通三性。論云隨相不障通余。
論。空有三者等。本疏不分假實但總相釋 要集云。或空無我。初中性．諦俱實。后即性實諦假。云有說空無我皆性．諦實者。非也。二空所顯及所執性。非苦諦故 今謂不爾。一疏文不判。尋聽此解理然。若云二空所顯及所執性非苦諦者。何故自斷云空無我初中性．諦俱實。豈計所執苦諦攝耶。今云空及無我性．諦俱實者。以空無我二種行相與彼相似。亦此行相所行境故。遍計性無名空無我。圓成實性空無我性亦空無我。苦諦本性非我所故空。非一常故無我。能觀所觀行相俱通。故說俱實。據實二性非苦諦攝。初后二行性實諦假。應知苦下四行各三如次依遍計．依他．圓成各分三行。初后皆性實。辨中邊說即彼性故。從諦皆假。中即依他。性．諦俱實。然依他中無漏依他是道諦攝。有漏依他是苦諦攝。攝依他少分。準法師辨中邊疏解無常行相。云今無常通緣三性故。說能緣行相有計所執等。實非此行通初后性。又以理準。無常緣三諦。初性非諦收。言緣彼者。通一切心緣無常語。假說為無常行。實非此行收。又以彼性假名無常。下諸行相準此應悉 今準此釋。無常苦等是苦諦行相。非初后性行相。說初后性
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 問：既然你已經選擇了所觀察的唯識，為什麼不包括初遍計所執性和后圓成實性？ 答：就所觀察的自性而言，它只是成實性。如果從詮釋顯現的角度來說，它可以包括三種自性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）。《瑜伽師地論》中說，隨順於現象並不妨礙通達其他自性。
論：空、有、三者等等。《瑜伽師地論》的根本疏（本疏）沒有區分假和實，只是總體上解釋。 《成唯識論要集》說：或者空無我。最初的遍計所執性和中間的依他起性，在自性和真諦上都是真實的。後面的圓成實性，在自性上是真實的，在真諦上是虛假的。有人說空無我在自性和真諦上都是真實的，這是不對的。因為二空（人空、法空）所顯現的以及所執著的自性，不是苦諦所包含的。 現在我認為不是這樣。首先，疏文中沒有判斷。尋找並聽取這種解釋是有道理的。如果說二空所顯現的以及所執著的自性不是苦諦所包含的，那麼為什麼自己又斷言空無我最初的遍計所執性和中間的依他起性，在自性和真諦上都是真實的呢？難道認為所執著的自性是苦諦所包含的嗎？現在說空和無我在自性和真諦上都是真實的，是因為空無我兩種行相與苦諦相似，也是這種行相所行之境的緣故。遍計所執性是無名空無我，圓成實性是空無我性，也是空無我。苦諦的本性不是我所擁有的，所以是空。不是單一常住的，所以是無我。能觀察的和所觀察的行相都貫通，所以說是都是真實的。實際上，這兩種自性不是苦諦所包含的。最初的遍計所執性和最後的圓成實性，在自性上是真實的，在真諦上是虛假的。應該知道苦諦下的四種行相（無常、苦、空、無我）各自有三種，依次依據遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性來劃分三種行相。最初的遍計所執性和最後的圓成實性，在自性上都是真實的。從真諦上來說，都是虛假的。中間的依他起性，在自性和真諦上都是真實的。然而，在依他起性中，無漏的依他起性是道諦所包含的，有漏的依他起性是苦諦所包含的。包含依他起性的一小部分。依照法師在《辨中邊論》疏中的解釋，無常的行相貫通三種自性，所以說能緣的行相有計所執等等。實際上，這種行相併沒有貫通最初的遍計所執性和最後的圓成實性。又以理推斷，無常緣於三種真諦。最初的遍計所執性不是真諦所包含的。說緣於它，是說一切心緣于無常的說法。假說為無常的行相，實際上這種行相併沒有包含它。又因為那種自性是假名無常。下面的各種行相應該都依此來解釋。現在依照這個來解釋，無常、苦等等是苦諦的行相，不是最初的遍計所執性和最後的圓成實性的行相。說最初的遍計所執性和最後的圓成實性
English version: Q: Since you have already taken the observed Vijnaptimatrata (唯識, Consciousness-only), why don't you include the initial Parikalpita-svabhava (遍計所執性, the nature of what is mentally constructed) and the final Parinispanna-svabhava (圓成實性, the nature of what is perfectly accomplished)? A: Regarding the nature of what is observed, it is only Satyasiddhi (成實性, the accomplishment of truth). From the perspective of what is expressed and revealed, it can include the three natures (Parikalpita-svabhava, Paratantra-svabhava (依他起性, the nature of dependence on others), and Parinispanna-svabhava). The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) says that following phenomena does not hinder understanding the others.
Treatise: Emptiness, existence, the three, etc. The root commentary (本疏) of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra does not distinguish between false and real, but explains it in general terms. The Essentials of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi (成唯識論要集) says: Or emptiness and no-self. The initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the middle Paratantra-svabhava are both real in nature and truth. The final Parinispanna-svabhava is real in nature but false in truth. Some say that emptiness and no-self are both real in nature and truth, but this is not correct. Because the nature revealed by the two emptinesses (人空, emptiness of self; 法空, emptiness of phenomena) and what is clung to is not included in the Truth of Suffering (苦諦). Now I think it's not like that. First of all, the commentary does not judge. It is reasonable to seek and listen to this explanation. If it is said that the nature revealed by the two emptinesses and what is clung to is not included in the Truth of Suffering, then why does it assert that the initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the middle Paratantra-svabhava of emptiness and no-self are both real in nature and truth? Does it consider the clung-to nature to be included in the Truth of Suffering? Now it is said that emptiness and no-self are both real in nature and truth because the two aspects of emptiness and no-self are similar to the Truth of Suffering, and also because they are the objects of this aspect. Parikalpita-svabhava is nameless emptiness and no-self, and Parinispanna-svabhava is the nature of emptiness and no-self, which is also emptiness and no-self. The original nature of the Truth of Suffering is empty because it is not what I possess. It is no-self because it is not singular and permanent. The aspects of what can be observed and what is observed are both connected, so it is said that they are both real. In reality, these two natures are not included in the Truth of Suffering. The initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the final Parinispanna-svabhava are real in nature but false in truth. It should be known that each of the four aspects under the Truth of Suffering (impermanence, suffering, emptiness, no-self) has three aspects, which are divided into three aspects according to Parikalpita-svabhava, Paratantra-svabhava, and Parinispanna-svabhava. The initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the final Parinispanna-svabhava are both real in nature. From the perspective of truth, they are both false. The middle Paratantra-svabhava is real in both nature and truth. However, in Paratantra-svabhava, the undefiled Paratantra-svabhava is included in the Truth of the Path (道諦), and the defiled Paratantra-svabhava is included in the Truth of Suffering. It includes a small part of Paratantra-svabhava. According to the Dharma Master's explanation in the commentary on the Madhyantavibhaga (辨中邊論), the aspect of impermanence connects the three natures, so it is said that the aspect of what can be conditioned has what is clung to, etc. In reality, this aspect does not connect the initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the final Parinispanna-svabhava. Also, judging by reason, impermanence conditions the three truths. The initial nature is not included in the truth. Saying that it conditions it means that all minds condition the saying of impermanence. It is falsely said to be the aspect of impermanence, but in reality, this aspect does not include it. Also, because that nature is falsely named impermanence. The following aspects should all be explained according to this. Now, according to this explanation, impermanence, suffering, etc., are the aspects of the Truth of Suffering, not the aspects of the initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the final Parinispanna-svabhava. Saying the initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the final Parinispanna-svabhava
【English Translation】 English version: Q: Since you have already taken the observed Vijnaptimatrata (唯識, Consciousness-only), why don't you include the initial Parikalpita-svabhava (遍計所執性, the nature of what is mentally constructed) and the final Parinispanna-svabhava (圓成實性, the nature of what is perfectly accomplished)? A: Regarding the nature of what is observed, it is only Satyasiddhi (成實性, the accomplishment of truth). From the perspective of what is expressed and revealed, it can include the three natures (Parikalpita-svabhava, Paratantra-svabhava (依他起性, the nature of dependence on others), and Parinispanna-svabhava). The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) says that following phenomena does not hinder understanding the others.
Treatise: Emptiness, existence, the three, etc. The root commentary (本疏) of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra does not distinguish between false and real, but explains it in general terms. The Essentials of the Vijnaptimatrata-siddhi (成唯識論要集) says: Or emptiness and no-self. The initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the middle Paratantra-svabhava are both real in nature and truth. The final Parinispanna-svabhava is real in nature but false in truth. Some say that emptiness and no-self are both real in nature and truth, but this is not correct. Because the nature revealed by the two emptinesses (人空, emptiness of self; 法空, emptiness of phenomena) and what is clung to is not included in the Truth of Suffering (苦諦). Now I think it's not like that. First of all, the commentary does not judge. It is reasonable to seek and listen to this explanation. If it is said that the nature revealed by the two emptinesses and what is clung to is not included in the Truth of Suffering, then why does it assert that the initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the middle Paratantra-svabhava of emptiness and no-self are both real in nature and truth? Does it consider the clung-to nature to be included in the Truth of Suffering? Now it is said that emptiness and no-self are both real in nature and truth because the two aspects of emptiness and no-self are similar to the Truth of Suffering, and also because they are the objects of this aspect. Parikalpita-svabhava is nameless emptiness and no-self, and Parinispanna-svabhava is the nature of emptiness and no-self, which is also emptiness and no-self. The original nature of the Truth of Suffering is empty because it is not what I possess. It is no-self because it is not singular and permanent. The aspects of what can be observed and what is observed are both connected, so it is said that they are both real. In reality, these two natures are not included in the Truth of Suffering. The initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the final Parinispanna-svabhava are real in nature but false in truth. It should be known that each of the four aspects under the Truth of Suffering (impermanence, suffering, emptiness, no-self) has three aspects, which are divided into three aspects according to Parikalpita-svabhava, Paratantra-svabhava, and Parinispanna-svabhava. The initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the final Parinispanna-svabhava are both real in nature. From the perspective of truth, they are both false. The middle Paratantra-svabhava is real in both nature and truth. However, in Paratantra-svabhava, the undefiled Paratantra-svabhava is included in the Truth of the Path (道諦), and the defiled Paratantra-svabhava is included in the Truth of Suffering. It includes a small part of Paratantra-svabhava. According to the Dharma Master's explanation in the commentary on the Madhyantavibhaga (辨中邊論), the aspect of impermanence connects the three natures, so it is said that the aspect of what can be conditioned has what is clung to, etc. In reality, this aspect does not connect the initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the final Parinispanna-svabhava. Also, judging by reason, impermanence conditions the three truths. The initial nature is not included in the truth. Saying that it conditions it means that all minds condition the saying of impermanence. It is falsely said to be the aspect of impermanence, but in reality, this aspect does not include it. Also, because that nature is falsely named impermanence. The following aspects should all be explained according to this. Now, according to this explanation, impermanence, suffering, etc., are the aspects of the Truth of Suffering, not the aspects of the initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the final Parinispanna-svabhava. Saying the initial Parikalpita-svabhava and the final Parinispanna-svabhava
者皆是假說。準空無我攝初后性亦是假說。彼非諦攝故非此行相 今又助釋。前解據三乘苦．集等諦不攝真如。依大乘宗四諦亦攝圓成實性。故涅槃經云。聲聞之人有苦有諦而無其實。菩薩之人亦有其實。實即真如。菩薩亦能依四諦詮觀圓成實。故苦．集諦亦攝彼二。雖非苦．集而是彼性。若依此釋。四三各后性．諦俱實。又邪行如等即諦真性。約詮顯體。如通四諦。故四三后性．諦俱實。
未離系集。假實準知。但為二釋。由是集性未離系。離系非集。即擇滅故。約未離系集之真性名為集者。性．諦俱實 以業煩惱名為集者。此即諦假。
滅諦初滅。要集三解。初解諦實性假。自性不生。是擇滅故(即與第二不別) 后釋性．諦俱實 無故不生。性實可爾。常故不生。與本性滅何別。故唯第二依本疏正。
中滅。依法師辨中邊疏。護法．安惠二師釋別。依護法雲。斷此二取所得不生。不生是擇滅。由依依他起而得於滅。假說為依他起。此意即性假諦實。安惠釋云。二取即遍計所報。二取所依識自體分是依他起。二取所依自體分斷得不生。不生是滅。假名依他。今言二取意取所依識之自體。
三本性滅者。辨中邊云。謂垢寂二即擇滅及真如。法師中邊疏云。安惠云。垢寂二種。一染垢寂。即
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：這些都是假說。即使是包含初始和最終性質的準空無我（Śūnyatā，空性，無自性）也是假說。因為它不屬於真諦的範疇，所以不是這種行相（ākāra，相狀）。現在進一步解釋。之前的解釋基於三乘（Triyāna，聲聞乘、緣覺乘、菩薩乘）的苦、集等諦（satya，真理）不包含真如（Tathatā，如如，事物的真實本性）。根據大乘（Mahāyāna，大乘佛教）的宗義，四諦（catvāri āryasatyāni，四聖諦）也包含圓成實性（Pariniṣpanna，圓滿成就的自性）。所以《涅槃經》（Nirvāṇa Sūtra）說：『聲聞（Śrāvaka，聲聞乘的修行者）之人有苦有諦，但沒有其實質。菩薩（Bodhisattva，菩薩）之人也有其實質。』這個『實』就是真如。菩薩也能依靠四諦來詮釋和觀察圓成實。因此，苦、集諦也包含那兩者。雖然不是苦、集，但卻是它們的性質。如果按照這種解釋，四諦和三種後來的性質都是真實的。此外，邪行如等就是真諦的真實性質，是關於詮釋和顯現本體的。如通達四諦一樣，所以四諦和三種後來的性質都是真實的。 未脫離束縛的集諦（samudayasatya，集諦），其真實與虛假可以類推得知。但有兩種解釋。由於集諦的性質尚未脫離束縛，脫離束縛就不是集諦，因為那是擇滅（Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha，通過智慧選擇而達到的寂滅）。如果將尚未脫離束縛的集諦的真性稱為集諦，那麼其性質和真諦都是真實的。如果以業（karma，行為）和煩惱（kleśa，精神上的困擾）作為集諦，那麼這就是虛假的真諦。 滅諦（nirodhasatya，滅諦）的初始寂滅，需要三種解釋。第一種解釋是真諦是真實的，性質是虛假的。自性不生，因為那是擇滅（這與第二種解釋沒有區別）。后一種解釋是性質和真諦都是真實的。沒有了，所以不生。性質真實是可以理解的。但如果是常有的，所以不生，那與本性寂滅有什麼區別？因此，只有第二種解釋是依據原本的疏文才是正確的。 中間的寂滅，依據法師（Dharmācārya）對《辨中邊論》（Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya，分別闡述中道與邊見的論著）的疏解。護法（Dharmapāla）和安慧（Sthiramati）兩位論師的解釋不同。依據護法的說法，斷除這兩種執取（二取，對主客體的執取）所獲得的不生，不生就是擇滅。由於依靠依他起（paratantra，依賴於其他條件而生起）而獲得寂滅，所以假說為依他起。這個意思是性質是虛假的，真諦是真實的。安慧解釋說，二取就是遍計所執（parikalpita，虛妄分別）。二取所依賴的識（vijñāna，意識）的自體分是依他起。斷除二取所依賴的自體分而獲得不生，不生就是寂滅，假名為依他。現在所說的二取，指的是所依賴的識的自體。 第三種本性寂滅，在《辨中邊論》中說：『所謂的垢寂二者，就是擇滅和真如。』法師在《辨中邊論》的疏解中說：『安慧說，垢寂有兩種，一是染垢寂，即……』
【English Translation】 English version: These are all hypothetical constructs. Even the quasi-non-self (Śūnyatā, emptiness, absence of inherent existence) encompassing initial and final natures is a hypothetical construct. Because it is not included within the category of truth (satya), it is not this aspect (ākāra, form). Now, further explanation. The previous explanation was based on the fact that the truths of suffering, origin, etc., of the Three Vehicles (Triyāna, Śrāvakayāna, Pratyekabuddhayāna, Bodhisattvayāna) do not encompass Suchness (Tathatā, the true nature of things). According to the doctrine of the Mahāyāna (Great Vehicle), the Four Noble Truths (catvāri āryasatyāni) also encompass the perfectly established nature (Pariniṣpanna, the perfectly accomplished nature). Therefore, the Nirvāṇa Sūtra says: 'The person of the Śrāvaka (Hearer, a practitioner of the Śrāvakayāna) has suffering and truth, but does not have its substance. The person of the Bodhisattva (Enlightenment Being) also has its substance.' This 'substance' is Suchness. The Bodhisattva can also rely on the Four Noble Truths to interpret and contemplate the perfectly established nature. Therefore, the truths of suffering and origin also encompass those two. Although they are not suffering and origin, they are their nature. If according to this explanation, the Four Noble Truths and the three subsequent natures are all real. Furthermore, wrong conduct and the like are the true nature of truth, which is about interpreting and manifesting the essence. Just as one understands the Four Noble Truths, so the Four Noble Truths and the three subsequent natures are all real. The truth of origin (samudayasatya) that has not yet been separated from bondage, its truth and falsity can be inferred analogously. But there are two explanations. Because the nature of the truth of origin has not yet been separated from bondage, separation from bondage is not the truth of origin, because that is cessation through discernment (Pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha, cessation attained through wise discrimination). If the true nature of the truth of origin that has not yet been separated from bondage is called the truth of origin, then its nature and truth are both real. If karma (action) and afflictions (kleśa, mental disturbances) are taken as the truth of origin, then this is a false truth. The initial cessation of the truth of cessation (nirodhasatya), requires three explanations. The first explanation is that the truth is real, and the nature is false. The self-nature does not arise, because that is cessation through discernment (this is no different from the second explanation). The latter explanation is that the nature and truth are both real. Because there is nothing, therefore it does not arise. That the nature is real is understandable. But if it is permanent, therefore it does not arise, then what is the difference from the cessation of inherent nature? Therefore, only the second explanation is correct according to the original commentary. The intermediate cessation, according to the Dharma Master's (Dharmācārya) commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (Commentary on Distinguishing the Middle from the Extremes). The explanations of the two masters Dharmapāla and Sthiramati differ. According to Dharmapāla's explanation, the non-arising obtained by cutting off these two graspings (dualistic grasping, grasping of subject and object), non-arising is cessation through discernment. Because cessation is obtained by relying on dependent origination (paratantra, arising in dependence on other conditions), it is hypothetically called dependent origination. The meaning of this is that the nature is false, and the truth is real. Sthiramati explains that dualistic grasping is the imagined nature (parikalpita, false discrimination). The self-nature division of consciousness (vijñāna, consciousness) on which dualistic grasping relies is dependent origination. Cutting off the self-nature division on which dualistic grasping relies and obtaining non-arising, non-arising is cessation, hypothetically named dependent origination. The dualistic grasping now referred to refers to the self-nature of the consciousness on which it relies. The third kind of cessation of inherent nature, in the Madhyāntavibhāga it says: 'The so-called defilement and quiescence are cessation through discernment and Suchness.' The Dharma Master in his commentary on the Madhyāntavibhāga says: 'Sthiramati says that there are two kinds of defilement and quiescence, one is defiled quiescence, which is...'
煩惱障斷。謂擇滅。二不染垢寂。即所知障斷。謂真如或。總解云。由垢寂故總得二。謂擇滅及真如。或垢寂故得擇滅。或性寂故即真如。總含二種故言垢寂二 然成唯識說二取滅即是擇滅。辨中邊說擇滅即本性收。二論說別者。中邊約所依．所得二各別故。所依依他假名為二取滅。或所得屬本性。唯識不約所依。但辨所得假名依他。故分擇滅。此意以中邊論云二二取滅。即能取二取二取不生。三本性滅。謂垢．寂二即擇滅及真如。以辨中邊說所依即能所取為二取滅。說所得即斷二取已所得擇滅。故分為二。唯識不說所依二取。但辨所得斷二取已所得擇滅假名依他。實是擇滅。故於本性滅中分出擇滅名二取滅。即諦實也。辨中邊論說所依二取無名二取滅。即彼所滅名之為滅。實依他起。性實諦假。若依識變名為擇滅。亦同此釋。本性滅者。依中邊論擇滅為本性。性．諦俱實 真如二說。若唯據詮性實諦假。詮．旨合說性．諦俱實。準涅槃經。諦攝法盡。真如非滅。即攝法不盡故。或滅之實性真如名本性滅。亦性．諦俱實。
道諦三者。要集云。三皆性假諦實。知所執無。斷染依他證真如理。凈分依他非所斷故。非所證故 今謂不爾。三作證道能證圓成實故。常無常門非圓實攝漏無漏門亦圓成收。真如所證成實。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 煩惱障斷，稱為擇滅（Nirvana obtained by discrimination）。二取（Duality of perception）不染垢寂，即所知障斷，稱為真如（Tathata）或本性寂（Primordial quiescence）。總的解釋是，由於垢寂的緣故，總共得到兩種，即擇滅及真如。或者說，因為有垢寂而得到擇滅，或者因為本性寂靜就是真如。總共包含兩種，所以說垢寂二者。 然而《成唯識論》（Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi）說二取滅就是擇滅。《辨中邊論》（Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya）說擇滅歸於本性收攝。兩部論典說法不同的原因是，《辨中邊論》從所依（basis）和所得（result）兩個方面分別說明，所依是依他起性（paratantra-svabhāva）的假名，稱為二取滅；或者所得屬於本性。而《成唯識論》不從所依的角度，只辨析所得的假名依他起性，所以區分出擇滅。這個意思是，《辨中邊論》說二取滅，即能取和所取二者不生；三本性滅，指的是垢寂二者，即擇滅及真如。因為《辨中邊論》說所依即能取和所取為二取滅，說所得即斷除二取后所得到的擇滅，所以分為兩種。《成唯識論》不說所依的二取，只辨析所得的斷除二取后所得到的擇滅，假名依他起性，實際上是擇滅。所以在本性滅中分出擇滅，名為二取滅，這是諦實（ultimate truth）。《辨中邊論》說所依的二取無名二取滅，即彼所滅名為滅，實際上是依他起性，性是實諦是假。如果依據識變（vijñāna-pariṇāma）稱為擇滅，也可以這樣解釋。本性滅，依據《辨中邊論》，擇滅為本性，性和諦都是實有。 真如的兩種說法，如果僅僅根據詮釋，性是實有，諦是假有；詮釋和旨意合起來說，性和諦都是實有。參照《涅槃經》（Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra），諦包含一切法，真如不是滅，即沒有包含一切法。或者說，滅的實性真如名為本性滅，也是性和諦都是實有。 道諦（Mārga-satya）的三種，要集（Essentials）中說，三種都是性假諦實，知道所執著的沒有，斷除染污的依他起性，證得真如的道理。清凈部分的依他起性不是所斷的，也不是所證的。 現在認為不是這樣。三種作為證道，能夠證得圓成實性（pariniṣpanna-svabhāva），常無常門不是圓成實性所包含的，有漏無漏門也歸於圓成實性收攝。真如是所證的圓成實性。
【English Translation】 English version The cessation of afflictive obstructions is called Nirvana obtained by discrimination (擇滅, ze mie). The non-contamination and quiescence of the two apprehensions (二取, er qu, Duality of perception) is the cessation of cognitive obstructions, called Tathata (真如) or Primordial quiescence (本性寂, ben xing ji). The general explanation is that due to the quiescence of defilements, two are obtained in total, namely Nirvana obtained by discrimination and Tathata. Alternatively, because of the quiescence of defilements, Nirvana obtained by discrimination is obtained, or because primordial quiescence is Tathata. Because it contains two types in total, it is said that defilement and quiescence are two. However, the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi (成唯識論) says that the cessation of the two apprehensions is Nirvana obtained by discrimination. The Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (辨中邊論) says that Nirvana obtained by discrimination is included in the fundamental nature. The reason why the two treatises differ is that the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya explains them separately from the two aspects of the basis (所依, suo yi) and the result (所得, suo de). The basis is the imputed name of the paratantra-svabhāva (依他起性, dependent nature), called the cessation of the two apprehensions; or the result belongs to the fundamental nature. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi does not consider the basis, but only distinguishes the imputed name of the dependent nature of the result, so it distinguishes Nirvana obtained by discrimination. The meaning of this is that the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya says that the cessation of the two apprehensions means that the apprehender and the apprehended do not arise; the three fundamental nature cessations refer to the two, defilement and quiescence, namely Nirvana obtained by discrimination and Tathata. Because the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya says that the basis, namely the apprehender and the apprehended, is the cessation of the two apprehensions, and that the result is the Nirvana obtained by discrimination obtained after the cessation of the two apprehensions, it is divided into two. The Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi does not speak of the two apprehensions of the basis, but only distinguishes the Nirvana obtained by discrimination obtained after the cessation of the two apprehensions, which is the imputed name of the dependent nature, but is actually Nirvana obtained by discrimination. Therefore, Nirvana obtained by discrimination is separated from the fundamental nature cessation and named the cessation of the two apprehensions, which is the ultimate truth (諦實, di shi). The Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya says that the two apprehensions of the basis have no name for the cessation of the two apprehensions, that is, what is ceased is called cessation, which is actually the paratantra-svabhāva, the nature is real and the truth is false. If it is called Nirvana obtained by discrimination according to vijñāna-pariṇāma (識變, transformation of consciousness), it can also be explained in this way. The fundamental nature cessation, according to the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya, Nirvana obtained by discrimination is the fundamental nature, and both the nature and the truth are real. Regarding the two explanations of Tathata, if only based on the interpretation, the nature is real and the truth is false; if the interpretation and the meaning are combined, both the nature and the truth are real. Referring to the Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra (涅槃經), the truth includes all dharmas, and Tathata is not cessation, that is, it does not include all dharmas. Alternatively, the real nature of cessation, Tathata, is called the fundamental nature cessation, and both the nature and the truth are real. The three of the Truth of the Path (道諦, Mārga-satya), the Essentials (要集) says that all three are nature false and truth real, knowing that what is clung to is non-existent, cutting off the defiled paratantra-svabhāva, and realizing the principle of Tathata. The pure part of the paratantra-svabhāva is neither what is cut off nor what is realized. Now it is thought that this is not the case. The three act as the path to realization, and can realize the pariniṣpanna-svabhāva (圓成實性, perfectly accomplished nature), the gate of permanence and impermanence is not included in the pariniṣpanna-svabhāva, and the gate of contaminated and uncontaminated is also included in the pariniṣpanna-svabhāva. Tathata is the pariniṣpanna-svabhāva that is realized.
四智慧證成實。故性．諦俱實。
論三解脫門等。若薩婆多準俱舍論二十八云。空三摩地。謂空．非我二種行相相應等持。無相三摩地。謂緣滅諦四種行相相應等持。涅槃離十相故名無相。緣彼三摩地得無相名。十相者何。謂五境為五。男女二種。三有為相。無愿三摩地。謂緣余諦十種行相相應等持 有何所以 答彼論云非常若因可厭患故。道如船筏必應舍故。能緣彼定得無愿名。皆為超過現所對故 此意為欲趣涅槃故名超所對 若爾空．非我相是苦諦行。何非無愿 答彼論云。非所厭舍。以與涅槃相相似故。此三各二。世．出世間等持別故。中無漏者名解脫門。能與涅槃為入門故。復有重者唯有漏定厭聖道故。無漏不然。即無學人不時解脫 初空空。緣前無學空三摩地取彼空相。空相順厭勝非我故。無愿無愿。緣前無學無愿等持。取非常相。不取苦．因等。非無漏故(不取苦及集因集生緣所以)。不取道等為厭舍故(以無漏法不順厭故)。無相無相。謂緣無學無相三摩地非擇為境。以無漏法無擇滅故(此釋不緣擇滅所以)。但取靜相非滅．妙．離。濫非常故(釋不取滅相所以)。是無記性故(釋不取妙離所以)。唯三洲人依十一地除七近分。
依大乘說諸文不同。初辨攝行。后明行境。瑜伽五十五云。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：四種智慧能夠證明真實性，因此自性和真諦都是真實的。
關於三解脫門等。如果按照薩婆多部的《俱舍論》第二十八卷所說：空三摩地，是指與空、非我兩種行相相應的等持。無相三摩地，是指緣于滅諦四種行相相應的等持。涅槃因為遠離十種相狀，所以稱為無相，緣於此（滅諦）的三摩地得到無相的名稱。十相是什麼呢？是指五境（色、聲、香、味、觸）為五種，男女兩種，三有（欲有、色有、無色有）為相。無愿三摩地，是指緣于其餘諦（苦、集、道）十種行相相應的等持。有什麼原因呢？回答是《俱舍論》中說：因為（苦、集）非常，是可厭惡的；道如船筏，必定應該捨棄。能夠緣於此（苦、集、道）的禪定得到無愿的名稱，都是爲了超過現在所對治的（煩惱）的緣故。這裡的含義是想要趣向涅槃，所以稱為超過所對治。
如果這樣，空、非我相是苦諦的行相，為什麼不是無愿呢？回答是《俱舍論》中說：不是所厭惡捨棄的，因為它與涅槃的相相似。這三種（三摩地）各有兩種，因為世間和出世間的等持不同。其中無漏的稱為解脫門，能夠作為進入涅槃的門徑。還有更重要的原因是隻有有漏的禪定才厭惡聖道，無漏的則不然，也就是無學之人不時解脫。最初的空空，是緣於前一個無學（阿羅漢）的空三摩地，取彼空相，空相順應厭離勝過非我。無愿無愿，是緣於前一個無學的無愿等持，取非常相，不取苦、因等，因為不是無漏的（不取苦及集因集生緣的原因）。不取道等，因為要厭惡捨棄（因為無漏法不順應厭惡）。無相無相，是指緣于無學無相三摩地，不以擇滅為境界，因為無漏法沒有擇滅（這是解釋不緣擇滅的原因）。但取靜相，不取滅、妙、離，因為容易與非常相混淆（解釋不取滅相的原因），而且是無記性的（解釋不取妙離的原因）。只有三洲（南贍部洲、東勝身洲、西牛貨洲）的人依於十一地（欲界四地，未至定，中間定，色界四根本定），除了七近分（欲界四根本煩惱，有頂三根本煩惱）。
依據大乘的說法，各種經文不同。首先辨別攝行，然後說明行境。《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷說：
【English Translation】 English version: The four wisdoms can prove reality, therefore, nature (性) and truth (諦) are both real.
Regarding the three doors of liberation (三解脫門) and so on. According to the Sarvastivada school's Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (俱舍論), volume 28: The Samadhi of emptiness (空三摩地) refers to the concentration (等持) that corresponds to the aspects of emptiness (空) and non-self (非我). The Samadhi of signlessness (無相三摩地) refers to the concentration that corresponds to the four aspects of cessation (滅諦). Nirvana (涅槃) is called signless because it is free from the ten signs. The Samadhi that is based on it (cessation) is called signless. What are the ten signs? They are the five objects of sense (五境) (form, sound, smell, taste, touch), the two genders (男女), and the three realms of existence (三有) (desire realm, form realm, formless realm). The Samadhi of wishlessness (無愿三摩地) refers to the concentration that corresponds to the ten aspects of the remaining truths (苦、集、道). What is the reason for this? The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya says: Because (suffering and accumulation) are impermanent (非常) and are to be厭患; the path (道) is like a raft and must be abandoned. The Samadhi that is based on them (suffering, accumulation, and the path) is called wishlessness because it is intended to overcome what is currently being opposed (煩惱). The meaning here is that it is called overcoming what is opposed because it is intended to lead to Nirvana.
If that is the case, why are the aspects of emptiness and non-self, which are aspects of the truth of suffering (苦諦), not wishlessness? The Abhidharmakośabhāṣya says: Because they are not to be厭惡 and abandoned, as they are similar to the aspect of Nirvana. Each of these three (Samadhis) has two types because the concentrations of the mundane (世間) and supramundane (出世間) are different. The one that is without outflows (無漏) is called the door of liberation because it can serve as the entrance to Nirvana. Furthermore, the more important reason is that only the concentration with outflows (有漏) dislikes the holy path (聖道), while the one without outflows does not. That is, those who are beyond learning (無學) are liberated at all times. The initial emptiness of emptiness is based on the Samadhi of emptiness of the previous one who is beyond learning (Arhat), taking that aspect of emptiness. The aspect of emptiness accords with厭離 and surpasses non-self. The wishlessness of wishlessness is based on the Samadhi of wishlessness of the previous one who is beyond learning, taking the aspect of impermanence. It does not take suffering, cause, etc., because it is not without outflows (the reason for not taking suffering and the causes and conditions of accumulation). It does not take the path, etc., because it is to be厭惡 and abandoned (because the Dharma without outflows does not accord with厭惡). The signlessness of signlessness refers to the Samadhi of signlessness of the one who is beyond learning, not taking cessation through discrimination (擇滅) as its object, because the Dharma without outflows does not have cessation through discrimination (this explains the reason for not being based on cessation through discrimination). It only takes the aspect of stillness, not cessation, exquisiteness, or separation, because it is easily confused with the aspect of impermanence (this explains the reason for not taking the aspect of cessation), and it is of an indeterminate nature (無記性) (this explains the reason for not taking exquisiteness or separation). Only the people of the three continents (南贍部洲, 東勝身洲, 西牛貨洲) rely on the eleven grounds (the four grounds of the desire realm, 未至定, 中間定, the four fundamental concentrations of the form realm), except for the seven proximate concentrations (the four fundamental afflictions of the desire realm, the three fundamental afflictions of the peak of existence).
According to the Mahayana teachings, the texts differ. First, distinguish the practices that are included, and then explain the objects of practice. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論), volume 55, says:
幾是空行。謂二行。即苦諦后二行。幾是無願行。謂六。即苦諦前二及集諦一切。幾是無相行。謂滅諦一切。幾是清凈因所顯行。謂道諦一切。此意空．無我行順空行故。六是有漏。不可願故。四是滅諦。無十相故。道下四行有二解。一云通三脫門。論云是清凈因所顯行故。三解脫門俱清凈因。能得涅槃故。以空．無我通諸諦故。以是有為不可願故。無男女等相故。一云非三攝。但說清凈因行所顯。不言三脫。道下四行。非空無我不是空行。非有漏故不是無愿。是有為故非無十相。故非三收。前釋為勝。此一複次 準六十八云。空行無我行見名空行。余行見名無願行。一行見名無相行。謂于滅諦離系行見 此意即說。空無我行是空行。無常．苦．集．道八是無願行。滅諦下四是無相行。此意道諦是有為故屬無願行。余義準前。此第二複次 準瑜伽十二。云何空三摩地。空有四種。一觀察空。謂觀察諸法空無常．樂。乃至空無我及我所等。此有二解。一云苦下四行俱是空行。無彼常．樂．我及我所皆名為空。一云但言無常無樂。不言是苦。但空．無我是空等持。
云何無願心三摩地。謂於五取蘊思惟無常。或思惟苦心住一緣 準亦有二解。一云既言於五取蘊觀無常．苦。通苦．集下六種行相。但言無常．苦者。舉
【現代漢語翻譯】 幾行是空行（Śūnyatākara，觀察諸法為空性之行）？ 謂二行。即苦諦（Duḥkha Satya，關於痛苦的真理）后二行。幾行是無願行（Aṇihitākāra，不希求任何事物的行）？ 謂六行。即苦諦前二及集諦（Samudaya Satya，關於痛苦根源的真理）一切。幾行是無相行（Animittākāra，不執著于任何相的行）？ 謂滅諦（Nirodha Satya，關於痛苦止息的真理）一切。幾行是清凈因所顯行？ 謂道諦（Mārga Satya，關於通往痛苦止息之道的真理）一切。此意為空、無我行順空行故。六是有漏（Sāsrava，仍受煩惱影響），不可願故。四是滅諦，無十相故。道諦下四行有二解。一說通三解脫門（Trimokṣa，三種解脫之門，即空、無相、無愿）。論中說，是清凈因所顯行故。三解脫門俱清凈因，能得涅槃（Nirvāṇa，解脫）。以空、無我通諸諦故。以是有為（Saṃskṛta，有條件的，非永恒的）不可願故。無男女等相故。一說非三攝。但說清凈因行所顯，不言三脫。道諦下四行，非空無我，不是空行。非有漏故，不是無愿。是有為故，非無十相，故非三收。前釋為勝。此一複次，準六十八說，空行、無我行見名空行。余行見名無願行。一行見名無相行。謂于滅諦離系行見。此意即說，空無我行是空行。無常、苦、集、道八行是無願行。滅諦下四行是無相行。此意道諦是有為故，屬無願行。余義準前。此第二複次，準瑜伽十二說，云何空三摩地（Śūnyatā Samādhi，空性三摩地）？空有四種。一觀察空。謂觀察諸法空無常、樂，乃至空無我及我所等。此有二解。一說苦諦下四行俱是空行。無彼常、樂、我及我所，皆名為空。一說但言無常無樂，不言是苦。但空、無我是空等持。 云何無願心三摩地（Aṇihita Samādhi，無愿三摩地）？謂於五取蘊（Pañcupādānaskandha，構成經驗的五種聚合）思惟無常，或思惟苦心住一緣。準亦有二解。一說既言於五取蘊觀無常、苦，通苦、集下六種行相。但言無常、苦者，舉例而已。
【English Translation】 How many are the 'emptiness' aspects (Śūnyatākara, aspects of observing all dharmas as empty)? Two. Namely, the latter two aspects of the Truth of Suffering (Duḥkha Satya, the truth about suffering). How many are the 'wishlessness' aspects (Aṇihitākāra, aspects of not desiring anything)? Six. Namely, the first two aspects of the Truth of Suffering and all aspects of the Truth of Origin (Samudaya Satya, the truth about the origin of suffering). How many are the 'signlessness' aspects (Animittākāra, aspects of not clinging to any signs)? All aspects of the Truth of Cessation (Nirodha Satya, the truth about the cessation of suffering). How many are the aspects manifested by the cause of purity? All aspects of the Truth of the Path (Mārga Satya, the truth about the path to the cessation of suffering). This means that the aspects of emptiness and selflessness accord with the emptiness aspect. The six are 'with outflows' (Sāsrava, still influenced by afflictions) because they are undesirable. The four are the Truth of Cessation because they lack the ten signs. There are two interpretations of the four aspects under the Truth of the Path. One says they connect to the three doors of liberation (Trimokṣa, the three doors of liberation, namely emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness). The treatise says they are aspects manifested by the cause of purity. The three doors of liberation are all causes of purity, capable of attaining Nirvāṇa (Nirvāṇa, liberation). Because emptiness and selflessness pervade all truths. Because they are conditioned (Saṃskṛta, conditioned, not eternal) and undesirable. Because they lack signs such as male and female. One says they are not included in the three. It only speaks of aspects manifested by the cause of purity, not mentioning the three liberations. The four aspects under the Truth of the Path are neither emptiness nor selflessness, so they are not emptiness aspects. Because they are not 'with outflows', they are not wishlessness aspects. Because they are conditioned, they do not lack the ten signs, so they are not included in the three. The former interpretation is superior. This is one further explanation, according to the sixty-eighth, the view of emptiness and selflessness aspects is called the emptiness aspect. The view of the remaining aspects is called the wishlessness aspect. The view of one aspect is called the signlessness aspect. Namely, the view of the detachment aspect in the Truth of Cessation. This means that the emptiness and selflessness aspects are the emptiness aspect. The eight aspects of impermanence, suffering, origin, and path are the wishlessness aspect. The four aspects under the Truth of Cessation are the signlessness aspect. This means that the Truth of the Path is conditioned, so it belongs to the wishlessness aspect. The remaining meanings are as before. This is the second further explanation, according to the Yoga twelve, what is the emptiness Samādhi (Śūnyatā Samādhi, emptiness Samādhi)? There are four kinds of emptiness. First, observing emptiness. Namely, observing that all dharmas are empty of permanence, pleasure, and even empty of self and what belongs to self. There are two interpretations of this. One says that all four aspects under the Truth of Suffering are emptiness aspects. The absence of permanence, pleasure, self, and what belongs to self are all called emptiness. One says that only impermanence and suffering are mentioned, not suffering. Only emptiness and selflessness are emptiness Samādhi. What is the wishlessness Samādhi (Aṇihita Samādhi, wishlessness Samādhi)? Namely, contemplating impermanence in the five aggregates of clinging (Pañcupādānaskandha, the five aggregates that constitute experience), or contemplating suffering with the mind dwelling on one object. There are also two interpretations according to the standard. One says that since it speaks of contemplating impermanence and suffering in the five aggregates of clinging, it encompasses the six aspects under the Truth of Suffering and Origin. But mentioning only impermanence and suffering is just an example.
果行相攝集因四。準此道理空中二解。前解亦得。一云準文但無常．苦名無願行。即不攝集。以于果上多計常．樂而起愿求。今偏治此故。但苦下無常．苦二為無願行 云何無相心三摩地。謂即于彼諸取蘊滅。思惟寂靜心住一緣 準此無相攝滅四行。性無相故。道四行相非三等持。義準前解。此第三複次 十二次下云。又覆滅．道俱應曉了。意說無相行所曉了。即滅．道八俱無相門。滅諦是果。道是功德。俱為所了。即無相門攝滅．道八。據能無相及性無相。第四複次 又云。十二次下云。若於此處無有彼物。由此道理觀之為空故名空性。即所觀空無可希愿故名無愿。觀此遠離一切行相故名無相。準此所說十六行相各三所攝。依無性義。第五複次 瑜伽八十六云。由三解脫門增上力故立四嗢拖南。一切行無常。一切行苦者。依無愿立。一切法無我者。依空建立。涅槃寂靜者。依無相立。準此所明。無愿攝十二。無常通三諦故。空攝十六。皆無我故。無相攝四。滅是涅槃故。依通行相。先無所愿。次方觀空。因空證滅。第六複次 依七十二。三解脫與五事相攝中。若是相邊十六行相各通三攝。彼云如是五事幾是空是空境。無愿無相為問亦同 答相通三種。亦三種境 此意三脫以相為體。即少分是能觀。全分是所觀。各通
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『果行相攝集因四』。依照這個道理，『空中』有兩種解釋。前一種解釋也成立。一種說法是，按照經文，只有『無常』、『苦』才稱為『無願行』，即不包含『集』。因為在果報上，人們多計較常樂而生起愿求，現在專門對治這種情況，所以只有『苦』下的『無常』、『苦』二者才算是『無願行』。 『什麼是無相心三摩地（Samadhi，禪定）？』就是對於那些取蘊（Skandha，構成個體的要素）的滅除，思惟寂靜，心住於一境。 依照這個道理，『無相』包含『滅』四行相，因為其自性是無相的。道四行相不是三等持（Samādhi，禪定）。意義上依照前一種解釋。這是第三種解釋。 『十二次下』說：『又，滅、道都應該曉了。』意思是說無相行所曉了的，就是滅、道八，都屬於無相門。滅諦（Nirodha Satya，苦滅的真理）是果，道是功德，都是所要曉了的。即無相門包含滅、道八。根據能無相和性無相。這是第四種解釋。 又說：『十二次下』說：『如果在這裡沒有那個事物，由此道理觀察它為空，所以稱為空性。』即所觀的空沒有什麼可以希望的，所以稱為無愿。觀察這個遠離一切行相，所以稱為無相。依照這個說法，十六行相各自包含三種。依據無性義。這是第五種解釋。 《瑜伽師地論》第八十六卷說：『由於三解脫門（三解脫門指空解脫門、無相解脫門、無愿解脫門）增上力的緣故，建立四嗢拖南（Udana，自說偈）。』『一切行無常，一切行苦』，依據無愿建立。『一切法無我』，依據空建立。『涅槃寂靜』，依據無相建立。依照這個說明，無愿包含十二，因為無常貫通三諦（三諦指空諦、假諦、中諦）。空包含十六，因為都是無我的。無相包含四，因為滅就是涅槃。依據通行相，先沒有所愿，然後才觀察空，因為空而證得滅。這是第六種解釋。 依據第七十二卷，三解脫與五事相攝中，如果是相邊，十六行相各自貫通三種。那裡說：『像這樣五事中有幾個是空，是空境？』無愿無相的提問也相同。 回答說：『相貫通三種，也是三種境。』 這個意思是三脫以相為體，即少部分是能觀，全部分是所觀，各自貫通。
【English Translation】 English version: 『The fruit conduct mutually includes the collection of causes, four in total.』 According to this principle, there are two interpretations of 『emptiness』. The former interpretation also holds. One explanation is that, according to the text, only 『impermanence』 and 『suffering』 are called 『desirelessness conduct』, which does not include 『accumulation』. Because people often calculate permanence and pleasure on the results and generate desires, now specifically addressing this situation, only 『impermanence』 and 『suffering』 under 『suffering』 are considered 『desirelessness conduct』. 『What is the Samadhi (Samadhi, meditative absorption) of the signless mind?』 It is contemplating stillness and focusing the mind on one object, regarding the cessation of those aggregates (Skandha, the elements that constitute an individual). According to this principle, 『signlessness』 includes the four aspects of 『cessation』, because its nature is signless. The four aspects of the path are not the three Samadhis (Samādhi, meditative absorption). In meaning, it follows the previous interpretation. This is the third explanation. 『Below the twelfth time』 it says: 『Also, cessation and the path should both be understood.』 It means that what is understood by signless conduct is cessation and the path, eight in total, all belonging to the signless gate. Nirodha Satya (Nirodha Satya, the truth of the cessation of suffering) is the fruit, and the path is merit, both of which are to be understood. That is, the signless gate includes cessation and the path, eight in total. Based on the ability to be signless and the nature of being signless. This is the fourth explanation. It also says: 『Below the twelfth time』 it says: 『If there is no such thing here, observing it as empty according to this principle, it is called emptiness.』 That is, the emptiness observed has nothing to be hoped for, so it is called desirelessness. Observing this is to be away from all aspects, so it is called signlessness. According to this statement, the sixteen aspects each include three. Based on the meaning of no-self nature. This is the fifth explanation. Yoga-bhumi-sastra, Volume Eighty-six says: 『Due to the increasing power of the three doors of liberation (the three doors of liberation refer to the door of emptiness, the door of signlessness, and the door of desirelessness), four Udānas (Udana, spontaneous verses) are established.』 『All conditioned things are impermanent, all conditioned things are suffering』, based on desirelessness. 『All dharmas are without self』, based on emptiness. 『Nirvana is quiescent』, based on signlessness. According to this explanation, desirelessness includes twelve, because impermanence pervades the three truths (the three truths refer to the truth of emptiness, the truth of provisional existence, and the truth of the middle way). Emptiness includes sixteen, because they are all without self. Signlessness includes four, because cessation is Nirvana. According to the common aspects, first there is no desire, and then emptiness is observed, because of emptiness, cessation is attained. This is the sixth explanation. According to Volume Seventy-two, among the mutual inclusion of the three liberations and the five matters, if it is on the side of aspects, the sixteen aspects each pervade three. It says there: 『Like this, how many of the five matters are emptiness, are the realm of emptiness?』 The questions of desirelessness and signlessness are the same. The answer is: 『The aspects pervade three, and are also three realms.』 The meaning of this is that the three liberations take aspects as their substance, that is, a small part is the observer, and the whole part is the observed, each pervading.
三攝。諦行是相故各通三分。若據名說名通三諦。實唯苦．道。是無記故非集諦攝。隨聲假說亦是集諦。得通無漏亦道諦收。依名行相通空．無愿。故三諦下四行少分空．無愿攝。故彼論云。名非三種是二種境。意除無相。若依分別苦．集諦八各可三攝。能觀通三諦故。若據所觀空．無愿攝。彼云分別通三是二種境 滅下四行空．無相攝。彼云。真如非三種。是空無相境。道四行相。若依能觀通三門攝。若約所觀空行所攝。彼云。正智通三種。是空所行境。準上所明。依相十六各三所攝據餘四言。空攝十六。無愿攝苦．集八。無相攝滅下四。又云若無差別總說為空．無愿．無相。此與相同。準此中明。依相乃無差別。同第十二第三複次 今者此中依所觀境取依餘四攝。行有別為第七複次 準七十四及顯揚第六。依三自性如次建立三解脫門。各緣一境。若據此說。空解脫門不攝諦行。遍計所執非是諦故。無愿解脫攝苦．集．道十二相行。是依他故。無相解脫攝滅諦四。第八複次 依顯揚第二云。空無相無愿各有所知及能知智。攝行有二。初以四諦為所觀境。斷妄證真于生死中不起希愿。彼云空行者。謂于諸行我不可得。及諸相中世俗分別法不可得。此意觀人我．法我二俱為空。亦攝苦諦下空行相。以我及所俱是空故攝二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 三攝：諦行（觀察真諦的行相）因為是行相，所以各自通於三分。如果根據名稱來說，名稱通於三諦（苦諦、集諦、滅諦）。實際上唯有苦諦和道諦。因為是無記性，所以不被集諦所攝。隨順音聲假說，也可以說是集諦。得通於無漏，也被道諦所收攝。依靠名稱的行相，通於空、無愿。所以三諦下的四行，少分被空、無愿所攝。所以《瑜伽師地論》說：『名稱不是三種，是二種境界』，意在排除無相。如果依靠分別，苦諦和集諦的八行各自可以被三者所攝。能觀通於三諦的緣故。如果根據所觀，則被空、無愿所攝。該論說：『分別通於三種，是二種境界』。滅諦下的四行被空、無相所攝。該論說：『真如不是三種，是空無相的境界』。道諦的四行相，如果依靠能觀，則通於三門所攝。如果約所觀來說，則被空行所攝。該論說：『正智通於三種，是空所行的境界』。參照上面所說明的，依靠行相，十六行各自被三者所攝，根據其餘四行來說，空攝取十六行，無愿攝取苦諦和集諦的八行，無相攝取滅諦下的四行。又說，如果沒有差別，總的來說就是空、無愿、無相。這與上面相同。參照這裡所說明的，依靠行相乃至於沒有差別，與第十二第三複次相同。現在這裡依靠所觀的境界，取依靠其餘四行來攝取。行有差別，是第七複次。參照第七十四卷和《顯揚聖教論》第六卷，依靠三自性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性），如次第建立三解脫門（空解脫門、無相解脫門、無愿解脫門），各自緣於一種境界。如果根據這個說法，空解脫門不攝取締行，因為遍計所執性不是真諦的緣故。無愿解脫門攝取苦諦、集諦、道諦的十二相行，因為是依他起性的緣故。無相解脫門攝取滅諦的四行。第八複次：依靠《顯揚聖教論》第二卷說，空、無相、無愿各自有所知和能知之智。攝取行有兩種。首先以四諦為所觀境界，斷除虛妄，證得真實，在生死中不起希求願望。該論說：『空行者，是指在諸行中我不可得，以及諸相中世俗分別法不可得。』這個意思是觀察人我和法我二者都為空。也攝取苦諦下的空行相，因為我和所都是空的緣故，所以攝取二者。
【English Translation】 English version Threefold Inclusion: The aspects of the Truths (諦行 dì xíng) are included in each of the three divisions because they are aspects. If based on name, the name encompasses the Three Truths (三諦 sān dì) [suffering, accumulation, cessation]. In reality, it is only suffering and the path. Because it is indeterminate, it is not included in the Truth of Accumulation. Following the sound of provisional speech, it can also be said to be the Truth of Accumulation. Attainment is connected to the unconditioned and is also included in the Truth of the Path. Relying on the aspect of the name, it is connected to emptiness and desirelessness. Therefore, the four aspects under the Three Truths are partially included in emptiness and desirelessness. Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Name is not threefold; it is a twofold realm,' intending to exclude signlessness. If relying on discrimination, the eight aspects of the Truths of Suffering and Accumulation can each be included in three. Because the ability to observe connects to the Three Truths. If based on what is observed, it is included in emptiness and desirelessness. That treatise says: 'Discrimination connects to three; it is a twofold realm.' The four aspects under cessation are included in emptiness and signlessness. That treatise says: 'Suchness is not threefold; it is the realm of emptiness and signlessness.' The four aspects of the Truth of the Path, if relying on the ability to observe, are included in the three doors. If speaking of what is observed, it is included in the aspect of emptiness. That treatise says: 'Right knowledge connects to three; it is the realm of what is practiced in emptiness.' According to the above explanation, relying on the aspects, the sixteen are each included in three. According to the remaining four aspects, emptiness includes the sixteen. Desirelessness includes the eight of suffering and accumulation. Signlessness includes the four under cessation. Furthermore, it says that if there is no difference, generally speaking, it is emptiness, desirelessness, and signlessness. This is the same as above. According to this explanation, relying on the aspects, there is no difference, the same as the twelfth and third repetition. Now, here, relying on the observed realm, taking reliance on the remaining four to include. The aspects are different, which is the seventh repetition. According to the seventy-fourth volume and the sixth volume of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, relying on the three natures (三自性 sān zì xìng) [the imagined nature, the dependent nature, and the perfected nature], the three doors of liberation (三解脫門 sān jiě tuō mén) [emptiness, signlessness, and desirelessness] are established in order, each connected to one realm. If according to this explanation, the door of liberation of emptiness does not include the aspects of the Truths, because the imagined nature is not a true Truth. The door of liberation of desirelessness includes the twelve aspects of the Truths of Suffering, Accumulation, and the Path, because it is the dependent nature. The door of liberation of signlessness includes the four aspects of the Truth of Cessation. Eighth repetition: According to the second volume of the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra, emptiness, signlessness, and desirelessness each have what is known and the wisdom that knows. There are two ways to include the aspects. First, taking the Four Truths (四諦 sì dì) as the observed realm, cutting off delusion and realizing truth, not arising with hopes and desires in birth and death. That treatise says: 'The practitioner of emptiness means that in all aspects, I am unobtainable, and in all signs, worldly discriminated dharmas are unobtainable.' This means observing that both the person-self and the dharma-self are empty. It also includes the aspect of emptiness under the Truth of Suffering, because both the I and what is mine are empty, therefore including both.
行相。無相行者。謂即于諸行中。眾生無我性可得。及法無我性可得。及於滅中滅．靜．妙．離行 此意觀如及擇滅為無相。二無我性即真如故。約廢詮談旨離滅．靜等別說二如。若詮．旨合明。即靜．妙等攝。準此無相攝滅四行。無願行者。謂無常．苦乃至云因．集．生．緣行。準此即攝無常及苦．集四行相。準上所明。道四行相非三所攝。非妄故非空。非真故有相。菩提故可願。若據能觀行相。道能作三亦即攝三。故彼前言空有二種。一所知。二智。餘二亦爾。又云緣智空道作道．如．行．出行。此亦是空。此意智緣空境智亦名空。道諦所攝名智空道。余皆準此。緣智無相道。作道如．行．出行。此亦是無相。緣智無愿道。作道．如．行．出行。此亦是無愿。雖能所殊同五十五三門俱攝。五十五文有二解。依前解與彼同。據后解此即別。第九複次 雜集第十一三解脫門攝十六行。與瑜伽論第十二同無相攝八謂滅．道諦。意少有別。彼云由彼不能作諸相故。此由滅性無相故。能觀智作無相行。能遣諸相故。諸文不同各據一義。略如前說。廣煩且止。前猶廣明 今更略者。一說。準五十一。空攝二行。謂苦諦下空．無我行。無愿攝六。謂苦諦下無常及苦並集下四。由觀苦果因於三界中不願求故。無相攝四。即滅四行。
道或通三。或非三攝 第二準六十八。空攝同前。無愿攝十。苦諦前二。集．道各四。無相攝四。滅下四行。第三準瑜伽第十二。空攝苦四。或但攝二。謂空．非我。無愿攝二。謂苦．無常。或可攝六。並集下四。無相攝四同前所說 第四又十二說。若約應知。無相攝八。滅．道各四。余同第三 第五亦十二說。三脫各攝十六行相 第六說準八十六。無愿攝十二。但除滅四。空攝十六。無相攝四 第七說準七十二。約相．名等五法明者。一云約相十六各通三解脫攝。無非相故。據名攝者。空及無愿。攝初三諦十二少分。有非名故。據分別說。苦．集八行各通三攝。據正智說。空攝道四。據如如說。空及無相攝滅下四。依相同前。依名等四攝即有別。合之第七。開之成十。名等攝諦各有寬狹。攝行不同故 十一說。準七十四。空解脫門不攝十六。依遍計性立空解脫故。無愿解脫攝苦．集．道三四十二。無相攝四。即滅行相 第十二說。依顯揚論第二說者。與五十五同有十一解。與五十五別。成十二釋。披前可智。略不更舉。準顯揚等。解脫即門。以能觀智無漏離縛名為解脫。故彼論云。若解脫言之唯是無漏修惠非余。即持業釋 或可。正能為解脫門。有漏是遠方便非正。不得名解脫門。據遠方便有漏亦是。依此解者解脫
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 道或通三（三種解脫門）。或非三攝：第二種說法參照《瑜伽師地論》第六十八卷。空解脫門（Śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha）的攝取範圍與之前相同。無愿解脫門（Apranihita-vimokṣa-mukha）攝取十種行相。苦諦（Duḥkha-satya）的前兩種行相，集諦（Samudaya-satya）和道諦（Mārga-satya）各四種。無相解脫門（Animitta-vimokṣa-mukha）攝取四種行相，即滅諦（Nirodha-satya）的后四種行相。 第三種說法參照《瑜伽師地論》第十二卷。空解脫門攝取苦諦的四種行相，或者只攝取兩種，即空和非我。無愿解脫門攝取兩種，即苦和無常。或者可以攝取六種，包括集諦的下四種行相。無相解脫門攝取四種行相，與前面所說相同。 第四種說法又有十二種說法。如果從應知的角度來說，無相解脫門攝取八種行相，即滅諦和道諦各四種。其餘與第三種說法相同。 第五種說法也有十二種說法。三種解脫門各自攝取十六種行相。 第六種說法參照第八十六卷。無愿解脫門攝取十二種行相，只是除去滅諦的四種。空解脫門攝取十六種行相，無相解脫門攝取四種行相。 第七種說法參照第七十二卷。如果從相、名等五法的角度來說明，一種觀點認為，從相的角度來說，十六種行相各自通於三種解脫門，因為沒有不是相的。從名的角度來說，空解脫門和無愿解脫門攝取初三諦（苦、集、滅）的十二種少分，因為有不是名的。從分別的角度來說，苦諦和集諦的八種行相各自通於三種解脫門。從正智的角度來說，空解脫門攝取道諦的四種行相。從如如的角度來說，空解脫門和無相解脫門攝取滅諦的下四種行相。從相的角度來說與前面相同。從名等四種的角度來說就有區別。合起來是第七種說法，分開來就成了十種說法。名等攝取的諦各有寬窄，攝取的行相也不同。 第十一種說法參照第七十四卷。空解脫門不攝取十六種行相，因為是依據遍計所執性（Parikalpita-svabhāva）而建立空解脫的。無愿解脫門攝取苦諦、集諦、道諦的三四十二種行相。無相解脫門攝取四種行相，即滅諦的行相。 第十二種說法，依據《顯揚聖教論》（Abhidharma-samuccaya）第二卷的說法，與第五十五卷相同，有十一種解釋。與第五十五卷不同，成就了十二種解釋。參考前面的內容就可以理解，這裡不再贅述。參照《顯揚聖教論》等，解脫就是門，以能觀的智慧，無漏離縛，名為解脫。所以該論說，如果說解脫，就只是無漏的修慧，不是其他的，這就是持業釋。或者，正能作為解脫門，有漏是遠的方便，不是正的，不能稱為解脫門。依據遠的方便，有漏也是。依據這種解釋，解脫。
【English Translation】 English version The path either connects to the three (three doors of liberation), or is not encompassed by the three. The second explanation refers to the sixty-eighth volume of the Yoga-ācāra-bhūmi-śāstra. The scope of the Śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha (door of emptiness liberation) is the same as before. The Apranihita-vimokṣa-mukha (door of signlessness liberation) encompasses ten aspects. The first two aspects of Duḥkha-satya (truth of suffering), and four aspects each of Samudaya-satya (truth of origin) and Mārga-satya (truth of the path). The Animitta-vimokṣa-mukha (door of wishlessness liberation) encompasses four aspects, namely the last four aspects of Nirodha-satya (truth of cessation). The third explanation refers to the twelfth volume of the Yoga-ācāra-bhūmi-śāstra. The Śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha encompasses the four aspects of Duḥkha-satya, or only two, namely emptiness and non-self. The Apranihita-vimokṣa-mukha encompasses two, namely suffering and impermanence. Or it can encompass six, including the last four aspects of Samudaya-satya. The Animitta-vimokṣa-mukha encompasses four aspects, the same as mentioned before. The fourth explanation has twelve sub-explanations. If viewed from the perspective of what should be known, the Animitta-vimokṣa-mukha encompasses eight aspects, namely four each of Nirodha-satya and Mārga-satya. The rest is the same as the third explanation. The fifth explanation also has twelve sub-explanations. Each of the three doors of liberation encompasses sixteen aspects. The sixth explanation refers to the eighty-sixth volume. The Apranihita-vimokṣa-mukha encompasses twelve aspects, except for the four aspects of Nirodha-satya. The Śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha encompasses sixteen aspects, and the Animitta-vimokṣa-mukha encompasses four aspects. The seventh explanation refers to the seventy-second volume. If explained from the perspective of the five dharmas such as characteristics and names, one view is that from the perspective of characteristics, each of the sixteen aspects is connected to the three doors of liberation, because there is nothing that is not a characteristic. From the perspective of names, the Śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha and Apranihita-vimokṣa-mukha encompass twelve small portions of the first three truths (suffering, origin, cessation), because there are things that are not names. From the perspective of distinctions, the eight aspects of Duḥkha-satya and Samudaya-satya are each connected to the three doors of liberation. From the perspective of correct wisdom, the Śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha encompasses the four aspects of Mārga-satya. From the perspective of suchness, the Śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha and Animitta-vimokṣa-mukha encompass the last four aspects of Nirodha-satya. From the perspective of characteristics, it is the same as before. From the perspective of the four, such as names, there are differences. Combining them is the seventh explanation, separating them becomes ten explanations. The truths encompassed by names etc. each have different widths, and the aspects encompassed are also different. The eleventh explanation refers to the seventy-fourth volume. The Śūnyatā-vimokṣa-mukha does not encompass sixteen aspects, because the emptiness liberation is established based on the Parikalpita-svabhāva (completely imputed nature). The Apranihita-vimokṣa-mukha encompasses the twelve aspects of Duḥkha-satya, Samudaya-satya, and Mārga-satya. The Animitta-vimokṣa-mukha encompasses four aspects, namely the aspects of Nirodha-satya. The twelfth explanation, according to the explanation in the second volume of the Abhidharma-samuccaya, is the same as the fifty-fifth volume, with eleven explanations. Different from the fifty-fifth volume, it achieves twelve explanations. Refer to the previous content for understanding, and it will not be repeated here. According to the Abhidharma-samuccaya etc., liberation is the door, with the wisdom of observation, non-outflow and freedom from bondage, it is called liberation. Therefore, the treatise says that if liberation is mentioned, it is only non-outflow cultivation wisdom, not others, this is the possessive determinative compound. Or, it can be the door of liberation, the outflow is a distant convenience, not the right one, and cannot be called the door of liberation. According to the distant convenience, the outflow is also. According to this explanation, liberation.
即是涅槃。因此觀智為門。得入解脫之門。依主釋也。據前持業。解脫門有三。據后依主。解脫體一。不可言三。由此三空能為彼門。應云三是解脫之門。或解脫之三門。準顯揚第二。空無相愿俱通境智。即境為門。若無彼境。智如何起。若境非彼。智不稱境。不名正智。智稱境生方名正智。故能觀智用境為門。如教與智及義為門。智因言教方能悟理。理亦因教而方得顯與二為門。三解脫門應知亦爾。然所觀境名為門者。即所變相未真證故。無為解脫因門方顯。解脫之智因門能證。故佛地論大空無相為所入門。明有能入。能入即智。或能觀智名之為門。理由智顯。言所入門者。因智為門果智方入。如四神足。足雖即定。從四因生定。亦定生故。應智由智入。準此而明理通二釋。言二空門義亦準此。
論。世俗有三。皆持業釋。由此二空能顯了真。非即真如故名世俗 或取所顯帶相觀真。未是親證。望廢詮證故名顯了。亦持業釋。
論。勝義有三一義勝義。本疏依士。今助一釋。亦得持業義謂道理。勝者無過。如似涅槃名為無上。此勝亦爾。更無過故亦即名勝。此理即勝名義勝義。初義是理。后即勝道理。義中最勝。或境義中勝名義勝義。論依對智依士為名。今談法體勝劣相形。持業為目 行勝義。亦通持
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這就是涅槃（Nirvana，解脫輪迴的境界）。因此，觀智是進入解脫之門。這是依主釋的解釋。如果按照前面的持業釋，解脫門有三個。如果按照後面的依主釋，解脫的本體只有一個，不能說是三個。因此，三種空性（三空：空、無相、無愿）可以作為進入涅槃之門，應該說三空是解脫之門，或者說是解脫的三門。參照《顯揚聖教論》第二卷，空、無相、無愿都通於境和智。以境為門，如果沒有那個境，智慧如何生起？如果境不是那個境，智慧就不符合境，不能稱為正智。智慧符合境而生起，才稱為正智。所以能觀之智用境作為門，如同教與智以及義作為門一樣。智慧因為言教才能領悟真理，真理也因為言教才能顯現，所以以教和義為門。三種解脫門也應該這樣理解。然而，所觀的境被稱為門，是因為所變的相還沒有真正證得。無為解脫的因門才能顯現，解脫的智慧因為門才能證得。所以《佛地經論》說，大空和無相是所入門，說明有能入者，能入者就是智慧。或者能觀之智被稱為門，理由是智慧顯現。說所入門，是因為以智慧為門，果智才能進入，如同四神足（四種達到禪定的方法）。神足雖然就是禪定，但從四種因生起禪定，也是禪定生起的原因。應該說智慧通過智慧進入。按照這個道理來理解，兩種解釋都通順。二空門（空門和無相門）的意義也參照這個來理解。
論：世俗有三種，都是持業釋。因為這兩種空性（空和無相）能夠顯現真如，但不是真如本身，所以稱為世俗。或者取所顯現的，帶著相來觀察真如，還沒有親證。相對於廢除詮釋和證明，所以稱為顯了，也是持業釋。
論：勝義有三種，第一種是義勝義。原本的疏解依據士釋，現在我輔助一種解釋，也可以用持業釋。義是指道理，勝是指沒有超過的。如同涅槃被稱為無上一樣，這種勝也是如此，因為沒有超過它的。這種道理就是勝，所以稱為義勝義。前面的義是道理，後面就是勝道理，在義中最勝。或者在境義中勝，稱為義勝義。論依據對智，依據士釋來命名。現在談論法體的勝劣，用持業釋來命名。行勝義，也通用持業釋。
【English Translation】 English version: This is Nirvana (the state of liberation from the cycle of rebirth). Therefore, contemplative wisdom is the gate to enter the door of liberation. This is an interpretation based on the possessive compound. According to the previous determinative compound, there are three gates of liberation. According to the latter possessive compound, the essence of liberation is one, and it cannot be said to be three. Therefore, the three emptinesses (three emptinesses: emptiness, signlessness, wishlessness) can serve as the gate to enter Nirvana. It should be said that the three emptinesses are the gate of liberation, or the three gates of liberation. Referring to the second volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, emptiness, signlessness, and wishlessness all connect to both object and wisdom. Taking the object as the gate, if there is no such object, how can wisdom arise? If the object is not that object, wisdom does not conform to the object and cannot be called correct wisdom. Only when wisdom arises in accordance with the object can it be called correct wisdom. Therefore, the wisdom of contemplation uses the object as the gate, just as teaching, wisdom, and meaning serve as the gate. Wisdom can only comprehend truth through verbal teachings, and truth can only be revealed through verbal teachings, so teaching and meaning serve as the gate. The three gates of liberation should also be understood in this way. However, the object of contemplation is called the gate because the transformed appearance has not yet been truly realized. The causal gate of unconditioned liberation can then be revealed, and the wisdom of liberation can be realized through the gate. Therefore, the Buddhabhūmi-sūtra-śāstra says that great emptiness and signlessness are what is entered, indicating that there is an enterer, and the enterer is wisdom. Or the wisdom of contemplation is called the gate, because wisdom is revealed. Saying what is entered is because the wisdom of fruition can only enter through the wisdom of cause as the gate, just like the four divine abodes (four methods to attain samadhi). Although the divine abodes are samadhi, samadhi arises from the four causes, and it is also the cause of samadhi. It should be said that wisdom enters through wisdom. According to this principle, both interpretations are valid. The meaning of the two emptiness gates (the emptiness gate and the signlessness gate) should also be understood in this way.
Treatise: There are three types of conventional truth, all of which are determinative compounds. Because these two emptinesses (emptiness and signlessness) can reveal Suchness, but are not Suchness itself, they are called conventional truth. Or taking what is revealed, observing Suchness with appearances, it is not yet direct realization. Relative to abolishing explanation and proof, it is called manifestation, which is also a determinative compound.
Treatise: There are three types of ultimate truth, the first being the ultimate truth of meaning. The original commentary is based on the genitive compound, and now I assist with an explanation, which can also use the determinative compound. Meaning refers to reason, and supreme refers to unsurpassed. Just as Nirvana is called unsurpassed, this supreme is also like that, because there is nothing surpassing it. This reason is supreme, so it is called the ultimate truth of meaning. The former meaning is reason, and the latter is the supreme reason, which is the most supreme in meaning. Or being supreme in the meaning of object, it is called the ultimate truth of meaning. The treatise is based on the opposition to wisdom, and is named based on the genitive compound. Now we discuss the superiority and inferiority of the essence of the Dharma, and use the determinative compound to name it. The ultimate truth of practice also commonly uses the determinative compound.
業。如世第一法。據行法中無漏最勝。無漏行即勝義。論據緣境。今談智體勝劣相形。行即勝義。俱名道理。俱是諦故。以別簡總。行中之勝。依士為目。
論。聚集分位等者。分位假者。依法分位作用不同。立別法名名分位假。即忿．覆等。論云煩惱分位等流性故。分位即忿等。等流無慚等。如名．句等但分位假。論云三分位。故佛一剎那聲亦能詮。無文說此不相應法是相續假 又放逸等既分位假。不放逸等返此可知。若云既與四俱不同忿等何名分位者。亦不然。生等法俱何名分位。若云前後位殊名為分位。亦防修．不防修位殊名為分位 或通分位及聚集假 擇．非擇滅亦分位假。無為雖非起盡。分位亦得。名為染凈分位。故法華經名為法位。然今論云圓成實性唯是實有。不由他緣而施設者。據真如說。非謂擇滅之待他緣 又釋唯實雖由智顯。本性自有。不由緣生而施設故。
成唯識論了義燈卷第六(末) 大正藏第 43 冊 No. 1832 成唯識論了義燈
成唯識論了義燈卷第七(本)(論第九)
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼撰
論云。即依此前所說三性等者。解此前後。略為三釋。一云無性先陳。三性后說。今釋外難即指論。云即依此前所明三性中。世尊經中后時解說三種
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：業，如世第一法（lokikāgradharma，世間最殊勝之法）。就修行法而言，無漏（anāsrava，沒有煩惱）最為殊勝。無漏行即是勝義（paramārtha，究竟真實）。論據是緣境。現在討論的是智慧本體的勝劣比較。行即是勝義，兩者都可稱為道理，因為兩者都是諦（satya，真理）。用區別來概括整體，行中的殊勝，依據修行者而立名。
論：聚集分位等，分位是假立的。依據法的分位作用不同，設立不同的法名，這叫做分位假，例如忿（krodha，憤怒）、覆（mrakśa，隱藏）等。論中說，煩惱的分位是等流性，分位即是忿等，等流是無慚（āhrīkya，無恥）等。如名、句等只是分位假。論中說三分位，所以佛陀一剎那的聲音也能詮釋。沒有文獻說這些不相應法是相續假。另外，放逸（pramāda，放縱）等既然是分位假，不放逸（apramāda，不放縱）等反過來可以知道。如果說，既然放逸等與四法都不同，忿等又憑什麼稱為分位呢？也不是這樣。生等法都存在，又憑什麼稱為分位呢？如果說前後位置不同叫做分位，那麼防修和不防修的位置不同也叫做分位。或者可以通用於分位和聚集假。擇滅（pratisamkhyā-nirodha，通過智慧選擇而達到的滅盡）和非擇滅（apratisamkhyā-nirodha，非通過智慧選擇而達到的滅盡）也是分位假。無為法（asaṃskṛta-dharma，不生不滅的法）雖然沒有生起和滅盡，也可以有分位，叫做染凈分位。所以《法華經》中稱為法位。然而現在的論中說，圓成實性（pariniṣpanna-svabhāva，圓滿成就的自性）唯是實有，不是由其他因緣而施設的，這是根據真如（tathatā，如實）而說的，不是說擇滅要依賴其他因緣。另外解釋唯實，雖然由智慧顯現，但本性自有，不是由因緣而生起而施設的。
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第六（末） 《大正藏》第43冊 No. 1832 《成唯識論了義燈》
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第七（本）（論第九）
淄洲大云寺苾芻惠沼撰
論中說：即依據此前所說的三性等。解釋這段前後文，大概有三種解釋。一種說法是無性（nihsvabhāva，無自性）先陳述，三性（trisvabhāva，三種自性）后說。現在解釋外人的疑問，即指論中說，即依據此前所明的三性中，世尊在經中後來解說三種。
【English Translation】 English version: Karma, such as the Highest Worldly Dharma (lokikāgradharma). Regarding the practice of Dharma, the unconditioned (anāsrava) is the most supreme. The unconditioned practice is the ultimate meaning (paramārtha). The argument is based on the object of cognition. Now we are discussing the relative superiority of the essence of wisdom. Practice is the ultimate meaning, and both can be called reason, because both are truth (satya). Using distinction to summarize the whole, the superiority in practice is named according to the practitioner.
Treatise: Aggregation, division, etc. Division is provisional. Based on the different functions of the divisions of Dharma, different names of Dharma are established, which is called provisional division, such as anger (krodha), concealment (mrakśa), etc. The treatise says that the division of afflictions is of the nature of outflow, division is anger, etc., and outflow is shamelessness (āhrīkya), etc. Such as name, sentence, etc., are only provisional divisions. The treatise says three divisions, so the Buddha's voice in one moment can also explain. There is no literature saying that these non-corresponding Dharmas are provisional continuity. Also, since indulgence (pramāda) etc. are provisional divisions, non-indulgence (apramāda) etc. can be known in reverse. If it is said that since indulgence etc. are different from the four Dharmas, why are anger etc. called divisions? It is not so. Since the Dharmas of birth etc. all exist, why are they called divisions? If it is said that different positions before and after are called divisions, then the different positions of guarding practice and not guarding practice are also called divisions. Or it can be applied to both division and provisional aggregation. Cessation by discrimination (pratisamkhyā-nirodha) and cessation without discrimination (apratisamkhyā-nirodha) are also provisional divisions. Although unconditioned Dharma (asaṃskṛta-dharma) does not have arising and ceasing, it can also have divisions, called defiled and pure divisions. Therefore, in the Lotus Sutra, it is called the position of Dharma. However, the current treatise says that the perfected nature (pariniṣpanna-svabhāva) is only real, and is not established by other conditions, which is based on suchness (tathatā), not saying that cessation by discrimination depends on other conditions. Another explanation of only reality, although manifested by wisdom, is inherent in nature, and is not established by arising from conditions.
Commentary on the Meaning of the Consciousness-Only Treatise, Volume 6 (End) Taisho Tripitaka, Volume 43, No. 1832, Commentary on the Meaning of the Consciousness-Only Treatise
Commentary on the Meaning of the Consciousness-Only Treatise, Volume 7 (Beginning) (Treatise 9)
Composed by Bhikshu Huizhao of Dayun Temple in Zizhou
The treatise says: 'Based on the three natures mentioned earlier, etc.' To explain this context, there are roughly three explanations. One explanation is that the absence of nature (nihsvabhāva) is stated first, and the three natures (trisvabhāva) are stated later. Now, to explain the doubts of outsiders, it refers to the treatise saying, 'Based on the three natures previously explained, the World Honored One later explained the three types in the sutras.'
無性。雖前總說諸法無性。不為顯說三種無性。後方分別所說無者即依三性。云立彼后說。非三性後方說無性。如第一卷釋外難云若唯有識。云何世間及諸聖教說有我法。論主為答所說我法皆依識變。不是先說唯識后說我法。此解亦順深密三時 問既三性后陳無性先說。何故此論及深密等先明三性 答欲顯無性必依三性是故先舉。何以故。為能遍計必依所計方起妄執。所以先舉 問若爾何故深密經中先說三性 答彼為德本菩薩先問於何齊何立善巧菩薩。世尊為答於此三性齊此三性施設善巧。非始問答所說三性。如百法論問答一切法及以無我非先不說。又深密經中勝義生菩薩。不牒前說三性為問。但舉世尊先說諸蘊．諦等善巧。何故復立一切諸法皆無自性。明不是前先說三性。今外舉經難此前說。故論主答不違彼教后說無性 一云前．后經說三性．無性。故今論云即依此前。此前兼二。依此論前。及依經前說三自性。觀生意樂密意趣故后立無性。今此為會顯不相違 問何故先說三種自性。后說無性 答順機欲故。欲顯無性依三性故。故顯揚十六云。當知無性不離自性。是故先說三自性義 問若爾何故說三性教為第三時。應第二時。在空前故。又準深密。同坐一經非前．后故 答經辨三時非約前後。但以類相從有為第一。
{ "translations": [ "現代漢語譯本：", "無性。雖然前面總體上說了諸法無性（dharma-svabhāva-śūnyatā，一切事物本質皆空），但並沒有明確闡述三種無性（tri-svabhāva-śūnyatā，三種無自性）。後面才分別說明所說的『無』是依據三種自性（tri-svabhāva，三種自性）而建立的。意思是說，是先有三種自性，然後才說無性，而不是在三種自性之後才說無性。如同《成唯識論》第一卷解釋外人的詰難時說：『如果只有識（vijñāna，意識），那麼世間以及諸聖教（ārya-dharma，聖者的教誨）所說的我（ātman，靈魂）和法（dharma，事物）又是什麼呢？』論主爲了回答這個問題，說明所說的我和法都是依據識的變現而產生的。並不是先說唯識（vijñānavāda，唯識論），然後才說我和法。這種解釋也符合《解深密經》的三時教（tri-kāla-dharma-cakra，佛陀的三次教法）。", "問：既然在三種自性之後才陳述無性，為什麼這部論以及《解深密經》等要先闡明三種自性呢？", "答：爲了顯示無性必定要依據三種自性，所以先舉出三種自性。為什麼呢？因為能遍計所執性（parikalpita-svabhāva，虛構的自性）必定要依靠所計度的對象才能產生虛妄的執著，所以先舉出三種自性。", "問：如果這樣，為什麼《解深密經》中先說三種自性呢？", "答：那是爲了德本菩薩（Guṇākara-bodhisattva，功德根本菩薩）先問世尊：『於何齊何立善巧菩薩（kauśalya-bodhisattva，善巧菩薩）？』世尊爲了回答這個問題，才說『於此三性齊此三性施設善巧』。並非一開始的問答就說了三種自性。如同《百法明門論》的問答中，關於一切法以及無我（anātman，無我）的討論，也不是一開始就沒有說。而且，《解深密經》中，勝義生菩薩（Paramārthotpāda-bodhisattva，真實生菩薩）並沒有重複前面所說的三種自性來提問，只是舉出世尊先前所說的諸蘊（skandha，五蘊）、諦（satya，四諦）等善巧。這表明不是先前先說了三種自性。現在外面引用經文來反駁前面所說，所以論主回答說不違背那部經的教義，是後來說的無性。一種說法是，前後的經文都說了三種自性和無性，所以現在這部論說『即依此前』。這裡的『此前』兼指兩種情況：依據這部論的前面，以及依據經文前面所說的三種自性。爲了觀察眾生的意樂和密意，所以後來才建立無性。現在這是爲了會通，顯示不相違背。", "問：為什麼先說三種自性，后說無性呢？", "答：爲了順應眾生的根機和意願。想要顯示無性是依據三種自性而建立的。所以《顯揚聖教論》第十六卷說：『應當知道無性不離自性。』因此先說三種自性的含義。", "問：如果這樣，為什麼說三種自性的教義是第三時教，應該屬於第二時教才對，因為它在空（śūnyatā，空性）之前。而且按照《解深密經》的說法，同在一個法會上，不分先後。", "答：經文辨別三時教不是按照時間上的前後順序，而是按照教義的類別。從有為法（saṃskṛta-dharma，有為法）的角度來說，屬於第一時教。", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", "", 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空為第二。俱為第三。以三自性遍計是空。餘二是有故當第三 又據漸悟一類菩薩說此三時。非望頓悟 若爾何故先說了義。后陳不了 答華嚴等云。譬如日出先耀高山。于大乘教頓悟先熟故先三性。漸悟后成后說無性 若爾復違法華等教。以為漸悟第二說空第三空有。如何得言為漸悟故后時說空 答約頓．漸二性無性在後。偏據漸悟初．中．后殊空為第二。今此論中通對頓．漸兩教前後。故云即依此前頓悟菩薩所聞三性。后時為彼漸悟菩薩密立無性。故不相違。本疏所明意含二解。此順經文有前空后 又釋二教非定前後。深密且對一類宜聞有．空前．后。論云即依此前等。此順華嚴如來以一語言中。演出無邊契經海文。各有一理任情取捨。然第二勝。依文對機有差別故。
論。雖依他起非勝義故等者。云非者無也。無無分別智所緣之義故。故名勝義無性。故顯揚十六云。由無勝義性故。此意依他名勝義無自性性者有二義。一由依他體非勝義性故。名勝義無性性。無者非也。一由依他無自然生性。亦名無自性性 若爾應云勝義生無自性性。何故但云勝義無自性性 答言勝義無無彼勝義。若言生無恐緣生亦無。又不無生無故。但言勝義無。又濫二性。亦是勝義亦是生無前已說生無。今但說勝義無故不雙無。又復依
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『空』為第二時（指無自性性），『俱』（指空與有）為第三時（指圓成實性）。以三自性（指遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）來說，遍計所執性是空，其餘二者（依他起性、圓成實性）是有，所以圓成實性應當屬於第三時。又根據漸悟一類菩薩來說，這是三個階段，不是針對頓悟的菩薩。如果這樣，為什麼先說了義（究竟的教義），后說不了義（非究竟的教義）呢？回答是，《華嚴經》等經中說，譬如太陽出來先照耀高山，在大乘教法中，頓悟的根機先成熟，所以先說三性，漸悟的根機后成熟，所以後說無自性性。如果這樣，又違反了《法華經》等教法，認為漸悟的菩薩在第二時說空，第三時說空有，怎麼能說是爲了漸悟的緣故，在後來說空呢？回答是，就頓悟和漸悟兩種根機來說，無自性性在後。偏就漸悟的菩薩來說，初、中、后三個階段不同，空為第二時。現在這部論中，是針對頓悟和漸悟兩種教法的前後順序來說的，所以說，就是依據此前頓悟的菩薩所聽聞的三性，後來為那些漸悟的菩薩秘密地建立無自性性，所以不相違背。本疏所闡明的意義包含兩種解釋。這順應經文有前空後有的說法。又解釋兩種教法並非一定是前後關係。深密經是針對一類適合聽聞有和空的先後順序的根機。論中說，就是依據此前等。這順應《華嚴經》中如來以一種語言中，演出無邊契經海的說法。各自有一種道理，可以任憑自己的意願取捨。然而第二種解釋更好，因為依據經文針對不同的根機有差別。
論：『雖依他起非勝義故等者』，意思是說『非』就是『無』。因為沒有無分別智所緣的意義，所以名為勝義無自性性。所以《顯揚聖教論》第十六卷說：『由於沒有勝義性的緣故』。這個意思是指，依他起性名為勝義無自性性有兩種含義：一是由於依他起性的體不是勝義性的緣故，名為勝義無自性性，『無』就是『非』的意思。二是由於依他起性沒有自然產生的自性，也名為無自性性。如果這樣，應該說『勝義生無自性性』，為什麼只說『勝義無自性性』呢？回答是，說『勝義無』，是沒有那個勝義。如果說『生無』，恐怕會認為緣生也沒有了。而且不無生無的說法，所以只說『勝義無』。又會混淆兩種自性，既是勝義又是生無，前面已經說了生無，現在只說勝義無，所以不雙重否定。又依他起性
【English Translation】 English version: 'Emptiness' is the second time (referring to the Anabhilakṣaṇatā, signlessness), 'both' (referring to emptiness and existence) is the third time (referring to the Pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva, the perfected nature). In terms of the three Svabhāvas (Parikalpita-svabhāva, Paratantra-svabhāva, Pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva), the Parikalpita-svabhāva (the completely conceptualized nature) is empty, and the other two (Paratantra-svabhāva, Pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva) exist, so the Pariṇiṣpanna-svabhāva should belong to the third time. Furthermore, according to the Bodhisattvas of the gradual enlightenment type, these are three stages, not aimed at Bodhisattvas of sudden enlightenment. If so, why were the definitive meanings (the ultimate teachings) spoken first, and the non-definitive meanings (the non-ultimate teachings) spoken later? The answer is, the Avataṃsaka Sūtra and other scriptures say, for example, the sun comes out and first shines on the high mountains. In the Mahāyāna teachings, the roots of sudden enlightenment mature first, so the three Svabhāvas are spoken first. The roots of gradual enlightenment mature later, so the Anabhilakṣaṇatā is spoken later. If so, it violates the teachings of the Lotus Sūtra and other scriptures, which believe that Bodhisattvas of gradual enlightenment speak of emptiness in the second time and emptiness and existence in the third time. How can it be said that it is for the sake of gradual enlightenment that emptiness is spoken later? The answer is, in terms of the two types of roots of sudden and gradual enlightenment, the Anabhilakṣaṇatā is later. Specifically for Bodhisattvas of gradual enlightenment, the initial, middle, and later stages are different, and emptiness is the second time. Now, in this treatise, it is aimed at the order of the two teachings of sudden and gradual enlightenment, so it is said that it is based on the three Svabhāvas heard by the Bodhisattvas of sudden enlightenment before, and later the Anabhilakṣaṇatā is secretly established for those Bodhisattvas of gradual enlightenment, so there is no contradiction. The meaning clarified in the commentary contains two explanations. This conforms to the statement in the scriptures that there is emptiness first and existence later. Also, the two teachings are not necessarily in a sequential relationship. The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra is aimed at a type of root that is suitable for hearing the order of existence and emptiness. The treatise says that it is based on the previous, etc. This conforms to the statement in the Avataṃsaka Sūtra that the Tathāgata uses one language to perform the boundless ocean of scriptures. Each has a reason, and you can choose according to your own wishes. However, the second explanation is better, because there are differences based on the scriptures for different roots.
The treatise: 'Although the Paratantra-svabhāva is not the ultimate meaning, etc.', means that 'not' is 'non-existent'. Because there is no meaning of what is perceived by non-discriminating wisdom, it is called the Paramārtha-anabhilakṣaṇatā (ultimate signlessness). Therefore, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, volume sixteen, says: 'Because there is no ultimate nature'. This means that the Paratantra-svabhāva is called Paramārtha-anabhilakṣaṇatā has two meanings: one is because the substance of the Paratantra-svabhāva is not of the ultimate nature, it is called Paramārtha-anabhilakṣaṇatā, 'non-existent' means 'not'. The second is because the Paratantra-svabhāva does not have a naturally produced nature, it is also called Anabhilakṣaṇatā. If so, it should be called Paramārtha-utpāda-anabhilakṣaṇatā, why only say Paramārtha-anabhilakṣaṇatā? The answer is, saying 'Paramārtha-anabhilakṣaṇatā' means that there is no that ultimate meaning. If you say 'utpāda-anabhilakṣaṇatā', I am afraid that it will be thought that conditioned arising is also non-existent. Moreover, there is no statement of non-arising, so only say 'Paramārtha-anabhilakṣaṇatā'. It will also confuse the two natures, both the ultimate meaning and non-arising. The non-arising has already been said before, and now only the ultimate meaning is said, so it is not a double negative. Also, the Paratantra-svabhāva
他不但自然生無。所執相亦無故不言生無。又復無彼勝義無。不無相生無。據無分別智境義。依他不是故云非勝義 問何故不名非勝義無性。而云勝義無性 答顯密義故云勝義無性。勝義是相生無之所顯性。又顯依他上勝義性無。即勝義無之性。亦名勝義無性。略去之言。總云勝義無性性 何以得知有其之言 答深密第二云。無自性性之所顯故 若四俗真相對而辨。依他亦是后得勝智家之境義。若約親緣。后得相分亦得是清凈所緣名為勝義。深密等但說根本清凈所緣。云依他起非是清凈所緣 又勝義有三義。一勝之義。二勝為義。三勝即義。通本后說。四種勝義皆具此三。唯初世俗不具此三不名勝義 若爾何故唯說真如 答欲顯諸法真實性故。故深密經云。是一切法勝義諦故。無自性性之所顯故 故今此論名識實性。要集不悟云本所說違經謬說 問依他非勝義。亦說依他為勝義無自性性。圓成非緣生。亦得說圓實為生無自性性 答不例。若約遮詮非是生無自性性故。云生無自性性。即謂圓成非是生無自性性之性。若約表詮是生無自性性故。言生無自性性。即以顯是前二性之性故不相例 而要集云相例皆得。準此知非。又複本疏云依他起亦后得勝之義名勝義。即斷違經。說依他等為相無自性性等。出何聖教。即非為謬。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：他不僅僅是自然而然地沒有產生（自然生無），因為所執著的表象也沒有，所以不說『生無』。而且也沒有那勝義諦的『無』，並非沒有表象的產生『無』。這是根據無分別智所觀照的境界而言的。依他起性不是勝義諦，所以說『非勝義』。 問：為什麼不稱為『非勝義無性』，而稱為『勝義無性』呢？ 答：爲了顯示隱秘的含義，所以稱為『勝義無性』。勝義是表象產生『無』所顯現的自性。又顯示在依他起性上，勝義的自性是『無』，也就是勝義『無』的自性，也稱為『勝義無性』。省略了『之』字，總稱為『勝義無性性』。 問：如何得知有『之』字呢？ 答：《深密解脫經》第二品說：『無自性性之所顯故』。 如果從四種世俗諦和真諦相對照來辨析，依他起性也是后得勝智所觀照的境界。如果從親近的因緣來說，后得智的相分也可以是清凈所緣，稱為勝義。而《深密解脫經》等只說了根本清凈所緣，說依他起性不是清凈所緣。 而且勝義有三種含義：一是殊勝的含義（勝之義），二是殊勝所為的含義（勝為義），三是殊勝即是的含義（勝即義）。通用於根本智和后得智。四種勝義都具備這三種含義，只有最初的世俗諦不具備這三種含義，所以不稱為勝義。 如果這樣，為什麼只說真如（Tathata）呢？ 答：想要顯示諸法的真實自性。所以《深密解脫經》說：『是一切法勝義諦故，無自性性之所顯故』。 所以現在這部論典名為《識實性》。《要集》不理解，說根本智所說的與經文相違背，是錯誤的說法。 問：依他起性不是勝義，卻也說依他起性是勝義無自性性。圓成實性不是因緣所生，也可以說圓成實性是生無自性性嗎？ 答：不能類比。如果從遮詮的角度來說，它不是生無自性性，所以說『生無自性性』，就是說圓成實性不是生無自性性的自性。如果從表詮的角度來說，它是生無自性性，所以說『生無自性性』，就是爲了顯示它是前兩種自性的自性，所以不能類比。 而《要集》說可以類比，根據這個就知道是不對的。而且本疏說依他起性也是后得勝智的含義，名為勝義，這就斷絕了與經文相違背的說法。說依他起性等是相無自性性等，出自什麼聖教呢？這就不是錯誤的說法。
【English Translation】 English version: It is not only naturally unproduced (ziran sheng wu), because the apprehended appearances are also absent, therefore it is not said 'unproduced'. Moreover, there is also no ultimate truth 'absence', not the absence of phenomenal arising 'absence'. This is according to the realm contemplated by non-discriminating wisdom. Dependent origination (依他起性, yita qixing) is not the ultimate truth, therefore it is said 'non-ultimate truth'. Question: Why is it not called 'non-ultimate truth absence-of-inherent-existence', but called 'ultimate truth absence-of-inherent-existence'? Answer: To reveal the hidden meaning, it is called 'ultimate truth absence-of-inherent-existence'. Ultimate truth is the nature revealed by the absence of phenomenal arising. It also shows that on dependent origination, the nature of ultimate truth is 'absence', which is also called 'ultimate truth absence-of-inherent-existence'. The word 'zhi' (之) is omitted, and it is collectively called 'ultimate truth absence-of-inherent-existence-nature'. Question: How do we know there is the word 'zhi' (之)? Answer: The second chapter of the Samdhinirmocana Sutra (深密解脫經) says: 'Because it is revealed by the absence-of-inherent-existence-nature'. If analyzed in relation to the four conventional truths and the ultimate truth, dependent origination is also the realm contemplated by subsequent attained wisdom. If speaking from close causes and conditions, the aspect-division of subsequent attained wisdom can also be pure object, called ultimate truth. However, the Samdhinirmocana Sutra and others only speak of the fundamental pure object, saying that dependent origination is not a pure object. Moreover, ultimate truth has three meanings: first, the meaning of being supreme (sheng zhi yi), second, the meaning of being done for the sake of the supreme (sheng wei yi), and third, the meaning of being identical to the supreme (sheng ji yi). It applies to both fundamental wisdom and subsequent attained wisdom. The four kinds of ultimate truth all possess these three meanings, only the initial conventional truth does not possess these three meanings, therefore it is not called ultimate truth. If so, why only speak of Suchness (Tathata, 真如)? Answer: To reveal the true nature of all dharmas. Therefore, the Samdhinirmocana Sutra says: 'Because it is the ultimate truth of all dharmas, because it is revealed by the absence-of-inherent-existence-nature'. Therefore, this treatise is now called The Real Nature of Consciousness. Yaoji does not understand, saying that what is said by fundamental wisdom contradicts the sutras and is a false statement. Question: Dependent origination is not ultimate truth, but it is also said that dependent origination is the ultimate truth absence-of-inherent-existence-nature. Perfected reality is not produced by conditions, can it also be said that perfected reality is the absence-of-inherent-existence-nature of production? Answer: It cannot be compared. If speaking from the perspective of negation, it is not the absence-of-inherent-existence-nature of production, therefore it is said 'absence-of-inherent-existence-nature of production', which means that perfected reality is not the nature of the absence-of-inherent-existence-nature of production. If speaking from the perspective of affirmation, it is the absence-of-inherent-existence-nature of production, therefore it is said 'absence-of-inherent-existence-nature of production', which is to show that it is the nature of the previous two natures, so it cannot be compared. Yaoji says that it can be compared, according to this, we know that it is incorrect. Moreover, the original commentary says that dependent origination is also the meaning of subsequent attained wisdom, called ultimate truth, which cuts off the statement that it contradicts the sutras. Saying that dependent origination etc. are the absence-of-inherent-existence-nature of characteristics etc., from what sacred teaching does it come? This is not a false statement.
論。而濫第二故此不說者。西明云。恐此依他勝義。濫第二生無自性性故此不說 要集云勝 今謂不然。彼經論中說二勝義。依他在初。圓成第二。恐依他勝義濫第二圓成勝義。就解勝義相對簡濫。何關生無自性。畏濫簡彼何故須簡。此中意說。諸法勝義唯識真性。彼非實性恐濫故簡。若以依他恐濫生無自性性。不說為勝義無自性性。亦應依他名圓成實。恐濫第二依他起。不說為圓成實。既約別義名為勝義。與生無自性。義不相濫故不須簡。同名勝義濫故須簡 問何故三種皆云無性性 答且相無自性性。初言相無自性是法本性。相自體無。重言性者教立為性。意顯于相無自性說為相無性。非說有性名為無性。餘二準知 問何故顯揚十六。但云相無性等。不言相無自性性 答彼略本性但舉施設。故彼論云。當知由三無自性說三無性。一相無性。謂遍計所執自性。由此自性體相無故。此意說。相無性者。即說遍計所執自性由彼體無故說為相無性。余準此知 問三性俱無。云何深密但說遍計及圓成實。為無生無滅等。不說生無自性。為無生無滅等 答非由別觀三自性故起遍計所執。但總於二性增益遍計所執自性。說遍計性無生滅等。即通依．圓二上遍計。不欲說彼依．圓二無故。不得說生無自性性無生無滅等。以有
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 論：如果因為害怕混淆第二種性質而不說，西明的解釋是：恐怕依他起性（Paratantra-svabhava，事物由其他條件產生的性質）和勝義（Paramartha，終極真理）會與第二種生無自性性（Anutpada-nihsvabhava，無生無自性）混淆，所以不說。要集也這樣認為。但我認為不然。那些經論中說了兩種勝義，依他起性是第一種，圓成實性（Parinishpanna-svabhava，事物完美實現的性質）是第二種。恐怕依他起勝義會與第二種圓成實勝義混淆，所以就解釋勝義的相對性來區分，這與生無自性有什麼關係？如果害怕混淆而要區分，為什麼需要區分它？這裡的意思是說，諸法的勝義就是唯識真性（Vijnapti-matrata，唯識），它不是真實存在的性質，所以害怕混淆而要區分。如果因為害怕依他起性與生無自性性混淆，而不說它是勝義無自性性，那麼也應該因為依他起性可能與第二種依他起混淆，而不說圓成實性。既然根據不同的意義稱為勝義，與生無自性的意義不相混淆，所以不需要區分。因為同名勝義才需要區分。問題：為什麼三種性質都稱為無性性？回答：就相無自性性（Lakshana-nihsvabhava，現象無自性）而言，最初說的相無自性是法的本性，相的自體不存在。重複說『性』，是教義上建立為『性』。意思是說，對於相無自性，說是相無性，不是說有性而稱為無性。其餘兩種可以類推得知。問題：為什麼《顯揚聖教論》（Xianyang Shengjiao Lun）第十六品只說相無性等，不說相無自性性？回答：它省略了本性，只舉出了施設。所以那部論說：『應當知道，由於三種無自性，所以說三種無性。一是相無性，指的是遍計所執自性（Parikalpita-svabhava，虛構的性質）。由於這種自性的體相不存在。』這裡的意思是說，相無性，就是說遍計所執自性，由於它的體不存在，所以稱為相無性。其餘的可以類推得知。問題：三種性質都是空無的，為什麼《深密解脫經》（Samdhinirmocana Sutra）只說遍計所執和圓成實性是無生無滅等，而不說生無自性是無生無滅等？回答：不是因為分別觀察三種自性才產生遍計所執，而是總的來說，在兩種性質上增益了遍計所執自性。說遍計性無生滅等，就包括了依他起性和圓成實性上的遍計。不是要說依他起性和圓成實性不存在，所以不能說生無自性性是無生無滅等，因為它存在。
【English Translation】 English version: Treatise: If one does not speak of it for fear of confusing the second nature, the explanation of Ximing is: I am afraid that the Paratantra-svabhava (the nature of things arising from other conditions) and Paramartha (ultimate truth) will be confused with the second Anutpada-nihsvabhava (non-arising and without self-nature), so it is not spoken of. Yaoji also thinks so. But I don't think so. Those sutras and treatises speak of two Paramarthas, Paratantra-svabhava is the first, and Parinishpanna-svabhava (the nature of things perfectly realized) is the second. I am afraid that the Paratantra Paramartha will be confused with the second Parinishpanna Paramartha, so the relativity of Paramartha is explained to distinguish them. What does this have to do with Anutpada-nihsvabhava? If you are afraid of confusion and want to distinguish it, why do you need to distinguish it? The meaning here is that the Paramartha of all dharmas is Vijnapti-matrata (consciousness-only), which is not a real nature, so it is distinguished for fear of confusion. If one is afraid that the Paratantra-svabhava will be confused with the Anutpada-nihsvabhava, and does not say that it is the Paramartha-nihsvabhava, then one should also not say that the Parinishpanna-svabhava because the Paratantra-svabhava may be confused with the second Paratantra. Since it is called Paramartha according to different meanings, it is not confused with the meaning of Anutpada-nihsvabhava, so there is no need to distinguish it. It is necessary to distinguish it because they have the same name Paramartha. Question: Why are all three natures called nihsvabhava? Answer: As for the Lakshana-nihsvabhava (phenomenon without self-nature), the first saying that the Lakshana-nihsvabhava is the nature of the dharma, and the self-nature of the Lakshana does not exist. Repeating 'nature' is to establish it as 'nature' in doctrine. The meaning is that, for Lakshana-nihsvabhava, it is said to be Lakshana-nihsvabhava, not to say that there is nature and call it nihsvabhava. The other two can be inferred. Question: Why does the sixteenth chapter of the 'Xianyang Shengjiao Lun' only say Lakshana-nihsvabhava, etc., and not say Lakshana-nihsvabhava? Answer: It omits the original nature and only cites the establishment. Therefore, that treatise says: 'It should be known that due to the three nihsvabhava, the three nihsvabhava are said. One is Lakshana-nihsvabhava, which refers to the Parikalpita-svabhava (fabricated nature). Because the body of this nature does not exist.' The meaning here is that Lakshana-nihsvabhava is to say the Parikalpita-svabhava, because its body does not exist, it is called Lakshana-nihsvabhava. The rest can be inferred. Question: All three natures are empty, why does the 'Samdhinirmocana Sutra' only say that the Parikalpita-svabhava and Parinishpanna-svabhava are unborn and unextinguished, etc., and does not say that the Anutpada-nihsvabhava is unborn and unextinguished, etc.? Answer: It is not because of observing the three natures separately that the Parikalpita-svabhava arises, but in general, the Parikalpita-svabhava is added to the two natures. Saying that the Parikalpita-svabhava is unborn and unextinguished, etc., includes the Parikalpita on the Paratantra-svabhava and Parinishpanna-svabhava. It is not to say that the Paratantra-svabhava and Parinishpanna-svabhava do not exist, so it cannot be said that the Anutpada-nihsvabhava is unborn and unextinguished, etc., because it exists.
生滅。圓成體常故無生滅。性非雜染故本寂靜。如解深密第二．瑜伽七十六皆悉具釋。
論。謂具大乘二種種性等者。性種性明本有性。明性有無．正助．隱顯。廣如能顯中邊惠日論辨。然瑜伽三十五云。謂諸菩薩六處殊勝有如是相。從無始世展轉傳來法爾所得名本性住種性 西明四解。第二為正。正取無漏法爾種子簡異無性。故云殊勝。不可舉果位等名為六處。善戒經云。謂陰界六處。故知六處是內六處。內六處中意根處攝無漏種子。是六處故。非遍六處皆能持種。亦不得云具顯果位內外六處。外六處中不持種故。說因性故 然有難言。若在內六處名為殊勝者。二乘法爾．及聞熏習．無性人種亦在六處。豈名殊勝。故取六位資糧．加行．見．修．等覺及妙覺位名為六處 此亦不然。瑜伽二十一雖解聲聞與此意同。云附在所依有如是相六處所攝。從無始世展轉傳來。豈許小乘亦有六位。若云據不定說。定姓如何。又如何言六處所攝從無始世展轉傳來。豈六位種法爾差別 若爾菩薩與二乘同。何名殊勝 答且望無姓總名殊勝。非唯簡小得殊勝名。若不許小亦名殊勝。違二十一。彼云如是種子非於六處有別異相。即于如是種類分位六處殊勝。從無始世展轉傳來法爾所得 又由此文云六處者。唯目六內處。非果位等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：生滅。圓成實性是恒常存在的，所以沒有生滅。自性不是由雜染構成的，所以本來就是寂靜的。如《解深密經》第二品、《瑜伽師地論》第七十六卷都有詳細解釋。
論中說，具有大乘二種種性等，這裡的『性種性』是指本有的自性。關於自性有無、正助、隱顯等問題，詳細的論述可見於《能顯中邊論》和《惠日論》。然而，《瑜伽師地論》第三十五卷說：『諸菩薩的六處具有殊勝的相，從無始以來輾轉相傳，自然而得，名為本性住種性。』西明的四種解釋中，第二種是正確的。『正取無漏法爾種子』是爲了區別于無性者。所以說是『殊勝』。不能用果位等來解釋六處。《善戒經》說：『謂陰、界、六處。』因此可知，六處是指內六處。內六處中，意根處攝持無漏種子。因為是六處，所以不是所有六處都能持種。也不能說是具足顯現果位的內外六處，因為外六處不持種。這是在說因性。
然而，有人提出疑問：如果說在內六處才名為殊勝，那麼二乘的法爾、以及聞熏習、無性人的種子也在六處，怎麼能說是殊勝呢？所以應該取六位，即資糧位、加行位、見道位、修道位、等覺位和妙覺位，作為六處。
這種說法也是不對的。《瑜伽師地論》第二十一卷雖然解釋聲聞與此意相同，說附在所依處，具有這樣的相，被六處所攝，從無始以來輾轉相傳。難道允許小乘也有六位嗎？如果說是根據不定而說，那麼定性者又該如何解釋？又如何說六處所攝從無始以來輾轉相傳？難道六位的種子是法爾差別嗎？
如果這樣，菩薩與二乘相同，憑什麼稱為殊勝？回答是，相對於無性者，總的來說可以稱為殊勝。並非只有區別于小乘才能得到殊勝之名。如果不允許小乘也稱為殊勝，就違背了第二十一卷的說法。該卷說：『這樣的種子並非在六處有別的異相，而是在這樣的種類分位中，六處殊勝，從無始以來輾轉相傳，自然而得。』
又由此文說六處，只是指六內處，不是指果位等。
【English Translation】 English version: Production and extinction. The perfectly accomplished nature is constant, therefore there is no production or extinction. The self-nature is not composed of defilements, therefore it is originally tranquil. As explained in detail in the second chapter of the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經) and the seventy-sixth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論).
The treatise says, 'Having the two kinds of great vehicle nature, etc.' Here, 'nature-seed' refers to the inherent self-nature. Regarding the existence or non-existence, the principal and auxiliary, the hidden and manifest aspects of self-nature, detailed discussions can be found in the Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya (能顯中邊論) and the Huiri Lun (惠日論). However, the thirty-fifth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'The six sense bases of the Bodhisattvas have such excellent characteristics, transmitted from beginningless time, naturally obtained, and are called the inherent abiding seed-nature.' Among the four interpretations of Ximing (西明), the second is correct. 'Specifically taking the faultless, naturally occurring seed' is to distinguish it from those without nature. Therefore, it is said to be 'excellent.' One cannot use the fruition position, etc., to explain the six sense bases. The Śīlaskandha Sūtra (善戒經) says: 'Namely, the aggregates, realms, and six sense bases.' Thus, it is known that the six sense bases refer to the six internal sense bases. Among the six internal sense bases, the mind-base (意根處) holds the faultless seed. Because it is the six sense bases, not all six sense bases can hold the seed. Nor can it be said to fully manifest the internal and external six sense bases of the fruition position, because the external six sense bases do not hold the seed. This is speaking of the causal nature.
However, some may raise the question: If it is said that being in the internal six sense bases is called excellent, then the naturally occurring seeds of the Two Vehicles (二乘), as well as those acquired through hearing and learning, and those of people without nature, are also in the six sense bases. How can it be called excellent? Therefore, one should take the six stages—the stage of accumulation (資糧位), the stage of application (加行位), the stage of seeing (見道位), the stage of cultivation (修道位), the stage of near-perfect enlightenment (等覺位), and the stage of wonderful enlightenment (妙覺位)—as the six sense bases.
This explanation is also incorrect. Although the twenty-first chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra explains that the Śrāvakas (聲聞) have the same idea, saying that it is attached to the support, having such characteristics, being encompassed by the six sense bases, and transmitted from beginningless time, does it allow the Lesser Vehicle (小乘) to also have six stages? If it is said to be based on the indeterminate, then how can the determinate nature be explained? And how can it be said that what is encompassed by the six sense bases is transmitted from beginningless time? Are the seeds of the six stages naturally different?
If this is the case, the Bodhisattvas are the same as the Two Vehicles. Why are they called excellent? The answer is that, relative to those without nature, they can generally be called excellent. It is not only by distinguishing themselves from the Lesser Vehicle that they obtain the name of excellence. If it is not allowed for the Lesser Vehicle to also be called excellent, it contradicts the twenty-first chapter. That chapter says: 'Such seeds do not have different characteristics in the six sense bases, but in such categories and divisions, the six sense bases are excellent, transmitted from beginningless time, naturally obtained.'
Furthermore, this passage says that the six sense bases only refer to the six internal sense bases, not the fruition position, etc.
習種姓者。本疏云。聞正法已令無漏增名習種性 顯成佛因及悟入唯識。有漏非正。非能正悟。非正習性。兼者亦是。唯識第二云。聞熏習中有漏性者感勝異熟。非生見道等。雖本有種。因聞熏故亦名聞熏。如攝大乘及瑜伽論皆云。多聞熏習所依非阿賴耶性所攝習氣。若取有漏賴耶所攝何云非攝。又無性攝論云。為長能觸法身種子者。為欲增長一切大乘多聞熏習。由此為先得法身故 問從何位去名為習性 答從勝解地已去。皆名習種姓菩薩。性種姓者。據未發心本無漏種。習種姓者。據發心已所熏成種。地持論云。若從先來修善所得名習種姓。瑜伽三十五云。謂先串習善根所得是名習所成者。就顯相說。簡未熏習。非謂初修不名習姓。故雜集論第十三說。有四順解脫。一依憑順解脫。謂從善法欲乃至為求解脫。皆名順解脫分。既名順解脫分。故是習種姓 西明釋云。十信已前名性種姓。十行已上名習種姓。又解仁王第一十住．十行．十回向如其次第習．性．及道菩薩本業經亦同。不說十信為習種姓。而仁王言伏忍聖胎三十人者。且舉方便說十信。非即十信為習種姓。又信有二種。一位地十信。即在十住前。故本業經云。未上十住前有十住名字菩薩常行信等十心。二行解十信。通十住已上。即十住．十行．十回如次配屬
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『習種姓』（通過修習而獲得的菩薩種性）。本疏解釋說：『聽聞正法后，使無漏法增長，名為習種姓。』這表明了成佛之因以及悟入唯識的道理。有漏法不是正法，不能正確地領悟，也不是真正的習種性。兼具二者的情況也算。唯識第二中說：『通過聽聞熏習而具有有漏性質的人，會感受到殊勝的異熟果報，但不會生起見道等。』雖然本有種性，但因為聽聞熏習的緣故，也稱為聞熏。如《攝大乘論》和《瑜伽師地論》都說，多聞熏習所依賴的不是阿賴耶識（第八識，含藏識）所攝的習氣。如果取有漏的阿賴耶識所攝，怎麼能說不是所攝呢？』又無性《攝論》說：『爲了增長能夠觸及法身（佛的智慧身）的種子，爲了增長一切大乘多聞熏習。因此，以這個為先導才能得到法身。』 問：從哪個位階開始稱為習種性？ 答：從勝解地（菩薩修行過程中的一個階段）開始，都稱為習種姓菩薩。性種姓（先天具有的菩薩種性）是指未發菩提心時本有的無漏種子。習種姓是指發菩提心后所熏習而成的種子。《地持論》說：『如果從先前修習善法所得，名為習種姓。』《瑜伽師地論》第三十五卷說：『指先前串習善根所得，這稱為習所成。』這是就顯現的相來說的，簡別未熏習的情況。並非說初修就不稱為習種姓。所以《雜集論》第十三說：有四種順解脫分。一是依憑順解脫分，指從善法欲乃至為求解脫，都名為順解脫分。既然名為順解脫分，所以是習種姓。 西明法師解釋說：十信位（菩薩修行過程中的最初階段）之前名為性種姓，十行位（菩薩修行過程中的一個階段）以上名為習種姓。又解釋《仁王經》中第一十住（菩薩修行過程中的一個階段）、十行、十回向（菩薩修行過程中的一個階段）依次是習、性、及道菩薩。《本業經》也相同。不說十信為習種姓。而《仁王經》說伏忍聖胎三十人，只是舉例方便說法，十信並非就是習種姓。又信有兩種，一是位地十信，即在十住之前，所以《本業經》說：未上十住前有十住名字菩薩常行信等十心。二是行解十信，通十住以上，即十住、十行、十回向依次配屬。
【English Translation】 English version 『Cultivated Gotra』 (Xí zhǒngxìng) (the Bodhisattva nature acquired through cultivation). This commentary explains: 『Hearing the correct Dharma and causing the unconditioned (anāsrava) to increase is called Cultivated Gotra.』 This demonstrates the cause of attaining Buddhahood and realizing the principle of Consciousness-Only (Vijñānavāda). Conditioned (sāsrava) dharmas are not correct, cannot lead to correct realization, and are not true cultivated natures. Those possessing both are also included. The second volume of the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi states: 『Those who have a conditioned nature through hearing and cultivation will experience superior Vipāka (result of actions), but will not generate the path of seeing (darśanamārga), etc.』 Although there is an inherent nature, it is also called hearing-cultivation (śruta-vāsanā) because of hearing and cultivation. For example, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha and the Yogācārabhūmi both state that the basis of extensive hearing and cultivation is not the habit-energy (vāsanā) contained within the Ālaya-vijñāna (eighth consciousness, storehouse consciousness). If one takes the conditioned as contained within the Ālaya-vijñāna, how can it be said that it is not contained?』 Furthermore, the Anabhisaṃbodhi states: 『In order to increase the seed that can touch the Dharmakāya (body of the Dharma, the wisdom body of the Buddha), in order to increase all Mahāyāna extensive hearing and cultivation. Therefore, only by taking this as a prerequisite can one attain the Dharmakāya.』 Question: From which stage is one called Cultivated Gotra? Answer: From the stage of Adhimukticaryābhūmi (stage of heightened intention) onwards, all are called Cultivated Gotra Bodhisattvas. Innate Gotra (Prakṛtistha-gotra) refers to the inherent unconditioned seed before the arising of Bodhicitta (the mind of enlightenment). Cultivated Gotra refers to the seed cultivated after the arising of Bodhicitta. The Bodhisattvabhūmi states: 『If it is obtained from previously cultivating good deeds, it is called Cultivated Gotra.』 The thirty-fifth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi states: 『It refers to what is obtained from previously familiarizing oneself with good roots; this is called what is accomplished through cultivation.』 This is in terms of the manifested appearance, distinguishing it from the uncultivated state. It does not mean that initial cultivation is not called Cultivated Gotra. Therefore, the thirteenth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya states: There are four aspects conducive to liberation (mokṣa). First, reliance on aspects conducive to liberation, referring to everything from the desire for good dharmas to the seeking of liberation, all are called aspects conducive to liberation. Since they are called aspects conducive to liberation, they are Cultivated Gotra. The Dharma Master Ximing explains: Before the ten stages of faith (śraddhā) (the initial stage in the Bodhisattva path) is called Innate Gotra, and above the ten stages of practice (caryā) (a stage in the Bodhisattva path) is called Cultivated Gotra. He also explains that the first ten abodes (avasthā) (a stage in the Bodhisattva path), ten practices, and ten dedications (pariṇāmanā) (a stage in the Bodhisattva path) in the Renwang Jing (The Sutra of Humane Kings) are, in order, the Cultivated, Innate, and Path Bodhisattvas. The Běnyè Jīng (Original Vows Sutra) is the same. It does not say that the ten faiths are Cultivated Gotra. The Renwang Jing says that the thirty people of the stage of forbearance and holy embryo are merely an expedient example; the ten faiths are not the Cultivated Gotra. Furthermore, there are two types of faith: first, the ten faiths of position, which are before the ten abodes, so the Běnyè Jīng says: Before ascending to the ten abodes, there are Bodhisattvas with the names of the ten abodes who constantly practice the ten minds such as faith. Second, the ten faiths of practice and understanding, which encompass the ten abodes and above, that is, the ten abodes, ten practices, and ten dedications are assigned in order.
習．性．道種三位菩薩。說位地信非名種習 今謂不然。初判十行已上方名習性。十住菩薩豈非習收 又云。仁王第一十住．十行等。如次習．性等。本業經同。不說十信者 不然。仁王第一無別十住．行．迴向名。即信．止．堅如次配習．性．及道種。不可違文判十信等是三方便非住等收。本業經等不說十信名者。依總位說不論別行。據十信是十住所收。有別說者。以初住難離出十信。如四善根內門難故。第十回向位中別開善根。既迴向收。十信定是十住所攝。仁王．華嚴．優婆塞戒經等。皆說四十二賢聖不說五十 又云。十信等是十住等方便即住等收。如初近分屬初定攝。又若十信位地在前。仁王經中復有十善菩薩。豈可地前開為五十。又位地十信在十住前。行解十信通十住已上無聖教說。若云本業經云未上十住前有十位名字菩薩。常行信等十心。即證位地十信在十住前。於此位中經幾時修。又仁王經十千劫中行菩薩道始入十信。豈位地信前更十千劫為十善位。此既不立。位地十信亦不應開。又設縱別開。何廢得是習種性位。仁王經等於習種位分諸王位。言銅輪王是習種姓。不云前非齊此已前方是習種。但前習未勝未得銅輪。據勝習時得銅輪位。言習種性作銅輪王 若爾性種姓等應亦通前 答不例。于習種位前後
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 習、性、道種三位菩薩（指菩薩修行的三個階段）。有人說位地信（指十信位的菩薩）不屬於種、習二位。現在我們認為這種說法不對。最初判定十行位（菩薩五十二階位中第十一到第二十位）以上才稱為習性位。十住位（菩薩五十二階位中第一到第十位）的菩薩難道不屬於習位所攝？又有人說，《仁王經》中第一十住、十行等，依次對應習、性等。《本業經》的說法相同。不說十信位是因為……不然。《仁王經》第一沒有單獨的十住、十行、十回向的名稱。而是用信、止、堅依次對應習、性、道種。不能違背經文，判定十信等是三方便（趨向真智的三種方便行，即佈施、持戒、忍辱），不屬於十住等所攝。《本業經》等不說十信位的名稱，是因為依據總位而說，不論別行。根據十信位是十住所攝。有特別說法是因為初住位難以脫離，超出十信位，如同四善根的內門難以進入。第十回向位中特別開出善根。既然迴向位已經包含，十信位一定是十住所攝。《仁王經》、《華嚴經》、《優婆塞戒經》等，都說四十二賢聖位，不說五十位。 又有人說，十信等是十住等的方便，即屬於十住等所攝。如同初近分定屬於初禪定所攝。又如果十信位的位地在前，《仁王經》中又有十善菩薩，難道可以在位地之前開出五十位？又位地十信在十住之前，行解十信通十住以上，沒有聖教這樣說。如果說《本業經》說未上十住前有十位名字菩薩，常行信等十心，就證明位地十信在十住之前。於此位中經過多長時間修行？又《仁王經》說一萬劫中行菩薩道才進入十信位，難道位地信之前還要經過一萬劫作為十善位？既然這個不成立，位地十信也不應該單獨開出。又假設縱然單獨開出，又有什麼妨礙得到習種性位？《仁王經》等於習種位劃分諸王位，說銅輪王是習種姓，不是說之前不是，只有到了這裡才是習種。只是之前的習位不勝，沒有得到銅輪王位。根據勝習之時得到銅輪王位，說習種性可以作銅輪王。 如果這樣，性種姓等也應該通於之前？回答說不能類比。在習種位有前後。
【English Translation】 English version The three positions of Bodhisattvas: Śīla (Habit), Nature, and Seed of the Path. Some say that the position of faith (referring to the Bodhisattvas in the Ten Faiths position) does not belong to the positions of Seed and Śīla. Now we believe this statement is incorrect. Initially, it was determined that the positions above the Ten Practices (the eleventh to twentieth positions in the fifty-two stages of Bodhisattvas) are called the positions of Habit and Nature. Are the Bodhisattvas in the Ten Dwellings position (the first to tenth positions in the fifty-two stages of Bodhisattvas) not included in the Śīla position? Furthermore, it is said that the first Ten Dwellings and Ten Practices in the Renwang Sutra correspond to Śīla, Nature, and so on, in that order. The Brahma-net Sutra has the same statement. The reason for not mentioning the Ten Faiths position is... No. The first in the Renwang Sutra does not have separate names for the Ten Dwellings, Ten Practices, and Ten Dedications. Instead, Faith, Cessation, and Firmness are used to correspond to Śīla, Nature, and Seed of the Path in that order. It is not permissible to violate the sutra and determine that the Ten Faiths, etc., are the three expedient means (three expedient practices leading to true wisdom, namely, giving, morality, and patience), and are not included in the Ten Dwellings, etc. The reason why the Brahma-net Sutra, etc., do not mention the name of the Ten Faiths position is because they are based on the general position and do not discuss separate practices. According to the Ten Faiths position, it is included in the Ten Dwellings. There are special statements because the initial Dwelling position is difficult to leave, exceeding the Ten Faiths position, just as the inner gate of the four roots of goodness is difficult to enter. In the Tenth Dedication position, roots of goodness are specially opened up. Since the Dedication position is already included, the Ten Faiths position must be included in the Ten Dwellings. The Renwang Sutra, Avatamsaka Sutra, Upasaka Precept Sutra, etc., all speak of the forty-two wise and holy positions, not the fifty positions. Furthermore, some say that the Ten Faiths, etc., are the expedient means of the Ten Dwellings, etc., and are therefore included in the Ten Dwellings, etc. Just as the initial Near-Concentration belongs to the initial Dhyana-Concentration. Also, if the position of the Ten Faiths is in front, and there are Ten Virtuous Bodhisattvas in the Renwang Sutra, how can fifty positions be opened up before the position? Also, the position of the Ten Faiths is before the Ten Dwellings, and the practice and understanding of the Ten Faiths extend beyond the Ten Dwellings. There is no holy teaching that says this. If it is said that the Brahma-net Sutra says that before reaching the Ten Dwellings, there are Bodhisattvas with ten named positions who constantly practice the ten minds of faith, etc., then it proves that the position of the Ten Faiths is before the Ten Dwellings. How long does it take to practice in this position? Also, the Renwang Sutra says that it takes ten thousand kalpas to practice the Bodhisattva path before entering the Ten Faiths position. Does this mean that before the position of faith, there must be another ten thousand kalpas as the position of the Ten Virtues? Since this is not established, the position of the Ten Faiths should not be opened up separately. Furthermore, even if it is opened up separately, what prevents one from attaining the Śīla-nature position? The Renwang Sutra, etc., divides the positions of kings in the Śīla position, saying that the Cakravarti King (Copper Wheel King) belongs to the Śīla-nature. It does not say that before this it is not, and only here is it the Śīla position. It is just that the previous Śīla position was not superior and did not attain the position of the Cakravarti King. According to the time of superior Śīla, one attains the position of the Cakravarti King, saying that the Śīla-nature can become a Cakravarti King. If that is the case, should the Nature-nature, etc., also extend to before? The answer is that it cannot be compared. There is a before and after in the Śīla position.
勝劣分出余故。又菩薩地明性種已次明發心。發心即是習種姓位。不可說彼據不退位已後方名發心。下文復云退與不退俱名發心。法華經中舍利弗等曾發大退。佛云汝等所行是菩薩道。又云令發一切智心猶在不失。故知總名發菩提心。不唯不退 又四十七明十三住云。勝解行住。從初發心乃至未得清凈意樂名勝解行住 又四十九說有七地。勝解行地即第二住 又云始從勝解行地乃至到究竟地。於此一切菩薩地中。若其十信非在習種。即勝解行等攝行不盡。非未發心非性種姓。不在十住非勝解行。若云雖非十住勝解行攝者。既許行攝何非習種。又善法欲已去得名為學。有為善法名為學法。何非習種性。據起現行發菩提心行熏成種已即名習種。不爾二乘迴心向大。經八萬劫乃至十千是何菩薩。不可得云是性種姓。何以故。所修諸善非不思擇。于大菩提非不趣求。雖未得入資糧勝位可名習種 或創發心及二乘迴向八萬劫等非勝解行。行未勝故。未在僧祇故。雖然不得在僧祇數及資糧等可名習種。無文定判十住已前不得名為習種菩薩 問十住中已能八相成道與佛何殊。何等是佛所現八相。何等是余所現八相 答未見文辨。且為一解。佛現八相具足長時。始終不異。菩薩化生隨宜暫現。或不具足。前後或異。或複本形。故與佛別
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 勝劣的區分在於其餘的緣故。此外，《菩薩地持經》在闡明自性種姓之後，接著闡明發心。發心即是習種姓位的開始。不能說只有達到不退轉位之後才能稱為發心。下文又說，退轉和不退轉都可以稱為發心。《法華經》中，舍利弗等人曾經發大退轉心，佛說：『你們所行的是菩薩道。』又說：『令發一切智心，仍然沒有失去。』因此可知，總的來說都稱為發菩提心，不只是不退轉。另外，第四十七卷闡明十三住時說：『勝解行住，從最初發心乃至未得清凈意樂，名為勝解行住。』第四十九卷說有七地，勝解行地即第二住。又說：『始從勝解行地乃至到究竟地。』在這所有的菩薩地中，如果十信不是在習種姓位，那麼勝解行等所攝的行就不圓滿。如果不是未發心，不是自性種姓，不在十住位，也不是勝解行位，如果說雖然不是十住位，但被勝解行所攝，既然允許被行所攝，為何不是習種姓？此外，善法欲已經可以稱為學，有為的善法稱為學法，為何不是習種姓？根據發起現行，發菩提心行熏習成種子，就可以稱為習種姓。否則，二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）迴心向大乘，經過八萬劫乃至十千劫，是什麼菩薩呢？不能說是自性種姓。為什麼呢？因為所修的各種善行並非不思擇，對於大菩提並非不追求。雖然沒有進入資糧位的殊勝地位，但可以稱為習種姓。或者，初次發心以及二乘迴向，八萬劫等等，不是勝解行位，因為行持尚未殊勝，未在僧祇數中。雖然不能算在僧祇數以及資糧位等，但可以稱為習種姓。沒有經文明確判定十住位之前不得稱為習種姓菩薩。 問：十住位中已經能夠八相成道，與佛有什麼區別？什麼是佛所顯現的八相成道？什麼是其餘菩薩所顯現的八相成道？ 答：沒有見到經文辨析。姑且解釋一下。佛顯現八相成道，具足且長久，始終不改變。菩薩化身隨順因緣暫時顯現，或者不具足，前後或者不同，或者恢復本來面目。因此與佛有所區別。
【English Translation】 English version The distinction between superior and inferior lies in the remaining causes. Furthermore, the Bodhisattvabhumi Sutra (Treatise on the Stages of a Bodhisattva) explains the initial arising of the mind after clarifying the inherent nature (prakrti-gotra) of beings. This initial arising of the mind is the stage of the practice lineage (abhyasa-gotra). It cannot be said that only after reaching the stage of non-retrogression (avaivartika) can one be called 'having generated the mind'. The following text also states that both retrogression and non-retrogression are called 'generating the mind'. In the Lotus Sutra, Shariputra (Śāriputra) and others once experienced great retrogression. The Buddha said: 'What you are practicing is the Bodhisattva path.' It also says: 'Causing the mind of all-knowing wisdom to arise is still not lost.' Therefore, it is known that all are generally called 'generating the Bodhi-mind', not just non-retrogression. Moreover, the forty-seventh section, explaining the thirteen abodes (vihara), states: 'The abode of understanding and practice (adhimukti-caryā-vihara), from the initial arising of the mind until the attainment of pure intention, is called the abode of understanding and practice.' The forty-ninth section says there are seven grounds (bhumi), and the ground of understanding and practice is the second abode. It also says: 'Beginning from the ground of understanding and practice until reaching the ultimate ground.' Within all these Bodhisattva grounds, if the ten faiths (dasa sraddha) are not within the practice lineage, then the practices included in understanding and practice are not complete. If it is not the unarisen mind, not the inherent nature, not in the ten abodes, and not in understanding and practice, if it is said that although it is not in the ten abodes, it is included in understanding and practice, then since it is allowed to be included in practice, why is it not the practice lineage? Furthermore, the desire for good dharma (kusala-dharma) is already called learning (śikṣā), and conditioned good dharma is called the dharma of learning, so why is it not the practice lineage? Based on the arising of present action, the practice of generating the Bodhi-mind, having been perfumed into a seed, is called the practice lineage. Otherwise, when the two vehicles (śrāvakayāna and pratyekabuddhayāna) turn their minds towards the Great Vehicle (Mahāyāna), after eighty thousand kalpas (aeons) or even ten thousand kalpas, what kind of Bodhisattva is that? It cannot be said that it is the inherent nature. Why? Because the various good deeds cultivated are not without deliberation, and they are not without seeking the Great Bodhi. Although they have not entered the superior position of the accumulation of merit (punya), they can be called the practice lineage. Or, the initial arising of the mind and the turning of the two vehicles, eighty thousand kalpas, etc., are not the stage of understanding and practice, because the practice is not yet superior, and not yet within the asamkhya (innumerable) kalpas. Although they cannot be counted in the asamkhya kalpas and the accumulation of merit, they can be called the practice lineage. There is no textual determination that before the ten abodes, one cannot be called a Bodhisattva of the practice lineage. Question: Within the ten abodes, one is already able to accomplish the eight aspects of enlightenment (aṣṭāṅga-mārga), so what is the difference between that and a Buddha? What are the eight aspects manifested by the Buddha? What are the eight aspects manifested by other Bodhisattvas? Answer: I have not seen any textual analysis. Let me offer one explanation. The Buddha manifests the eight aspects of enlightenment completely and for a long time, without changing from beginning to end. Bodhisattvas manifest temporarily according to conditions, or incompletely, or differently before and after, or they revert to their original form. Therefore, they are different from the Buddha.
問十住．十行等十皆名住等。何故十信但一得名。余不名信 答立名不定。如三空門初一名空餘二非空。又十住等各別位故皆名住等。信非別位非皆名信 問退．不退諸說不定取何為正 答不退有四。謂信．位．證．行。位如常顯。於十住后說言退者據證法說。言不退者據位乘說。余皆準此。或說發心皆不退者據上品說。或為因能令后不退。非發心已即能不退。少可會多。不能煩舉。
論。於二取隨眠等。問華嚴第十解十住菩薩中雲除滅諸煩惱永盡無有餘等。云何此言未伏二取 答因邪教邪師所起不共無明伴煩惱類盡。非盡一切自分別生。及俱生煩惱 又解說佛法功力能滅煩惱非皆已伏 又解自分別伏。邪師等起不能伏滅。緣起經文二互隨會。然疏下結。故此位中自分別煩惱未盡。故前解正 準發菩提心。緣力發者名不堅固。因力發者名為堅固。起惑亦爾。邪教起者易除。自力起者難伏 又解經據少分有能伏義。論依全分云不能伏。初后解正。疏文似脫。更勘正本。
論。多住外門等。疏會華嚴云不共無明此已伏故 問不共無明迷諦理起不信因果。十信第六信心不退。于因果理已生信解。即不共無明十信已除。云何說言第四住伏 答十信第六深生信心不謗因果。不廢猶于諦理不了。故第四住方伏不共。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：十住（Skt: Daśa-bhūmi，菩薩修行的十個階位）、十行（Skt: Daśa-caryā，菩薩修行的十種行為）等，都以『住』、『行』等命名。為什麼十信（Skt: Daśa-śraddhā，菩薩修行的十種信心）只有一種得到『信』的名稱，其餘的沒有被稱為『信』？ 答：立名沒有固定的規則。例如，三空門（Skt: Tri-śūnyatā-dvāra，佛教中三種空的法門）中，第一個被稱為『空』，其餘兩個則不是『空』。而且，十住等各有不同的位次，所以都稱為『住』等。而十信並非獨立的位次，所以不是都稱為『信』。 問：關於退轉（Skt: Avaivartika，從修行境界中退失）和不退轉（Skt: Anivartaniya，不退轉于阿耨多羅三藐三菩提）的說法不確定，應該以哪種說法為準？ 答：不退轉有四種，即信不退、位不退、證不退、行不退。位不退如常所說。在十住之後說退轉，是根據證法（Skt: Dharma-prativedha，證悟佛法）來說的。說不退轉，是根據位乘（Skt: Bhūmi-yāna，菩薩的階位和乘載）來說的。其餘情況可以依此類推。或者說發菩提心（Skt: Bodhicitta-utpāda，發起追求覺悟的心）都是不退轉，這是根據上品（Skt: Agra，最好的）來說的。或者說發心是因，能夠使後來不退轉，並非發心之後就能立即不退轉。可以用少數情況來解釋多數情況，不能一一列舉。
論：對於二取（Skt: Dvaya-graha，對能取和所取的執著）隨眠（Skt: Anuśaya，煩惱的潛在狀態）等。問：《華嚴經》（Skt: Avataṃsaka Sūtra）第十解（菩薩修行過程中的一個階段）中說，十住菩薩『除滅諸煩惱，永盡無有餘』等。為什麼這裡說還沒有降伏二取？ 答：因為邪教（Skt: Mithyā-dṛṣṭi，錯誤的教義）邪師（Skt: Mithyā-ājīva，以不正當手段謀生的人）所引起的，與不共無明（Skt: Asādhāraṇa-avidyā，獨特的無明）相伴隨的煩惱已經斷盡，並非斷盡一切由自己分別產生的，以及俱生煩惱（Skt: Sahaja-kleśa，與生俱來的煩惱）。 又解釋說，佛法的功力能夠滅除煩惱，並非都已經降伏。 又解釋說，自己分別產生的煩惱可以降伏，而由邪師等引起的煩惱不能降伏。緣起（Skt: Pratītyasamutpāda，事物相互依存的法則）經文可以相互會通。然而疏文的結論是，這個階段中自己分別產生的煩惱還沒有斷盡，所以前面的解釋是正確的。 準此，依靠外緣的力量發菩提心，稱為不堅固。依靠自身的力量發菩提心，稱為堅固。生起迷惑也是如此。由邪教引起的迷惑容易去除，由自身力量引起的迷惑難以降伏。 又解釋說，經文是根據少分有能力降伏的意思。論典是依據全分說不能降伏。最初和最後的解釋是正確的。疏文似乎有脫漏，需要進一步勘正版本。
論：多住在外門等。疏文解釋《華嚴經》說，不共無明在這個階段已經降伏。 問：不共無明是由於迷惑真諦（Skt: Paramārtha-satya，佛教的最高真理）而產生的不信因果（Skt: Hetu-phala，原因和結果）的觀念。十信中的第六信心不退，對於因果的道理已經產生信解（Skt: Adhimukti，深刻的理解）。那麼不共無明在十信階段就已經去除。為什麼說第四住才降伏不共無明？ 答：十信中的第六深生信心，是不誹謗因果，不廢棄因果，但仍然沒有完全明瞭真諦。所以第四住才降伏不共無明。
【English Translation】 English version Question: The Ten Dwellings (Skt: Daśa-bhūmi), the Ten Practices (Skt: Daśa-caryā), etc., are all named 'Dwelling,' 'Practice,' etc. Why is it that among the Ten Faiths (Skt: Daśa-śraddhā), only one is named 'Faith,' while the others are not called 'Faith'? Answer: There is no fixed rule for naming. For example, among the Three Doors of Emptiness (Skt: Tri-śūnyatā-dvāra), the first is called 'Emptiness,' while the other two are not 'Emptiness.' Moreover, the Ten Dwellings, etc., each have different positions, so they are all called 'Dwelling,' etc. The Ten Faiths, however, do not have independent positions, so they are not all called 'Faith.' Question: The statements about regression (Skt: Avaivartika) and non-regression (Skt: Anivartaniya) are uncertain. Which statement should be taken as correct? Answer: There are four types of non-regression: non-regression in faith, non-regression in position, non-regression in realization, and non-regression in practice. Non-regression in position is as commonly stated. Saying regression after the Ten Dwellings is based on the realization of the Dharma (Skt: Dharma-prativedha). Saying non-regression is based on the vehicle of position (Skt: Bhūmi-yāna). The remaining situations can be inferred accordingly. Or saying that generating the Bodhi mind (Skt: Bodhicitta-utpāda) is all non-regression is based on the highest quality (Skt: Agra). Or saying that generating the mind is the cause that enables later non-regression, not that generating the mind immediately leads to non-regression. A few cases can be used to explain many cases, and they cannot all be listed.
Treatise: Regarding the latent tendencies (Skt: Anuśaya) of dualistic grasping (Skt: Dvaya-graha), etc. Question: The tenth chapter of the Avataṃsaka Sūtra (Skt: Avataṃsaka Sūtra) on the Ten Dwellings Bodhisattvas says, 'Eliminating all afflictions, completely and without remainder,' etc. Why does this say that dualistic grasping has not yet been subdued? Answer: Because the afflictions arising from false teachings (Skt: Mithyā-dṛṣṭi) and evil teachers (Skt: Mithyā-ājīva), accompanied by unique ignorance (Skt: Asādhāraṇa-avidyā), have been exhausted, but not all afflictions arising from one's own discrimination and innate afflictions (Skt: Sahaja-kleśa). Also, it is explained that the power of the Buddha's teachings can eliminate afflictions, but not all have been subdued. Also, it is explained that afflictions arising from one's own discrimination can be subdued, while those arising from evil teachers, etc., cannot be subdued. The sutra texts on dependent origination (Skt: Pratītyasamutpāda) can be mutually reconciled. However, the commentary concludes that the afflictions arising from one's own discrimination have not been exhausted in this stage, so the previous explanation is correct. Accordingly, generating the Bodhi mind relying on external forces is called unstable. Generating the Bodhi mind relying on one's own strength is called stable. The same is true for arising delusion. Delusion arising from false teachings is easy to remove, while delusion arising from one's own strength is difficult to subdue. Also, it is explained that the sutra text is based on the meaning of being able to subdue in a small part. The treatise is based on the meaning of not being able to subdue in its entirety. The initial and final explanations are correct. The commentary seems to have omissions and needs further verification of the version.
Treatise: Mostly dwelling outside the gate, etc. The commentary explains the Avataṃsaka Sūtra by saying that unique ignorance has already been subdued in this stage. Question: Unique ignorance arises from delusion about the ultimate truth (Skt: Paramārtha-satya), leading to disbelief in cause and effect (Skt: Hetu-phala). The sixth faith in the Ten Faiths is non-regressing, and one has already developed faith and understanding (Skt: Adhimukti) in the principle of cause and effect. Then unique ignorance has already been removed in the Ten Faiths stage. Why is it said that the fourth dwelling subdues unique ignorance? Answer: The sixth faith in the Ten Faiths, deeply generating faith, does not slander cause and effect, and does not abandon cause and effect, but still does not fully understand the ultimate truth. Therefore, the fourth dwelling subdues unique ignorance.
雖未證解而能信解 問準前釋內法異生若放逸者。由三無明為緣不說有不共。云何今云不共無明第四住伏 答據不信因果不共者說。第六信前雖起暫伏。不由彼故發惡趣行。或因邪教所起不共放逸不起。若於諦理迷名不共。第四住伏。
論。法空智品與俱起故。此破安惠。然疏云第七有法執。法空智起即不行。第八法執有。法空智起此應滅者。是破余師。非安惠師。或寫者誤 若破安惠。應云第七有我執。生空智起即不行。第八法執有。法空智起此應滅。
論。七轉識內或多或少如煩惱說者。據煩惱俱數多少等。云如煩惱說。非是定判一切所知定與煩惱同種而生。又所知障執必是惠。與無明俱。異熟心疑此等名數。諸識所起數如煩惱。然疏云無離煩惱別起執故。故數多少與煩惱同者。據俱時起不斷煩惱身中所起所知障說。若許定同。如二乘無學已斷煩惱。猶起法執后熏成種。寧有煩惱與同種生 又異熟心疑人杌等是所知障。豈與煩惱同種生耶 問執杌迷人既是所知。為是法執為非執耶 答是法執類。非正法執。執必癡俱。彼非癡俱。是異熟故 又釋是執。若業感異熟不與癡俱。異熟生寬故與癡並 或迷杌心與其無明通俱．不俱。俱者是執。不俱非執但是等流。
論。此于無覆無記性中等者。問所知
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 雖未證得真解，但能信受理解。問：如果按照之前的解釋，內法（內道之法）與異生（凡夫）的放逸不同，因為異生由三種無明為緣，所以說沒有不共的放逸。為何現在又說不共無明在第四住位被伏藏？答：這是根據不信因果的不共無明來說的。第六識之前的信雖然暫時生起並伏藏，但不會因此而引發墮入惡趣的行為。或者因為邪教所產生的不共放逸不會生起。如果對於真諦的道理迷惑，就稱為不共無明，在第四住位被伏藏。
論：因為法空智品與法執同時生起，所以要破斥安慧的觀點。然而疏文中說，第七識有法執，法空智生起時，法執就不起作用。第八識有法執，法空智生起時，法執就應該滅除。這是爲了破斥其他論師的觀點，而不是安慧的觀點。或者可能是抄寫者寫錯了。如果要破斥安慧的觀點，應該說第七識有我執，生空智生起時，我執就不起作用。第八識有法執，法空智生起時，法執就應該滅除。
論：第七轉識內，或者多或者少，就像煩惱一樣。這是根據煩惱的數量多少等來說的，所以說『如煩惱說』。並非是斷定一切所知障都一定與煩惱同種而生。而且所知障的執著必定是慧，與無明同時生起。異熟心（異熟果報的心識）和疑等這些名數，諸識所起的數量就像煩惱一樣。然而疏文中說，沒有離開煩惱而單獨生起的執著，所以數量多少與煩惱相同。這是根據同時生起，不斷煩惱之身中所生起的所知障來說的。如果允許一定相同，就像二乘無學（阿羅漢）已經斷除了煩惱，仍然會生起法執，後來熏習成種子，怎麼會有煩惱與它同種生起呢？
而且異熟心懷疑人是木樁等，這是所知障，怎麼會與煩惱同種生起呢？問：執著木樁而誤以為是人，既然是所知，是法執還是非執呢？答：是法執的同類，不是真正的法執。執著必定與癡（無明）同時生起，但異熟心不是與癡同時生起，因為它是異熟果報。又解釋說，如果是業力感得的異熟果報，不與癡同時生起，異熟所生的範圍寬泛，所以可以與癡並存。或者迷惑木樁的心，與其無明有時同時生起，有時不同時生起。同時生起就是執著，不同時生起就不是執著，只是等流（相似的相續）。
論：『此于無覆無記性中等者』。問：所知
【English Translation】 English version Although not having attained realization, one can believe and understand. Question: If, according to the previous explanation, the inner Dharma (teachings of the inner path) is different from the defilements of ordinary beings (異生), because ordinary beings are conditioned by the three kinds of ignorance, then it is said that there is no unshared (不共) defilement. Why is it now said that unshared ignorance is subdued in the fourth abode (第四住位)? Answer: This is said based on the unshared ignorance of not believing in cause and effect. Although the faith before the sixth consciousness temporarily arises and is subdued, it does not cause actions leading to bad destinies. Or the unshared defilement arising from heretical teachings does not arise. If one is confused about the truth, it is called unshared ignorance, which is subdued in the fourth abode.
Treatise: Because the wisdom of emptiness of phenomena (法空智品) arises simultaneously with the attachment to phenomena (法執), it is necessary to refute the view of Anhui (安慧). However, the commentary says that the seventh consciousness has attachment to phenomena; when the wisdom of emptiness of phenomena arises, the attachment to phenomena does not function. The eighth consciousness has attachment to phenomena; when the wisdom of emptiness of phenomena arises, the attachment to phenomena should be eliminated. This is to refute the views of other teachers, not the view of Anhui. Or perhaps the scribe made a mistake. If one wants to refute the view of Anhui, one should say that the seventh consciousness has attachment to self (我執); when the wisdom of emptiness of self (生空智) arises, the attachment to self does not function. The eighth consciousness has attachment to phenomena; when the wisdom of emptiness of phenomena arises, the attachment to phenomena should be eliminated.
Treatise: Within the seventh consciousness, there may be more or less, just like afflictions. This is said based on the number of afflictions, etc., so it is said 'like afflictions'. It is not to be determined that all cognitive obscurations (所知障) are necessarily born from the same kind as afflictions. Moreover, the attachment of cognitive obscurations must be wisdom (慧), arising simultaneously with ignorance. The mind of resultant maturation (異熟心) and doubt, etc., these terms, the number of consciousnesses arising is like afflictions. However, the commentary says that there is no attachment arising separately from afflictions, so the number is the same as afflictions. This is said based on the cognitive obscurations arising simultaneously in the body of one who has not severed afflictions. If it is allowed to be the same, like the Arhats (無學) of the two vehicles (二乘) who have already severed afflictions, still give rise to attachment to phenomena, which is later imprinted as a seed, how can afflictions be born from the same kind?
Moreover, the mind of resultant maturation doubting whether a person is a stump, etc., is a cognitive obscuration, how can it be born from the same kind as afflictions? Question: Mistaking a stump for a person, since it is what is known, is it an attachment to phenomena or not an attachment? Answer: It is of the same kind as attachment to phenomena, but not a true attachment to phenomena. Attachment must arise simultaneously with delusion (癡, ignorance), but the mind of resultant maturation does not arise simultaneously with delusion, because it is a result of maturation. Also, it is explained that if it is the result of maturation caused by karma, it does not arise simultaneously with delusion; the scope of what is born from maturation is broad, so it can coexist with delusion. Or the mind that mistakes a stump, its ignorance sometimes arises simultaneously and sometimes does not. If it arises simultaneously, it is attachment; if it does not arise simultaneously, it is not attachment, but only a similar flow (等流).
Treatise: 'This is in the nature of neutral and un-obscured, etc.' Question: What is known
障中有法恚愛。法恚即嗔。云何無記 答有二解。一云望煩惱說嗔唯不善。望所知障即是無記 二云法恚亦是不善 若爾應縛能感異熟 答雖是不善望義有別。不名為縛。亦不感果。二解前正。論說無記不通不善。
論。此位二障雖未伏除等。問三種練磨等何別何位 答三別者。一怯時長難到。二怯行廣難修。三怯果妙難證 或可。初總云廣大深妙。通因及果。以俱廣大皆深妙故。或因廣大果深妙故。由此長時修方圓滿。深妙難成長時方到。故此論云。一聞無上正等菩提廣大深遠。后二是別。又三練磨各通三處。于彼長時引他已到省己有能。粗善尚能感於上界遠妙之果。我有妙善。何不能得深遠大果。乃至圓滿轉依彼既已得。我亦應爾。省己有能既有妙善何不能證。故疏云。初且舉菩提。后且舉轉依。論實皆得 問此練磨在何位者 答準此論文云此位二障雖未伏除修勝行時有三退屈。而能三事練磨其心。在資糧位通三十心不可別配。不爾十住應不能修十波羅蜜行。未能起堪能練故 又解亦通加行及七地前。唯除見道。以唯在定。又復時促。四善根位雖伏二障分別起者。俱生未伏。以文不言分別未伏故通俱生 又七地前雖伏煩惱。所知未全。要須加行故。又樂於下乘般涅槃障五地方斷。雖未斷時不退趣彼。或可起
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 障礙中存在法恚（dharma-dveṣa，對佛法的憎恨）和愛。法恚即是嗔恚（krodha，憤怒）。如何解釋無記（avyākṛta，非善非惡）？答：有兩種解釋。第一種說法認為，從煩惱（kleśa）的角度來看，嗔恚僅僅是不善（akuśala）。但從所知障（jñeyāvaraṇa，對真理的認知障礙）的角度來看，它就是無記。第二種說法認為，法恚也是不善。如果這樣，它應該能夠束縛並導致異熟果（vipāka-phala，果報）。答：雖然是不善，但從意義上有所區別，因此不稱為束縛，也不會導致果報。前一種解釋更為正確。論典中說，無記不包括不善。
論：此位二障（duḥkha和samatikrama）雖未伏除等。問：三種練磨（traividya，三種訓練）等有什麼區別？處於什麼階段？答：三種區別是：一、害怕時間長難以到達；二、害怕修行範圍廣難以修習；三、害怕果實精妙難以證得。或者可以這樣理解：最初總的來說是廣大深妙，包括因和果。因為因和果都廣大且深妙。或者因為因廣大而果深妙。因此需要長時間的修行才能圓滿。深妙難以成就，需要長時間才能到達。因此，此論說：一聽到無上正等菩提（anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi，無上正等覺悟）廣大深遠。后兩種是分別說明。又，三種練磨各通於三處。在漫長的時間裡，看到別人已經到達，反省自己有能力。粗淺的善行尚且能感得上界遙遠精妙的果實，我擁有精妙的善行，為什麼不能獲得深遠廣大的果實？乃至圓滿轉依（āśraya-parāvṛtti，轉化所依），別人既然已經獲得，我也應該如此。反省自己有能力，既然擁有精妙的善行，為什麼不能證得？所以疏鈔中說：最初只是舉出菩提，後來只是舉出轉依，實際上兩者都包括。問：這種練磨處於什麼階段？答：根據此論文的說法，此位二障雖然沒有被降伏和消除，但在修行殊勝行時，會有三種退縮，但能夠通過三種方法來磨練自己的心。處於資糧位（saṃbhāra-avasthā，積累資糧的階段），通於三十心，無法單獨分配。否則，十住（daśa-bhūmi，十地）應該不能修習十波羅蜜行（daśa-pāramitā，十種圓滿的修行），因為未能生起堪能性來磨練。又一種解釋是，也通於加行位（prayoga-avasthā，加行階段）和七地（saptama-bhūmi）之前，唯獨不包括見道位（darśana-mārga，見道位），因為見道位只在禪定中，而且時間短暫。四善根位（catvāri-kuśala-mūlāni，四種善根）雖然降伏了二障的分別生起，但俱生（sahaja，與生俱來的）的二障尚未降伏，因為經文中沒有說分別生起的二障尚未降伏，所以也包括俱生的二障。又，七地之前雖然降伏了煩惱障（kleśāvaraṇa，煩惱的障礙），但所知障尚未完全降伏，需要通過加行。又，樂於下乘般涅槃（hīnayāna-parinirvāṇa，小乘涅槃）的障礙在五地（pañca-bhūmi）方能斷除，雖然尚未斷除，但不會退轉而趣向於此。或者可以生起。
【English Translation】 English version: Within obstacles, there exist dharma-dveṣa (hatred of the Dharma) and attachment. Dharma-dveṣa is equivalent to krodha (anger). How is avyākṛta (undetermined) explained? Answer: There are two explanations. The first explanation states that from the perspective of kleśas (afflictions), krodha is solely akuśala (unwholesome). However, from the perspective of jñeyāvaraṇa (the obscuration of knowledge), it is avyākṛta. The second explanation states that dharma-dveṣa is also akuśala. If that were the case, it should bind and cause vipāka-phala (result of maturation). Answer: Although it is akuśala, there is a distinction in meaning, so it is not called binding and does not cause a result. The former explanation is more accurate. The treatises state that avyākṛta does not include akuśala.
Treatise: Although the two obscurations (duḥkha and samatikrama) in this stage have not been subdued, etc. Question: What are the differences between the three traividya (trainings), etc., and what stage are they in? Answer: The three differences are: first, fearing that it takes a long time to reach; second, fearing that the scope of practice is broad and difficult to cultivate; third, fearing that the fruit is exquisite and difficult to realize. Or it can be understood as: initially, it is generally said to be vast, profound, and subtle, including both cause and effect. Because both cause and effect are vast and profound. Or because the cause is vast and the effect is profound. Therefore, it requires a long time of practice to be complete. Subtlety is difficult to achieve and takes a long time to reach. Therefore, this treatise says: Upon hearing of anuttarā-samyak-saṃbodhi (unexcelled perfect enlightenment), it is vast and profound. The latter two are separate explanations. Also, the three traividya each connect to three places. In the long period of time, seeing that others have already arrived, reflect on one's own ability. Even crude wholesome actions can bring about the distant and subtle fruit of the upper realms. I possess exquisite wholesome actions, why can't I obtain the profound and vast fruit? Even the complete āśraya-parāvṛtti (transformation of the basis), since others have already obtained it, I should also be able to. Reflecting on one's own ability, since one possesses exquisite wholesome actions, why can't one realize it? Therefore, the commentary says: Initially, it only mentions bodhi, and later it only mentions āśraya-parāvṛtti, but in reality, both are included. Question: What stage is this traividya in? Answer: According to the text of this treatise, although the two obscurations in this stage have not been subdued and eliminated, when practicing superior conduct, there will be three instances of regression, but one can use three methods to train one's mind. It is in the saṃbhāra-avasthā (stage of accumulation), which encompasses the thirty minds and cannot be assigned separately. Otherwise, the daśa-bhūmi (ten stages) should not be able to cultivate the daśa-pāramitā (ten perfections), because the ability to train has not yet arisen. Another explanation is that it also encompasses the prayoga-avasthā (stage of application) and before the saptama-bhūmi (seventh stage), except for the darśana-mārga (path of seeing), because the path of seeing is only in samādhi and the time is short. Although the catvāri-kuśala-mūlāni (four roots of virtue) have subdued the separately arising two obscurations, the sahaja (innate) two obscurations have not yet been subdued, because the text does not say that the separately arising two obscurations have not been subdued, so it also includes the innate two obscurations. Also, although the kleśāvaraṇa (obscuration of afflictions) has been subdued before the seventh stage, the jñeyāvaraṇa has not been completely subdued and requires prayoga. Also, the obstacle of delighting in hīnayāna-parinirvāṇa (Nirvana of the Lesser Vehicle) can only be severed in the pañca-bhūmi (five stages), although it has not yet been severed, one will not regress and turn towards it. Or it may arise.
心。不爾如何五地方斷。設不起現種至此除。故未斷前猶須練磨。論且舉初影顯於後。如斷四處不唯地前。諸疑離疑執著．分別七地猶有 又解三練斷四處障但在地前。論文不說通地上故。地上二障煩惱障品皆能伏故。所除四處據分別說。然無文斷。任意取捨。
問準雜集十一。復修瑜伽有其五種。謂持．任．鏡．明．依。依謂轉依。即是見道。持．任．鏡．明此四為因得轉依果 持．任等四依何位起。復是何法 答準彼論云。依暖等位。即通四善根皆有此四。持即聞惠。任思惠。鏡即修惠。明謂所觀。無能所取 或鏡即定。明者是惠。暖．頂．忍三各因此四方得修滿入世第一。或無持．任。以上品忍唯一剎那即入世第一法。唯定時促故無持．任。但依此位有持．任．等。非必四位各有四種 又解四位各有此四。持．任二行非是聞．思。以在定中依憑聖教故以為持。論云如所多聞安立止．觀所緣境故。與定相應如理作意以為任。無倒思惟任持心故。即所依定名為鏡。云此三摩地猶帶相故。能觀之智名為明。云謂能所取無所得智 又釋持．任等唯除真見及佛果位。佛果位中更無果故。真見位中無影相等故。通所餘位。故顯揚二十云。有五種法能攝一切瑜伽行者諸瑜伽地。八地以上義說聞．思亦緣教等。故通為正。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：心，否則如何斷除五處地方的煩惱？假設不生起現行煩惱的種子，到這裡才能斷除。所以在未斷除之前，仍然需要練習磨礪。論中且先舉出初影，以顯示後面的情況。例如斷除四處煩惱，不僅僅是在見道位之前。各種疑惑、脫離疑惑的執著、分別，即使在七地仍然存在。又有一種解釋是，通過三種練習斷除四處障礙，僅僅是在見道位之前。論文中沒有說通達地上，是因為地上二障（煩惱障和所知障）的品類都能夠被降伏。所要斷除的四處，是根據分別而說的。然而沒有明確的經文說明要斷除哪些，可以任意取捨。
問：根據《雜集論》第十一卷，再次修習瑜伽有五種方法，即持（dhāraṇa，保持）、任（pratyaya，信賴）、鏡（ādarśa，反映）、明（āloka，光明）和依（āśraya，所依）。依，指的是轉依（āśraya-parāvṛtti，轉變所依），也就是見道（darśana-mārga，見道）。持、任、鏡、明這四種是獲得轉依果的因。
持、任等四種所依在什麼位次生起？又是什麼法？答：根據該論的說法，在暖位等位次。也就是說，四善根（catvāri kuśala-mūlāni，四種善根）都具有這四種。持，就是聞慧（śruta-mayī prajñā，聽聞而得的智慧）；任，是思慧（cintā-mayī prajñā，思考而得的智慧）；鏡，是修慧（bhāvanā-mayī prajñā，修習而得的智慧）；明，指的是所觀的境界，沒有能取和所取。
或者，鏡就是定（samādhi，禪定），明是慧（prajñā，智慧）。暖位、頂位、忍位這三個位次，各自依靠這四種方法才能修習圓滿，進入世第一法（laukikāgradharma，世間第一法）。或者沒有持和任，因為上品忍位只有一個剎那，立即進入世第一法。只是因為定時短暫，所以沒有持和任。但依靠這個位次有持、任等，並非必須四個位次各有四種。
又有一種解釋是，四個位次各有這四種。持和任這兩種行為不是聞慧和思慧，因為在禪定中依靠聖教，所以稱為持。論中說，『如所多聞，安立止觀所緣境』，因此與禪定相應，如理作意，稱為任。無倒思惟，任持心。所依的禪定名為鏡，因為『此三摩地猶帶相故』。能觀的智慧名為明，『謂能所取無所得智』。
又有一種解釋是，持、任等，唯獨排除真見位（真實見道位）和佛果位（buddha-phala，佛的果位）。因為佛果位中不再有果可得。真見位中沒有影相等。通達其餘的位次。所以《顯揚聖教論》第二十卷說，有五種法能夠攝持一切瑜伽行者的各種瑜伽地。八地以上的意義是說，聞、思也緣于教法等，所以普遍認為是正確的。
【English Translation】 English version: The mind. Otherwise, how could the five places be severed? Supposing the seeds of manifest afflictions do not arise, only then can they be eliminated here. Therefore, before severing them, one still needs to practice and refine. The treatise first mentions the initial shadow to reveal what follows. For example, severing the four places is not only before the stage of seeing the path (darśana-mārga). Various doubts, attachments to detachment from doubts, and discriminations still exist even in the seventh ground (saptama-bhūmi). Another explanation is that severing the four places of obstruction through the three practices only occurs before the stage of seeing the path. The treatise does not mention reaching the grounds above because the categories of the two obstructions (afflictive obstruction and cognitive obstruction) on those grounds can all be subdued. The four places to be severed are based on discriminations. However, there is no explicit text stating which ones to sever; one can choose arbitrarily.
Question: According to the eleventh chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya, there are five types of yoga practice: dhāraṇa (retention), pratyaya (reliance), ādarśa (mirror), āloka (light), and āśraya (support). Āśraya refers to āśraya-parāvṛtti (transformation of the basis), which is the path of seeing (darśana-mārga). Dhāraṇa, pratyaya, ādarśa, and āloka are the causes for attaining the result of āśraya-parāvṛtti.
In what stage do these four supports, such as dhāraṇa and pratyaya, arise? And what are they? Answer: According to that treatise, they are present in the stages of warmth (ūṣmagata), etc. That is, all four roots of virtue (catvāri kuśala-mūlāni) possess these four. Dhāraṇa is śruta-mayī prajñā (wisdom from hearing); pratyaya is cintā-mayī prajñā (wisdom from thinking); ādarśa is bhāvanā-mayī prajñā (wisdom from meditation); and āloka refers to the object of observation, without a perceiver or perceived.
Alternatively, ādarśa is samādhi (concentration), and āloka is prajñā (wisdom). The stages of warmth, peak (mūrdhan), and forbearance (kṣānti) each rely on these four to fully cultivate and enter the highest mundane dharma (laukikāgradharma). Or there are no dhāraṇa and pratyaya, because in the superior forbearance stage, one enters the highest mundane dharma in a single moment. It is only because the time is short that there are no dhāraṇa and pratyaya. But relying on this stage, there are dhāraṇa, pratyaya, etc.; it is not necessary that each of the four stages has all four.
Another explanation is that each of the four stages has these four. The two practices of dhāraṇa and pratyaya are not wisdom from hearing and wisdom from thinking, because they rely on the holy teachings in meditation, so it is called dhāraṇa. The treatise says, 'As one has heard much, one establishes the object of cessation and insight.' Therefore, corresponding to meditation, one applies the mind appropriately, which is called pratyaya. Undistorted thinking supports the mind. The meditation that is relied upon is called ādarśa, because 'this samādhi still carries characteristics.' The wisdom that can observe is called āloka, 'which is the wisdom of non-attainment of the perceiver and perceived'.
Another explanation is that dhāraṇa, pratyaya, etc., exclude only the stage of true seeing (real darśana-mārga) and the stage of Buddhahood (buddha-phala). Because there is no further result to be attained in the stage of Buddhahood. There are no shadows or appearances in the stage of true seeing. They are common to the remaining stages. Therefore, the twentieth chapter of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says that there are five dharmas that can encompass all the yoga grounds of yoga practitioners. The meaning of the eighth ground and above is that hearing and thinking also relate to the teachings, etc., so they are generally considered correct.
又四善根亦親蒙佛而為教授。故莊嚴論第七頌云。自後蒙諸佛法流而教授。釋云從此已后蒙諸佛如來以修多羅等法而為說之 準此文意。或蒙教授已修持．任．鏡．明。持謂于教起六種心。任即次起十一作意。鏡即修九種住心。明又依智作諸神通。或不配此 然四善根及持．任等。皆初祇滿心方始修之。莊嚴論第七云。行盡一僧祇長信令增上等。已後方說起四善根。諸教皆同。自古諸師意解不同。取文各別不得教意。教意菩薩修四善根。有正修滿位。有仰修習位。仰習作觀通三十心。如唯識觀等成就在見。學即通前。此亦應爾。學雖通前。正修成滿即在於后。資糧等位可得仰習。觀所取無伏我法執。觀能取無能伏於法執。不爾如何能伏二執。雜集．莊嚴．此唯識論等。據正修位不通資糧。瓔珞本業經云住於十住修學四善根者。是仰學修習。然梁攝論云。如須陀洹道前有四方便。菩薩亦有四方便。謂四十心者 或如小乘五停心觀．總相念處．別相念處合四善根為四方便。如四十心。非四善根名四方便 或言總意別。意取四十心滿修四善根。文言略故但云四十心 或翻譯謬。魏．梁．隋．唐同本異譯。餘本總無。故筆授謬。大品經云墮頂菩薩墮聲聞．辟支佛地者。或學觀所取似頂名墮頂。或本二乘在於頂位迴心向大亦名菩
薩。故云墮頂菩薩。說此等退墮二乘地。于理無違。然本業．大品更撿彼文 問四善根既屬初劫。云何言福智滿已。大莊嚴論云何言行盡僧祇。雜集如何言過第一無數劫 答約多分說。又據初劫定散雜修。已滿已過已盡純定所修此位方作。
論依明得定者。明者無滿惠。今言明者無漏惠明之前相。立以明名。求此前相今者現起。故名為得。即所得名得。明即所得。持業釋也。故無性攝論云。明謂能照無有義。智所求果遂故名為得。此論復言。初獲惠日前行相故立明得名。即無漏惠日正名為明。此明前相亦名為明。無性論云明謂能照無有義智者。此未正能照。照之前相立能照名。此依證達惠為明解。故經頌云。非不見真如而能了諸行。如名道火意喻事火正熱燒照前之暖相。似彼燒熱立以暖名。非體不暖。但非正火。非正名暖。若觀無義智體即明。何名前相立明得名。下亦不應云明相轉盛。又此明得即是尋思。無性論云。假有實無。方便因相說名尋思。又無漏智可不名明耶 問依定所發是下尋思。何不名下尋思定名明得定耶 答望義有別。照所取無名之為明。推求所取假有實無名為尋思。故無性論云。于加行時推求行見假有實無方便因相說名尋思。下文明謂能照無有義智。言定舉照義。明觀舉推求。互舉無妨 問明
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 薩（Sarva，一切）。所以說墮頂菩薩（Bodhisattva who has fallen from the peak）。說這些退墮到二乘（Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna，聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的菩薩，在道理上沒有衝突。然而《本業經》（Brahma-jāla Sūtra）和《大品般若經》（Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra）更應該檢查那些經文。 問：四善根（Four roots of good）既然屬於初劫（first kalpa），為什麼說福德和智慧已經圓滿？《大莊嚴論》（Mahālaṅkāra Sūtra）為什麼說修行已經歷盡僧祇（asaṃkhyeya，無數）？《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）又如何說已經超過第一個無數劫？ 答：這是就大部分情況來說的。而且根據初劫中定散雜修的情況，已經圓滿、已經超過、已經歷盡的是散亂的修行，而純粹的禪定修行才剛剛開始。 關於依據明得定（Ālokalabdha-samādhi，光明獲得三昧）的說法。「明」（Āloka，光明）指的是沒有圓滿的智慧。現在說「明」指的是無漏智慧（anāsrava-jñāna，無漏智）光明的前行之相，因此立名為「明」。尋求這個前行之相，現在正在生起，所以名為「得」，即所得之名「得」。「明」即所得，這是持業釋。所以無性《攝論》（Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations）說：「明，指的是能夠照亮無有的智慧。」智慧所求的果遂，所以名為「得」。此論又說：「最初獲得智慧日光的前行之相，所以立名為明得。」即無漏智慧日光正式名為「明」。這個「明」的前行之相也名為「明」。無性論說「明，指的是能夠照亮無有的智慧」，這裡還沒有真正能夠照亮，照亮的前行之相立為能照之名。這是依據證達智慧為「明」來解釋的。所以經中的偈頌說：「非不見真如（tathatā，如如）而能了諸行。」如名道火，意喻事火正熱燒照前之暖相。類似那種燒熱，立以暖名。並非本體不暖，但並非真正的火，並非真正名為暖。如果觀無義智體即是明，為什麼前相立明得名？下面也不應該說明相轉盛。而且這個明得即是尋思（vitarka，尋）。無性論說：「假有實無，方便因相說名尋思。」又無漏智可以不名為明嗎？ 問：依據禪定所發的是下尋思（lower vitarka），為什麼不名下尋思定名明得定呢？ 答：望義有別。照所取無名之為明，推求所取假有實無名為尋思。故無性論云。于加行時推求行見假有實無方便因相說名尋思。下文明謂能照無有義智。言定舉照義。明觀舉推求。互舉無妨。 問：明（Āloka，光明）
【English Translation】 English version: Sarva (everything). Therefore, it is said that Bodhisattvas who have fallen from the peak. There is no contradiction in principle in saying that these Bodhisattvas have fallen to the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna). However, the Brahma-jāla Sūtra and the Mahāprajñāpāramitā Sūtra should further examine those texts. Question: Since the Four Roots of Good belong to the first kalpa, why is it said that merit and wisdom are already complete? Why does the Mahālaṅkāra Sūtra say that practice has exhausted asaṃkhyeya (countless)? How does the Abhidharmasamuccaya say that it has exceeded the first countless kalpas? Answer: This is speaking in terms of the majority of cases. Moreover, according to the mixed practice of fixed and scattered practices in the first kalpa, what has been completed, exceeded, and exhausted is scattered practice, while pure samādhi practice has just begun. Regarding the statement based on Ālokalabdha-samādhi (illumination-obtained samādhi). 'Āloka' (illumination) refers to wisdom that is not yet complete. Now, 'Āloka' refers to the preliminary aspect of anāsrava-jñāna (untainted wisdom), hence it is named 'Āloka'. Seeking this preliminary aspect, which is now arising, is called 'labdha' (obtained), that is, the name of what is obtained is 'labdha'. 'Āloka' is what is obtained, this is a possessive compound. Therefore, Asaṅga's Compendium of Determinations says: 'Āloka refers to the wisdom that can illuminate non-existence.' The fruit sought by wisdom is achieved, hence it is called 'labdha'. This treatise further says: 'The preliminary aspect of initially obtaining the sunlight of wisdom, hence it is named Ālokalabdha.' That is, the sunlight of untainted wisdom is formally named 'Āloka'. This preliminary aspect of 'Āloka' is also named 'Āloka'. Asaṅga's treatise says, 'Āloka refers to the wisdom that can illuminate non-existence.' Here, it is not yet truly able to illuminate; the preliminary aspect of illumination is established as the name of being able to illuminate. This is based on interpreting wisdom as 'Āloka' through realization. Therefore, the verse in the sutra says: 'One cannot understand all phenomena without seeing tathatā (suchness).' Suchness is named the fire of the path, meaning that the fire is hot and burning, illuminating the warm aspect before it. Similar to that burning heat, the name of warmth is established. It is not that the substance is not warm, but it is not true fire, and it is not truly called warmth. If the substance of meaningless wisdom is Āloka, why is the preliminary aspect named Ālokalabdha? It should not be said below that the aspect of Āloka is becoming stronger. Moreover, this Ālokalabdha is vitarka (conceptualization). Asaṅga's treatise says: 'False existence and real non-existence, the aspect of expedient cause is called vitarka.' Moreover, can untainted wisdom not be called Āloka? Question: What is based on samādhi is lower vitarka, why is it not called lower vitarka samādhi Ālokalabdha-samādhi? Answer: The meaning is different depending on the perspective. Illuminating what is taken as non-existent is called Āloka, while investigating what is taken as falsely existent and truly non-existent is called vitarka. Therefore, Asaṅga's treatise says: 'During the stage of application, investigating and seeing the aspect of expedient cause of false existence and real non-existence is called vitarka.' Below, Āloka is said to be the wisdom that can illuminate non-existence. The word 'samādhi' emphasizes the meaning of illumination. The clear view emphasizes investigation. There is no harm in mentioning them mutually. Question: Āloka (illumination)
增亦所求果遂。何不名明增得定 答暖相在初偏立名得。故無性論云。此定創得無義智明。故得明得三摩地名。余既非創。不與得名 問若爾應云得之明名明得依主釋。何名持業 答舉能並所可依主名。今此所得立以得名。故非依主 或可。得是推求體也。明者是照用也。體能有用。得之明名明得。明得之定。並依主釋。或鄰近釋。定非明得。明得俱定名明得定。
依無間定等。此後無間即入見道立無間名。若以智名無間。即無間之定。依主為名。此定無間即入見道名無間定。即持業釋。不同明得。定非明故。無間非智。但無別隔即名無間。智定俱通 西明解。第一法觀名為無間。此所依定名無間定。即依主釋。闕持業釋 無間名寬。非唯智故。通二釋勝。不同前三。以名狹故 問準論云。名．義相異故別尋求。二二相同故合思察。離合為四。與瑜伽同。何故無性攝論第六云若名若義自性差別假立自性差別義。如是六種義皆無故 答彼論談法有其六種。若尋思觀即名．義別開。二自性二差別合觀故成四種。瑜伽三十六．顯揚第六．無性第六．大莊嚴論十二。皆說四尋思．四如實智。無說六尋思處 西明云離即為六合觀為四者 準此知非。廣釋名．義．自性．差別。如攝論第六．瑜伽三十六明。
論。如是
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『增亦所求果遂』（增，指增長；亦，也；所求，所希望的；果遂，結果實現）。為什麼不命名為『明增得定』（明，指智慧；增，指增長；得，指獲得；定，指禪定）？ 答：『暖相』（暖相，指修行者在修行過程中感受到的一種溫暖的徵兆）在最初階段被特別地命名為『得』。所以《無性論》（《無性論》，佛教論書）中說：『此定創得無義智明』（此定，指這種禪定；創得，初次獲得；無義智明，指沒有概念分別的智慧光明），因此得名『明增得三摩地』（三摩地，梵語，指禪定）。其餘的（狀態）既然不是初次獲得，就不使用『得』這個名稱。 問：如果這樣，應該說『得之明名明得』（得之明，獲得的光明），這是依主釋（依主釋，梵語 Tatpurusa，一種複合詞的構成方式，其中一個詞依附於另一個詞，表示所屬關係）。為什麼是持業釋（持業釋，梵語 Karmadharaya，一種複合詞的構成方式，其中兩個詞具有相同的格，互相修飾）？ 答：舉出能（能，指作用者）和所（所，指被作用者）可以稱為依主釋。現在這個所得的（狀態）被命名為『得』，所以不是依主釋。或者可以說，『得』是推求的本體，『明』是照用的作用。本體能夠產生作用，『得之明名明得』，『明得之定』，都是依主釋。或者可以採用鄰近釋（鄰近釋，複合詞的一種解釋方式，指兩個詞在意義上相互接近）。『定』不是『明得』，『明得』和『定』都是『定』，所以稱為『明得定』。 依『無間定』（無間定，指無間入于見道的禪定）等。此後無間（無間，指沒有間隔）即入見道（見道，指證悟真理的階段），所以立名為『無間』。如果以智慧（智）來命名『無間』，那就是『無間之定』，採用依主釋來命名。這個禪定無間即入見道，所以名為『無間定』，這是持業釋。這與『明得』不同，因為『定』不是『明』，『無間』不是『智』，只是沒有間隔，所以稱為『無間』。『智』和『定』都通用。西明的解釋是，第一法觀（第一法觀，指最初的對於法的觀察）名為『無間』，這個所依的禪定名為『無間定』，這是依主釋，缺少持業釋。『無間』這個名稱範圍更寬泛，不僅僅指智慧，所以兩種解釋都更合適。這與前面的三種情況不同，因為名稱範圍狹窄。 問：按照論典的說法，名和義不同，所以要分別尋求；兩個相同，所以要合併思考。離合為四種，與《瑜伽師地論》（《瑜伽師地論》，佛教論書）相同。為什麼《無性攝論》（《無性攝論》，佛教論書）第六卷說，如果名和義的自性差別假立自性差別義，這六種義都沒有呢？ 答：那部論典談論法有六種。如果尋思觀（尋思觀，指通過尋思進行觀察），那麼名和義分開。兩個自性、兩個差別合併觀察，所以成為四種。《瑜伽師地論》第三十六卷、《顯揚聖教論》（《顯揚聖教論》，佛教論書）第六卷、《無性攝論》第六卷、《大莊嚴論》（《大莊嚴論》，佛教論書）第十二卷，都說四尋思、四如實智（如實智，指如實地認識事物真相的智慧），沒有說六尋思的地方。西明說，分離就是六種，合併觀察就是四種，按照這個說法就知道不是這樣。詳細解釋名、義、自性、差別，如《攝論》第六卷、《瑜伽師地論》第三十六卷所說。 論：如是
【English Translation】 English version 『Zeng yi suo qiu guo sui』 (增亦所求果遂) (Zeng, meaning increase; yi, also; suo qiu, what is desired; guo sui, the result is achieved). Why not name it 『Ming zeng de ding』 (明增得定) (Ming, meaning wisdom; zeng, meaning increase; de, meaning to obtain; ding, meaning samadhi)? Answer: 『Nuan xiang』 (暖相) (Nuan xiang, referring to a warm sensation experienced by practitioners during practice) is specifically named 『de』 (得) in the initial stage. Therefore, the Wuxing Lun (無性論) (Wuxing Lun, a Buddhist treatise) says: 『This samadhi is newly obtained without conceptual wisdom and light,』 hence the name 『Ming zeng de sanmodi』 (明增得三摩地) (Sanmodi, Sanskrit, referring to samadhi). Since the remaining (states) are not newly obtained, the name 『de』 is not used. Question: If so, it should be said 『De zhi ming ming de』 (得之明名明得) (De zhi ming, the light of attainment), which is a Tatpurusa (依主釋) (Tatpurusa, Sanskrit, a type of compound word construction where one word is dependent on another, indicating a relationship of belonging). Why is it a Karmadharaya (持業釋) (Karmadharaya, Sanskrit, a type of compound word construction where two words have the same case and modify each other)? Answer: To mention the agent (能) (agent, referring to the actor) and the object (所) (object, referring to what is acted upon) can be called Tatpurusa. Now this obtained (state) is named 『de,』 so it is not Tatpurusa. Or it can be said that 『de』 is the substance of seeking, and 『ming』 is the function of illumination. The substance can produce function, 『De zhi ming ming de,』 『Ming de zhi ding,』 are all Tatpurusa. Or a neighboring interpretation (鄰近釋) (neighboring interpretation, a type of compound word interpretation, referring to two words that are close in meaning) can be adopted. 『Ding』 is not 『ming de,』 『ming de』 and 『ding』 are both 『ding,』 so it is called 『Ming de ding.』 Based on 『Wujian ding』 (無間定) (Wujian ding, referring to the samadhi of entering the path of seeing without interruption) and so on. Immediately after this, without interruption (無間) (without interruption, referring to no interval), one enters the path of seeing (見道) (path of seeing, referring to the stage of realizing the truth), so it is named 『Wujian.』 If 『Wujian』 is named with wisdom (智), then it is 『Wujian zhi ding,』 named using Tatpurusa. This samadhi immediately enters the path of seeing without interruption, so it is called 『Wujian ding,』 which is Karmadharaya. This is different from 『Ming de,』 because 『ding』 is not 『ming,』 『Wujian』 is not 『zhi,』 but there is no interval, so it is called 『Wujian.』 『Zhi』 and 『ding』 are both common. The interpretation of Ximing is that the first Dharma contemplation (第一法觀) (first Dharma contemplation, referring to the initial observation of the Dharma) is called 『Wujian,』 and the samadhi on which this is based is called 『Wujian ding,』 which is Tatpurusa, lacking Karmadharaya. The name 『Wujian』 has a wider scope, not only referring to wisdom, so both interpretations are more appropriate. This is different from the previous three cases, because the scope of the name is narrow. Question: According to the scriptures, names and meanings are different, so they should be sought separately; two are the same, so they should be considered together. Separation and combination are four types, the same as the Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) (Yogacarabhumi-sastra, a Buddhist treatise). Why does the sixth volume of the Wuxing Shelun (無性攝論) (Wuxing Shelun, a Buddhist treatise) say that if the nature difference of names and meanings falsely establishes the meaning of nature difference, then these six meanings do not exist? Answer: That treatise discusses six types of Dharma. If one contemplates through seeking (尋思觀) (contemplates through seeking, referring to observing through seeking), then names and meanings are separated. Two natures and two differences are observed together, so they become four types. The thirty-sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra, the sixth volume of the Xianyang Shengjiao Lun (顯揚聖教論) (Xianyang Shengjiao Lun, a Buddhist treatise), the sixth volume of the Wuxing Shelun, and the twelfth volume of the Dazhuangyan Lun (大莊嚴論) (Dazhuangyan Lun, a Buddhist treatise) all say four seekings and four true knowledges (如實智) (true knowledges, referring to the wisdom of truly knowing the truth of things), and there is no place that says six seekings. Ximing said that separation is six types, and combined observation is four types, according to this statement, it is known that this is not the case. A detailed explanation of name, meaning, nature, and difference is as stated in the sixth volume of the Shelun and the thirty-sixth volume of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra. Treatise: Thus
暖頂依能取識觀所取空乃至世第一法二空雙印者。此牒前釋悟入三性結前所明。以暖．頂位未觀能取無。云依能取識觀所取空。以彼所取名．義二種依能取識而假立故。此觀名．義初．后二位。無心外境但依內心。一重唯識。亦分悟依他。中忍起位觀能取空唯識如幻等。第二重唯識。初悟入遍計少分未悟能取亦遍計故。第二全悟遍計所執。亦知能取性非有故。亦悟依他。上忍．第一單雙印彼能所取空。並悟圓實。此言悟者據似悟說。非是實悟。故下結云。安立少物謂是唯識真勝義性 問若上忍．第一悟圓成者。何故云此四位中猶于現前安立少物謂唯識性。準此應通四位 答既言於四位中。明簡上忍及第一位。不爾但應云於此四位。何須說中 又解于暖．頂位觀名．義二離識是無互不相屬名悟遍計。觀名．義等唯有識量及假名義名悟依他。忍．第一位悟圓成實。此依攝論名．義為客處解 問中忍起位觀能取空。上忍起時方始能印。應于忍位方悟依他。如何初二說悟依他 答攝論據少分名悟依他。下中二忍從上忍說名悟圓成。或下忍位印所取空。心所變空是依他起。據真如理空即圓成實。故攝論中引莊嚴論云。住此二無真實理 問準無性攝論。初悟遍計。次悟依他。后悟圓實。準此論第八引經頌云非不見真如而能了諸行等
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：『暖』（指四加行位的第一個階段，是毗缽舍那觀的初始階段）和『頂』（四加行位的第二個階段，是毗缽舍那觀的增長階段）位，依能取識（能認知的主觀意識）觀察所取空（被認知的客觀對像為空性），乃至『世第一法』（四加行位的第四個階段，是毗缽舍那觀達到頂峰的階段）二空雙印（能取和所取皆為空性），這是總結前面對悟入三自性（遍計所執性、依他起性、圓成實性）的解釋，並總結前面所闡明的道理。因為在『暖』、『頂』位，還沒有觀察到能取是無的，所以說『依能取識觀所取空』。因為那些所取，即名稱和意義兩種，是依能取識而假立的。這種觀察針對名稱和意義的初始和最終兩個階段，沒有心外的境界，只是依內心而存在，這是第一重唯識，也部分地領悟了依他起性。中忍（四加行位的第三個階段，是毗缽舍那觀進一步發展的階段）開始時，觀察能取空，唯識如幻等，這是第二重唯識，最初領悟了遍計所執性的少部分，還沒有領悟到能取也是遍計所執的。第二重唯識完全領悟了遍計所執，也知道能取的自性並非真實存在，也領悟了依他起性。上忍（中忍的更高階段）和世第一法，單獨或同時印證能取和所取為空性，並且領悟了圓成實性。這裡說的『悟』，是根據相似的領悟來說的，不是真正的領悟。所以下面總結說，『安立少物謂是唯識真勝義性』（執著于少量的事物，認為這就是唯識的真實勝義）。 問：如果上忍和世第一法領悟了圓成實性，為什麼說『此四位中猶于現前安立少物謂唯識性』（在這四個階段中，仍然執著于少量的事物，認為這就是唯識的自性）？按照這個說法，應該貫通這四個階段。 答：既然說『於四位中』，就明顯地排除了上忍和世第一法階段。否則，應該只說『於此四位』，何必說『中』呢？ 另一種解釋是，在『暖』、『頂』位，觀察名稱和意義兩種與識分離，互不相屬，這叫做領悟遍計所執性。觀察名稱、意義等只是識的量，以及假名意義，這叫做領悟依他起性。忍位和世第一法位領悟圓成實性。這是根據《攝大乘論》將名稱和意義作為客體來解釋。 問：中忍開始時觀察能取空，上忍開始時才能印證，應該在忍位才能領悟依他起性，為什麼最初兩個階段就說領悟了依他起性？ 答：《攝大乘論》根據少部分領悟就稱為領悟依他起性。下忍和中忍從上忍的角度來說，稱為領悟圓成實性。或者下忍位印證所取空，心所變現的空是依他起性，根據真如理，空就是圓成實性。所以《攝大乘論》中引用《莊嚴經論》說：『住此二無真實理』（安住于這兩種（遍計所執性和依他起性）沒有真實的道理）。 問：按照無性菩薩的《攝大乘論》，最初領悟遍計所執性，其次領悟依他起性，最後領悟圓成實性。按照這個理論，第八卷引用經文偈頌說『非不見真如而能了諸行等』（如果不能見到真如，就不能瞭解諸行等等）。
【English Translation】 English version: 『Warmth』 (the first stage of the four preparatory practices, representing the initial stage of Vipassanā meditation) and 『Peak』 (the second stage of the four preparatory practices, representing the increasing stage of Vipassanā meditation), relying on the perceiving consciousness (the subjective consciousness that cognizes) to observe the emptiness of the perceived (the objective object being cognized as emptiness), up to the 『World's Supreme Dharma』 (the fourth stage of the four preparatory practices, representing the peak stage of Vipassanā meditation), the dual seal of two emptinesses (both the perceiver and the perceived are empty). This summarizes the previous explanation of realizing the three natures (Parikalpita-svabhava (the completely imputed nature), Paratantra-svabhava (the dependent nature), and Parinispanna-svabhava (the perfected nature)), and summarizes the principles explained earlier. Because in the 『Warmth』 and 『Peak』 stages, the perceiving consciousness has not yet been observed as non-existent, it is said that 『relying on the perceiving consciousness to observe the emptiness of the perceived.』 Because those perceived objects, namely names and meanings, are provisionally established based on the perceiving consciousness. This observation targets the initial and final stages of names and meanings. There is no external realm outside the mind, but only exists based on the inner mind. This is the first level of Consciousness-Only, and also partially realizes the dependent nature. When the Intermediate Forbearance (the third stage of the four preparatory practices, representing the further development stage of Vipassanā meditation) begins, observe the emptiness of the perceiving consciousness, Consciousness-Only is like an illusion, etc. This is the second level of Consciousness-Only, initially realizing a small part of the completely imputed nature, and not yet realizing that the perceiving consciousness is also completely imputed. The second level of Consciousness-Only fully realizes the completely imputed nature, and also knows that the nature of the perceiving consciousness is not truly existent, and also realizes the dependent nature. The Superior Forbearance (a higher stage of the Intermediate Forbearance) and the World's Supreme Dharma, individually or simultaneously seal the emptiness of the perceiver and the perceived, and realize the perfected nature. The 『realization』 mentioned here is based on a similar realization, not a true realization. Therefore, the conclusion below says, 『Establishing a small amount of things and considering it to be the true ultimate nature of Consciousness-Only』 (clinging to a small amount of things, considering this to be the true ultimate meaning of Consciousness-Only). Question: If the Superior Forbearance and the World's Supreme Dharma realize the perfected nature, why is it said that 『in these four stages, there is still clinging to a small amount of things and considering it to be the nature of Consciousness-Only』 (in these four stages, there is still clinging to a small amount of things, considering this to be the nature of Consciousness-Only)? According to this statement, it should encompass all four stages. Answer: Since it says 『in the four stages,』 it clearly excludes the Superior Forbearance and the World's Supreme Dharma stages. Otherwise, it should only say 『in these four stages,』 why say 『in』? Another explanation is that in the 『Warmth』 and 『Peak』 stages, observing the two types of names and meanings as separate from consciousness and not mutually related is called realizing the completely imputed nature. Observing that names, meanings, etc., are only the measure of consciousness, and provisional names and meanings, is called realizing the dependent nature. The Forbearance and World's Supreme Dharma stages realize the perfected nature. This is based on the Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle (Mahāyānasaṃgraha) interpreting names and meanings as objects. Question: When the Intermediate Forbearance begins, observe the emptiness of the perceiving consciousness. Only when the Superior Forbearance begins can it be sealed. It should be in the Forbearance stage that the dependent nature is realized. Why do the first two stages say that the dependent nature is realized? Answer: The Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle calls it realizing the dependent nature based on a small part of realization. The Lower Forbearance and Intermediate Forbearance are called realizing the perfected nature from the perspective of the Superior Forbearance. Or, in the Lower Forbearance stage, the emptiness of the perceived is sealed. The emptiness transformed by the mental factors is the dependent nature. According to the principle of Suchness, emptiness is the perfected nature. Therefore, the Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle quotes the Ornament of the Sutras (Mahāyānasaṃgraha) saying: 『Dwelling in these two, there is no true principle』 (Dwelling in these two (the completely imputed nature and the dependent nature), there is no true principle). Question: According to Asanga's Treatise on the Summary of the Great Vehicle, initially realize the completely imputed nature, then realize the dependent nature, and finally realize the perfected nature. According to this theory, the eighth volume quotes the verse from the sutra saying 『If one does not see Suchness, one cannot understand all phenomena, etc.』
。即先悟圓實。次悟依他。又復無性攝論初文。地前悟初二性。第二文地前通悟三性。何故不同 答依學觀察趣入方便相似悟說。先悟遍計。次依他。后圓實。即觀名．義更互為客知彼非真。次觀唯量及唯假等。若依真證要達圓成方知識幻。故彼此說各不相違 若爾何故攝論復云于繩謂蛇智。見繩了義無等。準此即先悟依他次悟遍計 答此約悟入除執而說。初雖觀彼名．義等無未能決定。要知依識已彼執方除。如見杌時方除人解。攝論亦云。如是依止唯識顯現依他起覺。舍於六義遍計執覺。不要先觀依他起已方觀遍計。故不相違 又釋于繩起蛇智等據久學說。名．義互為客等依初學明。準此等文悟．入有三。一初悟遍計次悟依他后圓實。即名．義互為客是。二先悟依他次遍計后圓實。即見繩了義無等是。三初悟圓成次依他后遍計。即非不見真如等是。入位亦三。準初總在見道前。準后總入見道后。三初二性在見道前悟。圓成實性入見已悟。即見繩了義等。故彼論云。如是依止圓成實覺。遣依他起迷亂之覺。及彼次下故似唯識亦不得生。由是因緣住一切義無分別名。於法界中便得現見相應而住。爾時菩薩平等平等。所緣能緣無分別智已得生起 問於此四位但遣遍計不遣依．圓。即觀假有及唯識性。云何言世第一法雙印二
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：即先領悟圓滿真實（圓實，指圓成實性）。其次領悟依他起性（依他，指依他起性）。又《攝大乘論》（無性攝論）的最初一段文字說，在初地之前領悟最初的兩種自性（初二性，指遍計所執性和依他起性）。第二段文字說，在初地之前普遍領悟三種自性（三性，指遍計所執性、依他起性和圓成實性）。為什麼說法不同呢？ 回答：這是依據學習觀察，趨入真理的方便，以及相似的領悟來說的。先領悟遍計所執性（遍計），其次是依他起性（依他），最後是圓滿真實性（圓實）。也就是觀察名相和義理，相互作為客體，從而知道它們不是真實的。其次觀察唯有量和唯有假相等。如果依據真實的證悟，必須通達圓成實性，才能知道一切都是幻象。因此彼此的說法並不互相違背。 如果這樣，為什麼《攝大乘論》又說，對於繩子產生蛇的錯覺（于繩謂蛇智），見到繩子就明白了義理，沒有其他等同的情況。按照這個說法，就是先領悟依他起性，其次領悟遍計所執性了？ 回答：這是就領悟而入，去除執著來說的。最初雖然觀察名相、義理等是虛妄的，但未能確定。必須知道是依識而起，才能去除那種執著。就像見到樹樁時，才能消除認為是人的錯覺。《攝大乘論》也說，像這樣，依靠唯識的顯現，覺悟到依他起性，捨棄對於六義的遍計所執的覺悟。不需要先觀察依他起性，然後才觀察遍計所執性。所以並不互相違背。 另外，解釋對於繩子產生蛇的錯覺等，是根據長期學習的人來說的。名相、義理相互作為客體等，是根據初學的人來說明的。按照這些經文，領悟和進入有三種情況。第一種是先領悟遍計所執性，其次領悟依他起性，最後是圓滿真實性。也就是名相、義理相互作為客體的情況。第二種是先領悟依他起性，其次是遍計所執性，最後是圓滿真實性。也就是見到繩子就明白了義理，沒有其他等同的情況。第三種是先領悟圓成實性，其次是依他起性，最後是遍計所執性。也就是並非沒有見到真如等情況。進入的位次也有三種。按照第一種情況，總是在見道之前。按照第二種情況，總是進入見道之後。第三種情況是，最初的兩種自性在見道之前領悟，圓成實性在進入見道后領悟。也就是見到繩子就明白了義理等情況。所以那部論典說，像這樣，依靠圓成實性的覺悟，遣除依他起性的迷惑之覺，以及那之後的，所以好像唯識的念頭也不會產生。由於這個因緣，安住於一切義理的無分別名相。在法界中便能夠現見相應而安住。這時菩薩平等平等，所緣和能緣的無分別智慧已經得以生起。 問：在這四種位次中，只是去除遍計所執性，不去除依他起性和圓成實性。也就是觀察虛假的實有和唯識的自性。為什麼說世第一法同時印證兩種自性呢？
【English Translation】 English version: That is, first realize the perfect reality (圓實, Yuánshí, referring to the Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). Secondly, realize the dependent nature (依他, Yī tā, referring to the Paratantra-svabhāva). Furthermore, the initial text of the Mahāyānasaṃgraha (無性攝論, Wúxìng Shèlùn) states that before the Bhumi, the first two natures are realized (初二性, chū èr xìng, referring to the Parikalpita-svabhāva and the Paratantra-svabhāva). The second text states that before the Bhumi, all three natures are universally realized (三性, sān xìng, referring to the Parikalpita-svabhāva, the Paratantra-svabhāva, and the Pariniṣpanna-svabhāva). Why are they different? Answer: This is based on learning and observation, the convenience of entering the truth, and similar realizations. First, realize the imagined nature (遍計, Biàn jì, referring to the Parikalpita-svabhāva), then the dependent nature (依他, Yī tā), and finally the perfect reality (圓實, Yuánshí). That is, observe the name and meaning, mutually as objects, and then know that they are not real. Secondly, observe only the measure and only the false, etc. If based on true realization, one must understand the perfect reality in order to know that everything is an illusion. Therefore, the statements of each do not contradict each other. If so, why does the Mahāyānasaṃgraha also say, 'The intellect that takes a rope for a snake (于繩謂蛇智, yú shéng wèi shé zhì), seeing the rope, one understands the meaning, and there is nothing else like it.' According to this statement, one first realizes the dependent nature and then the imagined nature? Answer: This is about realizing and entering, removing attachments. Although one initially observes that names, meanings, etc., are false, one cannot be certain. One must know that it arises from consciousness in order to remove that attachment. Just like when seeing a tree stump, one can eliminate the illusion of thinking it is a person. The Mahāyānasaṃgraha also says, 'Like this, relying on the manifestation of consciousness, one awakens to the dependent nature, abandoning the imagined awakening to the six meanings.' It is not necessary to first observe the dependent nature and then observe the imagined nature. Therefore, they do not contradict each other. In addition, explaining 'taking a rope for a snake' etc., is based on those who have studied for a long time. 'Names and meanings mutually as objects' etc., is explained based on beginners. According to these texts, there are three situations for realization and entry. The first is to first realize the imagined nature, then the dependent nature, and finally the perfect reality. That is, the situation of 'names and meanings mutually as objects.' The second is to first realize the dependent nature, then the imagined nature, and finally the perfect reality. That is, 'seeing the rope, one understands the meaning, and there is nothing else like it.' The third is to first realize the perfect reality, then the dependent nature, and finally the imagined nature. That is, the situation of 'not not seeing Suchness' etc. There are also three stages of entry. According to the first situation, it is always before the Path of Seeing. According to the second situation, it is always after entering the Path of Seeing. The third situation is that the first two natures are realized before the Path of Seeing, and the perfect reality is realized after entering the Path of Seeing. That is, the situation of 'seeing the rope, one understands the meaning' etc. Therefore, that treatise says, 'Like this, relying on the awakening of the perfect reality, one dispels the deluded awakening of the dependent nature, and after that, it seems that the thought of only consciousness will not arise. Because of this cause, one abides in the non-discriminating name of all meanings. In the Dharmadhatu, one can directly see and abide in accordance. At this time, the Bodhisattva is equal and equal, and the non-discriminating wisdom of the object and the subject has already arisen.' Question: In these four stages, only the imagined nature is removed, not the dependent nature and the perfect reality. That is, observing the false existence and the nature of only consciousness. Why is it said that the World's First Dharma simultaneously confirms the two natures?
空 答偏說印空。非不印有。由久妄執名．義等有不了依．圓。觀彼空時能悟后二。故說印空理亦印有。故下云。猶于現前安立少物。謂是唯識真勝義性 問安立少物謂唯識性即是有觀。印彼二空即是空觀。空．有既乖。如斷．常見。因何得並 答執．不執殊故得俱起。又觀無二即顯空性。是圓成實。據相似說。印此空性名印二空 若爾何故前云忍境．識空故亦名忍。準此正意印二取空 答準此前後雙印空．有。前說為好 問既言雙印。印二取空及依他有即是觀俗。印二空性謂真勝義即是觀真。真俗雙觀五地方得。云何地前已能合觀 答五地合觀據二智並起或真證說。此據相似非是正證。俱帶相故亦不相違。
此空有二相。西明云。三藏二解。一云於四位中初二觀所取空。后二觀能取空。如是觀時名等四種或六或四假有實無。假有是依他性。即是有相。實無即遍計。此即空相。二相皆滅安立真性。二云前四位中有能所取空相。與相分空相不一不異。無別體故不異。有無別故非一。然彼空相唯是所緣非緣。以無體故。當情現者從緣生故是所緣緣。故說觀心帶有無相 今謂二釋俱傳為謬。何者且初解云。初二觀所取空。后二觀能取空。不應道理。世第一法雙印二空。即雙觀二空。豈印二空而不觀耶。第二釋中緣二取
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 空：回答說，偏重於印證空性。並非不印證有。由於長久以來錯誤地執著名相、義理等為有，而不了達依他起性和圓成實性。觀察那空性的時候，能夠領悟後兩者。所以說印證空性，實際上也印證有。因此下面說：『猶如對於現前安立的少量事物，認為是唯識的真實勝義性』。 問：安立少量事物認為是唯識性，這就是有觀。印證那二取空，這就是空觀。空和有既然相違，如同斷見和常見，為什麼能夠並存？ 答：由於執著與不執著的差別，所以能夠同時生起。而且觀察無二，就顯現了空性，這是圓成實性。根據相似的情況來說，印證這空性，就叫做印證二空。如果這樣，為什麼前面說『安忍境、識空，所以也叫做安忍』？按照這個正確的意義，是印證二取空。 答：按照這個，前後都印證空和有。前面的說法更好。問：既然說是雙重印證，印證二取空以及依他起有，這就是觀俗諦。印證二空性，就是真勝義諦，這就是觀真諦。真俗雙觀只有在五地才能得到，為什麼在五地之前就已經能夠合觀？ 答：五地合觀是根據二智同時生起或者真實證得來說的。這裡是根據相似的情況，不是真正的證得，因為都帶有相，所以也不相違背。 這個空有二相。西明（地名，也指西明寺）說，三藏（指精通經、律、論三藏的僧人）有兩種解釋。一種說法是，在四位（指四種觀行位次）中，前兩種觀行是觀察所取空，后兩種觀行是觀察能取空。這樣觀察的時候，名等四種（指名、事、自性、差別四種）或者六種（加上正智、如如），或者四種（指名、句、文身），是假有實無。假有是依他性，就是有相。實無就是遍計所執性，這就是空相。兩種相都滅除，安立真性。另一種說法是，前四位中有能取和所取空相，與相分空相不一不異。沒有別的自體，所以不異。有無的差別，所以不是一。然而那空相只是所緣，不是緣。因為沒有自體。當情現者，是從緣生，所以是所緣緣。所以說觀心帶有有無相。現在我認為兩種解釋都流傳為謬誤。為什麼呢？且說第一種解釋，說前兩種觀行是觀察所取空，后兩種觀行是觀察能取空，不應該這樣說。世第一法（指修行位次）雙重印證二空，就是雙重觀察二空。難道印證二空而不觀察嗎？第二種解釋中，緣二取
【English Translation】 English version 『Emptiness』: The answer emphasizes validating emptiness. It doesn't mean not validating existence. Because of long-held mistaken attachments to names, meanings, and so on as existent, without understanding dependent origination (paratantra-svabhava) and perfect reality (pariniṣpanna-svabhava). When observing that emptiness, one can realize the latter two. Therefore, it is said that validating emptiness actually also validates existence. Hence, it is said below: 『It is like considering a small object established before one as the true ultimate nature of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātratā).』 Question: Establishing a small object as the nature of consciousness-only is the view of existence. Validating the emptiness of the two apprehensions (dvaya-grāha-śūnyatā) is the view of emptiness. Since emptiness and existence contradict each other, like annihilationism and eternalism, how can they coexist? Answer: Because of the difference between attachment and non-attachment, they can arise simultaneously. Moreover, observing non-duality reveals emptiness, which is perfect reality. According to a similar situation, validating this emptiness is called validating the two emptinesses. If so, why did it say earlier, 『Enduring the emptiness of objects and consciousness is also called endurance』? According to this correct meaning, it is validating the emptiness of the two apprehensions. Answer: According to this, both emptiness and existence are validated before and after. The previous statement is better. Question: Since it is said to be double validation, validating the emptiness of the two apprehensions and dependent origination is the conventional truth (saṃvṛti-satya). Validating the emptiness of the two emptinesses is the ultimate truth (paramārtha-satya), which is the view of the true. The dual view of truth and convention can only be obtained in the Fifth Ground (pañcama-bhūmi). How can one be able to combine the views before the Fifth Ground? Answer: The combined view of the Fifth Ground is based on the simultaneous arising of the two wisdoms (jñāna) or the actual attainment. This is based on a similar situation, not the actual attainment, because they both carry characteristics, so they are not contradictory. This emptiness has two aspects. Ximing (place name, also refers to Ximing Temple) said that the Tripitaka Master (refers to a monk proficient in the three baskets of Sutra, Vinaya, and Abhidharma) has two explanations. One explanation is that in the four stages (referring to the four stages of practice), the first two practices observe the emptiness of what is apprehended, and the last two practices observe the emptiness of what apprehends. When observing in this way, the four kinds of names, etc. (referring to the four kinds of name, entity, self-nature, and difference) or six kinds (adding correct knowledge and suchness), or four kinds (referring to name, sentence, and syllable), are provisionally existent but ultimately non-existent. Provisional existence is dependent origination, which is the aspect of existence. Ultimate non-existence is the imagined nature (parikalpita-svabhava), which is the aspect of emptiness. When both aspects are extinguished, true nature is established. Another explanation is that in the first four stages, there are the emptiness aspects of what apprehends and what is apprehended, which are neither identical nor different from the emptiness aspect of the image-division (ākāra-bhāga). Because there is no separate entity, they are not different. Because there is a difference between existence and non-existence, they are not identical. However, that emptiness aspect is only the object of thought, not the condition. Because it has no entity. What appears to the mind is born from conditions, so it is the object-condition (ālambana-pratyaya). Therefore, it is said that the mind in contemplation carries aspects of existence and non-existence. Now I think both explanations are transmitted as errors. Why? Let's talk about the first explanation, saying that the first two practices observe the emptiness of what is apprehended, and the last two practices observe the emptiness of what apprehends, it shouldn't be said like this. The World First Dharma (refers to the stage of practice) doubly validates the two emptinesses, which is doubly observing the two emptinesses. Could it be that validating the two emptinesses without observing them? In the second explanation, the condition of the two apprehensions
空。所變空相名為有者。豈可唯欲除此相分之有相。不除識性之相分耶。不爾如何言現前立少物。謂是唯識性。以有所得故。非實住唯識。復如何言后觸無所得。故知觀二取為空。觀識及性為有。猶帶此二故不證真。不可唯說緣空相分說之為有 問言皆帶相故未能證實故。說現前安立少物者為在何位 答準文正在四善根位。既明前位云。皆帶相故未能證實 又云帶相觀心有所得故。又教授頌云。菩薩于定位觀影唯是心等。故在定位。然不堅執是定現量 要集云。據出觀位說。觀中現量不作此解 今謂不爾。若許觀中不帶空．有二種相者。應觸無所得。即住真見何名加行。又亦應伏相．粗重縛。復違前諸文。
論。此加行位未遣相縛者。本釋如疏。今又助釋。此相縛體由第七識二執為本。令諸識中不能亡相。為相所拘。然前第五云。由我執故令六識中所起施等不能亡相。據執我能行佈施等及有受者。若執所施不亡相者。豈我執耶。由執法有故不亡相。設云見所施屬我之物。是我所見亦我執起者。于余度中不亡相者。豈皆執為我所耶。故瑜伽論但云染污末那為依止故。彼未滅時相了別縛不得解脫。不言由我。望菩薩說名為染污。二乘不行無相施等。又前釋言。言相縛者。謂于境相不能了達如幻事等。又若我執為相縛
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：問：如果將『空』所轉變的『空相』稱為『有』，難道僅僅是爲了去除此『相分』的『有相』，而不去除『識性』的『相分』嗎？如果不是這樣，又如何說『現前安立少物』，就說是『唯識性』呢？因為有所得的緣故，並非真正安住于唯識。又如何說『后觸無所得』，因此知道觀『二取』為空，觀『識』及『性』為『有』，仍然帶著這二者，所以不能證得真如。不可僅僅說緣『空相分』就說它為『有』。 問：既然說都帶著『相』，所以未能證實，那麼說『現前安立少物』是在什麼位次呢？答：根據文義，正是在『四善根位』。既然明確前面說『都帶著相，所以未能證實』，又說『帶著相觀心，有所得』。又有教授頌說：『菩薩于定位，觀影唯是心』等等，所以在『定位』。然而不堅執這是『定』中的現量。要集說：『根據出觀位說，觀中現量不作此解』。我認為不是這樣。如果允許觀中不帶著『空』、『有』兩種相，那麼應該『觸無所得』，就安住于真見，還叫什麼『加行』？又應該已經降伏了『相』和『粗重』的束縛，又違背了前面的各種說法。 論：此『加行位』未遣除『相縛』，本來的解釋如疏中所說。現在再輔助解釋。此『相縛』的本體，由第七識的『二執』為根本，使得各個識中不能忘卻『相』，被『相』所拘束。然而前面第五識說：『由我執故，令六識中所起施等不能亡相』，是根據執著『我』能行佈施等，以及有接受佈施者。如果執著所施之物不忘卻『相』，難道是『我執』嗎？因為有『法執』的緣故，所以不忘卻『相』。假設說見到所施之物屬於『我』的物品，是『我』所見，也是『我執』生起，那麼在其餘的度中不忘卻『相』，難道都執著為『我所』嗎？所以《瑜伽論》只說染污的『末那』為依止的緣故，那個沒有滅除的時候，『相了別縛』不得解脫，不說是由於『我』。相對於菩薩來說，名為染污。二乘不行無相施等。又前面的解釋說：『言相縛者，謂于境相不能了達如幻事等』。又如果『我執』是『相縛』。
【English Translation】 English version: Question: If the 'emptiness' that is transformed from 'emptiness' is called 'existence', is it merely to remove the 'existence-aspect' of this 'aspect-division' without removing the 'aspect-division' of 'consciousness-nature'? If not, how can it be said that 'establishing a small object in the present' is 'consciousness-only nature'? Because there is something obtained, it is not truly dwelling in consciousness-only. And how can it be said that 'subsequent contact is without attainment', therefore knowing that observing 'two graspings' as empty, and observing 'consciousness' and 'nature' as 'existent', still carries these two, so one cannot attain true suchness. It is not permissible to merely say that conditioning on the 'emptiness-aspect division' is called 'existence'. Question: Since it is said that all carry 'aspects', so one cannot truly realize, then in what stage is it said that 'establishing a small object in the present' is in? Answer: According to the text, it is precisely in the 'four roots of goodness' stage. Since it is clear that the previous stage says 'all carry aspects, so one cannot truly realize', and also says 'observing the mind with aspects, there is something obtained'. And there is a teaching verse that says: 'Bodhisattvas in meditative absorption, observe shadows as only mind' etc., so it is in 'meditative absorption'. However, one does not firmly grasp that this is the present moment in 'meditation'. Yaoji says: 'According to the stage of emerging from meditation, the present moment in meditation is not explained in this way'. I think it is not so. If it is allowed that in meditation one does not carry the two kinds of aspects of 'emptiness' and 'existence', then there should be 'contact without attainment', and one would dwell in true seeing, what is still called 'practice'? And one should have already subdued the bondage of 'aspects' and 'coarseness', and it also contradicts the previous various statements. Treatise: This 'stage of practice' has not eliminated the 'aspect-bondage', the original explanation is as said in the commentary. Now further assist in explaining. The substance of this 'aspect-bondage' has the 'two attachments' of the seventh consciousness as its root, causing the various consciousnesses to be unable to forget 'aspects', and being bound by 'aspects'. However, the previous fifth consciousness said: 'Due to self-attachment, the giving etc. that arise in the six consciousnesses cannot forget aspects', it is based on clinging to 'I' being able to perform giving etc., and there being a receiver of giving. If one clings to the object given without forgetting 'aspects', is it 'self-attachment'? Because there is 'dharma-attachment', so one does not forget 'aspects'. Suppose one sees that the object given belongs to 'my' possessions, is seen by 'me', and 'self-attachment' also arises, then in the other perfections one does not forget 'aspects', does one all cling to it as 'mine'? Therefore, the Yogacara-bhumi-sastra only says that the defiled manas is the basis, when that is not extinguished, the 'aspect-discrimination bondage' cannot be liberated, it does not say it is due to 'I'. Relative to Bodhisattvas, it is called defiled. The two vehicles do not practice giving without aspects etc. And the previous explanation said: 'The so-called aspect-bondage means that one cannot fully understand the aspects of objects as illusory events etc.'. And if 'self-attachment' is 'aspect-bondage'.
者。二乘無學斷此我執應無相縛。此等迴心加行等位應無二縛。又觀安立應能斷縛。何故瑜伽六十四云若離非安立諦二種解脫不應道理。二乘但能觀安立諦。故知二縛未得解脫 問若爾二乘無漏后得既行於相。應有相縛 答以漏無漏性相違故暫能伏除。雖行於相不為相縛。即據此理四分相望為所緣者亦得名相。雖非相分而是境相。前第五云。由斯見分彼相所拘者約顯相明。非唯相分名為相縛。故瑜伽七十五云。相．粗重縛有十四種。五于所知境無智縛。六于能知智無智縛。既能知所知俱名相．粗重縛。明見分等亦得名縛。本疏復云。如前第二卷引。眾生心二性。內外一切分所取能取纏等。證四皆縛。西明．要集俱悉不許見．自證等亦名為縛 要集難云。若由說纏即說縛者。如何論師引彼經頌。證成有漏．無漏四分。無漏無縛非證無漏 今者為通。且據有漏證有四分。顯知無漏亦有四分。若說言縛不得證無漏。亦應說眾生言不得證佛有 又云正智證如即無相分必有見等。故知不由有見分等。自證分等有了．不了 此難非理。據有漏說不約無漏。如何得舉無漏為難。
言粗重者。諸文不同。具如疏引。言如別抄說。粗重不同略有五種 一二障種子名粗重。即此論頌舍二粗重故便證得轉依 二二障所引生所餘習氣無堪
任性名為粗重。即下斷障中雲。二障所生無堪任性。如於二定說斷苦根 三二障現行名為粗重。即說惛沈正障輕安。違細輕故名為粗重。如第六明。又對法第十云。領受粗重。即異熟受能障定故 四諸有漏種總名粗重。顯揚十六說依他自性由相生粗重。粗重為緣又生於相 五一切有漏種及現行名為粗重。瑜伽五十八云。粗重縛即一切有漏法。應知此中或漏所隨故。漏所生故名粗重。或漏自性故。或相應故。名為粗重。何以故。瑜伽六十四云。無所堪能不調柔相是粗重相。此有五種。一現重相。二剛強相。三障礙相。四怯劣相。五不自在轉無堪能相。由此有漏隨其所有。總說有漏名為粗重。望無漏說。不善．無記名為粗重。即二障種．現及無記受望善心說。善有堪能故。或唯說散名為粗重望定而說。定有輕安故。前五相中具．不具等隨其所應。且有漏善或名粗重。漏所隨故。或非粗重非漏性故。非種子故。非習氣故。所餘或名粗重。或不名粗重。或唯說煩惱名為粗重。漏自性故。或通二障名為粗重。執自性故。漏性漏俱故。或唯障種說為粗重。以漏執性性沉隱故。生現障故偏得其名。或唯習氣名為粗重。以微隱故。性難斷故。諸說不同準此會釋。
論。菩薩起此暖等善根等。若二乘人增上忍．世第一通依五地。中
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
『任性』被稱為『粗重』（Prakriti-bhara，指心性的沉重和不靈活）。就像在《下斷障中》所說：『兩種障礙所產生的無堪任性』。例如，在兩種禪定中，說斷除苦根。
『兩種障礙的現行』被稱為『粗重』。也就是說，昏沉（Styana，精神萎靡）直接障礙輕安（Prasrabdhi，身心輕快安適）。因為違背了細微和輕盈，所以稱為『粗重』。如《第六明》所說。另外，《對法》第十說：『領受粗重』，也就是異熟受（Vipaka-vedana，由業力產生的感受）能夠障礙禪定。
『所有有漏的種子』總稱為『粗重』。《顯揚》第十六說，依他自性（Paratantra-svabhava，依他而起的性質）由相（Nimitta，表象）產生粗重，粗重為緣又產生相。
『一切有漏的種子和現行』被稱為『粗重』。《瑜伽》第五十八說：『粗重縛』就是一切有漏法。應該知道，這裡或者因為被煩惱（Asrava，漏）所隨逐，或者因為被煩惱所生，所以稱為『粗重』。或者因為是煩惱的自性，或者因為與煩惱相應，所以稱為『粗重』。為什麼呢？《瑜伽》第六十四說：『無所堪能、不調柔相』就是粗重相。這有五種：一、現重相，二、剛強相，三、障礙相，四、怯劣相，五、不自在轉無堪能相。因此，有漏法隨其所有，總的說來，有漏法被稱為『粗重』。相對於無漏法來說，不善和無記被稱為『粗重』。也就是兩種障礙的種子、現行以及無記受，相對於善心來說。因為善有堪能性。或者僅僅說散亂（Viksepa，心識散亂）被稱為『粗重』，相對於禪定來說。因為禪定有輕安。前面五種相中，具足或不具足等，隨其所應。而且有漏的善法有時被稱為『粗重』，因為被煩惱所隨逐。有時不被稱為『粗重』，因為不是煩惱的自性，不是種子，不是習氣。其餘的或者被稱為『粗重』，或者不被稱為『粗重』。或者僅僅說煩惱被稱為『粗重』，因為是煩惱的自性。或者通指兩種障礙被稱為『粗重』，因為執著自性，是煩惱的自性和煩惱的伴侶。或者僅僅說障礙的種子被稱為『粗重』，因為煩惱的執著自性沉隱。產生現行的障礙，所以特別得到這個名稱。或者僅僅說習氣被稱為『粗重』，因為微細隱蔽，性質難以斷除。各種不同的說法，根據這些來會通解釋。
論：菩薩生起這種暖等善根等，如果二乘人增上忍、世第一通依五地中。
【English Translation】 English version
'Arbitrariness' is called 'Grave-burden' (Prakriti-bhara, referring to the heaviness and inflexibility of the mind). Just as it is said in 'Lower Section on Severing Obstacles': 'The lack of fitness produced by the two obstacles.' For example, in the two samadhis, it is said to sever the root of suffering.
'The manifestation of the two obstacles' is called 'Grave-burden'. That is to say, sloth (Styana, mental languor) directly obstructs pliancy (Prasrabdhi, lightness and comfort of body and mind). Because it goes against subtlety and lightness, it is called 'Grave-burden'. As stated in 'Sixth Ming'. In addition, the tenth chapter of 'Abhidharma' says: 'Experiencing Grave-burden', that is, the resultant feeling (Vipaka-vedana, feelings arising from karma) can obstruct samadhi.
'All contaminated seeds' are collectively called 'Grave-burden'. 'Exposition' sixteenth says that the dependent nature (Paratantra-svabhava, the nature of arising dependently) produces Grave-burden from appearances (Nimitta, signs), and Grave-burden in turn produces appearances.
'All contaminated seeds and manifestations' are called 'Grave-burden'. 'Yoga' fifty-eighth says: 'The bond of Grave-burden' is all contaminated dharmas. It should be known that here, it is called 'Grave-burden' either because it is accompanied by defilements (Asrava, outflows), or because it is produced by defilements. Or because it is the nature of defilements, or because it is associated with defilements. Why? 'Yoga' sixty-fourth says: 'The state of being incapable and unpliable' is the characteristic of Grave-burden. There are five types: first, the characteristic of present heaviness; second, the characteristic of rigidity; third, the characteristic of obstruction; fourth, the characteristic of timidity; fifth, the characteristic of being unable to transform freely and lacking capability. Therefore, contaminated dharmas, according to their nature, are generally called 'Grave-burden'. Relative to uncontaminated dharmas, unwholesome and neutral states are called 'Grave-burden'. That is, the seeds and manifestations of the two obstacles, as well as neutral feelings, relative to wholesome mind. Because wholesomeness has capability. Or only distraction (Viksepa, mental scattering) is called 'Grave-burden', relative to samadhi. Because samadhi has pliancy. Among the previous five characteristics, completeness or incompleteness depends on the situation. Moreover, contaminated wholesome dharmas are sometimes called 'Grave-burden' because they are accompanied by defilements. Sometimes they are not called 'Grave-burden' because they are not the nature of defilements, not seeds, not habitual tendencies. The rest are either called 'Grave-burden' or not called 'Grave-burden'. Or only afflictions are called 'Grave-burden' because they are the nature of defilements. Or both obstacles are generally called 'Grave-burden' because they cling to self-nature, being the nature of defilements and companions of defilements. Or only the seeds of obstacles are said to be 'Grave-burden' because the clinging nature of defilements is hidden. Because they produce present obstacles, they especially receive this name. Or only habitual tendencies are called 'Grave-burden' because they are subtle and hidden, and their nature is difficult to eradicate. The various statements should be interpreted accordingly.
Treatise: When Bodhisattvas generate these wholesome roots such as warmth, etc., if the Hearers and Solitary Buddhas rely on the five grounds for the superior forbearance and the highest mundane dharma.
．下忍及暖．頂可通中間。非是見道近所依故 又解方便可通。若成滿者非在中間。若大乘者。上忍．第一唯第四定。余可通依近分．中間 又解中．下品忍及暖．頂二方便通依。成滿唯在第四靜慮故。今此文云。雖方便時通諸靜慮。而依第四方得成滿。準此成滿當不通下。故知中間定不得有三乘成滿。方便皆通。以入見道七十一及六十九唯說五依非中間地。西明．要集俱許得依者。乖文自說。西明引瑜伽第一百云。復有九依能盡諸漏。謂未至．中間．四靜慮．三無色。能起斷惑能起善根。理必應爾 今謂不爾。彼說盡漏約修道斷。非謂見道。七十一云三五依生。及六十九現觀依未至．及四靜慮。不說無色．及以中間。若以九依能斷為證。亦應無色能入見道能起善根。若許起者違涅槃經暖等善根是色界系。及七十一．六十九文 又此論中．及六十九．顯揚論等云依欲界起四善根及入見道者。就斷煩惱並大乘中頓悟者說。若漸悟者斷所知障色界亦許。二乘回趣亦依彼身起四善根入于見道 問既許毗缽菩薩生色．無色。雖是頓悟。亦依彼身起四善根。應通無色亦有善根 答暖．頂．下忍容許上生。非鄰近者可許上生。雖許上生所起暖等是色界故。定．惠均勝非彼地法以惠劣故。言生上地不起下者。據諸凡夫及二乘說 或四
善根菩薩生彼不能現起此四善根 或不上生。資糧位中許有生上未起暖等。作此說者順諸經論。
論。實證二空實斷二障等。傳三藏解頓漸二師合二十五釋。且漸斷師有十四釋。且煩惱．所知各分三品總有五解。一云即各三品先斷煩惱三品之中。各有無間．解脫成其六心。次斷所知既起異類斷道即起勝進復有一心。總有七心。次斷所知三品亦有六心。欲入相見起一勝進。亦總七心。合十四心真見究竟。何故入相起勝進道。以相見道未曾得故 問準第十云剎那剎那前後相望皆具四道。即不別起。何故今說有十四心 答彼別師義 又釋彼據修道。非創初說 問瑜伽五十五但說二障各分上下。別總三心真見究竟。如何今說有十四心 答如此論會依真假說。實相見道重法於前。以曾得故。各下品別法。中．上合法。故說三心。非實如是 二云所斷之障雖成六品。斷煩惱已欲斷所知。一類緣真更不別起勝進方入斷所知道。故十三心真見究竟 三云從真入相以曾修故。勝入劣故亦不起勝進。但十二心 問從真入相不起勝進。從相入修真無漏道起勝進不 答相入真修難故起勝進道 或已曾得入修。不更起勝進道。雖有二解起將為勝。非相見后即入修道真斷惑道。中間起散別時方入修真斷道故有勝進 四云準第十云二乘根鈍漸斷
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 如果善根菩薩生於彼處，則不能現起這四種善根（暖、頂、忍、世第一法），或者不能向上生。在資糧位中，允許有生於上方但尚未生起暖法等的情況。這樣說的人是順應諸經論的。
論：真實證悟二空（人空、法空），真實斷除二障（煩惱障、所知障）等。相傳三藏的解釋結合了頓悟和漸悟兩位大師的二十五種解釋。且說漸斷的老師有十四種解釋。且煩惱障和所知障各自分為三品，總共有五種解釋。第一種說法是，煩惱障的三品中，每一品都有無間道和解脫道，形成六種心。然後斷除所知障，既然生起了異類的斷道，就生起勝進道，又有一種心。總共有七種心。然後斷除所知障的三品，也有六種心。想要進入相見道，生起一種勝進道。也總共有七種心。合起來是十四種心，真正見到究竟。為什麼進入相見道要生起勝進道？因為相見道從未得到過。
問：按照第十卷所說，剎那剎那前後相望都具備四道（加行道、無間道、解脫道、勝進道），即不另外生起。為什麼現在說有十四種心？答：那是其他老師的說法。又解釋說，那是根據修道來說的，不是最初開始說的。問：瑜伽師地論第五十五卷只說二障各自分為上下，分別總共有三種心，真正見到究竟。為什麼現在說有十四種心？答：這部論的會通是依據真假來說的。實相見道重視法在前，因為曾經得到過。各個下品是別法，中品和上品是合法。所以說三種心，並非真實如此。第二種說法是，所斷的障礙雖然形成六品，斷除煩惱障后想要斷除所知障，一類緣于真如，不再另外生起勝進道才進入斷除所知障的道。所以是十三種心，真正見到究竟。第三種說法是，從真如進入相見道，因為曾經修習過，勝者進入劣者，也不生起勝進道。只有十二種心。問：從真如進入相見道不生起勝進道，那麼從相見道進入修道，真無漏道生起勝進道嗎？答：從相見道進入真修道很難，所以生起勝進道。或者已經曾經得到過進入修道，不再生起勝進道。雖然有兩種解釋，但生起勝進道被認為是殊勝的。不是相見道后立即進入修道真斷惑道，中間生起散亂，分別時才進入修真斷道，所以有勝進道。第四種說法是，按照第十卷所說，二乘根器遲鈍，漸次斷除。
【English Translation】 English version: If a Bodhisattva of good roots is born there, they cannot manifest these four good roots (warmth, summit, forbearance, the highest mundane dharma), or they cannot be born upwards. In the stage of accumulation, it is permissible to be born upwards but not yet generate the warmth dharma, etc. Those who say this are in accordance with the sutras and treatises.
Treatise: Truly realizing the two emptinesses (emptiness of self, emptiness of phenomena), truly severing the two obscurations (afflictive obscuration, cognitive obscuration), etc. It is said that the interpretation of the Tripitaka combines the twenty-five interpretations of the masters of sudden and gradual enlightenment. Furthermore, the teachers of gradual severance have fourteen interpretations. Moreover, the afflictive obscuration and the cognitive obscuration are each divided into three grades, totaling five interpretations. The first interpretation is that, within the three grades of the afflictive obscuration, each grade has the path of immediate consequence and the path of liberation, forming six minds. Then, severing the cognitive obscuration, since a different kind of severance path arises, the superior progressive path arises again, having one more mind. In total, there are seven minds. Then, severing the three grades of the cognitive obscuration, there are also six minds. Wanting to enter the path of characteristics and seeing, one superior progressive path arises. There are also seven minds in total. Combined, there are fourteen minds, truly seeing the ultimate. Why does the superior progressive path arise when entering the path of characteristics and seeing? Because the path of characteristics and seeing has never been attained.
Question: According to the tenth volume, moment by moment, looking at the preceding and following, all are equipped with the four paths (path of application, path of immediate consequence, path of liberation, path of superior progress), that is, they do not arise separately. Why is it now said that there are fourteen minds? Answer: That is the view of other teachers. It is also explained that it is based on the path of cultivation, not the initial beginning. Question: The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, volume fifty-five, only says that the two obscurations are each divided into upper and lower, separately totaling three minds, truly seeing the ultimate. Why is it now said that there are fourteen minds? Answer: The reconciliation of this treatise is based on truth and falsehood. The path of seeing reality values the dharma in front, because it has been attained before. Each of the lower grades is a separate dharma, while the middle and upper grades are combined dharmas. Therefore, it is said that there are three minds, but it is not truly so. The second interpretation is that, although the obstacles to be severed form six grades, after severing the afflictive obscuration, wanting to sever the cognitive obscuration, one kind relies on Suchness, and the superior progressive path does not arise separately before entering the path of severing the cognitive obscuration. Therefore, there are thirteen minds, truly seeing the ultimate. The third interpretation is that, from entering the path of characteristics and seeing from Suchness, because it has been cultivated before, the superior enters the inferior, and the superior progressive path does not arise either. There are only twelve minds. Question: If the superior progressive path does not arise from entering the path of characteristics and seeing from Suchness, then does the true unconditioned path of cultivation arise from entering the path of cultivation from the path of characteristics and seeing? Answer: It is difficult to enter the true path of cultivation from the path of characteristics and seeing, so the superior progressive path arises. Or, having already attained entry into the path of cultivation, the superior progressive path does not arise again. Although there are two interpretations, the arising of the superior progressive path is considered superior. It is not that one immediately enters the true path of severing afflictions after the path of characteristics and seeing; scattering arises in between, and one enters the true path of severance at separate times, so there is a superior progressive path. The fourth interpretation is that, according to the tenth volume, the two vehicles have dull faculties and gradually sever.
障時。必各別起無間．解脫。菩薩不爾。即后無間是前解脫。斷煩惱時有三剎那無間斷道。起勝進道欲斷所知。即為煩惱第三無間之解脫。即有四心。斷所知中三品亦爾。欲入相見起勝進道。即為第三無間解脫。故但八心真見究竟 五云斷煩惱障三無間已即斷所知不起勝進。即以所知初無間道。為彼煩惱第三無間之解脫道。故但七心真見究竟。準此應為六釋。以入相見亦除勝進。準前一解 又解二障各分上下。粗細難易斷差別故。如佛十力根上下力中根隨應屬上下故。斷障亦爾。中品隨應由觀行者意樂力故。隨上下斷故各分二 若爾云何名為漸斷 答由上下別得名為漸 又解本意二障各二不分中品。以各粗細易難斷故。二障合有四品斷別。亦有五釋義準前明。準其義加亦應六釋。義亦如前。又解二障。各分上下。二障下品必各別斷。以創斷故。二障上品即合共斷。以能重起斷障道故。以前斷彼二下品故。即以煩惱下品為下。所知下品為中。望初難故。二各上品為上。以難斷故。既三品斷。于中四釋。一云七心。三無間道三解脫道起一勝進入相見道。二云六心。從真入相不起勝進。三云五心。后無間道是前解脫斷。第三品別起解脫。從真入相起一勝進。四云四心除勝進道頓斷師義有十一釋。且斷二障各三品中。各下中上
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 障時（阻礙之時）。必定各自生起無間（無間道，指斷煩惱的智慧）和解脫（解脫道，指斷煩惱后獲得的解脫）。菩薩不是這樣。即後面的無間道就是前面的解脫道。斷煩惱的時候有三個剎那：無間道、斷道。生起勝進道（爲了更進一步斷除煩惱的努力）想要斷除所知障（對真理的認知障礙）。這就是煩惱障第三無間道的解脫。即有四種心念。斷除所知障中的三種品級也是這樣。想要進入相見道（通過觀察現象來認識真理的階段），生起勝進道。這就是第三無間道的解脫。所以只有八種心念才能真正見到究竟的真理。有一種說法是，斷除煩惱障的三種無間道之後，就斷除了所知障，不再生起勝進道。即以所知障的最初無間道，作為煩惱障第三無間道的解脫道。所以只有七種心念才能真正見到究竟的真理。按照這個推論，應該有六種解釋。因為進入相見道也除去了勝進道。按照前面的一個解釋。 又一種解釋是，兩種障礙（煩惱障和所知障）各自分為上下，因為粗細、難易、斷除的差別。如同佛的十力（佛所具有的十種力量）中，根器有上下，力量中等，根器隨著力量相應地屬於上下。斷除障礙也是這樣。中品隨著觀行者的意樂力量，隨著上下斷除，所以各自分為兩種。 如果這樣，為什麼叫做漸斷（逐漸斷除）呢？回答：因為上下的差別而得名為漸斷。 又一種解釋是，本來的意思是兩種障礙各有兩種，不分中品。因為各自粗細、容易和難以斷除。兩種障礙合起來有四種品級的斷除差別。也有五種解釋，意義按照前面說明。按照它的意義增加，也應該有六種解釋。意義也如前面一樣。又一種解釋是，兩種障礙，各自分為上下。兩種障礙的下品必定各自斷除。因為是初次斷除的緣故。兩種障礙的上品就合起來共同斷除。因為能夠重新生起斷除障礙的道。因為之前斷除了那兩種下品。即以煩惱障的下品為下，所知障的下品為中。因為相對於最初的困難。兩種各自的上品為上。因為難以斷除。既然是三種品級的斷除。其中有四種解釋。一種說法是七種心念。三種無間道，三種解脫道，生起一種勝進，進入相見道。一種說法是六種心念。從真如進入相見道，不生起勝進。一種說法是五種心念。後面的無間道是前面的解脫道斷。第三品分別生起解脫。從真如進入相見道，生起一種勝進。一種說法是四種心念，除去勝進道，頓斷的師父的意義有十一種解釋。且斷除兩種障礙各自的三種品級中，各自的下、中、上。
【English Translation】 English version When there is an obstruction (障時, zhàng shí, time of obstruction). There must be separate arising of wu jian (無間, wú jiàn, anantarya, the immediate path, referring to the wisdom that cuts off afflictions) and jie tuo (解脫, jiě tuō, liberation, referring to the liberation obtained after cutting off afflictions). Bodhisattvas are not like this. The subsequent wu jian is the jie tuo of the previous. When cutting off afflictions, there are three 剎那 (chà nà, ksana, moments): wu jian (無間), cutting off the path. Arising the sheng jin dao (勝進道, shèng jìn dào, path of superior progress, effort to further cut off afflictions) desiring to cut off the suo zhi zhang (所知障, suǒ zhī zhàng, the obstacle of knowledge, cognitive obscurations). This is the jie tuo of the third wu jian of the affliction obstacle. That is, there are four mental states. Cutting off the three grades within the suo zhi zhang is also like this. Wanting to enter the xiang jian dao (相見道, xiāng jiàn dào, the path of seeing, the stage of recognizing truth through observing phenomena), arising the sheng jin dao. This is the jie tuo of the third wu jian. Therefore, only with eight mental states can one truly see the ultimate truth. One saying is that after cutting off the three wu jian of the affliction obstacle, one cuts off the suo zhi zhang, without arising the sheng jin dao. That is, taking the initial wu jian dao of the suo zhi zhang as the jie tuo dao of the third wu jian of the affliction obstacle. Therefore, only with seven mental states can one truly see the ultimate truth. According to this inference, there should be six explanations. Because entering the xiang jian dao also removes the sheng jin dao. According to the previous explanation. Another explanation is that the two obstacles (affliction obstacle and knowledge obstacle) are each divided into upper and lower, because of the differences in coarseness, difficulty, and cutting off. Just like in the ten powers of the Buddha (佛十力, fó shí lì, the ten powers possessed by the Buddha), the faculties have upper and lower, the power is medium, and the faculties correspondingly belong to upper and lower according to the power. Cutting off obstacles is also like this. The middle grade follows the power of the practitioner's intention, and is cut off according to upper and lower, so each is divided into two. If so, why is it called gradual cutting off (漸斷, jiàn duàn)? Answer: Because of the difference between upper and lower, it is named gradual cutting off. Another explanation is that the original intention is that each of the two obstacles has two types, without dividing the middle grade. Because each is coarse, easy, and difficult to cut off. The two obstacles together have four grades of cutting off differences. There are also five explanations, the meaning according to the previous explanation. According to its meaning, adding, there should also be six explanations. The meaning is also like before. Another explanation is that the two obstacles are each divided into upper and lower. The lower grades of the two obstacles must be cut off separately. Because it is the first time cutting off. The upper grades of the two obstacles are cut off together. Because it can re-arise the path of cutting off obstacles. Because the two lower grades were cut off before. That is, taking the lower grade of the affliction obstacle as lower, and the lower grade of the knowledge obstacle as medium. Because of the initial difficulty. The upper grades of the two are taken as upper. Because it is difficult to cut off. Since there are three grades of cutting off. Among them, there are four explanations. One saying is seven mental states. Three wu jian dao, three jie tuo dao, arising one sheng jin, entering the xiang jian dao. One saying is six mental states. From zhen ru (真如, zhēn rú, suchness, the true nature of reality) entering the xiang jian dao, not arising sheng jin. One saying is five mental states. The subsequent wu jian dao is the jie tuo dao of the previous cutting off. The third grade separately arises jie tuo. From zhen ru entering the xiang jian dao, arising one sheng jin. One saying is four mental states, removing the sheng jin dao, the meaning of the master of sudden cutting off has eleven explanations. And cutting off the three grades of each of the two obstacles, each of the lower, middle, and upper.
共合為三有其四說。一云七心。三無間三解脫起一勝進入相見道。二云六心。除勝進道。三云五心。即后無間為前解脫。第三無間後起解脫及一勝進。四云四心。除勝進 問既有七．四剎那差別如何名頓 答二障同斷名之為頓 若爾云何五十八等說三心耶 答同前漸斷釋彼三心 就斷二障各分二品亦有四釋。義同於前 就斷二障各一品中有其三說。一云三心。一云二心。一云一心。義說為二。無間．解脫。能斷障故名無間道。證無為故名解脫道。此論雖多剎那者。是余師義。上漸斷十四。頓斷十一。總二十五釋。又傳二十六釋。漸有十六。頓斷有十。
且漸斷中十六釋者。如斷二障各三品中分為四釋。於前釋中但除斷煩惱已起勝進道方斷所知。余釋同前故但四解。斷二品中同前除勝進亦只四釋 又二下品別斷。上品合斷中。亦同前四解 各一品中亦有四解。一云五心。一云四心除勝進。一云四心。即后無間為前解脫。別起勝進入相見道。一云三心。亦除勝進。總十六釋 頓斷十釋者。各分三品合頓斷中。同前漸斷除一勝進亦為四解。各分二品亦同前漸分為四解。各一品中但為二解。無唯一心義說為二之中解也 如漸．頓斷各分為三。俱非正釋。各分二中第二二中后二釋正。順教文故。頓中各一初二解正第三及余
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 關於『共合為三有其四說』（Sameness combined into three has four explanations）有四種說法。第一種說法是七心（seven cittas/moments of consciousness）：三個無間道（three Anantarya-marga/paths of immediate consequence），三個解脫道（three Vimukti-marga/paths of liberation），以及生起一個勝進道（Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress）進入相見道（Darshana-marga/path of seeing）。第二種說法是六心（six cittas/moments of consciousness）：去除勝進道（Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress）。第三種說法是五心（five cittas/moments of consciousness）：即后無間道（Anantarya-marga/path of immediate consequence）為前解脫道（Vimukti-marga/path of liberation）。第三個無間道（Anantarya-marga/path of immediate consequence）之後生起解脫道（Vimukti-marga/path of liberation）以及一個勝進道（Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress）。第四種說法是四心（four cittas/moments of consciousness）：去除勝進道（Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress）。 問：既然有七個或四個剎那（kshana/moment）的差別，為什麼稱之為『頓』（sudden）？答：二障（two obscurations）同時斷除，稱之為『頓』（sudden）。如果這樣，為什麼在五十八等（fifty-eight etc.）中說三心（three cittas/moments of consciousness）呢？答：如同前面所說，漸斷（gradual cutting off）解釋那三心（three cittas/moments of consciousness）。 就斷除二障（two obscurations）各自分為二品（two categories），也有四種解釋。意義與前面相同。就斷除二障（two obscurations）各一品（one category）中有三種說法。第一種說法是三心（three cittas/moments of consciousness）。第二種說法是二心（two cittas/moments of consciousness）。第三種說法是一心（one citta/moment of consciousness）。意義上說是兩種：無間道（Anantarya-marga/path of immediate consequence）和解脫道（Vimukti-marga/path of liberation）。能夠斷除障礙，所以稱為無間道（Anantarya-marga/path of immediate consequence）。證得無為（Asamskrita/unconditioned），所以稱為解脫道（Vimukti-marga/path of liberation）。此論雖然多剎那（kshana/moment）的說法，是其他老師的觀點。上面漸斷（gradual cutting off）有十四種解釋，頓斷（sudden cutting off）有十一種解釋，總共有二十五種解釋。又傳說有二十六種解釋，漸斷（gradual cutting off）有十六種，頓斷（sudden cutting off）有十種。 且說漸斷（gradual cutting off）中的十六種解釋。如斷除二障（two obscurations）各自分為三品（three categories）中，分為四種解釋。在前面的解釋中，只是去除斷除煩惱障（Klesha-avarana/afflictive obscuration）後生起勝進道（Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress）才斷除所知障（Jneya-avarana/cognitive obscuration）。其餘的解釋與前面相同，所以只有四種解釋。斷除二品（two categories）中，與前面相同，去除勝進道（Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress），也只有四種解釋。又二下品（two lower categories）分別斷除，上品（superior category）合併斷除中，也與前面相同，有四種解釋。各一品（one category）中也有四種解釋。第一種說法是五心（five cittas/moments of consciousness）。第二種說法是四心（four cittas/moments of consciousness），去除勝進道（Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress）。第三種說法是四心（four cittas/moments of consciousness），即后無間道（Anantarya-marga/path of immediate consequence）為前解脫道（Vimukti-marga/path of liberation），分別生起勝進道（Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress）進入相見道（Darshana-marga/path of seeing）。第四種說法是三心（three cittas/moments of consciousness），也去除勝進道（Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress）。總共有十六種解釋。 頓斷（sudden cutting off）有十種解釋。各自分為三品（three categories）合併頓斷（sudden cutting off）中，與前面漸斷（gradual cutting off）相同，去除一個勝進道（Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress），也有四種解釋。各自分為二品（two categories），也與前面漸斷（gradual cutting off）相同，分為四種解釋。各一品（one category）中只有兩種解釋。沒有唯一一心（one citta/moment of consciousness）的說法，意義上說是兩種。如漸斷（gradual cutting off）和頓斷（sudden cutting off）各自分為三品（three categories），都不是正確的解釋。各自分為二品（two categories）中，第二種解釋和二品（two categories）中的后兩種解釋是正確的，因為順應教義的文句。頓斷（sudden cutting off）中各一品（one category）的最初兩種解釋是正確的，第三種以及其餘的解釋...
【English Translation】 English version There are four explanations regarding 'Sameness combined into three has four explanations'. The first explanation is seven cittas/moments of consciousness: three Anantarya-marga/paths of immediate consequence, three Vimukti-marga/paths of liberation, and the arising of one Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress entering Darshana-marga/path of seeing. The second explanation is six cittas/moments of consciousness: removing the Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress. The third explanation is five cittas/moments of consciousness: that is, the later Anantarya-marga/path of immediate consequence is the former Vimukti-marga/path of liberation. After the third Anantarya-marga/path of immediate consequence, the Vimukti-marga/path of liberation arises, as well as one Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress. The fourth explanation is four cittas/moments of consciousness: removing the Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress. Question: Since there is a difference of seven or four kshana/moments, why is it called 'sudden'? Answer: The two obscurations are cut off simultaneously, which is called 'sudden'. If so, why are three cittas/moments of consciousness mentioned in fifty-eight etc.? Answer: As mentioned before, gradual cutting off explains those three cittas/moments of consciousness. Regarding the cutting off of the two obscurations, each divided into two categories, there are also four explanations. The meaning is the same as before. Regarding the cutting off of the two obscurations, each with one category, there are three explanations. The first explanation is three cittas/moments of consciousness. The second explanation is two cittas/moments of consciousness. The third explanation is one citta/moment of consciousness. In meaning, there are two: Anantarya-marga/path of immediate consequence and Vimukti-marga/path of liberation. Being able to cut off obstacles, it is called Anantarya-marga/path of immediate consequence. Attaining the Asamskrita/unconditioned, it is called Vimukti-marga/path of liberation. Although this treatise has many kshana/moment statements, it is the view of other teachers. Above, gradual cutting off has fourteen explanations, sudden cutting off has eleven explanations, totaling twenty-five explanations. It is also said that there are twenty-six explanations, gradual cutting off has sixteen, and sudden cutting off has ten. Let's talk about the sixteen explanations in gradual cutting off. For example, in cutting off the two obscurations, each divided into three categories, there are four explanations. In the previous explanations, only after cutting off the Klesha-avarana/afflictive obscuration and the arising of Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress is the Jneya-avarana/cognitive obscuration cut off. The remaining explanations are the same as before, so there are only four explanations. In cutting off two categories, the same as before, removing the Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress, there are also only four explanations. Also, in the separate cutting off of the two lower categories and the combined cutting off of the superior category, there are also four explanations as before. In each one category, there are also four explanations. The first explanation is five cittas/moments of consciousness. The second explanation is four cittas/moments of consciousness, removing the Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress. The third explanation is four cittas/moments of consciousness, that is, the later Anantarya-marga/path of immediate consequence is the former Vimukti-marga/path of liberation, separately arising Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress entering Darshana-marga/path of seeing. The fourth explanation is three cittas/moments of consciousness, also removing the Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress. There are a total of sixteen explanations. Sudden cutting off has ten explanations. In each divided into three categories combined with sudden cutting off, the same as the previous gradual cutting off, removing one Adhimukti-marga/path of superior progress, there are also four explanations. In each divided into two categories, the same as the previous gradual cutting off, there are four explanations. In each one category, there are only two explanations. There is no saying of only one citta/moment of consciousness, in meaning there are two. If gradual cutting off and sudden cutting off are each divided into three categories, neither is a correct explanation. In each divided into two categories, the second explanation and the latter two explanations in the two categories are correct, because they follow the wording of the teachings. The initial two explanations of each one category in sudden cutting off are correct, the third and the remaining explanations...
皆不正釋 西明云。雖二十五釋理猶未盡。各一品中合有漸．頓二師說別。合二十八釋 今謂此說亦未盡理。一西明但聞三藏前二十五釋。不聞二十六釋。各一品中就西明釋但為三解。合有四釋如前已明。亦少一釋。又前三品二品之中斷煩惱已。欲斷所知應加勝進。前三類中各少一釋。不可說言一真見道不可別起勝進。以所釋障品類別故。又多不正故作此解 要集云。有解云。二十八釋亦未盡理。各一品中漸斷障家合有五釋。一個三心。二個四心。一個五心。一個六心。加西明二。又三心見道但為四解。亦不盡理。加前三解。一云初二心是二品無間。第三是前二解脫道。又從第一入第二。從第二入第三。既是異類應有勝進。即合七釋。合三十三方得盡理 今謂不爾。三心見道初二無間第三解脫。與前各一三心何別。應除此解三十二釋 要集云。此皆未盡。於一品頓斷之中合有四。即一無間斷惑證滅義說為二。只是一心。入相見時起一勝進。故為四解。又三二一各別斷中。從斷煩惱欲斷所知各起勝進。即加三勝進。于有解三十三釋中。除三心見道二釋但存五釋。于無間后不許起勝進。但取二心無間一心解脫合三十一。加勝進四。一品頓斷中加一。漸斷之中一二三品各加於一。合三十六釋。于中一二三品各十有釋。三心見
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 這些解釋都不完全正確。《西明》中說，即使有二十五種解釋，道理仍然沒有窮盡。每一品中都應該有漸悟和頓悟兩種不同師父的說法，合起來應該有二十八種解釋。現在我認為這種說法也不夠全面。首先，《西明》只聽說了三藏法師的前二十五種解釋，沒有聽說第二十六種解釋。每一品中，就《西明》的解釋來說，只有三種解釋，合起來有四種解釋，如前面已經說明的，也少了一種解釋。另外，在前面三品和二品中，斷除煩惱之後，想要斷除所知障，應該增加勝進。前面三類中，每類都少了一種解釋，不能說一真見道就不能另外生起勝進，因為所解釋的障礙品類不同。而且很多解釋都不正確，所以才這樣解釋。《要集》中說，有一種解釋說，二十八種解釋也沒有窮盡道理。每一品中，漸斷障的說法應該有五種解釋：一個三心，一個四心，一個五心，一個六心，加上《西明》的兩種。另外，三心見道只有四種解釋，也不夠全面。加上前面的三種解釋，一種說法是最初兩心是二品無間，第三心是前兩種的解脫道。另外，從第一心進入第二心，從第二心進入第三心，既然是不同種類，就應該有勝進，合起來就有七種解釋，合起來三十三種才能窮盡道理。現在我認為不是這樣。三心見道，最初兩心是無間，第三心是解脫，與前面各自一個的三心有什麼區別？應該去除這種解釋，剩下三十二種解釋。《要集》中說，這些都不夠全面。在一品頓斷之中，應該有四種解釋，即一個無間斷惑證滅的意義，說成兩種，其實只是一心。進入相見時，生起一個勝進，所以是四種解釋。另外，三二一各自斷除之中，從斷除煩惱想要斷除所知，各自生起勝進，就加上三種勝進。在有人解釋的三十三種解釋中，去除三心見道的兩種解釋，只保留五種解釋。在無間之後，不允許生起勝進，只取二心無間一心解脫，合起來三十一種，加上勝進四種。一品頓斷中加一種，漸斷之中，一二三品各自加一種，合起來三十六種解釋。其中一二三品各有十種解釋，三心見
【English Translation】 English version: These explanations are not entirely correct. The 'Xi Ming' says that even with twenty-five explanations, the reasoning is still not exhausted. Each chapter should have separate explanations from both gradual and sudden enlightenment masters, totaling twenty-eight explanations. Now, I believe this statement is also not comprehensive. Firstly, 'Xi Ming' only heard of the twenty-five explanations of the Tripitaka master, not the twenty-sixth explanation. Within each chapter, according to 'Xi Ming's' explanation, there are only three interpretations, totaling four explanations, as previously explained, also lacking one explanation. Furthermore, in the preceding three and two chapters, after cutting off afflictions, one should add 'sheng jin' (superior progress) to cut off the 'suo zhi zhang' (cognitive obscurations). Each of the preceding three categories lacks one explanation; it cannot be said that 'yi zhen jian dao' (seeing the one true path) cannot separately give rise to 'sheng jin', because the categories of obstacles being explained are different. Moreover, many explanations are incorrect, hence this explanation. The 'Yao Ji' says that one explanation states that twenty-eight explanations have not exhausted the reasoning. Within each chapter, the gradual cutting off of obstacles should have five explanations: one 'san xin' (three minds), one 'si xin' (four minds), one 'wu xin' (five minds), one 'liu xin' (six minds), plus the two from 'Xi Ming'. Furthermore, 'san xin jian dao' (three minds seeing the path) only has four explanations, which is also not comprehensive. Adding the preceding three explanations, one explanation is that the initial two minds are 'er pin wu jian' (two categories of uninterruptedness), and the third is the 'jie tuo dao' (path of liberation) of the previous two. Furthermore, from the first mind entering the second, from the second entering the third, since they are different categories, there should be 'sheng jin', totaling seven explanations, totaling thirty-three to exhaust the reasoning. Now, I believe this is not the case. 'San xin jian dao', the initial two minds are uninterrupted, and the third is liberation; what is the difference from the preceding individual three minds? This explanation should be removed, leaving thirty-two explanations. The 'Yao Ji' says that these are not comprehensive. Within one chapter of sudden cutting off, there should be four explanations, namely, the meaning of one uninterrupted cutting off of afflictions and realizing cessation, spoken as two, but in reality, it is only one mind. When entering 'xiang jian' (seeing the characteristics), one 'sheng jin' arises, hence four explanations. Furthermore, within the separate cutting off of three, two, and one, from cutting off afflictions wanting to cut off 'suo zhi', each arises 'sheng jin', thus adding three 'sheng jin'. In the thirty-three explanations that some explain, remove the two explanations of 'san xin jian dao', only retaining five explanations. After uninterruptedness, 'sheng jin' is not allowed to arise, only taking two minds uninterrupted and one mind liberation, totaling thirty-one, plus four 'sheng jin'. Add one in one chapter of sudden cutting off, and in gradual cutting off, add one each in chapters one, two, and three, totaling thirty-six explanations. Among them, chapters one, two, and three each have ten explanations, 'san xin'
道有其六釋 今謂不爾。四勝進道應頓斷中加。漸斷之中準有釋有。又可許各一品中。頓斷只得有四。漸斷有五。三心見道二無間一解脫過亦同前。應三十四釋。今者義準合三十九。各二三品中漸頓各六釋成二十四。各一品中共有九釋。如前準知。三心見道合有六釋。后無間道為前解脫釋中。于斷下品煩惱障已亦起勝進。或除相望無間解脫。但于別起無間解脫。斷下煩惱欲斷所知。起一勝進為一解。又斷中品起一勝進。趣總斷道亦為一解。
論。二相見道等。若依漸斷是真見道。解釋如前。故五十五云。云何名為第四現觀。乃至云善根無間有初內遣有情假法緣心生。能除耎品見道所斷煩惱粗重等。故知真見漸斷非頓。皆如疏引 若第二師亦如疏引。說三品心如次下會。又雜集第九云。又如上說見道差別皆假建立。非真實爾。何以故。出世位中各別內證絕戲論故。亦不可云此依十六。論云皆假。若說十六。但應云是假建立。何須說皆。故知總．別二種見道皆是假立。若爾頓斷家引。又所緣．能緣平等平等智為其相。亦應是假 答不爾非差別說故是真見。已下方云。又遣各別有情假法假等。三心見道是差別說。故假建立。
論。前二各法各別緣故等。疏有三例。此即別緣名法。總緣名類 西明云。但有二例。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 道有六種解釋，現在認為不是這樣。四勝進道應該在頓斷中增加。漸斷之中，按照準則有解釋也有沒有解釋的。又可以允許在每一品中，頓斷只有四種，漸斷有五種。三心見道、二無間道、一解脫道，也和前面一樣。應該有三十四種解釋，現在按照義理推算，合計有三十九種。在各二三品中，漸斷和頓斷各有六種解釋，共計二十四種。在各一品中，共有九種解釋，如前面所說的那樣。三心見道合計有六種解釋。後面的無間道，在前面的解脫道解釋中，在斷除下品煩惱障之後，也生起勝進。或者除去相望的無間解脫，只是在另外生起無間解脫時，斷除下品煩惱，想要斷除所知障，生起一種勝進，作為一種解釋。又斷除中品煩惱時，生起一種勝進，趨向于總斷道，也作為一種解釋。
論：二相見道等。如果依照漸斷，這是真見道。解釋如前。所以《五十五》中說：『什麼叫做第四現觀？』乃至說：『善根無間，有最初的內在遣除有情假法緣心生起，能夠去除軟品見道所斷的煩惱粗重等。』所以知道真見是漸斷，不是頓斷，都如疏中引用的那樣。如果第二師的觀點，也如疏中引用的那樣，說三品心依次下會。又《雜集》第九中說：『又如上面所說的見道差別，都是假立的，不是真實的。』為什麼呢？因為在出世位中，各自內在證悟，斷絕了戲論的緣故。也不可以說這是依據十六。論中說『都是假立』。如果說十六，只應該說是假建立，何必說『都』呢？所以知道總和別兩種見道都是假立的。如果這樣，頓斷家引用的，又所緣、能緣平等平等智作為它的相，也應該是假的。答：不是這樣，因為不是差別說，所以是真見。已經在下面說了：『又遣除各自的有情假法假等。』三心見道是差別說，所以是假建立。
論：前二各法各別緣故等。疏中有三個例子，這就是別緣名為法，總緣名為類。西明說：只有兩個例子。
【English Translation】 English version: There are six explanations of the path, but now it is considered not so. The four superior progressive paths should be added to the sudden cutting off. Within the gradual cutting off, according to the rules, there are explanations and there are none. It can also be allowed that in each stage, there are only four types of sudden cutting off, and five types of gradual cutting off. The three mind-moments of the path of seeing, the two uninterrupted paths, and one liberation path are also the same as before. There should be thirty-four explanations, but now, according to the principles, there are a total of thirty-nine. In each of the two or three stages, there are six explanations each for gradual and sudden cutting off, totaling twenty-four. In each stage, there are a total of nine explanations, as mentioned before. The three mind-moments of the path of seeing have a total of six explanations. The subsequent uninterrupted path, in the explanation of the previous liberation path, after cutting off the lower-grade afflictive obscurations (klesha-avarana), also arises superior progress. Or remove the mutually regarded uninterrupted liberation, only when another uninterrupted liberation arises, cutting off the lower afflictions, wanting to cut off the cognitive obscurations (jnana-avarana), giving rise to one superior progress, as one explanation. Also, when cutting off the middle-grade afflictions, giving rise to one superior progress, moving towards the path of total cutting off, also as one explanation.
Treatise: The two aspects of the path of seeing, etc. If according to gradual cutting off, this is the true path of seeing. The explanation is as before. Therefore, in 'Fifty-five' it says: 'What is called the fourth direct perception (abhisamaya)?' And it says: 'The root of goodness, uninterrupted, has the initial inner removal of sentient beings' false dharma-conditioned mind arising, able to remove the subtle afflictions and coarse burdens, etc., that are cut off by the path of seeing.' Therefore, it is known that true seeing is gradual cutting off, not sudden cutting off, all as quoted in the commentary. If the view of the second teacher is also as quoted in the commentary, saying that the three mind-moments successively descend. Also, the ninth volume of the Compendium of Topics (Abhidharmasamuccaya) says: 'Also, as said above, the differences in the path of seeing are all falsely established, not real.' Why? Because in the supramundane state, each internally realizes, cutting off the causes of elaboration (prapancha). It cannot be said that this is based on the sixteen. The treatise says 'all are falsely established.' If it said sixteen, it should only say it is falsely established, why say 'all'? Therefore, it is known that both the general and specific paths of seeing are falsely established. If so, the sudden cutting off school quotes, and the object of cognition (alambana) and the subject of cognition (nimitta) are equal, and equal wisdom is its characteristic, it should also be false. Answer: It is not so, because it is not a differentiated explanation, so it is true seeing. It has already been said below: 'Also, removing each sentient being's false dharma, falseness, etc.' The three mind-moments of the path of seeing are a differentiated explanation, so it is falsely established.
Treatise: The former two, each dharma has a separate condition, etc. The commentary has three examples, this is the separate condition called dharma, the general condition called category. Ximing says: There are only two examples.
一約三心。二約十六心。雜集第九緣如名法。法之智故。瑜伽等前二名法。第三名類。護法釋云。各別緣如是法之智。后總緣者前二智類。類即智故。故下云言后聖法皆是此類 要集云。有釋為勝。如體非異不可說類。能緣之智前後雖異是前智類 今謂不爾。瑜伽五十五但云又前二心法智相應。第三心類智相應。亦無文釋。五十八云是如智相應類者。釋一心言。意謂三心別斷。何名一心。以同緣如智無別故名為一心。不釋法．類。若以彼證。總名為類無有法智。然此論云言后聖智皆此類者解十六心。非是三心。三心之中自云前二名法智。各別緣故。第三名類智。總合緣故。又十六心由第三心緣第一二。謂後緣如智皆是此類。由第三心作種類印解名為類智。今此第三亦自緣如。何得同彼。又此論自釋。何故不依。若言此文不釋法類智名所以者。何須說云各別緣故總合緣故。故者所以。即辨法．類得名所由。故本釋勝 問大乘真見斷二障。據彼總別立三心。二乘真見斷一障。應亦別總立二心 答說六現觀既通三乘。現觀智諦現觀之中辨此三心。故許小有亦復無妨 又解不許。二乘唯觀安立諦故。此非安立二乘不作。若許作者。何故諸部小乘之中。皆不說有二心見道 若爾初十六心諸部亦無。豈可不作。若亦不作。違雜集第
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 一約三心：第一重約定包含三種心。第二重約定包含十六種心。《雜集論》第九緣中，『如名法』（如所有性之法）是由於對法的智慧。在《瑜伽師地論》等論著中，前兩種心被稱為『法』，第三種心被稱為『類』。護法的解釋是：每一種心各自緣于『如是法』的智慧。後面的總緣，是指前兩種智慧的類別。類別即是智慧。所以下文說，後來的聖法都是這一類。
《要集》中說：有一種解釋認為『勝』（殊勝）就像本體一樣，沒有差別，不能說是類別。能緣的智慧前後雖然不同，但屬於前一種智慧的類別。我認為這種說法不對。《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷只說：『又前兩種心與法智相應，第三種心與類智相應。』也沒有文字解釋。第五十八卷說：『與如智相應的類別。』解釋一心時說，意思是三種心分別斷除。為什麼稱為一心？因為它們共同緣于如智，沒有差別，所以稱為一心。沒有解釋法和類。如果用那段話來證明，總的名稱是類別，沒有法智。然而此論說，後來的聖智都是這一類，這是解釋十六心，不是三種心。三種心之中，自己說前兩種稱為法智，因為各自緣故。第三種稱為類智，因為總合緣故。又十六心由第三種心緣于第一二種心。意思是後來緣于如智的都是這一類。由第三種心作為種類印解，稱為類智。現在這第三種心也自己緣于『如』，怎麼能和那相同？而且此論自己解釋，為什麼不依據？如果說這段文字沒有解釋法類智的得名原因，那又何必說各自緣故，總合緣故？『故』就是原因，即辨別法和類得名的原因。所以本論的解釋更勝一籌。
問：大乘真見道斷除二障（煩惱障和所知障），根據總別建立三種心。二乘真見道斷除一障（煩惱障），應該也根據別總建立二種心。
答：因為說六現觀（六種現觀）貫通三乘，在現觀智和諦現觀之中辨別這三種心。所以允許小乘也有，也沒有妨礙。
又解釋為不允許。因為二乘只觀察安立諦（苦集滅道四聖諦），這並非安立，二乘不這樣做。如果允許這樣做，為什麼各部小乘之中，都不說有二心見道？
如果這樣，最初的十六心各部也沒有，難道可以不作嗎？如果也不作，就違背了《雜集論》的說法。
【English Translation】 English version One agreement, three minds. Two agreements, sixteen minds. The ninth condition in the Compendium of Determinations (Za Ji Lun) states that 『suchness as name-and-form』 (Ruming Fa) is due to the wisdom of the Dharma. In the Yoga Treatise (Yuqie Shidi Lun) and other treatises, the first two minds are called 『Dharma,』 and the third mind is called 『Category.』 The explanation by Dharmapala is: each mind individually cognizes the wisdom of 『such Dharma.』 The later general cognition refers to the category of the first two wisdoms. Category is wisdom. Therefore, the following text says that later holy Dharmas are all of this category.
The Essentials Collection (Yao Ji) states: there is an explanation that 『superior』 (Sheng) is like the essence, without difference, and cannot be called a category. Although the wisdom that cognizes is different before and after, it belongs to the category of the previous wisdom. I think this statement is incorrect. Volume 55 of the Yoga Treatise only says: 『Also, the first two minds are associated with Dharma-wisdom, and the third mind is associated with Category-wisdom.』 There is no textual explanation. Volume 58 says: 『The category associated with suchness-wisdom.』 When explaining one mind, it means that the three minds separately cut off. Why is it called one mind? Because they commonly cognize suchness-wisdom, without difference, so it is called one mind. There is no explanation of Dharma and Category. If you use that passage to prove it, the general name is category, without Dharma-wisdom. However, this treatise says that later holy wisdoms are all of this category, which explains the sixteen minds, not the three minds. Among the three minds, it says that the first two are called Dharma-wisdom because they cognize individually. The third is called Category-wisdom because it cognizes collectively. Also, the sixteen minds are cognized by the third mind cognizing the first two minds. It means that later cognitions of suchness-wisdom are all of this category. The third mind acts as a category seal and understanding, which is called Category-wisdom. Now, this third mind also cognizes 『suchness』 itself, how can it be the same as that? Moreover, this treatise explains itself, why not rely on it? If you say that this text does not explain the reason for the names of Dharma-wisdom and Category-wisdom, then why say that they cognize individually and cognize collectively? 『Therefore』 is the reason, which distinguishes the reasons for the names of Dharma and Category. Therefore, the explanation of this treatise is superior.
Question: The Mahayana path of seeing (true seeing) cuts off the two obscurations (klesha-avarana (煩惱障) and jneya-avarana (所知障)), establishing three minds based on generality and particularity. The path of seeing of the Two Vehicles cuts off one obscuration (klesha-avarana (煩惱障)), so it should also establish two minds based on particularity and generality.
Answer: Because the six direct perceptions (six kinds of direct perceptions) are said to penetrate the Three Vehicles, these three minds are distinguished in the direct perception of wisdom and the direct perception of truth. Therefore, it is permissible for the Hinayana to also have them, and there is no obstacle.
Another explanation is that it is not permissible. Because the Two Vehicles only observe the established truth (Four Noble Truths (苦集滅道四聖諦)), this is not an establishment, and the Two Vehicles do not do this. If it is permissible to do this, why do all the Hinayana schools not say that there is a path of seeing with two minds?
If so, the initial sixteen minds are also not present in all schools, can they not be made? If they are also not made, it contradicts the statement in the Compendium of Determinations (Za Ji Lun).
九。彼雲安立者謂聲聞等隨自所證已得究竟。為欲令他亦了知故。乃至安立道諦。謂于諸諦中有如是如是忍如是如是智如是等。既爾何故諸部不說總十六心。但有上下十六心耶 答約不愚法依大乘教中聲聞乘法作安立觀。諸部小乘多約愚法依彼小教故不能作 問若爾三心亦應如是 答雜集論中但說安立。不說聲聞作非安立。勝鬘經亦云聲聞知有作。二解任情 問聲聞．菩薩有真．相見。獨覺亦入相見道不 答有二解。一云亦入 若爾聲聞至第十六建立初果。緣覺既入。何不立果 答加行期心有差別故。聲聞期出心暫息故。緣覺不出即入修道。不暫息故。又如菩薩雖至十六亦不制果 二云不入 若爾何故說三十四心成緣覺果 答彼小乘說。非大乘義。二說前勝 問何故真後作相見耶 答為成就佛法三乘通明。大乘亦為降伏二乘欲引攝故。
論。二緣安立諦等。問未知二乘具作二種。為隨作一 答不愚法者作二十六。愚法之者作后十六 或廣惠者作二十六。非廣惠者但作上下。所以瑜伽五十五。但說上下一十六心。據三乘通及非廣惠。雜集論中說總十六。今此論中具說二種 問二十六心何先後作 答準五十五上下在先。何以故。彼云當知此智第三心無間。從見道起方現在前。又云又由此心勢力故。于苦等安立諦中。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 九、有人說，安立（Anli）的含義是指聲聞（Shengwen）等修行者，他們隨各自所證悟的境界，已經達到了究竟的解脫。爲了讓他們也能瞭解其他境界，所以安立道諦（Daodi），也就是說，在諸諦（Zhu di）中，有這樣這樣的忍（Ren），這樣這樣的智（Zhi）等等。既然如此，為什麼各部派不說總共十六心（Shiliu xin），而只有上下十六心呢？
答：這是根據不愚法（Bu yu fa）的觀點，依據大乘佛教（Dacheng fojiao）中聲聞乘（Shengwen cheng）的教法來安立觀察。各部派的小乘佛教（Xiaocheng fojiao）大多根據愚法（Yu fa）的觀點，依據他們的小乘教法，所以不能這樣安立。
問：如果這樣，那麼三心（San xin）也應該如此安立嗎？
答：《雜集論》（Zaji lun）中只說了安立，沒有說聲聞不能安立。勝鬘經（Shengman jing）也說聲聞知道有作為。兩種解釋都可以，任憑選擇。
問：聲聞和菩薩（Pusa）有真見道（Zhen jiandao）和相見道（Xiang jiandao）。緣覺（Yuanjue）也進入相見道嗎？
答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是也進入。如果這樣，聲聞到第十六心建立初果（Chuguo）。緣覺既然進入相見道，為什麼不建立果位呢？
答：這是因為加行期心（Jiaxing qi xin）有差別。聲聞的期出心（Qi chu xin）暫時停止，所以建立果位。緣覺不期出，直接進入修道（Xiudao），不暫時停止，所以不建立果位。又如菩薩雖然到了第十六心，也不制立果位。
另一種說法是不進入。如果這樣，為什麼說三十四心（Sanshisi xin）成就緣覺果呢？
答：那是小乘佛教的說法，不是大乘佛教的意義。兩種說法中，前一種說法更勝一籌。
問：為什麼真見道在相見道之後才出現呢？
答：爲了成就佛法（Fofa）三乘（San cheng）通明的境界，大乘佛教也是爲了降伏二乘（Er cheng），想要引導攝受他們。
論：二緣安立諦等。問：未知二乘（Er cheng）是全部都作兩種安立，還是隻隨作一種？
答：不愚法的人作二十六心（Ershiliu xin），愚法的人作后十六心。或者說，廣惠（Guanghui）的人作二十六心，非廣惠的人只作上下十六心。所以《瑜伽師地論》（Yujia shidi lun）第五十五卷只說了上下十六心，這是根據三乘共通以及非廣惠的觀點。雜集論中說總共十六心，而這部論中詳細地說了兩種情況。
問：二十六心以什麼先後順序來作呢？
答：按照第五十五卷的說法，上下十六心在先。為什麼呢？因為那裡說，應當知道這個智（Zhi）在第三心無間（Wujian），從見道（Jiandao）生起才現在眼前。又說，又因為這個心的勢力，所以在苦等安立諦中。
【English Translation】 English version: Nine. Some say that the meaning of 'Anli' (安立, Establishment) refers to the Shravakas (聲聞, Listeners) and others who, according to their respective realizations, have attained ultimate liberation. In order to enable others to understand these states as well, the Truth of the Path (道諦, Daodi) is established, meaning that within the various Truths (諸諦, Zhu di), there are such and such 'Ren' (忍, Acceptance) and such and such 'Zhi' (智, Wisdom), and so on. Given this, why do the various schools not speak of a total of sixteen 'Xin' (心, moments of mind), but only of the upper and lower sixteen 'Xin'?
Answer: This is based on the perspective of 'Bu yu fa' (不愚法, Non-ignorant of the Dharma), establishing observation according to the teachings of the Shravaka Vehicle (聲聞乘, Shengwen cheng) within Mahayana Buddhism (大乘佛教, Dacheng fojiao). Most schools of Hinayana Buddhism (小乘佛教, Xiaocheng fojiao) rely on the perspective of 'Yu fa' (愚法, Ignorant of the Dharma), based on their Hinayana teachings, and therefore cannot establish it in this way.
Question: If that is the case, should the three 'Xin' (三心, San xin) also be established in this way?
Answer: The Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論, Zaji lun) only speaks of establishment and does not say that Shravakas cannot establish it. The Shrimala Sutra (勝鬘經, Shengman jing) also says that Shravakas know of action. Both interpretations are acceptable, choose as you wish.
Question: Do Shravakas and Bodhisattvas (菩薩, Pusa) have True Seeing Path (真見道, Zhen jiandao) and Appearance Seeing Path (相見道, Xiang jiandao)? Do Pratyekabuddhas (緣覺, Yuanjue) also enter the Appearance Seeing Path?
Answer: There are two interpretations. One says that they also enter. If so, Shravakas establish the first fruit (初果, Chuguo) at the sixteenth 'Xin'. Since Pratyekabuddhas enter the Appearance Seeing Path, why is a fruit not established for them?
Answer: This is because there is a difference in the 'Jiaxing qi xin' (加行期心, Mind of striving effort). The 'Qi chu xin' (期出心, Mind of exiting) of Shravakas temporarily ceases, so a fruit is established. Pratyekabuddhas do not seek to exit and directly enter the Path of Cultivation (修道, Xiudao), without temporarily ceasing, so a fruit is not established. Similarly, even though Bodhisattvas reach the sixteenth 'Xin', they do not establish a fruit.
The other interpretation is that they do not enter. If so, why is it said that thirty-four 'Xin' (三十四心, Sanshisi xin) accomplish the fruit of a Pratyekabuddha?
Answer: That is a Hinayana Buddhist teaching, not a Mahayana Buddhist meaning. Of the two interpretations, the former is superior.
Question: Why does the True Seeing Path appear after the Appearance Seeing Path?
Answer: In order to accomplish the state of clear understanding of the Three Vehicles (三乘, San cheng) of the Buddha Dharma (佛法, Fofa), Mahayana Buddhism also aims to subdue the Two Vehicles (二乘, Er cheng), wanting to guide and embrace them.
Treatise: The two conditions establish the Truths, and so on. Question: Do the unknown Two Vehicles fully perform both types of establishment, or do they only follow and perform one?
Answer: Those who are 'Bu yu fa' (不愚法, Non-ignorant of the Dharma) perform twenty-six 'Xin' (二十六心, Ershiliu xin), while those who are 'Yu fa' (愚法, Ignorant of the Dharma) perform the latter sixteen 'Xin'. Or, those who are 'Guanghui' (廣惠, Broadly Wise) perform twenty-six 'Xin', while those who are not 'Guanghui' only perform the upper and lower sixteen 'Xin'. Therefore, the fifty-fifth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-shastra (瑜伽師地論, Yujia shidi lun) only speaks of the upper and lower sixteen 'Xin', which is based on the commonality of the Three Vehicles and those who are not 'Guanghui'. The Abhidharmasamuccaya speaks of a total of sixteen 'Xin', while this treatise speaks in detail of both situations.
Question: In what order are the twenty-six 'Xin' performed?
Answer: According to the fifty-fifth fascicle, the upper and lower sixteen 'Xin' come first. Why? Because it says there, 'It should be known that this Wisdom (智, Zhi) is without interval in the third 'Xin' (無間, Wujian), and only arises from the Seeing Path (見道, Jiandao) and is now present before one.' It also says, 'And because of the power of this 'Xin', in the establishment of the Truths such as suffering, and so on.'
有第二現觀位清凈無礙苦等智生 若爾何故雜集說總十六從世第一法無間而生 答此論中會依真假說。不言三心無間後生。故在後作。又顯揚十七云。不由行差別。即是言教隨真見道擬宜而說。教授於他。非內證智 又解總作在先。上下在後。雜集．此論俱先說故。顯揚十七云上下觀十六種智修道作故 若爾瑜伽如何通釋 答彼據從真見道入相見道。至第三心無間即出方現在前 又說現觀邊智諦現觀。二十六心俱此觀攝。隨且舉一。不言無間緣先世智曾所觀察下上二地等生。言第二現觀清凈無礙苦等智生者。依五十八現觀有二。依廣佈教相見第一。內證相見是第二故。非說下上為第二現觀 又釋不定。隨觀行者真見道前先意願力。至相見道即先作之。未見教斷。隨情取捨 問準瑜伽等上下十六在相見道。何故顯揚十七云。從此諦現觀已上于修道中有十六行世出世清凈智生 答二解。一云瑜伽等據重法前真見道智。無相．有相二智所行俱各創得。故有相智名相見道。又據不出觀即入有相行智俱名見道。顯揚約其真．相別起。相見在後更重修故名為修道。若據重緣真見所緣亦屬見道 又解瑜伽據不出觀初作之者。判在見道。顯揚據出觀後重作之者。名為修道。非於修道不作諦觀。故顯揚云。如是現觀智。若聲聞等所得。為
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 問：在第二現觀位，清凈無礙的苦等智生起。如果是這樣，為什麼《雜集論》中說總共有十六種智從世第一法無間生起？ 答：此論中會通時，依據真和假兩種情況來說明。並沒有說三心無間之後才生起，所以在後面才進行解釋。而且《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷說，『不由行差別』，就是說言教是隨著真見道來擬宜而說的，是教授於他人，而不是內證的智慧。 又一種解釋是，總觀在先，上下觀在後。《雜集論》和此論都是先說總觀，所以《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷說，上下觀是修道時所作的十六種智。 問：如果是這樣，《瑜伽師地論》又該如何解釋呢？ 答：它是根據從真見道進入相見道的情況來說的，到第三心無間時，立即出觀，方現在前。 又說現觀邊智和諦現觀，二十六心都包含在此觀中，只是隨便舉一個例子。並沒有說無間緣先世智曾經觀察過的下地和上地等而生起。說第二現觀清凈無礙的苦等智生起，是根據五十八現觀中有兩種情況：依據廣佈教相，相見是第一種；內證相見是第二種。並不是說下地和上地是第二現觀。 又一種解釋是不定的，隨著觀行者在真見道前先有的意願力，到相見道時就先作之。沒有見到教斷，可以隨意取捨。 問：按照《瑜伽師地論》等論典，上下十六觀在相見道中。為什麼《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷說，『從此諦現觀以上，在修道中有十六行世出世清凈智生起』？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，《瑜伽師地論》等論典是根據重法前的真見道智來說的，無相智和有相智所行的境界都是各自新獲得的，所以有相智名為相見道。又是根據不出觀就進入有相行智，都名為見道。《顯揚聖教論》是根據真見道和相見道分別生起來說的，相見道在後面更需要重新修習，所以名為修道。如果根據重緣真見道所緣的境界，也屬於見道。 又一種解釋是，《瑜伽師地論》是根據不出觀時初次作觀的人，判定在見道中。《顯揚聖教論》是根據出觀後重新作觀的人，名為修道。並不是說在修道中不作諦觀，所以《顯揚聖教論》說，『如果聲聞等所得的現觀智，是爲了……』
【English Translation】 English version Question: In the second Abhisamaya (現觀位, stage of realization), the pure and unobstructed wisdom of suffering, etc., arises. If so, why does the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論, Compendium of Abhidharma) say that a total of sixteen wisdoms arise without interruption from the highest mundane dharma (世第一法, the highest worldly dharma)? Answer: The explanation in this treatise reconciles the truth and the false. It does not say that it arises after three uninterrupted moments of thought, so it is explained later. Moreover, Asanga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (顯揚聖教論, Exposition of the Doctrine) XVII says, 'Not by the difference of practice,' which means that the teachings are spoken according to the suitability of the true Path of Seeing (真見道, True Path of Seeing), teaching others, not the wisdom of inner realization. Another explanation is that the general contemplation (總觀, general contemplation) comes first, and the upper and lower contemplations (上下觀, upper and lower contemplations) come later. Both the Abhidharmasamuccaya and this treatise first speak of the general contemplation, so Asanga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra XVII says that the sixteen wisdoms of upper and lower contemplation are practiced in the Path of Cultivation (修道, Path of Cultivation). Question: If so, how should the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論, Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) be explained? Answer: It is based on the situation of entering the Path of Vision of Characteristics (相見道, Path of Vision of Characteristics) from the True Path of Seeing. When the third moment of thought is uninterrupted, one immediately emerges from contemplation, and the method is now present. It also says that the wisdom on the edge of realization (現觀邊智, wisdom on the edge of realization) and the Truth Realization (諦現觀, Truth Realization), all twenty-six moments of thought are included in this contemplation, just giving one example. It does not say that the uninterrupted condition arises from the wisdom of previous lives that had observed the lower and upper realms, etc. Saying that the pure and unobstructed wisdom of suffering, etc., arises in the second Abhisamaya is based on the fact that there are two situations in the fifty-eight Abhisamayas: according to the widely spread teachings, the Vision of Characteristics is the first; the inner realization of the Vision of Characteristics is the second. It is not saying that the lower and upper realms are the second Abhisamaya. Another explanation is that it is uncertain, depending on the power of the practitioner's prior intention before the True Path of Seeing, and when reaching the Path of Vision of Characteristics, it is done first. Without seeing the cessation of teachings, one can freely choose. Question: According to the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other treatises, the sixteen upper and lower contemplations are in the Path of Vision of Characteristics. Why does Asanga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra XVII say, 'From this Truth Realization onwards, in the Path of Cultivation, sixteen practices of mundane and supramundane pure wisdom arise'? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra and other treatises are based on the wisdom of the True Path of Seeing before the heavy dharma, and the realms practiced by both the wisdom without characteristics (無相智, wisdom without characteristics) and the wisdom with characteristics (有相智, wisdom with characteristics) are newly obtained, so the wisdom with characteristics is called the Path of Vision of Characteristics. It is also based on the fact that entering the wisdom of practice with characteristics without emerging from contemplation is called the Path of Seeing. Asanga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra speaks of the separate arising of the True Path of Seeing and the Path of Vision of Characteristics, and the Path of Vision of Characteristics needs to be cultivated again later, so it is called the Path of Cultivation. If based on the realm of the True Path of Seeing that is re-conditioned, it also belongs to the Path of Seeing. Another explanation is that the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is based on the person who first contemplates without emerging from contemplation, judging it to be in the Path of Seeing. Asanga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra is based on the person who contemplates again after emerging from contemplation, calling it the Path of Cultivation. It is not that one does not contemplate the Truth in the Path of Cultivation, so Asanga's Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says, 'If the Abhisamaya wisdom obtained by the Śrāvakas, etc., is for...'
對治欲．色．無色三界雜染。若菩薩所得。為對治十種地障。乃至亦名究竟現觀。各據一義並不相違。二釋任取 問顯揚云。如是三智慧斷一百一十二煩惱。瑜伽論等說與此同。何故如是 答此論等說總約二障各分一品或上下品斷證差別。不說斷數。又據非立諦。顯揚約斷雖一二品。據安立諦分成一百一十二煩惱。實不相違。
論。一苦法智忍等。此中二意。一法真緣如。二別緣前加行位中能所二觀。此中且據法真見道。言觀三界苦諦真如。若準雜集二種具論。故云言苦者。謂苦諦。苦法者。謂苦諦增上所起教法。法智者。謂于加行道中觀察諦增上法智。智忍者。謂先觀察增上力故。于各別苦諦中起現證無漏惠。由此惠故永舍見苦所斷一切煩惱。又復云。忍即是印前苦。其不緣如何忍可 又解但緣真見所緣。言苦法智者舉此忍因。故下釋乃至云。如理作意所攝智增上力故。于自相續苦諦中。現證彼真如出世間惠。正見體生。即從因為名。若依俱舍第二十三。從果為名。故彼論云。此能生法智。是法智因得法智忍名。如華果樹。此從因名 或就果稱。西明義意 今謂俱舍釋后十六。可從果名。今此總緣。與上下別。又俱舍釋亦不盡理。苦法智是果。忍者是因。今既雙舉故因果合因。苦法智是因。忍者是果。因果雙
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：對治欲界、色界、無色界這三界的雜染，如果菩薩能夠獲得，就可以對治十種地障（菩薩修行過程中遇到的障礙）。乃至也可以稱為究竟現觀（對事物真相的徹底領悟）。這些說法各自依據一個方面，並不互相矛盾。兩種解釋任選其一即可。 問：顯揚論中說，這樣的三種智慧能夠斷除一百一十二種煩惱。瑜伽論等也持有相同的觀點。為什麼會這樣呢？ 答：這些論典的說法，總體上是針對二障（煩惱障和所知障）各自分為一品或上下品，從而區分斷除和證悟的差別，並沒有具體說明斷除的數量。而且，這是依據非安立諦（未經設立的真理）而言的。顯揚論雖然說斷除的是一二品，但依據安立諦（經過設立的真理）則分為一百一十二種煩惱。實際上並不矛盾。
論：一、苦法智忍等。這裡面包含兩種含義：一是法真緣如（以法的真實本性為所緣），二是分別緣於前加行位（修行過程中的準備階段）中的能觀和所觀。這裡暫且依據法真見道（通過觀察法的真實本性而證悟真理的階段）來說，即觀察三界苦諦的真如（苦諦的真實本性）。如果按照雜集論的兩種說法都加以論述，所以說『言苦者，謂苦諦』，指的是苦諦本身。『苦法者，謂苦諦增上所起教法』，指的是由苦諦增上而產生的教法。『法智者，謂于加行道中觀察諦增上法智』，指的是在加行道中觀察諦而獲得的法智。『智忍者，謂先觀察增上力故，于各別苦諦中起現證無漏惠』，指的是由於先前的觀察增上力的緣故，在各個不同的苦諦中生起現證的無漏智慧。由於這種智慧的緣故，能夠永遠捨棄見苦所斷的一切煩惱。 又說：『忍即是印前苦』，如果不緣于真如，又如何忍可呢？又有一種解釋是，僅僅緣于真見所緣（真見所觀察的對象）。『言苦法智者舉此忍因』，說苦法智是爲了舉出這種忍的因。所以下面的解釋乃至說：『如理作意所攝智增上力故，于自相續苦諦中，現證彼真如出世間惠，正見體生』，指的是由於如理作意所攝的智慧的增上力的緣故，在自身的相續苦諦中，現證那真如的出世間智慧，正見的本體產生。這是從因的角度來命名的。如果依據俱舍論第二十三卷的說法，則是從果的角度來命名的。所以該論說：『此能生法智，是法智因得法智忍名，如華果樹』，這種能夠生起法智的，是法智的因，因此得到法智忍的名稱，就像花和果樹一樣。這是從因的角度來命名。或者就果來稱呼。這是西明的義意。 現在我認為，俱舍論解釋后十六句，可以從果的角度來命名。現在這裡是總緣，與上下有所區別。而且俱舍論的解釋也不完全合理。苦法智是果，忍者是因。現在既然同時舉出，所以因果合一。苦法智是因，忍者是果，因果雙舉。
【English Translation】 English version: To counteract the defilements of the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm, if a Bodhisattva attains it, it can counteract the ten kinds of ground obstacles (obstacles encountered by Bodhisattvas in their practice). It can even be called the ultimate direct perception (a thorough understanding of the truth of things). These statements each rely on one aspect and do not contradict each other. Either of the two explanations can be chosen. Question: The Xianyang (Manifesting the Teachings) states that these three kinds of wisdom can cut off one hundred and twelve afflictions. The Yogacara-bhumi-sastra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and others hold the same view. Why is this so? Answer: The statements in these treatises generally refer to the two obscurations (afflictive obscurations and cognitive obscurations) each being divided into one category or upper and lower categories, thereby distinguishing the differences in cutting off and realizing, without specifically stating the number of cutoffs. Moreover, this is based on the non-established truth. Although the Xianyang says that one or two categories are cut off, it is divided into one hundred and twelve afflictions based on the established truth. In reality, there is no contradiction.
Treatise: One, Ksudra-dharma-jnana-ksanti (Patience with the Wisdom of the Dharma of Suffering), etc. This contains two meanings: one is that the dharma-satya is conditioned by suchness (taking the true nature of the dharma as the object), and the other is that it is separately conditioned by the observer and the observed in the preliminary practice stage. Here, we will temporarily base it on the dharma-satya-darshana-marga (the stage of seeing the truth of the dharma), that is, observing the suchness of the duhkha-satya (truth of suffering) of the three realms. If we discuss both according to the two statements in the Samuccaya (Compendium of Topics), then 'when we say suffering, we mean the duhkha-satya', referring to the duhkha-satya itself. 'Dharma of suffering means the teachings arising from the increase of the duhkha-satya', referring to the teachings arising from the increase of the duhkha-satya. 'Dharma-jnana means the dharma-jnana that observes the increase of truth in the path of practice', referring to the dharma-jnana obtained by observing the truth in the path of practice. 'Jnana-ksanti means that due to the increased power of previous observation, one arises with direct realization of non-outflow wisdom in each separate duhkha-satya', referring to the arising of direct realization of non-outflow wisdom in each different duhkha-satya due to the increased power of previous observation. Because of this wisdom, one can forever abandon all the afflictions that are to be cut off by seeing suffering. It is also said: 'Ksanti is to seal the previous suffering', if it is not conditioned by suchness, how can it be tolerated? Another explanation is that it is only conditioned by what is conditioned by true seeing. 'Saying duhkha-dharma-jnana is to cite the cause of this ksanti', saying duhkha-dharma-jnana is to cite the cause of this patience. Therefore, the following explanation even says: 'Due to the increased power of the wisdom contained in proper attention, in one's own continuum of the duhkha-satya, one directly realizes that suchness of the world-transcending wisdom, and the essence of right view arises', referring to the arising of the essence of right view due to the increased power of the wisdom contained in proper attention, in one's own continuum of the duhkha-satya, one directly realizes that suchness of the world-transcending wisdom. This is named from the perspective of the cause. If based on the twenty-third volume of the Abhidharmakosa (Treasury of Metaphysics), it is named from the perspective of the result. Therefore, that treatise says: 'This can generate dharma-jnana, it is the cause of dharma-jnana and obtains the name dharma-jnana-ksanti, like a flower and fruit tree', this which can generate dharma-jnana is the cause of dharma-jnana, therefore it obtains the name dharma-jnana-ksanti, just like a flower and fruit tree. This is named from the perspective of the cause. Or it is called from the perspective of the result. This is the meaning of Ximing. Now I think that the Abhidharmakosa's explanation of the latter sixteen sentences can be named from the perspective of the result. Now this is a general condition, which is different from the upper and lower. Moreover, the Abhidharmakosa's explanation is not entirely reasonable. Duhkha-dharma-jnana is the result, and ksanti is the cause. Now that both are mentioned at the same time, the cause and result are combined. Duhkha-dharma-jnana is the cause, and ksanti* is the result, with both cause and result being mentioned.
言故合為因。若唯從因。應如似悔從因立名名為惡作。不云惡作悔。今既因果合舉。明不唯因。即依主釋。通依及於。于即境聲。義如前顯 又二相見所有諸智有二所緣。一放法所緣。二自性所緣。放法所緣。緣見所證及能證智。如初三心及后十六即緣所證。第一十六緣能所證。二自性所緣。即兼緣前資糧．加行能所觀法。準此論說。上下現觀法真見道無間．解脫。瑜伽五十五云。當知此智第三心無間。從見道起方現在前。緣先世智曾所觀察上下二地。及二增上安立諦境 又解但緣真見道法。五十五云。緣先世智曾所觀察等者。緣謂緣藉因緣。非所慮緣。二解前勝。若不緣前。如何言苦法智忍。如三無生忍。非不緣印立彼三忍。故此名忍定亦緣前 問初十六心苦法智忍及苦法智俱緣于如。何分忍．智 答據印決定。俱應名忍亦同名智。據差別義初忍后智。以昔見前。雖依聖教觀苦等諦而有智生。未能證知。今初無漏創證彼境故得忍名。后雖亦印不得忍號。又忍．智俱決應俱名忍。恐后濫前不俱名忍 問前言苦法智忍。后但云苦法忍。即不相濫 答準此道理言忍亦得。顯因果別。不俱名忍。但隨舉一名忍不違。亦不可言后但云智不得名忍。俱同印故 問何故前言苦法法即教法后苦法智法即真如 答雖俱緣如。初創緣如未
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『言』（語言）和『故』（原因）合在一起稱為『因』（hetu，原因）。如果僅僅從『因』（原因）出發，應該像『似悔』（類似於後悔）那樣，從『因』（原因）來建立名稱，稱為『惡作』（kukkritya，後悔），而不是稱為『惡作悔』。現在既然『因』（原因）和『果』（結果）一起提出，就表明不僅僅是『因』（原因）。這就是『依主釋』（tatpurusa，持業釋），普遍地依賴於『于』（locative，方位格）。『于』（locative，方位格）就是『境聲』（指所緣境），意義如前所述。 此外，二相見（dualistic perception）所具有的各種智慧有兩種所緣（alambana，認知對像）：一是放法所緣（perceived object of abandonment），二是自性所緣（perceived object of self-nature）。放法所緣（perceived object of abandonment），緣于見所證（that which is realized by insight）以及能證智（the wisdom that realizes），例如最初的三心（three moments of mind）以及之後的十六心（sixteen moments of mind），即緣于所證（that which is realized）。第一十六心（the sixteenth moment of mind）緣于能所證（that which realizes and is realized）。二是自性所緣（perceived object of self-nature），即兼帶緣於之前的資糧位（equipment stage）、加行位（application stage）的能觀法（that which is able to observe）和所觀法（that which is observed）。按照此論的說法，上下現觀（higher and lower direct perception）的法真見道（Dharmas of the Path of Seeing）的無間道（uninterrupted path）、解脫道（path of liberation）。《瑜伽五十五》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Stage Fifty-Five）中說：『應當知道，此智（wisdom）在第三心（third moment of mind）的無間道（uninterrupted path）中，從見道（Path of Seeing）生起時才顯現於前，緣于先前世智（worldly wisdom）曾經觀察的上下二地（two realms, higher and lower），以及二增上（two superiorities）所安立的諦境（truth）。』 又有一種解釋認為，僅僅緣于真見道法（Dharmas of the Path of Seeing）。《瑜伽五十五》（Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Stage Fifty-Five）中說：『緣于先前世智（worldly wisdom）曾經觀察等等』，這裡的『緣』（alambana，認知對像）是指緣借因緣（dependent origination），而不是所慮緣（object of concern）。前一種解釋更為殊勝。如果不緣于先前，如何說『苦法智忍』（ksanti-jnana-dharma-duhkha, forbearance with the knowledge of the dharma of suffering）？就像三無生忍（three kinds of forbearance of non-origination）一樣，並非不緣于印（印可，認可）而安立那三種忍（forbearance）。因此，此處的『忍』（ksanti，forbearance）必定也緣于先前。 問：最初的十六心中，『苦法智忍』（ksanti-jnana-dharma-duhkha, forbearance with the knowledge of the dharma of suffering）和『苦法智』（jnana-dharma-duhkha, knowledge of the dharma of suffering）都緣于『如』（tathata，真如，如如），如何區分『忍』（ksanti，forbearance）和『智』（jnana，knowledge）？ 答：根據印（印可，認可）的決定，都應該稱為『忍』（ksanti，forbearance），也同樣可以稱為『智』（jnana，knowledge）。根據差別的意義，最初是『忍』（ksanti，forbearance），之後是『智』（jnana，knowledge）。因為過去已經見過，雖然依據聖教（arya-dharma，聖者的教法）觀察苦等諦（suffering and other truths）而生起智慧，但未能證知。現在最初的無漏智（anāsrava-jñāna，無漏的智慧）首次證得那個境界，所以得到『忍』（ksanti，forbearance）的名稱。之後雖然也印（印可，認可），但不能得到『忍』（ksanti，forbearance）的稱號。又因為『忍』（ksanti，forbearance）和『智』（jnana，knowledge）都決斷，所以都應該稱為『忍』（ksanti，forbearance），但恐怕後面的會混淆前面的，所以不都稱為『忍』（ksanti，forbearance）。 問：前面說『苦法智忍』（ksanti-jnana-dharma-duhkha, forbearance with the knowledge of the dharma of suffering），後面只說『苦法忍』（ksanti-dharma-duhkha, forbearance of the dharma of suffering），這樣就不會混淆了嗎？ 答：按照這個道理，說『忍』（ksanti，forbearance）也可以。顯示『因』（hetu，原因）和『果』（phala，結果）的差別，所以不都稱為『忍』（ksanti，forbearance）。只是隨便舉出一個名稱『忍』（ksanti，forbearance）也不違背。也不可以說後面只說『智』（jnana，knowledge）就不能稱為『忍』（ksanti，forbearance），因為都同樣是印（印可，認可）。 問：為什麼前面說『苦法』（duhkha-dharma，苦之法）的『法』（dharma，法）是指教法（doctrine），後面『苦法智』（jnana-dharma-duhkha, knowledge of the dharma of suffering）的『法』（dharma，法）是指真如（tathata，如如）？ 答：雖然都緣于『如』（tathata，真如，如如），但最初是初次緣于『如』（tathata，真如，如如），還沒有……
【English Translation】 English version 『Words』 (言) and 『reasons』 (故) combined are called 『hetu』 (因, cause). If only based on 『cause』 (因), it should be like 『similar regret』 (似悔), establishing the name from 『cause』 (因) as 『kukkritya』 (惡作, regret), instead of calling it 『regret of kukkritya』 (惡作悔). Now that 『cause』 (因) and 『effect』 (果) are both mentioned, it indicates that it is not solely based on 『cause』 (因). This is 『tatpurusa』 (依主釋, dependent compound), universally relying on 『locative』 (于). 『Locative』 (于) is the 『sound of the object』 (境聲, referring to the object of cognition), with the meaning as previously explained. Furthermore, the various wisdoms possessed by dualistic perception (二相見) have two objects of cognition (alambana, 所緣): one is the perceived object of abandonment (放法所緣), and the other is the perceived object of self-nature (自性所緣). The perceived object of abandonment (放法所緣) is related to what is realized by insight (見所證) and the wisdom that realizes (能證智), such as the initial three moments of mind (三心) and the subsequent sixteen moments of mind (十六心), which are related to what is realized (所證). The sixteenth moment of mind (第一十六心) is related to that which realizes and is realized (能所證). The perceived object of self-nature (自性所緣) also includes the ability to observe (能觀法) and what is observed (所觀法) in the preceding stages of equipment (資糧位) and application (加行位). According to this treatise, the uninterrupted path (無間道) and the path of liberation (解脫道) of the Dharmas of the Path of Seeing (法真見道) in higher and lower direct perception (上下現觀). The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Stage Fifty-Five (瑜伽五十五) states: 『It should be known that this wisdom (智) manifests in the uninterrupted path (無間道) of the third moment of mind (第三心), arising from the Path of Seeing (見道), relating to the two realms (二地, higher and lower) previously observed by worldly wisdom (世智), and the truths (諦境) established by the two superiorities (二增上).』 Another interpretation is that it is only related to the Dharmas of the Path of Seeing (真見道法). The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Stage Fifty-Five (瑜伽五十五) states: 『Relating to what was previously observed by worldly wisdom (世智), etc.』, where 『relating』 (緣) refers to dependent origination (因緣), not the object of concern (所慮緣). The former interpretation is more excellent. If it does not relate to the preceding, how can it be said to be 『ksanti-jnana-dharma-duhkha』 (苦法智忍, forbearance with the knowledge of the dharma of suffering)? Like the three kinds of forbearance of non-origination (三無生忍), they are not established without relating to the seal (印可, approval). Therefore, 『forbearance』 (忍) here must also relate to the preceding. Question: In the initial sixteen moments of mind, both 『ksanti-jnana-dharma-duhkha』 (苦法智忍, forbearance with the knowledge of the dharma of suffering) and 『jnana-dharma-duhkha』 (苦法智, knowledge of the dharma of suffering) are related to 『tathata』 (如, suchness), how are 『forbearance』 (忍) and 『knowledge』 (智) distinguished? Answer: According to the determination of the seal (印可, approval), both should be called 『forbearance』 (忍), and can also be called 『knowledge』 (智). According to the difference in meaning, the initial is 『forbearance』 (忍), and the subsequent is 『knowledge』 (智). Because it has been seen in the past, although wisdom arises from observing suffering and other truths (苦等諦) according to the holy teachings (arya-dharma, 聖者的教法), it has not been realized. Now, the initial unconditioned wisdom (anāsrava-jñāna, 無漏的智慧) realizes that state for the first time, so it obtains the name 『forbearance』 (忍). Although it is also sealed (印可, approved) later, it cannot obtain the title 『forbearance』 (忍). Furthermore, because both 『forbearance』 (忍) and 『knowledge』 (智) are decisive, both should be called 『forbearance』 (忍), but fearing that the latter will be confused with the former, they are not both called 『forbearance』 (忍). Question: Earlier it was said 『ksanti-jnana-dharma-duhkha』 (苦法智忍, forbearance with the knowledge of the dharma of suffering), and later only 『ksanti-dharma-duhkha』 (苦法忍, forbearance of the dharma of suffering) is mentioned, wouldn't this avoid confusion? Answer: According to this principle, it is also possible to say 『forbearance』 (忍). It shows the difference between 『cause』 (hetu, 因) and 『effect』 (phala, 果), so they are not both called 『forbearance』 (忍). It is not contradictory to just mention one name, 『forbearance』 (忍). It cannot be said that later only 『knowledge』 (智) is mentioned and it cannot be called 『forbearance』 (忍), because they are both equally sealed (印可, approved). Question: Why is the 『dharma』 (法) in 『duhkha-dharma』 (苦法, dharma of suffering) earlier referring to doctrine, and the 『dharma』 (法) in 『jnana-dharma-duhkha』 (苦法智, knowledge of the dharma of suffering) later referring to 『tathata』 (如, suchness)? Answer: Although both are related to 『tathata』 (如, suchness), initially it is the first time being related to 『tathata』 (如, suchness), and it has not yet...
印非忍。但印前教不得云如。第二重證。故法即如。教前印故理此印故。
論。諸相見道依真假說等。問三心見道二乘聖者回心向大已斷煩惱。入相見時亦三心不 答亦有。令彼障遠及除習氣。法彼真見無間解脫所有功能故亦定作。二十六心應知亦作。雖所知障不約迷諦。隨煩惱說。亦復無違 問三心十六在見道前何位。先修令相見起 答準顯揚十六。修起次第在資糧位修十六心。次說善根。準此論明加行位中。云此位菩薩于安立諦非安立諦俱學觀察。二論別者略為二解 一云顯揚據上下十六在資糧修。修道方起。此論據總十六。加行位作。相見中起上下觀者。文雖不說。準彼亦在資糧位修。相見道中最在後起 又解顯揚說初修在資糧位。此論約后習故在加行。各據一義皆不相違。
論。一思現觀等。此思等六出體有四。一克性。二據勝。三相應。四眷屬。如思現觀等說是惠者。即克性體。及俱行菩提法即后二體。五十五云。決定思惟者。思惟即思。據勝出體。釋名者。如思現觀是鄰近釋。如四念住體實是惠。由與念俱名爲念住。思現觀亦爾。此論．顯揚．瑜伽七十一併云。思所成惠而為自性。西明云。思現觀或持業。或依主。信鄰近。戒如信 且思現觀諸論說是思所成惠。如何持業。亦非依主。如戒非
觀名為現觀說為鄰近。思亦非觀。名為現觀。何非鄰近。若云現觀非思。因思所起故依主者。何不得云現觀非思。云思現觀是鄰近耶。信現觀體於三寶凈信為性此克性體。瑜伽五十五云。及聞所成決定智惠。據勝出體。顯揚十七云。或此俱行菩提分法。通相應眷屬。余皆準此。信．戒釋名者或亦有財。雖體非觀。能助現觀故。或依主釋。助現觀之信。令觀明之戒。名信．戒現觀。或如念住亦是鄰近。
論。初獲聖性等。西明云。能生初地無漏法爾種子。及新熏種為其自性 今謂。雖有新種非勝不立。由正能生有所生現。證理斷障故能生勝。不取新熏。未能生故 西明云。地前雖有無漏種子。而二性同時互相違故非聖性攝。如滅盡定依種假立。微微心時雖有其種。而非滅定。有心．無心義相違故 今謂。若爾初入見時二性不俱。應無漏種皆名聖性。又如滅定唯防心能名為滅定非諸種子。故此聖性非正能生。即不應取 西明又問聖性望同凡性。亦不相應耶。答此中亦立。即是得收。若望二障即非得攝。宗許非得亦通無漏 又解無漏力勝不假別立 要集亦云。不立為勝 今謂不爾。若無漏勝不立不相應。滅定無漏。應不立為不相應法 又前第一云。然依有情可成諸法分位。假立三種成就。翻此假立不成就名。故知聖性
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『觀』（Vipassana，毗婆舍那）名為『現觀』（Abhisamaya，現觀），說是『鄰近』（Upacara，近行）。『思』（Cinta，思）並非『觀』，也名為『現觀』。為何不是『鄰近』呢？如果說『現觀』不是『思』，因為『思』所生起，所以是『依主』（Adhipati，增上緣）。為何不能說『現觀』不是『思』，而說『思』、『現觀』是『鄰近』呢？ 『信現觀』（Sraddha-abhisamaya，信現觀）的體性是對三寶（Buddha, Dharma, Sangha，佛、法、僧）的清凈信心，這是它的克性體（Svabhava，自性）。《瑜伽師地論》第五十五卷說：『以及聽聞所成的決定智慧』，這是根據最殊勝的體性來說的。《顯揚聖教論》第十七卷說：『或者這是與菩提分法（Bodhipaksika-dharma，菩提分法）俱行的，通於相應的眷屬。』其餘的都可依此準繩類推。『信』、『戒』的解釋，或者也有『財』（Dhana，財）。雖然體性不是『觀』，但能幫助『現觀』的緣故。或者依『依主釋』（Adhipati-nirukti，增上釋），幫助『現觀』的『信』，使『觀』明晰的『戒』，名為『信現觀』、『戒現觀』。或者如『念住』（Smrtyupasthana，念住）也是『鄰近』。
論：最初獲得聖性（Aryatva，聖性）等。西明（註釋者名）說：『能生起初地（Prthivi，地）無漏法爾種子（Anasrava-prakrti-bija，無漏法爾種子），以及新熏種子（Navakrta-bija，新熏種子），是它的自性。』 現在認為，即使有新熏種子，如果不是殊勝的，也不能成立。因為真正能生起有所生起的顯現，證悟真理、斷除障礙，所以能生起殊勝的。不取新熏種子，因為它們還不能生起。 西明說：『地前（菩薩位階）雖然有無漏種子，但二性（有漏、無漏）同時互相違背，所以不屬於聖性所攝。如同滅盡定（Nirodha-samapatti，滅盡定）是依種子假立的。微微心時雖然有其種子，但不是滅定，因為有心、無心的意義互相違背。』 現在認為，如果這樣，初入見道（Darsanamarga，見道）時二性不俱，所有無漏種子都應該名為聖性。又如滅定只防止心能，名為滅定，而非諸種子。所以此聖性並非真正能生起，就不應該取。 西明又問：聖性望同凡性（Prthagjana-tva，凡夫性），也不相應嗎？回答說：此中也成立，即是得（Prapti，得）所攝。如果望二障（煩惱障、所知障），就不是得所攝。宗義允許非得（Aprapti，非得）也通於無漏。 又解釋說，無漏的力量殊勝，不需要另外建立。 《要集》（論書名）也說：不立為殊勝。 現在認為不是這樣。如果無漏殊勝不成立不相應，滅定無漏，應該不成立為不相應法。 又前面第一（指本論前面部分）說：『然而依據有情（Sattva，有情）可以成就諸法分位，假立三種成就。』翻轉這種假立不成就的名稱。所以知道聖性。
【English Translation】 English version 'Observation' (Vipassana) is called 'Direct Perception' (Abhisamaya), and is said to be 'Proximity' (Upacara). 'Thought' (Cinta), which is not 'Observation', is also called 'Direct Perception'. Why is it not 'Proximity'? If it is said that 'Direct Perception' is not 'Thought' because it arises from 'Thought', and is therefore 'Dominant Condition' (Adhipati). Why can't it be said that 'Direct Perception' is not 'Thought', and instead say that 'Thought' and 'Direct Perception' are 'Proximity'? The nature of 'Faith-Direct Perception' (Sraddha-abhisamaya) is pure faith in the Three Jewels (Buddha, Dharma, Sangha), this is its defining characteristic (Svabhava). The Yogacarabhumi-sastra, Volume 55, says: 'And the decisive wisdom arising from hearing', this is according to the most excellent nature. The Abhidharmasamuccaya, Volume 17, says: 'Or this is that which is concurrent with the limbs of enlightenment (Bodhipaksika-dharma), extending to the corresponding retinue.' The rest can be inferred by analogy. The explanation of 'Faith' and 'Precepts', or there may also be 'Wealth' (Dhana). Although the nature is not 'Observation', it can help 'Direct Perception'. Or according to the 'Dominant Condition Interpretation' (Adhipati-nirukti), 'Faith' that helps 'Direct Perception', and 'Precepts' that clarify 'Observation', are called 'Faith-Direct Perception' and 'Precepts-Direct Perception'. Or like 'Mindfulness' (Smrtyupasthana), it is also 'Proximity'.
Treatise: Initially obtaining the Noble Nature (Aryatva), etc. Ximing (commentator's name) says: 'It can generate the seed of the unconditioned natural law of the first ground (Prthivi), and the newly perfumed seed (Navakrta-bija) is its nature.' Now it is considered that even if there are newly perfumed seeds, if they are not superior, they cannot be established. Because the true ability to generate what is generated manifests, realizing the truth and eliminating obstacles, it can generate the superior. The newly perfumed seeds are not taken because they cannot yet generate. Ximing says: 'Although there are unconditioned seeds before the ground (stage of Bodhisattva), the two natures (conditioned and unconditioned) are simultaneous and mutually contradictory, so they are not included in the Noble Nature. Just as the Cessation Attainment (Nirodha-samapatti) is provisionally established based on seeds. Although there are seeds at the time of subtle mind, it is not Cessation Attainment, because the meanings of having mind and not having mind are mutually contradictory.' Now it is considered that if this is the case, when initially entering the Path of Seeing (Darsanamarga), the two natures are not simultaneous, all unconditioned seeds should be called Noble Nature. Also, like Cessation Attainment, only preventing the mind is called Cessation Attainment, not all seeds. Therefore, this Noble Nature is not truly able to generate, and should not be taken. Ximing also asks: Is the Noble Nature also not corresponding to the same ordinary nature (Prthagjana-tva)? The answer is: It is also established here, that is, included in attainment (Prapti). If looking at the two obscurations (afflictive obscuration and cognitive obscuration), it is not included in attainment. The doctrine allows non-attainment (Aprapti) to also extend to the unconditioned. It is also explained that the power of the unconditioned is superior and does not require separate establishment. The Essential Collection (treatise name) also says: It is not established as superior. Now it is considered that this is not the case. If the unconditioned superior is not established as non-corresponding, the unconditioned of Cessation Attainment should not be established as non-corresponding dharma. Also, the first part (referring to the earlier part of this treatise) says: 'However, based on sentient beings (Sattva), the divisions of all dharmas can be accomplished, provisionally establishing three kinds of accomplishment.' Reversing this provisional establishment is called non-accomplishment. Therefore, know the Noble Nature.
翻異生性。應名為得。不名非得。不爾翻何立異生性名為非得。或望不成異生性邊假名非得。
論。極難勝地等 西明云。仁王般若云。初地菩薩四天王。雙照二諦平等道。如何此論五地方能引。三藏解云。據實初地二智雙行。而約任運故說五地 有解已破 要集救云。十地功德多依妙觀。然五地以上任運雙行。八地以上方得任運。未見別教 今謂不爾。八地以上名無功用諸論共同。五地任運出何聖教。又行相互違。初即能合。何成極難。若云八地據任運長時。此地據任運能合者。此亦不爾。既任運能合何不長時。若云或有相間故不長時者。既為有相間無相觀。有時不合何成任運 若爾如何會此相違 答仁王經中據相見道變相雙緣。此論等說約真俗智並。未曾有處說于見道有二智並。五地創並故說極難。
論。此十修者。攝論第七說有五修。一現起加行修。二勝解修。三作意修。四方便善巧修。五成所作事修。云四如前釋。一現起加行修。即是發起勉勵加行。二勝解修。與雜集論勝解作意同。三作意修。即雜集論后三作意。四方便善巧修。攝論無別解。即七最勝中方便善巧最勝。五成所作事修。即雜集論依止自在修。攝論云。謂諸如來任運佛事無有休息。于其圓滿波羅蜜多。復更修習六到彼岸。雜集論云
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：
『翻異生性。應名為得。不名非得。不爾翻何立異生性名為非得。或望不成異生性邊假名非得。』
意思是說，如果轉變了異生性（pṛthag-jana-prakṛti，凡夫的本性），就應該稱之為『得』（prāpti，獲得），而不是『非得』（aprāpti，未獲得）。否則，又如何能將異生性建立為『非得』呢？或者說，只是相對於未成就的異生性而言，才假名為『非得』。
『論。極難勝地等。西明云。仁王般若云。初地菩薩四天王。雙照二諦平等道。如何此論五地方能引。三藏解云。據實初地二智雙行。而約任運故說五地。有解已破。要集救云。十地功德多依妙觀。然五地以上任運雙行。八地以上方得任運。未見別教。今謂不爾。八地以上名無功用諸論共同。五地任運出何聖教。又行相互違。初即能合。何成極難。若云八地據任運長時。此地據任運能合者。此亦不爾。既任運能合何不長時。若云或有相間故不長時者。既為有相間無相觀。有時不合何成任運。若爾如何會此相違。答仁王經中據相見道變相雙緣。此論等說約真俗智並。未曾有處說于見道有二智並。五地創並故說極難。』
這段論述關於『極難勝地』（durjaya-bhūmi，極難勝地）等問題。《西明》中說，《仁王般若經》中說，初地菩薩（prathamā-bhūmi-bodhisattva，歡喜地菩薩）與四天王（caturmahārājakāyika-deva，四大天王）同時照見二諦（satya-dvaya，真諦和俗諦）平等的道理。那麼，此論（指《瑜伽師地論》）的五地（pañcamī-bhūmi，第五地，極難勝地）如何能引用這一說法呢？三藏法師解釋說，實際上，初地菩薩的兩種智慧（二智，指真智和俗智）是同時執行的，但爲了說明任運（anābhoga，無功用行）的特點，所以才說五地。有一種解釋已經被駁斥了。《要集救》中說，十地（daśa-bhūmi，十地）的功德大多依賴於妙觀（adhimukti-caryā，勝解行）。然而，五地以上是任運雙行，八地（aṣṭamī-bhūmi，第八地，不動地）以上才能真正達到任運。沒有見到其他教派有這種說法。現在認為不是這樣。八地以上被稱為『無功用』（anābhoga，無功用行），這是各種論著都認同的。五地任運的說法出自哪部聖典呢？而且，『行』（caryā，行）是相互違背的。初地就能合，又怎麼能說是『極難』呢？如果說八地是根據任運的長時性，而此地（五地）是根據任運的能合性，那麼這種說法也是不對的。既然任運就能合，為什麼不能長時呢？如果說因為有時有相間（vyavadhāna，間隔），所以不能長時，既然有相間和無相觀（nirvyavadhāna-darśana，無間隔的觀照），有時不能合，又怎麼能說是任運呢？如果這樣，如何調和這些矛盾呢？回答是，《仁王經》中是根據相見道（sākṣāt-kāra-mārga，見道）變相雙緣（dvaya-sambandha，二者關聯）來說的，而此論等是根據真俗二智並存來說的。從未有地方說在見道中有二智並存。五地是初次並存，所以才說是『極難』。
『論。此十修者。攝論第七說有五修。一現起加行修。二勝解修。三作意修。四方便善巧修。五成所作事修。云四如前釋。一現起加行修。即是發起勉勵加行。二勝解修。與雜集論勝解作意同。三作意修。即雜集論后三作意。四方便善巧修。攝論無別解。即七最勝中方便善巧最勝。五成所作事修。即雜集論依止自在修。攝論云。謂諸如來任運佛事無有休息。于其圓滿波羅蜜多。復更修習六到彼岸。雜集論云。』
這段論述關於十種修（daśa-caryā，十種行）。《攝大乘論》（Mahāyānasaṃgraha，攝大乘論）第七品中說了五種修：一是現起加行修（abhisamudācāra-prayoga-caryā，現起加行修），二是勝解修（adhimukti-caryā，勝解修），三是作意修（manaskāra-caryā，作意修），四是方便善巧修（upāya-kauśalya-caryā，方便善巧修），五是成所作事修（kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-caryā，成所作事修）。其中四種修如前文解釋。一是現起加行修，就是發起勉勵加行（prayatna-prayoga，策勵加行）。二是勝解修，與《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya，阿毗達摩集論）中的勝解作意（adhimukti-manaskāra，勝解作意）相同。三是作意修，就是《雜集論》中的后三種作意（manaskāra，作意）。四是方便善巧修，《攝大乘論》中沒有特別的解釋，就是七最勝（sapta-paramatā，七最勝）中的方便善巧最勝（upāya-kauśalya-paramatā，方便善巧最勝）。五是成所作事修，就是《雜集論》中的依止自在修（āśraya-parivṛtti-caryā，轉依行）。《攝大乘論》中說，諸如來（tathāgata，如來）任運地做佛事（buddha-kārya，佛的事業），沒有休息，在圓滿波羅蜜多（pāramitā，波羅蜜多）的基礎上，又進一步修習六到彼岸（ṣaṭ-pāramitā，六波羅蜜多）。《雜集論》中說：
【English Translation】 English version:
'If the nature of an ordinary being (pṛthag-jana-prakṛti) is transformed, it should be called 'attainment' (prāpti), not 'non-attainment' (aprāpti). Otherwise, how can the nature of an ordinary being be established as 'non-attainment'? Or, it is only in relation to the unachieved nature of an ordinary being that it is nominally called 'non-attainment'.'
'Treatise: The Extremely Difficult to Conquer Stage, etc. Ximing says, the Prajñā of the Benevolent King says, the bodhisattva of the first ground (prathamā-bhūmi-bodhisattva) and the Four Heavenly Kings (caturmahārājakāyika-deva) simultaneously illuminate the equal path of the two truths (satya-dvaya). How can this treatise cite the five grounds? The Tripiṭaka master explains that, in reality, the two wisdoms of the first ground operate simultaneously, but the five grounds are mentioned in terms of effortless operation (anābhoga). Some explanations have already been refuted. Yaoji saves by saying that the merits of the ten grounds (daśa-bhūmi) mostly rely on wonderful contemplation (adhimukti-caryā). However, from the fifth ground onwards, there is effortless simultaneous operation, and only from the eighth ground (aṣṭamī-bhūmi) onwards is effortless operation attained. No separate teachings have been seen. Now it is said that this is not the case. The name 'without effort' (anābhoga) from the eighth ground onwards is common to all treatises. From which sacred teaching does the effortless operation of the fifth ground come? Moreover, the practices contradict each other. If the first ground can combine, how can it be extremely difficult? If it is said that the eighth ground is based on the long duration of effortless operation, and this ground (fifth ground) is based on the ability to combine effortlessly, then this is also not the case. Since it can combine effortlessly, why not for a long duration? If it is said that because there are occasional intervals (vyavadhāna), it cannot be for a long duration, since there are intervals and non-interval contemplation (nirvyavadhāna-darśana), and sometimes they do not combine, how can it be effortless? If so, how can these contradictions be reconciled? The answer is that the Benevolent King Sutra speaks of the simultaneous conditions of the transformation of aspects in the path of seeing (sākṣāt-kāra-mārga), while this treatise speaks of the combination of the two wisdoms of truth and convention. Nowhere has it been said that there is a combination of two wisdoms in the path of seeing. The fifth ground is the first combination, so it is said to be extremely difficult.'
'Treatise: These ten practices (daśa-caryā). The seventh chapter of the Compendium of the Great Vehicle (Mahāyānasaṃgraha) speaks of five practices: first, the practice of manifest effort (abhisamudācāra-prayoga-caryā); second, the practice of superior understanding (adhimukti-caryā); third, the practice of attention (manaskāra-caryā); fourth, the practice of skillful means (upāya-kauśalya-caryā); and fifth, the practice of accomplishing what needs to be done (kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-caryā). It is said that the four are explained as before. First, the practice of manifest effort is the effort of initiating and encouraging practice (prayatna-prayoga). Second, the practice of superior understanding is the same as the superior understanding attention (adhimukti-manaskāra) in the Compendium of Abhidharma (Abhidharmasamuccaya). Third, the practice of attention is the last three attentions (manaskāra) in the Compendium of Abhidharma. Fourth, the practice of skillful means has no separate explanation in the Compendium of the Great Vehicle; it is the most superior of skillful means (upāya-kauśalya-paramatā) among the seven superiorities (sapta-paramatā). Fifth, the practice of accomplishing what needs to be done is the practice of relying on self-mastery (āśraya-parivṛtti-caryā) in the Compendium of Abhidharma. The Compendium of the Great Vehicle says that the Tathāgatas (tathāgata) effortlessly perform the deeds of the Buddha (buddha-kārya) without rest, and on the basis of perfecting the pāramitās (pāramitā), they further practice the six perfections (ṣaṭ-pāramitā). The Compendium of Abhidharma says:'
。依止自在。即如次三身。身．行．說三皆得自在。雖得自在猶修不息故。二論開合互有不同。各據一義。雜集無攝論現起加行。攝論無雜集依止任持。攝論開雜集論四作意中初勝解作意。略無任持。以為所憑所修二差別。教是所憑。餘三正修。所以別開。雜集以作意故合彼勝解。別明任持必由因力方能修行。故別明之。或彼加行此任持中后二所攝。即舉后二影顯前二。雜集別明意樂。攝論即作意所攝。攝論顯諸勝行皆具六種意樂故不別明。雜集約總別不同別明意樂。並不相違。又六意樂二論少別。攝論云。一廣大。二長時。三歡喜。四荷恩。五大志樂。六純善。雜集云。一無厭足。二廣大。第三名同。四名恩德。五名無染。六善好 名不同者。釋論以殑伽沙等珍物施一有情。殑伽沙等身命。皆能惠舍名為廣大。此即就境及所行事名為廣大。即此長時舍于珍．命亦不為足名無厭足。以長時能捨亦名廣大。二論互舉。攝論以經多劫舍身．命．財。一一如來一一有情悉皆供養。而無厭足名為長時。雜集據雖多時設得成滿。猶行不息名為廣大。廣大．長時義一名異。如七大性長時．廣大俱名為大。雜集據不自求來世滿果。化他令得非為愛見。但無癡等起名為無染。攝論約令他相續舍三惡道得勝異熟。不為自身名大志樂 純善
．善好名義相似。西明云。攝論五修如次。即此論五修者。準前所列。名義同異不得如次。彼判有謬。
論。二攝善法戒等。本釋云。以有為無為無漏善法為體 西明云。修有為善。證即能證無為功德。而非無為為戒體性。又言十勝行。明非無為 要集云。此三凈戒皆用思愿現．種 今謂。本釋意少有別。若據克性即正三業。若據相從所修所證。通為．無為。如似相應．眷屬出體。又諸論等據所修戒。此兼所證故。然所修證。或通因果。因名所修。果名所證。即七大中證得大攝。攝論亦云。攝善法戒能令證得力．無畏等。此意因果皆欲修證名為攝善。雖然所證亦通無為。
論。此與二乘有共不共等。西明云。舊云性罪。謂殺生等。拔生草等是遮罪。今依攝論云。殺．盜．淫等貪等所生名為性罪。斷生草等非貪等生說名遮罪。此意染心斷生草等即名性罪 今謂不爾。彼攝論意。若故殺生等。必貪等起故是性罪。故斷生草。非必貪等起故是遮罪。又斷生草等。十業道中是何業道。染心起時得名性罪。若云由貪等是意業者。自由起貪等。何關斷草。又為貪等起殺等時。應犯身．意二處業道。又解深密雲。十地中所起煩惱不染污相。由知而起。但為利生不為過失。此起貪等應成性罪。何名不染污。若雖起貪等非染
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 善好名義相似。《西明》中說，《攝大乘論》中的五種修習是依次進行的。按照這個說法，此論中的五種修習，如果按照前面所列出的內容來看，名義的相同和差異就不能依次對應。因此，《西明》的判斷是有錯誤的。
論中說：『二攝善法戒等』。本釋中說：『以有為、無為、無漏善法為體』。《西明》中說：『修習有為善，證得就能證得無為功德，但無為並非戒的體性。』又說『十勝行』，表明並非無為。《要集》中說：『這三種凈戒都用思愿的現行和種子。』
我認為，本釋的意義略有不同。如果從克制本性來說，就是正三業（身、口、意）。如果從隨順相從的角度來說，所修和所證，都包括有為和無為。就像相似相應和眷屬出體一樣。而且，各種論典等是根據所修的戒來說的，這裡兼顧了所證的戒。然而，所修和所證，可以貫通因果。因稱為所修，果稱為所證。也就是七大中證得的大攝。《攝大乘論》也說：『攝善法戒能使人證得力、無畏等。』這個意思是說，因果都想要修證，稱為攝善。雖然所證也包括無為。
論中說：『此與二乘有共不共等』。《西明》中說：『舊說性罪，指的是殺生等；拔生草等是遮罪。』現在根據《攝大乘論》說：『殺、盜、淫等由貪等所生，稱為性罪；斷生草等並非由貪等所生，稱為遮罪。』這個意思是說，以染污心斷生草等，就稱為性罪。
我認為不是這樣。《攝大乘論》的意思是，如果故意殺生等，一定是貪等引起的，所以是性罪。所以斷生草，並非一定是貪等引起的，所以是遮罪。而且，斷生草等，在十業道中屬於哪種業道？染污心生起時才能稱為性罪。如果說是由於貪等是意業，那麼自由生起貪等，和斷草有什麼關係？而且，爲了貪等而殺生等時，應該犯身、意兩處的業道。而且，《解深密經》中說，十地中所生起的煩惱，不是染污的相，由於知曉而生起，只是爲了利益眾生，不是爲了過失。這種生起貪等應該成為性罪，怎麼能稱為不染污？如果即使生起貪等也不是染污的。
【English Translation】 English version The meanings of 'good' and 'well' are similar. Ximing says that the five cultivations in the She Lun (Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Compendium on the Great Vehicle) proceed in order. According to this, the five cultivations in this treatise, if listed as before, cannot have their names and meanings correspond in order. Therefore, Ximing's judgment is erroneous.
The treatise says: 'The second is the precepts, etc., that gather good dharmas.' The original commentary says: 'Taking conditioned, unconditioned, and undefiled good dharmas as their substance.' Ximing says: 'Cultivating conditioned good, attainment can then attain unconditioned merit, but the unconditioned is not the nature of the precepts.' It also mentions the 'ten excellent practices,' indicating that it is not unconditioned. Yaoji says: 'These three pure precepts all use the present and seed of thought and aspiration.'
I think the meaning of the original commentary is slightly different. If based on restraining nature, it is precisely the three karmas (of body, speech, and mind). If based on following along, what is cultivated and what is attained both include conditioned and unconditioned. It is like similarity and correspondence, and the family emerging from the substance. Moreover, various treatises, etc., are based on the precepts that are cultivated; this includes the precepts that are attained. However, what is cultivated and what is attained can penetrate cause and effect. The cause is called what is cultivated, and the effect is called what is attained. That is, the great gathering attained among the seven great elements. The She Lun also says: 'The precepts that gather good dharmas can enable one to attain strength, fearlessness, etc.' This means that both cause and effect are desired to be cultivated and attained, called gathering good. Although what is attained also includes the unconditioned.
The treatise says: 'This has common and uncommon aspects with the Two Vehicles.' Ximing says: 'The old saying of 'nature sins' refers to killing, etc.; pulling up living grass, etc., are prohibitive sins.' Now, according to the She Lun, 'Killing, stealing, adultery, etc., arising from greed, etc., are called nature sins; cutting living grass, etc., not arising from greed, etc., are called prohibitive sins.' This means that cutting living grass, etc., with a defiled mind is called a nature sin.
I think it is not so. The meaning of the She Lun is that if one intentionally kills, etc., it must be caused by greed, etc., so it is a nature sin. Therefore, cutting living grass is not necessarily caused by greed, etc., so it is a prohibitive sin. Moreover, cutting living grass, etc., belongs to which karma path among the ten karma paths? It can only be called a nature sin when a defiled mind arises. If it is said that greed, etc., are mental karma, then freely arising greed, etc., has what relation to cutting grass? Moreover, when killing, etc., for the sake of greed, etc., one should violate the karma paths of both body and mind. Furthermore, the Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經) says that the afflictions arising in the ten grounds are not defiled aspects, arising from knowledge, only for the benefit of sentient beings, not for fault. This arising of greed, etc., should become a nature sin; how can it be called undefiled? If even arising greed, etc., is not defiled...
污相不犯性罪。故不得言但貪等生即為性罪。
論。定學有四等。西明云。舊法師判。初之四地．五六七地．八九十地．金剛喻定．及佛四定。如次雖引古釋更無別判 今謂不然。何者若定有四。即別配地。戒．惠亦多。何不配地。故知隨分地地皆修。
論。一異生性障等。本釋異生性障。即隨依與現本識同地能生二障分別種上假立。斷能依故。說所依亦斷 要集云。無間道但斷二障。所依斷故。能依異生性亦隨斷 今謂異生性體非障所收。可言所依斷故能依亦斷。既異生性體亦是障。何不說斷。由此正與聖性相違故入初地。初正說斷故。此斷時種等亦斷。據增說故。又本疏云。十地論第一云凡夫我相障。此亦不然。障體通我法。非唯我故 西明．要集俱云。我相通攝二執。余處亦言法我等故 今謂。本釋以彼名濫故云不然。非不知我通攝二執。此意若以我言通二執故。但言我相障。應但云我相空。亦即攝二空。諸處何須別言我法。西明說異生性通依現種者不爾。此論第一及今此文。皆云依彼分別種立。雖下執著我法愚言即此障。不定現行。下二說故。無文明說通依現故 若爾何故言即此障 答異生性狹。言障即寬。雖舉異生性。意亦兼所依。且如愚品尚總名愚。況二執體俱是障故。故以初愚言即此障
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 污穢之相不構成自性罪。因此，不能說只要有貪慾等生起，就一定是自性罪。
論：禪定之學有四種層次。西明法師說，舊時的法師判別為：初地到四地、五地到七地、八地到十地、金剛喻定以及佛的四種禪定。雖然引用了古老的解釋，但沒有其他的判別。我認為不是這樣。為什麼呢？如果禪定有四種，就應該分別對應不同的地。戒律和智慧也有很多種，為什麼不對應不同的地呢？因此可知，每個地都隨分隨力地修習。
論：異生性障等。原本的解釋是，異生性障，是隨順所依和現行本識，在同一地上，能夠產生兩種障礙的分別種子上假立的。斷除了能依，所以說所依也斷除了。要集說，無間道只能斷除兩種障礙。因為所依斷除了，所以能依的異生性也隨之斷除。我認為異生性的本體不是障礙所包含的，可以說所依斷除了，能依也斷除了。既然異生性的本體也是障礙，為什麼不說斷除呢？因為這正好與聖性相反，所以進入初地。初地才正式說斷除。因此，斷除的時候，種子等也斷除了。這是根據增上的角度來說的。另外，本疏說，《十地論》第一卷說凡夫的我相是障礙。這也是不對的。障礙的本體包括我執和法執，不只是我執。西明和要集都說，我相普遍包含兩種執著。其他地方也說有法我等。我認為，原本的解釋是因為名稱容易混淆，所以說不對。並非不知道我相普遍包含兩種執著。這個意思是，如果用『我』這個詞普遍包含兩種執著，只說『我相障』，就應該只說『我相空』，也就能包含兩種空性。其他地方為什麼需要分別說我法呢？西明說異生性普遍依于現行和種子，是不對的。這部論的第一卷和現在的這段文字，都說依于那些分別種子而建立。雖然下文執著我法愚癡說就是這個障礙，但不一定是現行。下文兩種說法都這樣說。沒有明確的文字說普遍依于現行。如果這樣，為什麼說就是這個障礙呢？回答：異生性狹窄，說障礙就寬泛了。雖然舉了異生性，意思也兼顧了所依。比如愚癡品還總稱為愚癡，何況兩種執著的本體都是障礙。所以用最初的愚癡來說就是這個障礙。
【English Translation】 English version Impure appearances do not constitute inherent offenses. Therefore, it cannot be said that the mere arising of greed, etc., is an inherent offense.
Treatise: The study of meditation has four levels. Ximing said that old Dharma masters judged them as: the first to fourth grounds, the fifth to seventh grounds, the eighth to tenth grounds, the Vajra-like Samadhi, and the four Samadhis of the Buddha. Although ancient interpretations are cited, there are no other distinctions. I think this is not the case. Why? If there are four types of meditation, they should be specifically matched to different grounds. There are also many types of precepts and wisdom, why not match them to different grounds? Therefore, it can be known that each ground is cultivated according to one's capacity.
Treatise: The obstruction of the nature of ordinary beings, etc. The original explanation is that the obstruction of the nature of ordinary beings is hypothetically established on the seeds of discrimination that, in accordance with the dependent and manifest fundamental consciousness, can produce two obstructions on the same ground. Because the dependent is severed, it is said that the supported is also severed. The Yaoji says that the uninterrupted path only severs the two obstructions. Because the supported is severed, the dependent nature of ordinary beings is also severed accordingly. I think that the substance of the nature of ordinary beings is not included in the obstructions, so it can be said that because the supported is severed, the dependent is also severed. Since the substance of the nature of ordinary beings is also an obstruction, why not say it is severed? Because this is exactly the opposite of the holy nature, it enters the first ground. Only the first ground formally speaks of severance. Therefore, when it is severed, the seeds, etc., are also severed. This is according to the perspective of augmentation. Furthermore, the original commentary says that the first volume of the Ten Grounds Sutra says that the self-appearance of ordinary beings is an obstruction. This is also incorrect. The substance of the obstruction includes both attachment to self and attachment to phenomena, not just attachment to self. Both Ximing and Yaoji say that the self-appearance universally includes two attachments. Other places also say there are attachments to phenomena and self, etc. I think that the original explanation said it was incorrect because the name is easily confused. It is not that they do not know that the self-appearance universally includes two attachments. The meaning of this is that if the word 'self' universally includes two attachments, and only 'obstruction of self-appearance' is said, then only 'emptiness of self-appearance' should be said, which would also include two emptinesses. Why is it necessary to separately speak of self and phenomena in other places? Ximing's statement that the nature of ordinary beings universally relies on manifestation and seeds is incorrect. The first volume of this treatise and the current passage both say that it is established on those seeds of discrimination. Although the lower text says that attachment to self and phenomena is ignorance, which is this obstruction, it is not necessarily manifest. The two lower statements both say this. There is no clear text saying that it universally relies on manifestation. If so, why say it is this obstruction? Answer: The nature of ordinary beings is narrow, and saying obstruction is broad. Although the nature of ordinary beings is mentioned, the meaning also includes the supported. For example, the chapter on ignorance is still generally called ignorance, let alone the substance of the two attachments are both obstructions. Therefore, the initial ignorance is used to say that it is this obstruction.
又解執著我法愚。即是異生性。依彼我法種立而得彼名。非即說是現．種二執。故云應知愚品總說為愚。若云執著我法愚即是無明。與第二釋無別。下云利鈍障品俱起二愚。即唯說愚。若云即亦說執。執體是惠不是愚故。若云愚類亦說為愚。如何不許異生性體是愚等品亦名愚等。
又異生性。西明不定性人得聖已去。亦聖亦凡。又解唯聖 要集斷云。后解為勝 今謂前勝。同本疏故。于初地中獲聖性故。
諸經論中所說十障及二十二愚。名字少異義意多同。然要集云。十障與愚互相攝者應作四句。有障非愚。第四微細煩惱現行障。定法二愚不攝彼障 今謂不爾。下論解言。身見等言亦攝無始所知障攝定愛．法愛。準知此愚亦即是障。以等言攝。論明說故。
法觀已永斷伏我見及俱貪．嗔．癡等。唯有獨起貪．嗔．癡等。此前俱生諸伴已害名害伴隨眠 要集云。尋此中意。意識身見與所知障同體起故名為俱生。余貪等惑非同體故名不俱生。由俱生伴斷故。不俱生余等隨無。然四地斷同體身見。三地斷同體貪等 今謂不爾。有煩惱障不與所知障同生可如所說。無有煩惱離所知生。諸煩惱障必與所知同種而起。何獨身見與所知同有余不同。此三隨眠初二第六俱。七地已前斷故。微細隨眠即通第七。八地已
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 另一種解釋是，執著于『我』（ātman）和『法』（dharma）的愚癡，就是異生性（pṛthag-jana-tā，凡夫的性質）。這種異生性是依據『我』和『法』的種子而建立，並因此得名。但這並非直接指現行和種子這兩種執著。所以說，應該知道『愚品』（mūrkha-prakṛti）總括地稱為『愚』。如果說執著于『我』和『法』的愚癡就是無明（avidyā），那麼就和第二種解釋沒有區別了。下文說『利鈍障品』（tīkṣṇa-mṛdu-āvaraṇa-prakṛti）同時生起兩種愚癡，就只是說『愚』。如果說這也包括執著，那麼執著的本體是智慧（慧，prājñā），而不是愚癡。如果說愚癡的類別也可以稱為愚癡，那麼為什麼不允許異生性的本體，也就是愚等品，也稱為愚等呢？
此外，關於異生性，西明寺的觀點認為，不定性的人證得聖果后，既是聖人也是凡人。另一種解釋是隻有聖人才能斷除異生性。《要集》中斷言后一種解釋更為殊勝。但我認為前一種解釋更為殊勝，因為它與《本疏》的觀點相同，即在初地（prathamā bhūmi）中獲得聖性。
諸經論中所說的十障（daśa āvaraṇāni）和二十二愚（dvāviṃśati mohāḥ），名字略有不同，但意義和意圖大多相同。然而，《要集》中說，十障和愚互相包含的情況應該分為四句：有障不是愚，例如第四種微細煩惱現行障（sūkṣma-kleśa-prādurbhāva-āvaraṇa），定法二愚（sthita-dharma-dvaya-moha）不包含這種障礙。我認為並非如此。下文論述解釋說，身見（satkāya-dṛṣṭi）等也包含無始所知障（anādi-jñeyāvaraṇa），包含定愛（sthita-sneha）和法愛（dharma-sneha）。由此可知，這種愚癡也就是障礙，因為『等』字包含了這些。論中明確說明了這一點。
法觀已經永遠斷除和降伏了我見（ātma-dṛṣṭi）以及俱生（sahaja）的貪（rāga）、嗔（dveṣa）、癡（moha）等。現在只有獨起（ekaja）的貪、嗔、癡等。此前俱生的各種伴隨煩惱已經被消滅，稱為『害伴隨眠』（hata-sahacari-anuśaya）。《要集》中說，探究其中的含義，意識（manovijñāna）的身見與所知障同體生起，因此稱為俱生。其餘的貪等煩惱並非同體生起，因此稱為不俱生。由於俱生的伴隨煩惱已經斷除，因此不俱生的其餘煩惱等也就不存在了。然而，四地斷除同體的身見，三地斷除同體的貪等。我認為並非如此。有煩惱障（kleśāvaraṇa）不與所知障同生，可以如你所說。但沒有煩惱障離開所知障而生起的情況。各種煩惱障必定與所知障同一種子而生起。為什麼只有身見與所知障相同，而其餘的不同呢？這三種隨眠（anuśaya）中，最初兩種在第六地（ṣaṣṭhā bhūmi）同時斷除，七地（saptamī bhūmi）之前已經斷除。微細的隨眠則貫通第七地（saptamī bhūmi）。八地（aṣṭamī bhūmi）已...
【English Translation】 English version Another explanation is that the ignorance of clinging to 'self' (ātman) and 'dharma' is the nature of an ordinary being (pṛthag-jana-tā). This nature of an ordinary being is established based on the seeds of 'self' and 'dharma', and thus it gets its name. However, this does not directly refer to the two kinds of clinging, manifest and latent. Therefore, it is said that the 'category of ignorance' (mūrkha-prakṛti) is generally called 'ignorance'. If it is said that the ignorance of clinging to 'self' and 'dharma' is ignorance (avidyā), then there is no difference from the second explanation. The following text says that 'the category of sharp and dull obstructions' (tīkṣṇa-mṛdu-āvaraṇa-prakṛti) simultaneously arises with two kinds of ignorance, which only refers to 'ignorance'. If it is said that it also includes clinging, then the essence of clinging is wisdom (prājñā), not ignorance. If it is said that the category of ignorance can also be called ignorance, then why is it not allowed that the essence of the nature of an ordinary being, which is the category of ignorance, etc., is also called ignorance, etc.?
Furthermore, regarding the nature of an ordinary being, the view of Ximing Temple is that a person of uncertain nature, after attaining sainthood, is both a saint and an ordinary person. Another explanation is that only a saint can eliminate the nature of an ordinary being. The 'Essentials Collection' (Yaoji) asserts that the latter explanation is superior. However, I believe the former explanation is superior because it is consistent with the view of the 'Original Commentary' (Ben Shu), that is, one obtains the nature of a saint in the first ground (prathamā bhūmi).
The ten obstructions (daśa āvaraṇāni) and twenty-two ignorances (dvāviṃśati mohāḥ) mentioned in various sutras and treatises have slightly different names, but their meanings and intentions are mostly the same. However, the 'Essentials Collection' says that the mutual inclusion of the ten obstructions and ignorance should be divided into four sentences: there are obstructions that are not ignorance, such as the fourth subtle affliction of manifest obstruction (sūkṣma-kleśa-prādurbhāva-āvaraṇa), and the two ignorances of fixed dharma (sthita-dharma-dvaya-moha) do not include this obstruction. I think this is not the case. The following discussion explains that the view of self (satkāya-dṛṣṭi), etc., also includes beginningless cognitive obstruction (anādi-jñeyāvaraṇa), including fixed love (sthita-sneha) and dharma love (dharma-sneha). From this, it can be known that this ignorance is also an obstruction, because the word 'etc.' includes these. The treatise clearly states this.
Dharma contemplation has forever eliminated and subdued the view of self (ātma-dṛṣṭi) and the co-arisen (sahaja) greed (rāga), hatred (dveṣa), delusion (moha), etc. Now there are only singularly arisen (ekaja) greed, hatred, delusion, etc. The various accompanying afflictions that were previously co-arisen have been eliminated, called 'destroyed companion latent tendencies' (hata-sahacari-anuśaya). The 'Essentials Collection' says, exploring the meaning of this, the view of self of consciousness (manovijñāna) arises with the cognitive obstruction in the same entity, so it is called co-arisen. The remaining afflictions such as greed do not arise in the same entity, so they are called non-co-arisen. Because the co-arisen accompanying afflictions have been eliminated, the remaining non-co-arisen afflictions, etc., also do not exist. However, the fourth ground eliminates the view of self in the same entity, and the third ground eliminates greed, etc., in the same entity. I think this is not the case. If there are afflictive obstructions (kleśāvaraṇa) that do not arise with cognitive obstructions, it can be as you said. But there is no situation where afflictive obstructions arise apart from cognitive obstructions. Various afflictive obstructions must arise from the same seed as cognitive obstructions. Why is it that only the view of self is the same as cognitive obstruction, while the rest are different? Among these three latent tendencies (anuśaya), the first two are simultaneously eliminated in the sixth ground (ṣaṣṭhā bhūmi), and have been eliminated before the seventh ground (saptamī bhūmi). Subtle latent tendencies pervade the seventh ground (saptamī bhūmi). The eighth ground (aṣṭamī bhūmi) already...
上猶現行故。不說斷故。然說第六我見所引近遠分二者。說第六俱。非第七俱。七俱不由第六引故 問菩薩故意未斷煩惱但斷所知。斷所知時煩惱應壞。何以故。勝鬘經云。若無明大地壞。彼一切隨眠壞故 答據見．修惑各究竟說。於十地中修未究竟。雖分斷所知。有餘依故。
論令彼聞思修法忘失等聞．思在散思惠唯欲。云何欲貪得定已后發勝三惠 答由得此定令欲界中所有聞思得增明故。此定不起三惠非勝 問于初地中得證不退。云何于所聞思修法忘失 答有二解。一云以地前有二。謂得及證。聞思為得。修惠為證。地前二種俱退。地上無漏定為證。有漏者為得。今言忘失者。據有漏得退。無漏證者不退。一云地前于自他分法得已俱退。初地已上于自地法不退。於他地法修得有退。云初地已上證不退者據自地說 問貪等煩惱七地已前猶故意起。云何此地斷欲貪等 答故意起者約別相 有愚非障。惡趣雜染．定法二愛。亦謂不爾。定．法二愛如前所明亦是障故。
論。由斯初地說斷二愚等。問何故障中但言異生性。不攝第二愚。第二地中斷邪行障。即並攝第二 答彼邪行障以豎論故。通果即寬橫。論即狹。不遍煩惱。異生性障橫論故寬。遍二障故。豎言即狹。不攝第二愚。據橫．豎別故不相違 又解邪
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 上文所說的『現行』是確實存在的，因為沒有說它被斷除。然而，所說的第六意識的『我見』，可以根據距離的遠近分為兩種情況。第六意識包含這兩種情況，而第七意識則不包含，因為第七意識的生起不由第六意識引導。
問：菩薩故意不斷除煩惱，只是斷除所知障（Jnana-avarana）。當斷除所知障時，煩惱應該也隨之壞滅。為什麼呢？因為《勝鬘經》（Srimala Sutra）中說：『如果無明（Avidya）的大地壞滅，那麼一切隨眠（anusaya）也會隨之壞滅。』
答：這是根據見惑（dṛṣṭi-heya）和修惑（bhāvanā-heya）各自究竟的情況來說的。在十地（Bhumi）中，修行尚未究竟，雖然分斷了所知障，但還有殘餘的依處（有餘依）。 論：使他們忘失聽聞、思考和修習佛法等。聽聞和思考是在散亂的思考中，智慧只是對慾望的追求。那麼，如何才能在獲得禪定之後，生起殊勝的三種智慧（三慧）呢？
答：由於獲得這種禪定，使得欲界（Kama-dhatu）中所有的聽聞和思考都得到增強和明晰。如果沒有這種禪定，三種智慧就不會殊勝。
問：在初地（Prathama-bhumi）中，已經證得了不退轉（avaivartika）。為什麼還會忘失所聽聞、思考和修習的佛法呢？
答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，在初地之前有兩種情況，即『得』和『證』。聽聞和思考是『得』，修習智慧是『證』。在初地之前，這兩種情況都會退失。地上（Bhumi）的無漏定（anasrava-samadhi）是『證』，有漏定（sasrava-samadhi）是『得』。現在所說的『忘失』，是指有漏的『得』退失，而無漏的『證』不會退失。另一種說法是，在初地之前，對於自己和他人的法，『得』到之後都會退失。初地以上，對於自己地的法不會退退失，但對於其他地的法，修習『得』到后可能會退失。所說的初地以上證得不退轉，是指自己地的法而言。
問：貪等煩惱在七地（Saptama-bhumi）之前仍然是故意生起的，為什麼說此地斷除了欲貪等煩惱呢？
答：故意生起是指個別的情況。
有愚癡不是障礙，惡趣（durgati）的雜染（samklesha）、定愛（dhyana-prema）和法愛（dharma-prema）也是這樣認為的。定愛和法愛如前所述，也是障礙。 論：因此，初地說斷除了兩種愚癡等。問：為什麼在障礙中只說了異生性（prthag-janatva），而不包括第二種愚癡？第二地中斷除了邪行障（mithyacara-avarana），就包含了第二種愚癡。
答：邪行障是從豎向的角度來說的，通向果位的範圍寬廣，橫向的角度來說範圍狹窄，不能遍及所有煩惱。異生性障是從橫向的角度來說的，範圍寬廣，遍及兩種障礙。豎向的角度來說範圍狹窄，不包括第二種愚癡。根據橫向和豎向的區別，所以不矛盾。
又一種解釋是，邪行
【English Translation】 English version: The aforementioned 'manifestation' (現行, xiànxíng) is indeed existent, as it is not said to be severed. However, the 'self-view' (我見, wǒjiàn) of the sixth consciousness (第六意識, dìliù yìshì) can be divided into two categories based on the proximity or distance. The sixth consciousness encompasses both categories, while the seventh consciousness (第七意識, dìqī yìshì) does not, because the arising of the seventh consciousness is not guided by the sixth.
Question: Bodhisattvas intentionally do not sever afflictions (煩惱, fánnǎo), but only sever the cognitive obscurations (所知障, Jnana-avarana). When cognitive obscurations are severed, afflictions should also be destroyed. Why is this so? Because the Srimala Sutra (勝鬘經, Shèngmán Jīng) states: 'If the ground of ignorance (無明, Avidya) is destroyed, then all latent tendencies (隨眠, anusaya) will also be destroyed.'
Answer: This is spoken according to the ultimate state of both the afflictions to be abandoned by seeing (見惑, dṛṣṭi-heya) and the afflictions to be abandoned by cultivation (修惑, bhāvanā-heya). Within the Ten Bhumis (十地, Bhumi), cultivation is not yet complete. Although cognitive obscurations are severed partially, there is still a remaining basis (有餘依). Treatise: Causing them to forget hearing, thinking, and cultivating the Dharma, etc. Hearing and thinking are in distracted thought, and wisdom is merely the pursuit of desire. So, how can the three superior wisdoms (三慧) arise after obtaining samadhi (禪定)?
Answer: Because obtaining this samadhi causes all hearing and thinking in the desire realm (欲界, Kama-dhatu) to be enhanced and clarified. Without this samadhi, the three wisdoms would not be superior.
Question: In the first Bhumi (初地, Prathama-bhumi), one has already attained non-retrogression (不退轉, avaivartika). Why would one still forget the Dharma that has been heard, thought about, and cultivated?
Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that before the first Bhumi, there are two states: 'attainment' and 'realization'. Hearing and thinking are 'attainment', and cultivating wisdom is 'realization'. Before the first Bhumi, both of these states can be lost. The uncontaminated samadhi (無漏定, anasrava-samadhi) on the Bhumis is 'realization', and the contaminated samadhi (有漏定, sasrava-samadhi) is 'attainment'. The 'forgetting' mentioned now refers to the loss of contaminated 'attainment', while uncontaminated 'realization' is not lost. Another explanation is that before the first Bhumi, both one's own Dharma and the Dharma of others are lost after 'attainment'. Above the first Bhumi, one does not regress from the Dharma of one's own Bhumi, but one may regress from the Dharma of other Bhumis after cultivating and 'attaining' it. The statement that one attains non-retrogression above the first Bhumi refers to the Dharma of one's own Bhumi.
Question: Afflictions such as greed still intentionally arise before the seventh Bhumi (七地, Saptama-bhumi). Why is it said that desire-greed, etc., are severed in this Bhumi?
Answer: 'Intentionally arising' refers to individual cases.
Ignorance is not an obstacle, and neither are the defilements (雜染, samklesha) of the evil destinies (惡趣, durgati), attachment to dhyana (定愛, dhyana-prema), and attachment to Dharma (法愛, dharma-prema). Attachment to dhyana and attachment to Dharma, as mentioned earlier, are also obstacles. Treatise: Therefore, the first Bhumi is said to sever the two types of ignorance, etc. Question: Why does the obstacle only mention the nature of an ordinary being (異生性, prthag-janatva) and not include the second type of ignorance? Severing the obstacle of wrong conduct (邪行障, mithyacara-avarana) in the second Bhumi includes the second type of ignorance.
Answer: The obstacle of wrong conduct is spoken from a vertical perspective. The scope of reaching the fruit is broad, while the horizontal perspective is narrow and does not encompass all afflictions. The obstacle of the nature of an ordinary being is spoken from a horizontal perspective, which is broad and encompasses both obstacles. The vertical perspective is narrow and does not include the second type of ignorance. There is no contradiction because of the difference between the horizontal and vertical perspectives.
Another explanation is that wrong conduct
行障寬故攝二愚。異生性狹不攝第二。何緣如是。障聖性增唯異生性。障勝戒故起業亦是。又依第二解利鈍品愚異生性障亦攝二愚。
又論云雖見道生等。本疏云。能起煩惱亦攝所知 要集云。煩惱言不攝所知。望業果勢疏遠故 今謂不爾。通二障故。準下所知亦煩惱言攝故。
論。如入二定說斷苦根。問初定無苦習氣應除。何故二定方始說斷 答以初靜慮猶有三識。是苦所依。第二定無。是故說斷 問憂．喜．樂受依于意根。云何初定憂言出離 答五識自無治道。識無粗重方除。意地自有斷道。憂在初定即滅。離喜．樂等準此應知。
論。此粗彼細斷有前後者。本疏云。如何害伴。如斷障章已廣解訖。彼處言。害伴隨眠在五地斷。解深密經及瑜伽論七十八云。一者害伴。謂前五地。諸不俱生現行煩惱。是俱生煩惱現行助伴。彼于爾時永不復有。此言俱生者。非對分別任運起名為俱生。意言第六識中與身見俱起貪．嗔．癡名為俱生。獨起貪等不與我見俱故名不俱生。此不俱生由我見俱等勢力所引。是彼前伴。彼亦此伴。由四地中作菩提分說障勝者。於此中斷所依所知能依不起 問此欲貪等既障勝定。為總斷伏為不爾耶 答不爾。以緣境生。偏障能發勝三惠定者。此中斷之。非余皆斷 問前障三惠同
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本
行障（karmavarana，業障）寬廣，所以包含兩種愚癡（二愚）。異生性（prthag-jana-prakrti，凡夫性）狹隘，不包含第二種愚癡。為什麼會這樣呢？因為障礙聖性的增長只有異生性，障礙殊勝戒律的緣故，所以（由此）產生的業也是（障礙）。另外，依據第二種解釋，利根和鈍根品中，愚癡的異生性也包含兩種愚癡。
另外，《瑜伽師地論》說，即使是見道位所生等等。《瑜伽師地論》的根本疏（本疏）說，能夠生起煩惱的也包含所知障。《瑜伽師地論要集》（要集）說，煩惱一詞不包含所知障，因為從業果的角度來看，它比較疏遠。我認為不是這樣，因為它貫通兩種障礙。按照下面的說法，所知障也包含在煩惱一詞中。
《瑜伽師地論》說，就像進入二禪時說斷除苦根。問：初禪沒有苦的習氣應該斷除，為什麼在二禪才開始說斷除？答：因為初禪還有三種識，是苦的所依。二禪沒有，所以說斷除。問：憂、喜、樂受依于意根，為什麼初禪中說憂已出離？答：五識本身沒有對治之道，只有當識沒有粗重時才能斷除。意地本身有斷除之道，憂在初禪中就已滅除。出離喜、樂等，可以依此類推。
《瑜伽師地論》說，這是粗的，那是細的，斷除有先後順序。《瑜伽師地論》的根本疏（本疏）說，如何損害伴侶？就像在斷障章中已經廣泛解釋過。那裡說，損害伴侶的隨眠在五地斷除。《解深密經》和《瑜伽師地論》第七十八卷說，一是損害伴侶，指前五地中，那些不俱生（asahaja，非與生俱來）的現行煩惱，是俱生（sahaja，與生俱來）煩惱現行的助伴。它們在那個時候永遠不再存在。這裡說的俱生，不是相對於分別任運而起的名為俱生，意思是第六識中與身見一起生起的貪、嗔、癡名為俱生。單獨生起的貪等，不與我見一起，所以名不俱生。這些不俱生由我見等勢力所引導，是它們的前伴，它們也是這些的前伴。由於在四地中作菩提分說障礙殊勝者，在此中斷除所依的所知，能依不起。問：這些欲貪等既然障礙殊勝禪定，是全部斷除還是降伏，還是不這樣？答：不是這樣，因為緣境而生，偏重障礙能引發殊勝三慧定（sri-jnana-samadhi，殊勝智慧三摩地）的，在此中斷除它，不是其餘的都斷除。問：前面障礙三慧相同
【English Translation】 English version
Because karmavarana (karmavarana, obstacle of karma) is broad, it includes the two kinds of ignorance (dvi-avidya, two ignorances). The nature of a common being (prthag-jana-prakrti, nature of ordinary beings) is narrow, so it does not include the second kind. Why is it like this? Because only the nature of a common being obstructs the increase of the holy nature, and because it obstructs the superior precepts, the karma arising (from this) is also (an obstruction). Furthermore, according to the second explanation, in the chapter on sharp and dull faculties, the ignorance of the nature of a common being also includes the two kinds of ignorance.
Furthermore, the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that even those born in the Path of Seeing, etc. The root commentary (本疏, ben shu) of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that what can give rise to afflictions also includes the obstacle of knowledge. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra-sangraha (要集, yao ji) says that the term 'affliction' does not include the obstacle of knowledge, because it is distant in terms of the force of karmic results. I say that it is not so, because it pervades the two obstacles. According to what follows, the obstacle of knowledge is also included in the term 'affliction'.
The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that just as when entering the second dhyana (second concentration), it is said that the root of suffering is cut off. Question: The first dhyana should eliminate the latent tendencies of suffering, so why is it only said to be cut off in the second dhyana? Answer: Because the first dhyana still has the three consciousnesses, which are the basis of suffering. The second dhyana does not, so it is said to be cut off. Question: The feelings of sorrow, joy, and pleasure depend on the mind-basis (manas), so why is it said that sorrow is abandoned in the first dhyana? Answer: The five consciousnesses themselves do not have a means of treatment. Only when the consciousnesses are free from coarseness can they be eliminated. The mind-basis itself has a means of cutting off, so sorrow is extinguished in the first dhyana. The abandonment of joy, pleasure, etc., should be understood in the same way.
The Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that this is coarse, that is subtle, and the cutting off has an order. The root commentary (本疏, ben shu) of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says, how to harm companions? It has already been extensively explained in the chapter on cutting off obstacles. It says there that the latent tendencies of harming companions are cut off in the five grounds. The Samdhinirmocana Sutra and the seventy-eighth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra say that one is harming companions, referring to the non-co-arisen (asahaja, not born together) manifest afflictions in the first five grounds, which are the assistants of the manifest co-arisen (sahaja, born together) afflictions. They will never exist again at that time. The co-arisen mentioned here does not refer to what arises spontaneously in contrast to discrimination, but means that greed, hatred, and delusion arising together with the view of self in the sixth consciousness are called co-arisen. Greed, etc., arising alone, not together with the view of self, are called non-co-arisen. These non-co-arisen are led by the power of the view of self, etc., and are their former companions, and they are also the former companions of these. Because it is said in the four grounds that those who make the limbs of enlightenment obstruct the superior, the knowledge that is relied upon is cut off here, and the ability to rely upon does not arise. Question: Since these desires, etc., obstruct superior samadhi (sri-jnana-samadhi, superior wisdom samadhi), are they completely cut off or subdued, or not? Answer: It is not so, because they arise from objects, and those that particularly obstruct the ability to generate superior three wisdom samadhi (sri-jnana-samadhi, superior wisdom samadhi) are cut off here, not all the others. Question: The previous obstacles to the three wisdoms are the same
說闇鈍。云何斷障修與余別 答據實同障。約勝劣殊各據勝說 又解雖名同闇鈍。一障勝定及勝修惠。二障總持及聞思惠。斷雖同時據行相別故別說斷 問修惠是勝聞思劣。云何先勝后陳劣 答障修惠者與定同故。由得定已發勝總持及俱聞思。雖俱時斷約因果分。
論。第六識俱身見等攝等。問何故此障菩提分法。何不前除四地方斷 答菩提分法修念住等。由執我故障彼念住觀法無我等。故說為障。
初二三地相同世間修施．戒．修。四五六地相同二乘故四地作 問既非大乘正修學。何故須作 答三乘通修。非不為正 問修有何別 答若二乘修斷煩惱障。大乘所修即斷二障。又如二乘觀不凈等不為壞緣。大乘壞緣如觀身不凈．非不凈。非一向不凈。即觀不凈除煩惱。觀非不凈除所知。又聲聞等觀安立諦菩薩觀非安立 問說所餘障與愚名同。此障何故非愚名同 答障據根本。愚約能發定．法二愛。又障據總愚約別障 問所知障中豈可無愛。言所知攝二愚斷故。煩惱二愛亦永不行 答斷所知中實亦有愛。無明增故但說為愚。煩惱障中亦伏無明。由愛增故偏言煩惱二愛不行 問諸經論說二障三住斷。如何四地伏我見等 答彼約皮．肉．實等三說。非望別別所障地者 問何故此地除定．法愛 觀受是苦除定愛。觀
法無我故除法愛 問何故不于初．二．三地斷害伴乃至微細等 答若不斷身見害伴不斷。及不斷羸劣微細不斷。故於五．七．八等斷別 問何故要斷我見等已。害伴等方斷 答準常可知。
問四無礙解。何故前三同為一障。第四獨為一障 答前三無礙雖體有三。緣境各一無多行解。第四體一解行分多。謂即七辨 又云。前三是因。第四是果。故三一障而有差別。
問前言十障。今何十一 答前約障因十地故十。此兼障果故有十一 問此佛地障用何智斷 西明云。平等．妙觀依金剛定共斷此障。所證同故。此通根本及后得智。而差別者根本雙斷迷理迷事。后得斷事 今謂不爾。若許平等亦正能斷。應自能生。既觀察引。正唯觀察。不爾十障皆二智除。何但佛地。又斷前後后得斷事。一剎那除根本足能。如何后得別斷迷事。談能可爾。正斷即非 問金剛喻定何地所攝 要集云。有云兩解。一云第十滿心。若爾前前地地皆對治後後地障。答教說出十地即成佛故。故前位斷不同因位。一云出第十地滿心已後方是等覺。仁王．本業皆過十地說等覺故。后經時劫方入妙覺。要集云。后釋為勝 今謂不爾。如四善根諸處皆言初無數積智．福滿已方起善根。豈非初劫滿心所攝。此雖離第十地別云等覺。亦第三攝。即屬滿心
非滿心外。若許出十地外更經多時後方入佛。應出初地等亦經多時方入后地 問若第十外不經多時。何故本業經說金剛喻定許經多時。又彼經云。佛子摩尼寶瓔珞菩薩字者。等覺中一人。其名金剛惠菩薩。乃至住壽百劫修千三昧等 答今者通云。仁王般若初地已上名聖種性。第十地出最後滿心名為等覺。以入．住．出各經多劫故。瓔珞本業據出心滿斷自地障盡。修其加行斷第十一佛地障故。多時修習及正斷時。皆名等覺。所修之定皆名金剛。以能斷其在實粗重最後障故。非出十地滿心已后。別有等覺經多劫住。故瑜伽四十八云。于最上成滿菩薩住中。當知一切煩惱習氣隨眠障礙。皆悉永斷入如來住。此中既說法雲菩薩為成滿住。皆悉永斷入如來住。明非在外更別多時。若許多時應別立住。既不別立。明在第十滿心所攝 又此論第十云。此十一障二障所攝。乃至云。所知障中見所斷種。于極喜地見道初斷。修所斷種於十地中漸次斷滅。金剛喻定現在前時方永斷盡。既言於十地中。明非出十地滿心已后 若爾何故別說等覺多時修等 答以於此地斷第十地自障盡已。方欲斷彼第十一障。故須加行種種修學。得經多時故別立名 問諸十地障各入初斷。何故佛地障在第十地斷 答十地各分入．住．出位勝劣不同。故入地斷。佛位
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 並非在十地滿心之外。如果允許超出十地之外，還要經過很長時間才能成佛，那麼應該從初地等開始，也要經過很長時間才能進入后地。 問：如果第十地之外不經過很長時間，為什麼《本業經》說金剛喻定允許經過很長時間？而且那部經中說，『佛子摩尼寶瓔珞菩薩』，名為金剛惠菩薩，是等覺中的一人，乃至住世百劫修習千種三昧等。 答：現在統一來說，《仁王般若經》中，初地以上稱為聖種性。第十地超出最後滿心，稱為等覺。因為進入、安住、超出都需要經過多個劫數。而《瓔珞本業經》是根據超出滿心，斷儘自地障礙來說的，修習加行是爲了斷除第十一佛地障。所以長時間的修習以及真正斷除的時候，都稱為等覺。所修習的禪定都稱為金剛，因為它能夠斷除最堅實粗重的最後障礙。並非超出十地滿心之後，另外有等覺經過多個劫數安住。所以《瑜伽師地論》第四十八卷說：『在最上圓滿菩薩住中，應當知道一切煩惱習氣隨眠障礙，都完全斷除，進入如來住。』這裡既然說法雲地的菩薩爲了成就圓滿住，都完全斷除進入如來住，說明並非在十地之外另外經過很長時間。如果允許經過很長時間，就應該另外設立一個住位。既然不另外設立，說明包含在第十地滿心中。 又這部論的第十卷說：『這十一種障礙被兩種障礙所包含。』乃至說：『所知障中見所斷的種子，在極喜地見道時初次斷除，修所斷的種子在十地中逐漸斷滅，金剛喻定現在前時才永遠斷盡。』既然說在十地中，說明並非超出十地滿心之後。 如果這樣，為什麼另外說等覺要經過很長時間的修習等？ 答：因為在此地斷盡第十地自身障礙之後，才想要斷除第十一障礙，所以需要加行種種修學，才需要經過很長時間，所以另外立名。 問：各個十地的障礙都在進入時開始斷除，為什麼佛地障在第十地斷除？ 答：十地各自的進入、安住、超出階段，殊勝程度不同，所以進入時斷除佛位。
【English Translation】 English version Not outside the full mind of the Tenth Ground. If it were allowed that one could only enter Buddhahood after a long time beyond the Tenth Ground, then one should also enter subsequent grounds only after a long time from the initial ground. Question: If it doesn't take a long time outside the Tenth Ground, why does the Brahma-net Sutra say that the Vajra-like Samadhi allows for a long time? Moreover, that sutra says, 'The Buddha-son Mani Jewel Necklace Bodhisattva', named Vajra Wisdom Bodhisattva, is one of those in Equal Enlightenment, even dwelling for a hundred kalpas, cultivating a thousand samadhis, etc. Answer: Now, generally speaking, the Benevolent Kings Sutra says that those above the First Ground are called holy lineage. The Tenth Ground, exceeding the final full mind, is called Equal Enlightenment. Because entering, dwelling, and exceeding each require multiple kalpas. The Garland of Vows Sutra is based on exceeding the full mind, completely cutting off the obstacles of one's own ground, cultivating the practice to cut off the eleventh Buddha-ground obstacle. Therefore, long-term practice and the time of actual cutting off are both called Equal Enlightenment. The samadhis cultivated are all called Vajra, because they can cut off the most solid and heavy final obstacle. It is not that after exceeding the full mind of the Tenth Ground, there is a separate Equal Enlightenment dwelling for multiple kalpas. Therefore, Yogacarabhumi-sastra 48 says, 'In the most supreme and complete Bodhisattva dwelling, one should know that all afflictive habit-energies, latent hindrances, are completely and permanently cut off, entering the Tathagata dwelling.' Since this speaks of the Cloud of Dharma Bodhisattva completely cutting off and entering the Tathagata dwelling to achieve complete dwelling, it shows that it is not outside the Tenth Ground, requiring a separate long time. If it were allowed to take a long time, a separate dwelling should be established. Since it is not established separately, it shows that it is included in the full mind of the Tenth Ground. Moreover, the tenth volume of this treatise says, 'These eleven obstacles are encompassed by two obstacles.' And it says, 'Among the obstacles to knowledge, the seeds of what is to be cut off by seeing are initially cut off at the path of seeing in the Ground of Utmost Joy; the seeds of what is to be cut off by cultivation are gradually extinguished in the ten grounds; they are completely and permanently cut off only when the Vajra-like Samadhi manifests.' Since it says in the ten grounds, it shows that it is not after exceeding the full mind of the Tenth Ground. If so, why separately speak of Equal Enlightenment requiring a long time of cultivation, etc.? Answer: Because after completely cutting off the obstacles of the Tenth Ground in this ground, one then desires to cut off the eleventh obstacle, so one needs to practice various cultivations, which takes a long time, so a separate name is established. Question: The obstacles of each of the ten grounds are initially cut off upon entering, why is the Buddha-ground obstacle cut off in the Tenth Ground? Answer: The stages of entering, dwelling, and exceeding of each of the ten grounds have different degrees of superiority and inferiority, so it is cut off upon entering the Buddha position.
不然。故十地斷。若許佛地同十地者。即佛有勝劣。既無勝劣稱正等覺。故皆斷已方入佛地。作斯通會不違經論。◎
成唯識論了義燈卷第七(本終)
成唯識論了義燈卷第七(末)(論第十)
◎論。此十一障等。本疏言體性寬狹更無別異者。非唯十一障。以十種障各舉初斷。影顯住．出所斷障故。疏云十地所斷雖但所知。俱品不行即通二障。非唯十一初所斷者。論意如是。本明斷障得果。唯斷十一非但斷不成。亦不能得果。故下論文總分別斷。非為不知十一不攝住．出斷者。
論。煩斷障中等。本釋言極喜住。簡彼二乘。初見初斷。簡相見道。就真見道但取無間故說初斷。西明並取無間．解脫二心同斷。簡后三心．十六心等 要集云。有釋為勝 今謂不爾。前第九云無間．解脫斷惑證滅期心別故。不說同斷。若定同斷。如何得言期心別故。又要二道方能斷惑即違下文。菩薩利根剎那剎那能斷證故。以二共斷非剎那故。又雜集第九云。斷對治者。謂加行及無間道。持對治者。謂解脫道。不說為斷但云持得 問煩惱障品於十地中故意方起。云何二地猶有誤犯三業愚耶 答故起煩惱。誤者所知。亦不相違 問故起煩惱必依所知。無有煩惱離所知起 答彼誤犯愚但約別起所知障說。非煩惱俱。
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：不是這樣的。因此，十地（Dasa-bhumi）的障礙是斷除的。如果允許佛地（Buddha-bhumi）與十地相同，那麼佛就會有勝劣之分。既然沒有勝劣之分，才能稱為正等覺（Samyak-sambuddha）。所以，都是斷除之後才進入佛地。這樣理解才不違背經論。
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第七（本終）
《成唯識論了義燈》卷第七（末）（論第十）
論：這十一種障礙等等。《本疏》說體性寬狹沒有差別，不僅僅是十一種障礙，因為十種障礙各自舉出初斷，暗示了住地（Vasa-bhumi）、出地（Nirvana-bhumi）所斷的障礙。疏中說十地所斷雖然只是所知障（Jnana-avarana），但俱品不行就通於二障（煩惱障和所知障）。不僅僅是十一種初斷的障礙，論的本意是這樣。本論闡明斷障得果，只斷除十一種障礙，不僅僅是斷除不了，也不能得到果。所以下面的論文總的分別斷除，不是因為不知道十一種障礙不包括住地、出地所斷的障礙。
論：煩惱斷障中等等。《本釋》說極喜住（Pramudita-vasa），是爲了區別於二乘（Sravaka和Pratyekabuddha）。初見初斷，是爲了區別于相見道（Darsana-marga）。就真見道（Satya-darsana-marga）而言，只取無間道（Anantarya-marga），所以說是初斷。西明（寺廟名）認為無間道和解脫道（Vimukti-marga）二心同時斷除，是爲了區別於後三心、十六心等等。《要集》中說，有人解釋為殊勝，我認為不是這樣。前面第九卷說，無間道和解脫道斷惑證滅的期心不同，所以不說同時斷除。如果一定認為同時斷除，怎麼能說期心不同呢？而且要二道才能斷惑，就違背了下文。菩薩（Bodhisattva）利根，剎那剎那就能斷除和證得，因為二道共同斷除不是剎那。而且《雜集》第九卷說，斷對治者，是指加行道（Prayoga-marga）和無間道。持對治者，是指解脫道。不說為斷，只說是持得。問：煩惱障品在十地中故意才生起，為什麼二地還有誤犯三業的愚癡呢？答：故意生起的是煩惱，誤犯的是所知。也不相違。問：故意生起煩惱必定依靠所知，沒有煩惱離開所知而生起。答：他們誤犯的愚癡只是就別起所知障來說的，不是煩惱同時生起。
【English Translation】 English version: It is not so. Therefore, the obstructions of the Ten Grounds (Dasa-bhumi) are severed. If it is allowed that the Buddha-ground (Buddha-bhumi) is the same as the Ten Grounds, then the Buddhas would have superiority and inferiority. Since there is no superiority or inferiority, it is called Perfect Enlightenment (Samyak-sambuddha). Therefore, one enters the Buddha-ground only after all obstructions are severed. This understanding does not contradict the sutras and treatises.
Commentary on the Consciousness-Only Treatise: Lamp of Definitive Meaning, Volume 7 (End of the Volume)
Commentary on the Consciousness-Only Treatise: Lamp of Definitive Meaning, Volume 7 (End) (Treatise 10)
Treatise: These eleven obstructions, etc. The original commentary says that there is no difference in the breadth of their nature. It is not only the eleven obstructions, because each of the ten obstructions mentions the initial severance, implying the obstructions severed in the Abiding Ground (Vasa-bhumi) and the Emerging Ground (Nirvana-bhumi). The commentary says that although what is severed in the Ten Grounds is only the Obstruction of Knowledge (Jnana-avarana), the co-arising factors extend to the two obstructions (afflictive and knowledge obstructions). It is not only the initial severance of the eleven obstructions; this is the intention of the treatise. The treatise clarifies that severing obstructions leads to attaining the result. Severing only the eleven obstructions not only fails to sever completely but also cannot attain the result. Therefore, the following treatise generally distinguishes the severance, not because it is unaware that the eleven obstructions do not include the obstructions severed in the Abiding and Emerging Grounds.
Treatise: Among the severance of afflictive obstructions, etc. The original explanation says 'Joyful Abiding' (Pramudita-vasa) to distinguish it from the Two Vehicles (Sravaka and Pratyekabuddha). 'Initial seeing and initial severance' distinguishes it from the Stage of Appearance of Truth (Darsana-marga). Regarding the True Stage of Appearance of Truth (Satya-darsana-marga), only the Immediate Path (Anantarya-marga) is taken, so it is said to be the initial severance. Ximing (temple name) considers that the two minds of the Immediate Path and the Path of Liberation (Vimukti-marga) are severed simultaneously, distinguishing them from the subsequent three minds, sixteen minds, etc. The 'Essential Collection' says that some interpret it as superior, but I think it is not so. The previous ninth volume says that the minds of the Immediate Path and the Path of Liberation differ in their intention to sever afflictions and realize cessation, so it is not said that they are severed simultaneously. If it is definitely considered that they are severed simultaneously, how can it be said that their intentions differ? Moreover, it requires two paths to sever afflictions, which contradicts the following text. Bodhisattvas (Bodhisattva) with sharp faculties can sever and realize moment by moment, because the two paths severing together are not momentary. Furthermore, the ninth volume of the 'Collection of Categories' says that 'severing the antidote' refers to the Path of Application (Prayoga-marga) and the Immediate Path. 'Holding the antidote' refers to the Path of Liberation. It is not said to be severance, but only said to be holding and attaining. Question: Afflictive obstructions intentionally arise in the Ten Grounds, so why is there still ignorance leading to mistaken actions of body, speech, and mind in the Second Ground? Answer: Intentionally arising are afflictions, while mistaken actions are due to knowledge. They are not contradictory. Question: Intentionally arising afflictions must rely on knowledge; no afflictions arise apart from knowledge. Answer: Their mistaken actions of ignorance are only discussed in relation to the separate arising of the Obstruction of Knowledge, not the simultaneous arising of afflictions.
論。彼障現起地前已伏者。本解如疏 西明云。問十地修所斷種與俱生我見同體起。乃至嗔等同體起者何地斷盡。答俱說初地至金剛位位皆斷。而十障四地斷身見者。違道品故。依粗相顯說四地斷。據實我見及嗔等。各應多種地地別斷。不爾如何先斷誤犯細障。后斷欲界嗔等粗惑。仁王經云。初地斷貪。二地斷嗔等。三地斷癡。四地斷五見。五地斷疑等 今謂不爾。菩薩斷障非如二乘斷煩惱障。三界九地品品次第各各同斷。隨何等障障此地者菩薩即斷。不妨先斷色界之者。后斷欲界。亦無餘地斷于第六相應身見。仁王．此論俱說四地障道品等所知此斷。煩惱隨伏。若許餘地猶有我見。何得說有害伴等名。又準仁王。誤犯與嗔俱二地斷。亦無前後。
論。由斯故說二障粗重三住斷義。如本疏中解其所以 要集云。三粗重者。一云從初至七地斷皮粗重者。諸論無文。三種粗重。瑜伽四十八．七十三．解深密經第四。皆說三住斷故。然四十八別說二障各三住斷。斷煩能障初后粗重。通其現．種並及粗重。中間粗重但斷現行及其習氣。若斷所知俱通現．種並及習氣。然四十八斷煩惱中據正斷說。斷所知中據已斷說。二障互顯理實相似。又所知障為異二乘故約顯說。又四十八于所知障立面板肉三粗重名。于煩惱障但
【現代漢語翻譯】 論：如果障礙在現起地之前已經被降伏，那麼根本的解釋就像疏文中說的那樣。西明說：『問：十地修所斷的種子與俱生我見（Sahaja-Atma-dṛṣṭi，與生俱來的我執）同體生起，乃至嗔等同體生起，在哪個地斷盡？』答：『都說初地到金剛位（Vajra，金剛喻定）位都斷。而十障中四地斷身見（Satkayadristi，認為五蘊和合的身體為我），是因為違背道品（Bodhapaksa，菩提分法）的緣故。依據粗顯的相貌說四地斷。根據實際情況，我見以及嗔等，應該在多種地中各自別斷。不然的話，如何先斷誤犯的細微障礙，后斷欲界的嗔等粗重迷惑？』《仁王經》說：『初地斷貪，二地斷嗔等，三地斷癡，四地斷五見，五地斷疑等。』 現在我認為不是這樣。菩薩斷除障礙，不像二乘（Śrāvaka，聲聞；Pratyekabuddha，緣覺）斷除煩惱障（Kleśāvaraṇa，煩惱的障礙）。三界九地（Trailokya-Navabhumi，欲界、色界、無色界共九地）的品品次第各自一同斷除。無論什麼障礙障礙這個地，菩薩就斷除它。不妨礙先斷除微細的障礙，后斷除欲界的粗重迷惑。也沒有其餘的地斷除與第六意識相應的身見。《仁王經》和此論都說四地障礙道品等，所知障（Jñeyāvaraṇa，智慧的障礙）在此斷除，煩惱隨之被降伏。如果允許其餘的地還有我見，怎麼能說有害伴等名稱呢？又根據《仁王經》，誤犯與嗔都在二地斷除，也沒有先後之分。 論：因為這個緣故，才說二障（Dve-Avarana，煩惱障和所知障）的粗重在三住（Tri-sthiti，三種住位）斷除的意義。就像本疏中解釋的那樣。要集說：『三種粗重，一種說法是從初地到七地斷皮粗重，諸論中沒有這樣的說法。』三種粗重，《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）第四十八卷、第七十三卷、《解深密經》（Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra）第四卷，都說在三住斷除的緣故。然而第四十八卷分別說二障各自在三住斷除。斷除煩惱能障的初后粗重，包括現行、種子以及粗重。中間粗重只斷除現行及其習氣。如果斷除所知障，就包括現行、種子以及習氣。然而第四十八卷斷除煩惱中，是根據正斷來說的。斷除所知障中，是根據已經斷除來說的。二障互相顯現，理實上相似。又所知障是爲了區別於二乘，所以約顯說。又第四十八卷對於所知障立面板肉三種粗重名，對於煩惱障但
【English Translation】 Treatise: If the obstacles have already been subdued before the stage of manifestation, then the fundamental explanation is as stated in the commentary. Ximing says: 'Question: The seeds of what is severed by cultivation in the Ten Grounds arise together with innate self-view (Sahaja-Atma-dṛṣṭi), and even anger and the like arise together. In which ground are they completely severed?' Answer: 'It is said that all are severed from the first ground to the Vajra position (Vajra, diamond-like samadhi). And among the ten obstacles, the fourth ground severs the view of self in the aggregates (Satkayadristi, the view that the five aggregates are the self), because it contradicts the factors of enlightenment (Bodhapaksa, the limbs of enlightenment). According to the coarse appearance, it is said that the fourth ground severs it. According to the actual situation, self-view and anger, etc., should be severed separately in various grounds. Otherwise, how can one first sever the subtle obstacles of mistaken actions and then sever the coarse delusions of desire realm anger, etc.?' The Renwang Sutra says: 'The first ground severs greed, the second ground severs anger, etc., the third ground severs ignorance, the fourth ground severs the five views, the fifth ground severs doubt, etc.' Now I say it is not so. The Bodhisattva's severing of obstacles is not like the two vehicles (Śrāvaka, Hearer; Pratyekabuddha, Solitary Realizer) severing the afflictive obstacles (Kleśāvaraṇa, the obstacle of afflictions). The grades and sequences of the nine grounds of the three realms (Trailokya-Navabhumi, the nine planes of existence in the desire, form, and formless realms) are severed together. Whatever obstacle obstructs this ground, the Bodhisattva severs it. It does not hinder severing the subtle obstacles first and then severing the coarse delusions of the desire realm. Nor is there any other ground that severs the view of self corresponding to the sixth consciousness. The Renwang Sutra and this treatise both say that the fourth ground obstructs the factors of enlightenment, etc., and the obstacle of knowledge (Jñeyāvaraṇa, the obstacle of knowledge) is severed here, and afflictions are subdued accordingly. If it is allowed that there is still self-view in other grounds, how can one speak of harmful companions, etc.? Also, according to the Renwang Sutra, mistaken actions and anger are both severed in the second ground, and there is no sequence. Treatise: For this reason, it is said that the grossness of the two obstacles (Dve-Avarana, afflictive and cognitive obstacles) is severed in the three abodes (Tri-sthiti, three stages of dwelling). It is as explained in the original commentary. The Yaoji says: 'The three grossnesses, one saying is that the skin grossness is severed from the first to the seventh ground, but there is no such statement in the treatises.' The three grossnesses, the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) volumes 48 and 73, and the Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra (Explanation of the Profound Secrets Sutra) volume 4, all say that they are severed in the three abodes. However, volume 48 separately says that the two obstacles are severed in the three abodes respectively. Severing the initial and final grossness of the afflictive obstacles includes manifestation, seeds, and grossness. The middle grossness only severs manifestation and its habitual tendencies. If the obstacle of knowledge is severed, it includes manifestation, seeds, and habitual tendencies. However, volume 48's severing of afflictive obstacles is based on the actual severing. The severing of the obstacle of knowledge is based on what has already been severed. The two obstacles manifest each other, and in reality, they are similar. Also, the obstacle of knowledge is to distinguish it from the two vehicles, so it is said in terms of manifestation. Also, volume 48 establishes the names of skin, flesh, and bone for the three grossnesses of the obstacle of knowledge, but for the afflictive obstacles, it only
標總名。理實皮．肉．心等三名俱通二障。故瑜伽七十三總別互顯。第一粗重總含二障。不別說是煩惱．所知。第二屬煩惱。第三屬所知。故彼論云。一惡趣不樂品在皮粗重。二煩惱障品在肉粗重。三所知障品在心粗重。解深密經三俱總說。故彼經云。此諸隨眠幾種粗重斷所顯示。但由二種。謂由在皮粗重斷故顯彼初二。復由在膚粗重斷故顯彼第三。若在於骨粗重斷故。我說永斷一切隨眠。害伴．羸劣雖前第九正斷所知名二隨眠。煩惱隨伏亦得二名。要集引云有說四十八說二障二住斷者。煩惱無三住者。撿本疏文。無有煩惱無三住文。此論．瑜伽皆說二障有三住斷。本疏不違。
論。斷二障種漸頓云何者。本疏有二意。一前說菩薩未辨二乘。今對二乘辨斷差別。二前明斷不分漸．頓。今明漸．頓小．大斷別。
論。修所斷者隨其所應等。準聲聞乘得果有四。一次第得四。即此論文初一類是。二超初一取第二。三超初二取第三。雜集論云。謂倍離欲及全離欲。入于見道如次超初一及第二果。四超中二取初．後果。此論第二類。及雜集論第十三說。然今此論但舉二類略無中二。何以故。辨漸．頓斷。以超前二見必頓斷。余未伏修必漸斷故。與次第同所以不說。超中二果是頓斷修。與彼余別是故別說。準此道理
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 總標題：理實、皮、肉、心等三個名稱都可通於二障（煩惱障和所知障）。因此，《瑜伽師地論》第七十三卷總別互顯地闡述了這一點。第一，粗重總括二障，不分別說是煩惱或所知。第二，屬於煩惱障。第三，屬於所知障。所以該論說：『一、惡趣不樂品在皮粗重。二、煩惱障品在肉粗重。三、所知障品在心粗重。』《解深密經》三種都總括地說。所以該經說：『這些隨眠（煩惱的種子）由幾種粗重的斷除所顯示？』只由兩種，即由在皮粗重斷除的緣故，顯示那最初的兩種（隨眠）。又由在膚粗重斷除的緣故，顯示那第三種（隨眠）。若在於骨粗重斷除的緣故，我說永遠斷除一切隨眠。』害伴、羸劣雖然是前第九位正斷所知的兩種隨眠，煩惱隨伏也可以得到這兩個名稱。《要集》引用說，有人說四十八種，有人說二障二住斷除。煩惱沒有三住的說法。檢查本疏的文，沒有煩惱沒有三住的文。此論和《瑜伽師地論》都說二障有三住斷除。本疏不違背這一點。
論：斷除二障的種子，漸斷和頓斷是怎樣的？本疏有兩種意思。一是前面說菩薩沒有分辨二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘），現在針對二乘分辨斷除的差別。二是前面說明斷除不分漸斷和頓斷，現在說明漸斷和頓斷、小乘和大乘斷除的差別。
論：修所斷的隨其所應等等。按照聲聞乘得果的情況有四種。一是次第得到四果，即此論文的第一類。二是超越初果得到二果。三是超越初果和二果得到三果。《雜集論》說：『謂倍離欲及全離欲，入于見道如次超初一及第二果。』四是超越中二果得到初果和四果。這是此論的第二類，以及《雜集論》第十三所說。然而現在此論只舉出兩類，省略了中二果。為什麼呢？因為辨別漸斷和頓斷，以超越前二果見道必定是頓斷。其餘未伏修的必定是漸斷，與次第相同所以不說。超越中二果是頓斷修，與其他的不同，所以特別說明。按照這個道理。
【English Translation】 English version: General Title: The three names 'Lǐshí' (Principle and Reality), 'Pí' (Skin), 'Ròu' (Flesh), and 'Xīn' (Heart) all apply to the two obstacles (煩惱障 fánnǎo zhàng - obstacle of afflictions and 所知障 suǒ zhī zhàng - obstacle of knowledge). Therefore, the seventy-third volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (瑜伽師地論 Yújiāshī dìlùn) elucidates this in both general and specific terms. First, 'coarse and heavy' (粗重 cūzhòng) encompasses both obstacles, without specifically distinguishing between afflictions and knowledge. Second, it belongs to the obstacle of afflictions. Third, it belongs to the obstacle of knowledge. Therefore, the treatise says: '1. The category of unpleasant destinies is in the 'skin' coarse and heavy. 2. The category of the obstacle of afflictions is in the 'flesh' coarse and heavy. 3. The category of the obstacle of knowledge is in the 'heart' coarse and heavy.' The Saṃdhinirmocana Sūtra (解深密經 Jiěshēnmì jīng) speaks of all three in general terms. Therefore, the sutra says: 'These latent tendencies (隨眠 suímián - seeds of afflictions) are manifested by the elimination of which kinds of coarse and heavy?' Only by two kinds, namely, by the elimination of the 'skin' coarse and heavy, the first two (latent tendencies) are manifested. And by the elimination of the 'skin' coarse and heavy, the third (latent tendency) is manifested. If by the elimination of the 'bone' coarse and heavy, I say that all latent tendencies are permanently eliminated.' 'Hài bàn' (害伴 - Harmful Companion) and 'Léi ruò' (羸劣 - Weakness), although they are the two latent tendencies of knowledge that are rightly eliminated in the ninth stage, the afflictions that are subdued can also obtain these two names. The Yaoji (要集 - Essential Collection) quotes that some say forty-eight kinds, and some say the elimination of the two obstacles and two abodes. Afflictions do not have the concept of three abodes. Examining the text of the commentary, there is no text saying that afflictions do not have three abodes. This treatise and the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra both say that the two obstacles have the elimination of three abodes. The commentary does not contradict this.
Treatise: How is the gradual and sudden elimination of the seeds of the two obstacles? The commentary has two meanings. First, the previous discussion did not distinguish between the two vehicles (聲聞乘 Shēngwén chéng - Śrāvakayāna and 緣覺乘 Yuánjué chéng - Pratyekabuddhayāna), but now it distinguishes the differences in elimination for the two vehicles. Second, the previous explanation of elimination did not distinguish between gradual and sudden, but now it explains the differences in gradual and sudden elimination, and the elimination of the Small Vehicle and the Great Vehicle.
Treatise: Those that are eliminated by cultivation, according to what is appropriate, etc. According to the attainment of fruits in the Śrāvakayāna, there are four kinds. First, attaining the four fruits in order, which is the first category in this treatise. Second, surpassing the first fruit and attaining the second fruit. Third, surpassing the first and second fruits and attaining the third fruit. The Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論 Zájí lùn) says: 'Namely, those who are doubly detached from desire and those who are completely detached from desire, entering the path of seeing, surpass the first and second fruits in order.' Fourth, surpassing the middle two fruits and attaining the first and fourth fruits. This is the second category in this treatise, as well as what is said in the thirteenth section of the Abhidharmasamuccaya. However, this treatise only mentions two categories, omitting the middle two fruits. Why? Because distinguishing between gradual and sudden elimination, the path of seeing that surpasses the first two fruits must be sudden elimination. The remaining cultivation that has not subdued must be gradual elimination, which is the same as the sequential order, so it is not mentioned. Surpassing the middle two fruits is sudden elimination of cultivation, which is different from the others, so it is specifically explained. According to this principle.
若已曾伏三品入見道者。亦是次第非能頓超。雜集論說設少離欲亦漸次攝故 問倍離．全離二種性人。為先種殖順抉擇分。為未起耶。為即此生入于見道。為更生耶 答雖未見文今以義準。此等曾種順抉擇善分。逢外道緣。或先習力能倍全離。迴心趣小即於此生入于見諦。何以故。若許經生方入見諦。若全離欲不退上定。命終生色不得入見。若倍離欲經生。即退已伏煩惱重引現前。入見道時何能隨斷。如余不伏入見諦故。若未曾起順抉擇分。不可迴心現即入見。無有一生修即入聖。要三生等方入聖故。然經論中不說先起抉擇分等是隱略故 問此論何故不說超初及第二果 答略顯漸頓斷煩惱別。不具分別得果差別 問超初二果先所伏惑。何時能斷。何位得果 答準雜集說。于見道中第十六心隨得二果。準此論第九。十六心等是相見道。非實斷惑。依真假說放法真見。故在真見與見斷惑一時同斷。不勞異說 問獨覺之中有部行．麟角。準瑜伽三十四。與雜集論第十三同。然瑜伽云。云何獨覺道。謂由三相。一類安住獨覺種姓。經于百劫值佛出世。親近。承事。乃至如是名為初獨覺道。復有一類值佛出世。親近善士聞法作意。于先未起順抉擇分引發令起。謂煥．頂．忍。而無力能即於此生證法現觀。乃至云。于當來世能證法
現觀得沙門果。是名第二獨覺道。此當雜集或先已起順抉擇分。此通本來是獨覺種定姓之人。及不定姓聲聞種姓。起順抉擇未至上忍但至中．下。若至上忍。唯一剎那入第一法。即能證得法現觀故。是聲聞攝。非獨覺乘。復有一類。值佛出世。親近善士。聞法作意證法現觀得沙門果。而無力能畢竟證得梵行邊際阿羅漢果。復修蘊善巧等。乃至云。依出世道于當來世畢竟證得梵行邊際阿羅漢果。是名第三獨覺道。此是雜集先已得果。準此文意。言值佛者。有佛教法從他聽聞亦名值佛。雖有佛教無人傳說名無佛世。不爾但取佛自在世名為值佛。若佛滅已正．像等法亦名無佛。便無佛滅得聲聞果 總成勝出。何以故。瑜伽．雜集俱云后二名獨勝部行 問何以得知。雖有佛教無人傳說亦名無佛 答龍宮．天藏像末之後佛法豈無。以此準知。雖有佛教但天上人間無弘傳已方名無佛 問修習聲聞順抉擇已回作獨覺。為更修習獨覺乘中順解脫。為即至彼順抉擇 答有二釋。一云隨在聲聞惑暖．頂．忍。何位回趣即是獨覺暖．頂．忍位。以所斷證皆悉同故。不爾得果方作獨覺。豈更修彼資糧．加行。一云更修獨覺資糧．加行。證斷雖同修行有別。三．四生修有遠近故。不爾二生修彼聲聞順抉擇已。即於後產生獨覺耶。不同得果始回作者
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 現觀（Abhisamaya）獲得沙門果（Śrāmaṇaphalas），這被稱為第二種獨覺道（Pratyekabuddhayāna）。這種情況通常是雜修（雜集），或者先前已經生起了順抉擇分（anulomikī kṣānti）。這通常適用於本來就是獨覺種性（pratyekabuddha-gotra）的決定種姓之人，以及不定種姓的聲聞種姓之人。他們生起順抉擇分，但未達到上忍位（agra-kṣānti），只達到中忍位（madhya-kṣānti）或下忍位（adho-kṣānti）。如果達到上忍位，只需一個剎那進入第一法（prathama-dharma），就能證得法現觀，因此屬於聲聞乘（Śrāvakayāna），而非獨覺乘。 還有一類人，值遇佛陀出世，親近善知識，聽聞佛法並如理作意，證得法現觀，獲得沙門果，但沒有力量最終證得梵行（brahmacarya）的邊際——阿羅漢果（Arhat）。他們繼續修習蘊善巧（skandha-kauśalya）等，乃至說，依靠出世道（lokottara-mārga），在未來世最終證得梵行的邊際——阿羅漢果。這被稱為第三種獨覺道。這是雜修，先前已經獲得果位。 根據這段文字的意思，所謂『值遇佛陀』，是指有佛教的教法，從他人處聽聞，也稱為值遇佛陀。雖然有佛教的教法，但沒有人傳授，就稱為沒有佛陀出世。否則，如果僅僅將佛陀自在世間稱為值遇佛陀，那麼佛陀滅度后，正法時期、像法時期等，也稱為沒有佛陀出世，那麼佛陀滅度后就沒有人能獲得聲聞果了，這總體上就顯得不如前者殊勝了。為什麼呢？因為《瑜伽師地論》（Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra）和《雜集論》（Abhidharmasamuccaya）都說后兩種獨覺道被稱為獨勝部行（Rddhipāda）。 問：如何得知，雖然有佛教的教法，但沒有人傳授，也稱為沒有佛陀出世？ 答：龍宮（Nāga-bhavana）、天藏（deva-kośa）中，像法時期、末法時期之後，難道就沒有佛法了嗎？以此可以推知，雖然有佛教的教法，但天上人間沒有人弘揚傳授，才能稱為沒有佛陀出世。 問：修習聲聞乘的順抉擇分后，迴向作為獨覺，是需要重新修習獨覺乘中的順解脫分（anuloma-vimokṣa-bhāga），還是直接進入獨覺乘的順抉擇分？ 答：有兩種解釋。一種說法是，無論在聲聞乘的惑暖位（klesha-ūṣmagata）、頂位（mūrdhan）、忍位（kṣānti）的哪個階段迴向，就相當於獨覺乘的暖位、頂位、忍位。因為所斷除的煩惱和所證得的智慧都相同。否則，如果證得果位后才回向作為獨覺，難道還要重新修習那些資糧道（sambhāra-mārga）、加行道（prayoga-mārga）嗎？另一種說法是，需要重新修習獨覺乘的資糧道、加行道。雖然證得的智慧和斷除的煩惱相同，但修行的方式有所不同。因為三生（tri-bhava）、四生（catur-bhava）修行的遠近不同。否則，如果二生（dvi-bhava）修習了聲聞乘的順抉擇分后，就在後世成為獨覺了嗎？這與證得果位后才回向作為獨覺的情況不同。
【English Translation】 English version: Attaining the Śrāmaṇaphalas (fruits of the ascetic life) through Abhisamaya (direct realization) is called the second Pratyekabuddhayāna (path of the solitary Buddha). This usually involves mixed practices (雜集), or the prior arising of Anulomikī kṣānti (conformity-knowledge). This generally applies to those who are inherently of the Pratyekabuddha-gotra (solitary Buddha lineage), who are of definite lineage, as well as those of indefinite lineage of the Śrāvakayāna (hearer vehicle). They generate Anulomikī kṣānti but do not reach the Agra-kṣānti (highest forbearance), only reaching the Madhya-kṣānti (middle forbearance) or Adho-kṣānti (lower forbearance). If they reach the Agra-kṣānti, they can attain Dharma-Abhisamaya (direct realization of the Dharma) in a single moment of entering the Prathama-dharma (first Dharma), and therefore belong to the Śrāvakayāna, not the Pratyekabuddhayāna. There is also a category of individuals who, encountering the appearance of a Buddha, associate with virtuous friends, hear the Dharma and apply proper attention, attain Dharma-Abhisamaya, and gain the Śrāmaṇaphalas, but lack the strength to ultimately attain the boundary of Brahmacarya (holy life) – the Arhat (worthy one) fruit. They continue to practice Skandha-kauśalya (skill in the aggregates), and so on, even to the point of saying that, relying on the Lokottara-mārga (transcendental path), they will ultimately attain the boundary of Brahmacarya – the Arhat fruit – in a future life. This is called the third Pratyekabuddhayāna. This involves mixed practices, having previously attained a fruit. According to the meaning of this text, 'encountering a Buddha' means that having the Buddhist teachings and hearing them from others is also called encountering a Buddha. Although there are Buddhist teachings, if no one transmits them, it is called a time without a Buddha. Otherwise, if only the time when the Buddha is freely in the world is called encountering a Buddha, then after the Buddha's Parinirvana (final passing), the Dharma-age, the semblance-age, etc., would also be called times without a Buddha, and then no one could attain the Śrāvakaphala (fruit of the hearer) after the Buddha's Parinirvana, which would be less superior overall. Why? Because both the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra (Treatise on the Stages of Yoga Practice) and the Abhidharmasamuccaya (Compendium of Abhidharma) say that the latter two Pratyekabuddhayānas are called Rddhipāda (paths of accomplishment). Question: How do we know that even if there are Buddhist teachings, but no one transmits them, it is also called a time without a Buddha? Answer: In the Nāga-bhavana (dragon palace) and deva-kośa (heavenly treasury), after the Dharma-image age and the Dharma-ending age, are there no Buddhist teachings? From this, we can infer that even if there are Buddhist teachings, but no one propagates them in the heavens and human realm, it can be called a time without a Buddha. Question: After practicing the Anulomikī kṣānti of the Śrāvakayāna, if one redirects towards becoming a Pratyekabuddha, does one need to re-practice the Anuloma-vimokṣa-bhāga (conformity-liberation-part) in the Pratyekabuddhayāna, or does one directly enter the Anulomikī kṣānti of the Pratyekabuddhayāna? Answer: There are two explanations. One explanation is that whichever stage of the Klesha-ūṣmagata (heat of affliction), Mūrdhan (peak), or Kṣānti (forbearance) in the Śrāvakayāna one redirects from, it is equivalent to the heat, peak, or forbearance stage of the Pratyekabuddhayāna. This is because the afflictions to be eliminated and the wisdom to be attained are the same. Otherwise, if one redirects towards becoming a Pratyekabuddha after attaining the fruit, would one need to re-practice those Sambhāra-mārga (path of accumulation) and Prayoga-mārga (path of application)? Another explanation is that one needs to re-practice the Sambhāra-mārga and Prayoga-mārga of the Pratyekabuddhayāna. Although the wisdom attained and the afflictions eliminated are the same, the methods of practice are different. This is because the distance of practice in three lives (tri-bhava) and four lives (catur-bhava) is different. Otherwise, if one practices the Anulomikī kṣānti of the Śrāvakayāna for two lives (dvi-bhava), would one become a Pratyekabuddha in the next life? This is different from the case where one redirects towards becoming a Pratyekabuddha after attaining the fruit.
。已斷惑故。得現觀故。未見文斷取捨任情 問先修聲聞順抉擇已回作獨覺。更得百劫修行練根為麟角不 答有二釋。一云不得。此回趣者必不定姓。是鈍根故。又復瑜伽．雜集俱云此類是部行故 若爾何故雜集論云。餘生順抉擇分。為趣大乘及獨覺乘許更生故 答以若此生得即聲聞果。猶更餘生方成獨覺。非謂得許經多劫修。
若爾迴心趣大乘者豈不多劫 答回趣獨覺是鈍根性。趣大乘者望彼為利。根性別故得多劫 一云準彼論文云。或未起順抉擇分。或未得果。得成麟角。準此若在聲聞順抉擇分回趣獨覺。是未得果。亦得百劫修行練根說餘生故。如趣無上大菩提者得多劫修。然但說成部行類者。據從此已回作獨覺不練根者 若爾何須云在抉擇趣獨覺者方成部行。同順解脫俱得百劫。二位齊故 答在資糧位有未定生百劫練根。理即無難。在順抉擇已定生時。去諦觀近。據難偏說 問從凡趣入獨覺見道及起修道斷惑如何 答隨彼練根及不練根。俱先世道伏無所有。入見頓斷。唯非想地九品別斷得成獨覺。大乘未見正文。準有部說。必無出見八十一品斷修惑者。以利根故。不制果故 有義修惑見道滿已。八十一品各各別斷。然不出觀不止息故。故不立果。二說前勝。以性利根非漸次斷 問如得初果出無佛世作獨覺
者。斷修如何 答隨前三果準瑜伽說。必更修習諸善巧觀。隨所未斷。或復頓斷如頓出離。或不出觀次第漸斷。以更不取聲聞果故。若阿羅漢出無佛世。但修善巧斷余習氣練根成勝。無惑可斷。然瑜伽三十四云。又彼一切應知本來一向趣寂者。據不逢佛一類者說。除麟角喻余若逢佛成不定姓。
論。加行等四剎那剎那等者。具釋如疏。今者略以九門料簡。一出體。二釋名。三作用。四依界地。五漏無漏。六攝對治。七約修辨。八四差別。九因果殊。言出體者。一克性體。通世出世間智為四道體。故瑜伽六十九云。又修此智略有四道。一加行等。二引發體通戒．定．惠。三相應體通諸無漏加行．根本．后所得智及有漏中諸方便善心．心所法以此四道通漏．無漏故。諸餘出體略而不辨 二釋名者。于諸所斷加功用力順趣能斷名為加行。或順趣斷性亦名加行。非此加行不求證理。且據趣求能斷道說。故瑜伽六十九云。於一切地修道所斷耎中．上等九品煩惱。隨其品數各各差別。能隨順斷是名初道。雜集第九云。謂由此道能捨煩惱。意云。由此加行能令現行煩惱不起名為舍離。或據修道修加行時。亦能少分伏除粗重名為舍離。非是正斷所斷煩惱得舍離名。此據別起四道而說。若約相望。雖復加行亦能正斷。不以加義名為
【現代漢語翻譯】 問：如何斷除（煩惱）？ 答：依照前面三種果位（預流果、一來果、不還果）的標準，如《瑜伽師地論》所說，必須進一步修習各種善巧觀行，隨其尚未斷除的（煩惱）而斷除。或者像『頓出離』那樣頓然斷除，或者不通過觀行次第而逐漸斷除。因為不再追求聲聞果的緣故。如果阿羅漢出生在沒有佛的時代，只需修習善巧方便，斷除剩餘的習氣，鍛鍊根器使其變得殊勝，沒有疑惑可斷。然而，《瑜伽師地論》第三十四卷說：『又應當知道，他們一切本來就是一向趣向寂滅的。』這是就那些沒有遇到佛的一類人而言的。除了麟角喻（指獨自悟道的辟支佛）之外，其餘如果遇到佛，就會成為不定種姓（指根性不確定，可能證得不同果位的人）。 論：『加行等四剎那剎那等』，詳細解釋如疏文。現在簡略地用九個方面來簡別：一、出體；二、釋名；三、作用；四、依界地；五、漏無漏；六、攝對治；七、約修辨；八、四差別；九、因果殊。說到『出體』，一、克性體，通於世間和出世間的智慧，作為四道的本體。所以《瑜伽師地論》第六十九卷說：『又修習這種智慧，略有四道，一、加行等。』二、引發體，通於戒、定、慧。三、相應體，通於各種無漏的加行、根本智、后得智，以及有漏中的各種方便善心、心所法。因為這四道通於有漏和無漏，所以其他的『出體』就簡略而不辨析。二、解釋名稱：對於各種所要斷除的（煩惱），加以功用和力量，順著趣向能斷除的（道路），名為『加行』。或者順著趣向斷除的性質，也名為『加行』。並非這種加行不尋求證悟真理，只是就趣向尋求能斷除的道路來說。所以《瑜伽師地論》第六十九卷說：『在一切地修道所斷的下中上等九品煩惱，隨著它的品數各有差別，能夠隨順斷除，這名為初道。』《雜集論》第九卷說：『所謂由此道能夠捨棄煩惱。』意思是說，由此加行能夠使現行的煩惱不起，名為『舍離』。或者就修道時修加行來說，也能少分地伏除粗重的（煩惱），名為『舍離』。並非是真正斷除所斷的煩惱而得到舍離的名稱。這是就分別生起四道來說的。如果從相互觀待來說，即使是加行也能真正斷除（煩惱），但不以加行的意義來命名。
【English Translation】 Modern Chinese version: Q: How is severance (of afflictions) accomplished? A: According to the standard of the previous three fruits (Stream-enterer, Once-returner, Never-returner), as stated in the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra, it is necessary to further cultivate various skillful contemplations, severing (afflictions) according to what has not yet been severed. Or, severing suddenly like 'sudden departure', or severing gradually without going through the order of contemplation. Because one no longer seeks the Śrāvakayāna fruit. If an Arhat is born in an age without a Buddha, they only need to cultivate skillful means, sever the remaining habitual tendencies, and train their faculties to become superior, with no doubts to sever. However, the thirty-fourth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Moreover, it should be known that all of them are originally and consistently inclined towards tranquility.' This refers to those who have not encountered a Buddha. Except for the Pratyekabuddha (one who attains enlightenment on their own) who is likened to a rhinoceros horn, if the others encounter a Buddha, they will become those of uncertain lineage (referring to those whose potential is uncertain, and may attain different fruits). Treatise: 'Exertion and the like, four moments and the like', the detailed explanation is as in the commentary. Now, let's briefly distinguish them using nine aspects: 1. Substance; 2. Explanation of name; 3. Function; 4. Dependence on realm and ground; 5. Defiled and undefiled; 6. Inclusion and antidote; 7. Explanation based on cultivation; 8. Four differences; 9. Differences in cause and effect. Speaking of 'substance', 1. Definitive substance, encompassing both mundane and supramundane wisdom, as the substance of the four paths. Therefore, the sixty-ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'Moreover, the cultivation of this wisdom has roughly four paths, 1. Exertion and the like.' 2. Evoking substance, encompassing morality, concentration, and wisdom. 3. Corresponding substance, encompassing various undefiled exertions, fundamental wisdom, subsequent wisdom, as well as various skillful wholesome minds and mental factors in the defiled realm. Because these four paths encompass both defiled and undefiled, the other 'substances' are briefly omitted without analysis. 2. Explanation of names: For the various (afflictions) to be severed, adding effort and strength, following the path towards being able to sever, is called 'exertion'. Or, following the nature of tending towards severance is also called 'exertion'. It is not that this exertion does not seek to realize the truth, but it is only in terms of tending towards seeking the path that can sever. Therefore, the sixty-ninth volume of the Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra says: 'The lower, middle, and upper nine grades of afflictions to be severed by cultivating the path in all grounds, each differing according to its grade, being able to follow along with severance, this is called the initial path.' The ninth volume of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says: 'That is, by this path, one is able to abandon afflictions.' The meaning is that, by this exertion, one is able to prevent the arising of manifest afflictions, which is called 'abandonment'. Or, in terms of cultivating exertion during the cultivation of the path, one can also subdue and eliminate the coarse (afflictions) to a small extent, which is called 'abandonment'. It is not the name of truly severing the afflictions to be severed and obtaining abandonment. This is in terms of separately arising the four paths. If viewed in relation to each other, even exertion can truly sever (afflictions), but it is not named in the sense of exertion. English version:
無聞。望義別故。道者通履義。加行即道。持業釋也。言無間道者。二義無間。一觀理無間。不同加行猶帶相故。二斷惑無間。不同加行猶未正斷有此後間。瑜伽．雜集皆且據后一義而釋。故六十九云能無間斷是第二道。雜集第九云。謂由此道無間永斷令無所餘。無間即道。若有漏道能無間伏。皆持業釋。
解脫道者。解脫有二。一能解脫體得自在。即離繫縛。如八解脫。今此解脫亦復如是。能除粗重得解脫名。二所顯理名為解脫。自性離縛名為解脫。昔來惑障智不能證。今除惑已智方能證。解脫是理。道者是智。故雜集第九云。謂由此道證斷煩惱所得解脫。若依前解亦是持業。論多依后。即是依主。解脫之道。何故如是。為簡無漏勝進道故。依主為名 若爾有漏何名解脫 答亦通能得擇．非擇滅。以所伏惑有永．暫故 言勝進道者。勝謂殊勝。進謂升進。故雜集第九云。或復進入余勝品定。諸如是等名勝進道。亦持業也 或望前為勝。趣后為進。勝進即道。雜集第九。為斷此品后余煩惱。所有加行．無間．解脫道望此品是勝進故。名勝進道 三作用者。謂諸世間及出世間諸有所修。或為斷染。或為證理及勝功德。皆因四道能得成滿。若據前後相望四道。四道俱能斷惑證理起勝功德。若據別起四道有殊。且約斷
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 『無間』（Anantarya，指無間道）一詞，因其意義與『望義』（期待意義）有所不同。『道』（marga，指道路、方法）是指普遍遵循的意義，『加行』（prayoga，指加行道）本身就是『道』，這是持業釋（tatpurusa，一種複合詞的解釋方式）。說『無間道』，是因為它在兩個方面是『無間』的：一是觀理無間，不同於加行道仍然帶有相；二是斷惑無間，不同於加行道尚未真正斷除，之後還有間斷。瑜伽師地論和雜集論都主要根據后一種意義來解釋。所以瑜伽師地論第六十九卷說，能夠無間斷除煩惱的是第二道（指無間道）。雜集論第九卷說，通過此道，可以無間地、永遠地斷除煩惱，使其無所剩餘。『無間』就是『道』。如果是有漏道（sasrava-marga，指有煩惱的道路）能夠無間地調伏煩惱，也屬於持業釋。
『解脫道』（vimukti-marga，指解脫的道路）一詞，『解脫』有兩種含義：一是能夠解脫自體，獲得自在，即脫離繫縛，如八解脫（asta-vimoksa，指八種禪定解脫）。這裡的『解脫』也是如此，能夠去除粗重煩惱，因此得名『解脫』。二是所顯示的真理，名為『解脫』，自性脫離束縛名為『解脫』。過去由於惑障，智慧無法證得，現在去除惑障后，智慧才能證得。『解脫』是真理，『道』是智慧。所以雜集論第九卷說，通過此道，可以證得斷除煩惱后所獲得的解脫。如果按照前一種解釋，也屬於持業釋。論典多以後一種解釋為主，即是依主釋（bahuvrihi，一種複合詞的解釋方式），『解脫』的『道』。為什麼這樣解釋呢？爲了簡別無漏勝進道（anasrava-visesa-marga，指無煩惱的殊勝進步的道路）。依主釋作為名稱。如果這樣，有漏道又叫什麼『解脫』呢？回答是，也通達能夠獲得擇滅（pratisamkhya-nirodha，指通過智慧選擇而滅盡煩惱）和非擇滅（apratisamkhya-nirodha，指非通過智慧選擇而自然滅盡煩惱），因為所調伏的煩惱有永遠和暫時之分。
『勝進道』（visesa-marga，指殊勝進步的道路）一詞，『勝』是指殊勝，『進』是指升進。所以雜集論第九卷說，或者進入更殊勝的禪定，諸如此類，名為『勝進道』，也屬於持業釋。或者相對於前一階段來說是『勝』，趨向后一階段來說是『進』，『勝進』就是『道』。雜集論第九卷說，爲了斷除此品煩惱之後剩餘的煩惱，所有的加行道、無間道、解脫道，相對於此品煩惱來說，都是殊勝進步的，所以名為『勝進道』。從三種作用來說，無論是世間還是出世間，所有修習，或是爲了斷除染污，或是爲了證得真理以及殊勝功德，都因為四道（catvari-marga，指四種修行道路）才能得以成就圓滿。如果根據前後相望，四道都能斷惑證理，生起殊勝功德。如果根據各自不同的作用，四道各有不同。這裡先從斷惑來說。
【English Translation】 English version: The term 'Anantarya' (無間, referring to the immediate path) differs in meaning from '望義' (expectational meaning). 'Marga' (道, path, method) refers to the meaning of universal adherence; 'Prayoga' (加行, preparatory path) itself is 'Marga,' which is a Tatpurusa compound (持業釋, a type of compound word explanation). The term 'Anantarya-marga' (無間道) is used because it is 'Anantarya' (無間, immediate) in two aspects: first, the contemplation of truth is immediate, unlike the preparatory path which still carries characteristics; second, the cutting off of afflictions is immediate, unlike the preparatory path which has not truly cut them off, and there are interruptions afterward. The Yogacarabhumi-sastra (瑜伽師地論) and the Abhidharmasamuccaya (雜集論) both mainly explain it according to the latter meaning. Therefore, the sixty-ninth fascicle of the Yogacarabhumi-sastra says that the second path (referring to the immediate path) is that which can cut off afflictions immediately. The ninth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that through this path, afflictions can be cut off immediately and forever, leaving nothing remaining. 'Anantarya' (無間) is 'Marga' (道). If the Sasrava-marga (有漏道, path with afflictions) can subdue afflictions immediately, it also belongs to the Tatpurusa compound.
The term 'Vimukti-marga' (解脫道, path of liberation), 'Vimukti' (解脫, liberation) has two meanings: first, it can liberate the self and attain freedom, that is, to be free from bondage, such as the eight liberations (asta-vimoksa, 八解脫, referring to eight kinds of meditative liberations). The 'Vimukti' (解脫) here is also like this, it can remove gross afflictions, hence the name 'Vimukti' (解脫). Second, the truth revealed is called 'Vimukti' (解脫), the self-nature free from bondage is called 'Vimukti' (解脫). In the past, due to afflictions, wisdom could not attain it, but now after removing afflictions, wisdom can attain it. 'Vimukti' (解脫) is truth, 'Marga' (道) is wisdom. Therefore, the ninth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that through this path, one can attain the liberation obtained after cutting off afflictions. If according to the former explanation, it also belongs to the Tatpurusa compound. The treatises mostly focus on the latter explanation, which is a Bahuvrihi compound (依主釋, a type of compound word explanation), the 'Marga' (道) of 'Vimukti' (解脫). Why is it explained this way? In order to distinguish the Anasrava-visesa-marga (無漏勝進道, path of unsurpassed progress without afflictions). The Bahuvrihi compound is used as the name. If so, what is the 'Vimukti' (解脫) called for the Sasrava-marga (有漏道)? The answer is that it also generally attains Pratisamkhya-nirodha (擇滅, cessation through wisdom) and Apratisamkhya-nirodha (非擇滅, cessation without wisdom), because the afflictions subdued are either permanent or temporary.
The term 'Visesa-marga' (勝進道, path of unsurpassed progress), 'Visesa' (勝) means unsurpassed, '進' means progress. Therefore, the ninth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that, or entering more unsurpassed samadhi, all such things are called 'Visesa-marga' (勝進道), which also belongs to the Tatpurusa compound. Or it is 'Visesa' (勝) relative to the previous stage, and '進' (progress) towards the later stage, 'Visesa-marga' (勝進道) is 'Marga' (道). The ninth fascicle of the Abhidharmasamuccaya says that in order to cut off the remaining afflictions after this category of afflictions, all the preparatory path, immediate path, and liberation path are unsurpassed progress relative to this category of afflictions, so it is called 'Visesa-marga' (勝進道). From the perspective of three functions, whether in the mundane or supramundane, all practices, whether to cut off defilements or to attain truth and unsurpassed merits, can be accomplished and perfected because of the four paths (catvari-marga, 四道, referring to the four paths of practice). If according to the mutual relationship between before and after, the four paths can all cut off afflictions, attain truth, and generate unsurpassed merits. If according to their respective different functions, the four paths are different. Here, we will first talk about cutting off afflictions.
惑加行有伏煩惱之能。無間有正斷惑之用。解脫能證所得滅。勝進能有進斷余功。證理起德準義可知 四依界地。五漏無漏。並如疏辨。疏云有頂有解脫道類名解脫亦有。非次無間后之解脫者。解云道類名解脫者。非無間后解脫。是此類故。如容豫時重緣先時所得解脫。非次無間后之解脫者。若是證真無間后之解脫。亦親證理。此有頂解脫次此無間后即起之者。如無學身中余時所起之者。非次第也 今又助解。如六行伏依近分定皆具四道。根本地中修八解脫亦通有漏。依有頂地無漏四道斷惑者無。修八解脫第七第八皆依彼地許有四道。此亦何失。諸處但說為斷惑故修四道者。且約一義。非謂修余不有四道。六十九云。第一有中所有諸智。皆俗智攝者。據初學者。設久學者約不親證真如理說。何以得知。彼云但作非想非非想行。出世作意有想諸定所攝受故。既云出世作意。明通無漏。又復遊觀無漏極成。又彼地心亦緣真如。準前第十二。入滅盡定有二方便。一緣非想非非想入。一緣無相界相入。故知論云但作非想非非想者不盡理說 六攝對治者。準雜集第九云。由具四種對治故名對治修。謂厭患對治．斷對治．持對治．遠分對治。見有漏過患如病癰等名厭患。欣斷正斷諸煩惱故名斷對治。即加行．無間二道所攝。據實厭
患亦是加行。以遠近別。近無間道之加行者得加行名。攝斷對治任持斷得名持對治。雖大乘宗不別立得。即于現行能證彼斷。以體持用。用即是得。明．闇相違亦名對治。或持所得。即是真對治性。即解脫道攝。由解脫道證對治性名持對治。令先所斷煩惱轉遠離故名遠分對治。勝進道攝 七約修辨者。雜集第九有四種修。謂得修．習修．除去修．對治修。彼論自為二複次釋。文雖但配一對治修。以理而說具攝四修。加行．勝進二。各攝得及除去修。令無間道種子增故。修加行時能伏現故。故彼論釋得修云。為得故修。釋除去修云。由此修力除去現行位諸不善法。無間．解脫攝習．對治。彼論釋云。由此修力數習已得諸善法故。對治未來諸不善法。令成不生法故。或一一道各具攝四。亦復不違 八四道差別者。若望前後相望剎那具四。據義有別。體即不殊。若據別起四別行相。如出體辨。然唯無漏可約剎那各具四道。剎那剎那可斷惑故。非有漏道 九因果有殊者。在二乘位因果皆四。然除麟角及俱解脫定姓之者。不趣大故。自乘滿故。但起解脫。部行．惠勝定．不定姓俱各起四。決定種姓自乘勝德未成滿故。或但起二。解脫．勝進。不定種姓回趣大故。大乘因位八地已前具二四道。八地已上起無漏四。若在佛位有後二道
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『患』（煩惱）也是『加行』（修行）。以遠近來區分。接近『無間道』（無礙解脫道）的『加行』，才獲得『加行』的名稱。『攝斷』（包含斷除）和『對治』（對抗）被稱為『任持斷』（保持斷除），獲得名稱為『持對治』（保持對治）。雖然大乘宗不另外設立『得』（獲得），但在現行中能夠證得彼斷（斷除煩惱），以體（本體）持用（作用），用即是得。明（光明）與闇（黑暗）相違也稱為『對治』。或者保持所得（已經獲得的），即是真實的『對治性』（對治的性質），屬於『解脫道』（解脫的道路）所包含。由於『解脫道』證得『對治性』，稱為『持對治』。使先前所斷的煩惱更加遠離，因此稱為『遠分對治』（遠離部分的對治），屬於『勝進道』（殊勝進步的道路）所包含。 七、關於修行的辨別：在《雜集》第九卷中有四種修行，即『得修』（獲得的修行）、『習修』（習慣的修行）、『除去修』（去除的修行）、『對治修』（對治的修行）。該論自身又做了兩次解釋。文句雖然只配合『對治修』，但從道理上說，包含了四種修行。『加行道』和『勝進道』各自包含『得修』和『除去修』。因為使『無間道』的種子增長，所以在修行『加行』時能夠降伏現行。因此，該論解釋『得修』說：『爲了獲得而修行。』解釋『除去修』說：『通過這種修行的力量，去除現行位的各種不善法。』『無間道』和『解脫道』包含『習修』和『對治修』。該論解釋說：『通過這種修行的力量，多次練習已經獲得的各種善法。對治未來各種不善法，使之成為不生之法。』或者每一道各自包含四種修行，也不相違背。 八、四道的差別：如果從前後相望的剎那來看，具備四道。根據意義有差別，本體並不不同。如果根據分別生起的四種不同的行相，如在出體中辨別。然而只有無漏道可以從剎那的角度來看，各自具備四道。因為剎那剎那可以斷除迷惑。不是有漏道。 九、因果的差異：在二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的果位，因果都有四道。然而除了麟角喻獨覺（Pratyekabuddha）和俱解脫（Ubhayatobhāga）定性的人，因為不趣向大乘，自身乘的修行已經圓滿，所以只生起『解脫道』。部行（信仰隨法行）和慧勝（智慧殊勝）定性與不定性的人都各自生起四道。決定種姓的人，自身乘的殊勝功德尚未成就圓滿，或者只生起兩種道，即『解脫道』和『勝進道』。不定種姓的人，因為回心轉意趣向大乘。大乘因位的八地菩薩之前具備兩種四道。八地菩薩以上生起無漏的四道。如果在佛的果位，有後兩種道（勝進道和解脫道）。
【English Translation】 English version 'Affliction' (患, kleśa) is also a 'preparatory practice' (加行, prayoga-mārga). This is distinguished by distance. That which is close to the 'path of immediate consequence' (無間道, ānantarya-mārga) obtains the name 'preparatory practice'. 'Comprehending cessation' (攝斷) and 'antidote' (對治, pratipakṣa) are called 'sustaining cessation' (任持斷), obtaining the name 'sustaining antidote' (持對治). Although the Mahayana school does not separately establish 'attainment' (得, prāpti), it is able to realize that cessation in the present action, using the essence to sustain the function, and the function is attainment. Light and darkness contradicting each other are also called 'antidote'. Or sustaining what is attained is the true 'nature of antidote' (對治性), which is included in the 'path of liberation' (解脫道, vimukti-mārga). Because the 'path of liberation' realizes the 'nature of antidote', it is called 'sustaining antidote'. Causing the previously severed afflictions to become more distant is called 'distant part antidote' (遠分對治), which is included in the 'path of superior progress' (勝進道, viśeṣa-mārga). 7. Distinguishing based on practice: The ninth chapter of the Abhidharmasamuccaya has four types of practice, namely 'practice of attainment' (得修), 'practice of habituation' (習修), 'practice of removal' (除去修), and 'practice of antidote' (對治修). That treatise itself provides two further explanations. Although the text only matches one 'practice of antidote', in principle, it encompasses all four practices. The 'path of preparatory practice' and the 'path of superior progress' each encompass 'practice of attainment' and 'practice of removal'. Because they increase the seeds of the 'path of immediate consequence', they are able to subdue the present action when practicing 'preparatory practice'. Therefore, that treatise explains 'practice of attainment' by saying, 'Practicing for the sake of attainment.' It explains 'practice of removal' by saying, 'Through the power of this practice, various unwholesome dharmas in the present action position are removed.' The 'path of immediate consequence' and the 'path of liberation' encompass 'practice of habituation' and 'practice of antidote'. That treatise explains, 'Through the power of this practice, various wholesome dharmas that have already been attained are repeatedly practiced. It antidotes various future unwholesome dharmas, causing them to become dharmas that do not arise.' Or each path individually encompasses all four practices, which is not contradictory. 8. Differences between the four paths: If viewed from the perspective of moments succeeding each other, all four paths are present. According to meaning, there are differences, but the essence is not different. If according to the four different aspects that arise separately, as distinguished in the explanation of the essence. However, only the unconditioned path can be viewed from the perspective of moments, each possessing all four paths. Because moment by moment, delusion can be severed. This is not the case for the conditioned path. 9. Differences in cause and effect: In the stage of the Two Vehicles (二乘, dviyāna - Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna), both cause and effect have four paths. However, except for those of the rhinoceros-horn solitary buddha (麟角喻獨覺, Pratyekabuddha) and those of the both-ways-liberated (俱解脫, Ubhayatobhāga) fixed nature, because they do not aspire to the Great Vehicle, and their own vehicle's practice is already complete, they only generate the 'path of liberation'. Those of the faith-follower (部行) and wisdom-superior (惠勝) fixed and unfixed natures all generate all four paths. Those of the determined lineage, because the superior merits of their own vehicle have not yet been accomplished and completed, or only generate two paths, namely the 'path of liberation' and the 'path of superior progress'. Those of the undetermined lineage, because they turn their minds and aspire to the Great Vehicle. In the causal stage of the Mahayana, before the eighth bhūmi, they possess two sets of four paths. From the eighth bhūmi onwards, they generate the unconditioned four paths. If in the stage of the Buddha, there are the latter two paths (the path of superior progress and the path of liberation).
。證先所得故。望因勝進。非自果位 問五地之中作四諦觀。云何證得無差別如 答雖作四諦觀而不言唯。通八諦觀而復壞緣。不以真如別屬諦故。知理通故。不如小乘定執觀故。證無別如。
釋所棄捨。于中二釋。一約轉齊。本有無漏種子三品。如加行位下品種增生初見道無分別智。即此現行無漏有力資中品種令能生現。亦令自種轉成中品名為轉齊 又解由中品種生現行已。資下品種轉成中品。與本有種中品之者。及新熏生亦為中品。與能生自本有之種。三合生一后念現行。或各別生。俱許無妨。中上品生轉齊亦爾 言轉滅者。即本有種唯有一個。加行位中名為下品。入見已去能生現行。現行熏種即成中品。並有力能令本種子生后中品。下品即滅名為轉滅。不同轉齊令生自種亦成中品。故名轉滅 或雖本有三品種子。中品生已下品不生。亦不能生后念中品。新生中品但由現能 若爾即違雜集論說行習修文。彼許初習自．下地中種子增故。不可唯說但中上增不通下品。無別目故。違比量故。準此即應三品各一。但令本種生后中品。即下品種生現行者自體不增 若爾既許下品種在。何名轉滅。若以不生即名為滅。豈諸種子皆定生現。準此道理轉齊應勝 若爾即應轉二乘種成大乘性。以轉齊故。若云類別不轉下．中
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：因為驗證了先前獲得的成果，所以期望憑藉殊勝的因緣而精進，而不是因為自身果位的緣故。問：在五地（指菩薩修行過程中的第五個階段）之中，如果進行四諦觀（苦、集、滅、道），如何證得無差別真如（指平等一如的真理）？答：雖然進行四諦觀，但不執著于唯一的四諦觀，而是通達八諦觀（四諦的順逆觀察），並且破除對因緣的執著。不因為真如特別屬於四諦的範疇，而是因為明白真理是融會貫通的，不像小乘那樣執著于固定的觀法，所以能夠證得無差別真如。
解釋所捨棄的內容，其中有兩種解釋。第一種是關於『轉齊』（指種子轉變到同一水平）。原本具有無漏種子（指沒有煩惱的種子）的三種品類。比如在加行位（指正式修行前的準備階段），下品種子增長，初見道時產生無分別智。這個現行的無漏智慧，能夠增強有力地資助中品種子，使其能夠生起現行，也使得自身種子轉變成中品，這叫做『轉齊』。另一種解釋是，由於中品種子生起現行之後，資助下品種子轉變成中品，與原本具有的中品種子，以及新熏習而生的也是中品種子，這三者結合生起一個后唸的現行，或者各自單獨生起，都是可以允許的。中品和上品種子的生起和『轉齊』也是如此。所說的『轉滅』（指種子轉變並滅失），就是原本只有一個種子。在加行位中稱為下品。進入見道位之後，能夠生起現行。現行熏習種子就成為中品，並且有力地使得原本的種子生起後來的中品。下品種子就滅失了，這叫做『轉滅』。這不同於『轉齊』，『轉齊』是使得自身種子也成為中品，所以叫做『轉滅』。或者雖然原本具有三種品類的種子，中品種子生起之後，下品種子不再生起，也不能生起后唸的中品，新生的中品只是由於現行的作用。
如果這樣說，就違背了《雜集論》中關於『行習修文』的說法，該論認為最初的熏習是由於自身和下地中種子的增長。不能只說中品和上品增長，而不包括下品，因為沒有其他的名稱可以稱呼它，也違背了比量（一種推理方式）。按照這個道理，就應該是三種品類各有一個，只是使得原本的種子生起後來的中品，即使下品種子生起現行，其自體也不會增長。如果這樣，既然允許下品種子存在，為什麼叫做『轉滅』呢？如果認為不生起就叫做滅，難道所有的種子都一定要生起現行嗎？按照這個道理，『轉齊』應該更殊勝。如果這樣，就應該能夠將二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的種子轉變成大乘的自性，因為是『轉齊』的緣故。如果說類別不同，下品和中品不能轉變。
【English Translation】 English version: Because one verifies what has been previously attained, one hopes to advance through superior causes, not because of one's own fruit position. Question: Within the Fifth Ground (referring to the fifth stage in the Bodhisattva's path), if one practices the Four Noble Truths (suffering, origin, cessation, path), how does one realize the undifferentiated Suchness (referring to the truth of equality and oneness)? Answer: Although one practices the Four Noble Truths, one does not cling to the exclusive practice of the Four Noble Truths, but comprehends the Eight Truths (observing the Four Truths in both forward and reverse order), and breaks free from attachment to conditions. It is not because Suchness particularly belongs to the category of the Four Truths, but because one understands that truth is all-encompassing, unlike the fixed practices of the Hinayana (Small Vehicle), so one is able to realize the undifferentiated Suchness.
Explaining what is abandoned, there are two explanations. The first is about 'Transformation to Uniformity' (轉齊, zhuǎn qí, referring to seeds transforming to the same level). Originally, there are three categories of un-outflow seeds (無漏種子, wú lòu zhǒng zi, referring to seeds without afflictions). For example, in the Stage of Application (加行位, jiā xíng wèi, referring to the preparatory stage before formal practice), the inferior seeds increase, and the non-discriminating wisdom arises upon the initial seeing of the Path. This current un-outflow wisdom powerfully supports the intermediate seeds, enabling them to arise in the present, and also transforms the seed itself into an intermediate seed, which is called 'Transformation to Uniformity'. Another explanation is that, because the intermediate seeds arise in the present, they support the inferior seeds to transform into intermediate seeds, together with the original intermediate seeds, and the newly cultivated seeds which are also intermediate seeds. These three combine to give rise to a subsequent thought in the present, or they may arise separately, which is permissible. The arising and 'Transformation to Uniformity' of the intermediate and superior seeds are similar. What is called 'Transformation to Extinction' (轉滅, zhuǎn miè, referring to seeds transforming and becoming extinct) is that there is originally only one seed. In the Stage of Application, it is called inferior. After entering the Stage of Seeing the Path, it is able to give rise to the present. The present cultivation of the seeds becomes intermediate, and powerfully enables the original seed to give rise to the subsequent intermediate seed. The inferior seed then becomes extinct, which is called 'Transformation to Extinction'. This is different from 'Transformation to Uniformity', which causes the seed itself to also become intermediate, so it is called 'Transformation to Extinction'. Or, although there are originally three categories of seeds, after the intermediate seed arises, the inferior seed no longer arises, nor can it give rise to the subsequent intermediate seed. The newly arising intermediate seed is only due to the function of the present.
If this is the case, it contradicts the statement in the Compendium of Abhidharma (雜集論, Zájí lùn) regarding 'Cultivation of Practice and Study', which states that the initial cultivation is due to the increase of seeds in oneself and in the lower grounds. One cannot only say that the intermediate and superior seeds increase, without including the inferior seeds, because there is no other name to call it, and it also contradicts inference (比量, bǐ liàng, a method of reasoning). According to this principle, there should be one of each of the three categories, only enabling the original seed to give rise to the subsequent intermediate seed, even if the inferior seed gives rise to the present, its essence will not increase. If this is the case, since the inferior seed is allowed to exist, why is it called 'Transformation to Extinction'? If it is thought that not arising is called extinction, must all seeds necessarily arise in the present? According to this principle, 'Transformation to Uniformity' should be more superior. If this is the case, it should be possible to transform the seeds of the Two Vehicles (聲聞乘, Shēngwén chéng and 緣覺乘, Yuánjué chéng) into the nature of the Mahayana (大乘, Dàchéng), because it is 'Transformation to Uniformity'. If it is said that the categories are different, the inferior and intermediate cannot transform.
二乘種姓為菩薩性。亦應菩薩三品種殊。不轉下中成中上品 答乘性別故。不轉二乘成菩種姓。下中上三同菩薩姓。故可轉令成中上品。
論。菩薩應無生死法故者。此意應無變易生死。非此無生死即難令無生滅之法。生者皆死一向記故。古德有云。解脫道后即無生滅。得別真常諸相好身永不遷謝。又云空如來藏即是真如。具足熏已生常身者。如惠日論破。
論。二所棄捨等者。本釋如疏 西明二解。一云但舍二乘無漏。對菩薩故名劣無漏。二云二乘無漏及菩薩因位未圓無漏亦名為劣。三藏意取初說為正。余及要集皆同有釋 今謂。不唯二乘名劣。菩薩因位亦劣所收。若不名劣因果何別。何故論云金剛喻定引極圓明純凈本識。又第二師云。住無間道應名佛故。后解脫道應無用故。由此故知。因位無漏亦名為劣。不爾論文應有簡別。漸悟菩薩舍劣無漏。頓悟菩薩無劣無漏故。又因不捨豈得成佛。不捨金剛喻定無間道耶 又雜集第十四云。于諸現觀位證得後後勝品道時。舍前所得下劣品道。故知得佛舍劣因位。言舍之者非是全舍。但是轉齊。又二乘者即是轉滅。二俱名舍。
論。釋涅槃。本疏解自性涅槃體相真如理。即七如中實相真如 有釋即云。是一切法通相真如 今謂不爾。真如無二。豈有一切法
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）的種姓也是菩薩的自性。菩薩的三種品級也有差別。不能將下品和中品轉變成中品和上品。回答：因為乘的類別不同。不能將二乘轉變成菩薩的種姓。下品、中品、上品這三種都是菩薩的種姓，所以可以轉變，使之成為中品和上品。
論：菩薩應該沒有生死的法則。這個意思是說，菩薩應該沒有變易生死。不是說菩薩沒有生死，就難以讓他們沒有生滅的法則。因為凡是生的，必定會死，這是一定的。古代的德行高尚的人說，在解脫道之後，就沒有生滅了。得到特別的真常，各種相好之身永遠不會遷謝。又說，空如來藏就是真如，具足熏習后產生常身。這些觀點如同惠日論所破斥的。
論：兩種所要捨棄的等等。原本的解釋如同疏文。西明的兩種解釋：一種說法是隻捨棄二乘的無漏，因為相對於菩薩來說，這被稱為低劣的無漏。另一種說法是二乘的無漏以及菩薩因位時未圓滿的無漏，也都被稱為低劣。三藏的觀點認為第一種說法是正確的。其餘的以及《要集》都持有相同的解釋。我認為，不僅僅是二乘的無漏被稱為低劣，菩薩因位時的無漏也被包括在低劣之中。如果因位的無漏不被稱為低劣，那麼因和果有什麼區別呢？為什麼論中說，金剛喻定能夠引出極其圓明純凈的本識？還有第二位法師說，住在無間道就應該被稱為佛，那麼之後的解脫道應該就沒有用了。由此可知，因位時的無漏也被稱為低劣。否則，論文中應該有所區分，漸悟的菩薩捨棄低劣的無漏，頓悟的菩薩沒有低劣的無漏。而且，因位如果不捨棄，怎麼能夠成佛呢？難道不捨棄金剛喻定無間道嗎？另外，《雜集》第十四卷說，在各種現觀位證得越來越殊勝的道時，捨棄先前所得的下劣品道。所以知道成佛時要捨棄低劣的因位。所說的捨棄，不是完全捨棄，而是轉變到齊平。而二乘則是轉滅，二者都可以稱為捨棄。
論：解釋涅槃。原本的疏文解釋自性涅槃的體相就是真如理，也就是七如中的實相真如。有一種解釋說，這是一切法的通相真如。我認為不是這樣。真如沒有兩種，怎麼會有一切法的通相真如呢？
【English Translation】 English version The gotra (lineage, seed) of the two vehicles (sravaka-yana and pratyekabuddha-yana) is also the nature of a bodhisattva. The three grades of bodhisattvas should also be distinct. It is not possible to transform the lower and middle grades into the middle and upper grades. Answer: Because the categories of vehicles are different. It is not possible to transform the two vehicles into the gotra of a bodhisattva. The lower, middle, and upper three are all the gotra of a bodhisattva, so it can be transformed to become the middle and upper grades.
Treatise: A bodhisattva should be without the law of birth and death. This means that a bodhisattva should be without the birth and death of transformation. It is not that if a bodhisattva has no birth and death, it is difficult to make them without the law of arising and ceasing. Because whatever is born will surely die, this is certain. Ancient virtuous people said that after the path of liberation, there is no arising and ceasing. Obtaining the special true permanence, the various forms and marks of the body will never change. It is also said that the tathagatagarbha (womb of the tathagata) of emptiness is tathata (suchness), and after being fully perfumed, it produces a constant body. These views are refuted as in the Huirilun.
Treatise: The two that are to be abandoned, etc. The original explanation is as in the commentary. The two explanations of Ximing: One says that only the asrava (outflows, defilements) of the two vehicles are abandoned, because it is called inferior asrava compared to the bodhisattva. The other says that the asrava of the two vehicles and the unfulfilled asrava of the bodhisattva in the causal stage are also called inferior. The view of the Tripitaka (three baskets) is that the first statement is correct. The rest and the Yaoji all hold the same explanation. I think that not only is the asrava of the two vehicles called inferior, but the asrava of the bodhisattva in the causal stage is also included in the inferior. If the asrava of the causal stage is not called inferior, then what is the difference between cause and effect? Why does the treatise say that the vajropamasamadhi (diamond-like concentration) can elicit the extremely perfect and pure original consciousness? Also, the second teacher said that one should be called a Buddha when dwelling in the anantarya-marga (path of immediate consequence), so the subsequent path of liberation should be useless. From this, it is known that the asrava in the causal stage is also called inferior. Otherwise, there should be a distinction in the treatise, the gradually enlightened bodhisattva abandons the inferior asrava, and the suddenly enlightened bodhisattva has no inferior asrava. Moreover, if the causal stage is not abandoned, how can one become a Buddha? Does one not abandon the vajropamasamadhi anantarya-marga? In addition, the fourteenth volume of the Zaji says that when one attains more and more superior paths in various abhisamaya (direct realization) positions, one abandons the previously obtained inferior paths. So it is known that one must abandon the inferior causal stage when becoming a Buddha. The so-called abandonment is not a complete abandonment, but a transformation to equality. And the two vehicles are transformed and extinguished, and both can be called abandonment.
Treatise: Explaining nirvana. The original commentary explains that the substance of svabhavanirvana (self-nature nirvana) is the principle of tathata (suchness), which is the bhutatathata (true suchness) of reality among the seven tathatas. One explanation says that this is the common characteristic tathata of all dharmas (phenomena). I don't think so. Tathata is not two, how can there be the common characteristic tathata of all dharmas?
別相真如。又七如中說有實相。不說通相。據何得知通相為體 又解涅槃經第二說三事涅槃有二解。一約理。二約三體。西明一向解彼經意。唯取于理舉能成智。取所顯理為其自性 今謂通二攝義圓備。何以故。如余處言菩提．菩提斷俱名為菩提。故知涅槃亦通相．性。不爾何故言摩訶般若．解脫．法身名大涅槃。若取所顯應但言如來法身名大涅槃。眾功所顯故。又若唯取所顯理為體。何得說言三事不一異名大般涅槃。既不唯說法身為涅槃故。相．性合方名為大故。法華經論云。唯有如來證大菩提究竟滿足一切智惠名大涅槃。又顯異二乘得無餘依無諸德故。
論。明四涅槃得人之中。本解如疏 然要集等不許菩薩有無住處。若許有者。論應言二乘無學容有四種。何故但言容有前三 今謂非難。二乘無學容有前三。據定性說。若不定性。迴心已去即名菩薩。非二乘故。不說二乘容有四種。若入初地得無住處。分非圓得。具悲．智故。證得生死．涅槃無差別如故。廣如前辨 如來具四明有有餘。論中二釋。本解如疏 有解云。依金光明第一。依應化身說有餘故 有云。同有解 要集云。有解為勝 今謂此同本疏。金光經云依應化身。即此論初解有似苦依王宮生身。智者應知。若云引證故說為勝者。此義極成。何煩引
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 別相真如（區別於一般現象的真如）。又有七如（七種真如）中說有實相（真實的相），不說通相（普遍的相）。根據什麼得知通相為體？又《涅槃經》第二說三事涅槃（三種涅槃）有兩種解釋。一是約理（從道理上解釋），二是約三體（從三種本體上解釋）。西明（西明寺）一向解釋該經的意義，只取能成智（能夠成就智慧的），取所顯理（所顯現的真理）作為其自性。現在認為通相和性相都包含，意義圓滿具備。為什麼呢？如其他地方說，菩提（覺悟）和菩提斷（斷除煩惱）都名為菩提。所以知道涅槃也包含通相和性相。不然，為什麼說摩訶般若（大智慧）、解脫（解脫煩惱）、法身（佛的法身）名為大涅槃？如果取所顯理，應該只說如來法身名為大涅槃，因為是眾多功德所顯現的。又如果只取所顯理為體，怎麼能說三事不一異（三種事物既不相同也不相異）名為大般涅槃？既然不只是說法身為涅槃，所以相和性合在一起才名為大。法華經論說，只有如來證得大菩提（大覺悟），究竟滿足一切智慧，名為大涅槃。又顯示不同於二乘（聲聞乘和緣覺乘）得到無餘依（沒有剩餘的依處），沒有各種功德的緣故。 論中，闡明四種涅槃的證得者，原本的解釋如疏（註釋）。然而《要集》等不承認菩薩有無住處涅槃（不住于生死和涅槃的涅槃）。如果承認有，論中應該說二乘無學（二乘的無學位）容有四種涅槃。為什麼只說容有前三種？現在認為這並非難點。二乘無學容有前三種，是根據定性（已經確定根性）來說的。如果是不定性（根性不確定），迴心（回小向大）之後就稱為菩薩，不是二乘的緣故。所以不說二乘容有四種涅槃。如果進入初地（菩薩的第一個階位），得到無住處涅槃，是分證而非圓滿證得，因為具足悲和智的緣故。證得生死和涅槃沒有差別，如如不動。詳細的解釋如前所述。如來具足四種涅槃，表明有有餘涅槃（有剩餘的涅槃）。論中有兩種解釋。原本的解釋如疏。有一種解釋說，依據《金光明經》第一，依據應化身（佛的應化身）說有有餘涅槃的緣故。還有一種說法與有解相同。《要集》說，有解為勝。現在認為這與原本的疏相同。《金光明經》說依據應化身，即此論最初解釋的有似苦（示現苦相）依王宮生身（在王宮出生的身體）。智者應該知道。如果說因為引用經文作為證據所以說為勝，這個意義非常明確，何必再引用呢？
【English Translation】 English version: 'Distinctive Aspect of Suchness'. Furthermore, among the Seven Suchnesses, it is said that there is 'Real Aspect' (Śūnyatā, the true nature of reality), but not 'Common Aspect' (Samanya-laksana, the general characteristics). Based on what can we know that the 'Common Aspect' is the substance? Moreover, the second chapter of the 'Nirvana Sutra' states that there are two interpretations of the 'Three Aspects of Nirvana'. One is based on 'Principle' (reasoning), and the other is based on 'Three Entities' (three bodies of the Buddha). Ximing (Ximing Temple) consistently interprets the meaning of that sutra by only taking what can accomplish wisdom, taking the revealed principle as its self-nature. Now, it is considered that both the 'Common Aspect' and 'Nature' are included, and the meaning is fully complete. Why? As it is said elsewhere, both 'Bodhi' (enlightenment) and 'Bodhi-cessation' (the cessation of afflictions) are called 'Bodhi'. Therefore, it is known that Nirvana also includes both 'Common Aspect' and 'Nature'. Otherwise, why is it said that 'Mahaprajna' (great wisdom), 'Liberation' (from afflictions), and 'Dharmakaya' (the Dharma body of the Buddha) are called 'Great Nirvana'? If we take the revealed principle, we should only say that the 'Tathagata's Dharmakaya' is called 'Great Nirvana', because it is revealed by numerous merits. Furthermore, if we only take the revealed principle as the substance, how can we say that the 'Three Aspects are neither identical nor different' are called 'Great Parinirvana'? Since it is not only saying that the Dharmakaya is Nirvana, the aspect and nature together are called 'Great'. The 'Lotus Sutra Treatise' says that only the Tathagata attains 'Great Bodhi' (great enlightenment), ultimately fulfilling all wisdom, and is called 'Great Nirvana'. It also shows the difference from the Two Vehicles (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) who attain 'Nirvana with remainder' (nirvana with the skandhas still present), without various virtues. In the treatise, clarifying the attainers of the Four Nirvanas, the original explanation is as in the commentary. However, 'Yaoji' (Essentials Collected) and others do not admit that Bodhisattvas have 'Non-abiding Nirvana' (Nirvana that does not abide in either Samsara or Nirvana). If it is admitted, the treatise should say that the 'Two Vehicles' (Śrāvakayāna and Pratyekabuddhayāna) Arhats (those in the stage of no more learning) can have four types of Nirvana. Why does it only say that they can have the first three? Now, it is considered that this is not a difficult point. The 'Two Vehicles' Arhats can have the first three, according to those who are 'definitely destined' (to be Arhats). If they are 'not definitely destined', after turning their minds (towards the Mahayana), they are called Bodhisattvas, not belonging to the Two Vehicles. Therefore, it is not said that the Two Vehicles can have four types of Nirvana. If one enters the first Bhumi (the first stage of a Bodhisattva), one attains 'Non-abiding Nirvana', but it is a partial attainment, not a complete attainment, because they possess both compassion and wisdom. They realize that there is no difference between Samsara and Nirvana, being in suchness. The detailed explanation is as mentioned before. The Tathagata possesses four types of Nirvana, indicating that there is 'Nirvana with remainder' (nirvana with the skandhas still present). There are two explanations in the treatise. The original explanation is as in the commentary. One explanation says that according to the first chapter of the 'Golden Light Sutra', it is said that there is 'Nirvana with remainder' based on the 'Nirmanakaya' (emanation body of the Buddha). Another explanation is the same as the 'existing explanation'. 'Yaoji' says that the 'existing explanation' is superior. Now, it is considered that this is the same as the original commentary. The 'Golden Light Sutra' says that it is based on the 'Nirmanakaya', which is the initial explanation in this treatise, resembling the 'suffering appearance' (showing the appearance of suffering) relying on the 'body born in the royal palace' (the body born in the royal palace). The wise should know. If it is said that it is superior because it quotes sutras as evidence, this meaning is very clear, why bother quoting it again?
證。處處皆說化非真故。
出涅槃體。諸部差別。大乘具四。餘部但二。然余．無餘薩婆多師體雖無別俱擇滅為體。然體有多。隨有漏法各一擇滅故。大乘依一真如假立。經部無體。但苦因滅處名有餘依。苦果滅處名為無餘。皆是假立。不說有體。無為亦爾。然有餘．無餘俱擇滅攝。本疏釋云。中二擇滅攝。斷縛得故。所依縛盡初得果時名為擇滅。所依后無方顯涅槃。后依無時由前擇力 要集云。大乘聖道斷煩惱故。所證擇滅名有餘依。煩惱因滅苦果任運滅位別得擇滅。遠由擇力而滅依故。故次下云。中二擇滅攝。然入無餘無別無間．解脫道也 今謂不爾。既云煩惱因滅苦果任運滅位。云何別得擇滅。自不許有無間．解脫。又佛地論云。菩薩初證如來地時。頓證二種大涅槃界。準此二乘初得無學。亦應頓證二種涅槃。由此應依本疏為勝。若云雖不別起無間．解脫。由前智故此後斷滅名為擇滅。何不許前正斷障時已得二種。無餘后顯故是擇滅。若云菩薩證如來地時。舍有漏故得二涅槃。二乘苦在不得無餘。故后時得者。后既任運諸苦不生。應非擇滅。同黃門等見惑因盡。彼任運滅得非擇故。
論。大圓鏡智相應心品。本釋如疏 西明云。從喻為名。然云鏡智即用相應智品為體 要集等云。或凈第八亦名為智
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：證明。處處都說化現並非真實。
關於涅槃的本體，各部派的觀點有所不同。大乘具備四種（涅槃），其他部派只有兩種。然而，有餘依涅槃和無餘依涅槃，薩婆多部的觀點是本體雖然沒有區別，但俱擇滅作為本體。然而本體有多種，隨著有漏法的不同，各有各的擇滅。大乘依據一真如假立（涅槃）。經部沒有本體，只是苦因滅盡的地方稱為有餘依涅槃，苦果滅盡的地方稱為無餘依涅槃，都是假立的，不認為有實體。無為法也是如此。然而，有餘依涅槃和無餘依涅槃都屬於擇滅所攝。本疏解釋說，屬於兩種擇滅所攝，因為斷除束縛才能得到。所依的束縛斷盡，初次證得果位時，稱為擇滅。所依在之後不再存在，才能顯現涅槃。之後所依不存在時，是由於之前的擇滅之力。《要集》中說，大乘聖道斷除煩惱的緣故，所證得的擇滅稱為有餘依涅槃。煩惱之因滅盡，苦果任運而滅的階段，另外得到擇滅，是由於擇滅之力的長遠作用而滅盡所依，所以接下來才說，屬於兩種擇滅所攝。然而，進入無餘依涅槃時，沒有無間道和解脫道。
現在我認為不是這樣。既然說煩惱之因滅盡，苦果任運而滅的階段，怎麼能另外得到擇滅呢？自己不承認有無間道和解脫道。而且，《佛地論》中說，菩薩初次證得如來地時，頓悟兩種大涅槃界。按照這個說法，二乘初次證得無學果位時，也應該頓悟兩種涅槃。因此，應該依據本疏的說法更為殊勝。如果說雖然沒有另外生起無間道和解脫道，但由於之前的智慧，此後的斷滅稱為擇滅。為什麼不承認之前正在斷除障礙時，就已經得到兩種涅槃，無餘依涅槃在之後顯現，所以是擇滅呢？如果說菩薩證得如來地時，捨棄有漏之身，所以得到兩種涅槃。二乘的痛苦在於無法得到無餘依涅槃，所以在之後才能得到。之後既然任運而行，各種痛苦不再產生，應該不是擇滅。如同黃門等人，見惑之因滅盡，他們任運而滅，得到非擇滅的緣故。
《論》。大圓鏡智相應的心品。原本的解釋如同疏文。西明說，從比喻來命名。然而，說鏡智就是用相應的智品作為本體。《要集》等說，或者清凈的第八識也稱為智。
【English Translation】 English version: Proof. Everywhere it is said that transformation is not real.
Regarding the substance of Nirvana, different schools have different views. The Mahayana possesses four (Nirvanas), while other schools have only two. However, regarding Nirvana with remainder (有餘依涅槃, Youyiyi Niepan) and Nirvana without remainder (無餘依涅槃, Wuyiyi Niepan), the Sarvastivadins (薩婆多, Saboduo) hold that although the substance is not different, both Nirodha-satya (俱擇滅, Juzemie) serve as the substance. However, there are multiple substances, each with its own Nirodha-satya depending on the different conditioned dharmas (有漏法, Youloufa). The Mahayana provisionally establishes (Nirvana) based on the One True Suchness (一真如, Yizhenru). The Sautrantikas (經部, Jingbu) do not have a substance; they merely call the place where the cause of suffering is extinguished 'Nirvana with remainder,' and the place where the result of suffering is extinguished 'Nirvana without remainder.' These are provisional establishments and do not consider there to be a substance. The unconditioned (無為, Wuwei) is also like this. However, both Nirvana with remainder and Nirvana without remainder are included within Nirodha-satya. The commentary explains that they are included within the two Nirodha-satyas because one can attain (Nirvana) by severing bonds. When the bonds of what is relied upon are completely severed, and one initially attains the fruit, it is called Nirodha-satya. Only when what is relied upon no longer exists does Nirvana become manifest. When what is relied upon no longer exists, it is due to the power of the previous Nirodha-satya. The 'Essentials Collected' says that because the Mahayana's holy path severs afflictions, the Nirodha-satya attained is called Nirvana with remainder. When the cause of affliction is extinguished and the result of suffering spontaneously ceases, one separately attains Nirodha-satya, which is extinguished due to the long-term effect of Nirodha-satya, so it is said that it is included within the two Nirodha-satyas. However, when entering Nirvana without remainder, there is no path of no-interval (無間道, Wujiandao) or path of liberation (解脫道, Jietuodao).
Now I say that this is not so. Since it is said that when the cause of affliction is extinguished and the result of suffering spontaneously ceases, how can one separately attain Nirodha-satya? One does not acknowledge the existence of the path of no-interval or the path of liberation. Moreover, the 'Treatise on the Buddha-land' says that when a Bodhisattva initially attains the Buddha-land (如來地, Rulaidi), they suddenly realize the two great Nirvana realms. According to this, when the two vehicles (二乘, Ercheng) initially attain the state of no-more-learning (無學, Wuxue), they should also suddenly realize the two Nirvanas. Therefore, one should rely on the commentary as being more superior. If it is said that although the path of no-interval and the path of liberation do not arise separately, the subsequent cessation due to previous wisdom is called Nirodha-satya, why not acknowledge that when one was previously severing obstacles, one had already attained the two Nirvanas, and Nirvana without remainder is manifested later, so it is Nirodha-satya? If it is said that when a Bodhisattva attains the Buddha-land, they abandon the conditioned body (有漏之身, Youlouzhizhen), so they attain the two Nirvanas. The suffering of the two vehicles lies in their inability to attain Nirvana without remainder, so they can only attain it later. Since all sufferings spontaneously cease later, it should not be Nirodha-satya. It is like eunuchs, whose cause of the delusions of views (見惑, Jianhuo) is extinguished, and their spontaneous cessation is non-Nirodha-satya.
Treatise. The mind-class associated with the Great Perfect Mirror Wisdom (大圓鏡智, Dayuanjingzhi). The original explanation is like the commentary. Ximing says that it is named from a metaphor. However, it is said that mirror wisdom is using the corresponding wisdom-class as its substance. The 'Essentials Collected' and others say that the pure eighth consciousness (第八識, Dibashi) is also called wisdom.
。從喻相應名圓鏡智。是有財釋。又云。或智用增。即別境惠名圓鏡智。或依主。或持業。余心．心所或是有財。或依主釋。所變種現唯有財釋 今謂本釋但是總釋圓鏡智名。圓鏡雖喻。六釋之中無從喻釋。然智及識諸相應品亦總名智。智相應故。圓鏡即智。並持業釋。除種及相定道戒等。不能現生身等影故。現雖種生。現望于種。現非種影。但由現智變帶生故名之為智。如說識言識自相故等。然別解五法得智名者。心．心所法相應法故。鄰近得名。不相應等依相應釋。即非名鄰近者。亦通鄰近。故下云如是四智相應心品。雖言各有二十二法能變．所變種．現俱生。而智用增。以智名顯。故餘名智皆鄰近釋 然無為名智。或鄰近名。或有財釋。寶性論中。云由此有趣及涅槃故。得名有財。然正解者是依主釋。智之性故。不可相應名為鏡智。從有財釋智非能有。鏡非所有故。若云識及余所有惠俱故名有財者。亦不應理。不為余所有此智故。現相應故。是鄰近釋。如四念住。若凈第八名為智者。亦同念住正是鄰近。不通依主。依．所依定故。此下文云。識為主故。雖果智強不名為主。設依主言不同能．所依。以識依智應名智識。如眼識等。既不如是。明非依主 若別境惠名圓智者。亦非依主。主非智故。此別境惠是智自相
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：從比喻相應的角度來說，『圓鏡智』（Ādarśa-jñāna，the Wisdom of the Great Perfect Mirror）可以被解釋為『有財釋』（Bahu-vrīhi，一種複合詞的解釋方式，指具有某種屬性的事物）。另一種說法是，當智慧的作用增強時，『別境慧』（Vaisāradya-pratibhāna-jñāna，區分諸法的智慧）可以被稱為『圓鏡智』。這種解釋可以是『依主釋』（Tat-puruṣa，一種複合詞的解釋方式，指依附於主體的屬性），也可以是『持業釋』（Karma-dhāraya，一種複合詞的解釋方式，指具有相同格的詞語組合）。其餘的心和心所法，可以按照『有財釋』或『依主釋』來解釋。所變現的種子和現象，只能用『有財釋』來解釋。 現在我們認為，最初的解釋只是對『圓鏡智』這個名稱的總體解釋。雖然圓鏡是一種比喻，但在六種解釋方式中，沒有一種是從比喻的角度來解釋的。然而，智慧和識以及所有相應的法，都可以總稱為『智』，因為它們與智慧相應。因此，『圓鏡』就是『智』，這是一種『持業釋』。除了種子、相、禪定、道、戒等，因為它們不能直接產生身等影像。雖然現象是由種子產生的，但從現象的角度來看，現象並不是種子的影像。只是因為現象是由智慧變現並帶有智慧的屬性，所以才被稱為『智』。正如所說的，『識』這個詞是指識的自相等等。然而，另一種解釋認為，五法（指五蘊）獲得『智』這個名稱，是因為心和心所法與智慧相應，所以是鄰近而得名。不相應的法等，則按照相應的解釋。不是名稱鄰近的，也包括鄰近的情況。所以下面說，『像這樣，四智相應的心的品類』。雖然說各有二十二法，能變、所變、種子、現象同時產生，但因為智慧的作用增強，所以以『智』這個名稱來彰顯。因此，其餘被稱為『智』的名稱，都是鄰近的解釋。 然而，無為法被稱為『智』，可以是鄰近而得名，也可以是『有財釋』。《寶性論》（Ratna-gotra-vibhāga）中說，『因為由此而有樂趣和涅槃，所以得名有財』。然而，正確的解釋是『依主釋』，因為它是智慧的自性。不能因為相應而稱為『鏡智』，因為從『有財釋』的角度來看，智慧不是能擁有的，鏡子不是被擁有的。如果說識和其餘所有的智慧一起，所以稱為『有財』，也是不合理的，因為不是爲了其餘所有而有這種智慧。因為現象是相應的，所以是鄰近的解釋，如四念住（catuḥ-smṛty-upasthāna，four foundations of mindfulness）。如果清凈的第八識（Ālaya-vijñāna，the storehouse consciousness）被稱為『智』，也和念住一樣，只是鄰近的。不包括『依主釋』，因為是所依和能依的關係。下面的經文說，『因為識是主』。雖然果智強大，但不稱為主。即使是『依主釋』，也不同於能依和所依的關係。因為識依附於智，應該稱為『智識』，如眼識等。既然不是這樣，就表明不是『依主釋』。 如果『別境慧』被稱為『圓智』，也不是『依主釋』，因為主不是智慧。這種『別境慧』是智慧的自相。
【English Translation】 English version: From the perspective of metaphorical correspondence, 『Ādarśa-jñāna』 (the Wisdom of the Great Perfect Mirror) can be explained as 『Bahu-vrīhi』 (a type of compound word explanation, referring to things with certain attributes). Another saying is that when the function of wisdom increases, 『Vaisāradya-pratibhāna-jñāna』 (the wisdom of distinguishing dharmas) can be called 『Ādarśa-jñāna』. This explanation can be 『Tat-puruṣa』 (a type of compound word explanation, referring to attributes attached to the subject), or 『Karma-dhāraya』 (a type of compound word explanation, referring to combinations of words with the same case). The remaining mind and mental factors can be explained according to 『Bahu-vrīhi』 or 『Tat-puruṣa』. The seeds and phenomena that are transformed can only be explained by 『Bahu-vrīhi』. Now we believe that the initial explanation is only a general explanation of the name 『Ādarśa-jñāna』. Although the round mirror is a metaphor, there is no explanation from the perspective of metaphor among the six explanation methods. However, wisdom and consciousness, as well as all corresponding dharmas, can be collectively called 『Jñāna』 because they correspond to wisdom. Therefore, 『round mirror』 is 『Jñāna』, which is a 『Karma-dhāraya』. Except for seeds, characteristics, meditation, the path, precepts, etc., because they cannot directly produce images of the body, etc. Although phenomena are produced by seeds, from the perspective of phenomena, phenomena are not images of seeds. It is only because phenomena are transformed by wisdom and have the attributes of wisdom that they are called 『Jñāna』. As it is said, 『the word consciousness refers to the self-nature of consciousness』, and so on. However, another explanation is that the five dharmas (referring to the five aggregates) obtain the name 『Jñāna』 because the mind and mental factors correspond to wisdom, so the name is obtained by proximity. Non-corresponding dharmas, etc., are explained according to correspondence. Those that are not close in name also include proximity. So it says below, 『Like this, the categories of mind corresponding to the four wisdoms』. Although it is said that there are twenty-two dharmas each, the transforming, the transformed, the seeds, and the phenomena arise simultaneously, but because the function of wisdom increases, the name 『Jñāna』 is highlighted. Therefore, the remaining names called 『Jñāna』 are all explanations of proximity. However, unconditioned dharmas called 『Jñāna』 can be named by proximity or 『Bahu-vrīhi』. In the 『Ratna-gotra-vibhāga』 (寶性論), it says, 『Because of this, there is pleasure and Nirvana, so it is named Bahu-vrīhi』. However, the correct explanation is 『Tat-puruṣa』, because it is the nature of wisdom. It cannot be called 『Mirror Wisdom』 because of correspondence, because from the perspective of 『Bahu-vrīhi』, wisdom is not what can be possessed, and the mirror is not what is possessed. If it is said that consciousness and all the remaining wisdom together, so it is called 『Bahu-vrīhi』, it is also unreasonable, because this wisdom is not for all the remaining. Because the phenomena are corresponding, it is an explanation of proximity, such as the catuḥ-smṛty-upasthāna (四念住, four foundations of mindfulness). If the pure eighth consciousness (Ālaya-vijñāna, 阿賴耶識, the storehouse consciousness) is called 『Jñāna』, it is also just proximity, like the smṛty-upasthāna. It does not include 『Tat-puruṣa』, because it is the relationship between what is relied on and what can be relied on. The following text says, 『Because consciousness is the master』. Although the wisdom of the result is strong, it is not called the master. Even if it is 『Tat-puruṣa』, it is different from the relationship between what can be relied on and what is relied on. Because consciousness relies on wisdom, it should be called 『Jñāna-vijñāna』, such as eye consciousness, etc. Since it is not like this, it shows that it is not 『Tat-puruṣa』. If 『Vaisāradya-pratibhāna-jñāna』 is called 『Round Wisdom』, it is also not 『Tat-puruṣa』, because the master is not wisdom. This 『Vaisāradya-pratibhāna-jñāna』 is the self-nature of wisdom.
故。但持業名 然諸經論說不同者。各據一義。如佛地論云諸如來第八凈識。能現能生智等影像如大圓鏡者。據親能生實身．土影。相應智等杖彼變故。非持種故。但說凈識不說心所。若據質．相．假．實合說。通諸心所亦能現生諸相分影。佛地第四云凈識者據前義。今此論中假．實合論。總出體故。是總說故。論下結云。此四智品攝功德盡。唯除無為。說生得故。性．相別故。
論。平等性智。本釋真如名平等性。智緣於此云平等性智 西明云。謂有情平等。莊嚴論名眾生平等智 今謂本釋是盡理。言餘眾生平等者。由何能緣眾生平等。意由智證真如平等。是一切法平等性故。故能緣生而為平等。又復說言平等性智故。不但言平等智故。眾生不是平等之性。又經云非不見真如而能了諸行故。佛地論云。先通達真法界時。得諸有情平等心等。不障平等性智通緣性相。但正釋名不唯約有情。
釋轉識得智中。大莊嚴論轉第六識得成事智。轉五識得妙觀察智。此論相違。如何會釋 答本有二解 一云莊嚴不依次說。非言轉六得成事智。故不相違 二疏外別解云。莊嚴論中據第六識能作神通等諸成業云得事智。五識因位粗不觀察。果位方能云得觀察。故亦不違。無性兩釋。各隨一義不違二論。然佛地論破轉五識
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本： 因此，雖然只是持有業的名稱，但各經論的說法不同，是因為各自依據一個義理。例如，《佛地論》說諸如來的第八凈識（第八意識，又稱阿賴耶識，此處指轉識后清凈的阿賴耶識），能夠顯現和產生智慧等的影像，就像大圓鏡一樣。這是依據它能夠直接產生真實的身和國土的影像，以及相應的智慧等，憑藉這些變化的原因，而不是因為它持有種子。所以只說凈識，不說心所（伴隨意識產生的心理活動）。如果依據質、相、假、實合起來說，那麼所有的心所也能顯現和產生各種相分的影像。《佛地論》第四卷說凈識是依據前面的義理。現在這部論中是假、實合起來論述，總括地說明它的體性。這是總體的說法。論的下文總結說，這四智品所包含的功德都完備了，唯獨除去了無為法，因為它們是生得的，並且自性和現象不同。
論：平等性智（四智之一，證得諸法平等性的智慧）。 本來的解釋是真如（諸法實相）名為平等性，智慧緣於此，稱為平等性智。《西明疏》說，是指有情（眾生）的平等。《莊嚴論》名為眾生平等智。我認為本來的解釋是窮盡了真理。至於說緣于眾生的平等，是因為什麼能夠緣于眾生的平等呢？意思是由於智慧證悟了真如的平等，真如是一切法的平等性，所以能夠緣于眾生而成為平等。而且說平等性智，不僅僅說平等智。眾生不是平等的自性。而且經中說，如果不能見到真如，就不能瞭解諸行（一切現象）。《佛地論》說，先通達真法界（真實的法性），才能得到諸有情的平等心等，不障礙平等性智普遍地緣于自性和現象。但是，正面的解釋名稱不只是侷限於有情。
解釋轉識得智中，《大莊嚴論》說轉第六識（意識）得到成事智（成就事業的智慧），轉五識（眼、耳、鼻、舌、身識）得到妙觀察智（精妙觀察諸法的智慧）。這與本論相違背，如何解釋呢？ 回答：本來有兩種解釋： 一種說法是《莊嚴論》不是按照順序說的，並非說轉第六識得到成事智，所以不相違背。 另一種是《瑜伽師地論疏外記》的另一種解釋說，《莊嚴論》中依據第六識能夠作出神通等各種成就事業的行為，而說得到成事智。五識在因位時粗糙，不能觀察，在果位時才能觀察，所以說得到妙觀察智，因此也不相違背。無性菩薩的兩種解釋，各自隨順一個義理，不違背兩種論典。然而，《佛地論》破斥了轉五識的說法。
【English Translation】 English version: Therefore, although it merely holds the name of 'karma', the differing statements in various sutras and treatises arise because each relies on a specific meaning. For example, the Buddhabhumi Sutra states that the eighth pure consciousness (the eighth consciousness, also known as the Alaya consciousness, here referring to the purified Alaya consciousness after transformation) of the Tathagatas can manifest and generate images of wisdom, like a great round mirror. This is based on its direct ability to generate images of the real body and land, as well as corresponding wisdom, due to these transformative causes, rather than because it holds seeds. Therefore, it only speaks of pure consciousness and not mental factors (mental activities that accompany consciousness). If based on combining substance, characteristics, provisionality, and reality, then all mental factors can also manifest and generate images of various aspect-divisions. The fourth volume of the Buddhabhumi Sutra states that pure consciousness is based on the preceding meaning. Now, this treatise discusses combining provisionality and reality, comprehensively explaining its nature. This is a general statement. The treatise concludes below that the merits encompassed by these four wisdom categories are complete, except for unconditioned dharmas, because they are innate and because their nature and phenomena are different.
Treatise: Equality Wisdom (one of the Four Wisdoms, the wisdom that realizes the equality of all dharmas). The original explanation is that Suchness (the true nature of all dharmas) is called Equality. Wisdom that focuses on this is called Equality Wisdom. The Ximing Commentary says that it refers to the equality of sentient beings. The Ornament of the Great Vehicle Sutra calls it the Wisdom of Equality of Sentient Beings. I believe the original explanation exhausts the truth. As for saying that it focuses on the equality of sentient beings, what enables it to focus on the equality of sentient beings? It means that because wisdom realizes the equality of Suchness, and Suchness is the equality of all dharmas, it can focus on sentient beings and become equality. Moreover, it is called Equality Wisdom, not just Equality Wisdom. Sentient beings are not the nature of equality. Furthermore, the sutra says that if one cannot see Suchness, one cannot understand all actions (all phenomena). The Buddhabhumi Sutra says that one must first penetrate the true Dharma realm (the true nature of Dharma) to attain the equal mind towards all sentient beings, which does not obstruct Equality Wisdom from universally focusing on nature and phenomena. However, the direct explanation of the name is not limited to sentient beings.
Regarding the explanation of transforming consciousness to attain wisdom, the Ornament of the Great Vehicle Sutra says that transforming the sixth consciousness (consciousness) attains Accomplishing Wisdom (wisdom to accomplish deeds), and transforming the five consciousnesses (eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body consciousnesses) attains Wonderful Observing Wisdom (wisdom to exquisitely observe all dharmas). This contradicts this treatise. How can it be explained? Answer: There are originally two explanations: One explanation is that the Ornament of the Great Vehicle Sutra does not speak in sequence, and it does not say that transforming the sixth consciousness attains Accomplishing Wisdom, so there is no contradiction. Another explanation from the Extraneous Notes on the Yogacarabhumi-sastra Commentary says that in the Ornament of the Great Vehicle Sutra, it is based on the sixth consciousness being able to perform various actions that accomplish deeds, such as supernatural powers, and thus it is said to attain Accomplishing Wisdom. The five consciousnesses are coarse and unable to observe in the causal stage, and only able to observe in the fruition stage, so it is said to attain Wonderful Observing Wisdom, thus there is also no contradiction. Vasubandhu's two explanations each follow one meaning and do not contradict the two treatises. However, the Buddhabhumi Sutra refutes the statement of transforming the five consciousnesses.
得觀察智。云說法斷疑非五識能者。是破別師。非破莊嚴。如理門論破古因明言。諸師異釋。繁不具敘。
論。金剛喻定無所熏識等者。要集云。由現行多聞能熏力故。法爾種子增長勝用。故下文云此四種姓雖皆本有。而要熏發方得現行。因位漸增果位圓滿等。今謂。此判見道可爾。以見道前無現無漏熏起新種。至修道已有現能熏熏得新種。若言及其成佛法爾種生 又云由此道理現熏等種。種生勝現。由現力故劣種成勝。謂金剛位種體雖具。其用未成勝。至佛果位前念類種生勝解脫現行果道。由此道力彼能生種亦成最勝。故言轉齊者 理即不爾。護法宗意新熏．本種俱許生現。如何生果新獨不生唯本有起。鏡智．成事因無現智而為能熏。由他現資唯本有起。理即實爾。平等．妙觀唯本種起。理即不可。若云金剛無間現行既劣。如何熏種即得成勝。故本有生者 此亦不爾。本種既劣。如何能生勝現解脫。既許劣種能生勝現。如何不許劣現能熏生勝種子。又現能熏不生勝種。種非能熏。生勝現行道理不可。又能熏義至果不增。現勝解脫增其本種。即果猶增故不應理由此應信。金剛無間現行雖劣能熏勝種。並令本種功能亦增。圓鏡．成事唯本種生。妙觀．平等本．新合起可應正理。轉齊．轉滅義如前釋。
論。
【現代漢語翻譯】 得觀察智（獲得觀察智慧）。『云說法斷疑非五識能者』（說能夠說法斷除疑惑的不是五識所能做到的），這是爲了駁斥其他宗派的觀點，並非爲了駁斥《莊嚴經論》。正如《如理門論》駁斥古代因明學說時所說：『各家各派的解釋不同，這裡不一一詳述。』
論：『金剛喻定無所熏識等者』（金剛喻定沒有熏習識等作用），《要集》中說：『由於現行多聞能夠產生熏習的力量，自然而然地種子增長，產生殊勝的作用。』所以下文說：『這四種姓雖然本來就存在，但需要熏習才能顯現出來。』因位的逐漸增長，果位的圓滿等等。現在認為，這種判斷對於見道位是可以成立的，因為在見道位之前，沒有現行的無漏法來熏習產生新的種子。到了修道位，已經有了現行法能夠熏習，從而熏習得到新的種子。如果說到了成佛的時候，自然而然地產生種子，又說由此道理，現行熏習等等產生種子，種子產生殊勝的現行，由於現行的力量，劣等的種子變成殊勝的種子，指的是金剛喻定位的種子雖然具備，但其作用尚未成為殊勝，到了佛果位，前唸的同類種子產生殊勝的解脫現行果道，由於這種道的力量，它所能產生的種子也成為最殊勝的，所以說『轉齊』等。
但這種說法在護法宗的觀點中是不成立的，護法宗認為新熏種子和本有種子都可以產生現行，為什麼產生果的時候，只有本有種子才能產生，而新熏種子不能產生呢？圓鏡智（圓滿的鏡子般的智慧）、成事智（成就事業的智慧）在因位沒有現行智慧作為能熏，只能依靠本有種子產生，這種說法是符合道理的。平等智（平等的智慧）、妙觀察智（精妙觀察的智慧）只能依靠本有種子產生，這種說法是不可以的。如果說金剛喻定無間現行既然是劣等的，為什麼熏習種子就能成為殊勝的呢？所以說本有種子產生，這種說法也是不成立的。本有種子既然是劣等的，怎麼能產生殊勝的現行解脫呢？既然允許劣等種子能夠產生殊勝的現行，為什麼不允許劣等現行能夠熏習產生殊勝的種子呢？而且現行能夠熏習卻不能產生殊勝的種子，種子不能熏習卻能產生殊勝的現行，這種道理是說不通的。而且能熏習的意義到了果位也不會增加，現行的殊勝解脫增加了其本有種子，即使到了果位仍然在增加，所以不應該用這種理由來相信。金剛喻定無間現行雖然是劣等的，但能夠熏習殊勝的種子，並且使本有種子的功能也得到增強。圓鏡智、成事智唯有本有種子產生，妙觀察智、平等智本有種子和新熏種子共同產生，這才是正確的道理。『轉齊』、『轉滅』的意義如前文解釋。
論。
【English Translation】 One obtains observational wisdom. 'The statement that explaining the Dharma and resolving doubts cannot be done by the five consciousnesses' is to refute other schools, not to refute the Śūraṅgama Sūtra. Just as the Nyāyamukha refutes ancient Hetuvidya, saying, 'Various teachers have different interpretations, which will not be described in detail here.'
Treatise: 'The Vajra-like Samādhi does not have the function of perfuming consciousnesses, etc.' The Yaoji says, 'Due to the power of present practice and extensive learning, the seeds naturally grow and produce excellent functions.' Therefore, the following text says, 'These four lineages, although originally present, need to be perfumed to manifest.' The gradual increase in the causal stage, the perfection in the fruition stage, etc. Now, it is considered that this judgment is valid for the Path of Seeing, because before the Path of Seeing, there is no present, undefiled Dharma to perfume and generate new seeds. When one reaches the Path of Cultivation, there is already present Dharma that can perfume, thus perfuming and obtaining new seeds. If it is said that when one becomes a Buddha, seeds are naturally produced, and it is also said that due to this principle, present perfuming, etc., generates seeds, and seeds generate excellent present manifestations, and due to the power of present manifestations, inferior seeds become superior seeds, referring to the seeds in the Vajra-like Samādhi state, although present, their function has not yet become superior. When one reaches the state of Buddhahood, the similar seeds of the previous thought generate excellent liberation, the present manifestation of the fruition path. Due to the power of this path, the seeds that it can generate also become the most superior, hence the term 'transformation together'.
However, this statement is not valid in the view of the Dharmapāla school. The Dharmapāla school believes that both newly perfumed seeds and originally existing seeds can generate present manifestations. Why is it that when producing the fruit, only originally existing seeds can produce it, while newly perfumed seeds cannot? The Mirror-like Wisdom (Ādarśa-jñāna) and the Wisdom of Accomplishing Activities (Kṛtyānuṣṭhāna-jñāna) do not have present wisdom as the perfumer in the causal stage, and can only rely on originally existing seeds to produce them. This statement is in accordance with reason. The Wisdom of Equality (Samatā-jñāna) and the Wonderful Observing Wisdom (Pratyavekṣaṇa-jñāna) can only rely on originally existing seeds to produce them. This statement is not acceptable. If it is said that the uninterrupted present manifestation of the Vajra-like Samādhi is inferior, why can perfuming the seeds make them superior? Therefore, the statement that originally existing seeds produce is also not valid. Since originally existing seeds are inferior, how can they produce excellent present liberation? Since it is allowed that inferior seeds can produce excellent present manifestations, why is it not allowed that inferior present manifestations can perfume and produce excellent seeds? Moreover, the present manifestation can perfume but cannot produce excellent seeds, and the seeds cannot perfume but can produce excellent present manifestations. This principle is untenable. Moreover, the meaning of being able to perfume does not increase when reaching the fruition stage. The excellent liberation of the present manifestation increases its originally existing seeds, even when reaching the fruition stage, it is still increasing, so one should not believe this reason. Although the uninterrupted present manifestation of the Vajra-like Samādhi is inferior, it can perfume excellent seeds and enhance the function of the originally existing seeds. The Mirror-like Wisdom and the Wisdom of Accomplishing Activities are produced only by originally existing seeds. The Wonderful Observing Wisdom and the Wisdom of Equality are produced jointly by originally existing seeds and newly perfumed seeds. This is the correct principle. The meaning of 'transformation together' and 'transformation to extinction' is as explained earlier.
Treatise.
成事智而多間斷者。西明云。作意起故即有間斷 有解等云。緣多不具。又分別根作意方起故非恒續 要集云。必由作意。然是本願作意。非說佛果。謂由本願有情根熟即應現化。有情根熟非恒現。故作意事即斷 又云。由意識力五識得起。意識作意能起成事。任運應機無別作意。五識必依方得起故。謂所化根熟。任運作意能引五識。根熟不恒引彼五識有起無起。必依根．境故。云雖二種理甚難定 今謂。若以依根．境等方始得起。智既遍緣。緣何不具。但為佛果事智緣境不為希望五塵境起。但願度有情慾無滅故。以機不恒會互有所屬故多間斷。化地上菩薩平等．觀察二智慧故不假事智。
常無分別。要集云。相傳二釋。一云自性法身體凝然常。受用．變化皆是無常。一云三身皆凝然常。說無常者據化相故。二家皆廣道理成立。后斷云。上來二釋皆為應理 今謂必無二俱應理。互相違故。本說雖略以明理盡。應依攝論．金光明經．無上依經．楞伽經等。說報．化無常。以為盡理。經言常者經及論文皆自會訖。
論。同能變識俱善無漏等者。且第八識漏無漏分別。無漏能所緣俱無漏。純種生故。二三性分別。能所緣俱善。純種生故。約親相說 三界地系不繫對。能所緣同不繫。亦約親相。如是諸識據因果位
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本 『成事智』（成就事業的智慧）之所以多間斷，西明解釋說：『因為作意（心理活動）生起，所以就有間斷。』 有些解釋認為：『因為所緣的條件不完備。』 又因為『分別根』（能夠區分事物的感官）和『作意』才能生起，所以不是恒常持續的。 『要集』中說：『必定要通過作意。』 然而這是本願的作意，不是指佛果。意思是說，由於本願，有情眾生的根機成熟，佛菩薩就應機示現。有情眾生的根機成熟不是恒常的，所以作意的事情也就間斷了。』 『要集』又說：『由於意識的力量，五識（眼識、耳識、鼻識、舌識、身識）才能生起。意識的作意能夠生起成事智。隨順機緣，沒有其他的作意。五識必定要依靠才能生起。』 意思是說，所教化的眾生根機成熟，隨順機緣的作意能夠引發五識。根機成熟不是恒常的，所以引發五識有生起和不生起。必定要依靠根和境，所以說雖然有兩種說法，但道理很難確定。』 現在我認為，如果依靠根和境等才能生起，那麼智慧既然普遍緣取，為什麼所緣的條件不完備呢？ 只是因為佛果的成事智緣取境界，不是爲了希望五塵（色、聲、香、味、觸）的境界生起，只是希望度化有情眾生，慾望沒有斷滅的緣故。因為眾生的根機不是恒常會合，互相有所歸屬，所以多有間斷。化地菩薩因為有平等性智和觀察智，所以不需要成事智。
『常無分別』，『要集』中說：『相傳有兩種解釋。一種說法是自性法身是凝然常住的，受用身和變化身都是無常的。另一種說法是三身（法身、報身、化身）都是凝然常住的，說無常是根據化身示現的緣故。』 兩家都廣泛地用道理來成立自己的觀點。最後斷定說：『以上兩種解釋都應道理。』 現在我認為必定沒有兩種都應道理的情況，因為互相違背的緣故。原本的說法雖然簡略，但已經把道理說盡了。應該依據《攝大乘論》、《金光明經》、《無上依經》、《楞伽經》等，說報身和化身是無常的，作為最終的道理。經中說常，經和論文都會自己解釋清楚。
論中說：『同能變識，俱善無漏等』，先說第八識（阿賴耶識）有漏和無漏的分別。無漏的能緣和所緣都是無漏的，因為是純粹的無漏種子所生。再說三種性質的分別，能緣和所緣都是善的，因為是純粹的善種子所生。這是就親近的相來說的。 三界（欲界、色界、無色界）的繫縛和不繫縛的對應，能緣和所緣都是不繫縛的。這也是就親近的相來說的。 像這樣，各種識都是根據因果的地位來說的。
【English Translation】 English version The 'Accomplishing Wisdom' (Chengshi Zhi, wisdom of accomplishing deeds) is often interrupted. Ximing explains: 'Because of the arising of intention (zuoyi, mental activity), there are interruptions.' Some explanations suggest: 'Because the conditions for what is being cognized are incomplete.' Also, because 'discriminating faculties' (fenbie gen, sensory organs capable of distinguishing things) and 'intention' are required for arising, it is not constantly continuous. 'Yaoji' states: 'It must be through intention.' However, this is the intention of the original vow, not referring to the Buddha-fruit. It means that due to the original vow, when the faculties of sentient beings mature, Buddhas and Bodhisattvas manifest accordingly. The maturation of sentient beings' faculties is not constant, so the matter of intention is interrupted.' 'Yaoji' further states: 'Due to the power of consciousness, the five consciousnesses (wushi, eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, body-consciousness) can arise. The intention of consciousness can give rise to Accomplishing Wisdom. Following the circumstances, there is no other intention. The five consciousnesses must rely on something to arise.' It means that when the faculties of the beings to be taught mature, the intention that follows the circumstances can evoke the five consciousnesses. The maturation of faculties is not constant, so the evocation of the five consciousnesses has arising and non-arising. It must rely on the faculties and objects, so it is said that although there are two explanations, the reasoning is difficult to determine.' Now I believe that if it relies on faculties and objects to arise, then since wisdom universally cognizes, why are the conditions for what is being cognized incomplete? It is only because the Accomplishing Wisdom of the Buddha-fruit cognizes the realm, not hoping for the arising of the realm of the five dusts (wuchen, form, sound, smell, taste, touch), but only hoping to liberate sentient beings, because the desire to liberate has not ceased. Because the faculties of sentient beings do not constantly meet, and are mutually related, there are many interruptions. Bodhisattvas of the Transformation Ground do not need Accomplishing Wisdom because they have the Wisdom of Equality and the Wisdom of Observation.
'Constantly without discrimination,' 'Yaoji' states: 'There are two transmitted explanations. One explanation is that the self-nature Dharmakaya (faxin, body of the law) is solidified and constant, while the Reward Body (shouyong shen) and Transformation Body (bianhua shen) are impermanent. The other explanation is that the Three Bodies (sanshen, Dharmakaya, Sambhogakaya, Nirmanakaya) are all solidified and constant, and saying impermanent is because of the manifestation of the Transformation Body.' Both sides extensively establish their views with reasoning. Now I believe that there cannot be two cases that are both reasonable, because they contradict each other. Although the original statement is brief, it has exhausted the reasoning. One should rely on the 'Compendium of the Mahayana,' the 'Golden Light Sutra,' the 'Supreme Reliance Sutra,' the 'Lankavatara Sutra,' etc., to say that the Reward Body and Transformation Body are impermanent, as the ultimate reasoning. When the sutra says constant, the sutra and treatises will explain it themselves.
The treatise says: 'The same transforming consciousness, all good and without outflows, etc.' First, the eighth consciousness (alaya-vijnana, alaya consciousness) is distinguished between with outflows and without outflows. The cognizer and the cognized of the outflow-free are both outflow-free, because they are born from pure outflow-free seeds. Then, the three natures are distinguished, the cognizer and the cognized are both good, because they are born from pure good seeds. This is speaking of the close aspect. The correspondence between the bound and unbound of the Three Realms (sanjie, desire realm, form realm, formless realm), the cognizer and the cognized are both unbound. This is also speaking of the close aspect. Like this, the various consciousnesses are all spoken of according to the position of cause and effect.
。諸門辨釋親疏能所緣準理可悉。
唯識深法義 非凡智所思 佛菩薩能知 今形量為失
成唯識論了義燈卷第七(末終)
【現代漢語翻譯】 現代漢語譯本：各種法門的辨析，親疏、能所、緣起的準則，依據道理都可以明白。
唯識的深奧法義，不是凡夫的智慧所能思量的。 只有佛和菩薩才能瞭解，現在用比量來衡量，就會有所缺失。
《成唯識論了義燈》第七卷（結束）
【English Translation】 English version: The distinctions of all Dharmas (phenomena), the principles of close and distant relationships, the capable and the caused, and dependent origination can all be understood according to reason.
The profound Dharma (teachings) of Vijnaptimatrata (Consciousness-only) is not something that ordinary wisdom can comprehend. Only Buddhas and Bodhisattvas can understand it. Now, using inference to measure it will lead to shortcomings.
Completion of the seventh volume of the Cheng Weishi Lun Liao Yi Deng (Commentary on the Meaning of the Establishing Consciousness-only Treatise)